The Rise and Fall of Tutelary Democracy in Turkey

Geoffrey Landor Gordon
Charlottesville, VA

M.Sc., London School of Economics, 2011
B.A., New College of Florida, 2009

A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of
Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Politics

University of Virginia
December, 2023

Committee:

Carol Mershon (chair)
John Echeverri-Gent
Robert Fatton
Adam Slez (Sociology)
George Lawson (Australian
 National University)

Abstract

What do military actors hope to achieve when they take power, reorganize political institutions, and then return power to civilians? This dissertation provides a historical perspective to recent debates about the causes and effects of transitions to democracy following military coups and brief interregnums. As a country that has experienced a higher number of military coups than economic and social structural variables would suggest without a consolidated military dictatorship, Turkey provides a useful vantage point for developing a theory that links civil-military relations, endogenous institutions, and patterns of democratic breakdown.

I use the concept of tutelary democracy to describe the combination of competitive, multiparty politics and fair elections with efforts by military and other state elites to monopolize symbolic power. These state elites seek to establish the parameters of political debate by concentrating the authority to define the interests, identity, and boundaries of the political community. Concretely, this means propagating national myths that define the boundaries of the 'the people' that the state rules in the name of, establishing narratives that establish the people's claim to control the state's territory, and constructing the objectives or benchmarks that orient the state's administrative, pedagogical, and coercive practices. Tutelary democracy arises when geopolitical and historical conditions make state sovereignty and security contingent on domestic institutions, policies, and cultural practices. Elites then use their control over institutional design and the state's ideological and repressive apparatuses to defend the hegemony of their articulation of national identity, interests, and boundaries by policing the speech and conduct of parties, social movements, and other political actors.

I focus on two challenges of institutional design and enforcement that military and other state elites face as they try to establish the parameters of political debate while still allowing elected

civilian politicians to govern on a day-to-day basis. First, in the choice of electoral rules, elite institutional engineers face a catch-22: repressive electoral rules tend to create majority parties that can use their legislative power to articulate a competing state project, but permissive electoral rules create fragmented coalition governments and legislative stalemate while providing small extremist parties with access to cabinet seats and state resources. I show how elites involved in processes of institutional design alternated back and forth between permissive and restrictive electoral rules in response to the most recent form of crisis, creating unintended consequences that undermined political stability.

The second challenge facing state elites in tutelary democracy concerns enforcement: in order for members of the judiciary, bureaucracy, and security state to police the boundaries of acceptable political discourse, they need to agree on how to distinguish between legitimate and subversive political practice. However, the divergent evolution of norms and internal competitions within these institutional fields resulted in classification struggles between judges, lawyers, military officers, and other state officials over which actions constituted threats to national security and what responses the state should take to these actions. Recurring classification struggles resulted in the gradual construction of a parallel state structure that concentrated the authority to define "what is what" in the hands of military elites by giving them influence of personnel decisions and regulatory choices across a wide range of state institutions. However, divergent perceptions of whether the AKP government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan qualified as a security threat and what measures the state should take against it among military elites prevented them from taking action against a party that sought to fundamentally alter the nature and purposes of state power.

This project highlights the importance of elite projects – and the resistance that they provoke – for long-term trajectories of political development. Furthermore, it shows how norms that define the appropriate purposes of state power and rank countries according to perceptions of cultural and economic development can have unintended negative consequences for democratization even when powerful states promote free and fair elections. Finally, the project demonstrates how difficult it is for elites to "game democracy" using institutional design. Uncertainty and miscalculations repeatedly give rise to unintended consequences and unwanted conflicts.

Acknowledgements

This project would not have reached its conclusion without the patience and support of my advisor Carol Mershon. Although we have very different orientations to political science, Carol maintained an open mind while also pushing me to write more clearly and concisely. Her course on comparative political institutions sparked my interest in endogenous institutional choices and their consequences for democratic consolidation and breakdown. I also appreciate George Lawson's active participation as an external committee member. His generous comments on multiple chapters gave me confidence in the project's value. It amazes me that he agreed to join the committee of a graduate student on a different continent who he only met through a podcast interview. I also appreciate the feedback and support of Robert Fatton and John Echeverri-Gent, their perspectives and suggestions made this a better product. Finally, I want to acknowledge David Waldner's influence on this project. Throw-away comments that he made about Marxist state theory stuck with me and changed the direction of this project, and he suggested that I choose Turkey as a case during the prospectus phase.

Over the course of my time in Charlottesville, I have had the pleasure of working alongside a number of great people who happen to be excellent scholars as well. Brittany Leach deserves special recognition. She introduced me to political theory, and our conversations about articulation theory and Laclau and Mouffe had important ramifications for this project. Anthony, Danilo, Dan, Bob, Chelsea, Jeff, Aycan, Jen, Alexis, Ben, John, and Theo also deserve recognition for their friendship and support over the years. The Jefferson Foundation also provided me with an opportunity to meet some wonderful people from across the university.

Outside of the university, I want to thank Michael, Becky, and the coaches and athletes at Solidarity CrossFit. They helped me make major changes in my life, and showed me that I can do

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

What do militaries hope to achieve when they take power and reorganize political institutions? And how do their institutional choices shape the behavior of political parties, social movements, and voters? Scholars have recognized that military coups in the post-Cold War era have been more likely to produce rapid returns to elected civilian government than long-term military dictatorships (Marinov and Goemans 2014; Derpanopoulos et al. 2016; Powell 2014; Zengin 2022; Dahl and Gleditsch 2023). However, studies of post-coup transitions to democracy have also recognized that these military officers do not simply return to the barracks when they restore civilian political authority. Instead, they seek to use formal rules and informal networks to maintain influence under the new regimes (Albertus and Menaldo 2014; 2017; Kuehn 2017; Grewal and Kureshi 2019; Self 2022). What these officers hope to achieve by "ruling without governing" (Cook 2007), and how these objectives influence their institutional choices and the strategies of other actors, are important questions for understanding this new era of "coups for democracy" (Marinov and Goemans 2014).

This dissertation seeks to answer these questions by examining three cycles of democratic transition, political instability, and democratic breakdown in Turkey's post-World War II history. The case studies examine the choices of military officers and political leaders during moments of institutional choice (or non-choice) during regime interregnums, and the interactions between civilian and military officers during subsequent democratic spells, with an eye towards understanding the strategies that military officers use to maintain their influence during periods of nominal civilian authority – as well as the limits to those strategies. Furthermore, this study's longitudinal approach allows us to see how the historical legacies of the country's founding period

shaped the perceptions and strategies of military actors. This study also examines how changes in the international system from the founding of the Republic in the wake of World War I through the interwar, Cold War, and Global War on Terror conjunctures shaped the incentives, preferences, and beliefs of both military and civilian actors. Turkey's unique history of repeated military coups followed by institutional changes and returns to civilian authority allows us to see both the persistent causes of social conflict and conjunctural factors that shape the strategies of military and civilian actors in countries that are prone to military interventions in politics.

To examine why some countries are more prone to military interventions in politics than others, I begin by developing a new conceptualization of tutelary democracy. Many scholars have used the word 'tutelary' to describe regimes in which military officers exercise formal or informal oversight over elected civilian leaders in Turkey and elsewhere. However, these scholars almost never elaborate on what makes militaries or other collective actors in these cases 'tutelary.' Drawing on cultural theories of state formation and agonistic and deliberative approaches to democratic theory, I conceptualize tutelary democracy as a regime type that combines competitive multiparty elections with the concentration of symbolic power in the institutions of the state. Tutelary democracy allows citizens to choose their political leaders while prohibiting political parties, social movements, and other collective actors from challenging officially sanctioned definitions of national identity, interests, and boundaries.

In other words, military actors in tutelary democracies aim to control the process of political socialization – they want to become the sole 'tutors' of their citizens. Military, policy, intelligence, judicial, and other state actors use a variety of strategies, including institutional design, discursive practices, the creation of separate legal systems for cases related to national security, extra-judicial killings, and military coups followed by temporary interregnums, to police

the boundaries of acceptable political discourse without completely eliminating competitive elections or arrogating day-to-day decision-making responsibilities to themselves.

I then examine the structural and historical factors that have made the emergence of tutelary democracy more likely in some settings than in others. I argue that tutelary democracy emerges under conditions that make external sovereignty and international status dependent on domestic political institutions, economic policies, and cultural uniformity. International hierarchy, histories of territorial contestation, and histories of symbolic and/or social revolutions make military actors more likely to understand political, economic, and cultural development as keys to national security. International hierarchies make external recognition of sovereignty and access to scarce club goods like capital, markets, and military resources depend on the adoption of particular institutions, policies, and cultural norms that may not have widespread popularity domestically. Histories of territorial contestation make military actors more likely to view ethnic, racial, and religious minorities as potential internal enemies, leading to exclusionary policies, armed resistance, and campaigns of militarized pacification. And histories of revolutionary upheaval give rise to counter-hegemonic political projects that threaten to undermine political order and geopolitical status. Each of these historical and geopolitical factors make it more likely that military actors will view the defense of a contingent articulation of national identity, interests, and boundaries as critical to national security because they tend to call into question or erode the boundary between the foreign and the domestic that militaries are established to defend.

After explaining *why* military actors intervene in political and civil society, I turn to examining *how* they exercise influence without constructing a durable military regime. In particular, I examine how military officers and their political and judicial allies used institutional design to achieve their political objectives. Examining processes of institutional choice during

regime interregnums, I show how elite institutional engineers had divergent institutional preferences despite sharing a common secular, ethnonationalist, and developmentalist understanding of Turkish national identity and interests. I refer to the group of actors involved in processes of constitutional deliberation and institutional choice as elite institutional engineers to highlight their prominent positions in the legal, academic, and military fields and their common desire to use institutional design to achieve broader political objectives. Yet the heterogeneous backgrounds and priorities of these elite institutional engineers resulted in the construction of political orders that contained numerous internal tensions, contradictions, and trade-offs.

Regarding the choice of electoral rules, I argue that elite institutional engineers faced a paradox: any government that was strong enough to enact ambitious social modernization programs also had the capacity to promote their own articulations of national identity and interests. As long as the strongest parties adhered to the principles of the nation-building project promoted by military officers, this was a non-issue. But when parties took power that promoted alternative nation-building projects, or when institutional engineers opted for constitutions that produced weak civilian governments, political instability ensued, resulting in military coups and institutional replacement. By contrast, when elite institutional engineers chose permissive electoral rules, they created a favorable political opportunity structure for ideological parties rooted in social movements to gain influence. In the 1960s and 1970s, proportional representation lowered entry costs for parties of the extreme right, who then managed to draw supporters away from the center-right Justice Party. The fragmentation of the party system gave rise to unstable mutli-party coalition governments that gave Islamist and far-right nationalist parties access to key cabinet portfolios and financial resources that they used to promote their agendas and extra-parliamentary activities.

In addition to electoral rules, I also examine attempts to construct institutions that could coordinate the classification of legitimate and illegitimate political conduct across the range of institutions that comprise the state. Policing the activities of political parties, social movements, media outlets, educators, and other individual or collective actors to ensure that they do not articulate political programs that conflict with the officially sanctioned understanding of national identity, interests, and boundaries constitutes a core function of tutelary political regimes. However, in order for state actors to police the boundaries of acceptable political discourse they need to agree on what concrete practices constitute violations of these abstract principles (Norton 2014; Emmenegger 2021). The monitoring and enforcement of the boundaries of acceptable political discourse involves the coordination of a complex network of actors to collectively produce the distinctions between, for example, loyal or subversive opposition behavior and moderate or reactionary religious practices (Norton 2014, 1537–38). Because judicial, police, military, educational, and other actors are situated in distinct social fields with their own professional norms, taken-for-granted assumptions about the world, internal divisions, and linkages to other social groups and institutions, their interpretations of the boundaries of acceptable political discourse will likely vary. These discordant ways of translating abstract principles into concrete acts of enforcement can give rise to classification struggles between different arms of the state, with security forces working outside of the law when they perceive that judges and lawyers have gone soft on internal threats to security.

Over the course of the period examined in this project, I show that military actors attempted to resolve classification struggles with politicians, judges, academics, and other actors by circumventing legal restrictions on their activities and by creating parallel state structures that concentrated the capacity to say "what is what" in their hands. When judicial and political actors

attempted to limit the prerogatives of military actors and other members of the security state, they operated outside of the law by collaborating with far-right paramilitary organizations and organized crime groups in order to harass and eliminate left-wing, Kurdish, and Islamist political activists. They also used institutional changes following military interventions to construct parallel legal apparatuses for cases that they classified as relevant to national security. Most importantly, they introduced and gradually strengthened the National Security Council, which allowed military leaders to issue advice and warnings to elected leaders, oversee the development of school curricula, and influence personnel decisions in bureaucracies related to political subjectivity formation. Military actors – especially senior military leaders – concentrated the power to define the limits of acceptable political discourse in their hands as a response to persistent classification struggles over the definition of national interests, identity, and boundaries.

The final part of the analysis examines how the Justice and Development Party government succeeded in destroying the institutional basis of military authority and undermining the autonomy of the officer corps. My analysis points to a concatenation of international and institutional factors that allowed the AKP to succeed in their effort to replace the tutelary regime. First, the politics of accession to the European Union created exogenous pressure for reforms that undermined the constitutional authority of the military by weakening the National Security Council (Sarigil 2007; Satana 2008; Gürsoy 2011). Secondly, in the post-9/11 context, the Bush Administration in the United States held the AKP up as a model of a moderate Islamist political party (Tuğal 2016). Military officers thus could not count on US support for a coup attempt, in contrast to earlier episodes of civil-military strife. Thirdly, the electoral rules created by the 1982 coup and the effects of the economic crisis of 2000-01 on support for other party meant that the AKP could govern as a single party despite having just a plurality of popular votes in its first election. Whereas military

officers could pressure minority coalition partners in previous governments to abandon governments that threatened its power in the past, the strong single party government that emerged in the 2000s proved impossible to dislodge.

1.1: Research design: case selection and use of sources

Here I outline and motivate the research design I use to evaluate my new theoretical framework for understanding elite-led democratization, civil-military relations, and regime transitions. I begin by explaining why Turkey provides a particularly valuable setting for examining the origins and dynamics of tutelary democracy. I also defend my periodization scheme, which breaks the country's history of democratization up into three spells, and which traces the end of the tutelary regime to the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer scandals of 2011-12. Then I discuss how I selected and used the works of historians and other social scientists, which constituted the main research sources for this project.

<u>Case selection and periodization</u>

In comparative politics, the choice of country case(s) is a basic element of research design. Whereas representative cases provide the best settings for testing causal hypotheses and estimating treatment effects (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Seawright and Gerring 2008; Herron and Quinn 2016), deviant or exceptional cases are valuable for studies that aim to examine scope conditions of existing theories, reconceptualize objects of political analysis, and develop new hypotheses (Emigh 1997; Ermakoff 2014; Bennett 2022; Pacewicz 2022). Choosing a country with an exceptional history of military interventions in politics makes sense for this project because I am interested in rethinking core concepts in civil-military relations and developing new hypotheses. Furthermore, actors' interpretations of events in earlier historical periods are important aspects of the theory developed in this project. Thus, I seek a country case in which I can conduct

a longitudinal research design to allow examination of how and how much earlier iterations of civil-military conflict and party competition have shaped the expectations, preferences, and resource endowments of actors in subsequent periods.

Turkey therefore provides a useful setting for examining elite-led democratization and its consequences over time because of its deviation from the expectations of established theories of democratization and military coups, and because of its repeated episodes of elite-led democratization. Turkey's unsettled path of democratization despite its relatively high levels of socioeconomic development, urbanization, and education and its modest levels of landholding inequality make it a deviant case from the perspective several prominent theoretical perspectives in democratization studies (Svolik 2015; Sarfati 2017). While agrarian reform and land hunger have constituted important issues in Turkish politics over the course of the 20th century, outside of the Kurdish-dominated southeast, landholding inequality has historically been modest (Waldner 1999; Jacoby 2006). The country has lacked the sort of absentee rentier landholding class that has opposed democratic movements in theories and histories of democratization in Latin America and Europe (Albertus 2017; M. Bernhard 2001; Moore 1966; Ziblatt 2008; 2017). The country has also experienced democratic failures under a range of institutional arrangements, defying theories that link executive structure (Linz 1990) or electoral rules (Meisburger 2012; Reynolds and Carey 2012) to democratic breakdown or consolidation. The close relationship between secessionism and military interventions in Turkish history would seem to confirm Rustow's (1970) view that agreement about the boundaries of the political community constitutes a structural prerequisite for democratization. However, a closer examination of the historical record demonstrates that secessionism is as much a consequence of authoritarianism and militarism as it is a cause. Turkey's

chronic political instability (M. Bernhard 2015), despite the relative paucity of structural barriers to democratization that the literature has identified, make it a valuable case for theory development.

Additionally, Turkey's repeated episodes of elite-led democratization make it a valuable setting for theorizing about how history shapes the strategies of military and civilian political actors. Each episode of institutional choice or non-choice in Turkish political history has featured different sets of actors with varying agendas, and with interpretations of past experiences that affected their strategies in different ways. Yet in each case actors had no intention of replacing the constitution that they were writing (or choosing to keep in place) in the future. Thus, I employ Haydu's (2010) explanatory model for historical case studies, which conceives of successive historical periods as contrasting solutions to recurrent problems. This approach combines comparisons of different periods, which direct our attention to contingent contextual features that shape actors' decisions and strategies, with narratives of causal sequences that span multiple periods, which highlight persistent structural factors that repeatedly constrain political actors. Furthermore, this approach allows us to see how actors' own narratives of the past shape their strategies. This hybrid research design highlights both the time-varying conjunctural factors that shape elite strategies for maintaining their power during transitions to democracy and the relatively time-invariant structural factors that produce unintended consequences and ultimately undermine their efforts.

Longitudinal historical case studies also raise the question of how to divide the period under examination into comparable units. While my research interest in examining the consequences of institutional changes that followed military coups limited the range of periodization options, I still had to exercise discretion in determining what kinds of military interventions and institutional changes constituted breakpoints between spells. Military leaders

forced elected leaders to resign during the 1971 memorandum coup and the February 28th Process of 1997-98, yet I did not consider them events that ended democratic spells because they did not result in wholesale constitutional replacements. Instead, dividing Turkey's trajectory of regime formation into three spells (1950-60, 1960-1980, and 1980-2011) allows me to see how uncertainty during periods of regime change and institutional transformation shaped actors' choices, and then to explore how those institutional changes shaped political dynamics in subsequent periods of competitive electoral politics.

Another periodization dilemma concerned when to date the end of tutelary democracy. While few scholars would regard Turkey's current regime as a liberal democracy, the question of when elections ceased to be free and fair or when (or whether) the tutelary structures were eliminated are politically charged and not easily resolvable (Tansel 2018). Democratic backsliding is so hard to measure precisely because actions that eliminate constraints on the power of elected political leaders also have a strong democratizing edge because they eliminate obstacles to majoritarian conceptions of popular sovereignty (Bermeo 2016). The AKP government's time in power constitutes a prime example of this dynamic: Turks from across the political spectrum and many external observers viewed its adoption of policies that limited the powers of the National Security Council and undermined the autonomy of the military leadership as democratizing reforms (Tuğal 2016). Additionally, the AKP government has used the state's concentration of symbolic power – a legacy decades of military coups and elite institutional engineering – to promote its neo-Ottomanist, patriarchal, and neoliberal state agenda (Gökarıksel, Neubert, and Smith 2019; Yavuz 2020; I. Yilmaz 2021; Kocabıçak 2023) Finally, the coup attempt of 2016 had clear echoes of earlier military interventions. There are few clear answers about when democracy died, and when (or whether) it lost its tutelary character.

Ultimately, I decided that the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases of 2010-11, the ensuing purge of the military leadership, and constitutional changes that eroded the independence of the judiciary in 2010 jointly brought about the end of tutelary democracy. The military and the courts constituted the two key sources of tutelary power within the Turkish state during the third spell. The reforms and purges of this period undermined the autonomy of these institutions, even if they did not eliminate the sense that these organizations had unique historical objectives among individuals within these fields. Many scholars regard the crackdown on independent media and freedom of association that followed the Gezi Park uprisings in 2013 as the point when Turkey crossed the threshold into competitive authoritarianism (e.g., Esen and Gumuscu 2016; Bayulgen, Arbatli, and Canbolat 2018; Arslanalp and Erkmen 2020), but I think that the absence of autonomous sources of power in the courts and the security state conditioned the government's response to this crisis. Finally, scholars and journalists who investigated the causes of the 2016 coup attempt trace its origins to conflicts within the Islamist movement, rather than to the type of conflict between elected leaders and autonomous, tutelary military elites that characterized earlier military interventions (Filkins 2016; Yavuz 2018; Yavuz and Balci 2018; Waldman and Caliskan 2020). While I am sympathetic to scholars who see continuities between the current single-party authoritarian regime and the tutelary period insofar as they both seek to monopolize symbolic power in order to produce desired citizens (e.g., I. Yilmaz 2021), I chose 2010-11 to mark the end-date of tutelary democracy because the purges and reforms adopted during these years undermined the articulation between competitive electoral politics and tutelary state authority that constituted the object of investigation for this project.

The longitudinal study of a deviant case provides a valuable setting for developing new hypotheses about conjunctural factors that shape elite institutional design decisions during

democratic transitions, structural factors that impede democratic consolidation, and conceptual problems that weaken extant theories of democratization and civil-military relations. The lack of generalizability is, of course, a drawback of any study that focuses on a single case. Only iterative hypothesis testing across a wide range of cases can demonstrate the strength or weaknesses of the causal processes that I highlight in this study and uncover scope conditions that either activate or repress causal mechanisms (Seawright 2021). However, by developing new context-independent descriptions of tutelary political regimes and militaries, this study has generated knowledge that can inform research on other cases that have experienced catch-up development under autocratic or hybrid regimes and repeated military interventions in politics (Pacewicz 2022).

Use of secondary sources

Sources used in research shape a study's content and conclusions. I had to rely on English-language secondary sources to conduct the bulk of the research for this project. The inability to understand what Turkish scholars and political actors say in their own language about their own history is a significant drawback. Furthermore, Turkish and international political circumstances relevant to the topic of this study undoubtedly shape English-language scholarship on Turkish politics and history. The sociological backgrounds common to Turkish scholars who receive English-language educations and publish in English likely constitutes a source of bias in the literature, although to my knowledge no systematic research has been conducted to examine the direction, extent, and historical or geographical variation of this selection effect. Furthermore, European and American scholarship on the Islamic world has a well-known history of bias (Said 1978; Lockman 2009).

That being said, my social, scholarly, and political backgrounds led me to study Turkish history with a distinct set of theoretical questions and empirical comparisons in mind. Narratives

of European and American history that erase, downplay, or ignore histories of racism, imperialism, settler colonialism, exploitation, and political violence have shaped the research questions and theoretical answers that have driven comparative research on the non-Western world (Chakrabarty 2008; Go 2016; Bhambra and Holmwood 2021). My anti-racist and anti-colonialist political commitments led me to see the theoretical importance of the erasure or whitewashing of settler colonialism and racism from extant research on civil-military relations and democratization, and to receive foundational narratives about inter-ethnic relations with a degree of skepticism. This project joins a wave of recent research in Turkish studies that employs concepts from Critical Race Theory in order to think differently about Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question (e.g., Ergin 2008; 2017; Demir 2014; Ünlü 2016; Kurt 2021). Social scientists' personal and political backgrounds can bias research questions and findings, but they can also inspire novel approaches to longstanding questions.

My procedure for using sources consisted of tacking back and forth between empirical studies and more general works of political and social theory as I observed events and processes that extant research could not explain. I used other bodies of theoretical work to try to make sense of my observations, and then tested my provisional hypotheses with more empirical research. As I conducted research on different periods of Turkish history, I sought out sources from a wide range of disciplinary, theoretical, and political standpoints. I aimed for saturation, which is the point at which reading additional studies on a given topic yielded diminishing marginal returns in terms of new evidence or arguments (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).

I used three major criteria for determining which sources were the most valid or reliable. The first criterion regards internal consistency and the handling of evidence, fundamental in assessing secondary sources. Key questions are: does the author's argument logically follow from

their premises, and does their evidence genuinely support their assertions? Are there other possible ways of interpreting their findings? Second, I sought to rely on studies that used archival, interview, or other primary sources rather than relying on secondary sources. While historical syntheses were particularly valuable in the early stages of research for learning about the most important events in Turkish history, they quickly became less useful as I found studies that dove deeper into specific events or actors using primary source material. Third, I sought a balance between micro-level and macro-level sources. I also had to think about how to handle sources that focused on particular regions, cities, or even neighborhoods: while these studies could often highlight aspects of politics that more macro-level studies could not see, that level of detail came at the expense of generality. However, one of the findings that emerged from this study was the spatial unevenness of Turkish state formation, with different neighborhoods within large cities having much different relationships with legal institutions, security forces, and political parties. That would have been impossible to see or think about if I had dismissed evidence from micro-level studies altogether.

<div align="center">Selection bias</div>

Still another important consideration for evaluating the utility of different sources was the theoretical or political background assumptions that guided an author's analysis. A particular area of concern in the literature on the use of secondary sources in historical social science is the threat of selection bias, which in this context entails only using sources that support one's theoretical or political perspective (Lustick 1996; Møller and Skaaning 2021). While I certainly agree that assessing an author's theoretical and/or political perspective is an important aspect of employing secondary sources for historical research, the extant methodological guidance in political science is both misleading and inadequate. Advice that researchers should randomly sample from the

secondary literature (Lustick 1996), or that they should prioritize sources that adhere to political scientists' common operationalizations of variables and are "relatively atheoretical" (Møller and Skaaning 2021), ignore the theory-laden nature of social science observations and the contextual (i.e. non-cognitive) factors that influence the choice of theories and indicators in political research (Fuhse 2022).

Thus, instead of searching for sources that provided a mythical "view from nowhere," I actively sought out sources that had conflicting political and theoretical perspectives in the hopes that these studies could not only inform me about the topics of their research, but about the competing worldviews at play in Turkish and international politics. I found it valuable to read sources that were sympathetic to Islamist or left-wing or Kemalist political movements because they taught me something valuable about those worldviews, even if I found their analyses to be logically inconsistent or their use of evidence unconvincing. Furthermore, studies by anthropologists, geographers, and sociologists that employed conceptualizations of democracy, civilian control of the military, the rule of law, and other objects of political analysis that differed from mainstream political science allowed me to see the importance of events, actors, and processes that political scientists routinely misapprehend, downplay, or ignore. For the purposes of theory-building, reading empirical work by scholars operating in different disciplinary or theoretical traditions provided a source of inspiration that prodded me to question assumptions that I had taken for granted because of my training as a political scientist. Standpoint plurality served as my loadstar, rather than standpoint neutrality.

Furthermore, in their focus on sources of bias at the level of the individual researcher, methodological guidance on the use of secondary sources ignores systemic sources of bias that affect broader research communities. Turkish political and military actors have sought from the

beginning of the Republic to shape scholarly understandings of the country's history, guiding principles, and social conditions. While Turkish studies is a vibrant interdisciplinary field consisting of scholars working in a wide range of institutional, theoretical, and political settings, certain myths or blind spots continue to shape dominant narratives of Turkish history. This is particularly true when it comes to the Kurds, who are marginalized in narratives of Turkish history. The common assertion that Turkish citizenship is exclusionary towards Christians by inclusive towards Muslims (e.g., Çağaptay 2006; Eligür 2019), for example, ignores the long history of anti-Kurdish state and non-state violence (Ünlü 2016; Kurt 2021).

Additionally, trying to come to terms with the different religious movements that have gained prominence in Turkish society has been like walking through a hall of mirrors. The positive scholarly and media attention that Fethullah Gulen received in the United States, including from eminent scholars of Turkish politics like M. Hakan Yavuz (Yavuz and Esposito 2003), in the years before the 2016 coup attempt that he masterminded exemplifies the difficulties of coming to terms with political movements and actors that aim to control the narrative. Gulen's narrative offensive, in turn, was so effective because of the power that the moderate/extremist dichotomy continues to hold in US political and academic discourse about the Muslim world. Believing that any particular perspective on Turkish politics or history captures the atheoretical or objective truth risks uncritically accepting the self-representations of political actors and social movements. Standpoint pluralism is the only conceivable alternative.

Rather than searching in vain for apolitical or atheoretical sources, I aimed to pit competing theoretical and political perspectives against each other and determine which interpretations were the most persuasive based on internal consistency, convincing use of evidence, and access to particularly valuable or novel sources of evidence. While my process of repeatedly tacking back

and forth between theory and evidence breaks from the idealized understanding of the scientific process that underlies much methodological advice in political science, recent studies have highlighted how, in practice, social scientists routinely intertwine the practices of theorizing and doing empirical research (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2013; Tavory and Timmermans 2014; Yom 2015; Rubin 2021). As a situated researcher with background assumptions shaped by my training and socialization, I used the opportunity presented by the exposure to different theoretical and political perspectives to identify and challenge my own biases.

1.2: Map of the dissertation and its significance

I now offer a brief outline of the chapters that follow. In the next chapter, I review the literatures on civil-military relations and democratization. I argue that civil-military relations research's focus on interactions between military and political leaders in the context of security threats posed by the militaries of other nation-states limits its ability to explain the dynamics of tutelary democracy. At the same time, historical institutionalist approaches to democratization studies have largely neglected the role that militaries have played in struggles over regime change, whereas structuralist approaches have treated military actors as agents of other social groups, particularly ethnic or economic groups. Understanding tutelary democracy requires viewing the military as a relatively autonomous institution that is concerned not only with defending the territorial state against external threats, but also with fabricating social order and improving the state's status in the hierarchical international order.

Following the literature review, I develop an institutionalist theory of the dynamics of tutelary democracy. An adequate theory of tutelary democracy needs to explain a) why military actors become involved in debates over national identity, interests, and boundaries, b) how the military's nation-building and subject-forming objectives shaped the institutional choices of

military actors during regime interregnums, and c) how those institutional choices affected civil-military interactions during subsequent democratic spells. The framework that I develop to answer these questions synthesizes theoretical perspectives from historical international relations, historical institutionalism, and political articulation theory.

The empirical core of the project begins with an examination of the historical circumstances that led Turkish political and military leaders to advance a state project that centered around cultural homogenization, secularization, and economic and cultural modernization. Then I examine civil-military relations during three democratic spells, each of which begins with a period of institutional choice and ends with an authoritarian transition: 1950-1960, 1961-1980, 1983-2011. The periods between these spells (1960-61 and 1980-83) are what I refer to as regime interregnums: periods when military officers and their political and judicial allies reconstructed political institutions. I examine how institutional choices reflected conflicting objectives, internal splits within the coup coalition, and attempts to learn lessons from previous spells. I then examine how civilian political actors responded to the incentives created by the new institutional arrangements, and to the ever-present threat of interventions by military actors (including those that fall short of coup attempts). Finally, I explain why each spell ended in a military coup, an episode of executive aggrandizement, or — in the case of the 1950-1960 coup — both.

Chapter 2: The significance of the project, then, is that it advances research on democratization and civil-military relations by developing a new theoretical framework for analyzing why military actors intervene in democratic processes. Rather than starting from the premise that the military is the arm of the coercive apparatus of the state that is primarily responsible for external security, the approach adopted in this project shows how military actors produce the boundaries of the political community through their administrative, discursive, and coercive practices. Civil-military conflict arises when military officers, political parties, and social movements advance conflicting nation-building projects, not when civilian or military actors overstep boundaries that derive from functional differentiation (cf. Huntington 1957). Militaries, Social Structures, and Democratization

Extant research on civil-military relations and democratization in political science suffers from several conceptual inadequacies, theoretical blind-spots, and empirical shortcomings. As a point of departure for the rest of the project, this chapter will highlight some key problems that hinder our understanding of what militaries hope to achieve when they undertake temporary seizures of power and reorganize political institutions before handing power back to civilians. I focus on three main subsets of research on the role of militaries in long-term trajectories of regime formation.

First, I focus on the conceptual and theoretical presuppositions that guide research on civil-military relations. I argue that the civil-military relations literature takes the existence of nation-

states with uniform territorial jurisdictions, established geopolitical borders, and stable social boundaries for granted as the foundational units of world politics. Consequently, scholarship tends to overlook the historical contingency of the nation-state form and the role of military actors in producing national populations and territories. Instead, scholars tend to treat military coups and other forms of military involvement in 'domestic' politics as aberrational features of authoritarian regimes and weak states, or as the results of rent-seeking strategies by military elites. In doing so, they overlook the importance of state- and nation-building to the political objectives of military actors.

Secondly, I examine the role that military actors play in structuralist theories of democratization. I focus on structuralist theories, in particular, because of their focus on long-term patterns of regime (trans)formation. I make two arguments in this section. First, structuralist theories tend to treat military actors as agents of other social groups or forces, ignoring the autonomous political objectives that military actors pursue when they intervene in politics. Secondly, structuralist theories of democratization have tended to treat class and identity as separate, competing explanations for patterns of regime formation. As a result, they ignore the material underpinnings of ethnic conflicts as well as the mediating role of moral discourses and cultural schemas in the relationship between inequality and democratization. Bringing these points together, I argue that understanding why military actors intervene in politics requires examining how material conflicts related to nation-building and state-formation shape the political objectives of military actors.

Finally, I situate this study in the emerging literature on authoritarian-led democratization (Riedl et al. 2020). I argue that scholars of authoritarian-led transitions to democracy overestimate the capacity of political and military actors to foresee the consequences of their institutional

choices. Consequently, the literature has yet to examine how authoritarian elites respond to unforeseen developments after transitions to democracy, such as the rise to power of antagonistic social forces or the fragmentation of the authoritarian elite itself. This study addresses this gap in the literature by theorizing about why authoritarian political and military elites miscalculate in their strategies for "gaming democracy" (Albertus and Menaldo 2014), and examining the strategies these actors use to restore elite-biased equilibria after oppositional forces gain power.

2.1: Methodological nationalism in civil-military relations

Scholars of civil-military relations typically think of the military as the actor within a state's coercive apparatus "that is formally mandated to defend against foreign threats" (R. A. Brooks 2019, 380). While militaries "may also have internal security missions and participate in state-led repression," much civil-military relations theorizing focuses on the effects of foreign threats on the relationship between military officers and civilian political leaders (e.g., Mcmahon and Slantchev 2015). These works conceive of civil-military relations as a delegation problem: a population delegates authority to political leaders to maintain social order, and those political leaders delegate power to military actors to protect society against external threats (Feaver 1999). Additionally, a large body of literature inspired by the Arab Spring and its aftermath examines the conditions under which militaries remain loyal to or defect from authoritarian regimes (Makara 2013; Koehler and Albrecht 2021; Bou Nassif 2020; Holmes and Koehler 2020). All of this research rests on the presupposition that the world consists of territorially-bounded national societies with firm distinctions between insiders and outsiders, foreign and domestic policy arenas, and a corresponding division of labor between militaries and civilian police forces. Scholars attribute the participation of military actors in repression against 'domestic' actors or groups to the

country's divergence from the ideal-typical liberal nation-state form (i.e., authoritarianism, ethnic heterogeneity, or state weakness).

When scholars take the ideal-typical nation-state as the foundation for theoretical and empirical work on civil-military relations, they abstract from the violent processes through which political and military authorities have produced national populations and territories. Historically, the most common political form has been the multiethnic dynastic empire, which was characterized by legal pluralism, porous and ill-defined borders, and overlapping jurisdictions. Nation-states emerged as the result of historically contingent projects of territorial monopolization and subject formation. "Contemporary nation-states are the historical products of the use of large measures of violence to set and maintain state borders, to produce and reproduce national identities, and to define and control populations, who become understood as 'nationals'" (Adamson 2016, 21–22). States and militaries did not emerge from already existing national populations and territories. Rather, they had to produce national populations and territories through projects of ethnic cleansing and assimilation, victory in warfare against colonial powers and/or rival polities, and suppression of resistance to alien rule by internal 'others' (Adamson 2016, 21–22; Mann 2004; Moses 2021). The US army, for example, developed its institutional identity in the context of the so-called "Indian Wars" associated with the conquest of the western half of the continent (Hixson 2013; Frymer 2017) Furthermore, the widespread persistence of racially-, ethnically-, territorially-differentiated regimes of law and citizenship belies any straightforward teleological meta-narrative positing a worldwide shift from empire to nation-state (Kumar 2010; Mueller 2016; Malešević 2017b; Go 2017; McCann and Kahraman 2021). Militaries do not just protect the boundaries of the state, they produce those boundaries through their administrative, coercive, and discursive practices.

Overcoming methodological nationalism in civil-military relations requires reconceiving military actors as central figures in projects of nation-building and state-formation (Brenner et al. 2008). Scholars of nationalism and ethnic politics agree that nations are socially constructed, and that states and other political actors reproduce national identities and societies through their administrative, financial, and discursive practices. An implication of this insight is that national security does not consist of defending people and land as they already exist; rather, it consists of (re)producing loyal subjects and pacifying territories (Baron et al. 2019). Not only have states used militaries as instruments for turning uneducated conscripts into national subjects (Conversi 2008), but militaristic discourses contribute to the everyday reproduction of nationalism (Billig 1995; Eastwood 2018). Militaries have also used physical processes of demographic engineering to defend state sovereignty by ensuring that loyal subjects populate geopolitical sensitive regions (McNamee and Zhang 2019). Instead of seeing these processes as anomalous departures from the ideal-typical liberal nation-state model, scholars should see practices of subjectivation and pacification as central to what militaries, police, intelligence agencies, and other 'arms' of the state do.

This project starts from the assumptions that nation-building and state-formation are ongoing, contested processes, and that military actors are central to both (cf. Tilly 1985). Consequently, the analysis of military interventions in politics has to foreground the politics of nation-building. In Turkey, military actors have repeatedly subjected the eastern parts of the country to martial law, deployed violence against protestors and activists, and used its power to institutionalized historical narratives that support the state's claim to represent an autochthonous Turkish population in a space that used to have people of many different ethnic and religious communities. Studies that examine how citizens can monitor and sanction military actors who act

in their names certainly have value, but the one-sided focus on delegation in the civil-military relations literature has neglected the role that militaries play in constituting national populations and territories.

2.2: Structuralist theories of democratization

The structuralist tradition in democratization studies examines how conditions outside of the immediate control of political actors shape their preferences, resource endowments, and opportunities for action (Haggard and Kaufman 2016). Studies in this tradition focus on two major axes of division: economic and sociocultural (Waldner and Lust 2018, 103). Debates in the literature on economic inequality and democratization center on two questions: which social class or class coalition is most likely to push for democratization (Moore 1966; Luebbert 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Huber Stephens 1992), and do high levels of inequality make democratization more or less likely (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Houle 2009; B. W. Ansell and Samuels 2014)? The literature on sociocultural causes of democratization has focused on the effects of ethnic and religious diversity on democratization (e.g., Rustow 1970; Gerring, Hoffman, and Zarecki 2018), and on the long-term effects of different types of nationalist ideologies on patterns of regime development (Tudor and Slater 2021; Mylonas and Tudor 2021). Despite their differences in focus, most of these studies share the tendency to view impersonal economic or demographic forces as the drivers of political change because of their influence on actors' preferences and resource endowments.

This study breaks from the structuralist tradition in democratization theory in three important ways. First, scholars of democratization have tended to view economic and sociocultural variables as competing explanations of long-term patterns of regime formation. Waldner and Lust capture this tendency when they distinguish between "interest-based" divisions that characterize

economic structures and "identity-based" divisions that constitute sociocultural structures. While they note that "interest- and identity-based divisions may overlap to varied degrees," their discussion of structuralist theories nonetheless demonstrates the tendency to treat economic and sociocultural divisions as isolated, externally-related variables. Similarly, in their critique of structuralist theories of democratization that focus on economic divisions, Clarke argues that sociocultural cleavages grounded in identity-based divisions shape political in post-colonial states more than class divisions, despite pointing out that ascriptive identities intersect and overlap with class boundaries to create "variegated social mappings and intersectional identities" (Clarke 2017, 570). Authors frequently note the interconnections between class, ethnicity, and other axes of social division, yet they continue to treat economic and sociocultural divisions as mutually exclusive categories, with economic divisions being more material or objective and sociocultural divisions being subjective (J. Kaplan 2021).

Political scientists continue to treat culture and economy as mutually exclusive categories because they employ theoretical frameworks that treat preferences as exogenous and pre-political. Economic structuralist approaches grounded in Marxian social theory or rational choice theory derive actors' political preferences from their positions in highly abstract models of production. However, cultural schemas about how economies work, representations of the past and future, and narratives that justify various forms of inequality and domination mediate the relationship between inequality and political outcomes, including support for democratic transitions and reversals (Sum and Jessop 2013; Wherry 2014; Beckert 2016; Palomera and Vetta 2016; Wullweber 2019; J. Kaplan 2021). For their part, analysts of the effects of sociocultural divisions on regime transformation often assume that ethnolinguistic or religious groups have fixed boundaries, internal homogeneity, and uniform preferences (Brubaker 2009; Clarke 2017). In reality, the

strategies of political parties, states, and militaries have a strong influence on the degree of homogeneity and political unity among members of an ethnic or religious group. Furthermore, ethnic and religious differences take on a higher level of political salience in the long term when states, militaries, and other political actors distribute resources and opportunities on the basis of membership in ascriptive identity categories (Lieberman and Singh 2012; P. Singh and vom Hau 2016; Bhandar 2018). The administrative, financial, and discursive practices of political actors shape the preferences and expectations of other actors in ways that belie any straightforward dichotomy between economy and culture, meaning and materiality.

The important role that political organizations play in constituting actors' preferences highlights a third weakness of the structuralist approach in democratization studies: the tendency to treat political actors as mere agents of social forces located outside the state. When military actors enter into structuralist explanations at all, scholars tend to assume that they are agents of one economic group or social class. For example, in their game theoretic model that examines the relationship between inequality and democratization, Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, chap. 7) explicitly state that they assume that military actors are agents of social elites. However, the relationship between military leaders and economic groups is rarely as straightforward as these authors imply. In reality, militaries are often internally divided along the lines of class and ethnic background, and the material requirements of maintaining a modern military creates a complex political relationship between military and economic actors. On the one hand, the military's reliance on the rest of society for tax revenue, technology, manpower, and provisions can make the military dependent on the success of leading sectors of the economy, particularly in peripheral economies that depend on export-oriented economic sectors for access to hard currency. On the other hand, there is the famous trade-off between "guns and butter":

resources that the military consumes could have gone towards investments in the civilian economy or towards welfare consumption. The relationship between military and economic actors thus depends on the conjunctural circumstances and the coalition-building practices of military leaders, political parties, businessmen, and other actors. Assuming a priori that the military or other political actors are agents of a particular class or economic group ignores the complex relationships between military, political, and economic actors.

Instead of thinking of economic and sociocultural divisions as exogenous and pre-political, we need a conception of social structure that allows us to see how past political decisions shape the contemporary balance of social forces, perceptions of self-interest and normative appropriateness, and opportunities for political action. Additionally, this understanding of social structure would have to capture the interrelationship between meaning and materiality that constitutes politically salient social divisions. Finally, this approach would need to capture the sources of autonomy and restraint that military actors face as they uphold a particular understanding of national identity, interests, and boundaries. As I elaborate in the next chapter, the concept of political articulation provides a way to understand the social structures that enable and constrain political and military actors that transcends economic-culture dualism, integrates processes of preference formation into the analytical frame.

2.3: Elite-biased democratization

The structuralist tradition in democratization studies has typically assumed that democratization comes about because incumbents lose the capacity to hold onto power, either because of elite splits or working-class mobilization (or both). A recent research program in comparative politics takes issue with this assumption, examining cases in which political or social elites initiate transitions to democracy because they anticipate that they will be able to maintain

power under the new regime (Riedl et al. 2020). These studies incorporate the dynamics of elite bargaining that were the main focus of the agent-centered transitology research program (e.g. O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996) of the 1980s and 1990s into a historical institutionalist framework that examines the long-term effects of transition pacts and institutional choice on redistribution and democratic consolidation. The titles of articles like "Gaming Democracy" (Albertus and Menaldo 2014) and "The Strength to Concede" (Slater and Wong 2013) convey the idea that elites can use their influence over processes of institutional design and/or the organizational capacities of authoritarian ruling parties to continue to exert influence after transitions to democracy. Whereas simplistic political economy models of democratization associate democratic transitions with the unmediated rule of the (relatively poor) median voter, the elite-led democratization literature highlights the sources of de facto power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008) that authoritarian elites use to maintain their influence and wealth under the new regime.

There are two somewhat-overlapping strands of the elite-led democratization literature that focus on different mechanisms that allow incumbents to maintain their political power after transitions to democracy. The first perspective focuses on the elite use of institutional design, including electoral rules, legislative structure, and separation of powers, to "lock in" their agenda-setting power and grant disproportionate electoral influence to their favored constituencies (Albertus and Menaldo 2017). The second perspective focuses on the factors that allow political parties that represent economic elites and authoritarian regime incumbents to succeed electorally following transitions to competitive multiparty politics with free-and-fair elections (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Riedl et al. 2020). Studies in both strands of this research program assume the

elites strategically use institutional change to respond to pressure for reform (the source of which could be either domestic or international) without having to surrender their power.

My argument is that the authoritarian-led democratization literature overestimates elites' capacity to control the transition process and anticipate the consequences of their institutional choices. Scholars in both strands of this research overstate the unity of authoritarian elites, neglecting the importance of factions within ruling parties and divergent preferences and expectations between party and military leaders. During periods of institutional design that I examine in this project, Turkish institutional engineers had different institutional and educational backgrounds, divergent policy preferences on key issues of constitutional design, and contradictory policy objectives. These differences resulted in contradictory institutional choices, the interaction of which produced unintended consequences. Divergent preferences and expectations can result in incoherent institutional choices and undermine the ability of authoritarian incumbents to reverse institutional changes when they produce unintended consequences.

Furthermore, scholars of elite institutional engineering tend to assume that autocratic elites will prefer unequivocally prefer institutions that increase the transaction costs of governing in the interest of maintaining the sociopolitical status quo. Albertus and Menaldo, for example, assume that incumbent economic elites desire to prevent reforms that will undermine the policy status quo by creating many veto gates that they can control. This assumption overlooks the possibility that at least some authoritarian elites will favor energetic governance, creating conflicting objectives and contradictory institutional arrangements. When military coups take place in the context of economic crises, economic, political, and military elites who all oppose the rise of social forces that favor redistribution may nonetheless disagree about the need for structural economic reforms

aimed at restoring capital inflows and accumulating hard currency. The perception among the leaders of the 1980 military coup that the country needed to implement structural adjustment reforms and a long-term process of privatization, for example, shaped their preferences in favor of a highly centralized, majoritarian political order, which contradicted the predictions of Albertus and Menaldo's (2017) model of elite-biased constitutional change.

Finally, the institutional choice literature assumes that elite institutional engineers have accurate beliefs about how electoral rules and legislative arrangements will affect the balance of power between political forces under the new regime. However, the balance of political forces during and immediately after periods of institutional choices was highly fluid in each of the periods examined in this project. The choices of military leaders during interregnums to close political parties contributed to their inability to accurately predict the results of elections following returns to civilian rule. Over the longer term, political parties and civil society groups adapted to new rules of the game, established new discourses and policy programs to appeal to new constituencies, and formed opportunistic alliances to upend the expectations of elite institutional engineers.

The upshot of this argument is that "ruling but not governing" (Cook 2007) is harder than it looks. This project advances the elite-led democratization literature by examining patterns of division among authoritarian incumbents during regime transitions and examining the contradictory objectives that motivated elite institutional engineers. Furthermore, this project examines the longer-term, unpredictable reactive sequences that elite institutional choices and changes in the broader social environment produce.

Chapter 3: Understanding Tutelary Democracy

This chapter develops a theoretical framework that does three things. First, it conceptualizes tutelary democracy as a hybrid regime that combines free and fair elections with efforts by state elites to monopolize symbolic power. Military, bureaucratic, and judiciary elites in tutelary democracies seek to prevent political parties and social movements from challenging the hegemonic definition of national interests, identity, and boundaries. They do so by controlling or co-opting the means of political socialization while monitoring and policing the discursive practices of schools, religious institutions, political organizations, and civil society groups. Tutelary interventions occur when elected civilian politicians or political organizations seek to advance a alternative political projects that re-imagine the boundaries of the political community and the relationship between the nation and other states in the international system. This approach differs from definitions of tutelary democracy that conceive of it as a system from protecting the military or security 'domain' from civilian interference because the boundary between the political and security domains is endogenous to these broader political conflicts over national interests and identity.

Secondly, this chapter examines the structural conditions that give rise to tutelary state projects, which can either evolve into authoritarian regimes or tutelary democracies. I point to three historical and geopolitical circumstances that give rise to tutelary state projects by linking international standing and territorial sovereignty to domestic institutions, policies, and cultural practices. First, social closure in the international system allows powerful states and other actors to make recognition of sovereignty and access to club goods like capital, markets, and military technology contingent on adherence to class-relevant, racialized, and gendered international

norms. The threat of pauperization, intervention, and subsumption into imperial polities compels political, military, and other state elites in peripheral polities to avoid or overcome stigmatization, prompting them to undertake far-reaching projects of social transformation. Secondly, the production of national populations, territories, and economies entails the articulation of new classifications of social groups into in-groups and out-groups, the appropriation of symbolic power, and the pacification of groups that do not conform to the new characteristics of desired citizens. Thirdly, military modernization in the context of economic underdevelopment draws military actors into conflicts over the allocation of social resources. By linking external security and territorial sovereignty to domestic institutions, policies, and cultural practices, each of these structural factors undermine any firm distinction between the political and military domains.

The third task of this chapter is to examine the dynamics of tutelary democracy. Although tutelary state elites seek to monopolize symbolic power, I argue that they face limitations on their ability to have citizen/subjects perceive their principles of vision and division as natural or taken-for granted. Furthermore, the increasing autonomy of the fields that compose the state also give rise to intra-elite divisions. Elite institutional engineers in tutelary democracies seek to use constitutional design to empower elected leaders to carry out ambitious nation-building agendas without allowing them to advance their own articulations of national identity, interests, and boundaries, and to coordinate understandings of what actions fall outside of the boundaries of acceptable political discourse. In doing so, they run into two problems. First, the choice of electoral rules presents a catch-22: restrictive electoral rules lead to single-party majority governments that have both the ability and the incentives to challenge the authority of tutelary state elites, whereas permissive electoral rules keep elected leaders weak at the expense of undermining government efficiency and opening the door for small ideological parties to gain access to the legislature.

Secondly, the challenge of policing the boundaries of acceptable political discourse results in the construction of parallel state structures that undermine bureaucratic autonomy and the circumvention of legal obstacles by security forces when classification struggles occur the translation of abstract principles into concrete practices of enforcement. Despite having multiple opportunities to redesign political institutions from the ground up and experiment with alternative sets of rules, elite institutional engineers ultimately failed to find a stable institutional formula that would maintain the hegemony of the tutelary state project without military actors having to overthrow governments.

3.1: Conceptualizing Tutelary Democracy

Political scientists have employed the phrase 'tutelary democracy' to describe political regimes in which military actors regularly intervene in politics. Extant conceptualizations suffer from three major shortcomings. First, they conceive of military interventions solely in terms of military coups, overlooking the everyday administrative, discursive, financial, and coercive practices that military actors use to promote their agendas (Croissant et al. 2010). For example, Przeworski (1988, 60) defines tutelary democracies as regimes in which, "while elections take place in such systems and the elected representatives govern, the armed forces remain in the shadows, ready to fall upon anyone who transgresses too far in undermining their values or interests." While this definition usefully draws attention to the desire of military actors to promote their values or interests, it fails to account for the full range of strategies and tactics that officers and soldiers have at their disposal beyond military coups or the threat thereof. Military actors can also use institutional design, discursive practices, extra-judicial killings, and other strategies to establish and enforce the boundaries of acceptable political discourse. A satisfactory conceptualization of tutelary

democracy needs to account for the full variety of strategies that military and other actors can use to monopolize the ability to define national interests, identity, and boundaries.

Other authors (e.g., Merkel 2004; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011; Bünte 2022) conceive of tutelary democracies as regimes in which militaries and other bodies intervene to protect "reserve domains" such as defense budges or slush funds that lie outside of civilian oversight. However, conceptualizing tutelary democracy as the protection of reserve domains obscures the political struggles over determining, for example, which issues or policy areas fall within the security domain. A persistent weakness in the literature on civil-military relations and democratization is the tendency to assume that the distinction between security and non-security issues derives from ontological distinctions between war and peace, the domestic and the foreign, and the public and the private spheres. To paraphrase Mitchell (1991, 78), I conceive of the distinction between security and non-security issues not as the boundary between discrete 'domains,' but as a line drawn internally within the network of institutions that maintain a social and political order. The authority to define the boundaries of the security domain is at stake in the power struggles that motivate tutelary interventions.

Moreover, none of the prominent definitions of tutelary democracy or tutelary interventions explain why the 'tutelary' adjective is appropriate. Tutelage denotes some form of pedagogy, training, or leadership, but extant conceptualizations of tutelary democracy do not examine why military, religious (as in the Islamic Republic of Iran), or monarchical (as in Thailand or Morocco) actors justify their interventions in terms of protecting some vision of the public interest or national security or promoting a project of social and cultural reform (however conservative it might be). One could easily dismiss such rhetoric as rationalizations of nakedly self-interested behavior, but the invocation of the language of pedagogy and discipline to justify interventions that end or

temporarily cease democratic regimes point to an important paradox that empirical democratization studies has largely ignored: States and political parties have the ability to shape the preferences, beliefs, and expectations of the very citizens that they are supposed to be accountable to (Loveman 2005). Territorial control, economic development, and military modernization all depend on the ability of states to reshape their populations into obedient and productive subjects through processes of socialization, regulation, and normalization (Gorski 2003, 165–66; cf., Foucault 2003; 2009). Collective mobilization for military purposes requires more than just a stated rationale; it requires the construction of acquiescent individuals and societies through mundane everyday articulations of national interests, identity, and boundaries (McIntosh 2021). Because those articulations are grounded in contingent, socially constructed, and exclusionary biographical narratives and visions of the future, and because the administrative, coercive, and discursive practices that they underwrite have distributive implications, they are always open to contestation (Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Wingenbach 2011; Berenskoetter 2014; Krebs 2015; Beckert 2016).

Thus, I conceptualize tutelary democracy as a political regime that combines multiparty competitive politics with a monopolization of symbolic power in the hands of state elites. Symbolic power denotes the ability to shape individuals' embodied dispositions and cultural schemas, and to "impose the legitimate principles of vision and division" in society (Bourdieu 1989, 1). The desire to produce subjects that internalize hegemonic understandings of national interests, identities, and boundaries is what makes tutelary democracy *tutelary*. Political and social actors can classify populations, construct the boundaries of the political community, and define the interests of the state in a number of different ways. These classifications, identity constructs, and articulations of group, state, and national interests become social facts when political and social

actors (individual and collective) translate these abstract symbolic forms into concrete administrative, financial, discursive, and coercive practices that reify group and national identities and boundaries, distribute resources, opportunities, and vulnerability to premature death (Gilmore 2007) unevenly across groups, and construct hierarchical social relations between groups. Symbolic power captures the capacity to translate socially constructed representations of group interests, identities, and boundaries into social facts. Institutions and organizations that have the capacity to not only make laws, norms, and rules, but to have them followed by significant numbers of individuals, are the bearers of symbolic power.

The degree of concentration of symbolic power constitutes a central distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes that procedural definitions of democracy do not necessarily capture. Studies that employ the procedural minimum definition of democracy conceive of political action in terms of individuals acting strategically based on their given preferences, and examines how political processes aggregate those preferences. By contrast, an approach to studying political regimes that focuses on the degree of concentration of symbolic power views individual preferences as socially constructed and examines how political institutions affect the distribution of discursive and organizational capacities for collective action across social groups (Heller 2022). Democratic regimes disperse symbolic power among a wide range of state and non-state organizations, including political parties, religious organizations, interest groups, and other civil society organizations. Furthermore, these organizations have the autonomy to challenge established hegemonic articulations of public interests, the boundaries of the political community, and national identity. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, restrict the range of political demands that citizens can make on the state by either suppressing autonomous organization altogether, or by policing boundaries of public discourse that they construct in order to maintain the hegemony

of their particular contingent articulation of national interests, identity, and boundaries. My conceptualization of tutelary democracy deploys a more substantive understanding of democracy than proceduralist approaches to classifying political regimes. It is more consonant with democracy indexes that incorporate measures of freedom of association and speech, but in my view such indexes ignore concentrations of symbolic power within civil society as well as the possibility that symbolic power among state institutions can be more or less concentrated.

Although this conceptualization employs Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power, it breaks from his use of it in an important way. In his work on the state, Bourdieu argues that modern states are characterized by a monopoly on the legitimate use of symbolic power, analogous to Weber's understanding of the state as having a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Public education, in particular, constitutes the primary means of producing subjects who have internalized the state's classificatory schemes and uneven, hierarchical valuation of forms of capital. However, as a number of sympathetic critics (Loveman 2005; Loyal and Quilley 2017; Swartz 2019) have pointed out, religious institutions, media organizations, political parties, and other institutions also shape the preferences, beliefs, and social resources of citizen-subjects (De Leon, Desai, and Tuğal 2009). Furthermore, by conceiving of the state *as such* as the carrier of symbolic power, Bourdieu overlooks the possibility of competitions for symbolic power *among* state institutions, which is an important theme in this study (Jessop 2013). Tutelary interventions not only aim to concentrate symbolic power within society, but they also aim to subordinate the full range of organizations that comprise the state to one political project. Consequently, I think of the monopoly of symbolic power as a limit concept that only the most totalitarian regimes can approximate. Instead, I conceive of the degree of concentration of symbolic power as a continuous variable.

3.2: Origins of tutelary democracy

Tutelary democracy is a political regime in which state elites attempt to monopolize symbolic power while still allowing competitive elections and a limited degree of pluralism. The question that this section addresses is, when are military actors likely to consider monopolizing symbolic power to be a core national security priority? I argue that military actors view the monopolization of symbolic power as a national security priority when a state's position in the international system and history of state formation make external sovereignty and internal political order contingent on the transformation of social relations and cultural practices. The first subsection introduces the concept of tutelary state projects, and examines the geopolitical and historical conditions in which state security comes to depend on the implementation of an ambitious project of social transformation. The following subsection examines some of the social tensions that give rise to divisions among tutelary elites, which give rise to transitions to limited forms of electoral politics without displacing military and other state elites who remain committed to projects of top-down social change.

Origins of tutelary state projects

State projects are organized packages of ideas and practices that define the boundaries of the state system vis-à-vis society as a whole and articulate the nature and purposes of the state for the wider social formation (Tsing 2002; Jessop 2013). Because modern states are highly differentiated organizations composed of a multitude of distinct institutional and organizational social fields (see below), their capacity for coherent collective action depends on widespread acceptance of a state project (Jessop 2013). State projects also arise because of the multiple different ways that one can characterize the identity, interests, and boundaries of a state depending on their background assumptions about the ontology of the social world (Weldes 1996; Doty 1996;

Campbell 1998). While the pursuit of wealth and power may have oriented the activities of states for centuries, shifting discourses about the sources of wealth and power and innovations in practices of government affect the content of state projects (Allan 2018a, 3). The concept of state projects highlights the contingent foundations of political authority.

A state project is tutelary when it positions state elites in the position of a vanguard vis-à-vis the society that it governs in the name of, delaying the possibility of popular sovereignty until subjects have achieved a certain level of civilization, development, class-free equality, or moral stature. Tutelary state projects entail ambitious plans for (re-)molding populations in the image of a desired citizen or subject through a wide range of pedagogical, disciplinary, and coercive interventions into everyday life (Gorski 2003; Bargu 2019; Maier 2023). My argument in this section is that tutelary state projects arise when geopolitical and historical circumstances make state security and the external recognition of sovereignty contingent on domestic institutions, policies, and cultural practices. In these circumstances, state actors come to fear that the failure to undertake state-led projects of social transformation, or even the pursuit of the wrong vision of social change, can lead to international intervention, economic crisis, separatist insurgencies, or other such maladies.

Three geopolitical and historical factors lead to the adoption of tutelary state projects because they erode the boundaries between the domestic and foreign policy domains. First, international hierarchies make external recognition of sovereignty and access to scarce club goods like capital, markets, and military resources contingent on the adoption of institutional forms, economic policies, and cultural practices that may not command widespread support domestically (Getachew 2019, chap. 2; Viola 2020; Mathieu 2021; Brundage 2023). Powerful states and economic actors produce international norms that validate certain institutional forms, cultural

practices, racial characteristics, or other means of differentiation while stigmatizing others (Zarakol 2010; A. E. Towns 2012; Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 2014). The economic and military costs of stigmatization compel less powerful polities to either assimilate to the standards established by the hegemonic powers in the international system, contest their classification while affirming the normative principles of the international order, or challenge the authority of the norm-producing powers (El Taki 2021). All of these strategies entail far-reaching internal reforms that challenge the established economic and moral order of a society.

Beginning in the 19th century, increasing global inequality as a result of the industrial revolution, the expansion of European and North American empires, and the emergence of a scientific cosmology that made progress and improvement into the primary ends of state power altered the geopolitical landscape that faced political and military elites in states on the periphery of the international system (Osterhammel 2014; Buzan and Lawson 2015; Allan 2018a). At the same time, racialized, gendered, and class-relevant ideological discourses from North America and Europe classified non-Western polities as uncivilized, static, effeminate, and backwards social formations that were doomed to collapse unless they adopted Western political, economic, and cultural institutions (Gong 1984; Anghie 2005; Suzuki 2005; Bowden 2009; A. Towns 2009; Tzouvala 2020). Polities that escaped subsumption into European empires still faced the pressure to upgrade their militaries and internal infrastructures, which in turn required far-reaching fiscal reforms and/or entrapment in the chains of sovereign debt (Bayly 2004). At the same time, unequal treaties that sheltered European merchants from regulation, taxation, and dispossession impeded the adoption of excise taxes and import duties that would have offset the burden of military modernization (T. Kayaoğlu 2010; Margolies et al. 2019; Tzouvala 2019; Mihatsch and Mulligan 2021). The new geopolitical milieu created traps for polities outside of Europe or North America:

failure to catch up militarily could lead to a polity's territory getting swallowed up by these expanding empires, but efforts to catch up militarily entailed reforms that reached to the fiscal core of the political order and could lead to spiraling foreign debt.

Because these discourses of civilization and progress had material effects on the geopolitical conditions that non-Western social formations faced, even political elites who sought to rebut these depictions and resist the pressure for assimilation had to frame their alternative programs in terms of modernization and "catching up." Although the material power of norm-producing states and actors compelled less powerful polities to respond, the strategies that elites in these states ultimately adopted was not determined exclusively by international factors. Instead, how non-Western political and social actors responded to stigmatization depended on their positions within their social formations, with entrenched social elites in the political and religious fields being more likely to adopt absolutist programs of modernization along the lines of Peter and Catherine in 18th century Russia (Fedyukin 2018) or the reign of Abdulhamid II in the Ottoman Empire (1806-1879) (Fortna 2008). These approaches sought to expand the fiscal and military powers of the state without upsetting established forms of social rank and differentiation. New classes of Western educated bureaucrats and military officers, on the other hand, tended to see the need for more ambitious political and social changes, even if they remained critical of aspects of European and North American societies and sought to retain indigenous cultural markers (Trimberger 1978; Maier 2023). Thus, the classification of non-Western social formations as backwards and uncivilized by European and North American imperial powers resulted in the emergence of temporal ideologies (Zeglen 2023) that diagnosed the sources of social backwardness and prescribed policy changes in competing ways. The common thread among these competing discourses was the threat posed advanced European forms of organization and

technology. However, conflicts between supporters of rival temporal ideologies tended to be highly contentious, with the competing factions believing that the other's political project would result in political and social disaster.

The need to produce national populations, territories, and economies constitutes the second major factor that motivates elites to undertake tutelary state projects. The idea that states and nations should be coterminous presupposes that the world consists of discrete peoples who have long-standing, organic ties to the lands that they live on (Zenker 2011; Hanchard 2018). However, the long history of human mobility through conquest, migration, nomadic forms of life, and the circulation of goods and knowledge across wide geographical expanses undermine the myths of autochthony and national purity that ground the norm of self-determination (Norton 2017; Sharma 2020). In reality, most nation-states have either emerged out of the ashes of multi-national, multi-ethnic imperial polities that lacked clear spatial or social boundaries between discrete populations, or through processes of state-building in which militarily powerful core regions imposed physical control over culturally distinct groups on the periphery, which were then discriminated against on the basis of language, religion, or other cultural attributes (Kumar 2010; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010; Malešević 2017a; Halperin 2017, 101). Nation-states did not gain power and legitimacy through processes of delegation by preformed, well-bounded, self-consciously united populations. Instead, building a nation-state constituted a feat of social engineering.

The builders of new nation-states do not carry out projects of social engineering on formless populations or territories, but in societies and spaces structured by prior political and social orders (Cocks 2014). Thus, establishing a new sovereign entity in place of an old one involves an act of "foundational erasure" (Cocks 2014) in which state-builders replace one way of classifying, ranking, and differentially valuing social groups and spaces with a new one.

Establishing these new principles of vision and division as the taken-for-granted rules of the game involves a process of primitive accumulation of symbolic power, in which new state-builders find new areas of social life to regulate, co-opt holders of symbolic authority in the old regime, or replace authorities and institutions that previously held the responsibility for political socialization (Loveman 2005). The foundational acts of symbolic violence lead to physical violence when the new principles of vision and division includes and valorizes some segments of the older order's population but excludes or subordinates other segments, leading to armed resistance, violent campaigns of pacification, and security discourses that stigmatize the new out-groups as inherently violent, untrustworthy, and backwards (Cocks 2014; Bonacker 2019; Baron et al. 2019). Nation-states emerging from the ashes of empires thus took on the characteristics of empires in their own right by constructing hierarchically differentiated in-groups and out-groups, using abject brutality to put down insurrections, extracting and channeling resources from peripheral to central regions, using demographic engineering to restructure populations of geopolitically sensitive territories, and centralizing power at the expense of local self-government (Mueller 2016; J. A. Hall 2017; McNamee and Zhang 2019; Spanu 2020). Cementing claims of national sovereignty over a given territory requires pedagogical, disciplinary, and coercive state action to produce loyal national subjects and pacify unruly minority groups.

Thirdly, mobilizing social formations for military purposes requires the construction of symbolic infrastructures that normalize military service, build consent for military spending, and identify internal and external threats to national security. Warfare entails the mobilization of scarce and economically precious manpower, the consignment of food and other resources, high taxes, and other forms of hardship for populations at home, to say nothing of the loss of relatives to death in combat (Barkawi 2006). Furthermore, desertion, the breakdown of discipline, and challenges to

military command hierarchy frequently accompany prolonged military campaigns (Forrest 1989; Akın 2018). Maintaining support for war fighting, prolonged campaigns of militarized pacification, and military preparation and modernization during peacetime all require the production of consent, particularly in regimes that hold regular competitive elections. Geopolitical and historical discourses that identify threats to the national self therefore lay the ideological and affective groundwork for mobilizing subjects to put their lives on the line for the state and persuading people of militarized value systems and national grievances (McIntosh 2021). The need to maintain support for military spending, troop deployments, and the mobilization of scarce resources motivate military actors to compete for symbolic power.

International hierarchies, the rise of the nation-state form, and the need to mobilize military forces in underdeveloped countries contributed to the rise of tutelary state projects by tying recognition of external sovereignty and territorial boundaries and access to scarce club goods to the construction of culturally homogeneous populations with modern cultural practices, developed economies, and modern militaries. From the perspective of proponents of tutelary state projects, resistance to their state- and nation-building measures constituted threats to state security because they threatened to undermine territorial control, invite foreign intervention, and undermine access to financial and military resources that weaker states need in order to survive in the international system. However, even under the constraints created by the geopolitical context of state formation, there was more than one possible way to understand the identity, interests, and boundaries of the political community, giving rise to resistance movements and threatening the unity of the state.

The limits of symbolic power

The compulsion to increase international standing by resisting stigmatization, the challenges of building a new nation-state, and the need to mobilize resources for military

modernization motivated military, bureaucratic, and other state elites to try to monopolize symbolic power. These conditions tied state security to the ability to define the objectives guiding state action, the boundaries of the political community, the principles of vision and division that classified and ranked members of the population, and the identity of geopolitical threats. However, the societies that they governed were not blank slates, and the populations that they aimed to transform into modern, loyal, compliant subjects were not endlessly plastic. This section outlines a number of factors that constrained efforts by tutelary state elites to concentrate symbolic power. The efforts to overcome these factors influenced the evolution of tutelary regimes.

First, reformist political and military elites had to wrest control over the means of political socialization away from conservative religious, monarchical, and social elites, many of whom sought to pursue alternative projects of social reform and state strengthening (Loveman 2005). Even when reformist political leaders came to power after revolutions or wars for independence, they had to consider how populations who had been shaped by old structures of social differentiation and distinction would respond to new principles of vision and division. The establishment of national school systems incorporated a wide range of subjects into the new political dispensation (Weber 1976; Darden and Mylonas 2016), but resource constraints limited their reach and old religious and social elites still held preponderant influence over socialization in the countryside. State-builders faced a strategic dilemma: accommodate traditional social elites and water down the reform program, or risk alienating social elites and their clients by attempting to displace them (Garfias and Sellars 2022). Fiscal and military constraints often forced their hands.

Secondly, political and military elites could not take the unity of the state behind transformative political projects for granted. Professionalization of the legal, medical, educational,

military, and other fields increased their autonomy from each other as specialized education produced taken-for-granted norms and cultural schemas that resulted in different interpretations of the nature and purposes of state power. For example, as the legal field gained autonomy from the political and military fields, lawyers and judges began to develop understandings of the rule of law that created tension with members of the security services. Integration into transnational social fields tended to deepen these rifts and create internal divisions within fields between actors who received education and work experience abroad versus those who remained in the country for their entire careers. Transnational connections also fostered opportunities for conflict or coalition-formation across the social fields that comprise the state. Consequently, political and military elites struggled to maintain the unity of the state apparatus against endogenous sources of disruption (Poulantzas 2017).

Finally, contingent articulations of national interests, identities, and boundaries have distributional consequences that give rise to various forms of resistance. Minority ethnic and religious groups occupy a difficult position in new nation-states as they face pressure to give up their languages, cultural practices, and forms of life. Members of these groups can resist efforts by state elites to classify them as backwards, uncivilized, and in need of paternalistic interventions to bring them up to the level of the majority population, particularly where limited resources prevent political and military officials from implementing ambitious programs of population resettlement, reeducation, or elimination (P. Singh and vom Hau 2016). In addition, the unequal distribution of economic costs of modernization can undermine the picture that elites paint of the nation-state as an organic community, particularly where class-based organizations have the opportunity to spread their messages (Benner 1995). Even forms of resistance that fall short of insurrections or strike

waves can strain resources, undermine elite unity, and draw military resources away from external focuses (Metinsoy 2020; 2021).

For tutelary state elites, maintaining independence and upward social mobility in the stratified international system depend on undertaking ambitious programs of social transformation. But the populations that they seek to transform have already been shaped by centuries of socialization into religious, kinship, property, and other structures. Furthermore, maintaining elite unity as the social fields that comprise the state develop their own autonomous norms and taken-for-granted understandings of the nature and purposes of state power is no easy task. Finally, the unequal distribution of costs and benefits associated with projects of social transformation can produce various forms of resistance that can drain state resources and undermine elite unity. Tutelary democracy emerges as a strategy for venting intra-elite and broader social tensions while keeping the social formation on track towards the vision of modernity that guide tutelary state projects.

3.3: The politics of indirect military rule

Political and military leaders in peripheral polities aim to monopolize symbolic power in the quest to improve their standing in the hierarchical international system and construct national populations and territories, but they face a number of obstacles that push back against their state projects or undermine them from within. In this section, I examine how the interaction between elite efforts to impose transformational reform projects on society, resistance to these political projects from below, and intra-elite conflict over how to translate abstract state projects into concrete practices shape the evolution of tutelary political regimes. I argue that tutelary democratic regimes do not come into existence fully formed. Rather, they evolve as military, judicial, and bureaucratic elites create new rules and procedures to overcome obstacles to reform, prevent

elected leaders and parties from implementing alternative projects, and coordinate perceptions of threats to the state.

I focus on two sets of institutional choices that face elite institutional engineers who seek to prevent elected leaders and parties from undermining the tutelary state project. First, I focus on the choice of electoral rules because the translation of votes into assembly seats affects both the strength of the elected civilian governments that compete with tutelary elites for power and the range of political ideas and interests that receive representation in formal political institutions. I argue that elite institutional engineers face a catch-22: strong central governments can efficiently implement ambitious social engineering projects, but they also have more power to resist tutelary interventions. Multiparty coalition governments, on the other hand, pose less of a threat to the institutional arrangements that constitute tutelary democracy, but they lack efficiency and give voice to ideological minorities that straddle the boundary of acceptable political discourse. Each attempt to engineer political institutions thus resulted in a choice of different electoral rules that aimed to achieve efficiency, homogeneity, and control, but each solution created unintended consequences that undermined political stability.

Secondly, I focus on procedures for enforcing the boundary between acceptable and subversive political discourse. Tutelary democracy depends on coordinated practices of classification and coercion across a wide range of state institutions, each of which contains their own internal cultures and divisions and external rivalries. Consequently, differing interpretations of what constitutes acceptable political discourse can give rise to classification struggles between different branches of the state that undermine the unity and cohesion of the state. I argue that the increasing frequency and severity of classification struggles among state elites resulted in the gradual concentration of authority over the ability to define the boundary between acceptable and

57

forbidden political discourse. Military actors increased their influence over hiring practices of state bureaucracies and courts, school curricula, and the decisions of elected political leaders over the course of the period covered by this project. Ultimately, however, this concentration of authority did not prevent classification struggles over acceptable political practices within the military leadership itself during the third democratic spell.

<div align="center">The decision to take power</div>

Military interventions in politics become more likely when political and military elites begin to disagree over issues that bear on fundamental questions of national interests or identity. Debates over whether to appropriate or reject international norms or to seek alternative providers of economic and military aid are particularly fraught because political and military elites establish hegemonic articulations of national identity, interests, and boundaries in relation to great power rivalries and to the criteria that (implicitly or explicitly) rank states in terms of symbolic status and material power (A. E. Towns 2012; Zarakol 2013; A. E. Towns and Rumelili 2017; Abou-El-Fadl 2019; El Taki 2021). Consequently, new articulations of national identity, interests, and boundaries can put pressure on establish security partnerships, economic agreements, and bilateral and multilateral foreign policy alignments, particularly if they result in international stigmatization (Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 2010) or, conversely, if they create the perception that the country has become too subservient to a foreign patron. Additionally, changes in policies towards ethnic and religious minorities can strain relations between political and military elites, particularly where military elites perceive actors who claim to represent the interests of minority groups as agents of neighboring states or foreign powers. The close link between domestic institutions, policies, and cultural practices, on the one hand, and international standing, on the other, undermines any distinction between the political and national security domains.

The choice of strategies for exercising influence and decisions about whether to return power after military coups depend on the cohesiveness of the military itself and on perceptions of stigmatization and great power response. One might expect military leaders to simply seize power whenever they reach an impasse with political leaders, but establishing a coup coalition, allocating governing responsibilities, and deciding whether to hold onto or return power are all risky endeavors that entail the possibility of internal revolts, purges, popular backlash, and international stigmatization (N. Singh 2014; Thyne et al. 2018). Furthermore, governing directly involves military officers in policy areas that they do not have relevant training for and distracts the organization from its core responsibilities and competences. Consolidated military regimes tend to be short-lived because they have tendencies towards personalization, raise the prospect of civil war, and require military leaders to acquire some degree of support from elite and popular constituencies, thereby turning into the very politicians that they loathe (Svolik 2009; 2012; P. Roessler 2011; P. G. Roessler 2016). Finally, repeated military coups can erode trust between political and military leaders, giving rise to security dilemmas between military and political leaders.

<u>Elite institutional engineering</u>

Because military coups are costly and risky, military leaders often turn to institutional design as a means of ensuring that soldiers can return to the barracks without political parties and social movements challenging the hegemonic articulation of national interests, identity, and boundaries. I refer to the process of designing new constitutions with the aim of concentrating symbolic power in the hands of state elites as elite institutional engineering. The concept of institutional engineering highlights the instrumental nature of institutional design. Like rational choice theories of endogenous institutional choice, I assume that elites use institutional design as

a means to achieve broader political ends. I refer to the heterogeneous group of political, legal, and military elites who take part in processes of institutional design as elite institutional engineers. Military elites delegate responsibility for institutional design to legal experts because of their functional specialization in matters of lawmaking and enforcement, and they include sympathetic intellectuals and political elites as a means to build a broader coalition that supports the new set of rules. However, the composition of the group of elite institutional engineers can vary in the number of actors involved in institutional choice, the number of distinct social fields and institutions represented among the group, and in the differential allocation of power established by the procedures of institutional choice.

My theory of elite institutional engineering in tutelary democracies focuses on two specific challenges that engineers face regarding institutional choice and enforcement. First, electoral rules influence both the transaction costs of policymaking and the range of groups and ideologies that receive representation in the legislature. However, elite institutional engineers face a trade-off between governing efficiency and preventing elected political leaders from getting too powerful. Secondly, policing the boundaries of acceptable political discourse requires coordination across a wide range of state institutions. As these institutions become more autonomous from each other, however, classification struggles arise over the translate of abstract principles into concrete coercive actions.

<div align="center">Electoral rules</div>

Tutelary elites' interest in weakening elected political leaders and opposition parties exist in tension with their belief in the need for far-reaching programs of social reform. Consequently, introducing veto gates into the policymaking process that tutelary elites do not control by increasing the number of parties in coalition governments does not actually maximize the

preferences of tutelary elites. Instead, I argue that elite institutional engineers face a trade-off between efficiency and representation (Carey and Hix 2011). Advancing ambitious projects of social transformation require delegating substantial authority to elected civilian leaders and larger parties by adopting restrictive electoral rules that create disproportionality and strong incentives for voters and candidates to coordinate on a smaller number of parties (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2004; Rock 2013; 2015). However, the intuition that strong elected governments pose a threat to state elites with conflicting preferences is not wrong. Strong elected parties can challenge the authority of tutelary elites by provoking conflicts over issues on which public opinion opposes military or judicial interference. Victory of the elected government in these conflicts can undermine the state project or weaken the institutional procedures that protect the power of tutelary elites, while victory for the latter can radicalize the opposition and undermine the legitimacy of the state.

Conversely, permissive electoral rules tend to increase the number and reduce the size of parties in the legislature, leading to inefficient multiparty coalition governments and giving voice to political parties and social movements that straddle the boundary of acceptable political discourse. The adoption of proportional representation tends to lead to an increase in the number of political parties represented in the legislature, and to the number of parties participating in government (Cox 1997). Party factions face lower costs of breaking away over policy disputes or disagreements about the distribution of spoils. Additionally, small ideological parties have lower barriers to entry into the legislature and perhaps even participation in governing coalitions, raising their visibility.

Elite institutional engineers thus face a catch-22: restrictive electoral rules might lead to parties that have the ability to challenge their hegemonic state project, but permissive rules might

dissipate political authority altogether and empower extremists.To make matters worse, elite institutional engineers often lack reliable information about the consequences of institutional choices (Benoit 2007, 369). Frequent changes of party identities, the introduction of new parties, violence in the run-up to elections, and frequent changes in electoral rules also increased the uncertainty surrounding the likely results of elections (Ferree, Powell, and Scheiner 2014). Consequently, elite institutional engineers involved in writing Turkey's post-coup constitutions had to rely on political outcomes during the most recent spell to guide their institutional choices. This resulted in frequent reversals in the choice of electoral rules: the first spell spell had restrictive rules, which lead to the emergence of a strong majority party that confronted the military. After the coup, institutional engineers then chose permissive rules in an attempt to break up the Democrat Party's voting bloc, producing fractious coalition governments and the rise of small parties that challenged the boundaries of acceptable discourse. The next set of institutional engineers reversed the previous choice yet again by introducing rules that would create disproportionality and keep small parties out. While the more restrictive rules failed to prevent party system fractionalization in the 1990s, disproportionality helped the AKP come to power as a single-party majority government in 2002 (Çarkoğlu and Aksen 2019).

<div align="center">Policing discourse</div>

The institutionalization of distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate political discourses requires consistent employment of these categories in formal rules and judicial and bureaucratic interpretations across connected institutional and policy realms (Capoccia 2016). The types of security threats that preoccupy military actors, intelligence officials, jurists, and other members of the tutelary state's repressive apparatus do not resemble tanks amassing at the border or hostile aircraft entering the country's airspace – situations in which the threat to security is

immediate and relatively self-evident to all of the actors involved. Instead, the capacity of state actors to suppress subversive or threatening political discourses and practices depends on the coordinated social construction of the objects of violence (Norton 2014, 1541). In this context, objects of violence consist of concatenations of knowledges, artifacts, physical phenomena, and practices that stand for political ideas that state actors find threatening because of the challenge that they pose to the hegemonic understanding of national identity, interests, and boundaries (Allan 2018b; Norton 2014; 2022). Before Turkish political, judicial, and military actors can coordinate to protect the secular character of the state from religious fanaticism, they need to have shared understandings of which forms of religious practice symbolize personal morality and modesty and which ones symbolize a desire to capture the state and implement a reactionary agenda (Asad 1993a; Gürbey 2009; Arik 2021). Headscarves and alcohol consumption thus became issues of concern to military officers because of the ideas that they represented.

The difficulty of enforcing symbolic boundaries lies in producing shared understandings of which concatenations of actors, artifacts, discourses, and practices symbolize dangerous ideas and therefore warrant coercive responses by state actors. States consist of distinct social fields with their own structuring norms and shared understandings that emerge through training and socialization. Social fields denote arenas of production, appropriation, and exchange of goods, services, knowledge, or status in which actors (individual and collective) struggle to accumulate, exchange, and monopolize different kinds of scarce, socially recognized resources, expertise, or connections (Swartz 2013, 55). Fields have autonomy to the extent that their practices and products are evaluated according to criteria internal to the domain of activity (Hilgers and Mangez 2015). For example, the field of higher education is autonomous to the extent that professional advancement within the field depends on criteria like academic publications, teaching evaluations,

or other achievements that members within the field consider important. By contrast, the influence of other criteria on professional advancement, such as political loyalties or family connections, signifies field heteronomy.

Tutelary democracies face persistent challenges of coordinating understandings of the boundaries of acceptable discourse because the fields that constitute the state tend to become more autonomous from each over time. International norms of appropriate state conduct link the professionalization and autonomy of administrative, educational, legal, and scientific fields with higher international standing, yielding better access to capital and markets and closer connections with powerful states. Integration into global circuits of knowledge, goods, and capital also leads to fields becoming more autonomous and internally differentiated. Because jurists, professors, soldiers, and other state elites often go abroad for education and participate in transnational exchanges of knowledge and debates, these social fields are differentially incorporated into transnational social fields and influenced by the norms and subjectivities that prevail in those arenas (Go and Krause 2016; Buchholz 2016; Carlson and Schneickert 2021; Stampnitzky 2016). Consequently, the difficulty of coordinating understandings of which discourses and practices signify threats to the political order increases because socialization into increasingly autonomous fields produces state elites with different attitudes about whether, for example, a woman wearing a headscarf in public constitutes a threat to state security.

Classification struggles over which concrete practices and discourses violate abstract political principles open the door to endogenous institutional changes that allow parties and social movements with alternative political projects to advance their agendas (Emmenegger 2021). Savvy political entrepreneurs and social movements can exploit differences in rule interpretation across institutional settings to gradually shift the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable political

discourse (Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Norton 2014). Maintaining the unity and coherence of the state therefore requires elite institutional engineers to constructing parallel state structures (Poulantzas 2017, chap. 5) that limit the autonomy of the distinct social fields that constitute the state. With each intervention into politics, military elites implemented rule changes that increased their power to oversee administrative, financial, and discursive practices across a wide range of policy domains (Kaynar 2018). Additionally, classification struggles motivated members of the security state to operate outside of the law by coordinating with right-wing paramilitaries and organized crime syndicates to harass and assassinate actors that they believed constituted threats to national security (Gingeras 2010; Gunter 2014; Gourisse 2022a). Military leaders and other members of the security state fought the tendency towards field autonomy by attempting to subordinate other fields to their direction, or by circumventing actors in other fields altogether.

3.4: Conclusion

Tutelary state elites seek to monopolize symbolic power in order to advance projects of social transformation that international norms, the nation-state form, and the demands of military modernization compel them to undertake. However, the societies and spaces that they seek to transform are not formless masses; instead, past polities and social orders produced systems of social stratification, political and social identities, and patterns of circulation of goods, people, and knowledge that confront state-builders. Furthermore, projects of social transformation can give rise to intra-elite conflicts that produce classification struggles over the enforcement of the boundaries of acceptable political discourse.

Consequently, when intra-elite conflicts and social resistance lead to transitions to electoral democracy, tutelary state elites seek to use institutional design to prevent political parties and social movements from challenging their articulation of national interests, identities, and

boundaries. But the choice of electoral rules presents elite institutional engineers with a catch-22: restrictive electoral rules could create majoritarian parties that articulate their own competing understanding of national interests and identity, while permissive electoral rules could produce weak, fractious governments and open the door to the influence of extremist parties. Coordinating perceptions of the boundaries of acceptable political discourse also proves challenging in the context of intra-elite heterogeneity: classification struggles between security actors, judges, bureaucrats, and other state actors involved in monitoring political discourse and enforcing boundaries lead to the adoption of institutions that limit bureaucratic autonomy. At the same time, these classification struggles can also lead security actors to act outside of the law and collude with non-state paramilitary or criminal organizations, eroding the rule of law. Elite institutional engineering thus fails to prevent military interventions in politics or to forestall political (especially state) violence.

Chapter 4: Origins of Tutelary Democracy

My argument in this dissertation is that military leaders repeatedly overthrew elected governments and redesigned political institutions in order to maintain the hegemony of the Kemalist understanding of Turkish national interests, identity, and boundaries. They believed that ethnic and religious heterogeneity, class conflict, movements for gender equality or environmental protection, and other forms of contestation over the foundations of the social and political order threatened to undermine state sovereignty. My objective in this chapter is to develop a richer understanding of what military actors hoped to achieve when they intervened in Turkish politics and redesigned political institutions by examining the origins and content of the Kemalist articulation of Turkish nationalism, which became hegemonic in Turkish military academies and barracks life from the declaration of the Republic in 1923. I am interested in examining the key tenets of Kemalist ideology, as well as the sociohistorical processes and institutional contexts that gave rise to them (Goswami 2002).

In particular, I highlight three salient dimensions of Kemalist nationalism that had deleterious long-term consequences for democratization by undermining distinctions between security and non-security issues, and between loyal opposition and subversion. First, I argue that Kemalism is best understood as a form of ethnic nationalism that asserted that Sunni Muslim Turks were the sole legitimate owners of the territory of the Turkish state. The first generation of Turkish political and military leaders responded to the experience of the decline and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by continuing the project (began during the years of World War I) of transforming Anatolia from a multi-religious, multi-ethnic patchwork into an ethnically and culturally homogeneous Turkish homeland. Although the government formally held open the

possibility that Kurds, Alevis, and Muslim refugee populations from the Caucasus and the Balkans could become fully-fledged citizens of the new Republic if they chose to adopt Turkish customs (especially the Turkish language), in practice members of the security state viewed these minority populations as threats to national security because of their transnational social ties, adherence to ways of life that political and military leaders deemed to be backwards, and the possibility that rival states could use these populations as levers for foreign influence in Turkish politics. Consequently, the Turkish state implemented forced resettlement policies to break up territorial concentrations of minority populations, withheld investments in public services in regions in which these groups predominated (with the hopes that they would eventually die out), and ruthlessly crushed insurrections. It also created institutions that gave military officers a direct role in the governance of geopolitically sensitive borderland regions, particularly in the Kurdish-dominated southeastern Anatolia.

The second important dimension of Kemalism that I highlight is its status as a temporal ideology. Kemalism, like the ideologies of the Young Turks that preceded the formation of the Turkish Republic, was a product of the global transformations of the nineteenth century (Buzan and Lawson 2015; Osterhammel 2014). Industrialization, the extension of the market to a global scale, and processes of rational state-formation gave rise to "a bifurcated international system in which rule-based order was reserved for 'civilized' peoples, and territorial annexation rendered for 'barbarians' and 'savages'" (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 2; c.f., Anghie 2005). European empires regarded the Ottomans as barbarians and intervened repeatedly to protect the interests of Christian populations, destabilizing institutions that governed inter-communal relations within the empire and casting suspicion upon non-Muslim subjects (Pitts 2018, chap. 2). Furthermore, the Treaty of Lausanne, which established diplomatic recognition of the new Republican regime in Ankara,

incorporated minority protection provisions that threatened to undermine Turkish sovereignty if European states believed that ethnic and religious minorities were at risk of death or expropriation at the hands of the Sunni Muslim majority. Consequently, early Republican political and military leaders came to view the achievement of institutional and cultural markers of civilization and progress as central to national security. In a hierarchical international system that legitimated intervention in spaces that were deemed to be uncivilized, Mustafa Kemal and other Turkish leaders believed that the transformation of 'domestic' institutions and cultural norms in line with European understandings of progress were necessary to secure recognition of Turkish sovereignty and autonomy.

Not all domestic actors shared the same understandings of progress and civilization, however. The temporal dimension of Kemalist ideology brought it into conflict with different tendencies within the clerical establishment. Islamic clergy in the late Ottoman Empire occupied important positions within the state, even if their financial autonomy and juridical authority had been under attack since the onset of the Tanzimat reform program. Members of the clergy were divided over how to respond to the growing power gap between the Ottoman Empire and Christian European empires, with some clergy being more open to the introduction of novel social forms and norms than others (Bein 2011). Yet, even more moderate members of the religious establishment – including ones who served within the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in the early Republic – had reservations about Kemalism's articulation of a state-sponsored Islamic ideology that would Turkify Islamic practices and adopt new interpretations and approaches to religious study that conflicted with older traditions (Dorroll 2014; Lord 2018). Thus, one consequence of the temporal dimension of Kemalism was persistently high tensions between the Republican state and Islamic clergy and lay organizations.

The third salient dimension of Kemalism for this study is its articulation of national belonging with military service. The humiliation of the Balkan Wars, the devastation of World War I, and the successful guerrilla war of the War for Independence made the reconstruction of military strength an important structuring factor of early Republican politics. Military modernization entailed not only the purchase of weapons and the training of soldiers, but also the construction of infrastructures that would facilitate the provision of food, water, and resources during warfare, continued support for military endeavors despite the high costs of warfare in a largely agrarian society, and the production of military subjects who would be willing to sacrifice family ties for military service. These "backward linkages" brought gave military officers a political interest in a wide range of policy debates, including those that are typically considered to be firmly within the civilian realm like education, social policy, and economic policy. Additionally, perceptions of military necessity were articulated with gendered and racialized understandings of which kinds of people should perform which functions in a society organized around military preparedness, entrenching the ideational and material structures of hegemonic masculinity and suspicion of the loyalty of non-Muslim or non-Turkish residents.

The ethnic nationalist, temporal, and militaristic dimensions of Kemalist ideology had far-reaching and persistent consequences for how military actors perceived threats to national security, and what they hoped to achieve when they intervened in politics in subsequent periods. My analysis in this chapter contributes to broader debates about nationalism in two ways. First, I argue that nationalist ideologies that leave open the possibility of assimilation for non-dominant populations are not necessarily liberal or civic. The Kemalist state project constructed an ethno-religious hierarchy that valorized particular cultural practices and securitized difference, even as it espoused a universalistic language of rights in its official documents. Secondly, I argue that

nationalist ideologies with temporal and militaristic dimensions do not just create inter-group hierarchies on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or religion. They also construct intra-group hierarchies that symbolically and materially favor citizens who are more 'civilized' (in this case, secular, urban) over those who are 'backwards' (in this case, religious 'reactionaries' (*irtica*), rural peasants) (I. Yilmaz 2021). The militaristic aspects of nationalism valorize an aggressive form of masculinity, while holding women responsible for the biological and cultural reproduction of the armed forces (Altinay 2004). These narratives and images of 'desired citizens' become institutionalized in administrative, financial, and symbolic policies across a wide range of state and non-state institutions, producing intra-group inequality along axes of class, gender, sexuality, and disability status (I. Yilmaz 2021; Altinay 2004; Açıksöz 2017; Arat 2017; Gökarıksel 2017). The prevailing focus on the consequences of nationalism for inter-ethnic relations in the literature on democratization and nationalism risks overlooking the intra-group structuring effects of nationalist discourses, particularly when they are articulated with ideologies of development and militarism.

4.1: Kemalism as Ethnic Nationalism

My argument in this section is that Kemalism was an example of ethnic nationalism, and that this dimension can be traced to the sociohistorical processes that brought about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was a polyglot multiethnic, multireligious configuration. While Islam occupied a central place in the symbolic universe of the Ottoman Empire, scholars nonetheless refer to it as an "empire of difference" (Barkey 2013) because it did not impose a uniform identity on its population. Rather, it sought to accommodate Christians and Jews, and for much of its history had more Christians than Muslims within its imperial borders (Baer 2021). The millet system delegated responsibility for day-to-day governance of Christian and Jewish

populations to religious leaders and would maintain a policy of 'live and let live' while also subjecting them to extra taxes and restrictions from owning weapons (Barkey and Gavrilis 2016). Although the millet system fell well short of the liberal multicultural ideal, it proved to be an effective means of managing communal relations, and religious minorities received fairer treatment in the Ottoman Empire than in European societies for much of the medieval and early modern periods.

<center>Sources of inter-communal tension</center>

Over the course of the 19th century, however, the institutional equilibrium that governed communal affairs broke down. There are several reasons for the rise of communal tensions between Muslims and Christians in the imperial borderlands of the Balkan Peninsula and Eastern Anatolia during this time period. First, the disproportionate benefits accruing to Christian and Jewish communities from European trade in the 19th century, owing to the extension of the capitulations treaties to Ottoman subjects with connections to European merchants, linked economic development to issues of sovereignty and military security. Secondly, claims by European empires to represent the interests of Ottoman Christian subjects vis-à-vis the Ottoman state created a sense of paranoia among Ottoman state leaders that the empire's Christian subjects would aid the enemies in the event of a war. Given the frequent conflicts between the Ottoman and Russian empires in the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia, the Armenian community was particularly vulnerable to this concern, although Greek communities along the Aegean and Black Sea coasts were also viewed with suspicion.

First, Christian communities in coastal port cities benefited disproportionately from the dramatic increase in trade with Western Europe (Robson 2021, 982). The Ottoman Empire granted trading rights and extraterritorial protections to French and British merchants in the sixteenth

century, at a time when the Ottomans were at least as strong as their European counterparts. However, by the nineteenth century, "the terms under which trade was conducted between Europe and the Ottoman Empire evolved from a situation of equality or even of relative Ottoman superiority to one that is best described as an effective domination or influence of Western economic actors over Ottoman markets, production and consumption" (Eldem 2006, 284). These European powers were able to extend protection to their local clients, who tended to be Christians or ladino Jews because of cultural affinities. "By the early nineteenth century, European consulates – recognizing the power inherent in these exemptions from both Ottoman law and Ottoman taxation, and confident that the Ottoman state no longer had the capacity to withdraw their privileges – were beginning to offer (and sometimes to sell) capitulatory privileges to merchants who were not actually employed as dragomans [Ottoman subjects hired as interpreters]. This development benefited Ottoman Christians and Jews at the expense of Muslims; only non-Muslims were routinely employed by European consulates and allowed to participate in or purchase capitulatory privileges, and foreign-owned companies tended to hire and involve mainly non-Muslims commercial partners" (Robson 2021, 983). Consequently, as the Ottoman state experienced persistent fiscal crises over the course of the century, many of the empire's Christian communities gained non-taxable wealth because of their access to capitulatory privileges.

The effect of capitulations on inter-communal relations highlights how global markets have been embedded in international hierarchies that stratify polities and peoples according to race, religion, gender, and other factors for centuries (Robinson 2000). Legal institutions like the capitulations that regulate access to markets, resources, property rights, and the right to mobility "reflect and consolidate language, ways of seeing, and modes of subjectivity" that render some groups of people as "uncivilized" or "barbarians," and therefore "lacking the requisite cultural

practices, habits of thought, and economic organization to be considered as rational economic subjects" (Bhandar 2018, 3). The capitulations were legal instruments that allocated economic rights on the basis of religious identity, and were embedded in European discourses of civilizational disparity and an Ottoman moral economy that permitted Christian and Jews to govern themselves as long as they remained subordinate to the Islamic rulers. From the perspective of the European empires, the Ottoman Empire lacked the level of civilization required to protect the rights and property, not only of foreign subjects, but also of their own Christian subjects (Rodogno 2011; Pitts 2018, chap. 2). However, from the perspective of Ottoman state elites – both conservative and reformist – the enrichment of Christian and Jewish communities while Muslim peasants were subject to increasingly harsh taxation in order to pay for military upgrades required to defend against European incursions contravened the fundamental moral order of an Islamic empire (Hanioğlu 2008). The effect of international economic integration on inter-communal relations in the Ottoman Empire was mediated by hegemonic discourses that attributed "differential and intrinsic worth" to persons and groups on the basis of religious identity (Bodirsky 2021, 66). Racially- and religiously-influenced discourses of civilization and barbarism that became increasingly hegemonic on the global scale challenged hegemonic discourses of moral economy that elevated Muslims above Christians and Jews within the Ottoman Empire, thereby linking inter-communal relations with the empire's increasingly precarious geopolitical position.

In addition to the political economic effects of the capitulations, the second way in which changes in the international sphere destabilized inter-communal relations was the claim by European empires to speak for the Ottomans' Christian subjects. Weitz argues that the 19th century witnessed a transformation in the logic of international relations from the Vienna system centered on dynastic legitimacy and state sovereignty within clearly defined borders, to the "Paris system"

(named for the Paris Peace Conference the followed World War I) that focused on populations and an ideal of state sovereignty rooted in national homogeneity. The Balkan and Caucasian borderlands of the Ottoman Empire constituted one of two "critical sites for the emergence of the Paris system" (Weitz, 1316).

Russia, France, and Great Britain all claimed at different times to represent the interests of some or all of the empire's Christian communities vis-a-vis the sultan. As the largest Orthodox Christian state in Europe, Russia, in particular, sought to conquer Constantinople and restore its standing as one of the seats of Orthodox Christianity in the world, while also gaining direct access to the Eastern Mediterranean. The large Armenian populations on both sides of the Ottoman-Russian frontier made Ottoman state elites suspect that Armenian organizations were secretly colluding with their geopolitical rivals to undermine state sovereignty in its eastern borderlands. France similarly sought to exercise influence in the Levant by supporting its Maronite Christian populations. Great Britain, for its part, sought to buttress Ottoman sovereignty in order to check Russia's advances in the Mediterranean littoral and Central Asia, but vocal groups in Parliament pressured the government to defend Christian populations during revolts in Greece and Rumelia. Because of these imperial machinations and claims to represent the interests of Christian populations, Ottoman state elites viewed the emergence of Christian public spheres (a consequence of their increasing commercial prosperity) as a threat to imperial sovereignty.

In addition to the European empires, former Ottoman provinces in the Balkan Peninsula that gradually gained autonomy and independence from Istanbul sought to incorporate populations of co-ethnics and co-religionists who remained within the empire. After successfully gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1831, Greece developed a state project around the so-called "Megale Idea" (Great Idea), which entailed the incorporation of the empire's remaining

Greek Orthodox population into the nascent nation-state. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania also had irredentist ambitions, albeit just as often against each other as against the Ottomans. These irredentist projects came to a head in 1912, when the Empire's former Balkan provinces all declared war on the Ottomans. The Balkan Wars resulted in the loss of the Empire's remaining European territories and the expulsion of large Muslim populations. As refugees, these Muslim populations would contribute to the increasing animosity and mistrust towards the Empire's Christian populations, as they brought with them stories of Christian atrocities.

While the ethnonationalist state projects of the Balkan states threatened the security of the Empire, members of the officer corps who were responsible for fighting insurgencies in the Balkan borderlands came to appreciate the symbolic power of ethnonationalism. As Zurcher points out, the fact that many of the military members of the Committee of Union and Progress (including Mustafa Kemal) were from or had served in the Balkan provinces is significant. These officers saw how claims to autochthony and indigenneity could mobilize men from poor families to volunteer to fight for an ethnic homeland. Compared to the centrifugal forces that were clamoring for greater autonomy within the empire, these officers perceived that this degree of unity was a major asset in warfare that increasingly drew on all of society's resources.

In addition to tensions between Christians and Muslims within the empire, the Ottoman state also faced greater calls for autonomy from constituent Islamic communities such as the Kurds, Arabs, and Albanians. Elites in these communities resented efforts by the Sublime Porte to centralize control over taxation. Furthermore, legal reforms that eroded distinctions between Christians and Muslims in terms of rights, responsibilities, and privileges undermined the symbolic power of the sultan and the Ottoman state vis-a-vis its Muslim subjects. Ottoman reformers

struggled to strike a balance between demonstrating to Christian minorities and European powers that they regarded all of the empire's subjects as equals without alienating the empire's Muslims.

Relations with the Kurds, in particular, proved to be problematic throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Many Kurdish clans lived a semi-nomadic lifestyle in the borderlands of the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires, which made it difficult for states to tax these communities or to limit their raids on settled agricultural communities in the region. As part of the Tanzimat reform program in the middle decades of the 19th century, the Ottoman military disbanded several Kurdish emirates in eastern Anatolia and forced influential clan leaders to move to Istanbul. Rather than easing the tasks of regulating and taxing Kurdish tribes, however, these actions resulted in increasing strife among Kurdish groups and more raids on agricultural communities. Ottoman state elites increasingly regarded Kurds as lawless and uncivilized, a common trope among land-based empires that had mobile, semi-nomadic populations in peripheral regions. Ottoman state elites even compared their difficulties of settling and "civilizing" the Kurds with the difficulties that the United States faced with Indigenous groups throughout the 19th century.

The perception that Kurds were uncivilized and lawless did not prevent Ottoman state elites from harnessing their mobility and capacity for violence for their state-building efforts. As Ottoman state elites became increasingly worried about the loyalty of Armenian communities in its eastern borderlands, they began to view Kurdish groups as potential allies that could maintain security in the region. In the 1890s, Sultan Abdulhamid II formed the Hamidian regiments, which consisted of Kurdish tribes that had pledged their loyalty to the Sultan and received weapons and training in return. Although these groups were formed to attack Armenian revolutionary groups, they regularly raided and destroyed Armenian villages and took Armenian property with impunity. Atrocities committed by these groups contributed to the worsening of communal relations between

Muslims and Christians, and fed the perception among European powers that the Ottoman state was itself uncivilized and incapable of maintaining order within its borders.

In addition to the difficulties of managing relations with non-Muslim and non-Turkish peoples, global discourses of race science, crowd psychology, and Social Darwinism also contributed to the rise of ethnonationalism among late Ottoman state elites. After the Franco-Prussian War, the Ottomans invited Prussian military officers to reform the curriculum of Ottoman military academies. Under their influence, cadets in officer training schools learned that modern warfare involved the mobilization of the entirety of social resources, blurring the distinctions between war and peace, and between civilian and military spheres. Consequently, political survival depended on the creation of a "nation in arms," a society united and mobilized for warfare at all times. Political dissent, decentralization, and separatism posed security threats because resistance to the mobilization of social resources for military use would create weaknesses that stronger nations could exploit. In the international struggle for survival, strong and united nations would inevitably triumph over weaker and divided nations. Given the fact that most of the leading state elites of the early Republican period had served as officers in the Ottoman military and had attended elite military academies, these views formed the bedrock common sense within the military and political fields of the early Republic.

Despite these increasing centrifugal pressures, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was not a foregone conclusion. The constitutional revolution of 1908 did provide an opening for demands for recognition of cultural rights and autonomy to be recognized, but the largest Christian, Arab, Kurdish, and other organizations still sought autonomy within the imperial framework. The Committee for Union and Progress maintained a vision of a centralized state with an overarching Ottoman identity that would assimilate non-Turkish peoples, and the military wing was

particularly reluctant to grant autonomy for peripheral ethnic or religious groups. Nonetheless, the CUP and its military leaders did not have a political monopoly in the early years of the revolution.

Instead, the mobilization for the Balkan Wars and World War I exacerbated centrifugal communal tensions beyond the point of no return. The costs of wartime mobilization for Ottoman society were massive. Draft evasion and desertion were common across all communities in the Empire during these wars, but the widespread perception that Christians and Jews sought to avoid sacrifice for imperial defense and may have even supported the invading militaries of Christian states turned soured inter-communal relations. The disastrous Balkan Wars also resulted in the consolidation of power in the hands of the CUP 'triumvirate' — Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pashas — who represented the most xenophobic elements in the Young Turk movement.

The decision to enter World War I on the side of the Entente (i.e., the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires) against Russia, Britain, and France was a disaster for the entirety of Ottoman society, but it was particularly bad for the Armenian community. The presence of Ottoman Armenian volunteer regiments in the ranks of the Russian military lent credence to the perception among military leaders that the Armenian community was disloyal, and that its presence in the eastern borderlands of the Empire constituted a major security threat. Despite the fact that Armenian leaders largely supported confederation within the Ottoman Empire over independence, the experience of the loss of the Balkan borderlands and the concern that international pressure for better treatment of Armenians was really a smokescreen for imperial aggrandizement at Ottoman expense convinced Ottoman policymakers that radical action was necessary. The first wave of the Armenian Genocide began as early as 1914 with the forced evacuations of Armenian communities near the front lines of the Caucasian theater, but the massacres accelerated after the disastrous winter expedition led by Enver Pasha resulted in the loss of manpower and territory to the

Russians. Enver and other Ottoman leaders blamed Armenian treachery for the defeat of the Sarikamis campaign.

World War I and its aftermath also brought about the destruction of Greek Orthodox communities along the Aegean littoral and Black Sea coastline. Greece participated in the Balkan Wars and joined World War I on the side of the Allies in the hopes of bringing Orthodox Christian communities under its rule. At the end of the war, international forces occupied Istanbul and the Greek military occupied provinces along the western coast of Anatolia, including Izmir (Smyrna). Because of the anti-Christian sentiments, boycotts, and policies that were adopted during the Balkan War and World War I, many members of the Greek Orthodox communities in Anatolia welcomed the Greek annexation. Consequently, when the Turkish national resistance led by Mustafa Kemal and other former CUP members regained control in western Anatolia, they regarded the Greek Orthodox community as a security threat, despite the fact that these communities had been present in Anatolia for over a millennium.

Thus, after the end of the War, the Greek and Turkish governments agreed to a population transfer that drastically altered the demography of the new republic, especially its coastal provinces. Virtually overnight, Izmir went from being a center of Orthodox Christian culture in the Mediterranean to a predominantly Muslim population. In less than a decade, the Armenian genocide and the expulsion of Ottoman Orthodox Christians drastically altered the demographic profile of the lands that are now part of the Turkish Republic. This demographic 'social engineering' was driven by the desire on the part of Ottoman and early Republican political and military leaders for a population that owed its allegiance exclusively to one state. In a world in which sizeable minority populations were associated with foreign interference, state security could only be guaranteed by the blockage of transnational flows of people, ideas, and allegiances.

Yet, the forced removal and elimination of Christian communities did not eliminate ethnolinguistic heterogeneity. The large refugee populations from the Balkans and Caucasus posed difficult questions about how to incorporate these people into the state, and about the boundaries of 'Turkishness.' Furthermore, the Kurdish groups had gained a new level of nationalist consciousness in the course of the previous decade. Although these groups participated in the Armenian Genocide and benefited from the seizure of Armenian property, they also understood that they were outsiders in a state that was dominated by the same Turkish political forces whose desire for homogeneity had caused the bloodletting to begin with. Furthermore, the previous decade had seen the emergence of Kurdish organizations who advanced a project for independence. Moreover, the decision to abolish the caliphate and end the Ottoman dynasty severed the personal and symbolic connections that tied the Kurds to the political order. While the Kurdish political landscape was still fragmented along tribal and class lines, skepticism of the intentions of early Republican leaders was rampant.

The Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 constituted an early turning point in Turkish-Kurdish relations. As it became clear that the early Republican leadership had settled on an assimilationist policy towards Turkey's ethnic minorities, Kurdish groups became convinced that they would face a similar fate to the Armenians. Sheikh Said was a religious leader whose position in the Kurdish social field allowed him to coordinate resistance among clan leaders and social forces who had not always seen eye-to-eye. From the perspective of Republican leaders, this rebellion led by a Kurdish religious leader represented religious backwardness, ethnic separatism, and probably foreign interference, as they suspected that the British supported the rebellion in order to push territorial claims in eastern Anatolia.

The suppression of the rebellion coincided with a sharp authoritarian turn in Turkish politics, as the government closed all opposition groups and critical publications. Moreover, the Sheikh Said rebellion marked the beginning of a regime of exception in the eastern provinces of the Republic, with military officers taking a more direct role in policymaking on the Kurdish question. The government forced Kurdish groups to move to other parts of the country in order to break up concentrations of Kurdish communities in the sensitive borderland regions, while also providing incentives for ethnic Turkish families to move to the eastern provinces. The government also invested in improving transportation and communication infrastructure in order to integrate the region into the country's cultural and economic life, and began opening boarding schools for Kurdish children in order to assimilate them into Turkish mainstream culture. These policies backfired, however, as government efforts to break up Kurdish communities and suppress Kurdish language and culture elicited resistance from their targets. In turn, Kurdish resistance fed the political narrative that they were backwards, inherently violent, and posed a threat to state sovereignty, justifying stronger interventions into their communities.

The experiences of the loss of empire and ethnic insurrection indelibly shaped the political institutions of the Turkish Republic. The languages people speak and the religions that they practice became markers of loyalty to the state. The restrictive citizenship regime that the new Republic institutionalized also produced a self-reinforcing logic. Because language and religion affected access to education, property, and capital, ethnic and religious minorities became socially marginalized, which created a basis for resistance and organized crime. In turn, violent resistance and the presence of organized crime within these communities justified further coercion and marginalization. What did not happen was assimilation, which is what Turkish policymakers

hoped to achieve. They believed that Kurdish society and culture would inevitably die off as Kurds either assimilated or perished, but instead they persisted and resisted.

4.2: Temporal insecurity and the rise of a tutelary state project

This section highlights the importance of the sense of 'temporal insecurity' (Çapan and Zarakol 2019) that Turkish elites felt vis-a-vis the US and Western Europe for the Kemalist state project. As ideas of historical progress became hegemonic in European societies during the 19th century (Buzan and Lawson 2015), both European and Ottoman elites came to view the Ottoman Empire as belonging to a different, earlier stage of development. Ottoman and Turkish elites felt that they "never quite managed to exist on the same temporal plane as Europe/the West. Instead, it was always 'catching up'" (Çapan and Zarakol 2019, 268–69). The standards of civilization that indexed Turkey's backwardness vis-à-vis the European (and later, North American) empires linked international security to domestic institutions and culture because these great powers used perceptions of "backwardness" to justify interventions and the colonization of peripheral polities (Anghie 2005; Bowden 2009; Gong 1984; Pitts 2018). Furthermore, as the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic looked for military assistance from the US, Britain, and Germany for protection against Russian aggression, perceptions of Turkey's level of development by these powers influenced their level of investment in developing the Turkish armed forces (Uyar and Güvenç 2022). From the perspective of Ottoman and Turkish political and military leaders, European (and eventually North American) powers would only recognize Turkey's autonomy and view it as an equal partner in diplomatic relationships when they recognized its domestic institutions and culture as civilized. Consequently, overcoming temporal insecurity required transforming Ottoman subjects and Turkish citizens into 'modern' people, although what exactly modernity has meant continues to be a point of contention in Turkish politics.

The perception of temporal insecurity gave the Kemalist state project its tutelary thrust: the political and military elites who constructed the early Republic viewed themselves as a modernist vanguard that would turn their "backwards" peasant society into a modern nation-state that would earn equal treatment on the international stage and respect for its territorial autonomy from potential rivals. Consequently, the Kemalist articulation of Turkish nationalism not only departed from the ideal type of civic nationalism in constructing a hierarchy of rights on the basis of ethnic and religious identities; it also constructed a *temporal* hierarchy that valorized certain people or practices as modern while categorizing others – most notably pious Muslims and tribalistic Kurds – as "backwards" and "reactionary," and therefore in need of education and assimilation into modern ways of life. Social movements that resisted the modernizing and homogenizing thrust of the Kemalist state project therefore constituted threats to national security because they threatened to undermine the effort to construct the appearance of civilization in the eyes of European and North American counterparts.

The development of the European empires coincided with the rise of ideologies of progress and civilization, which provided both rhetorical justifications for interventions into peripheral polities and cultural schemas that guided policies towards these polities (Buzan and Lawson 2015). For European liberals, the spread of these ostensibly universal standards of civilization would constitute a 'win-win' for both the Europeans and the non-European 'others': both would experience increased income and security. On the other hand, resistance of these standards marked a polity as backwards and fanatical, and therefore a threat to the security of all of mankind. More conservative European actors, on the other hand, believed that non-Western polities were incapable of assimilation because of biological and/or cultural factors. As Tzouvala (2020) argues, European polities tended to oscillate back and forth between holding out the promise of recognition

of internal sovereignty of non-Western polities if they assimilated to these standards, and pessimism about the possibility of assimilation, which justified more bellicose policies.

These standards of civilization produced new divisions within peripheral polities. Although there is a tendency in the literature on non-Western responses to European expansion to dichotomize the resulting social conflicts as pitting Westernizers against reactionaries, the reality — and the legacies of these divisions — is much more complex. The attitudes of actors in non-Western polities towards the standards of civilization emerging from the European empires varied along several dimensions. First, political actors disagreed about whether or not European empires would ever willingly recognize non-Western polities as equals. Importantly, pessimism about whether it was possible to gain Western recognition did not necessarily map onto an anti-reformist position. In fact, the belief that conflict with European empires was inevitable fueled some of the most radical reformists in non-Western polities. Many of the Young Turks, for example, did not believe that Britain, France, and Russia would recognize full Ottoman sovereignty and autonomy, even though they advocated for deep social changes, and this perspective has remained hegemonic within the Turkish military field (Bora 2003; Canefe and Bora 2003). Consequently, secular Turks have been divided between a more liberal camp that has favored greater integration with Europe, and a more nationalist camp that has remained skeptical of European intentions even as they have advocated for institutional reforms that would mimic aspects of Western societies in the interest of catching up economically and militarily.

Secondly, actors and groups disagreed about the sources of European superiority. At issue here was whether the economic and military strength of the European empires reflected deeper cultural differences. One faction regarded the European strength as the result of improved practical and technical knowledge that could be incorporated without more fundamental changes to non-

Western subjectivities and cultural institutions. With the Ottoman Empire, the Young Ottoman movement, which mobilized in opposition to what they viewed as inauthentic and excessively mimetic reforms undertaken in the Tanzimat era, and the neo-absolutist reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II represent distinct versions of this viewpoint (Çiçek 2010; Turnaoğlu 2017a). Another group believed that the power deficit was the result of more basic philosophical changes in European societies that required a thorough uprooting of indigenous epistemologies. The Young Turk adherents of Positivism and European materialist philosophy and many of the officers trained in elite Ottoman military academies beginning in the last third of the 19th century adopted this position, and this position became hegemonic in the early years of the Turkish Republic (Turnaoğlu 2017b; 2017a; Hanioğlu 2001; 2008). A third faction regarded the increased wealth of European societies as the result of their *immorality* and lack of scruples, and therefore resisted any kind of assimilation. The most powerful conservative members of the Islamic clergy in the late Ottoman Empire best represent this perspective, although as Bein (2011) and Dorroll (2014) show in different ways, this view was not unanimous in the Islamic religious field. The "whip of external necessity" created by European imperial expansion generated pressures for reform within the Ottoman state, but how actors interpreted these pressures and the responses that they generated depended on the taken-for-granted presuppositions that were common in the social fields that they belonged to.

The status of religious teachings, practices, and leadership in Ottoman politics and society was a particularly important source of disagreement among state elites in debates about how to respond to the power gap between the Ottoman Empire and its European rivals. Both the exile and military wings of the Young Turk movement believed that the clerical class, the *ulema*, constituted an impediment to political and social modernization that would be necessary to save the empire from

collapse. As followers of Positivist and materialist doctrines of European thought, the Young Turks believed that law and education had to be grounded in rationalist Enlightenment principles, rather than following Islamic doctrines (Hanioğlu 2001; 2008). The hostility to religion tout court that is often attributed to the Young Turk movement is somewhat exaggerated, as important members of the Young Turk intelligentsia such as Ziya Gokalp believed that Islam served as an important social glue that preserved solidarity in societies undergoing rapid transformations (Dressler 2015). Nonetheless, the Young Turk movements were uniformly and strongly anticlerical. They believed that undermining the institutional power of the *ulema* was a necessary step for transforming Ottoman society along rationalist lines (Lord 2018). In this sense, they had a strong affinity with French republicanism (Turnaoğlu 2017a).

For their part, the *ulema* were also divided between recalcitrant conservatives and more modernist clerics who believed that religious education and practices had to change in order to keep up with developments in science, geopolitics, and commerce (Bein 2011). The Tanzimat reforms that eroded legal distinctions between the empire's Muslim and non-Muslim subjects also chipped away at the institutional sources of clerical authority, particularly in the legal realm (Findley 2008). The reign of Abdulhamid II expanded the geographical reach of the clerical elite associated with the office of the Sheik ul-Islam, and restored the symbolic centrality of the empire's Islamic identity. However, new statutory courts and new-style schools under the authority of specialized ministries continued to encroach on the jurisdiction of the religious establishment (Bein 2011).

From the perspective of conservative members of the *ulema*, the expansion of European-style education for the empire's elites constituted a major threat to the stability of the empire. For these clerics, the Muslim backlash to the Tanzimat reforms and what they viewed as the declining morals

and religiosity of the European empires demonstrated the dangers of imposing rationalist blueprints on Ottoman society. More modernist clerics who had received educations in new-style schools were more open to reforms that encroached on traditional clerical domains in the legal and educational fields, but they also had reservations about the ambitions of the more radical Young Turks. Whereas the Young Turks viewed emulation of European ways of living and knowing as means of catching up to the great powers in terms of economic and military strength, the clerical elite believed that it was necessary to conserve the empire's Islamic identity. While most clerics recognized the need to import European knowledge of science and technology, they believed that reforms should be gradual and cautious.

The leaders of the early Turkish Republic shared the Young Turks' anti-clericalism and belief in the need to appropriate European ways of knowing and being. The abolition of the caliphate and the initiative to change the language of the call to prayer from Arabic to Turkish served the three purposes. First, they sharpened the contrast between the Ottoman and Republican political orders. Secondly, they subordinated the symbolic authority of the clerical elite to the new nationalist state project. The new government sought to construct a specifically Turkish Islam that broke from what it considered backwards foreign traditions associated with Arabs, thereby weakening the transnational religious ties that could undermine the authority of the new national government (Dorroll 2014). Finally, they sent a message to the European powers that the new government was no longer beholden to barbaric religious doctrines. Instead, the message they intended to send was that the state was grounded on secular, rationalist foundations, and that therefore the government should be regarded as an equal in the international system.

For early Republican policymakers, challenges to the new boundaries drawn between the religious and political spheres and to practices that sought to subordinate Islam to the nation-

building project constituted challenges to national security. Religious movements threatened to undermine the narrative of modernization and civilization that the government sought to establish both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, religious movements could interfere with the ability to establish alliances with European or North American powers, which were necessary to protect the country's geopolitical interests in the interwar and Cold War international systems and to gain access to technology, knowledge, capital, and markets that would raise the country's level of development. From the perspective of Kemalist political and military leaders, Islamist groups would only increase the country's temporal insecurity by aligning Turkey internationally with countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and other Islamic societies that they regarded as backwards.

However, Islamist groups have responded to perceptions of temporal insecurity and geopolitical pressures to assimilate to Western ways of knowing and being in different ways. Influential religious figures in late Ottoman and Turkish society, such as the Sufi leader Said Nursi, have sought to synthesize Western and Islamic epistemological and moral principles, rather than perceiving the relationship between Europe and the Islamic world as inevitably antagonistic (Yavuz 2005). Islamism has not been uniformly antagonistic to the efforts to construct a Turkish national identity either, despite the tension that exists between commitments to an Islamic transnational community and Turkish particularism. The battles within the Islamist political field between supporters of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Fethullah Gulen movement have deep historical roots, as Islamic clerical and lay leaders have developed contradictory responses to the perception of temporal insecurity vis-a-vis the West (Kandil 2016).

The temporal insecurity that European standards of civilization gave rise to generated complex divisions over geopolitical alignments, the role of religion in politics and society, and the 'correct'

interpretation of Islamic doctrines (Kadioğlu 1996). How this complex discursive field translated into concrete social divisions depended on the articulatory practices of state and military elites, political parties, religious organizations, and other groups. In particular, the Kemalist project of creating 'desired citizens' (I. Yilmaz 2021) through policies that granted access to education, state contracts, capital, and other resources to ethnic Turks who wore western attire and did not engage in public displays of piety produced overlapping religious and economic cleavages. Early Republican elites hoped that policies that suppressed religious education and prevented students and civil servants from wearing specifically Islamic clothing in public spaces would compel Turks to adopt 'civilized' ways of life. Instead, these policies embittered pious Turks who believed that they were becoming second class citizens because they refused to give up their traditional beliefs (Demiralp 2012). Polarization between secular and pious Turks was not foreordained; rather, policies that linked the allocation of economic resources to outward displays of modern ways of living and thinking deepened the schism between these groups and impeded the formation of cross-cutting coalitions.

4.3: Kemalism as Militarism

My argument in this section is that the perception of the increasing scale of social resources required for maintaining a modern military eroded distinctions between war time and peace time, domestic and foreign policy, and security and non-security issues for early Republican state elites. The successful mobilization of social resources for military purposes requires the construction of political infrastructures that enable the state to raise revenues; conscript and/or recruit soldiers; provide those soldiers with food and weapons; transport soldiers, provisions, weapons, and machinery to front lines; and coordinate troop movements across large distances (Barkawi 2006; Goddard and Nexon 2016). The construction of these military infrastructures is political in two

senses (Cowen 2014). First, the resources that are put to military use could be employed for other purposes like production and commerce. For example, tax revenue that goes to military spending could instead be used for development of the domestic economy or for social expenditures, peasants may be reluctant to send children to war or pay taxes if they do not believe that they have a stake in the armed conflict. Secondly, the successful mobilization of military resources requires that a whole series of principal-agent relations to operate smoothly, without agents attempting to exercise hold-up power by delaying the mobilization of resources in order to extract more revenue or power from the state. Ottoman military endeavors were plagued by the Sultan's reliance on provincial notables for the mobilization of manpower because these actors routinely attempted to extort funding and privileges from Istanbul (V. Aksan 2021). In the age of industrial warfare, organized labor could use strikes in strategically important industries to secure more favorable working conditions and guarantees of political involvement (Kier 2021). The ability to win and hold territory thus depends on the construction of social institutions that naturalize the use of social resources for military mobilization and facilitate top-down coordination of large-scale social action. Huntington's argument that tactics should be the concern of military leaders while civilian politicians should be responsible for strategic planning does not hold because the military leadership's freedom to choose different tactical options depends on the smooth operation of these politically-created military infrastructures (R. Brooks 2020).

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire had to respond to major changes in the way that wars were fought and paid for. Like other "composite states" (Elliott 2009) that were characterized by legal pluralism and decentralized control over far-flung imperial holdings, the Ottoman state had to find ways to increase revenues in order to pay for state defense without destabilizing the internal political equilibrium between the sultan, the central bureaucracy, and

provincial governors and notables (ayaans) (Findley 2008; Hanioğlu 2008; V. H. Aksan 2007). Additionally, the Janissary corps, which formed the cornerstone of imperial defense, demonstrated an inability to keep up with the tactical and technological innovations of other European militaries (V. Aksan 2021). Fiscal-military reforms were urgently needed in the face of aggression by rival empires such as Russia, Britain, and France, but the treatment could turn out to be worse than the disease if reforms undermined the social relations that maintained stability within the empire.

The Kemalist state project was shaped by the experiences of fiscal-military reform and imperial dismemberment during the long 19th century, and by the acquisition of ideas about total warfare that had taken hold in post-Napoleonic continental Europe (especially in Prussia). The political and military leadership of the early Republic was largely products of the military academies that the imperial state established as part of its effort to modernize the officer corps (Gruesshaber 2018; Uyar and Güvenç 2022). After the Franco-Prussian War resulted in the establishment of the German Empire, Prussian officers displaced their French counterparts at the head of these military academies (Provence 2017). Ottoman officers learned that modern warfare involved the entirety of a society's manpower and resources, and that survival in the struggle between states required the construction of a "nation in arms" (Hanioğlu 2008). The boundaries that had existed between war and peace, and between civilian and military life, had been eroded by the increasing technological sophistication and resource intensity of modern warfare (D. A. Bell 2007).

The Ottoman experiences in the Balkan Wars and World War I further demonstrated to early Republican leaders that national security was inseparable from economic and social policy. The low productivity of agriculture throughout much of the Ottoman Empire exerted a tremendous drag effect on the efforts to mobilize resources for the war (Akın 2018). First, low technological sophistication meant that the agricultural sector competed with the military for the labor of young

men, without whom entire families and communities would be destitute. This factor contributed to the high rates of desertion across all of the Ottoman millets, including Muslim communities. Secondly, the agricultural sector in many parts of the empire was largely subsistence oriented and operated outside of the cash economy, so tax revenues were extremely limited. Finally, the low productivity of agriculture meant that provisioning the army came at the expense of feeding the remaining civilian population. The major drag that economic weakness created for military mobilization demonstrated to early Republican state elites and military actors that national defense required economic planning and an activist state, even if these officers and state elites disagreed about which economic sectors to promote.

Increased economic intervention was only one example of how World War I resulted in the state becoming a stronger presence in the day-to-day lives of most of the population (Akın 2018). Although the strategic calculus about which areas of social and economic policy to prioritize would change with the end of the war and the transition to the Republic, the presence of the state in daily life only intensified under the new regime. The social reproduction of military power became the top priority that guided policymaking in the early republic (Altinay 2004). Here, I follow feminist political economists in conceiving of social reproduction broadly to include investments in the biological reproduction of the military-aged population (i.e. creating incentives to increase birthrates, investing in health care and food provision to make sure that children survive) and the cultural reproduction of militarist subjectivities (i.e., the veneration of the military in public rituals, emphasizing the centrality of military service to full citizenship through education and the media, preparing future soldiers to be willing to fight, kill, and die for the imagined national community) (Bakker 2007; Bhattacharya 2017; V. S. Peterson 2020). Early Republican political and military leaders were preoccupied with insuring that, whenever neighboring states or European empires

decided they wanted to try to capture Turkish territory, Turkish citizens would be willing and able to defend the state (Altinay 2004; S. Kaplan 2006).

The logic of military necessity clashed with other components of the Kemalist project, however. In particular, the need to raise taxes to rebuild and modernize the military increased tensions between the central government and the mass of peasants who lived outside of the major cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara (Metinsoy 2020; 2021). The presence of invading militaries during World War I and the ensuing War for Independence and the wartime conscription of young men and requisition of farm animals devastated the Turkish countryside (Akın 2018). At the same time, the country also had to settle and incorporate refugees from the Balkans and Caucasus (Gingeras 2019, 226–40). To gain the support of the population for the Kemalist state project, the government developed a 'cult of the peasantry,' symbolically venerating Turkish cultivators as the heart of the country. Yet at the same time, the government increased the tax burden while also upending traditional religious institutions (Jacoby 2006; Metinsoy 2021). Thus the Kemalist state project had to deal with widespread noncompliance and frequent localized insurrections (many of which also had simultaneous economic, religious, and ethnic overtones) (Brockett 1998).

4.4: Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted three dimensions of the Kemalist articulation of Turkish national identity that would have long lasting and deleterious consequences for Turkish democracy: its ethnocentrism, its temporal character, and its militarism. I have argued that each of these components of the Kemalist articulation of nationalism blurred the boundaries between foreign and domestic policy, security and non-security issues, state and civil society, and the public and private sectors that, in extant civil-military relations research, delimit the appropriate range of policies that military actors should have a say in. For Turkish military officers who would be

trained in military academies that taught the Kemalist understanding of national identity and interests, national security was an elastic concept because national sovereignty was always under threat from potential separatist groups, predatory foreign powers, reactionary Islamists, and naïve liberals. Understanding why military actors repeatedly intervened in Turkish politics, and what they were hoping to achieve when they did so, requires an examination of the historical construction of national security imaginaries.

At the same time, I have also examined the objective sociohistorical processes and institutional contexts (Goswami 2002) that gave rise to the subjective threat perceptions of late Ottoman and early Republican political and military leaders. The Ottoman Empire's interaction with rapidly industrializing and expanding European empires and nascent nation-states with novel ideologies of political legitimation created a "whip of external necessity" that compelled the political and military leaders of the empire to implement reforms in order to catch up and fend off dismemberment by its geopolitical rivals. Furthermore, temporal ideologies of civilizational progress (Buzan and Lawson 2015; Zeglen 2023) had a strong influence on the political and military actors who would go on to become the first generation of political leaders in the Turkish Republic. It is not a coincidence that Kemalism, and the Young Turk ideologies that preceded and gave rise to it, closely resembled state projects of defensive modernization and catch-up development in other polities that were threatened by European imperialism and adjusting to nascent nationalist ideologies (Duzgun 2018a; 2018b). At the same time, however, these pressures for change generated by these external threats and opportunities were refracted by taken-for-granted assumptions and material interests generated by existing political institutions, producing new, intersecting axes of social division that would structure Turkish politics in the years that follow.

My analysis departs from the common view that the Turkish political and military leadership has pursued ethnocultural nationalism toward Turkey's non-Muslims, while applying civic-territorial nationalism toward Muslims, including Kurds and non-Turkish-speaking Muslim immigrants (e.g., Eligür 2019, 158–59; Çağaptay 2006). After World War I and the Armenian Genocide, this view holds, Turkish leaders considered Christians to be unassimilable into the national community, whereas Kurds, Balkan refugees, and 'heterodox' Muslim communities (e.g. the Alevis) were held to be 'future Turks' (Yeğen 2009) that would gain full citizenship status as long as they conformed to the dominant Turkish culture, including speaking Turkish in public and worshipping at state-approved religious institutions. This openness to the possibility that ethnic minorities and heterodox Muslims could eventually become Turks stands in contrast to the outright exclusion that Greek and Armenian Christian populations were subjected to in the new Republic. Furthermore, the possibility of cultural assimilation stands in contrast to biological understandings of the nation-form that explicitly deny the possibility that ethnic minorities could become members of the dominant group (Çağaptay 2004).

In my view, there are two problems with the "ethnic nationalism towards Christians, civic-territorial nationalism towards Muslims" perspective. First, the emphasis on the openness of Turkish nationalism to the assimilation of non-Turkish Muslims or non-Sunni Turks downplays what I take to be a central aspect of the Kemalist state project: the securitization and elimination of cultural difference. The Kemalist understanding of Turkish nationalism created a relationship of inequality and domination between the Sunni Turkish majority and the Kurdish and Alevi minorities, which has been enforced through state and state-sanctioned vigilante violence (Yeğen

2007; 2021; Tambar 2014; 2016; Ünlü 2016; Yadirgi 2017).[1] Furthermore, the promise of citizenship in return for assimilation has coincided with state policies designed to break up concentrations of Kurds and Alevis through forced resettlement, the deliberate withdrawal of public services and infrastructure from Kurdish-majority regions, and police harassment of these communities (Üngör 2008; Jongerden 2007; van Etten et al. 2008; Yeğen 2021). The focus on the possibility of assimilation in studies of Turkish nationalism naturalizes the creation of a social hierarchy based on ethnic characteristics and religious practices and distracts attention from the illiberal technologies of rule – including tutelary institutional designs, spaces governed by martial law, and military coups – needed to protect the social order.

My second objection to the "civic nationalism for Muslims, ethnic nationalism for non-Muslims" story is that it obscures the articulation of nationalism with patriarchy, class, and other forms of domination. As a consequence, it becomes difficult to see how nationalist ideologies sanction unequal power relationships among members of the dominant group. Feminist scholars of nationalism and state-formation have demonstrated that "the centrality of inheritance and intergenerational continuity [in nation-building projects] render 'family' a focal site of power relations with extensive, wide-ranging emotional, cultural, and political economic effects" (V. S. Peterson 2020, 179). Kemalist nationalism amounts to a claim of ownership over Rumelia and Anatolia on behalf of the Turkish national community, making intergenerational reproduction of modern ethnic Turkish Sunni Muslims a central element of state policy (I. Yilmaz 2021). As Peterson (2020, 180) argues, states that successfully foster intergenerational reproduction regulate sexual reproduction (by legally codifying and enforcing intimate – 'family' – relations), sustain

---

[1] I take the broader point that social science analyses that focus on the possibility of assimilation downplay or overlook the reality of inequality and domination that racialized and minority groups face from Jung (2009).

surplus resource accumulation (by commanding labor and juridically regulating inheritance of property and status/citizenship claims), and cultivate identification with and allegiance to the state (by legitimating internal hierarchies and stigmatizing outsiders as inferior and/or threatening). In the process of regulating sexual reproduction, sustaining surplus accumulation, and cultivating identification with the state, Kemalism produced an intersecting matrix of gender, class, status, and ethnic domination. And because military officers perceived the reproduction of this matrix of domination as the foundation of state sovereignty, they viewed efforts to alter these hierarchies as a threat to national security.

Chapter 5: First Democratic Spell, 1950-1960

This chapter has two explanatory objectives. First, it examines why Turkish political elites did not change the constitution before undertaking an elite-led transition to competitive multiparty politics in 1946-50. I argue that the same elite divisions that prompted the transition to a limited form of democracy also prevented incumbent elites from implementing institutional changes that would have introduced more checks and balances than the strongly majoritarian 1924 Constitution. Incumbent president İsmet İnönü lacked the support within the ruling Republican People's Party and within the military to implement constitutional reforms that would have reduced the power of leaders of the majority party in the Turkish National Assembly ahead of the 1950 election. Furthermore, to members of the RPP, the leadership of the Democrat Party did not necessarily represent a threat to the Kemalist state project because they had all served as RPP representatives or party-affiliated bureaucrats during the single-party era. Finally, the lack of reliable information about voter preferences made it difficult for incumbent political elites to predict the electoral outcomes, or even to have a sense of which social groups were likely to support the incumbent party. Uncertainty about the intentions of voters and opposition party leaders and divisions among incumbent elites prevented İnönü and his supporters from implementing reforms that would have checked the power of the party that won power in the country's first democratic election.

The second explanatory objective of the chapter is to examine how the decision to keep the 1924 Constitution in place interacted with other conjunctural developments to produce democratic breakdown. Early Republican political elites designed the 1924 Constitution to cement the Republican People's Party's hold on power by allowing the leader of the largest party in the Turkish National Assembly to govern without judicial oversight, and by uniting executive and

legislative power. The leader of the Democrat Party, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, used these institutional features to attempt to construct a new single-party authoritarian regime by stocking the bureaucracies and military leadership with party loyalists, implementing restrictions on freedoms of the press and association, and launching investigations into RPP finances. Menderes's authoritarian tendencies became particularly pronounced with the end of the Korean War, which resulted in a decline of prices for Turkey's staple export commodities and a fiscal crisis.

Menderes's primary weakness stemmed from his inability to navigate divisions within the military. Executive aggrandizement provoked a military coup for two reasons. First, the policies that buttressed Menderes's support among the military leadership inflamed tensions within the military, with the losing faction becoming increasingly hostile to the government. The officer corps was divided between senior and junior officers over promotions, strategic priorities, and on the importance of formal classroom training and technical expertise. Additionally, both senior and junior officers were divided along the lines of ideology and political affiliation. Menderes sided with more conservative senior officers in debates over military reorganization, alienating junior officers. Secondly, military officers and soldiers were unwilling to undermine their public support and credibility in order to protect an increasingly unpopular and autocratic leader. Opposition mobilization in response to Menderes' authoritarian tendencies and the country's economic woes meant that he had to rely on the military to protect his hold on power. The displeasure among junior officers with the pace and direction of military reorganization, soldiers' unwillingness to open fire on protesters, and the persistent connections between İnönü and some senior military leaders resulted in the formation of a coup coalition that successfully overthrew Menderes's government on May 27, 1960.

5.1: Elite-led democratization, 1946-50

Turkey's first democratic spell began with the formation of the Democrat Party by a group of dissident elites in 1946, and culminated in that party's victory over the incumbent Republican People's Party in the 1950 elections and the subsequent peaceful transition of power. Political liberalization took place in a controlled, top-down fashion in the absence of a revolutionary push from below (VanderLippe 2005; Kandil 2016). Although some scholars attribute the democratic transition to the changing international structure with the beginning of the Cold War,[2] internalist arguments that emphasize elite divisions over the direction of economic policy, alienation of core RPP constituencies as a consequence of wartime policies, and divisions within the military over promotions, reorganization, and the military's future role in society were all key drivers of the decision to liberalize. Although the Democrat Party's landslide victory in the 1950 election was aided by a highly majoritarian electoral system (Çarkoğlu and Aksen 2019, 44–45), it reflected widespread discontent with the authoritarianism and interventionist policies of the RPP.

However, despite attacking the RPP's authoritarian tendencies during the run-up to the 1950 election, the Democrat Party, led by Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, proved to be just as intolerant of political opposition when they were in power. Admission to NATO and strong economic performance driven by high commodity prices and the influx of Marshall Plan aid

---

[2] The work of Hakan Yılmaz and Hazem Kandil provide examples of this perspective, emphasizing the importance of competitive elections for receipt of foreign aid from the United States and admission into NATO (Yılmaz 1997; 2002; Kandil 2016). However, as Kayaoglu points out, the externalist perspective would need to explain why Spain and Portugal did not face similar pressures to democratize during this period, despite Spain's neutrality in World War II and similar regime types and perceptions of strategic importance to the Western bloc (B. Kayaoğlu 2009).

overshadowed harassment of journalists and labor organizers during the early years of the DP's time in office, but as economic growth slowed and chronic budget deficits produced inflation, the DP's authoritarian tendencies became more severe (Zürcher 2004; Pelt 2014). Pogroms against Greeks and Armenians resulting from Menderes's stoking of nationalist sentiment during a crisis over Cyprus in 1955 created a split within the governing party over Menderes's authoritarianism (Zürcher 2004, 255), and the failure to reorganize military promotions and facilitate the adoption of new warfighting technologies alienated military officers who once welcomed the change in parties (Zürcher 2004, 238–39; Kandil 2016, 163–64). As student unrest and RPP criticism increased, Menderes alienated allies and members of the security apparatus by violently cracking down on protests and launching investigations into activities of the RPP leadership (Zürcher 2004, 240). The Democrat Party was overthrown in a coup in 1960, ending Turkey's first democratic spell and bringing about a top-down reorganization of politics.

Rather than reflecting deep-seated divisions between a secular, statist "center" and a pious, agrarian capitalist "periphery," (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009), a division ¨ between the Kemalist establishment and the disenfranchised provincial bourgeoisie,2 or an "immature" political culture (Ahmad 2008, 235), I will argue that inability of the limited political opening to become self-reinforcing was a consequence of the institutional framework inherited from the single-party era. This constitution was designed to facilitate the state's penetration of society and allow it to implement radical political, economic, and social reforms without being encumbered by groups with different interests or social imaginaries. It was not designed to protect individual rights and liberties, or to check the arbitrary exercise of state power against political opposition. The breakdown of democracy was a logical consequence of maintaining a political order that was designed to limit accountability and debate over the direction of national policy.

In the next subsection, I will examine the institutional choices and, just as importantly, the noncloices that were made in the critical juncture of 1946-50. Although the decision of incumbent elites to maintain an institutional framework with majoritarian electoral rules, no balance of powers between political branches, and no veto gates to check the majority party is surprising from the standpoint of some models of elite institutional choice, I will argue that a shared preference among elite factions to limit pluralism, imperfect information about the balance of political forces, and divisions among incumbent elites made a "gaming democracy" strategy unappealing and difficult to implement for Ismet Inonu. Then, I will use a brief event history analysis to demonstrate that institutions provide a better explanation for the failure of democracy to become self-reproducing than explanations that foreground social cleavages or political culture.

5.2: Keeping the rules of the game

From the perspective of "gaming democracy" theory (Albertus and Menaldo 2014; 2017), the decision to maintain an institutional framework with majoritarian electoral rules and no veto gates is puzzling. They predict that during elite-led democratic transitions, incumbents will use their leverage over outsider elites and non-elites to bargain for rules that will constrain electoral majorities through proportional representation and the introduction of counter-majoritarian institutions like a constitutional court, an upper house with electoral rules that favor incumbent elites (or is appointed by the incumbent party), or reserves seats in the lower house. Why did the incumbent elites in Turkey's first transition to democracy stick to a highly majoritarian framework?

One reason is that the splits within the ruling Republican People's Party that resulted in the formation of the Democrat Party also constrained the ability of Ismet Inonu to change the rules of the game. The ability of authoritarian incumbents to make institutional changes ahead of a

transition to electoral democracy depends on authoritarian elites sharing the same preferences (Albertus and Menaldo 2017, 29). However, among elites who remained in the RPP, the extent of loyalty to Inonu's leadership was questionable. Before succeeding Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as the leader of the Turkish Republic in 1938, Inonu had been cast out of national politics because he was on the losing side of the factional struggles within the party over the direction of economic policy during the mid-1930s (VanderLippe 2005, 25). In the years before his death, Ataturk had sided with the economic liberals within his government due to slow economic growth and high inflation, resulting in the elevation of Celal Bayar, who would become a founding member of the Democrat Party, and Inonu's departure from politics altogether. The onset of World War II temporarily unified the elite in the face of perceived threats to territorial unity from Italian aggression, but intra-elite divisions reemerged as both the Allied and Axis powers promoted their interests in Ankara and as mobilization for defense created fiscal pressure and economic dislocation (VanderLippe 2005). If Inonu were to try to initiate institutional changes that would tip the scales in favor of the incumbent party, it is not clear that he would have received unanimous support from the members that remained.

Furthermore, the officer corps was as divided as the civilian elite in the wake of World War II. A group within the army that strongly supported ending the single-party regime had emerged in the early post-war years, and effectively aligned with the Democrat Party (W. Hale 2011, 197). Many officers resented the replacement of Marshall Fevzi Cakmak, the Chief of Staff for the first 22 years of the Republic and an ally of the religious-nationalist tendency in Turkish politics, and other top military leaders with Inonu loyalists, as well as the 1949 law that subordinated the Chief of Staff to the Defense Minister rather than the Prime Minister (Kandil 2016, 163). Additionally, there were important divisions between senior and junior officers over the incorporation of new

technologies and promotion for officers with technical skills (Zürcher 2004, 238–39) many junior officers resented Turkey's neutrality during World War II and placed the blame on their senior commanders (Kandil 2016, 163). "Many young officers became convinced that they knew more about modern warfare than their superiors, but were frustrated by the rigid hierarchy within the armed forces" (W. Hale 2011, 198). A group of Turkish officers formed an alliance with the Democrat Party leadership ahead of the 1950 election, promising their support for a transition of power in return for military reorganization, and two of these officers – Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek and General Fahri Belen – served in the cabinet under the Democrat Party (W. Hale 2011; Kandil 2016). Thus, an attempt to change the rules of the game in order to favor the RPP or to maintain policy stability could have triggered a split within the military and a possible coup attempt, or an unwillingness to support the incumbents in the face of demonstrations.

While splits within the ruling party and the military provided supply-side constraints to institutional change in the lead-up to the 1950 election, the biographies of the leaders of the Democrat Party provide a complementary explanation for the lack of demand for a new set of rules that defended the status quo. The leaders of the opposition party did not have their roots in popular social movements or the Islamic clergy. Instead, they were former members of the ruling CHP with solid nationalist and Kemalist credentials. The man who would become president under the Democrat Party government, Celal Bayar, had been a member of the Committee for Union and Progress, a leader in the armed resistance to foreign occupation during the Turkish War for Independence, and had held key positions in the cabinet under Mustafa Kemal, including serving as his last prime minister after Kemal sacked Inonu (Özbudun 2013; VanderLippe 2005). It would be difficult to argue that he represented a new force in Turkish society or that he represented a suppressed Islamist or pro-peasant tendency. Despite the increasingly heated debates over the

direction of economic policy over the course of the 1930s, "political debate in Turkey remained confined to a small group within the single party, and to a narrow range of political possibilities. Politically, the differences between Ataturk, Inonu, and Bayar remained quite limited, a matter of subtle differences of emphasis within general agreement on the larger assumptions regarding the nature of the Turkish homeland and the role of the state" (VanderLippe 2005, 25). Given the degree of acrimony that developed over the course of the democratic spell, there is a temptation to view the division between the CHP and the DP as a reflection of deeper social tensions or elite polarization. However, reading history backwards in this way would be a mistake. There was no indication at this point that a Democrat Party victory would constitute a threat to the very existence of the CHP, and elites within the incumbent party likely did not see a need to embed safeguards of their influence within the constitution.

Another reason demand for institutional changes leading up to the 1950 elections was low was that the leaders of the incumbent party believed that they would win. Authoritarian elections are not credible sources of information about support for the incumbent party precisely because they are not competitive and do not take place in conditions in which citizens feel free to express their political opinions (Brancati 2014). Therefore, previous elections could have provided the CHP leadership with a reliable picture of genuine support for the party throughout the country. Furthermore, in 1950 modern public opinion polling was still in its infancy in the United States, and the communications and transportation infrastructure in Turkey would not have supported the conduct of surveys that could inform incumbent leaders about their standing with the population. Additionally, the CHP retained the loyalty of notables in eastern Anatolia, where patron-client relations were stronger than in the parts of central Anatolia that had been incorporated into national and international markets (Jacoby 2006). While analyses of the 1950 elections highlight the

importance of the nascent commercial bourgeoisie for the DP's electoral success (Abou-El-Fadl 2019), it is not obvious that the CHP could have anticipated the extent to which this socioeconomic group would defect from their coalition. CHP policies that deliberately aimed to replace the Christian Greek and Armenian commercial class with Turkish Muslims during the first decades of the Republic (Karataşlı and Kumral 2019). Indeed, Özbudun referred to the DP's 1950 victory as a "stunning election" from the perspective of the incumbents(Özbudun 2013, 36). Ismet Inonu and his allies within the RPP may have felt that the changes of victory under the established rules were good enough that it was not worth undergoing a process of institutional change that could have alienated remaining party members or military officers.

Finally, the decision to stick with the majoritarian institutional framework reflected their continued belief that excessive pluralism could undermine territorial integrity and disrupt catch-up development. While the transition to multiparty politics did coincide with an easing of restrictions on press freedoms and the ability to establish organizations (including labor unions), these reforms did not include the creation of constitutional courts that could protect individual civil liberties, nor did they include the right to strike. Elites in both parties were suspicious of groups that organized on the basis of class or ethnic identity. The threat of communist subversion, increasing concerns about labor militancy, and persistent concern about unrest among the Kurdish population of the southeast likely informed the lack of a push for institutional changes that could have rigorously protected individual rights against arbitrary state laws, or allowed for the representation of a wider range of interests and ideologies in the legislature at the expense of the largest party. The institutional framework that was designed to facilitate top-down social engineering during the single-party era was not changed because elites still believed in the need

for the state to act as a vanguard of modernization. Protections for individuals or groups with alternative visions of modernization risked enhancing their disruptive capacity.[3]

5.3: Menderes in Power

In the years between 1946 and 1950, the Democrat Party campaigned on a platform of democratization. They argued that the Republican People's Party had used its time in office to reward cronies with confiscated property and patronage; they had abused the peasantry with excessive taxation and arbitrary exercises of authority by the gendarmes; and they had not been held accountable for economic policies that resulted in high levels of inflation and agrarian distress. However, a decade later, citizens ranging from military officers and RPP elites to student demonstrators expressed their concern that Adnan Menderes, the DP's Prime Minister, was using the tremendous power allocated to his office by the strongly majoritarian constitution inherited from the single-party era to arrogate power to himself, attack perceived opponents, and entrench the DP in power. As Democrat Party assembly members prepared to launch an investigation of RPP activities and Menderes called on the military to put down student protests roiling the country's largest universities, a coalition consisting largely of junior military officers overthrew Menderes in May 1960. The end of first democratic spell illustrates that executive aggrandizement (Bermeo 2016) and military coups are not always alternative pathways of democratic breakdown, but are often sequentially linked.

---

[3] Here I suggest that the relationship between economic modernization and democratization is mediated by the ability of social groups, such as the working class, to disrupt production in order to extract concessions from political and economic elites (Usmani 2018). Where I depart from Usmani is that I argue that institutional choices can enhance or weaken the disruptive capacity of social groups, whereas Usmani assumes disruptive capacity to simply be a function of the ratio of industrial workers to the working-age population.

Understanding the breakdown of the first democratic spell requires explaining how two parties that largely agreed on domestic and foreign policies (Özbudun 2013, 36) became so polarized over the course of the decade. Although the Democrat Party portrayed itself as the party of the peripheral "outsiders," and their infrastructural investments and expansion of access to credit transformed the countryside during the boom years in the first half of the decade, this incorporation of the peasantry was not fueled by redistribution at the expense of incumbent elites (Zürcher 2004, 224). Indeed, Marshall Plan aid that funded highway construction allowed the Democrats to incorporate the peasantry without implementing land reform programs that would have harmed the economic interests of large landowners like Menderes (Adalet 2018). Thus, political economy theories of democratic backsliding that focus on social conflict over redistribution or intra-elite conflict over the distribution of rents provide little explanatory leverage. While the economic downturn that resulted from the decline of agricultural commodity prices following the end of the Korean War resulted in a loss of public support for Menderes that would have put pressure on any political leader, exogenous economic shocks are an insufficient explanation for democratic backsliding because their political effects are mediated through institutions (Andersen 2019). Similarly, while one could rightly point out that Menderes was less than entirely committed to democracy in principle and viewed any criticism or dissent as a threat to his authority, these agent-centered explanations also need to be put in an institutional context. The survival of democracy only becomes contingent on the preferences of individual leaders in institutional frameworks that unite legislative and executive authority, reward parties that win electoral majorities with the power to rewrite the rules of the game, do not limit the violence that executive actors can wield against perceived threats to national security, and do not provide opposition groups with recourse in the event that the incumbent party tries to skew the playing field to entrench their own power.

If Menderes had to negotiate with other actors that had different preferences, such as coalition partners or other leaders with different electoral calculations, he may not have been able to push through legislation that restricted press freedoms or limited the ability of opposition parties to campaign publicly.

Indeed, the continuity in the rules of the game from the single-party period to the era of multi-party competition provides a key to understanding the failure of Turkey's first democratic spell. This continuity reflected a shared commitment to top-down social engineering and a concern that organizations that elites did not control would pose a threat to social order and territorial integrity. "As a party born in the single-party era, the Democrat Party shared with the ruling elite a belief in social engineering, a dislike and fear of any dissidence/opposition" (Cizre 2008, 308). Under Mustafa Kemal, the Republican People's Party built a governing framework designed to facilitate elite-led social engineering, and to allow the state to respond effectively to groups that threatened to undermine social order by disrupting processes of nation-building and state-led economic development. Built in the wake of the trauma of imperial collapse and in response to insurrections that threatened the territorial integrity of the state, these institutions were designed to enable the ruling party to implement ambitious nation building and economic modernization agendas without being hampered by dissent from class-based organization or ethnic and religious minorities. Thus, it is not surprising that when a new party led by members of the established ruling class who shared the same nation-building and social modernization objectives took over this institutional apparatus, they used it to restrict press freedoms, constrain the formation of labor unions, ban strikes, and repress left-wing student activity (İnce 2012, 94–95). As long as the Democrat Party used the state's coercive apparatus against groups that elites in both major parties shared similar threat perceptions of, it is plausible to believe that some sort of elite settlement to

share the spoils of the state could have been reached.[4] However, the Democrat Party's paranoia that the RPP would use its connections in the military and bureaucracy to thwart their agenda and undermine their power combined with the DP's unchecked power to produce a security dilemma and, ultimately, a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Adnan Menderes's pre-emptive strikes against the RPP's influence within the state and organizational resources provoked the very military action that he sought to prevent.

Although the Democrat Party favored more liberal economic policies and a relaxation of secularist religious policies, the differences between them and the RPP were minimal and easy to exaggerate. However, the Democrat Party feared that the entrenchment of loyalists to Inonu and the RPP in the bureaucracy, military, and universities provided an incentive to use the unchecked power that the majority party could wield against the elite opposition. During the single-party era, "the state apparatus and the RPP machine had been merged to the extent that one could say that the party was just one of the instruments through which the state controlled and steered society" (Zürcher 2004, 221–22). The Democrats feared that state institutions, especially the highest ranking officers in the army, continued to be loyal to Inonu because of the historic role he had played in the founding of the republic (Ahmad 2008, 235–36). The influence of the RPP in the press, the universities, and the military made it easy for Menderes and other DP leaders to view public criticism as an indication of disloyal opposition to the regime, particularly given the RPP's history of authoritarian practices.

From the perspective of the Democrats, their 1950 election result indicated that they represented the popular will and should have a free hand to govern without having to negotiate

---

[4] Here I have in mind something like the 1958 Punto Fijo agreement between Venezuela's two largest parties, which led to three decades of stable, if also conservative and elitist, competitive politics (Karl 1987).

compromises with holdovers from the previous regime. The Turkish electoral system combined a simple-majority system with multimember constituencies at the provincial level (Özbudun 2013, 108–9). Certain populous provinces elected large numbers of deputies, such as Istanbul with twenty-seven seats in 1950, and the party that obtained a simple plurality of the votes won all the seats in such provinces, producing extremely disproportionate results at the national level. Thus, the Democrats were able to turn a 53.3 percent majority of total votes in the 1950 election into 83.8 percent of seats in the National Assembly, and 56.6 percent of votes into 93 percent of seats in the 1954 national elections (Özbudun 2013, 108–9; Çarkoğlu and Aksen 2019, 44). The electoral rules that governed elections in the 1950s contributed to political instability in two major ways. First, massive disproportionality in favor of the largest party meant that narrow majorities or pluralities of the national vote could translate into commanding supermajorities in the legislature. Thus, the governing party could claim to represent the general will and represent the opposition as enemies of 'the people' (Çinar and Sayin 2014, 368). Given that the electoral coalition supporting the Democrats consisted of a heterogeneous mix of urban middle class professional and businessmen who resented economic mismanagement during the war, peasants who resented over-taxation and abuse from tax collectors and gendarmes, religious conservatives who sought a more public role for Islam, and Kurdish minorities who resented the restrictive vision of national identity Kemalist elites, attacking the RPP and promoting the fear that they would overthrow the government provided a way to draw an internal frontier and create a "chain of equivalence" (Laclau and Mouffe 2014) that bound these political demands together into a common identity. In other words, heightening polarization and stirring up fear of the RPP as the secular authoritarian 'other' provided a way for the Democrats to articulate heterogeneous political demands into a common partisan identity.

112

Secondly, the extreme disproportionality of the electoral rules exacerbated the electoral weakness of the RPP. Research on authoritarian successor parties suggests that organizational autonomy and performance-based legitimacy built during the era of authoritarian rule can allow former ruling parties to have success in subsequent democratic regimes (Loxton 2018; Cheng and Huang 2018). The RPP had neither of these qualities. Under Mustafa Kemal, it eschewed building mediating institutions between the state and society, relying instead on a limited political coalition of civil servants, military officers, local notables, and urban professionals. It also showed little interest in expanding its provincial organization, given its control over the state bureaucracy (Esen 2014, 604–5, 609). Additionally, the ruling party was a highly personalistic organization that failed to develop regularized rules and procedures, leaving it rudderless after Kemal's death (Esen 2014, 609). Although US-based political scientists in the middle of the 20th Century regarded Kemal as a master institution-builder (Huntington 1968; Rustow 1968), in reality the organization that he built was ill-suited for competitive politics. However, under a more proportional set of electoral rules it could conceivably have played an important role in the formation of governing coalitions, as authoritarian successor parties have in Brazil and Indonesia (Power 2018; Slater and Wong 2018). Instead, the strongly majoritarian electoral rules created a perception among elite opponents of the Democrat Party that extra-institutional means such as a military coup were the only way to remove Menderes from office, a perception that grew stronger as Menderes became more authoritarian.

Thus, the electoral weakness of the Republican People's Party and the connections between RPP leaders and factions of the military officer corps created a security dilemma for Menderes and the Democrats. With the RPP's chances of returning to power through the ballot box diminishing during the economic boom of the first half of the decade, Menderes became increasingly concerned

that the party's leadership would conspire with the military to weaken and eventually unseat him. In December 1953, the Assembly requisitioned all of the RPP's material assets and handed them over to the Treasury, to go along with the People's Homes and People's Rooms – physical structures linked to government initiatives to promote literacy and Kemalist ideology during the single-party era – which the government disbanded in 1951. Also in 1953, the government passed a series of laws that placed severe restrictions on the press and the universities, prohibiting professors from taking part in "political" activities and making it easier to prosecute journalists (İnce 2012, 94). With the Democrat Party's ability to pass laws without having to negotiate with smaller parties, and with the broad powers of executive prerogative granted to the Prime Minister and his cabinet by the Turkish legal system, the DP faced few constraints as it sought to entrench itself in power. In 1954, the government introduced a new rule that any civil servant with more than 25 years of service could be suspended and sent into early retirement, a rule that also applied to judges and university professors and "completed the establishment of control over the executive and even over the judiciary" (Zürcher 2004, 230). These repressive policies were implemented despite the fact that the economy was booming, and the party was cruising to an even larger electoral victory in 1954.

As the economy began to cool off in 1955, acceptance of the DP's authoritarian tendencies began to diminish, particularly among intellectuals and military officers. Although the Democrats had made promises to influential junior officers that they would implement reforms that would reorganize the military and open up the path to promotion for officers with technical training, the government reneged because of concerns about alienating senior officers whose loyalty to the government was already questionable (W. Hale 2011, 197–98). Furthermore, increasing levels of inflation ate away at the salaries of these officers, further straining their patience (W. Hale 2011,

198). Menderes's standing within his own party was hurt by the anti-Greek pogroms during the Cyprus crisis of 1955, which were touched off by inflammatory statements by Menderes accusing Greeks of vandalizing Ataturk's birthplace in Thessaloniki (Salonica) (Ahmad 2008, 236–37). However, the Democrats still managed to win a commanding majority of seats in the 1957 election, despite their share of the popular vote dropping under 50 percent. It became increasingly clear to members of the military that the only way to unseat Menderes would be through a military coup. Deteriorating economic conditions and student demonstrations against the government's authoritarianism contributed to a crisis situation. However, instead of offering concessions to the opposition, Menderes and the Democrats in the Assembly decided to open an investigation into corruption by RPP figures in the spring of 1960 (Zürcher 2004, 240). Driven by a fear that the RPP was plotting to undermine him and his party, Menderes repeatedly took actions that would make the military more likely to intervene, and the prospect of the largest opposition party – Ataturk's own party – being closed finally brought the experiment with elected government to an end. On May 27, 1960, army units overthrow the government and arrested Menderes and Celal Bayar. Menderes would eventually be executed.

Ultimately, in their effort to stifle popular mobilization aimed at expanding citizenship rights to lower classes and ethnic and religious minorities, Turkish elites constructed a political regime that concentrated legislative power and the discretion to use coercion in the hands of the prime minister. Their goal in doing so was to create a government that was strong enough to enact modernizing reforms and weaken social groups that threatened to disrupt the social order in the pursuit of recognition. But by failing to reform these institutions before expanding political competition, Inonu and the RPP created an opening for an ambitious leader like Adnan Menderes to arrogate power by targeting RPP sympathizers within the state and, eventually, seeking to

115

weaken the party itself. Instead of a legal framework that facilitated the deepening of democracy and the expansion of citizenship rights by allowing new social groups to organize, push for recognition, and disrupt social production if political society failed to incorporate their demands, the RPP bequeathed a constitutional order that already concentrated legislative power and coercive authority in the hands of the executive. In trying to stifle social conflict, RPP leadership created an unstable institutional equilibrium that facilitated executive aggrandizement. The only way to prevent a slide into a new single-party authoritarian regime was for the military to overthrow the government.

Chapter 6: Second Democratic Spell, 1960-1980

Compared to the original 1924 constitution, which all but guaranteed single-party hegemony, and the highly restrictive 1982 constitution, the 1961 constitution stands out for its liberal features. Proportional representation and the protection of civil and political rights resulted in a more pluralistic party system. Protections for the autonomy of universities allowed them to become spaces of deliberation, contention, and activism. Clauses that protected the rights of labor unions to organize and undertake strike actions also altered the balance of political power between employers and workers, and between landlords and peasants. Although the new constitution also had distinctive tutelary features, such as the creation of the National Security Council, it nonetheless marked a rupture with the Republic's political traditions by opening up space for new parties and political identities to emerge.

While liberal and left-leaning commentators and scholars often regard the 1961 constitution with a degree of nostalgia, conservative nationalists regard the two decades that followed as a time of ideological excesses. The period witnessed high levels of social conflict and political violence, which conservative attribute to the permissiveness of the political system. During the second democratic spell, Turkey experienced an unprecedented wave of labor activism, peasant revolts, unrest on university campuses, the stirrings of Kurdish nationalist sentiment, violent conflict for control of peri-urban neighborhoods, and an escalating campaign of terror by left- and right-wing paramilitaries. Turkey also experienced economic problems that were common among developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s: surging energy costs, rising public debt, the inability to incorporate rural-urban migrants into formal labor markets, and conflict over taxation and food prices. Turkey's political system during this period was characterized by unstable multiparty governing coalitions, an unwillingness by political leaders to denounce violent

actions by groups on "their" side, political paralysis, and calls for the military to intervene. For the right, "virtually all the problems of the day stemmed from the 1961 constitution, which was deemed too liberal and therefore a luxury for Turkey at its stage of underdevelopment" (Ahmad 2010, 99).

With the economy in a balance of payments crisis and left-wing activists mobilizing on a large scale, conservative military and political leaders attempted to restore order by changing the constitution in 1971. In the "memorandum coup" of that year, the military leadership forced the elected government to resign in favor of a non-partisan technocratic caretaker government, which then implemented constitutional reforms that eroded the autonomy of universities and state-owned media, undermined freedoms of press and association, and created security courts that gave the military a free hand to deal with "subversive elements" (Ahmad 2010; Kandil 2016; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009). However, this intervention failed to put an end to the challenges that new social movements posed to the hegemonic articulation of national identity, interests, and boundaries. Instead, activists on the left and right became radicalized, while civilian governments continued to be too weak and fragmented to confront the growing structural economic crisis. As the violence reached a peak and as the government failed to come to terms with the debt crisis brought on by the sudden increase in interest rates on Turkey's sovereign debt, senior military officers overthrew the government on September 12, 1980, initiating another round of state violence and institutional engineering.

This chapter examines the process that resulted in the adoption of the 1961 constitution, and the contributions of those institutional choices to the political instability that characterized the 1960s and 1970s. I am particularly interested in two sets of questions. Regarding the origins of the 1961 constitution, I am interested in understanding why the military intervention produced a

constitution that stands out in Turkish history for its liberal and pluralistic features, despite long-standing suspicion of democracy within the officer corps? Furthermore, I am also interested in examining the degree of continuity with earlier Turkish constitutions. I argue that participants in the military coup and the constitutional design process were divided about how much power to delegate to elected leaders, and about how much autonomy universities and the media should have from elected political leaders and other power centers in the Turkish state. Contingent choices of procedures favored actors who sought to prevent elected leaders and majority parties from having the ability to dominate the state, as Adnan Menderes had done in the 1950s. As a consequence, the 1961 constitution featured proportional representation, created a new constitutional court, and contained provisions that protected universities and the state-owned media from political interference. At the same time, however, the new constitution still contained provisions that prevented political parties and social movements from challenging the boundaries of the political community or the Kemalist articulation of national identity. Furthermore, the new constitution created a National Security Council that provided senior military officers with an institutionalized voice in the policymaking process. Despite the new constitution's liberal and pluralistic features, it still established red lines that political actors could not cross, thereby reproducing patterns of ethnic and religious exclusion. The tensions between the inclusive and exclusionary aspects of the constitutional order would haunt Turkish democracy during the second spell.

Concerning the effects of the constitution on democratic consolidation, I ask whether the liberal and pluralistic features of the constitution were responsible for the degree of political violence and polarization in Turkish society during the 1960s and 1970s. Conservative political and military elites feared that the new institutional arrangements would open the door to political activism that challenged the social status quo. The wave of activism, social conflict, and political

violence that followed the return to civilian rule only deepened these concerns. While the fragmentation of the party system and the increase in social conflict were not entirely the results of institutional choices, I argue that the 1961 constitution created a favorable political opportunity structure for social movements and political parties that sought to challenge the Kemalist articulation of national identity, interests, and boundaries. The 1961 constitution created opportunities for liberal, leftist, Islamist, and far-right nationalist movements to advance alternative understandings of national identity, interests, and boundaries that clashed with those of military leaders. Urbanization, agrarian conflict, the global Cold War, and other conjunctural factors also contributed to the polarization and fragmentation of Turkish political society, but the 1961 constitution mediated the political consequences of heightened social conflict and the transnational circulation of new ideas by creating new opportunities for political mobilization that challenged hegemonic political ideas and practices. Lower barriers to entry for small ideological parties to enter the legislature and participate in governing coalitions facilitated the rise of the Islamist National Vision Movement and the far-right Nationalist Action Party, while provisions that allowed union activism and protected university autonomy created new opportunities for left-wing radicalism.

Furthermore, the new constitutional court and increasingly autonomous judiciary interpreted the constitution in a way that limited the prerogatives of the security services, which created increasing tensions between judges and military leaders during the 1970s. Lawyers, judges, and military actors disagreed about where to draw the boundary between legitimate political activity and internal threats to national security. The weakness of parallel state structures (Poulantzas 2017, chap. 5) like the National Security Council meant that there was no way to resolve classification struggles between the judiciary and the military over the distinction between

lawful political activism and unlawful subversive behavior (Norton 2014; 2022). Consequently, military actors and other members of the security state began to circumvent formal legal institutions in their efforts to combat left-wing and Kurdish political organizing by providing material, organizational, and discursive support to far-right paramilitary organizations. The collusion between right-wing paramilitaries and members of the security state exacerbated the centrifugal forces in Turkish society that produced a steady increase in political violence over the course of the 1970s.

With fragile multiparty coalitions unable to govern, political violence threatening to spiral out of control, and an escalating economic crisis, the military brought the second democratic spell to an end on September 11, 1980. The view that the 1961 constitution was too permissive for a country at Turkey's level of economic and social development has gained currency on the political right and among some academic commentators in the decades following its demise. While I agree that the electoral system contributed to the fragmentation of the party system, I argue that the interpretation of the second spell as being too open obscures the roots of political conflict in the foundational exclusions of the Turkish Republic. The ability of excluded or marginalized groups to challenge hegemonic definitions of national identity and interests constitutes a core feature of democracy. Yet military leaders refused to countenance such challenges because they feared that the success of socialist, Islamist, or Kurdish movements would alter Turkey's geopolitical alignments, weaken the state's control of borderland regions, and undermine the state's capacity to mobilize resources for self-defense. A rigid conception of Turkey's national identity, interests, and boundaries prompted members of the security state, conservative political elites, and right-wing terrorists to regard peasant movements, labor unrest, and movements for Kurdish cultural rights as existential threats or evidence of foreign machinations, rather than as legitimate

expressions of demands for social change. The fear of pluralism, rather than an excessive amount of it, caused the end of Turkey's second democratic spell.

6.1: Designing the new constitution

In the period that followed the military coup of May 27, 1960, members of the coup coalition faced the challenge of redesigning political institutions in a way that would limit the authority of any individual political leader or political party without undermining the state's ability to maintain social order in the context of economic modernization, urbanization, and the expansion of education. Some military officers doubted that such a compromise could be achieved within the framework of competitive elections and universal suffrage. Within the coup coalition, a group of officers led by Colonel Alparslan Turkeş, a far-right military officer who expressed as much disdain for İsmet İnönü and the Republican People's Party as for the Democrat Party government that the coup had overthrown, sought to consolidate a military dictatorship that would implement far-reaching social changes (Karpat 1970, 1663; Gourisse 2022b, 77). These officers were a minority, however, and most members of the coup coalition favored a return to elected civilian rule under new rules that would limit the power of political parties and elected leaders (Esen 2021, 207).

What drove elite institutional choices, beyond a desire to prevent a repeat of the experience of executive aggrandizement that the country had just experienced? Theories of elite-biased institutional choice assume that political elites have common objectives and understand the likely consequences of their institutional choices, even if they have no legal training or expertise (Albertus and Menaldo 2017, 29–30).[5] Indeed, many scholars interpret the 1960 coup and the 1961

---

[5] Strangely, Albertus and Menaldo (2017, 78) do not code the 1961 constitution as an "elite-biased" constitution, even though it was authored under a military dictatorship with minimal public input.

constitution as the work of a unified "statist elite" or "Republican establishment" (Belge 2006). From this perspective, the coup represented an attempt to eliminate a strong political party that represented the periphery – landowners, peasants, and pious Muslims – and design political institutions that would secure the autonomy of the state from elected political leaders, who were likely to represent these constituencies in the future (Karpat 1970; Heper 1985; Yavuz 2005). Other scholars regard the 1961 constitution as an expression of the military leadership's or the state elite's commitment to democratic ideals, regarding the 1960 intervention as a "democratic coup" (Varol 2012; 2017). All of these interpretations share the assumption that the military officers who led the coup and the legal academics and party cadres involved in the constitution-writing process shared a common political project.

However, recent scholarship on the 1960 coup (Esen 2021; Gourisse 2022b) and the process that produced the 1961 constitution (Akan 2011; Camelio 2015) have highlighted the multiple, contradictory objectives of the actors involved in establishing the new political order. Military actors provided limited input during the process of drafting the new constitution because of their lack of legal competence, and because of their preoccupation with restoring the chain of command within the military following a purge of pro-Democrat Party senior military officers (Camelio 2015, 122; Gourisse 2022b, 71). As Gourisse (2022b, 71) argues, "the 1960 coup was also a coup within the army." Although General Cemal Gürsel, who served as the head of the Turkish land forces, was the nominal leader of the coup coalition, frustrated junior officers who had grievances about blocked promotions, poor pay, and the slow pace of military reforms provided the impetus for coup plotting during the 1950s and constituted a majority of the Committee for National Unity that governed the country during the interregnum (Karpat 1970; Harris 2011, 204). Thus, while some members of the coup coalition had sought deep-seated social

and political reforms, other military officers joined the initiative because of the authoritarian turn and economic mismanagement of the Menderes government. The latter group was more content with restoring civilian rule quickly after making constitutional changes to prevent a single party from consolidating power over the military and bureaucracy, whereas the more radical junior officers like Turkeş sought to consolidate a longer-term military government (Esen 2021, 205; Gourisse 2022b, 72).

The legal experts that the leaders of the coup coalition delegated responsibility for drafting the constitution to also disagreed among themselves about how to structure the new political order. As I show below, one faction of legal experts sought to reimpose the statist, corporatist order that Mustafa Kemal had constructed during the single-party era. The other faction, by contrast, believed that elected politicians should have the ability to respond to demands for accountability and social change, but that the new constitution needed more checks and balances than the 1924 Constitution in order to prevent a recurrence of the executive aggrandizement that undermined democracy in the 1950s. Disagreements among the members of the committee of legal experts assigned with producing a draft constitution prompted military officers to restart the drafting process in October 1960, with a more public process that included members of the Republican People's Party and appointees of RPP-affiliated professional organizations. The inclusion of RPP cadres shifted the balance in favor of the more liberal faction of legal experts in the process of producing a new draft constitution, but gaining the approval of the military leadership required incorporating the new National Security Council. The divisions within the "state elite" that produced the new constitution reflected the emerging fault lines that would undermine the pursuit of a coherent state project in the decades to come.

At the same time, however, attention to the novel liberal and pluralistic features of the 1961 Constitution should not distract us from the persistent, foundational exclusions that remained in place during the new political order. Hostility to expressions of Kurdish cultural difference, to say nothing of demands for recognition, redistribution, and autonomy, structured the new constitutional order. The 1961 Constitution also sought to maintain the state's monopoly on the ability to authorize religious teachings and practices, despite the Committee for National Unity's and legal experts' expressed commitments to secularism and laicism. Not only did this draw the ire of pious Sunni Muslims who belonged to Sufi orders or communities that dissented from the state-approved version of Islam authorized by the Directory of Religious Affairs, but it also marginalized Alevis, whose beliefs and practices diverged significantly from those of the Sunni majority. The political order established by the 1961 Constitution, therefore, reproduced Sunni Turkish supremacy and sought to suppress religious pluralism. These constitutive exclusions and contradictions are central to understanding the social conflicts that Turkey experienced during the second democratic spell.

<p style="text-align:center">The Committee of Legal Scholars</p>

Because of the divisions within the coup coalition and the limited legal expertise of the military officers in charge, General Cemal Gürsel delegated responsibility for drafting the new constitution to a committee of ten elite legal academics. He chose Sıddık Sami Onar (1898-1972), the rector of Istanbul University, to lead the committee in charge of drafting the constitution. Onar acquired his position on the faculty at Istanbul University when the single-party government under Mustafa Kemal purged academics whose loyalty to the regime was suspect (Parslow 2018, 54–55). His views on jurisprudence reflected the corporatist and statist articulation of Kemalist ideology that prevailed in the 1930s. In particular, his approach granted the security services a

wide-ranging prerogative to respond to emergencies, and he believed that civil and religious liberties were secondary to the state's responsibility to cultivate modern ways of life among citizens (Parslow 2018). The draft that the committee produced reflected Onar's strong statist proclivities and belief in the necessity of granting the executive and security services wide discretionary powers during emergencies (Parslow 2016; 2018). It also reflected the "corporatist solidarism" that characterized Kemalism in the 1920s and 1930s (Parla and Davison 2004), with the professors on the committee "rejecting as illegitimate the radicalization of social conflict and of struggles between the parties, theorized about a state above society and drawing its legitimacy from within and from the 'legal order'" (Camelio 2015, 134). The authors of the first draft of the constitution envisioned a political order that would restore "an idealized way of functioning of the single-party regime" in which the administrative state would have full autonomy from elected political leaders (Camelio 2015, 135).

However, the draft constitution that the committee of legal experts submitted to the military leadership on October 17, 1960 elicited a strong negative reaction, including from other legal scholars whom Onar had excluded from the process. "The draft seriously deviated from the principle of universal suffrage" (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 14) by proposing to create a second chamber (Senate of the republic) which would be partly appointed by professional associations, universities, and the military, and partly elected by voters with at least a middle school education, which was a small percentage of the population in 1960. In addition, the draft also proposed to establish a large number of autonomous administrative agencies, severely restricting the power of the elected executive (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 14). The proposed senate and autonomous administrative agencies embodied the tutelary principle that the people could not be counted on to govern themselves responsibly, so authority had to be delegated to unelected experts who

understood how to elevate the country to the level of "contemporary civilization" (Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009).

Opposition to the draft constitution came from political party leaders and younger legal scholars, who were excluded from the committee not only because of their lack of stature but because of their involvement in political circles (Camelio 2015, 137). The scholars who came of age in the 1940s and 1950s were shaped by the triumph of liberal democracies in World War II, rather than the interwar ascendancy of fascism and corporatism that had shaped the lawyers of Onar's generation. As a result, they "supported the idea of a shorter constitution giving greater room to the parties and more freedom of action to the political authorities" (Camelio 2015, 137). These legal scholars particularly opposed the corporatist nature of the Senate (Camelio 2015, 137). Politicians and politically active legal scholars also opposed the secrecy with which the committee charged with authoring the constitution operated. Onar and his colleagues conceived of themselves as a group of specialists whose scientifically-grounded work of institutional design required insulation from public opinion, reflecting their faith in technocratic authority and pessimism about the intellectual faculties of citizens. However, a minority of the members of the committee, who were only included after the faculty of the prestigious University of Ankara protested their exclusion from the initial group, disagreed with the decision to operate under the veil of secrecy. They began to leak details about the debates within the committee to the press (resulting in the exclusion of two members) and to hold constitutional seminars at Ankara's Faculty of Political Sciences that were open to the public. The fact that the committee of legal scholars could not agree on the procedures for writing the rules of the game or key features of the new institutional order highlights the ideological differences within the "state elite" during this period.

<u>Writing a second draft</u>

The divisions within the committee responsible for drafting the constitution and the negative reception to the authoritarian character of the constitution from, among others, leaders of the Republican People's Party and leading voices in the media made the military leaders reject the constitutional draft. Furthermore, the day after the committee of legal experts submitted their draft of the constitution, the Committee for National Unity enacted a law that reorganized the universities and purged 147 academics, including several prominent scholars (Weiker 1962; Özdemir 2021, 151).[6] The Democrat Party's decision to fire academics who openly criticized the government was one of the reasons why the legal academy abandoned the regime in the first place, so the decision to purge the universities of faculty members with questionable views caused even legal experts who supported the coup (including statists like Onar) to protest the decision. The list of 147 academics who lost their jobs included two legal experts, Tarık Tunaya and Docent İsmet Giritli, who had participated in drafting the constitution until their disagreements with Onar resulted in their removal from the committee (Weiker 1962, 285). Given that the battles between professors and the officers, and the open disagreements among members of the committee, occurred in the context of a power struggle between hardliners and moderates within the coup coalition, there was a real risk that the new political regime would lack legitimacy even among actors who had supported the coup.

---

[6] To clarify the timeline: the coup occurred on May 27, the committee of experts convened on May 29 to begin work on the constitution, they submitted the first draft on October 17, the Committee for National Unity enacted the university reorganization law on October 18, and the 14 radical officers were purged from the NUC in mid-November.

The Committee for National Unity appointed a larger Constituent Assembly consisting of two chambers: an upper chamber that consisted of all of the CNU members, and a lower chamber that contained a wider range of legal scholars, party members, and representatives of professional associations (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 14–15). The final form of the constitution therefore reflected inter- and intra-institutional tensions: between soldiers, lawyers, and politicians; between younger liberal members of the legal academy and their older more conservative counterparts; and between military leaders and junior officers (Camelio 2015; Esen 2021; Gourisse 2022b). The combination of liberal, pluralistic, restrictive, and tutelary elements that comprise the 1961 constitution reflected the conflicting priorities of the actors who had a role in crafting the new political order.

One of the most significant differences between the first and second drafts regarded the selection method and legislative role of the Senate. Whereas the first draft created an upper house with a significant number of appointed members and suffrage limitations for the elected candidates, the new document increased the proportion of elected members, eliminated the extra voter education requirements, and created lifetime membership for members of the coup coalition. Additionally, the new upper house had less power vis-à-vis the lower house in the second draft than in the first draft (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009). Aside from the stronger voice for the military, the upper house was both more democratic and weaker in the second draft constitution than in the first one. Members of the Republican People's Party, in particular, did not approve of the limitations that the first draft's upper house placed on the authority of the Assembly.

The inclusion of members of the Republican People's Party also resulted in the inclusion of the Turkish Constitutional Court in the second draft constitution. "Over its years as the opposition…the RPP, troubled by the illiberal majoritarian policies of the Democrat Party

government, had developed a preference for a more liberal and pluralistic democracy based on a system of checks and balances, including constitutional review and strong guarantees for the independence of the judiciary" (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 15). The new constitutional court had the power to review all laws, governmental decrees, and bylaws of the parliament (Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009, 771). The National Assembly had a very limited influence on the composition of the TCC, having the ability to appoint only three of the 15 permanent members, and one of those Assembly appointees had to be nominated by the universities (Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009, 772). The rest of the lifetime members were appointed by administrative courts such as the Court of Cassation and the Court of Accounts. Furthermore, internal affairs of the judiciary such as appointments and promotions were entrusted to the newly established Supreme Council of Judges, rather than by elected politicians (Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009, 771). The members of the Constituent Assembly attempted to create a judiciary that elected political leaders could not instrumentalize.

Universities and the state-owned media had similar levels of autonomy from elected political leaders under the new constitutional order, insulating the bureaucracy from political instrumentalism but also shielding it from democratic accountability. Like the judiciary, universities and the state broadcaster had the autonomy to make personnel and spending decisions with limited input from the National Assembly or other political forces. Supporters of the new constitution represented this insulation as a means of defending spheres of technocratic expertise from instrumentalization by self-seeking or demagogic political leaders like Adnan Menderes and the Democrat Party. However, other scholars interpret these institutional choices as a way of making sure that Kemalist state elites could continue their project of socially engineering a modern, secular, ethnically homogeneous nation-state without allowing political leaders to contest

their understanding of national interests, identity, and boundaries (Heper 1985; Belge 2006; Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009). Insulation of the bureaucracy, in other words, would allow for democracy without politics, with elected leaders, political parties, and social movements unable to challenge fundamental parameters of the Turkish social order. Indeed, as I argue below, despite its relatively liberal and pluralistic character compared to the 1924 Constitution, the 1961 Constitution reproduced exclusions, hierarchies, and contradictions that had hindered the institutionalization of democratic rule since the foundation of the Republic. However, the authors of the constitution did not foresee how changes in Turkish society and the international system would result in the fragmentation of the "state elite" from within.

<div align="center">A radical change?</div>

Despite these differences in objectives and influence across the different actors involved in the process of writing the new Turkish constitution, they did share two common assumptions that would have important political ramifications during the second spell. First, all of the actors shared a commitment to a laicist state, even if they disagreed about how to implement this principle in practice (Akan 2011). In interviews conducted by the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service in September 1960, a significant number of officers (including members of both the radical and moderate factions) argued that Adnan Menderes and the Democrat Party had instrumentalized religion in order to secure the support of unsophisticated rural voters (Ter-Matevosyan 2019, 122–24). This interpretation of the political events of the 1950s placed military officers and other educated, secular Turks at the more advanced end of a developmental telos than their compatriots, justifying both the military coup and the construction of political institutions that empowered experts and bureaucratic agencies vis-à-vis elected politicians. Even though some members of the bodies responsible for writing the constitution recognized the contradiction between their laicist

principles and the state's monopoly over the ability to define correct Islamic doctrines and practices, they nonetheless viewed the electoral success of the Democrat Party as evidence that the state still needed to try to cultivate moderate, individualized religious sensibilities in its citizens (Akan 2011; Gürbey 2009). Turkey's relative backwardness, on this view, necessitates the creation of a body that would monopolize the ability to define the boundaries of acceptable religious beliefs and practices. The dispersal of symbolic power would only empower reactionaries who would endanger the country's path of modernization, as Menderes had, in the eyes of the leaders of the coup coalition and constitutional commission.

Consequently, the political order produced by the 1961 constitution would retain the central role played by the Directory of Religious Affairs in sanctioning specific religious teachings and practices, even if new rights and liberties would allow informal religious teachings to expand. Authors of the constitution continued to view Sunni Islam as a crucial aspect of Turkish national identity, but also as a possible weapon that demagogues could use to generate support from unwitting peasants. Furthermore, although more liberal members of the committee of law professors and wider Constituent Assembly favored extending official support for religious institutions to Alevis, more conservative members opposed officially recognizing heterodox forms of Islam (Akan 2011; Lord 2017). The ban on members of the Democrat Party or people who had run afoul of restrictions on religious appeals to the public could not participate in authoring the constitution, so the committee and assembly were both biased in favor of the tutelary status quo.

Secondly, none of the members of the committee or of the assembly advocated for recognition of Kurdish cultural rights. Public advocacy of Kurdish cultural rights likely would have resulted in stigmatization and even arrest during this period. Indeed, the year before the coup occurred, Turkish authorities arrested 49 Kurdish activists who participated in protests against

inflammatory anti-Kurdish statements and newspaper columns (Garapon and Çelik 2021, 236). Turkish military and intelligence officials remained convinced that the Soviet Union promoted Kurdish nationalism as a means of undermining state sovereignty in the borderlands of eastern Anatolia, and as a means of influencing Turkish politics (Hashimoto and Bezci 2016). Moreover, anti-Kurdish sentiments permeated the military, legal establishment, and party leadership. While older elements in these institutions would have remembered the Kurdish rebellions of the single-party years, younger Turks had been taught that Kurds were culturally backwards and in need of elevation to contemporary civilization. Consequently, for all of the liberal elements of the 1961 constitution, it retained elements that facilitated the forced assimilation of ethnic minority populations, and it granted the armed forces with significant leeway to deal with insurrections in the case of an emergency.

In sum, the 1961 constitution had a contradictory combination of liberal elements that protected individual rights and promoted pluralism, and illiberal elements that protected the hegemonic articulation of Turkish national identity, interests, and boundaries from challenges by subaltern groups. This combination represented the variety of projects advanced by military, legal, and political actors involved in the process of writing the constitution, as well as their common perceptions of the boundaries of the political community and apprehensions about whether citizens could be trusted to choose politicians wisely. As the liberal features of the constitution opened the door to contestation over the hegemonic definition of national identity, interests, and boundaries that senior military leaders and conservative political elites sought to defend, the latter became disaffected with the new political order.

6.2: Challenges to the Social Status Quo

During the 1960s and 1970s a wide range of social movements and new political parties emerged to challenge the secular, solidaristic, and ethnonationalist articulation of national identity, interests, and boundaries that had grounded Turkish politics since the foundation of the Republic. Labor strikes, land occupations, and other forms of class-based activity challenged rising levels of inequality and the insufficient provision of basic needs like food, health care, and housing (Buğra 2007; Mello 2010; Gürcan and Mete 2019; Bekmen, Öngel, and Hadiz 2020; Gürel, Küçük, and Taş 2022). Communist groups sought to articulate these localized challenges into a revolutionary movement that could challenge the authority of the state, but disagreed among themselves over tactics and objectives (Ulus 2011). Although the Turkish Workers' Party failed to influence electoral politics, the increasing frequency of strikes, campus demonstrations, and land occupations convinced conservative political and military leaders that the growing influence of leftwing ideas constituted a threat to national security (Gümrükçü 2023; Beyribey 2023).

In addition, educated and urbanized Kurdish and Alevi youths began to challenge the boundaries of the political community, drawing the ire of conservative nationalists within the military and on the far-right of the political spectrum (Gündoğan 2011; Ertan 2019). Autonomous Kurdish political activity made a comeback after two decades of relative quiet, as a new group of educated and urbanized Kurdish professionals challenged the coopted traditional landed elite in the eastern part of the country. Urbanization also shaped Alevi involvement in politics as it brought members of the community into greater contact with hostile Sunni Turks, who regarded the religious minority group as deviants. Kurdish and Alevi movements also benefitted from the increased protections of civil liberties embedded in the 1961 Constitution, even as the new political order sought to entrench established understandings of Turkish national identity and boundaries.

Left-wing social movements incorporated Kurdish and Alevi activists, fueling right-wing concerns that Communists sought to undermine the territorial integrity of the Turkish state.

At the same time, the political right also witnessed the emergence of new social movements and political parties that challenged the hegemony of the center-right Justice Party. Islamist movements challenged state-sanctioned official Islamic teachings and practices, and some of these forces pushed for a reorientation of the country's economic development and foreign policies away from state-led industrialization and European economic integration under the US security umbrella (Özdalga 2010). Islamist groups thus not only challenged the secular orientation of the Turkish state, but they also sought redress for spatial inequalities that left central and eastern Anatolia relatively underdeveloped, and they wanted closer ties with the rest of the Muslim world (Lord 2018, 172; Yıldız 2023). Far-right nationalists also sought to restore Islamic morality to the center of Turkish culture, but they sought a more isolationist approach to foreign policy and their understanding of Turkish national identity subordinated Islam to membership in the ethnic community (Arikan 1998; Balci 2011). The far-right also valorized political violence, and right-wing youth groups associated with the Nationalist Action Party committed violent actions against left-wing student groups, Kurdish and Alevi neighborhoods in major cities, and other perceived enemies of the state (Gümrükçü 2023; Gourisse 2022a).

By the end of the 1970s, the country was on the brink of civil war, with left- and right-wing paramilitaries engaging in an escalating spiral of political violence (Houston 2020), while the economy plummeted because of rising costs of energy imports, persistent budget deficits, and escalating costs of servicing debt (Waldner 1999). To what extent did the 1961 constitution contribute to the interlocking political, economic, and social crises that the country experienced by the end of the 1970s? In this section, I argue that the liberal and pluralistic features of the 1961

constitution provided a political opportunity structure conducive to the emergence of new social movements that challenged the Kemalist articulation of Turkish national identity, interests, and boundaries. The adoption of proportional representation lowered barriers to entry for ideological parties that challenged cornerstones of the Kemalist state project, which in turn put pressure on parties of the center to adopt more radical policy positions. By participating in governing coalitions, parties like the far-right Nationalist Action Party and Islamist National Salvation Party also gained access to offices that allowed them to shape the state's discursive practices and gain access to resources that these parties could use for building their organizations (Gümrükçü 2023, 218). While the new political order allowed groups to challenge the hegemonic Kemalist understanding of national identity, interests, and boundaries, it also provided weak incentives for political parties to articulate heterogeneous political demands into new historical blocs. The rise of movements that sought to deepen Turkish democracy thus coincided with the fragmentation of the party system and the sequential formation of weak coalition governments that failed to respond to economic crisis and spiraling political violence.

At the same time, the expansion of access to education and the broader liberalization of public discourse produced fragmentation within the state itself. The same universities and legal institutions that had enacted and defended the Kemalist state project in the past became battlegrounds for new fights over the purposes and appropriate instruments of political power. Whereas state planners intended the Turkish education system to produce Kurdish "native informants" who would assist in the production of a homogeneous national population, the generation of Kurdish intellectuals who attended universities in the 1940s and 1950s became advocates for the Kurdish national cause. Instead of protecting the state elite's monopoly on the ability to establish the cognitive categories through which citizens understood the social world

(Swartz 2013, 82) from elected political leaders, constitutional provisions that defended the autonomy of universities, the state-run media, and the judicial system contributed to the increasing pluralism of Turkish political society.

However, by itself, the increased political pluralism enabled by the 1961 Constitution cannot explain the prevalence of political violence, the deepening economic crisis, or the 1980 coup that brought the second democratic spell to an end. The long-standing securitization of difference made it difficult for political and military actors to accept the legitimacy of movements that challenged the exclusionary foundations of the Republican order. Instead, intransigent conservative forces not only used extra-legal state violence against movements for social change, but they also created a discursive environment that legitimized paramilitary violence against strikers, student organizers, and ethnic and religious minorities. Focusing exclusively on the proliferation of new social movements as the cause of polarization and disfunction thus obscures the willingness of conservative political and military actors to alter or circumvent rules that protected free speech and association, which in turn radicalized movements for social change. Furthermore, the structural balance of payments and budget deficits that forced the Turkish government to rely heavily on foreign debt were common features of political economies in developing countries during the 1970s, particularly after the increase in oil prices in 1973. Any democratically-elected government would have chafed at the austerity policies that the country would have needed to implement in order to put public finances on a sustainable path, single-party or coalition.

Class conflict in the second democratic spell

Agrarian change, urbanization, and state-led import substitution industrialization interacted with the new freedoms provided by the 1961 constitution to produce an unprecedented degree of

137

class conflict in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s. The mechanization of agriculture and expansion of credit in the agricultural sector during the 1950s led to an increasing concentration of landownership and higher levels of joblessness in the countryside (Gürel, Küçük, and Taş 2022). The biggest beneficiaries of the Democrat Party's export-oriented agricultural policies and distribution of Marshall Plan largesse were large commercially-oriented landowners, who used their expanded incomes and access to credit to purchase machinery. Tenant farmers and agricultural laborers, on the other hand, lost access to land and employment, spurring urbanization (Aydin 2010, 154). In areas where landholding inequality and landlessness were already high, such as the Kurdish-majority areas of eastern and southeastern Anatolia, landowners substituted technology for labor, resulting in higher levels of rural-urban migration than elsewhere in the country (Yadirgi 2017, 206). The mechanization of agriculture transformed social relations in the countryside and spurred urbanization.

Smaller-scale peasants, on the other hand, continued to constitute a majority of the population during the second spell, and to attract the attention of political parties because of their significant share of the electorate. Center-right parties like the Justice Party solicited peasant support by promising to deliver higher prices for agricultural goods, easier credit, and cheaper inputs (Waldner 1999, 62). Peasants supported parties of the center-right because they associated the Republican People's Party with the heavy taxation of the 1930s and 1940s, whereas the center-right Democrat Party both relaxed taxation and increased spending to support incomes in the agrarian sector during the 1950s (Yildirmaz 2017, chap. 3). After the 1960 coup resulted in the execution of Adnan Menderes and the closure of the Democrat Party, the Justice Party continued to act as the champion of rural interests and cultural conservatism. Under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel, who served as Prime Minister from 1965 until 1971 and then again in the

shifting coalition governments of the 1970s, Justice Party governments maintained price-support mechanisms that guaranteed favorable domestic terms of trade for the agricultural sector (Buğra 2007, 42–43) while symbolically linking itself to the Democrat Party legacy by fighting for remaining DP political leaders (including former president Celal Bayar) to be freed from prison (Ahmad 2008, 243–44). In a society in which peasants constituted the majority of the population even as the populations of cities swelled with rural-urban migrants, appealing to the interests and identifications of the small-scale peasantry held the key to electoral success.

Yet, over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, low taxation of the agricultural sector and price support for the goods that peasants sold would clash with the Turkish government's desire to promote industrialization. The post-coup government led by Ismet Inonu (1961-1965) formed a new State Planning Organization (SPO) with the support of international financiers and the World Bank to coordinate investments in heavy industry in order to overcome the bottlenecks that hindered economic growth during the second half of the 1950s (Pamuk 2008, 283; Döşemeci 2013). The new planning organization and the first post-coup coalition government led by İsmet İnönü proposed implementing a new property tax on rural producers to make up for the sector's paltry contribution to state revenues, but the RPP's coalition partners – including the Justice Party – rejected the policy (Buğra 2007, 43), foreshadowing the difficulties that coalition governments would have implementing adjustment policies as the country's budget deficits and balance of payments problems deepened (Pamuk 2008, 285). More broadly, while price supports to rural producers supported industrialization by increasing the size of the domestic market for durable consumer goods, the lack of tax revenue from the agricultural sector worsened the country's foreign debt problem at a time when agricultural exports were the country's primary source of hard currency (Pamuk 2008, 284–85). The rural-urban divide also correlated with cultural differences

in Turkish society. Urban middle class supporters of the Republican People's Party and the youth activists that opposed the Menderes government interpreted peasant support for the Democrat Party as a result of the cultural backwardness of village life and the manipulation of religious sentiment for political benefit (Yildirmaz 2017, 121–22)

The 1961 Constitution and legislation passed by the first post-coup government allowed new social movements to emerge that responded to the needs of rural-urban migrants, land-starved peasants, and the nascent urban working class. The new constitution declared the Turkish Republic a "social state" and provided new safeguards for the right of workers to organize, form unions, and to strike (Mello 2007, 218). Although the participants in the 1960 coup coalition sought to restore political order in the wake of the upheaval caused by the Democrat Party's concentration of power, the infighting within the coup coalition and the adoption of a liberal constitution resulted in a new wave of union militancy. The 1961 Saraçhane Rally, which called on the newly elected coalition government to enact legislation that would support labor's new constitutional rights, and the 1963 Kavel Resistance, which prevented factory owners from rolling back concessions they made to workers and de-unionizing the workplace, put pressure on the Inonu government to implement new laws that would protect and expand the rights of workers to organize and the rights of unions to participate in politics beyond the individual workplace (Gürcan and Mete 2019, 270). The view that the formation of coalitions between mainstream parties and labor unions constituted a top-down project by state elites (e.g. Waldner 1999, 64) overlooks the importance of bottom-up activism. RPP leadership adopted a strategy of competing for the support of organized labor by enhancing labor's capacity to organize autonomously because labor militancy in the years immediately following the 1960 coup signaled dissatisfaction with the political quiescence of the conservative leadership of the largest union confederation, Türk-İş.

The government responded with the Act on Trade Unions and the Act on Collective Bargaining, Strikes, and Lockouts in 1964, which strengthened protections for autonomous union activity. These laws were important for two reasons. First, they increased the capacity of labor to organize and act autonomously from political parties. Although Turkey's largest union confederation, Türk-İş, remained politically conservative during the second spell, the new legal terrain allowed the Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Knfederasyonu (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey, or DİSK), a more militant confederation with a commitment to a broader agenda of social transformation beyond the workplace, to form in 1967 and compete for influence. Employees of state-owned firms, who overwhelming belonged to unions associated with Türk-İş, constituted a labor aristocracy that received material benefits in return for loyalty to the Justice Party and political quiescence. However, workers in the private sector tended to have more conflictual relationships with management over wages and work conditions and did not benefit from the political concessions that public-sector unions received. Consequently, tended to be more radical (Mello 2007; Waldner 1999, 64). The institutional arrangements that resulted from the 1960 military coup made it possible for autonomous and militant labor unions to form, undermining the stability of relations between capital and labor that had characterized the first democratic spell and giving voice to political demands that ran contrary to the conservative preferences of the leaders of the 1960 coup coalition.

Secondly, the pro-union legislation passed by the Inonu government signaled an ideological shift in the Republican People's Party away from the class-blind solidarism of the single-party era (Mello 2007, 219; Ugur-Cinar, Acikgoz, and Esen 2023, 4). The struggles against the Democrat Party in the 1950s gave rise to a new generation of political leaders within the Republican People's Party that did not share the military background or commitment to the

memory of the single-party era that men of İnonü's generation had. Instead, they were more committed to pluralism, social justice, and welfarism (Ugur-Cinar, Acikgoz, and Esen 2023). Bülent Ecevit, the Minister of Labor in the coalition government that adopted these pro-union laws, led this younger faction of RPP leaders who sought to reconstruct the party as a center-left social democratic party, along the lines of center-left parties in Germany and Sweden. The party congress of 1965 elected Ecevit as the new leader of the party, marking a definitive break with the class-blind politics of the RPP during the single-party era (Emre 2014, 82). The ascent of a new generation of leaders in the RPP committed to a center-left agenda also opened up a gap between the authoritarian successor party and conservative military leaders, who viewed the new language of redistribution through the lens of Cold War anti-communism. This gap would widen after the purge of left-wing junior officers in 1971.

In addition to the industrial workplace, the growing shantytowns (*gecekondus*) on the edges of major cities also became focal points of political struggle during the second democratic spell. As in other late industrializing countries in the 1960s and 1970s, Turkish peasants and unemployed rural workers moved to cities much faster than the formal economy could absorb them (Yalcintan and Erbas 2003, 92–93). Rural-urban migration also outstripped the transportation, electricity, health and sanitation infrastructures of Turkish municipalities. Furthermore, rural-urban migrants tended to build settlements on state-owned or privately-owned land (Balaban 2011, 2164), calling into question the state's ability to control "what belongs to whom, and who belongs where" (Lund 2016, 1204). Organized "land mafias" (Houston 2020, 105–6) and political groups associated with the far-left and far-right used violence (or the threat thereof) to control access to land within squatter neighborhoods under their control, undermining the political authority of the state from within (Balaban 2011, 2166–67).

In contrast to the shantytowns and the industrial working classes, the countryside remained a bastion of conservative politics. The state provided payoffs in the form of public goods that were available to peasants and large farmers regardless of party affiliation, and public policies aimed at keeping prices for agricultural goods above levels that the market would have set (Waldner 1999, 62). The support of peasants and large landowners constituted the backbone of the electoral success of the center-right Justice Party during this period. That being said, the countryside also experienced a significant amount of contentious action during the late 1960s and 1970s in the form of peasant land occupations (Gürel, Küçük, and Taş 2022). Agricultural modernization enabled farmers to bring idle land under cultivation, leading to the closing of the land frontier and the displacement of tenants. Furthermore, the incompleteness of cadastral registration opened up a wide space for contesting ownership claims (Gürel, Küçük, and Taş 2022, 11–12). Article No. 38 of the 1961 Constitution entitled the government to confiscate landholdings, providing an important political and legal resource for proponents of land reform and peasant occupation by justifying the abrogation of property rights (Gürel, Küçük, and Taş 2022, 13). Although land occupations never resulted in the formation of an autonomous movement of landless peasants like the Landless Workers' Movement in Brazil, and radical workers' and student movements were unable to articulate peasant demands into a broader revolutionary coalition, land occupations still contributed to the class-based contention that affected every corner of Turkish society in the 1960s and 1970s (Gürel, Küçük, and Taş 2022).

The growth of left-wing politics also took place on university campuses and in primary and secondary schools throughout the country. Universities had become spaces of political activism during the 1950s as a consequence of the arrogation of power by the Democrat Party (Gourisse 2022b, 74). The 1961 Constitution encouraged these tendencies by allowing universities to have

more autonomy from the government in hiring and firing decisions, and by preventing police from taking action on university campuses unless invited by the rector (Boyunsuz 2020, 16). Consequently, the new freedoms accorded to universities and the media by the 1961 Constitution opened up space for wide-ranging debates over national interests, identity, and boundaries (Ahmad 2008, 244). As Turkish university students began to identify with struggles for decolonization in the Third World, decry the increasing inequality in Turkish society, and criticize the country's alignment with the United States (particularly after the US failed to support Turkey's position in the Cyprus crisis in 1964), the protections afforded to universities by the 1961 Constitutions facilitated political action (Bozarslan 2020, 121–22). Left-wing student groups also sought to build connections with officers in military academies by articulating an anti-imperialist, social justice-oriented interpretation of Kemalism, a trend that worried more conservative military leaders (Ulus 2011). At the same time, Islamist and nationalist student groups fought the proliferation of Communism and promoted a variety of conservative political projects (Ahmad 2008, 244; Erken 2014, 203; Gourisse 2022a, 60). The politicization of university campuses epitomized the dispersion of symbolic power in Turkish society that resulted from the adoption of the 1961 Constitution.

For military actors committed to membership in NATO and a solidaristic interpretation of Turkish national interests and identity, the expansion of class-based political movements in the 1960s and 1970s constituted a major national security threat. Political institutions mediated the effects of structural socioeconomic changes such as agricultural modernization, industrialization, and urbanization on political outcomes such as party system fragmentation, political polarization, and civil-military relations. That the 1961 Constitution, created under the guidance of a temporary military dictatorship, created a favorable political opportunity structure for labor organization,

student radicalism, and peasant mobilization demonstrates the difficulty of "ruling but not governing" (Cook 2007). In the interests of preventing a repeat of the Democrat Party experience of the 1950s, in which a majority party used the powers of the constitution to persecute the opposition and monopolize political authority, the framers of the 1961 Constitution created an institutional framework that resulted in a proliferation of challenges to the social status quo. Although left-wing political parties struggled to gain electoral traction against the center-right Justice Party, class-based social movements nonetheless challenged the status quo by organizing strikes, demonstrations, land occupations, creating "liberated areas" in *gecekondu* neighborhoods, and resignifying Kemalism as an anti-imperialist, social justice-oriented revolutionary ideology (Döşemeci 2013, chap. 2; Houston 2020; Ulus 2011). These movements challenged conservative political and military leaders to find ways to restore the ideological hegemony of class-blind solidaristic nationalism.

Challenging Sunni-Turkish Supremacy

The 1961 Constitution not only facilitated the rise of class-based social movements, but it also provided space for activists to challenge the dominant positions of Sunni Islam and Turkish ethnicity in Turkish society. From the perspective of the leaders of the coup coalition, the emergence of social movements contesting the foundations of Turkish national identity and the boundaries of the political community was highly undesirable. In fact, the coup coalition's official statement justifying their decision to overthrow the government of Adnan Menderes cited the perceived lenience of the Democrat Party towards Kurdish political unrest in the late 1950s, and the Committee for National Unity's Law No 1587 mandated the changing of Kurdish place names into Turkish ones (Türkmen 2021, 46). When a group of Kurdish activists organized to demand autonomy for the majority-Kurdish eastern provinces shortly after the military coup, the military

government arrested 248 Kurds who they "believed to have supported agitation for a free Kurdish state" (Hashimoto and Bezci 2016, 646). Years after the coup, Cemal Gürsel, the former head of the Committee for National Unity and first President of the Republic following the return to civilian rule, declared that "there is no Kurdish nation, and that Kurds and Turks are consanguine (soydaş)" (Türkmen 2021, 46). The leaders of the coup coalition had no interest in promoting challenges to hegemonic understandings of national identity and the boundaries of the political community.

Yet, the 1961 Constitution contributed to the renewal of Kurdish and Alevi politics by protecting civil liberties and establishing university campuses as safe spaces for political activism (Garapon and Çelik 2021, 245). Ironically, long-standing state policies of Turkification backfired when Kurdish students at universities in the 1950s and 1960s established student groups with each other and, after the coup, began taking advantage of the liberated atmosphere to read leftist anti-colonial literature from around the world, finding parallels with the processes of the internal colonization that their people had experienced since the formation of the Turkish Republic (Gündoğan 2011, 391; Türkmen 2021, 46). In the context of changes in Kurdish society stemming from agricultural mechanization and the resulting rural-urban migration, and in a broader transnational context of Kurdish political mobilization in neighboring states like Iraq and Iran, this new class of educated young professionals and activists constituted a new group of political leaders in the Kurdish provinces. Unlike the tribal leaders and large landowners, who had been co-opted by governing parties during the early republic and the first spell, the new cohort of Kurdish intellectuals and activists had left-wing political views on issues like land reform and the role of women in society and an understanding of Kurdish society as constituting a nation that was unjustly divided up by rival imperial states (including Turkey) (Garapon and Çelik 2021; Kaya

2020). As structural changes in the agrarian sector eroded the patron-client relations that had allowed the traditional Kurdish elites to act as power brokers in the east, the new military political leaders in Kurdish society began to join left-wing parties and win elections in the Kurdish provinces (Dorronsoro and Watts 2009). Despite the prevalence of anti-Kurdish perspectives among the coup leaders and many of the framers of the 1961 Constitution, the liberal and pluralistic features of the new political order made it possible for a Kurdish counterelite (Aktürk 2011) to emerge in the eastern provinces.

At the same time that Kurdish activists and intellectuals mounted an unprecedented challenge to the ethnonationalist foundations of the Turkish state, members of the Alevi community began to challenge the centrality of Sunni Islam in Turkish society. Alevis, who historically have also been called Kızılbaşis or Bektaşis, are a heterodox Islamic religious community that emerged in the borderlands of the Ottoman and Safavid empires in the sixteenth century (Ertan 2019, 932). The community gained its identity and sense of distinction by rejecting the efforts of the Sunni ulema to establish the boundaries of acceptable practices and teachings. At a time when the ulema and the Ottoman dynasty had a symbiotic relationship, the rejection of the authority of the ulema constituted a challenge to the authority of the sultan (Baer 2021). Consequently, the Ottoman state enacted brutal violence against the Alevis, driving them into isolated mountainous villages where they formed self-enclosed communities with their own religious traditions and judicial practices outside of the reach of the state (Yavuz 2005, 66; Ertan 2019, 933).

The isolation of the Alevi communities eroded as a consequence of the same socioeconomic forces that drove rural-urban migration in the rest of Turkish society beginning in the 1950s. As Alevis moved to cities, however, they came into closer contact with the Sunni

majority, who perceived them to be "blasphemers and heretics" (Yavuz 2005, 66). Furthermore, urbanization disrupted the traditional structures of Alevi society, which were built around oral transmission of religious traditions (since Alevi communities were not allowed to construct their own schools under Ottoman rule) and communal ceremonies that served the conflict mediating function of legal institutions (Ertan 2019, 933). For the Sunni majority, the presence of Alevis in major cities constituted a threat to the established social order that was built around the principle that jobs, land, and public services should benefit Sunni Turks rather than other groups. Alevis, for their part, had a longstanding distrust of centralized political and religious authority, creating a combustible situation.

As with the emerging class of Kurdish activists and intellectuals, Alevis found a political home on the left. Socialist discourses that aimed at transforming social hierarchies appealed to Alevis because political authorities had suppressed their beliefs and practices for many years (Ertan 2019, 936). As Alevis tended to support the RPP after its transformation into a social democratic party or the Turkish Workers' Party, members of the security state and far-right organizations associated Alevism with Communism and moral degeneration, therefore constituting a threat to Turkish society. In turn, as Alevis suffered massacres at the hands of far-right paramilitaries, they increasingly identified with socialist groups who attempted to protect their neighborhoods from aggression (Houston 2020).

The rise of the left enabled by the 1961 Constitution and driven by changes in Turkish society not only challenged the class-based domination of employers and landowners, but also challenged foundational understandings of national identity and political boundaries by giving voice to demands for recognition and security by ethnic and religious minorities. The members of the 1960 coup coalition, many of whom would go on to have political careers in conservative and

far-right parties, certainly did not intend to create space for non-Turks and non-Sunni Muslims to challenge the ethnonationalist and religious majoritarian foundations of the Republican political order (Lord 2017). Yet, the liberal and pluralistic features of the 1961 Constitution created a favorable political opportunity structure for social movements that sought to challenge established social hierarchies that military actors deemed natural and/or desirable. Given the history of secessionist movements in the Ottoman Empire and movements for Kurdish autonomy in neighboring states, the loss of the monopoly of symbolic power in Turkish society constituted a national security threat for the military leaders over the course of the 1960s and 1970s.

<u>Challenging secularism: the rise of the Islamist movement</u>

Challenges to the Kemalist articulation of national interests, identity, and boundaries did not only come from the leftist groups during the 1960s and 1970s. Religious conservatives also formed new political groups that sought to increase their influence over politics during Turkey's second democratic spell.

Proponents of a stronger public role for Sunni Islam in Turkey society and politics largely sided with the Democrat Party during the 1950s. Consequently, they tended to view the 1960 military coup as an usurpation of power from the hands of the pious majority of Turkish society by the country's secular state elites. Pious conservatives made the vote for ratification of the 1961 constitution much closer than military and political leaders had hoped, and they made the Justice Party, which constituted the new political home for cadres of the Democrat Party after the coup, the largest party in the first elections after the return to civilian rule. Religious leaders remained steadfast in their support for the mainstream center-right during the early years of the second democratic spell.

However, new political actors emerged that appealed to voters outside of major cities by articulating grievances generated by increasing spatial inequalities with criticism of the state's laicist policies. The Justice Party had cautiously walked a tightrope between giving voice to the grievances of pious constituents about the marginalization of religion in public life while supporting economic integration with Europe and interventionist economic policies that favored large business groups located predominantly in Istanbul and Izmir. The JP's cautious approach to promoting religious education and continuation of economic policies that favored the large cities of western Anatolia produce left pious owners of small and medium-sized enterprises in the less developed central and eastern parts of the country dissatisfied.

The National Outlook movement emerged in 1970 to give rise to the impatience with secularism and the perceived neglect of the country's smaller cities in its drive to integrate economically with Europe. Necmettin Erbakan, an engineer from the conservative central Anatolian city of Konya, formed the National Outlook party after the prime minister, Justice Party leader Suleyman Demirel, refused to accept his election to head the Turkish Chamber of Commerce, the largest business association in the country. Erbakan won the election by mobilizing the country's small businesses against the largest business groups, who they accused of corruption and manipulation of credit markets. The other major figure behind the National Outlook movement was Mohammed Kutus, the imam of the highly influential Iskendarpasa Mosque in Istanbul and a leader in the Naqshibendi order in Turkey. Together, these men developed a political program built around the claims that Turkish economic, cultural, and foreign policies had favored the secular "Masonic" urban elites at the expense of Sunni Turks from the country's interior, and that integration into the European Economic Community would constitute the reinstatement of the Capitulations regime that, from their perspective, had undermined Muslim dominance in the

Ottoman Empire and resulted in its downfall. These arguments put them at odds with conservative political and business leaders, who shared their disdain for the secular left but nonetheless continued to support the state project of assimilating Turkish society to the norms of European and US-centered international society.

Although the military leadership forced the National Vision Party to disband following the 1971 memorandum coup, the party re-constituted itself as the National Salvation Party in 1973 and became a mainstay of coalition governments in the 1970s, despite never winning more than 10% of the national vote. In the conservative "National Front" coalition that formed in 1976, the NSP leadership bargained for control over the Ministry of Education, further eroding the predominance of secular elites over the state's symbolic apparatus. The shift to proportional representation, with its lower barriers to competition, had the consequence of increasing competition for the center-right electorate among parties with different understandings of the meaning and value of laicism, Turkey's position in the international system, and its economic interests. While many of the Justice Party supporters during the 1960s and 1970s favored a stronger role for Islam in public life (particularly in response to the rise of left-wing mobilization during this time period), their understandings of the 'correct' balance between religious and political authority and their perceptions of the country's national interests and identity differed greatly from the more radical National Salvation Party. Thanks to the more pluralistic electoral system, pious conservatives had more options to choose from.

The lower barriers to entry into parliament and governing coalitions for new parties enabled pious small business owners from inner Anatolia to express their frustration with the cautious, pro-big business Justice Party, contributing to the fragmentation of the Turkish party system during the second spell. The rise of the National Salvation party during the 1970s raises the question of

why the Turkish Workers' Party did not succeed in pursuing a similar strategy on the left during this period? The Turkish Workers' Party never succeeded in winning more than a handful of seats in any given election during the second spell and, unlike the NSP, was never invited to join a governing coalition. While it is difficult to point to a single factor that explains the relative electoral weakness of the TWP during this period, a few possibilities are plausible. First, the roots of the National Vision movement in the Naqshibendi order provided the party with access to networks and resources that left-wing parties lacked. Secondly, the military was more hostile towards Communists than Islamists during this period, and likely would not have accepted the formation of a coalition government that included the socialist TWP. Finally, the hostility of the far-left to electoral politics, especially after the 1971 memorandum coup, reduced turnout of the party's base and reduced the pool of prospective cadres, who were more likely to join revolutionary splinter organizations or the radical labor confederation DİSK, which actually endorsed the RPP and Ecevit during the 1970s. That being said, the Islamist movement remained a relatively marginal actor in Turkish politics during the second spell. Its influence did not rise until it began to make inroads into the *gecekondus* of Istanbul and other large cities in the 1980s and 1990s.

<u>Far-right reaction: The Nationalist Action Party (MHP)</u>

Challenges to the hegemonic interpretation of Turkish national identity, interests, and boundaries from class-based social movements, ethnic and religious minorities, and Islamist groups elicited a strong reaction from right-wing nationalists. The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) represented the perspective of far-right Turkish nationalists who opposed Communism *and* western integration, defended the patriarchal social order against movements for women's liberation, and who regarded any expression of ethnic or religious difference as a threat to national sovereignty and independence (Arikan 1998; Canefe and Bora

2003). Known as the Republican Peasants National Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, CKMP) when it formed in 1948, the party increased its visibility when Alparslan Turkeş, the leader of the radical faction of the 1960 coup coalition, joined it and became its leader in 1964. The party changed its name to the Nationalist Action Party at its 1969 Congress, reflecting its more militant approach (Arikan 1998).

The party's populist economic platform and traditionalist identity allowed it to earn enough votes to regularly join governing coalitions in the 1970s despite its association with violent paramilitary organizations. In 1969, the party adopted a platform that also called for a stronger emphasis on Islam in education as a means of counteracting the growth of socialist and modernist ideas at universities (Balci 2011). During the 1970s, a group of conservative nationalist intellectuals associated with the MHP, the Intellectuals' Hearths (AO), began to articulate the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which constituted an effort to build bridges across conservative factions in Turkish society. Nonetheless, the MHP did not see eye-to-eye with many Islamist groups when it came to understanding Turkey's place in the world. For example, while the National Salvation Party joined the MHP in opposing European economic integration, they also favored building stronger economic and social ties with other Islamic countries. The MHP, on the other hand, had no pan-Islamic sympathies and regarded Islam as a secondary element of Turkish national identity behind the ties of blood that united members of the political community. The MHP also had no plan to allow the ulema more autonomy and influence in Turkish society, which was a key Islamist priority. Furthermore, far-right nationalists and Islamists had different interpretations of the country's history, with important implications for education, foreign policy, and relations with ethnic minorities (particularly the Kurds). Whereas the Islamists venerated the country's Ottoman roots, the nationalists adopted a pan-Turanist ideology that looked to a mythical

153

pre-Islamic Turkic past for inspiration (Burris 2007; Yavuz 2020). Consequently, despite the efforts of intellectuals associated with the MHP, there still remained important barriers to cooperation between right-wing nationalists and Islamists.

However, the impact of the MHP on Turkish politics during the second spell was mainly felt in the streets. Under Turkeş, the MHP became an umbrella organization that brought together labor unions, professional associations, student groups, and other civic organizations in the struggle to promote their hardline nationalist ideology (Gourisse 2022a). In line with their virulent rhetoric against Communists and ethnic and religious minorities, the party also included paramilitary groups under its umbrella. Known as the "Idealists," far-right paramilitaries under the MHP's leadership received military-style training and access to weapons with the goal of cleansing public spaces of groups that did not conform to the party's xenophobic, misogynistic vision of social order (Houston 2020; Gourisse 2022a; Gümrükçü 2023). Idealist groups assassinated socialist professors, rampaged through predominantly Alevi and Kurdish neighborhoods, and fought with left-wing activists on university campuses (Houston 2020). Paramilitary violence was a core feature of the nationalist movement's broader strategy of increasing its influence within the state and society (Gourisse 2022a). MHP leaders and activists regarded themselves as acting in the interests of the state against groups that colluded with outside forces and sought to undermine national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

<u>Summing up: social changes in the second spell</u>

The liberal and pluralistic features of the 1961 constitution interacted with other changes in Turkish society and Turkey's position in the Cold War international system to produce unprecedented challenges to the Kemalist articulation of national interests, identity, and boundaries. Urbanization, the closure of the land frontier, and the state-led industrialization

154

resulted in growing labor unrest and agrarian conflict, with significant union activism, frequent strikes and land occupations, and the emergence of class-based revolutionary organizations. Urbanization, the expansion of education, and the emergence of Kurdish political movements in neighboring Iraq and Iran also contributed to a rise in Kurdish political activity within Turkey, calling into question one of the foundations of Turkish political order: ethnonationalism. At the same time, new social movements emerged on the right to fight against European integration, Communism, and the perceived threat of territorial dismemberment. Islamists also pushed back against the secular foundations of the Kemalist state project, promoting domestic and foreign policies that articulated Turkish national identity more strongly with Islam. Conservative nationalists reacted to these developments with novel articulations of national identity, interests, and boundaries, along with the violent defense of established social hierarchies. The new electoral system, the protection of autonomy for universities and the media, and judicial reforms that protected civil and political rights created space for social actors and groups to make new political demands, but they also provided weak incentives for political parties to articulate heterogeneous, broad political demands into new, unified historic blocs.

Instead, the party system became fragmented, resulting in weak coalition governments that failed to confront rising political violence and an economic crisis that escalated over the course of the decade. Inflation, already a problem because of persistent budget deficits in the 1960s, soared to new heights after the oil shock resulted in higher energy prices, and the country failed to produce goods for export that were of sufficient value to match its capital imports. A single-party government would have struggled to deal with these structural economic difficulties that confronted states across the world during the tumultuous 1970s, but the ideologically heterogeneous multiparty governments proved uniquely incapable of confronting these problems.

Moreover, the rising political violence in cities and on university campuses created the widespread impression that Turkey was on the path to civil war. Indeed, when the second spell ended with a military coup on September 12, 1980, the military leadership cited the government's inability to deal with the escalating political violence as one of the main reasons why they felt the need to take power and reorganize political institutions. Yet, as I show next, any account of the political turmoil of the 1970s that focuses exclusively on the shortcomings of civilian politicians leaves out a major contribution to the breakdown of social order: the military's own lawlessness.

6.3: The military in the Second Spell

The members of the coup coalition that overthrew the Democrat Party government of Adnan Menderes sought to prevent another majority party from capturing the state and subordinating the military, educational institutions, judicial institutions, and other bureaucracies to their agenda. However, the leaders of the military that survived the power struggles and secondary coup attempts that began immediately after the coup occurred had no desire to open the door to class-based, ethnic, or religious challenges to the ethnonationalist, solidaristic, and secularist understanding of Turkish national identity, interests, and boundaries. Not only did Cemal Gürsel deny the existence of the Kurds as a distinct group with its own culture (as mentioned above), but he also joined the right-wing Anti-Communist League while serving as president of the Republic immediately after the return to civilian rule (W. M. Hale 1994, 177). Similarly, his successor as the head of the military (and then as president) Cevdet Sunay held conservative views on issues of class, ethnicity, and secularism. These actors may have been more committed to competitive electoral politics than the radical members of the coup coalition who they succeeded in sidelining in the months after the coup, but they had no intention of unleashing a wave of contention that would challenge the foundations of the social order.

Consequently, military actors responded to the new social movements by criticizing, changing, and ultimately circumventing the liberal and pluralistic features of the 1961 Constitution. As labor unrest, student protests, and Kurdish political activity increased over the course of the 1960s, the views of senior military leaders began to converge with those of conservative political leaders, who believed that the 1961 Constitution created more pluralism than Turkish society could afford (Beyribey 2023, 189). This is deeply ironic considering that many of the members of the center-right Justice Party had supported, worked for, or represented the Democrat Party during the 1950s. These military leaders became increasingly alarmed that left-wing organizations had tried to build influence among junior officers by articulating an anti-imperialist left-wing understanding of Kemalism (Ulus 2011, 16–17). Within a decade of the military's intervention to overthrow a right-wing government that threatened to consolidate a single-party dictatorship, military leaders believed that newly-empowered left-wing forces constituted the biggest threat to national security.

In 1971, the senior military leadership issued a memorandum to the government threatening to undertake a coup d'état unless it resigned and allowed a caretaker government to implement constitutional reforms. The coalition led by the Justice Party under Suleyman Demirel complied with the memorandum, and the caretaker government (led by a member of the older conservative faction of the RPP) issued a number of changes to the constitution that allowed the military a free hand to deal with what it perceived to be subversive elements in Turkish society. These illiberal changes, combined with mass arrests of activists during the caretaker period, led to a radicalization of opposition to the regime on the left. Shortly after the return to civilian rule, however, the Constitutional Court demonstrated its independence from the will of the military leadership by enabling an amnesty for left-wing political prisoners. Since the intervention aimed

to weaken left-wing political parties and labor unions, this move demonstrated that the changes implemented during the period of unelected rule were insufficient for the military to neutralize the threat posed by the left. Military actors then began to circumvent legal restrictions and normative limitations on their ability to act against perceived internal enemies by colluding with right-wing paramilitaries associated with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Military actors actively contributed to the polarization of Turkish society by attempting to defend the contingent foundations of the social order against social movements that represented exploited, disenfranchised and stigmatized social groups. When constitutional protections of civil rights got in the way, military actors did their best to circumvent them. Finally, as political violence between left-wing and right-wing paramilitaries spiraled out of control amidst a deepening economic crisis, the military pulled the plug on democracy with a coup on September 12, 1980.

<u>The Memorandum Coup of 1971</u>

Despite the continuities in personnel and policy agendas between the Justice Party and the deposed Democrat Party, the majority governments led by the Justice Party beginning in 1965 succeeded in restoring a degree of political and economic stability in Turkey. Tensions between military officers and JP leaders decreased in the late 1960s because the JP government treated the military with much greater deference than their DP predecessors, supporting the leadership bids of military leaders Cemal Gürsel and Cevdet Sunay for the presidency in 1961 and 1966, respectively (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 18). Furthermore, JP and military leaders viewed the growth of the left over the course of the 1960s with equal dismay. Although Demirel was reluctant to use the military against student demonstrators after Menderes's experience, the views of JP and military leaders began to converge on the excessive freedoms that the 1961 Constitution provided for

radical student groups, labor organizations, and Kurdish groups (Harris 2011, 206; Gürcan and Mete 2019).

However, three factors led senior military commanders to lose faith in the Justice Party's ability to maintain order. First, the government struggled to contain distributive conflicts amid structural weaknesses in the Turkish economy. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies resulted in a balance of payments crisis and currency devaluation in 1969-70, which reduced the purchasing power of middle-class Turks (including military officers). Furthermore, the government had refused to implement land reforms, despite the insistent demands from small peasants and landless agrarian workers in the face of the closure of the agrarian frontier (Gürel, Küçük, and Taş 2022). A proposal by the JP to create a union monopoly to stop the left-wing DİSK's growing influence resulted in a massive demonstration of force by the political union movement on June 15-16, 1970, when over 150,000 workers (including some members of the government-backed Türk-İş confederation) demonstrated in the streets of Istanbul and other major cities (Mello 2010, 14–15; Gürcan and Mete 2019, 272; Dönmez 2021, 521). In response to the labor unrest, the government imposed martial law in Istanbul and Kocaeli (Mello 2010). The basic problem was that the country's balance of payments and budget difficulties required the implementation of an austerity program that would weaken workers' rights and reduce the government's payments to peasants for agricultural goods (Dönmez 2021, 521). The Justice Party's reliance on the peasantry for votes made Demirel unwilling to pass costs onto his chief constituency (Waldner 1999, 104). Although he was much more willing to undermine workers' rights, the increasing strength of radical unions meant that passing costs of adjustment onto workers would require the support of the military. However, military officers refused to quell social unrest because they viewed it as a result of the Justice Party's irresponsible economic policies (Ulus 2011, 217).

Second, military leaders lost faith in Demirel's government due to his governing coalition's fragmentation. The adoption of proportional representation in the 1961 Constitution made it easy for ideological factions to form their own independent parties, leading to the fragmentation of the right-wing coalition that the Democrat Party had held together in the first democratic spell (W. M. Hale 1994, 180). Although the emergence of the Islamist National Order Party and the far-right Nationalist Action Party in 1969 contributed to the Justice Party's loss of electoral support in the 1969 parliamentary elections, divisions within Demirel's own party caused more problems for stability of the governing coalition in 1969-70. Here, the legacy of the Democrat Party confronted Demirel head-on. Elder statesmen in the party who occupied important positions within the provincial party apparatuses demanded influential positions in the cabinet for themselves and amnesty for members of the Democrat Party who remained behind bars. Demirel, on the other hand, sought to promote loyalists to himself within the party and to accommodate opposition to amnesty within the military. As a consequence, five influential dissidents within the party, including Menderes's son Yüksel and Demirel's former rival for leadership of the party Sadettin Bilgiç, resigned from the JP's General Executive Council in early February 1970 and soon toppled the cabinet by voting against the budget (W. M. Hale 1994, 180). These figures later formed a separate Democratic Party, in obvious homage to the party that the military had overthrown in 1960. Following the government's collapse, senior military commanders feared that the lack of a stable governing majority would intensify Turkey's socioeconomic problems and embolden radical activists (Esen 2021, 213). The framers of the 1961 Constitution thus succeeded in fragmenting the coalition of social forces that constituted Democrat Party hegemony in the 1950s at the expense of creating an unstable party system.

The third factor that contributed to the concern that political leaders could not maintain social order was the development of Kurdish political activism in the eastern part of the country. Although not typically discussed as a cause of the 1971 military intervention – authoritative analyses of the memorandum coup omit any discussion of Kurds altogether (W. M. Hale 1994, chaps. 7 & 8; Harris 2011; Kandil 2016, chap. 8; Esen 2021; Gourisse 2022b) omit any discussion of Kurds altogether – research that focuses specifically on the Kurdish "problem" tells a different story. The development of a Kurdish intelligentsia, their efforts to promote Kurdish self-consciousness and challenge co-opted traditional communal elites (as in the Eastern Meetings of 1967-68), and the connections between Kurdish activists and the Turkish left (marked by the growing influence of the Turkish Workers' Party in Kurdish-majority regions) greatly concerned conservative military and political leaders (Gündoğan 2011; Garapon and Çelik 2021). Military leaders refused to acknowledge that long-standing policies of extraction, repression, and neglect motivated Kurdish political activism (Yadirgi 2017). Instead, they regarded Kurdish political activism as evidence of foreign – particularly Soviet – efforts to subvert the political order (Hashimoto and Bezci 2016). Military officers could point to the connections between Kurdish movements and the Soviet Union in neighboring Iraq and Iran, and the ties between Kurdish activists and the Turkish Workers' Party, as evidence of the communist origins of Kurdish political mobilization. The growth of Kurdish political activism and its articulation with broader currents of left-wing political activity influenced military actors' decision to intervene in Turkish politics and their actions during the 1971-73 interregnum.

Consequently, a group of officers began to worry that parliamentary rule only strong military rule could generate rapid economic growth and social justice (Esen 2021, 213). These officers were influenced by the leftist articulation of Kemalism promoted by the *Yön*, a weekly

newspaper based in Ankara that promoted state-led socialist developmentalism (Ulus 2011, chap. 2). Turkish military officers were more politically engaged than their counterparts in the early 1960s, and several of them had contacts with prominent socialist intellectuals and read leftist periodicals (Esen 2021, 213). Proponents of this line of thinking argued that the May 1960 "revolution" constituted a continuation of Mustafa Kemal's effort to modernize the country by undermining traditional hierarchies and establishing a strong national economy that did not rely on Western capital or markets (Bozarslan 2020, 121).

Left-wing Kemalism also appealed to the disaffection that Turks across the political spectrum felt towards the United States. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the US withdrew weapons from Turkey without input from Turkish political leaders, and the 1964 Johnson telegram, in which President Lyndon Johnson not only refused to support Turkey's intervention to defend Turkish Cypriots but also forbid the Turkish military from using US-supplied weapons, Turkish intellectuals and military actors regarded the US as an unreliable ally at best (Döşemeci 2013, chaps. 2–3). By standing with the students and workers against pro-US reactionaries like the large landowner Menderes or the corporate-backed Demirel, soldiers could secure the Kemalist revolution against forces that wished to make Turkey a satellite of foreign empires (Pekesen 2020). Support for this position was not only limited to the junior officers and left-wing ideologues; leading military figures like Air Force Commander Musin Batur and Commander of the Land Forces Faruk Gürler tacitly supported the plans of leftist officers by participating in secret meetings with proponents of a coup against the Demirel government (Esen 2021, 213).

Despite their growing concern with Demirel, more cautious and conservative senior military leaders did not wish to intervene because they worried that another coup could result in conflicts within the military, and they believed that "social and economic reforms had 'nothing to

do with the armed forces' (in the words of Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tağmac)" (W. M. Hale 1994, 188). However, the discovery of the plot by left-wing officers with the support of high-level commanders like Batur and Gürler forced Tağmac to act preemptively. On March 12, 1971, the Chief of General Staff and the three top commanders (including Batur and Gürler) issued an ultimatum to the government, calling on its leadership to resign. Otherwise, the leaders argued, the military would have to uphold its "duty to protect and look after" the Turkish Republic and "take over the administration of the state" (as quoted in Ulus 2011, 17). The government agreed to resign on March 19, and a new non-party coalition government formed, led by Nihat Erim, a law professor who represented the conservative faction of the RPP. However, the government of technocrats still had to work with the assembly that was elected in 1969, resulting in a persistent inability to form stable legislative coalitions during the period of exceptional rule.

Within the military, the memorandum coup resulted in over 300 officers retiring, transferring, being arrested, or purged from the ranks (Gourisse 2022b, 80). These personnel changes targeted left-wing officers and their social networks. As a consequence, the officer corps became significantly more ideologically homogeneous and conservative following this event. The Cold War context had resulted in growing ties between right-wing politicians and military elites. After the anti-communist faction within the military prevailed in the factional infighting of the early 1970s, a very conservative understanding of national interests, identity, and boundaries took hold in the military (Esen 2021, 216). Before the memorandum coup, competing groups of military actors interpreted the country's economic difficulties and political changes in different ways, with junior officers rooted in the academies believing that the absence of social reform constituted the root cause of instability (W. M. Hale 1994, 187–88) while anti-communist senior leaders believed that subversive elements in universities and labor unions deserved the blame. The purges that

followed the memorandum coup meant that the conservative, hardline anti-communist perspective had prevailed, which would facilitate collective action during political crises while also fostering reactionary groupthink.

In addition, the caretaker government implemented a number of reforms, including constitutional changes, at the behest of military leaders. The new government implemented three categories of constitutional changes: (1) curtailing certain civil liberties while restricting the review power of the courts; (2) strengthening the executive, particularly by allowing the legislature to grant it law-making powers; and (3) increasing the institutional autonomy of the military by excluding it from review by civilian administrative courts and the Court of Account (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 18). Importantly, the last category of reforms included the introduction of state security courts, which allowed military actors to act with impunity against individuals or groups that they deemed as constituting threats to national security (W. Hale 1977). In addition, the constitutional changes allowed the executive branch to issue decrees that had the force of law for the first time since the Ottoman era (Boyunsuz 2020, 18). Personnel changes and constitutional reforms reflected the perception among military leaders that Turkish society had become too pluralistic, giving rise to political forces that threatened the country's path of state-led development and commitment to ethnic and religious homogeneity.

The memorandum coup also resulted in a crackdown on social movements that challenged the solidaristic, secular, and ethnonationalist foundations of the Republican social order. The Turkish Workers' Party and the National Order Party were banned because of their commitment to class-based and religious political agendas (Ulus 2011, 18; Kandil 2016, 171). In eastern and southeastern Anatolia, hundreds of Kurdish activists and intellectuals were arrested and military leaders declared martial law in three Kurdish-majority provinces (Ulus 2011, 18; Dorronsoro and

Watts 2009, 464). Hundreds of members of student groups and labor organizations were also arrested on the grounds that they constituted threats to the social order in a process that the interim government called "Operation Sledgehammer" (Beyribey 2023; Ulus 2011). The crackdown on left-wing and minority activists indicated that the military leaders held leftists responsible for the social disorder that resulted in work stoppages, peasant occupations, and campus activism, rather than the social inequalities that gave rise to these grievances.

<div align="center">Spiraling political disorder, 1973-1980</div>

When military leaders forced the government of Suleyman Demirel to resign in March 1971 and declared martial law in parts of the country that had experienced significant contentious political activity, they had three aims (Ahmad 2010; Esen 2021; Harris 2011; Ulus 2011). First, they wanted to neutralize the threat to social order posed by left-wing student groups, labor unions, and Kurdish activists. With the Communist subversives in prison, political violence provoked by strikes, demonstrations, and violations of property rights would subside. Secondly, they wanted to roll back what they viewed as the liberal and pluralistic excesses of the 1961 Constitution that prevented the state security forces from acting against subversive political elements. Finally, they wanted to demonstrate to political party leaders that they would not tolerate partisan bickering and indecision during periods of acute economic crisis.

Instead of social order, economic development, and political consensus, however, the years following the return to civilian rule with the parliamentary elections of 1973 witnessed spiraling political violence, an escalating economic crisis, and deepening political polarization. While the military leadership had little to do with the causes of the economic crisis, their words and deeds contributed to the increase in political violence and polarization. Military officers provided a discursive opportunity structure that made violence against left-wing activists and ethnic and

religious minorities permissible, and they provided right-wing paramilitaries with weapons, training, and legal protection (Özman and Yazıcı Yakın 2012; Gümrükçü 2023; Gourisse 2022a; cf. McCammon 2013). In the years after the end of martial law, these "Idealist" groups drove the spike in political violence, with left-wing paramilitary violence only rising in later part of the decade as a response to these attacks (Gümrükçü 2023; Bozarslan 2020). Leaders of the 1980 coup, sympathetic commentators, and even some Western scholars have portrayed the rise of right-wing paramilitary groups in the 1970s as an "inevitable" (W. M. Hale 1994, 177) response to the emergence of social movements that challenged hegemonic articulations of Turkish national identity, interests, and boundaries. However, this interpretation obscures the collusion between military officers, political elites, the Nationalist Action Front and its associated civil society organizations, and right-wing paramilitaries, without which Idealist clubs would have lacked cohesion, training, weapons, and protection from prosecution (Gunter 2014; Esen 2021, 216; Gourisse 2022a).

At the same time, the constitutional changes that the multi-party aretaker governments passed during the interregnum failed to prevent the Constitutional Court from taking decisions that military leaders objected to. The most important case that the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled on after the return to civilian rule in 1973 concerned a motion for amnesty for the political prisoners that state security forces arrested in 1971. After they surprised military leaders and political commentators by winning a plurality of legislative seats in the 1973 election, the Republican People's Party under its left-of-center leader Bülent Ecevit proposed legislation that granted a blanket amnesty to tens of thousands of non-violent prisoners in commemoration of the fifty-year anniversary of the founding of the Republic (Cohen 1973; *The Times* 1974a). Because the RPP only had a plurality of seats in the lower house of the Assembly, and because the Justice Party (the

next-largest party) refused to join a coalition with its archrivals, the RPP turned to the National Salvation Front, an Islamist party composed of former members of the National Order Party (*The Economist* 1973). While the NSF agreed to most of the groups covered by the amnesty law, they objected to the idea of freeing left-wing political dissidents because of the party's staunchly anti-communist platform. After a large segment of the NSF parliamentary group joined the conservative opposition to vote down the amnesty bill (*The Times* 1974b) and the government passed one that did not free political prisoners, members of the RPP (including Ecevit) petitioned the Constitutional Court to review the legislation on the grounds that it violated the principle of equal treatment under the law. In a ruling that infuriated conservative military and political elites, the Constitutional Court sided with the plaintiffs, resulting in the extension of the amnesty to include left-wing political prisoners (Cohen 1974).

The amnesty ruling set free thousands of political prisoners whose activities had motivated military actors to undertake the memorandum coup in the first place. The ruling demonstrated the persistent weakness of the tutelary institutions that the 1961 Constitution established, even with the constitutional changes implemented during the 1971-73 interregnum. For tutelary democracy to work, members of the courts, the security apparatuses, and the bureaucracy not only need to share common understandings of the identity, interests, and boundaries of the political community, but they would also have to share an interpretive framework for translating general principles into concrete actions that enforce the limits of what political actors and social movements can say and do (Norton 2014; 2022). The difficulty is that the goal of monopolizing the ability to define the boundaries of the political community comes into conflict with democratic principles when subaltern groups use their rights to challenge official narratives of national identity and interests. In those situations, it is vital for state elites to share a common interpretive framework for

identifying which actions and actors constitute threats to the national community and therefore stand outside of the normal legal order.

For tutelary democracy to work the courts, the security apparatus, and the bureaucracy would have to share a common interpretation of which groups of people constituted threats to national security and therefore stood outside of the normal legal system (Capoccia 2016; Jessop 2013; Norton 2014; 2022). For military actors to actually exercise the exclusive authority to define which groups of people constituted threats to national security and therefore stood outside of the legal order, the institutional order needed mechanisms that could prevent other agencies of the state from proposing their own interpretations of "the nature, purposes, and stakes of government" (Jessop 2013, 43). While military leaders viewed left-wing revolutionaries and Kurdish activists as the most important threats to the state's territorial sovereignty during the 1960s and 1970s, and security as the chief purpose of state action, the activists, politicians, lawyers, and judged involved in the amnesty ruling articulated an alternative state project that prioritized a particular understanding of welfare and social justice that prioritized civil liberties. Although the framers of the 1961 Constitution envisioned the Turkish Constitutional Court as a body that would prevent a majority party or coalition from capturing the state, they did not foresee the emergence of a group of political leaders, lawyers, and judges who would seek to place limits on state authority from within (Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009). Consequently, even after the reforms implemented during the interregnum, military actors had no capacity to prevent actors in other state institutions from proposing alternative definitions of the boundaries and purposes of the state. The amnesty ruling demonstrated the inability of the Turkish state to implement a coherent response to the rise of left-wing activism within the boundaries of the political order established by the 1961 constitution.

In addition to demonstrating the fragmentation of the so-called "Kemalist establishment" during the 1970s, the amnesty ruling also had profound effects on contentious politics in subsequent years. The experience of imprisonment and torture at the hands of the state's security services led many of these activists to abandon the pursuit of social reform through electoral politics and nonviolent contention in favor of armed revolution. Whereas many left-wing activists considered soldiers – if not necessary military leaders – to be natural allies in the fight against reactionary social forces before the memorandum coup, the experience of imprisonment and torture made many of them disillusioned with the state and the political process altogether (Ulus 2011). For Kurdish political activists who had never put much faith in the military to begin with, imprisonment radicalized their belief in the need for national self-determination and crystallized their belief in their status as an internally colonized population (Dorronsoro and Watts 2009, 464–65). The 1974 amnesty law did nothing to combat their disillusionment with the prevailing political order while enabling these activists to form new clandestine organizations devoted to secession (Garapon and Çelik 2021). Military actors and other members of the security forces radicalized left-wing activists with repression and torture, and then these groups got out of prison because the increasingly fragmented state elite did not share the same understanding of the nature, purposes, and stakes of government (Jessop 2013, 43). Consequently, the memorandum coup largely failed in its objective to repress left-wing political mobilization.

With left-wing political activists free to reconstitute revolutionary organizations, and with other branches of the state veering away from the conservative interpretation of Kemalism that guided military actors, officers and conservative political elites began to circumvent the constitutional order in order to contain what they perceived to be the grave national security threat posed by the left. The growth and increasingly militancy of right-wing paramilitary groups in the

wake of the memorandum coup was not an "inevitable" (W. M. Hale 1994, 177) or spontaneous response to leftist political mobilization and contentious action during the 1960s. Nor was there symmetry in the organizational resources, opportunity structures, and willingness to use violence between leftist and rights groups during this period (Gourisse 2022a). Instead, the "Idealist" paramilitary groups associated with the Nationalist Action Party committed a large majority of violent protest events between the end of 1973 and the end of 1978, according to a study of reporting on political activity from the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* (Gümrükçü 2023, 218).[7] Granted, left-wing groups were involved in violence against people or property during the 1960s and 1970s, as left-wing revolutionary groups had kidnapped US soldiers and diplomats on two occasions in the 1960s and routinely engaged in contentious activity that posed the threat of escalating into violence (W. M. Hale 1994). However, recent research on the political violence in the 1970s demonstrates that right-wing paramilitary groups had better organization, access to superior resources (including money and weapons), and employed an ideology that explicitly sanctioned violence against left-wing activists (or demographic groups associated with left-wing or "secessionist" activity, such as Kurds and Alevis) (Houston 2020; Gourisse 2022a; Gümrükçü 2023; Beyribey 2023). Collusion with conservative political parties, military leaders, right-wing police unions, and other groups in Turkish political society provided these groups with resources and political opportunities to commit violence against left-wing activists.

Although the Nationalist Action Party participated in electoral politics, its strategy for taking state power did not rely on success at the ballot box. Instead, it had a two-pronged strategy for increasing its social and political power. First, the NAP developed a network of organized

---

[7] The editor of *Milliyet* was assassinated by right-wing militants on February 1, 1979.

groups that paralleled other professional associations in the education, law enforcement, business, labor, and other sectors of civil society and the state. The party served as a hierarchically organized umbrella organization that coordinated the use of state powers and resources for the purposes of building the party's strength. Thus, the party used cabinet positions that it gained by participating in coalition governments to entrench its members in the state bureaucracy and steer resources towards other groups associated with the party. Secondly, the party used political violence as a key aspect of its strategy for gaining access to state power. Beginning in 1966 and accelerating in the years after the memorandum coup, the NAP formed Idealist groups whose sole purpose was to intimidate and harass left-wing organizations, activists, and professors. Far-right organizations and paramilitaries connected to the NAP attempted to provoke a military coup led by right-wing officers, who would then rely on the NAP and associated organizations to rule the country (Gürel 2020, 153). The NAP used access to public office and political violence to promote a far-right political agenda that had little popular support.

A major difference between right-wing and left-wing paramilitaries in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s was the amount of training that militants received. While some members of left-wing groups traveled to Palestine to receive combat training, members of Idealist groups regularly attended training camps in Turkey where they received instruction in the tactics and the use and maintenance of weapons from active duty and retired soldiers, intelligence agents, and police officers. The leader of the Nationalist Action Party, Alparslan Turkeş, and other leaders of the NAP who had backgrounds in the security sector used their connections to the military, police, and intelligence fields to train and organize young militants so that they could disrupt left-wing organizations in the streets (Gümrükçü 2023, 216). These organizational resources, secured through collusion between far-right party elites and right-wing elements in the security state,

allowed right-wing militants to engage in violent protest actions more frequently and effectively than the small, fragmented, under-resourced left-wing groups that they fought (Gourisse 2022a).

In addition to training, far-right paramilitary groups also received access to weapons and other state resources through the Nationalist Action Party's participation in governing coalitions after the return to civilian rule in 1973. Beginning with the first Nationalist Front coalition in March 1975, the mainstream center-right Justice Party repeatedly invited the Nationalist Action Party to participate in governing coalitions despite the public knowledge of its sponsorship of violent paramilitary organizations. In Nationalist Front governments, the Justice Party engaged in "semi-loyal behavior," defined as the willingness to encourage, excuse or justify the actions of other organizations that go beyond the limits of peaceful, legitimate patterns of politics in a democracy (Gümrükçü 2023, 218–19; cf. Sartori 1976). Media outlets sympathetic to the Nationalist Front governments popularized the slogan "Demirel in Parliament, Türkeş in the Street," and conservative political and military leaders hoped that Idealist activists would intimidate left-wing activists as well as the social democratic RPP (Ahmad 2008, 252). As a member of coalition governments, the party gained the necessary resources to award civil service posts (including some in the security forces) to its activists, and with Gün Sazak's appointment to the post of Minister of Customs and Monopolies in the Second Nationalist Front government, to import arms, bombs, ammunition, radios, and other supplies (Gümrükçü 2023, 218). Conservative party leaders actively facilitated the growth of right-wing paramilitaries as a response to growing pressure for social change from left-wing and Kurdish forces.

Beyond providing training and resources, military actors and conservative political elites also created a discursive opportunity structure conducive to right-wing paramilitarism. Anti-Communist and Turkish supremacist discourses promoted by military and political leaders

172

stigmatized activists and minority populations as threats to the family and to territorial sovereignty (Özman and Yazıcı Yakın 2012). The Turkish Workers' Party's articulation of class-based, gender, and ethnic grievances not only threatened private property and the rule of capital, but it also threatened to undermine the patriarchal family structure and triggered longstanding fears about territorial dismemberment. Although Kemalist discourse associates the cultural reforms of the early Republic with the liberation of women from backwards religious practices, mainstream Turkish society – secular as well as pious – has maintained norms that associate women with honor, virtue, and reproduction of the nation, both biologically and culturally (Kandiyoti 1987; Altinay 2004; Coşar 2021). Consequently, political appeals that associated communism with threats to the status of men and the reproduction of the Turkish nation, which in turn justified extra-legal coercion by public and private actors (Özman and Yazıcı Yakın 2012). In addition, the rise of Kurdish activism and the role of Kurds in left-wing politics evoked long-standing fears about territorial separatism and dismemberment at the hands of other states among citizens in a society where the educational system maintains the memory of traumatic past events like the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Sevres at the forefront of the public imagination (Gunter 1989; Burris 2007). By portraying left-wing activism as a threat to the cultural, biological, and territorial reproduction of the Turkish nation-state, political and military elites framed extra-judicial violence against left-wing and Kurdish nationalist groups as a natural – or even justified – response to the threat posed by the left rather than as a leading cause of social disorder in its own right (Gümrükçü 2023, 219).

The memorandum coup of 1971 not only failed to restore political order, but arguably it deepened the polarization of Turkish society. The intervention did nothing to reduce the fragmentation of the party system driven by the proliferation of right-wing parties. Between January 1971 and December 1979, Turkey had 12 coalition governments, with an average of one

173

government every nine months (Kandil 2016, 173). At the same time, political violence reached levels that trumped anything that the country experienced in the 1960s. Whereas four people died as a result of political violence in 1974, 1,939 died in the nine months preceding the September 12, 1980 military coup that brought the second democratic spell to an end. Conservative military and political leaders, who believed that the 1961 Constitution had created too much pluralism in civil society, colluded with far-right activists in a campaign of violence that brought the country to the brink of civil war. While left-wing groups also engaged in political violence during the 1970s, much of this was defensive, particularly as far-right groups began targeting Alevi and Kurdish neighborhoods in the late 1970s (Bozarslan 2020). With no end in sight to the country's economic woes, political instability, and spiraling violence, the military leadership decided that it had to intervene.

6.4: Conclusion

The democratic spell that began with a coup to overthrow an elected leader and party that had concentrated too much power ended with a coup in response to the absence of political authority. Whereas junior officers led the 1960 coup and upended the military hierarchy in the process, senior military leaders led the 1980 coup and maintained the chain of command. They portrayed themselves as neutral arbiters of the national interest who no choice but to intervene because self-interested politicians and extremist agitators had brought the country to the brink of ruin. After the coup, security services arrested, imprisoned, and executed thousands of political activists of all stripes, including members of the Idealist groups who viewed themselves as allies of the military. The coup put an end to chaos of the 1970s, though the country's economic problems persisted.

The framers of the 1961 Constitution did not foresee the rise of social movements that would challenge hegemonic understandings of national identity, interests, and boundaries. Many individuals who participated in drafting the constitution remained committed to the project of constructing an ethnically homogenous, secular, class-blind society. Instead, their primary concern was to prevent the emergence of a majority party that could consolidate a single-party authoritarian regime by subordinating the institutions of the state to their political project. The 1961 Constitution achieved that objective. Even during the late 1960s when the Justice Party won electoral majorities that allowed them to govern without coalition partners, low barriers to entry for new parties allowed dissident factions within the JP to break away and form new parties that would compete for the same constituencies. Furthermore, the insulation of the military, the courts, the universities, and the media from manipulation by elected politicians constrained parties and coalitions from cementing their hold on power, even if other state bureaucracies remained vulnerable to the political spoils system. The 1961 Constitution succeeded in preventing another Democrat Party from conquering the state.

From the perspective of reproducing tutelary democracy, however, the framers of the 1961 Constitution made a major error: constitution failed to institutionalize parallel power networks that could "cross-cut and unify the state's formal structures and connect them to civil society," in Jessop's analysis of the state 2013, 57; cf. Poulantzas 2014). The point of tutelary democracy is to ensure that elected political leaders do not undermine the coherence of the state project that military leaders and other state elites promote, or try to promote their own alternative project at their expense. While the 1961 Constitution adequately protected against political leaders having the capacity to promote their own alternative state projects, the political order that it created could not defend against fragmentation of the state elite itself in the face of social contradictions, political

175

struggles, internal conflicts within branches of the state, or broader geopolitical transformations. Disillusion with the alliance with the United States and integration with Europe, class conflict, the challenges created by urbanization, and the mobilization of new political demands from excluded populations created challenges to sedimented articulations of Kemalism from within the state apparatus. Structural dislocations undermined the coherence of the Kemalist state project from within. Without a body that could issue authoritative interpretations of national identity, interests, and boundaries in the face of changing social and geopolitical circumstances, and ensure that the administrative, financial, and discursive practices conformed with those interpretations by monitoring and sanctioning non-compliance, the tutelary project gave way to a cacophony of cross-cutting political projects. The role of universities in promoting left-wing agitation, the rise of left-Kemalism within the military, and the amnesty of political prisoners by the Turkish Constitutional Court illustrate how the fragmentation of the state elite undermined the pursuit of a tutelary state project.

On the face of it, the National Security Council created by the 1961 Constitution should have empowered military leaders to unite the "many arms of the state" behind their interpretation of Kemalist principles. The NSC did succeed in protecting the chain of command within the military at critical moments. The decision to undertake the memorandum coup, for example, occurred at a secret meeting of the NSC, which allowed senior military officers to share information about the coup plot promoted by left-wing junior officers and develop a strategy to pre-empt their move. However, even after the constitutional changes during the 1971-73 interregnum that strengthened the NSC vis-à-vis other branches of the government, it still lacked the authority to perform the coordinating function that would have been necessary to stabilize the tutelary regime. For example, universities and the media regulators still maintained their autonomy

176

from the military leadership. As the next chapter shows, the authors of the 1982 Constitution would not make the same mistake.

From the perspective of social groups excluded from the hegemonic class-blind, ethnonationalist, and secularist interpretation of national identity, interests, and boundaries, however, the period examined here constitutes a high-water mark for democracy in Turkey. Labor unions, peasant activists, Kurdish nationalists, and other activists challenged the exclusionary foundations of the Kemalist Republic to an unprecedented extent. The recourse to extra-legal violence in the forms of martial law, temporary periods of unelected government, the construction of a parallel judicial apparatus to deal with crimes against "state security," and the collusion between paramilitaries and "official" state security agents highlights the foundational violence that tutelary democratic regimes perpetuate by institutionalizing a contingent, exclusionary understanding of "the nation." Although the second democratic spell created more space for excluded groups to challenge the foundational exclusions of the Republic than any period of Turkish politics before or since, it still witnessed high levels of violence against workers, Kurds, Alevis, and other groups struggling for rights, recognition, and redistribution.

The second democratic spell highlighted the challenges of establishing and enforcing institutional constraints on elected leaders and social forces in tutelary democracy. Shortsighted concerns with undermining the electoral and legislative power of large political parties resulted in the adoption of an electoral system that created opportunities for ideological parties and social movements to challenge the hegemonic conception of national interests, identities, and values. Furthermore, growing divisions among state elites caused by the contradiction between tutelary and democratic principles resulted in an inability to translate shared commitments to secular nationalism into coherent administrative, discursive, and coercive practices. The effect of political

institutions on the choices of political actors depends on the degree of consistency in the application of cultural and ideological categories across connected institutional and policy realms, and on the consistent interpretation of abstract categories in concrete circumstances by judges and bureaucrats (Capoccia 2016, 1104). The increasing disunity of the state elite, as demonstrated by public disputes and contradictory decisions across different "arms" of the state, showed that tutelary democracy requires the construction of authoritative coordinating bodies that could shape public discourses, legislative agendas, and interpretation of rules in concrete cases. This lesson would guide the engineers of the 1982 Constitution that structured the third democratic spell.

Chapter 7: Third Democratic Spell, 1980-2011

After the coup of September 12, 1980, military leaders once again had to grapple with the challenge of reconstructing political institutions in such a way that would protect their ability to define national interests and protect their understanding of national identity from internal and external enemies, while also delegating day-to-day governance to elected officials. Following the end of the second democratic spell Turkey's elite institutional engineers once again attempted to learn from the mistakes of the previous periods in order to construct a tutelary democratic system that would endure without another major military intervention. Proportional representation gave rise to fractious multiparty coalitions that allowed small ideological parties to access state resources, so the new group of elite institutional engineers attempted to create stronger incentives for candidates and voters to coordinate on a small number of large parties. Furthermore, the classification struggles over the jurisdiction of military courts, amnesties for political prisoners, and unrest at the country's universities demonstrated the lack of coordination among state elites in the military, judiciary, education, and media fields about the proper way to translate abstract ideals about secularism, democracy, national sovereignty, and security into concrete administrative, financial, discursive, and coercive practices. Consequently, military elites, who held preponderant influence among the elite institutional engineers who made constitutional choices at the beginning of the third spell, sought to strengthen parallel state structures that would concentrate the symbolic power to make authoritative distinctions between legitimate and subversive or reactionary political discourse in their hands. Elite institutional engineers hoped that restrictive electoral rules and stronger parallel state structures would produce a less politicized society and a less polarized party system.

What emerged from the 1980-83 military interregnum was a potentially contradictory system of tutelary majoritarianism. As long as voters elected politicians who shared the same priorities and threat perceptions as military leaders, the tutelary aspects of the constitution would remain latent. This, in turn, was contingent on an education system and media environment that produced subjects who shared the military leadership's perception of social reality, and an electoral system that limited the range of feasible choices to conservative parties that represented the mainstream. However, the smooth reproduction of the system of tutelary majoritarianism was far from guaranteed, premised as it was on the denial of the pluralism of intellectual standpoints that even restricted forms of democracy inevitably give rise to. If an elected party came to power that challenged the symbolic boundaries established by the military junta, a destabilizing power struggle would likely ensue.

The country experienced two such challenges during the third democratic spell, the second of which ultimately brought an end to the system of tutelary democracy. First, the Welfare Party, an Islamist party descended from the National Vision Movement that emerged in the 1970s, took military leaders by surprise by winning a plurality of seats in the Turkish National Assembly elections of 1994. After provocative meetings with religious leaders and foreign affairs initiatives came to light, military leaders used the newly strengthened National Security Council to issue a memorandum on February 28, 1997 that all but forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign, disbanded the Welfare Party, and resulted in a crackdown on Islamist activists and party cadres.

Although the "February 28th Process" succeeded in weakening the Islamist movement, the profound economic crisis of 2000-01 and the weakness of mainstream center-right parties resulted in the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), another Islamist party. However, the

AKP succeeded in using EU accession protocols to weaken the parallel state structures that the elite institutional engineers created in the 1982 Constitution. When AKP leaders provoked confrontations with the military over the appointment of a pious president and judicial reforms that would further undermine the tutelary structures established by the constitution, military officers lacked the popular support, international support, and internal cohesion to enforce the boundaries of legitimate political discourse. The AKP put an end to tutelary democracy once and for all with the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon scandals, which allowed them to purge the military leadership of secular nationalist hardliners.

7.1: The 1980 coup coalition

Although the broad parameters of the problem that the leaders of the 1980 coup coalition faced as they faced the challenge of institutional reconstruction were broadly similar to the dilemmas facing the leaders of the 1960 coup coalition, the context in which they made institutional choices was substantially different in ways that affected the shape of the new political regime. Three contextual differences were particularly important. First, the nature of the coup coalition was different. Whereas the 1960 coup coalition consisted of a mix of junior and senior officers who did not share an assessment of the roots of the political crisis or a plan for how to reorganize political institutions, the 1980 coup coalition was led by the most senior commanders of the military, most prominently the Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren (Harris 2011, 209). These officers already had a clear diagnosis of the maladies that resulted in the breakdown of public order in the 1970s and, although a division between moderates and hardliners did emerge in the aftermath of the coup, authority was much more concentrated in Evren's hands and senior leadership largely maintained its cohesion (Eligür 2014, 86–91). The purges of the 1970s had produced an officer corps that was more ideologically homogeneous and conservative than the

coalition that overthrew the Democrat Party in 1960 (Lord 2018, 227–28). Thus, the institutional choices reflected a broader programmatic vision about how to reshape Turkish society. Although the 1980 coup is often regarded as a "status quo" coup because it did not result in a redistribution of resources or power, this interpretation masks important changes in state practices and institutions that military leaders put in place during the interregnum that would have long-lasting and unforeseeable consequences.

Secondly, relations between the military leadership, the judicial field (encompassing judges, lawyers, and academic jurists), political parties, and civil society were much more strained and contentious in 1980 than in 1960-61 (Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009, 773). "A major difference between the making of the 1961 and 1982 constitutions is that in the latter case the military no longer trusted civilian bureaucratic agencies, which it perceived as highly fragmented, infiltrated by political parties, and vulnerable to radical political ideas" (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 21). Clashes between military leaders and senior judges over the status of state security courts (Shambayati and Kirdiş 2009, 773) and the generals' perception that academia had become too liberal and westernized (Eligür 2014, 105–6) meant that the leaders of the 1980 coup were unwilling to delegate anywhere near as much power to jurists to design the new constitution as the leaders of the 1960 coalition had. Instead, the leaders of the coup coalition turned to a group of nationalist academics called the Intellectuals' Hearth to assist in institutional design, curriculum reforms, and other reform initiatives during the military interregnum (Eligür 2014, 101–2; Lord 2018, 230). As noted, the Hearth, which had connections to the leadership of the far-right Nationalist Action Party, had formed in the late 1960s to combat what its members viewed as the rise of socialist ideology and national disintegration (caused by Kurdish and Alevi demands for recognition). Members of the Hearth occupied prominent positions in the committees that the junta

182

delegated with responsibility to design the constitution, new school curriculums, and other aspects of the reorganization of political life (Eligür 2014, 101–2).

Finally, the political and economic context in which the 1980 coup took place was radically different from the situation in 1960. Whereas the 1960 coup was undertaken to prevent the Democrat Party from achieving hegemony over the state, the 1980 coup was a response to a perceived vacuum of political authority (W. Hale 1988). The cycling coalitions of the 1970s, intensifying street violence between far-left and far-right paramilitary groups, and the deepening balance of payments crisis caused by the oil shocks of the 1970s and the exhaustion of the import-substitution industrialization model created the perception among leaders of the coup coalition that the reorganization of political power would have to empower the executive branch to implement far-reaching economic reforms and respond to security crises, limit the ability of interest groups to influence public policy, and prevent small parties representing extremist ideological factions or minority groups from gaining representation in the legislature. The implementation of structural adjustment programs and the shift to a more liberal economic model "was predicated on the creation of a socially disciplined and depoliticized society" (Cizre 2008, 316). At the same time, however, the military leadership disdained the entire political class, which they deemed to be venal and incompetent (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 22). Consequently, the new political structure combined strongly majoritarian electoral rules that aimed to produce a small number of catch-all political parties, an institutional structure that greatly empowered the prime minister and their cabinet at the expense of the legislature and judiciary, granted the indirectly-elected president the power to make appointments to the highest-ranking positions in bureaucratic agencies, and a strengthened National Security Council with new agenda-setting and veto powers (Lord 2012; Özbudun 1988).

Three features of the 1982 Constitution are particularly important for understanding the subsequent political dynamics that defined Turkish politics in the Third Republic. The first is perhaps the most remarked-upon: the strengthened National Security Council, which enhanced the agenda-setting and veto powers of the military leadership compared to the previous constitution. From the introduction of the council in the 1961 constitution, the NSC was established as a semi-military body within the Council of Ministers. However, from the 1961 constitution through the amendments adopted by the military-appointed caretaker government in 1971 to the 1982 constitution, the wording that described the nature of the council's advice to the government, and what civilian politicians were supposed to do with the advice, was continuously strengthened: the duty of the NSC was elevated from "submitting" the requisite fundamental recommendations of the Council of Ministers, which implied no binding force and usually took place at the request of the competent body or authority; to "advising," in the 1971 amendment, which denoted instructions given by equals to each other; to the demand that the Council of Ministers "primarily considered" the decisions of the NSC concerning measures that "it deemed necessary" for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state (Kaynar 2018, 461). This wording kept the precise function of the NSC vis-à-vis the civilian government deliberately vague, while implying that a refusal to adopt the military's policy preferences would have serious consequences. It also refused to specify the scope of policy areas deemed to be important for national security, and therefore within the purview of the NSC. In addition, the 1982 constitution increased the number of military officials on the NSC while reducing the number of civilians (Kaynar 2018). Thus, the 1982 constitution went further than previous constitutions in formalizing the tutelary

power of the military, and did not include any language designed to demarcate the boundaries of the military's authority. Elected officials ignored the NSC's directives at their own peril.

Secondly, the 1982 constitution and other rules adopted during the interregnum transformed the institutional context for political parties and inter-party competition. While the framers of the 1982 constitution maintained an electoral system based on proportional representation, they added a requirement that political parties attain at least 10 percent of the nationwide vote in order to enter the legislature. For the leaders of the military junta, the crisis of the 1970s "was at least partly due to the excessive fragmentation of the party system and the blackmailing or kingmaker power obtained by the extremist minor parties such as the National Salvation Party and the Nationalist Action Party" (Özbudun 2013, 111). The leader of the junta Kenan Evren said that, "In my view, the greater the number of parties in parliament, the higher the probability of coalition governments. When we look at the USA and the UK, there are two main parties and other parties are insignificant, and governments do not fall often between the two elections leading to crises. I had a strong desire for a system of two major parties where power alternates between them as in those countries" (quoted in Özbudun 2013, 112). While I have not found any Engllish-language sources that address why the framers of the new institutional dispensation chose to maintain proportional representation with a high national threshold rather than adopt the single-member plurality electoral system that the US and UK have, one possibility is the fear that those rules would make it possible for a political party representing Kurds to emerge in the country's southeast, where they constitute a majority (Kandil 2016, 180). The national threshold, by contrast, would force parties to campaign outside of any specific ethnic, religious, or economic enclave.

In addition to new electoral rules – and possibly working at cross-purposes with them – the new constitution banned the party leaders from the 1970s from participating in politics for the first ten years of the new regime. The ban on party leaders was not originally part of the institutional blueprint of the junta. As Hale (1988, 167–68) argues, the junta had originally hoped that the existing parties would agree to cooperate in a cabinet responsible to themselves. However, moderates in the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party were dissuaded by their party leaders and colleagues from joining the cabinet because they worried that aligning their parties too closely with the military would have adverse long-term consequences, even as the leaders of the parties, Bulent Ecevit and Suleyman Demirel, were being held in protective custody in the aftermath of the coup. With the major political parties dragging their feet to join a cabinet that would govern during the interregnum, Evren and the other junta leaders decided that a more thoroughgoing transformation of the party system was necessary. They hoped that by 1992 "most people would have forgotten about Ecevit, Demirel, and the other political leaders of the pre-coup period, so that their re-entry into politics would be practically impossible" (W. Hale 1988, 169). This aspect of the constitution would have unforeseen and, from the perspective of the constitution's framers, adverse consequences, as it made it difficult for voters to strategically coordinate on a small number popular candidates or parties, since the field would be populated with new actors. This would counteract the effects of the electoral rules on the number of parties, particularly when the already well-known figures from the 1970s rejoined the political field alongside newer forces that emerged in their absence.

The third feature of the 1982 constitution that would become a focal point in years to come was the powerful, indirectly-elected presidency. Whereas the office of the presidency was a "largely symbolic and ceremonial office" under the 1961 constitution, it was transformed into an

active and powerful one with important political functions, particularly with respect to bureaucratic appointments (Özbudun 1988, 37). The 1982 constitution allocated a wide range of legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the office of the presidency. In terms of legislative powers, the president had the ability to return laws to the Assembly for reconsideration, appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of laws, law-amending ordinances, and the Standing Orders of the Assembly on grounds of unconstitutionality, and to dissolve the Assembly and call for new elections. While the president's executive powers included powers commonly attributed to heads of state, such as accrediting diplomatic representatives, it also had important powers of appointment to bureaucracies that were deemed to be central to the military's security agenda. The president had the ability to appoint members of the Board of Higher Education and university rectors, which gained new importance given the role that campus unrest played in the 1970s and the importance that the junta leaders attributed to education reform. Furthermore, the president had the power to appoint members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the members of the Council of State (the highest administrative court), the Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and his deputy, the members of the High Military Administrative Court, and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Özbudun 1988, 39). With its expanded powers of appointment to the judiciary and the bureaucracy, the president became a much more important actor under the new regime. Consequently, battles over presidential elections would become focal points for broader social conflicts over issues of national identity and symbolic boundaries, since the president's appointment powers gave the office the ability to shape the administrative, financial, and symbolic practices that constitute the boundaries between public and private, religious and secular, and citizen and "other" (Mayrl and Quinn 2016).

The framers of the new constitution intended the new, more powerful presidency to serve as a lever of military influence over the bureaucracy and the judiciary. "If the 1982 constitution somewhat curbed the review powers of the judiciary and the autonomy of universities, this was not intended to strengthen elected assemblies and responsible governments at the expense of bureaucratic agencies. Rather, the intent was to create a strong presidency, which the makers of the 1982 Constitution assumed would be controlled by the military" (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 20). Under the new restrictive electoral rules that banned previous political party leaders, the framers of the constitution assumed that military-affiliated or -approved candidates and parties would occupy the center of party politics for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, by requiring that the president be elected by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the framers of the new constitution hoped to ensure that the president would be a non-partisan consensus figure, preventing any one party from instrumentalizing the state bureaucracy and using it to pursue a political project that clashed with the laicist modernization project that military leaders promoted. In short, the framers hoped that the president would serve as a guardian of the boundary between the sphere of electoral politics, with its ideological conflicts and patronage politics, and the bureaucracy, which would finally become a depoliticized realm of rationalist, technocratic policymaking, as opposed to the instrument of single-party hegemony, as during the first democratic spell, or the fragmented and politicized apparatus of the second spell.

7.3: Democracy without divisions: reforms in the education system

The key to making this combination of tutelary majoritarianism work was the ability of the education system to shape Turkish subjects into loyal, obedient citizens who shared the military leadership's perceptions of security threats. Thus, reforms to the education system also occupied a prominent place in the agenda of the military junta during the interregnum, as the generals sought

to "position themselves as the chief cultural brokers of the national polity" (S. Kaplan 2006, 177; cf. Altinay 2004; Eligür 2014, 102–9). The 1980 coup took place in the context of the growing influence of left-wing thought in secondary schools and universities, on the one hand, and the growth of political Islam in the Middle East epitomized by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, on the other. In this conjuncture, the military leadership viewed the promotion of "official" Islam as a national security priority as a way to inoculate against the influence of both communism and radical Islamism (Kandil 2016, 178). Accordingly, religious education had to be offered as a compulsory course in kindergartens; in primary, secondary, and high schools; and in the army itself (Eligür 2014, 102–3), and the principle of compulsory religious education was included in Article 24 of the 1982 constitution. Changes to the standard curriculum were also aimed at preventing the consolidation of identities that threatened the fragment the nation into a politics of differences. This required "setting up the terms for participation in and exclusion from the national culture" by "building consensus around categories of enmity" (S. Kaplan 2006, 194–95). "In orienting the school system to those political and ethnic distinctions the army supported, the school system de-legitimated and silenced any interest group that advocated alternative collective identities and thereby justified their exclusion from participating in the public sphere" (S. Kaplan 2006, 196). Compulsory courses on national security, which were taught by uniformed military officers, would train citizens to think in geopolitical terms about the threats to Turkish society, including potential internal enemies (Altinay 2004, chaps. 5 & 6). If civil-military conflicts arise because of differing perceptions of threat levels between military and civilian leaders (Mcmahon and Slantchev 2015), the military government sought to design a curriculum that would prevent these differences from arising in the first place.

Another important change to the education system was to allow graduates of the *imam hatip* schools, which are religious vocational schools that were created to train officially-approved Islamic scholars and preachers, to enter all departments of universities. Even at the time of the military coup, the *imam hatip* schools were viewed as epicenters of the Islamist movement, producing educated and motivated individuals who often became cadres in the Islamist National Salvation Party and the far-right Nationalist Action Party (Lord 2018, 218–19). Students in these schools were taught the prominent works of both Islamist and conservative Turkish nationalist writers alongside the usual religious texts (Lord 2018, 218). Because they were created with the objective of training religious officials, graduates of *imam hatip* schools had previously been restricted to enrollment in theology faculties if they wanted to pursue higher education. However, under the influence of the Intellectuals' Hearth, the military leadership chose to allow graduates of these schools to enter a wider range of university faculties, which in turn would enable them to enter professions such as business and law with greater ease. The predictable and desired outcome of this policy was to foster the rise of a more conservative and nationalist middle class, thereby changing the social bases of party politics (Yavuz 2005).

At the same time that new educational policies were diminishing the boundaries between the secular and religious spheres in Turkish society, the military junta also implemented new policies that reinscribed the boundary between public secularism and private religiosity. Shortly after the coup, the military government passed the "Dress and Appearance Regulation," which prohibited employees while on duty in public agencies, offices, and institutions from wearing mustaches, beards, and long hair for men, and mini-skirts, low-necked dresses, and headscarves for women, and many other institutions such as businesses and universities followed suit by adopting similar appearance regulations (Olson 1985, 163). The new dress regulation was aimed

190

both at leftist activists and women who were either too Westernized (and therefore inauthentic) or too religious (and therefore backwards or reactionary) (Çınar 2008; Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008). In banning the headscarf, the military government reinscribed the boundaries between public and private, and secular and religious, on women's bodies. "Secularist norms that draw the public-private boundaries upon the female body maintain that the hair and the neck are open to the public gaze, whereas Islamic norms (as they are interpreted by Islamists in Turkey) consider these aspects of female embodiment strictly private. When women wearing the Islamic headscarf appear in public spaces, especially in places like university campuses or public offices, which are the strongholds of secularism, this seemingly trivial piece of clothing imposes an Islamic frame on the public-private distinction and unsettle[s] the established secular norms that constitute publicness" (Çınar 2008, 903). Additionally, even as the military government expanded the range of faculties that *imam hatip* graduates could enter in university, officers in charge of military academies continued to prohibit graduates of these schools from enrolling (S. Kaplan 2006, 192). Thus, the military government put in place a two-track program of co-optation and contain by opening more options to Islamist groups to participate in public life while also drawing strict boundaries that marked certain spaces and practices off limits (Yavuz 2005, 213).

The military government of 1980-83 reorganized political institutions with the goal of producing more authoritative civilian governments that were elected by citizens who shared the military leadership's understanding of strategic priorities. By weakening the autonomy of the courts and the education system, military leaders and conservative nationalist intellectuals hoped to produce "desired citizens" (I. Yilmaz 2021) who valorized military service and viewed nonconformists with suspicion, and to have the freedom to surveil and discipline ethnic, religious, and ideological minorities who posed a threat to the militarized social order (S. Kaplan 2006;

Altinay 2004). The goal was to complete the monopolization of symbolic power that the Kemalists had sought to achieve since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. By limiting access to electoral politics and denying autonomy to educational institutions, the framers of the 1982 constitution sought to prevent other actors from shaping perceptions of social reality, thereby making it impossible for social groups to emerge that would challenge the social status quo (Swartz 2013, 82).

The attempt to establish a state monopoly of symbolic power was risky, however. If a political party succeeded in getting their preferred candidate elected president, they would then have the ability to challenge the narrative that the military leadership's authority was built on, and pursue their own hegemonic project by using their control over the state to articulate a claim to represent the true will of the people. Compared to the 1924 constitution that the Democrat Party inherited when it won power in 1950, the 1982 constitution had more obstacles to single-party hegemony. But by seeking to reduce the number of political parties and strengthening the prime minister, the potential for a single-party takeover was embedded in the new regime. In theory, the National Security Council provided a means for military leaders to prevent civilian politicians from pursuing a conflicting political project. However, the tutelary features of the state were a blunt instrument that could undermine the perception of impartiality, objectivity, and selflessness that military leaders sought to cultivate. Furthermore, an overt political intervention could undermine the military leadership's effort to improve the country's international standing. Finally, a successful exercise of tutelary power required a degree of consensus within the officer corps about a party's threat to the national interest. Savvy political leadership, an international environment inhospitable to military interventions, and divisions within the officer corps could

make it difficult for the military to prevent a political party from capturing the state and establishing its own hegemonic regime.

At the same time, the military also redrew symbolic boundaries by instituting new administrative and symbolic practices that destabilized the categorical distinctions between "secular" and "religious." In line with constructivism in political science, anthropologists of religion and secularism have pointed out that the categories of religion and "the secular" do not have essential, transhistorical definitions; rather, the categorization of specific spaces, practices, and actors as secular or religious is an inherently political process (Asad 1993b; Cannell 2010). In the case of Turkey, the adoption of secularism was motivated by a particular conception of religion marked as "univocal, archaic, backward, antimodern, and aiming to capture the state," and it produced the construction of an "enlightened" conception of religion based on a particular Sunni interpretation of Islam, understood mainly as "a system of belief, dissociated from practices, which as the constitutive element of national identity is used to make the cohesion of the social body possible" (Gürbey 2009, 372). The secular Turkish Republican state has always been a theological actor, insofar as it was always involved in establishing which religious ideas and practices were consistent with nation-building objectives and which ones constituted security threats (Shively 2008; Lord 2018). Viewed in this light, the adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the expansion of religious education marks a departure from secularist state schemas that had guided military leaders and secular politicians in the past, but not necessarily a radical one. Nonetheless, as Mayrl and Quinn (2016, 18) argue, even small changes in administrative, financial, and symbolic practices that constitute the boundaries of the state may over time come to have significant ramifications for the distribution of resources, producing unintended consequences and unforeseeable feedback loops.

7.4: The return to democracy

After three years of repressing paramilitary groups, suppressing political activity, and reorganizing political institutions, the military returned power to civilians in 1983. With the major parties and figures from the 1970s banned from taking part in electoral politics, only three parties had any chance of gaining power in the first post-coup election. The most preferred party, from the military's perspective (W. Hale 1988, 170–71), was the Nationalist Democracy Party, which was led by ex-general Turgut Sunalp and represented the secular center-right. The other two parties were the Populist Party, which was supposed to represent the officially approved center-left and was led by Necdet Calp, a former provincial governor and private secretary to two previous presidents; and the Motherland Party, which ran as a catch-all center-right party that sought to appeal to Islamist, nationalist, and economically liberal constituencies. The latter was led by Turgut Özal, an economist with connections to mainstream center-right politics (as an economic advisor to Justice Party prime minister Suleyman Demirel on two occasions), the World Bank (where he worked during the 1971-73 interregnum), and the Islamist political field (he was a member of the influential Naksibandi Sufi brotherhood) (Kalaycioglu 2002; Öniş 2004). Özal was viewed with suspicion by some members of the military because he had run as a candidate for the Islamist National Salvation Party in 1977 (Acar 2002, 165–66). General Kenan Evren, the junta leader who became president as a consequence of the uncontested constitutional referendum the year before, made a speech that was highly critical of Özal just two weeks before the 1983 election, despite his desire to be seen as being above the political fray. Nonetheless, Özal's connections to financial markets (both in the West and in the Gulf states, which were becoming increasingly influential as a consequence of the oil shocks of the 1970s), broadly pro-Western orientation, and

willingness to collaborate with the military junta as a deputy prime minister during the period immediately after the coup made him an acceptable candidate (Eligür 2014, 112–13).

Just as the 1961 election shocked and disappointed the leaders of the coup coalition by rewarding the Justice Party with a substantial share of votes and legislative seats, so the 1983 election also disappointed the military, with Özal's Motherland Party forming the first single-party majority government since the 1950s. The Motherland Party received 45.1 percent of the vote, while the Popular Party came in second with 30.5 percent and the Nationalist Democracy Party finished third with just 23.3 percent (Özbudun 2013, 48–49). The failure of the military's preferred NDP demonstrates the paucity of actors who could act as a bridge between the military field and the field of electoral politics. Without connections to patronage networks, religious brotherhoods, business groups, and media outlets, military leaders such as Sunalp were ill-positioned to compete in electoral politics, even under the new regime that tried to level the playing field by eliminating old parties and leaders. While the 1980 military coup was broadly perceived as necessary within Turkish society, the voters (and even some military leaders) doubted whether military figures could manage the complicated economic situation (Demirel 2003, 260). Özal, by contrast, could not only lay claim to economic expertise, but his social capital in the Islamic political field allowed him to draw support from influential religious groups, and he successfully appealed to conservative nationalist voters as well by emphasizing the country's Sunni Turk identity against claims from minority groups (Akça 2014, 19–21; Ayata 1996, 44–45). Furthermore, unlike other leaders in the Islamist political field, Özal did not have a history of inflammatory anti-secularist rhetoric, and he and his wife lived a modern lifestyle that included occasional consumption of alcoholic beverages and his wife's decision not to wear the Islamic headscarf. In his memoirs, Evren noted that despite

Özal's Islamic credentials, the generals were "assured by the fact that as a couple they looked civilized" (Acar 2002, 166).

The emergence of a majority party with weak connections to the military and connections to Islamist networks tested the new tutelary majoritarian system. While Özal could not appoint members of the military, higher education officials, or media regulators, he did have the power to appoint people associated with religious organizations to important posts within the economic bureaucracy. According to Ayata (1996, 44), the Özal cabinets had at least three or four ministers and a large percentage of their parliamentary group had connections to various religious organizations, and the Islamists, particularly those associated with the Naksibandi brotherhood (of which Özal was a member), constituted the "single most powerful faction in the party organization." Control over key positions in government and the bureaucracy enabled the well-organized Islamic networks to recruit their own members into civil service jobs (Ayata 1996, 44–45), and privatizations and liberalization of markets allowed business groups associated with the Naksibandi brotherhood and the Gülen movement not only to expand their businesses but also to enter the media and educational fields (Yavuz 2018, 27–31). Furthermore, despite the Motherland Party's pro-market rhetoric, the new political arrangement provided the government with an even stronger ability to distribute patronage without judicial, media, or legislative oversight. The new institutional arrangement created a large number of extra-budgetary funds through the diversion of tax resources from the parliament-controlled consolidated budget, allowing the government to disburse these funds without parliamentary authorization (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 51; Karataşlı 2015). The party used these funds to steer financial resources to business groups associated with the Islamist movement To a greater extent than in the Democrat Party in the 1950s or any of the governments led by the Justice Party during the 1960s and 1970s, the Islamic brotherhoods not

only supported the Motherland Party but constituted a major wing of the party (Eligür 2014, 119). Özal's period of leadership was associated with the emergence of the so-called Anatolian bourgeoisie, consisting of small and medium-sized enterprises owned by pious businessmen, and these groups also opened up new newspapers, television channels, and radio stations to promote a pious agenda (Özdalga 2010, 79; Koyuncu Lorasdaği 2007, 154).

Despite the increasing role that Islamist activists and groups were playing in the government of the country, neither President Kenan Evren or other members of the National Security Council raised an alarm over the question of secularism. Tension between Özal and the military leaders centered on his attempt in the summer of 1987 to promote an officer he perceived to be a political ally, General Necip Torumtay, to the position of the Chief of the General Staff, overruling the recommendation of the senior military command (Karabelias 1999, 137). For the first few years of his time as prime minister, Özal was content to defer to the military leadership on issues related to internal security and foreign affairs, focusing most of his energy on economic reform (Karabelias 1999, 136). However, he began to challenge the military for a couple of reasons. First, the ban on party leaders undermined his own legitimacy as a leader because it created the perception that the Motherland Party was only competitive because of the absence of more established parties and leaders on the political scene. Even though Evren and other senior military leaders were reluctant to admit the old party leaders back into the political arena, Özil had an incentive to bring these leaders back onto the scene. Secondly, while economic growth had improved following the liberalization reforms, inflation remained a persistent problem because of high government spending. With the economy becoming less of a calling card, democratizing reforms could improve his standing with the press and intellectuals, who had become critical of the military's power (Karabelias 1999, 136–37).

While the conflict over the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff provoked public criticism from senior military leaders, it did not result in a coup attempt. Two years later, Özal was elected to the Presidency of the Republic by the National Assembly with no public opposition from military leaders or officers. The main reason for this restraint was that Özal's political agenda and leadership style gave them little reason to worry that he was undermining the country's sovereignty, international status, or territorial integrity. Although Özal had used his powers of appointment to promote members of religious organizations, this occurred at a time when members of the military leadership adhered to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis program, which allowed for greater expression of personal piety and a somewhat more prominent role for a domesticated, nationalist Sunni Islam, without jeopardizing Western alliances and shifting the country into alignment with Iran or other revisionist countries in the Middle East (Aral 2001, 75). Indeed, as Aral (2001, 77) argues, Özal "uncritically accepted the three main roles envisaged for Turkey by the United States and its Western allies in the post-Cold War era": acting as a bulwark against Iranian influence in the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia; constraining and containing radical states and/or non-state political movements as part of a pro-Western bloc of status quo-oriented states; and to remain committed to European integration. If the Motherland Party consisted of economically liberal, nationalist, and Islamist tendencies, Özal's policy priorities clearly placed him within the liberal camp, even if he also sought to build the party by mobilizing Islamist supporters. His primary foreign policy objective was to deepen Turkey's incorporation into the global economy as part of a broader shift to an export-led growth model, which required the attraction of foreign investment and access to new markets. Some nationalist elements of the officer corps and intelligence community considered him to be an agent of Western influence because of his stridently pro-US foreign policy, and others believed that his performance of

198

moderation and modernism amounted to dissimulation to distract from the pro-Islamist content of his domestic policies (Aral 2001; Acar 2002; Kandil 2016). However, these groups remained small minorities, as they were unable to convince other officers that he posed a threat to the military's traditional self-strengthening project.

In fact, Özal's strong commitments to economic liberalism and a pro-Western foreign policy prevented the Motherland Party from successfully melding together the factions that made up the Islamist political field. Among groups that sought a more prominent role for Islam in public life in Turkey, there was substantial disagreement over how to articulate Islamic and Turkish identities, what implications Islamist political ideologies had for economic and social policies, and how far the state should go in promoting an adherence to and Islamic lifestyle (Tuğal 2009, chap. 2). Although Özal had a background in the National Vision movement, he did not see eye-to-eye with its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, who sought to build the Welfare Party into a competitor for the adherence of pious voters. In contrast to Özal's pro-Western alignment, Erbakan had long criticized the military leadership's alignment of the country with the US and Europe because of the decadence of Western society and the country's dependence on imported Western technology, and he sought to reorient the country's foreign policy in a pan-Islamic direction (Yılmaz 2011). Furthermore, Erbakan's economic program envisioned a larger role for the state in economic planning and support for the downtrodden than Özal's market-oriented program, which had led to an increase in economic inequality by the end of the 1980s. In contrast, Özal had stronger affinities with Fethullah Gülen, a neo-Nur preacher whose version of Islam was much more compatible with the understanding of national identity and interests that the military had traditionally promoted, and whose approach to Islam emphasized individual initiative and entrepreneurial values consistent with Özal's economic liberalism (Koyuncu Lorasdaği 2007, 157; Yavuz 2013).

199

Nonetheless, "toward the end of [the 1980s], the infiltration of the state institutions by the Islamic groups, and the Islamization of society, both from below and above, along with the increasing sway of the…Islamist conservative wing in the party, began to worry not only the opposition and leftist secular intelligentsia, but also the country's leading power elite, such as the wealthy business groups, the military, and the liberals within the ruling party itself" (Ayata 1996, 45). The fragmentation of the Islamic political field reflected both deep-seated political differences over whether and how to confront the military and its Western allies, as well as personal and organizational rivalries for prestige and access to state positions and resources. These divisions belie any simple center/periphery or secular/Islamist dichotomization of Turkish politics.

7.5: The road to the "February 28th Process"

Turgut Özal's sudden death of a heart attack in 1993 brought a transformative decade for Turkish politics and society to an end. The left-right polarization that characterized Turkish politics in the 1970s had come to an end, partly because the military government had imprisoned left-wing activists and undermined the organizational basis for working class activism (Akça 2014; Buğra and Savaşkan 2014, 49). Although the Kurdish insurgency created difficulties for the country's military leaders, the street violence in major cities and on university campuses had come to an end. Turkey's economic conditions had also changed dramatically, as the Özal government's liberalization and privatization programs increased foreign direct investment, lowered barriers to competition for new smaller and medium-sized firms, and increased the availability of imported consumer goods (Bekmen 2014). While inflation remained persistently high and the government continued to run budget deficits in order to subsidize agriculture and avoid raising taxes, there was nonetheless a substantial degree of optimism about the country's social and economic future, at least among the middle classes (Öniş 2004).

Yet, even before Özal passed away, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the architects of the new political order had not succeeded in suppressing contestation over the symbolic boundaries of Turkish national identity. In addition to the Kurdish insurgency, which was fueled by the military's unwillingness to recognize the existence of a distinct Kurdish ethnic group (Bozarslan 2008, 350), the meaning and legitimacy of secularism were increasingly being questioned by the growing Islamist movement. The adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis by the military junta during the 1980-83 interregnum and the cultural and economic policies of the Özal governments instigated a period of contention over the lines of division that group practices, actors, and spaces into the recognizable categories of "the secular" and "the religious" (Mayrl and Quinn 2016, 2–3; Gürbey 2009; Eligür 2014). The military government's strategy of increasing the role of Islam in public education while simultaneously implementing new measures that would reassert state control over religious practices and limit public displays of piety were partly offset by Özel's economic policies and hiring practices, which granted individuals and organizations affiliated with different strands of the Islamist movement access to new financial, administrative, and symbolic resources (Ayata 1996). By 1997, Islamists owned 19 newspapers, 100 magazines, 51 radio stations, 20 TV channels, 2500 associations, 500 foundations, more than a thousand companies, 1200 university dormitories, and more than 800 private schools and university exam-prep courses (Eligür 2014, 222). These newly-empowered Islamist individuals and organizations then politicized the symbolic boundaries that the founders of the Third Republic constructed by presenting them as impositions by Westernized, inauthentic secular elites (so-called "White Turks") that had deleterious material consequences for pious individuals who did not believe they should have to choose between their spirituality and their ability to participate in public life (so-

called "Black Turks") (Demiralp 2012). The emerging Islamist political movement sought to erase the boundary between the secular public sphere and the private religious sphere.

This new Islamist movement was embodied by the Welfare Party, which was formed in 1981 but was not allowed to participate in national electoral politics because of its Islamist connections until 1987. The WP emerged from the National Vision movement began by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970, but because of the closure of the National Salvation Party in the wake of the military coup and because of Erbakan's inclusion in the ban of party leaders from the previous decade, it had to adopt a new, secular-sounding name. Benefitting from the divisions within the Motherland Party between liberals and Islamists, and from the demise of the social-democratic left as an electoral force, the Welfare Party quickly grew into one of the strongest parties in the country. In the 1987 national elections, the WP gained 7.2 percent of the registered votes; in the next national elections in 1991, it doubled its votes, reaching 16.2 percent of votes; and in the 1994 municipal elections, the party managed to reach 19.1 percent of the vote share, and won the mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara, two cities that had long been associated with the secular center-left (M. E. Yilmaz 2012, 365–66). By this point, the military leadership, secular elites in business and academia, and other figures became alarmed at the rapid growth of the Welfare Party, and military leaders became outspoken critics of the Party, and of Erbakan in particular (Aslan 2016). Nonetheless, in the December 1995 national elections, the Welfare Party became the largest party in a fragmented field, winning 21.4% of the vote and 158 out of 550 seats (28.7% of the seats).

Whereas Özil was a figure whose personal piety was balanced by a Western foreign policy orientation and secular lifestyle, Erbakan was a figure who represented a more radical tendency in Islamist politics. He supported a foreign policy reorientation away from Europe and the US, and

towards the broader Muslim world, including Iran and Saudi Arabia (Kandil 2016). This alienated both the military leadership, many of whom had trained in the United States and who had long been suspicious of Iranian and Saudi ambitions for regional leadership, and the country's largest business groups, who wanted to integrate into European markets. In addition to his foreign policy views, Erbakan's approach to lifestyle issues also alarmed secularists. His wife, and the wives of other leading figures in the party, wore the Islamic headscarf, and the party advocated for a removal of the headscarf ban. At the municipal level, Welfare Party leaders had instituted bans and restrictions on the purchase and consumption of alcohol, which had long been viewed as a mark of Western modernity (Turam 2012).

The Welfare Party's success owed less to Erbakan as a leader than to its new organizational capacity, however. The new administrative, financial, and symbolic practices instituted by the military government and expanded by the Özal government created a new Islamist business class that financed the growth of the Welfare Party and related civil society organizations that promoted an Islamic agenda through education, media, and outreach to poor citizens (Gülalp 2001; Gumuscu 2010). The expansion of *imam hatip* schools, the growth of private religious schools, and the expansion of religious education in public schools also produced a new group of motivated, pious youths and young professionals, who were willing to commit their time and skill sets to building the Islamist movement (Eligür 2014, chap. 5). As Mayrl and Quinn (2016, 8) argue, "adjustments of state boundaries (through new or rearranged financial, administrative, or symbolic practices) may alter the existing distribution of state resources, spurring mobilization among those actors who perceive that proposed adjustments affect their interests." Newly empowered Islamic business groups, civil society organizations, and political parties used their new access to economic resources, expansion of access to the public sphere through the opening of new media outlets

(Öncü 1995), and the opening presented by the fragmentation of the party system and skepticism of incumbent political elites (Eligür 2014, chap. 4) to push for a reconfiguration of state schemas and practices.

7.6: Undermining Welfare

In response to the rise of the Welfare Party, secular military officers, members of the judiciary, academics, and other secular elites policed existing boundaries and sought to inscribe new ones that would protect what they viewed as the secular, modern nature of Turkish national identity. Civil-military relations became entangled in this classification struggle (Bourdieu 2019) over the meaning and boundaries of Turkish national identity. This conflict would test how effective the tutelary aspects of the 1982 constitution were in the face of a government whose policy agenda crossed several of the military leadership's traditional red lines. Tutelary government is fundamentally mode of what Abbott et al (2016) describe as indirect governance, or the use of intermediaries to achieve governance objectives. The tutelary regime combines elements of delegation, insofar as military leaders exercise hard control over politicians and citizens in order to achieve security objectives set by the generals, with elements of orchestration, in that military leaders hope to enlist the voluntary compliance of like-minded intermediaries to achieve governance objectives.

The problem for military leaders is that party leaders have divergent objectives, insofar as cooperating with the military may undermine the party's electoral chances or policy objectives, while like-minded groups in political and civil society, such as media outlets and political parties that share the military leadership's policy agenda and threat perceptions, may lack the influence to bring about the outcomes that military leaders hope to achieve (Abbott et al. 2016, 722–23). Thus, tutelary rule is only effective insofar as the military can monitor and sanction political leaders

when they are told to implement a certain policy or form a coalition, and insofar as like-minded intermediaries have enough field-specific and political capital to achieve the military leaders' objectives.

The military leadership's efforts to thwart the Welfare Party demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of the regime of indirect governance established during the 1980-83 interregnum. The first strategy that the military attempted to use was to orchestrate a public opinion campaign using (quasi-)voluntary compliance from secular media outlets and business people, who had their own reasons to oppose the Welfare Party's agenda, after the 1994 municipal elections. However, the Welfare Party's even stronger performance in the December 1995 election demonstrated the lack of influence that secular media and business people had outside of the secular middle-class enclaves that traditionally supported the center-left or secular center-right (Aslan 2016, 367). Then the military leadership put pressure on the two center-right parties, the True Path Party and the Motherland Party, to form a coalition with each other and to agree not to form a coalition with the Welfare Party. However, this coalition was short-lived because of the personal animosity between Tansu Ciller and Mesut Yilmaz, the respective party leaders. The military leadership was unable to do anything to sanction these party leaders for their failure to maintain a lasting coalition government. Instead, Ciller formed a coalition with the Welfare Party, and Erbakan became prime minister. His ability to take office already demonstrated the limitations of the military's informal influence.

However, the powers vested in the National Security Council by the 1982 Constitution allowed the military to undermine the Welfare-True Path Coalition. At the National Security Council meeting of February 28, 1997, less than a year after Erbakan took office as prime minister, the military leadership issued a joint memorandum that established Islamism as the primary

security threat to the country (ahead of the Kurdish insurgency), and issued an 18-point policy agenda that would promote secularism. They knew that this agenda would be unacceptable to Erbakan, since it contradicted the entire thrust of his policy agenda. That was the objective. While Erbakan tried to hold out and stall implementation of the military leadership's agenda, the withdrawal of the True Path Party from the coalition government prevented him from holding onto power, and he resigned in June. In December, the Constitutional Court forced the Welfare Party to disband.

This intervention demonstrated both the strengths and the weaknesses of the tutelary regime. On the one hand, the National Security Council's constitutional powers allowed the military leadership to thwart the legislative ambitions of the Welfare Party without having to overthrow the government in a classic military coup, with all of the intra-military disorder and audience costs that such a move would entail. On the other hand, the tutelary system did not provide the military with the power to create new administrative, financial, and symbolic practices that would reinscribe the secular-Islamic boundary. After the Welfare-True Path Party coalition government resigned in July 1997, the military leadership had difficulty finding partners who would implement its program of eliminating political Islam from the public sphere because remaining political parties wanted to appeal to the constituency of the now-defunct Welfare Party. Of the 18 point legislative agenda to curb the Islamist movement that the military presented to Erbakan in the memorandum delivered in the National Security Council meeting of February 28, 1997 (the so-called "February 28 process"), only one policy was actually passed by the National Assembly (Eligür 2014, 222). Moreover, the military's active role in forcing Erbakan to resign as prime minister resulted in the emergence of a new, more powerful Islamist coalition, as actors in the Islamic political field with divergent policy agendas would overcome their differences in an

attempt to challenge the military leadership. The February 28th process was a pyrrhic victory, demonstrating the limitations of the fundamentally negative boundary-policing powers that the military leadership had its disposal through the National Security Council.

7.7: The end of tutelary democracy

I argue that the regime of tutelary democracy ended with the fallout from the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon scandals in the early 2010s. Although there was an attempted military coup in 2016, that episode differed from previous Turkish military coups in that the coup coalition consisted of disaffected members of the Islamist Gulen movement rather than proponents of the Kemalist nation-building project (Filkins 2016). Indeed, the irony of the 2016 coup attempt is that it was enabled by the purges of secular military officers that followed the onset of the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon scandals, which involved media reports about a planned attempt to overthrow the Justice and Development Party government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Subsequent reporting and scholarship have demonstrated that key documents that reporters based their coverage of the alleged coup plot on, and that prosecutors used to convict high-ranking military officers, were in fact forgeries. Nonetheless, by purging high ranking officers who opposed the AKP's political project, the Sledgehammer and Ergenekon scandals fatally undermined the capacity and willingness of military leaders to intervene in Turkish politics (Aydinli 2011; Gürsoy 2012b; 2012a; Bardakçi 2013).

How did the AKP bring the regime of tutelary democracy to an end? I argue that institutional factors, divisions within the military and judiciary over the potential costs and benefits of intervention, and political opportunities created by the EU accession process and the post-9/11 reorientation of US foreign policy explain how and why the AKP succeeded in bringing tutelary democracy to an end. As mentioned above, the majoritarian electoral rules put in place by the 1982

constitution allowed the AKP to govern as a majority party despite only winning a slim plurality in the 2002 elections. The fate of the Reform Party, the predecessor of the AKP on the Islamist right, during the 'soft coup' of 1998 demonstrated the difficulty of challenging the military as a party that needed to share power with coalition partners who did not have the same desire for conflict.

At the same time that the 1982 constitution allowed the AKP to turn an electoral plurality into a parliamentary majority, however, it also created obstacles to the AKP's ability to implement its nation-building project, which conflicted with the Kemalist project traditionally promoted by military officers. But enforcing the rules that entrenched the Kemalist state project required a shared understanding of the strategic situation among military officers, jurists, and bureaucrats. Thus, the second reason why the AKP succeeded in undermining the foundations of tutelary democracy was the lack of a consensus among ostensibly secular forces within the state about the extent of the threat posed by the AKP and the costs and benefits associated with counter-democratic actions. Following the soft coup of 1998 and the onset of the EU accession process, secular political forces were divided, with moderates favoring dialog and democratic competition and hardliners favoring judicial action or a coup to remove the Islamist government. The successful performance of moderation and competence by AKP leaders in the early years of the government weakened the position of hardliners within the security apparatus and the judiciary (Altınordu 2016). The enforcement of rules and informal 'red lines' that protect the tutelary project depends on members of the establishment sharing a common view of the strength and intentions of opposition groups, but in the 1990s and the 2000s secular political elites lacked common knowledge about the strategic situation.

Finally, the international conjuncture strengthened the AKP because it presented opportunities for the party to perform moderation and competence, and to divide secular political forces that would otherwise oppose their cultural agenda. The AKP's embrace of the EU accession process signaled to liberal secular political forces that they were different from earlier generations of Islamist political movements, which opposed closer relations with Europe. EU accession protocols also provided support for institutional reforms that were key to undermining the veto power of military actors, and opening up the judicial appointment process to stronger influence by civilian political leaders (Michaud-Emin 2007; Karaosmanoğlu 2011). Furthermore, the AKP's liberalizing economic reforms took place in the context of rising international liquidity, facilitating a rapid return to growth following the devastating economic crisis of 2000-01 and lending credibility to the party's claim of technocratic competence. Finally, the willingness of the Bush Administration to embrace a "moderate" Islamist party as a model for the Middle East during the early years of the Global War on Terror signaled to prospective coup-plotters that they could not count on US support for a military intervention, unlike their Cold War predecessors (Tuğal 2016). The AKP's early embrace of economic globalization and liberal democracy (at least rhetorically) undermined the claims by Kemalists that only their project could close the temporal gap between Turkey and the West.

Once the AKP succeeded in passing constitutional reforms that changed the composition of the National Security Council and reduced the scope of its political authority, and after it had used the scandals to purge the officer corps of secular hardliners, the military no longer served as the main obstacle to their own bid for hegemony. One of the lasting ironies of tutelary democracy is that the highly centralized state that military officers and their allies had constructed allowed the AKP to build their own single-party authoritarian regime over the course of the 2010s (Esen and

Gumuscu 2016; I. Yilmaz 2021). Tutelary elites designed a "pedagogical state" (S. Kaplan 2006) that aimed to shape the preferences and beliefs of citizens through their control over the education system and ability to regulate public discourse. Even as the AKP succeeded in weakening the military's ability to monitor and sanction civilian political leaders, they maintained the state's centrality in the process of subject formation. Military officers may have lost their veto power and even their ideological cohesion, but the legacy of tutelary democracy persisted in institutions that constrained social pluralism and limited public discourse.

7.8: Conclusion

Turkey's third democratic spell began with the most ambitious attempt yet to construct parallel state structures that would concentrate the authority to decide which forms of political discourse were legitimate in the hands of military leaders. The strengthened National Security Council gave Turkish military leaders influence over administrative, financial, discursive, and coercive practices across the many arms of the state in an effort to avoid a repeat of the classification struggles between military officers, judges, and politicians that occurred in the 1970s. As of 1997-98 the system appeared to work as institutional designers hoped that it would. Military elites forced an Islamist prime minister to resign without having to launch a formal military coup, and their elites in the judiciary disbanded the party. By the turn of the century it appeared as though tutelary democracy had reached its most evolved form.

However, Islamist political strategies, the deep economic crisis of 2000-01, and the post-9/11 global conjuncture quickly presented new problems for the military elite. The division of the Islamist movement into a pro-EU self-styled moderate party (the AKP) and a more hardline party (the Virtue Party) made it difficult for military leaders to continue to portray Islamists as dangerous

fanatics who posed a threat to secular lifestyles. At the same time, the economic crisis weakened other center-right political forces that might have taken votes away from the AKP. Despite winning only a third of the popular vote in 2002, the electoral system assisted the new party by creating disproportionality as established parties failed to meet the 10% threshold. And in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks and concurrently with the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, American political elites welcomed the success of a party that could serve as a moderate model for other Islamist parties in the region in a country that had a long alliance with the United States. Consequently, military leaders had to doubt whether Washington would support a military coup. A decade after attempting to eradicate the Islamist movement, military leaders had to cope with the strongest challenge to their secular nation-building project. Ultimately, the construction of parallel state structures to facilitate coordinated policing of the boundaries of acceptable political discourse could not offset the failure of military leaders to reach a consensus about the threat posed by the AKP.

The third democratic spell highlights the recurring difficulty of policing the boundaries of acceptable political discourse while maintaining a competitive electoral democratic regime. Tutelary democracy articulates two contradictory political logics: the people should rule themselves, but the people cannot be trusted to rule themselves. Consequently, reforms that undermine obstacles to the concentration of power by a single-party majority government have a democratic edge because of the long history of anti-democratic actions by the judiciary, the military, and the security state. Once constitutional reforms defanged the counter-majoritarian tutelary state structures, the highly concentrated state that elite institutional engineers constructed made it easier for a new party to implement their own authoritarian nation-building project than a decentralized state with more participatory institutions would have. Elite institutional engineers

created a state designed to facilitate top-down processes of social transformation, and then lost control of it.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This project aimed to explain the conditions under which an unsettled path to democratization—characterized by attempts at building democracy, coups, violence, and democratic backsliding—can unfold. Turkey provided the case examined, for reasons identified at the outset. Turkey's path in the 20th century resulted in several successful military coups and coup-like events, two incidents of democratic backsliding via executive aggrandizement, and repeated bouts of political violence involving right-wing nationalists, communist groups, and Kurdish groups. I conceptualized Turkey's form of democracy as tutelary democracy, which I defined as the combination of multiparty competitive electoral politics with efforts by military and state elites to monopolize symbolic power.

The project attributed the origins of this regime type to two factors. First, the desire of Republican political and military elites to improve Turkey's standing in the hierarchical international system created a strong incentive for these actors to limit the range of socio-political projects that could gain access to state power. Secondly, state elites' concern that Kurdish desire for self-determination could elicit external interference caused them to implement an ethnonationalist project of cultural assimilation and demographic engineering in the eastern borderlands, resulting in recurring unrest and insurrections that provoked military intervention. Thus, even when elite splits within the ruling Republican People's Party resulted in a transition to electoral democracy in 1950, military elites still considered the formation of citizens' understandings of national identity, interests, and boundaries as a core national security concern.

The project then examined how military actors and their allies in the judiciary and the broader political system attempted to use institutional design to construct regimes that combined

competitive elections with restrictions on pluralism. After allowing relatively liberal actors in the judiciary and the legal academy to produce a relatively liberal constitution in 1961, I showed how military elites repeatedly used interventions into the political process to increase their control over education, media regulation, and other policy areas related to the formation of political preferences. At the same time, however, the choice of electoral rules oscillated between proportional rules that prevented any one party from gaining control over the state but produced legislative stalemates, and majoritarian rules that allowed governments to undertake ambitious reform programs but also empowered them to impose their own understandings of national identity, interests, and boundaries. Institutional engineers faced a paradox: any party that was strong enough to implement reforms that would improve the country's international standing could was also strong enough to challenge the military's nation-building project.

Finally, the project examined how the Justice and Development Party succeeded in rolling back the military's tutelary authority. I argued that unintended consequences of the military's support for privatization opened the door for the Islamist movement to gain electoral influence. However, without an international conjuncture that undermined foreign support for military interventions and electoral rules that allowed the AKP to form single-party governments, the Islamist movement would not have had sufficient power resources to win in a showdown with the military. I also argue that the pedagogical state built by military leaders and their allies in the bureaucracy and the judiciary facilitated the AKP's authoritarian turn by providing it with powerful tools to impose its vision of national identity, interests, and boundaries.

The rest of this concluding chapter examines avenues for future research opened up by this project. These suggestions focus on the themes of decentering the nation-state in the methodological and theoretical imagination of comparative politics and broadening the focus of

research in civil-military relations and democratization studies. Following up on my criticism of methodological nationalism in civil-military relations in chapter 2, the first section argues that comparativists should join the interdisciplinary 'global turn' in the social sciences and humanities by employing relational research designs to study macro-political phenomena and to avoid taking the existence of national populations and territories for granted. I then show how democratization studies could benefit from engaging with international relations research on hierarchies and social closure, centering gender cleavages in theorizing about the social conflicts that drive regime transitions, and incorporating a stronger focus on the politics of preference formation. Finally, I argue that civil-military relations research could benefit from viewing the military through the lens of field theory, and incorporating police into its field of vision. In sum, I argue that the boundaries of comparative politics need to be expanded to incorporate insights from global approaches to history and historical sociology, and from critical social and political theory that interrogates the relationship between power and knowledge.

8.1: Globalizing comparative politics

A major theme of this project has been that regime transitions are, to paraphrase Lawson, "intersocietal all the way down." The hierarchical international system puts pressure on political and military elites in peripheral states to limit the range of demands that citizens could make on their government. At the same time, transnational flows of people, goods, and ideas constituted the preferences, expectations, and resource endowments of different groups and actors in Turkish society. In order for Kemalist elites to construct a Turkish national territory, population, and economy, they had to assert their control over these transnational patterns of circulation and forcibly eliminate, expel or relocate populations whose transnational connections constituted a threat to the nascent territorial nation-state. Inter- and trans-national structures and processes did

not just constitute a political opportunity structure that made some strategies more viable than others. Rather, these relations shaped the identities, interests, and boundaries of different actors and groups in Turkish society.

Yet, scholars of comparative politics continue to take the ideal-typical nation-state as the starting point for theory building and research design (Adamson 2016; Schwedler 2021; Riofrancos 2021). There are two main sources of methodological nationalism in comparative politics. First, the method of controlled comparison takes isolated nation-states as the unit of analysis and then looks for internal causes of divergence between cases (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Bhambra 2010; 2016; Duzgun 2018a; Matin 2020). Scholars who employ controlled comparison assume that actors' preferences, expectations, and resource endowments form as a result of processes of development that take place within the boundaries of the unit of analysis. International factors only enter the analysis, to the extent that they do at all, when they catalyze 'domestic' cultural, institutional, or economic change, or persuade local political leaders with pre-constituted preferences to alter their behavior (Waldner and Lust 2018, 105).

The major problem with controlled comparison in comparative politics is that it obscures the (often quite violent) processes through which political actors produced nationally "caged" (Mann 1993, 20; cf. Clemens 2007, 534–36) social relations. Nation-states did not emerge in socio-spatial vacuums, and their borders did not reflect the boundaries of "ethnic homelands" that belong to their people from time immemorial. Rather, geopolitical borders are the contingent result of centuries of warfare and international negotiations, and the populations who occupy these territories were shaped by migration, intermarriage, and transregional commercial and religious ties. As Norton (2017, 38) argues, nation-states only became feasible units of analysis through the "persecution, exclusion, and destruction of [pre-existing] trans-state circuits" of goods, people,

and ideas. Nationalist political leaders and military forces constructed national territories and populations by strategically mobilizing institutions to regulate and reorganize social and economic relations (Brenner et al. 2008, 6–7; Goswami 1998; 2004; Brenner and Elden 2009; Lefebvre 2008). Political and military actors then regarded populations that did not fit the mold of their desired citizens – either because they did not speak the right language or because did not engage in "modern" or "civilized" cultural and economic practices – as threats to security, particularly where these groups were spatially clustered in geopolitically sensitive borderland regions (McNamee and Zhang 2019).

When scholars of comparative politics take the nation-state as the unit of analysis, they obscure the contested processes of producing national territories and populations out of the fabric of pre-existing patterns of commerce, transportation, and communication. As a consequence, the fail to see the role of state and international actors in instigating social conflicts over territory, population, and authority. In Turkey, the expulsion of Greek Christians in the Treaty of Lausanne and the confiscation of Christian-owned property during World War II were motivated by the desire to construct a Turkish bourgeoisie in the effort to protect the project of economic development from foreign interference (Eligür 2019; 2020). In the Kurdish provinces and elsewhere, conflicts between states and minority ethnic groups have resulted from the fact that the livelihood strategies of mobile pastoralist and nomadic groups do not conform to the spatiality of the nation-state (Costa Buranelli 2021; MacArthur 2019). In other cases, the construction of national economies disrupted long-standing imperial, regional, and local networks of commerce (Goswami 2002; Appel 2017). These episodes of foundational violence had long-term impacts on the projects of political and military leaders and the relations between state centers and peripheries (Cocks 2012).

217

Secondly, the foundational theories of state formation, democratization, and economic development in comparative politics have been shaped by Eurocentric historical narratives. These narratives conceive of the emergence of modern states, political regimes, and industrialization as processes that were caused by factors that were internal to European societies, and then spread to the rest of the world through processes of diffusion and emulation (Bhambra 2009; 2014; Go 2016; Boatcă 2015). These analytically bifurcated (Go 2014) accounts of European political and economic development ignore the constitutive effects that imperialism had on the identities, interests, and boundaries of social groups within the metropole. Furthermore, these Eurocentric accounts overlook the effects that slavery (Williams 2021; Inikori 2020), the extraction of natural resources (Mitchell 2013), and expropriation of indigenous peoples (Carlos, Feir, and Redish 2022) had on the political and economic development of European empires and their settler offshoots during the periods when these societies experienced transitions to modernity. These Eurocentric, internalist narratives then serve as the benchmarks against which postcolonial societies and peripheral states are compared and found lacking or deficient.

It is time for comparative politics to take a 'global' turn, following the lead of scholars of global history and global historical sociology (Conrad 2017; Osterhammel 2014; 2016; Go and Lawson 2017). A global turn does not necessitate discarding comparison — far from it. Instead, it requires reconceptualizing the purposes of comparison in two ways. First, instead of trying to isolate 'domestic' variables that lead to 'domestic' outcomes, a global approach to comparison focuses on "the co-constitution of particular places and macro processes" (Riofrancos 2021, 107). Instead of thinking of chronic political instability in Turkey as the result of an internal structural defect that 'blocked' the emergence of liberal democracy, we can see how social stratification at the international level and the transnational circulation of racialist and social Darwinian ideas

contributed to the emergence of a Turkish political and military elite who viewed ideological and ethnic pluralism as threats to national security. Comparison gains its plausibility from the global scale of processes like the spread of capitalism and the expansion of international society, which have shaped political developments across the world (P. McMichael 1990; Bodnár 2019; Dunne and Reus-Smit 2017). The purpose of comparison then becomes to understand how actors in different settings respond to these totalizing processes, albeit under different historical circumstances.

Secondly, comparative politics needs to decenter the nation-state by incorporating empire into its theoretical lexicon. To the extent that scholars of comparative politics have thought about empires theoretically, they have considered them as the opposite of nation-states: whereas empires have universalist principles, are culturally heterogeneous, do not aspire towards establishing fixed borders, and have deeply hierarchical social orders, nation-states are thought to be secularized social organizations with fixed and stable territory, a sense of 'horizontal comradeship' among citizens, and formal equality before the law (Malesevic 2017). States that fall short of the nation-state ideal are anomalous or deficient. However, when I read Stoler and McGranahan's (2006) conceptualization of 'imperial formations' I can think of a wide range of self-identifying nation-states that embody several of the defining characteristics. They argue that imperial formations are "states of deferral" that "manage and produce their own exceptions" such as conditions of delayed sovereignty, temporary intervention, conditional tutelage, military takeover in the name of humanitarian intervention, and violent interventions in the name of human rights. The very concept of 'tutelary democracy' names just such a state of deferral. They also argue that imperial formations "create new subjects that need to be relocated in order to be productive and exploitable, dispossessed in order to be modern, disciplined in order to be independent, converted in order to

be human, stripped of old cultural bearings in order to be citizens, coerced in order to be free."
Many nation-building projects, including Kemalism, have entailed some or all of these processes
of demographic engineering, dispossession, and forced assimilation. When political scientists
assume that national populations and territories analytically and historically precede the formation
of states, they overlook these coercive processes of nation-building and the long-term political
consequences that they have.

8.2: International Social Closure and Domestic Politics

One of the encompassing processes that shape domestic politics, particularly in less
wealthy or powerful countries, is the stratification of the international system through processes of
social closure (Keene 2014; Zarakol 2017; Gordon and Webber 2019; Viola 2020; Naylor 2022).
Social closure "refers to the process of drawing boundaries and building communities to
monopolize scarce resources for one's own group and to exclude others from gaining access to
them" (Viola 2020, 26). The international system is constituted through the differential allocation
of rights across actors that arises out of an ongoing process of possession and appropriation of
political space. The rules or criteria that determine which states gain membership — and what
degree of membership — in the international system are the rules of social closure (Viola 2020,
28). Efforts by powerful states to monopolize scarce resources and limit access to club goods
undermine political pluralism in the international system by requiring less wealthy or lower status
countries to conform to specific models of political, economic, and cultural development.

The effects of rules of international social closure (and the discourses that justified them)
on the preferences and threat perceptions of Turkish political and military actors constituted a
major theme in this project. The standards of civilization, which justified the differential treatment
of non-Christian or non-European polities in the Europe-centered international system,

undermined the development of democratic political institutions in Turkey by linking state sovereignty to the adoption of a culturally-specific set of political and economic institutions and social practices. The need to adopt these culturally-specific standards of civilization pushed these actors to adopt an authoritarian state-building project geared towards producing secular nationalist political subjects (I. Yilmaz 2021). Social closure in the international system not only limits political pluralism at the systemic level by restricting the numbers and types political actors that can gain recognition (Viola 2020, 9), but it also puts pressure on governments and security apparatuses at the domestic level to limit the range of political demands that citizens can make on their governments. Social closure at the international level undermines political pluralism at the domestic level.

The domestic politics of international social closure thus constitute an important avenue for future research in comparative politics and international relations. Political and military actors undermine labor rights (Dean 2022b; 2022a), crack down on protest around environmental issues and access to land (Earl and Braithwaite 2022; Adaman, Arsel, and Akbulut 2019), and adopt cultural policies that clash with the preferences of many citizens, all in the interest of maintaining access to scarce material and symbolic resources controlled by powerful states. Comparativists who study democratization, political accountability, and parties and party systems need to examine how the rules of social closure and the discourses that justify them shape the policies adopted by governments in ways that weaken their ties to domestic constituencies. Furthermore, international relations scholars have begun to examine when and why some states respond to social closure through mimicry and assimilation of international norms that justify the limitation of access to scarce resources controlled by powerful states (Zarakol 2013). Comparativists and IR scholars both have an interest in examining how these conflicts over assimilation or resistance to rules of

social closure shape social conflicts and civil-military relations in states on the periphery of the international system.

8.3: Gender and Democratic Breakdown

One aspect of Turkey's experience with democratic transitions, breakdowns, coups, and the leading role of the military in politics that deserves greater attention is gender politics. The fact that conflicts over the headscarf issue over the last four decades have consisted of predominantly male political and military leaders arguing over what women should wear in public tells us something important about the role of patriarchal social structures in Turkish politics and society (Saktanber 2006; Çınar 2008; Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün 2017; Arat 2022). At the same time that the Kemalist state project champions the liberation of women from the fetters of traditional Islamic society, secular nationalists and military actors have promoted a hegemonic understanding of gender relations in which men bear the responsibility for protecting the nation while women serve to reproduce national identity through their role as mothers (Altinay 2004; Arat 2008; Altan-Olcay 2009; Ozkaleli 2015). This discourse has served to justify policies that limit women's autonomy and their capacity to engage in public life as equals, even as Kemalist military and political leaders have justified military interventions into politics on the ground that they were upholding modern notions of women's liberation (Kandiyoti 1987; White 2003). For their part, political Islamists have advanced their own hegemonic understanding of gender relations built around the idea that men and women perform complementary roles in the family and society, and that politics is the rightful business of men (Arat 2012; Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün 2017; Doğangün 2020). Debates about women's autonomy and their appropriate position in society have been central to struggles for democratization in Turkey.

However, scholars of democratization studies lack the theoretical resources needed to make sense of the role that gender ideologies and patriarchal social structures play in struggles over political regimes. Until recently, struggles for women's suffrage were absent from historical narratives about the emergence of liberal democracy in Western Europe and its settler offshoots (Teele 2018). In places where universal suffrage was already in place when transitions to competitive multiparty political regimes took place, scholars outside of gender studies have largely overlooked the role that fights over gender and sexuality have played in broader struggles over civil rights, the rule of law, and the personalization of power (Graff, Kapur, and Walters 2019; Fangen and Skjelsbæk 2020; Graff and Korolczuk 2021; Bogaards and Pető 2022). Part of the problem for political scientists is the assumption that preferences reflect a person's position within the social order (Clarke 2017). Because political fights over gender rarely pit all women on one side and all men on the other, in the same way that fights over redistribution tend to pit workers against employers, political scientists mistakenly assume that gender is not relevant to democratization. In addition, research on the relationship between nationalism, ethnicity, and democratization has ignored the crucial link between the gendered politics of reproduction and nationalist or ethnic politics (Chatterjee 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997; Enloe 2014; Gökarıksel, Neubert, and Smith 2019; V. S. Peterson 2020). The theoretical frameworks that political scientists use to make sense of social conflicts over participation and accountability have made it difficult to see the difference that gender and sexuality make to struggles over political regimes.

Research in cognate disciplines and gender studies provide theoretical resources that political scientists can use to rectify democratization studies' shortcomings. The concept of hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Messerschmidt 2018) highlights how certain normative understandings of masculinity are more associated with authority and social

power than nonhegemonic masculinities, femininities, and non-binary sexualities. Studies of the relationship between gender and right-wing populism have shown how crackdowns on free speech and association in countries like Turkey, the US, India, and Brazil have been motivated by attacks on "gender ideologies" that threaten to undermine these hegemonic understandings of masculinity (Corredor 2019; Case 2019; Sosa 2019; Slootmaeckers 2019; Chacko 2020). I think that a promising avenue for future research would be to examine whether the political and institutional compromises that made transitions to democracy possible were premised on protecting the privileges of certain forms of masculinity. I suspect that, once social movements arose that challenged gendered and sexualized hierarchies, incumbent social and political forces who were invested in the gendered status quo withdrew their support for democratic institutions. To see how gender matters for democratic backsliding we first have to examine how political institutions become gendered in the first place , and to see how earlier political settlements perpetuated these social relations.

8.4: Bringing Preferences Back In

Another opportunity for expanding the boundaries of democratizations studies is to pay more systematic attention to the battles to shape citizens' preferences and beliefs. As proponents of the agonistic model of democracy argue, thinking of political regimes as a means of aggregating preferences overlooks the influence that politicians, state actors, civil society groups, and others have on the preferences of voters (Disch 2021). For Turkish military actors, party leaders, and social movements, exercising control over state educational institutions, religious organizations, and media outlets constituted both an objective and an instrument in the struggle for political and social hegemony. Current battles over history education, ethnic studies, and "gender ideology" in the US, Britain, France, and elsewhere demonstrate the importance that political actors attach to

exercising control over the interpretation of the past, understandings of national identity and interests, and beliefs about moral economy and national security (Beaman and Fredette 2022; D. Bell 2008; Fekete 2022; Mälksoo 2015).

However, comparative politics research depoliticizes education by conceiving of it as a public good rather than as a stake in struggles for hegemony. Scholars of comparative politics treat the quantity and quality of education provision as an indicator of how responsive political actors are to voter demands for public goods, or as an indicator of the state's ability to penetrate society and radiate its power throughout its territorial boundaries (B. W. Ansell 2010; B. Ansell and Lindvall 2013; P. Singh and vom Hau 2016). Battles over what schools should teach, and what kinds of citizens schools should produce, have received less attention, despite their centrality to political conflicts around the world. Political actors do not just care about education because of the importance of having an educated workforce in industrial and post-industrial economies, or because they want to demonstrate their competence and honesty to constituents. They also care about reproducing their political bloc by ensuring that schools produce new generations of voters, cadres, and militants.

Battles to shape political subjectivities extend well beyond public education. As the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci argued, struggles for social and political hegemony take place both within political society — which consists of state institutions and the political parties that compete for power — and within civil society, with religious institutions, business organizations, philanthropic foundations, and other organizations contributing to forming the preferences and beliefs of citizens (Gramsci 1971). An exclusive focus on formal procedures and legal protections of free speech and association is therefore unlikely to capture the wide range of practices that social forces use to either reproduce or subvert the socio-political status quo (S. Hall 1986; 1980;

Mazzolini 2020). The boundary between the public and private spheres is itself one of the stakes in the struggle for hegemony (Mitchell 1991; Jessop 2013; Mayrl and Quinn 2016), so inquiry into how parties, social movements, militaries, and other collective actors try to shape political subjectivities cannot restrict itself to state institutions.

Political struggles to shape the preferences and beliefs of citizens raise a number of normative and empirical questions for future research. From a normative perspective, claims that certain communication practices or subjects constitute indoctrination or propaganda abound in everyday political discourse, yet it is unclear what a politically fair or democratic approach to subject formation would look like (Wingenbach 2011). While being skeptical of claims to the objectivity or political neutrality of particular truth claims or communication practices, agonistic democratic theorists and constructivist scholars of democratic representation have argued that practices that increase citizens' autonomy and reflexivity with regard to their own biases undermine attempts by social forces to monopolize symbolic power (Dovi 2018; Celikates 2018; Disch 2021). Yet, because of the division of labor between normative political theory and empirical research, scholars have made little effort to operationalize autonomy and reflexivity for empirical research. These are pressing research questions for scholars of politics in an era of global culture wars, conspiracy theories, and information warfare.

8.5: Towards a Field Theoretical Approach to Civil-Military Relations

Before military actors can worry about shaping the subjectivities of the citizens they need to defend, they need to produce cohesion within the armed forces by developing shared understandings of threat perceptions, the military's role in society, and norms about proper exercise of authority (McIntosh 2021). Yet, divisions among military officers, and between officers and rank-and-file soldiers, have acquired great visibility in this project. At different

226

periods, officers and soldiers were divided over the criteria that should determine which officers get promoted, the strategic orientation of military doctrines, interpretation of the Kemalist state project, how closely Turkey should align with US foreign policy objectives, and whether and to what extent Islamist political leaders posed a threat to national security. At the same time, the shared experience of training in officer schools and less formal modes of socialization endowed officers with many common perceptions of the role of the military in Turkish politics and society and of threats to national security. The extent of cohesiveness of the officer corps affected the military's capacity to intervene in politics as well as the objectives that drove these interventions.

While the argument that cohesiveness among officers affects the capacity of the military to achieve its objectives is hardly novel (Feaver 1996; N. Singh 2014), current approaches to civil-military relations that try to incorporate intra-military differences are inadequate because they treat preferences and expectations as exogenous parameters. Rationalist approaches to coordination during coup attempts limit disagreements among officers and soldiers to the likelihood of coup success, rather than to larger debates about security doctrines, personnel policies, relations to different social constituencies, and differential ties to other militaries (e.g., N. Singh 2014; Mcmahon and Slantchev 2015; Little 2017; Hendrix and Salehyan 2017). Consequently, as Brooks (2019, 383) argues, "scholars [of military coups] tend to motivate hypotheses with narrowly tailored analytical logics, yielding sometimes important but often piecemeal findings; the sum of the parts often seems greater than the whole." Scholars of civil-military relations need an analytical framework that can describe the sources of division among military officers in more detail and explain the variation in the degree of cohesion over time.

Theories of social fields (Bourdieu 1977; 1990; Martin 2003; Fligstein and McAdam 2012) provide a set of conceptual tools that scholars of civil-military relations can use not only to analyze

dynamics of contestation and coordination among military officers, but also to link changes in the military field to developments in other political and social spheres. Social fields are arenas of conflict in which actors struggle to accumulate valuable resources and to define which resources are considered valuable (Bourdieu 1985; Swartz 2013, chap. 3; Go and Krause 2016, 8). Field-specific capital in the military setting might include specialized training, battlefield success, control over funding decisions, and links to actors in the civilian sphere and in other, more powerful militaries, depending on the state of competition within the field over which resources carry the most prestige.

Importantly, the preferences and expectations that determine actors' behavior are shaped by their experiences both within the field and in their broader process of socialization. The habitus of military officers is shaped by common experiences of training, living in the barracks, and fighting on the battlefield, creating common understandings of the military's purpose and of the state's geopolitical priorities. But different types of training and service across branches of the military, different family backgrounds and pre-military experiences, and travel abroad for training may also create differences in perceptions of which forms of military-specific capital are the most important, and beliefs about how military actors should relate to civilian politicians and other groups. Field theory opens up a range of new vistas for understanding the sources of civil-military and intra-military conflict by incorporating the preferences, expectations, and embodied dispositions of military actors as both causes and consequences of developments in the military field and society more broadly.

In addition to developing deeper theoretical and empirical accounts of the sources of tension within militaries, field theory opens up new avenues for studying how relations between militaries shape political outcomes (Mudge and Vauchez 2012; Go and Krause 2016; Buchholz

2016; S. Bernhard and Schmidt-Wellenburg 2020). Studies of international causes of military coups tend to focus on the incentives that international norms and political opportunity structures create for officers who, for whatever reason, are interested in overthrowing civilian governments (Marinov and Goemans 2014; Savage and Caverley 2017; Thyne et al. 2018; Casey 2020). As with other rationalist approaches to coups and civil-military relations, these approaches leave preferences and expectations exogenous. However, historians have demonstrated how officers who received training abroad tended to have different perceptions of the role of the military in society, of national security interests, and of the means that militaries should use to carry out their missions than their colleagues and superiors (Cronin 2008; Martins Filho 2014; Mabee 2016; T. G. Peterson 2023; Eck and Ruffa 2023). An exciting avenue for future research would be the examination of the emergence of a transnational military field as a consequence of increasing interactions between military officers in great powers and their client states, resulting both in unit-level changes within militaries and states in the global South as well as changes in the international system as the result of the diffusion of strategies, tactics, and technologies.

Field theory has the potential to transform the study of civil-military relations by enabling scholars to gain a deeper understanding of the historical factors that shape contests for power within the military and dispositions of military actors vis-a-vis their civilian counterparts (Gorski 2013). In Turkey, secondary education and military training endowed officers with embodied dispositions that made them unlikely to trust civilian political leaders, more likely to view some types of political unrest as threatening to the political order than others, and to view the military as responsible for maintaining the country's international standing at all costs. At the same time, generational changes, divisions between officers with different foreign training backgrounds, disagreements over the relationship between Islam and national identity, and clashing conceptions

of Turkey's position in the international system created tensions within the officer corps that inhibited coordination during coup attempts and, in the case of the 1960 coup, prevented military actors from exercising effective control over the process of institutional design. Theoretical models that decontextualize military actors make it difficult to see these sources of both cohesion and division within the military that condition its ability to intervene in politics and defend the state effectively.

8.6: From Civilian Control of the Military to Democratic Control of Violence Workers

The final avenue for future research I highlight is re-examining the object of study in civil-military relations. The primary question that scholars of civil-military relations have focused on is, how can civilians exercise effective control the armed forces that protect them from external threats? Yet political scientists have only asked this question with respect to the military, and not to ostensibly civilian police agencies. I suspect that this silence is, at least partially, a produce of the methodological nationalism that I criticize above, which has led political scientists to assume that the military and police are incommensurate because they deal with entirely different types of problems. Militaries protect against the militaries of other nation-states in an anarchical international society, while police maintain social order in the context of a hierarchically ordered space in which they maintain the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Thus, the problem of maintaining civilian control over the military has been treated in isolation from democratic accountability of police forces to the citizens that they are supposed to protect.

However, recent political developments and critical policing scholarship have undermined the assumption that there is a fixed, ontological boundary between the responsibilities of police and military forces. Demonstrations about excessive police violence and corruption in the United States and elsewhere have raised concerns about the extent to which elected officials and voters

effectively control the police forces that are supposed to protect them (Walrath and Linnemann 2021). At the same time, a wave of recent research on the militarization of police forces has demonstrated that, throughout their history, police forces around the world have made use of military personnel, tactics, weapons, and intelligence (McCoy 2009; C. McMichael 2017; Schrader 2019; Go 2020; Müller and Steinke 2021; Schrader 2022). Finally, the debate in historical sociology about what, if any, differences there are between empires and nation-states has demonstrated that even the most established nation-states like Britain, France, Spain, and the US have long histories of military participation in operations of conquest and pacification within their own borders (Byler 2009; Kumar 2010; Go 2017). All of these developments have served to undermine the assumption that there is an inherent difference between military and police forces in terms of their relationship to civil society and the democratic polity.

Therefore, I argue that political scientists should expand their focus from studying how civilians can exercise control over the military to examining how democratic polities can control violence workers. In using the phrase "violence workers," which I borrow from Seigel (2018), I signal that the differences between the police and the military in a given society are the contingent outcome of classification struggles (Bourdieu 2019) and boundary disputes between political, military, police, and other actors over the responsibilities, resources, and status allocated to different coercive arms of the state. My claim is that the struggles that citizens of countries like Turkey have had to keep their military officers from intervening in affairs of state are commensurable with the struggles that citizens in places like Ferguson, Missouri have had to keep police from killing unarmed Black men (Dodd 2015; Soss and Weaver 2017). In both cases, violence workers have defended the sovereign prerogatives delegated to them by the constitutional political order to use lethal violence on the grounds that they have unique expertise in the

deployment of force to defend the social order. In both cases, their uses of lethal power against stigmatized social groups have garnered support from members of the political elite and sizable constituencies of voters (Kurt 2021). And in both cases, members of targeted social groups and their allies in civil society have fought to hold members of the security state accountable for their lethal actions, and to institutionalize civilian oversight of the coercive arms of the state. These are only a few of the structural similarities in the struggles for democratic control over the state's violence workers that are taking place at multiple geographical scales around the world.

Bibliography

Abbott, Kenneth W., Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. 2016. "Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration." *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (4): 719–29. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000593.

Abou-El-Fadl, Reem. 2019. *Foreign Policy as Nation Making: Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War*. Global Middle East. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Acar, Feride. 2002. "Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation." In *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, edited by Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, 163–80. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions." *The American Economic Review* 98 (1): 267–93.

Açıksöz, Salih Can. 2017. "He Is a Lynched Soldier Now: Coup, Militarism, and Masculinity in Turkey." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 13 (1): 178–80. https://doi.org/10.1215/15525864-3728811.

Adalet, Begüm. 2018. *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*. Kindle edition. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uva/detail.action?docID=5317439.

Adaman, Fikret, Murat Arsel, and Bengi Akbulut. 2019. "Neoliberal Developmentalism, Authoritarian Populism, and Extractivism in the Countryside: The Soma Mining Disaster in Turkey." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 46 (3): 514–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1515737.

Adamson, Fiona B. 2016. "Spaces of Global Security: Beyond Methodological Nationalism." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1 (1): 19–35. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv003.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. 2014. "Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society." *International Organization* 68 (1): 143–76. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000337.

Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (2): 565–611. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382148.

Ahmad, Feroz. 2008. "Politics and Political Parties in Republican Turkey." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed., 226–65. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.010.

———. 2010. "Military and Politics in Turkey." In *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Kerem Öktem, Celia Kerslake, and Philip Robins, 92–116. Basingstoke [England]; New York; Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan; in association with St Antony's College. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=668014.

Akan, Murat. 2011. "The Infrastructural Politics of Laiklik in the Writing of the 1961 Turkish Constitution." *Interventions* 13 (2): 190–211. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2011.573217.

Akça, İsmet. 2014. "Hegemonic Projects in Post-1980 Turkey and the Changing Forms of Authoritarianism." In *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, edited by

İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, 13–46. London: PlutoPress. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u6225306.

Akın, Yiğit. 2018. *When the War Came Home: The Ottomans' Great War and the Devastation of an Empire*. Stanford University Press.

Aksan, Virginia. 2021. *The Ottomans 1700-1923: An Empire Besieged*. Routledge.

Aksan, Virginia H. 2007. "The Ottoman Military and State Transformation in a Globalizing World." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27 (2): 259–72.

Aktürk, Şener. 2011. "Regimes of Ethnicity: Comparative Analysis of Germany, the Soviet Union/Post-Soviet Russia, and Turkey." *World Politics* 63 (1): 115–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887110000304.

Albertus, Michael. 2017. "Landowners and Democracy." *World Politics* 69 (02): 233–76. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887116000277.

Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. 2014. "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution." *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 575–603.

———. 2017. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Allan, Bentley B. 2018a. *Scientific Cosmology and International Orders*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108241540.

———. 2018b. "From Subjects to Objects: Knowledge in International Relations Theory." *European Journal of International Relations* 24 (4): 841–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117741529.

Altan-Olcay, Özlem. 2009. "Gendered Projects of National Identity Formation: The Case of Turkey." *National Identities* 11 (2): 165–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940902891336.

Altinay, A. 2004. *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*. Springer.

Altınordu, Ateş. 2016. "The Political Incorporation of Anti-System Religious Parties: The Case of Turkish Political Islam (1994–2011)." *Qualitative Sociology* 39 (2): 147–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-016-9325-8.

Andersen, David. 2019. "Comparative Democratization and Democratic Backsliding: The Case for a Historical-Institutional Approach." *Comparative Politics* 51 (4): 645–63.

Anghie, Antony. 2005. *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614262.

Ansell, Ben, and Johannes Lindvall. 2013. "The Political Origins of Primary Education Systems: Ideology, Institutions, and Interdenominational Conflict in an Era of Nation-Building." *American Political Science Review* 107 (03): 505–22.

Ansell, Ben W. 2010. *From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of Education*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ansell, Ben W., and David J. Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization : An Elite-Competition Approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u6512282.

Appel, Hannah. 2017. "Toward an Ethnography of the National Economy." *Cultural Anthropology* 32 (2): 294–322. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca32.2.09.

Aral, Berdal. 2001. "Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 1983-93." *Middle Eastern Studies* 37 (1): 72–88.

Arat, Yeşim. 2008. "Contestation and Collaboration: Women's Struggles for Empowerment in Turkey." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed., 388–418. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.016.

———. 2012. *Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics*. SUNY Press.

———. 2017. "Men's Coups, Women's Troubles." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 13 (1): 175–77. https://doi.org/10.1215/15525864-3728800.

———. 2022. "Democratic Backsliding and the Instrumentalization of Women's Rights in Turkey." *Politics & Gender* 18 (4): 911–41. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X21000192.

Arik, Hülya. 2021. "Emotional and Corporeal Formations of Secularism: A Case Study of Military Bases in Turkey, 1980s-2000s." *Social & Cultural Geography* 22 (1): 97–118. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2018.1559344.

Arikan, E. Burak. 1998. "The Programme of the Nationalist Action Party: An Iron Hand in a Velvet Glove?" *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (4): 120–34.

Arslanalp, Mert, and T. Deniz Erkmen. 2020. "Mobile Emergency Rule in Turkey: Legal Repression of Protests during Authoritarian Transformation." *Democratization* 27 (6): 947–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1753701.

Asad, Talal. 1993a. "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category." *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* 2: 27–54.

———. 1993b. "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category." In *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, 27–54. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press.

Aslan, Ömer. 2016. "'Unarmed' We Intervene, Unnoticed We Remain: The Deviant Case of 'February 28th Coup' in Turkey." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43 (3): 360–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.1102710.

Ayata, Sencer. 1996. "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 50 (1): 40–56.

Aydin, Zülküf. 2010. "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10 (2): 149–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2009.00241.x.

Aydinli, Ersel. 2011. "Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish 'Inner State.'" *Turkish Studies* 12 (2): 227–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.572630.

Baer, Marc David. 2021. *The Ottomans: Khans, Caesars, and Caliphs*. First edition. New York: Basic Books, Hachette Book Group.

Bakker, Isabella. 2007. "Social Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy." *New Political Economy* 12 (4): 541–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460701661561.

Balaban, Utku. 2011. "The Enclosure of Urban Space and Consolidation of the Capitalist Land Regime in Turkish Cities." *Urban Studies* 48 (10): 2162–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098010380958.

Balci, Tamer. 2011. "The Rise and Fall of Nine Lights Ideology." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 12 (2): 145–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2011.591979.

Bardakçi, Mehmet. 2013. "Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey under AKP Rule." *Turkish Studies* 14 (3): 411–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.831256.

Bargu, Banu. 2019. "Police Power: The Biopolitical State Apparatus and Differential Interpellations." *Rethinking Marxism* 31 (3): 291–317. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2019.1629196.

Barkawi, Tarak. 2006. *Globalization and War*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Barkey, Karen. 2013. *Empire of Difference the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. New York, N.Y: Cambridge University Press.

Barkey, Karen, and George Gavrilis. 2016. "The Ottoman Millet System: Non-Territorial Autonomy and Its Contemporary Legacy." *Ethnopolitics* 15 (1): 24–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2015.1101845.

Baron, Ilan Zvi, Jonathan Havercroft, Isaac Kamola, Jonneke Koomen, Justin Murphy, and Alex Prichard. 2019. "Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence." *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (1): 199–212. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy060.

Bayly, C. A. 2004. *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*. The Blackwell History of the World. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

Bayulgen, Oksan, Ekim Arbatli, and Sercan Canbolat. 2018. "Elite Survival Strategies and Authoritarian Reversal in Turkey." *Polity* 50 (3): 333–65. https://doi.org/10.1086/698203.

Beaman, Jean, and Jennifer Fredette. 2022. "The U.S./France Contrast Frame and Black Lives Matter in France." *Perspectives on Politics* 20 (4): 1346–61. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592722001104.

Beckert, Jens. 2016. *Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics*. Harvard University Press.

Bein, Amit. 2011. *Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bekmen, Ahmet. 2014. "State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era." In *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, edited by İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, and Barış Alp Özden, 47–74. London: PlutoPress. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u6225306.

Bekmen, Ahmet, Ferit Serkan Öngel, and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2020. "Contesting Working-Class Politics in Turkey: Social Transformations, Islam, and the Left." *Critical Sociology* 46 (7–8): 1025–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920520934171.

Belge, Ceren. 2006. "Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the Constitutional Court of Turkey." *Law & Society Review* 40 (3): 653–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2006.00276.x.

Bell, David A. 2007. *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Bell, Duncan. 2008. "Agonistic Democracy and the Politics of Memory." *Constellations* 15 (1): 148–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2008.00478.x.

Benner, Erica. 1995. *Really Existing Nationalisms: A Post-Communist View from Marx and Engels*. Clarendon Press.

Bennett, Andrew. 2022. "Drawing Contingent Generalizations from Case Studies." In *The Case for Case Studies: Methods and Applications in International Development*, edited by Daniel Ortega Nieto, Jennifer Widner, and Michael Woolcock, 62–86. Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108688253.005.

Benoit, Kenneth. 2007. "Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (1): 363–90. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.101608.

Berenskoetter, Felix. 2014. "Parameters of a National Biography." *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (1): 262–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112445290.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. "On Democratic Backsliding." *Journal of Democracy* 27 (1): 5–19.

Bernhard, Michael. 2001. "Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal." *Comparative Politics* 33 (4): 379–400. https://doi.org/10.2307/422440.

———. 2015. "Chronic Instability and the Limits of Path Dependence." *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (04): 976–91. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592715002261.

Bernhard, Stefan, and Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg, eds. 2020. *Charting Transnational Fields : Methodology for a Political Sociology of Knowledge*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429274947.

Beyribey, Tuncer. 2023. "Terrorism as a Conceptual Site for Power Struggles: Problematization of Terrorism in Turkey in the 1970s." *European Journal of International Relations* 29 (1): 179–201. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661221131432.

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2009. *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*. 1. publ. in paperback. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2010. "Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23 (1): 127–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570903433639.

———. 2014. *Connected Sociologies*. Theory for a Global Age. London: Bloomsbury.

———. 2016. "Comparative Historical Sociology and the State: Problems of Method." *Cultural Sociology* 10 (3): 335–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/1749975516639085.

Bhambra, Gurminder K., and John Holmwood. 2021. *Colonialism and Modern Social Theory*. Cambridge ; Medford, MA: Polity.

Bhandar, Brenna. 2018. *Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial Regimes of Ownership*. Duke University Press.

Bhattacharya, Tithi, ed. 2017. *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*. London: Pluto Press.

Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. SAGE.

Boatcă, Manuela. 2015. *Global Inequalities Beyond Occidentalism*. Global Connections. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate.

Bodirsky, Katharina. 2021. "Making and Breaking Alliances: On Valuation in Hegemonic Projects." *Dialectical Anthropology* 45 (1): 65–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-020-09585-3.

Bodnár, Judit. 2019. "Comparing in Global Times: Between Extension and Incorporation." *Critical Historical Studies* 6 (1): 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1086/702546.

Bogaards, Matthijs, and Andrea Pető. 2022. "Gendering De-Democratization: Gender and Illiberalism in Post-Communist Europe." *Politics and Governance* 10 (4): 1–5. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i4.6245.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bonacker, Thorsten. 2019. "Security Practices and the Production of Center–Periphery Figurations in Statebuilding:" *Alternatives*, January. https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375418821479.

Bora, Tanıl. 2003. "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102 (2–3): 433–51. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-102-2-3-433.

Bou Nassif, Hicham. 2020. *Endgames: Military Response to Protest in Arab Autocracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108893695.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812507.

———. 1985. "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups." *Theory and Society* 14 (6): 723–44.

———. 1989. "Social Space and Symbolic Power." *Sociological Theory* 7 (1): 14–25. https://doi.org/10.2307/202060.

———. 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford University Press.

———. 2019. *Classification Struggles: General Sociology, Volume 1 (1981-1982)*. Wiley.

Bowden, Brett. 2009. *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea*. University of Chicago Press.

Boyunsuz, Şule Özsoy. 2020. "Regime Cycles, Constitution Making, and the Political System Question in Ottoman and Turkish Constitutional Developments." In *The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in Turkey: Regressing Towards Constitutional Autocracy*, edited by Felix Petersen and Zeynep Yanaşmayan, 84–117. Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108596459.003.

Bozarslan, Hamit. 2008. "Kurds and the Turkish State." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed., 333–56. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.013.

———. 2020. "From Kemalism to the Armed Struggle: Radicalization of the Left in the 1960s." In *Turkey in Turmoil: Social Change and Political Radicalization during the 1960s*, edited by Berna Pekesen, 115–36. De Gruyter Oldenbourg. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654509-007.

Brancati, Dawn. 2014. "Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (1): 313–26. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052013-115248.

Brenner, Neil, and Stuart Elden. 2009. "Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory." *International Political Sociology* 3 (4): 353–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00081.x.

Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon MacLeod. 2008. "Introduction: State Space in Question." In *State/Space*, 1–26. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470755686.ch1.

Brockett, Gavin D. 1998. "Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38." *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (4): 44–66.

Brooks, Risa. 2020. "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States." *International Security* 44 (4): 7–44.

Brooks, Risa A. 2019. "Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22 (1): 379–98. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2009. "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35: 21–42.

Brundage, Jonah Stuart. 2023. "Representation and Recognition: State Sovereignty as Performative." *American Journal of Sociology* 128 (5): 1335–80. https://doi.org/10.1086/724674.

Buchholz, Larissa. 2016. "What Is a Global Field? Theorizing Fields beyond the Nation-State." *The Sociological Review* 64 (2_suppl): 31–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/2059-7932.12001.

Buğra, Ayşe. 2007. "Poverty and Citizenship: An Overview of the Social-Policy Environment in Republican Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (1): 33–52.

Buğra, Ayşe, and Osman Savaşkan. 2014. *New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business*. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=N-JnAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&ots=t6tqWpxNr9&sig=kJd9ToNy8FxAmZm5JR9zKr4g6EY.

Bünte, Marco. 2022. "Ruling but Not Governing: Tutelary Regimes and the Case of Myanmar." *Government and Opposition* 57 (2): 336–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2020.38.

Burris, Gregory A. 2007. "The Other from Within: Pan-Turkist Mythmaking and the Expulsion of the Turkish Left." *Middle Eastern Studies* 43 (4): 611–24.

Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. 2015. *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations*. Cambridge University Press.

Byler, Charles A. 2009. "The Military, Civil Disorder, and Natural Disasters, 1877–2007." In *A Companion to American Military History*, edited by James C Bradford, 650–61. Wiley.

Çağaptay, Soner. 2004. "Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40 (3): 86–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/0026320042000213474.

———. 2006. *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey*. 0 ed. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203968925.

Camelio, Nicolas. 2015. "'The Military Seize the Law': The Drafting of the 1961 Constitution." In *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century*, edited by Marc Aymes, Benjamin Gourisse, and Élise Massicard, 121–45. BRILL. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004289857_007.

Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Kindle edition. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Canefe, Nergis, and Tanıl Bora. 2003. "The Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism." *Turkish Studies* 4 (1): 127–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/714005725.

Cannell, Fenella. 2010. "The Anthropology of Secularism." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 39 (1): 85–100. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.012809.105039.

Çapan, Zeynep Gülsah, and Ayşe Zarakol. 2019. "Turkey's Ambivalent Self: Ontological Insecurity in 'Kemalism' versus 'Erdoğanism.'" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 32 (3): 263–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1589419.

Capoccia, Giovanni. 2016. "When Do Institutions 'Bite'? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change." *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (8): 1095–1127. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015626449.

Carey, John M., and Simon Hix. 2011. "The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2): 383–97.

Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Deniz Aksen. 2019. "Partisan and Apportionment Bias in Creating a Predominant Party System." *Political Geography* 69 (March): 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.11.009.

Carlos, Ann M., Donna L. Feir, and Angela Redish. 2022. "Indigenous Nations and the Development of the U.S. Economy: Land, Resources, and Dispossession." *The Journal of Economic History* 82 (2): 516–55. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050722000080.

Carlson, Sören, and Christian Schneickert. 2021. "Habitus in the Context of Transnationalization: From 'Transnational Habitus' to a Configuration of Dispositions and Fields." *The Sociological Review* 69 (5): 1124–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/00380261211021778.

Case, Mary Anne. 2019. "Trans Formations in the Vatican's War on 'Gender Ideology.'" *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44 (3): 639–64. https://doi.org/10.1086/701498.

Casey, Adam E. 2020. "The Durability of Client Regimes: Foreign Sponsorship and Military Loyalty, 1946–2010." *World Politics* 72 (3): 411–47. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000039.

Celikates, Robin. 2018. *Critique as Social Practice: Critical Theory and Social Self-Understanding*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Chacko, Priya. 2020. "Gender and Authoritarian Populism: Empowerment, Protection, and the Politics of Resentful Aspiration in India." *Critical Asian Studies* 52 (2): 204–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2020.1711789.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2008. *Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. 2nd edition. Princeton : Princeton University Press,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u3558436.

Chatterjee, Partha. 1989. "Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women: The Contest in India." *American Ethnologist* 16 (4): 622–33.

Cheng, T.J., and Teh-fu Huang. 2018. "Authoritarian Successor Parties in South Korea and Taiwan: Authoritarian Inheritance, Organizational Adaptation, Issue Management." In *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*, edited by James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 84–112. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Çiçek, Nazan. 2010. *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Library of Ottoman Studies 20. London: Tauris Academic Studies.

Çinar, Menderes, and Çagkan Sayin. 2014. "Reproducing the Paradigm of Democracy in Turkey: Parochial Democratization in the Decade of Justice and Development Party." *Turkish Studies* 15 (3): 365–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.954743.

Cindoglu, Dilek, and Gizem Zencirci. 2008. "The Headscarf in Turkey in the Public and State Spheres." *Middle Eastern Studies* 44 (5): 791–806.

Cizre, Ümit. 2008. "Ideology, Context and Interest: The Turkish Military." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed., 301–32. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.012.

Çınar, Alev. 2008. "Subversion and Subjugation in the Public Sphere: Secularism and the Islamic Headscarf." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 33 (4): 891–913. https://doi.org/10.1086/528850.

Clarke, Killian. 2017. "Social Forces and Regime Change: Beyond Class Analysis." *World Politics* 69 (3): 569–602. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000119.

Clemens, Elisabeth S. 2007. "Toward a Historicized Sociology: Theorizing Events, Processes, and Emergence." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (1): 527–49. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131700.

Cocks, Joan. 2012. "The Violence of Structures and the Violence of Foundings." *New Political Science* 34 (2): 221–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2012.676400.

———. 2014. *On Sovereignty and Other Political Delusions*. 1 edition. Bloomsbury Academic.

Cohen, Sam. 1973. "Turkish Amnesty Move Likely." *The Guardian (1959-2003)*, October 25, 1973.

———. 1974. "Turkey to Free 2,000 Political Prisoners." *The Guardian (1959-2003)*, July 4, 1974.

Connell, R. W., and James W. Messerschmidt. 2005. "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept." *Gender & Society* 19 (6): 829–59. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205278639.

Conrad, Sebastian. 2017. *What Is Global History?*

Conversi, Daniele. 2008. "'We Are All Equals!' Militarism, Homogenization and 'Egalitarianism' in Nationalist State-Building (1789–1945)." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31 (7): 1286–1314. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701625450.

Cook, Steven A. 2007. *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*. JHU Press.

Corredor, Elizabeth S. 2019. "Unpacking 'Gender Ideology' and the Global Right's Antigender Countermovement." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44 (3): 613–38. https://doi.org/10.1086/701171.

Coşar, Simten. 2021. "Turkish Nationalism and Patriarchy." In *The Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Turkey*. Routledge.

Costa Buranelli, Filippo. 2021. "Standard of Civilization, Nomadism and Territoriality in Nineteenth-Century International Society." In *Nomad-State Relationships in International Relations: Before and after Borders*, edited by Jamie Levin, 77–99. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cowen, Deborah. 2014. *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade*. U of Minnesota Press.

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf. 2010. "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-Ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies." *Democratization* 17 (5): 950–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2010.501180.

Cronin, Stephanie. 2008. "Importing Modernity: European Military Missions to Qajar Iran." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50 (1): 197–226.

Dahl, Marianne, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2023. "Clouds with Silver Linings: How Mobilization Shapes the Impact of Coups on Democratization." *European Journal of International Relations*, January, 13540661221143212. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661221143213.

Darden, Keith, and Harris Mylonas. 2016. "Threats to Territorial Integrity, National Mass Schooling, and Linguistic Commonality." *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (11): 1446–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015606735.

De Leon, Cedric, Manali Desai, and Cihan Tuğal. 2009. "Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey." *Sociological Theory* 27 (3): 193–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2009.01345.x.

Dean, Adam. 2022a. "Arresting the Opposition: Labor Repression and Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries." *International Studies Quarterly* 66 (3): sqac058. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac058.

———. 2022b. *Opening Up By Cracking Down: Labor Repression and Trade Liberalization in Democratic Developing Countries*. Cambridge University Press.

Demir, Ipek. 2014. "Humbling Turkishness: Undoing the Strategies of Exclusion and Inclusion of Turkish Modernity." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27 (3): 381–401. https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12054.

Demiralp, Seda. 2012. "White Turks, Black Turks? Faultlines beyond Islamism versus Secularism." *Third World Quarterly* 33 (3): 511–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.657487.

Demirel, Tanel. 2003. "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980." *Armed Forces & Society* 29 (2): 253–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0302900206.

Derpanopoulos, George, Erica Frantz, Barbara Geddes, and Joseph Wright. 2016. "Are Coups Good for Democracy?" *Research & Politics* 3 (1): 2053168016630837. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630837.

Disch, Lisa. 2021. *Making Constituencies: Representation as Mobilization in Mass Democracy*. University of Chicago Press.

Dodd, Lynda G. 2015. "The Rights Revolution in the Age of Obama and Ferguson: Policing, the Rule of Law, and the Elusive Quest for Accountability." *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (3): 657–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592715001231.

Doğangün, Gokten. 2020. "Gender Climate in Authoritarian Politics: A Comparative Study of Russia and Turkey." *Politics & Gender* 16 (1): 258–84. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000788.

Dönmez, Pınar E. 2021. "Against Austerity and Repression: Historical and Contemporary Manifestations of Progressive Politicisation in Turkey." *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space* 39 (3): 512–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420920291.

Dorroll, Philip. 2014. "'The Turkish Understanding of Religion': Rethinking Tradition and Modernity in Contemporary Turkish Islamic Thought." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 82 (4): 1033–69. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfu061.

Dorronsoro, Gilles, and Nicole F. Watts. 2009. "Toward Kurdish Distinctiveness in Electoral Politics: The 1977 Local Elections in Diyarbakir." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41 (3): 457–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743809091156.

Döşemeci, Mehmet. 2013. *Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107045361.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996. "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity." In *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, edited by Cynthia Weber and Thomas J. Biersteker, 121–47. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598685.005.

Dovi, Suzanne. 2018. "Good Representatives Foster Autonomy." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 51 (2): 323–26. https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909651700244X.

Dressler, Markus. 2015. "Rereading Ziya Gökalp: Secularism and Reform of the Islamic State in the Late Young Turk Period." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 47 (3): 511–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743815000525.

Dunne, Timothy, and Christian Reus-Smit, eds. 2017. *The Globalization of International Society*. First edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Duzgun, Eren. 2018a. "Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations: Re-Interpreting the Ottoman Path to Modernity." *Review of International Studies* 44 (2): 252–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000468.

———. 2018b. "The International Relations of 'Bourgeois Revolutions': Disputing the Turkish Revolution." *European Journal of International Relations* 24 (2): 414–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117714527.

Earl, Jennifer, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite. 2022. "Layers of Political Repression: Integrating Research on Social Movement Repression." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 18 (1): 227–48. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-050520-092713.

Eastwood, James. 2018. "Rethinking Militarism as Ideology: The Critique of Violence after Security." *Security Dialogue* 49 (1–2): 44–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617730949.

Eck, Kristine, and Chiara Ruffa. 2023. "Military Training and Decolonisation in the British Empire." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 51 (1): 156–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2022.2084937.

El Taki, Karim. 2021. "Subordinates' Quest for Recognition in Hierarchy." *Millennium* 50 (1): 55–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298211050953.

Eldem, Edhem. 2006. "Capitulations and Western Trade." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*, edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi, 3:281–335. Cambridge History of Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620956.015.

Eligür, Banu. 2014. *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*. Reprint edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2019. "Ethnocultural Nationalism and Turkey's Non-Muslim Minorities during the Early Republican Period." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 46 (1): 158–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017.1388767.

———. 2020. "The 1964 Expulsion of Greek Citizens from Turkey: Economic and Demographic Turkification Under Ethnocultural Nationalism." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 11 (4): 319–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2020.1830606.

Elliott, J. H. 2009. *Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800*. New Haven [Conn.] ; London: Yale University Press.

Emigh, Rebecca Jean. 1997. "The Power of Negative Thinking: The Use of Negative Case Methodology in the Development of Sociological Theory." *Theory and Society* 26 (5): 649–84.

Emmenegger, Patrick. 2021. "Agency in Historical Institutionalism: Coalitional Work in the Creation, Maintenance, and Change of Institutions." *Theory and Society* 50 (4): 607–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-021-09433-5.

Emre, Yunus. 2014. *The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey : The Left and the Transformation of the Republican People's Party*. New York: I. B. Tauris. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u6177288.

Enloe, Cynthia. 2014. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Univ of California Press.

Ergin, Murat. 2008. "'Is the Turk a White Man?' towards a Theoretical Framework for Race in the Making of Turkishness." *Middle Eastern Studies* 44 (6): 827–50.

———. 2017. *Is the Turk a White Man? Race and Modernity in the Making of Turkish Identity*. Studies in Critical Social Sciences, Volume 95. Leiden ; Boston: Brill.

Erken, Ali. 2014. "Ideological Construction of the Politics of Nationalism in Turkey: The Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP), 1965–1980." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 20 (2): 200–220. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2014.909159.

Ermakoff, Ivan. 2014. "Exceptional Cases: Epistemic Contributions and Normative Expectations." *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 55 (2): 223–43. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975614000101.

Ertan, Mehmet. 2019. "The Latent Politicization of Alevism: The Affiliation between Alevis and Leftist Politics (1960–1980)." *Middle Eastern Studies* 55 (6): 932–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2019.1591276.

Esen, Berk. 2014. "Nation-Building, Party-Strength, and Regime Consolidation: Kemalism in Comparative Perspective." *Turkish Studies* 15 (4): 600–620. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.986318.

———. 2021. "Praetorian Army in Action: A Critical Assessment of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey." *Armed Forces & Society* 47 (1): 201–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20931548.

Esen, Berk, and Sebnem Gumuscu. 2016. "Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey." *Third World Quarterly* 37 (9): 1581–1606. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732.

Etten, Jacob van, Joost Jongerden, Hugo J. de Vos, Annemarie Klaasse, and Esther C. E. van Hoeve. 2008. "Environmental Destruction as a Counterinsurgency Strategy in the Kurdistan Region of Turkey." *Geoforum* 39 (5): 1786–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.05.001.

Fangen, Katrine, and Inger Skjelsbæk. 2020. "Editorial: Special Issue on Gender and the Far Right." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 21 (4): 411–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2020.1851866.

Feaver, Peter D. 1996. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23 (2): 149–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9602300203.

———. 1999. "Civil-Military Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1): 211–41. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211.

Fedyukin, Igor. 2018. "'Westernizations' from Peter I to Meiji: War, Political Competition, and Institutional Change." *Theory and Society* 47 (2): 207–31.

Fekete, Liz. 2022. "Who Is behind the 'War on Woke': An Interview with Ralph Wilson and Isaac Kamola." *Race & Class* 64 (2): 38–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/03063968221127591.

Ferree, Karen E., G. Bingham Powell, and Ethan Scheiner. 2014. "Context, Electoral Rules, and Party Systems." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (1): 421–39. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-195419.

Filkins, Dexter. 2016. "The Thirty-Year Coup." *The New Yorker*, October 17, 2016.

Findley, Carter Vaughn. 2008. "The Tanzimat II." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed., 4:9–37. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.003.

Fligstein, Neil, and Doug McAdam. 2012. *A Theory of Fields*. Oxford University Press.

Forrest, Alan I. 1989. *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society During the Revolution and Empire*. Oxford University Press.

Fortna, Benjamin C. 2008. "The Reign of Abdülhamid II." In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed., 4:38–61. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.004.

Foucault, Michel. 2003. *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976*. Macmillan.

———. 2009. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977--1978*. Macmillan.

Frymer, Paul. 2017. *Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion*. Princeton University Press.

Fuhse, Jan A. 2022. "How Can Theories Represent Social Phenomena?" *Sociological Theory* 40 (2): 99–123. https://doi.org/10.1177/07352751221087719.

Garapon, Béatrice, and Adnan Çelik. 2021. "From Tribal Chiefs to Marxist Activists: Kurdistan from 1946 to 1975." In *The Cambridge History of the Kurds*, edited by Cengiz Gunes, Hamit Bozarslan, and Veli Yadirgi, 229–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108623711.009.

Garfias, Francisco, and Emily A. Sellars. 2022. "When State Building Backfires: Elite Coordination and Popular Grievance in Rebellion." *American Journal of Political Science* 66 (4): 977–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12611.

Gerring, John, Michael Hoffman, and Dominic Zarecki. 2018. "The Diverse Effects of Diversity on Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 48 (2): 283–314. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600003X.

Getachew, Adom. 2019. *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Gilbert, Leah, and Payam Mohseni. 2011. "Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46 (3): 270. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-011-9088-x.

Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. 2007. *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California*.

Gingeras, Ryan. 2010. "Last Rites for a 'Pure Bandit': Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the Turkish 'Deep State.'" *Past & Present* 206 (1): 151–74. https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtp047.

———. 2019. *Eternal Dawn: Turkey in the Age of Atatürk*. Oxford University Press.

Go, Julian. 2014. "Occluding the Global: Analytic Bifurcation, Causal Scientism, and Alternatives in Historical Sociology." *Journal of Globalization Studies* 5 (1): 122–36.

———. 2016. *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory*.

———. 2017. "Myths of Nation and Empire: The Logic of America's Liberal Empire-State." *Thesis Eleven* 139 (1): 69–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617700046.

———. 2020. "The Imperial Origins of American Policing: Militarization and Imperial Feedback in the Early 20th Century." *American Journal of Sociology* 125 (5): 1193–1254. https://doi.org/10.1086/708464.

Go, Julian, and Monika Krause. 2016. "Fielding Transnationalism: An Introduction." *The Sociological Review* 64 (2_suppl): 6–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/2059-7932.12000.

Go, Julian, and George Lawson, eds. 2017. *Global Historical Sociology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goddard, Stacie E., and Daniel H. Nexon. 2016. "The Dynamics of Global Power Politics: A Framework for Analysis." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1 (1): 4–18. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv007.

Gökarıksel, Banu. 2017. "Making Gender Dynamics Visible in the 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 13 (1): 173–74. https://doi.org/10.1215/15525864-3728789.

Gökarıksel, Banu, Christopher Neubert, and Sara Smith. 2019. "Demographic Fever Dreams: Fragile Masculinity and Population Politics in the Rise of the Global Right." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44 (3): 561–87. https://doi.org/10.1086/701154.

Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gordon, Todd, and Jeffery R. Webber. 2019. "Complex Stratification in the World System: Capitalist Totality and Geopolitical Fragmentation." *Science & Society* 84 (1): 95–125. https://doi.org/10.1521/siso.2020.84.1.95.

Gorski, Philip S. 2003. *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gorski, Philip S. 2013. "Bourdieusian Theory and Historical Change: Maps, Mechanisms, and Methods." In *Bourdieu and Historical Analysis*, edited by Philip S. Gorski, 327–67. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Goswami, Manu. 1998. "From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40 (4): 609–36. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417598001674.

———. 2002. "Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical Conception of Nationalism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44 (4): 770–99. https://doi.org/10.1017/S001041750200035X.

———. 2004. *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space*. Chicago Studies in Practices of Meaning. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press.

Gourisse, Benjamin. 2022a. "In the Name of the State. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the Genesis of Political Violence during the 1970s." *Turkish Studies* 23 (1): 56–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2021.1885295.

———. 2022b. "What Politics Does to the Army: Divisions and Reconfigurations to the Military Institution in the 27 May 1960 Coup in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies* 58 (1): 70–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1946795.

Graff, Agnieszka, Ratna Kapur, and Suzanna Danuta Walters. 2019. "Introduction: Gender and the Rise of the Global Right." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44 (3): 541–60. https://doi.org/10.1086/701152.

Graff, Agnieszka, and Elżbieta Korolczuk. 2021. *Anti-Gender Politics in the Populist Moment (Edition 1)*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003133520.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. New York: International Publishers.

Grewal, Sharan, and Yasser Kureshi. 2019. "How to Sell a Coup: Elections as Coup Legitimation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (4): 1001–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718770508.

Gruesshaber, Gerhard. 2018. *The German Spirit in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938: A History of Military Knowledge Transfer*. 1st edition. Boston, MA: De Gruyter Oldenbourg.

Gülalp, Haldun. 2001. "Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (03): 433–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743801003051.

Gümrükçü, Selin Bengi. 2023. "Ideology, Discourse, and Alliance Structures: Explaining Far-Right Political Violence in Turkey in the 1970s." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 35 (1): 210–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1895121.

Gumuscu, Sebnem. 2010. "Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt." *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (7): 835–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010361341.

Gündoğan, Azat Zana. 2011. "Space, State-Making and Contentious Kurdish Politics in the East of Turkey: The Case of Eastern Meetings, 1967." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 13 (4): 389–416. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2011.623867.

Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe, and Gökten Doğangün. 2017. "Gender Politics of the AKP: Restoration of a Religio-Conservative Gender Climate." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 19 (6): 610–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2017.1328887.

Gunter, Michael M. 1989. "Political Instability in Turkey during the 1970s." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 9 (1).

———. 2014. "Turkey, Kemalism, and the 'Deep State.'" In *Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria*, edited by David Romano and Mehmet Gurses, First edition, 17–39. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u6390843.

Gürbey, Sinem. 2009. "Islam, Nation-State, and the Military: A Discussion of Secularism in Turkey." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29 (3): 371–80. https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-2009-025.

Gürcan, Efe Can, and Berk Mete. 2019. "The Combined and Uneven Development of Working-Class Capacities in Turkey, 1960–2016." *Labor History* 60 (3): 268–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1537027.

Gürel, Burak. 2020. "Civil War and Massacre in Maraş 1978." In *Turkey in Turmoil: Social Change and Political Radicalization during the 1960s*, edited by Berna Pekesen, 152–80. De Gruyter Oldenbourg. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110654509-009.

Gürel, Burak, Bermal Küçük, and Sercan Taş. 2022. "Land Occupation as a Form of Peasant Struggle in Turkey, 1965–1980." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 67 (November): 4–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2022.3.

Gürsoy, Yaprak. 2011. "The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military." *South European Society and Politics* 16 (2): 293–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2011.577950.

———. 2012a. "The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil–Military Relations in View of the 2011 General Elections." *Turkish Studies* 13 (2): 191–211. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.685254.

———. 2012b. "The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Democratization through Coup Plots?" *Democratization* 19 (4): 735–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.623352.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2016. "Democratization During the Third Wave." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (1): 125–44. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042114-015137.

Hale, William. 1977. "Turkish Democracy in Travail: The Case of the State Security Courts." *The World Today* 33 (5): 186–94.

———. 1988. "Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective." In *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 159–75. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

———. 2011. "The Turkish Republic and Its Army, 1923–1960." *Turkish Studies* 12 (2): 191–201. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.572628.

Hale, William M. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London; New York: Routledge.

Hall, John A. 2017. "Taking Megalomanias Seriously: Rough Notes." *Thesis Eleven* 139 (1): 30–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617700453.

Hall, Stuart. 1980. *Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance*. na.

———. 1986. "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity." *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10 (2): 5–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/019685998601000202.

Halperin, Sandra. 2017. "The Imperial City-State and the National State Form: Reflections on the History of the Contemporary Order." *Thesis Eleven* 139 (1): 97–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617700455.

Hanchard, Michael G. 2018. *The Spectre of Race: How Discrimination Haunts Western Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. 2001. *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2008. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harris, George S. 2011. "Military Coups and Turkish Democracy, 1960–1980." *Turkish Studies* 12 (2): 203–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.573181.

Hashimoto, Chikara, and Egemen B. Bezci. 2016. "Do the Kurds Have 'No Friends but the Mountains'? Turkey's Secret War against Communists, Soviets and the Kurds." *Middle Eastern Studies* 52 (4): 640–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1175344.

Haydu, Jeffrey. 2010. "Reversals of Fortune: Path Dependency, Problem Solving, and Temporal Cases." *Theory and Society* 39 (1): 25–48.

Heller, Patrick. 2022. "Democracy in the Global South." *Annual Review of Sociology* 48 (1): 463–84. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-030320-123449.

Hendrix, Cullen S., and Idean Salehyan. 2017. "A House Divided: Threat Perception, Military Factionalism, and Repression in Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (8): 1653–81. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715620473.

Heper, Metin. 1985. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley, North Humberside; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Eothen Press ; Distributed in the U.S.A. by Humanities Press.

Herron, Michael C., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2016. "A Careful Look at Modern Case Selection Methods." *Sociological Methods & Research* 45 (3): 458–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124114547053.

Hilgers, Mathieu, and Éric Mangez, eds. 2015. *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications*. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315772493.

Hixson, W. 2013. *American Settler Colonialism: A History*. Springer.

Holmes, Amy Austin, and Kevin Koehler. 2020. "Myths of Military Defection in Egypt and Tunisia." *Mediterranean Politics* 25 (1): 45–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2018.1499216.

Houle, Christian. 2009. "Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization." *World Politics* 61 (4): 589–622.

Houston, Christopher. 2020. *Istanbul, City of the Fearless: Urban Activism, Coup d'Etat, and Memory in Turkey*. Kindle edition. Berkeley, CA: Univ of California Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

İnce, Başak. 2012. *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk's Republic to the Present Day*. I.B.Tauris.

Inikori, Joseph E. 2020. "Atlantic Slavery and the Rise of the Capitalist Global Economy." *Current Anthropology* 61 (S22): S159–71. https://doi.org/10.1086/709818.

Jacoby, Tim. 2006. "Agriculture, the State and Class Formation in Turkey's First Republic (1923–60)." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 33 (1): 34–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150600624454.

Jessop, Bob. 2013. *The State: Past, Present, Future*. Cambridge: Polity.

Jongerden, Joost. 2007. *The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War*. BRILL.

Jung, Moon-Kie. 2009. "The Racial Unconscious of Assimilation Theory." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 6 (2): 375–95. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X09990245.

Kadioğlu, Ayşe. 1996. "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32 (2): 177–93.

Kalaycioglu, Ersin. 2002. "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party." *Turkish Studies* 3 (1): 40.

Kandil, Hazem. 2016. *The Power Triangle: Military, Security and Politics in Regime Change*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kandiyoti, Deniz A. 1987. "Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case." *Feminist Studies* 13 (2): 317–38. https://doi.org/10.2307/3177804.

Kaplan, Jessica. 2021. "Against Economy–Culture Dualism: An Argument from Raced Economies." *Feminist Theory* 22 (3): 381–403. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700120975699.

Kaplan, Sam. 2006. *The Pedagogical State :Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015064922894.

Karabelias, Gerassimos. 1999. "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980-95." *Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (4): 130–51.

Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L. 2011. "Transformation of Turkey's Civil-Military Relations Culture and International Environment." *Turkish Studies* 12 (2): 253–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.572632.

Karataşlı, Şahan Savaş. 2015. "The Origins of Turkey's 'Heterodox' Transition to Neoliberalism: The Özal Decade and Beyond." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 21 (2): 387–416. https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.8.

Karataşlı, Şahan Savaş, and Sefika Kumral. 2019. "Capitalist Development in Hostile Conjunctures: War, Dispossession, and Class Formation in Turkey." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 19 (3): 528–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12317.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1987. "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela." *Latin American Research Review* 22 (1): 63–94.

Karpat, Kemal H. 1970. "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution." *The American Historical Review* 75 (6): 1654–83. https://doi.org/10.2307/1850760.

Kaya, Zeynep N. 2020. *Mapping Kurdistan: Territory, Self-Determination and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108629805.006.

Kayaoğlu, Barın. 2009. "Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945-52." *Cold War History* 9 (3): 321–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740902981403.

Kayaoğlu, Turan. 2010. *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China*. Cambridge University Press.

Kaynar, Ayşegül Kars. 2018. "Making of Military Tutelage in Turkey: The National Security Council in the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions." *Turkish Studies* 19 (3): 451–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1387055.

Keene, Edward. 2014. "The Standard of 'Civilisation', the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space." *Millennium* 42 (3): 651–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814541319.

Kier, Elizabeth. 2021. *War and Democracy: Labor and the Politics of Peace*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Kocabıçak, Ece. 2023. "The Causes and the Consequences of the Patriarchal State: Evidence from Turkey." *Women's Studies International Forum* 98 (May): 102744. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2023.102744.

Koehler, Kevin, and Holger Albrecht. 2021. "Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy." *Armed Forces & Society* 47 (1): 148–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X19881747.

Koyuncu Lorasdaği, Berrin. 2007. "Globalization, Modernization, and Democratization in Turkey: The Fethullah Gulen Movement." In *Remaking Turkey: Globalization, Alternative Modernities, and Democracy*, edited by Emin Fuat Keyman, 153–77. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Krebs, Ronald R. 2015. *Narrative and the Making of US National Security*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316218969.

Kuehn, David. 2017. "Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military's Impact on Democratic Development." *Democratization* 24 (5): 783–800. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1324421.

Kumar, Krishan. 2010. "Nation-States as Empires, Empires as Nation-States: Two Principles, One Practice?" *Theory and Society* 39 (2): 119–43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-009-9102-8.

Kurt, Mehmet. 2021. "No Justice for Kurds: Turkish Supremacy and Kurdophobia." *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 88 (4): 923–47. https://doi.org/10.1353/sor.2021.0052.

Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 2014. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Verso. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u6299082.

Lefebvre, Henri. 2008. "Space and the State." In *State/Space*, 84–100. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470755686.ch5.

Lieberman, Evan S., and Prerna Singh. 2012. "The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Violence." *Comparative Politics* 45 (1): 1–24.

Linz, Juan J. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1): 51–69.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: JHU Press.

Little, Andrew T. 2017. "Coordination, Learning, and Coups." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (1): 204–34.

Lockman, Zachary. 2009. *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*. Cambridge University Press.

Lord, Ceren. 2012. "The Persistence of Turkey's Majoritarian System of Government." *Government and Opposition* 47 (02): 228–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01360.x.

———. 2017. "Between Islam and the Nation; Nation-Building, the Ulama and Alevi Identity in Turkey." *Nations and Nationalism* 23 (1): 48–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12238.

———. 2018. *Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Loveman, Mara. 2005. "The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power." *American Journal of Sociology* 110 (6): 1651–83. https://doi.org/10.1086/428688.

Loxton, James. 2018. "Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide." In *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*, edited by James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 1–49. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Loxton, James, and Scott Mainwaring, eds. 2018. *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Loyal, Steven, and Stephen Quilley. 2017. "The Particularity of the Universal: Critical Reflections on Bourdieu's Theory of Symbolic Power and the State." *Theory and Society* 46 (5): 429–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9298-y.

Luebbert, Gregory M. 1991. *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy : Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe /*. New York : Oxford University Press,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u1855600.

Lund, Christian. 2016. "Rule and Rupture: State Formation through the Production of Property and Citizenship." *Development and Change* 47 (6): 1199–1228. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12274.

Lustick, Ian S. 1996. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *The American Political Science Review* 90 (3): 605–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082612.

Mabee, Bryan. 2016. "From 'Liberal War' to 'Liberal Militarism': United States Security Policy as the Promotion of Military Modernity." *Critical Military Studies* 2 (3): 242–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2016.1184418.

MacArthur, Julie. 2019. "Decolonizing Sovereignty: States of Exception along the Kenya-Somali Frontier." *The American Historical Review* 124 (1): 108–43. https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhy577.

Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen, eds. 2009. "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change." In *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, 1–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511806414.003.

Maier, Charles S. 2023. *The Project-State and Its Rivals: A New History of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*. Harvard University Press.

Makara, Michael. 2013. "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring." *Democracy and Security* 9 (4): 334–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.802983.

Malešević, Siniša. 2017a. "Empires and Nation-States: Beyond the Dichotomy." *Thesis Eleven* 139 (1): 3–10. https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617700017.

———. 2017b. "The Foundations of Statehood: Empires and Nation-States in the Longue Durée." *Thesis Eleven* 139 (1): 145–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617701925.

Mälksoo, Maria. 2015. "'Memory Must Be Defended': Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security." *Security Dialogue* 46 (3): 221–37. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614552549.

Mann, Michael. 1993. *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Natin-States, 1760-1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2004. *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817274.

Margolies, Daniel S., Umut Özsu, Maïa Pal, and Ntina Tzouvala, eds. 2019. *The Extraterritoriality of Law: History, Theory, Politics*. Politics of Transnational Law. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Marinov, Nikolay, and Hein Goemans. 2014. "Coups and Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (04): 799–825.

Martin, John Levi. 2003. "What Is Field Theory?" *American Journal of Sociology* 109 (1): 1–49. https://doi.org/10.1086/375201.

Martins Filho, João Roberto. 2014. "Military Ties between France and Brazil during the Cold War, 1959–1975." *Latin American Perspectives* 41 (5): 167–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X14544112.

Mathieu, Xavier. 2021. *Sovereignty and the Denial of International Equality: Writing Civilisational Difference in Early Modern International Relations*. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429265389.

Matin, Kamran. 2020. "Deciphering the Modern Janus: Societal Multiplicity and Nation-Formation." *Globalizations* 17 (3): 436–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2019.1673615.

Mayrl, Damon, and Sarah Quinn. 2016. "Defining the State from within: Boundaries, Schemas, and Associational Policymaking." *Sociological Theory* 34 (1): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275116632557.

Mazzolini, Samuele. 2020. "Populism Is Not Hegemony: Towards a Re-Gramscianization of Ernesto Laclau." *Theory & Event* 23 (3): 765–86.

McCammon, Holly. 2013. "Discursive Opportunity Structure." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm073.

McCann, Michael, and Filiz Kahraman. 2021. "On the Interdependence of Liberal and Illiberal/Authoritarian Legal Forms in Racial Capitalist Regimes…The Case of the United States." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 17 (1): 483–503. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-111720-012237.

McCoy, Alfred W. 2009. *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*. New Perspectives in Southeast Asian Studies. Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press.

McIntosh, Janet. 2021. "Language and the Military: Necropolitical Legitimation, Embodied Semiotics, and Ineffable Suffering." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 50 (1): 241–58. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-101819-110258.

Mcmahon, R. Blake, and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2015. "The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces." *American Political Science Review* 109 (02): 297–313. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000131.

McMichael, Christopher. 2017. "Pacification and Police: A Critique of the Police Militarization Thesis." *Capital & Class* 41 (1): 115–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309816816678569.

McMichael, Philip. 1990. "Incorporating Comparison within a World-Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method." *American Sociological Review* 55 (3): 385–97. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095763.

McNamee, Lachlan, and Anna Zhang. 2019. "Demographic Engineering and International Conflict: Evidence from China and the Former USSR." *International Organization* 73 (2): 291–327. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000067.

Meisburger, Timothy M. 2012. "Debating Electoral Systems: Getting Majoritarianism Right." *Journal of Democracy* 23 (1): 155–63. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0003.

Mello, Brian. 2007. "Political Process and the Development of Labor Insurgency in Turkey, 1945–80." *Social Movement Studies* 6 (3): 207–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742830701666905.

———. 2010. "Communists and Compromisers: Explaining Divergences within Turkish Labor Activism, 1960-1980." *European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey*, no. 11 (October). https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.4343.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. "Embedded and Defective Democracies." *Democratization* 11 (5): 33–58.

Messerschmidt, James W. 2018. *Hegemonic Masculinity: Formulation, Reformulation, and Amplification*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Metinsoy, Murat. 2020. "Negotiating the Price of the New State and Republican Modernization: Resistance to the Agricultural Taxes in Modern Turkey." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 63 (November): 80–112. https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2020.24.

———. 2021. *The Power of the People: Everyday Resistance and Dissent in the Making of Modern Turkey, 1923-38*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-of-the-people/524ECFFA00ED730ECD01C63ABB315C22.

Michaud-Emin, Linda. 2007. "The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and Its Ramifications for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 8 (1): 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840601138138.

Mihatsch, Moritz Anselm, and Michael Mulligan. 2021. "The Longue Durée of Extraterritoriality and Global Capital." *Culture, Theory and Critique* 62 (1–2): 7–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/14735784.2021.1894960.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." *American Political Science Review* 85 (1): 77–96. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962879.

———. 2013. *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil*. New York: Verso.

Møller, Jørgen, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2021. "The Ulysses Principle: A Criterial Framework for Reducing Bias When Enlisting the Work of Historians." *Sociological Methods & Research* 50 (1): 103–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124118769107.

Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World,*. Boston,: Beacon Press. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u3183831.

Moses, A. Dirk. 2021. *The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression*. Human Rights in History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316217306.

Mudge, Stephanie Lee, and Antoine Vauchez. 2012. "Building Europe on a Weak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational Politics." *American Journal of Sociology* 118 (2): 449–92. https://doi.org/10.1086/666382.

Mueller, Justin. 2016. "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism: When Is Imperialism?" *Politics* 36 (4): 428–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395716644941.

Müller, Markus-Michael, and Andrea Steinke. 2021. "Community Policing's Extended Military History: Brazilian Pacification from the Global Cold War to the Global War on Terror." *Policing and Society* 31 (9): 1017–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2020.1772256.

Mylonas, Harris, and Maya Tudor. 2021. "Nationalism: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know." *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (1): 109–32. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-101841.

Naylor, Tristen. 2022. "Social Closure and the Reproduction of Stratified International Order." *International Relations* 36 (1): 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211010325.

Norton, Matthew. 2014. "Classification and Coercion: The Destruction of Piracy in the English Maritime System." *American Journal of Sociology* 119 (6): 1537–75. https://doi.org/10.1086/676041.

———. 2017. "Real Mythic Histories: Circulatory Networks and State-Centrism." In *Global Historical Sociology*, edited by George Lawson and Julian Go, 35–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316711248.002.

———. 2022. *The Punishment of Pirates: Interpretation and Institutional Order in the Early Modern British Empire*. University of Chicago Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u691835.

Olson, Emelie A. 1985. "Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: 'The Headscarf Dispute.'" *Anthropological Quarterly* 58 (4): 161–71. https://doi.org/10.2307/3318146.

Öncü, Ayşe. 1995. "Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial Television." *Public Culture* 8 (1): 51–71. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-8-1-51.

Öniş, Ziya. 2004. "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40 (4): 113–34.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2014. *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. America in the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2016. "Global History and Historical Sociology." In *The Prospect of Global History*, edited by James Belich, John Darwin, Margret Frenz, and Chris Wickham, 23–43. New York: Oxford University Press. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1159846.

Özbudun, Ergun. 1988. "The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?" In *State, Democracy, and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 37–45. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

———. 2013. *Party Politics & Social Cleavages in Turkey*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Özbudun, Ergun, and Ömer F. Gençkaya. 2009. *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey*. Budapest ; Central European University Press,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u5312866.

Özdalga, Elizabeth. 2010. "Transformation of Sufi-Based Communities in Modern Turkey: The Naksibendis, the Nurcus, and the Gulen Community." In *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Kerem Öktem, Celia Kerslake, and Philip Robins, 69–91. Basingstoke [England]; New York; Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan ; in association with St Antony's College. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=668014.

Özdemir, Seçkin Sertdemir. 2021. "Civic Death as a Mechanism of Retributive Punishment: Academic Purges in Turkey." *Punishment & Society* 23 (2): 145–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474520941744.

Ozkaleli, Umut. 2015. "State of the State in Their Minds: Intersectional Framework for Women's Citizenship in Turkey." *Women's Studies International Forum* 48 (January): 93–102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2014.11.012.

Özman, Aylin, and Aslı Yazıcı Yakın. 2012. "The Symbolic Construction of Communism in Turkish Anti-Communist Propaganda during the Cold War." *Journal of Language & Politics* 11 (4): 583–605. https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.11.4.06ozm.

Pacewicz, Josh. 2022. "What Can You Do With a Single Case? How to Think About Ethnographic Case Selection Like a Historical Sociologist." *Sociological Methods & Research* 51 (3): 931–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124119901213.

Palomera, Jaime, and Theodora Vetta. 2016. "Moral Economy: Rethinking a Radical Concept." *Anthropological Theory* 16 (4): 413–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499616678097.

Pamuk, Şevket. 2008. "Economic Change in Twentieth-Century Turkey: Is the Glass More than Half Full?" In *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 4:266–300. Cambridge History of Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.011.

Parla, Taha, and Andrew Davison. 2004. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* Syracuse University Press.

Parslow, Joakim. 2016. "Theories of Exceptional Executive Powers in Turkey, 1933–1945." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 55 (November): 29–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2016.20.

———. 2018. "Jurists of War and Peace: Siddik Sami Onar (1898–1972) and Ali Fuad Başgil (1893–1967) on Law and Prerogative in Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 50 (1): 45–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743817000939.

Pekesen, Berna. 2020. "Atatürk's Unfinished Revolution -- The Turkish Student Movement and Left-Wing Kemalism in the 1960s." In *Kemalism as a Fixed Variable in the Republic of Turkey: History, Society, Politics*, edited by Lutz Berger and Tamer Düzyol, 97–117. Baden-Baden, Germany: Ergon Verlag.

Pelt, Mogens. 2014. *Military Intervention and a Crisis of Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and Its Demise*. New York: I. B. Tauris.

Peterson, Terrence G. 2023. "Networking the Counterrevolution: The École Supérieure de Guerre, Transnational Military Collaboration, and Cold War Counterinsurgency, 1955–1975." *Journal of Social History* 56 (3): 607–36. https://doi.org/10.1093/jsh/shac059.

Peterson, V. Spike. 2020. "Family Matters in Racial Logics: Tracing Intimacies, Inequalities, and Ideologies." *Review of International Studies* 46 (2): 177–96. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210519000433.

Pitts, Jennifer. 2018. *Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 2014. *State, Power, Socialism*. London: Verso.

———. 2017. *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Spain, Greece*. Kindle edition. London: Verso Books.

Powell, Jonathan M. 2014. "An Assessment of the 'Democratic' Coup Theory." *African Security Review* 23 (3): 213–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2014.926949.

Power, Timothy J. 2018. "Contrasting Trajectories of Brazil's Two Authoritarian Successor Parties." In *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*, edited by James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 229–53. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Provence, Michael. 2017. *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1988. "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts." In *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, edited by Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, 59–80. Studies in Rationality and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173629.003.

———. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Studies in Rationality and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139172493.

Reynolds, Andrew, and John M. Carey. 2012. "Debating Electoral Systems: Getting Elections Wrong." *Journal of Democracy* 23 (1): 164–68. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0006.

Riedl, Rachel Beatty, Dan Slater, Joseph Wong, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2020. "Authoritarian-Led Democratization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (1): 315–32. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052318-025732.

Riofrancos, Thea. 2021. "From Cases to Sites: Studying Global Processes in Comparative Politics." In *Rethinking Comparison: Innovative Methods for Qualitative Political Inquiry*, edited by Erica S. Simmons and Nicholas Rush Smith, 107–26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108966009.006.

Robinson, Cedric J. 2000. *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. Chapel Hill (N.C.): University of North Carolina Press.

Robson, Laura. 2021. "Capitulations Redux: The Imperial Genealogy of the Post–World War I 'Minority' Regimes." *The American Historical Review* 126 (3): 978–1000. https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhab358.

Rock, Michael T. 2013. "East Asia's Democratic Developmental States and Economic Growth." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (1): 1–34.

———. 2015. "Southeast Asia's Democratic Developmental States and Economic Growth." *Institutions and Economies* 7 (1): 23–51.

Rodogno, Davide. 2011. *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914. Against Massacre*. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400840014.

Roessler, Philip. 2011. "The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa." *World Politics* 63 (02): 300–346. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000049.

Roessler, Philip G. 2016. *Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rubin, Ashley T. 2021. *Rocking Qualitative Social Science: An Irreverent Guide to Rigorous Research*. Stanford University Press.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, John D. Stephens, and Evelyne Huber Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u1963682.

Rustow, Dankwart A. 1968. "Atatürk as Founder of a State." *Daedalus* 97 (3): 793–828.

———. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics* 2 (3): 337–63. https://doi.org/10.2307/421307.

Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. Penguin History. New York: Pendulum.

Saktanber, Ayşe. 2006. "Women and the Iconography of Fear: Islamization in Post-Islamist Turkey." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 32 (1): 21–31. https://doi.org/10.1086/505890.

Sarfati, Yusuf. 2017. "How Turkey's Slide to Authoritarianism Defies Modernization Theory." *Turkish Studies* 18 (3): 395–415. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1315304.

Sarigil, Zeki. 2007. "Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the Turkish Military." *Mediterranean Politics* 12 (1): 39–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390601136822.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ywr0CcGDNHwC&oi=fnd&pg=PR8&dq=giovanni+sartori&ots=xS89dPcwcT&sig=oKY7TgBn2x_QaS8cpsWAtr0D4IU.

Satana, Nil S. 2008. "Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy." *Armed Forces & Society* 34 (3): 357–88.

Savage, Jesse Dillon, and Jonathan D Caverley. 2017. "When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups." *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (4): 542–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317713557.

Schrader, Stuart. 2019. *Badges without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing*. Univ of California Press.

———. 2022. "Global Counterinsurgency and the Police-Military Continuum: Introduction to the Special Issue." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 33 (4–5): 553–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2054113.

Schwedler, Jillian. 2021. "Against Methodological Nationalism: Seeing Comparisons as Encompassing through the Arab Uprisings." In *Rethinking Comparison: Innovative Methods for Qualitative Political Inquiry*, edited by Erica S. Simmons and Nicholas Rush Smith, 172–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108966009.009.

Seawright, Jason. 2021. "Beyond Mill: Why Cross-Case Qualitative Causal Inference Is Weak, and Why We Should Still Compare." In *Rethinking Comparison: Innovative Methods for Qualitative Political Inquiry*, edited by Erica S. Simmons and Nicholas Rush Smith, 31–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108966009.002.

Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077.

Seigel, Micol. 2018. *Violence Work: State Power and the Limits of Police*. Duke University Press.

Self, Darin Sanders. 2022. "Bounded Democratization: How Military-Party Relations Shape Military-Led Democratization." *Comparative Political Studies*, August, 00104140221116461. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221116461.

Shambayati, Hootan, and Esen Kirdiş. 2009. "In Pursuit of 'Contemporary Civilization': Judicial Empowerment in Turkey." *Political Research Quarterly* 62 (4): 767–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909346741.

Sharma, Nandita. 2020. *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants*. *Home Rule*. Duke University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478002451.

Shively, Kim. 2008. "Taming Islam: Studying Religion in Secular Turkey." *Anthropological Quarterly* 81 (3): 683–711.

Singh, Naunihal. 2014. *Seizing Power : The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u6423453.

Singh, Prerna, and Matthias vom Hau. 2016. "Ethnicity in Time: Politics, History, and the Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision." *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (10): 1303–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016633231.

Slater, Dan, and Joseph Wong. 2013. "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia." *Perspectives on Politics* 11 (3): 717–33.

———. 2018. "Game for Democracy: Authoritarian Successor Parties in Developmental Asia." In *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*, edited by James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 284–313. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108560566.011.

Slootmaeckers, Koen. 2019. "Nationalism as Competing Masculinities: Homophobia as a Technology of Othering for Hetero- and Homonationalism." *Theory and Society* 48 (2): 239–65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-019-09346-4.

Sosa, Joseph Jay. 2019. "Subversive, Mother, Killjoy: Sexism against Dilma Rousseff and the Social Imaginary of Brazil's Rightward Turn." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44 (3): 717–41. https://doi.org/10.1086/701158.

Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. 2017. "Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race–Class Subjugated Communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (1): 565–91. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060415-093825.

Spanu, Maja. 2020. "The Hierarchical Society: The Politics of Self-Determination and the Constitution of New States after 1919." *European Journal of International Relations* 26 (2): 372–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119866496.

Stampnitzky, Lisa. 2016. "The Lawyers' War: States and Human Rights in a Transnational Field." *The Sociological Review* 64 (2_suppl): 170–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/2059-7932.12007.

Stoler, Ann Laura, and Carole McGranahan. 2006. "Refiguring Imperial Terrains." *Ab Imperio* 2006 (2): 17–58. https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2006.0090.

Sum, Ngai-Ling, and Bob Jessop. 2013. *Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in Its Place in Political Economy*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Suzuki, Shogo. 2005. "Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (1): 137–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105050139.

Svolik, Milan W. 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 477–94.

———. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=6fUgAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR17&ots=SKb1KaH3Zw&sig=3rnHFhFZ5owi_QCDrMJ2n-yGtJ8.

———. 2015. "Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (04): 715–38. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000550.

Swartz, David L. 2013. *Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals: The Political Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*. University of Chicago Press.

———. 2019. "The Heavy Hands of the State." *Contemporary Sociology* 48 (1): 12–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306118815498.

Tambar, Kabir. 2014. *The Reckoning of Pluralism: Political Belonging and the Demands of History in Turkey*. Stanford University Press.

———. 2016. "Brotherhood in Dispossession: State Violence and the Ethics of Expectation in Turkey." *Cultural Anthropology* 31 (1): 30–55. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca31.1.03.

Tansel, Cemal Burak. 2018. "Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress." *South European Society and Politics* 23 (2): 197–217. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945.

Tavory, Iddo, and Stefan Timmermans. 2014. *Abductive Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research*. University of Chicago Press.

Teele, Dawn Langan. 2018. *Forging the Franchise: The Political Origins of the Women's Vote*. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1822238.

Ter-Matevosyan, Vahram. 2019. *Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation*. Modernity, Memory and Identity in South-East Europe. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97403-3.

The Economist. 1973. "Wanted-an Ally," October 20, 1973. The Economist Historical Archive.

The Times. 1974a. "Promise of an Amnesty in Turkey," January 26, 1974. The Times Digital Archive.

———. 1974b. "MPs Defeat Turkish Premier on Amnesty," May 16, 1974. The Times Digital Archive.

Thyne, Clayton, Jonathan Powell, Sarah Parrott, and Emily VanMeter. 2018. "Even Generals Need Friends: How Domestic and International Reactions to Coups Influence Regime Survival." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (7): 1406–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716685611.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 169–91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1578958.

Towns, Ann. 2009. "The Status of Women as a Standard of 'Civilization.'" *European Journal of International Relations* 15 (4): 681–706. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109345053.

Towns, Ann E. 2012. "Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion 'From Below.'" *International Organization* 66 (2): 179–209. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000045.

Towns, Ann E., and Bahar Rumelili. 2017. "Taking the Pressure: Unpacking the Relation between Norms, Social Hierarchies, and Social Pressures on States." *European Journal of International Relations* 23 (4): 756–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066116682070.

Trimberger, Ellen Kay. 1978. *Revolution from above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.

Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. 2002. "Nature in the Making." In *New Directions in Anthropology and Environment: Intersections*, edited by Carole L. Crumley, 3–23. AltaMira Press.

Tudor, Maya, and Dan Slater. 2021. "Nationalism, Authoritarianism, and Democracy: Historical Lessons from South and Southeast Asia." *Perspectives on Politics* 19 (3): 706–22. https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272000078X.

Tuğal, Cihan. 2009. *Passive Revolution : Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u4878726.

———. 2016. *The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings Brought down Islamic Liberalism*. London: Verso.

Turam, Berna. 2012. "Are Rights and Liberties Safe?" *Journal of Democracy* 23 (1): 109–18. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012.0007.

Türkmen, Gülay. 2021. *Under the Banner of Islam? Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Turnaoğlu, Banu. 2017a. *The Formation of Turkish Republicanism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2017b. "The Positivist Universalism and Republicanism of the Young Turks." *Modern Intellectual History* 14 (3): 777–805. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244316000408.

Tzouvala, Ntina. 2019. "'And the Laws Are Rude...Crude and Uncertain': Extraterritoriality and the Emergence of Territorialized Statehood in Siam." In *The Extraterritoriality of Law: History, Theory, Politics*, edited by Daniel S. Margolies, Umut Özsu, Maïa Pal, and Ntina Tzouvala, 134–50. Politics of Transnational Law. London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

———. 2020. *Capitalism As Civilisation: A History of International Law*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108684415.

Ugur-Cinar, Meral, Ali Acikgoz, and Berk Esen. 2023. "Party Change and Cleavage Shifting in the Global South: The Case of Ecevit's CHP in Turkey." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* ahead of print (April): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2023.2197307.

Ulus, Özgür Mutlu. 2011. *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism*. London ; I.B. Tauris ; http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u5289276.

Üngör, Uğur Ümit. 2008. "Seeing like a Nation-State: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913–50." *Journal of Genocide Research* 10 (1): 15–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520701850278.

Ünlü, Barış. 2016. "The Kurdish Struggle and the Crisis of the Turkishness Contract." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 42 (4–5): 397–405. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453715625715.

Usmani, Adaner. 2018. "Democracy and the Class Struggle." *American Journal of Sociology* 124 (3): 664–704. https://doi.org/10.1086/700235.

Uyar, Mesut, and Serhat Güvenç. 2022. "A Tale of Two Military Missions: The Germans in the Ottoman Empire and the Americans in the Republic of Turkey." *War & Society* 41 (2): 85–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/07292473.2022.2046344.

VanderLippe, John M. 2005. *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Varol, Ozan O. 2012. "The Democratic Coup d'Etat." *Harvard International Law Journal* 53 (2): 291–356.

———. 2017. *The Democratic Coup d'État*. Oxford University Press.

Viola, Lora Anne. 2020. *The Closure of the International System: How Institutions Create Political Equalities and Hierarchies*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108612562.

Waldman, Simon, and Emre Caliskan. 2020. "Factional and Unprofessional: Turkey's Military and the July 2016 Attempted Coup." *Democracy and Security* 16 (2): 123–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2019.1593831.

Waldner, David. 1999. *State Building and Late Development*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Waldner, David, and Ellen Lust. 2018. "Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21 (1): 93–113. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628.

Walrath, Nicholas, and Travis Linnemann. 2021. "War, Police, and the Production of Global Social Order." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.614.

Weber, Eugen. 1976. *Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford University Press.

Weiker, Walter F. 1962. "Academic Freedom and Problems of Higher Education in Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 16 (3): 279–94.

Weldes, Jutta. 1996. "Constructing National Interests." *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (3): 275–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066196002003001.

Wherry, Frederick F. 2014. "Analyzing the Culture of Markets." *Theory and Society* 43 (3/4): 421–36.

White, Jenny B. 2003. "State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman." *NWSA Journal* 15 (3): 145–59.

Williams, Eric Eustace. 2021. *Capitalism & Slavery*. Third edition. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Wimmer, Andreas, and Yuval Feinstein. 2010. "The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001." *American Sociological Review* 75 (5): 764–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410382639.

Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. "Methodological Nationalism and beyond: Nation–State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences." *Global Networks* 2 (4): 301–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0374.00043.

Wingenbach, Ed. 2011. *Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and Political Liberalism*. Farnham, UNITED KINGDOM: Routledge. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uva/detail.action?docID=744147.

Wullweber, Joscha. 2019. "Money, State, Hegemony: A Political Ontology of Money." *New Political Science* 41 (2): 313–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2019.1596686.

Yadirgi, Veli. 2017. *The Political Economy of the Kurds of Turkey: From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316848579.

Yalcintan, Murat Cemal, and Adem Erdem Erbas. 2003. "Impacts of 'Gecekondu' on the Electoral Geography of Istanbul." *International Labor and Working-Class History* 64 (October): 91–111. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547903000218.

Yanow, Dvora, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. 2013. *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. 2nd edition. Armonk, UNITED STATES: Taylor & Francis Group. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uva/detail.action?docID=302458.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2005. *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2013. *Toward an Islamic Enlightenment : The Gülen Movement*. New York : Oxford University Press,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u5945392.

———. 2018. "The Three Stages of the Gulen Movement: From Pietistic Weeping Movement to Power-Obsessed Structure." In *Turkey's July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why*, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci, 20–45. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

———. 2020. *Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Bayram Balci, eds. 2018. *Turkey's July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Yavuz, M. Hakan, and John L. Esposito, eds. 2003. *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement*. 1st ed. Contemporary Issues in the Middle East. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u3994508.

Yeğen, Mesut. 2007. "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (1): 119–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870601006603.

———. 2009. "'Prospective-Turks' or 'Pseudo-Citizens:' Kurds in Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 63 (4): 597–615.

———. 2021. "Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, 1898–2018." In *The Cambridge History of the Kurds*, edited by Cengiz Gunes, Hamit Bozarslan, and Veli Yadirgi, 311–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108623711.013.

Yildirmaz, Sinan. 2017. *Politics and the Peasantry in Post-War Turkey: Social History, Culture and Modernization*. New York: I. B. Tauris.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2021. *Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/creating-the-desired-citizen/5C687E835F29991DC42D1403B1DE8890.

Yilmaz, Muzaffer Ercan. 2012. "The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of the Welfare Party." *Turkish Studies* 13 (3): 363–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.717449.

Yıldız, Tunahan. 2023. "International Politics in Turkish Islamism during the Cold War, 1947–1964." *Middle Eastern Studies* 59 (3): 437–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2022.2103545.

Yılmaz, Hakan. 1997. "Democratization from above in Response to the International Context: Turkey, 1945–1950." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17: 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600002739.

———. 2002. "External-Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change." *Democratization* 9 (2): 67–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000257.

———. 2011. "Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion." *South European Society and Politics* 16 (01): 185–208.

Yom, Sean. 2015. "From Methodology to Practice: Inductive Iteration in Comparative Research." *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (5): 616–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014554685.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender and Nation*. SAGE.

Zarakol, Ayşe. 2010. *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921421.

———. 2013. "Revisiting Second Image Reversed: Lessons from Turkey and Thailand." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (1): 150–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12038.

———. 2014. "What Made the Modern World Hang Together: Socialisation or Stigmatisation?" *International Theory* 6 (02): 311–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971914000141.

———. 2017. *Hierarchies in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Zeglen, David. 2023. "Temporal Ideologies in Uneven and Combined Development." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 36 (2): 184–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1858027.

Zengin, Huseyin. 2022. "Why Do Some Coups Lead to Democratization?" *Democratization* 29 (5): 798–813. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.2013204.

Zenker, Olaf. 2011. "Autochthony, Ethnicity, Indigeneity and Nationalism: Time-Honouring and State-Oriented Modes of Rooting Individual-Territory-Group Triads in a Globalizing World." *Critique of Anthropology* 31 (1): 63–81. https://doi.org/10.1177/0308275X10393438.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2008. "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization?: A Test of the 'Bread and Democracy' Thesis and the Case of Prussia." *World Politics* 60 (4): 610–41. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.0.0021.

———. 2017. *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zürcher, Erik Jan. 2004. *Turkey: A Modern History*. 3rd ed., new Ed. London ; I.B. Tauris,. http://search.lib.virginia.edu/catalog/u4047264.