

# Determining Military Coalition Participation

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### **Abstract**

This paper argues that states participate in military coalitions due to dependence on a coalition leader. Unlike alliances, military coalitions are immediate and there is no issue with reliability. These characteristics make the analysis of military coalitions distinct. Dependence between states come in several forms that can be broadly categorized into economical dependence and security dependence. A logit analysis using the six cases of the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars finds support for the argument that both forms of dependence are positively related with a state's decision to participate in a military coalition led by the US.

## 1 Introduction

In 1965 and 1966, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) sent two infantry divisions and additional support units to serve in the war in Vietnam(Sarantakes, 1999, p. 42). This came at a time when it had recently come out of a devastating war of its own approximately ten years prior, and was still struggling economically while being confronted with a major military threat directly to its north. Under such circumstances, the Korean troops were more than just token forces; they were the second largest foreign army fighting in Vietnam behind the United States, and the infantry divisions sent stayed until 1973. At one point, the Korean forces actually outnumbered American ground forces(Sarantakes, 1999, p. 440). In total, 312,853 soldiers were sent by Korea to Vietnam, from 1964 to 1975(Park, 2003, p. 379).

More recently, South Korea only sent approximately 300 non-combatant forces (medical support and air transport) to the Gulf War in 1991, 3,000 (peak number in 2003) non-combatant forces to the war in Afghanistan, and 20,000 (peak number in 2004) non-combatants to Iraq.<sup>1</sup>

The geographic locations of all the conflicts listed above evidently make them of peripheral interest in the security sense to a state that faced a grave threat to its immediate north throughout the whole period. Then why did Korea still participate to such a magnitude in the Vietnam War? What changed to affect its token contribution to the subsequent ones?

On a more general note, according to version 4 of the Correlates of War Interstate

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<sup>1</sup>[http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=0\\_46591&boardSeq=0\\_50261&titleId=null&id=mnd\\_010701000000](http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=0_46591&boardSeq=0_50261&titleId=null&id=mnd_010701000000)

War dataset, among the 36 interstate wars that have occurred after 1950, a little over half of them (19 cases) were bilateral, and the rest have had more than three participants. Among the 17 cases where military coalitions existed (i.e. where there were two or more combatant states on either side), the US has predominantly led the most in 8 cases. The largest coalition was that of the Korean War in 1950 with 14 coalition members (including the US). Although the conflict itself was contained to the Korean peninsula in East Asia, the participating coalition states ranged from around the globe; France and Greece from Europe, Thailand from South Asia, Ethiopia from Africa and even Colombia from South America. What factor did these seemingly disparate states have in common, leading them to participate in the Korean War?

The research question for this study stems from the empirical anomalies found in the previous examples; "Why do states participate in (international) military coalitions that are not of direct interest to their security?"<sup>2</sup> The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, it proposes to argue that states participate in military coalitions due to (economic and security related) dependence on a coalition leader. Additionally, it is intended to dissect the specific forms of dependence and their relative impact on coalition participation. To the first end, the paper starts from the well established literature on alliances and the functions those provide, and then moves on to differentiate military coalitions from alliances. Then, building on a theory of dependence, the paper proposes and tests hypotheses targeted at addressing the

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<sup>2</sup>The concept of *military coalitions* distinctly refers to those coalitions that are formed for the purpose of participating in interstate wars. See Tago (2007) for a further discussion of specific coalitions categorized by purpose (e.g. peace keeping operations, humanitarian interventions etc.)

latter objective of parsing out the specific modes of dependence that determine military coalition participation. The conclusion summarizes the findings, proposes future work and emphasizes their relevant significance.

## **2 Alliances and Military Coalitions**

### **2.1 Alliances**

Leeds (2003) defines alliances as 'written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict.' Alternatively, the New Oxford American Dictionary more simply defines alliances as 'unions or associations formed for mutual benefit [esp] between countries or organizations.'

An important function that such alliances provide for their respective members (and their potential aggressors) is the revelation of information regarding future intentions. Alliance agreements provide states with information regarding each others' future intentions; the likelihood of intervention and aid by another in potential conflicts. Although such contracts are not enforceable, the act of formalizing the commitment itself is regarded to be sufficient in revealing information about future incentives and even create new ones(Leeds, 2003, pp. 427-28). The revealing of information deters potential aggressors from engaging in war with states that

possess extended deterrent commitments.<sup>3</sup>

For example, when state *A* and *B* are committed to each other in a defensive alliance, not only do they possess a heightened level of security due to *knowledge* that they will be aided by the other in the case either one of them are attacked, but a potential adversary, state *C*, will also witness those (future) intentions of *A* and *B*. When it is evident that the cost of failing to aid each other outweigh the costs of the formation of the *A-B* alliance, *C* should be deterred.

However, the anarchic characteristic of the international system prevents any such agreements from having an enduringly 'binding' effect. This is because there is no central authority in the system to enforce states to stick to their agreements (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). In short, anarchy makes promises and contracts between states problematic. This is what enables wars to still occur in the face of existing alliances. Smith (1995, p. 418) accounts for this anomaly by theorizing on the *reliability* of alliances. Being agreements by definition, the fact that there are levels of differing reliability in alliances and their members is a direct by-product of anarchy. Naturally, the question that follows is what determines the degree of reliability in alliances.

First, the *nature of the agreement* changes the probability of a state respecting its commitments when called to do so. Alliances are not created equal. Some may be defensive, others a mere agreement to not participate in aggressions against each other. Based on such differences, it can be suspected that such alliance *types* will

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<sup>3</sup>A game theoretic model provided by Smith (1995) demonstrates that the formation of an alliance has an effect on the behavior of states regarding war. When both costs of forming an alliance, and failing to honor those agreements are considered, the greater the cost of the latter, *ceteris paribus*, potential aggressors should be deterred (Smith, 1995, pp. 408, 410).

change its level of reliability. According to their general forms of agreed upon future cooperation, alliances are distinguished into five different types (Leeds, 2003, p. 429). First, defensive cooperation commits states to aid each other when either one of them is the *target* of another third party. Second, offensive cooperation commits states to join each other in case one decides to become the aggressor against another third party. Neutrality and non-aggression are similar in that they entail states to refrain from violence against each other, and consultation agreements regards those alliances that do not necessarily promise direct military assistance, but only indirect aid through diplomacy and informative methods (Leeds, 2003, p. 429). The ability to distinguish different types of alliances has introduced interesting results in the literature. Potential challengers that have an offensive alliance are .47 more likely to initiate disputes (than those that do not belong to an offensive alliance), and potential targets with defensive alliances are .28 less likely to become targeted (than those that do not partake in a defensive alliance) (Leeds, 2003, p. 436).

The reliability of alliance commitments may also be affected by characteristics of the alliance members themselves and exogenous systemic factors. Building on the observation that while many alliance partners join in on wars, but many more do not, Siverson and King (1980)'s quantitative analysis of interstate wars and war participation between 1815 and 1965 find that the characteristics of specific alliances affect the probability of participation. More specifically, states join allies in war when many allies are in the war, the allies they join are minor powers, the alliance is relatively small and defensive, the alliance is relatively young, and when the state is associated with a relatively large number of alliances overall (Siverson

and King, 1980, pp. 1, 3-5, 13). These results show that not only does the type of alliance matter (the alliance is defensive and new), but that characteristics of the aided state (allies they join are minor powers), assisting state (they are associated in multiple alliances), and those of the conflict itself (the number of allies joining the war) also have a significant impact.

Despite their primary goal of revealing information and preventing war, alliances themselves may also lead bilateral wars to 'catch on' to others and cause the war to grow in its size of participants. The process by which two nations initially begin a war may be considerably different from the process for those states that are subsequent participants who *join in* later into the war (Siverson and Starr, 1990, p. 47). Recognizing this problem, a line of research has shifted its attention to the *diffusion* of war, i.e, its contagion. This approach has mainly focused on borders and alliances as possible independent variables that have a causal effect in determining war diffusion (Siverson and Starr, 1990, pp. 47-8).

The reasons why borders matter may seem fairly clear, but I use the opportunity to highlight the incentives and disincentives of war participation for non-primary actors. The costs and benefits for target and challenging states regarding conflict is the subject of a plethora of theories that has enriched security studies as a whole. While the primary focus has been on the former major two (or more) actors, the fact that the costs and benefits are also inflicted upon *all* participant states in general is easy to overlook.

An initial look at the matter may make it seem that states contiguous to a conflict are simply 'dragged' into it regardless of their intentions. However, conflicts



situated geographically close to a state may present them with opportunity costs of foregoing participation (containing the conflict where it is, or taking advantage of the situation to advance one's own agenda etc.). Based on such factors, states weigh the costs and benefits of participation, and the more the scale favors the advantages, the more willing (to participate) a state becomes (Siverson and Starr, 1990, pp. 47-9).

Geographic locations of a state are a given. A state can not decide to pack its bags and move because there is a problem in the neighborhood. Alliances, unlike geography, result from a deliberate process of policy choice (Siverson and Starr, 1990, p. 50). The willingness to form alliances—and with specific partners—may be seen as an indicator of shared policy preferences (Siverson and Starr, 1990, p. 50). On the other hand, alliances may also form as a result of rational cost/benefit analysis. Hence, states balance the cost of alliance commitments against the benefits of protection against a threat, and act accordingly (Newnham, 2008, p. 184).

When presented with a situation of contagion (not necessarily limited to the geographical sense), alliance dependence plays an important role in a state's decision to participate or not. States in the international system are not equal with respect to their size and material capabilities. When any two states are allied with each other, they face the fear of abandonment and entrapment (Cha, 2000, p. 265). Abandonment is when an ally either realigns with another state, or fails to help a state against an adversary. Entrapment is when the alliance induces a state to become involved in a conflict that is central to their ally's interest, but peripheral to their own (Cha, 2000, p. 265). This happens when the state believes that the costs

of participation in the conflict outweigh the benefits of preserving the alliance through which they hope to minimize the risks and costs of future wars (Bennett et al., 1994, p. 44).

The fear of abandonment is higher for states in asymmetric alliances, where they are highly dependent on the alliance commitments from a *patron* state. The threshold of entrapment should thus also be higher, leading *protégé* states (the smaller state in an asymmetric alliance) to endure more by showing their commitment in order to secure a patron's reciprocity into the future (Cha, 2000; Bennett et al., 1994). In short, the war becomes contagious not geographically but in terms of entrapment for the protégé; when a patron goes to war, the protégé's level of contribution to the war effort will be positively affected by their level of dependence (Bennett et al., 1994, p. 49, 54, 57, 60, 63-64).

## 2.2 Military Coalitions

The US Department of Defense defines coalitions as 'arrangements between two or more nations for common action' and multinational forces as 'forces composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for specific purposes (JCS, 2010, pp. 39, 178).' More broadly, for the purposes of this paper, Military Coalitions, hereafter shortly referenced to as simply coalitions in most instances, are defined as 'military forces composed of combatants from two or more nations with a commonly stated purpose and imminent action plan.' The major point in which military coalitions stand apart from alliances is that the former are formed with a goal of *immediate* action, whereas the latter are commitments

towards *future* events (that may or may not happen). Hence, the mechanisms that lead to the decision of participating in military coalitions should be distinct from those that lead to forming an alliance due to the immediateness of the act and its related costs.

In many cases, military coalitions are indeed the resulting products of alliances, causing confusion in distinguishing them apart (Tago, 2007, p. 180). More specifically, it could be the case that the *agreement* of an alliance commitment materializes into military *action* through coalitions. Let us suppose that state *A* and *B* possess a defensive alliance agreement prior to state *C*'s attack on *B*. The subsequent combined military response *A–B* would be a direct realization of previous commitments. Note however that the action of the military response *A–B* is highly related to the commitment, but *is not* the commitment itself.

This is not to be taken to mean that military coalitions are solely bound to alliances, and are a subset therefore. Alliance arrangements are neither necessary, nor sufficient for two states to form a military coalition. Assuming that alliances are sufficient for coalition participation would render the entire debate on the reliability of alliances irrelevant. Neither are alliances a necessary prior condition for coalition participation. States without an alliance agreement may indeed find it useful to temporarily combine forces targeting specific, immediate goals. In the more extreme rearrangement of these two concepts, it could also be the case that the experience of acting together in a military coalition absent of an alliance agreement sparks the desire and/or need to form one. The temporal order of events in some

cases indeed show that coalitions may proceed alliances.<sup>4</sup>

Coalitions are different from alliances further in that the decision to participate is not necessarily intended to reveal future intentions of a state. The decision to participate in a war reveals immediate interests, and indirect evidence of a state's future interests at best. This is in contrast with the debate on the reliability of alliances. Even in well defined alliance agreements that specify what actions a state will take and in what circumstances to aid another, the latent nature of actions can lead to deviation when actually called upon to do so.

Rather than think of revealing future intentions then, it is better to think of coalition participation as a mechanism through which states can reveal their *reliability* to an alliance partner.<sup>5</sup> In the case that the alliance agreement indeed preceded the decision to participate in a military coalition, a state may utilize the opportunity to reveal its willingness to respect its alliance commitment, hence not revealing its future intentions *per se*, but revealing the reliability of already stated such intentions. This aspect of coalition participation does not necessarily need the type of a military coalition to correspond to the pre-agreed upon commitment of an alliance; states may participate in offensive coalitions where there only existed a defensive alliance with the coalition leader, with the goal of revealing their reliability and worthiness as an alliance partner.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Greece, Turkey, Australia and the Philippines, did not have a formal alliance agreement with the US prior to their participation in the Korean War, but such alliances were formed shortly before or after their participation in the Korean War effort.

<sup>5</sup>or to a potential future alliance partner

<sup>6</sup>Empirically, the US has formed multiple military coalitions after WWII that did not address the goal of defending itself (directly). Under such circumstances, several allied states went 'above and beyond' the expected defense agreements that their alliance with the US required, and participated in those coalitions.

### 3 Dependence

In order to better understand why states would feel the need to prove their reliability through coalition participation, we need to first define and understand the concept of dependence. Dependence is where a state (the protégé) relies on another (the patron) for specific goods or functions (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 8).<sup>7</sup> Assuming that ensuring their survival and increasing the odds of such are the primary interests of states, being reliant on another for the means towards those ends makes a protégé quite vulnerable. Being in such a vulnerable position makes it highly sensitive towards the actions and intentions of its patron. It is likely that protégés would go to great lengths to assure the continuous deliverance of such means from their patron; even participate in military coalitions (led by the patron) that seem of peripheral interest to themselves.<sup>8</sup>

#### 3.1 Dependence and Coalition Participation

Any increase in dependence increases the probability that a protégé will participate in a patron led coalition due to how participation can affect future expectations regarding continued support from the patron. These expectations can be a direct connection from levels before a coalition event to those after (a protégé is highly dependent on a patron, and expects to secure the patron's support into the future),

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<sup>7</sup>Keohane and Nye (1977) define dependence more broadly as *a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces*. The definition used in this paper intentionally narrows the focus to the relationship between states.

<sup>8</sup>More specifically, protégés may participate in military coalitions that do not fall within the previously agreed upon conditions for defensive aid in an alliance agreement. Hence, going 'above and beyond' their obligations.

or they can be indirect (a state is not a protégé of a patron state, but hopes to receive aid/services from that state by participation in a coalition).

A direct connection is where a protégé participates in a coalition due to the desire (and expectation) of *maintaining current levels* of input from its patron. This can either be because they fear that a failure to participate leads to retribution from the patron, or to the substitution of itself with another potential protégé that does participate (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 13). The dilemma that these states face resemble the problems of abandonment and entrapment states face in alliances. Protégés fear that they may be abandoned by the coalition leader if they do not contribute on the one hand, and on the other, they fear that they may become entrapped in a conflict that is not central to their own security interests if they do. The balance can be found where they commit to the extent in which the costs of participation do not outweigh the benefits they gain from the continued input of needed goods from the coalition leader. Figure 3.1 draws this causal reasoning of protégé states in cases where high levels of dependence lead them to participate in coalitions.





Figure 3.1: Direct Link from Levels of Dependence to Participation

On the other hand, it could be the case that there is an indirect connection;

where a state is not dependent on another that is leading a coalition. However, if the former state desires to increase inputs (of some kind of resource or function) from the latter, they may participate in the coalition due to the expectation that the action increases the possibilities of such benefits in the future (Tago, 2007, 2008).<sup>9</sup> This is a more active interpretation of participation, saying that it leads to an increase in bilateral ties and interactions with the coalition leader. Figure 3.2 draws the causal reasoning of aspiring protégé states' decision to participate in coalitions.

Figure 3.2: In-direct Link from Levels of Dependence to Participation



The fears of abandonment for protégé states can be further exacerbated or ameliorated by the exit costs of their respective patron state. Exit costs are low in instances of severely asymmetric dependency, where the protégé is simply dependent on the patron. However, as the relationship moves from dependency towards inter-dependency, the exit costs for the patron rise (Crescenzi, 2003, pp. 811). Where exit costs are relatively high for a patron state, it may be constrained from either exacting retribution on the protégé, or substituting it with another. Conversely, where such costs are low, the patron has relatively higher bargaining


<sup>9</sup>The scope of this paper focuses on the former direct connection between pre-participation levels of dependence and its consequences regarding coalition participation. The latter question of participation and its consequences is bracketed for future work. See Tago (2008) for a study that directly addresses this question.

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power in getting its way with the protégé (Crescenzi, 2003, pp. 812-3, 815-6). This does not imply that such an explicit bargaining model where the patron is directly demanding coalition participation of its protégé exists, but rather that the protégé's level of fear stems from the knowledge of such exit costs to the patron. Figure 3.3 combines the various expectations of states into a decision matrix of coalition participation based on dependency.



Figure 3.3: Decision Matrix of Coalition Participation



\*Status Quo : Does not participate in coalition

### 3.2 Modes of Dependence

So far, the theory has demonstrated that dependent protégés are more likely to participate in military coalitions led by their respective patrons due to their desire to secure the continuation of that relationship into the future. The next question is that of different modes, i.e., types of dependence. Dependence can come in several forms, based on what resources (the means) a state requires from another, and to what end. I build on security and economy as the two broad categories of ends a state pursues. The security of a state is an end that is a direct representation of the ultimate goal of survival, and the growth (or preservation) of its economy is an end translatable towards that goal.

A mode of dependence refers to an externally provided (by a patron state) resource or function that increases, or ensures to maintain, a certain level of one of the two ends of security and economy. For example, where a protégé is highly dependent on a patron's economic aid contributions to keep their economy afloat, the means of economic aid is needed to maintain the end of its economy. Shortly put, the *mode* of dependence in this case, is economic aid. The remainder of this section broadly identifies two modes of economic dependence, and three of security dependence.

The first mode of economic dependence is foreign trade. This is when a protégé relies disproportionately on its patron's market to absorb its output. Imports put money into the hands of others, where exports bring it into domestic hands. The increase of exports over imports then creates a virtuous cycle of growth (Lake, 1988, p. 27). Assuming that states (at the least) act on such mercantilist beliefs, they

should consider themselves more vulnerable to a patron as the portion of their exports to that patron increases.

**H1: When a patron state builds a military coalition, more trade dependent protégés are more likely to participate in a coalition led by that patron.**

Another mode of economic dependence is outright economic aid from a patron to its protégé (Walt, 1987, pp.41-5). A protégé's economy may rely on direct injections of cash and other monetary funds from their patron to function or simply keep afloat. In such cases, the fear of retribution works heavily on protégés to make them 'prove their worth.'<sup>10</sup>

**H2: Protégés receiving higher amounts of direct economic aid from a patron are more likely to participate in a coalition led by that patron.**

In addition to the two modes of economic dependence, there are three modes of security dependence that can be distinguished by how directly it translates into heightened security. Direct security measures are resources or actions of the patron state that directly build the security of a protégé state, and indirect measures are those that build a 'sense' of security.

The most direct way a patron can contribute to the security of a protégé is by donating arms or funneling funds towards the military of a protégé state. Building tanks cost money, and high-end fighter jets even more. If a state depends on their

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<sup>10</sup>This analysis does not address the possibility of 'indirect' dependence of a protégé on a patron through international institutions and brackets the question for future work. It is conceivable that such modes of economic (and security) dependence are not necessarily provided directly from the patron but delivered indirectly through international institutions and organizations (*i.e.* United Nations, International Monetary Fund etc).

own economic resources for acquiring, or building such systems, all is fine. When they rely on funds from others to buy such systems, or even more directly yet, rely on another to give them such systems, they would have to justify the costs to the patron when the instance came up.

**H3: Protégés receiving higher amounts of military aid from a patron are more likely to participate in a coalition led by that patron.**

Security contributions from a patron can be less direct. Alliance agreements between a patron and a protégé do not enhance the immediate security of a protégé *per se*, but does reveal the future intentions of each state regarding their actions in (future) crises. Protégés that rely on the extended deterrent function of these agreements for their security may want to strengthen the reliability of such commitments (secure the actual realization of agreement terms when needed) by participating in patron led coalitions (See Huth and Russett 1988 and Huth 1988 for a more detailed discussion on extended deterrence). The alliance literature has already demonstrated that the reliability of alliances may depend upon the specific type of the alliance itself. Then, it may further be the case that the type and direction of alliance commitments matter for security dependence as well. With regards to the content of the commitment, defensive alliances should have the most direct link to a state's level of security. Alliance commitments may also be asymmetrical in the sense that the direction of promised action may be lopsided. If so, protégés should be more sensitive towards those agreements that commit the action of a patron to the aid of itself when in need, rather than the other way around.

**H4: Protégés receiving defensive alliance commitments from a patron are more**

**likely to participate in a coalition led by that patron than states not receiving such commitments.**

The last mode of security contribution from a patron to a protégé is situated in between the former two with regards to its directness. A patron can elect to station their own military forces within the geographical borders of their protégé in order to either 1) augment the military capability of their protégé (direct security contribution), or 2) to signal the reliability of their alliance commitments by having their troops act as a 'tripwire' that ensure the involvement of the patron in a crisis (indirect security contribution), or serve both purposes. Whichever function(s) such troop deployments serve, it is direct evidence of a protégé's reliance on a patron for security.

**H5: Protégés in which more patron troops are deployed are more likely to participate in patron led coalitions.**

## **4 Other possible determinants and related factors of participation decision**

Most grand theories in international relations do not tailor to states other than the great powers. Most propositions condition themselves by the qualifying statement that 'Major powers will do this,' and 'Great powers will do that.' This is justifiable to the extent that in their objective of addressing major events in the international system, most of the heavy lifting is done by major powers. The question that this

paper asks is the reverse in the sense that it is focused on the decision process of smaller protégé states. The remainder of this section identifies other conventional possible determinants of war participation and additional factors that are not related to dependence but should be considered in the subsequent analysis.

#### **4.1 Geopolitics and Relative Power**

A major characteristic of states is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to manipulate their geographical location. As mentioned while evaluating the contagion effect of alliances, states can't 'pack their bags and move.' Therefore, states are highly attuned to what goes on near their borders and constantly assess the impact such events may have on themselves. Walt (1987) theorized that the origins of alliances themselves were mainly responses by states to balance threats in their region(Walt, 1987, pp. 18-19, 148-172). If it is true that states facing the gravest threats pay disproportionately more than those that do not (in alliances), it can be expected that states more close to a conflict will be more likely to intervene through coalition participation(Bennett et al., 1994, pp. 42-43).

The overall balance of material capabilities in the international system and the impact of relative power plays an important role in the calculations of states' behavior regarding their survival. Within such a system, when one state elects to go to war, it can be perceived as an opportunity for other states in the system to enhance their relative power vis-à-vis that state as the warring state wears its resources out in war. They are in effect, balancing, against the state going to war. If major powers are more considered with the balance of power in the international

system, we can suspect that balancing behavior will be more apparent as the material capability of a state increases. Conversely, if other states expect the benefits of war to outweigh the costs, they wouldn't want to stand-by while the warring state reaps those benefits alone and effectively tilts the balance of power in its favor. In such cases, other states would band-wagon with the warring state, investing accordingly to their available resources to increase the allocation of pay offs.

## **4.2 Regime type and Past Benefits**

In answering the question of why democracies tend to win wars more often than autocracies do, Reiter and Stam (2002) addresses the possibility that democracies inherently share a sense of community, hence leading to a tendency to stand together against individual threats (also see Lai and Reiter 2000). Assuming that victory in war implies that the victor can impose its own regime type on the defeated, states could want to assist a state going to war that is close to its own regime type.

States may also decide to participate in a coalition due to a specific contribution by the coalition leader to itself in the past. More specifically, if the current survival of a state is the direct result of a coalition leader's past action, that state may participate out of some form of obligation to 'pay back' the favor. For example, South Korea often calls the US its 'blood brother,' referring to the fact that the US 'shared in the spilling of blood' during the Korean War.

## 5 Research Design

The US has not only played a dominant role in modern coalition efforts and aid provision, but also holds a distinctive position in the international market. Also, as mentioned in the introduction, the US has predominantly led the most military coalition efforts (8 out of 17) since 1950. The quantitative analysis hence restricts itself to those coalition efforts led by the US after WWII. Conceptually, this restricts the application of findings to the US rather than to major power coalition leaders in general. However, the advantage is that by holding one side of the analysis constant (the US), the analysis is able to attribute the variation in states' participation decisions more strongly to one side, rather than having to also account for changes in the coalition leader. For instance, if state *A* decides to participate in a coalition led by state *B* in war  $w_1$  and then does not in war  $w_2$ , the analysis can address the variation solely in the variables between the two wars, rather than also having to account for changes in the coalition leader.

Based on this decision, the scope of this analysis limits itself to those coalition efforts led by the US, where the universe of cases are; the Korean War (1950–1953), Vietnam War (1965–1975), Gulf War (1990–1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq invasion of 2003.<sup>11</sup> Table 5.1 provides an overview of the resulting six events that consist the scope of the analysis. The following subsections provide brief discussions regarding the variables used in the analysis. Refer to appendix A for a complete discussion of the data and variables.

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<sup>11</sup>The Vietnam War is constructed from 3 separate wars. Refer to appendix A for a discussion of the construction of the Vietnam War and its participants.



Table 5.1: Military Coalitions and Participants

War	Korean		Vietnam		Gulf		Kosovo		Afghanistan		Iraq	
	State/Years		State/Years		State/Years		State/Years		State/Years		State/Years	
Coalition	US	'50-'53	US	'65-'73	US	'91	US	'99	US	2001	US	2003
	Canada	'50-'53	S.Korea	'65-'73	Canada	'91	UK	'99	Canada	2001	UK	2003
	Colombia	'51-'53	Thailand	'67-'73	UK	'91	Netherlands	'99	UK	2001	Australia	2003
	UK	'50-'53	Cambodia	'70-'75	France	'91	France	'99	France	2001		
	Netherlands	'51-'53	Philippines	'66-'73	Italy	'91	Germany	'99	Australia	2001		
	Belgium	'51-'53	Australia	'65-'72	Morocco	'91	Italy	'99				
	France	'51-'53			Egypt	'91	Turkey	'99				
	Greece	'51-'53			Syria	'91						
	Ethiopia	'51-'53			Saudi Arabia	'91						
	Turkey	'50-'53			Qatar	'91						
	Thailand	'51-'53			Oman	'91						
	Philippines	'50-'53			United Arab Emirates	'91						
	Australia	'50-'53										
Opponent	China	'50-'53	Vietnam	'65-'75	Iraq	'90-'91	Yugoslavia	'99	Afghanistan	2001	Iraq	2003
	N.Korea	'50-'53										
Target	S.Korea	'50-'53	S.Vietnam	'65-'75	Kuwait	'90-'91						
			Laos	'68-'73								

## 5.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is coalition participation, *participate*.<sup>12</sup> With exception to the main belligerents already involved in a war and also for those on the opposing side, all states present in the international system at the time a (US led) military coalition is formed can be considered to face a choice of participating or not.

Table 5.2 provides a brief overview of the number of *cases* that are coded as positive outcomes (coalition participating states) from the total number of possible states that could have joined.<sup>13</sup> Coalition participation decision is coded for every year, and not by each conflict. As a conflict progresses, every state is constantly faced with the decision to participate or not. For those states that are already participating, they have the option of pulling their support from the effort. Therefore, the coding scheme increases the number of observations for long and protracted wars such as the Vietnam War. The annual coding of participation does not necessarily bias the results towards more positive outcomes because at the same time, negative observations are being increased by the same factor. Furthermore, it more accurately depicts the data due to late joiners; those states that decide to participate later on in a specific conflict. Due to this coding method, the years of a conflict are only considered when the US is participating. For instance, although the US pulled its troops from the Vietnam War in 1973, the war itself persisted until 1975. Since the theory is focused on the relationship of participating states with the US (the coalition leader), only the years from 1965 to 1973 are observed

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<sup>12</sup>as coded by the CoW Interstate War Data 4.0

<sup>13</sup>This 'pool' of potential participants excludes the target, adversary states, the US itself, and also Japan (due to its constitution's restrictions)(Ameda, 2006).

Table 5.2: Number of Coalition Participating States

	Total Number of States	Participating States
Korean War	313	41
Vietnam War	1,189	42
Gulf War	177	11
Kosovo	188	6
Afghanistan	189	4
Iraq Invasion	190	2

as 'coalition participation' in the data, as opposed to coding additional years that states continued to fight in a war where the US was not present.

## 5.2 Independent Variables

**Trade Dependence.** The variable *tr\_percent* are the exports from a specific state to the US (in a given year) as a percentage of its own national total exports that year. As the percentage reaches one-hundred, the state is considered to be more dependent on the US market for its export industry, and a measure of zero means that it is totally independent of it. From 7,676 observations from 1945 to 2004, the mean is 16.6%. Table 5.3 provides an initial look at the mean measures for states that participated and those that did not.<sup>14</sup> The simple comparison shows that at the aggregate level, states that participated in US led coalitions had exports to the US share a larger portion of their overall exports in the previous than those that did not. However, table 5.4 shows that this only holds true for half of the sample (the Korean, Vietnam wars, and Afghanistan) when broken down by case.

<sup>14</sup>Based on lagged values: if a state participated in a coalition in year  $t$ , the value measure is taken from year  $t-1$ .

Table 5.3: Mean U.S. Export Shares : All Cases

Mean Percentage of Exports to US	
Non-Participants	16.7
Participants	26.2

Table 5.4: Mean U.S. Export Shares: by Case

	War					
	Korean	Vietnam	Gulf	Kosovo	Afghanistan	Iraq
Non-Participants	28.4	14.9	15.5	15.9	16.3	15.9
Participants	36.2	22.6	13.0	0.96	29.2	12.8

**Economic Aid Dependence.** The variable *econaid\_gdp* is the total amount of direct economic aid a state receives from the US as a percentage of its gross domestic product.<sup>15</sup> Tables 5.5 and 5.6 are initial looks at what the mean values of these percentages are for participant and non-participant states.<sup>16</sup> Similar to export ratios, the overall means in table 5.5 show that coalition participating states tend to have had US economic aid share a larger portion of their GDP in the year before participation. It can also be seen that when broken down by case, the results seem to be largely driven by the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Table 5.5: Mean Economic Aid as Percentage of GDP : All Cases

Mean Economic Aid as Percentage of GDP	
Non-Participants	0.488
Participants	1.113

**Military Aid Dependence.** Military aid(*militaryaid\_expend*) is the amount of US

<sup>15</sup>Both values in constant US dollars.

<sup>16</sup>As was with the case for trade ratios, one year lags were used for this initial comparison.

Table 5.6: Mean Economic Aid as Percentage of GDP : by Case

	War					
	Korean	Vietnam	Gulf	Kosovo	Afghanistan	Iraq
Non-Participants	0.69	0.584	0.544	0.269	0.232	0.242
Participants	1.062	1.768	0.14	0.000	0	0

military aid to a state as a percentage of its own military expenditures.<sup>17</sup> Tables 5.7 and 5.8 depict the mean values for participant and non-participant states in general, and across cases. In step with the pattern the former two variables have established, the mean value of participant states greatly surpasses that of non-participants in the aggregate, but differs greatly from case by case.

Table 5.7: Mean Military Aid as Percentage of Expenditures : All Cases

Mean Military Aid as Percentage of Expenditures	
Non-Participants	4.878
Participants	76.012

Table 5.8: Mean Military Aid as Percentage of Expenditures : by Case

	War					
	Korean	Vietnam	Gulf	Kosovo	Afghanistan	Iraq
Non-Participants	9.904	5.308	3.227	2.713	1.549	2.867
Participants	48.799	138.411	8.549	0.011	0.000	0.000

**Troop Deployments.** Troop deployments (*troops\_k*) are the annual number of US troops (by the thousands) deployed to a country. Initial comparisons are listed in tables 5.9 and 5.10.<sup>18</sup> The (mean of) troop numbers stationed in participant states

<sup>17</sup>One year lagged values and both amounts in current US dollars.

<sup>18</sup>Means are calculated excluding states fighting on the opposite side of the US, and the target of the initial aggression, e.g., South Korea in the Korean War, South Vietnam in the Vietnam War etc.

are both greater for the aggregate as well as for each case.

Table 5.9: Mean number of US Troops stationed: All Cases

Mean number of US Troops stationed (thousands)	
Non-Participants	1.75
Participants	14.0

Table 5.10: Stationed Number of US Troops (thousands) : by Case

	War					
	Korean	Vietnam	Gulf	Kosovo	Afghanistan	Iraq
Non-Participants	3.42	1.55	2.28	0.67	1.22	1.53
Participants	7.14	26.09	4.84	15.24	3.09	6.1

**Alliance Commitments.** The variable *def\_frm* is a dichotomous measure of the existence of an alliance between a state and the US in which the US specifically has a commitment to defend the state. The direction of the defensive commitment is hence from the US towards the state. Table 5.11 provides an initial comparison of the fraction of participating and non-participating states that had such alliance agreements one year prior to their involvement/non-involvement in each year the US was fighting with a coalition.

Table 5.11: Portion of States with Alliance Agreements w/ US

defense_from	
Non-Participants	0.317
Participants	0.651

### 5.3 Control Variables

**Distance and Material Power.** The variable *dist\_k* is the distance (in thousands of kilometers) between the capital of any given state, and that of the state in which the coalition is acting within. The overall material capabilities of a state are measured through the variable *cinc*, which is the share of those capabilities a state holds among all others in the international system. Table 5.12 are the mean values of this score from 1945 to 2004.<sup>19</sup> The top 10 states that were still present in 2004 is reported. Among these states, the United Kingdom(UK), Germany, France and Italy have all participated in US led coalitions, with the UK participating five times out of the six cases considered.

Table 5.12: Mean Material Capability Shares (1945-2004)

Mean CINC Share	
US	0.19
Russia	0.14
China	0.12
India	0.05
Japan	0.05
United Kingdom	0.04
Germany	0.03
France	0.03
Brazil	0.02
Italy	0.02

**Democracies and Past Beneficiaries.** Democracy (*democ\_p4*) is a continuous measure of a state's institutionalized democracy on an 11 point scale ranging from 0 to 10. The US is consistently ranked as a 10 on this scale, meaning that the higher any

<sup>19</sup>Refer to appendix B for a brief discussion of CINC scores over time.

other state ranks on this scale, the closer they are to the US' regime type.

The variable *prevben* is a dichotomous indicator of if the state was protected by previous US intervention. For instance, South Korea is coded 1 for every year after the end of the Korean War. Although the scope of the analysis is after 1950, beneficiary states were also measured for WWII.<sup>20</sup>

## 6 Results and Discussion

The analysis pools all the wars together and runs a logit model by accounting for each case with dummy variables.<sup>21</sup> All independent variables were lagged two years, and control variables held at their current values.<sup>22</sup> Table 6.1 reports the marginal effects along with 95% confidence intervals.<sup>23</sup>

The marginal change in probabilities of participation for all the control variables (distance, material capability, level of democracy, and previous history with the US) are in their respectively expected directions. *Ceteris paribus*, states geographically farther from the dispute location are less likely to participate in US led military coalitions. For every 1000 kilometer increase between their state capitol and that of the state within which the military coalition is primarily acting within, the

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<sup>20</sup>The criteria for inclusion was as follows: 1) The state must have been engaged in WWII *before* the engagement of the US in 1941. (hence excluding China, the Soviet Union etc.) 2) The state has to have been positioned on continental Europe. (hence excluding Australia, Canada etc.)

<sup>21</sup>Target and aggressor states that are the primary actors of the war are excluded from each case, as well as Japan for all cases due to article 9 of its constitution restricting the deployment of its armed forces abroad.

<sup>22</sup>Refer to appendix A for a brief discussion on the use of lagged values

<sup>23</sup>Odds ratios from the logit regression along with standard errors are provided in table B.1 in appendix B.



Table 6.1: Marginal Change in Probability of Participation

	marginal effects
L2.tr_percent	0.001 (0.000 - 0.001)
L2.econaid_gdp	-0.002 (-0.015 - 0.010)
L2.militaryaid_expend	0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)
L.def_frm	0.065 (0.039 - 0.091)
L2.troops_k	0.001 (0.001 - 0.002)
dist_k	-0.013 (-0.017 - -0.010)
cinc	0.156 (-0.514 - 0.827)
democ_p4	0.002 (-0.001 - 0.005)
prevben	0.016 (-0.010 - 0.042)
Observations	1,307

*95% ci in parentheses*

probability of their participation decreases by approximately 1.3%. States with a larger share of overall global material capability, more democratic states, and previous benefactors of US intervention are more likely to participate, albeit the lack of evidence make the effects of these latter three controls inconclusive.<sup>24</sup>


More importantly, the analysis provides support for certain modes of dependence within each of the broad fields of both economy and security. For economic dependence, the marginal effect of trade dependence on coalition participation

<sup>24</sup>Tables and figures of the marginal effects of the control variables are further provided in appendix B.

probability is positive, and two modes of security dependence are in their hypothesized directions as well. The remainder of this section discusses each independent variable of interest.

Trade dependence, measured as the percentage of exports to the US among all exports (*tr\_percent*), has a positive effect on a state's probability of joining a US led military coalition. Figure 6.1 shows the predictive marginal probabilities of coalition participation by trade dependence, and table 6.2 list the actual probabilities.

Figure 6.1: Trade Dependence and Probability of Participation  
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals



The results show that as export shares to the US increase as a portion of a state's total exports, a state has a higher probability of coalition participation. The

Table 6.2: Percentage US Exports: Predictive Margins

% US Exports	Pr
0	0.041 (0.028 - 0.054)
10	0.048 (0.037 - 0.059)
20	0.056 (0.046 - 0.066)
30	0.065 (0.051 - 0.078)
40	0.075 (0.054 - 0.095)
50	0.086 (0.055 - 0.116)
60	0.098 (0.055 - 0.141)
70	0.112 (0.054 - 0.170)
80	0.127 (0.051 - 0.203)
90	0.144 (0.047 - 0.241)
100	0.163 (0.043 - 0.283)
Observations	1,307
95% ci in parentheses	

reported marginal effect from table 6.1 is .001, meaning that a 1% increase in the share of exports to the US among all exports is *ceteris paribus* associated with a .001 increase in a state's probability of joining a US led coalition. The margins reported in table 6.2 account for the probability of participation by 10% intervals for a more direct look at the magnitude of this effect. For instance, a state that is highly independent of the US with regards to its exports (dependence 0) has a .041 probability of participating. In contrast, a state that exports 50% of their exports to the US is two times more likely to participate with a probability of .086. When comparing a state that is totally dependent on the US market for its exports (exports to US 100%) to that of a totally independent one, we can observe that the predicted probability increases nearly four-fold from .041 to .163. The results are in accordance with the first hypothesis regarding economic dependence that states more trade dependent on a patron building a coalition are more likely to participate.

The other mode of economic dependence, direct economic aid, lacks the evidence to state the findings with any statistical confidence. However, it is still interesting to find that the marginal change in probability of participation due to economic aid as a percentage of GDP is negative. In other words, for each 10% increase in the amount US aid relative to a state's GDP, the probability that it would participate decreases by .02. It may be the case that states requiring such large sums of direct economic aid from the US (relative to their own GDP) are simply inadequately equipped to be of any significant assistance to a military coalition

effort.<sup>25</sup>

The results for two modes of security dependence are in their expected directions. Albeit not necessarily negative, the marginal effect for military aid as a percentage of a state's military expenditures not only lacks the statistical significance for any conclusive statement, but is also essentially 0.

States that are the recipients of defensive alliance commitments from the US are more likely to participate in US led military coalitions than those that do not. Table 6.3 reports the probability of participation according to the existence of a defensive commitment from the US.

Table 6.3: Alliance Commitments: Predictive Margins


def_frm*	Pr
No(0)	0.024 (0.012 - 0.036)
Yes(1)	0.099 (0.069 - 0.128)
Observations	1,307
<i>95% ci in parentheses</i>	
<i>*US has defensive commitment to state</i>	

While states that are not receiving a defensive commitment from the US are predicted to participate in a US led coalition with a probability of .02, nearly 1 out of 10 states that do are predicted to participate. In other words, on average, states that have a defensive commitment from the US are approximately 5 times

<sup>25</sup>Not only does the confidence interval indicate that the effect could be between  $-.015$  and  $.01$ , the reported marginal effect changes direction in additional analyses as well. None of the alternate measures of direct economic aid result in any statistically significant results, precluding further discussion. Refer to appendix B, table B.1 for the results of the additional analyses.

more likely to participate in a US led coalition than those that do not have such commitments. Another result for security dependence that is in accordance with expectations is that for the number of US troops deployed(stationed) in a country. Figure 6.2 shows the probability of participation across states, according to their differing levels of US troops deployed.

Figure 6.2: US troops and Probability of Participation  
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals



The increase is strictly positive, evidencing that states with more US troops are more likely to participate. Table 6.4 reports the predictive margins in 10 thousand troop intervals.

The increase in probability of participation from .06 to .204 for states with ten

Table 6.4: Deployed US troops (thousands): Predictive Margins

troops*	Pr
0	0.045 (0.034 - 0.056)
10	0.060 (0.048 - 0.072)
20	0.079 (0.058 - 0.100)
30	0.102 (0.064 - 0.140)
40	0.130 (0.068 - 0.193)
50	0.164 (0.069 - 0.259)
60	0.204 (0.069 - 0.338)
70	0.249 (0.070 - 0.429)
Observations	1,307
<i>95% ci in parentheses</i>	
<i>US troops deployed(thousands)</i>	

thousand US troops and sixty thousand troops, respectively, deployed on their soil is quite drastic. If US troops were meant to augment the actual force of a state's military, the fact that those in need of more such additional forces are willing to send out their own troops to aid in a US led military coalition elsewhere is quite contradictory. This lends more credibility to the possibility that increased numbers of US troops on foreign soil is an indicator of a higher level of US commitment, and that those states who receive higher commitments from the US are more dependent on the US for their security, hence leading to the need to secure those commitments

by participating in US led coalitions.

## 7 Conclusion and Extensions

I suggest three possible extensions for immediate future work. The first is to determine if states are justified in acting in this manner. Focusing on participating and non-participating states, a change in their trade flows with a patron after a coalition event should provide justification if patrons actually reward participation or punish non-participation. Second, the participants measured in this analysis are admittedly not *all* participants but only those that qualify as the dataset requires. However, non-combatant forces and small numbers of forces are still a level of participation higher than no reaction at all. Building data that captures this continuous measure of low to high participation should enable a richer analysis, that demonstrates differing levels of dependence corresponding to differing levels of participation. Finally, in addition to quantitative work, in depth case studies should demonstrate that states actually base their decisions on such considerations as laid out in figure 3.3.

Recalling the question this paper started out with, it may no longer be such a surprise that South Korea participated in the Vietnam War but not in Afghanistan. In 1963, two years prior to its participation, South Korea's military expenditures were almost a third of its hostile neighbor to the north.<sup>26</sup> This made South Korea highly reliant on the security commitment from the US. In addition to such security

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<sup>26</sup>North Korea spent 280,000,000 dollars in contrast to South Korea's budget of 100,081,000. In 1999, the spending is vastly reversed, at 2,100,000,000 and 12,088,000,000, respectively.



dependence, over a third of its exports went to the US. In 1999, two years prior to Afghanistan, it sent a fifth of its exports to the US, and its military expenditures were more than five times that of the North.

This paper has argued that higher levels of dependence lead states to participate in military coalitions led by their respective patrons. The empirical analysis suggests that this is partly driven by both economic and security related dependence. However, both categories suggest that indirect connections between the patron and protégé (trade dependence, alliance commitments, and stationed troops) have a stronger effect than direct aid (Walt, 1987, pp. 41-5, 268-69). Although the limited scope of the analysis bars broad generalizations at this stage, the initial implications for US policy, at the least, is intriguing. It provides a hint towards who the US should ask to participate in future military coalitions and how it could implicitly pressure states to do so.

## Appendix A Methodology

### A.1 Data

#### A.1.1 Military Coalition Participation

The source data for the dichotomous indication of participation in a war is taken from the Correlates of War project(CoW)'s Inter-State War Data Version 4.0. According to their codebook, the criteria for a state to be considered to have participated in a war are 1) the state must have committed 1,000 or more troops to the war, or 2) it must suffered 100 or more battle related deaths.

The Laotian War and Communist Coalition were collapsed and combined into the Vietnam War due to concerns that the temporal and geographical scope of the former two events do not make them independent from the latter. By collapsing these events into one, South Vietnam's participation in the Laotian effort is discarded due to the fact that it was already involved in the Vietnam War as an initial target in 1965, three years prior to its participant as a coalition member in the Laotian effort in 1968. Conversely, although Cambodia is coded as the initial target of aggression in the Communist Coalition in 1970, the observation as a coalition participant in the Vietnam War is retained since the observation coincides temporally. Tables A.1, A.2, A.3 provide a look at how the three wars were coded in the original dataset and table A.4 is the collapsed version used in the analysis. The US and their respective military coalition participants are coded as side *a* of each war and states that were the initial target of the opposing side(side *b*) are distinguished with an asterisk.

Table A.1: Vietnam War(Phase II) Participants

Vietnam War(Phase II)		
Side	State	Years
a	United States of America	'65-'73
a	South Korea	'65-'73
a	Thailand	'67-'73
a	Cambodia	'70-'75
a	Philippines	'66-'73
a	Australia	'65-'72
a*	South Vietnam	'65-'75
b	Vietnam	'65-'75

Table A.2: Laotian War Participants

Second Laotian, Phase II		
Side	State	Years
a	United States of America	'68-'73
a	Thailand	'70-'73
a*	Laos	'68-'73
b	Vietnam	'68-'73

The limited nature of this project has little to say about the determinants of why states go to war with *each other* initially. Rather, the focus is on why states participate in wars led by others. Therefore, initial targets and opposing forces are excluded from the analysis. For instance, although South Korea fought in the Korean War, and South Vietnam fought in the Vietnam War, they were the subjects of initial aggression by the opposing side, and hence were not faced with the decision of whether they should participate in the US led coalition. Therefore, all states that are classified as either opponents or targets are dropped from the possible pool of participants for the respective years that the US is engaged in the event. For

Table A.3: Cambodian War Participants

Communist Coalition		
Side	State	Years
a	United States of America	'70-'71
a	South Vietnam	'70-'71
a*	Cambodia	'70-'71
b	Vietnam	'70-'71

Table A.4: Vietnam Participants – Constructed

Communist Coalition		
Side	State	Years
a	United States of America	'65-'73
a	South Korea	'65-'73
a	Thailand	'67-'73
a	Cambodia	'70-'75
a	Philippines	'66-'73
a	Australia	'65-'72
a*	South Vietnam	'65-'75
a*	Laos	'68-'73
b	Vietnam	'65-'75

example, observations for China, and North and South Korea are dropped from the years 1950 through 1953.

### A.1.2 Trade

Trade statistics are constructed using the CoW Project Dyadic Trade Data Version 3.0. This dataset provides trade statistics (in current millions of US dollars) between states in the international system as defined by the Correlates of War(CoW)

Project.<sup>27</sup>

Annual exports to the US by each state are straight-forwardly from the dataset itself, and annual total exports by a state are constructed by summing all exports for a state in a given year, according to all the dyads containing that state. The measures for mainland China include the trade figures of Macao and Hong Kong after those respective areas were unified in 1998. Also, I follow the original project's logic in taking the ratio values for pre-1996 values of Belgium and Luxembourg.<sup>28</sup>

### A.1.3 Aid Data and GDP

US economic and military aid data is originally provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).<sup>29</sup> The dataset (informally known as the Greenbook) contains data of US government foreign assistance since 1945 and is updated annually.

Although the data is arranged in country-year format, it should be noted that this 'year' actually refers to fiscal years, running from October 1 to September 30, designated by the year in which it ends. For example, the aid amount reported for 1980 for any given country would actually be accounting for the aid provided to that country from October 1st, 1979 to September 30th, 1980. There is a further complication as the fiscal year prior to 1977 was calculated from July 1 the previous year to June 30th of that year. Hence, the original Greenbook data accounts the gap

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<sup>27</sup>The criteria are 1) prior to 1920 the entity must have a population greater than 500,000 and have had diplomatic missions at or above the rank of charge d'affaires with Britain and France, 2) after 1920, the entity must be a member of the United Nations or League of Nations, or have a population greater than 500,000 and receive diplomatic missions from two major powers.

<sup>28</sup>Refer to p. 4 of the respective dataset's codebook for a discussion on this topic.

<sup>29</sup><https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/data/prepared.cfm>

from June 30th, 1976 to October 1st, 1976 as a separate observation denoted 1976tq.  
30

In using this data, this analysis makes two judgement calls: 1) It does not differentiate between the differences made in fiscal year calculations before and after 1977; 2) The separate observations accounting for the change in fiscal year calculations are combined into the 1976 observations.

The main measure of gross domestic product comes from the Penn World Table(PWT) version 8.0. Among the variables provided by the PWT8.0, the analysis uses *rgdp-na*; real GDP from national-account growth rates (in constant US dollars). An alternate measure of GDP from Eichengreen and Leblang (2008), is used in alternate models (also in constant US dollars).<sup>31</sup>

#### A.1.4 US Troops

Annual US troop deployment numbers by country are provided by the Heritage Foundation. The dataset is compiled from original annual reports from the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) of the Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR) in the U.S. Department of Defense. U.S. troop deployments by year and country.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>The USAID website provides a more detailed discussion regarding these issues and other frequently asked questions at [https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/about/reporting\\_concepts.cfm#time](https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/about/reporting_concepts.cfm#time)

<sup>31</sup>The scope of the data in the Penn World Table is from 1950 to 2011. While the years correspond to the scope of events this project is concerned with (the earliest event is the US involvement in the Korean War in 1950), it is problematic for measuring *lagged* economic indicators that need to be normalized by GDP. Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) use multiple sources to expand GDP data back to years as far back as 1870.

<sup>32</sup>Original source data at [www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/reports.do?category=reports&subCat=pubs](http://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/reports.do?category=reports&subCat=pubs)

### A.1.5 US Defensive Commitments

Among the six variants of the Formal Interstate Military Alliance data (Version 4.1) available from the CoW project, the data formatted in directed-yearly format is used. This format includes observations for each allied directed dyad–year. That is, provided that state  $a$  and  $b$  have an alliance agreement for any given year  $t$ , there are two sets of observations for that year where one set records the obligations  $a$  has to  $b$  in year  $t$ , and the other for the obligations  $b$  has to  $a$  in that same year (Gibler, 2013, p. 4).

Among the specific commitments provided, the variable *defense* (country signed a defense pact to protect the other) is used as the variable *def\_frm* in the analysis here (Gibler, 2013, p. 4). The dichotomous measures are coded 1 or 0 based on if the commitment exists or not.

### A.1.6 Distance

Capital distances between states were derived from the CShapes R package (Weidmann et al., 2010).<sup>33</sup> The variable *dist\_k* is the distance (in thousands of kilometers) between the capital of any given state, and that of the state in which the coalition is acting within. For the cases of the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf War, the latter refers to South Korea, South Vietnam, and Kuwait. For the Afghanistan War, Iraq War and Kosovo, it refers to the respective states.

An alternate measure of distance comes from the ordered categorical variable (*conttype\_target*), which is provided by the CoW project direct contiguity dataset

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<sup>33</sup>Package and code available at <http://nils.weidmann.ws/projects/cshapes/r-package>

version 3.1. The contiguity types are provided in table A.5 for reference. The last category, 6, is added for the purposes of this analysis.<sup>34</sup> This additional variable is used as an alternative of *dist\_k* in alternate analyses.

Table A.5: Coding of Contiguity

Code	
1	shares a direct land or river border
2	less than 12 miles
3	less than 24 miles
4	less than 150 miles
5	less than 400 miles
6*	farther than 400 miles

### A.1.7 Material Power, Military Spending, and Population

State material capability share, military spending (in current US dollars), and total population are from the CoW Project National Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0. The original dataset contains annual cross section data for six measures of a state's raw material capability (total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditures, primary energy consumption, and iron and steel production), and a Composite Index of National Capability (*cinc*) score by summing the six measures of material capability (in any given year) and then converting that to a share of the international system.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup>Refer to Hensel (2007) for a description of the data and categories.

<sup>35</sup>Refer to the dataset's codebook, National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0, for detailed descriptions of each variable.



### A.1.8 Democracy

Democracy data is from the democracy scores provided by annual time-series formatted version of the Polity IV Project's Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset (2013 version). The variable *democ* provides a continuous measure of a state's institutionalized democracy on an 11 point scale ranging from 0 to 10 (Marshall et al., 2014). Extensive explanations of how the institutionalized democracy index is constructed can be further found in their Users' Manual.

Due to conceptual differences and debates in defining and measuring democracy, a dichotomous measure of regime type is also incorporated as an alternate measure from Boix et al. (2012). According to Boix et al. (2012, pp. 5, 8-12), democracies are classified by thresholds set in the two dimensions of political contestation and participation. Version 2.0 of the data set provides measures of democracy (0 non-democracy and 1 democracy) for 219 countries in the period of 1800–2010.

### A.1.9 Past Beneficiaries

The variable *prevben* is constructed from the CoW project Inter-State War Data Version 4.0. It is a dichotomous indicator of if a state had benefitted from previous US military intervention starting with WWII. For instance, South Korea is coded 1 for every year after the end of the Korean War. States that benefitted from US involvement in WWII were coded by the following criteria: 1) The state must have been engaged in WWII before the engagement of the US in 1941 (hence excluding China, the Soviet Union etc.), 2) The state had to have been positioned on continental Europe (hence excluding Australia, Canada etc.).

## A.2 Lagged Values

The main analysis uses two-year lagged values of the independent variables. This is to account for the planning phase of military operations and the possibility that a war starts toward the earlier portion of a year. According to the theory then, the substantive meaning is that a state decides to participate in a US led coalition starting in year  $t$  based on their values of  $x_i$  of year  $t - 2$  (where  $x_i$  is an independent variable of interest). An alternate analysis without the use of lagged values is provided in appendix B, and the change does not significantly affect the results.

## Appendix B Additional Analyses, Tables, and Figures

### B.1 Additional Analyses

The resulting odds ratios of additional analyses using alternate measures of the concepts of interest are presented along with the originally designed analysis in table B.1. Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals of each model is reported in table B.2. Model 1 is the originally designed logit model using two-year lagged values for the independent variables *tr\_percent*, *econaid\_gdp*, *militaryaid\_expend*, *def\_frm*, *troops\_k*, and non-lagged measures for the control variables of *dist\_k*, *cinc*, *democ\_p4*, and *prevben*.

Model 2 is the same model as the first, except without the use of any lagged values. Subsequent models replace specific variables with their alternate measures to address conceptually debated measures of variables or differences in the coverage of data. The changes made in each model in comparison to model 1 and reasons thereof are listed below:

**M1:** Base model

**M2:** No lags for independent variables

**M3:** Alternate GDP measure from Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) used to normalize US economic aid due to scope of available data (*econaid\_gdp* → *econaid\_gdp2*)

**M4:** Categorical contiguity used in place of capital distance to address possibility that absolute distance between borders are more relevant (*dist\_k* →

*conttype\_target*)

**M5:** Total population used as measure of state size in place of material capability due to concern that state capability should be measured with absolute concept rather than the relative nature of CINC scores(*cinc* → *tpop*)

**M6:** No normalization of US economic/military aid with GDP/military expenditures (*econaid\_gdp* → *econ\_aid\_constant*; *militaryaid\_expend* → *mil\_aid\_constant*)

Table B.1: Logit Regression Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L2.tr_percent	1.027*		1.026*	1.007	1.027*	1.033*
	(0.010)		(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)
L2.econaid_gdp	0.927			0.933	0.951	
	(0.205)			(0.133)	(0.208)	
L2.militaryaid_expend	1.001		1.001	1.013*	1.000	
	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
L.def_frm	9.130*		10.778*	3.216*	8.418*	8.081*
	(4.142)		(4.896)	(1.409)	(3.838)	(3.509)
L2.troops_k	1.049*		1.072*	1.085*	1.053*	1.050*
	(0.014)		(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
dist_k	0.637*	0.646*	0.640*		0.628*	0.636*
	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.039)		(0.040)	(0.037)
cinc	203.409	6300.639	15.048	98.836		0.242
	(2367.406)	(56111.916)	(150.355)	(1014.076)		(2.763)
democ_p4	1.086		1.108*	1.075	1.096	1.092
	(0.058)		(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.059)	(0.053)
prevben	1.727	2.083	1.285	1.313	1.758	1.871
	(0.788)	(0.839)	(0.611)	(0.602)	(0.793)	(0.836)
tr_percent		1.024*				
		(0.009)				
econaid_gdp		1.047				
		(0.115)				
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮

*se in parentheses*

\* p&lt;0.05

Table B.1: Logit Regression Results (*cont.*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
militaryaid_expend		1.004 (0.004)				
def_frm		8.970* (3.725)				
troops_k		1.033* (0.012)				
democ_brm		1.132 (0.441)				
L2.econaid_gdp2			1.050 (0.141)			
conttype_target				0.551* (0.089)		
tpop					1.000 (0.000)	
L2.econ_aid_constant						1.000 (0.000)
L2.mil_aid_constant						1.000 (0.000)
Observations	1,307	1,462	1,495	1,307	1,307	1,545

*se in parentheses*

\*  $p < 0.05$

Table B.2: Marginal Effects  
with 95% confidence intervals

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L2.tr_percent	0.001 (0.000 - 0.001)		0.001 (0.000 - 0.001)	0.000 (-0.000 - 0.001)	0.001 (0.000 - 0.001)	0.001 (0.000 - 0.001)
L2.econaid_gdp	-0.002 (-0.015 - 0.010)			-0.002 (-0.012 - 0.007)	-0.001 (-0.014 - 0.011)	
L2.militaryaid_expend	0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)		0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)	0.000 (0.000 - 0.001)	-0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)	
L.def_frm	0.065 (0.039 - 0.091)		0.062 (0.039 - 0.085)	0.041 (0.010 - 0.072)	0.062 (0.037 - 0.088)	0.056 (0.033 - 0.078)
L2.troops_k	0.001 (0.001 - 0.002)		0.002 (0.001 - 0.003)	0.003 (0.002 - 0.004)	0.002 (0.001 - 0.002)	0.001 (0.001 - 0.002)
dist_k	-0.013 (-0.017 - -0.010)	-0.015 (-0.018 - -0.011)	-0.012 (-0.015 - -0.008)		-0.014 (-0.017 - -0.010)	-0.012 (-0.015 - -0.009)
cinc	0.156 (-0.514 - 0.827)	0.300 (-0.298 - 0.897)	0.070 (-0.437 - 0.578)	0.162 (-0.547 - 0.871)		-0.038 (-0.634 - 0.558)
democ_p4	0.002 (-0.001 - 0.005)		0.003 (0.000 - 0.005)	0.003 (-0.001 - 0.006)	0.003 (-0.000 - 0.006)	0.002 (-0.000 - 0.005)
prevben	0.016 (-0.010 - 0.042)	0.025 (-0.002 - 0.052)	0.007 (-0.018 - 0.031)	0.010 (-0.022 - 0.041)	0.017 (-0.009 - 0.042)	0.017 (-0.007 - 0.040)
tr_percent		0.001 (0.000 - 0.001)				
econaid_gdp		0.002 (-0.006 - 0.009)				
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮

95% ci in parentheses

Table B.2: Marginal Effects (*cont.*)  
with 95% confidence intervals

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
∴	∴	∴	∴	∴	∴	∴
militaryaid_expend		0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)				
def_frm		0.075 (0.048 - 0.102)				
troops_k		0.001 (0.000 - 0.002)				
democ_brm		0.004 (-0.022 - 0.030)				
L2.econaid_gdp2			0.001 (-0.006 - 0.008)			
conttype_target				-0.021 (-0.033 - -0.009)		
tpop					-0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)	
L2.econ_aid_constant						0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)
L2.mil_aid_constant						0.000 (-0.000 - 0.000)
Observations	1,307	1,462	1,495	1,307	1,307	1,545


95% ci in parentheses



## B.2 Additional Tables and Figures

The material capability shares in table 5.12 are the mean values for each state during the years 1945–2004. Figure B.1 depicts the change in CINC scores for the three states with the the highest means during that same time period.

Figure B.1: Material Capability Shares  
US, Russia, and China (1945–2004)



In using CINC as an indicator of national material capability, it would be mistaken to view the values as absolute capability amounts. By definition, CINC scores are relative in nature; it is measuring how much a share of the pie a state has, rather than the absolute size of its piece of pie. The main analysis uses the

CINC scores because it built on the assumption that states are interested in relative, not absolute, power (refer to section 4.1). In order to address possible contention to this assumption, model 5 in table B.1 uses absolute values of total population in place of CINC scores.

The remainder of this appendix provides tables and figures of the predicted probabilities of participation (of model 1) by each of the variables not discussed in depth in the main results section.

Table B.3: Previous US Intervention and Probability of Participation: Predictive Margins

prev_ben*	Pr
no(0)	0.052 (0.041 - 0.063)
yes(1)	0.069 (0.043 - 0.096)
Observations	1,307
95% ci in parentheses	
<i>*previously benefitted from US intervention</i>	

Table B.4: Economic Aid Dependence:  
Predictive Margins

econ aid*	Pr
0	0.057 (0.046 - 0.067)
6	0.044 (-0.014 - 0.103)
12	0.034 (-0.064 - 0.133)
18	0.026 (-0.093 - 0.146)
24	0.020 (-0.106 - 0.146)
30	0.015 (-0.108 - 0.138)
36	0.011 (-0.103 - 0.125)
Observations	1,307

95% ci in parentheses  
\*Economic aid as % of GDP

Figure B.2: Economic Aid Dependence and Probability of  
Participation  
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals




Table B.5: Military Aid Dependence:  
Predictive Margins

mil aid*	Pr
0	0.055 (0.044 - 0.066)
50	0.057 (0.044 - 0.070)
100	0.059 (0.034 - 0.084)
150	0.062 (0.021 - 0.102)
200	0.064 (0.007 - 0.120)
250	0.066 (-0.008 - 0.140)
Observations	1,307

95% ci in parentheses

\*Military aid as % of own expenditure

Figure B.3: Military Aid Dependence and Probability of  
Participation  
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals




Table B.6: Capital Distance: Predictive Margins

distance*	Pr
0	0.328 (0.243 - 0.414)
5	0.121 (0.091 - 0.150)
10	0.032 (0.021 - 0.043)
15	0.005 (0.001 - 0.010)
20	0.001 (-0.000 - 0.001)
Observations	1,307

95% ci in parentheses  
\*thousands of kilometers

Figure B.4: Capital Distance and Probability of Participation  
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals




Table B.7: National Material Capability(CINC): Predictive Margins

cinc*	Pr
0	0.054 (0.043 - 0.066)
.03	0.059 (0.042 - 0.076)
.06	0.064 (0.025 - 0.103)
.09	0.070 (0.004 - 0.135)
.12	0.075 (-0.020 - 0.171)
.15	0.082 (-0.048 - 0.211)
.18	0.088 (-0.080 - 0.257)
Observations	1,307

95% ci in parentheses

\*relative national material capability share

Figure B.5: National Material Capability and Probability of Participation  
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals





Table B.8: Democracy and Probability of Participation: Predictive Margins

democ	Pr
0	0.042 (0.025 - 0.059)
2	0.046 (0.033 - 0.060)
4	0.051 (0.040 - 0.062)
6	0.055 (0.046 - 0.065)
8	0.060 (0.049 - 0.072)
10	0.066 (0.049 - 0.082)
Observations	1,307

95% ci in parentheses  
 \*PolityIV democracy score

Figure B.6: Democracy and Probability of Participation  
 Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals



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