Playing for Profit: Staging Self-interest in Early Modern England

Lucia I. Alden
Charlottesville, VA

BA, McGill University, 2017
MSt, University of Oxford, 2018

A dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia
in Candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of English

The University of Virginia

December, 2023

Katharine Maus

Michael Suarez

Lukas Erne

Max Edelson

Contents

ABSTRACT

My dissertation, *Playing for Profit: Staging Self-interest in Early Modern England*, uses the works of Christopher Marlowe, Ben Jonson, William Shakespeare, and Thomas Middleton to examine conflicting conceptions of self-interest in early modern drama. My research combines economic, theater, and book historical methodologies with close literary analysis to examine how the playwrights responded to London's growing markets in their works and career decisions. Scholarship has long highlighted the financial *rhetoric* employed in early modern texts. Yet, scholars have rarely stopped to question the economic ideologies undergirding this moneyed language or how understanding the early moderns' shifting economic perspectives can enhance our knowledge of the texts produced. Examining these works from the vantage point of social and economic exchange illuminates the dramatists' divergent stances on individual choice, agency, and humanity's capacity for cooperation. Necessitating a close engagement with questions of genre, commerce, and law, my dissertation challenges current scholarship by redefining the relationships between competing dramatists, the texts produced, and the producers and consumers of those works.

The first chapter of my dissertation juxtaposes Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta* with Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* to elucidate the authors' contradictory conceptions of self-interest and human networks. With no reliable rule of law in Malta, order can only be regained through the reimposition of an inflexible tyrant, offering a grim picture of human cooperation. In *Merchant*, however, the maintenance of a reliable legal system and codified property rights allows citizens to reach more horizontal solutions through legal negotiation and exchange. Chapter 2 follows the political actions of Duke Vincentio and Prince Hal to posit that Shakespeare viewed self-interest as a positive force that could create socially beneficial solutions when harnessed appropriately. The chapter places Shakespeare and Adam Smith on the same intellectual trajectory

by arguing that the seeds of Smith's impartial spectator are already present in Shakespeare's Duke Vincentio. Chapter 3 focuses on Shakespeare's unique position as house playwright, shareholder, and investor in The Globe. I analyze how his personal investments shaped his approach to risk and reward, community engagement, and social welfare as seen in his sympathetic but pragmatic portrayal of the Cade rebellion in *Henry VI, part 2*. The final chapter explores Jonson's cynical view of self-interest, tracing his persistent rejection of the commodification of playtexts and vilification of greed throughout his corpus, particularly in *Volpone* and *Bartholomew Fair*. I contrast Jonson's repudiation of commercialization with Middleton's enthusiastic embrace of the commodified play, marshalling the exceptional theatrical history of *A Game at Chess* to illustrate Middleton's commercial savvy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have always had an aversion to long-winded acknowledgements, but dissertations take a village, so here we are. I owe my deepest gratitude to my committee for their guidance and feedback throughout the drafting process. Their expertise was invaluable and this document would not exist in its current state without their careful annotations and generous intellectual labor. A similar debt is owed to all the incredible academic mentors at American University, the University of Geneva, McGill University, and Oxford who have shaped, nurtured, and inspired my intellectual endeavors over the last several years. The English professors at McGill deserve special mention. I would not be the scholar I am today without their rigorous standards (and joyous annual Miltonmas parties – thank you Maggie Kilgour). Maggie Kilgour taught me to love Milton and Eli MacLaren fed my love of book history and textual editing in ways I cannot repay.

Many days, the emotional support received during one's doctorate feels far more essential than the academic. I would not have finished this degree if it were not for the flood of support from family and friends over the years. Thank you to my "very verbal" mom for teaching me to love words and crave ideas, and to both of my parents for decades of unwavering support and the many, many shoulders to cry on. Thank you for always being there, no matter the hurdle ahead. Thanks to both of my brothers for daring me to quit several times, knowing it would only make me grit through, *not* quit. My Virginia families in McLean and Mechanicsville (you know who you are) sustained me with bottomless chana masala, wine, salmon, and sympathy when I most needed to be fed, physically and emotionally. My bibliography community – James, Michael, Jessica, David, Andy, DVM, and Jerome McGann – kept me excited, engaged, and supported throughout my time at UVA. Lastly, to every student, colleague, and family member who attended my defense, thank you for making what one imagines to be a trial, feel like a celebration. Your love and joy were palpable in Jefferson's Pavilion III.

Introduction: To the Gentle Reader

Shylock:

> "'Hath a dog money? is it possible
> A cur can lend three thousand ducats?'"
> (Shakespeare, *MV* 1.3.116-17)

In *Measure for Measure*, Angelo extends to Isabella a simple offer: her body in exchange for her brother's life. This would seem to be a largely personal decision, based on her love for her brother, her valuation of herself, and her relationship to God. This dissertation argues that it is also an economic one: how *much* does she love her brother? What is her chastity *worth*? Would she *trade* her place in heaven for his place on earth? What is the *cost* of one sin? These are the questions with which so much of early modern drama and Shakespeare's corpus, in particular, grapple. Though early modern drama is deeply intertwined with economic questions, there is reluctance on both sides over being yoked together. Until recent decades, literary criticism had resisted any serious engagement with economics and, today, most economists – outside, perhaps, of those teaching in business and law schools – would be surprised to see their field analyzed alongside Shakespeare.

Both reactions seem unwarranted. Questions surrounding exchange, markets, and tradeoffs permeate early modern drama. Shylock creates a market for human flesh by offering Antonio an unusual bond; Angelo offers to accept Isabella's body in exchange for her brother's life; Prince Hal trades his sins for Percy's life and martial glory on his way to the throne; Alexander Iden offers Jack Cade charity in exchange for civility; Volpone sells the fantasy of inheritance in exchange for the legacy hunters' wealth; Middleton's Fat Bishop trades a pamphlet blaspheming the Protestants for a place with the Catholics; the list goes on. Despite the abundance of economic ideologies central to early modern drama, however, there has been a reluctance to engage deeply with the

theories themselves. Indeed, economic literary analysis was largely nonexistent until the New Economic Criticism movement of the 1990s.[1] Part of this hesitancy is due to the rise of Marxist criticism in the latter half of the twentieth century, but the lion's share is owed to a fundamental misunderstanding of economics as a discipline. Once understood, economics' *raison d'être* is not all too different from that of literary criticism: to answer the "why" of human action.

This project centers on the proximity between literature and economy so, if the gentle reader will allow, it is worth explaining. Understanding why modern economics and literature should be less estranged requires a brief history lesson. Economics as we understand it today is a twentieth-century phenomenon that emerged from millennia of theorists, from Hesiod to Adam Smith to today's Thomas Piketty, thinking about the relationship between household management and national wealth. Known first to the Greeks as *oeconomy*, and labelled political economy from the late seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century, the discipline was based on observation and analysis with little to no mathematical modelling (Hawkes 3). Before the nineteenth century, there was no such occupation as an economist.[2] Instead, politico-economic writings were produced by religious men, merchants, men of finance, clergymen, and philosophers.[3] Political economy "was from the beginning very much a normative field of study," which focused on "the relationships between individuals and society and between markets and the state" (Balaam). Because the discipline concerns itself with networks of economic, social, and political relationships, political economy is inherently more prone to analyzing people, relationships, and illustrative anecdotes than the big data sets of contemporary economics.

---

[1] See David Hawkes' chapter 5, "Money as Metaphor: The New Economic Criticism."
[2] The *OED* places the first use of "economist" to denote "an expert in or student of economics" in 1826. Before that date, the Greek "oeconomist" was used to mean a manager of household wealth ("economist, n").
[3] Thomas Malthus was a clergyman turned professor of political economy, Thomas Carlyle was a minister, David Hume was a law student turned essayist, Adam Smith was a moral philosopher, and David Ricardo was a financier, drawn to political economy by Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (Pullen).

A famous example of the politico-economic approach is Adam Smith's theory of the division of labor, which was born out of Smith's analysis of a pin factory's operations. Rather than touring Scotland and collecting data from numerous pin factories, aggregating the data, and running the numbers through algorithms to locate patterns, he simply observed that, over time, people become more efficient when they focus on a single task. Introducing the pin factory's division of labor, Smith notes that the "peculiar trade" is "divided into a number of branches . . . One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations" (*WN* I.i.3).

His language reveals the observational quality of his analysis of this "strange" operation and he sounds more like a biologist, watching his specimen from afar, than an economist. It is unclear exactly how many pin factories Smith had been to or how long he observed the men at work, yet he has no problem extrapolating out from this anecdote and thinking through the implications of specializing tasks.[4] Smith writes that he "shall only observe" that

> Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object . . . But, in consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object. It is naturally to be expected, therefore,

[4] It is likely that Smith took the majority if not all of his analysis from Diderot's *Encyclopédie*, which explains the various tasks in a pin factory, dividing the production of a pin into eighteen tasks, as Smith does. It is unclear if Smith ever visited local pin factories and he would not have needed to for this analysis. See Kay.

that some one or other of those who are employed in each particular branch of labour should soon find out easier and readier methods of performing their own particular work." (I.i.8)

Is it naturally to be expected, however, that men will strive toward efficiency in menial tasks? I am not so sure. Yet, Smith's anecdotal observations are the foundation of modern economics and his theory of specialization is pivotal to both macro- and microeconomics.

After Adam Smith and David Hume came David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham – all of whom were still working within the domain of political economy. In the late nineteenth century, the broader, more observational analysis of the previous decades was gradually supplanted by "a group of more narrowly focused and methodologically conventional disciplines, each of which sought to throw light on particular elements of society, inevitably at the expense of a broader view of social interactions" (Balaam). As universities grew and, like Smith's pin factory, became more systematized, so did their departments and political economy was soon displaced by the more specialized fields of economics, sociology, and political science.[5] Alfred Marshal played a large role in ushering about this change in England through his development of Cambridge's economic curriculum, wherein he "explicitly separated his subject—economics or economic science—from political economy, implicitly privileging the former over the latter" (Balaam). The separation of the two disciplines was cemented by Paul Samuelson's publications, which were the first to introduce complex mathematical modelling into economic theory. Like other social science and select humanities departments, economics increasingly sought to ally itself with the natural sciences by becoming more mathematical, fact-based, and data-driven, often at the expense of the core human element.[6]

---

[5] See Keith Tribe's *Constructing Economic Science*. For Marshall's impact, see chapters 5 and 6.

[6] There are significant similarities to bibliography, which also sought to become more data-driven, introducing bibliographical "formulae" that recorded the structure of a given copy. W.W. Greg went as far as to publish "The Calculus of Variants," which attempted to apply calculus to bibliographical analysis.

The turn toward math and away from intellectual reasoning was not without its dissenters. One of the loudest voices was the renowned economist and sparring partner of John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich A. Hayek. In 1964, in a section entitled "*Statistics Impotent to Deal with Pattern Complexity*" Hayek writes that statistics "is often, but erroneously, believed to give us access to the understanding of complex phenomena . . . Statistics, however, deals with the problem of large numbers essentially by eliminating complexity" and removing complicated interconnections between related elements. He proceeds to argue that statistics is useful in cases where we are striving to regain simplicity, but that it is "irrelevant to the solution of problems in which it is the relations between individual elements with different attributes that matter" – say that of individuals and their choices (*The Market* 265).

He strengthens his critique in his 1974 Nobel acceptance speech, declaring that "as a profession [economists] have made a mess of things." He attributes this failure "to guide policy more successfully" to "their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the physical sciences," which he cautioned might very well ruin the field of economics by prioritizing the "'scientific' approach" which Hayek finds "'decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought." He excoriates economists for having turned the field into a mathematical exercise – the robotic "application of a ready-made technique" imitating "the form rather than the substance of scientific procedure, as if one needed only to follow some cooking recipes to solve all social problems" (368). These are bold statements for the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics to make in his own acceptance speech and we can be sure that Hayek did not make them lightly.

Hayek's American successor, James Buchanan, shared his disdain for the abdication of thought in favor of statistical analysis. In 1964, Buchanan urged his fellow economists to stop

conceiving of the field in terms of problems and solutions, for many of economics' problems have no solution. The danger, according to Buchanan, is that "Once the format has been established . . . some solution is more or less automatically suggested. Our whole study becomes one of applied maximization of a relatively simple computational sort . . . If there is really nothing more to economics than this, we had as well turn it all over to the applied mathematicians," whose contributions to economics must be seen as mathematical advancements, "not [as contributions] to our chosen subject field which we, for better or for worse, call 'economics'" (*Logical Foundations* 33). Evidently, humanities scholars are not the only members of the academy to be deeply skeptical of economics' insistence on statistical computation at the expense of humanism. Thanks to the work of Hayek, Buchanan, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, Peter Boettke, and others, political economy has continued to develop as its own discipline, though many non-economists are unaware of this distinction. I would argue that this difference is deeply vital to our analysis of early modern literature. Once viewed through the lens of political economy rather than twenty-first-century economics, the possibilities for economic literary analysis unfurl: Shakespeare and Jonson have as much to say as Adam Smith about networks of exchange and the individual's relation to the state.

As my reader may have gleaned, this dissertation engages with the discipline of political economy and not that of economics as currently understood. I follow Nobel laureate in economics James Buchanan in his claim that "I am not, and have never been, an 'economist' in any narrowly-defined meaning. My interests in understanding how the economic interaction process works has always been instrumental to the more inclusive purpose of understanding how we can learn to live with one another without engaging in Hobbesian war and without subjecting ourselves to the dictates of the state" (26). This sounds very much like the analysis of *The Jew of Malta* and *The*

Merchant of Venice I offer in chapter 1. Defining the individual against his peers and his state is central to political economy and, certainly, to early modern drama. The question of how individuals might live peaceably and happily with one another given humans "like rats" pursue "a thirsty evil" is, essentially, the topic of this project (Shakespeare, *MM* 1.2.120–2). Once you pose this question, you quickly tumble into the world of competing interests and scarce resources and, eventually, how individuals manage to secure the goods they desire without significantly harming their neighbors or shared sociopolitical network. In other words, you reach the challenge of squaring private with public interests. This challenge is central to *Playing for Profit*.

The notion that self-interest is "bad" and was incompatible with Anglicanism and Catholicism is an old one and one my project hopes to dispel. By the mid-sixteenth century, it had already been largely accepted that self-love was an innate part of human nature. The question in early modern England had shifted from how to rid men of their vice, to how vice might be channeled in such a way as to maximize social good (or at least minimize harm) and enrich the commonwealth. England's commerce was swiftly expanding and market-based systems of exchange increasingly replaced older feudal economic and social structures, prioritizing individual over collective exchange. This was particularly true of the expanding theater industry, which started charging for admission in the sixteenth century and soon found itself one of London's most popular forms of entertainment by the turn of the seventeenth. Between the burgeoning theater industry and its companion market of the book trade, dramatists were uniquely positioned to capitalize on both media. Not all did so, however. The following chapters seek to throw light on the diverse approaches playwrights Christopher Marlowe, William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, and Thomas Middleton took to London's growing commercial markets in their dramaturgy and career decisions.

I argue in the succeeding chapters that Shakespeare viewed self-interest more capaciously than his fellow dramatists, considering it a necessary ill that could not only be contained, but could be used to secure socially beneficial outcomes. This pragmatic outlook, evident in his corpus and his investment decisions, puts him more in line with certain contemporary men of finance, like John Wheeler, Thomas Smith, and the later Edward Misselden, than with many of his fellow dramatists.[7] I contend that, unlike his peers, Shakespeare was not so dissimilar to early modern English "projectors" – roughly equivalent to the modern entrepreneur. Koji Yamamoto notes that the early modern period was similar to our own in having witnessed an enormous amount of economic growth and accompanying income inequality that rendered citizens "deeply concerned about the implications of economic forces" (5).

The growing concern over inequality combined with the humanist belief in self-improvement to give us "projectors," who "found they did well by doing good . . . mix[ing] public and private in different proportions" (Thrisk qtd. in Yamamoto 27). Shakespeare does not fit this mold precisely and thinking about Shakespeare as an entrepreneur, as did several twentieth-century scholars, can quickly devolve into oversimplification.[8] I am not arguing here that Shakespeare was an exceptional entrepreneur and in fact, as chapter 3 demonstrates, he was rather averse to risk – a key component of projecting. Instead, I posit that Shakespeare's balanced approach to man's propensity for self-love allowed him to move beyond cynicism and be more optimistic about man's ability to collaborate and negotiate disparate interests, provided the right institutions. These included first and foremost a market system supported by property rights and the rule of law.

Lest I lose my readers before they have begun, allow me to elaborate by way of explaining the design of the project before turning to its aims. Chapter 1 grapples with the core of

[7] See Lars Engle's *Shakespearean Pragmatism*.
[8] See Farnham's *Shakespeare's Economics.*

Shakespeare's political economy by comparing social institutions and individual outcomes in Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta* and Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*. The chapter opens with a brief contextualization of the terms "self-interest" and public and private interests within the English early modern imagination and London's expanding economy. Throughout the dissertation, I deliberately use the terms "self-interest" and "self-love" interchangeably. Some historians and philosophers will disagree with this choice, but I deploy this transhistorical approach as a reminder that the terms represent different historical iterations of the same evolving concept: regard to one's own's interests, whether out of love or greed – a question I leave to the philosophers and theologians. After briefly discussing the evolution of the term "interest" within early modern England's shifting economic landscape, I turn to Marlowe's *Jew* and Shakespeare's *Merchant* and the authors' contradictory conceptions of self-interest and human exchange. In *Jew*, the lack of a reliable legal system in Malta leaves Barabas little choice but to redress his abuses through unmitigated and uncalculated violence. After Ferneze publicly breaks his own decree and unjustly strips Barabas of his wealth, goods, and house, Barabas sees little left in the world but revenge: facing poverty and a corrupt legal system, his actions have no cost. Without law or property rights, there is no faith in social, political, or economic exchanges and order is only regained through the reimposition of an inflexible tyrant.

By contrast, in Shakespeare's *Merchant*, the maintenance of a reliable legal system enables characters to reach horizontal solutions to social ills by negotiating their disparate interests through discourse (however fraught), individual choice, and the market bounded by the rule of law. In *Merchant*, unlike in *Jew*, the Duke spectacularly fails to restore order. Instead of order being imposed by the crown, the play's resolution is generated by the people, thanks to Portia's deft manipulation of individuals' private interests. Through Portia, Shakespeare rewrites the machiavel

of Marlowe's *Jew*, imbuing Portia with the Machiavellian pragmatism that Barabas and Shylock both lack. My analysis challenges traditional readings of *Merchant* by arguing that Shylock is fully rational and actively *chooses* his fate through his strict legal literalism and repeated rejection of mercy. Instead of seeing Portia as a cruelly manipulative Machiavel, I emphasize her skillful statecraft and true Machiavellian ability to resolve conflict without bloodshed when mercy and humanity have run dry.

In chapter 2, I deepen the previous chapter's inquiry into how Shakespeare's successful leaders mitigate self-interest's threat to the commonwealth, analyzing the dramatist's multifaceted portrayal of interest in *Measure for Measure*, *Henry IV*, *Part 1*, and *Henry V*. I argue that Shakespeare's conception of private interest was unique among his peers and prefigured Adam Smith's moral philosophy in important and unexamined ways. *Measure for Measure* and the Henriad offer particularly strong examples of the broad scope of Shakespearean self-interest. In both instances, the dramatist carefully and systematically differentiates between private interests which enrich the Commonwealth and ought be tolerated, and dangerous vice which, jeopardizing national interests, must be stamped out. Angelo, the embodiment of Smith's overly rigid "man of system," demands from society an unbending heavenly perfection that no man can meet – as he discovers first-hand in act 2.

Unlike Angelo, Duke Vincentio accepts human imperfection as inevitable and learns how to balance private vice and public good, enforcing the best system "that the people can bear" (A. Smith, *TMS* VI.ii.2.16). Prince Hal proves himself even more adept at separating petty from pernicious vice in *1H4*, *2H4*, and *H5*, tolerating Falstaff's and others' harmless tricks but swiftly banishing outright corruption (eventually including Falstaff) from his court. Hal's language and approach to social, martial, and political transactions expose his intimate understanding of human

behavior and London's increasingly commercial markets. As King, Hal's former vice of frequenting Eastcheap's seedy establishments becomes an asset to England, as Henry V allies London's commercial and courtly circles. Through Hal and Vincentio, Shakespeare not only demonstrates that private interest is inevitable but that it can be socially beneficial; untethered greed, however, has no place in the Commonwealth.

In chapter 3, I move from analyzing Shakespeare's characters into an examination of the dramatist himself, exploring the relationship between his investments, especially those in the theater, and his measured sympathy for the poor. The chapter pays particular attention to how Shakespeare's personal investments shaped his approach to risk and reward, community engagement, and social welfare as seen in his sympathetic but pragmatic portrayal of the Cade rebellion in *Henry VI, Part 2*. Shakespeare's company, the Lord Chamberlain's Men, was unique in being the first theater company to form a joint-stock company, where the principal actors were also the shareholders. This created a less hierarchical company structure that aligned financial and artistic interests, seeing as the actors financed their own productions. Unlike most contemporary playing companies where a single impresario, like Phillip Henslowe, controlled the players and dramatists through debt and contracts, Shakespeare's company ran on the shared interests of the original sharers. This tied investment to risk, reward, and welfare in important ways that reveal themselves in Shakespeare's drama, where questions of desert are omnipresent.

To help think through Shakespeare's complicated relationship with private investment and public welfare, I close read *Henry VI, Part 2* and the fates of Gloucester, Suffolk, Lord Saye, and Jack Cade. Throughout the play, Shakespeare wrestles with balancing private and public interests in the political arena, writing characters who either look to their interests too little, like Gloucester, or too much, like Suffolk and Jack Cade. Though Shakespeare's treatment of Cade's followers

betrays his fellow-feeling – to use a Smithian turn of phrase – for the working poor, Cade's death makes it clear that a classless society is no solution. Cade's fate, largely brought on by his rejection of all hierarchies and, thus, his violent refusal of Iden's charity, signals that ultimately Shakespeare saw a world without investment, risk, and reward as not only fantastical, but dangerous.

The final chapter contrasts Shakespeare's more generous view of self-interest and human collaboration with Jonson's cynical approach to avarice and commodification. I trace Jonson's complex relationship with commercialism in the theater and print industry throughout his career, paying particular attention to his bibliographical self-fashioning. Of the dramatists examined here, Jonson is the most invested in print publication, second only perhaps, to Thomas Middleton, as I argue in the chapter's final portion. Unlike Middleton and Shakespeare who used the playhouse and print house to maximize their reach, Jonson's cynicism toward mass markets drove him to increasingly see print as a way to curate his audience and control his reception. Jonson's negative view of self-interest and commercialism manifests most clearly in *Volpone* and *Bartholomew Fair*, both of which portray systems that, though designed to regulate exchange, only exacerbate the corruption.

I contend that in contrast with Shakespearean dramaturgy, where the market is used as a tool to mediate social ills and quash corruption (as far as corruption is ever quashed), Jonsonian drama sees the market as the *site* of corruption, intensifying society's problems rather than solving them. After analyzing Jonson's distaste for commercialism, I turn to Middleton's embrace of the commodified play, drawing on the exceptional textual evidence of *A Game at Chess* to illustrate Middleton's commercial savvy. Middleton arguably exhibits the most innovative use of the market for the commodified play, taking full advantage of theatrical, print, and manuscript publication in increasingly sophisticated ways throughout his career. In many ways, Middleton marks a fitting

end to our examination of markets and self-interest, being the dramatist who displays the most impressive command of page and stage by catering to his audience's interests and his own.

A few matters deserve clarification. First, my dissertation is *not* claiming that Shakespeare was exceptional. That claim was introduced by Milton, amplified by the Romantics**,** and has largely been debunked among specialists. Instead, I posit that Shakespeare's relatively subtle understanding of economic principles, market forces, and private and public interests afforded him a more optimistic view than his peers of man's capacity for collaboration, given the right institutions. Introducing the notion of institutional design automatically implicates the field of political economy. My focus on political economy instead of economics marks a subtle departure from the current body of economic literary criticism. My work is both indebted to and subtly challenging New Economic Criticism and the work that has come out of that movement.[9] New Economic Criticism sought to bring about a rapprochement between the seemingly disparate fields of economics and literary criticism by analyzing notions like the economics of language, the rhetoric of money, metaphors of debit and credit, and other literary theoretical translations of economic topics.[10]

Though New Economic Criticism was doubtlessly an important step in introducing greater interdisciplinarity between the two fields, the work of these critics often ignores the actual economic ideologies undergirding this financial rhetoric, preferring a superficial engagement with terms over concepts. By concentrating on buzzwords, such as money, exchange rates, debt, and bonds, without interrogating the underlying economic principles, New Economic Criticism stunted the profundity of its analysis and lost sight of what has always been the core of economics: analyzing why *people* do what they do in given situations. I see my dissertation as a simultaneous

[9] See Hawkes, chapter 5. See also Marc Shell.
[10] See *The New Economic Criticism*'s table of contents for a list of the field's guiding preoccupations.

intervention in and invitation to the field of economic literary criticism to engage more deeply with the actual economic principles upon which the moneyed language and metaphors sit.

There is already a rich literature in Shakespeare studies on credit and debt markets, usury and its theological implications, and financial or moneyed rhetoric and metaphor in Shakespeare. As a result, though my dissertation touches on all of these ideas, it does not sit with any of them at legnth. To an equal extent, although my dissertation can appear Weberian from the outset – as individuation is seen as breeding productivity which, in turn brings economic success – I do not attempt to make any sweeping claims about capitalism or socialism and national identity, religion, or economic success. Therefore, while Max Weber appears for a brief cameo in a footnote, Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* does not contribute to my argument regarding Shakespeare's economic understanding, that of his peers, or any other aspect of early modern drama analyzed in the following pages.

My hope for this dissertation is three-fold. First, I hope that by delineating between political economy and economics – much like the field of textual studies demarcates between bibliography and the history of the book, more humanities scholars will see the deep humanism of political economy and feel less estranged. My second hope is that scholars will view this delineation as an invitation to think about economics in more capacious terms that surpass the mathematical models of today and return to the genesis of economics: the human condition – the individual in Ancient Greece or early modern England trying to manage his household. I hope championing this humanistic approach to political economy will encourage more humanities scholars to join the dialogue and steer economic literary criticism toward economics' key questions – centered on how to live peaceably with one another while maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain – and not just their linguistic signifiers. Lastly, and most importantly, I hope that by viewing Shakespeare's works

and career through the pragmatic lens of political economy, I might slightly recast the towering narrative of Shakespeare, “privileged poet,” and advocate for a rational Shakespeare who both saw the world for what it was and for what it could be.

CHAPTER ONE

"For that is theft": The *Jew*, the *Merchant*, and the Laws of Exchange

> Ay, but theft is worse. Tush, take not from me then,
> For that is theft; and if you rob me thus,
> I must be forced to steal and compass more.
> (Marlowe, *JM* 1.2.126–8)

> Beneficence, therefore, is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it.
> (Smith, *TMS* II.ii.3.3)

Though not all self-interest was created equal, by the turn of the seventeenth century it was understood that all men were created equally self-interested and no amount of moralizing would cleanse men of their natural vices. Man's less pious tendencies were an unavoidable part of human nature that had to be controlled and, if one were politically savvy, harnessed to strengthen the Commonwealth. As England grew into a more prosperous and market-based society, conversations around private and public wealth accumulation became increasingly important. Contemporaries like Gerard de Malynes knew that "there could be no 'Commonwealth without private wealth,'" which meant a certain tolerance for vice or the "greed" that incentivizes personal wealth accumulation (Finkelstein 39). Writers such as Malynes, Thomas Smith, and, I argue, Shakespeare, saw man's innate self-interest as a potentially positive vice that added value to society instead of detracting from it. Not only did private interest generate national wealth, but exchange created the opportunity for opposing factions to mediate "intergroup conflict." Economic exchange forces men to barter with one another and reach agreements on shared value; in social and economic terms, it provides "the alternative of 'peaceful symbiosis'" as factions are incentivized to overcome their hostility to reach mutually beneficial deals (Lee 352).

Shakespeare explores the power of markets to coordinate disparate interests in *The Merchant of Venice*. While it does not eradicate infighting between the Christian majority and Jewish minority, Venice's market of exchange, guided by the rule of law and Portia's Machiavellian pragmatism, does resolve the deadly conflict that looms over most of the play – conflict that dominates Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*. Shakespeare's defense of market order and the potential power of self-interest to generate socially optimal outcomes was relatively unique among contemporary playwrights. Christopher Marlowe and Ben Jonson both took a more cynical approach toward commerce, though their castigation of commercial markets manifested itself in different ways. Jonson's plays and publication decisions, examined at length in chapter four, are deliberately anti-commercial and "reflec[t] a deep hostility to the market that . . . shaped his career as a writer" (Kendrick 47). Marlowe's views on markets are harder to pin down. His rejection of market order has less to do with his disdain for the commercial and more to do with his inability to envision society as a place of organic exchange, where interdependence and justice check men's natural tendency toward hypocrisy and greed.

In order to discuss Marlowe's and Shakespeare's contrasting conceptions of self-interest, the chapter begins with a brief historical contextualization of self-interest, or what was referred to by early moderns as the passions and interests. Building on this historical understanding of private and public interests, I then turn to *The Jew of Malta* and Marlowe's portrayal of self-interest as a dangerous force that destabilizes society without the potential of generating positive outcomes. In Marlowe's Malta, man's rabid and corrupt self-interest removes all possibility of organic social or market order by stripping transactions of trust and justice. Ferneze's self-interested rejection of the rule of law, a staple characteristic of the revenge play, relegates Maltese society to complete lawlessness and the wronged Barabas is left with little recourse but to fight injustice with injustice.

Without the framework of a stable legal system, the only way order can be restored in Malta is through Ferneze's reinstallation as tyrant, offering a grim portrait of society and human nature.

Taking up many of the themes of Marlowe's *Jew*, Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* presents a more optimistic view of society and self-interest. In Shakespeare's Venice, the market enables characters to reach horizontal solutions to social and economic ills by forcing characters to calibrate their individual interests to those of their fellow citizens, through the process of negotiation and individual choice. Shakespeare remedies Malta's corrupt self-interest by introducing a reliable legal structure that upholds faith in transactions and relative justice in outcome, as characters largely *choose* their own fates. Unlike Barabas, who is driven to lawlessness through Ferneze's disregard for the rule of law, Shylock pursues his revenge through intensely legal means, putting his faith in the legal system to uphold his contract with Antonio – a contract to which both parties voluntarily agreed. In act 4, like Barabas, Shylock is undone by his own device: the disguised Portia walks Shylock into a legal loophole of his own making by offering the Jew a choice between options he engineered and, thus, cannot plausibly refute.

Deftly balancing private with public interests, Portia maintains social order through her insistence on individual *choice* and the importance of the rule of law. Portia's view of "human volition as being predicated on economics" and individuals' subjectively rational calculus allows her to secure the *least worst* alternative to a politically and socially volatile situation (Grav 99). Portia's understanding and skillful manipulation of human nature saves Antonio's life while sparing Shylock's, maintains legal order, and protects individual freedom by ensuring parties are free to choose but forced to "bear the risk attaching to that choice" and be rewarded (or punished) accordingly (Hayek, *Studies on the Abuse* 65). Through a close comparison of Marlowe's *Jew* and Shakespeare's *Merchant*, I hope to illuminate the authors' fundamentally oppositional approaches

to self-interest. While Marlowe viewed self-interest as an inherent threat to society, Shakespeare saw self-interest more generously, recognizing its ability to generate, if not optimal, then at least tolerable outcomes without tyranny, when operating within a just market, bounded by the rule of law.

I. Contextualizing "Self-interest": Vices, Interest, and Profit

Any discussion of nascent capitalism before the eighteenth century runs the risk of being anachronistic.[11] Spencer Dimmock reminds us that "If capitalism is defined as an economic system in which businesses produce to sell on the market either domestically or overseas, then capitalism has always existed if in less efficient forms." This definition describes trucking and bartering, however, and not a capitalist *system*. Instead, Dimmock views capitalism not as a simple commercial network, but a "specific historical form of social system or *society* with its own specific economic logic, *fundamentally* distinct from earlier historical forms of society . . . it is the struggle to make a living by opposed interests within the established structure" of sociopolitical relations that defines capitalist societies and determines the society's potential for growth (1). While key contemporary economic terms like "self-interest" or "profit maximization" were not part of early modern parlance, the "struggle to make a living" within the inherited structure of opposed interests and class relations was a very real aspect of daily existence in early modern England.

As such, the ideologies and behaviors associated with self-interest and profit-maximization appear in a wide range of early modern writings, from theorists like Thomas Smith, Machiavelli,

[11] I follow Lars Engle who argues that while we "owe a developed sense of the word 'pragmatism' to the late nineteenth century and a developed sense of the word 'economy' to the late eighteenth," these ideas were circulating throughout early modern England in less refined forms. Engle contends that Shakespeare's approach to pragmatism and economy is something that modern theorists "are *recovering*" and I tend to agree (7). For a more in-depth discussion of pre-seventeenth century political economy, see Waswo.

Montaigne, and Bacon to merchants like John Wheeler and Gerard de Malynes. The phrase self-interest was not coined until the eighteenth century, but the notion that human nature was driven by individuals' passions and *interests* was already firmly established by the turn of the seventeenth. As is well known, England saw an unprecedented amount of intellectual activity in the seventeenth century, and economic theory was no exception. Before the solidification of modern economics, the discipline was called political economy and was far more qualitative than quantitative, rendering the gap between economic theorists and other contemporary thinkers much smaller than it is today. Bacon, Descartes, and Locke had as much to say about interest and bullion as the men in charge of England's balance of trade. The rise of trading companies like the British East India Company led to "a proliferation of new economic ideas" and new conversations around personal interests versus public wealth (Backhouse 66). This outpouring of new economic ideas was driven simultaneously by England's desire to enrich the commonwealth and England's increasingly secular, scientific outlook following the Reformation and the Scientific Revolution.[12]

Though economic beliefs became increasingly secular in the seventeenth century, by the mid-fifteenth century, the commonwealth had already "come to grips with the 'realism' that some have portrayed as a turn to a more self-interested political economy" (Dauber 22). It had become largely accepted that personal interest, or self-love, was innately human.[13] Machiavelli wrote in 1532 that "The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when

[12] Conceiving of economics in terms of interests and personal investments has its roots chiefly in two places: one, the Aristotelean understanding of distributive justice (which assigned rewards and punishments based on desert) and its impact on England's religious reformers; and two, the competition for chivalric honor at court (Dauber 27–80). Dauber posits that these two separate systems of distributing rewards and punishments – one religious, one largely secular – combined in complex ways to slowly introduce and normalize the competition and profit mentalities integral to a capitalist or proto-capitalist society.

[13] As explained in the introduction, I use self-love and self-interest largely interchangeably throughout my dissertation. Although the terms have unique histories, with self-love enjoying distinct philosophical resonances tied to Aristotle, Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other thinkers, I conceive of them as different historical iterations of the evolving concept of private interest.

they can" (*Prince* 12). Fifty years later, Thomas Smith, author of *A Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of England,* argued that "If they find more profit thereby than otherwise, why should they not?", knowing that man would do what was in his interest "so long as they find more profit" in it (51).[14] By the mid-sixteenth century, the conversation had largely shifted from whether or not profit-seeking was moral to its political and social implications for the state: how could England square private and public interests to maximize common wealth?

A key part of the answer lay in containing the "destructive passions" of avarice, envy, and lust. It became increasingly clear that they "could not be contained by religious or moral teaching" alone but needed a stronger countermeasure to be kept in check so as not to threaten social order (Backhouse 73). Countervailing passions offered a solution. By appealing to man's self-love, one vice could be used to effectively control the others. Thomas Smith recognized that vice could not only be managed, but that egoism was "a great force which [could] be directed by the wise statesman" (xxiv). Montaigne, Bacon, and Hobbes proposed that the key to a stable society lay in understanding "how [affections] do fight and encounter one with another" (Bacon 267). Montaigne specifically argued that vices are innately human and can only be counterbalanced by other vices, or "poisons." "Our being," he writes

> is cemented with sickly qualities: ambition, jealousy, envy, revenge, superstition, and despair have so natural a possession in us, that its image is discerned in beasts . . . of the seeds of which qualities, whoever should divest man, would destroy the fundamental

[14] Thomas Smith's *Discourse* has an interesting and somewhat opaque textual history. The text was first circulated anonymously in manuscript and was not published in print until 1581, under the title *A compendious or briefe examination of certayne ordinary complaints of diuers of our country men in these our days*. There are five known early manuscript copies of Smith's *Discourse*, though modern editors take the Yelverton MS as their copy-text, seeing as it has "the fewest omissions and errors" and is closest to the 1581 printing (Dewar qtd. in Smith v). For a detailed account of the *Discourse*'s textual history, see Dewar's account in *Discourse*'s Appendix B, pp. 149–62; for a synopsis of the text's authorship and publication see the critical introduction, pp. xiv–xxvi. Though the anonymous publication caused immediate and prolonged controversy, Dewar notes that to those familiar with Smith's works, "the *Discourse* is unmistakably from his pen" (xxii).

> conditions of human life . . . Vices there help to make up the seam in our piecing, as poisons are useful for the conservation of health. (B1^{v})

Instead of medicine, Bacon uses hunting metaphors to describe the same phenomenon, explaining how one could "set affection against affection, and to master one by another; even as we used to hunt beast with beast . . . upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of *præmium* and *pæna*, whereby civil states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest" (267). Bacon emphasizes man's natural tendency to desire rewards and fear punishments – an aspect of human nature so basic it needs no further explanation in his view. As governments of states must "bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within." Bacon has digested and reappropriated Machiavelli's statecraft, explaining that to win the war against internal affections, one must govern the body as one would the body politic, setting vice against vice to produce a virtuous, temperate whole.

Following in Montaigne's and Bacon's footsteps, Hobbes writes that "destructive passions" such as greed, desire for glory, and domination, could be curbed by countervailing passions which "came to be known as 'interests'" (Backhouse 73). It was not until the end of the seventeenth century, however, that interest came to mean self-interest in a distinctly economic sense.[15] The first recorded use of interest in 1450 refers to one's "right or title to property" as in "hafuyng interest, right or title, of or in ony of the premises" ("interest, n"). By the end of the sixteenth century, interest had come to be synonymous with "'reasons of state' . . . lying in between "passion and

[15] The *OED* dates the first recorded use of "selfe interest" to 1595 in Robert Southwell's *Triumphs over Death*: "Shee was a iewel that both God and you desired to enjoy, he to her assured benefit without selfe interest, you for allowable respectes." A search of EEBO's corpus reveals the next use to be the 1625 *An abridgement of Christian perfection* (STC 11539), which is a translation of the Italian *Breve compendio intorno alla perfezione cristiana*, composed by Christina Bellinzaga under the supervision of Achilles Galliardi (1537–1607). The term self-interest appears seven times throughout the work, with all uses carrying the negative connotation of an "infection of self-interest" (12). The *OED* locates the first use of self-interest as the "Preoccupation with, or pursuit of, one's own advantage or welfare, esp. to the exclusion of consideration for others," in 1649, but Galliardi's text, likely translated collaboratively by Lady Mary Percy and Anthony Hoskins, uses self-interest in this negative sense as early as the turn of the century.

rationality." This notion of interest as *public* interest changed during the English Civil War as the gap between the individual and the "State" narrowed and individuals claimed their political and personal rights, defining their *personal* interests against the state's. In an increasingly unstable Commonwealth, the strict division between private and public interests fell and "interest" was applied not only to national interests but also to "individuals and groups within the nation," encapsulating all "human aspirations" like glory, honor, and material comfort and connoting "an element of reflection and calculation about how these were to be achieved" (Backhouse 74). The *OED* dates the first economic usage of "interest" twenty years before the Civil War. In the 1622 English translation of Mateo Alemán's *The Rogue,* "Loue, interest, and feare, are those three ropes that halter Iustice." The interplay here between personal interest and public good, or justice, is crucial. In order to have a just society, one must control the passions – the same passions that are represented as leading justice itself. Though "interest" took on its fully economic connotation in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the term was already being used as the "selfish pursuit of one's own welfare" as early as 1622 and had been used to claim one's assets since the mid-thirteenth century ("interest, n.").

The connotation may have been shifting, but the concepts of personal profit and wealth accumulation undergirding the term interest had longstanding cultural and legal roots predating the early modern period. Notions of personal profit have existed since antiquity, with Cato and Aristotle writing about household and wealth management. Cato offers an early understanding of depreciation, urging "traders . . . bent on making money" to "Sell worn-out oxen, blemished cattle, blemished sheep, wool, hides, an old wagon, old tools, an old slave, a sickly slave, and whatever else is superfluous. The master should have the selling habit, not the buying habit" (0.3, ii.7). Gerard de Malynes reframes Cato's advice for English kings over a millennium later, writing in

his 1622 *Maintenance of Free Trade* that "Traffique . . . may properly be called, *The Praheminent Studie of Princes*," for "a King is miserable . . . if he Raignes over a poore people" (P4$^{r–v}$). As "the fathers of the great families of Commonweales [Kings and Princes] are to bee carefull for the general good." A prince, therefore "must bee a Seller, and not a Buyer" (A3^{r}). Malynes argues that, like household income, national wealth accumulation is the most important sociopolitical aspect that princes must manage for the good of their citizens. Yet, while Cato's early economic theories were evidently important to the development of England's political and economic order, they were met with skepticism by Cato's contemporaries. His Roman peers condemned Cato's overvaluation of profit at the expense of human life (a critique that still haunts modern capitalism). Plutarch excoriated Cato for treating men as beasts and only seeing value in them "whilst there arises some profit" (356).

Plutarch's disdain for Cato's profiteering corroborates the fact that private profit was not only alive and well in 160 BC, but theorists were already recording (and criticizing) ways of maximizing one's profit and accumulating wealth. Cato's theories of profit maximization and resource management – including labor – are not so different from those in early modern England or our own capitalist society today. Craig Muldrew emphasizes "the enormous expansion" from 1550 on "in the retailing of ale," coal, and especially tobacco, illustrating "how rapidly social exchange could occur when profit could be made by meeting demand." By the "late sixteenth century, England was a very active market culture in which profit, price, and bargains were a constant concern for most households on a weekly, if not daily, basis" and buying and selling were quotidian (58-9). Contemporary accounts confirm Muldrew's quantitative archival research in England's trade records. In the 1550s, Thomas Smith wrote that "every man naturally will follow that wherein he sees profit," though his *Discourse* would not see publication in print until 1581

(60). Thomas Smith forwards an argument that Adam Smith would explore in depth over two centuries later: man's natural tendency to maximize his own profit symbiotically increases the nation's wealth. Put otherwise, private avarice breeds public benefit, as

> Every man is a member of the Commonweal, and that that is profitable to one may be profitable to another if he would exercise the same feat. Therefore that that is profitable to one and so to another may be profitable to all and so to the Commonweal . . . That reason is good, adding somewhat more to it. True it is that that thing which is profitable to each man by himself . . . is profitable to the whole Commonweal. (51–2)

John Wheeler reiterates and extends Thomas Smith's assertion that every man naturally seeks to maximize his profit in the 1601 *A Treatise of Commerce*. Like Smith, Wheeler argues that self-interest is an innate part of mankind and as soon as "man beginneth the train or course of his life," he discovers

> that naughtiness and corruption which is naturally in him. For there is nothing in the world so ordinary and so natural unto men, as to contract, truck, merchandise, and traffic one with another, so that it is almost unpossible for three persons to converse together two hours, but they will fall into talk of one bargain or another . . . The Prince with his subjects, the master with his servants, one friend and acquaintance with another, the captain with his soldiers, the husband with his wife, women with and among themselves, and in a word, all the world choppeth and changeth,[16] runneth and raveth after marts, markets, and merchandising. (316)

By 1601, the vices inherent to peasants and princes, as outlined by Montaigne, Machiavelli, and Thomas Smith, had evolved into a natural component of human nature that drives him to barter

[16] Bartering and exchanging.

with his neighbors and his wife for his own benefit. It had become what we call self-interest. Yet this pragmatic approach to human nature which viewed greed as not just unavoidable but generative when harnessed wisely, had loud opponents. Christopher Marlowe, I argue, was among that number, taking a more Hobbesian view of human nature than Thomas Smith or, as the last portion of this chapter posits, William Shakespeare. As is reflected in works like *Doctor Faustus*, *Tambourlaine*, *Massacre at Paris*, and *The Jew of Malta*, Marlowe seems to have conceived of self-interest as a vice that would never be controlled through countervailing passions and, thus, had to be quashed by the strict authoritarianism of a designated ruler.[17]

II. Marlovian Machiavels and Maltese Markets

Marlowe's Barabas, the original self-obsessed stage machiavel, provides a natural point of departure for a discussion of destructive greed on the early modern stage.[18] As scholars have firmly established, the stage machiavel is patently *un*-Machiavellian and the caricature of Machiavelli Marlowe presents "is either the result of wilful misreading or of ignorance" (Arienzo and Petrina 13). Ironically, part of the reason Machiavelli's writings make such good theater is his intentionally general approach to statecraft, designed as a practical guide to instruct politicians, not to intellectualize politics. Instead of overanalyzing and "correct[ing], Machiavelli exhorts and adumbrates, oversimplifying, distorting even, to dramatize his points" (Raab 4). When further flattened, Machiavelli's already simplified political advice made for easy theatrical fodder,

[17] My argument is in dialogue and, at times, tension with Patrick Cheney's central claim in *Marlowe's Republican Authorship*. Cheney posits that throughout his corpus, Marlowe "actively imagines republican political practice; and he creates a formal English republican language, without putting it into a program" (6). There is an evident language of republicanism and anti-tyranny in Barabas' challenge to Ferneze in act 1 (and throughout *Jew*): "Will you then steal my goods?" (1.2.95). It is harder, however, to locate an active conjuring of republican values in Marlowe's works. Cheney acknowledges his indebtedness to David Norbrook's *Writing the English Republic*, in which Norbrook convincingly identifies a deep hostility in Marlowe's writing toward "political power preserved in the hands of the few" and institutional corruption (qtd. in Cheney 4).

[18] For a discussion of the "exorbitantly crafty 'machiavel'" on the early modern English stage, see Maus's *Inwardness and Theater* pp. 35–71 (35); for more on the stage machiavel as it relates to Shakespeare's drama, see Ringwood.

generating dynamic villains whose singular drive for domination captivated audiences through bloodshed and terror. Marlowe's oversimplification of Machiavelli did little to advance the political merits of the Italian's writings, however. Instead, Marlowe's destructive machiavels seem to speak to the dramatist's larger fear of private interests. While many "readers, whether revolutionaries or reactionaries, could simply read, appreciate, analyse and translate" only conservative readers "would show a real fear of Machiavelli's writings, since these might offer a justification for the interruption of the status quo" (Areinzo and Petrina 27). Christopher Marlowe's vilification of Machiavelli's politics in *The Jew of Malta* seems to out the dramatist as one such reader.

It is possible to dismiss Marlowe's two-dimensional stage machiavel as a theatrical villain created by a dramatist pandering to his audience's taste for bloodshed. His grim portrayal of self-interest as an inherent threat to the public sphere, however, is harder to brush aside and speaks either to his conservatism or a deep skepticism of humanity's ability to cooperate and solve problems without authoritarian oversight. Machiavelli's prince and the rationally self-interested actor, or *homo oeconomicus*, overlap in their pragmatic approach to utility maximization, but Machiavellian statecraft is not the same as self-interest. At least it *ought not* be the same; rather than acting for himself, a good prince acts in the interests of his state. In theory, when the prince acts to benefit the state, he indirectly benefits himself, as the Crown's and Commonwealth's interests are aligned. Much like a shareholder and his company, the state's success should be inseparable from its prince's. A prince's Machiavellian pragmatism, then, is a positive force that maintains political stability: by protecting his own political and personal interests, he strengthens the state. Though Marlowe's *Jew* is the genesis of the stage machiavel, it is difficult to find a single character who emulates the calculated pragmatism enshrined in Machiavelli's writings. Instead,

Marlowe's characters, including Governor Ferneze, all pursue their own interests at the expense of the state, destabilizing Malta rather than maintaining political and social order. Scholars have located Machiavelli's writings to differing degrees in the prologue's Machevil, Barabas, and Ferneze. Yet, while all characters may exhibit the deception and capacity for violence Machiavelli deemed necessary in a prince, none display the political pragmatism that Machiavellian statecraft demands. I contend that this misalignment of public and private interests, when coupled with Malta's complete absence of legal process, renders social and economic exchange an impossibility in Marlowe's *Jew*.

Marlowe opens his play by baiting his spectators with the prologue's Machiavellian strawman, Machevil. Machevil's unapologetic villainy certainly satisfies the theatergoers "who as[k] from Machevil nothing more than [to be] as odious as possible so that they can point their finger at him" (Arienzo and Petrina 76). However, this two-dimensional depravity would hold little intellectual interest for those who were familiar with *The Prince* and its cardinal rule: the prince must never act in a way that makes him openly hated – a rule Machevil, Ferneze, and Barabas all violate. Enrico Stanic demonstrates how the prologue's direct allusions to *The Prince* allow it to function on two levels, engaging the less intellectually curious with its dynamic theatricality while allowing the more cerebral playgoers to engage with Machiavelli's "peculiar form of 'moral fluidity'" and the ethical implications of that ambiguity (Arienzo and Petrina 77). This is not surprising for Marlowe who, despite flirting with the politics of self-interest, prioritizes his commercial interests by emphasizing theatricality over fidelity to his sources and favoring rhetorical flourish over philosophical complexity. Contemporary Ben Jonson introduced this critique, deriding Marlowe for "depart[ing] from life and the likeness of truth" and "fly[ing] from all humanity, with the Tamerlanes and Tamerchams" as Marlowe, according to Jonson, courted

applause at the expense of artistic integrity (*Ben Jonson* 542). Jonson's criticism is a bit reductionist, however, ignoring Barabas's deep humanity. Though his human "likeness" is obfuscated by his bloody revenge, Barabas defies Jonson's caricature by beginning and ending the play with profoundly human motivations: the desire for social and political negotiation in the face of institutional abuse.

Machevil's two-dimensional artifice largely disappears from the play after the prologue but Marlowe's interrogation of ethics and "moral fluidity" does not. Initially, Barabas's inhuman violence seems to validate Jonson's critique that Marlowe writes unnatural characters devoid of all humanity. When one looks beyond Barabas's violent theatrics, however, it becomes obvious that his inhumanity derives from a profoundly human place. In the opening scene, Barabas is introduced as a great merchant personifying exorbitant, selfish gain: his investments have guaranteed returns, he has little risk, and his riches remain locked away, guarded by the Jew's "hostile self-interest" (Thurn 163). The idea of *hostile* interest is integral to Barabas's character and, arguably, to Marlowe's broader understanding of self-interest. Barabas is not the cool-headed merchant taking calculated risks. Instead, he appears a kind of self-assured Scrooge, confident in his returns and hoarding his carefully counted "riches in a little room" (1.1.37). Barabas's paranoid protection of his wealth is not without cause, considering his status as an uncommonly successful minority amongst a relatively poorer Christian majority. It is the existence of Barabas's massive wealth combined with Malta's strong mercantilist mentality that place Barabas at the center of the play and its commercial exploitation as everyone from the Turks to Malta's political and religious leaders seek to extract wealth from someone else and profit off another's labor (Lim 358).

As an alien living in commercial Malta, Barabas's wealth is inextricable from his Jewishness: from the first scene Barabas defines his wealth through his religion.[19] When he learns that his ships are all accounted for and will make a safe return, he responds "thus are we on every side enriched. / These are the blessings promised to the Jews . . . Who hateth me but for my happiness? . . . Rather had I, a Jew, be hated thus / Than pitied in a Christian poverty" (1.1.103–14). Barabas is not driven by political power, gain, or acceptance, but by a self-interest and self-identification so strong they become self-destructive. Though in the play's opening scene his interest is directed toward wealth accumulation and preservation, when his personhood and religion are abused by the Governor in scene two, his priorities quickly shift toward unrestrained revenge. Barabas is too passionate to be a Machiavel and though he is "resourceful and disturbingly enterprising," he proves no *homo oeconomicus* either (Arienzo and Petrina 81).[20] Couched in early modern terms, Barabas's "passions" override his "interests" as he pursues revenge at the expense of his own financial and political advancement. With no trustworthy legal system to adjudicate his abuse, in typical revenger fashion, Barabas turns to lawlessness to enact his own brand of impassioned justice on those who wrong him.[21]

---

[19] The importance of Barabas's religion is immediately apparent the moment we hear his name given its significance in the New Testament. Barabas features in all four of the Gospels as the prisoner who was selected to be pardoned by Pontius Pilot and spared execution over Jesus Christ.

[20] Scholars have long struggled to agree upon a definition for the "economic man" or *homo oeconomicus*. James Buchanan describes "the *Homo economicus* of classical theory who must, when confronted with alternatives, select that which stands highest on his preference ranking, as evaluated in terms of a *numéraire.* He must maximize income-wealth and minimize outlays," with no concern for the welfare of others (3–21). The definition of the classical *homo oeconomicus* has been criticized in recent decades, however, due to "its restrictive assumptions such as self-interest, rationality and complete information. In reality, economic behaviour is multifaceted and context-dependent. The economic man does not always seem to be a self-interest-maximising being and, what's more, economic choices are often made on the basis of various motives, including emotions, social norms and values," a point Shylock makes in 4.1 (Kargol-Wasiluk et al, 33–57).

[21] The lack of a reliable justice system and idea that justice will only be wrought through violence is a key component of early modern revenge tragedies, which highlight "a fundamental system of rule through which the nobility of Early Modern England at large and the English revenge play in particular assert power, a means through which the latter's corrupt aristocracy perform their crimes and simultaneously ensure that retribution for those crimes cannot take place" (Condon 66). For more on the formal components of a revenge tragedy and the importance of theatricality see Condon; for a discussion of law and the revenger's dilemma, see Dunne; for an overview of the genre, see Maus "Introduction."

Barabas's passions are already present in act 1, scene 1 and need only be catalyzed by Governor Ferneze's maltreatment in scene 2. Barabas views himself as other from the beginning. In the first scene he immediately establishes an us and them dichotomy between the Christian majority and Jewish minority claiming "They say we are a scattered nation: / I cannot tell, but we have scambled up / More wealth by far than those that brag of faith . . . Ay, wealthier far than any Christian" (1.1.119–26). Like Shakespeare's Shylock who credits the Jews with thrift, Barabas boasts that the savvy investment decisions of his Jewish peers have left them better off than their Christian counterparts who "brag" of faith but exhibit "malice, falsehood, and excessive pride" (1.1.116). Unlike "Christian kings, / That thirst so for principality" Barabas has no such desires for political greatness (as proven by his subsequent actions), having "one sole daughter . . . And all I have is hers" (1.1.133–8). Lest we doubt Barabas's portrayal of Christian politicians, Ferneze enters shortly after Barabas's diatribe only to exhibit excessive malice and pride, unjustly confiscating all Barabas's wealth to pay the national debt accrued by his own fiscal irresponsibility. Having let "ten years' tribute" remain unpaid, Ferneze now has one month to gather a decade's worth of back taxes. Instead of taxing all inhabitants of Malta equally, Ferneze concentrates the tax burden on "those Jews of Malta," sparing the city's citizens (1.2.34).[22] Barabas challenges the ethics and political sagacity of this decision, asking "Are strangers with your tribute to be taxed?" and hopes all citizens will be taxed "equally" (1.2.59–62). Ferneze responds to Barabas's earnest pursuit of just taxation with religious slander, retorting "No, Jew," you will be taxed "like infidels. / For through our sufferance of your hateful lives, / Who stand accursèd in the sight of heaven, / These taxes and afflictions are befallen" (1.2.62–5).

[22] Thurn underscores the fact that Barabas is not a citizen of Malta and, therefore, Ferneze views his rights as malleable and "authorizes the seizure by a decree based upon theological and ethnic categories" (163).

Contrary to the claim that the "text, when read without bias, infallibly points to Ferneze as the real Machiavellian hero," in act 1 Ferneze proves himself to be as imprudent as Barabas. Through his pointed and unnecessary abuse of Barabas, Ferneze initiates the bloodshed and political upheaval he must ultimately employ Machiavellian means to neutralize in act 5. Instead of taxing all citizens or offering Barabas a plausible political explanation for the skewed tax (an explanation Barabas might well have accepted given his pride in Jewish wealth *vis à vis* Christian poverty), Ferneze responds with religious vitriol. Ferneze is not "truly Machiavellian, a sharp and prudent leader as *The Prince* ideally depicts him" (Arienzo and Petrina 81). Instead, he better reflects the excessively prideful and malicious Christian King Barabas described moments earlier, driving his state into excessive debt through irresponsibility before hubristically assuming that with the "sum [being] over-great" Calymath will "favour" Malta and forgive the debt (1.2.8–11). When the debt is not forgiven by the Turks, Ferneze turns to malice, stealing from the minority to fund his political imprudence. In addition to being fiscally foolhardy, Ferneze proves politically unwise, underestimating the threat Barabas and the "alien" Jews pose to the Maltese state. This leads Ferneze to offend Barabas irreparably by slandering his religion, his person, and confiscating all his wealth by royal decree in an act of unrestrained and unexplained tyranny.[23]

Unlike *The Merchant of Venice* in which, as we will see, Shylock is given multiple chances to choose between pursuing revenge or wealth, Ferneze's unchecked authoritarianism robs Barabas of this choice. Ferneze decrees that all Jews shall "each of them [pay] one half of his estate" and "he that denies to pay shall straight become a Christian" (1.2.69–70, 73–4). Barabas questions the justice of the tax, exclaiming that "Half of [his] substance is a city's wealth" (1.2.86). Ferneze

[23] Cheney underscores that Marlowe's "afflicted imaginative obsession [is] at once obsessed with and tormented by the republican fantasy of freedom, and thus inextricably bound by its binary opposite, the servitude of empire" (*Marlowe's Rep.* 22). Contrary to Cheney's claim, while he routinely equivocates, Marlowe does not seem to advocate for republicanism but portrays its impossibility.

leaves no room for negotiation or explanation but dictates Barabas "Either pay that, or we shall seize on all" (1.2.90). Barabas quickly concedes and submits to the decree, telling Ferneze "stay, you shall have half, / Let me be used but as my brethren are" (1.2.91–2). The corrupt Ferneze, "utterly ruthless in [his] self-serving materialism" (Logan 132), responds "No Jew, thou hast denied the articles, / And now it cannot be recalled." Though Barabas never denied Ferneze's decree, he does not fight the Governor's assessment, but asks "Will you then steal my goods? / Is theft the grounds of your religion?" Ferneze responds, "No, Jew, we take particularly thine" (1.2.93–7). In a final plea, Barabas urges Ferneze to uphold the law by applying the tax according to the rules of his decree, by which all Jews must give half of their wealth, instead of stealing according to his whim. Barabas warns the Governor that should Ferneze "rob [him] thus, / [Barabas] must be forced to steal and compass more" (1.2.127–8). In response, the merciless governor turns the Jew's house into a nunnery, depriving Barabas of his "wealth, the labor of [his] life, / The comfort of [his] age, [his] children's hope, / And therefore ne'er distinguish of the wrong" (1.2.150–2).[24]

As connoted by Barabas's repeated use of the word "theft," by breaking his own royal decree and stealing *only* Barabas's goods, Ferneze has publicly invalidated Malta's system of law, ushering Malta into a period of violent lawlessness that will remain until act 5. Left with no legal means through which to pursue arbitration, Barabas works outside the law, enacting the only justice he sees possible in the form of unrestrained revenge. Immediately following Ferneze's exit, Barabas's rhetoric becomes unhinged, morphing from the cool, level-headed tone employed when questioning Ferneze, to the acrid, rhetorically scattered strings of curses he utters throughout the play's remaining acts. When Ferneze leaves, Barabas's sense of injustice boils over and he cries

[24] Shylock makes the same claim in *Merchant*, arguing that to take his livelihood is to take his life (4.1.370–3).

Ay, policy? That's their profession,

And not simplicity, as they suggest.

The plagues of Egypt, and the curse of heaven,

Earth's barrenness, and all men's hatred

Inflict upon them, thou great *Primus Motor*.

And here upon my knees, striking the earth,

I ban their souls to everlasting pains

And extreme tortures of the fiery deep,

That thus have dealt with me in my distress. (1.2.161–9)

This rhetorical turn, as Barabas shifts from speaking in composed sentences to fragmented curses, marks a change in Barabas's interests. From 1.2 on, Barabas pivots from pursuing and protecting his wealth to seeking revenge above all else, promising to send his enemies' souls to hell and the "extreme tortures of the fiery deep" – a threat whose irony is not fully realized until Barabas's fate in act 5.

Barabas's overblown diction exposes *Jew*'s "aggressive energies" that simultaneously drive the play and threaten to destabilize it, as the violent prose tears itself away from the very reality it is intended to describe (Thurn 159). Barabas's shift in diction from careful, diplomatic interrogation, to the uncontrolled and embittered fragments of 1.2 marks a shift in the play as his unintelligible prose increasingly mirrors his unproductive violence. Finding himself the only abused Jew in Malta – a minority of the minority, Barabas's self-interest quickly turns destructive as he focuses his energies on revenge, carrying out seemingly pointless acts of violence that offer no material benefit, instead of making calculated decisions to regenerate his wealth or gain advantage. Unlike a true Machiavellian or profit-maximizer, Barabas spends most of the play –

from 1.2 to 5.2 – acting against his own interests by inflicting violence in a way that is both unpolitical and unsustainable. The apparent irrationality of his actions is underscored by his knowledge, expressed in 1.1, that "nothing violent, / Oft have I heard tell, can be permanent" (1.1.131–2). Barabas says repeatedly in act 1 that he only cares for "[him], [his] daughter, and [his] wealth" (1.1.152) Stripped of these things, he loses his ability to pursue ends rationally. Having lost everything he claimed to have valued apart from his life, he cannot see any benefits against which he would weigh costs.[25] Faced with Ferneze's lawlessness and robbed of his goods, his livelihood, and all legal recourse, his actions have no cost.

Barabas's extreme sense of loss catalyzes the reckless violence which dominates the play through act 5. Though his actions make for dynamic drama, they bring little gain, generating neither personal nor public value. In *The Jew of Malta*, Marlowe creates a world where, instead of generating value, self-interest destroys welfare and erodes social stability. When we strip away the "*enfant terrible*" aspects of Marlowe's showmanship, his plays betray a deep skepticism of society as an ecosystem of "mutual relationships and interdependencies." Instead, "*The Jew of Malta* represents a world of greed, hypocrisy, and selfishness, where faith and justice are conspicuously lacking, and an isolated example of decency, such as Abigail, is soon destroyed" (Bawcutt 48). Trust and justice are the linchpins of a functioning society and economy, both of which are built on the faith that the other party will uphold their side of the bargain and an overarching framework of legal justice that ensures agreements and rights of ownership are both recognized and enforced.[26] The ability to trust transactions arguably undergirds all human exchange whether

[25] His love for and, therefore, valuation of his daughter hinges on her being subservient and fully committed to him and their shared religion. After Abigail joins the nunnery of her own accord, thereby rejecting Judaism, Barabas no longer views her as precious and swiftly discards her, poisoning the entire convent.

[26] For a discussion of the function of trust and justice in market transactions see Kirzner pp. 384–94, Choi and Storr, and Hayek's *The Constitution of Liberty*.

social, economic, or political. Modern political theorists have argued that the institutions "of a free and civilized society, in fact rely upon impersonal economic forces to transform a Hobbesian jungle into a stable and ordered system of law . . . These forces can only be relied upon provided a widely shared ethic already exists which firmly recognizes the 'rightness' of the property rights system and the corresponding 'wrongness' of theft and fraud" (Kirzner 392). In Malta, there is no such recognized ethic. In Marlowe's Hobbesian jungle, with no shared morality, no law, and no empathy to restrain vice, selfless individuals are left unprotected and vulnerable to attack.[27]

Barabas's daughter Abigail, whose virtue "shines like a good deed in a naughty world," is the most glaring victim of this political hellscape (Humphreys 281). Arguably the only selfless character in the play, Abigail cannot survive Marlowe's world of 'all against all' and is quickly consumed by Barabas's need for revenge. When we first meet Abigail in act 1, she is weeping over Barabas's loss and exclaims she is sad

> Not for [her]self, but agèd Barabas:
> Father, for thee lamenteth Abigail:
> But I will learn to leave these fruitless tears,
> And, urg'd thereto with my afflictions,
> With fierce exclaims run to the senate-house,
> And in the senate reprehend them all,
> And rent their hearts with tearing of my hair,
> Till they reduce the wrongs done to my father. (1.2.230–37)

[27] Marlowe's society is not a Hobbesian state of nature, as the citizens of Malta do recognize Ferneze, then Barabas, as their political leader and have tacitly consented to consigning their independent political rights to the chief "Governor." Yet, Maltese society does share several aspects of the "Warre of every one against every one" mentality central to Hobbes' "condition of Man," (Hobbes 91). In this state, every man plots against every other and displays a "known willingness to fight." For Barabas, certainly, Malta holds aspects of a state of war, where, though there may be no actual fighting, "there is so little security of life and property, that [individuals] live in constant fear and productive work is pointless" (Kavka 292).

Abigail's defense, in which she promises to play the martyr and throw herself at the feet of the senate to elicit mercy, is touching but naïve and is quickly shut down by Barabas. Instead of working through the established political system and hoping for mercy, as Abigail plans to do, Barabas finds an alternate solution, advising Abigail that "things past recovery / Are hardly cur'd with exclamations . . . And time may yield us an occasion, / Which on the sudden cannot serve the turn" (1.2.238–42). While Abigail's faith rests on her innocent belief in Christian mercy (a quality that Ferneze has already shown himself to be lacking), Barabas places his faith not in others but in himself, relying on the savings he preemptively hid in his house.

When Abigail reveals that his house has been turned into a nunnery "where none but their own sect / Must enter in," Barabas briefly swings toward desperation before, once again, placing his faith in his own actions and ability to survive, paying no heed to his place in the larger Maltese society. Processing his plight aloud, Barabas exclaims

> You partial heavens, have I deserved this plague?
> What will you thus oppose me, luckless stars,
> To make me desperate in my poverty? . . .
> No, I will live; nor loathe I this my life:
> And since you leave me in the ocean thus
> To sink or swim, and put me to my shifts,
> I'll rouse my senses, and awake myself. (1.2.256–69)

Unlike Abigail, who defines her actions in relation to other parties, describing how she will appeal to the senate on behalf of her father so they will act to lessen his suffering, Barabas relies only on himself, viewing his life as the only one affected and himself as the sole solution. His rhetoric betrays his deep isolation, as he repeats the pronouns *I* and *me*, never referring to his daughter or

their community. He clearly does not view Abigail as part of his suffering or as an agent in finding a solution. Instead, she is treated as a pawn in Barabas's "shifts" – someone to realize the plan *he* generates. While Barabas thinks only of himself, exhibiting an isolated and unsustainable self-interest, detached from *all* other members of society (including his own daughter), Abigail places herself within society's established framework. Out of extreme loyalty to her father, Abigail sacrifices herself to his plot, responding "Father, whate'er it be to injure them / That have so manifestly wrongèd us, / What will not Abigail attempt?" (1.2.275–7). In contrast to her father, Abigail recognizes the impacts human actors have on one another. Abigail defends acting outside of strict morality by stating that *they* have wronged *us*; in response to this injustice, *Abigail* must act to try to restore the social equilibrium by reducing the relative injustice of *their* situation. A glimmer of hope amidst Marlowe's cynicism, Abigail sees herself and her father as part Malta's social network and calibrates her actions to those of other actors.

Unfortunately, Abigail's communal understanding of society does little to help her. As instructed by her father, Abigail pretends to join the convent in order to sneak into their former home and uncover the "gold and jewels" Barabas has hidden beneath the floorboards (1.2.298). Successful in her mission, Abigail leaves the nunnery and drops her disguise only to be used immediately in another of her father's schemes against the Christians. This time, Barabas aims his machinations at her lover, Don Mathias, and Abigail is unwilling to play along. Abigail was able to rationalize the first deception as retributive justice – a necessary action to regain a modicum of equality by recovering her father's wealth. Barabas's abuse of her beloved, Don Mathias, and his fellow suitor Lodowick – who also happens to be Ferneze's son – however, lacks a similarly defensible purpose. Barabas does not possess the pragmatic calculation integral to the *homo oeconomicus* or seasoned Machiavel; instead, he targets all who offend or impinge upon his actions

not out of necessity but out of a perverse pleasure in violence for violence's sake. Abigail's moral purity is no match for Barabas's irrationally violent need for revenge and soon even Abigail falls victim to her father's rage. When Abigail learns that, instead of facilitating the marriage between Abigail and Don Mathias, as Barabas had promised, he "invented a challenge" that "ended both their days," she reenters the nunnery – this time in earnest (3.3.18–21).

Abigail is overcome by the realization that, having played the pawn in her father's revenge plot, she indirectly killed her lover. Alone on stage, a grief-stricken Abigail can find no good in a world of inexplicable violence where, instead of wrong actions being punished systematically, faultless parties are punished for the sake of vengeance alone. Abigail addresses her absent father in a moving soliloquy, challenging her "Hard-hearted father, unkind Barabas":

> Admit thou lovedst not Lodowick for his sin,
> Yet Don Mathias ne'er offended thee:
> But thou wert set upon extreme revenge,
> Because the Prior dispossessed thee once,
> And couldst not venge it but upon his son,
> Nor on his son, but by Mathias' means;
> Nor on Mathias, but by murdering me.
> But I perceive there is no love on earth,
> Pity in Jews, nor piety in Turks. (3.3.36–48)

Through Abigail, Marlowe expresses a deep-seated doubt in society's ability to negotiate opposing interests and find satisfactory solutions. Abigail's soliloquy makes it clear how misaligned her father's actions are with the original offense. He does not respond to Ferneze's assault on his life and livelihood by addressing Ferneze directly; instead, he uses deception to hurt Ferneze via the

death of his son, punishing those who played no part in the initial injury. The sentence does not fit the crime.[28] Barabas's actions against Dons Mathias and Lodowick do not constitute vigilante justice; that, Abigail might have been willing to support, as when she stole back her father's wealth from beneath the convent's floorboards. Instead of being a just reaction to an unjust situation, Barabas's actions for the remaining acts constitute little but uncalculated slaughter. In Malta, self-interest is divorced from public good and characters act in isolation, yielding "a nightmare world where no bargain is possible and no deal holds" – even those between father and daughter (Marino 246). When Abigail acts of her own volition and refuses to serve Barabas's ends, he poisons his own kin and her fellow nuns without hesitation. Viewing himself as a lone actor in an antagonistic world, Barabas executes revenge with no thought to others, including the daughter he claimed was all he needed in act 1.

Without any law or order in Malta, stability can only be regained through the restoration of unchecked authoritarian (mis)rule. Ferneze largely disappears from the play in the middle acts and remains noticeably absent during Barabas's killing spree, conveniently reappearing in act 5 to reclaim power. In Ferneze's absence, Malta has withstood a significant amount of social turbulence. To briefly summarize, Barabas's revenge included: orchestrating Lodowick and Mathias's deaths; killing all of the nuns including his daughter with a pot of poisoned rice; strangling Friar Barnardine and framing Friar Jacomo for his murder (ensuring Jacomo's death); poisoning his corrupt slave Ithamore and his followers with a contaminated bouquet; faking his

[28] Even within the revenger framework, Barabas' indirect killing of Don Lodowick and, especially, Don Mathias makes little sense strategically. Moreover, it violates even the most fundamental forms of "justice" enshrined in the Code of Hammurabi and Old Testament: an eye for an eye. Ferneze ruined Barabas, so quid pro quo logic assumes that Barabas can rightfully ruin Ferneze as retribution. Killing the Governor's son, however, violates the eye-for-an-eye definition of justice *and* leaves Ferneze alive such that he can avenge his son's death and reclaim political authority. Here, Barabas is not only an unwise judge, but unfit Machiavellian, offending his political threat without eliminating him. Barabas's actions here and elsewhere neither achieve a net gain nor shore up his political dominance, leaving him no better off materially and, fatally, much more vulnerable to attack.

own death; and plotting the total destruction of Malta by facilitating the Turks' attack only to strike an agreement with Ferneze to burn the Turks alive while Barabas hosts them for dinner. Malta is far from a stable society. The issue with Barabas's senseless violence is just that: it has no purpose. As Barabas has said repeatedly, he has no desire for political power but simply wants to be able to live in Malta as an alien, enjoying his wealth away from society – as he claims in acts 1 and 5 at least, when he appears to be at his most rational. Faced with the decision between aiding the Turks in their pillaging, which would give Barabas the ultimate revenge on Malta but jeopardize his wealth, or negotiating with Ferneze, Barabas tries to broker a deal with the former governor.

Though too passionate to be truly Machiavellian, Barabas is no political ignoramus and recognizes "I now am governor of Malta; true, / But Malta hates me, and in hating me / My life's in danger," without bringing any monetary or political gain, since making political allies or "friends" would prove difficult given his recent murderous rampage (5.2.29–31, 5.2.39). In an effort to "Slip not [his] opportunity" and benefit from his new political burden, Barabas asks Ferneze "What wilt thou give me, Governor, to procure / A dissolution of the slavish bands / Wherein the Turk hath yoked your land and you?" (5.2.44, 5.2.76–8). Having enacted the larger part of his revenge, Barabas is ultimately brought back to reason by raw self-preservation and attempts to make a deal with Ferneze. Ferneze, though he lacks Machiavellian pragmatism, is a skilled dissembler and promises that if Barabas deals "truly with [Ferneze] as [Barabas]" suggests, Ferneze will procure for Barabas large sums of money from his citizens (money which ostensibly *could* have been collected to pay the tribute in act 1) and let Barabas live "governor still." Barabas responds, "do thou this, Ferneze, and be free: / Governor, I enlarge thee; live with me; / Go walk about the city, see thy friends: . . . And let me see what money thou canst make" (5.2.85–4). Barabas's society sounds much like the free society for which Barabas advocated in act 1 in

response to Ferneze's unlawful seizure of the Jew's goods. Indeed, his advice that the Governor try to see what money he can make on the Maltese market is a saucy restatement of Ferneze's own advice to the impoverished Jew in 1.2: "Barabas we will not banish thee, / But here in Malta, where thou got'st thy wealth, / Live still; and, if thou canst, get more" (1.2.101–03).

Having offered Ferneze his freedom to try his luck on the market, Barabas proceeds to take Ferneze at his word and assumes their trade will be upheld honestly. Shortly after they converse, Ferneze, in the most Machiavellian move of the play, sells Barabas out to Calymath, securing Ferneze's own political advantage and reinstatement as Governor, freeing Malta, and sending Barabas to be burned alive in the cauldron of his own construction. In Malta, with no rule of law, there is no trust; where there is no trust, there can be no social, political, or economic exchange. Instead of enabling citizens to solve their problems through negotiation and accord, as Barabas attempts to do at the end of the play, Malta's lack of legal justice forces society into an all-against-all Hobbesian jungle that can only be tamed by the severe limits imposed by Ferneze's corrupt tyranny.

In some ways, Ferneze's Machiavellian actions at the end of the play are similar to Duke Vincentio's in *Measure for Measure*, which will be the topic of the next chapter. Like the Duke, Ferneze has let political pragmatism slip for the last decade, ignoring his debt to the Turks and allowing the unpaid tribute to grow until it was unpayable by conventional taxation – so he claims. This not only puts Ferneze but all of Malta in an extremely volatile position that necessitates the Governor's immediate action in order to protect his city. In contrast to the Duke, however, Ferneze does not work within the confines of perceived justice to find the least objectionable alternative and maximize common good; rather, he ignores the costs of his actions, publicly invalidates

Malta's legal code, and unjustly sacrifices Barabas "To save the ruin of a multitude" (1.2.98).[29] Treating Barabas as the sacrificial lamb for all of Malta without just cause, Ferneze sets in motion Barabas's subsequent obsession with unmeted revenge, bringing social disorder and enslaving all of Malta under the Turks. Only *after* Ferneze has sacrificed his freedom as Governor and his kingdom's safety does he play the Machiavel and make pragmatic decisions that save his political power and maximize the benefits to the Maltese citizens.

These citizens do not include minority aliens, however, and Barabas is executed without hesitation as Ferneze looks on, deaf to the Jew's pleas for help as he burns alive in the cauldron he had intended for Calymath. In many ways, Barabas's gravest miscalculation was his overconfidence in legal and social order to enable just transactions between citizens. In act 1, we see Barabas confront Ferneze over the legality of the total seizure of his property, reminding Ferneze that his actions violate the legal decree that *all* Jews should forfeit *half* of their estate. Under the false claim that Barabas "denied the articles," which he never actually did, Ferneze seizes all of Barabas's goods but leaves the other Jews' estates untouched. "Will you then *steal* my goods?" Barabas asks plainly (1.2.95, my emphasis). Ferneze answers in the affirmative, confirming that there is no recognition of private property, fair treatment, legal decrees, or rule of law in Malta. Living in a near state of all against all, not recognized or protected by Maltese law, Barabas survives through violence, seeing anyone who insults his Jewish "otherness" as dangerous antagonists who must be neutralized. He is only able to drop this survival mode when he secures

[29] Cheney rather optimistically claims that the "foundational idea of *The Jew of Malta*" is that the "'people must set aside all personal and sectional interests, and learn to equate their own good with the good of the city as a whole'" or the common good (*Marlowe's Rep.* 124). The problem is that Barabas is the one who is forced to surrender his good and he is not accepted as part of Malta's *commons* and will receive few, if any, benefits from Malta's success. The largest indirect benefit he got from Malta's prosperity was economic gain and Ferneze just seized his estate. It is impossible to equate Barabas's good with the state's.

political capital as Governor of Malta and assumes he is in a safe position to make a deal with the enslaved Ferneze.

Regrettably for Barabas, he assumes incorrectly. While Barabas views Ferneze as part of his social stratosphere, "liv[ing] with [him]," walking the same streets, and trading on the same market, Ferneze does not see the "base Jew" as part of Malta (5.2.90–5, 5.5.72). In many ways, it is not Barabas but Ferneze who should be seen as the ultimate villain of the play. Not only does he run Malta's finances into the ground, but by confiscating Barabas's entire estate and ignoring the Jew's pleas for just taxation, Ferneze unleashes Barabas's vengeance on his family, his city, and all of its inhabitants. This is a far cry from Machiavellian pragmatism. At the play's conclusion, Ferneze embraces the worst aspects of Machiavelli, not merely dissembling but acting in bad faith. Neither his legal decree nor his personal promise carries any weight and Ferneze spends most of the play misaligning the interests of prince and state. This makes him no different than Machevil or Barabas and all three characters end the play as caricatures of Machiavelli's teachings.

As a poor Machiavel and worse father, the blood of all the slain characters, including his son, is ultimately on Ferneze's hands. In acts 1 and 5 of the play, Barabas extends a kind of economic olive branch, suggesting that Ferneze and Barabas could live and trade together and still be enemies – just not mortal ones. This vision of trade is one the international community still relies on today to calm geopolitical tensions, as continued market negotiations force "a kind of trade-friendship or partnership" creating a crucial "economic interdependence" that disincentivizes actions that would jeopardize this partnership. This helps contain the violence of intergroup conflict by allying diverse interests through mutual economic gain. Lacking the "spontaneous order" generated by free and fair markets, Malta must remain a divisive and divided society led by an abusive monarch who maintains control by minimizing individual freedom

(Collins 3).[30] *The Jew of Malta* paints a dark picture of destructive self-interest. Rather than generating social value by way of exchange within a network of overlapping relationships, private interests breed social ills, threatening society and necessitating their swift removal. Without law or market forces, individual interests must be constrained by totalitarianism which shackles personal freedoms and eradicates the possibility of organic exchange. Crucially, this leaves citizens unable to solve social issues through negotiation. Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* attempts to remedy this crisis in faith by insisting on the importance of the rule of law.

III. Venetian Market Order and the Rule of Law

Though he takes up many of Marlowe's themes in *The Merchant of Venice*, Shakespeare depicts a more organic society in which the rule of law allows self-interest to mediate social ills rather than spawn them. Swimming in the same dramatic circles as Marlowe, Shakespeare embraced certain aspects of Marlowe's "verbal pyrotechnics" but shows "indifference to or firm rejection of his content" (Logan 136, 16). Shakespeare's works, though brimming with villains and injustices, seem to reflect a more capacious, less cynical view of human nature than Marlowe's: one that certainly interrogates "the manipulation of power, wealth being its sinews" but also celebrates "human goodness" and what "goodness can be among men and women" (Humphreys 289). Humphrey's conditional statement is telling, conveying that Shakespeare's goodness is far from guaranteed; instead, it is a conditional generosity that might be. As Marlowe's cynicism is just under the surface, so is Shakespeare's optimism.

By introducing a stable legal system and the notion of a common good, the Shakespearean marketplace maintains the faith and justice (as well as any society can) so conspicuously absent in Malta, inching closer to a celebration of human potential. I argue that in *The Merchant of Venice*,

[30] For a helpful summary on Hayek's theory of spontaneous order see Collins and Albrecht. For Hayek's own discussion of spontaneous order, see *The Market and Other Orders*.

the locus of this human potential is in society's ability to negotiate disparate interests and resolve conflict relatively peacefully, without shedding any Christian or Jewish blood. This is only possible due to the rule of law and inhabitants' immediate recognition of its validity. It is crucial to underscore that unlike many of Shakespeare's comedies in which rulers bend laws to bring comedic resolution, *Merchant* is the only comedy where resolution is achieved "through adherence to law rather than by law's suspension" (Grace 385). At the play's denouement, Shylock must accept that he "of course, has asked for all this [unpleasantness] by assuming a literalist as well as a legalist stance with regard to the bond" and the law (395). Venice's combination of trust in market order and just legal process enables society to reach less authoritarian ends through more egalitarian means. In contrast to *The Jew of Malta*, stability is not restored by the ruler but by the city's inhabitants. *Merchant*'s Duke spectacularly fails to bring order in act 4, nearly codifying murder and threatening the validity of his city's charter. Instead of being imposed by the political powers that be, the solution is generated by the Venetian citizens themselves.

While Marlowe presents a pejorative, two-dimensional parody of Machiavellian doctrine, Shakespeare's corpus contains a more generous treatment of Machiavelli's political calculus, as evidenced by Portia's cunning performance in acts 4 and 5. Thomas Cartelli identifies Marlowe's philosophical flattening as characteristic of Marlovian dramaturgy. With the potential exception of *Doctor Faustus*, Cartelli notes Marlowe's tendency to pen monologic plays that "speak to their audiences from a single privileged point of view," constructing clear-cut "positions for the playgoer to inhabit." Shakespeare, in contrast, is more willing to feature extreme perspectives as he explores "comparatively radical political" frameworks (136–7). James Shapiro extends Cartelli's analysis, arguing that the "unresolved 'problem' of this problem comedy [*Merchant*] . . . comes from Shakespeare's inability to contain and assimilate what he takes from Marlowe,"

complicating rather than containing Marlowe's subtext ("'Which is the Merchant'" 272). Labelling Shakespeare's intentional deviations from *Jew* an inability, however, seems uncharitable if not inaccurate. In this chapter, I argue that in *The Merchant of Venice*, Shakespeare's rejection of destructive self-interest and positive portrayal of Machiavellian statecraft emerge as purposeful correctives to Marlowe's understanding of social organization that ultimately *solve* society's problems by finding consensual solutions outside of tyrannical rule.

Hugh Grady identifies two distinct kinds of Machiavellianism in Shakespeare's career. In his early drama, Grady finds a "popular discourse" of Machiavellianism clearly inherited from Kyd and Marlowe featuring villains "of the same mettle as, say, Kyd's Balthazar or Marlowe's Barabas." These early plays, like *Richard III* and *Henry VI, part 1*, and their characters caricature and condemn Machiavelli's political theory. The strain of Machiavellianism in Shakespeare's later works, on the other hand, minimizes the grotesque and privileges the practical nature of Machiavellian doctrine as an "attractive and explanatory philosophy of history and politics" – particularly law, state design, and forms of exchange. This later approach to Machiavelli probes and often defends the "critical rationality pioneered in Machiavelli's incisive analyses" but remains "pointedly aware of the use of deception, force, and violence" that is sometimes necessary to the maintenance of social order (46–7). This is the type of Machiavellian statecraft with which Shakespeare experiments in *The Merchant of Venice* through Portia's strategic machinations in act 4. Portia's intervention is no doubt pivotal, but it relies upon a combination of deception and force that make it equally problematic – a tension with which the final portion of this chapter must grapple: one chiefly located in Shylock's tragic fate.

Shylock, when misread, can seem perilously similar to the "Machiavellian" Barabas in his pursuit of vengeance above all else. Like his predecessor, Shylock is far too focused on revenge to

be a true machiavel or *homo oeconomicus*. Yet Shylock's revenge is undoubtedly more evolved than Barabas's slaughter. Instead of turning to violence, Shylock puts his faith in legal and market order, constructing the ultimate revenge plot based on the rule of law and the theory of free and fair exchange, by which both parties enter into an agreement voluntarily because the trade is mutually beneficial. This assumes that each actor is free to choose whether to exchange or not and reasonably able to estimate the risk of the transaction, despite the imperfect information inherent to all trades (the risk of ships being lost at sea or debtors defaulting on loans, for example). Thanks to Venice's rule of law, Shylock can work within the established legal framework to ensure his murderous revenge is perfectly lawful, drafting a contract that entitles Shylock to a pound of Antonio's flesh instead of financial compensation, should Antonio default on his loan.

Though Shylock is calculating, he is by no means objectively rational and lacks the pragmatism of a rigid profit-maximizer, pursuing vengeance over the quantifiable gains of ducats. Shylock explicitly denounces money, claiming the pound of Antonio's flesh is more valuable to him than ducats, as flesh will feed his revenge. Shylock is evidently not a profit-maximizer, but he does maximize his utility, or personal pleasure, by choosing the best combination of goods he can afford, based on the imposed constraints – in this case, Venetian law. This is a crucial difference between Barabas and Shylock: though both men pursue revenge, Shylock does so in an exceedingly calculated way, verbalizing his desires, denouncing that which is not valuable to him, and *choosing* his actions accordingly, while Barabas continually works against his stated interests. Shylock personifies the complex dialogism Cartelli identifies in Shakespeare: on the surface, "the grasping usurer Shylock seems to incarnate" Venice's wealth-obsessed mercantilism. If we assume, as does the theory of the profit maximization, that money is the "primary motivation for human behavior, it would appear that Shakespeare has presented us with something of a paradox."

From one angle, Shylock is a greedy usurer who profits by offering loans at interest to the financially desperate; yet Shylock "seems to be the character in *Merchant* least motivated by economic imperatives." As critics such as Peter Grav have pointed out, the play's crisis does not stem from his obsession with wealth, usury, or his immoral pursuit of financial gain, but his resounding rejection of all three in favor of revenge (85).

Grav argues that "Shylock is patently no Barabas," but if we consider their social alienation, personal motivations, and thirst for revenge, the Jews come out having more in common than not (86). We can see the seeds of Shakespeare's Shylock in act 1 of *The Jew of Malta*, as the then rational Barabas differentiates between Jewish thrift and Christian theft, celebrating the exceptionalism of the Jewish nation as he fixates on his otherness. Before his vengeance hampers his verbal clarity, Barabas draws a distinction between the rightful seizure of goods as outlined by decree and unlawful theft. The labor and cunning required to accumulate wealth is implicit in Barabas's claims that his wealth was "not got so easily" and should not be so casually taken. The implicit is made explicit in Shylock's differentiation between thrift and stealing in act 1 of *Merchant*. Both Jewish aliens in a Christian society, Barabas and Shylock commend the resourcefulness of their ancestors who, avoiding the "malice, falsehood, and excessive pride" of Christian merchants, have "scambled up / More wealth by far than those who brag of faith" (*JM* 1.1.116–22). Shylock similarly praises his people's thrift using the Old Testament's Jacob, who worked within the confines of his agreement with Laban to maximize his gains through his skillful use of animal husbandry (though Shylock's understanding of genetics is notably lacking).[31]

[31] According to Shylock's account, Laban told Jacob that all of the lambs born with multi-colored coats would belong to Jacob. In order to increase the number of spotted lambs, "The skilful shepherd" put colored rods in front of the ewes' eyes while they were "in the doing of the deed." This caused those ewes to birth "parti-colour'd lambs," which then belonged to Jacob (1.3.79–83). Clearly, this is not how genetics work and recessive genes often make animals' coloring particularly difficult to predict, let alone control. Shylock's praise of Jacob reflects the seventeenth-century belief that whatever the female animal sees during the moment of conception would directly affect the appearance of her offspring.

Through his agricultural know-how and craft, Jacob thrived "And *thrift* is a blessing if men *steal* it not" (*MV* 1.3.85, my emphasis).

Shylock's defense of usury as the deft employment of human capital – thrift *not* theft – is refused by Antonio, who denies Jacob's skill and attributes his fortune to Providence, reasoning that even "The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose" (1.3.93). Antonio proceeds to compare Shylock to the devil, an "evil soul," a "villain with a smiling cheek," and a rotten apple. Shylock silently stomachs the religious slander and turns to the business at hand: the loan of 3000 ducats (1.3.94–6). From the start, Shylock views the proposed exchange as a highly personal one and, unlike Jacob, does not try to maximize his profit through thrift, but seeks reparations for the continued abuse he has endured from Antonio. Antonio, who has "[called him] misbeliever, cut-throat dog, / And spet upon [his] Jewish gaberdine" now finds himself needing Shylock's help (1.3.106–09). Before they negotiate the terms of the loan, Shylock looks for an acknowledgement of past wrongs, asking the merchant

> "Hath a dog money? Is it possible
> A cur can lend three thousand ducats?" or
> Shall I bend low, and . . .
> Say this:
> "Fair sir, you spet on me on Wednesday last,
> You spurn'd me such a day; another time
> You call'd me dog: and for these courtesies
> I'll lend you thus much moneys"? (1.3.106–24)

Clearly, neither the minutiae of the loan nor the interest rate preoccupies Shylock who, instead of drawing up a profitable business contract, offers Antonio a choice between humanity and

animosity. Antonio chooses the latter, shaming Shylock further by countering "I am as like to call thee so again, / To spet on thee again, to spurn thee too." Antonio instructs Shylock to lend the money not as "to thy friends . . . But lend it rather to thine enemy, / Who if he break, thou may'st with better face / Exact the penalty" (1.3.126–32).[32] Unlike Barabas, Shylock expresses a desire for basic social acceptance and tries numerous times to join the Venetian community instead of participating in its economy at the margins. Responding to Antonio's inhumanity, Shylock exclaims

> Why, look you how you storm!
> I would be friends with you and have your love,
> Forget the shames that you have stain'd me with,
> Supply your present wants, and take no doit
> Of usance for my moneys, and you'll not hear me,—
> This is kind I offer. (1.3.133–8)

Seeing as Shylock has already admitted to hating Antonio and wishing his demise in several soliloquies, his sincerity in wanting to "be friends" with Antonio and win his love seems dubious at best. Unmotivated by economic interests, Shylock uses the exchange to offer Antonio one last test of the merchant's self-proclaimed Christian compassion before finalizing the terms of his loan.

[32] Antonio's understanding of credit markets is quite Aristotelean, as becomes glaringly obvious in these lines. He is happy to lend money as a friend to Bassanio, as "the superior [richer] person [gets] more honour, and the person in need more gain, since honour is the reward of virtue and beneficence, while gain is what ministers to need" (Aristotle 160). This is only because he and Bassanio are friends, however. By instructing Shylock to lend to him as an enemy, Antonio destabilizes the beneficiary-benefactor relationship by which "the beneficiaries are debtors, the beneficiaries creditors. Thus, just as in the case of loans debtors wish their creditors did not exist, while the creditors actually take thought for the safety of the debtors, so benefactors wish their beneficiaries to exist, since they expect gratitude in return" (171). Antonio's vilification of Shylock is so complete that it erases both the relationship of benefactor-beneficiary and creditor-debtor, leaving Shylock wishing his debtor "did not exist," regardless of Antonio's outstanding balance.

Antonio fails immediately and "violently rejects any claim of kinship, even merely as a fellow human being" (Engle 90).[33]

By offering to participate in Venice's exchange economy as a "friend"[34] and not an alien, Shylock attempts to join the established early modern credit market where personal relationships supersede those of capital.[35] At this point in the scene, however, the offer is performed, not genuinely proffered, as indicated by the imperfect *would*. Antonio has sealed his own fate through his persistent antagonism and refusal to "hear" Shylock. Having faced repeated rejection (and ridicule) by the Venetian credit community, Shylock replaces his usual usance with a less conventional and far less prosperous payment: a pound of Christian flesh. These are not the strategic negotiations of a Machiavellian or profit-maximizing *homo oeconomicus*. Shylock's calculus is strictly emotional. Heeding Antonio's request to lend as to an enemy, Shylock constructs a loan which, *if* defaulted on, would cost Antonio his life.

Unlike Malta, Shakespeare's Venice is a relatively free market where citizens can barter as they choose in a space "tempered by underlying rules . . . that ensure private selves and private property," whether flesh or ducats, "are kept safe" (Tiffany 385). In Venice's marketplace, both Antonio and Shylock make decisions that work against their economic interests: Antonio refuses Shylock's offer of an interest-free loan in exchange for more humane treatment and Shylock rejects

---

[33] It remains unclear how genuine Shylock's offer ever was. Clearly, his use of "would" denotes that the offer of friendship has expired by this scene. His deeply impassioned reaction to Antonio's abuse and his incessant need for revenge, however, betray an emotional response to otherness that suggests Shylock desires at least some kind of acceptance into the Christian community, like the communal, though still not necessarily intimate, relationship provided by an early modern credit network, where interest on smaller loans was not charged.

[34] There is an interesting parallel here with Aristotle's presentation of friendship and beneficence in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which he asks: "For what use is such prosperity if there is no opportunity for beneficence, which is exercised mainly and in its most commendable form towards friends? Or how could their prosperity be watched over and kept safe without friends? . . . In poverty, too, and in other misfortunes, people think friends are the only resort." While this has clear ties to Antonio and Bassanio, as scholarship has long explored, it has murkier, but present, parallels to Shylock as well. After all, he does seem to want to buy entry into their community and offers to lend *gratis* either out of beneficence or his interest in protecting his "prosperity" through community (141).

[35] For a thorough account of England's credit community, see Muldrew (especially pp. 95–195). For a comparison of small versus large cash loans in the context of *Merchant*, see Scott.

the economic gain of making Antonio "pay" for his actions via interest and, instead, selects the monetarily useless payment of human flesh. Both know the relative costs and benefits of their decisions and choose to make them anyway. Accepting Antonio's flesh as collateral may appear an irrational choice to the audience, but remains perfectly rational to the abused Jew. Salerio ribs Shylock, saying "Why I am sure if he forfeit, thou wilt not take his flesh,– what's that good for?" (3.1.45–6). Shylock quickly responds "To bait fish withal,– if it will feed nothing else, it will feed my revenge." Shylock has been too psychologically damaged by Antonio's prolonged dehumanization to respond with economic rationality. Instead of maximizing profit, he maximizes his utility by pursuing revenge.

Antonio's mistake, as Engle intimates, is treating Shylock as a dog, incapable of human empathy, passion, and revenge. In one of the most moving and famous of Shakespeare's speeches, Shylock laments how Antonio has routinely "disgrac'd [him]," stymied business endeavors, poisoned his friends, and "laugh'd at [his] losses . . .and what's his reason? I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? . . . if you prick us do we not bleed? if you tickle us do we not laugh?" (3.1.48–59). Having been so severely belittled, Shylock is forced to remind his Christian neighbors of his humanity in the most literal sense, as he catalogues the eyes, hands, dimensions, and emotional faculties that are uniquely and universally human. Shylock responds to Antonio's dehumanization by returning the favor, putting a price on Christian's life, monetizing revenge, and turning Antonio's human body into a quantifiable good he is all too glad to accept as payment. Far from being irrationally valueless, Antonio's flesh feeds Shylock's desire for revenge. Like Barabas who cautions Ferneze that theft must be countered by stealing, Shylock warns Salerio that in a human society, revenge will be met with revenge.

Shylock, unlike Barabas, nearly gets the full extent of his revenge. The major difference affecting their fates is Venice's maintenance of a reliable legal system. Through Ferneze's tyranny, the governor makes it clear in act 1 that Malta's law is neither impartial nor universally applied, leaving Barabas no legal means through which to exact justice. This is not the case in Venice and, as Walter Lim notes, one of the play's great ironies is that "Shylock's case against Antonio rests upon the very infrastructure of law and economics that facilitates the vibrancy and success of Venetian commercial life itself" (374–5). Shylock's revenge plot was built on Venetian institutions to ensure it would be legally and economically *just*, as Antonio voluntarily consented to the contract's legal terms when making his trade. Antonio, overly confident that his ships would come to port without incident, freely agreed to the unconventional (and life-threatening) arrangement with no deception on Shylock's part. Unfortunately, Antonio's ships all miscarry, "[*his] creditors grow cruel*," and Antonio is faced with his execution, "*since in paying [the bond], it is impossible [he] should live*" (3.2.314–17).[36] Just when all hope seems lost, Portia, the play's real Machiavel, steps on the scene in act 4. Fortunately for Antonio, "the character whose actions" show the greatest mastery and exploitation of the play's "pattern of credit and debit, payment and profit" and "homosocial exchange" is neither Antonio nor Shylock, but Portia (Engle 97). A model of Machiavellian pragmatism, Portia is not ruled by emotion, but by reason, ignoring religious pettiness in pursuit of the socially optimal outcome for Venetian society, all while maintaining the rule of law.[37]

Like Barabas in *The Jew of Malta* and Antonio in act 1 of *Merchant*, Shylock's own decisions throughout the play eventually bring about his undoing – this time, through legal means.

[36] It is significant that Antonio immediately accepts his fate as he knows it is legally enforceable and must be carried out for Venetian law to remain legitimate (3.3.26–36).
[37] Note that Venetian society does not technically include Shylock, for whom the outcome is more than suboptimal.

In contrast to Barabas, however, Shylock actively and consistently chooses the fate he will be dealt. In Venice's market economy, where order is maintained by the rule of law and not through absolute authority, actors are able to reach more horizontal resolutions through negotiation (albeit, not always free negotiation). Instead of being issued their fate by decrees, the parties are forced to *choose* the least distasteful decision based on a set of options, determined and bounded by the established legal framework. By the time Portia enters the scene in act 4 disguised as the young lawyer Balthazar, an incensed Shylock is insistent that the court uphold his contract entitling him to cut a pound of flesh from Antonio's breast. The Duke all but demands that Shylock "not only loose the forfeiture, / But touch'd with human gentleness and love, / Forgive a moiety of the principal," in light of Antonio's recent losses (4.1.24–6). Shylock reminds the Duke that to deny him of his bond would invalidate the law and bring "danger . . . Upon [the Duke's] charter and [his] city's freedom!" (4.1.38–9). Richard Waswo rightly underscores that Shakespeare took "some pains to make the issue perfectly clear: if written contracts are not honored . . . there can be no economy. The law of contracts is absolute; no individual will, learned or monarchical, can alter it. Mercy is supremely irrelevant here" (123).

With mercy off the table, law and individual choice become imperative; act 4's court scene is a master class in both. In defense of the seemingly irrational "fashion of [his] malice," Shylock responds:

> You'll ask me why I rather choose to have
> A weight of carrion flesh, than to receive
> Three thousand ducats: I'll not answer that!
> But say it is my humour,—is it answer'd?
> What if my house be troubled with a rat,

> And I be pleas'd to give ten thousand ducats
>
> To have it ban'd? what, are you answer'd yet? . . .
>
> So can I give no reason, nor I will not,
>
> More than a lodg'd hate, and a certain loathing
>
> I bear Antonio, that I follow thus
>
> A losing suit against him! (4.1.40–62)

Shylock offers the Duke – and Shakespeare his audience – an early lesson in rational choice theory and the individual nature of tastes and preferences.[38] "Shylock's passion for vengeance at all costs" has not "cloud[ed] his judgment and ability to reckon" or made him "impenetrable to reason" as some critics have claimed (Korda 150). It has merely shifted his calculus and redefined what he deems *valuable*. While the economic term "tastes and preferences" is anachronistic, Shylock demonstrates that the utility-maximizing logic undergirding what he labels "likes and loathes" had already seeped into early modern parlance. Shylock publicly recognizes the perceived irrationality of his choice to pursue a "losing suit," acknowledging that if he *wins* "Shylock will lose three thousand ducats, receiving only a 'weight of carrion flesh'" – which, to others, seems an inferior outcome (4.1.62n). It is not inferior to Shylock, who explains the subjective nature of rationality to the opposition. He argues that, hypothetically, if he wishes to pay 10,000 ducats to have a rat killed, it is his right to do so without questioning or explaining his exact motivation. It is simply according to his "humor" or "affections."

Some individuals would gladly pay 10,000 ducats to live rat-free, while others would be happier saving their money and either tolerating the mangy housemate or killing it themselves.

[38] For a general discussion of rational choice theory (RCT) and its strengths and weaknesses in predicting human behavior see Eriksson. For a survey of current literature on RCT and a detailed commentary on the diverse application of RCT in economic theory, see Herfeld.

The market for rat-baners allows individuals to make that decision based on their consumption preferences (their "likes or loathes") and budget constraints – essentially, how they prefer to spend their money to bring them the most pleasure and least amount of discomfort possible (4.1.52).[39] So should it be with other transactions, Shylock argues, including his preference for a pound of Antonio's flesh over monetary compensation. To view "Shylock's penalty for default on the bond [as] 'closer to folklore than to capitalism,'" and his "refusal to accept Bassanio's offer of money [as] a 'rejection of rational-choice economics'" is to ignore Shylock's carefully considered and publicly stated rationale (Lee 354–5). Shylock's reasoning, as he very clearly explicates, is subjective and while it may be difficult for others to understand, it is not irrational. Unfortunately, Bassanio fails to grasp Shylock's unique utility function and responds to Shylock's lengthy diatribe by offering the Jew six thousand ducats. Shylock summarily refuses the sum, stating "If every ducat in six thousand ducats / Were in six parts, and every part a ducat, / I would not draw them, I would have my bond!" (4.1.85–7). Shylock could not be more disinterested in monetary compensation.

In an effort to bring Shylock to heel, the Duke asks "How shalt thou hope for mercy rend'ring none?" Shylock proceeds to tighten the noose of his legal loophole: "What judgement shall I dread doing no wrong?" He knows the law is on his side and reminds the court "If you deny me, fie upon your law! / There is no force in the decrees of Venice: / I stand for judgment,– answer, shall I have it?" (4.1.89–103). In a pivotal moment, Shylock asks the Duke if he will uphold

[39] The Oxford *Dictionary of Economics* defines personal preferences as "Individual tastes, as regards both consumption and work. Personal preferences determine the indifference curves of an individual, and differences in preferences among individuals are reflected in differences in their indifference curves. Personal preferences combine with the budget constraint to determine choices" (Black et al. "personal preferences"). Preferences reflect the idea that consumers must base their consumption – what and how much they decide to buy – on their available budget, deciding which combination of goods at which quantities give them the greatest utility, or personal satisfaction. For Shylock, this is one pound of Antonio's flesh. See "personal preferences," "indifference curves," and "budget constraints" in Black et al., *A Dictionary of Economics*.

Venice's rule of law and preserve its free society, recalling Barabas's "Will you then steal my goods?" (Marlowe, *JM* 1.2.95). The Duke is backed into a corner and knows it. Unlike Ferneze, who casually and very publicly breaks the law when it suits his political fancy, the Duke realizes that to deny Shylock justice would render the entire legal system corrupt and, therefore, meaningless.[40] As the nearly victorious Shylock is whetting his knife, Portia enters disguised as Balthazar. The brilliant irony of Portia's defense is that Shylock not only lays his own trap through the rhetoric he employed in his contract, but proceeds to validate the ruling's legitimacy through his loud insistence on rational choice – the basis of Portia's entire legal performance.

Portia begins where the Duke left off, asking Shylock to be merciful, famously instructing Shylock that "The quality of mercy is not strain'd": it cannot be forced but must be freely given. When Shylock refuses, Portia doubles down on the importance of upholding the law, telling Bassanio that "there is no power in Venice / Can alter a decree established: / 'Twill be recorded for a precedent" and a multitude of similar legal errors will plague the state destabilizing society – "it cannot be" (4.1.214–19). Thinking he has won the day, Shylock celebrates Portia's adherence to the letter of the law, exclaiming "A Daniel come to judgment: yea a Daniel! / O wise young judge how I do honour thee!" (4.1.219–20).[41] But Portia has not finished her performance. Instead of continuing to urge Christian mercy, Portia changes tack and attempts to buy Shylock's mercy in exchange for "thrice [his] money" (4.1.230). Once again, Shylock immediately refuses, having full

[40] Note that there is an overarching difference between the retributive justice Shylock seeks, which has its roots in the Old Testament, and the New Testament's emphasis on mercy. The perception that the "supremely isolated Shylock" is "incapable of upholding the kind of proper and healthy social relations prioritized by *De Beneficiis*" is "enforced through the play's invocation of typological structures specifically aimed at associating the Old Testament dispensation with Shylock's ruthless economic and legal dealings. Shakespeare's audience would have been generally familiar with the idea that the letter of the law claimed by Shylock differs significantly from the New Testament focus on grace and the spirit" (Lim 365).

[41] While Shylock is far more than a caricature of Jewish stereotypes, Shakespeare does not shy away from engaging with the contemporary Christian fear of "Jewish finance" as "reflected in uncertainties about Jewish imagination: standing at the center of an essential network of debt and credit, the problem with Jews was somehow that they too strictly adhered to the letter of texts *while being* masters of misreading, and of theater" (Sheerin 57).

faith in Balthazar, a "well-deserving pillar" of law to uphold justice. An all-too-eager Shylock extols Balthazar, calling him "a worthy judge" who "know[s] the law" before imploring the young judge to "Proceed to judgment . . . I stay here on my bond" (4.1.232–8). Shylock readies his knife, the scale is brought out to weigh Antonio's flesh, Antonio issues his final words, then comes the catch. Emphasizing the importance of upholding legal strictures, Portia announces that Shylock "must cut this flesh from off [Antonio's] breast, / The law allows it, and the court awards it" (4.1.298–9). Shylock's enthusiasm is short-lived. "Tarry a little," Portia adds

> . . . there is something else, —
> This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood,
> The words expressly are "a pound of flesh":
> Take then thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh,
> But, in the cutting it, if thou dost shed
> One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
> Are (by the laws of Venice) confiscate
> Unto the state of Venice. (4.1.301–8)

Shylock has walked into his own trap. His complete confidence in the law and the precise diction of his bond proves his undoing. Shylock's insistence on the wording of the bond which he had used moments earlier to deny Antonio a doctor – "I cannot find it, 'tis not in the bond" – becomes the very means through which he is denied his revenge (4.1.258).

In a brutal bout of irony, Shylock's dangerous insistence on the letter of the law is quickly disarmed by Portia's equally intense literalist interpretation. Faced with Portia's cunning, Shylock immediately realizes the impossibility of securing his bond and attempts to accept the monetary compensation he rejected several times over, telling Bassanio to "pay the bond thrice / And let the

Christian go." Portia will not have it and states "The Jew shall have all justice, – soft no haste! / He shall have nothing but the penalty" (4.1.317–8). Shylock is arguably given *more* than the penalty as Portia "pulls out her second rabbit" and charges Shylock with attempted murder (Watt 293). Venetian law states that if any alien "by direct, or indirect attempts" seeks "the life of any citizen," said party can seize half of the offender's estate, while the other half "Comes to the privy coffer of the state, / And the offender's life lies in the mercy / Of the Duke only" (4.1.346–52).

Shylock's sudden peril recalls the Duke's insistence on the importance of mercy and the Jew's arrogant "What judgment shall I dread doing no wrong?" Now, having chosen to scorn mercy several times in open court, to deny Antonio's right to have a doctor on hand to offer medical assistance, and to construct a bond that essentially guarantees Antonio's death, doctor or no, Shylock has done wrong and is charged with attempted murder. Unlike Ferneze, who lectures on fiscal responsibility and promises honesty but practices neither, the Duke holds himself to his own ethical standards and straightaway shows mercy. He tells Shylock "thou shalt see the difference of our spirit / I shall pardon thee thy life before thou ask it" (4.1.364–5). Shylock, facing the full danger of the legal system he fought so hard to have upheld, is ironically only spared by the Christian mercy he so loudly denounced. Following the Duke's example, Antonio also shows mercy, though its quality is rather strained.[42]

The play's final judgment has been taken by modern audiences as unforgivably spiteful – the "last outrageous bit of hypocrisy meant to further torment Shylock" (Mahon and Mahon 210).

[42]Antonio allows Shylock to keep and live off half of his goods with the stipulation that the other half be given to his daughter and her new and unapproved Christian husband, Bassanio. Additionally, Shylock must leave his estate to the newlyweds upon his death and convert to Christianity. It is disturbing that Antonio is the one to require the conversion since early modern merchants "saw a crucial connection between conversion and commerce." English Puritan writer and preacher Hugh Broughton was so insistent that British merchants would "profit from his labor [converting Jews] that he demanded they assume the financial burden" of his conversion efforts (Shapiro, *Jews* 149). Antonio's conversion of Shylock is at once theologically, socio-politically, and financially motivated which makes his erasure of Shylock's identity all the more disturbing.

Shylock's forced conversion is particularly cruel seeing as it will have little to no impact on his social standing given that early modern conversions "played havoc with conventional ways of thinking about religious identity." In *Shakespeare and the Jews*, James Shapiro identifies three categories of Jews: those who identified as Jewish, those who fellow Jews accepted as Jewish, and those who non-Jews considered Jewish (5–6).[43] Shylock checks all three boxes, particularly since he does not actually perform his conversion at the end of the play but flees the stage, visually disturbed and physically weakened by the notion of converting. Shylock's life may be spared by turning Christian, but his conversion does little to improve his life in Venice, buying him neither acceptance nor the Christian friendship he claimed to desire earlier in the play.

Though to modern audiences, his forced conversion remains irreconcilable with act 5's levity, Shylock has slightly less trouble accepting his fate. When asked by the disguised Portia "Art thou contented Jew? What dost thou say?" Shylock responds "I am content." Given that death is the alternative, it is difficult to call his decision freely made. In making it, however, Shylock accepts that living as a Christian is the best possible outcome for him given the gravity of his charges and the *choices* he loudly insisted upon moments earlier. While the phrase's intonation depends upon the actor, Shakespeare's words denote Shylock's acknowledgment that he has brought this choiceless choice upon himself by rabidly pursuing a literalist interpretation of the law and persistently rejecting any notion of mercy. Choosing between his death and the offered alternative, Shylock decides to content himself with the latter.[44]

---

[43] On the complexities of the public versus private self in early modern England, see Maus's *Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance*.

[44] This is not to say that Shylock is literally "content" in the prevailing modern connotation, but rather that he accepts the situation given his actions and limited set of choices. Hugh Short sees the words as "uttered freely and reflect[ing] Shylock's actual state of mind and soul at the time he speaks them." Short argues this reading "more thoroughly accounts for and accommodates the other details of the play than any of the readings that have so far prevailed, and makes apparent a depth and richness in the play that is otherwise lost" (Mahon and Mahon 199). This seems several degrees too far and it is rather unlikely Shylock is glad or even grateful at the end of the play. Though Shylock chooses

The ending highlights the tragic aspect of this dark comedy. As a genre, tragedy "shows us people *freely choosing* how to understand, and respond to, the profoundly difficult circumstances they find themselves in . . . tragedy is committed to freedom, though tragedy also acknowledges that freedom also [sic] takes place in a specific, and therefore limiting context." For if there were no limits, "there would be nothing to choose between" (Holbrook 17). Tragedy puts under a microscope "people choosing what stance they will adopt towards this world and the difficulties and dilemmas it presents, what choices, given the circumstances, they will make," however "agonizingly limited" those choices are (25, 17). Though *Merchant* is not classified as a tragedy, John Drakakis notes that audiences, readers, and "critics since Rowe have laboured to humanize the figure of the Jew, and to think of the play as Shylock's tragedy" (110). When viewed in this light, Shylock becomes the play's tragic protagonist (or antagonist), choosing what stance he will adopt from an "agonizingly limited" set of options. Under this lens, Shylock shares more with Lear, tormented by his own stubbornness and others' hard-heartedness, than Barabas, who torments others. While Shylock may be relatively content not to die, there is no possible reading in which he is content to convert. If there were, one imagines Shylock would have freely chosen to do so in act 4; instead, he verbally acquiesces and immediately requests leave, with his next to last line being "I am not well" (4.1.392).

However imperfect the ending of this dark comedy is, the stark difference between the endings of Marlowe's *Jew* and Shakespeare's *Merchant* (the most glaring being that the Jew survives) speaks to a fundamental difference in the way Shakespeare and Marlowe envisioned a functioning society. In his *Jew,* Marlowe is unable to conceive of a society that runs organically by relying on the negotiation of disparate interests on a market of exchange and not on totalitarian

---

not to die, he does not *gladly* convert to Christianity and to argue this seems to dull the painfully insensitive and highly antisemitic ending of the play. This would, in turn, diminish the play's richness instead of uncovering it.

rule. In *Merchant*, Shakespeare seems equally unable to imagine a society that functions successfully under unchecked authoritarian rule. *Merchant*'s act 4 is testament to this. Where the Duke fails to find a solution that satisfies everyone, nearly killing Antonio, invalidating Venetian law, legalizing murder, and intensifying the antagonism between the Christian majority and Jewish minority, the market, moderated by the rule of law (and Balthazar's deft Machiavellian pragmatism), achieves a solution to which no party can legitimately object.[45]

* * *

As Portia, the Duke, Antonio, and Shylock all acknowledge over the course of the play, "Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it" (A. Smith, *TMS* II.ii.3.3). Though everyone might not be perfectly happy at the end of *Merchant*, no one need die to restore order, which cannot be said for Marlowe's *Jew.* Instead of being imposed by a single authority, the outcome is determined organically by a legally constrained network of individuals who fit their actions to the those of other parties and are "rewarded, not according to the goodness or badness of [their] intentions, but solely on the basis of the value of the results to others" (Hayek, *Studies on the Abuse* 65). Unlike Marlowe and, as chapter 4 will argue, Ben Jonson, Shakespeare realized in the 1590s what F.A. Hayek would record three and a half centuries later: what human nature and the Christian tradition lacked, markets supplied. Hayek expounds that

> To the accepted Christian tradition that man must be free to follow *his* conscience in moral matters if his actions are to be of any merit, the economists added the further argument that he should be free to make full use of *his* knowledge and skill, that he must be allowed to be guided by his concern for the particular things of

[45] Legally, one *could* object to Portia's presence in the courtroom, as she is neither a man nor a doctor of law. Thus, her fraud could be seen as invalidating the legality of her clever legal solution.

> which *he* knows and for which *he* cares, if he is to make as great a contribution to the common purposes of society as he is capable of making . . . What the economists understood for the first time was that the market as it had grown up was an effective way of making man take part in a process more complex and extended than he could comprehend and that it was through the market that he was made to contribute 'to ends which were no part of his purpose'. (*Studies on the Abuse* 60)

To use the cliché from which Hayek spared us, through market order, man is able to be part of something greater than himself. In *Merchant*, when Christian generosity fails to engender social order, the market, guided by the rule of law, incentivizes parties to act in "the common purposes of society" by protecting their own interests. In *The Jew of Malta*, with no system of law, there can be no equitable system of social or economic exchange. Without any shared ethic, legal order, or market structure, there is no place for mediated neutral exchange and the religious cleavage between the Christian majority and Jewish minority remains intraversable. The one attempt at voluntary inter-group exchange in act 5 between Barabas and Ferneze ends fatally. In contrast to Malta, the Venetian marketplace functions as a neutral space where individual interests and the rule of law, rather than religious bigotry, govern exchanges. This means that "[d]espite the history of hostility between them, the Christians and the Jews can thus engage in what Marshall Sahlins calls 'silent trade,' in which the propensity for self-interested gain at the expense of each other is socially suppressed so that equitable and peaceful exchanges can be conducted between them. This way, the Christians and the Jews can establish a kind of trade-friendship or partnership, which immunizes an important economic interdependence against a fundamental social cleavage between them" (Lee 352). Trading does not suddenly make Antonio and Shylock friends (in fact, far from it), but Venice's free and relatively fair market does ensure that parties can *choose* to trade and that

their rights will be protected if, as Ferneze does, the other party fails to uphold their end of the bargain.

This economic interdependence is crucial to Shakespeare's understanding of social order, which the next two chapters explore in more depth. While Marlowe's characters see their actions in isolation, operating as if there will be no repercussions, Shakespeare writes worlds in which his protagonists and antagonists alike recognize their choices are part of a larger network of interconnected actors. Every action in Shakespearean drama will have some kind of opposite, though not necessarily equal, reaction. The successful rulers and some of Shakespeare's most compelling characters are those who figure out how to use individuals' overlapping interests to maximize social good as, by pursuing his own desires, man is made to contribute unknowingly "'to ends which were no part of his purpose.'" Having absorbed Machiavelli's "lessons into his drama, where we see a continuous flux of circumstance, and where we witness characters" like Portia consistently "redeeming lost situations," Shakespeare dramatizes "how circumstances can be exploited, wrestled with, and resisted; change which threatens to undermine all, properly understood, can be the means to ascendancy," control, and social order – as Duke Vincentio and Hal, the focus of the next chapter, well understood (Vilches 385–6).

CHAPTER TWO

Capitalizing on Vice: Shakespeare and the Invisible Hand of Disguised Authority

> "They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society…" (A. Smith, *TMS* IV.i.10)

> So Vice is beneficial found,
> When it's by Justice lopt and bound;
> Nay, where the People would be great,
> As necessary to the State,
> *As Hunger is to make 'em eat.*
> Bare Virtue can't make Nations live
> In Splendor; they, that would revive
> A Golden Age, must be as free,
> For Acorns, as for Honesty.
> (Mandeville, *FB* 76).

Initially, William Shakespeare and Adam Smith might appear to be strange bedfellows. When examined more carefully, however, the playwright and moral philosopher ideologically converge in more ways than one: most notably in their belief in the benevolent power of markets to turn individuals' vice into public good. Both authors conceded that man was prone to self-love and, while unrestrained avarice was harmful, self-interest constituted a powerful and positive social force when harnessed correctly. Unlike many early modern dramatists who caricature self-interest, creating grotesque villains who meet extreme ends, like Marlowe's Barabas or Jonson's Volpone, Shakespeare offers a more nuanced depiction of greed. As England became increasingly commercial, early modern thinkers like Gerard de Malynes and, I argue, Shakespeare understood that "there could be no 'Commonwealth without private wealth,'" which meant a certain tolerance for vice (Finkelstein 39). Accepting men for what they are, the dramatist sets about trying to understand them by "paint[ing] forth," as Francis Bacon wrote, "with great life, how affections are

kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree . . . and how they do fight and encounter one with another" (267).

Bacon and Shakespeare knew in the early 1600s what Adam Smith would record more than a century later: one vice could conquer another and produce a public benefit, as when the glutted rich "are led by an invisible hand" to feed the poor: their charity does not stem from altruism but from overabundance (*TMS* IV.i.10). Steeped in the political philosophy of early modern thinkers like Bacon, Botero, Montaigne, and Machiavelli, Shakespeare illustrates many of Smith's positions on social networks, pragmatic empathy, and market order as presented in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (*TMS*). The ideological overlap between the two canonical writers, however, has been underanalyzed by both economic historians and literary scholars. In this chapter, I aim to close this gap in scholarship by placing Smith in conversation with Shakespeare to better understand how self-interest operates throughout Shakespeare's corpus. Taking *Measure for Measure*, *Henry IV, Part 1*, and *Henry V* as representative case studies I contend that in Shakespeare's works, self-love operates in a decidedly Smithian way, prefiguring the Scotsman's writings. Though Richard Halpern briefly discusses Smith's invisible hand in the context of tragic action in *Eclipse of Action*, he refrains from discussing any serious politico-economic theoretical interplay between Smith and Shakespeare. Instead, Halpern focuses on the "concept of action entailed by a novel understanding of happiness" and what "must be done to foster public happiness," as opposed to tragedy, across Smith's and Shakespeare's works (34). Though compelling questions, they ignore the strongest ideological similitudes between the two authors and, instead, force the generic constraints of tragedy onto *TMS*, a decidedly optimistic and *anti*-tragic work.[46] It seems time we took the

[46] Halpern's *Eclipse of Action: Tragedy and Political Economy* discusses Shakespeare and Smith in chapters one and three but does so in largely pejorative terms, using Smith's labor theory to claim that "Smithian political economy devalues both tragedy and action" (Ch. 1 abstract). There is little serious probing into Smith's understanding of

thinkers' texts for what they are – in-depth analyses of human action, incentive structures, and social, political, and economic exchange – and not, as Smith writes, what we "might chuse to impress upon [them]" (*TMS* VI.ii.2.17).

Halpern is one of the few scholars who deals at all with Shakespeare and Smith in tandem and I have yet to encounter any research that analyzes Shakespeare's use of the "impartial spectator" figure in his drama.[47] The impartial spectator is one of Smith's greatest contributions to jurisprudential and market theory, second in infamy and importance only to the "invisible hand." The germ of Smith's impartial spectator is already present in Shakespeare's works and serves a crucial role in the dramatic resolution of several plays. By largely ignoring the playwright's parallels to Smith and the intellectual lineage from which both thinkers emerged, Shakespeare scholarship has missed an opportunity to understand how innovative and market-based many of the dramatist's solutions to social ills were and remain today. The impartial spectator is linked in important ways to self-knowledge, Christian doctrine, philosophy, interpersonal and communal relationships, economics, justice, and political science – all of which are fundamental to Shakespeare's dramaturgy and constitute major subfields in twenty-first century Shakespeare studies. Unlocking a new understanding of the dramatist's foreshadowing of Smith's "impartial spectator" allows us to better comprehend Shakespeare's pragmatic and subtle approach to social order and the role of self-interest in society.

---

economic and social value in its own right and no tracking of Shakespeare's prefiguring of Smith's theories by way of early modern political economy.

[47] In his recent article "*Hamlet* and Rational Choice," Jim Leitzel draws interesting connections between Smith and Shakespeare, though much of the conversation is confined to the footnotes. See also: Waswo, "Shakespeare and the Modern Economy"; Lars Engle, *Shakespearean Pragmatism*, particularly his introduction (p. 2), and Wilson, "Why Shakespeare?" for brief connections between Shakespeare and Smith. Paul Cantor discusses Austrian economics and the "invisible hand" in relation to early modern book publishing and mentions Shakespeare in passing in Chapter 1 of *Literature and the Economics of Liberty*.

The tension between private and public interests is at the heart of the majority of Shakespeare's plays, as he explores how justice and sociopolitical stability might be maintained in the face of personal ambitions. Using *Measure for Measure*, *Henry IV, Part 1* and *Henry V*, I argue that Shakespeare's drama – as well as his position as company shareholder – reveals "the extent to which Shakespeare grasped, as did no other writer in the sixteenth century, the central principle of the new economic order that had been developing for three centuries" (Waswo 126). I aim to extend Richard Waswo's analysis by arguing that Shakespeare not only understood and dramatized the mechanics of capitalist markets – what Waswo terms the "fiduciary principle" and "volitional corollary" – but believed personal interests could be channeled to generate socially beneficial outcomes, as Bacon before and Smith after him theorized. The trick, as many of his characters discover, is learning how to bridle self-interest such that it works in service of, rather than in opposition to, public good. Duke Vincentio, in contrast to Prince Hal, learns this lesson the hard way in *Measure for Measure*. In my reading of the problem comedy, the impartial spectator, played by Duke Vincentio, emerges as a key figure in the play's debate over how leaders ought to weigh private vice against public good to maintain (or regain) social order.

Throughout the play, Duke Vincentio struggles to square private and public interests and takes Vienna from having too much to too little freedom overnight. Yet, despite the Duke's early jurisprudential wobbles, he has an intimate understanding of human nature and political design whereas Angelo, his temporary replacement, understands neither. Angelo's inability to view human imperfections with humanity and interpret others' actions empathetically, as what Smith terms an "impartial spectator," ultimately proves his undoing. In *Measure for Measure,* Shakespeare presents gradations of vice, ranging from the laughable faults of Lucio and the tapsters to Claudio's more serious oversteps and the nearly fatal shortcomings of Angelo, who embodies Smith's rigid

and fallible "man of system." While tragedy is ultimately avoided, the play ends with legal and poetic justice as Lucio, Angelo, and the Duke all face the consequences of their self-love.

Building on the political wisdom of writers such as Francis Bacon and Niccolò Machiavelli, Shakespeare's Duke takes advantage of man's immorality to produce the most socially beneficial outcome given the constraints, turning vice into a productive, positive externality. King Henry V takes this pragmatic approach to human nature a step further in *Henry IV, Part 1* and *Henry V*, capitalizing on men's corruption to gain greater glory for the Crown. Surpassing Vincentio's mastery of statecraft, Hal deftly exercises Smith's and Machiavelli's theories of interest in both plays, having learned valuable lessons in commerce and politics from the grubby streets of Eastcheap. I hope to show that, contrary to Engle's claim that "prior to Adam Smith, the market had little of its contemporary ideological valence as a normalizer or harmonizer of needs and capacities," in Shakespeare's works, the market emerges as a key harmonizing space (2). The three plays offer a pragmatic representation of self-interest as something that cannot be eradicated and, therefore, must be directed in order to reach a socially beneficial outcome, given the sociopolitical constraints. Self-interest in itself, Shakespeare suggests, is not inherently negative; it is when personal interest harms *common wealth* that vice is no longer tolerated and perpetrators must be punished.

I. The Duke of Dark Corners: Machiavelli's Fox, Smith's Jurisprudence

In addition to being culturally dissimilar, early modern England was economically distinct from continental Europe. Joyce Oldham Appleby underscores that in England, unlike Europe, fundamental ideas of capitalism had been circulating for "so long a period of time that the categories of thought associated with [modern] capitalism appeared to the English as timeless forms imprinted on the very stuff of the human brain . . . Modes of behavior," such as profit-

seeking or cost minimization "shaped by a commercial society were viewed as characteristic of human nature in general" (17). As discussed in detail in chapter one, by the turn of the sixteenth century, self-love was considered an inherent and irradicable part of the human condition which drove men "to contract, truck, merchandise, and traffic with one another" in markets of all kinds, both domestic and public (Wheeler 316). John Wheeler, sixteenth-century merchant and secretary of the Merchant Adventurers of England, saw trading as an intrinsically human impulse and thus categorized all transactions, whether between merchants, husbands and wives, or a prince and his subjects, as exchanges made on markets, based on personal desires (Wauchope). Two decades later, fellow merchant Edward Misselden defended trade by asking "And is it not lawful for Merchants to seeke their Privatum Commodum in the exercise of their calling? Is not gaine the end of trade? Is not the publique involved in the private, and the private in the publique? What else makes a Common-wealth, but the private-wealth . . . of the members thereof[?]" The desire to profit from trading "amongst themselves, and with forraine Nations" is not only instinctive but often publicly beneficial: the more profits merchants accrued as individuals, the fuller the Crown's coffers (qtd. in Finkelstein 61).

A wise prince then, would not only tolerate, but encourage private interests that bred public prosperity. This pragmatic approach to avarice was starkly opposed to the puritans' ostensible antagonism toward profit-seeking, which sought to root out excessive self-love in the name of divine love.[48] Outside of puritan extremism, religion and investment were seen as deeply intertwined, not only coexisting but augmenting one another, as merchants were thought to be

[48] See O'Donovan's *The Problem of Self-love in St. Augustine* for an in-depth account of Augustine's theology concerning divine versus earthly love, particularly self-love. See Grewal for how later theologians and theorists interpreted and applied Augustine's teachings, leading to Smith's "political theology." For an account of how religious self-love became increasingly secular in early modern England, see Muldrew's "Self-Love and the Transformation of Obligation to Self-Control in Early Modern British Society."

protected by Providence, thus validating the trade of the devout.[49] Niccolò Machiavelli and Adam Smith both found Christianity integral to a functioning state and economy, though the men conceived of religion in vastly different ways (and Adam Smith was genuinely devout).[50] Though Smith is often credited with founding the discipline of economics, many of the principles of cost-benefit analyses, pragmatism, rational choice, and sociopolitical exchange can be found in Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses*.[51] This intermingling of religion with politics and economics was not always popular with readers, however. Machiavelli and Smith have been equally misconstrued by subsequent generations of readers and critics who created cultural myths that long outlived and overshadowed the authors themselves. In the words of Nobel laureate Amaryta Sen, "Shakespeare did not say it, but it is true that some men are born small, some achieve smallness, and some have smallness thrust upon them. Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, has had to cope with a good deal of such thrusting," usually in the name of "conservative extremism" and neoliberalism in the United States and the United Kingdom. Adam Smith, a vocal proponent of charity and wealth distribution would be astonished (and likely not

[49] For a discussion of how divinity, service to the Church, and the profit motive became intertwined in the premodern economy, see Caferro, "Premodern European Capitalism, Christianity, and Florence." As we see in Dauber, responsible investment (risk), service (labor), and reward are a long-standing part of the Christian tradition. Max Weber famously emphasized the importance of Protestantism in both validating and growing pro-capitalist ideology in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber writes that the "most importann[t] criterion" for measuring the "usefulness of a calling, and thus its favour in the sight of God . . . is found in private profitableness. For if that God, whose hand the [devout see] in all the occurrences of life, shows one of His elect a chance of profit . . . the faithful Christian must follow the call by taking advantage of the opportunity" (108). This is clearly a twentieth century understanding of providential support of the merchant class, but many early moderns felt similarly; we see the tension between labor, usury, and Christian desert at play in *The Merchant of Venice*.

[50] See Vatter's "Machiavelli and the Republican Conception of Providence" for the complexities of Machiavelli's political theology and Ballor and Cornelis van der Kooi's *Theology, Morality and Adam Smith* for how Christianity shaped Smith's writings.

[51] See Jérémie Barthas's "Machiavelli, Public Debt, and the Origins of Political Economy: An Introduction" and Kendall D'Andrade's "Machiavelli's Prince as CEO."

for the better) to learn he and his "invisible hand" are being "implicate[d to justify] the straight and the narrow" of laissez-faire economics ("Adam Smith's Prudence" 28).[52]

In her 2022 book *Adam Smith's America*, Glory Liu describes at length how Smith's theories were reappropriated in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to validate "conservative ideology" by think tanks like the Adam Smith Foundation "'working to stop needless government regulations,' 'fighting waste and abuse of taxpayer dollars,' and 'working to constrain activist judges'" (xiii). Seen by most as the founder of economics and "ingenious Scotsman who revealed" the coordinating mechanism of the market's "invisible hand," "distorted notions of self-interest, free markets, and 'the invisible hand' have eclipsed Smith's moral philosophy, jurisprudence, and more," turning Smith into an emblem of conservative extremism rather than careful, balanced philosophical thought (xiii–xv). As the rest of the chapter seeks to elucidate, this version of Smith ignores the largest portion of his thinking, teaching, and writing on moral philosophy and radically misrepresents his views on markets and justice. Far from encouraging the unrestrained accumulation of wealth or power, Smith and Machiavelli advocated prudence. More specifically, their works probe into how individuals' negative qualities, like greed or deception, might be channeled by prudential self-love to enrich public welfare. Put simply, Machiavelli viewed this public good as a stable state maintained by a powerful, self-interested prince, while Smith's public good was the national wealth and justice produced by individuals tending to their own interests.

What Machiavelli and Smith present as prudent decisions taken by pragmatic individuals was rewritten as villainy, giving the early modern stage the antagonistic machiavels of Barabas

[52] F.A. Hayek notes that while not fully warranted, "There was perhaps some excuse for the revulsion against Smith's formula [for social order], because he may have seemed to treat it as too obvious that the order which formed itself spontaneously was also the best order possible." Hayek credits Smith's contemporary, Josiah Tucker, with more clearly expressing their shared belief *not* that "'the universal mover in human nature, self-love' always did receive, but that it 'may receive such a direction in this case (as in all others) as to promote public interest by those whose efforts it shall make towards pursuing its own'" (298).

and Richard III, and twentieth-century Hollywood capitalist degenerates like *Wall Street*'s Gordon Gecko. This hostile view of Smith as the architect of callous, free-market capitalism is far more legend than reality, seeing as "Adam Smith was *not* an economist" but a moral philosopher and he "never uses the term 'capitalism'" (Liu xv; Weinstein). A large part of Smith's misrepresentation is due to the celebrity of his "invisible hand" metaphor. Ironically, his most well-known phrase comes from his least well-known work, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.* If you asked the average layman what he knew about economics, he would probably mention scarce resources and the trusted laws of supply and demand. If you asked him about Adam Smith, he would likely cite the invisible hand of free markets and *The Wealth of Nations*. Smith's theory that self-interest can function as an imperceptible guide, however, derives from his moral philosophy treatise, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, and not his economic work. *TMS* does not focus on personal gain but on man's natural capacity for empathy and "fellow-feeling." Smith uses the phrase "the invisible hand" to conjure perceptions of Providence rather than greed; he is not discussing trade or rent-seeking but wealth distribution. He explains how the rich inadvertently feed the poor by ridding themselves of the remains of their bounty as

> The rest he is obliged to distribute among . . . those who provide and keep in order all the different baubles and trinkets, which are employed in the economy of greatness; all of whom thus derive from his luxury and caprice, that share of the necessaries of life, which they would in vain have expected from his humanity or his justice . . . [The rich] divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life . . . and thus without intending

> it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. (IV.i.10)[53]

Smith displays his indebtedness to thinkers like Thomas Smith and Montaigne by arguing that vice can be virtuous in spite of the individual's actual intentions. This is not a ringing endorsement of self-interest, but a pragmatic admission that self-love is both inevitable and essential to the maintenance of social order and, Smith posits, humanity itself.[54] For "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (*WN* 1.2). The same interest that causes the butcher to sell meat so he may buy bread for his family, also promotes charity, benevolence, and justice in society.

Smith believed that social order stemmed from individuals' shared fellow-feeling, or empathy: "We can sympathize with the distress which excessive hunger occasions" because we "imagine ourselves in the situation of the sufferers, and thence readily conceive [their] grief, the fear, and consternation . . . We feel, ourselves, some degree of those passions, and therefore sympathize with them" (*TMS* I.ii.I.2). Smith, like his early modern counterparts, presents the passions, sympathies, and interests as co-dependent. We sympathize with our neighbor out of our own self-love, driven by the fear that we might one day feel hunger and the hope that our neighbor would share his bounty. The same passion that drives man to avoid future starvation by feeding his famished neighbor also compels him to improve his society more broadly. According to Smith, humanity is pained by witnessing hunger and other suffering, as we imagine our own empty bellies, and derives pleasure from eradicating imperfections and "beholding the perfection of so beautiful

---

[53] For a succinct survey of the use of the phrase "invisible hand" before Smith and its important theological implications, see Harrison's "Adam Smith and the History of the Invisible Hand."

[54] Without self-interest, Smith argues there would be widespread famine, death (particularly among the lower classes), and a dwindling of the population which would catalyze a vicious cycle therein producing yet fewer workers, less food, and increased death rates due to famine.

and so grand a system." It is out of this love of beauty and grandeur that we "promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures" from our own desire "to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and orderly system" (IV.i.11). From this theory of self-love emerges Smith's conception of the just ruler or "impartial spectator," whose notions of what is *just* stem from the empathy generated by his self-interest which leads him to judge others as he would himself. Far from a break with tradition, Smith's theories on individual and national interests constitute a natural progression from thinkers like Augustine, Machiavelli, Misseldon, and Thomas Smith. Adam Smith's ideas, though reframed, are clear descendants of early modern England's increasingly commercial economy and the ideologies and theology that evolved to enable the pursuit of individual and national wealth accumulation.[55] In the face of England's new market growth, the question was not whether private interests were bad but how the state might square individual and national ambitions: how could they balance personal with national gain in a way that promoted justice and a stable, prosperous Commonwealth.

As chapter 1 explores in detail, a trusted legal system with recognized property rights is one of if not the most critical preconditions for national wealth accumulation. This causes ruminations over private and public interests to quickly seep from economic into legal thought. Adam Smith's approach to equilibrating public and private interests is instructive and, I suggest, emphatically Shakespearean. The Smithian approach to justice focuses not on "'what would be perfectly just institutions?'" but on 'how would justice be advanced?'" (Sen, "Intro" xvii). Smith draws a distinction between the impartial spectator, whose judgment stems from fellow-feeling, and the "man of system" who forces all citizens to submit to his will. Unlike the man of system who imagines he can control men "with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces

[55] See Grewal for a discussion of the development of the commercial society and its politico-theological roots.

upon a chess-board," the wise ruler "will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people" (VI.ii.2.16–17**)**. Shakespeare brings this binary to life over a century before Smith in *Measure for Measure*. By pairing Duke Vincentio, the impartial spectator figure, with Angelo, the rigid man of system, Shakespeare reminds us that justice must bend to accommodate human nature or it will break. Angelo epitomizes the man of system who is

> so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without any regard either to the great interests or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it. (A. Smith, *TMS* VI.ii.2.17**)**

Having been given the reins temporarily by Duke Vincentio, Angelo immediately sets to work trying to stamp out all vice from Vienna and rehabilitate the law, which the duke has "let slip" (Shakespeare, *MM* 1.3.21). Striving toward the impossible ideal of heavenly perfection, Angelo proclaims that "All houses in the suburbs of Vienna must be plucked down" (1.2.88–9). He wastes no time but "insist[s] upon establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition," his own ideal of justice, showing "the highest degree of arrogance" (A. Smith, *TMS* VI.ii.2.18). He does not consider the public's "great interests" or "strong prejudices," but acts out

of his own understanding of what society *ought* to be, without any consideration of what society *is*. Mistress Overdone and Pompey are quick to see the other social ills this proclamation will spawn, citing unemployment and the creation of a black-market economy as collateral damage:

> Mis. O. Why, here's a change indeed in the commonwealth! What shall become of me?
>
> Pom. Come: fear not you: good counsellors lack no clients: though you change your place, you need not change your trade: I'll be your tapster still; courage, there will be pity taken on you; you that have worn your eyes almost out in the service, you will be considered. (Shakespeare, *MM* 1.2.96–103)

Mistress Overdone's language, as she pits the commonwealth against herself as an individual, highlights the irony of Angelo's proclamation: what was intended to better the commonwealth hurts its citizens. Without her business, however morally questionable it may be, Mistress Overdone is undone, with no livelihood or means of subsistence. Her vein question "What shall become of me?" makes clear that she is not part of Angelo's Commonwealth – her existence at the fringes of society has now been obliterated and she and her business excised. Pompey swiftly reassures her that while the law may have closed the whorehouses, it has done little to change people's penchant for them and will simply force the brothels underground, for "good counsellors lack no clients."[56] Where the commonwealth does not provide, individuals' vice will ensure that Mistress Overdone is taken care of.

Immediately following this scene, we learn that Claudio has been condemned to die by Angelo for the common offence of sleeping with his betrothed before their marriage had been certified:

---

[56] It is an understood tenet of contemporary economics that total government regulation leads to black-market economies, as notably seen in the drug trade, prostitution, and market for human organs. For an explanation of underground economies and their origins see Hall's "Underground Economy"; for an in-depth exploration of vice and public policy, see Jim Leitzel's *Regulating Vice*, especially "Chapter 6: Commercial Sex."

Thus can the demi-god, Authority,

Make us pay down for our offence by weight.

The words of heaven; on whom it will, it will;

On whom it will not, so; yet still 'tis just. (1.2.112–15)

Using Claudio as a mouthpiece, Shakespeare questions the contemporary idea of "justice" that saw the divinely-ordained prince as a god among men who could punish people however he saw fit, basing punishments on whim rather than reason.[57] Shakespeare spends the rest of the play demonstrating how *unjust* Angelo's justice is. When Lucio asks what Claudio has been charged with, we learn that Angelo's justice is more performative than legally sound. Lucio, surprised that Claudio would be jailed for sexual escapades asks "Is lechery so look'd after?," to which Claudio explains that although the law has slumbered for nineteen years but "this new governor . . . *for a name* / now puts the drowsy and neglected act / Freshly on me" (1.2.133–60, my emphasis).[58]

Though Claudio assumes Angelo is enacting such harsh laws to garner political capital, Angelo's strict rule seems to stem equally from his ignorance of human nature and statecraft. Every other character in the play – excepting, perhaps, Isabella – accepts as fact that men's "natures do pursue, / like rats that ravin down their proper bane, / a thirsty evil" (1.2.120–2). Lucio repeats this sentiment more explicitly in act 3, explaining to the disguised Duke "in good sooth, the vice is of a great kindred; / it is well allied; but it is impossible to extirp it quite, / friar, till eating and drinking be put down." Lucio then reports that the gossip on Vienna's streets is "Angelo was not made by man and woman," for his lack of passions makes him "a motion ungenerative" or, in modern vernacular, a robot (3.2.97–108). The disguised Duke does not disagree with this, responding "You

[57] See Halper.

[58] The Duke says fourteen years. The discrepancy could either be due to a compositional error or Shakespeare may have forgotten his previous reference.

are pleasant sir, and speak apace." Encouraged by the Duke, Lucio continues and condemns Angelo's killing of Claudio for what even the Duke knows to be a "general" vice: "Why, what a ruthless thing is this in [Angelo], for the rebellion of a codpiece to take away the life of a man!" He proceeds to rib the Duke for sharing the same vice, as do all men, claiming "He had some feeling of the sport; he knew the service; and that had instructed him to mercy" (3.2.109–17). Whether or not the Duke is as flawed as some critics believe[59] or as sexually liberal as Lucio implies, he understands that if given the rein, men will run "as headstrong jades," necessitating the "needful bits and curbs" of statutes and laws (1.3.20).[60]

While the Duke's character remains opaque, Angelo's repressed sexuality is painfully clear.[61] Throughout the play he is presented as inhuman in his denial of his passions – for the first act of the play, at least. Lucio talks of Angelo as "not made by man and woman," positing that "A little more lenity to lechery would do no harm in him. Something too crabbed that way" (3.2.94–100). The Duke shares Lucio's sentiment, telling Friar Thomas "Lord Angelo is precise; . . . scarce confesses / That his blood flows; or that his appetite / Is more to bread than stone." The Duke's use of appetite is noteworthy as we will witness Angelo's "power change purpose" when Angelo is overtaken by his sexual appetite in the second act (1.3.50–54). Smith addresses the issue of repressed passions in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, arguing that the problem is not the excessive indulgence in pleasure but the dereliction of duties that is most offensive. It is when our passions

[59] In the so-called "problem play" *Measure for Measure*, the Duke is an especially problematic character, putting "critics under stress" and causing disagreement "over the kind of figure the Duke is – benevolent, all-knowing, successful, or bumbling, comic, sententious, and flawed" (Howard 149).

[60] Knoppers, for instance, writes regarding his marriage proposal: "The Duke decides, suddenly and with little apparent emotion or forethought, to marry. He does not seem to have changed. He never talks about falling in love with Isabella and seems insensitive to her needs and her desires. The Duke is rather, like Angelo, 'moved' by the simultaneous display of chastity and shame; as with Angelo, he offers Isabella her brother's life in exchange for her chastity. It might suddenly occur to the audience that Lucio, in his insinuations about the Duke's lechery, may not be lying after all" (469).

[61] For further debate on the Duke's character, see Burkhardt and Riefer.

are "not restrained by the sense of propriety, when it is unsuitable to the time or to the place, to the age or to the situation of the person" and when in indulging it he neglects his duty "it is justly blamed as excessive" and harmful to society. In other words, "What is chiefly to be found fault with is not so much the strength of the propensity to joy as the weakness of the sense of propriety and duty" (VI.iii.21). To say Angelo's actions in *Measure for Measure* are unrestrained or unsuitable to time, place, or station would be an understatement. Had Angelo accepted his humanity and indulged his desire in a *suitable* way, things would have been much different. Instead, by forcing himself into a moral straitjacket – and expecting others to do the same, while striving for that which is "set down so in heaven, but not in earth," he authors his own downfall (2.4.50). Shakespeare preempts Smith's analysis that "Our sensibility to the pleasures, to the amusements and enjoyments of human life, may offend, in the same manner, either by its excess or by its defect. Of the two, however, the excess seems less disagreeable than the defect" (*TMS* VI.iii.21). Shakespeare effectively writes Smith's opinion into the resolution of *Measure for Measure*, in which Claudio is spared – even rewarded – for his excessive passion, while Angelo is publicly disgraced and punished with a forced marriage to his ex-lover.

Angelo's refusal to acknowledge the existence of human passions – his *defect* – ensures his inability to perform the defining task of the impartial judge: putting one's self in the other's position and judging others as an impartial spectator would.

> We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man, according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it. And, in the same manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from

> his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it . . . Whatever judgment we can form concerning them, accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others. We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. (A. Smith, *TMS* III.i.2)

Angelo fails every aspect of this test, multiple times. In a prophetic foreshadowing of the latter half of the play, Escalus – whose name evokes the scales of justice – cautions Angelo against enforcing the law too harshly, too fast. In response to Angelo's concern that they not "make a scarecrow of the law" Escalus counters

> Ay, but yet
> Let us be keen, and rather cut a little,
> Than fall, and bruise to death . . .
> Let but your honour know –
> Whom I believe to be most strait in virtue –
> That in the working of your own affections,
> Had time cohered with place or place with wishing,
> Or that the resolute acting of your blood
> Could have attain'd th'effect of your own purpose,
> Whether you had not sometime in your life
> Err'd in this point, which now you censure him,
> And pull'd the law upon you. (2.1.4–16)

Angelo, deaf to Escalus' counsel, answers "'Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus, / Another thing to fall" (1.2.17–8).[62] Significantly, this exchange opens act 2, an act bookended by scene one, in which he condemns others for falling, and scene four, in which he himself falls. By the end of the act 2, Angelo has "give[n his] sensual race the rein" and urges Isabella "Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite" (2.4.159–60). The language of Angelo's proposition places it in dialogue with the Duke's exchange with Friar Thomas in act 1, drawing on the metaphors of men as "headstrong jades," needing tight reins and "curbs" to control the passions. Angelo, unable to maintain his strict asceticism, has loosed the reins and, no longer feeling the bit of restraint, gives himself over to sexual pleasure.

Measure for Measure, like *The Merchant of Venice*, is divided between those characters who see justice as the interpretation of laws fit to maximize public good – most obviously Escalus and the Duke – and those who see the law as a black and white document, applied *exactly* as it is set down – as we see represented in Angelo and satirized in his constable Elbow. Angelo, as Smith's "man of system," sees the world in black and white. His rigid understanding of the law renders justice unjust and legal code quickly becomes a parody of justice. Nowhere is this clearer than in his lacky, the constable Elbow. Elbow is satirized from the moment he enters and states his name: "If it please your honour, I am the poor Duke's constable, and my name is Elbow. I do lean upon justice, sir, and do bring in here before your good honour two notorious benefactors," to which Angelo responds, "Benefactors? . . . Are they not malefactors?" (2.1.47–52). Elbow, as Escalus notes, is anything but a "wise officer." As a constable under the Duke, he is an extension of the Duke's power to enforce the law. His name, however, depicts him not as an arm of the law, but an *elbow* – a subpart of a subpart of the body politic. He speaks most truthfully in his first line in

[62] Isabella makes a similar argument to Angelo in 2.2, instructing him to mercy: "If [Claudio] had been as you, and you as he, / You would have slipp'd like him, but he like you / Would not have been so stern" (2.2.64–6).

saying “If these be good people in a commonweal, that do nothing but use their abuses in common houses, I know no law” (2.1.41–3). He quickly shows us that, indeed, he knows no law proving, contrary to his intention, that those he is arresting must be good people. When asked by Angelo if the criminals are not *malefactors* instead of *benefactors*, Elbow answers “If it please your honour, I know not well what they are. But precise villains they are, that I am sure of, and void of all profonation in the world, that good Christians ought to have” (2.1.53–6).

Though Elbow’s “misplacings” or malapropisms render the pitiable constable unable to articulate what he means, they allow Shakespeare to elucidate a higher truth: Vienna’s justice system “knows no law” and cannot properly differentiate between malefactors, who mean the commonwealth harm, and benefactors who do not. Elbow has little idea who Pompey and Froth are and, instead, blindly follows commands, labeling them “precise villains” – of that he is *sure*. Yet they are precise villains “void of all profanation,” immediately nullifying his “sure” accusation. When Angelo asks why Elbow is unable to speak, the accused Pompey jumps in, jesting “He cannot, sir: he’s out at elbow,” implying he lacks the wit to respond (2.1.60). Pompey is, more or less, correct and we learn that Elbow knows of this “hot-house” because his wife has been there for what seem to be less than pious reasons. As Elbow recounts his story, Escalus, once again, questions Elbow’s reliability as an enforcer of justice, asking Angelo “Do you hear how he misplaces?” but Angelo does not respond (2.1.87). In fact, Angelo does not respond for the majority of the exchange, forcing Escalus to conduct the questioning until Angelo finally abdicates his role as arbiter and “leave[s Escalus] to the hearing of the cause; / Hoping [he’ll] find good cause to whip them all” (2.1.135–6).

Elbow continues his assault on Pompey and Froth without evidence, clinging to the assertion that because they are tapsters, they wronged his wife. When pressed for evidence by

Escalus, Elbow responds with a slew of accusations but confuses "suspected" with "respected" rather irrecoverably: "First, and it like you, the house is a respected house; next, this is a respected fellow; and his mistress is a respected woman," mistakenly defending the very people he is trying to accuse (2.1.159–61). The scene unravels further with Pompey saying – rightly so – that Elbow's wife is more respected than all of them. Elbow, thinking his wife's honor has been besmirched, bursts forth with threats aimed at Pompey and what should have been a legal trial becomes pure parody. This scene takes premarital sex, the central issue of the play – a play which still looks to be heading toward Claudio's death and Isabella's rape – and turns it into farce: the mistresses, tapsters, and whore-houses are more "respected" than Elbow's wife, who has never been "respected with man, woman, or child" (2.1.165–6). Escalus finally ends the absurdity and provides the antidote to deaf justice: humanity – not mercy, but the understanding of Smith's impartial spectator. Instead of heeding Angelo's advice to "whip them all," Escalus shows firm compassion, letting Pompey off with the warning that should he cause trouble again Escalus will beat him and "prove a shrewd Caesar" to Pompey (2.1.245–6). Additionally, he promises to lighten Elbow's duties as constable by adding more men to his staff. These acts of beneficence are immediately followed by Escalus' admission to Justice that though he "grieves" for Claudio, "there's no remedy," for "Mercy is not itself, that oft looks so." Mercy given too freely becomes normalized such that forgiveness is no longer granted but assumed, allowing lawlessness to flourish. Fittingly, Escalus shows more balance than Justice, constantly seeking to avoid "second woe[s]" by prioritizing public good over individual griefs, including his own (2.1.277–82).

Unlike Escalus, the Duke seems to have only recently recognized the need for *selective* mercy and now must set about achieving across Vienna the equilibrium Escalus has just shown us microcosmically. In the opening act of the play, after he hands Angelo temporary control of Vienna,

the Duke asks Friar Thomas to "give [him] secret harbour" so the Duke can observe the goings-on in Vienna unrecognized. The Duke's intentions behind disguising himself – and as a friar at that – remain one of the slipperier questions of the play. It has been suggested that the Duke is, himself, in trouble romantically and must escape "the dribbling dart of love" though the Duke denies this.[63] The reason he gives is "More grave and wrinkled" than matters of the heart and is purely political (1.3.2–5). Duke Vincentio claims to have "for this fourteen years . . . have let slip" Vienna's laws, to a point where he has lost his power to enforce them, becoming "more mock'd than fear'd: so our decrees, / Dead to infliction, to themselves are dead, / And Liberty plucks Justice by the nose" (1.3.21–9). Friar Thomas presses him on this, pointing out that the Duke could have "unloose[d] this tied-up justice when [he] pleas'd" and his station as Duke would have made him more "dreadful" or feared than Angelo (1.3.31–4). The Duke responds by saying that this course of action would be "I do fear, too dreadful. / Sith 'twas my fault to give the people scope, / 'Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them." Instead, he puts the burden on Angelo "Who may in th'ambush of my name strike home," with his natural propensity for rigidity, "And yet my nature never in the fight / To do in slander" (1.3.34–43). The Duke has devalued mercy by forgiving vice too freely and must now rehabilitate justice. Claudio corroborates this account by confessing that his fate was caused by

> too much liberty, my Lucio. Liberty,
> As surfeit, is the father of much fast;
> So every scope by the immoderate use
> Turns to restraint. (1.2.117–20)

[63] See Brown for an overview of the Duke's questionable sexual conduct and critics' responses.

By overindulging in liberty, which becomes license, Claudio has lost his freedom and by allowing Claudio and the other citizens of Vienna this overindulgence, the Duke has lost his authority. Instead of solving the problem directly, the Duke disguises himself and leaves Angelo to restore law in Vienna without damaging his own reputation as a benevolent ruler. Vincentio quite literally becomes Adam Smith's impartial spectator, trading his politician's robes for a friar's habit and, with it, his partial position as ruler for the impartial one of confessor – a job based on listening and *not* adjudicating. Through the Duke, as we will see again with Henry V, Shakespeare literalizes Smith's impartial spectator, taking advantage of the disguised ruler convention to present a complex and pragmatic form of jurisprudence that combines Smithian sympathy with Machiavellian deception and political calculus.[64] It is his disguise as the impartial Friar Lodowick that allows Vincentio to spectate Angelo's "change [of] purpose" and ultimately redeem Isabella, pardon Claudio, and revive Vienna's law, all while maintaining his image as benevolent prince – more loved than feared, but now respected (1.3.54).

Unlike Angelo, who tries to root out all vice from Vienna, the Duke takes a more pragmatic approach to vice, fighting Angelo's deception with counterdeception in the form of a bed trick. In a striking soliloquy comprised of rhyming couplets, the disguised Duke criticizes Angelo

> . . . whose cruel striking
> Kills for faults of his own liking!
> Twice treble shame on Angelo,
> To weed my vice, and let his grow! (3.2.260–3)

[64] The disguised ruler was a popular convention in early modern drama. It allowed the ruler to evaluate his people's loyalty and the efficacy of his rule directly, away from the flattery of his court. Living among his citizens, he witnessed their plight firsthand. By cutting himself off from court, the ruler eliminated the middlemen and enabled the fellow-feeling, self-knowledge, and conscience that Shakespeare and Smith found essential to sound jurisprudence and governance. For more on the disguised ruler on the early modern stage, see Quarmby.

Speaking as an 'everyman' the Duke calls Angelo out for his hypocrisy, recognizing what Angelo refuses to admit: all men, including Angelo, contain these human "faults" and "vices." The Duke implicitly emphasizes the importance to sound judgement of what Smith would later term sympathy and imagination. In contrast to Angelo, the Duke knows "We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man" based on our understanding of our own capacity to act similarly and "sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it" (*TMS* III.i.2). Angelo's "lack of self-knowledge is his Achilles' heel. In this play, as in all of Shakespeare, self-knowledge is a foundation for knowing anything else," including the sentiments (and thereby potential guilt) of others (Yoshino 692). Angelo prioritizes his life in the "City of God" over his existence in the "Earthly City" and, regrettably, quickly falls from both.[65] He is as ignorant of his own nature as he is of the reality of the human condition. As a result, he is vulnerable to both "refut[ing] the core contention (made by Vincentio, Isabella, and Escalus throughout the play) that he, as a sinner himself, cannot judge others" (691). The Duke, in contrast, understands his own imperfect nature – the need for his vice and others' to be contained – and Angelo's hypocritical immorality. Upon this realization, Vincentio pivots from Smithian sympathy to Machiavellian statecraft, knowing that to fight Angelo's outward show of virtue and maintain his own princely benevolence, the Duke must apply "Craft against vice." From this blend of sympathy and political prudence, the bed trick is born and Vincentio tricks Angelo into sleeping with his previous betrothed, Mariana, instead of Isabella.

[65] Augustine famously made this distinction in his *De civitate Dei contra paganos* (*On the City of God Against the Pagans*). For analysis on the theological and social implications see O'Donovan. Angelo makes the mistake of overvaluing God's city at the expense of his life on earth. This goes against Augustine's teachings, which stressed harmony, acknowledging the complications of balancing earthly and divine love but rejecting extremism.

Though morally ambiguous by today's standards – and likely by early modern ones as well – there is a gratifying poetic justice to Angelo's fate.[66] The bed-trick, notes Marliss C. Desens, is squarely political, being arranged neither to fulfill the duke's sexual fantasies nor serve his sexual self-interest. Yet, despite its political motivation, critics have consistently overlooked "Vincentio's political self-interest" (102).[67] The Duke's language, reminiscent of Bacon's in *The Advancement of Learning*, validates Desens' hunch as the Duke promises to set one "affection," craft, against vice "to master one by another" (Bacon 267). Like Bacon, who advocates fighting "beast with beast," Machiavelli counsels that a prince must be half man and half beast and "know how to make use of both natures," for "one without the other is not durable. A prince therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion" – the fox to discover the "snares" of evil and a lion to terrify the "wolves," or malefactors. Vincentio knows that he cannot keep to strict, transparent morality "when such observance may be turned against him" and the political situation does not allow him to keep strict faith. The prince would not need to deploy the fox "If men were entirely good . . . but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them" (*Prince* 57). Montaigne echoes this sentiment, writing that the "The public weal requires that men should betray, and lie, and massacre" to maintain a

[66] See Wilson's "'When evil deeds have their permissive pass'" for an examination of current standards of justice, consent, and policing in states as it applies to *Measure*. For early modern audience reception regarding the moral ambiguity of bed tricks in performance, see Desens.

[67] Despite Desens' open invitation to critics in 1994 to analyze Shakespeare's prioritization of Vincentio's political statecraft, I have not encountered any scholarship that has done so to any serious extent. Benjamin Bertram's "*Measure for Measure* and the Discourse of Husbandry" comes the closest; however, his analysis is primarily focused on early modern notions of husbandry and husbandry manuals and is limited by the strict binary he draws between Lucio's "wasteful" husbandry and the Duke's "joyless economy" (a notion which is hard to square with the Duke's speeches, actions, and reputed past). For peripherally related discussions of "mysteries of state" and "Machiavellian fraud" (though the analysis conveys little engagement with Machiavelli's *actual* positions), see Fadely and Planinc respectively. For a survey of the use of the bed trick in early modern drama and its reception history, see Desens.

stable state (B2[r]). Though he stops short of massacre, the Duke does lie and, arguably, betray his "office" (albeit a fake one) as confessor for Vienna's public "weal."[68]

While Angelo strives toward a heavenly perfection that, as Isabella notes in act 2, is impossible to achieve on earth, the Duke sees his citizens more realistically and accommodates "his public arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people." Being unable to establish a perfect ideal of justice, Vincentio does "not disdain to ameliorate the wrong; but, like Solon, when he cannot establish the *best* system of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear" (A. Smith, *TMS* VI.ii.2.16, my emphasis). This means justice marked by selective mercy. The Duke puts on Machiavelli's fox and leaves Angelo to play the enforcer while Vincentio watches from the safety of his habit. By literally and figuratively embodying the impartial spectator, the Duke sets in motion his heroic rescue and revitalization of Viennese law, rendering mercy more scarce while the Duke himself appears more merciful. Vincentio has perfected Machiavelli's prince who must equally exercise strategic deception and

> know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler . . . it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to *appear* merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. (*Prince* 58, my emphasis)

[68] Debora Shuger cautions against making too much of the Duke's deception, reminding us that "had Shakespeare thought it important for the audience to realize that, in disguising himself as a friar, the Duke had done something wildly improper, the play would have raised the possibility," noting that "the Duke speaks several times with real friars," none of whom "rais[e] an eyebrow" (5).

The Duke proves himself a model Machiavellian, knowing it is in his best interests to *appear* merciful and upright, but harmful to the state to always be so. Luckily for the Duke and Vienna, he knows how to "change to the opposite" and in so doing, moves deftly between the lion and the fox to regain social order. By taking this cunning, backdoor approach to conflict resolution, the Duke maximizes public good, minimizes damages, and maintains his image of benevolent monarch to his people: Isabella's virginity is spared (though she now faces the Duke's unexplained and unanswered marriage proposal), Claudio is saved, Angelo is demoted and forced to marry Mariana, Mariana gets her beloved, and Lucio is punished for his lewdness with marriage to his mistress. Legal and poetic justice have been meted out, *measure* for *measure*.

While the remedy of the bed trick is certainly questionable by today's standards of consent, it seems the least offensive alternative given the constraints, minimizing personal damage to Isabella while maximizing public good. Duke Vincentio cannot be perfectly "upright" because humanity is not, as reflected by Vienna's citizens. Through the Duke's subtle politicking, Shakespeare, like Machiavelli before and Bernard Mandeville after him, shows himself to have been intimately aware of man's imperfections. A century after Shakespeare, Mandeville defends necessary government intervention, writing

> it is the grossest Absurdity, and a perfect Contradiction in Terms, to assert, That a *Government* may not commit Evil that good may come of it; for, if a Publick Act, taking in all its Consequences, really produces a greater Quantity of Good, it must, and ought to be term'd a good Act. … no sinful Laws can be beneficial, and *vice versa*, … no beneficial Laws can be sinful. (*A Modest Defense* F3^{r})

Though a touch fallacious in its logic, Mandeville's Machiavellian utilitarianism is one Shakespeare seems to endorse through the ultimate success of Duke Vincentio. To be clear,

Mandeville is "far from encouraging Vice, and think[s] it would be an unspeakable Felicity to a State, if the Sin of Uncleanness could be utterly Banish'd from it." As pragmatists, however, Mandeville and Shakespeare accept that "it is impossible: The Passions of some People are too violent to be curb'd by any Law or Precept; and it is Wisdom in all Governments to bear with lesser Inconveniences to prevent greater" (*FB* 127). In the cost-benefit analysis political leaders must daily conduct, a wise statesman will recognize that in order to gain the greater benefit of keeping the peace, he must tolerate the lesser evils of human nature and quash those that "injure the whole people" (Machiavelli, *Prince* 54). Vincentio knows this and though he rouses Vienna's slumbering law by the end of the play, he tolerates the "lesser inconveniences" of Claudio and Juliet's pre-marital sex, Vienna's tapsters, and Lucio's lewdness to prevent greater crimes, like those of extortion and rape. By privileging public benefit over idealistic moralism, the Duke combines Smith's impartial spectator with Machiavelli's rational Prince: aware of his own and others' faults but unafraid to use subterfuge to secure the largest social benefit for the common wealth.

II. Hal: Machiavelli Meets Selective Mercy

Unlike Vincentio, who learns the value of scarcity through trial and error, Prince Hal needs no lessons in political calculation and makes no mistakes. Contrary to more cynical readings of Prince Hal, I posit this is because the prince not only knows others but knows himself well enough to balance Smithian empathy with political necessity. While the Duke's motivation behind his disguise is largely based in public interest and personal fault, as he seeks to repair the legal system he let collapse, Hal's deceptions are more squarely self-interested – or initially appear so. Though Hal's actions do ultimately add to the Commonwealth by bringing greater political stability and expanding the empire, Hal is motivated by his own interests, offering a more obvious example of

private vice – his desire for honor – generating public wealth. Written at the close of the sixteenth century, *Henry IV, Part I* depicts an increasingly commercial, market-oriented London, based on transactions, accounting, and imported commerce. Hal's London is a city where turkey and bacon are shipped to the table instead of plucked from the backyard. Prince Henry is not just at ease in this grubby, commercial London, but he thrives in it. Hal's time in Eastcheap is an education: through his swaggering around taverns and whorehouses with the "lads in Eastcheap," he absorbs the language and ideology of commercial London that he will use in potent political ways when he finally makes his bid for power (2.4.14).

In his sun soliloquy in act 1, Hal narrates one of his most brilliant political plays and the one that has produced the most anxiety among critics who cast him as a "steely," opportunistic Machiavel who plays on the emotions of his fellow countrymen and "slough[s]" off his friends when it suits him (Fisher 152, 164).[69] Stephen Greenblatt has an even darker view of Hal as "We are continually reminded that Hal is a 'juggler,' a conniving hypocrite, and that the power he both serves and comes to embody is glorified usurpation and theft" ("Invisible Bullets" 30). Greenblatt sees the prince as "meanly calculating" and practicing "systematic" "betrayals" (35). Lars Engle similarly accuses Hal of "a systematic taking of advantage that Hal himself seems to pursue consistently but not to understand." Melding political and economic theory, Engle uses Adam Smith to explain Hal's abdication of agency, claiming there is a "logic of state beyond his control . . . at work like an invisible hand here" (115). Engle's reading of Hal as passively manipulative ignores the prince's stated, intentional investment strategy and misuses Smith's metaphor of the invisible hand in convenient (and careless) ways. When viewed in this light, Hal is diminished to "a façade, a man without inner depth, an actor, a player of roles, a pseudo-king, a Machiavel who

[69] See Sjoberg for more on Hal as Machiavel.

dons the mask of virtue for political ends" (McAlindon 124). "The notion of Hal," McAlindon writes, "as a mere player of roles, an actor, is one of the most conspicuous features in the critical tradition which represents him as an essentially deceitful prince, or as someone whose royalty" is counterfeit (133).

This biting characterization of Hal is only partly true, however. While compellingly dramatic, it suffers from a blinkered, two-dimensional response to the complexity of Machiavellian statecraft and the long-run cost-benefit decisions responsible political leadership demands. Unlike Falstaff, the play's real juggler, Hal's apparently selfish actions are nearly always in service of his higher purpose of strengthening the state. When read through the lens of political necessity, Hal exemplifies the values forwarded by Machiavelli, Thomas Smith, Wheeler, Malynes, Hobbes, and other political economists writing during England's economic and political growth. Through Hal, Shakespeare delineates beneficial and harmful self-interest, condoning self-interested actions that enrich the realm but punishing actors whose vice actively harms the Commonweal. Harmful avarice, like that of Falstaff's embezzlement in *1H4* and the treason and unsanctioned pillaging in *HV*, is not tolerated. Self-interest, as Shakespeare presents it, may be morally questionable in the strictest terms of Christian theology (Hal is not always the portrait of piety), but it is not criminal. It is when personal interest harms public welfare that perpetrators are punished.

Regardless of whether one thinks Hal is a "Machiavellian militarist" or an "ideal monarch," he is undoubtably no cherub (Wentserdorf 264). The first time we see Hal in act 1, the heir apparent is stumbling out of a whorehouse talking of "cups of sack" and "fair hot wench[es] in flame-coloured taffeta" (1.1.7-11). Strengthening the case against Hal, this scene immediately follows a tense exchange of political strategy between the King and Westmoreland, placing Harry's base, roguish lifestyle in direct contradistinction to the high political office he should be holding as heir

apparent. Only after agreeing to take part in a robbery with his thieving friends does Hal explain the purpose behind his dubious behavior: "I know you all, and will awhile uphold / The unyoked humour of your idleness." From the first line of his soliloquy Hal distinguishes himself from the riff-raff in Eastcheap, claiming he will put on *their* "unyoked humour," and wear their disdainful apathy to mask his ambition. Hal employs a moralizing language of bridling or "yoking" one's passions, exhibiting great control over his own as he counterfeits their baseness. Unlike his lowly peers, Hal is only imitating their vile behavior, like the sun

> Who doth permit the base contagious clouds
> To smother up his beauty from the world,
> That, when he please again to be himself,
> Being wanted, he may be more wondered at
> By breaking through the foul and ugly mists
> Of vapours that did seem to strangle him. (1.2.185–93)

Hal's casual repudiation of his Eastcheap crew has proven the hardest for critics and audiences to stomach. He describes the lads in decidedly negative terms yet, most brutally, they are neither his enemies nor his friends, but vaporous pawns he intends to abandon once they have served his political purpose. The Prince knows from the start that his success means the destruction of the Eastcheap lot and Hal willingly makes this trade to amplify his future political power. Hal effortlessly blends the political with the commercial, moving from a Machiavellian explanation of the utility of political puppets into a lesson on the principle of scarcity. His speech is politico-economically sophisticated, showing a mastery of statecraft and important "mercantile strategies" such as "maximiz[ing] demand" by limiting supply (Fischer 161). Knowing that things are only valuable because they are scarce, Hal explains that

If all the year were playing holidays,

To sport would be as tedious as to work;

But when they seldom come, they wished-for come,

And nothing pleaseth but rare accidents.

So when this loose behavior I throw off

And pay the debt I never promised,

By how much better than my word I am. (1.2.185–200)

His language is not unlike Escalus' characterization of mercy in *Measure for Measure*: "Mercy is not itself that oft looks so" (2.1.283). When desired goods are overabundant, they lose their value and soon holidays feel like work and mercy reads like law.[70] Unlike Duke Vincentio, Hal understands the value of scarcity to a political leader *before* he takes office, though we do not see his mercantilist expertise in its fullest form until he is crowned.

As he extends his politico-economic musings, Hal's language becomes increasingly economic, transitioning from the value of scarcity to notions of debts, repayments, and the rate of return on his actions. A large part of Hal's success is "because he cultivates an attitude toward temporality drawn from a commercial order that not only acknowledges the difference between today and tomorrow, but attempts to profit from it" (Maus, *Being* 50). Hal is not, as Engle posits, guided by some unknowable "invisible hand." To the contrary, his present knavish behavior is an intentional investment in his reformation of tomorrow as he forgoes current public glory so he may "show more goodly and attract more eyes" when he "throw[s] off" his base behavior and "pay[s] the debt" he never chose by becoming king (1.2.198–204). Unlike Duke Vincentio who was forced to manufacture his heroic reformation, Hal's excessive libertinism is strategic: he is playing the

[70] Note the linguistic origin of *goods* as that which is "good or beneficial" ("good, adj., n., adv., and int.").

long game. Through his calculated use of performed immorality, Hal turns present vice into future political virtue, maximizing his own and, by extension, the state's political integrity simultaneously.

Though both Henry IV and V understand the principle of scarcity, the prince proves himself to be a more skilled political strategist than his father. While King Henry IV intentionally minimized his public sightings to appear more "wondered at," Hal acts to maximize his political power as king through his reformation. In contrast to his father, Hal ensures he will be wondered at *and* loved by the people. The differences in the political strategy of the King, who deposed Richard II, and Prince, who will inherit his father's "stolen" crown, underscore the questions of legitimacy surrounding Bolingbroke's rule – questions of which Hal is acutely aware. Henry IV's speech to his son in act 3 closely parallels Hal's confessional to the audience in act 1, but with several key deviations. In place of Hal's metaphor of a patient sun waiting to cast off the foul clouds, the King compares himself to "a comet" who, "By being seldom seen, I could not stir / But . . . I was wondered at." He juxtaposes his "rareness" with King Richard's vanity as Richard "ambled up and down / With shallow jesters and rash bavin wits" and "Mingled his royalty with capering fools." Richard debased himself and, like Hal, "Grew a companion to the common streets" and "being daily swallowed by men's eyes, / They surfeited with honey and began / To loathe the taste of sweetness" (3.2.46–72).

The King reappropriates Hal's sun metaphor from act 1 and uses it against him, viewing Harry's actions not as political savvy but as weak vanity reminiscent of the deposed king. According to his father, Hal, like Richard II, spends too much time wasting his royal presence on the vile majority, thus rendering himself common and vulgar, instead of valuable. Commonality, however, is precisely what Hal seeks with his future subjects, knowing that, unlike his father, his

kingship was not won and thus his inheritance rests on contested grounds. Hal understands what Henry IV does not: to legitimate his rule, he needs not only the awe of the people, but the loyalty and respect of *all* constituents, including the "vile" masses of Eastcheap. In Machiavelli's terms, "to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers . . . to be severe and gracious" he must ingratiate himself with *le peuple* and princes alike (*Prince* 27). Harry, as we see come to fruition in *Henry V,* manages to be loved by his people (for the most part) and feared by his enemies. This success, I argue, is due to his shrewd calculus of present versus future political value – a notion learned from commercial London and one Harry describes in economic terms in response to his father's accusations.

By playing the sinner in Eastcheap, Hal engineers his own redemption and garners political capital that surpasses even his father's. As Hal answers his father, he slips farther into the language of investment and rates of return, wishing

> For every honour sitting on [Percy's] helm,
> Would they were multitudes, and on my head
> My shames redoubled! for the time will come,
> That I shall make this northern youth exchange
> His glorious deeds for my indignities.
> Percy is but my factor, good my lord,
> To engross up glorious deeds on my behalf;
> And I will call him to so strict account,
> That he shall render every glory up. (3.2.142–9)

Prince Harry is a shrewd investor, trading his past shames for Percy's glory on a market where martial skill breeds political capital. Harry frames his promise in terms of a return on investment, wishing Percy's honors and his own shames were doubled in order to maximize the glory Hal will receive when he defeats Percy and wins his "glorious deeds." Hal plans to not only to eradicate his "shames" but profit from them and his counterfeited vice.

Harry exercises the cardinal rule of investment and forgoes current consumption of glory to gain greater future glory and political renown. He understands that in this trade, Percy "is but [Hal's] factor," or financial agent, and will "engross up," or purchase, glory on Hal's behalf. Only when Percy's glories have been fully accumulated will Hal hold him to "strict account" and force Percy to make good on the trade by giving Hal every recorded honor (3.2.146–50). Hal's accounting metaphors reflect England's increasingly commercial exchange economy where household and business financial bookkeeping were routine. Having started in Italy, "From the Middle Ages to the end of the 19th century, double entry [bookkeeping was] *the* accounting method," allowing investors to "evaluate past investments" and adjust future behavior. Carruthers and Espeland argue that double entry bookkeeping worked as a rhetorical frame and, like diction, was frequently manipulated "to convey a desired impression, legitimate someone's performance, or bolster a particular position," such as Hal sacrificing Percy for England's common good (47).[71]

This reading of Hal qua accountant is corroborated by the fact that double entry accounting was not limited to the merchant community but, in tandem with literacy, steadily spread from the merchant to the non-merchant classes. As citizens became more financially literate, they tended to

[71] This is not substantially different from modern accounting, which legally allows accountants to weight numbers in a way that forwards their chosen financial and corporate aims. In this way, the weighted numbers function like the rhetorical frame Carruthers and Espeland describe, allowing one data set to tell multiple, potentially conflicting stories about a firm's health. For more on the flexibility of corporate accounting as it relates to income smoothing and accounting discretion, see Allayannis and Simko.

become more rational and "more easily persuaded by accounting information," structuring their actions in a way that maximized credit and minimized debt (51). Hal exemplifies England's growing accounting literacy as he conceives of his political (in)action in financial terms. Not only does it illustrate the widespread use of accounting ideology, but also the evolution of double entry bookkeeping as a tool not solely deployed for financial accuracy, but also for "its ability to conceive of concrete transactions" as "fluid and manipulable abstractions" (Ganim 298). Hal's investment plan subtly blends the concrete accuracy of accounting with the unquantifiable, abstract notion of martial glory.[72] His frequent use of "econo-contractual metaphor" demonstrates the degree to which Hal has "abandon[ed] feudalism," and "accept[ed] a different economic construct of reality": one where the new value of individual investment supplements his promised inheritance (Fischer 150).

Even Hal's profiteering has its limits, however. Though Hal is evidently not above using people for personal gain, he draws the line when individual interest harms the collective good. This harmful self-interest is most clearly illustrated by Falstaff, whose self-love escalates over the course of the play from petty thieving to essentially embezzling government funds. The difference between how Hal and Falstaff approach battle as soldiers and military commanders encapsulates Shakespeare's differentiation between sanctioned self-interest and corrupt criminal behavior. By act 4 of *1H4*, we have seen Falstaff rob travelers at Gadshill, subsequently lie about his cowardice, avoid his debts, mistreat Mistress Quickly, and display a level of blustering knavishness that manages to be both humiliating and endearing. This is all tolerated. His actions in act 4, however,

[72] Double-entry bookkeeping was developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth century and "By 1500, computation of a trial balance and closing balances could be done rapidly and accurately, showing changes in the profit and equity of individual partners, credit risks, and the overall health of the firm from year to year" (R. Black 48). See Carruthers and Espeland for a history of accounting in England and Ganim for accounting in England and Chaucer. See James for an annotated transcription of contemporary William Laud's household accounts.

mark a decisive break with this loveable "goodly, portly man" as his greed overtakes any possible sense of loyalty to Hal or duty to his nation (2.4.410). Having been generously handed the command of an infantry unit by Hal, Falstaff proceeds to abuse his position by using the draft to enrich himself at England's expense. Falstaff is keenly aware of the sad state of his soldiers and brags

> If I be not ashamed of my soldiers, I am a soused gurnet. I have misused the king's press damnably. I have got, in exchange of a hundred and fifty soldiers, three hundred and odd pounds. I press me none but good house-holders, yeoman's sons . . . I pressed me none but such toasts-and-butter, with hearts in their bellies no bigger than pins' heads, and they have bought out their services; and now my whole charge consists of . . . slaves as ragged as Lazarus in the painted cloth, where the glutton's dogs licked his sores; and such as indeed were never soldiers, but discarded unjust serving-men, younger sons to younger brothers, revolted tapsters and ostlers. (4.2.11–29)

Falstaff has (mis)used his military office not in service of the state, but to line his own pockets, harming the Commonwealth's interests by producing an army so enfeebled that they seem unlikely to reach the battle, let alone win it. These are not the soldiers with which to defend the King and Falstaff knows it. Hal walks in at the end of Falstaff's soliloquy and both Harry and Westmoreland note how "beggarly" Falstaff's troops are (4.2.68). The prince subtly calls Falstaff out on his corruption, claiming Falstaff's "theft hath already made thee butter," as Falstaff grows still fatter (read richer) at his troops' expense. Hal admits that he "did never see such pitiful rascals," to which Falstaff replies "Tut, tut, good enough to toss; food for powder, food for powder. They'll fill a pit as well as better" (4.2.59–66). Falstaff does not value the lives of his "exceeding poor and bare" soldiers, but looks after his own interests at the expense of public welfare (4.2.68). While Falstaff

consigns his enfeebled, impoverished troops to a mass grave, Hal tries to spare his men by challenging Hotspur to single combat "to save the blood on either side" (5.1.99).[73] In direct opposition to Falstaff, Hal knows "there is many a soul / Shall pay full dearly for this encounter / If once they join in trial" and acts to prevent the unnecessary slaughter of both armies (5.1.83–5). Though Hal desires to defeat Percy for his own political gain, he objects to personally profiting at the expense of human life and attempts to secure the least harmful outcome from what promises to be a bloodbath. Unlike Falstaff who famously rejects honor, Hal's pursuit of glory feeds national interests, differentiating his noble political interests from Falstaff's ignoble and publicly harmful avarice.

It is precisely this virtuous pursuit of honor that distinguishes Hal from Falstaff and the lads of Eastcheap. While Prince Hal covets honor, Falstaff and his thieving comrades see it as hollow label, not a valuable asset to be won.[74] Nowhere is this more obvious than in Falstaff's "honour" speech, in which he subverts the language of debt and payment Hal uses in act 3 to justify his cowardice. As the King's troops prepare for battle, Hal instructs Falstaff to be brave and embrace his fate on the battlefield, as "thou owest God a death." After the prince exits, Falstaff responds "'Tis not due yet; I would be loath to pay him before his day." He then tries to reassure himself that he fights for honor, but soon rethinks this, finding no value or use in "honour" alone. Catechizing, Falstaff asks

> Yea, but how if honour prick me off when I come on? how then? Can honour set to a leg? no: or an arm? no: or take away the grief of a wound? no. Honour hath no skill in surgery,

[73] Jamey Graham challenges the authenticity of Hal's actions, arguing that rather than wishing to spare his men, "Hal wanted to be seen as the sort of man who would challenge Hotspur to single combat at this stage of the battle" (259).
[74] Dauber notes that the origins of British capitalism are equally based in the pursuit of courtly honor and Christian glory. In both instances, systems were put in place that converted secular and religious honor to assets that could be quantified and won through certain behaviors or codes. This acculturated people to the market process and provided the foundation from which many market-based capitalist processes sprung. See Dauber, Ch. 1 "The Reformers' Commonwealth" for an extensive discussion on religion, the state, and pre-capitalist forms of reward.

> then? no. What is honour? a word. What is in that word honour? What is that honour? air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? he that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? no. Doth he hear it? No . . . Therefore I'll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon. (5.1.125–40)

Alone on stage, Falstaff drops his characteristic jocularity and explores a somber truth. Honor is not useful or tangible in and of itself: it cannot save you from death, fix the injuries incurred in battle, or even be perceived as other valuables are, being neither audible nor tangible. Honor is but a "scutcheon" or veneer, gilding the ugly surface of battle with a façade of worth. There is profound truth in Falstaff's soliloquy. Honor alone, is empty – it is only the value invested in honor by one's individual pride that makes it worth pursuing. While Falstaff has a high tolerance for humiliation and low valuation of public image (as we witness repeatedly in the tavern scenes), Hal does not. Instead, Hal thrives off his carefully constructed image as sun king: divinely ordained, true, but worthy of the throne due to the honor he wins in battle. By setting Falstaff's commentary and cowardice against Hal's honorable single combat challenge in act 5, Shakespeare places himself in the long line of writers who argued that honor alone is not enough to drive men to honorable pursuits: it is man's vanity that makes honor valuable. Following Shakespeare, Adam Smith writes that "Great success" has

> very seldom been acquired without some degree of this excessive self-admiration . . . the most successful warriors, the greatest statesmen and legislators, the eloquent founders and leaders of the most numerous and most successful sects and parties; have many of them been not more distinguished for their very great merit than for a degree of presumption and self-admiration altogether disproportioned even to that very great merit. (*TMS* VI.iii.28)

Hal personifies this philosophy and over the course of *Henry IV, parts 1* and *2* and *Henry V*, we see that it is Henry V's constant pursuit of honor that drives him to greatness in war, law, and

politics. Hal, now King, tells us as much in *Henry V* claiming "By Jove, I am not covetous for gold . . . / But if it be a sin to covet honour, / I am the most offending soul alive" (4.3.24–9). It is this 'sin' or "self-admiration" that propels Henry V and England to greatness.

Devoid of the desire to, at the very least, *appear* honorable, Falstaff's self-interest becomes much darker than other forms of personal gain we see in the play. Unlike Hal's profiteering approach to glory, which ultimately forwards national interests, Falstaff's self-interest actively harms England and is, therefore, not tolerated. It is Falstaff's corrupt, dishonorable pursuit of money over all else that costs him his place in court and, as recounted in *Henry V*, his life, as the banished Jack Falstaff purportedly dies of a broken heart.[75] Falstaff's death is announced immediately after King Henry V's public pardon of a drunkard who "railed against" the King and the public arrest of the treasonous lords planning Henry's assassination (2.2.41–3). This scene epitomizes Henry V's approach to vice and governance and underscores his careful delineation between beneficial, tolerable, and harmful self-interest. Like Mandeville's wise governments, Hal "bears with lesser Inconveniences to prevent greater" (*FB* 127). His forbearance of petty vice, however, does not constitute a tolerance of crime, particularly when the crimes directly harm the health of the Commonwealth.

From the beginning of *Henry V*, questions of justice, mercy, and right are placed center stage. The play opens with a jurisprudential and theological conversation over whether Henry can "with right and conscience make [a] claim" to the throne of France. Hal's sincerity over the justness of his invasion has been contested by critics and Jamey Graham goes as far as to argue that "Henry himself never has a conscience" but "tricks" others into performing the ethical calculus for him

[75] See Fleissner.

(266).[76] My reading of Henry V seeks to temper this extreme. Whether Henry V's conscience is genuine must remain unanswered but, unlike Falstaff, Henry does appear to have a conscience, can differentiate between might and right, and does so consistently. I contend that Henry does have a conscience and wishes to pursue what is right but knows righteousness must fit itself to the political moment. This requires ethical perfection to be weighed against political need. As "indisputably [Shakespeare's] most Machiavellian" character and "arguably [his] greatest man," Henry V blends the conscience of the impartial spectator with the political calculus of Machiavelli's prince. Graham slightly undercuts her argument by acknowledging that "The Prince can spontaneously change his apparent character because he is, as much as Cicero's Marcus, psychologically divided into a spectator . . . and a separate, objective actor" (254). This conscious division between self and other is key to Henry's statecraft and jurisprudence: he understands himself and others as a spectator but must ultimately act as a prince – not a steely machiavel devoid of conscience, but a King who must square state stability with strict morality. Henry V has mastered this balance and it shows in his practical application of might and right – or firm rule marked by selective mercy – in act 2's court scene. Shakespeare's depiction of model leadership combines the best aspects of Machiavellian pragmatism and Smithian empathy. Hal judges others as he would himself but, crucially, also as others would judge themselves, holding individuals to their professed morality. Seen through the lens of the impartial spectator – Smith's coinage for the preceding centuries' ruminations over justice and mercy – Hal does not "tric[k]" others into deciding for him (266). Instead, he rules with certainty *and* conscience as he obligates his citizens

[76] See Matthew J. Smith's "The Experience of Ceremony in *Henry V*," Slights's "The Conscience of the King: Henry V and the Reformed Conscience," and Mattox's "Henry V: Shakespeare's Just Warrior" for a discussion of whether Henry V's invasion of France and the ensuing war was "just" and Henry's genuine versus feigned concern.

to live by the moral codes they thrust on others. Hal, judging as an impartial spectator, forces his court to uphold the same standards of justice and mercy.

Aware of his own faults (recall Hal's carousing in Eastcheap), Henry adjudicates accordingly: in his court petty offenders are pardoned but traitorous lords meet their legal deserts. After Henry V pardons the drunk slanderer, who was only set on "by excess of wine," the soon-to-be traitor Lord Scroop objects, stating "That's mercy, but too much security. / Let him be punished, sovereign, lest example / Breed, by his sufferance, more of such a kind" (2.2.44–6). Echoing the Duke's warning to Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice*, the King replies

> O let us yet be merciful . . .
> If little faults proceeding on distemper
> Shall not be winked at, how shall we stretch our eye
> When capital crimes, chewed, swallowed, and digested,
> Appear before us? (2.2.47–58).

Like Shylock, the lords ignore this jurisprudential warning. Shortly after, the King delivers their sentences for treason. Scroop and his fellow traitors fall to their knees and beg for the very mercy they advised against moments earlier. Henry highlights their selfish hypocrisy, stating "The mercy that was quick in us but late / By your own counsel is suppressed and killed" (2.2.79–80). Like Falstaff and the rogues of Eastcheap, Lords Scroop, Grey, and Cambridge do not see value in honor and decide to privilege monetary incentive over political loyalty, allowing themselves to be bought by the French to kill their King. Henry V cheapens their decision, painting it as the worst of transactional agreements. He airs the depth of their betrayal, reminding them of "how apt our love was to accord / To furnish [them] with all appertinents / Belonging to his honour," but the traitors rejected the King's love and honor "for a few light crowns" (2.2.86–9). Harry emphasizes their

immoral self-interest, conceding to Scroop "That knewst the very bottom of my soul, / That almost mightst have coin'd me into gold / Wouldst thou have practised on me for thy use?" (2.2.97–9). The language here conjures notions of usury or utility, as Scroop does not see *worth* in the King's person, but only in what he can extract from him. After Henry censures the traitors for over sixty lines, the Lords ask to be pardoned again. King Henry responds decisively to their empty appeals:

> God quit you in his mercy! Hear your sentence.
>
> You have conspired against our royal person . . .
>
> Wherein you would have sold your king to slaughter,
>
> His princes and his peers to servitude,
>
> His subjects to oppression and contempt,
>
> And his whole kingdom into desolation.
>
> Touching our person seek we no revenge,
>
> But we our kingdom's safety must so tender,
>
> Whose ruin you have sought, that to her laws
>
> We do deliver you. (2.2.166–78)

Despite the attack on his royal person, the King is neither retributive nor selfish in his punishment of the lords, but remains wholly interested in protecting the interests of his kingdom. The drunkard's slander, uttered while inebriated, harms no one and thus his unchecked vice of overindulgence is tolerated; the traitor's conspiracy against the King to enrich themselves, however – having been "chewed, swallowed, and digested" – is swiftly punished.

While Harry's need to persecute traitors is obvious, his execution of Bardolph for what first appears to be petty thieving – a vice Hal routinely, though reluctantly, tolerated in his Eastcheap days – is less clear. In an eerie foreshadowing of Falstaff's banishment from court and Hal's future

treatment of the Eastcheap lot, Falstaff jests in *1H4* "shall there be gallows standing in England when thou art king? and resolution thus fobbed as it is with the rusty curb of old father antic the law? Do not thou, when thou art king, hang a thief" (*1H4* 1.2.56–9). This is precisely what King Henry does to Bardolph in *Henry V*. Bardolph, Nym, and Pistol are all friends of Falstaff and import his swaggering braggadocio and debauchery into *Henry V*. At first, they are all characterized in the same way by their boy servant as dishonest, but not dangerous: "for a' never broke any man's head but his own, and that was against a post when he was drunk. They will steal anything, and call it purchase. Bardolph stole a lute-case, bore it twelve leagues, and sold it for three half pence. Nym and Bardolph are sworn brothers in filching, and in Calais they stole a fire-shovel" (3.2.39–45). Reminiscent of Falstaff's idiotic schemes in *1H4*, though immoral, their thefts do not disrupt the Commonwealth and are thus tolerated. Henry V is no Angelo and knows that to hang every man for pinching a cup of sack would be a losing battle.

It is when Bardolph's stealing harms England's political interests that he is duly prosecuted and "hanged for robbing a church" (3.6.100). The King defends this decision with political strategy, explaining "We would have all such offenders so cut off; and we give express charge that in our marches through the country there be nothing compelled from the villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the French upbraided or abused in disdainful language; for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner" (3.6.106–12). Bardolph's pillaging of a French church is not merely blasphemous and immoral, but it expressly harms England's political interests and military strategy. Henry's humane treatment of the French, ensuring that they suffer no unnecessary abuse at the hands of the English, is merciful and politically prudent, promising a shorter battle with fewer causalities on both sides. Bardolph's trajectory parallels Falstaff's in *1H4*: his knavery is stomached until it interferes with England's

political interests. Now that Harry is king, he must merge "public and private welfare in an attempt to ensure a prosperous economic future" and instill moral confidence in his reign (Fischer 164). As king, Hal has the ability (and duty) to punish offenders whose parasitic self-interest damages the commonwealth and he does so without hesitation.

* * *

Unlike Vincentio, Hal does not need to let the legal system go to seed to learn how to balance private vice with public good: he received his schooling in the dodgy taverns of commercial London. In contrast to Vincentio's overabundance of mercy, Hal knows that value stems from scarcity and he uses this mercantilist knowledge to his political advantage, exercising selective mercy from day one of his rule. As Prince and King, Hal embraces Machiavelli's political strategy in order to maintain political stability but he is no machiavel in the vein of Barabas or Richard III. Unlike villainous stage machiavels, Hal's self-interest is counterbalanced by his humanity, or "fellow-feeling." As Smith's impartial spectator, Hal's "Respect for what are, or for what ought to be, or for what upon a certain condition would be, the sentiments of other people . . . overawes all those mutinous and turbulent passions" and makes Henry V a just ruler, humane soldier, and "mirror of all Christian kings" (*TMS* VI.concl.3; Shakespeare, *H5* 2.0.6).

Hal surpasses Vincentio in his political skill and his strategic counterfeiting – whether the role be a drunk Eastcheap lad or fellow soldier – embodying Machiavelli's prince who must oscillate between the fox and the lion, beast and man, to maintain political order. Hal's ability to be feared without losing his humanity reaches its peak at the gates of Harfleur in *Henry V*. King Henry warns the governor that should he refuse to open the gates, Hal's own "gates of mercy shall be all shut up, / And the flesh'd soldier, rough and hard of heart" shall mow down villagers and "Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters," dash fathers' "most reverend heads . . . to the

walls," and spit "Your naked infants . . . upon pikes" (3.3.10–38). Hal's language is the antithesis of humane, yet he employs this grotesque verbiage to avoid physical massacre and spare French and English lives. Though he is willing to *say* anything to beat the French, his execution of Bardolph for pillaging French property shows that he is not willing to *do* anything.

Hal's mastery of Machiavellian statecraft counterbalanced by Smithian sympathy is evident in the governor's reply as he opens the gates stating "Therefore, dread King, / We yield our town and lives to thy soft mercy." Hal is a dread king with the power to take lives, but the humanity to spare them. Henry V does not abuse the governor's trust but instructs Exeter to enter Harfleur and "Use mercy to them all," without exception (3.3.10–54). What distinguishes Hal's self-interest from Falstaff's and the Duke's is Hal's unrelenting conscience and persistent valuation of human life and deserved honor. Henry V's humanity stems equally from his avaricious desire to accrue honor and his understanding of self and other, producing the desire to appear honorable in others' eyes and in his own – to act with right *and* conscience. Now that he is king, Hal's mercantilist, profiteering mentality is the engine that drives England to martial and political greatness, winning Henry kingly honor and winning England, France. As King, the self-interest that appeared egotistical in *1H4* is now fully aligned with national interests. In the ultimate example of virtuous vice, Hal combines the best of Machiavelli's Prince and the impartial spectator, allying London's commercialism with king, crown, and country as he pursues might and right.

CHAPTER THREE

My Garden, Our Greens: Shakespeare's Collective, Cade's Commons, and Public Good

> 'Gentry, and other able persons, cannot impoverish the Kingdome; if it be done with curious and costly works upon our Materials, and by our own people, it will maintain the poor with the purse of the rich, which is the best distribution of the Common-wealth. (Mun L3^{r})

> But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. (Hamilton et al. 234)

Shakespeare shared Hal's prudent approach to risk and reward. As Hal's winning pursuit of might and right gained England greater glory under his rule, Shakespeare's balanced approach to investment secured his success in his lifetime and in ours. Shakespeare's early investment in the Chamberlain's Men, a company with a socially minded approach to business and horizontal management structure, helped the company and its chief playwright succeed. Like Hal, Shakespeare's belief in and knowledge of markets allowed him to engineer his success by weighing present risk against future reward. Shakespeare was a savvy but humane businessman, prefiguring Adam Smith's notion of sympathetic self-love that would arise in the eighteenth century and current theories of corporate social responsibility that have trended in recent decades.[77] Like Hal and Duke Vincentio, the Smithian and twenty-first-century approach to exchange asks how we can harness human nature to make individuals and society better off.

---

[77] See Kotler and Lee's *Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing the Most Good for Your Company and Your Cause* and Sims' *Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility: Why Giants Fall* for a general discussion of the benefits of socially minded business practices. For recent data on the benefits of ethical corporate governance see Flammer et al. For an explanation of why successful businesses are both profit- and purpose-driven, see Ed Freeman's work on stakeholder theory, particularly his *The Power of And: Responsible Business Without Trade-Offs*, co-authored with Parmar and Martin. Mainstream examples of socially minded firms are Whole Foods, Patagonia, and TOMS.

This is a question that preoccupied Shakespeare and his attempts to answer it permeate his dramaturgy and his financial decisions. Scholarship has long acknowledged the playwright's unique financial situation as a shareholder in England's first public, permanent outdoor theater company and his use of financial or "moneyed" language in his texts.[78] Yet Shakespeare studies have failed to stitch these two pieces together and view the dramatist as a rational actor whose investment ideology not only shaped his career, but colors his plays and characters as well. Shakespeare's approach to personal investment in his career and his dramaturgy are not siloed but intimately intertwined. I argue here and in the preceding chapters that this crosspollination between his intellectual interests and investments stems from Shakespeare's belief in markets as the most tolerable mechanism for securing social good while limiting authoritarian abuse. Lars Engle's *Shakespearean Pragmatism* comes the closest to grappling with this symbiotic relationship between theatrical investor and inventor, promising to elucidate Shakespeare the pragmatist who "substituted a mutable economy of value, action, and belief for what the philosophic tradition has tried to establish as a fixed structure of fact, truth, and knowledge" (3). The bold proposal outlined in Engle's introduction, however, goes unfulfilled by subsequent chapters which analyze the financial language in Shakespeare's sonnets and plays, ignoring the economic and pragmatic philosophies that generated this language.

It has become increasingly clear thanks to studies such as Lukas Erne's *Shakespeare as Literary Dramatist* and Bart van Es's *Shakespeare in Company* that there was substantial overlap between the worlds of the early modern playhouse and playbook. The financial decisions of the playing company affected the printed play at every point of production, leaving lasting textual, thematic, and theatrical evidence that continues to be mined centuries later. What we know of

[78] For foundational studies on Shakespeare as shareholder, see: Chambers, Irwin Smith, Charles William Wallace, and Harbage. For more recent approaches to Shakespeare as sharer see Erne and van Es.

Shakespeare's career and the surviving playtexts indicate an important relationship between the dramatist's investment decisions, dramatic interests, and his success and longevity *vis à vis* his contemporaries. Shakespeare's belief in markets as a way to mediate ills and maximize benefits is apparent in the investment decisions he made as a member of the Chamberlain's-King's Men in addition to his ruminations on social welfare, individual investment, and income distribution throughout his corpus. Though admittedly imperfect, a society without markets and systems of exchange quickly devolves into corrupt chaos, as is seen most clearly in *2 Henry VI*'s Cade's rebellion. Scholarship's long neglect of Shakespeare's belief in markets as the most socially beneficial way to negotiate disparate interests has led to the misnomer of Shakespeare the "privileged playwright," connoting an advantage bestowed on him, rather than one earned by him through his persistent investment and labor.

This label is not just ungenerous but inaccurate, attributing his success to birth or luck in a way that does not account for the dramatist's calculated investment decisions, willingness to risk capital, and entrepreneurial skill.[79] His position as investor remains a rich field of discovery. Bart van Es writes "The difference between Shakespeare's financial position and that of other playwrights remains curiously under-reported," reminding us that contemporary dramatists like Heywood, Jonson, Dekker, Middleton, and Webster "had nothing approaching Shakespeare's wealth" and many lived in debt and in and out of debtor's prison. This difference remains under-reported and misunderstood, as the critical conversation has largely stopped at the label of *privileged* without asking precisely where this privilege came from and how its origins might be reflected in the playtexts themselves. This chapter seeks to dispel the notion of Shakespeare's "privilege" and replace it with the more accurate understanding of Shakespeare as prudent investor

[79] Given current cultural connotations, the term "privileged" seems particularly fraught, recalling associations with white or male privilege, or an unfair advantage conferred upon an individual at birth.

or "projector" (roughly the early modern equivalent of entrepreneur). Reframing Shakespeare as a projector more aptly reflects his complex belief in the social benefits of commerce and his approach to investing, which sought to secure prosperity for himself and his company.[80] The financial viewpoints promoted by Shakespeare's investment decisions, company management, and the themes in his playtexts show him to be more in line philosophically with contemporary men of finance than his dramatic peers. Shakespeare was not privileged, but deeply motivated by the belief that individual investment and labor made society and its citizens better off, serving private and public interests simultaneously.

As a founding member of one of the most innovative playing companies in a burgeoning industry, Shakespeare, like Hal, created his own opportunity through investment, deferring immediate gains in favor of long-term success. In examining how Shakespeare's enterprising mentality influenced his works, this chapter begins by looking at the theater industry's organization, particularly its inception as a trade founded on charity. I then move into an examination of the economic benefits of the Lord Chamberlain's Men's innovative horizontal management style, before turning to Shakespeare's personal investment decisions and the plays themselves – the most complete record we have of his intellectual preoccupations. The final portion of the chapter explores the range of self-interest displayed in *Henry VI, Part 2*. As the unfortunate successor to the revered Henry V, Henry VI, along with his cabinet and his citizens, struggles to square public and private interests. The balance of public interests and private gain proves a delicate and dangerous one in *2 Henry VI* and the King, Gloucester, Suffolk, and Jack

[80] The *OED* defines "projector" as "A person who forms a project; one who plans or designs an enterprise or undertaking; a proposer or founder of some venture," citing its earliest use in 1596 (*n. 1.a*). For an in-depth analysis of "projecting" and its evolving perceptions throughout the seventeenth century see Yamamoto pp. 1100. Yamamoto never offers an explicit definition of "projector," but warns against simply equating the term with entrepreneur as this does not account for projector's shifting connotations throughout the sixteenth century (15).

Cade pay for their miscalculations with their lives. Written before Shakespeare's initial investment in the Lord Chamberlain's Men, *2H6* serves as an instructive point of departure for an analysis of Shakespeare's approach to investment, labor, desert, and social welfare. *2 Henry VI* ultimately reveals the implausibility of a society without markets or hierarchies – a theme to which Shakespeare returns at the end of his career in *The Tempest*. In a world where men are not angels, markets must be used to govern vice and direct individual self-love toward a greater collective good. Though Shakespeare's corpus reflects a deep sympathy with the plight of the poor, it also acknowledges that a stateless nature without hierarchies or competing interests is untenable, "the baseless fabric" of an "insubstantial pageant faded" (*Tempest*, 4.1.151, 4.1.155).

I. "The play's the thing": Theater Industry and Company Organization

Shakespeare's position as shareholder gave him the opportunity to generate wealth but it was the long-term success of his company, the Chamberlain's Men, that delivered his financial and, ultimately, his literary success.[81] James Burbage, the driving force behind the Chamberlain's Men, wasted no time entering the infant commercial theater industry. In 1576, with the help of co-investor and brother-in-law John Brayne, James Burbage erected the Theatre, London's first successful public theater.[82] By this point, the play was a commodity and one that was not welcomed by all. William Ingram explains society's reluctance toward commodification, writing "Free trade" – a generous term for England's still heavily regulated economy – "the principal pillar of urban prosperity in Shakespeare's and Jonson's day, was still an equivocal activity, a new and not fully

[81] Credit for Shakespeare's authorial status is due to his company both indirectly, since his shares provided Shakespeare the stable income that enabled his artistic freedom, and directly through their posthumous publication of the First Folio. As Emma Smith, Ben Higgins, and others have shown, the First Folio used paratextual material and intentional bibliographic codes to construct Shakespeare's author status in ways the playwright did not care to do in his lifetime. Not to mention, of course, that the Folio publishes 18 previously unpublished plays, preserving Shakespeare's corpus.
[82] Though naming a theater the Theatre seems uninspired today, Burbage chose the name for the word's original meaning of an atlas, hoping to conjure drama's Greek and Roman origins and "the classical grandeur that was Rome" (Gurr, "Shakespeare's Playhouses" 365).

understood way of marketing – indeed, of living – centered on money and profits, yet still partially engrafted onto an older, essentially feudal system" based on kinship and service (*Business* 44). Added to the reluctance to embrace new commercial practices was the age-old puritan objection to playing as "an abomination," for "only vicious men portray vices in public, only dissolute men dress boys as girls, only corrupt men show how treason and fraud might be effected, and so on, all such conduct being against God's will and therefore on the path to damnation" (Ingram, "The Economics" 317).[83] Facing substantial opposition to their profession, London's theater industry found a curiously liberal economic solution in the form of forced charity, or what today is called a sin tax.[84]

Throughout the 1570s, laws banning vagrancy and strengthening censorship were passed in an effort to diminish playing and "Acts in 1574 and 1579 sought to exact . . . a pension for the hospitals of the city from landlords whose inns hosted plays" (Kesson et al.). It was not until the turn of the seventeenth century, however, that this arrangement was actualized. By the 1590s, instead of enacting bans on theaters, tactics shifted toward tolerance in the name of social welfare and the state, Church, and playing companies soon reached their own solution without involving the courts. The pension scheme of the 1570s resurfaced in 1587 in an unsigned letter to the Queen's secretary which outlines the social costs of theater before proposing a pragmatic solution.[85] The author, the anonymous army officer, writes that "The daily abuse of Stage Plays is such an offence

[83] For the early modern perspective see Gosson's attack, *The School of Abuse*, and Sidney's counterargument the "Defense of Poesy" in Pollard. For the critical conversation, see Hilliard, Lehnhof, and Newstok.

[84] Though the labels sin tax and negative externality are modern coinages, the notion is far from new and can be traced to the Catholic Church, which has a long history of dealing with unwanted, socially harmful behavior by collecting funds from their members in the form of indulgences and other pragmatic deals. See Duggan for history of indulgences; see Posner's *God's Bankers: A History of Money and Power at the Vatican* for a contemporary account of the Church's history of financial corruption.

[85] In their record summary, the British Library describes the document as "an unsigned letter to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 25 January 1587 said to have been written by Maliverny Catlyn, a spy in Walsingham's employ" (British Library). Munro, Kesson, and Davies corroborate this attribution in their transcription and summary of the letter.

to the godly, and so great a hindrance to the gospel, as the papists do exceedingly rejoice at the blemish thereof." The officer complains that "players bills are set up in sundry places of the City" and, worse, when the bells toll for the Lectorer's public reading of the Scriptures, the "trumpets sound to the stages . . . Woe is me! The playhouses are pestered while the churches are naked: at the one it is not possible to get a place at: at the other void seats are plenty." The theater is poaching the Church's audience, leaving pew seats unfilled while theaters swell with groundlings and other "wicked faction[s]."

Yet, more problematic than impiety to the army officer is the seemingly unjust distribution of wealth, as players openly profit from their immorality: "It is a woeful sight to see two hundred proud players get in their silks, where five hundred poor people starve in the streets."[86] Not only are the "proud players" filching religious audiences, but they are harming social welfare, sponsored by royals and nobles to air their immoral fictions while the poor starve for want of state support.[87] The officer proposes a sensible solution and, instead of doubling down on the immorality of playing and demanding the playhouses be closed, he takes a tact reminiscent of Bacon or Smith by using one social ill to solve another. The officer forwards a plan that would turn the theater's vice into a public benefit: "But if needs this mischief must be tolerated," he continues, "whereat (no doubt) the highest frowneth, yet for God's sake (Sir), let every Stage in London pay a weekly pension to the poor," that "*ex hoc malo, proueniat aliquod bonum"* (Wickham 90; Kesson et al.).[88] The officer urges the implementation of what is known today as a "sin tax," or a tax placed on goods that detract from social welfare – like cigarettes, gas, and corporate pollution in today's

[86] The letter writer considers this a negative externality, or a social ill for which the players should pay damages, not something they should be paid to produce.
[87] Samuel Cox lodges a similar complaint in a 1590 letter to an unnamed acquaintance, asking "what could be more abominable than 'To see rich men give more to a player for a song, which he shall sing in one hour, than to their faithful servants for serving them a whole year? To see infinite numbers of poor people go a begging about the streets for penury, when players and parasites wax rich by juggling and jesting?'" (Ingram, "The Economics" 318(.
[88] "From this evil proceeds some good" (Kesson et al.).

society. The tax is collected and redistributed by local or federal authorities, turning individuals' *malo* into *aliquod bonum*, some public good.[89]

Our petitioner did not have to wait long to see his proposal realized. Though never formally codified, by 1600, records reflect it was common practice for playhouses to give tithes to the poor by way of their local parish.[90] Ultimately, "theater proved itself "too scandalous to be tolerated and too useful to be suppressed" (Ingram, *Business* 46). While the tithes were surely not altruistic, there was no law governing or forcing the theaters' continued public charity and the documents from the parishes themselves present the charity as a willing and "very liberal" gift that the playhouse investors are "contented" to give. The parish admits that they are similarly "rather contented to accept this means of relief of our Poor, because our Parish is not able to relieve them" and the justices have taken no action to redistribute the county's wealth (Wickham 91). As we saw with Mistress Overdone in *Measure for Measure*, where the State fails to provide for its citizens' welfare, in a market economy, private vice intervenes to spread the wealth. Though still highly regulated in many respects, the theater industry displayed a classically liberal tolerance for vice and a protocapitalist belief in the benefits of trade to negotiate opposing interests as parishes bartered with playhouses to provide for the poor.

I hope by this point to have shown that early modern society was generally not averse to exchange. Within this framework, however, the theaters are understood to have been uniquely liberal. The industry's location in London's Liberties gave them even greater commercial, moral, and ideological freedom than other sectors. The liberties "'belonged' to the city yet fell outside the

[89] In 1604, the economic reasoning becomes even more refined as "Richard Fiennes, seventh Baron Saye and Sele, proposed to raise money by taxing theatregoers. This, he argued, constituted 'no monopole, noe nor imposition' because watching fashionable shows, like smoking tobacco, was an act of luxury which was 'as unnecessary & yet yelde noe penny to his Maiesty' (unlike tobacco)" (Yamamato 58).
[90] See Ingram, *Business* 45–46 and Wickham 91 for documentary evidence from local parishes.

jurisdiction of the lord mayor, the sheriffs of London, and the Common Council," constituting an "ambiguous geopolitical domain over which the city had authority but, paradoxically, almost no control" (Mullaney). This facilitated "experimentation with a wide range of available ideological perspectives," exposing the key "cultural contradictions of its age" (Mullaney qtd. in Bruster 9). Douglas Bruster suggests that in addition to facilitating ideological exploration, their location within the liberties allowed theater companies to experiment with capitalist principals of consumer demand, as the theaters "were both responsive and responsible to the playgoing publics." Their financial success depended on playing companies responding to their consumers' tastes and preferences to carve out their share of the market.[91] As businesses, Bruster posits, "it seems undeniable that the profit motive claimed a great, even predominant measure of the theaters' practical energy." Given companies' profit motive, the "map of interests" drawn by the playhouses' economic foundation cannot be separated from and, therefore, must be analyzed alongside the ideological contradictions staged in London's liberties (10).

It is in this petri dish of moral and commercial freedom that Shakespeare grew his career as actor, playwright, and investor with the Lord Chamberlain's Men. The Chamberlain's Men's story is one of continued entrepreneurial savvy and a good amount of calculated risk. By the time the Burbages moved across the Thames to what would become the Globe, they had accrued nearly two decades of business acumen in the fledgling theater industry. Up until 1597, the Burbages performed in the Theatre, London's "first successful amphitheater." Built in 1576, the Theatre was allocated to the Chamberlain's Men through the government-granted "monopolising of London

[91] The importance of product differentiation on the English early modern stage has heretofore been underreported because scholars assume a state-granted monopolistic market (see Gurr *Shakespeare Company* pp. 1–2 and Gurr *Shakespearean Stage* pp. 47–91). More recent scholarship has shown that there was more mixing between the indoor, outdoor, and Inns of Court audiences than had previously been thought, making the theater industry a much more competitive market of largely (but not fully) substitute goods (see van Es 205 and Watson).

playing that started in 1594" (Gurr, *Shakespearean Stage* 55). Less than a year later, they found themselves with a company of players and a theater but no land to rent (Gurr, "Shakespeare's Playhouses" 367). Caught in a bitter legal battle with their recalcitrant landlord, Giles Allen, who refused to renew their lease on the land, the Chamberlain's Men found a creative alternative.[92] Though James Burbage was unable to see his public theater in the liberties erected before his death in 1597, his legal foresight and close attention to property rights are what allowed the Chamberlain's Men to construct the Globe.

Burbage had written a prescient protection into the original lease nineteen years prior, by which:

> yt shall or may be lawfull for the sayde Jeames Burbage his executors or aſſignes . . . at any tyme or tymes before the end of the sayd terme of xxj^{tie} yeares by thes p*reſe*nte*s* granted to have take downe & Carrye away to his & their owne proper vſe for euer all such buildinges . . . eyther for a Theater or playing place or for any other lawfull vſe for his or their Comodityes. (Wallace 177)

Frustrated by their failing lease negotiations with Allen, the younger Burbages, Richard and Cuthbert, decided to pack up their timbers and leave. Capital, however, was in short supply. Though Cuthbert Burbage had inherited the theater's timbers and other "personal property," the bulk of the Burbages' inheritance was tied up in the Blackfriars indoor theater which could not be used due to the neighborhood's opposition to playhouses.[93] Short on cash, the Burbages formed a

---

[92] James Burbage had secured a twenty-one-year lease for the land from Giles Allen in 1576 "& did alſo to his great charges erect and builde a playing howſe called the Theater." Despite that after the first ten years of the lease, Burbage "did often tymes in gentle maner ſolicit & require the said Giles Allen for making a new leaſe," Allen refused to sign, alleging it was "not verbatim agreeable with the ould lease" (Wallace 183, 13).

[93] In classic landlord fashion, Giles Allen took them to court over the stolen timbers and trampled grass but was unsuccessful in his suit (Aaron, "Theatre as Business" 431). In 1596, when relations with Allen began to sour, James Burbage bought the Blackfriars playhouse hoping to move operations to the new indoor theater. Unfortunately, the building's surrounding neighbors petitioned against it and they were unable to use the Blackfriars until 1608 (Gurr, "Shakespeare's Playhouses" 368–9).

joint-legal tenancy, "retaining five shares for themselves" and selling one share each to Shakespeare, John Heminges, Augustine Phillipps, Thomas Pope, and William Kempe, all lead actors and sharers in the company (Aaron, *Global Economics* 36).[94]

Having by this point secured a stable lease, under the cover of nightfall, the Chamberlain's Men disassembled the Theatre and rowed its timbers across the river to their new plot of land. A few short months later, in 1599, the Globe opened its doors as the first theater whose principal actors were also its owners, or "housekeepers." The land's lease and the construction and maintenance of the Globe were paid for by the housekeepers in proportion to their individual share and profits were distributed accordingly. This might not seem revolutionary to the twenty-first-century reader, as shareholding is a key aspect of the modern corporation, but at the turn of the seventeenth century, joint-stock companies were a relatively new financial instrument and entirely new to the theater industry. Shakespeare's company was the first to use both a joint-stock and joint-tenancy agreement, for the company and the building respectively. In fact, the only two playhouses financed through a joint-tenancy agreement were the Globe and the Blackfriars, both acquired by the Burbages and financed by many of the same housekeepers (Ingram, "The Economics" 321).[95] This unprecedented and "deliberate policy to integrate the lead actors with their theatre building[s]" and company contributed in large part to the company's success, stability, and longevity (van Es 157).

---

[94] Aaron puts the cost of building the Globe in 1599 at £700. "There were originally seven housekeepers in 1599: the Burbage brothers, Cuthbert and Richard, retained ownerships of half the Globe, worth £175 apiece. The remaining half was divided into five equal parts worth £70 each, bought by William Shakespeare, John Heminges, Augustine Phillips, Thomas Pope, and William Kempe. Kempe asked his fellow housekeepers to buy him out within a few days of signing the initial contract," leaving the four remaining sharer's final purchase price at £87.10*s* each ("Theatre as Business" 422).

[95] The housekeepers for the Globe were the Burbage brothers, Shakespeare, Augustine Phillips, Thomas Pope, John Heminges, and William Kemp; the Blackfriars' housekeepers were the Burbage brothers, Shakespeare, Henry Condell, William Sly, John Heminges, and Thomas Evans (Ingram, "The Economics" 321).

The uniquely interconnected nature of the actor-sharer-housekeeper business model created a powerful alignment of financial, dramatic, and personal interests that no other company was able to replicate, despite their attempts. One immense benefit of the actor-sharer model was the attenuation of hierarchies. This is not to say that hierarchies among the cast and crew were eliminated, however. On the contrary, the theater industry was built on "a complex arrangement of labor relations" and even the actors were typically bisected into the sharers, "sometimes known for their wealth" and "hired actors, typically known for their poverty" (Kendrick 12). Among the company's principal members, however, the joint-stock structure facilitated a more egalitarian work relationship which contrasted the hierarchical arrangement of rivals like Philip Henslowe's Admiral's Men. The evolution of the Chamberlain's Men from a father-son business to a joint-stock enterprise, while new to the theater industry, was not unique within the broader English economy. The nation as a whole was transitioning from the model of the family firm, or "*compangia*," comprised of fathers, sons, and relatives, to that of the "joint stock company," where associations of capital replaced familial ties (Braudel 436–39). I argue that the company's maintenance of a more "familial" business model within the new corporate structure, however, was unusual and proved highly effective. In a time of "hot-tempered individualism, when any difference of interest or opinion might lead to a duel or a quick resort to the courts," it is exceptional that "not one lawsuit arose from among the original members of the company" or its housekeepers (I. Smith 253).[96]

[96] The Chamberlain's-King's Men's original and early sharers were very close, living in the same parishes, caring for one another's families, marrying within the company network, and naming other sharers in their wills (Cerasano, "Chamberlain's-King's Men" 335–6). Shakespeare "left 26 shillings and 8 pence each to his theatrical fellows Richard Burbage, John Heminges, and Henry Condell, as well as to Hamnet Sadler, William Reynolds, and Anthony and John Nash, to buy mourning rings" (Nelson and Folger Shakespeare Library staff).

The fact that the principal sharers were also actors and Shakespeare was the company's house playwright seems to have minimized the potential for divergent interests on a financial and artistic level.[97] What was good for the sharers was good for the company, which was good for the actors, which, full circle, was good for the sharers. This way, individual investment enriched each sharer and the company as a whole, allying private and corporate interests in a way that turned individuals' profit motive into a company asset. This virtuous investment was not limited to the individual companies or the theater industry alone but spilled over into the larger economy. Playhouses were "a critical part of the London economy, providing work not only for actors, and other hired men – tiremen, bookholders, and stagekeepers – but for watermen, tavern keepers, and those in illicit industries, such as prostitutes" (Aaron, *Global Economics* 31–2). To this list, we must add bear-baiters, theatrical scribes, cloth merchants, printers, publishers, and a myriad of other individuals in sectors that benefitted from the theater industry's positive spillover effects (including the Church).

Despite the market's highly commercial, competitive nature, the Chamberlain's Men maintained a communal operating style reminiscent of the *compagnia* and older guild culture that their competitors chose not to retain. Instead of "disrupt[ing] the conduct of business, personal relationships facilitated the development of cooperative commercial strategies that accommodated change and promoted growth" (Knutson, *Playing Companies* 47).[98] Andrew Gurr notes that this

[97] van Es's *Shakespeare in Company* offers the most extensive recent analysis on how Shakespeare's drama was influenced by his company investment (see pp. 79–162 specifically).

[98] Knutson takes this argument a few steps too far, however, by applying this sense of guild culture to the theater industry as a whole claiming companies saw "one another as partners in the enterprise of developing a habit of playgoing among Londoners" and that the Chamberlain's Men "thought of Burbage as a financier whose business was their business" ("Falconer" 16–7). This argument contradicts her claim that the War of the Theaters, particularly Q2 *Hamlet's* eyases reference was, in large part, a manifestation of the Chamberlain's Men's and other companies' anxiety over new theater companies entering the industry. This anxiety is exemplary of a competitive marketplace, not a collaborative (or collusive) one. S.P. Cerasano notes that companies in general were financially quite *unlike* guilds in that "they possessed an incredible financial autonomy in comparison to London guildsmen . . . their unique financial power lay in their prerogative (under royal or aristocratic patronage) to create a discrete corporation that was

level of collaboration was by no means industry-wide, but very specific to the King's Men and, more "specifically, the two Burbage brothers." Gurr locates the uniquely egalitarian structure of the King's Men in the theater's beginnings as travelling companies of players, crediting the Burbage brothers with choosing to "preserve the old collaborative system against all the profiteering that a more capitalistic and authoritarian system might have offered them." While "other playing companies got their backing from entrepreneurial impresarios, their management system was unique," building a more communal relationship between the investors and players. Somewhat ironically, given their royal patronage, in contrast to other companies "Only the King's ran themselves" (*Shakespeare Co.* 87).

Rival companies were not so lucky. Bart van Es explains that "There were both strong and weak companies" and not all shares were equal or lucrative. The "corollary of collective ownership," unfortunately, "was the dangerous fact of joint liability" (105). Many principal investors in competing theater companies like the Pembroke's and Admiral's Men exploited sharers' joint liability by using financial instruments as a means of extortion. To Henslowe, an "outside capitalist" with "shrewd business capacity," (Chambers 1: 358) debt "was itself often a means of gaining control. His companies (and he was explicit about this proprietorial naming) developed extraordinary collective debts to their landlord," resulting in "'weak' fellowships" as members were fighting to stay out of individual debt to Henslowe rather than working collaboratively for collective gains. Henslowe's "financial trap-door" upon which companies and sharers sat, "meant they had little power to impact the long-term artistic and financial direction of their enterprise" (van Es 106). This was not the case for Shakespeare's company after 1599, as the

impervious to external government control, unlike any trade guild" ("Business" 238). Thus, the guild influence was a largely managerial one, creating corporate community without forcing the economic inefficiencies of public run enterprises. Their private control over their own financing incentivized the stakeholders to compete, not collaborate with rival companies.

principal actors also owned the company and the performance space they designed, built, and played in.

The two divergent approaches, Henslowe's vertical management model versus the Chamberlain's Men's horizontal system of corporate community, reveal substantially different motivations. As the landlord, financier, and dominant company manager, Henslowe was less interested in the health and longevity of the company and more interested in short-run individual profit. Unlike James, Richard, or Cuthbert Burbage, Henslowe did not care if the company outlived him as long as he could extract more profit. Henslowe, landlord to and manager of the Admiral's Men, established an exploitative, self-interested credit system for actors and affiliates in debt, and strategically employed all actors – both sharers and hirelings – not through bonds but using the precarious legal instrument of "contracts of service entered into, under penalties of breach." This gave the legal advantage to Henslowe who, as the contract's drafter, was able to design it to his benefit, leaving the actors to sign or not sign with little to no bargaining power. Henslowe's ability to "terminate these contracts" at his own legal discretion meant that the company's security and long-run stability were, to an extent, "dependent upon his good will," or the self-interest of one over the collective interests of several stakeholders (Chambers 1: 363). Henry Turner emphasizes how deftly Henslowe exploited the disparity between company culture and the culture of credit, employing "a system of management that sought to isolate the actors by bonding them individually" while playing on the understanding "of the actors themselves that they had more to gain by working collectively" (127). In stark opposition to this model, the Chamberlain's Men's collective was formed out of the Burbages' need for co-investors. They could not afford to use credit as leverage or terminate contracts with their principal actors (for the first few years at least), because if they lost their actors, they also lost their business partners.

Unlike the Burbages, Henslowe's management style was not predicated on community but on compulsion, for "should these fellowes Come out of my debt, J should have noe rule wth: them" (Greg, *Diary* 89). Indeed, Henslowe frequently "[broke] up his companies and then reconstitute[ed] them so as to increase his leverage over the individual players," killing the company in his prioritization of personal wealth (Turner 129). His manipulation[99] of individuals was not limited to actors and sharers, but extended to playwrights as well, as is most famously illustrated by Daborne's continual debt to Henslowe, which Henslowe only begrudgingly forgave on his deathbed – his fear of God ultimately overpowering his greed.[100] Daborne writes to Henslowe in an undated letter, "'I pay y^{u} half my earnings in the play besyds my continuall labor and chardge imployd for y^{u},'" complaining that "he has foregone his salary in order to repay his debts to Henslowe" and must now request another loan (Ioppolo 43). Grace Ioppolo imagines that "As a money-lender," Henslowe was probably not "averse to putting Daborne into further financial debt and advancing him increasing sums of money against . . . the two still-unwritten plays" (39). The financial tensions Henslowe bred between "poets and players" by money-lending and basing his purchase of play scripts on the actors' read-throughs, led dramatists like Marston and Daborne, to "encourage and even acquire financial interests in a rival type of theatrical organization," namely the boys companies which, by the turn of the century, had become true commercial threats to the adult companies' market share (Chambers 1:378). The multiple lawsuits, adds James Forse, "show Players and playwrights associated with Henslowe protesting exploitation, over-work, low pay, restrictive contracts and impossible deadlines: playwrights and actors come and go," profits

[99] See *Articles of Grievance against Mr. Hinchlowe* and *Articles of Oppression against Mr. Hinchlowe* (Greg, *Papers* 86–90).

[100] Gabriella Edelstein attempts to soften this harsh portrayal of Henslowe in her "Collaborating on Credit." Ultimately, however, she concedes that Henslowe's loans to hired men "ensured a continued relationship and their dependence on him for future survival in the business. Henslowe does not have the Scrooge-like reputation for nothing. Credit culture, although mutually beneficial in some ways, did not create harmonious communities" (240–1).

are forever (43). Only, this is not so: this level of abuse is not simply uncaring but proves unprofitable in the long run as the company becomes a revolving door of lost workers and artistic talent. Henslowe's exploitative management style was not just inefficient from an internal review stance, but his myopia actively harmed his own company by strengthening the competition.[101]

Shakespeare's company never had this problem. In contrast to Henslowe, the Chamberlain's Men's more collaborative approach to management did not merely augment their short-run success and the sharers' profits, but helped the company "run for forty-eight years as the unrivalled leader of its time" (Gurr, *Shakespeare Co.* xiii). Unlike other companies who were run by a sole manager or principal investor, the Chamberlain's Men shared the financial burden and all sharers were principal actors in the company they owned. This arrangement established a sense of kinship and equality that only broke down when the original shares were transferred to non-actors and there was a "perceived change from the cooperative venture of playing, in which 'share' meant literally 'shared labor,' to an economic organization in which shares were a currency of investment" (Dunsworth and McKluskie 437).[102] This shift altered the relationship from one of intertwined financial and artistic investment in the productions they mounted together to an "associatio[n] of capital only" (Braudel 439). Without the direct involvement of its sharer-actors in company management, the fellowship weakened and disputes arose as the interests of the investors and those of the troupe diverged.[103]

From 1576–1642, however, Burbage's company flourished. Not only did the shareholder-housekeepers make back their initial investment in the Globe "within two and a half years," but

---

[101] This soon proved doubly unwise as boy companies only grew in popularity. By the turn of the sixteenth century the boy players had become true rivals of the adult companies as seen in the War of the Theaters (see Bednarz).

[102] This was raised by a case involving John Shank, who was neither an original member of the company nor a descendent of a member, but merely bought his shares, offering capital with no shared labor. See Dunsworth and McLuskie p. 437.

[103] See Pettigrew and Smith for interesting analysis of corporate management and community building in the East India Company as they dealt with "hierarchies within the [ship]yard" and workers' labor lobbying (133).

they became a model for other companies to follow (Aaron, *Global Economics* 55). In competitive markets, imitation is not mere flattery but signals a company's commercial success that rivals then strive to reproduce. By 1600, Henslowe was already trying to poach the industry know-how of the Chamberlain's Men by attempting to replicate the Globe's blueprints for the Fortune. Having based their blueprints of the Globe off the Theatre, the Chamberlain's Men were confident in the success of its design which became the "precedent for all eight of the other amphitheatres built subsequently in London's suburbs" which "all followed Burbage's [design] idea" closely (Gurr, "Shakespeare's Playhouses" 366). A mere four months after their first performance, Henslowe inked a contract with Globe architect Peter Street, mentioning the Globe specifically four times to be sure its design would be replicated (Aaron, *Global Economics* 56–7).[104] Clearly, the Chamberlain's Men were a success by 1600 and they only grew in popularity, securing royal patronage under King James in 1603. With their eye on long-run gains and overall company health, the King's Men and its individual investors, including Shakespeare, continued to prosper from their initial investment, rewarded individually for the health of the collective they created, nurtured, and maintained together.

II. "Put money in thy purse" (or plot): Shakespeare on Investment and Labor

The unique structure of the Chamberlain's Men meant Shakespeare was in a highly unusual position for an early modern playwright: he was a sharer, actor, and dramatist for a company organized around mutual risk and reward, in a rapidly expanding industry that maintained its right to play for profit through poor relief. Paradoxically, by investing in himself, Shakespeare invested in his immediate acting family and their parish's poor. Throughout his career, Shakespeare saw

[104] See Aaron's *Global Economics* pp. 57–8 for quotations from the contract between Street and Henslowe on the specific details that are to be copied from the Globe, such as the "height of the three stories," playhouse interior, and design of the tiring house (57).

individual investment add to personal and collective wealth in his company and his larger London community. Unlike the extreme entrepreneurs of James Burbage's, Henslowe's, or his father John Shakespeare's ilk, however, Shakespeare's acquisitions increasingly reflected his status as a risk-averse investor who saw real estate as a low-risk means through which to keep his money safe and allow it to multiply. Shakespeare clearly valued investment, but he never overleveraged himself, engaged in high-risk schemes, or displayed the kind of risky legal exploitation, black-market dealings, or money-lending that Philip Henslowe and his father favored. In fact, Shakespeare's approach to investment seems to have been in large part a response to the financial and legal troubles that plagued his father during William's formative teenage years (Archer 166). David Fallow recently proposed that Shakespeare not only witnessed his father's shady black market wool dealings but participated in them, for to be successful, "Even a regional level trader needed financial resources, [and] trusted employees" and "sons were the logical choice. To suggest that the eldest Shakespeare boy, William, was exempt is most unlikely" (34). Fallow goes as far as to suggest that Shakespeare first came to London not as an "impoverished poet" but as a wool broker for his father and the capital for Shakespeare's early investments came from "the family business" rather than his own theatrical endeavors (38, 34).[105]

Whether this is true must remain up for debate, though it seems closer to a romanticized tale of Shakespeare the swashbuckler than historical fact. What we do know is that William Shakespeare seems to have disentangled himself from his father's dubious business schemes as soon as he could, developing an investment ideology diametrically opposed to his father's: one

[105] In an earlier 1993 study, Forse conjectures that Shakespeare "used his already written plays as his 'buy-in'" to the theater company, offering six or seven plays which would have equaled "£36 to £70 . . . close to the usual 'buy-in' price" (52).

based on labor and safe investments, not risky, illegal schemes.[106] Understanding Shakespeare's approach to investment reveals undiscovered richness in his works. His plays and poems are imbued not only with a language of investment, but with the values of the *homo economicus*, or rational actor who, as discussed in chapter one, only spends his resources when the benefits outweigh the costs. Rather than offering a list of Shakespeare's investments, as several studies have already done, this chapter is chiefly concerned with his investment mentality, or the way he conceived of individual risk and reward. [107] Though his exact gross annual income is largely irrelevant to his drama, his investment philosophy is not. Explorations of economic decision making permeate his works, from the early *Henry VI, Part 2* to his final plays, *The Tempest* and *Coriolanus*. The plot of *2 Henry VI* revolves around notions of individual investment in the commonwealth and the related question of who *deserves* what? Shakespeare's appreciation of individual investment, both in terms of the capital and labor supplied, was already well developed by 1590, four years before he bought into the Chamberlain's Men. His belief in markets' ability to maximize individual and social welfare was not developed in response to financial success but antedated and, I argue, engendered that success.

His pragmatic approach both to morality, as seen in the previous chapter, and financial individualism, as explored here, was a crucial part of Shakespeare the individual and Shakespeare the author, heavily coloring his career and the themes and outcomes in his works. It is reductionist to see Shakespeare's works as uninterested in "the exploration and negotiation of the tensions wrought by economic change" simply because, as Ian Archer points out, he "never wrote a city

[106] See Fallow for an explanation of exactly which types of wool dealing were illegal and why. As a glover, John Shakespeare was allowed to sell certain types of fleece but under very tight regulations and in fixed quantities.
[107] For the most recent, most complete study of Shakespeare's finances, see Bearman. For discussions of Shakespeare and his fellow sharers' income, see Forse, Wallace, I. Smith, Aaron, Gurr's *The Shakespeare Company*, and van Es pp. 79–162.

comedy" and "shows little interest in how his characters make their money" – which, if one has read the *Merchant of Venice*, is simply untrue (Archer 178). This misreads the texts, Shakespeare's ideological interests, and the field of economics all at once. Contrary to prevailing notions of the field, economics is not, nor has it ever been, interested in "how [people] make their money." Instead, the field since its inception focuses on how and why individuals make their choices, given certain constraints. This is something Shakespeare grapples with throughout his works. Archer undercuts his argument as he makes it by forwarding that the "fortunes of Shakespeare's characters are more usually presented as a result of ethical choices rather than the result of economic processes." Adam Smith, moral philosopher and father of the discipline, would instruct us (if he is not busy rolling in his grave), that economics, previously called political economy, is entirely concerned with ethical choices and their results, one of which can be money.[108] For economics and for Shakespeare's philosophical exploration of economic forces, money is more of an afterthought, with markets and exchange constituting the main event.

One must imagine that Shakespeare learned a great deal about markets and exchange from his father and his own involvement in the family business, however direct or indirect it may have been. Unlike John, William Shakespeare made sure he never overextended himself. The dramatist's preference for consistent, cautious investing distinguished him from his peers and secured his position as a "privileged playwright," allowing him to excel both financially and artistically (Erne 44).[109] His sonnets may betray his aspirations for literary fame but his publication pattern (or lack thereof) indicates that his desire for financial stability outweighed his print ego.

---

[108] The Oxford *Dictionary of Economics* defines economics as a "social science that studies individual and group decisions on how to use scarce resources," which necessitates defining private and public interests and immediately involves questions of "ethical choices" or just distribution (Black et al. "economics"). Much of Shakespeare's corpus, contrary to Archer's blinkered claim, is concerned with economics and the "ethical choices" it demands.

[109] Erne attributes the phrase "privileged playwright" to S.P. Cerasano's 2001 Folger Institute Seminar, "Rewriting the Elizabethan Stage."

Shakespeare was well aware that the money was in the playhouse, not the print shop, and structured his career and investments to garner financial stability over literary success.[110] Ironically, it was these very investment decisions that ensured his lasting literary fame. Lukas Erne has cogently argued that while Shakespeare did not see any personal benefit in publishing his plays, his company did and "As a rule, the Lord Chamberlain's Men," barring previous publication or legal constraints, "seem to have sold Shakespeare's manuscripts to a publisher approximately two years after the plays reached the public stage" (110).

Instead of being "indifferent" or "opposed" to print publication, as twentieth-century scholarship imagined, Erne sees an "economical reasoning" behind this publication scheme, contending that "the Lord Chamberlain's Men and their playwright actively supported the publication of [Shakespeare's] plays" (111). While publication was not lucrative for the playwright, the "coherent" publication "strategy" benefitted Shakespeare's company. Seeing the print market as a second "compatible" and "synergetic" form of publication, printing Shakespeare's plays offered the company a way of maximizing their profit through a staggered publication scheme, profiting off stage performance while the play was new, before publishing it in print form. Though the actual sale of the manuscript was not enormously profitable, print publication served as free advertisement for the company. The company's name was printed prominently on the title page which was then "put up on posts" across London, thereby giving new life to older, "stale" plays the company was reviving (115). To paraphrase Hamlet, the play may have been "the thing" for his company, but for Shakespeare, the thing was the *playing company*. Shakespeare was keenly aware that his company shares would "yield the most important and consistent element of his income" (Bearman 50). This knowledge caused him to invest his

[110] For an excellent account of the economics of playtext publication and the modest returns to publisher and playwright see Blayney "The Publication of Playbooks."

time and money in cultivating the value of those shares by maintaining the health of his company and tending his other investments rather than pouring his resources into cultivating his authorial image, as did Jonson – the topic of the final chapter.

While Shakespeare's company concerned themselves with the publication of his plays, Shakespeare did not. Instead, he invested in land. After purchasing his shares, Shakespeare pivoted from the glutted market of theatrical commerce to real estate investment – land being a staple and not a "luxury good" (Yamamoto 58).[111] Shakespeare was a risk-averse investor and the necessity of land for tenant farmers combined with its scarcity rendered land a relatively safe investment. The dramatist saw real estate as a way to obtain multiple streams of passive income and avoid risky speculation (van Es 103).[112] His first recorded investment was buying into the Chamberlain's Men in 1594, if not slightly before. The profit Shakespeare generated from this initial investment, conservatively estimated to be around £50 per year, enabled him to save and reinvest his funds in real estate over the next two decades, typically investing in a new asset every three years (Bearman 45). His investment interests were concentrated in Stratford, exhibiting a clear commitment to his family and a desire to provide "himself and his family with a reliable source of income" independent of his ability to work in the theaters (119).

Three years after having invested in the Chamberlain's Men, Shakespeare used the profits from his shares to purchase New Place, the "second largest house" in Stratford. This provided the Shakespeares with a proper Stratford estate that would accommodate Shakespeare's immediate

[111] Aaron makes this same distinction in her "Theatre as Business," explaining that the "increasing economic centralization of England in London created a market large enough for luxury goods and services such as the theatre" (420).

[112] van Es goes too far in claiming that Shakespeare's property "investments were, in the main, ways to lay up capital," rather than to make it, and is remiss to assume these investments "show that Shakespeare had a surfeit of money ready and was (in an age before private banking) looking for ways to tie it up" (103). Shakespeare's investment approach was not driven by locking up his capital but, rather, sowing it in an investment that would securely grow over time and provide a stable income for his family, even after his retirement. See Bearman pp. 86–130.

and extended family (76). While New Place and the 1596 purchase of a family coat of arms constitute personal purchases as Shakespeare strove to move his family up the social ranks, his subsequent acquisitions were largely financial. The theater was his most lucrative asset but also his most precarious.[113] Suffering frequent closures from the plague and political turmoil, it was never guaranteed playhouses would remain open and, thus, profitable. Aware of this danger, Shakespeare acquired rental investments in the form of agricultural plots and tithes that provided him with stable, guaranteed rental income. In 1602, three years after investing in the Globe, Shakespeare bought 107 acres of farmland in Stratford which was already being leased to tenant farmers, thus obtaining immediate rental income without any personal labor or real risk (106).[114] Shakespeare's pattern of investing nearly every three years reflects a cautious investment strategy based on continued investment and long-run gains, rather than short-run speculation and spurts of profit. Shakespeare was not one to spend beyond his means, but waited until he had recouped his investment and his finances were stable before reinvesting his capital. Like his company, Shakespeare valued long-run stability and success over precarious short-run profits.

The next substantial investment Shakespeare made, three years later, was purchasing a portion of Stratford tithes in 1605. As Bearman explains, "The owners of tithes at this period rarely collected them themselves. Instead, for a fixed sum, they let the right to collect them to a tenant who was free to make what profit he could" (119). This purchase not only illustrates Shakespeare's own investment strategy but speaks to his belief in the profit motive and valuation of individual

[113] Though exact figures are impossible to recreate given a lack of financial records, Aaron estimates that a share in the company would have been worth approximately £42 per year after expenses (*Global Economics* 55). See *Global Economics* chapters one and two for a full account of the Chamberlain's-King's Men's finances during Shakespeare's lifetime. More recently, Bearman has estimated the figure to be £50 or more per annum.

[114] Interestingly, the acreage was not "a series of neatly enclosed fields" but was comprised of "strips, or 'lands,' dotted around in the old unenclosed fields which bordered Stratford." The lands were not enclosed until the 1770s, which is interesting given that enclosure was one of the most heated political and economic topics of Shakespeare's day (Bearman 105). Shakespeare seems to have stayed out of this fight in his own lifetime, though enclosure appears in several plays and is a prominent part of *2H6* (Bearman 138–45).

labor. Thanks to the tithe collection system, Shakespeare avoided the costs of the labor and the risk of not being able to collect the tithes (denoted by Bearman's phrasing "make what profit he *could*" [my emphasis]) by transferring those costs to the lessee while he enjoyed the stable rental income. The Stratford Tithes underscore his preference for safe investments and his support of a system in which individual labor is rewarded with corresponding profit. While Shakespeare was paid by his tenants regardless of tithes collected, his tenants' profit depended on the labor they expended on collection. [115]

Shakespeare's understanding of labor as a social necessity that should be justly compensated factors into Jack Cade's fate in *2 Henry VI*. Not unlike the play's self-supporting Alexander Iden, Shakespeare sought long-term security and sustenance over excess, valuing saving and investment over immediate gains through high-risk ventures. The dramatist's prudent, lifelong investing and his continuous "exploitation of his creditworthiness" throughout the 1590s and into the 1600s distinguished him financially and, ultimately, artistically from his peers, putting him in a significantly better financial position than his peer playwrights and a marginally more successful one than his fellow sharers (166). It was this comfortable position – a privilege earned, not given – that gave Shakespeare the freedom to pen his best drama by focusing on his own intellectual preoccupations, not the potboiling demands of his audience. Shakespeare's financial decisions indicate that he was a hard but efficient worker, willing to bet on the Chamberlain's Men's success – based on twenty years of the Burbage's performance record – but unwilling to buy into risky or morally opaque ventures like money-lending, wool broking, stock in monopolies, or contemporary trading companies. Though "it may be a matter of disappointment to the more romantically inclined" that his tale is neither one of exceeding wealth nor bankruptcy, the fact that

[115] See Bearman pp. 118–21 for a more in-depth explanation of the history and collection of tithes.

Shakespeare saved his family from his father's financial trouble and provided a stable income for them "through the extraordinary exploitation of his talents" and early investments is labor that was well to be rewarded (178).

III. Jack Cade and the Fantasy of a Stateless Nature

Shakespeare's prioritization of individual investment and later financial success by no means numbed him to the plight of the less fortunate. In contrast, it seems to have set off a deeper interest in matters of economic desert and redistribution, as seen in Cade's dystopic social plan and the utopian fantasies of *King Lear* and *The Tempest*. Thought to have been written in 1590, *2 Henry VI* antedates Shakespeare's recorded investments. To argue that Shakespeare's plays were shaped in response to his investments would be to oversimplify and misunderstand the playwright's career. Instead, I contend that Shakespeare's career and the themes he interrogates throughout his corpus reflect his belief in the value of individual labor and his view of markets as the best (or least harmful) way to bridle man's greed. Though Shakespeare's preoccupation with economic inequality and individual compensation may have become more nuanced throughout his career, it was never absent. His society, "like ours," was "deeply concerned about the societal implications of economic forces" in the increasingly urban economy (Yamamoto 1). Shakespeare's plays exemplify these concerns.

In early modern England, the "underlying proximity between private and public interests—an enduring feature of early modern projects—was symptomatic of the broader process of state-formation" (13). Seen as an inevitable part of nation-building, the individual's growing profit motive created increasing disparity throughout the sixteenth century. Tudor humanism responded to the "novel emergence of mass poverty" by remodeling "political thought as properly a matter of economic planning rather than ethical philosophy" and "Abandoning the medieval notion of

poverty as inevitable." Man, with all his humanist capabilities, could "achieve universal prosperity" and bring about political stability by exercising self-sufficiency (Fitter "So Distribution," 844–5). In Shakespeare's society, "between a quarter and a third of the urban population were trapped in desperate poverty," facing hunger and unemployment and often "reduced to begging." Instead of practicing charity, "the ruling elite, ever more wealthy as the 16th century unfolded, responded to the hungry and destitute" by vilifying them in literature and law via public ridicule, the suppression of wages, public whippings, and "execution by Martial Law." Using characters like Suffolk, Cade, Iden, Gloucester (in both *2H6* and *Lear*), Lear, Poor Tom, Caliban, and Gonzalo, Shakespeare attempts to envision a society that "praised a common weal not commons whipped . . . where each man had enough" (857–8). The dramatist's dreams, however, were tempered by his concrete understanding of human nature, investment, and political economy. His plays highlight the disparity between social fantasies and the constraints of reality, showing deep sympathy for the poor and antipathy toward the corrupt elite, while simultaneously endorsing deserved compensation and legally regulated structures of exchange. In Shakespeare's garden, though he may have wished it otherwise, there is no such thing as a free "sallet."[116]

With no free lunches, squaring private interests with public good proves a delicate balance throughout *2 Henry VI*. The play "in all its comic, carnivalian grotesquerie and excess, makes the question 'who should rule?' into a question about the distribution of wealth: 'Who gets what?'" and *why* (Maus, *Being* 105–6). In the history play, who gets what is entangled with questions of statecraft, desert, and self-interest in complex and, ultimately deadly, ways. The King and

[116] This, of course, is a recasting of Milton Friedman's famous adage "there's no such thing as a free lunch," which is a pithy way of conveying opportunity costs. Sadly, nothing is "free." Even if, for example, your company buys you lunch at work, it will take an hour out of your workday, meaning that instead of choosing to pay $10 for a sandwich, you pay an hour to eat on the company's dime. Depending on your hourly wage – if you are a lawyer billing hundreds per hour, for instance – this could be a very expensive lunch. See Friedman's collection of essays by the same name, *There's No Such Thing as a Free Lunch*.

Gloucester suffer from having too little self-interest, making them ineffective statesmen, while Suffolk and Cade have far too much. This imbalance of public and private interests leads all four men to their deaths, though Henry must wait until *3 Henry VI* for his exit. Gloucester and Suffolk offer an instructive and dramaturgically parallel dichotomy. While they inhabit opposite ends of the spectrum, with Gloucester having too little and Suffolk too much self-interest, both men die at the hands of commoners after appealing their death with a final series of failed defenses. Their pleas present radically different viewpoints that speak to each man's inability to balance public and private interests in the ways their political positions demand. Gloucester's weakness is ultimately his overt dedication to service and morality – or his surplus of public devotion without the self-love needed to protect himself from others' corruption. Gloucester is the portrait of a perfect public servant, protecting king and kingdom by upholding what he deems to be public virtue and morality. He demonstrates his intolerance for harmful self-interest most clearly when he exposes the beggars Simpcox and his wife in 2.1, which early on "establishes Gloucester as a wise judge, indeed the ethical center of the play" (Maus, *Being* 111). While King Henry remains oblivious to the beggars' knavery, Gloucester tests the "blind" man's vision and, when he fails the test, has the purportedly crippled man "not able to stand alone" whipped as a second trial (2.1.71, 2.1.139). Bearing but one blow, the able-bodied Simpcox quickly leaps up and flees the whipping on foot. Gloucester remains unmoved by the wife's claim that they "did it for pure need," viewing their ruse as money stolen from the commonwealth through self-interested deceit (2.1.148).[117]

[117] The bigger question Shakespeare raises with this episode is why there is this level of "pure need" without redistribution by the state. We see it explicitly in the wife's comment and implicitly in the Queen's amusement at their suffering as she responds to their suffering with the insensitive "It made me laugh to see the villain run" (2.1.147). Though Shakespeare reveals his sympathy for the poor through this exchange, he does not offer any kind of solution to their plight. Gloucester's morality is strengthened by his exchange with Suffolk and the Cardinal as it becomes clear that though he must maintain order by punishing the poor, he does not enjoy their suffering, as his peers do evidenced by their perception of punishment as spectacle.

In act 3, Gloucester finds himself in a position more grave than Simpcox, begging for his life before the king against charges of treason brought against him by Lords Suffolk and York who use Gloucester's position of Protector to accuse him of corruption. "'Tis thought, my lord," York levies, "that you took bribes of France, / And, being Protector, stayed the soldiers' pay, / By means whereof his highness hath lost France" (3.1.104–06). Gloucester fights this accusation by claiming that he has never taken bribes and, far from harming his country, has "watched the night, / Ay, night by night, in studying good for England!" Unlike the power-hungry Suffolk and York, Gloucester has lived a life of service to his King, country, and citizens. He objects to his opponents' slanderous accusations with the direct admission:

> No: many a pound of mine own proper store,
> Because I would not tax the needy commons,
> Have I disspursed to the garrisons
> And never asked for restitution. (3.1.110–18)

Though Gloucester has no compassion for dishonest showmen like Simpcox, whose harmful deceit depletes the common wealth, he is sympathetic to the plight of the poor. Most importantly, he acts on his sympathies by donating his own earnings so as not to add to the poor's burden by taxing those in need.

The King proves himself a useless pawn of his lords, easily mistaking Suffolk's performative rhetoric for substantive accusations. After Suffolk's specific accusations are successfully punctured by Gloucester's defense, Suffolk adds "these faults are easy, quickly answered, / But mightier crimes are laid unto your charge / Whereof you cannot easily purge yourself" (3.1.133–35). Never specifying what these "mightier crimes" are, he leaves Gloucester with no concrete allegation to fight, rendering him powerless against his ensuing arrest. The King,

with childlike naïveté, responds "'tis my special hope / That you will clear yourself from all suspense. / My conscience tells me you are innocent" (3.1.139–41). Faced with a baseless arrest and a puppet king, all Gloucester can do is issue a warning:

> Ah, gracious lord, these days are dangerous.
> Virtue is choked with foul ambition,
> And charity chased hence by rancour's hand;
> Foul subornation is predominant,
> And equity exiled your highness' land.
> I know their complot is to have my life,
> And if my death might make this island happy
> And prove the period of their tyranny,
> I would expend it with all willingness.
> But mine is made the prologue to their play. (3.1.142–51)

Gloucester is all service with no statecraft, relying on other actors' morality instead of guarding against their vice. He cannot survive in Suffolk's England. Even in his final speech, he displays selfless devotion to king and country, claiming that if his life would stop the power-hungry lords, he would willingly die.

Yet Gloucester knows that, once activated, their avarice will not end until their "plotted tragedy" has reached its conclusion and they have completed their coup (3.1.153). King Henry VI is notably absent from this exchange, allowing his wife, the Cardinal, and his lords to speak for him while Gloucester, his Protector and trusted political advisor, is silenced and dragged away. In a powerful string of metaphors, Gloucester bemoans the King who

> . . . throws away his crutch

> Before his legs be firm to bear his body.
>
> Thus is the shepherd beaten from thy side,
>
> And wolves are gnarling who shall gnaw thee first.
>
> Ah, that my fear were false; ah, that it were!
>
> For, good King Henry, thy decay I fear. (3.1.189–94)

The King confirms Gloucester's worst anxieties and, instead of addressing Gloucester's concerns or responding in any real way, gives all power over to his lords, stating "My lords, what to your wisdoms seemeth best / Do, or undo, as if ourself were here." The problem is that he *is* there. King Henry abdicates all responsibility, not only proving useless but rendering himself powerless through his own actions as he transfers royal authority to his lords. By giving away his political power to a pack of avaricious lords, Henry leaves himself little recourse, sealing his fate and Gloucester's. While Gloucester suffers for having served public good at the expense of his own survival, the King shows himself to be devoid of both private and public interest. The antithesis of his father, the great Henry V, Henry VI is an actionless king and, though he sees "The map of honour, truth, and loyalty" in Gloucester's face, he fails to intervene. Instead, he passively blames some "louring star" that "envies" Gloucester's estate, exercising pity (and piety) through "sad unhelpful tears" instead of using his absolute political power. Henry seems to forget he is king and facing such mighty "vowed enemies," sees no action but to "weep, and 'twixt each groan / Say, 'Who's a traitor, Gloucester, he is none'" (3.1.198–222). Though Gloucester serves the state and the overly devout Henry, his scripture, both men pay for their misplaced selflessness with their lives.

Opposing Gloucester's and King Henry's lack of self-interest, however, is Suffolk's dangerous, self-serving avarice and disservice to the realm for which he is killed. Executed by a

band of vigilante pirates, Suffolk's death is one of the more satisfying scenes in the play. In 4.1, disguised as a prisoner on a vessel bound for France, Suffolk is called to pay the ship's crew one thousand pounds in exchange for his life, so that the crew might "make boot," or profit from his holding (4.1.13). When negotiations fail, Suffolk reveals his identity as a gentleman, showing his "George," or badge of St. George as proof that he is a member of the Order of the Garter. Walter Whitmore, his captor, is unimpressed and instead of honoring Suffolk's status, clings to his own code of ethics by asserting

> Never yet did base dishonour blur our name
> But with our sword we wiped away the blot.
> Therefore, when merchant-like I sell revenge,
> Broke be my sword, my arms torn and defaced
> And I proclaimed a coward through the world. (4.1.39–43)

Whitmore refuses to play the merchant and commodify revenge, working instead within an economy of honor – a market in which Suffolk's currency is invalid. Suffolk's first attempt stymied, the lord tries a further appeal to status, responding "Stay, Whitmore, for thy prisoner is a prince, / The Duke of Suffolk, William de la Pole" (4.1.44–5). Unlike Gloucester's defense, Suffolk's "case for special treatment is predicated on the assumption that his rank and station entitle him to be treated differently to other men—not on his good works as a human being and not on a denial of the charges his captives have raised against him" (MacKenzie 74). Suffolk's reveal could not have been more poorly calculated and he finds himself not only a prisoner but a personal enemy of the ship and, more importantly, its captain. Putting too much stock in his title and too little in the Lieutenant's power, Suffolk hurls insults at his captor, calling him an "Obscure and lousy swain" and "Base slave," too "blunt" to wound Suffolk (4.1.50, 67). In a speech that

proves anything but blunt, the Lieutenant accuses Suffolk of harmful greed and actions that wreaked havoc on England's wealth and stability.

Pool! Sir Pool! Lord!

Ay, kennel, puddle, sink, whose filth and dirt
Troubles the silver spring where England drinks;
Now will I dam up this thy yawning mouth
For swallowing the treasure of the realm.
Thy lips that kissed the Queen shall sweep the ground;
And thou that smiledst at good Duke Humphrey's death,
Against the senseless winds shalt grin in vain
Who in contempt shall hiss at thee again.
. . .
By thee Anjou and Maine were sold to France,
The false revolting Normans thorough thee
Disdain to call us lord, and Picardy
Hath slain their governors, surprised our forts
And sent the ragged soldiers wounded home.
The princely Warwick, and the Nevilles all,
Whose dreadful swords were never drawn in vain,
As hating thee, are rising up in arms.
. . .
The commons here in Kent are up in arms:
And, to conclude, reproach and beggary

Is crept into the palace of our King.

And all by thee. Away! Convey him hence. (4.1.70–103)

The personal quickly turns political through the Lieutenant's punning as he compares de la Pole to a cesspool, contaminating England's pure, silver spring and forcing the citizens to drink in his corruption. Unlike Suffolk who can only attack the Lieutenant's class relative to his own "honourable blood of Lancaster," the Lieutenant has real charges to bring against Suffolk. While Suffolk's speeches are "poorly argued and laden with emotion and presumption," his captors prove "methodical and incisive in their demolition of his pretensions." Suffolk's empty pleas are no match for "the hard facts and realities of the deathly emissaries" (MacKenzie 80). The captain, who initially cautioned Whitmore not to be rash but to profit from the ransom, now joins Whitmore's economy of honor. This is not just an *ungentle* gentleman, but Suffolk – canker to the Commonwealth, sower of discord, political violence, and rebellion – represents a real threat to England's political stability that must be quickly removed.

In contrast to Whitmore, who seems insensibly tied to honor for honor's sake, the captain understands and advocates for profit-motivated ransoms as long as the Commonwealth is helped, not harmed by sparing the prisoner in exchange for his fee – or as long as the social benefit outweighs the social cost. Suffolk's corrupt dealings and self-serving ambition are too costly for the Commonwealth. His threat to social order is so great that no ransom can spare him – he must be excised. Suffolk, whose "imperial tongue" is "used to command, untaught to plead for favour," is condemned to die by his unschooled, dangerous pride (4.1.123–4). Showing no remorse for the public suffering he has caused, de la Pole is removed by retributive execution. Suffolk's self-interest only gets him so far. It may have allowed him to triumph over the service-minded Gloucester, but is no match for the Lieutenant; fluent in discourses of private and public interest,

the captain accepts ransoms for harmless prisoners but not when the threat to public order outweighs the monetary gain. Suffolk is not just self-interested (the Lieutenant likely would have tolerated that), he is a "sink, whose filth and dirt" has contaminated the entire state.

Gloucester and Suffolk's fates prime us for a discussion of individual versus collective gain, but Jack Cade is the play's fullest rumination on questions of who gets what and why. Richard Helgerson credits the first two-thirds of the play with being "open and univocal in its political ideology," as it continuously seeks a union between king and commons. The commons are surprisingly loyal to notions of political order and common good. Even the pirates, unlikely pillars of morality, "who murder Suffolk, act in those interests," ousting Suffolk from the political landscape due to his desire to disrupt the union between king and commons. For Helgerson, however, Cade's rebellion "push[es] that inclusionist ideal toward its own exclusionist extreme, at once enunciating its most radical implications and reducing it to absurdity" (207). Yet, the rebels are more than just absurd extremists and recent scholarship has foregrounded Shakespeare's sympathetic depiction of the commons.[118] Though Cade may take his quest for equitable distribution several steps too far, neither he nor his followers can be reduced to mere comedy.

Immediately following the Lieutenant's bold execution of Suffolk, we meet the central players of Cade's rebellion – simple tradesmen who seek to take the "threadbare" commonwealth and "set a new nap upon it," yielding a fuller, richer, less patchy (i.e., more evenly distributed) nation (4.2.5). Though armed with a noble goal, the rebels immediately present a divided front, as the Butcher and Weaver repeatedly interrupt Cade's speech with humorous, irreverent asides that call into question Cade's lineage, sociopolitical identity, and authority. In response to Cade's introduction as "John Cade," named by his father, a Mortimer, and his mother, a Plantagenet, the

[118] See Maus, *Being* pp. 99–132, Fitter "So Distribution," Hobday, Doty, Patterson pp. 32–51, Keck, and Eklund.

Butcher jokes he was named Cade for "stealing a cade of herrings" and his father was no Mortimer but an "honest man, and a good bricklayer," while his mother, "I knew her well, she was a midwife." Far from royalty, Cade's family appears barely working class, resorting to stealing fish and peddling lace – "valiant" beggars who have "been whipped three market days together" (4.2.29–53).

His peers' jabs aside, the stronger proof of Cade's humble background as a tradesman and not a statesmen is the implausibility of his social plan. Unlike the Lieutenant who understood the necessity of markets and exchange, Cade rejects all structures of exchange – indeed, all structures in general – unaware of the necessity of *value* as a driving force of social order. The society he outlines is far from a free society, reproducing England's tyranny, but in a radically different form. In Cade's communist fantasy, rather than freeing its citizens, levelling merely constitutes an alternate form of oppression. In rhetoric that "anticipates the phraseology of the Levellers half a century later" Cade "vows reformation" and promises the crowd "There shall be in England seven halfpenny loaves sold for a penny . . . and I will make it felony to drink small beer. All the realm shall be in common" (Hobday 73; 4.2.59–63). Ignoring all notions of scarcity, Cade eliminates value, selling seven *halfpenny* loaves for *one* penny, and undoes social order, "enforc[ing] the consumption of festive double beer, or strong ale." This makes drunkenness not just legal but "compulsory" (4.2.62–3n). Unconcerned with who pays for or works for what, Cade promises

> And when I am king, as king I will be . . .There shall be no money, all shall eat and drink on my score, and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers and worship me their lord. (4.2.64–70)

Cade shifts the economic burden of food and drink to the state without realizing that *he* would be the state or reckoning with the costs of such provisions.

His radical proposal for levelling conflates economic need with his own political hunger. Cade presents real issues like the rising cost of wheat, enclosure of the commons, and legal discrimination against the illiterate poor without offering any plausible solutions. Unbothered by the logistics, Cade quickly pivots from the economic to the political, claiming kingship in a farcical parody of the real *contention* over the crown pervading the play. Set against the backdrop of the legitimate fight between York and Henry – to whom the commons just promised "love and loyalty" and proceed to offer protection in act 3 – Cade's claim that he is "rightful heir unto the crown" and the commons' "God save your majesty!" becomes a burlesque of York's true claim (3.2.250; 4.2.122, 66). In *2 Henry VI*, comedy "is never free from irony" as embodied by Cade. The deep irony is that his plan for a levelled England does not eliminate hierarchy but exacerbates it. Cade's "dream of undistinction," is anything but un-distinct, creating one giant division between the lord and the plebians who must slavishly be of one mind, "in one livery," and *worship* "their lord" (Cartelli, "Jack Cade" 65). With vocabulary reminiscent of both feudal and religious exchanges, Cade's new social organization is worse than England's previous feudal and contemporary seventeenth-century market structures. By entirely eliminating factions, Cade creates one excessively disproportionate power dynamic where several competing inequalities once stood.[119] In a society without "money," value, or economic exchange, citizens will be fed by Cade in exchange for worshipping him – a grim, dystopic portrait of social harmony and something quite far from an egalitarian society.

Cade's unfortunate irony builds throughout act 4 as it becomes increasingly clear that his call for equality is a sham scheme for his own advancement. The fissures in Cade's social plan

[119] When designing America's "ideal" society in their experimental government, the founders warned against the elimination of factions, as that would allow the tyranny of one majority to rule (see Madison's Federalist No. 10 in Hamilton et al. pp. 48–53).

deepen over the course of act 4, coming to a head in Lord Saye's execution, which even Cade balks at. Burlesquing Gloucester and Suffolk's previous political executions, Saye is accused of "traitorously corrupt[ing] the youth of the realm in erecting a grammar school" and spreading literacy (among the wealthy) through print – even building a paper mill to do so. After these farcical accusations, Cade charges Saye with more legitimate complaints:

> . . . Thou hast appointed justices of peace, to call poor men before them about matters they were not able to answer. Moreover, thou hast put them in prison, and because they could not read thou hast hanged them, when indeed only for that cause they have been most worthy to live. (4.7.29–43)

While grammar schools and the printing press should be social benefits, it is quickly made clear that the benefit of education and literacy is not reaching the poor, whose illiteracy bars their access to the benefit of clergy. A grammar school education for the middleclass and wealthy allows guilty noblemen who learned Latin to walk free while the illiterate poor hang. Cade's final accusation, though, is the most relevant to his pursuit of social equality (as Cade sees it), charging Lord Saye with treating his horse better than his constituents. In a question reminiscent of Lear's ravings on the heath Cade asks "Thou dost ride on a foot-cloth, dost thou not? . . . Marry, thou ought'st not to let thy horse wear a cloak when honester men than thou go in their hose and doublets" (4.7.42–7).[120] In this dehumanizing example of exorbitant income disparity, noble government officials treat their horses better than their citizens, clothing their animals to protect them from the cold while the poor freeze.

Saye's defense recalls Gloucester's pleas in act 3. Like Gloucester, Saye is a responsible civil servant, sympathetic to his citizens' suffering: "Justice with favour have I always done; /

[120] See *King Lear* 3.4.23–36 for Lear's delirious speech on "houseless poverty" and the king's responsibility to "care" for the "poor naked wretches" – a responsibility he has ignored.

Prayers and tears have moved me, gifts could never." He rejects any claim that he favored nobility or took bribes, claiming equal service to "King, the realm and you [the commons]," ensuring that when "This tongue hath parleyed unto foreign kings" it was "For you behoof" (4.7.62–73). In a final attempt to save himself, Saye asks

> Tell me, wherein have I offended most?
>
> Have I affected wealth or honour? Speak.
>
> Are my chests filled up with extorted gold?
>
> Is my apparel sumptuous to behold?
>
> Whom have I injured, that ye seek my death?
>
> These hands are free from guiltless bloodshedding,
>
> This breast from harbouring foul deceitful thoughts.
>
> O, let me live! (4.7.90–97)

Saye's claims to have served the commons and their interests in his first appeal ring true here, as he invites the commons to "Speak" up if he be guilty of any real offences. While the dramaturgical model of accusation, defense, and execution parallels Gloucester's and Suffolk's deaths, Saye breaks the pattern by inviting his accusers to speak and air their grievances. Unlike his fellow nobles who view the commons as expendable pawns in a marketplace for political power, Saye acknowledges his duty to serve the commons and swears to be free of "guiltless bloodshed," and "deceitful thoughts." Cade's brief aside confirms Saye's innocence as even "in Cade's distorted account he seems to have executed his duties conscientiously" (Maus, *Being* 111). Though Cade admits to "feel[ing] remorse in myself with his words," the radical leader reverts back to political survival mode with the immediate "but I'll bridle it." However brief, this glimpse of morality humanizes Cade, showing a rare moment of empathy and remorse as he recognizes Saye's

innocence and his own guilt. The moment is short-lived. Cade immediately suppresses his emotions for the good of his movement and himself and regresses back to the contradictory, heartless leader of the levelers in the next line. Still as an aside, Cade determines that Saye "shall die, an it be but for pleading so well for his life" (4.7.98–100). Acting as if scared by his momentary hesitation, Cade doubles down on senseless violence. After admitting to himself that Saye is guiltless of real crime and will instead die for defending his guiltlessness "so well," Cade orders the rebels to kill Saye and his son-in-law and display their heads "upon two poles" (4.7.105).

As Saye is dragged offstage, Cade launches into his most glaringly dystopic speech, describing the "ideal" society he will create. Having issued the tyrannical "Away with him! And do as I command ye," Cade warns his followers that in Cade's society, "The proudest peer in the realm shall not wear a head on his shoulders, unless he pay me tribute; there shall not a maid be married, but she shall pay to me her maidenhead ere they have it; men shall hold of me *in capite*; and we charge and command that their wives be as free as heart can wish or tongue can tell" (4.7.112–17). Though Cade previously eliminated all money, value, and rank, here he describes a society in which money talks and the "lord" tyrant rules. In Cade's twisted feudal dystopia, nobles will be beheaded if they don't pay "tribute" to their lord and virgins will "pay" the lord with their maidenhead, not even given the choice (as were the nobles) between paying Cade and being executed. Cade's society is horrifyingly arcane, codifying rape, extramarital sex, and perverse wealth taxes.

While it may reduce Cade to the ridiculous and hypocritical, this terrifying parody of the feudal system reflects Shakespeare's profound sympathy for the poor. Cade's political proposals are undoubtedly unrealistic and abusive, but they are a reaction to current problems and past abuses. Cade's plan is modelled on the feudal system of the lord's power over his vassals – a power

that protected the vassals, providing them with guaranteed food, shelter, and clothes, but also exposed them to the kinds of exploitation and sexual harms Cade lists. Cade's political vision is severely hobbled by the feudal system of England's recent memory and, symptomatic of the system's prolonged abuse of the poor, he cannot think of another way to order society. Cade will never be able to achieve what he actually desires which is "less the return to a garden state . . . than the recovery of an 'ancient freedom' that will supersede the memory of their servitude" (Cartelli, "Jack Cade" 64–5). Rather than ending the cycle of abuse, Cade augments it, yielding a darker, more exploitative, and more tyrannical perversion of feudal ranks.

Based in his own self-interest and not in collective good, Cade's movement can only last so long. At the end of act 4, even his followers abandon him, opting for the safety of royal pardon over the insecurity of rebellion. Contrary to Cade's belief that the commons are as light as a feather "blown to and fro," the masses are "not fickle but rather 'unswervingly loyal – to themselves'" (4.8.55; Doty 88). Living in a system in which the cards are perpetually stacked against them, the commons (and Cade) realize that their foremost motivation must be self-preservation. Suddenly finding himself a populist leader without any followers, Cade calls out the commons' cowardice, reminding them of the abuses they are running back to: "I thought ye would never have given o'er these arms till you had recovered your ancient freedom; but you are all recreants and dastards and delight to live in slavery to the nobility. Let them break your backs with burdens, take your houses over your heads, ravish your wives and daughters before your faces. For me, I will make shift for one" (4.8.25–31).

In an unusual non-performative moment of honesty, Cade expresses disbelief that his followers could abandon their mission and elect to live in "slavery to the nobility." Disappointed the multitude would give up their freedom so readily, Cade leaves them to their own devices,

deserting his levelling mission to protect himself. Now an outlaw, however, Cade is unable to "make shift" and soon finds himself outside a walled garden, delirious with hunger. When Cade is offered an alternative to the inequity of the urban marketplace, however, he swiftly rejects it, too proud to accept Iden's charity. In Cade's final scene, Shakespeare presents a portrait of Cade at his most sympathetic and most flawed. Desperate and ravenous Cade laments "Fie on ambitions! Fie on myself that have a sword and yet am ready to famish! These five days have I hid me in these woods . . . but now am I so hungry . . . I [can] stay no longer" (4.10.1–6). Spying a garden, Cade climbs over the fence "to see if I can eat grass, or pick a sallet another while," closer to an emaciated beast than man (4.10.7–8). Alexander Iden, modest gentleman farmer and the garden's proprietor, enters immediately after and contrasts Cade's rhetoric of raw survival with one of bounty and gratitude. Iden extols the quiet country life away from the turmoil of court, where he "may enjoy such quiet walks as these." The archetype of a gentleman farmer, Iden claims to be content with his "small inheritance . . . worth a monarchy." As Cade listens from within the garden's walls, Iden professes:

> I seek not to wax great by others' waning
>
> Or gather wealth I care not with what envy;
>
> Sufficeth that I have maintains my state,
>
> And sends the poor well pleased from my gate. (4.10.17–23)

Despite having overheard Iden's commitment to humble comfort and equitable wealth distribution, Cade immediately takes up the offensive assuming Iden, "lord of the soil . . . [will] betray [him] and get a thousand crowns of the King" by delivering Cade's head (4.10.24–7). Viewing Iden not as "a poor esquire" but "the walking embodiment of established authority," Cade vows to "make [him] eat iron like an ostrich, and swallow [Cade's] sword like a great pin, ere

[they] part" (Cartelli, "Jack Cade" 49; 4.28–9). Shocked by Cade's unprovoked aggression, Iden replies

> Why, rude companion, whatsoe'er thou be,
> I know thee not; why then should I betray thee?
> Is't not enough to break into my garden
> And like a thief to come to rob my grounds,
> Climbing my walls in spite of me the owner,
> But thou wilt brave me with these saucy terms? (4.10.30–5)

Cade responds with pure need, telling Iden to "Look on me well: I have eat no meat these five days," before challenging the "lord of the soil" to a duel (or more accurately, simply promising to kill him). Iden refuses Cade's challenge, uncomfortable with the physical disparity between the famished Cade and his own well-nourished frame:

> Nay, it shall ne'er be said, while England stands,
> That Alexander Iden, a squire of Kent,
> Took odds to combat a poor famished man.
> Oppose thy steadfast-gazing eyes to mine,
> See if thou canst outface me with thy looks.
> Set limb to limb, and thou art far the lesser;
> Thy hand is but a finger to my fist. (4.10.41–7)

To Iden, it would be unjust and ignoble to fight Cade and *take odds* against a poor, starving, and enfeebled opponent. Unable to digest Iden's charity, Cade attacks Iden and is swiftly killed, crying "O, I am slain! Famine and no other hath slain me" (4.10.59).

Cade did die indirectly from the famine that led him to cross Iden's wall, but his blood is on his own hands. Iden prides himself on sharing his greens with the poor and "if Cade had politely asked for relief . . . he might well have received succor." But Cade is "too hungry" and far too proud "to be deferential" (Maus, *Being* 110). Hilary Eklund argues that "Cade's curse that the garden 'wither' and become a 'burying-place' captures the deadlock of a system that offers only these two options for habitation: lordship and spoil" (59). Yet this binary neglects the third option that Iden presented upon entering: charity. To accept charity, however, one must accept hierarchies, or the notion that there are some better off who can aid those worse off by, as Adam Smith wrote, "divid[ing] with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants."

Smith's theory that voluntary redistribution will magically produce an equally housed and fed society is as close to utopian fantasy as Gonzalo's dream in *The Tempest* that without labor, all things "nature should produce . . . To feed my innocent people" (*TMS* IV.1.10; 2.1.160-5). Countering Gonzalo's – and, to a lesser extent, Smith's – idealism, Iden has mastered an attainable redistribution, making no grand claims of levelling hierarchies or eliminating labor, but merely sending the poor with full bellies from his humble country garden. Sadly, Cade will not walk away "well pleased," for he has consistently shown himself unable to accept "different ranks of life," unless the inequities are of his own design (4.10.23; *TMS* IV.1.10). Ultimately, it is not his hunger but Cade's hubristic refusal to acknowledge systems and ranks that proves his undoing. Unwilling to buy into anyone else's system of exchange, Cade rejects Iden's plenty, even if it means his death.

* * *

Shakespeare's sympathetic portrayal of the Cade rebellion intimates his desire for a more equitable society, but Cade's disturbing dystopian social plan – with increasingly stronger ties to the abusive feudal past over a corrective, egalitarian future – cements its impossibility. A state without money or factions is pure fiction for human nature ensures new, more dangerous interests will arise to replace the old, creating fresh social ills instead of remedying old ones. Shakespeare knew that a society without self-interest was unattainable, as *Measure for Measure*, *1 Henry IV*, *Henry V*, and *2 Henry VI* all illustrate. Cade's plan does not account for this. Unwilling to recognize the validity of any market, having abolished money, labor, law, and gratitude, Cade is ultimately unable to benefit from the system's redistribution. Iden foreshadows Adam Smith's understanding of distributive charity as something given freely by the rich but bought into by everyone. In Smith's and Shakespeare's garden, you cannot be a non-laboring member of society and expect to leave "well pleased from [the garden] gate" (*2H6* 4.2.23). Labor and investment (indirect labor) are actions that both men thought should be rewarded.

The belief in labor as "good" and praiseworthy has its root in Christianity, as Cade notes when in defense of tradesmen he invokes the original laborer, reminding the noble Stafford that "Adam was a gardener" (4.2.125). In Christianity, labor is tied to the "variable concept of dignity or worth. The abundance that God might have given equally to all is said to be 'mete to'—meaning both appropriate to and measured to—the inherited social hierarchy. This limit on distribution has been called the principle of measure," incorporating economics "within a larger social framework" that combines "ethical moderation" and an acceptance of inherent "social structures with reciprocity in economic exchange" (Graham 144). When God divided the earth's wealth, he did not distribute it equally. Fortunately for the poor, man's "vain and insatiable desires" cause the wealthy to overproduce and redistribute their goods to the poor whose "labours" produced their

bounty (A. Smith, *TMS* IV.1.10). Charity is still an exchange however and, as such, must come with reciprocity for both parties. Proposing a labor-free, moneyless, and classless society, Cade refuses to buy into the principle of measure, rejecting Iden's approach to charity. Scorning all systems of exchange, Cade offers neither labor nor gratitude, and attacks his would-be benefactor. Bent on destroying civil society instead of participating in it, Cade's presence in Iden's garden and Henry VI's England ultimately proves too harmful to be allowed.

Iden, Shakespeare, The Chamberlain's-King's Men collective, and Adam Smith all share a core belief in individual investment (be it labor or capital), compensation, and the market's power to equilibrate private and public interests to secure greater social benefits. While the market does not produce utopic perfection, it avoids the corrupt perversion of Cade's "feudal communism" (Hobday 74). Shakespeare returns to questions of redistribution in *King Lear* and *The Tempest*. Though he may go down the path of a stateless society "where each man had enough" after Cade, he never lets himself or his characters reach the garden gate (Fitter, "So Distribution" 858). Gonzalo's speech outlining the ideal commonwealth in act 2 of *The Tempest* is barely verbalized before it is laughed offstage by the "ungentle" Antonio and Sebastian. Gonzalo's proposal for a classless society in many ways feels like Shakespeare rewriting Cade, this time with more intellect and less greed. Gonzalo's genuine commitment to bettering the commonwealth is reminiscent of Gloucester and Saye as he embraces his responsibility to serve his people. Impervious to Sebastian and Antonio's jabs, which parallel the Butcher and Weaver's irreverent interjections during Cade's speech, Gonzalo promises that if he were king

> I'th' commonwealth I would by contraries
> Execute all things, for no kind of traffic
> Would I admit; no name of magistrate;

> Letters should not be known; riches, poverty
> And use of service, none; contract, succession,
> Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard – none;
> No use of metal, corn, or wine or oil;
> No occupation all men idle, all;
> And women, too, but innocent and pure;
> No sovereignty – (2.1.148–57)

Here Sebastian interrupts with "Yet he would be king on't," publishing the irony of a self-proclaimed sovereign abolishing sovereignty. Antonio quickly adds "The latter end of his commonwealth forgets the beginning" (2.1.158–9). The irony allowed to thrive in *2 Henry VI* is quickly spotted and silenced in *The Tempest*. Gonzalo does not respond, too lost in his fantasy of a stateless nature to absorb Sebastian's apt critique. Shakespeare allows Gonzalo to complete his fantasy and voice his final hope for a *common wealth* where "All things in common nature should produce / Without sweat or endeavour . . . To feed my innocent people" (2.1.160–65). The scene ends in a parodic rewriting of the common's shouts to Cade as Sebastian and Antonio joke "Save his majesty!" and "Long live Gonzalo!" When Gonzalo earnestly asks his peers if they are listening to him Alonso responds "Prithee, no more. / Thou dost talk of nothing to me" and Gonzalo's political musings are concluded by comedy (2.1.170-72). Ultimately, a world without trade, learning, riches, poverty, or labor is impossible and Shakespeare, Antonio, and Sebastian acknowledge this fact. Labor is required to produce necessities and markets are necessary to distribute those goods as, contrary to Gonzalo's utopia, people are not innocent. Shakespeare, his company, and his most successful characters all accepted that men were not angels and, to think otherwise would be mere theater.

CHAPTER FOUR

A Game at Press: Jonson, Middleton, and the Commodified Play

> What a wretchedness is this, to thrust all our riches outward, and be beggars within; to contemplate nothing but the little, vile, and sordid things of the world, not the great, noble, and precious! We serve our avarice, and not content with the good of the earth that is offered us, we search and dig for the evil that is hidden. (Jonson, "Timber" 542)

> "The age must needs be foul when vice reforms it."
> (Middleton, *The Phoenix* 13.65–6)

The fox praised in *Henry V* becomes the fox mortified in *Volpone*. Unlike Shakespeare's corpus which, I have argued, allows for a more optimistic view of self-interest, Jonson's writings resound with his castigation of private interests and commercialization. Thomas Middleton and Ben Jonson, whose dramatic output continued well beyond Shakespeare's death in 1616 – also the publication year of Jonson's *Workes* – approached their careers much differently than Shakespeare. Though more hostile to self-interest than Shakespeare, Jonson and Middleton both embraced the commercial print market and invested a good deal of effort in constructing intentional print personas or "bibliographic egos" in Joseph Loewenstein's words (1). Facing an increasingly commercialized society, Jonson's and Middleton's works forward a more cynical conception of private interests than Shakespeare's. I propose that Jonson and Middleton saw self-interest as a damaging force that eroded social value rather than creating it. Though they do so in different ways, both playwrights resist private interest in their texts and portray greed as decidedly pernicious, without the same range of self-interest present in Shakespeare's *Merchant*, *Measure for Measure,* or the Henriad. While Shakespeare portrays vice as a potentially generative force that wise leaders can marshal for the public good, the works of Jonson and Middleton betray a more hostile understanding of greed as it relates to social order. This same skepticism of private vice *vis à vis* public value is also reflected in their publication decisions. Unlike Shakespeare, who focused

his time and money on the theater, Jonson and Middleton utilized the print industry in surprisingly innovative ways to achieve their desired ends, whether aesthetic – as in the case of Jonson – or financial. Both dramatists, as this chapter goes on to substantiate, recognized the advantages to print (and manuscript) publication and exploited the control it gave authors to package their works for select audiences in a way that the public theater did not afford.

The chapter begins with an analysis of Jonson's distrust of mass commodification and his resulting highly curatorial approach to print as he crafted his print legacy through quarto and, ultimately, folio publication. Jonson's career decisions and works prioritize "the autonomous labor of the craftsman" over "the commodified labor of the marketplace." The playwright reviled popular success's demand "that the poet subject his labor to the command of money" and, instead, sought out protected spaces for his plays in the form of highly controlled print and court performances. Both venues limit mass access through either price or status, increasing Jonson's odds of securing a more educated, aesthetically sophisticated audience (Kendrick 24). Though these filtering mechanisms were still imperfect, they gave Jonson greater control over his plays' audience and reception. I posit that Jonson's careful selection of venue and meticulous framing of his material enabled him to dismiss less sophisticated consumers uninterested in the cerebral nature of his drama, ultimately sparing Jonson from pandering to the pit's fickle tastes. This elitism barred him from reaping the financial compensation from print that Middleton would – not that print was richly rewarded – but gave Jonson greater agency in the presentation and, as he hoped, reception of his works than his contemporaries.

After examining how Jonson used paratextual material and bibliographical elements to control the reception of his works on page and stage, the chapter shifts from the material to the dramaturgical impacts of Jonson's anti-commercialism. I argue that Jonson's works portray a

deeply cynical view of human nature as parasitic, which scholars have long noted, and a deep skepticism of institutions' ability to control these impulses via social, economic, or legal means. Instead of remedying social ills, economic and legal structures tend to exacerbate them in Jonsonian drama, creating perverse incentives that intensify immorality and bring social disorder rather than yielding any kind of social optimum. The exploitative commerce and corrupt incentives that pervade *Volpone* and *Bartholomew Fair* underscore Jonson's lack of faith in the ability of markets or private interests to generate any net benefit at all. For Jonson, instead of creating value, enterprise erodes economic, aesthetic, and moral gains. Jonson's distrust of commodification produced the highly stylized print persona and moral framing we see in the prologues and epilogues to his plays as he desperately tried to ensure his works ended up in the right reader's hands – Jonson's "Reader extraordinary" – and evaded the censure of the masses (*Catiline* A3^{r}).

Middleton took a different approach. Though his plays express a less rosy picture of private interests than Shakespeare's, the dramatist was more willing than Jonson to accept the realities of the market. Instead of rejecting popular preferences, Middleton capitalized on sensationalism to sell drama on and off stage, employing innovative marketing strategies to get his plays into the hands of as many readers and viewers as possible. While Jonson rejected drama's growing commercialization, Middleton embraced it, using paratextual material to add to his plays' commodification and maximize what little money print publication offered early modern authors. Whereas Jonson used his prefatory material to sort his readers into the learned and unlearned – catering to the former group, Middleton utilized diverse marketing strategies and print formats to appeal to all classes of consumers. His tiered marketing strategy took advantage of print, manuscript, and performance to ensure that his works reached all plausible subsets of the market to increase his market share. This strategy is particularly evident in his *A Game at Chess*, which

uses the theater, print industry, and bespoke manuscript publication to maximize Middleton's income by simultaneously appealing to the new profit structures of the commodified play and the long tradition of patronage. Much more than Shakespeare or Jonson, "print as a culture and a technology" consumed Middleton's thoughts and references to the semiotics of print are peppered throughout his works (Hope 248).

Middleton was well-versed in the commercial aspects of printed playtexts and his career decisions show he used this knowledge to his advantage in increasingly nuanced ways. Yet, while he embraced the commodified play, Middleton's moral stance on self-interest is much more ambivalent than Shakespeare's or Jonson's. Like Marlowe, Middleton was not above catering to his audience's diverse aesthetic and ideological preferences which, at times, renders the playwright's own ideology difficult to glean. While Marlowe favored the dynamic overreacher who brings bloodshed and verbose, dramatic verbiage, Middleton tended to rely on the sensationalism of political topicality. After broadly surveying Middleton's approach to sensationalism and print publication over the course of his career, I use the chapter's final pages to analyze the unique material history of *A Game at Chess*. It is my hope that by pairing the play's exceptional run on stage and in print with an examination of *Game*'s moral allegory, we may begin to excavate Middleton's complicated, equivocal approach to self-interest. Despite the black and white nature of the play's chess metaphor, Middleton occupies the moral grey area. In the end, it is arguably not the White House's purity but the Black Queen Pawn's cunning self-interest that saves the White Queen's Pawn and the White House from ruin, ensuring the White House's victory. Though the most avaricious characters are eventually defeated and thrown in the bag, self-interest remains a powerful force through the play's close. Though Jonson and Middleton portray private interest in a more problematic light than Shakespeare, Middleton displays a finer approach to

commercialism and private interests than Jonson, embracing the commodification of the printed playtext and the benefits of commercial markets, without ideologically favoring self-interest itself.

I. Bartholomew (un)Fair: Parasites and Profiteering in Jonson

The claim that Jonson used print to curate his authorial image is not new. Many studies have analyzed Jonson's careful attention to print publication and, most notably, his 1616 *Workes*. Yet scholarship has not adequately connected his distaste of commercialism, evident in the materiality, paratexts, and works themselves, to the pernicious self-interest that pervades his works.[121] This section aims to put Jonson's carefully cultivated bibliographic ego in dialogue with his approach to market exchange and private interests, both of which reveal the playwright's skepticism regarding humanity's ability to collaborate in mutually beneficial ways. Brian Sheerin singles Jonson out as chief among the cynical "literary voices . . . in satirizing what seemed to be a new cultural hollowness emptying out a more financially organic social past" (112). The playwright's frustration with the inauthenticity of commercial London often focused itself on the public theaters' audience. Throughout his career, Jonson consistently grappled with playgoers' inability to sift the high art of poetry from the vulgarity of popular drama. Print eventually became the medium through which Jonson attempted to circumvent audience ignorance and he increasingly viewed "publication as a fortress from which self-defense could be mounted" (Loewenstein 146). Yet, Sheerin cautions against "emblemizing Jonson as the cynical gadfly of economic change," explicating that while he may have railed against contemporary socioeconomic and cultural shifts, "Jonson did not fail to capitalize brilliantly on the very kinds of changes he often seemed to be critiquing" (112). Though "capitalize" seems strong for an author who struggled

[121] For more on Ben Jonson's involvement in publishing, see: Calhoun and Gravell, Cannan, Miola, Loewenstein, and Jowett ("Jonson's Authorization"); for the first folio, see: Brady and Herendeen, Griffin, Dutton, and Hooks.

with poverty throughout his lifetime, Jonson showed impressive command of the print medium.[122] Instead of using his knowledge of print publication to grow his readership however, he used it to curate his audience and appeal to the wiser sort through paratextual material that condemned the flighty tastes of fad-focused audiences.[123]

Rather than chasing trends, Jonson repeatedly set them through his innovative use of prefatory material in his quartos and the publication of his bold 1616 *Workes*, the first folio to publish drama from London's public stage as serious literature.[124] When viewed in tandem with the themes of his works, particularly *Volpone* and *Bartholomew Fair*, Jonson's writings and print persona portray commercial markets as corrupt spaces that corrode value instead of creating it.[125] Perhaps Jonson's biggest contention with commercialization was its erasure of artistry from vocations, as poets chased short-term sales instead of pursuing lasting literary value. Jonson saw commercial competition as a race to the bottom that, rather than inspiring creativity and increasing the quality of production, hamstringed artistic range by validating sub-par products.[126] Because of

---

[122] Jonson's finances were particularly precarious in the late 1620s. Ian Donaldson notes that "On 19 January 1629 a grant of £5 was made by the Dean and Chapter of Westminster 'to Mr Beniamin Jhonson in his sicknes and want', and in March of the same year Jonson thanked King Charles in verse for 'a Hundred Pounds He Sent Me in My Sickness'" ("The Life of Ben Jonson"). To say that Jonson truly "capitalized" off his curatorial approach to print seems misguided if, by the end of his career, he is this financially strapped. The real "capitalizing" Jonson achieved, was not in the form of financial compensation, but lasting literary cachet.

[123] The phrasing "wiser sort," of course, recalls Gabriel Harvey's comment on Shakespeare that while *Venus and Adonis* may delight the young readers, *The Rape of Lucrece* and *Hamlet* will "please the wiser sort" ("Earliest known").

[124] Herendeen underscores "the maverick independence that [Jonson] boldly asserts through the publication of the Folio," which announces a "determined independence . . . More than most, Jonson insisted on being his own agent, using this freedom to select his companies and his audiences" (Brady and Herendeen 53)

[125] This is not to say that Jonson rejected all markets. His frustration was directed at those predicated on increased competition and audience reception over what Jonson viewed as the unwavering value of classical poetic craft. The growing playwriting industry certainly fell into this category. While the playing companies enjoyed royal monopoly privileges, the dramatists did not and, consequently, had to fight for the audience's favor which typically favored action over heady intellectualism.

[126] The idea that increased competition yields increased efficiency and innovation has been integral to economics and, particularly, market theory since antiquity (see Chapter 1). This view of competition sees the consumer as a reasonable judge of value and taste, which Jonson does not. The idea is that consumers are not ignorant, but express their preferences through their buying choices, or consumer sovereignty. The favorable view of competition proposes that increased pressure to win consumer dollars will yield better products as sellers (in our case, playwrights) improve

this, Jonson spent much of his career differentiating between the vulgarity of the playwright, who "is more drawn to newness than goodness," and the craft of the poet ("Timber" 533).[127] Kendrick claims that this distinction comes less from the dramatist's opposition of "material labor to ideal labor" than it does from his belief in "the autonomous labor of the craftsman," unsullied by consumer demand. Jonson was far less interested in financial success than the valuation of his "poetic labor" (24). Print publication, particularly the growing body of paratextual conventions, offered Jonson the ability to frame his publications in ways that validated his own works and rewarded certain kinds of readers and modes of reading over others.

Ironically, Jonson resists the market's reduction of poetry to commodity by using the very genesis of the commodified text: print technology. His use of the print house, however, was not driven by his appetite for financial success but his desire to control his poetic legacy. While Middleton used print to expand his readership, catering to as many sectors as publication would allow, I argue that Jonson used prefatory material to encourage self-selection among his readers. Through his heavily classical borrowings and the lofty tone of his paratexts, Jonson caters to the educated elite.[128] Unlike Middleton, who contented himself with play-goers, readers, and low- and high-brow patrons alike, Jonson sought the educated class of reader, convinced of the average patron's inability to appreciate authentic poetic craft. By marketing his playbooks to the elite within a mass market, Jonson was able to blend the "two very different, but overlapping economies" of book-selling and clientage, "the one of personal property or goods, the other of the

---

their product to beat out competitors. Because Jonson devalues his audience's preferences, this theory cannot hold and, instead, increased competition corrupts products by pandering to popular tastes over actual artistic talent.

[127] All Jonson quotations apart from *Bartholomew Fair* are taken from the Oxford *Ben Jonson*, edited by Ian Donaldson. All *Bartholomew Fair* quotations come from the New Mermaids edition edited by G.R. Hibbard. Supplementary explanatory notes are taken from the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben Jonson Online* and noted accordingly in the accompanying parenthetical citations.

[128] See Miola and Loewenstein for an in-depth analysis on Jonson's use of Latin text and quotations in his prefatory material. See Miola for a succinct account of Jonson's paratextual framing and, particularly, how he reframed his plays to underscore their literary rather than their theatrical qualities.

personal attributes or skills constitutive of reputation" (Loewenstein 129). Jonson's savvy use of paratextual material allowed him to earmark his works for his most sophisticated patrons without alienating the less seasoned readers. Framing his plays as intellectual exercises helped enable this multivocality, as the elite were bolstered by Jonson's praise while those who self-selected as median readers could feel heartened by the potential for intellectual edification foregrounded in Jonson's works. While there is no direct evidence that the dramatist oversaw his plays in the printhouse, Jonson exerted substantial creative control over his works through his pioneering use of paratext, particularly of addresses to the reader, to elevate the playtext by distancing it from the stage. Even though Jonson begrudged commercialism, it did not stop him from playing to his audience and he proved himself a shrewd marketer, cultivating an elite brand that relied on the very commodification he reviled.

In the majority of his prefaces, Jonson uses the space as a primer for his audience – whether readers or viewers. His addresses blend punishment and praise as, in the same breath, Jonson validates the aesthetically sophisticated while encouraging the masses to elevate their tastes. This framing allows Jonson to shift the burden of artistic quality from author to audience: if they do not like the play, they must not be reading it correctly – a problem Jonson can remedy. In the 1611 quarto of *Catiline*, Jonson writes two separate prefaces, one "To the Reader in Ordinarie" – who Jonson implicitly promises to help – and the other "To the Reader extraordinary." The difference in length is immediately apparent, as the former occupies twenty-four lines of text while the latter takes a mere three. The ordinary reader's preface is dripping with condescension as Jonson transfers the blame for his work's potentially poor reception to the reader's ignorance rather than his lack of poetic skill. Jonson is so sure in his craft that "neither praise, nor dispraise from [them]

can affect [him].” He dismisses his ordinary readers from the start, assuming them to be those who “read some pieces of [Cicero], at Schoole, and understand them not yet.”

Jonson frames their reading of his play as intellectual practice rather than elite performance, claiming himself above “all vexation of Censure” as he leaves his juvenile reader “to [his] exercise. Beginne.” While Jonson treats the ordinary reader as an unseasoned schoolboy, his “Reader extraordinary,” the “better Man,” is above instruction. Jonson humbly submits himself and his work without fanfare. The difference between the two readers is underscored by the addresses’ parallel, antithetical conclusions, as Jonson bids the elementary reader to “Beginne” while bidding the expert “Farewell.” The implication is that the learned need no tutelage and will surpass him, leaving Jonson to supervise the unschooled reader as a master would his pupil ($A3^{r}$). Yet, as with most educational endeavors, the hope remains that the ordinary may become the extraordinary reader, should he absorb Jonson’s teachings. *The Alchemist*, printed in the same year, makes a similar rhetorical move, dividing the readers into the “understander[s],” and the “pretender[s].” He warns the pretender to “receiv[e] thy commodity” with caution, “for thou wert never more fair in the way to be cozened than in this age in poetry, especially in plays” (112). Art, according to Jonson, instructs, but plays – mere commodities stuffed in every hand – will cozen.

Jonson’s rejection of commercialization is louder in *Volpone*, in which the playwright uses coded paratextual material to introduce the play’s satirical critique of self-interest and commodification. The prologue morally primes Jonson’s audience to denounce the corrupt self-interest that is about to grace the stage. In the prologue, Jonson’s compositional philosophy blends with his distaste of pandering and he promises his audience a Horatian formula that “mix[es] profit with [their] pleasure.” Though the majority of the prologue details his resistance to theatrical market trends, he begins by offering his audience “According to the palates of the season / . . .

rhyme, not empty of reason." After this dual appeasement and critique of their seasonal (read unseasoned) taste, Jonson explains that he will not cater to fleeting trends by giving the audience the physical farce or violent action "Wherewith your rout are so delighted." Nor will he bring in tired, overused material "to stop gaps in loose writing," rely on "monstrous and forced action," or fill his play with jests stolen from others. His play, he promises, will be original and refined, for "The laws of time, place, persons he observeth / From no needful rule he swerveth" (Prologue 3–31). Rules of propriety pervade Jonson's paratextual material and, indeed, his plays.

His valuation of appropriate poetic craft is strengthened in the 1607 quarto's epistle dedicatory, which offers the play to "the most noble and most equal sisters, the two famous universities," Oxford and Cambridge. As he reframes *Volpone* for a reading public, he pledges that in the pages to follow, he will "raise the despised head of poetry again, and stripping her out of those rotten and base rags wherewith the times have adulterated her form, restore her to her primitive habit, feature, and majesty." In his appeal to classicism, Jonson contrasts his pure, authentic approach to poetry with "the writers of [his] days," who have "nothing remaining . . . of the dignity of the poet but the absurd name, which every scribe usurps; that now, especially in dramatic or (as they term it) stage-poetry, nothing but ribaldry, profanation, blasphemy, all licence of offence to God and man is practiced." He rebukes the market-driven debasement of noble poesy by directly addressing those authors who strive to "make themselves a name with the multitude, or (to draw their rude and beastly claps) care not whose living faces they entrench with their petulant styles." Above the fray, Jonson leaves the poor playwrights to "do it without a rival, for me; I choose rather to live graved in obscurity than share with them in so preposterous a fame." Jonson rejects fame if it means kowtowing to the "the present trade of the stage . . . where nothing but the filth of the time is uttered, and that with such impropriety of phrase, such plenty

of solecisms, such dearth of sense, so bold prolepses, so racked metaphors, with brothelry able to violate the ear of a pagan" (2–3).

Jonson's preface elucidates the tensions between the dramatist's reliance on the popularity of the theater industry and his preference for classical craft. Robert Miola, John Jowett, and others have shown how Jonson frequently appropriated citations from Horace, pairing Latin text with Latin spellings and typography to create an "ostentatious stylization of classical effects" that lent his works a learned air (Jowett, "Jonson's Authorization" 264). Jonson's bibliographical self-fashioning is clever, for as he distances himself from the theater through classical allusions and critical disdain for London's dramaturgy, he reminds us of his play's status as a (reformed) theatrical good. Jonson's drama is at once of the theater and yet, in a realm apart. The "antiacquisitive humor of city comedies by Ben Jonson," writes Aaron Kitch, "sits uneasily with the overt commercialism of the popular playhouses in which they were performed," and to which the playbooks – and Jonson himself – catered ("The Character" 403).[129] By framing his playtext as an intellectual exercise, however, Jonson manages to appeal to its theatricality and its elitism simultaneously, distancing the elite reader from the "proud, scornful [and ignorant] spectators," as Jonson advertises its theatricality and distinct literariness (Miola 46).

Jonson's paratexts are bold in their design and their author, equally forward in his confidence, "redefining the act of buying and selling his book as his own purchase of an identity" (Brady and Herendeen 119). Crucially for Jonson, the discerning patron will recognize his boldness as truth, not vacuous bluster. Jonson was "not the only one of his contemporaries to use

[129] Jonson quickly learned how to have his cake and eat it too, simultaneously repudiating popular theater and leaning into the theater of deception. *Volpone* is a prime example of this. Though the play's denouement openly punishes Volpone's rampant deception, drawing an unmistakable tie between lying and acting, the metatheatricality present throughout the play celebrates Volpone's dramatic talents and the craft that goes into his elaborate rouse. As the professional players on stage, Volpone successfully fools his audience until Mosca turns on him. Seen in this light, the play is a celebration of public playing, even while Jonson's address to his reader pretends otherwise.

print as a means of cultivating an authorial persona" but he was the "only playwright of the period to experiment with breaking completely free of [the] modesty topos" (Miola 179, 190). By the time of *Sejanus*'s and *Volpone*'s publication, Jonson saw no point in claiming he was unworthy of the lofty subject at hand, or that he could never do it justice, as the topos demanded.[130] That burden, he placed on his reader, crowning himself the ultimate intellectual arbiter. Through this practice, instead of rendering his quarto solely condemnatory, he gives the reader, who has already cracked the spine, a chance to win his intellectual approval by becoming an understander.[131] By positioning himself as a benevolent tutor, Jonson markets his writing to an elite audience, crafting his self-made brand of intellectualism, while benefiting from the diverse reach and literary legacy print publication promised.

Though Jonson is clearly performing aspects of his intellectualism as part of his dedication to Oxford and Cambridge – two powerful potential allies – his commonplace book *Timber, or Discoveries*, confirms that his private thoughts were no different. In fact, they are even more damning and significantly less tempered in their condemnation of contemporary poetry. Jonson ties his disdain for contemporary poets to their valuation of success over craft – particularly their envy of others' success and desire for the same kickback, whether earned or not. To Jonson, self-interest detracts from society, cheapening drama and corroding integrity as individuals pursue wealth over intellectual enrichment. In *Timber*, Jonson grumbles that "The time was when men would learn and study good things . . . but the professors, indeed, have made the learning cheap-

[130] By the publication of *Sejanus* in 1605 and *Volpone* in 1607, Jonson was well practiced in the cultivation of his bibliographical brand. Calhoun and Gravell suggest that Jonson even "arranged to use English paper with royal watermarks in order to give *Sejanus* (1605) the appearance of the king's sanction" following the political upheaval of the Gunpowder plot (64). Jowett goes even further by proposing that Jonson controlled his own typography: "Jonson has appropriated functions of the stationer and printer . . . establish[ing] the equivalent of a house style" for his works which bear his "distinctive [bibliographical] birthmark" ("Jonson's Authorization" 256).

[131] Jonson writes in *Timber* that he "take[s] this labour in teaching others, that they should not be always to be taught" (567).

railing and tinkling rhymers, whose writings the vulgar more greedily read." Jonson discusses the ramifications of readers' impoverished standards, lamenting that "He shall not have a reader now unless he jeer and lie. It is the food of men's natures; the diet of the times" (529).

To Jonson, markets are mutually ensured destruction, as playwrights lower their standards to sell to the masses, thus validating the consumers' base tastes, forcing the playwrights to sink still lower until there is little value to audience or author. For Jonson, there is no escape from this vicious circle of commercialism. He proceeds in *Timber* to stress the importance of intellectual pursuits over capital gain, asserting that "It was the ancient poverty that founded commonweals, built cities, invented arts" (558). Put differently, it was man's mind, not his money, that made him rich. Jonson's worldview is distinctly anti-commercial and he underscores that uncompensated self-edification should be humanity's fundamental pursuit. From a pragmatic standpoint, it is difficult to see how uncompensated work would motivate people to build the city buildings or tackle the logistical aspects of governance a great society requires, but Jonson is unperturbed by what, to him, are lower order concerns. Instead of inspiring man to organize and innovate, he sees commercial endeavors as a corrupting force that leads humanity "not content with the good of the earth that is offered us" to "search and dig for the evil that is hidden" within (558).

This corrupt self-interest takes center stage in *Volpone* where, instead of fostering beneficial trades, private interest breeds corruption and guarantees mutual destruction. Act 1 opens with Volpone's blasphemous veneration of his gold as he orders his minion, Mosca, to "Open the shrine" so Volpone "may see [his] saint." Volpone worships his wealth as a false idol, comparing its brightness to the light from earth's sun "Struck out of chaos" by God in Genesis. He praises his "sacred treasure" for its ability to "mak[e] men do all things" though gold itself "canst do naught" (1.1.1–27). Though his values are clearly misguided, Volpone understands incentives and we soon

learn he has been skillfully manipulating men's vice to extract wealth from the legacy hunters. While gold can do nothing, indirectly, it has the power to make men do all. He reveals that more than the possession of his wealth, he glories its "cunning purchase," claiming he acquired it in

> No common way; I use no trade, no venture;
> I wound no earth with ploughshares; fat no beasts
> To feed the shambles; have no mills for iron,
> Oil, corn, or men, to grind 'em into powder;
> I blow no subtle glass; expose no ships
> To threatenings of the furrow-facèd sea;
> I turn no moneys in the public bank;
> Nor usure private —. (1.1.30–9)

Mosca adds that Volpone's wealth does not derive from devouring "soft prodigals" or mercilessly jailing poor men and leaving their wives and children to "wash your pavements" with their tears.

Though Mosca's narrative reliability is suspect at best – having a vested interest in flattering Volpone – Volpone's subsequent actions corroborate Mosca's claims of his master's amorality. In the following acts, Volpone does not take advantage of the poor or vulnerable, but targets the greedy. After Mosca exits the stage, having been handsomely tipped by Volpone for his flattery, Volpone explains the rationale behind his manipulation of the legacy seekers. Because Volpone has no next of kin, he must decide to whom he will bequeath his wealth, which "draws new clients, daily, to [his] house . . . That bring [him] presents," hoping that when he dies "(which they expect / Each greedy minute) it shall then return / Tenfold upon them" (1.1.76–81). Volpone is not blind to the self-interested nature of their pursuits: they have no emotional use for Volpone, but hope he dies quickly to hasten their inheritance. To win Volpone's favor while he lives, they

"Contend in gifts, as they would seem, in love" (1.1.84). The miser sees their corruption and raises them, playing their competing interests against one another in order to amass more wealth that he has no intention of leaving to them. Volpone is not merely greedy, but sadistic in his greed, thrilling at his cunning plots as he lets "the cherry knock against their lips" before "draw[ing] it by their mouths, and back again" (1.1.89–90). Like Tantalus, the legacy seekers are punished for their greed with the perpetual promise of riches that inch ever closer but continually fail to materialize.

In act 1, Jonson emphasizes the problematic fact that Volpone's wealth comes neither from investment nor from labor – a critique not dissimilar to Shakespeare's censure of Cade. Volpone's parasitic model of wealth accumulation is unsustainable as it is not predicated on creating value, but on taking wealth from others without any real compensation, redistributing rather than generating value. This seems to be Jonson's principal issue with commercialism: instead of encouraging increased innovation and generating long-term value, the economic incentives that undergird commercialism encourage short-run gains from hastily produced goods of little quality. They may satiate short-term demand but, lacking long-term value, their worth fades with their novelty. In Jonson's view, commercialism has turned goods and plays into quick fixes that are consumed, digested, and discarded in one sitting. Like the prattling playwrights of Jonson's era, Volpone adds no value to society, neither trading, risking his capital, tending land to feed the masses, nor embracing the uncertainties of the merchant or investor. Instead, he accumulates wealth by playing greed off of greed. In a perversion of the Baconian maxim of setting vice against vice to limit corruption, Jonson depicts a world in which vice fosters vice and augments corruption. In many ways, the vicious cycle of self-interest we see in *Volpone* is more pernicious than that in Marlowe's *Jew*, as it is neither squarely illegal nor violent in its execution; rather, it exists alongside and within the legal framework of a rule of law and market of exchange.

Jonson's portrayal of social and economic exchange in *Volpone* is deeply cynical, highlighting man's propensity to lie and cheat instead of truck and barter. Rather than allowing men to negotiate their desires, the Jonsonian marketplace is built on the parasitism of *Volpone*, where nothing is created and wealth is merely moved from one pocket to the next. Jonson expresses this cynicism explicitly in act 3, in which Mosca muses that "Almost / All the wise world is little else in nature / But parasites, or sub-parasites." Even the most basic parasite, far from Volpone's sophisticated cunning, Mosca implies, can "mould / Tales for men's ears" and procure someone's kitchen scraps "To please the belly and the groin" (3.1.11–9). Jonson seems unable to conceive of a world in which private interests generate *anything*, viewing the world as a "zero-sum game," in which one person's gain necessitates another's loss (Maus, "Satiric and Ideal" 45).

The dramatist's depiction of economic exchange as a parasitic relationship means it must be short-lived. The play's denouement proves that exploitative relationships cannot last, for, to extend the metaphor, if the host animal dies, the parasite must either perish alongside his host or find its next victim. The question then becomes how many hosts are available to fat the leech. In the world of human exchange, where transactions depend on trust, the answer is not many. Volpone's and Mosca's fates corroborate the precarity of parasitic economic relationships within a human society, where long-run survival is based on reputation. If no one is willing to trade with you or offer charity, like the host-less parasite, you face uncertain survival. The problem with Volpone's plan is that "his fortune is precisely built on a breach of the trust and reciprocity on which the credit economy of the time relied" (Ladegaard 66). Volpone consistently ignores long-term survival, focusing solely on short-run gains. Though Volpone is acutely skilled in profiting off of man's vice, he fails to create a sustainable economic model that would allow him to, if not profit, at least live comfortably in society. Indeed, the very design of his plan means that it can

only end in his death – real or feigned – or the discovery of his crimes. Unfortunately for Volpone, the former leads to the latter, as his minion Mosca sells him out in the hope of profiting from his master's corruption. Mosca and Volpone capture the irony of their mutual destruction in act 1 as, in response to Volpone's praise, Mosca claims "I but do as I am taught: / Follow your grave instructions, give 'em words, / Pour oil into their ears, and send them hence." Volpone responds "'Tis true, 'tis true. What a rare punishment / Is avarice to itself!" (1.4.139–43). Volpone discovers the full truth of his statement in act 5, as his carefully crafted scheme collapses in on itself and he faces the "rare punishment" of his own greed.

Crucially, the play presents avarice as not only detrimental to the greedy but to society at large, as evidenced by Volpone's mountebank scheme in 2.2. Through the mountebank, Jonson demonstrates greed's insipid, indirect effect on the marketplace, as the self-interest of commercialism quickly corrodes moral and monetary value. In 2.2, Volpone, disguised as a travelling mountebank, cons his audience into buying ineffective and overpriced medicine. To underscore the inauthenticity of the exchange, Jonson depicts the episode as a theatrical performance. The scene opens with Mosca and Nano, Volpone's parasites, setting up a stage under Celia's window in the town square. Volpone, as mountebank Scoto Mantuano, begins by differentiating himself from the false mountebanks who "spread their cloaks on the pavement" and tell "mouldy tales out of Boccaccio" detailing fake travels and made-up captivities in the "Turks' galleys." Sir Politic Would-be, the play's imbecilic know-it-all, responds "Note but his bearing, and contempt of these," betraying his ignorance as he laps up Volpone's lies. Volpone proceeds to falsely advertise his product in every way imaginable. He begins by creating the perception of its scarcity – and, therefore, value – caused by excess demand, claiming "I and my six servants are not able to make of this precious liquor so fast as it is fetched away from my lodging by gentlemen

of your city, strangers of the Terra Firma, worshipful merchants, aye, and senators too" (2.2.39–71). Volpone lends his product credibility by convincing his audience that their noble peers, wealthy merchants, and senators are all clamoring after his potion.[132] After establishing the trustworthiness of his product, he appeals to their mortality, exclaiming "Oh, health! health! The blessing of the rich! the riches of the poor! Who can buy thee at too dear a rate, since there is no enjoying this world without thee?" He encourages them to not be "so sparing" as to refuse his product, lest their frugality "abridge the natural course of life," and cause their premature death (2.2.76–80).

Volpone markets his medicine as a universal cure that cannot be replicated, though "very many have essayed, like apes," owing to the complex extraction method unique to Volpone's product. "But," Volpone continues, having established his product's exceptionalism, "to the price." In clichéd salesman fashion, Volpone tells the crowd that, while he normally sells the medicine for eight crowns, "this time," he will be "deprived of it for six," though its true value cannot be matched "for then [he] should demand of [them] a thousand crowns," as myriad princes have paid (2.2.133–58). Naturally, the mountebank *despises* money and will accept no such sum from his audience, reducing the price from the thousand crowns princes paid, to his previously offered six crowns before he rejects that offer and plummets the price, emphatically performing his generosity for his audience: "you shall not give me six crowns, nor five, nor four, nor three, nor two, nor one; nor half a ducat; no, nor a *moccenigo*: six . . . pence it will cost you" (2.2.184–6). Obviously, the fake mountebank's "medicine" is worthless, but Volpone manages to create value through his

[132] Interestingly, the mountebank's advertising strategy employs the same "snob effect" that Jonson himself uses in his prefatory material, where he claims that only the best and smartest will understand his writing, thus making its elitism a desired quality. The important difference here is that Jonson believed in the quality of his products and truly offered them to his audience whereas the mountebank and Volpone are both acutely aware of their product's inauthenticity and knowingly conceal it from their customers.

claims of the drug's commercial success and exceptionalism: his product is unattainable elsewhere as it is irreplicable by anyone else.

Mountebank Scoto Mantuano is another glaring example of Jonson's skepticism of economic and social exchange. The mountebank's commercial ploy is not so different from Volpone's overarching wealth accumulation scheme: neither "trade" produces any mutual benefit due to their insincerity and both must be short-lived. Once the buyers open the precious vials and discover the medicine is ineffectual, the mountebank's lies will be discovered and, like Volpone, he will be forced to disappear and move on to the next scheme, the next town, the next host. As Jonson writes in *Timber*, "nothing is lasting that is feigned; it will have another face than it had, ere long" (536). Jonson's depiction of commercial markets here and in his print career suggests he understood commerce in exceedingly negative terms. For Jonson, instead of generating innovation and increasing the quality or accessibility of goods, as economic theory since Aristotle has suggested, commerce is a necessarily vicious cycle: nothing but a race to the bottom as sellers cheat other sellers and their buyers until there is nothing left to be gained.

Once discovered, the mountebank can simply move on to the next town, but Volpone's fate is harder to sustain, as it relies on Mosca's cooperation. Unfortunately for Volpone, Mosca has absorbed his master's teachings all too well and turns on Volpone, as parasite destroys parasite. In the play, instead of individual interests facilitating beneficial exchange, private interests bar trade and bring mutual destruction. Volpone and Mosca decide to end their scheme by playing a final trick on the legacy hunters, telling them that Volpone has finally died but, contrary to his promises, has made Mosca the sole inheritor of his wealth. Assuming their collusive partnership will continue, Volpone places too much faith in Mosca and draws up a legitimate legal will, naming Mosca the sole heir. Not yet ready to drop the charade, the disguised Volpone verbally embarrasses

the legacy seekers for having been duped by an unlearned "mule" like Mosca (5.6.9). Volpone's insults to Voltore are particularly cutting and lead the lawyer to confess to all of the crimes he helped Mosca commit. This unleashes a flurry of events as Mosca sells out Volpone, Volpone tries but fails to win Mosca back, and everyone is punished by the Avacotore according to the severity of their crimes. There are no winners at the play's conclusion. The First Avocatore cautions the audience to "see these vices thus rewarded . . . Mischiefs feed / Like beasts, till they be fat, and then they bleed" (5.12.149–51).

Rather than facilitating mutual gain, markets careen toward universal loss as self-interest destroys moral and financial profits. The anticommercial sentiment briefly displayed in *Volpone*'s mountebank scene becomes the main preoccupation of Jonson's *Bartholomew Fair*, which showcases the pernicious effects of prioritizing short-term over authentic value. I argue that, contrary to Paul Cantor's claim that the play displays Jonson's faith in markets, *Bartholomew Fair*'s unregulated markets and inept legal system underscore the dramatist's lack of faith in humanity to exchange with one another in any *mutually* beneficial way. Cantor follows Jean-Christophe Agnew in arguing that "The fair itself is the engine that precipitates the action of the play . . . Jonson's market operates, in effect, as an 'invisible hand,' diverting private vices to the public benefit . . . Like *The Wealth of Nations*, *Bartholomew Fair* imagined the market as a power capable of generating its own legitimacy through a negotiated process of mutual authorization" (Agnew qtd. in Cantor 171). Cantor strengthens Agnew's argument, claiming that "Jonson displays unusual sympathy for the nascent free markets of the Renaissance in *Bartholomew Fair*," going as far as to say that "*Bartholomew Fair* may be the first portrait in literary history of how a free market operates" (172). Even if it were literature's first depiction of a free market (a rather lofty

claim), *Bartholomew Fair* paints markets in a decidedly negative light.[133] Instead of enabling positive moral, social, or economic exchange, Jonson's unregulated market breeds corruption and thieves, as cutpurses, buffoons, swindlers, and unbridled avarice thrive, emptying transactions of any social or financial value.

Ursla, the fair's pork seller, provides the most damning evidence against unregulated commercialism. Like *Volpone*'s mountebank, Ursla makes her money through a combination of faulty advertising and overcharging for inferior products. Ursla explains her profiteering antics to her apprentice, Mooncalf, instructing him to: "Froth your cans well i' the filling at length rogue . . . and drink with all companies, though you be sure to be drunk; you'll misreckon the better, and be less ashamed on't." As if selling customers more head than beer and drunkenly overbilling them were not enough, Ursla counsels that the "true trick" is "to be ever busy, and mistake away the bottles and cans in haste before they be half drunk off, and never hear anybody call, . . . till you ha' brought fresh" and charged double (2.2.87–94). Ursla's self-motivated service is the least of her commercial crimes however. While her dishonest service is unquestionably corrupt, the prices she captures for her beer – "six and twenty shillings a barrel" and "fifty shillings a hundred o'my bottle-ale" are downright extortionary (2.2.85–6). "In 1613," a year before the play was staged, Lord Mayor Myddleton had "limited brewers to producing two kinds of beer, at 4s or 8s a barrel. These regulations were still in force when in 1617 the Lords of the Board of Green Cloth complained to the mayor that brewers were charging up to 16s a barrel" (*Cambridge* 2.2.77–8n).

[133] The claim that the swindling and illegality at Bartholomew's Fair is a depiction of a "free market," in the way modern economics conceives of markets cannot be true. With the inept Overdo in charge, the fair lacks the *functioning* rules and institutions that ensure free and fair exchanges. As Nobel laureate Alvin Roth explains, a free market is not simply "a free-for-all, but rather a market with well-designed rules that make it work well" (13). Well-designed, enforceable rules are what *enable* markets to be free, as Chapter 1 explores in detail. Additionally, Shakespeare, as previous chapters discussed, portrays aspects of free markets long before Jonson in his *Merchant of Venice*, written over a decade earlier. This is to say nothing of global literatures, which have depicted exchange economies and varying degrees of free markets since antiquity.

Ursla's price gouging, 10 shillings over the 16s complaint, is in clear defiance of the Lord Mayor's 1613 regulation. She very happily breaks Myddleton's law and upcharges her customers for beer by setting an illegally high price *and* over-frothing the pours. Just as Ursla cheats the volume of beer with heady pours, she dilutes the quantity of tobacco sold by mixing the tobacco with coltsfoot. Here her deception is worse than that of her marked up beer, as customers cannot see the ratio of tobacco to coltsfoot as they can with beer and head. As a result, customers are left unwittingly buying an inferior product they likely would not purchase – at least not at that price – were they cognizant of Ursla's practices.

Ursla's commercial corruption is as exorbitant as her pours are heady and she moves from explaining her pricing of ale and tobacco to that of pork. She tells Mooncalf that five shillings is her lowest price, but "If it be a sow-pig, sixpence more. If she [the customer] be a great bellied wife, and long for't, sixpence more than that" (2.2.98–9). Unscrupulous, Ursla engages in what is known today as price discrimination – a prejudicial practice that is illegal in most developed economies. Ursla knows she will be able to charge pregnant women more because their cravings will increase their willingness to pay for pork to satisfy their hunger. Whether it be men's drunkenness, stupidity, or women's hormonal cravings, Ursla is all too happy to exploit her customers' weaknesses if it means increasing her profit margins. In response to her depravity, the disguised Justice Overdo cries "*O tempora! O mores!*", lamenting the values of the times as he formulates a plan to save her apprentice Mooncalf from further corruption at Ursla's hands.[134]

Her abuse of her unwitting customers is emblematic of the fair as a whole, where one is either a scheming swindler, frothing the beer, or a bumbling ignoramus, drinking his pint unaware

[134] "Oh, what times! Oh, what values!" The phrase was used several times by Cicero – "most famously in the opening of his masterpiece of invective, *In Catilinam*, the first speech against Lucius Sergius Catilina in 63 BC" (*Cambridge* 2.2.92n).

that he has been cheated. In a functioning economy, customers would eventually notice Ursla's "miscalculated" bills, underpoured beer, overpriced pork, and polluted tobacco and choose to take their business elsewhere. This, in turn, would force Ursla to improve her products or find a new profession. In Jonson's market, this feedback mechanism is broken and customers are largely, if not fully, unaware that they are being swindled. Ursla's flagrant chicanery recalls the mountebank's scheme in *Volpone*. Both rouses are predicated on their transitory existence: by the time the mountebank's consumers discover his product's failings, he will have moved onto the next town; by the time Ursla's customers realize she is intentionally short-changing them, the fair will have ended.[135] There is no incentive for either seller to ameliorate their service or product in this type of transitory exchange: there are simply winners and losers. The lack of middle ground in *Bartholomew Fair* is a central issue of the play: one is either savvy or ignorant, the hoodwinker or the hoodwinked, the parasite or the host. We see this most powerfully in Sir Cokes who is cheated out of two purses, a large sum of money, his cloak, and his future bride through his laughable ignorance and misplaced faith in the fair's attendees.

Cokes is the archetype of an ignorant consumer and is fleeced by everyone at the fair, from cutpurses, to sellers, to fellow customers. Much to his assistant Wasp's chagrin, Cokes hemorrhages money at the fair, buying up whole booths of superfluous goods like gingerbread and ballads, and ending the play much worse off financially than he began it. Cokes' exchanges at the fair are not representative of free and fair trade, where both parties gain, but more closely resemble theft. This mode of transaction is a signature of the fair where, because it is only one day, faithless

[135] This temporary market environment is entirely antithetical to the market for credit, where trust is the most important currency and transitions happen over long periods of time, as loans are paid back across weeks and months. The notion of prolonged exchange also undergirds contemporary market theory on the power of consumer sovereignty to hold corporations accountable over the long run. For more on the early modern credit economy, see Muldrew's *The Economy of Obligation*; for an explanation of public input, stakeholder theory, and the modern corporation, see Freeman's *The Power of And*.

transactions have no real repercussions. Cokes shows the extent of his stupidity and poor judgment when, having been robbed several times, he complains: "I ha' lost myself, and my cloak and my hat, and my fine sword, and my sister, and Numps, and Mistress Grace, a gentlewoman that I should ha' married, and a cut-work handkerchief she ga' me, and two purses today. And my bargain o' hobby-horses and gingerbread, which grieves me worst of all" (4.2.70–4). Cokes clearly does not have his priorities straight, grieving the loss of his trinkets over his purses, his sister, and his betrothed.

Cokes continues his complaint, jesting "Would I might lose my doublet, and hose, too, as I am an honest man" but there be nothing "but thieving and cozening in this whole Fair." After this realization, the one good he has managed to hold onto, his pears, become tainted in his eyes and though he has "paid for [his] pears, a rot on 'em! [He'll] keep them no longer" for they are "choke-pears to [him]." Having had nearly everything valuable stolen from him, Cokes voluntarily throws out his one remaining purchase. He blames the fair for his losses, complaining "Methinks the Fair should not have used me thus" (4.2.58–66). When Cokes asks his assistant Wasp why he continues to be so wrongfully abused, Wasp responds: "Why? Because you are an ass, sir. There's a reason the shortest way, / an you will needs ha' it. Now you ha' got the trick of losing, you'd / lose your breech an 'twere loose" (3.5.209–11). Cokes' thieves, Edgworth and Nightingale, carry the abuse further, claiming he is such an ignoramus that "A man might cut out his kidneys . . . and he never feel / 'em, he is so earnest" (4.2.36–7).

Rather than owning up to his ineptitude, Cokes chides the fair for his misfortune and, in many ways, he is right. Jonson's fair is decidedly unfair: a world of immorality, where theft is fought with theft and corruption countered with corruption. Surrounded by immorality, the earnest, moral, and unsuspecting cannot emerge unscathed. When Quarlous catches the pickpocket

Edgworth stealing Cokes' wallet for the *second* time, Quarlous calls him out stating "Do not deny it, you are a cut-purse." Edgworth assumes Quarlous will turn him in to the authorities and begs "Good gentlemen, do not undo me; I am a civil young man, and but a beginner indeed." Instead of chastising Edgworth or turning him in, Quarlous and Winwife coerce Edgworth into committing another theft in return for concealing his crimes, reassuring Edgworth "we are no cathpoles nor constables" but "you must do us a piece of service" (3.5.225–32). The pair of "gentlemen" proceed to blackmail Edgworth into stealing Cokes' marriage warrant, which Wasp has taken for safe-keeping. The fair is far from "a system of checks and balances that relies on the common material interests of its participants to bring about their harmony"; rather, it is a world of thieving and debauchery, where the material interests breed corruption that prohibits mutually beneficial trade (Cantor 172).

While Cokes' idiocy is comical to a degree, his continued abuse shows how broken the marketplace is, as law and order is conspicuously absent and wronged individuals must face the dangers of the fair without protection. In his Hayekian reading of *Bartholomew Fair*, Cantor contends that "Jonson shows the way the market tends to level differences" as "people from all walks of life meet and interact freely" (206). Seeing as most of the transactions at the fair are thefts, counter-thefts, or the unwitting purchase of adulterated goods, however, calling this free exchange hardly seems accurate. Far from praising unregulated markets, Jonson's play makes a strong case for the existence and enforcement of market regulations to help prevent the purchase of tainted, overpriced products and deter theft. The continued pickpocketing at the fair is just the most extreme dramatization of the commercial "theft" Jonson saw as endemic to unregulated, capitalist markets, where sellers pollute their products to increase profits and consumers are none the wiser. This is the same complaint Jonson had of the marketplace for drama, where financially motivated

playwrights decreased the quality of their work to pander to audiences' tastes. This, in turn, cemented the masses' low-brow preferences as the new standard for popular theater. *Bartholomew Fair* does not show Jonson considering "the ways in which the market allows people to negotiate their differences and thus actually helps to bring them together" but dramatizes how the market pulls people apart. The strongest evidence against a harmonious marketplace is arguably the play's conclusion, which is not, as Cantor claims, brought about organically "as the participants in the fair come to realize their common economic interests" (206). The play's conclusion shows quite the opposite, as order is forced into existence by Adam Overdo, who finally removes his disguise and regains his legal power to punish the fair's offenders, ending the day's corruption.

Until Overdo steps in, the convergence of the fair's participants at the puppet show in act 5 threatens to maintain the fair's corruption rather than regain order. The scene merges Jonson's several critiques of commercialism, theater, and human nature, as Littlewit stages an "adaptation" of Marlowe's *Hero and Leander*. Assuming Marlowe's script to be "too learned and poetical for [his] / audience," he sets it in London, making "it a little easy, and modern for the times," imagining the Hellespont "our Thames here" and Leander "a dyer's son about Puddle-wharf: and Hero a wench o'the Bank-side" (5.3.94–105). Cokes, the fair's poorest judge of character and quality, exclaims "I am in love with the actors already . . . / Hero shall be my fairing" – the irony being that the actors are lifeless puppets, pulled from a wicker basket (3.5.112–4). The show is broken up mid-performance by the puritan Busy, who bursts in and accuses the "actors" – all puppets voiced by Littlewit – of being an "abomination; for the male, among you, putteth on the apparel of / the female, and the female of the male" (5.5.84–5).

As if the reimagined *Hero and Leander* were not laughable enough, here Jonson has the puppets cross-dress, parodying the theater's practice of having boy actors play female characters,

as women were not permitted on stage. The Puppet Dion spells this irony out for the audience, crying "*It is your old stale argument against the players, but it will not hold against the puppets; for we have neither male nor female amongst us*" (5.5.88–90). The puppet then lifts his dress to show his lack of sexual organs. Without any real, substantive criticism of the show's immorality – ignoring Hero's drunkenness, her occupation as a "*whore*," and Hero's crass response to "*Kiss the whore o'the arse*" – Busy sees he is wrong and is straightaway "*converted*" (5.4.266, 5.4.268, 5.5.99). Satisfied that since there is no crossdressing, the show must be above board, Busy responds "Let it go on; for I am changed, and will become a beholder with you" (5.5.101–2). The market, full of pickpockets, thieves, and swindlers passing off corrupted goods as fair transactions, now sells crass, sensual drama as "licensed by authority" and certified by "the master of the revel[s]" (5.5.13–15). Obviously, in accusing Leatherhead of "licentiousness" over the puppets' crossdressing, Busy has missed the truly licentious aspects of the show. Seeing the puppets lack genitalia, Busy finds no further complaint, immediately joining the audience to take in the entertainment.

While the market's outcome here could be viewed as participants recognizing common interests – specifically, the easy entertainment of shoddy theater – Busy's sham puritanism is hardly a solution to the day's crimes. Witnessing Busy's failure to call out the fair's true corruption, Justice Adam Overdo finally intervenes. Stating he has "discovered enough," Overdo removes his disguise, claiming it is "time to take enormity by the forehead, and brand it" (5.5.109–10). Though he does not get it all exactly right and is ultimately embarrassed into silence by his wife's indecent drunkenness, Overdo's intervention takes a step toward righting the wrongs of Bartholomew's marketplace. Overdo's attempted moralizing is undone by Quarlous who points out that Justice Overdo is hardly the wise judge he believes himself to be. In addition to his wife's public

intoxication, Quarlous reveals to Overdo that Edgworth, the "'innocent young man', you have ta'en such care of all this day, is a cutpurse, that hath got all your brother Cokes his things, and helped you to your beating and the stocks. If you have a mind to hang him now, and shew him your magistrate's wit, you may; but I should think it were better recovering the goods, and to save your estimation in pardoning him" (5.6.69–75).

The solution does not come from the market but from Overdo's *disruption* of the market and Quarlous' subsequent pragmatic negotiations. Rather than further humiliating Overdo, Quarlous advises he tend to his wife and "remember you are but Adam, flesh and blood! — you have your frailty. Forget your other name of Overdo, and invite us all to supper. There you and I will compare our 'discoveries'" as they wash down the day's embarrassments with wine. Justice Overdo wisely accepts and, humbled, invites everyone to his house for dinner, claiming none should "fear to go along, for my intents are *ad correctionem, non ad destructionem; ad aedificandum, non ad diruendum*" (5.6.92–4). Overdo is convinced by Quarlous' pragmatism, which serves as a counterpart to the puritanical Busy's corrupted conversion moments earlier. The justice admits that Quarlous' logic "hath wrought upon my judgement, and prevailed." Quarlous reminds Overdo that, rather than being a spotless arbiter of law, as Overdo understands himself to be, he is but human and, like the biblical Adam, prone to error. Having already exposed the day's corruption, Overdo refrains from further aggrandizing, promising his peers that his ultimate goal is "to correct, not destroy; to build, not to demolish" (*Cambridge* 5.6.93–4n).

While the ending avoids the abusive tyranny of Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*, unrestrained markets are ultimately pitched as the cause of the day's disorder, not its solution. Ursla, "the sow of enormity," is called out for her corruption, Edgworth is forced to return Cokes' goods and is kindly spared his hanging, and Overdo is rightly embarrassed by his bungled adjudication and near

hypocrisy. Quarlous is the only one who seems to have ended the day on top, having blackmailed Edgworth into stealing Grace's marriage deed (though Winwife does, indeed, win Grace), before playing the moral enforcer and revealing everyone's corruption. The only reason he *knew* about the day's corruption, however, is because he participated in it and benefited from Edgworth's thieving firsthand. Far from painting a picture of social harmony, Jonson depicts the Fair as a space in which corruption begets corruption, thieving yields more thieving, and self-interest erodes value on economic, social, and moral levels. There are no mutually beneficial transactions at the fair; instead, much like *Volpone*, trade and commercialism in *Bartholomew Fair* trend toward mutually ensured destruction. The fair is the antithesis of a working market and order is only restored through intervention, not free negotiation.

Not unlike Adam Overdo, Jonson often failed to live up to his high moral standards. In *Timber*, he bemoans man's propensity to "covet superfluous things . . . O! if a man could restrain the fury of his gullet and groin, and think how many fires, how many kitchens, cooks, pastures, and ploughed lands; what orchards, stews, ponds and parks, coops and garners, he could spare." Yet people lack the control to avoid overindulging and, instead, "we make ourselves slaves to our pleasures, and we serve fame and ambition, which is an equal slavery" (558). Jonson's writing here seems part proselytization part confessional as the author counts himself among that number that overconsumes for pleasure's sake while having "a puritanical uneasiness about pleasure itself" (Barish 135). His friend William Drummond confirms Jonson's tendency to overindulge in his consumption and ambition. Drummond describes Jonson as "a great lover and praiser of himself, a contemner and scorner of others, given rather to lose a friend than a jest, jealous of every word and action of those around him (especially after drink, which is one of the elements in which he liveth), a dissembler of ill parts which reign in him, a bragger of some good that he wanteth"

("Conversations" 610–11). Jonson is far from perfect and clearly a ways away from temperate. If we take Drummond at his word, Jonson is slave both to food and drink and his ambition. Indeed, Jonson's own appeal to humanity to spare the plenty of the kitchens, cooks, and pastures recalls his poem "To Penhurst," in which the country house magically provides all with no risk of depletion, as "Fat, aged carps . . . run into" nets and children pluck juicy peaches from the garden walls (line 33). The manor's harmony is disrupted by Jonson himself, however, who "writes himself into the estate as an overindulgent parasite characterized by 'gluttony' and immoderate ambition" (Remien 270).

In "To Penhurst," Jonson confirms Drummond's assessment of his character and admits to his inability to restrain his "gullet" as a waiter, envious of his "gluttony . . . gives [him] what [he] call[s] and lets [him] eat" (lines 68–9). Peter Remien notes the irony of Jonson's all-consuming presence in "a poem where even the fish obey the edicts of hierarchical obligation." In a letter from James Howell to Sir Thomas Hawkins, Howell reiterates Jonson's crude manners, writing there was "excellent cheer" until Jonson "began to engross all the discourse, to vapor extremely of himself, and by vilifying others to magnify his own Muse" (qtd. in Remien 270). Taking as evidence Drummond, Jonson's own account, and Howell, we may reasonably conclude that Jonson lacked the decorum and refinement he consistently demanded of others, revealing his own vices of gluttony and excessive pride. When read generously, Jonson's cameo in "To Penhurst" can be understood as the poet grappling with his own place as both parasite and victim of the exploitative world of commercial theater. In order to maintain his high artistic standards, Jonson had to pander either to the preferences of his theatrical audience or the tastes of would-be patrons. Jonson chose the latter, self-fashioning his print identity to fit his elevated understanding of poetry and himself. Though Jonson did not admire London's growing commercial markets, he needed them and

learned to use them selectively. If the world is but parasites and sub-parasites, Jonson resigned himself to be the parasite that did not kill its host – that which, while not always the ideal guest, never bled its patron dry.

II. Middleton: Gaming the Market

Middleton had fewer qualms about capitalizing on London's growing commercialism. Unlike Jonson who cultivated a print persona that served as an intellectual gatekeeper, Middleton used print to appeal to all castes of readers. Unsurprisingly, Ben Jonson disdained Middleton's commercialism, labelling him as "not of the number of the Faithful Poets . . . but a base fellow" who chose popularity over poetic virtue (qtd. in Burt 186). Though Middleton surely wrote with his audience in mind, he did not do so in base desperation, but published his works strategically. John Jowett describes Middleton's approach as "inevitably respectful to his patrons [and] familiar with his general readers. He does not, like Jonson, stand aloof, hector, educate; he does not offer himself as the only authoritative reader of his own text. More modestly, he draws his audience into a circle whose admission price is a few pence" ("For Many" 289). Middleton's theatrical publications foregrounded a more democratic approach to art that sought to increase access to his works and embrace, rather than revile, London's diverse consumer base.

Middleton was attuned to the heterogeneity of his audience and differentiated his works and the form in which they were published to appeal to individuals' varied needs, ideologies, and tastes. His career shows a sophisticated comprehension of the market for drama on page and stage and he takes advantage of the evolving media with increasing success throughout his career. Middleton comes the closest to Shakespeare's commercial know-how of any of the playwrights examined thus far. Marlowe and Jonson, as we have seen, reject self-interest in their works and their careers, but Shakespeare and Middleton tend to be less antagonistic toward markets. Rather

than investing in the theater itself, as Shakespeare did, Middleton took the opposite approach, focusing his energies on the print market. The playwright had an impressive knowledge of the commercial print market from a supply and demand side and was intimately aware of the semiotics of print. In the final portion of this chapter, I propose that Middleton used his understanding of bibliographic codes – such as format, font, paratextual material, and scribal publication – and what they communicated to the reader to increase the sensationalism of his works and pitch his texts to diverse subsets of consumers. This allowed him to gain increased readers and notoriety as he profited off his infamy.

As a playwright, Middleton thrived on diversity, producing "poetry, prose satire, journalistic pamphlets, comic almanacs, masques, civic pageants, political allegory, history plays, comedy, tragicomedy, and tragedy. Within each of these, he mixed genres and modes, imitation and parody, prose and verse. His plays were staged by adult and boy actors, at the court and in the city" (Chakravorty 5). Middleton collaborated with a myriad of dramatists and was no stranger to repackaging his own material when it suited him. He understood, as did most dramatists, that plays were commercial products and his livelihood relied on their salability and, thus, the fickleness of consumers. In *Roaring Girl*, co-authored with Thomas Dekker, Middleton writes as much in his signed epistle to "*the Comic Play-readers, Venery, and Laughter*," explicitly comparing trends in playwriting to tastes "in apparel." Using a familiar comparison, Middleton ribs the audience for the old "huge bombasted plays, quilted with mighty words to lean purpose." But as the fashionable "doublet fell, neater inventions began to set up . . . our plays follow the niceness of our garments: single plots, quaint conceits, lecherous jests dressed up in hanging sleeves." Middleton cheekily acknowledges that if he wants to sell plays, like the tailor, he must adjust his style to fit his consumers' preferences, whether he shares them or not.

In contrast to Jonson, Middleton does not try to lecture his readers, nor urge them to elevate their judgement, but leans into the commercial aspect of the market, reassuring them that "Such a kind of light-colour summer stuff, mingled with diverse colours, you shall find this published comedy—good to keep you in an afternoon from dice, at home in your chambers; and for venery you shall find enough, for sixpence" (726). Middleton knows his competition and acknowledges that instead of buying his printed play, his readers could easily spend their six pence on a host of other activities – equally costly and therefore equally valuable to the paying customer. After titillating his audience with the promise of a cross-dressing Venus, he reassures them that the printed "book" is appropriately decorous and may "be allowed both gallery-room at the play-house and chamber-room at your lodging." Though Middleton's play may be built on scandal – a fictionalized account of Mary Frith, the cross-dressing female cut-purse – it has been reinvented for the elite, fit for the most expensive theater seats and, indeed, the intimate chambers of his reader's home. In his short epistle, Middleton balances sensationalism and sophistication, pitching his playtext to the low- and high-class patrons alike.

Crucially, though the play was a collaboration between Middleton and Thomas Dekker, the epistle is only signed by Middleton. Unlike many of his peers, including Jonson, Shakespeare, and, here, Dekker, Middleton saw the commercial advantages to print publication and sought to exploit them, appealing to middling readers and rich patrons at once. Middleton did not enjoy the same economic securities as Jonson who was sponsored by the Sidneys and steadily called on for court masques, or Shakespeare, an invested sharer and house playwright for the King's Men. Instead, Middleton "was required at times to find audiences and markets beyond the theatre-yard. More than [Shakespeare or Jonson], he was a writer of works *for* the printing press . . . While Jonson certainly prepared his plays for the press, and Shakespeare may have thought about publication,

this was not the primary mode of disseminating their work, and print as a culture and a technology does not occupy either's mental landscape to the extent it does Middleton's" (Hope 248–9).

Proof of Middleton's fixation with print pervades his works, which routinely reference specific bibliographic codes and analyze the semiotics of these material choices. In *Your Five Gallants*, for example, when speaking of a courtesan's measurements, Frip and Primero determine her size by comparing her frame to the format of a book. Frip, a pawnbroker, asks "Of what volume is this book, that I may fit a cover to't?" Primero answers "Faith, neither in folio nor in decimo sexto, but in octavo between them both, a pretty middle-sized trug" (1.1.172–5). Frip compares her body to a print edition, sold stab-stitched but "naked," lacking a cover which, as the metaphorical "binder," he seeks to provide. Primero's response indicates that the courtesan is neither the grossest "folio" size nor the petite sextodecimo (16mo), but a pleasingly average octavo – a common, portable, and convenient format. A similarly comical display of print knowledge appears in *The Nice Valour* in which the aspiring author Lepet bids the printer to put certain words "in pica roman / And with great T's" while others should be set "in *italica.*" The author then complains that the printer prints his work on "pot-paper too, the rogue, / Which had been proper for some drunken pamphlet" but is too cheap for his edition (4.1.245–6). Middleton's understanding of the market and book production allows him to "conjure meanings from the materials that make up books," as the "leather, gilt, ribbons, and paper" as well as the type fount and manuscript scrawlings become part of his stories, finding a life beyond their material existence (Hope 248).

This bibliographic language exemplifies that Middleton not only understood the mechanics of the print house but was well versed in the meaning conveyed by material choices. Through his characters, Middleton exhibits a clear understanding that pica roman and italica communicate

different things to the audience and should be employed selectively to maximize the text's effect. Using his fictional author, Middleton proves that material matters: poor pott paper will tell the reader that the text is cheap ephemera – the stuff of a drunken ballader, not worth prizing and, perhaps, not worth buying.[136] Lepet's readers were less bibliographically minded, as it turns out, and Lepet's book becomes a best-seller. Middleton makes it a point to emphasize that the "only people making money from the text are the booksellers: a blunt acknowledgment of the economics of publication" at a time when the lack of intellectual property rights meant authors received no royalties. While he may have griped about this economic reality in his writing, Middleton's career choices reflect his ultimate acceptance of the market's workings. Instead of rejecting market forces, Middleton developed a business model that exploited the print market's structures as much as possible, leaning into its increasing commodification of the play, though not always without complaint. When Middleton writes of a patron using the special ribbons of a display copy "as laces in his shoes" or the pages of a book "as baking paper" for a pie, he acknowledges the tension between the value authors place on their work and the comparatively low value patrons and society at large assign to their intellectual labor (249).

This realization and Middleton's command of bibliographic codes informed his publication pattern, as the playwright sought to squeeze every pence he could out of the various stages of publication. I posit that this led him to opt for a staggered publication scheme for his playtexts,

[136] Not all pott paper was equal. Pott paper was given its name because it bore a watermark of a pot in the center. In the sixteenth century, it ranged in size from 38 x 28 cm to 42 x 29 cm (see Gaskell 66–77). Middleton is clearly unimpressed by the quality of pott his publisher used and Bidwell confirms the lack of "fine" pott paper when compared to other seventeenth-century paper options (foolscap, crown, demy, and royal), which all had ordinary and fine varieties and price differences (590). Middleton's contemporary John Taylor makes the same critique of pott paper in *The Praise of Hempseed* (1620), in which he marvels that "the torne shift of a Lords or Kings / Be pasht and beaten in the Paper mill / And made Pot-paper by the workmans skill?" while "a Tyborne slave" has more honor than a king for "His shirt may be transformed to Paper-royall" (qtd. in Halasz 13). For a succinct introduction to pott paper, see Bland *A Guide* pp. 26–8.

which he learned to fully exploit by the end of his career, as evidenced by the publication pattern of *A Game at Chess.* We saw this tendency at work briefly in Middleton's epistle to *Roaring Girl*, in which he referenced the cross-dressing heroine's success on stage to briefly scandalize and intrigue his audience, before promising that the printed edition would be equally entertaining but more decorous. By allying himself with scandal and sophistication, theatrical and print publication, Middleton casts his net widely and manages to appeal to a broad swath of potential consumers. Though Cyndia Susan Clegg and Harold Love have discussed aspects of Middleton's approach to publication, I am not aware of a study that sets manuscript, print, and theatrical publication together to parse how Middleton approached the three markets to augment his payouts. I propose that Middleton became increasingly savvy throughout his career, learning to avoid censorship and maximize his profits by staging his plays, then circulating them in manuscript, before finally releasing them in print.[137] This publication scheme used product differentiation to intensify scandal while reaching the largest possible number of paying customers as he profited from the older patronage model and new "mass market" print distribution simultaneously.

Middleton likely amassed his knowledge of the print market through his longstanding business relationship with a small circle of stationers. Landing somewhere between Jonson and Shakespeare in terms of his involvement, Middleton is thought to have seen his works through the press personally; if not all the way off the press, then at least into the compositor's hands. Clegg notes Middleton's prolonged associations "with particular publishers and printers" which "points to significant author involvement in publishing." She catalogs the pattern of associations between Middleton and his stationers, crediting Thomas Creede with being "at the centre of the earliest network of Middleton's stationers" (251). Middleton praises Creede in *Father Hubbard's Tales*'s

[137] Note that this was not always the author's choice as pirated editions were common.

epistle to the reader, claiming he "never wished this book better fortune than to fall into the hands of a true-spelling printer and an honest-stitching bookseller; and if honesty could be sold by the bushel like oysters, I had rather have one Bushel of honesty than three of money" (166). Though references to the printer were a common trope in early modern paratexts, Middleton's is exceptional for commending rather than criticizing his stationers. Authors typically used the epistle to the reader to claim they had never wished to publish, but had been forced to release an amended, authorial version in response to the printers' egregious errors. Thomas Heywood, for example, claims that though ever faithful to the stage over the press, he deigned to publish his *The Rape of Lucrece* in 1608 "since some of my plaies haue (vnknown to me, and without any of my direction) accidentally come into the Printers handes, and therfore so corrupt and mangled, (coppied onely by the eare)" (A2^{r}). Middleton does not appear to have this same complaint; his emphatic endorsement of both the printer *and* bookseller is important. Middleton's approval exemplifies or, at least, publicly claims a high degree of trust between author and stationer – a rare commodity in early modern printing (as Middleton's Lepet clearly articulates). Far from the parasitic world of Jonsonian commerce, Middleton depicts a symbiotic relationship of trust and mutual gain between author, printer, and bookseller.

Creede only printed Middleton's works between 1599 and 1604, but he connected Middleton with the three printers with whom Middleton would have lasting relationships: Edward Allde, Thomas Purfoot, and George Eld. These printers "dominated the printing of Middleton's plays during the author's lifetime." Importantly, George Eld functioned as a printer-publisher, meaning he not only printed the works but made the investment decisions on *which* works should be printed and with what specific bibliographic features.[138] Middleton and Eld worked together for

[138] Many bibliographic decisions were determined by the print shop's house style. Both the house style and deviations from standard practice would have been determined by Eld. This could have given Middleton entrée into the artistic

"seventeen years," suggesting "a working relationship between the writer and printer" and, more importantly, writer and publisher (253). These relationships, particularly that with Edward Allde, would become increasingly important to the printing of *A Game at Chesse* which, as we will see, required quick and specialized printing to skirt censorship and maximize profits.

Middleton's understanding of commercial markets was not limited to the print industry, but extended to scribal publication as well. The dramatist used scribal publication in unique and innovative ways, being the first repeatedly to rely on scribal publication to disseminate plays. Harold Love writes that "while at a later period unprinted plays by Fletcher and Massinger are known to have been obtainable in manuscript, there is little evidence for the scribal publication of play texts prior to Middleton's initiative" (104). There is significant manuscript evidence for *A Game* that Middleton planned out his scribal publication to maximize returns by offering gift copies to wealthy patrons and selling uncensored manuscript editions of the play to anyone willing to pay. *Game*, however, seems to be the culmination of Middleton's commercial savvy in print, manuscript, and theatrical publication, not his first foray. There are also surviving manuscripts or evidence of circulation for *The Witch*, *Hengist, King of Kent, Women Beware Women, Your Five Gallants, The Conqueror's Custom or the Fair Prisoner,* and *An Invention Performed for the Service of the Right Honourable Edward Barkham, Lord Mayor of the City of London.* The first two plays are unmistakably gift copies, produced for patrons before the print edition as either presentation copies or to skirt censorship in what was surely "a very profitable process." The remaining manuscript evidence largely comes from records of personal holdings so we cannot be sure whether they were the dramatist's fair papers or intentionally prepared gift copies. The surprisingly high number of surviving manuscripts, however, suggests a pattern of pre-print scribal

---

print process if he enjoyed a close working relationship with Eld. See Mark Bland's "The Appearance of the Text in Early Modern England" for more on print house style.

publication that demonstrates Middleton's knowledge of the market's valuation scheme, as he took full advantage of the value of novelty and scarcity.

Middleton saw the profitability of manuscript and print publication and exploited both avenues when he could. While the playhouses were closed for the plague, Middleton wrote for the paying reader en masse, concentrating "on prose genres which involved quick production, low costs, and brisk sales" (Chakravorty 37). When the playhouses were open, he deftly straddled the worlds of theatrical, manuscript, and print publication, developing a publication schedule that allowed him to maximize his payouts in each market, staging sensationalism, publishing the scandal scribally, and finally releasing the allowed version in print. Middleton's staggered publication scheme illustrates the extent of his business savvy. While selling his plays to the theater and the press meant a one-time payout, his control over scribal publication allowed him to receive numerous payments from wealthy patrons for the same work. Love admits that circulating manuscripts increased the threat of piratical print publication, as stationers got their hands on a copy and hastily printed their edition, often forcing the author to release an amended edition to combat the botched printing. Given the prevalence of piracy, "Middleton, Crane [his professional scribe] and their assistants were engaged in a race against time in the production of copies, knowing that a printed text would be a very desirable addition to any stationer's stall" (106). There is a "pointed falling off" in Middleton's printed works in 1611, however. Apart from *A Game at Chess, The World Tossed at Tennis,* and two collaborations, the rest of Middleton's works did not see publication until after he died in 1627. Though the explanation must remain conjectural, Love proposes that this was an intentional choice by the now-seasoned playwright who, having witnessed the benefits of manuscript publication over the meager payouts from publishers, "deliberately withheld work from the press so that he could profit from the sale or presentation of

manuscripts" – manuscripts of his politically scandalous works that did not need the censor's approval.

A Game at Chess, staged two years before Middleton's death, offers the strongest proof of the playwright's systematized publication scheme. Middleton could not have asked for a better swan song; the play was unparalleled in its success. *A Game* is theatrically and textually exceptional, being the first play to run for nine consecutive performances and one of the most textually complex plays of its time, with six surviving manuscripts and three printings, all made within Middleton's lifetime. One of the extant manuscripts is fully authorial and four of the other manuscript copies contain portions, inscriptions, or corrections in Middleton's hand. The large number of surviving variant texts is rare for early modern drama and speaks to the play's unparalleled popularity. "Middleton, it seems, did not attempt to evade restrictions on the stage with his *A Game at Chess*," according to Michelle O'Callaghan. Involving scandal, topical politics, and a good deal of anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic sentiment, *A Game* was "an immediate success." On August 6, 1624, the day after it opened at the Globe, "John Woolley wrote to his friend, William Trumbull, that 'All the news I have heard since my coming to town is of a new play . . . called a game at Chess.'" Woolley was scandalized by the play's anti-Spanish tenor and claimed "'such a thing was never before invented'" and, if it had been, the author would have hanged for it. The next day, August 7, another viewer wrote of a "'new play . . . which describes Gondomar and all the Spanish proceedings very boldly and broadly, so that it is thought that it will be called in and the parties punished'" (159).

Though he was eventually called in and given a slap on the wrist, Middleton's political topicality paid off, generating scandalous buzz about the novelty, audacity, and legality of his artistic choices. This word-of-mouth publicity drew still more patrons to the theater, as he knew it

would, and raised the value of publication in all forms – page, stage, and codex. Stephen Wittek estimates that over the course of the nine-day run, "the play attracted thirty thousand spectators, or a seventh of London's adult population, an unprecedented reception apparently deriving from the players' impersonation of contemporary public figures and enactment of political events" (423).[139] The King's Men went to great lengths to make the characters immediately recognizable as their real-life political counterparts, particularly in the case of Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador to England. They even secured a "'cast suit of his apparel'" and a replica of Gondomar's "chair and litter," which featured a hole cut out to accommodate his anal fistula, the frequent butt of *A Game*'s jokes (Howard-Hill, *Middleton's "Vulgar Pasquin"* 128). Despite having been approved by the Master of Revels, the play was shut down after its nine-day run and Middleton was temporarily imprisoned, reportedly for having had actors impersonate the King of Spain, which the Spanish king did not take kindly (Howard-Hill, *A Game* 22–3).

Before it was shut down, the company "managed to generate profits estimated at £1,500—a massive fortune" (Wittek 440). At the heart of *A Game*'s success was the play's broad appeal to viewers from all socioeconomic and political backgrounds. Middleton, an experienced dramatist nearing the end of his career, had honed his ability to write works that, as contemporary John Chamberlain observed, were "frequented by all sorts of people old and younge, rich and poore, masters and seruants, papists and puritans, wise men et[c] churchmen and statesmen as s*i*r Henry wotton, S*i*r Albert morton, S*i*r Benjamin Ruddier, S*i*r Thomas Lake, and a world besides" (qtd. in Wittek 440). Unlike Jonson, Middleton did not curate his audience or discourage certain castes of viewers, but wrote plays for the checkered inhabitants of contemporary London who differed in

[139] This number seems high but is not implausible. Andrew Gurr notes that "Modern estimates of the capacities of the amphitheatres converge on about 2,500 as a maximum figure (de Witt estimated 3,000 for the Swan, and John Chamberlain said the Globe held over 3,000 in 1624)" (*Shakespearean Stage* 261). Current scholars at Shakespeare's Globe confirm the 3,000-person audience capacity ("Audiences").

wealth, political ideology, religious identity, class, and education. Middleton welcomed and, indeed, intended to attract all varieties of paying customers. A key part of Middleton's theatrical success was his "double-edgedness" or unique ability to bring together "multiple perspectives" without passing judgment (432). With this broad sociopolitical appeal, however, comes a certain ambivalence that makes Middleton's own ideological position harder to ascertain. While Jonson's ideology is often hard to miss, as he morally instructs his audience through satire, Middleton intentionally resists singular interpretation.

The playwright knew his play would have broad appeal and, before it even opened, Middleton had already developed a staggered publication scheme. Somewhere between the play's close and Middleton's imprisonment, the dramatist began "a premeditated course of preparing texts of the play for sale, for presentation to patrons . . . and for surreptitious publication" (Howard-Hill qtd. in Clegg 254). The main reason *A Game at Chess* remains "the most complicated editorial problem in the entire corpus of early modern English drama" is because Middleton transcribed and ordered copies of the play in various stages of completion (Taylor, "General Textual Intro," 712). This created a host of textual witnesses with a litany of variants that are impossible to fully disentangle. The play's texts consist of six extant manuscripts and three printed quartos – with Q2 as a reprint of Q1 and Q3 as a separate edition, all printed in 1625. The surviving witnesses still do not fully explain the textual variants, however, leading Trevor Howard-Hill to infer that there must be at least seven other manuscripts made to create the existing textual discrepancies. Howard-Hill notes that "the play had not completed its development when Middleton transcribed [the autograph Trinity manuscript]. The process is difficult to trace because he apparently decided early on that the play offered possibilities for exploitation outside the theatre."

The textual variants between the manuscript and print witnesses reveal "that Middleton had decided to make transcripts for sale even before the play had been revised for performance" and "seems to have kept his foul papers" to ensure he would be able to have manuscript copies made while the King's Men's performance script was at the theater (*A Game* 4–5). "The proliferation of manuscripts of *A Game at Chess* is due," as Richard Burt explains "to the perceived markets for them, some being sold and others presented as gifts, markets here understood to include economic and cultural capital (though patrons sometimes made cash payments, the cash could be less important than the prestige attached to their patronage)." Burt emphasizes that the manuscript "market is made possible precisely through fetishism, not the reverse" – intimately linking the commodity's value to taboo and scandal (188).

Middleton had an impressively nuanced understanding of playtext as fetishized commodity and leaned into the text's scandal when he could. Middleton, more than his peers, recognized the "synergetic" relationship between stage and page and planned his publications accordingly (Erne 114). Instead of focusing exclusively on readers or theatergoers, Middleton invested his energies in both sectors, managing the scribal, theatrical, and print publication of *A Game* to capture all possible consumers in every income bracket. Even with the shockingly high number of six known manuscripts and the estimated seven more, now lost, Love claims that "the total number produced is likely to have been higher still, being limited only by what Middleton, Crane and their assistants could produce over the four months or more during which manuscripts of the play remained a hot property" (106). Middleton did everything he could to ensure that his play remained popular up until business operations were shut down by his inconvenient jail sentence. Understanding that scandal sells, Middleton made revisions to the book after it had been approved by Master of the Revels Henry Herbert, to increase the topicality and theatricality of the play. One key revision was

the addition of the character of the Fat Bishop who represents the religious hypocrisy of the Catholics and provides a good deal of comedic humor as the play's Falstaffian fat, loafing leech.

Whether or not Middleton and the King's Men obtained a second license from Herbert is unknown though, based on the political and legal turmoil that followed, it seems unlikely.[140] Regardless of whether the insertions were allowed, they exemplify Middleton's attention to the popularity of the production and, particularly, the play's afterlife. Censorship was a known quantity to those involved in the theater and plays were frequently shut down for political indiscretion – a fact to which Middleton, Jonson, and their peers could all attest. Middleton and his company were pushing the envelope and knew it. More than that, they counted on it, amplifying the topicality to sell seats and copies. Their non-stop performance of the play in an age of repertory theater suggests they knew that their gamble had a limited shelf life on the public stage. Middleton, having recognized this profit opportunity earlier in his career, not only took advantage of scribal publication but, I argue, intentionally sharpened the scandal of *A Game* on stage to attract a higher number of scribal sales and patrons. Given the lack of royalties, once *A Game* had been successfully mounted, Middleton had little investment in the life of the play on stage. Thus, it was in his interests to escalate allusions' political scandal in order to drive manuscript sales. Middleton even benefited from the play being shut down, which only added to his notoriety.

Knowing the play had a short stage life, Middleton focused on scribal, then print publication, armed with the first-hand knowledge that scandal sells copies. Given the dramatist's decades-long experience with the print market, he would have understood the commercial backlash of a pirated edition and thus, as Clegg argues, may well have approached printer Nicholas Okes to avoid an unauthoritative edition. The variants in the first edition of *A Game at Chess* suggest that

[140] For more on Herbert's role in approving the book and the controversy surrounding the revisions, see Howard-Hill, *A Game* introduction, pages 18–20.

the Q1 and Q2 were "printed from a manuscript closely associated with Middleton" (255). Moreover, Howard-Hill asserts that one of the main reasons Middleton kept his foul papers was likely to provide the printer with an authoritative copy (*A Game* 5). Clegg corroborates the likelihood of Middleton's involvement in the first edition, noting that Okes had not only printed several of Middleton's dramatic works, suggesting a "long-term working relationship" between the two men, but that Okes was known for being an "entrepreneurial risk-taker." Peter Blayney echoes this view of Okes as an entrepreneur "possessing 'determination, initiative, and perhaps more than a little chicanery'" (28). *A Game* was nothing if not a text whose printing would require chicanery and a healthy tolerance for risk. Published the same year as it was performed with exceptional popularity, the play was guaranteed to be in demand.

The printed play's profitability is best illustrated by the publication of a separate quarto edition (Q3) printed by Augustine Matthewes and Edward Allde in the same year. Not only was Q3 released months after Q1 and Q2, but Q3 built on the play's political sensationalism by bibliographically reproducing the play's scandal through its deft deployment of "accidentals," such as capitalization and orthography, as substantive changes that inconspicuously strengthened the play's sensitive politics. Through an analysis of the skeleton formes of Q1/Q2 and Q3, Adrien Weis established that Q1/Q2 was a rushed print job, forcing Okes to cut corners and produce a textually inferior edition. Q3, meanwhile, was printed with more care, as evidenced by the textual accuracy and careful attention to systematic pointing, capitalization, and bibliographic codes. A close comparison of the two texts reveals the printer's attention to more than mere accuracy, however. I argue that the printing of Q3 shows an obvious sensitivity to the political themes of *A Game* which is in keeping with Middleton's politically and financially motivated publication structure. The most obvious and pervasive proof of its subtle politicism is the compositor's judicious capitalization,

used methodically to denote topical references and emphasize religious themes. In this way, Q3 fulfills Moxon's expectations of a "good *Compositer*," clarifying and enhancing the author's genius for his reader (211).

An illustrative example of this is act 1, scene 1's reference to printer Nathaniel Butter. While Q1 prints "butter" and "hebrew" uncapitalized, Q3 prints "I thinke they haue seal'd this [letter] with Butter," to which the Black Knight responds "They haue put their pens the Hebrew way (me / thinks.)" (Q1 C3^{r}; Q3 C^{r}). The capitalization of Butter and Hebrew signals the passage's topical reference to "to the reports of the Thirty Years' War published in the news-sheets of Nathaniel Butter" (Levin qtd in Howard-Hill, *A Game* 88 n301–2.). Similarly, the majuscule "H" in Hebrew draws attention to the bawdy pun on pen (slang for male genitalia) and the fact that Hebrew is written backwards, from right to left, as Middleton targets the "Assistant Fathers" from all angles. Not only does Middleton demean their sexual and intellectual backwardness, but he offends their religious order by giving the Jesuit the writing practices of the Jew. Q1's lower-case "butter" and "hebrew" make it much easier for readers to skip over the pun, missing the scandalous theological mockery.

This careful capitalization is not an isolated example; rather, capitalization is used throughout Q3 to highlight *A Game*'s critique of the Catholic Church and Anglo-Hispanic politics. Several critical examples can be found on signature G3^{v} alone, on which 'Poison'd Allegiance', 'Faith', 'Truth', 'Cause', 'States', 'Parrots', 'Villanie', 'Monster', and 'Sin' (all of which denote important religious and political figures or themes) are capitalized in Q3 and not in Q1.[141] The same compositorial care evident in Q3's intentional use of capitalization extends into the edition's punctuation – particularly its emphatic use of parentheses. Though Q1's printer generally uses

[141] For more examples of emphatic capitalization, see: Q3 G^{r}, H^{v}, H2^{r}, and H2^{v}, among many others.

parentheses and commas interchangeably (sometimes seeming to forget which one he had previously set), Q3 shows a more judicious use of parentheses and one which frequently emphasizes the text's ironies. In addition to clarifying Middleton's sense, the printer's use of parentheses strengthens the play's overarching critique of Catholicism, as the compositor routinely deploys parentheses to highlight the Catholic Church's hypocrisy. In 3.2, for example, Q3 prints the White Knight as saying "because I will not foule my Clothes / Ever hereafter (for white quickly soyles you know)." In these lines the parentheses, absent in Q1, serve an emphatic rather than a grammatical function, underscoring the moral themes at play. After informing the Black Jesting Pawn he looks "Iust like the Deuill, striding o're a Night-mare" the White Pawn marks his exit by blaming the Black House's vulgarity (Q3 E3^{r}). The parentheses make glaring the metaphor of the White House's untainted virtue as opposed to the immoral soot of the Black House. The play's fundamental metaphors of white and black and the two houses are designed to represent, on one level, England's oscillation between Catholicism and Protestantism and the political games driving their indecision (particularly the theological-political dealings of the Spanish match).[142] The compositor's editorial eye is usefully employed here as he signals the political metaphor to his reader, emphasizing the theological and political themes with which the passage directly engages.[143]

Another poignant example of Q3's compositorial sensitivity to the themes of *A Game* can be found in 4.2 where the Fat Bishop is found reading "The Booke *of Generall Pardons*," a title Q3 both capitalizes and italicizes. While both editions set the book's Latin title "*Taxa*

[142] See Taylor's introduction to *A Game* (esp. 1774); also Howard-Hill, *A Game* 10–16.
[143] Sonia Massai thinks of the compositor as an 'editor' in *Shakespeare and the Rise of the Editor*. My analysis of the editor-compositor and his role is more expansive than Massai's however, as she discusses the compositor as a "corrector" (which he was) while I am more concerned with his function as mediator, interpreting the author's meaning and conveying that meaning through typographical and textual interventions to his reader (11–12).

Penitentiaria" in italics, Q3 also italicizes and capitalizes the English subtitle "The Booke *of Generall Pardons, of all prices*" while Q1 does not. Though it was standard practice to italicize Latin, making it unsurprising that *Taxa Penitentiaria* is set in italics, the italicization of the English description constitutes a more distinct choice. Instead of solely signaling a book title or foreign language, the font change serves an emphatic function, highlighting Catholicism's corrupt practice of absolution, where all sins may be granted a general pardon for the right price. This reading of the italics as emphatic is supported by the fact that "Booke" is not italicized, thereby creating a division between a titular use of italics (for which "Booke" would be part of the italicized subtitle) and an emphatic use of italics for political purposes.

Taxa Penitentiaria (which Middleton shortened from *Taxa Sacra Penitentiaria Apostolica*) is a real text that details and monetizes the ecclesiastical pardon of all the sins the Fat Bishop lists, including: murder, incest, and simony (Howard-Hill, *A Game* 156 n82ff). While Q1's printer skips over this politically-charged reference, Q3's compositor emphasizes the superficiality of the Catholic practice of absolution. This is underscored by the scene's supreme irony that while the Fat Bishop's book promises to give pardons for all sins, "*of all prices*" (i.e., of all degrees), the Fat Bishop is unable to find a sum for the Black Knight Pawn's sin of gelding the White Bishop's Pawn – an uncommon offense. In this way, the book of *all* general pardons is not what it claims to be and the Black Knight, who promised to obtain absolution for his pawn, proves himself full of empty promises, dishonesty, and overconfidence in a faulty religious system that proves not what it claims to be.

A final instance of the power of Q3's politically attuned setting is found on the last page, as the entire Black House is placed in the bag. Though most editors would classify this orthographical difference as an accidental, Q3's change has a substantial impact on the text and its

level of specificity arguably shows human agency, not mere coincidence. As the remaining Black pieces are being bagged, the Fat Bishop says "The Bishop must haue Rome, he will haue Rome, / And Roome to lye at pleasure," to which the Jesting Pawn responds "All the Bag I thinke / Is roome too scant for your Spalletto Paunch" ($I4^{v}$). Q1, on the other hand, prints "roome" for all three instances. Though roome and rome were both acceptable and often interchangeable spellings for the word room (as in space), Q3's printer proves himself a particularly deft interpreter, highlighting the pun on Rome for his reader. Q3's setting distinguishes between Catholicism's acquisition of Rome – for the Fat Bishop "will have Rome" – and the topical allusion to the fat De Dominis (caricatured in Middleton's Fat Bishop) whose sprawling paunch would take up room in the bag (Howard-Hill, *A Game* 33). Furthermore, the printer's differentiation between 'Rome' and 'Roome' creates space for a third pun (and a further dig at the Catholic Church) on lie: the Bishop's occupancy of Rome gives him room to lie – to sprawl across Rome lazily and lie to its citizen – at his pleasure. This speaks to the immorality of the Catholic Church which, according to Middleton, uses its seat in Rome as the epicenter from which the Catholics spread religious untruths. Though typographical intention is notoriously difficult to prove with certainty, it seems highly unlikely that this triple pun was accidental. The orthographical differentiation appears quite intentionally set by the compositor to communicate the multiple meanings to the reader and underscore Middleton's politically charged *jeu de mots*.

These are just a few of the many bibliographical choices which speak to Allde's and Matthewes' understanding of the value of the play's political (and polemical) topicality. This interpretation is supported by Q3's intriguing paratextual material which creates a fictional publication narrative and location. The quarto's title page bears an engraving modified from Q1

with a barely noticeable note in the corner reading "Ghedruckt / in Lydden / by Ian Masse."[144] This small, printed note in the lower right-hand corner of the engraving ascribes Q3's printing to the fictitious stationer Jan Masse from Leiden, Netherlands using "Ghedruckt" – the German word for printed – to complete its fiction (see figure 3). Allde and Mathewes' carefully crafted publication narrative situates the work's production in continental Europe, far from its real point of origin in London (and equally far from England's strict censorship laws). The setting of the prologue, induction, and epilogue also demonstrates the pair's desire to distance themselves from the text. The headings for all three paratexts are printed in large, unmistakable "double pica black letter" (see figure 4). Weiss explains that Allde and Mathewes were working under the assumption that by 1625 "the reading public now saw black letter not as a standard English typeface for notorious new texts," as had been the case throughout the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, "but as characteristic of Northern European countries which continued to use it as their primary text face" (206).[145]

The printers' coordination speaks to the importance of selling the ruse, as Mathewes, in charge of sheets A-D, set the prologue and the induction, while Allde, who printed E–I, set the epilogue. Despite being at different print shops, Allde and Mathewes used twin typefaces, though subtle differences reveal themselves at the individual type level.[146] This must have required a fair amount of communication as even texts that were printed in the same shop have obvious inconsistencies and often show signs of poor communication (Q1 being one such example).

---

[144] For a discussion of the engraving's relation to Q1 and relative politicism see Taylor "General Textual Intro." pp. 751–2. Interestingly, Taylor proposes we might "characterize the MATHEWES/ALLDE engraving as politically 'safer' or 'more cautious'" than Okes' engraving (752). This would play into the paratextual fiction as the *less* political title page masks the *more* political text.

[145] Though the title page could have been designed by Mathewes as the primary printer, the collaboration regarding the blackletter paratexts is certain (Weiss 223). Differences between the two printers' type ensures their collusion which speaks to the larger fiction crafted by the two men, supporting the idea that the title page was designed jointly.

[146] Weiss notes particular differences between the "'e g l o'" (206).

Mathewes and Allde obviously felt enough was at stake to necessitate this carefully planned, coordinated deception. Given the themes of the text, the obvious explanation for their charade is concern over censorship.[147] Yet, instead of sidestepping scandal, the printers enhanced it, concocting a false narrative through playful paratextual material that allowed them to print a more politically aware, sensationalized text of a sensational play.

Though Middleton would not have directly benefited from print publication after selling the manuscript to Okes, its printing (particularly the better set, politically emphatic Q3) would have increased the allure of the play. Placing his irreverent, wildly popular play in book stalls across London not only spread his infamy by widening access, but also opened avenues for gift copies and bespoke, uncensored manuscript copies to be sold to wealthy readers. Like the theater and print industries, manuscript and print had a mutually nurturing relationship. Love overplays the division between print and scribal publication, describing scribal publication as a "race against time" and a period of immense profitability that would end with the release of a printed edition. This is not entirely true, however, and print and manuscript coexisted well into the 18th century. David McKitterick reminds us that there was a "reciprocity of print and manuscript, and the practices whereby those trained as craftsmen or artists in a manuscript tradition were able to continue their work in an age increasingly dependent upon print, persisted at every social, financial, and educational level" (58). Especially when the texts were political, "private need frequently was at odds with the printing press, and vice-versa," creating demand for manuscript copies of printed works (52).

[147] The threat of legal consequences was very real at this point. After an unusual run of nine consecutive performances, the King's Men were shut down (despite having had their playbook licensed by the Master of the Revels) and Middleton was imprisoned for an 'unknown' time (Burt 182). On censorship, also see Howard-Hill, *Middleton's "Vulgar Pasquin"* 92–109; also Clegg.

Middleton recognized and happily took advantage of this reciprocal demand for print and manuscript publication. Yet, while he evidently had no problem profiting off the commercial opportunities London's theater markets created, he does not champion markets or consumerism in his plays. Instead, he often uses his texts to reveal the darker side of the self-interest he lived off exploiting. His ambivalence toward self-interest appears throughout his corpus, though my analysis will focus on *A Game*. In addition to being textually and theatrically unique, *A Game* constitutes somewhat of an artistic and ideological shift for Middleton. Though the allegory of a chess board with a Black House and White House should intensify the moral allegory, forcing a right and wrong and good and bad interpretation onto the play, Middleton's "tangled web of sexual, religious, and political conduct muddies the moral clarity of black and white. In earlier plays, he had used farce and bawdy to exaggerate such ambiguities" (Chakravorty 188). In *A Game*, Middleton uses farce more sparingly and, instead of heightening simple binaries, begins with the most dichotomous metaphor, a chess match, to ultimately resist easy judgments. The play opens with an induction in which Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Society of Jesus, bemoans the fact that Jesuits have not yet managed to convert England. He rouses his sleeping lackey Error, "Father of Supererogation," cementing the pair's Catholicism. Error proceeds to recount the dream Ignatius interrupted, which happens to be "a game at chess / Betwixt our side and the White House." Ignatius demands Error conjure his dream and Error makes both houses materialize on stage, beginning the play. The game is meant to be a match between the Anglican English White House and the Jesuit Spanish Black House. The induction, given by the father of the Jesuits and Error, and chess allegory establish the binary of a benevolent White and malevolent Black house from the start, playing on England's anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish sentiments.

The Black House is represented as corrupt, cunning, greedy, and self-serving throughout the play, as they try to capture the White House and win the chess game, with the match metaphorically representing England's conversion to Catholicism. Examples of the Black House's hypocrisy pervade *A Game* and most cater to England's stereotype of the corrupt Catholic Church that preaches abstinence and piety while engaging in illicit sex and extortion. Self-interest underlies the moral corruption of the Black House, as each actor pursues his or her own interests and impulses, often under the guise of serving the Church. The Fat Bishop is the most obvious example of greed and the text's constant allusions to his girth consistently reminds us of his destructive avarice as he leeches off the White and Black Houses without qualm. The Bishop is much more interested in the "plenty and variety of victuals" available to him "When [he] was one of the Black House," than in spreading the gospel (2.2.24–5). His allegiance to his given house is based neither on loyalty nor religious devotion, but on how richly he will be compensated gastronomically and, it turns out, sexually. The Fat Bishop divulges that while his person may be satisfied, his "parts" are not, as the White House has failed to provide for his sexual predilections, making him "master of the Beds" with "no marigolds that shuts and opens." Consequently, he is left with "more beds than drabs" when he would rather have "more such [women] than beds" (2.1.34–41). He implies that this sexual liberality was his reality at the Black House where, though food was sparse, payment in sexual favors abounded. Ultimately, the Fat Bishop's insatiable appetite leads him to switch allegiances once again and return to the Black House.

The Fat Bishop's self-interest, though harmful, is not as dastardly as the Black Bishop's Pawn's sexual exploitation of the White Queen's Pawn which is only prevented by the Black Queen Pawn's self-interested intervention. The positive outcome of the Black Queen's Pawn's personally motivated intervention complicates the play's portrayal of private interests and

underscores Middleton's resistance to ideological uniformity. In act 2, the Black Bishop's Pawn uses his official station in the Church to sexually blackmail the virginal White Queen's Pawn. When he is unsuccessful, the black pawn threatens sexual violence, promising the White Queen's Pawn that "there's art to help [her]" hide her marred virginity "And fools to pass [her] to." Faced with her impending rape, the virginal White Queen's Pawn begs him to "take [her] life, sir, / And leave [her] honour to guide [her] to heaven." The Black Bishop's Pawn replies "Take heed I take not both," which he promises to do should she continue to resist his advances (2.1.123–35). As the shaken White Queen's Pawn exits, her black counterpart enters and chastises the Black Bishop's Pawn for his rashness:

> Are you mad?
> Can lust infatuate a man so hopeful?
> No patience in your blood? The dog-star reigns sure;
> Time and fair temper would have wrought her pliant.
> I spied a pawn of the White House walk near us
> And made that noise [within] o' purpose to give warning. (2.1.150–5)

She confesses in an aside, however, that far from wishing to protect him, she signaled alarm "For [her] own turn, which end is all I work for" (2.1.156).

The Black Queen's Pawn's ruse is just beginning and, after gaining the White Queen Pawn's trust, she uses it to arrange a bed trick to settle a personal score. Through several well-spun lies and an illusion involving a mirror and the disguised Black Bishop's Pawn, she convinces the White Queen's Pawn that her disguised attacker is actually her future husband, virtuous and fair. The Black Queen's Pawn then promises the corrupt bishop's pawn she will arrange a meeting for him with the virginal pawn at night in a dark room but takes the white pawn's place, "cozen[ing

them] both" (4.2.149). In act 5, when the Black Bishop's Pawn accuses the White Queen's Pawn of "nice iniquity, hot luxury, / And holy whoredom," for denying she slept with him, the Black Queen's Pawn intervenes, confessing that she was his bedfellow – the one who "work[ed] so kindly, without rape" (5.2.89). The black pawn has her own reasons for her actions, seeking revenge for the Black Bishop's Pawn's history of financially and sexually abusing young nuns, herself included.

She is vilified by both the Black and White houses. When the Black Bishop's Pawn learns of her deception, he calls her "devil," "a bawdy voice," wishes a "pox confound [her]," and promises to "slit" her throat (5.2.81–7). The White Queen joins in the derision, calling her a "lewd Pawn, the shame of womanhood," before capturing and bagging her. The Black Bishop's Pawn's barbs, though cutting, can be dismissed as a sore loser's vengeful slander, but the White Queen's moral condemnation of the Black Queen's Pawn smacks of ingratitude. Through the Black Queen's Pawn's actions, the White Queen's Pawn's virginity was saved, the Black Bishop's Pawn's corruption was uncovered, he was defeated, and the White House remained untainted by the scandal of unsanctioned and nonconsensual sexual relations with the Black House. This is far superior to the White House's response. After the White Queen's Pawn recounts the attempted rape to her king and queen, the Black Knight enters and falsely claims that the Black Bishop's Pawn "Has not been seen ten days in these parts" (2.2.208). He produces letters proving the Black Bishop's Pawn's absence and the White King immediately turns on his pawn, leaving her to the Black Knight's censure as she is punished for her own attempted rape.

It is the Black Queen's Pawn's self-interest that preserves the white pawn's honor. Yet, while her actions have a net positive effect, they hardly constitute a ringing endorsement of self-interest, adding to the ambivalence inherent to Middletonian drama. Middleton was adept at

appeasement and part of his strength as a popular dramatist was his ability to write plays which entertained multiple perspectives, allowing many interpretations and affirming none. Adrian Streete examines how Middleton uses laughter to destabilize hierarchies, threatening "propriety and social order" by directing laughter at "individuals regardless of rank" (300). Stephen Wittek similarly proposes that Middleton uses the theater as an explorative space wherein multiple ideologies and approaches can be entertained by the diverse viewing public from the safety of their seat (or patch of ground). For Wittek, *A Game* resists easy interpretation and cannot be read "as a coherent expression of a single ideology" (430). Political allegories were routine on the early modern stage, and Middleton takes advantage of their popularity, introducing "criticism of Catholicism and Spain alongside a more subtle critique of the English Court, allegorically telegraphing anti-Court stereotypes that portrayed James's administration as a hotbed of corruption" (429). Middleton's theater was ideologically inclusive and *A Game* reframes English politics, making familiar figures appear "in an entirely new light, thereby enabling people to think through [some] of the most prominent issues of the day on a much more open-ended, critical, and affective basis" (431). Not interested in universal truths or edifying maxims, Middleton invited his audience to think alongside him as he questioned conflicting viewpoints that evaded easy answers.

* * *

A similarly conflicted approach to commerce is found in *The Phoenix*, in which markets and credit become twisted perversions of exchange that equate human beings "with commodities and moral values with financial" ("The Phoenix" 92). In scene 8, a sea captain is attempting to sell his wife to pay back his debts, to which his wife cries "Have you no sense, neither of my good name / Or your own credit?" The Captain responds with a distorted view of the credit market, retorting "Happier that man, say I, whom no man trusts; . . . O, he that has no credit owes no debts"

(8.15). The Lady's response encapsulates the multiple meanings of the word credit and sees through to the heart of the issue: it is only by credit, others trust in us, that men survive. "O, captain, husband," the Lady responds, "you name that dishonest / By whose good power all that are honest live" (8.22-3). Remove credit and life is not worth living: you will be financially destitute and religiously damned, as lines of financial and moral credit were (and remain) based on trust. The play ends with Phoenix's mixed acceptance of vice as he condemns and commends it, declaring "The age must needs be foul when vice / reforms it" (13.65). While Middleton did not champion vice as the solution to man's evils in the same way Bacon did, he is more willing than Jonson is to accept its necessity. In foul ages, countervailing passions cannot be extinguished but must be harnessed, as vice checks vice.

Middleton did not view self-interest as positively as Shakespeare did, but he was not as cynical as Jonson or Marlowe. This simultaneous understanding of, yet ambivalence toward self-interest and consumerism seems to have enabled Middleton to survive off his pen without the protection Jonson's sponsorship or Shakespeare's investments provided. Ben Jonson did not have Middleton's ability to equivocate. Not only does he skewer all vices repeatedly in his satires, but his career actively demonstrates his repudiation of markets, commerce, and self-interest as he intentionally crafted a print ego that was designed to keep his works out of the hands of the masses – or, at least, bar their full access to his texts' riches. For Jonson, vice and consumerism are the ever problems and never solutions. The world of *Volpone* and *Bartholomew Fair* is a destructive space of parasitic avarice and poisonous greed. Here, self-interest guarantees mutual destruction and commercialism necessitates a race to the bottom, stripping goods of aesthetic and moral value. Jonson spent his career attempting to counter this debasement of artistic craft. It seems possible that Jonson saw a bit of himself in his created justice Adam Overdo: bound to forever lecture but

never be fully heard in his attempts to “correct, not to destroy; to build, not to demolish” his Reader Ordinary (“Volpone” 5.6.93–4n).

F. B. Heer's *Taxa Penitentiaris* Knight,
The booke of generall pardons, of all prizes :
I haue bin ſearching for his ſinne this halfe houre,
And cannot light vpon it.

B. Kt. That is ſtrange let me ſee it.

B. *Kt.* Wretched as I am, ha's my rage done that
There is no preſident of pardon for ?

B. Kt. For wilfull murder 13. pounds, 4. ſhillings,
and ſixe-pence, that's reaſonable cheape, for killing,
killing, killing, killing, killing, killing.
Why heer's nothing but killing of this ſide.

F. B. Turne ore the ſheete, you ſhal finde adultery
And other triuiall ſinnes.

B. *Kt.* Adultery, oh time met now, for Adultery
A couple of ſhillings, and for Fornication fiue pence,
Mas theſe are the good penny-worths,
I cannot ſee how a man can mend himſelfe, for lying
With Mother, Siſter, or Daughter, I marry (ſir)
Thirty three pounds, three ſhilling, and three pence,
The ſins gradation right payd all in threestoo.

F. *B.* You haue read the ſtory of that monſter (ſir)
That got his daughter, ſiſter & wife, of his own mother

B. Kt. Symone nine pounds.

F. B. They may thank me for that, t'was ninteene,
Before I came, I haue mittigated many of the ſumms.

Figure 1: Q1 *A Game* H3r. Image reproduced from *EEBO*.

Your outeries and your Cunning, farwel brookage
W. Q. p. Nay ſtay, and heare me but giue thankes a
Little, if your eare can endure a worke ſo gracious,
Then you may take your pleaſure.
B. B. p. I haue done that.
W. Q. p. That power that hath preſerued me from this diuell
B. B. p. How?
W. *Q. p.* This that may challenge the chiefe chaire in Hell,
And ſit aboue his Maſter.
B. *B. p* Bring in Merrit.
W. *Q. p* .That ſuffereſt him through blinde luſt to be led laſt
night, to the action of ſome common bed.
B. Q. p. Not ouer common neither. *Black Queenes*
B. *B. p.* Hah what voice is that? *p. within.*
W. *Q. p.* Of virgins be thou euer honored,
Now you may goe, you heare I'ue giuen thanks (ſir)
B. *B p.* Here is a ſtrange Game indeed, did not I lie with you.
B. *Q p* No. *within*
B. *B. p.* What a diuell art thou?
B. *Q p.* I will not anſwer you (Sir)
after thankes-giuing.
B. *B. p* You made promiſe to me
After the Contract.
B. *Q p.* Yes. *Within*
B. *B. p.* Miſchiefe confound thee
I ſpeake not to thee : and you were prepared for't
And ſet your loyes more heigh.
B. *Q. p.* Then you could reach (Sir) *Within*
B. *B. p.* This is ſome bawdy Pale ſlit the throat on t.
B. Q. p. What me your bedfellow. *Enter Blacke*
To one that workes ſo kindly without rape. *Q. p*
B. *B. p.* My bedfellow?
B. *Q p.* Do you plant your ſcorne againſt me?
Why, when I was *Probationer* at *Bruxells.*

That

Figure 2: Q1 I4r. Note the difference in margin sizes starting with the Black Queen's Pawn's "Yes," evidence of Okes' rushed job. Image reproduced from *EEBO*.

Figure 3: Q3's engraved title page, showing the "Ian Masse" attribution. Image reproduced from *EEBO*.



Figure 4: Q3's black letter prologue heading. Image reproduced from *EEBO*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aaron, Melissa D. *Global Economics*. University of Delaware Press, 2005.

———. "Theatre as Business." *The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare*, edited by Arthur F. Kinney, Oxford UP, 2014, pp. 420–32. doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566105.013.0024.

Ajzenstat, Samuel. "The Ubiquity of Contract in *The Merchant of Venice*." *Philosophy and Literature*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1997, pp. 262–78. *Project MUSE*, https://doi:10.1353/phl.1997.0026.

Albrecht, Brian C. "The Breakdown of Spontaneous Order: Smith and Hayek Diverge." *New York University Journal of Law and Liberty*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2017, pp. 346–70. *HeinOnline*, https://heinonline-org.proxy1.library.virginia.edu/HOL/.

"Audiences." *Shakespeare's Globe*, 2023, www.shakespearesglobe.com/discover/shakespeares-world/audiences/.

Smoothing, Credit Quality, and Firm Value." *Journal of Banking & Finance*, vol. 140, 2022. *EBSCOhost,* https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106514.

Anderson, David K. "The Theater of the Damned: Religion and the Audience in the Tragedy of Christopher Marlowe." *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, vol. 54, no. 1, Apr. 2012, pp. 79–109. *JSTOR,* http://www.jstor.org/stable/41349150.

Appleby, Joyce Oldham. *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-century England*. Figueroa Press, 2004.

Archer, Ian. "Economy." *The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare*, edited by Arthur F. Kinney, Oxford UP, 2014, pp. 165–81. *Oxford Academic*, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566105.013.0010.

Arienzo, Alessandro, and Alessandra Petrina, editors. *Machiavellian Encounters in Tudor and Stuart England: Literary and Political Influences from the Reformation to the Restoration*. Routledge, 2016.

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Edited by Roger Crisp, Cambridge UP, 2014.

Ayyildiz, Nilay Erdem. "An Evaluation of the Evil Characters in Shakespeare's Four Main Tragedies in Terms of Machiavellian Principles." *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, vol. 18, no. 3, July 2019, pp. 1037–49. *Directory of Open Access Journals*, https://doi.org/10.21547/jss.493489.

Backhouse, Roger E. *The Penguin History of Economics*. Penguin, 2002.

Bacon, Francis. *Advancement of Learning*, The Floating Press, 1975.

Baker, David J. *On Demand: Writing for the Market in Early Modern England*. Stanford UP, 2010.

Balaam, David N. *Political Economy*, Britannica Money, www.britannica.com/money/political-economy. Accessed 18 Sept. 2023.

Barber, C. L. *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy*. Princeton UP, 2012.

Barish, Jonas A. *The Antitheatrical Prejudice*. University of California Press, 1981.

Bartels, Emily Carroll, and Emma Smith, editors. *Christopher Marlowe in Context*. Cambridge UP, 2015.

Bartels, Emily Carroll. *Spectacles of Strangeness Imperialism, Alienation, and Marlowe*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.

Barthas, Jérémie. "Machiavelli, Public Debt, and the Origins of Political Economy: An Introduction." *The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language*, edited by Filippo Del Lucchese et al., BRILL, 2015, pp. 273–305.

Bate, Jonathan. "Marlowe's Ghost." *The Genius of Shakespeare*, Oxford UP, 1998, pp. 101–32.

Bawcutt, N.W. "Machiavelli and Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*." *Renaissance Drama*, vol. 3, Jan. 1970, pp. 3–49. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41917055.

Bearman, Robert. *Shakespeare's Money*. Oxford UP, 2016.

Bednarz, James P. *Shakespeare & the Poets' War*. Columbia UP, 2001.

Beranek, William, and David R. Kamerschen. "Examining Two of Keynes's Most Popular Statements—Wasteful Public Spending Can Be Acceptable, and, in the Long Run We Are All Dead—Yields Some Surprising Implications." *The American Economist*, vol. 61, no. 2, 2016, pp. 263–67. *SageJournals*, https://doi.org /10.1177/0569434516653848.

Bernthal, Craig A. "Jack Cade's Legal Carnival." *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, vol. 2, no. 2, Jan. 2002. *Project MUSE,* https://doi.org10.1353/sel.2002.0012.

Bertram, Benjamin. "*Measure for Measure* and the Discourse of Husbandry." *Modern Philology*, vol. 110, no. 4, 2013, pp. 459–88. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.1086/669966.

Bidwell, John. “French Paper in English Books.” *The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain*, edited by John Barnard and D. F. McKenzie, vol. 4, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 583–601.

Black, John, et al. *A Dictionary of Economics*. 5th ed., Oxford UP, 2017.

Black, Robert A. “Accounting and the Auditing Function in Economic History: Transaction Costs, Trust, and Economic Progress.” *Journal of Markets & Morality*, vol. 22, no. 1, Spring 2019, pp. 41–65. *EBSCOhost*, https://web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy1.

Bland, Mark. “The Appearance of the Text in Early Modern England.” *Text*, vol. 11, 1998, pp. 91–154.

———. “Ben Jonson and the Legacies of the Past.” *Huntington Library Quarterly*, vol. 67, no. 3, Sept. 2004, pp. 371–400. *JSTOR,* https://doi.org/10.1525/hlq.2004.67.3.371.

———. *A Guide to Early Printed Books and Manuscripts*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Blayney, Peter. “The Publication of Playbooks.” *A New History of Early English Drama*, edited by John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan, Columbia UP, 1997, pp. 384–422.

———. *The Texts of King Lear and their Origins*. Cambridge UP, 1982.

Botero, Giovanni. *The Reason of State*. Edited by Robert Bireley, Cambridge UP, 2017.

Boughner, Daniel C. *The Devil’s Disciple: Ben Jonson’s Debt to Machiavelli*. Philosophical Library, 1968.

Brady, Jennifer, and Wyman H. Herendeen. *Ben Jonson's 1616 Folio*. University of Delaware Press, 1991.

Braudel, Fernand. *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*. University of California Press, 1992.

Broadberry, Stephen, et al. *British Economic Growth, 1270–1870*. Cambridge UP, 2014.

Brooks, Douglas A. *From Playhouse to Printing House: Drama and Authorship in Early Modern England*. Cambridge UP, 2000.

Brown, Carolyn E. “The Homoeroticism of Duke Vincentio: ‘Some Feeling of the Sport.’” *Studies in Philology*, vol. 94, no. 2, 1997, pp. 187–220. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4174575.

Brustein, Robert Sanford. *The Tainted Muse*. Yale UP, 2009.

Bruster, Douglas. *Drama and the Market in the Age of Shakespeare*. Cambridge UP, 2004.

Buchanan, James M. "Is Economics the Science of Choice?" *The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan*, vol. 12, Liberty Fund, 2000, pp. 3–29.

———.. *The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty*. Liberty Fund, 1999.

Burkhardt Louis. "Spectator Seduction: *Measure for Measure*." *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, vol. 37, no. 3, 1995, pp. 236–63. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40755073.

Burt, Richard. "Thomas Middleton, Uncut: Castration, Censorship, and the Regulation of Dramatic Discourse in Early Modern England." *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture: A Companion to the Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 182–94.

Caferro, William. "Premodern European Capitalism, Christianity, and Florence." *Business History Review*, vol. 94, no. 1, 2020, pp. 39–72. *Cambridge Core*, https://doi:10.1017/S0007680520000045.

Caldwell, Ellen C. "Jack Cade and Shakespeare's *Henry VI, Part 2*." *Studies in Philology*, vol. 92, no. 1, 1995. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4174505.

Calhoun, Thomas O., and Thomas L. Gravell. "Paper and Printing in Ben Jonson's 'Sejanus' (1605)." *The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, vol. 87, no. 1, 1993, pp. 13–64, https://doi.org/10.1086/pbsa.87.1.24304157.

Cannan, Paul D. "Ben Jonson, Authorship, and the Rhetoric of English Dramatic Prefatory Criticism." *Studies in Philology*, vol. 99, no. 2, 2002, pp. 178–201. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4174726.

Cantor, Paul A., and Stephen D. Cox. *Literature & the Economics of Liberty: Spontaneous Order in Culture*. Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 2009.

Carroll, William C. *Fat King, Lean Beggar*. Cornell UP, 1996.

Carruthers, Bruce G., and Wendy Nelson Espeland. "Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality." *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 97, no. 1, 1991, pp. 31–69. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2781637.

Cartelli, Thomas. "Jack Cade in the Garden: Class Consciousness and Class Conflict in *2 Henry VI*." *Enclosure Acts*, edited by Richard Burt and John Archer, Cornell UP, 2019, pp. 48–67.

———. *Marlowe, Shakespeare, and the Economy of Theatrical Experience*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991.

Cato, Marcus Porcius. Harrison Boyd Ash, William Davis Hooper, and Marcus Terentius Varro. *Marcus Porcius Cato, On Agriculture; Marcus Terentius Varro, On Agriculture.* Harvard UP, 1934.

Cerasano, S. P. "The 'Business' of Shareholding, the Fortune Playhouses, and Francis Grace's Will." *Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England*, vol. 2, 1985, pp. 231–51. *JSTOR*, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24322224.

———. "The Chamberlain's-King's Men." *A Companion to Shakespeare*, edited by David Scott Kastan, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, 1999, pp. 328–45.

———. "Theater Entrepreneurs and Theatrical Economics." *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theatre*, edited by Richard Dutton. Oxford UP, 2011, pp. 380–95. *Oxford Academic*, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697861.013.0023.

Chakravorty, Swapan. *Society and Politics in the Plays of Thomas Middleton*. Clarendon Press, 1996.

Chambers, E. K. *The Elizabethan Stage*. Oxford UP, 2009. 4 vols.

Cheney, *Marlowe's Republican Authorship: Lucan, Liberty, and the Sublime*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

———. "Introduction: Marlowe in the Twenty-First Century." *The Cambridge Companion to Christopher Marlowe*, edited by Patrick Cheney, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp. 1–23.

Clark, Michael J. "Adam Smith as Solon: Accommodating on the Edges of Liberty, Not Abandoning it." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 2020, pp. 739–47. *ScienceDirect*, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.029.

Clarkson, Leslie A. *The Pre-Industrial Economy in England, 1500–1750*. Schocken Books, 1971.

Clegg, Cyndia Susan. "'Twill Much Enrich the Company of Stationers': Thomas Middleton and the London Book Trade, 1580–1627." *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture: A Companion to the Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 247–59.

Coast, David. "Speaking for the People in Early Modern England." *Past & Present*, vol. 244, no. 1, 2019, pp. 51–88. *Oxford Academic*, https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtz024.

Collins, Gregory M. "Spontaneous Order and Civilization: Burke and Hayek on Markets, Contracts and Social Order." *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 2021, pp. 1–30. *Sage Publications,* https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453721990683.

Condon, James J. "Setting the Stage for Revenge: Space, Performance, and Power in Early Modern Revenge Tragedy." *Medieval & Renaissance Drama in England*, vol. 25, Jan. 2012, pp. 62–82. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24322473.

Crowley, Robert. *The way to wealth wherein is plainly taught a most present remedy for sedicion . . . ad imprimendum solum*. London: 1550. *Early English Books Online*, www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2240900397/99840872/C0039A1AE2664C06PQ/1?accountid=14678.

D'Andrade, Kendall. "Machiavelli's Prince as CEO." *Business Ethics Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 4, 1993, pp. 395–404. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/3857285.

Danson, Lawrence. "Continuity and Character in Shakespeare and Marlowe." *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, vol. 26, no. 2, 1986, pp. 217–34. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/450505.

Dauber, Noah. *State and Commonwealth: The Theory of the State in Early Modern England, 1549–1640*. Princeton UP, 2016.

Detmer-Goebel, Emily. "Shakespeare's Bed-Tricks: Finding Justice in Lies?" *Justice, Women, and Power in English Renaissance Drama*, edited by Andrew J. Majeske and Emily Detmer-Goebel, Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2009, pp. 118–139.

Dimmock, Spencer. *The Origin of Capitalism in England, 1400–1600*. Brill, 2014.

Dollimore, Jonathan, and Alan Sinfield, editors. *Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism*. Cornell UP, 1994.

Donaldson, Ian. "Life of Ben Jonson." *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben Jonson Online*, edited by David Bevington, Martin Butler, Ian Donaldson, and David Gants. Cambridge UP, 2012. https://universitypublishingonline.org/cambridge/benjonson/k/essays/jonsons_life_essay/1/.

Doty, Jeffrey S. "Shakespeare and Popular Politics." *Literature Compass*, vol. 2, no. 2, Feb. 2013, pp. 162–74. *VIVA Wiley Blackwell,* https://doi.org/10.1111/lic3.12022.

Drakakis, John. "Introduction." *The Merchant of Venice,* The Arden Shakespeare, 2011, pp. 1–159.

Duggan, Lawrence G. “Indulgence.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 20 July 1998, www.britannica.com/topic/indulgence.

Dunne, Derek. *Shakespeare, Revenge Tragedy and Early Modern Law: Vindictive Justice*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Dunsworth, Felicity, and Kathleen E McKluskie. “Patronage and the Economics of Theater.” *A New History of Early English Drama,* edited by John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan, Columbia UP, 1997, pp. 423–40.

Dutton, Richard. *Ben Jonson: To the First Folio*. Cambridge UP, 1983.

“Earliest Known Reference to Shakespeare’s Hamlet in Harvey’s Copy of Speght’s Chaucer.” *British Library,* www.bl.uk/collection-items/earliest-known-reference-to-shakespeares-hamlet-in-harveys-copy-of-speghts-chaucer#:~:text=Here%20he%20notes%20that%20’The,to%20please%20the%20wiser%20sort’. Accessed 27 July 2023.

“economist, n.”. *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford UP, July 2023, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1019324081

Edelstein, Gabriella. “Collaborating On Credit: Ben Jonson's Authorship In Eastward Ho!.” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 50, no. 2, 1 Mar. 2020, pp. 233–55. *The University of Chicago Press Journals*, https://doi.org/10.1086/708232.

Egan, Michael. “Managers as Kings: Shakespeare on Modern Leadership.” *Management Decision*, vol. 38, no. 5, June 2000, pp. 315–27. *Business Source Complete,* https://doi.org/10.1108/00251740010340490.

Eklund, Hillary. “Revolting Diets: Jack Cade’s ‘Sallet’ and the Politics of Hunger in *2 Henry VI*.” *Shakespeare Studies*, Jan. 2014. *Gale Literature Resource Center*, gale.com/apps/doc/A385403548/LitRC?u=viva_uva&sid=bookmark-LitRC&xid=448617ee.

Ellis, David. *The Truth About William Shakespeare*. Edinburgh UP, 2012.

Engle, Lars. *Shakespearean Pragmatism: Market of His Time*. University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Eriksson, Lina. *Rational Choice Theory: Potential and Limits*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Erne, Lukas. *Shakespeare as Literary Dramatist*. Cambridge UP, 2013.

Fadely, Patrick. "'Unknown Sovereignty': *Measure for Measure* and the Mysteries of State." *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, vol. 18, no. 4, 2018, pp. 1–25. *JSTOR*, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26899558.

Fallow, David. "His Father John Shakespeare." *The Shakespeare Circle: An Alternative Biography*, edited by Paul Edmondson and Stanley Wells, Cambridge UP, 2016.

Farnam, Henry W. *Shakespeare's Economics*. Yale UP, 1931.

Finkelstein, Andrea. *Harmony and the Balance: An Intellectual History of Seventeenth-century English Economic Thought*. University of Michigan Press, 2000.

Fischer, Sandra K. "'He Means to Pay': Value and Metaphor in the Lancastrian Tetralogy." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 40, no. 2, 1989, pp. 149–64. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2870816.

Fitter, Chris. *Majesty and the Masses in Shakespeare and Marlowe.* Routledge, 2021.

———. "Shakespeare, Jack Cade, and 'Kentish Men': England's Earliest Working-Class Rebel-Heroes?" *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, vol. 20, no. 4, 2020, pp. 89–111. *Project MUSE.* https://doi.org/10.1353/jem.2020.0031.

———. "'So Distribution Should Undo Excess': Recovering the Political Pressure of Distributive and Egalitarian Discourses in Shakespeare's *King Lear* and Early Modern England." *English Literary History*, vol. 4, no. 4, Jan. 2019. *Project MUSE*, https:/doi.org/10.1353/elh.2019.0031.

Flammer, Caroline, et al. "Corporate Governance and the Rise of Integrating Corporate Social Responsibility Criteria in Executive Compensation: Effectiveness and Implications for Firm Outcomes." *Strategic Management Journal*, vol. 40, no. 7, 1 Jul. 2019, pp. 1097–1122. *Wiley Online Library*, https://doi.og/ 10.1002/smj.3018.

Fleissner, Robert F. "Falstaff's Green Sickness unto Death." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1961, pp. 47–55. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2867270.

Forse, James H. *Art Imitates Business: Commercial and Political Influences in Elizabethan Theatre*. Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1993.

Francis K. H. So. "Economic Obsession in Early Literary Imagination: Shakespeare, Jonson and More." *Interlitteraria*, vol. 24, no. 1, Aug. 2019. *Directory of Open Access Journals*, https://doi.org/10.12697/IL.2019.24.1.6.

Freeman, R. Edward, et al. *The Power of And: Responsible Business Without Trade-offs*. Columbia UP, 2020.

Friedman, Milton. *There's No Such Thing as a Free Lunch*. Open Court, 1974.

Galliardi, Achilles. *An abridgement of Christian perfection Conteining many excellent precepts, & aduertisments, touching the holy, and sacred mysticall diuinity*. London: 1625. *Early English Books Online*, https://www.proquest.com/eebo/results/8D1665DE131A4875PQ/1?accountid=14678.

Ganim, John M. "Double Entry in Chaucer's 'Shipman's Tale': Chaucer and Bookkeeping before Pacioli." *The Chaucer Review*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1996, pp. 294–305. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/25095934.

Gants, David, and Tom Lockwood. "The Printing and Publishing of Ben Jonson's Works." *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben Jonson*, edited by David M. Bevington et al., Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK, 2012, p. clxiv–clxxxvi.

Gaskell, Philip. *A New Introduction to Bibliography*. Clarendon Press, 1972.

Gieskes, Edward. *Representing the Professions: Administration, Law, and Theater in Early Modern England*. University of Delaware Press, 2006.

Golz, Michael, and Daniel J. D'Amico. "Market Concentration in the International Drug Trade." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, vol. 150, 1 Jun. 2018, pp. 28–42. *ScienceDirect*, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.025.

"good, adj., n., adv., int.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford UP, July 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/4101948276.

Grady, Hugh. *Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from Richard II to Hamlet*. Oxford UP, 2002.

Graham, Jamey E. "Consciousness, Self-Spectatorship, and Will to Power: Shakespeare's Stoic Conscience." *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 44, no. 2, 2014, pp. 241–74. *JSTOR,* www.jstor.org/stable/43607773.

Graham, Kenneth J. E. "Distributive Measures: Theology and Economics in the Writings of Robert Crowley." *Criticism,* vol. 47, no. 2, 2005, pp. 137–58. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23127234.

Grav, Peter F. *Shakespeare and the Economic Imperative: 'What's aught but as 'tis valued?'*. Routledge, 2008.

Greenblatt, Stephen. "Invisible bullets: Renaissance Authority and its Subversion, *Henry IV* and *Henry V*." *Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism*, edited by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, Cornell UP, 1994, pp. 18-47.

———. “Marlowe, Marx, and Anti-Semitism.” *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1978, pp. 291–307. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343013.

Greg, W. W. *The Calculus of Variants*. Oxford UP, 1927.

———. *Henslowe Diary*. London: A.H. Bullen, 1908.

———. *Henslowe Papers: Being Documents Supplementary to Henslowe's Diary*. A.H. Bullen, 1907.

Grewal, David Singh. “The Political Theology of Laissez-Faire: From Philia to Self-Love in Commercial Society.” *Political Theology,* vol. 17, no. 5, 2016, pp. 417–33. *EBSCOhost,* https://doi.org/10.1080/1462317x.2016.1211287.

Griffin, Brent. “‘Original Practices’ and Jonson’s First Folio.” *Ben Jonson Journal*, vol. 25, no. 1, May 2018, pp. 19–31. *Edinburgh University Press Journals,* https://doi.org/10.3366/bjj.2018.0208.

Gurr, Andrew. “Globe Theatre.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 5 Nov. 2020, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Globe-Theatre.

———. “Shakespeare’s Playhouses.” *A Companion to Shakespeare*, edited by David Scott Kastan, Blackwell Publishers 1999, pp. 362–76.

———. *The Shakespearean Stage, 1574–1642*. 4th ed. Cambridge UP, 2008.

Haile, Christopher. “‘Pawn! Sufficiently Holy But Unmeasurably Politic’: The Pawns Plot in Middleton’s A Game at Chess.” *Journal of Early Modern Studies*, Mar. 2019, pp. 191–224. *EBSCOhost,* https://doi.org/10.13128/JEMS-2279-7149-24887.

Halasz, Alexandra. “Strange Food, Paper.” *Early Modern Literary Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1, 2018, pp. 1–21. *EBSCOhost*, web-s-ebscohost-com.proxy1.library.virginia.edu/ehost/.

Hall, Allen. “Underground economy”. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 8 Jan. 2019. https://www.britannica.com/money/topic/underground-economy.

Hall, Kim F. “Guess Who's Coming to Dinner? Colonization and Miscegenation in *The Merchant of Venice*.” *Renaissance Drama*, vol. 23, 1 Jan. 1992, pp. 87–111. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41917285.

Halper, Louise. “*Measure For Measure:* Law, Prerogative, Subversion.” *Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2001, pp. 221–64. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/lal.1.2001.13.2.221.

Halpern, Richard. *Eclipse of Action: Tragedy and Political Economy*. University of Chicago Press, 2017.

———. *The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation*. Cornell UP, 1991.

Hamilton, Alexander, et al. *The Federalist Papers*. Open Road Integrated Media, Inc., 2020. *ProQuest Ebook Central*.

Hanley, Ryan Patrick. *Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue*. Cambridge UP, 2011.

———, editor. *Adam Smith: His Life, Thought, and Legacy*. Princeton UP, 2016.

Harbage, Alfred. *Shakespeare's Audience*. Columbia UP, 1941.

———. *Shakespeare and the Rival Traditions*. The Macmillan Company, 1952.

Harris, Jonathan Gil. *Sick Economies: Drama, Mercantilism, and Disease in Shakespeare's England*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Harris, Ron. *Going the Distance: Eurasian Trade and the Rise of the Business Corporation, 1400–1700*. Princeton UP, 2020.

Harrison, Peter. "Adam Smith and the History of the Invisible Hand." *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 72, no. 1, 2011, pp. 29–49. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23011275.

Hawkes, David. *Shakespeare and Economic Theory*. The Arden Shakespeare, 2015.

Hayek, Friedrich A. *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition*. Edited by Ronald Hamowy, The University of Chicago Press, 2011.

———. *The Market and Other Orders*. Edited by Bruce Caldwell, The University of Chicago Press, 2017.

———. *Studies on the Abuse and Decline of Reason: Text and Documents*. Edited by Bruce Caldwell, Liberty Fund, 2018.

Hebert, L. Joseph. "The Reward of a King: Machiavelli, Aquinas, and Shakespeare's Richard III." *Perspectives on Political Science*, vol. 44, no. 4, Oct. 2015, pp. 238–46. *Education Research Complete*, https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2015.1022098.

Helgerson, Richard. *Forms of Nationhood*. University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Hennessey, Oliver. “Jonson’s Joyless Economy: Theorizing Motivation and Pleasure in *Volpone*.” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2008, pp. 83–105. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43447956.

Herfeld, Catherine. “The Diversity of Rational Choice Theory: A Review Note.” *Topoi*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2018, pp. 329–47. *Springer Americas*, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9588-7.

Heywood, Thomas. *The Rape of Lucrece a True Roman Tragedie*. London: 1608. *Early English Books Online*, https://www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2240924153/59F2A96F8F1741EFPQ/1?accountid=14678&imgSeq=1.

Higgins, Ben. *Shakespeare's Syndicate: The First Folio, Its Publishers, and the Early Modern Book Trade*. Oxford UP, 2022.

Hilliard, Stephen S. “Stephen Gosson and the Elizabethan Distrust of the Effects of Drama.” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 9, no. 2, Wiley, 1979, pp. 225–39. *JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43446949.*

Hirsch, Brett D. “Counterfeit Professions: Jewish Daughters and the Drama of Failed Conversion in Marlowe’s *The Jew of Malta* and Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice*.” *Early Modern Literary Studies* Special Issue, vol. 19, no. 4, 2009, pp. 1–37. http://purl.oclc.org/emls/si-19/hirscoun.html.

Hirschman, Albert O. *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph*. Princeton UP, 1977.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edited by Richard Tuck, Cambridge UP, 2002.

Hobday, Charles. “Clouted Shoon and Leather Aprons: Shakespeare and the Egalitarian Tradition.” *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1, Jan. 1979, pp. 63–78. *Taylor and Francis Online,* doi.org/10.1080/14735787909366434.

Holbrook, Peter. *English Renaissance Tragedy: Ideas of Freedom*. The Arden Shakespeare, 2015.

Hooks, Adam G. “First Folios: Jonson and Shakespeare.” *A Companion to British Literature*, edited by Robert DeMaria et al., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014, pp. 280–94. *Wiley Online Library,* https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118827338.ch45.

———. *Selling Shakespeare*. Cambridge UP, 2016.

Hope, Jonathon. “Middletonian Stylistics.” *The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Middleton*, edited by Gary Taylor and Trish Thomas Henley, Oxford UP, 2016, pp. 247–63.

Howard, Jean E. "*Measure for Measure* and the Restraints of Convention." *Essays in Literature*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1 Sep. 1983, pp. 149–58. *EBSCOhost*, https://web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy1.library.virginia.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=344a79a2-2fe3-4125-8b65-66001958d058%40redis.

Howard, Margaret. *The Coat of Many Colors: A Survey of Sheep Color Pattern Expression*. Edited by Dee Heinrich, Tawanda Farms, 2012.

Howard-Hill, T. H. *Middleton's "Vulgar Pasquin": Essays on a Game at Chess*. University of Delaware Press, 1995.

Humphreys, Arthur. "*The Jew of Malta* and *The Merchant of Venice*: Two Readings of Life." *Huntington Library Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 3, 1987, pp. 279–93. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/3817401.

Ide, Arata. "*The Jew of Malta* and the Diabolic Power of Theatrics in the 1580s." *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, vol. 46, no. 2, Apr. 2006, pp. 257–79. *JSTOR,* http://www.jstor.org/stable/3844642.

Ingram, Jill Phillips. *Idioms of Self-Interest: Credit, Identity, and Property in English Renaissance Literature*. Routledge, 2006.

Ingram, William. *The Business of Playing*. Cornell UP, 1992.

———. "The Economics of Playing." *A Companion to Shakespeare*, edited by David Scott Kastan, Blackwell Publishers, 1999, pp. 313–27.

"interest, n.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford UP, July 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/5102372696.

Ioppolo, Grace. *Dramatists and Their Manuscripts in the Age of Shakespeare, Jonson, Middleton and Heywood*. Routledge, 2006.

James, Leonie, editor. *The Household Accounts of William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1635-1642*. Boydell & Brewer, 2019.

Jessica Ratcliff. "Art to Cheat the Common-Weale: Inventors, Projectors, and Patentees in English Satire, ca. 1630–70." *Technology and Culture*, vol. 53, no. 2, 2012, pp. 337–65. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41475502.

Johnson, Timothy. "Reciprocity as a Foundation of Financial Economics." *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 131, no. 1, 2015, pp. 43–67. *JSTOR Journals*, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2257-x.

Jones, Harold B. “Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic Ethic, and Adam Smith.” *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 95, no. 1, 2010, pp. 89–96. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40784940.

Jonson, Ben. “Bartholomew Fair.” Edited by John Creaser. *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Ben Jonson Online*. Edited by David Bevington, Martin Butler, Ian Donaldson, and David Gants. Cambridge UP, 2012. https://universitypublishingonline.org/cambridge/benjonson/k/works/bartholomew/facing/#.

———. *Bartholmew Fair*. Edited by G.R. Hibbard and Alexander Leggatt, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007.

———. *Catiline His Conspiracy*. London: 1611. *Early English Books Online*, https://www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2248516541/99843561/E355478972754398PQ/2?accountid=14678.

———. “Conversations with William Drummond or Hawthornden.” *Ben Jonson*. Edited by Ian Donaldson, Oxford UP, 1985, pp. 595–611.

———. “To Penshurst.” *Seventeenth-Century British Poetry: 1603–1660: Authoritative Texts, Criticism,* edited by John Peter Rumrich and Gregory Chaplin, W.W. Norton, 2006, pp. 97–100.

———. *The Staple of News*. Edited by Anthony Parr, Manchester UP, 1999.

———. “Timber, or, Discoveries.” *Ben Jonson*. Edited by Ian Donaldson, Oxford UP, 1985, pp. 521–94.

———. “Volpone.” *Ben Jonson*. Edited by Ian Donaldson, Oxford UP, 1985, pp. 1–109.

———. “For Many of Your Companies: Middleton’s Early Readers.” *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture: A Companion to the Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 286–327.

———. “Jonson’s Authorization of Type in ‘Sejanus’ and Other Early Quartos.” *Studies in Bibliography*, vol. 44, 1991, pp. 254–65. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40371943.

Kahn, Victoria Ann. *Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton*. Princeton UP, 1994.

Kargol-Wasiluk, Aneta, et al. “The Evolution of the Economic Man. From *homo oeconomicus* to *homo moralis*.” *Gospodarka Narodowa*, vol. 293, no. 1, 2018, pp. 33–57, https://doi.org/10.33119/gn/100566.

Kavka, Gregory S. “Hobbes’s War of All Against All.” *Ethics*, vol. 93, no. 2, 1983, pp. 291–310. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380421.

Kay, John. “Adam Smith and the Pin Factory.” *John Kay*, Erasmus Press Ltd, 18 Dec. 2019, www.johnkay.com/2019/12/18/adam-smith-and-the-pin-factory/.

Keck, Emily Gruber. “‘Famine and No Other Hath Slain Me’: Jack Cade in the Garden of Iden.” *Early Modern Culture*, vol. 11, 2016, pp. 1–26. *Tiger Prints*, https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/emc/vol11/iss1/1/.

Keenan, Siobhan, and Dominic Shellard, editors. *Shakespeare’s Cultural Capital: His Economic Impact from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Kendrick, Matthew. *At Work in the Early Modern English Theater: Valuing Labor*. Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2015.

Kennedy, William J. *Petrarchism at Work*. Cornell UP, 2016.

Kesson, Andy, et al. “Post from the Past 1: Spying the Playhouses.” *Before Shakespeare: The Beginnings of London Commercial Theatre, 1565–1595*, 7 Feb. 2017, https://beforeshakespeare.com/2017/02/07/post-from-the-past-1-spying-the-playhouses/.

Kinney, Arthur F., et al. *A Companion to Renaissance Drama*. Blackwell Pub, 2002.

Kirzner, Israel Mayer. *Reflections on Ethics, Freedom, Welfare Economics, Policy, and the Legacy of Austrian Economics*. Edited by Peter Joseph Boettke and Frederic E. Sautet, Liberty Fund, 2018.

Kiséry, András. *Hamlet’s Moment: Drama and Political Knowledge in Early Modern England*. Oxford UP, 2016. *Oxford Scholarship Online,* https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746201.001.0001.

Kitch, Aaron. “The Character of Credit and the Problem of Belief in Middleton's City Comedies.” *Studies in English Literature 1500–1900*, vol. 47 no. 2, 2007, pp. 403–26. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4625117.

———. *Political Economy and the States of Literature in Early Modern England*. Routledge, 2016.

Kizelbach, Urszula. *The Pragmatics of Early Modern Politics: Power and Kingship in Shakespeare's History Plays*. Rodopi, 2014.

Knights, L. C. *Drama & Society in the Age of Jonson*. Chatto & Windus, 1937.

Knoppers, Laura Lunger. "(En) Gendering Shame: 'Measure for Measure' and the Spectacles of Power." *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1993, pp. 450–71. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/43447735.

Knowles, Ronald. "The Farce of History: Miracle, Combat, and Rebellion in 2 'Henry VI.'" *The Yearbook of English Studies*, vol. 21, Modern Humanities Research Association, 1991, pp. 168–86. *JSTOR,* doi.org/10.2307/3508486.

Knutson, Roslyn Lander, and Kirk Melnikoff, editors. *Christopher Marlowe, Theatrical Commerce, and the Book Trade*. Cambridge UP, 2018.

Knutson, Roslyn Lander. "Falconer to the Little Eyases: A New Date and Commercial Agenda for the 'Little Eyases' Passage in *Hamlet*." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1–31. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/2871152.

———. *Playing Companies and Commerce in Shakespeare's Time*. Cambridge UP, 2001.

Korda, Natasha. "Dame Usury: Gender, Credit, and (Ac)Counting in the Sonnets and *The Merchant of Venice*." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 60, no. 2, 2009, pp. 129–53. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468402.

Kotler, Philip, and Nancy Lee. *Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing the Most Good for Your Company and Your Cause*. Wiley, 2005.

Krumm, Bernard. "Mammon in the Market; or, How Ben Jonson Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Capitalism." *Ben Jonson Journal*, vol. 28, no. 1, May 2021, pp. 37–65. *Edinburgh University Press Journals*, https://doi.org/10.3366/bjj.2021.0299.

Ladegaard, Jakob. "Luxurious Laughter. Wasteful Economy in Ben Jonson's Comedy *Volpone*, *or the Fox* (1606)." *European Review*, vol. 24, no. 1, Feb. 2016, pp. 63–71. *Cambridge Journals*, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798715000447.

Lall, Sanjaya, and Frances Stewart. *Theory and Reality in Development*. St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Landreth, David. *The Face of Mammon: The Matter of Money in English Renaissance Literature*. Oxford UP, 2012.

Lee, Huey-ling. "The Social Meaning of Money in Dekker's *The Shoemaker's Holiday* and Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*." *Comparative Drama*, vol. 49, no. 3, 2015, pp. 335–66. *Academic Search Complete*, https://doi.org/10.1353/cdr.2015.0035.

Lehnhof, Kent R. "Antitheatricality and Irrationality: An Alternative View." *Criticism: a Quarterly for Literature and the Arts*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1 Jan. 2016, pp. 231–50. *EBSCOhost,* https://doi.org/10.13110/criticism.58.2.0231.

Leinwand, Theodore B. *Theatre, Finance and Society in Early Modern England.* Cambridge UP, 1999.

Leitzel, Jim. "Hamlet and Rational Choice." *International Advances in Economic Research*, vol. 29, no. 1–2, 2023, pp. 63–78. *EBSCOhost*, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11294-023-09865-y.

———. *Regulating Vice: Misguided Prohibitions and Realistic Controls*. Cambridge UP, 2008.

Levine, Nina. "Extending Credit in the Henry IV Plays." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 4, 2000, pp. 403–31. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2902337.

Lim, Walter S.H. "Surety and Spiritual Commercialism in *The Merchant of Venice*." *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, vol. 50, no. 2, 2010, pp. 355–81. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40658434.

Liu, Glory M. *Adam Smith's America: How a Scottish Philosopher Became an Icon of American Capitalism*. Princeton UP, 2022.

Lobanov-Rostovsky, Sergei. "The Triumphes of Golde: Economic Authority in the Jacobean Lord Mayor's Show." *English Literary History*, vol. 60, no. 4, 1993, pp. 879–98. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2873321.

Loewenstein, Joseph. *Ben Jonson and Possessive Authorship*. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2002.

Logan, Robert A. *Shakespeare's Marlowe: The Influence of Christopher Marlowe on Shakespeare's Artistry*. Ashgate, 2007.

Love, Harold. "Thomas Middleton: Oral culture and the Manuscript Economy." *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture: A Companion to the Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 98–109.

Lupton, Julia Reinhard. "The Jew of Malta." *The Cambridge Companion to Christopher Marlowe*, edited by Patrick Cheney, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp. 144–57.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. *Discourses on Livy*. Edited by Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, Oxford UP, 1997.

———. *The Prince*. Trans. M.K Marriott. CreateSpace Independent Platform, 2017.

———. *The Prince: Bedford series in history and culture*. Edited by William J. Connell, Bedford, 2005.

MacKenzie, Clayton. “Of Death and Dukes: ‘King Henry VI Part 2’ and the ‘Danse Macabre.’” *Journal of English Studies*, vol. 13, Dec. 2015, pp. 71–82. *EBSCOhost*, https://doi.org/10.18172/jes.2788.

Mahon, John W., and Ellen Macleod Mahon, editors. *The Merchant of Venice: New Critical Essays*. Routledge, 2013.

Majumder, Doyeeta. *Tyranny and Usurpation: The New Prince and Lawmaking Violence in Early Modern Drama*. Liverpool UP, 2019.

Malynes, Gerard. *The Maintenance of Free Trade According to the Three Essentiall Parts of Traffique . . . by Gerard Malynes Merchant*. London: 1622. *Early English Books Online,* https://www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2240927616/99855264/F9CC2697114243PQ/1?accountid=14678.

Mandeville, Bernard. *The Fable of the Bees*. Edited by Phillip Harth. Penguin, 1989.

———. *A modest defence of publick stews: or, an essay upon whoring, as it is now practis'd in these kingdoms. Written by a layman*. London: 1724. *Eighteenth Century Collections Online*. go-gale-com.proxy1.library.virginia.edu/ps/retrieve.do.

Marino, James J. “Stranger to Profit: Waste, Loss, and Sacrifice in *the Jew of Malta*.” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 51, no. 2, 2021, pp. 243–69. *University of Chicago Press Journals,* https://doi.org/10.1086/713486.

Marlowe, Christopher. *Doctor Faustus and Other Plays*. Edited by David M. Bevington and Eric Rasmussen, Oxford UP, 2008.

Massai, Sonia. *Shakespeare and the Rise of the Editor*. Cambridge UP, 2007.

Mattox, John Mark. “Henry V: Shakespeare's Just Warrior.” *War, Literature & the Arts: An International Journal of the Humanities*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2000, pp. 30–53. *EBSCOhost,* search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=4203308&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Maus, Katharine Eisaman. *Being and Having in Shakespeare*. Oxford UP, 2013.

———. “Idol and Gift in *Volpone*.” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 35, no. 3, Oct. 2005, pp. 429–53. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24463629.

———. “Introduction.” *Four Revenge Tragedies*, edited by Michael Cordner, Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. ix–xxxi.

———. *Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance*. University of Chicago Press, 1995.

———. “Satiric and Ideal Economies in the Jonsonian Imagination.” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1989, pp. 42–64. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43447266.

McAlindon, Tom. *Shakespeare's Tudor History: A Study of Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2*. Routledge, 2018.

———. “Swearing and Forswearing in Shakespeare’s Histories: The Playwright as Contra-Machiavel.” *The Review of English Studies*, vol. 51, no. 202, May 2000, pp. 208–29. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/519341.

McMillian, Lance. “Drug Markets, Fringe Markets, and the Lessons of Hamsterdam.” *Washington & Lee Law Review*, vol. 69, no. 2, 1 Mar. 2012, pp. 849–91. *EBSCOhost*, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=85474701&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Melnikoff, Kirk. *Elizabethan Publishing and the Makings of Literary Culture*. University of Toronto Press, 2018.

Middleton, Thomas. *A Gam at Chaess* [Quarto 1]. London: c. 1625. *Early English Books Online*, https://www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2240899572/99842196/A9CEE7248DB6475CPQ/3?accountid=14678.

———. *A Game at Chesse* [Quarto 3]. London: 1625. *Early English Books Online*, https://www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2240919808/A9CEE7248DB6475CPQ/2?accountid=14678&imgSeq=1.

———. *A Game at Chess*. Edited by T. H. Howard-Hill, Manchester UP, 2009.

———. “The Nice Valour.” *Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2010, pp. 1679–713.

———. “The Phoenix.” *Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2010, pp. 90–127.

———. “The Roaring Girl or Moll Cutpurse.” *Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2010, pp. 721–78.

———. “Your Five Gallants.” *Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2010, pp. 594-636.

Millstone, Noah. “Seeing Like a Statesman in Early Stuart England.” *Past & Present*, no. 223, May 2014, pp. 77–127. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24545153.

Miola, Robert S. “Creating the Author.” *Ben Jonson Journal*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1999, pp. 35–48. *Edinburgh University Press Journals*, https://doi.org/10.3366/bjj.1999.6.1.3.

Mischo, John Brett. “The Rhetoric of Poverty and the Poverty of Rhetoric: Shakespeare’s Jack Cade and the Early Modern Rhetoric Manual.” *English Language Notes*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2003, pp. 32–44. *e-Duke Journals Scholarly Collection,* https://doi.org /10.1215/00138282-41.1.32.

Montaigne, Michel de. *Essays of Michael, Seigneur De Montaigne in Three Books, with Marginal Notes and Quotations of the Cited Authors, and an Account of the Author's Life / New Rendered into English by Charles Cotton, Esq.* London: 1685. *Early English Books Online*, https://www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2240951318/12076770/80B5251D7CE4BF4PQ /1?accountid=14678.

Moxon, Joseph. *Mechanick Exercises on the Whole Art of Printing*. Edited by Herbert Davis and Harry Carter. Oxford UP, 1962.

Muldrew, Craig. *The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England*. Macmillan Press, 1998.

———. “Self-Love and the Transformation of Obligation to Self-Control in Early Modern British Society.” *Early Modern Debts: 1550–1700*, edited by George Oppitz-Trotman and Laura Kolb, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2020, pp. 353–401.

Mulholland, Paul. “*The Roaring Girl*: New Readings and Further Notes.” *Studies in Bibliography*, vol. 37, 1984, pp. 159–70. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40371799.

Mullaney, Steven. “Shakespeare and the Liberties.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 10 Nov. 2005, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shakespeare-and-the-Liberties-1086252.

Mun, Thomas. *England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, or, The Ballance of Our Forraign Trade Is the Rule of Our Treasure . . . Now Published for the Common Good by His Son John Mun*. London: 1664. *Early English Books Online*, https://www.proquest.com/eebo/docview/2264209304/9098288/C66B848B74924971PQ/ 1?accountid=14678.

Munro, Lucy. “‘As it Was Played In the Blackfriars’: Jonson, Marston, and the Business of Playmaking.” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 50, no. 2, 2020, pp. 256–95. *The University of Chicago Press Journals*, https://doi.org/10.1086/708231.

Naumovich, Colleen. “Addressing Transplant Tourism Problems and Proposed Solutions: Regulation Instead of Prohibition.” *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2, 1 Jul. 2020, pp. 409–29. *Project MUSE*, https://doi.org/10.2979/indjglolegstu.27.2.0409.

Nelson, Alan H, and Folger Shakespeare Library Staff. “William Shakespeare’s Last Will and Testament: Original Copy Including Three Signatures.” *Shakespeare Documented*, 29 Nov. 2022, https://doi.org/10.37078/110.

Newstok, Scott L. “‘Here Lies’: Sincerity and Insincerity in Early Modern Epitaphs Onstage.” *Christianity & Literature*, vol. 67 no. 1, 2017, pp. 50–68. *Project MUSE*, muse.jhu.edu/article/735690.

O’Callaghan, Michelle. *Thomas Middleton, Renaissance Dramatist*. Edinburgh UP, 2009.

O’Connor, Marie Theresa. “Why Redistribute? The Jacobean Union Issue and King Lear.” *Early Modern Literary Studies,* vol. 19, no. 1, 2016, pp. 1–27. *EBSCOhost,* search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=119123465&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

O'Donovan, Oliver. *The Problem of Self-love in St. Augustine*. Yale UP, 1980.

Orgis, Rachel. “‘Father and son, I ha’ done you simple service here’: The (Interrupted) Circulation of Money in Middleton and Dekker’s *The Roaring Girl*.” *Economies of English. SPELL: Swiss Papers in English Language and Literature.* Edited by Martin Leer and Genoveva Puskás, vol. 33. Tübingen: Narr, 2016, pp. 143–62, https://elibrary.utb.de/doi/epdf/10.5555/9783823390671.

Oz, Avraham, et al. “Nomadic Shylock: Nationhood and Its Subversion in *The Merchant of Venice*.” *Routledge Handbook of Shakespeare and Global Appropriation*, Routledge, 2020, pp. 139–49.

Patterson, Annabel M. *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice*. B. Blackwell, 1989.

Pettigrew, William A., and Edmond Smith. “Corporate Management, Labor Relations, and Community Building at the East India Company’s Blackwall Dockyard, 1600–57.” *Journal of Social History*, vol. 53, no. 1, Aug. 2019, pp. 133–56. *Oxford Academic*. doi.org/10.1093/jsh/shy083.

Planinc, Zdravko. “Shakespeare's Critique of Machiavellian Force, Fraud, and Spectacle in *Measure for Measure*.” *Humanitas (10667210)*, vol. 23, no. 1/2, 1 Jul. 2010, pp. 144–68. *EBSCOhost*, https://doi.org/10.5840/humanitas2010231/210.

Plutarch, et al. *Plutarch's Lives*. Tudor publishing co, 1935.

Pollard, Tanya, editor. *Shakespeare's Theater: A Sourcebook*. Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

Ponce, Timothy M. “Reconsidering the Early Modern Machiavellian: Illicit Manuscripts and Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy.” *Texas Studies in Literature & Language*, vol. 60, no. 4, Dec. 2018, pp. 443–66. *Humanities International Complete*, https://doi.org/10.7560/TSLL60403.

Posner, Gerald L. *God's Bankers: A History of Money and Power at the Vatican*. Simon & Schuster, 2015.

"projector, n.". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford UP, July 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/7866420198.

Pullen, J. M. "Malthus, (Thomas) Robert (1766–1834), political economist." Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. May 24, 2008. Oxford University Press. www-oxforddnb-com.proxy1.library.virginia.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-17902

Quarmby, Kevin A. *The Disguised Ruler in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*. Routledge, 2016.

Raab, Felix. *The English Face of Machiavelli: Studies in Political History*. Routledge & K. Paul, 1964.

Remien, Peter. "Jonson's Universal Parasite: Patronage and Embodied Critique in 'To Penshurst.'" *Studies in Philology*, vol. 111, no. 2, 2014, pp. 255–81. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24392085.

Riefer, Marcia. "'Instruments of Some More Mightier Member': The Constriction of Female Power in Measure for Measure." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 2, 1984, pp. 157–69. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2869924.

Ringwood, Frances. "Shakespeare's Mavericks and the Machiavellian Moment." *Shakespeare in Southern Africa*, vol. 32, no. 1, 2019, pp. 38–48. *MLA International Bibliography*, https://doi.org/10.4314/sisa.v32i1.5.

Risvold, Ward J. "Parnassus Commodified: Ben Jonson and the Printing of Value." *Renaissance Papers*, 2019, edited by Jim Pearce and William Given, NED-New edition, Boydell & Brewer, 2020, pp. 105–26. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv134vjmm.11.

Rockwood, Catherine. "'Know Thy Side': Propaganda and Parody in Jonson's Staple of News." *English Literary History*, vol. 75, no. 1, 2008, pp. 135–49. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30029588.

Roe, John. *Shakespeare and Machiavelli.* D.S. Brewer, 2002.

Roth, Alvin E. *Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design*. Mariner Books, 2016.

Sawyer, Robert. *Marlowe and Shakespeare: The Critical Rivalry*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Scalzo, Germán. "Inquiries Into the Genealogy of Self-interest in Adam Smith." *Empresa y Humanismo*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2010, pp. 249–68. *Semantic Scholar*, https://doi.org/10.15581/015.13.4339.

Scott, Alison V. "Censuring Indulgence: Volpone's 'Use of Riches' and the Problem of Luxury." *AUMLA: Journal of the Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association*, vol. 110, 2008. *Taylor and Francis Online*, https://doi.org/10.1179/000127908805259734.

Scott, Charlotte. *Shakespeare's Nature*. Oxford UP, 2014.

Scott, William O. "Conditional Bonds, Forfeitures, and Vows in The Merchant of Venice." *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 34, no. 3, Wiley, 2004, pp. 286–305. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24463655.

Sebek, Barbara, and Stephen Deng, editors. *Global Traffic: Discourses and Practices of Trade in English Literature and Culture From 1550 to 1700*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Sen, Amaryta. "Adam Smith's Prudence." *Theory and Reality in Development Essays in Honour of Paul Streeten*, edited by Sanjaya Lall and Frances Stewart, Macmillan, 1986, pp. 28–37.

———. "Introduction." *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. By Adam Smith. Penguin, 2010. vii–xxvi.

Shakespeare, William. *King Henry IV, Part 1*. Edited by David Scott Kastan. London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2002.

———. *King Henry V*. Edited by T. W. Craik. The Arden Shakespeare, 1995.

———. *King Henry VI, Part 2*. Edited by Ronald Knowles, The Arden Shakespeare, 2016.

———. *Macbeth*. Edited by Sandra Clark and Pamela Mason. The Arden Shakespeare, 2015.

———. *Measure for Measure*. Edited by J. W. Lever. The Arden Shakespeare, 1987.

———. *The Merchant of Venice*. Edited by John Russell Brown, The Arden Shakespeare, 2006.

———. *The Tempest*. Edited by Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan, The Arden Shakespeare, 1999.

Shapiro, James. *Shakespeare and the Jews*. Columbia UP, 2016.

———. "'Which is the Merchant Here, and Which the Jew?': Shakespeare and the Economics of Influence." *Shakespeare Studies (0582-9399)*, vol. 20, 1 Jan. 1988, pp. 269–79. *EBSCOhost*, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=7167371&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

———. "'Steale from the Deade?': The Presence of Marlowe in Jonson's Early Plays." *Renaissance Drama*, vol. 18, 1987, pp. 67–99. *ProQuest*, https://www.proquest.com/docview/1308645823?accountid=14678&imgSeq=1.

Sheerin, Brian. *Desires of Credit in Early Modern Theory and Drama: Commerce, Poesy, and the Profitable Imagination*, Routledge, 2018.

Shell, Marc. *The Economy of Literature*. Johns Hopkins UP, 1978.

Shuger, Debora Kuller. *Political Theologies in Shakespeare's England: The Sacred and the State in Measure for Measure*. Palgrave, 2001.

Sjoberg, Elsa. "From Madcap Prince to King: the Evolution of Prince Hal." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1969, pp. 11–16. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2868969.

Slights, Camille Wells. "The Conscience of the King: Henry V and the Reformed Conscience." *Philological Quarterly*, vol. 80, no. 1, 1 Jan. 2001, pp. 37–55. *Gale Literature Resource Center*, gale.com/apps/doc/A92907173/LitRC?u=viva_uva&sid=bookmark-LitRC&xid=26024dbb.

Smith, Adam. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Volume I. Edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Liberty Fund, 1982.

———. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Edited by D. D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, Liberty Fund, 2007.

Smith, Emma. *The Making of Shakespeare's First Folio*. Bodleian Library, 2023.

Smith, Irwin. *Shakespeare's Blackfriars Playhouse: Its History and its Design*. London: Peter Owen, 1966.

Smith, Matthew J. "The Experience of Ceremony In *Henry V*." *Studies In English Literature, 1500–1900*, vol. 54, no. 2, 2014, pp. 401–21. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24511209.

Smith, Thomas. *A Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of England*. Edited by Mary Dewar, Folger Shakespeare Library, 1969.

So, Francis K. H. “Economic Obsession in Early Literary Imagination: Shakespeare, Jonson and More.” *Interlitteraria*, vol. 24, no. 1, Aug. 2019, pp. 67–80. *Open Journal Systems*, doi.org/10.12697/IL.2019.24.1.6.

Storr, Virgil Henry, and Ginny Seung Choi. *Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals?* Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Streete, Adrian. “Polemical Laughter in Thomas Middleton’s A Game at Chess (1624).” *English Literary Renaissance*, vol. 50, no. 2, Mar. 2020. *The University of Chicago Press Journals*, https://doi.org/ 10.1086/708233.

Sullivan, Ceri. *The Rhetoric of Credit: Merchants in Early Modern Writing*. Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2002.

Taylor, Gary, and Trish Thomas Henley. “*A Game at Chess*: General Textual Introduction.” *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture: A Companion to the Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 712–873.

Taylor, Gary, and Trish Thomas Henley, editors. *The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Middleton*. Oxford UP, 2012.

Teague, Frances. “A Conversation among Texts.” *Ben Jonson Journal*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2018, pp. 106–18. *Edinburgh University Press Journals*, https://doi.org/10.3366/bjj.2018.0212.

Nina Green. “BL Harley 286, Ff. 102-3 Summary.” *The Oxford Authorship Site*, Nina Green, 2016. www.oxford-shakespeare.com/BritishLibrary/BL_Harley_286_ff_102-3.pdf.

Thirsk, Joan. *Economic Policy and Projects*. Clarendon Press, 1978.

Thomson, Peter. *Shakespeare’s Professional Career*. Cambridge UP, 1992.

Thurn, David H. “Economic and Ideological Exchange in Marlowe’s *Jew of Malta*.” *Theatre Journal*, vol. 46, no. 2, 1994, pp. 157–70. *JSTOR,* https://doi.org/10.2307/3208449.

Tiffany, Grace. “Law and Self-Interest in *The Merchant of Venice*.” *Papers on Language & Literature*, vol. 42, no. 4, Sept. 2006, pp. 384–400. *EBSCOhost,* search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asu&AN=505184648&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Tinkle, Robert. “‘To Cast with Cunning’; or, Marlowe’s Market Players.” *Renaissance Drama*, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 2021, pp. 1–27. *Supplemental Index*, https://doi.org/10.1086/713984.

Tribe, Keith. *Constructing Economic Science: The Invention of a Discipline 1850-1950*. Oxford UP, 2022.

Turner, Brandon. "Fénelon and the Refinement of Self-love." European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 20, no. 3, 2021, pp. 575–9. *Sage Journals*, https://doi.org/10.1177/14748851211002013.

Turner, Henry S. *The Corporate Commonwealth: Pluralism and Political Fictions in England, 1516–1651*. The University of Chicago Press, 2016.

van Es, Bart. *Shakespeare in Company*. Oxford UP, 2013.

Vatter, Miguel. "Machiavelli and the Republican Conception of Providence." *Review of Politics*, vol. 75, no. 4, 2013, pp. 605–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670513000612.

Vilches, Patricia, et al. *Seeking Real Truths: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Machiavelli*. Brill, 2007.

Vinter, Maggie. "'This Is Called Mortifying of a Fox': *Volpone* and How to Get Rich Quick by Dying Slowly." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 65, no. 2, 2014, pp. 140–63. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24778553.

Wallace, Charles William. *The First London Theatre*. B. Blom, 1969.

Waswo, Richard. "Shakespeare and the Modern Economy." *Economies of English. SPELL: Swiss Papers in English Language and Literature.*, Edited by Martin Leer and Genoveva Puskás, vol. 33. Tübingen: Narr, 2016, pp. 117–27, https://elibrary.utb.de/doi/epdf/10.5555/9783823390671.

Watson, Jackie. "Satirical Expectations: Shakespeare's Inns of Court Audiences." *Actes Des Congrès De La Société Française Shakespeare*, no. 33, 2015, pp. 1–13, doi:10.4000/shakespeare.3352.

Watt, Gary, and Paul Raffield, editors. *Shakespeare and the Law*. Hart Publishing Limited, 2008.

Wauchope, Piers. "Wheeler, John (d. 1617), secretary of the Company of Merchant Adventurers." *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. January 03, 2008. Oxford UP. https://www-oxforddnb-com.proxy1.library.virginia.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-29188.

Wayne, Don E. "Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson: An Alternative View." *Renaissance Drama*, vol. 13, 1982, pp. 103–29. *ProQuest*, proxy1.library.virginia.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fscholarly-journals.

Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Edited by Anthony Giddens. Translated by Talcott Parsons, Routledge, 2005.

Weinstein, Jack Russell. "Adam Smith (1723–1790)." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by James Fieser and Bradley Dowden. https://iep.utm.edu/smith/.

Weiss, Adrian. "Casting Compositors, Foul Cases, and Skeletons: Printing in Middleton's Age." *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture: A Companion to the Collected Works*, edited by Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino, Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 195–225.

Wentersdorf, Karl P. "The Conspiracy of Silence in Henry V." *Shakespeare Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 3, 1 Jul. 1976, pp. 264–87. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/2869500.

Wheeler, John. *A Treatise of Commerce*. Edited by George Burton Hotchkiss. New York UP, 1931.

Wheeler, Thomas, editor. *The Merchant of Venice: Critical Essays*. Routledge, 2015.

Whittle, Jane, editor. *Landlords and Tenants in Britain, 1440–1660*. Boydell & Brewer, 2013.

Wickham, Glynne William Gladstone, et al. *English Professional Theatre, 1530–1660*. Cambridge UP, 2000.

Wilson, Jeffrey R. "'When Evil Deeds Have Their Permissive Pass': Broken Windows in William Shakespeare's Measure of Measure." *Law and Humanities*, vol. 11, no. 2, 2017, pp. 160–83. *EBSCOhost*, https://doi.org/10.1080/17521483.2017.1371953.

———. "Why Shakespeare? Irony and Liberalism in Canonization." *Modern Language Quarterly*, vol. 81, no. 1, 2020, pp. 33–64. *Duke University Press*, https://doi.org/10.1215/00267929-7933076.

Wittek, Stephen. "Middleton's *A Game at Chess* and the Making of a Theatrical Public." *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, vol. 55, no. 2, 2015, pp. 423–46.

Woodmansee, Martha, and Mark Osteen, editors. *The New Economic Criticism: Studies at the Intersection of Literature and Economics*. Routledge, 1999.

Yachnin, Paul Edward. *Stage-Wrights: Shakespeare, Jonson, Middleton, and the Making of Theatrical Value*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997.

Yamamoto, Koji. *Taming Capitalism Before Its Triumph: Public Service, Distrust, and 'projecting' in Early Modern England*. Oxford UP, 2018.

Yoshino, Kenji. "On Empathy in Judgment (*Measure for Measure*)." *Cleveland State Law Review*, vol. 57, no. 4, 1 Jan. 2009, pp. 683–702. *HeinOnline*, https://heinonline-org.proxy1.library.virginia.edu/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/clevslr57&i=691.

Zelmanovitz, Leonidas. “The Mirage of Democratic Excesses Hayek’s Law, Legislation, and Liberty.” *Independent Review*, vol. 24, no. 4, 2020, pp. 619-26. *EBSCOhost,* search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bah&AN=142960273&site=ehost-live&scope=site.