

Seeing Gender Everywhere:
Assessing the Impact of Traditional Gender Attitudes on
American and European Public Opinion

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the role that deeply held beliefs about gender roles, masculinity, and femininity—otherwise known as gender attitudes—have on public opinion. Gender’s influence stretches far beyond the role of individual gender identities and gender consciousness to encompass the ways in which feelings or beliefs about masculinity and femininity (either conscious or subconscious) shape behavior and opinions on a variety of issues—many of which may have no explicit connection to gender. Despite the prominent role gender plays in our perceptions and the impact it has on our behavior, however, we still know very little about the relationship between gender attitudes and a variety of political phenomena.

In this dissertation, I analyze the role of gender attitudes in American and European politics in the form of three complementary, yet distinct, papers. Paper one looks at the relationship between traditional gender attitudes, nativism, and support for the radical right in Europe using survey data from the European Values Study, and provides evidence that traditional gender attitudes constitute a unique pathway to support for the radical right among both nativists and non-nativists. Paper two provides a theoretical framework for understanding the ways in which gender traditionalism is linked to the gendered dimensions of nationalism, and tests this relationship using original survey questions fielded on the 2020 Cooperative Election Study. I also show how gendered nationalism has the capacity to mediate the relationship between traditional gender attitudes and support for anti-immigrant policies, the latter of which harbors implicit connections to the gendered components of nationalism. Lastly, paper three explores the association between traditional gender attitudes and support for political violence using original survey data collected in the United States, where I find that holding traditional gender attitudes increases the likelihood of expressing favor for violence against both the state and ordinary citizens.

Overall, these findings improve our understanding of the role gender attitudes play in shaping public opinion, and contribute to the broader political science literature on the psychology of identity-based attitudes, support for illiberalism, and gender politics.

For my past and future self.

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Chapter One: Introduction

In a 2018 radio interview, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán remarked that his government was “working on building an old-school Christian democracy, rooted in European traditions [...] [W]e believe in the importance of the nation and in Hungary we do not want to yield ground to any supranational business or political empire” (Reuters 2018a). Embedded in his statement, and so many others that he has given during his tenure as prime minister, was a wholesale rejection of “Europe” as it is defined by the European Union, with its open borders and progressive values. Sitting alongside the explicit dismissal of the European Union was a call-back to the past: “old-school,” “rooted,” and “European traditions” serving as bellwethers of the type of Hungary Orbán claims to defend.

Also situated within Orbán’s language was an implicit invocation of *gender*. While most of the popular discourse surrounding gender has to do with gender identity¹ or gender consciousness,² gender also exists as a tacit social ordering that systematizes power dynamics over individuals and shapes their comprehension of the outside world (Brush 2003). Its influence can be felt from the micro to the macro levels of society, from adult men and women occupying roles that reflect sex role stereotypes, to the state creating, reinforcing, and reproducing social orderings along gendered³ lines (Htun 2005). Individual beliefs and feelings, whether conscious

¹ An individual’s presentation as masculine or feminine, as well as the social construction of various attributes, behaviors, and processes that we ascribe to certain bodies.

² An individual awareness of one’s own gender and the ways it influences interactions with the world around them.

³ To say that something is “gendered” is to acknowledge the social processes that have “determined what is appropriately masculine or feminine and that gender [either explicitly or implicitly] has thereby become integral to the definition of the phenomenon” (Schwartz and Rutter 1998).

or subconscious, can be gendered in masculine and/or feminine ways that reflect how pervasive gender is in sorting and categorizing our human existence.

By referring to the “nation,” Orbán drew attention to a political construct (the nation) that has been gendered feminine throughout the Western world. By remarking that Hungary does “not want to yield ground to any supranational business or political empire,” Orbán used language that implies a resistance to appearing weak or emasculated—concepts that are typically defined in opposition to what we consider gendered masculine. In this speech, like in so many others Orbán and his radical right⁴ counterparts have given over the years across the United and Europe, Orbán spoke explicitly about Western traditions while also invoking implicit conceptualizations of gender.

Of course, not every invocation of gender in politics is implicit. In the fall of 2021, junior United States Senator Joshua Hawley gave a speech decrying what he characterized as an all-out assault on traditional masculinity in America. He argued that “[t]he Left want to define traditional masculinity as toxic. They want to define the traditional masculine virtues—things like courage, and independence, and assertiveness—as a danger to society” (Hawley 2021). Despite being just one voice out of many in a long historical tradition of raising the alarm in regards to greater gender and sexual equality, Hawley’s speech still stands out as emblematic of the ways in which gender can become front and center in our politics. As Flávia Biroli argues, what defines the “gender backlash” in the 21st century has less to do with its specific content and more to do with the ways in which transnational actors can quickly draw on the “supposed corruption of the natural sexual order” in today’s interconnected world as a way to mobilize

⁴ I use the term “radical right” to refer to both the party family in Europe and the worldwide ideology that embraces a combination of authoritarianism, nativism, and populism in its approach to politics and everyday life (Mudde 2007).

individuals to express support for anti-pluralism and increasingly authoritarian values (Biroli 2021).

Given gender's implicit and explicit prominence in our political discourse, we still have a very limited understanding of how *attitudes* about gender influence political behavior among individuals. Gender roles and expectations have the capacity to “shape public opinion, political participation, and elite and voter prejudice” (Schneider and Bos 2019, 202). These roles and expectations lie on a continuum, with traditional and egalitarian conceptualizations of gender situated at either end. Gender traditionalists “see [the] gender hierarchy as a natural, necessary, and positive outgrowth” (Winter 2008, 43) of the fundamental, presumably biological (or even divine) differences between men and women. On the other hand, gender egalitarians view the same gender hierarchy as artificial, socially constructed, and unjust. For these individuals, differences between men and women are far from inevitable, but rather imposed (Winter 2008).

Although gender attitudes have received greater attention in the academic literature over the last decade than ever before, many questions still remain. What role, if any, do traditional gender attitudes play in driving support for rightwing politics? Does this support differ between radical right parties and mainstream conservative parties? How do gender attitudes intersect with important political constructs, such as the nation-state, to shape individual perceptions and beliefs? How do these beliefs in turn impact important policy positions, including those that are anti-immigrant? What role, if any, do gender attitudes play in driving support for some of the most concerning problems facing democracies today, such as support for political violence? This dissertation takes up these questions about gender attitudes and their impact on public opinion three conceptually related, yet distinct, chapters.

In Chapter Two, I draw on large-scale, nationally representative survey data from the European Values Study to ascertain what relationship, if any, exists between traditional gender attitudes, nativism, and support for radical right-wing parties. The radical right has a contradictory history related to gender throughout Europe, with many parties openly expressing support for “Western” gender equality while also maintaining an explicit preference for traditional gender norms and the heteronormative family structure. One thing that is consistent across the radical right in Europe, however, is that much of their nationalist, xenophobic (i.e. nativist) rhetoric is framed in either implicitly or explicitly gendered ways, which I argue is due to the congruence between nativism and traditional gender attitudes on a psychological level. Given that non-nativist gender traditionalists might find an ideological “home” amongst mainstream conservative parties, I argue that nativism and gender traditionalism work alongside each other to produce support for the party family. My results demonstrate that traditional gender attitudes are a meaningful pathway to support for the radical right across the European continent, but not for mainstream conservative parties. Furthermore, this association persists among both nativists and non-nativists. These findings highlight the heightened relationship between gender traditionalists and the radical right, and ask us to expand our list of explanations for why certain individuals are drawn to the latter.

In Chapter Three, I turn my attention to the American context and look at the ways in which gender traditionalism intersects with nationalism (and nativism) to produce “gendered nationalism,” and how beliefs about the role of masculinity and femininity within the nation can in turn influence opinions about immigration. I connect extensive feminist theorizing on gender and the nation-state to individual level attitudes, and argue that because the nation-state is inherently gendered in traditional ways, gender traditionalists are more likely to respond

favorably to beliefs about the nation-state that structurally align with their pre-existing opinions about acceptable gender hierarchies and norms. In order to test this assertion, I draw on three original survey questions I developed and fielded on the 2020 Cooperative Election Study that implicitly touch on topics that are gendered nationalist. Despite none of these questions explicitly referencing topics related to gender, I find that gender traditionalists are indeed more likely to express higher levels of support for more gendered nationalist opinions—with Democrats experiencing the highest marginal effect of being more gender traditional on their likelihood of expressing support. Because immigration is a particularly salient topic among nativists, I then employ a mediation analysis to show that gender traditionalism operates through gendered nationalism to create support for building a border wall between the United States and Mexico. In doing so, I provide evidence that traditional gender attitudes and gendered nationalism have the potential to work together to create support for anti-immigrant policy preferences.

Lastly, in Chapter Four, I put traditional gender attitudes in conversation with the broader literature on democratic erosion and renewed concerns about the threat of political violence in the United States. Grievance and a wider sense of victimization have consistently been linked with support for political violence (Armaly, Buckley, & Enders 2022). Self-victimizing language, as well as a very real belief that traditional gender norms and the heteronormative family is under attack from a progressive left, is a common feature of gender traditionalists in the radical right in both Europe and the United States (Djetze and Roth 2020; Hawley 2021; Kantola and Lombardo 2020). Given the aggrieved sense of victimization these individuals hold, as well as work done in criminology that links holding traditional gender attitudes to violent sexual attitudes towards women (Kuck and Schander 1997; Singh and Aggarwal 2020), there are a variety of avenues through which gender attitudes might plausibly predict support for political violence as well.

Data collected from an original survey fielded in the United States supports this assertion, with gender traditionalists being more likely to support both political violence against the state and ordinary citizens. Furthermore, while both gender traditional men and women express higher levels of support for both types of political violence than their egalitarian counterparts, gender egalitarian men are slightly less likely than their female egalitarian counterparts to do the same.

Overall, the three papers demonstrate that traditional gender attitudes play an important role in shaping individual preferences and opinions across Europe and the United States.

Furthermore, their impact is not confined to a certain sex or ideology. Instead, men and women alike are moved by gender attitudes in largely similar ways, as are individuals across the party spectrum in the United States and the nativist/non-nativist divide in Europe. As a result, I argue that it would behoove scholars of public opinion and political behavior to take gender attitudes more seriously as an explanatory variable in their own right, even when dealing with topics that may not seem “gendered” at all at first glance.

Chapter Two: Traditional Gender Attitudes, Nativism, and Support for the Radical Right⁵

Using data from the 2017 European Values Study, I analyze the link between harboring traditional gender attitudes and supporting radical right-wing parties. I theorize that the intrinsically gendered elements of the radical right's platforms and rhetoric, which mirror traditional masculinity and femininity in both explicit and implicit ways, make the ideology a comfortable home for individuals who hold traditional gender attitudes. My analyses reveal that gender traditionalists are more likely than egalitarians to express support for the radical right, even after controlling for a host of existing explanations. The same impact is not replicated for mainstream conservative parties. In addition, holding more gender traditional attitudes raises the probability of supporting the radical right among both nativists and non-nativists alike. These findings provide important evidence that gender attitudes seemingly constitute a significant pathway to support for the radical right across Europe.

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Traditional gender norms and sexuality are closely intertwined with radical right politics in Europe (Akkerman 2015; Grzebalska and Pető 2017a). Through their repeated emphasis on concepts such as the nefarious impact of “gender ideology” on society, and their explicit support for traditional gender roles, the radical right has made a name for itself as defenders of a way of life that exalts the traditional family and embraces (at least some semblance of) a patriarchal social system. Despite the radical right’s broader emphasis on the traditional family and gender norms, however, an equally strong narrative surrounding the preservation of “[European/Western] gender equality” has arisen in a variety of (primarily Western European) radical right parties, who use such language as part of a larger anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim discourse. While this “femonationalist” (Farris 2017) rhetoric has become commonplace among some of these parties, its reception and potential impact on the general electorate so far appears to be largely non-existent (Spierings and Zaslove 2015b).

These developments present a challenging paradox to radical right scholars, who have yet to fully make sense of this phenomenon. Strong arguments are emerging that traditionalism is no longer even a primary motivator for the radical right, and that immigration and nationalism are now the “core” sources of concern for its supporters (Lancaster 2020). This is in line with one of the most consistent findings in the literature on the radical right over the last half-century: that there is a robust connection between harboring xenophobic, anti-immigrant attitudes and supporting the party family⁶ (Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 2007; Spierings and Zaslove 2015a).

I argue that it is too soon to abandon the idea that traditional attitudes, particularly gender attitudes, matter deeply for radical right support. While it is true that we have well established

⁶ I use the term “party family” to refer to the constellation of parties on the European continent that exhibit the ideological platform scholars have identified as consistent with the radical right. A full list of these parties can be found in Appendix A.

evidence that nativism is a significant driver of the demand for radical right politics, we still have a limited understanding of how attitudes beyond authoritarianism and populism (the other two “pillars” of the radical right ideology), such as gender attitudes, may factor in.⁷ A growing body of work has noted that gender and nativism are related to the radical right project - especially in certain contexts (Farris 2017; Mudde and Kastwaller 2015, Spierings and Zaslove 2015b), but the nuances of this relationship are still largely unknown.

In this paper, I analyze the relationship between gender role attitudes, nativism, and radical right support in 23 European countries using data from the 2017 European Values Study. I seek to answer two sets of questions about the radical right and its connection to traditional gender norms. First, are the traditional gender attitudes that radical right discourse seemingly seeks to tap into uniquely associated with radical right-wing support, or is it associated with support for mainstream conservative parties more broadly? Although the radical right appears to dominate the socially conservative issue space in many European countries, gender traditional individuals might instead find a home in other more mainstream conservative parties. Second, is the relationship between traditional gender attitudes and support for the radical right moderated by the influence of other factors, namely nationalism and xenophobia (i.e. nativism), that have

⁷ Over the last decade, Cas Mudde’s (2007) definition of the three core principles that constitute the radical right (populism, nativism, and authoritarianism) has become incredibly influential (Muis et al. 2016) and widely accepted as one of the more accurate definitions of this ideology. Although variation across time, space, parties, and individuals is to be expected, these three features are considered the nucleus of the movement, and all radical right parties share “at least these three features as (part of) their ideology.” Mudde defines populism as a belief system that separates the “pure, average person” from the “corrupt elite” and argues that government should reflect the will of the people; nativism as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia that argues countries should be made up solely of members of the “nation” (natives) to the exclusion of non-native outsiders (who are perceived as a threat to the largely homogeneous shared values and customs encapsulated by the nation-state); and authoritarianism as the prioritization of strict adherence to law and order with stern punishments for those that deviate from it (Mudde 2017).

previously been identified as major conduits of support for the radical right? As I will argue, nativism and traditional gender norms share an analogous structure, which implies that they might complement each other in drawing individuals to the radical right fold.

I find that holding highly gender traditional attitudes increases the likelihood of supporting the radical right, but not mainstream conservative parties. Furthermore, an analysis of the interactive effect of gender attitudes and nativist attitudes on support for the radical right reveals that holding more gender traditional attitudes increases the likelihood that both nativists *and* non-nativists will support the party family. Considering how integral nativism is to the radical right project, this finding is particularly poignant, and suggests that traditional gender attitudes are an additional pathway of support for individuals who would otherwise not be inclined to identify with the ideology.

These findings speak to the radical right's unique ability to capitalize on matters related to gender norms, the nation, and the intersection of the two. In addition to their strong nativist ideology, they have, with few exceptions, a long history of associating themselves with traditional positions on matters related to gender, the family, and sexuality, and have repeatedly emphasized childbirth and childrearing as matters related to the national interest (Akkerman 2015).⁸ Even in countries where the radical right has embraced what they characterize as “Western” or “European” gender equality, much of their nativist rhetoric is framed in a way that speaks to implicit conceptualizations of gender. This allows both openly gender traditional

⁸ Tjitske Akkerman (2015) goes so far as to argue that gender issues have historically been the defining characteristic that separates radical right parties from mainstream right parties in *Western* Europe, although that characteristic is growing less salient in the region as immigration and integration concerns related to Muslims challenge the dominant gender narrative.

radical right parties *and* their slightly more progressive (at least in terms of their rhetoric) counterparts similar opportunities to appeal to people on a gendered dimension.⁹

Ultimately, my findings suggest that both gender attitudes and nativism, including their intersection, play an important role in the radical right electorate. These findings also provide an additional explanation for the motivations that might prompt an individual to support the radical right more broadly, an area of study that has so far been lacking in the research addressing the “demand” side of the radical right’s emergence and persistence (Fitzgerald 2018).

Theorizing Gender Attitudes & Nativism

Gender is a multifaceted paradigm that exists as part of an unspoken, taken for granted social ordering that both organizes power over individuals and dictates how they perceive the world around them (Brush 2003). The state actively creates, reinforces, and reproduces the aforementioned social structures, which include the sexual division of labor, heteronormativity, and other gendered power hierarchies, through its various laws and policy priorities (Htun 2005; Young 2002). Because this “gendering” is inherent to so many of our interactions and spaces, it becomes “invisible” and “second nature” in a way that makes its outcomes and consequences feel inherent and intuitive. It is one of the first systems of power that becomes fully fleshed out in our psyche, and its psychological potency over how we organize and interpret the social world is evident even in very young children (Charafeddine et al. 2020; Leinbach, Hort, and Fagot 1997). These dynamics also structure adult behavior, with men and women segregating

⁹ I do not make any claims as to whether or not these parties are *intentionally* attempting to appeal to gender traditionalists or egalitarians, although certainly there are instances where such appeals are calculated and instrumental.

themselves into social and professional roles that reflect sex role stereotypes, for instance (Cejka and Eagly 1999).

A vast literature has identified how identity related attitudes, such as racial attitudes in the United States, shape how people both interact with and process the world around them (e.g., Gilens 1999; Tesler 2012; Winter 2008). For example, over the course of Barack Obama's presidency in the United States (U.S.), several studies demonstrated that racial predispositions had a growing impact on individual perceptions of politics (Tesler and Sears 2010; Tesler 2016). Given how intrinsic gender is to how we process the world, we should expect that an individual's beliefs or feelings (either conscious and subconscious) that are gendered also have important implications for how he or she arrives at certain political opinions. This point has been emphasized recently by Monica Schneider and Angela Bos, who argue that we should expect gender roles and expectations to “shape public opinion, political participation, and elite and voter prejudice” (Schneider and Bos 2019: 202). These are the gender “attitudes” referred to in this paper.

Historically, however, most of the research focused on the intersection of gender and public opinion has been concentrated on either the “gender gap” in voting or opinion differences, or on how one's understanding of his or her own gender (i.e. gender consciousness) impacts political behavior – with several important exceptions.¹⁰ Nicholas Winter (2000; 2008) found that gender attitudes significantly influenced opinions about Hillary Clinton during her time as First Lady of the United States in the 1990s, while Mary McThomas and Michael Tesler (2016)

¹⁰ Like Spierings and Zaslove (2015a), I am reluctant to use the term “gender gap” when discussing male vs. female behavior, because demarcating quantifiable differences in outcomes between the two sexes is not the same as grappling with behavioral patterns that are rooted in gender. Going forward I will use the phrase “sex gap” where applicable.

extended this research and found that Clinton's exceptional popularity during her tenure as Secretary of State was driven almost entirely by gender egalitarians. More recently, the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, and the growing influence of the far right globally, has prompted a variety of scholarship on the role of *sexist* attitudes on vote choice, largely confined to the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Bracic, Israel-Trummel, and Shortle 2019; Cassese and Barnes 2019; Glick 2019; Ratliff et al. 2019; Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta 2018; Valentino, Wayne, and Ocen 2018; Winter 2022) and with comparatively little focus on party systems across Europe (Lodders and Weldon 2019).¹¹

In the European context, most recent scholarship related to gender attitudes has focused on the *development* of pro-gender equality attitudes (rather than the consequences of persistent traditional gender attitudes) and how these attitudes are related to questions not directly related to party evaluations - a practice Niels Spierings (2018) labels "progress bias." Even research that is framed as more questioning or skeptical "take positive development [towards gender equality] as their starting point" (pg. 173). Important exceptions to these trends include Niels Spierings and Andrej Zaslove (2015), who use data from the 2010 European Social Survey to assess whether attitudes regarding gender equality and equal rights for gays and lesbians helps explain the sex gap in voting for radical right parties, and Jane Green and Rosalind Shorrock (2021), who find that "gender resentment" and other gender-related concerns appear to have played a role in prompting some individuals in the United Kingdom (particularly men) to vote to leave the European Union in 2017.¹²

¹¹ While the trend towards taking sexism seriously as a predictor of political behavior is a welcome development, I should emphasize that attitudes related to potential prejudice towards the opposite sex are not the same as attitudes related to what are perceived as acceptable gender roles or gender expression, which are the focus of this paper.

¹² The belief that women now have an unfair advantage socially, culturally, and economically

We therefore still have much to learn about how gender attitudes impact political behavior, including how they interact with other factors known to influence opinion, such as nativism. Preliminary scholarship to this end is beginning to emerge in the American politics literature. Laura Van Berkel et al. (2017) analyze whether the American identity itself is gendered, and find that both men and women were likely to construct the “prototypical” American as more masculine than feminine. Meanwhile, Melissa Deckman and Erin Cassese (2019) find that “gendered nationalism” strongly predicted support for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election among both men and women.¹³ This literature is nascent, however, and much work remains to be done – particularly in the non-American context.

I theorize that traditional gender attitudes are an important conduit for radical right support. The considerable influence of these attitudes stems from their ability to, on their own, increase the likelihood that an individual supports that radical right, as well as their ability to magnify the influence of other conduits for radical right support, including nativism. Regarding the latter, I theorize that gender attitudes can moderate the relationship between radical right support and nativism both due to the implicitly gendered structure of nativism and the explicitly gendered goals of the nativist project. As a result, traditional gender attitudes have the capacity to influence public opinion on their own, as well as work in conjunction nativism to produce support for political leaders and parties that adopt a nativist policy agenda and rhetoric - such as the radical right. For clarity, I am not arguing that gender traditionalism raises the probability of being nativist and therefore support for the radical right. Rather, I argue that while each likely exerts an independent influence on the propensity to support the radical right, nativism and

relative to men.

¹³ The belief that the United States has grown “too soft and feminine” (Deckman and Cassese 2019)

gender traditionalism are also attitudinally compatible in such a way that, when both are present, the likelihood of supporting the radical right is higher than when one is not present.

Nativism's implicit congruence with gender traditionalism is most closely connected to the ways in which patriarchal power relations are analogous at both the macro (state) and micro (individual) levels. For example, Iris Young traces the existence of the security state to the pervasiveness of patriarchy, arguing that individuals raised in societies where women are used to trading freedom for security from a benevolent patriarch are much more receptive to similar trade-offs made with the state, a phenomenon she dubs the "logic of masculine protection" (Young 2003). Just as a husband and father can expect obedience, respect, and loyalty in exchange for providing protection (be it physically or financially), the state can demand the same fealty from its citizens in exchange for protection from all enemies "foreign and domestic."

The logic of masculine protection creates a parallel relationship between the man protecting the woman and children at home and the state protecting the nation and its citizens. The normalization of this dynamic has important implications for democracy and the citizenries' willingness to acquiesce to the erosion of their freedoms and privacy under the guise of "protection."¹⁴ The security state becomes normalized because individuals are already conditioned to the protector (masculine)/protected (feminine) dynamic in their homes and throughout society and popular culture.

If the security state naturally becomes gendered masculine as it takes on the role of protector, the *nation*, which must be protected, becomes gendered feminine. This symbolism lies

¹⁴ It is not my intention here to insinuate that any government involvement in citizens' lives is a gross violation of freedom and security, nor do I wish to convey the idea that I think citizen security is not a valid concern. Instead, my aim is to point out the state's capacity to abuse the citizenry's predisposed preference for security as a justification for questionable surveillance and violence.

at the heart of the congruence and potential synergy of nativism and gender traditionalism. Nira Yuval-Davis emphasizes that we cannot understand the nation without considering that women reproduce it biologically, culturally, and symbolically (Yuval-Davis 1997). This reality, combined with the reinforcement of the traditional family (wherein women are confined to the private home while men occupy the public world) creates a scenario where female bodies become wrapped up in conceptualizations of the nation itself. As the embodiment of a common historical identity or destiny that must be continually renewed and carefully preserved, the nation displays a sense of vulnerability and defenselessness - two traits that are gendered feminine. The nation becomes a feminine space that calls for protection from masculine actors (i.e. the state) because “protection” and “defending” are gendered masculine.¹⁵

Of course, not all the connections between gender and the nation are symbolic. The survival of individual, unique nations cannot be achieved unless *native* women commit to having children, and therefore this particular gendering must become much more explicit. Literal women are essential to the nationalist project, because they not only physically reproduce the nation via childbearing, but conceptually reproduce it by raising ethnically-pure children with a nationalist mindset (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989). When Hungary promises to give a mini-van to every native woman with more than three children, or when the Alternative for Germany party puts up a poster featuring a photo of a white pregnant belly and the slogan “New Germans? We'll Make Them Ourselves” (Rueters 2018; Nelson 2017), the message is subtle but still clear: have children so we can rely on your offspring, and not migrants, to keep this country alive.

The radical right is enmeshed within the gendered logic of masculine protection and feminine vulnerability just outlined. As a nativist party family, their rhetoric and imagery are

¹⁵ See Mostov (2012) for more on the masculine state and the feminine nation.

replete with calls to protect both the physical borders of the nation and its values; and because a portion of these nationalistic claims rest on an unspoken, traditionally gendered logic, they are able to speak to voters who are already predisposed to thinking about the world through an analogously gendered lens (Winter 2008). For individuals with a more “traditional” gender lens, their gendered beliefs may serve as a beacon for what is true and real in a world that seems increasingly unfamiliar. When America was “great,” for instance, the world was organized around what are now considered traditional gender roles (man at work, woman at home).

For these individuals, a return to traditional roles and values is a critical step in life returning to “normal,” because life as they once knew it feels like it is slipping away. By espousing policies that seek to “turn back the clock and reestablish eras of homogeneous demography, rigid hierarchy, and protectionist economics” (Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018: 1695), radical right parties portray themselves as some of the last and only institutions and people capable of bringing back this lost sense of “normalcy,” which is closely tied to traditional gender norms - even if they are never mentioned outright. This phenomena fits within the umbrella of the larger “cultural backlash” to the displacement of traditional gender roles, familial structures and sexuality, in addition to countless other socially liberal and post-materialist values that have swept the Western world over the last several decades (Norris and Inglehart 2019).

Given the ways in which traditional gender norms are closely intertwined with the nativist elements of the radical right, I have several expectations. First, traditional gender attitudes will be associated with support for the radical right more generally. Stated formally:

H1a: *Compared to those with more gender egalitarian attitudes, highly gender traditional individuals will be more likely to select a radical right party as most appealing.*

One way to further test this hypothesis is to compare support for the radical right among gender traditionalists to their support for mainstream conservative parties, which have not been as closely associated with gendered and nativist rhetoric over the last several decades. In other words:

H1b: *Compared to those with more gender egalitarian attitudes, individuals with stronger gender traditionalist attitudes will have a greater likelihood of finding radical right parties more appealing than mainstream conservative parties.*

Finally, if nativism and gender traditionalism are psychologically congruent in the way argued above, I anticipate that this will be reflected in support for the radical right among people who profess high levels of both attitudes:

H2: *Compared to those who hold more gender egalitarian and non-nativist attitudes, individuals who hold both stronger gender traditionalist attitudes and nativist attitudes will have a greater likelihood of finding radical right parties more appealing.*

Data and Methods

To analyze the connections between gender traditionalism and the appeal of the radical right, I utilize data from the 2017 European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is conducted every nine years and is intended to gauge how Europeans “think about life, family, work, religion, politics, and

society” (European Values Study). As of this writing, it included the most comprehensive and current data on the items and countries of interest to this analysis. The 2017 study features a probabilistic representative sample and a minimum of either 1,000 or 1,200 respondents per country depending on whether or not the population was below or exceeded two million. All told, the analyses presented in this paper draw on upwards of 20,000 observations across twenty-three countries from within the EVS.¹⁶

Dependent Variables

To assess support for the radical right, I created a binary variable coded “1” when an individual selected a radical right party as “most appealing” and “0” for all other parties.¹⁷ Responses labeled “don’t know,” “no answer,” “not applicable,” “not included,” or “missing” were dropped from the dataset.¹⁸ To assess the equivalent support for mainstream conservative parties, I created a second binary variable coded in the same fashion.

There are drawbacks to relying on self-reported data about either people’s preferences for parties or their vote choice. It is possible that an individual might be willing to express a preference for a radical right party and not actually follow through with that preference at the ballot box. However, it is also possible that an individual might be hesitant to express open

¹⁶ Several countries included in this release of the EVS are excluded from the models in this paper because either they do not have a clearly defined radical right party or the radical right party active in the country was not included in the EVS questionnaire (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Romania, Russia, and Spain).

¹⁷ Respondents were given a country-specific list of parties and asked “[w]hich (political) party appeals to you most?” They were then asked whether or not there was a second party that appealed to them (this response was not included in either party choice variable). The EVS does not ask respondents which party they voted for in the last election. Please see Appendix A for a full list of the parties included in this analysis.

¹⁸ I also re-estimated all the models in the paper coding this data as “0”. Doing so did not alter any of the substantive results.

preference for a radical right party on a survey due to social desirability bias. A meaningful difference likely exists between someone's preference versus their actual behavior, as the former may capture the radical right's *potential* electorate, while the latter (at least attempts) to capture their present electorate. I approach my analysis of expressed *appeal* for the radical right (vs. confirmed vote choice) with these realities in mind.

Independent Variable

To gauge an individual's gender attitudes, I constructed a scale from eight survey questions asking about opinions regarding the roles men and women should play in society. Exploratory factor analysis confirmed that each of these survey items load on the same factor.¹⁹ The survey items included are:

- When a mother works for pay, the children suffer
- A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children
- All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job
- A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family
- On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do
- A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl
- On the whole, men make better business executives than women do
- When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women

Each question was measured using a four-point scale (except for the job scarcity question, which used five). The combined gender attitudes scale created for this analysis was normalized to run from 0-1, with higher values indicating higher levels support for gender traditionalism.

¹⁹ Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO): 0.883; Bartlett's Test ($p < .001$); Eigen value 3.794; all factor loadings $> .6000$.

Moderating Variable: Nativism

To capture nativist attitudes, I selected questions that fall along both the nationalist and xenophobic elements of the ideology. This is in keeping with the accepted definition of nativism in the broader literature on the radical right, which sees the ideology as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia that argues countries should be made up solely of members of the “nation” (natives) to the exclusion of non-native outsiders, who are perceived as a threat to the largely homogeneous shared values and customs encapsulated by the nation-state (Mudde 2017). To approximate the nationalist component of nativism, I include a question asking the respondent’s opinion about the importance of being born their native country. The question was prefaced with the following statement: “[s]ome people say the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?” The respondents were then asked whether or not being born in their country was important. For xenophobia, I created an index from four variables that deal with a respondent’s attitudes towards immigrants: what impact do you think immigrants have on the development of [your country]; do immigrants take away jobs from [nationality]; do immigrants increase crime problems; and are immigrants a strain on the welfare system. Each of these survey items load on the same factor.²⁰

It is important to note here that despite the fact that nativism is a singular construct, these questions are entered into the model separately due to methodological constraints. There is no singular question on the EVS that fully captures nativism, nor do any of the separate survey

²⁰ Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO): 0.771; Bartlett’s Test ($p < .001$); Eigen value 2.168; all factor loadings $> .6000$.

items in the dataset dealing with nationalism and xenophobia load onto the same factor, which significantly lowers the reliability of any scale that attempts to combine them.

Controls

A number of other ideological positions have been identified as predictors of support for the either nativism or the radical right, including authoritarianism and beliefs about income redistribution. To capture authoritarianism, I include one item measured using a 10-point scale asking whether or not people think it is an “essential characteristic of democracy that people obey their rulers” (with higher scores indicating this is an essential characteristic) and one categorical variable asking whether or not respondents’ think it would be “good,” “bad,” or “don’t mind” if there was a societal shift towards greater respect for authority. To account for attitudes about income redistribution, I include a 10-point scale asking whether the respondent considered “governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” an essential characteristic of democracy, with higher levels corresponding with the belief that such measures are essential.²¹

I also include controls for a respondent’s left-right ideology, whether or not a person identifies as religious, and the level of confidence an individual has in their national parliament. Ideology was measured using a 10-point scale by asking “in political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”, with higher items indicating the right. Religious identity is a categorical variable asking whether or not a person identifies as “religious,” “not religious,” or a “convinced atheist” independent of

²¹ Euroskepticism has also been identified as a potential explanation for radical right support. As a robustness check, I included a binary variable asking how much confidence the individual has in the European Union, with “0” indicating a great deal or some trust and “1” indicating little to no trust. Including this variable did not substantively change the results, and therefore is not presented in the manuscript due to space constraints.

church attendance. Confidence in parliament was measured with a categorical variable asking respondents' whether they considered themselves to have a "great deal," "quite a lot," "not very much," or "none at all" in terms of confidence.

Controls were also added for demographics, socio-economic factors and other attitudes identified as predictors of support for the radical right in the existing literature, including age, sex, education, employment status, and political memberships. Finally, to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the different countries represented in these data, I employ country-level fixed effects in the form of dummy variables for each country represented in the analysis.

Results

Descriptive Analyses

Figure 1 displays the full distribution of gender attitudes in the EVS sample. Among all respondents, the mean score on the gender attitudes scale was .35 and the median was .36. Broken down by sex, the mean gender attitudes score for all women in the sample was .34 versus .38 for men.




Figure 1

This distribution tells us that a majority of respondents in the EVS sample trend towards gender egalitarian in their beliefs, with relatively few individuals selecting answers that would place them at the highest levels of gender traditionalism. Amongst the countries included in the full analyses in this paper, Slovakia had the highest mean score on the gender scale (.48) and Norway had the lowest (.13). Northern European countries had a mean score of .19, Western European countries had a mean score of .29, and Eastern European countries had a mean score of .45.

Regarding nationalism, a clear majority of respondents (61%) said that they felt it was important to be born in their country in order to be a part of their country's nationality. For the more xenophobic attitudes, the mean value on the constructed immigration attitudes scale amongst all respondents was .54 (see Figure 2 for the full distribution) and the median was .55, which indicates that the average respondent in the sample was mostly neutral on the potential contributions or downsides of immigrants in their country.




Figure 2

Amongst the individual countries included in the full analysis, Hungary had the highest mean score on the immigration scale (.72) and Albania had the lowest (.32). When categorized by region, the mean immigration score was much closer across the three groups than the mean gender attitudes score. Northern European countries had a mean score of .49, Western European countries overall had a mean score of .54, and Eastern European countries had a mean score of .58.

In terms of overall support for the radical right, 7.6% of respondents selected a radical right party and 14% selected a mainstream conservative party as “most appealing.” Broken down by sex, 46.7% of respondents who selected the radical right were women, and 53.3% were men, a 6.6 percentage point difference ($p < 0.001$).²² Among those who selected a mainstream

²² The data includes 31,013 female respondents and 25,298 male respondents.

conservative party 51.9% were women, and 48.1% were men (3.8 percentage point difference, $p < 0.001$).

From here I divide the explanatory results into two sections: gender attitudes and support for the radical right, and the potential interactions between both gender attitudes and nativist attitudes on radical right support.

Explanatory Analyses

Gender Attitudes and the Radical Right

In order to assess the relationship between gender attitudes and support for the radical right, I estimated two different logistic regression models. The first model looks solely at the bivariate relationship between support for the radical right and gender attitudes. The results are presented in the first column of Table B1 in Appendix B.²³ This initial model is consistent with **H1a**: higher levels of gender traditionalism positively predicts support for the radical right ($\beta = .73$, $SE = .078$, $p < 0.001$). This finding holds in the fully specified model that includes the nativist and other control variables outlined above (column five in Table B1, Appendix B).

To illustrate whether or not gender traditional attitudes have a unique impact on support for the radical right, I re-estimated the above models after replacing radical right support with mainstream conservative support in the dependent variable. The results for the bivariate model (column two in Table B1) show a negative, statistically significant correlation ($\beta = -.67$, $SE = .062$, $p < 0.001$), but this result disappears in the fully specified model (column six in Table B1).

Because logistic regression coefficients must be interpreted through either logged odds or odds ratios (which are not as intuitive as the interpretations for coefficients reported using

²³ All the tables presented in this manuscript were created using *asdoc*, a Stata program written by Shah (2018).

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression) I turn here to predicted margins/probabilities for a more straightforward, fine-grained interpretation of the results discussed above. Figure 3 displays the predicted probability and 95% confident interval that an individual selected a radical right party as “most appealing” across all potential values of the gender traditionalism scale, holding the other variables in the model at their observed values.^{24 25}




Figure 3

Those at the highest level of gender traditionalism have a .178 predicted probability of supporting the radical right, while those at the lowest level have a .118 predicted probability—a

²⁴ Graphs are scaled the same throughout this paper. The lowest and highest points on the y-axis for each graph are always ten points below and above the lowest and highest values of the predicted probability values being presented.

²⁵ See Appendix C in the online supplementary materials for numerical results of the predicted probabilities presented here.

six percentage point difference. The results are statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level.^{26 27}

This suggests that, all else equal, being more gender traditional raises the probability that an individual will support the radical right.

To ascertain whether gender traditionalism has a unique impact on support for radical right parties, I conducted the same analysis on an individual's likelihood of selecting a conservative party as "most appealing" given their position on the gender traditionalism scale. The predicted probabilities are presented graphically in Figure 4. Note that in the full models, gender traditionalism is positively correlated with support for mainstream conservative parties, but this result is not statistically significant.

²⁶ See the "Gender Scale" variable in column five of Table B1 in Appendix B for the corresponding regression coefficient and p-value.

²⁷ As an additional step, I disaggregated the results above by each country in the sample. Being more gender traditional increased the likelihood of supporting the radical right at a statistically significant level in Denmark, France, Hungary, Lithuania, and Switzerland and *decreased* the likelihood in Italy (it did not reach statistical significance in the remaining countries in the sample). Due to the small number of both gender traditional and radical right voters in each sample, I approach these results with a high degree of caution and am reluctant to speculate as to their broader meaning without more data. However, the fact that gender traditional attitudes reached statistical significance across countries with both geographic and radical right party heterogeneity is a positive sign for my assertion that gender traditional attitudes could matter across a variety of contexts where the radical right is an active presence.




Figure 4

As the graph demonstrates, those who are more gender traditional do not have a significantly higher likelihood of supporting mainstream conservative parties than gender egalitarians, with the predicted probability of support increasing by only .2 percentage points between the lowest and highest values of the gender attitudes scale (.239 versus .241). This suggests that while there is a greater probability that respondents will choose a conservative party over a radical right party more generally (and therefore slightly less ability for gender traditionalism to shift support either way), moving from low to high gender traditionalism appears to play almost no role in the probability of choosing to support mainstream conservative parties, providing support for the second component of my first hypothesis (**H1b**²⁸).

²⁸ As a robustness check, I re-estimated my full model using a multinomial regression looking at support for radical right parties, mainstream conservative parties, and all other parties. Compared to the radical right baseline, gender traditionalism was negatively correlated and statistically

Gender Attitudes and Sex

It is also worth mentioning that in these data respondent sex does not moderate the relationship between gender attitudes and radical right support. In the full model (Appendix B, Table B1), respondent sex is correlated with a higher likelihood of supporting the radical right. However, this finding disappears when respondent sex is interacted with the gender attitudes scale (Table B2). Although the average marginal effect of gender attitudes on support is 1.4 percentage points higher for men (7.3) than it is for women (5.9), there is no significant difference between the two (Figure 5).




Figure 5

insignificant in predicting support for conservative parties and negatively correlated and statistically significant in predicting support for all other parties.

In other words, whether or not someone *identifies* as male or female does not appear to be the primarily “gendered” avenue to radical right support in these data. Instead, it appears to be certain *beliefs* and *attitudes* (either more egalitarian or more traditional) about the ways in which men and women are expected to operate within society that increase the likelihood of supporting the radical right party family.

Gender Attitudes, Nativism, and the Radical Right

So far I have presented evidence that gender attitudes predict support for the radical right but not mainstream conservative parties. This finding suggests that gender traditionalism, like the well-established conduit that nativism provides, is a probable pathway toward supporting radical right-wing parties. But do these two pathways interact in any significant way? This section investigates whether or not simultaneously being both more gender traditional *and* nativist matters for radical right support. Studying the interactions of these two variables greatly enhances our understanding of the dynamics of these two constructs as they relate to supporting the radical right.

Using the same base model from the previous section, I interacted the gender attitudes scale with both the country of birth variable and the immigration attitudes scale. From there, I calculated the predicted probability that an individual selected a radical right party as “most appealing” across all potential values of the gender traditionalism scale and each of the nativist variables in question.²⁹

²⁹ Note that it is not possible to take the marginal effect of an interaction. While the interacted term exists in the original model, the marginal effects are calculated simultaneously but separately.

Country of Birth Attitudes and Gender Attitudes

Figure 6 graphically examines that relationship between a respondent's belief in the importance of being born in one's country to having one's nationality, holding gender traditional attitudes, and radical right support. Fervent nativists tend to place a particularly high importance on the genetics of an individual for national "belonging," and while this question does not directly capture the question of genetics (certainly someone could be born in one's country yet still have a different national or ethnic ancestry), it is a close proxy. It strikes right at the heart of the implicit connections between nativism and traditional gender norms – i.e. the idea that native women need to produce native children in order to preserve the nation's legacy and heritage.




Figure 6

The results here indicate that being more gender traditional moderates the relationship between attitudes regarding the importance of one's birthplace and support for the radical right,

but the “effect” size is much greater (13.5 vs. 3.5 percentage points) for those who *do not* think being born in his or her country is important for nationality. The boost for nativists, while modest, is still significant at the $p < 0.001$ value. What is fascinating, however, is the steep increase in the probability of support between the non-nativist egalitarians and the non-nativist traditionalists. While it is possible that some of this effect may be coming from non-native, socially conservative migrants (who therefore would be less inclined to think being born in the country was important for nationality), one would expect those individuals to be even more likely to eschew the radical right due to the party family’s exclusionary rhetoric towards non-natives. Therefore, while these results do provide evidence in support of **H2**, they also suggest that gender traditionalism does not work solely in favor of nativists.

Immigration Attitudes and Gender Attitudes

As with the gender scale, I selected several points of interest along the composite immigration scale (the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles) before calculating the marginal effects. As a reminder, higher values on the scale indicate higher levels of anti-immigrant (and therefore xenophobic attitudes). Figure 7 displays the results.




Figure 7

Here we see clear variation. Holding more gender traditional attitudes is associated with a reduced probability of support for the radical right amongst the most fervent xenophobes (99th percentile, an overall 9.5 percentage point reduction), but a higher probability of support for everyone else.³⁰ This finding provides mixed support in favor of **H2**. Gender traditional individuals at the 75th percentile of xenophobia do appear more likely to support the radical right than egalitarians, but this finding does not extend to the most (99th percentile) xenophobic individuals. While the most xenophobic gender traditionalists have the same probability of support for the radical right as those individuals in the other three quartiles, the largest probability of support comes from the most xenophobic egalitarians.³¹

³⁰ 15.1 percentage points for the 25th percentile, 11.3 percentage points for the 50th percentile, and 4.6 percentage points for the 75th percentile.

³¹ As Hainmueller et al. 2019 show, researchers need to be particularly sensitive to a host of potential analytical and interpretive pitfalls when estimating linear interaction effects, such as

Why might this be the case? Prior work has identified a subset of “sexually modern nativists” (Spierings et al. 2017) who are pro-gender and LGBTQ+ equality and have strong anti-migrant attitudes. It stands to reason that some sexually modern nativists might feel threatened by an influx of conservative immigrants and respond to such threats by choosing to vote for the radical right. These results suggest as much. However, the mechanisms behind why these individual become activated along an anti-migrant dimension are still unclear, particularly because there is a current lack of evidence demonstrating a strong link between sexually modern nativists voting for the radical right in countries (such as the Netherlands) where the radical right is most vocal about its support for LGBTQ issues (Spierings 2020). Further work is still needed to understand this phenomenon.

Discussion and Conclusions

The radical right has long placed an emphasis on traditional family values in their manifestos, rhetoric, and policy agendas (Akkerman 2015). In doing so, they speak to fears individuals may have surrounding the decline in what they perceive as the “proper” roles for men and women to hold in society, as well as more deeply rooted anxieties about what it means for the traditional gender order to be disrupted.

Overall, I find that traditional gender attitudes do predict support for the radical right, which is in contrast to recent preliminary work on the topic (e.g. Spierings and Zaslove 2015a), a difference that could be the result of different samples (European Social Survey vs. European

extrapolation and interpolation that stem from a lack of common support. If there is a lack of common support, estimated linear marginal effects may be model dependent and misleading. To check for this, I ran various diagnostics using Hainmuller et al.’s *interflex* package. Diagnostics show that my data do not lack common support and that there are minimal issues related to extrapolation and/or interpolation. These diagnostics are depicted and overviewed across Figures 1-2 of Appendix D in the online supplementary materials.

Value Study, seven Western European countries vs. a larger sample of countries across the continent, etc.) or time periods. What is clearer than ever is that there is still much we do not understand about the relationship between gender and radical right-wing parties, and more research is urgently needed to further enhance our understanding of this relationship. A second major finding of this paper is that, while gender traditionalism is positively associated with radical right support, this was not the case with more mainstream or “traditional” conservative parties. This finding suggests that the appeal of radical right parties is uniquely gendered and that more research is needed to understand the ways that radical right parties and politicians incorporate traditional gender appeals in their political communication.

Importantly, I also find that traditional gender attitudes and nativism combined have a nuanced, yet meaningful impact on the likelihood of finding the radical right appealing. Anti-immigrant attitudes remain the highest predictors of support for the radical right in the full models - above and beyond gender attitudes and other common explanations – and a belief that it is important to be born in one’s country in order to “truly” be a part of one’s nationality was also a strong predictor. Although nativists appear to need very little extra “help” to support the radical right, however, being gender traditional provides a boost that fits nicely within their broader paradigm.

Even more telling is that the “effect” of gender traditionalism on support also extends to non-nativists. This is a poignant finding, because most non-nativists should have strong priors against supporting the radical right, who are by and large defined as a party family by their subscription to nativist ideology. Theoretically they should be able to find a “home” with another conservative party who, while perhaps not being as publicly forceful about their socially conservative agenda, still harbor similar views. We do not see that story play out in these data, however, since gender

traditional attitudes appear to play little role in inducing support for mainstream conservative parties. This finding forces us to reckon with whether or not nativism is always the common dominator of radical right support, and suggests that holding gender traditional attitudes is a potential backdoor pathway into the radical right fold for non-nativists. Although this is a purely speculative statement (this dataset cannot fully validate this argument either way), such conjectures remain a potentially fruitful area for future research.

One limitation of this analysis is that I cannot ascertain a causal direction between either gender attitudes and nativism or gender attitudes, nativism, and radical right support. It is possible that the relationship between nativism and gender attitudes is truly multi-directional due to the analogous structure of both phenomena. Supporting more nativist viewpoints may subsequently increase the likelihood of expressing more gender traditional attitudes *or vice versa* and the subsequent outcomes would be relatively unchanged because they are so closely intertwined. On the other hand, experimental evidence is certainly needed to validate my claim that at least some of the connection between gender attitudes and nativism as it relates to the radical right is due to the congruence between implicitly gendered, nativist rhetoric and traditional gender attitudes. Future research should investigate these questions directly.

Another drawback of this paper is that, while it provides illuminating insights regarding the relationship between traditional gender attitudes and support for the radical right in Europe at a broad level, it is incapable of speaking directly to developments in strategic choices being made by radical right parties regarding gendered rhetoric. In particular, to help advance their nativist agenda while simultaneously expanding their base of support, some radical right-wing groups frame their Islamophobic stances as being primarily rooted in a defense of gender equality, a strategy seemingly at odds with gender traditionalism. Future research should

investigate directly how such rhetoric is received by gender traditionalist individuals that this paper has identified as being more likely to support radical right-wing parties.

My results provide us with an additional motivation for why someone might be drawn to the radical right above and beyond our prevailing explanations. Although we know much about the demographic profile of the average radical right voter (male, working class, lower-educated, etc.), we still lack a complete explanation of the motivations that prompt individuals to support the radical right or not (Fitzgerald 2018), and therefore why these individuals find the radical right so appealing. This paper adds individual gender attitudes to the list of potential motivations - both for nativists and non-nativists alike. Gender traditionalism can heighten the already vigorous connections between nativism and the radical right and draw in non-nativists who might otherwise be less inclined to support the party family.

Finally, this paper imparts new context to our growing knowledge of how gender attitudes, similar to racial attitudes, impact political behavior (e.g., Deckman and Cassese 2019; Schneider and Bos 2019). There is a large scholarship on the impact of being either “male” or “female” on political behavior, but we know relatively little in comparison about the ways in which *ideas* regarding how either “men” or “women” should behave, or what is appropriately “masculine” or “feminine,” may exert an additional influence. Considering the fact that ideas about gender pervade almost every aspect of our lives, it is more important than ever to fully explore how they shape our politics.

Appendix

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Appendix A: List of Parties

Radical Right Parties

Albania: Albanian National Front
 Austria: Freedom Party of Austria
 Bulgaria: Attack
 Croatia: Croatian Party of Rights
 Czechia: Freedom and Direct Democracy
 Denmark: Danish People's Party
 Estonia: Conservative People's Party of Estonia/EKRE
 Finland: Finns Party
 France: National Front/National Rally
 Germany: Alternative for Germany
 Great Britain: British National Party
 Hungary: Fidesz; Jobbik
 Iceland: Icelandic National Party; Progressive Party
 Italy: Lega Nord/League
 Lithuania: Order and Justice
 Netherlands: Party for Freedom; Forum for Democracy
 Norway: Progress Party
 Poland: Law & Justice
 Serbia: Serbian Radical Party
 Slovakia: Slovak National Party; Kotleba/People's Party Our Slovakia
 Slovenia: Slovenian Democratic Party
 Sweden: Sweden Democrats
 Switzerland: Christian Democratic Party; The Liberals

Conservative Parties

Albania: Justice Integration, and Unity
 Austria: Austrian People's Party
 Bulgaria: Citizens for European Development
 Croatia: Croatian Democratic Union
 Czechia: Civic Democratic Party
 Denmark: Conservative People's Party; Venstre, Denmark's Liberal Party
 Estonia: Estonian Reform Party
 Finland: Center Party; Christian Democrats
 France: The Republicans
 Germany: Christian Democratic Union
 Great Britain: Conservative
 Hungary: Christian Democratic People's Party
 Iceland: Independence Party
 Italy: Let's Go Italy/Forza Italia
 Lithuania: Homeland Union; Lithuanian Christian Democrats
 Netherlands: Christian Democratic Appeal
 Norway: Conservative Party
 Poland: Korwin
 Serbia: Serbian Progressive Party
 Slovakia: Freedom and Solidarity
 Slovenia: New Slovenia - Christian People's Party
 Sweden: Moderate Party
 Switzerland: Swiss People's Party

Appendix B: Logistic Regression Tables

Table B1: Party Family as Dependent Variable

	(1) Radical Right	(2) Conservative	(3) Radical Right	(4) Radical Right	(5) Radical Right	(6) Conservative
Gender Scale	0.729*** (0.077)	-0.669*** (0.062)	0.797*** (0.153)	1.248*** (0.148)	0.685*** (0.155)	0.013 (0.130)
Immigrant Attitudes			2.947*** (0.138)		2.804*** (0.140)	-0.091 (0.095)
Born Country				0.552*** (0.055)	0.332*** (0.058)	0.075* (0.044)
Authority Respect			-0.088*** (0.033)	-0.100*** (0.032)	-0.085*** (0.033)	-0.056** (0.025)
Democracy: Obey Rulers			0.026*** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.024** (0.009)	0.013* (0.007)
Tax Rich/ Subsidize Poor			0.025** (0.010)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.025** (0.010)	-0.044*** (0.007)
Religiosity			0.064 (0.042)	0.095** (0.041)	0.067 (0.042)	-0.242*** (0.033)
Sex			0.091* (0.054)	0.092* (0.052)	0.091* (0.054)	-0.003 (0.041)
Age			-0.044* (0.023)	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.043* (0.023)	0.074*** (0.018)
Low Education			0.712*** (0.087)	0.809*** (0.084)	0.678*** (0.088)	-0.027 (0.063)
Medium Education			0.628*** (0.066)	0.685*** (0.064)	0.609*** (0.067)	-0.026 (0.046)
Work Fulltime			0.143 (0.092)	0.120 (0.090)	0.130 (0.092)	-0.178** (0.070)
Work Part-time			-0.078 (0.131)	-0.148 (0.128)	-0.087 (0.132)	-0.270*** (0.097)
Retired			-0.152 (0.106)	-0.224** (0.103)	-0.168 (0.106)	-0.091 (0.080)
Homemaker			-0.246 (0.172)	-0.235 (0.168)	-0.264 (0.172)	0.054 (0.131)
Student			-0.160 (0.161)	-0.277* (0.156)	-0.163 (0.161)	-0.067 (0.123)

Unemployed			0.210 (0.155)	0.197 (0.151)	0.208 (0.155)	-0.299** (0.118)
Political Memberships			-0.151** (0.067)	-0.203*** (0.063)	-0.151** (0.067)	0.114** (0.055)
Parliament Confidence			0.211*** (0.034)	0.286*** (0.033)	0.217*** (0.034)	-0.298*** (0.028)
Ideology			0.329*** (0.013)	0.374*** (0.012)	0.326*** (0.013)	0.432*** (0.010)
Constant	-2.438*** (0.034)	-1.259*** (0.025)	-6.815*** (0.253)	-5.736*** (0.238)	-6.858*** (0.254)	-1.991*** (0.186)
Obs.	36015	36015	19775	20317	19743	19242
Pseudo R ²	0.004	0.003	0.309	0.281	0.310	0.205
Country Dummies			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table B2: Logistic Regression Results (Sex*Gender Attitudes Model)

	(1) Radical Right
Gender Scale	0.634*** (0.180)
Male	.043 (.094)
Female*Gender Scale (Baseline)	
Male*Gender Scale	0.112 (0.224)
Constant	-7.098*** (0.226)
Obs.	19743
Controls	Yes

Standard errors are in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$

Appendix C: Predictive Probability Tables

Table C1
Predicted Probability of Radical Right Support =1 along Gender Scale

Predictive margins		Number of obs. = 19,574				
Model VCE : Robust						
Expression : Pr(Radical Right), predict()						
1._at	: Gender Scale	=	0			
2._at	: Gender Scale	=	.04			
3._at	: Gender Scale	=	.2			
4._at	: Gender Scale	=	.36			
5._at	: Gender Scale	=	.52			
6._at	: Gender Scale	=	.64			
7._at	: Gender Scale	=	.76			
8._at	: Gender Scale	=	.88			
9._at	: Gender Scale	=	1			
Delta-method						
	Margin	Std.Err.	z	P>z	[95%Conf.	Interval]
_at						
1	0.1181	0.005	26.190	0.000	0.111	0.129
2	0.1201	0.004	28.990	0.000	0.113	0.130
3	0.1286	0.003	46.960	0.000	0.124	0.134
4	0.1376	0.002	66.130	0.000	0.133	0.141
5	0.1470	0.003	45.770	0.000	0.139	0.151
6	0.1544	0.005	32.420	0.000	0.142	0.161
7	0.1621	0.006	24.580	0.000	0.146	0.171
8	0.1700	0.008	19.720	0.000	0.149	0.181
9	0.1783	0.010	16.480	0.000	0.152	0.192

Table C2:
Predicted Probability of Conservative Support =1 along Gender Scale

Predictive margins		Number of obs.		=		19,242
Model VCE		: Robust				
Expression : Pr(Radical Right), predict()						
1._at	: Gender Scale	=	0			
2._at	: Gender Scale	=	.04			
3._at	: Gender Scale	=	.2			
4._at	: Gender Scale	=	.36			
5._at	: Gender Scale	=	.52			
6._at	: Gender Scale	=	.64			
7._at	: Gender Scale	=	.76			
8._at	: Gender Scale	=	.88			
9._at	: Gender Scale	=	1			
Delta-method						
	Margin	Std.Err.	z	P>z	[95%Con f.	Interval]
_at						
1	0.2396	0.006	39.070	0.000	0.228	0.252
2	0.2397	0.005	43.700	0.000	0.229	0.250
3	0.2399	0.003	73.270	0.000	0.234	0.246
4	0.2402	0.003	81.640	0.000	0.234	0.246
5	0.2405	0.005	49.150	0.000	0.231	0.250
6	0.2407	0.007	35.180	0.000	0.227	0.254
7	0.2409	0.009	27.010	0.000	0.223	0.258
8	0.2411	0.011	21.820	0.000	0.220	0.263
9	0.2413	0.013	18.270	0.000	0.215	0.267

Please contact the author for tables of the following models, which are too large to reproduce in this document:

- Predicted Probability of Radical Right =1 along Gender Scale and Born in Country Importance
- Predicted Probability of Radical Right =1 along Gender Scale and Immigration Attitudes

Appendix D: *interflex* Analyses

Figure 1 provides confirmation that there is common support in my interactive model of immigration attitudes and gender attitudes as they relate to radical right support.




Figure 1

There are 954 individuals in the full dataset who score at the 99th percentile of xenophobia and can be also be classified as gender egalitarian (i.e. in the 25% percentile or below on the gender attitudes scale), which equates to roughly 3% of the sample.

Employing a kernel estimator on the same model presented in Figure 6 in the main body of the paper does not substantively change the results (see Figure 2 below). While the non-linear relationship is perhaps a bit starker overall than the linear relationship presented in the paper, the high-level takeaway is the same as in the linear model: the marginal effect of gender traditionalism on support for the radical right is greater, on average, for those with lower levels

of xenophobia than those who harbor higher levels of xenophobia. Indeed, at the highest levels of xenophobia, high levels of gender traditionalism are associated with a decreased likelihood of supporting radical right parties.




Figure 2

Chapter Three: Keep the Nation (Women) Pure: Implicitly Gendered Nativism in American Public Opinion

Using original survey questions fielded on the 2020 Cooperative Election Study, I explore the relationship between gender traditionalism, gendered nationalism, and anti-immigrant attitudes. My analyses demonstrate that gender traditionalists are more likely to express support for implicitly gendered nationalist statements, and although this finding applies to gender traditionalists from all political parties, being more gender traditional has the greatest impact among Democrats when compared to Republicans. Furthermore, while gender traditionalism does predict support for anti-immigrant attitudes, gendered nationalism significantly mediates this relationship. These findings underline the importance of traditional gender attitudes in the American psyche, and demonstrate that gendered nationalism is an additional dimension that should be accounted for when assessing public opinion towards immigration.

“Russia is a Christian Nationalist nation, actually Orthodox Christian. I’m Russian Orthodox so you know I actually support Putin’s right to protect his people and always put his people first but also protect their Christian values. [...] Christian Nationalist countries also are a threat to the global regime. The Luciferian regime wants to mash everything together. But Putin takes care of his people, he looks out for his people. I watched as he deported, like they literally walked them through the streets, the criminal illegals who were coming into their country. They walked them out and they escorted them out and they said “get out.” You know I can respect that, and I can respect the fact that Putin does everything he can to protect his people.”

- Lauren Witzke, Delaware’s 2020 GOP Candidate for U.S. Senate, February 2022.

Perceptions that traditional values are under attack have fueled reactionary right-winged populism all across the world throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Front and center in these disputes have been traditional gender norms, which supporters of such movements, parties, and candidacies consistently perceive as being in decline. Feminists, academics, various cultural elites, and transnational organizations (e.g., The United Nations and the European Union) have all been derided as attempting to undermine the traditional gender and family order. Recent work has demonstrated radical right-wing parties in Europe are particularly appealing to those who harbor traditional gender attitudes (Christley 2021) and that gender may be a lens through which many voters view the nation, cultivate and express nationalist sentiments, and interface with and perceive their own nation state (Deckman and Casesse 2021; Van Berkel, Molina, and Mukherjee 2017).

In this paper, I further illuminate the connections between traditional gender attitudes and gendered nationalism while demonstrating, using representative survey data collected during the 2020 United States presidential election, that these constructs are an especially explanatory and analytically powerful lens through which to understand immigration attitudes. These attitudes are an ideal test to get at the power of gendered nationalism in the American psyche, because immigration is easily framed in ways that intersect with an individual’s pre-existing beliefs about both gender and the nation.

The first study in this paper explores whether gender traditionalists are significantly more likely to express support for gendered nationalism than their gender egalitarian counterparts. I find that they are, and that this relationship is consistent across both Republican and Democrat identifying respondents. In the second study, I look at whether or not traditional gender attitudes and gendered nationalism are associated with support for building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border and, crucially, whether or not gendered nationalism *mediates* the relationship between gender traditionalism and support for the border wall in any way. My results show that both sets of gender attitudes are independently connected to support for building a border wall. Once gendered nationalism is added to the model alongside gender traditionalism, however, the latter is no longer statistically significant. This research expands our understanding of the role of gender attitudes in American public opinion, provides a new way of measuring gendered nationalism, and contributes to a growing body of scholarship that highlights the impact of gender in a way that is distinct from sexism, gender identity, and gender consciousness.

Gender, Nationalism, and the Nation-State

“The family, nationhood and manhood [are] all politicized and associated with national imagery.”
 - Suruchi Thapar-Björkert (2013) synthesizing Joane Nagel (1998)

Max Weber classically defined a nation as “a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own” (Weber 1994). Nationalism, then, is a byproduct of this community that makes up the narrative of what the “nation” is and connects it to an existing (or potential) state (Layoun 1991). It is not an “elite ideology” or a “specific set of normative beliefs” (Bonikowski et al. 2016), but “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices,

and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life” (Brubaker 2004, 10).

The classic explorations of the nation and nationalism, however, typically overlooked gender. The 1990s saw the first large push by gender politics scholars to examine the role of women in national projects and highlight how traditional scholarship had failed to acknowledge the gendered structure of the nation-state (see Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, Yuval-Davis 1997). Three decades later, we now have a much more nuanced awareness of how the nation-state is gendered both masculine and feminine,³² and scholarship is starting to emerge looking at this relationship from a political behavior perspective. For instance, Laura Van Berkel et al. (2017) find that masculine traits are regarded as more “prototypically American” than female traits among both men and women, and that constructing nationalism in masculine terms leads to women being less likely to identify with the nation. More recently, Melissa Deckman (2020) and Deckman and Erin Cassese (2021) label the macro-leveling gendering of American society as masculine or feminine “gendered nationalism,” and connect beliefs about American society growing “too soft and feminine” to political incivility and voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. While Deckman and Cassese conceptualize gendered nationalism as a particular subset of individual perception — i.e. the ways in which individuals explicitly perceive the nation as either masculine or feminine — I argue that the term can and should be extended to encapsulate the entire constellation of gendered beliefs and perceptions, either explicit or implicit, that an individual holds related to the nation-state. I expound on this argument in the next section.

³² See also Enloe (2014) and Kaufman and Williams (2007).

Femininity, Masculinity, and Nativism

The history of the nationalist project has in large part been defined by the need for women to reproduce both the physical group of the nation and the nation's metaphysical culture (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989). The reinforcement of the traditional family (wherein women are confined to the private home while men occupy the public world) also creates a scenario where female bodies become central to conceptualizations of the nation itself. As a feminine space in need of protection by and from masculine actors ("protecting" and "defending" being actions gendered masculine), the nation becomes all the more precious—its integrity and purity in need of safeguarding from the corrupting influence of outsiders. Talking about the gendering of boundaries and spaces in the former Yugoslavia, Julie Mostov (2012) writes in this vein:

Feminine spaces remain open to invasion— and this image of vulnerability is particularly inviting to ethnocrats or those engaged in crafting nationalist rhetoric and expanding national boundaries or in waging war on behalf of the nation. The vulnerability and seductiveness of women/borders (space/nation) require the vigilance of protectors or border guards. Thus, just as the territory of the nation must be protected by male soldiers and national leaders, women's bodies must be protected by fathers, husbands and the (national) state. (91)

As Mostov suggests, safeguarding the nation requires protecting not only its physical borders, but also its people, values, and mores. Since women are the primary reproducers (via childbearing) and transmitters (via childrearing) of these values and mores, women's bodies become the primary focus of concern and control in the face of outside threats to the integrity of the nation-state because they are the material representation of otherwise intangible concepts.

Men and masculinity play a complementary but much more public role in shaping the nation-state. Joane Nagel argues that the ideologies of masculinity, colonialism, imperialism, militarism and nationalism are now so closely interwoven in the West that "it is not surprising that masculinity and nationalism seem stamped from the same mold." Because the most

“important aspects of the structure and culture of the nations and states in the modern state system” were created by men, they were gendered masculine in a way that keeps women as outsiders, and places the burden of defending this way of life from outside threats onto male bodies (Nagel 1998, 251).

Prioritizing women’s roles as reproducers and men’s roles as protectors reinforces a number of gender hierarchies, wherein both heterosexuality and the traditional family structure are considered both ideal and natural. The normative value of heterosexuality (dubbed heteronormativity in the gender literature) rests on the “identification and evaluation of women in terms of their sexual availability and attractiveness to men, and their confinement within heterosexual relationships as wives and mothers” (Norocel 2013, 55). Meanwhile, the authority structure wherein the man/father provides a living while the female/mother tends to the children at home (Rich 1980, 657) solidifies the separation between work and family, public and private and “legitimizes” the children born into these heteronormative, traditionally masculine and feminine homes (Norocel 2013).

With so much at stake wrapped up in the traditional family structure, the “family” then becomes a site where class, religious, ethnic, and/or racial divides are justified (Yuval- Davis 1997). Indeed, the family construct becomes “indispensable for legitimating exclusion and hierarchy within nonfamilial social forms such as nationalism, liberal individualism and imperialism” (McClintock 1995, 45). Erik Ringmar takes this argument a step further, highlighting how the family is used as a metaphor in political language to call to mind certain social structures that contain both hierarchical and biological principles. To this end, political leaders have often referred to themselves as “fathers” of their countries and their citizens as “children” (Ringmar 2008). For nativists (including the radical right), this conceptualization of the family

becomes fertile ground for naturalizing claims about male dominance, the submission of women, and the overall superiority of their nation-state vis-à-vis “others” or “outsiders”—many of whom are racialized or otherwise considered culturally “inferior” (Norocel 2013; Yuval-Davis 1997).

What these arguments make clear is that nationalism, the nation, and the state are closely intertwined with ideas about gender. Moreover, the gendered components of nationalism contribute to the xenophobia that so often accompanies the ideology. When concerns about preserving the purity of the (feminine) nation arise, migrants (gendered hostile masculine) must be kept out by the state and its leaders (gendered benevolently masculine) in order to preserve the ethnic and cultural make-up associated with the national ethos. This concept of “purity” is often heavily racialized. The myth of a shared common origin and/or “destiny” is “constructed around the specific origin of the people (or their race)” among those who hold the most rigid and exclusionary views about what constitutes their nation (Yuval-Davis 1997, 21). Among nativists for whom genealogy and origin are key to their understanding of the nation, racial diversity is inexcusable—lest anyone from an “inferior” race “pollute” the “purity” of what is construed as the “superior” national race (Yuval-Davis 1997, 23).

All of the gendered parallels discussed by theorists of gender and nationalism are embedded to various degrees in the way nativists create an “us versus them” dichotomy between natives/migrants and the home country/outside political influences. They also appear in the way they approach the role of the state and its “obligation” to protect its citizens. Lastly, they manifest themselves more explicitly in attempts to safeguard society from “Western/leftist/feminist³³” influences that seek to undermine traditional gender roles and/or

³³ Whichever one of these terms gets used is going to depend on the space and context. For instance, people in the United States who are against the push away from traditional gender norms are not likely to blame “Western” influences for such a phenomenon, while perhaps

question heteronormativity. All of this messaging easily maps onto second-nature beliefs about public versus private, protector versus protected, who should be dominant versus who should be submissive (etc.) that are all gendered either masculine or feminine — but not always in immediately obvious ways.

The debates surrounding inter-ethnic, inter-faith relations and/or immigration are the quintessential example of a political issue that is frequently (and easily) implicitly gendered by nativists. Their characterizations of migrants and/or minority men situate them in a contradictory space wherein they are both subordinate (and therefore feminized) vis-à-vis the hegemonic masculinity of the nation-state, but also a hyper-masculine threat to the purity of the nation's women (and therefore the whole of the nation itself).

By allowing outsiders to infiltrate the state and (potentially) sully the nation, the state also risks emasculation. This in turn reaffirms the nation's status as an acceptable candidate for protection (Bracewell 2000; Munn 2008; Norocel 2013). Layered throughout this scenario of course are the paradoxical ways in which masculinity and femininity can operate depending on what role is being played by whom. There is a hierarchy of masculinity that privileges the customs of the native state and its men, and a parallel hierarchy of femininity that venerates the native nation and its women. As long as each group operates within its acceptable gendered roles, order can be maintained.

Among individuals who hold traditional beliefs about gender roles and norms, these messages align comfortably with the way they already view the world as gendered, and in turn helps form the basis of their beliefs about how society “should” be arranged. If it is the men's role to protect women, by extension it seems perfectly logical that a strong, militarized state

someone in Poland might.

should protect the much more fragile nation (particularly its cisgendered women citizens) from danger, whether it be from invading migrants, nefarious political entities, or outside influences that question the inherent gender order. In this way, the state, as opposed to father, truly knows best. Nativists can then draw on this familial language to reinforce the idea of the “people” as a community that can only be reproduced via the traditional family (Norocel 2013).

The above considerations point strongly to gender being a powerful lens through which to understand nationalism. I contend that politicians, pundits, and voters alike draw on these gendered components of nationalism routinely. To define the term, “gendered nationalism” can then be understood as a broader psychological framework through which individuals perceive, both implicitly and explicitly, the nation-state in traditionally-gendered ways. As a result, gender traditionalists should be more likely to express beliefs about how the nation-state is structured that align neatly with their opinions about gender hierarchies and traditional gender norms. Stated formally:

H1a: *Compared to those with more gender egalitarian attitudes, individuals with stronger gender traditionalist attitudes will be more likely to hold gendered nationalist beliefs.*

Given the increasing partisan divide between Republicans and Democrats in the United States, with Republicans being more likely to endorse more conservative opinions on gender and nationalism, I expect the relationship between gender traditionalism and gendered nationalism to vary by party identification. Stated formally:

H1b: *Compared to gender traditional Democrats and Independents, Republicans with stronger gender traditional attitudes will be more likely to hold gendered*

nationalist beliefs.

The alignment between gender traditionalism and gendered nationalism has implications for a variety of political phenomena, particularly immigration. Because of the salience immigration holds among nativists, it is an ideal topic through which to test my theory that gendered nationalism, rooted in a gender traditional worldview, is an important component of public opinion. From here I will provide a brief overview of the literature on public opinion towards immigration and discuss how it intersects with gender attitudes before turning to my empirical analyses.

Beliefs about Gender and Immigration

Historically, scholarship on public opinion and immigration has been divided between two camps, one that posits that native citizens will be opposed to immigrants who threaten their material self-interest (e.g. Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter 2007; Mayda 2006; Scheve & Slaughter 2001) and another that argues that the sociocultural “ingroup/outgroup” dynamics of factors like language, religion, and/or race and ethnicity make natives less likely to be receptive to “outsiders” (e.g. Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008; Citrin et al. 1997; Lawrence and Sears 2000). Recent scholarship in political science has attempted to put these camps into broader conversation, primarily utilizing conjoint (also known as factorial) experiments to look at attitudes towards immigrants from a multi-causal perspective (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Valentino et al. 2019).³⁴

Within the “in-group/out-group” literature of immigration opinion, most of the scholarship related to gender has focused on the differences in anti-immigrant beliefs between

³⁴ Observational work has also trended in this direction, e.g. Halikiopoulous and Vlandas (2020).

men and women (François and Magni-Berton 2013; Givens 2004),³⁵ and culture-based arguments that pit Western norms surrounding gender equality against the seemingly more gender traditional norms of immigrant populations (Farris 2017; Ponce 2017; Spierings, Lubbers, & Zaslove 2017). While this work is vital to understanding *some* of the gendered dimensions of anti-immigration attitudes and xenophobia writ large, they do not take full stock of the gendered psychological dimensions pertinent to immigration. As I outlined in the previous section, femininity and masculinity are intertwined in our conceptualizations of the nation-state in very meaningful ways—some of which directly intersect with how people perceive migrants and other “outsiders.” By neglecting the ways in which gendered understandings of the nation and the state shape opinion towards immigrants and immigration, we do not capture the entirety of gender’s influence on our beliefs or behaviors.

I contend that gender is central to understanding the commonplace linkage between nationalism and xenophobia. To fully understand how this works, one must sequentially examine the relationships between gender traditionalist attitudes, gendered nationalist attitudes, and immigration related opinions. If gender traditionalism is linked to gendered nationalism as I hypothesize, we should expect gender traditionalists to express support for anti-immigrant policies and beliefs. Furthermore, we should also expect gendered nationalism to significantly mediate the relationship between gender traditionalism and nativism due to the psychological congruency between gender traditionalism and gendered nationalism that I have outlined in this paper. Stated formally:

³⁵ I should note here that much of this work is technically focused on the sex gap in voting for radical right parties in Europe and not anti-immigration attitudes specifically. That said, the nativist agenda of these parties makes this a good proxy for anti-immigrant attitudes more broadly.

H2: *Compared to gender egalitarians, individuals with stronger gender traditionalist attitudes will be more likely to hold anti-immigrant beliefs.*

H3: *Compared to those who are not gendered nationalist, individuals with stronger gendered nationalist attitudes will be more likely to hold anti-immigrant beliefs.*

H4: *Gendered nationalism significantly mediates the relationship between gender traditionalism and anti-immigrant beliefs.*

Study One: Gender Traditionalism and Support for Gendered Nationalism

Data for this study came from the 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES), which was administered by YouGov to 50,000+ people across two waves (pre- and post-election) in the fall of 2020 (Schaffner et al. 2021). I contributed three novel questions regarding gendered nativist attitudes on the survey, which were shown to a subset of 1,000 respondents on the University of Virginia's module. These questions are ideal for the purposes of this paper, as they allow me to directly assess the relationship between holding traditional gender attitudes and expressing support for the xenophobic and nationalist beliefs that underlie gendered nativism.

Dependent Variables

The three novel questions mentioned above comprise the dependent variables in this study. Each of them attempts to capture the implicitly gendered structure of the nation-state in ways that speak to traditional constructions of gender. All respondents were asked "how much do you agree with the following statement," after which they selected from responses ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" for each question. The first asked respondents to

react to the assertion “[a] nation’s people belong together in their shared homeland.” The following two questions were “[a]s heads of their countries, political leaders' unique authority should be respected above all others when it comes to politics” and “[e]ntities like the United Nations threaten the survival of nations by interfering with leaders trying to do what's best for their country.”

The first question frames the nation in a manner that invokes the literal space in which a family resides. The word “homeland” is particularly explicit here, bringing to mind a physical place (i.e. the private home) where a family (i.e. the nation) gathers. In this conceptualization, the nation has a sense of rootedness both as a psychoanalytic construct and as a group that belongs in a literal space. The second question draws upon conceptualizations of the traditional family structure wherein the father is the “head” and therefore the public face and authority of a household. The political leader [i.e. father] holds a level of influence over a country that elevates his opinions about its trajectory over all others. Lastly, the third question invokes a feminine/masculine dichotomy in its portrayal of the [feminine] nation facing a threat from outside entities, which has the potential to [emasculate] interfere with the role of [father] leaders trying to do “what’s best” (an homage to the “father knows best” 20th century American colloquialism).

These questions were combined into one scale and normalized to run from 0-1, with higher values indicating greater levels of support for gendered nationalism. Exploratory analyses confirmed the scale is statistically reliable.³⁶ The mean score on the scale for the full dataset was

³⁶ Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.6576; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO): 0.655; Bartlett’s Test ($p < .001$); Eigen value 1.172; all factor loadings $> .5500$.

.46 and the median was .5, which indicates that the average respondent in the sample was mostly neutral in terms of their gendered nationalist beliefs.

Independent Variable

The gender attitudes index for this dataset was constructed with one question taken from the ambivalent sexism scale developed by Glick and Fiske (1997) and two questions taken from the gender-role battery fielded as part of the American National Election Studies:

- Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives
- A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.
- It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.

One additional question was added from the list of gender role questions utilized on the European Values Study (2019):³⁷

- A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.

Exploratory analyses confirmed the scale is statistically reliable.³⁸ For the analyses presented in this paper, the scale was normalized to run from 0-1, with higher values indicating higher levels

³⁷ This scale does not significantly deviate in reliability from the full ambivalent sexism scale developed by Glick and Fiske. I focus on questions here that deal explicitly with the public/private divide that defines the traditional family arrangement.

³⁸ Cronbach's Alpha: 0.6919; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO): 0.676; Bartlett's Test ($p < .001$); Eigen value 1.704; all factor loadings $> .4000$.

of support for gender traditionalism. The mean score for the full dataset was .33 and the median was .31. These numbers indicate that the average respondent in the sample trended more gender egalitarian than traditional.

Controls

All multivariate models in this study control for age, sex, race, education, partisanship, political ideology, racial resentment, the importance of religion in the respondent's life, and a proxy for general attitudes towards immigrants. Full details about the question wording and coding for these variables can be found in Appendix A.

Results

Does gender traditionalism predict support for gendered nationalism? To answer this question, I first estimate an ordinary least squares regression looking at the bivariate relationship between the two variables. The results are presented in Model 1 of Table B1 in Appendix B. This analysis provides support for **H1a**, as holding more gender traditional attitudes is associated with being more gendered nationalist ($\beta = 0.54$, $SE = .03$, $p = <0.001$). This finding holds in the fully specified model that includes the control variables held at their means (Model 2 in Table B1, Appendix B).

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the linear predictions of supporting gendered nationalism as one identifies as more gender traditional. As the graph illustrates, gender traditionalists have a much higher probability of holding gendered nationalist beliefs. Those at the highest levels of gender traditionalism have a .67 predicted value on the gendered nationalism scale, while those at the lowest level have a .36 predicted value — a 31 percentage

point difference. This suggests that, all else equal, being more gender traditional increases the likelihood that an individual will also be a gendered nationalist.





Figure 1: Predicted attitudes about support for gendered nationalism across the range of gender attitudes. Control variables are held at their means. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

Turning to the relationship between party identification, gender attitudes, and support for gendered nationalism, I first plot the average values on both the gender attitudes and gendered nationalism scales for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. As Figure 2 graphically demonstrates, Republicans in the sample hold higher average gender attitudes (.44) and gendered nationalist attitudes (.59) than both Democrats (.24, .38) and Independents (.33, .45).

Figure 2: Average gender attitudes and gendered nationalism scores across Party ID.



Contrary to **H1b**, however, gender traditionalism does not exert the greatest “effect” on a Republican’s likelihood of expressing more gendered nationalist beliefs. While being more gender traditional increases the likelihood of supporting gendered nationalism regardless of party identification, it has the largest impact on Democrats (Figure 3).³⁹ The difference in the marginal effect of gender traditionalism is statistically significant between Democrats and Republicans (but not for Independents paired with either).

³⁹ .42 for Democrats, .31 for Independents, and .21 for Republicans. See Table B2 in the Appendix for the full model these marginal effects are derived from, as well as the predicted margins (Table B3).




Figure 3: Predicted attitudes about support for gendered nationalism across the range of gender attitudes by respondent Party ID. Control variables are held at their means. The spiked region represents the 95% confidence interval.


The results in this section, while structurally consistent with my theory, still do not have direct bearing on my argument that it is partly because people implicitly see the nation as being gendered feminine (and ergo something that needs to be protected from outside threats) that they are drawn to a nativist ideology. To explore this concept further and test my remaining hypotheses, I present a second study to dig deeper into the implicit connections between traditional gender attitudes and nativism.

Study Two: Gendered Nationalism and Immigration

Study 1 looked at the association between gender traditionalism and gendered nationalism. In Study 2 I turn my focus to testing whether or not both sets of attitudes predict anti-immigrant

attitudes, and whether or not gendered nationalism mediates the relationship between gender traditionalism and anti-immigrant attitudes (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Predicted Mediation of Gendered Nationalism on Border Attitudes



Dependent Variable

To capture anti-immigrant attitudes, I employ a proxy variable from the 2020 CES module that asks respondents whether they support or oppose the following statement: “increase spending on border security by \$25 billion, including building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico.” This question invokes the idea that immigrants present a threat to the U.S. by using the word “security,” and entreats respondents to think about a literal barrier between the U.S. and the southern border (which would objectively prevent migrants from entering).

Results

Using probit regression models,⁴⁰ I first look at the bivariate relationships between the gender traditionalism and gendered nationalism scales and support for funding and building a border wall. The results, which are reported in Models 1 and 2 in Table B4, provide support for

⁴⁰ I estimate probit versus logistic regression models in Study 2 in order to conduct the sensitivity analyses required for the mediation analysis. As a robustness check, I calculated logistic regression models separately. These models did not differ from the probit models presented in the paper.

H2 and **H3**. Both gender traditionalism and gendered nationalism have a statistically significant and positive relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes ($\beta = 3.06$, $SE = .24$, $p = <0.001$; $\beta = 3.36$, $SE = 2.4$, $p = <0.001$). I expect, however, for the role of gender traditionalism in predicting support for the border wall to be mediated by the presence of gendered nationalism (**H4**). In order to assess this, I conduct two complementary mediation analyses.

In keeping with the approach outlined by Reuben Baron and David Kenny (1986), I estimated models regressing gender traditionalism on support for the border wall both with and without gendered nationalism (the hypothesized mediator). Model 3 in Table B4 displays the fully specified model sans gendered nationalism. Here gender traditionalism remains highly predictive of support — even when controlling for party identification and racial resentment. Once gendered nationalism is included (Model 4 in Table B4), however, the coefficient for gender traditionalism is no longer statistically significant.⁴¹

In order to better estimate the proportion of gender traditionalisms impact when mediated by gendered nationalism, I also draw on a mediation package developed by Tingley et al. (2014) that uses a bootstrap method to obtain standard errors and assess the statistical significance of the mediated effects from regression analyses.⁴² Mediation analysis of models looking at the relationship between the mediator (gendered nationalism) and the outcome (support for a border wall) estimate an average direct effect (ADE) of $\beta = 0.11$, $p = 0.09$ and an average mediation effect (AME) of $\beta = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$. The total effect of traditional gender attitudes on support for a border wall is $\beta = 0.22$, $p = 0.002$ (Figure 5). Ultimately, gendered nationalism mediates an

⁴¹ As a robustness check, I reran the model with a measure of hostile sexism (Glick and Fiske 1997). Doing so did not substantively alter the results.

⁴² This analysis was performed on the same models presented in Model 2 in Table B1 of Study 1, and Model 4 in Table B4 of Study 2.

estimated 50% of the association between traditional gender attitudes and support for the border wall.⁴³




Figure 5: Mediation analysis of the relationship between gender traditionalism and support for a border wall through gendered nationalism. Control variables are held at their means. The spiked region represents the 95% confidence interval.

⁴³ Because mediation analysis imposes a strong assumption of sequential ignorability (see Imai, Keele & Yamamoto 2010), I conducted a sensitivity analysis to find and estimate that in order for my average mediation effect to equal zero, the error terms of my mediation and outcome models would need to be correlated at 0.30 (see Figure 6 in Appendix C).

Discussion and Conclusions

Seventeen years after Karen Beckwith (2005) defined gender as a political “category” and a “process,” we still have so much to learn about how gender operates, both within our institutions and within our minds. For many individuals, the traditional gender order is a prominent lens through which they view the world (Winter 2008). When this lens intersects with the nation-state, it has the potential to influence opinion about seemingly ungendered phenomena in both explicitly and implicitly gendered ways. In the case of the United States’ southern border with Mexico, for example, this can look like the explicitly gendered debates over citizenship for the children of “illegal” immigrants (Leach 2022), or it may operate on an implicit dimension that sees the border as a metaphor for the nation’s vulnerable women. The state, with its masculine weaponry and (preferably) male leadership, becomes its logical protector.

My analyses support two conclusions about the role of gendered nationalism in American public consciousness. First, holding traditional gender attitudes is a strong predictor of endorsing gendered nationalism. This can be attributed to the way the nation-state embodies various elements that align comfortably with traditional masculine and feminine norms (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989). This association persists despite the fact that traditional gender norms (such as the salience of the public/private domain) have slowly eroded in everyday life in the face of greater support for gender equality. Americans still view the prototypical American as masculine (Van Berkel, Molina, and Mukherjee 2017), and beliefs about the increasing “softness” and feminization of America independently predict support for voting for Donald Trump in 2016 (Deckman and Cassesen 2021). However, my analysis demonstrates this gendering need not be explicit in its references to masculinity or femininity in order to appeal to gender traditionalists. Gender traditionalists expressed high levels of support for statements that made no mention of

men or women, masculinity or femininity, or a variety of very obviously gendered concepts (such as pregnancy or childbirth).

This result held across Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, but perhaps most intriguingly, gender traditionalism exerted the highest “impact” on support for gendered nationalism among Democrats. While this may come as surprise to some given the partisan sorting that has made the Republican party in the United States somewhat synonymous with more conservative opinions towards gender and the nation, my results suggest that gender traditionalism has the capacity to influence beliefs across the partisan divide. This is also in keeping with prior work by Olyvia Christley (2021), which found that gender traditionalism predicts support for the radical right among both nativists and non-nativists.

Second, I find that while gender traditionalism and gendered nationalism both predict support for anti-immigrant beliefs, the relationship between gender traditionalism and these beliefs is heavily mediated by the presence of gendered nationalism — even while controlling for racial attitudes and party identification. My results *suggest* that gendered nationalism is an important component of support for anti-immigrant policies such as support for a border wall on the southern border of the United States. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first times an analysis has sought to understand how gendered nationalism works both alongside and through traditional gender attitudes.

A significant limitation of this paper is that the studies presented within are not causal in nature. While the mediation analysis presented *suggests* that gendered nationalism mediates the relationship between gender traditionalism and anti-immigrant attitudes, the data is ultimately observational in nature and incapable of making truly causal claims. Further research that examines the priming effect of gendered nationalism in an experimental setting is needed to fully

grasp its potential to serve as a causal mechanism. If my theorizing about the nation and gender is correct, we should expect gender traditionalists to be more drawn to policy preferences and candidates who reflect a gendered nationalist framework.

These findings contribute to a growing scholarship that highlights the importance of taking gender attitudes into account when exploring explanations for a variety of political phenomena (Christley 2021; Deckman and Cassese 2021; Schneider and Bos 2019). As traditional gender norms give way to post-materialist values that prioritize gender egalitarianism and greater rights for LGBTQ+ individuals throughout much of the world, the growing “backlash” against these more progressive values has brought increasing attention to the primacy of gender in shaping individual beliefs and preferences (Kováts 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Paternotte and Kuhar 2018). This paper highlights the role of gendered nationalism amidst these beliefs and preferences, and serves as another reminder that gender is omnipresent in our perceptions — whether at home or amongst the nation.

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Appendix A: Survey Measures

- Age
 - Continuous measure ranging from 1925-2002. Measured by birth year. Provided by YouGov.
- Sex
 - Binary. 1 = male, 0 = female. Provided by YouGov.
- Racial identification
 - Eight category ordinal measure. 1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Hispanic, 4 = Asian, 5 = Native American, 6 = Two or more races, 7 = Other, 8 = Middle Eastern. Provided by YouGov.
- Level of education
 - Six category ordinal measure. 1 = No HS, 2 = High school graduate, 3 = some college, 4 = 2-year degree, 5 = 4-year degree, 6 = Post-grad degree. Provided by YouGov.
- Partisan Identification
 - Three category ordinal measure. 1 = Democrat, 2 = Independent, 3 = Republican. Provided by CES.
- Ideological Identification
 - Seven category measure. 1 = Very liberal, 2 = Liberal, 3 = Somewhat Liberal, 4 = Middle of the road, 5 = Somewhat Conservative, 6 = Conservative, 7 = Very conservative. Provided by CES.
 - Question wording: Rate Ideology -- Yourself
- Racial Resentment
 - Normalized (from 0 – 1) index measure comprised of 4 items. Higher values equate to greater levels of racial resentment. Items featured 5 pt. Likert scales of agreement.
 - Item 1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors
 - Item 2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class
 - Item 3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten than they deserve
 - Item 4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites
- Importance of Religion (Pew version)
 - Four category ordinal measure. 1 = Very important, 2 = Somewhat important, 3 = Not too important, 4 = Not at all important. Provided by CES.
 - Question wording: How Important is Religion in Your Life?
- Attitudes towards Immigrants
 - Binary. 1 = support, 2 = oppose. Provided by CES.
 - Question wording: Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.

Appendix B: Tables

Table B1: OLS Regression Results for Study 1

	(Model 1) Gendered Nationalism	(Model 2) Gendered Nationalism
Gender Scale	.538*** (.032)	.315*** (.039)
Sex		.065*** (.014)
Education		-.011** (.005)
Political Ideology		.017*** (.005)
Race		.016*** (.005)
Birth Year		0.0004 (0.0004)
Religion Importance		-.012* (.007)
Racial Resentment		.186*** (.03)
Party ID		-.015** (.007)
Immigrant Attitudes		-.022 (.018)
Constant	.285*** (.013)	-.761 (.826)
Observations	826	774
R-squared	.254	.406

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Table B2: OLS Regression Results for Study 1 (Party ID*Gender Attitudes Model)

Gendered Nationalism	Coef.	St. Err.	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
Gender Scale	.218	.063	3.43	.001	.093	.342 ***
Republican (Baseline)	0
Democrat	-.078	.042	-1.89	.06	-.16	.003 *
Independent	-.065	.043	-1.51	.131	-.149	.019
Republican* Gender Scale (Baseline)	0
Democrat*GS	.209	.086	2.42	.016	.04	.378 **
Independent*GS	.094	.09	1.05	.296	-.082	.27
Mean dependent var.		0.464	SD dependent var.			0.240
R-squared		0.405	Number of obs.			721
F-test		36.994	Prob. > F			0.000
Controls		Yes				

Table B3: Predicted Margins (Party ID*Gender Attitudes Model)

Predictive Margins		Number of obs. = 721	
Model VCE: OLS			
Expression: Linear prediction, predict()			
1. at:	Gender Scale = 0		
	Party ID = 1		
2. at:	Gender Scale = 0		
	Party ID = 2		
3. at:	Gender Scale = 0		
	Party ID = 3		
4. at:	Gender Scale = .5		
	Party ID = 1		
5. at:	Gender Scale = .5		
	Party ID = 2		
6. at:	Gender Scale = .5		
	Party ID = 3		
7. at:	Gender Scale = 1		
	Party ID = 1		
8. at:	Gender Scale = 1		
	Party ID = 2		
9. at:	Gender Scale = 1		
	Party ID = 3		

Delta-method						
	Margin	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_at						
1	0.336	0.022	14.960	0.000	0.292	0.380
2	0.350	0.026	13.400	0.000	0.298	0.401
3	0.414	0.032	13.030	0.000	0.352	0.477
4	0.549	0.019	29.410	0.000	0.513	0.586
5	0.505	0.018	28.860	0.000	0.471	0.540
6	0.523	0.019	27.770	0.000	0.486	0.560
7	0.763	0.046	16.400	0.000	0.671	0.854
8	0.661	0.048	13.850	0.000	0.568	0.755
9	0.632	0.041	15.270	0.000	0.551	0.713

Table B4: Probit Regression Results for Study 2

	(Model 1) Border Spending	(Model 2) Border Spending	(Model 3) Border Spending	(Model 4) Border Spending
Gender Scale	3.061*** (.240)		1.288*** (.365)	.666 (.389)
Gendered Nationalism		3.357*** (2.47)		2.001*** (.391)
Sex			.125 (.139)	-.034 (.147)
Education			-.045 (.046)	-.037 (.048)
Political Ideology			.237*** (.052)	.229*** (.054)
Race			.071 (.055)	.034 (.057)
Birth Year			.001 (.004)	.001 (.004)
Religion: Importance			-.067 (.064)	-.056 (.067)
Racial Resentment			2.459*** (.274)	2.309*** (.283)
Democrat			-.535*** (.169)	-.621*** (.177)
Republican			.351** (.167)	.27 (.174)
Constant			-5.058 (8.155)	-5.166 (8.514)
Observations			783	776
Pseudo R ²			.552	.58

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, .

Appendix C: Sensitivity Analysis




Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis for Study 2 results. Control variables are held at their means. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

Chapter Four: Stand Up and Fight Like a Real Man! Traditional Gender Attitudes and Support for Political Violence

Traditional gender attitudes may become associated with political violence when anxiety and feelings of victimhood as they relate to gender are ignited (either explicitly or implicitly). Using original survey data collected in the United States, I examine whether or not gender traditionalists are more likely to endorse political violence than gender egalitarians. I discover that gender traditionalists are in fact more likely than gender egalitarians to express support for political violence against the state *and* ordinary citizens. Furthermore, while both gender traditional men and women express higher levels of support for both types of political violence than their egalitarian counterparts, gender egalitarian men have a slightly lower likelihood of expressing support for violence against ordinary citizens than gender egalitarian women.

“The crisis of American men is a crisis for the American republic. It’s not just that millions of men out of work slows our innovation and economic growth. It’s not just the billions of dollars in welfare payments these idle men cost the federal government year on year. It’s not only the depression and darkness that now shadow so many. It’s that liberty requires virtue. And in particular, it requires the manly virtues. America needs good men. The liberty of a republic is a demanding thing. To keep a republic, you have to be willing to fight for it.”

– United States Senator Josh Hawley, November 1, 2021

The January 6, 2021 riot at the United States Capitol capped off a decade of increasing incidents of domestic terrorism in the United States (O’Harrow Jr., Ba Tran, and Hawkins 2021). From the shooting at a practice session for the annual Congressional Baseball Game for Charity in 2017 that left six people injured (Beitsch 2021), to the plot to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and create a “civil war” in 2020 (Egan and Baldas 2020), the United States has not faced domestic terror threats to this degree in over a quarter-century. Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has labeled domestic and/or homegrown violent extremists the “greatest threat we face in the homeland” (Wray 2020), while the Department of Homeland Security has labeled them “the most significant and persistent terrorism-related threat” currently facing America today (Department of Homeland Security 2021).

All of these events provide the backdrop for an increasing body of evidence that suggests support for political violence might be on the rise (Bartels 2020; Kalmoe & Mason 2022; Uscinski et. al, 2021). This development may be part of a broader trend of democratic backsliding (Kingzette et al. 2021) that appears to be taking deep root in both developing and well-established democracies across the world (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Waldner & Lust 2018). Alongside this shift towards more anti-democratic political positions is a concurrent “cultural backlash” to post-materialist values that have gained a strong foothold in the Western world over the last half-century (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Radical-right wing parties and civil society groups, which espouse an ideology that “tactically undercut[s] the liberal normative

framework of democracy from within” (Bytlas 2018, 4), have been vocal advocates of this backlash since its inception.

The radical right is particularly explicit in its condemnation of what it views as the increasing hostility in the West towards the heteronormative nuclear family and its prominence in society (Dietze and Roth 2020). In a speech titled the “Future of the American Man,” Josh Hawley, a junior United States Senator who rose to prominence following the January 6th Capitol Insurrection due to his apparent support for the insurrectionists, lamented the villainization of masculinity in America, and made clear that he believes traditionally masculine men are needed to “fight” for the preservation of America’s republic (Hawley 2021). This sense of victimization at the hands of the progressive left is not unique to the United States. “Self-victimizing” language is a common feature of radical right discourse around gender in the European Parliament (Kantola and Lombardo 2020), and gender resentment—or the idea that women have unfair social, cultural, and economic advantages over men— and other gender-related concerns have also been linked to voting for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union in 2017, particularly among men (Green and Shorrocks 2021).

Individuals who espouse traditional gender attitudes appear to be drawn to radical right parties—even when they do not hold the nativist beliefs foundational to the radical right’s ideology (Christley 2021). Although a complete explanation as to why still eludes us, it seems likely that a growing sense of perceived victimhood as it relates to traditional gender attitudes may be a part of the ideology’s appeal. That is, those who subscribe to traditional gender norms and beliefs have likely internalized political rhetoric, much of which emanates from far-rightwing parties and factions, that such traditional beliefs are under attack. This is important because we know that feelings of grievance or perceived victimhood have been linked to

political violence (Armaly, Buckley, & Enders 2022; Detges 2017; Dyrstad & Hillesund 2020; Miodownik and Nir 2016). Coupled with evidence that traditional gender attitudes have been linked to greater support for sexual and other physical violence against women (York 2011), it stands to reason that holding traditional gender attitudes may be linked to broader support for political violence as well.

In this paper, I advance a theory that links traditional gender attitudes to greater acceptance of political violence, whether directed towards the state or ordinary citizens. Drawing on feminist theory and criminology studies, I argue that traditional gender attitudes may become associated with political violence when anxiety and feelings of victimhood as they relate to gender are ignited (either explicitly or implicitly). I then use original data collected in the United States (U.S.) to examine whether or not gender traditionalists are more likely to endorse political violence than gender egalitarians. I discover that gender traditionalists are in fact more likely to express support for political violence against the state *and* ordinary citizens than egalitarians. Furthermore, while both gender traditional men and women express higher levels of support for both types of political violence than their egalitarian counterparts, gender egalitarian men are slightly less likely to express support for violence against ordinary citizens than their female counterparts. These results speak to the growing evidence that gender attitudes are an important component of public opinion, and have implications for our approach to combating domestic terrorism threats in the years to come.

Attitudes Towards Political Violence in the United States

Despite being a feature of American political life since its founding, political violence—particularly from a behavioral perspective—was rarely a topic of mainstream political science

research for most of the 20th and well into the 21st century.⁴⁴ As a result, we know relatively little about American's attitudes towards the subject. Recent work has linked support for political violence in America to party identity strength and trait aggression (Kalmoe and Mason 2022), autocratic and dominance orientations (Bartusevičius, van Leeuwen, and Petersen 2020), partisan incivility and the use of violent metaphors in political rhetoric, (Kalmoe 2014; Muddiman, Warner, and Schumacher-Rutherford 2020), and various components of Christian Nationalism—including perceived victimhood (Armaly, Buckley, and Enders 2022).

What we do know, however, is that there is a deep sense of nostalgic deprivation, or a “discrepancy between individuals’ understandings of their current status and their perceptions about their past” (Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018, 1696) amongst supporters of the radical right in the United States. This is meaningful, because feelings of deprivation (whether real or imagined) and grievance have already been linked to support for political violence elsewhere in the world (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020; Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur 2007). These feelings of loss as they relate to traditional gender norms and the heteronormative family structure are one area that may lead individuals to be more supportive of political violence. The next section of the paper takes up this argument in greater detail.

Traditional Gender Attitudes and Support for Political Violence

Although research looking at relationship between gender attitudes and political behavior is still in its infancy, we do know that the impact of gender does not end at one's gender identity or consciousness, but also encompasses the ways in which feelings and beliefs about masculinity and femininity shape how people view the world more broadly (e.g. Christley 2021; Deckman

⁴⁴ Important exceptions to this include Graham and Gurr 1969, Stohl 1975, and Rasler 1986.

and Cassese 2021; Schneider and Bos 2019; Winter 2008). For those who see the world through a more “traditional” gendered lens, their beliefs are likely to align with traditional conceptualizations of masculinity and femininity that align 1:1 on male and female bodies and are seen as biologically inherent. In contrast, those who have a more “egalitarian” gendered lens are likely to see these binaries between masculinity and femininity as socially constructed and far from immutable (let alone inherent to any particular body) (Winter 2008).

Professed adherence to traditional gender roles has been linked to greater acceptance of “rape myths”⁴⁵ and other violent sexual and physical attitudes towards women at the individual level (Herrero et al. 2017; Hill and Marshall 2018; Johnson, Kuck and Schander 1997; Singh and Aggarwal 2020). They are also predictive of forcible sex offenses and physical and/or domestic violence committed against women (York 2011). Although the exact causal relationship between these attitudes and violence towards women has not been fully isolated, it stands to reason that being socialized into a patriarchal value system that prioritizes hypermasculinity and puts women in an inferior position relative to men (both publicly and privately) likely plays a significant role (York 2011).⁴⁶

Gabrielle Bardall, Elin Bjarnegård, and Jennifer Piscopo (2019) argue that political violence, which they define as any harm or attack that “perpetrators intend to disrupt political processes” (923) can be gendered in three different ways: gendered motives, gendered forms, and gendered impacts. Gendered motives occur when “perpetrators commit violence to preserve

⁴⁵ The justification, minimization, and concurrent rationalization of the raping of women (York 2011)

⁴⁶ While studies looking at the relationship between committing intimate partner violence (IPV) and other acts of criminal violence are relatively sparse, preliminary evidence suggests that there is some overlap between individuals who been convicted of both (Piquero, Theobald, and Farrington 2013).

the gendered order of power.”⁴⁷ The authors are primarily concerned with violence intended to explicitly keep women and others out of the political arena, but I contend that we can imagine a world where “the gendered order of power” does not need to map solely onto more overt efforts to keep politics an exclusively hegemonically masculine space. It may also exist in a subtler, yet much more expansive space, where the gendered order of power does not just apply to men and women in politics but how masculinity and femininity are constructed and regarded throughout society.

Radical right parties in Europe obsess over “the gendered order of power,” and have been warning of the dangers of the “gender ideology”⁴⁸ for over a decade (Pető 2015). A similar narrative has begun to enter mainstream Republican discourse in the United States as well (Hawley 2021). Whether or not elites are instrumentality deploying this rhetoric or actually believe it (or both) is not entirely clear; but what is growing more apparent is that individuals who do not attitudinally align with the Western shift towards post-materialist values—including those favoring greater gender and sexual equality—over the last half-century are more likely to express support for radical rightwing parties (Christley 2021; Norris and Inglehart 2019). These parties are increasingly hostile towards democratic norms, which include the belief that violence is *not* an acceptable tool to achieve political ends. Notably, preliminary research out of Australia

⁴⁷ Political violence takes on a gendered form when “actors use gendered roles or tropes to carry out the attack” (926). Meanwhile, gendered impacts refer to the discriminate ways in which men and women experience political violence differently. While I do not address these two types of gendered political violence directly in this paper, it is important to note that there is a growing literature documenting and grappling with violence against women in politics (see Bjarnegård, Håkansson, and Zetterberg 2022; Håkansson 2021; Herrick and Thomas 2021; Krook 2018, 2020).

⁴⁸ It is hard to provide a definition for what “gender ideology” actually means, because it has taken on a catch-all quality for anything that the radical right sees as threatening to the heteronormative family structure (and the traditional gender roles and sexuality that are baked into it).

notes that holding anti-democratic views predicts support for political violence among both the left-wing, right-wing, and politically unaffiliated (Vergani et al. 2022).

A significant component of support for the radical right comes from its adherents' feelings of lack, grievance, and/or victimization originating from their perceived loss of cultural, political, and economic status throughout broader society (Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018; Gidon and Hall 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019). This sense of victimhood also extends to gender-related concerns. A key feature of gender-related backlash is the “denial of privilege” and/or the “counter-claim that it is now men who are disadvantaged” (Flood, Dragiewicz, and Pease 2020). As traditional gender roles continue to fade and male dominance is no longer taken for granted, individuals who find themselves outside of this cultural shift (particularly gender traditional men) may be more likely to view themselves as “in crisis” or as victims (Schmitz and Kazyak 2016), which in turn can have real political implications. For instance, fears that men are being discriminated against has been linked to voting for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union in 2016—particularly among men (Green and Shorrocks 2021). In the United States, the belief that female candidates would be more likely to direct government resources to women predicted opposition to Hillary Clinton in the 2008 Democratic primary campaign (Goldman 2018). A recent study in Sweden found that a subset of individuals with authoritarian, anti-immigrant, and anti-egalitarian views (i.e. “radical rightists”) perceived feminism as a security threat (Olsson Gardell, Wagnsson, and Wallenius 2022).⁴⁹

Given the close connections between perceived victimhood and support for the radical right, it appears logical that traditional gender attitudes—another conduit of support for the

⁴⁹ Although the authors could not provide a definitive explanation as to why, I would argue that it may be in part due to the perceived threat feminists pose to “gendered ordered of power” referenced previously.

radical right and a set of attitudes linked to victimhood—would also be positively associated with support for political violence. When you add to this the finding that traditional gender attitudes are already tied to acts of gender-based violence towards women, and political violence itself is associated with feelings of grievance and victimhood, it becomes clear that there are a variety of pathways that may link traditional gender attitudes to expressing greater affinity for political violence. Stated formally:

H1: *Compared to those with more gender egalitarian attitudes, highly gender traditional individuals will be more likely to express support for the use of political violence against the state.*

Other recent work (Munis, Memovic, and Christley 2022) identified diverging outcomes between support for political violence against the state versus ordinary citizens, with those high in rural resentment being more likely to support the former but not the latter. In the gender context, I do not have strong priors against traditional gender attitudes also predicting support for political violence against ordinary citizens. If anything, the fact that we know traditional gender attitudes have already been linked to greater support and *actual instances* of violence towards women (York 2011) leads me to believe that traditional gender attitudes will also be indicative of support for political violence towards ordinary citizens. Stated formally:

H2: *Compared to those with more gender egalitarian attitudes, highly gender traditional individuals will be more likely to express support for the use of political violence against ordinary citizens.*

Given that men report higher levels of gender resentment, and that masculinity itself is linked with a greater propensity to commit violent acts, I also anticipate that gender traditional men will be more likely to support both forms of political violence than gender traditional women. Therefore, I expect the following:

H3: *Compared to highly gender traditional women, highly gender traditional men will be more likely to expressed support for political violence against the state.*

H4: *Compared to highly gender traditional women, highly gender traditional men will be more likely to expressed support for political violence against ordinary citizens.*

Data and Methods

The data for this study was collected via Lucid in November 2021. Lucid does not provide fully probabilistic samples, but does ensure that its respondents are largely representative of the U.S. adult population based on sex, age, race, and education. While recent work has largely validated the use of samples from Lucid to gauge political attitudes (Coppock and McClellan 2019), there are growing concerns that survey respondents are becoming more inattentive (Aronow et al. 2020). To mitigate this, and help preserve the quality of my data, I required respondents to complete three attention checks. The models reported include both the full sample of completed responses and completed responses minus inattentive respondents (defined as those who failed two or more attention checks out of three). Out of 3,000 recruited respondents, 2,401 completed the entire survey and 1,801 passed the required attention checks.

The results reported in each study are based on ordered logistic regressions. For ease of interpretation, I focus primarily on the predicted probabilities of the values of interest in the main body of the manuscript. Full tables of all the models can be found in the Appendices B and C.⁵⁰

Dependent Variables

Each study uses two dependent variables to capture support for political violence. The first is measured via a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “definitely not” to “definitely yes” in response to the question: “is violence ever appropriate when citizens believe something is wrong with their government?”⁵¹ The second is measured with three response categories (“No,” “Maybe, and “Yes”) in response to the question: “do you think it is ever justified for ordinary citizens to take up arms against other ordinary citizens for political reasons?”

Independent Variable

The gender attitudes scale was constructed using a subset of questions from the gender attitudes battery used on the European Values Study (2017). The five Likert-type items were selected to reflect a respondent’s opinion regarding the roles men and women should play in society and ranged from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (5). They were worded as follows:

- When a mother works for pay, the children suffer.
- A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children.
- All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.

⁵⁰ All the tables presented in this manuscript were created using *asdoc*, a Stata program written by Shah (2018).

⁵¹ This question was adapted from a poll conducted by Morning Consult in late January 2021: <https://morningconsult.com/form/tracking-voter-trust-in-elections/>

- A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.
- On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.

Exploratory analyses confirmed the scale is statistically reliable.⁵² For the analyses presented in this paper, the scale was normalized to run from 0-1, with higher values indicating higher levels of support for gender traditionalism.


Controls

All multivariate models in this study control for age, sex, race, education, partisanship, political ideology, racial animus, populist sentiment, southern residency, and rural residency. Full details about the question wording and coding for these variables can be found in Appendix A.

Results

Figure 1 displays the mean value for each of the two dependent variables across the full-range of the gender attitudes scale. As the figure demonstrates, higher levels of gender traditionalism are associated with higher levels of support for each type of political violence. Gender traditionalism is also positively correlated with support for both political violence against the state ($r=.4182$, $p<0.001$) and ordinary citizens ($r=.4561$, $p<0.001$).

⁵² Cronbach's Alpha: 0.8805; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (KMO): 0.840; Bartlett's Test ($p<.001$); Eigen value 2.995; all factor loadings $>.7000$.

Figure 1: Support for Political Violence Against the State and Ordinary Citizens

Note: This figure plots the average value on the political violence measures along the gender attitudes scale.

Turning to my regression models, I begin by looking at the bivariate relationship between gender traditionalism and support for political violence against the state, the results of which are presented in column one of Table B1 in Appendix B. My findings are consistent with **H1**: higher levels of gender traditionalism positively predict support for violence against the state ($B=2.04$, $SE=.176$, $p<0.001$). This finding holds in the fully specified model that includes the control variables held at their means (Model 3 in Table B1, Appendix B).⁵³

Figure 2 graphs the predicted probability and 95% confidence interval that an individual answered “definitely yes” to supporting political violence against the state across all potential values of the gender traditionalism scale, holding the other variables in the model at their observed values. Those at the highest level of gender traditionalism have a .126 predicted probability of selecting “definitely” yes, while the most gender egalitarian respondents have a .02 predicted probability—a 10.6 percentage point difference ($p<0.001$). These results indicate

⁵³ I include additional tables in the appendices that look at the same models in both studies using the full sample. Doing so does not substantively change the results, although the coefficients are larger in the full sample.

that, on average, gender traditionalists are significantly more likely to support politically violence against the state.




Figure 2: Predicted attitudes about support for violence against the state across the gender scale (attentive respondents only). Control variables are held at their means. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

In order to test **H2**, I repeat the analyses presented above using the violence against ordinary citizens measure as the dependent variable. The results for the bivariate model (column two in Table B2) show a positive, statistically significant correlation ($\beta = .2.77$, $SE = .202$, $p < 0.001$). In other words, higher levels of gender traditionalism also predict support for political violence directed towards ordinary citizens. Figure 3 displays the predicted probability and 95% confidence interval of this relationship. There is a 19.1 percentage point difference (.212 versus .021) between the most gender traditional and most gender egalitarian respondents.




Figure 3: Predicted attitudes about support for violence against ordinary citizens across the gender scale (attentive respondents only). Control variables are held at their means. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

Overall, these results provide strong evidence in support of both **H1** and **H2**. Gender traditionalism appears to be a significant avenue to support for political violence in the American context. In order to identify whether or not any of this relationship is conditional on respondent sex, and test **H3** and **H4**, I present results in the next section interacting respondent sex with the gender traditionalism scale for both dependent variables.

Respondent Sex and Support for Political Violence

Looking at the relationship between gender attitudes and support for political violence conditional on respondent sex, I find a divergence between the results for violence directed towards the state versus ordinary citizens. When respondent sex is interacted with the gender attitudes scale (Table B3), there is no statistically significant difference between men's and women's support for political violence towards the state (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Predicted attitudes about support for violence against the state across the gender scale (attentive respondents only), conditional on respondent sex. Control variables are held at their means. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

There is, however, a statistically significant difference between men's and women's support for political violence towards ordinary citizens along some of the values of the gender scale (Figure 5). The average marginal effect of gender attitudes on support for political violence directed towards ordinary citizens is higher for men at all levels of the gender scale except for the most

egalitarian. Here gender egalitarian males are *slightly less* likely than gender egalitarian females to answer yes ($p < 0.001$).




Figure 5: Predicted attitudes about support for violence against ordinary citizens across the gender scale (attentive respondents only), conditional on respondent sex. Control variables are held at their means. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

The difference between the most gender traditional men and gender traditional women is not statistically significant. It is not entirely clear why female egalitarians would be slightly more likely (two percentage points) to answer yes, but it may have something to do with the fact that gender egalitarian females may be more likely to embrace more masculine traits (such as violence) and/or gender egalitarian males may be more likely to embrace more feminine traits (such as eschewing violence).

In the attentive sample, there is no statistically significant difference between gender traditional men and women in terms of selecting “definitely yes” to supporting violence towards

ordinary citizens. There is, however, a significant difference in the non-attentive sample, which leaves **H4** as mostly inconclusive.

Discussion and Conclusions

The use of violence to influence political outcomes is in direct contradiction to well-established democratic principles that emphasize peaceful transfers of power and free and fair elections to settle political disputes. Unfortunately, democratic backsliding and the overall erosion of democratic norms appear to be on the rise in both developing and well-established democracies across the world (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Waldner & Lust 2018). Americans seem quick to abandon democratic principles when partisan victory is on the line (Graham & Svobik 2020), and preferences for undemocratic alternatives are rising among the younger cohort in a variety of European countries (Wuttke, Gavras, and Schoen 2020). These developments could have real implications for political instability, as individuals of all ideological backgrounds who embrace anti-democratic norms appear more likely to express support for political violence (Vergani et al. 2022).

At the forefront of this democratic erosion is the radical right in both Europe and the United States, some of whom have openly embraced the retreat of liberal democracy for what they label “illiberal” democracy (Mulder 2021; Reuters 2018b) and have taken outright steps to limit democratic participation (Mudde 2022; Slater 2022). There is a persistent, increasingly mainstream narrative amongst the radical right that traditional values, particularly those related to gender, are under attack by a progressive left (Hawley 2021). This backlash against “gender ideology” and what these individuals perceive as the devaluing of the traditional family are part of a broader narrative of victimhood and grievance—two sets of attitudes that have already been linked to greater affinity for political violence.

My results support several conclusions. First, gender traditionalism is positively associated with support for political violence against both the state and ordinary citizens. This finding is related but conceptually distinct from prior work that has focused on violence directed towards women in politics (Krook 2018, 2020; Bardall, Bjarnegård, and Piscopo 2020). While people certainly commit or express support for various acts of violence conditional on the victim's sex, my analyses underscore that gender does not only relate to violent *outcomes* but can also plays a role in *explaining* what may draw a person to express support for political violence. The questions asking about political violence in my surveys did not reference gender or sex explicitly, yet they still prompted gender traditionalists to express higher levels of support for both violence against the state and ordinary citizens.

Second, this relationship is not conditional on respondent sex for violence against the state, but is towards violence against ordinary citizens. Gender egalitarian men are slightly less likely to endorse violence against ordinary citizens than their female egalitarian counterparts. This is an important and intriguing finding, especially given what we know about the relationship between traditional gender attitudes and sexual assault or intimate partner violence. While the exact dimensions of this divergence between male and female egalitarians is not entirely clear, it may reflect both sexes being more willing to adopt more stereotypically feminine or masculine attitudes and actions. It is also worth noting that gender traditional men are more likely to support violence towards citizens than gender traditional women, but this difference is not statistically significant in the attentive sample.

These findings add to the increasing scholarship linking grievance and perceived deprivation to support for political violence, and underscore the fact that victimhood and resentment should be taken seriously as contributors to political animus and instability. While it

is easy to brush aside individual grievances and concerns, particularly if they are viewed as out-of-touch and misinformed, the reality is that *perceived* victimhood can matter just as much as legitimate victimhood in triggering negative feelings towards outgroups and, perhaps, towards increasing the likelihood that someone might endorse violence to rectify their political problems.

Of course, the studies presented in this paper are not without their flaws. Given the fact that my samples are not probabilistic, it would be preferable if additional questions looking at gender attitudes (versus just respondent sex or various measures of sexism) were included in mainstream, large-scale surveys (conducted within political science or elsewhere) that utilize probabilistic samples so that these studies could be replicated. Furthermore, as Sean Westwood et al. (2021) advise, surveys looking at attitudes towards political violence need to pay particular attention to the contextual details that shape individual violent episodes. While the attempt to separate out political violence towards the state versus ordinary citizens is a first step in this direction, future research should strive to be even more specific where appropriate.

It is also unclear what role elite cues play in stoking fears related to gender. Alarm over the erosion of “family values” or the appropriate roles that men and women should play (either in public or in private) is not unique to the 21st century (nor is political violence). Ideally we would be able to draw on data looking at the connection between these two sets of attitudes over time, while also putting them in conversation with elite rhetoric and imagery that may have been particularly salient during those years. While that may not be possible, future work can and should draw on experimental designs to ascertain what type of gendered messaging may be more or less likely to cue greater levels of support for political violence.

Overall, this paper provides further evidence that gender attitudes are an important and heretofore underacknowledged component of support for some of the most enduring and

important political questions of our time—including what may draw individuals to support political violence. The feelings of grievance and victimhood that define so many of our most politically charged attitudes, from rural resentment (Munis, Memovic, and Christley 2022) to Christian nationalism (Armaly, Buckley, and Enders 2022), are closely linked to feelings that may encourage people to express support for violence that upholds the status quo. It appears that we can also add traditional gender attitudes to this list.

Appendix

Appendix A: Survey Measures	101
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Appendix A: Survey Measures

- Age
 - Continuous measure ranging from 18-91. Measured in years. Provided by Lucid (data vendor).
- Gender identification
 - Binary. 1 = male, 0 = female. Provided by Lucid.
- Racial identification
 - Binary. 1 = white (non-Hispanic), 0 = non-white. Provided by Lucid.
- Level of education
 - Binary. 1 = four-year college degree or more, 0 = less than four-year degree. Provided by Lucid.
- Southern residency
 - Binary. 1 = lives in the South, 2 = does not live in the South. Provided by Lucid.
- Respondent income
 - Ordered categorical variable. 1 = less than \$35k, 2 = \$35k-69.9k, 3 = \$70k-99.9k, 4 = \$100k-149.9k, 5 = \$150k – 199.9k, 6 = \$200k – 249.9k, 7 = \$250k+. Provided by Lucid.
- Rural Identification
 - Binary. 1 = rural identifier, 0 = non-rural identifier.
 - Measured with the following question: “Thinking of the community where you live and spend most of your time, would you say that you live in an urban location, a rural location, or someplace in between?”
 - Collapsed categories “Very rural,” and “Somewhat rural” into rural = 1. All other categories (“Very urban,” “Somewhat urban,” and “Neither/Somewhere in between urban and rural”) coded as 0.
- Partisan Identification
 - Five category ordinal measure. 1 = Strong Democrat, 2 = Democrat (includes leaners), 3 = pure independent, 4 = Republican (includes leaners), 5 = Strong Republican. Provided by Lucid.
- Ideological Identification
 - Seven category measure. 1 = Extremely liberal, 2 = Liberal, 3 = Slightly liberal, 4 = Moderate; middle of the road, 5 = Slightly conservative, 6 = Conservative, 7 = Extremely conservative.
 - Question wording: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
- Rural resentment (Munis 2020)
 - Normalized (from 0 – 1) index measure comprised of 4 items. Higher values equate to greater levels of rural resentment. Items featured 5 pt. Likert scales of agreement. Item 1. Public schools focus too much on college prep instead of teaching the skills that matter for rural areas.

- Item 2. People in urban areas look down on my community.
 - Item 3. I feel that most political leaders in this country don't understand rural areas.
 - Item 4. Young people wouldn't have to move away from places like the community where I live if the government did more to help.
 - Munis, B. K. (2020). Us Over Here versus Them Over There... Literally: Measuring Place Resentment in American Politics. *Political Behavior*, 1-22.
- Anti-elite populism (Schulz et al. 2018)
 - Normalized (from 0 – 1) index measure comprised of 4 items. Higher values equate to levels of anti-elite populism. Items featured 5 pt. Likert scales of agreement.
 - Item 1. Members of Congress very quickly lose touch with ordinary people.
 - Item 2. The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people.
 - Item 3. People like me have no influence on what the government does.
 - Item 4. Politicians talk too much and take too little action.
 - Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2018). Measuring Populist Attitudes on Three Dimensions. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 30(2), 316-326.
- Racial prejudice against blacks.
 - 7 point sliding scale on which respondents rated Blacks as being from 1 = hardworking to 7 = lazy.

Appendix B: Regression Tables

Table B1: Ordered Logistic Regression Results (Attentive Respondents Only)

	(1) State Violence	(2) Citizen Violence	(3) State Violence	(4) Citizen Violence
Gender Scale	2.038*** (.176)	2.771*** (.202)	1.988*** (.21)	2.512*** (.239)
Age			-.043*** (.003)	-.044*** (.004)
Sex			.332*** (.098)	-.171 (.117)
Race			1.148 (.63)	1.434** (.592)
College Education			.3*** (.108)	.022 (.131)
Strong Democrat (Baseline)			-	-
Democrat			-.266 (.139)	-.657*** (.175)
Independent			.051 (.155)	-.192 (.183)
Republican			-.062 (.184)	-.363 (.222)
Strong Republican			-.011 (.183)	.088 (.204)
Ideology			-.061 (.037)	.005 (.042)
Racial Animus			.05* (.03)	.007 (.034)
Populism			.83*** (.258)	-.156 (.294)
Southern Residency			-.039 (.097)	-.126 (.116)
Income			.028 (.036)	.081* (.043)
Rural Residency			-.105 (.108)	-.119 (.133)

Cut 1: Constant	.926*** (.074)	2.072*** (.09)	-.641** (.284)	-.416 (.325)
Cut 2: Constant	1.666*** (.078)	3.946*** (.114)	.2 (.282)	1.423*** (.33)
Cut 3: Constant	2.848*** (.09)		1.535*** (.285)	
Cut 4: Constant	3.855*** (.105)		2.638*** (.298)	
Observations	2924	2924	1734	1734
Pseudo R ²	.062	.117	.088	.135

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table B2: Ordered Logistic Regression Results (Full Sample)

	(1) State Violence	(2) Citizen Violence	(3) State Violence	(4) Citizen Violence
Gender Scale	3.226*** (.144)	3.885*** (.163)	2.665*** (.171)	3.311*** (.195)
Age			-.042*** (.003)	-.045*** (.003)
Sex			.342*** (.084)	-.033 (.097)
Race			.225 (.543)	1.238*** (.478)
College Education			.3*** (.093)	-.049 (.107)
Strong Democrat (Baseline)			-	-
Democrat			-.381*** (.12)	-.543*** (.141)
Independent			-.11 (.128)	-.175 (.145)
Republican			-.208 (.157)	-.319* (.184)
Strong Republican			-.107 (.14)	-.028 (.154)
Ideology			-.076*** (.028)	-.018 (.03)
Racial Animus			.073*** (.024)	.056** (.027)
Populism			.954*** (.212)	-.125 (.236)
Southern Residency			.022 (.083)	-.089 (.095)
Income			.02 (.031)	.117*** (.035)
Rural Residency			-.197** (.096)	-.23** (.113)

Cut 1: Constant	.926*** (.074)	2.072*** (.09)	-.463** (.234)	-.144 (.26)
Cut 2: Constant	1.666*** (.078)	3.946*** (.114)	.33 (.232)	1.861*** (.265)
Cut 3: Constant	2.848*** (.09)		1.632*** (.235)	
Cut 4: Constant	3.855*** (.105)		2.791*** (.245)	
Observations	2924	2924	2305	2305
Pseudo R ²	.062	.117	.132	.202

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table B3: Ordered Logistic Regression Results (Sex*Gender Attitudes Models)

	(1) State Violence	(2) Citizen Violence
Female*Gender Scale (Baseline)	-	-
Male*Gender Scale	-.151 (.396)	1.282*** (.47)
Gender Scale	2.061*** (.286)	1.947*** (.314)
Female (Baseline)	-	-
Male	.393** (.189)	-.765*** (.249)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1734	1734
Pseudo R ²	.088	.138

Standard errors are in parentheses.

Attentive Respondents Only.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$

Chapter Five: Conclusion

This dissertation makes several important contributions to the literature on gender, political psychology, nativism, and illiberalism. First, it underscores the importance of taking gender attitudes seriously when evaluating public opinion. Across Europe and the United States, beliefs about masculinity and femininity and their proper expressions within society shape individuals' attitudes and patterns in very real and measurable ways. These beliefs extend far beyond traditional discussions over the sex gap in voting or debates over gender equity in politics. As I demonstrate, whether or not people hold more gender traditional or gender egalitarian attitudes influences their likelihood of supporting a variety of different opinions that, on their face, appear to have little to do with gender. Furthermore, this finding applies to individuals across a variety of divides—from men to women, nativists to non-nativists, and Democrats to Republicans. Given the historical tendency to relegate analyses that involve gender to subjects that have explicit connections to it (whether this be discussions about women in politics to scholarship looking at public policy in regards to “women’s” issues), this dissertation provides wide-ranging evidence that gender’s influence extends well beyond the obvious or the clichéd, and we should take care to better incorporate it into our hypothesizing and expectations going forward.

Second, this dissertation underscores the relationship between traditional gender attitudes and nationalism, the two of which are psychologically congruent in ways that have important implications for who gender traditionalists support at the ballot box and what type of policy positions they support. Gender traditionalism raises the likelihood that both nativists *and* non-nativists will express support the radical right—a finding that suggests gender traditionalism may make nativist politics more palatable than they otherwise would be. Gendered nationalism also

significantly mediates the impact of traditional gender attitudes on support for anti-immigrant policies, such as support for a border wall between the United States and Mexico.

Third, traditional gender attitudes in particular appear to be an overarching pathway to support for various types of illiberalism, whether that takes the form of radical right parties or support for political violence. This relationship holds amidst a variety of other prevailing explanations, which once again emphasizes the power of gender to influence how people think the world around them. Individuals draw on their gendered “lenses” to evaluate the world, and the lenses that are colored more traditional appear to be linked to some of the most politically divisive topics facing liberal democracies today.

There are several important limitations and qualifications to these papers. First the data upon which I base my findings is purely observational in nature and cross-sectional. While we can learn a great deal from this type of analysis, experimental studies are needed in order to fully understand the potential causal relationship between elite framing, gender attitudes, and support for a variety of nativist or violent attitudes. Considering that the salience of “culture wars” over gender norms has waxed and waned over the decades, the effect of elite cues appealing to gendered evaluations (either implicitly or explicitly) is particularly unknown. It is possible that gender attitudes may fall in and out of importance in an individual’s evaluation of any particular issue depending on the broader political climate—or operate consistently in the background.

Second, the intersection of gender attitudes with racial and sexual attitudes has not been fully addressed in this dissertation. While gender attitudes remain an important predictor of support for all of the analyses presented here above and beyond the inclusion of variables accounting for racial or sexual prejudice, it is still likely that there are places where they overlap

in ways that these papers were not able to consider. This is a fruitful area for future research, and one that should be extended where possible to locations both within and outside the West.

Ultimately, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the role gender attitudes play in shaping public opinion and political behavior in both Europe and the United States. Future work can and should take up the questions and puzzles raised in these papers in an experimental setting, as well as attempt to look at the influence of gender attitudes across time and space. What we now think of as “traditional” gender attitudes have been a salient part of life for people across the world for thousands of years, and it stands to reason that their impact is not confined solely to the time periods and locations discussed here.

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