New political parties and democratic satisfaction after Europe's financial and migrant crises

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Introduction

Why have political party systems in Western Europe changed so dramatically in the past decade? Older, well-established parties across most countries have seen substantial decline in their support and voteshares at elections, whilst challenger parties are on the rise. For instance, right-wingers Alternative for Germany (AfD) currently hold 11% of seats in the Bundestag, and Vox won nearly 15% of seats in the Spanish parliament; this is a considerable success for these parties given that both are less than a decade old. Another example from the left is Podemos, currently in a coalition government in Spain, again although only a decade old. Even in the center ground, parties such as En Marche and Ciudadanos show that new movements have become the norm within European politics.

New challenger parties are strongly tied to processes of globalization: leftist and far-right movements are eurosceptic (albeit for different reasons), whilst liberal and centrist movements are clearly pro-European and call for further EU integration. In this dissertation, I assess the impacts of multiple facets of globalization on citizens' satisfaction with democracy and politics, and how political parties respond to these shifting voter preferences. Contemporary processes of globalization, particularly over the past two to three decades, have radically shifted once rigid social divisions and cleavages, such as religion and class. Three issues in particular come to the forefront: economic effects (most notably, outsourcing at the individual-level), immigration, and the increased integration of supranational institutions, especially the EU in the European context. These issues have become more salient individuals, who then seek representation from political parties. Failing adequate representation, voters turn to new parties who promise to act in their best interests.

In addition, political parties strategize to capture citizens' support and votes. Across many countries in Western Europe, mainstream parties are tied to older cleavages such as class and religiosity. Despite shifts in their party platforms, long-established parties face difficulties in breaking free of their prior ties. In comparison, new movements can more easily claim to represent voters according to issues

that were not salient several decades ago, such as intra-European migration, or the expansion of the EU. In this dissertation I also aim to shed light on the connections of party strategy and social cleavages.

Overview and structure

I divide the dissertation into three main parts which assess globalization's links to 1. party preferences, 2. democratic satisfaction and trust in political institutions, and 3. party strategy on behalf of both long-standing, mainstream parties, and newer movements.

In the first part, I probe and challenge the widely used losers vs. winners of globalization dichotomy, in order to better capture the variation between how individuals are affected by, and react to, processes of globalization. I derive two main dimensions – cultural and economic – along which four main groups emerge. First, globalization *winners*, and globalization *losers* are apparent according to the current conventional wisdom: winners benefit culturally and economically, whilst losers are disadvantaged culturally and economically. However, two other groups – which I call c*ultural winners/economic losers*, and *economic winners/cultural losers* – refine our understanding of globalization's effect by grappling with the nuances of its impacts on individuals. By drawing on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) across 16 countries in Western Europe I measure these dimensions according to three variables. In order to capture the cultural element, I refer to two variables that ask respondents "to what extent do you think that immigration culturally enriches your country" and "to what extent do you think that European unification should go further?". To measure the individual-level economic effects of globalization, I divide individuals according to whether their jobs are offshorable, interacted with their skill level.

After devising this typology, I demonstrate its utility in explaining changes in voters' party preferences as a reaction to globalization. I show that each group has a greater probability of voting for a distinct party type (winners for centrist/liberal parties; losers for far-right parties; cultural

winners/economic losers for leftist parties, and economic winners/cultural losers for center-right parties). My results therefore imply that a four-part understanding of winners and losers is more useful in explaining the distinctions between citizens' preferences regarding globalization: according to my typology, each group has a greater propensity of voting for a certain political party, based on the party's associated stances and promises on globalization.

The second part then uses this new conceptualization to assess how globalization has affected citizens' satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. Current research suggests there is a growing gap between those who benefit from globalization in contrast to those who are disadvantaged: the former express greater democratic satisfaction and political trust in comparison with the latter. However, whilst the existing scholarship focuses primarily on country-level variables of globalization (e.g. net migration, trade, supranational institutions, the eurozone crisis), I show that it is vital to investigate individual-level variables such as citizens' perceptions of globalization, in addition to economic effects at the individual-level, in the context of Western Europe. Again, I use the three independent variables from the first part – offshorability and skill level, views towards immigration, and attitudes towards the EU – to assess their impact on measures of democratic satisfaction ("to what extent are you satisfied with the way that democracy works in your country"), and trust in political institutions ("to what extent do you trust political parties/politicians/parliament").

The findings suggest that the individual-level processes deserve greater attention in explaining democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy: specifically, two different mechanisms are at play. First, those who hold negative perceptions of immigration and international institutions express less satisfaction with democracy and trust in politics. However, individuals who are negatively affected by economic globalization are motivated to express their discontent, hence boosting their political trust and democratic satisfaction. I then use the typology devised in the previous chapter to analyze each group's probability of expressing dissatisfaction with democracy and political institutions. I find that winners

and cultural winners/economic losers express greater satisfaction with democracy and political trust than losers and cultural winners/economic losers.

The third part of this dissertation then assesses the role of party strategy in responding to globalization and its associated divide between citizens regarding democratic and political satisfaction. First, I focus on the case of Spain, which provides a fruitful case for analyzing my theory due to its rapid increase in global integration following the fall of the authoritarian regime under Franco in the late 1970s. Although many countries in West Europe have experienced significant changes in their political party systems within the past decade, Spain stands out amongst them. Despite being a mostly two-party system, three new major parties – one on the left, one in the center, and one on the left – have emerged in the past ten years, and found considerable success at the ballot box. Why has Spain's party system changed so dramatically? To address this question, I trace the evolution of the main center-left party in Spain, Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), from the end of the civil war (1939) until today. I find that PSOE's party elites moved more and more towards moderate, pro-globalization stances, which at first significantly helped PSOE establish itself as a major contender for parliamentary power by the advent of modern democracy in 1976. At the same time, however, PSOE's trajectory towards the center-ground also left a vacuum for new parties to rapidly gain support from globalization losers, catalyzed by the Eurozone crisis, in addition to the migrant crisis.

Second, I compare Spain's party system to that of Portugal. Two countries share many similarities in the development of their political systems: their paths to democracy, rapid party system institutionalization, political institutions, and the structure of party competition from the mid-1970s until 2013. However, whilst Spain's party system is now much more volatile, Portugal's relative stability can be explained by the combination of three factors. First, processes of globalization did not have the same impact as they did in Spain: neither the eurozone nor the migrant crises were as deep as they were in Spain. Second, the mainstream parties in Portugal were more flexible in adapting their party strategy to

shifting social divisions. Finally, Portugal's social cleavages are not as entrenched and fragmented as those in Spain, meaning that voters had fewer reasons to seek representation from outside political parties.

A new typology of globalization's winners and losers, and who they vote for

Abstract:

The terms "winners" and "losers" of globalization are used frequently and liberally in the social sciences. In short, it is claimed that winners vote for pro-status quo, pro-globalization parties, whilst losers vote for anti-globalization, populist parties. However, recent scholarship has begun to challenge this dichotomous conceptualization. Since individuals are affected by globalization in a number of different ways, what framework best captures the different types of globalization's winners and losers? Secondly, how is this manifested in citizens' political preferences, as evidenced in voting patterns? I derive two main dimensions - sociopolitical and economic - along which four main groups emerge: first, 1. winners and 2. losers (according to the conventional wisdom). However, two other groups, which I call 3. cultural winners/economic losers, and 4. economic winners/cultural losers, refine our understanding of globalization's effects by grappling with the nuances between individuals. I draw on data from four waves of the ESS (2012 to 2018) in across 16 countries in Western Europe, and conduct a series of logistic regressions to show that each group has a greater probability of voting for a distinct party type (1. centrist/liberal, 2. far-right, 3. leftist, 4. center-right, respectively), compared to the other three. Therefore, this paper contributes to - and further encourages - research which probes and challenges the two-part winners vs. losers understanding, in order to better capture the variation between how individuals are affected by, and react to, processes of globalization.

A new typology of globalization's winners and losers, and who they vote for

Introduction

The terms "winners" and "losers" of globalization are used frequently and liberally in the social sciences. Two of the most cited sets of scholars conceptualize this division as a new social cleavage which has divided citizens and subsequently shaped their policy preferences, which parties they vote for, and the extent of their political participation (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2012, 2019; Hooghe and Marks, 2018). In short, it is claimed that winners vote for pro-status quo, pro-globalization parties, whilst losers vote for anti-globalization, populist parties. However, a recent contribution from De Wilde (2019) reshapes the categories of winners and losers by moving beyond a dichotomous conceptualization. In addition, voters of populist parties are not necessarily globalization losers, as the conventional wisdom claims (Roodujin, 2017). Prompted by this, I ask: what framework best captures the different types of globalization's winners and losers? Secondly, how is this manifested in citizens' political preferences, as evidenced in voting patterns?

According to social cleavage theory, when a new division emerges due to exogenous forces (in this case, globalization), political parties emerge to represent these competing interests (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Therefore, the cleavage is evident in each group's distinct voting patterns. Whilst other scholars have not explicitly referred to the divide as a social cleavage, they adopt the winners vs. losers framework to explain party positions and voter policy preferences across various dimensions of globalization. In general, losers are negatively affected across a range of globalization indicators, such as trade, immigration, and the expansion of the European Union and other supranational organizations whereby "nation states are losing part of their problem-solving capacity" (Kriesi et al,. 2008: 7). On the

other hand, winners benefit from these changes and welcome policies which further promote globalization. When applied to party politics in Western Europe, the winners vs. losers divide is strongly associated with voting for distinct political parties. In particular, the majority of scholarship centers on the rise and success of far-right and populist-right parties (e.g. Golder, 2016; Mayer, 2020; Mudde, 2019). The usual wisdom holds that losers are disenchanted with globalization and hence vote for far-right parties which rebel against immigration and European integration, and call for more protectionist policies. However, De Wilde (2019) spurs a reconsideration of the winners vs. losers dichotomy by devising a new framework that accounts for four different types of ideologies linked to globalization.

Influenced by this revision**,** I contend that the conventional winners vs. losers framework ought to be refined to improve our understanding of the different groups of citizens affected by globalization. In contrast to de Wilde (2019), I expand the scope and draw on scholarship in International Political Economy (IPE), in addition to Comparative Politics (CP). Therefore, I intend to further encourage the reconsideration of the standard winners vs. losers dichotomy across different subfields in Political Science and the social sciences more broadly. I present a new typology that combines two dimensions of globalization, which I refer to broadly as economic and sociopolitical. By considering the potential positive and negative impacts of both dimensions on citizens, I derive four categories of individuals. I then argue that each of these groups have distinct economic and political interests, which is evidenced through which political parties they support. First, globalization winners benefit from both the economic and sociopolitical dimensions, and have a greater probability of voting for centrist and liberal parties. Second, losers are disadvantaged according to both dimensions, and are more likely to vote for far-right parties. However, there are two other groups which "win" according to one dimension and "lose" on the other. Economic winners/cultural losers benefit from the economic effects of globalization, but are resistant to increased immigration and enhanced EU integration, and vote for center-right parties.

Finally, economic losers/cultural winners are disadvantaged economically by globalization, but are largely supportive of European unification and immigrants, and vote for leftist parties.

First, I review the economic and sociopolitical dimensions, pointing out the benefits of bringing these two sets of literature into conversation with one another. Then, I outline each group of the four-way globalization framework, and argue that each of their interests should be evidenced through different voting patterns. I focus on three key independent variables to represent the two dimensions of globalization: offshorability, attitudes towards immigration, and views of further EU unification. I then analyze their effects through a set of logistic regressions, treating party preference as the dependent variable, and using data from the four most recent waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). I find strong support for my predictions, hence there is good reason to adopt the four-way winners/losers framework to pursue other research questions.

Globalization's winners and losers at a broader level

Scholars who refer to globalization as a cleavage tend to conceptualize the winners vs. losers dichotomy as a two, or three-dimensional space. Kriesi et al. (2008) identifies 1. economic competition, 2. cultural factors (especially increased cultural diversity), and 3. political competition between nation-states and supranational institutions, as the three key factors which comprise a "demarcation vs integration" cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2006; 2012). Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2018) refer to a "transnational cleavage" formed by the impacts of immigration, integration, and trade. Bornschier (2010) instead draws out two lines of conflict: first, a state-market division, evolved from the traditional class divide (Ibid., 5); and second, a cultural dimension which has been "enriched" with new issues such as immigration and European identity. Therefore, in contrast, Bornschier's conceptualization collapses both immigration and European integration into a single dimension, which can be described as a libertarian/universalist vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. Hooghe and Marks (1999) also refer to two dimensions: economic issues (due to EU decisions), and citizens' views towards national

sovereignty and Europe. Nevertheless, there is large agreement as to who constitutes winners and losers. Winners are highly educated, tend to be younger, and living in cosmopolitan cities. As a result of their high skills and the wealth of opportunities in bigger cities, winners have greater labor market security and higher wages. In addition, their education fosters cultural tolerance, so winners are also favorable towards immigration and the EU's open borders. On the other hand, losers are not well-educated, tend to be older, and live in deindustrialized/rural areas. As a result, their job opportunities are more scarce, and their position in the labor market is more precarious. Furthermore, losers are skeptical of increased immigration and European integration.

One debate that separates a large part of IPE research from other work in Comparative Politcs is the extent to which economic or sociopolitical factors are the most important in explaining political outcomes. As Rodrik (2021) points out, a considerable part of IPE scholarship on globalization demonstrates tight relationships between economic, social, and political factors. According to this set of arguments, economic factors can either 1. lead directly to changes in individuals' support for different types of policies and parties, or 2. shape attitudes and perceptions of immigrants, which in turn also affects support for policies and parties. For example, Colantone and Stanig (2018a) focus on the "economic determinants of the cultural backlash", placing trade as the independent variable, and a range of sociopolitical factors as outcome variables, including attitudes towards immigration, and support for liberalism, democracy and traditional values. Similarly, Steiner and Harms (2021) and Strain and Veuger (2019) also assess the impacts of trade import penetration on the degree of nationalism and perceptions of the EU, and attitudes towards race, religion, and immigration, respectively. In contrast, other scholars stress that the sociopolitical dimension is the primary variable in driving the globalization divide between citizens (e.g. Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Teney et al,. 2014). As Grande and Kriesi (2012) put it, they "would like to suggest that the cultural and political dimensions of the new divide are politically more consequential than the economic dimension" (Ibid., 15).

Amongst this debate, it is clear that, 1. both economic and sociopolitical factors are important in shaping a globalization divide, and 2. scholars tend to discuss this divide as simply dichotomous i.e. winners vs. losers. My goal is to reframe the second point; to create a succinct and more nuanced understanding of how exactly citizens win or lose, when combining both dimensions. In order to do this, first I will more thoroughly review how we understand individuals to be affected by economic and sociopolitical factors, and how this impacts political preferences. After, I build on these arguments and evidence to generate four categories of winners and losers, and how this should be apparent in voting patterns.

As stated earlier, De Wilde (2019) also derives four “ideologies" of globalization: liberalism, cosmopoltanism, communiatarianism, and statism. The conceptualization, measurement, and conclusions presented here are quite different. Whilst his four ideological groups definitely have certain elements linked to the categories proposed in this paper, he draws on two different dimensions: globality and permeability of borders (Ibid.: 14).. Furthermore, De Wilde draws on different data from discourse in public debates in five countries, whilst I focus on survey data in West Europe at the individual-level. Therefore, the aim here is *not* to heavily challenge this previous framework. Instead, I build on this to further contribute to and encourage more research that breaks away from the dichotomous categories of winners and losers, especially at the intersection of CP and IPE.

Globalization’s economic winners and losers

There are two primary ways of conceptualizing the economic dimension of globalization’s winners and losers when linked to individuals’ party preferences. The first focuses on trade, where losers are “those segments of society that bear most of the adjustment costs of international trade” (Colantone and Stanig, 2018: 936; Dippel et al., 2022). The impact of trade on citizens’ voting patterns has been assessed by using import exposure (to Chinese imports) as an independent variable (e.g. Autor et al., 2020; Barone and Kreuter, 2021; Steiner and Harms, 2021). Others focus on the role of offshoring,

or the "offshorability" of an individual, and how that affects their perception of their security in the labor market (Blinder 2009). Arguably, placing offshorability as the independent variable is more accurate in measuring individual variation according to the economic dimension of globalization, compared to analyzing trade import shocks per region. A focus on offshoring acknowledges that "individuals in different occupations employed in the same industry or even in the same firm may face different competitive pressures from globalization" (Owen 2017: 298). The degree of offshorability, in conjunction with one's skill-level, is crucial for how individuals perceive their labor market risk, which then affects their perception of globalization. According to this understanding, globalization losers are in occupations which face large outsourcing pressures, and are also "low-skilled" i.e. they are generally not well formally educated. As a result, losers experience high job market insecurity and downward pressure on wages, as their occupations can be shifted abroad to be performed for a lower cost for firms. In contrast, globalization winners are highly educated and are in occupations that can be outsourced to the benefit of the winner. Winners can "sell their skills to a wider net of customers worldwide" (Rommel and Walter, 2018: 625), such as a successful entrepreneur, professor, or scientist. In this case, a high degree of offshorability works in the high-skilled individual's favor, and is likely to increase their wages (Hummels et al., 2014; Walter, 2017).

What are the consequences of economic globalization on winners' and losers' party and policy preferences? Scholars focusing on the links between trade and party politics have most often looked at support for far-right and right-wing populist movements. For example, in a broad cross-country study across 15 Western European states, Colantone and Stanig (2018c) find that import shocks lead to increased support for far-right parties. In many other single case studies across Europe, other researchers have found similar results, where greater import shocks in regions have led to greater support for the far-right National Rally (France), populist right movements in Germany, and a higher percentage of votes for Brexit's Leave campaign (Malgouyres, 2017; Dippel et al., 2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2018b). According to these studies, losers have a greater probability of voting for far-right parties as a

backlash to economic globalization. However, the role of other groups affected by globalization (namely, winners), and the consequences for party politics, are not considered to the same extent.

Instead, research linking offshoring to individuals' party and policy interests examines the role of winners and their party preferences in greater depth. In the US context, constituencies that are more vulnerable to offshoring express greater protectionist sentiment (Owen, 2017). Protectionist preferences can be expressed by left-wing parties, not just far-right or populist right parties. As a result, Rommel and Walter (2018) find that losers (offshorable and low-skilled) are more likely to vote for leftist policies, which advocate for greater labor protections for those vulnerable to the negative effects of offshoring. On the other hand, winners (offshorable and high-skilled) have a greater propensity to vote for center-right and liberal parties which support less restrictions for export-oriented firms. When taking into account both research on trade and offshoring, it appears that losers might vote for leftist or far-right parties. Given that leftist and far-right parties differ drastically, what explains the difference between why some losers might vote for the former, and others for the latter? Rommel and Walter (2018) acknowledge the need to consider other elements beyond economic competition, given that "populist right parties appeal to low-skilled voters across the board" (Ibid.: 645). Similarly, although center-right and liberal parties[1] are much closer together, in comparison, winners must have different incentives to choose one over the other. Therefore, I argue it is necessary to combine our knowledge of economic globalization with research on sociopolitical globalization so as to better understand these differences.

Globalization's sociopolitical winners and losers

The sociopolitical dimension incorporates both immigration and attitudes towards the EU. Much of the literature regarding winners, losers, and who they vote for, centers on objective measures of immigration. The primary indicator is usually immigrant share/percentage of immigrant population within a region (e.g. Barone et al., 2016; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Edo et al., 2019; Eichengreen et al.,

[1] Liberal parties are typically centrist in European party politics.

2017), but other studies look at migrant growth rate (Becker et al. 2017) or the percentage of foreign-born population (Mendez and Cutillas, 2014; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014). Once again, the main outcome of interest in this set of research is support for far-right and populist right parties. In a study across 12 European countries, an increase in non-tertiary educated immigrants in a region is associated with stronger nationalist sentiments (Moriconi et al. 2018). A wealth of single case studies yields similar results e.g. regions with higher growth rates of migrants are associated with more votes for Brexit and the United Kingdom Independence Party (Becker and Fetzer, 2017; Becker et al., 2017), and a greater immigrant share in Austrian regions has a positive impact on support for the far-right Freedom Party (Halla et al. 2017). To a lesser extent, the impact of immigration on leftist parties is also considered. For instance, an increasing migrant share has led not only to greater support for far-right parties, but decreased support for traditional left-wing parties in Denmark (Harmon, 2018) and France (Edo et al., 2019).

Another set of studies concentrates on more subjective measures of immigration and perceptions of the EU. These scholars argue that attitudes towards immigrants are shaped much more by "cultural values", and how an individual identifies with the nation state, rather than other economic or personal circumstances (Grande and Kriesi, 2012: 13-14; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007: 437). Teney et al. (2014) also urge an expansion beyond objective measures of globalization, and look to subjective measures which more directly capture an individual's perception about the social effects of increased European integration. For example, using survey data from the ESS and European Values Survey (EVS) indicators such as a) whether respondents view globalization as a threat or opportunity, and b) whether an individual most closely identifies themselves as a citizen of Europe, their country, province, or town, may be more accurate (Ibid.: 578, Langsæther and Stubager, 2019). Capelos and Katsanidou (2018) use a different set of measures, and operationalize opposition to European integration by assessing the impact of an individual's "traditional values".

However, findings from research using more subjective measures of immigration are still very much aligned with the results from objective indicators. Essentially, far-right parties benefit from drawing on the "(alleged) incompatibility of immigrant behavioural norms and cultural values with those of the native population" (Golder, 2016: 485). "Traditional cultural values" are more salient and important to citizens in Western Europe [compared to two decades ago], which has led to more citizens identifying with anti-integration and anti-immigration stances (Capelos and Katsanidou, 2018: 1277-1279). Rydgen (2008) finds that negative attitudes to immigration are the principal reason for voting for radical right parties across six countries in West Europe. In response, the most successful right-wing populist parties consistently mobilize attitudes to immigration (Iversflaten, 2008: 17).

Overall, it is clear that globalization losers believe that they are disadvantaged by further immigration and EU integration, as it is a threat to their cultural or traditional set of values. This leads to an increased probability of losers voting for far-right or populist right parties, as they are the most vocal in opposing immigration and the EU. However, whilst some research also shows that those with more positive opinions of immigrants are more likely to vote leftist, this body of work is not nearly as large. What about liberal and center-right parties? Although Kriesi, Bornschier, Hooghe and Marks theorize that winners should welcome immigrants and further EU unification, this has not been tested to the same extent as the links between losers and far-right parties. Therefore, below I combine the sociopolitical and economic dimensions to improve our conceptualization of winners and losers, and test this theory separately for each group, by analyzing their vote preferences.

Theory and hypotheses

The review above of both dimensions shows that the dichotomous understanding of winners vs. losers does not adequately explain voting patterns. I begin by specifying the most relevant variables for constructing a refined understanding of winners and losers, then I present the four categories of

individuals. These groups' different political interests should then be reflected in voting patterns for different groups of parties.

I select offshorability as the principal determinant of whether an individual is a winner or a loser on the economic dimension. Similar to Langsæther and Stubager (2019) - who test Kriesi's theory in a different context - I focus on offshorability (as opposed to trade import shocks) as "political preferences are shaped much more by occupational risks than by sectoral risks" (Walter, 2017: 63; Langsæther and Stubager, 2019: 1219). This also allows greater variation by measuring an individual's potential to be offshored, in comparison to individuals nested within regions (the most common way of measuring import penetration). I also use subjective measures of immigration and EU integration in order to capture an individual's cultural attitudes. Whilst attitudes to supranational institutions might not be as salient in other world regions, in the European context it is crucial to consider perceptions of the EU, given the pervasiveness of EU laws and governance on everyday life for most citizens.

In a dichotomous space, winners are defined by a) high offshorability and a high skill set on the economic dimension, and b) favorable attitudes towards immigration and European integration. In table 1, this group is hence labelled the standards "winners". In contrast, losers are defined by a) high offshorability and a low skill set, and b) negative attitudes towards immigration and European integration. Similarly, this group is labelled the standard "losers". However, it is possible to move beyond a dichotomous space and vary the two dimensions. First, "cultural winners, economic losers" have favorable attitudes towards immigrants and European integreation, but are vulnerable to the negative effects of offshoring, as they have a low skill set. In contrast, "cultural losers, economic winners" hold negative attitudes towards immigrants and European integration, but are advantaged on the economic dimension and have a high skill set combined with high offshorability. Figure 1 further clarifies the four different groups of the globalization cleavage.



Figure 1.1. The globalization winner-loser dimensions.

In the next section, I will generate hypotheses that predict which party each group should be likely to vote for based on their interests. However, I first briefly provide a "ideal type" of each character profile, similar to the "cosmopolitan, educated and young" vs. "rural, not well-educated and old" characterization. The first group - globalization winners - are likely to be young, highly educated, living in big cities (and therefore exposed to multiculturalism) and works in large, service-oriented firms e.g. consulting or the financial sector. Second, cultural winners/economic losers have been raised in big cities and been exposed to different cultures and backgrounds in school, but are otherwise in a precarious position in the labor market, where the negative effects of offshoring are very much still a threat. Third, cultural losers/economic winners, likely work in a company that benefits from an export-oriented focus, although holds traditional, nativist values regarding multiculturalism and nationalism. Finally, the fourth group, globalization losers, is employed in industry at a lower level, experiencing much job precarity, and expresses more nationalistic and anti-immigrant views.

Winners: liberal parties

According to their economic interests, globalization's winners vote for parties that support increased global economic liberalization. Winners do not vote for leftists as "policies pursued by left parties tend to conflict with the material interest of individuals benefitting from offshoring" (Rommel and Walter, 2018: 267). One point to support this prediction is that, for globalization's winners, introducing protectionist policies would make a country less competitive internationally, hence reducing the overall value of winners' skills. In addition, should any redistribution be introduced - by leftist governments, for example - then winners would be the ones to foot the bill (Wren and Rehm, 2013). Along this dimension, winners should vote for centrist, liberal parties, who promote further economic liberalization globally. With regards to the sociopolitical dimension, liberal parties also advocate for increased European integration and the role of European identity. As discussed below, some left parties are also in favor of cultivating an international, European identity. Nevertheless, the more redistributive policies of the left remain in tension with winners' interests. Therefore, on both dimensions, winners should vote for liberal parties. Given that liberals are somewhat more supportive of European identity and immigration, winners should also be slightly more likely to vote for liberal parties:

H1: Globalization winners have a greater probability of voting for liberal parties.

Cultural winners, economic losers: left parties

The first group of globalization's losers experience greater economic insecurity due to an increased risk of offshoring moving their employment abroad. The first group of losers therefore wish to secure more redistributive policies to compensate for their perceived precarity in the labor market. Leftist and Social Democratic parties appeal to cultural winners/economic losers, as these parties have historically advocated for individuals at threat of offshoring or experiencing an otherwise precarious

position in the job market (Benedetti et al., 2020). In addition, according to the sociopolitical component, leftist parties are usually favorable to the furthering of European identity, and tend to support policies that view immigration positively (Carvalho and Ruedin, 2018). Leftists highlight issues based on moral arguments, such as overall fairness and egalitarianism, in which immigrants are included (Messina, 2007; Helbing et al., 2010). Given the emphasis on overall fairness, leftist parties also appeal to immigrants, who are often viewed as part of the working classes (Carvalho and Ruedin, 2018: 381).

Of course, the Left in Western Europe is composed of more explicitly socialist parties, in contrast to those on the center-left, such as *Podemos* vs. *PSOE* in Spain, *Die Linke* vs. the *Social Democratic Party* in Germany, and *La France Insoumise* vs. the *Socialist Party* in France. However, I predict that *cultural winners, economic losers* should have a greater propensity of voting for leftist parties overall, for two reasons.[2] First, compared to Rightist parties, leftist parties (regardless of centrist or further-left stance) "implement more generous welfare arrangements" and highlight economic redistribution (Finseraas, 2011: 26). Second, according to the sociopolitical dimension, there is a "lower degree of polarization among left-wing parties" and a "strong coherence between their ideological preferences" (Carvalho and Ruedin, 2018: 385). Therefore, overall the first group of globalization's losers vote for leftist parties that guarantee both 1) greater wealth redistribution (in the face of increased precarity in the labor market), and 2) the promotion of an international, European identity, and supporting the rights of immigrants to live and work within the losers' nation. Put simply:

H2: Cultural winners/economic losers have a greater probability of voting for leftist parties.

[2] Nevertheless, I include robustness checks in the appendix which codes parties separately according to whether they are center-left and far-left.

Cultural losers, economic winners: center-right parties

The second group of globalization's losers, in contrast to the first group, work in international firms in highly-skilled jobs. As a result, they have much better employment security due to a low degree of offshorability. In this respect, the second group of losers recognize the benefits of globalization. Hence, those who work in international, export-oriented firms support increased economic liberalization on a global scale in order to maximize profits at the firm-level, which then benefits the highly-skilled individual through increased wages and further security. On the sociopolitical dimension, this group places much greater emphasis on their national identity. Center-right parties are ideal candidates for representing the interests of *cultural losers, economic winners* as "[center-right parties] have historically been the friends of business and free markets… [but] they also trade in nationalism, sovereignty, and security" (Hadj Abdou et al., 2021: 332). Whilst there is a great deal of variation of center-right parties' platforms across countries, for the most part, concern for immigration and European integration is a common thread for conservative and Christian Democratic parties (Ibid.; Bale, 2008). Whilst these concerns do not compare to the anti-immigrant policies supported by the far-right, they may be enough to satisfy some of these losers' policy preferences, in conjunction with their economic interests.[3] Overall, when taking both dimensions of the globalization cleavage into account:

H3: Cultural losers/economic winners have a greater probability of voting for center-right parties.

Losers: far-right parties

The final group - the third category of globalization's losers - perceive negative effects across both economic and sociopolitical components. This category experiences job insecurity through the

[3] It is also important to note that this is a divergence from Rommel and Walter's (2018) predictions, where they state that according to the economic dimension, winners should vote for both liberal and center-right parties. Liberal and center-right parties vary on the sociopolitical dimension (the fomer being more pro-immigration and EU identity, the latter less favorable), hence the four-part categorization of globalization winners better teases out these differences with regards to party preferences.

threat of offshoring, and should therefore favor parties offering more redistributive policies. However, as stated above, leftist parties stress that immigrants should also benefit from wealth redistribution, which does not fit with the third category of losers' stance on the sociopolitical dimension. Instead, far-right parties explicitly advocate for severe cuts in immigration, and reject European identity in favor of national identity. In addition, these parties - especially populist right-wing parties - appeal to the third category of globalization's losers by supporting forms of "welfare chauvinism." According to this idea, far-right parties interpret citizenship based on cultural or ethnic belonging (Ketola and Nordensvard, 2018). This is most successful - in garnering support for far-right parties - when universal benefits are targetted, and promised to only those who are citizens, excluding immigrants (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018). On the whole, compared to the three other groups, the third category of globalization's losers have a much greater propensity to vote for far-right parties:

H4: Globalization losers have a greater probability of voting for far-right parties.

Finally, Green parties are also prominent in European politics, as shown by the percebtage of votes obtained in national and European elections in table 3 (5.9%). I have not included this party group in the hypotheses as their main focus (environmentalism) usually sets the Greens apart from other political parties on the left-right dimension. In addition, Green parties do not exist or are not successful in winning even a small percentage of the vote in some countries, e.g. Spain and Portugal. However, as detailed below, I include Green parties in the analysis to gauge which individuals are more likely to vote for them.

Group	Party choice
Winners	Centrist/Liberal
Cultural winners, economic losers	Leftist
Economic losers, cultural winners	Center-Right
Losers	Far-Right

Table 1.1. Party preferences of each group according to the four-part categorization.

Party group voted for	%
Leftist	34.90
Center/Liberal	10.25
Center-Right	35.93
Far-Right	7.77
Green	5.90
Other	5.25
	Total obs.: 70,813

Table 1.2. The percentage of votes cast for different party groups according to the four waves of ESS data from 2012 to 2018. This counts respondents' vote for the party that they voted for at the last national election, at the time of asking.

Methods, data, measurement

I conduct two analyses to test the predictions. First, I follow a method similar to Rommel and Walter (2018) in which they assess the impact of offshoring on an individual's vote for a specific party group. They interact an individual's offshorability with education, and assess the direction and significance of the regression coefficient in relation to the four party types I list above, in addition to

green parties. I adopt this framework but make three important changes. First, Rommel and Walter use data from five waves of the ESS from 2002 to 2010, but I use more recent ESS data from 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 across 16 countries in Western Europe. Second, I also consider an individual's immigration attitudes as an independent variable, as a crucial part of the sociopolitical dimension, rather than a control variable. Finally, I also include a respondent's attitudes to European integration as a final independent variable. Both immigration and EU attitudes are measured on a 0 to 10 pt. scale asking if a country's "cultural life is enriched or undermined by immigrants", and how negatively or positively one feels towards "increased European unification", respectively. This variable is absent in the ESS wave prior to 2012, hence I use data from 2012 onwards. In addition, data post-2010 might yield different results, given the increased salience of globalization for many European citizens, following several significant events including the eurozone crisis, the migrant "crisis", and Brexit.

In the first analysis, I run four multilevel logistic regression models with fixed time effects, each with one of the five party types as the dependent variable, coded as a dummy variable (simply, the respondent reported voting for the party at the last national election, or did not). I coded every political party across 16 countries in West Europe according to these party types to fit into "liberal", "leftist", "center-right", or "far-right", as well as "green" or "other" if they did not fit into these groups[4]. To measure "offshorability", I adopt a variable from Blinder (2009) which codes every occupation with an ISCO 6 digit code on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 meaning a job completely within the domestic market, and 100 representing the most offshorable job. I then code this into a binary variable to split individuals into simply onshore vs. offshorable occupations, and interact this with education years, which represents the skill-set of respondents[5]. The coefficients "offshore" and "education" are also important in informing how respondents vote, but the interaction term indicates the conditional effect i.e. a positive interaction term means that those in offshorable jobs are more likely to vote for a certain party as their skill-set (or education years) increases. Therefore, the variables "offshore" and "education" alone do not distinguish

[4] See appendix (A9) for categorization of every political party in the ESS (in Western Europe) from 2012 to 2018.
[5] I used existing Stata code from Thewissen and Rueda (2019) and Walter (2017) to convert isco-08 to a measure of offshorability (see corresponding Stata .do file).

winners from losers. Instead, the interaction term is key: a positive coefficient indicates that among individuals in offshorable occupations, those with a higher education level (measured in years) have a greater probability of voting for a certain party type. On the contrary, a negative coefficient shows that among individuals in offshorable occupations, those with lower educational attainment have a greater probability of voting for the political party in question. Essentially, a positive interaction term demonstrates that economic winners have a greater propensity to vote for the party type, whilst a negative interaction term shows that economic losers have a larger probability of voting for the party group.

Group	**%**
Winners	9.25
Cultural winners, economic losers	16.98
Cultural losers, economic winners	4.57
Losers	13.37
Cumulative total:	44.17
	Total obs.: 111,999

Table 1.3. The four winners/losers groups as a percentage of four waves of ESS respondents (2012 to 2018) across 16 West European countries.

In the second analysis, I create four new independent variables, each one representing one of the four winners/losers groups. I average respondents' scores between the immigration and EU attitudes to generate a general sociopolitical dimension score[6]. Then I combine this with an individual's level of offshorability and education years to determine which group they belong to. For example, to code

[6] E.g. since these two variables are measured on 0 to 10 pt. scales, I add the immigration and EU variables together, then divide by two. Those who have an average of lower than 5 - the midpoint - are classed as sociopolitical losers, whilst those who have an average of 5 or greater are classed as sociopolitical winners.

"winners", I select respondents who are 1. in offshorable occupations, 2. have received a Bachelor's degree (or above), and 3. have mostly positive attitudes on the sociopolitical dimension. Another example, to code "cultural winners, economic losers", I select respondents who also have mostly positive attitudes on the sociopolitical dimension, but also who are 1. in offshorable occupations, and 2. have NOT received a Bachelor's degree (so, high school and below). After coding these groups, it is clear that there is greater variation than previously thought according to the dichotomous conceptualization of globalization. Table 3 shows that about 44% of respondents fit into the four-part categorization of winners and losers. Only about 9% of these fit in the winners category, but the largest group (17%) is formed by the cultural winners, economic losers. Only about 5% make up the cultural losers, economic winners category, but this is still a significant deviation from the losers, which make up 13% of the total population.

I then run four sets of multilevel logistic regression models, again using party choice as the dependent variable. In each set of models, I run one model for each independent variable (and a standard set of controls), and then include a fifth model including all four groups of globalization winners and losers together. I then repeat the same steps for each party. I include time fixed effects, and then generate predicted probabilities of each group voting for each party group based on the regression models. Finally, I include a standard set of individual-level control variables that could affect party choice, beyond the globalization cleavage: gender, age, unemployed/employed, religiosity, income, and democratic satisfaction.

Results

The first analysis shows good support for the predictions, though support is stronger for the sociopolitical dimension than the economic dimension. Table 4 shows the results, and all the coefficients for immigration attitudes and EU attitudes trend in the expected direction, with a high degree of statistical significance. Essentially, the positive coefficients for respondents who are classed as winners

according to the sociopolitical dimension (and have positive atttitudes towards the EU and immigration) indicates that they are more likely to vote for left or liberal parties. In contrast, the negative coefficients for respondents who are classed as losers according to the sociopolitical dimension (with largely negative attitudes of immigration and EU integration) shows that they are more likely to vote for a center-right or far-right party.

	(1) Leftist	(2) Liberal	(3) Center-right	(4) Far-right	(5) Green
Offshore	.103*	-.157	.079	-.305***	-.035
	(.062)	(.098)	(.062)	(.118)	(.144)
Education (years)	-.018***	.029***	-.004	-.069***	.079***
	(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	(.006)	(.006)
Offshore X Education	-.015***	.008	.007*	.015	-.001
	(.004)	(.006)	(.004)	(.009)	(.009)
Immigration attitudes	.132***	.028***	-.104***	-.274***	.256***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.004)	(.008)	(.01)
EU attitudes	.024***	.046***	-.009**	-.157***	.071***
	(.004)	(.006)	(.004)	(.007)	(.008)

Standard errors are in parentheses
****<p.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1*
Note: multilevel logistic regression models, random effects: country.

Table 1.4. Logistic regression results of offshore-skills interaction, immigration and EU attitudes on voting for left, liberal, center-right, or far-right parties. Expanded table with controls and fixed time effects is in the appendix (A1).

Also fitting with H2, the coefficient for the offshore-skills interaction variable is negative and statistically significant for left parties, meaning that among those in offshorable occupations, individuals

with higher levels of education (and therefore higher skill levels) are less inclined to vote for left parties. Essentially, economic globalization losers are more likely to vote for leftist parties. The interaction term is positive and liberal parties, so among those in offshorable occupations, individuals with higher skill levels (economic winners) are more likely to vote for liberal parties. However, whilst the coefficient trends in the predicted direction, it is not statistically significant. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant for center-right parties, meaning that individuals with higher skill sets (in offshorable jobs) are more likely to vote center-right. Finally, the interaction term runs in the opposite direction for far-right parties compared to the prediction in H4. Furthermore, the term is not significant. One more point to note is that the coefficients for the interaction variable between offshore and education are remarkably similar to the results from Rommel and Walter's study, even though I draw from four different data sets[7]. In addition, there are slight differences between the results for far-left and center-left parties, and these robustness checks are discussed further in the appendix (A2). Finally, the coefficient for Green parties is negative, but again does not meet the threshold for statistical significance.

In the second analysis, I generate predicted probabilities of each group voting for different party types, illustrated by the graphs below. Overall, again there is very good support for the four hypotheses, this time including both H3 and H4. First, for leftist parties, the cultural winners, economic losers have the greatest propensity to vote for a leftist party (compared to the other three groups, which fits with H1[8]. Second, for liberal parties, winners have the greater probability of voting liberal, matching H2. It is also clear from the graph that the differences between all four groups' propensity to vote for liberal parties are much smaller compared to their propensity to vote for leftist parties. This is expected, given that center-right and leftist parties still dominate European politics, as displayed by the majority of votes being cast for these two parties in table 3. Third, as predicted by H3, cultural losers/economic winners

[7] Their coefficients for offshore X education, for left, liberal, center-right, and far-right parties (in order) are: -0.015***, 0.009*, 0.008**, and -0.002 (Ibid.: 641). With the exception of far-right parties, the coefficients are similar to my results: -0.015***, 0.008*, 0.007, 0.012.

[8] Robustness checks for center-left and far-left parties yield very similar results which fit with the hypotheses (A10 and A11).

have a greater probability of voting for center-right parties, compared to the other three groups. Finally, as predicted by H4, losers have a greater propensity of voting for a far-right party. Again, similar to the findings for liberal parties, the probabilities of voting for far-right parties for all four groups are a lot smaller than center-right or leftist parties. Hence, whilst not all losers will vote for far-right parties, they still have a greater probability of doing so, compared to winners, cultural losers/economic winners, and cultural winners/economic losers.



Figure 1.2. Predicted probabilities of the four globalization groups voting for different party types. The logistic regression results (which were used to generate these probabilities) and robustness checks are in the appendix: tables A3 to A8.

Further discussion

I did not take into account green parties in my predictions, given their distinct focus on environmentalism, yet I generated results for each groups' probability of voting green to get an idea of who might be more likely to do so. The results are quite similar to the probabilities for liberal parties: winners are most likely to vote, followed by cultural winners/economic losers, then cultural losers/economic winners, then losers. Whilst green parties focus mostly on environmental issues, there is a great deal of variation between their policy positions and successes across West Europe (Grant and Tilley, 2019). However, green parties tend to be successful in "post-materialist contexts", i.e. wealthier countries where citizens are "liberated from the traditional political priorities of economic growth" (Ibid.: 497). In addition, green party voters are usually young, highly educated, and predominantly urban, which makes them "potential winners with respect to new societal divisions caused by globalization processes" (Dolezal, 2010: 548). Thus, though research on green parties is more scarce in comparison with the other main party types identified in this paper, my findings are consistent with the current scholarly consensus.

Although it was not my aim to enter the debate between economic vs. sociopolitical forms of globalization being more influential on individuals, the predicted probabilities lend support to the sociopolitical side. Above all, voters appear to be more united across parties according to the sociopolitical dimension, but less so according to the economic dimension. For example, although cultural winners/economic losers are most likely (out of all the four groups) to vote leftist, winners are the second most likely. Then, vice versa for their likelihood to vote for liberal parties. Both winners and cultural winners/economic losers are united on the sociopolitical dimension, but not on the economic dimension. Similar results are found for the other two groups and far-right and center-right parties: losers have the greatest probability of voting for far-right parties, and cultural losers/economic winners have the second greater probability. Then, again vice versa for their propensity to vote for center-right

parties. These two groups are also united on the sociopolitical dimension, although they differ on the economic dimension.

Such findings are especially important when expanding the scope of this paper beyond the four-part categorization of winners and losers. Most notably, the conceptualization presented here only focuses on individuals in offshorable occupations, and not domestic workers in sheltered jobs. As table 4 shows, around 45% of respondents are in offshorable occupations, which is clearly a significant percentage of citizens. Like other theories about social cleavages and voting behavior, in general, I do not intend to explain the policy and vote preferences of every single individual according to the globalization cleavage. I see this as a strength rather than a limitation, in outlining the specific scope conditions under which the hypotheses work. However, the results for the sociopolitical dimension still suggest how onshore individuals vote. Citizens who are favorable to immigrants and EU integration have a greater probability of voting for leftist, liberal, and green parties. On the other hand, citizens who have more unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants and the EU are more likely to vote for center-right and far-right parties.

Furthermore, economic and sociopolitical issues are treated as two different dimensions in this paper, but it is important to note that a lot of research shows how they are tightly linked. Economic globalization can affect citizens' perceptions of immigration and supranational institutions. For example, individuals in regions with greater exposure to international exports tend to be more nationalistic and skeptical of the EU (Steiner and Harms, 2021). At the individual level, perceived job insecurity (such as unemployment and the risk of automation) fuels nativism, which then increases the probability of voting for populist movements (Algan et al., 2017; Im et al., 2019). In addition, Kaihovaara and Im (2020) show that, similar to my argument, offshorable workers "are not necessarily more vulnerable" to foreign competition (Ibid.: 332). Instead, routine workers in offshorable occupations are more anti-immigration compared to nonroutine workers. Therefore, it is clear that economic and sociopolitical dimensions can be strongly interconnected, and further research could more precisely outline the scope conditions of my

argument. However, the links between the two dimensions do not hinder the framework's utility and the spatial diagram (presented in figure 1). Other spatial political position maps, most notably the "Political Compass", are widely used, whilst acknowledging that the two dimensions are tightly connected[9].

Conclusion

In sum, I have argued that the standardized globalization "winners vs. losers" framework needs to be reshaped to better understand how citizens are affected, and how this can translate into different political preferences. By bringing together scholarship from IPE and CP, I have designed a four-way typology according to two dimensions: economic and sociopolitical. The divisions between these four groups are apparent when assessing the propensity of each group to vote for a certain political party type. I labelled the four categories: 1. winners, 2. economic losers, cultural winners, 3. cultural losers, economic winners, and 4. losers. The first and fourth groups fit with the previous dichotomy used by many scholars: individuals either both "win" or both "lose" according to the economic and sociopolitical dimensions. However, the second and third groups depart from the usual two-part conceptualization of winners and losers. The framework presented here instead allows for more variation between individuals, who are affected by globalization in different ways and to different degrees.

The utility of the four-part categorization is demonstrated when analyzing voting preferences. Winners have a relatively greater probability of voting for centrist and liberal parties, as they promote increased globalization. Losers have a relatively greater propensity of voting for far-right parties, which oppose increased globalization. Economic losers/cultural winners are more likely to vote for leftist parties, as they tend to be favorable towards immigration and increased European integration, but advocate for greater wealth distribution. Finally, cultural losers/economic winners tend to vote for

[9] https://www.politicalcompass.org: the horizontal axis is the "economic" dimension (left to right). The vertical dimension represents the "social" dimension (libertarian to authoritarian). In reality, these dimensions are not totally divorced from one another.

center-right parties, which are generally supportive of economic globalization, but are more critical of immigration and the EU.

There currently exists a huge wealth of scholarship on individuals who benefit and are disadvantaged from globalization. However, this paper contributes to - and further encourages - research which probes and challenges the two-part winners vs. losers understanding, in order to better capture the variation between how individuals are affected by, and react to, processes of globalization.

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A Appendix

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Appendix Table A.1: First stage of analysis: multi-level logistic regressions for party choice. Immigration and EU attitudes as 11-pt. variables.

	(1) Leftist	(2) Liberal	(3) Center-right	(4) Far-right	(5) Green
Offshore	.103*	-.157	.079	-.305***	-.035
	(.062)	(.098)	(.062)	(.118)	(.144)
Education (years)	-.018***	.029***	-.004	-.069***	.079***
	(.003)	(.004)	(.003)	(.006)	(.006)
Offshore X Education	-.015***	.008	.007*	.015	-.001
	(.004)	(.006)	(.004)	(.009)	(.009)
Immigration attitudes	.132***	.028***	-.104***	-.274***	.256***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.004)	(.008)	(.01)
EU attitudes	.024***	.046***	-.009**	-.157***	.071***
	(.004)	(.006)	(.004)	(.007)	(.008)
Gender (female)	.097***	-.004	-.093***	-.386***	.476***
	(.018)	(.028)	(.018)	(.035)	(.037)
Age	.003***	.002**	.007***	-.012***	-.017***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	.274***	-.312***	-.224***	-.003	.018
	(.05)	(.092)	(.056)	(.097)	(.104)
Religiosity	-.08***	.007	.113***	-.028***	-.057***
	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)	(.006)	(.006)
Household income	-.075***	.026***	.093***	-.026***	-.034***
	(.004)	(.006)	(.004)	(.007)	(.007)
Democratic satisfaction	-.042***	.046***	.112***	-.14***	-.055***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.005)	(.008)	(.009)
Time fixed effects:					
ESS 2014	-.163***	.068*	.022	.263***	-.01

	(.025)	(.039)	(.025)	(.051)	(.051)
ESS 2016	-.158***	.081**	-.011	.359***	-.067
	(.026)	(.039)	(.026)	(.052)	(.052)
ESS 2018	-.239***	.197***	-.141***	.762***	-.073
	(.026)	(.038)	(.026)	(.049)	(.053)
Constant	-.414***	-4.369***	-1.949***	1.889***	-6.651***
	(.16)	(.516)	(.144)	(.502)	(.777)
No. of countries	16	16	16	16	16
No. of observations	60,004	60,004	60,004	60,004	60,004
Random-effects:	0.580	1.990	0.502	1.923	2.930
	(0.103)	(0.414)	(0.090)	(0.389)	(0.657)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	-36184.199	-18463.856	-36184.858	-12690.246	-11427.316

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Note: multilevel logistic regression models, random effects: country.

Appendix Table A.2 First stage of analysis: robustness checks (separating leftist parties into far-left and center-left).

	(1)	(2)
	Center-left	Far-left
Offshore	.146**	-.134
	(.064)	(.117)
Education (years)	-.03***	.024***
	(.003)	(.005)
Offshore X Education	-.017***	.002
	(.005)	(.008)
Immigration attitudes	.091***	.19***
	(.005)	(.009)
EU attitudes	.045***	-.055***
	(.004)	(.007)
Gender (female)	.083***	.099***
	(.019)	(.036)
Age	.004***	-.003***
	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	.162***	.315***
	(.052)	(.078)
Religiosity	-.048***	-.141***
	(.003)	(.006)
Household income	-.049***	-.107***
	(.004)	(.007)
Democratic satisfaction	-.003	-.145***
	(.005)	(.008)
Time fixed effects:		
ESS 2014	-.155***	-.055

	(.026)	(.05)
ESS 2016	-.136***	.001
	(.027)	(.05)
ESS 2018	-.255***	.098**
	(.027)	(.049)
Constant	-1.203***	-2.63***
	(.332)	(.471)
No. of countries	16	16
No. of observations	59.998	59.998
Random-effects	1.293	1.797
	(0.250)	(0.362)
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	-33681.764	-12119.991

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Note: multilevel logistic regression models, random effects: country.

Appendix Table A.3 Second stage of analysis: multilevel logistic regressions (DV = votes for leftist party), for each group of the globalization cleavage.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Winners	-.016				-.052*
	(.029)				(.03)
Cult. W, econ. L		.191***			.122***
		(.024)			(.025)
Econ. W, cult. L			-.487***		-.514***
			(.05)		(.05)
Losers				-.294***	-.297***
				(.027)	(.028)
Gender (female)	.14***	.139***	.134***	.137***	.13***
	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)
Age	.002***	.002***	.002***	.003***	.002***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	.25***	.249***	.252***	.252***	.255***
	(.048)	(.048)	(.048)	(.048)	(.048)
Religiosity	-.081***	-.081***	-.081***	-.081***	-.082***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Household income	-.071***	-.071***	-.069***	-.073***	-.07***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Democratic satisfaction	-.009**	-.012***	-.01***	-.013***	-.016***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
ESS 2014	-.174***	-.174***	-.173***	-.176***	-.173***
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
ESS 2016	-.153***	-.153***	-.151***	-.16***	-.158***
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)

ESS 2018	-.222***	-.224***	-.222***	-.231***	-.23***
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
Country intercept	-.005	-.008	.027	.049	.088
	(.148)	(.148)	(.148)	(.15)	(.149)
S.d. country intercept	-.592***	-.597***	-.593***	-.582***	-.587***
	(.178)	(.178)	(.178)	(.178)	(.178)
ICC	.085	.084	.085	.087	.086
BCC	76712.55	76650.82	76610.74	76595	76478.19
Observations	62335	62335	62335	62335	62335

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix Table A.4 Second stage of analysis: multilevel logistic regressions (DV = votes for liberal party), for each group of the globalization cleavage.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	libparty	libparty	libparty	libparty	libparty
Winners	.276***				.234***
	(.039)				(.04)
Cult. W, econ. L		-.081**			-.08**
		(.038)			(.039)
Econ. W, cult. L			-.049		-.048
			(.068)		(.069)
Losers				-.28***	-.269***
				(.047)	(.048)
Gender (female)	.018	.016	.015	.012	.013
	(.027)	(.027)	(.027)	(.027)	(.027)
Age	0	0	-.001	0	.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	-.268***	-.261***	-.261***	-.26***	-.266***
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Religiosity	.006	.005	.005	.005	.006
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
Household income	.042***	.047***	.047***	.046***	.041***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
Democratic satisfaction	.061***	.066***	.065***	.061***	.059***
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
ESS 2014	.077**	.078**	.079**	.077**	.075**
	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)
ESS 2016	.104***	.107***	.108***	.101***	.098**
	(.039)	(.039)	(.039)	(.039)	(.039)

ESS 2018	.234***	.243***	.244***	.235***	.227***
	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)	(.038)
Country intercept	-3.761***	-3.736***	-3.734***	-3.685***	-3.702***
	(.519)	(.519)	(.519)	(.519)	(.519)
S.d. country intercept	.702***	.702***	.703***	.702***	.702***
	(.208)	(.208)	(.208)	(.208)	(.208)
ICC	.5529739	.5532083	.5534099	.5531749	.5528812
BCC	38325.24	38368.86	38372.88	38335.23	38324.05
Observations	62335	62335	62335	62335	62335

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix Table A.5 Second stage of analysis: multilevel logistic regressions (DV = votes for center-right party), for each group of the globalization cleavage.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	crightparty	crightparty	crightparty	crightparty	crightparty
Winners	-.109***				-.026
	(.029)				(.03)
Cult. W, econ. L		.05**			.114***
		(.024)			(.025)
Econ. W, cult. L			.385***		.438***
			(.044)		(.045)
Losers				.288***	.325***
				(.027)	(.027)
Gender (female)	-.137***	-.136***	-.13***	-.134***	-.128***
	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)
Age	.008***	.008***	.008***	.008***	.008***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	-.211***	-.213***	-.215***	-.214***	-.219***
	(.054)	(.054)	(.054)	(.054)	(.054)
Religiosity	.114***	.114***	.114***	.115***	.115***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Household income	.084***	.082***	.08***	.084***	.083***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)
Democratic satisfaction	.086***	.084***	.086***	.089***	.09***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
ESS 2014	.025	.025	.023	.026	.025
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
ESS 2016	-.024	-.025	-.027	-.018	-.018
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)

ESS 2018	-.155***	-.158***	-.159***	-.149***	-.149***
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
Country intercept	-2.379***	-2.388***	-2.42***	-2.449***	-2.493***
	(.134)	(.134)	(.133)	(.135)	(.135)
S.d. country intercept	-.728***	-.728***	-.732***	-.715***	-.715***
	(.18)	(.18)	(.18)	(.18)	(.18)
ICC	.0662351	.0661871	.0656912	.0677961	.0678028
BIC	76067.44	76077.31	76006.58	75965.36	75885.52
Observations	62335	62335	62335	62335	62335

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix Table A.6 Second stage of analysis: multilevel logistic regressions (DV = votes for far-right party), for each group of the globalization cleavage.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	frightparty	frightparty	frightparty	frightparty	frightparty
Winners	-1.51***				-1.517***
	(.095)				(.096)
Cult. W, econ. L		-.765***			-.76***
		(.058)			(.059)
Econ. W, cult. L			.262***		.148*
			(.076)		(.076)
Losers				.681***	.503***
				(.04)	(.041)
Gender (female)	-.504***	-.5***	-.497***	-.487***	-.49***
	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)
Age	-.006***	-.004***	-.004***	-.006***	-.007***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	-.02	-.032	-.036	-.039	-.022
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.091)
Religiosity	-.02***	-.017***	-.016***	-.016***	-.021***
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Household income	-.063***	-.077***	-.077***	-.073***	-.062***
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Democratic satisfaction	-.241***	-.243***	-.249***	-.241***	-.226***
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
ESS 2014	.242***	.231***	.232***	.235***	.242***
	(.049)	(.049)	(.049)	(.049)	(.049)
ESS 2016	.297***	.287***	.29***	.311***	.308***
	(.05)	(.05)	(.049)	(.05)	(.05)

ESS 2018	.639***	.618***	.613***	.642***	.664***
	(.046)	(.046)	(.046)	(.046)	(.046)
Country intercept	-.446	-.498	-.54	-.665	-.546
	(.498)	(.499)	(.501)	(.498)	(.495)
S.d. country intercept	.663***	.665***	.668***	.662***	.656***
	(.202)	(.202)	(.202)	(.202)	(.202)
ICC	.5338054	.5347594	.5361433	.5332037	.5303655
BIC	29067.75	29249.89	29444.74	29183.26	28681.27
Observations	62335	62335	62335	62335	62335

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix Table A.7 Second stage of analysis: multilevel logistic regressions (DV = votes for green party), for each group of the globalization cleavage.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	greenparty	greenparty	greenparty	greenparty	greenparty
Winners	.666***				.574***
	(.047)				(.049)
Cult. W, econ. L		-.024			-.022
		(.049)			(.05)
Econ. W, cult. L			-.353***		-.33***
			(.103)		(.105)
Losers				-.906***	-.851***
				(.072)	(.074)
Gender (female)	.544***	.535***	.53***	.525***	.53***
	(.036)	(.035)	(.035)	(.036)	(.036)
Age	-.021***	-.022***	-.022***	-.021***	-.02***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	.056	.07	.073	.082	.072
	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)
Religiosity	-.068***	-.072***	-.072***	-.072***	-.068***
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Household income	-.002	.01	.011*	.007	-.002
	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)
Democratic satisfaction	.019**	.031***	.03***	.019**	.009
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.009)
ESS 2014	.042	.047	.048	.043	.04
	(.049)	(.049)	(.049)	(.049)	(.049)
ESS 2016	-.02	-.009	-.007	-.024	-.032
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.051)

ESS 2018	.007	.034	.034	.015	-.007
	(.051)	(.051)	(.051)	(.051)	(.051)
Country intercept	-3.948***	-3.889***	-3.864***	-3.745***	-3.782***
	(.715)	(.708)	(.708)	(.714)	(.72)
S.d. country intercept	1***	.99***	.99***	.999***	1.007***
	(.225)	(.225)	(.225)	(.225)	(.225)
ICC	.6920595	.6877857	.6877788	.6915062	.6948689
BIC	24971.16	25154.53	25142.02	24958.8	24833.6
Observations	62335	62335	62335	62335	62335

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix Table A.8 Second stage of analysis: robustness check logistic regressions (DV = votes for center-left vs. far-left parties), for each group of the globalization cleavage.

	(1)	(2)
	Center-left	Far-left
Winners	.001	.189**
	(.045)	(.075)
Cult. W, econ. L	.224***	-.052
	(.036)	(.068)
Econ. W, cult. L	-.558***	-.319**
	(.079)	(.129)
Losers	-.295***	-.449***
	(.042)	(.086)
Gender (female)	.069**	.008
	(.027)	(.049)
Age	.002***	-.007***
	(.001)	(.002)
Unemployed	.111	.299***
	(.071)	(.102)
Religiosity	-.044***	-.172***
	(.005)	(.01)
Household income	-.045***	-.085***
	(.005)	(.009)
Democratic satisfaction	.022***	-.146***
	(.006)	(.011)
Country fixed effects:		
Austria	-.557***	.857***
	(.053)	(.245)
Belgium	-.865***	-.498
	(.066)	(.418)

Switzerland	-.208***	2.247***
	(.049)	(.226)
Denmark	-.115**	2.627***
	(.056)	(.23)
Spain	-.167***	2.66***
	(.056)	(.227)
Finland	-.933***	2.516***
	(.056)	(.228)
France	-.183***	2.351***
	(.056)	(.231)
UK	.195***	
	(.053)	
Ireland	-.732***	-.068
	(.057)	(.284)
Iceland	-5.415***	3.604***
	(.502)	(.232)
Italy	1.113***	1.205***
	(.082)	(.299)
Netherlands	-1.013***	2.763***
	(.059)	(.228)
Norway	-.226***	2.407***
	(.053)	(.228)
Portugal	.16**	3.175***
	(.071)	(.234)
Sweden	-.322***	2.209***
	(.052)	(.228)
Time fixed effects:		
ESS 2014	-.1***	.088
	(.037)	(.071)

ESS 2016	-.076**	.22***
	(.038)	(.069)
ESS 2018	-.262***	.496***
	(.037)	(.07)
Constant	-.342***	-2.786***
	(.09)	(.258)
No. of observations	62327	57494
Pseudo R^2	.04	.107

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix Table A.9 Categorization of political parties into groups. Names printed as they are in European Social Survey (ESS) datasets 2012 - 2018.

Country	Party Group	Party Name(s)
Austria	Left (far-left)	KPÖ
	Left (center-left)	SPÖ
	Liberal / center	NEOS
	Center-right	ÖVP, BZÖ
	Far-right	FPÖ
	Green	Grüne
Belgium	Left (far-left)	PTB
	Left (center-left)	PVDA+, PS, SP.A
	Liberal / center	Open VLD, MR. DéFI
	Center-right	CD&V, Lijst Dedecker, CDH, N-VA
	Far-right	Front National, Vlaams Belang, Parti Populaire
	Green	Groen!, Ecolo
Switzerland	Left (far-left)	Alternative Left, Left
	Left (center-left)	Socialist Party, Swiss Labour Party
	Liberal / center	Bourgeois-Democratic Party, Conservative Democratic Party
	Center-right	Christian Democrats, Radical Liberals, FDP
	Far-right	Ticino League, Federal Democratic Union, Swiss People's Party, Swiss Democrats, Swiss Nationalist Party
	Green	Green Liberal Party, Green Party
Germany	Left (far-left)	Die Linke
	Left (center-left)	SPD
	Liberal / center	FDP
	Center-right	CDU, CSU
	Far-right	AfD, Die Republikaner, NPD
	Green	Bündis 90/Die Grünen
Denmark	Left (far-left)	Enhedslisten, Alternativet
	Left (center-left)	Socialdemokraterne. Socialistisk Folkeparti
	Liberal / center	Det Radikale Venstre

	Center-right	Det Konservative Folkeparti, Venstre, Liberal Alliance, Kristendemokraterne
	Far-right	Dansk Folkeparti
	Green	N/A
Spain	Left (far-left)	IU, ICV, AMAIUR, BNG, Podemos, En Comú Podem, En Marea
	Left (center-left)	PSOE, ERC, Compromís, CUP, EH Bildu,
	Liberal / center	CiU, UPyD, EAJ, PNV, CC, PNC
	Center-right	PP, Foro de Ciudadanos, Geroa Bai, CDC-PdeCAT, Navarra Suma,
	Far-right	Vox
	Green	N/A
Finland	Left (far-left)	Left Alliance, Communist Party, The Communist Workers' Party, Workers' Party
	Left (center-left)	Social Democratic Party, For The Poor
	Liberal / center	SPP, The Centre Party
	Center-right	The National Coalition Party, Christian Democrats
	Far-right	True Finns, Freedom Party, Change 2011
	Green	Green League
France	Left (far-left)	NPA, LO, FDG, PCF, FI
	Left (center-left)	PS, Parti Radical de Gauche
	Liberal / center	MODEM, Nouveau Centre, LREM
	Center-right	UMP, LR
	Far-right	FN, MPF
	Green	EELV
UK	Left (far-left)	N/A
	Left (center-left)	Labour, SNP, Plaid Cymru, Sinn Fein (NI), Social Democratic and Labour Party (NI), People Before Profit (NI)
	Liberal / center	Liberal Democrat, Alliance Party (NI)
	Center-right	Conservative, Ulster Unionist Party (NI), Democratic Unionist Partym (NI)
	Far-right	UKIP, Traditional Unionist Party (NI)
	Green	Green Party
Iceland	Left (far-left)	Samfylkinguna, Vinstri hreyfinguna-Grænt framboo, Albyourfylkinguna
	Left (center-left)	Húmanistaflokkin

	Liberal / center	Framsóknarflokkinn, Bjarta framtio, Flokk fólksins, Dögun, Vioreisn
	Center-right	Sjálfstæoisflokkinn, Frjálslyndafinguna, Lyoræoishreyfinguna
	Far-right	Íslensku bjóofylkinguna
	Green	N/A
Ireland	Left (far-left)	Socialist Party, United Left Alliance, People Before Profit
	Left (center-left)	Labour, Sinn Fein
	Liberal / center	N/A
	Center-right	Fianna Fail, Fine Gael
	Far-right	N/A
	Green	Green Party
Italy	Left (far-left)	Rivoluzione Civile, Liberi e Uguali, Potere al popolo
	Left (center-left)	PD, M5S, Italia Europa Insieme
	Liberal / center	Scelta Civica, Radicali Italiani, + Europa, Civia Popolare Lorenzin, SVP-PATT
	Center-right	UDC, FLI, PdL, FARE-Giannino, Forza Italia, Noi con l'Italia
	Far-right	Lega Nord, Fratelli d'Italia, Casapound Italia
	Green	SEL
Netherlands	Left (far-left)	Socialist Party
	Left (center-left)	Labour
	Liberal / center	Democrats 66
	Center-right	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, Christian Democratic Appeal, Christian Union, Reformed Political Party, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
	Far-right	Party for Freedom, Forum for Democracy
	Green	Green Left
Norway	Left (far-left)	RØDT, SV
	Left (center-left)	A
	Liberal / center	V, SP
	Center-right	KRF, H
	Far-right	FRP
	Green	MDG
Portugal	Left (far-left)	BE, CDU, POUS, PCTP-MRPP, PCP-PEV

	Left (center-left)	PS, L/TDA - LIVRE, PDR
	Liberal / center	PH. JPP, NC, PDR
	Center-right	CDS, PP, PDA, PND, PSD, PPD
	Far-right	PNR, PPV/CDC
	Green	MPT
Sweden	Left (far-left)	Vänsterpartiet
	Left (center-left)	Socialdemokraterna
	Liberal / center	Centern, Folkpartiet liberalerna
	Center-right	Kristdemokraterna. Moderata samlingspartiet
	Far-right	Sverigedemokraterna
	Green	Milijöpartiet de gröna

Appendix Figure A.10 Second stage of analysis: predicted probabilities of voting for center-left party, derived from first model in 2.f. above.



Appendix Figure A.11 Second stage of analysis: predicted probabilities of voting for far-left party, derived from first model in 2.f. above.



How does globalization affect the public's trust in elections and perceptions of democracy?

Abstract:

How does globalization affect citizens' perceptions of democracy and political legitimacy? Current research suggests that there is a growing gap between those who benefit from globalization in contrast to those who are disadvantaged: the former express greater democratic satisfaction and political trust in comparison with the latter. However, whilst the existing scholarship focuses on country-level variables of globalization (e.g. net migration, trade, supranational institutions, the eurozone crisis), I show that it is vital to investigate individual-level variables such as citizens' perceptions of globalization, in addition to economic effects at the individual-level, in the context of Western Europe. The findings suggest that the individual-level processes deserve greater attention in explaining democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy: specifically, two different mechanisms are at play. First, those who hold negative perceptions of immigration and international institutions express less satisfaction with democracy and trust in politics. However, individuals who are negatively affected by economic globalization are motivated to express their discontent, hence boosting their political trust and democratic satisfaction. Therefore, extant analyses of globalization remain incomplete and even misleading without greater consideration of the individual level.

How does globalization affect the public's trust in elections and perceptions of democracy?

Introduction

How does globalization affect citizens' perceptions of democracy and political legitimacy? The rise of new movements and political parties in Europe pose a threat to the "status quo" centrist politics, calling into question citizens' satisfaction with political processes. In particular, populist forces on the right are stronger than ever, in part due to perceived negative developments related to globalization (Arzheimer, 2009). On the other side, social unrest and populism on the left - such as the Occupy and Indignados movements - are another demonstration of growing dissatisfaction with existing political channels of expression. Therefore, it is vital to address citizens' perceptions of political legitimacy to analyze if current populist and extremist movements pose a serious threat to democratic stability. In this paper I argue that focusing on individual-level impacts of globalization is of crucial importance in assessing this question.

On the whole, support for democracy is stronger than ever (e.g. Norris, 2011; Fuchs et al., 1998). However, a gap has emerged between those who benefit from globalization, in comparison to those who are disadvantaged. Individuals who benefit from globalization have a better perception of how politics works for them and express greater satisfaction with democracy and other key components of political legitimacy. On the other hand, citizens exposed to the downsides of globalization feel as though the political system is biased against them. However, the existing research on these themes focus mainly on country-level impacts of globalization (such as net migration, trade, and the extent of the eurozone crisis), and measure the division between advantages/disadvantages of globalization by education level. This leads us to a second, more specific research question: are individual-level processes of globalization also influential on citizens' perceptions of democracy and political legitimacy?

I focus on three factors which more directly capture the effects of globalization on citizens at the individual-level and find that they are consistent predictors of satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. First, individuals who perceive themselves as negatively affected by globalization according to both immigration and the expansion of supranational institutions express less democratic satisfaction and less political trust. Second, individuals in offshorable occupations are more content with the way that democracy and political processes work for them. Surprisingly, however, amongst individuals in offshorable occupations, those who are "low-skilled" display greater democratic satisfaction and trust in the political system (compared to those who are "high-skilled"). In addition, the individual-level variables appear to be more consistent predictors of political trust than macro-level measurements of globalization. The results in this paper, therefore, both complement and expand the current scholarship on globalization and democracy by a) contributing to evidence that displays the impacts on citizens' perceptions of political legitimacy, and b) demonstrating the significance of individual-level processes of globalization for democratic satisfaction.

Defining and operationalizing democratic satisfaction, political legitimacy, and globalization

I refer specifically to "diffuse" support for democracy i.e. how democracy works in an individual's country, rather than broader, theoretical assessments of the pros and cons of democracy (Easton 1975). Satisfaction with democracy captures the extent to which the broader political system mirrors citizens' normative expectations of a legitimate democratic society (Kuechler 1991). Globalization is linked to "the malfunctioning of representative democracy, especially by the deficiencies of the party system (Kriesi and Pappas, 2016: 2). Therefore, whilst citizens' democratic satisfaction is distinct from "particular political authorities" such as major parties, political figures, and leaders, perceptions of democracy and political trust are still tightly connected (Thomas, 2016: 3).

Globalization can be defined according to three main elements: economic competition, cultural values, and the expansion of supranational political institutions (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012). In analyzing

globalization's impact on citizens' satisfaction with democracy and political legitimacy, country-level explanations dominate current research. For example, Thomas (2016) operationalizes globalization by using measures which map neatly onto the three elements: the economic, social, and political indices from the KOF globalization index.[10] Specifically, these indices comprise macro-level variables such as trade in goods (% of GDP), migration (foreign-born residents as % of population), and the number of international organizations in which a country is a member. Similarly, Aarts et al. (2017) use a different index developed by Dreher (2006) which compiles economic measures of globalization such as trade, FDIs, portfolio investments, and income payments to foreign nationals. In other studies of globalization's impact of national-level politics, many researchers focus on individual-level variables which also map onto the three main components e.g. attitudes towards immigrants, perceptions of the EU, and the offshorability status of one's occupation. Such variables are used to assess the impact on support for welfare provisions, populist party support, and left-right placement (e.g. Langsæther and Stubager, 2019; Walter, 2017; Rommel and Walter, 2018; Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2019). However, these individual-level measures of globalization are yet to be applied to the same degree in understanding their impacts on democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy.

Is globalization good or bad for democracy?

Some scholars argue that in general, globalization is outright bad for citizens' satisfaction with democracy. This is evident through several factors, such as a decline in trust in political institutions, dwindling voter turnouts, and decreasing support for freedom of speech (Foa and Mounk, 2016: 6-8; 2017a; 2017b). Overall, it is claimed that a decrease in citizens' support for democracy can be observed since the mid-1990s, and this is more pronounced amongst younger cohorts (i.e. millennials and gen-Z) (Ibid.). The decrease in voter turnout is most evident amongst advanced industrial democracies: when

[10] For conceptualization and operationalization of all globalization variables, see: https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html

comparing election turnout rates from 1970 to 2011, turnout decreased on average by 10% (Karp and Milazzo, 2016: 190). Globalization's negative impact on turnout is evident as voters feel more detached from political parties (Steiner, 2010; Gray and Kitilson, 2005).

Mechanisms linking globalization to negative effects on democratic satisfaction and political trust operate according to the three main dimensions of globalization. First, increasingly integrated webs of economic interdependence mean that governments, parties, and politicians are restricted in their ability to seriously alter and influence economic policy issues (Hellwig and Samuels, 2007; Karp and Milazzo, 2016). Furthermore, lending between international banks and financial institutions (such as that between the European Central Bank and Southern Europe prior to the eurozone crisis) creates a perception of greater precarity and volatility (White, 2010). Second, the expansion of supranational political institutions, namely the EU, also contributes to the loss of states' ability to solve political problems on their own. An interdependent web of relations with other countries leads to reduced transparency of systems of political accountability (Held et al., 1999; Rodrik, 2011). Finally, increasing migrant flows and the migrant "crisis" in 2015 similarly contributes to a sense of loss of control over the nation state's boundaries.

However, there are also reasons to believe that globalization exerts a positive effect on support for democracy and political institutions. Increased economic growth and multiculturalism leads to a promotion of liberal ideas because "people, goods, and services are more able to move freely around the world" (Vowles and Xezonakis, 2016: 8; Wolf, 2004; Rudra, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Another line of thought instead argues that although citizens might be negatively affected by some aspects of globalization, it can act as a positive force in motivating individuals to take their political participation more seriously. As a result, citizens feel more encouraged to vote, join demonstrations and other political movements, and pay closer attention to current affairs. For example, Fisher (2016: 134) argues that globalization "is less a source of democratic despair for voters but encourages citizens to use elections as a means to hold governments to account". If citizens perceive that globalization might lead

to economic decline, it is argued, then national government performance becomes even more salient than usual to citizens, prompting them to vote. Similarly, Karp and Milazzo (2016: 193) claim that an economic crisis - in particular the 2008 financial crisis and 2010 eurozone crisis - can "raise the stakes associated with the outcome of the election".

Gaps in support for democracy and political trust

On further inspection, globalization exerts positive effects on democratic satisfaction for some citizens, but has negative impacts for others. A gap is therefore emerging between those who are advantaged by globalization compared to those who are disadvantaged, and it is widening over time (Aarts et al., 2017; Thomas, 2016). This research, however, focuses mostly on country-level variables, such as the KOF index, and the division between those who benefit (and those who do not) from globalization is measured according to education levels. Yet, "it is interesting that democratic support remains high, even in the aftermath of the World Financial and Euro crises", suggesting it is important to more thoroughly probe individual-level explanations of globalization's impact on democratic satisfaction and political trust (Ibid.: 230). Furthermore, whilst education levels certainly shape one's satisfaction with the political system, it is necessary to assess variables which may more directly capture the "core processes of the globalization model" (Langsæther and Stubager 2019: 1216). For instance, in one study, Fuchs and Roller (2019) consider the impact of an individual's attitudes towards immigration in shaping satisfaction with the political system, finding that more positive attitudes increase the likelihood that they are content. I follow this logic before moving onto two other variables which have been neglected.

H5: The more positively an individual views immigrants, the more likely they are to express greater satisfaction with democracy and trust in the country's political system.

In addition, it is key to more directly assess the mechanism regarding the perceived "loss of political transparency" due to the increased expansion and integration of supranational institutions. For example, contrasted to the KOF's measure of the presence of international institutions, an individual's actual opinions toward those institutions better demonstrates the process of the perceived transparency. Therefore:

H6: The more positively an individual views supranational institutions, the more likely they are to express greater satisfaction with democracy and trust in the country's political system.

Finally, in order to assess the impact of economic globalization, a citizen's "offshorability" status much more directly captures individual-level effects, compared to country-level measures such as trade in goods and services. Individuals who work in export-oriented firms (and hence have a high degree of offshorability) are more likely to benefit from globalization due to the potential for success in a growing global market (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). Hence, offshorable workers have a greater probability of placing trust in a country's political institutions, since the globalization "status-quo" benefits their individual economic position in the labor market.

H7: Individuals in offshorable occupations are more likely to express greater satisfaction with democracy and trust in the country's political system.

However, there is a key difference amongst employees in export-oriented firms. In particular, Walter (2017) argues that the degree of offshorability, in conjunction with one's skill-level, is crucial in understanding how individuals perceive their labor market risk. If the employee is in a high-skilled occupation (where skill level is measured by years of education), they can "sell their skills to a wider net of customers worldwide" (Rommel and Walter 2018: 625). In this case, a high degree of offshorbaility works in the high-skilled individual's favor, and is likely to increase their wages (Hummels et al. 2014). In contrast, occupations that are considered "low-skilled", which are also highly offshorable, can be shifted elsewhere in the world to be performed at a cheaper rate. Consequently, individuals in these positions have less job security, and encounter increasingly depressed wages (Ibid.). As a result, "low-skilled" employees in offshorable occupations are more likely to be disenchanted with the political system that further promotes economic globalization.

H8: Amongst individuals in offshorable occupations, those who are higher-skilled express greater democratic satisfaction and trust in the country's political system.



Figure 2.1. Histogram of respondents in 16 Western European countries, 2012 to 2018, who selected on a scale of 1 - 10 "how satisfied are you with the way that democracy works in your country?" European Social Survey data, N = 109,168.

Methods, data, measurement

As figure 1 suggests, I use data from the European Social Survey's (ESS) four most recent complete waves (2012 to 2018) across 16 countries in Western Europe to assess the impacts of globalization in the past decade. The ESS contains several relevant variables that capture citizens' perceptions of globalization, as well as their specific occupational role, in contrast to other studies which focus on variables at the country-level (e.g. objective measures of net immigration; impact of eurozone crisis, etc). In particular, there are four dependent variables that directly measure democratic satisfaction and trust in the political system, all of which are on a 11-pt. scale ranging from "not at all satisfied/no trust" to "completely satisfied/complete trust". The first variable asks respondents "to what extent are you satisfied with the way that democracy works for you in your country?". The other three variables ask "to what extent do you trust [political parties/politicians/the parliament] in your country?". This

study uses the four most recent waves (2012 to 2018) of the ESS in order to capture effects of perceptions of globalization on democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy post-eurozone crisis.

I also use three independent variables to assess each dimension of globalization. For H1 and H2, I use two variables (also on a 11-pt. scale) which ask, first, "how much do you think immigration culturally destroys or enriches a country's cultural life" ranging from "destroys" (0) to "enriches" (10). Second, "to what extent do you think that European unification should go further?" ranging from "unification has already gone too far" (0) to "should go further" (10). These two questions, therefore, capture how negatively or positively one feels towards immigration and supranational institutions. Finally, I also code respondents' offshorability status, adapted from Blinder (2009), originally listed on a 0 to 100 scale. I code this as a binary variable, simply: an individual is in an offshorable job (1), or an individual is **not** in an offshorable job (0) (adapted from Walter 2017; Rommel and Walter 2018). To analyze the impact of economic globalization amongst different skill-levels in offshorable occupations, I include education (measured in years of formal education) as an interaction term.

I run four multilevel OLS regression models, one for each dependent variable, including fixed-time effects and a commonly adopted set of control variables (see appendix). In addition, I also include country-level measures of globalization: the KOF economic index, social index, and political index. These provide a direct comparison to the individual-level economic, cultural, and political measures of globalization. For robustness checks, I first run the same OLS regression models minus the country-level effects (the KOF indices), and second, I recode the dependent variables into binary variables and run four multilevel logit models, also outlined in the appendix.

Results



Figure 2.2. Predictors of individual-level globalization variables for democratic satisfaction. ESS data 2012 - 2018; linear regression; regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.

The results show that individual-level effects of globalization are indeed significant predictors of citizens' satisfaction with democracy and the political system. First, the positive coefficients for immigration attitudes and EU attitudes trend in the prediction direction (H1 and H2) across all four models: the more positive an individual's attitudes towards immigration and supranational institutions, the more likely they are to express satisfaction with democracy and trust in political parties, politicians, and parliament. The results for H3 and H4 are more mixed: the coefficients also all trend in the predicted direction, therefore, individuals in offshorable, export-oriented professions express greater satisfaction with democracy and political trust. Yet, the negative interaction terms (offshore X education) indicate that, entirely contradictory to H4, those in offshorable occupations are less likely to express satisfaction/trust as their skill-set (or years of education) increases. Essentially, amongst those in offshorable occupations, lower-skilled individuals are actually more likely to be satisfied with democracy and trust political institutions. Although the interaction terms for democratic satisfaction and trust in parliament are not statistically significant, the coefficients for trust in political parties and politicians are positive and statistically significant. Robustness checks also display similar findings (see tables A2 and A3 in appendix).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democratic satisfaction	Trust in political parties	Trust in politicians	Trust in parliament
Offshore	.112*	.154***	.19***	.115*
	(.059)	(.059)	(.06)	(.063)
Education (years)	.003	.006**	.014***	.03***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Offshore X Education	-.006	-.011***	-.012***	-.003
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Immigration attitudes	.116***	.091***	.102***	.136***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
EU attitudes	.071***	.102***	.107***	.106***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
KOF Economic Index	.004	.032	.027	-.014
	(.018)	(.024)	(.022)	(.017)
KOF Social Index	.094***	.113***	.11***	.115***
	(.032)	(.042)	(.038)	(.031)
KOF Political Index	.001	-.002	-.004	.023**
	(.011)	(.014)	(.013)	(.01)
Observations	43080	43088	43210	43026

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Table 2.1. Multilevel OLS regression results for DVs democratic satisfaction, trust in parties, trust in politicians, and trust in parliament. 16 countries; ESS 2012 - 2018; full results including control variables and robustness checks in appendix (tables A2 and A3).

Discussion and conclusions

The results presented here show a couple of major implications. First, the mechanisms linking globalization and citizens' views of democracy and political trust appear to differ according to different elements of globalization. For example, for both immigration and supranational attitudes, the more negative an individual's perspectives are, the more likely that they express greater political discontent. Hence, according to these two dimensions of globalization, the "globalization is bad for democratic satisfaction" argument applies. However, the results for the economic competition dimension work in the opposite way: contrary to expectations, those who are more negatively affected by offshoring express greater satisfaction with democracy, and more political trust. Therefore, it may be that the mechanism presented by Fisher (2016) applies to the economic effects of globalization. Whilst Fisher finds that negative economic impacts can prompt citizens to vote and politically participate, the results in this paper also show that these same individuals experience a positive boost in their views towards political legitimacy: essentially, they think that the political system can genuinely be a vehicle for change.

Second, of the three macro measures of globalization included, only one is consistently statistically significant across all four measures of political legitimacy: the social dimension of immigration and EU attitudes. On the other hand, all three measures of globalization at the individual-level are consistently statistically significant (with the exception of offshorability for democratic satisfaction and trust in parliament). Therefore, alongside large-scale events such as the eurozone crisis, trade, and the migrant "crisis", individual-level measures of globalization have just as big of an impact of citizen's trust in democracy and the political system.

In conclusion, the evidence in this research note suggests that individual-level processes of globalization have a significant impact on democratic satisfaction and trust in political institutions. Future research could assess in greater detail how the mechanisms vary from one dimension to another,

and measure other ways of conceptualizing globalization processes at the individual-level to better understand citizens' trust in democracy and perceptions of political legitimacy.

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A Appendix

List of Tables

Replication code available via Stata .do file on request.

Appendix table A.1: 11-pt. OLS regression, individual-level AND KOF included

	(1) Democratic satisfaction	(2) Trust in political parties	(3) Trust in politicians	(4) Trust in parliament
Offshore	.112*	.154***	.19***	.115*
	(.059)	(.059)	(.06)	(.063)
Education (years)	.003	.006**	.014***	.03***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Offshore X Education	-.006	-.011***	-.012***	-.003
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Immigration attitudes	.116***	.091***	.102***	.136***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
EU attitudes	.071***	.102***	.107***	.106***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
KOF Economic Index	.004	.032	.027	-.014
	(.018)	(.024)	(.022)	(.017)
KOF Social Index	.094***	.113***	.11***	.115***
	(.032)	(.042)	(.038)	(.031)
KOF Political Index	.001	-.002	-.004	.023**
	(.011)	(.014)	(.013)	(.01)
Gender	-.067***	.09***	.12***	-.074***
	(.018)	(.018)	(.019)	(.02)
Age	.001	-.003***	.001	-.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	-.02	-.012	-.065	.013
	(.046)	(.046)	(.046)	(.049)
Religiosity	.049***	.062***	.066***	.062***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Urban/rural	-.042***	-.024***	-.017**	-.061***

	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
Household income	.036***	.009**	.019***	.049***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Satisfaction with economy	.447***	.352***	.374***	.403***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
Time effects	-.623***	-.128***	-.168***	-.154***
	(.019)	(.019)	(.02)	(.021)
Intercept	-5.939**	-11.306***	-10.993***	-9.89***
	(2.685)	(3.59)	(3.228)	(2.585)
S.d. country intercept	.307***	.412***	.370***	.294***
	(.056)	(.073)	(.066)	(.053)
ICC	.026	.046	.037	.022
BIC	176080.9	176460.2	177881	181283.2
Observations	43080	43088	43210	43026

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix table A.2: Robustness checks: OLS regressions, individual-level only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democratic satisfaction	Trust in political parties	Trust in politicians	Trust in parliament
Offshore	.112*	.154***	.189***	.115*
	(.059)	(.059)	(.06)	(.063)
Education (years)	.003	.006**	.014***	.03***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Offshore X Education	-.006	-.011***	-.012***	-.003
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Immigration attitudes	.116***	.091***	.102***	.135***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
EU attitudes	.071***	.102***	.107***	.106***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Gender	-.067***	.09***	.12***	-.074***
	(.018)	(.018)	(.019)	(.02)
Age	.001	-.003***	.001	-.001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	-.021	-.012	-.065	.012
	(.046)	(.046)	(.046)	(.049)
Religiosity	.049***	.062***	.066***	.062***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Urban/rural	-.042***	-.024***	-.017**	-.061***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
Household income	.036***	.009**	.019***	.049***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Satisfaction with economy	.447***	.353***	.374***	.403***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)

Time effects	-.624***	-.128***	-.168***	-.154***
	(.019)	(.019)	(.02)	(.021)
Intercept	2.55***	.852***	.259*	.98***
	(.125)	(.164)	(.154)	(.13)
S.d. country intercept	.417***	.596***	.548***	.430***
	(.074)	(.106)	(.097)	(.077)
ICC	.0478	.092	.078	.045
BIC	176058.6	176440	177861.5	181263.2
Observations	43080	43088	43210	43026

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Appendix table A.3: Robustness checks: logit-regressions, binary dependent variables

Note: 11-pt. Dependent variables (democratic satisfaction, trust in political parties, trust in politicians, trust in parliament) recoded into binary variables, where 0 to 5 is coded as "no trust/not satisfied", and 6 to 10 is coded as "high trust/satisfied".

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democratic satisfaction	Trust in political parties	Trust in politicians	Trust in parliament
Offshore	.158*	.299***	.253***	.063
	(.093)	(.091)	(.089)	(.088)
Education (years)	.004	.01**	.015***	.031***
	(.005)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Offshore X Education	-.01	-.021***	-.016**	.001
	(.007)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Immigration attitudes	.115***	.118***	.122***	.151***
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
EU attitudes	.085***	.128***	.125***	.111***
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
KOF Economic Index	.007	.041	.034	-.012
	(.02)	(.03)	(.027)	(.019)
KOF Social Index	.107***	.119**	.116**	.123***
	(.036)	(.053)	(.048)	(.034)
KOF Political Index	.001	-.005	-.007	.024**
	(.012)	(.018)	(.016)	(.011)
Gender	-.012	.076***	.1***	-.055**
	(.029)	(.027)	(.027)	(.027)
Age	.002***	-.005***	0	-.002***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unemployed	.013	-.043	-.107	-.069
	(.068)	(.075)	(.075)	(.068)

Religiosity	.064***	.076***	.08***	.071***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
Urban/rural	-.032***	-.029**	-.022**	-.061***
	(.012)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)
Household income	.046***	.007	.025***	.058***
	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
Satisfaction with economy	.486***	.382***	.391***	.409***
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.007)
Time effects	-.861***	-.087***	-.123***	-.145***
	(.031)	(.029)	(.028)	(.028)
Intercept	-12.388***	-17.601***	-17.039***	-15.777***
	(3.088)	(4.467)	(4.033)	(2.874)
S.d. country intercept	-1.053***	-.672***	-.776***	-1.123***
	(.183)	(.18)	(.181)	(.182)
ICC	.036	.073	.060	.031
BIC	31837.12	34439.14	35457.81	36003.46
Observations	37339	35014	35369	35854

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

A new typology of globalization's winners and losers, as applied to perceptions of democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy

Abstract

In this chapter I apply the chapter from chapter one to individuals' satisfaction with democracy and political legitimacy. The results further demonstrate the utility of the four-part typology in explaining political preferences as a result of processes of globalization. The findings point to two trends in particular. First, globalization winners are most likely to express satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions, compared to the other three groups. At the other end, globalization losers have a lower probability of expressing democratic satisfaction and political trust. Second, there is a gap between winners and cultural winners/economic losers, on the one hand, with losers and cultural losers/economic winners. Therefore, the results here also somewhat mirror the findings from the first chapter: winners and cultural winners/economic losers are very close when it comes to their party preferences, but also in their expressed satisfaction with democracy and political trust.

A new typology of globalization's winners and losers, as applied to perceptions of democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy

Introduction

The first chapter of this dissertation devised a new typology of globalization's winners and losers, separated into four categories. Then, this typology was applied to individual's votes for political parties, which demonstrated a clear divide between each of the four groups in terms of their political preferences. Next, the second chapter contributed to the debate which asks how globalization affects citizens' perceptions of democracy and political legitimacy. The results showed that individual-level factors appear to have a significant impact on democratic satisfaction and trust in domestic political institutions, in addition to macro-level measures of globalization, which up until this point have dominated scholarship on this research question. Here I go further and apply the typology from chapter one to satisfaction with democracy and political legitimacy. The results add further support to the utility of the typology in explaining political preferences as a result of globalization's impacts as a result of two main dimensions; on the one hand, economic, and on the other, sociopolitical.

On the face of it, one might expect the hypotheses generated here to be quite straightforward: winners should be more satisfied with democracy and express greater trust in political institutions, as the political status quo works for them in turns of securing economic and sociopolitical benefits. This is in contrast to losers, who should display more discontent with the way that democracy and political institutions work for them. However, the expected impacts of globalization on the two intermediary groups (1. Cultural losers/economic winners, and 2. Cultural winners/economic losers) are not so clear. In order to generate hypotheses pertaining to these two groups, I build from some of the nuances from the previous chapter, where I found that there are potentially two mechanisms at play in shaping democratic satisfaction and political trust. First, those who hold negative attitudes towards immigration and European integration are less satisfied with democracy and political institutions, in comparison to

those who hold positive attitudes. Second, however, individuals who are negatively affected by economic globalization (in this case, offshoring), may experience a boost in their satisfaction with democracy and political trust, as they see the political system as a positive force for change (Fisher, 2016).

Hypotheses

As stated above, the following hypotheses derive from prior chapters, relying on the four-part categorization of winners and losers: 1. Winners, 2. Cultural winners/economic losers, 3. Cultural losers/economic winners, and 4. Losers. First, winners benefitted according to the sociopolitical dimension and have developed a strong affinity for social liberalism, and as a result, they support further globalization. On the other dimension, they have also benefitted economically from globalization. In short, again as stated above, the domestic political systems seems to have worked very well for winners in terms of furthering their interests (Vowles and Xezonakis, 2016). Therefore, winners are more likely to be satisfied with democracy and have high(er) confidence in political legitimacy, compared to others.

H9: Relative to others, globalization winners express the greatest democratic satisfaction and political trust.

In complete contrast, losers are likely to see themselves as "left behind" by a country's political system: liberal democracy has not worked in their favor. The combination of low-skilled, offshorable jobs (and therefore highly precarious labor market conditions), in addition to a rejection of sociopolitical globalization has left losers feeling alienated from the political system.

H10: Relative to others, globalization losers express the least democratic satisfaction and political trust.

At this point, there are two intermediary groups left: both "winning" on one dimension, and "losing" on the other. In this case, it might be said that both groups have (roughly) equal levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust. However, two factors might influence distinctions between these two groups in terms of their political attitudes towards democracy (beyond other control variables). First, their support for the current state of democracy and political institutions depends on to what extent individuals value one dimension over the other. Yet, this is difficult to measure with existing survey data, whether that be from the European Social Survey, European Values Survey, Eurobarometer, etc. as that rests on asking questions about salience of issues, beyond just how positively or negatively a respondent feels about the issue. However, the second factor may be observed in the analysis presented here by the distinct effects on democratic satisfaction and political trust between the economic and sociopolitical dimensions.

Whilst the negative impacts of economic globalization can decrease citizens' satisfaction with the political system (such as in H2), the impacts might not be as large as the sociopolitical impacts. In fact, negative economic conditions can boost citizens' political participation as they feel mobilized to act (such as voting in elections and demonstrating in protests). Due to adverse economic conditions caused by globalization, "voters may well pay more attention to the abilities of their governments in attracting capital and retaining and creating jobs" (Fisher, 2016: 134). Whilst Fisher looks at the macro-level of economic globalization (the impact of the financial crisis), I go further and apply the four-part typology of globalization in which negative economic conditions means that an individual is low-skilled and in an offshorable occupation. Therefore, whilst the two intermediary groups both "loser" on one dimension, and "win" on the other, we should expect that those who are cultural winners/economic losers to express greater levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust than cultural losers/economic winners.

H11: Relative to others, cultural winners/economic losers should express the second-highest levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust.

H12: Relative to others, cultural losers/economic winners should express the second-lowest levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust.

Methods

I draw on the first chapter's methods to operationalize the independent variables. To recap, I use four variables to create the four distinct groups. To recap, I use data from the European Social Survey's (ESS) four most recent complete waves (2012 to 2018) across 16 countries in Western Europe. I average respondents' scores between immigration and EU attitudes to generate a sociopolitical dimension score.[11] Then I combine this with an individual's level of offshorability and years of education to determine which group they belong to. For example, to code "winners", I select respondents who are 1. in offshorable occupations, 2. have received a Bachelor's degree (or above), and 3. have mostly positive attitudes on the sociopolitical dimension. Another example, to code "cultural winners, economic losers", I select respondents who also have mostly positive attitudes on the sociopolitical dimension, but also who are 1. in offshorable occupations, and 2. have NOT received a Bachelor's degree (so, high school and below)."

There are four dependent variables that directly measure democratic satisfaction and trust in the political system, all of which are on a 11-pt. scale ranging from "not at all satisfied/no trust" (0) to "completely satisfied/complete trust" (10). The first variable asks respondents "to what extent are you satisfied with the way that democracy works for you in your country?". The other three variables ask "to what extent do you trust [political parties/politicians/the parliament] in your country?". This study uses

[11] E.g. since these two variables are measured on 0 to 10 pt. scales, I add the immigration and EU variables together, then divide by two. Those who have an average of lower than 5 - the midpoint - are classed as sociopolitical losers, whilst those who have an average of 5 or greater are classed as sociopolitical winners.

the four most recent waves (2012 to 2018) of the ESS in order to capture effects of perceptions of globalization on democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy post-eurozone crisis.

I present two steps of analysis to test the predictions. First, I run four models using OLS regression, where each model assesses the impact of the winner-loser typology on each of the four measures of democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy. Since each independent variable is coded as a binary variable (i.e. either a respondent is included in the category, or not), then the results should indicate the change in the dependent variables for each group, relative to others. In the second analysis, I recode the four dependent variables as dummy variables, where a score of 5 and below equals "overall not satisfied/no trust", and a score of 6 and above equals "overall satisfied/trust in politics". Then, similar to the first chapter, I generate the predicted probability of each group expressing satisfaction with democracy and trust in politics, by running a series of logistic regressions.

Results

	(1) Democratic satisfaction	(2) Trust in political parties	(3) Trust in politicians	(4) Trust in nat. parliament
Winners	.482***	.427***	.522***	.741***
	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.036)
Cult. winners, econ. losers	.399***	.355***	.386***	.423***
	(.028)	(.027)	(.028)	(.029)
Cult. losers, econ winners	-.294***	-.425***	-.401***	-.269***
	(.055)	(.054)	(.055)	(.058)
Losers	-.472***	-.472***	-.503***	-.605***
	(.031)	(.03)	(.031)	(.032)
Observations	45662	45924	46099	45801

Standard errors are in parentheses

*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Table 3.1. OLS regression results. Full table including control variables in appendix table A1.

The results displayed in table 1 conform to the predictions. Globalization winners and cultural winners/economic losers express greater satisfaction with democracy, and political trust across the three indicators. For example, relative to others, winners rate their satisfaction with democracy 0.48 points higher on the 0 to 10 scale, and cultural winners/economic losers rate their satisfaction 0.40 points higher. Therefore, winners display the greater satisfaction with democracy, and cultural winners/economic losers display the second highest satisfaction, in line with the expectations from H1 and H2. In contrast, cultural losers/economic winners and losers rate their satisfaction with democracy 0.29 and 0.47 points lower, respectively, relative to others. Again, this is in line with expectations from H3 and H4, and all of these coefficients are statistically significant.

The trend is the same across the remaining three measures of political trust, with the most pronounced difference being respondents' trust in the national parliament. Winners, compared to others, rate their trust in the national parliament 0.74 points higher. In contrast, at the other end, losers rate their trust in the national parliament 0.61 points lower than others. It must be noted, however, that although the predicted trends are evident in this analysis, the coefficients are not particularly large. On a 0 to 10 scale, a change of roughly 0.5 points - the average across the four dependent variables, between winners and losers - either way is not a huge jump. This is in line with findings from other scholars that overall - despite inequalities in citizens' satisfaction with the political system - support for the way that democracy works for citizens in their respective countries is higher than ever (Norris, 2011; Fuchs et al., 1998). This is true across most demographics, despite how positively or negatively they are affected by globalization, and yet, the inequalities in satisfaction with democracy and political trust are also growing (Thomas 2016).

The results from the second analysis also lend support to this explanation, as demonstrated by figure 1. Overall, globalization winners come in first place when rating their satisfaction with democracy and political trust, followed by cultural winners/economic losers, then cultural losers/economic winners, and finally losers. The figure also shows that the difference between winners and cultural winners/economic winners is very small, and the same can be said for the difference between losers and cultural losers/economic winners. Although the coefficients for the logistic regression are statistically significant (see table A2 in appendix), there is still a lot of overlap between the groups' confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities. Therefore, the same can be said as above: support for democracy and political trust remain quite high above all groups, yet inequalities still exist.



Figure 3.1. Predicted probabilities of the four groups of the globalization winners-losers typology of expressing satisfaction with democracy, and three indicators of political trust. Logistic regression results - from which the probabilities are derived - are in the appendix table A2.

There are two further points that are clear from figure 1. First, satisfaction with democracy is, for the most part, very high, ranging from the lowest probabliity (0.69 for losers) to the highest (0.81 for winners). Compared to this, trust in political parties and politicians is much lower across all groups of the globalization winners/losers typology. Losers and cultural losers/economic winners have only about a 0.2 probability of expressing trust in parties and politicians, whereas winners and cultural winners/economic losers have a probability of around 0.4 in expressing trust. Like the OLS results, there is also a wider discrepancy for trust in the national parliament: at the top end, winners have a propensity of 0.72 of stating that they have trust in the national parliament, compared to the bottom end, where losers have a 0.42 predicted probability.

Conclusion

The results presented in this chapter a) further support the utility of the globalization winners/losers typology, and b) further demonstrate the gaps in support for democracy and political trust between those who benefit most from globalization in comparison to those who are disadvantaged. The results here also somewhat mirror the findings from the first chapter: winners and cultural winners/economic losers are very close when it comes to their party preferences, but also in their expressed satisfaction with democracy and political trust. The same can also be said for losers and cultural losers/economic winners; taken together, this once again suggests that the sociopolitical dimension of globalization is a larger determinant of respondents' political preferences, rather than the economic dimension. The findings here also lend support to the mechanism proposed by Fisher (2016): that the downsides of economic globalization may actually boost an individual's confidence in politics by motivating them to participate in voting and demonstrations. For instance, whilst cultural winners/economic losers are slightly less likely to display democratic satisfaction and political trust, compared to winners, the differences are not that large. However, further research should focus on why the different mechanisms behind the economic vs. sociopolitical dimensions' impact on political

attitudes. If the negative impacts of economic globalization motivate individuals to both formally and informally participate in politics (e.g. voting, and protesting), enhancing their support for the national political system, then why and how do the negative impacts of the sociopolitical dimension work in a different way? For now, this chapter contributes to this scholarship by demonstrating that this trend is apparent at the individual-level, expanding upon other national-level measures of globalization.

A Appendix

List of Tables

A.1. OLS regressions: impact on democratic satisfaction and political trust (DVs measured on 0 to 10 scale)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democratic satisfaction	Trust in political parties	Trust in politicians	Trust in nat. parliament
Winners	.482***	.427***	.522***	.741***
	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.036)
Econ. losers, cult. winners	.399***	.355***	.386***	.423***
	(.028)	(.027)	(.028)	(.029)
Cult. losers, econ winners	-.294***	-.425***	-.401***	-.269***
	(.055)	(.054)	(.055)	(.058)
Losers	-.472***	-.472***	-.503***	-.605***
	(.031)	(.03)	(.031)	(.032)
Gender	-.196***	-.023	.003	-.185***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.021)
Age	0	-.004***	0	-.003***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unempolyed	-.27***	-.211***	-.273***	-.236***
	(.05)	(.048)	(.049)	(.052)
Religiosity	.078***	.085***	.089***	.089***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)
Urban/rural	-.081***	-.067***	-.067***	-.122***
	(.009)	(.008)	(.008)	(.009)
Household income	.093***	.062***	.076***	.117***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Time effects	-.125***	.285***	.273***	.333***
	(.021)	(.02)	(.02)	(.022)
Intercept	5.657***	3.559***	3.29***	4.549***
	(.249)	(.263)	(.256)	(.247)

S.d. country intercept	.968	1.03	.998	.959
	(0.171)	(.182)	(.177)	(.170)
ICC	.173	.201	.185	.157
BCC	198179.9	196655.9	199312.5	203413.5
Observations	45662	45924	46099	45801

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

A.2. Logistic regressions: impact on democratic satisfaction and political trust

	(1) Democratic satisfaction	(2) Trust in political parties	(3) Trust in politicians	(4) Trust in nat. parliament
Winners	.482***	.44***	.506***	.75***
	(.045)	(.04)	(.04)	(.042)
Econ. losers, cult. winners	.471***	.399***	.417***	.454***
	(.036)	(.033)	(.033)	(.033)
Cult. losers, econ winners	-.37***	-.553***	-.488***	-.21***
	(.064)	(.07)	(.067)	(.062)
Losers	-.486***	-.574***	-.587***	-.634***
	(.036)	(.04)	(.04)	(.036)
Gender	-.119***	-.036	-.019	-.138***
	(.025)	(.024)	(.024)	(.023)
Age	.001*	-.005***	-.001	-.003***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Unempolyed	-.215***	-.192***	-.255***	-.251***
	(.057)	(.065)	(.065)	(.059)
Religiosity	.082***	.089***	.091***	.085***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
Urban/rural	-.058***	-.075***	-.074***	-.108***
	(.011)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Household income	.092***	.05***	.067***	.107***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.004)	(.004)
Time effects	-.202***	.304***	.282***	.332***
	(.025)	(.025)	(.024)	(.024)
Intercept	.592**	-1.003***	-1.265***	-.199
	(.245)	(.258)	(.245)	(.223)

S.d. country intercept	.941	.995	.942	.852
	(.167)	(.177)	(.167)	(.151)
ICC	.212	.231	.213	.181
BCC	40845.8	41601.71	42959.95	44809
Observations	39959	37667	37997	38455

Standard errors are in parentheses

**** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1*

Why were the effects of the eurozone and migrant crises on Spanish politics so pronounced? PSOE's ties to Spanish modernization, and laying the ground for Podemos

Resumen

En la mayoría de los países de Europa Occidental, los nuevos partidos políticos han tenido éxito en elecciones nacionales de la última decada. Entre ellos, España es diferente: a pesar de ser relativamente bipartidista por tres décadas, su sistema de partidos políticos se ha vuelto cada vez más fragmentado. A nivel nacional, tres nuevos partidos han tenido un éxito especial en términos de voto popular y escaños obtenidos. En este papel yo uso datos recopilados de los archivos de materiales de campaña del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), evidencia de manifiestos, y otros textos para explicar la interacción de las divisiones sociales con la estrategia de partido del PSOE. Sostengo que el declive de las divisiones interactuó con el desarrollo estratégico del PSOE después de la Guerra Civil, lo que llevó a un enfoque en una política de compromiso y modernización. En particular, hay cuatro temas principales en la evidencia, que ayudaron al PSOE a estabilizar la democracia. Sin embargo, esta estrategia también significó que a medida que surgían nuevas divisiones - conectadas con la globalización - la respuesta del PSOE a sus votantes se vio limitada, dejando una política de partidos española más fragmentada.

Abstract

Across the majority of countries in Western Europe, new political parties have found success in national elections within the past decade. Amongst them, Spain stands out: despite being relatively bipartisan for three decades, the party system has become increasingly fragmented. At the national level, three new parties in particular have been especially successful in terms of the popular vote and seats won. In this paper I focus on data gathered from archives of Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) campaign materials, evidence from manifestos, and other texts in order to trace the interaction of social cleavages with PSOE's party strategy over time. I argue that the decline of old cleavages interacted with PSOE's strategic development after the Civil War, leading to a focus on a politics of compromise and modernization. In particular, I draw out four main themes from the evidence, which helped PSOE in stabilizing Spanish democracy. However, at the same time, this strategy also meant that as new cleavages arose – linked to globalization – PSOE's response to its voters was constrained, leaving a more fragmented Spanish party politics.

Why were the effects of globalization on Spanish politics so pronounced? PSOE's ties to Spanish modernization, and laying the ground for Podemos

Introduction

Across the majority of countries in Western Europe, political party newcomers have found success in national elections within the past decade. Whether this be in north (e.g. Alternative for Germany; the Brexit Party; En March!) or the south (e.g. Five Star Movement; Syriza; Vox) of Western Europe, new parties on the left, right, and center have made large gains in their country's parliaments. This trend is also observed in Spain to some extent, but with one crucial difference: despite a stable bipartisan system at the national level for over three decades, the Spanish political landscape has become increasingly fragmented. As demonstrated in figure 1, although the two major parties – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and Partido Popular (PP) – still win the plurality of votes/seats, there has been a significant reduction in their voteshare since 2015. Three new parties – Podemos (leftist), Vox (rightist), and Ciudadanos (centrist) have emerged as viable contenders for government, also demonstrated in figures 1 and 2.

Another sign of the intense fragmentation is the frequency of national-level elections. The collapse of governments - or the failure to establish one in the first place - has become much more common in the past decade. Mariano Rajoy served as PM for 14 years. However, after the 2015 election, Spain lacked a government for 6 months due to failed negotiations. After fresh elections in 2016, Rajoy's PP managed to secure a coalition government with another new party, Ciudadanos. However, a no confidence vote in Rajoy in 2018 marked the end of this government. PSOE took over but also could not secure a majority government, hence two elections were held in 2019, until an agreement emerged between PSOE and Podemos to rule as a coalition government.



Figure 4.1. Election results (% of the popular vote) at the national level in every election since the advent of Spanish modern democracy.



Figure 4.2. Election results (% of the popular vote) at the national level, zoomed in to the last six elections.

Given these significant changes in Spanish party politics, what sets the Spanish case apart from other Western European countries? By tracing the role of social cleavages and PSOE's party strategy since the end of the civil war, I contend that PSOE emphasized the interdependence of globalization and democracy in order to both a) modernize Spain, b) stabilize Spanish democracy after the long dictatorship under Franco, and c) to secure their long-term viability as a contender for governmental power. This strategy went to plan for several decades for PSOE. However, globalization led to new social cleavages in Spain, and exacerbated older divisions (most notably, the Spanish-Catalan divide). Although PSOE adjusted their image and policy promises, their historical path of politics based on compromise (with other parties and political stances) and emphasis on globalization limited their ability to effectively respond to citizens' new demands. Therefore, new parties seized the moment: here, I focus on their new major left-wing competitor, Podemos.

Through a wealth of research drawn from scholarship in the disciplines of Political Science, History, and Sociology, in addition to archival research based on PSOE's campaign promises, and analysis of PSOE and Podemos' manifestos, I demonstrate how PSOE's long-term development as a force for promoting politics centered around compromise helped to stabilize Spanish democracy. At the same time, this limited PSOE's ability to represent voters in the wake of new social cleavages related to globalization. Below, I outline the argument before tracing the trajectory of PSOE's political platform since the end of the Civil War in 1939.



Figure 4.3. The argument.

The argument in summary

Much of contemporary scholarship on shifts in Southern European political party systems points to the role of globalization (e.g. Bosch and Duran 2019; Ramiro and Gomez 2017; Vidal 2018). Yet, the majority of this scholarship also focuses on economic and political developments in the past decade or so (especially since the eurozone crisis). I show that it is vital to go further back in time and analyze the trajectory of Spanish party politics and society leading up to the advent of Spain's modern democracy. I focus on the left of Spanish politics for two reasons: First, PSOE has existed as a political party for almost 150 years. The longevity of this party allows me to go back in time and trace the long-term causes of the current shifts in Spanish party politics today. Second, Podemos, now the second biggest force on the left, was the first of the three new parties to arise, and is now currently in government. Therefore, arguably the changes in Spanish politics so far have been felt more prominently on the left.

Tracing the development of leftist party politics since the end of the Spanish civil war is especially insightful in investigating the causes of fragmented Spanish party politics today, given that there is a "dearth of analytical literature on the PSOE under Franco and by the long-term significance of party developments under that period" (Gillespie, 1989: xii). Over three decades since Gillespie made that claim, it is still true, and to our detriment, as PSOE's role in simultaneously stabilizing Spanish democracy and later leading to fragmented party politics has been overlooked.

Figure 3 presents the argument in brief. First, I focus on the interaction of declining salience of social cleavages that had been previously significant before the civil war with PSOE's search for the most effective strategy in combating Franco's regime to establish democracy. Then, at the end of Franco's dictatorship, the decline of these saliences and PSOE's new political strategy – focused on compromise and globalization as modernization – helped to consolidate and stabilize Spanish democracy, forming a bipartisan political party system (alongside PP). However, over the next two to three decades, PSOE's platform of globalization as democratization was locked in, demonstrated by the consistency in their manifesto promises and policies in power. At the same time, globalization

introduced new social cleavages, and reopened the Catalan-separatist divide. As a result, by the early 2010s, PSOE lacked the ability to respond effectively to some citizens' demands, as their prior stable voter base was now split amongst new divides. As a result, the fragmentation of the Spanish party system ensued, ensuring an opening for Podemos and other new political forces. Below, I go through these elements one-by-one to explain the developments in greater depth.

The decline of cleavages from the end of the Civil War (1930s) to the mid-1970s

A number of cleavages pervaded Spanish society in the twentieth century. The civil war of the 1930s was fought along these lines, including divisions over religion (secular - Catholicism), regional cleavages (most notably the Basque Country and Catalonia), class, and the rural-urban divide. These cleavages were highly salient during the 1930s, leading to high levels of polarization amongst the various groups. Nevertheless, by the end of Franco's rule, the salience of these cleavages had greatly diminished, allowing a relatively peaceful path towards democracy.

The religious cleavage:

Firstly, a reduction in the salience of the religiosity cleavage aided the path to democratic consolidation. Even today, around 90% of Spaniards are baptized Catholics. However, the strength of individuals' identification with Catholicism has greatly decreased, demonstrated through their societal attitudes. For example, Spain was amongst one of the first countries in the world to legalise gay marriage, where at the time around two-thirds of Spaniards were in favour of the reform (Hooper 2006: 193).

The role of religion had previously played a significant role in society, with a great deal of cooperation between the dictatorship and the church. Yet, by the end of the 1970s, the church had become too divided to be seen as any real threat to democracy (Gillepsie 2012: 130). On the other side

of the cleavage, secularists had also softened their attitudes towards Catholicism, in comparison to the days of the civil war. Liberalization within the church meant that leftists' anti-clerical tendencies were greatly reduced. In 1980 around 39% of the left-wing Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) identified as religious believers, though by 1986 this had increased to 50% (Ibid). For both Catholics and secularists, the stakes of their interests had decreased and were willing to compromise or meet in the middle on many policy issues, whether that be gay marriage or contraception. Before (during the 1930s), parties observed that the stakes were too high for their supporters, and hence party elites attempted to solidify support amongst their ranks, increasing polarization within the social cleavage.

The regional cleavage:

Regional cleavages also played a role in the road to democratic consolidation in Spain. The Basques and Catalans were heavily repressed during Franco's rule, including limitations on their regional languages and self-governance. By the late 1970s, these regional distinctions remained highly salient. Nevertheless, the salience of the regional cleavage began to diminish over the next two decades, encouraging party elites to cooperate with other politicians who were very much in favour of the Spanish union. The two main regional parties during this time - Partido Nacional Vasco (PNV) and Convergència i Unió (CiU) - moderated their positions on Spanish-regional affairs. By the end of the 1980s, PNV was the incumbent party in coalition with PSOE at the regional level (Morlino 1995: 368). In contrast, the radical Herri Batasuna - often viewed as a legal front for the terrorist Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) - was only polling at 1% of the Spanish national vote, at best, during the 1980s. In Catalonia, the CiU has now split. However, the party dominated the Catalan government during the 1990s, favouring a "moderate nationalism", refraining from calls for independence.

At times, the pro-independence Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) also played a role in government. But overall, Catalan politics up until 2010 was marked by calls for more autonomy within the Spanish state, and not independence. Again, party elites mirrored citizens' opinions to secure

support, and were prepared to work with other politicians on the other side of the regional-union cleavage. Finally, it should be mentioned that the late twentieth century also marked a decrease in the rural-urban salience, with the "virtual disappearance of the rural proletariat". Whilst this class made up 48% of the workforce in 1950, this decreased to just 18% by 1980. As a result, PSOE could no longer make political statements related to this class, instead choosing a strategy of cooperating with other parties they would have previously considered too bourgeois.

PSOE's reaction to change in social cleavages:

As a consequence of the decreasing relevance of old social cleavages, major parties attempted to secure the continued backing of their supporters by adopting a strategy of cooperating with other political competitors. One example is PSOE's acceptance of the monarchy, as well as appeasing the army and police (Gillespie 2012: 128). Such a strategic move would have been unimaginable a few decades before, but the willingness to compromise amongst citizens filtered upwards to party elites. As major societal cleavages became less salient, one strategy across the major parties - PSOE and PP included - was to adopt catch-all strategies, characterized by the moderation of their intentions among themselves" (Gunther et al. 2004: 234). At the PSOE 1979 congress, the party eliminated the term "Marxism" from the party's self-definition.

PSOE's changing attitudes are also found in the party's liberal economic policies in the 1980s, such as the privatization of Telefónica under Felipe Gonzalez, and a more rightward shift in foreign policy. On the other hand, ex-Francoist politician Manuel Fraga demonstrated the right's newfound moderation with his participation in drawing up the new democratic constitution of Spain. On the whole, it is evident that the reduction in cleavage saliences has been noted by party elites. As a result, as developed further below, party elites resorted to a strategy of compromise and moderation, which further reduced polarization amongst citizens, and helped to "lock in" the party system and democratic consolidation.

A change in PSOE's strategy: compromise, stable democracy, and a global outlook

On the one hand, PSOE party elites shifted positions in accordance with the decreasing salience of previously entrenched, bitterly divided cleavages. At the same time, PSOE recognized that broad promises of a stable democracy, alongside a more modernized, outward-looking Spain provided a breath of fresh air to the increasingly stale dictatorship. Such developments, PSOE elites argued, would be necessary to establish the party as a main contender for political power once Franco's fascist regime fell. In this section, I first explain PSOE's evolving strategy from the end of the civil war up until the early days of the new democracy. To add further evidence, I draw on archival evidence from PSOE's campaign materials following the end of Franco's authoritarian regime. Four trends are evident in PSOE's changes during Franco's era: 1. Moderate calls for "compromise" and "democracy", 2. Appeals to traditionally conservative constituencies of voters, 3. Maintaining a somewhat socialist stance to hold onto support from leftists, and 4. A very international, pro-European stance.

PSOE's trajectory during the dictatorship era:

Founded in 1879, PSOE has staunchly socialist roots. Whilst not as radical as the Communists, Anarachists or POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista – the Stalinist party), PSOE was allied with these forces and fought alongside them during the civil war. At first, in the early days of the post-civil war dictatorship, seeing the end of Mussolini and Hitler in the 1940s ``reopened expectations that the likely consequence [in Spanish politics] would be the fall of Franco" (Ramos, 1989: 61; Cobo and Cobo 1995: 180). At the beginning, therefore, PSOE stood firm in their socialist ideology. "We do not accept and we will combat the wish of some sectors of opinion that support instituting a monarchy" a member noted at a PSOE Assembly in exile (PSOE Assembly, 24 to 25 September 1944, Toulouse,

France). In addition, “the republican institutions are the only legality that the Spanish people can accept" (Ibid.).

Yet, the PSOE was now divided amongst three major branches: those in exile in either Toulouse, France, or in Mexico, or the underground party in the interior. Whilst those in exile tended to maintain a fairly hard-left platform, those within Spain came face-to-face with the day-to-day suppression of speech, and began to take on a more compromising tone. Therefore, overall, Preston finds that the transition period between the civil war and modern democracy came to be characterized by a couple of major themes: first, the necessity of uniting the democratic opposition to Franco, regardless of their other political platforms. Second, PSOE separated itself from prior links with the Communists, to signify a move away from the extremes and polarization of the civil war, in order to stress the merits of democracy (Preston 1988: 209). For example, the underground PSOE within Spain pushed forwards in exploring other avenues for overthrowing Franco, contrary to the revolutionary rhetoric of the civil war. In October and December 1944, PSOE established contaxt with (anti-Franco) monarchists in an attempt to form the Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas (ANFD), before Francoist forces quickly shut down this possibility (Ramos 1989: 73).

Therefore, in the early days post-civil war, there are clear signs that any total abandonment of PSOE’s staunchly leftist foundations was unlikely. And yet, at the same time, the agitation for compromise had begun. At the same meeting in December 1944, PSOE also explicitly banned any future partnerships with those linked with the Communists (Ibid.: 67). This initial move towards centrist, moderate politics is evidenced in the headline for the corresponding edition of El Socialista – the official newspaper of PSOE – from that month: “The diplomatic offensive against Franco’s dictatorship has begun: Reestablishment of the Spanish Republic, Here is the imperative of the moment”. The aim remained to reinstall a Spanish Republic, as had been the goal during the civil war, and yet this was now to be a “diplomatic offensive”, whereby the arms of the war had been laid down in favor of nonviolent methods.

Edición en Francia

Redacción y Administración: 69, rue du Taur

EL SOCIALISTA

Organo oficial del Partido Socialista Obrero Español y portavoz de la U. G. T.

Fundador: PABLO IGLESIAS

Ano LVII - Número 5.250 | 21 Diciembre de 1944 | Precio: 2 francos

Al vado o a la puente

A pesar de llevar el sello inconfundible que pone en todas sus actividades, nunca creímos que la intitulada U. N. E. fuese una creación del Partido Comunista español, no obstante ser el único que no haya hecho protestas por su inclusión, y a pesar también de ser notoria su participación en las tareas de tal organismo.

Después de celebrada la Conferencia de Toulouse, no es posible ya duda. El Partido Comunista español es el animador del conglomerado unionista, y, teniendonos a los datos que poseemos, es —sin que haya lugar a duda— su único creador. Lo sentimos por las consecuencias que para él ha de tener en el porvenir.

El afán desmedido de proselitismo y de dominación le ha llevado a la aventura, de la que la salida ni es fácil ni puede ser airosa. Comienza por una ficción y la ficción se convierte en la norma de este organismo, que dejará triste memoria.

Ficción fué el acto de su creación, que afirman se verificó el 7 de noviembre de 1942 en Grenoble. Mas en esta fecha ni en ninguna otra se ha celebrado en la capital del Isère reunión alguna de tal carácter, ni allí han podido concurrir los representantes autorizados de los Partidos y Organizaciones. Fué en un lugar próximo a plantaban donde el día 1.° de noviembre, y no el 7, del año expresado se reunieron algunos elementos, en su mayoría comunistas, y algunos miembros aislados de otros organismos, sin más representación que la suya personal, y en la que se dió a conocer el programa de U. N. E. y el propósito de su creación.

A partir de ese momento sé da como existente la U. N. E., y como adheridos a organismos que ni siquiera tenían noción de la existencia de sus creadores. A partir de ese momento se habla de una Junta Suprema residente... en Madrid!

Ficción es también esta flamante Junta, a la que en Madrid se llama «la tinta sapada», Junta en realidad inexistente, pero que además sería absurdo establecer donde tiene que vivir absolutamente invisible y sin medios posibles de actuación. Es como si a Hitler se le hubiera ocurrido establecer su cuartel general en Londres o a los Aliados establecerlo en Berlín. No se puede imaginar nada más disparatado. Pero se explica. Si se hubiera fijado su residencia en Francia o en Londres, había que dar a conocer quiénes eran sus componentes, lo que se hubiese hecho si los Partidos y Organizaciones hubieran picado en el anzuelo de U. N.; pero, fracasada la pesca, ha sido necesario conservar el incógnito de esta Junta fantasma.

La ofensiva diplomatica contra *la dictadura de Franco,* **ha empezado**

Restablecimiento de la Republica Espanola.

He aqui el imperativo del momento

La actualidad diplomática mundial gira en torno al problema político español. Las Agencias de Prensa rivalizan en la profusión de fantásticas noticias, anunciando una crisis que todos coincidimos en considerar inminente.

Los periódicos parisinos de mayor tirada han acogido con desacostumbrada solicitud las recientes declaraciones políticas del señor Maura, a cuyas actividades es totalmente ajeno nuestro Partido, y sobre cuyo resultado no nos permite forjar grandes esperanzas nuestro escepticismo.

Los Países aliados acaban de retirar sus representaciones diplomáticas acreditadas en Madrid, sin que públicamente se haya dado una explicación del alcance de decisión de tanta gravedad.

A través de todos estos acontecimientos, la única fuerza que mantenía en el Poder a Franco era la coacción proyectada por Italia y Alemania a través del Mediterráneo y de los Pirineos. Por eso el derrumbamiento estrepitoso del poderío militar de los países totalitarios ha sido suficiente para que el glorioso movimiento sea arrastrado a la pendiente e inicie el resquebrajamiento del tinglado, montado durante cinco largos años por la Falange, con la misma fragilidad que un castillo de naipes.

En esta hora de innegable gravedad para el futuro de España, consideramos un deber ineludible salir al paso de las ambiciones desmedidas de quienes quisieran convertir a España en campo de experiencias de determinados sistemas en boga y de aquellos que, por otra parte, pudieran explotar para los países aliados no debe existir más que un Gobierno legítimo de España. Constitucionalmente, bastará que el señor Martínez Barrios, presidente de las Cortes y como tal —y con carácter accidental Presidente de la República desde el fallecimiento de don Manuel Azaña, proceda a la constitución de un Gobierno que tome sobre sí la tarea de restablecer por todos los medios la legalidad republicana y la vigencia de la Constitución que el Pueblo se dió en diciembre de 1931, en el ejercicio de su soberanía.

Que el paso de la actual situación falangista a esta legalidad republicana entraña graves problemas a resolver, es indudable. Nadie con mayor autoridad para afrontarlos que ese Gobierno constitucional.

Figure 4.4. The front page of El Socialista: 21 December 1944. Available at online archive, PSOE.

Over time, therefore, "the revolutionary language as an act of retaking power was abandoned" by the party in the interior, whilst those in exile continued to "affirm their loyalty to the traditional marxist platform of the party" (Mateos 2004: 93). Hence, those in the interior led a "transition within a transition". This was partly a survival tactic of the interior PSOE during the brutal suppression of leftist forces by Franco. Due to the (comparatively) toned-down platform of underground PSOE activists, they avoided the worst of the targeting: between 1946 to 1949, 15% of political prisoners were socialist-affiliated, compared to 40% who were communist-affialiated (Ibid.: 96).

From the 1950s onwards and through the latter half of Franco's rule, due to the interior PSOE movement's initial caution, they could now be more forceful. The extreme political poaching and authoritarian tendencies of Franco "were seen increasingly by the ruling classes to have served their

purpose" (Prescott 1988: 217). Therefore, PSOE began to exercise more of a voice by acting as lawyers for fellow working-class leaders on trial. PSOE in the interior, therefore, learnt that a gradual, nonviolent move towards socialist success could happen – without any more socialist blood spilt – by working within the regime to incrementally chip away at Franco's power.

At the same time, it was impossible for PSOE and other anti-Franco opposition forces to deny some success of Franco's regime, albeit at the cost of social and political repression. In the 1960s, Spain came to be "the most rapidly expanding economy in Western Europe", which lifted many Spaniards out of poverty (Gillespie 1989: 266). The grievances of the working classes – PSOE's traditional supporter base – declined as their material needs were satisfied to a greater extent than ever before. Around half of Spain's population were now "lower middle class" (Le Socialiste 28.5.70, 3).[12] Therefore, PSOE allies realized that their prior convictions about the dire economic policies of the Francoists were not as believeable to many of their core supporters. Consequently, PSOE's anti-capitalist stances were diluted by the latter half of Franco's regime (Gillespie 1989: 99). At this point, by the early 1960s, efforts to unite with other anti-Francoists more formally crystallized: La Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas was officially established on 24 June 1961.

PSOE during the transition period and the early days of democracy:

In the dying days of the dictatorship – the early to mid-70s – it became clear that "Francoism had ceased to be the best political system for the bourgeoisie" (Gillepsie 1989: 303). At this point, it became even more pressing for PSOE to reform and make broader appeals beyond the proletariat in time for the transition to democracy (Abdón Mateos 2017: 137). Below, I draw out four major themes from archival research of PSOE campaign posters and materials from the 1970s and 1980s by analyzing the slogans and images used.[13] PSOE used these four components to establish itself as a trustworthy party that could

[12] Citing a study by the Fomento de Estudios Sociales y de Sociologica Aplicada (FOESSA), 1970.
[13] Available at Fundación Pablo Iglesias – Archivo y Biblioteca, Alcalá de Henares, Madrid. All footnotes below pertaining to campaign posters and materials reference access names as coded in FPI's database.

ensure a healthy democracy in Spain. In line with Mainwaring's definition of a stable party system (or party system institutionalization), one key element in ensuring an enduring democracy is "party and electoral legitimacy" (Mainwaring 1999: 31 - 35). Essentially, high confidence in political parties is required for a functioning democracy. Through the four themes presented below, PSOE presented itself as a leader for the face of modern Spanish democracy. Yet, these four themes would also lay the road for fragmentation of party politics and distrust of political institutions later down the line.

Theme #1: Moderate calls for "change", "compromise" and "democracy".

In line with the gradual moderation of the underground PSOE of the interior, many campaign materials of the first two to three elections (1977, 1979, 1982) reflected a sense of politics based on compromise, drawing on "catch-all" language that aimed at unifying Spaniards. For example, many posters simply state "Vote PSOE for change" or "Vote PSOE for cultural change".[14] Leader Felipe González helped to "tame" PSOE's radical roots, as he stated in an interview in 1978 that "I think that democracy is the only way to socialism" (Nepomuceno, entrevista with Felipe González, 1978, in de Arcos, 2022). One year later, González succeeded in removing the term "marxismo" from PSOE's manifesto for the first time in the party's history. PSOE therefore presented itself as a professional political party. Gone were the days of explicit revolutionary glorification and attire; by the end of the 1970s, PSOE campaign posters were more likely to feature images of politicians in suits and ties.[15] Campaign slogans and promises were largely focused on broad ideas that many would find to disagree with, regardless of partisanship. For example, the PSOE 1979 calendar featured slogans such as "everyone deserves to be born free and equal".[16]

[14] CAR-PSOE-R0284 and CAR-PSOE-R0291.
[15] CAR-PSOE-R0257.
[16] CAR-PSOE-R0049-01.

Theme #2: Appeals to traditionally conservative voters.

Beyond broad-based promises that focused on a politics of compromise, PSOE went as far to appeal directly towards conservative-leaning citizens that had previously likely supported right-wing opposition forces. In 1979, one campaign depicted a rural scene with the text "the savior of the countryside is in your hands", whilst another showed "workers, farmers, and students… united in the grand project".[17] Such a strategy directly bridged the gap between the previous proletarian image of the PSOE and citizens in more rural, conservative areas. Other images also appealed to citizens who at least were fairly materially well-off and possibly pertaining to the "bourgeoisie": "come with us on vacation" read one poster, featured on a background of a scenic view of trees and the ocean.[18]

Theme #3: Maintaining a somewhat leftist stance, and reaching out to those who were oppressed during Franco's era.

However, PSOE made sure to cover their traditional base by appealing to socialist language and imagery, albeit less frequently. In the wake of modern democracy, some materials celebrated the resiliency of the socialists during the fascist repression, reflected in a poster from 1979 depicting PSOE's founder Pablo Iglesias next to Felipe González with the text "one hundred years of honor and firmness".[19] Clearly, PSOE were not too quick to abandon their socialist links. After all, it also aided in their aim to appear as long-standing and reliable political players. In October 1977, the main poster for the party congress in Madrid evoked a classic socialist memory, with an image of Iglesias' face in the center, adorned with Republican flags (from the civil war) around the edges.[20]

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[17] CAR-PSOE-R0153 and CAR-PSOE-R0238.
[18] CAR-PSOE-R0031.
[19] CAR-PSOE-R0023
[20] CAR-PSOE-R0081.

Some, although few, materials even went as far as to explicitly reference the party's Marxist origins, such as posters for PSOE-led events for the 160th anniversary of Marx's birth in May 1978.[21] Although, after the removal of "marxismo" from PSOE's manifesto in 1979, such socialist imagery was virtually nonexistent, it continued to appear infrequently, such as the poster for the 33rd party congress in Madrid (March 1994) with images of socialist roses and "a new socialist impulse".[22] The taming of PSOE's socialist roots allowed the party to move more towards the center-ground of Spanish politics, whilst other leftist parties clung onto Soviet-friendly imagery and slogans well into the late 1980s. For example, the Communist Party printed posters in the 1980s depicting not only Marx and Engels, but also Lenin and Stalin. The Partit Comunista Obrer de Catalunya similarly depicted an image of Marx and Lenin in front of the Catalan and Soviet flag as late as 1988 for their party conference.[23] Finally, whilst PSOE focused on the unity of citizens from many different backgrounds, PSOE's campaign materials were sensitive to regional differences. Especially significant, given the oppressive rules imposed on regions such as the Basque Country and Catalunya, materials were printed in Basque and Catalan stating claims such as "vote for a Government with dynamism, because Catalans are dynamic people ".[24] Therefore, whilst PSOE held out an olive branch to more conservative citizens, PSOE also aimed to secure the support of those who were firmly anti-Francoist.

Theme #4: A very international, pro-European stance.

Initially, PSOE elites expressed skepticism about joining the European Community (ECC) for a couple of reasons (Gillespie, 1996: 156-7; Kennedy, 2013: 44). First, Franco's Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella requested that Spain join the ECC in 1962, but this was swiftly turned down due to Spain's authoritarian regime. Despite this rejection, PSOE feared that a possible acceptance of

[21] CAR-PSOE-R0093 and CAR-PSOE-R0103.
[22] CAR-PSOE-R0537.
[23] CAR-PSOE-R0335 and CAR-PSOE-R0517, 1988: VI Congres, Barcelona 30-31 mars.
[24] CAR-PSOE-R0442.

Spain as a member of the ECC would legitimize Franco's regime internationally. Beyond this, however, PSOE also expressed doubts about the ECC itself right up until the democratic transition because through the 1960s and 70s, PSOE was still working out its relationship with Marxist ideology and anticapitalism. As late as 1974, at the 26th party Congress, Felipe González stated that PSOE should reject the premise that "[European] unity be based on political and economic institutions serving international capitalism" (PSOE, 1974: 4, in Kennedy, 2013: 45).

Nevertheless, any trace of skepticism towards the "European project" vanished entirely in PSOE's campaign materials by the third national election of modern democracy in 1982. Most political parties, with the exception of the Communists, agreed that "European integration would bolster the country's nascent democratic regime" (Ibid.: 40). Hence, "Europe" became synonymous with the idea of progress and the move towards stable democracy in Spain. However, whilst Francoists had attempted to join the ECC for economically liberal policies only, PSOE knew that its party platform had to also more fully embrace the political and cultural benefits. Though this was not immediately evident in the campaign materials from the first two national elections in 1977 and 1979, posters from the build-up to the 1982 election displayed a much more positive view of the ECC. "Europe, where things are done well", and "Vote PSOE: with strength in Europe" were two prominent slogans, adorned with images of Spanish and European flags.

PSOE's platform becomes locked in: evidence from manifestos

PSOE manifestos also reflect these four themes. Figures 5 to 7 show data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, which counts the percentage of "quasi-sentences" that are dedicated to different topics per manifesto in each national election year. I display the graphs below in three groups: figure 5 represents issues associated with the traditional far-left; figure 6 represents issues linked to broad support for democracy and Europe; and figure 7 shows references to "equality", "education", and

"freedom" – issues that most citizens support regardless of partisanship. Later, I contrast these results to Podemos' manifestos.



Figure 4.5. % of quasi-sentences in PSOE manifestos in national elections; **traditional far-left issues.**



Figure 4.6. % of quasi-sentences in PSOE manifestos in national elections; **democracy and Europe**.



Figure 4.7. % of quasi-sentences in PSOE manifestos in national elections; **broad-support issues.**

First, figure 5 lends support to themes 1, 2, and 3. For the majority of the traditional leftist issues – positive references to communist ideology, Keynesian economics, nationalization, and Marxist analysis – there are almost no references throughout PSOE's manifestos in the entirety of modern Spanish democracy. Thus, there is an evident moderation of typically socialist stances that were more apparent pre-democracy, appealing to more centrist and even conservative voters. However, fitting with theme 3, references to labor groups and market regulation are quite prominent: at first, from 1977 to 1996, market regulation was almost completely neglected, whereas positive appeals to labor groups and unions still made up between 4% and 6% of PSOE manifestos. Therefore, PSOE still drew on its historically leftist platform to appeal to more left-wing voters. The increase in references to market regulation from 2000 onwards shows that PSOE's platform is not static: a change in strategy from the start of the 21st century displays a change in party strategy, likely in reaction to increasing economic

interdependence with the EU and beyond. Overall, then, PSOE tamed its leftist roots significantly, and yet also drew on labor unions and market regulation more prominently in recent years.

Second, figure 6 also demonstrates PSOE's strong support for democracy, Europe, and internationalism, fairly consistenly over time, fitting with themes 1 and 4. References to democracy were, unsurprisingly, particularly high in the first election in 1977, and positive representation of Europe and internationalism featured more prominently from the early 1980s onwards. Again, a shift in strategy is also apparent from the early 2000s with a slight decrease in the percent of manifesto space dedicated to positive statements about Europe. Overall, the manifestos of PSOE highlight the party's commitment to advancing Spain's modernization by prioritizing the establishment of a stable democracy and a progressive, internationally-oriented agenda.

Finally, figure 7 presents three issues that obtain large support from voters regardless of partisan identification. In the first national election, nearly 12% of PSOE's manifesto referenced freedom and human rights – again, unsurprising given that this was the first election after Franco's authoritarian regime. Though this decreased quite substantially after, human rights have once again become a prominent feature since 2015. This renewed focus highlights the party's historical role in establishing a stable and democratic political system in the 1970s. PSOE's consistent focus on education and equality also demonstrates its emphasis on unifying policies and concepts. Once again, a change in strategy emerged from around 2008 onwards, with a greater focus on equality, likely as a response to the financial crisis and eurozone crisis.

New social cleavages related to globalization emerge

By the mid-1980s, Spain's democracy was consolidated and stable; the country was second only to Australia with regards to the longevity of its governments (Bruneau et al. 2001). Despite varying tactics and competing ideologies within PSOE leading up to the democratic transition, the party in the interior won the day with a more centrist, compromising stance. Therefore, PSOE could claim to have

played a significant role in laying the foundations for a stable democratic regime, alongside the decreasing social divisions of religion, class, and the urban-rural divide. In addition, the consolidation of democracy occurred interdependently with Spain's increasing global ties: PSOE presented the "Europeanization" of Spanish society as essential to its modernization and prosperity.

From the mid-2000s, however, a new set of divisions – or a *globalization cleavage* – emerged in Western Europe, including Spain (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). In particular, three specific events exacerbated these lines: the financial crash, eurozone crisis, and migrant crisis. Whilst the latter has been linked to the rise of the far-right and Vox (e.g. Vampa 2020), the financial and eurozone crises are linked to the rise of the populist left. By 2013, the unemployment rate in Spain reached 26% – a huge increase from 8% in 2007, and more than 15% above the EU average (Eurostat, 2015, in Ramiro and Gomez 2017: 110). Therefore, although the traditional class cleavage had declined in salience throughout the latter part of the 20th century, new socioeconomic divisions emerged. Whilst PSOE and other mainstream parties had embraced the EU up until that point, the eurozone crisis prompted Spaniards to raise questions about the EU, the European Central Bank, and their negative impact on citizens' economic security, as exemplified by the emergence of the Indignados movement (Hughes, 2011).

PSOE's response and the fragmentation of Spanish party politics

As mentioned above, PSOE altered its strategy to appeal to voters adversely impacted by the financial and eurozone crises. Yet, since the party had largely committed to a platform of compromising politics and globalization, it was difficult to change its stance. In addition, PSOE's success from the early days of modern democracy was partly due to the decreasing salience of old social cleavages. With new and intensive divisions, however, its catch-all strategy was no longer viable. Consequently, Spanish politics came to be characterized by "increasing political discontent and mistrust towards representative institutions" such as politicians and political parties (Lisi et al. 2019: 1288, Torcal, 2014). Hence,

Podemos' rise is a result of citizens' negative evaluations of Spain's economic situation, interacted with distrust of democratic institutions (Bosch and Duran, 2019; Vidal, 2018).

An analysis of Podemos' manifestos, in comparison to PSOE, shows how Podemos diverged from PSOE's style of compromising politics and strong support for globalization. First, figure 8 (when compared to figure 5) shows that Podemos dedicated a much greater percentage of its manifesto to the role of labor groups and market regulation in their first two national elections in 2015 and 2016. By 2019, this difference was even more significant (6% of PSOE's manifesto was linked to labor groups, compared to 10% in Podemos' manifesto, and whilst nearly 4% of PSOE's manifesto referenced market regulation, this constituted around 14% of Podemos' manifesto). Figure 8 also shows that other than labor groups, market regulation, and nationalization of industries, traditional far-left issues – such as overt Marxist analysis and protectionism – did not appear in Podemos' formal party strategy. Therefore, Podemos's approach does not attempt to attract "old school leftists" but rather employs language that is relevant to the contemporary cleavage generated by negative effects of globalization on the economy.

Figure 9, compared to figure 6, also displays large differences between Podemos and PSOE's strategies regarding democracy, Europe, and internationalism. The percentage of references to democracy are roughly equal compared to PSOE (around 5% each in both elections in 2019). Podemos criticizes political elites (whether at the Spanish national or the EU level) that enforced austerity policies, following the financial and eurozone crises. Therefore, Podemos insists that political elites "are not going to dictate it to us from the top" (Podemos, 2019).



Figure 4.8. % of quasi-sentences in Podemos' manifestos in national elections; **trad. far-left issues.**



Figure 4.9. % of quasi-sentences in Podemos' manifestos in national elections; **democracy and Europe**.



Figure 4.10. % of quasi-sentences in Podemos' manifestos in national elections; **broad-support issues.**

In contrast, PSOE continues to stress its legacy as a guardian of Spain's modern democracy, claiming that it will "renew its social democratic commitment" which is an "alternative to populists" (PSOE, 2019 manifesto: 18). Above all, its most recent electoral manifesto claims, PSOE is "above all a lover of democracy and its rules" (Ibid.: 20).

However, there are stark differences between PSOE and Podemos regarding positive references to internationalism and Europe. PSOE's strategy has consistently drawn on internationalism and Europe in all of its elections since 1977 (around 4-5% of its manifestos for the former, and 3% for the latter, as averaged since 2000), whilst Podemos' manifestos almost never included positive statements about these themes (2% for internationalism for its first two elections only, and 0 for Europe across all four elections). PSOE's links between Europe, internationalism, and democracy are evident as their latest manifesto states "as socialists, we believe that Spain is democratic, plural, open, European, and modern" (Ibid.: 148). Although PSOE also states that they hope to "build an alternative to neoliberalism", they

also believe that "Spain should continue to increase its weight in the EU, UN, and G-20": organizations which Podemos have heavily criticized for being neoliberal (Ibid.: 18, 273). Therefore, overall, PSOE's pro-European stance, as connected to Spanish democracy, is stronger than ever. Given increased grievances with globalization, this has created a gap on the left for Podemos to build a core voter support base.

Finally, figure 10, as compared to figure 7, shows a great deal of convergence for both parties regarding the broad-support issues of equality, education, and freedom and human rights. Promises for greater equality feature quite prominently: since 2011, PSOE's manifesto contained between 7-12% of quasi-sentences dedicated to the issue, whilst Podemos' manifesto contained 7-9%. In the past four national elections, both parties referenced the role of education policies, with the proportion of quasi-sentences between 3-6%. PSOE's manifesto made claims about freedom and human rights for about 3-5% of its manifestos in the past four elections, whilst Podemos did the same consistently at a percentage of 4% of its manifestos. Hence, both parties are about equal in these broad-support issues. However, Podemos distinguishes itself from PSOE's long-term platform of Spanish democracy, politics, economy as intertwined with Europe.

Conclusion

In this paper I have traced the current fragmentation of Spanish party politics by drawing on the historical legacies developed by one of the two mainstream parties, PSOE. Specifically, during the dictatorship era, despite debate and conflict within the party, PSOE gradually moved towards a cohesive political platform that emphasized the connections between democracy, compromise, and globalization. In particular, PSOE continues to champion and support Spain's role in furthering the European Union's goals. In a context where previously divisive social cleavages – class, rural-urban, religiosity, and regional – were in decline, this stance successfully established PSOE as a major player in Spanish politics, and helped to consolidate Spain's modern democracy. Yet, at the same time, with the rise of

new cleavages tied to globalization, PSOE's ties to democracy, compromise, and globalization no longer appeal to some citizens. Therefore, new parties – in this case, Podemos — have seen great success in national elections, whilst PSOE and PP struggle to attain the same amount of popular support that they did two decades ago. Spain's gradual path to democracy, in conjunction with PSOE's role, helps to explain why the country has seen greater fragmentation in party politics as compared to some of its Western European neighbors.

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Contrasting Iberian Party Systems Amidst Globalization: The Portuguese Trajectory of Stability

Abstract:

What explains the divergence between Spain and Portugal's space for party competition? Spain and Portugal share many similarities in their political system, including their paths to democratization in the mid-1970s, rapid party system institutionalization, and political institutions. The structure of Portuguese party competition also mirrored Spanish party competition up until the early 2010s, when Spain's party system experienced great volatility. In comparison, Portugal's relative stability in its party system can be explained by the combination of three factors. First, processes of globalization (in particular, economic processes in addition to attitudes towards migrants) did not have the same dramatic impact as they did in Spain. Second, the existing mainstream parties in Portugal had greater flexibility in reshaping their party platform, and exercised this ability in order to absorb the potential for new parties to arise and gain support. Finally, Portugal's social cleavages are not as deeply entrenched and fragmented as they are in Spain, meaning that voters had fewer reasons to seek representation from outside existing political parties.

Contrasting Iberian Party Systems Amidst Globalization: The Portuguese Trajectory of Stability

Introduction

Spain and Portugal share many similarities in their political histories in the past 100 years. In both countries, far-right authoritarian regimes took hold in the 1930s, which later ended in the mid-1970s. Spain and Portugal's democracies then consolidated rapidly, thanks in large part to high degrees of party-system institutionalization. Both countries also suffered in the wake of the eurozone crisis, accepting large bailouts from the European Central Bank. And yet, in the past decade, whilst Spain's party system is now characterized by fragmentation and volatility, Portugal's party system has remained relatively stable and predictable. The two major parties, Partido Socialista (PS) and Partido Social Democrata (PSD), are still the dominant forces in Portuguese politics. This is in contrast to PSOE and PP in Spain who have seen sharp declines in their popular vote support and share of parliamentary seats.

Portugal's party system is not completely rigid, however. Indeed, similar to Spain, three new parties in particular emerged in the past decade. Chega (far-right), founded in 2019, won 7.18% of the popular vote at the 2022 election. Initiativa Liberal (centrist), founded in 2017, won 4.92% of the vote at the same election. Finally, LIVRE (leftist), founded in 2014, won 1.28% of the vote. In total, new party support adds to a total of 13.38% of the popular vote, which is clearly not negligible. And yet, this figure does not compare to the huge 34.7% of the vote shared by their Spanish counterparts (Vox, Ciudadanos, and Podemos). In November 2019, the combined total of seats for the two major Spanish parties came to a measly 45%, in contrast to a huge 81% won by their Portuguese equivalents. In this chapter I ask, given the two countries' many similarities, why is there so much divergence between Spain and Portugal's contemporary party systems?

Below, I present an overview of the argument which concerns three intertwined factors: the relative shock of globalization in each country, the differing party strategies employed by the four mainstream parties (PS, PSD, PP, and PSOE), and social cleavages. Afterwards, I discuss in greater detail the similar background conditions between Spain and Portugal, which sets up the puzzle for the differences between their present party systems, followed by an analysis of each of the three factors.

Overview of argument

Prior to 2010, the two countries mirrored each other to a large extent in the patterns of party competition: in Portugal, PS and PSD dominated parliament, and in Spain, PSOE and PP were also the leading forces. In order to explain the shift in Spain, compared to Portugal's stability, I point to three reasons in combination with each other. First, the globalization "shock" has not been nearly as drastic in Portugal as it has been in Spain. Although both countries suffered after the financial and eurozone crisis, Portugal's long-established depressed economy meant that the effects were not felt as suddenly as they were in Spain. In addition, migration has not affected Portugal in the same way as it has Spain. Second, PS and PSD adopted different strategies in dealing with the fallout from the eurozone crisis. In comparison to PSOE, for example, neither PS nor PSD have been so wedded to the EU and internationalism. In addition, PS and PSD have demonstrated greater flexibility in altering their party platforms, in comparison to PSOE and PP. Third, the Portuguese electorate have not been as well-anchored in terms of social cleavages as Spaniards. Altogether, these three factors ensured the divergence between Portugal and Spain's party systems.

Historical background conditions and comparisons

1. Transitions to democracy

Spain's authoritarian regime emerged as a result of the civil war between leftist and rightist forces, ending with the establishment of Franco as dictator. In Portugal, a coup against the democratic First Republic led to authoritarian rule, which later evolved into the Estado Novo (or Second Republic) in 1933. Both of these regimes were characterised by staunch support for Catholicism, monarchism, and anti-communism, and suppressed political opposition and civil liberties. However, there were some differences in their path to democratization after the period of autocracy (Fishman 2019). The relatively peaceful and gradual approach of Spain is a contrast to Portugal's much more abrupt turn to democracy (Wiarda 1989: 217). In Spain, Franco had already handed down power to Juan Carlos two years before his death in 1975. As a result, Juan Carlos began preparing for a future after Francoism, and then stepped aside and let a new prime minister move towards elections. However, the end to authoritarianism in Portugal came as a result of growing opposition at home and losing wars abroad in Angola and Mozambique. Consequently, young military officials overthrew the regime, and the road to democracy was characterised by a much greater degree of instability. For instance, between 1974 and 1976 there were several coup attempts. Another important factor to consider is that political parties were new in Portugal's first elections, whereas PSOE had existed since 1879 in Spain, and was allowed to stand for election again in the 1970s.

Therefore, there are differences between democratization in Spain and Portugal, but there are more similarities in terms of the regimes that came before the establishment of modern democracy. In addition, they democratized at the same point in time, and despite their initial differences in party competition, their party systems followed similar trends. For example, in a similar light to my argument above, Jalili (2019) argues against Mair's claim that Portugal and Spain only consolidated their democracy in the mid-1990s (Mair 1997: 214). Jalili shows that although there were initially high levels of electoral volatility in Portugal, this decreased after the mid-1980s. This is very similar to Spain,

where electoral volatility was evident in the first decade or so after democratisation, but then levelled out. As a result, Spain and Portugal had experienced virtually parallel trajectories when consolidating their democracies (Diamandouros and Gunther 2001; Morlino 1998).

2. Electoral laws

A country's electoral system plays a major role in shaping political actors' behaviour in the formation and functioning of parties (Cox 1997). New parties are more likely to form and attain success at the ballot box with electoral laws that are more proportional in nature (Hino 2006). In addition, Golder (2003) finds that a more permissive electoral system leads to a higher percentage of votes for far-right parties. Whilst socioeconomic structures can bring about opportunities for new parties, these structures still interact with institutions, and hence their effects are conditioned by the electoral system (Hino 2012). Within Europe, most countries use a form of proportional representation, yet there are still some variations within this electoral system. For example, both Spain and Portugal use the d'Hondt method. According to the d'Hondt method, within an electoral district, seats are designated according to the formula:

$$r_n = v / (s + 1)$$

v in this equation represents the total number of votes for the party, and $s + 1$ corresponds to the constituency seats plus one (to ensure that 0 is not the divisor). r_n is therefore each round of seat allocations. The first seat goes to the party with the largest total after this equation is performed, then in the next round this seat is added to its seat total.

While the median district size in Spain is 5 seats, there are 35 and 31 seats in Madrid and Barcelona respectively. The median district size in Portugal is 6, though there are 47 and 39 seats in

Lisbon and Porto respectively (Kedar et al. 2015). Despite the great variation in district size within the two countries, it is clear that overall they employ the d'Hondt method in very similar ways.

3. Presidential and parliamentary regimes

According to this attribute, there are differences between Spain and Portugal: Spain is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, and Portugal has a semi-presidential system.

Whilst Portgual's president does not have the same capabilities and power as other presidential regimes, they still have a large influence in government formation and policymaking. For example, in 1979 the president dissolved parliament and called for new elections after several failed attempts from the PS and other smaller leftist parties to form a government. The presidency of Aníbal Cavaco Silva (2006 - 2016) is also an example of the "soft power" that presidents have in Portugal (Feijó 2019: 46). In his first term, he worked with the government to modify around 20% of all legislation that was passed. However, he also effectively vetoed 15 laws passed by the government (Rapaz 2017). Since the president can exercise power (compared to no president in Spain), this could provide barriers to new party formation and securing votes from citizens. This is due to the "winner-takes-all" nature of a presidential election with ultimately one position up for grabs. This contrasts with parliamentary systems where:

> ...the belief in the unfettered rule by the popularly elected majority lies at the heart of the tradition of parliamentary government. It also implies that the parliamentary front bench is the locus of executive decision-making. (Strøm 2000: 263).

In this situation, there may be greater potential for negotiations as to who has this executive decision-making. For example, Podemos is now in coalition with PSOE, and although the former only won 12.8% of the vote share in November 2019, some of their politicians have now secured top

positions in the cabinet. Nevertheless, given some differences between Spain's parliamentary system and Portugal's semi-presidential system, overall they effectively work very similarly in practice. In Portugal, the "executive answers to the parliament and not the president", and so the presidents "tends to be more a referee or facilitator" rather than a leading actor (Freire 2017: 17; da Silva and Mendes 2019: 142). Below, table 1 summarizes a range of similar background conditions across Spain and Portugal, and also clarifies the distinctions in the party systems across the two countries.

Attribute	Spain	Portugal
Regime type	● Parliamentary constitutional monarchy: ● Executive composed of Government, integrated by the PM and the Cabinet. ● Legislative is composed of the Cortes Generales, which is divided into the Congress of Deputies and the Senate.	● Unitary semi-presidential system: ● Executive composed of a PM, president, cabinet. ● Legislative composed of the Assembly of the Republic (unicameral).
Electoral system	● d'Hondt method with a 3% threshold. ● 52 national districts. ● Median district magnitude is 5 seats. Madrid has 35 seats, and Barcelona has 31 seats.	● d'Hondt method. ● 22 national districts. ● Median district magnitude is 6 seats. Lisbon has 47 seats and Porto has 39 seats.
Democratic history	● Emerged as a democracy from a peaceful transition in 1976. ● First elections in 1977. ● Previous regime: dictatorship under Francisco Franco, who came to power at the end of a civil war in 1939. Characterised by staunch support for Catholicism, monarchism, and Spanish nationalism.	● Democratization began in 1974 after a leftist revolution. ● First elections in 1976. ● Previous regime: dictatorship - Estado Novo - under António de Oliveria Salazar, who came to power in 1932, and then Marcello Caetano from 1968. Characterized by staunch support for Catholicism, conservative values, and Portuguese nationalism.
Party system prior to newcomers (~2014)	● One-party governments, formed by one of two main parties, one centre-left (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and one centre-right (Partido Popular). ● With the exception of Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) 1977 - 82.	● Two main parties, one centre-left (Partido Socialista) and one centre-right (Partido Social Democrata). ● The overall majority of governments have been formed by one of these two parties. ● Otherwise, PSD has looked to one right-wing (Centro Democrático e Social - Partido Popular) to form a coalition government. ● With the exception of Aliança Democrática (AD) 1979 - 83.
Party system trans-formation?	● Two new parties, one leftist (Podemos) and one centre-right (Ciudadanos) won seats in the Diputados in 2015, collecting 34.7% of the popular vote. ● In the 2016 election, this voteshare of the two new parties remained stable. ● In April 2019, another new party, far-right Vox, also secured its first seats. Combined the three parties represent 40.46% of the popular vote. ● In November 2019, the overall vote share of the three parties declined (but remains significant) at 34.72%.	● In October 2015, right-wing coalition Portugal à Frente won the single largest vote share (38.6%) and 47% of the seats in the Assembly, forming a minority government. This might mark some change, but this coalition was still formed of PSD and CDS-PP, who had formed four governments as a coalition before, including the previous government, but as a majority government. ● In November 2015,the CDS-PP coalition collapsed and was replaced by a minority PS government. ● In 2019, PS again secures a minority government. ● Two new parties enter the Assembly in 2019, Chega and Livre, but together they secure only 2% of the vote.

Table 5.1. Summary of similar background conditions between Spain and Portugal, in addition to differences in party system transformation.



Figure 5.1. Trajectory of three measures of KOF Globalization Index in **Spain** 1970 to 2017.



Figure 5.2. Trajectory of three measures of KOF Globalization Index in **Portugal** 1970 to 2017.

Impacts of globalization in Portugal in comparison to Spain

On the face of it, it may seem that Portugal and Spain have been affected very similarly by globalization since their shift to modern democracy in the 1970s. For example, figures 1 and 2 display the trajectory of three KOF indicators: economic, political, and social globalization. According to the economic indicator, between 1970 to 2017, Spain rose from 33 to 77, and Portugal from 40 to 80. For the social indicator, Spain increased from 56 to 83, and Portugal from 50 to 80. Finally, for the political indicator, whilst Spain rose from 68 to 98, Portugal increased from 58 to 92.

Despite these similarities, however, two events in particular – the eurozone crisis and the migrant crisis – affected Spain and Portugal in very distinct ways. In Portugal's case, economic disaster and sluggish growth had plagued the country prior to the eurozone crisis: 2000 to 2010 was essentially a "lost decade" where the economy "grew less than the US during the Great Depression (Reis 2013). In part, the enlargement of the EU and the subsequent economic competition from Central and Eastern Europe meant that Portugal was very well accustomed to stagnation long before the eurozone crisis. Therefore, whilst it is clear that globalization has had some negative impacts on Portugal's economy, the relative impact of the eurozone crisis is "not as dramatic in Portugal as in other Southern European contexts if one compares it to the pre-crisis situation" (da Silva and Mendes 2019: 146-147).

Additionally, immigration and the migrant crisis of 2015 also affected Spain and Portugal in different ways. During 2015, over 1 million migrants entered Europe through the Mediterrean, where the large majority first arrived in Greece, Italy, or Spain. In large part, Portugal did not see the same influx of migrants, which is also reflected in the number of assylum applications: In 2021, 123 000 refugees were granted in asylum in Spain, whilst only 2700 were granted asylum in Portugal[25]. In public opinion, Portugal "consistently ranks as the EU country that is the least concerned about immigration" (Mendes and Dennison 2021: 754). Figure 3 displays data from the European Social Survey (ESS) which contrasts respondents from Spain and Portugal and their answers to "to what extent do you think that

[25] MacroTrends (data source: World Bank). https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/PRT/portugal/refugee-statistics Accessed 03/26/2023.

immigrants are bad or good for the country?" on a scale of 1 (bad) to 10 (good). In general, towards the lower end of the scale, Spanish respondents were more likely to say that immigrants were bad for the economy, in comparison to Portuguese respondents (from 0 to 5). On the upper end of the scale, Portuguese respondents were more likely to say that immigrants were good for the economy (from 6 to 10). In sum, two key components of globalization – the fallout from the eurozone crisis and the migrant crisis – have not been felt as profoundly in Portugal as they have been in Spain. In the next section I also show that in conjunction with mainstream parties' strategies, globalization has not led to instability in Portugal's party system in the same way that it has done so in Spain.



Figure 5.3. Spain (ES) compared to Portugal (PT): percentage of respondents from each country that answered the question "to what extent do you think that immigrants are bad or good for the country's economy, on a scale of 1 (bad) to 10 (good)?" Data from European Social Survey 2018.

Party strategy

As noted, there have been some changes to Portugal's party system – three newcomers, similar to Spain – and yet the impacts have been limited in terms of new parties' influence and electoral successes. Whilst voteshares for PS and PSD have fallen somewhat, the impacts of globalization appear slight: the combined vote share of PS and PSD only declined 2.4 points between the 2009 elections (pre-eurozone crisis) to 2015 (post-crisis) (Jalili 2019: 93 - 94). As a result, whatever changes are apparent in the Portuguese party system, they are incremental, as opposed to the huge shocks such as in Spain (Lisi et al. 2020). In large part, the flexibility of PS and PSD has contributed to this relative stability.

Since democratization in 1974, Portugal's party system has shown "considerable stability in terms of its macrostructure and main interactions" which allowed the structure of competition to be essentially closed (Ibid.: 82; Mair 1997). All of the major parties – predominantly the PS and PSD – were established after 1975, meaning that the "power holders of the old authoritarian order were essentially totally absent from the process of change" (De Giorgia and Santana-Pereira 2020: 140; Fishman 2019: 43). In stark contrast, PSOE had already existed for nearly a century (founded 1879) and moved gradually to change their appeals and promises upon Spain's democratization. At the same time, PP grew out of Alianza Popular, which to some extent acted as a continuation of conservative Francoist elites.

Therefore, in comparison to PSOE and PP, Portugal's mainstream parties were essentially "parachuted from above" and were not attached to cleavages in the same way that Spanish parties are (Afonso et al. 2015: 322). Consequently, Portuguese parties did not have the incentives to establish a "well-anchored mass-based organizational model" but instead from the start aimed to be a catch-all party which lacked rigidly defined ideological stances (Ibid.; De Giorgia and Santana-Pereira 2020: 141). This difference in the foundation of party systems between Spain and Portugal has left the latter

more flexible in parties' platforms and promises, meaning that Portuguese parties can also be "more sensitive to external pressures" (Lisi 2019: 160).

This flexibility is reflected in figures 4 and 5, which graph the percentage of quasi-sentences dedicated to two topics – Europe and internationalism – in PS and PSD manifestos in all Portuguese parliamentary elections since democratization. First, it is evident that there is great variation from year-to-year for PS manifestos for both Europe and internationalism. In several election years, running from 1980 to 1987, PS referenced themes related to internationalism virtually never, although a large 8% of their manifesto in 1975 had been dedicated to the same topic. Another example comes from 1985, in which PS referenced Europe in almost 10% of their manifesto, which then plummeted to almost 0% in the following election year. Figure 5 shows that PSD manifestos have not varied quite so much in comparison to PS, and yet there is still greater variation in comparison to the manifesto data analyzed by PSOE in the previous chapter.



Figure 5.4. Percentage of quasi-sentences in **PS** manifestos in all elections since 1975.



Figure 5.5. Percentage of quasi-sentences in **PSD** manifestos in all elections since 1975.

Secondly, in contrast to Spain, the eurozone crisis encouraged cooperation between existing leftist parties and movements. As a result, PS could offer policies that appealed as "renewing rejuvenating" due to increased influence from the radical and far-left (Freire 2021). Whilst PSOE has diverged from the far-left, leaving room for Podemos to enter Spain's space of party competition, instead, recent years in Portugal have seen a "degree of cooperation within the left that is unprecedented in Portuguese democracy" (Jalili 2019: 91). António José Seguro, socialist leader in 2011, established LIPP (Lab of Political Ideas for Portugal), which aimed to create bottom-up mechanisms to gather information for future policy formation (Lisi 2019: 152). Hence, the mainstream Portuguese leftist party has preempted changes in the party system and acted to contain the potential impacts.

At the same time, whilst PS shifted to the left in the past decade, PSD also moved to the right (Freire 2021: 11).[26] Therefore, any potential surges in citizens identifying with far-left or far-right

[26] PSD was already centrist/center-right beforehand.

politics have been mostly absorbed by the current mainstream parties. Newcomers to the electoral arena are heavily constrained and hence lack an "innovative, alternative and credible party to exploit citizens' disappointment" (De Giorgia and Santana-Pereira 2020: 137).

Demands from citizens

To some extent, there are demands for populism in Portugal. For example, De Giorgia and Santana-Pereira argue that some Portuguese citizens called for populist politics, yet they could not find the political parties to clearly also express those views (Ibid. 2020: 140). The emergence of three new protest parties are a sign of some form of radicalization, yet when compared to other countries in Southern Europe, what followed the eurozone crisis was more a strengthening of PS and PSD (Reis 2013). In conjunction with the reasons explained above (the relatively smaller shock to the economy, and PS and PSD party strategy), the lack of deeply entrenched social cleavages in Portugal has also limited any potential impact of new protest parties.

Compared to Spain, Portugal's citizens are not tightly attached to cleavages such as class and religion when it comes to voting (Gunther 2005). To be sure, although the salience of older social cleavages declined in Spain through Franco's era, they still remained more prominent than they ever were in Portugal. This also meant that these cleavages could not be reactivated in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis and migrant crisis. Furthermore, Portugal does not have the same regional divide that Catalan independence movements pose in Spain, which has galvanized Vox and Ciudadanos (Mendes and Dennison 2021: 754). Portugal's politics still centers on only one main socioeconomic dimension, as opposed to several lines of division that fragment Spanish politics further.



Figure 5.6. Spain (ES) compared to Portugal (PT): percentage of respondents from each country that answered the question "to what extent do you have trust in political parties in your country, on a scale of 1 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)?" Data from European Social Survey 2018.

Finally, another key difference between the Spanish and Portuguese electorate is that whilst Spaniards have become more dissatisfied with the way that politics works in their country, Portugal is characterized more by disaffection i.e. abstention rates (Magalhães 2005). Again, this existed prior to the eurozone crisis, where in the 2009 election, around 43% of citizens who were entitled to vote did not vote (Reis 2013). As a result, voters who were disenchanted in Portugal simply "exited the electoral market" which then strengthened the governing parties (PS and PSD) further (Lisi et al. 2020).

Despite this, because government stability was greater in Portugal throughout the 2010s, this allowed political trust to recover remarkably quickly in comparison to other countries (De Giorgia and Santana-Pereira 2020). Figure 6 displays the percent of respondents from Spain and Portugal (in the ESS) that answered the question "to what extent do you have trust in political parties in your country?" on a scale of 1 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). Overall, the data is skewed to the left: in both countries, respondents do not have much trust in political parties. Yet, at the two lowest levels of trust

(so, those who answered 0 and 1 on the scale), Portuguese respondents were less likely to select this option in comparison to Spanish respondents. Around 29% of Spanish respondents selected "no trust at all" in political parties, in comparison to 24% of Portuguese respondents. At the other end of the scale, from 6 to 10 – those who therefore have a good degree of trust in political parties – although the differences are small, Portuguese respondents were still more likely to say that they had trust in political parties at all levels in comparison to Spanish respondents.

Conclusion

In sum, Spain and Portugal share many similarities in their political system, including their paths to democratization in the mid-1970s, rapid party system institutionalization, and political institutions such as the electoral system. The structure of Portuguese party competition also mirrored Spanish party competition up until the early 2010s, when Spain's party system experienced great volatility. In comparison, Portugal's relative stability in its party system can be explained by the combination of three factors. First, processes of globalization (in particular, economic processes in addition to attitudes towards migrants) did not have the same dramatic impact as they did in Spain. Second, the existing mainstream parties in Portugal had greater flexibility in reshaping their party platform, and exercised this ability in order to absorb the potential for new parties to arise and gain support. Finally, Portugal's social cleavages are not as deeply entrenched and fragmented as they are in Spain.

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Conclusion

Overview of dissertation

In this dissertation I have sought to address the overarching question: why have political party systems in Western Europe changed so dramatically in the past decade? In comparison to a period of several decades of stability – whereby most countries centered around two to three mainstream parties – new challenger parties emerged following the Eurozone Crisis, Migrant Crisis, and other more gradual processes of globalization. The populist left and right in particular gained momentum and are still performing well in national elections. To a lesser extent, overtly pro-European and pro-internationalist parties such as En Marche and Ciudadanos are also significant contenders, challenging the status quo of one mainstream center-left and one mainstream center-right party as the dominant forces within European countries.

To address this question I divided the dissertation into three main components, which emphasized the links between two main processes of globalization, democratic satisfaction, political trust, and impacts on party politics. Overall, the economic and sociopolitical dimensions of globalization have profoundly altered social divisions, effectively replacing older cleavages tied to class and religiosity. Overall, despite shifts in their party platforms, long-established parties face difficulties in breaking away from their previous ties, whereas challenger movements can more easily claim to represent voters according to new issues.

First, I attempted to reframe the widely used losers vs. winners of globalization dichotomy to more effectively capture the variation between how individuals are affected by, and react to, processes of globalization. By considering two dimensions – cultural and economic – I derived four main categories.

In this first part, I demonstrated the utility of this framework regarding citizens' political party preferences. Globalization winners, relative to the other categories, have a greater probability of voting for centrist and liberal parties, which have very pro-European, pro-immigration, and pro-free trade platforms. Globalization losers, relative to others, have a larger propensity to vote for far-right parties, which purport policies strongly tied to anti-immigration and economically protectionism. Cultural winners/economic losers, relative to others, are more likely to vote for leftist parties, which express positive attitudes towards an internationalist and European identity, but still favor some economically protectionist policies. Finally, cultural losers/economic winners, relative to the other categories, have a greater probability of voting for center-right parties, which are more skeptical of immigration and European integration, but are still mostly receptive to free trade (especially the Single Market, in the European context).

Second, I asked how globalization affects an individual's satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. Extant literature suggests that there is a growing gap between those who benefit from globalization in contrast to those who are disadvvantaged: the former express greater democratic satisfaction and political trust in comparison with the latter. However, I focused on three individual-level variables of globalization, going further beyond the existing scholarship which primarily focuses on country-level variables (most notably: migration, trade, supranational institutions, and the eurozone crisis).

The findings demonstrated that indeed, the individual-level processes deserve greater attention in explaining democratic satisfaction and political legitimacy. Specifically, two different mechanisms are at play. First, those who hold negative perceptions of immigration and international institutions express less satisfaction with democracy and trust in politics. However, individuals who are negatively affected by economic globalization are motivated to express their discontent, hence boosting their political trust and democratic satisfaction. I then use the typology devised in the previous chapter to analyze each group's probability of expressing dissatisfaction with democracy and political institutions. I find that

winners and cultural winners/economic losers express greater satisfaction with democracy and political trust than losers and cultural winners/economic losers.

Finally, I analyzed the role of party strategy in response to processes of globalization and their resulting new social divisions. I focused on Spain due to the especially profound changes in its party system, due to the success of three new major parties, disrupting the otherwise stable pattern of party competition between two mainstream parties: PP and PSOE. I traced the evolution of PSOE from the civil war to today, analyzing manifestos and party campaign materials, and found that party elites moved more andmore towards the center-ground of party politics. By establishing themselves as a major contender in the center-ground, PSOE tied themselves to pro-globalization themes. Whilst this initially assisted in consolidating Spain's modern democracy, PSOE's tratjectory also left a vacuum for new parties – in particular, Podemos – to rapidly gain support from globalization losers, catalyzed by the Eurozone crisis.

I then compared Spain's system of party competition to Portugal. Despite the two countries' shared histories according to many aspects, Spain's party system is now much more volatile compared to Portugal's relative stability. Three factors explain the break in the commonalities between their party systems. First, processes of globalization did not have the same impact as they did in Spain. Second, the mainstream parties in Portugal were more flexible in adapting their party strategy to shifting social divisions. Finally, Portugal's social cleavages are not as entrenched and fragmented as those in Spain, meaning that voters had fewers reasons to seek representation from outside political parties.

Limitations, implications, contributions and further research

In assessing the scope and limitations of the issues raised in this dissertation, I point to several factors. First, to what extent can the arguments presented here be applied outside of Western Europe? New challenger parties and movements tied to processes of globalization have emerged across the globe, such as populist right-wing Bolsonaro in Brazil, or left-wing populist Malema and the Economic

Freedom Fights in South Africa. I acknowledge that the three main independent variables in this dissertation – attitudes towards immigration, attachment to the European Union, and one's offshorability potential – are limited in their generalizability beyond Western Europe. Even within Western Europe, some stark differences are evident: the Eurozone Crisis and Migrant Crisis impacted Germany in different ways to Spain, for example, and the proportion of offshorable jobs differs greatly when comparing the UK to Portugal. Therefore, when seeking to generalize the argument beyond the boundaries of Western Europe, it is necessary to consider to what extent other countries also share those commonalities. Since the increased integration of Eastern Europe with Western Europe, it is possible to analyze attachment to European identity and support for the further unification of the EU – especially since many Eastern European countries are included in the ESS. Yet, the different trajectories of Eastern Europe and Western Europe – specifically, the move towards democracy following the collapse of the USSR – suggest that the argument would need to be heavily adjusted.

Also beyond European borders, it is necessary to conceptualize support for internationalism (and supranational institutions) differently. However, the EU is quite unique in its powers and centralization in comparison to other international institutions. Nevertheless, there are likely ways to provide ways for some comparison with other regions, as long as one bears in mind that the economic and sociopolitical dimensions assessed in this dissertation are quite unique to Western Europe.

There are three research agendas in particular, however, that this dissertation contributes to beyond Western Europe. First, I hope to encourage a more holistic approach to understanding how processes of globalization work together when analyzing impacts on politics. Whilst much of IPE literature currently considers how economic factors (such as trade and offshoring) influence attitudes towards immigration and nationalism, CP might also take these relationships into account in greater depth than is evident in current scholarship. Second, CP scholarship could also address the relationship between globalization, satisfaction with democracy and political processes, and outcomes on party politics to a larger extent. Rather than assessing the links between one set of independent variables

linked to globalization with a set of dependent variables focused on populist parties, the underlying mechanisms and intervening variables should also be addressed.

Finally, although I have addressed the role of party strategy in mobilizing issues connected to globalization, it is important to further investigate why some parties can more quickly respond and reshape their platforms, in comparison to others. Why can some long-standing parties more easily adapt to new cleavages and take advantage of new divides, whilst others struggle? In the first part of this dissertation, I noted the difficulties that mainstream parties face in general: since older parties are attached to certain older cleavages, they face more trouble adapting to new social divisions in comparison to new movements. And yet, the last part of this dissertation – focused on Portugal – shows that some mainstream parties can be very flexible when responding to processes of globalization. By taking into account factors such as histories of democratization, party system institionalization, and the entrenchment of social divisions, we can better understand the variation in the effectiveness of political parties' strategies in responding to globalization.