

Framing Islam: Non-Muslim Americans' Narratives of Muslim and Islamic Identity

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Abstract

Anti-Muslim sentiments continue to rise in the United States, as do harassment of and hate-crimes against Muslims. To combat this trend, it is critical to better understand the lenses through which non-Muslim Americans view Muslims and Islam. Using frame analysis, this study examines in detail the sentiments and narratives that motivate Islamophobia. As an analytical tool, frames refer to the schemas that assign identity and meaning to social actors and actions in specific social contexts. The primary objectives of this study are to (1) identify the frames through which Americans perceive Muslims and Islam, (2) determine the predictors across demographic backgrounds, affiliations, and practices that align with each frame and (3) examine how these frames impact opinions on policy and social inclusion regarding Muslims and Islam. To address these objectives, this project uses a mixed methods approach. Specifically, quantitative data are collected through a survey measuring the attitudes, behaviors, and demographics of a sample of non-Muslim Americans. In addition, a discourse analysis of the 2016 presidential candidates' campaign rhetoric is presented.

A combined total of six frames and counter-frames are developed and analyzed in this study. In the context of this project, frames present critical views of Muslims and Islam; whereas counter-frames reflect perspectives amenable to Muslims and Islam within the United States. In predicting expression of frames and counter-frames, the multivariate regression analysis of survey results shows political measures largely drive expression, followed by media consumption behaviors. The discourse analysis also shows the persistent partisan relationship between politics and sentiments toward Muslims and Islam. Counter to existing literature, this study finds that religion has relatively less impact on expression of frames/counter-frames when other factors are controlled via multivariate analysis. In assessing the influence of frames and counter-frames on opinions regarding policy and social inclusion, this study finds that frames/counter-frames maintain significant effects even when analyzed alongside other known covariates (such as political ideology, religiosity, Evangelicalism, education). This study concludes that frame analysis is an effective method for studying sentiments toward Muslims and Islam and advancing our understanding of Islamophobia.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO FRAMING ISLAM

Islam is projected to surpass Judaism and become the largest non-Christian religion in the United States by 2050 (Pew Research Center 2015b). This demographic trend is of significant importance considering the increasingly hostile and prejudiced views held by the American public towards the growing Muslim immigrant population. Over the past decade, Americans' concerns about Islamic extremism have continued to rise, with over half of Americans reporting that they harbor unfavorable opinions of Muslims and that they are "very concerned" about Islamic extremism and its perceived potential to encourage violence (Pew 2010, Pew 2014a, Pew 2015). Further, reports of harassment and hate-crimes perpetrated against Muslims, or non-Muslims who were believed to be Muslim, continue to rise (Buncombe 2017; Kishi 2017; Levin 2016; Lichtblau 2016). In order to combat these anti-Muslim sentiments and actions, it is critical to better understand the lenses through which non-Muslim Americans perceive Muslims and Islam. To that end, this study breaks down the widely used yet broadly defined concept of Islamophobia to examine more specific frames through which Americans structure their sentiments toward Islam and the Muslim population. Frames, from this perspective, refer to the social schemas that ascribe identity and meaning, organize narratives, and maintain and justify opinions regarding Muslims and Islam.

In examining this topic, it is important to note that Americans holding these anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments are not on the fringes of society, instead these sentiments are often widespread. Among studies that have examined demographic correlates of prejudice against Muslims, findings consistently show Republican affiliation (Gallup 2016; Pew Research Center 2015b) and certain religious affiliations (Pew Research Center 2014a) (Pew 2014b) to be

correlated with less favorable opinions of Muslims¹. However, studies are inconsistent in the extent to which educational background and personal knowledge of Islam affect attitudes toward Muslims and Islam (Gallup 2016; Smith 2013). Thus, in addition to more clearly identifying the frames through which anti-Islamic sentiments are maintained, it is necessary to better understand the specific demographic background and social practices of Americans that facilitate possessing a given frame and the corresponding sentiments.

The objectives of this study are to (1) identify the frames through which Americans perceive Muslims and Islam, (2) determine the predictors across demographic backgrounds, affiliations, and practices that align with each frame and (3) examine how these frames impact opinions on policy and social inclusion regarding Muslims and Islam. To achieve these objectives, this project employs mixed methods. Specifically, quantitative data were collected through a large-scale online survey measuring the attitudes, behaviors, and demographics of a sample of non-Muslim Americans. Prior to survey data collection, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted to refine the range of frames and finetune the survey questionnaire. As an additional source of data to supplement the survey findings, a discourse analysis of the 2016 presidential candidates' campaign rhetoric was conducted, which focused on the candidates' mention of immigration, national security, global and domestic Islam and Muslims, and religious tolerance.

As noted above, this study aims to go beyond the term Islamophobia to further elucidate the perspectives and narratives held by Americans that shape and maintain their sentiments

¹ These findings do not mean members of these political or religious groups unanimously hold anti-Islamic sentiments, nor do they assert that such sentiments are limited to only members of these groups. Rather, these studies find higher proportions of Republicans hold anti-Muslim sentiment compared to Democrats, and likewise, studies show higher proportions of Evangelicals hold anti-Muslim sentiment compared to non-Evangelicals.

toward Muslims and Islam. Before introducing the frames developed for this study, an overview of the existing theory on Islamophobia is presented below.

Examining Islamophobia

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1979) has influenced much of the contemporary discussion of Islamophobia. In this work, he described the "othering" treatment and assumptions Western societies have of Muslims and Muslim-majority countries. In particular he articulated the tendency of Western societies to assume cultural and moral superiority over the 'exotic,' 'barbaric,' and 'uncivilized' Islamic world (Considine 2017a; Said 1979). In 1997, the term again garnered wide-spread attention when the Runnymede Trust, a UK-based race equality think tank, published reports on the topic of Islamophobia, with objectives to both define the concept and provide policy prescriptions (Runnymede Trust 1997). The Trust characterized Islamophobia as holding closed views on eight elements:

- (1) "Islam is seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities"
- (2) "Islam is seen as separate and Other. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them, and does not influence them"
- (3) "Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist"
- (4) "Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in 'a clash of civilizations'"
- (5) "Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used to acquire political or military advantage"
- (6) "Criticism of the West by Muslims is rejected out of hand"
- (7) "Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and the and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society"
- (8) "Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal" (Runnymede Trust 1997)

Supporting these themes, Allen (2010) defined and described the social process of Islamophobia as involving three components: (1) holding an ideology that informs and ascribes

meaning and intention to Islam and Muslims; (2) the ideology functions through “modes of operation” that reinforce and perpetuate the belief system through the media, political discourse and so on; and (3) Islamophobia engages in exclusionary practices that discriminate and disadvantage Muslims. Additionally, Richardson’s (2012:7) definition –“A shorthand term referring to a multifaceted mix of discourse, behavior and structures which express and perpetuate feelings of anxiety, fear, hostility and rejection towards Muslims, particularly but not only in countries where people of Muslim heritage live as minorities”—makes the explicit point that often Islamophobia occurs when there is a disparity in power between a Muslim minority and the non-Muslim majority.

Islamophobia can be enacted in a number of ways, varying in structure and consequence. It can be expressed in daily social interactions, ranging from harassment to discrimination to hate crimes. Islamophobia can also be institutionalized, carried out through policies by state and federal government agencies (e.g., banning of hijab in French schools, the USA PATRIOT Act, the National Security Entry–Exit Registration System (NSEERS), proposing to create a national Muslim registry, to name a few) (Allen 2010; Considine 2017a; Hussain and Bagguley 2012; Love 2009). Islamophobia carried out at the individual level typically differs from the institutional in its reach and effect: institutionalized Islamophobia encompasses pervasive and systematic policies and practices that particularly target and disadvantage Muslims (Larsson and Sander 2015:16).

While Islamophobia can be enacted at both a structural and interpersonal level, this is not to suggest that these two avenues do not inform and reinforce one another. For example, Americans’ impressions of Muslims and Islam are significantly shaped by media presentations, both news and entertainment, as well as by political discourse. In turn, those impressions then

inform Americans' daily interpersonal interactions and reactions. With this self-reinforcing cycle, Islamophobia has become more widely accepted, with political rhetoric or news stories emboldening anti-Muslim discrimination. While politics and Islamophobia will be discussed in more detail below, it can quickly be noted that prominent political figures openly and freely make anti-Muslim comments. This political discourse functions both to appeal to a particular voting base and to legitimize and normalize these anti-Muslim sentiments among the American public and popular culture. This is all to say that anti-Muslim language and acts are openly accepted within mainstream society; they are not relegated to the extremist fringes (Singh 2013). In an effort to explain the character of Islamophobia, scholars on the topic often refer to one or more of the following three themes: race, religion, and politics. Each theme is discussed in detail below, beginning with race and Islamophobia.

Race and Islamophobia

Many scholars writing on American Islamophobia argue that much of the discrimination and hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims rest on a racialized understanding of Muslim identity (Allen 2010; Chandrasekhar 2003; Chu 2015; Considine 2017a; Goeman 2013; Modood 2005; Naber 2008; Singh 2013). In other words, the harassment, violence, and profiling that Muslims experience are often the direct product of a perceived "visible archetype" of Islamic identity, marked by clothing, facial hair, skin color/phenotype, accent, and/or name (Considine 2017a; Naber 2008). Consistent with the understanding that race is a social construct rather than a biologically-determined category, the ascription of Muslim identity relies on visual and cultural cues, laden with meanings and associations imposed by the majority based on a subjective socio-historical and cultural context (Omi and Winant 1994). Even the assertions of Islam's cultural

and moral inferiority and of Muslims as “uncivilized” and “primitive,” parallel racist sentiment as “these tropes are a repetition of older biological racist discourses” (Considine 2017a:9).

The racialization of Muslims is evident in treatment of non-Muslims who “look Muslim.” There are countless examples of profiling and violent harassment of Sikhs, non-Muslim Indians and Arabs, Guatemalans and Filipinos, as well as other individuals from outside of South Asia and the Middle East (Considine 2017a; Goeman 2013). While Sikhs are a particularly common conflated target because of their beards and headdress, all of the examples above have non-white skin color in common (Singh 2013). And across those instances, actual religious ideology, nationality, citizenship and individuality are irrelevant. Two examples of non-Muslims receiving discriminatory, even violent treatment illustrate the racial component of Islamophobia.

First, in 2013, Cameron Mohammed was shot multiple times with a pellet gun in a Walmart parking lot in Florida (Orlando and Sullivan 2013). During the attack, the assailant actually asked Mohammed if he was Muslim or Arab, but he was repeatedly shot despite denying this identity (Goeman 2013). In speaking to police after the assault, the police corroborated the fact that Mohammed was not Muslim, but the assailant replied “they’re all the same.” (Considine 2017a:10). For the perpetrator, actual Islamic affiliation was irrelevant—his attack was justified based on the perceived identity of the victim.

In another instance of presumed Muslim identity, a darker-skinned Italian economist was pulled off of a plane after his seatmate saw him writing equations on a notepad pre-takeoff, which prompted the seatmate to report the behavior on suspicion of terrorism. This example again illustrates that the discriminatory treatment stemmed from physical cues and social context (Chu 2015). This treatment was not the “simple consequence of ‘rational disagreement’ with the tenets of Islam, rather [it stemmed from] xenophobic distrust of people who look different from

‘normal’ Americans” (Considine 2017a:10). This case is also emblematic of the treatment at airports for many individuals who “look Muslim,” and in these instances, airlines are not “attacking Islamic theology, but rather Muslim people or people perceived to be Muslim” (Considine 2017a:13).

Religion and Islamophobia

In addition to the racialization of Islam, another recurrent theme in American Islamophobia scholarship is the role Christians, particularly Evangelicals, play in positing Islam as antagonistic to American society (Belt 2016; Singh 2013). Many prominent Christian figures have openly spoken out against Islam, often citing either the religion’s ties to terrorism or claims that Muslims’ goal is to usurp American culture. In the first of these two narratives, opponents of Islam claim violence and terrorism as foundational missions of Islamic tenets. Thus, all Muslims are to be feared as Islamic ideology is inherently dangerous to the safety of Americans.

There are countless examples of prominent religious leaders espousing this narrative. In the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, evangelist Franklin Graham publicly disagreed with President Bush’s assurance to Americans that Islam is peaceful and the terrorists responsible for the attacks were not representative of the religion. Instead, Graham succinctly stated his rebuttal: “I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion” (USA Today 2001). The following year, Jerry Falwell gave an interview to *60 Minutes* in which he asserted he thought the prophet Mohammed was a “terrorist” (60 Minutes 2002). In 2002, Reverend Jerry Vines, former president of the Southern Baptist Convention, addressed a convention of clergy, and after stating that Islam was “not as good as Christianity,” he went on to assert that:

“Islam was founded by Muhammad, a demon-possessed pedophile who had 12 wives – and his last one was a 9-year-old girl. And I will tell you Allah is not Jehovah either. Jehovah’s not going to turn you into a terrorist that’ll try to bomb

people and take the lives of thousands and thousands of people.” (Breed 2002: para. 5).

In this statement to other clergy who also held influential positions and a regular platform to share their views, Vines explicitly asserted that Muslims, if they are faithful and obedient to Allah, will necessarily become terrorists who murder thousands of people. The president of the Southern Baptist Convention at that time endorsed Vines’ comments (Singh 2013:119).

The Islamization narrative is another prominent theory pushed forward by select Christian leaders. This narrative asserts that Muslims in the U.S. are on a mission to culturally usurp Christian values and topple Christians’ preeminent standing in the American religious landscape. For example, on the popular religious conservative radio show “Dr. James Dobson’s Family Talk,” former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and retired general Jerry Boykin expressed his deep knowledge of this Islamization plan. He stated that the “the Muslim Brotherhood is currently entering ‘phase four’ of a five-phase plan to take over America” (Belt 2016:215). During another appearance on Dobson’s program (“The Threat of Islamic Terrorism II”, 2012), Boykin expressed his grave concern for the future of America with the following statement: “Let me say I have six grandchildren and three of them are females and I must tell you, I am greatly concerned about the day coming when they will be wearing burqas. That’s how serious I consider this threat.” To clarify, this narrative is not concerned only about the loss of religious freedom but specifically the threat of America becoming a Muslim nation.

This subset of Christians fear Islam will encroach on several American spheres and public institutions. The universal cultural and government acceptance of Christmas serves as one example. In 2010, Gary Bauer, former Republican presidential candidate, lamented the choice of Portland, Oregon officials to name the city’s annual tree-lighting event “Tree Lighting,” (Singh 2013:121). As an explanation for the officials’ unwillingness to use “Christmas” in the title,

Bauer brought in the obvious and nefarious opponent—Islam: “Radical Islam’s secular enablers have been driving Christianity from the public square for decades” (Collins 2010: para. 13).

Politics and Islamophobia

Generally speaking, research shows that opposition to Islam is partisan, with Republicans comprising the majority of Americans who espouse anti-Islamic sentiments (Belt 2016; Singh 2013). For many Republican politicians and candidates, speaking out against Islam has become an effective political platform, particularly among the Christian conservative constituency. These politicians use Islamophobic rhetoric strategically by openly positing Islam as inferior to Christianity as a means of appealing to their voting base (Belt 2016; Considine 2017a; Hafez 2014; Singh 2013). The narratives that this subset of Republicans espouse are similar to those discussed in the “Religion and Islamophobia” section above, with slight variations. In addition to viewing Muslims as a national security threat, Republican politicians regularly cite the perpetual impending threat of Islamization, but in doing so, they often position Islamists and Democrats/Liberals as co-conspirators in the effort to tear down American democracy and Christian values (Belt 2016).

Promoting the narrative that terrorism is inherent to Islam, former Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain stated in a 2011 interview that “based upon the little knowledge that [he has] of the Muslim religion, they have an objective to convert all infidels or kill them” (Jilani 2011: para. 4). In addition, he warned of Muslims’ mission “to gradually ease sharia law and the Muslim faith into our government; it does not belong in our government” (Sullivan 2011: para. 2). This threat of sharia is widespread among Republicans who subscribe to the Islamization theory.

In 2010, Jerry Boykin, mentioned earlier for his concerns that his granddaughters would have to wear burqas, stated in no uncertain terms that “those following the dictates of the Quran are under an obligation to destroy our Constitution and replace it with sharia law” (Mantyla 2010: para. 3). In keeping with the threat of sharia, Newt Gingrich, former Republican Speaker of the US House of Representatives and later a Republican presidential candidate, warned that radical Islamists already in the U.S. threaten “to impose an extraordinarily different system on us--replace American freedom with Sharia” (Gingrich and Gingrich 2010). To a Christian Zionist congregation in Texas, Gingrich again spoke of this threat and the need to intervene before it is too late: “I am convinced that if we do not decisively win the struggle over the nature of America, [in a generation, it will become] a secular atheist country, potentially one dominated by radical Islamists with no understanding of what it once meant to be an American” (Marr 2011: para. 2). Interestingly, Gingrich posits that a “secular, atheist” America would be run by “radical Islamists,” which effectively groups together Muslims and atheists as conspiratorial opponents to Christians. Additionally, when he asserts that Muslims have “no understanding” of what American identity entails, Gingrich reinforces the presumed boundary between Islam and America as well as the narrative of Judeo-Christian foundations being integral to American society.

Bridging together two political enemies toward this narrative, Michele Bachmann, former member of the US House of Representatives, warned in a 2010 interview during her Republican presidential primary campaign, “It seems like there is this common cause that is occurring with the left and with radical Islam. It’s frightening to think how the left in this country . . . is throwing in with common cause with these radical elements of Islamic extremism” (EIFD 2016: para. 23). Exemplifying this narrative pairing, David Horowitz, a popular conservative writer,

titled his 2006 book: *Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left*. Political commentators, such as Glenn Beck and Erick Stakelbeck, also contribute to spreading this narrative of Democrats and Islamists joining forces to overthrow Western civilization (Belt 2016:218).

Beyond rhetoric, Republican politicians have also enacted legislation to combat the Islamization threat of widespread sharia law. From 2011 to 2012, 78 bills were proposed by state legislators that curtailed Islamic practice and prohibited sharia. Seventy-three of those bills were introduced by Republicans, again speaking to the partisanship that exists surrounding anti-Muslim sentiment (Saylor 2014). Further, these talking points and proposed legislation are just as rampant today as they were five to 10 years ago. For example, during the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump declared to Anderson Cooper that “Islam hates us,” (CNN 2016: para. 2). Additionally, Ben Carson stated, “I would not advocate that we put a Muslim in charge of this nation” (Bradner 2015: para. 2) and he also likened Syrian refugees to “rabid dogs” (Associated Press 2015: para. 6). Putting words to action, Trump signed an executive order in his first week in office that banned travel to the U.S. from 7 Muslim-majority countries, certainly a nod to his campaign promise to block all Muslims from entering the U.S. (Johnson 2015).

With these ongoing public expressions of Islamophobia, it is important to more critically examine how these sentiments are conceptually organized, who holds these frames, and what effect they have on opinions toward policy and the social inclusion of Muslims and Islam. To that end, the specific frames used in this study’s analysis are discussed below.

Frame Analysis

Seminal to sociological framing, Goffman’s *Frame Analysis* (1974) provides both a method and theoretical concept to examine how individuals make sense of social life and

experiences through meaning making and conceptual organization. Goffman defines a primary framework as one which “allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label” otherwise seemingly disconnected or meaningless occurrences into comprehensible schema (1986:21). Frames may be intentional, created and diffused by actors with conscious, pointed agendas, but frames may also be simply functional (Benford and Snow 2000). In intentional framing, the actor “select[s] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[s] them more salient . . . in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993:52). Frames can be spread and validated through a variety of sources, including news and entertainment media, politicians and public figures, religious leaders, and in everyday interpersonal interaction (Belt 2016; Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2017a; Rane and Ewart 2012; Singh 2013; Wilkins 2009).

An important property of frames is their resonance, as the more a frame resonates in the life of the audience, the more powerful and robust the frame becomes. Frame resonance can be bolstered by a frame’s credibility. Several factors contribute to a frame’s credibility, including consistency of the frame, empirical support for the existence of the frame, the credibility of the advocates or distributors of the frame, as well as narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow 2000). Narratives are an important concept in frame analysis as they are often used to justify frames, illustrate or exemplify the main objectives of a frame, and/or assign meaning to the frame (Davis 2002; Oman 2009; Polkinghorne 1988). Polletta (1998) outlines three characteristics of narrative: plot, point of view, and narrativity. Plot is the “logic that links events,” and this feature, along with implying the meaning underlying the plot, helps to make the frame familiar and relatable (1998:421). Narratives contain three points of view—narrator, protagonist, and audience—which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and together, they unite perspectives to build and/or

sustain collective identity around the frame (1998:423). Finally, the narrativity refers to the story-telling quality of a narrative, which compels and captures the attention of the audience (1998:423). Narratives function to promote frames by often presenting a one-sided, uncomplicated account of events and actors. While narratives are important, the term is neither synonymous nor interchangeable with frames (Oman 2009; Polletta 1998). Frames are conceptually broader and function as the schema with which actors organize experiences, perceive social interactions, and motivate behavior.

In the following sections, three sets of frames are described that inform and organize Americans' opinions of Muslims and Islam. These frames were constructed from a synthesis of literature, including the sociology of race and ethnicity, immigration and assimilation, the sociology of religion, and American Islam scholarship, to name a few. Through performing the discourse analysis, pre-survey qualitative interviews, and construction of the survey instrument, these frames have evolved and been refined. The three sets presented below reflect the final iteration of the frames, which is the version used in this study.

In a general sense, these frames encapsulate three types of ascribed Muslim identity—political, racial/ethnic, and religious. Within each type of identity, there exists a frame and counter-frame, and for the purposes of this study, frames refer to perspectives that are critical of Muslims and Islam whereas counter-frames are more defensive of Muslim identity. As a final point of clarification, the frames presented are ideal types, and while they are distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. A single American may espouse multiple frames, or even a combination of frames and counter-frames. However, these frames will still be introduced separately in order to highlight what is essential to and distinctive of each frame. In later analysis, the extent to which these frames overlap and/or function independently will be examined. Below, Table 1

presents the schema of the frames and counter frames covered in this analysis, with each frame discussed in detail following the table.

Table 1. Frames Typology

<i>Type of Identity</i>	Frames	Counter-Frames
Political	[F1] Muslim as Terrorist – Threat to National Security	[CF1] “Not all Muslims are Terrorists”
Racial/Ethnic	[F2] Neo-Orientalist/Islam as anti-Democratic—Threat to American Identity	[CF2] American Multiculturalism
Religious	[F3] Islam as Religious ‘Other’—Threat to American Religious Landscape	[CF3] Defense of Religious Freedom

[Frame 1] Muslim as Terrorist– Threat to National Security

In the United States, there is a widespread perception of Muslim identity being synonymous with terrorist and Islam with violence (Hutcheson et al. 2004; Naber 2000; Sides and Gross 2013). The driving force of negative sentiments associated with this frame is the fear resulting from the belief that Islam and Muslims pose a threat to public safety and national security. Accordingly, individuals who hold this frame believe that the profiling of Muslims and Arabs is justified. While profiling of Middle Eastern immigrants occurred prior to the September 11th attacks, acceptance of profiling by the general public and the extent of profiling and surveillance by the government and law enforcement have greatly expanded following this event (Fischbach 1985; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003). After the 9/11 attacks, Muslims and Arab-Americans, or anyone appearing to be of either background, were increasingly “singled out for questioning and security checks based on their skin color, clothing, name, or religious beliefs” (Ramirez, Hoopes, and Quinlan 2003:1195).

Existing data demonstrate that the percentage of Americans who hold the opinion that Islam, more so than other religions, encourages violence has risen over the last sixteen years. In 2002, 25% of Americans reported believing Islam encouraged violence more so than other religions. In 2010, this percentage rose to 35%. In 2015, 50% of Americans held this view (Pew Research Center 2017). While the number of Americans holding this view has decreased since 2015 (41% reported this opinion in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2017)), these percentages still show a marked and maintained increase of Americans holding this view since 2002. Further, across the general American public, concerns about Islamic extremism in the U.S. have also risen over the last decade, with 31% of respondents reporting in 2005 that they were very concerned about Islamic extremism compared to 43% in 2017 (Pew Research Center 2017; Poushter 2015).

[Counter-Frame 1] “Not all Muslims are Terrorists”

As a counterargument to the stereotype of Muslims as terrorists, some Americans stress the point that out of the 1.6 billion Muslims world-wide, the vast majority of Muslims are peaceful and condemn terrorism (Ahmed 2011; Pew Research Center 2009). This frame functions by drawing a distinction between Islamic extremists and the rest of Muslims (Ahmed 2011; Al-Zo’by 2015). As is often the case for minority populations, each member is involuntarily designated a representative of that group, whether they accept that role or not. Muslim Americans are no exception; however, even when the majority of Muslim Americans condemn Islamic extremism and terrorism (Pew Research Center 2009), many non-Muslim Americans still ascribe the actions of a handful of extremists to the entire group.

In addition to acknowledging the diversity and peaceful coexistence of the majority of Muslims, proponents of Counter-Frame 1 also use the narrative of civil rights, arguing that

profiling based on race, or religion, violates the civil liberties of those targeted (Oman 2009; Ramirez et al. 2003:1195). However, as concerns over national security increase in salience, the civil rights narrative may lose its competitive significance. As noted above, one property of conflicting frames is that the more pressing or salient frame will stifle competing frames, and the issue of public safety, central to Frame 1, is one that is currently highly resonant among the American public (Belt 2016; Hussain and Bagguley 2012; Schudson 1989). Proponents of profiling even acknowledge that this practice may infringe on certain individuals' rights but they claim it is necessary for the greater good—national security. For example, in a 2002 NPR broadcast, Law Professor Jonathan Turley offered the following justification:

“There are 40 million people that travel by air in this country. We cannot stop each one of them and make an individualized determination of risk. We have to develop some type of profile. The fact is profiling is a legitimate statistical device. And it's a device that we may have to use if we're going to have a meaningful security process at these airports.” (as cited in Ramirez et al. 2003: 1195).

The quote above illustrates how frames and counter-frames confront one another, and the ways in which underlying narratives, like the importance and salience of national security, are employed to justify the adoption of one frame over another. In this case, the frame of Muslims as a threat to national security supersedes the counter-frame that views the majority of Muslims as peaceful and profiling as a violation of civil rights.

[Frame 2] Neo-Orientalist/Islam as anti-Democratic –Threat to American Culture and Identity

Some Americans who have expressed concerns over immigration explain that their opposition stems from a fear that new immigrants could bring about social and cultural change, thereby directly undermining and destabilizing their perception of contemporary 'American' identity (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Theiss-Morse 2009; Williams 2013:247). Often underlying this concern is the conceptualization of American identity as based strictly on an Anglo-

Protestant culture, such as that characterized by Huntington in *Who Are We?* (2005) and Higham's account of nativism in *Strangers in the Land* (1955). As Williams (2012) notes, "immigration is, above all, a question of who counts as an American" (2012:334). For Americans who subscribe to this frame, American national identity is defined by both race and culture and further, Muslim identity is viewed not strictly as religious, but equally so as an ethnic and/or racial affiliation. Put most simply, the perceived and practiced interchangeability of the terms Muslim and Arab exemplifies this frame. It should be noted that this frame reflects neither the reality of the high racial and ethnic diversity within the Muslim American population nor the fact that most Arab Americans are Christians (Haddad 2004; Pew Research Center 2007). Within this frame, Muslim identity becomes a catchall, pan-ethnicity that absorbs all US-born Muslims, Muslim immigrants, and even non-Muslims who "look Muslim." The cultural, religious, ethnic, and racial diversities that exist within the American Muslim population are minimized so that the significant boundary for non-Muslim Americans lies between 'Muslims' and 'Americans'.

As an illustration of the intersection of race and religion as it relates to nativist views of American identity and Muslim identity, recall the controversy surrounding the false assertion that President Barack Obama is Muslim. To begin, independent of the inaccuracy of the claims, the fact that the assertion of Obama being Muslim was implicitly understood as an attack on his loyalty to America and a challenge to his ability to serve as president speaks to the persistent tension and 'otherness' of Islam in American society (Berlet 2010; Singh 2013). The various political cartoons depicting Obama wearing a turban, displaying his name (including his middle name, Hussein) in Arabic font, placing him alongside camels, including the Saudi Arabian flag in the background, have all been intended to collapse Obama's identity to that of a Middle Eastern Muslim (Williams 2012:340). These tropes have conflated religious, ethnic, and national

identity, and they further assert that having a Muslim identity is un-American. These depictions are consistent with the general incorporation of anti-Muslim messages into more mainstream media, thereby increasing their coverage and wider acceptance (Bail 2012). Importantly, in this frame, such depictions significantly influence the national political culture in ways that increase the ethnic “othering” of Muslims (Bail 2012; McCloud 2003; Williams 2013).

In addition to the narrative of American identity as Anglo-Protestant, many proponents of this frame also hold the narrative that Islam promotes inferior moral laws that directly contradict and threaten Western civilization (Al-Zo’by 2015). In this view, Islam is considered to be barbaric, misogynistic, and uncivilized (Naber 2000; Said 1997). This frame is consistent with Orientalist ideology (Said 1979), which is “based on an assumption of moral and cultural superiority [by the West] over the Oriental other” (Behdad and Williams 2010:84). Orientalism portrayed individuals from ‘the Orient’ (which itself was a discursive construct rather than a geographically defined place) as uncivilized ‘natives’ who lacked the competency to form civic institutions and maintain political cohesion and power; the narrative of neo-Orientalism has reframed the means to the same end (Al-Zo’by 2015; Said 1979; Taustad 2004). In the case of Islam, a “neo-Orientalism” has emerged in the last few decades in Western media and scholarship that directly addresses Islam and Muslims globally (Al-Zo’by 2015; Behdad and Williams 2010; Said 2003).

As an expansion on traditional Orientalism, proponents of neo-Orientalism assert that ‘natives,’ now often referring specifically to Muslims and Arabs, are uncivilized not out of ineptitude but because of an intentional resistance to Western political discourse. Neo-Orientalists claim that Islamic law (sharia) and Muslim culture are inherently anti-democratic and actively antagonistic to Western society (Al-Zo’by 2015:223). This shift in Orientalist

depictions is particularly convenient because it changes the narrative—whereas before, “natives” were barbaric because of weakness and inability to stand up against colonialism, neo-Orientalism now asserts that these cultures are active and accountable participants in rejecting “civilization” and democracy (Taustad 2004). This shift in responsibility and intentionality functions to create a more incendiary and inexcusable antagonist.

As evidenced by the exemplary neo-Orientalist texts of Huntington’s (2011) *Clash of Civilizations* and Pipes’ (1990) “The Muslims Are Coming! The Muslims Are Coming!”, a key feature of this narrative is its scope. Neo-Orientalism asserts that Islam as a global religion, not just radical or extremist sects, is anti-democratic and aggressively opposed to Western civilization. As a result, Muslims everywhere necessarily possess an inferior moral character (Al-Zo’by 2015). Because this incompatibility is viewed as absolute, neo-Orientalists assert that the only possible resolution is that “Islam must be quarantined and the devil exorcized from it” (Mamdani 2005:24). While Islam is depicted here as a civilization unto itself rather than simply a religion that spans diverse places and time, proponents of this frame tend to equate the ‘War on Terror’ to a religious war (Al-Zo’by 2015).

[Counter-Frame 2] American Multiculturalism

The counter-frame to the nativist and neo-Orientalist narratives outlined in the frame above is best characterized as American multiculturalism (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005). In this frame, Muslims are not expected to give up their cultural distinction as their religion and culture are not viewed as un-American or incompatible with American identity. While adherents to this frame want Muslims to participate in the larger society in terms of civic engagement and labor participation, they simultaneously celebrate and respect Muslim cultural distinction. The Muslim immigrant is still permitted to maintain his/her own separate cultural customs, which are viewed

as worthwhile to enrich and diversify American culture (Khan 2003). Multiculturalists do not seek a uniform or monolithic American identity; rather, they prefer American culture and society as composed of a plurality of groups with distinct cultures and customs. For example, according to this perspective, Muslims would be welcome to wear a hijab or hold public cultural festivals that celebrate the specific immigrant group's countries of origin.

Further, within this frame, while Muslim cultural distinction is valued, the individual is prioritized independent of affiliation and he or she is viewed not merely as a member or representative of a larger group. In other words, while subnational groups are acknowledged and may provide distinction and even identity for group members, membership is viewed as a choice. For example, a Pakistani Muslim may choose to identify as Pakistani and/or as Muslim, but ultimately, the individual has the right to choose these affiliations and his/her civil rights remain respected regardless of group affiliation (or lack of affiliation) (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005:228). This view enables the untangling of Muslim identity from ethnic or subnational affiliations.

Further, as a direct counter to the neo-Orientalist narrative, proponents of this counter-frame want to dispel the notion that contemporary Islam is antithetical to the United States and Western Democracy. Within this frame, Islam is understood as harmonious with American culture and principles, with neither affiliation having to be compromised for a Muslim to live in the United States. For example, in *Journey into America*, Akbar Ahmed (2011) spoke with a second-generation Muslim Lebanese immigrant, Joe Aosse, who explained:

“I don't consider myself to be a Muslim in an American society; I consider myself an American who believes what the Quran teaches us . . . This illusion or argument about what comes first, country or God, is a created argument . . . I've lived here for seventy-one years, and my ideals of what America is and what Islam is blend beautifully” (Ahmed 2011:243).

Within this narrative, there is not a sacrifice in holding either identity, which is exemplified by Khan's assertion that "American Muslims today are as Islamic as any Muslim and as American as any American" (2003:193). In fact, some Muslims argue that their Islamic practice and identity is enhanced in the U.S. precisely because of democratic ideals like freedom of religion and freedom of speech, which American Muslims value and celebrate (Ahmed 2011:276). In sum, this counter-frame uses the narratives of multiculturalism and harmonious U.S.-Islamic values to challenge nativist and neo-Orientalist perspectives. In keeping with these themes, proponents of this counter-frame stress that the United States is "not at war with a religion."

[Frame 3] Islam as Religious 'Other' – Threat to American Religious Landscape

Frame 3 views Muslims specifically as religious actors, members of a "foreign" religion. Proponents of this frame are concerned by the presence of Muslims and Islam in the US as they pose a perceived threat to the current American religious status quo, which is overwhelmingly Christian. While religious freedom and separation of church and state are constitutionally protected, some argue Christianity has benefited from a de facto hegemony since the country's founding, which proponents of this frame are concerned to lose (Singh 2013:115).

In lieu of an official state religion, an American civil religion is well entrenched in American culture and politics (Bellah 1967). The extent to which American civil religion is fundamentally and necessarily connected to Christian or Judeo-Christian traditions is debatable, but at the very least, American civil religion shares certain traditions and principles with Christianity and often draws on Judeo-Christian imagery (Bellah 1967). Proponents of this frame also hold the narrative that the United States was built by Protestant immigrants with many of the founding fathers being Christian; therefore, America, and American identity, has inextricable

Protestant foundations. While Protestantism served as the primary religious experience for Americans from the founding of the country through the 1800s, the American religious landscape broadened in the twentieth century to encompass Catholicism and Judaism as additional viable religious options. Those three traditions make up the American religious mainstream, and are widely considered acceptable affiliations within American identity (Herberg 1955).

For proponents of this frame, Islam is positioned as an eternal and inevitable “rival system” to Christianity and Judaism (Lewis 1990:49). Following this perspective, Muslim immigration, or any influx of non-Judeo-Christian religious actors, is then perceived as a threat to American civil religion, the mainstream American religious landscape, and ultimately, American identity.

[Counter-Frame 3] Defense of Religious Freedom

In contrast to the frame outlined above, proponents of this frame argue that regardless of American civil religion and American Christian foundations, the value and principle most fundamental to the American religious experience is freedom of religion (Singh 2013). These proponents uphold a narrative of the United States as a pluralistic, religiously-tolerant host that enforces the First Amendment and thus accepts religious actors of all religions, including Islam. From this perspective, it is precisely because of the separation of church and state that the United States can accommodate religious pluralism and enable and protect the religious lives of all practitioners, including Muslims, both American-born and immigrants. In addition to supporting one’s right to practice or not practice a given religion, this counter-frame also objects to any policy or interpersonal treatment that targets an individual because of their religious affiliation and practice. For example, proponents of this frame would object to the creation of a Muslim

registry and restrictions placed on travel from Muslim-majority countries on the basis of the principle of freedom of religion.

Data and Methods

Using the frames outline above, this study seeks to: (1) examine the prevalence of each frame, (2) identify the predictive demographic backgrounds, affiliations, and behaviors of Americans that correlate with each frame, and (3) examine the extent to which each frame impacts opinions on policy and social inclusion of Muslims and Islam. To address these various aims, I employed a mixed methods approach, which included the creation and distribution of a large-scale survey, as well as a discourse analysis of rhetoric used during the 2016 presidential campaign. Each method is discussed in greater detail below.

Large-Scale Internet Survey

Within the context of the research questions, the purpose of the survey data is to provide a generalizable overview of the frames held among the general American public. Further, to better understand the types of people who align with each frame, multivariate OLS regression analysis was conducted. Additional multivariate regression analysis was used to examine the impact of the frames, and in these models, the frames served as independent variables alongside other covariate predictors. The questionnaire items cover three key topics required to evaluate the frames of American perception of Muslims and Islam: (1) sentiments toward Muslims and Islam, (2) demographics of the respondent, (3) behaviors and experiences of the respondent, including media use, political engagement and opinions, religious background, first-hand experience with Muslims, and knowledge of Islam.

At various stages of the survey instrument construction, semi-structured interviews were conducted to refine concepts and develop measures. A total of 12 semi-structured interviews

were collected toward this effort of developing and testing the survey questionnaire. The online survey was administered to a commercial survey access panel, purchased from Survey Sampling International (SSI). Data were collected between March 23rd and March 28th 2017, which yielded 1,109 complete cases.

Discourse Analysis of Presidential Campaign Rhetoric

As political ideology is a well-documented correlate to attitudes on Islam, this study expands on this research by further examining this relationship through an analysis of the 2016 presidential campaigns (Gallup 2016; Pew Research Center 2015b). This piece of analysis identifies the prominent narratives of Muslim and Islamic identity that are presented in American political discourse at the national level. Specifically, I conducted a discourse analysis of the rhetoric used during debates and on Twitter by the top two candidates from each major party (Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders) during the 2016 presidential primary and general election campaigns. An examination of these candidates' rhetoric illuminates the respective views of Islam and Muslims that are held by the parties' arguably most prominent and influential representatives.

Chapters Ahead

In the following chapter [Chapter 2], an overview of the Muslim American population is provided. This chapter begins with a historical background on the Muslim American population, followed by a discussion of Islam as an institution within the American religious landscape. The chapter concludes with an overview on American media portrayals of Muslims and Islam. In Chapter 3, the survey methods and sample are discussed. This chapter presents key sample demographics alongside population parameters, followed by an overview of the key measures used in analysis: religious practices, political preferences, media consumption, familiarity with

Islam, and the frames and counter-frames. Chapter 4, examines the demographic and behavioral predictors for each frame. Next, Chapter 5 examines the impact of each frame on opinions regarding select policy measures and social inclusion regarding Muslims and Islam. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the findings from the discourse analysis of the campaign rhetoric, offering specific quotes and a discussion of how the frames varied by party and by candidate. In the final chapter [Chapter 7], the findings across all analyses are summarized, corresponding prescriptions for combatting anti-Muslim sentiment are provided, and directions for future research are discussed.

CHAPTER TWO: WHO ARE MUSLIM AMERICANS? A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

In any discussion of the reception of a minority population, it is important to have a base understanding of the group in question. This chapter provides an overview on several aspects of the Muslim American population. First, a demographic portrait is given that addresses the size, nationality, race, and socioeconomic standing, among other characteristics, of the current Muslim American population. Next, the chapter discusses the history of Islam in the United States, examining both the role of immigrants in bringing Islam to the U.S. as well as the prominence of Islam within the African American community. The subsequent section examines the nature and variety of Muslim American identities and the institutional structure and practice of American Islam. The chapter then shifts focus towards reception for the Muslim American experience, beginning with an overview of American media portrayals of Islam. This chapter concludes with a brief summary of existing trends regarding the general American public's sentiments regarding Islam and Muslims.

A Demographic Overview of Muslim Americans

Today, there are an estimated 3.45 million Muslims in the U.S., 2.15 million of which are adults (Pew Research Center 2017). At this estimate, the adult Muslim population accounts for less than one percent of the total U.S. adult population. The majority of Muslim Americans are foreign-born, with 58 percent emigrating from another country. Among foreign-born Muslims, ninety-one percent arrived in the US after 1970. Despite the large portion of U.S. Muslims who are foreign-born, 82 percent of all U.S. Muslims are American citizens (Pew Research Center 2017:34).

In spite of its relatively small size, the Muslim American population is highly diverse across a number of indicators. Among the foreign-born population, approximately one-third of Muslim immigrants come from South Asia, one-quarter from the Middle East and North Africa, 23 percent from other Asian/Pacific regions, nine percent from Sub-Saharan Africa, and the remaining eight percent from Europe and the Americas (Pew Research Center 2017:32). Additionally, no single country accounts for more than 15 percent of the foreign-born Muslim population, with Pakistan accounting for 15 percent followed by the next largest share of 11 percent emigrating from Iran (Pew Research Center 2017:32). The Muslim American population is also racially and ethnically diverse with 41 percent identifying as white, 20 percent as black, 28 percent as Asian, eight percent as Hispanic, and the remaining three percent as another race or multiracial (Pew Research Center 2017:35).

In comparison to the U.S. adult population, Muslim Americans are generally younger. The median age for Muslim Americans adults is 35 years old compared to 47 years old for the U.S. general public (Pew Research Center 2017:23). There are slightly more men than women (51 percent; 49 percent respectively) in the Muslim American population, which is the opposite of the U.S. general public (48 percent male; 52 percent female) (Pew Research Center 2017:164). Muslim Americans are as likely as the U.S. general public to be married; though, when looking specifically at Muslim immigrants, marriage rates are much higher among foreign-born Muslims (70 percent) than that of the general public (53%) (Pew Research Center 2017:39).

The percentage of all adult Muslims with either a college (21 percent) or graduate degree (11 percent) is comparable to that of the U.S. general public (19 percent and 11 percent respectively); however, the foreign-born segment of the Muslim American population serves to lift these figures. When comparing foreign-born to US-born Muslims, the foreign-born

population is notably more likely to have at least a college degree, with a combined 38 percent having a college degree or higher compared to just 21 percent of U.S.-born Muslims (Pew Research Center 2017:41). Despite matching the U.S. general public in terms of educational attainment, the American Muslim population reports higher percentages of annual household incomes *below* \$30,000 (40 percent) as compared to the U.S. general public (32 percent). With that said, there is a fair amount of heterogeneity within the Muslim population regarding income as nearly a quarter (24 percent) of U.S. Muslims earn more than \$100,000, which is commensurate to the U.S. general public (23 percent) (Pew Research Center 2017:42). Further, in spite of comparable educational levels to the general U.S. public, the Muslim American population reports higher rates of underemployment. Specifically, 10 percent of U.S. Muslims who work part-time report preferring they worked full-time and an additional 18 percent are unemployed and looking for work. In comparison, six percent of the U.S. general public reports working part-time while preferring full-time work and just six percent report being unemployed while looking for work (Pew Research Center 2017:43). With these characteristics of the current Muslim American population in mind, the following section gives an overview of how and when many of these Muslims, or their ancestors, arrived to the U.S.

A Brief History of Muslim Immigration to the United States

One of the first instances of Muslims arriving to the United States occurred during the Atlantic slave trade. Many of the West Africans who were brought to the U.S. as slaves were Muslim, though upon arriving, they were forced to convert to Christianity, leaving little trace of Islam in the United States until the arrival of voluntary Muslim immigrants in the 1800s (McCloud 2003:160).

Voluntary Muslim immigration to the United States occurred over the course of three distinct waves. The first wave of Muslim immigration began in the 1870s with just a small number of primarily unskilled migrant workers, most of whom were young, single men emigrating from the rural Syrian region. These immigrants arrived with the intention to work temporarily and then return back to their homeland with their earnings, but due in part to famine and an unstable economy in the Middle East combined with lower than expected earnings in the U.S., these immigrants remained and settled in the United States (Haddad 2009; Smith 2010). As a result of the combination of small population size and inadequate institutional support, members of this first wave either relinquished much of their religious practice and traditions or relegated their religious observance strictly to the private sphere (McCloud 2003:161; Smith 2010:55–56). This modest flow of Muslim immigrants all but diminished with the passing of the National Origins Act of 1924, which limited the number of Middle Eastern immigrants to 100 per year (Haddad 2004).

The second wave of Muslim immigration occurred immediately following WWII when the American government began internationally recruiting college students for enrollment in U.S. graduate programs. Following completion of their American education, these international students—mostly Arab men—were then expected to return to the Middle East where they could serve as allies to the U.S. from afar (Haddad 2009:250). Members of this second wave were generally of a higher educational background and class status as compared to their Muslim predecessors immigrating at the turn of the twentieth century (Haddad 2004). Also of note, approximately two-thirds of immigrants in this later wave married American-born citizens, resulting in many of these immigrants remaining and building their professional careers in the U.S. rather than returning, as planned, to the Middle East (Haddad 2009:250). Members of this

wave of Muslim immigration achieved economic and professional success, occupying middle and upper class status in America, and it is among this group that Islam began to be practiced publicly in the United States (McCloud 2003:162).

The third and largest wave of Muslim immigration, which is ongoing today, began following the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which set new, more open immigration policies and eliminated the quota system first established in 1924. This wave brought a more diverse set of Muslim immigrants, varying in terms of gender, nationality, and economic and educational background. Unlike earlier waves, post-1965 Muslim immigration included large numbers of women and even children. Additionally, immigrants from a variety of ethnic and national backgrounds came to the U.S. during this wave, which effectively increased the ethnic heterogeneity of the Muslim American population. Similar to the second wave, many post-1965 Muslim immigrants were highly skilled and socially mobile professionals and students. At the same time, this wave also included refugees, many of whom lacked the financial stability or professional background characteristic of the second wave Muslim immigrants (Haddad 2004). Adding to the ethnic and national heterogeneity of the Muslim American population, these refugees emigrated over the course of decades from a variety of countries and regions including, but not limited to, Iran, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Cambodia, and Burma (Ahmed 2011). The majority of foreign-born and second-generation immigrant Muslims in the U.S. today stem from this post-1965 wave of immigration.

While the majority of American Muslims are either themselves foreign-born or their parents are foreign-born, a sizeable minority (24 percent) are US-born with US-born parents. Among this portion of the American Muslim population, approximately half are black (Pew

Research Center 2017:37). The following section provides a brief overview of the history of Islam in the African American community.

African American Muslims and the Nation of Islam

As noted above, Islam first arrived in North America through the transatlantic slave trade. As a means of oppression, slave owners would rename slaves and prohibit any religious practice that deviated from Christianity, and this forcible suppression extended to Islam (Lumumba 2003; Walvin 2001). As a form of resistance, some Muslim slaves attempted to maintain their Islamic tradition by observing Islamic practice however they could—such as continuing to pray five times a day, not consuming pork, speaking in Arabic, and even rewriting passages from the Quran based off memory (Lumumba 2003; Turner 1994; Walvin 2001). However, because these Muslim slaves were socially isolated and unable to establish a social network or institutional base for Islam in the U.S., their idiosyncratic version of Islam only lasted the life cycle of those Muslim slaves (Turner 1994).

Islam made a resurgence within the African American community through the Nation of Islam (NOI), beginning around 1930. With many African Americans still reeling from the Great Depression and enduring blatant employment discrimination, NOI functioned as a social movement as much as it did a religious one (Howard 1966; Turner 1994). Nation of Islam provided a sense of identity and empowerment to the African American community through an emphasis on Afrocentrism, economic self-reliance and stability, and an interdependent social network (Beynon 1938; Smith 2010; Turner 1994). NOI changed leaders a handful of times over the twentieth century, and with those changes, the alignment of its teaching with traditional orthodox Islam would vary (Smith 2010; Turner 1994). In the mid-1970s, NOI membership splintered along these lines of orthodoxy. The majority of members left NOI to realign teachings

and practice with Sunni Islam. Conversely, the remaining members of NOI returned to the organization's original insular teachings of ethnic exclusivity and social and political separation (Smith 2010). Contemporary NOI membership primarily draws young African Americans and/or those who are socially disadvantaged (Lumumba 2003:217).

Today, just three percent of American-born black Muslims identify as members of the Nation of Islam (Pew Research Center 2017:37). In contrast, 45 percent of U.S.-born black Muslims identify as Sunni and an additional 30 percent as Muslim, non-specific (Pew Research Center 2017:113). Despite relatively few African American Muslims today identifying with the Nation of Islam (NOI), it remains a prominent fixture in the American public's consciousness regarding Islam within the African American community.

Placing this discussion back within the context of the Muslim American community more broadly, American-born black Muslims comprise 13 percent of the U.S. adult Muslim population (Pew Research Center 2017:37). This segment of the Muslim American population is distinct from other Muslims in the U.S. in a number of ways. First, unlike most other Muslim Americans, U.S.-born black Muslims' families have been in the U.S. for multiple generations. This difference in geographic roots likely has an impact on how the Muslim American contextualizes their religious identity within broader society. For these African American Muslims, Islam is an indigenous religion and as such, deserves equal footing in the American religious landscape. As another point of distinction from the majority of Muslim Americans, two-thirds of U.S.-born black Muslims are converts to Islam (Pew Research Center 2017:37). For this population, Islamic identity and practice has been sought out and actively chosen.

American Islam and Muslim Practice in the United States

Despite the noted racial and ethnic heterogeneity of the Muslim American population, the strongest internal boundary of this group is arguably between US-born black Muslims and Muslim immigrants (either themselves foreign-born or the US-born children of immigrants) (Ansari 2004:255; Jackson 2004:217). Prior to the 1970s, American Islam was largely constructed by African American Muslims, but this changed with new immigration policy and the subsequent steady flow of Muslim immigrants to the U.S. With this demographic shift, American Islam changed its cultural traditions, social agenda, and intellectual base (Jackson 2004:216). While the transition of the African American Muslim community to more orthodox Islam has served to provide a bridge between themselves and Muslim immigrants, there still exist deep cultural and socio-economic distinctions between these communities. The lack of representation of Black American Muslims in national Islamic organizations as well as their general absence in the American public's consciousness are evidence of this disconnect. As the majority of Muslim Americans are immigrants or children of immigrants, the remainder of this section addresses American Islam as it is primarily experienced among Muslim immigrants.

Muslim American Immigrant Identity

In *Journey into America: the Challenge of Islam*, Akbar Ahmed (2011) describes his extensive travels across the United States in which he interviewed Muslim immigrants, converts, and native-born citizens about their experiences as Muslims in the United States. Through his study, he identified three prominent identities assumed by Muslim American immigrants: mystic, modernist, and literalist. These identities capture the nature of the Muslim's religious practice and the interaction between their religious experience and America as a host country.

First, according to Ahmed (2011), mystic Muslims make up 10 to 20 percent of the Muslim American population (2011:229). This identity includes, though is not limited to, Sufi Muslims. The mystic practices “quiet piety” with most of their religious practice performed in private and he/she rejects ideologies encouraging violence and/or extremism. As key components of this identity and practice, mystic Muslims focus on the Islamic teachings of compassion, peace, and universal acceptance; engages in interfaith dialogue; and promote mutual respect and understanding (Ahmed 2011:216). Most mystic Muslims do not fit the exotic image of turbans, loose robes, and long beards that is displayed in U.S. media; instead, many wear suits or other Western clothing and are professional businessmen and women. They are Muslim, and they are culturally integrated into American society.

Characteristic of mystic Muslims is an equal emphasis on Islam and American culture, stressing a harmonious cooperation between the two. Ahmed (2011) shares the experience of Imam Ahmed Raza Khan, a mystic who promotes the teachings of the Prophet and simultaneously supports America, finding no contradiction in being Muslim and being American. Khan describes his own and his fellow Muslims’ attitudes toward practicing Islam in the United States in explaining, “We’re Muslims, but we’re American” (Ahmed 2011:226). Another mystic whom Ahmed encounters, Imam Salahuddin Wazir explains that he can and must practice his religion fully without rejecting or being detached from surrounding American society, “realizing that he does not have the luxury of living in the past, he must adapt to the present” (Ahmed 2011:227).

An important note on mystic Muslims is that their incorporation and acceptance of American society does not necessarily equate to a disappearance of their religious practice or cultural distinction, but rather an integration and melding of Islamic practice into American

society and culture. This sort of integration of mystic Muslims is consistent with the assimilation model of “the melting pot” (Yetman 1999). Because mystics focus heavily on the teachings of the Prophet, aiming to implement his message into daily life, they are not removed from the larger society, but are motivated to participate in it via incorporating their religious beliefs. In sum, mystic Muslims are equally devoted to their Islamic practice as well as to being active, present participants and voices in American society and culture.

As an alternative identity, Ahmed (2011) identifies the modernist Muslim, whom he estimates makes up 40 to 50 percent of the Muslim American population (2011:227). Modernist Muslims are attracted to American pluralism and are typically successful professionals, well integrated into the public community, even holding leadership positions (Ahmed 2011:227). Modernist Muslim immigrants are socioeconomically integrated, but unlike mystic Muslims, they are not culturally integrated. Ahmed (2010) explains that “for all their professional education, it seemed [modernist] immigrants were not really interested in American history and culture” (2011:232). Modernists hold onto their religion and actively work to maintain cultural, ethnic distinction. This type of incorporation shares similarities with Portes & Zhou’s (1993) theory of segmented assimilation whereby immigrants (in Portes & Zhou’s study, specifically second-generation immigrants) may effectively maintain cultural distinction while simultaneously occupying thorough social and economic integration.

An example of a modernist Muslim whom Ahmed encountered along his journey was Hassan Bukhari, a physician and immigrant from Pakistan. Invited into his home, Ahmed observed from “just a glance around his house” that Bukhari “was living the American dream, but with a distinctly Pakistani flavor” (Ahmed 2011:228). Bukhari is a successful physician, is well respected in his community of immigrants and non-immigrants, practices Islam, chooses to

retain much of his native culture and stays involved in the current affairs of Pakistan.

Characteristic of modernist Muslims, Bukhari retained his ethnic and religious identity while also successfully integrating into American social institutions, demonstrated by his high socioeconomic status and civic involvement (Ahmed 2011:228).

Literalist Muslims, whom Ahmed estimates comprise around 30 to 40 percent of the Muslim American population, are more traditional and religiously conservative than mystic and modernist Muslims. Among literalist Muslims, there are two subgroups who vary in their response of how they maneuver American society while maintaining strict adherence to a traditional interpretation of Islam (2011:229). The first group of literalists typically occupy white-collar professions and are interested in interfaith dialogue, desiring a public coexistence of Muslim immigrants and American society. While these literalist Muslims are optimistic that Islam can be practiced in the United States, they differ from mystic Muslims in that these literalists think America is not *yet* conducive to Islam, but it can become so through open engagement and interfaith dialogue. Further, these literalist Muslims aim to practice their religion in a publicly integrated manner whereas mystics tend to practice in private. As an illustration of this type of literalist identity, Ahmed describes Imam Mohammed Al-Darsani who considers his mission to be to “defend, explain, and spread Islam in a land he felt was hostile to it” (2011:251). In Ahmed’s meeting with Al-Darsani, he is also introduced to his son, who makes the distinction between an interfaith dialogue that is defensive and combative rather than one of mutual respect and understanding. Al-Darsani’s son stresses that it is through the latter form of dialogue that progress may be made and peaceful coexistence may be reached (Ahmed 2011:253).

Considering themselves to be the true “champions of Islam,” the adherents to the other literalist group are relatively removed from Western society (Ahmed 2011:251). They usually hold positions as laborers or taxi-cab drivers and dismiss the American way of life and American identity, seeing them as irrelevant to their own (2011:257). These individuals strive to live as the prophet Mohammed lived, and toward that end, they largely isolate and separate themselves from mainstream American society. These literalists believe it is their responsibility to spread the word of Islam so as to convert non-believers. A small minority of literalist Muslims go beyond voluntary conversion to condone violence as a response to perceived heresy (2011:260). This type of literalist Muslim is typically associated with the Salafi tradition within Islam, which is characteristically reclusive, and even fellow Muslims find what little they do know about Salafi practices and affairs to be bizarre, extreme, and off-putting. In general, Salafis are indifferent and unattached to their surroundings, and the United States is no exception. Ahmed explains that America is “merely a backdrop for their practice of Islam: They could be on the moon or Mars.” He goes on to describe an African American Salafi who when asked what it means to be American, responded, “nothing” (Ahmed 2011:262).

In sum, unlike the literalist Muslims, mystic Muslims perceive no contradiction or challenge in practicing their religion in American society. This is due in part to mystics practicing privately and independently. Thus, mystics’ public involvement in American society is entirely separate from and unaffected by their religious practice. Further, mystic Muslims fully assume American identity and culture. In contrast, while modernist Muslims socioeconomically integrate into American society, they retain cultural, ethnic, and public religious distinction. Finally, literalist Muslims adhere to a traditional and conservative practice of Islam, which they view as challenged by American society. Literalist Muslims are split in how they resolve this

challenge. One group of literalists view Islam and America as potentially compatible, the harmony of which can be achieved through interfaith dialogue and a concerted and peaceful effort to educate Americans on Islamic beliefs and practices. The other literalists do not care to involve American society in Islam or vice versa; instead, they socially withdraw from American society and center their lives around their religious identity and practice. For these Muslims, the U.S. is simply a backdrop against which they maintain as little involvement as necessary, and if they do speak publicly on Islam, it is with the intention to convert rather than merely educate.

De Facto Congregationalism and American Islam

The socioeconomic, cultural, and ideological heterogeneity among American Muslims provides a formidable roadblock in the pursuit of a united American *Umma* (community) (McCloud 2003:165). Nonetheless, the expression and organization of Islam within the Muslim immigrant community has adapted to certain standards within the American religious landscape (Bankston and Zhou 2000; Hirschman 2006; Warner and Wittner 1998). Over the course of U.S. religious history, many immigrant religions have undergone an “Americanization” process that manifests itself in multiple ways, including having services held in English, carrying out weekly services on Sunday, structuring the service around a sermon, and the rising presence of an influential, interactive laity (Hirschman 2006:1215). This adaptive process has been described as a “de facto congregationalism” (Bankston and Zhou 2000; Hirschman 2006; Warner and Wittner 1998) and selective adaptation (Abusharaf 1998:235). Islam is no exception.

In spite of having a traditionally nonhierarchical and noncongregational structure and lacking a professional ministry or even official membership, Islam has transformed in a number of ways to create a distinctly American version of itself (Abusharaf 1998; Haddad 2009; Lin 2009; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). For example, many Islamic centers have adapted by hiring

imams, increasing female participation, holding English-led services, developing a professional Muslim ministry, creating and maintaining an official congregational membership, holding Sunday events and Sunday school, and creating and electing a governing body to oversee mosque affairs (Abusharaf 1998; Wuthnow 2005). The imam's responsibilities have also expanded. While traditionally authoritarian, the imam's role in the U.S. is now more comparable to that of a pastor, which includes providing counsel, representing the community, and performing weddings and other celebratory services (Haddad 2009:255). The role and environment of the mosque has changed as well, tending to be more family-oriented rather than the historically gender-segregated and male-centric orientation (Haddad 2009:255). Additionally, mosques and Islamic centers now double as community centers, providing language classes, religion classes, and public tours, with some even housing their own libraries and bookstores (Lin 2009:287; Wuthnow 2005:60).

Although the mosque has mirrored other American religious institutions in many ways, this is not to suggest the religion has become a watered-down or inauthentic version of Islam. Some Muslim Americans negotiate the balance between religious preservation and adaptation through their interpretation of Islam specifically within the U.S. context. Many Muslims highlight the western liberal principles of religious freedom and religious pluralism as evidence that America is an ideal context for practicing Islam because it provides choice and agency in religious affiliation and practice. For example, a Lebanese Muslim immigrant explained, "Everybody has their own religion. And religion goes back to Allah. A person can preserve their religion if they are Muslim or Christian. And the system here allows this" (Lin 2009:281). Another Muslim immigrant stated that they "are proud to be a Muslim and they are proud to be American. [They] love America because [they] have freedom of speech, freedom of religion"

(Ahmed 2011:276). Even further, some Muslims argue that they can practice the best version of Islam because of the specific American context. One Muslim explained that “she felt she could be a much better Muslim in America because of its developed notions of justice, civil liberties, and freedom. These made her more confident about her identity and optimistic about the future” (Ahmed 2011:297).

In the case of Muslim immigrants, this point of preserving Islam’s integrity in the American context is especially salient as the religious community can provide the immigrant a means of navigating cultural distinction alongside acculturation. The mosque and corresponding religious community serve as “vehicles through which immigrants reconstruct their communal identity in the diaspora, thus preserving and safeguarding their ethnoreligious and cultural landscapes. For all its congregants throughout the years, it has been the paradigmatic religious cultural ‘home away from home’ (Abusharaf 1998:236).” By belonging to a religious community, Muslim immigrants can connect with their homeland, spiritually and ethnically, while also selectively adapting to other American customs or institutions.

Towards this aim, some Muslims have made a concerted effort to articulate and promote a united and distinctly American Muslim identity. In particular, educated and professional Muslim immigrants arriving in the second-half of the 1900s pioneered this identity objective (Khan 2003:180). These particular Muslim immigrants were able to pursue this task of constructing a public American Muslim identity because they possessed the necessary economic standing and cultural tools to execute the task without social cost. More specifically, these Muslims were “capable of articulating enlightened self-interest and formulating a far-reaching vision for the revival of Islam and Islamic values” in addition to being successfully structurally integrated in American society (Khan 2003:180).

This emphasis on curating a public Muslim American identity has remained a concerted effort among contemporary second-generation Muslim immigrants, whose objective is to not only have Islam tolerated in the United States, but have American Islam be “recognized as a constituent element of the American identity” (Khan 2003:186). With familiarity of Western principles of democracy and multiculturalism combined with an understanding of liberal elements of Islam, this segment of the U.S. Muslim population has been able to construct a framework that facilitates and upholds a Muslim American identity (Khan 2003:194). Second-generation Muslim immigrants desire a single identity that encompasses both being American and Muslim, rather than one yielding to the other: “These young people are not Americans who are Muslims or Muslims who are born in America. They are American Muslims (2003:193).

While this goal of a jointly Islamic and American identity is shared by a sizeable portion of the Muslim American population, it does not extend to all Muslims in the U.S. The heterogeneity in the economic standing, social agenda, and religious ideology of this population can result in internal conflict for the Muslim American community, hindering the emergence of a unified, public American Islam (McCloud 2003). As already noted, Muslim immigrants arriving in the first half of the twentieth century and prior practiced their religion in private, if they practiced at all. As these immigrants were mostly young men who had come to work to send remittances back to their home countries, they found little motivation or reason to incorporate their cultures or religion into American society (McCloud 2003:161). It was the highly educated and professional elite immigrants arriving in the last several decades who made a concerted effort to create a Muslim American identity. As demonstrated by the literalist Muslims, there are

still contingents of recent Muslim immigrants who have no interest in constructing a Muslim American identity or in culturally engaging with U.S. society.

Nonetheless, an American Islamic cultural presence continues to emerge not only in the accounts of individual Muslims, but also in the existence of numerous Muslim American organizations and the growing presence of mosques. With the wave of students and professionals immigrating to the U.S. from Arab regions and South Asia in the 1970s, U.S. Muslim organizations quickly began forming and spreading (Ahmed 2011:270; McCloud 2003:162). To name a few of these organizations, there exist the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), the American Muslim Council (AMC), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), and the already mentioned CAIR and MSA (Ahmed 2011; Khan 2003). Partly as a response to suspicions and misconceptions brought about due to the events of September 11, 2001, many Muslim organizations reoriented their agendas following 2001 to emphasize educating American society on Islam, both its teachings and practices, and to widespread participation in interfaith dialogue (Ahmed 2011). Further, while up-to-date figures on the numbers of mosques and Islamic centers are difficult to find, as of 2012, there were more than 2,100 mosques (Bagby 2012), and over a decade ago, there were 2,000 Islamic centers and over 1,000 Islamic schools (Khan 2003). These numbers have likely only grown as the Muslim American population has steadily risen over this period, illustrating the growing Islamic institutional footprint in the public sphere (Pew Research Center 2017).

American Media Portrayals of Muslims and Islam

The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of who Muslim Americans are and their experiences in the U.S. In that pursuit, it's worthwhile to address the common portrayals

that American popular culture superimposes on this community. Specifically, an examination of media is an important avenue of study in both framing and public perception. Scholars have already made the case that media function as sources of popular knowledge and ideological mediation. Acting to both produce and maintain world-views, media provide the public meticulously narrated images of events and societies as well as cultural and moral ideals (Al-Zo'by 2015; Barker 2003; Hall 1997; Rane and Ewart 2012). Further, media provide the platform for public policy debates and political agendas to reach the American public (Bowe, Fahmy, and Jorg 2015; Oman 2009; Smith 2013).

It is then a telling barometer of public opinion that American news and entertainment media portrayals of Muslims are often monolithic, offering a crude caricature of an uncivilized, barbaric, fanatical Muslim identity, which fails to reflect the diversity of the Muslim population, both nationally and globally (Considine 2017b; Said 1979; Shaheen 2015). In American popular culture, Muslim identity has become synonymous with Arab identity, which has become synonymous with terrorist identity (Hutcheson et al. 2004; Naber 2000:51; Sides and Gross 2013). Looking specifically at entertainment media, Jack Shaheen analyzed over 1,000 films that depict Arabs and Muslims for his book *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies People* (2015). Shaheen found that over 900 of the films depict Arabs and Muslims negatively and draw on the violent and anti-Western stereotypes. Further, he found just 12 films that portrayed Muslims positively (Shaheen 2015). While fictional movies might seem inconsequential, these repeated narrative tropes become internalized as racial and cultural fact by the viewer, especially when these portrayals are consistently one-sided (Alsultany 2015; Omi and Winant 1994; Poynting and Mason 2006; Wilkins 2009).

Even in instances in which Muslim identity is presented with alternatives, these portrayals are still often limited to a simple binary. The most common binary is simply “good Muslim” versus “bad Muslim” (Al-Zo’by 2015:228; Khalid 2011:20). This ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ dichotomy does not function to assert that Islam, for some, is a peaceful, or at least neutral religion that happens to have religious extremists. Instead, the portrayals often treat ‘good Muslims’ as the exception that prove the rule (Smith 2013:8). Additionally, the ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ Muslim trope is often intertwined with either the nationality of Muslims or the level of cultural assimilation of Muslims (Smith 2013:8). For example, Irshad Manji, a Canadian Muslim whose parents are Indian and Egyptian, has made a prolific, and by many, a respected media career off of the assertion that Islam can be a peaceful religion so as long as it undergoes a cultural reformation; specifically, insofar as it becomes Westernized and modernized. In keeping with that, she argues that the form of Islam as it is practiced by the Arab world is barbaric, and she singles out Palestinians as particularly offensive carriers of this backwards, ‘desert-Arab’ version of Islam (Al-Zo’by 2015; Bayoumi 2010:88; Herzog and Braude 2009; Manji 2005).

In addition to the cultural slant that accompanies Islam’s media portrayals, current affairs and incidence of terrorist attacks also greatly influence coverage. Not surprisingly, the frequency of terrorist incidents affects the frequency of newspaper and TV news stories, though this does not mean coverage is proportional to frequency of attacks. Coverage of Muslim terrorist attacks grossly outweighs the actual incidence of Islamic attacks. One study found that attacks committed by Muslims received 450% more coverage than attacks committed by non-Muslim perpetrators, even though non-Muslim terrorist attacks are more frequent in incidence (Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2017b). Coverage also increases if the Muslim perpetrator is foreign-born (Kearns et al. 2017a). Further, if an event involved American victims or occurred on American

soil, then those events also receive greater coverage (Kern, Just, and Norris 2003). Beyond the amount of coverage increasing, the particular presentation of Islam and Muslims assumes a predictable pattern following the binary of good versus evil (Hutcheson et al. 2004). And because terrorism makes for riveting news, more so than the “good Muslim” narrative, American media portrayals of Muslims and Islam are often limited to this negative context (Kern et al. 2003).

The news source also impacts the nature of the coverage of Muslims and Islam. In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the content and valence of news coverage became increasingly partisan. Since 2002 onward, right-wing new outlets have primarily portrayed Islam as inherently violent and inciting terrorism (Smith 2013:8). This partisan coverage effect is likely compounded by the fact that Americans selectively seek news sources they know align with their existing opinions and perspectives (Iyengar and Hahn 2009).

To examine the range and frequency of varying narratives of Muslims presented in American media, Bowe, Fahmy, and Matthes (2015) conducted a study of 18 large-circulation newspapers to examine how each newspaper framed Islam. Using valence framing, whereby media coverage was coded for positive or negative terms and tone, the authors discover six general frames. First, the “No Peace” frame purports Islam as an inherently violent and intolerant religion whose followers do not want peace (2015:50). The second frame is “Reconciliation,” which is the only positive frame the authors found, and this frame stresses the similarities of Islam to other religions and asserts Islam is a tolerant religion (2015:50). The third frame is the “Journalistic Balance” frame, which strives for an unbiased, emotionally detached perspective in reporting, presenting neither positive nor negative valence. The fourth frame is the “Religious Intolerance” frame, which describes Muslims as “a sinister outside group to be feared”

(2015:51). This frame has the strongest association of any frame with a negative view of Islam and racial tolerance. In other words, proponents of this frame consider Islam itself to be racist (2015:51). The final two frames--“Peace” and “Religious Difference”—are both neutrally valenced (2015:51).

One of the findings from this study is that the majority of newspaper reports on Muslims and Islam are not negatively valenced, as three of six frames were neutral and one frame was positive. However, 26.4 percent of articles were negatively valenced compared to less than 5 percent (4.3 percent precisely) that were positive, making articles with the positive frame the least common (Bowe et al. 2015:51). So, while there is more negative coverage than positive coverage, there is still more coverage that is neutral than it is negative. However, it is worth noting that the authors found negatively valenced frames to have the strongest impact and influence on its readers. For example, when readers were presented with policies intended to deter risk versus policies designed to promote opportunity, the policy to deter risk was considered far more pertinent (2015:52). Another key finding of this study is that there were not any frames that contained both positive and negative valence—it was either one or the other, but never both. In other words, balance in media is achieved between frames rather than within a single frame (2015:51).

Considering the demonstrated influence on perception and attitudes toward policy, media play an important role in the study of non-Muslim Americans’ perceptions of Islam. Especially when considering that less than half of the American public personally knows a Muslim, media are critical in providing narratives and shaping the perceived salience of Islam and Muslims in the U.S. (Lipka 2014). Additionally, while the media are able to consciously construct and promote frames, Americans are consumers who can choose which news channels, papers, and

websites to follow, effectively filtering out dissenting or alternative perspectives. This dynamic makes media portrayals of Islam and Muslims all the more powerful. In light of Bowe et al.'s (2015) findings that a single frame never contains both positive and negative valence, it is unsurprising that Americans have such polarized and impassioned opinions on Muslims and Islam. The following section highlights some of those sentiments that have already been measured through national polls and survey data.

Trends in American Public Attitudes on Islam and Muslims

There are a handful of studies that measure certain sentiments of the American public regarding Islam and Muslims in the United States. While these studies are fruitful in establishing some correlates between demographics and valenced sentiments toward Muslims, these studies do not provide a single comprehensive source of data that captures the range of sentiments or possible frames through which these sentiments are supported. This lack of a single data source then also limits analysis of intersectionality. This project aims to address these limitations, but first, below is a discussion of the emergent trends that have been found in previous studies thus far.

Over the last decade, Americans' expressed favorability of Muslims has declined, with 47 percent of respondents expressing a favorable opinion in 2001, compared to just 30 percent expressing a favorable opinion in 2010. Additionally, 2010 marked the first time that more Americans held an unfavorable opinion of Muslims than Americans who held a favorable opinion (Pew Research Center 2010). Interestingly, Americans' opinions of Muslim Americans are markedly better than they are towards Islam as a religion. In 2005, 39 percent of respondents expressed a favorable opinion of Islam, with 36 percent holding an unfavorable opinion. Yet, in the same survey, 55 percent of respondents expressed a favorable opinion of Muslims compared

to just 25 percent with unfavorable opinion (Pew Research Center 2005). This suggests that while Americans may be skeptical of Islamic teachings or Islam's position as a religious institution, the American public is more accepting of Muslims as individuals.

A perhaps unexpected trend has emerged regarding Western favorability of Muslims surrounding periods when prominent terrorist attacks have occurred—these attacks do not worsen public opinion, and occasionally, sentiments improve following an attack. For instance, following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Americans' favorability of Muslims as measured in November of 2001 was nearly 15 percent higher than when it was measured in March 2001, six months prior to the attacks (Poushter 2015). In a poll conducted immediately following the London terrorist attack in 2005, American sentiments were unchanged when compared to a measure two years prior (Pew Research Center 2005). Following the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, Americans' opinion that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence was unaffected in comparison to the same measure two years prior (Pew Research Center 2013). Following the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, French respondents' favorability of Muslims increased compared to measures from the year prior (Poushter 2015).

When looking at bivariate analysis, respondents who have greater knowledge of Islam tend to hold more favorable views of Muslims Americans (Pew Research Center 2014a, 2005). This study includes knowledge of Islam as a predictor in later analysis. Political affiliation also demonstrates a correlation with respondents who identify as Republican reporting higher rates of concern for Islamic extremism than do non-Republican respondents (Poushter 2015). Republicans also report less favorable opinions of Muslims (Pew Research Center 2014a). As already established, news coverage portrayals of Muslims and Islam are partisan (Smith 2013:8), so the news sources Republicans access could be contributing to this relationship. Further, as

discussed in Chapter One, Republican politicians regularly engage in anti-Muslim rhetoric, with some even promote anti-Muslim policy (Belt 2016; Considine 2017a; Hafez 2014; Saylor 2014; Singh 2013). And as research shows that civilians are influenced by politicians and other prominent public figures (Zaller 1992), this partisan rhetoric is especially consequential and may account for this relationship.

Religion is another important characteristic in relation to attitudes toward Muslims. Respondents who consider religion very or somewhat important in their own lives are more likely (58 percent) to express strong concerns of Islamic extremism than are respondents who consider religion not as important in their own lives (38 percent) (Poushter 2015). Additionally, white evangelical Protestants report the least favorability toward Muslims compared to other religious and racial groups (Pew Research Center 2014a). In general, religious traditionalism tends to predict negative sentiments toward minority groups who are culturally dissimilar (Altermeyer 2003; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009), so in this case, Muslims may simply be yet another “outgroup”.

Additional studies suggest that level of religiosity, regardless of religious affiliation, can impact individuals’ sentiments toward practitioners of other religious traditions. Ciftci, Nawaz, and Sydiq (2015) examined interreligious favorability across twenty countries. Their results found that individuals who expressed a religious identity as their primary identity tended to show less favorable attitudes toward a religious other (Ciftci et al. 2015). Similarly, Putnam et al. (2012) found that individuals who report higher levels of religiosity are less tolerant of “exotic” religions than are secular individuals.

As part of an explanation for this tendency, it is useful to consider the use of boundaries to affirm identity and group membership. Several studies have examined how religious identity

and attitudes toward a religious other are impacted under the conditions of globalization. These studies consistently find that as one's own religious group's position may be challenged, or simply perceived as being challenged, the individual can reaffirm their religious identity and sense of belonging by emphasizing the boundary between their religious affiliation and that of a religious other (Ciftci et al. 2015; Kinnvall 2004; Lichterman 2008). In particular, studies have shown that evangelicals, more so than other religious traditions, tend to express unfavorable opinions toward Muslim immigrants, and that may be considered in light of a possible strategy to draw distinct boundaries when confronted with religious and cultural diversity (Smith and Emerson 1998; Williams 2012). In other words, American evangelicals may be using the tension of diversity to reinforce their own group identity and distinction. Chapter 5 will more closely examine religious affiliation, political ideology, media consumption behaviors, and familiarity with Islam, among other characteristics, in their relationships to attitudes toward Muslims and Islam.

Conclusion

The adult Muslim population accounts for less than one percent of the adult U.S. population. Within this relatively small group, there exists a high degree of heterogeneity. Muslim Americans vary in terms of national background, socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity, as well as their approaches toward acculturation and religious practice. As a result, Muslim American identity cannot be captured by one monolithic characterization; instead there exist a variety of typical identities just as there exist a range of experiences for Muslim Americans.

A key element of the Muslim American experience is their reception by the host society. In spite of their modestly-sized population, Muslims are disproportionately featured in American

news and media. A particular challenge faced by the Muslim American population is the extent to which it has had to continually dispel widespread, politically-charged negative stereotypes (Khan 2003; McCloud 2003; Kusow 2006; Portes & Rumbaut 2006; Esposito & Mogahed 2007; Ahmed 2010). Despite the great degree of variation within this population, “in the public mind, Arab, Muslim, and terrorist have become synonymous” (Portes and Rumbaut 2006:336). Further, anti-Muslim sentiments have continued to rise within the American public. Alarming, assaults against Muslims reached a new highest record in 2016 with 127 assaults, surpassing the previous record of 91 assaults in 2001 (Kishi 2017).

Despite ongoing discrimination and internal disagreements, American Muslims are making headway in establishing an American Islam and a public Muslim American identity. The post-1965 immigration wave plays a large part in this advancement. Many of the post-1965 Muslim immigrants occupied a high socioeconomic standing, and with their social and material means, they made a concerted effort to define and promote a public Muslim American identity. Additionally, the growing second- and third- generation Muslim immigrants possess a sense of belonging and claim in American society as if their native country, and this circumstance positions these later generations to navigate American and Muslim identity with equal stake and responsibility. Finally, while anti-Muslim sentiments and assaults have reached new heights, many Americans still view Muslims and Islam favorably (Pew Research Center 2014a). With an increasing presence of Muslim institutions and widespread active engagement in interfaith dialogue, American Islam continues to secure its foothold in the American religious and cultural landscape. This trend is unlikely to change as Islam is projected to replace Judaism as the second largest religion in the United States by 2040 (Mohamed 2018).

Indeed, many Muslims find harmony in practicing Islam in the United States, and they reject the notion that Muslim identity is any way antithetical to American identity. For example, Joe Aosse, a second-generation Muslim immigrant whose family is from Lebanon, explains:

I don't consider myself to be a Muslim in an American society; I consider myself an American who believes what the Quran teaches us . . . This illusion or argument about what comes first, country or God, is a created argument . . . I've lived here for seventy-one years, and my ideals of what America is and what Islam is blend beautifully. (Ahmed 2011:243).

For the majority of Muslims, American Islam permits and preserves the coexistence of an American identity with a Muslim identity. And in certain ways, this Islam has undergone an Americanization process, including hiring and expanding the roles of the imam, re-orienting the mosque for family participation, and holding Sunday events. Finally, in establishing a Muslim American identity, many Muslims aim to reject the “othering” and challenge the perception that Islam is foreign and separate from American culture. One Muslim immigrant even scoffed at the idea of being distinct from other Americans, as he responded, “It’s not like I’m living a separate life. There is no ‘them’ and ‘me.’ I don’t know who ‘them’ is” (Ahmed 2011:278).

CHAPTER THREE: SURVEY DATA, SAMPLE STATISTICS, AND KEY MEASURES

Before exploring the findings of this study, it is necessary to understand both the population and sample of respondents. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the methodology used to procure the survey sample. The next section provides the sample's demographic characteristics presented alongside equivalent demographic parameters of the population—the American general public². Following this section, the key measures of the study are introduced. First, an overview of the religious background and practices of the sample is provided. The chapter then presents the political ideology and preferences of the respondents, followed by their media consumption practices. Next, the chapter presents measures of the respondents' awareness of Islam and personal familiarity with Muslims. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the construction of the frames and counter-frames, which are used in the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Sample and Data Collection

To examine American society's sentiments toward Muslims and Islam, this study surveyed non-Muslim Americans using an online commercial access panel purchased from Survey Sampling International. For eligibility in the study, respondents had to be native to and residing in the United States, not identify as Muslim, and be at least 18 years old. In order to ensure adequate variation across key variables of interest, the sample was recruited with defined

² Technically, the targeted population is non-Muslim Americans, yet the comparison figures presented in this chapter refer to the general American public, *not* filtering for religious affiliation. Taking that into account, these figures are still informative in providing a broad demographic portrait of American society, against which the sample characteristics can be considered for representativeness. Additionally, as noted in Chapter 2, Muslims comprise less than one percent of the American adult population, so their inclusion or exclusion in the general public data should not substantially alter parameters.

quotas for age, political affiliation, and race. For age, quotas were set to have approximately equally sized groups across three ranges: 18-34 years old, 35-49 years old, and 50 years and older. Additionally, political party affiliation was purposively sampled to have approximately equally sized groups across the following three affiliations: Republican, Democrat, and Independent/Unaffiliated. Finally, African-American and Hispanic quotas were set to achieve approximately 18 percent representation for each group in the final sample. These three sets of quotas were not designed to mimic the composition of the U.S. general public, but rather to achieve maximum variation across these measures. For this reason, you will see in the discussion below that some of these statistics do vary from the population parameters.

All survey responses were collected online using the Qualtrics survey platform. Data collection began March 23rd, 2017 and concluded on March 28th, 2017, during which time 1135 responses were collected. After cleaning the data to eliminate ineligible cases, incompletes, and speeders, 1109 qualified cases remained and these respondents comprise the final sample discussed below, which was used in the analysis for Chapters 4 and 5. A copy of the complete survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.

Demographic Comparison of Sample and General American Public

Since this sample was recruited through non-probability sampling, it is especially important to consider its representativeness as the goal of this study is to draw inferences about the broader population. To that end, this section provides several demographic sample characteristics alongside population parameters. These comparisons can provide insight into the extent to which our sample is broadly representative of the general American public.

Age

To begin, this sample is slightly younger than the U.S. general population. As can be seen in Table 2, approximately two-thirds of the sample are below the age of 50 years old, compared to just under 55 percent of the general public falling in that age range. Further, the average age of the sample is 45 years old while the average age of the U.S. general public is 47 years old.

Table 2. Age.

Age		
	Sample %	U.S. General Public %
18 thru 29	20.6	21.2
30 thru 39	24.2	17.2
40 thru 49	19.6	16.2
50 thru 59	12.4	17.5
60 and older	23.2	27.9
	100	100
	$\bar{x} = 45$	$\mu = 47$

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).

Race and Ethnicity

To measure race and ethnicity, respondents were asked a series of two separate questions. First, respondents were asked if they considered themselves Hispanic or Latino. As can be seen in Table 3, 18.5 percent of the sample identified themselves as Hispanic/Latino, which is slightly higher but comparable to the U.S. general public.

Table 3. Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino?

Hispanic Ethnicity		
	Sample %	U.S. General Public %
Yes	18.5	15.9
No	81.5	84.1
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).

In reporting their racial identity, respondents were able to select as many categories as they considered applicable. In Table 4, the percentages for each racial category reflect respondents who selected only that single category, and respondents who selected more than one racial category are grouped under “Two or more races.” Comprising the largest share, three out of four respondents identify as White. Approximately 17 percent of respondents identify as Black or African American, which is higher than the general public, in which just 12.5 percent of Americans identify exclusively as Black or African American. Recall, this slightly oversized portion of Black respondents is intentional and the product of purposive oversampling of the online panel. Also of note, the sample contains just 1.5 percent of respondents who identify exclusively as Asian, which is lower than the 6.1 percent represented in the general public. In contrast, the survey sample is higher in its proportion of multi-racial respondents (4.2 percent) compared to the U.S. general public (1.7 percent).

Table 4. With which race(s) do you identify?

Race		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
White alone	75.7	78.2
Black or African American alone	17.3	12.5
American Indian and Alaska Native alone	1.1	1.1
Asian alone	1.5	6.1
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone	0.2	0.4
Two or more races	4.2	1.7
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017)

Table 5 combines the race and Hispanic ethnicity responses to gain a sense of the overall racial and ethnic composition of the sample. Constituting the largest portion of the sample, three out of five respondents identify as non-Hispanic White. An additional fifteen percent of

respondents identify as Hispanic/Latino and White. The “Multiracial/ethnic and other race” category combines the American Indian and Native Hawaiian racial categories as well as all multi-racial respondents from Table 4, including respondents who identified as Hispanic in combination with any race category other than “White.” This grouping accounts for six percent of the sample.

Table 5. Race and Hispanic ethnicity combined.

Race and Ethnicity Combined	
	<i>Sample %</i>
White, non-Hispanic	60.5
Hispanic/Latinx, White	15.2
Black and African American	16.9
Asian	1.5
Multiracial/ethnic and other race	6.0
	100

Gender

Approximately two-thirds of the respondents in the sample identify as female, whereas just over half of the population is female. Gender was not set as a quota in recruiting the sample, and as a result, there is a higher percentage of female respondents. See Table 6 for precise figures.

Table 6. What is your gender identity?

Gender		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Male	34.1	48.4
Female	65.9	51.6
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey
(U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017)

Marital Status

Among the sample respondents, approximately half are married, which is comparable to the proportion who are married in the population. Approximately one-third (34.4%) of the sample has never been married, which is slightly higher than the population parameter (28.5%). Comprising the third largest proportion of respondents, approximately one in ten persons are divorced, which is consistent with the population parameter. Combined, widowed and separated respondents make up approximately five percent of the sample. See Table 7 for reference.

Table 7. Marital status.

Marital Status		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Married	51.1	53.0
Widowed	3.6	6.1
Divorced	9.5	10.4
Separated	1.5	2.0
Never married	34.4	28.5
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).

Socioeconomic Status

To capture the socioeconomic makeup of the sample, respondents were asked about their education, their employment status, and their annual household income. As seen in Table 8, the sample is more highly educated across degrees than the U.S. general public. While two in five adult Americans (39.9%) have completed up to a high school degree, just one in five sample respondents (20.2%) report this level of education. Following this trend, approximately 27 percent of the sample has earned a four-year degree while 20 percent of the U.S. general public has. Finally, a combined sixteen percent of the sample has earned a post-graduate degree compared to 11.4 percent of the population earning this level of post-graduate education.

Table 8. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Education		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Less than high school	1.4	11.0
High school degree	18.8	28.9
Some college	24.8	18.9
2-year degree	12.0	9.8
4-year degree	26.9	20.0
Master's degree	11.8	8.4
Professional degree	2.8	1.3
Doctorate	1.4	1.7
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).

Despite the higher level of education held across the sample, the employment status is fairly comparable between the sample respondents and U.S. general public. For example, 42 percent of the sample is employed full-time compared to 46 percent in the population. An additional 12.5 percent of the sample works part-time, which is consistent with the 12 percent working part-time in the population. Approximately five percent of the sample report being students, which is nearly double the proportion of students in the population. For all categories and percentages, see

Table 9 below.

Table 9. Employment status.

Employment Status		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Working fulltime	42.8	46.1
Working part-time	12.5	12.0
Unemployed looking for work	4.4	4.1
Unemployed not looking for work	2.2	2.0
Retired	17.7	20.0
Student	5.3	2.7
Homemaker	9.5	9.9
Disabled	5.1	-- ³
Other	0.5	3.1
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from General Social Survey 2016 (NORC at the University of Chicago 2016).

Despite the sample holding higher educational attainment and having comparable employment status compared to the population, sample respondents report lower household income than the U.S. general public. As seen in

³ This employment category was not available in the GSS.

Table 10 below, nearly half (47.1%) of the sample has an annual income below \$50,000 compared to just under 40 percent of the population reporting this income level. Most strikingly, over 30 percent of the population reports a household income over \$100,000 whereas less than 18 percent of the sample reports this level of income. In considering an explanation for this gap in earnings between the sample and population, the younger age of the sample may account for part of this disparity as the sample respondents simply have yet to reach their peak earning potential.

Table 10. What was your total household income from all sources last year before taxes?

Income		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Less than \$30,000	25.0	22.9
\$30,000 - \$49,999	22.1	16.8
\$50,000 - \$69,999	18.9	13.9
\$70,000 - \$99,999	16.5	15.6
\$100,000 +	17.6	30.8
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).

Region

To gain a sense of the geographic spread of the sample, respondents were asked to provide the state in which they live. This information has been recoded into the four regions defined by the U.S. Census Bureau: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Approximately one-quarter of the sample is from the Northeast, which is higher than the 17.8% of the population that resides there. Additionally, the sample has slightly fewer respondents from the South (32.0%) than is representative of the population (37.8%). In representing the Midwest and West, the sample is highly comparable to the population. Specific figures can be found in Table 11.

Table 11. Region.

Region		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Northeast	24.5	17.8
Midwest	19.1	20.8
South	32.0	37.8
West	24.4	23.8
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017)

Religious Affiliation and Practices

As discussed in Chapter 2, religious behavior and intensity have been shown to have an impact on tolerance toward other religions. Typically, the more intensely an individual identifies

with their religious belief or practice, independent of specific affiliation, the less favorable their sentiments are toward “exotic” or unfamiliar religions (Ciftci et al. 2015; Putnam et al. 2012). In preparation for examining that relationship further in the upcoming results chapters, this section presents some of the basic religious measures captured in the survey, including religious affiliation, fundamentalism, Evangelicalism, and religiosity.

Religious Affiliation

To begin, respondents were asked about their religious affiliation in a series of questions, and the aggregate of their responses can be seen in

Table 12 and Table 13. The vast majority of the sample, like the U.S. population, is Christian. Comprising the largest affiliation, slightly less than half of the sample identifies as Protestant (Table 13 provides a further breakdown of this group by specific denominations), which closely matches the percentage of Protestant affiliation in the general public. An additional quarter of the sample identifies as Catholic, which is slightly higher than the one-fifth of the U.S. public who identify as Catholic. Individuals who do not identify with any religion make up the third largest group, which accounts for approximately one-fifth of the sample. These religious “nones” include, though are not limited to, self-identified atheists and agnostics. The remaining affiliations make up much smaller portions of the sample, with Jewish (3.4%) and Mormon (1.9%) individuals representing the fourth and fifth largest affiliations.

Table 12. What is your religious preference?

Religious Affiliation		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Protestant	46.3	47.0
Catholic	24.5	20.8
Jewish	3.4	1.9
Mormon	1.9	1.6
Buddhist	1.2	0.7
Eastern Orthodox	0.4	0.5
Pagan or Wiccan	0.4	--
Jehovah's Witness	0.2	0.8
Hindu	0.1	0.7
Muslim	-- ⁴	0.9
Miscellaneous other	1.1	2.3
No religious affiliation	20.6	22.8
	100	100

U.S. general public data from Religious Landscape Study (Pew Research Center 2015a).

Among the half of the respondents who indicated they were Protestant, Baptists represent the single largest denomination with 26.3 percent of Protestant respondents. However, the largest grouping within the Protestant affiliation is Interdenominational or Nondenominational Christian, accounting for 30 percent of the subsample. An additional quarter of Protestant respondents identify as either Methodist (10.1%), Pentecostal (8.8%), or Lutheran (8.4%). The full list of denominations/affiliations and percentages can be seen in Table 13 below. Due to the small size within the sample of several of the religious traditions (e.g., Judaism, Mormonism), religious affiliation was not used as a measure in the multivariate analysis. It is shown here strictly to provide a sense of the general composition of the sample.

⁴ Recall, this study's sample only includes non-Muslim Americans, thus this category is empty.

Table 13. With which Christian tradition do you identify?

Protestant Affiliation	
	<i>Sample %⁵ (n=513)</i>
Baptist	26.3
Methodist	10.1
Pentecostal	8.8
Lutheran	8.4
Presbyterian	5.1
Episcopalian/Anglican	3.9
Adventist	0.6
Church of Christ	0.4
Evangelical	0.4
Church of Nazarene	0.4
Church of God	0.2
Congregationalist	0.2
United Church of Christ	0.2
Wesleyan Church	0.2
Inter/Non-denominational Christian	30.0
Just Protestant	0.8
Just Christian	1.0
Other, miscellaneous Christian	0.4
Don't know/Decline to answer	2.7
	100

Fundamentalism

Following the same coding approach used to construct the religious fundamentalism variable in the General Social Survey⁶, a fundamentalism variable was created using the sample data. As seen in Fundamentalism is used as an independent variable in Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 14 , approximately one-third of respondents were classified as “liberal,” approximately a quarter classified as “fundamentalist,” and the remaining 44.6 percent classified as “moderate.” These proportions roughly match the variation of fundamentalism among the

⁵ Percentages reflect the specific tradition among the subset (46.3%) of respondents who reported they identified with Christianity/Protestantism in an earlier question. These percentages are not reflective of the entire sample.

⁶ For a detailed discussion of this coding process, see “Classifying Protestant Denominations” (Smith 1987).

U.S. general public. Fundamentalism is used as an independent variable in Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 14. Religious fundamentalism.

Fundamentalism		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Liberal	32.3	33.2
Moderate	44.6	41.5
Fundamentalist	23.1	25.3
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).

Evangelicalism

Previous research shows evangelical Protestants often hold exclusivist beliefs, meaning they consider other religious traditions' beliefs and practices to be incompatible with their own and ultimately false in their proclamations. This dynamic functions in part through strong in-group social relationships that reinforce out-group boundaries, which enables exclusivist worldviews and minimizes the chance of interfaith dialogue or concessions (Trinitapoli 2007:455). To evaluate Evangelicalism in this study, respondents who identified as Christian were asked the following question: "Would you describe yourself as a 'born-again' or evangelical Christian?" Among all respondents, approximately one-quarter describe themselves as Evangelical. This proportion is comparable to the general U.S. public, as seen in Table 15. Evangelicalism serves as an independent variable in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 analysis.

Table 15. Would you describe yourself as a 'born-again' or evangelical Christian?

Evangelicalism		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Evangelical	26.2	25.4
Non-Evangelical Christian	42.8	45.2
Non-Christian	31.0	29.4
	100	100

U.S. general public data from Religious Landscape Study (Pew Research Center 2015a).

Religiosity

Simply put, religiosity refers to the intensity of one's religious orientation. This term aims to capture the wide range of religious experience, including one's beliefs, practices, and importance placed on religion. Religiosity is a particularly useful concept as it allows a researcher to analyze the impact of religion, which can be widely multifaceted, in a single composite measure. For this study, a composite religiosity scale was created using five separate variables: religious service attendance, religious group participation, prayer, reading holy text, and expressed importance of religion. These measures were selected in an attempt to create a religiosity scale that is broadly applicable to religious adherents both within and outside of Christianity, though some of these measures still favor a typical congregation-centric tradition. Each of the five component measures, which were asked of all respondents who indicated having some religious affiliation, are presented in

Table 16 on the following page.

To measure religious service attendance, respondents were asked how frequently they typically attend religious services outside of weddings and funerals. Approximately one-quarter of these respondents reported attending a religious service once a week, with an additional 7.6 percent reporting regular attendance more than once a week. About one in five respondents reported they seldom attend services, and about one in seven respondents reported they never attend religious services.

As another indicator of religiosity, respondents were asked how often they participate in prayer groups, scripture study groups, religious education programs, or any other religiously affiliated program. Over one-third of respondents never attend these types of religious groups, and another quarter report only seldom attending these groups. Approximately 15 percent of respondents say they attend this type of programming at least monthly.

Table 16. Component indicators of religiosity.

Religiosity Indicators	
	<i>Sample %⁷</i>
<i>Frequency of religious service attendance</i>	
Never	14.3
Seldom	22.2
A few times per year	17.9
Once or twice a month	12.8
Once a week	25.1
More than once a week	7.6
<i>Organized religious group participation (religious education programs, scripture study groups, etc.)</i>	
Never	38.8
Seldom	26.9
A few times per year	11.9
Once or twice a month	7.6
At least once a week	14.7
<i>Frequency of prayer</i>	
Never	6.3
Seldom	11.1
A few times a month	8.1
Once a week	3.1
A few times a week	14.4
Once a day	23.8
Multiple times per day	32.1
Question not applicable to my religion	1.2
<i>Frequency of reading scripture</i>	
Never	24.3
Seldom	26.4
A few times per year	11.9
Once or twice a month	9.3
At least once a week	26.6
Question not applicable to my religion	1.5
<i>Importance of religion in daily life</i>	
Not at all important	7.9
Slightly important	17.3
Moderately important	20.0
Very important	23.4
Extremely important	31.4

⁷ These questions were only asked of respondents who indicated they identified with a religious tradition (77.2%) in an earlier question.

Serving as a more private indicator of religious practice, respondents were asked how often they typically pray. Over half of the respondents report praying daily, with approximately one-quarter praying once a day and one-third praying multiple times per day. Just 6.3 percent of religiously affiliated respondents report never praying.

As another indicator of private religious practice, respondents were asked how often they read scripture or other holy text outside of religious services. Approximately one-quarter of respondents report reading scripture at least once a week, while an additional 50 percent report seldom (26.4%) or never (24.3%) reading scripture. A small portion of respondents (1.5%) did indicate that this question was not applicable to their religion. The final indicator included in this study's measure of religiosity is the respondent's sense of the importance of religion in their daily life. Over half of the respondents described religion as either extremely (31.4%) or very (23.4%) important. Just eight percent report religion as not at all important in their daily life.

As noted, these indicators were combined into a composite measure of religiosity, with values ranging from 0 to 28. Respondents who had indicated that they did not have any religious affiliation were coded as "0" on the religiosity measure. By expanding this composite measure to include the absence of religiosity as its lowest point on the scale, the measure can better speak to the impact of religiosity on the respondent's sentiments toward Islam and Muslims. On this scale, the mean is 13.5, and the median is 15.0. The standard deviation is 9.0.

Though religiosity is analyzed as a continuous measure in the multivariate analysis in later chapters, a collapsed version of this scale is presented in Table 17 below to provide a general sense of the distribution within the sample. Approximately one-fourth of the sample holds high religiosity, with an additional 30 percent expressing moderate religiosity. Approximately one in five respondents are classified as having no religiosity as they are not

religiously affiliated. Religiosity is included as a continuous independent measure in the multivariate analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 17. Religiosity.

Religiosity	
	<i>Sample %</i>
None	21.3
Low	23.4
Moderate	30.2
High	25.1
	100

Political Preferences

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, political preference, like religiosity, has a demonstrated relationship with attitudes toward Muslims and Islam (Pew Research Center 2014a; Poushter 2015). In order to analyze the impact of political preference with greater variation and nuance, this analysis examines political ideology.

Political Ideology

A combined one-third of respondents classify their political ideological as conservative-leaning. Specifically, seven percent considering their ideology “extremely conservative,” and an additional 16.7% “conservative” and 10.2% “slightly conservative.” This combined proportion of conservative-leaning ideology is comparable to the U.S. general public, though within this subgroup of the population, there are fewer Americans who classify themselves as “extremely conservative” and instead there are more “slightly conservative” than is in the sample. The percentage of individuals who identify as “moderate” is higher in the population (37.4%) than in the sample (30.0%). Finally, there is a higher proportion of liberal-leaning individuals in the sample than is representative of the population. Among sample respondents, a combined 36.1

percent report liberal-leaning ideology, whereas this subset comprises a combined 28.8 percent in the U.S. general public. See Table 18 for reference. Political ideology is used as an independent variable for analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 18. Using the following scale, what is your political ideology?

Political Ideology		
	<i>Sample %</i>	<i>U.S. General Public %</i>
Extremely liberal	9.7	4.9
Liberal	18.5	12.7
Slightly liberal	7.9	11.2
Moderate	30.0	37.4
Slightly conservative	10.2	13.9
Conservative	16.7	15.5
Extremely conservative	7.0	4.4
	100	100

Source of U.S. general public data from General Social Survey 2016 (NORC at the University of Chicago 2016).

Voting Practices and Preferences in 2016 Presidential Election

In addition to political ideology, respondents were asked about their preferences in the 2016 presidential election. Though voting practices were not used in the analysis for Chapters 4 and 5, the voting information is still presented here to provide additional background and insight on the sample. As seen in Table 19, approximately seven out of eight respondents report voting for a presidential candidate in the election.

Table 19. Did you vote for a presidential candidate in the general election?

Voted in 2016 General Election	
	<i>Sample %</i>
No	12.7
Yes	87.3
	100

This figure is markedly higher than the national 61.4% voter turnout recorded for the 2016 election (Krogstad and Lopez 2017). A number of factors may explain the sample's

reported higher voting rate. The demographic makeup of the sample could account for part of the higher turnout as this sample has a higher proportion of women and is more educated than the general public, both of which tend to increase likelihood of voting. Additionally, despite the online self-administered format of the survey, it is possible that the respondents answered under the effect of social desirability bias and reported that they voted even if they did not in actuality.

Among those respondents who indicated they voted in the election, half (51.1%) voted for Hillary Clinton. Slightly more than a third (38.3%) voted for Donald Trump. An additional eight percent voted for third-party candidates. See Table 20 for reference.

Table 20. Who did you vote for?

Respondent voted for...	
	<i>Sample %⁸ (n=967)</i>
Hillary Clinton	51.1
Donald Trump	38.3
Gary Johnson	5.3
Jill Stein	2.6
Other	2.8
	100

In addition to whom they voted for, respondents were asked the primary reason they voted for that particular candidate. These results are presented in Table 21. Among the Clinton voters, nearly 40 percent said they supported her and agreed with her platforms, which was the number one response. Over a quarter of these respondents said their primary reason they voted for Clinton was because they did not want Trump to win, and an additional quarter said their primary reason was Clinton's qualifications.

⁸ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they voted in the election. Percentages in this table reflect this subset of respondents, *not* representative of entire sample.

Among Trump voters, the number one reason was also based in support and agreement with his political platforms (40.3%). Another quarter voted for Trump because they did not want Clinton to win. An additional 14.1 percent said the primary reason was that they thought Trump was the most likely candidate to address their concerns. One in ten respondents voted for Trump primarily because they wanted a non-politician to assume the office. See Table 21 for the full range of responses and specific percentages.

Table 21. What is the primary reason that you voted for Clinton/Trump?

Reason R voted for...	
<i>Hillary Clinton</i>	<i>Sample %⁹ (n=494)</i>
I supported Clinton and agreed with most of her political platforms	38.3
I did not want Trump to win	27.3
I felt she was the most qualified candidate	25.7
I wanted the Democratic Party to win	9.5
I wanted to elect a female president	1.6
Other	0.2
<i>Donald Trump</i>	<i>Sample %¹⁰ (n=370)</i>
I supported Trump and agreed with most of his political platforms	40.3
I did not want Clinton to win	27.6
I thought Trump was the most likely candidate to address my concerns	14.1
I wanted a non-political to win in order to change the political status quo	11.1
I wanted the Republican Party to win	6.5
Other	0.5

⁹ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they voted for Hillary Clinton. Percentages in this table reflect this subset of respondents, *not* representative of entire sample.

¹⁰ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they voted for Donald Trump. Percentages in this table reflect this subset of respondents, *not* representative of entire sample.

Satisfaction with Presidential Performance

Regardless of voting behavior, all respondents were asked their level of satisfaction with Trump's performance since he took office. As a reminder, survey responses were collected in late March of 2017, so he had only been in office for just over two months at the time that these responses were recorded. Comprising the largest portion of the sample, over 40 percent (43.7%) express being "extremely dissatisfied." An additional combined fifteen percent report either moderate dissatisfaction (9.6%) or slight dissatisfaction (5.7%). Conversely, one in ten respondents expressed extreme satisfaction, and an additional 20 percent reporting either moderate (12.7%) or slight (8.7%) satisfaction. As shown in Table 22, just 7.8 percent of respondents reported being "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" and approximately two percent said they had not been following Trump's performance closely enough to have an opinion. This measure is included as an independent variable for analysis in both Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 22. How satisfied have you been with President Trump's performance since he took office January 20, 2017?

Satisfaction with Trump's performance in office	
	<i>Sample %</i>
Extremely dissatisfied	43.7
Moderately dissatisfied	9.6
Slightly dissatisfied	5.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	7.8
Slightly satisfied	8.7
Moderately satisfied	12.7
Extremely satisfied	9.9
I haven't been following his performance	1.9
	100

Support of Political Correctness

As an additional measure of political perspective, respondents were asked their general support of political correctness. First widely used in the 1940's by Socialists to describe Communists, political correctness has taken on its own meaning and significance in the context

of contemporary United States (Jones 1994:384). Today's vernacular is most consistent with use of the term beginning in the 1980's and 1990's in which political correctness is considered somewhat synonymous with cultural pluralism or multiculturalism. Consistent with the 1980's use of the term, Americans' understanding of the functioning and effect of political correctness is highly partisan. Generally, "left of center" Americans consider political correctness key to achieving equality for all individuals, across categories such as race, gender, and religion, through the use of inclusive and accommodating language. In contrast, "right of center" Americans consider the concept to be "authoritarian [rather] than egalitarian," resulting in an infringement on one's right to freedom of expression and honest discussion (Jones 1994:384). Further, the concept of political correctness has become enmeshed in political rhetoric, functioning as either a standard for equality or a barrier to problem-solving and resolution. In this analysis, political correctness will be measured alongside other political covariates to assess the extent to which the concept captures an additional effect beyond partisan ideology.

Table 23 presents the frequency of responses to the question: "We hear a lot today about 'political correctness' in political speech and in everyday life. Generally, how do you view political correctness?"

Table 23. General View of Political Correctness

View of Political Correctness	
	<i>Sample %</i>
Very negatively	18.4
Somewhat negatively	18.7
Neither negatively nor positively	18.4
Somewhat positively	9.6
Very positively	4.2
It just depends on context	26.6
No opinion	4.1
	100

Approximately one-third view the concept either very negatively or somewhat negatively. Just 13.8% of respondents view political correctness either very or somewhat positively. Approximately one-quarter of respondents consider the appropriateness of political correctness to depend on the context. To capture general support of political correctness, this measure is included as an independent variable in the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

Attention to Current Events and Media Consumption

To further understand the behavior and perspectives of sample participants, respondents were asked about their level of engagement in following current events and the media they access as sources of said information. When interpreting the tables on media sources, it is important to note that respondents were able to select multiple answer choices. As a result, the corresponding percentages in those tables reflect *percent of cases* and will therefore not total 100 percent.

American Public Affairs

Addressing one broad area of current events, respondents were asked how often they follow news on American government and public affairs. The vast majority of respondents follow these events at least some of the time.

Table 24. How often would you say you follow what's going on in American government and public affairs?

Frequency of following American public affairs	
	<i>Sample %</i>
Not at all	3.7
Seldom	7.4
Some of the time	28.5
Most of the time	33.0
Daily	27.5
	100

As seen in Table 24, approximately one-quarter follow American public affairs daily, an additional third follow “most of the time,” and about 30 percent follow “some of the time.” This measure is included as an independent variable in the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 25. Media consumption when following American government and public affairs

Media consumption for American public affairs	
	<i>% of cases</i> ¹¹
<i>Sources for information</i> ¹²	
Broadcast and cable news (TV or radio)	79.8
Social media	49.2
News and political websites	48.4
Newspapers/magazines (including online editions)	44.3
Hearing second-hand from others around me	25.4
<i>Broadcast/cable news followed</i> ¹³	
ABC	47.7
NBC	44.9
CNN	42.5
Fox News	42.4
CBS	41.3
<i>News and political websites followed</i> ¹⁴	
Huffington Post	63.0
Buzzfeed	37.2
“Other”	22.8
Breitbart	9.0
Al Jazeera	8.3
<i>Newspapers/magazines followed</i> ¹⁵	
The New York Times	49.8
The Washington Post	43.4
USA Today	40.8
The Wall Street Journal	30.1
New York Post	20.7

¹¹ Respondents were able to select multiples choices for each of the questions below, so the percentages reflect *percent of cases* and do not add up to 100 (they will exceed 100%). Further, only the top five selected answers for each question are included in this table. The full frequencies can be found in the appendix.

¹² This question was only asked of respondents who reported they followed American government and public affairs with a frequency of at least “seldom” or more frequently.

¹³ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they used broadcast/cable news to follow American government and public affairs.

¹⁴ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they used news and political websites to follow American government and public affairs.

¹⁵ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they used newspapers or magazines to follow American government and public affairs.

Among the 96.3 percent of respondents who follow American public affairs with at least some level of frequency, four out of five follow broadcast and cable news to access this information. Additionally, half of these respondents use social media to follow public affairs, and half access news and political websites for this purpose. Approximately 45 percent of these respondents read newspapers and magazines to keep up with American public affairs, and one quarter keep up with current events through second-hand accounts. See Table 25 on the previous page for reference.

Of the 80 percent of respondents who use broadcast or cable news to follow American public affairs, nearly half watch ABC. NBC is the second most viewed broadcast news station with 44.9 percent of respondents watching it. CNN and Fox News each have approximately 42.5 percent of respondents as viewers, and CBS is watched by 41.3 percent of respondents when they are following American public affairs.

Among the half of respondent (48.4%) who access news and political websites to follow current events, nearly two-thirds read *Huffington Post*. Additionally, over one-third get their news from *Buzzfeed*. Over 20 percent of respondents indicated a different website not included in the provided categories,¹⁶ which suggests a wide range of sites are regularly used to keep up with American current events. The next most widely accessed website is *Breitbart* with 9.0% of respondents using this site, and 8.3% of respondents follow *Al Jazeera*.

Lastly, among the 44.3 percent of respondents who read newspapers and magazines to keep up with American public affairs, the *New York Times* is the most widely read with half of the respondents indicating this newspaper. Approximately 40 percent of respondents read each the *Washington Post* and/or the *USA Today*. Thirty percent of respondents read the *Wall Street*

¹⁶ The complete list of provided categories can be found in the full questionnaire in the appendix.

Journal, followed by twenty percent who read the *New York Post*. See Table 25 above for reference. These sources are included as independent variables in the multivariate analysis for Chapters 4 and 5.

International Public Affairs

Extending the focus globally, respondents were asked how often they follow international public affairs. Approximately 16 percent of respondents follow international public affairs daily, an additional 30 percent follow “most of the time,” and a third of respondents follow “some of the time.” See Table 26 below for specific percentages and the full range of response categories. This measure serves as an independent variable in the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 26. How often would you say you follow what's going on in international public affairs?

Frequency of following international public affairs	
	<i>Sample %</i>
Not at all	5.8
Seldom	15.5
Some of the time	33.6
Most of the time	29.0
Daily	16.1
	100

Respondents who indicated following international public affairs with at least some frequency were then asked to select all of the sources from they get this information. Table 27 presents the top five sources. Three-quarters of respondents follow broadcast or cable news. Social media is the next most widely used source for information on international affairs with 40.5 percent of respondents, followed very closely by news and political websites (40.2%). Over a third of respondents read newspapers and magazines for information on global events, and 17.7 percent learn about these events through second-hand information.

Table 27. From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply).

Sources for information on international public affairs¹⁷	
	<i>% of cases¹⁸</i>
Broadcast and cable news (TV or radio)	75.4
Social media	40.5
News and political websites	40.2
Newspapers/magazines (including online editions)	38.0
Hearing second-hand from others around me	17.7

Awareness of Islam and Familiarity with Muslims

Like most negative sentiments based in prejudice, research shows that accurate knowledge of and personal connection to a group decreases likelihood of maintaining negative stereotypes (Pew Research Center 2014a, 2005). To examine this effect within our study, respondents were asked about their knowledge of Islam as well as any personal connections they may have to Muslims.

Knowledge of Islam

For this measure, respondents were asked about their familiarity with Islam’s religious traditions and beliefs. It is important to stress that this measure is purely a self-assessment, and it’s possible that some respondents who report they are “extremely familiar” do not actually possess accurate information on Islam. With that in mind, over a quarter of respondents report they are “not familiar at all” with Islam. A combined 62 percent of respondents report being either “slightly” or “moderately” familiar. Just one in 10 respondents assert they are “very” or

¹⁷ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they followed international public affairs with a frequency of at least “seldom” or more frequently.

¹⁸ Respondents were able to select multiples choices for this question, so the percentages reflect *percent of cases* and do not add up to 100 (they will exceed 100%). Further, only the top five selected answers are included in this table. The full frequencies can be found in the appendices.

“extremely” familiar with Islam and its teachings. See Table 28 below for reference. This measure is included as an independent variable in the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 28. How familiar are you with Islam's religious traditions and beliefs?

Familiarity with Islam	
	<i>Sample %</i>
Not familiar at all	27.0
Slightly familiar	37.5
Moderately familiar	24.7
Very familiar	7.3
Extremely familiar	3.4
	100

Among the 73 percent of respondents who reported being at least “slightly” familiar with Islam, half gained this information through personal readings and research. Forty-five percent of these respondents learned about Islam through the news. Approximately one-third have learned about Islam through personal relationships with a Muslim. Approximately one-quarter of respondents gained their awareness of Islam in school, and nearly 19 percent have learned about Islam through social media. It is important to recognize that many of these sources of information are vulnerable to a biased presentation of Islam, particularly personal readings and research, the news, and social media. These sources serve to reassert the point that this self-assessment of familiarity with Islam needs to be considered with these limitations in mind.

Table 29. Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply).

Sources of information on Islam ¹⁹	
	% of cases ²⁰
Personal reading/research	50.0
In the news	45.5
Personal acquaintance with Muslim(s)	31.3
In school	28.7
Social media	18.7

Personal Familiarity with Muslims

As an additional metric of awareness of Muslims and Islam, respondents were asked if they personally knew any Muslims. As seen in Among the 44 percent of respondents who do personally know a Muslim, approximately 75 percent know them either “moderately” or “very” well. The most common way in which these respondents personally know a Muslim is through personal friendship. Forty percent of respondents know Muslims through their work, and approximately one-third of respondent know Muslims from their neighborhood. One-quarter of respondents have met a Muslim through school, and 22 percent know Muslims through mutual friends. Among the 56 percent of respondents who do not personally know a Muslim, less than a third even know of any Muslims in their workplace, neighborhood, broader community, etc. In other words, approximately one third of the total sample has no personal or impersonal knowledge of Muslims in their daily life. See **Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.** on the following page for reference.

¹⁹ This question was only asked of respondents who reported at least “slightly” familiarity or higher with Islam.

²⁰ Respondents were able to select multiples choices for this question, so the percentages reflect *percent of cases* and do not add up to 100 (they will exceed 100%). Further, only the top five selected answers are included in this table. The full frequencies can be found in the appendices.

Table 30, the majority of respondents (56.0%) do not personally know any Muslims. This measure serves as an independent variable in the multivariate analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

Among the 44 percent of respondents who do personally know a Muslim, approximately 75 percent know them either “moderately” or “very” well. The most common way in which these respondents personally know a Muslim is through personal friendship. Forty percent of respondents know Muslims through their work, and approximately one-third of respondent know Muslims from their neighborhood. One-quarter of respondents have met a Muslim through school, and 22 percent know Muslims through mutual friends. Among the 56 percent of respondents who do not personally know a Muslim, less than a third even know of any Muslims in their workplace, neighborhood, broader community, etc. In other words, approximately one third of the total sample has no personal or impersonal knowledge of Muslims in their daily life. See **Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.** on the following page for reference.

Table 30. Personal familiarity with Muslims

Personal familiarity with Muslims	
<i>Do you personally know any Muslims?</i>	<i>Sample %</i>
Yes	44.0
No	56.0
	100
<i>Of the Muslim(s) you know best, how well do you know them?</i>	% ²¹ (n=480)
Not well at all	27.5
Moderately well	54.8
Very well	17.7
	100
<i>From where did you meet the Muslim(s) you know?</i>	% of cases ²² (n=480)
Personal friend	42.5
Work	41.2
Neighborhood	29.5
School	25.4
Friend of a friend	22.1
<i>Do you know of any Muslims in your community, neighborhood, work, etc.?</i>	% ²³ (n=532)
Yes	31.6
No	68.4
	100

Frames and Counter-Frames

This final section discusses the construction of the frame and counter-frame measures and presents their representation in the sample. In this study, scales were created to capture the range of sentiments each frame and counter-frame represents. The specific indicators for each scale are

²¹ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they did personally know a Muslim. These percentages are reflective of this subset of respondent, *not* representative of the entire sample.

²² This question was only asked of respondents who reported they did personally know a Muslim. Respondents were able to select multiples choices, so the percentages reflect *percent of cases* and do not add up to 100 (they will exceed 100%). Further, only the top five selected answers for each question are included in this table. The full frequencies can be found in the appendices.

²³ This question was only asked of respondents who reported they did *not* personally know any Muslims. These percentages are reflective of this subset of respondent, *not* representative of the entire sample.

discussed in detail in the following subsections. As a final overall comment on the frame and counter-frame composite measures, these six scales are central to the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5, but their analytical role shifts between these chapters. Chapter 4 examines the demographic and behavioral characteristics that predict expression of a given frame/counter-frame, thus, the frame and counter-frame measures function as dependent variables in that chapter. Shifting focus, Chapter 5 examines the relative impact that these frame/counter-frames have in predicting opinions on policy and social inclusion regarding Muslims and Islam, so in this chapter, the frames and counter-frames serve as independent variables.

Frame 1

Recall, Frame 1 refers to the perspective that Muslims are likely to be terrorists and Islam incites violence; therefore, proponents of this frame view Muslims and Islam as a potential threat to national security. Five items were used to create the Frame 1 scale, which are listed below.

- *Do you think the profiling of Muslims is justified? Yes, because it is often Muslims who are the perpetrators of terrorist attacks*
- *What values of Islam are the most incompatible with the US? Islamic jihad*
- *Islam, more so than other religions, encourages violence: Somewhat agree, Agree, Strongly Agree*
- *International Islamic extremist groups are a major threat to the US: Agree, Strongly Agree*
- *Islamic radicalization occurring within the US is a major threat: Agree, Strongly Agree*

Because some of these items were weighted more heavily than others in scale construction, the scale values range from 0 to 7²⁴. A value of 0 on this scale indicates no expression of Frame 1, and a 7 indicates the highest level of expression of Frame 1. The scale's sample mean is 2.24. The sample median is 2.0, with an IQR of 4. The standard deviation is

²⁴ For the specific scoring used to construct the Frame 1 scale, see Appendix B.

2.16. Among respondents, 72.3% expressed some level of this frame. The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is .704.

Counter-Frame 1

As a reminder, Counter-Frame 1 captures the perspective that Islam and Muslims are generally peaceful. This counter-frame views Muslim terrorists as extremists and unrepresentative of the majority of Muslims and of Islam as a religion. Three items were used to create the Counter-Frame 1 scale, which are listed below.

- *Islam, more so than other religions, encourages violence: Disagree, Strongly Disagree*
- *The vast majority of Muslims are peaceful: Somewhat Agree, Agree, Strongly Agree*
- *Islamic terrorist attacks are the product of a small number of radical groups, which are not representative of all of Islam*

Because some of these items were weighted more heavily than others in scale construction, the scale values range from 0 to 6²⁵. A value of 0 on this scale indicates no expression of Counter-Frame 1, and a 6 indicates the highest level of expression of Counter-Frame 1. The sample mean is 2.23, with a standard deviation of 1.87. The sample median is 2.0, with an IQR of 3. Among respondents, 79.2% expressed some level of this counter-frame. The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is .611.

Frame 2

Frame 2 refers to the neo-Orientalist view of Muslims as barbaric and uncivilized. This frame also considers Islam inherently anti-Democratic and antithetical to American culture. Six items were used to create the Frame 2 scale, and they are listed below.

²⁵ For the specific scoring used to construct the Counter-Frame 1 scale, see Appendix B.

- *To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs? Not at all compatible, Only a little compatible*
- *To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values? Not at all compatible, Only a little compatible*
- *What values of Islam are the most incompatible with the US? Most Islamic societies are too backwards in terms of tradition and customs*
- *What values of Islam are the most incompatible with the US? So few Muslim-majority countries are democracies—there's little evidence Islam could be compatible with democracy*
- *Islamic terrorist attacks are representative of a major clash between Islam and Western Civilization*
- *Why do you think Islam cannot be practiced fully in the United States? Because Islamic values conflict with American values*

Because some of these items were weighted more heavily than others in scale construction, the scale values range from 0 to 8²⁶. Among respondents, 56.4% expressed some level of this frame. The sample mean is 1.73, with a standard deviation of 2.07. The sample median is 1.0, and the IQR is 3. The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is .604.

Counter-Frame 2

Recall, Counter-Frame 2 rejects the notion of Islam as antithetical to American values. Instead, Counter-Frame 2 draws on the American multiculturalism narrative, which promotes diversity and accommodates cultural distinction in conjunction with social inclusion. Five items were used to create the Counter-Frame 2 scale, and they are listed below.

- *Muslim immigrants are fine in the US without needing to assimilate*
- *To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs? Mostly compatible, Completely compatible*
- *To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values? Mostly compatible, Completely compatible*
- *Muslims can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life in the US*
- *Do you think the profiling of Muslims is justified? No, it is unfair to Muslims to target them because of their religion and/or ethnicity*

²⁶ For the specific scoring used to construct the Frame 2 scale, see Appendix B.

Because some of these items were weighted more heavily than others in scale construction, the scale values range from 0 to 7²⁷. Among respondents, 74.8% expressed some level of this counter-frame. The sample median is 1.0, with an IQR of 3. The sample mean is 1.95, and the standard deviation is 1.85. Finally, the Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is .757.

Frame 3

Frame 3 draws on the narrative of the U.S. as a Judeo-Christian nation, with Christian foundations that are integral to contemporary values and national identity. This perspective is critical of Islam as a religious institution in the context of the United States because it potentially challenges this notion and threatens to alter the American religious landscape. Five items were used to create the Frame 3 scale, and they are:

- *What values of Islam are the most incompatible with the US? America was founded on Christian ideals, and Islam is incompatible with those foundations*
- *Why do you think Islam cannot be practiced fully in the US? Because America is founded on and structure around Christian traditions*
- *To what extent do you think Islam has a lot in common with Christianity? Nothing in common*
- *How comfortable are you with a Muslim being a US citizen? Moderately uncomfortable, Extremely uncomfortable*
- *How comfortable are you with a Muslim as the US President? Moderately uncomfortable, Extremely uncomfortable*

Because some of these items were weighted more heavily than others in scale construction, the scale values range from 0 to 7²⁸. Within the sample, 48.3% of respondents expressed some level of Frame 3, thus, the median has a value of 0. The IQR is 2. The sample mean is 1.2, and the standard deviation is 1.59. The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is .643.

²⁷ For the specific scoring used to construct the Counter-Frame 2 scale, see Appendix B.

²⁸ For the specific scoring used to construct the Frame 3 scale, see Appendix B.

Counter-Frame 3

Counter-Frame 3 draws on the narrative of religious freedom, considered in this counter-frame to be foundational to American society and values. Based on that narrative, this counter-frame welcomes Islam and defends the right of Muslims to freely practice their religion without discrimination or additional scrutiny. Four items were used to create the Counter-Frame 3 scale.

- *The creation of a registry based on religion is a violation of freedom of religion as protected by the First Amendment*
- *Muslims can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life in the US*
- *Do you think the profiling of Muslims is justified? No, it is unfair to Muslims to target them because of their religion and/or ethnicity*
- *How comfortable are you with a Muslim as the US President? Moderately comfortable, Extremely comfortable*

Because some of these items were weighted more heavily than others in scale construction, the scale values range from 0 to 5²⁹. Within the sample, 75.7% of respondents expressed some level of Counter-Frame 3. The sample mean is 1.99, with a standard deviation of 1.68. The median is 2.0, with an IQR of 2. The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale is .448, which suggests slightly less cohesion among these items than occurred across the other scales.

Conclusion

In comparing our sample to the general U.S. public, there are a few discrepancies in demographic composition, though some of those characteristics (age, race/ethnicity, and political ideology) were intentionally sampled to increase variation. On average, the sample was slightly younger and had a notably higher percentage of females than is representative of the population. The sample did match the U.S. general public in terms of its Hispanic and White composition. However, the sample is slightly higher in African American representation and multiracial

²⁹ For the specific scoring used to construct the Counter-Frame 3 scale, see Appendix B.

representation, but there are fewer Asian individuals than is typical of the population. In terms of socioeconomic characteristics, the sample is more educated, comparable in employment status, but has lower annual income than the general population. There is also a higher proportion of respondents from the Northeast and slightly fewer from the South, but the sample is generally comparable geographically. While these variations exist and are worth discussing, they should not distract from the overall comparability of the sample. The vast majority of these discrepancies between the sample statistics and population parameters are within a few percentage points of one another, meaning the sample is by and large comparable to the general U.S. public.

This chapter also presented the religious background of the sample respondents. When looking at religious affiliation, the sample is comparable to the population, with the largest percentage of individuals identifying as Protestant, a quarter Catholic, and one fifth having no religious affiliation. The sample's compositions of religious fundamentalism and Evangelicalism are also comparable to the American public. Finally, a composite religiosity measure was constructed to capture the overall level of religious practice and sentiment among the respondents. This scale incorporates religious service attendance, religious group participation, frequency of prayer, reading of scripture/holy text, and reported importance of religion in daily life. This scale will be used in the analysis in the coming chapters.

Another key area of interest is the sample's political preference and civic behavior. A combined one-third of respondents classify their political ideology as conservative-leaning, which is comparable to the U.S. general public. The sample contains a higher proportion of liberal-leaning individuals than is representative of the population, while there are more self-described moderates in the population than are in the sample. Turning to the political behavior of

the respondents, a much higher percentage of the sample report voting (87.3%) in the 2016 election than the recorded national voter turnout (61.4%). This may indicate that the respondents are more civically engaged than the population, but it's also possible that respondents are appealing to a perceived social desirability of voting, resulting in artificially inflated self-reporting of voting practice. Additionally, the demographic variation in the sample (higher proportion of women and more highly educated) could contribute to the higher turnout of the sample. Likely, it is a combination of several of these factors that explain the reported higher turnout. Across the sample, respondents are generally dissatisfied with President Trump's performance since taking office. Comprising the largest portion of the sample, over 40 percent of respondents express being "extremely dissatisfied." Conversely, one in ten respondents expressed extreme satisfaction.

Respondents were asked not only about their opinions on current events but also on their level of engagement in following this news. The vast majority of respondents report following American public affairs at least some of the time. Approximately one-quarter follow these events daily, and a combined two-thirds follow either "most" or "some" of the time. Among those who follow American public affairs, four out of five follow broadcast and cable news to access this information. Additionally, half use social media to follow public affairs, and half also access news and political websites for this purpose. For following American current events, ABC is the most widely followed broadcast news source, *Huffington Post* is the most popular news or political website, and *The New York Times* is most popular newspaper among the sample. Turning the focus internationally, one in six respondents follows international public affairs daily, with an additional 30 percent following "most of the time," and a third following "some of the time."

As a self-assessed measure of knowledge of Islam, over one quarter of respondents reported they are “not familiar at all” with Islam’s traditions and teachings. A combined 62 percent of respondents reported being either “slightly” or “moderately” familiar. Just one in 10 respondents assert they are “very” or “extremely” familiar with Islam. Among the 73 percent of respondents who reported being at least “slightly” familiar with Islam, half report getting this information through personal readings and research. Forty-five percent of these respondents learned about Islam through the news. Approximately one-third have learned about Islam through personal relationships with a Muslim. Approximately one-quarter of respondents gained their awareness of Islam in school, and nearly 19 percent have learned about Islam through social media. It is important to caution that many of these sources are in a position to present a biased, or worse, factually inaccurate, portrayal of Islam, particularly personal readings and research, the news, and social media.

Examining personal familiarity with Muslims, the majority of respondents (56.0%) do not personally know any Muslims. And among this 56 percent, less than a third even knew of any Muslims in their communities. In other words, approximately one in three respondents across the entire sample has no personal or impersonal interaction with Muslims in their daily life. This lack of exposure to actual Muslims places even greater significance on the second-hand portrayals of Muslims that are presented online, in the news, and from presidential candidates. In the following chapter, we examine the predictors for expressing each frame and counter-frame.

CHAPTER FOUR: SAYS WHO? EXAMINING THE PREDICTIVE CHARACTERISTICS FOR EXPRESSING FRAMES AND COUNTER-FRAMES

The aim of this chapter is to examine the predictors for expressing the various frames and counter-frames outlined in Chapter 1. This chapter is organized by presenting the analysis for each frame and counter-frame one at a time, with six multivariate OLS regression models presented per frame/counter-frame. The first five of six models in each section assess the independent impact of thematically grouped sets of predictors. In the first model, religious predictors are analyzed against the frame/counter-frame dependent variable. In the second model, political predictors are analyzed. The third model examines the impact of media consumption on expressing a frame/counter-frame. The fourth model assesses the impact of familiarity with Islam. In the fifth model, standard demographics are analyzed against the frame/counter-frame. The sixth and final model combines the previous five sets of predictors in order to assess the durability and strength of each predictor.

Predicting Expression of Frame 1: Muslim as Terrorist/Islam as Violent

Religious Predictors

The religious predictors in this analysis include 6 variables: religiosity, Evangelicalism, fundamentalism, black*religiosity, Hispanic*religiosity, other*religiosity. These last three variables are product terms created to capture potential interaction effects between religiosity and race/ethnicity. When interpreting the findings, white-religiosity serves as the reference category for these three product term variables.

Table 31 presents the findings for the regression of religious predictors on Frame 1. Based on the adjusted R-squared, these predictors account for nearly 10% of variation in

expression of the terrorism frame. As expected from the literature (Ciftci et al. 2015; Poushter 2015; Putnam et al. 2012), religiosity has a positive and statistically significant relationship with expression of this frame. In addition, Evangelicalism has a positive and statistically significant relationship whereby identifying as an Evangelical increases the expression of Frame 1 by approximately .7 points on the “Muslim as terrorist” scale. The interaction terms of black-religiosity and Hispanic-religiosity both have statistically significant negative relationships with the terrorism frame. Meaning, relative to white Americans, black Americans express lower levels of Frame 1 as their religiosity increases. Likewise, as religiosity increases among Hispanic Americans, expression of Frame 1 decreases in comparison to rates of white Americans’ expression. Fundamentalism and the interactional term of “other” race-religiosity do not have statistical significance in predicting expression of the terrorism frame.

Table 31. Impact of Religion on Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.651	0.186		8.882	0.000
Religiosity	0.061	0.010	0.256	5.840	0.000
Evangelical	0.728	0.178	0.149	4.089	0.000
Fundamentalism	-0.101	0.119	-0.035	-0.850	0.395
Black*Religiosity	-0.068	0.011	-0.206	-6.283	0.000
Hispanic*Religiosity	-0.028	0.012	-0.072	-2.282	0.023
OtherR*Religiosity	-0.030	0.018	-0.051	-1.656	0.098

Dependent Variable: Frame- Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent; Adjusted R²=.099

Political Attitudes

Eleven political predictors are included in this model. Conservatism refers to self-identified political ideology, with low values indicating liberal political ideology. Trump approval refers to the level of satisfaction the respondent reported regarding President Trump’s

performance since assuming office. Support of political correctness refers to the respondent's general view of the concept, with high values indicating positive feelings toward political correctness. The remaining variables are all dichotomous, with a value of one indicating the respondent selected the topic as the most important/largest threat³⁰. The results of this model are presented below in Table 32.

Table 32. *Impact of Political Attitudes on Frame 1*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.103	0.303		3.641	0.000
Conservatism	0.120	0.051	0.098	2.361	0.018
Trump approval	0.262	0.039	0.275	6.730	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.238	0.064	-0.132	-3.720	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	0.424	0.165	0.089	2.567	0.010
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.394	0.160	0.081	2.457	0.014
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.368	0.235	0.051	1.568	0.117
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.118	0.150	-0.026	-0.788	0.431
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.379	0.211	0.064	1.800	0.072
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.403	0.188	-0.079	-2.148	0.032
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.458	0.149	0.105	3.080	0.002
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.028	0.191	0.005	0.147	0.884

Dependent Variable: Frame- Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent; Adjusted R²=.306

Together, the political predictors account for approximately 30% of the variation in expression of the terrorism frame. Consistent with expectations from the literature (Belt 2016; Pew Research Center 2014a; Poushter 2015), both conservatism and approval of Trump have statistically significant positive relationships with expression of Frame 1. Conversely, support for

³⁰ The complete frequencies of these items can be viewed in Appendix D.

political correctness has a statistically significant negative relationship with Frame 1, meaning as one's approval for political correctness increases, their level of expression of the terrorism frame decreases. Regarding the topics most important during the 2016 election, if the person considers either immigration or terrorism and ISIS to be the most important topic, then expression of Frame 1 increases, with statistical significance. Viewing social injustice as the biggest threat facing the U.S. today has a statistically significant negative relationship with Frame 1, meaning those who consider social injustice a major problem are less likely to express the view that Muslims are terrorists. Finally, as one might expect, viewing terrorism as the biggest threat facing the world today carries a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Frame 1.

Media Consumption

The media consumption model, which is presented in Table 33 below, contains 22 predictors. The first two independent variables measure the frequency with which the respondent follows either American or international current events. The subsequent variables capture the various sources the respondent uses to follow the news and current affairs. The five "source" variables included in the model are the five most frequently reported modes of gaining information, which include broadcast/cable news, newspapers or magazines, news or political websites, social media, and simply hearing information second hand from others around you. The "Broadcast/Cable" variables reflect the top five most watched networks among respondents who indicated they followed broadcast or cable networks. Likewise, the newspaper and website variables each represent the top five responses among respondents who indicated they used that given mode.

Table 33. *Impact of Media Consumption on Frame 1*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.788	0.239		3.296	0.001
Follow American public affairs	0.364	0.096	0.178	3.804	0.000
Follow international public affairs	0.029	0.088	0.015	0.329	0.742
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.298	0.194	0.059	1.532	0.126
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.120	0.155	-0.027	-0.771	0.441
Source- News/political websites	-0.184	0.200	-0.043	-0.919	0.358
Source- Social media	-0.342	0.128	-0.079	-2.670	0.008
Source- Second-hand	0.150	0.146	0.030	1.029	0.304
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	-0.224	0.150	-0.050	-1.494	0.135
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	0.051	0.152	0.011	0.337	0.736
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.061	0.157	0.013	0.385	0.700
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.941	0.145	0.203	6.497	0.000
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.651	0.150	-0.141	-4.351	0.000
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.559	0.244	-0.090	-2.289	0.022
Newspaper- Washington Post	-0.331	0.241	-0.050	-1.375	0.170
Newspaper- USA Today	0.171	0.230	0.025	0.742	0.458
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	0.284	0.253	0.037	1.122	0.262
Newspaper- New York Post	0.254	0.294	0.028	0.867	0.386
Website- HuffingtonPost	-0.269	0.209	-0.054	-1.289	0.198
Website- BuzzFeed	0.139	0.211	0.023	0.662	0.508
Website- Al Jazeera	0.546	0.257	0.072	2.119	0.034
Website- Breitbart	1.619	0.344	0.138	4.703	0.000
Website- Other	-0.441	0.359	-0.036	-1.229	0.219

Dependent Variable: Frame- Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent; Adjusted R²=.157

The media consumption model accounts for 15.7% of the variation in expression of Frame 1. Frequently following American public affairs increases one's level of expression of the terrorism frame, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among the various sources for accessing information on current events, only social media carries a statistically significant relationship with Frame 1. Following social media to get one's information decreases one's likelihood of expressing the terrorism frame. Among the broadcast/cable news variables, following Fox News and CNN each have a statistically significant relationship with expression

of Frame 1. As expected (Smith 2013), following Fox News increases one's expression of Frame 1, and conversely, following CNN decreases one's level of expression of Frame 1. Reading the *New York Times* has a statistically significant negative relationship with expression of Frame 1. Among websites, accessing *Breitbart* and *Al Jazeera* each have a statistically significant relationship with expression of Frame 1. Following *Breitbart* has a positive relationship with expression of the terrorism frame, and surprisingly, so does following *Al Jazeera*. This is an unexpected relationship as the majority of Americans who follow *Al Jazeera* identify as politically liberal (Pew Research Center 2014b), and the relationship between liberal ideology and expression of Frame 1 was shown in Table 33 to have a negative relationship.

Familiarity with Islam

Two familiarity measures are included in this model. First, a dichotomous variable that captures if the respondent personally knows a Muslim. The second variable is a self-reported assessment of one's knowledge of Islam and its tenets. As noted in Chapter 4, this knowledge measure needs to be assessed in light of the fact that considering oneself knowledgeable does not necessarily equate to being accurately informed regarding Islam's teachings.

As seen in Table 34, personally knowing a Muslim has a statistically significant negative relationship with expression of Frame 1, which is consistent with the literature (Lipka 2014). Conversely, as self-assessed knowledge of Islam increases, level of expression that Muslims are terrorist increases, and this relationship is statistically significant. This positive relationship between self-assessed knowledge and expression of Frame 1 runs counter to the literature that expects increased knowledge to lead to less hostile opinions of the religion (Lipka 2014), adding credence to the earlier discussion that self-assessed knowledge of Islam may not translate to actual

knowledge of Islam. Together, these variables account for 3.2% of variation in expression of Frame 1.

Table 34. Impact of Familiarity with Islam on Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.545	0.152		10.139	0.000
Personally know Muslim	-0.405	0.135	-0.093	-2.989	0.003
Knowledge of Islam	0.394	0.065	0.189	6.059	0.000

Dependent Variable: Frame- Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent; Adjusted R²=.032

Demographics

Table 35 presents the results of the regression of demographic variables on expression of Frame 1. The demographics included in the model are gender (male is the reference category), age, education, income, race/ethnicity (White, non-Hispanic is the reference category), marital status (married is the reference category), and region (Northeast is the reference category). Together, these demographics account for approximately nine percent of the variation in level of expression of Frame 1.

Both age and education have statistically significant relationships with expression of Frame 1. As age increases, the level of expression of the terrorism frame also increases. Education, on the other hand, has a negative relationship with Frame 1. Moving onto race, compared to white Americans, African Americans express lower levels of Frame 1, and this relationship is statistically significant. Marital status also has a statistically significant relationship with Frame 1 in which never being married or being divorced/widowed/separated decreases expression of the terrorism frame as compared to Americans who are currently married.

Table 35. Impact of Demographics on Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.404	0.363		6.625	0.000
Female	-0.229	0.137	-0.050	-1.669	0.095
Age	0.022	0.005	0.168	4.673	0.000
Education	-0.110	0.046	-0.078	-2.370	0.018
Income	-0.009	0.025	-0.013	-0.369	0.713
African American/Black	-0.621	0.188	-0.108	-3.296	0.001
Hispanic	-0.237	0.197	-0.039	-1.204	0.229
Multiracial/Other race	-0.468	0.254	-0.057	-1.844	0.065
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.799	0.203	-0.131	-3.936	0.000
Never married	-0.620	0.164	-0.137	-3.776	0.000
Region- Midwest	-0.370	0.196	-0.067	-1.891	0.059
Region- South	0.175	0.172	0.038	1.018	0.309
Region- West	-0.013	0.185	-0.003	-0.069	0.945

Dependent Variable: Frame- Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent; Adjusted R²=.092

Full Model

Table 36 presents the results of the full model, which includes all religious, political, media, familiarity with Islam, and demographic predictors. Because this model includes 53 independent variables, only the statistically significant predictors are presented in

Table 36 below for the sake of space and ease in reading the table. The full version of this table, with all 53 predictors shown, can be found in Appendix C.

Table 36. Impact of Full Model on Frame 1

Model*	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-0.058	0.588		-0.099	0.921
Evangelical	0.381	0.192	0.078	1.989	0.047
Trump approval	0.215	0.042	0.225	5.149	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.198	0.069	-0.110	-2.868	0.004
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.334	0.164	0.068	2.037	0.042
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.381	0.153	0.087	2.488	0.013
Follow American public affairs	0.230	0.108	0.113	2.122	0.034
Knowledge of Islam	0.207	0.076	0.099	2.724	0.007
Age	0.016	0.006	0.121	2.734	0.006


Dependent Variable: Frame- Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent; Adjusted R²=0.326

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

As a complement to

Table 36, Figure 1 presents the statistically significant predictors for Frame 1, organized by standardized beta values and split according to the direction of the relationship between the predictor and expression of the frame.

Figure 1. Predictors of Frame 1



Among the religious predictors, only Evangelicalism retains statistical significance, and the relationship remains positive, so an American who identifies as Evangelical will have a higher level of expression of the terrorism frame than non-Evangelicals. While religiosity and the interaction terms of black*religiosity and Hispanic*religiosity were statistically significant in the religious-only model, these variables lose their statistical significance when analyzed in the full model. Among the political predictors, Trump approval, support of political correctness, terrorism/ISIS important in the election, and terrorism as a top global threat are all statistically significant predictors in the full model. The direction of these relationships remains consistent with the partial model, with Trump approval, terrorism being important in the election, and terrorism being a top international threat all having positive relationships with expression of

Frame 1. Based on its standardized beta coefficient, Trump approval is the most influential of the predictors in explaining expression of Frame 1. Support of political correctness maintains its negative relationship with Frame 1. While they had statistically significant relationships in the politics-only model, conservatism, immigration being important in the election, and social injustice as a top national threat all lose significance in the full model.

Among the media consumption variables, only the frequency of following American current events retains statistical significance in the full model. As in the media-only model, following national current events has a positive relationship with expression of the terrorism frame. Following social media, Fox News, CNN, *New York Times*, *Breitbart*, and *Al Jazeera* as sources of information, all lose statistical significance when analyzed in the full model. Among the familiarity with Islam predictors, personally knowing a Muslim loses significance while self-reported knowledge of Islam retains its statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Frame 1. Finally, among the demographic predictors, only age remains statistically significant. As age increases, the level of expression of the terrorism frame also increases. In the full model, education, race (specifically African American/black affiliation), and marital status lose significance.

Based on the adjusted R-squared, the full model accounts for 32.6% of the total variation in the level of expression of the terrorism frame. It is worth recalling that the political predictors model had an adjusted R-squared of .306, so the full model accounts for just two additional percent in the variation of Frame 1 expression.

Predicting Expression of Counter-Frame 1: Majority of Muslims are Peaceful

Religious Predictors

Table 37 presents the results of the regression of religious predictors on Counter-Frame 1. This model accounts for nearly 6% of variation in the expression of the peaceful counter-frame.

Table 37. Impact of Religion on Counter-Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.744	0.165		16.639	0.000
Religiosity	-0.040	0.009	-0.191	-4.278	0.000
Evangelical	-0.542	0.158	-0.127	-3.428	0.001
Fundamentalism	0.040	0.105	0.016	0.377	0.706
Black*Religiosity	0.030	0.010	0.104	3.100	0.002
Hispanic*Religiosity	0.003	0.011	0.008	0.250	0.802
OtherR*Religiosity	0.017	0.016	0.033	1.065	0.287

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful; Adjusted R²= .059

Consistent with the literature, both religiosity and Evangelicalism have negative (and statistically significant) relationships with Counter-Frame 1. Conversely, the interaction term black*religiosity has a statistically significant positive relationship with Counter-Frame 1. In other words, among black Americans, expression of the peaceful counter-frame is higher than it is for white Americans as religiosity increases.

Political Attitudes

Table 38 presents the impact of political attitudes on expression of Counter-Frame 1. Together, the political predictors account for 22.8% of variation in the level of expression of the peaceful counter-frame. As expected from the literature, conservatism and Trump approval have statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 1. In contrast, support of political correctness carries a statistically significant positive relationship, so as

support of political correctness increases, one's level of expression of the peaceful counter-frame also increases. Likewise, considering social injustice a top national threat increases the expression of Counter-Frame 1, and this positive relationship is statistically significant.

Table 38. Impact of Political Attitudes on Counter-Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.148	0.278		11.342	0.000
Conservatism	-0.234	0.047	-0.220	-5.030	0.000
Trump approval	-0.153	0.036	-0.184	-4.273	0.000
Support political correctness	0.150	0.059	0.095	2.560	0.011
Important in election - Immigration	-0.064	0.152	-0.015	-0.419	0.675
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.076	0.147	-0.018	-0.517	0.605
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.202	0.215	0.032	0.936	0.349
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.040	0.137	-0.010	-0.291	0.771
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.283	0.193	-0.055	-1.468	0.143
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.431	0.172	0.097	2.507	0.012
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.123	0.136	0.032	0.905	0.366
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	-0.019	0.175	-0.004	-0.110	0.913

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful; Adjusted R²=.228

Media Consumption

The following model analyzes the impact of media consumption behaviors on expression of Counter-Frame 1. This model accounts for nearly 13% of variation in the level of expression of the peaceful counter-frame. These results are presented in Table 39 below.

Table 39. Impact of Media Consumption on Counter-Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.643	0.211		7.776	0.000
Follow American public affairs	0.239	0.085	0.135	2.828	0.005
Follow international public affairs	-0.171	0.078	-0.100	-2.188	0.029
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.141	0.172	0.032	0.822	0.411
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.286	0.137	0.075	2.083	0.038

Source- News/political websites	0.287	0.177	0.076	1.623	0.105
Source- Social media	0.041	0.113	0.011	0.359	0.720
Source- Second-hand	0.117	0.129	0.027	0.904	0.366
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	0.051	0.132	0.013	0.384	0.701
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	-0.184	0.134	-0.046	-1.370	0.171
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.052	0.139	0.013	0.373	0.709
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.816	0.128	-0.203	-6.370	0.000
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.390	0.132	0.097	2.949	0.003
Newspaper- New York Times	0.591	0.216	0.109	2.740	0.006
Newspaper- Washington Post	0.427	0.213	0.074	2.010	0.045
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.702	0.203	-0.119	-3.459	0.001
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	-0.001	0.224	0.000	-0.007	0.995
Newspaper- New York Post	-0.394	0.259	-0.049	-1.520	0.129
Website- HuffingtonPost	0.178	0.184	0.041	0.967	0.334
Website- BuzzFeed	0.034	0.186	0.006	0.185	0.853
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.363	0.228	-0.055	-1.594	0.111
Website- Breitbart	-1.193	0.304	-0.117	-3.922	0.000
Website- Other	0.458	0.317	0.043	1.445	0.149

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful; Adjusted R²=.129

Frequently following American current events has a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 1. Recall from Table 33 and

Table 36 that following American current events also carried a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Frame 1. The concept of “echo chambers” may explain this persistent positive relationship between following American news and expression of each Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 1. Research shows that Americans select news sources based on assumed political leaning and ideology confirmation, and this selective exposure is partisan based (Iyengar and Hahn 2009). In this case, it is likely that individuals are selecting news sources that present narratives of Islam, Muslims, immigration, and terrorism that are consistent with their existing impressions and simply reaffirming and strengthening those frames/counter-frames.

Now broadening that scope, frequency of following international current events also holds a statistically significant relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 1, though this relationship is negative. In other words, the more frequently an American follows international current affairs, the lower their expression of Counter-Frame 1. As for type of news source, using the newspaper to access information holds a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of the peaceful counter-frame. In terms of specific news source, watching Fox News, reading *USA Today*, and reading *Breitbart* all have statistically significant relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 1. In contrast, watching CNN, reading the *New York Times*, and reading the *Washington Post* all have statistically significant positive relationships with expression of the peaceful counter-frame.

Familiarity with Islam

The following model analyzes the impact of familiarity with Islam on the expression of Counter-Frame 1. Within this model, which accounts for nearly five percent of variation in Counter-Frame 1, personally knowing a Muslim has a positive and statistically significant

relationship with level of expression of the peaceful counter-frame. Results of this model can be viewed in Table 40 below.

Table 40. Impact of Familiarity with Islam on Counter-Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.772	0.131		13.489	0.000
Personally know Muslim	0.817	0.117	0.216	6.998	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.043	0.056	0.024	0.774	0.439

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful; Adjusted R²= .049

Demographics

Table 41 presents the results of the regression of demographic variables on expression of Counter-Frame 1. Together, demographics account for approximately four percent of the variation in the level of expression of Counter-Frame 1. Both education and income have positive and statistically significant relationships with expression of the peaceful counter-frame. Additionally, in comparison to married Americans, divorced, separated, widowed, and never married Americans will have a higher level of expression of Counter-Frame 1, and these relationships are statistically significant.

Table 41. Impact of Demographics on Counter-Frame 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.936	0.324		2.889	0.004
Female	0.073	0.123	0.018	0.595	0.552
Age	0.003	0.004	0.028	0.770	0.441
Education	0.151	0.041	0.123	3.646	0.000
Income	0.045	0.022	0.073	2.010	0.045
African American/Black	0.298	0.168	0.060	1.771	0.077
Hispanic	0.027	0.176	0.005	0.153	0.879
Multiracial/Other race	0.073	0.227	0.010	0.323	0.747
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.597	0.181	0.112	3.289	0.001
Never married	0.692	0.147	0.176	4.719	0.000
Region- Midwest	0.018	0.175	0.004	0.102	0.919

Region- South	-0.269	0.154	-0.067	-1.751	0.080
Region- West	-0.010	0.166	-0.002	-0.060	0.952

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful; Adjusted R²=0.041

Full Model

Table 42 below presents the results of the full model on expression of Counter-Frame 1. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented below, though all predictors were included in the regression model for analysis. For the full version of this table, see Appendix C. This model accounts for 28.2% of variation in the expression of Counter-Frame 1.

Table 42. Impact of Full Model on Counter-Frame 1


Model*	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.432	0.510		2.807	0.005
Conservatism	-0.189	0.050	-0.178	-3.755	0.000
Trump approval	-0.135	0.037	-0.162	-3.599	0.000
Support political correctness	0.186	0.062	0.119	3.011	0.003
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.397	0.172	0.090	2.307	0.021
Follow American public affairs	0.210	0.097	0.119	2.163	0.031
Personally know Muslim	0.482	0.133	0.128	3.622	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.135	0.068	0.074	1.984	0.048

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful; Adjusted R²=0.282

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 2 presents the statistically significant predictors for Counter-Frame 1, organized by standardized beta coefficients and split according to the direction of the relationship between the predictor and expression of the counter-frame.

Figure 2. Predictors of Counter-Frame 1



In the full model, none of the religious predictors have statistically significant effects on expression of Counter-Frame 1. Recall, in the religious-only model, religiosity, Evangelicalism, and the product term black*religiosity all had significant relationships. This loss of significance in the full model suggests that the relationship of these religious variables was actually driven by another variable (or combination of variables) that is now included in the full model. Both conservatism and Trump approval retain their statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 1. Additionally, support for political correctness and considering social injustice a top national threat both retain positive and statistically significant relationships with expression of the peaceful counter-frame.

Among media consumption predictors, only the frequency of following American current events retains a statistically significant relationship, which remains positive. Following international current events, reading the newspaper as a primary source for news, watching Fox

News and CNN, reading the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *USA Today*, and following *Breitbart* all lose statistical significance in the full model analysis.

Personally knowing a Muslim maintains its statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 1. Interestingly, in the full model, knowledge of Islam becomes statistically significant, and it shares a positive relationship with Counter-Frame 1. None of the demographic variables retain statistical significance in the full model even though education, income, and marital status held significance in the demographics-only regression.

Predicting Expression of Frame 2: Neo-Orientalist View – Islam as Anti-Democratic

Religious Predictors

The results of the regression of religious predictors on expression of Frame 2 are presented in

Table 43 below. Together, these predictors account for 6.8% of variation in the expression of the neo-Orientalist frame. In keeping with the literature and the results for Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 1, both religiosity and Evangelicalism have positive and statistically significant relationships with Frame 2. Evangelicals and Americans with higher religiosity express higher levels of the neo-Orientalist frame. Conversely, the product term black*religiosity has a statistically significant negative relationship with Frame 2. Meaning, relative to white Americans, black Americans will express lower levels of the neo-Orientalist frame as their religiosity increases.

Table 43. Impact of Religion on Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.151	0.182		6.331	0.000
Religiosity	0.055	0.010	0.240	5.385	0.000
Evangelical	0.483	0.174	0.102	2.774	0.006
Fundamentalism	-0.071	0.116	-0.025	-0.615	0.539
Black*Religiosity	-0.045	0.011	-0.139	-4.180	0.000
Hispanic*Religiosity	-0.017	0.012	-0.047	-1.460	0.145
OtherR*Religiosity	-0.029	0.018	-0.052	-1.654	0.099

Dependent Variable: Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic; Adjusted R²=0.068

Political Attitudes

Table 44 presents the impact of political attitudes on expression of Frame 2. This model accounts for nearly one-fourth of the variation in the level of expression of the neo-Orientalist frame. Trump approval has a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Frame 2; however, conservatism is not a statistically significant predictor, though the relationship in the sample is positive. As one would expect, support for political correctness carries a statistically significant negative relationship, so as support for political correctness increases, Americans' level of expression of the neo-Orientalist frame decreases. Likewise, Americans who consider social injustice the top national threat express lower levels of the neo-Orientalist frame, and this relationship is statistically significant. In contrast, Americans who viewed immigration as an important topic in the election as well as those consider immigration the top national threat will report higher levels of Frame 2, and these findings are statistically significant.

Table 44. Impact of Political Attitudes on Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.957	0.304		3.151	0.002
Conservatism	0.090	0.051	0.076	1.762	0.078
Trump approval	0.233	0.039	0.254	5.973	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.245	0.064	-0.141	-3.819	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	0.557	0.166	0.121	3.360	0.001
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.100	0.161	0.021	0.624	0.533
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.159	0.236	0.023	0.675	0.500
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.157	0.150	0.037	1.048	0.295
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.521	0.211	0.091	2.465	0.014
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.202	0.188	-0.041	-1.071	0.284
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.024	0.149	0.006	0.160	0.873
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.029	0.192	0.005	0.154	0.878

Dependent Variable: Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic; Adjusted R²=0.245

Media Consumption

The following table (

Table 45) shows the impact of media consumption behaviors on expression of Frame 2. Together, the media predictors account for 12.2% of variation in expression of the neo-Orientalist frame. Following American public affairs does not yield a statistically significant relationship with expression of Frame 2; however, the frequency of following international current events does hold a statistically significant positive relationship with Frame 2. The more frequently Americans follow international news, the higher their expression of the neo-Orientalist frame.

Table 45. Impact of Media Consumption on Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.651	0.235		2.774	0.006
Follow American public affairs	0.046	0.094	0.023	0.489	0.625
Follow international public affairs	0.308	0.087	0.163	3.545	0.000
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.161	0.191	0.033	0.845	0.398
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.415	0.153	-0.099	-2.724	0.007
Source- News/political websites	-0.430	0.196	-0.103	-2.187	0.029
Source- Social media	0.048	0.126	0.012	0.386	0.700
Source- Second-hand	-0.167	0.143	-0.035	-1.169	0.243
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	-0.151	0.147	-0.035	-1.024	0.306
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	0.211	0.149	0.048	1.417	0.157
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	-0.055	0.154	-0.012	-0.357	0.721
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.899	0.142	0.202	6.323	0.000
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.694	0.147	-0.156	-4.723	0.000
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.449	0.240	-0.075	-1.871	0.062
Newspaper- Washington Post	-0.064	0.236	-0.010	-0.269	0.788
Newspaper- USA Today	0.504	0.226	0.077	2.234	0.026
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	-0.067	0.249	-0.009	-0.270	0.787
Newspaper- New York Post	0.368	0.288	0.041	1.278	0.201
Website- HuffingtonPost	-0.123	0.205	-0.026	-0.599	0.549
Website- BuzzFeed	0.192	0.207	0.033	0.930	0.353
Website- Al Jazeera	0.429	0.253	0.059	1.698	0.090
Website- Breitbart	1.390	0.338	0.123	4.114	0.000
Website- Other	-0.164	0.352	-0.014	-0.465	0.642

Dependent Variable: Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic; Adjusted R²=.122

In terms of the general source of attaining information, both newspapers/magazines and news/political websites have statistically significant relationships with expression of Frame 2. In other words, Americans who regularly get their information from newspapers or magazines will report lower levels of Frame 2 than Americans who don't gather their information using this mode. Likewise, Americans who get their information from news and political websites will report lower levels of the neo-Orientalist frame than Americans who don't access their information through this source. Regarding broadcast news, Americans who watch Fox News

will report higher levels of Frame 2, and Americans who follow CNN will report lower levels of Frame 2. Both of these relationships are statistically significant. Reading *USA Today* carries a statistically significant positive relationship with Frame 2, as does using the website *Breitbart* to get your news.

Familiarity with Islam

The following model analyzes the impact of familiarity with Islam on the expression of Frame 2. Both personally knowing a Muslim and considering oneself knowledgeable on Islam are statistically significant predictors. Americans who personally know a Muslim are less likely to express Frame 2. In contrast, as one's knowledge of Islam increases, their expression of Frame 2 also increases. Together, these variables account for 2.4% of variation in expression of the neo-Orientalist frame. Results of this model are presented in Table 46 below.

Table 46. Impact of Familiarity with Islam on Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.437	0.147		9.766	0.000
Personally know Muslim	-0.609	0.131	-0.146	-4.661	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.252	0.063	0.126	4.015	0.000

Dependent Variable: Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic; Adjusted R²=.024

Demographics

Table 47 presents the results of the regression of demographic variables on expression of Frame 2. This demographics model accounts for 4.5% of the variation in level of expression of the neo-Orientalist frame. Education holds a statistically significant negative relationship with Frame 2, so as education increases, one's expression of the neo-Orientalist frame decreases. Identifying as African American or black also carries a statistically significant negative relationship. Thus, African Americans express lower levels of the neo-Orientalist frame than

white Americans. Finally, marital status has a statistically significant relationship with expression of Frame 2. Americans who are divorced, separated, widowed, and never married express lower levels of the neo-Orientalist frame than Americans who are married.

Table 47. Impact of Demographics on Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.578	0.358		7.201	0.000
Female	-0.125	0.136	-0.028	-0.918	0.359
Age	0.008	0.005	0.064	1.741	0.082
Education	-0.168	0.046	-0.124	-3.662	0.000
Income	-0.016	0.025	-0.023	-0.632	0.528
African American/Black	-0.446	0.186	-0.081	-2.401	0.017
Hispanic	-0.082	0.194	-0.014	-0.420	0.674
Multiracial/Other race	-0.482	0.250	-0.061	-1.925	0.054
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.510	0.200	-0.087	-2.546	0.011
Never married	-0.591	0.162	-0.135	-3.644	0.000
Region- Midwest	-0.106	0.193	-0.020	-0.550	0.583
Region- South	0.157	0.170	0.035	0.923	0.356
Region- West	-0.099	0.183	-0.020	-0.541	0.589

Dependent Variable: Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic; Adjusted R²= .045

Full Model

The results of the full model regression on expression of the neo-Orientalist frame are presented in Table 48 below. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented here, though all predictors were included in the regression model for analysis. The full table can be referenced in Appendix C. This model accounts for 26.3% of variation in the expression of Frame 2, which is approximately just two percent more variation than the politics-only model explains, indicating that political attitudes tell us a great deal as to whether or not an American will express the neo-Orientalist frame.

Table 48. Impact of Full Model on Frame 2


Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.585	0.591		0.989	0.323
Trump approval	0.191	0.042	0.208	4.562	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.284	0.069	-0.163	-4.087	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	0.498	0.169	0.108	2.949	0.003
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.436	0.214	0.076	2.035	0.042
Follow international public affairs	0.251	0.101	0.133	2.490	0.013
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.390	0.181	-0.093	-2.151	0.032

Dependent Variable: Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic; Adjusted R²=.263

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 3 presents the statistically significant predictors for Frame 2, organized by standardized beta coefficients and split according to the direction of the relationship between the predictor and expression of the frame.

Figure 3. Predictors of Frame 2



In the full model, none of the religious predictors retain their statistical significance, even though religiosity, Evangelicalism, and the product term black-religiosity all had significant

relationships in the religious-only model. Regarding political predictors, Trump approval maintains its statistically significant positive relationship with expression of the neo-Orientalist frame. Additionally, support for political correctness retains a negative and statistically significant relationship with expression of Frame 2. In contrast, Americans who considered immigration the most important topic in the election or who consider immigration the top national threat will express higher levels of the neo-Orientalist frame. Both of these measures were statistically significant in the politics-only model as well. In the full model, considering social injustice a top national threat does not maintain its statistically significant negative relationship with Frame 2.

Among media consumption predictors, only the frequency of following international current events and reading the newspaper/magazines as a primary source of information remain statistically significant. Americans who regularly follow international public affairs will likely express higher levels of the neo-Orientalist frame; whereas, Americans who read the newspaper/magazines for news will express lower levels of this frame. Using news or political websites as a primary source for news, watching Fox News and CNN, reading *USA Today*, and following *Breitbart* all lose statistical significance in the full model analysis.

The familiarity with Islam predictors, both of which were statistically significant in the partial model, do not retain significant relationships in the full model. Likewise, none of the demographic variables maintain statistical significance in the full model even though education, African American identification, and marital status held significance in the demographics-only analysis. In sum, only the political and media predictors retain statistical significance in the full model, suggesting these measures had latent effects in the other partial models and ultimately drive variation in expression of the neo-Orientalist frame.

Predicting Expression of Counter Frame 2: American Multiculturalism

Religious Predictors

Table 49 presents the results of the regression of religious predictors on Counter-Frame 2. This model accounts for 6.2% of variation in the expression of the multiculturalism counter-frame. Consistent with the literature and their effect on Counter-Frame 1, both religiosity and Evangelicalism have negative and statistically significant relationships with Counter-Frame 2. The product term black*religiosity has a statistically significant positive relationship with Counter-Frame 2. In other words, among black Americans, expression of the multiculturalism counter-frame is higher than it is for white Americans as religiosity increases.

Table 49. Impact of Religion on Counter-Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.559	0.163		15.734	0.000
Religiosity	-0.034	0.009	-0.165	-3.683	0.000
Evangelical	-0.533	0.156	-0.127	-3.418	0.001
Fundamentalism	-0.084	0.104	-0.034	-0.810	0.418
Black*Religiosity	0.044	0.010	0.155	4.631	0.000
Hispanic*Religiosity	0.017	0.011	0.051	1.576	0.115
OtherR*Religiosity	0.024	0.016	0.049	1.560	0.119

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America; Adjusted R²=.062

Political Attitudes

Table 50 presents the impact of political attitudes on expression of Counter-Frame 2. Together, the political predictors account for over one quarter (27.6%) of the variation in the level of expression of the multiculturalism counter-frame. As expected from the literature and performance across the other frames, conservatism and Trump approval have statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 2. Conversely, support of

political correctness carries a statistically significant positive relationship, so as support of political correctness increases, one's level of expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame also increases. Similarly, considering social injustice a top threat to the U.S. increases the level of expression of Counter-Frame 2, and this positive relationship is statistically significant. No other political predictors are statistically significant in this model.

Table 50. Impact of Political Attitudes on Counter-Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.767	0.265		10.427	0.000
Conservatism	-0.194	0.045	-0.184	-4.357	0.000
Trump approval	-0.158	0.034	-0.192	-4.620	0.000
Support political correctness	0.184	0.056	0.119	3.291	0.001
Important in election - Immigration	-0.202	0.145	-0.049	-1.396	0.163
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.161	0.141	-0.038	-1.144	0.253
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.140	0.206	0.023	0.681	0.496
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.154	0.131	-0.040	-1.172	0.242
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.221	0.185	-0.043	-1.197	0.232
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.572	0.164	0.131	3.481	0.001
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.010	0.130	0.003	0.077	0.938
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.058	0.167	0.012	0.348	0.728

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America; Adjusted R²=0.276

Media Consumption

The following model analyzes the impact of media consumption behaviors on expression of Counter-Frame 2. This model accounts for over 16% of variation in the level of expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame. These results are presented in Table 51 on the following page.

Following American current events has a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 2, which it also did with Counter-Frame 1. Regarding type of news source, using the newspaper to access information holds a statistically significant positive

relationship with expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame; whereas using broadcast or cable news has a statistically significant negative relationship with Counter-Frame 2. In terms of specific news source, watching Fox News, reading *USA Today*, and reading *Breitbart* all have statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 2. In contrast, watching CNN, watching ABC, reading the *New York Times*, and accessing not-previously listed political and news websites all have statistically significant positive relationships with expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame.

Table 51. Impact of Media Consumption on Counter-Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.487	0.204		7.279	0.000
Follow American public affairs	0.195	0.082	0.111	2.381	0.017
Follow international public affairs	-0.097	0.076	-0.058	-1.282	0.200
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	-0.329	0.166	-0.076	-1.978	0.048
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.358	0.133	0.096	2.697	0.007
Source- News/political websites	0.262	0.171	0.071	1.532	0.126
Source- Social media	0.160	0.109	0.043	1.466	0.143
Source- Second-hand	-0.083	0.125	-0.019	-0.665	0.506
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	0.252	0.128	0.065	1.969	0.049
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	-0.193	0.130	-0.049	-1.491	0.136
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	-0.043	0.134	-0.011	-0.322	0.747
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.822	0.124	-0.207	-6.641	0.000
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.525	0.128	0.132	4.108	0.000
Newspaper- New York Times	0.766	0.209	0.143	3.672	0.000
Newspaper- Washington Post	0.155	0.206	0.027	0.754	0.451
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.637	0.196	-0.109	-3.245	0.001
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	-0.422	0.216	-0.063	-1.951	0.051
Newspaper- New York Post	-0.368	0.251	-0.046	-1.466	0.143
Website- HuffingtonPost	0.331	0.178	0.077	1.858	0.063
Website- BuzzFeed	0.099	0.180	0.019	0.552	0.581
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.167	0.220	-0.026	-0.759	0.448
Website- Breitbart	-0.993	0.294	-0.099	-3.377	0.001
Website- Other	0.829	0.307	0.079	2.704	0.007

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America; Adjusted R²=.164

Familiarity with Islam

The following model examines the impact of familiarity with Islam measures on the expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame. Both personally knowing a Muslim and having increased knowledge of Islam are statically significant predictors of Counter-Frame 2. Both of these relationships are positive, and, these predictors account for nearly seven percent of variation in the multiculturalist counter-frame. Results of this model can be viewed in Table 52. below.

Table 52. Impact of Familiarity with Islam on Counter-Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.230	0.128		9.595	0.000
Personally know Muslim	0.831	0.114	0.223	7.295	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.161	0.055	0.090	2.944	0.003

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America; Adjusted R²=0.069

Demographics As with the demographics model for Counter-Frame 1, education has a positive and statistically significant relationship with expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame. Additionally, relative to married Americans, divorced, separated, widowed, and never married Americans have a higher level of expression of Counter-Frame 2, and these relationships are statistically significant. Black Americans also express higher levels of this frame than white Americans. Finally, Americans in the South express lower levels of Counter-Frame 2 as compared to Americans in the Northeast. Both of these relationships are statistically significant.

Table 53 presents the results of the regression of demographic variables on expression of Counter-Frame 2. This demographics model accounts for 6.5% of variation in the level of expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame. As with the demographics model for Counter-Frame 1, education has a positive and statistically significant relationship with expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame. Additionally, relative to married Americans, divorced, separated, widowed, and never married Americans have a higher level of expression of Counter-Frame 2, and these relationships are statistically significant. Black Americans also express higher levels of

this frame than white Americans. Finally, Americans in the South express lower levels of Counter-Frame 2 as compared to Americans in the Northeast. Both of these relationships are statistically significant.

Table 53. Impact of Demographics on Counter-Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.167	0.316		3.693	0.000
Female	-0.128	0.120	-0.033	-1.072	0.284
Age	-0.008	0.004	-0.068	-1.852	0.064
Education	0.235	0.040	0.194	5.812	0.000
Income	0.014	0.022	0.023	0.632	0.527
African American/Black	0.448	0.164	0.091	2.734	0.006
Hispanic	0.082	0.171	0.016	0.478	0.633
Multiracial/Other race	0.208	0.221	0.029	0.940	0.347
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.361	0.177	0.069	2.039	0.042
Never married	0.544	0.143	0.140	3.801	0.000
Region- Midwest	-0.085	0.170	-0.018	-0.500	0.617
Region- South	-0.306	0.150	-0.077	-2.041	0.041
Region- West	-0.036	0.161	-0.008	-0.223	0.824

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America; Adjusted R²=.065

Full Model

On the following page,

Table 54 presents the results of the full model on expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented below, though all predictors were included in the regression model for analysis. For the full version of this table, see Appendix C. The full model accounts for 34.5% of variation in the expression of Counter-Frame 2. Also presented on the following page,

Figure 4 displays the statistically significant predictors for Counter-Frame 2, organized by standardized beta coefficients and split according to the direction of the relationship between the predictor and expression of the counter-frame.


Table 54. Impact of Full Model on Counter-Frame 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.601	0.497		3.221	0.001
Conservatism	-0.128	0.048	-0.121	-2.687	0.007
Trump approval	-0.156	0.035	-0.190	-4.417	0.000
Support political correctness	0.214	0.058	0.138	3.674	0.000
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.540	0.162	0.124	3.331	0.001
Follow American public affairs	0.196	0.092	0.112	2.144	0.032
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.317	0.152	0.085	2.080	0.038
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.444	0.224	-0.076	-1.983	0.048
Personally know Muslim	0.429	0.125	0.115	3.420	0.001
Knowledge of Islam	0.206	0.064	0.115	3.217	0.001
Education	0.087	0.043	0.072	2.005	0.045

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America; Adjusted $R^2=.345$

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 4. Predictors of Counter-Frame 2



In the full model, none of the religious predictors remain statistically significant in their relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 2. Both conservatism and Trump approval hold their statistically significant negative relationships in the full model. Additionally, support for political correctness and considering social injustice a top threat to U.S. both keep their positive and statistically significant relationships with expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame.

Among the media consumption measures, the frequency of following American current events remains statistically significant, holding a positive relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 2. Reading the newspaper as a primary source for news, watching CNN, and reading the *New York Times* retain their statistically significant and positive relationships with expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame. Reading *USA Today* also remains a statistically significant predictor, holding a negative relationship with Counter-Frame 2. Though they were statistically significant in the media-only model, watching CNN, watching Fox News, reading *Breitbart* and “other” websites all lose significance in the full model analysis.

Both familiarity with Islam predictors remain statistically significant—personally knowing a Muslim and self-assessed knowledge of Islam hold positive relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 2. Among the demographics, only education carries statistical significance in the full model, maintaining its positive relationship with the multiculturalist counter-frame.

Predicting Expression of Frame 3: America as Judeo-Christian

Religious Predictors

The results of the regression of religious predictors on expression of Frame 3 are presented in Table 55. Together, these predictors account for over 10% of variation in the expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. Consistent with the earlier models, both religiosity and

Evangelicalism have positive and statistically significant relationships with Frame 3. In other words, Evangelicals and Americans with higher religiosity express higher levels of the Judeo-Christian frame. The interaction terms black*religiosity and Hispanic*religiosity each hold statistically significant negative relationships with Frame 3. Meaning, relative to white Americans, both black Americans and Hispanic Americans express lower levels of the Judeo-Christian frame as religiosity increases.

Table 55. Impact of Religion on Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.602	0.136		4.408	0.000
Religiosity	0.036	0.008	0.207	4.743	0.000
Evangelical	0.682	0.131	0.189	5.216	0.000
Fundamentalism	0.034	0.087	0.016	0.392	0.695
Black*Religiosity	-0.033	0.008	-0.134	-4.091	0.000
Hispanic*Religiosity	-0.026	0.009	-0.092	-2.934	0.003
OtherR*Religiosity	-0.019	0.013	-0.045	-1.455	0.146

Dependent Variable: Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian; Adjusted R²=.102

Political Attitudes

Table 56 presents the impact of political attitudes on expression of Frame 3. This model accounts for 24.1% of the variation in the level of expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. Conservatism and Trump approval both have statistically significant positive relationships with expression of Frame 3. Consistent with the previous models, support for political correctness carries a statistically significant negative relationship, so as support for political correctness increases, Americans' level of expression of the Judeo-Christian frame decreases. Likewise, Americans who consider social injustice the top national threat express lower levels of Frame 3,

and this relationship is statistically significant. In contrast, Americans who viewed immigration as an important topic in the election as well as those who consider immigration the top national threat report higher levels of Frame 3, and these findings are statistically significant.

Table 56. Impact of Political Attitudes on Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.292	0.233		1.255	0.210
Conservatism	0.114	0.039	0.126	2.919	0.004
Trump approval	0.151	0.030	0.214	5.028	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.097	0.049	-0.073	-1.970	0.049
Important in election - Immigration	0.298	0.127	0.085	2.347	0.019
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.213	0.123	0.059	1.730	0.084
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.111	0.181	0.021	0.617	0.538
Top threat to US – Terrorism	0.005	0.115	0.002	0.044	0.965
Top threat to US – Immigration	0.547	0.162	0.125	3.377	0.001
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.317	0.144	-0.084	-2.195	0.028
Top threat to the world – Terrorism	0.108	0.114	0.034	0.949	0.343
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.070	0.147	0.017	0.476	0.635

Dependent Variable: Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian; Adjusted R²= .241

Media Consumption

Table 57 presents the results of the regression of media consumption behaviors on expression of Frame 3. Together, the media predictors account for 12% of the variation in expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. As with Frame 2, following American public affairs does not yield a statistically significant relationship with expression of the Judeo-Christian frame; however, the frequency of following international current events does hold a positive and statistically significant relationship with Frame 3. The more frequently Americans follow international news, the higher their expression of the Judeo-Christian frame.

Table 57. Impact of Media Consumption on Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.816	0.180		4.542	0.000
Follow American public affairs	0.072	0.072	0.048	1.005	0.315
Follow international public affairs	0.137	0.066	0.095	2.055	0.040
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	-0.039	0.146	-0.011	-0.267	0.790
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.419	0.117	-0.130	-3.589	0.000
Source- News/political websites	-0.246	0.150	-0.077	-1.634	0.102
Source- Social media	-0.033	0.096	-0.010	-0.339	0.735
Source- Second-hand	-0.088	0.110	-0.024	-0.802	0.423
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	-0.268	0.113	-0.081	-2.384	0.017
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	0.129	0.114	0.038	1.132	0.258
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.128	0.118	0.037	1.079	0.281
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.578	0.109	0.170	5.309	0.000
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.550	0.112	-0.162	-4.895	0.000
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.311	0.184	-0.068	-1.695	0.090
Newspaper- Washington Post	0.038	0.181	0.008	0.212	0.832
Newspaper- USA Today	0.474	0.173	0.095	2.742	0.006
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	0.071	0.190	0.012	0.373	0.709
Newspaper- New York Post	0.052	0.221	0.008	0.235	0.814
Website- HuffingtonPost	-0.254	0.157	-0.069	-1.623	0.105
Website- BuzzFeed	0.035	0.158	0.008	0.222	0.824
Website- Al Jazeera	0.230	0.193	0.041	1.190	0.234
Website- Breitbart	1.249	0.259	0.145	4.829	0.000
Website- Other	-0.371	0.270	-0.041	-1.375	0.169

Dependent Variable: Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian; Adjusted R²=.120

Regarding the general source of attaining information, reading newspapers/magazines as a source for information has a statistically significant negative relationship with expression of Frame 3. So, Americans who regularly get their information from newspapers or magazines are expected to report lower levels of Frame 3 than Americans who don't get their information using this mode. Regarding broadcast news, Americans who watch Fox News will report higher levels of Frame 3, and Americans who watch ABC or CNN will report lower levels of Frame 3. These relationships are statistically significant. Additionally, reading *USA Today* carries a statistically

significant positive relationship with Frame 3, as does accessing the website *Breitbart* to read the news.

Familiarity with Islam

The following model analyzes the impact of familiarity with Islam on the expression of Frame 3. Both personally knowing a Muslim and considering oneself knowledgeable on Islam have statistically significant relationships with expression of the Judeo-Christian frame.

Americans who personally know a Muslim are less likely to express Frame 3. Conversely, as one's knowledge of Islam increases, their expression of Frame 3 also increases. Together, these variables account for 3.8% of variation in expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. Results of this model are presented in Table 58 below.

Table 58. Impact of Familiarity with Islam on Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.165	0.112		10.430	0.000
Personally know Muslim	-0.664	0.099	-0.208	-6.696	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.147	0.048	0.096	3.093	0.002

Dependent Variable: Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian; Adjusted R²= .038

Demographics

Table 59 presents the results of the regression of demographic variables on expression of Frame 3. This demographics model accounts for 6.4% of the variation in level of expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. Education holds a statistically significant negative relationship with Frame 3, so as education increases, one's level of expression of the Judeo-Christian frame decreases. Income also holds a statistically significant negative relationship with expression of Frame 3. In terms of ethnic affiliation, Hispanic Americans report lower levels of the Judeo-

Christian frame than white Americans, and this relationship is statistically significant.

Additionally, marital status holds a statistically significant relationship with Frame 3. Americans who are divorced, separated, widowed, and never married express lower levels of the Judeo-Christian frame than do Americans who are married.

Table 59. Impact of Demographics on Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.240	0.271		8.266	0.000
Female	-0.105	0.103	-0.031	-1.019	0.309
Age	0.004	0.004	0.046	1.252	0.211
Education	-0.153	0.035	-0.148	-4.429	0.000
Income	-0.040	0.019	-0.077	-2.134	0.033
African American/Black	-0.247	0.141	-0.058	-1.754	0.080
Hispanic	-0.416	0.147	-0.094	-2.833	0.005
Multiracial/Other race	-0.253	0.189	-0.042	-1.334	0.182
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.384	0.152	-0.085	-2.529	0.012
Never married	-0.566	0.123	-0.170	-4.614	0.000
Region- Midwest	-0.137	0.146	-0.034	-0.940	0.348
Region- South	0.104	0.128	0.031	0.812	0.417
Region- West	-0.065	0.138	-0.018	-0.468	0.640

Dependent Variable: Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian; Adjusted R²=.064

Full Model

The results of the full model regression on expression of the Judeo-Christian frame are presented in

Table 60 on the following page. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented, though all predictors from the partial models were included in the full model regression for analysis. For the full version of this table, see Appendix C. This model accounts for 28.8% of the variation in the expression of Frame 3.

Table 60. Impact of Full Model on Frame 3


Model*	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.805	0.445		1.811	0.071
Evangelical	0.389	0.145	0.108	2.679	0.008
Trump approval	0.113	0.032	0.161	3.592	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.113	0.052	-0.085	-2.156	0.031
Important in election – Immigration	0.298	0.127	0.085	2.348	0.019
Top threat to US – Immigration	0.448	0.161	0.102	2.781	0.006
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.289	0.145	-0.077	-1.991	0.047
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.383	0.136	-0.119	-2.807	0.005
Website- Breitbart	0.650	0.297	0.075	2.185	0.029
Personally know Muslim	-0.288	0.112	-0.090	-2.564	0.011
Education	-0.077	0.039	-0.074	-1.985	0.048

Dependent Variable: Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian; Adjusted R²= .288

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 5 presents the statistically significant predictors for Frame 3, organized by standardized beta coefficients and split according to the direction of the relationship between the predictor and expression of the frame.

Figure 5. Predictors of Frame 3



In the full model, Evangelicalism is the only religious predictor that retains its statistical significance, even though religiosity and the product terms black*religiosity and Hispanic*religiosity all had significant relationships in the religious-only model. Evangelicalism holds its positive relationship with expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. Regarding political predictors, Trump approval maintains its statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Frame 3. Additionally, support for political correctness maintains a negative and statistically significant relationship with expression of Frame 3. In contrast, Americans who considered immigration the most important topic in the election or those who consider immigration a top threat to the U.S. express higher level of the Judeo-Christian frame. Both of these measures were statistically significant in the politics-only model, and they retain their significance even when included in the full model. Finally, considering social injustice a top national threat maintains its statistically significant negative relationship with Frame 3 in the full model. Conservatism is the only political predictor that lost significance between the partial and full models.

Among media consumption measures, regularly reading the newspaper/magazines as a primary source for news and accessing the *Breitbart* website each maintain statistical significance in the full model. Americans who primarily get their news from newspapers/magazines are likely to express lower levels of Frame 3. Conversely, Americans who read *Breitbart* are likely to express higher levels of the Judeo-Christian frame. All other media predictors do not have statistically significant impacts on expression of Frame 3. Among the familiarity with Islam predictors, only personally knowing a Muslim maintains a statistically significant relationship—Americans who personally know a Muslim express lower levels of Frame 3. Education is the only demographic variable that retains statistical significance

in the full model. The higher one's education, the lower their expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. Income, Hispanic identification, and marital status all lose significance upon inclusion in the full model.

Predicting Expression of Counter Frame 3: Defense of Religious Freedom

Religious Predictors

Table 61 presents the results of the regression of religious predictors on Counter-Frame 3. These predictors account for nearly 10% of the variation in the expression of the multiculturalism counter-frame. Consistent with the literature and their effect on both previous counter-frames, religiosity and Evangelicalism each have a negative and statistically significant relationship with Counter-Frame 3. The interaction terms black*religiosity and Hispanic*religiosity each have a statistically significant positive relationship with Counter-Frame 3. Meaning, in comparison to the relationship between religiosity and expression of Counter-Frame 3 among white Americans, black Americans and Hispanic Americans express higher levels of the religious freedom counter-frame as religiosity increases.

Table 61. Impact of Religion on Counter-Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.716	0.145		18.723	0.000
Religiosity	-0.037	0.008	-0.198	-4.529	0.000
Evangelical	-0.600	0.139	-0.157	-4.317	0.000
Fundamentalism	-0.122	0.093	-0.054	-1.322	0.186
Black*Religiosity	0.049	0.008	0.189	5.748	0.000
Hispanic*Religiosity	0.023	0.010	0.075	2.383	0.017
OtherR*Religiosity	0.017	0.014	0.037	1.213	0.226

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom; Adjusted R²=.099

Political Attitudes

Table 62 presents the impact of political attitudes on the expression of Counter-Frame 3.

As expected, conservatism and Trump approval have statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 3. Viewing social injustice as a top national threat is the only other statistically significant political predictor. Americans who consider social injustice the primary threat facing the U.S. today report higher levels of expression of Counter-Frame 3. Despite only containing three statistically significant predictors, this model accounts for one-third (33.5%) of the variation in the level of expression of the religious freedom counter-frame.

Table 62. Impact of Political Attitudes on Counter-Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.460	0.231		14.952	0.000
Conservatism	-0.196	0.039	-0.204	-5.046	0.000
Trump approval	-0.208	0.030	-0.279	-7.001	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.003	0.049	-0.002	-0.057	0.954
Important in election - Immigration	-0.186	0.126	-0.050	-1.476	0.141
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.116	0.123	-0.030	-0.947	0.344
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.145	0.179	0.026	0.807	0.420
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.139	0.114	-0.040	-1.218	0.224
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.260	0.161	-0.056	-1.612	0.107
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.568	0.143	0.143	3.965	0.000
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-0.080	0.114	-0.023	-0.706	0.481
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.089	0.146	0.020	0.610	0.542

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom; Adjusted R²=.335

Media Consumption

The following model analyzes the impact of media consumption behaviors on expression of Counter-Frame 3. This model accounts for 17% of variation in the level of expression of the religious freedom counter-frame, as seen in Table 63 below.

Table 63. Impact of Media Consumption on Counter-Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.649	0.185		8.900	0.000
Follow American public affairs	0.098	0.074	0.062	1.324	0.186
Follow international public affairs	-0.086	0.069	-0.056	-1.260	0.208
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.001	0.151	0.000	0.007	0.994
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.338	0.120	0.099	2.809	0.005
Source- News/political websites	0.106	0.155	0.031	0.684	0.494
Source- Social media	0.131	0.099	0.039	1.322	0.187
Source- Second-hand	0.024	0.113	0.006	0.208	0.835
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	0.160	0.116	0.046	1.379	0.168
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	-0.129	0.118	-0.036	-1.097	0.273
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.037	0.122	0.010	0.302	0.763
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.962	0.112	-0.266	-8.567	0.000
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.558	0.116	0.155	4.816	0.000
Newspaper- New York Times	0.520	0.189	0.107	2.748	0.006
Newspaper- Washington Post	0.239	0.187	0.046	1.280	0.201
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.736	0.178	-0.139	-4.136	0.000
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	-0.164	0.196	-0.027	-0.833	0.405
Newspaper- New York Post	-0.122	0.227	-0.017	-0.538	0.591
Website- HuffingtonPost	0.481	0.162	0.123	2.976	0.003
Website- BuzzFeed	0.001	0.163	0.000	0.003	0.997
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.001	0.200	0.000	-0.004	0.996
Website- Breitbart	-0.636	0.267	-0.070	-2.383	0.017
Website- Other	0.494	0.278	0.052	1.778	0.076

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom; Adjusted R²=.170

Following American current events does *not* have a statistically significant relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 3, even though it had significant effects on both Counter-Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2. Regarding type of news source, using the newspaper to access

information holds a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of the religious freedom counter-frame. In terms of specific news sources, watching Fox News, reading *USA Today*, and reading *Breitbart* all have statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 3. In contrast, watching CNN, reading the *New York Times*, and reading *Huffington Post* all have statistically significant positive relationships with expression of the religious freedom counter-frame.

Familiarity with Islam

The following model examines the impact of the familiarity with Islam predictors on the expression of the religious freedom counter-frame. This model accounts for six percent of total variation in the expression of Counter-Frame 3. Personally knowing a Muslim has a statistically significant positive effect on expression of the religious freedom counter-frame. Knowledge of Islam, on the other hand, does not have a statistically significant effect on Counter-Frame 3. Results of this model can be viewed in Table 64 below.

Table 64. Impact of Familiarity with Islam on Counter-Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.569	0.117		13.387	0.000
Personally know Muslim	0.824	0.104	0.243	7.917	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.027	0.050	0.017	0.538	0.591

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom; Adjusted R²=.060

Demographics

Table 65 presents the results of the regression of demographics on expression of Counter-Frame 3. This model accounts for 6.3% of variation in the level of expression of this counter-frame. In keeping with the demographics model for both Counter-Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2, education has a positive and statistically significant relationship with expression of Counter-

Frame 3. Additionally, African Americans express higher levels of this counter-frame than white Americans express. Finally, never married Americans also report higher levels of Counter-Frame 3 than their married counterparts express. Both of these relationships are statistically significant.

Table 65. Impact of Demographics on Counter-Frame 3

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.069	0.287		3.723	0.000
Female	-0.060	0.109	-0.017	-0.556	0.579
Age	-0.005	0.004	-0.046	-1.253	0.210
Education	0.185	0.037	0.168	5.035	0.000
Income	0.027	0.020	0.048	1.351	0.177
African American/Black	0.481	0.149	0.107	3.227	0.001
Hispanic	0.289	0.156	0.061	1.852	0.064
Multiracial/Other race	0.278	0.201	0.043	1.382	0.167
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.282	0.161	0.059	1.757	0.079
Never married	0.585	0.130	0.165	4.501	0.000
Region- Midwest	-0.076	0.155	-0.018	-0.493	0.622
Region- South	-0.159	0.136	-0.044	-1.166	0.244
Region- West	-0.010	0.147	-0.003	-0.070	0.944

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom; Adjusted R²= .063

Full Model

Table 66 on the follow page presents the results of the full model on expression of the religious freedom counter-frame. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented below, though all predictors from the partial models were included in the full model for analysis. To reference the full version of this table, see Appendix C. The full model accounts for 38.8% of variation in the expression of Counter-Frame 3.

Table 66. Impact of Full Model on Counter-Frame 3


Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.497	0.437		5.708	0.000
Evangelical	-0.292	0.143	-0.076	-2.045	0.041
Conservatism	-0.127	0.042	-0.132	-3.029	0.003
Trump approval	-0.195	0.031	-0.261	-6.280	0.000
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.552	0.143	0.139	3.873	0.000
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.312	0.134	0.091	2.324	0.020
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.277	0.129	-0.077	-2.143	0.032
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.513	0.197	-0.097	-2.602	0.009
Personally know Muslim	0.393	0.110	0.116	3.564	0.000

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom; Adjusted R²= .388

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 6 presents the statistically significant predictors for Counter-Frame 3, organized by standardized beta coefficients and split according to the direction of the relationship between the predictor and expression of the counter-frame.

Figure 6. Predictors of Counter-Frame 3



In the full model, Evangelicalism is the only statistically significant religious predictor. Evangelicals express lower levels of the religious freedom counter-frame than non-Evangelical Americans express. Both conservatism and Trump approval hold their statistically significant negative relationships in the full model. Considering social injustice a top threat to the U.S. also remains a statistically significant political predictor, maintaining its positive relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 3.

Regarding the media consumption predictors, reading the newspaper/magazines as a primary source for gathering information on current events, watching Fox News, and reading *USA Today* all remain statistically significant in the full model. Watching Fox News and reading *USA Today* both hold negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 3; whereas relying on the newspaper as a primary source for information carries a positive relationship with expression of the religious freedom counter-frame. In addition, personally knowing a Muslim has a statistically significant positive relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 3. Finally, none of the demographics function as statistically significant predictors in the full model.

Conclusion

Using multivariate regression analysis, this chapter examined the statistically significant predictors for each frame and counter-frame. Five general types of predictors were analyzed: religious characteristics, political ideology and opinions, media consumption behaviors, familiarity with Islam, and basic demographics. Each set of predictors was analyzed in a partial model against the frame/counter-frame before inclusion in the full model, which combined the five sets of predictors to assess the overall predictive power as well as the resiliency of each predictor.

In analyzing expression of Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist), the full model was able to account for approximately one-third of the variation in expression of Frame 1. In a comparison of adjusted R-squared values across the partial models, the politics-only model explains far more variation than any other partial model. Shifting focus to the specific predictors, Evangelicalism is the only religious predictor to maintain statistical significance in the full model. Evangelical Americans express higher levels of Frame 1 than non-Evangelical Americans. Several political predictors maintain significance in the full model. Approval of Trump carries a positive relationship. Likewise, both Americans who considered terrorism/ISIS the most important topic in the 2016 election and Americans who consider terrorism to be the top international threat express higher levels of Frame 1. Conversely, Americans who support political correctness express lower levels of Frame 1.

Additionally, the more frequently Americans follow national current events, the higher their expression of Frame 1. Similarly, Americans who are knowledgeable about Islam express higher levels of the terrorism frame. Finally, age has a statistically significant positive effect on Frame 1. Though the political predictors outnumber other measures in the full model, select religion, media consumption, familiarity with Islam, and demographic predictors still retain statistical significance in conjunction with the political measures to explain variation in expression of Frame 1.

Regarding expression of Counter-Frame 1 (majority of Muslims are peaceful), the full model explains approximately 28% of variation. In predicting expression of this counter-frame, the politics model accounts for more variation than any other model. The media consumption model explains the second most amount of variation in expression of Counter-Frame 1. In the full model, several political predictors carry statistical significance. As expected, both

conservatism and approval of Trump have negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 1. Americans who support political correctness, on the other hand, express higher levels of Counter-Frame 1, and likewise, Americans who view social injustice as the top national threat express higher levels of Counter-Frame 1. Moving beyond the political predictors, regularly following American current events has a positive relationship with expression of this counter-frame. Likewise, personally knowing a Muslim has a statistically significant positive effect on expression of this counter-frame. Additionally, increased knowledge of Islam leads to increased levels of expression of Counter-Frame 1. None of the religious predictors or demographics maintain statistically significant relationships in the full model for expression of Counter-Frame 1.

In the analysis of Frame 2 (neo-Orientalism/Islam and anti-democratic), the full model explains over one-quarter of the variation in expression of Frame 2. In a comparison of adjusted R-squared values across the partial models, the politics-only model again explains the most variation of any of the partial models. Regarding the specific predictors, approval of Trump significantly increases expression of Frame 2. Similarly, Americans who considered immigration an important topic in the 2016 election express higher levels of Frame 2, as do Americans who consider immigration to be the top threat facing the US today. Conversely, Americans who support political correctness are less likely to express Frame 2. Regarding media consumption, Americans who regularly follow international affairs express higher levels of Frame 2. Finally, reading newspapers/magazines as a primary source for information has a statistically significant negative effect on this frame. Notably, none of the religious predictors, familiarity with Islam measures, or demographics maintain statistically significant relationships with expression of Frame 2 in the full model.

Moving onto Counter-Frame 2 (multiculturalism/Islam compatible with American society), the full model was able to explain 34.5% of the variation in expression of Counter-Frame 2. Based on a comparison of adjusted R-squared values across the partial models, the politics-only model accounts for the highest amount of variation, followed by the media consumption model. As for the specific significant predictors, both conservatism and approval of Trump carry statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 2. In contrast, support for political correctness carries a statistically significant positive relationship with the multiculturalist frame. Additionally, Americans who consider social injustice to be the greatest national threat express higher levels of Counter-Frame 2.

Regarding media consumption behaviors, Americans who regularly follow national current events express higher levels of Counter-Frame 2. Further, Americans who keep up with this news via newspapers and magazines report higher levels of expression of the multiculturalist frame. However, Americans who get their information from reading *USA Today* express lower levels of Counter-Frame 2. Shifting focus, both familiarity with Islam measures serve as statistically significant predictors in the full model. Americans who personally know a Muslim are more likely to express Counter-Frame 2, and likewise, as knowledge of Islam increases, level of expression of Counter-Frame 2 increases. Finally, education has a positive effect on expression of the multiculturalist frame. Overall, none of the religious predictors carry statistical significance in the full model. Instead, political, media, and familiarity with Islam measures drive the full model in explaining variation in expression of Counter-Frame 2.

In analyzing expression of Frame 3 (US as exclusively Judeo-Christian), the full model accounted for 28.8% of variation in expression. In a comparison of adjusted R-squared values across the partial models, the politics-only model explains the most variation. Media accounts for

the second-most variation, followed very closely by the religion partial model. As for the significant predictors in the full model, Evangelicalism holds a positive effect on expression of Frame 3. Additionally, Americans who approve of Trump's performance express higher levels of Frame 3. In contrast, as support of political correctness increases, expression of the Judeo-Christian frame decreases. For both Americans who considered immigration an important topic in the 2016 election and Americans who consider immigration the top national threat, expression of Frame 3 increases with these sentiments. In contrast, Americans who consider social injustice to be the top threat facing the US express lower levels of Frame 3.

Select media predictors also have statistically significant effects in the full model of Frame 3. Reading newspapers/magazines as a primary means of getting news decreases expression of Frame 3. Conversely, getting your news from *Breitbart* increases expression of the Judeo-Christian frame. Regarding familiarity with Islam, Americans who personally know a Muslim are less likely to express this frame. Finally, education has a statistically significant negative relationship with this frame. As education increases, expression of Frame 3 decreases.

Regarding expression of Counter-Frame 3 (defense of religious freedom), the full model explains almost 40% of the variation. In predicting expression of this counter-frame, the politics model again accounts for the vast majority of variation as compared to any other partial model. Turning to the significant predictors within the full model, Evangelicalism has a negative relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 3. Evangelical Americans are less likely to express this counter-frame than are non-Evangelical Americans. Both conservatism and approval of Trump also have negative relationships with expression of Counter-Frame 3. In contrast, Americans who consider social injustice to be the top national threat express higher levels of the religious freedom counter-frame. Regarding media predictors, primarily gathering your news

from newspapers/magazines has a positive relationship with expression of Counter-Frame 3. Conversely, Americans who get their news from watching Fox News or reading *USA Today* are less likely to express this counter-frame. Finally, personally knowing a Muslim has a statistically significant positive effect on expression of the religious freedom counter-frame. None of the demographic variables maintain statistically significant effects on expression of Counter-Frame 3 in the full model.

Broadening our scope beyond the specific analysis of each frame/counter-frame, several trends emerge that run across these models. For all six frames/counter-frames, the political partial model explains the vast majority of the variation accounted for in each full model. In other words, the political measures are significant and persistent predictors in explaining expression of the various frames and counter-frames. Narrowing in on specific measures, approval of Trump is the only predictor that holds statistical significance across all six full models. Additionally, approval of Trump consistently has a positive relationship with expression of the various frames and a negative relationship with expression of the counter-frames. Support for political correctness carries statistical significance in five of the six models, and again, the direction of the relationship is consistent. Support for political correctness carries a positive relationship with expression of counter-frames and a negative relationship with expression of frames. Personally knowing a Muslim, considering social injustice the top national threat, and reading the newspaper as your primary source of information were each significant predictors in four out of six models.

Considering the expansive literature on the relationship between religion and attitudes toward Islam, or non-majority religions more generally (Ciftci et al. 2015; Poushter 2015; Putnam et al. 2012), it is surprising that the religious partial models and individual religious

predictors are not more influential in motivating expression of frames and counter-frames. It is important to recognize that many of these predictors did carry significance in the religious-only models, but their effects were minimized upon inclusion in the full models. As the lone significant religious predictor, Evangelicalism does retain significance in three full models: Frame 1, Frame 3, and Counter-Frame 3, which supports existing literature on the relationship between Evangelicalism and critical attitudes toward non-Evangelical religions, in this case Islam (Trinitapoli 2007). The lack of statistical significance regarding religiosity may suggest that religion's effects on attitudes toward Muslims/Islam are mitigated by other factors, thus, when religious predictors are analyzed alongside other covariates, religious measures' predictive powers are minimized if not erased.

However, it is important to note that the religious measures used in this analysis do not explicitly address religious theology, which very well may carry significant effects on sentiments toward Muslims and Islam. Religious theology refers to the particular religious ideology one holds, such as exclusive monotheism (the belief that there is only one true deity, and all others are nonexistent and false), claims to one true religion, belief in duty of proselytizing, etc. The extent to which a religious actor holds these beliefs could inform and shape their attitudes toward Islam, more so than the frequency or intensity of their religious practice, which was captured in the religiosity measure. Further, the fact that affiliation with Evangelicalism indirectly captures a particular theology may explain the stronger statistical significance of Evangelicalism relative to other religious measures included in this study. Future research on the relationship between religion and attitudes toward Islam would benefit from including measures of theology.

Broadening focus across all predictors, a notable trend emerges regarding the impact of specific predictors between frames and counter-frames. While the direction of the effects of most

predictors remain consistent between frames and counter-frames (e.g., personally knowing a Muslim carries a positive relationship with expression of counter-frames and a negative relationship with expression of frames), two predictors held positive relationships with expression of both frames and counter-frames. In the full model of Frame 1, knowledge of Islam has a statistically significant positive effect. Yet, knowledge of Islam also has statistically significant positive relationships with both Counter-Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2. Recall, this measure is a self-reported assessment of one's knowledge of Islam, which is not necessarily an accurate account of Islam's messages and teachings. Instead, these findings tell us that considering yourself knowledgeable of Islam heightens your expression of these various frames/counter-frames, independent of the accuracy of your information.

In addition, the frequency with which Americans keep up with national current events has varying effects. This predictor has a statistically significant positive effect on both Frame 1 and Frame 2 in the full models. Keeping up with American current events *also* has a positive effect on Counter-Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2. As already discussed, this is likely a product of Americans situating themselves in “echo chambers” as they selectively seek and filter news from certain media sources. This theory is further supported by the fact that none of the specific media sources (e.g., reading the *New York Times* or watching Fox News) varied in their directional effect on frames and counter-frames. In other words, Americans may indeed be regularly following the news, but based on their media sources, their opinions are likely to be reaffirmed and validated by the presentation of stories and “facts” rather than be organically informed.

In the following chapter, the predictive power of these frames and counter-frames is assessed. Using multivariate regression analysis, the frames and counter-frames will function as independent variables, analyzed alongside these other covariates to measure their effects on

attitudes toward policy and social inclusion of Muslims and Islam. In other words, do these frames and counter-frames actually contribute, beyond the tested demographics and behavioral characteristics, to a more nuanced understanding for explaining American attitudes on Islam?

CHAPTER FIVE: WHAT CAN FRAMES TELL US? ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF FRAMES AND COUNTER-FRAMES ON ATTITUDES TOWARD POLICY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION

Now that the predictors for each frame and counter-frame have been established, this chapter seeks to examine how effective these frames are as predictors themselves of attitudes toward policy and social inclusion regarding Muslims and Islam. Four different dependent measures are analyzed in this chapter: (1) support for Executive Order 13769, commonly referred to as the “travel ban” or “Muslim ban,” (2) support for the creation of a Muslim registry, (3) social closeness to Muslims, and (4) comfortability with Islam as a major American religion. In order to assess the effectiveness of the frames as predictors, the analysis uses nested models. For each dependent variable, three models are presented. The first model contains the predictors used in Chapter Five, which include religious measures, political attitudes, media consumption behaviors, familiarity with Islam, and basic demographics. The second model analyzes the exclusive impact of the frames and counter-frames on the given dependent variable. Finally, the third model is the full model that combines the behavioral and attitudinal predictors from Model 1 with the frames and counter-frames from Model 2. The adjusted R-squared will be used to assess overall models’ relative impact, and standardized beta coefficients will be compared to assess individual frames and counter-frames’ relative impact.

Predicting Support for Executive Order 13769 – Travel Ban

On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that quickly became referred to as the “travel ban” or “Muslim ban.” This order contained several provisions, including the following: (1) Suspend the visa issuance and other immigration benefits to nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and

Yemen) for at least 30 days while additional screening and verification procedures are established, and nationals from those countries who already possess a green card or visa status are not permitted re-entry to the United States for 90 days; (2) suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days while the program screening is under review, and after revised procedures are established, applicants may be accepted if they pass these procedures' screening and emigrate from a country considered by the administration to be non-threatening to national security; (3) upon reinstatement, the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program will prioritize the applications of refugees who claim religious persecution and are a religious minority in their home country; (4) indefinitely suspend the acceptance of Syrian refugees to the United States until the President determines Syrian nationals are no longer a threat to national security. Several appeals and revisions on this order have been issued, but the measure analyzed in this section refers specifically to the first executive order.

For this measure, respondents were first asked if they had heard of this executive order, and for respondents who had (n=981), they were then asked their general support or opposition to the order. This measure of support serves as the dependent variable for this section. As can be seen in the frequency table on the following page, approximately one-third of respondents strongly oppose the executive order. On the other end of the spectrum, a combined 28.4% of respondents support or strongly support the executive order.

Table 67. In general, to what extent do you support or oppose the executive order?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly oppose	323	29.1	32.9	32.9
	Oppose	125	11.3	12.7	45.7
	Somewhat oppose	80	7.2	8.2	53.8
	Neither support nor oppose	74	6.7	7.5	61.4
	Somewhat support	100	9.0	10.2	71.6
	Support	109	9.8	11.1	82.7
	Strongly support	170	15.3	17.3	100.0
	Total	981	88.5	100.0	
Missing	System	128	11.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

Attitude and Demographic Predictors

Table 68 presents the findings from the regression of religious, political, media, familiarity, and demographic predictors on support of the executive order. Because this model includes so many independent variables, only the statistically significant predictors are presented in the table below. The full version of this table can be found in Appendix C.

Table 68. Impact of Attitudes and Demographics on Support of Executive Order Travel Ban

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.487	0.363		4.097	0.000
Conservatism	0.243	0.038	0.183	6.472	0.000
Trump approval	0.533	0.028	0.516	18.888	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.261	0.046	-0.134	-5.672	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	0.310	0.114	0.060	2.726	0.007
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.487	0.144	0.076	3.372	0.001
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.258	0.111	-0.052	-2.318	0.021
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.414	0.167	-0.051	-2.484	0.013

Dependent Variable: Support of Travel Ban; Adjusted R²=.748

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Strikingly, this model accounts for nearly three-fourths of the variation in support of the executive order. Looking at specific predictors, both conservatism and approval of Trump hold statistically significant positive relationships with support of the executive order. Conversely, support for political correctness carries an inverse relationship with support of the order. Americans who considered immigration the most important topic in the election report higher support for this executive order than Americans who did not consider immigration to be of primary importance. Likewise, Americans who consider immigration to be the top national threat report higher support than Americans who do not consider it a top threat. Both of these relationships are statistically significant. Regarding specific media sources, Americans who watch CNN as well as Americans who read *Al Jazeera* are each likely to hold less support for the executive order than Americans who do not use these sources. None of the religious predictors, familiarity with Islam measures, or demographics have statistically significant relationships with support of the executive order.

Frames as Predictors

Table 69 presents the results of the regression analysis of the frames and counter-frames on support of the executive ban. This partial model accounts for over 50% of the variation in support, and five of the six frames/counter-frames are statistically significant predictors. Counter-Frame 2 (multiculturalism/Islam harmonious with US) is the only predictor that is not statistically significant. Among the significant predictors, the directions of the relationships of these frames and counter-frames perform as expected—frames have a positive effect while counter-frames have a negative effect on support. For example, as Americans' expression of the terrorism frame (Frame 1) increases, support for the executive order also increases. As

Americans' expression of the religious freedom counter-frame (Counter-Frame 3) increases, support for the executive order decreases.

Table 69. Impact of Frames on Support of Executive Order Travel Ban

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.914	0.151		25.880	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.291	0.030	0.269	9.732	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	-0.106	0.036	-0.085	-2.915	0.004
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic	0.085	0.038	0.076	2.229	0.026
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	-0.014	0.046	-0.011	-0.299	0.765
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	0.114	0.048	0.078	2.374	0.018
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	-0.537	0.053	-0.388	-10.072	0.000

Dependent Variable: Support of Travel Ban; Adjusted R²=.535

In terms of the relative importance of each frame and counter-frame, it is helpful to reference the standardized beta coefficients. Based on these standardized coefficients, we can assert that Frame 1, the view that Muslims are terrorists, is the most influential frame in predicting support of the executive order, and this is intuitively logical. Americans who are fearful that Muslims are terrorists and believe Islam promotes violence would rationally support measures to prevent Muslims from entering their country. Conversely, counter-Frame 3—defense of religious freedom—is the most impactful counter-frame in explaining support of the executive order. An increase in one standard deviation in expression of Counter-Frame 3 leads to a decrease of .388 standard deviations of support for the executive order. Again, this result makes intuitive sense. Americans who vehemently support religious freedom would be opposed to a policy that appears to discriminate on the basis of religion.

Full Model

To assess the extent to which the frames/counter-frames contribute their own predictive power, the full model combines these frames and counter-frames with the attitude and demographic predictors from Model 1. The full model explains nearly 80% of variation in support of the executive order. Table 70 presents the findings from the full model regression on support of the executive order. Because this model includes so many independent variables, only the statistically significant predictors are presented in the table below. See Appendix C for the complete table.

Table 70. Impact of Full Model on Support of Executive Order Travel Ban


Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.139	0.345		6.203	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.060	0.027	0.055	2.254	0.025
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	-0.312	0.045	-0.226	-6.950	0.000
Conservatism	0.195	0.034	0.147	5.658	0.000
Trump approval	0.445	0.027	0.432	16.769	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.234	0.043	-0.120	-5.482	0.000
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.355	0.131	0.055	2.698	0.007
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.198	0.101	-0.040	-1.961	0.050
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.371	0.151	-0.045	-2.459	0.014

Dependent Variable: Support of Travel Ban; Adjusted $R^2=.794$

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 7 presents the statistically significant predictors for support of the executive order, organized by standardized beta values and split according to the direction of the relationship.

Figure 7. Predictors for Support of Executive Order



Among the frames and counter-frames, only Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 3 maintain statistical significance in the full model. Recall, both Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 3 were the most impactful frames/counter-frames in the partial model. Additionally, these predictors maintained the direction of their relationships from the partial model. Among the political predictors, conservatism and approval of Trump retain their statistically significant positive relationships with support of the executive order. Additionally, support of political correctness remains a statistically significant predictor, sharing a negative relationship with support of the executive order. Americans who consider immigration a top threat to the U.S. have more support for the executive order than Americans who don't consider immigration a top threat, and this relationship is significant. From the partial model to the full model, considering immigration an important topic in the election lost significance.

Regularly watching CNN and reading *Al Jazeera* each have a statistically significant negative impact on support of the executive order. Americans who use either source to get

information on current affairs will report lower levels of support for the executive order. None of the religious predictors, familiarity with Islam measures, or demographics carry statistical significance in the full model of support for the executive order.

Predicting Support of Muslim Registry

While no legislation has been passed to create a Muslim registry, it is a policy concept that has been publicly proposed and supported by numerous politicians, including President Trump. For this measure, respondents were asked their general support or opposition to the creation of a Muslim registry. Approximately 30% of respondents strongly oppose a registry, and an additional 25% oppose or somewhat oppose a registry. Conversely, just one in ten respondents strongly support the creation of a registry, with an additional combined 18% who support or somewhat support a registry. See Table 71 below for reference.

Table 71. Support of Muslim Registry

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly oppose	320	28.9	30.2	30.2
	Oppose	147	13.3	13.9	44.1
	Somewhat oppose	113	10.2	10.7	54.8
	Neither support nor oppose	180	16.2	17.0	71.8
	Somewhat support	116	10.5	11.0	82.8
	Support	73	6.6	6.9	89.7
	Strongly support	109	9.8	10.3	100.0
	Total	1058	95.4	100.0	
Missing	System	51	4.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

Attitude and Demographic Predictors

Table 72 presents the results of the partial model regression of attitude, behavior, and demographic predictors on support of a Muslim registry. Only the statistically significant

predictors are presented in the table. For the full version of this table, see Appendix C. This model explains over one-third (34.5%) of the variation in support of a Muslim registry.

Table 72. *Impact of Attitudes and Demographics on Support of Muslim Registry*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.508	0.495		5.071	0.000
Trump approval	0.318	0.038	0.353	8.287	0.000
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.688	0.197	0.122	3.500	0.000
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.447	0.211	-0.076	-2.123	0.034
Personally know Muslim	-0.498	0.136	-0.121	-3.661	0.000
Education	-0.135	0.047	-0.102	-2.881	0.004

Dependent Variable: Support for Muslim Registry; Adjusted R²=.345

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Approval of Trump has a statistically significant positive effect on support of a Muslim registry. Additionally, Americans who consider immigration a top national threat express higher support for a registry. No other political predictors had statistically significant relationships in this model. Regarding media consumption, reading the *New York Times* is the only statistically significant predictor, and it holds a negative relationship with support of a registry. As one would expect, Americans who personally know a Muslim have less support for a Muslim registry, and this relationship is statistically significant. Additionally, education has a statistically significant negative relationship with support of a Muslim registry. No other demographic predictors had a significant relationship. None of the religious predictors had a significant effect on support of a Muslim registry.

Frames as Predictors

Table 73 presents the results of the regression of the frames and counter-frames on support for the creation of a Muslim registry. This model accounts for over 50% (53.4%) of the

variation in support, and all six frames/counter-frames are statistically significant predictors. All three frames carry positive relationships with support of a registry, which is the expected effect. Counter-Frame 1 (majority of Muslims are peaceful) and Counter-Frame 3 (defense of religious freedom) both hold negative relationships with support of a registry, which again function as anticipated. Surprisingly, Counter-Frame 2—the multiculturalist counter-frame—has a positive relationship with support, meaning as expression of the multiculturalist counter-frame increases, support for a Muslim registry also increases. In bivariate analysis, Counter-Frame 2 consistently has a negative relationship with support of a registry³¹, thus one or more of the other frames/counter-frames in the model is exerting a moderating effect on the relationship between Counter-Frame 2 and support. Among the frames and counter-frames, Counter-Frame 3 is far and away the most impactful predictor with a standardized beta of -.539. Frame 1 is the second strongest predictor with a standardized beta coefficient of .141.

Table 73. Impact of Frames on Support of Muslim Registry

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	4.056	0.127		31.815	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.133	0.025	0.141	5.294	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	-0.118	0.031	-0.109	-3.861	0.000
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View-Islam as Anti-Democratic	0.097	0.032	0.098	2.995	0.003
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	0.100	0.039	0.091	2.575	0.010
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	0.091	0.040	0.071	2.252	0.025
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	-0.653	0.045	-0.539	-14.537	0.000

Dependent Variable: Support for Muslim registry; Adjusted R²=.534

³¹ The Pearson correlation coefficient is -.545; the gamma is -.600; and the standardized beta coefficient is -.545.

Full Model

Table 74 presents the findings from the full model regression on support a Muslim registry. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented in the table below. For the complete table, see Appendix C. The full model accounts for 55.7% of variation in support of a registry, which is approximately just 2% more variation explained than in the partial model of frames/counter-frames.

Table 74. Impact of Full Model on Support of Muslim Registry


Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.865	0.427		9.045	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.122	0.033	0.129	3.712	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	-0.099	0.038	-0.091	-2.620	0.009
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic	0.087	0.039	0.088	2.201	0.028
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	0.102	0.048	0.092	2.134	0.033
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	-0.581	0.056	-0.480	-10.427	0.000
Trump approval	0.154	0.033	0.171	4.689	0.000
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.446	0.163	0.079	2.737	0.006
Education	-0.086	0.039	-0.065	-2.212	0.027
Region- South	-0.285	0.141	-0.065	-2.024	0.043

Dependent Variable: Support for Muslim registry; Adjusted $R^2=.557$

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 8 presents the statistically significant predictors for support of the executive order, organized by standardized beta values and split according to the direction of the relationship.

Figure 8. Predictors of Support for Muslim Registry



With the exception of Frame 3, all of the other frames and counter-frames remain statistically significant predictors. The unexpected positive relationship remains between Counter-Frame 2 and support of a Muslim registry in the full model. Among the political predictors, approval of Trump maintains its statistically significant positive relationship with support of a registry. Additionally, viewing immigration as the top threat to the U.S. remains a statistically significant predictor, holding a positive relationship with support of a Muslim registry. As in the partial model, no other political predictors carry statistical significance.

In the full model, reading the *New York Times* loses statistical significance in its relationship to support of a registry. Likewise, personally knowing a Muslim loses its statistically significant relationship in the full model. Among the demographic variables, education remains a statistically significant predictor. Additionally, living in the south becomes statistically significant, and it holds a negative relationship. Meaning, Americans who live in the South hold less support for a Muslim registry than do Americans living in the Northeast. In the full model,

none of the religious predictors, media consumption predictors, or familiarity with Islam carry statistically significant effects on support of a Muslim registry. This model is driven by the frames and counter-frames and a few select political and demographic measures.

Predicting Social Closeness to Muslims

This study's measure of social closeness, which is a composite measure, captures respondents' levels of comfort across various social relationship scenarios with a Muslim. This social closeness scale is a summation of seven items, and each individual item's response categories range from (1) "extremely uncomfortable" to (6) "extremely comfortable"³². The seven items included in this scale are:

- *A Muslim in the US as a non-citizen, temporary visitor*
- *A Muslim being a US citizen*
- *A Muslim co-worker*
- *A Muslim neighbor on the same street*
- *A Muslim as a close personal friend*
- *A Muslim as a close relative by marriage*
- *A Muslim as the President of the United States*

This scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .949.

While this measure is heavily inspired by the Bogardus (1933) social distance scale, this social closeness scale varies in a few important ways. Most notably, the construction of this composite measure deviates from that used in the Bogardus scale. As noted, this social closeness scale is a straight summation of the seven component items, meaning no single item is weighted more heavily than any other item, and the order of these items is irrelevant in the construction of the scale. In contrast, the Bogardus social distance scale is a cumulative scale, one which assumes a logical progression of either acceptance or distance as the items increase in social

³² The frequencies for each individual item can be referenced in Appendix D.

intimacy. For example, the Bogardus scale expects that if the respondent accepts a Muslim as a US citizen, then they would also accept a Muslim as a non-citizen, temporary visitor. Likely because of the nature of the frames non-Muslim Americans hold regarding Muslims, such as the view that Islam incites violence and promotes terrorism, the items do not “build” in a cumulative pattern. To illustrate this point, Table 75 presents the mean score of each component item.

Table 75. Means of Social Closeness Component Items

<i>How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios?</i>	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
A Muslim in the US as a non-citizen, temporary visitor	1105	3.97	1.557
A Muslim being a US citizen	1097	4.64	1.465
A Muslim co-worker	1098	4.68	1.453
A Muslim neighbor on the same street	1104	4.54	1.546
A Muslim as a close personal friend	1101	4.72	1.509
A Muslim as a close relative by marriage	1104	4.47	1.591
A Muslim as the President of the United States	1103	3.45	1.911

As a reminder, each item’s values range from 1 to 6, with a 1 indicating “extremely uncomfortable” and 6 indicating “extremely comfortable.” If these items performed as the Bogardus social distance scale expected, then respondents would be most comfortable with a Muslim in the US as a non-citizen visitor, and as the social relationships increase in intimacy, fewer respondents ought to be comfortable with the given scenario. As shown in the table above, the means do not follow the expected pattern of the Bogardus social distance scale. Instead, we see that a Muslim in the US as a temporary visitor is one of the scenarios with which the respondents are *least* comfortable. Additionally, the scenario of a Muslim U.S. President has the lowest reported level of comfort of any items, and while this item is not traditional of the Bogardus scale as it doesn’t reflect an interpersonal social relationship, it was included in this study because of the social and political relevance regarding the topic of Muslims’ place in U.S.

society and culture. More specifically, the extent to which an American accepts a Muslim U.S. President speaks to the social inclusion of Islam at large.

Table 76 presents the descriptive statistics of the social closeness scale used in this study's analysis. The scale ranges from 7 to 42, with higher values indicating more willingness of social closeness to Muslims. A respondent who has a composite score of 7 reported they were "extremely uncomfortable" across all 7 relationship scenarios. At the other end, respondents who have a score of 42 reported they were "extremely comfortable" with each of the 7 scenarios. The sample average is 30.6, which indicates more comfort than discomfort with social closeness.

Table 76. Descriptive Statistics of Social Closeness Scale

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Social Distance Scale	1082	7.00	42.00	30.6081	9.63544
Valid N (listwise)	1082				

As seen in Table 77 below, one-quarter of the respondents have a value or 24 or lower, indicating they're slightly uncomfortable on most closeness measures. The median value is 32, which means these respondents are between slightly comfortable and moderately comfortable on most closeness items. The IQR for this measure is 16.

Table 77. Social Closeness Quartiles

<i>Percentile</i>	<i>Value</i>
25 th	24.0
50 th	32.0
75 th	40.0

Attitude and Demographic Predictors

Table 78 presents the results of the partial model regression of attitude, behavior, and demographic predictors on the social closeness scale. Only the statistically significant predictors

are presented in the table. For the full version of this table, see Appendix C. This partial model explains one-third of the variation in social closeness to Muslims.

Table 78. Impact of Attitudes and Demographics on Social Closeness

Model*	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	28.975	2.358		12.287	0.000
Religiosity	-0.102	0.041	-0.096	-2.472	0.014
Conservatism	-0.641	0.244	-0.117	-2.630	0.009
Trump approval	-0.901	0.183	-0.211	-4.918	0.000
Top threat to US - Immigration	-2.484	0.937	-0.093	-2.650	0.008
Top threat to US - Social injustice	2.075	0.844	0.091	2.459	0.014
Follow American public affairs	1.075	0.456	0.118	2.358	0.019
Follow international public affairs	-0.872	0.438	-0.099	-1.989	0.047
Personally know Muslim	2.606	0.648	0.134	4.019	0.000
Education	0.449	0.224	0.071	2.005	0.045
Income	0.322	0.119	0.102	2.705	0.007
Region- Midwest	1.808	0.919	0.074	1.967	0.050

Dependent Variable: Social Closeness Scale; Adjusted R²=.333

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Religiosity has a statistically significant negative effect on comfortability with social closeness to Muslims. In other words, as religiosity increases, social closeness decreases. Likewise, among political predictors, both conservatism and approval of Trump hold statistically significant negative relationships with social closeness. Additionally, Americans who consider immigration a top national threat are less comfortable with social closeness to Muslims than are Americans who do not consider immigration a top threat. Conversely, Americans who are most concerned with social injustice as a threat to the U.S. are more comfortable with social closeness to Muslims. Both of these relationships are statistically significant.

Among the media consumptions predictors, frequently following American current events has a statistically significant positive relationship with social closeness to Muslims.

Conversely, frequently following international current events has a negative impact on social closeness to Muslims. Regarding statistically significant familiarity predictors, Americans who personally know a Muslim express higher social closeness to Muslims. Similarly, education and income each have a statistically significant positive relationship with social closeness. Finally, Americans who live in the Midwest are more comfortable with social closeness to Muslims than are Americans in the Northeast.

Frames as Predictors

Table 79 presents the results of the regression of the frames and counter-frames on social closeness to Muslims. This model accounts for an impressive 75.5% of the variation in social closeness. With the exception of Frame 2 (neo-Orientalist frame), the remaining five frames/counter-frames are statistically significant predictors. The direction of the relationships between social closeness and each Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2 are surprising. One would expect Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist) to have a negative relationship to social closeness, yet the relationship is positive in the model. Further, one would expect Counter-Frame 2 (multiculturalism/Islam harmonious with US) to have a positive relationship with social closeness, yet the predictor carries a negative relationship in the model. In bivariate analyses, the frame³³ and counter-frame³⁴ consistently demonstrate the expected direction of relationship with social distance. In exploratory analysis using three-way crosstabs, it appears Counter-Frame 3 (defense of religious freedom) has an interaction effect on each Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2 in their relationship with social closeness.

³³ The Pearson correlation coefficient is -.402; the gamma is -.362; and the standardized beta coefficient is -.402.

³⁴ The Pearson correlation coefficient is .571; the gamma is .664; and the standardized beta coefficient is .571.

Table 79. Impact of Frames on Social Closeness Scale

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	27.744	0.432		64.159	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.374	0.086	0.084	4.378	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	0.627	0.104	0.122	6.037	0.000
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic	0.051	0.109	0.011	0.470	0.639
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	-0.469	0.132	-0.090	-3.541	0.000
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	-3.279	0.137	-0.540	-23.901	0.000
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	2.708	0.152	0.473	17.774	0.000

Dependent Variable: Social Closeness Scale; Adjusted R²=.755

Regarding relative importance of frames and counter-frames within the model, Frame 3 and Counter-Frame 3 are the most impactful predictors with standardized betas of -.540 and .473, respectively. As expression of the Judeo-Christian frame increases, comfort with social closeness decreases. Conversely, as expression of the religious freedom counter-frame increases, social closeness increases as well.

Full Model

Table 80 presents the findings from the full model regression on social closeness to Muslims. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented in the table below. See Appendix C for the complete table. The full model accounts for less than 1% more of total variation in social closeness than the partial frames/counter-frames model accounted for, which suggests the frames and counter-frames largely drive the explanation in variation of social closeness.

Table 80. Impact of Full Model on Social Closeness Scale


Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	25.199	1.481		17.020	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist	0.273	0.114	0.061	2.397	0.017
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	0.521	0.130	0.101	3.996	0.000
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	-0.512	0.165	-0.098	-3.095	0.002
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	-3.176	0.171	-0.523	-18.545	0.000
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	2.594	0.193	0.454	13.438	0.000
Income	0.168	0.071	0.053	2.350	0.019
Region- Midwest	2.073	0.550	0.085	3.766	0.000
Region- South	1.018	0.488	0.049	2.087	0.037
Region- West	1.223	0.518	0.055	2.361	0.019

Dependent Variable: Social Closeness Scale; Adjusted R²=.762

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 9 presents the statistically significant predictors for support of the executive order, organized by standardized beta values and split according to the direction of the relationship.

Figure 9. Predictors of Social Closeness



The five statistically significant frames and counter-frames from the partial model retain their significant effects; Frame 2 (neo-Orientalist frame) remains a statistically *insignificant* predictor of social closeness. The unexpected positive effect of Frame 1 and the negative effect of Counter-Frame 2 remain in the full model. Among the demographics, income remains a statistically significant predictor, holding a positive relationship with social closeness. Additionally, all of the region measures have statistically significant positive effects on social closeness. So, Americans from the Midwest, South, or West are more comfortable with social closeness to Muslims than are Americans in the Northeast. None of the religious predictors, political measures, media consumption behaviors, or familiarity measures retain statistical significance in the full model. Variation in social closeness is primarily explained by the frames and counter-frames, and a few demographic characteristics.

Predicting Comfortability with Islam as a Major American Religion

As a final measure to assess general attitudes regarding the social inclusion of Muslims and Islam, the analysis explores level of comfort with the idea of Islam becoming a major American religion. Respondents were given answer categories ranging from extremely uncomfortable to extremely comfortable. As seen in

Table 81 on the following page, two-fifths of respondents are either “extremely” or “moderately uncomfortable” with the idea of Islam being a major American religion. In contrast, approximately half as many respondents express being “moderately” or “extremely comfortable” with this idea.

Table 81. Level of comfort with Islam becoming major American religion

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Extremely uncomfortable	294	26.5	28.7	28.7
	Moderately uncomfortable	116	10.5	11.3	40.0
	Slightly uncomfortable	121	10.9	11.8	51.8
	Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	263	23.7	25.7	77.5
	Slightly comfortable	42	3.8	4.1	81.6
	Moderately comfortable	84	7.6	8.2	89.8
	Extremely comfortable	105	9.5	10.2	100.0
	Total	1025	92.4	100.0	
Missing	Don't know/Decline to answer	81	7.3		
	System	3	0.3		
	Total	84	7.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

Attitude and Demographic Predictors

Table 82 presents the results of the partial model regression of attitude, behavior, and demographic predictors on comfortability with Islam as a major American religion. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented in the table. For the full version of this table, see Appendix C. This partial model explains one-third (33.1%) of the variation in level of comfort with Islam as a major American religion. Evangelicalism has a statistically significant negative effect on level of comfort; evangelical Americans express less comfort with Islam being a major American religion than non-evangelical Americans express. Among political predictors, both conservatism and approval of Trump have statistically significant negative relationships with level of comfort. Additionally, Americans who considered terrorism and ISIS the most important topic in the 2016 election are less comfortable with Islam being a major American religion. Conversely, as support of political correctness increases, comfort with Islam being a major American religion increases.

Table 82. *Impact of attitudes and demographics on comfort with Islam becoming major American religion*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.751	0.488		7.684	0.000
Evangelical	-0.503	0.174	-0.111	-2.894	0.004
Conservatism	-0.155	0.050	-0.137	-3.078	0.002
Trump approval	-0.166	0.038	-0.188	-4.373	0.000
Support political correctness	0.260	0.062	0.156	4.197	0.000
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.309	0.149	-0.068	-2.070	0.039
Personally know Muslim	0.269	0.134	0.067	2.006	0.045
Knowledge of Islam	0.195	0.069	0.101	2.840	0.005

Dependent Variable: Comfortability with Islam becoming major American religion; Adjusted R²= .331

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Both familiarity measures are statistically significant in this model. Americans who personally know a Muslim express a higher level of comfort with Islam being a major American religion than Americans who do not personally know a Muslim. Additionally, as Americans' knowledge of Islam increases, their level of comfort with Islam being a major religion also increases. In the partial model, none of the media consumption predictors or demographics had statistically significant effects on level of comfort with the idea of Islam being a major American religion.

Frames as Predictors

Table 83 presents the results of the regression of the frames and counter-frames on comfort with Islam as a major American religion. This model accounts for 58.7% of the variation in level of comfort. Five of the six frames/counter-frames are statistically significant predictors. Frame 2 (neo-Orientalist frame) does not have a statistically significant impact on comfort with Islam as a major religion. Among the statistically significant predictors, the frames and counter-frames perform as expected in terms of the direction of these relationships—frames have a

negative effect while counter-frames have a positive effect on comfort level. For example, as Americans' expression of the religious freedom counter-frame (Counter-Frame 3) increases, comfort with the idea of Islam being a major American religion increases. On the other side, Americans who express the Judeo-Christian frame (Frame 3) are less likely to be comfortable with Islam being a major religion, as one would expect. Regarding relative importance of measures within the model, Counter-Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2 are the most impactful predictors with standardized betas of .202 and .205, respectively.

Table 83. Impact of Frames on Comfort with Islam becoming Major American Religion

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.775	0.119		23.294	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	-0.153	0.024	-0.165	-6.480	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	0.214	0.029	0.202	7.496	0.000
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View-Islam as Anti-Democratic	-0.058	0.030	-0.060	-1.911	0.056
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	0.221	0.036	0.205	6.057	0.000
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	-0.242	0.038	-0.193	-6.414	0.000
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	0.179	0.042	0.152	4.270	0.000

Dependent Variable: Comfortability with Islam becoming major American religion; Adjusted R²=.587

Full Model

Table 84 presents the findings from the full model regression on comfort with Islam as a major American religion. Only the statistically significant predictors are presented in the table below. See Appendix C for the complete table. The full model accounts for 59.0% of variation in level of comfort, which explains just 0.03% more variation than the partial model of frames, suggesting the frames and counter-frames carry most of the predictive power in the full model.

Table 84. Impact of Full Model on Comfort with Islam becoming Major American Religion


Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.858	0.401		7.120	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist	-0.114	0.031	-0.124	-3.690	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	0.207	0.035	0.195	5.864	0.000
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	0.189	0.045	0.175	4.201	0.000
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	-0.236	0.046	-0.188	-5.080	0.000
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	0.181	0.052	0.153	3.451	0.001
Support political correctness	0.121	0.050	0.073	2.439	0.015
Knowledge of Islam	0.143	0.055	0.074	2.601	0.010

Dependent Variable: Comfortability with Islam becoming major American religion; Adjusted $R^2=.590$

*This is an abbreviated version of the table in which only statistically significant predictors from the model are displayed. For complete table, see Appendix C.

Figure 10 below presents the statistically significant predictors for support of the executive order, organized by standardized beta values and split according to the direction of the relationship.

Figure 10. Predictors of Comfortability with Islam as a Major American Religion



All of the statistically significant frames and counter-frames from the partial model remain statistically significant predictors in the full model. As expression of the terrorist frame increases, comfort with Islam as a major religion decreases, which is the same effect that expression of Frame 3 (US as Judeo-Christian) imparts. For all three counter-frames, as expression of that counter-frame increases, level of comfort with Islam also increases, which is as expected. Support for political correctness also retains its statistically significant positive relationship with comfort. Conservatism, Trump approval, and importance of the topic of terrorism in the election all lose their statistical significance in the full model.

Among the familiarity measures knowledge of Islam remains statistically significance. As knowledge of Islam increases, level of comfort also increases. Personally knowing a Muslim did not retain its statistical significance from the partial model. Further, within the full model, none of the religious predictors, media consumption behaviors, or demographics have statistically significant effects on comfort with Islam being a major religion. Instead, the frames, counter-frames, one political measure, and one familiarity with Islam measure exclusively drive this model.

Conclusion

Through the use of nested multivariate models, this chapter assesses the impact frames and counter-frames have in predicting Americans' attitudes on policy and social inclusion regarding Muslims and Islam. Specifically, the dependent measures were support of Executive Order 13769 (the "travel ban"), support for the creation of a Muslim registry, comfortability with social closeness to Muslims, and comfortability with the idea of Islam as a major American religion.

In analyzing support for the executive order, the full model was able to account for approximately 80% of variation in support. In a comparison of adjusted R-squared values between the two partial models, the attitude and demographics model explains more variation in support of the travel ban than does the frames/counter-frames model. However, Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist) and Counter-Frame 3 (defense of religious freedom) maintain statistically significant effects even when included in the full model. Expression of Frame 1 increases support of the travel ban while expression of Counter-Frame 3 decreases support. Quite a few political predictors maintain statistical significance in the full model. Both conservatism and approval of Trump increase Americans' support of the executive order. Additionally, Americans who consider immigration to be the top threat facing the US today have increased support of the travel ban. Conversely, as support of political correctness increases, support for the executive order decreases. Finally, a few of the media consumption predictors maintain statistical significance in the full model. Regularly watching CNN and reading *Al Jazeera* to gather your news decrease support of the executive order. Notably, religion, familiarity with Islam, and demographics did not carry statistically significant effects on support of the travel ban. In other words, support is driven by political characteristics, and a few frames/counter-frames and media consumption behaviors.

Regarding support for the creation of a Muslim registry, the full model explains 55.7% of variation in support. In predicting this measure, the frames/counter-frames partial model accounts for more variation than the attitudes and demographics partial model explains. In the full model, five of the frames and counter-frames carry statistically significant effects. All of these frames/counter-frames carry the expected relationship with the exception of Counter-Frame 2 (multiculturalism/Islam harmonious with US), which surprisingly has a positive relationship

with support of a Muslim registry. Among the political predictors, approval of Trump increases Americans' support of the creation of a Muslim registry, which isn't surprising considering Trump publicly endorsed this idea while on the 2016 campaign trail. Additionally, Americans who consider immigration to be a top national threat show increased support for a Muslim registry. Regarding demographic predictors, education has a negative effect. Additionally, compared to Americans in the Northeast, Americans living in the South have less support for a registry. Religion, media consumption, and familiarity with Islam do not have statistically significant effects on support of a registry. Instead, support is driven by the frames and counter-frames, and a few political characteristics and demographics.

Moving onto the next measure, the full model explains over three-fourths of the variation in comfortability with social closeness to Muslims. Further, the frames/counter-frames partial model accounts for the vast majority of this variation in comparison to the attitudes and demographics partial model. In the full model, five of the six frames and counter-frames carry statistically significant effects. However, on this measure, both Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist) and Counter-Frame 2 (multiculturalism/Islam harmonious with US) have unexpected effects on social closeness. Despite having a negative effect in bivariate analysis, expression of Frame 1 increases social closeness when analyzed in the full model. Likewise, the direction of the relationship between Counter-Frame 2 and social closeness reverses between bivariate analysis and inclusion in multivariate regression.

Interestingly, none of the religious predictors, political indicators, media consumption behaviors, or familiarity with Islam have statistically significant effects on social closeness in the full model. Instead, income and region serve as significant predictors. As income increases, Americans' comfortability with social closeness to Muslims also increases. And Americans

living in the South, Midwest, or West all show higher social closeness to Muslims than Americans living in the Northeast show. In sum, comfortability with social closeness to Muslims is primarily driven by the frames/counter-frames Americans hold as well as a few select demographic characteristics.

As a final dependent measure of social inclusion, this chapter analyzed comfortability with the idea of Islam being a major American religion. The full model accounts for approximately three-fifths of variation in level of comfortability. In a comparison of the adjusted R-squared values between the two partial models, the frames/counter-frames model explains more variation in comfortability than the attitudes and demographics model. In the full model, five of the six frames and counter-frames serve as statistically significant predictors, and each of these frames carry the expected direction of the relationship—frames have a negative effect on comfortability whereas counter-frames have a positive effect. Among political predictors, support for political correctness maintains a positive relationship with comfortability of Islam as a major religion. Finally, self-assessed knowledge of Islam has a positive relationship with comfortability. In the final model, religion, media consumption, and demographics do not have statistically significant effects on comfortability. Instead, this measure is largely driven by the frames and counter-frames Americans hold as well their support of political correctness and knowledge of Islam.

Looking across these four dependent measures, the frames/counter-frames partial models explained far more variation than the attitude and demographics partial models in three of four instances. In terms of specific predictors in the full models, Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 3 carry statistically significant effects across all four dependent measures. However, it needs to be noted that Frame 1 does have a surprising relationship to social closeness, but as discussed, that is

likely mitigated by Counter-Frame 3. Shifting focus, political predictors appear to play a larger role in the first two measures, both of which deal with policy, than in the latter two measures, which speak more to interpersonal and cultural social inclusion. In both support of the travel ban and the creation of a Muslim registry, approval of Trump *and* concern with immigration as a top national threat each carry statistically significant positive effects. It is unsurprising that Trump approval has these positive relationships as both policies have been either enacted or endorsed by Trump. The concern over immigration logically shares a positive relationship with support for the executive order, which limits entry into the country. However, the positive relationship between concern of immigration and support of a Muslim registry speaks to an underlying sentiment as a Muslim registry doesn't necessarily "resolve" immigration. This finding suggests that some critical attitudes toward Muslims and Islam may have less to do with the religious tradition and more to do with general opposition to immigrants and outgroups (Kalkan et al. 2009).

Notably, none of the religious measures impart statistically significant results in any of the four full models, which is counter to previous studies that show religiosity, religious traditionalism, and evangelicalism as relevant predictors (Altermeyer 2003; Ciftci et al. 2015; Kalkan et al. 2009; Pew Research Center 2014a; Poushter 2015; Putnam et al. 2012). This study's findings suggest that the relationships of religiosity and evangelicalism with attitudes on Islam are largely driven by other predictors, so when these religious measures are included in multivariate analysis, particularly with frames and counter-frames, the effects of religious predictors disappear.

In conclusion, the frames and counter-frames were the only predictors to maintain statistical significance across all four of the policy and social inclusion measures. Additionally, it

is important to stress that even when the frames and counter-frames were included in the full model, controlling for the other religious, political, media, familiarity, and demographic predictors, many of the frames and counter-frames retained statistically significant effects. This tells us that the frames and counter-frames provide a unique contribution beyond the commonly cited covariates (religiosity, evangelicalism, political affiliation, education, etc.) to our understanding of American attitudes toward policy and social inclusion of Muslims and Islam.

CHAPTER SIX: WHAT'S IN A NAME? ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORIC USED IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

As discussed, previous studies show a correlation between political party affiliation and sentiments on Islam and Muslims, with Republican affiliation typically correlating with more critical views of Islam. However, the mechanisms through which this relationship exists are not well established. This chapter expands on the analysis thus far through a discourse analysis of the rhetoric used by the major party candidates during the 2016 presidential primary and general election campaigns. As these candidates are the selected representatives and public figures of their respective parties, an examination of the candidates' rhetoric illuminates the national political discourse on Islam from a top-down approach. To that end, the Twitter feeds and debate transcripts were analyzed for the top two candidates from the Republican and Democratic primaries—Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders. The objectives of this chapter are to: (1) examine the extent to which the espoused frames/counter-frames vary by each candidate and by party, and (2) assess how the frames/counter-frames may be strategically employed when confronted with conflicting frames or other political situations.

Twitter and the debates were selected as sources for data based on their generally open accessibility between candidates and voters. Unlike some other avenues for contact with candidates, such as attending rallies or donor meet-and-greets, both Twitter and the debates could be viewed by virtually any American with access to the internet. This open-access communication then has the potential for greater dissemination of the ideas expressed on these particular platforms. Twitter, specifically, was included as a platform for analysis because it represents a less formal, more direct path for sharing information between the candidate and their base. Further, at the time, a tweet was limited to 140 characters, so the candidate was forced to

distill their ideas down into a succinct and straightforward message. Since data collection, the nature and impact of Twitter as a social media platform has continued to evolve and grow, particularly in light of President Trump's prolific tweeting since assuming office. Debates were included as the second source of data in order to capture a more formal, official platform from which the candidates communicate to voters. Additionally, the debate format is structured as a dialogue with back-and-forth between candidates, which provides the opportunity to examine how frames and counter-frames may interact. Further, the moderator controls, to an extent, the topics covered, sometimes forcing candidates to express their views more fully than can be done through tweets.

For the Twitter analysis, each candidate's feeds were assessed, beginning on the date they announced their candidacy for the duration of their campaigns. Through the search filter feature on Twitter, tweets were pulled for analysis if they contained one or more of the following 27 search words (or derivations): Muslim, Islam, terror, immigrant, immigration, attack, Israel, Syria, Arab, Iraq, ISIS, Palestine, refugee, race, racist, prejudice, freedom, religion, religious, Iran, security, diversity, radical, extremism, fundamentalism, jihad, 9/11. Additionally, all 12 Republican primary debates, eight Democratic primary debates, and three general election debates were included in the debate analysis. The tweets and debate transcripts were uploaded into NVivo, which was used to analyze and code these texts.

Drawing on the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), the frames and counter-frames, which were informed by existing literature, were used as codes to classify the narratives of Islam and Muslims as espoused by the presidential candidates. Coding occurred in two phases. In the first phase, the "initial" codes, which were derived exclusively from the literature, were analyzed across both the debates and candidates' tweets. After this first pass, the

codes were refined, and in some cases collapsed and in others expanded. The final “focused” codes are the same six frames and counter-frames used in the survey analysis in the previous chapters (Charmaz 2001). The findings from this analysis are presented below.

The Prominent Frames and Counter-Frames Expressed by the Candidates

As noted in Chapter 1, the frames and counter-frames are not mutually exclusive, and in many instances, the candidates drew on multiple frames or counter-frames in a single tweet or debate response. With that said, the discussion below is still structured by presenting each frame/counter-frame one at a time in order to demonstrate thematic similarities in how frames/counter-frames are expressed, but this does not suggest the frames/counter-frames are exclusive. The findings from this discourse analysis are presented below, beginning with a discussion of how the candidates evoked Frame 1.

“Radical Islamic Terrorism”

Across Twitter and the debates, both Trump and Cruz prolifically used the term “radical Islamic terrorism.” Use of this term effectively evokes Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist) as it rhetorically provides the association between Islam and terrorism. Additionally, these candidates were hyper-critical of Democratic politicians for not using the term. The following tweets illustrate this point:



In the above tweets, both candidates criticize Democratic politicians who do not use the term “radical Islam,” which harkens back to the Islamophobia literature that suggests the Republican party strategically portrays liberals and Islamists as bedfellows in order to reinforce party lines (Belt 2016). Additionally, Trump’s tweet is laden with assumptions that associate terrorism and radical Islam. Further, he claims national security hinges on the unanimous adoption of the term “radical Islam,” and he posits political correctness as the mediating factor responsible for preventing widespread use of the term. Cruz echoes many of these sentiments, claiming that because Obama does not use the term, he is then an apologist for “radical Islamic terrorism.”

Across Twitter and the debates, Trump and Cruz rarely referenced Islam or Muslims outside of the context of “radical Islamic terrorism.” Thus, even though these candidates do not explicitly state all Muslims are terrorists, they effectively espouse the association between Islam and terrorism by not discussing Islam/Muslims in either a positive or even neutral manner. This rhetorical association of Muslim and terrorist is an illustration of Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist). In contrast, both Clinton and Sanders refused to use the term “radical Islamic terrorists” and would instead use phrasing like “jihadists” or “radical jihadists.”

During the Republican Primary Debate on March 3rd, 2016, Trump was specifically asked about the extent to which all Muslims are antagonistic to the U.S.:

TAPPER: “Mr. Trump, let me start with you. Last night, you told CNN quote, ‘Islam hates us?’ Did you mean all 1.6 billion Muslims?”

TRUMP: “I mean a lot of them. I mean a lot of them.”

DINAN: “Do you want to clarify the comment at all?”

TRUMP: “Well, you know, I’ve been watching the debate today. And they’re talking about radical Islamic terrorism or radical Islam. But I will tell you this. There’s something going on that maybe you don’t know about, maybe a lot of other people don’t

know about, but there's tremendous hatred. And I will stick with exactly what I said to Anderson Cooper.” (Republican Primary Debate 3/10/16)

In his response, Trump toes the line of stating all Muslims hate the United States, but he does stress that at least “a lot of them” do. Further, when he says the word Islam, he only uses it within the phrases “radical Islamic terrorism” and “radical Islam.” These rhetorical choices reinforce Frame 1, which asserts Muslims are terrorist and Islam encourages such behavior.

As noted, both Republican candidates often referred to Islam and Muslims in the context of “radical Islamic terrorism,” so as a result, Frame 1 was the single most prominent frame evoked by either of these two candidates. Additionally, Frame 1 is often present when Trump and Cruz elicit other frames, which can be seen below.

“They have no laws. They have no rules”

Following Frame 1, Trump most often referred to Frame 2 (Muslim as ethnic other/neo-Orientalist frame). Trump often evoked Frame 2 by highlighting the national origin/ethnicity of an Islamic terrorist or by associating particular national refugees with ISIS. The tweets on the following page illustrate this point.




Trump is able to evoke both Frame 1 and Frame 2 by referring to attacks or ISIS in the same tweets in which he mentions “Somali refugee,” “Middle Eastern immigrant,” and “Syrians.” Rhetorically, he is emphasizing that Islam and Muslims are external and foreign to the United States, effectively disregarding the narrative that Americans can be Muslim and Islam can be peacefully practiced in the U.S. In the October 19th, 2016 general debate, Trump again constructs this association of Syrian—refugee—ISIS—threat. In the excerpt below, Trump makes these connections as he speaks on Clinton’s role as Secretary of State and her support of the Iraq War:

TRUMP: “If she did nothing, we’d be in much better shape. And this is what’s caused the great migration, where she’s taking in tens of thousands of Syrian refugees, who probably in many cases -- not probably, who are definitely in many cases, ISIS-aligned, and we now have them in our country, and wait until you see -- this is going to be the great Trojan horse. And wait until you see what happens in the coming years.” (General Debate 10/19/16).

In the above excerpt, Trump elicits Frame 2 in several ways. First, he implies that the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees are not only Muslim (reinforcing the notion that Islam is

foreign and that all Middle Easterners are Muslim) but they are ISIS sympathizers. He explicitly states that these refugees are “not probably [but] are definitely in many cases, ISIS-aligned” (evoking Frame 1). Further, Trump asserts a quantitative component— “tens of thousands,” and “many cases”—suggesting that the radical Islamists are widespread and essentially typical among the Muslim population. Additionally, his use of the phrasing “we now have *them* in *our* country,” reasserts the assumed national and cultural boundary between Muslims and the U.S., positing Muslims as necessarily foreign and naturally external to American society. Finally, his reference to the “great Trojan horse” also connects to the perpetual impending threat of Islamization that was discussed in the Introduction. This reference plays off of the narrative circulated by some politicians that Muslims have a desire and intention to take over American society, replacing its democracy with sharia law (Mantyla 2010; Sullivan 2011).

Trump also regularly evoked the neo-Orientalist narrative within Frame 2, characterizing Islam as barbaric and openly antagonistic to America. For example, in the following 2-part tweet, Trump stresses that terrorist violence and opposition arise from obedience to Allah. Thus, Islam necessarily demands hatred, opposition to, and violence against the U.S. and other Western countries.



Trump again characterizes Islam and Muslims as antagonistic to the U.S. in the following excerpt from the Republican Primary Debate on March 10th, 2016:

TRUMP: “In large mosques, all over the Middle East, you have people chanting ‘death to the USA.’ Now, that does not sound like a friendly act to me. [...] They have no laws. They have no rules. They have no regulations. They chop off heads. They drown 40, 50, 60 people at a time in big steel cages, pull them up an hour later, everyone dead.” (Republican Primary Debate 3/10/16).

In this excerpt, he again alludes to this hatred being widespread by describing “large mosques, all over the Middle East,” the phrasing of which also acts to reinforce the narrative that Islam is foreign and Muslims are Middle Eastern. Consistent with the neo-Orientalist perspective, he portrays Muslims as being uncivilized—“they have no rules, they have no regulations”—and barbaric and violent with the sensationalized claim—“They chop off heads. They drown 40, 50, 60 people at a time in big steel cages, pull them up an hour later, everyone dead.”

In this same primary debate, Trump again refers to a widespread hatred among Muslims, placing Islam and its religious adherents in opposition to the United States. Trump states:

TRUMP: “Marco talks about consequences. Well, we’ve had a lot of consequences, including airplanes flying into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and could have been the White House. There have been a lot of problems. Now you can say what you want, and you can be politically correct if you want. I don’t want to be so politically correct. I like to solve problems. We have a serious, serious problem of hate.

(APPLAUSE)


There is tremendous hate. There is tremendous hate. Where large portions of a group of people, Islam, large portions want to use very, very harsh means. Let me go a step further. Women are treated horribly. You know that. You do know that. Women are treated horribly, and other things are happening that are very, very bad.” (Republican Primary Debate 3/10/16).

In the above excerpt, Trump again emphasizes quantity—“a lot of consequences,” “a lot of problems,” *tremendous hate*,” “large portions”—which acts to assert that these anti-American

or even terrorist sentiments are endemic across Muslims. Trump also claims that Islam treats women “horribly,” which positions Islam as counter to American standards of gender equality. Additionally, Trump again brings in the concept of political correctness as a direct impediment to resolution, as he states: “I don’t want to be so politically correct. I like to solve problems.” Specifically, he posits political correctness as a barrier to overcoming the “serious, serious problem of hate” in the asserted cultural conflict between Islam and the U.S.

“America and Israel Are in the Fight Together”

Like Trump, Cruz most often referred to Frame 1, but following that frame, he also frequently espoused Frame 3 (US as exclusively Judeo-Christian). Under Frame 3, American values and principles are viewed as exclusively Judeo-Christian and the nation as inextricably connected to a proclaimed Christian foundation and origin. From this, Islam is placed in opposition to Judeo-Christian culture. In the following tweet, Cruz presents two opposing sides—Islam vs. Christianity and Judaism:




In this tweet, without explicitly stating any of the three religions, Cruz makes clear that this antagonism between Islam (“terrorist”) and Judeo-Christian traditions (“Nazareth” and “Israeli”) is intentional and malicious— “it is no accident” and “machete-wielding terrorist attacked.” Additionally, throughout the campaign, Cruz was emphatic that he was not neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but that he supports Israel. Often in his discussion of this conflict,

he portrayed Israel as a U.S. ally and Palestinians as terrorists and ISIS sympathizers. This dynamic is illustrated in the two tweets below:



His presentation of both Israel and Palestine reinforces Frame 3—that Christianity and Judaism can and do coexist, but Islam is not a partner to these traditions, and further, Judeo-Christian traditions are under threat from Islam. Further, eliciting Frame 1, both tweets associate Islam, either implicitly or explicitly, with terrorism.

Consistent with Frame 3, Cruz also frequently referred to the religious foundations of the United States. In the following tweet, Cruz discusses this foundation:



In the above tweet, Cruz stresses the importance of religious liberty; however, it should be noted that he never explicitly discussed religious liberty in the context of Islam. Rather, when he spoke of religious liberty and religious persecution, which was often, he would refer to Christian practice in the United States that was under political attack.

“One Hateful Person Committed a Heinous Crime”

Both Clinton and Sanders regularly pushed back against the pervasive use of the term “radical Islamic terrorism,” and instead, they urged that Islamic terrorist attacks are carried out by a small number of extremists who are not representative of Islam or the Muslim population as a whole (espousing Counter-Frame 1). In both of the tweets below, Clinton and Sanders highlight this dynamic of contrasting the majority against the minority:



In the tweets above, Clinton and Sanders very intentionally push back against rhetoric or attitudes that monolithically portray Muslims as terrorists. In their rejection of anti-Muslim

rhetoric, they introduce a moral component, suggesting that such rhetoric is “wrong” or enacting “bigotry.” Additionally, both candidates use quantitative language— “vast majority,” “one hateful person,” “entire people”—to emphasize the scope of sentiments among Muslims/Islam. Recall, Trump also used quantitative language, describing “a lot of” Muslims as hating America, Syrian refugees as “definitely in many cases, ISIS-aligned,” and there existing “large portions of” Muslims who want to inflict violence. Thus, this same rhetorical device is used by multiple candidates with differing assertions in an attempt to give credence to their portrayal of Islam and Muslims.

In the following excerpt from the Democratic Primary Debate on November 14th, 2015, Clinton addresses the term “radical Islam.” In her response, she again draws the distinction between the majority of Muslims and the minority of extremists:

DICKERSON: “Secretary Clinton, you mentioned radical jihadists. Marco Rubio, also running for president, said that this attack showed and the attack in Paris showed that we are at war with radical Islam. Do you agree with that characterization, radical Islam?”

CLINTON: “I don't think we're at war with Islam. I don't think we're at war with all Muslims. I think we're at war with jihadists who have —”

DICKERSON: “Just to interrupt. He didn't say all Muslims. He just said radical Islam. Is that a phrase you don't...”

CLINTON: “I think THAT you can talk about Islamists who clearly are also jihadists, but I think it's not particularly helpful to make the case that Senator Sanders was just making that I agree with, that we've got to reach out to Muslim countries.

We've got to have them be part of our coalition. If they hear people running for president who basically shortcut it to say we are somehow against Islam, that was one of the real contributions, despite all the other problems, that George W. Bush made after 9/11 when he basically said after going to a mosque in Washington, we are not at war with Islam or Muslims.

We are at war with violent extremism. We are at war with people who use their religion for purposes of power and oppression. And, yes, we are at war with those people. But I don't want us to be painting with too broad a brush.”

In this excerpt, Clinton explains the problem of ubiquitously using the term “radical Islam.” Even when a person uses the qualifier of “radical,” the association to Islam is effectively made. Further, if Islam is not discussed outside of that rhetorical pairing, a war against “jihadists” or “violent extremism” becomes conflated and reduced to a “war with Islam.”

“Muslim Americans: This is Your Country, Too”


In addition to explicitly denouncing generalizations that equate Islam to terrorism, both Clinton and Sanders regularly drew on Counter-Frame 2 (American multiculturalism/Islam harmonious with US democracy). The multiculturalist narrative of this counter-frame promotes inclusivity and diversity as important tenants of American culture, and that inclusivity extends to Islam. The following selection of tweets illustrate this multiculturalist narrative:



All three of these tweets are based in a discussion of what it means to be American. From this perspective, American identity and culture rest on inclusion, unity, and diversity. Thus, the United States ought to be a hospitable context for Islam and Muslims.

Another narrative within Counter-Frame 2 presents Islam as compatible with US values and Muslims as equal, worthwhile members of American society. In addition to Counter-Frame

1, Clinton most often espoused this narrative of Counter-Frame 2. The following tweets illustrate this aspect of Counter-Frame 2:



In the above tweets, Clinton rejects the notion that Muslims are in any way less American or possess values antithetical to American democracy. Instead, she professes a comradery between Muslim Americans and “many, many other Americans,” and she articulates the fact that there are Americans who are also Muslims — “this is your country too.” In reference to arguably the most patriotic American office a citizen can assume, Clinton supports the prospect of a Muslim president, and further, she is exasperated at having to even clarify that position — “In a word: Yes. Now let’s move on.” In other words, she considers the debate regarding Muslims’ American qualifications to be moot and unnecessary. During the general debate on October 9th, 2016, Clinton again espouses Counter-Frame 2:

CLINTON: “[...] First, we’ve had Muslims in America since George Washington. And we’ve had many successful Muslims. We just lost a particular well-known one with Muhammad Ali.

My vision of America is an America where everyone has a place, if you're willing to work hard, you do your part, and you contribute to the community. That's what America is. That's what we want America to be for our children and our grandchildren.

It's also very short-sighted and even dangerous to be engaging in the kind of demagogic rhetoric that Donald has about Muslims. We need American Muslims to be part of our

eyes and ears on our front lines. I've worked with a lot of different Muslim groups around America. I've met with a lot of them, and I've heard how important it is for them to feel that they are wanted and included and part of our country, part of our homeland security, and that's what I want to see. [...] We are not at war with Islam. And it is a mistake and it plays into the hands of the terrorists to act as though we are. So I want a country where citizens like you [a Muslim] and your family are just as welcome as anyone else." (General Debate 10/9/16).

By acknowledging that Islam has been practiced in America since the country's founding as well as noting the citizenship of the Muslim interviewer, Clinton pushes against the notion that Islam and Muslims are foreign or external to the U.S. Further, she again speaks to what it means to be an American. To that end, she evokes values of inclusivity, security, and reciprocity. Finally, she reiterates that "we are not at war with Islam," because Islam as a religion and Muslims as religious adherents are not a threat to the United States or American values.

"If This Country is About Anything, It's About Religious Freedom"

In addition to Counter-Frame 2, Sanders frequently referred to Counter Frame 3 (defense of religious freedom). This frame condemns religious persecution and prioritizes freedom of religion as a foundational American principle. The following tweets illustrate this counter-frame:




In these tweets, Sanders recognizes that American Muslims experience religious discrimination, and he combats that prejudice on the basis of religious freedom as protected under the First Amendment. Within this counter-frame, Islam is not being defended out of any characteristic inherent to Islam and its teachings, but rather it is the value and policy of religious freedom within the context of the U.S that protects Islamic practice. Particularly in the first two tweets, Sanders emphasizes this point that American society and values depend on enforcement of religious freedom— “If this country is about anything, it’s about religious freedom” and that any policy based on religious exclusion “undermin[es] the Constitution.”

Patterns of Strategic Use of Frames and Counter-Frames

In addition to the candidates’ selection of particular frames and counter-frames, *how* and *when* candidates brought up certain frames also speaks to the salience of the frames. Just as frames are not mutually exclusive to one another, the ideologies behind the frames and counter-frames also coexist and the candidates often had to confront and address when frames and counter-frames compete. Among the Republican candidates, Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist) was enacted and justified as a means to protect national security, placing public safety above civil liberties of individual Muslims. In the following tweet, Trump directly compares religion and security, and he makes it clear that national security must take precedence over religious liberty:



Trump also evokes Frame 1 as a justification to not accept refugees:



In the above tweet, Trump refers to an Islamic terrorist attack, and in effect, equates all Syrian refugees with Muslims, who are automatically a threat to national security. Thus, for the sake of public safety, eliciting Frame 1, borders must remain closed to refugees.

During the general presidential debate on October 9th, 2016, Trump again prioritized Frame 1 in response to a question about Islamophobia. The following excerpt captures the exchange:

QUESTION: "Hi. There are 3.3 million Muslims in the United States, and I'm one of them. You've mentioned working with Muslim nations, but with Islamophobia on the rise, how will you help people like me deal with the consequences of being labeled as a threat to the country after the election is over?"

TRUMP: "Well, you're right about Islamophobia, and that's a shame. But one thing we have to do is we have to make sure that -- because there is a problem. I mean, whether we like it or not, and we could be very politically correct, but whether we like it or not, there is a problem. And we have to be sure that Muslims come in and report when they see something going on. When they see hatred going on, they have to report it.

[....]

And, you know, there's always a reason for everything. If they don't do that, it's a very difficult situation for our country, because you look at Orlando and you look at San Bernardino and you look at the World Trade Center. Go outside. Look at Paris. Look at that horrible -- these are radical Islamic terrorists.

And she won't even mention the word and nor will President Obama. He won't use the term "radical Islamic terrorism." Now, to solve a problem, you have to be able to state what the problem is or at least say the name. She won't say the name and President

Obama won't say the name. But the name is there. It's radical Islamic terror. And before you solve it, you have to say the name.” (General Debate 10/9/16).

In his response, Trump very dismissively acknowledges that Islamophobia is “a shame,” and he then quickly moves on to spend the remainder of his timed response listing off instances of terrorist attacks and insisting then-President Obama must adopt the term “radical Islamic terrorism.” In this response, Trump prioritizes public safety, eliciting Frame 1, as a justification to the less consequential and salient offense of Islamophobia.

In addition to Trump drawing on Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist) to defend against Counter-Frame 2 (American multiculturalism) and Counter-Frame 3 (Defense of religious freedom), Trump also enacted Frame 1 and Frame 2 (neo-Orientalist) for personal gain. He evoked these frames as a tactic to redirect the conversation away from personal accusations against him. The following excerpt is from the general presidential debate on October 9th, 2016. This was the first debate following the release of the “Access Hollywood” recording, which captured Trump boasting about sexually assaulting women.

COOPER: “We received a lot of questions online, Mr. Trump, about the tape that was released on Friday, as you can imagine. You called what you said locker room banter. You described kissing women without consent, grabbing their genitals. That is sexual assault. You bragged that you have sexually assaulted women. Do you understand that?”

TRUMP: “No, I didn't say that at all. I don't think you understood what was -- this was locker room talk. I'm not proud of it. I apologize to my family. I apologize to the American people. Certainly I'm not proud of it. But this is locker room talk.

You know, when we have a world where you have ISIS chopping off heads, where you have -- and, frankly, drowning people in steel cages, where you have wars and horrible, horrible sights all over, where you have so many bad things happening, this is like medieval times. We haven't seen anything like this, the carnage all over the world.

And they look and they see. Can you imagine the people that are, frankly, doing so well against us with ISIS? And they look at our country and they see what's going on.

Yes, I'm very embarrassed by it. I hate it. But it's locker room talk, and it's one of those things. I will knock the hell out of ISIS. We're going to defeat ISIS. ISIS happened a

number of years ago in a vacuum that was left because of bad judgment. And I will tell you, I will take care of ISIS."

COOPER: "So, Mr. Trump..."

TRUMP: "And we should get onto much more important things and much bigger things."

COOPER: "Just for the record, though, are you saying that what you said on that bus 11 years ago that you did not actually kiss women without consent or grope women without consent?"

TRUMP: "I have great respect for women. Nobody has more respect for women than I do."

COOPER: "So, for the record, you're saying you never did that?"

TRUMP: "I've said things that, frankly, you hear these things I said. And I was embarrassed by it. But I have tremendous respect for women."

COOPER: "Have you ever done those things?"

TRUMP: "And women have respect for me. And I will tell you: No, I have not. And I will tell you that I'm going to make our country safe. We're going to have borders in our country, which we don't have now. People are pouring into our country, and they're coming in from the Middle East and other places.

We're going to make America safe again. We're going to make America great again, but we're going to make America safe again." (General Debate 10/9/16)

In this exchange, Trump evokes Frame 1 and Frame 2 to deflect attention from his wrong doing. By immediately following, "this is locker room talk," with "You know, when we have a world where you have ISIS chopping off heads, where you have -- and, frankly, drowning people in steel cages" and "I will knock the hell out of ISIS," Trump shifts focus and priorities away from his own discretions. Knowing the salience of these frames, Trump strategically uses the accepted scapegoat and antagonist of Islam to construct a direct comparison with the now 'lesser' offense of sexual assault. Further, he ends his response with the statement, "we're going to make America safe again," which both asserts that America is currently unsafe and reassures Americans he is fit for being president on the issues that matter most--public security.

Clinton and Sanders also enacted counter-frames as a strategic political means to undermine Donald Trump. Both Democratic candidates frequently brought up Trump's rhetoric and policy suggestions regarding Islam and Muslims as evidence that Trump is ill-informed, divisive, and/or bigoted. Most often, Clinton and Sanders elicited Counter-Frame 2 (American multiculturalism) in these critiques:



In the three tweets above, Clinton and Sanders critique Trump's stance on Muslims as just one case of exclusion among many (e.g., women, racial/ethnic minorities, and immigrants) that are the targets. Thus, these tweets do not defend Islam in particular, but all minority or oppressed groups more generally. Further, these tweets are intended to undermine Trump's fitness for office based on the values espoused by Counter-Frame 2 (American multiculturalism).

In the following two tweets, there is specific and exclusive reference to Islam. Again, these tweets push back against rhetoric or policy that is prejudiced against Muslims. Additionally, Clinton and Sanders use these tweets to position themselves against Trump or other

Republican candidates (indicated by the #GOPDebate), further establishing the apparent partisan divide on the topic of Islam.



All five tweets above share a common thread with many of the other instances when Clinton and Sanders have enacted counter-frames—they are often reactive and operate on the defensive. Trump and Cruz espouse frames that are animated and incendiary, conjuring strong imagery of who a Muslim is and their nefarious intentions. These frames portray Muslims and Islam as posing a threat, either to national security, American culture, Western Democratic values, and/or American religious identity. Further, these frames are compelling in that they arouse a sense of urgency to defend the precarious and vulnerable American way of life. In contrast, many of the Democratic candidates' counter-frames are either attempting to dispel the negative portrayals of Muslim identity (so on the defense, such as Counter-Frame 1) or they add little commentary to the character of Islam and instead attempt to appeal to Americans' notions of multiculturalism (Counter-Frame 2), inclusivity, and religious liberty (Counter-Frame 3). Thus, while the Democratic candidates are sympathetic to the rights of Muslims, the counter-frames they espouse do not advance the notion of a positively charged and clearly defined Muslim identity.

Conclusion

In summary, the candidates from each political party maintained consistent and distinct sentiments toward Islam and Muslims in their espoused frames. The Republican candidates primarily evoked frames that were critical of Islam, with Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist) being the most pervasive frame as both Trump and Cruz ubiquitously used the term “radical Islamic terrorism” in reference to Muslims and Islam. Following Frame 1, Trump most often espoused Frame 2 (neo-Orientalist frame), in which he characterizes Islam as barbaric, hateful and antagonistic to American society and values. Cruz, more so than Trump, evoked Frame 3 (US as exclusively Judeo-Christian), in which he positions Islam as incompatible with Judeo-Christian traditions, and he stresses the Christian foundations of American culture.

Among the Democratic candidates, Counter-Frame 1 (not all Muslims are terrorists) and Counter-Frame 2 (American multiculturalism) were widely used by both Clinton and Sanders. Both candidates evoked Counter-Frame 1 by distinguishing between the majority of Muslims who are peaceful and condemn terrorism and the few extremists who are not representative of Islam. Under Counter-Frame 2, both candidates support Islam and Muslims’ place in the United States by embracing the multiculturalist narrative, promoting diversity and inclusivity. Additionally, Sanders often referred to Counter-Frame 3 (defense of religious freedom) in his objection to anti-Muslim prejudice.

In drawing on Frame 1 (Muslim as terrorist), Trump and Cruz were able to assert a threat to national security that then justified disregard for civil liberties and individual comfort. In their argument, public safety takes precedence over other concerns. Trump even used Frame 1 and Frame 2 in response to allegations of sexual assault, enacting a strategy to minimize those allegations in an appeal to more pressing matters, like defeating ISIS to preserve national

security. The Democratic candidates' use of Counter-Frame 2 (American multiculturalism) was sometimes strategically employed as an attack on Trump, challenging his morality and competency as a leader.

The findings from this chapter are able to speak to some of the narratives of Islam and Muslims that are expressed within the two major political parties, which sheds light on the association between political party affiliation and attitudes toward Muslims. However, these findings need to be understood as a snapshot in time, capturing the prominent sentiments during the 2016 presidential campaigns, which was perhaps a period of heightened polarization in attitudes, perspectives, and sources of information. Further, this analysis only includes the final two candidates in each of the two major parties. Because a candidate receives their party's nomination, this does not necessarily mean the candidate reflects the mainstream or average sentiments of their party's base. Recall the findings from Chapter 5 showed political ideology to be occasionally statistically significant across frames and counter-frames, whereas approval of Trump was the only measure to hold statistical significance in predicting all six frames and counter-frames. This finding speaks to the suggestion that while the presidential candidates are notable figures within a party, their specific views are not held unanimously among party members. Arguably, the candidates that emerge from their party represent a more distilled, concentrated, less-center perspective of the party's base, meaning these results reflect a more polarized, divergent relationship between political party affiliation and framing of Islam than is likely held across the American population. Nonetheless, this chapter sheds light on the prominent frames and counter-frames espoused by the parties' prominent figures and the ways in which frames and counter-frames can be strategically used as means toward political ends.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Through frame analysis, this study expanded on the concept of Islamophobia by more narrowly examining the patterned narratives held by Americans that shape and maintain their sentiments toward Muslims and Islam. More specifically, the primary objectives of this study were to: (1) identify the frames through which Americans perceive Muslims and Islam, (2) examine the demographic and behavioral predictors for holding each frame, and (3) assess the relative impact of these frames on opinions regarding policy and social inclusion of Muslims and Islam. To address these objectives, this dissertation employed a mixed methods approach, including a large-scale survey of non-Muslim Americans and discourse analysis of rhetoric used during the 2016 presidential campaigns.

Regarding the first objective, six frames and counter-frames were developed and refined over the course of the study. Frame 1 refers to the perception that Muslims are likely to be terrorists and Islam incites violence. Proponents of Frame 1 fear Muslims pose a threat to national security. In contrast, Counter-Frame 1 draws a distinction between Islamic extremists and the majority of Muslims who condemn violence and terrorism. Frame 2 views Muslims as culturally incompatible because it considers Islam antithetical to American democratic values and views Muslims as barbaric and uncivilized, thereby posing a threat to American identity and culture. Counter-Frame 2 endorses American multiculturalism, proponents of which acknowledge and accept the national and cultural diversity within the American Muslim population. Frame 3 views the American religious landscape as exclusively Judeo-Christian, and further, they view American culture and national identity as intertwined with Judeo-Christian values. Carriers of this frame are concerned that Islam may interrupt or compromise the role of Christian values in American society. Conversely, proponents of Counter-Frame 3 consider

freedom of religion to be the paramount characteristic of American religious life. By extension, Muslims and Islamic practice are welcomed and constitutionally protected in the United States.

Using multivariate regression analysis, Chapter 4 addressed objective 2. This chapter examined the statistically significant predictors for each frame and counter-frame. This analysis included five sets of predictors to explain variation in expression of frames and counter-frames: (1) religious characteristics, (2) political ideology and opinions, (3) media consumption behaviors, (4) familiarity with Islam measures, and (5) demographics. To assess the predictive power and the resilience of each predictor, this analysis used nested models with each set of predictors first analyzed in a partial model before inclusion alongside all other covariates in the full model.

In analyzing expression of Frame 1, the full model accounted for approximately one-third of the variation in this frame. Specifically, the statistically significant predictors in the full model included Evangelicalism, approval of Trump, considering terrorism important in the 2016 election, considering terrorism the top international threat, disapproval of political correctness, regularly following national current events, knowledge of Islam, and age. Regarding expression of Counter-Frame 1, the full model explained approximately 28% of variation. Support of political correctness, considering social injustice the top national threat, regularly following American current events, knowledge of Islam, and personally knowing a Muslim were all statistically significant positive predictors of expression of Counter-Frame 1 in the full model. Additionally, conservatism and approval of Trump were statistically significant negative predictors of this counter-frame. None of the religious predictors or demographics maintained statistically significant relationships in the full model.

In the analysis of Frame 2, the full model explained over one-quarter of the variation in expression. Approval of Trump, considering immigration an important topic in the 2016 election, considering immigration to be the top national threat, and regularly following international current events were statistically significant positive predictors of Frame 2 in the full model. Conversely, support of political correctness and reading the newspaper as a primary source of information both held statistically significant negative relationships with expression of Frame 2. Notably, none of the religious predictors, familiarity with Islam measures, or demographics had statistically significant effects in the full model. In examining Counter-Frame 2, the full model explained 34.5% of the variation. In the full model, support for political correctness, considering social injustice the greatest national threat, regularly following national current events, reading the newspaper as a primary source of information, personally knowing a Muslim, knowledge of Islam, and education all had statistically significant positive effects on expression of the multiculturalism counter-frame. Additionally, conservatism, approval of Trump, and reading USA Today for news all carried statistically significant negative relationships with Counter-Frame 2. None of the religious predictors held statistical significance in the full model.

Turning to expression of Frame 3, the full model accounted for 28.8% of variation in expression. Evangelicalism, approval of Trump, considering immigration an important topic in the 2016 election, considering immigration a top national threat, and following Breitbart all had statistically significant positive relationships with expression of Frame 3 in the full model. Conversely, support of political correctness, considering social injustice a top national threat, reading the newspaper as a primary source of information, personally knowing a Muslim, and education all had statistically significant negative effects on expression of Frame 3. Regarding expression of Counter-Frame 3, the full model explained nearly 40% of the variation. In the full

model, considering social injustice the top national threat, reading the newspaper as a primary source for news, and personally knowing a Muslim had statistically significant positive effects on Counter-Frame 3. In contrast, Evangelicalism, conservatism, approval of Trump, watching Fox News, and reading USA Today had statistically significant negative relationships with expression of this counter-frame. Additionally, none of the demographic variables maintained statistically significant effects on expression of Counter-Frame 3 in the full model.

For all six of the frames and counter-frames, the political partial model explained the vast majority of the variation accounted for in each full model. This tells us that political measures are significant and persistent predictors in explaining expression of frames and counter-frames. Consistent with expectations from the literature (Belt 2016; Singh 2013), the results found Republican-leaning Americans were more likely than Democratic-leaning Americans to espouse frames. Specifically, approval of Trump held statistical significance across all six full models, with a positive effect on expression of frames and a negative effect on expression of counter-frames. Additionally, support for political correctness had statistically significant effects in five of the six full models, holding positive relationships with expression of counter-frames and negative relationships with expression of frames. In contrast, conservatism had statistical significance in just three of the six full models. This finding suggests that models examining political perspectives in relation to attitudes toward Islam and Muslims need to include more nuanced and varied measures of political sentiment beyond just party affiliation or political ideology.

In a surprising break from the literature (Ciftci, Nawaz, and Sydiq 2015; Poushter 2015; Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett 2012), the religious partial models and individual religious predictors were not particularly influential in explaining expression of frames and counter-

frames. While many of the religious predictors did carry significance in the religious-only partial models, their effects were minimized upon inclusion in the full models. Evangelicalism was the only religious predictor to retain significance, which it held in three of the six full models: Frame 1, Frame 3, and Counter-Frame 3. These findings reaffirm the importance of multivariate analysis to adequately assess the impact of individual predictors. In the case of religion, various religious measures' effects disappeared when analyzed alongside other covariates, suggesting particular religious measures' relationship to attitudes toward Islam and Muslims are mitigated by other predictive measures, such as political perspective and media behavior. However, as noted in Chapter 4, expanded religious measures, specifically measures of theology, are needed in future research to further examine the complex relationship between religion and attitudes toward Islam. Looking at the dependent measures, this study's analysis expands our understanding of the relationship between religion and attitudes on Muslims by thematically organizing these sentiments into frames and counter-frames. For example, based on Evangelicalism's statistically significant relationships with Frame 1, Frame 3, and Counter-Frame 3, we see that many Evangelical Americans' views on Muslims are guided by a perception of Islam inciting terrorism and posing a threat to the Judeo-Christian American religious landscape.

Chapter 4 provides a final takeaway. While the direction of the effects of most predictors remained consistent between frames and counter-frames (e.g., personally knowing a Muslim carries a positive relationship with expression of counter-frames and a negative relationship with expression of frames), two predictors held positive relationships with expression of frames *and* counter-frames: Knowledge of Islam and regularly following American current events. Knowledge of Islam had a statistically significant positive effect on expression Frame 1 as well

as on Counter-Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2. Recall, this measure is a self-reported assessment of one's knowledge of Islam. In other words, these findings show that considering oneself knowledgeable on Islam heightens one's expression of these various frames/counter-frames, independent of the accuracy of the information. A future study could assess the expression of these frames/counter-frames on the basis of those who are truly knowledgeable, as empirically determined via correct answers to questions regarding factual aspects of Islam, versus those who merely consider themselves to be knowledgeable.

In addition, the frequency with which Americans keep up with national current events had varying effects. This predictor had a statistically significant positive effect on Frame 1, Counter-Frame 1, Frame 2, and Counter-Frame 2. In other words, regularly following the news increases expression of both frames and counter-frames, which suggests specific media source is a necessary measure to adequately examine this relationship. As discussed in Chapter 5, this finding supports the notion of "echo chambers," in which Americans selectively seek and filter news from certain media sources based on anticipated presentation of content. This theory is further supported by the fact that none of the specific media sources (e.g., *New York Times* or *Fox News*) varied in their directional effects on frames and counter-frames. Meaning, so long as Americans selectively access news sources, regularly following national current events will only act to reinforce existing sentiments on Muslims and Islam rather than objectively inform or change sentiments.

Moving onto objective 3, Chapter 5 assessed the impact that these frames and counter-frames have in predicting Americans' attitudes on policy and social inclusion regarding Muslims and Islam. Specifically, the dependent measures used for this analysis were support of Executive Order 13769 (the "travel ban"), support for the creation of a Muslim registry, comfortability with

social closeness to Muslims, and comfortability with the idea of Islam as a major American religion.

In analysis of support for the executive order, the full model accounted for approximately four-fifths of variation in support. In a comparison of adjusted R-squared values between the two partial models, the attitude and demographics model explained more variation than the frames/counter-frames model did. However, Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 3 maintained statistically significant effects in the full model. As one would expect, expression of Frame 1 increased support of the travel ban while expression of Counter-Frame 3 decreased support. Among the other predictors, conservatism, approval of Trump, and considering immigration a top national threat held statistically significant positive relationships with support of the travel ban. Conversely, support of political correctness, watching CNN, and reading Al Jazeera all had statistically significant negative effects in the full model. Religion, familiarity with Islam, and demographic measures did not have statistically significant effects on support of the travel ban.

Regarding support for the creation of a Muslim registry, the full model explained 55.7% of variation in support. The frames/counter-frames partial model accounted for more variation in support than the attitudes and demographics partial model explained. In the full model, five of the six frames and counter-frames had statistically significant effects. All of those frames/counter-frames carried the expected relationship with the exception of Counter-Frame 2, which had an unexpected positive relationship with support of a Muslim registry. Among the other predictors, approval of Trump and considering immigration to be a top national threat had statistically significant positive effects on support. In contrast, education and living in the South (relative to living in the Northeast) had statistically significant negative effects on support for a registry. Religion, media consumption, and familiarity with Islam did not have statistically

significant effects on support. In other words, support for a Muslim registry is driven by the frames and counter-frames, and a few political characteristics and demographics.

Looking at comfortability with social closeness to Muslims, the full model explained over three-fourths of the variation in this measure. The frames/counter-frames partial model accounted for the majority of this variation. In the full model, five of the six frames and counter-frames had statistically significant effects. However, among those five frames/counter-frames, Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2 had unexpected effects on social closeness. Expression of Frame 1 increased social closeness whereas Counter-Frame 2 decreased social closeness in the full model. As noted in Chapter 5, Counter-Frame 3 may have been responsible by mitigating the relationships between this other frame and counter-frame and social closeness. Strikingly, none of the religious predictors, political indicators, media consumption behaviors, or familiarity with Islam measures had statistically significant effects on social closeness in the full model. However, income and living in the South, Midwest, or West all have statistically significant positive effects on social closeness to Muslims.

As a final measure of social inclusion, Chapter 5 analyzed comfortability with the idea of Islam being a major American religion. The full model accounted for approximately three-fifths of variation in level of comfortability. The frames/counter-frames model explained more variation in comfortability than the attitudes and demographics model. In the full model, five of the six frames and counter-frames were statistically significant predictors, and each of these frames carried the expected direction of the relationship. Among the other predictors, support for political correctness and self-assessed knowledge of Islam had positive relationships with comfortability. Religion, media consumption, and demographic measures did not have statistically significant effects on comfortability. Instead, this measure was primarily driven by

the frames and counter-frames Americans hold as well their support of political correctness and knowledge of Islam.

To review, the frames/counter-frames partial model explained far more variation than the attitude and demographics partial model for three of these four dependent measures in Chapter 5. Across all four measures, Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 3 carried statistically significant effects in the full models. Regarding the political predictors, they were more impactful on the first two measures, which dealt with policy, than in the latter two measures, which captured interpersonal and cultural social inclusion. Across both policy measures, approval of Trump and concern with immigration as a top national threat each carried statistically significant positive effects. Since both of these policies were either enacted or endorsed by Trump, it is unsurprising that Trump approval carried these positive relationships. Additionally, the concern over immigration logically shared a positive relationship with support for the executive order, which limits entry into the country. However, the positive relationship between concern of immigration and support of a Muslim registry cannot be directly explained, instead it speaks to an underlying sentiment that may have less to do with the religious tradition and more to do with general opposition to the “other” and outgroups (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009).

Notably, none of the religious measures carried statistically significant results in any of the four full models, which runs counter to previous studies that show religiosity, religious traditionalism, and Evangelicalism as relevant predictors (Altermeyer 2003; Ciftci, Nawaz, and Sydiq 2015; Kalkan et al. 2009; Pew Research Center 2014; Poushter 2015; Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett 2012). The findings from both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggest that the relationships of religiosity and Evangelicalism with attitudes on Islam are largely driven by other predictors,

so when these religious measures are included in multivariate analysis, particularly with frames and counter-frames, the effects of religious predictors dissolve.

Further, the frames and counter-frames were the only predictors that maintained statistical significance across all four of the policy and social inclusion measures. In other words, even when the frames and counter-frames were included in the full model, controlling for the other religious, political, media, familiarity, and demographic predictors, many of the frames and counter-frames still retained statistically significant effects. In answer to objective 3, this finding demonstrates that the frames and counter-frames provide a unique contribution beyond the commonly cited covariates (religiosity, Evangelicalism, political affiliation, education, etc.) to our understanding of American attitudes toward policy and social inclusion of Muslims and Islam.

Chapter 6 presented the results from the discourse analysis of the rhetoric used during the 2016 presidential campaigns. This analysis complemented the survey findings by pursuing an additional social space to examine the link between politics and attitudes toward Muslims. Analyzing the presidential candidates' rhetoric shed light on the public partisan discourse regarding Muslims and Islam. To review, the candidates from each political party maintained consistently partisan sentiments toward Islam and Muslims in their espoused frames. The Republican candidates primarily evoked frames that were critical of Islam. Trump and Cruz evoked Frame 1 the most of any other frames, largely through their ubiquitous use of the term "radical Islamic terrorism." While this term alone does not necessarily espouse Frame 1, its prolific use in the absence of any discussions that portray Muslims or Islam outside of "radical Islamic terrorism," presents a single association and interchangeability between Islam and "radical Islamic terrorism." Following Frame 1, Trump most often espoused Frame 2, in which

he characterized Islam as barbaric, hateful and antagonistic to American society and values. Cruz, more so than Trump, evoked Frame 3 by celebrating a Judeo-Christian alliance, which he posited as under attack by radical Islam.

Among the Democratic candidates, both Clinton and Sanders regularly evoked Counter-Frame 1 and Counter-Frame 2. The candidates drew on Counter-Frame 1 by emphasizing quantity and span of the majority of Muslims who are peaceful in contrast to the few extremists who carry out terrorist acts. Espousing Counter-Frame 2, both candidates supported Islam and Muslims' place in the United States by celebrating and prioritizing the multiculturalist narrative as central to American values and identity. Additionally, Sanders often referred to Counter-Frame 3 in his objection to anti-Muslim prejudice.

Through this campaign analysis, it became clear that the topic of Islam was an effective partisan political platform and talking point. Accordingly, the candidates strategically drew on frames/counter-frames, even when Islam or Muslims were not central to the topic at hand. For example, the Democratic candidates' use of Counter-Frame 2 was at times employed more as an attack on Trump, challenging his competency as a leader and morality as an American, than it was a pure defense or protection of Islam. As another example, Trump evoked Frame 1 and Frame 2 in response to a line of questioning about his sexual conduct. In calling on these frames, he attempted to minimize the sexual assault allegations by shifting focus and drawing attention to seemingly more pressing matters, like defeating ISIS to preserve national security.

Additionally, when Trump spoke of Islam and Muslims, he regularly brought up the concept of political correctness, positioning it as a barrier to adequately diagnosing and resolving America's greatest threats—public safety and national identity. Recall, this packaging of political correctness against frames was also demonstrated in the survey analysis. In Chapter 4,

Americans who supported political correctness were more likely to espouse counter-frames whereas Americans who opposed political correctness were more likely to espouse frames. In Chapter 5, opposition to political correctness was a significant predictor of support for the travel ban, and support for political correctness was a significant predictor for comfortability with Islam becoming a major American religion.

To review, the findings from Chapters 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate the significant role politics play in attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. However, it is clear that a variety of political measures (such as support of specific politicians; attitudes on political correctness; and importance of specific policy or political platforms, like immigration, social justice, or national security) beyond just affiliation or ideology are necessary to adequately examine this relationship between politics and sentiments toward Muslims. To a lesser extent, media consumption also shapes these sentiments, functioning in part through “echo chambers.” Surprisingly, when examined in multivariate analysis, religious predictors are less influential than originally expected. This study expands our existing understanding of the relationship between religion and attitudes on Islam both by assessing religious measures within multivariate analysis and by grouping sentiments toward Muslims into frames and counter-frames. Finally, while personally knowing a Muslim was an effective predictor for holding counter-frames, over half of the survey sample did not personally know any Muslims, meaning those individuals are only able to draw on political and media portrayals and/or personal research to guide their impressions on this religion and population.

Due to financial constraints, this study does have its limitations. The greatest improvement on this research would be the use of a probability survey sample. While the online access panel was highly effective in garnering a large volume of relatively inexpensive

responses, the non-probability recruitment limits our ability to assess sampling error and draw inference. However, these survey findings provide promising directions for future research. First, the use of frames and counter-frames to organize sentiments on Islam proved fruitful. Several of the frames and counter-frames maintained statistical significance in predicting opinions on policy and social inclusion, even when analyzed alongside other known covariates. Future research would benefit from carrying forward the use of frame analysis in studying Islamophobia, and it should continue to examine frames' impact on attitudes toward other policies and measures of social inclusion.

As already noted, politics has demonstrated a clear connection to attitudes on Muslims and Islam, and a wider range of political measures are necessary to adequately examine this relationship. This study demonstrated the effectiveness of using politician-specific support measures in addition to general political ideology (recall approval of Trump held statistical significance across all frames and counter-frames; whereas political ideology maintained significance in just three of the full models). Additionally, this study showed the significance of political correctness in discussions of Islam and Muslims, despite the concept of political correctness being rarely discussed in Islamophobia research³⁵. Future research needs to further unpack this dynamic by assessing the mechanisms through which political correctness shapes these sentiments. Finally, a study that more comprehensively examines the links between politics, media consumption, and framing of Islam could advance understanding of the partisan “echo chambers” theory and its connection to attitudes on Islam. The findings from Chapters 5,

³⁵ Poynting (2008) does directly link political correctness to Islamophobia, though his work is specifically on Australia; thus scholarship on American Islamophobia is still lacking in addressing this relevant predictor.

6, and 7 certainly allude to this process, but a more focused examination of this specific theory would complement the current work.

Beyond advancing theory, this study's findings also carry practical implications. Approximately three out of five Americans do not know someone who is Muslim (Lipka 2014), meaning their impressions of Islam and Muslims are likely shaped from the media and political discourse. Therefore, the public rhetoric and presentations put forward have consequence for how the Muslim American population is viewed and treated. Thus, so long as Islam remains a political talking point for partisan platforms, portrayals of Muslims will be limited to a reductionist binary of "good" versus "bad" rather than acknowledging the diversity and complexity within this population and religious tradition. Additionally, while regulation of media content can be highly problematic, there needs to be greater informed and objective discussions regarding the media. Specifically, Americans need to be better equipped critical consumers to evaluate the validity of sources, distinguish between fact and opinion, and recognize the withholding of information is itself biased. Through these findings, this dissertation contributes to the existing study of Islamophobia by providing more precisely grouped sentiments toward Muslims and Islam through the introduction of frames and counter-frames.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

American Attitudes toward Muslims and Islam

Start of Block: Intro/Screenener Block

Intro *Survey of American Political and Religious Attitudes*

Thank you for taking the survey. On certain political and social issues, the country today seems to be more divided than ever. This study, carried out by a research team at the University of Virginia, seeks to understand where those divisions lie and what motivates them. In particular, many Americans disagree on policies surrounding Muslim immigration, and this survey seeks to capture your perspective on this contentious but important topic. In addition to your attitudes on Muslim immigration and Islam, you will be asked about your opinions on the recent presidential campaign and domestic and international current affairs, as well as your own religious background.

Although SSI knows who you are, they will not share any of that information with our research team, making this survey effectively anonymous. In other words, we do not know any identifying information about you, and so any responses you share cannot be connected to your identity in any way. Please be as truthful and open as possible in your responses. Thank you for being willing to share your perspective with us.

The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Your participation in the study is voluntary, so you may choose not to answer any question(s) throughout the survey. If you have questions or technical issues, please email us at ksf5fe@virginia.edu.

This study has been approved by the U.Va. Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (IRB No. 2016036600). For questions or information about your rights as a participant in this study, please contact the Director of the IRB at UVa, Dr. Tonya Moon, trm2k@virginia.edu, 434-924-0823.

Thank you for your participation!

Page Break

A1 Were you born in the United States?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)

End of Block: Intro/Screenener Block

Start of Block: Screener 2

A2 Do you identify as a Muslim?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)

Display This Question:

If Do you identify as a Muslim? = Yes

Muslim_close Because this survey is aimed at finding out the attitudes of non-Muslim Americans toward Islam and Muslims, we are not including Muslims in our study population. We appreciate your time and interest in the survey.

End of Block: Screener 2

Start of Block: Question Block Part 1

C_Intro Thank you for answering those qualifying questions. Now that we know you're eligible to participate in this survey, we'd like to ask about your opinions on various politic topics.

D1 Some people tend to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election or not. Others aren't that interested. How often would you say you follow what's going on in American government and public affairs?

- ☐ Not at all (1)
- ☐ Seldom (2)
- ☐ Some of the time (3)
- ☐ Most of the time (4)
- ☐ Daily (5)

Display This Question:

If Some people tend to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whe... = Seldom

Or Some people tend to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whe... = Some of the time

Or Some people tend to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whe... = Most of the time

Or Some people tend to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whe... = Daily

D1a

From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affairs? Check all that apply.

- ☐ Broadcast news (TV or radio) (1)
- ☐ Newspapers/magazines (including online editions) (2)
- ☐ News and political websites (3)
- ☐ Podcasts (4)
- ☐ Social media (5)
- ☐ Satirical news/political commentary (6)
- ☐ Directly from elected officials' websites or social media accounts (7)
- ☐ Hearing information second-hand from others around me (8)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (9) _____

Display This Question:

If From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affa... = Broadcast news (TV or radio)

D1a_a Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply.

- ☐ ABC (1)
- ☐ NBC (2)
- ☐ CBS (3)
- ☐ Fox News (4)
- ☐ CNN (5)
- ☐ MSNBC (6)
- ☐ NPR (7)
- ☐ BBC (8)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (9) _____

Display This Question:

If From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affa... = Newspapers/magazines (including online editions)

D1a_b Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply.

- ☐ USA Today (1)
- ☐ The New York Times (2)
- ☐ The Wall Street Journal (3)
- ☐ The Washington Post (4)
- ☐ The Washington Times (13)
- ☐ The Atlantic (5)
- ☐ The Economist (6)
- ☐ Chicago Tribune (7)
- ☐ New York Post (8)
- ☐ Daily Mail (9)
- ☐ The Guardian (10)
- ☐ My local newspaper (11)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (12) _____

Display This Question:

If From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affa... = News and political websites

D1a_c

Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply.

- ☐ HuffingtonPost (1)
- ☐ Breitbart (2)
- ☐ Jezebel (3)
- ☐ The Federalist (4)
- ☐ BuzzFeed (5)
- ☐ Al Jazeera (6)
- ☐ Slate (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____

D2 Generally, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the US today?

- ☐ Extremely dissatisfied (1)
 - ☐ Moderately dissatisfied (2)
 - ☐ Slightly dissatisfied (3)
 - ☐ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (4)
 - ☐ Slightly satisfied (5)
 - ☐ Moderately satisfied (6)
 - ☐ Extremely satisfied (7)
 - ☐ Other (please explain) (8) _____
 - ☐ Don't know (9)
-

D3 What do you consider the single biggest threat to the US today?

- ☐ Environmental issues/climate change (1)
 - ☐ Wealth inequality (2)
 - ☐ Weak economy/unemployment (3)
 - ☐ International terrorism (4)
 - ☐ Homegrown terrorism (5)
 - ☐ Corporate corruption (6)
 - ☐ Immigration (7)
 - ☐ Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality) (8)
 - ☐ Decline in traditional values/moral decay (11)
 - ☐ Health crises (9)
 - ☐ Other (please specify) (10) _____
-

D4 What do you consider the second biggest threat to the US today?

- ☐ Environmental issues/climate change (1)
 - ☐ Wealth inequality (2)
 - ☐ Weak economy/unemployment (3)
 - ☐ International terrorism (4)
 - ☐ Homegrown terrorism (5)
 - ☐ Corporate corruption (6)
 - ☐ Immigration (7)
 - ☐ Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality) (8)
 - ☐ Decline in traditional values/moral decay (11)
 - ☐ Health crises (9)
 - ☐ Other (please specify) (10) _____
-

D5 Earlier we asked about how often you follow national current affairs. Now we would like to know about your familiarity with global events. How often would you say you follow what's going on in *international* public affairs?

- ☐ Not at all (1)
- ☐ Seldom (2)
- ☐ Some of the time (3)
- ☐ Most of the time (4)
- ☐ Daily (5)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (6)

Display This Question:

If Earlier we asked about how often you follow national current affairs. Now we would like to know a... = Seldom

Or Earlier we asked about how often you follow national current affairs. Now we would like to know a... = Some of the time

Or Earlier we asked about how often you follow national current affairs. Now we would like to know a... = Most of the time

Or Earlier we asked about how often you follow national current affairs. Now we would like to know a... = Daily

D5a

From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply).

- ☐ Broadcast news (TV or radio) (1)
 - ☐ Newspapers/magazines (including online editions) (2)
 - ☐ News and political websites (3)
 - ☐ Podcasts (4)
 - ☐ Social media (5)
 - ☐ Satirical news/political commentary (6)
 - ☐ Directly from elected officials' websites or social media accounts (7)
 - ☐ Hearing information second-hand from others around me (8)
 - ☐ Other (please specify) (9) _____
-

D6 Generally, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the world today?

- ☐ Extremely dissatisfied (1)
 - ☐ Moderately dissatisfied (2)
 - ☐ Slightly dissatisfied (3)
 - ☐ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (4)
 - ☐ Slightly satisfied (5)
 - ☐ Moderately satisfied (6)
 - ☐ Extremely satisfied (7)
 - ☐ Other (please explain) (8) _____
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)
-

D7 What do you consider the single biggest threat to the world today?

- ☐ Environmental issues/climate change (1)
 - ☐ Wealth inequality/poverty (2)
 - ☐ International terrorism (3)
 - ☐ Nuclear war and/or another world war (9)
 - ☐ Genocide (4)
 - ☐ Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality) (5)
 - ☐ Health crises (6)
 - ☐ Other (please specify) (7) _____
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (8)
-

D8 What do you consider the second biggest threat to the world today?

- ☐ Environmental issues/climate change (1)
- ☐ Wealth inequality/poverty (2)
- ☐ International terrorism (3)
- ☐ Nuclear war and/or another world war (9)
- ☐ Genocide (4)
- ☐ Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality) (5)
- ☐ Health crises (6)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (7) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (8)

Page Break

C1 We hear a lot today about "political correctness" in political speech and in everyday life. Generally, how do you view political correctness?

- ☐ Very negatively (1)
- ☐ Somewhat negatively (2)
- ☐ Neither negatively nor positively (3)
- ☐ Somewhat positively (4)
- ☐ Very positively (5)
- ☐ *It just depends on context and must be decided on a case-by-case basis* (8)
- ☐ *No opinion* (9)

C2 Political correctness means different things to different people, so below are a series of various definitions of the term. For each of the definitions below, please rate the statement on how accurately it matches your understanding of political correctness.

"Political correctness" means...

	Not at all accurate (1)	Slightly accurate (2)	Moderately accurate (3)	Very accurate (4)
Reserving honest opinions or not talking about certain topics in order to be polite and not offend (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Certain terms are deemed unacceptable and those that use them are then villainized, regardless of intention by the person saying the terms (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Selectively not using certain terms considered offensive or outdated in order to avoid marginalizing or excluding groups of people (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Unfair policing of speech and a violation of one's freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A political maneuver to play victim and persecute others (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Display This Question:

If Political correctness means different things to different people, so below are a series of variou... [Very accurate] (Count) = 0

And Political correctness means different things to different people, so below are a series of variou... [Moderately accurate] (Count) = 0

C2_other We see none of the previous definitions were accurate to you. Please provide a definition in your own words of "political correctness" in the space provided.

C3 To what extent do you agree or disagree that Americans should be more careful in daily life about not saying things or using terms that might offend certain groups?

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
 - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
 - ☐ Agree (6)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (8)
-

C4 To what extent do you agree or disagree that elected officials should be more careful about not saying things or using terms that might offend certain groups of people?

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
 - ☐ Disagree (2)
 - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
 - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
 - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
 - ☐ Agree (6)
 - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (8)
-

Page Break

C5 How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall?

- ☐ Did not follow the campaigns (1)
 - ☐ Not very closely (2)
 - ☐ Moderately closely (3)
 - ☐ Very closely (4)
-

Display This Question:

If How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Not very closely
Or How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Moderately closely
Or How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Very closely

C5a

From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply.

- ☐ Broadcast news (TV or radio) (1)
- ☐ Newspapers/magazines (including online editions) (2)
- ☐ News and political websites (3)
- ☐ Podcasts (4)
- ☐ Social media (5)
- ☐ Satirical news/political commentary (6)
- ☐ Directly from candidates' websites or social media accounts (7)
- ☐ The presidential debates (8)
- ☐ Campaign ads (9)
- ☐ Hearing information second-hand from others around me (10)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (11) _____

Display This Question:

If How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Not very closely

Or How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Moderately closely

Or How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Very closely

C5b What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two.

- ☐ Employment/the economy (1)
 - ☐ Taxes (2)
 - ☐ Trade with other countries (12)
 - ☐ Environmental issues/climate change (3)
 - ☐ Foreign relations (13)
 - ☐ Immigration (4)
 - ☐ Education (5)
 - ☐ Abortion/reproductive rights (6)
 - ☐ Terrorism/ISIS/national security (7)
 - ☐ LGBTQ rights (8)
 - ☐ Domestic issues on race and ethnicity (9)
 - ☐ The character of the candidates themselves (14)
 - ☐ Other (please specify) (10) _____
 - ☐ Other (please specify) (11) _____
-

Display This Question:

If How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Not very closely

Or How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Moderately closely

Or How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall? = Very closely

C5c What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two.

- ☐ Employment/the economy (1)
- ☐ Taxes (2)
- ☐ Trade with other countries (12)
- ☐ Environmental issues/climate change (3)
- ☐ Foreign relations (13)
- ☐ Immigration (4)
- ☐ Education (5)
- ☐ Abortion/reproductive rights (6)
- ☐ Terrorism/ISIS/national security (7)
- ☐ LGBTQ rights (8)
- ☐ The character of the candidates themselves (14)
- ☐ Domestic issues on race and ethnicity (9)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (10) _____
- ☐ Other (please specify) (11) _____

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Employment/the economy

C5d_1 Regarding employment and the economy, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Taxes

C5d_2 Regarding taxes, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Environmental issues/climate change

C5d_3 Regarding environmental issues and climate change, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Immigration

C5d_4 Regarding immigration, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Education

C5d_5 Regarding education, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
 - ☐ Donald Trump (2)
 - ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
 - ☐ Jill Stein (4)
 - ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)
-

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Abortion/reproductive rights

C5d_6 Regarding abortion and reproductive rights, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Terrorism/ISIS/national security

C5d_7 Regarding combating terrorism and ISIS, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = LGBTQ rights

C5d_8 Regarding LGBTQ rights, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Domestic issues on race and ethnicity

C5d_9 Regarding race issues, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Trade with other countries

C5d_12 Regarding trade, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Foreign relations

C5d_13 Regarding foreign relations, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = The character of the candidates themselves

C5d_14 Regarding the character of the candidates, which candidate did you most trust?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
 - ☐ Donald Trump (2)
 - ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
 - ☐ Jill Stein (4)
 - ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)
-

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Other (please specify)

C5d_10 Regarding the other topic you listed, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

Display This Question:

If What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please c... = Other (please specify)

C5d_11 Regarding the other topic you listed second, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic (5)

C6 Did you vote for a presidential candidate in the general election?

- ☐ No (1)
- ☐ Yes (2)

Display This Question:

If Did you vote for a presidential candidate in the general election? = Yes

C6a

Who did you vote for?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton (1)
- ☐ Donald Trump (2)
- ☐ Gary Johnson (3)
- ☐ Jill Stein (4)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (5) _____

Display This Question:

If Who did you vote for? = Hillary Clinton

C6b

What is the primary reason that you voted for Hillary Clinton?

- ☐ I supported Clinton and agreed with most of her political platforms (1)
- ☐ I wanted the Democratic Party to win (2)
- ☐ I did not want Trump to win (3)
- ☐ I felt she was the most qualified candidate (4)
- ☐ I wanted to elect a female president (5)
- ☐ Other (please explain) (6) _____

Display This Question:

If Who did you vote for? = Donald Trump

C6c What is the primary reason that you voted for Donald Trump?

- ☐ I supported Trump and agreed with most of his political platforms (1)
- ☐ I wanted the Republican Party to win (2)
- ☐ I did not want Clinton to win (3)
- ☐ I wanted a non-politician to win in order to change the political status quo (4)
- ☐ I thought Trump was the most likely candidate to address my concerns (5)
- ☐ Other (please explain) (6) _____

Display This Question:

If Did you vote for a presidential candidate in the general election? = No

C6d

What is the primary reason that you did not vote?

- ☐ I did not like any of the candidates (1)
- ☐ I am not registered to vote (2)
- ☐ I typically do not vote (3)
- ☐ I did not think my vote would make a difference (4)
- ☐ I just was not able to make it to the polls on the day of the election (5)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (6) _____

C7 Generally, how satisfied have you been with President Trump's performance since he took office January 20, 2017?

- ☐ Extremely dissatisfied (1)
- ☐ Moderately dissatisfied (2)
- ☐ Slightly dissatisfied (3)
- ☐ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (4)
- ☐ Slightly satisfied (5)
- ☐ Moderately satisfied (6)
- ☐ Extremely satisfied (7)
- ☐ I haven't been following his performance (8)

D9 On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that has become commonly referred to as the "travel ban" or "Muslim ban". On February 9, 2017, a U.S. Court of Appeals declined to uphold the order after it had been challenged in court. On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued a new executive order that revised the previous version. Have you heard about either of these executive orders?

- ☐ Yes, I had heard about both (1)
- ☐ Yes, but I had only heard about the first order and not the second (3)
- ☐ Yes, but I had only heard about the second order and not the first (4)
- ☐ No, I had not heard about either (2)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (5)

Display This Question:

If On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that has become commonly referred... = Yes, I had heard about both

Or On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that has become commonly referred... = Yes, but I had only heard about the first order and not the second

D9a1 How familiar are you with the content of the first executive order, issued January 27, 2017?

- ☐ Not at all familiar (1)
- ☐ Slightly familiar (2)
- ☐ Moderately familiar (3)
- ☐ Very familiar (4)
- ☐ Extremely familiar (5)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (6)

Display This Question:

If On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that has become commonly referred... = Yes, I had heard about both

Or On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that has become commonly referred... = Yes, but I had only heard about the second order and not the first

D9a2 How familiar are you with the content of the second executive order, issued March 6, 2017?

- ☐ Not at all familiar (1)
- ☐ Slightly familiar (2)
- ☐ Moderately familiar (3)
- ☐ Very familiar (4)
- ☐ Extremely familiar (5)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (6)

Display This Question:

If How familiar are you with the content of the first executive order, issued January 27, 2017? , Not at all familiar Is Displayed

D9b1 In general, to what extent do you support or oppose the first executive order?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (8)

Display This Question:

If How familiar are you with the content of the second executive order, issued March 6, 2017? , Not at all familiar Is Displayed

D9b2 In general, to what extent do you support or oppose the second executive order?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (8)

D_ExecText Because these executive orders contain multiple sections and subsections and can be complex, we will summarize the prominent directives within the orders for your reference. First, we will ask about the January 27th executive order.

The executive order issued January 27th, 2017:

(1) Suspends the visa issuance and other immigration benefits to nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen) for at least 30 days while additional screening and verification procedures are established. Additionally, nationals from those countries who already possessed green card or visa status are not permitted re-entry to the United States for 90 days.

(2) Suspends the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days while the program screening is under review. After revised procedures are established, applicants may be accepted if they pass these procedures' screening and emigrate from a country considered by the administration to be non-threatening to national security.

(3) Upon *reinstatement* of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, will prioritize the applications of refugees who claim religious persecution and are a religious minority in their home country.

(4) Indefinitely suspends the acceptance of Syrian refugees to the United States until the president determines Syrian nationals are no longer a threat to national security.

The questions below ask about these specific points. Please reference the above text as needed when answering the following questions.

D10 To what extent do you support or oppose part (1)—suspending entry for nationals from the seven specified Muslim-majority countries—of this executive order?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (9)

D11 To what extent do you support or oppose part (2)—temporarily suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program—of this executive order?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (9)

D12 To what extent do you support or oppose part (3)—giving preference to refugees who are a religious minority in their home country and fleeing religious persecution—of this executive order?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)

D13 To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees to the US—of this executive order?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)

Display This Question:

If To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Somewhat support
Or To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Support
Or To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Strongly support

D13a What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two.

- ☐ The U.S. should stay out of international civil wars and crises (1)
- ☐ There are already enough Americans in the U.S. who need help and resources, so we should address their needs first (2)
- ☐ For American safety, the U.S. shouldn't accept Syrian refugees because it could facilitate terrorists entering the country (3)
- ☐ There are already too many foreigners in the U.S. (4)
- ☐ Refugees would be a strain on the economy (5)
- ☐ Because President Trump has expressed his view that Syrian refugees should not be admitted at this time, and I support his authority and judgment. (6)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (7) _____

Display This Question:

- If To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Strongly oppose
- Or To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Oppose
- Or To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Somewhat oppose
- Or To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Neither support nor oppose
- Or To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = Other (please specify)
- Or To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees t... = *Don't know/Decline to answer*

D13b Do you think the U.S. should accept Syrian refugees?

- ☐ Yes, without conditions (1)
- ☐ Yes, with conditions (2)
- ☐ No, the US should not accept Syrian refugees (3)
- ☐ I don't have an opinion on this topic (4)

Display This Question:

If Do you think the U.S. should accept Syrian refugees? = Yes, with conditions

D13b_1 Which of the following conditions should be considered for the U.S. to accept Syrian refugees? Check all that apply.

- ☐ The U.S. should set a maximum number to be accepted annually and cap off the immigration at that (1)
- ☐ There needs to be a "vetting" process whereby each refugee's background is investigated to ensure terrorists do not enter the country (2)
- ☐ Only non-Muslim Syrian refugees should be accepted (3)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (4) _____

Q154 The executive order issued on March 6, 2017, varied from the first order in several ways, both expanding on certain components in the previous order and entirely omitting other portions. Below are key points summarized from the March 6th order.

The executive order issued March 6, 2017:

(1) *Suspends entry into the United States for foreign nationals from six Muslim-majority countries (Syria, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen) for at least 90 days. Exceptions to this suspension of these foreign nationals includes allowing entry for lawful U.S. permanent residents, foreign nationals traveling on a diplomatic or diplomatic-type visa, and foreign nationals who have been granted asylum or refugee status in the U.S. The issuance of visas to foreign nationals from one of these six countries may be granted on a case-by-case basis.*

(2) *Permits that Iraqi foreign nationals may travel to the United States and be issued visas; however, their visa approval process will undergo additional scrutiny and screening as compared to the screening process for foreign nationals from other countries.*

(3) *Suspends the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days while the program screening is under review. This suspension means no new refugees may enter the U.S. during this time and no refugee status applications may be approved during this period. As a noted exception, if a refugee had already been granted approval and formal travel arrangements had been made prior to the effective date of this order, then they may enter the U.S.*

(4) *Declares that no more than 50,000 refugees may be accepted to the U.S. during the 2017 fiscal year.*

(5) *Establishes an information sharing plan whereby Homeland Security collects and makes public information on the number of foreign nationals who are charged and/or convicted with crimes relating to terrorism, incidents of radicalization of foreign nationals*

after entry to the U.S. and engagement in terrorism-related activities, and incidents of gender-based violence against women, such as "honor killings."

Please reference the above text as needed when answering the following questions.

Q155 The March 6th order differs from the January 27th order by *not* including Iraq in the list of countries whose foreign nationals are barred entry and visa issuance for 90 days. To what extent do you support *not* including Iraq on this list?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)

Q158 The March 6th order differs from the January 27th order by providing exceptions as to which foreign nationals from those six countries may and may not enter during the 90 day period. The January order did not provide any distinction or exception. To what extent do you support making exceptions so certain foreign nationals from those six countries may still enter and/or be issued visas during the 90 day period?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)

Q159 The January 27th order indefinitely banned acceptance of Syrian refugees to the U.S. The March 6th order did not include this stipulation. To what extent do you support the March order leaving out this stipulation (in other words, to what extent do you support *not* indefinitely banning Syrian refugees)?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)

Q156 To what extent do you support or oppose part (5)—Homeland Security collecting and publicly sharing information on the number of foreign nationals who commit or engage in terrorist-related activities—of this executive order?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (8) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)

Q157 Overall, which executive order do you prefer?

- ☐ The January 27th order (1)
- ☐ The March 6th order (2)
- ☐ I liked both (3)
- ☐ I liked neither (4)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (9)

D14 Some politicians have suggested creating a registry of Muslims in the United States. To what extent do you support or oppose this idea?

- ☐ Strongly oppose (1)
- ☐ Oppose (2)
- ☐ Somewhat oppose (3)
- ☐ Neither support nor oppose (4)
- ☐ Somewhat support (5)
- ☐ Support (6)
- ☐ Strongly support (7)
- ☐ Don't know (8)

Display This Question:

If Some politicians have suggested creating a registry of Muslims in the United States. To what extent... = Strongly oppose

Or Some politicians have suggested creating a registry of Muslims in the United States. To what extent... = Oppose

Or Some politicians have suggested creating a registry of Muslims in the United States. To what extent... = Somewhat oppose

D14a

Why do you oppose the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply.

- ☐ A registry based on religion is a violation of freedom of religion as protected by the First Amendment. (1)
- ☐ Creating a registry just doesn't seem feasible -it would be too difficult to collect accurate and complete information on all Muslims in the US. (2)
- ☐ Creating any registry would be a privacy infringement on the part of the federal government. (3)
- ☐ Creating a registry could alienate Muslims and push them towards extremism. (4)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (5) _____

Display This Question:

If Some politicians have suggested creating a registry of Muslims in the United States. To what extent... = Somewhat support

Or Some politicians have suggested creating a registry of Muslims in the United States. To what extent... = Support

Or Some politicians have suggested creating a registry of Muslims in the United States. To what extent... = Strongly support

D14b

Why do you support the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply.

- ☐ National security sometimes takes precedence over individuals' privacy and rights. The government needs as much information as they can get to properly monitor domestic terrorism. (1)
- ☐ A religious registry doesn't infringe on Muslims' rights so long as they are law-abiding. They should have nothing to hide. (2)
- ☐ A registry is OK so long as the government does not make the registry public. (3)
- ☐ I don't consider creating a religious registry to violate a person's privacy. (4)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (5) _____

D15 To what extent are you familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

- ☐ Not at all familiar (1)
- ☐ Slightly familiar (2)
- ☐ Moderately familiar (3)
- ☐ Very familiar (4)

Display This Question:

If To what extent are you familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? = Slightly familiar

Or To what extent are you familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? = Moderately familiar

Or To what extent are you familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? = Very familiar

D15a

Do you believe one side is more at fault than the other for the conflict?

- ☐ Yes, Palestinians are more at fault (1)
- ☐ Yes, Israel is more at fault (2)
- ☐ Both sides are equally at fault (3)
- ☐ Neither is at fault (4)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (5) _____
- ☐ Don't know (6)

Display This Question:

If Do you believe one side is more at fault than the other for the conflict? , Yes, Palestinians are more at fault Is Displayed

D15b Do you think the American government should formally voice their support for one side over the other in this conflict?

- ☐ Yes, support for Palestinians (1)
- ☐ Yes, support for Israel (2)
- ☐ No (4)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (3) _____
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (5)

E_update Thank you for your thoughtful responses so far—you're over half-way through survey!

E1 For the following questions, please give us your best guess based off your present knowledge. Please don't look up the answers. Thinking about the entire Muslim population in the United States, what percentage do you think are born in the U.S.?

- ☐ Less than 10% (1)
- ☐ More than 10%, less than 20% (2)
- ☐ More than 20%, less than 30% (3)
- ☐ More than 30%, less than 40% (4)
- ☐ More than 40%, less than 50% (5)
- ☐ More than 50%, less than 60% (6)
- ☐ More than 60%, less than 70% (7)
- ☐ More than 70%, less than 80% (8)
- ☐ More than 80%, less than 90% (9)
- ☐ More than 90% (10)

E2 Thinking about the entire Muslim population in the United States, what percentage do you think are American citizens?

- ☐ Less than 10% (1)
- ☐ More than 10%, less than 20% (2)
- ☐ More than 20%, less than 30% (3)
- ☐ More than 30%, less than 40% (4)
- ☐ More than 40%, less than 50% (5)
- ☐ More than 50%, less than 60% (6)
- ☐ More than 60%, less than 70% (7)
- ☐ More than 70%, less than 80% (8)
- ☐ More than 80%, less than 90% (9)
- ☐ More than 90% (10)

E3 Thinking about the entire Muslim population in the United States, what percentage do you think are Arab?

- ☐ Less than 10% (1)
- ☐ More than 10%, less than 20% (2)
- ☐ More than 20%, less than 30% (3)
- ☐ More than 30%, less than 40% (4)
- ☐ More than 40%, less than 50% (5)
- ☐ More than 50%, less than 60% (6)
- ☐ More than 60%, less than 70% (7)
- ☐ More than 70%, less than 80% (8)
- ☐ More than 80%, less than 90% (9)
- ☐ More than 90% (10)

E4 What percentage of the *total* U.S. population do you estimate is Muslim?

- ☐ Less than 2% (1)
- ☐ More than 2%, less than 5% (2)
- ☐ More than 5%, less than 10% (3)
- ☐ More than 10%, less than 20% (4)
- ☐ More than 20% (5)

E5 Do you personally know any Muslims?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)

Display This Question:

If Do you personally know any Muslims? = Yes

E5a From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.)

- ☐ Personal friend (1)
- ☐ Romantic relationship (2)
- ☐ Family member (3)
- ☐ Work (5)
- ☐ School (6)
- ☐ Neighborhood (7)
- ☐ Community organization (8)
- ☐ Friend of a friend (9)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (10) _____

Display This Question:

If From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) , Personal friend Is Displayed

E5b Thinking of the Muslim(s) you know the best, how well do you know them?

- ☐ Not well at all (1)
- ☐ Moderately well (3)
- ☐ Very well (4)

Display This Question:

If Do you personally know any Muslims? = No

E5c While you don't personally know any Muslims, do you know of any Muslims in your community, neighborhood, work, etc.?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ No (2)
 - ☐ Don't know (3)
-

E6 How familiar are you with Islam's religious traditions and beliefs?

- ☐ Not familiar at all (1)
 - ☐ Slightly familiar (2)
 - ☐ Moderately familiar (3)
 - ☐ Very familiar (4)
 - ☐ Extremely familiar (5)
-

Display This Question:

If How familiar are you with Islam's religious traditions and beliefs? = Slightly familiar

Or How familiar are you with Islam's religious traditions and beliefs? = Moderately familiar

Or How familiar are you with Islam's religious traditions and beliefs? = Very familiar

Or How familiar are you with Islam's religious traditions and beliefs? = Extremely familiar

E6a

Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.)

- ☐ In school (1)
- ☐ At church or another non-Muslim religious organization (2)
- ☐ Through a Muslim organization (3)
- ☐ Traveling in Muslim countries (10)
- ☐ Personal reading/research (4)
- ☐ In the news (5)
- ☐ Social media (6)
- ☐ Movies/TV shows (7)
- ☐ Personal acquaintance with Muslim(s) (8)
- ☐ Other (Please specify) (9) _____

E7 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios?

	Extremely uncomfortable (1)	Moderately uncomfortable (2)	Slightly uncomfortable (3)	Slightly comfortable (4)	Moderately comfortable (5)	Extremely comfortable (6)
A Muslim in the US as a non-citizen, temporary visitor (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A Muslim being a US citizen (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A Muslim co-worker (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A Muslim neighbor on the same street (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A Muslim as a close personal friend (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A Muslim as a close relative by marriage (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
A Muslim as the President of the United States (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

E8 Which of the following comes closest to your view on Muslim immigrants?

- ☐ Muslim immigrants are fine in the United States so long as they assimilate (1)
- ☐ Muslim immigrants are fine in the United States without needing to assimilate (2)
- ☐ Muslim immigrants are never fine in the United States (3)
- ☐ Other (please explain) (4) _____
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (5)

E9 Do you think Muslims in the US experience discrimination?

- ☐ Yes, often (1)
- ☐ Yes, sometimes (2)
- ☐ Yes, but seldom (3)
- ☐ No, they do not (4)

E10 Do you think the profiling of Muslims at airports, additional scrutiny by NSA security surveillance, and related surveillance measures are justified?

- ☐ Yes, because it is often Muslims who are the perpetrators of terrorist attacks so they deserve additional scrutiny (1)
- ☐ Yes, because national security and public safety are at risk, so that takes priority over individual Muslims' rights (2)
- ☐ No, it is unfair to Muslims to target them because of their religion and/or ethnicity (3)
- ☐ Muslims are not actually being profiled or singled out for surveillance in the US (5)
- ☐ Other (please explain) (4) _____

E11 To what extent do you think Islam has a lot in common with your own religion?

- ☐ Nothing in common (1)
- ☐ A little in common (2)
- ☐ Some in common (3)
- ☐ A lot in common (4)
- ☐ *I don't affiliate with a religion* (6)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (5)

E12 To what extent do you think Islam has a lot in common with Christianity?

- ☐ Nothing in common (1)
- ☐ A little in common (2)
- ☐ Some in common (3)
- ☐ A lot in common (4)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (5)

E13 Do you think a Muslim can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life here in the United States?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)
- ☐ Depends (Please explain) (4) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (3)

Display This Question:

If Do you think a Muslim can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life here in the Unite... = No

Or Do you think a Muslim can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life here in the Unite... = Depends (Please explain)

E13a Why do you think Islam *cannot* be practiced fully in the United States? Select the answer choice that most closely matches your view.

- ☐ I don't think any religion can be practiced fully in the United States (1)
- ☐ Because American society is not accepting of Islam (2)
- ☐ Because America is founded on and structured around Christian traditions (3)
- ☐ Because Islamic values conflict with American values (4)
- ☐ Other (Please specify) (5) _____

E14a To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs?

- ☐ Not at all compatible (5)
 - ☐ Only a little compatible (4)
 - ☐ Somewhat compatible (3)
 - ☐ Mostly compatible (2)
 - ☐ Completely compatible (1)
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (7)
-

E14b To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values?

- ☐ Not at all compatible (5)
 - ☐ Only a little compatible (4)
 - ☐ Somewhat compatible (3)
 - ☐ Mostly compatible (2)
 - ☐ Completely compatible (1)
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (7)
-

Display This Question:

If To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs? = Not at all compatible
Or To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs? = Only a little compatible
Or To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs? = Somewhat compatible
Or To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values? = Not at all compatible
Or To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values? = Only a little compatible
Or To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values? = Somewhat compatible

E14c

Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.)

- ☐ Islamic *jihad*, which some argue justifies the use of force or violence by Muslims against nonbelievers (1)
 - ☐ The unequal treatment of women within Islam (2)
 - ☐ Most Islamic societies are just too backwards in terms of tradition and customs (3)
 - ☐ So few Muslim-majority countries are democracies- there's little evidence Islam could be compatible with democracy (4)
 - ☐ America was founded on Christian ideals, and Islam is incompatible with those foundations (5)
 - ☐ Other (Please specify) (6) _____
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (7)
-

E15 How likely do you think it is that Islam will become a major religion in the United States?

- ☐ Not at all likely (1)
- ☐ Only a little likely (2)
- ☐ Somewhat likely (3)
- ☐ Very likely (4)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (7)

E16 To what extent are you comfortable with the idea of Islam being a major American religion?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
- ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
- ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
- ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
- ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
- ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
- ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (8)

E17 For each of the following statements, please mark the extent to which you agree with each sentiment.

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat Disagree (3)	Neither Disagree nor Agree (4)	Somewhat Agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly Agree (7)	<i>Don't know/Decline to answer (8)</i>
Islam, more so than other religions, encourages violence. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The vast majority of Muslims are peaceful. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In the context of the US, Islam is as much an ethnicity as it is a religion. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
International Islamic extremist groups are a major threat to the U.S. (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Islamic radicalization occurring within the U.S. is a major threat. (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

E21 To what extent are you concerned about Islamic extremism in the U.S.?

- ☐ Not at all concerned (1)
- ☐ Slightly concerned (2)
- ☐ Moderately concerned (3)
- ☐ Very concerned (4)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer (5)*

E22 To what extent are you concerned about Islamic extremism around the world?

- ☐ Not at all concerned (1)
- ☐ Slightly concerned (2)
- ☐ Moderately concerned (3)
- ☐ Very concerned (4)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer (5)*

E23 With which of the following characterizations do you most agree: Islamic terrorist attacks are representative of a major clash between Islam and Western civilization *OR* Islamic terrorist attacks are the product of a small number of radical groups, which are not representative of all of Islam?

- ☐ Islamic terrorist attacks are representative of a major clash between Islam and Western civilization (1)
- ☐ Islamic terrorist attacks are the product of a small number of radical groups, which are not representative of all of Islam (2)
- ☐ Other (please explain) (3) _____

B_Intro

Thank you for sharing your opinions on these sensitive topics. You've finished about three-quarters of our questions.

We'd now like to learn about your own religious background.

B1 What is your religious preference?

- ☐ Christian (1)
- ☐ Jewish (2)
- ☐ Hindu (3)
- ☐ Buddhist (7)
- ☐ Other (Please specify) (4) _____
- ☐ None (6)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? = Christian

B1a1 With which Christian tradition do you identify?

- ☐ Catholic (8)
- ☐ Baptist (1)
- ☐ Methodist (2)
- ☐ Lutheran (3)
- ☐ Presbyterian (4)
- ☐ Pentecostal (10)
- ☐ Episcopalian/Anglican (5)
- ☐ Mormon (9)
- ☐ Inter/Non-denominational Christian (7)
- ☐ Other Christian (Please specify) (6) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (15)

Display This Question:

If With which Christian tradition do you identify? = Baptist

B1_Baptist What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ American Baptist Association (4)
- ☐ American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A (5)
- ☐ National Baptist Convention of America (6)
- ☐ National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc (7)
- ☐ Southern Baptist Convention (8)
- ☐ Other Baptist Churches (9)
- ☐ Baptist, Don't know which (10)

Display This Question:

If With which Christian tradition do you identify? = Methodist

B1_Methodist What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ African Methodist Episcopal Church (4)
- ☐ African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (5)
- ☐ United Methodist Church (6)
- ☐ Other Methodist Churches (7)
- ☐ Methodist, Don't know which (8)

Display This Question:

If With which Christian tradition do you identify? = Lutheran

B1_Lutheran What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ American Lutheran Church (4)
- ☐ Lutheran Church in America (5)
- ☐ Lutheran Church -- Missouri Synod (6)
- ☐ Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod (7)
- ☐ Other Lutheran Churches (8)
- ☐ Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (9)
- ☐ Lutheran, Don't know which (10)

Display This Question:

f With which Christian tradition do you identify? = Presbyterian

B1_Presbyterian What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ Presbyterian Church in the United States (4)
- ☐ United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (5)
- ☐ Other Presbyterian Churches (6)
- ☐ Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (7)
- ☐ Presbyterian, Don't know which (8)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? = Christian

B1a2

Would you describe yourself as a "born-again" or evangelical Christian?

- ☐ Yes, would (1)
- ☐ No, would not (2)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (3)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? = Jewish

B1b Which of the following Jewish religious denominations do you consider yourself to be?

- ☐ Orthodox (1)
- ☐ Conservative (2)
- ☐ Reform (3)
- ☐ Other denomination (Please specify) (5) _____
- ☐ No particular denomination (4)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (7)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? = None

B1c Which of the following do you consider yourself to be?

- ☐ Atheist (1)
- ☐ Agnostic (2)
- ☐ No identification (3)
- ☐ Other (Please specify) (4) _____

B2 Has this always been your religious affiliation?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)

Display This Question:

If Has this always been your religious affiliation? = No

B2a For how long have you identified

as \${B1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} \${B1a1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}\${B1b/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}\${B1c/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}?

- ☐ Less than one year (1)
- ☐ Longer than one year but less than five years (2)
- ☐ Longer than five but less than ten years (3)
- ☐ Longer than ten but less than twenty years (4)
- ☐ Longer than twenty years (5)
- ☐ *Don't Know/ Decline to answer* (6)

Display This Question:

If For how long have you identified as \${q://QID163/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} ... , Less than one year Is Displayed

B2b What was your religious preference in the past?

- ☐ Christian (1)
- ☐ Jewish (2)
- ☐ Muslim (16)
- ☐ Hindu (19)
- ☐ Buddhist (20)
- ☐ Other (Please specify) (3) _____
- ☐ None (4)

Display This Question:

If What was your religious preference in the past? = Christian

B2b_1 With which Christian tradition did you identify? If more than one, select the denomination that you affiliated with for the longest period of time.

- ☐ Catholic (8)
- ☐ Baptist (1)
- ☐ Methodist (2)
- ☐ Lutheran (3)
- ☐ Presbyterian (4)
- ☐ Pentecostal (10)
- ☐ Episcopal/Anglican (5)
- ☐ Mormon (9)
- ☐ Non-denominational Christian (7)
- ☐ Other Christian (Please specify) (6) _____
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (15)

Display This Question:

If With which Christian tradition did you identify? If more than one, select the denomination that y... = Baptist

Q152 What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ American Baptist Association (4)
- ☐ American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A (5)
- ☐ National Baptist Convention of America (6)
- ☐ National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc (7)
- ☐ Southern Baptist Convention (8)
- ☐ Other Baptist Churches (9)
- ☐ Baptist, Don't know which (10)

Display This Question:

If With which Christian tradition did you identify? If more than one, select the denomination that y... = Methodist

Q153 What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ African Methodist Episcopal Church (4)
- ☐ African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (5)
- ☐ United Methodist Church (6)
- ☐ Other Methodist Churches (7)
- ☐ Methodist, Don't know which (8)

Display This Question:

If With which Christian tradition did you identify? If more than one, select the denomination that y... = Lutheran

Q154 What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ American Lutheran Church (4)
- ☐ Lutheran Church in America (5)
- ☐ Lutheran Church -- Missouri Synod (6)
- ☐ Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod (7)
- ☐ Other Lutheran Churches (8)
- ☐ Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (9)
- ☐ Lutheran, Don't know which (10)

Display This Question:

If With which Christian tradition did you identify? If more than one, select the denomination that y... = Presbyterian

Q155 What specific denomination is that, if any?

- ☐ Presbyterian Church in the United States (4)
- ☐ United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (5)
- ☐ Other Presbyterian Churches (6)
- ☐ Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (7)
- ☐ Presbyterian, Don't know which (8)

Display This Question:

If What was your religious preference in the past? = Jewish

B2b_2 Which of the following Jewish religious denominations did you consider yourself to be in the past?

- ☐ Orthodox (1)
- ☐ Conservative (2)
- ☐ Reform (3)
- ☐ Other denomination (Please specify) (5) _____
- ☐ No particular denomination (4)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (7)

Display This Question:

If What was your religious preference in the past? = None

B2b_3 Which of the following did you consider yourself to be in the past?

- ☐ Atheist (1)
- ☐ Agnostic (2)
- ☐ No identification (3)
- ☐ Other (Please specify) (4) _____

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? != None

B3 Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

- ☐ More than once a week (1)
- ☐ Once a week (2)
- ☐ Once or twice a month (3)
- ☐ A few times a year (4)
- ☐ Seldom (5)
- ☐ Never (6)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (8)

Display This Question:

If Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? = More than once a week

Or Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? = Once a week

Or Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? = Once or twice a month

B4 Has your house of worship participated in interfaith events?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (3)

Display This Question:

If Has your house of worship participated in interfaith events? = Yes

B5 Have you participated in any of those interfaith events?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (3)

Display This Question:

If Have you participated in any of those interfaith events? = Yes

B6 Did you find the interfaith event(s) worthwhile?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (3)

Display This Question:

If Have you participated in any of those interfaith events? = Yes

B7 What religions other than your own were involved in the event?

- ☐ Please list: (1) _____
- ☐ Don't recall (2)

Display This Question:

If Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? = More than once a week

Or Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? = Once a week

Or Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? = Once or twice a month

B8 Over the past twelve months, about how regularly has politics been brought up during the religious services you have attended?

- ☐ Often (1)
- ☐ Occasionally (2)
- ☐ Seldom (3)
- ☐ Never (4)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (5)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? != None

B9 How often do you participate in prayer groups, scripture study groups, religious education programs, or other religiously affiliated programs?

- ☐ At least once a week (1)
- ☐ Once or twice a month (2)
- ☐ Several times a year (3)
- ☐ Seldom (4)
- ☐ Never (5)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (6)

Display This Question:

If How often do you participate in prayer groups, scripture study groups, religious education progra... = At least once a week

Or How often do you participate in prayer groups, scripture study groups, religious education progra... = Once or twice a month

Or How often do you participate in prayer groups, scripture study groups, religious education progra... = Several times a year

B10

Over the past 12 months, about how often has politics been brought up, formally or informally, at these events?

- ☐ Often (1)
- ☐ Occasionally (2)
- ☐ Seldom (3)
- ☐ Never (4)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (5)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? != None

B11 How often do you typically pray?

- ☐ Multiple times a day (1)
- ☐ Once a day (2)
- ☐ A few times a week (3)
- ☐ Once a week (4)
- ☐ A few times a month (5)
- ☐ Seldom (6)
- ☐ Never (7)
- ☐ This question is not applicable to my religion (8)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (9)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? != None

B12 How often do you read scripture outside of religious services?

- ☐ At least once a week (1)
- ☐ Once or twice a month (2)
- ☐ Several times a year (3)
- ☐ Seldom (4)
- ☐ Never (5)
- ☐ This question is not applicable to my religion (6)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (7)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? != None

B13 Which comes closest to your view? The holy book of my religion is the word of God, **OR** it is a book written by men and is not the word of God.

- ☐ This holy book is the word of God (1)
- ☐ This holy book is a book written by people and is not the word of God (2)
- ☐ This question is not applicable to my religion (3)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (4)

Display This Question:

If Which comes closest to your view? The holy book of my religion is the word of God, OR it is a boo... = This holy book is the word of God

B14

Regarding this holy book, which of the following comes closest to your belief?

- ☐ This book should be taken literally, word for word (1)
- ☐ Not everything in this book should be taken literally, word for word (2)
- ☐ Other (Please specify) (3) _____

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? != None

B15 How important is religion in your daily life?

- ☐ Not at all important (1)
- ☐ Slightly important (2)
- ☐ Moderately important (3)
- ☐ Very important (4)
- ☐ Extremely important (5)
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (6)

Display This Question:

If What is your religious preference? != None

B16 Between the following two statements, which statement comes closest to your own views even if neither is exactly right?

- ☐ My religion is the one true faith leading to eternal life, OR (1)
- ☐ Many religions/ways of life can lead to eternal life (2)
- ☐ I do not believe in eternal life (4)
- ☐ Other (Please explain) (3) _____
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (6)

B17 Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout religious person and living in a modern society?

- ☐ Yes, there is conflict (1)
- ☐ No, I don't think so (2)
- ☐ Depends on the religion (3)
- ☐ Other (Please explain) (4) _____
- ☐ Don't know/Decline to answer (5)

Display This Question:

If Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout religious person and living in a... = Yes, there is conflict

Or Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout religious person and living in a... = Depends on the religion

Or Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout religious person and living in a... = Other (Please explain)

B18 What religion(s) do you think would be difficult to practice fully in modern society?

F_Intro Thank you for sharing your religious background and perspective. We just have a few final questions about you!
A reminder: SSI will not share any personally identifying information with the researchers at UVA, and UVA will not share your responses with SSI, so your responses are fully anonymous.

F1 In what year were you born?

F2 What is your gender identity?

- ☐ Male (1)
- ☐ Female (2)
- ☐ Other (3)
- ☐ Prefer not to answer (4)

F3 How would you characterize the town/city where you live?

- ☐ Urban (1)
- ☐ Suburban (2)
- ☐ A small town or city not in a metro area (3)
- ☐ Rural (4)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (5) _____

F4 In what state do you currently live?

▼ Alabama (1) ... Wyoming (50)

F5 In the last five years, have you traveled outside of the United States?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (3)

Display This Question:

If In the last five years, have you traveled outside of the United States? = Yes

F6 To which countries did you travel and spend time in? Please list all.

F7 Have you ever spent time in a Muslim-majority country?

- ☐ Yes (Please list) (1) _____
- ☐ No (2)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (3)

F8 What is your marital status?

- ☐ Married (1)
- ☐ Widowed (2)
- ☐ Divorced (3)
- ☐ Separated (4)
- ☐ Never married (5)
- ☐ *Decline to answer* (6)

F9 Have you or an immediate family member served in a branch of the U.S. military?

- ☐ Yes (1)
 - ☐ No (2)
 - ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (3)
-

F10 Using the following scale, what is your political ideology?

- ☐ Extremely liberal (1)
- ☐ Liberal (2)
- ☐ Slightly liberal (3)
- ☐ Moderate (4)
- ☐ Slightly conservative (5)
- ☐ Conservative (6)
- ☐ Extremely conservative (7)
- ☐ *Other (Please specify)* (8) _____
- ☐ *Don't know/Refuse to answer* (9)

F11 How would you classify your financial situation?

- ☐ Excellent (1)
- ☐ Very good (2)
- ☐ Good (3)
- ☐ Fair (4)
- ☐ Poor (5)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (6)

F12 What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ☐ Less than high school (1)
- ☐ High school graduate (2)
- ☐ Some college (3)
- ☐ 2 year degree (4)
- ☐ 4 year degree (5)
- ☐ Masters degree (6)
- ☐ Professional degree (7)
- ☐ Doctorate (8)

F13 Which of the following best describes you?

- ☐ Working full time (35 hours/week or more) (1)
- ☐ Working part time (2)
- ☐ Unemployed looking for work (3)
- ☐ Unemployed not looking for work (4)
- ☐ Retired (5)
- ☐ Student (6)
- ☐ Homemaker (7)
- ☐ Disabled (8)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (9) _____

F14 What was your total *household income* from all sources last year before taxes?

- ☐ Less than \$30,000 (1)
- ☐ \$30,000 - \$39,999 (2)
- ☐ \$40,000 - \$49,999 (3)
- ☐ \$50,000 - \$59,999 (4)
- ☐ \$60,000 - \$69,999 (5)
- ☐ \$70,000 - \$79,999 (6)
- ☐ \$80,000 - \$89,999 (7)
- ☐ \$90,000 - \$99,999 (8)
- ☐ \$100,000 - \$149,999 (9)
- ☐ More than \$150,000 (10)
- ☐ *Don't know/Decline to answer* (11)

F15 Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino?

- ☐ Yes (1)
- ☐ No (2)
- ☐ *Decline to answer* (3)

F16 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.)

- ☐ White (1)
- ☐ Black or African-American (2)
- ☐ Asian (3)
- ☐ American Indian/Alaska Native (4)
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (5)
- ☐ Other (please specify) (6) _____
- ☐ *Decline to answer* (7)

Comments That's all the questions we have for you. If you have any additional comments to share, please write them below.

close Thank you so much for your time and for sharing your perspective with us. You'll now be returned to the SSI tracking system web page.

APPENDIX B

FRAMES CONSTRUCTION

Table 85. Items and Scoring Used to Create Frame 1 Scale

<i>Item</i>	<i>Response Category</i>	<i>Value Awarded Towards Frame 1 Scale</i>
Do you think the profiling of Muslims is justified?	Yes, because it is often Muslims who are the perpetrators of terrorist attacks	1
What values of Islam are most incompatible with US?	Islamic jihad	1
Islam, more so than other religions, encourages violence	Somewhat agree	1
	Agree	2
	Strongly Agree	3
International Islamic extremist groups are a major threat to the US	Agree	1
	Strongly Agree	1
Islamic radicalization occurring within the US is a major threat	Agree	1
	Strongly Agree	1
<i>Maximum possible score</i>		8

Table 86. Items and Scoring Used to Create Counter-Frame 1 Scale

<i>Item</i>	<i>Response Category</i>	<i>Value Awarded Towards Frame 1 Scale</i>
Islamic terrorist attacks are the product of a small number of radical groups, which are not representative of all of Islam	Selected	1
The vast majority of Muslims are peaceful	Somewhat agree	1
	Agree	2
	Strongly Agree	3
Islam, more so than other religions, encourages violence	Disagree	1
	Strongly Disagree	2
<i>Maximum possible score</i>		6

Table 87. Items and Scoring Used to Create Frame 2 Scale

<i>Item</i>	<i>Response Category</i>	<i>Value Awarded Towards Frame 1 Scale</i>
What values of Islam are most incompatible with US?	Most Islamic societies are too backwards in terms of tradition and customs	1
What values of Islam are most incompatible with US?	So few Muslim-majority countries are democracies	1
Islamic terrorist attacks are representative of a major clash between Islam and Western Civilization	Selected	1
Why do you think Islam cannot be practiced fully in the United States?	Because Islamic values conflict with American values	1
To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs?	Only a little compatible	1
	Not at all compatible	2
To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values?	Only a little compatible	1
	Not at all compatible	2
<i>Maximum possible score</i>		8

Table 88. Items and Scoring Used to Create Counter-Frame 2

<i>Item</i>	<i>Response Category</i>	<i>Value Awarded Towards Frame 1 Scale</i>
Do you think the profiling of Muslims is justified?	No, it is unfair to Muslims to target them because of their religion and/or ethnicity	1
Muslim immigrants are fine in the US without needing to assimilate	Selected	1
Muslims can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life in the US	Selected	1
To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs?	Mostly compatible	1
	Completely compatible	2
To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values?	Mostly compatible	1
	Completely compatible	2
<i>Maximum possible score</i>		7

Table 89. Items and Scoring Used to Create Frame 3

<i>Item</i>	<i>Response Category</i>	<i>Value Awarded Towards Frame 1 Scale</i>
What values of Islam are the most incompatible with the US?	America was founded on Christian ideals, and Islam is incompatible with those foundations	1
Why do you think Islam cannot be practiced fully in the US?	Because America is founded on and structure around Christian traditions	1
To what extent do you think Islam has a lot in common with Christianity?	Nothing in common	1
How comfortable are you with a Muslim being a US citizen?	Moderately uncomfortable	1
	Extremely uncomfortable	2
How comfortable are you with a Muslim as the US President?	Moderately uncomfortable	1
	Extremely uncomfortable	2
<i>Maximum possible score</i>		7

Table 90. Items and Scoring Used to Create Counter-Frame 3

<i>Item</i>	<i>Response Category</i>	<i>Value Awarded Towards Frame 1 Scale</i>
Do you think the profiling of Muslims is justified?	No, it is unfair to Muslims to target them because of their religion and/or ethnicity	1
Muslims can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life in the US	Selected	1
The creation of a registry based on religion is a violation of freedom of religion as protected by the First Amendment	Selected	1
How comfortable are you with a Muslim as the US President?	Moderately comfortable	1
	Extremely comfortable	2
<i>Maximum possible score</i>		5

APPENDIX C
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION TABLES

Table 91. Impact of Full Model on Frame 1- All Variables

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-0.058	0.588		-0.099	0.921
Religiosity	0.004	0.013	0.015	0.283	0.777
Evangelical	0.381	0.192	0.078	1.989	0.047
Fundamentalism	-0.034	0.125	-0.012	-0.268	0.789
Black*Religiosity	0.002	0.022	0.006	0.092	0.927
Hispanic*Religiosity	0.022	0.022	0.057	0.983	0.326
OtherR*Religiosity	0.018	0.031	0.030	0.570	0.569
Conservatism	0.077	0.056	0.063	1.375	0.170
Trump approval	0.215	0.042	0.225	5.149	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.198	0.069	-0.110	-2.868	0.004
Important in election - Immigration	0.329	0.168	0.069	1.958	0.051
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.334	0.164	0.068	2.037	0.042
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.237	0.242	0.033	0.978	0.328
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.090	0.151	-0.020	-0.594	0.553
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.308	0.213	0.052	1.447	0.148
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.301	0.192	-0.059	-1.572	0.116
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.381	0.153	0.087	2.488	0.013
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.025	0.195	0.004	0.127	0.899
Follow American public affairs	0.230	0.108	0.113	2.122	0.034
Follow international public affairs	-0.106	0.100	-0.054	-1.057	0.291
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.154	0.222	0.031	0.694	0.488
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.206	0.180	-0.047	-1.142	0.254
Source- News/political websites	-0.124	0.225	-0.029	-0.550	0.582
Source- Social media	-0.128	0.151	-0.030	-0.844	0.399
Source- Second-hand	0.076	0.163	0.015	0.466	0.641
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	-0.069	0.169	-0.015	-0.408	0.683
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	0.084	0.170	0.018	0.494	0.622
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	-0.008	0.176	-0.002	-0.046	0.963
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.233	0.174	0.050	1.341	0.180
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.153	0.172	-0.033	-0.891	0.373
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.137	0.278	-0.022	-0.490	0.624
Newspaper- Washington Post	-0.045	0.271	-0.007	-0.166	0.868
Newspaper- USA Today	0.110	0.265	0.016	0.417	0.677
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	0.221	0.285	0.028	0.775	0.439
Newspaper- New York Post	0.166	0.331	0.018	0.500	0.617
Website- HuffingtonPost	0.010	0.235	0.002	0.044	0.965
Website- BuzzFeed	0.172	0.238	0.028	0.723	0.470
Website- Al Jazeera	0.198	0.290	0.026	0.681	0.496

Website- Breitbart	0.541	0.393	0.046	1.376	0.169
Website- Other	-0.120	0.405	-0.010	-0.297	0.766
Personally know Muslim	0.075	0.148	0.017	0.507	0.612
Knowledge of Islam	0.207	0.076	0.099	2.724	0.007
Female	0.011	0.153	0.002	0.074	0.941
Age	0.016	0.006	0.121	2.734	0.006
Education	-0.046	0.051	-0.033	-0.903	0.367
Income	-0.028	0.027	-0.039	-1.017	0.309
African American/Black	0.002	0.367	0.000	0.005	0.996
Hispanic	-0.130	0.348	-0.022	-0.374	0.709
Multiracial/Other race	-0.331	0.441	-0.040	-0.751	0.453
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.406	0.217	-0.066	-1.869	0.062
Never married	-0.114	0.181	-0.025	-0.631	0.528
Region- Midwest	-0.176	0.210	-0.032	-0.839	0.402
Region- South	0.088	0.187	0.019	0.474	0.635
Region- West	0.031	0.197	0.006	0.157	0.875
Dependent Variable: Frame- Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent; Adjusted R2=0.326					

Table 92. Impact of Full Model on Counter-Frame 1- All Variables

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.499	0.527		2.843	0.005
Religiosity	-0.021	0.012	-0.099	-1.766	0.078
Evangelical	-0.198	0.172	-0.046	-1.151	0.250
Fundamentalism	0.150	0.112	0.059	1.335	0.182
Black*Religiosity	-0.004	0.019	-0.012	-0.184	0.854
Hispanic*Religiosity	-0.004	0.020	-0.012	-0.199	0.842
OtherR*Religiosity	0.024	0.028	0.047	0.861	0.390
Conservatism	-0.189	0.050	-0.178	-3.755	0.000
Trump approval	-0.135	0.037	-0.162	-3.599	0.000
Support political correctness	0.186	0.062	0.119	3.011	0.003
Important in election - Immigration	-0.122	0.150	-0.029	-0.810	0.418
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.094	0.147	-0.022	-0.642	0.521
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.311	0.217	0.050	1.434	0.152
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.037	0.135	0.010	0.276	0.782
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.217	0.191	-0.042	-1.134	0.257
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.397	0.172	0.090	2.307	0.021
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.072	0.137	0.019	0.524	0.601
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.165	0.175	0.034	0.944	0.346
Follow American public affairs	0.210	0.097	0.119	2.163	0.031
Follow international public affairs	-0.156	0.090	-0.092	-1.736	0.083
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.123	0.199	0.028	0.618	0.537
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.191	0.162	0.050	1.179	0.239
Source- News/political websites	0.266	0.202	0.071	1.315	0.189
Source- Social media	-0.078	0.136	-0.021	-0.576	0.564
Source- Second-hand	0.181	0.146	0.041	1.234	0.218
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	-0.061	0.151	-0.016	-0.405	0.685
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	-0.268	0.153	-0.068	-1.754	0.080
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.099	0.158	0.024	0.625	0.532
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.116	0.156	-0.029	-0.746	0.456
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.038	0.154	-0.010	-0.248	0.804
Newspaper- New York Times	0.219	0.250	0.041	0.879	0.380
Newspaper- Washington Post	0.106	0.243	0.018	0.437	0.662
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.419	0.237	-0.071	-1.766	0.078
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	0.084	0.256	0.012	0.329	0.742
Newspaper- New York Post	-0.203	0.297	-0.025	-0.683	0.495
Website- HuffingtonPost	-0.142	0.211	-0.033	-0.675	0.500
Website- BuzzFeed	0.043	0.213	0.008	0.200	0.841

Website- Al Jazeera	-0.210	0.260	-0.032	-0.806	0.421
Website- Breitbart	-0.478	0.353	-0.047	-1.356	0.176
Website- Other	-0.139	0.363	-0.013	-0.383	0.702
Personally know Muslim	0.482	0.133	0.128	3.622	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.135	0.068	0.074	1.984	0.048
Female	0.058	0.137	0.015	0.424	0.672
Age	0.006	0.005	0.054	1.172	0.242
Education	0.031	0.046	0.026	0.682	0.495
Income	0.031	0.024	0.051	1.285	0.199
African American/Black	-0.308	0.329	-0.062	-0.938	0.349
Hispanic	-0.231	0.312	-0.044	-0.741	0.459
Multiracial/Other race	-0.612	0.395	-0.086	-1.547	0.122
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.243	0.195	0.046	1.247	0.213
Never married	0.192	0.162	0.049	1.187	0.236
Region- Midwest	-0.057	0.189	-0.012	-0.304	0.762
Region- South	-0.147	0.167	-0.037	-0.877	0.381
Region- West	-0.027	0.177	-0.006	-0.152	0.879
Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful; Adjusted R ² =0.282					

Table 93. Impact of Full Model on Frame 2- All Variables

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.585	0.591		0.989	0.323
Religiosity	0.018	0.013	0.078	1.366	0.172
Evangelical	0.114	0.193	0.024	0.589	0.556
Fundamentalism	-0.063	0.126	-0.022	-0.501	0.616
Black*Religiosity	0.009	0.022	0.028	0.416	0.677
Hispanic*Religiosity	-0.005	0.022	-0.014	-0.227	0.820
OtherR*Religiosity	0.005	0.031	0.009	0.163	0.871
Conservatism	0.079	0.057	0.067	1.398	0.162
Trump approval	0.191	0.042	0.208	4.562	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.284	0.069	-0.163	-4.087	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	0.498	0.169	0.108	2.949	0.003
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.004	0.165	0.001	0.023	0.982
Important in election - Domestic race relations	-0.021	0.244	-0.003	-0.086	0.931
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.134	0.152	0.031	0.879	0.380
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.436	0.214	0.076	2.035	0.042
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.125	0.193	-0.026	-0.651	0.515
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-0.022	0.154	-0.005	-0.144	0.886
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	-0.102	0.196	-0.019	-0.521	0.603
Follow American public affairs	-0.035	0.109	-0.018	-0.325	0.745
Follow international public affairs	0.251	0.101	0.133	2.490	0.013
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.122	0.223	0.025	0.545	0.586
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.390	0.181	-0.093	-2.151	0.032
Source- News/political websites	-0.354	0.227	-0.085	-1.563	0.118
Source- Social media	0.200	0.152	0.048	1.312	0.190
Source- Second-hand	-0.270	0.164	-0.056	-1.644	0.101
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	-0.043	0.170	-0.010	-0.252	0.801
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	0.297	0.171	0.068	1.736	0.083
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	-0.085	0.177	-0.019	-0.479	0.632
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.193	0.175	0.043	1.104	0.270
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.224	0.173	-0.050	-1.292	0.197
Newspaper- New York Times	0.004	0.280	0.001	0.014	0.989
Newspaper- Washington Post	0.261	0.273	0.041	0.958	0.339
Newspaper- USA Today	0.327	0.266	0.050	1.229	0.220
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	-0.135	0.287	-0.018	-0.471	0.638
Newspaper- New York Post	0.207	0.333	0.023	0.623	0.534
Website- HuffingtonPost	0.116	0.236	0.024	0.490	0.624
Website- BuzzFeed	0.185	0.239	0.032	0.773	0.440

Website- Al Jazeera	0.168	0.292	0.023	0.576	0.565
Website- Breitbart	0.394	0.395	0.035	0.997	0.319
Website- Other	0.345	0.407	0.030	0.849	0.396
Personally know Muslim	-0.224	0.149	-0.054	-1.503	0.133
Knowledge of Islam	0.083	0.076	0.041	1.086	0.278
Female	0.088	0.154	0.020	0.575	0.565
Age	0.004	0.006	0.031	0.657	0.511
Education	-0.093	0.051	-0.069	-1.810	0.071
Income	-0.019	0.027	-0.028	-0.705	0.481
African American/Black	0.032	0.369	0.006	0.087	0.931
Hispanic	0.230	0.350	0.040	0.655	0.513
Multiracial/Other race	-0.251	0.443	-0.032	-0.566	0.572
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.089	0.218	-0.015	-0.409	0.683
Never married	-0.096	0.182	-0.022	-0.528	0.598
Region- Midwest	0.061	0.211	0.012	0.289	0.772
Region- South	0.081	0.188	0.018	0.431	0.667
Region- West	-0.023	0.199	-0.005	-0.114	0.909
Dependent Variable: Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic; Adjusted R2=.263					

Table 94. Impact of Full Model on Counter-Frame 2- All Variables

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.601	0.497		3.221	0.001
Religiosity	-0.012	0.011	-0.057	-1.056	0.291
Evangelical	-0.207	0.162	-0.049	-1.274	0.203
Fundamentalism	0.005	0.106	0.002	0.044	0.965
Black*Religiosity	0.004	0.018	0.014	0.216	0.829
Hispanic*Religiosity	0.006	0.019	0.018	0.316	0.752
OtherR*Religiosity	0.005	0.026	0.009	0.176	0.860
Conservatism	-0.128	0.048	-0.121	-2.687	0.007
Trump approval	-0.156	0.035	-0.190	-4.417	0.000
Support political correctness	0.214	0.058	0.138	3.674	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	-0.191	0.142	-0.047	-1.347	0.178
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.133	0.139	-0.032	-0.957	0.339
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.225	0.205	0.036	1.096	0.273
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.083	0.128	-0.022	-0.647	0.518
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.180	0.180	-0.035	-0.999	0.318
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.540	0.162	0.124	3.331	0.001
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.006	0.130	0.002	0.045	0.964
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.151	0.165	0.031	0.919	0.359
Follow American public affairs	0.196	0.092	0.112	2.144	0.032
Follow international public affairs	-0.111	0.085	-0.066	-1.307	0.192
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	-0.280	0.188	-0.065	-1.489	0.137
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.317	0.152	0.085	2.080	0.038
Source- News/political websites	0.235	0.190	0.063	1.236	0.217
Source- Social media	-0.027	0.128	-0.007	-0.210	0.834
Source- Second-hand	-0.012	0.138	-0.003	-0.085	0.932
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	0.132	0.143	0.034	0.924	0.356
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	-0.252	0.144	-0.065	-1.753	0.080
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.000	0.149	0.000	-0.003	0.998
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.120	0.147	-0.030	-0.819	0.413
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.090	0.146	0.023	0.617	0.537
Newspaper- New York Times	0.286	0.235	0.054	1.216	0.224
Newspaper- Washington Post	-0.173	0.230	-0.030	-0.754	0.451
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.444	0.224	-0.076	-1.983	0.048
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	-0.380	0.241	-0.057	-1.577	0.115
Newspaper- New York Post	-0.096	0.280	-0.012	-0.342	0.732
Website- HuffingtonPost	-0.001	0.199	0.000	-0.003	0.998
Website- Buzzfeed	0.062	0.201	0.012	0.308	0.758
Website- Al Jazeera	0.008	0.245	0.001	0.034	0.973

Website- Breitbart	-0.276	0.332	-0.027	-0.829	0.407
Website- Other	0.226	0.342	0.022	0.660	0.509
Personally know Muslim	0.429	0.125	0.115	3.420	0.001
Knowledge of Islam	0.206	0.064	0.115	3.217	0.001
Female	-0.113	0.129	-0.029	-0.874	0.383
Age	-0.002	0.005	-0.018	-0.410	0.682
Education	0.087	0.043	0.072	2.005	0.045
Income	0.006	0.023	0.010	0.257	0.797
African American/Black	-0.249	0.310	-0.050	-0.803	0.422
Hispanic	-0.299	0.295	-0.058	-1.015	0.311
Multiracial/Other race	-0.272	0.373	-0.039	-0.730	0.466
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.026	0.184	0.005	0.141	0.888
Never married	0.032	0.153	0.008	0.207	0.836
Region- Midwest	-0.117	0.178	-0.025	-0.660	0.509
Region- South	-0.137	0.158	-0.034	-0.866	0.387
Region- West	-0.055	0.167	-0.013	-0.328	0.743

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America; Adjusted R²=.345

Table 95. Impact of Full Model on Frame 3- All Variables

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.805	0.445		1.811	0.071
Religiosity	0.010	0.010	0.055	0.980	0.327
Evangelical	0.389	0.145	0.108	2.679	0.008
Fundamentalism	0.009	0.095	0.004	0.096	0.923
Black*Religiosity	0.004	0.016	0.018	0.263	0.793
Hispanic*Religiosity	0.007	0.017	0.026	0.443	0.658
OtherR*Religiosity	-0.002	0.023	-0.006	-0.106	0.915
Conservatism	0.069	0.043	0.076	1.614	0.107
Trump approval	0.113	0.032	0.161	3.592	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.113	0.052	-0.085	-2.156	0.031
Important in election - Immigration	0.298	0.127	0.085	2.348	0.019
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.177	0.124	0.049	1.424	0.155
Important in election - Domestic race relations	-0.059	0.183	-0.011	-0.320	0.749
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.010	0.114	-0.003	-0.091	0.928
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.448	0.161	0.102	2.781	0.006
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.289	0.145	-0.077	-1.991	0.047
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.092	0.116	0.029	0.798	0.425
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	-0.002	0.147	0.000	-0.014	0.989
Follow American public affairs	0.015	0.082	0.010	0.186	0.853
Follow international public affairs	0.097	0.076	0.067	1.274	0.203
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	-0.059	0.168	-0.016	-0.349	0.727
Source- Newspaper/magazine	-0.383	0.136	-0.119	-2.807	0.005
Source- News/political websites	-0.175	0.170	-0.055	-1.027	0.305
Source- Social media	0.104	0.115	0.033	0.904	0.366
Source- Second-hand	-0.137	0.123	-0.037	-1.107	0.269
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	-0.174	0.127	-0.053	-1.368	0.172
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	0.174	0.129	0.052	1.353	0.176
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.033	0.133	0.010	0.248	0.804
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.027	0.131	0.008	0.205	0.837
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.194	0.130	-0.057	-1.490	0.137
Newspaper- New York Times	0.006	0.211	0.001	0.027	0.978
Newspaper- Washington Post	0.286	0.205	0.059	1.394	0.164
Newspaper- USA Today	0.308	0.200	0.062	1.538	0.125
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	0.107	0.216	0.019	0.498	0.618
Newspaper- New York Post	-0.131	0.250	-0.019	-0.524	0.600
Website- HuffingtonPost	-0.030	0.178	-0.008	-0.169	0.866
Website- BuzzFeed	0.070	0.180	0.016	0.392	0.696

Website- Al Jazeera	0.087	0.220	0.016	0.397	0.691
Website- Breitbart	0.650	0.297	0.075	2.185	0.029
Website- Other	0.011	0.306	0.001	0.035	0.972
Personally know Muslim	-0.288	0.112	-0.090	-2.564	0.011
Knowledge of Islam	0.015	0.057	0.010	0.269	0.788
Female	0.003	0.116	0.001	0.026	0.979
Age	0.003	0.004	0.029	0.633	0.527
Education	-0.077	0.039	-0.074	-1.985	0.048
Income	-0.035	0.021	-0.068	-1.724	0.085
African American/Black	0.116	0.277	0.027	0.420	0.675
Hispanic	-0.294	0.263	-0.067	-1.117	0.265
Multiracial/Other race	0.033	0.333	0.005	0.100	0.921
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.086	0.164	-0.019	-0.522	0.602
Never married	-0.139	0.137	-0.042	-1.020	0.308
Region- Midwest	-0.080	0.159	-0.020	-0.502	0.616
Region- South	-0.052	0.141	-0.015	-0.365	0.715
Region- West	-0.075	0.149	-0.020	-0.504	0.614

Dependent Variable: Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian; Adjusted R²=0.288

Table 96. Impact of Full Model on Counter-Frame 3- All Variables

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.497	0.437		5.708	0.000
Religiosity	-0.006	0.010	-0.032	-0.621	0.535
Evangelical	-0.292	0.143	-0.076	-2.045	0.041
Fundamentalism	-0.046	0.093	-0.020	-0.489	0.625
Black*Religiosity	-0.001	0.016	-0.003	-0.041	0.967
Hispanic*Religiosity	-0.001	0.017	-0.004	-0.067	0.947
OtherR*Religiosity	-0.017	0.023	-0.038	-0.763	0.446
Conservatism	-0.127	0.042	-0.132	-3.029	0.003
Trump approval	-0.195	0.031	-0.261	-6.280	0.000
Support political correctness	0.017	0.051	0.012	0.327	0.744
Important in election - Immigration	-0.212	0.125	-0.057	-1.700	0.090
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.105	0.122	-0.027	-0.859	0.391
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.210	0.180	0.037	1.166	0.244
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.082	0.112	-0.024	-0.734	0.463
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.189	0.158	-0.041	-1.195	0.232
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.552	0.143	0.139	3.873	0.000
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-0.085	0.114	-0.025	-0.749	0.454
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.132	0.145	0.030	0.911	0.363
Follow American public affairs	0.136	0.081	0.085	1.684	0.093
Follow international public affairs	-0.062	0.075	-0.041	-0.834	0.405
Source- Broadcast/Cable news	0.015	0.165	0.004	0.093	0.926
Source- Newspaper/magazine	0.312	0.134	0.091	2.324	0.020
Source- News/political websites	0.079	0.168	0.023	0.472	0.637
Source- Social media	-0.046	0.113	-0.014	-0.413	0.680
Source- Second-hand	0.065	0.121	0.017	0.536	0.592
Broadcast/Cable- ABC	0.040	0.125	0.011	0.319	0.749
Broadcast/Cable- NBC	-0.129	0.127	-0.036	-1.016	0.310
Broadcast/Cable-CBS	0.095	0.131	0.026	0.726	0.468
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.277	0.129	-0.077	-2.143	0.032
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.092	0.128	0.025	0.716	0.474
Newspaper- New York Times	0.130	0.207	0.027	0.627	0.531
Newspaper- Washington Post	-0.074	0.202	-0.014	-0.368	0.713
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.513	0.197	-0.097	-2.602	0.009
Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	-0.182	0.212	-0.030	-0.856	0.392
Newspaper- New York Post	0.135	0.246	0.019	0.550	0.583
Website- HuffingtonPost	0.123	0.175	0.032	0.706	0.480
Website- BuzzFeed	-0.057	0.177	-0.012	-0.323	0.747

Website- Al Jazeera	0.111	0.216	0.019	0.513	0.608
Website- Breitbart	0.056	0.293	0.006	0.191	0.849
Website- Other	0.056	0.301	0.006	0.188	0.851
Personally know Muslim	0.393	0.110	0.116	3.564	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.096	0.056	0.059	1.699	0.090
Female	-0.080	0.114	-0.022	-0.699	0.485
Age	-0.004	0.004	-0.040	-0.956	0.339
Education	0.054	0.038	0.049	1.416	0.157
Income	0.018	0.020	0.034	0.915	0.360
African American/Black	-0.155	0.273	-0.034	-0.568	0.570
Hispanic	-0.017	0.259	-0.004	-0.066	0.948
Multiracial/Other race	0.096	0.328	0.015	0.294	0.769
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.052	0.161	-0.011	-0.320	0.749
Never married	0.075	0.134	0.021	0.558	0.577
Region- Midwest	-0.105	0.156	-0.024	-0.670	0.503
Region- South	0.054	0.139	0.015	0.392	0.695
Region- West	0.005	0.147	0.001	0.036	0.971

Dependent Variable: Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom; Adjusted R²=.388

Table 97. *Impact of Attitudes and Demographics on Support of Executive Order Travel Ban*

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.487	0.363		4.097	0.000
Religiosity	0.001	0.006	0.005	0.206	0.836
Evangelical	0.051	0.129	0.010	0.397	0.692
Conservatism	0.243	0.038	0.183	6.472	0.000
Trump approval	0.533	0.028	0.516	18.888	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.261	0.046	-0.134	-5.672	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	0.310	0.114	0.060	2.726	0.007
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.117	0.111	0.022	1.054	0.292
Important in election - Domestic race relations	-0.225	0.164	-0.029	-1.373	0.170
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.147	0.103	0.030	1.430	0.153
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.487	0.144	0.076	3.372	0.001
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.246	0.130	-0.045	-1.897	0.058
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.137	0.104	0.029	1.317	0.188
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	-0.143	0.131	-0.023	-1.088	0.277
Follow American public affairs	0.010	0.070	0.004	0.137	0.891
Follow international public affairs	0.067	0.067	0.032	0.998	0.318
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.207	0.111	0.041	1.866	0.062
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.258	0.111	-0.052	-2.318	0.021
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.244	0.155	-0.036	-1.581	0.114
Newspaper- USA Today	0.072	0.165	0.010	0.437	0.662
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.414	0.167	-0.051	-2.484	0.013
Website- Breitbart	0.213	0.260	0.017	0.820	0.412
Personally know Muslim	-0.179	0.100	-0.038	-1.796	0.073
Knowledge of Islam	-0.003	0.051	-0.001	-0.064	0.949
Female	-0.115	0.103	-0.023	-1.120	0.263
Age	0.001	0.004	0.008	0.314	0.754
Education	-0.038	0.035	-0.025	-1.106	0.269
Income	0.012	0.018	0.015	0.638	0.524
African American/Black	0.123	0.147	0.020	0.841	0.401
Hispanic	0.059	0.144	0.009	0.410	0.682
Multiracial/Other race	0.223	0.183	0.025	1.213	0.225
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.200	0.147	-0.030	-1.362	0.174
Never married	-0.230	0.122	-0.047	-1.883	0.060
Region- Midwest	-0.001	0.141	0.000	-0.010	0.992
Region- South	-0.206	0.125	-0.041	-1.642	0.101
Region- West	-0.028	0.133	-0.005	-0.209	0.835
Dependent Variable: Support of Travel Ban; Adjusted R ² =.748					

Table 98. Impact of Full Model on Support of Executive Order Travel Ban

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.139	0.345		6.203	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.060	0.027	0.055	2.254	0.025
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	0.013	0.030	0.011	0.433	0.665
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic	0.055	0.032	0.049	1.743	0.082
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	0.023	0.039	0.018	0.597	0.551
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	0.054	0.040	0.036	1.344	0.179
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	-0.312	0.045	-0.226	-6.950	0.000
Religiosity	-0.003	0.006	-0.012	-0.541	0.589
Evangelical	-0.093	0.118	-0.017	-0.785	0.433
Conservatism	0.195	0.034	0.147	5.658	0.000
Trump approval	0.445	0.027	0.432	16.769	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.234	0.043	-0.120	-5.482	0.000
Important in election – Immigration	0.189	0.104	0.036	1.820	0.069
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.058	0.101	0.011	0.576	0.565
Important in election - Domestic race relations	-0.177	0.149	-0.023	-1.189	0.235
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.122	0.093	0.025	1.309	0.191
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.355	0.131	0.055	2.698	0.007
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.054	0.119	-0.010	-0.456	0.649
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.077	0.094	0.016	0.813	0.416
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	-0.108	0.119	-0.018	-0.907	0.365
Follow American public affairs	0.041	0.064	0.019	0.638	0.523
Follow international public affairs	0.038	0.062	0.018	0.615	0.539
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.108	0.101	0.022	1.071	0.285
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.198	0.101	-0.040	-1.961	0.050
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.164	0.140	-0.024	-1.173	0.241
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.049	0.149	-0.007	-0.326	0.745
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.371	0.151	-0.045	-2.459	0.014
Website- Breitbart	0.196	0.236	0.016	0.831	0.406

Personally know Muslim	-0.041	0.092	-0.009	-0.444	0.657
Knowledge of Islam	0.004	0.047	0.002	0.081	0.936
Female	-0.146	0.093	-0.030	-1.575	0.116
Age	0.000	0.003	-0.003	-0.122	0.903
Education	-0.008	0.031	-0.006	-0.268	0.789
Income	0.020	0.017	0.026	1.208	0.227
African American/Black	0.061	0.133	0.010	0.456	0.649
Hispanic	0.040	0.131	0.006	0.309	0.758
Multiracial/Other race	0.202	0.166	0.023	1.212	0.226
Divorced/separated/widowed	-0.194	0.133	-0.029	-1.452	0.147
Never married	-0.190	0.111	-0.039	-1.718	0.086
Region- Midwest	-0.035	0.128	-0.006	-0.274	0.784
Region- South	-0.201	0.114	-0.040	-1.773	0.077
Region- West	-0.018	0.121	-0.003	-0.147	0.883
Dependent Variable: Support of Travel Ban; Adjusted R2=.794					

Table 99. Impact of Attitudes and Demographics on Support of Muslim Registry

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.508	0.495		5.071	0.000
Religiosity	0.012	0.009	0.052	1.344	0.179
Evangelical	0.247	0.176	0.053	1.404	0.161
Conservatism	0.058	0.051	0.050	1.141	0.254
Trump approval	0.318	0.038	0.353	8.287	0.000
Support political correctness	0.010	0.063	0.006	0.164	0.870
Important in election - Immigration	0.177	0.155	0.039	1.139	0.255
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.177	0.151	0.038	1.169	0.243
Important in election - Domestic race relations	-0.124	0.223	-0.018	-0.557	0.578
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.121	0.140	0.029	0.868	0.386
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.688	0.197	0.122	3.500	0.000
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.342	0.177	-0.071	-1.932	0.054
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	0.075	0.141	0.018	0.531	0.596
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.209	0.179	0.039	1.166	0.244
Follow American public affairs	-0.144	0.096	-0.075	-1.509	0.132
Follow international public affairs	0.139	0.092	0.075	1.508	0.132
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.237	0.151	0.054	1.569	0.117
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	-0.031	0.152	-0.007	-0.204	0.838
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.447	0.211	-0.076	-2.123	0.034
Newspaper- USA Today	0.192	0.224	0.030	0.856	0.392
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.384	0.227	-0.054	-1.689	0.092
Website- Breitbart	-0.099	0.354	-0.009	-0.279	0.781
Personally know Muslim	-0.498	0.136	-0.121	-3.661	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.003	0.069	0.001	0.042	0.967
Female	-0.034	0.140	-0.008	-0.242	0.809
Age	0.001	0.005	0.007	0.170	0.865
Education	-0.135	0.047	-0.102	-2.881	0.004
Income	-0.010	0.025	-0.015	-0.395	0.693
African American/Black	0.211	0.200	0.039	1.056	0.291
Hispanic	0.203	0.196	0.036	1.036	0.301
Multiracial/Other race	0.315	0.250	0.041	1.261	0.208
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.047	0.200	0.008	0.235	0.814
Never married	0.004	0.166	0.001	0.023	0.982
Region- Midwest	-0.004	0.193	-0.001	-0.022	0.982
Region- South	-0.290	0.171	-0.066	-1.697	0.090
Region- West	-0.279	0.182	-0.059	-1.536	0.125
Dependent Variable: Support for Muslim Registry; Adjusted R2=.345					

Table 100. Impact of Full Model on Support of Muslim Registry

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.865	0.427		9.045	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.122	0.033	0.129	3.712	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	-0.099	0.038	-0.091	-2.620	0.009
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic	0.087	0.039	0.088	2.201	0.028
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	0.102	0.048	0.092	2.134	0.033
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	0.063	0.049	0.049	1.269	0.205
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	-0.581	0.056	-0.480	-10.427	0.000
Religiosity	0.003	0.007	0.012	0.383	0.702
Evangelical	-0.013	0.146	-0.003	-0.092	0.927
Conservatism	-0.043	0.043	-0.037	-1.011	0.313
Trump approval	0.154	0.033	0.171	4.689	0.000
Support political correctness	0.064	0.053	0.038	1.215	0.225
Important in election - Immigration	-0.035	0.129	-0.008	-0.272	0.786
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.067	0.125	0.014	0.533	0.594
Important in election - Domestic race relations	-0.012	0.184	-0.002	-0.066	0.948
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.085	0.115	0.020	0.736	0.462
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.446	0.163	0.079	2.737	0.006
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.025	0.148	0.005	0.169	0.866
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-0.028	0.117	-0.007	-0.236	0.814
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.279	0.147	0.053	1.899	0.058
Follow American public affairs	-0.069	0.080	-0.036	-0.872	0.383
Follow international public affairs	0.078	0.076	0.042	1.022	0.307
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.055	0.125	0.013	0.442	0.659
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.067	0.125	0.015	0.539	0.590
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.276	0.174	-0.047	-1.587	0.113
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.044	0.185	-0.007	-0.237	0.812
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.319	0.187	-0.045	-1.706	0.089
Website- Breitbart	-0.152	0.293	-0.014	-0.517	0.605
Personally know Muslim	-0.221	0.114	-0.054	-1.934	0.054
Knowledge of Islam	0.019	0.058	0.009	0.321	0.748
Female	-0.077	0.115	-0.018	-0.669	0.504
Age	-0.001	0.004	-0.009	-0.265	0.791
Education	-0.086	0.039	-0.065	-2.212	0.027

Income	0.008	0.021	0.013	0.409	0.683
African American/Black	0.076	0.165	0.014	0.459	0.646
Hispanic	0.142	0.162	0.025	0.875	0.382
Multiracial/Other race	0.247	0.206	0.032	1.195	0.233
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.087	0.165	0.015	0.526	0.599
Never married	0.094	0.137	0.022	0.688	0.492
Region- Midwest	-0.061	0.159	-0.012	-0.381	0.703
Region- South	-0.285	0.141	-0.065	-2.024	0.043
Region- West	-0.261	0.149	-0.055	-1.743	0.082
Dependent Variable: Support for Muslim registry; Adjusted R2=.557					

Table 101. Impact of Attitudes and Demographics on Social Closeness

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	28.975	2.358		12.287	0.000
Religiosity	-0.102	0.041	-0.096	-2.472	0.014
Evangelical	-1.269	0.839	-0.058	-1.512	0.131
Conservatism	-0.641	0.244	-0.117	-2.630	0.009
Trump approval	-0.901	0.183	-0.211	-4.918	0.000
Support political correctness	-0.169	0.299	-0.021	-0.566	0.572
Important in election - Immigration	-1.014	0.740	-0.047	-1.371	0.171
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.307	0.720	-0.014	-0.426	0.670
Important in election - Domestic race relations	1.998	1.064	0.062	1.878	0.061
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.295	0.667	-0.015	-0.442	0.659
Top threat to US - Immigration	-2.484	0.937	-0.093	-2.650	0.008
Top threat to US - Social injustice	2.075	0.844	0.091	2.459	0.014
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-1.066	0.674	-0.055	-1.581	0.114
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.768	0.852	0.031	0.900	0.368
Follow American public affairs	1.075	0.456	0.118	2.358	0.019
Follow international public affairs	-0.872	0.438	-0.099	-1.989	0.047
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.083	0.719	0.004	0.116	0.908
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.995	0.723	0.048	1.376	0.169
Newspaper- New York Times	1.376	1.004	0.049	1.371	0.171
Newspaper- USA Today	-1.317	1.069	-0.043	-1.232	0.218
Website- Al Jazeera	0.104	1.084	0.003	0.096	0.924
Website- Breitbart	-1.722	1.687	-0.033	-1.021	0.308
Personally know Muslim	2.606	0.648	0.134	4.019	0.000
Knowledge of Islam	0.459	0.331	0.049	1.385	0.167
Female	0.084	0.667	0.004	0.126	0.900
Age	0.033	0.023	0.057	1.445	0.149
Education	0.449	0.224	0.071	2.005	0.045
Income	0.322	0.119	0.102	2.705	0.007
African American/Black	-1.338	0.954	-0.052	-1.403	0.161
Hispanic	0.716	0.933	0.027	0.767	0.443
Multiracial/Other race	-0.839	1.192	-0.023	-0.704	0.482
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.591	0.954	0.022	0.620	0.536
Never married	0.912	0.793	0.045	1.150	0.250
Region- Midwest	1.808	0.919	0.074	1.967	0.050
Region- South	1.201	0.814	0.058	1.476	0.141
Region- West	1.538	0.866	0.069	1.775	0.076
Dependent Variable: Social Closeness Scale; Adjusted R ² =.333					

Table 102. Impact of Full Model on Social Closeness Scale

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	25.199	1.481		17.020	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	0.273	0.114	0.061	2.397	0.017
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	0.521	0.130	0.101	3.996	0.000
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic	-0.045	0.136	-0.010	-0.330	0.741
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	-0.512	0.165	-0.098	-3.095	0.002
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	-3.176	0.171	-0.523	-18.545	0.000
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	2.594	0.193	0.454	13.438	0.000
Religiosity	-0.038	0.025	-0.036	-1.528	0.127
Evangelical	0.746	0.507	0.034	1.472	0.142
Conservatism	-0.077	0.148	-0.014	-0.520	0.603
Trump approval	-0.066	0.114	-0.015	-0.577	0.564
Support political correctness	-0.444	0.183	-0.055	-2.425	0.016
Important in election - Immigration	0.307	0.445	0.014	0.689	0.491
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	0.397	0.433	0.018	0.918	0.359
Important in election - Domestic race relations	1.087	0.638	0.034	1.703	0.089
Top threat to US - Terrorism	-0.187	0.400	-0.009	-0.468	0.640
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.402	0.564	-0.015	-0.713	0.476
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.047	0.512	-0.002	-0.091	0.927
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-0.639	0.405	-0.033	-1.577	0.115
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.479	0.510	0.019	0.939	0.348
Follow American public affairs	0.505	0.276	0.055	1.831	0.068
Follow international public affairs	-0.290	0.264	-0.033	-1.095	0.274
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	0.535	0.432	0.026	1.237	0.216

Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.120	0.433	0.006	0.276	0.782
Newspaper- New York Times	0.598	0.602	0.021	0.994	0.321
Newspaper- USA Today	0.008	0.641	0.000	0.012	0.990
Website- Al Jazeera	-0.266	0.649	-0.008	-0.410	0.682
Website- Breitbart	-0.277	1.014	-0.005	-0.273	0.785
Personally know Muslim	0.479	0.395	0.025	1.211	0.226
Knowledge of Islam	0.235	0.202	0.025	1.165	0.245
Female	0.259	0.399	0.013	0.650	0.516
Age	0.027	0.014	0.046	1.925	0.055
Education	0.063	0.135	0.010	0.467	0.641
Income	0.168	0.071	0.053	2.350	0.019
African American/Black	-0.346	0.572	-0.013	-0.605	0.545
Hispanic	0.234	0.562	0.009	0.416	0.677
Multiracial/Other race	-0.231	0.715	-0.006	-0.324	0.746
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.498	0.573	0.018	0.869	0.385
Never married	0.199	0.475	0.010	0.420	0.675
Region- Midwest	2.073	0.550	0.085	3.766	0.000
Region- South	1.018	0.488	0.049	2.087	0.037
Region- West	1.223	0.518	0.055	2.361	0.019
Dependent Variable: Social Closeness Scale; Adjusted R ² =.762					

Table 103. Impact of Attitudes and Demographics on Comfort with Islam as Major Religion

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3.751	0.488		7.684	0.000
Religiosity	-0.007	0.009	-0.031	-0.790	0.430
Evangelical	-0.503	0.174	-0.111	-2.894	0.004
Conservatism	-0.155	0.050	-0.137	-3.078	0.002
Trump approval	-0.166	0.038	-0.188	-4.373	0.000
Support political correctness	0.260	0.062	0.156	4.197	0.000
Important in election - Immigration	-0.250	0.153	-0.056	-1.631	0.103
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.309	0.149	-0.068	-2.070	0.039
Important in election - Domestic race relations	0.045	0.220	0.007	0.203	0.839
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.085	0.138	0.021	0.615	0.539
Top threat to US - Immigration	-0.206	0.194	-0.037	-1.061	0.289
Top threat to US - Social injustice	0.321	0.175	0.068	1.837	0.067
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-0.147	0.140	-0.036	-1.055	0.292
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.130	0.176	0.025	0.739	0.460
Follow American public affairs	-0.016	0.094	-0.008	-0.165	0.869
Follow international public affairs	-0.049	0.091	-0.027	-0.537	0.591
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.186	0.149	-0.044	-1.253	0.211
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.135	0.150	0.032	0.900	0.369
Newspaper- New York Times	0.089	0.208	0.015	0.426	0.670
Newspaper- USA Today	-0.249	0.221	-0.040	-1.123	0.262
Website- Al Jazeera	0.249	0.224	0.036	1.109	0.268
Website- Breitbart	-0.070	0.349	-0.007	-0.202	0.840
Personally know Muslim	0.269	0.134	0.067	2.006	0.045
Knowledge of Islam	0.195	0.069	0.101	2.840	0.005
Female	-0.061	0.138	-0.015	-0.443	0.658
Age	-0.005	0.005	-0.043	-1.098	0.272
Education	0.079	0.046	0.061	1.712	0.087
Income	0.008	0.025	0.012	0.312	0.755
African American/Black	-0.048	0.197	-0.009	-0.241	0.810
Hispanic	-0.150	0.193	-0.027	-0.778	0.437
Multiracial/Other race	-0.100	0.247	-0.013	-0.407	0.684
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.211	0.198	0.037	1.068	0.286
Never married	0.161	0.164	0.038	0.979	0.328
Region- Midwest	0.051	0.190	0.010	0.270	0.787
Region- South	-0.072	0.169	-0.017	-0.429	0.668
Region- West	-0.142	0.179	-0.031	-0.793	0.428
Dependent Variable: Comfortability with Islam becoming major American religion; Adjusted R2=.331					

Table 104. Impact of Full Model on Comfort with Islam as Major Religion

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.858	0.401		7.120	0.000
Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent	-0.114	0.031	-0.124	-3.690	0.000
Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful	0.207	0.035	0.195	5.864	0.000
Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic	-0.065	0.037	-0.068	-1.756	0.079
Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America	0.189	0.045	0.175	4.201	0.000
Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian	-0.236	0.046	-0.188	-5.080	0.000
Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom	0.181	0.052	0.153	3.451	0.001
Religiosity	0.004	0.007	0.019	0.623	0.533
Evangelical	-0.224	0.137	-0.049	-1.629	0.104
Conservatism	-0.039	0.040	-0.034	-0.966	0.334
Trump approval	-0.006	0.031	-0.006	-0.183	0.855
Support political correctness	0.121	0.050	0.073	2.439	0.015
Important in election - Immigration	-0.015	0.121	-0.003	-0.127	0.899
Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	-0.156	0.117	-0.034	-1.325	0.186
Important in election - Domestic race relations	-0.083	0.173	-0.012	-0.479	0.632
Top threat to US - Terrorism	0.104	0.108	0.025	0.958	0.338
Top threat to US - Immigration	0.105	0.153	0.019	0.689	0.491
Top threat to US - Social injustice	-0.074	0.139	-0.016	-0.534	0.594
Top threat to the world - Terrorism	-0.063	0.110	-0.016	-0.574	0.566
Top threat to the world - Social injustice	0.065	0.138	0.013	0.470	0.639
Follow American public affairs	-0.119	0.075	-0.063	-1.587	0.113
Follow international public affairs	0.049	0.072	0.027	0.685	0.493
Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	-0.052	0.117	-0.012	-0.440	0.660
Broadcast/Cable-CNN	0.045	0.117	0.011	0.384	0.701
Newspaper- New York Times	-0.113	0.163	-0.020	-0.692	0.489
Newspaper- USA Today	0.005	0.174	0.001	0.027	0.978
Website- Al Jazeera	0.191	0.176	0.027	1.086	0.278

Website- Breitbart	0.193	0.275	0.018	0.703	0.482
Personally know Muslim	-0.073	0.107	-0.018	-0.678	0.498
Knowledge of Islam	0.143	0.055	0.074	2.601	0.010
Female	-0.015	0.108	-0.004	-0.142	0.887
Age	-0.004	0.004	-0.037	-1.166	0.244
Education	0.012	0.037	0.009	0.318	0.751
Income	-0.013	0.019	-0.020	-0.689	0.491
African American/Black	0.151	0.155	0.028	0.973	0.331
Hispanic	-0.038	0.152	-0.007	-0.248	0.805
Multiracial/Other race	0.046	0.194	0.006	0.238	0.812
Divorced/separated/widowed	0.108	0.155	0.019	0.697	0.486
Never married	0.051	0.129	0.012	0.396	0.692
Region- Midwest	0.092	0.149	0.018	0.615	0.539
Region- South	-0.009	0.132	-0.002	-0.070	0.944
Region- West	-0.155	0.140	-0.033	-1.100	0.272
Dependent Variable: Comfortability with Islam becoming major American religion; Adjusted R2=.590					

APPENDIX D FREQUENCIES

D1 Follow American public affairs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all	41	3.7	3.7	3.7
	2 Seldom	82	7.4	7.4	11.1
	3 Some of the time	315	28.4	28.5	39.6
	4 Most of the time	365	32.9	33.0	72.5
	5 Daily	304	27.4	27.5	100.0
	Total	1107	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$d1a Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$d1a Sources for information on American government and public affairs	D1a_1 Source- Broadcast/Cable news	840	28.3%	79.8%
	D1a_2 Source- Newspaper/magazine	466	15.7%	44.3%
	D1a_3 Source- News/political websites	510	17.2%	48.4%
	D1a_4 From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affairs? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Podcasts	71	2.4%	6.7%
	D1a_5 Source- Social media	518	17.4%	49.2%
	D1a_6 From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affairs? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Satirical news/political commentary	148	5.0%	14.1%
	D1a_7 From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affairs? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Directly from elected officials' websites or social media accounts	135	4.5%	12.8%
	D1a_8 Source- Second-hand	267	9.0%	25.4%
	D1a_9 From which of the following sources do you get information on American government and public affairs? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	16	0.5%	1.5%
	Total	2971	100.0%	282.1%

\$d1aa Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$d1aa Broadcast news followed	D1a_a_1 Broadcast/Cable- ABC	397	17.3%	47.7%
	D1a_a_2 Broadcast/Cable- NBC	374	16.3%	44.9%
	D1a_a_3 Broadcast/Cable-CBS	344	15.0%	41.3%
	D1a_a_4 Broadcast/Cable-Fox News	353	15.4%	42.4%
	D1a_a_5 Broadcast/Cable-CNN	354	15.4%	42.5%
	D1a_a_6 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice MSNBC	187	8.1%	22.4%
	D1a_a_7 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice NPR	115	5.0%	13.8%
	D1a_a_8 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice BBC	121	5.3%	14.5%
	D1a_a_9 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	52	2.3%	6.2%
	Total	2297	100.0%	275.8%

\$d1ab Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$d1ab Newspapers/magazines followed	D1a_b_1 Newspaper- USA Today	126	13.2%	40.8%
	D1a_b_2 Newspaper- New York Times	154	16.1%	49.8%
	D1a_b_3 Newspaper- Wall Street Journal	93	9.7%	30.1%
	D1a_b_4 Newspaper- Washington Post	134	14.0%	43.4%

D1a_b_5 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice The Atlantic	25	2.6%	8.1%
D1a_b_6 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice The Economist	41	4.3%	13.3%
D1a_b_7 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Chicago Tribune	30	3.1%	9.7%
D1a_b_8 Newspaper- New York Post	64	6.7%	20.7%
D1a_b_9 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Daily Mail	43	4.5%	13.9%
D1a_b_10 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice The Guardian	41	4.3%	13.3%
D1a_b_12 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	41	4.3%	13.3%
D1a_b_13 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice The Washington Times	36	3.8%	11.7%
Total	954	100.0%	308.7%

\$d1ac Frequencies

		Responses		
		N	Percent	Percent of Cases
\$d1ac News and political websites followed	D1a_c_1 Website- HuffingtonPost	274	40.4%	63.0%
	D1a_c_2 Website- Breitbart	39	5.7%	9.0%
	D1a_c_3 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Jezebel	16	2.4%	3.7%
	D1a_c_4 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice The Federalist	27	4.0%	6.2%
	D1a_c_5 Website- Buzzfeed	162	23.9%	37.2%
	D1a_c_6 Website- Other	36	5.3%	8.3%
	D1a_c_7 Which of the following do you regularly follow for news? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Slate	26	3.8%	6.0%
	D1a_c_8 Website- Al Jazeera	99	14.6%	22.8%
Total		679	100.0%	156.1%

D2 Generally, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the US today? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely dissatisfied	317	28.6	29.1	29.1
	2 Moderately dissatisfied	259	23.4	23.8	52.9
	3 Slightly dissatisfied	167	15.1	15.3	68.3
	4 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	124	11.2	11.4	79.7
	5 Slightly satisfied	98	8.8	9.0	88.7
	6 Moderately satisfied	87	7.8	8.0	96.7
	7 Extremely satisfied	36	3.2	3.3	100.0
	Total	1088	98.1	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please explain)	3	.3		
	System	18	1.6		
	Total	21	1.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

D3 What do you consider the single biggest threat to the US today? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Environmental issues/climate change	59	5.3	5.4	5.4
	2 Wealth inequality	110	9.9	10.0	15.3
	3 Weak economy/unemployment	118	10.6	10.7	26.0
	4 International terrorism	161	14.5	14.6	40.7
	5 Homegrown terrorism	76	6.9	6.9	47.5
	6 Corporate corruption	47	4.2	4.3	51.8

	7 Immigration	77	6.9	7.0	58.8
	8 Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality)	136	12.3	12.3	71.1
	9 Health crises	77	6.9	7.0	78.1
	10 Other (please specify)	26	2.3	2.4	80.5
	11 Decline in traditional values/moral decay	146	13.2	13.2	93.7
	12 US political climate	15	1.4	1.4	95.1
	13 Trump/ Republican Party	54	4.9	4.9	100.0
	Total	1102	99.4	100.0	
Missing	System	7	.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

D4 What do you consider the second biggest threat to the US today?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Environmental issues/climate change	88	7.9	7.9	7.9
	2 Wealth inequality	118	10.6	10.6	18.6
	3 Weak economy/unemployment	129	11.6	11.6	30.2
	4 International terrorism	135	12.2	12.2	42.4
	5 Homegrown terrorism	118	10.6	10.6	53.0
	6 Corporate corruption	71	6.4	6.4	59.4
	7 Immigration	98	8.8	8.8	68.3
	8 Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality)	127	11.5	11.5	79.7
	9 Health crises	88	7.9	7.9	87.6
	10 Other (please specify)	35	3.2	3.2	90.8
	11 Decline in traditional values/moral decay	102	9.2	9.2	100.0
	Total	1109	100.0	100.0	

D5 Follow international public affairs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all	64	5.8	5.8	5.8
	2 Seldom	170	15.3	15.5	21.3
	3 Some of the time	369	33.3	33.6	54.9
	4 Most of the time	318	28.7	29.0	83.9
	5 Daily	177	16.0	16.1	100.0
	Total	1098	99.0	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't know/Decline to answer	10	.9		
	System	1	.1		
	Total	11	1.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$d5a Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$d5a Sources for information on international public affairs	D5a_1 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Broadcast news (TV or radio)	766	32.1%	75.4%
	D5a_2 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Newspapers/magazines (including online editions)	386	16.2%	38.0%
	D5a_3 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice News and political websites	408	17.1%	40.2%

D5a_4 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Podcasts	58	2.4%	5.7%
D5a_5 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Social media	411	17.2%	40.5%
D5a_6 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Satirical news/political commentary	94	3.9%	9.3%
D5a_7 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Directly from elected officials' websites or social media accounts	67	2.8%	6.6%
D5a_8 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Hearing information second-hand from others around me	180	7.5%	17.7%
D5a_9 From which of the following sources do you get information on international public affairs? (Check all that apply). - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	19	0.8%	1.9%
Total	2389	100.0%	235.1%

D6 Generally, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the world today? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely dissatisfied	226	20.4	21.5	21.5
	2 Moderately dissatisfied	292	26.3	27.8	49.4
	3 Slightly dissatisfied	252	22.7	24.0	73.4
	4 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	188	17.0	17.9	91.3
	5 Slightly satisfied	61	5.5	5.8	97.1
	7 Extremely satisfied	27	2.4	2.6	99.7
	8 Other (please explain)	3	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	1049	94.6	100.0	
Missing	6 Moderately satisfied	42	3.8		
	System	18	1.6		
	Total	60	5.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

D7 What do you consider the single biggest threat to the world today? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Environmental issues/climate change	118	10.6	11.0	11.0
	2 Wealth inequality/poverty	128	11.5	11.9	22.8
	3 International terrorism	478	43.1	44.4	67.2
	4 Genocide	29	2.6	2.7	69.9
	5 Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality)	97	8.7	9.0	78.9
	6 Health crises	53	4.8	4.9	83.8
	7 Other (please specify)	30	2.7	2.8	86.6
	9 Nuclear war and/or another world war	144	13.0	13.4	100.0
	Total	1077	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	32	2.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

D8 What do you consider the second biggest threat to the world today? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Environmental issues/climate change	139	12.5	13.2	13.2
	2 Wealth inequality/poverty	179	16.1	17.0	30.2

	3 International terrorism	205	18.5	19.4	49.6
	4 Genocide	82	7.4	7.8	57.4
	5 Social injustice (including racial and ethnic inequality, LGBTQ rights, gender inequality)	110	9.9	10.4	67.8
	6 Health crises	111	10.0	10.5	78.4
	7 Other (please specify)	24	2.2	2.3	80.6
	9 Nuclear war and/or another world war	204	18.4	19.4	100.0
	Total	1054	95.0	100.0	
Missing	System	55	5.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

C1 Support political correctness

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Very negatively	204	18.4	26.5	26.5
	2 Somewhat negatively	207	18.7	26.9	53.4
	3 Neither negatively nor positively	204	18.4	26.5	80.0
	4 Somewhat positively	107	9.6	13.9	93.9
	5 Very positively	47	4.2	6.1	100.0
	Total	769	69.3	100.0	
Missing	8 It just depends on context and must be decided on a case-by-case basis	295	26.6		
	9 No opinion	43	3.9		
	System	2	.2		
	Total	340	30.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

C2_1 "Political correctness" means... - Reserving honest opinions or not talking about certain topics in order to be polite and not offend

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all accurate	172	15.5	15.6	15.6
	2 Slightly accurate	316	28.5	28.6	44.2
	3 Moderately accurate	325	29.3	29.4	73.6
	4 Very accurate	292	26.3	26.4	100.0
	Total	1105	99.6	100.0	
Missing	-99	1	.1		
	System	3	.3		
	Total	4	.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

C2_2 "Political correctness" means... - Certain terms are deemed unacceptable and those that use them are then villainized, regardless of intention by the person saying the terms

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all accurate	127	11.5	11.5	11.5
	2 Slightly accurate	279	25.2	25.3	36.8
	3 Moderately accurate	374	33.7	33.9	70.8
	4 Very accurate	322	29.0	29.2	100.0
	Total	1102	99.4	100.0	
Missing	-99	1	.1		
	System	6	.5		
	Total	7	.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

C2_3 "Political correctness" means... - Selectively not using certain terms considered offensive or outdated in order to avoid marginalizing or excluding groups of people

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all accurate	69	6.2	6.3	6.3
	2 Slightly accurate	234	21.1	21.2	27.4
	3 Moderately accurate	402	36.2	36.4	63.9
	4 Very accurate	399	36.0	36.1	100.0
	Total	1104	99.5	100.0	

Missing	-99	1	.1		
	System	4	.4		
	Total	5	.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

C2_4 "Political correctness" means... - Unfair policing of speech and a violation of one's freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all accurate	283	25.5	25.6	25.6
	2 Slightly accurate	279	25.2	25.2	50.9
	3 Moderately accurate	295	26.6	26.7	77.6
	4 Very accurate	248	22.4	22.4	100.0
	Total	1105	99.6	100.0	
Missing	-99	1	.1		
	System	3	.3		
	Total	4	.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

C2_5 "Political correctness" means... - A political maneuver to play victim and persecute others

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all accurate	334	30.1	30.3	30.3
	2 Slightly accurate	258	23.3	23.4	53.8
	3 Moderately accurate	263	23.7	23.9	77.7
	4 Very accurate	246	22.2	22.3	100.0
	Total	1101	99.3	100.0	
Missing	-99	1	.1		
	System	7	.6		
	Total	8	.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

C3 To what extent do you agree or disagree that Americans should be more careful in daily life about not saying things or using terms that might offend certain groups?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly disagree	131	11.8	12.0	12.0
	2 Disagree	107	9.6	9.8	21.7
	3 Somewhat disagree	124	11.2	11.3	33.1
	4 Neither agree nor disagree	185	16.7	16.9	50.0
	5 Somewhat agree	233	21.0	21.3	71.2
	6 Agree	183	16.5	16.7	87.9
	7 Strongly agree	132	11.9	12.1	100.0
	Total	1095	98.7	100.0	
Missing	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	14	1.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

C4 To what extent do you agree or disagree that elected officials should be more careful about not saying things or using terms that might offend certain groups of people?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly disagree	89	8.0	8.2	8.2
	2 Disagree	81	7.3	7.4	15.6
	3 Somewhat disagree	98	8.8	9.0	24.6
	4 Neither agree nor disagree	169	15.2	15.5	40.1
	5 Somewhat agree	199	17.9	18.3	58.3
	6 Agree	177	16.0	16.2	74.6
	7 Strongly agree	277	25.0	25.4	100.0
	Total	1090	98.3	100.0	
Missing	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	17	1.5		
	System	2	.2		
	Total	19	1.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5 How closely did you follow the presidential campaigns this past fall?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Did not follow the campaigns	43	3.9	3.9	3.9
	2 Not very closely	113	10.2	10.2	14.1
	3 Moderately closely	405	36.5	36.6	50.7
	4 Very closely	546	49.2	49.3	100.0
	Total	1107	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$c5a Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$c5a Sources for information on presidential campaigns	C5a_1 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Broadcast news (TV or radio)	888	23.2%	83.5%
	C5a_2 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Newspapers/magazines (including online editions)	437	11.4%	41.1%
	C5a_3 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice News and political websites	490	12.8%	46.1%
	C5a_4 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Podcasts	78	2.0%	7.3%
	C5a_5 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Social media	506	13.2%	47.6%
	C5a_6 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Satirical news/political commentary	170	4.4%	16.0%
	C5a_7 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Directly from candidates' websites or social media accounts	179	4.7%	16.8%
	C5a_8 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice The presidential debates	502	13.1%	47.2%
	C5a_9 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Campaign ads	291	7.6%	27.3%
	C5a_10 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Hearing information second-hand from others around me	280	7.3%	26.3%
	C5a_11 From which of the following sources did you get information on the fall campaign and the candidates? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	12	0.3%	1.1%
Total		3833	100.0%	360.2%

\$c5b Frequencies

Responses		Percent of Cases
N	Percent	

\$c5b Topics that came up most frequently during campaign (select 2)	C5b_1 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Employment/the economy	307	12.2%	28.9%
	C5b_2 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Taxes	186	7.4%	17.5%
	C5b_3 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Environmental issues/climate change	52	2.1%	4.9%
	C5b_4 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Immigration	652	25.8%	61.5%
	C5b_5 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Education	74	2.9%	7.0%
	C5b_6 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Abortion/reproductive rights	102	4.0%	9.6%
	C5b_7 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Terrorism/ISIS/national security	358	14.2%	33.7%
	C5b_8 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice LGBTQ rights	53	2.1%	5.0%
	C5b_9 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Domestic issues on race and ethnicity	92	3.6%	8.7%
	C5b_10 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	10	0.4%	0.9%
	C5b_11 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	3	0.1%	0.3%
	C5b_12 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Trade with other countries	112	4.4%	10.6%
	C5b_13 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Foreign relations	145	5.7%	13.7%
	C5b_14 What topics did you perceive to come up the most frequently during the campaigns? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice The character of the candidates themselves	355	14.1%	33.5%
	C5b_15 Topic that came up most frequently - Healthcare	23	0.9%	2.2%
Total		2524	100.0%	237.9%

\$c5c Frequencies

N	Responses		Percent of Cases
		Percent	

\$c5c Topics most important to R from campaign (select 2)	C5c_1 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Employment/the economy	406	18.9%	38.3%
	C5c_2 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Taxes	155	7.2%	14.6%
	C5c_3 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Environmental issues/climate change	127	5.9%	12.0%
	C5c_4 Important in election - Immigration	314	14.6%	29.6%
	C5c_5 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Education	135	6.3%	12.7%
	C5c_6 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Abortion/reproductive rights	67	3.1%	6.3%
	C5c_7 Important in election - Terrorism/ISIS	292	13.6%	27.5%
	C5c_8 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice LGBTQ rights	51	2.4%	4.8%
	C5c_9 Important in election - Domestic race relations	110	5.1%	10.4%
	C5c_10 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	22	1.0%	2.1%
	C5c_11 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	4	0.2%	0.4%
	C5c_12 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Trade with other countries	75	3.5%	7.1%
	C5c_13 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Foreign relations	102	4.7%	9.6%
	C5c_14 What topics did you personally consider the most important during the presidential race? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice The character of the candidates themselves	254	11.8%	24.0%
	C5c_15 Topic most important to you- Healthcare	35	1.6%	3.3%
Total		2149	100.0%	202.7%

C5d_1 Regarding employment and the economy, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	144	13.0	35.9	35.9
	2 Donald Trump	171	15.4	42.6	78.6
	3 Gary Johnson	18	1.6	4.5	83.0
	4 Jill Stein	8	.7	2.0	85.0
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	60	5.4	15.0	100.0
	Total	401	36.2	100.0	
Missing	System	708	63.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_2 Regarding taxes, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	52	4.7	33.8	33.8

	2 Donald Trump	68	6.1	44.2	77.9
	3 Gary Johnson	10	.9	6.5	84.4
	4 Jill Stein	3	.3	1.9	86.4
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	21	1.9	13.6	100.0
	Total	154	13.9	100.0	
Missing	System	955	86.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_3 Regarding environmental issues and climate change, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	83	7.5	65.4	65.4
	2 Donald Trump	6	.5	4.7	70.1
	3 Gary Johnson	6	.5	4.7	74.8
	4 Jill Stein	15	1.4	11.8	86.6
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	17	1.5	13.4	100.0
	Total	127	11.5	100.0	
Missing	System	982	88.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_4 Regarding immigration, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	85	7.7	27.2	27.2
	2 Donald Trump	195	17.6	62.3	89.5
	3 Gary Johnson	7	.6	2.2	91.7
	4 Jill Stein	3	.3	1.0	92.7
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	23	2.1	7.3	100.0
	Total	313	28.2	100.0	
Missing	System	796	71.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_5 Regarding education, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	76	6.9	56.7	56.7
	2 Donald Trump	16	1.4	11.9	68.7
	3 Gary Johnson	8	.7	6.0	74.6
	4 Jill Stein	3	.3	2.2	76.9
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	31	2.8	23.1	100.0
	Total	134	12.1	100.0	
Missing	System	975	87.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_6 Regarding abortion and reproductive rights, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	37	3.3	56.1	56.1
	2 Donald Trump	20	1.8	30.3	86.4
	3 Gary Johnson	1	.1	1.5	87.9
	4 Jill Stein	3	.3	4.5	92.4
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	5	.5	7.6	100.0
	Total	66	6.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1043	94.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_7 Regarding combating terrorism and ISIS, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	80	7.2	27.5	27.5
	2 Donald Trump	168	15.1	57.7	85.2
	3 Gary Johnson	6	.5	2.1	87.3
	4 Jill Stein	1	.1	.3	87.6
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	36	3.2	12.4	100.0
	Total	291	26.2	100.0	
Missing	System	818	73.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_8 Regarding LGBTQ rights, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	33	3.0	64.7	64.7
	2 Donald Trump	2	.2	3.9	68.6
	3 Gary Johnson	3	.3	5.9	74.5
	4 Jill Stein	2	.2	3.9	78.4
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	11	1.0	21.6	100.0
	Total	51	4.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1058	95.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_9 Regarding race issues, which candidate's stance on the topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	73	6.6	67.0	67.0
	2 Donald Trump	6	.5	5.5	72.5
	3 Gary Johnson	3	.3	2.8	75.2
	4 Jill Stein	2	.2	1.8	77.1
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	25	2.3	22.9	100.0
	Total	109	9.8	100.0	
Missing	System	1000	90.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_12 Regarding trade, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	28	2.5	38.4	38.4
	2 Donald Trump	35	3.2	47.9	86.3
	3 Gary Johnson	4	.4	5.5	91.8
	4 Jill Stein	2	.2	2.7	94.5
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	4	.4	5.5	100.0
	Total	73	6.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1036	93.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_13 Regarding foreign relations, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	48	4.3	47.1	47.1
	2 Donald Trump	28	2.5	27.5	74.5
	3 Gary Johnson	6	.5	5.9	80.4
	4 Jill Stein	4	.4	3.9	84.3
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	16	1.4	15.7	100.0
	Total	102	9.2	100.0	
Missing	System	1007	90.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_14 Regarding the character of the candidates, which candidate did you most trust?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	136	12.3	53.8	53.8
	2 Donald Trump	29	2.6	11.5	65.2
	3 Gary Johnson	6	.5	2.4	67.6
	4 Jill Stein	9	.8	3.6	71.1
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	73	6.6	28.9	100.0
	Total	253	22.8	100.0	
Missing	System	856	77.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_10 Regarding the other topic you listed, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	24	2.2	40.7	40.7
	2 Donald Trump	24	2.2	40.7	81.4
	4 Jill Stein	2	.2	3.4	84.7
	5 None of the candidates shared my opinion on this topic	9	.8	15.3	100.0
	Total	59	5.3	100.0	
Missing	System	1050	94.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

C5d_11 Regarding the other topic you listed second, which candidate's stance on that topic did you most agree with?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	2	.2	50.0	50.0
	2 Donald Trump	2	.2	50.0	100.0
	Total	4	.4	100.0	
Missing	System	1105	99.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

C6 Did you vote for a presidential candidate in the general election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 No	141	12.7	12.7	12.7
	2 Yes	967	87.2	87.3	100.0
	Total	1108	99.9	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

C6a Who did you vote for? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Hillary Clinton	494	44.5	51.1	51.1
	2 Donald Trump	370	33.4	38.3	89.3
	3 Gary Johnson	51	4.6	5.3	94.6
	4 Jill Stein	25	2.3	2.6	97.2
	5 Other (please specify)	27	2.4	2.8	100.0
	Total	967	87.2	100.0	
Missing	System	142	12.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

C6b What is the primary reason that you voted for Hillary Clinton? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 I supported Clinton and agreed with most of her political platforms	176	15.9	35.6	35.6
	2 I wanted the Democratic Party to win	47	4.2	9.5	45.1
	3 I did not want Trump to win	135	12.2	27.3	72.5

	4 I felt she was the most qualified candidate	127	11.5	25.7	98.2
	5 I wanted to elect a female president	8	.7	1.6	99.8
	6 Other (please explain)	1	.1	.2	100.0
	Total	494	44.5	100.0	
Missing	System	615	55.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

C6c What is the primary reason that you voted for Donald Trump? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 I supported Trump and agreed with most of his political platforms	149	13.4	40.3	40.3
	2 I wanted the Republican Party to win	24	2.2	6.5	46.8
	3 I did not want Clinton to win	102	9.2	27.6	74.3
	4 I wanted a non-politician to win in order to change the political status quo	41	3.7	11.1	85.4
	5 I thought Trump was the most likely candidate to address my concerns	52	4.7	14.1	99.5
	6 Other (please explain)	2	.2	.5	100.0
	Total	370	33.4	100.0	
Missing	System	739	66.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

C6d What is the primary reason that you did not vote? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 I did not like any of the candidates	67	6.0	47.5	47.5
	2 I am not registered to vote	22	2.0	15.6	63.1
	3 I typically do not vote	21	1.9	14.9	78.0
	4 I did not think my vote would make a difference	15	1.4	10.6	88.7
	5 I just was not able to make it to the polls on the day of the election	11	1.0	7.8	96.5
	6 Other (please specify)	5	.5	3.5	100.0
	Total	141	12.7	100.0	
Missing	System	968	87.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

C7 Trump approval

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely dissatisfied	485	43.7	44.6	44.6
	2 Moderately dissatisfied	106	9.6	9.7	54.3
	3 Slightly dissatisfied	63	5.7	5.8	60.1
	4 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	86	7.8	7.9	68.0
	5 Slightly satisfied	97	8.7	8.9	76.9
	6 Moderately satisfied	141	12.7	13.0	89.9
	7 Extremely satisfied	110	9.9	10.1	100.0
	Total	1088	98.1	100.0	
Missing	8 I haven't been following his performance	21	1.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

D9 Have you heard about either of these executive orders?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, I had heard about both	833	75.1	76.9	76.9
	2 No, I had not heard about either	50	4.5	4.6	81.5
	3 Yes, but I had only heard about the first order and not the second	167	15.1	15.4	97.0
	4 Yes, but I had only heard about the second order and not the first	33	3.0	3.0	100.0
	Total	1083	97.7	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	25	2.3		
	System	1	.1		
	Total	26	2.3		

Total		1109	100.0		
D9a1 How familiar are you with the content of the first executive order, issued January 27, 2017?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all familiar	24	2.2	2.4	2.4
	2 Slightly familiar	215	19.4	21.7	24.2
	3 Moderately familiar	323	29.1	32.7	56.8
	4 Very familiar	276	24.9	27.9	84.7
	5 Extremely familiar	151	13.6	15.3	100.0
	Total	989	89.2	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't know/Decline to answer	8	.7		
	System	112	10.1		
	Total	120	10.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

D9a2 How familiar are you with the content of the second executive order, issued March 6, 2017?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all familiar	29	2.6	3.4	3.4
	2 Slightly familiar	214	19.3	25.2	28.6
	3 Moderately familiar	290	26.1	34.1	62.7
	4 Very familiar	193	17.4	22.7	85.4
	5 Extremely familiar	124	11.2	14.6	100.0
	Total	850	76.6	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't know/Decline to answer	8	.7		
	System	251	22.6		
	Total	259	23.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

D9b1 Support of Travel Ban

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	323	29.1	32.9	32.9
	2 Oppose	125	11.3	12.7	45.7
	3 Somewhat oppose	80	7.2	8.2	53.8
	4 Neither support nor oppose	74	6.7	7.5	61.4
	5 Somewhat support	100	9.0	10.2	71.6
	6 Support	109	9.8	11.1	82.7
	7 Strongly support	170	15.3	17.3	100.0
	Total	981	88.5	100.0	
Missing	System	128	11.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

D9b2 In general, to what extent do you support or oppose the second executive order?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	245	22.1	29.1	29.1
	2 Oppose	113	10.2	13.4	42.5
	3 Somewhat oppose	62	5.6	7.4	49.8
	4 Neither support nor oppose	81	7.3	9.6	59.4
	5 Somewhat support	91	8.2	10.8	70.2
	6 Support	91	8.2	10.8	81.0
	7 Strongly support	160	14.4	19.0	100.0
	Total	843	76.0	100.0	
Missing	System	266	24.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

D10 To what extent do you support or oppose part (1)—suspending entry for nationals from the seven specified Muslim-majority countries—of this executive order? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	284	25.6	26.5	26.5
	2 Oppose	133	12.0	12.4	38.9
	3 Somewhat oppose	88	7.9	8.2	47.1
	4 Neither support nor oppose	114	10.3	10.6	57.7
	5 Somewhat support	142	12.8	13.2	70.9

	6 Support	98	8.8	9.1	80.1
	7 Strongly support	214	19.3	19.9	100.0
	Total	1073	96.8	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	4	.4		
	System	32	2.9		
	Total	36	3.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

D11 To what extent do you support or oppose part (2)—temporarily suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program—of this executive order? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	263	23.7	24.5	24.5
	2 Oppose	138	12.4	12.9	37.4
	3 Somewhat oppose	97	8.7	9.0	46.5
	4 Neither support nor oppose	110	9.9	10.3	56.7
	5 Somewhat support	149	13.4	13.9	70.6
	6 Support	110	9.9	10.3	80.9
	7 Strongly support	205	18.5	19.1	100.0
	Total	1072	96.7	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	1	.1		
	System	36	3.2		
	Total	37	3.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

D12 To what extent do you support or oppose part (3)—giving preference to refugees who are a religious minority in their home country and fleeing religious persecution—of this executive order? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	195	17.6	18.5	18.5
	2 Oppose	92	8.3	8.7	27.2
	3 Somewhat oppose	87	7.8	8.2	35.5
	4 Neither support nor oppose	246	22.2	23.3	58.8
	5 Somewhat support	149	13.4	14.1	72.9
	6 Support	137	12.4	13.0	85.9
	7 Strongly support	149	13.4	14.1	100.0
	Total	1055	95.1	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	3	.3		
	System	51	4.6		
	Total	54	4.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

D13 To what extent do you support or oppose part (4)—indefinitely blocking entry of Syrian refugees to the US—of this executive order? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	268	24.2	25.1	25.1
	2 Oppose	135	12.2	12.6	37.7
	3 Somewhat oppose	103	9.3	9.6	47.4
	4 Neither support nor oppose	160	14.4	15.0	62.4
	5 Somewhat support	116	10.5	10.9	73.2
	6 Support	99	8.9	9.3	82.5
	7 Strongly support	187	16.9	17.5	100.0
	Total	1068	96.3	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	1	.1		
	System	40	3.6		
	Total	41	3.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$d13a Frequencies

Responses		Percent of Cases
N	Percent	

\$d13a Reason R supports US suspending Syrian refugees (select 2)	D13a_1 What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice The U.S. should stay out of international civil wars and crises	47	6.7%	11.7%
	D13a_2 What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice There are already enough Americans in the U.S. who need help and resources, so we should address their needs first	194	27.8%	48.4%
	D13a_3 What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice For American safety, the U.S. shouldn't accept Syrian refugees because it could facilitate terrorists entering the country	263	37.7%	65.6%
	D13a_4 What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice There are already too many foreigners in the U.S.	52	7.4%	13.0%
	D13a_5 What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Refugees would be a strain on the economy	63	9.0%	15.7%
	D13a_6 What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Because President Trump has expressed his view that Syrian refugees should not be admitted at this time, and I support his authority and judgment.	67	9.6%	16.7%
	D13a_7 What is the primary reason(s) you support the US indefinitely suspending Syrian refugees? Please check no more than two. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	12	1.7%	3.0%
Total		698	100.0%	174.1%

D13b Do you think the U.S. should accept Syrian refugees?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, without conditions	107	9.6	15.2	15.2
	2 Yes, with conditions	444	40.0	63.2	78.4
	3 No, the US should not accept Syrian refugees	63	5.7	9.0	87.3
	4 I don't have an opinion on this topic	89	8.0	12.7	100.0
	Total	703	63.4	100.0	
Missing	System	406	36.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$d13b1 Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$d13b1 Conditions for US accepting Syrian refugees	D13b_1_1 Which of the following conditions should be considered for the U.S. to accept Syrian refugees? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice The U.S. should set a maximum number to be accepted annually and cap off the immigration at that	123	22.7%	27.7%
	D13b_1_2 Which of the following conditions should be considered for the U.S. to accept Syrian refugees? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice There needs to be a "vetting" process whereby each refugee's background is investigated to ensure terrorists do not enter the country	406	75.0%	91.4%
	D13b_1_3 Which of the following conditions should be considered for the U.S. to accept Syrian refugees? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Only non-Muslim Syrian refugees should be accepted	6	1.1%	1.4%

	D13b_1_4 Which of the following conditions should be considered for the U.S. to accept Syrian refugees? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	6	1.1%	1.4%
Total		541	100.0%	121.8%

Q155 The March 6th order differs from the January 27th order by not including Iraq in the list of countries whose foreign nationals are barred entry and visa issuance for 90 days. To what extent do you support not including Iraq on this list? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	129	11.6	12.5	12.5
	2 Oppose	112	10.1	10.8	23.3
	3 Somewhat oppose	124	11.2	12.0	35.3
	4 Neither support nor oppose	293	26.4	28.4	63.7
	5 Somewhat support	120	10.8	11.6	75.3
	6 Support	137	12.4	13.3	88.6
	7 Strongly support	118	10.6	11.4	100.0
	Total	1033	93.1	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	7	.6		
	System	69	6.2		
	Total	76	6.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

Q158 The March 6th order differs from the January 27th order by providing exceptions as to which foreign nationals from those six countries may and may not enter during the 90 day period. The January order did not provide any distinction or exception. To what extent do you support making exceptions so certain foreign nationals from those six countries may still enter and/or be issued visas during the 90 day period? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	117	10.6	11.3	11.3
	2 Oppose	96	8.7	9.2	20.5
	3 Somewhat oppose	87	7.8	8.4	28.8
	4 Neither support nor oppose	245	22.1	23.6	52.4
	5 Somewhat support	207	18.7	19.9	72.3
	6 Support	166	15.0	16.0	88.3
	7 Strongly support	122	11.0	11.7	100.0
	Total	1040	93.8	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	6	.5		
	System	63	5.7		
	Total	69	6.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

Q159 The January 27th order indefinitely banned acceptance of Syrian refugees to the U.S. The March 6th order did not include this stipulation. To what extent do you support the March order leaving out this stipulation (in other words, to what extent do you support not indefinitely banning Syrian refugees)? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	122	11.0	11.8	11.8
	2 Oppose	88	7.9	8.5	20.3
	3 Somewhat oppose	108	9.7	10.4	30.7
	4 Neither support nor oppose	223	20.1	21.5	52.2
	5 Somewhat support	188	17.0	18.1	70.4
	6 Support	165	14.9	15.9	86.3
	7 Strongly support	142	12.8	13.7	100.0
	Total	1036	93.4	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	4	.4		
	System	69	6.2		
	Total	73	6.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

**Q156 To what extent do you
support or oppose part (5)—Homeland Security collecting and publicly sharing information on the
number of foreign nationals who commit or engage in terrorist-related activities—of this
executive order? - Selected Choice**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	85	7.7	8.1	8.1
	2 Oppose	63	5.7	6.0	14.1
	3 Somewhat oppose	60	5.4	5.7	19.8
	4 Neither support nor oppose	182	16.4	17.3	37.1
	5 Somewhat support	173	15.6	16.5	53.6
	6 Support	187	16.9	17.8	71.4
	7 Strongly support	300	27.1	28.6	100.0
	Total	1050	94.7	100.0	
Missing	8 Other (please specify)	3	.3		
	System	56	5.0		
	Total	59	5.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

Q157 Overall, which executive order do you prefer?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 The January 27th order	139	12.5	14.3	14.3
	2 The March 6th order	217	19.6	22.3	36.6
	3 I liked both	232	20.9	23.8	60.4
	4 I liked neither	386	34.8	39.6	100.0
	Total	974	87.8	100.0	
Missing	System	135	12.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

D14 Support for Muslim registry

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly oppose	320	28.9	30.2	30.2
	2 Oppose	147	13.3	13.9	44.1
	3 Somewhat oppose	113	10.2	10.7	54.8
	4 Neither support nor oppose	180	16.2	17.0	71.8
	5 Somewhat support	116	10.5	11.0	82.8
	6 Support	73	6.6	6.9	89.7
	7 Strongly support	109	9.8	10.3	100.0
	Total	1058	95.4	100.0	
Missing	System	51	4.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$d14a Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$d14a Reason for opposing Muslim registry	D14a_1 Why do you oppose the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice A registry based on religion is a violation of freedom of religion as protected by the First Amendment.	489	38.2%	84.3%
	D14a_2 Why do you oppose the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Creating a registry just doesn't seem feasible -it would be too difficult to collect accurate and complete information on all Muslims in the US.	178	13.9%	30.7%
	D14a_3 Why do you oppose the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Creating any registry would be a privacy infringement on the part of the federal government.	316	24.7%	54.5%
	D14a_4 Why do you oppose the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Creating a registry could alienate Muslims and push them towards extremism.	264	20.6%	45.5%

D14a_5 Why do you oppose the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	14	1.1%	2.4%
d14a_6 Must resist fascism/recall dangers of Nazi Germany and Holocaust w/ registry	19	1.5%	3.3%
Total	1280	100.0%	220.7%

\$d14b Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$d14b Reason for supporting Muslim registry	D14b_1 Why do you support the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice National security sometimes takes precedence over individuals' privacy and rights. The government needs as much information as they can get to properly monitor domestic terrorism.	182	39.6%	61.3%
	D14b_2 Why do you support the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice A religious registry doesn't infringe on Muslims' rights so long as they are law-abiding. They should have nothing to hide.	138	30.0%	46.5%
	D14b_3 Why do you support the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice A registry is OK so long as the government does not make the registry public.	97	21.1%	32.7%
	D14b_4 Why do you support the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice I don't consider creating a religious registry to violate a person's privacy.	40	8.7%	13.5%
	D14b_5 Why do you support the government creating a Muslim registry? Check all that apply. - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	3	0.7%	1.0%
	Total	460	100.0%	154.9%

D15 To what extent are you familiar with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all familiar	312	28.1	28.2	28.2
	2 Slightly familiar	387	34.9	34.9	63.1
	3 Moderately familiar	264	23.8	23.8	86.9
	4 Very familiar	145	13.1	13.1	100.0
	Total	1108	99.9	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

D15a Do you believe one side is more at fault than the other for the conflict? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, Palestinians are more at fault	179	16.1	26.0	26.0
	2 Yes, Israel is more at fault	76	6.9	11.0	37.0
	3 Both sides are equally at fault	395	35.6	57.3	94.3
	4 Neither is at fault	28	2.5	4.1	98.4
	5 Other (please specify)	11	1.0	1.6	100.0
	Total	689	62.1	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't know	107	9.6		
	System	313	28.2		
	Total	420	37.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

**D15b Do you think the American government should formally voice
their support for one side over the other in this conflict? - Selected Choice**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, support for Palestinians	43	3.9	6.1	6.1
	2 Yes, support for Israel	262	23.6	37.2	43.3
	3 Other (please specify)	16	1.4	2.3	45.5
	4 No	384	34.6	54.5	100.0
	Total	705	63.6	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	90	8.1		
	System	314	28.3		
	Total	404	36.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

E1 Thinking about the entire Muslim population in the United States, what percentage do you think are born in the U.S.?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Less than 10%	152	13.7	13.7	13.7
	2 More than 10%, less than 20%	233	21.0	21.0	34.8
	3 More than 20%, less than 30%	196	17.7	17.7	52.5
	4 More than 30%, less than 40%	181	16.3	16.4	68.8
	5 More than 40%, less than 50%	109	9.8	9.8	78.7
	6 More than 50%, less than 60%	108	9.7	9.8	88.4
	7 More than 60%, less than 70%	61	5.5	5.5	93.9
	8 More than 70%, less than 80%	38	3.4	3.4	97.4
	9 More than 80%, less than 90%	20	1.8	1.8	99.2
	10 More than 90%	9	.8	.8	100.0
	Total	1107	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

E2 Thinking about the entire Muslim population in the United States, what percentage do you think are American citizens?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Less than 10%	129	11.6	11.7	11.7
	2 More than 10%, less than 20%	195	17.6	17.6	29.3
	3 More than 20%, less than 30%	145	13.1	13.1	42.4
	4 More than 30%, less than 40%	148	13.3	13.4	55.8
	5 More than 40%, less than 50%	99	8.9	9.0	64.7
	6 More than 50%, less than 60%	118	10.6	10.7	75.4
	7 More than 60%, less than 70%	101	9.1	9.1	84.5
	8 More than 70%, less than 80%	93	8.4	8.4	92.9
	9 More than 80%, less than 90%	53	4.8	4.8	97.7
	10 More than 90%	25	2.3	2.3	100.0
	Total	1106	99.7	100.0	
Missing	System	3	.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

E3 Thinking about the entire Muslim population in the United States, what percentage do you think are Arab?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Less than 10%	144	13.0	13.0	13.0
	2 More than 10%, less than 20%	213	19.2	19.2	32.2
	3 More than 20%, less than 30%	213	19.2	19.2	51.4
	4 More than 30%, less than 40%	170	15.3	15.3	66.8
	5 More than 40%, less than 50%	127	11.5	11.5	78.2
	6 More than 50%, less than 60%	102	9.2	9.2	87.5
	7 More than 60%, less than 70%	47	4.2	4.2	91.7
	8 More than 70%, less than 80%	52	4.7	4.7	96.4
	9 More than 80%, less than 90%	26	2.3	2.3	98.7
	10 More than 90%	14	1.3	1.3	100.0
	Total	1108	99.9	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.1		

Total	1109	100.0		
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E4 What percentage of the total U.S. population do you estimate is Muslim?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Less than 2%	114	10.3	10.3	10.3
	2 More than 2%, less than 5%	310	28.0	28.0	38.3
	3 More than 5%, less than 10%	330	29.8	29.8	68.1
	4 More than 10%, less than 20%	228	20.6	20.6	88.6
	5 More than 20%	126	11.4	11.4	100.0
	Total	1108	99.9	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

E5 Do you personally know any Muslims?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	487	43.9	44.0	44.0
	2 No	620	55.9	56.0	100.0
	Total	1107	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$e5a Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$e5a Where R met Muslims they know	E5a_1 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Personal friend	206	23.1%	42.5%
	E5a_2 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Romantic relationship	19	2.1%	3.9%
	E5a_3 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Family member	41	4.6%	8.5%
	E5a_5 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Work	200	22.4%	41.2%
	E5a_6 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice School	123	13.8%	25.4%
	E5a_7 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Neighborhood	143	16.0%	29.5%
	E5a_8 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Community organization	40	4.5%	8.2%
	E5a_9 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Friend of a friend	107	12.0%	22.1%
	E5a_10 From where do you know them? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	14	1.6%	2.9%
	Total	893	100.0%	184.1%

E5b Thinking of the Muslim(s) you know the best, how well do you know them?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not well at all	132	11.9	27.5	27.5
	3 Moderately well	263	23.7	54.8	82.3
	4 Very well	85	7.7	17.7	100.0
	Total	480	43.3	100.0	
Missing	System	629	56.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

E5c While you don't personally know any Muslims, do you know of any Muslims in your community, neighborhood, work, etc.?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	168	15.1	31.6	31.6
	2 No	364	32.8	68.4	100.0
	Total	532	48.0	100.0	

Missing	System	577	52.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

E6 Knowledge of Islam

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not familiar at all	299	27.0	27.0	27.0
	2 Slightly familiar	416	37.5	37.5	64.5
	3 Moderately familiar	274	24.7	24.7	89.3
	4 Very familiar	81	7.3	7.3	96.6
	5 Extremely familiar	38	3.4	3.4	100.0
	Total	1108	99.9	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$e6a Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$e6a Where R learned about Islam	E6a_1 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice In school	231	13.6%	28.7%
	E6a_2 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice At church or another non-Muslim religious organization	69	4.1%	8.6%
	E6a_3 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Through a Muslim organization	39	2.3%	4.8%
	E6a_4 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Personal reading/research	403	23.8%	50.0%
	E6a_5 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice In the news	367	21.7%	45.5%
	E6a_6 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Social media	151	8.9%	18.7%
	E6a_7 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Movies/TV shows	108	6.4%	13.4%
	E6a_8 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Personal acquaintance with Muslim(s)	252	14.9%	31.3%
	E6a_9 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Other (Please specify)	26	1.5%	3.2%
	E6a_10 Where did you learn what you know about Islam? (Check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Traveling in Muslim countries	48	2.8%	6.0%
Total		1694	100.0%	210.2%

E7_1 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios? - A Muslim in the US as a non-citizen, temporary visitor

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	99	8.9	9.0	9.0
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	103	9.3	9.3	18.3
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	218	19.7	19.7	38.0
	4 Slightly comfortable	233	21.0	21.1	59.1
	5 Moderately comfortable	217	19.6	19.6	78.7
	6 Extremely comfortable	235	21.2	21.3	100.0
	Total	1105	99.6	100.0	
Missing	-90	4	.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

E7_2 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios? - A Muslim being a US citizen

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	55	5.0	5.0	5.0
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	59	5.3	5.4	10.4
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	113	10.2	10.3	20.7
	4 Slightly comfortable	198	17.9	18.0	38.7
	5 Moderately comfortable	241	21.7	22.0	60.7
	6 Extremely comfortable	431	38.9	39.3	100.0
	Total	1097	98.9	100.0	
Missing	-90	12	1.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

E7_3 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios? - A Muslim co-worker

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	53	4.8	4.8	4.8
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	57	5.1	5.2	10.0
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	113	10.2	10.3	20.3
	4 Slightly comfortable	179	16.1	16.3	36.6
	5 Moderately comfortable	260	23.4	23.7	60.3
	6 Extremely comfortable	436	39.3	39.7	100.0
	Total	1098	99.0	100.0	
Missing	-90	11	1.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

E7_4 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios? - A Muslim neighbor on the same street

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	77	6.9	7.0	7.0
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	57	5.1	5.2	12.1
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	134	12.1	12.1	24.3
	4 Slightly comfortable	174	15.7	15.8	40.0
	5 Moderately comfortable	248	22.4	22.5	62.5
	6 Extremely comfortable	414	37.3	37.5	100.0
	Total	1104	99.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	5	.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

E7_5 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios? - A Muslim as a close personal friend

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	64	5.8	5.8	5.8
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	58	5.2	5.3	11.1
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	99	8.9	9.0	20.1
	4 Slightly comfortable	164	14.8	14.9	35.0
	5 Moderately comfortable	231	20.8	21.0	55.9
	6 Extremely comfortable	485	43.7	44.1	100.0
	Total	1101	99.3	100.0	
Missing	-90	8	.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

E7_6 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios? - A Muslim as a close relative by marriage

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	89	8.0	8.1	8.1
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	73	6.6	6.6	14.7
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	110	9.9	10.0	24.6
	4 Slightly comfortable	186	16.8	16.8	41.5
	5 Moderately comfortable	251	22.6	22.7	64.2

	6 Extremely comfortable	395	35.6	35.8	100.0
	Total	1104	99.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	5	.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

E7_7 How comfortable would you be with each of the following scenarios? - A Muslim as the President of the United States

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	302	27.2	27.4	27.4
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	100	9.0	9.1	36.4
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	147	13.3	13.3	49.8
	4 Slightly comfortable	143	12.9	13.0	62.7
	5 Moderately comfortable	181	16.3	16.4	79.1
	6 Extremely comfortable	230	20.7	20.9	100.0
	Total	1103	99.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	6	.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

E8 Which of the following comes closest to your view on Muslim immigrants? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Muslim immigrants are fine in the United States so long as they assimilate	454	40.9	41.2	41.2
	2 Muslim immigrants are fine in the United States without needing to assimilate	372	33.5	33.8	75.0
	3 Muslim immigrants are never fine in the United States	110	9.9	10.0	85.0
	4 Other (please explain)	10	.9	.9	85.9
	5 Muslims are fine so long as they do not engage in or endorse extremism/they follow the law/have undergone background che	155	14.0	14.1	100.0
	Total	1101	99.3	100.0	
Missing	-90	8	.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

E9 Do you think Muslims in the US experience discrimination?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, often	534	48.2	48.5	48.5
	2 Yes, sometimes	384	34.6	34.8	83.3
	3 Yes, but seldom	116	10.5	10.5	93.8
	4 No, they do not	68	6.1	6.2	100.0
	Total	1102	99.4	100.0	
Missing	System	7	.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

E10 Do you think the profiling of Muslims at airports, additional scrutiny by NSA security surveillance, and related surveillance measures are justified? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, because it is often Muslims who are the perpetrators of terrorist attacks so they deserve additional scrutiny	239	21.6	21.7	21.7
	2 Yes, because national security and public safety are at risk, so that takes priority over individual Muslims' rights	315	28.4	28.6	50.3
	3 No, it is unfair to Muslims to target them because of their religion and/or ethnicity	477	43.0	43.3	93.6
	4 Other (please explain)	23	2.1	2.1	95.7
	5 Muslims are not actually being profiled or singled out for surveillance in the US	47	4.2	4.3	100.0
	Total	1101	99.3	100.0	
Missing	-90	8	.7		

Total	1109	100.0		
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E11 To what extent do you think Islam has a lot in common with your own religion?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Nothing in common	298	26.9	37.0	37.0
	2 A little in common	208	18.8	25.8	62.9
	3 Some in common	201	18.1	25.0	87.8
	4 A lot in common	98	8.8	12.2	100.0
	Total	805	72.6	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	110	9.9		
	6 I don't affiliate with a religion	189	17.0		
	System	5	.5		
	Total	304	27.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

E12 To what extent do you think Islam has a lot in common with Christianity?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Nothing in common	269	24.3	28.7	28.7
	2 A little in common	279	25.2	29.8	58.5
	3 Some in common	253	22.8	27.0	85.5
	4 A lot in common	136	12.3	14.5	100.0
	Total	937	84.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	172	15.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

E13 Do you think a Muslim can fully practice their Islamic religion and way of life here in the United States? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	602	54.3	63.8	63.8
	2 No	277	25.0	29.3	93.1
	4 Depends (Please explain)	38	3.4	4.0	97.1
	5 Depends--can't practice Sharia law/must follow US laws/not extremist	27	2.4	2.9	100.0
	Total	944	85.1	100.0	
Missing	-90	2	.2		
	3 Don't know/Decline to answer	163	14.7		
	Total	165	14.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

E13a Why do you think Islam cannot be practiced fully in the United States? Select the answer choice that most closely matches your view.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 I don't think any religion can be practiced fully in the United States	25	2.3	7.5	7.5
	2 Because American society is not accepting of Islam	105	9.5	31.3	38.8
	3 Because America is founded on and structured around Christian traditions	65	5.9	19.4	58.2
	4 Because Islamic values conflict with American values	126	11.4	37.6	95.8
	5 Other (Please specify)	14	1.3	4.2	100.0
	Total	335	30.2	100.0	
Missing	-90	774	69.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

E14a To what degree is Islam compatible with American society and customs?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Completely compatible	102	9.2	10.8	10.8
	2 Mostly compatible	177	16.0	18.7	29.4
	3 Somewhat compatible	262	23.6	27.6	57.1

	4 Only a little compatible	211	19.0	22.3	79.3
	5 Not at all compatible	196	17.7	20.7	100.0
	Total	948	85.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	161	14.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

E14b To what degree is Islam compatible with democratic values?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Completely compatible	92	8.3	10.4	10.4
	2 Mostly compatible	151	13.6	17.1	27.5
	3 Somewhat compatible	233	21.0	26.3	53.8
	4 Only a little compatible	186	16.8	21.0	74.8
	5 Not at all compatible	223	20.1	25.2	100.0
	Total	885	79.8	100.0	
Missing	-90	224	20.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$e14c Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
\$e14c Characteristics of Islam incompatible w/ American customs/Democratic values	E14c_1 Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.) - Selected Choice Islamic jihad, which some argue justifies the use of force or violence by Muslims against nonbelievers	401	33.1%	63.1%
	E14c_2 Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.) - Selected Choice The unequal treatment of women within Islam	414	34.2%	65.2%
	E14c_3 Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.) - Selected Choice Most Islamic societies are just too backwards in terms of tradition and customs	111	9.2%	17.5%
	E14c_4 Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.) - Selected Choice So few Muslim-majority countries are democracies- there's little evidence Islam could be compatible with democracy	105	8.7%	16.5%
	E14c_5 Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.) - Selected Choice America was founded on Christian ideals, and Islam is incompatible with those foundations	125	10.3%	19.7%
	E14c_6 Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.) - Selected Choice Other (Please specify)	4	0.3%	0.6%
	E14c_7 Specifically what values or characteristics of Islam do you think are the most incompatible? (Please check no more than two.) - Selected Choice Don't know/Decline to answer	52	4.3%	8.2%
Total		1212	100.0%	190.9%

E15 How likely do you think it is that Islam will become a major religion in the United States?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all likely	352	31.7	36.2	36.2
	2 Only a little likely	264	23.8	27.2	63.4
	3 Somewhat likely	251	22.6	25.8	89.2
	4 Very likely	105	9.5	10.8	100.0

	Total	972	87.6	100.0	
Missing	7 Don't know/Decline to answer	130	11.7		
	System	7	.6		
	Total	137	12.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

E16 Comfortability with Islam becoming major American religion

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Extremely uncomfortable	294	26.5	28.7	28.7
	2 Moderately uncomfortable	116	10.5	11.3	40.0
	3 Slightly uncomfortable	121	10.9	11.8	51.8
	4 Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable	263	23.7	25.7	77.5
	5 Slightly comfortable	42	3.8	4.1	81.6
	6 Moderately comfortable	84	7.6	8.2	89.8
	7 Extremely comfortable	105	9.5	10.2	100.0
	Total	1025	92.4	100.0	
Missing	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	81	7.3		
	System	3	.3		
	Total	84	7.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

E17_1 For each of the following statements, please mark the extent to which you agree with each sentiment. - Islam, more so than other religions, encourages violence.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly Disagree	139	12.5	15.1	15.1
	2 Disagree	110	9.9	11.9	27.0
	3 Somewhat Disagree	95	8.6	10.3	37.3
	4 Neither Disagree nor Agree	160	14.4	17.4	54.7
	5 Somewhat Agree	134	12.1	14.5	69.2
	6 Agree	109	9.8	11.8	81.0
	7 Strongly Agree	175	15.8	19.0	100.0
	Total	922	83.1	100.0	
Missing	-90	121	10.9		
	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	66	6.0		
	Total	187	16.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

E17_2 For each of the following statements, please mark the extent to which you agree with each sentiment. - The vast majority of Muslims are peaceful.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly Disagree	52	4.7	5.5	5.5
	2 Disagree	32	2.9	3.4	8.9
	3 Somewhat Disagree	41	3.7	4.4	13.3
	4 Neither Disagree nor Agree	177	16.0	18.8	32.2
	5 Somewhat Agree	181	16.3	19.3	51.4
	6 Agree	210	18.9	22.4	73.8
	7 Strongly Agree	246	22.2	26.2	100.0
	Total	939	84.7	100.0	
Missing	-90	122	11.0		
	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	48	4.3		
	Total	170	15.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

E17_3 For each of the following statements, please mark the extent to which you agree with each sentiment. - In the context of the US, Islam is as much an ethnicity as it is a religion.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly Disagree	81	7.3	9.0	9.0
	2 Disagree	59	5.3	6.6	15.6
	3 Somewhat Disagree	81	7.3	9.0	24.6

	4 Neither Disagree nor Agree	232	20.9	25.8	50.3
	5 Somewhat Agree	195	17.6	21.7	72.0
	6 Agree	154	13.9	17.1	89.1
	7 Strongly Agree	98	8.8	10.9	100.0
	Total	900	81.2	100.0	
Missing	-90	125	11.3		
	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	84	7.6		
	Total	209	18.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

E17_4 For each of the following statements, please mark the extent to which you agree with each sentiment. - International Islamic extremist groups are a major threat to the U.S.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly Disagree	37	3.3	4.0	4.0
	2 Disagree	34	3.1	3.7	7.7
	3 Somewhat Disagree	39	3.5	4.2	11.9
	4 Neither Disagree nor Agree	123	11.1	13.3	25.2
	5 Somewhat Agree	185	16.7	20.0	45.1
	6 Agree	174	15.7	18.8	63.9
	7 Strongly Agree	334	30.1	36.1	100.0
	Total	926	83.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	124	11.2		
	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	59	5.3		
	Total	183	16.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

E17_5 For each of the following statements, please mark the extent to which you agree with each sentiment. - Islamic radicalization occurring within the U.S. is a major threat.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Strongly Disagree	29	2.6	3.2	3.2
	2 Disagree	46	4.1	5.0	8.2
	3 Somewhat Disagree	38	3.4	4.2	12.3
	4 Neither Disagree nor Agree	149	13.4	16.3	28.6
	5 Somewhat Agree	189	17.0	20.7	49.3
	6 Agree	163	14.7	17.8	67.1
	7 Strongly Agree	301	27.1	32.9	100.0
	Total	915	82.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	128	11.5		
	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	66	6.0		
	Total	194	17.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

E21 To what extent are you concerned about Islamic extremism in the U.S.?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all concerned	71	6.4	6.9	6.9
	2 Slightly concerned	257	23.2	25.1	32.0
	3 Moderately concerned	291	26.2	28.4	60.4
	4 Very concerned	405	36.5	39.6	100.0
	Total	1024	92.3	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	68	6.1		
	System	17	1.5		
	Total	85	7.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

E22 To what extent are you concerned about Islamic extremism around the world?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all concerned	40	3.6	3.9	3.9
	2 Slightly concerned	173	15.6	16.8	20.7
	3 Moderately concerned	292	26.3	28.3	49.0
	4 Very concerned	526	47.4	51.0	100.0

	Total	1031	93.0	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	76	6.9		
	System	2	.2		
	Total	78	7.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

E23 With which of the following characterizations do you most agree: Islamic terrorist attacks are representative of a major clash between Islam and Western civilization OR Islamic terrorist attacks are the product of a small number of radical groups, which are not representative of all of Islam? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Islamic terrorist attacks are representative of a major clash between Islam and Western civilization	342	30.8	31.0	31.0
	2 Islamic terrorist attacks are the product of a small number of radical groups, which are not representative of all of Islam	735	66.3	66.6	97.6
	3 Other (please explain)	27	2.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	1104	99.5	100.0	
Missing	-90	5	.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1 What is your religious preference? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Christian	812	73.2	73.2	73.2
	2 Jewish	38	3.4	3.4	76.6
	3 Hindu	1	.1	.1	76.7
	4 Other (Please specify)	16	1.4	1.4	78.2
	6 None	229	20.6	20.6	98.8
	7 Buddhist	13	1.2	1.2	100.0
	Total	1109	100.0	100.0	

B1a1 With which Christian tradition do you identify? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Baptist	135	12.2	16.9	16.9
	2 Methodist	52	4.7	6.5	23.4
	3 Lutheran	43	3.9	5.4	28.8
	4 Presbyterian	26	2.3	3.3	32.1
	5 Episcopalian/Anglican	20	1.8	2.5	34.6
	6 Other Christian (Please specify)	31	2.8	3.9	38.5
	7 Inter/Non-denominational Christian	155	14.0	19.4	57.9
	8 Catholic	272	24.5	34.1	92.0
	9 Mormon	21	1.9	2.6	94.6
	10 Pentecostal	43	3.9	5.4	100.0
	Total	798	72.0	100.0	
Missing	15 Don't know/Decline to answer	14	1.3		
	System	297	26.8		
	Total	311	28.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1_Baptist What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	4 American Baptist Association	7	.6	5.6	5.6
	5 American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A	9	.8	7.3	12.9
	6 National Baptist Convention of America	5	.5	4.0	16.9
	7 National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc	1	.1	.8	17.7
	8 Southern Baptist Convention	41	3.7	33.1	50.8

	9 Other Baptist Churches	24	2.2	19.4	70.2
	10 Baptist, Don't know which	37	3.3	29.8	100.0
	Total	124	11.2	100.0	
Missing	System	985	88.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1_Methodist What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	4 African Methodist Episcopal Church	3	.3	6.0	6.0
	5 African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church	5	.5	10.0	16.0
	6 United Methodist Church	37	3.3	74.0	90.0
	7 Other Methodist Churches	3	.3	6.0	96.0
	8 Methodist, Don't know which	2	.2	4.0	100.0
	Total	50	4.5	100.0	
Missing	System	1059	95.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1_Lutheran What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	4 American Lutheran Church	6	.5	14.0	14.0
	5 Lutheran Church in America	3	.3	7.0	20.9
	6 Lutheran Church -- Missouri Synod	13	1.2	30.2	51.2
	7 Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod	2	.2	4.7	55.8
	8 Other Lutheran Churches	4	.4	9.3	65.1
	9 Evangelical Lutheran Church of America	9	.8	20.9	86.0
	10 Lutheran, Don't know which	6	.5	14.0	100.0
	Total	43	3.9	100.0	
Missing	System	1066	96.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1_Presbyterian What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	4 Presbyterian Church in the United States	8	.7	30.8	30.8
	5 United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America	3	.3	11.5	42.3
	6 Other Presbyterian Churches	3	.3	11.5	53.8
	7 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)	6	.5	23.1	76.9
	8 Presbyterian, Don't know which	6	.5	23.1	100.0
	Total	26	2.3	100.0	
Missing	System	1083	97.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1a2 Would you describe yourself as a "born-again" or evangelical Christian?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, would	279	25.2	38.0	38.0
	2 No, would not	455	41.0	62.0	100.0
	Total	734	66.2	100.0	
Missing	3 Don't know/Decline to answer	45	4.1		
	System	330	29.8		
	Total	375	33.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1b Which of the following Jewish religious denominations do you consider yourself to be? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Orthodox	2	.2	5.3	5.3
	2 Conservative	10	.9	26.3	31.6
	3 Reform	16	1.4	42.1	73.7
	4 No particular denomination	9	.8	23.7	97.4
	5 Other denomination (Please specify)	1	.1	2.6	100.0
	Total	38	3.4	100.0	
Missing	System	1071	96.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

B1c Which of the following do you consider yourself to be? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Atheist	55	5.0	23.9	23.9
	2 Agnostic	58	5.2	25.2	49.1
	3 No identification	103	9.3	44.8	93.9
	4 Other (Please specify)	14	1.3	6.1	100.0
	Total	230	20.7	100.0	
Missing	System	879	79.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

B2 Has this always been your religious affiliation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	825	74.4	74.5	74.5
	2 No	282	25.4	25.5	100.0
	Total	1107	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

B2a For how long have you identified as -SelectedChoices]?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Less than one year	12	1.1	4.5	4.5
	2 Longer than one year but less than five years	45	4.1	17.0	21.6
	3 Longer than five but less than ten years	57	5.1	21.6	43.2
	4 Longer than ten but less than twenty years	67	6.0	25.4	68.6
	5 Longer than twenty years	83	7.5	31.4	100.0
	Total	264	23.8	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't Know/ Decline to answer	18	1.6		
	System	827	74.6		
	Total	845	76.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

B2b What was your religious preference in the past? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Christian	201	18.1	71.8	71.8
	2 Jewish	7	.6	2.5	74.3
	3 Other (Please specify)	38	3.4	13.6	87.9
	4 None	30	2.7	10.7	98.6
	16 Muslim	2	.2	.7	99.3
	19 Hindu	1	.1	.4	99.6
	20 Buddhist	1	.1	.4	100.0
	Total	280	25.2	100.0	
Missing	System	829	74.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

B2b_1 With which Christian tradition did you identify? If more than one, select the denomination that you affiliated with for the longest period of time. - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Baptist	35	3.2	17.9	17.9
	2 Methodist	11	1.0	5.6	23.5
	3 Lutheran	11	1.0	5.6	29.1
	4 Presbyterian	8	.7	4.1	33.2
	5 Episcopal/Anglican	8	.7	4.1	37.2
	6 Other Christian (Please specify)	8	.7	4.1	41.3
	7 Non-denominational Christian	28	2.5	14.3	55.6
	8 Catholic	71	6.4	36.2	91.8
	9 Mormon	3	.3	1.5	93.4
	10 Pentecostal	13	1.2	6.6	100.0
	Total	196	17.7	100.0	
Missing	15 Don't know/Decline to answer	5	.5		
	System	908	81.9		
	Total	913	82.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

Q152 What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	4 American Baptist Association	1	.1	2.9	2.9
	5 American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A	1	.1	2.9	5.7
	6 National Baptist Convention of America	3	.3	8.6	14.3
	8 Southern Baptist Convention	12	1.1	34.3	48.6
	10 Baptist, Don't know which	18	1.6	51.4	100.0
	Total	35	3.2	100.0	
Missing	System	1074	96.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

Q153 What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	6 United Methodist Church	10	.9	90.9	90.9
	8 Methodist, Don't know which	1	.1	9.1	100.0
	Total	11	1.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1098	99.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

Q154 What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	4 American Lutheran Church	3	.3	27.3	27.3
	5 Lutheran Church in America	1	.1	9.1	36.4
	6 Lutheran Church -- Missouri Synod	2	.2	18.2	54.5
	7 Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod	1	.1	9.1	63.6
	9 Evangelical Lutheran Church of America	1	.1	9.1	72.7
	10 Lutheran, Don't know which	3	.3	27.3	100.0
	Total	11	1.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1098	99.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

155.0 What specific denomination is that, if any?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	5 United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America	1	.1	12.5	12.5
	7 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)	2	.2	25.0	37.5
	8 Presbyterian, Don't know which	5	.5	62.5	100.0
	Total	8	.7	100.0	
Missing	System	1101	99.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

B2b_2 Which of the following Jewish religious denominations did you consider yourself to be in the past? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2 Conservative	5	.5	71.4	71.4
	3 Reform	1	.1	14.3	85.7
	4 No particular denomination	1	.1	14.3	100.0
	Total	7	.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1102	99.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

B2b_3.0 Which of the following did you consider yourself to be in the past? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Atheist	3	.3	10.0	10.0
	2 Agnostic	1	.1	3.3	13.3
	3 No identification	23	2.1	76.7	90.0
	4 Other (Please specify)	3	.3	10.0	100.0
	Total	30	2.7	100.0	
Missing	System	1079	97.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

B3 Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 More than once a week	66	6.0	7.6	7.6
	2 Once a week	219	19.7	25.1	32.7
	3 Once or twice a month	112	10.1	12.8	45.5
	4 A few times a year	156	14.1	17.9	63.4
	5 Seldom	194	17.5	22.2	85.7
	6 Never	125	11.3	14.3	100.0
	Total	872	78.6	100.0	
Missing	8 Don't know/Decline to answer	19	1.7		
	System	218	19.7		
	Total	237	21.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

B4 Has your house of worship participated in interfaith events?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	133	12.0	41.4	41.4
	2 No	188	17.0	58.6	100.0
	Total	321	28.9	100.0	
Missing	System	788	71.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

B5 Have you participated in any of those interfaith events?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	91	8.2	68.4	68.4
	2 No	40	3.6	30.1	98.5
	3 Don't know/Decline to answer	2	.2	1.5	100.0
	Total	133	12.0	100.0	
Missing	System	976	88.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

B6 Did you find the interfaith event(s) worthwhile?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	83	7.5	93.3	93.3
	2 No	6	.5	6.7	100.0
	Total	89	8.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1020	92.0		
Total		1109	100.0		

B8 Over the past twelve months, about how regularly has politics been brought up during the religious services you have attended?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Often	28	2.5	7.3	7.3
	2 Occasionally	115	10.4	30.0	37.3
	3 Seldom	148	13.3	38.6	76.0
	4 Never	92	8.3	24.0	100.0
	Total	383	34.5	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	13	1.2		
	System	713	64.3		
	Total	726	65.5		
Total		1109	100.0		

B9 How often do you participate in prayer groups, scripture study groups, religious education programs, or other religiously affiliated programs?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 At least once a week	126	11.4	14.7	14.7
	2 Once or twice a month	65	5.9	7.6	22.3
	3 Several times a year	102	9.2	11.9	34.3
	4 Seldom	230	20.7	26.9	61.2
	5 Never	332	29.9	38.8	100.0
	Total	855	77.1	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't know/Decline to answer	34	3.1		
	System	220	19.8		
	Total	254	22.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

B10 Over the past 12 months, about how often has politics been brought up, formally or informally, at these events?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Often	41	3.7	14.6	14.6
	2 Occasionally	100	9.0	35.6	50.2
	3 Seldom	86	7.8	30.6	80.8
	4 Never	54	4.9	19.2	100.0
	Total	281	25.3	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	8	.7		
	System	820	73.9		
	Total	828	74.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

B11 How often do you typically pray?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Multiple times a day	277	25.0	32.1	32.1
	2 Once a day	206	18.6	23.8	55.9
	3 A few times a week	124	11.2	14.4	70.3
	4 Once a week	27	2.4	3.1	73.4
	5 A few times a month	70	6.3	8.1	81.5
	6 Seldom	96	8.7	11.1	92.6
	7 Never	54	4.9	6.3	98.8
	8 This question is not applicable to my religion	10	.9	1.2	100.0
	Total	864	77.9	100.0	
Missing	9 Don't know/Decline to answer	27	2.4		
	System	218	19.7		
	Total	245	22.1		
Total		1109	100.0		

B12 How often do you read scripture outside of religious services?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 At least once a week	228	20.6	26.6	26.6
	2 Once or twice a month	80	7.2	9.3	35.9
	3 Several times a year	102	9.2	11.9	47.8
	4 Seldom	226	20.4	26.4	74.2
	5 Never	208	18.8	24.3	98.5
	6 This question is not applicable to my religion	13	1.2	1.5	100.0
	Total	857	77.3	100.0	
Missing	7 Don't know/Decline to answer	34	3.1		
	System	218	19.7		
	Total	252	22.7		
Total		1109	100.0		

B13 Which comes closest to your view? The holy book of my religion is the word of God, OR it is a book written by men and is not the word of God.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 This holy book is the word of God	561	50.6	69.6	69.6
	2 This holy book is a book written by people and is not the word of God	184	16.6	22.8	92.4
	3 This question is not applicable to my religion	61	5.5	7.6	100.0
	Total	806	72.7	100.0	
	System	303	27.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

B14 Regarding this holy book, which of the following comes closest to your belief? -

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 This book should be taken literally, word for word	246	22.2	44.7	44.7
	2 Not everything in this book should be taken literally, word for word	292	26.3	53.1	97.8
	3 Other (Please specify)	12	1.1	2.2	100.0
	Total	550	49.6	100.0	
	System	559	50.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

B15 How important is religion in your daily life?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Not at all important	69	6.2	7.9	7.9
	2 Slightly important	150	13.5	17.3	25.2
	3 Moderately important	174	15.7	20.0	45.2
	4 Very important	203	18.3	23.4	68.6
	5 Extremely important	273	24.6	31.4	100.0
	Total	869	78.4	100.0	
	System	219	19.7		
Missing	6 Don't know/Decline to answer	21	1.9		
	System	219	19.7		
	Total	240	21.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

B16 Between the following two statements, which statement comes closest to your own views even if neither is exactly right? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 My religion is the one true faith leading to eternal life, OR	283	25.5	35.1	35.1
	2 Many religions/ways of life can lead to eternal life	426	38.4	52.8	87.9
	3 Other (Please explain)	17	1.5	2.1	90.0

	4 I do not believe in eternal life	81	7.3	10.0	100.0
	Total	807	72.8	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't know/Decline to answer	79	7.1		
	System	223	20.1		
	Total	302	27.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

B17 Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout religious person and living in a modern society? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes, there is conflict	318	28.7	32.6	32.6
	2 No, I don't think so	430	38.8	44.1	76.8
	3 Depends on the religion	220	19.8	22.6	99.4
	4 Other (Please explain)	6	.5	.6	100.0
	Total	974	87.8	100.0	
Missing	5 Don't know/Decline to answer	130	11.7		
	System	5	.5		
	Total	135	12.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

F2 What is your gender identity?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Male	374	33.7	34.1	34.1
	2 Female	722	65.1	65.9	100.0
	Total	1096	98.8	100.0	
Missing	3 Other	4	.4		
	4 Prefer not to answer	4	.4		
	System	5	.5		
	Total	13	1.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

F3 How would you characterize the town/city where you live? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Urban	311	28.0	28.1	28.1
	2 Suburban	526	47.4	47.5	75.6
	3 A small town or city not in a metro area	134	12.1	12.1	87.7
	4 Rural	136	12.3	12.3	100.0
	Total	1107	99.8	100.0	
Missing	5 Other (please specify)	2	.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

F4 In what state do you currently live?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Alabama	15	1.4	1.4	1.4
	2 Alaska	2	.2	.2	1.5
	3 Arizona	45	4.1	4.1	5.6
	4 Arkansas	4	.4	.4	6.0
	5 California	113	10.2	10.3	16.3
	6 Colorado	22	2.0	2.0	18.3
	7 Connecticut	8	.7	.7	19.0
	8 Delaware	4	.4	.4	19.4
	9 Florida	116	10.5	10.6	29.9
	10 Georgia	13	1.2	1.2	31.1
	11 Hawaii	2	.2	.2	31.3
	12 Idaho	4	.4	.4	31.7
	13 Illinois	33	3.0	3.0	34.7
	14 Indiana	8	.7	.7	35.4
	15 Iowa	10	.9	.9	36.3
	16 Kansas	5	.5	.5	36.8
	17 Kentucky	30	2.7	2.7	39.5
	18 Louisiana	18	1.6	1.6	41.1
	19 Maine	4	.4	.4	41.5

	20 Maryland	24	2.2	2.2	43.7
	21 Massachusetts	17	1.5	1.5	45.2
	22 Michigan	30	2.7	2.7	48.0
	23 Minnesota	10	.9	.9	48.9
	24 Mississippi	3	.3	.3	49.1
	25 Missouri	20	1.8	1.8	51.0
	26 Montana	3	.3	.3	51.2
	27 Nebraska	5	.5	.5	51.7
	28 Nevada	14	1.3	1.3	53.0
	29 New Hampshire	9	.8	.8	53.8
	30 New Jersey	30	2.7	2.7	56.5
	31 New Mexico	3	.3	.3	56.8
	32 New York	90	8.1	8.2	65.0
	33 North Carolina	39	3.5	3.5	68.5
	35 Ohio	70	6.3	6.4	74.9
	36 Oklahoma	27	2.4	2.5	77.3
	37 Oregon	30	2.7	2.7	80.1
	38 Pennsylvania	100	9.0	9.1	89.2
	39 Rhode Island	10	.9	.9	90.1
	40 South Carolina	5	.5	.5	90.5
	41 South Dakota	6	.5	.5	91.1
	42 Tennessee	9	.8	.8	91.9
	43 Texas	31	2.8	2.8	94.7
	44 Utah	10	.9	.9	95.6
	45 Vermont	1	.1	.1	95.7
	46 Virginia	11	1.0	1.0	96.7
	47 Washington	16	1.4	1.5	98.2
	48 West Virginia	3	.3	.3	98.5
	49 Wisconsin	13	1.2	1.2	99.6
	50 Wyoming	4	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	1099	99.1	100.0	
Missing	System	10	.9		
Total		1109	100.0		

F7 Have you ever spent time in a Muslim-majority country? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes (Please list)	74	6.7	6.8	6.8
	2 No	1017	91.7	93.2	100.0
	Total	1091	98.4	100.0	
Missing	3 Don't know/Decline to answer	15	1.4		
	System	3	.3		
	Total	18	1.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

F8 What is your marital status?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Married	559	50.4	51.1	51.1
	2 Widowed	39	3.5	3.6	54.7
	3 Divorced	104	9.4	9.5	64.2
	4 Separated	16	1.4	1.5	65.6
	5 Never married	376	33.9	34.4	100.0
	Total	1094	98.6	100.0	
Missing	6 Decline to answer	13	1.2		
	System	2	.2		
	Total	15	1.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

F9 Have you or an immediate family member served in a branch of the U.S. military?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	401	36.2	36.5	36.5
	2 No	698	62.9	63.5	100.0
	Total	1099	99.1	100.0	
Missing	3 Don't know/Decline to answer	8	.7		

System	2	.2		
Total	10	.9		
Total	1109	100.0		

F11 How would you classify your financial situation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Excellent	61	5.5	5.6	5.6
	2 Very good	198	17.9	18.3	24.0
	3 Good	378	34.1	35.0	59.0
	4 Fair	327	29.5	30.3	89.3
	5 Poor	116	10.5	10.7	100.0
	Total	1080	97.4	100.0	
Missing	6 Don't know/Decline to answer	24	2.2		
	System	5	.5		
	Total	29	2.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

F12 Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Less than high school	16	1.4	1.4	1.4
	2 High school graduate	208	18.8	18.8	20.3
	3 Some college	274	24.7	24.8	45.0
	4 2 year degree	133	12.0	12.0	57.1
	5 4 year degree	298	26.9	26.9	84.0
	6 Masters degree	131	11.8	11.8	95.8
	7 Professional degree	31	2.8	2.8	98.6
	8 Doctorate	15	1.4	1.4	100.0
	Total	1106	99.7	100.0	
Missing	System	3	.3		
Total		1109	100.0		

F13 Which of the following best describes you? - Selected Choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Working full time (35 hours/week or more)	474	42.7	42.8	42.8
	2 Working part time	138	12.4	12.5	55.3
	3 Unemployed looking for work	49	4.4	4.4	59.7
	4 Unemployed not looking for work	24	2.2	2.2	61.9
	5 Retired	196	17.7	17.7	79.6
	6 Student	59	5.3	5.3	84.9
	7 Homemaker	105	9.5	9.5	94.4
	8 Disabled	57	5.1	5.1	99.5
	9 Other (please specify)	5	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	1107	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1109	100.0		

F14 Income

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Less than \$30,000	265	23.9	25.0	25.0
	2 \$30,000 - \$39,999	127	11.5	12.0	37.0
	3 \$40,000 - \$49,999	107	9.6	10.1	47.1
	4 \$50,000 - \$59,999	108	9.7	10.2	57.3
	5 \$60,000 - \$69,999	92	8.3	8.7	65.9
	6 \$70,000 - \$79,999	72	6.5	6.8	72.7
	7 \$80,000 - \$89,999	58	5.2	5.5	78.2
	8 \$90,000 - \$99,999	44	4.0	4.2	82.4
	9 \$100,000 - \$149,999	118	10.6	11.1	93.5

	10 More than \$150,000	69	6.2	6.5	100.0
	Total	1060	95.6	100.0	
Missing	11 Don't know/Decline to answer	47	4.2		
	System	2	.2		
	Total	49	4.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

F15 Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 Yes	203	18.3	18.5	18.5
	2 No	897	80.9	81.5	100.0
	Total	1100	99.2	100.0	
Missing	3 Decline to answer	4	.4		
	System	5	.5		
	Total	9	.8		
Total		1109	100.0		

\$f16 Frequencies

		Responses		
		N	Percent	Percent of Cases
\$f16 Racial affiliation	F16_1 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.) - Selected Choice White	858	73.8%	77.4%
	F16_2 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Black or African-American	207	17.8%	18.7%
	F16_3 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Asian	30	2.6%	2.7%
	F16_4 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.) - Selected Choice American Indian/Alaska Native	34	2.9%	3.1%
	F16_5 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	7	0.6%	0.6%
	F16_6 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Other (please specify)	8	0.7%	0.7%
	F16_7 With which race(s) do you identify? (Please check all that apply.) - Selected Choice Decline to answer	19	1.6%	1.7%
	Total	1163	100.0%	105.0%

raceth4

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00 White, non-Hispanic	667	60.1	60.5	60.5
	2.00 Hispanic	167	15.1	15.2	75.7
	3.00 Black/African American	186	16.8	16.9	92.6
	4.00 Multiracial/other	82	7.4	7.4	100.0
	Total	1102	99.4	100.0	
Missing	-99.00	7	.6		
Total		1109	100.0		

terrorf Frame 1 - Muslim as terrorist/Islam as violent

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	307	27.7	27.7	27.7
	1.00	216	19.5	19.5	47.2
	2.00	185	16.7	16.7	63.8
	3.00	102	9.2	9.2	73.0
	4.00	86	7.8	7.8	80.8
	5.00	75	6.8	6.8	87.6
	6.00	88	7.9	7.9	95.5
	7.00	50	4.5	4.5	100.0
	Total	1109	100.0	100.0	

peacef Counter Frame 1 - Majority of Muslims Peaceful

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00 No expressino of Islam as peaceful	230	20.7	20.8	20.8
	1.00	267	24.1	24.2	45.0
	2.00	165	14.9	14.9	59.9
	3.00	159	14.3	14.4	74.3
	4.00	129	11.6	11.7	86.0
	5.00	58	5.2	5.2	91.2
	6.00 High CF1	97	8.7	8.8	100.0
	Total	1105	99.6	100.0	
Missing	-99.00	4	.4		
Total		1109	100.0		

neof Frame 2 - Neo-Orientalist View- Islam as Anti-Democratic

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	484	43.6	43.6	43.6
	1.00	182	16.4	16.4	60.1
	2.00	119	10.7	10.7	70.8
	3.00	80	7.2	7.2	78.0
	4.00	65	5.9	5.9	83.9
	5.00	97	8.7	8.7	92.6
	6.00	65	5.9	5.9	98.5
	7.00	12	1.1	1.1	99.5
	8.00	5	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	1109	100.0	100.0	

harmoniousf Counter Frame 2 - Islam harmonious with America

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	280	25.2	25.2	25.2
	1.00	277	25.0	25.0	50.2
	2.00	205	18.5	18.5	68.7
	3.00	141	12.7	12.7	81.4
	4.00	75	6.8	6.8	88.2
	5.00	62	5.6	5.6	93.8
	6.00	36	3.2	3.2	97.0
	7.00	33	3.0	3.0	100.0
	Total	1109	100.0	100.0	

christianf Frame 3 - US as Judeo-Christian

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	573	51.7	51.7	51.7
	1.00	170	15.3	15.3	67.0
	2.00	141	12.7	12.7	79.7
	3.00	98	8.8	8.8	88.5
	4.00	68	6.1	6.1	94.7
	5.00	41	3.7	3.7	98.4
	6.00	17	1.5	1.5	99.9
	7.00	1	.1	.1	100.0
	Total	1109	100.0	100.0	

relfreedomf Counter Frame 3 - Defense of Religious Freedom

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	269	24.3	24.3	24.3
	1.00	261	23.5	23.5	47.8
	2.00	174	15.7	15.7	63.5
	3.00	144	13.0	13.0	76.5
	4.00	137	12.4	12.4	88.8
	5.00	124	11.2	11.2	100.0
	Total	1109	100.0	100.0	