Politics, Poverty, and Policy in Brazil

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Chapter One: An Introduction to Silver Bullets

...Sou pequena em benefícios financeiros, em educação,
mas sinto-me digna por participar de um
governo democratico e solidário como o seu.

[…I am low on financial means, in education,
but I feel dignified for participating
in a democratic and solidary
government like yours.]

– Letter from a Bolsa Família beneficiary
to President Lula,
Paraíba, Brazil
August 2006[1]

When news of Brazil's innovative anti-poverty policy, the *Programa Bolsa Família* (PBF) hit the New York Times in January 2004, the story included a since oft-repeated line from esteemed development economist, Nancy Birdsall of Washington D.C.'s Center for Global Development, "…these programs are as close as you can come to a magic bullet in development[2]." Indeed, in the twelve years since the publication of that famous quote, the PBF and programs like it have been rightfully credited as the key factor in the marked decline of extreme poverty in Brazil, Latin America, and around the globe[3]. The Bolsa Família and similar policies, instruments known as conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs), ameliorate situations of immediate and extreme poverty by

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[1] Letter quoted in Cohen 2012, *Cartas ao Presidente Lula.*
[2] NYT January 3 2004. "To Help Poor Be Pupils, Not Wage Earners, Brazil Pays Parents"
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[3] Other important factors in the reduction of poverty rates in Latin America include a vibrant labor market and strong economic growth in the 2002-2010 period.

providing a small cash transfer at regular (typically, monthly) intervals to families that meet proxy means tests and other eligibility criteria. However, in order to receive the monthly transfer, beneficiary families must complete a set of requirements, typically aimed at the children in recipient households, and include behaviors such as prenatal clinic visits, meeting a schedule of vaccines, and school enrollment and attendance rates for children. Through the fulfillment of these conditions, CCTs aim to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty by strengthening the human capital attainments of beneficiary children, and incentivizing the use of publically available clinics and schools.

The significant reduction in poverty credited to CCTs is itself something to study, as many scholars and policy professionals at leading international institutions have done. CCTs in Latin American countries as varied as Honduras, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil have experienced significant decreases in the squared poverty gap, and substantial increases to economic measures directly related to increases in family income, such as rates of consumption.[4] Students of cash transfer programs have also noted the impact the programs have on educational attainment of beneficiary children, across a series of operationalizations. For instance, PROGRESA/Oportunidades, the Mexican CCT, is credited with a nine percentage point increase in girls' secondary school enrollment (6 percentage points for boys) in one study, and a ten to twelve percentage point increase in overall school enrollment in another (Schultz 2000, 2004; Todd and Wolpin 2006). The program is also associated with a significant reduction in grade failure, repetition, and dropout rates, and a concurrent increase in retention and progression (see Behrman, Sangupta, and Todd 2000, 2005). Nicaragua's *Red de Protección Social* (Social

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[4] For more complete analyses of the direct economic effects of CCT programs, as well as a detailed literature review of several related studies, please see: Fitzbein and Schady (2009) and Adato and Hoddinott (2010)

Protection Network) is associated with a twelve percentage point increase in enrollment, a twenty point increase in attendance, and a seven percentage point increase in grade advancement (Maluccio and Flores 2004).

Thus, across a range of similar programs it is clear that CCT policies incentivize beneficiary children to, at the very least, attend school, though notably measures of concrete learning outcomes are limited. While it surely preferable that CCT programs generate real improvements in the knowledge and formation of beneficiary children, the initial importance of school enrollment and attendance played a significant role in the formation of these programs, stemming as they did from the mid-1990s attempts to eradicate child labor, such as Brazil's *Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (Child Labor Eradication Program, PETI). When interviewed about the idea for a Brazilian CCT, Cristovam Buarque, mayor of Brasilia at the time of implementation, reported, "[t]he idea was to pay the families to bring their children to school rather than put them to work."[5] In this way, perhaps, the programs are fulfilling their intended educational purpose.

The second condition common to CCT programs is for beneficiary families maintain a schedule of vaccines and other health outcomes for children in the household. While impact evaluations vary in both quality and outcome, CCT programs in Brazil and Honduras have been associated with significant increases in frequency of clinic visits, up-to-date vaccinations, and growth and weight of beneficiary children, relative to similar children who do not receive the benefit. No similar results have been established for the Mexican case. In brief, like the sister condition of education, the difference between

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[5] NYT January 3 2004. "To Help Poor Be Pupils, Not Wage Earners, Brazil Pays Parents"

expected and actual outcomes in health is large; and is an issue to which we will return below.

The social and political impacts of CCT programs are perhaps as palpable as are the tangible returns to poverty alleviation and human capital. Proponents of CCT programs cite a variety of common specifications of CCT program design as innovative ways to deepen social inclusion. For instance, two such design elements are CCTs' focus on female heads of household as the primary recipient of the monthly transfer, and differentially large payments to incentivize high school-aged female children in beneficiary households to stay in school. These elements, claim proponents, help to equalize gender balance in the household, as well as decrease the future incidence of gender-based inequalities (see Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa, 2003; Rawlings and de la Brière 2006).

Similarly, CCTs foster deeper social inclusion through the construction of bureaucratic infrastructure tasked with identifying and formally incorporating poor citizens into the state through registration for CCT programs and other targeting protocol. In some cases, registration for a CCT benefit is the first formal inclusion into the state an individual has ever experienced (Hunter and Sugiyama 2011). Such inclusion is very likely to have consequences for citizenship and democratic consolidation. CCTs in Latin America appreciably contribute to the erosion of clientelist networks, as they provide an individual, near-universalized, programmatic benefit larger than the maximum amount per voter a patron could distribute. Tracy Fenwick (2016) notes that, because the Brazilian CCT transfers move directly from the federal Ministry of Social Development to municipalities, they effectively sidestep the powers of governors, who have been

historically the principal distributors of public resources. De La O (2015) finds that enrollment in a CCT program, "decreases the incidence of vote buying, increases recipients' perceptions that their vote is secret, and increases the probability that recipients feel free to cast their vote according to their preferences" (De La O 2015, p. 133). Finally, in a study of three municipalities in the North East of Brazil, Sugiyama and Hunter (2011) find that the Bolsa Família program is not used for clientelist purposes, and that it decreases the incidence of clientelism in those places. This has potentially critical implications for democracy. Following Desposato (2007), "vote buying at its worst eliminates both participation and influence. Voters do not participate in public decision making, instead trading their votes for private gains."

Through these improvements in social inclusion, potential for increased gender and class equity, and decreases in clientelist practices, CCTs possess a real capacity to change the political game in developing countries. From key Latin American cases, such as Brazil and Mexico, scholars have already identified ways in which these programs generate increases in electoral support for incumbent presidential candidates. De La O (2013, 2015) finds significant pro-incumbent support among beneficiaries of the Mexican CCT, as do Diaz- Cayeros et al (2007, 2009). Zucco (2008, 2013) finds that beneficiaries of Brazil's Bolsa Família are significantly more likely to support the incumbent presidential candidate across election cycles. The comparison of these two cases is quite important on this score, as Mexico electoral system does not require all citizens to vote, whereas the Brazilian system features mandatory voting rules. Across this key institutional feature, there is convincing evidence that CCTs generate pro-incumbent support.

Thus, in a few key ways, CCTs have been a positive influence on democratic consolidation, though many effects remain to be identified, analyzed, and documented. How can we link the decrease in clientelist practices and the increase in support for incumbents among beneficiaries? In what other ways does receipt of a cash transfer affect the political lives of beneficiaries and their neighbors who do not receive the program's benefits?

In this dissertation I build upon and advance the scholarship on the political ramifications of these programs. I assess the ways in which such powerful and widespread social policies can contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in a middle-income country (Brazil). Each of the three constituent papers focuses on a different element of democratic life that illuminates our understanding of the ways in which universalistic social programs help to construct robust party systems and citizenry in developing democracies. In so doing, the project highlights the capacity of social policy to contribute to democratic consolidation even in extreme instances of longstanding institutional weakness, as is historically the case in Brazil. Through this examination of behavioral effects to the policy's target population, it strives to understand the intermediary effects of policy on mass opinion. These three constituent foci highlight key areas of scholarly debate regarding the political profile of a vibrant polity: (1) the electoral connection, (2) social class and race, and (3) democratic confidence and efficacy.

The first paper, "Policy Attribution and Political Behavior in Brazil," examines whether and how the Bolsa Família Program is generating a new constituency for the incumbent Workers' Party (PT). It extends the findings of extant scholarship on the

electoral effects of the Bolsa Família, which suggest an incumbency advantage only at the presidential level, by showing that down-ticket electoral advantages do obtain in the voting behavior of beneficiaries who attribute provision of the program to the incumbent party. The findings suggest that attribution of the program to the PT generates a class-wide effect, and that this effect is particularly strong among program recipients, who not only vote in higher proportion for the PT, but are significantly more likely to report partisan sympathies. This paper highlights a policy's capacity to strengthen the electoral connection between a political party and a targeted group of voters, a key element in Kitschelt et al's (2010) theory of "programmatic party structuration."

The second paper, "(*Afro-)Brasileiro, Profissão Esperança*: Race, Class, and Welfare in Two Brazilian Cities," strives to understand the ways in which social policy aimed at redressing longstanding extreme income inequality affects beneficiaries' attitudes towards social mobility. It emphasizes the specific effects that universalized policy has on Afro-Brazilian recipients' views of mobility. The paper finds that, in certain contexts, Afro-Brazilian beneficiary respondents are more likely to have positive views of their own social mobility relative to both white beneficiaries and Afro-Brazilian non-beneficiaries. The methodological design of this paper attacks the measurement of social mobility in a novel way. This work makes use of an original survey, in which respondents were asked a series of vignette-style questions and cutting edge measurement models designed to uncover the latent dimension of attitudes towards social mobility. Key to this series of questions is the fact that the age, gender, race, region, and rural or urban residence varied in the four vignettes applied. This mitigates the possibility that demographic characteristics could randomly condition the respondents' assessments of

each vignette characters' social mobility, such that effect of the respondent's race is implicitly isolated.

In the third and final paper, "What Have You Done For Me Lately? : CCTs and Democratic Confidence In Brazil," I assess the impact of Brazilian social policy on citizen assessments of democratic quality, defined along three salient dimensions (abstract regime preference, specific trust in institutions, and respondent's assessment of her own efficacy). I attend to the variations within the target sample, specifically in terms of political interest. I find that receipt of the policy positively affects evaluations of democracy in some areas for those who are "tuned in" to the signal it gives off—those who are roughly more politically active. I subsequently compare the results obtained through use of the original survey data with results using nationally representative data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, and find that treatment effects differ starkly based on the nature and quality of the data employed.

Original Survey Data and "Purposive-Random Sampling"

In contrast to scholarship that uses municipal-level aggregated, or nationally representative survey data, the project employs an original survey for which I designed a novel sampling strategy to efficiently target beneficiary households and non-recipients from the same communities who therefore closely resemble beneficiaries. This data affords a unique comparison between treatment (beneficiaries) and control (non-beneficiaries), which mitigates myriad unobserved contextual biases and allows a fine-grained observation of treatment effects unavailable to extant scholarship.

I conducted the survey in two key municipalities, Uberlândia, Minas Gerais (February-June 2014), and Recife, Pernambuco (July-August 2014). Uberlândia, Minas Gerais, is an interior city of nearly 700,000 inhabitants, of which over twelve thousand receive a monthly Bolsa Família stipend. Situated roughly 435 kilometers (270 miles) south of Brasília in the nation's countryside and boasting both rural and industrial areas, Uberlândia serves as an excellent baseline with which to compare results from the disproportionately underdeveloped North East of the country. Indeed, Uberlândia's presidential electoral returns have been the closest to the national results than any other municipality over the last several presidential elections, underlining the usefulness of results from this city.[6]

The second survey site is Recife, Pernambuco. Situated on the Atlantic coast in the North East of Brazil, Recife serves to highlight the drastic differences in social and economic development between the North and North East and the rest of the country.[7] Over two-thirds of all Bolsa Família transfers are directed to the North East of the country, such that it is reasonable to expect that such prevalence of the program would generate region specific effects. Recife's beneficiary population per capita captures the differential magnitude of transfers that is observed generally between the North East and South East of the country, as it is about four times that of Uberlândia's (roughly 8.2% in Recife, compared to Uberlândia's 1.7%).

The survey is designed to capture the realities of life in poor communities and allow a faithful comparison between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the same

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[6] Estadão, November 3, 2014: http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,na-cidade-metonimia-umretrato-do-voto-no-brasil-imp-,1587145

[7] This excludes the Amazon, and other sparsely populated areas, and is meant to portray the over two-thirds of Brazil's population that lives in the Atlantic corridor.

communities. This stands in contrast to nationally representative surveys, which, even when statistically matched to compare responses that are alike on several observed pretreatment covariates, still do not have the ability to compare treatment and control observations from the same areas. What national surveys gain in generalizability, they lack in the internal validity of the comparisons between treatment and control observations. The value added of the present survey data lies in this ability to accurately compare like with like, as well as the nuanced questionnaires specifically designed, pre-tested, and revised so that they address the thorny issues faced in measuring the attitudes of the poor (for instance, those linked to illiteracy and innumeracy).

Efficient and effective administration of such a survey was not easy, as most Brazilian municipalities—including the two selected for this survey—are very socio-economically diverse. Unlike other nations, in Brazil, it is extremely likely that each zip code will have a smattering of various types of residents, from those who live in luxury condominiums to those who reside in informal shantytowns next door. This complicates the use of standard probability sampling and makes efficiently drawing a random sample of Bolsa Família beneficiaries and very similar non-beneficiaries quite difficult. After all, the target population is by definition the poorest in society and these respondents often live in precarious, informal neighborhoods and settlements, making traditional sampling quite problematic.

I developed a sampling design with both purposive and random elements to target precisely those neighborhoods within each city that were sufficiently uniform in terms of socio-economic conditions as to ensure that control units (non-beneficiary respondents) would be as similar as possible to treatment units (respondents who receive the Bolsa

Família) and therefore render the most faithful estimation of treatment effects. I first gathered a list of all the Bolsa Família beneficiaries in each municipality from the municipal office of social development. I then sorted them by neighborhood and identified those neighborhoods with the highest incidence of transfers, or "high-impact" neighborhoods, and randomly selected from among them. I then repeated that operation at the street level, selecting "high-impact" streets from among the randomly selected "high-impact" neighborhoods. I then randomly selected streets from the list of "high-impact" streets and instructed enumerators to begin their random-walk process at each of them.[8] Enumerators then randomized again at the household level, through use of the "last birthday" method. In this way, the sample at once attended to the methodological requirement of randomization and the need to sample efficiently only those areas that return dependably similar treatment and control observations. Essentially, this method performs through sampling what statistical matching procedures achieve through pairing on observable characteristics, all while saving precious time and financial resources. It has the significant added benefit of comparing treatment and control observations from the same neighborhoods and contexts, compared of nationally-representative datasets that at best align treatment and control observations by sub-national region. The flow chart below graphically illustrates my sampling design.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

In total, the data set includes 760 observations, 360 from Uberlândia, and 400 from Recife. Overall, the data is well balanced on all observable characteristics of importance,

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[8] I employed survey enumerators from the Universidade Federal de Uberlândia and from the Fundação Joaquim Nabuco (Recife) to carry out the survey. I personally trained them, monitored their enumeration, and oversaw their progress. I employed students at local universities to input the data from the questionnaires into spreadsheets, but personally conducted all coding of open-ended questions.

with the exceptions of slight deviations outside of the standard accepted range of [-0.25, 0.25] on income, gender, and age—all three of which are directly affected by provision of the PBF. As policy-makers deliberately designed the program to target female heads of household, we should reasonably expect this imbalance, such that members of the treatment group (beneficiaries) should be disproportionately women of childbearing age whose income is below the PBF's means test.

Nevertheless, the data has been preconditioned through use of Shekhon's genetic matching algorithm so that balance is also achieved on these three variables. While results generally hold when the unmatched data is used (with the exception of slightly higher p-values, and therefore less statistical significance in some models), I have made the modeling choice to employ the matched data throughout this dissertation. I did not make this decision lightly. Even though the three characteristics that are out of balance in the raw data (age, income, and gender) all clearly covary with program receipt, they also could independently affect the estimations in this analysis. Therefore, it is critical that differences in age, gender, and income are held constant between treatment and control groups, and their effects measured and controlled for in each model, as is standard practice in survey-based regression models.

This timing includes an extensive pre-test period from February to April 2014. This pre-test put into stark relief the distinct challenges of conducting a survey in the least developed areas of each municipality. Administration of the survey faced logistical problems ranging from identifying what days and times to enter the communities, to developing a schema to randomly identify beneficiary households that mitigated the pressures for efficiency presented by the time and financial costs of interviewing

dissimilar "control" responses of non-recipients. Identifying when to instruct enumerators to enter the survey neighborhoods involved conversations with residents and local police forces to find out what times, if any, were particularly dangerous given the presence of drug-related activity. During the pre-test it also became clear that the schedules of residents varied in such a way that, to achieve a sample with sufficient variation in age and gender (an issue my enumeration teams and I affectionately called "the grandma problem"), enumerators needed to enter neighborhoods on both weekday mornings and afternoons (after the typical lunch hour), as well as mid-afternoons on weekend days. In general, the challenge to identify and interview households during daylight hours (while leaving enough time for enumerators to exit the survey areas in full daylight) somewhat delayed the survey process. Additionally, in some cases, particularly in Recife, the availability of respondents and the presence of organized crime conflicted, which presented other difficulties, and required enumerators to spend more time interviewing in those neighborhoods (on safe days). Importantly, all results were gathered before the beginning of the *horário eleitoral,* the period in which publically funded campaign advertisements air every evening on television. Thus, to the best extent possible, the survey mitigates potential campaign effects.

Therefore, as a function of the high quality of this data, the project highlights the effects of beneficiary status to specific sub-populations and puts the Bolsa Família in context. Notably, it finds that receipt alone of the policy is unlikely to have a uniform effect on all beneficiaries. Rather, program receipt has important effects for those beneficiaries that are in some way more politically or socially conscious – through their level of political activism, their attribution of program provision to the incumbent party,

or the acute sensitivity of racial minority status. I now turn to the individual examinations

of each essay.

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Appendix: Tables and Figures:

Figure 1: Survey Design Flow Chart:

Figure 2: Balance of Raw Survey Data:

Figure 3: Balance of Conditioned Survey Data, Matched Items Only:

FALSE
■ unst

age   ■

incindexPCA   ■

gender   ■

-0.0030   -0.0020   -0.0010   0.0000

Standardized Differences

Essay 1:
Policy Attribution and Political Behavior in Brazil

 Abstract:
Does social policy generate partisan sympathies among targeted groups? Is voting behavior similarly affected? Using original survey data collected in anticipation of the 2014 election, this paper tests the degree to which the Brazilian conditional cash transfer program, the *Bolsa Família*, at once affects voting behavior and generates partisan sympathies among Brazil's poor. It innovates upon and blends diverse existing literatures, and argues that while receipt of the program is insufficient to generate partisan loyalties and subsequent voting behavior, such sympathy is produced when respondents attribute responsibility for program provision, thus signaling a programmatic linkage between the incumbent party and program recipients.

In 2003, Brazilian president, Luiz Ignacio "Lula" da Silva, introduced a sweeping overhaul and expansion of a few relatively small social policies that had the aim of redressing longstanding economic inequalities. Although initiated under the previous president's administration, under Lula's rule, these programs-- a cooking fuel subsidy, a food assistance subsidy, and a program designed to incentivize school attendance in recipient children -- were essentially folded into one encompassing program, the *Programa Bolsa Família, (*PBF). One of the first programs of this type in the world, the PBF belongs to a family of social programs called "conditional cash transfer programs" (CCTs). These programs redress both immediate and intergenerational cycles of poverty through the direct transfer of small sums of cash to poor citizens in exchange for the completion of certain conditions that typically involve the health and education of children in beneficiary households. Such programs have experienced great success in middle-income countries around the globe. Despite the longevity, the success, and the world influence of the PBF, our causal understanding of the political ramifications of such an innovative policy instrument is still incomplete.

Indeed, the solidification and expansion of Brazil's various, minor cash transfer programs into the PBF has had very significant and lasting impacts on both the country's poverty rates and has reverberated around the political arena. Now internationally renowned for its success in poverty alleviation, the PBF has become a key element in the incumbent Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores,* PT)'s platform, and remains a commonly cited rationale for their continued electoral victories among pundits and scholars alike. Indeed, in every presidential election cycle since Lula's 2003 transformation of the basket of social policies aimed at the poor, political parties, news

organizations, and other entities generate maps, statistics, and opinion columns associating areas of high PBF transfers with areas of high PT support. Underlying the general tone of these mainstream arguments about the program are two key assumptions: 1) That receipt of the PBF translates into higher— indeed, nearly universal— vote share for the PT among recipients, and, 2) that recipients are therefore the "new" base of the PT as a function of this loyal voting behavior. Using novel, original data sources, the goal of the present work is to assess the validity of those widespread claims regarding both voting behavior and partisan sympathies. This paper therefore assesses both levels of partisan attachment and, with inspiration in extant scholarly literature on the PBF and similar programs, also measures the consequent voting behavior of poor citizens. To foreshadow the theoretical argument below, I show that the policy does create partisan proclivities among recipients and the subsequent expected voting behavior, but only for those who attribute the program to the Workers' Party. This linkage, borne out both in reported partisan attachments as well as in reported voting behavior, constitutes a significant development in the political incorporation of the poor into the Brazilian political arena, and contributes more broadly to scholarly understanding of how policy and politics interact.

Of course, national media and political elites are not the only ones to observe the aggregated correlations between areas of high rates of transfer and voting behavior among poor residents of those areas, and specifically, program recipients. Scholarly evidence analyzing the electoral effects of the PBF suggests that the program does in fact generate additional support for the incumbent presidential candidate (either Lula himself or his successor, Dilma Rouseff, both of the PT). This scholarship does not find,

however, that the receipt of program induces greater partisanship among recipients, or greater electoral loyalty to PT candidates in down-ticket races.[9] Rather, these works find significant effects at the presidential level alone either because the researchers did not evaluate voting behavior for other levels of administration, or because results for other political offices were not statistically significant. This second reason is, however, perhaps conditional on the type of data used to evaluate the hypothesis that program receipt affects voting behavior. Given the number of choices both for candidates and for parties on the ballot in Brazil's open-list proportional representation system, use of data from nationally-representative surveys, that do not ask extensive batteries of questions regarding electoral behavior, or that assess this behavior by matching municipal-level voting returns and levels of transfer, may cloud the results at lower levels of administration.

Regardless of the data limitations, scholars of Brazilian political parties may not find these results very surprising. Since the classic analyses of Mainwaring (1999) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Brazilian parties have been consistently characterized as exceedingly weak-- from the behavior of party elites in the national legislature to the parties' roots in society -- the consequence of which is an "inchoate" party system, in which legislative members, until the legislative ruling of 2010 could change partisan hats at alarming rates (Desposato (2006)), and citizens split tickets "as the rule" (Ames et al. 2008). Given the state of Brazilian parties and voters, why should we expect that a small monthly transfer would foster any change at all in communities where it is prevalent? These same communities, after all, are comprised of Brazil's least educated and most at risk citizens, for whom exchanging a vote for a small service or good, or persuasions

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[9] See Zucco (2008, 2013), Zucco and Power (2013), Rennó et al (2009), *inter alia.*

from local bosses have been the *modus operandi* of political life since before the return to democracy in the late 1980s, and those practices continue into the present day (Gingerich (2014), Nichter (2009, 2014), *inter alia*).

This pessimistic outlook of Brazilian political realities is slowly changing, however. Recent work analyzing the Brazilian case in the years since the stabilization of the currency in the mid-1990s, suggests that parties are growing stronger at both the elite and mass levels. From the elite perspective, for example, Hagopian (2009) suggests that market reforms have decreased the funds available for clientelist electoral strategies, shifting the interactions between candidates and their bases away from vote buying, and towards programmatic cleavages. She argues that in this era of increased programmatic appeals, partisan labels are beginning to take on new value, specifically as citizens become more responsive to the new cohesiveness of party brands. Conversely, from the perspective of mass politics, the argument that Brazilian parties have weak roots has always had one notable exception, the Workers' Party. The increasing political dominance of the PT, marked by its long-standing and seemingly unique ability to galvanize partisan loyalties among its core constituents – historically, labor unions, leftist intellectuals, and student groups from the South East of the country— generated a relatively recent series of scholarly attempts to understand the internal dynamics of this party and its effect on the party system more generally. (Samuels (2004, 2006), Carreião and Kinzo (2002). In brief, these articles suggest that the PT alone has had a good deal of success at creating, and retaining partisans over time, based mostly on its strong, ideological ties to labor unions, and its ability to control its members through strong internal institutions for candidate selection.

Note, however, that the historical base of the PT stipulated in scholarship on the PT differs drastically across regional, class, and demographic characteristics from the population under study in the present work. Blue-collar workers and the extreme poor have rather little in common in terms not only of social realities, but particularly with regard to their interactions within the political sphere. While the former have several decades of experience with political activism both before and after the return to democracy in the 1980s, the latter have led political lives of marginalization, forgotten by all but vote brokers and local bosses throughout Brazil's history—as the illiterate adult population was only granted suffrage with the return to democracy in 1988. When taken together, the divergent theoretical postulations and factual assertions of the two literatures presented above provide us with a first order puzzle regarding the nature of the PT's success. While the PT's success in party building comes from its longstanding ties with unions and other historical elements, its continued electoral dominance seems to stem from its successful incorporation of poor voters.

Thus, might it be the case that the base of the PT is shifting to meaningfully include Bolsa Família recipients? Could the PBF stimulate greater partisanship among recipients, a phenomenon heretofore unperceived in work substantiated by broad, nationally representative election surveys and municipal-level analyses? I argue that the PBF is responsible for generating a linkage between recipients and elites. This linkage is programmatically based in the provision of the program, and only obtains for those voters who give credit for that provision to the PT. In contrast to the extant literature on the electoral effects of CCT programs, I argue that receipt of the benefit alone is not sufficient to change voting behavior in down ticket elections or partisan loyalties. A more

complicated interplay of attitudes is at work. While receipt of the PBF alone may be sufficient to affect for whom a recipient votes for president, to change her partisan identification –indeed, mostly likely, to create such attachments—citizens must explicitly give credit to the party deemed responsible for program provision.

There is recent theoretical precedent for the argument that programmatic policy provision strengthens bonds between parties and targeted groups of citizens in Latin America. Kitschelt et al (2010)'s comparative work on the historical development of, and variance among, Latin American party systems develops the concept of "programmatic party structuration," (PPS) defined as a combination of (1) programmatic coordination – politicians' use of party labels in the development of differentiated baskets of policy goods, and (2) programmatic linkages, or, the sorting of the electorate into partisan coalitions based upon the proximity of each individual's ideology to that of a given political party. The authors posit that countries with high levels of PPS in the present have histories of programmatic definitions between parties that date back to the era of import substitution industrialization. Specifically, early political parties instituted welfare states that galvanized the urban working class, often in opposition to agrarian oligarchies, generating a partisan realignment around those parties that successfully defined programmatic linkages to one or the other social classes. In the absence of this crucial historical trend, the authors argue that party systems have persisted in a fluid and inchoate state, largely though the mobilization of clientelistic or personalistic linkages between parties and citizens. Coupled with the chaos brought about by the debt crisis in the 1980s that has hindered the further maturation of party systems and individual parties, the authors argue that trends in party systems at the time they analyze—the late 1990s—

are a function of these historical states: either the class-based structuration, or inchoate, personalist politics. Kitschelt and his coauthors make clear, however, that unlike Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) classic freezing hypothesis, in their view parties and party systems are capable of change, however gradual. Rather, they posit that, "the disappearance of existing programmatic alignments and the emergence of new ones requires political and economic innovations that have yet to germinate." (p. 4) Such modifications require the complex interplay of "citizens' and politicians' capabilities, their opportunities to engage in the iteration of the competitive electoral game, and the emergence of new 'stakes' of conflict that result from the existing distribution of scarce materials and symbolic resources in a polity." (p.7)

The authors' characterize Brazilian PPS as comparatively weak and dependent upon personalist linkages rather than programmatic ones. However, I argue that the application of their general argument to the case of Brazil is in need of a significant update. As the authors duly note, the data they use to substantiate their claims comes in large part from historical material and a legislative survey dating back to the late 1990s, a time period in which Brazil was still sorting out the aftershocks of both the debt crisis and the return to democracy of the previous decade. In the last decade, however, Brazil has made truly impressive strides in addressing inequality, poverty and economic redistribution, among which the PBF is perhaps the capstone. These advances, which fall well outside of the time period covered in Kitschelt et al.'s analysis, may have already laid the groundwork for new programmatic cleavages to begin to form. Within their framework, this would suggest a shift from affective and clientelistic linkages with

specific individual political elites and party factions, towards a universalized, programmatic cleavage. In short, enough has changed in the nearly twenty years since their data was collected as to render an argument reliant only on this time period in dire need of revised data and empirical analysis, something I undertake from the vantage point of poor citizens below.

In sum, Kitschelt et al. (2010) argue that the development of a stable party system is contingent on the linkages developed between competing parties that offer differentiated baskets of policy goods geared towards various sectors of society, and that constituent individuals in those sectors predictably affiliate with, and vote for, those parties with the most proximate baskets of policy proposals. Does the PBF constitute a step in the direction of programmatic linkage formation, of, to use Kitschelt et al.'s term, programmatic party structuration? If so, is provision of the program alone sufficient to generate a class-wide linkage between the PT and poor voters, or is receipt of the program-- that is, first-hand experience with program provision-- an intermediary pathway necessary to generate partisan affiliation? I analyze the creation of this linkage through the measurement of to what political entity, party, or branch of government respondents attribute credit for the PBF.

If this innovative social policy is generating a new era of "PPS" in Brazil, we should observe the following behaviors in the survey data:

1) Respondents who credit the incumbent party with provision of the PBF should have a significantly increased likelihood of reporting support for the incumbent party;

2) This should coincide with coherent reports regarding these individuals' voting behavior—they should support the PT across all open posts;

3) In theory, these behaviors should not necessarily depend on beneficiary status. Rather, they should depend on the ideological disposition of voters on the key dimension in recent elections, the degree to which the government should address poverty and inequality through social programs.

When taken together, these related but divergent arguments leave us with opposing theoretical and empirical predictions. On the one hand, studies based on long-term, historical data suggest that based on the constellation of political institutions and its history, we should expect to see a continually weak party system, the empirical implication of which is a Brazilian electorate that remains uninterested in parties, politics and partisan labels (Mainwaring (1999, 2003), Mainwaring and Scully (1995)). This is particularly expected of poor voters—the very citizens at the heart of this research—who, in most models of vote buying are considered less attached to their potential ideological positions, and instead favor receipt of personalized handouts in exchanges for their votes, and for whom partisan politics is not a theoretically important element of their political lives (Stokes et al 2013). In the context of the present analysis, this strand of the literature essentially provides a null hypothesis, that current political realities remain unchanged from the pessimistic accounts of the last few decades, what we might call the "status quo" hypothesis.

On another hand, following the contributions of other studies that have analyzed strictly the electoral benefits of CCT programs, PBF recipients may reward presidential incumbents for provision at the polls with little interest in partisan politics or down ticket races, much in the vein of retrospective voting models. On still another hand, as explained in detail above, by extending and updating the theoretical contributions of Kitschelt et al (2010), we may expect to see that the increased capabilities of the incumbent PT (e.g. the PT "in power") to provide social grants to poor citizens increases their affinity for the party, fostering a new sub-coalition based on the means-tested receipt of CCTs and similar programs. The present study must therefore adjudicate whether changes in voting behavior and increases in partisanship should accrue only to *beneficiaries* of the policies, or, as Kitschelt et al's work would suggest, it is *class wide*, in which provision of the policy—and specifically acknowledgment that the PT is responsible for it—generates loyalties among individuals who fit the general socio-economic and ideological profile of recipients, regardless of whether or not they in fact benefit from its receipt.

This analysis derives four main hypotheses:

H0: *Status Quo*：The total constellation of Brazilian political institutions (for example, presidential decree powers, ballot structure, the candidate selection process, presidential system, among others[10]) strongly reinforces a weak party system with limited roots in

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[10] See Mainwaring (1999) for further argument on this score.

society, such that no basket of social policies is likely to make much of a difference to levels of mass partisanship and voting behavior across contested offices.

H1: *CCT Literature:* Following the earlier findings of Zucco (2013) and Renno et al (2009), CCT programs may generate electoral benefits to incumbent candidates at the most visible levels of government. This effect should only obtain for recipients—those who directly gain from the policies, not for similar non-beneficiaries (those who do not have a recipient as a member of their household) and should not affect partisanship.

H2: *Kitchelt et. al's Class-wide Effects:* Programmatic policies generate linkages between the parties that provide them and the groups that are most ideologically in-line with these offerings. If this is the case, we should see the class-wide reported partisanship for those who associate the provision of the PBF with the PT.

H3: *Role of Attribution:* Essentially, this is a logical middle ground. It could be the case that the PBF at once generates the type of partisan linkages predicted in H2, but that receipt of the policy is a necessary condition for behavioral change, as predicted in H1. In this case, we would expect any support of the PT, in votes or partisan sympathies, to accrue only to program beneficiaries. Here we would expect reported partisan linkages in accordance with H2, and the subsequent vote intentions to reflect those new partisan identities. We should observe support of the PT across all elected offices, and this should be especially clear for the least "noisy" races, those with few alternative parties and highly visible candidates – senator, governor and president. Since receipt is a necessary

condition for this hypothesis to hold, we should expect to see that the PBF effects little to no change in the behavior of non-recipients.

Graphically, these hypotheses can be conceived as occupying different spaces on a two by two matrix in which the horizontal dimension describes whether or not the respondent attributes the program to the incumbent party (the PT) or not, and the vertical dimension regards beneficiary status. Each of these three literatures and their subsequent hypotheses occupies a different box or set of boxes. Hypothesis 1, that beneficiaries vote for incumbent PT presidential candidates as a function of having received the program, suggests that receipt of the PBF alone conditions voting behavior at the top of the ballot, and therefore variance in program attribution should condition voting behavior. Thus, Table 1 depicts variance only along the beneficiary status dimension. Hypothesis 2, that party systems institutionalize as a given party's policy initiatives strengthen the linkage between the party and the constituents to which the program was targeted, is represented below in Table 2. Here, variance in actual receipt of the program is unimportant, as what is predicts voting behavior is ideological, programmatic affiliation with the party that promulgates the policy most ideologically proximate to the particular group of voters. Thus, Table 2's shading indicates variance only along the attribution dimension. Finally, Hypothesis 3, that program receipt conditions the programmatic linkage, suggests that we should expect variance on both dimensions, and that only beneficiaries that attribute the program to the incumbent party should experience increases in support for the PT across the ticket. Therefore, only the top left box is shaded in Table 3.

The tables are as follows:

Table 1: Hypothesis 1:

	Credit	Do Not Credit PT
Beneficiary	Hypothesis 1: Current CCT Literature	
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 2: Hypothesis 2:

	Credit PT	Do Not Credit PT
Beneficiary	Hypothesis 2: Party System Institutionalization Literature	
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 3: Hypothesis 3:

	Credit PT	Do Not Credit PT
Beneficiary	Hypothesis 3: Receipt Conditions Linkage	
Non-Beneficiary		

The article proceeds by first describing the novel data collected to test these claims. I then discuss the statistical modeling in two distinct sections first with models that directly test H1 and enter into conversation with the existing literature on CCTs' electoral effects. In the second empirical section I test H2 and H3, using a new variable, policy attribution. A final section concludes.

Survey Data:

This paper brings to bear original survey data collected in Brazil between April and August 2014. This dataset is specifically designed to address the methodological concerns of using nationally representative data to shed light on questions generated by social policies that target only specific subsets of the population. It employs a unique

sampling strategy that targets areas of high PBF provision, and the questionnaire includes probing batteries of questions unavailable elsewhere. It therefore offers a unique, intensive glimpse into the PBF's effects on relevant groups while remaining faithful to survey methodological protocol for large samples.

The survey was conducted in two survey sites intended to allow comparison of relevant regional and political contrasts. The first of these, Uberlândia, Minas Gerais is a mid-size city in the interior of the country. According to the *Estado de Sao Paulo*, a national paper of record, since 1994 Uberlândia has been the municipality with election results that most closely mirrored the national outcomes.[11] As an industrialized city in the rural interior of Brazil in one of the nation's most populous and politically relevant South Eastern states, Uberlândia is essentially a "baseline" city: one that possesses many of the important traits shared by much of the rest of the country.

In contrast, over 68% of all PBF transfers are destined to the North East of Brazil. Therefore, to take advantage of this drastic difference in program prevalence, the survey was also administered in Recife, Pernambuco. A larger, capital city in the far less-developed North East of the country, Recife's beneficiary population per capita is about four times that of Uberlândia's (roughly 8.2% in Recife, compared to Uberlândia's 1.7%), capturing the differential magnitude of transfers that is observed generally between the North East and South East of the country.

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[11] Estadao, November 3, 2014: http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,na-cidade-metonimia-um-retrato-do-voto-no-brasil-imp-,1587145

The survey employs a novel sampling strategy developed specifically to efficiently target beneficiary households and similar households of non-beneficiaries, while at once attending to the standard methodological protocol of random sampling. The strategy, explained in greater detail in an appendix, is essentially akin to a "pre-matching" process. By targeting the survey to areas of high PBF provision in each survey site, I eliminate from the sample dissimilar households whose values on key observable characteristics would render them ineligible at a later stage of statistical matching anyway. This saves valuable resources—in time and money—and ensures that the data employed reflect most closely the ways in which receipt of the program changes political behavior within communities.

All told, the survey yielded 760 responses, 360 from Uberlândia and 400 from Recife. Of the 760 total observations, 389 respondents are Bolsa Família recipients (198 in Uberlândia and 202 in Recife) and the remaining 371 (173 in Uberlândia and 187 in Recife) do not receive the program. Though the sample is extremely well balanced with regard to treatment status, and both beneficiary and non-beneficiary respondents come from the same neighborhoods, I statistically match using Sekhon's genetic matching algorithm on three key characteristics that have slightly unbalanced standardized differences between treatment conditions, gender, age, and income. These three variables are specifically related to the treatment condition, as the program is disproportionately given to female heads of household, who are within childbearing years, and who meet an income-based means test. Nevertheless, once matched statistically, the differences in

these variables are mitigated and full balance is achieved. I report the results of analysis using the matched data throughout this paper and dissertation.

Models:

The statistical analysis proceeds by testing each hypothesis in a series of logit regressions. I first test the validity of the main finding of the extant CCT literature (H1)— that transfers influence voting behavior at the presidential level and only the voting behavior of beneficiaries. I next move to tests of the second hypothesis—whether or not the PBF generates partisans through programmatic linkage-- by adding a key variable: credit for provision of the PBF. I then split the sample into only beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, to show the degree to which the effects are class-wide, as opposed to only affecting beneficiaries, which adjudicates the validity of the third hypothesis, that receipt of the PBF is a necessary condition for the partisan linkage to obtain. Within each series I test several specifications, depending on the theoretical inclusion of specific variables, or the methodological need to split samples. Each specification is run for all the dependent variables, in total six regressions per specification: one for each of the five posts available in the 2014 elections (president, senator, federal deputy, state deputy and governor), and one for partisan identification.

Variables:

There are six dependent variables, one each for the five posts contested in the 2014 election, and one for partisanship. The dependent variables include five separate

binary measures for vote intentions-- one for each of the offices on the ballot in the 2014 elections. They include: president, governor, senator, federal deputy (e.g. congressman), and state deputy (e.g. state representative). Each of these variables takes a value of one if the respondent indicated intent to vote for the PT, and zero otherwise (e.g. the respondent indicated intent to vote for another party, individual or was undecided). Partisanship is also measured using a binary variable, and takes a value of one if the respondent indicated sympathizing with the PT, and zero otherwise (e.g. the respondent indicated sympathy for another party, or reported no party sympathies whatsoever).

The following chart describes the independent variables used in the regression analysis:

Independent Variables:	Notes:
Beneficiary Status	Takes 1 if respondent is a PBF recipient, 0 otherwise.
Age	Age of respondent in completed years (range: 18-91, mean= 41 years)
Education	Reported number of years of education (range: 0-17, mean= 7.7 years)
Race	Takes 1 if respondent self-reports being Afro-Brazilian or mixed-race, zero otherwise
Income	Is a weighted household-item index in which the relative weight of each constituent item is derived from the first eigenvalue obtained using principal components analysis
Gender	Takes 1 if respondent is male, 0 if female.
Recife	Takes 1 if the respondent resides in Recife, 0 if Uberlândia.
Evangelical	Takes 1 if the respondent reports evangelical beliefs, 0 otherwise.
Social Policy	Takes on 1 if the respondent receives any social policy besides PBF
Policy* PBF status	Interaction of Social Policy and PBF beneficiary status
Economic Evaluation	Categorical variable that measures the respondent's evaluation of the national economy. Higher values indicate more positive evaluations
Individual Economic	Categorical variable that measures the respondent's evaluation of his or her personal economic situation. Higher values indicate more

Evaluation	positive evaluations
Church Activism	Indicates whether the respondent attends church activities (1) or not (0)
Church Activism * PBF	Interaction that indicates whether or not the respondent attends church activities and is a PBF beneficiary
Attribution	Indicates that the respondent attributes responsibility for the provision of the PBF to the PT (1), or otherwise (0)
Atrribution*PBF	Interaction of beneficiary status and attribution

Series One: Tests of the CCT Hypothesis:

I begin the empirical portion of this paper by testing the hypotheses generated in the extant literature on the effect of the PBF on voting behavior. To fully understand the PBF's effects to voting behavior, and to cautiously attend to all relevant variables used in extant literatures, I include three different model specifications in this section. I first specify a baseline model for the full series of possible outcomes (e.g. one regression per elected office and for partisanship), including only the standard demographic variables traditionally specified in these models. These variables include: age, gender, education, race, survey site (Recife or Uberlândia), and income. The results of these regressions are found in the first column of each table. I then include variables taken from perhaps the most salient existing analysis of the PBF's electoral effects to date, Zucco (2013). He finds that Brazilian CCTs generate an electoral boost for incumbents who provide them, both in the case of the *Bolsa Escola*, PBF's predecessor, and in the case of the PBF itself. Zucco likens this phenomenon to the behavior observed under retrospective voting models, and, accordingly, does not find evidence of electoral impacts outside of those for sitting presidents, nor of increased partisanship. Finally, with inspiration from Magaloni et al.'s work on the case of the Mexican CCT, *Progresa-Oportundades*, I allow for the

possibility that voting effects accrue primarily and most strongly to those recipients who also receive other social programs.

Baseline Models:

The baseline model preforms better than we would have expected under the extant hypotheses found in Zucco (2013) and Renno et al (2009). Instead of only finding electoral support at the presidential level, we see that beneficiaries' electoral support extends down to the gubernatorial and senatorial levels. Only state and federal deputies are not affected. This innovation upon the extant findings stands to reason, as the number of candidates is far lower for governor and senator—as these are majoritarian elections with restricted seat allocations—than it is for federal and state deputy, positions for which proportional representation elections generate an incentive for quite literally hundreds of candidates to run. Still, that we see results beyond the presidential level, while a significant finding in its own right, begs for additional analysis. Furthermore, as predicted in this literature, we see no effects for partisanship.

Retrospective Voting Models:

Taking a cue from the salient work of Cesar Zucco (2013), I move to a specification that includes variables linked to the standard retrospective voting hypotheses, one of the most commonly cited factors in determining vote choice, both in the American Behavioral literature and in comparative perspective (Fiorina (1978, 1981), Lewis Beck and Stegmaier (2000, 2007, 2008), Anderson (2007), *inter alia*). Under this

hypothesis, voters make choices about for whom to vote based on how much better off they are (or society is, in certain variants) relative to the period before the incumbent took office. In essence, these arguments capture the nature of vertical accountability, such that the principal (i.e. voters) is able to reward (or punish) the agent (i.e. the incumbent politician or party) based on good (or bad) performance. Major variants of this argument are twofold: either personal pocketbook voting (Fiorina (1978), Lewis-Beck (1985)), in which voters base their judgments of candidate performance based on how well off they are personally relative to before the incumbent took office, and sociotropic voting (Kinder and Kieweit (1981)) in which welfare is judged not based on personal financial health, but that of the nation.

Given the context of the current case we must account for both personal and sociotropic voting scenarios as competing explanations. Both personal and sociotropic explanations are inherently plausible. On the one hand, treated respondents are given a rather large amount of cash relative to other earnings, an amount that stands to greatly impact beneficiaries "personal pocketbooks." On the other, the context of this analysis is one in which it is likely that the PBF generates large class-wide effects, such that sociotropic attitudes are not out of the question. Therefore, to account for the possibility that respondents' vote choice is a function of either of these possible explanations, I include specifications that use two of the standard measures used to discern evidence of pocketbook voting, first, a question that reads, "do you feel that you are better off now than you were last year?", and second, a question that reads, "how would you evaluate your economic situation… would you say that it is great, good, fair, poor, terrible…."

Secondly, to attend to the possibility of sociotropic voting patterns, I include similar measures that replace personal economic situations for the nation's economic situation.

These regressions appear in the second column of each table. The results do not fare well for this hypothesis. In essentially no case does either specification of retrospective voting significantly change voting behavior or partisanship. Rather, the results of the initial, baseline models are essentially robust to the inclusion of either retrospective variable. Neither personal nor national economic evaluations affect vote choice at any level of administration. Therefore, if in fact there is some effect of these theories in play, it does not come from the standard theorized channels. Rather, it is likely that the PBF does have some retrospective qualities, but ones that are much more in line with the ideological and programmatic argument I make more generally in the second part of this paper. Strictly speaking, therefore, respondents do not vote based on classical economic issues alone, thus rendering the standard retrospective economic voting model irrelevant here. If economics does influence respondents' politics, therefore, it must be through either a different, or a vaguer channel than the direct one stipulated in these theories.

Receipt of Multiple Social Programs, The "One-Two Punch":

Finally, in line with according to the work of Estevez, Magaloni and Diaz-Cayeros on similar Mexican social programs (forthcoming) I include a specification for the combined effect of receipt of more than one social program. They posit that perhaps the most profound electoral effect of receipt of a CCT is obtained when the individual

receives more than one social program, such as publicly provided health insurance (*Seguro Popular,* in the Mexican case)- what Estevez has described in interviews with the author as the "one-two punch." Just as is true of its Mexican counterpart, the network of social programs aimed at the same demographic as benefits from the PBF has expanded significantly in the last decade. Receipt of secondary programs such as *Tarifa Social de Energia Electrica* (Social Rate for Electricity), which provides subsidies for low-income households' electric bills, *Minha Casa Minha Vida* (My House My Life), a low-income housing program, and others, may differentially affect the electoral choices of PBF recipients, above and beyond the receipt of the PBF alone. I include two different specifications of other grants, one only for the *Tarifa Social,* the second most widely-received program in my sample, and the subsequent interaction term with PBF receipt, and second specification that includes *Tarifa Social, Minha Casa Minha Vida,* as well as state pensions, and disability grants, as well as the interaction term with PBF receipt.

These models appear in the third and final column of each table. It seems as though the "one-two punch" hypothesis that clearly holds in the Mexican case, does not hold for its southern neighbor. Under no specification of receipt of other social grants does voting behavior change significantly, either for beneficiaries or their neighbors that do not benefit from the PBF or other programs. Reported in these tables is the most generous specification of other program receipt, whose inclusive nature would make it most likely to find an effect.

Beyond the baseline model, the results for the remaining two models are quite clear: neither stands up to the statistical tests. The standard retrospective voting hypotheses do not hold in the case of Brazil's poor voters. Under this specification, the results from the baseline analysis remain intact, and proxies for assessments of personal or national economic wellbeing do not make a significant impact on respondents' voting choices. Similarly, the models testing the addition of receipt of other social programs do not stand up to rigorous statistical tests.

These results suggest some improvement upon the extant CCT hypothesis, as with this data and deeper battery of vote intention questions, more offices are tested, yet do not fully account for the possible effects of the PBF. As explained above, following the insights of Kitschelt et al, it may not be that receipt alone is sufficient for partisanship to obtain, rather, citizens would have to attribute the program to the PT for a programmatic linkage to evolve. In the following series of regressions, I turn to evaluation of precisely this point.

Series Two: Tests of Linkage and Credit Assignment:

The standard voting models and the approach used by the bulk of the extant literature on CCTs' electoral effects do not leave space for either a problematization of a mechanism or for a more nuanced understanding of the linkage that might be created between political elites and the poor—either specifically beneficiaries or class-wide. I argue that to test the linkage between citizens and candidates created by the PBF, we

must begin by measuring the degree to which those citizens attribute the policy to the incumbent political party (e.g. the party most plausibly able to take credit[12]), and the politicians that comprise it. This inversion of the standard "credit-claiming" premise begins with the pivotal observation of citizen's attributions of policy provision to the specific party in question. Thus, I theorize that we should see intensified results for those respondents who attribute provision of the PBF to the PT.

If credit assignment is generating a linkage between poor voters and the PT, it should positively affect both partisan attachments and voting behavior at all levels of administration. Therefore, I sequentially analyze the same dependent variables as series one, the five offices contested in the 2014 election and partisanship. I begin the statistical analysis with the standard vote choice model that preformed best in series one, with the same controls for key demographic variables and a dummy for region, but this time also including a key variable added to measure to which entity – politician, government agency, branch of government or political party-- respondents attributed responsibility for provision of the PBF. This variable takes a value of "1" if the respondent attributes the policy to the PT, Lula, Dilma, or "the current president", and a "0" if they attribute the policy to any other party, agency, or branch of government. Even with this coarse coding definition, there is a surprising amount of variance, with over a third of respondents attributing the policy to entities other than those most associated with the PT. The results for this first model are found on the left of each regression table for series two.

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[12] In fact, the "paternity" of the PBF is a concept under contention in every election cycle. Since the program was first devised on a much smaller scale and under a different name during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB, all PSDB presidential candidates have contested the PT's claim to the PBF during presidential elections.

The results from this first model quite strongly suggest that attribution, i.e. linking the policy with the PT and its key players, is an extremely important element in both vote choice and in creating partisan sympathies. So much so that beneficiary status fails to maintain its importance in roughly the same manner as it did in the initial models. Rather, the effect of attribution, in every race except for president (in which beneficiary status maintains its effect on vote choice) seems to absorb the effect of receipt of transfers. Most importantly, respondents who attribute the PBF to the PT and its major figures are very significantly more likely to report an intention to vote for the PT *down the entire ticket*. This result is particularly surprising at the level of federal congressperson and state senator, as quite literally hundreds of candidates representing dozens of parties contest each seat. The din of such democratic processes makes it quite difficult for any citizen to remember for whom to vote, most especially, perhaps, for those who have little formal education or interaction with politics. Remember also that this survey was conducted before political advertisements were allowed on television, therefore limiting the exposure of respondents to political campaigns.

The interplay between beneficiary status and attribution is not captured in this model, however. It could likely be the case that receipt of the PBF and attribution have a joint effect above and beyond the individual effects of each variable. Therefore, I run a secondary analysis of the full sample, this time including an interaction term for the joint effect of receipt of the PBF and attribution. The results from this specification are found in the second column of each table. As we can see, while the results returned by this

analysis confirm the statistical importance of attribution across all dependent variables, the relationship between attribution and beneficiary status is somewhat unclear. In all cases either the variable measuring attribution alone, or the interaction term is positive and significant. Like the first model specification, however, beneficiary status remains insignificant, with the exception of party identification, for which the sign is negative.

This odd and striking relationship between beneficiary status and attribution warrants further investigation. It could be the case, that the results obtained using the full dataset hide a pattern in the data. For example, the effect of attribution could be particularly strong (or weak) for beneficiaries, or perhaps the sign of the effect is different for each treatment status and the effect's overall strength hides that divergent trend. Thus, to mitigate the inconclusiveness of the results on the full sample, and to truly separate the effect of beneficiary status and attribution, I split the sample by beneficiary status and rerun the analysis. I again test the balance of each group, and as no variables lie out of the accepted (-0.25, 0.25) range for standardized differences, I run analyses on the raw data, to maximize the power of these smaller samples. The results for the split sample analysis are found in the rightmost two columns of each series two table.

The results are quite strong. They suggest that the effects of attribution matter only for those respondents who receive the program, as the analysis run on the sample of non-beneficiaries returns only insignificant results. The results for the beneficiary sample, however, suggest that giving credit to the PT markedly affects a respondent's propensity

to vote for the PT across the entire ticket, as well as report partisan affiliation with the PT.

The results of the split samples also at least partially resolve an issue of causal direction that would otherwise plague this analysis. After all, it could be the case that the increased partisanship we observe is caused by an already existing level of partisanship among respondents, and not by the political entity a respondent feels is responsible for program provision. In other words, those who attribute the program to the PT could be *a priori* partisans. If this were true, partisanship would affect attribution, not vice versa. This logic would hold for the voting behavior dependent variables as well, as partisanship would likely affect vote choice in the same manner. However, if it were the case that *a priori* partisanship affected to which entity respondents affiliated provision of the PBF, significant results for partisanship would obtain for both the beneficiary and non-beneficiary sub-samples. As it happens, we do not observe this outcome. Instead, we see that only beneficiaries experience a boost in partisanship and increase in vote intentions for the PT when they attribute the PBF to the PT, which suggests the causal flow is from attribution to partisanship and voting behavior.

Substantively, we can see that attribution among beneficiaries who attribute constitutes a difference in the propensity to affiliate with the PT of fourteen percentage points in Recife and fifteen percentage points in Uberlândia. The striking consistency between regions suggests that region plays little role in partisan affiliation. Furthermore, given the national context of party's "weak roots" in society, and the recent closeness of

the second round elections for president, governor and other races, this constitutes an important and significant effect. These results for region and attribution hold across all analyses of voting behavior at every level of administration. Even when the effect size seems small, it is important to remember that the surveys took place before the month before the election, in which television advertising is allowed. Thus, the fact that attribution had the statistically significant impact that it did on down ticket races is in and of itself a remarkable finding.

Overall, the results from series two show that receiving credit for a major policy strongly affects mass behavior, but only for those who have experience with the policy. Not only do PBF recipients report partisan affiliation with the PT, but their voting behavior also supports the logical consequence of such partisanship—they vote in greater propensity for the PT across all levels of administration. In stark contrast to national results, for those who benefit and give credit to the PT, split ticket voting is anything from the rule. Finally, unlike projects that use nationally representative or municipal level data to track voting behavior of recipients, this evidence suggests that a programmatically based linkage between program recipients and the PT is forming.

A Note on Attribution:

It is important to report the variation in attribution by beneficiary status, to show that both recipients and non-recipients attribute the program to the PT. The table below reports these results with two percentages, the first each entry as a percentage of the total sample, an the second as a percentage of the category of beneficiary status (% of recipeints and % of non-receipients).

	Does Not Attribute (% of total sample) *(% PBF Category)*	**Attributes** (% of total sample) *(% PBF Category)*	**Total** (% of total sample)
Beneficiary	100 (13%) *(26%)*	289 (38%) *(74%)*	389 (51%)
Non-Beneficiary	138 (18%) *(37%)*	233 (31%) *(63%)*	371(49%)
Total (% of total sample)	238 (31%)	522 (69%)	760

A second area of potential causal inconsistency regards the nature of attribution, which is treated as randomly assigned in this analysis. Empirically, this may not be the case, and we may not expect it to be so, as recipients of the PBF are possibly more likely to think that the incumbent party is responsible for program provision. Contrariwise, we might expect those with greater experience with the PBF to be able to correctly attribute the program to the Ministry of Social Development. While the survey is designed to allow Bolsa Familia receipt to be treated as if it were randomly distributed, no such attention was given in the data gathering process to treat attribution for the program as if it too were randomly assigned. In the theory that guides this paper, it is considered an independent moderator, but in practice could plausibly be mediated by CCT receipt, and therefore could be endogenous to it. Both the significant results of a bivariate binary regression using beneficiary status to predict respondents' attribution and a Pearson's correlation test suggest that this might indeed be the case. (However, the variables are weakly correlated at 0.12 in the Pearson's correlation matrix.)

Ideally, I would run a nearly identical survey targeting similar populations to the ones that respondent to the present survey, instead targeting households that do and do not attribute the PBF to the PT, however this is not possible in the present work given time and funding constraints. Therefore, a few other statistical approaches will suffice to

address these concerns. Using the same strategy as employed above to test the causal direction of partisan identification can help to ameliorate concerns of endogeneity between program receipt and attribution to the PT. When I split the sample by whether or not the respondent attributes the program to the PT, results echo those of the split samples by beneficiary status. Those respondents who receive the program but do not attribute the Bolsa Familia to the PT do not report significantly different results from those respondents that do not attribute the program to the PT and do not receive the PBF. However, beneficiary respondents that *do* attribute the PBF to the PT show significantly higher likelihoods of voting for the PT for president, senator, and governor. Results are not significant for federal and state deputy, or for partisanship, however. This may be because reduced sample size affects the p-score, and we should take heart that the sign of each coefficient is positive. [13]

A second statistical test further helps to disentangle the potential endogeneity between attribution and program receipt. By matching the data by attribution instead of by program receipt I can manipulate the treatment to allow for the assumption that attribution is distributed as if it were random. This is not ideal, as the survey data was designed to treat beneficiary status as random. Results suggest that attribution affects voting behavior and partisan identification in much the same was as reported in the main analysis: those respondents that attribute the program to the PT are significantly more likely to support the PT at the ballot box. Beneficiary status, however, looses much of its power to predict these outcomes. For all omodels, the interacted variable measuring the joint effect of receipt and attribution is positive, though only significant in the model for

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[13] As this test is secondary to the larger paper, full regression tables are not provided in the appendix to this chapter, but are available upon request.

governor voting intention. In any case, while not damning to the evidence presented in the main analysis, these statistical tests—while not fully conclusive-- do suggest that the causal direction in the paper may need to be analyzed further.

Conclusion:

This paper has shown that programmatic access to material resources can play a significant role in the way in which beneficiaries behave. Specifically, it suggests that social policy can generate partisan sympathies among sub-groups of the targeted constituency, which consequently generate electoral benefits. The power of policy to consolidate blocs of voters through universalized programs, informs the interaction between citizens and political elites, and has serious implications for party system institutionalization. As voters increasingly attribute favorable policy outputs to specific parties, and subsequently align themselves with those parties and vote accordingly, the crucial programmatic linkage between them strengthens and with it the party system.

Brazilian democracy has historically weathered all manner of serious challenges, and continues to confront them in the present. It would be folly to suggest that a single social policy aimed at a quarter of the population could act as a panacea against them all. However, that the PBF shows an increase in partisanship among the relevant classes, and is consequently beginning to ameliorate the rampant split-ticket voting blamed for such slow and corrupt dealing between branches of government and weak vertical accountability, we can credit it with more than its intended --and achieved—purpose of lifting 13 million households out of poverty and incentivizing the frequent use of publicly-provided health and education resources among the nation's poor. Rather, it

speaks to the growing question of the effects of welfare policies in the developing world, the changes in which stand to have lasting impact on the state of political development.

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Variables	Baseline Model				1-2 Punch				Retrospective Voting			
DV: President Vote Intention	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.
PBF receipt	**0.411 *****	0.193	0.03	[0.033, 0.788]	0.309	0.219	0.158	[-0.12, 0.739]	**0.425 *****	0.198	0.032	[0.037, 0.813]
Age	-0.001	0.008	0.934	[-0.015, 0.014]	-0.002	0.008	0.828	[-0.017, 0.013]	-0.002	0.008	0.795	[-0.017, 0.013]
Education	**- 0.073 *****	0.031	0.019	[-0.137, 0.012]	**-0.077 *****	0.032	0.016	[-0.139, 0.014]	**0.074 *****	0.032	0.021	[-0.136, -0.011]
Gender	0. 284	0.205	0.167	[-0.119, 0.687]	0.299	0.206	0.149	[-0.107, 0.704]	0.193	0.208 2	0.353	[-0.215 0.602]
Race	-0.260	0.197	0.186	[-0.645, 0.125]	-0.232	0.199	0.243	[-0.621, 0.157]	-0.262	0.199 2	0.189	[-0.652, 0.129]
Income	0.001	0.062	0.990	[-0.12, 0.122]	**-0.016 *****	0.062	0.799	[-0.138, 0.106]	0.005	0.061 9	0.933	[-0.116, 0.127]
Recife	**-0.606 *****	0.186	0.001	[-0.971, -0.24]	-0.703	0.201	0.000	[-1.1, -0.309]	**-0.58 *****	0.188	0.002	[-0.949, -0.211]
Tarifa Social	---	---	---	---	0.285	0.492	0.562	[-.68, 1.25]	---	---	---	---
TS*PBF	---	---	---	---	0.04	0.535	0.936	[-1.005, 1.09]	---	---	---	---
Econ. Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	**0.211 *****	0.087	0.016	[0.04, 7 .382]
Indv. Econ Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.009	0.104	0.929	[-0.214, 0.195]
Constant	-0.146	0.512	0.775	[-1.149, 0.857]	-0.066	0.53	0.901	[-1.105, 0.973]	-0.592	0.628	0.346	[-1.824 .64]

Variables	Baseline Model				1-2 Punch				Retrospective Voting			
DV: Governor Vote Intention	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.
PBF receipt	**0.562**	0.26	0.031	[0.052,1.073]	0.374	0.289	0.195	[-0.192, 0.94]	**0.512**	0.262	0.051	[-0.001, 1.026]
Age	**0.019**	0.008	0.015	[0.004, 0.034]	**0.019**	0.008	0.014	[0.004, 0.035]	**0.019**	0.008	0.017	[0.003, 0.034]
Education	**0.063**	0.034	0.063	[-0.003,0.13]	**0.061**	0.034	0.075	[-0.006,0.129]	**0.064**	0.035	0.065	[-0.004, 0.133]
Gender	**0.592**	0.224	0.008	[0.152,1.032]	**0.628**	0.226	0.006	[0.184, 1.071]	**0.538**	0.228	0.018	[0.091, 0.986]
Race	-0.058	0.25	0.816	[-0.548, 0.432]	0.018	0.26	0.945	[-0.492, 3.527]	-0.001	0.258	0.996	[-0.506, 0.503]
Income	0.022	0.074	0.763	[-0.122,0.167]	-0.004	0.075	0.954	[-0.151, 0.143]	0.012	0.074	0.868	[-0.133, 0.158]
Recife	0.373	0.25	0.135	[-0.117, 0.863]	0.302	0.258	0.241	[-0.204, 0.808]	0.37	.2504	0.140	[-0.121, 0.86]
Tarifa Social	---	---	---	---	-0196	0.738	0.790	[-1.642, 1.249]	---	---	---	---
TS*PBF	---	---	---	---	0.514	0.777	0.509	[-1.01, 2.037]	---	---	---	---
Econ. Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.149	0.111	0.180	[-0.069, 0.367]
Indv. Econ Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.07	0.13	0.588	[-0.324 0.184]
Constant	**-3.647**	0.655	0.000	[-4.931, 2.363]	-3.627	0.67	0.000	[-4.941, -2.313]	**-3.797**	0.816	0.000	[-5.397 -2.198]

Variables	Baseline Model				1-2 Punch				Retrospective Voting			
DV Senator Vote Intention	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.
PBF receipt	**0.559**	0.288	0.052	[-0.005, 1.124]	**0.572**	0.323	0.076	[-0.06, 1.205]	**0.524**	0.291	0.072	[-0.047, 1.095]
Age	**0.017**	0.009	0.044	[0.0004, 0.034]	0.017	0.009	0.051	[-0.0001, 0.034]	**0.019**	0.009	0.031	[0.002, 0.036]
Education	**0.065**	0.038	0.089	[-0.01, 0.141]	0.071	0.039	0.073	[-0.007, 0.148]	**0.067**	0.041	0.097	[-0.012 .147]
Gender	**0.969**	0.263	0.000	[0.453, 1.484]	0.965	0.263	0.000	[0.45,1.48]	**0.927**	0.264	0.000	[0.41, 1.445]
Race	-0.138	0.281	0.622	[-0.689, 0.412]	-0.132	0.28	0.638	[-0.681, 0.417]	-0.085	0.288	0.766	[-0.649, 0.478]
Income	0.061	0.086	0.474	[-0.107, 0.229]	0.051	0.087	0.557	[-0.12, 0.223]	0.068	0.087	0.432	[-0.102, 0.238]
Recife	0.356	0.277	0.198	[0.186, 0.899]	0.335	0.28	0.231	[-0.214, 0.883]	0.393	0.287	0.171	[-0.169. 0.956]
Tarifa Social	---	---	---	---	0.082	0.716	0.909	[-1.322, 1.49]	---	---	---	---
TS*PBF	---	---	---	---	-0.085	0.775	0.912	[-1.604, 1.433]	---	---	---	---
Econ. Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.159	0.13	0.221	[-0.096, 0.414]
Indv. Econ Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.042	0.156	0.789	[-0.347 0.263]
Constant	**-4.077**	0.717	0.000	[-5.482 -2.672]	-4.09	0.725	0.000	[-5.511, -2.66]	-4.462	0.974	0.000	[-6.371, -2.552]

Variables	Baseline Model				1-2 Punch				Retrospective Voting			
DV Federal Deputy Vote Intention	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.
PBF receipt	0.512	0.323	0.113	[-0.121, 1.145]	0.457	0.36	0.204	[-0.249, 1.164]	0.483	0.325	0.137	[-0.154, 1.12]
Age	0.004	0.009	0.644	-[0.014, 0.022]	0.003	0.01	0.768	[-0.016, 0.022]	0.006	0.009	0.515	[-0.01, 0.023]
Education	0.065	0.045	0.143	[-0.022, 0.153]	0.07	0.047	0.133	[-0.021, 0.162]	0.053	0.045	0.230	[-0.034, 0.141]
Gender	0.438	0.258	0.090	[-.068, 0.944]	0.489	0.265	0.065	[-0.03, 1.008]	0.361	0.263	0.170	[-0.155, 0.876]
Race	0.118	0.298	0.692	[-0.466, 0.702]	0.186	0.344	0.589	[-0.488, 0.859]	0.163	0.309	0.596	[-0.442 0.769]
Income	0.072	.086	0.407	[-0.098, 0.241]	0.035	0.095	0.710	[-0.151, 0.222]	0.086	0.087	0.328	[-0.086 0.257]
Recife	-0.349	.2585	0.177	[-0.855, 0.158]	-0.36	0.264	0.173	[-0.877, 0.157]	-0.388	0.261	0.137	[-0.899, 0.124]
Tarifa Social	---	---	---	---	0.067	0.913	0.941	[-1.721, 1.856]	---	---	---	---
TS*PBF	---	---	---	---	0.175	1.003	0.861	[-1.79, 2.14]	---	---	---	---
Econ. Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.17	0.139	0.223	[-0.103, 0.443]
Indv. Econ Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.223	0.144	0.112	[-0.511, 0.053]
Constant	-3.16	0.827	0.000	[-4.784,-1.542]	-3.214	0.86	0.000	[-4.899, -1.529]	-2.861	0.982	0.004	[-4.786 -0.937]

Variables	Baseline Model				1-2 Punch				Retrospective Voting			
DV State Senator Vote Intention	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.
PBF receipt	0.414	0.337	0.219	[-0.247, 1.075]	0.385	0.374	0.302	[-0.347,1.118]	0.492	0.354	0.164	[-0.201,1.185]
Age	0.003	0.01	0.773	[-0.017, 0.023]	0.003	0.0104	0.765	[-0.017,0.024]	0.007	.01	0.475	[-0.012, 0.026]
Education	0.033	0.049	0.501	[-0.063, 0.129]	0.041	0.051	0.418	[-0.059, 1.1418]	0.041	.051	0.425	[-0.059, 0.1401]
Gender	0.484	0.281	0.085	[-0.066, 1.035]	0.503	0.283	0.076	[-0.053, 1.058]	0.465	0.276	0.092	[0-.076, 1.006]
Race	0.259	0.342	0.449	[-0.411, 0.928]	0.332	0.386	0.390	[-0.425,1.09]	0.365	0.403	0.366	[-0.426, 1.155]
Income	0.006	0.091	0.950	[-0.173, 0.184]	-0.014	0.097	0.887	[-0.204,0.177]	0.04	0.096	0.679	[-0.148, 0.228]
Recife	-0.414	0.278	0.136	[-0.959, 0.1303]	-0.406	0.278	0.145	[-0.952, 0.14]	-0.365	0.274	0.184	[-0.902, 0.173]
Tarifa Social	---	---	---	---	-0.332	1.196	0.781	[-2.676,2.012]	---	---	---	---
TS*PBF	---	---	---	---	0.372	1.265	0.769	[-2.106,2.851]	---	---	---	---
Econ. Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.251	0.155	0.106	[-0.054, 0.556]
Indv. Econ Eval	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-.2	0.156	0.207	[-0.511, 0.111]
Constant	-2.96	0.993	0.003	[-4.905, -1.011]	-3.072	1.026	0.003	[-5.08,-1.061]	-3.429	1.27	0.007	[-5.919, -0.939]

Variables	Baseline Model				1-2 Punch				Retrospective Voting			
DV: Partisanship	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I.
PBF receipt	-0.067	0.192	0.729	[-0.444, 0.311]	-0.279	0.223	0.210	[-0.716, 0.157]	-0.074	0.194	0.702	[-0.453925 .3058]
Age	0.015	0.008	0.051	[-0.000, 0.029]	0.014	0.008	0.076	[-0.001, 0.028]	0.014	0.008	0.057	[-0.000, 0.029]
Education	0.031	0.031	0.317	[-0.03, 0.0918]	0.025	0.031	0.433	[-0.037, 0.086]	0.031	0.031	0.328	[-0.031, 0.092]
Gender	0.038	0.219	0.862	[-0.391, 0.467]	0.046	0.22	0.835	[-0.386, 0.478]	0.05	0.221	0.819	[-0.383, 0.484]
Race	0.133	0.214	0.536	[-0.288, 0.554]	0.181	0.217	0.404	[-0.245, 0.608]	0.136	0.215	0.527	[-0.285, 0.557]
Income	-0.047	0.062	0.447	[-0.168, 0.074]	-0.058	0.062	0.349	[-0.18, 0.064]	-0.042	0.062	0.500	[-0.164, 0.08]
Recife	-0.197	0.193	0.309	[-0.576, 0.182]	-0.272	0.2	0.175	[-0.663, 0.12]	-0.225	0.196	0.250	[-0.608, 0.159]
Tarifa Social	----	----	----	----	-0.02	0.466	0.966	[-0.934, 0.89]	----	----	----	----
TS*PBF	----	----	----	----	0.516	0.529	0.330	[-0.522, 0.553]	----	----	----	----
Econ. Eval	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-0.009	0.088	0.918	[-0.182, 0.164]
Indv. Econ Eval	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-0.096	0.104	0.355	[-0.301, 0.108]
Constant	1.953	0.514	0.000	[-2.96, -0.947]	-1.823	0.523	0.000	[-2.848, -0.798]	-1.619	0.622	0.009	[-2.838, -0.399]
	N=627				N=622				N=626			

DV: Presidential Vote Choice	Full Sample				Split Samples			
	Model 1		Model 2		Beneficiaries Only		Non-Beneficiaries Only	
	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.
PBF	0.372 ** (0.192)	[-0.004, 0.749]	-0.003 (0.39)	[-0.768, 0.762]	----	----	----	----
Attribution	0.94*** (0.224)	[0.501, 1.337]	0.65** (0.339)	[-0.016, 1.315]	1.127 (0.299)	[0.54, 1.713]	0.432 (0.264)	[-0.084, 0.949]
Attribution*PBF	----		0.49 (0.447)	[-0.385, 1.369]	----	----	----	----
Age	-0.002 (0.008)	[-0.016, 0.013]	-0.002 (0.008)	[-0.016, 0.013]	0.004 (0.009)	[-0.014, 0.023]	-0.001 (0.008)	[-0.017, 0.016]
Education	-0.08*** (0.031)	[-0.143, -0.021]	-0.083*** (0.031)	[-0.144, -0.021]	0.028 (0.031)	[-0.125, 0.038]	-0.058 (0.037)	[-0.13, 0.014]
Race	-0.29 (0.206)	[-0.694, 0.114]	-0.271 (0.207)	[-0.677, 0.134]	0.122 (0.218)	[-0.87, 0.175]	-0.398 (0.261)	[-0.91, 0.113]
Income	-0.01 (0.06)	[-0.128, 0.109]	-0.011 (0.061)	[-0.13, 0.108]	-0.057 (0.062)	[-0.134, 0.16]	-0.049 (0.075)	[-0.195, 0.098]
Gender	0.383 (0.211)	[-0.03, 0.796]	0.393* (0.211)	[-0.02, 0.807]	0.094 (0.221)	[-0.358, 0.719]	0.763*** (0.25)	[0.273, 1.254]
Recife	-0.69*** (0.19)	[-1.06, -0.32]	-0.704*** (0.19)	[-1.122, -0.371]	-0.275 (0.196)	[-1.325, -0.373]	-0.5* (0.265)	[-1.019, 0.018]
Constant	-0.67 (0.519)	[-1.69, 0.347]	-0.409 (0.567)	[-1.08, 0.621]	-1.935 (0.554)	[-2.085, 0.489]	-0.645)	[-1.827, 0.538]
***: p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<.1	N=627		N=627		N=389		N=356	

| DV: Governor Vote Choice | Full Sample | | | | Split Samples | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Beneficiaries Only | | Non-Beneficiaries Only | |
	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.
PBF	0.354 (0.233)	[-0.104, 0.811]	-0.423 (0.475)	[-1.357, 0.503]	----	----	----	----
Attribution	0.54** (0.268)	[0.014, 1.066]	-0.029 (0.389)	[-0.79, 0.734]	0.897** (0.393)	[0.126, 1.667]	-0.056 (0.321)	[-0.686, 0.574]
Attribution*PBF	----	----	1.04* (0.548)	[-0.036, 2.111]	----	----	----	----
Age	0.018** (0.009)	[0.000, 0.035]	0.017** (0.009)	[0.000, 0.035]	0.022** (0.011)	[0.001, 0.044]	0.017* (0.01)	[-0.003, 0.037]
Education	0.061* (0.037)	[-0.01, 0.133]	0.059 (0.037)	[-0.013, 0.131]	0.079 (0.05)	[-0.019, 0.176]	0.089** (0.045)	[0.001, 0.176]
Race	-0.039 (0.25)	[-0.578, 0.402]	-0.058 (0.251)	[-0.551, 0.434]	-0.111 (0.323)	[-0.745, 0.527]	-0.702** (0.323)	[-1.334, -0.069]
Income	-0.039 (0.072)	[-0.18, 0.103]	0.04 (0.072)	[-0.182, 0.102]	0.019 (0.089)	[-0.156, 0.194]	-0.104 (0.095)	[-0.29, 0.081]
Gender	0.531** (0.242)	[0.057, 1.005]	0.551** (0.243)	[0.201, 1.079]	0.538* (0.308)	[-0.066, 1.142]	0.684** (0.337)	[0.061, 1.307]
Recife	-0.013 (0.229)	[-0.468, 0.437]	-0.05 (0.231)	[-0.244, 0.713]	0.427 (0.299)	[-0.159, 1.014]	0.046 (0.337)	[-0.614, 0.706]
Constant	-3.565*** (0.637)	[-4.813, -2.318]	-3.144*** (0.658)	[-4.434,-1.855]	-4.056*** (0.816)	[-5.656, -2.457]	-3.17*** (0.76)	[-4.66, -1.683]
***: p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<.1	N=627		N=627		N=389		N=356	

DV: Senator Vote Choice	Full Sample				Split Samples			
	Model 1		Model 2		Beneficiaries Only		Non-Beneficiaries Only	
	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.
PBF	0.259 (0.268)	[-0.267, 0.784]	-0.16 (0.646)	[-1.105, 1.425]	----	----	----	----
Attribution	1.066*** (0.352)	[0.376, 1.757]	0.997* (0.537)	[0.055, 2.05]	1.067** (0.475)	[0.136, 1.998]	0.503 (0.378)	[-0.238, 1.243]
Attribution*PBF	----	----	0.119 (0.867)	[-1.269, 1.5076]	----	----	----	----
Age	0.014 (0.01)	[-0.006, 0.034]	0.014 (0.01)	[0.006, 0.034]	0.024* (0.012)	[0.000, 0.0487]	0.017 (0.012)	[-0.005, 0.04]
Education	0.057 (0.043)	[-0.026, 0.141]	0.057 (0.043)	[0.026, 0.141]	0.072 (0.057)	[-0.04, 0.184]	0.046 (0.049)	[-0.05, 0.141]
Race	-0.03 (0.292)	[-0.602, 0.543]	-0.027 (0.292)	[-0.6, 0.546]	-0.094 (0.373)	[-0.825, 0.637]	-0.997*** (0.358)	[-1.699, -0.295]
Income	-0.002 (0.083)	[-0.166, 0.161]	0.003 (0.083)	[-0.166, 0.161]	0.053 (0.103)	[-0.148, 0.254]	-0.172 (0.107)	[-0.381, 0.038]
Gender	0.905*** (0.267)	[0.381, 1.429]	0.906*** (0.268)	[0.382, 1.431]	1.033*** (0.339)	[0.368, 1.698]	0.639* (0.353)	[-0.053, 1.331]
Recife	-0.146 (0.264)	[-0.664, 0.371]	-0.15 (0.265)	[-0.67, 0.37]	0.145 (0.344)	[-0.53, 0.82]	-0.087 (0.375)	[-0.823, 0.648]
Constant	-4.215*** (0.755)	[-5.694, -2.736]	-4.157*** (0.827)	[-5.778, -2.536]	-4.658*** (0.945)	[-6.509, -2.806]	-3.225*** (0.856)	[-4.904, -1.547]
***: p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<.1	N=627		N=627		N=389		N=356	

DV: Federal Deputy Vote Choice	Full Sample				Split Samples			
	Model 1		Model 2		Beneficiaries Only		Non-Beneficiaries Only	
	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.
PBF	0.387 (0.284)	[-0.177, 0.938]	-0.769 (0.754)	[-2.246, 0.708]	----	----	----	----
Attribution	1.321 (0.394)	[0.548, 2.093]	0.602 (0.535)	[-0.446, 1.651]	1.828*** (0.623)	[0.608, 3.049]	0.591 (0.385)	[-0.164, 1.345]
Attribution*PBF	----	----	1.351* (0.816)	[-0.248, 2.95]	----	----	----	----
Age	0.002 (0.011)	[-0.019, 0.023]	0.002 (0.011)	[-0.019, 0.023]	0.008 (0.013)	[-0.017, 0.034]	-0.002 (0.012)	[-0.026, 0.0218]
Education	0.044 (0.045)	[-0.044, 0.133]	0.044 (0.045)	[-0.045, 0.132]	-0.121** (0.061)	[0.002, 0.24]	0.033 (0.05)	[-0.064, 0.131]
Race	0.044 (0.305)	[-0.555, 0.643]	0.073 (0.307)	[-0.528, 0.674]	0.481 (0.421)	[-0.345, 1.306]	-0.785** (0.356)	[-1.482, -0.088]
Income	0.02 (0.087)	[-0.149, 0.19]	0.018 (0.087)	[-0.151, 0.188]	0.033 (0.105)	[-0.174, 0.239]	0.02 (0.105)	[-0.186, 0.226]
Gender	0.572** (0.289)	[0.007, 1.138]	0.596 (0.29)	[0.028, 1.164]	0.526 (0.365)	[-0.188, 1.241]	0.099 (0.351)	[-0.589, 0.787]
Recife	-0.684*** (0.274)	[-1.221,-0.147]	-0.717 (0.276)	[-1.258, -0.177]	-0.382 (0.344)	[-1.056, 0.293]	-0.816** (0.384)	[-1.57, -0.063]
Constant	-3.7*** (0..807)	[-5.28,-2.116]	-3.12 (0.836)	[-4.761, -1.482]	-5.11*** (1.076)	[-7.219,-3.001]	-1.897** (0.842)	[-3.548, -0.247]
***: p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<.1	N=627		N=627		N=389		N=356	

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DV: State Deputy Vote Choice	Full Sample				Split Samples			
	Model 1		Model 2		Beneficiaries Only		Non-Beneficiaries Only	
	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.
PBF	0.23 (0.311)	[-0.277, 0.876]	-0.734 (0.932)	[-2.561, 1.093]	----	----	----	----
Attribution	1.82*** (0.482)	[0.875, 2.76]	1.205* (0.646)	[-0.06, 2.47]	2.341*** (0.751)	[0.87, 3.813]	0.707 (0.432)	[-0.141, 1.554]
Attribution*PBF	----	----	1.15 (0.983)	[-0.776, 3.076]	----	----	----	----
Age	0.004 (0.011)	[-0.018, 0.026]	0.004 (0.011)	[-0.018, 0.026]	0.01 (0.014)	[-0.017, 0.037]	-0.003 (0.013)	[-0.029, 0.023]
Education	0.011 (0.043)	[-0.073, 0.094]	0.013 (0.047)	[-0.08, 0.105]	0.06 (0.062)	[-0.062, 0.181]	-0.006 (0.548)	[-0.114, 0.101]
Race	0.158 (0.326)	[-0.481, 0.798]	0.179 (0.327)	[-0.462, 0.82]	0.156 (0.412)	[-0.652. 0.965]	-0.584 (0.391)	[-1.35, 0.181]
Income	0.041 (0.091)	[-0.219, 0.137]	-0.043 (0.091)	[-0.221, 0.135]	-0.006 (0.11)	[-0.221, 0.21]	-0.057 (0.114)	[-0.281, 0.167]
Gender	0.659** (0.3)	[0.07, 1.249]	0.676** (0.302)	[0.085, 1.27]	0.972*** (0.373)	[0.24, 1.704]	-0.166 (0.384)	[-0.918, 0.586]
Recife	-0.849*** (0.287)	[-1.41, -0.287]	-0.869*** (0.287)	[-1.43, -0.306]	-0.67* (0.362)	[-1.38, 0.04]	-0.539 (0.408)	[-1.339, 0.262]
Constant	-4.04*** (0.883)	[-5.77, -2.314]	-3.515*** (0.937)	[-5.351, -1.679]	-5.02*** (1.166)	[-7.305, -2.736]	-1.918** (0.931)	[-3.74, -0.094]
***: p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<.1	N=627		N=627		N=389		N=356	

DV: Party I.D.	Full Sample				Split Samples			
	Model 1		Model 2		Beneficiaries Only		Non-Beneficiaries Only	
	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.	Coef. (SE)	95% C.I.
PBF	-0.108 (0.194)	[-0.487, 0.272]	-0.771** (0.395)	[-1.545, 0.004]	----	----	----	----
Attribution	0.499** (0.222)	[0.063, 0.935]	0.058 (0.31)	[-0.55, 0.666]	0.902*** (0.334)	[0.248,1.556]	0.114 (0.264)	[-0.403, 0.631]
Attribution*PBF	----	----	0.883** (0.453)	[-0.006, 1.771]	----	----	----	----
Age	0.015** (0.008)	[-0.000, 0.03]	0.015** (0.008)	[-0.000, 0.03]	0.005 (0.01)	[-0.015, 0.025]	0.004 (0.009)	[-0.013, 0.0202]
Education	0.0298 (0.031)	[-0.031, 0.091]	0.028 (0.031)	[-0.033, 0.089]	0.028 (0.045)	[-0.06, 0.115]	-0.029 (0.037)	[-0.101, 0.0436]
Race	0.089 (0.217)	[-0.336, 0.513]	0.122 (0.218)	[-0.305, 0.549]	-0.02 (0.292)	[-0.592, 0.551]	-0.206 (0.266)	[-0.728, 0.3156]
Income	-0.056 (0.062)	[-0.177, 0.066]	-0.057 (0.062)	[-0.179, 0.065]	-0.078 (0.081)	[-0.236, 0.08]	0.061 (0.076)	[-0.088, 0.211]
Gender	0.078 (0.22)	[-0.355, 0.51]	0.094 (0.221)	[-0.339, 0.528]	-0.052 (0.3)	[-0.639, 0.536]	0.136 (0.254)	[-0.362, 0.633]
Recife	-0.246 (0.195)	[-0.629, 0.137]	-0.275 (0.196)	[-0.661, 0.11]	-0.103 (0.259)	[-0.612, 0.404]	-0.234 (0.269)	[-0.762, 0.294]
Constant	-2.257*** (0.537)	[-3.31, -1.2]	-1.935*** (0.554)	[-3.021, -0.849]	-2.229*** (0.719)	[-3.638, -0.821]	-0.998 (0.612)	[-2.196, 0.201]
***: p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<.1	N=627		N=627		N=389		N=356	

Substantive Implications: Predicted Probabilities (Generated for Women, holding all other variables at their mean or mode, allowing region, attribution, and beneficiary status to vary. Italicized results not significant, for comparison only.)

Partisanship										
Sample Type	Beneficiary, Attributes		Beneficiary, Does Dot Attribute			Non-Beneficiary, Attributes		Non-Beneficiary, Does Not Attribute		
	Uberlândia	Recife	Uberlândia	Recife	**Difference**	Uberlândia	Recife	Uberlândia	Recife	**Difference**
Full	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.16	+9 (U) +7 (R)	0.31	0.26	0.21	0.17	+10 (U) + 9 (R)
Split	0.29	0.26	0.14	0.12	+15 (U) +14 (R)	*0.24*	*0.20*	*0.22*	*0.18*	*+2 (U) +2 (R)*

Presidential Vote Choice										
Sample Type	**Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Beneficiary, Does Dot Attribute**			**Non-Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Non-Beneficiary, Does Not Attribute**		
	Uberlândia	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**
Full	0.41	0.26	0.22	0.12	+19 (U) + 14(R)	0.33	0.2	0.22	0.12	+11(U) +10 (R)
Split	0.46	0.26	0.21	0.1	+25(U) +16 (R)	*0.25*	*0.16*	*0.18*	*0.11*	*+7 (U) +5 (R)*

Governor Vote Choice										
Sample Type	**Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Beneficiary, Does Dot Attribute**			**Non-Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Non-Beneficiary, Does Not Attribute**		
	Uberlândia	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**
Full	0.18	0.17	0.11	0.11	+7 (U) +6 (R)	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.08	+5 (U) +5 (R)
Split	0.14	0.2	0.06	0.09	+8 (U) +11 (R)	*0.08*	*0.08*	*0.08*	*0.08*	*+0 (U) +0 (R)*

			Senator Vote Choice							
Sample Type	**Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Beneficiary, Does Dot Attribute**			**Non-Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Non-Beneficiary, Does Not Attribute**		
	Uberlândia	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**
Full	0.13	0.11	0.05	0.04	+8 (U) +7 (R)	0.1	0.09	0.04	0.03	+6 (U) +6 (R)
Split	0.1	0.11	0.04	0.04	+6 (U) +7 (R)	*0.07*	*0.06*	*0.04*	*0.04*	+3 (U) +2 (R)

			Federal Deputy Vote Choice							
Sample Type	**Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Beneficiary, Does Dot Attribute**			**Non-Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Non-Beneficiary, Does Not Attribute**		
	Uberlândia	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**
Full	0.18	0.1	0.05	0.03	+13 (U) +7 (R)	0.13	0.07	0.04	0.02	+9 (U) +5 (R)
Split	0.17	0.12	0.03	0.02	+15 (U) +8 (R)	*0.13*	*0.06*	*0.08*	*0.04*	+ 5(U) +2 (R)

			State Deputy Vote Choice							
Sample Type	**Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Beneficiary, Does Dot Attribute**			**Non-Beneficiary, Attributes**		**Non-Beneficiary, Does Not Attribute**		
	Uberlândia	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Uberlândia**	**Recife**	**Difference**
Full	0.18	0.09	0.03	0.02	+15 (U) + 7(R)	0.14	0.07	0.03	0.01	+11 (U) +6 (R)
Split	0.16	0.09	0.02	0.01	+14 (U) +8 (R)	*0.12*	*0.07*	*0.06*	*0.04*	+6(U) +3 (R)

Dissertation Essay 2:

(Afro-)Brasileiro, Profissão Esperança: Race, Class, and Welfare in Two Brazilian Cities

Abstract:

From theoretical models of democratic etiology, to theories of global development, to in-depth studies of the political participation on American social security beneficiaries, the role of social class in key aspects of democratic consolidation is a significant element of political science theory. This paper incorporates insights from a variety of literatures to assess whether, how, and to what degree the Bolsa Família program affects beneficiaries' views of the potential social mobility of themselves and people like them. Using a variety of statistical methods and a novel battery of survey questions, it finds that, in contrast to conventional understandings of Brazilian racial and social dynamics, beneficiary status operates differently for Afro-Brazilian and white beneficiaries.

A situation like [that of the Afro-Brazilian]
involves more than social inequality
and insidious poverty.
The individuals affected by it
are not included in the existing social structure,
as if they were not human beings,
nor even normal citizens.

- Floristan Fernandes (1964)
Brazilian sociologist, politician,
and activist for racial equality

Part 1: Introduction:

How does redistribution condition beneficiaries' attitudes towards social mobility in contexts of longstanding racial and economic inequality? Political science scholarship is divided in its expectations of how redistributive policy affects recipients' assessments of social class. Scholars of welfare programs in the American case find that receipt of a means-tested benefit are more likely to possess disparaging attitudes about their standing in society vis-à-vis other socio-economic classes regardless of their racial identification (e.g. Soss 2004). Conversely, proponents of conflict theory suggest that economic inequality increases the salience of class divisions in society and consequently the demand for redistributive policy. As redistribution increases to suit the needs of the median voter, it stands to increase the relative social position of recipients (e.g. Meltzer and Richard (1981), Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)). However, neither area of scholarship fully attends to the potential differential effects that social policy could have on beneficiaries of different racial identifications. In contexts in which both racial *and* economic inequalities are profound barriers to social mobility, we should expect that redistribution would have differential effects on recipients of different races.

This paper evaluates those theoretical predictions in light of racial inequalities in the Brazilian case.

Deeply unequal societies are often hosts to a wide array of political and economic pathologies. To briefly summarize a profound and intricate web of connections between poverty and inequality and economic and political issues in both scholarly and policy literature, unequal polities tend to lack depth and diversity of representation and a vibrant civic political sphere. Such shallow democratic culture and weak institutions, lends itself to feeble vertical accountability, and opens space for corruption, and non-programmatic, populist leaders to win the support of the poor (see Plattner 2012). High income inequality lessens the impact of economic growth, blunting its power to improve human development and reduce poverty, thus failing to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty. Indeed, economic inequality is frequently pinpointed as an ironic culprit of low economic growth itself.

For these reasons, over the last fifteen years, key international development organizations and domestic governments have dedicated a great deal of resources to finding solutions throughout the developing world to the drastic discrepancies in a variety of types of inequality – gender, race, and income to name a few. The World Bank alone has made these twin issues the subject of their World Development Reports—a key yearly publication outlining the most pressing development issue for the year— as well as several regional reports on Latin America. (See World Bank 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, *inter alia*)

In Latin America, poverty and inequality have long been seemingly insurmountable maladies. Even with some growth coming out of the debt-crisis and "lost

decade" of the 1980s, the region, until recently, had amounted to essentially a continent's worth of evidence against Kuznet's famous 1950 hypothesis that increasing development would eventually decrease these twin evils. However, in recent years, poverty and inequality have been markedly declining in Latin America. While better management of macroeconomic policies including exchange, monetary, and inflation rates, are partially responsible for the breakthrough in combating the region's most persistent developmental challenge, it is commonly known that redistributive social policies, like Brazil's *Bolsa Família,* have played a significant role in bringing millions of the region's poor out of destitution and into the lower-middle classes. (See Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010, and Birdsall et al 2012, *inter alia*).

This economic and demographic shift has enormous potential political consequences both to social science theory and in practice. The contributions of rigorous theoretical models of political development, particularly those stemming from the seminal work of Meltzer and Richards (1981), specifically Açemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003), provide a theoretical glimpse into the democratic ramifications of a unequal society, in which redistributive tensions between elites and masses are high. Put briefly, these works rely on the income distribution and the location of the median voter to argue that the relative size of a given socio-economic class (masses, elites) in a particular polity structures the incentives for elites to concede some modicum of power or the magnitude of redistribution. These factors determine the nature and type of government that obtains, and with it the quantity and character of social policies that government provides as a function of aggregate preferences of each class.

We can take from these landmark projects a few insights to guide the present work. Changes in the relative size of classes as a result of redistributive policies have the potential to affect the quality of democracy. An increase in the size of the (relative) middle class, given redistribution, and a change in the position of the median voter should affect political representation under democracy. This impact should emerge most clearly where compulsory voting is in place, as in Brazil: under such institutional conditions, the position of the median voter can be expected to be especially sensitive to the success of programs designed to alleviate poverty. Without compulsory voting, as a rich tradition of research shows, the propensity to turn out to vote varies according to educational attainment and income: those with little schooling and low income tend not to vote (e.g., Solt (2008); Brady et al (1995); Verba et al (1977)).

In related yet practical terms, the changing nature of inequality stands to increasingly impact the nature of political competition in Latin America. As one of the most important elements in the remarkable decline of poverty and inequality in the region, conditional cash transfer programs stand to make a mark not only as the policy instrument responsible for qualitative improvements in the lives of millions of the region's poorest citizens, but on both the politics and social classes in these countries. The empirical impact of CCTs has been borne out across the work of many scholars. Regarding specifically the context of redistributive social programs in the last decade in Latin America, scholars have consistently found that the provision of conditional cash transfer programs in Brazil and Mexico—the nations with the two longest-standing and farthest-reaching programs of this type in the world-- has led to increased electoral support for incumbent parties at the presidential level (Zucco 2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2015,

Renno et al 2009, De la O 2013), across levels of administration (Kaknes Chapter 1), and, when respondents attribute the policy to a particular political party, can increase partisan sympathies among recipients (Kaknes, Chapter 1). In short, there is substantial--and growing--scholarly evidence that these programs have electoral and related political effects.

In short, we have both theoretical evidence to suggest that the relative size of social classes determines the type of government empowered and the subsequent policy goods it provides, and also empirical evidence that poverty reduction policies have political effects. It remains to be seen however, whether and how these policies affect the nature of social class perceptions, a fundamental element of the immensely salient theoretical literature cited above. Given that scholars have determined that CCT policy can play an intervening role in other areas of political life, and that class is such an important variable in our best understandings of generalized models of politics, the possible intervention that policy may have on the formation of social groups or the attitudes held in society about them has potentially great significance.

This paper investigates how we can link the convincing findings of the direct political and electoral effects of these programs to the larger contribution of class-based theoretical models that have defined the general nature of political development. What is the behavioral effect of CCTS on class-based attitudes among those citizens most affected by the programs? Using nationally-representative survey data, as well as original field survey data, this paper takes up the task of understanding the role that CCTs have played in generating various class-based attitudes in Brazil.

The paper has surprising findings. Specifically, on the basis of data that uses novel survey question design to attend to the specific context of Brazilian's poorest citizens and pinpoint attitudes on sensitive questions, it finds that race and beneficiary status jointly condition self-evaluations of social class in ways that upend traditional conceptions of race and class in Latin America's largest democracy. The paper gives empirical support to the burgeoning and ongoing deconstruction of the longstanding myth of Brazilian racial democracy, finding that in some contexts, Afro-Brazilian beneficiaries are significantly more likely to view their personal social mobility positively, compared to both white beneficiaries and similar respondents who are not beneficiaries. The paper advances our understanding of the political and social impact of this landmark instrument of poverty alleviation, and suggests new avenues for inquiry into the racial dynamics of Brazilian society. It continues in eight parts. I first lay out the recorded effects of the Bolsa Família Program on class and poverty over the decade of its implementation, and the intersection of class and race that underlines the realities of Afro-Brazilian social and political life. I then move to the data, first by analyzing mass attitudes towards beneficiaries with nationally representative survey data. I then use original survey data designed to narrowly focus on the comparison of PBF recipients and members of the same communities who do not benefit from the program, to study respondents' attitudes of respondents towards their own social mobility. A final section concludes.

Part 2: Understanding Social Mobility and Brazilian Social Class in the 21st Century:

The monumental development challenge of poverty and income inequality in Brazil is best reflected in the sage and satirical 1974 essay by Brazil's famed economist and co-architect of the *Plano Real*, Edmar Bacha, *"O Rei de Belindia"* (The King of Belindia). In it he recounts the contradictions of a fictional country with taxes and laws suited to a small, developed nation (like Belgium) and a social and economic reality of a large, poor, and unequal nation (like India). Indeed, the landscape of Brazilian social classes can be imagined as a small island of developed elite "Belgians," amid an ocean of (stereotypical) "Indians."

The reality of *Belindia* has changed somewhat in the last decade. According to celebrated Brazilian economist Marcelo Neri (2014, 2015), aggregate social mobility, defined as the proportion of citizens moving from the poorest two income quintiles (*classe E* and *classe D*) to the middle quintile (*classe C*), has increased markedly in the last decade, and absolute poverty rates have decreased in lockstep. He notes that 43 million Brazilians ascended into the middle class in the period ranging from 2003-2009. Based on the rate of change in the 2003- 2009 he forecasts a further ten million entrants into Brazil's new middle class, *classe C,* by 2014, to total 52.1 million people, or around a quarter of the total population. Using similar methods, he calculates the marked decrease in poverty (*classe E and D)* in the 2003-2014 period as reducing by half, from 96.2 million people to 48.9 in 2014. (Neri 2014, 2015)

Though the Brazilian government might be tempted to rejoice at the growth of the *classe C* (and their consumption power) Brazil's (and more generally, Latin America's) context of a growing middle class and shrinking poverty rates is not yet sufficiently stable to warrant a celebration in the streets. People are moving out of poverty and into a

transitional category, where they are not considered poor, nor are they entirely part of the traditional middle class. Due to the precarious nature of their income, it is possible that they may eventually slide back into poverty (something that unfortunately remains a significant possibility in the face of the current Brazilian economic and political crises). Ferreira et al (2013) consider these people "vulnerables."

In real terms, the effect of the Bolsa Família Program on social mobility is precisely on individuals falling in this category. When it comes to CCT programs in general, both academic scholars and those in the policy community agree that CCT programs have been quite successful at alleviating poverty across the board. Various studies have shown that regardless of the program, this family of policy instruments is particularly effective at increasing consumption, closing the poverty gap, (which measures the average distance between the poverty line and the consumption by the poor) and reducing the per capita number of individuals under the poverty line. Fitzbein and Schady et al (2009) suggest, for example, that CCT programs in Nicaragua, Colombia, Mexico, and Honduras both increased consumption in targeted households and decreased the poverty gap by roughly ten percentage points in each case. The authors find that the Bolsa Família reduces the squared poverty gap, a measure that accounts for the distribution of resources among the poor, by nearly fifteen percent. (F&S 2009 p 108).

Thus, across various measures, studies, and indicators, we can sense the palpable and pronounced upward trajectory underlying the context of social mobility for Brazil's lower income classes. What remains to be seen is the direct effect of the Bolsa Família program on individual attitudes towards social class and social mobility, a task this paper takes up below.

Part 3: Mass Attitudes towards PBF Beneficiaries:

One's conception of one's own social class does not develop in a vacuum. To understand the context of self-evaluations of social position, it is necessary to recognize the larger context of social attitudes towards one's group. This is particularly true of welfare beneficiaries, as a program with such transformative effects on society as the PBF is surely to have attitudinal effects in the polity as well. Therefore, using nationally representative data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), in this section I bring to light some stark trends that are reflective of the overall findings in this paper. This survey asked respondents the degree to which they agreed with three questions:

Question 1:...*Some people say that beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família program get too comfortable when they receive their benefit. Up to what point do you agree or disagree with that sentence?*
Question 2: *The Bolsa Família program incentivizes beneficiaries to have more children. Up to what point do you agree or disagree with that sentence?*
Question 3: *Beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família program spend the money they receive on the wrong types of things. Up to what point do you agree or disagree with that sentence?*[14]

Presented below are graphs of the frequency with which different types of respondents agreed with these negative stereotypes of beneficiaries. The sample is divided by race, beneficiary status, and income category as measured by the method used by Brazilian survey agencies, the total income in the household as a multiple of the

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[14] Questions asked in Portuguese. Presented are the author's translations.

minimum wage.[15] We can see that attitudes on the actions of beneficiaries are stark; either respondents agree strongly with these statements, or they disagree with equal fervor. Black respondents are surprisingly consistent in their attitudes about these stereotypes, and tend to uphold the disparaging ideas, even though Afro-Brazilians are most likely to be members of the poorest two income brackets, and roughly 30 percent of all Afro-Brazilians are beneficiaries of the PBF. Similarly, beneficiary respondents are likely to express some agreement with disparaging stereotypes of beneficiaries. These attitudes remain negative; perhaps intensifying as one increases in social class—here measured as the number of "minimum salaries" the household receives monthly.

[Insert Figures 1-3 here]

This provides important motivation for the questions and hypotheses this paper presents. First of all, it seems that there are some predominant values and ideas associated with Bolsa Família receipt that seems to parallel the discourse that surrounds welfare recipients in the United States. That in turn, may help us to identify some key hypotheses about the individual class assessments of recipients in the original survey sample. Secondly, we can see that class is an important factor in determining attitudes towards beneficiaries. This may not come as a surprise to anyone who has experienced firsthand the visceral and stark differences in the lives of the Brazilian rich and poor, which sometimes overlap on the same street, or in the same neighborhood. However, it is quite important to underline the systematic nature of these class divides across survey questions. Class divides remain strong in Brazil. These comparisons highlight an oft

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[15] There are multiple ways to calculate class and income on surveys. As this is the most straightforward measure, and most closely replicates the method used in prevailing national studies, I chose to calculate income as reported number of "minimum monthly salaries" the household received.

unspoken reality of Brazilian culture, that the reality of the Afro-Brazilian context differs in important ways from the dominant social narrative—one that is underlined in a European-centric racial hierarchy.

Part 4: Class-based Effects: Effect of Receipt on Attitudes of Class and Social Mobility

In the previous section of this paper, we have seen the systematic ways in which attitudes in society at large vary vis-à-vis stereotypes of recipients. In general, it seems that both elite and social impressions of beneficiaries of this program are pervasive and deeply held. Within the American Behavioral scholarship on welfare programs, we have convincing evidence that such strong society-wide stereotypes have lasting effects on how recipients engage with politics and how they judge themselves as a function of the receipt of a means-tested program.

While the Brazilian case and society are surely different than those of the United States, we can take some initial theoretical insights from the findings of this literature. Perhaps the most salient work on this subject in American politics is Joel Soss' renowned book, *Unwanted Claims* (2002, and his related publications)**.** Through extensive interviews with recipients of two types of social welfare programs (Social Security Disability Insurance, SSDI and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC), he concludes that differences in program administration, government oversight via social workers, and the larger social and political context that surrounds these two programs structures the ways in which, and degrees to which, beneficiaries engage in the political

arena. Recipients of SSDI are afforded a greater degree of autonomy vis-à-vis social workers' oversight, are not typically identified as "takers," and are therefore more vocal and active participants in politics. In contrast, AFDC beneficiaries, are not as politically active, as for these recipients extensive oversight and prevailing "taker" discourse generate deeply entrenched perceptions of marginalization. He writes, "welfare institutions have the potential to empower or marginalize their clients; they can contribute to a more capable and engaged citizenry or reinforce political inequalities and quiescence" (Soss, 2002, chapter 1).

Taking into account the findings from the American case, that welfare programs – whose benefits and beneficiaries are both easily identifiable—empower clients in arrangements that allow autonomy, and marginalize in ones with greater government oversight, I ask, whether, and in what ways, do attitudes towards group and individual social mobility vary among the poor as a function of CCT receipt? The design of CCT programs at once allows a degree of autonomy in how a beneficiary spends the cash transfer, as well as, as we have seen above, generates negative (or at least discordant), systematic attitudes in mass opinion.

On the one hand, if the above findings from studies of the American case are mirrored here, and beneficiaries internalize widely held negative attitudes, we have reason to believe that recipients of Brazil's most salient means-tested program will display a differentially negative outlook of group and personal social mobility, relative to non-recipients. Conversely, it could very well be the case that, because of the visceral and significant impact the PBF has on the daily lives of beneficiaries -- even providing the first formal government identification for some recipients-- that the program has the

opposite effect. In this case, the PBF could be responsible for generating differentially hopeful attitudes in beneficiaries vis-à-vis their class mobility.

This produces two hypotheses:

H1: *Negative Context, Pessimistic Attitudes:* Recipients of PBF are less likely to respond positively to questions about their personal social mobility and that of others, because they internalize the negative stereotypes of beneficiaries.

H2: Recipients of PBF are more likely to be positive about the social mobility of themselves and others, relative to non-beneficiaries of the same income, (objective) class, and neighborhood context, because they are receiving aid from the state boosting income, and human capital outcomes for their children.

Part 5: Intersections of Class and Race—Afro Brazilian Context

Like many societies with a history of African slavery and labor exploitation, Brazilian society is plagued by deep-rooted and longstanding inequalities generated by legacies of racial discrimination. However, unlike the United States, Brazilian society has historically been conceived as divided exclusively along class and regional lines, subverting active notions of structural racism, to the detriment of Brazil's predominately Black and mixed-race poor. As a consequence, the conceptualization and dialogue of race-based discrimination as a force that actively stunts the potential for social mobility among Brazilians of color – both indigenous and African descendants-- has only developed in the national discourse quite recently. Edward Telles (2004) underlines this element of Brazilian society in the introduction to his insightful and significant sociological analysis of contemporary race relations in Brazil. He compares the seminal

argument of *American Apartheid* (Massey and Denton 1993), which suggests that the social exclusion and economic, occupational and social disadvantages that African Americans face stem from residential exclusion rooted in racial discrimination. Telles argues that if Brazilian scholarship and discourse are to be believed, in Brazil residential segregation is based on class differences, and race is simply not an element of importance to their explanation of inequalities. Take a trip to a poor neighborhood in any corner of Brazil, however, and one observes the striking dissimilarity in racial composition of the residents from rich areas of the same city.

The relatively recent timing of the acknowledgement by both Brazilian academics and society of the phenomenon of racial discrimination stems from the conceptions of national identity formed in the 1940s. A large part of the nation building efforts of Vargas' Estado Nôvo were founded on the myth of racial democracy, that all Brazilians descended from a noble mix of Indian, European, and African roots and that racial miscegenation was a deep-seated, foundational element of Brazilian society. Indeed, even before Gilberto Freyre's landmark tome to Brazilian racial mixture, *Master and the Slaves*, Brazilian elites and eugenicists of the early 1900s had begun to publically support the virtues of Brazil's heritage as a *mulatto* society (Telles 2004, chapter 2). Early elite opinion aside, both the publication and overwhelmingly positive reception of Freyre's *Master and the Slaves,* and the political salience of class –based cleavages of Getúlio Vargas' populist and corporatist regime, further underlined class as the key social cleavage and obscured and prevented both scholarly and popular examination of structural racial discrimination in Brazil. The extreme pervasiveness of the myth of Brazilian racial democracy highlighted the country's history of racial mixture as a key

element of national identity and dominated prevailing attitudes regarding race through the 1990s.

As scholarship on race has evolved to embrace the reality of structural racial discrimination in Brazil, so to has the response of political elites, primarily of the Workers' Party, but also including former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the center-right PSDB. By 2010, the national government had promulgated affirmative action policies to begin to amend the real (if not fully de-mythologized) economic and social inequalities that Afro-Brazilians face (Htun 2016, Telles 2004).

What role does redistributive policy have in ameliorating the discrepancies in development generated by racial discrimination? Telles (2004, ch 4) offers a detailed analysis of the effects of racial discrimination on human development conditions of poverty more likely for Afro-Brazilians than for other members of society. Among Afro-Brazilians, this is particularly true for individuals who identify as black over mixed-race. A variety of scholarship has documented the degree to which the context of discrimination differs by skin color, offering mixed-race Afro-Brazilians an "escape hatch" through which to access the wider (and whiter) society, given enough financial resources. Thus, a social program that offers a novel inclusion, may be meaningful to recipients not only on the dimension of income, but perhaps even more so for Afro-Brazilian beneficiaries, for whom the discourse (and reality) of exclusion is doubly applicable. Given the longstanding, though largely unacknowledged, racial discrimination that, joint with class dynamics, has negatively impacted the fortunes of Brazilians of color, Afro-Brazilian respondents in the present survey sample may have significantly different views towards their own social mobility.

This informs two subsequent testable implications:

H3: *The marginal increase in wealth provided by the PBF represents a disproportionately large boost to the prospects of social mobility for Afro-Brazilians relative to their white counterparts.* Because of the newfound incorporation and potential for upward social movement that the PBF affords, and the legacy of racial discrimination that has thwarted previous efforts to increase social standing, Afro Brazilian beneficiaries attitudes towards social mobility are stronger than those of non-Black (essentially, white) beneficiaries.

H4: Because of the legacy of racial discrimination, *Afro-Brazilian respondents are more likely to internalize the negative attitudes towards PBF beneficiaries* that are white beneficiaries, and subsequently rate themselves as coming from a lower class, relative to white beneficiaries in the same conditions.

A note on racial classification:

Perhaps an artifact of the long history and impact of racial mixture in Brazilian society, terminology and delineation of racial categories is highly variable across regions, classes, and contexts. This paper uses the strategy for measuring racial identification employed by the Brazilian national statistics agency (IBGE) since the 1950s, as well as on the census and nationally representative surveys. It divides race into five categories: Black, Mixed-race, White, Indigenous, and Asian. One might issue the critique that these categories mirror commonly held conceptions of race in society and therefore simplify the complexities and varied nature of race, and reify the myth of racial democracy (see

Telles 2004, chapter 2). However, these are the common categories used by a majority of the population, and use of this question worded precisely as it is on other surveys maximizes the potential for generalizing claims made in this paper.

Importantly, the survey asks a racial self-identification question rather than having the enumerator classify the race of the respondent after the interview has concluded. This choice was deliberate. After all, the behavioral and opinion-effects of race on self-evaluation of social class is how one identifies oneself vis-à-vis racial dynamics and opinions in society, not the external opinions of others, however much those might matter in other related contexts.

Furthermore, this paper seeks to identify a novel glimpse of the dynamic characteristics of race and class among the Brazilian poor. It is therefore imperative to disaggregate race into categories of mixed race (denoted by the Brazilian terminology, *parda*) and black (*preta*) to see the micro-dynamics of race, as well as capturing a binary categorization (black and parda versus non-black, e.g. white, indigenous, or Asian) that generalizes the phenomena as well. There is reason to believe the attitudes towards class would be different among those who classify themselves as *parda,* and those who consider themselves *preta.*

Synthesis of Theoretical Predictions:

The above hypotheses vary along two dimensions with respect to their predictions on respondent evaluation of social mobility: beneficiary status, and racial identification. These can therefore be represented graphically using 2x2 tables. Table 1 shows the prediction of the scholarship on the American Welfare system. Following that argument, we should expect to see that beneficiaries, as a function of receiving means-tested social

assistance, should have depressed attitudes towards their social mobility relative to non-beneficiaries. Following conflict theory, Table 2 shows that we should expect to see that beneficiaries, who have (relative to their previous income) increased their position in relative income distribution, to possess increased attitudes towards their social mobility (as, under the auspices of this line of argument, they have augmented their standing). Neither of these first two hypotheses predicts differential effects as a function of racial identification, and consequently we should not expect variance along that dimension. Conversely conventional sociological predictions regarding the attitudinal effects of racial discrimination on respondents' assessments of social position suggest that we should observe decreased assessments of mobility among members of the disadvantaged racial group (in this case, Afro-Brazilians), as we see in Table 3. Finally, this paper contends that policy has disproportionately positive effects on Afro-Brazilian recipients' class assessments precisely because of the longstanding barriers to social mobility that racial and economic inequalities traditionally present to them. Receipt of a benefit that substantially increases their monthly income will be doubly important to a group that faces disproportionate barriers to mobility. This hypothesis is represented in Table 4. A summary table of all hypotheses and their attendant empirical predictions is presented in Table 5.

Table 1: Hypothesis 1: American Welfare Literature

	Black	White
Beneficiary	Decreased assessment of social mobility	
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 2: Hypothesis 2: Conflict Theory

	Black	White
Beneficiary	Increased evaluation of social mobility	

	Non-Beneficiary		

Table 3: Hypothesis 3: Classical Scholarship on Racial Inequalities

	Black	White
Beneficiary	Decreased evaluation of social mobility	(Positive relative to Afro-Brazilians)
Non-Beneficiary		(Positive relative to Afro-Brazilians)

Table 4: Hypothesis 4: Joint Effect of Race and Beneficiary Status

	Black	White
Beneficiary	Increased evaluation of social mobility	
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 5: Summary of All Hypotheses and Predictions:

	Black		White	
Beneficiary	H1: ↓	H2: ↑	H1: ↓	H2: ↑
	H3: ↓	H4: ↑↑	H3: ↑	H4: ↑
Non-Beneficiary	H1: ↑	H2: ↓	H1: ↑	H2: ↓
	H3: ↓	H4: No Change	H3: ↑	H4: No Change
Key: ↑= Increased assessment of social mobility ↓=Decreased assessment ↑↑=Strong assessment relative to other sub-groups. **No change**=theory does not predict an observable change in the mobility assessments for this sub-group.				

Part 6: Data and Methods:

Data and Methods 1: Categorical Measures of Individual Class Evaluation and Mobility:

This paper makes use of an original survey designed to measure the behavioral effects of the Bolsa Família Program on beneficiaries. It employs a novel sampling design that compares beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries from the same communities, thereby capturing a nuanced picture the reality of life for Brazil's poorest citizens. Through this careful comparison, the analysis below yields a fine-grained interpretation of the effects the PBF has on respondents' attitudes towards social class mobility.

The survey was conducted in two municipalities, Uberlândia, Minas Gerais, and Recife, Pernambuco. Uberlândia was selected because it is a good "baseline" case, against which to compare results from the "high-impact" Northeast of the country (Recife), the region that receives over two-thirds of all PBF transfers. Overall, the survey consists of 760 observations, 360 in Uberlândia and 400 in Recife. Of these, 389 are beneficiaries and the remaining 371 are members of the same communities that do not receive the program.[16]

The analysis below employs a set of four dependent variables designed to test how receipt of the Bolsa Família program affects both respondents' attitudes towards *their own* social mobility, and their attitudes about social mobility of *others like them* in society using seven point Likert scale indicators.[17]

The first tests of class ideologies (dependent variables 1-3) uses three related dependent variables that measure a respondent's evaluation of their own social mobility. The series asks,

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[16] More details on the nature of the survey and the survey sites can be found in the introduction to this dissertation.

[17] These indicators are condensed from seven points to five points in the analysis for concision in post estimation procedures and for more equal distribution across the range of values. The same procedure for condensing the variables is preformed on both original indicators, which maintains consistency in the differenced variable.

In Brazilian society, there are groups that tend to be at the top of the social scale and other that tend to be at the base. Here is a scale that goes from the base to the top, where "1" corresponds to the base and "7" corresponds to the top.

Question 1: In your opinion, where do you believe you are now?

Question 2: And can you indicate where you imagine you will be in five years?

Respondents were shown a scale with seven numbered items. At values 1, 4, and 7 the scale read "base," "middle," and "top," respectively. This addition helped respondents in the pre-test evaluate their responses on the bases of the full range of options, ameliorating the tendency to report erroneously extreme values, as well as a centralizing tendency. Thus, we have greater confidence that respondents reporting an extremely high or low self-evaluation are communicating a true attitude, and not misinterpreting the scale or the question. Even so, extreme values are less frequent over all.

The third dependent variable in this series takes the simple difference between the respondents' evaluations of their class standing five years into the future and their rating of their current class to measure each individual's expected class mobility in the short- and medium- term. The table below summarizes these variables.

Variable:	N. of Observations	Mean	St. Deviation	Min	Max
Class now	757	2.63	1.3	1	5
Class in five years	672	3.76	1.37	1	5

| Class difference | 672 | 1.54 | 1.33 | -1 | 4 |

Independent variables of import include three separate specifications of race (black, mixed-race, and a combined dummy for black/mixed-race vs. white), as well as beneficiary status, and the interaction of program receipt and race. Analysis also includes the standard set of demographic controls employed throughout the papers in this project—income (an index based on presence of various household items), gender, age, years of education, and survey site. Importantly given the hypotheses above, I preformed statistical tests that confirm the theorized statistical independence of race and income, two key predictors of class evaluations. Given the categorical nature of the dependent variables, the subsequent statistical analysis uses an ordered logit specification.

Overall, the data is well balanced on all observable characteristics of importance, with the exceptions of slight deviations outside of the standard accepted range of [-0.25, 0.25] on income, gender, and age—all three of which are directly affected by provision of the PBF. As the program is purposively targeted to female heads of household, we should reasonably expect that members of the treatment group (i.e. beneficiaries) should be disproportionately women of childbearing age whose income is below the PBF's means test. Nevertheless, the data has been preconditioned through use of Shekhon's genetic matching algorithm so that balance is also achieved on these three variables.[18]

Data and Methods II: Item Response Model and Novel Question Battery

A second aspect of the methodological design of this paper attacks the measurement of social mobility in a novel way. Through the use of original surveys, this

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[18] More information on the balance between treatment categories available in other chapters of this dissertation, and upon request.

paper asked respondents in areas of high transfer of the PBF a series of vignette-style questions designed to uncover the latent dimension of attitudes towards social mobility. Key to this series is the fact that the age, gender, race, region, and rural or urban residence varied in the four vignettes applied. This mitigates the possibility that demographic issues could randomly and immeasurably condition the respondents' assessments of each characters' social mobility. The questions are worded as follows:

Now we are going to talk about a few scenes with hypothetical personalities and their personal goals. For each one, I want you to tell me what you think about them….

João lives in Salvador, he's Black and he's 30 years old. Right now he works in the informal market, that is, on the street. But João wants to become a banker. Considering only the presented information… do you think it is very possible, possible, not very possible, or impossible that João achieves his goal?

Do you know someone with the same conditions and goals as João?

Maria lives in a rural area in Goiás state. She's mixed-race and she's 20 years old. Right now she works on a farm, but she wants to go to a larger city to study and become a secretary. Do you think it is very possible, possible, not very possible, or impossible that Maria achieves her goal?

Do you know someone with the same conditions and goals as Maria?

José lives in São Paulo, he's white and he's 18 years old. Right now he's a construction worker, but he would like to become the boss of the construction company. Do you think

it is very possible, possible, not very possible, or impossible that José achieves his goal?

Do you know someone with the same conditions and goals as José?

Ana lives in [Surubim for Recife respondents, Araguarí for Uberlândia respondents],

she's Black and she's 40 years old. Right now she works every so often as a housemaid,

but she would like to open a small bakery. Do you think it is very possible, possible, not

very possible, or impossible that Ana achieves her goal?

Do you know someone with the same conditions and goals as Ana?[19]

This series yields eight questions, four assessments of possibility of social mobility, and four reports of knowing someone like each of the characters. These questions were combined in a graded response theoretical model to create a continuous variable measuring the latent attitudes toward social mobility that are discretely measured through each question in the battery.

In general, item response models, the family to which the graded response model belongs, take several discrete "items" (variables), and evaluate the degree to which each individual item both relates to other items in the series and to the measurement of the latent trait. Instead of simply creating a composite index by summing the scores and evaluating consistency using *Chronbach's* Alpha, this family of models evaluates traits of each item as well as provides a measurement of the latent trait. Specifically, they evaluate the difficulty of each question and the degree to which each item discriminates between "types" of the latent variable.

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[19] Survey questions were administered in Portuguese only. Presented here are the author's translations. For the original wording, please see the appendix.

As these models are widely applied in education, a particularly instructive example would be that to measure a student's abilities in a particular subject (the latent trait), one might administer a test with several questions (items). The model would evaluate the degree to which each item is difficult (how hard it is to get the right answer) as well as how well each item discriminates between high and low ability students—essentially a measure of each item's validity.

In the present case, to measure the latent attitudes towards social mobility, I administered a survey targeted at uniformly poor areas of key cities, with eight important items designed to measure the latent trait while also mitigating the role of various demographic factors when aggregated. IRT models return a score for each component item called the Item Characteristic Curve (ICCs). This score represents the probability of "success" (e.g. a correct answer on a test or, here, a positive view of a vignette character's successful transition to the desired occupation, or a respondent knowing someone like the character). In the case of the graded response model, which adapts the traditional IRT model for ordinal items, the ICCs represent the probability of an individual with a latent trait score of X answering each item in manner consistent with their latent trait score. [20]

The continuous variable produced through storage of the estimates generated by the item response model, is an observed measure of latent attitudes towards social mobility, and becomes the dependent variable in the subsequent regression analysis. As the dependent variable is continuous, I run standard OLS regressions on this test of social mobility. Thus, all told there are four sets of regressions, three that aim to understand self

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[20] Graphs and statistics regarding the ICCs are available upon request. For concision, they are not included in this paper.

assessment of current and future class standing, as well as individual class mobility, and one that aims to capture attitudes towards general class mobility of people in situations that resemble their own.

Part 7: Results and Discussion:

[Insert Tables 1-15 here.]

Taken as a whole, the regression results suggest that there both race and beneficiary status play a significant role in determining the self-evaluations of respondents in both Uberlândia and Recife, often in tandem with one another. While direct interpretation of ordered logit coefficients is not recommended, and we cannot therefore comment on the magnitude of effects, we can see that the sign and direction of these coefficients suggests that beneficiary status tends to increase the positive social class self placement, and that the influence of beneficiary status is often conditioned by race.

To facilitate interpretation across racial and beneficiary categories, Tables 5-15 provide predicted probabilities for each of the first three model specifications (as the measure of race differs) of each of the three self-placement dependent variables (class now, class in five years, and the difference between them). This results in nine separate tables. Each table displays the predicted probability that a respondent of the specified type responds with that value across the range of values of the dependent variable. The predicted probabilities are generated in such a way that we can observe the differential effects of race, beneficiary status, survey site, and gender on evaluations of class. All other covariates are held at their means.

Generating these distinct "ideal types" allows us to uncover a variety of trends present in the data. Generally speaking, women tend to report lower class attainment

than men, across survey site, race, and beneficiary status. In itself this is rather an interesting consistency of the analysis. Part of the cache of the PBF was its inherent ability to raise the profile and possibilities for women in beneficiary households. The finding that women systematically rate themselves as pertaining to a lower class at present than men (of objectively the same class) suggests that the transfers may not have that particular positive externality.[21] Further, and perhaps unsurprisingly given Brazil's extreme regional inequalities, respondents in Recife (North East) are much more likely to identify as lower class than are respondents who reside in Uberlândia. However, it is difficult to generalize about the effects of race and beneficiary status, as their influence on class attitudes somewhat varies. I now turn to this analysis sequentially by dependent variable.

Class Now:

The first set of models fitted in this paper measure the degree to which respondents of different racial identifications and receipt status self-evaluate their current social class position. Each model uses a different specification of racial self-identification, as justified above in section 2.1. These are black (model 1), mixed-race (model 2) and a binary, combined measure of race (model 3) where Afro-Brazilian identity is considered a response of either mixed-race or black to the racial self-identification question.

The predicted probabilities for model 1 (which specifies Afro-Brazilian identity as those who self identify as *preta/*black) show a few key insights. While class ratings are highest in Uberlândia, they are especially high among blacks in that city. Interestingly,

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[21] However, women are more likely to report higher class predictions in future, suggesting that perhaps the PBF generates positive expectations in future periods only.

while white beneficiaries rate their class lower than non-beneficiaries in both cities, the trend is reversed for black respondents, who are roughly ten percent more likely to rate themselves as belonging to one of the top two classes than are non-beneficiary blacks. Specifically, this amounts to 41 percent likelihood that Afro-Brazilian male beneficiaries (and 30 percent for females of that category) in Uberlândia evaluate their current class so positively, compared with 31 percent for respondents of the same category in Recife (27 percent for female respondents). In contrast, 29 percent of non-beneficiary, Afro-Brazilian men in Uberlândia (27 percent of women) and 19 percent of their counterparts in Recife (18 percent for women) have a likelihood of reporting their class standing in a top bracket. This suggests partial support of hypotheses one and three, and that receipt of the PBF affects white and black beneficiaries in striking and different ways.

When Afro-Brazilian identity is specified to isolate respondents who report being mixed race (*parda*), as it is in model 2, the results are reversed. White beneficiaries are more likely to report higher current class than are white non-beneficiaries or mixed-race respondents. At first glance, this conforms to the expectation of hypothesis four that white beneficiaries have higher perceptions of class than do black beneficiaries. However, when we take into account non-beneficiaries of both racial specifications, we see that Afro-Brazilian respondents have *overall* higher self-classification of social class than do white respondents, which fits the trend first and most starkly identified with the *preta* specification of race above. Still, the significantly different trajectories of beneficiaries as a function of their racial self-identification warrants further investigation.

Finally, when race is specified as the combined measure (model 3), the patterns present in model 2 remain. White beneficiaries have the highest overall probability of

rating their current class status as one of the top two categories, relative both to black beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of either racial category, suggesting further confirmation of hypothesis four.

Class in Five Years:

Overall, respondents of all stripes are very optimistic about the future. Interestingly women are somewhat more positive about their future class positions than are male respondents. All else equal, black (or mixed-race) respondents are more positive than are white respondents.

Predicted probabilities from model 1 suggest a similar pattern as identified in the first model (current class), but yield significantly higher probabilities of identification in the top two class categories. Black beneficiaries, as was true in the first model, are more likely to report predicted class status as one of the top two categories by at least ten percentage points. Specifically, black beneficiaries in Uberlândia have an 84 percent likelihood of reporting high class status relative to 72 percent likelihood for male and 74 percent for female white beneficiaries in that city. This is even more striking in the context of Recife, where black male beneficiaries have a 71 percent likelihood of reporting class in the highest two categories (72 percent for black female beneficiaries), compared to a 56 percent likelihood for white male beneficiaries (58 percent for women.)

Probabilities for the mixed-race specification adhere to the patterns presented in the "current class" series above. White beneficiaries in Uberlândia have a 79 percent likelihood of high social class self-placement five years in the future, relative to 64 percent for male white recipients in Recife (66 percent for women of that category). The difference in probabilities among black respondents, while generally following the

pattern identified for current class assessments, deviates in an interesting way. While there is a relatively small difference between mixed-race beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Uberlândia (71 (72) percent likelihood for male (female) beneficiary respondents, compared to 76 (77) percent likelihood for non-beneficiaries), the difference in Recife is quite remarkable. Non-beneficiary mixed-race respondent women have an 82 percent likelihood of reporting high social class position compared to 60 percent for mixed-race male non-beneficiaries, and roughly 55 percent for beneficiaries of either gender.

Finally, when the combined racial measure is employed, there appears to be no effect of beneficiary status for Afro-Brazilians, though the scores are much higher in Uberlândia (around a 75 percent likelihood), than in Recife (55-60 percent), and significantly higher than white non-beneficiaries in either city. White beneficiaries have a slightly higher probability of forecasting a high social class self-placement than do Afro-Brazilian respondents or white non-beneficiaries.

Difference in class measures

The last set of models corresponds to the dependent variable measuring the simple difference between a respondent's current class self-placement and where she sees herself in five years. It varies from -1 (suggesting higher class self-placement now than predicted for five years into the future) to 4 (much higher class in future), and includes 0 (no change in class between time periods). This measure shows the individual-level optimism about social mobility, ultimately what truly matters in this analysis, as that orientation is likely to be a key motivator of other public opinion and behaviors. Here we see results that help to solve some puzzles established in the analysis of the previous two series.

Across all three racial measures two key findings emerge. Firstly, beneficiaries have higher self-placements relative to their initial positions (indicated by the high score in the difference between future and current class self-placement) than do non-beneficiaries. Secondly, *ceteris paribus*, Afro-Brazilian respondents have higher self-placements relative to their initial placements. Finally, region and gender show interesting consistencies, specifically respondents in Uberlândia are more positive than those in Recife, and women are more positive than men.

Regarding the joint effect of beneficiary status and race, we observe that black beneficiaries are more likely to have highly positive (values of 3 or 4, the top two categories) than are white beneficiaries. This is particularly true of the *preta* (black) racial specification, as we have seen in previous series of models, though it remains consistent across race measures. For instance, female respondents in Uberlândia who are beneficiaries and self-identify as black have a 37 percent likelihood of obtaining one of the top two class categories in the differenced measure, relative to 30 percent of whites in that category. This holds for men in Uberlândia as well, with a 31 percent likelihood for black beneficiaries and 26 percent for whites. It also hold by region, where the likelihood of obtaining those high class scores for *Recifense* Afro-Brazilian women beneficiaries is 32 percent (28 for men) and for white beneficiary women it is 26 percent (22 for men).

IRT Class Mobility Variable:

Table 4 shows the regression results, and Table 14 the linear predictions of the continuous measure of general (versus individual) social mobility for categories of respondents that vary based on beneficiary status, race, gender, and survey site. As only the combined race measure shows statistical significance, Table 14 only reports values

for that regression (model 3). In general, the results are not as significant as the self-assessment results are. However, Afro-Brazilian residents of Uberlândia who receive a Bolsa Família stipend have a mean class mobility rating of 0.19 for men and 0.11 for women. This suggests that both race and region potentially interact with program receipt to influence judgments of group class mobility. These means are higher than white beneficiaries in Uberlândia, and black non-beneficiaries, as well as all respondents in Recife. This finding, though constrained to Uberlândia, is consistent with the third hypothesis that Afro-Brazilian beneficiaries internalize the aid provided by the Bolsa Família program in positive ways.

Part 8: Conclusion

In 1966, as the military dictatorship consolidated power in Brazil, famed playwright Paulo Pontes published the first version of his renown musical, *Brasileiro: Profissao, Esperanca.* Over the decade to follow, in times of serious political and social turmoil, the musical went through several adaptations and performances, each highlighting the community, culture, and music that ground the Brazilian sensibility. In the end, regardless of the tumult and uncertainty of the day, Brazil is the country of the future, a place where citizens abound with hope for days to come. Indeed, Brazilians of all stripes are hopeful, forward-looking people.

This paper exposes the optimism of some of Brazil's most jeopardized for a better future. It has employed a series of carefully designed tests to measure the affect of the Bolsa Família program on very personal and deeply held attitudes towards social class. These attitudes in turn, have ramifications for both the policy and political public spheres.

The results suggest that redistributive social policy can, in certain conditions, affect other areas of social exclusion, and perhaps attend to the significant and longstanding social, economic, and political marginalization of certain racial groups. Its title reflects the long history of Brazilian optimism, changed as it is by the findings of this paper, that Afro-Brazilians have great expectations for class mobility.

Figures 1-3(section 3):

Figure 1:

Figure 2:

Figure 3:

Beneficiaries Spend on Wrong Things by Race, Income, and Receipt

Table 1: Affect of Race and Beneficiary Status on Self-Assessment of Current Class:

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1: Black	(2) Model 2: Mixed Race	(3) Model 3: Combined
Ben. Status	-0.226	0.323	0.317
	(0.164)	(0.209)	(0.271)
Black	-0.429		
	(0.297)		
Black*BF	0.762**		
	(0.383)		
Age	0.00209	0.00134	0.00104
	(0.00582)	(0.00576)	(0.00579)
Gender	0.117	0.129	0.124
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.169)
Education	0.0466*	0.0475**	0.0456*
	(0.0242)	(0.0241)	(0.0243)
Recife	-0.547***	-0.538***	-0.551***
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.150)
Income	0.198***	0.205***	0.201***
	(0.0483)	(0.0479)	(0.0481)
Mixed		0.371	
		(0.232)	
Mixed*BF		-0.830***	
		(0.297)	
Race Binary			0.139
			(0.243)
Race*BF			-0.553*
			(0.324)
Constant cut1	-0.901**	-0.681*	-0.779*
	(0.386)	(0.388)	(0.410)
Constant cut2	-0.0827	0.158	0.0402
	(0.385)	(0.388)	(0.409)
Constant cut3	0.954**	1.190***	1.075***
	(0.388)	(0.391)	(0.413)
Constant cut4	2.924***	3.170***	3.043***
	(0.415)	(0.420)	(0.439)
Observations	625	634	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 2: Affect of Race and Beneficiary Status on Self-Assessment of Class in Five Years:

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Ben. Status	0.0651	0.522**	0.703**
	(0.175)	(0.224)	(0.297)
Mixed		0.423*	
		(0.241)	
Mixed*BF		-0.846***	
		(0.308)	
Age	-0.0191***	-0.0207***	-0.0218***
	(0.00628)	(0.00601)	(0.00605)
Gender	-0.0776	-0.113	-0.137
	(0.181)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Education	0.0267	0.0297	0.0293
	(0.0264)	(0.0254)	(0.0256)
Recife	-0.715***	-0.584***	-0.617***
	(0.168)	(0.159)	(0.159)
Income	0.151***	0.150***	0.143***
	(0.0523)	(0.0497)	(0.0499)
Black	0.0907		
	(0.318)		
Black*BF	0.536		
	(0.423)		
Race Binary			0.548**
			(0.260)
Race*BF			-0.849**
			(0.348)
Constant cut1	-3.317***	-3.087***	-3.017***
	(0.436)	(0.426)	(0.446)
Constant cut2	-2.224***	-2.016***	-1.922***
	(0.422)	(0.414)	(0.433)
Constant cut3	-1.576***	-1.380***	-1.275***
	(0.417)	(0.410)	(0.429)
Constant cut4	-0.490	-0.304	-0.195
	(0.411)	(0.405)	(0.425)
Constant cut5		0.314	0.419
		(0.405)	(0.425)
Constant cut6		0.862**	0.959**
		(0.407)	(0.428)
Observations	559	567	559

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Affect of Race and Beneficiary Status on Difference in Self-Assessment of Class:

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1: Black	(2) Model 2: Mixed Race	(3) Model 3: Combined
Ben. Status	0.358**	0.562**	0.838***
	(0.171)	(0.229)	(0.301)
Race Binary			0.789***
			(0.258)
Race*BF			-0.747**
			(0.351)
Age	-0.0271***	-0.0265***	-0.0277***
	(0.00629)	(0.00622)	(0.00627)
Gender	-0.217	-0.211	-0.244
	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.176)
Education	0.0418	0.0353	0.0387
	(0.0262)	(0.0260)	(0.0262)
Recife	-0.181	-0.237	-0.258
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.159)
Income	0.0102	0.00546	0.00609
	(0.0503)	(0.0498)	(0.0500)
Black	0.435		
	(0.309)		
Black*BF	-0.150		
	(0.402)		
Mixed		0.413*	
		(0.238)	
Mixed*BF		-0.500	
		(0.311)	
Constant cut1	-4.087***	-3.942***	-6.745***
	(0.469)	(0.468)	(1.083)
Constant cut2	-1.923***	-1.840***	-6.051***
	(0.417)	(0.422)	(0.824)
Constant cut3	-0.551	-0.489	-4.549***
	(0.409)	(0.416)	(0.544)
Constant cut4	0.462	0.516	-3.758***
	(0.409)	(0.416)	(0.486)
Constant cut5	1.978***	2.040***	-1.572***
	(0.427)	(0.434)	(0.438)
Constant cut6			-0.184
			(0.434)
Constant cut7			0.836*
			(0.435)
Constant cut8			2.356***
			(0.453)
Constant cut9			3.124***
			(0.479)
Constant cut10			3.557***
			(0.504)
Observations	559	567	559

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Affect of Race and Beneficiary Status on Social Mobility (Continuous):

VARIABLES	(1) Model 1: Black	(2) Model 2: Mixed-Race	(3) Model 3: Combined
Ben. Status	-0.00776	-0.0204	-0.160
	(0.0802)	(0.104)	(0.135)
Black	-0.262*		
	(0.146)		
Black*BF	0.267		
	(0.187)		
Age	0.00415	0.00404	0.00423
	(0.00288)	(0.00284)	(0.00287)
Gender	0.0807	0.0715	0.0735
	(0.0831)	(0.0829)	(0.0831)
Education	-0.00103	0.00103	0.00118
	(0.0118)	(0.0117)	(0.0118)
Recife	-0.187**	-0.200***	-0.178**
	(0.0730)	(0.0729)	(0.0732)
Income	-0.0105	-0.00403	-0.00487
	(0.0234)	(0.0231)	(0.0233)
Mixed		0.0847	
		(0.112)	
Mixed*BF		0.0785	
		(0.145)	
Race Binary			-0.0771
			(0.119)
Race*BF			0.275*
			(0.160)
Constant	-0.0849	-0.174	-0.104
	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.201)
Observations	627	636	627
R-squared	0.020	0.021	0.021

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tables 5-15: Predicted Probabilities for Models 1, 2, and 3 as Race, Beneficiary Status, Gender, and Survey Site Vary:

Table 5: Predicted Probabilities for Respondent's Evaluations of Their Current Class – Preta/Black:

Recife								Uberlândia							
Value of DV (Low=1, High=5)			1	2	3	4	5	Value of DV:			1	2	3	4	5
White	Ben.	Male	0.35	0.20	0.23	0.19	0.04	White	Ben.	Male	0.24	0.18	0.25	0.27	0.07
		Female	0.38	0.20	0.22	0.17	0.04			Female	0.26	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.06
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.30	0.19	0.24	0.22	0.05		Non-Ben.	Male	0.20	0.16	0.25	0.31	0.08
		Female	0.32	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.04			Female	0.22	0.17	0.25	0.29	0.07
Black	Ben.	Male	0.28	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.05	Black	Ben.	Male	0.18	0.15	0.25	0.32	0.09
		Female	0.30	0.19	0.24	0.22	0.05			Female	0.20	0.16	0.25	0.31	0.08
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.40	0.20	0.21	0.16	0.03		Non-Ben.	Male	0.27	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.05
	Ben.	Female	0.42	0.20	0.20	0.15	0.03			Female	0.30	0.19	0.24	0.22	0.05

Table 6: Predicted Probabilities for Respondent's Evaluations of Their Current Class – Parda/Mixed Race:

Recife								Uberlândia							
Value of DV (Low=1,High=5)			1	2	3	4	5	Value of DV:			1	2	3	4	5
White	Ben.	Male	0.28	0.19	0.24	0.23	0.05	White	Ben.	Male	0.18	0.16	0.25	0.32	0.09
		Female	0.31	0.20	0.24	0.21	0.05			Female	0.20	0.17	0.25	0.30	0.08
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.35	0.20	0.22	0.19	0.04		Non-Ben.	Male	0.24	0.18	0.25	0.17	0.06
		Female	0.38	0.21	0.21	0.17	0.3			Female	0.26	0.19	0.24	0.25	0.06
Black	Ben.	Male	0.38	0.21	0.21	0.17	0.3	Black	Ben.	Male	0.26	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.06
		Female	0.41	0.21	0.20	0.15	0.3			Female	0.29	0.20	0.24	0.22	0.05
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.27	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.05		Non-Ben.	Male	0.17	0.15	0.25	0.33	0.09
	Ben.	Female	0.30	0.20	0.24	0.22	0.05			Female	0.20	0.16	0.25	0.31	0.08

Table 7: Predicted Probabilities for Respondent's Evaluations of Their Current Class –Combined Race Measure:

Recife								Uberlândia							
Value of DV (Low=1,High=5)			1	2	3	4	5	Value of DV			1	2	3	4	5
White	Ben.	Male	0.27	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.06	White	Ben.	Male	0.17	0.15	0.25	0.33	0.09
		Female	0.29	0.19	0.24	0.22	0.05			Female	0.19	0.16	0.25	0.31	0.08
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.34	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.04		Non-Ben.	Male	0.23	0.17	0.25	0.28	0.07
		Female	0.36	0.20	0.22	0.18	0.04			Female	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.26	0.06
Black	Ben.	Male	0.36	0.20	0.22	0.18	0.04	Black	Ben.	Male	0.24	0.18	0.25	0.26	0.06
		Female	0.39	0.20	0.21	0.16	0.03			Female	0.27	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.06
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.31	0.19	0.24	0.22	0.05		Non-Ben.	Male	0.20	0.16	0.25	0.30	0.06
		Female	0.31	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.04			Female	0.22	0.17	0.25	0.28	0.07

Table 8: Predicted Probabilities for Respondent's Evaluations of Their Class in Five Years—Preta/Black:

Recife								Uberlândia							
Value of DV (Low=1,High=5)			1	2	3	4	5	Value of DV			1	2	3	4	5
White	Ben.	Male	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.26	0.30	White	Ben.	Male	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.25	0.47
		Female	0.11	0.16	0.14	0.26	0.32			Female	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.49
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.26	0.29		Non-Ben.	Male	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.27	0.46
		Female	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.26	0.31			Female	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.25	0.48
Black	Ben.	Male	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.26	0.45	Black	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.21	0.63
		Female	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.25	0.47			Female	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.20	0.64
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.26	0.31		Non-Ben.	Male	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.25	0.48
		Female	0.11	0.16	0.14	0.26	0.33			Female	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.25	0.50

Table 9: Predicted Probabilities for Respondent's Evaluations of Their Class in Five Years- Parda/Mixed Race:

Recife

Value of DV (Low=1,High=5)			1	2	3	4	5
	Ben.	Male	0.09	0.14	0.13	0.26	0.38
White		Female	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.26	0.40
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.15	0.18	0.15	0.25	0.27
		Female	0.14	0.18	0.15	0.25	0.27
Black	Ben.	Male	0.13	0.18	0.15	0.26	0.29
		Female	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.26	0.30
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.11	0.15	0.14	0.26	0.34
	Ben.	Female	0.10	0.14	0.14	0.26	0.56

Uberlândia

Value of DV:			1	2	3	4	5
White	Ben.	Male	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.23	0.56
		Female	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.22	0.57
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.16	0.41
		Female	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.26	0.43
Black	Ben.	Male	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.26	0.45
		Female	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.25	0.47
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.24	0.52
		Female	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.24	0.53

Table 10: Predicted Probabilities for Respondent's Evaluations of Their Class in Five Years—Combined Race Measure:

Recife

Value of DV (Low=1,High=5)			1	2	3	4	5
	Ben.	Male	0.09	0.14	0.13	0.26	0.38
White		Female	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.26	0.40
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.17	0.22	0.16	0.23	0.21
		Female	0.14	0.18	0.15	0.25	0.27
Black	Ben.	Male	0.13	0.18	0.15	0.26	0.29
		Female	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.26	0.30
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.11	0.15	0.14	0.26	0.34
	Ben.	Female	0.10	0.14	0.13	0.26	0.35

Uberlândia

Value of DV:			1	2	3	4	5
White	Ben.	Male	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.24	0.54
		Female	0.04	0.08	0.09	0.23	0.56
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.09	0.14	0.13	0.26	0.37
		Female	0.08	0.13	0.13	0.26	0.40
Black	Ben.	Male	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.50
		Female	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.24	0.51
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.24	0.51
		Female	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.24	0.53

Table 11: Predicted Probabilities for the Difference of Current Class and Class in Future- Black/Preta (Model 1):

			Recife -1	0	1	2	3	4	Uberlândia			-1	0	1	2	3	4
Value of DV (Low=1 ,Hi=5)			-1	0	1	2	3	4				-1	0	1	2	3	4
White	Ben.	Male	0.04	0.21	0.32	0.23	0.16	0.06	White	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.18	0.30	0.23	0.19	0.07
		Female	0.03	0.18	0.30	0.23	0.19	0.07			Female	0.02	0.15	0.28	0.24	0.21	0.09
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.05	0.26	0.33	0.19	0.13	0.04		Non-Ben.	Male	0.04	0.23	0.32	0.20	0.14	0.05
		Female	0.04	0.23	0.32	0.20	0.15	0.05			Female	0.03	0.20	0.31	0.22	0.17	0.06
Black	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.17	0.29	0.24	0.20	0.08	Black	Ben.	Male	0.02	0.14	0.27	0.24	0.22	0.09
		Female	0.02	0.14	0.27	0.24	0.23	0.09			Female	0.02	0.12	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.11
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.03	0.20	0.31	0.22	0.17	0.06		Non-Ben.	Male	0.03	0.17	0.30	0.25	0.20	0.08
		Female	0.03	0.17	0.29	0.24	0.20	0.08			Female	0.02	0.14	0.27	0.24	0.22	0.09

Table 12: Predicted Probabilities for the Difference of Current Class and Class in Future- Parda/Mixed Race (Model 2):

			Recife -1	0	1	2	3	4	Uberlândia			-1	0	1	2	3	4
Value of DV (Low=1,High=5)			-1	0	1	2	3	4				-1	0	1	2	3	4
White	Ben.	Male	0.04	0.20	0.31	0.22	0.17	0.06	White	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.17	0.29	0.24	0.20	0.09
		Female	0.03	0.17	0.29	0.23	0.20	0.08			Female	0.02	0.14	0.27	0.24	0.23	0.10
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.06	0.29	0.33	0.18	0.11	0.04		Non-Ben.	Male	0.05	0.25	0.32	0.20	0.14	0.05
		Female	0.05	0.25	0.32	0.19	0.13	0.05			Female	0.04	0.21	0.31	0.21	0.16	0.06
Black	Ben.	Male	0.04	0.21	0.31	0.22	0.16	0.06	Black	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.18	0.30	0.23	0.19	0.07
		Female	0.03	0.18	0.30	0.23	0.19	0.07			Female	0.03	0.15	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.09
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.04	0.22	0.32	0.21	0.16	0.05		Non-Ben.	Male	0.03	0.19	0.30	0.23	0.18	0.07
		Female	0.03	0.19	0.30	0.23	0.18	0.07			Female	0.05	0.16	0.28	0.24	0.21	0.08

Table13: Predicted Probabilities for the Difference Respondent's Evaluations of Their Current Class and Class in Future-Combined Race Measure (Model 3):

Recife			-1	0	1	2	3	4	Uberlândia			-1	0	1	2	3	4
Value of DV(Low=1,High=5)			-1	0	1	2	3	4				-1	0	1	2	3	4
White	Ben.	Male	0.04	0.21	0.32	0.22	0.16	0.06	White	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.17	0.30	0.23	0.19	0.07
		Female	0.03	0.18	0.30	0.23	0.19	0.07			Female	0.02	0.14	0.28	0.25	0.22	0.09
	Non-Ben.	Male	0.09	0.35	0.32	0.14	0.08	0.03		Non-Ben.	Male	0.06	0.31	0.33	0.17	0.10	0.03
		Female	0.06	0.31	0.33	0.16	0.10	0.03			Female	0.05	0.27	0.33	0.19	0.12	0.04
Black	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.20	0.32	0.22	0.16	0.06	Black	Ben.	Male	0.03	0.17	0.30	0.24	0.20	0.08
		Female	0.03	0.17	0.30	0.24	0.19	0.07			Female	0.02	0.14	0.27	0.25	0.23	0.09
	Non-Ben	Male	0.04	0.22	0.32	0.21	0.15	0.05		Non-Ben.	Male	0.03	0.18	0.31	0.23	0.19	0.07
		Female	0.03	0.18	0.31	0.23	0.18	0.07			Female	0.02	0.15	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.09

Table 14:Linear predictions for class mobility across region, race, gender and beneficiary status.

Recife			Prediction:	p-value:	Uberlândia			Prediction:	p-value:
White	Beneficiaries	Male	-0.19	0.113	White	Beneficiaries	Male	0.15	0.923
		Female	**-0.26**	**0.01*****			Female	0.08	0.407
	Non-Ben.	Male	-0.029	0.811		Non-Ben.	Male	-0.01	0.225
		Female	-0.01	0.331			Female	0.09	0.472
Black	Beneficiaries	Male	0.01	0.920	Black	Beneficiaries	**Male**	**0.19**	**0.04*****
		Female	-0.06	0.332			**Female**	**0.11**	**0.1†**
	Non-Ben.	Male	-0.11	0.265		Non-Ben.	Male	0.07	0.493
		Female	-0.18	0.018			Female	-0.001	0.981

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Dissertation Essay 3:
What Have You Done For Me Lately? : CCTs and Democratic Confidence In Brazil

Abstract: By the turn of the new millennium, measurements of citizen trust in government in those countries that had undergone a regime transition during the third wave had reached a stable low. At the same time, however, these nations, particularly those in Latin America, began an era of social policy innovation that soon spread around the globe. These policies significantly altered the daily lives of millions of the regions' poorest citizens, bringing large swaths of the population out of abject poverty. In perhaps no other country are these two points so starkly observed than in Brazil, where assessments of citizen confidence in democracy have ranked among the lowest of middle-income countries, and where one of the first innovations in anti-poverty policy grew to affect roughly a quarter of the population (some 50 million citizens) by 2013. In this paper, I assess the impact of Brazilian social policy on citizen assessments of democratic quality, defined along three salient dimensions. Through the use of novel survey data specifically designed to measure the opinions of those most affected by this policy, I attend to the variations within the most obviously affected subsection of the Brazilian populace—those who receive the program and their neighbors of similar means—specifically in terms of political interest. I find that receipt of the policy positively affects evaluations of democracy in some areas for those who are "tuned in" to the signal it gives off—those who are roughly more politically active.

Does social policy affect levels of democratic confidence and efficacy of those who receive it? Under what conditions might it do so? This paper argues that under conditions of continuing democratic consolidation and widespread disinterest in politics, policy receipt alone is not sufficient to engender significant change in attitudes towards democracy. Rather, such attitudinal change is consistently observed only among a sub-group of beneficiaries: those who are relatively more politically engaged than their neighbors. As individual engagement with politics increases—and with it the capability to process and synthesize the signal that policy provision constitutes a shift in government's attention to recipients—so too does confidence in democracy and attitudes of one's political efficacy.

This argument contributes to a substantial literature on the differential nature of political activity and engagement among socio-economic groups in a given polity. Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) argue that while legal channels of participation such as casting a vote and contacting political officials are theoretically citizenship rights extended to all members of a given polity, they are disproportionately available and accessed as a function of one's socio-economic standing. Where significant economic inequalities are present, the authors observe that advantaged groups more frequently and effectively make use of legal channels of participation. This holds even where "participation floors" such as compulsory voting institutions exist.

This seminal work of Sydney Verba and his coauthors (1972, 1978) lays the foundation for subsequent work on the resource model of political participation. Verba, Brady, and Schlozman (1995) build on the notion that higher socioeconomic status engenders greater engagement with politics through a specification of the particular

resources (time, money, civic knowledge) that more affluent members of society are disproportionately likely to possess, and the ways in which attainment of those resources structures political participation.

The resource model predicts that the poor will have similar levels of participation as a function of their shared socio-economic standing. This paper accepts the premise that the poor are less likely to have the tools necessary to engage politically and at the same challenges the implicit assumption that this group should possess uniform levels of political engagement. While the resource model literature focuses on the differences in engagement in an entire polity, the present work attends to the differential nature of engagement *within* a specific socioeconomic stratum in the context of mandatory voting. Where policy intervenes to generate increases in welfare within a social class (e.g. the extremely poor) I observe that differential levels of engagement generate different attitudinal outcomes among similar respondents.

A second area of scholarly inquiry also informs this research question. Studies of economic inequality, redistribution, and participation stemming from the seminal work of Meltzer and Richards (1981) (e.g. Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2005) suggest that as inequality increases the relative poverty of the poor vis-à-vis the wealthy. This inequality increases the attractiveness of redistributive policy, and therefore enhances engagement and mobilization among the poor. In theory, in an unequal society governments should enact more redistributive policies to suit the policy preferences of the median voter (who, given the income distribution, is likely to be poor). Such redistribution is increasingly costly to affluent citizens, and generates increasingly incompatible policy preferences and subsequently more contentious –and active—

political arenas. An extension of the premise of conflict theory would suggest that as a regime enacts more redistributive policies, program recipients would report increasing satisfaction with democracy. Conflict theory suggests that redistributive policy should have an effect on the attitudes of the poor. What remains for this paper to substantiate is the way in which that effect presents. The argument of this paper blends the premise that redistributive policy magnifies political attitudes and the premise that engagement matters.

The present argument has important implications for democratic consolidation generally, and vertical accountability in particular. An engaged and responsive citizenry possessed of a strong sense of political efficacy, that monitors and checks political officials, one that makes clear, programmatic demands on government, and participates fully in elections is vital for the health of the regime. The degree to which economic development, and specifically redistributive policy play a role in structuring recipients' attitudes towards the political system constitutes a significant element in the process of consolidation.

Mise en scene: Democracy and Policy Development in Latin America:

Thirty years ago the landscape of democratic nations looked quite different than it does today. In no region is this more strikingly the case than in South America, where nearly the entire continent saw military and authoritarian systems fall in the 1980s and early 1990s. While democratic governments have firmly taken root in terrains as varied as the Andes and Tierra del Fuego, the quality of those many democratic systems remains quite mixed—as the citizens of these countries are well aware. Indeed, after the initial

"honeymoon" period of high esteem for the day-to-day functioning of their fledgling democratic regimes, Latin American citizens' approval of these democratically elected administrations largely dropped below fifty percent, and have remained stably low over the course of the following twenty years. Brazil, the region's largest democracy both geographically and in population, has among the lowest citizen evaluations of confidence in and satisfaction with the functioning of democratic governments, despite an increasing—though still low for region and world averages—acceptance of and preference for democracy as a regime type, vis-à-vis authoritarianism. Using data from the Latinobarómetro survey of 17 Latin American countries, published works (Lagos 2003, Payne et al 2006) consistently show that regional support for democracy was high through the 1990s (roughly 60% of respondents attesting to confidence in the system) and dipped significantly around 2000 (to roughly 40% of respondents reporting support for democracy) and has stayed low in the years since (around 50% of respondents). In Brazil specifically, support for democracy dropped from 50% in the mid-1990s, to 38% in the early 2000s (see Payne et al 2006).

This mixed evaluation of democracy, combined with disillusionment with democratic performance with respect for democracy as an ideal regime type, fits the pattern identified by Pippa Norris (1999) in her influential edited volume on the quality of democracy at the turn of the new millennium. She finds the same dualistic assessment in advanced industrial countries with long histories of inclusive democratic practices, such as Germany and Sweden, as well as the newer democracies of the third wave. In short, Latin America broadly, and Brazil specifically, are no outliers when it comes to citizen skepticism of democratic administrations but broad respect for citizens' rights and

democratic practices. She observes the important challenges this mass skepticism may pose for democracy, as disillusionment enervates the public and erodes their ability to meet the rigorous demands of vertical accountability. Then as now, engaged publics that challenge and monitor political elites and that participate meaningfully in the electoral process are an important factor in the consolidation of healthy democratic systems and vertical accountability.

Times have changed, however, in the nearly two decades since Norris' volume. Political and, very importantly, economic developments in both the Latin American region and the world stand to affect meaningfully both the objective quality of democracy in developing nations as well as the opinions constituents have of those administrations. Notable among these developments is innovative social policy designed with the very aim of reducing extreme poverty through the programmatic inclusion into democratic administrations of the poorest and most marginalized citizens. In Latin America, the programs most responsible for this democratic shift in policy design belong to a family of policies called "conditional cash transfers" (CCTs). Brazil was at the forefront of this policy innovation, implementing the *Bolsa Escola* nationally in 2001 and consolidating and expanding the program under a new name, the *Bolsa Família* (PBF), two years later. The PBF at once reduces immediate extreme poverty through a monthly, means-tested stipend to families with children, and impacts intergenerational poverty through requiring recipient families to meet health and education goals for children in the household to continue their eligibility for the monetary benefit. Now with over 13 million beneficiary families – or nearly a quarter of the total Brazilian population--the program has been

remarkably successful at its intended goals.[22] Extreme poverty has been halved in the time since the PBF's expansion, and child mortality has decreased substantially, specifically with respect to deaths caused by malnutrition and diarrhea, the two causes most explicitly rooted in extreme poverty. In short, with such a significant impact on both the daily lives and the futures of millions of citizens—many of whom had previously been so marginalized as to lack even a form of formal, government-sanctioned, identification[23]— such a programmatic intervention warrants inquiry into whether and how it might affect attitudes towards democracy, in terms of its abstract quality, its day-to-day functioning, and in terms of its impact on the relative ability of those citizens to participate in the system.

Given this shift in policy attention, one might reasonably expect that evaluations of democracy of those affected by the program would increase relative to other classes. Ignored by administrations ranging from the corporatists of the 1940s, to the military regimes of the mid-century, to the neo-liberal presidents of the early return to democracy, program beneficiaries finally have a positive answer to the question, "what has democracy done for me lately?" Now formally included in the programmatic political arena, recipients may report a stronger preference for democratic ideals. Imbued with new entitlement, recipients may view the day-to-day functioning of government differently than their neighbors who do not receive the program. Furthermore, having gone through the bureaucratic process required to receive and maintain their stipends,

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[22] For detailed analysis on the intended effects of the PBF, see: Rasella et al (2013) on child mortality; World Bank estimates on poverty reduction; Glewwe and Kassouf (2010) on educational outcomes.
[23] For a detailed account of formal identification and documentation within Brazil's informal sector, and the impact of the PBF and other social policies, see Hunter and Sugiyama's (2011) APSA meeting paper.

beneficiaries may feel more efficacious than similar individuals who do not have this new experience with government.

This paper is one of few studies to analyze the degree to which the PBF structures recipients' attitudes towards democracy. To date, only one other working paper, Layton et al (unpublished manuscript 2014), attends to this possibility. Using nationally-representative data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, the authors argue that receipt of the PBF should increase perceptions of democratic quality across a variety of measures and increase the legitimacy of the status-quo regime. The results of their analysis suggest that there is weakly increasing support for democracy among recipients relative to non-recipients. However, while the authors do employ a covariate matching strategy to create a pool of non-beneficiaries that reflects the observable characteristics of beneficiary respondents along a vector of covariates ranging from residence in a particular region of Brazil, to household characteristics, to individual level attributes, the data's general purpose is to measure attitudes from the entire national population, and therefore does not contain a significant number of similar respondents that do and do not receive the PBF. This does not allow a fine-grained evaluation of program recipients and non-recipients from similar communities, and thus may be too blunt to observe the attitudinal differences within that very specific polity, and the treatment effects of the PBF.

In light of Layton et al's study, is the simple provision of the program sufficient to change the attitudes of the poor? After all, this is a segment of the population with a high percentage of functionally illiterate adults,[24] and with historically little interaction in the

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[24] For instance, in my sample, over one fifth of the total sample reported attaining less than four years of schooling, and more than two thirds reported attaining less than a high school education.

programmatic political sphere, as in large part, politicians essentially engaged the poor only clientelistically.[25] In short, armed with few of the skills Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1986, 2012) would deem necessary to sing a samba in the "unheavenly chorus," crediting the program outright with a higher evaluation of democracy might be a difficult task for many individuals in this population. Therefore, it may be that the presence of the PBF affects the attitudes about democracy of those who are *a priori* primed to connect program provision to their assessments, those who pick up on the signal that the program sends out—those who are already *politically interested*.[26] Thus, those respondents who are politically active-- those who care about politics, and those who have a partisan affiliation--might be more likely respond to the program with more favorable attitudes, particularly if have first-hand experience with it. That activism might magnify or activate the effect of having received a PBF stipend is not unprecedented: Kaknes (chapter 1) shows that when beneficiaries attribute provision of the PBF to the ruling Workers' Party, they are significantly more likely to vote for that party across all layers of governance, relative to both similar non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries that do not attribute provision to the incumbent administration.

The paper continues by first establishing the key hypotheses derived from the above discussion. I then discuss the novel survey data set, and measurement and operationalization of key variables. The subsequent two sections discuss the statistical analysis of the novel survey data, and a comparison with nationally- representative data,

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[25] For sociological and ethnographic scholarship on the political attitudes of the poor, see for instance Janice Perlman's (2012) descriptions of the changing attitudes of shantytown residents in Rio de Janeiro, or Sugiyama and Hunter's (2010) focus groups with North Eastern PBF recipients.
[26] I thank Cesar Zucco for the suggestion to analyze the relative political activity of beneficiaries as it regards their political opinions.

and show the ways in which the Bolsa Família magnifies support for democracy among activists and partisans. A final section concludes.

Hypotheses:

Thus, in the analysis below, I will therefore test three key hypotheses:

H1: Beneficiary Status Matters: Following the work of Layton et al (2014), when higher quality data is employed, the PBF may have an effect on the democratic assessments of only those who have direct experience with the program, regardless of their level of political engagement. If this hypothesis is supported, we should expect to see that the indicator for beneficiary status is positive and significant in the following analysis.

H2: Resource Model: Poor citizens lack the skills necessary to evaluate democracy and engage with it. Thus we should not expect results for relatively more engaged respondents.

H3: Conflict Theory: Redistributive policy mobilizes those that are most affected by it such that relatively higher levels of political engagement should influence respondents' attitudes towards democracy, regardless of beneficiary status. This would indicate that the provision of the PBF is, at best, a background influence of respondents' assessments. If this hypothesis is supported, we should expect to see that the variable indicating political engagement is positive and significant, while beneficiary status terms are not.

H4: Program Receipt and Political Interest Exert Joint Effects: Beneficiary status' effect is magnified by greater political interest. Beneficiary respondents who are politically

aware and interested understand the impact of the PBF on their lives and credit the government with that improvement in their lives. Respondents who are "active beneficiaries" are more likely hold positive views about the state of democracy, relative to either non-beneficiary sophisticates or passive beneficiaries.

These theoretical predictions are better understood through the following tables. The shaded areas indicate each literature's expectation of the respondent types for which we should expect to see differential attitudinal responses emerge from the statistical analysis. As the tables below show, predictions vary along two dimensions, beneficiary status and level of political engagement. Thus, Layton et al (2014) expect receipt of the PBF to affect the democratic assessments of PBF recipients and do not make a prediction on variation of level of engagement, therefore their prediction varies only on the dimension of beneficiary status. The classic resource model of political participation, stemming from the many works of Sidney Verba and coauthors, suggests that the poor lack the skills to participate (here including regime assessments) and therefore we should not expect results for engaged respondents, here represented with the "Not Engaged" column shaded. As this theory does not include discussions of the effect of policy on engagement, it does not vary along those lines. Following the conflict theory of inequality and participation, redistributive policy should raise the stakes of participation for all members of the socio-economic stratum, thus we should expect that policy affecting "me and people like me" to motivate all individuals to become more engaged. We should therefore see results that do not statistically differentiate between recipients and non-recipients. Finally, the argument of this paper and the others in this dissertation is that receipt of the

PBF conditions the expected responses. We should therefore see differential effects for "active beneficiaries" if this hypothesis holds.

The tables are as follows:

Table 1: Hypothesis 1:

	Engaged	Not Engaged
Beneficiary	Current CCT Literature (Layton et al 2014)	
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 2: Hypothesis 2: Resource Model of Political Participation

	Engaged	Not Engaged
Beneficiary		Resource Theory
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 3: Hypothesis 3: Conflict Theory

	Engaged	Not Engaged
Beneficiary	Conflict Theory	
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 4: Hypothesis 4:

	Engaged	Not Engaged
Beneficiary	Hypothesis 4: Joint Effect of Receipt and Engagement	
Non-Beneficiary		

Table 5: Summary of All Hypotheses and Predictions:

	Engaged		Not Engaged	
Beneficiary	H1: ↑	H2: No Change	H1: ↑	H2: ↑
	H3: ↑	H4: ↑↑	H3: No Change	H4: ↑

Non-Beneficiary	H1: ↓	H2:No Change	H1: ↓	H2:↑
	H3:↑	H4: ↑	H3:No Change	H4: No Change
Key: ↑= Increased assessment of democracy ↓=Decreased assessment ↑↑=Strong assessment relative to other sub-groups. **No change**=theory does not predict an observable change in the mobility assessments for this sub-group.				

Data and Methods:

This paper employs novel survey data collected in two cities in Brazil from April to August 2014. Uberlândia, Minas Gerais is a relatively large city in the interior of the country, about six hours' drive south of the capital, Brasilia. With both rural and urban elements, it serves as a baseline for comparison with the North East of the country, which is significantly less developed, in economic, infrastructural, and political terms. For this reason, over 60 percent of all PBF transfers go to the North East. The second survey site, Recife, on the Atlantic coast of Pernambuco state, is one such North Eastern city.

The novel survey design employed in this paper allows a careful and precise comparison of beneficiaries ("treated") and non-beneficiaries ("control") within the context of the same neighborhoods. This survey is capable of greater isolation of treatment effects that is nationally representative survey data that has been matched on observable covariates. What larger surveys gain in generalizability, they lack in internal validity, which is the focus of this survey. [27] To further the precise evaluation of treatment effects in this analysis, I employ a genetic matching algorithm to the raw data. This attends to some slight imbalances in the data. Beneficiaries are slightly more likely to be poorer women of childbearing age than are non-beneficiaries. While this imbalance

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[27] More details about the nature of this survey can be found in the introduction to this dissertation.

is likely a direct function of program receipt (e.g. that it is a means-tested policy preferentially given to the woman head of household who have small and school-age children) I match the data for balance on these characteristics so that there is no observable characteristic that might affect the interpretation of treatment effects other that the key variables of interest.

Measuring Trust and Satisfaction: An Ongoing Pursuit:

Political scientists have long sought an understanding of mass opinion of democracy. Such approval has implications for a variety of important concepts, from regime change to democratic consolidation and the survival of equalitarian institutions. Therefore, the operationalizations in the present study stand on the shoulders of a vast body of scholarship. David Easton (1965, 1975)'s seminal work on mass attitudes towards democracy first proposed the division of *diffuse* support for regime principles and the political community and *specific* support for democratic performance, institutions, and actors. Pippa Norris (1999, 2011) further divides the diffuse-specific typology into a continuum of five different objects of support, of which Easton's diffuse and specific measures are two. Subsequent authors employ a similar approach that further details the types of system support (e.g. Dalton 2004; Booth and Seligson 2009). Norris is correct to distinguish between attitudes towards abstract concepts such as citizens' rights in a democratic system and necessity of elections, and opinions about the day-to-day functioning of democratic institutions. However, while Norris theorizes the necessity of a continuum from diffuse to specific, I punctuate my analysis into a focus of the two major

areas along the spectrum of democratic attitudes that she highlights. Beyond this, I incorporate a third area of great importance to democratic quality, respondents' assessments of their own political efficacy. As the relative strength of a polity's vertical accountability is ultimately the element most deeply and immediately affected by citizens' appraisals of democracy, understanding the degree of efficacy in the polity is a particularly important addition to an analysis of democratic quality. The three dependent variables I analysis are, therefore, (1) "diffuse" support for democracy as a regime, (2) "specific" confidence in major political, administrative, and electoral institutions, and (3) respondents' attitudes of expressive of their efficacy to change and willingness to participate in the system. This encapsulates and allows response and comparison with major theories and inquiries in this scholarship through analysis of the most diffuse and most specific elements of Norris' continuum, and encorporates the understanding of how the same group views its ability to participate.

I measure these three salient dimensions of attitudes towards using graded response models that use an iterative Bayesian algorithm to incorporate several individual variables into one continuous measure of the underlying attitude. This allows the seamless inclusion of many factors that contribute to the measurement of the latent trait underlying each of these three distinct conceptualizations of democratic confidence. These models have substantial benefits over both additive scales generated through the simple addition of correlated variables, or on separate regressions of each variable itself. In general, item response models, the family to which the graded response model belongs, take several discrete variables or "items", and evaluate the degree to which each

individual item both relates to other items in the series and to the measurement of the latent trait. Instead of simply creating additive measure by summing the variables and evaluating consistency using *Cronbach's* Alpha, this family of models evaluates the impact of each item in the modeling process as well as provides a continuous measurement of the latent trait.[28][29]

In the present case, to measure the latent attitudes towards democracy, I include several individual variables that each measure one aspect of each conceptualization into the graded response model. To measure respondents' confidence in the day-to-day functioning of democracy, I include seven distinct questions that measure confidence in separate political institutions: the federal government, the presidency, congress, municipal government, elections, political parties, and the Brazilian political system. In each case, respondents were asked the degree of confidence they have in each institution, along a 7-point Likert scale. Similarly, to model citizen assessment of efficacy, I include questions that ask respondents to rate on a seven-point Likert scale the degree to which: they think that their opinions matter as much as other Brazilians', they can influence politics in their communities, that politicians listen to their demands, and that they can influence national politicians. Finally, to model preferences for democracy as a regime, I include three variables that elicit an evaluation of democracy and participation vis-à-vis

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[28] For robustness, additive scales using the same component variables were created. The results of the graded response models hold. This is true also of individual regressions on each component variable, the results of which are available upon request. More detailed analysis of each dependent variable, including graphs of the distributions are available on request.

[29] Specifically, IRT models evaluate the difficulty of each question and the degree to which each item discriminates between "types" of the latent variable. As these models are widely applied in education, a particularly instructive example would be to measure a student's abilities in a particular subject (the latent trait), one might administer a test with several questions (items). The model would evaluate the degree to which each item is difficult (how hard it is to get the right answer) as well as how well each item discriminates between high and low ability students—essentially a measure of each item's validity.

authoritarian rule.[30]   The continuous variables produced through storage of the estimates generated by the item response model provide an observed measure of latent attitudes towards one of the three characterizations of democratic quality: regime preference, trust in democratic institutions, and respondent efficacy, and become the dependent variables in the subsequent regression analysis.

Measuring Political Engagement: Concept and Context

The concept of political engagement is related to a variety of components of democratic life. It involves a component of what a citizen does (activity), often conditioned by an institutional component of what a citizen is allowed or obliged to do, and a component of what a citizen knows (sophistication). The concept is therefore informed by studies that isolate one or the other constituent element. In comparative studies, an operationalization engagement must also take into account the context of the polity or polities under consideration. The operationalization employed in this study is grounded in decades of scholarship that, whether it is acknowledged outright or not, is based upon the particular context of the societies analyzed in each work. In this paper, I attend to the specific conditions of the Brazilian poor.

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[30] These questions are as follows: (1) "Do you believe that in our country a government with a "strong fist" is necessary, or should problems be resolved with everyone's participation?", (2)"With which of the three following sentences are you most in agreement: A) For people like me, it doesn't matter if the government is democratic or not; B) Democracy is always preferable to whatever other form of government; C) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one." (3) Some people say we need a strong leader, that isn't elected through the vote. Others say that, even if things don't always work out, electoral democracy, that is, the popular vote, is always better. What do you think?"

Since the path breaking scholarship of Converse (1964) and Campbell, et al (1960) first introduced the notion that mass publics might differ along an informational, ideological, or a "degree of activism" dimension, the concept of political sophistication, broadly defined, has received a great deal of attention in the behavioral literature. Many specifications, operationalizations, and models have been employed to measure it and understand its effects. The concept is operationalized differently even between these two seminal works, as Converse focuses on ideological placement along the standard liberal-conservative spectrum, and Campbell et al center their analysis around the nature and effects of partisan identification. As statistical methods capable of more complex modeling strategies evolved, the literature on this topic flourished. For example, coming from a political-psychological approach, Luskin (1987, 1990) defines political sophistication as a high degree of coherency in political cognition and uses structural equation models to understand the latent contributions of several related variables including education levels, ideological self-placement on the liberal-conservative continuum and the placement of political elites on the same, political knowledge questions, and an interviewer rating of respondent's apparent level of political information. Still other projects use one or another of these variables, particularly political knowledge questions, as a stand-alone proxy for political sophistication.

From a comparative perspective, Gordon and Segura (1997) argue that the political context plays a role in determining an individual's level of sophistication, which they operationalize using income, education and political knowledge questions. They develop a model that includes institutional variation such as the type of electoral system and the

nature of competiveness in the party system as larger order terms that affect the sophistication of citizens. Indeed, here as in most things, context is key. The context of Brazilian partisanship and activism in the general populace differs a great deal from that of the United States, such that measurement must be adapted to fit the constraints on the ground, both general ones and those that are specific to this population. The Brazilian mass public has been described as disinterested, disaffected, and at times, disgusted with politics and politicians. Indeed, until very recent scholarship began to suggest otherwise,[31] Brazilian political parties and the party system were infamous for their "weak roots in society, and "inchoate, feckless" nature.[32] This context obviously differs starkly from the institutionalized parties in the U.S. Under this political environment, if a respondent in a Brazilian survey self-identifies as a partisan, already we can infer that this respondent has a greater deal of political interest and activity than the average citizen. This is magnified in the population under present analysis. As explained above, not only does this population typically lack the educational and social resources classically theorized to motivate political interest, but it also has a history of political marginalization that would demotivate political activity. While partisan sympathies are an indication of engagement among the general populace, that signal is magnified in the present sub-section. Further still, a respondent that reports activity beyond a partisan proclivity, such as attending party meetings, working for a campaign, or speaking to others about candidates, or reports an attitude such as interest in politics, is clearly a politically sophisticate or activist.

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[31] See Kaknes (2015, manuscript) and Hagopian et al (2009) for descriptions of how the party system is consolidating, at the mass and elite levels, respectively.

[32] The most salient scholarship to describe the Brazilian party system this way is the work of Scott Mainwaring (1999), and Mainwaring and Scully (1995).

I at once take cues from the American behaviorist tradition that measures both sophistication and resources, and attend to the specific context of the Brazilian case to develop a scale of political engagement. I use the same innovative measurement strategy to model latent political engagement as is employed with the dependent variables. In this graded response model, I include individual items that measure: reported partisan sympathy, level of interest in politics, whether the respondent has worked for a campaign, number of political party meetings attended, and whether the respondent speaks to neighbors about candidates. The continuous variable returned by the model has some imperfections. As the resource literature expects, the pool of engaged respondents is rather small in this sample (as it would also likely be nationally). Thus, we must be aware that this variable is not normally distributed; rather it is skewed towards low political interest. Still, it is important to understand the effect of policy receipt on democratic trust as interest varies at the margins, and the requisite interacted term between policy receipt and interest is also included.

As the number of respondents reporting levels of activism is low, I also run the models using only a measure of partisanship—previously a constituent element in the measurement model—to understand the individual effect of the most prevalent component attitude. In this subsequent analysis, I also include the interacted term with beneficiary status.

Analysis:

[Insert tables 1-3 about here.]

As the dependent variables are continuous, I run standard OLS regressions with matching weights. I first run baseline models including only the term for beneficiary status, as shown on the leftmost side of each table. Surprisingly perhaps, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries do not differ significantly in their assessments of democratic confidence, regime preference, or individual efficacy. With this targeted dataset designed to best measure the poor (as opposed to all social classes) it is difficult to discern whether this finding is suggestive of a class-wide effect, such that the presence of program provision affects *both* beneficiaries and their neighbors in the same way, or if it simply has no effect. This is a point to which we shall return later, with nationally representative data.

The terms for political interest and its joint effect with beneficiary status are included in the second series of models, displayed in the middle of each table. The results generally align with what may have been expected, given both the nature of political interest in the American behavioral literature and the results of the first series of models. Those who are more politically active are significantly more likely to have higher trust in democratic institutions, prefer democracy as a regime, and have stronger confidence in their own efficacy. The joint effect of interest levels and receipt of the PBF has less consistent results. However, we do observe one very interesting result; beneficiary respondents who are more politically interested are even more likely than either non-beneficiary activists or passive beneficiaries to highly rate their own efficacy.

[Insert Graph 1 about here]

As we can see in Graph 1, the slope showing the effect of interest on efficacy for beneficiaries is far steeper than that of non-beneficiaries, suggesting that interest has a magnifying effect on recipients of the program. Those with low values of interest report lesser feelings of efficacy, while beneficiary respondents with higher levels of interest are much more confident in their ability to participate in the system relative to non-beneficiaries, for whom the slope is rather flat.

Finally, I replace the continuous measurement of political interest with a simple partisan dummy, taking one if the respondent reports sympathy for any party. Following the argument above, given the generally weak nature of citizens' political interest in the Brazilian context, we can take reporting a partisan sympathy as a broad proxy of the concept. The results here are quite striking and differ from those returned using the continuous specification. For both attitudes towards efficacy and trust in institutions, partisan beneficiaries are a good deal more likely to report higher confidence, while non-beneficiary partisans are significantly likely to report only higher trust in institutions. As with the previous specifications, there is not a significant effect for diffuse regime attitudes.

[Insert Table 6 about here]

The effects of beneficiary status and reported partisanship are best displayed in Table 6, which shows the mean level of reported efficacy or trust by subgroup. We see that partisan beneficiaries are essentially the only respondents to have a positive mean value of efficacy and, essentially, also confidence in institutions. Interestingly, non-partisans of either recipient status have negative mean values of both dependent variables, though beneficiaries' mean value is lower, mirroring the pattern first shown in the steep slope of the continuous operationalization of political engagement. In short, this analysis shows that beneficiary status matters, but at the margins. For those individuals who are politically aware, receipt of the program intensifies their assessments of democracy.

Section two: Comparison with Nationally Representative Data.

How does the fine-grained picture provided in this carefully constructed data set compare to the broader depiction generated with nationally-representative data? To assess both the generalizability of the results obtained with my original survey data and to assess the class-wide question raised in the above analysis, I replicate as best as possible my analysis using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)'s 2014 wave in Brazil.

Several of the questions included in the novel questionnaire above and subsequently used as constituent elements of the graded response models were purposely worded identically or as closely as possible (given contextual changes) to those historically included in the LAPOP questionnaires, for the explicit purpose of replication. As both surveys were in

the field at the same time, however, this wording and inclusion was based on the 2012 survey. As it happens, the LAPOP questionnaire underwent significant revisions, and two of the questions regarding regime type were removed from the survey, as well as two of the political activism questions. As the full conceptualization of efficacy is a novel contribution of the present work, only a replication of the democratic trust dependent variable is feasible, using partisanship as a proxy for engagement. I therefore run the analysis on the one regime variable, and replicate the analysis above most closely with the democratic trust graded response model.

To keep the two analyses as similar as possible, I again employ Jas Sehkon's genetic matching algorithm to the LAPOP data, this time balancing on income, education, age, region of the country, gender, and household size. Interestingly, once unbalanced observations are removed from the sample, the two data sets have essentially the same number of observations, as the LAPOP data set is reduced to 687 relevant respondents. I replicate the creation of the dependent variable for confidence in institutions and include binary indicators for beneficiary status, partisan sympathies and the interacted term as independent variables of interest, as well as standard demographic controls.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

As table 4 shows, when we compare beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries only along observed pre-treatment covariates and do not compare individuals from the same areas, the baseline models suggest that beneficiary status on its own significantly affects

confidence in institutions, something we did not observe in the data that more closely compares treatment and control responses from the same communities. This effect is robust to the inclusion of partisanship indicators, though like my original data, the effect to partisan beneficiaries is somewhat higher than either marginal group alone—though all three terms are significant. Furthermore, like my survey, the PBF and partisanship have no effect on regime preferences. [33] In substantive terms, referring back to Table 6, we can see that the sub-group means do not follow the same pattern as that observed with the original dataset. Non-partisan beneficiaries have a positive (and significant) mean level of trust, while partisan non-beneficiaries have a far higher mean level of trust than do partisan beneficiaries.

Conclusion:

Citizen opinion of democracy is a critical element in the long-term development of healthy, consolidated democratic polities. The foundation of theoretical and empirical assessments of democratic quality stems from the argument that interested publics are necessary to hold elites accountable, generate vibrant public debates, and take elections seriously. Populaces that support the abstract tenets of democracy, that have a high degree of confidence in the functioning of institutions, and that believe they have an important part to play in the system are more likely to meaningfully fulfill these essential duties. Citizen support, however, does not exist in a vacuum. To ultimately develop

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[33] To compare this result with my data, I reran the analysis using only the common dependent variable (outright preference for democracy over an authoritarian system). The results are consistent with the presented models using both data sets, and are available upon request.

better, more programmatic, and transparent systems, it may be necessary to first extend policy that whets the public's appetite for participation.

This paper has endeavored to uncover how one such program affects these pivotal mass opinions. In doing so it makes a set contributions to extant scholarship. Methodologically, it innovates both in terms of modeling choices and in survey design and implementation. The use of graded response models to measure respondents' democratic attitudes allows for a much more nuanced evaluation of the broader idea of democratic trust. The novel survey data set presented here employs a unique sampling design that allows a close comparison of individuals that receive the policy and those that do not. The ability to compare individuals within their same communities holds constant myriad unobservable and potentially confounding qualities, and allows a singular opportunity to assess the attitudinal differences between very similar respondents, something that is rarely done with nationally representative data. The evidence presented suggests that when treatment and control units are drawn from the same areas, and are therefore very closely balanced, the individual effect of the program is attenuated, but when the data compare units from across sub-regions with each other, the program's effect is reinstated. Both of these findings are useful for our understanding of the total impact of the Bolsa Família. Theoretically, this paper proposes the novel suggestion that policy might affect not only day-to-day confidence in institutions, but also the degree to which recipients feel that their voices and actions matter. It suggests that the poor cannot be treated as one cohesive and homogeneous group, but rather that distinct levels of interest may subdivide the population. Empirically, this paper shows that this sub-group

division is quite relevant, and that receipt of anti-poverty policy magnifies the impact of that division.

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Table 1: Effect of Beneficiary Status and Political Engagement on Regime Attitudes

Variables	Baseline Model					Model Including Political Engagement Terms					Model Including Partisanship Terms				
DV Regime IRT	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper
Beneficiary Status	0.042	0.062	0.499	-0.080	0.163	0.019	0.061	0.760	-0.101	0.138	-0.019	0.078	0.808	-0.173	0.135
Pol. Active	--	--	--	--	--	**0.187***	0.069	**0.007**	0.051	0.322	--	--	--	--	--
Pol. Active * Ben. Status	--	--	--	--	--	0.066	0.085	0.439	-0.101	0.233	--	--	--	--	--
PID	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.027	0.098	0.783	-0.165	0.220
PID* Ben Status	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.159	0.127	0.211	-0.090	0.409
Age	0.005***	0.002	0.025	0.001	0.010	0.004*	0.002	0.074	0.000	0.009	0.005**	0.002	0.025	0.001	0.010
Gender	0.081	0.071	0.253	-0.058	0.219	0.047	0.069	0.499	-0.089	0.183	0.076	0.070	0.282	-0.063	0.214
Race	-0.039	0.068	0.571	-0.172	0.095	-0.045	0.067	0.498	-0.176	0.086	-0.040	0.068	0.557	-0.173	0.094
Income	0.029	0.020	0.137	-0.009	0.068	0.033*	0.020	0.092	-0.005	0.071	0.032	0.020	0.108	-0.007	0.071
Recife	-0.073	0.062	0.242	-0.195	0.049	-0.022	0.062	0.722	-0.143	0.099	-0.075	0.062	0.230	-0.196	0.047
Education	0.030***	0.010	0.003	0.011	0.050	0.025***	0.010	0.013	0.005	0.044	0.030***	0.010	0.003	0.010	0.049
Constant	-0.414	0.164	0.012	-0.736	-0.092	-0.322**	0.161	0.046	-0.638	-0.005	-0.415	0.166	0.013	-0.740	-0.089

Table 2: Effect of Beneficiary Status and Political Engagement on Democratic Confidence

Variables	Baseline Model					Model Including Political Engagement Terms					Model Including Partisanship Terms				
DV Democratic Confidence IRT	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper
Beneficiary Status	0.004	0.077	0.957	-0.147	0.156	-0.035	0.074	0.638	-0.180	0.110	-0.113	0.095	0.237	-0.300	0.074
Pol. Active	--	--	--	--	--	0.308***	0.084	0.000	0.143	0.473	--	--	--	--	--
Pol. Active * Ben. Status	--	--	--	--	--	0.121	0.104	0.244	-0.083	0.325	--	--	--	--	--
PID	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.242**	0.119	0.043	0.008	0.477
PID* Ben Status	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.303**	0.155	0.050	-0.001	0.607
Age	-0.001	0.003	0.646	-0.007	0.005	-0.003	0.003	0.242	-0.009	0.002	-0.002	0.003	0.552	-0.008	0.004
Gender	0.035	0.088	0.691	-0.138	0.208	-0.022	0.085	0.798	-0.188	0.144	0.017	0.086	0.847	-0.152	0.185
Race	0.196**	0.085	0.021	0.030	0.363	0.186**	0.081	0.023	0.026	0.345	0.187	0.083	0.024	0.024	0.349
Income	0.046*	0.025	0.062	-0.002	0.095	0.052**	0.024	0.029	0.005	0.099	0.051**	0.024	0.033	0.004	0.099
Recife	-0.294***	0.077	0.000	-0.446	-0.142	-0.209***	0.075	0.006	-0.356	-0.061	-0.295***	0.075	0.000	-0.443	-0.146
Education	0.000	0.012	0.971	-0.024	0.025	-0.009	0.012	0.441	-0.033	0.014	-0.001	0.012	0.912	-0.025	0.023
Constant	0.010	0.204	0.961	-0.391	0.411	0.165	0.197	0.403	-0.221	0.551	-0.038	0.202	0.851	-0.435	0.359

Table 3: Effect of Beneficiary Status and Political Engagement on Assessments of Individual Efficacy

Variables	Baseline Model					Model Including Political Engagement Terms					Model Including Partisanship Terms				
DV Efficacy IRT	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper
Beneficiary Status	0.018	0.070	0.800	-0.120	0.156	-0.016	0.067	0.816	-0.148	0.116	-0.109	0.087	0.211	-0.280	0.062
Engaged	--	--	--	--	--	**0.234***	0.076	**0.002**	0.084	0.384	--	--	--	--	--
Engaged * Ben. Status	--	--	--	--	--	**0.183***	0.094	**0.054**	-0.003	0.368	--	--	--	--	--
PID	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.142	0.109	0.193	-0.072	0.357
PID* Ben Status	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	**0.331****	0.142	**0.020**	0.053	0.609
Age	0.003***	0.003	0.236	-0.002	0.009	0.002	0.003	0.572	-0.004	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.256	-0.002	0.008
Gender	0.143*	0.080	0.074	-0.014	0.301	0.095	0.077	0.220	-0.057	0.246	0.129	0.079	0.101	-0.025	0.283
Race	0.059	0.077	0.448	-0.093	0.211	0.053	0.074	0.471	-0.092	0.199	0.053	0.076	0.486	-0.096	0.202
Income	-0.003	0.022	0.892	-0.047	0.041	0.005	0.022	0.828	-0.038	0.047	0.002	0.022	0.920	-0.041	0.046
Recife	-0.350***	0.070	0.000	-0.489	-0.212	-0.276	0.068	0.000	-0.410	-0.142	-0.353***	0.069	0.000	-0.488	-0.217
Education	0.007	0.011	0.548	-0.016	0.029	-0.002	0.011	0.834	-0.024	0.019	0.005	0.011	0.634	-0.017	0.027
Constant	-0.156	0.186	0.403	-0.521	0.210	-0.020	0.179	0.913	-0.370	0.331	-0.178	0.185	0.335	-0.541	0.185

Table 4: Effect of Beneficiary status and Party I.D. on Democratic Confidence: LAPOP Data

DV Democratic Confidence IRT	Baseline Model					Model Including Partisanship Terms				
	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper
Ben. Status	**0.166**	0.073	**0.022**	0.024	0.309	**0.307**	0.083	**0.000**	0.144	0.470
PID	--	--	--	--	--	**0.571**	0.127	**0.000**	0.323	0.820
Pid*Ben Status	--	---	--	--	--	**-0.641**	0.169	**0.000**	-0.973	-0.309
income	-0.065	0.026	0.014	-0.116	-0.013	-0.053	0.026	0.044	-0.104	-0.001
race	-0.113	0.087	0.194	-0.285	0.058	-0.110	0.086	0.202	-0.280	0.059
edu	-0.054	0.014	0.000	-0.082	-0.026	-0.058	0.014	0.000	-0.085	-0.031
Age	-0.004	0.003	0.172	-0.011	0.002	-0.005	0.003	0.106	-0.011	0.001
north	0.015	0.127	0.905	-0.235	0.265	0.041	0.126	0.746	-0.207	0.288
north east	-0.193	0.114	0.091	-0.417	0.031	-0.225	0.113	0.047	-0.447	-0.003
south	-0.097	0.176	0.582	-0.444	0.249	-0.130	0.176	0.461	-0.475	0.216
south east	-0.184	0.123	0.136	-0.425	0.058	-0.210	0.122	0.085	-0.449	0.029
gender	-0.118	0.075	0.115	-0.264	0.029	-0.132	0.075	0.076	-0.279	0.014
constant	0.742	0.236	0.002	0.280	1.205	0.705	0.234	0.003	0.246	1.165

Table 5: Effect of Beneficiary status and Party I.D. on Preference for Democracy: LAPOP Data

	Baseline Model					Model Including Partisanship Terms				
DV Democratic Confidence IRT	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper	Coef.	SE	P>Z	95% C.I. Lower	95% C.I. Upper
Ben. Status	0.224	0.161	0.163	-0.091	0.539	0.307	0.188	0.101	-0.060	0.675
PID	--	--	--	--	--	0.071	0.282	0.801	-0.481	0.623
Pid*Ben Status	--	---	--	--	--	-0.344	0.374	0.359	-1.077	0.390
income	0.078	0.058	0.179	-0.036	0.192	0.082	0.059	0.160	-0.033	0.197
race	0.318	0.186	0.087	-0.047	0.683	0.307	0.187	0.100	-0.059	0.673
education	0.014	0.031	0.654	-0.047	0.074	0.012	0.031	0.705	-0.049	0.072
Age	0.006	0.007	0.385	-0.008	0.020	0.006	0.007	0.371	-0.008	0.020
north	1.005	0.296	0.001	0.425	1.585	1.014	0.297	0.001	0.432	1.597
north east	0.157	0.256	0.539	-0.345	0.660	0.128	0.257	0.619	-0.376	0.632
south	0.082	0.393	0.836	-0.689	0.852	0.039	0.395	0.922	-0.735	0.812
south east	0.111	0.265	0.677	-0.409	0.630	0.086	0.266	0.748	-0.436	0.607
gender	0.420	0.165	0.011	0.096	0.744	0.449	0.168	0.008	0.119	0.778

Chapter Four:

Conclusion: What's Next for *O Pais do Futuro?*

A cash transfer program augments far more than the balance of a bank account. It incentivizes human capital development, spurs consumption in poor neighborhoods, and deeply affects the political life of the citizens that benefit most from it. The results from the papers contained in this dissertation corroborate the ways in which social policy can affect the lives of constituents in both anticipated and surprising ways. The Bolsa Família program connects the incumbent party responsible for program provision with voters along programmatic lines, and in so doing structures both voting behavior and partisan sympathies. It affects the perceptions of class standing and future social mobility of beneficiaries in ways that upend the traditional conception of race and class in Brazil. And, in certain contexts, it conditions the way in which citizens assess democracy.

The findings of the present papers are based on very fine-grained data from two important and representative municipalities in Brazil. However, the intuitions and results from them can serve to guide future research in divergent contexts. What these data lack in overt generalizability, they gain in close attention to valid treatment effects, something that aids the future comparison of these results with those from other Brazilian cases, or those from different Latin American countries and regions. These potential comparisons open a space for two avenues of subsequent research. Comparing the results of the first paper with those from areas with different electoral rules (such as Argentina, which has closed list proportional representation), strength of political party systems (such as Mexico), or across regions with some similar electoral and party system aspects (such as

India) would serve to strengthen the validity of the innovative findings of that paper. Additionally, the findings of this paper can be extended through an investigation into the differential effects of municipal level programs, such as Rio de Janeiro's *Cartão Família Carioca*. Subsequent research will analyze the effectiveness of this municipal anti-poverty policy in Rio's shantytowns, as well as potential changes in the political behavior of beneficiaries. In 2010, the municipal government of Rio de Janeiro promulgated a secondary conditional cash transfer program designed to increase the monthly stipend for the city's poorest Bolsa Família recipients. This program, the Cartão Família Carioca (CFC), was initiated by a mayor from a national opposition party and currently benefits over 100,000 of the city's poorest citizens. The joint political effects of receipt of both municipal (CFC) and federally funded social grants (Bolsa Família) can be compared to those of both recipients of only federally funded programs and to non-beneficiaries from the same neighborhoods, with the aim of understanding the ways in which receipt of a local program changes the political behavior of recipients, relative to those who receive only a federal grant, specifically as it pertains to vote choice and partisan sympathies.

Taking the second paper's premise of the PBF's differential effects by race as the impetus for comparison with CCT programs that aid other ethnic minorities, such as indigenous peoples under Colombia's *Famílias en Acción* or Ecuador's *Bono de Desarrollo Humano,* would serve to bolster our understanding of the incorporating effects of CCTs for historically marginalized ethnic groups, across an array of historical and social contexts. Such comparisons across ethnic groups raise another avenue of research, specifically, into the nature of targeting potential recipients, and the potential political and social ramifications of it. In areas where traditional or indigenous communal

worldviews are prevalent (as is true of Eastern Brazil, and large parts of the Andean highlands, as well as many parts of Africa that have CCTs) it is extraordinarily difficult to identify recipients, as this is often essentially anathema to the mind frame of local powers. Yet, CCTs require individual beneficiaries. This conflict has significant consequence for policy effectiveness and efficient distribution, as well as potential effects on the nature of traditional societies.

Finally, a significant future path of investigation involves the ways in which CCT programs stimulate the development of, or detract attention from, the nascent welfare state in middle-income countries. While CCT programs are remarkably effective at lifting citizens from situations of misery, they cannot be treated as the centerpieces of social safety nets. It remains to be seen whether CCT programs generate increased public support for investments in health and educational infrastructure (as well as job training and other programs), which creates a politically expedient space for politicians to fund costly public goods projects. It could also be the case that, as CCT programs distribute easily identifiable and individualized benefits, their implementation creates a moral hazard for politicians, particularly those that benefit from the electoral support of beneficiaries. In short, as middle-income countries attend to the development of their welfare states through poverty reduction policies such as CCTs, they will need to pay close attention to a variety of related programs, including: the quality, universality, and reliability of the very health and education services responsible for addressing the needs of beneficiary citizens (and others like them), health insurance to the informal sector (in states without full public health coverage), and graduation and employment programs for

beneficiary families with children that no longer meet the age range specified for CCT eligibility.

In the Brazilian case, the Bolsa Família was intended[34] to be the centerpiece of a larger set of programs aimed at further reductions in poverty, and stabilizing the progress towards greater inclusion and equality made over the last decade, known jointly as *Brasil Sem Miseria* (BSM, Brazil Without Extreme Poverty[35]). Below is a graph from the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) that outlines the strategies of the BSM plan.[36] It is clearly organized around the Bolsa Família, and little attention is paid to other important aspects of human capital development and welfare.

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[34] At the time of this writing, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that the goals of the Brazil Without Misery program, a hallmark of the first administration of Dilma Rousseff, will come to fruition. Nevertheless, the focus on issues of poverty reduction and infrastructural development remain.

[35] This is the government's official English translation of the name of the program. An alternative would simply be, Brazil Without Misery.

[36] Chart taken from a compendium of papers published as a text by the MDS called "Brazil Without Extreme Poverty." Teresa Campello ed. Brasilia 2015. English translation available at: http://www.mds.gov.br/webarquivos/publicacao/brasil_sem_miseria/book_bsm.pdf

Chart 1 - Summary of part of the strategies and instruments regarding the actions of the MDS in the Plan.

Poor and Extremely Poor

STRATEGIES

INSTRUMENTS

To improve the design and the management of Income Guarantee programs

To identify and include all families in extreme poverty in the Single Registry and the income guarantee programs.

To reinforce the role of the Single Registry as the main instrument for the coordination of actions and access to public policies in the strategy to eradicate extreme poverty

To increase the follow-up of conditions and to promote the follow-up of families in vulnerable conditions

To extend and qualify the offer of Services from the Unified Social Assistance System (Sistema Único de Assistência Social - SUAS) and of social work with families in vulnerable territories

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF THE BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAM

BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAM

CONTINUOUS WELFARE BENEFIT FOR THE ELDERLY AND DISABLED

CHILD LABOR ERADICATION PROGRAM

ADOLESCENT PROGRAM

ACTIVE SEARCH

SINGLE REGISTRY FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

SYSTEM FOR THE MONITORING OF CONDITIONALITY

EXTENSION OF THE OFFER OF SUAS SERVICES

SPECIALIZED SERVICE FOR THE HOMELESS POPULATION

Source: MDS, material for the preparation of BSM, 2011.

Future research will assess the simulating or deemphasizing role that CCTs play in the development of a larger welfare state in middle income countries, and on the potential conflict between investments in health and educational infrastructure, which is less ripe for attribution to particular parties or politicians, and CCT provision, which, as the first essay in this dissertation shows, is clearly attributable to the incumbent party.

This dissertation has endeavored to show the ways in which poverty, policy, and politics interweave in ways that have real and lasting effects on citizens and their governments. It has endeavored to uncover how policy affects democratic consolidation through a focus on the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of those people most affected by it. Based in data from an innovative original survey, it attends to the contextual realities of Brazil's

poorest citizens, and in so doing, has identified key areas for subsequent research. Above all, the present work makes one thing clear; there are still surprises in store for the country of the future.

Questionário

Preencher as perguntas abaixo ANTES de começar a entrevista

Q1. número de questionário |__|__|__|__| **Q1.1 código de recenseador** |__|__|__|__|__|

Q2. Estado |__|__|
   ☐   MG (1)   ☐   PE (2)   ☐   Outro (3)

Q3. Cidade |__|__|
   ☐   Uberlândia (1)   ☐   Recife(2)   ☐   Outra (3)

Q4. Bairro (escreva o nome abaixo)
   ☐   _____

Q5. Rua (escreva o nome abaixo)
   ☐   _____

Q6. Horário de início (escreva abaixo)
   ☐   _____

Q7. Data da entrevista (escreva abaixo)
   ☐   _____

Selecionamento do entrevistado:

Olá, sou [NOME DO RECESENCEADOR], estou ajudando a realizar uma pesquisa de opinião pública para uma tese de doutorado da Universidade Federal de Uberlândia -UFU. E gostaria de fazer algumas perguntas sobre suas opiniões políticas. O questionário tomará uns vinte minutos para preencher. Todas as suas respostas serão confidenciais. Posso contar com a ajuda de alguém nessa casa?[Se falar que sim, pode continuar] **Gostaria de falar com a pessoa que fez anniversario mais recentemente que estiver em casa agora.**

   [Quando a pessoa vier, prosseguir com as perguntas.]

O/A Sr./sra. mora nessa casa?
   ☐   Sim → CONTINUAR   ☐   Não → Agradeça e termine a entrevista, selecionar nova casa
   [Obrigada/o por sua disposição em participar desta pesquisa. Somente uma pessoa que more nessa casa poderá responder as perguntas.]

[Só se morar na casa] O/A Sr./sra. é cidadão/ã ou residente permanente do Brasil?
   ☐   Sim → CONTINUAR   ☐   Não → Agradeça e termine a entrevista, selecionar nova casa [*Obrigada/o por sua disposição de participar dessa pesquisa, mas somente posso entrevistar uma pessoa que seja cidadão ou residente permanente no Brasil.*]

O/A Sr./sra. tem pelo menos 18 anos?
   ☐   Sim → CONTINUAR   ☐   Não →Pedir que chame uma pessoa dentro da casa que tenha pelo menos 18 anos. [*Se não houver alguém em casa: Obrigada/o por sua vontade de participar dessa pesquisa, mas somente posso entrevistar a uma pessoa que tenha no mínimo 18 anos.*]

O/A sr./sra. ou alguém que more nessa casa recebe benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família? |__|__|
☐   Sim (01) →**sempre continuar com o questionário**

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

NÃO SE ESQUEÇA DE LER A FOLHA DE ACEITE ANTES DE CONTINUAR COM A ENTREVISTA

Antes de começar com a entrevista, preciso dizer-lhe o seguinte. Nessa entrevista vou perguntar ao/à sr./sra. várias perguntas sobre as suas preferências políticas. Esta entrevista vai fazer parte de uma grande pesquisa acadêmica que analisa o cenário político atual. É muito importante que o/a sr./sra. fale a sua verdadeira opinão sobre as perguntas. Por isso, as suas respostas permanecerão totalmente confidenciais. Não vou registrar nenhuma informação que possa ser utilizada para revelar a sua identificação. A qualquer momento o/a sr./sra. pode parar a entrevista, e, a qualquer momento pode recusar-se a responder a qualquer pergunta também. O/A sr./sra. entende tudo isso e está pronto/a para começar?

Q1. Para começar, em geral, até que ponto o/a sr./sra. está satisfeito/a com a sua vida? O/A sr./sra.diria que está…
[leia as alternativas abaixo] |__|__|

☐ Muito Satisfeito/a   (01)   ☐ Muito **In**satisfeito/a (04)
☐ Pouco Satisfeito/a   (02)   ☐ Não Sabe   (88)
☐ Pouco **In**satisfeito/a (03)   ☐ Não Respondeu   (99)

Q2. Na sua opinião, qual é o problema mais grave que o país esta enfrentando? [*Não ler as alternativas, marcar uma opção só]* |__|__|

☐ Água, falta de (01)   ☐ Mau governo(18)
☐ Condição das ruas (02)   ☐ Meio ambiente (19)
☐ Corrupção política (03)   ☐ Migração (20)
☐ Falta de Crédito financeiro (04)   ☐ Gangues, quadrilhas (21)
☐ Delinquência/crime/violência (05)   ☐ Pobreza (22)
☐ Desemprego (06)   ☐ Protestos populares (greves, fechamento de
☐ Desigualdade (07)   estradas, paralizações, etc.) (23)
☐ Desnutrição (08)   ☐ Saúde, falta de serviço (24)
☐ Discriminação, Preconceito (09)   ☐ Sequestros (25)
☐ Drogas, tráfico e/ou uso (10)   ☐ Segurança, falta de (26)
☐ Economia (11)   ☐ Terra para cultivar, falta de (29)
☐ Educação, falta de/qualidade (12)   ☐ Transporte (30)
☐ Eletricidade, falta de (13)   ☐ Habitação, moradia (31)
☐ Explosão demográfica (14)   ☐ Outro   (97)
☐ Impunidade (15)   escreva:_____
☐ Inflação, altos preços (16)   ☐ Não Sabe   (88)
☐ Os políticos (17)   ☐ Não Respondeu   (99)

Q3. Agora, falando sobre a economia... Como o/a sr./sra. avalia a situação econômica *do país*? O/A sr./sra. considera que ... [*leia opções abaixo*] |__|__|

☐ Muito boa/ Ótima (01)   ☐ Muito má/ Péssima (05)
☐ Boa (02)   ☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Nem boa, nem má/regular (03)   ☐ Não Respondeu (99)
☐ Má (04)

Q4. O/A sr./sra. considera que a situação econômica atual *do país* está melhor, igual, ou pior do que há *doze meses*?
                                                                    |__|__|

☐ Melhor (01)   ☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Igual (02)   ☐ Não Respondeu (99)
☐ Pior (03)

Q5. Como o/a sr./sra. avalia, em geral, *a sua* situação econômica *pessoal*? O/A sr./sra. considera que ela seja... [*leia opções abaixo**]* |__|__|

☐ Muito boa/ Ótima (01)   ☐ Muito ruim/ Péssima (05)
☐ Boa (02)   ☐ Não Sabe (88)

Q6. O/A sr./sra. considera que *sua* situação econômica atual está melhor, igual, ou pior do que há *doze meses*? |__|__|

☐ Melhor (01)
☐ Igual (02)
☐ Pior (03)

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q7: Agora, mudando um pouco de tema para falar de classe social. Q10: *[Mostrar cartão A, escrever número indicado pelo entrevistado nas caixinhas.]* **Na sociedade brasileira há grupos que tendem a estar no topo da escala social e grupos que tendem a estar na base. Aqui está uma escala que vai da base ao topo, onde o ponto 1 corresponde à base e o ponto 7 corresponde ao topo. Na sua opinião, onde é que o/a sr./sra. acredita que esteja agora?** |__|__|

Q8: E pode indicar onde é que o/a sr./sra. imagina que estará daqui a 5 anos? |__|__|

[Retira Cartão A]

Vamos falar de algumas cenas com personagens hipotéticas e as metas pessoais delas. Para cada uma, quero que o/a sr./sra. me fale o que pensa sobre elas.

O João mora em Salvador, é negro e tem 30 anos. Agora ele trabalha no mercado informal, ou seja, na rua. Mas João quer se tornar bancário. Considerando apenas as informações apresentadas agora...

Q9: O/A sr./sra. acredita ser muito possível, possível, pouco possível ou impossível que João consiga atingir a meta dele? |__|__|

☐ Muito Possível (01)
☐ Possível (02)

☐ Pouco Possível (03)
☐ Impossível (04)   ☐NS (88) ☐NR (99)

Q10: O/A sr./sra. conhece uma pessoa com as mesmas condições e metas de João? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)
☐ Não (02)

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

➜➜Q10A: [Somente se a resposta for que <u>sim </u>conhece uma pessoa assim] E essa pessoa está tentando, ou já conseguiu atingir a meta dela? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)
☐ Não (02)
☐ Está Tentando[provar por que S/Ñ]:
_____ (03)

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q12: Acha que a meta do João é realista/possível? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)
☐ Não (02)

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q13: Maria mora na zona rural no estado de Goiás, é parda e tem 20 anos. Agora ela trabalha em uma fazenda, mas ela deseja ir para uma cidade maior para estudar e se tornar secretária.

O/A sr./sra. acredita ser muito possível, possível, pouco possível ou impossível que Maria consiga atingir a meta dela? |__|__|

☐ Muito Possível (01)
☐ Possível (02)

☐ Pouco Possível (03)
☐ Impossível (04)   ☐NS (88) ☐NR (99)

Q14: O/A sr./sra. conhece uma pessoa com as mesmas condições e metas de Maria? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)
☐ Não (02)

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

➜➜Q14A: [Somente se a resposta for que <u>sim </u>conhece uma pessoa assim] E essa pessoa está tentando, ou já conseguiu atingir a meta dela? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)

☐ Não Sabe (88)

Q15: Acha que a meta da Maria é realista/possível? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q16: José mora em São Paulo, é branco e tem 18 anos. Agora ele trabalha como pedreiro, mas quer se tornar o chefe da empresa de construção.

O/A sr./sra. Acredita ser muito possível, possível, pouco possível ou impossível que José consiga atingir a meta dele?
. |__|__|

- ☐ Muito Possível (01)
- ☐ Possível (02)
- ☐ Pouco Possível (03)
- ☐ Impossível (04)   ☐NS (88) ☐NR (99)

Q17: O/A sr./sra. conhece uma pessoa com as mesmas condições e metas de José? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→→Q17A: [Somente se a resposta for que <u>sim</u> conhece uma pessoa assim] E essa pessoa está tentando, ou já conseguiu atingir a meta dela? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Está Tentando[provar por que S/Ñ]: _____ (03
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q18: Acha que a meta do José é realista/possível? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q19: Ana mora em Araguari, é negra e tem 40 anos. Agora ela só trabalha de vez em quando como empregada doméstica, mas ela quer abrir uma pequena padaria.

O/A sr./sra. Acredita ser muito possível, possível, pouco possível ou impossível que Ana consiga atingir a meta dela?
. |__|__|

- ☐ Muito Possível (01)
- ☐ Possível (02)
- ☐ Pouco Possível (03)
- ☐ Impossível (04)   ☐NS (88) ☐NR (99)

Q20: O/A sr./sra. conhece uma pessoa com as mesmas condições e metas de Ana? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→→Q20A: [Somente se a resposta for que <u>sim</u> conhece uma pessoa assim] E essa pessoa está tentando, o já conseguiu atingir a meta dela? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Está Tentando: _____ (03)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q21: Acha que a meta da Ana é realista/possível? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q22. Agora mudando de tema: de modo geral, o/a sr./sra. considera que as pessoas deste bairro são... [*leia as opções abaixo***]** |__|__|

- ☐ Muito Confiáveis (01)
- ☐ Confiáveis (02)
- ☐ Pouco Confiáveis (03)
- ☐ Nada Confiáveis (04)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

- ☐ Muito Confiáveis (01)
- ☐ Confiáveis (02)
- ☐ Pouco Confiáveis (03)
- ☐ Nada Confiáveis (04)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q24. Como o/a sr./sra. se informa sobre política? [*leia as opções abaixo, marcando todas as escolhidas***]** |__|__|

- ☐ Jornais (01)
- ☐ Rádio (02)
- ☐ Televisão (03)
- ☐ Redes Sociais (04)
- ☐ Outro [Anote:_____] (05) |__|__|
- ☐ Não Sabe (88) |__|__|
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q25. O quanto o/a sr./sra. se interessa por política: muito, um pouco, pouco ou nada?... |__|__|

- ☐ Muito (01)
- ☐ Um pouco (02)
- ☐ Pouco (03)
- ☐ Nada (04)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q26A-Q26K:*[Mostrar cartão B para o entrevistado]* **Gostaria de saber sobre suas impressões a respeito de alguns políticos e partidos políticos. Vou ler o nome de uma pessoa ou de um partido político e gostaria que o/a sr./sra. avaliasse essa pessoa ou partido usando este cartão, que possui uma escala de 1 a 10. Os números entre 5 e 10 siginficam que o/a sr./sra. tem uma impressão boa até ótima desta pessoa ou partido, e os números entre 1 e 5 significam que o/a sr./sra. tem uma impressão ruim até péssima. Se chegarmos a um nome que o Sr/Sra não reconhece, não é necessário fazer a avaliação. Avise e pularemos para o próximo nome.** *[Ler cada nome, marcando as resposta ao lado de cada nome. Marque "88" se o entrevistado não souber e "99" se não responder]*

- ☐ **Lula da Silva** |__|__|
- ☐ **Dilma Rouseff** |__|__|
- ☐ **Marina Silva** |__|__|

- ☐ **Aécio Neves** |__|__|
- ☐ **Eduardo Campos**|__|__|

- ☐ **PT**|__|__|
- ☐ **PSDB** |__|__|
- ☐ **PSB**|__|__|
- ☐ **PMDB** |__|__|
- ☐ **P.C. do B.** |__|__|

[Retirar Cartão B e mostrar Cartão C para o entrevistado]

Q27: . Com qual partido o(a) Sr./Sra. se simpatiza *[NÃO LER AS ALTERNATIVAS]* |__|__|

- ☐ PT (01)
- ☐ PSDB (02)
- ☐ PMDB (03)
- ☐ PSB (04)
- ☐ PC do B (05)
- ☐ Outro (06)
- [Anote o nome exatamente como o entrevistado disser:_____]
- ☐ Nenhum (07)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ →Q27A: *[Só perguntar se falar que simpatiza com um partido político]* **O/A Sr./sra. diria que o seu apoio desse partido político é...** *[LER OPÇÕES ABAIXO]***?** |__|__|

- ☐ Muito Forte (01)
- ☐ Um pouco forte (02)
- ☐ Nem forte nem fraco/regular (03)
- ☐ Um pouco fraco (04)
- ☐ Muito fraco (05)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ →Q27B: *[Só perguntar se falar que simpatiza com um partido político]* **O/A sr./sra. é afiliado/a com este partido político?** |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ →Q27C: *[Só perguntar se falar que simpatiza com um partido político]* **O/A sr./sra. contribui financialmente a este partido político?** |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ →**Q27D:** *[Só perguntar se falar que simpatiza com um partido político,]* **Há quanto tempo, aproximadamente, tem apoiado este partido político?** |__|__|

- ☐ Alguns meses (01)
- ☐ Um ano   (02)
- ☐ Dois anos (03)
- ☐ Três anos (04)
- ☐ Entre 3 e 6 anos (05)
- ☐ Mais que seis anos (06)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ →**Q27E:** *[Só perguntar se fala que simpatiza com um partido político]* **O/A sr./sra. antes simpatizou com outro partido político?** |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)→ Perguntar Q. 19
- ☐ Não (02) → Pular a Q. 20

→ →**Q27F:** *[Só perguntar se fala que simpatizou com outro partido político]* **Qual partido?** |__|__|

- ☐ PT (01)
- ☐ PSDB   (02)
- ☐ PMDB (03)
- ☐ Outro (04)
- [Anotar nome:_____]
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q28: Durante as eleições, algumas pessoas tentam convencer outras pessoas a votar em algum partido ou candidato. Com que frequência o(a) sr./sra. tentou convencer outras pessoas a votar em um partido ou candidato? [*Ler alternativas*] |__|__|

- ☐ Frequentemente (01)
- ☐ De vez em quando (02)
- ☐ Muito Raramente (03)
- ☐ Nunca (04)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q29: Existem pessoas que trabalham para algum partido ou candidato durante as campanhas eleitorais. O/A sr./sra. trabalhou para algum partido ou candidato nas eleições presidencias de 2010? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim Trabalhou (01)
- ☐ Não Trabalhou (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Agora vou ler uma lista de grupos e organizações. Por favor, diga se o/a sr./sra, assiste às reuniões dessas organizações pelo menos uma vez por semana, uma ou duas vezes ao mês, uma ou duas vezes ao ano, ou nunca.

[Se precisar, pode repetir as categorias para ajudar o entrevistado.Circular resposta na tabela.]	Uma vez por Semana	Uma ou duas vezes ao mês	Uma ou duas vezes ao ano	Nunca	NS	NR
Q30A: **Reuniões de uma associação de pais e mestres da escola ou colégio?**	1	2	3	4	88	99
Q30B: **Reuniões de uma associação de bairro ou junta de melhorias para a comunidade?**	1	2	3	4	88	99
Q30C: **Reuniões de um partido ou movimento político?**	1	2	3	4	88	99
Q30D: **Alguma atividade da sua igreja?**	1	2	3	4	88	99

Q31: O/A sr./sra. votou nas eleições presidenciais de 2010? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ → **Q31A:** *[Só perguntar se Q31= SIM]* **Em qual dos candidatos o(a) sr./sra. votou para presidente no primeiro turno das eleições presidenciais de 2010?** *[Não ler opções]* |__|__|

- ☐ Dilma Rousseff (PT, PMDB, PDT, PCdoB, PSB, PR, PRB, PTN, PSC,PTC) (01)
- ☐ José Serra (PSDB, DEM, PTB, PPS, PMN, PT do B) (02)
- ☐ Marina Silva (PV) (03)
- ☐ Plínio Sampaio Arruda (PSOL) (04)
- ☐ Outro (05) [Anota nome:_____]
- ☐ Nenhum (foi votar, mas deixou a cédula em branco, ou anulou seu voto) (06)

Q31B: Se a eleição para presidente fosse hoje, em qual candidato votaria? [*Não ler opções*] |__|__|

☐   Dilma Rousseff (PT, PMDB, PDT, PCdoB, PR, PRB, PTN, PSC,PTC) (01)

☐   Aécio Neves (PSDB, DEM, PTB, PPS, PMN, PT do B) (02)

☐   Marina Silva (PV) (03)   ☐   Eduardo Campos (PSB) (04)

☐   Outro (05) [Anotar exatamente o que é falado:_____]

☐   Nenhum (votará, mas deixará a cédula em branco, ou anulará seu voto) (06)

☐   Não Votará (07) ☐   Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q32: Se a eleição para governador fosse hoje, em qual partido político votaria?   [*Não ler opções*] |__|__|
☐ PT (01)   ☐   PSDB (02)   ☐   PV (03)   ☐   PSB (04)

☐ Outro (05) [Anotar exatamente o que for falado:_____]

☐ Nenhum (votará, mas deixará a cédula em branco, ou anulará seu voto) (06)

☐ Não Votará (07) ☐   Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q33: Sabe o partido no qual gostaria de votar para senador? [*Não ler opções* |__|__|

☐ PT (01)   ☐   PSDB (02) ☐   PV (03)   ☐   PSB (04)

☐ Outro (05) [Anota exatamente o que for falado:_____]

☐   Nenhum (votará, mas deixará a cédula em branco, ou anulará seu voto) (06)

☐ Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q34: Sabe o nome do candidato no qual gostaria de votar para senador?   [*Não ler opções*] |__|__|

Anotar exatamente o que for falado:_____

☐ Nenhum (votará, mas deixará a cédula em branco, ou anulará seu voto) (06)

☐   Não Votará (07) ☐   Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q35: Sabe o partido no qual gostaria de votar para deputado federal?   [*Não ler opções*] |__|__|

☐ PT (01)   ☐   PSDB (02) ☐   PV (03)   ☐   PSB (04)

☐ Outro (05) [Anota exatamente o que for falado:_____]

☐   Nenhum (votará, mas deixará a cédula em branco, ou anulará seu voto) (06)

☐ Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q36: Sabe o nome do candidato no qual gostaria de votar para deputado federal?   [*Não ler opções* |__|__|

Anotar exatamente o que for falado:_____

☐ Nenhum (votará, mas deixará a cédula em branco, ou anulará seu voto) (06)

Q37: <u>Sabe o partido no qual gostaria de votar para deputado estadual?</u>   [*Não ler opções*] |__|__|

☐   PT (01)   ☐   PSDB (02) ☐   PV (03) ☐   PSB (04)

☐   Outro (05) [Anota exatamente o que for falado:_____] ☐   NS (88) ☐   NR

 Q38: <u>Sabe o nome do candidato no qual gostaria de votar para deputado estadual?</u> [*Não ler opções*] |__|__|

Anotar exatamente o que for falado:_____

☐   Nenhum (votará, mas deixará a cédula em branco, ou anulará seu voto) (06)

☐   Não Votará (07) ☐   Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)   Não Sabe (88) ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q39: <u>Às vezes, as pessoas usam fontes diferentes de informação para embasar a escolha do voto. Quais das seguintes fontes usa para decidir em qual candidato votar para deputado federal e deputado estadual? [</u> *Pode ler as opções para ajudar.*] |__|__|
☐   Rádio (01)
☐   Televisão (02)
☐   Jornais (03)
☐   O entrevistado vota por legenda (04)
☐   Outro (05) [Anotar exatamente o que for falado:_____]
☐   Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q39A: <u>Também, às vezes, pessoas importantes, partidos políticos ou outros políticos sugerem que votemos para um candidato específico. Alguma vez uma pessoa ou político fez uma recomendação assim para o/a sr./sra.?</u> |__|__|
☐   Sim (01)   ☐   Não Sabe (88)
☐   Não (02)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

➔ ➔Q39B: <u>Quem fez essa recomendação?</u>   *(Não Ler)* |__|__|
☐   Pastor da igreja (01)
☐   Outro político (02)
☐   Partido polítco (03)
☐   Prefeito (04)
☐   Membro da comunidade (05)
☐   Qualquer um que lhe oferceu presente/ cesta basica para o entrevistado (06)
☐   Outro (07) [Anotar exatamente o que for falado:_____]
☐   Não Sabe (88)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

[ENTREGUE CARTÃO "C" AO ENTREVISTADO]

 Q40: Nessa <u>nova</u> escala de 1 a 10, onde 1 significa que defende os ricos e 10 significa que defende os pobres, onde se localizam os políticos brasileiros? [*Anotar um número de 1 a 10, 88 para aqueles que não sabem e 99 para aqueles que não respondem***]** |__|__|

Q40A: E usando a mesma escala, onde 1 significa que defende os ricos e 10 significa que defende os pobres, onde o(a) sr./sra. gostaria que se localizassem os políticos brasileiros? [*Anotar um número de 1 a 10, 88 para aqueles que não sabem e 99 para aqueles que não respondem]*** |__|__|

[Ainda com a mesma escala, ler cada nome de político após fazer cada pergunta e anotar a nota dada pelo entrevistado. Caso o entrevistado não saiba, marque NS=88, caso não responda, marque NR=99]	Dilma Rousseff	Aécio Neves	Eduardo Campos	Marina Silva

Dizem que alguns políticos defendem os interesses dos mais pobres, enquanto outros defendem os mais ricos. Gostaria que o(a) Sr./Sra. desse uma nota de um a dez para cada um dos seguintes políticos, em relação à defesa que eles fazem dos interesses dos mais pobres (sendo 1 "defendem os ricos" e 10 "defendem muito os pobres"). [*Leia o nome do político*]	Q41A	Q41B	Q41C	Q41D

Q42: O/A Sr./sra., aprova o Programa Bolsa Família? |__|__|

    ☐   Sim (01)☐   Não (02)   ☐   NS (88)   ☐   NR (99)

Q43: Até que ponto o(a) sr./sra. acredita que o programa Bolsa Família melhorou ou piorou a qualidade de vida de sua comunidade [*Ler opções*] |__|__|

    ☐   Melhorou muito (01)   ☐   Piorou (04)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)
    ☐   Melhorou (02)   ☐   Piorou muito (05)
    ☐   Não fez diferença (03)   ☐   Não Sabe (88)

Q44: Quem o/a sr./sra. considera responsável por implementar o Progama Bolsa Família? [*Não ler opções*] |__|__|

    ☐ A Presidente/ Dilma Rousseff (01)   ☐Partido dos Trabalhadores/PT (09)
    ☐ Lula da Silva   (02)   ☐ PSDB (10)
    ☐ O governo federal (03)   ☐ Outro Político (11)
    ☐ O governo estadual (04)   [Anota nome:_____]
    ☐ O governo local (05)   ☐ Outro Partido Político (12)
    ☐ O Congresso Nacional (06)   [Anota nome:_____]
    ☐ O Senado (07)   ☐   Não Sabe (88)
    ☐ Ministério Desenvolvimento Social e Saúde (08)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Q45: O/A Sr./sra., acha que o Governo deve ampliar o número de famílias beneficiárias do Programa Bolsa Família, reduzir esse número, terminar o programa por completo, ou mantê-lo igual ao que o número de beneficiarios de agora? |__|__|

    ☐   Ampliar (01)   ☐   Mantê-lo igual (04)
    ☐   Reduzir (02)   ☐   Não Sabe (88)
    ☐   Terminar por completo (03)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)

Somente Perguntar a Quem Recebe Bolsa Família:

Q46: Há quanto tempo, aproximadamente, essa pessoa tem recebido benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família? |__|__|

    ☐   Alguns meses (01)   ☐   Três anos (04)   ☐   Não Sabe (88)
    ☐   Um ano   (02)   ☐   Entre 3 e 6 anos (05)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)
    ☐   Dois anos (03)   ☐   Mais que seis anos (06)

Q47: Alguma vez nos últimos 12 meses seu benefício da Bolsa Família foi bloqueado? [*Se a resposta for "sim", pergunte se continua ou não continua bloqueado*] |__|__|

    ☐   Sim, continua bloqueado (01)   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)
    ☐   Sim, mas foi desbloqueado (02)
    ☐   Não foi bloqueado (03)
☐   Não Sabe (88)

Q48: Alguma vez teve algum outro tipo de problema para receber seu benefício da Bolsa Família, ou sempre recebeu dentro do prazo?[*Se a resposta for "sim", pergunte qual tipo de problema*] |__|__|

    ☐   Sim, (01) [anotar explicação   ☐   Não Sabe (88)
    _____]   ☐   Não Respondeu (99)
    ☐   Não foi bloqueado (02)

☐ Melhorou muito (01)	☐ Piorou (04)	☐ Não Respondeu (99)
☐ Melhorou (02)	☐ Piorou muito (05)	
☐ Não fez diferença (03)	☐ Não Sabe (88)	

Q50: Como o/a sr./sra. incicalmente se cadastrou para receber os benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família? |__|__|

☐ usando o cadastro único (01)	☐ outro (05) [anotar resposta:
☐ na prefeitura (02)	_____
☐ on-line (03)	☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ alguem veio a sua casa (04)	☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q51: Em qualquer momento, o/a sr./sra. foi encorajado/a a solicitar benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)➔ Perguntar Q. 52
☐ Não (02) ➔ Pula a Q. 53   ☐ Não Sabe (88) ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

➔ ➔Q52: Quem encorajou ao/á sr./sra. a solicitar benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família? *[Não ler opções]* |__|__|

☐Pessoal do governo (01)	☐ Pessoal de um partido	☐ Outro: [Anotar:
**Provar: qual: _____	[Anotar qual:	_____ (04)
☐Pessoal do MDS (02)	_____ (04)	☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐Pariente/Vizinho (03)	☐Escola (05)	☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q53A- 53C: *[Mostrar Cartão D pelo entrevistado. Marcar número indicado nas caixinhas.]*

Vou ler algumas afirmações e gostaria que o/a sr./sra. me falasse o quanto está de acordo, ou em desacordo com elas. Vamos usar este cartão no qual há uma escala de 1 a 7. Os números entre 5 e 7 significam que o/a sr./sra. concorda até concorda muito com a frase, e os números entre 1 e 3 significam que o/a sr./sra. descorda até discorda muito com ela. Se chegarmos a uma frase que não quer responder ou não tem resposta, não é preciso avaliar ele, só me fale e pularemos à seguinite.

Q53A: "Estou mais interessado/a na política do que antes de receber benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família." |__|__|

Q53B: "Eu sinto mais afinidade com os políticos que fornecem o Programa Bolsa Família agora que sou beneficiário, comparado com antes de receber benefícios do programa." |__|__|

Q53C: "Eu voto no PT porque eles são responsáveis por fornecer a Bolsa Família, e se eles não estiverem no poder, o programa pode desaparecer." |__|__|

Voltando a Perguntar a Todos os Entrevistados:

Q54: O/A Sr./sra., é beneficiário da Tarifa Social? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)➔ Perguntar Q. 55   ☐ Não (02) ➔ Pular a Q. 56

➔ ➔Q55: *[Só perguntar se Q54= SIM]* **Há quanto tempo, aproximadamente, tem recebido benefícios da Tarifa Social?** |__|__|

☐ Alguns meses (01)	☐ Três anos (04)	☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Um ano (02)	☐ Entre 3 e 6 anos (05)	☐ Não Respondeu (99)
☐ Dois anos (03)	☐ Mais que seis anos (06)	

Q56: Quem o/a sr./sra. considera responsável por implementar o Progama Tarifa Social? *[Não ler opções]* |__|__|

☐ A Presidente/ Dilma Rousseff (01)	☐Partido dos Trabalhadores/PT (09)
☐ Lula da Silva (02)	☐ PSDB (10)
☐ O governo federal (03)	☐ Outro Político/Partido (11)
☐ O governo estadual (04)	[Anotar nome:_____]
☐ O governo local (05)	☐ Caixa Federal Econômica (12)
☐ O Congresso Nacional (06)	☐ Não Sabe (88)

Q57: O/A sr./sra. , ou outra pessoa que mora nessa casa é beneficiário do Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida?|__|__|

☐　　　Sim (01)→ Perguntar Q. 58　　　　　　　☐　　　Não (02) → Pula a Q. 59

→ → Q58: *[Só perguntar se Q57= SIM]*　Há quanto tempo, aproximadamente, tem recebido benefícios do Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida?　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Alguns meses (01)　　　　☐　Três anos (04)　　　　　☐　Não Sabe (88)
☐　Um ano　(02)　　　　　　☐　Entre 3 e 6 anos (05)　　　☐　Não Respondeu (99)
☐　Dois anos (03)　　　　　　☐　Mais que seis anos (06)

Q59: Quem o/a sr./sra. considera responsável por implementar o Progama Minha Casa Minha Vida? *[Não ler opções]*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　A Presidente/ Dilma Rousseff (01)　　　　☐Partido dos Trabalhadores/PT (09)
☐　Lula Da Silva　(02)　　　　　　　　　　☐　PSDB (10)
☐　O governo federal (03)　　　　　　　　　☐　Outro Político　(11)
☐　O governo estadual (04)　　　　　　　　[Anotar nome:_____]
☐　O governo local (05)　　　　　　　　　　☐　Outro Partido Político (12)
☐　O Congresso Nacional (06)　　　　　　　[Anotar nome:_____]
☐　O Senado (07)　　　　　　　　　　　　☐　Não Sabe (88)
☐　Ministério de Desenvolvimento e Saúde (08)　　☐　Não Respondeu (99)

Q60: Antigamente, o/a sr./sra. ou outra pessoa que mora nessa casa era beneficiário do Programa Bolsa Escola?
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　　　Sim (01)→ Perguntar Q. 61　　　　　　　☐　　　Não (02) → Pula a Q. 62

→ →Q61: *[Só perguntar se Q60= SIM]* Por quanto tempo, aproximadamente,　recibeu benefícios do Programa Bolsa Escola?　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Alguns meses (01)　　　　☐　Três anos (04)
☐　Um ano　(02)　　　　　　☐　Não Sabe (88)
☐　Dois anos (03)　　　　　　☐　Não Respondeu (99)

Q62: Quem o/a sr./sra. considera responsável por implementar o Progama Bolsa Escola? *[Não ler opções]*　|__|__|

☐　A Presidente/ Dilma Rousseff (01)　　　　☐Partido dos Trabalhadores/PT (09)
☐　Lula da Silva　(02)　　　　　　　　　　☐　PSDB (10)
☐　O governo federal (03)　　　　　　　　　☐　Outro Político　(11)
☐　O governo estadual (04)　　　　　　　　[Anotar nome:_____]
☐　O governo local (05)　　　　　　　　　　☐　Outro Partido Político (12)
☐　O Congresso Nacional (06)　　　　　　　[Anotar nome:_____]
☐　O Senado (07)　　　　　　　　　　　　☐　Não Sabe (88)
☐　Ministério de Desenvolvimento e Saúde (08)　　☐　Não Respondeu (99)

Q63: O/a sr./sra. ou alguém que more nessa casa recebe aposentadoria?　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Sim (01)　　　　　　　　　　　　☐　　　Não Respondeu (99)
☐　Não (02)
☐　　Não Sabe (88)

Q64: O/a sr./sra. ou alguém que more nessa casa recebe benefício por invalidez?　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Sim (01)　　　　　　　　　　　　☐　　　Não Respondeu (99)
☐　Não (02)
☐　　Não Sabe (88)

Q65: O/a sr./sra. ou alguém que more nessa casa recebe seguro desemprego?　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Sim (01)　　　　　　　　　　　　☐　　　Não Respondeu (99)
☐　Não (02)
☐　　Não Sabe (88)

estava, mas agora não?)
- ☐ Agora não, mas antes sim (03)

- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

➔ ➔**Q66B: [***Se falar que tem ou tinha CadÚnico]* **Qual foi o motivo para fazer o CadÚnico?** |__|__|
- ☐ Anotar resposta:

  _____

- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q67: O/a sr./sra. sabe onde está o CRAS deste bairro? (Pode falar "Centro de referência de assistência social") |__|__|
- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não conheço CRAS(03)

- ☐ Não tem aqui (04)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q68: O/a sr./sra. ou alguém que more nessa casa já foi para o CRAS deste bairro? |__|__|
- ☐ Sim (01)
- ☐ Não (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)

- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

➔ ➔**Q68B: [***Se falar que foi para o CRAS]* **Qual foi o motivo para ir lá?** |__|__|
- ☐ Anotar resposta/ Provar depois "**Algum outro motivo?"** E anotar:

  _____

- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q69: Agora vamos falar dos serviços de saúde. O que o/a sr./sra. pensa sobre a qualidade do serviço público de saúde no Brasil? É: [*Ler opções*] |__|__|
- ☐ Bom(01)
- ☐ Regular (02)

- ☐ Ruim (03)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88) ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q69A: De modo geral, quantas vezes por ano o/a sr./sra. e a sua família vão ao médico?[*Não ler opções*] |__|__|
- ☐ Nunca (01)
- ☐ Uma ou duas vezes (02)
- ☐ Três a cinco vezes (03)

- ☐ Entre seis a dez vezes (04)
- ☐ Mais que dez vezes (05)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88) ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q69B: E de modo geral, o seu atendimento nessas visitas é: [*LER OPÇÕES*] |__|__|
- ☐ Bom(01)
- ☐ Regular (02)

- ☐ Ruim (03)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88) ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

[*Mostrar Cartão D ao entrevistado e anota o número indicado pelo entrevistado nas caixinhas*] **Vou ler algumas afirmações e gostaria que o/a sr./sra. me falasse o quanto está de acordo, ou em desacordo com elas. Vamos voltar a usar este cartão no qual há uma escala de 1 a 7. Os números entre 5 e 7 siginficam que o/a sr./sra. concorda até concorda muito com a frase, e os números entre 1 e 3 significam que o/a sr./sra. discorda até discorda muito com ela. O 4 é um ponto intermediário. Se chegarmos a uma frase que não quer responder ou não tem resposta, não é preciso avaliar, só me fale e pularemos à seguinite.**

Q70A: Eu tenho orgulho de ser Brasileiro. |__|__|

Q70B: No modo geral, eu acho que entendo bem os assuntos políticos deste país. |__|__|

Q70C: Os políticos prestam atenção nas pessoas como eu. |__|__|

Q70D: Quando eu voto para algum político, eles vão escutar as minhas demandas. |__|__|

Q70E: As minhas opiniões importam tanto quanto as opinões dos outros brasileiros. |__|__|

Q70F: Os políticos só prestam atenção nas pessoas como eu quando estão precisando de voto. |__|__|

Q70G: Eu tenho o poder de influenciar as decisões dos políticos <u>da minha comunidade</u>. |__|__|

Q70H: Eu tenho o poder de influenciar as decisões <u>dos políticos do país</u>. |__|__|

Q70I: Atualmente, o Governo é mais democrático do que há quinze anos porque está se esforçando para combater a pobreza. |__|__|

Q70J: O Governo somente resolve os problemas dos ricos, e se esquece dos problemas dos pobres. |__|__|

[Usar Cartão E] **Agora, vamos continuar as afirmações usando outra escala. Nela também há sete valores. Os números entre 5 e 7 siginficam que o/a sr./sra. tem confiança até muita confiança, e os números entre 1 e 3 significam que o/a sr./sra. tem pouca confiança até nenhuma confiança. O 4 é um ponto intermediário. Se chegarmos a uma frase que não quer responder ou não tem resposta, não é preciso avaliar, só me fale e pularemos à seguinite.**

Q70K: Até que ponto o(a)sr./sra. tem confiança no Congresso Nacional? |__|__|

Q70L: Até que ponto o(a)sr./sra. tem confiança no Governo Federal? |__|__|

Q70M: Até que ponto o(a)sr./sra. tem confiança nos partidos políticos? |__|__|

Q70N: Até que ponto o(a)sr./sra. tem confiança no governo municipal? |__|__|

Q70O: Até que ponto o(a)sr./sra. tem confiança no Presidente da República? |__|__|

Q70P: Até que ponto o(a)sr./sra. acha que se deve apoiar o sistema político brasileiro? |__|__|

Q70R: Até que ponto o(a)sr./sra. tem confiança nas eleições? |__|__|

[Retirar Cartão E]

Q71:Agora mudando outra vez de assunto, com qual das seguintes três frases o(a) sr./sra. está mais de acordo: |__|__|

(1) Para pessoas como eu, tanto faz um regime democrático ou um não democrático (01)

(2) A democracia é preferível a qualquer outra forma de governo, ou (02)

Q72: O/A sr./sra. acredita que em nosso país faça falta um governo de "pulso firme", ou que os problemas devem ser resolvidos com a participação de todos? |__|__|

- ☐ Pulso firme (01)
- ☐ Participação de todos (02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q73: Existem pessoas que dizem que precisamos de um líder forte, que não seja eleito através do voto. Outros dizem que, ainda que as coisas não funcionem, a democracia eleitoral, ou seja, o voto popular, é sempre o melhor. O que o/a sr./sra. pensa? *[Ler alternativas]* |__|__|

- ☐ Necessitamos de um líder forte que não seja eleito através do voto, ou (01)
- ☐ A democracia eleitoral é o melhor.(02)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q74: Quantas pessoas moram nessa casa? *Escrever número nas caxinhas* |__|__|

Q75: Quantas crianças moram nessa casa? *Escrever número nas caxinhas* |__|__|

Q76: Qual é a sua idade? *Escrever número nas caxinhas* |__|__|

Q77: Qual foi o último ano de escola que o/a sr./sra. terminou? |__|__|

_____ **Ano do** _____ **(primário, secundário, universidade, superior não-universitário) =**_____ **total de anos [**_USAR TABELA ABAIXO PARA CÓDIGO_**]**

Nível Serie→	1º	2º	3º	4º	5º	6º	7º	8º
Nenhum	0							
Primário (Fundamental)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Secundário	9	10	11					
Universidade	12	13	14	15	16	17+		
Ensino Superior não-universitário (incl. ténico)	12	13	14	15				
Não Sabe	(88)							
Não Respondeu	(99)							

Q78: Qual sua profissão atual? Escrever resposta: _____

Q79: O/A sr./sra. é filiado a um sindicato? |__|__|

- ☐ Sim (01)→ Perguntar Q. 80
- ☐ Não (02) → Pula a Q. 81

→ → Q80: Quão ativo/a acha que o/a sr./sra. é nesse sindicato? [_Ler opções abaixo_**.]** |__|__|

- ☐ Nada ativo/ só pago uma vez ao ano(01)
- ☐ Pouco ativo/leio a revista dele e/ou assisto algumas reuniões (02)
- ☐ Ativo/ assisto reuniões frequentemente, (03)
- ☐ Muito ativo/ sou líder, ou me quero me candidatar para ser líder algum dia (04)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q81: O/A sr./sra. se considera uma pessoa branca, parda, preta, indígena ou amarela? |__|__|

- ☐ Branca (01)
- ☐ Parda (02)
- ☐ Preta (03)
- ☐ Amarela (04)
- ☐ Indígena (05)
- ☐ Outra(06)
- ☐ Não Sabe (88)
- ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q82: Qual a sua religião, se tiver? [_Não leia as alternativas_**] [**_Se o entrevistado diz que não tem religião, explore se o entrevistado pertence à alternativa_ 3 ou 6**]** |__|__|

☐ Católica, (01)

☐　Evangélica pentecostal (pentecostal, Igreja Universal, Sara Nossa Terra, etc) (especificar qual igreja/denominação) _____, (04)
☐　Candomblé/Umbanda (05)
☐　É ateu/Não acredita em Deus (06)
☐　Espírita Kardecista (07)
☐　Não Sabe (88)
☐　Não Respondeu (99)

→ → **Q82A:** [*Perguntar só se tiver religião*] **Com que frequência o(a) sr./sra. vai à missa ou culto religioso?** [*Ler opções*]　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Mais de uma vez por semana, (01)
☐　Uma vez por semana (02)
☐　Duas vezes por mês (03)
☐　Uma vez por mês (04)

☐　Uma ou duas vezes por ano (05)
☐　Nunca ou Quase Nunca (06)
☐　Não Sabe (88) ☐   NR (99)

→ → **Q82B:** [*Perguntar só se tiver religião*]**De modo geral, durante campanhas políticas o/a sr./sra. ouviu o padre ou o pastor da sua igreja falar sobre os candidatos?** [*Ler opções*]　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Sim (01)
☐　Não (02)
☐　Não Sabe (88)

☐　Não Respondeu (99)

→ → **Q82C:** [*Perguntar só se tiver religião*] **O pastor/padre da sua igreja apoiou algum candidato para presidente da República? Quem?**　　　[*Ler opções*]　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Dilma Rousseff (01)
☐　Aécio Neves (02)
☐　Eduardo Campos (03)
☐　Marina Silva (04)

☐　Apoio mas não lembra quem (05)
☐　Outro [*Escrever exatamente o que foi dito]* _____(06)
☐　Não Sabe (88)　　☐　Não Respondeu (99)

Q83: Agora vamos falar do estado da sua família. Nos últimos 20 anos teve alguma mudança, quanto aos nascimentos, adoções, mortos, etc. no número de pessoas que fazem parte da família que mora nesta casa?: |__|__|

☐　Sim (01)
☐　Não (02)

☐　Não Sabe (88)
☐　Não Respondeu (99)

Q84: Agora gostaria de saber quantas crianças nasceram nos últimos vinte anos. O/A Sr./Sra. poderia listar todas elas a idade que tem? [*Anotar abaixo as informações dadas—repetir para todas as crianças*]

Criança:	E, quando nasceu (ano) ?	E, está viva? (S/N)	[*Se Não*] Quando faleceu (ano)?

Q85: Esta casa tem agua encanada dentro de casa ?　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　|__|__|

☐　Sim (01)
☐　Não (02)

☐　Não Sabe (88)
☐　Não Respondeu (99)

→ → **Q85B:**[*Se falar que não tem água encanada*] **Qual sistema de água tem?**　　　　　　　　|__|__|

[Deixar entrevistado falar. Depois averiguar resposta, usando opções abaixo: [*"OK. O/A sr./sra. tem XXX sistema..."*]

☐Água encanada para habitação (1)

☐ Poço protegido (05)

☐ Água da chuva (09)
☐ Caminhão-pipa (10)
☐ Carro com pequeno tanque (11)
☐ Água do rio/lago/bica/represa/canal (12)
☐ Canal de Irrigação (13)

☐ Água engarrafada (14)
☐ Outro [Anotar:_____] (15)
☐ Não Sabe(88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ →Q85C: Onde fica essa fonte de água? |__|__|

☐ Na própria habitação (01)
☐ No próprio quintal / terreno (02)
☐ Em outra parte [especificar:

_____] (03)
☐ Não Sabe(88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ → Q85D: Quanto tempo leva para ir lá, pegar água, e voltar? |__|__|

☐ *Escrever o número de minutos nas caixinhas acima.*   ☐ Não Sabe(88)   ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q86: O/A sr./sra. faz alguma coisa para tornar a água mais segura para beber? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)
☐ Não (02)

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ → Q86A: [Somente se falar que sim] O que o/a sr./sra. costuma fazer para tornar a água mais segura para beber?

[*Marcar todas maneiras mencionadas. Pode mencionar opções para ajudar ao entrevistado.*]

Item:	SIM	NÃO
Ferver (01)		
Adicionar água sanitária / cloro (02)		
Filtrar com um pano (03)		
Filtro de água (cerâmica/areia/ composto/ etc.) (04)		
Desinfecção solar (05)		
Deixar em repouso até que a sujeira vá para o fundo (06)		
☐ Outro [especificar: _____] (07)		

☐ Não Sabe (88)   ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q87: Esta casa tem banheiro dentro da casa ? |__|__|

☐ Sim (01)
☐ Não (02)

☐ Não Sabe (88)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ → Q87A: [*Se falar que não tem banheiro.*] Que tipo de instalações sanitárias os membros da sua família costumam usar? |__|__|

[Deixar intrevistado falar. Depois averiguar resposta, usando opções abaixo: ["*OK. O/A sr./sra. tem XXX sistema…*"]

☐ Sistema de esgoto encanado (01)
☐ Fluxo de esgoto para fossa séptica (02)
☐ Fluxo de esgoto despejado no solo (03)
☐ Esgoto despejado em outro lugar. (04)
☐ Não sabe onde o esgoto é despejado (05)
☐ Latrina (06)
☐ Latrina de ventilado melhorado (07)
☐ Latrina com laje (08)

☐ Latrina sem laje (09)
☐ A céu aberto (10)
☐ Banheiro de compostagem (11)
☐ Balde (12)
☐ Nenhuma instalação (12)
☐ Outro [Especificar_____] (14)
☐ Não Sabe(99)
☐ Não Respondeu (99)

→ → Q87B: Quantas famílias usam estas facilidade de banheiro? |__|__|

☐ *Escreve número de famílias nas caixinhas acima.*   ☐ Não Sabe (88)   ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q88: Somando a renda de todas as pessoas que moram na sua casa, incluindo envios de dinheiro de pessoas que estão no exterior ou outro lugar e o salário de todos os adultos e crianças que trabalham, qual das seguintes categorias mais se aproxima da renda Famíliar dessa casa? [*Se não entendeu, pergunte: quanto dinheiro ao todo entra na sua casa por*

☐ De R$ 510,01 até R$ 1020,00 (02)   ☐ Mais de R$ R$ 2.550,00 (05)
☐ De R$ 1020,01 até R$ 1.530,00(03)   ☐ Não Sabe(99)
☐ De R$ 1.530,01 até R$ 2.550,00(04)   ☐ Não Respondeu (99)

Q89: Poderia me dizer se em sua casa tem: [Ler todos elementos da lista abaixo, marcando a resposta do entrevistado com um X.]

Item:	SIM	NÃO
Televisão		
Geladeira		
Telefone fixo (não celular)		
Tablet (iPad ou outro)		
Telefone celular		
Automóvel		
Máquina de lavar roupa		
Forno de micro-ondas		
Motocicleta		
Computador		
Internet		
TV de tela plana		

Estas são todas as perguntas que eu tenho. Muito obrigado/a pela sua colaboração. Suas respostas tem sido muito importantes.

*__**Para recenseador só**__*

90: Genero do entrevistado: |__|__|

☐ Homem (01)   ☐ Mulher (02)

Hora em que terminou a entrevista _____ : _____
TI. Duração da entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____ |_|_|_|_|
As informações acima, por serem verdadeiras, seguem assinadas abaixo por mim.
Assinatura do entrevistador_____ Data ___ /_____ /_____
Comentários:
_____