

Loving and Hating America in Turkey and Iran:
A Cold War Story of Alliance Politics and Authoritarian Modernization, 1945-1980

Barın Kayaoğlu
Ankara, Turkey

B.A., Bilkent University, 2001
M.A., Bilkent University, 2002
M.A., Bilkent University, 2005
M.A., University of Virginia, 2006

A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

University of Virginia
December 2014

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December 2014

To Lara, Arda, Ayla, Hasan, Barkın, and Demet

and

Mel Leffler, the captain with the mighty heart

Abstract

This dissertation is a study of U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran during the Cold War and the rise of anti-Americanism in the two countries. The dissertation explores why pro-American sentiments in Turkey and Iran in the 1940s and 1950s turned into vicious anti-Americanism in the 1960s and reached a crescendo by the 1970s. The study argues that, rather than individual events such as the CIA-sponsored coup d'état against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953 or the successive coups in Turkey, authoritarian modernization in the two countries and their turbulent alliances with the United States led to anti-Americanism. Although U.S. officials encouraged economic and social development in Turkey and Iran – building schools, hospitals, dams, factories, and roads – they remained mostly silent on the question of political change for the sake of stability. While authoritarianism undermined the political institutions that could have ameliorated economic and social ills in the two countries, Ankara and Tehran's geopolitical interests began to diverge from Washington's global and regional priorities by the 1960s. As their publics became visibly anti-American, even the normally pro-U.S. leaders in the two countries became skeptical of the United States.

Keywords: U.S. foreign policy, Turkey, Iran, anti-Americanism, authoritarianism, modernization, development

Table of Contents

Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Acknowledgments	vii
Chapter 1 – Concepts, Backgrounds, Structures	1
Introduction	1
Modernization as Theory and Practice	5
Defining Anti-Americanism	8
Authoritarian Modernization in Turkey and Iran Before 1945	12
The United States as a Model of Liberal Modernization	25
Organization and Methodology of the Study	29
Chapter 2 – The Curious Case of Pro-Americanism, 1945-1954	35
Introduction	35
From Confrontation in the Near East to Containment in Europe and East Asia	37
The United States and Turkey’s Orderly Transition to Democracy	46
The United States and Iran’s Troublesome Political Economy	53
“Welcome, Our Dear Friends”: Turkey’s Volatile Pro-Americanism and Entry into the Western Alliance	62
“The Great and Friendly Land of the United States of America”: The Oil Crisis and Iran’s Cautious Pro-Americanism	71
Conclusion	85

Chapter 3 – Pro-Americanism Subsides, Anti-Americanism Rises, 1955-1963	87
Introduction	87
“We Can Do These Things Without Going Broke”: The Eisenhower Administration and the Developing World	89
The Eisenhower Administration and the Turkish Turbulence	95
The Eisenhower Administration and the Iranian Imbalance	103
“Let Us Begin”: Modernization Theory and the Kennedy Administration	111
Old and New Frontiers in Ankara	116
Turkey’s Transition from Pro-American to U.S.-Skeptic	120
Iran: The New Frontier with an Authoritarian Flavor	129
The Steady Rise of Anti-Americanism in Iran	135
Conclusion	143
 Chapter 4 – Targeting America, 1964-1973	146
Introduction	146
“Let Us Continue”: The Relative Decline of U.S. Power in the Age of <i>Détente</i>	148
The United States Deals With an Autonomous, Prospering, and Unstable Turkey	154
Pandora’s Box Opens: Cyprus, the Radical Left, and Violent Anti-Americanism in Turkey	165
The United States Deals With an Autonomous, Autocratic, and Stable Iran	178
Autocracy, Militant Radicalism, and Anti-Americanism in Iran	189
Conclusion	198

Chapter 5 – Anti-Americanism Consolidates, 1974-1980	201
Introduction	201
The Decade of Shocks: <i>Détente</i> Ends, the Cold War Resumes	204
Pahlavi Iran: The Making of a Regional Superpower, the Unmaking of a Regime	211
“The Americans Can’t Do a Damned Thing”: The Revolution, the Hostage Crisis, and the Collapse of U.S.-Iranian Relations	223
The Turkish Military Solves Ankara and Washington’s Opium, Cyprus, and Chaos Problems	232
Opium, Cyprus, Gladio: Anti-Americanism Strikes Back in Turkey	244
Conclusion	255
Chapter 6 – Conclusion	258
Bibliography	270

Acknowledgements

This Ph.D. dissertation is the product of six years of sweat, tears, laughter, heartbreak, and everything in between. It is also the culmination of thirteen years of graduate study – a long time during which I accumulated many debts of gratitude. So if these acknowledgements come to you as long, I can assure you that this is the brief version.

No project of international history can be pursued, much less completed, without generous sponsors. I would like to thank the Dwight D. Eisenhower Foundation, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation, the Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation, and the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation for their travel grants, which allowed me to conduct research at the presidential libraries of their namesakes in Abilene, Ann Labor, Austin, and Boston. The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) awarded me the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship, which, together with a grant from the University of Virginia's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, enabled me to start learning Persian at the University of Tehran's Dehkhoda Institute in the summer of 2008. The Graduate School's Malone-Gallatin Fellowship paid for the research in my native Turkey while SHAFR's Samuel F. Bemis Grant funded part of my research in Iran.

The following institutions have supported me with fellowships and publishing opportunities: The Lynne and Harry Bradley Foundation Fellowship covered my research trips to Iran, the U.S. National Archives in College Park, and the Nixon and Carter libraries. It also enabled me to start writing in 2011. The John Anson Kittredge Educational Fund extended a generous hand so that I could continue writing in the summer of 2012. With a Smith Richardson Foundation Predoctoral Fellowship in International Security Studies at Yale University and the Eisenhower Institute's Clifford Roberts Fellowship, I wrote most of the chapters in 2012-13. I am grateful to these institutions and their benefactors and administrators for their support. Parts of

the second and fifth chapters previously appeared on the journals *Cold War History* and *Iranian Studies* and they are used here courtesy of the Taylor & Francis Group.

Archivists and librarians in the United States, Turkey, and Iran were incredibly helpful. In College Park, at the Carter, Eisenhower, Ford, Johnson, Kennedy, and Nixon presidential libraries, and at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives, archivists patiently handled my requests and gave sage advice on which collections I should focus. The employees of the National Library in Ankara, the National Library and Archives in Tehran, and the staff of the libraries at Yale and Virginia were equally supportive.

Few places present as congenial an environment for graduate studies as the University of Virginia. Starting with the members of my dissertation committee – William Quandt, Elizabeth Thompson, and Philip Zelikow – I am thankful to the many mentors who oversaw my transition from an easy-going student into a serious-looking historian. Stephen Schuker, who forced me to read a host of books on prose in spring 2007, deserves special praise. Other faculty members at UVA helped me hone my skills as a learner, teacher, and public speaker: Brian Balogh, Julian Bond, David Coleman, Ronald Dimberg, Gary Gallagher, Max Gross, Zjaleh Hajibashi, Michael Holt, Alireza Korangy, Ted Lendon, Allen Lynch, Chuck McCurdy, Farzaneh Milani, Joseph Miller, Ruhi Ramazani, Sophie Rosenfeld, Jeff Rossman, Marc Selverstone, John Stagg, and Fariba Zarinebaf. Sabri Ateş, now at Southern Methodist University, encouraged me to take my first steps into Iranian history with his groundbreaking work on Ottoman-Iranian borderlands.

Beyond Charlottesville, others, too, were generous with their time and feedback. Nur Bilge Criss, Yüksel İnan, and Walter Kretchik, mentors from my Bilkent days, turned my fuzzy ideas into something much better – just as they had done in the past. James Matray's comments on the second chapter at the SHAFR conference in 2011, the many email correspondences with Tom Schwartz, and a chance meeting with Abbas Milani in Palo Alto gave the dissertation a

much-needed reality check. Malcolm Byrne, Jim Goode, Vicky de Grazia, Jim Hershberg, John Limbert, James Edward Miller, Christian Ostermann, and Salim Yaqub helped to improve the end product with their comments and critiques on chapters and proto-chapters.

Although administrative staff gets much flak in academic circles these days, I have found little to complain about UVA in that regard. Over the years, folks at the International Studies Office (ISO), especially Richard Tanson and Adrienne Kim-Bird, made sure that my slips with documents and course registration deadlines would not get me deported from the United States. Molly Angevine, Jewel Courtney Hay, Kent Merritt, Kathleen Miller, Liz Smith, and Ella Wood, the History Department's able and amiable administrators, helped mortals like me with The University's labyrinthine procedures. In this category, Jenni Via deserves special recognition: without her patience and resourcefulness, I may not have finished the Ph.D. program.

Colleagues at UVA's Alderman Library, where I worked as a reference librarian, made the job feel like a long intellectual conversation (or occasional moments of clowning on my part) for which I happened to get paid. Thank you, Anne Benham, Bryson Clevenger, Patricia Courtney, Haynes Earnhardt, Warner Granade, Alli King, Jared Loewenstein, Elizabeth Margutti, Rich Miller, Tim Morton, Arlyn Newcomb, Irene Norvelle, Barbie Selby, Keith Weimer, and Muhammad Sajjad Yusuf.

Friends sustained me through good times and not-so-good times and I am a better person for them. In Charlottesville, I was lucky to have Lauren Simenauer and the members of the ancient and honorable Jefferson Literary and Debating Society, who were always patient with my endless antics and impersonations. At times, they were kind enough to laugh at my jokes. Deniz Balçı, Paul Belonick, Emily Charnock, Samet Demirkaya, Burak Erdim, Scott Harrop, Jonas Hart, Mary Hicks, Heather Mastapeter, Arsalan Khan, Marina Omar, Süleyman Özbey, Jerry Reid, Susan Reid, Omer Shaukat, Jennifer Simpson, Basak Şefii, Fotis Vavelidis, Halil İbrahim

Yenigün, and Rizwan Zamir listened to my not-always interesting stories with interest. Martin Öhman was a superb friend, roommate, and critic. Rose Wellman kindly shared her research notes while Stephen Macekura, Victor Nemchenok, Rob Rakove, James Wilson, and Kelly Winck read portions of this dissertation. It is a much better work of history and I am a somewhat better historian for it.

Elsewhere on planet earth, I established new friendships and rekindled old ones. Ali and Heather Demir made what would have been a very cold stay in Ann Arbor in December 2008 a heartwarming experience. The other great surprise of Ann Arbor was meeting Roham Alvandi at the Ford Library. The archivists there told us that it was a first in the history of that institution that two students of Iran showed up at the same time. I have immensely appreciated Roham's friendship and our discussions since then. I look forward to more of those in the years ahead.

In Austin, Joe and Julie Parrott were not only gracious and patient hosts but also excellent friends. It is a testament to their good hearts that Joe and Julie let me crash on their couch for two weeks in an apartment into which they had barely moved. Seeing Ghazi Bsaibes thirteen years after Lebanon was another pleasant memory from Austin.

In Turkey, Tuğçe Bigeç and Funda Titiz generously shared their research when we met at the National Library. It was my good fortune that they also turned out to be terrific friends. Işıl Acehan, Özge Adıgüzel, Hakan Bozkurt, Seçil Bozkurt, Özlem Boztaş, Gülüm Eralp, Kazım Eryılmaz, Levent İşyar, Bleda Kurtarcan, Özge Mumcu, and Bora Uçak made my re-adaptation to Turkey a less stressful experience.

In Afghanistan, where I took time off from the dissertation to work on another project and as an election observer in 2010, Barış Andiç, Eyüp Can Dervişoğlu, Onur Katmerci, and Onur Şaylan made sure that I would not get into trouble whether I was inside or outside military bases and diplomatic compounds. In Kabul, His Excellency Ambassador Basat Öztürk treated me like

“one of the guys” and let me sit in some of the most interesting discussions about Afghanistan. It is a rare opportunity for anyone to be indulged with such insights about that country; it was my great fortune that my education came from one of the rising stars of the Turkish Foreign Service.

In Iran, Mahdi Ahouie, Erdem Aydın, Rory Brown, Maral Jefroudi, Barış Kalkavan, Maryam Kamal Khaledi, Gizem Kaşoturacak, Dina Nourelahian, Hilda Tehrani, Alp Yenen, and Emirhan Yorulmazlar turned an intense schedule of research and language training into a delightful learning experience. Amina Tawasil, whose pioneering work on Iranian women in religious higher education inspired me to push myself harder with my research, turned out to be an amazing surrogate cousin/sister. Hamed Mohsen and his lovely family – Malakeh, Nahleh, Mehramiz, Murat, Melisa, and Melina – have become my family.

Back in the U.S., seeing Michael and Cristine Emerson, Serkan and C.J. Gürbüz, and Onur and Gamze İşçi reminded me that time and space mean nothing when it comes to age-old friendships. In New York, Sara Barton, Erin Eastburn, Ira Krakhman, Melis Kurultay, Mehmet Özöktem, and Gizem Sucuoğlu indulged me with food and first-rate gossip. Artemy Kalinovsky, James Lyon, and Veysel Şimşek generously shared their work and commented on mine.

The ISS fellowship at Yale introduced me to another group of splendid friends and mentors. Before I met anyone, Anand Toprani gave me the grand tour of New Haven. Gülay Türkmen, Rıza Dervişoğlu, Daniel Fresen, Siobhan Quinlan, and Jeff Spooner raised my expectations on what to look for in future neighbors. My fellow fellows at ISS, Rebecca Brubaker, Rachel Herrmann, David Howell, Gagan Sood, Wang Tao, and Craig Wonson, together with Amanda Behm, Igor Biryukov, Jadzia Biskupska, Jeremy Friedman, Kathleen Galo, Ryan Irwin, Kim Lowe, Adam Tooze, and Liz Vastakis turned out to be excellent friends and colleagues. Auditing the grand strategy seminar taught by David Brooks, John Gaddis, Charlie Hill, Paul Kennedy, John Negroponte, and Paul Solman demonstrated how a class with

multiple instructors and dozens of students can be both fun and pedagogically effective. With Paul Kennedy, whose books had piqued my interest in international history as a clueless undergrad back in the day, I shared many meals at Yorkside Pizza after manning the front lines of the Wednesday soup kitchen at St. Thomas More. Even if Yale had not turned out to be such a wonderful chapter in my life, just knowing Paul would have been worth it.

Speaking of superb mentors and friends, one person deserves a special place here. I have neither met nor heard of an academic adviser who is as dedicated to his students as Mel Leffler. From our first meeting over coffee in Washington in February 2005 through the final touches to the dissertation, Mr. Leffler never tired of making calls and writing letters of recommendation on my behalf or giving pep talks (both pleasant and tough). He was always praiseful of my accomplishments and patient with my shortcomings. He always insisted that I do well in my work and never let me off the hook until I did. Without him, I would have never finished the Ph.D. I will always be in his debt and he will always be in my heart.

I should conclude by thanking my family: Although all my relatives have had a positive influence on me over the years, I feel a special gratitude to my uncle Mehmet Erdem, my cousin Ogan Tarhan, and his wife Ayca Tarhan for their friendship and support.

Another group that must be thanked is my brother-from-another-mother, Emre İmamoğlu, his lovely wife (and my second sister-in-law) Berta Özromano İmamoğlu, and their awesome son Jason. The İmamoğlus opened their home to me for what was supposed to be a few weeks. Even when those weeks turned into months and months into a one-year stay, Emre, Berta, and Jason (and his nanny, Emine Çınar) never once made me feel unwelcome (though at times I made them feel unwelcome in their own home!). Not everyone gets to have a good family in life; I am blessed to have such a wonderful second one.

And here's to saving the best for the last: Notwithstanding what this short list (!) may suggest, words fail me when I think of how much I owe to my mother Ayla, my father Hasan, and my brother Barkın. From my earliest memories in life through the end of graduate school, my parents and my brother always influenced me in the best way possible. Their love nourished me. Their support for all my undertakings – even when they doubted their merits – gave me the self-confidence that took me far in life. Even when I did not appreciate it (and there were many such instances), they always had my back. When a “course correction” was in order, they gave that back a well-deserved proverbial kick. Most important, their faith in me and my ability to finish this dissertation never faltered even when I lost faith sometimes. Through my brother, I met my sister-in-law Demet, who gave our family the two most wonderful people I have met in life: my niece Lara and my nephew Arda. Demet's kindness and the love and affection that Lara and Arda inspired in me have had an immeasurable impact on my life. I can never thank my family enough for what they mean to me. But I will never stop.

Chapter 1

Concepts, Backgrounds, Structures

Introduction

In February 1941, ten months before the United States entered World War II, Henry Luce, the influential owner of *Time* and *Life* magazines, wrote an essay titled “The American Century.” Luce argued that the ongoing global conflict proved the fate of humanity to be “fundamentally indivisible.” The American people, Luce said, had “to accommodate themselves to [the] fact [that] their nation [has become] [t]he most powerful and the most vital nation in the world.” If the United States could lead and transform the world after the war, the twentieth century would become the American century.¹

As Luce predicted, the United States did enjoy immense power and prestige after 1945. The attacks of 11 September 2001, however, also showed how anti-Americanism had built up around the world during the American century.² The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; instability in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia; the decline of Europe; the rise of China; the re-rise of Russia have raised the possibility that the twenty-first century could become “the anti-American century.”³ In this context, the question “why do they hate us?” clearly needs an answer

¹ Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” *Life*, 17 February 1941.

² For studies on anti-Americanism in the pre-9/11 period, see Kazuo Kawai, “The New Anti-Americanism in Japan,” *Far Eastern Survey* 22, No. 12 (Nov., 1953): 153-57; Frederick C. Turner, “Anti-Americanism in Mexico, 1910-1913,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 47, No. 4 (Nov., 1967): 502-18; Chong-Soo Tai, Erick J. Peterson, and Ted Robert Gurr, “Internal Versus External Sources of Anti-Americanism: Two Comparative Studies,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17, No. 3 (Sept., 1973): 455-88; Tim Shorrock, “The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of Anti-Americanism,” *Third World Quarterly* 8, No. 4 (Oct. 1986): 1195-1218; Stephen M. Streeter, “Campaigning Against Latin American Nationalism: U.S. Ambassador John Moors Cabot in Brazil, 1959-1961,” *The Americas* 51, No. 2 (Oct. 1994): 193-218; Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith (eds.) *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985); Vol. 497 of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (May 1988).

³ Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century?” *Journal of Democracy* 15, No. 2 (Apr. 2004): 5-16.

other than “they hate our freedoms.”⁴ If the United States seeks to maintain its global leadership – as a majority of Americans think it should – understanding anti-Americanism is crucial.⁵

To that end, this study examines the origins of anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran, the two most powerful countries in the Middle East at the turn of the twenty-first century. The study argues that, rather than a kneejerk reaction to U.S. power or a pathological hatred of the United States, anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran had its roots in the two countries’ desire to modernize and the turbulent nature of their Cold War alliances with the United States.

At the onset of the Cold War, Turks and Iranians welcomed U.S. help with their security and development: in 1946, Washington put pressure on Moscow to remove Soviet troops from Iran and backed Ankara against Soviet demands for territory in eastern Turkey and bases on the Turkish Straits. Despite setbacks, such as the CIA and SIS-sponsored coup d’état against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953 and the Turkish coup of 1960, Turks and Iranians appreciated U.S. aid.⁶ By the mid-1960s, however, as their countries still struggled with

⁴ Peter Ford, “Why Do They Hate Us?” *The Christian Science Monitor* (Sept. 27, 2001); Fareed Zakaria, “The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?” *Newsweek* (Oct. 15, 2001); Mohsin Hamed, “Why Do They Hate Us?” *The Washington Post* (Jul. 22, 2007). President George W. Bush had given the “they hate our freedoms” response on 20 September 2001: “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731>; accessed 25 October 2012. For a discussion on U.S. global leadership in the post-Bush era, see American Political Science Association Task Force, *U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future* (2009), http://www.apsanet.org/content_59477.cfm; accessed 20 February 2011; Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro (eds.) *To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁵ In a 2008 survey, 83 percent of Americans rated “improving America’s standing in the world” as their country’s number one foreign policy goal. See The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, *Anxious Americans Seek a New Direction in United States Foreign Policy: Results of a 2008 Survey of Public Opinion*, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202008/2008%20Public%20Opinion%202008_US%20Survey%20Results.pdf, 9; accessed 1 May 2014.

⁶ The journalist Stephen Kinzer and the political scientist James Bill imply that the 1953 coup pre-determined the 1979 revolution and its anti-Americanism: Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003) and James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). Other observers do not necessarily draw that conclusion: See Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004) and Darioush Bayandor, *Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). In fact, Bayandor goes further and argues that, although the CIA directed the failed coup of 16 August 1953, its role in the successful coup of 19 August was minimal.

underdevelopment and authoritarianism, Turks and Iranians came to believe that, just as Britain, France, and Russia had done in the past, the United States was keeping their countries backward.

Why did Turkish and Iranian perceptions change so dramatically? The U.S. grand strategy to contain the Soviet Union entailed building a chain of alliances from Europe to Southeast Asia, which necessitated economic and military aid to Turkey and Iran, two of the chain's key links. From the late 1940s onward, U.S. officials encouraged socioeconomic reform in the two countries – building schools, hospitals, dams, factories, and roads. Political change, however, was a different story. Although Turkey maintained a multi-party system with free elections from the late 1940s until the coup of 1980, the military frequently intervened in politics. Iran witnessed the rise of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi's absolutist rule from the mid-1950s onward. For the sake of stability, U.S. administrations either supported authoritarian regimes in Turkey and Iran or promoted democracy and human rights very quietly.⁷

Rather than any single event, authoritarian modernization and their alliances with the United States fueled anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran. By ignoring their people and their own development experts, Turkish and Iranian leaders implemented flawed policies and hurt their economies. Although Ankara and Tehran – not Washington – were responsible for those policies, people in the two countries turned against their own governments as well as the United States.

From the 1960s onward, Washington's perceived indifference to the geopolitical concerns of Turkey and Iran also frustrated their normally pro-U.S. political elites. Elected leaders and senior bureaucrats in Turkey deemed U.S. support over Greece and Cyprus inadequate. Likewise,

⁷ David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For alternative views and case studies, see Tony Smith, *Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid For World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Boris N. Liedtke, *Embracing a Dictatorship: US Relations with Spain, 1945-53* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998); Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991).

the Shah and Western-educated technocrats in Iran questioned the merits of the U.S. alliance because of Washington's ostensible disinterest in their country's security needs. As disappointments grew, Turks and Iranians came to believe that their countries should resist and even challenge the United States in order to develop and pursue their national interests. Being the heirs to two of the world's greatest empires probably compounded Turkish and Iranian outrage.

By analyzing U.S.-backed modernization efforts in Turkey and Iran, this study contributes to the growing literature on similar U.S. efforts in other countries.⁸ The study also assesses the role of modernization as a cause of anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran and forces us to think about alternative reasons to explain anti-U.S. fervor around the world.⁹

Several reasons have sparked the need for a comparative study of U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran. Despite their appearance as polar opposites, the two countries are quite similar. After Egypt, Turkey and Iran are the most populous nations in the Middle East and they have the longest tradition of modernization in the region. Non-Arab but overwhelmingly Muslim, Turkey and Iran are the successors to the Ottoman and Persian empires – a glorious past still cherished by many Turks and Iranians. Most important, the two countries' Cold War alliances with the United States have shaped their politics and foreign relations well into the twenty-first century.¹⁰

⁸ Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Bradley R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁹ Max Paul Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Alan McPherson (ed.) *Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); Denis Lacorne and Tony Judt (eds.) *With Us or Against Us: Studies in Global Anti-Americanism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Paul Hollander, *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004).

¹⁰ Works that grapple with this theme are Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); R. K. Ramazani, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's

This project also contributes to a growing body of comparative works on Turkey and Iran.¹¹ It examines the origins of the so-called “Turkish model” (a secular, democratic, and pro-Western market economy) and the “Iranian model” (an undemocratic, anti-Western theocracy with a command economy). The project questions those assumptions and points out how leaders in Turkey and Iran have used and continue to use authoritarian methods – controlling the economy, the media, and the opposition – to become developed.¹² By analyzing the histories of these “models” and the U.S. role in their evolution, the study aims to inform current debates on development, democratization, and anti-Americanism in the Middle East and around the world.¹³

Modernization as Theory and Practice

At the crux of modernization lies the Enlightenment idea of progress – that humanity can and should eradicate war, disease, hunger, poverty, and ignorance through reason and science.¹⁴ As it came out of Western Europe and North America from the late seventeenth century onward, “modernity” changed the world in several ways: upheavals such as the English, American, and

Foreign Policy,” *Middle East Journal* 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2004): 549-59; Nur Bilge Criss, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” *The Journal of American History* 89, No. 2 (Sept. 2002): 472-84.

¹¹ In *Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future* (New York: Times Books, 2010), the journalist Stephen Kinzer gives a general overview of U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran to explain the present and future of U.S. standing in the Middle East. Historical studies of Turkish-Iranian relations are Douglas E. Streusand, *Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, Mughals* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011); Sabri Ateş, “Bones of Contention: Corpse Traffic and Ottoman-Iranian Rivalry in Nineteenth-Century Iraq,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 30, No. 3 (2010): 512-32; Fariba Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz: Modernity and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran,” *Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 28, No. 1 (2008): 154-69; Touraj Atabaki (ed.) *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society, and the State in Turkey and Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Touraj Atabaki and Eric Jan Zürcher (eds.) *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

¹² This study will use the terms “modernization” and “development” interchangeably.

¹³ Jeremi Suri, *Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama* (New York: Free Press, 2011); Hilton L. Root, *Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2008); James Dobbins, *After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); Kenneth J. Hagan and Ian J. Bickerton, *Unintended Consequences: The United States at War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*; Francis Fukuyama (ed.) *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

¹⁴ Amanda Kay McVety, *Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 6-37; Göran Therborn, *European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000* (Gothenberg: University of Gothenberg, 1995), 4-5.

French Revolutions undermined absolutism and introduced the notions of individual rights and popular rule into politics. The proliferation of the telegraph, steamboats, canals, and railroads created larger markets and improved communication. Factories produced cheap consumer goods in unprecedented quantities. New medicines and public sanitation improved quality of life. Advances in science led to military innovations such as armored ships, machine guns, and rapid-firing artilleries, which allowed their bearers to amass unprecedented political power.¹⁵

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through war, trade, education, and colonialism, modernity spread from Europe and North America to “traditional” societies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In order to thwart the encroachments of industrialized powers in their lands, leaders in many “traditional” societies sought to “become modern.” For these nations, modernization meant an independent economy, a standardized national language, an urbanized population, high literacy rates, industrialization, a strong military, and an institutionalized political-government system – if not a full-fledged democracy, then constitutional rule.¹⁶

Although the prescription of modernization sounds simple, implementing it has created many hardships. Applying modern techniques to agriculture has released excess labor from the land and enabled the expansion of industry and services. Industrialization and professionalization have led to urbanization and mass education. As the number of urbanites increased and cities became too large to manage effectively, workers and the intelligentsia have become more active

¹⁵ Daniel Headrick, *Power over People: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Steven Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Reprint; Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992); Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1900* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (London: Random House, 1987); Karl Mendelssohn, *Science and Western Domination* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976); J.B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry Into Its Origins and Growth* (New York: Macmillan, 1932). A similar list is in Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 19.

¹⁶ Nick Cullather, “Development? It’s History,” *Diplomatic History* 24, No. 4 (Fall 2000): 643; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 45-46. For a general overview of how development/modernization became global, see Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development From Western Origins to Global Faith* (London: Zed Books, 1997).

politically. Moreover, not all groups and regions in a developing country benefit from the transition to modernity equally. Modernization has created winners among the upper and middle classes but has not always been so positive for villagers and the urban working class. Overall, these transformations have taken place as the modernizing society's value systems – especially family relations and religious mores – change dramatically. And as humanity has found out in the second half of the twentieth century, development has significant environmental costs.¹⁷

In order to prevent social fragmentation and keep potential opponents at bay, many political leaders in modernizing societies have resorted to authoritarian rule. “Authoritarian modernization,” therefore, denotes the process of development where the state regulates the economy, mass media, and political activity to control the transition to modernity.¹⁸

In the late nineteenth century, Japan followed that path and became the first “traditional” country to transform into a modern industrial economy. Countries as disparate as China under the “Self-Strengthening Movement,” Egypt under the dynasty of Mehmed Ali Pasha, and Mexico under the Liberal Party also tried to modernize in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but foreign interference and domestic turmoil derailed those attempts.¹⁹

¹⁷ The following works have shaped my understanding of modernization: M.P. Cowen and R. W. Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); David Harrison, *The Sociology of Modernization and Development* (London: Routledge, 1991); Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Alex Inkeles, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); David Caute (ed.), *The Essential Writings of Karl Marx* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1951); Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (New York: Rhinehart, 1944); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942).

¹⁸ Other works that discuss authoritarian modernization are Steffen Erdle, *Ben Ali's 'New Tunisia' (1987-2009): A Case Study of Authoritarian Modernization in the Arab World* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2010); Simpson, *Economists with Guns*; Atabaki and Zürcher (eds.) *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*.

¹⁹ William G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic, and Social Change Since 1850* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); David Pong, *Shen Pao-chen and China's Modernization in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Juan R. I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: The Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999); John H. Coatsworth, *Growth Against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Porfirian Mexico* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981).

Proponents of modernization believed that developing countries had to replicate developed ones. Karl Marx argued how “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.”²⁰ As we shall see later in this chapter, that vision came to fruition for the first time in Turkey in the 1920s under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose vision of *muasırlaşma* (“becoming modern”) went beyond the Ottoman understanding of reform and aimed at *total* transformation of society “toward a terminus defined by the West.”²¹ Partly inspired by Atatürk, Reza Shah pursued similar objectives in Iran.

As Western empires declined after 1945 and the Cold War expanded to developing countries, modernization became a comprehensive theory on how to improve conditions in poor nations. Scholars and policy-makers in the United States hoped that “modernization would not only contain communist subversion but also dramatically improve the lives of millions of people in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.”²² Turning the theory of modernization into practice had profound consequences for the United States and the rest of the world.

Defining Anti-Americanism

According to one definition, anti-Americanism is “any hostile action or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States.”²³ Another definition holds that “anti-Americanism [is] a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society.”²⁴

²⁰ Quoted in Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism*, 60.

²¹ Quote from Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 31.

²² Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution*, 4.

²³ Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith, “Anti-Americanism in the Third World,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988): 36. Also see their “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon,” in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith (eds.) *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 1-30.

²⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Varieties of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis,” in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds.) *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, 12.

The sociologist Paul Hollander finds anti-Americanism to be “a negative predisposition, a type of bias which is [s]imilar to racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism.” According to Hollander, anti-Americanism is also a “crisis of meaning,” a by-product of modernization: “to the extent that ‘Americanization’ is a form of modernization,” he says, “the process can inspire understandable apprehension and anguish among those who seek to preserve a more stable and traditional way of life in various parts of the world.” Modernizing societies conflate American capitalism with modernity and the harm it inflicts on traditional values and human relationships. As such, says Hollander, at the crux of anti-Americanism lies “unhappiness about living in a basically secular [and] excessively individualistic society which, while providing a wide range of choices and options, offers little help for its members to make their lives more meaningful.”²⁵

Hollander’s framework is perceptive but it does not fully apply to Turkey and Iran. Frustrations with modernization did contribute to anti-Americanism but Turks and Iranians did not oppose modernization per se. They supported their countries’ U.S. alliance in the early Cold War because they hoped it would help with development. In the 1960s, however, ordinary folks and political opponents in Turkey and Iran turned against the United States because they blamed it for the externalities of rapid socioeconomic change while Turkish and Iranian leaders began to have serious disagreements with their counterparts in Washington. Likewise, although anti-U.S. sentiments in many countries have irrational and almost paranoid traits (Turkey and Iran were no exceptions), dismissing most, if not all, anti-Americanism as a reaction by poorly informed

²⁵ Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965-1980* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), viii; xi. For studies on anti-Americanism in developed countries, see Richard Kuisel, *The French Way: How France Embraced and Rejected American Values and Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Sergio Fabbrini, “Layers of Anti-Americanism: Americanization, American Unilateralism, and Anti-Americanism in a European Perspective,” *European Journal of American Culture* 23, no. 2 (2004): 79-94; Dan Diner, *America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996); Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); Herbert J. Spiro, “Anti-Americanism in Western Europe,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (May 1988): 120-32; Andrei S. Markovits, “On Anti-Americanism in West Germany,” *New German Critique* 34 (Winter 1985): 3-27.

foreigners can be misleading.²⁶ As U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran during the Cold War and subsequent events in the Middle East have demonstrated, irrational fear and hatred can have profound consequences for global affairs.

The question of (ir)rationality begets another one: is anti-Americanism inevitable? Some scholars suggest that anti-Americanism was inevitable during the twentieth century because hegemonic powers are usually unpopular. Hollander states that, because the United States symbolized modernity, foreigners blamed it for modernization's undesirable effects. The political scientists Alvin Rubinstein and Donald Smith claim that "anti-Americanism was an inevitable consequence of Third World disenchantment with the United States [and its economic policies]." Washington promoted a specific type of modernization – capitalist, Western-oriented, and frequently undemocratic – which led to anti-Americanism in many developing countries.²⁷

But Rubinstein's and Smith's more recent stress on the inevitability of anti-Americanism is a serious contradiction of their 1985 book, in which they had written that "the Third World perceives U.S. foreign policy as frequently irresponsible, belligerent, and imperialist, U.S. international economic activity as frequently exploitative, and the United States as a basically good society."²⁸ During the Cold War, many developing countries saw the United States as indifferent (if not openly hostile) to their socialist aspirations. Moscow had significant advantages over Washington because the Soviet model of development, which emphasized the nationalization of key industries, heavy public sector investment, and extensive central planning,

²⁶ After all, just as many Americans believe in the same conspiracy theories about their country. See Lev Grossman, "Why the 9/11 Conspiracy Theories Won't Go Away," *Time*, 3 September 2006, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1531304,00.html>; accessed 29 December 2012. To be fair to Hollander, he tries to distinguish between rational and irrational elements of anti-Americanism and between criticism of the United States and anti-Americanism. See the 1995 edition of his 1992 book, *Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995).

²⁷ Rubinstein and Smith, "Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon," in Rubinstein and Smith (eds.) *Anti-Americanism in the Third World*, 6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

appealed to the Third World more than the U.S. focus on private investment, low tariffs, and open markets.²⁹ In the 1950s, Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. pointed out how “under communism, the Soviet Union has developed from an almost wholly agricultural ‘kulak’ state into a state which ranks as one of the most important industrial powers.” Many U.S. decision-makers, like Hoover, worried that the Soviet model could entice developing countries because a “non-Western Power [had] equipped itself to meet the industrial challenge which [had begun] in the West.”³⁰ U.S. support for colonialism, apartheid, and dictatorships made matters worse and dispelled the image of America exemplified by Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson.³¹

Indeed, it would have been very hard for the United States – extremely powerful, wealthy, and anti-communist – not to become more involved with foreign nations in the second half of the twentieth century. The sheer nature of a relationship in which an influential and affluent superpower deals with a weaker nation is bound to create tension – as it did with Turkey, Iran, and many other U.S. allies. But it is also fair to argue that, had U.S. policy-makers and their partners in allied nations pursued policies more in tune with American ideals and international expectations based on those ideals, perhaps anti-Americanism would not have erupted as viciously as it did during the Cold War and beyond.

That last point admonishes us to be careful with all-encompassing definitions of anti-Americanism. The historian Max Paul Friedman argues that such a catch-all definition leads to “the myth of anti-Americanism,” which he defines as “the conviction that [the opposition the United States] meets abroad springs principally from malevolence, anti-democratic sentiment, or

²⁹ This study will use the term “Third World” to denote countries that are “developing” or “underdeveloped” irrespective of their Cold War alignment. For a succinct of the origins of the term, see William Ryrie, *First World, Third World* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 1-3; Westad, *Global Cold War*, 2-4.

³⁰ Quoted in H.W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 270.

³¹ Rubinstein and Smith, “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon,” 29.

psychological pathologies among foreigners.” This myth, warns Friedman, “stands between American policy-makers and their ability to draw upon potentially useful information from abroad or to improve their policies by knowing more about the world.”³²

With that caveat in mind, this study will use anti-Americanism to denote grievances against U.S. policies in Turkey and Iran. The study will also investigate whether Turks and Iranians saw U.S. actions as helpful or detrimental to their interests.³³ Such an approach will allow the readers to identify the contingent moments that American, Turkish, and Iranian leaders faced and the choices they made within the structure of the Cold War. As a result, we shall see how the turbulent nature of U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran and their policies of authoritarian modernization led to anti-Americanism in the two countries.

Authoritarian Modernization in Turkey and Iran Before 1945

The setbacks that Turkey and Iran faced in their reform attempts before 1945 shed light on why discontent from modernization merged with anti-Americanism during the Cold War. Between 1774 and 1878, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its domains in the Balkans and North Africa to European powers (and the rest save for Anatolia and Eastern Thrace by 1918).³⁴ In 1828, Qajar Iran lost Georgia, Armenia, and northern Azerbaijan to Russia. In 1857, Britain ended Iranian suzerainty over Herat (now in Afghanistan) to protect India.³⁵

³² Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism*, 3-4.

³³ In June 2011, at a panel during the annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, the historian James I. Matray suggested that we should use “anti-U.S. governmentism” to denote anti-Americanism borne out of irritation with U.S. government policies.

³⁴ Although Turks were not the only ethnic group in the Ottoman Empire, republican Turkey preserved the geopolitical core of its imperial predecessor. As such, this section will use “Ottoman Empire” and “Ottoman” interchangeably with “Turkey” and “Turkish.” On this point, see Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 4-6.

³⁵ In the nineteenth century, the weakening of the two empires raised the issue of how to manage their decline – also known as the “Eastern” and “Persian” questions. See L. Carl Brown, *International Politics in the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 21-81; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966) 33-77; Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966);

These geopolitical disasters convinced “an intelligentsia made up of bureaucrats and military officers, who identified their own interests with those of the state,” that only modernization could protect their lands. Turkish and Iranian reformers admired Europe’s economic, scientific, and military advances, not its political liberty. After all, many liberal societies in Europe benefited from colonialism at the expense of countries like Turkey and Iran. In the nineteenth century, the political elite in the two countries thought that, the bourgeoisie, who were often non-Muslim minorities, did not serve the interests of their states. Thus, the individual and her relationship with the state became a marginal issue in Turkey and Iran.³⁶

Turkish and Iranian reform shared other features. Thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp, a nationalist Turkish sociologist, and Jamaladdin Afghani, an Iranian Pan-Islamist intellectual and activist, saw the need to adopt Western science and technology. But they also wanted to keep Islam as the core identity of their societies. Meanwhile, the most enthusiastic supporters of modernization advocated emulating Western fashion and languages and not just the science and technology. In the Ottoman Empire, the novelists Hüseyin Cahit and Fatma Aliye wanted French to replace Arabic and Persian as the language of culture. In Iran, Mirza Malkum Khan, a reformer and anti-Qajar revolutionary, mocked the country’s literati for their obscure language and Muslim clerics (*ulama*) for their ignorance of Western sciences.³⁷ Both Westernizers and conservatives

Christopher N. B. Ross, “Lord Curzon and E. G. Browne Confront the ‘Persian Question,’” *The Historical Journal* 52, No. 2 (June 2009): 385-411.

³⁶ Atabaki and Zürcher, “Introduction,” in Atabaki and Zürcher (eds.) *Men of Order*, 2.

³⁷ Hüseyin Cahit is known to have said, “We have to Europeanize whether we like it or not. Just as the pants we wear come from Europe, so shall our literature.” Malkum Khan, for his part, stated that “henceforth, all governments in the world will have to be ordered like those of Europe, or be subjugated and conquered by European power.” Cahit quote in Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1973), 338; Malkum quote from Hamid Algar, *Mirza Malkom Khan: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 70. Also see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).

accepted the need to modernize but they disagreed on methods, which created friction between them from the late nineteenth century onward.³⁸

Turkey and Iran faced another problem. As the two countries reformed to resist foreign domination, they turned to European creditors and signed disadvantageous agreements. On the eve of the Crimean War (1854-56), the Ottoman Empire drew its first loan of 75 million francs (£3.6 million) with an annual interest of six percent from French banks. Higher debts followed.³⁹ By 1881, the Ottoman state was bankrupt and acquiesced to the formation of the European-controlled Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye İdaresi) to pay its debts.

Under free trade agreements with Western countries, Istanbul and Tehran had to lower tariffs for foreign goods before they could build their industrial base. Likewise, they granted concessions known as “capitulations,” which gave exclusive trading rights to foreigners for commodities such as cotton and soap as well as enterprises such as lighthouses and railroads. With the introduction of steamships in the mid-nineteenth century, transportation costs decreased and Western goods flooded local markets. Unable to compete with European products, industries in Turkey and Iran, as in many non-European countries, weakened. By turning into exporters of raw materials, the two countries became “peripheral” players in the world economy.⁴⁰

³⁸ For the genesis of “conservative” modernists, see Pelin Helvacı, “A Critical Approach: Political Thoughts on Young Ottomans,” *European Journal of Social Sciences* 16, No. 3 (2010): 441-45; Farzin Vahdat, *God and Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 27-74; Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 2001) 292-95; Ali Mirsepassi, *Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The following collection of primary sources gives a broad overview of Islamic modernizers throughout the Muslim world: Charles Kurzman (ed.) *Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

³⁹ The Ottoman state budget stood at approximately £16 million in 1864. Figures from Bernard Camille Collas, *1864’te Türkiye: Tanzimat Sonrası Düzenlemeler ve Kapitülasyonların Tam Metni* [Turkey in 1864: Regulations After the Tanzimat and the Full Text of the Capitulations] (İstanbul: Bileşim, 2005), 86. Comparative exchange rates drawn from the same work on pp. 134-35.

⁴⁰ Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1981), 92; Immanuel M. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System Vols. I-II-III* (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980, 1989); Immanuel M. Wallerstein, “The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World Economy: Some Questions for Research,” *Review* 2, No. 3 (Winter

Despite these similarities, Qajar Iran faced more acute problems than Ottoman Turkey. While the Ottomans could build railroads with Western financial and technical support, Russia and Britain prevented Iran from doing so in order to stop an invasion from the other Great Power. Worse, the Iranians did not have the Ottomans' revenue base so Nasraddin Shah signed extremely unpopular capitulations with foreign entrepreneurs. In 1872, he granted the exclusive right to form a state bank and exploit mines as well as build railways, roads, and telegraph lines to a Briton, Julius de Reuter (of later news agency fame). Reuter agreed to pay a lump sum of £40,000 and 60 percent of the profits. George Curzon, a British traveler (and noted statesman later on), remarked: "The [Reuter] agreement contained the most complete surrender of the entire resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in history."⁴¹ Once the concession became public, however, popular hostility and Russian opposition forced Nasraddin to abrogate certain parts of the agreement.⁴²

Two decades later, Nasraddin Shah signed an unpopular agreement with another Briton, Gerald Talbot, for a fifty-year monopoly on the sale of tobacco. Talbot promised the Shah a "personal gift" of £25,000, an annual rent of £15,000, and a quarter of the profits. *Bazaars* (markets) across Iran shut down in protest. The *ulama* issued *fatwas* (religious rulings) that banned smoking. The Tobacco Revolt of 1891-1892 was a harbinger of things to come.⁴³

1979): 389-98; Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*, 48; Robert A. McDaniel, "Economic Change and Economic Resiliency in Nineteenth Century Persia," *Iranian Studies* 6, No. 1 (Winter 1971): 36-49; Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 27-52; Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980); Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971). The historian Carter Findley argues some Ottoman industries did compete against Western industries successfully: Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 111-15.

⁴¹ Quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 55.

⁴² The concession still allowed the British to establish the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889. Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 3.

⁴³ Nikki Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 49.

The modernization of Ottoman Turkey and Qajar Iran differed in other respects. “The Ottoman state furnished a stratum of reformist bureaucrats [t]hat had no counterpart in Iran, whose reformers were isolated individuals.” Furthermore, “the Ottoman *ulama* had nothing like the independence of their Iranian counterparts and were in no position to oppose [r]eformers.”⁴⁴ And while neither state formally lost its independence, the Ottomans retained a greater degree of sovereignty. Thus, Western-oriented modernization had more enemies in Iran than in Turkey.

By the early twentieth century, political and economic hardships antagonized broad sections of society in both countries. Qajar rulers’ extensive commercial and political concessions caused many Iranians to equate foreign influence with tyranny and poverty. In the summer of 1905, *bazaar* merchants’ protests in Tehran triggered a popular revolt and brought the *ulama* and modernist intellectuals together. In December 1906, Mozaffaraddin Shah agreed to popular demands for a constitution. In the Ottoman Empire, an army mutiny in the Balkans broke out in the spring of 1908 in response to political repression and ethnic separatism. A coalition of army officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, with support from ethnic and religious minorities, compelled Sultan Abdülhamid II to restore the 1876 constitution in the summer of 1908.⁴⁵

Constitutional rule, however, did not survive in either country. The Committee of Union and Progress, the famed Young Turks, turned to ethnic nationalism after territorial losses in the Balkans and North Africa and formed a single-party government in 1913. Meanwhile, to counter the growing influence of Germany in the Middle East, Britain and Russia signed a treaty to divide Iran into spheres of influence in 1907. Four years later, when the Iranian parliament tried

⁴⁴ Tim McDaniel, *Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 26.

⁴⁵ Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Zarinebaf, “From İstanbul to Tabriz;” M. Şükrü Hanioglu, “The Second Constitutional Period, 1908-1918” in Reşat Kasaba (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 62-111; Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 194-201.

to bring state finances under control with the help of the American financial expert Morgan Shuster, the Russian army occupied Iran with British approval and assisted the restoration of absolutist rule. According to the political scientist Rouhollah Ramazani, “besides partitioning Iran into spheres of influence and destroying the *Majles* [parliament], the Anglo-Russian friendship treaty induced an unprecedented degree of outright intervention in [Iran].”⁴⁶

At the end of World War I, Turkey’s prospects looked bleak. Since 1911, it had fought against Italy, then its Balkan neighbors, and finally on the side of Germany against the Entente during the Great War. Although the Allied occupation after the war offended the heirs of a once-proud empire, Turkish people were exhausted. A general by the name of Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk, “father of the Turk”), who had rose to fame in Gallipoli during the war, seized the moment. He appealed to his people’s patriotism, coerced those who would not join the fight, and mustered the remainder of the Turkish army. After sowing discord among the Allies, Turkish forces defeated the occupying Greek army in September 1922.⁴⁷

Next, Atatürk abolished the sultanate, moved the capital to Ankara, proclaimed Turkey a republic, and became its first president. He embarked on a rigorous modernization program to “elevate” Turkish people to the level of “modern civilization” (i.e., the West). Although Atatürk fervently believed in his compatriots, he argued that Turks had lost their independent streak after centuries of despotism and needed firm leadership to activate their potential.⁴⁸

Atatürk used highly unusual methods in creating “the modern Turk.” During a countryside tour in 1925, he banned the *fez* (a Moroccan headgear that had become a symbol of modernity under Sultan Mahmud II a hundred years before) as he wore a Panama-style hat. He

⁴⁶ Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, 103; William Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York: The Century Co., 1912).

⁴⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 45-56.

⁴⁸ Metin Heper, *The Mode of Legitimizing a Modern State: The Case of Turkey* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Research Papers, 1985), 5-6. For a broader discussion of the state-led modernization in Turkey, see Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Hull: The Eothen Press, 1987).

also encouraged women to take off their veils (unlike Iran, however, Turkish authorities did not coerce women to unveil). The father of modern Turkey led efforts to purge Arabic and Persian words from Turkish, promoted Western classical music (he continued to listen to Turkish folk music in private), and financed archaeological excavations and Central Asian studies to emphasize Turkey's pre-Islamic past.⁴⁹ Atatürk's modernization program meant women's emancipation with full political rights, abolition of polygamy, adoption of the Latin alphabet instead of the Perso-Arabic script, state-directed industrialization, and replacing Islamic law (*sharia*) with the French, Swiss, and Italian legal codes.⁵⁰

The end of capitulations and the Great Depression presented the young Turkish republic with various challenges and opportunities. Gains in mining, energy, and transportation, sectors in which the state had a leading role, were impressive. Coal production increased from 597,000 tons in 1923 to 2.5 million tons in 1940.⁵¹ Electricity production increased from 50 million kw/h in 1923 (5 kw/h per capita per year) to 397 million kw/h by 1940 (20-22 kw/h per capita per year).⁵² The expansion of railroads was also significant: 4,138 km in 1923 (roughly half of it foreign-owned) to 6,639 km in 1935 (fully nationalized).⁵³ Nevertheless, partly because of the Great Depression, it took 17 years for per capita income to double, even though Turkey's 1923 population of 12.5 million only increased to 17.7 million by 1940.⁵⁴

Politics in the new Turkey was a mixed affair as well. Atatürk saw democracy as an important element of the country he wanted to create. He encouraged the Grand National

⁴⁹ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press, 1999), 361-414, 464-66; James F. Goode, *Negotiating For the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 31-66.

⁵⁰ Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 31.

⁵¹ Memduh Yaşa (ed.) *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi, 1923-1978* [The Turkish Economy in the Republican Era, 1923-1978] (İstanbul: Akbank Kültür Yayını, 1980), 261.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 263.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 274-75.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi-TBMM) to become a functional institution. On the other hand, Atatürk was not a democrat: he allowed opposition parties to form in 1924 and 1930 against his Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) but closed them down as soon as they became a threat to his CHP. When a plot to assassinate Atatürk surfaced in 1926, he let former comrades such as Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Rauf Orbay, who opposed his authoritarianism, stand trial on feeble evidence.⁵⁵ The Turkish military suppressed several Kurdish uprisings during the 1920s and 1930s, the most infamous at Dersim (Tunceli) in 1937-38. The Founding Father's love-hate relationship with a free political system would reverberate later on: subsequent Turkish leaders, too, would have trouble tolerating opponents.

Interestingly, although Atatürk preferred authoritarianism to democracy in order to accomplish his reforms, unlike Reza Shah in Iran, he established the institutions that would lead to a democratic transition in the late 1940s. The historian Andrew Mango points out that Turkey's "first republican constitution of 1924 enshrined the principles and set up the structures [for] genuine parliamentary government to emerge from free elections in 1950." "Atatürk left behind him the structure of a democracy," says Mango, "not of a dictatorship."⁵⁶

Republican Turkey's international standing also improved. It signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1925. It resolved its boundary disputes with Iraq in 1926 and entered into a rapprochement with Greece in the 1930s. Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos even

⁵⁵ For an account of how the influential novelist Halide Edip Adivar, an ally of Atatürk during the National Struggle, turned into an opponent after 1923, see the chapter titled "Halide Edib, Turkey's Joan of Arc: The Fate of Liberalism after World War I," in Elizabeth F. Thompson, *Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 91-116.

⁵⁶ Mango, *Atatürk*, 534. Other scholars, however, challenge the notion that the early Turkish Republic held democratic aspirations: Cemil Koçak, *Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir* [Your Past Cleaned With Care], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009); Cemil Koçak, "Parliament Membership During the Single-Party System in Turkey (1925-1945)," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, No. 3 (2005), <http://ejts.revues.org/pdf/497>, accessed 5 July 2014; Erik J. Zürcher, "Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic: The Role of the People's Party," in Atabaki and Zürcher (eds.), *Men of Order*, 98-112; Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)* [The Establishment of the Single-Party Administration in the Republic of Turkey] (Ankara: Tarih Vakfı, 1999).

nominated Atatürk for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934. Ankara joined the League of Nations in 1932 and signed non-aggression pacts with its Balkan and Middle Eastern neighbors in the late 1930s. With the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 and the rise of Nazi Germany, Turkey came closer to Britain and France. Overall, except for using coercive diplomacy to regain Hatay province (Alexandretta) from French Syria in the late 1930s, Atatürk's foreign policy adhered to his slogan of "peace at home, peace in the world."⁵⁷

Iran also faced new challenges and opportunities in the late 1910s and early 1920s as British strength diminished and the Bolshevik Revolution put Russia in turmoil. In 1919, Britain and the weakened Qajar state signed an agreement to employ British personnel to train Iranian officers and bureaucrats. Iranians saw the agreement as a new British attempt to dominate their country.⁵⁸ In order to undermine Britain, the Bolsheviks renounced the 1907 agreement and canceled all Iranian debts and concessions to the Tsarist government. The Bolsheviks pledged "to free Persia from the agents of tsarism and [t]he imperialist bourgeoisie who are [t]he enemies of the Persian [and] Russian people."⁵⁹ Moscow also supported the *Jangali* (jungle-dweller) uprising of Mirza Kuchik Khan in northwest Iran.

Amid the turmoil, Reza Khan, commander of the Cossack Brigade, a military unit formed with the help of Russian advisers in 1879, staged a coup d'état in April 1921. The Bolsheviks had already realized that supporting a strong government in Tehran would be the best option to

⁵⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 44-78; Roderic H. Davison, "Peaceful Relations: An Achievement of Atatürk," *Siyasal Bilgiler Dergisi* 36, No. 1-4 (1981): 167-77; İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları, 1920-1945* [Turkey's Political Agreements, 1920-1945] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983). On the Hatay question, see Sarah D. Shields, *Fezzes in the River: Identity Politics and European Diplomacy in the Middle East on the Eve of World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁵⁸ Oliver Bast, "Putting the Record Straight: Vosuq al-Dowleh's Foreign Policy in 1918-19," in Atabaki and Zürcher (eds.) *Men of Order*, 260-81.

⁵⁹ "Soviet Renunciation of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 on Persia," January 27, 1918 and "Soviet Renunciation of All tsarist Claims on Persia and Appeal for Friendly Relations," June 26, 1919, in Basil Dmytryshyn and Frederick Cox (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: A Documentary Record of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, 1917-1985* (Princeton: The Kingston Press, 1987), 244-49.

undermine the British. They withdrew support from the *Jangalis* and signed a friendship agreement with Iran in February 1921. The British, too, calculated that political stability would serve their interests in Iran and supported Reza Khan. In the fall of 1921, Reza's forces destroyed the *Jangalis*. Three years later, Reza marched on the *de facto* autonomous province of Khuzestan in southwest Iran and removed its Arab sheikh, Khazal Khan.⁶⁰

Reza Khan consolidated his rule by 1925. Impressed with the reforms in Turkey, he toyed with the idea of proclaiming a republic. The Iranian *ulama*, aware of Atatürk's secularism (especially the abolition of the caliphate in March 1924), resisted Reza's overtures but acquiesced in his accession to the throne.⁶¹ In late 1925, Reza Khan became Reza Shah and assumed the name "Pahlavi" for his dynasty. "Pahlavi," the name of Middle Persian in pre-Islamic Iran, also invoked the image of heroism and defined Iran's new political order.

Just like Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Shah succeeded where his predecessors had failed. Some of his most significant achievements were the establishment of the University of Tehran in 1925, the completion of the Trans-Iranian railway, which connected the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Tehran, and increasing the central government's authority by expanding the army and the court system at the expense of local notables and the *ulama*.⁶²

On the cultural front, Reza Shah stressed the use of the Persian language in public and discouraged Arabic, Armenian, and Azeri Turkish. He also tried to excise Arabic and Turkish

⁶⁰ Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 62-66. Some historians argue that the British actively supported Reza Khan's coup: Abbas Milani, *The Shah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 18-19; Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 80.

⁶¹ Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 101-4.

⁶² McDaniel, *Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution*, 27-28; Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 136. Also see Stephanie Cronin, *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Riza Shah, 1921-1941* (London: Routledge, 2003).

words from Persian. And akin to his fellow authoritarian modernizer in Turkey, Reza Shah sponsored archaeological excavations to underline Iran's pre-Islamic past.⁶³

Unlike Atatürk, however, Reza Shah did not care much for political institutions. Though he kept the 1906 constitution and the Majles, his rule became arbitrary.⁶⁴ The Pahlavi king ordered Iranian men to wear Western attire and, after his visit to Turkey in 1934, he tried to out-modernize Atatürk by forcing Iranian women to take off the *chadoor*, a traditional long overdress, and their headscarves.⁶⁵ Reza even banned the ritual commemorations of Imam Hussein, a central tenet of Shia Islam, which earned him (and his son) many enemies among pious Iranians.⁶⁶

Although Reza Shah abrogated all capitulations in 1928, Iran still suffered from Soviet and British meddling. Article 5 of the 1921 treaty allowed the Soviets to intervene in Iran in case of an "emergency." Moscow invoked that clause to invade Iran in 1941. Thereafter, the Soviets used the communist *Tudeh* (Masses) Party to influence Iranian politics.

Britain, on the other hand, used the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) as a vehicle to exert influence in Iran.⁶⁷ Formed under a private concession that Mozaffaraddin Shah had granted to the Australian millionaire William D'Arcy in 1901, AIOC held the right to prospect for oil throughout Iran but gave only sixteen percent of its profits to the Iranian government.⁶⁸

Prior to World War I, the British government obtained a majority of AIOC's shares as Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, oversaw the transformation of the Royal Navy

⁶³ Goode, *Negotiating For the Past*, 127-84.

⁶⁴ Afshin Matin-Asgari, "The Pahlavi Era: Iranian Modernity in Global Context" in Touraj Daryaee (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 346-64; Matthew Elliot, "New Iran and the Dissolution of Party Politics Under Reza Shah," in Atabaki and Zürcher, *Men of Order*, 65-97.

⁶⁵ For an insider's account of the Shah's visit to Turkey, see Hasan Arfa, *Under Five Shahs* (London: John Murray, 1964), 243-53.

⁶⁶ Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 128.

⁶⁷ The company's name remained "Anglo-Persian Oil Company" until the mid-1930s when Reza Shah asked foreigners to stop using the "obsolete" name of "Persia."

⁶⁸ Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle*, 7.

from coal to diesel. Although the AIOC's production steadily rose after World War I, the company's revenues fluctuated, which Iranians took as a sign of British deceit. They had a point: British officials frequently barred them from inspecting the company's books and the decrease in Iranian royalties was greater than the drop in AIOC revenues.⁶⁹ To address these concerns, Reza Shah asked for the renegotiation of the D'Arcy concession. The negotiations, which lasted from 1928 through 1933, ended with an agreement that was still disadvantageous for Iran and it extended the concession for another sixty years.⁷⁰

Despite setbacks, both Atatürk and Reza Shah succeeded in creating strong, centralized states. By expelling foreign invaders and suppressing domestic insurgents, the two authoritarian modernizers gained significant support even as they sidelined democracy. The historians Touraj Atabaki and Eric Zürcher argue that past experiences “left the middle classes and the intelligentsia in [Turkey and Iran] with no other option than to look for a *man of order* – who [w]ould install a centralized, powerful (though not necessarily despotic) government, [and] [w]ould be capable of solving the country's [p]roblems of underdevelopment.” Iran's political disintegration and the Ottoman Empire's destruction after World War I left authoritarianism as the most viable option. “When faced with the choice between strong government and swift reforms on the one hand, or, on the other, broader political freedoms that could benefit the opponents of reform, most intellectuals [in the two countries] tended to support the former.”⁷¹

The end of Atatürk's and Reza Shah's rule (from the former's death in 1938 and the latter's abdication after the Anglo-Soviet occupation in 1941), coupled with the impact of World War II, changed the politics of the two countries. Turkey stayed out of the war by playing the

⁶⁹ When AIOC produced 5.9 million tons of oil in 1930, the company turned £3.9 million in profits and gave Iran £1.3 million in royalties. The following year, for a 3.2 percent drop in production, AIOC's profits decreased to £2.4 million but Iran's royalties fell to an astonishing £307,000. See Table 1 in Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle*, 18.

⁷⁰ Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 117-19; Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle*, 36.

⁷¹ Atabaki and Zürcher, “Introduction,” in *Men of Order*, 4-6.

Axis and Allies against each other until it joined the latter in February 1945. Nonetheless, food shortages, high inflation, the closure of export markets in Europe, hoarding, and bureaucratic malfeasance hurt Turkish society. The decision to implement a wealth tax (Varlık Vergisi), which mostly affected Armenian, Greek, and Jewish entrepreneurs in Istanbul and Izmir, also undermined the single-party regime. As the war ended in Europe in May 1945, President İsmet İnönü, Atatürk's comrade-in-arms and successor, began the transition to a multi-party system.⁷²

Iran was not as lucky as Turkey. Following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Moscow and London asked Reza Shah to let Allied supplies for the Red Army to pass through the so-called "Persian Corridor." Wary of his country's traditional rivals and sympathetic to Germany, Reza Shah rebuffed the Allies. The Soviet Union and Britain invaded Iran in August 1941 and Reza abdicated in favor of his twenty-two-year-old son, Mohammed Reza. Without a strong monarch, Iran experienced free political activity and turmoil until the early 1950s.

For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman and Qajar governments had tried to establish closer relations with Washington to counter British, French, and Russian influence, with little success. Prior to 1945, many Americans contributed to the modernization of Turkey and Iran. In the 1830s and 1840s, American engineers advised their Ottoman colleagues on how to build new ships based on U.S. designs.⁷³ Other Americans became heroes. During the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, Howard Baskerville, a graduate of Princeton University and a teacher at the American Memorial School in Tabriz, joined

⁷² The most comprehensive study of Turkey's transition to democracy after World War II is John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

⁷³ William A. Helseth, *Turkey and the United States, 1784 to 1945* (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, 1957), 14-19; Kamyar Ghaneabassiri, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Persia, 1856-1921," *Iranian Studies* 35, No. 1-3 (2002): 145-75; Çağrı Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri* [The Historical Origins of Turkish-American Relations] (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2001), 132-34.

constitutional revolutionaries defending the town against a royalist siege. Instead of taking shelter in the U.S. consulate, the 24-year-old Nebraskan died defending Tabriz.⁷⁴

Other Americans helped educational efforts in the two countries. Schools such as the Academy for Girls (now Üsküdar American Academy) and Robert College in Istanbul, the American Memorial School in Tabriz, and the American College in Tehran (Alborz College) educated thousands of Turks and Iranians. In 1924, the progressive philosopher and educator John Dewey visited Turkey on Atatürk's invitation and helped to reform the national curriculum. Samuel Jordan, the principal of Alborz College, played a similar role in Iran.⁷⁵ By 1945, there was much goodwill toward the United States in both countries.

The United States as a Model of Liberal Modernization

The U.S. approach to modernization differed from the Turkish and Iranian outlook. In Turkey and Iran, modernizers sought to "save the state." The U.S. political elite, however, believed in achieving progress and social order through the autonomy of the individual, free enterprise, and limited government.⁷⁶ According to the historian Michael Latham, American leaders believed that their country, "itself the product of an anticolonial revolution," with its "liberal values, capitalist economy and pluralist democracy provided an example of what a truly

⁷⁴ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 17; "Howard Baskerville," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/baskerville-howard-c>; accessed 20 February 2013; Mansour Bonakdarian, "Great Expectations: U.S.-Iranian Relations, 1911-1951," in A. Amanat and M. Bernhardtsson (eds.) *U.S.-Middle East Historical Encounters: A Critical Survey* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 121-41; Abraham Yesselson, *United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883-1921* (Newark: Rutgers University Press, 1956).

⁷⁵ See *Iranian Studies* 44, No. 5 (Sept. 2011), a special issue on Alborz College's role in Iran; Ernest Wolf-Gazo, "John Dewey in Turkey: An Educational Mission," *Journal of American Studies of Turkey* 3 (1996): 15-42.

⁷⁶ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955); David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). For an incisive critique of the effects of the U.S. search for markets, see William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1959).

modern society could become.”⁷⁷ The historian Michael Hunt argues that American leaders’ sense of national greatness and racial supremacy, together with skepticism of radical revolution, pushed them to spread republican government and expand markets around the world.⁷⁸

The term “manifest destiny,” coined in 1845 to justify U.S. expansion across North America, explains that mindset. The historian Anders Stephanson defines “manifest destiny” as “the providentially assigned role of the United States to lead the world to new and better things.”⁷⁹ By the end of World War I, “manifest destiny” reached its logical conclusion as President Woodrow Wilson ascribed a special mission to the United States to spread democracy and free enterprise to a world destroyed by war and seduced by Bolshevism.⁸⁰

The Wilsonian outlook had its roots in America’s progressive movement. From the 1870s until the late 1910s, progressives realized that industrialization, urbanization, and the expansion of corporations could undermine social order. While improved transportation opened new markets, mechanization and scientific techniques boosted agricultural production. Agricultural surplus, however, decreased market prices and hurt farmers’ earnings. The combination of an industrial boom, increase in real wages, rural emigration, and influx of European immigrants

⁷⁷ Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution*, 3.

⁷⁸ Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). The historian Robert Kagan calls this belief in American superiority “not simple racism [but] civilizationism.” Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).

⁷⁹ Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), xii, 28. Also see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935).

⁸⁰ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (London: Routledge, 2002), 132-73; Thomas Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); N. Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967). “To American reformers in this period,” say the historian Alan Dawley, “changing the world [c]arried the double meaning of combating the evils afflicting their own society [and] the wider world.” Alan Dawley, *Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 1. Also see E.M. Hugh-Jones, *Woodrow Wilson and American Liberalism* (London: English Universities Press, 1951).

expanded U.S. cities. Periods of economic boom followed cycles of bust partly because of speculative trading and the malpractices of large corporations – the notorious “robber barons.”⁸¹

In order to avert a radical revolution at home, American progressives hoped the state could tame capitalism and improve living conditions for the people. They advocated social reform and checks on corporate practices – especially against monopolies and trusts. Some of the major reform achievements included the Interstate Commerce Act (1887), the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), the Federal Reserve Act (1913), the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), and universal female suffrage (1920).⁸²

Although Wilson’s attempts to turn the United States into an active global power failed in the face of congressional opposition after World War I, the progressive agenda reentered the scene in the 1930s. When the Great Depression threatened domestic order and global capitalism, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became president in 1933, called for a “New Deal” to institutionalize the role of the federal government in the political economy – a “broker state” that would mediate between well-organized interest groups in U.S. society.⁸³ In that respect, the New Deal had a lasting impact: social security, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation established useful checks and balances on the free market. Projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Hoover Dam spearheaded rural development. At a time

⁸¹ Sean Dennis Cashman, *America in the Gilded Age: From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: New York University Press, 1984); Alan Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); John G. Sproat, *Best Men: Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

⁸² Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: A Grassroots History of the Progressive Era* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2000); Gillis J. Harp, *Positivist Republic: August Comte and the Reconstruction of American Liberalism* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Eugene M. Tobin, *Organize or Perish: America’s Independent Progressives, 1913-1933* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Ellis W. Hawley, *The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979); Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966); Samuel P. Hays, *The Response to Industrialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

⁸³ David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-380; William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

when far-right and far-left governments around the globe promised deliverance from the failures of liberal capitalism, the Roosevelt administration demonstrated that development and prosperity in a free market democracy was still possible.⁸⁴ America's role in destroying fascism and militarist imperialism during World War II vindicated liberal modernization.

But World War II also heralded the prowess of the Soviet model of development. After all, Russia, a semi-industrialized backwater at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, largely defeated Germany, the greatest industrial power in Europe. The Soviet command economy and autarky, of course, challenged the U.S. vision of free enterprise and open markets; an ideological struggle that defined the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 until 1990. According to the historian Odd Arne Westad, the United States and the Soviet Union were "locked in conflict over the very concept of [m]odernity." "Washington and Moscow," says Westad, "needed to change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of [developing] states proved fertile ground for their competition." Overall, "both powers saw themselves as assisting natural trends in world history and as defining their own security at the same time."⁸⁵

Ideological differences mixed with geopolitics. U.S. leaders saw that "a viable international economy was the surest way to defend [c]ore industrial nations and [f]riendly governments from internal disorders and nationalist impulses that might impel them to gravitate

⁸⁴ Major development projects such as TVA and the Hoover Dam were meant to serve that political purpose: David Ekbladh, "'Mr. TVA': Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-1973," *Diplomatic History* 26, No. 3 (2002): 335-74.

⁸⁵ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 4. On the evolution of U.S. and Soviet modernization: Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution*, Chapter 1; Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, Chapter 1-2; David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Walter LaFeber, "Technology and U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 24, No. 1 (Winter 2000): 1-19; Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995); John F. Kasson, *Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976). On experiences with modernization/development outside of the U.S. and Soviet contexts, see the roundtable on *Diplomatic History* 33, No. 3 (June 2009): 375-512.

[toward Moscow].”⁸⁶ After 1945, U.S. grand strategy aimed to keep the Western Hemisphere and key parts of Eurasia free from Soviet control. “If Eurasia came under Soviet domination, either through military conquest or political and economic ‘assimilation,’ America’s only potential adversary would fall heir to enormous natural resources, industrial potential, and manpower.”⁸⁷ According to the historian Melvyn Leffler, after 1945, Washington “intended to promote world peace and [s]tability at the same time that [it] safeguarded national security, perpetuated American power, and further augment American prosperity.” The economies of U.S. partners in Western Europe and East Asia depended on their access to the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.⁸⁸

Turkey and Iran had an important place in these considerations, which would force the United States to protect them from the Soviet Union. For Turkish and Iranian political leaders, the combination of U.S. global power, U.S. prosperity, and America’s potential as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, brought them closer to the United States.⁸⁹

Organization and Methodology of the Study

In the absence of contemporary public opinion polls that measured Turkish and Iranian perceptions of the United States, this study uses contemporary newspapers, magazines, political pamphlets, and books from the two countries, as well as official U.S. documents to gauge elite

⁸⁶ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 10.

⁸⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48,” *The American Historical Review* 89, No. 2 (April 1984): 357.

⁸⁸ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 3. Also see Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.) *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) and Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Works that are more critical of the U.S. role in the early Cold War include Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (2nd ed.; London and Boulder: Pluto Press, 1995); Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Lloyd C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964) argues that expansionist U.S. economic policies had been established under Roosevelt.

⁸⁹ Kuniholm, *Origins*, 3-5; Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,” *The Journal of American History* 71, No. 4. (Mar., 1985): 807-25; Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 18; R.K. Ramazani, *Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975), 70-172.

and public perceptions of America during the Cold War. The study comprises six chapters. The second chapter (1945-1954) begins the story by discussing U.S. efforts to “contain” the Soviet Union. The chapter analyzes how the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in Turkey and the Point Four program in Iran generated pro-American sentiments. It covers the end of the single-party system in Turkey, Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Iran’s oil nationalization, and the coup against Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq.

The third chapter (1955-1963) explores how modernization came to define the U.S. role in the developing world and how authoritarian modernization reversed pro-U.S. sentiments in Turkey and Iran. The chapter analyzes modernization theorists and their influence on decision-making in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years. It then discusses how Washington encouraged greater regional cooperation between pro-U.S. regimes in the region to “contain” the Soviets and how it continued to push for socioeconomic reform in Turkey and Iran.

Despite U.S. aid, the economic situation in Turkey worsened in the late 1950s. The Democrat Party (DP), which had ended single-party rule by beating CHP in free elections in 1950, began jailing opponents. A military junta overthrew the DP government in May 1960. In the fall of 1961, after writing a new constitution, the military handed power back to the civilians even though it maintained the commanding heights of politics. Although pro-Americanism faded away in Turkey in 1955-1963, anti-Americanism was not yet a major problem.

Meanwhile, in Iran, political uncertainty continued to threaten Mohammed Reza Shah, who failed to implement land reform and the development projects prepared by planning experts. The Eisenhower administration encouraged the Shah to reform and the Kennedy administration put pressure on the Pahlavi king to allow liberals to form a government in 1961. The Shah soon sacked the reformers, embraced their agenda, and announced his “White Revolution” in January 1963. Unlike Turkey, anti-Americanism already was mounting in Iran in 1955-1963.

Anti-Americanism entered the scene in both countries with full force during the period that the fourth chapter studies (1964-1973). Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, the United States initiated the “Great Society” program and the war in Vietnam. The costly war and domestic spending for the Great Society caused inflation and hurt the United States. Despite Johnson’s and his successor Richard M. Nixon’s efforts to ease Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union and communist China, the Vietnam War damaged U.S. prestige around the world.⁹⁰

In the 1960s and 1970s, while the economies of Turkey and Iran grew rapidly and the two countries began to assert their independence from their U.S. ally, the radical left in both countries began to see their nations’ relations with the United States as a detriment to modernization. Turkey’s unstable democracy and the complete lack of political freedom in Iran, coupled with the displacements and inequalities borne from rapid socioeconomic change, caused the opposition to blame “American imperialism” and its “lackeys” in Ankara and Tehran for their countries’ troubles. Militant leftists in Turkey and Iran attacked U.S. service members, diplomats, and businesses. U.S. attempts to prevent Ankara from intervening in the Cyprus conflict, the Turkish coup of 1971, and the U.S.-sponsored ban on Turkish opium decimated America’s standing in Turkey. In Iran, the passage of an unpopular Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Shah’s absolutist rule, and U.S. support for the Pahlavi king worsened anti-Americanism.

The fifth chapter (1974-1980) discusses Washington’s troubles and the breakdown of political order in Turkey and Iran. The Watergate scandal forced President Nixon to resign in 1974 and shook the American people’s trust in their government. The global recession triggered by the breakup of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the price hikes of the Organization for

⁹⁰ Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2013).

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina, and the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 created the image that the United States was in “decline.”⁹¹

After the 1973 elections in Turkey, the military retreated from the frontline of politics once again. A coalition government of the secular leftist CHP and the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi–MSP) lifted the opium ban. In July 1974, Turkey intervened in Cyprus when a coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists, with support from the military junta in Athens, tried to unify the island with Greece. The subsequent U.S. arms embargo on Turkey, which aimed to make the Turks more flexible in the negotiations over Cyprus, exacerbated anti-Americanism and forced Ankara to pursue an even more independent foreign policy.

Iran also became more independent from the United States in the 1970s. Much to the dislike of the Nixon and Ford administrations, the Shah steered OPEC to raise the price of oil. After Britain withdrew its forces from the Persian Gulf in the early 1970s, the oil profits and the Shah’s massive arms buildup enabled Iran to become the predominant regional power. On the domestic front, the Shah closed down the already-weak political parties and formed a single-party system. The Shah’s massive domestic spending to achieve rapid development caused runaway inflation and put him into an impossible bind after oil prices began to decline in late 1976.

When the Carter administration came to power in 1977, the United States had limited options to deal with the disorder in Turkey and Iran. Despite impressive economic growth in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the lower and middle classes in the two countries began to suffer more from inflation than they benefited from development. As conditions worsened, political violence led to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979 and another military

⁹¹ Quite a few works were preoccupied with the theme of “U.S. decline” in the 1970s: Leo P. Crespi, *Trends in Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Economic Strength and the Impact of the Dollar Decline* (Washington: International Communication Agency, 1979); Joseph Churba, *The Politics of Defeat: America’s Decline in the Middle East* (New York: Cyrco Press, 1977); Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy; American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974); Peter Schrag, *Decline of the WASP* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971).

coup in Turkey in September 1980. Iran became a sworn enemy of the United States when militant students, with memories of the 1953 coup in their minds, stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and took American diplomats hostage. The Carter administration, unwilling to lose another ally in the region, got Congress to lift the arms embargo on Turkey, supported economic liberalization in the NATO ally, and recognized the coup regime of September 1980.

In the end, the United States, Turkey, and Iran paid a very high price for the fallout. The United States lost Iran, a critical ally in a troublesome region. Things got worse when, on 22 September 1980, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein took advantage of revolutionary turmoil in Iran and attacked the newly established Islamic Republic. After the eight-year war with Iraq, many Iranians came to believe (with much justification) that the United States had supported Saddam.

In Turkey, the military-backed constitution of 1982 curtailed labor activism and the expression of Kurdish identity. Furthermore, because the military endorsed religious groups to counter the perceived influence of communism, the political left weakened, nationalists and conservatives gained strength, and violent Kurdish separatism emerged in Turkey. A lingering suspicion of the United States crept into the popular narrative.

The sixth and final chapter gives an overview of U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran and the evolution of anti-Americanism in the two countries between 1945 and 1980. It illustrates how the Turkish and Iranian experiences as U.S. allies during the Cold War are crucial for understanding their domestic politics and foreign policies in the post-1990 period. Examining the modernization of Turkey and Iran can also help us appreciate their search for regional hegemony. In the nineteenth century, Ottoman Turkey and Qajar Iran had initiated reforms to protect their realms against Western powers. As Turkey and Iran are militarily and politically strong at the turn of the twenty-first century, they are trying to become regional superpowers once again.

Beyond the United States, Turkey, and Iran, the last chapter also engages with the debates on globalization, nation-building, development, and democratization. Although “liberal autocracies” that only respect social and economic rights (not political ones) may seem better suited for developing nations, this study disputes the wisdom of privileging stability and growth over political rights and liberties.⁹² Following in the footsteps of Amartya Sen and others,⁹³ I argue that development and democratization efforts around the world (which resemble modernization attempts during the Cold War) can achieve their stated aims only if they create inclusive political institutions. When governments curtail the expression of public opinion, citizens tend to vent their anger more violently than they do in a democracy, especially in times of economic downturn. Thus, political leaders in developing nations risk their countries’ future when they resort to authoritarianism in order to maintain order and accelerate economic growth.

During the Cold War, Turkish and Iranian leaders had aimed to hasten development by curbing political freedoms and silencing the opposition. In the end, authoritarianism led to poor decision-making and political turmoil, which undermined socioeconomic development. Washington suffered for apparently supporting authoritarian modernization in Turkey and Iran. Thus, if the United States – still the most powerful nation in the world – wishes to facilitate the creation of a peaceful and prosperous world order without generating anti-Americanism, it needs to uphold liberal values, socioeconomic development, and political democracy simultaneously.

⁹² Although he does not argue against promoting democracy in developing nations, the journalist Fareed Zakaria makes a compelling case for establishing liberal constitutionalism over electoral democracy. See Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

⁹³ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 146-60. Also see Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown, 2012); Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, “Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change,” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1, No. 2 (July 2009): 88-126; Michael Mandelbaum, *Democracy’s Good Name: The Rise and Risks of the World’s Most Popular Form of Government* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).

Chapter 2

The Curious Case of Pro-Americanism, 1945-1954*

Introduction

At the onset of the Cold War, Soviet demands for bases and territory from Turkey and the lingering presence of Red Army troops in Iran caused Turks and Iranians to see the United States in a positive light. While Washington became the counterweight to Moscow, American wealth and technology appealed to Turks and Iranians, who hoped that cooperation with the United States would lead to similar prosperity in their countries.

This chapter first examines the crises in Greece, Turkey, and Iran and the escalation of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry after World War II. In order to explain how U.S. thinking on the Cold War and “containing” the Soviet Union evolved, the chapter discusses the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, Point Four, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Korean War in tandem with political developments inside the United States.¹

The chapter then examines U.S. policy toward Turkey and Iran and pro-Americanism in the two countries. Political elites and opinion-makers (particularly journalists and academics) in Turkey and Iran, who were optimistic about U.S. promises to support development around the world, lavished the United States with praise. Indeed, Turkey received more than \$250 million in U.S. economic and technical aid between 1948 and 1951 (including \$100 million under the Marshall Plan), which helped its economy to grow almost

* Parts of this chapter previously appeared in Barın Kayaoğlu, “Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945-52,” *Cold War History* 9, No. 3 (August 2009): 321-45.

¹ On U.S. “containment” efforts in the early Cold War, see Curt Cardwell, *NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Revised ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 53-86; Ralph B. Levering and Verena Botzenhart-Viehe, “The American Perspective” and “Documents” in Ralph B. Levering et al (eds.), *Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 1-83; Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 366-418; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Thomas G. Paterson, *On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War* (Revised ed.; New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 41-162; Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War* (Revised ed.; New York: Penguin Books, 1990).

fifty percent from 1948 until 1953.² After the \$100 million from the Truman Doctrine in 1947-48, Ankara continued to receive vast sums of U.S. military assistance.³

Compared to Turkey, Iran received less aid and fewer advisors from the United States. Nonetheless, U.S. experts – among them agriculturalists, healthcare providers, teachers, and economic planners – advised thousands of their Iranian colleagues. Iran received approximately \$70 million in technical and economic aid between 1951 and 1954 and another \$70 million in military aid from the United States in 1950-54.⁴

But despite this seemingly straightforward story of U.S. aid and recipient appreciation, pro-Americanism in Turkey and Iran was a curious phenomenon. Lavish praise of the United States quickly changed to disappointment when support was not forthcoming. When U.S. help (arms, dollars, or political support) did not meet expectations, Turks and Iranians became upset. Right from the start, modernization and the challenges of building and maintaining an alliance determined Turkish and Iranian attitudes toward the United States.

Toward the mid-1950s, pro-Americanism began to disappear in the two countries. Pro-U.S. sentiments in Turkey cooled amidst an economic downturn while U.S. aid failed to neutralize the harmful effects of the oil nationalization crisis in Iran (1951-54). Although the

² In 1947, the Turkish fiscal budget stood slightly over TL1 billion (\$361 million), with defense as the largest expenditure. Figures from Max Thornburg et al., *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), 146, 217. With U.S. national income at \$244 billion in 1947 and Marshall Plan aid costing U.S. taxpayers about \$15 billion, U.S. aid to Ankara can be considered modest. See p. 43 and footnote 35 in this chapter. In 1950 alone, 81 American specialists trained Turkish technicians in Turkey while 195 Turkish experts received training in the United States. In 1951, a total of 900 American personnel served in civilian and military U.S. missions in Turkey. Their numbers increased through the rest of the 1950s. Economic and technical aid figures from Telegram, Ankara to Washington, 4 July 1949, Box 1, Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1947-1958 [hereafter SF-TR, 47-58], Record Group 59 – General Records of the Department of State [hereafter RG 59], National Archives and Record Administration [hereafter NARA] and “Briefing Notes on Turkey for Use Before Congressional Committee,” 17 January 1952, Box 2, SF-TR, 47-58, RG 59, NARA.

³ Total U.S. military aid to Turkey would exceed \$2.5 billion by 1964. William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 116, 123.

⁴ William Warne, who led the U.S. aid program in Iran from 1951 until 1955, relates that 13 American experts trained 2,400 Iranians, “from doctors down to pump-sprayers,” in how to fight malaria. There were many other such programs. See William E. Warne, *Mission for Peace: Point Four in Iran* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956), 138; Ahmed Ali Nuban, *The Point Four Program in Iran* (M.A. Thesis; Princeton University, 1954), 43-115. The civilian aid figure, which excludes emergency aid after the 1953 coup, comes from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954: Supplement to World Economic Report, 1953-54* (Reprint; New York: Kraus Reprint, 1973), 89. Military aid from “Briefing Memorandum for Greece, Turkey, and Iran,” December 1954, Box 40, Records of the Officer-in-Charge of Iranian Affairs, 1946-1954 [hereafter O-i-C-Iran, 46-54], Lot 57 D 529, RG 59, NARA.

coup against Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in August 1953 and its effect on Iranian anti-Americanism are still debated,⁵ this chapter argues that the coup itself did not lead to rampant anti-Americanism. Pro-Mosaddeq Iranians blamed Britain rather than the United States for the coup but they were disappointed by the lack of U.S. support for Iran during the oil dispute.⁶ Similarly, U.S. reluctance to furnish Iran with aid comparable to Turkey and the absence of a security pact between Washington and Tehran weakened pro-U.S. sentiments.

From Confrontation in the Near East to Containment in Europe and East Asia

When Franklin D. Roosevelt suddenly died on 12 April 1945, Vice President Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency of the United States. In less than a month, Nazi Germany surrendered. Three months and two atomic bombs later, Imperial Japan laid down its arms as well. The Grand Alliance of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union stood victorious.

By late 1945, however, President Truman was complaining about “babying the Soviets.”⁷ After liberating Nazi-occupied lands, the Soviets installed “friendly” (i.e., communist) governments in the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe. The Red Army’s abysmal behavior in liberated areas – raping women, pillaging homes, extracting harsh reparations, and using German POWs as forced laborers – made matters worse.⁸

⁵ I agree with the scholarly consensus that the August 1953 coup was planned primarily by the Americans and the British and implemented by the Iranians: Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations* (New York: The New Press, 2013); Christopher de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Very British Coup* (London: Bodley Head, 2012); Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004); Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken: John Wiley, 2003); James Goode, *The United States and Iran in the Shadow of Musaddiq* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). Pro-Shah Iranians find such interpretations to be unduly deferential to the CIA and SIS. For example, the retired Iranian diplomat Darioush Bayandor credits royalist forces in Tehran, not foreign agents, for the coup that successfully toppled Mosaddeq on 19 August 1953: Darioush Bayandor, *Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Other works that emphasize Iranian agency in the coup are Gholam Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of the Shah* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 155-84; and Ardeshtir Zahedi, *Khaterat-e Ardeshtir Zahedi* (Volume I; Westminster: IBEX, 2006).

⁶ Abbas Milani, *The Shah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 182.

⁷ Robert H. Ferrell, *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*, (Harper and Row, 1980; reprint, Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 80; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), 1: 551-2.

⁸ Of course, much of the Soviet behavior had to do with seeking vengeance against the German behavior during World War II. Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation*,

Marshal Joseph Stalin, for his part, was also concerned. The Soviet leader perceived the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 as a veiled U.S. threat. Stalin correctly suspected that Truman was trying to keep him out of East Asia as well as the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.⁹

As distrust between Washington and Moscow grew, Greece, Turkey, and Iran became the first frontlines of the Cold War. On 19 March 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper that the renewal of the Turkish-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1925 was conditional upon a “joint” Turkish-Soviet defense of the Black Sea Straits. A few months later, the Soviets also asked for territory in eastern Turkey.¹⁰

Turkish-Soviet relations had been correct—even friendly—since the 1920s. In fact, at first, the Turkish government did not make a big issue out of Soviet demands. In a meeting with the Turkish high command in July 1945, President İsmet İnönü expressed his wish to remain friendly with Moscow. Atatürk’s successor and second-in-command observed that it would be ideal for Turkey to be allied with both Britain and the Soviet Union. Whichever side would put pressure on Turkey in the future, İnönü calculated that Turkey would tilt to the other; in a confrontation between the two, Turkey could simply remain neutral.¹¹

But Stalin’s demands for bases and territory dealt a severe blow to Turkish-Soviet relations and pushed Ankara toward the West. The United States backed Turkey to deny the

1945-1949 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), 69-204. Other works on Eastern Europe in the post-1945 period include Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956* (New York: Doubleday, 2012); Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.) *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Odd Arne Westad et al (eds.) *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-89* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).

⁹ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 186-91; David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 117.

¹⁰ On the Turkish crisis, see Jamil Hasanli, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011); Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 111-15; Eduard Mark, “The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences,” *Diplomatic History* 21, No. 3 (Summer 1997): 383-415; Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 355-73; Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

¹¹ İlhan Turan (ed.) *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söylevler* [İsmet İnönü: Speeches, Statements, Articles, Messages, and Discourses] (Ankara: TBMM, 2003), 34-36.

Soviet Union an outlet from which it could gain access to the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. In April 1946, the *USS Missouri* visited Istanbul to bring the remains of the late Münir Ertegün, the former Turkish ambassador to the United States. The appearance of the U.S. Navy's largest battleship was a clear warning to the USSR.¹²

The confrontation came to a head in August 1946 as the Red Army allegedly amassed troops in Bulgaria and the Caucasus, which President Truman interpreted as "an open bid to obtain control of Turkey."¹³ On 15 August, he told Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Undersecretary of War Kenneth Royall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the Soviets "should be resisted at all costs."¹⁴ When asked if he grasped the full implications of his order, Truman said he would go all the way: "we might as well find out whether the Russians are bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years."¹⁵

Meanwhile, another crisis was taking place in Iran. At the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Allies had pledged to respect Iran's territory and sovereignty by agreeing to withdraw their forces six months after the war. But by March 1946, six months after Japan's surrender, Soviet forces were still in Iran, protecting local communists in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from the central government. Despite U.S. protests and Truman's casual usage of the word "ultimatum," the Red Army stayed.¹⁶ Moscow hinted that it would remove its troops in exchange for the right to explore oil in northern Iran. In April 1946, after negotiating with

¹² Kuniholm, *Origins*, 335, 356-57.

¹³ Truman, *Memoirs*, 2: 97.

¹⁴ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 195.

¹⁵ Quoted in Mark, "The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences," 383. Mark argues that Stalin seriously considered invading Turkey in August 1946 but Truman's determination deterred the Soviet leader. The following work argues otherwise: Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," *The Journal of American History* 71, No. 4. (Mar., 1985): 807-25.

¹⁶ A White House press statement later on argued that Truman used "ultimatum" in a "non-technical, layman's sense." See "Editorial Note," *FRUS* 1946, 7: 347-49.

Stalin and Molotov in Moscow for two weeks, Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam signed an agreement for a joint Soviet-Iranian venture to develop the oil fields of northern Iran.¹⁷

Subsequent events revealed the limits of Soviet power, growing U.S. influence in Iran, and the strength of Iranian nationalism. In order to get the Majles to ratify the oil agreement, Qavam advised the Kremlin to withdraw its forces. He also brought in members of the pro-Soviet Tudeh (Mass) Party into his cabinet. When the Red Army left Iran on 25 May 1946, the Majles began to drag its feet. In 1944, amidst another dispute with the Soviets over oil concessions, Mohammed Mosaddeq, a nationalist deputy, had persuaded the parliament to pass a law banning all new oil concessions to foreigners. In December 1946, after stalling the Soviets and obtaining U.S. diplomatic support, the Iranian army restored sovereignty over northwest Iran. The Majles vetoed Qavam's oil agreement in October 1947.¹⁸

Unlike Turkey, Washington and London had significant differences over Iran. During the Iranian crisis, Wallace Murray, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, suspected that the British wanted to reach a tacit agreement with the Soviets – similar to the 1907 agreement – where both powers would keep their spheres of influence.¹⁹ While the United States sought to protect Iran and secure Persian Gulf oil for Western Europe and Japan, Iranian leaders wanted to bring U.S. oil companies to their country in order to weaken the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).²⁰ In March 1946, Prime Minister Qavam offered prospecting rights to American oil companies in the southeastern province of Baluchistan. When

¹⁷ For a comprehensive historiographical review of the Iran crisis, see Louise Fawcett, "Revisiting the Iranian Crisis of 1946: How Much More Do We Know?" *Iranian Studies* 47, No. 3 (May 2014): 379-99. On the crisis itself, see Jamil Hasanli, *At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis Over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941-1946* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Fernande Schied Raine, "Stalin and the Creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Iran, 1945," *Cold War History* 2, No. 1 (October 2001): 1-38; Louise Fawcett, *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Kuniholm, *Origins*, 304-50, 383-99; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975), 91-153.

¹⁸ Hasanli, *At the Dawn of the Cold War*, 225-52; Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy*, 139-53.

¹⁹ "The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State," 10 January 1946, *FRUS* : 7: 299-300. An inter-agency committee report shared Ambassador Murray's concerns: "Special Ad Hoc Committee: Country Report on Iran," 30 July 1947, Box 40, O-i-C-Iran, 46-54, Lot 57 D 529, RG 59, NARA.

²⁰ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 27-31.

Ambassador Murray pointed out that the British also wanted to explore oil in the area, Qavam reportedly “expressed surprise and said that [the] British have already received all oil rights they will ever get [a]nd [s]outhern oil still unallocated will go to the Americans.”²¹

With their exchequer in need of AIOC royalties, the British did not want any interference that could undermine their position in Iran. Mexico had nationalized its petroleum industry in 1940 and U.S. oil companies in Venezuela had agreed to a 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement in 1943 (Saudi Arabia would get a similar deal from ARAMCO in 1950). The British calculated that troubles in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan would prevent the Iranians from fighting the AIOC. As we shall see, these concerns would come to pass: by the early 1950s, Iranian nationalists would demand the complete control of their country’s oil.²²

While the Turkish and Iranian crises wound down in 1946, a communist uprising threatened the pro-Western regime in Greece. The partisan resistance against Nazi occupation during the war turned into an insurgency when British-backed royalist forces took control in liberated Athens. Although Moscow did not help Greek communists, who received support from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, the Truman administration came to believe that Stalin was also provoking the Greek civil war, which lasted until 1949.²³

Events in Greece, Turkey, and Iran led Washington to take a firmer stand against Moscow. The reasoning was simple: if Greece, Turkey, or Iran fell under Soviet control, the

²¹ “The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State,” 23 March 1946, *FRUS* 1946, 7: 373.

²² On how oil affected U.S. and British policy toward Iran, see Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 81-147; James F. Goode, *The United States and Iran, 1946-51: The Diplomacy of Neglect* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 84-102; Ronald W. Ferrier, “The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute: A Triangular Relationship,” Wm. Roger Louis, “Musaddiq and the Dilemmas of British Imperialism,” and James A. Bill, “America, Iran, and the Politics of Intervention,” in James A. Bill and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 164-99, 228-60, 261-95; David Painter, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1986), 111-16, 172-210; Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 651-3, 689.

²³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 195. On the Greek civil war, see James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 1-23; Thanasis D. Sifkas, “War and Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945-1949,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 (Fall 2001): 5-30; Howard Jones, *“A New Kind of War”: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Kuniholm, *Origins*, 221-29, 249-55, 350-55, 399-410.

other two would collapse. With direct access to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, the USSR would be strengthened, Western Europe's access to oil and the Suez Canal would be jeopardized, and the United States and its allies would be weakened.²⁴

In October 1946, Loy Henderson, the State Department's director of Near East and African Affairs (NEA), reflected those concerns when he summarized Turkey's significance: "Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East." By its geographical position, Henderson said, "Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East." Likewise, a special inter-agency report deemed Iran to be "of major strategic interest to the United States" and called its "domination [b]y an unfriendly Power" to be a threat to "the vital oil reserves of Iraq and the Persian Gulf area; Turkey and Afghanistan; India and Southeast Asia."²⁵

Even as U.S. policy-makers believed that the Soviet Union wanted world domination, Stalin worried about his country's weaknesses. From Kaliningrad in the Baltic to Odessa in the Black Sea, the Nazi invasion had destroyed every town, factory, and farm in western USSR and claimed the lives of 27 million Soviet citizens. Thus, Stalin fell back on a theme he had first expounded in 1931: "the history of Russia is one unbroken record of the beatings she suffered for [h]er backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. [S]he was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. [A]ll beat her for her backwardness." Fear of another war caused Stalin to

²⁴ George C. McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 21; Kuniholm, *Origins*, 212.

²⁵ Loy W. Henderson, "Memorandum on Turkey," 21 October 1946, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949* [hereafter IAT], [Microfilm] (Washington: National Archives, 1983), Reel 1; "Memorandum on Turkey Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs," *FRUS* 1946, 7: 895; "Special Ad Hoc Committee: Country Report on Iran," 30 July 1947, Box 40, O-i-C-Iran, 46-54, Lot 57 D 529, RG 59, NARA.

expand his domains; what appeared to the West as aggressive moves, the Soviet dictator saw as defensive policies to protect Mother Russia.²⁶

U.S. officials, too, wanted to protect the peace and their sphere of influence. To do so, they prepared for war: U.S. military planners estimated that, if another world war broke out, the Red Army would easily overrun Europe. To weaken the Soviet bloc, U.S. bombers would target industries and oil facilities in the Caucasus, the Urals, Ukraine, and Romania.²⁷ Turkey would serve as a defense of Allied bases in the Cairo-Suez area that would host U.S. bombers. The Turkish army would slow down the Soviet advance toward the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Greece and Iran would prevent Turkey from being rapidly outflanked.²⁸

Although Britain had been responsible for arming Greece and Turkey since World War II, the situation changed in February 1947 when the Labor government of Clement Attlee informed the Truman administration that it could not support Athens and Ankara anymore. Given its strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the United States had few options other than supporting Greece and Turkey. On 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and asked for \$400 million in military aid for the two countries. In the historic speech (in which he proclaimed the doctrine named after him),

²⁶ Quotes from Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 20. On Soviet strategic thinking in the early Cold War, see Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Soviet Union and the World, 1944-1953," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1: 90-111; Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1-93; Artiom A. Ulunian, "Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945-58," *Cold War History* 3, No. 2 (January 2003): 35-52; Vladimir O. Pechatnov and C. Earl Edmondson "The Russian Perspective" and "Documents" in Levering et al (eds.), *Debating the Origins of the Cold War*, 85-178; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 1-109. Zubok and Pleshakov argue that both revolutionary zeal and Russian nationalism—the "revolutionary-imperial paradigm," as they call it—informed Stalin's policies.

²⁷ Joint Intelligence Committee 329, "Strategic Vulnerability of the USSR to a Limited Air Attack," 3 November 1945, in Steven T. Ross and David Alan Rosenberg (eds.) *America's Plans for War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1950* (New York and London: Garland, 1997), 1: 2.

²⁸ Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," 814. Also see Joint War Plans Committee 416/1, "Military Position of the United States in Light of Russian Policy," 8 January 1946; JWPC 475/1, "Strategic Study of the Area Between the Alps and the Himalayas, Short Title: 'Caldron,'" 2 November 1946; Joint Staff Planners 789/1, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Problems Deriving From Concept of Operations for 'Pincher,'" 13 April 1946, in Ross and Rosenberg (eds.) *America's Plans for War*, 1: 28-29, 2: 29-30, Vol. 3; Peter Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2005), 14; Michael J. Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 19-61; Joseph Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), 58.

Truman stated that “it must be the policy of the United States to support the free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”²⁹ Two months later, Congress passed the aid bill for Greece and Turkey. Because the British still played a predominant role in Iran, it did not receive major U.S. assistance at this point.³⁰

The Truman Doctrine led to a broader assistance program.³¹ In June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall called for the United States to support European economic recovery. Marshall had witnessed massive food and fuel shortages on the continent during his trip in spring 1947. He concluded that, if the economies of Western Europe could not recover, local communists and ultimately Moscow would benefit. Under the European Recovery Program (ERP – better known as the Marshall Plan), U.S. aid would help European countries with their balance of payments and regenerate intra-continental as well as trans-Atlantic trade.³²

The Marshall Plan constituted a key part of the emerging policy of containment, a term that first came to use in a *Foreign Affairs* article in July 1947. The author of the article, George Kennan, now head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, revised his February 1946 “long” telegram from Moscow and advocated a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Instead of confronting the Soviets militarily, Kennan argued for the United States to strengthen its allies politically and economically so that they could resist communist subversion. If the Soviets could be “contained,” Kennan said, their oppressive system would collapse sooner or later.³³

²⁹ “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” *Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman* (Washington: USGPO, 1963), 176-80.

³⁰ Iranian leaders, especially the Shah, were quite disappointed about their exclusion from the Truman Doctrine. See Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 52-53.

³¹ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 233: “Had there been no Truman Doctrine, there probably would have been no Marshall Plan.”

³² Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 26; Jones, *Fifteen Weeks*, 250.

³³ X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, No. 4 (Jul., 1947): 566-82 (quote from 575). For a discussion on how Kennan’s thoughts evolved in the 1940s, see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 24-52; John

Why did the United States, which had mostly dealt with the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific in the past, turn to Eurasia after World War II? Aside from fear of Soviet control of the world's largest landmass, America's global economic position was the reason. With two-third of the world's gold reserves, three-fourths of its capital investment, half of its manufacturing capacity, and half of its gross income, the United States stood as the most powerful country in 1945.³⁴ GDP increased from \$220 billion in 1946 to \$244 billion in 1947 and reached \$358 billion by 1952. Per capita income, which was \$473 in Western Europe and \$80 in developing countries, was \$1,453 in 1949. Unemployment increased from 1.9 percent in 1945 to 5.9 percent in 1949 but stood at 2.9 percent in 1953. Life expectancy was 68 years, one of the highest in the world.³⁵ From 1945 until 1947, Washington paid 70 percent of the \$3 billion budget of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).³⁶

Truman discussed these achievements and their international implications in his inaugural speech on 20 January 1949. In the first three points of his speech, he stated that the United States would continue to support the UN, foster world trade, and resist communism. In his fourth point, Truman set the tone for the U.S. role in global development:

We must embark on a bold new program [to] mak[e] [o]ur scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. [M]ore than half the people of the world are living in [m]isery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. [O]nly by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: Penguin, 2011), 172-370; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 252-448.

³⁴ Figures from Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 41.

³⁵ *Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition*, <http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/indexes/indexTablePath.do?id=Ca9-19>; <http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/table/seriesnext.do>, accessed 25 February 2013. Life expectancy figure from Table 1-5a in Angus Maddison, *The World Economy* (Paris: OECD, 2006), 32. Comparative per capita income from Nuban, *The Point Four Program in Iran*, 2.

³⁶ Figure from David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 87.

Truman also argued that “democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies – hunger, misery, and despair.” In order to differentiate the United States from previous world powers, Truman insisted that “the old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. [W]e envisage a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.”³⁷

Just like the Marshall Plan, Truman’s Point Four speech reflected a unique vision for global development. Freedom, order, and open markets ought to go hand-in-hand. Political democracy need not be sacrificed for prosperity. Quite the contrary: long-term development could occur only under democratic rule. National governments might spearhead development projects but the private sector and foreign investors would play an important role as well.

After World War II, U.S. domestic power, the perceived Soviet threat, the need to coopt and reconstruct foreign enemies such as West Germany and Japan, and the desire to reshape the world stimulated Washington’s interest in international affairs. Events in Greece, Turkey, and Iran prompted the Truman administration to contain communism through aid and security guarantees first to Greece and Turkey, then to European countries, and, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, to East Asia. The Cold War was afoot.

The United States and Turkey’s Orderly Transition to Democracy

Given their long borders with the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran were highly valuable for the United States and its strategy of containment. A State Department policy paper in 1949 defined Turkey as a “bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Near and Middle East” and a “base of operations” in the event of war. Aside from fortifying Turkey, the U.S. objective was

³⁷ “Inaugural Address,” 20 January 1949, *The American Presidency Project* [hereafter APP] <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13282>, accessed 28 February 2013. Scholarly analyses of Point Four are: Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 77-113; Stephen Macekura, “The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 128, No. 1 (Spring 2013): 127-60; Sergei Y. Shenin, *The United States and the Third World: The Origins of Postwar Relations and the Point Four Program* (Huntington: Nova, 2000).

“to assist [the Turkish] government’s determined and successful efforts to achieve a fuller democracy and a more productive economy, and thus to counteract communism and Soviet influence not only in Turkey but in adjacent countries to the south and east.”³⁸

The dissimilar domestic outlooks of Turkey and Iran required different responses from the United States – relatively generous assistance for Ankara, more limited aid for Tehran. While Iran had to grapple with foreign occupation and an uncertain future after World War II, Turkey, which had been spared the horrors of the war, began an orderly transition to democracy. In January 1946, dissatisfied members from the ruling Republican People’s Party (CHP), namely, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü, formed the Democrat Party (DP). In May 1950, with little direct U.S. input, Turkey completed its transition to multi-party democracy when the DP defeated CHP in free elections.³⁹

Although statist development under Atatürk and İnönü had achieved success in transportation, energy, and education, World War II forced the single-party regime to open up. The need to maintain a large army, stringent price controls, and the scarcity of commodities such as bread, sugar, and coal hurt the average Turk.⁴⁰ After the war, Turkish observers attacked plans to expand industrial production and demanded private businesses – not state conglomerates – to manufacture consumer products.⁴¹ From 1946 through 1950, the DP presented itself as a liberal alternative to the tried and tired single-party system. The DP’s emphasis on free enterprise, political democracy, and personal liberty, partly inspired from the United States, helped voters to differentiate it from the CHP’s statism.⁴²

³⁸ “Policy Statement: Turkey,” 5 May 1949, Box 1, SF-TR, 47-58, Lot File 58 D 610, RG 59, NARA.

³⁹ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1977), 8-10.

⁴⁰ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985* [Economic History of Turkey, 1908-1985] (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1988), chapter 4.

⁴¹ “Sanayiciler 5 Yıllık Planı İyi Karşılamadılar” [Industrialists Have Not Liked the 5-Year-Plan], *Cumhuriyet*, 9 March 1948.

⁴² Interestingly, the U.S. embassy in Ankara found DP’s liberalism to have “no basis in fact.” See “Despatch 37, Economic Policies of the Principal Turkish Political Parties,” 12 January 1950, Box 4062, Central Decimal Files [hereafter CDF], 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.

U.S. officials, however, were initially skeptical about free elections. After an interview with İnönü in October 1945, Edwin Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, found the Turkish president's desire for democratization sincere but untimely: "[the] international situation, particularly relations with Russia, will make it inadvisable [t]o risk throwing [the] country into possible confusion and agitation of direct elections."⁴³

Sensing that the DP might win the general election of 1947, the CHP called for early elections. Though competitive, the July 1946 election was hardly the finest hour of Turkish democracy. Many officials rigged the count to ensure a CHP victory. "Ballots were in most cases burned within twenty-four hours after the polling, so that no recount was possible," reported Herbert Bursley, counselor of the U.S. embassy in Ankara. Furthermore, the DP had little time to organize: it could not field candidates in 16 provinces and could not compete for 114 of 465 parliamentary seats. Bursley, however, seemed relieved by the CHP victory.⁴⁴

U.S.-Turkish relations improved despite opposition from members of Congress who were uneasy about Turkey's problematic democracy.⁴⁵ On 22 May 1947, Congress approved the Greece and Turkey aid bill by large majorities in the House and Senate. For the next two years, U.S. military aid to Turkey totaled \$200 million, mostly military hardware but also some road construction equipment. At a time when the Turkish fiscal budget stood slightly over TL1 billion (\$361 million), with defense as the largest expenditure, U.S. aid gave Turkey a much-needed boost.⁴⁶ U.S. equipment and advisers began to transform the Turkish military from an antiquated organization into an effective and modern fighting force.⁴⁷

⁴³ Wilson to the Secretary of State, telegram no.1352, Ankara, 19 October 1945, IAT, reel 1.

⁴⁴ Bursley to the Secretary of State, dispatch no. 992, 'Turkish Election Day, July 21, 1946', Ankara, 21 July 1946, IAT, reel 1.

⁴⁵ Kayaoglu, "Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric," 328-29.

⁴⁶ Thornburg et al., *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, 146, 217. Military aid was a bargain for Washington. In 1954, General George C. Stuart told a House committee that, with the low salary of Turkish conscripts, "Turkey had an annual maintenance cost of \$20 a head, [c]ompared with \$1100 in Europe and \$3000 in the United States." Quote from Joseph Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401 (May 1972): 81.

⁴⁷ Craig Livingston, "'One Thousand Wings': The United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947-50," *Middle Eastern Studies* 30, No. 4 (Oct. 1994): 778-825. Also see Leffler, "Strategy,

There was another matter, aside from democratization, in which Ankara was ahead of Washington. While the United States would become interested in land reform to avert leftist revolutions in developing countries in the 1950s, the government of Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu introduced a land reform bill in May 1945 to broaden the CHP's base. During the debates at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Agriculture Minister Şevket Hatipoğlu defined share-cropping, landlessness, and tenancy "a cancer of Turkish farming."⁴⁸

But aside from parts of eastern Turkey, the country had an egalitarian distribution of land where 99.75 percent of farms were 500 *dönüm* (about 50 hectares) or less.⁴⁹ Thus, when it passed in June 1945, land reform backfired: CHP deputies who were close to landowners or were landowners themselves (such as Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, who would become president and prime minister in 1950, respectively) began to seek their fortunes elsewhere.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, U.S. aid improved Turkish agriculture. With additional U.S. imports, the use of chemical fertilizers increased from 13,000 tons in 1948 to 74,000 tons in 1952. While Turkey had only 956 tractors in 1944, U.S.-financed imports increased the total by 37 times to 35,670 by 1953. From 1946 through 1953, the area under grain cultivation increased by 44 percent, yields by 40 percent, and total production by 105 percent.⁵¹

After coming to power in May 1950, the DP government used U.S. assistance to pursue farmer-friendly policies. While Turkish growers received TL 412 million in credits in 1950, that figure reached TL 1.5 billion five years later.⁵² Subsidies helped to boost grain

Diplomacy, and the Cold War," 817-18. A rich collection of reports and photographic material of the military equipment and the training that took place in Turkey is available at Box 6978, CDF, 1945-1949, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁸ Quote from *Başbakan Şükrü Saraçoğlu ve Tarım Bakanı Ş.R. Hatipoğlu'nun Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanununun TBMM'de Görüşülmesi Sırasında Söylevleri* [The Speeches of Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu and Minister of Agriculture Ş.R. Hatipoğlu at the TBMM during the Debates on the Law to Give Land to Farmers] (Ankara: Tarım Bakanlığı, 1945), 46.

⁴⁹ Haim Gerber, *Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Lynne Rienners, 1987), 106-7.

⁵⁰ Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 266.

⁵¹ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 209-11.

⁵² Memduh Yaşa (ed.) *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi, 1923-1978* [The Economy of Turkey in the Republican Era, 1923-1978] (İstanbul: Akbank, 1980), 150. Productivity statistics from *Zirai İstatistik Özetleri, 1936-1958* [Summary of Agricultural Statistics] (Ankara: Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1959), 4-7.

production, which reached an unprecedented 14.6 million tons in 1953. The state-run Office for Soil Products (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi–TMO) bought 1.9 million tons for TL546 million (\$190 million) in 1953, of which it sold 626,000 tons on the domestic market and exported 962,000 tons. Turkey became one of the leading grain exporters in the world.⁵³

The Menderes government also distributed state lands to landless peasants and Balkan immigrants in order to keep the countryside tranquil, which turned out to be a prudent move. While the Turkish state distributed 83,160 hectares in 1950, that figure reached 1.5 million hectares by 1954. Coupled with the fact that the DP government had exempted all agricultural revenues from taxation, Turkish farmers saw significant improvements in their livelihoods and developed strong bonds with Menderes and the Democrats.⁵⁴ Unlike many developing countries that experienced rural disturbance in the 1950s and 1960s, the Turkish country-side became a strong and fairly reliable electoral base for center-right parties.⁵⁵

U.S. diplomats in Turkey closely observed that dynamic. In spring 1951, Edward F. Rivinus, the U.S. consul in Izmir, took an extended trip through western Turkey. Rivinus reported that, of the nearly hundred people with whom he conversed at length, he “never encountered anyone who supported [CHP]” and no “evidence of reactionary movements.” “Probably the most striking change in the Anatolian picture,” he added, “was the general lack of evidence of that political and social discontent which was so apparent on all sides at the time of my former trips in Anatolia [before May 1950].” Rivinus was also impressed with his interlocutors’ positive sentiments toward the United States for its aid to Turkey.⁵⁶

Although the market value of the Turkish lira was much lower (hovering around \$1 to TL 8.5), the official exchange rate stayed at \$1 to TL 2.82 until 1958.

⁵³ Yaşa, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 209.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁵⁵ The following work argues that the lack of land reform may have had long-term benefits for Turkey: Manoucher Parvin and Mükerrrem Hic, “Land Reform versus Agricultural Reform: Turkish Miracle or Catastrophe Delayed?” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, No. 2 (May 1984): 207-32.

⁵⁶ E.F. Rivinus, “Observations Made on an Inspection Trip in the Izmir Consular District,” 16 May 1951, Box 4062, CDF 1950-54, RG 59, NARA.

Indeed, the combination of U.S. aid and DP policies began to change rural Turkey rapidly. In early 1950, Mahmut Makal, a 19-year-old school teacher in a central Anatolian village, published his observations and complained about both villagers' conservatism and the CHP administration's failure to spread the blessings of modernity to the countryside.⁵⁷ Makal got into trouble with the authorities for his writing.

Four years later, however, two British experts on Turkey, who translated Makal's book into English, witnessed the "improvements in village standards of living of a striking nature [p]artly as a result of the new and rapid advances, which American aid has made possible on the foundations laid by Atatürk." One of the experts, Paul Stirling, observed how "one of Makal's villages is now on one of the best main roads in Turkey." Stirling, however, also admonished Turks for their "burning sense of backwardness." "In Turkey," he warned, "as elsewhere in the world, the task of replacing a functioning social system with another, and [v]ery different one, calls for strenuous, continued and thoughtful effort, and even so is bound to involve areas of failure and maladjustment."⁵⁸ Turkey would have to be patient.

But patience was not one of the DP's virtues. U.S. aid and a fervent zeal to develop caused the Turkish Democrats to fund infrastructure projects and the industrial sector. Cement production, which fuelled Turkey's construction boom in the 1950s, rose from 345,000 tons in 1948 to 707,000 tons in 1954. Total electricity production, which was 312 million kilowatt/hours (kwh) in 1938, approached 1.3 billion kwh in 1954 (and would increase more than twofold to 2.6 billion kwh by 1960). The number of workers employed in industry (excluding construction) increased from 714,000 in 1948 to over 800,000 in 1953.⁵⁹ Turkey had 47,000 km in roads (29,300 miles) in 1950 (only 6,000 km of which were paved, concrete, or stabilized), which expanded to 61,500 km by 1960 (31,000 km of it paved,

⁵⁷ Mahmut Makal, *Bizim Köy: Bir Köy Öğretmeninin Notları* [Our Village: The Notes of a Village Teacher] (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1950).

⁵⁸ Mahmut Makal, *A Village in Anatolia* (London: Valentine, Mitchell, and Company, 1954), xiii; xiv.

⁵⁹ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 215-26.

concrete, or stabilized).⁶⁰ Thanks to hundreds of millions in U.S. assistance, for the first time since 1943, Turkey's fiscal budgets were balanced in 1954 and 1955.⁶¹

But the DP government's desire to achieve rapid growth had severe repercussions. Development projects increased the import of capital and raw materials, especially oil. As a result, Turkey's current account deficit became unsustainable by 1954. The Menderes administration's decision to keep the Turkish lira artificially high worsened the situation. Although Menderes had initiated economic liberalization by relaxing import restrictions and credit limits, those measures were suspended in April 1953. The government adopted quotas and licenses for imports and imposed a restrictive foreign currency regime in September 1953. Against the suggestions of the International Monetary Fund and U.S. advisers, the Menderes government continued to furnish farmers and entrepreneurs with cheap credit.⁶²

Natural events and inflation did not help either. A drought in 1954 turned Turkey's agricultural boom into dust. Grain production fell to 9.6 million tons in 1954, a 30 percent decrease from 1953. Because government spending – especially agricultural subsidies – remained constant, inflation began to spin out of control. While the price index of 100 in 1948 had become only 103 by mid-1953 (despite rapid economic growth), by the end of 1953, it rose to 111 and then to 119 in November 1954.⁶³

Turkey's economic problems would complicate its political scene and give headaches to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations in the 1955-63 period. For much of 1945-54, however, Turkey was the exemplary ally. Its orderly transition to democracy, rapid economic growth, and commitment to the Western alliance received public and private praise in the United States. When the DP won the 1950 elections, Assistant Secretary of State George

⁶⁰ Yaşa, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 189, 294-95, 263.

⁶¹ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 233.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 230.

⁶³ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954*, 211, 233.

McGhee called the event “excellent Turkish propaganda” for the United States.⁶⁴ Washington supported the “Turkish miracle” with significant aid and, as we shall see later in this chapter, by extending NATO membership to Ankara.

The United States and Iran’s Troublesome Political Economy

Iran, meanwhile, worried Washington with its many problems. Amidst the Azerbaijan crisis in 1946, Prime Minister Qavam formed the Party of Independent Democrats (Hezb-e Demokrat-e Mostaqil), which brought old school aristocrats together with anti-British and anti-Tudeh radicals (the latter included Hasan Arsanjani, the future agriculture minister).⁶⁵ Qavam, however, also ran afoul of the imperial court for his attempts to increase his powers. In December 1947, Mohammed Reza Shah and his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, worked behind the scenes and secured a vote of no-confidence in parliament against Qavam.⁶⁶ From Qavam’s resignation in December 1947 until the prime ministry of Chief of General Staff Haj Ali Razmara in June 1950, Iran changed five prime ministers, none of whom enjoyed enough support in the divided Majles to enact political and economic reforms.

Weak parties, known as “fraksiyun,” compounded instability. Although several parties formed the National Front of Iran (Jabheh-ye Melli-ye Iran) in 1949, they did not hold a parliamentary majority until the seventeenth Majles in 1951. Out of all the parties, the communist Tudeh had the most effective organization and reliable supporters. Because of turmoil, indigenous communists, and British interests, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations did not extend the same benefits to Iran as they did to Greece and Turkey.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ “Comments on the Turkish Elections of May 14, 1950,” Box 19, Office Files of Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee, 1945-53, Lot 53 D 468 [hereafter McGhee Files], RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁵ Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998): 64. On Qavam’s Democrats, see Behrouz Tayarani (ed.), *Asnad-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-ye Iran* [Political Parties of Iran: A Collection of Documents] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Sazman-e Asnad-e Melli-ye Iran, 1376/1997), 2: 7-13.

⁶⁶ Abbas Milani, *Eminent Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 1: 163.

⁶⁷ de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 135.

In this context, the young Shah did not command much authority and had few means to make radical changes. In order to increase his powers, the Pahlavi king asked for the 1906 Constitution to be amended, which he argued would “allow [Iran] to find its place amongst the genuine democracies of the world and allow the government to work for a more just and equitable distribution of wealth.”⁶⁸ Iranian politicians, however, had no inclination to go back to one-man rule less than a decade after Reza Shah’s abdication.

The Truman administration, too, disliked the Shah’s proposals. In January 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall warned the U.S. embassy in Tehran accordingly: “we do not believe that grant[ing] power to [the] Shah to dissolve [the] Majlis [*sic*] would enhance [the] speed or certainty of reform and development in Iran.” The Majles, Marshall argued, “by its very nature, is [a] safeguard against concerted foreign pressure upon any single source of power in Iran.” Furthermore, “any diminution of Majlis power in favor [of] [o]ne-man rule would almost certainly evoke unsympathetic reaction [from the] American public.”⁶⁹

The United States hoped that democratic forces could pull Iran out of stalemate. In July 1946, the State Department emphasized the need to “strengthen [Iran’s] sovereignty and [r]aise living standards by democratic processes.” Washington would have to support Iran’s internal security and promote democratic institutions in order to “prevent the growth of a dictatorial regime which might either oppose or limit friendly intercourse with other nations.”⁷⁰ Another State Department memorandum in 1949 identified U.S. interests in Iran as “maintaining that nation’s independence and denying the Soviets access to the high seas and the oil of the Persian Gulf.” But “if governing Iranians are not prepared to make sacrifices,” the memorandum continued, the United States “cannot maintain it for them.”⁷¹

⁶⁸ Quoted in Milani, *The Shah*, 137.

⁶⁹ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 8 January 1948, *FRUS* 1948, 5: 92-93.

⁷⁰ “Policy and Information Statement on Iran,” 15 July 1946, *FRUS* 1946, 7: 507-9.

⁷¹ Jernegan to Woodbridge, “Some random (and not necessarily original) notes on a United States Economic Policy Toward Iran,” 10 March 1950, Box 36, Records of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs,

An attempt on the Shah's life on 4 February 1949 damaged Iran's chance for democracy. After surviving the assassination, the Shah used public sympathy and threatened to abdicate unless his powers were expanded.⁷² In April 1949, a constitutional convention created a 60-seat Senate (half of its members to be appointed by the monarch) and authorized the king to dissolve the Majles. As the Shah sowed the seeds of his personal rule in the late 1940s, he "learned [the] important tactics of maneuver and manipulation that were to become a part of his political repertoire."⁷³

The increase in the Shah's powers did not bring stability. As Secretary Marshall had warned in January 1948, however, it did usher greater foreign interference in Iranian affairs – primarily from the United States. In March 1950, the Shah decided to appoint the career diplomat and former governor Ali Mansour as prime minister.⁷⁴ Members of the Shah's close circle, including his half-brother, Prince Abdol Reza, informed U.S. ambassador John Wiley that Mansour "was being given serious consideration because of American Embassy support." When Wiley told his interlocutors that the United States would not interfere in such matters, Abdol Reza and court chamberlain Baqer Pirnia "implored" Wiley to inform the Shah accordingly. Perhaps unaware of the irony, the U.S. envoy told the Shah about his neutrality on Mansour's appointment. Three months later, this time with the U.S. embassy's open endorsement, the Shah appointed General Razmara prime minister.⁷⁵

Iran's economy was just as problematic as its politics. The effects of the Allied occupation, where tens of thousands of foreign troops put immense strains on Iran's limited resources, continued to reverberate after 1945. The cost of living index, adjusted to 100 for 1938, became 851 by 1945. From 1946 until 1950, the index fluctuated between 650 and 780;

1932-1951, Lot File 54 D 363, RG 59, NARA. For a broader discussion of U.S. aims in Iran, see "Policy Statement on Iran Prepared in the Department of State," 1 February 1949, Washington, *FRUS* 1949, 6: 474-75.

⁷² Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 249-50.

⁷³ Milani, *The Shah*, 193.

⁷⁴ Not to be confused with his son, Hasan Ali, who would also serve as prime minister from 7 March 1964 until his assassination on 27 January 1965.

⁷⁵ The episode is recounted in Wiley's telegram, Tehran to Washington, 23 March 1950, Box 4106, CDF, 1950-54, RG 59, NARA. For the U.S. role in Razmara's appointment, see Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 52.

inflationary pressures (especially the Mosaddeq government's policy of printing currency to cover the fiscal deficit in 1951-53) brought it to 941 by 1955.⁷⁶

The agricultural sector did not fare well either. Because of inadequate irrigation and lack of machinery, only 4.6 million hectares of Iran's potentially arable 50 million hectares were under cultivation.⁷⁷ While 1946 was a bumper year, droughts hit in 1947 and 1948 and the price of wheat shot up by 50 percent. Although 80 percent of Iran's population of 18 million was employed in agriculture, the country had to import wheat in 1948.⁷⁸

Land ownership patterns compounded agricultural underdevelopment. Students of modern Iran share a near-universal consensus that land tenure in the country was extremely unequal – a view shared by contemporary observers.⁷⁹ Gideon Hadary, who had served as an attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tehran from 1948 until 1950, estimated that 95 percent of Iranian farmers were landless or sharecroppers. Hadary reported that absentee landlords owned one-half of arable lands. Religious foundations (*waqfs*) held one-quarter while the state and the Pahlavi dynasty held as much as one-tenth of all farmlands. Few people owned what they toiled so production was not incentivized. Because nearly two-thirds of Majles members were landowners, democratic institutions offered little hope for change.⁸⁰

In order to remedy that situation and broaden his popular base, the Shah issued a decree (*firman*) in January 1951 and ordered the sale of crown farms to peasants who lived on

⁷⁶ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 79.

⁷⁷ *Report on Seven Year Development Plan for the Plan Organization of the Imperial Government of Iran* (5 vols.; New York: Overseas Consultants, Inc., 1949), 1: 25. Iran's total area is about 160 million hectares – slightly larger than Alaska.

⁷⁸ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 79, 82. In comparison, only 18 percent of the U.S. population was engaged in farming in the late 1940s. See *Report on Seven Year Development Plan*, 3: 9.

⁷⁹ The most comprehensive work on the Iranian country-side in the twentieth century still remains Ann K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (Reprint; London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), which was originally printed in 1953. Influential studies on the relationship between land reform and politics in Iran are Mohammad Javad Amid, *Agriculture, Poverty, and Reform in Iran* (London: Routledge, 1990); Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Land Reform and Social Change in Iran* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1987); Eric J. Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982). A notable exception to this consensus is a study by the son of a leading Iranian landowner, who argues that land tenure before the mid-1950s was not unjust but the Shah's subsequent land reform program was harmful to Iranian agriculture: Mohammad Gholi Majd, *Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000).

⁸⁰ Gideon Hadary, "The Agrarian Reform Problem in Iran," *The Middle East Journal* 5, No. 2 (Spring 1951): 181-96.

them. The plan covered an area of 800,000 hectares, with 2,000 villages, 49,000 families, and 300,000 people.⁸¹ Although the Shah's confrontation with Mohammed Mosaddeq brought land distribution to a pause, most royal lands were sold off after the 1953 coup.⁸²

The Shah's reformist tendencies struck a positive chord with Washington. According to the historian Nathan Citino, in the 1950s, U.S. decision-makers began to see land reform as an effective way to jumpstart socioeconomic and political modernization in the developing world: "wider distribution of landownership would result in more egalitarian societies immune to radical subversion" and ownership "would give formerly disenfranchised peasants incentives to improve the land, thereby raising yields and living standards." Washington wanted to replicate the experience of the early United States, where the industrial sector developed through an agrarian democracy based on free and egalitarian land ownership (excluding African Americans, of course).⁸³

These ideas formed the basis of one of the most ambitious projects that the Point Four mission undertook in Iran. The Rural Improvement Program entailed villagers electing local councils that would have power over irrigation, road-building, equipment-sharing, and taxing landlords. Villagers would also receive a greater share of the crops that they grew.⁸⁴

The program's aims went beyond socioeconomic development. William Warne, the Point Four administrator in Iran from 1951 until 1955, hoped that representative institutions in rural areas would "provide the beginnings of a grass-roots democracy in Iran." Warne, the son of a California farmer and a rural development expert at the Department of the Interior (where

⁸¹ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 63-64.

⁸² The Shah had intended to use the sale of crown lands as a pilot project for a comprehensive land reform program. Although he had first broached the idea in 1943, because of his dependence on the political support of the clergy and landowners, he would have to wait until the early 1960s to fulfill his goal. Milani, *The Shah*, 243.

⁸³ Nathan J. Citino, "The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, (2008): 581-82. For an extended discussion on how U.S. views on modern agriculture related to development and democracy, Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 3-10 and Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 14-39.

⁸⁴ Larsen to Director of U.S. Operations Mission, "Village Council Problems and Accomplishments," Undated [quite likely fall 1954], Box 8, Mission to Iran, Classified Subject Files, 1951-1961 [hereafter CSF, 1951-61], Record Group 469 – Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961 [hereafter RG 469], NARA.

he had risen to the rank of assistant secretary before coming to Iran), saw the village councils akin to America's town halls, where ordinary citizens participated in politics. "The most valuable techniques America has to offer underdeveloped regions," Warne wrote shortly after leaving Iran, "are those that make our own democratic processes work." "The great strength of the United States," he said, "lies in the astounding ability to find leadership in the intelligence, initiative, and energies of *all* her people. [N]o other form of government yet devised has [used] so fully the skills of so large a percentage of the total population."⁸⁵

But the Rural Improvement Program never reached its full potential. The legal basis of the village council law was a decree that Prime Minister Mosaddeq passed after obtaining emergency powers from the Majles in January 1953. After the August 1953 coup, the program became a political hot potato. Worse, many of the Shah's political allies were primarily landowners and they stonewalled the central government's attempts to extend its influence into their literal and metaphorical backyards. Even though the Ford Foundation took over the program from Point Four, by the late 1950s, the project had clearly failed.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, U.S. military aid began to turn the Iranian military into a viable domestic security apparatus. With the help of the U.S. Army Mission (ARMISH), the size of the Iranian army increased from 65,000 in 1941 to 120,000 by 1946.⁸⁷ General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former superintendent of the New Jersey State Police (and father of the famous Gulf War general), led an advisory team that turned Iran's ramshackle gendarmerie into an effective police force. While the Truman administration had given Iran only \$10 million worth of equipment before 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean War, Tehran began

⁸⁵ Warne, *Mission for Peace*, 201-2.

⁸⁶ While the following study's argument that the rural program failed because the United States "sought stability instead of democracy" in Iran is debatable, it is an excellent analysis of how the Rural Development Program evolved after it came under the Ford Foundation's purview: Victor V. Nemchenok, "'That So Fair a Thing Should Be So Frail': The Ford Foundation and the Failure of Rural Development in Iran, 1953-1964," *Middle East Journal* 63, No. 2 (Spring 2009): 261-84.

⁸⁷ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 246.

receiving heavy equipment such as tanks. The new armored units and U.S. connections with Iranian officers would play a key role in the 1953 coup.⁸⁸

Private U.S. citizens also entered the scene to work on development projects in Iran. One such individual was the financial expert Arthur C. Millspaugh, who had worked in Iran in the mid-1920s to reorganize state finances. Millspaugh saw his work as a continuation of Morgan Shuster's, the American expert whose brief tenure as treasurer-general had led to the Russian invasion of 1911. Many in Iran knew and even admired Millspaugh for his confrontation with Reza Shah in the 1920s over the military budget.⁸⁹

But Millspaugh's second mission as administrator-general of state finances during World War II did not go well. Millspaugh initially enjoyed a cordial relationship with Abolhassan Ebtehaj, the ill-tempered, strong-willed, and able governor of Bank Melli, Iran's *de facto* central bank. In mid-1944, however, Millspaugh became overbearing and condescending for not being consulted about Ebtehaj's appointment as head of the Iranian delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference. Millspaugh also got into trouble for stonewalling Majles deputies who sought information about his activities. The American expert was sent home in February 1945.⁹⁰

Another American expert was Max Weston Thornburg, who worked with the Iranian government in the late 1940s and early 1950s to devise a long-term development plan. Thornburg had gained fame for his work with Standard Oil and as an advisor to the State Department during World War II. He advocated cooperation between business interests and

⁸⁸ On U.S. reluctance to extend security guarantees and defense assistance to Iran before 1950, see "The Acting Secretary to the Embassy in Iran," 3 January 1948, *FRUS* 1948, 5: 88-90 and "Analysis and Comparison of United States Policies with Regard to Aid to Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan," Undated, *FRUS* 1949, 6: 4-6. On 26 June 1950, a day after war broke out in Korea, President Truman pointed at Iran on a map and said: "[I]f we just stand by, [the communists will] move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East." Quote from Malcolm Byrne, "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953," in Gasiorowski and Byrne (eds.) *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, 201.

⁸⁹ Mansour Bonakdarian, "Great Expectations: U.S.-Iranian Relations, 1911-1951," in Abbas Amanat and Magnus T. Bernhardsson (eds.) *U.S.-Middle East Historical Encounters: A Critical Survey* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 127-28.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 130. The Ebtehaj-Millspaugh feud is covered in Frances Bostock and Geoffrey Jones, *Planning and Power in Iran: Ebtehaj and Economic Development Under the Shah* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 87-144.

the government to advance U.S. global interests. Thornburg believed that “the extension of democratic capitalism as the superior model for modernization to the rest of the world” required “the adaptation of our free enterprise system [t]o change world conditions.”⁹¹ He argued that Western oil companies should use part of their profits to help oil-producing nations; improving socioeconomic conditions in those countries would prompt them to cooperate with the United States. Thus, “the United States would gain highly compatible trading partners, foreign investment would be encouraged, the continuing penetration of American business would be guaranteed, and American strategic interests would be served.”⁹²

Thornburg’s ideas on using Iran’s oil revenues for development comported with the Truman administration’s thinking. AIOC royalties were insufficient for Iran’s self-sustaining development so Washington encouraged the British to negotiate with the Iranians. Oil-for-development was also a good solution because, given how Iranian leaders such as Razmara and Mosaddeq did not want to antagonize the Soviets by aligning with the West, the United States was hesitant to extend assistance to Iran at the same level as Greece and Turkey.⁹³

In 1949, London dispatched a delegation of AIOC officials led by company chairman William Fraser to negotiate with the Iranian government. While Tehran wanted to divide the oil profits evenly with the AIOC, the British pushed back and had their way once again: under the Supplemental Agreement to the 1933 concession, AIOC would give Tehran between 32 to 37.5 percent of total net profits depending on foreign exchange differentials and other costs. Furthermore, the British insisted on paying in pound sterling in order to maintain British and Commonwealth domination of Iran’s foreign trade.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Quotes from Linda Wills Qaimmaqami, “The Catalyst of Nationalization: Max Thornburg and the Failure of Private Sector Development in Iran, 1947-1951,” *Diplomatic History* 19, No. 1 (Winter 1995): 4, 5.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁹³ Qaimmaqami, “The Catalyst of Nationalization,” 2-3; Byrne, “The Road to Intervention,” 207-208; Goode, *The United States and Iran, 1946-51*, 34.

⁹⁴ Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 55-56.

Meanwhile, with Max Thornburg's input, the Iranian government adopted a Seven-Year Development Plan in 1949. The plan earmarked oil revenues for development projects and placed them under the newly-formed Plan Organization (Sazman-e Barnameh). The first plan would spend 21 billion rials (\$650 million) for 1950-57: 25 percent would go to agriculture, 23.8 percent would be allocated for the transportation network, and 28.6 percent would be spent on social projects – schools, health clinics, and hospitals.⁹⁵

In June 1950, in order to get Majles ratification for the Supplemental Agreement, the Shah appointed to the prime ministry the no-nonsense chief of general staff, Haj Ali Razmara. Razmara supported many of the Pahlavi king's reforms, including land reform. Razmara also believed that, if he could get the Majles to pass the Supplemental Agreement, Iran would be able to finance its own development and perhaps secure additional funding from the United States. To assert his independence from the Shah, Razmara improved relations with the Soviet Union, which undermined Tehran's relations with Washington. Razmara's reform proposals and anti-corruption drive also earned him many enemies among the political elite.⁹⁶

In the end, the *raison d'être* of Razmara's ministry – to get the Supplemental Agreement ratified by the Majles – brought about his demise. In November 1950, a parliamentary commission led by Mohammed Mosaddeq rejected the agreement and resolved to nationalize Iran's oil. On 4 March 1951, before submitting the agreement to the Majles floor, Razmara called the Mosaddeq commission's proposals "impractical" because "Iran was incapable of running its oil industry."⁹⁷ On 7 March, a member of the Fedaiyan-e Islam (Devotees of Islam), a militant religious group with connections to a small circle of clerics in Qom and responsible for other political assassinations, gunned down Razmara.

⁹⁵ UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East*, 85.

⁹⁶ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 263-67. Also see M. Reza Ghods, "The Rise and Fall of General Razmara," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, No. 1 (Jan. 1993): 22-35.

⁹⁷ Quotes from de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 150-51.

After Razmara's assassination, the Majles rejected the Supplemental Agreement and nationalized oil. On 27 April, after Hossein Ala's brief ministry, Mohammed Mosaddeq, a Swiss-educated jurist who was known for his honesty during his tenure as finance minister and provincial governor of Fars and Azerbaijan provinces, became prime minister.

From 1945 until the start of the Mosaddeq ministry in 1951, Iran had weak political parties, a young monarch trying to regain his father's power, militant Islamists and communists, and a populace still suffering from underdevelopment and the aftershocks of the Allied occupation. With traditional Iranian fears of the Soviets and the British, the United States emerged as a viable partner and a prominent player in Iran's internal affairs.

But given Iran's oil wealth, the Truman administration did not feel responsible for lavishing it with aid comparable to Greece and Turkey. Instead, Washington encouraged the British government to share a greater portion of the AIOC's profits with the Iranians. Although Washington supported democratic institutions in Iran in the late 1940s, its primary goal was rebuilding Western Europe and Japan. As long as Iran did not disintegrate and fall into the Soviet orbit, the United States seemed content with the status quo. The oil crisis would change U.S. priorities in Iran.

"Welcome, Our Dear Friends": Turkey's Volatile Pro-Americanism and Entry into the Western Alliance

According to an American expert of Turkey, "at the outset [of the Cold War], [the U.S.-Turkish] relationship appeared solidly grounded on mutual interests and shared aspirations, not only for defense, but for development as well."⁹⁸ Indeed, America's example as the most developed country in the world – with its bustling cities, modern agriculture, technological prowess, and military might – and the prospects of U.S. aid achieving similar results in their country appealed to Turkish leaders and opinion-makers. Writing in the

⁹⁸ George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 3.

moderate leftist daily *Tan* in 1945, the journalist Zekeriya Sertel argued that “the most sincere helping hand [for Turkey’s development] can come from America.” “It has the money, the machine, and the technician,” Sertel said, and presaged Truman’s Point Four speech: “America’s aid policy to other nations is not based on the principle of imperialism that we’ve come to know,” calling the prospects of U.S. aid to Turkey “a blessing.”⁹⁹

The most conspicuous signs of postwar pro-Americanism emerged in Turkey on 5 April 1946, when the *USS Missouri* arrived in Istanbul to deliver the funeral of Münir Ertegün, the former Turkish ambassador to the United States. “Welcome, our dear friends!” exclaimed Necmettin Sadak, editor of the Istanbul daily *Akşam*. Other papers, too, welcomed the largest battleship of the U.S. Navy and its sailors.¹⁰⁰ Hundreds of Istanbul residents toured the *Missouri* during her three-day stay.

Although U.S. officials saw Turkey primarily as a geopolitical asset, Turkish commentators ascribed idealistic motives to the United States and linked the prospects of an American alliance to their country’s development and democratization. During the *Missouri*’s visit, the influential writer Falih Rıfkı Atay interpreted America’s global vision as “a non-belligerent and non-violent world based on the security of free, equal, and sovereign nations; where only morals, the law, and agreements prevail.” “Anyone who wishes to live in such a world,” Atay continued, “can see their lucky star on the American flag.”¹⁰¹ Abidin Daver, an equally influential opinion-maker, saw the arrival of the *Missouri* as “the desire of the American Republic and democracy to show its friendship toward the democracy [of the] Republic of Turkey.” “This unity of aims and ideals constitutes the most unshakeable component of the friendship between Turkey and America,” Daver added, which would

⁹⁹ Zekeriya Sertel, “Türkiye’nin Amerika İle Münasebetleri” [Turkey’s Relations with America], *Tan*, 15 October 1945.

¹⁰⁰ Necmettin Sadak, “Aziz Dostlarımız, Hoş Geldiniz” [Welcome, Our Dear Friends], *Akşam*, 5 April 1946; Nadir Nadi, “Dost Amerikan Denizcilerini Karşılarken” [As We Receive the Friendly American Sailors], *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1946; Abidin Daver, “Eski Dostluğun Yeni ve Parlak Bir Tezahürü” [New and Shining Reflection of an Old Friendship], *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1946.

¹⁰¹ Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Missuri,” *Ulus*, 8 April 1946.

“become the most important protector of peace and security in the Near and Middle East.”¹⁰² The centrist *Cumhuriyet* claimed on 9 April that, just like Americans, Turkish people “appreciate individualism, do not melt the individual into the collective, and do not refute individual enterprise and creativity.” “Should our development accelerate through closer relations with America,” continued the editorial, “our mutual commitments will become stronger.”¹⁰³ Turkish newspapers spread a very pro-U.S. message.¹⁰⁴

Then came the Truman Doctrine, which caused euphoria among Turkish literati. On 13 March 1947, *Cumhuriyet* argued that Truman’s speech represented America’s best values. “America [h]as finally said ‘stop’ to Bolshevik-Slavic imperialism, has understood its responsibility to the world and history, [a]nd has taken a stand against communism, which is the successor to Nazi and fascist thinking.” “We can now see America as represented by the Statue of Liberty in front of New York harbor,” the article went on, “which shines the entire world with its torch. Civilization and history will be grateful to her.”¹⁰⁵ Falih Rıfkı Atay called America “a peaceful state” that sought “a world based on liberty and law, [not] war and hegemony.” A few weeks later, conservative writer Ömer Rıza Doğrul argued that President Truman’s “revolutionary” policies would change international relations, ensure justice and equality among nations, and lead to development and prosperity.¹⁰⁶ In a speech to the National Assembly, Nihat Erim, one of CHP’s rising stars, argued that “the most developed country in material terms is also the one that has the highest standards in spiritual greatness.” “The noble role that the USA has played during and after the war,” said Erim, “shall be remembered as one of the greatest honors in the history of that nation.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² Daver, “Eski Dostluğun Yeni ve Parlak Bir Tezahürü” [New Reflection of an Old Friendship].

¹⁰³ “Daha Yakın ve Daha Sıkı Dostluk” [Closer and Stronger Friendship], *Cumhuriyet*, 9 April 1946.

¹⁰⁴ This dynamic had antecedents during the war. See Adam B. McConnel, “The CHP, the U.S., and Ulus: The Portrayal of the United States in Ulus Gazetesi During World War II” (M.A. Thesis; Sabancı University, 2008).

¹⁰⁵ “İşte İdeal Amerika” [This is Ideal America], *Cumhuriyet*, 13 March 1947.

¹⁰⁶ Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Barış Kurucu Amerika” [America the Peacebuilder] *Ulus*, 15 March 1947; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, “Büyük Bir İnkılab” [A Great Revolution], *Cumhuriyet*, 24 April 1947.

¹⁰⁷ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* [TBMM Journal of Minutes], 8 May 1947 (Ankara: TBMM, 1948), 32.

In June 1947, when Secretary of State Marshall announced the European Recovery Program, the sound of U.S. economic aid waxed lyrical to Turkish ears. Initially, however, Washington seemed reluctant to extend credits and grants to Ankara under the Marshall Plan. The State Department argued that Turkey could pay in cash and would not require U.S. credit to purchase farming, transportation, and mining equipment. In a guest column on *Cumhuriyet*, CHP deputy Ali Rıza Türel, who had attended the Marshall Plan conference in Paris as a delegate in July 1947, begged to differ: Turkey was spending over fifty percent of its fiscal budget on defense, which weakened its ability to purchase capital goods. “In a situation directly related to world peace, extending emergency economic aid to our country [i]s just as important as helping the reconstruction and economic development of European countries.” “The American government,” Türel hoped, “shall correct this wrong sooner or later.”¹⁰⁸

The disappointment over the Marshall Plan aid ended when Washington deemed Ankara eligible for credits. But a sense of unease resurfaced in 1948-49 because the Truman administration did not want to include Turkey as a member into NATO. Upon becoming the new Turkish ambassador to the United States in August 1948, Feridun Cemal Erkin observed that “the West Europeans and America are not ready to accept us [into] the new security system.”¹⁰⁹ Even though Erkin told American diplomats that it should be perfectly sensible to have Greece and Turkey as NATO members (since the French pushed for the membership of Italy, hardly an Atlantic littoral state), Washington and London sidelined Athens and Ankara.

In September 1948, Erkin warned Joseph Satterthwaite of the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs that “the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey as a factor of freedom, order, and justice in the [M]iddle East are indispensable and of vital importance for the maintenance of peace [and] security [in] the Mediterranean area, which are

¹⁰⁸ “Marshall Planına Türkiyenin İtirazları” [Turkey’s Objections to the Marshall Plan], *Cumhuriyet*, 22 January 1948.

¹⁰⁹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışışlerinde 34 Yıl: Anılar-Yorumlar* [34 Years in the Foreign Ministry: Memoirs-Comments] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1980), 2-1: 25.

inseparably linked with the peace and security of the [U]nited States.”¹¹⁰ According to George McGhee, who served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (NEA) from 1949 until 1951 and then as ambassador to Turkey from 1951 until 1953, Ankara feared that, in the absence of a U.S.-Turkish security pact, the Soviets would gain “the impression that the United States [was leaving] Turkey undefended.”¹¹¹

When the United States, Canada, and ten European countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949, Turkey launched a public relations campaign in the United States. A few days after the signing of the treaty, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, who had written one of the “welcome” articles for the *USS Missouri* as a columnist in 1946, arrived in Washington. To coincide with his visit, Sadak published an article on *Foreign Affairs* and rendered a lengthy account of how the Soviet Union, since the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, had longed to control Turkey. Even though Moscow had not raised the issue of the Straits or border changes after August 1946, Sadak argued that it still constituted a threat to Turkey; Ankara had to be in NATO.¹¹²

The Turks complained that their exclusion put both their country and the United States in a precarious position vis-à-vis the USSR, a point they constantly reiterated until joining NATO in 1952.¹¹³ In his meeting with Secretary of State Dean Acheson on 12 April 1949, Sadak expressed his disappointment that Turkey, “the European nation most exposed to Russian attack, was being left outside of Western security arrangements.”¹¹⁴ Acheson told Sadak that, from Washington’s viewpoint, Turkey’s importance had not diminished. Nevertheless, he conceded that it would not be possible to forge a formal security pact between Turkey and the United States for a while. Acheson assured Sadak that the Washington Treaty did not preclude U.S. support for Turkey in the event of Soviet aggression

¹¹⁰ Erkin to Satterthwaite, Washington, 10 September 1948, Box 2, McGhee Files, RG 59, NARA.

¹¹¹ McGhee, *The U.S. – Turkish – NATO Middle East Connection*, 56.

¹¹² Necmettin Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets,” *Foreign Affairs* 27, No. 3 (April 1949): 449-61.

¹¹³ Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War,” 820-23.

¹¹⁴ “Türkiye’nin Rolü” [Turkey’s Role], *Hürriyet*, 13 April 1949.

nor did the lack of a formal alliance signify a decrease in the U.S. commitment to Turkey's security.¹¹⁵ The time was just not right.

Turkish opinion-makers were disappointed once again. While *Hürriyet*, the leading center-right newspaper, celebrated NATO and its potential contribution "to poor Europe, which badly needs peace for its development," it reacted to Turkey's exclusion harshly. "Why don't we raise our voice to question our exclusion from the Atlantic Pact?" one *Hürriyet* editorial demanded on 13 April, "why aren't we receiving [more] aid?"¹¹⁶ A *Cumhuriyet* columnist tied the Turkish exclusion from NATO to the \$30 million in Marshall Plan aid for Ankara, which he found abysmally low: "Turkey is closer to the Red Giant than any other pact member and it faces the greatest peril." Two days later, the same columnist pointed out that Turkey had asked for \$90 million in ERP funds but received only \$30 million for 1949. "We are expected to assume great burdens; the aid should also be great."¹¹⁷

These reactions not only reveal the volatility of pro-Americanism in Turkey in the early Cold War but also hint at the causes of subsequent anti-Americanism. Establishing closer relations with the United States not only meant protection from the Soviet Union but, equally important, also vindicated Turkey as a "modern" and "Western" ally. Whenever the United States did not seem to appreciate Turkey as a Cold War partner, Turkish perceptions of the United States worsened. Until Turkey was invited to NATO in 1951, the Turkish press praised the United States when it extended new assistance and complained whenever it turned down Ankara's requests for aid and admission into the Atlantic Pact.

But despite uncertainties over Turkey's role in the Western alliance, the United States appealed to many Turks as a symbol of modernity. The Ministry of Education, for example,

¹¹⁵ "Memorandum of Conversation," Washington, 12 April 1949, Box 3392, CDF, 1945-49 (711.6711-2645 – 711.6822/12-3145), RG 59, NARA; "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," FRUS, 1949, 6: 1647-53; Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, 2-1: 66. Also see "Memorandum of Conversation – Mr. Webb, Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Mr. John D. Jernegan," Box 19, George McGhee Files, NARA.

¹¹⁶ "Atlantik Paktı" [The Atlantic Pact], *Hürriyet*, 20 March 1949.

¹¹⁷ Abidin Daver, "Atlantik Paktı ve Türkiye" [The Atlantic Pact and Turkey] and "Amerikan Askeri Yardımı Arttırılmalıdır" [American Military Aid Must Be Increased], *Cumhuriyet*, 20 March and 22 March 1949.

translated and published several books under the title of “American Classics.” The collection included the select speeches of Abraham Lincoln and William James’s *Pragmatism*.¹¹⁸ Likewise, translations of English-language books on America and travelogues of Turks who visited the United States engendered Turkish interest in the United States at the onset of the Cold War. These works shared several common features. Turks who visited the United States were impressed by the opportunities they saw for upward social mobility and social equality (discounting African Americans). Turks appreciated America’s immense wealth, the industriousness of the average American worker, the democratic order, and American politicians’ accountability to their constituents. Many Turks saw U.S. foreign policy as essentially benign and contributing to global peace and prosperity.¹¹⁹

As interest in the United States grew in Turkey, Turkish officials sought ways to receive more U.S. aid and secure a formal alliance from Washington. That opportunity came when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. The new DP cabinet, which had won the elections the previous month, decided to send troops to the faraway Asian country in order to demonstrate solidarity with the United States and seek NATO membership. Ambassador Erkin happened to be in Turkey on vacation when the war started. In a meeting with President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, Erkin pointed out in vivid terms the imperative need for Turkey to send troops to Korea: “If we remain indifferent to the assault on South Korea today, who would support us, or even care about us, if our neighbor-in-question [the Soviet Union] attacks us tomorrow?” His superiors

¹¹⁸ Abraham Lincoln, *Seçme Nutuklar* [Select Speeches] (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1948); William James, *Pragmacılık* [Pragmatism] (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1948). Although American classics were translated only after 1945, the Turkish Ministry of Education had been translating Western classics since 1941.

¹¹⁹ Fuad Gedik, *Amerika* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1948); Şevket Rado, *Amerikan Masalı* [The American Fairy Tale] (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1950); Afşin Oktay, *Amerika* (Ankara: Publisher unknown, 1952); Russel W. Davenport, *Daimi İnkılaplar Diyarı Amerika* [America, The Land of Permanent Revolutions] (İstanbul: Nebioğlu, 1953); Bedii Faik Akın, *Sam Amca’nın Evinde* [In Uncle Sam’s Home] (İstanbul: Yenilik Yayınevi, 1954); Mahmut E. Ozan, *Amerika’ya Doğru: Seyahat ve Yüksek Tahsil Kılavuz Rehberi* [To America: A Guide for Travel and Higher Education] (Place and date of publication unknown).

found Erkin's argument so compelling that, against his counsel, they coupled the decision to send troops with a new request for NATO membership.¹²⁰

The background to Turkey's NATO membership is fairly intricate. Since the late 1940s, the United States and Britain had been working on the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in which Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran would be allied with Britain. London wanted to retain its predominance in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf through MEDO. The plan, however, did not survive: the Greeks and Turks did not regard MEDO as a viable alternative to NATO while the rise of anti-British sentiment in Egypt and Iran precluded their joining a British-led security pact.¹²¹

In the summer of 1951, the State Department and the JCS agreed that Greece and Turkey should be included in NATO to protect Western interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹²² Although the United States had continued to furnish Turkey with military aid after 1948, without a formal guarantee, the Turks signaled their unwillingness to side with the West in the event of a war with the Soviets. Specifically, Ankara tied U.S. access to Turkish airfields to NATO membership. "We need to tell the Americans," wrote the editor-in-chief of the highest-circulating *Hürriyet* in early 1951, "that we have a powerful army, we are reliable, and we have no communists." "If they are to ask our help when a war breaks out tomorrow, they should also know how to help."¹²³ Ambassador Erkin conveyed these sentiments to State Department officials.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, 2-1: 153.

¹²¹ Ibid., 2-2: 340-52. On Egypt's refusal to join MEDO, see Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 14-130.

¹²² Toru Onozawa, "Formation of American Regional Policy for the Middle East, 1950-1952: The Middle East Command Concept and Its Legacy," *Diplomatic History* 29, No. 1 (January 2005): 128. Also see Behçet Yeşilbursa, "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and its Admission to NATO, 1950-52," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, No. 4 (October 1997): 70-102, and Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," 807-25. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 119, also points out that Turkey's NATO membership was closely connected to its position at the confluence of the Balkans, eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

¹²³ Sedat Simavi "Amerikan Yardımı" [American Aid], *Hürriyet*, 14 January 1951. The airbases-for-NATO connection comes from Haluk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler, 1923-1968" [Factors That Guide Turkish Foreign Policy, 1923-1968] *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 23, No. 3 (September 1968): 262.

¹²⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation," 4 June 1951, Box 4069, CDF, 1950-54, RG 59, NARA.

The United States saw no other option but to accept Turkey into the Atlantic Pact.¹²⁵ By the second half of 1951, it became clear that the West, which feared a Soviet-instigated war in Europe (erroneously thinking that the Kremlin had provoked hostilities in Korea), would need Greece and Turkey in the event of war. The only option guaranteeing that outcome was NATO membership for Athens and Ankara. As Acheson put it, “if the [Soviet] attack came in Western Europe, there is nothing which would make the Turks or the Greeks take any move” unless they were in NATO.¹²⁶ At the North Atlantic Council’s Ottawa meeting in September 1951, Acheson convinced the Europeans that the two countries’ membership would be the safest (and most cost-effective) way to strengthen the alliance. Greece and Turkey entered NATO as full members the following year.

Turks appreciated the gesture. The Ankara-based pro-CHP *Ulus* declared that NATO would become much stronger now that Turkey was a member. DP deputy Mümtaz Faik Fenik argued that Turkey’s accession to NATO confirmed its status as a “Western” country and its importance for Europe. *Hürriyet*’s Sedat Simavi praised the DP government for its foreign policy success and pointed out the implications of NATO membership for Turkey’s development: “Just like the Atlantic states we join, we will also be in a position to decrease our war budget. We will have greater means for economic development.”¹²⁷

Indeed, U.S. aid improved Turkey’s prospects throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s. That Turkey was spared the horrors of World War II and undertook an orderly transition to democracy helped the burgeoning U.S.-Turkish alliance. Although the level of U.S. aid and the U.S. reluctance to formalize the alliance until 1952 disappointed Turks from

¹²⁵ According to the historian Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “the U.S. decision to extend a security guarantee to Turkey was the combined result of Washington’s [l]ine of security thinking and Turkey’s consistent diplomatic pressure.” Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey – Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945 – 1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 240.

¹²⁶ “Report by the Secretary of State on European Problems,” *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 451.

¹²⁷ “Kuzey Atlantik Paktına Alındık” [We’re Admitted to the Atlantic Pact], *Ulus*, 21 September 1951; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Dış Politikada Büyük Zafer” [Major Victory in Foreign Policy], *Zafer*, 22 September 1951; Sedat Simavi, “Türkiye Atlantik Paktında” [Turkey in the Atlantic Pact], *Hürriyet*, 22 September 1951.

time to time, pro-Americanism was quite prevalent in Turkey between 1945 and 1954 because the U.S.-Turkish alliance was a mutually beneficial arrangement.

“The Great and Friendly Land of the United States of America”: The Oil Crisis and Iran’s Cautious Pro-Americanism

Even before 1945, Iranians leaders and opinion-makers were eager to cooperate with the United States for their country’s security and development. During the wartime occupation, the Tehran daily *Ettelaat* had called the United States “Iran’s only hope for freedom and independence” and wished it would end British and Soviet interference.¹²⁸

After the war, however, pro-Americanism in Iran turned out to be much more cautious compared to Turkey. Part of the reason was that Iranians had had enough with great powers – many did not want to throw off the British and Russian yoke only to come under American control. The Americans, too, did not want to poke their nose into what they saw as a British responsibility. Finally, Iranian pro-Americanism was cautious because, as the oil crisis dragged on from 1951 until 1953, Iranians with pro-U.S. tendencies had to tone down their rhetoric lest they be undermined by the anti-Americanism of the Tudeh Party.

Reactions to the financial expert Arthur Millspaugh in 1944-45 showed Iranians’ nuanced sentiments toward the United States.¹²⁹ Despite its critical attitude toward Millspaugh, *Ettelaat* published his responses and gave him a fair hearing. One column on 8 July 1944 praised the Michiganian’s expertise and country of origin (“the free country of America”) but lamented that “Dr. Millspaugh has not performed to expectations.” Millspaugh’s decision-making was opaque, he did not explain his reasoning to anyone, and he

¹²⁸ *Ettelaat*, 17 Azar 1320 / 8 December 1941.

¹²⁹ The historian Mansour Bonakdarian argues that “Millspaugh’s second mission to Iran [e]roded the image of the United States as a benevolent third power.” Millspaugh, “formed yet another rallying point for the [p]latform of ‘negative equilibrium.’” Bonakdarian, “Great Expectations,” 131.

risked destabilizing Iran's already-fragile economy.¹³⁰ Mohammed Mosaddeq, then a Majles deputy, juxtaposed Millspaugh to Americans who were popular in Iran. Mosaddeq mentioned Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., who was well-liked for his closeness to Iranians during his tenure as the U.S. minister plenipotentiary from 1940 until 1943, and his wife, Grace, who was admired for her philanthropic work: "The popularity of Mr. Dreyfus and his respected (*muhtaram*) wife [i]s an indicator of the warm feeling that Iranians have for Americans."¹³¹

Despite kind words and hopes for U.S. support vis-à-vis Britain and the Soviet Union, Iranians disagreed on what they wanted from the United States. One group advocated "positive equilibrium" (*movazeneh-ye mosbat*), which, in the past, meant balancing Russia and Britain against each other or, in the 1930s, Germany against both. After 1945, proponents of "positive equilibrium" expected U.S. aid and security guarantees against London and Moscow in exchange for a share in Iran's oil wealth (much like Prime Minister Qavam had done in 1946).¹³² General Hassan Arfa, who served as chief of general staff of the Iranian armed forces from 1944 until 1946, put it best: "our policy [w]as to bring as many Americans as possible to Iran, to be witnesses of the Soviet political encroachments and as a deterrent for the more open violations of our independence and interference in our internal affairs."¹³³

But another group that advocated "negative equilibrium" (*movazeneh-ye manfi*) did not want Iran to become a U.S. ally. This group called for the removal of all foreign influence from Iran. As Mohammed Mosaddeq put it, they compared the idea of balancing disparate

¹³⁰ "Rajeh-be Doktor Millspaugh" [About Doctor Millspaugh], *Ettelaat*, 6 Tir 1323 / 27 June 1944; "Doktor Millspaugh va Eqtesadiyat-e Kashvar" [Doctor Millspaugh and the National Economy], *Ettelaat*, 17 Tir 1323 / 8 July 1944; "Nameh-ye Doktor Millspaugh" [Doctor Millspaugh's Letter] *Ettelaat*, 11 Tir 1323 / 2 July 1944.

¹³¹ Hussein Kia-Ustuvan, *Siyaset-e Movazeneh-ye Manfi dar Majles-e Charahdahom* [The Politics of Negative Equilibrium in the Fourteenth Majles], (Tehran, 1327/1949), 123; quoted in Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 26-27.

¹³² This line of thinking had taken hold early on: "Amrika va Naft-e Khavarmiyaneh: Reqabat-e Engelestan va Amrika bar sar-e manaba-ye naft-e in mentqeqeh" [America and Middle East Oil: Competition of England and America over the resources of the region], *Ettelaat*, 25-26 Tir 1323 / 16-17 July 1944. The Tudeh, for its part, hoped to neutralize Anglo-American influence in Iran with the help of the Soviet Union. See Mark Hamilton Lytle, *The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953* (New York: Homes & Meier, 1987), 159, 164.

¹³³ Hassan Arfa, *Under Five Shahs* (London: John Murray, 1964), 325.

foreign interests by allowing them greater reign in Iran to “a person without an arm having his other arm amputated in order to attain physical balance.”¹³⁴

This reasoning had much to do with Iran’s modernization. In 1950, Mohammed Hossein Meymandinejad, a lecturer at the University of Tehran, argued that Iran should have stayed out of World War II and used oil revenues to “strengthen” itself. Meymandinejad made the same case for the postwar period: Iran, he believed, ought to “manipulate” the United States and the Soviet Union to keep both of them out and strengthen itself.¹³⁵

Other Iranian opinion-makers, too, held variegated views of the United States. On the one hand were those such as Abbas Massoudi, the editor-in-chief of *Ettelaat* newspaper, who advocated replicating U.S. social customs in Iran. In 1945, Massoudi traveled to the New World and reported his experiences over the course of several weeks (he published the articles as a book in 1949). In *Come With Me to America*, Massoudi called upon his fellow Iranians to understand the roots of U.S. prosperity, especially the “law-abiding” nature of Americans. “Public control is not necessary,” Massoudi said, because “people know that the first need and duty of their life is to enforce the law.” To illustrate his case, he pointed out how Americans, despite their dislike for wartime restrictions such as limited meat sales, obeyed the laws. Massoudi drew a connection between Americans’ sense of duty, patriotic solidarity, respect for law, and their prosperity. Given Massoudi’s conservatism and his close relations with the Pahlavi dynasty, it was little surprise that he emphasized America’s conformist aspects.¹³⁶

Other Iranian intellectuals, such as Fakhreddin Shadman, had a more realistic appreciation of the United States and the West. A cultural critic, former prosecutor, and double PhD (in law from the Sorbonne and in history from the London School of Economics),

¹³⁴ Quoted in Homa Katouzian, “Oil Boycott and the Political Economy: Musaddiq and the Strategy of Non-Oil Economics,” in Bill and Louis (eds.), *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, 204.

¹³⁵ Mohammed Hossein Meymandinejad, *Naft – Doshman-e Shomare-ye Yek-e Iran!* [Oil – The Number One Enemy of Iran!] (Tehran: Chapkhaneye Chehr, 1329/1950), 33-35; 278-82.

¹³⁶ Abbas Massoudi, *Ba Man Biayid Be Amrika* [Come With Me to America] (Tehran: Sharkat-e Sahami Chap, 1328 / 1949), 7, 8, 87. For an abbreviated biography of Massoudi, see Milani, *Eminent Persians*, 1: 394-98.

Shadman's *The Conquest of Western Civilization* (1948) criticized those Iranians who thought of themselves as "modern" but merely imitated the West (*fokolis*). Showing how European empires had built their civilization on the toils of non-Europeans, Shadman called upon his compatriots "to capture Western civilization before it captures us." To that end, he argued that every scientific book and machinery from the West should be brought home and replicated so as to make Iran stronger.¹³⁷ Hardly a xenophobe – he had enjoyed living in the United States as well as Europe for many years – Shadman's patriotism also affected his politics: Iran, he believed, should take a balanced approach in its relations with Western countries. According to a short biography, he cautioned Iranian politicians "not to put all their eggs in the American basket" because "England [would] still matter."¹³⁸ As we shall see in later chapters, other Iranian intellectuals would echo many of Shadman's ideas in the 1960s and 1970s.

Beyond the works of intellectuals and the perceived U.S. role in Iran's modernization, the dynamics of the U.S.-Iran partnership, especially the discrepancy between Tehran's demands for aid and Washington's ability to meet them, affected Iranian perceptions of the United States. In 1949, the Iranian government requested \$147 million for development projects outside the Seven-Year Plan, which displeased John Jernegan, the director of the State Department's Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (GTI). "It is ridiculous for the Iranian Government to say on [the] one hand that it is embarking on a comprehensive program under the Plan Organization," Jernegan noted, "and on the other hand require \$147 million outside the plan." "Either they have a plan or they do not."¹³⁹

The problem was that Iranian leaders could not agree on priorities or appreciate the costs of modernization. In a meeting with U.S. embassy counselor A.R. Richards, Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani, the most politically active cleric at the time, demanded that the United

¹³⁷ Fakhreddin Shadman, *Tashkhir-e Tamaddon-e Farangi* [The Conquest of Western Civilization] (Tehran: Chapkhane-ye Majles, 1326 / 1948), 30-31, 63-64, 75

¹³⁸ Milani, *Eminent Persians*, 1:302-3.

¹³⁹ Jernegan to Roundtree and Ferguson, Washington, 9 November 1949, Box 42, O-i-C-Iran, 46-54, Lot File 57 D 155, RG 59, NARA.

States support “big” and “useful” projects in Iran, not village development or military build-up. “What good could a well-equipped and well-trained army of even 250,000 do against 18 million hungry people?” Kashani asked.¹⁴⁰ Despite Kashani’s wisdom in prioritizing socioeconomic development over military affairs, he too had shortcomings: the cleric was foolish to dismiss village development, of course, but he also did not appreciate the costs of his ideas either. Kashani reportedly told William Warne that the \$23 million allocated for Iran in the Point Four program should be enough to build large dams. Warne failed to convince a nonplussed Kashani that such projects would cost several hundred million dollars.¹⁴¹

Mohammed Reza Shah, for his part, pushed for U.S. military support and a formal alliance with the United States. He became frustrated when he was turned down. During his visit to Washington in November 1949, the Shah told President Truman how Greece, Turkey, and Iran constituted a joint bulwark against the Soviet Union and that containment would fail “if the right flank [Iran] remained so weak.” While Secretary of State Acheson advised Iran to focus on social and economic affairs, the Shah insisted that his country’s bigger problem was lack of adequate military hardware and the absence of an alliance with the United States.¹⁴²

In a March 1950 telegram, Acheson asked the U.S. embassy in Tehran to impress upon the Shah that his focus on military affairs suggested a weakening in his resolve “to show his people [the] road to progress.”¹⁴³ Though the note seemed supportive of liberal modernization, it actually marked the point when the Truman administration started backing the Shah to keep Iran in the U.S. orbit and on the road to development. “[The] essential need of Iran [i]s progressive, courageous leadership, which only [the] Shah himself can provide.”

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 95.

¹⁴¹ Warne’s talks with Kashani related in Warne, *Mission for Peace*, 67-70.

¹⁴² “Interview Between the President and the Shah of Iran” and “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” 18 November 1949, *FRUS* 1949, 6: 572-79

¹⁴³ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 25 March 1950, *FRUS* 1950, 5: 505.

“With such leadership,” Acheson continued, “progressive, patriotic, and competent Iranians will rally [a]nd all national problems can be solved in time.”¹⁴⁴

It was Mohammed Mosaddeq, after he became prime minister in April 1951, who seemed like a good candidate to provide the sort of leadership Acheson wanted. Mosaddeq was educated in the West, he was a democrat, and, despite his opposition to an alliance with the United States, sought U.S. support for Iran’s modernization. In June 1951, through an open letter addressed to Iranian students studying abroad, Mosaddeq used a pro-U.S. discourse to secure Washington’s support for his country’s oil nationalization:

You are scattered in many countries and mostly in the great and friendly land of the United States of America [so] I hope you [will] spread the facts among all the fair-minded persons [y]ou come in [c]ontact. [E]ach year millions of tons of oil were produced and exported [from Iran] and [o]nly a trifling sum was given to us, the true owners of the oil. [1]8 million inhabitants of Iran, the real owners of this wealth, live in dire poverty and inexplicable misery, [and] every year hundreds of thousands of Iranians die of disease and want; and the Iranian Government is unable to carry out its education, health and reform programs and develop its economy and agriculture.¹⁴⁵

To make his case more appealing to Washington’s Cold War concerns and Americans’ sense of fair play, Mosaddeq argued that the nationalization of the AIOC was the extension of Iran’s resistance to Soviet attempts in obtaining oil concessions in 1944 and 1946-47. He also pointed out how the AIOC turned £120 million in profits but Iran received only one-eighth of that figure (£15 million). Through this letter, which was translated into English, Mosaddeq hoped to convince the United States that Iran would be able to pay for its modernization and secure its northern borders provided that it could control the oil.¹⁴⁶

To solve the dispute, the Mosaddeq government held direct talks with AIOC officials and offered to pay the company’s full value. Ignoring the Attlee government’s nationalization of industries in their own country, British negotiators also demanded the AIOC’s projected

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Mohammed Mosaddeq, *Peyam-e Agha-ye Doktor Mosaddeq: Nokhost Vazir-e Iran be Daneshjuyan-e Irani dar Kharej* [The Message of Dr. Mosaddeq: The Prime Minister of Iran to Iranian Students Abroad] (Tehran: Publisher unknown, 1330/ 1951), 1-5.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

profits through 1993 (when the 1933 concession would expire). A labor strike in Abadan, partly in protest against working conditions and partly designed to soften British negotiators, led Iranian administrators, headed by a nationalist engineer named Mahdi Bazargan, to take over AIOC headquarters and rename it the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Production stopped in July 1951; Britain soon withdrew non-Iranian employees of the company and imposed a blockade on Iranian oil exports. With British and U.S. oil companies owning a majority of the world's tanker fleet, Iran's oil exports ground to a halt.¹⁴⁷

To regain the initiative, Mosaddeq went to the United Nations on 15 October 1951. After a masterful display at the UN, he traveled to Washington by way of Philadelphia. At Independence Hall, the Iranian prime minister used pro-U.S. statements and drew parallels between Americans' love of liberty and Iranians' struggle for independence.¹⁴⁸ In Washington, Mosaddeq reiterated those themes to President Truman: liberty, independence, and Iran's legitimate rights. Truman appeared supportive: Britain was an ally, Iran was a friend. He commissioned Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee to mediate between the two sides.¹⁴⁹ The Mosaddeq-McGhee talks, which lasted until mid-November 1951, made progress toward resolving the dispute. But when the Conservatives won the elections in Britain, the talks came to naught. The government of Winston Churchill rejected U.S. mediation and tried to get McGhee sacked for his sympathetic views toward Iran.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 64-113.

¹⁴⁸ Mosaddeq made his case against the British representative so effectively that the Security Council's 19 October resolution only suggested that discussion on the oil dispute be postponed until the International Court of Justice verdict. See de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 179; Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men*, 127-29.

¹⁴⁹ As a former Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, McGhee was the ideal mediator. As an Anglophile, McGhee wanted to preserve good relations with Britain. As the assistant secretary responsible for the Middle East, he understood and sympathized with Iranian concerns. And as a former oil company executive, he wanted to make sure that the crisis would not jeopardize U.S. oil companies' global operations. See George C. McGhee, *I Did It This Way: From Texas and Oil to Oxford, Diplomacy, and Corporate Boards* (Danbury: Rutledge Books, 2001).

¹⁵⁰ Per McGhee's plan, the NIOC would take over all the oilfields and control the exploration, production, and transportation of crude oil. The refinery complex at Abadan would be sold to a non-British company, which would hire its own technicians and train Iranian personnel. The sum from the sale of the refinery would go to the AIOC and the NIOC would pledge to sell the British at least 30 million tons of oil for the next fifteen years. Thus, Britain would be compensated, Iranian nationalization would be recognized, and profits would be split somewhat equally. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 77; Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 126.

At their last meeting on 17 November, McGhee asked Mosaddeq to accept an international consortium that would include the British. Mosaddeq declined and requested \$10 million in monthly aid until the oil embargo ended. McGhee reminded him that a deal – even if imperfect – would bring Iran revenues much greater than \$120 million per year. Mosaddeq gave a terse retort: nationalization was not just about money; it was also about principles.¹⁵¹

The last meeting between Mosaddeq and McGhee was particularly interesting because of what the Iranian leader said about the United States. Mosaddeq related how “all his life [h]e had fought for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of elections, and freedom of religion,” things that were not respected in communist countries. Iran, he said, was “compelled [b]y circumstance and traditions to follow [t]he West.” If Iran could receive U.S. help, Mosaddeq said his country would develop in a liberal and democratic fashion.¹⁵²

Although Mosaddeq may have used a pro-U.S. and pro-Western discourse simply to extract aid from the Truman administration, the Persian patriot probably meant what he said: unlike virtually every Middle Eastern leader in the modern age, Mosaddeq’s liberalism was genuine.¹⁵³ Like many Iranians, he wanted closer ties with the United States in order to modernize his country. Unlike Mohammed Reza Shah or Ahmad Qavam, however, Mosaddeq did not want an alliance with the United States. He and independent-minded Iranians welcomed U.S. help to the extent that it helped their country’s development but they did not want anything that could bring greater U.S. interference in Iran’s internal affairs.

The problem was that Mosaddeq and his supporters could not foresee how Iranian and U.S. interests did not always align. When the Truman administration refused Mosaddeq’s loan request, Iranian newspapers were offended. *Ettelaat* and *Kayhan*, another Tehran-based

¹⁵¹ “Memorandum of Conversation” and “McGhee-Mosaddeq Meeting November 17,” 19 November 1951, Box 45, O-i-C-Iran, 46-54, Lot 57 D 529, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ Mosaddeq’s Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Neuchatel advocated the adoption of Western legal processes in Iran. He held the 1906 Constitution in high esteem. Though supportive of Reza Shah’s reforms in the 1920s, Mosaddeq opposed his increasing authoritarianism. Even as Reza Shah’s rule became more autocratic and dangerous in the 1930s, Mosaddeq continued to speak for the preservation of representative institutions in Iran. See de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 3-4, 39-42; Kinzer, *All the Shah’s Men*, 53-61.

paper, appeared angry not only over U.S. refusal for aid but also for the fact that Turkey received more assistance than Iran.¹⁵⁴

After Mosaddeq's return home in late 1951, events took a turn for the worse. A mix of pro-British and anti-Mosaddeq deputies stayed away from the Majles to deny the prime minister a quorum. Mosaddeq's response was severe. To National Front supporters gathered outside the parliament, he rendered a tirade: "People, benevolent and patriotic! You are the Majles and that place," he pointed at the legislative building, "that handful who do not want the best for their country, are not parliament at all!"¹⁵⁵

From that episode until his overthrow in August 1953, Mosaddeq assumed an authoritarian posture. Despite popular support, he lost the backing of the Shah, the clerics, and even some of his allies. One such former ally accused Mosaddeq "of being [a] worse dictator than Reza Shah."¹⁵⁶ While genuine critics accused him of weakening the constitutional order for which he had fought all his life, the prime minister's more conniving opponents engaged in clandestine activities to undermine him – going so far as to murder Tehran's able and pro-Mosaddeq police chief, General Mahmoud Afshartus, in April 1953. When opposition deputies resigned and left the Majles without a quorum in July 1953, Mosaddeq held a plebiscite of dubious legality.¹⁵⁷ The Persian patriot's eccentricities also undercut him.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ *Kayhan*, 17 Azar 1330 / 9 December 1951; *Ettelaat*, 18 Azar 1330 / 10 December 1951

¹⁵⁵ Quoted in de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 189.

¹⁵⁶ Quoted in Milani, *The Shah*, 168. Former Mosaddeq allies such as Mozaffar Baqai and Ayatollah Kashani became opponents were rumored to have been paid by the CIA during the coup: Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'état in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, No. 3 (Aug. 1987): 269.

¹⁵⁷ The mechanics of the plebiscite also undermined the National Front's democratic credentials – supporters and opponents had to vote in separate booths, which made it easier to bully the latter. Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Conclusion: Why Did Mosaddeq Fail?" in Gasiorowski and Byrne (eds.) *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, 265-66.

¹⁵⁸ An illness caused Mosaddeq to faint during his fiery speeches, a problem that amused some foreigners. An American physician who claimed to have a medication to solve Mosaddeq's problem asked if he "[s]hould [o]ffer it to [Mosaddeq] under Point Four or [l]et him faint?" Scymen Nussbaum to President Truman, Blackfoot, Idaho, 6 June 1951, Box 4116, CDF, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. Mosaddeq's public histrionics helped his detractors to portray him as a senile old man vulnerable to communists. While *Time* magazine choose the Iranian prime minister "man of the year" in 1951, his "Old Mossy" image in the Western media ("Mussy Duck," as Churchill liked to call him) helped to caricaturize Iran's case. de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 2.

Beyond Mossadeq's own flaws, Iran's hand in the oil dispute weakened because of Britain's "special relationship" with the United States. Although its empire was in decline, London still carried great weight in international politics. When Churchill came back to power in late 1951, he "made Truman understand in no uncertain terms that Britain's continued support in the Korean War was predicated on America's help in Iran."¹⁵⁹ In early 1952, the Truman administration began to tilt toward Britain in its dispute with Iran.

As the oil crisis continued, Iran's economy contracted, a problem compounded by the high number of people on government payroll. According to one estimate, out of Iran's population of 18 million, 2.25 million people worked as "civil servants." On top of a bloated public sector, the Mosaddeq government had to support 70,000 ex-AIOC workers left idle by the shutdown in the oil industry.¹⁶⁰ As economic conditions worsened, some began to call for a "non-oil" economy. Mozaffar Baqai, a moderate leftist and Mosaddeq ally who would split with the prime minister later on, suggested that Iran's oil fields should be "destroyed by an atom bomb rather than remain in the AIOC's hands."¹⁶¹ Washington feared that the turmoil could benefit the Tudeh and the Kremlin and that Iranian nationalization could prompt other oil-producing countries in the developing world to follow Tehran's lead.¹⁶²

As economic and political conditions worsened, anti-U.S. sentiments in Iran became more visible. The Tudeh accused Mosaddeq of being a "liberal bourgeois" with false illusions about America." The National Front, Tudehis claimed, represented the "comprador bourgeoisie" linked to Western interests, especially those of the United States.¹⁶³ In this context, Tudeh activists tried to present Marxism as compatible with Islam. According to the historian Abbas Amanat, Tudehis "built elaborate syllogisms to show that their creed had

¹⁵⁹ Milani, *The Shah*, 145.

¹⁶⁰ de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 181.

¹⁶¹ Quoted in Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 137.

¹⁶² McGhee claims he stated this aspect of nationalization to Mosaddeq clearly: George McGhee, "Recollections of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq," in Bill and Louis (eds.), *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, 298.

¹⁶³ Quoted in Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 59.

support in the Koran.” This discourse linking Islamic philosophy to dialectic materialism made headway among some Iranians, who began to see Washington’s support for London during the oil dispute as a continuation of British imperialism by other means.¹⁶⁴

The Soviets, too, did much to enflame anti-Americanism. When U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas visited Iran in 1949-50 and traveled in the country-side, Radio Moscow’s Persian-language broadcasts referred to him as “Great Satan.” The term probably impressed clerics in seminaries of Qum, including a certain Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini.¹⁶⁵

“American imperialism” came under more attack in Iran as Mosaddeq’s position became shakier in summer 1953. In June, a group called “Defenders of the Youth’s Rights in Babolsar,” a town on the Caspian coast, distributed pamphlets titled “Yankee Go to Hell!” The pamphlets threatened the staff of the local Point Four office, calling them “spies [who] have done nothing [for] the benefit of the population and [a]gricultural development.” “Let us [d]ispel the so-called American adviser-spies,” the piece raged on, “as we did with [the] plundering British adviser-thieves,” referring to the end of diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952. The broadside ended on a positive note: “May the [path] of the [heroic] Iranian Nation for dispelling the British and American Imperialists end in victory!”¹⁶⁶

But not all Iranians resented the United States and Americans living in Iran; many appreciated U.S. help. During one of his tours to the Talaqan Valley, William Warne was surprised by villagers’ slogans of “Long Live the American Government!” (“Zنده-abad Dowlat-e Americaei!”). Though Warne conceded that there was anti-Americanism in Iran, he

¹⁶⁴ Amanat, “Khomeini’s Great Satan: Demonizing the American Other in Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” in Amanat and Bernhardsson (eds.) *U.S.-Middle East Historical Encounters*, 153-56. Also see Fakhreddin Azimi, “Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces,” in Gasiorowski and Byrne (eds.) *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, 69.

¹⁶⁵ Amanat, “Khomeini’s Great Satan: Demonizing the American Other in Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” in Amanat and Bernhardsson (eds.) *U.S.-Middle East Historical Encounters*, 153-56. Recent scholarship suggests that, after Stalin’s death in March 1953, power struggles in Moscow prevented the Soviets from pursuing a coherent approach toward Mosaddeq. See Artemy M. Kalinovsky, “The Soviet Union and Mosaddeq: A Research Note,” *Iranian Studies* 47, No. 3 (May 2014): 401-18.

¹⁶⁶ Regional Director (Moshiri) to U.S. Director of Technical Cooperation (Warne), 10 June 1953, Box 8, Mission to Iran, CSF, 1951-61, RG 469, NARA.

thought much of it was a residue of anti-British feeling and common xenophobia. At any rate, advocates of “Yankee Go Home,” Warne found, were a “puny minority.” A local governor assured the American adviser that “just as the Iranian people cannot forget the tyranny [o]f the imperialistic powers, they will not [f]orget the genuineness of your friendship.”¹⁶⁷

Unfortunately, goodwill did not prevent U.S.-Iranian relations from deteriorating after Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in January 1953. Unlike Truman, who had opposed British coup plans against Mosaddeq, Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the secretary’s younger brother, supported them. Notwithstanding Mosaddeq’s requests to Washington for help with Iran’s development and its dispute with Britain, in the spring of 1953, the CIA began working with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) on plans to topple the Iranian premier.¹⁶⁸

The first attempt to overthrow Mosaddeq on the night of 15-16 August 1953 failed. The Shah, who had supported the coup plans only halfheartedly, escaped to Italy by way of Iraq. On 19 August, a day after Mosaddeq withdrew his supporters from the streets as a gesture to U.S. ambassador Loy Henderson, royalist elements in the Tehran garrison and pro-Shah demonstrators (some of them recruited with CIA dollars), overthrew Mosaddeq. The coup leader, General Fazlollah Zahedi, who had served under Mosaddeq as interior minister in 1951, became prime minister. The Shah returned to Iran on 22 August.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Warne, *Mission for Peace*, 81, 121-23, 133. A report drafted by the NSC’s Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) on 8 January 1953 observed that “the Iranian attitude towards Americans is friendly, despite a tendency to identify the United States with every facet of British policy.” “A Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East,” PSB D-22, 8 January 1953, Box 15, White House Office Files, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61 [hereafter NSC Staff Papers, 1953-61], Psychological Board (PSB) Central Files Series [hereafter PSB Central Files], Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library [hereafter Eisenhower Library].

¹⁶⁸ Interestingly, Eisenhower was initially inclined to help Mosaddeq. At an NSC meeting in March 1953, he reportedly said “if [I] had \$500,000,000 million of money to spend in secret, I would give \$100,000,000 of it to Iran right now.” “Memorandum of Discussion,” 4 March 1953, *FRUS* 1952-1954, 10: 698. Accounts by two CIA officers who planned and implemented the coup are: Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); Donald N. Wilber, *Regime Change in Iran: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953* (Reprint; Nottingham: Spokesman, 2006). The latter book was the CIA’s internal history of the coup.

¹⁶⁹ For the historiographical debate on the relative importance of the activities of foreign spies and anti-Mosaddeq Iranians, see note 5 above. Although most Iranians would lament Mosaddeq’s downfall subsequently, in the summer of 1953, even the normally apolitical clerics began to worry about Mosaddeq’s authoritarianism

The events of August 1953 led to a sudden increase in anti-British sentiments in Iran but not anti-Americanism. After the failed coup, Hossein Fatemi, Mosaddeq's foreign minister and editor-in-chief of the moderate leftist daily *Bakhtar-e Emrooz*, criticized Britain and the Shah rather than the United States. Fatemi called the Pahlavi king a "traitor" and, without mentioning the United States or the CIA, called the attempt of 16 August a "British coup."¹⁷⁰ *Ettelaat*, too, targeted Britain and the Shah.¹⁷¹ Public sentiment against Britain was so rampant that, after the successful coup on 19 August, the Shah had to make anti-British statements and the Zahedi government delayed reestablishing diplomatic relations with London. Although the United States would become the sole scapegoat for the 1953 coup in later years, Britain bore the brunt of public vexation in Iran at the time.¹⁷²

The U.S. embassy, too, observed that phenomenon: "Between August 18 and 19," read one account, "the attitude of the Iranian Government and public toward the United States made a complete about-face." Before the coup, "the Tudeh Party had managed to organize and direct much of the anti-foreign feeling against the United States and Britain." Now, American citizens could move freely around Iran "without fear of abuse or slogan-calling." Similarly, an American aid expert in the Kurdish city of Kermanshah told William Warne how "Yankee Go Home" had changed almost overnight to "we want you to stay here."¹⁷³

National Front supporters – university students, the modern middle class, and workers – were bitter to see Mosaddeq's downfall. But many still held positive views of the United

and the republican leanings of some of his allies, especially Hossein Fatemi. On the clerical involvement in the 1953 coup, see Shahrough Akhavi, "The Role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949-1954," in Bill and Louis (eds.), *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, 91-117.

¹⁷⁰ Hossein Fatemi "Khaini ke Mikhast Vatan-ra Bekhak va Khoun Bekeshad Farar Kard" [The Traitor Who Wanted to Shed the Nation's Blood Fled], *Bakhtar-e Emrooz*, 26 Mordad 1332 / 17 August 1953; "Mellat-e Bot Shekan" [Iconoclast Nation] *Bakhtar-e Emrooz*, 27 Mordad 1332 / 18 August 1953.

¹⁷¹ *Ettelaat*, 26-28 Mordad 1332 / 16-18 August 1953. It is worth noting that while Fatemi, a sworn enemy of the Shah, was executed in 1954, *Ettelaat's* editor-in-chief Abbas Massoudi reconciled with the king. See Milani, *Eminent Persians*, 1: 397.

¹⁷² The historian Abbas Milani writes: "it is a remarkable feat of historical transubstantiation that eventually the events of August [1953] became known as the 'CIA coup,' with all but no mention of the British role." Milani, *The Shah*, 182, 190-93.

¹⁷³ "Iranian Political Developments from the Advent of the Zahedi Government to the Arrival of the British Diplomatic Mission (August 19 – December 21, 1953)," Tehran, 21 January 1954, Box 4112, CDF, 1950-1954, RG 59, NARA. Kermanshah event related in Warne, *Mission for Peace*, 308.

States. In a letter sent to Americans living in Iran in December 1954, the National Resistance Movement of Iran, a group of former National Front activists, described the United States as “a great democratic and freedom loving nation used to the principles of democracy” and called upon Washington to cease supporting the Shah and Zahedi.¹⁷⁴ According to Richard Cottam, one of the CIA’s Iran experts (though one who opposed the coup) and later critic of U.S. foreign policy, after the 1953 coup, many Iranians still hoped that the United States would support democracy and development in their country.¹⁷⁵

Pro-Americanism in Iran at the onset of the Cold War was a mixed bag. Because of the Allied occupation during World War II, agricultural underdevelopment, and the harmful effects of the oil nationalization crisis, Iran suffered from an unstable political economy in the 1945-54 period. Although Americans helped with rural development, healthcare, education, and economic planning, Washington’s assistance to Tehran paled in comparison to its support for Ankara. The U.S.-Iranian partnership did not have anything comparable to Turkey’s NATO membership either. Those Iranians who hoped to neutralize Soviet and British influence in their country through closer relations with the United States were disappointed that they could not secure more aid and a defense pact from Washington.

On the other hand, not all Iranians who thought well of the United States wanted their country to become a U.S. ally. They sought U.S. support for Iran’s modernization and in its confrontation with Britain but they did not want Washington to interfere in Iranian affairs. Overall, because of their past experiences with Britain and Russia, and the agitation of the Tudeh and other groups, Iranians were not as enthusiastically pro-U.S. as the Turks. In the early Cold War, Iranian pro-Americanism was much more cool-headed and cautious than Turkish pro-Americanism.

¹⁷⁴ See William Koren, Jr., “National Resistance Movement Letter in English,” 4 February 1955, Box 3808, CDF, 1955-59, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁷⁵ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Updated ed.; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 231-33.

Conclusion

As the Grand Alliance of World War II began to unravel in late 1945, President Harry Truman decided to contain the perceived Soviet threat in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Joseph Stalin, for his part, saw U.S. efforts as an attempt to reverse the Soviet Union's wartime gains. U.S.-Soviet differences emerged first in Greece, Turkey, and Iran and then spread into Europe and East Asia. The Cold War started.

In the two hundred years preceding the Cold War, Turkey and Iran had lost significant territory to Russia. Thus, Washington's support for Ankara and Tehran in their confrontations with Moscow struck a positive chord with Turkish and Iranian people. Years after his retirement from politics, Truman boasted how he had "saved" Turkey by opposing the Soviet Union in 1945-46.¹⁷⁶ Many Turks appreciated that fact at the time. And although Washington did not flex its muscle against Moscow during the Iranian crisis in 1946, many Iranians also appreciated U.S. diplomatic support during this period.

Interestingly, while many Turks and some Iranians ascribed idealistic motives to U.S. foreign policy, the United States became involved in Turkey and Iran for geopolitical, strategic, ideological, and economic reasons. Worried that the Soviets threatened Western countries' access to the Suez Canal and the oil resources of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Washington decided to strengthen Turkey and Iran. For Turks, U.S. aid would help them realize their elusive dream of becoming a modern and developed nation. As their reactions to the *USS Missouri's* visit, the Truman Doctrine, and NATO membership demonstrated, Turkish observers hoped that a formal alliance with the United States would make their country safe and modern. Iranians thought along similar lines, although with one crucial difference: not all Iranians agreed that their country should become a U.S. ally.

¹⁷⁶ Truman's comment in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.) *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 368.

But the United States was not cynical either: it wanted to nurture free market democracies in Turkey and Iran. Although Turkish and Iranian leaders seemed to share those aims, the results were mixed. With little U.S. urging, Turkey successfully completed its transition to multi-party democracy in 1950. The newly-elected Democrat Party boosted agriculture and infrastructure thanks to U.S. assistance, a dynamic that contributed to pro-Americanism in Turkey.

Iran, which experienced an improvement in political liberties after Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, nevertheless faced serious political problems. Even though Mohammed Reza Shah increased his powers in 1949, he did not yet command the absolute authority that would define his rule in the 1960s and 1970s. The lack of institutionalized parties meant that Iran did not have strong leadership until Mohammed Mosaddeq became prime minister in 1951. Even then, Fedayan-e Islam, a small but powerful militant Islamic group, together with the Tudeh, continued to destabilize Iranian politics. Washington's pro-British neutrality during the oil crisis, coupled with the Tudeh's vocal anti-Americanism, dampened the tenor of pro-U.S. sentiments in the early 1950s.

Different political conditions and different ties with the United States translated into different types of pro-Americanism in the two countries: enthusiastic but volatile in Turkey, cautiously optimistic in Iran. From 1947 through the mid-1950s, Turkey received hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. technical, economic, and military assistance; Iran received only a fraction of what Turkey received. While U.S. support for Turkey against the Soviet Union in this period was unequivocal, the United States could not really back Iran in its oil dispute against Britain, a primary U.S. ally in the Cold War. Furthermore, Americans feared that Iran's oil nationalization could set a bad example for other oil-producing countries. Notwithstanding these setbacks, many Iranians appreciated America's democracy, prosperity, and its benevolence to their country. Events would take a different turn after 1955.

Chapter 3

Pro-Americanism Subsides, Anti-Americanism Rises, 1955-1963

Introduction

Authoritarian modernization began to take its toll on Turkey and Iran from 1955 until 1963. Although the U.S. government encouraged political and socioeconomic reform in the two countries, it had mixed success. In Turkey, the Democrat Party (DP) of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes mismanaged the economy and became more autocratic, which led to the coup d'état of May 1960. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, alarmed since 1958 by the Pakistani coup and the Iraqi revolution, worried that the Turkish coup could inspire the Iranian military to overthrow him. Instead of opening up the political system, however, the Shah consolidated his rule.

Pro-Americanism subsided in the two countries differently. During the 1950s, Turkish intellectuals blamed the Menderes government, not the United States, for their country's economic and political situation. After the 1960 coup, because President Dwight D. Eisenhower supported the return to democracy, a policy that continued under his successor, John F. Kennedy, anti-Americanism did not grow but pro-U.S. sentiments in Turkey did fade away. Washington's apparently good relations with Menderes and the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles after the Cuban missile crisis helped to turn pro-Americanism into U.S.-skepticism in Turkey.

Meanwhile, Washington's input for reform had limited effect in Iran. A coup attempt in 1958, which the Shah suspected to be the work of the Eisenhower administration, together with the Kennedy administration's pressure on the Shah to reign and not rule, caused the Pahlavi king to resent the United States. While many in the middle class became indignant at the Shah's growing power, clerics worried about Western-oriented change, especially land reform and

female emancipation. Thus, anti-Americanism spread among a wider array of political actors in Iran than in Turkey.

Despite the troubles, however, the fortunes of the two countries began to improve by 1963. The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations exerted pressure on the junta in Ankara to return to democracy and to be lenient on DP leaders. After the formation of a democratically-elected government in late 1961, the Kennedy administration also encouraged Turkey to devise and implement a development plan, which it finally did in 1963.

In Iran, the Eisenhower administration refused the Shah's requests for increased military aid and advised him to focus on socioeconomic reform. Kennedy held his predecessor's line and pressed the Shah to appoint a reform-minded cabinet under the veteran politician Ali Amini. Although Amini was ineffective as prime minister, his agriculture minister, Hasan Arsanjani, laid the groundwork for a land reform program aimed at weakening landlords and empowering Iranian peasants. In January 1963, the Shah expanded Arsanjani's project and announced his own comprehensive program for socioeconomic modernization, the "White Revolution."

1955-63 was a paradoxical period for anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran. Although Washington supported reform in the two countries, U.S. popularity began to weaken. Because political leaders in Ankara and Tehran promised development (the so-called "revolution of rising expectations") but failed to deliver it, the United States received part of the blame.¹

This chapter first explains the Eisenhower administration's global policies and its approach to Turkey and Iran. It then analyzes how modernization theory became the foreign policy ideology of the United States in the late 1950s as Washington understood that it could best wage the Cold War by attracting the "global South" (sometimes called the Third World) to the

¹ "Revolution of rising expectations," a term credited to the American diplomat and author Harlan Cleveland, denotes developing societies' hope in rapid change: David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 169-70.

Western side.² By 1961, the foundations for the U.S. approach to the developing world had been established for the Kennedy administration.³ The chapter then analyzes development efforts, Cold War dynamics, and the end of the pro-American moment in Turkey and Iran.

“We Can Do These Things Without Going Broke”: The Eisenhower Administration and the Developing World

In a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in December 1955, President Eisenhower suggested that the administration should think about “the promotion of [international] economic associations, somewhat as we have done in the military area.” “While we are busy rescuing Guatemala or assisting Korea and Indo-China,” he warned, “[the Soviets] make great inroads in Burma, Afghanistan, and Egypt.” If the United States and non-communist countries could coordinate their economic policies over the long term, the Soviet Union’s new economic offensive in the developing world could be blunted. “If we plan and organize properly,” Ike said, “we can do these things without going broke.”⁴

When it came to power in January 1953, the Eisenhower administration had argued that trade and investment would create better opportunities for both developing and developed countries; “trade not aid” was the order of the day. George Humphrey, former president of the Hanna Steel Corporation and Eisenhower’s first Secretary of the Treasury, contended that foreign

² Even though “Third World” was used for developing countries that were non-aligned during the Cold War, it is used here to include developing U.S. and Soviet allies during the Cold War. A very succinct discussion of the origins of the phrase “Third World” is in William Ryrie, *First World, Third World* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 1-3.

³ On how modernization theory influenced U.S. foreign policy, see Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8-38.

⁴ Eisenhower to Dulles, 5 December 1955, Box 3, White House Memoranda Series [hereafter WHMS], Papers of John Foster Dulles [hereafter J.F. Dulles Papers], Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library [hereafter Eisenhower Library]. On how U.S. decision-makers viewed the Soviet aid offensive in the 1950s, see Robert J. McMahon, “The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of Soviet Threat, 1955-1956,” *The International History Review* 18, No. 3 (Aug. 1996): 591-619.

aid obstructed “market forces around the world.”⁵ The new administration encouraged the World Bank to extend credit only to countries that adopted “policies and attitudes conducive to sound economic growth.” From 1953 until 1960, total U.S. aid fell by 23 percent.⁶

Eisenhower decreased aid in his first term because he wanted to balance the budget. When Joseph Stalin died in March 1953, Ike negotiated with Soviet leaders to reduce Cold War tensions. He hoped that easing conflict between Washington and Moscow would protect humanity from nuclear holocaust and put the United States on a sound economic footing.⁷

But the U.S.-Soviet rivalry did not end. In 1954, Moscow announced that it would extend \$2 billion worth of assistance to developing countries for the next two years. Although \$2 billion barely constituted a quarter of U.S. foreign assistance for the same period, Soviet aid, which appealed to recipient countries because it had fewer strings attached, exceeded U.S. grants and loans in nine countries that Washington deemed of strategic importance.⁸

Moscow’s turn to the developing world had much to do with the new Soviet premier, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. The Soviet system, Khrushchev believed, could prove its worth by raising its people’s living standards and by flaunting its successful industrialization around the world. He called for “peaceful coexistence” between communism and capitalism until the latter

⁵ Quotes and figures from Michael R. Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?: The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World,” in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds.) *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 61-63.

⁶ Quotes and figures from Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?” 48-52. Also see Burton I. Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 84-150. Also see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 366-418.

⁸ Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?” 54-58. On Soviet strategy toward decolonization and developing countries, see Sergey Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Kenneth Osgood, *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

would die a “natural” death. Khrushchev’s 1955 visit to India, Afghanistan, and Burma, coupled with the \$2 billion aid, constituted the first salvoes of the Soviet economic offensive.⁹

Although contemporary observers had a point when they criticized the administration for not caring about developing nations, especially neutral ones,¹⁰ in fact, Eisenhower and Dulles did much to counter the appeal of the Soviet model of modernization in the developing world. U.S. aid did decrease in absolute terms in the 1950s, but Washington continued to assist allies as well as neutrals. In 1955, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea received more than half of total U.S. military and economic aid. For the next five years, they received over \$2 billion. Overall, the Eisenhower administration extended nearly \$50 billion in assistance to countries – allied as well as non-aligned – that it deemed to be under “direct communist threat.”¹¹ The administration also instituted the “Food for Peace” program (better known as Public Law/PL 480) to sell excess U.S. agricultural products to foreign nations at a discount.¹²

U.S. officials worried that, as the Cold War expanded its global reach, Moscow could establish “economic control” in developing nations through high-profile projects such as the Aswan High Dam in Egypt or the Bilai Steelworks in India, thus reshaping recipients’

⁹ For a discussion of the relationship between Khrushchev’s domestic and foreign policies, see Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 94-122; Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, *Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006); William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 270-528.

¹⁰ See, for example, the following works by influential thinkers at the time: Walter Lippmann, *The Communist World and Ours* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959); C.L. Sulzberger, *What’s Wrong With U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959); Reinhold Niebuhr, *The World Crisis and American Responsibility: Nine Essays* (New York: Association Press, 1958). For a more even-handed account on Eisenhower’s approach to the Third World, see Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of Revisionists,” *Political Science Quarterly* 101, No. 3 (1986): 453-73.

¹¹ Figures from Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?” 55.

¹² On PL 480, see Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 142-46. For critical views on PL 480: Richard Ball and Christopher Johnson, “Political, Economic, and Humanitarian Motivations for PL 480 Food Aid: Evidence from Africa,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 44, No. 3 (Apr. 1996): 515-37; Nasir Islam, “Food Aid: Conscience, Morality, and Politics,” *International Journal* 36, No. 2 (Spring 1981): 353-70.

sympathies toward Moscow.¹³ They heeded the warning of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who had cautioned the Truman administration in the late 1940s that victory in the Cold War “would come to the system providing the greatest benefits to the peoples of the world.”¹⁴

Just as important as Soviet overtures, successive events reminded the Eisenhower administration to boost assistance for the developing world. In April 1955, hoping to make a good impression on the leaders of Asian and African countries meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, Eisenhower asked Congress for \$200 million for an Asian development fund.¹⁵ He argued that non-communist countries in critical areas, allied as well as nonaligned, were central to the Cold War: “Free nations need the United States, and we need them, if all are to be secure.”¹⁶ From 1956 until 1961, the United States sent hundreds of millions of dollars to a diverse group of Asian nations ranging from nonaligned India to allied South Korea.¹⁷

Middle East events, too, helped to revive foreign aid. In 1956, after Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and prompted Britain, France, and Israel to attack Egypt, Eisenhower forced the aggressors to withdraw.¹⁸ In a Congressional address on 5 January 1957, which came to be known as the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” Ike requested military aid for Middle Eastern countries as well as authority “to employ the armed forces of the United

¹³ Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?” 57.

¹⁴ Quoted in Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 102.

¹⁵ H.W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 111.

¹⁶ “Special Message to Congress on the Mutual Security Program,” 20 April 1955, *Public Papers of President Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Washington: USGPO, 1955), 404-13.

¹⁷ In 1957, the Eisenhower administration pledged a \$225 million loan to India and persuaded the World Bank to cover the balance of New Delhi’s foreign aid needs for the second plan. Washington sent New Delhi another \$90 million in loans and grants that year. U.S. aid to India reached \$194 million in 1960 and, in May 1960, Washington and New Delhi signed commodity agreements totaling \$1.25 billion. Quote and figures from Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism*, 133-35. On U.S.-South Korean relations during the Eisenhower years, see Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 84-112; Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 137-45.

¹⁸ Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 27-118; Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 211-39; Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism*, 226.

States [t]o defend the territorial integrity and [p]olitical independence of any nation in the area against communist armed aggression.” To avert a future conflict that could increase Soviet influence in the Middle East, Eisenhower argued that Washington should support regional governments so that “they possess [l]oyal security forces” and create “economic conditions [so as not to make] communism an attractive alternative.”¹⁹ The Eisenhower Doctrine reflected the U.S. emphasis on arming Middle Eastern countries as well as helping with their modernization.²⁰

The flight of the first Soviet satellite, Sputnik, on 7 October 1957 gave Eisenhower another impetus to change the U.S. course. The American people feared rockets that could send satellites into space could also deliver nuclear warheads against their country; Ike, as a former general, knew that the United States was ahead in missile technology. He was more concerned that Sputnik would give the impression of Soviet leadership in science and technology.²¹

In his state of the union address in January 1958, Eisenhower discussed the missile scare. “Admittedly,” he said, “most of us did not anticipate the psychological impact [o]f the launching of the first [s]atellite.” “Let us not make the same kind of mistake,” Ike continued, “in another field by failing to anticipate the much more serious impact of the Soviet economic offensive.” He underlined America’s economic and military prowess to assuage his domestic audience:

The productivity [o]f the American economy is the solid foundation-stone of our security. Our [f]armers produce an abundance of food and fiber. Our [w]orkers are versatile, intelligent, and hardworking. Our businessmen are imaginative and resourceful.

[O]ur problem is to make sure that we use these vast economic forces confidently and creatively, not only in direct military defense efforts, but likewise in our foreign policy, through such activities as mutual economic aid and foreign trade.

¹⁹ “Special Message to the Congress on the Situation of the Middle East,” *The American Presidency Project* [hereafter *APP*]; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11007>; accessed 9 December 2013.

²⁰ Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 269-76; Brands, *Specter of Neutralism*, 284.

²¹ David L. Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1999); Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[W]e have tremendous [r]esources on other non-military fronts to [c]ounter the Soviet threat: education, science, research, and, not least, the ideas and principles by which we live. And in all these cases the task ahead is to bring these resources more sharply to bear upon the new tasks of security and peace in a swiftly-changing world.

Eisenhower pointed out that “no investment we make in our own security and peace can pay us greater dividends than necessary amounts of economic aid to friendly nations.”²² Reflecting the subsequent increase for funding science, technology, and language training at U.S. colleges, the Eisenhower administration also extended aid to developing nations.

Even Latin America, which had received little U.S. aid hitherto, began to receive more attention after the Cuban Revolution in 1959.²³ Cuba proved that heavy private investment could not thwart revolutionary uprisings. In fact, the revolution in the Caribbean nation demonstrated the opposite: economic “backwardness,” combined with large-scale U.S. private investment, could engender political repression and socioeconomic inequality and lead to radicalism in America’s own backyard. Afraid of a ripple effect in the Western Hemisphere, Washington created the Inter-American Development Bank and pledged half of its \$1 billion capital in 1959. The United States also earmarked an additional \$500 million to the regional Social Progress Trust Fund to pay for healthcare, land reform, and housing projects.²⁴

By the end of his second term, Eisenhower, who had originally endorsed “trade not aid,” came to recognize that foreign assistance was “the cheapest insurance in the world” against the Soviets.²⁵ The Soviet economic offensive in the developing countries and the possibility that socialism could appeal to people in those countries as a better model for development convinced

²² “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 9 January 1958, [online], accessed on 28 January 2012; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11162#axzz1iRqDAjfX>.

²³ In 1958 alone, NGOs working in South Korea (over three-fourths of them American) spent nearly \$70 million, a sum larger than the U.S. government’s entire technical assistance program in Latin America. Figures in Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 144-45.

²⁴ Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution*, 42. Also see Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

²⁵ Quoted in Chester J. Pach, Jr., “Introduction: Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,” in Statler and Johns (eds.) *The Eisenhower Administration*, xiii.

the United States to reevaluate its approach to the emerging Global South and adopt a more proactive policy in the 1950s. Ike's successor, John F. Kennedy, would intensify those efforts.

The Eisenhower Administration and the Turkish Turbulence

The Eisenhower administration hoped to avoid a Korea-like war in the Middle East – unexpected, prolonged, and debilitating – through a “northern tier” strategy that would insulate the Soviets from the Middle East and South Asia. As part of the U.S. grand strategy of containment, “northern tier” aimed to link NATO to other U.S. alliances such as SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which included Pakistan) and ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty). In April 1954, Turkey and Pakistan concluded a cooperation treaty and Karachi signed a more comprehensive defense pact with Washington the following month. In 1955, Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan formed the Baghdad Pact.²⁶

As the central links of the global chain of alliances that would contain the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran became even more indispensable for the United States in the 1950s. President Eisenhower hoped that the Turkish economy could be built to a point so that it could sustain a military strong enough to deter the Soviets. At an NSC meeting on 5 January 1955, Ike stated that it would be “cheaper to assist the Turks [t]han to create additional U.S. divisions.” For the Eisenhower administration, Turkey's economic vitality was just as important as its ability to contain the Soviet Union.²⁷ However, Washington had to balance the objective of helping Ankara's orderly development and its position in the Western alliance with limited resources.

²⁶ Peter L. Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2005), 1-18; Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle, 1950-1959* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005); Magnus Persson, *Great Britain, the United States, and the Security of the Middle East: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1998). For a discussion on the military aspects of “northern tier,” see Michael J. Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 298-323.

²⁷ “Editorial Note,” *FRUS* 1955-1957, 24: 608.

The U.S. embassy's report from Ankara in September 1955 reflected those concerns: "The United States is [i]nterested in the overall development of the Turkish economy [and] its ability to support a modern military." According to the report, beside direct assistance, the United States promoted private investment and bilateral trade with Turkey. Ankara received over \$450 million in economic aid from 1948 through 1955. Still, although Turkey earned a mere \$70 million from exports, it needed at least \$10 to \$12 million to service its debt.²⁸

Turkey's military preparedness was not complete either. Since 1947, Ankara had received \$1.1 billion in U.S. military aid but it needed another \$900 million worth of equipment for existing units. Together with reserve ammunition and other materiel, Turkey would require a total of \$1.7 billion to defend Western interests in its neighborhood.²⁹

Notwithstanding the checkered nature of Turkey's economy and security, the Democrat Party's policies brought about impressive changes. Increases in farms subsidies, area under cultivation, and mechanization accelerated rural development after 1950. Turkey's agricultural sector grew over 40 percent in 1950-55 while the share of rural workers decreased from 85 percent of the labor force in 1950 to 77 percent by 1960. Investments in infrastructure boomed.³⁰

Human development was also remarkable. Per capita income, \$128 in 1950 (\$85 in Iran that same year), increased more than 30 percent by 1953, even as the population grew at an

²⁸ "Briefing Paper on Turkey Covering Political, Military, and Historical Matters," September 1955, 19-24, Box 3731, Central Decimal File, 1955-1959 [hereafter CDF, 55-59], Record Group 59 – General Records of the Department of State [hereafter RG 59], National Archives and Record Administration [hereafter NARA].

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Memduh Yaşa (ed.) *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi, 1923-1978* [The Economy of Turkey in the Republican Era, 1923-1978] (İstanbul: Akbank, 1980), 150, 189, 294-95, 263; *Zirai İstatistik Özetleri, 1936-1958* [Summary of Agricultural Statistics] (Ankara: Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1959), 4-7.

annual average of 2.5 percent.³¹ Literacy increased from 30 percent in 1945 to 39 percent by 1960 and reached 50 percent by 1965.³² These improvements owed much to U.S. assistance.

But the gains came at a high cost. Unable to increase tax revenues and unwilling to curtail farm subsidies in order not to alienate its rural base, the DP government forced the Turkish central bank to expand monetary circulation. Thus, the cost of living index increased from 100 in 1953 to 233 by 1960. Per capita income remained stagnant from 1954 until 1962.³³

The U.S. embassy in Ankara acknowledged that the DP's ambitions worsened Turkey's economic problems. DP leaders, the embassy said, "have not welcomed suggestions [m]ade by the IMF [International Monetary Fund], OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation], and certain groups in Turkey – that the investment program was in excess of available resources and would have to be curtailed if serious inflation was to be prevented."³⁴ Fearing a return to CHP-style statism, the DP refused to implement a development plan, which could have placed government spending on a rational basis and restored the market's confidence.

Economic desperation forced the Menderes government to seek Soviet aid. In 1956, Ankara accepted from Moscow a low-interest credit of \$100,000 for a glass factory. New lines of credit followed. Meanwhile, Turkish trade with Eastern Europe expanded from TL160 million (\$64 million) in 1953 to over TL400 million (\$160 million) in 1956.³⁵

³¹ Yaşa, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 37, 656; Maddison, *The World Economy*, 565. Per capita income figures for Turkey and Iran from *The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendation for a Development Program* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1951), 25.

³² "Okuma yazma bilen nüfus, 1935-2000" [Literate population, 1935-2000], *Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu*, www.tuik.gov.tr/Beslenme/excel/0104t02.xls; accessed on 18 May 2013.

³³ Yaşa, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 124; Maddison, *The World Economy*, 565.

³⁴ "Briefing Paper on Turkey Covering Political, Military, and Historical Matters," September 1955, 19-24, Box 3731, CDF 55-59, RG 59, NARA.

³⁵ Mehmet Altan, *Türkiye ve Süperler: Türkiye'deki Amerikan ve Sovyet Yardımları* [Turkey and the Supers: American and Soviet Aid in Turkey] (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 1986), 95-96. Although the actual market value of the Turkish lira was much lower (hovering around \$1 to TL 8.5), the official exchange rate stayed at \$1 to TL 2.82 until 1958. Figures from Yaşa, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 151, 164.

The Turks used their improving relations with the communist bloc to obtain better terms from their U.S. ally. In January 1956, President Celal Bayar told U.S. ambassador Avra Warren that Soviet propaganda about “unlimited economic aid” in exchange for Turkish neutrality could affect his people. Bayar pointed out that Turkey was “committed to [the] West and particularly to [the] United States.” He wondered why the U.S. government supported neutralist Egypt but did not give more aid to Turkey for its NATO commitments and economic development.³⁶

The veiled threat had an effect. A month after the Bayar-Warren meeting, Eisenhower sent his economic policy adviser, Clarence Randall, to Ankara. Randall, who had visited Turkey in 1953 as the head of a private investment delegation, repeated his earlier suggestions: balance the budget, curtail subsidies and credits, force state-owned enterprises to become more profitable, and set orderly procedures for the allocation of foreign currency.³⁷ But without adopting Randall’s suggestions first, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes requested \$300 million in economic and military aid from the United States. Washington calculated that maintaining present force levels and financing development in Turkey could cost as much as \$2 billion for the next five years. Eisenhower refused to underwrite such an amount for any ally.³⁸

Without U.S. aid, the DP-controlled parliament passed the National Protection Law (Milli Korunma Kanunu) in June 1956. Based on a legislation that CHP had used during World War II, the law allowed the government to set profit margins, determine price and rent ceilings for businesses and property owners, and restrict private access to foreign currency. The controls created a black market even for such basic items as coffee, tea, and sugar. 4,000 merchants were

³⁶ “Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State,” Ankara, 17 January 1956, *FRUS* 1955-57, 24: 666-68.

³⁷ “Letter from the President’s Special Consultant (Randall) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover),” Washington, 6 March 1956, *FRUS* 1955-57, 24: 669-73.

³⁸ “Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council,” Washington, 17 May 1956, *FRUS* 1955-57, 24: 680-85.

prosecuted under the law in its first year; the number kept rising the following year.³⁹ Worse, the law did not even bring the intended stability because the Menderes government did not curtail spending or implement a plan. By 1958, Turkey stood bankrupt.

Instead of putting its house in order, the Menderes government used regional dynamics to get more U.S. aid. In November 1956, after Syria signed a military cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union, Ankara interpreted growing Soviet influence in Damascus as a threat. When the Eisenhower Doctrine came into effect in January 1957, the Menderes government tried to get Washington to intervene in Syria.⁴⁰ The Eisenhower administration interpreted Turkish enthusiasm as a scheme to secure more military aid.⁴¹ The crisis died down after Syria merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic in February 1958.

Although the Eisenhower administration did not want to provide additional aid to Turkey unless it implemented austerity measures,⁴² it changed course when a revolution took place in Iraq on 14 July 1958 that overthrew the pro-Western Hashemite dynasty. Aside from sending troops to protect the pro-Western regimes of Lebanon and Jordan, the United States and Britain decided to extend financial aid to Turkey.

Ankara, too, realized it had to change course. On 23 July, the Menderes administration signed a stabilization agreement with the IMF and agreed to abolish the National Protection Law,

³⁹ Mustafa Albayrak, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Milli Korunma Kanunu Uygulamaları (1955-1960)" [The Implementation of the National Protection Law During Democrat Party Rule (1955-1960)] *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 23 No: 67-68-69 (March-July-November 2007), 219-50.

⁴⁰ Menderes to Dulles, 22 October 1957; Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 1 October 1957; Box 5, White House Memoranda Series, J.F. Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library.

⁴¹ An August 1957 intelligence memorandum in the State Department considered Ankara's Soviet gambit to be "superficial tactical shifts designed primarily to increase Turkey's bargaining power with the United States." Hugh S. Cumming, Jr. to the Secretary, 7 August 1957, Box 1, Subject Files Relating to Turkey, 1947-1958, Lot File 58 D 610 [hereafter SF-Turkey, 47-58], RG 59, NARA.

⁴² A State Department report in 1957 laid out U.S. worries about Turkey quite clearly: "The essential question is whether [a]id provides essential relief to Turkey's acute raw materials and supplies shortages and whether our overall economic relations are such that we [a]re exerting a constructive influence on Turkey's economic policies." The report argued that the United States should be willing to provide supplemental aid to Turkey only if it stabilized its economy. "U.S. Economic Relations with Turkey," [undated] 1957, Box 1, SF-Turkey, 47-58, RG 59, NARA.

curtail credits, devalue the lira, encourage savings, and liberalize the repatriation of foreign investors' profits. Under the agreement, Turkey borrowed \$760 million from Western countries (\$400 million in rescheduled debt), one-third of which came from the United States.⁴³

Amidst the economic downturn, the DP, which had been swept into power in 1950 for its liberal image, resorted to authoritarian measures. President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes defended their policies as a continuation of Turkey's tradition of a "strong state" and a necessity for development.⁴⁴ After closing down the Nation Party, which had only one deputy in the TBMM, the DP government confiscated most of the CHP's properties in 1954. A State Department paper in December 1954 noted that, after asserting "absolute control" of "the laws and the courts to stifle criticism," Menderes, with his "dynamic and dogmatic personality," had "visions of making Turkey a world power."⁴⁵ Secretary of State Dulles warned the U.S. embassy in Ankara that DP's authoritarianism would "destroy [f]avorable U.S. press" toward Turkey and "have a deleterious effect on [T]urkish-U.S. relations."⁴⁶ Washington sensed trouble ahead.

Indeed, the crackdown intensified. In August 1955, CHP secretary-general Kasım Gülek, the second most senior party leader after İsmet İnönü, was taken into custody for "insulting parliament." A magistrate released Gülek but police took him in again. As a Western-educated intellectual and leading member of the liberal minority within CHP in 1945-50, Gülek had supported the transition to democracy but he became a vocal critic of the DP by the mid-1950s. Because Gülek was not a deputy and did not enjoy parliamentary immunity, a court sentenced him to 6 months in prison under the new Meetings and Demonstrations Law, which virtually

⁴³ Albayrak, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Milli Korunma Kanunu Uygulamaları," 240.

⁴⁴ Bayar explains why a "strong state" would help development and how it comported with democracy in Celal Bayar, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes* [My Prime Minister Adnan Menderes] (Reprint; İstanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2010), 56-59.

⁴⁵ "Briefing Memorandum," December 1954, Box 2, SF-TR, 47-58, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁶ Telegram, Dulles to Ankara, 29 December 1954, Box 4064, CDF 50-54, RG 59, NARA.

banned all public gatherings. The crackdown on opponents became so ubiquitous that, upon the Iranian Embassy's request, the DP government jailed Metin Toker (who was also İsmet İnönü's son-in-law) for allegedly "defaming" Mohammed Reza Shah.⁴⁷

Urban opposition against Menderes and the Democrats increased as economic problems hit the Turkish middle class – mainly CHP-leaning military officers and civilian bureaucrats. In November 1956, the Ministry of Education dismissed Prof. Turhan Feyzioğlu, dean of the School of Political Sciences at Ankara University (Mülkiye), for his criticism of the government. When students protested, the police arrested nearly 300 of them. The students were soon released but Feyzioğlu resigned his tenure, joined the CHP, and became a deputy in the 1957 election.

Eisenhower was aware of Turkey's political problems but there was little his administration could do.⁴⁸ Menderes and his party maintained sizeable parliamentary majorities in the 1954 and 1957 elections, thanks to the winner-take-all system. The Menderes government rebuffed calls from the International Press Institute and Western news outlets to relax its control over the press, labelling the criticism a "detestable interference in the worst traditions of [the Ottoman] capitulations."⁴⁹ Washington had few options other than working with the DP.

In the spring of 1960, however, Turkey's relative stability began to crumble. On 27 April, at Menderes's behest, DP deputies formed a commission to investigate the CHP's alleged revolutionary activities. CHP chairman İnönü, who had overseen the process that culminated in

⁴⁷ John Goodyear to Washington, 30 July 1959, "Prosecution of Turkish Magazine AKİS For Libelling Shah of Iran," Box 3816, CDF, 55-59, RG 59, NARA. On the Menderes government's authoritarianism, see Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 307-9.

⁴⁸ In a memorandum dated 22 January 1959, CIA Director Allen Dulles referred to CHP chairman İsmet İnönü as "the man chiefly responsible for Turkey's successful and orderly transition from dictatorship to democracy." Eisenhower reportedly put quotations around the word "democracy" and added a question mark. See editorial note to "Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower," 22 January 1959, *FRUS* 1958-69, 10-2: 789-90.

⁴⁹ Owen T. Jones (GTI) to Rountree (NEA), "New Turkish Moves in Restraint of Freedom of the Press," 26 November 1958, Box 3, SF-Turkey, 47-58, RG 59, NARA.

DP's victory in 1950, became subject to government abuse. In order to appeal to the participants of the NATO foreign ministers' conference in İstanbul, pro-CHP students staged demonstrations on 28 April. Security forces responded with small arms fire and tear gas, killing two students. Protests spread to Ankara. In a telegram to Secretary of State Christian Herter, who was in İstanbul for the NATO meeting, Deputy Undersecretary Loy Henderson noted "[the] lack of anti-Americanism" in Turkey and advised his boss to "stay out" of the DP-CHP dispute.⁵⁰

But events brought the Eisenhower administration into the fray anyhow. On 27 May 1960, the National Unity Committee (NUC–*Milli Birlik Komitesi*), a junta mostly composed of junior-ranking officers, overthrew the DP government and arrested President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes. The junta installed as its leader General Cemal Gürsel, the recently retired army chief of staff.⁵¹ The NUC announced that Turkey would stay in NATO and CENTO and pledged to transfer power to an elected government once it drafted a new constitution.⁵²

Washington was relieved that Turkey would not be lost to neutralism or communism. U.S. Ambassador Fletcher Warren⁵³ seemed satisfied that most Turks still had a "friendly attitude" toward the United States and NATO.⁵⁴ But unlike Ambassador Loy Henderson, who established a cozy relationship with the Zahedi government in Iran in 1953, Warren had a standoffish approach to the NUC, partly because of his friendship with Menderes. In his first meeting with Gürsel and the new foreign minister, Selim Sarper, the U.S. ambassador expressed disappointment. Recalling his experiences in Latin America, Warren presciently warned Gürsel and Sarper that "in [the] future, [the Turkish] military would find it [d]ifficult not [to] become

⁵⁰ "Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter, at İstanbul," Washington, 1 May 1960, *FRUS* 1958-60, 10-2: 834-35.

⁵¹ Menderes had forced Gürsel into retirement a month before the coup for suggesting that the government heed the voice of protesting students.

⁵² After Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in February 1959, the alliance's headquarters were moved to Ankara and the pact came to be called the Central Treaty Organization.

⁵³ Not to be confused with his predecessor, Avra Warren.

⁵⁴ Warren to Washington, 27 May 1960, Box 2039, CDF 61-63, RG 59, NARA.

involved [in] any divisive political controversy.”⁵⁵ In a separate meeting with Sarper, Warren called the junta “men who stabbed their chiefs [DP leaders] in the back” and criticized the troops who had reportedly beaten Bayar and Menderes.⁵⁶

U.S.-Turkish relations during the Eisenhower years resembled the Truman era: Ankara constantly sought aid and expressed disappointment when Washington did not increase assistance. But unlike the 1945-54 period, Turkey ceased to be the exemplary U.S. ally because of the DP government’s economic mistakes and political authoritarianism. After the May 1960 coup, the Eisenhower administration would work to steer Turkey back to democracy and orderly development. The Kennedy administration would continue those efforts after January 1961.

The Eisenhower Administration and the Iranian Imbalance

Just like its predecessor, the Eisenhower administration wanted a military establishment in Iran that could keep domestic order and slow down the Soviets in the event of war but not so large that it would hurt the economy. Ike and his subordinates also hoped that Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi would focus on socioeconomic and political reform, not military affairs.⁵⁷

Iran’s situation in the 1950s, however, was just as troubling as Turkey’s. Despite owing his throne to General Fazlollah Zahedi (or perhaps because of it), the Shah quickly came into conflict with his new prime minister. While Pahlavi hoped to resolve the oil dispute expeditiously, Zahedi, just as fervent a nationalist as Mohammed Mosaddeq, wanted the best terms for Iran.⁵⁸ Ironically, the October 1954 agreement between Tehran and a consortium of

⁵⁵ Warren to Washington, 29 May 1960, Box 2039, CDF 61-63, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁶ Warren to Washington, 28 May 1960, Box 2039, CDF 61-63, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁷ See “Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson),” 7 January 1955, *FRUS* 1955-57, 12: 676-80 and “Report of the Interdepartmental Committees on Certain U.S. Aid Programs,” 3 July 1956, *FRUS* 1955-57, 12: 828-36.

⁵⁸ Gholam Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of the Shah* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 190-200.

Western oil companies, including British Petroleum (the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), looked much like what U.S. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee had offered Mosaddeq in 1951: in exchange for a 50-50 share of profits, the West recognized Iran's nationalization.⁵⁹

Because Iran could not export oil from 1951 until 1954, its coffers were empty. After Mosaddeq's overthrow, Washington gave Tehran a total of \$145 million in emergency aid until 1957 and another \$500 million in military aid until 1963. As Tehran signed new agreements for oilfields not allocated to the consortium with such companies as Italy's ENI, revenues rose from \$34 million in 1955 to \$181 million in 1957, which nearly doubled to \$358 million by 1961.⁶⁰ However, given the Shah's penchant for arms and rampant corruption in the bureaucracy and the royal family, the Pahlavi state was never far from bankruptcy between 1955 and 1963.

Yet there were positive signs. The Shah reinvigorated economic planning in 1954 and appointed the honest and ambitious Abolhassan Ebtehaj as head of the Plan Organization. After working for the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia in the 1920s and 1930s, Ebtehaj moved to the public sector and adroitly managed 40 state-owned enterprises. From 1942 until 1950, as governor of Bank Melli, Iran's *de facto* central bank, he became convinced that, unless development projects were coordinated free from political interference, Iran's modernization

⁵⁹ The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) would receive 50 percent of the profits derived from the oil exports and the control of the Iranian market. Of the remaining half, BP would receive forty percent and five U.S. oil companies would each have eight percent. The remainder would be shared by Dutch and French companies. On the formation of the consortium, see Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 310-31.

⁶⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 419-20. Though their numbers are different, James Bill and Homa Katouzian point to a similar increase in Iranian revenues: James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 112-14; Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 206.

efforts would fail. Ebtehaj hoped that the plan would coordinate the state's investments in transportation, energy, and social development without discouraging private enterprise.⁶¹

Although the Second Seven-Year Plan (1955-61) could have helped Iran to develop with less state interference in the economy, Ebtehaj's tactlessness in dealing with politicians and fellow technocrats undermined his base of support. In April 1955, when Ebtehaj confronted Prime Minister Zahedi over the fate of oil revenues, the Shah sacked his chief minister and began to exert greater influence on state finances. Four years later, the Shah would force Ebtehaj to resign after the chief planner criticized proposed increases in the military budget.⁶²

Despite setbacks, the second plan achieved some success. On the plus ledger was agriculture. While the price of foodstuffs and the area under cultivation remained constant in the second half of the 1950s, grain production (wheat, barley, and rice) increased from an average of 3 million tons in 1952 to 4.6 million tons in 1959. Much of the agricultural surge came from the adoption of intensive farming – increased use of pesticide, fertilizers, and modern machinery.⁶³

Conditions in industry and infrastructure were also promising. Iran experienced a slow but steady industrialization with an average of 300,000 workers employed in the non-oil sector in the mid-1950s.⁶⁴ While the country's installed electric capacity was 200 million kw/h in 1948 (excluding AIOC's own infrastructure in southwest Iran), that figure reached 800 million kw/h ten years later (and would become 4 billion kw/h by 1967).⁶⁵

⁶¹ Frances Bostock and Geoffrey Jones, *Planning and Power in Iran: Ebtehaj and Economic Development Under the Shah* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 87-144.

⁶² For Ebtehaj's career during this period: Ali Reza Aruzi (ed.), *Khaterat-e Abolhassan Ebtehaj* [The Memoirs of Abolhassan Ebtehaj] (London: Paka, 1991), 1: 334-451.

⁶³ Table 8 and 10 in *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1956-1957: Supplement to World Economic Survey, 1957* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1958), 20, 22; Table 1 in *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1958-1959: Supplement to World Economic Survey, 1959* (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1960), 1-2.

⁶⁴ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954: Supplement to World Economic Report, 1953-54* (Reprint; New York: Kraus Reprint, 1973), 65.

⁶⁵ "Barq," *Encyclopedia Iranica*; <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/barq>; accessed 29 March 2012.

Human development was more modest: thanks to oil revenues, per capita income increased from \$85 in 1950 to \$170 by 1963.⁶⁶ While the number of students (primary, secondary, and university) increased to 1.6 million by 1960 (a 400 percent increase from 1946), nearly half of Iranian children still did not attend school; at any rate, the minority that managed to finish high school and college rarely found gainful employment.⁶⁷

These dynamics coincided with an increase in U.S. development aid to Iran. In the second half of the 1950s, the U.S. aid program enlarged from ten American advisers working on a budget of less than \$20 million in 1952 to a program of 400 experts (and another 3,800 Iranians), dispensing \$75 million in the fields of agriculture, public healthcare, and education in 1956.⁶⁸

Political instability, however, tempered many of the gains. After firing Zahedi in 1955, the Shah appointed Hossein Ala as prime minister. Trying to balance the people's need for butter with the monarch's desire for guns created a shortfall in the funds available for the second plan. In 1956, as an interdepartmental committee in the U.S. government estimated, Iran began to incur annual budget deficits of around 10 to 15 percent for the next three years.⁶⁹

Instead of changing his priorities, the Shah replaced Ala with Pahlavi-loyalist Manuchehr Eqbal in 1957. Eqbal, a self-described "household slave" of the king, did not fare any better.⁷⁰ Coupled with a bad harvest, the cost-of-living increased 35 percent from 1957 until 1960 while IMF-imposed budget cuts displeased workers: whereas Iran had witnessed only three major strikes between 1955 and 1957, 20 strikes took place in 1957-61, most of which turned violent.⁷¹

⁶⁶ "Economy in the Pahlavi Period," *Encyclopedia Iranica*, [online]; accessed 29 March 2012; available on <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-ix>. 1950 per capita income from *The Economy of Turkey*, 25.

⁶⁷ Education statistics from George B. Baldwin, *Planning and Development in Iran* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 144 and Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 208.

⁶⁸ *United States Aid Operations in Iran* (Washington: USGPO, 1956), 125.

⁶⁹ "Report of the Interdepartmental Committees on Certain U.S. Aid Programs," 3 July 1956, *FRUS* 1955-57, 12: 828-36.

⁷⁰ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 103.

⁷¹ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 421-22.

In this context, even as he paid lip service to democracy, the Shah continued to marginalize other political actors and institutions. The two political parties that came after the National Front revealed the sorry state of Iranian politics. In the late 1950s, Prime Minister Eqbal's Melliyun (National) and Asadollah Alam's Mardom (People's) provided the semblance of a two-party system for the Shah. However, unlike political groups in the 1941-53 period, Melliyun and Mardom were not independent: people frequently referred to them as "Tweedledee and Tweedledum" and the "yes" and "yes, sir" parties.⁷²

As such, Iranian politics degenerated into charades. While the Shah vetted candidates before the elections for the eighteenth and nineteenth Majles in 1954 and 1956, government officials tampered with the ballot count. As populist movements gained strength in the Middle East in the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration, which had always worried about the stability of the Shah's regime,⁷³ began to press Tehran to institute social, economic, and political reforms. A memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree in 1958 specified these reforms as improving governance, combatting corruption, reforming the tax code, and a more egalitarian land system.⁷⁴ U.S. and Iranian officials also discussed "mov[ing] Iran [toward] constitutional monarchy," an idea to which the Shah seemed receptive.⁷⁵

At first, the machinations of an Iranian general blunted the Eisenhower administration's push for reform. On 22 January 1958, Major General Valiollah Qarani, vice chief of staff of the Imperial Army, told U.S. embassy officials that he planned with about 2,000 "American

⁷² "Hezb-i Melliyun (National Party)," in John H. Lorentz, *Historical Dictionary of Iran* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007), 123.

⁷³ In October 1953, the NSC's Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) reported that while "the American condition in Iran remains more or less favorable," it admitted that "there is no hope that we can develop an adequate leader out of the [S]hah." Neilson C. Debevoise to Dr. H. S. Craig, 22 October 1953, Box 13, NSC Staff Papers, 1953-61, PSB Central Files, Eisenhower Library.

⁷⁴ "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to Secretary of State Dulles," 9 September 1958, *FRUS* 1958-1960, 12: 588-90.

⁷⁵ "Memorandum of Discussion at the 379th Meeting of the National Security Council," 18 September 1958, *FRUS* 1958-1960, 12: 592.

oriented” Iranians to form “the nucleus [of a] new government.” Qarani suggested that Secretary of State Dulles “should make a demand to the Shah [to] reign and not rule.” Otherwise, Moscow “may soon [o]verthrow [t]he [Eqbal] government and [s]elect [a] new government completely sympathetic to Russia.”⁷⁶ Qarani’s words had the markings of an impending coup.

Although U.S. diplomats allegedly ignored Qarani’s overtures, the general managed to get into trouble by complaining to the Shah about the corruption of General Teymour Bakhtiar, chief of the newly formed intelligence agency, SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Kashvar – Organization for Intelligence and National Security). Bakhtiar, in turn, brought Qarani’s efforts to the Shah’s attention. On 27 February 1958, Qarani and 38 other suspects were arrested. Although the general should have been executed, the Shah believed that he was a CIA agent; unwilling to offend Washington, he saw to it that Qarani received a light sentence.⁷⁷

The revolution in Iraq in July 1958 and the new regime’s reforms added urgency to the Shah’s situation. In August 1958, a joint national intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA, the State Department, and the Pentagon observed that “the swift and brutal overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq shocked and frightened the Shah.” “Widespread dissatisfaction in the army and in the urban population,” the estimate read, caused the Shah to “reappraise [h]is position.”⁷⁸ Once again, the United States advised the Pahlavi king to reign and not rule and to curb corruption in the bureaucracy and the royal family.

⁷⁶ “Despatch from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” Tehran, 6 February 1958, *FRUS* 1958-60, 12: 537-39.

⁷⁷ The Shah was justified in suspecting U.S. involvement: in early February 1958, the journalist Esfandiar Bozorgmehr, Qarani’s ally, had met with Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree in Athens. Furthermore, Qarani’s frequent travels to the United States as chief of army intelligence made him, together with the Iranian ambassador in Washington, Ali Amini, suspect. See “Despatch from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” Tehran, 6 February 1958, *FRUS* 1958-60, 12: 537-39. The Shah reportedly made his displeasure in very clear terms to the U.S. embassy. See “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” Washington, 28 February 1958, *FRUS* 1958-60, 12: 541-42. Also see Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, No. 4 (Nov. 1993): 625-44.

⁷⁸ “Special National Intelligence Estimate,” 26 August 1958, *FRUS*, 1958, 12: 586.

The Shah, however, had other ideas. Despite the increase in U.S. military aid in the 1950s, Iran still received less assistance than Turkey and Pakistan.⁷⁹ Tehran also lacked a security treaty with Washington. The Shah felt that neither CENTO nor the Eisenhower Doctrine – not even Ike’s personal reassurance – could protect Iran.⁸⁰ He complained to the British chargé d’affaires Sir Denis Wright that the West treated him “more like a kept woman than a wife.”⁸¹ Without a tangible security guarantee from the West or a rapprochement with the Soviets, Pahlavi feared losing the Peacock throne.

In January 1959, with the Shah’s goading, the Eqlbal cabinet began secret negotiations with the Soviets for a non-aggression pact. On 10 February, however, the Iranians suddenly withdrew from the talks after leaks emerged in the press. Religious circles and other conservatives, fearing that friendly relations with Moscow might embolden local communists, opposed the talks. Washington, too, worried about losing Iran so it granted the Shah’s decade-long wish on 5 March 1959: the U.S.-Iranian security agreement.⁸² The Soviets, enraged by another Iranian deceit similar to the oil agreement fiasco of 1946-47, issued harsh statements and broadcasted propaganda against the Pahlavi regime, encouraging Iranians to overthrow the Shah.⁸³ Khrushchev allegedly ordered a KGB team to assassinate the Iranian monarch.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ During his visit to Tehran in January 1958, Secretary Dulles observed the Shah’s displeasure on Turkey and Pakistan’s receiving greater U.S. assistance than Iran. “Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State,” 25 January 1958, *FRUS* 1958-1960, 12: 533.

⁸⁰ Eisenhower personally told the Shah in Washington in 1958 that “if any major Russian forces ever invaded Iran [i]t would be considered a major attack on the free world.” See “Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower, 30 June 1958, *FRUS* 1958-1960, 12: 567.

⁸¹ Quote from Abbas Milani, *The Shah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 227.

⁸² Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Developing Nations* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975) 294-303. The historian Homa Katouzian speculates that the Shah was still quite distrustful of the United States and that his Soviet overture was probably genuine. Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 200-1.

⁸³ On 26 March 1959, Moscow issued a stern warning that it “cannot ignore [I]ranian territory being converted into a strategic *place d’armes* of the imperialist powers against the U.S.S.R.” See “The Soviet Reaction to Bilateral Agreements Between the U.S.A., and Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan,” in Yaacov Ro’i (ed.) *From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973* (New York and Toronto: John Wiley and Sons and Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974), 312.

As economic and political uncertainty, Soviet propaganda, and unrest in the armed forces threatened Iran's fragile balance in 1959-60, the Shah reached out to opponents. He commissioned his childhood friend and confidant Asadollah Alam, the leader of the Mardom Party, to approach Khalil Maleki, an ally of Mosaddeq. The Alam-Maleki talks soon included the Shah himself, who reassured Maleki that, if the National Front would respect his kingship and control over the armed forces, he would not interfere in the elections for the twentieth Majles.⁸⁵

The U.S. State Department was initially optimistic about the Shah's attempts to reconcile with the opposition. A background paper in November 1959 welcomed the Shah's overtures yet still warned that "most reform is more apparent than real, at least so far as the general populace is concerned."⁸⁶ When Eisenhower visited Iran the following month, he encouraged the Shah to focus on governance and land reform, not military build-up. At his address to the Iranian Majles, Ike reiterated that theme: "military strength alone," he warned, "will not bring about peace and justice." "The spiritual and economic health of the free world must be likewise strengthened."⁸⁷

But the attempt to establish political and economic equilibrium in Iran soon ran aground. The Majles passed an ineffective land reform bill that allowed landowners to keep large portions of their holdings. Meanwhile, many National Front activists refused to deal with Alam or the Shah. Before the term of the nineteenth Majles ended in the summer of 1960, they created the Second National Front. At the Front's inaugural rallies at the Jalaliyeh racetrack in Tehran, when

⁸⁴ Milani, *The Shah*, 229. For the Soviet-Iranian non-aggressions talks, see Roham Alvandi, "Flirting With Neutrality: The Shah, Khrushchev, and the Failed 1959 Soviet-Iranian Negotiations," *Iranian Studies* 47, No. 3 (May 2014): 419-40.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 238-9.

⁸⁶ "Political-Economic Situation in Iran – Background Paper," 16 November 1959, Box 20, Subject Files Relating to Iran, 1956-1959, Lot 61D260, RG 59, NARA.

⁸⁷ "Address to the Members of the Parliament of Iran," 14 December 1959, *APP*; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11624>, accessed 29 December 2013.

one of the speakers mentioned Mosaddeq's name, the crowd called for the 78-year-old political legend to return as prime minister.⁸⁸

The Shah imprisoned leading members of the Second National Front and reneged on his pledges about free and fair elections for the twentieth Majles. On 31 August 1960, Eqbal resigned and the former technocrat and cabinet minister Jafar Sharif-Emami became prime minister. Despite the Shah's renewed calls for free and fair elections, misconduct marred the next poll, too. Tens of thousands of teachers and students took to the streets when the twentieth Majles opened on 21 February 1961. Sharif-Emami resigned on 5 May 1961.⁸⁹

After the 1953 coup, the Eisenhower administration tried to get the Shah to institute social, economic, and political reform. Though Iran saw improvements in infrastructure and human development, its political institutions became less functional because the Qarani affair, as well as revolutions and coups in neighboring countries, made the Shah hesitant regarding reform.⁹⁰ Pahlavi's insecurities barred him from working with independent-minded subordinates such as Fazlollah Zahedi and made him more comfortable with the likes of Manuchehr Eqqal. As the Shah put it in 1957, Iran's modernization would be safer if he was "the fountainhead of all authority."⁹¹ After 1961, Kennedy would try to change the Iranian monarch's mind.

"Let Us Begin": Modernization Theory and the Kennedy Administration

The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations deemed helping the developing world as critical to U.S. global interests because they drew their ideas from the same institutions and

⁸⁸ Milani, *The Shah*, 263-66.

⁸⁹ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 422.

⁹⁰ One biographer argues that the Shah's 1953 standoff with Mosaddeq taught him that anyone who could help to develop Iran could seek power at his expense: Afkhami, *The Life and Times of the Shah*, 187.

⁹¹ Milani, *The Shah*, 204.

experts that advocated greater U.S. involvement in development at home and abroad.⁹² Two economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, brought modernization into discussions on U.S. foreign policy. In 1952, with \$850,000 in “seed” money from the Ford Foundation, Rostow and Millikan founded the Center for International Studies at MIT.⁹³ In a study originally presented to CIA Director Allen Dulles, they argued for “a much-expanded program of American participation in the [d]evelopment of [u]nderdeveloped areas” to become “one of the most important [p]urposes of American foreign policy.”⁹⁴

Rostow’s subsequent service in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations invites a closer look at his background. Since his undergraduate days at Yale University in the 1930s, Rostow had struggled to find a response to Karl Marx, which culminated in his influential 1960 book, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*.⁹⁵ Rostow diagnosed communism as “a disease of transition” for developing nations passing from the “traditional” past to the “modern” present. Developing countries had “to organize [and] get on with the job of modernization” to avoid the pitfalls of communism.⁹⁶

But what did “modern” mean? In 1962, the American sociologist Edward Shils wrote thus: “Modernity entails democracy, and democracy in the new states, even where it is not representative, must above all be egalitarian.” Furthermore, Shils said,

⁹² Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 177. For a more nuanced discussion on the genesis of modernization theory, see Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1-61.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁹⁴ Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (Reprint; New York: Harper, 1957), 1.

⁹⁵ Walt W. Rostow, “Development: The Political Economy of the Marshallian Long Period,” in *Pioneers in Development*, ed. P.T. Bauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 229.

⁹⁶ Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 162-67. Rostow’s influential book was partially based on his earlier study titled *The Process of Economic Growth* (New York: Norton, 1953). For a critical assessment of Rostow’s intellectual evolution and later service in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, see David Milne, *America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2008).

[N]o country is modern unless it is economically advanced or progressive. To be advanced economically means to be industrialized and to have a high standard of living. No country can aspire to modernity and ignore its economic improvement.

[M]odernity demands universal public education and equality of access to opportunities for entering into the more influential and better-rewarded positions with which even an egalitarian regime cannot dispense.

Just like the West, developing nations had to democratize, industrialize, secularize, and rationalize.⁹⁷ To that end, they would have to discard many of their traditions.⁹⁸

Proponents of modernization theory perceived the Middle East along similar lines. In a widely read book sponsored by MIT's CENIS, the sociologist Daniel Lerner contended that "Islam is absolutely defenseless" against the "infusion of a rationalist and positivist spirit" from the West. "Everywhere," said Lerner, "increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting)." This Western template reappeared "in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, [and] creed."⁹⁹

In general, modernization theorists shared similar ideals with earlier U.S. leaders who crafted the New Deal, the Marshall Plan, and Point Four. Thinkers such as Gunnar Myrdal, Alexander Gerschenkron, and John Kenneth Galbraith advocated "democratic planning" for

⁹⁷ Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1962), 8-11. The historian Nils Gilman argues that Shils had expressed a similar definition at a conference in 1959. See Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 1-2.

⁹⁸ See, for example, Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Modernization in Japan and Turkey," *The American Journal of Sociology* 64, no. 1 (Jul., 1958): 1-5. Bellah's 1958 article is especially interesting because it contained his early ideas on his better-known work on "civil religion" in the United States: Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 96, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 1-21.

⁹⁹ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, paperback ed. (New York: Free Press, 1964), 45-46. Another influential name was the Belgian scholar Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, who wrote in 1955 that "the disorder and poverty which rage in the Middle East, [s]eem incapable of being remedied except by a [g]eneral modernization of these countries." Faced against modernity, Islam would "founder." Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, "How Does Islam Stand?" in Gustave von Grunebaum (ed.) *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 3-4.

developing countries that lacked the legal and physical infrastructure for a mature market economy. Through central plans, governments in those countries would set social and economic priorities and allocate resources. Once a developing country built its infrastructure and markets, the private sector would assume a greater role. A free economy, combined with moderate state control, could alleviate poverty, reduce misery, and resist communism.¹⁰⁰ Other scholars hoped that the United States could help developing nations in building those institutions.¹⁰¹

In parallel with the efforts of scholars and the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s, some members of Congress pushed for increased U.S. aid to allied as well as non-aligned nations. John F. Kennedy, a young Democratic senator from Massachusetts, was a leading member of this group.¹⁰² When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, Walt Rostow inserted his terminology into the Democratic candidate's talking points and even coined some of his most catchy slogans such as "Let's Get America Moving Again" and "New Frontier."¹⁰³ Kennedy peppered his speeches with "points of economic take-off" and "stages of growth" while emphasizing the need for extending democracy and prosperity at home and abroad.¹⁰⁴

Kennedy's inaugural address as president on 20 January 1961 built on his campaign themes. Kennedy pledged to "peoples in the huts and villages across the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery [o]ur best efforts to help them help themselves." Echoing Truman's

¹⁰⁰ Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (New York: Praeger Press, 1965); Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity* (New York: Harper, 1958); John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958).

¹⁰¹ The political scientist Gabriel Almond argued that the United States [should] concern itself with the development of [p]olitical and organizational skills which make possible a more equitable distribution of welfare [in the recipient countries]. Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), ix.

¹⁰² For example, Kennedy introduced a resolution with Sen. John S. Cooper (R-KY) on 25 March 1958 that recognized the importance of India's economic development "to democratic values and [s]tability in the world." With "nearly 40 percent of all the free peoples of the uncommitted world," Kennedy warn, "India's would not mean well for the non-communist camp. U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 85th Congress, 2nd sess., vol. 104, pt. 4 (Washington: USGPO, 1958), 5252-3. For an extended discussion on the Kennedy-Cooper initiative, see Walt W. Rostow, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 3-12.

¹⁰³ Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 191-94.

¹⁰⁴ Haefele, "Walt Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth," 83-84; Westad, *Global Cold War*, 27.

Point Four speech in 1949, Kennedy promised newly independent states in Asia and Africa that “one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny.” The new president then gave his time-frame: “All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first thousand days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin.”¹⁰⁵

Once in office, Kennedy and his subordinates began a review of U.S. foreign aid. The new program aimed to phase out military assistance, consolidate all economic and technical aid activity under one agency, and improve coordination with other industrialized nations.¹⁰⁶ On 22 March 1961, Kennedy sent his foreign aid bill to Congress and called for the 1960s to become “the Decade of Development, [a] period when many less-developed nations make the transition into self-sustained growth [and] [a]n enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations can reduce world tensions.” Furthermore, Kennedy said, “the economic programs I am recommending [c]annot succeed without peace and order.” Military strength would protect the political stability and territorial integrity of developing nations against insurgents. Only then could communist overtures in the Third World be blunted.¹⁰⁷

In September 1961, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act. International aid (military and civilian) increased from \$2.5 billion to \$4 billion as Kennedy had requested.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ “Inaugural Address,” *Public Papers of President John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington: USGPO, 1962), 1-3.

¹⁰⁶ The following work captures those two months very nicely: Edward W. Weidner, *Prelude to Reorganization: The Kennedy Foreign Aid Message of March 22, 1961* (Syracuse: The Inter-University Case Program, 1969).

¹⁰⁷ “Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid,” *APP*; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8545>; accessed 9 December 2013.

¹⁰⁸ Even at the “heyday” of the Decade of Development, foreign aid cost a fraction of national defense, which took 63 percent of the approximately \$100 billion budget in fiscal year 1962. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1963* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), 387-89.

Importantly, for the first time since the Marshall Plan, the United States spent more on foreign development than military aid. By 1965, U.S. foreign aid would reach a total of \$8 billion.¹⁰⁹

In the 1950s, modernization theorists turned the idea of the U.S. government playing an active role in the developing world into the foreign policy ideology and Cold War strategy of the United States. Scholars such as Rostow and Galbraith entered government service during the Kennedy years.¹¹⁰ To fight the Cold War, the Kennedy administration inherited the ideas and policies of its predecessors and brought in prominent modernization theorists to implement them. While U.S. policy toward Turkey would succeed, it would obtain mixed results in Iran.

Old and New Frontiers in Ankara

In promoting social, economic, and political reform in Turkey and Iran, Kennedy and his subordinates hoped that, once the two countries could finance their own modernization, they would not be “lost” to neutralism or communism and that they could balance Soviet influence in the Middle East.¹¹¹ Washington tried to keep Ankara in the Western alliance by preventing the NUC (or another junta) from becoming permanent and by facilitating the return to democracy. Washington also encouraged Ankara to adopt planned development.

In many respects, the Kennedy administration continued its predecessors’ Turkish policy. On 11 June 1960, Eisenhower wrote a letter to Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the NUC junta, and praised the Turkish general’s “expressed determination to hold elections and to turn over the government [t]o the newly-elected authorities.” “It is the deep hope of all of us,” Ike continued, “that [e]lections and the new constitution [w]ill mark another milestone in the development of

¹⁰⁹ Haefele, “Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth,” 81. 1965 foreign aid budget from Rostow, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid*, 175.

¹¹⁰ Rostow briefly worked as deputy national security adviser under Kennedy and assumed the State Department’s policy planning staff in 1961. In 1966, he moved back into the White House as Johnson’s national security adviser. Galbraith served as the U.S. ambassador to India from 1961 until 1963.

¹¹¹ See Rostow to Kennedy, Washington, February 28, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 9: 204-9.

democracy in Turkey.”¹¹² To sustain Turkey’s transition back to democracy and preserve U.S. influence in Ankara, the Eisenhower administration released TL52 million (\$5.2 million) from its local currency deposits a week after the coup and, for the rest of 1960, expended a majority of its aid commitments to the NATO ally without stringent preconditions.¹¹³

Washington prevented Ankara from sliding into neutralism or the Soviet side. This fear was not imaginary: despite the debt reorganization agreement in 1958, the Turkish state still had balance of payment problems; after the 1960 coup, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, hoping to take advantage of Turkey’s weakness, offered an interest-free loan worth \$500 million. Meanwhile, Radio Moscow waxed lyrical about the “27 May Revolution” and encouraged Ankara to abandon NATO and CENTO.¹¹⁴ The Kennedy administration had little choice but to continue assisting Turkey: on top of \$90 million in military grants in 1961, it provided Ankara with \$25 million worth of excess grain, \$4.3 million in technical assistance, and another \$117.3 million for the construction of a steel mill on the Black Sea town of Ereğli.¹¹⁵ Kennedy also asked such allies as the West Germans to support Ankara.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile, the NUC formed the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT) in September 1960. Headed by an army colonel and staffed by young experts, the DPT began working on Turkey’s First Five-Year Plan. The planners hoped to end their country’s dependence on foreign aid by changing its socioeconomic dynamics: they aimed to expand public

¹¹² Eisenhower to Gürsel, Washington, June 11, 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, 10: 850.

¹¹³ “Political-Economic Situation in Turkey,” 17 April 1961, Box 4, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, RG 59, NARA.

¹¹⁴ The NUC itself used the word “revolution” (*devrim*) because it recalled Atatürk’s reforms. The Soviet aid offer, although quite likely exaggerated, came from U.S. ambassador Warren: Warren to Washington, Ankara, 11 August 1960, *FRUS* 1958-1960, 10: 875.

¹¹⁵ “Political-Economic Situation in Turkey,” 17 April 1961, Box 4, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, RG 59, NARA.

¹¹⁶ In his meeting with West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano on 13 April 1961, Kennedy asked Bonn to help Ankara. The West Germans agreed to extend DM100 million (\$25 million) to the Turks in the 1961-62 fiscal year and began working on a long-term, low-interest loan for infrastructure projects. See “Memorandum of Conversation,” Washington, April 13, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 9: 233-35.

healthcare and education, levy a land tax that would prevent large farms from sitting idly (thus boost production and lower food prices), institute a progressive income tax, and make state-owned enterprises profitable. As we shall see in the next chapter, the plan would succeed in many of these aims.¹¹⁷ The Kennedy administration welcomed the DPT initiative.¹¹⁸

Together with its economy, Turkey was also reorganizing its politics: after a popular referendum approved the NUC-endorsed constitution, the parliamentary elections in October 1961 produced a divided TBMM (now a bicameral body with a senate) where no party had a majority. Gürsel became president and NUC members entered the TBMM under the dubious title of “natural senator” (*doğal senator*). To prevent future parties from dominating the judiciary and legislature like the DP did in the 1950s, the 1961 constitution created a constitutional court.¹¹⁹

Although the new regime would survive through 1980, it did not bring stability. Until late 1964, several coalition governments led by İsmet İnönü’s CHP ruled Turkey, which displeased the more radical officers in the armed forces. These disgruntled officers saw İnönü and his insistence on maintaining parliamentary democracy as an impediment to modernization. Talk of another coup became rife once again.¹²⁰ Jeffrey Kitchen, assistant secretary of state for military-political affairs, worried that “if the [new] political system [d]oes not succeed, the military might again intervene forcefully with the consequent risk of revolution and dictatorship.”¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Fahri Aral (ed.), *Planlı Kalkınma Serüveni: 1960’larda Türkiye’de Planlama Deneyimi* [The Planned Development Adventure: Turkey’s Planning Experience in the 1960s] (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003), 1-5.

¹¹⁸ On 27 December 1961, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, deputy assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs, wrote a memorandum that was widely circulated among the national security establishment in Washington. Of the \$12 billion that Turkey needed for the five-year plan, Kitchen estimated that the United States could furnish about \$600 million and the rest of Ankara’s foreign financing could come from the OECD and the World Bank. Kitchen to Rusk and McNamara, Washington, December 27, 1961, Item no. CC00125, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, Digital National Security Archive, National Security Archive, George Washington University [hereafter DNSA-NSA].

¹¹⁹ Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 311-12.

¹²⁰ See, for example, the May 1961 telegram from the U.S. military attaché: USAIRA Turkey to Secretary of State, Ankara, 31 May 1961, Box 2039, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

¹²¹ Kitchen to Rusk and McNamara, Washington, December 27, 1961, Item no. CC00125, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, DNSA-NSA.

A major problem in keeping Turkey democratic and stable was the fate of former DP leaders. Although the 27 May junta exiled its most anti-democratic members in November 1960, many active-duty officers still wanted DP leaders to be executed. To avoid capital punishment, the new U.S. ambassador, Raymond A. Hare, pressed Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper.¹²² Aside from a backlash in the U.S. Congress, Hare worried that disgruntled DP supporters could start a civil war if any Democrat leader were executed.¹²³

Although the anticipated civil unrest did not occur after the execution of Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan on 16-17 September 1961, Turkey did experience two coup attempts in 1962 and 1963.¹²⁴ On 22 February 1962, cadets from the Military Academy (Kara Harp Okulu), led by their commandant, Colonel Talat Aydemir, took up arms against the İnönü government for allegedly betraying the “May 27 revolution” and Atatürk’s legacy. Pro-government units quickly crushed the rebellion. A second coup attempt on 20 May 1963, also spearheaded by the rogue colonel, failed as well.¹²⁵

Although it is not clear what role, if any, U.S. intelligence played in thwarting Colonel Aydemir and his collaborators, it is important to note that unlike the 1960 coup, the CIA station in Ankara seems to have had advance knowledge about both “the 22 February and 20 May incidents.” According to CIA reports from the field, both attempts had tacit support from the

¹²² Hare’s report on his talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper in Hare to Washington, Ankara, April 4, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 694.

¹²³ Hare to Washington, 2 September 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 707-8.

¹²⁴ Hare to Washington, 15 September 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 709-10. President Celal Bayar’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment because of old age. Bayar, who was 78 in 1961, was released in 1963, and he would live to be 103.

¹²⁵ The following works by the plotters and their relatives provide useful insight about them: Talat Aydemir, *Talat Aydemir’in Hatıraları* [The Memoirs of Talat Aydemir] (İstanbul: Kitapçılık, 1968); Osman Deniz, *Harbiyeli Aldanmaz* [The Cadet Cannot Be Fooled] (İstanbul : Yapı Kredi, 2002); Öner Gürcan, *Ben İhtilalciyim: 27 Mayıs 1960, 22 Şubat 1962, 21 Mayıs 1963 ve Sonrası* [I am a Revolutionary: 27 May 1960, 22 February 1962, 21 May 1963 and the Aftermath] (Ankara: Süvari, 2005).

commanders of the land, air, and naval forces, as well as other officers serving at critical posts such as the presidential guard regiment and some former NUC members in the Senate.¹²⁶

From January 1961 until President Kennedy's tragic assassination on 22 November 1963, the U.S. government succeeded in all three of its objectives for Turkey: it prevented the NATO ally's potential drift from the West, backed planned development, and supported the return to democracy. From 1964 onward, Ankara would become economically much stronger and more autonomous from Washington.

Turkey's Transition from Pro-American to U.S.-Skeptic

The connection between the U.S.-Turkish alliance, pro-Americanism, and Turkey's modernization played out conspicuously in the 1954 general election. In December 1953, Edward Waggoner, the U.S. consul in İzmir, reported that local DP officials flaunted the Menderes government's connections with Washington to discredit opponents. İzmir Democrats claimed how "U.S. aid to Turkey [would] be immediately discontinued" if the CHP won the election. Waggoner noted the irony: it was İnönü and the CHP, not Menderes and his DP, that had initiated good relations with the United States and large-scale U.S. assistance in 1947.¹²⁷

Despite the ruling party's boasts about its U.S. connection, pro-Americanism in Turkey actually began to subside in the mid-1950s. While the DP guaranteed U.S. aid and, thus, development, members of the CHP's İzmir branch were criticizing U.S. military personnel for "treating Turkey as if it were an American colony [and acting toward] local citizens [a]s the

¹²⁶ "Turkish Internal Situation," 19 January 1962, Box 167, National Security Files [hereafter NSF], Countries, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library [hereafter JFK Library]; "Completion of Plans for a Military Takeover," 5 October 1962, Box 167, NSF, Countries, JFK Library.

¹²⁷ Edward L. Waggoner, "İzmir Monthly Political Report for October 1953," 11 December 1953, Box 4064, CDF 50-54, RG 59, NARA.

British behave toward their colonial subjects.”¹²⁸ Indeed, an incident during Turkish Republic Day on 29 October 1954 revealed growing tensions. Four intoxicated U.S. airmen serving at the NATO airbase in İzmir tore down a Turkish flag.¹²⁹ Anti-U.S. sentiments suddenly boomed in the Aegean city, which Consul Waggoner related to “resentment among Turks of all classes [o]f the evident prosperity of the American military [a]nd the occasional ill-considered behavior of the Americans.” Waggoner agreed with the local police chief’s analysis that “the average Turk is still basically xenophobic and the recent close and friendly relations [b]etween Turkey and the United States have not [d]iminished this xenophobia.”¹³⁰

As strategic relations between Washington and Ankara grew in the 1950s, the number of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Turkey increased. More Americans in Turkey meant a higher probability of fights between the visitors and the locals over important matters such as obeying local customs and laws or more mundane ones such as the cost of a cab ride. It is important to note, however, that although such stories found coverage in the Turkish press for a few days, they usually faded away. Long-term dynamics and not individual events led to the decline of pro-Americanism in Turkey in the 1950s.

Just as the United States had received credit for helping Turkey’s defense and development in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it received part of the blame when things went bad after the mid-1950s. One reason why pro-U.S. sentiments in Turkey cooled down had to do with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’s overreliance on U.S. aid. Although U.S. assistance was critical in helping Turkey in the 1940s and early 1950s, it also fueled the Turkish prime

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ “İzmir’de 4 Amerikalı çavuşun küstahlığı” [The Arrogance of 4 American Sergeants in İzmir], *Hürriyet*, 31 October 1954.

¹³⁰ Edward L. Waggoner, “İzmir Monthly Political Report for October 1954,” 3 December 1954, Box 4064, CDF 50-54, RG 59, NARA. Desecration of the national flag has always been a major social taboo in Turkey.

minister's desire to develop his country rapidly, an ambition that led to economic instability and strengthened the critics of the DP government.

The articles on the biweekly journal *Forum* reflected this phenomenon. *Forum* started in 1954 as a medium for public intellectuals to discuss national and global issues. Its stellar cast of contributors, which included future CHP chairman and prime minister Bülent Ecevit, the sociologist Şerif Mardin, and Erdal İnönü (a Caltech-educated physicist and son of the former president), found much to dislike about the DP government. As Turkey's most widely circulated periodical during the 1950s, *Forum* frequently commented on development and Ankara's relations with Washington.

One of *Forum*'s first editorials against the Menderes government read as follows: "It is safe to argue that the party in power [c]onsiders economic planning the same as socialism and is taking a mistaken and ruinous path."¹³¹ The economist Osman Okyar (a student of John Maynard Keynes at Cambridge and a harsh critic of the Soviet model of development) noted the DP's failure in instituting a liberal economic model in Turkey. Echoing "democratic planners" such as Myrdal and Galbraith, Okyar reminded the government to use state resources in a more rational way. He called on DP to abandon its exorbitant farm subsidies and ambitious yet aimless investments because they "made it impossible for the market mechanism to operate freely."¹³²

When discussing U.S. policy toward Turkey, especially its presumed support for the DP, *Forum* contributors appeared cautious. After returning from a U.S. trip sponsored by the State Department and the Rockefeller Foundation in fall 1954, the journal's editor-in-chief, Aydın Yalçın, discussed Turkey's need "to fully adapt itself to the spiritual sources that tie us to our

¹³¹ "Seçimlerde Esas Konu: İktisadi Mesele," [The Real Issue in the Elections: The Economic Question] *Forum* 1, No. 3 (27 April 1954): 2.

¹³² Osman Okyar, "Türkiye'de Liberalizm ve Devletçilik" [Liberalism and Statism in Turkey] *Forum* 1, No. 8 (15 July 1954): 8.

allies in the Atlantic Pact and the American nation leading it.” Yalçın seemed generally sympathetic to Washington and critical of the DP’s authoritarianism. He stated that “only through a sincere belief in liberty and democracy and determination to improve [those ideals] can we become a true NATO member.” On the other hand, Yalçın also hoped that the U.S. government would do more to rein in the Menderes administration.¹³³

Indeed, unlike the 1940s, when Turkish newspapers waxed lyrical about Washington at one moment only to accuse it of stinginess the next, *Forum* contributors had a calm approach on the question of U.S. aid. More often than not, they blamed their own government when Washington refused assistance requests. In 1955-56, when the Eisenhower administration turned down Menderes’s incessant appeals for more aid, *Forum* articles discussed how a development plan could decrease Turkey’s need for foreign assistance.¹³⁴ Others, such as an editorial in February 1956, argued that had the DP implemented a development plan, “it would be unthinkable for our American friends to turn their backs on their most loyal friend and ally while they invest hundreds of millions in other lands.”¹³⁵

But even more so than in the 1940s and early 1950s, Turks did not hold exclusively positive views of the United States, especially when their country’s vital interests were at stake. For example, in April 1954, when the Eisenhower administration suggested that the DP government revise Turkey’s petroleum laws to make extraction and refinery operations more lucrative for foreign companies, two *Forum* editorials criticized the U.S. input. On the one hand, the articles argued that international oil giants would undermine Turkey’s own companies. The

¹³³ Aydın Yalçın, “Amerika ve Hür Dünya Liderliği” [America and Leadership of the Free World], *Forum* 1, No. 15 (1 November 1954): 8.

¹³⁴ İsmail Türk, “Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları ve Türkiye” [American Economic Aid and Turkey] *Forum* 3, No. 28 (15 May 1955); “Kendimize Güvenme Zamanı” [Time to Trust Ourselves], *Forum* 3, No. 31 (1 July 1955); “Dış Yardımsız Kalkınma” [Development Without Foreign Aid], *Forum* 3, No. 36 (15 September 1955).

¹³⁵ “Amerikadan Yardım Meselesi” [The Question of Aid from America] *Forum* 4, No. 46 (15 February 1956).

Forum editorials also worried that, if foreign enterprises extracted Turkey's oil, they could sell the refined products to Turkish consumers at high prices and repatriate their profits, much like U.S. petroleum companies did in other countries. Although the unidentified authors denied that they were anti-U.S. in any way, they were clearly not pro-U.S.¹³⁶

Pro-Americanism in Turkey was nonetheless alive and well in the late 1950s. Despite CHP officials' occasional criticism of U.S. military personnel stationed in Turkey, CHP chairman İnönü made a point of sending congratulatory letters to U.S. ambassadors in Ankara on the anniversaries of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. "I hope," İnönü's July 1958 note read, "the ties of friendship between the friendly and allied great American Nation and our Nation will continue to be strengthened further."¹³⁷ Other influential Turks also expressed positive sentiments toward the United States. The labor union leader Burhanettin Asutay, who was among the founders of the Confederation of Labor Syndicates of Turkey (Türk-İş), wrote a book following his trip to the United States in 1961. Asutay's choice of title, *Turkey Can Become Another America*, gave a clear idea about how the United States continued to appeal to Turkish people as a successful model for development.¹³⁸

It is important to note that, as elsewhere, the U.S. government played an active role in generating such positive publicity for the United States in Turkey. For example, U.S. labor experts helped their Turkish counterparts during the formation of Türk-İş in the early 1950s.¹³⁹ Aside from long-term academic exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, the State Department

¹³⁶ "Petrol Kanunu" [Petroleum Law] and "Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri ve Yanlış Tefsir" [Turkish-American Relations and an Erroneous Interpretation] *Forum* 1, No. 1 (1 April 1954).

¹³⁷ İnönü's letter enclosed to John Goodyear to Washington, 17 July 1958, Box 1, SF-Turkey, 47-58, RG 59, NARA.

¹³⁸ Burhanettin Asutay, *Türkiye de Bir Amerika Olabilir* [Turkey Could Also Become Another America] (İzmir: İstiklal, 1961).

¹³⁹ Sera Öner, "Labor in U.S. Foreign Policy During the Early Cold War: The Marshall Plan and American-Turkish Relations, 1945-1955" (M.A. thesis; Bilkent University, 2006).

sponsored short-term visits to facilitate exchanges between Turkish and American bureaucrats, businessmen, and students.

Publicity efforts targeted ordinary Turks, too. The U.S. Information Service (USIS), in partnership with the Turkish State Railways, transported films in a railroad car to screen documentaries with titles such “Visit to USA,” “Missiles,” and “Atoms in the Service of Humanity” to Turkish townsfolk. It is not certain whether the 600,000 viewers who saw the USIS films from July through November 1959 did so because they liked the United States or because they had nothing better to do. But their interest in the American way of life certainly suggested that elite pro-Americanism in Turkey resonated at the grass-roots level.¹⁴⁰

Turkish travelogues and observational pieces on the United States, too, showed greater nuance in the 1955-63 period than their counterparts at the onset of the Cold War. Beyond Hollywood, the shiny cities, and large factories, Turkish travelers now sought to understand small-town America and its social values. One young İstanbuler raised in a fairly secular family was surprised by the average American’s religiosity and patriotism.¹⁴¹

Another Turkish intellectual tried to inject a greater dose of realism into her compatriots’ perceptions of the United States. The veteran political activist and novelist Halide Edib Adivar, who was educated at the Üsküdar American Academy in İstanbul, had traveled extensively in the United States in the 1930s, and served as a DP deputy in 1950-54, criticized her fellow Turks – especially her former colleagues in the National Assembly – for trying to imitate all things American. According to Adivar, Turks missed the point about the United States. She argued that it was constitutional and democratic government that ushered America’s material well-being, not

¹⁴⁰ USIS İstanbul to USIA Washington, 30 November 1959, Box 2, Office of Near East and South Asia Operations, Greece, Turkey, and Iran Division, Turkey Desk Decimal Files 1955-60, Record Group 469 – Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61 (hereafter RG 469), NARA.

¹⁴¹ Özkul Akın, *Amerika’yı Tanımak İstedim* [I Wanted to Get to Know America] (İstanbul, 1957).

the other way around. If Turkey, she said, could also ascribe a “sacred” meaning to its constitution and democratic principles, it had a chance to attain America’s prosperity.¹⁴²

This nuanced and realistic understanding of the United States reflected on Turkish decision-makers after the coup of 27 May 1960. Although the NUC junta declared its commitment to the West after assuming power, it was clearly not as pro-U.S. as Turkish leaders in the late 1940s and early 1950s. On the one hand, the junta was staunchly anti-communist and highly suspicious of Soviet designs on Turkey. Thus, its members saw the United States and NATO as beneficial to Turkish security. On the other hand, the junta also perceived Turkey’s strict adherence to the West as detrimental to its economic and strategic interests. An August 1960 intelligence report prepared at the State Department pointed out that NUC members and many active-duty officers had come to resent “Menderes’s subservience to foreigners.” “These elements,” continued the report, “may be expected to challenge and examine many details of the operation of Turkey’s alliances, which Menderes did not allow to be questioned.”¹⁴³

Although Menderes was hardly “subservient” to anyone, he did damage U.S.-Turkish relations. On the one hand, junior-level U.S. diplomats dealt with complaints from anti-DP Turks about Washington’s support for the authoritarian ruling party. Daniel Oliver Newberry, who served as an economic-commercial officer at the U.S. consulate in İstanbul in the late 1950s, recalls that the United States was “tarred with the same brush” as the DP and seen as not “only condoning but encouraging Menderes to abuse his power.”¹⁴⁴ Menderes’s close friendship with Ambassador Fletcher Warren harmed U.S. interests, too: the May 1960 coup took the U.S. embassy by surprise. Newberry relates that Ambassador Warren “did not want his ‘constituent

¹⁴² Halide Edib Adivar, *Türkiye’de Şark, Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri* [Eastern, Western, and American Influences in Turkey] (İstanbul, 1955).

¹⁴³ INR to the Acting Secretary, 16 August 1960, Box 2040, CDF 60-63, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴⁴ Rifat N. Bali (ed.) *American Diplomats in Turkey: Oral History Transcripts (1928-1997)* (İstanbul: Libra, 2011, 1: 101.

posts' reporting things against [M]enderes" and even prevented the junior diplomat's report on impending coup plans by İstanbul-based military units from reaching Washington.¹⁴⁵

Although the Eisenhower administration worked with Menderes rather than support him outright, the view from Turkey was different. The NUC junta and other anti-DP factions interpreted Menderes and his government's decisions (especially their economic policies and alleged kowtowing to religious voters) as an impediment to Turkey's modernization. Although nobody explicitly drew the conclusion that Washington wanted to keep Turkey backward, the post-1960 political and intellectual elite did become more skeptical of the United States. For example, they wondered whether İncirlik Air Force Base was a U.S. or Turkish facility. Rumors circulated that the base had hosted U-2 spy planes flying over the Soviet Union, including the one commanded by Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960. Some columnists wanted Turkish courts to have jurisdiction over NATO personnel in Turkey.¹⁴⁶ Some observers, unlike those who had found fault in DP leaders for the U.S. refusal in increasing aid to Ankara, demanded to know why Turkey received less aid from its U.S. ally than nonaligned India.¹⁴⁷

Turkey's transition from pro-U.S. to U.S.-skeptic accelerated after the transition to democracy in the fall of 1961. One problem was the status of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. From April to June 1961, the Kennedy administration tried to convince Ankara that NATO interests would be better served with Polaris submarines. Unlike the Jupiters, ballistic missile submarines would not invite a Soviet first-strike on Turkey.¹⁴⁸ But because Turkish leaders saw the missiles both as a deterrent against the Soviet Union and a symbol of a modern military, they

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 1: 103. Although other U.S. diplomats posted to Turkey around that time do not necessarily blame Warren's friendship with Menderes, they do agree that the May 1960 coup caught them off-guard. See, for example, the interview with William A. Helseth, who served as political officer in Ankara in 1957-60. Ibid., 1: 210-22.

¹⁴⁶ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Amerika'yla İki Meselemiz Var" [We Have Two Problems with America], *Ulus*, 24 November 1960.

¹⁴⁷ "Hindistan'a Yardım Kulübü ve Türkiye" [India Aid Club and Turkey], *Hürriyet*, 11 June 1961.

¹⁴⁸ Norstad to McNamara, 20 April 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 697-9; Paris to Washington, 14 May 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 700.

resisted Washington's suggestion. Not even U.S. promises to supply additional conventional arms had an effect.¹⁴⁹ Coupled with the political uncertainties in the aftermath of Kennedy's stormy meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, the Jupiters stayed in Turkey.

The discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba on 14 October 1962 changed the Kennedy administration's calculus and, subsequently, Turkish decision-makers' perceptions of the United States. After Kennedy announced the presence of the missiles in Cuba and threatened military action unless they were removed, Khrushchev demanded the withdrawal of Turkish missiles. After the U.S. blockade of Cuba and nerve-racking deliberations between the two sides, Washington began to remove its missiles from Turkey and pledged not to invade Cuba in return for the removal of Soviet missiles in the Caribbean nation.¹⁵⁰

Ankara suspected Washington of trading the Jupiters for the Soviet missiles in Cuba, which offended them: Turkish officials resented being equated with the communist regime in Havana – unlike Castro, they said, they were not “puppets.”¹⁵¹ Although Turkish military officers and diplomats jokingly asked their American counterparts to let them carry out a preemptive strike against the Soviets in the 1950s,¹⁵² they had welcomed the U.S. nuclear deterrent and took it seriously. The apparent trade-off between the United States and the Soviet Union revealed that Washington might ignore Ankara's concerns when it suited their interests. Still, it was a

¹⁴⁹ Washington to London, April 20, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 696.

¹⁵⁰ On the Cuban missile crisis, see James G. Hershberg, “The Cuban Missile Crisis” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2: 65-87; Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 151-57; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); Barton J. Bernstein, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?” *Political Science Quarterly* 95, No. 1 (Spring 1980): 97-125.

¹⁵¹ Finletter to Washington, Paris, October 25, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 731.

¹⁵² See the oral history interviews with Foreign Service officers Daniel Oliver Newberry and Wilbur P. Chase in Bali (ed.), *American Diplomats in Turkey*, 121, 176-77.

testament to the absence of anti-Americanism in Turkey that Turkish decision-makers registered their disappointment to their U.S. counterparts in private.¹⁵³

In the 1955-63 period, Turkey was not visibly pro-American anymore. NATO membership gave the Turks a feeling of trust in the United States and a sense of security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. But their expectations that the U.S. alliance would miraculously solve their social and economic problems did not come to pass. Instead of blaming the United States, Turks held their own leaders responsible for their woes for much of the period: having a democratic system necessitated blaming one's own elected representatives, not a distant ally. Although aid levels and the behavior of U.S. servicemen disappointed Turks from time to time, pro-Americanism did subside but anti-Americanism did not gain strength in the 1950s.

By the early 1960s, however, the dynamics of U.S.-Turkish relations began to change. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes's mistakes, coupled with the image that he was on very good terms with Washington, alienated the Turkish military and intelligentsia, who began to question the merits of the U.S. alliance after the May 1960 coup. With the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Turkey's turn from pro-American to U.S.-skeptic was complete.

Iran: The New Frontier with an Authoritarian Flavor

In November 1963, while many of his fellow Iranians joined world citizens to mourn John F. Kennedy's tragic death, Mohammed Reza Shah did not.¹⁵⁴ From January 1961 onward, Kennedy and his subordinates insisted that the Shah should reach out to moderate politicians and

¹⁵³ See documents 380 through 394 in *FRUS*, 1961-1963, 16: 730-60.

¹⁵⁴ Upon hearing the news of Kennedy's death, the Shah allegedly helped himself to a celebratory glass of scotch: Mansur Rafizadeh, *Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal – An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1987), 124. On world reaction to Kennedy's death, see Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, xvii-xix.

institute land reform; an annoyed Pahlavi adopted Washington's proposals for socioeconomic reform but successfully resisted political liberalization.¹⁵⁵

Initially, the Shah tried to establish a good rapport with Kennedy. In early 1961, he dispatched the chief of SAVAK, General Taymour Bakhtiar, to deliver a personal letter to the U.S. president, requesting military and economic aid. Kermit Roosevelt, who had organized CIA assets in Tehran during the 1953 coup and still had good relations with the Shah, reported Bakhtiar's meeting with CIA Director Allen Dulles to the Iranian king. Upon Bakhtiar's return to Tehran in March 1961, the Shah dismissed his top spy.¹⁵⁶ What transpired between Dulles and Bakhtiar is unknown but some CIA reports in 1960-61 explicitly named Bakhtiar as "actively plotting to seize power from the Shah."¹⁵⁷

The Shah suspected that Bakhtiar was a CIA agent and that the Kennedy administration wanted to undermine his rule. Subsequent events only worsened the Shah's suspicions: As protests against Prime Minister Sharif-Emami gained steam in the spring of 1961, when 50,000 people marched in Tehran alone on 5 May, the Kennedy administration suggested that the liberal Ali Amini should form a new government. Worried about Soviet Premier Khrushchev's recent boast to the influential journalist Walter Lippman that Iran was "ripe for revolution,"¹⁵⁸ Kennedy hoped Amini would initiate the reforms that the Shah never could. On 9 May, Pahlavi dissolved the Majles and appointed Amini as prime minister.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ The Shah allegedly contributed money to the Nixon campaign before the 1960 election because he saw Kennedy's liberalism as a threat to the Pahlavi dynasty. Amir Taheri, *The Unknown Life of the Shah* (London: Hutchinson, 1991), 135-6.

¹⁵⁶ Milani, *The Shah*, 250.

¹⁵⁷ "NSC Briefing," 13 January 1960, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), Doc. No. CIA-REDP79R00890A001200010008-5, NARA. Bakhtiar went into exile in January 1962 and tried to lead an opposition group against the Shah. He was killed in Iraq by SAVAK operatives in 1967.

¹⁵⁸ Walter Lippman, *The Coming Tests with Russia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), 16.

¹⁵⁹ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 423.

The Amini cabinet had several disadvantages. It “was a coalition of lapsed communists, socialists, and independent [o]pponents of the Shah” and lacked cogency.¹⁶⁰ Worse, the Shah personally disliked Amini: he suspected that his former ambassador to Washington had taken part in the Qarani affair. That Amini was a grandson of Nasraddin Shah Qajar, and therefore a member of Iran’s old royal family, also worried the Pahlavi king.¹⁶¹

The new prime minister, however, had a few trump cards. He promised to maintain good relations with the opposition and to initiate an anticorruption drive.¹⁶² Amini also made wise personnel decisions. In order to placate teachers, many of whom had participated in the protests against Sharif-Emami, he appointed the president of Iran Teachers’ Association, Mohammed Derakhshesh, as education minister. Derakhshesh’s expansion of schools and literacy programs began to improve public education in Iran.¹⁶³

The new agriculture minister, Hasan Arsanjani, played an even more important part. Since his travels to the country-side in his youth, Arsanjani had developed an intense hatred for large landowners – a group he referred to as “reactionary sons-of-bitches.”¹⁶⁴ Seeing the land reform bill passed by the nineteenth Majles in 1960 as ineffective, Arsanjani took advantage of the dissolution of the legislature and instituted land reform through an executive decree. The new plan entailed paying a nominal fee to landowners who owned more than one village and distributing the excess land to landless villagers. As a radical reformist, Arsanjani hoped to transform Iran by improving the living standards and political power of its peasants.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ Quoted in Milani, *The Shah*, 258.

¹⁶¹ Milani, *The Shah*, 256.

¹⁶² Ali Amini, *Doktor Ali Amini Bername-ye Kar-e Khod-ro Taqdim Mikonad* [Dr. Ali Amini Presents His Program] (Tehran: n.p., 1961), 2-16.

¹⁶³ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 143

¹⁶⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*, 145.

¹⁶⁵ “Hasan Arsanjani,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/arsanjani-hasan-journalist-and-politician-1922-69>, accessed 9 December 2013.

Amini's efforts, however, came to a standstill by mid-1962. The rapid implementation of land reform and the anticorruption campaign alienated the military and landowners, two of the Shah's main backers. The maltreatment of opponents and the poor economy irritated the modern middle class – engineers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other salaried professionals – Amini's main supporters. In January 1962, when special forces units stormed the University of Tehran to suppress a student demonstration and injured dozens, Amini's political base all but vanished.

Unlike Turkey, where the Kennedy administration supported both democracy and development, political troubles in Iran and the lack of an alternative to the Shah as a stabilizing force convinced Washington to cast its lot with the Pahlavi king.¹⁶⁶ In April 1962, Kennedy hinted to the Shah during his visit to the United States that his administration would support Pahlavi provided that he could institute social and economic reform without losing control.¹⁶⁷

The Shah finally gained the upper hand. In July 1962, he fired Amini for suggesting a decrease in military spending and replaced him with the brutal but efficient Asadollah Alam. On 9 January 1963, Pahlavi announced a comprehensive modernization project, the "White Revolution" (Enqelab-e Sefid), also called the "Revolution of the Shah and the People." Two weeks later, the White Revolution passed with a blatantly rigged 99.9 percent in a popular referendum that women voted for the first time in the history of Iran. The Pahlavi state nationalized private pastures and forests and it commissioned literacy, health, and construction corps to work on public service projects across Iran. Most importantly, the regime began distributing land to peasants and shares of state-owned factories to workers (soon, private

¹⁶⁶ "Paper by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff," 20 October 1962, *FRUS* 1961-1963, 18: 189-95. On the Kennedy administration's policy toward Iran, see Victor V. Nemchenok, "In Search of Stability Amid Chaos: U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1961-1963," *Cold War History* 10 No. 3 (August 2010): 341-69; April R. Summitt, "For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran," *Middle East Journal* 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2004): 560-75.

¹⁶⁷ "Summary of Conversations Between His Imperial Majesty, the President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense," 19 April 1962, Box 116, NSF, Countries, JFK Library.

industrialists were forced to follow suit). As one historian points out, the Shah “co-opted [Kennedy’s] New Frontier” through the White Revolution.¹⁶⁸

The Shah hoped that intensive farming, together with land distribution, would make Iran self-sufficient in, if not a net exporter of, food.¹⁶⁹ Labor would be diverted to the industrial and service sectors while the state built roads, bridges, highways, railroads, power stations, schools, and hospitals. The Shah seems to have read his modernization theory: he saw socioeconomic development as the key to thwarting a communist uprising and a possible conduit to democracy in the future. “Political democracy has no meaning,” he declared, even as he ignored the most basic elements of democratization, “unless it is complemented by economic democracy.”¹⁷⁰

The authoritarian version of the New Frontier seemed to have secured Kennedy’s support. Despite Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s discomfort with widespread voter intimidation during the January 1963 referendum, Kennedy welcomed the White Revolution. In his message to the Shah on 29 January, he wrote that the “demonstration of support should [s]trengthen your resolve to lead Iran [and] to better the lot of your people.”¹⁷¹

But not everyone was happy. As land reform took off in 1962-63, the traditional upper class – landowners, *bazaar* leaders, and the high-ranking clergy, who constituted only two percent of Iran’s population while owning two-thirds of its land – turned against the Shah.¹⁷² The Agricultural Union of Iran (Ettihad-e Fallahat-e Iran), a group representing the interests of

¹⁶⁸ James Goode, *The United States and Iran in the Shadow of Musaddiq* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 179.

¹⁶⁹ Julian Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 133.

¹⁷⁰ Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 132, 168-9, 196. That book was originally published as *Mamuriyat Beraye Vatanam* (Tehran: Bonyad-e Pahlavi, 1960). Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *The White Revolution* (Tehran: Kayhan, 1967), 21.

¹⁷¹ “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 29 January 1963, *FRUS* 1961-1963, 18: 334. Rusk’s telegram is “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 29 January 1963, *FRUS* 1961-1963, 18: 328.

¹⁷² Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 148. According to U.S. Foreign Service officer Jack Miklos, landlords held over 60 percent of the cultivated land: Jack C. Miklos, *The Iranian Revolution and Modernization: Way Stations to Anarchy* (Washington: The National Defense University, 1983), 37.

landowners, warned that excessive expropriation and the ambiguous definition of “village” in the land reform decree would harm Iranian agriculture. Echoing Mosaddeq’s opponents in 1953, the Union also underlined the dubious legality of the January 1963 referendum.¹⁷³

On the clerical side, Ruhollah Khomeini, a hitherto unknown ayatollah, led the charge. After the death of Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi, his apolitical *marja-e taqlid* (“source of emulation,” a cleric in Usuli Shiism whose legal rulings are followed by other clerics), Khomeini delved into politics. Even as most *ulama* worried about the regime’s announcement that women would be granted the right to vote or land reform’s implications for the rents of religious endowments (*vaqf*),¹⁷⁴ Khomeini focused on the bigger picture. He questioned the legality of the January 1963 vote and its fraudulent nature. “If the government is trying to do [g]ood for the people,” Khomeini asked, “why does it not consult the clergymen so that they could provide benefits for all people?” “The nation will live in peace and welfare,” he continued, “if governmental decisions are made with help from the clergymen.”¹⁷⁵

Khomeini’s criticism of the Shah was mild at first. He pointed out that not everyone was sorry to see the end of Reza Pahlavi’s rule in 1941 and asked Mohammed Reza Shah “to learn from [his] father’s mistakes.”¹⁷⁶ But as the Shah and Alam ignored the criticism, tensions boiled over: on 3 June 1963, during *ashura* commemorations, the holiest day in Shia Islam that mourns the Karbala massacre in 680, Khomeini gave a speech at his seminary in Qom and denounced the Pahlavi regime. He spoke out against the regime’s authoritarianism, corruption, and close

¹⁷³ Mohammad Gholi Majd, *Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 88-101.

¹⁷⁴ In a strongly-worded rebuttal to his suggestion that the *ulama* supported land reform, Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammed Reza Golpayagani warned Arsanjani that “any law that is contrary to the sacred laws of the holy religion of Islam is void and without effect.” Ali Davani, *Nahzat-e Rohaniyun-e Iran* [The Clerical Movement of Iran] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang-e Imam Reza, 1360/1981), 3: 32-34.

¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Davani, *Nahzat-e Rohaniyun*, 3: 205.

¹⁷⁶ Quoted in *Zandaginame-ye Imam Khomeini* [Biography of Imam Khomeini] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Moharram, 1978) 1: 40-41.

relations with the United States and Israel. When demonstrations broke out in Qom and spread to Tehran, the authorities arrested Khomeini at his home. Larger riots erupted throughout Iran on 5 June (15th of Khordad in the Persian calendar), which ended only after a brutal crackdown. The U.S. embassy in Tehran estimated a death toll of 125 people, though the actual figure was probably higher. Shortly after 15 Khordad, the Shah bluntly told U.S. chargé d'affaires Stuart Rockwell that “nothing can stop the White Revolution now.”¹⁷⁷

Indeed, the Shah’s White Revolution project seemed so secure that, for the next 15 years, the authoritarian modernization of the Pahlavi regime would appear unstoppable. Paradoxically, as the Shah consolidated his rule after marginalizing liberal and moderate forces such as the Second National Front and Ali Amini, he left his people with no viable opposition other than radical intellectuals, religious circles, and militant groups. Any hope to open up the politics of Imperial Iran, an idea voiced regularly within U.S. decision-making circles since the early Cold War, came to an end. But as we shall see in the following section, Washington continued to be identified with the Shah’s authoritarianism in 1955-63 and beyond.

The Steady Rise of Anti-Americanism in Iran

Iran’s cautious pro-Americanism in the early Cold War turned into anti-Americanism in the second half of the 1950s. While the Shah resented the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations’ insistence on political reform and their refusal to increase military aid, he suspected that Washington schemed to remove him from office. Ironically, elite as well as popular anger at the United States grew in Iran toward the late 1950s precisely because many believed that Washington backed the Shah’s authoritarianism and his ill-advised policies.

¹⁷⁷ “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 24 June 1963, *FRUS* 1961-1963, 18: 601-3.

Several developments began to neutralize Iranians' pro-U.S. sentiments after the August 1953 coup. The military tribunal that tried Mohammed Mosaddeq for "treason" was the first one. The former prime minister was nothing if not defiant during his trial, which lasted from November 1953 to May 1954: Mosaddeq argued that the Shah did not have the mandate to dismiss him on 16 August 1953 and challenged the competency of the military court. The ex-prime minister also added flair to the proceedings: he wept, laughed, shouted, went on a hunger strike twice, and occasionally fainted. He even taunted the prosecutor to a wrestling match.¹⁷⁸ Although many Westerners viewed Mosaddeq's performance at the court as a re-run of "Old Mossy," his compatriots thought differently. Some Iranians had had misgivings about Mosaddeq's prime ministry, but after his trial they fell in love with him once again.¹⁷⁹

By the time Mosaddeq served his prison term and went into house arrest at his Ahmadabad estate in 1956, he was becoming something of a legend in Iran.¹⁸⁰ Some Iranians began to express their disillusionment with U.S. policy. Thomas A. Cassilly, the U.S. consul in Mashhad, discerned these mixed feelings at a party with local dignitaries in February 1956. The Iranian coterie, which included two army generals, a Majles deputy, and a landlord, gave Cassilly a brief history lesson when the young diplomat suggested that the ex-prime minister had been overthrown in a "genuinely popular" uprising. The group reportedly expressed anti-Shah sentiments, questioned the Pahlavi king's sincerity about reform, and lectured Cassilly about "the U.S. role in setting up [Z]ahedi" and dismissing Mosaddeq. The Iranians further inquired why "the U.S. was backing British imperialism in Cyprus and the French in North Africa."¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ *Mosaddeq dar Mahkamah-ye Nizami* [Mosaddeq at the Military Court] (Tehran: Nahzat-e Moqavamat-e Melli-ye Iran, 1987).

¹⁷⁹ de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 256.

¹⁸⁰ Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 193-94; Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 101.

¹⁸¹ Meshed to Washington, "Political: Anti-Shah and Pro-Mosadeq Sentiment in Meshed," 26 July 1955, Box 3809, CDF 1955-59, RG 59, NARA. The British journalist Christopher de Bellaigue argues that Iranians came to see "the Shah and Zahedi [as] marionettes twitched from Washington and London": de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 256.

Similar to Cassilly's experience, the U.S. consulate in Tabriz reported that, although pro-Shah and pro-U.S. sentiments existed in Azerbaijan, many citizens of the area were growing disappointed with allegations of the Pahlavi family's corruption.¹⁸² Even Masud Foruqi, a self-described "staunch monarchist" and household master of the Shah's elder sister, Princess Shams, told U.S. embassy officials that "after 15 years on the throne, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi has not lived up to the high expectations he showed as Crown Prince." Foruqi suggested that Washington should threaten to cut off aid unless the Shah initiated reform and withdrew from day-to-day politics.¹⁸³

Toward the late 1950s, and much like their views on British and Russian policy toward their country, Iranians came to perceive U.S. influence as an impediment to development and the Shah as an "American puppet." As political and economic uncertainty continued in the late 1950s, U.S. emergency aid in 1953-57 came to be seen as payoff for Tehran's consent to the oil agreement of 1954 and its Baghdad Pact membership in 1955. Overall, U.S. aid "was seen as benefiting the rich and, despite the best of American intentions, seldom dribbled down to the poor."¹⁸⁴ A 1956 study prepared by a U.S. Congressional committee admitted just as much: economic and technical assistance to Iran (a totaled of \$250 million in 1951-56), the report argued, had been administered in a "loose, slipshod, and unbusinesslike manner." Therefore, U.S.

Conversely, Richard Cottam, an American expert of Iran who worked for the CIA as an analyst at the time, argues that although the CIA role in the August 1953 coup became common knowledge fairly quickly, "many [supporters of the National Front] believed there was still hope [in the United States]." Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Updated ed.; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 231.

¹⁸² Tabriz to Washington, "Public Attitudes in Azerbaijan Regarding the Shah and the Ala Government," 27 June 1956, Box 3815, CDF 1955-59, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁸³ Tehran to Washington, "Criticism of Shah," 21 February 1957, Box 3815, CDF 1955-59, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁸⁴ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 115.

aid simply kept Iran afloat without changing the basic parameters of its despondent economy, which angered many Iranians.¹⁸⁵

Indeed, U.S. aid proved ineffective as Iranian politics became much less responsive to popular demands after the coup against Mosaddeq. After 1953, the Shah made a mockery of Iran's already-fragile political institutions and processes, especially the Majles and its elections. Likewise, the expression of ideas became circumscribed and popular disappointments grew into political disaffection, much of which would hurt the United States. In 1961, the Princeton University professor T. Cuyler Young warned Walt Rostow that the Shah's unwillingness to engage with opponents intensified the anger over U.S. policy toward Iran:

During the last decade, the United States has furnished Iran more than a billion dollars in economic and military aid. [T]his has served to identify the United States with the Shah's regime, [and] what the regime has done, or failed to do. [A]mong [a]nti-United States groups are those who still think and feel in the neutralist tradition, who deplore such complete alliance with, but especially dependence upon, the United States. This is not so much because of fear of [R]ussia, though this is real; it is rather their fear of becoming so beholden to, and identified with, the United States that [Iran] loses its independence and freedom of action. Fiercely patriotic and nationalistic, [Iranians] are suspicious of any policy that might give any great power undue hold upon them.¹⁸⁶

Abolhassan Ebtehaj, who resigned as head of the Plan Organization in February 1959 after becoming fed up with the Shah and his attempts to increase the military budget, delivered that message to U.S. audiences himself. At a conference in San Francisco in September 1961, Ebtehaj looked back to the early days of the Cold War when "the United States was loved and respected [in Iran] as no other country." "Now," he said, "Americans are neither loved nor

¹⁸⁵ Quoted in Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes (eds.), *The United States and Iran: A Documentary History* (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1980), 273.

¹⁸⁶ Personal copy of Young's letter quoted in Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 129. Also see T. Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 40 (January 1962): 275-92.

respected; she is distrusted by most people, and hated by many.” The U.S. government, Ebtehaj said, squandered its money and popular goodwill in Iran by enabling the Shah’s excesses.¹⁸⁷

Ebtehaj’s criticism begot the Shah’s wrath. When the former chief planner returned to Iran in November 1961, the Pahlavi king had the 62-year-old Ebtehaj imprisoned on charges of corruption during his tenure at the Plan Organization (nearly three years after Ebtehaj had stepped down). From his jail cell, Ebtehaj tried to warn the U.S. government about land reform and the Shah’s authoritarianism. Although he disliked absentee landlords as did most Western-educated Iranians, Ebtehaj also believed that, in the absence of a proper land survey, long-term credits for farmers, and an honest bureaucracy, a government-run land redistribution program would hurt the development of a free market economy in Iran. The government did not take “excess” factories from factory-owners, Ebtehaj argued, so there was no reason to punish landowners. The former chief planner suggested that landowners could be taxed based on target crop yields. Thus, they would either sell idle plots to avoid taxes or they would have to grow crops.¹⁸⁸ Ebtehaj further laid out the implications of the Shah’s increasingly autocratic rule in a letter to George McGhee, once again assistant secretary of state under Kennedy:

The situation in Iran today is explosive. [W]hen the explosion comes, the reaction against the U.S. and the West will be unavoidable and uncontrollable. It will be equally damaging to Iran.

I firmly believe this danger *can be avoided*. The present regime could not survive but for U.S. financial, military, moral and political support, it has no other alternative. The U.S. can remedy the past mistakes by disassociating itself from all the evils and in this way by gaining the sympathy and friendship of the *people* of Iran. This would not only be in the interest of the U.S. It is the surest and perhaps the only way to save Iran.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Quoted in Bostock and Jones, *Planning and Power in Iran*, 161.

¹⁸⁸ Bostock and Jones, *Planning and Power in Iran*, 163-64; Milani, *The Shah*, 262.

¹⁸⁹ Quoted in Bostock and Jones, *Planning and Power in Iran*, 7.

One group that agreed with Ebtehaj and resented the Shah's authoritarianism was landowners. Originally a solidly pro-U.S. and pro-Shah group, landowners turned against both over the question of land reform in the early 1960s. In 1959, after the Eqbal government submitted a land redistribution bill to the nineteenth Majles, the chairman of the Agricultural Union of Iran, Mohammad Ali Majd, called upon the Shah not to punish landowners. Majd pointed out how landowners had always constituted a "patriotic" bulwark against communist influence in Iran; their weakening, he said, would undermine stability in the country. Majd also argued that landowners fulfilled a crucial role in the country-side that the state was not ready to assume: they provided credit, seeds, tools, and machinery to peasants and maintained infrastructure, especially Iran's famous man-made underground water tunnels, the *qanats*.¹⁹⁰

Conservative Iranians tried to mold American ideas about land reform. In January 1956, Reza Kadivar, a Majles deputy and landowner in Mashhad, told the U.S. consul Thomas Cassilly that the recent floods in the province and the collapse of many *qanats* had demonstrated how peasants needed landowners. Kadivar "declared that he was not opposed in principle to the Shah's land reform program," but he argued that "without a landlord to come to their aid, the peasants in Khorasan would soon be reduced to a wretched condition."¹⁹¹ Likewise, Reza Afshar, a former cabinet minister under Reza Shah and majority owner of Iranian Airways, told Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree and Murat Williams, deputy director of the office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian affairs, that the United States "encouraged socialism in Iran" through land distribution.¹⁹² Even Hossein Qods-Nakhai, Iran's ambassador to the United States, warned the

¹⁹⁰ Majd, *Resistance to the Shah*, 88-94. The author of this book is the son of Mohammad Ali Majd.

¹⁹¹ Thomas A. Cassilly, "Political: Conversation with Reza Kadivar, Deputy from Meshed," 12 January 1956, Box 3809, CDF 1955-59, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁹² Memorandum of Conversation, 10 October 1957, 12 January 1956, Box 3811, CDF 1955-59, RG 59, NARA.

State Department's officer in charge of Iranian affairs, Gordon Tiger, that "land reform [i]s needlessly risky" and would cost both the United States and Iran "a lot of money."¹⁹³

The U.S. endorsement of land reform caused Iranian stakeholders to become "convinced that land distribution was an American plot designed to destroy Iran's agriculture and force her to import food in exchange for oil." "In this 'satanic' conspiracy, the United States collaborated with the Shah and his government."¹⁹⁴ The words of Abu Taleb Shirvani, an influential landlord who had observed industrial-scale farms larger than 20,000 hectares in the United States, summarized his fellow landowners' anger as follows: "If land distribution [is] a wise idea, [w]hy [is] it not implemented in America itself?"¹⁹⁵

Although not all clerics adhered to the "satanic conspiracy" thesis, for the radical *ulama* such as Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shah's reforms betrayed a much bigger problem about his rule. In the aftermath of the "approval" of the White Revolution in January 1963, Khomeini and his supporters saw Western support for the Shah as evidence that the Pahlavi king was doing the bidding of foreign powers.¹⁹⁶ These clerics called upon the people of Iran to "stand against the imperialistic decisions of [the] Shah" and the United States, "the main planner of [the] Shah's programs."¹⁹⁷ Khomeini's call that his followers boycott the elections for the twenty-first Majles in October 1963 signaled the growing chasm between the *ulama* and the Pahlavi regime.¹⁹⁸

In many respects, 1963 marked a watershed in Iranian politics. Whereas secular nationalists of the Mosaddeq ilk had opposed Pahlavi autocracy in the past, now religious figures

¹⁹³ M. Gordon Tiger to Harry H. Schwartz, 7 December 1962, Box 5, Records of the Iranian Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁹⁴ Quoted in Majd, *Resistance to the Shah*, 12.

¹⁹⁵ Quoted in *ibid.*, 125.

¹⁹⁶ Davani, *Nahzat-e Rohaniyun*, 3: 226.

¹⁹⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, 3: 226-28.

¹⁹⁸ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (3rd ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 148.

such as Khomeini appealed to a more diverse segment of society. These supporters included younger admirers of Mosaddeq, who were vexed by the Second National Front's impotence.¹⁹⁹

As the Pahlavi regime increased its control over society in the late 1950s (especially with the formation of SAVAK), Iranians studying abroad became another important force to oppose the Shah and U.S. influence in Iran. From the mid-1950s onward, as air travel became easier and overland transport between Iran and Europe became cheaper (thanks in part to the improvements in Turkey's road and rail network, much of it a result of U.S. aid), as well as the Pahlavi regime's desire to maintain a steady output of university graduates, the government began sending young Iranians to Western universities. By 1960, nearly 4,000 Iranians were studying in U.S. colleges with twice that number attending European universities. These students came together in Paris in 1962 to form the Confederation of Iranian Students, National Union (CISNU–Konfederasyon-e Jahani-ye Muhassalin ve Daneshjuyan-e Irani, Ettehad-e Melli).²⁰⁰

Originally, Iranian students in Europe, a majority of them National Front supporters, were anti-monarchical but still described themselves as “fully pro-American.” In a 1955 letter sent to the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the students appealed to the United States to “discontinue its support of corrupt elements in Iran” because “it plays into the hands of communists.” “A change of regime is inevitable in Iran,” they wrote, warning the Americans that they had “to choose between this hated and corrupted monarchy or the Iranian people.”²⁰¹

By the late 1950s, however, the average Iranian student in Europe was more likely than not to be anti-U.S. A propaganda brochure reportedly produced by the local Iranian student organization and obtained by the U.S. embassy in Paris in 1959 included a caricature of the Shah

¹⁹⁹ Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 120.

²⁰⁰ Afshin Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2002), 26-37.

²⁰¹ “Problems Connected With the Iranian Students in Europe,” 21 February 1955, Box 3814, CDF 55-59, RG 59, NARA.

flanked by an American and British soldier and sitting in front of a tent (which curiously had the Turkish crescent and star along with the Union Jack and the Star-Spangled Banner). Around the tent, members of the Pahlavi family were shown stealing “profits from land distribution” and “jewels from [the] National Bank.”²⁰² These students would do much more than draw cartoons from the mid-1960s onward.

From 1955 until 1963, various actors on the Iranian political scene developed grievances against the United States. While the Shah resented Washington’s support for reform and alleged approval of coup attempts in the late 1950s and early 1960s, landowners and clerics resented the Shah’s endorsement of the Amini government’s Western-oriented reforms, especially land distribution. Although both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had consistently supported the improvement of governance and socioeconomic standards in Iran, the deterioration of the country’s democratic aspirations undermined its material well-being. For these problems, and even before the Pahlavi king consolidated his rule with the White Revolution and the June uprisings in 1963, Iran’s cautious pro-Americanism gave way to anti-U.S. sentiments.

Conclusion

Around the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union began to appeal to the hearts and minds of the people in developing countries by extending development assistance. Proponents of modernization theory in the United States and other Western countries warned U.S. policy-makers that, given the legacy of colonialism and the appeal of statist development policies in the Third World, Moscow could expand its global reach. The political and intellectual elite in the United States came to believe that, if non-Western societies, irrespective of their historical or

²⁰² Enclosure to William Witman to Murat Williams, 22 May 1959, Box 21, Supplemental Files Relating to Iran, 1956-1959, Lot File 61D407, RG 59, NARA.

cultural background, could establish Western political, economic, and social institutions and become democratic, secular, and capitalist, they could “save” themselves from communism.

But as Turkey and Iran had experienced before and relived in the 1950s and early 1960s, the road to modernity frequently led to wrong turns and dead ends. In the late 1950s, Adnan Menderes’s Democrat Party in Turkey resorted to statist economic policies and cracked down on opponents, which caused economic and political turbulence. As a result, the Turkish military overthrew Menderes in May 1960. After the restoration of civilian rule in late 1961, the United States opposed new coup attempts and supported endeavors to preserve parliamentary democracy and planned development in Turkey.

Much like Menderes in Turkey, the Shah of Iran also failed to balance his country’s development needs with its economic capacity and security requirements. Misguided policies led to uncertainty and popular frustration. Despite U.S. expectations for political reform and the examples set by the coups and revolutions in neighboring countries, the Shah did not liberalize his regime in the 1955-63 period. Instead, he implemented new social and economic policies, partly co-opting the ideas of his subordinates and modernization theorists. His announcement of the White Revolution in 1963 suggested that the Shah wanted to modernize Iran economically and socially while consolidating all power in his hands.

In this context, pro-Americanism in Turkey subsided but anti-U.S. sentiments were not prevalent. For much of the 1950s, critics of the DP administration in Turkey refrained from blaming the United States for Menderes’s follies and criticized their democratically-elected prime minister for their country’s economic and political mess. Meanwhile, unlike the enthusiastic (though quite volatile) approach of the early Cold War years, Turkish intellectuals took a more realistic stance toward the United States in the 1955-63 period.

Around the time of the 1960 coup, however, Turks began to wonder whether their alliance with the United States served their national interests. One reason was that the Eisenhower administration became increasingly identified with Menderes in the eyes of his opponents. The Kennedy administration's decision to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 confirmed Turkish suspicions that Washington could ignore Ankara's strategic concerns.

Compared to Turkey, pro-Americanism waned and anti-Americanism increased more quickly in Iran. The Shah's hesitance to initiate political, economic, and social changes for much of the 1950s, as well as his marginalization of moderate opponents, also reflected on the United States – notwithstanding the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration's consistent support for political reform. When the Shah finally did embark on reform in the early 1960s, the authoritarian nature of his initiatives alienated landowners and clerics, who had traditionally supported the Pahlavi king in the past. In the end, however, as the Shah consolidated his rule by suppressing myriad political forces, he strengthened the clerical class's political clout. After 1964, a greater number of Iranians would be drawn to religious critics of the Pahlavi regime, especially Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati.

From 1955 until 1963, many things changed regarding U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, the military became a preeminent political force after the 1960 coup, a role that would remain constant for the rest of the twentieth century. In Iran, the Shah drove all effective opposition underground. As the tempo of development in the two countries accelerated from the mid-1960s onward, authoritarian modernization and the difficulties of maintaining an alliance would cause anti-Americanism to mount in both Turkey and Iran.

Chapter 4

Targeting America, 1964-1973

Introduction

From 1964 until 1973, anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran took a violent turn. Global dynamics, the unintended effects of modernization, and the Turkish and Iranian governments' authoritarianism intensified anti-Americanism to such an extent that militant groups resorted to violence against their own governments as well as Americans living in the two countries.

This chapter first discusses how the Vietnam War weakened the U.S. economy, undermined President Lyndon B. Johnson, and decreased Washington's control over allies. Johnson's successor, Richard M. Nixon, recalibrated U.S. commitments and delegated more responsibility to allied nations for their defense. Nixon also continued Johnson's attempts to reduce tensions with communist countries, a process known as *détente*. By the end of Nixon's first term in 1973, however, America's ability to control global events continued to decline.¹

With the global context in place, the chapter turns to Turkey and Iran. It traces political, economic, and social phenomena in Turkey and Iran in tandem with a discussion of U.S. policy toward the two countries. After examining the changing nature of Washington's relations with Ankara and Tehran, the chapter discusses anti-Americanism. When President Johnson barred Ankara from carrying out a military operation against Cyprus in 1964, Turkish opinion-makers

¹ H.W. Brands (ed.) *The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam* (College Station. Texas A&M University Press, 1999); H.W. Brands, *Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds.), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2012); Niall Ferguson et al (eds.), *Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (eds.) *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York: The Viking Press, 1978).

and the general public were offended. Oblivious to the U.S. desire to prevent a clash between its two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, Ankara believed that Washington wanted the island to unify with Athens. Turks also saw their country's inability to solve the Cyprus question on its own terms as a sign of its economic and military weakness, for which they also blamed the United States. Cyprus opened Pandora's Box and generated a wider debate on the U.S. role in Turkey's modernization.

That discussion took place as the Turkish economy grew rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s. Education and public health improved. Remittances from Turkish "guest workers" in Europe boosted the country's foreign currency earnings for the first time since the 1940s. But income inequalities, rapid urbanization, and political activism created an environment where the United States became a scapegoat for Turkey's troubles.

Meanwhile, disgruntled Iranians found new reasons to loath America and "America's shah," Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.² In 1964, Tehran acceded to a status of forces agreement (SOFA), a document that administers the legal status of U.S. military personnel in allied nations. Unlike similar arrangements with other allies, the SOFA with Iran extended immunity to the relatives of U.S. personnel. Majles deputies opposed the agreement and ratified it with a very narrow margin in October 1964. A lot of Iranians viewed the SOFA as a continuation of nineteenth-century capitulations.³

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had led the revolt against the White Revolution in June 1963, mobilized popular resentments to expand his political base. Khomeini defied the Shah and assailed Iran's alliance with the United States and Israel, as well as the U.S. influence in Iran. In response, the Shah sent Khomeini into exile. As the Pahlavi king consolidated his rule and

² Helmut Richards, "America's Shah, Shahanshah's Iran," *MERIP Reports* No. 40 (Sept. 1975): 3-26.

³ Richard Pfau, "The Legal Status of American Forces in Iran," *Middle East Journal* 28, No. 2 (Spring 1974): 141-42.

Iran's oil exports increased, more Iranians came to ascribe their monarch's policies to alleged U.S. designs to exploit their country and its oil.

Even as their countries became more independent from the United States, the opposition in Turkey and Iran attacked their leaders for being "American lackeys" and the United States for being a detriment to their countries' development. Inspired by "armed revolutions" in Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam, militant radicals in Turkey and Iran attacked U.S. military and diplomatic personnel as well as U.S. government buildings and private businesses. Although Americans living in the two countries had not been harassed in the past (except for the summer of 1953 in Iran), dozens of U.S. diplomats and servicemen were beaten, kidnapped, and even killed between 1964 and 1973. Targeting America and Americans became a choice political statement in Turkey and Iran for groups that blamed their countries' problems on the U.S. alliance.

Authoritarianism compounded socioeconomic and political troubles. The ruling Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) and the military (which ruled the country by proxy in 1971-73) in Turkey and the Pahlavi state in Iran crushed the left. Legitimate political activity became virtually impossible for many radical leftists, who became even more aggressive. Thus, violent anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran was the by-product of poor governance and socioeconomic change in the two countries during the most critical stage of their modernization.

"Let Us Continue": The Relative Decline of U.S. Power in the Age of Détente

On 27 November 1963, five days after John F. Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson gave his first address to Congress as president. "All I have I would have gladly given not to be standing here today," he said and tried to convey strength: "[n]o words are strong enough to express our determination to continue the forward thrust of America that [President Kennedy] began." "In this moment of new resolve," Johnson followed, "I would say to all my fellow

Americans, let us continue.”⁴ As Johnson took charge, he tried to maintain his predecessors’ efforts to contain communism around the globe, strengthen U.S. allies, and promote Western modernization in developing nations.

The United States, however, faced a much more challenging world in the 1960s than in previous years. Dozens of African and Asian countries gained independence from European colonial powers and joined the United Nations. The specter of another Cuban revolution loomed over Latin America. In Europe, French President Charles de Gaulle asserted greater independence, expelled U.S. forces from his country in 1966, and withdrew from the military wing of NATO. Gaullist France also reached out to West Germany and the East Europeans in order to create a European community independent of Washington and Moscow.⁵

The United States encountered peril elsewhere: in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Britain’s reach weakened, Greek-Turkish tensions worsened, the Arab-Israeli conflict turned into full-scale war, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s ideas galvanized Arab masses, and Iran flexed its muscle in the Persian Gulf. In Asia, Indo-Pakistani relations went from bad to worse, Indonesia pursued irredentist policies, and Maoist China threatened regional security. These problems presented advantages to America’s principal Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union.⁶

⁴ “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” *The American Presidency Project* [hereafter APP], <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25988>, accessed 1 May 2014.

⁵ Philip E. Muehlenbeck, *Race, Ethnicity, and the Cold War: A Global Perspective* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012); Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.) *Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution* (Westport: Praeger, 1991); Christian Nuenlist et al (eds.) *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010).

⁶ Roham Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War* (New York: Onxford University Press, 2014); Robert J. McMahon (ed.), *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (3rd ed.; Washington: Brookings Institution, 2005), 23-55; Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2001); Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 272-336; Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

Vietnam compounded these challenges. Originally a French colony, the Southeast Asian country proclaimed independence in September 1945. Although Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Vietnamese independence movement, courted U.S. support against French colonial rule, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations backed Paris.⁷ Despite U.S. help, Vietnamese guerillas defeated French forces in 1954 and the conflict seemed to end with the temporary division of the country. In the early 1960s, however, mirroring the communist insurgency in neighboring Laos, hostilities reemerged between the communist regime in North Vietnam and the anti-communist South Vietnam, which Kennedy supported.⁸

As Senate majority leader and vice president, Johnson had backed Eisenhower and Kennedy over Vietnam. As president, he could not ignore the problem. LBJ also remembered how “losing to communism” had undermined past administrations: “I knew that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their effectiveness from the day that communists took over China [in 1949],” he said, predicting that his other problems would be “chickenshit [i]f we lost Vietnam.”⁹

Vietnam also worried Johnson because he did not want the image of being “soft on communism” to derail his domestic agenda. As a young congressman, Johnson had supported FDR’s New Deal; he wanted to reinvigorate that spirit of reform by addressing racial and economic injustice in America. In 1964, Johnson called for the creation of a “Great Society.”¹⁰ Until the end of his second term in 1969, his administration sent nearly 300 legislative bills to

⁷ Stein Tønnesson, *Vietnam 1946: How the War Began* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 13; John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2009).

⁸ Fredrik Logevall, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2012); James Waite, *The End of the First Indochina War: A Global History* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

⁹ Quotes from Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 76-77. Also see Yuen Foon Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Andrew Preston, *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

¹⁰ Johnson used the term “Great Society” for the first time in May 1964: “Remarks in Athens at Ohio University, May 7, 1964,” *APP*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26225>, accessed 2 June 2012.

Congress, which passed most of them. These included programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights, and others.¹¹

Ironically, Vietnam did lead to the undoing of Johnson and the Great Society, and undermined U.S. power.¹² Since 1941, the United States had afforded guns as well as butter. By 1967, however, spending for domestic reform and national defense triggered inflation and caused the U.S. fiscal deficit to increase to 10 percent of the federal budget (\$11 billion).¹³ Vietnam also weakened Washington by sapping its ability to respond to global challenges. Lucius D. Battle, assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asian affairs (NEA) in the Johnson years, admitted that everyone in the State Department (including his NEA) and the White House was “obsessed with Vietnam” and could not react to other global problems effectively.¹⁴ As America’s economic power declined, U.S. international assistance, which had increased from \$4 billion in 1961 to \$8 billion by the mid-1960s, decreased to \$3.9 billion by 1971.¹⁵

Aside from weakening the United States, Vietnam also served as a wake-up call for militant leftist groups around the world. Groups such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany,

¹¹ Randall B. Woods, *LBJ: Architect of American Ambition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (eds.) *The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005); Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon B. Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹² The historian Andrew Johns argues that presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon could not achieve victory in Vietnam because of their preoccupation with domestic politics: Andrew L. Johns, *Vietnam’s Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010).

¹³ Budget figures from Jeffrey W. Helsing, *Johnson’s War/Johnson’s Great Society: The Guns and Butter Trap* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 224.

¹⁴ Battle’s foreword to Parker T. Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War – Cyprus: A Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), ix. The Johnson administration could not do much in the run-up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war: William B. Quandt, “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?” *Middle East Journal* 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 198-228. Other scholars who do not agree with that assessment are Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978).

¹⁵ When adjusted for inflation, U.S. aid actually went down to \$3.1 billion by 1971. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1963* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), 387-89 and Mark H. Haefele, “Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Action,” in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, edited by David C. Engerman et al (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 81; Walt W. Rostow, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 175; Ekbladh, *Great American Mission*, 233.

the Spear of the Nation in South Africa, and the New People's Army in the Philippines believed that Vietnam, just like Algeria and Cuba, demonstrated how an "armed struggle" for "national liberation" could "save" their nations. As the symbol of global capitalism, the United States and allied governments frequently became targets for such radical leftist movements.¹⁶

In this context, Richard M. Nixon, who had been a fervent anti-communist Republican in Congress and Eisenhower's vice president, became president in January 1969. Upon assuming office, Nixon tried to reduce some of his country's commitments so that it could maintain its overall global power. In what would be dubbed "the Nixon Doctrine," he stated in July 1969 that the United States "must avoid [the] kind of policy that will make countries [s]o dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one [i]n Vietnam."¹⁷ A few months later, Nixon declared that "the United States would assist in the defense and development of allies and friends, but it cannot—and will not—conceive of all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world."¹⁸

To curtail his country's growing trade deficit, Nixon withdrew the United States from the Bretton Woods system on 15 August 1971. The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 had reinstituted the gold standard and set the U.S. dollar as the main instrument of global trade by pegging international currencies to the dollar.¹⁹ After the U.S. withdrawal from Bretton Woods,

¹⁶ Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

¹⁷ "Richard Nixon: Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen," *APP*; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>; [online]; accessed on 1 September 2012.

¹⁸ "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s," *APP*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>, accessed on 1 September 2012.

¹⁹ The U.S. withdrawal from Bretton Woods happened as follows. As U.S. overseas capital investments, foreign aid, and military expenditures soared in the late 1950s, the U.S. foreign trade deficit ballooned. When inflation increased in the second half of the 1960s and the dollar value of gold remained constant, gold purchases from the U.S. Treasury became a very lucrative deal for foreign central banks. By withdrawing from Bretton Woods, Nixon sought to end the exodus of gold bullion from the United States. See Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

however, global exchange rates became “free floating” and foreign currencies gained value vis-à-vis the dollar. As the dollar declined, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised the price of oil in 1973, which led to a global recession.²⁰

Nixon also tried to reverse the relative decline in U.S. power by engaging in *détente*. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 had aimed to prevent the Cold War from turning into thermonuclear war. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, intensified diplomatic efforts to decrease Cold War tensions.²¹

Nixon and Kissinger had eager partners in Moscow and Beijing. Much like the United States, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China needed international stability to put their house in order.²² While the Soviet economy slowed down despite the discovery of vast oil and gas deposits in Western Siberia, the Cultural Revolution (1966-71) threw China into chaos. After border skirmishes broke out between the two communist powers in 1969, Nixon and Kissinger coupled *détente* with an effort to balance the Soviets against the Chinese. As Kissinger himself noted in his memoirs, “the hostility between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other.”²³

One of *détente*’s highlights was Nixon’s visits to the Soviet Union and China in 1972, the latter a first for a U.S. president. Nixon’s talks with Chairman Mao Zedong initiated the

²⁰ David Hammes and Douglas Wills, “Black Gold: The End of Bretton Woods and the Oil-Price Shocks of the 1970s,” *The Independent Review* 9, No. 4 (Spring 2005): 506. On the ascendancy of OPEC, see Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New ed.; New York: Free Press, 2009), 501-22, 562-614.

²¹ See note 1 in this chapter for leading works on *détente*.

²² Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

²³ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979), 712. On the Sino-Soviet split, see Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens*; Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split. Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 238-76. For a discussion of Soviet thinking on *détente*, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 192-226; Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 16-63.

normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations.²⁴ In Moscow, Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT I), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and a memorandum of understanding that acknowledged U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence around the world. The Cold War entered a period of normality.²⁵

Nonetheless, just like its predecessors, the Nixon administration continued to use the traditional means of aid, trade, political pressure, and covert intervention to maintain U.S. power.²⁶ But the war in Vietnam, domestic political and economic turmoil, and global economic troubles continued to erode U.S. strength. While economic powerhouses West Germany and Japan began to leave their mark on the global scene, new players such as France, India, and China also asserted themselves. Less powerful countries, including such U.S. allies as Turkey and Iran, also struggled to gain more latitude in their foreign and domestic affairs.²⁷

The United States Deals With an Autonomous, Prospering, and Unstable Turkey

In June 1964, U.S. Foreign Service officer (FSO) Robert Dillon wrote how Turkish modernization had never been “based on the perfectability of man [o]r [i]ndividual welfare.” The Turkish political elite, Dillon argued, preferred “to crush the masses into modernity, whether they like it or not.” The young diplomat then forecasted Turkey’s authoritarian modernization:

We are dealing with a country with less consensus on which to base stability than we have been willing to admit. [O]ne of our premises, that economic development in and of itself can solve difficult political problems, is likely to prove false. We are in the ironic position that the conservative peasantry, with its roots in Islamic tradition, is the strongest force opposing authoritarian reform movements.

²⁴ Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007). Despite his confrontational tone, the following article that Nixon had written in 1967 clearly lays out his rationale in “opening China”: Richard M. Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” *Foreign Affairs* 46, No. (1 October 1967): 111-25.

²⁵ For a comprehensive discussion of *détente*, see the second volume of Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (3 Vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 196-97.

²⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (London and New York: Penguin, 2005), 83-155.

As Turkey's peasants are converted to city proletariat, a necessary development for [m]odernization, one wonders whether they will remain this bulwark, or whether they will become the raw material for mass movements. [T]he hope of American policy is that Turkey will develop on the model of Western Europe, but it is not inconceivable that Turkey will eventually [r]esemble Eastern Europe.²⁸

Dillon's assessment reflected several puzzles about U.S.-Turkish relations in the 1964-73 period. While Ankara pursued its regional interests with more autonomy from Washington, Turkey's radical leftists claimed that their country had become "an American colony." When the Johnson administration tried to mediate the Cyprus dispute between Athens and Ankara, Turks – both in government and in opposition – accused Washington of supporting the Greeks. And even as Turkey's socioeconomic outlook improved in the 1960s and 1970s, its people became restive and its politics even more tumultuous than in the late 1950s.

Turkey's high growth rates constituted the most important element of the changing nature of U.S.-Turkish relations in 1964-73. Turkish GDP increased at an annual average of 6.7 percent from 1963 to 1967, 6.6 percent in 1968-1972, and 7 percent in 1973-76. Industry, which grew at an annual average of 10 percent between 1963 and 1976, replaced agriculture as the largest sector of the economy.²⁹ As the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) pointed out, Turkey sustained its modernization through its own resources after 1964. Economically, Turkey appeared as a showcase for Western-style modernization.³⁰

²⁸ Robert S. Dillon, "Philosophical Nature of the Turkish Reform Movement," 12 June 1964, Box 2751, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-66, RG 59, NARA.

²⁹ Zülküf Aydın, *The Political Economy of Turkey* (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005), 38. With a population of 35 million growing at 2.5 percent in 1970, such gains in prosperity point to an immense rise in Turkish industrial productivity: out of a labor force of 13.4 million in 1970, only 1.5 million were employed in industry. Services, which would replace industry as the largest sector in the second half of the 1970s, increased its take from the labor force from 15.4 percent in 1960 to 29.5 percent by 1980. Agriculture's share in the work force decreased from 77 percent in 1962 to 65 percent in 1972. 8.7 million Turks continued to live off the land in the early 1970s. See Memduh Yaşa, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ekonomisi, 1923-1978* [The Economy of Turkey in the Republican Era, 1923-1978] (İstanbul: Akbank, 1980), 30, 656, 672; Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985* [Economic History of Turkey, 1908-1985] (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1988), 105.

³⁰ "Administrative History, Agency for International Development," 211, [undated], Box 1, Administrative History, Agency for International Development Volume I, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library [hereafter LBJ Library].

The reason why Turkey did not need foreign aid for development was the First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-67), which placed state spending on a rational basis.³¹ The “export” of “guest workers” to Europe also helped. Between 1961 and 1972, approximately 1 million Turks went to Europe—especially West Germany—for employment.³² Although few of those gained new skills abroad, their savings became a great source of foreign currency. In the late 1960s, the half million Turkish workers still abroad sent home the equivalent of \$100 million every year. By the late 1970s, one million Turks were sending back nearly \$1 billion per annum.³³

Human development surged ahead as well.³⁴ By 1971, nearly 85 percent of children aged 7-12 were attending primary school. Literacy increased from 39.5 percent in 1960 to 55.5 percent in 1970. Average life expectancy at birth, which was 48 in 1960, advanced to 53 in 1975. The number of healthcare providers and hospital beds also expanded.³⁵

These improvements took place even as Turkey preserved its democracy (parliament remained open during the military regime of 1971-73). Following the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64 (which will be covered in the next section), the center-right AP replaced the CHP-led coalition of Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. AP then won the general election in October 1965 and secured a

³¹ Under the first plan, Turkey used 16 percent of its GNP for capital investments and coordinated public and private investments. See Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.5 in William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 141-52; *Kalkınma Planı (Birinci Beş Yıl), 1963-1967* [Development Plan (First Five Year), 1963-1967] (Ankara: DPT, 1963), 2. For a comprehensive assessment of the First Five-Year Plan, see S. İlkin and E. İnanç (eds.) *Planning in Turkey* (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 1967).

³² Walter F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey: From Atatürk to the Present Day* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), 79-85.

³³ Z. Y. Hershlag, *Economic Planning in Turkey* (İstanbul: Economic Research Foundation, 1968), 67; Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 98-99.

³⁴ *Kalkınma Planı (Birinci Beş Yıl)*, 441-67; *İkinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, 1968-1972* [Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1968-1972] (Ankara: DPT, 1968), 125-259; *Üçüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, 1973-1977* [Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1973-1977] (Ankara: DPT, 1973), 73-100.

³⁵ The shortfall in education estimates had to do with parents’ reluctance to send their daughters to school. In 1970, male literacy in Turkey was 69.5 percent while female literacy was still 40.9 percent. See *Üçüncü Plan*, 85, 773. Life expectancy figures from the World Bank’s online database: <http://data.worldbank.org>; [online]; accessed on 2 June 2012.

majority in both houses of at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). The party's leader, Süleyman Demirel, became Turkey's youngest prime minister at the age of 41.

The 1965 election meant good news for Washington. In a memorandum to President Johnson, National Security Council (NSC) staff member Robert Komer described Demirel as "highly effective and pro-Western" but "likely to be a little less cautious fiscally and [to] give us some bad moments on that front." "However," continued Komer, "we think Demirel's new ideas and dynamism will more than offset any tendency to unbalance the fiscal machinery."³⁶

Komer's interpretation of Demirel's dynamism was correct. However, the allegedly pro-U.S. prime minister turned out to be a tough customer for Washington not because of his fiscal policies but because of his independence. When the opposition questioned why most U.S. bases in Turkey operated outside the NATO framework and without a clear legal mandate, Demirel initiated negotiations to clarify the status of all U.S. installations on Turkish soil, which led to the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Ankara and Washington in 1969.³⁷ Even before the DCA, the AP cabinet limited U.S. military and intelligence operations in Turkey. According to İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, who served under Demirel as foreign minister, when it came to affairs of state, his boss did not have "a propitious moment" for allies; Ankara was clearly putting its own interests above those of its U.S. partner.³⁸

Despite his staunch opposition to communism, Demirel continued İnönü's overtures to the Soviet Union.³⁹ His spring 1967 trip to the USSR brought unprecedented Soviet investment to

³⁶ R.W. Komer, "Memorandum for the President," 14 October 1965, Box 6 (1 of 2), White House Confidential File [hereafter CF], LBJ Library.

³⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," *The Journal of American History* 89, No. 2 (Sept. 2002): 473-74.

³⁸ İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, "*Kader Bizi Una Değil, Üne İtti*": *Çağlayangil'in Anıları* ["Fate Has Pushed Us not to Flour, But to Fame": The Memoirs of Çağlayangil] (Reprint; Ankara: Büke Yayınları, 2000), 24.

³⁹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, who served as foreign minister under İnönü, visited Moscow in September 1964. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko came to Turkey a few months later. *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi, 1923-2000* [Encyclopedia of the Republic, 1923-2000] (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), 3: 94-95.

Turkey: the iron-steel complex in the Mediterranean port of İskenderun, a hydroelectric dam on the Turkish-Soviet border, a large oil refinery near Aliğa, İzmir, and an aluminum plant in Seydişehir, Konya were worth over \$200 million. Demirel preferred Moscow over Turkey's Western allies because Soviet credits terms were better.⁴⁰

Rather than worrying about Ankara's increasing autonomy, Washington seemed comfortable with it. In 1966, the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) pointed out that, "since the inception of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey has drifted [a]way from [t]he U.S. toward a more independent foreign policy." "However," the INR report continued, "viewed in terms of the history of Turkey since World War I, this development constitutes more a normalization of Turkish-U.S. relations than a radical new departure." After all, said the report, "Turkey is an underdeveloped country whose interests do not always coincide with those of the developed nations and [it needs] assistance from any source, including the USSR."⁴¹

Still, the U.S. alliance had made a significant difference for Turkey, although most Turks ceased to appreciate it by the mid-1960s. From 1945 until 1967, Washington gave Ankara over \$4.5 billion (half of it in military aid), which turned the Turkish military into a formidable force. A background paper on U.S. military assistance specifically praised the Turkish Air Force and its "capability to effectively maintain and utilize [U.S.-made] aircraft [and its] consistently high combat readiness ratings awarded by NATO evaluation teams."⁴²

Turkey's rapid transformation, however, had its downside. Different governments – be they AP, CHP, or military-backed "technocrats" – mishandled monetary policy. Much like the

⁴⁰ Mehmet Altan, *Türkiye ve Süperler: Türkiye'deki Amerikan ve Sovyet Yardımları* [Turkey and the Supers: American and Soviet Aid in Turkey] (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1986), 132-33.

⁴¹ "Research Memorandum," 25 March 1966, Box 50, NSF, Robert W. Komer Files [hereafter Komer Files], LBJ Library.

⁴² U.S. aid figure from "Background Notes: Turkey." Assessment of Air Force in "Visit of President Sunay of Turkey, April 3-13, 1967, Background Paper: Military Assistance Program." Both documents in Box 158, NSF, CF, LBJ Library.

1950s, an inflexible foreign exchange policy led to the overvaluation of the Turkish lira, which made exports expensive and imports cheap. Meanwhile, a population boom and the AP government's policy of increasing farm subsidies fueled food prices and caused inflation.⁴³

The policy of import-substituted industrialization (ISI) led to even bigger problems. Under ISI, stiff tariffs and quotas on industrial imports created a complacent manufacturing sector. When Turkish experts had formulated the first plan in the early 1960s, they had thought of import duties as temporary measures.⁴⁴ But unlike South Korea, where the state and private corporations pondered ways to create competitive industries, industrialists and decision-makers in Turkey lost interest in exports and foreign competition. For the second time since 1950, Turkey missed the opportunity to transition to an export-oriented market economy.⁴⁵

Disparities in regional income also tempered progress.⁴⁶ Although living conditions in the country-side had improved considerably since 1950, it was better to move to urban areas for higher wages.⁴⁷ Because of inadequate housing, however, shantytowns became ubiquitous in urban areas. For example, with 65 percent of its residents living in slums, the capital Ankara also

⁴³ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 95, 101, 103.

⁴⁴ Fahri Aral (ed.), *Planlı Kalkınma Serüveni: 1960'larda Türkiye'de Planlama Deneyimi* [The Planned Development Adventure: Turkey's Planning Experience in the 1960s] (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2003), 60. The relevant sections of the first plan indeed confirm that the protective measures were designed to be temporary: *Kalkınma Planı (Birinci Beş Yıl), 1963-1967*, 522.

⁴⁵ Aydın, *Political Economy*, 36

⁴⁶ From 1963 until 1968, the poorest 20 percent's share from the national income dropped from 4.5 percent to 3 percent while the richest 20 percent's share increased from 57 percent to 60 percent. By 1973, the poorest segment had to live with 3.5 percent of the national income while the richest 20 percent enjoyed 56.5 percent. In 1973, annual household incomes were TL40,000 (approximately \$2,850) in İstanbul and İzmir and TL30,000 in Ankara. The rest earned less: The Black Sea region (TL27,000), Central Anatolia (TL25,500), the Aegean and Marmara (TL22,000), and the Mediterranean (TL21,400). Eastern Anatolian families, who comprised 14.7 percent of the nation's households, came last with an average of TL16,000 (about \$1,140). Statistically, the average Turkish household had 5.5 individuals in the 1960s and 1970s. *Gelir Dağılımı, 1973* [Income Distribution, 1973] (Ankara: DPT, 1976), 24, 38-40. Per capita income in Yaşa, *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 28.

⁴⁷ By 1968, Turkey's road system had expanded to the point where three-quarters of the villages were less than two hours' travel time to a provincial district center and less than four hours' travel time to a provincial capital. Though quite inadequate, 88 percent of the villages had schools. Half the villages were less than fifty kilometers (approximately 31 miles) away from a modern healthcare facility. Half the villagers read a newspaper at least once a week while 40 percent of them listened to the radio on a daily basis. Thus, many villagers were eager to live in places where modern conveniences were more widespread. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey*, 52.

became the nation's largest shantytown.⁴⁸ As per capita income increased from \$320 in 1965 to \$500 in 1975, the rural exodus accelerated. With a constant stream of rural immigrants flocking to the cities, unemployment hovered around 12 to 13.5 percent between 1964 and 1973.⁴⁹

This breathtaking transformation ushered new political actors, especially leftist ones. The CHP, which relied on a narrow base of urban middle class voters after 1950, began to reorient itself to the left. The party of Atatürk and İnönü had no choice: CHP received only 36.5 percent in the 1961 election and sustained one of its worst defeats by garnering merely 28.7 percent in 1965 (as opposed to AP's 52.9 percent).⁵⁰ In 1966, Bülent Ecevit, a rising CHP star, persuaded the party congress to identify as "left of center" (*ortanın solu*). Rather than just attacking the center-right AP, Ecevit believed that the CHP ought to stand for egalitarian modernization: women's and workers' rights, land reform, cheap credit to farmers, and free public education. "Left of center," a CHP leaflet argued, "is the road to development."⁵¹

Although the AP stayed in power in the 1969 elections, CHP, now under Ecevit's chairmanship, won a plurality of seats in parliament in 1973. "Left of center" seemed to have paid off: while many low-income Turks held on to traditional values, CHP got two votes for every AP vote from the poorer constituents.⁵² This rapid change from 1969 to 1973 showed that large-scale class politics had taken root in Turkey.⁵³

⁴⁸ Michael Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, "Urbanization and Income Distribution in Turkey," in *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*; edited by Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), 273.

⁴⁹ Table 19 in *Dördüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı 1979-1983* [Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, 1979-1983] (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1979), 26.

⁵⁰ *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, 3: 117.

⁵¹ CHP Eskişehir İl Gençlik Kolu, *Ortanın Solu, Kalkınmanın Yolu* [Left of Center is the Road to Development] (Eskişehir: CHP, 1968). On CHP's left turn, see Yunus Emre, *The Emergence of Social Democracy in Turkey: The Left and Transformation of the Republican People's Party* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

⁵² Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Towards a Critical Realignment?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (October, 1975): 473.

⁵³ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 202.

The CHP, however, was not the only leftist game in town. As the percentage of unionized labor increased from 10 percent in 1963 to 30 percent in 1971,⁵⁴ radical leftist leaders came to the forefront. In 1967, labor leaders who were fed up with the non-partisan Confederation of Labor Syndicates of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu–Türk-İş) formed DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu–Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Syndicates). DİSK leaders accused Türk-İş, which had received financial help from the U.S. government at its formative years in the early 1950s, for “turning Turkey into an American colony.” They also denounced Türk-İş for “[not] serving the interests of Turkish workers, pursuing anti-national policies, [and therefore] los[ing] the right to represent Turkish labor.”⁵⁵ With the advent of DİSK, labor strikes and walk-outs became more common in Turkey. In order to prevent its members from joining DİSK, Türk-İş also became more combative against business owners. By the mid-1970s, average wages in Turkey more than doubled those in South Korea.⁵⁶

The Labor Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi–TİP) tried to translate union activism and youth support into political power.⁵⁷ In the 1965 elections, TİP gained three percent of the votes and secured 15 out of 450 seats in the lower house of the TBMM. TİP deputies and their supporters looked like they would become a very serious force in Turkish politics.⁵⁸

Despite initial successes, however, the dilemma that bedeviled revolutionary parties elsewhere also paralyzed the TİP: should one come to power by legitimate means or carry out a

⁵⁴ *Üçüncü Plan*, 81.

⁵⁵ *Türk-İş Çıkmazı* [The Türk-İş Dead End] (İstanbul: DİSK, 1967), 1, 9. The U.S. government had supported Türk-İş in the 1950s and early 1960s. See Sera Öner, “Labor in U.S. Foreign Policy During the Early Cold War: The Marshall Plan and American-Turkish Relations, 1945-1955” (M.A. thesis; Bilkent University, 2006).

⁵⁶ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 101.

⁵⁷ Many TİP leaders were themselves young. Although the party chairman, Mehmet Ali Aybar, a law professor from a wealthy family, was 52, the average age of TİP founders was 41.3. Of the nearly 12,000 people who had filled out membership forms in the late 1960s, 27.4% were workers; 26.3% artisans and tradesmen; 9.0% were agricultural laborers; and 17.0% were small farmers. Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 123.

⁵⁸ Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, 127.

violent revolution without bothering with “bourgeois democracy”? TİP chairman Mehmet Ali Aybar and his supporters advocated democratic means; another group called for a “national democratic revolution” (milli demokratik devrim–MDD). Adherents of MDD believed that, without “national liberation” (i.e., a complete break with the capitalist world), a “socialist” revolution – the control of the means of production by the masses – would not succeed. In 1966, the MDD group broke away. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which gave the lie to Moscow’s self-ascribed “anti-imperialist” credentials, further divided the radical left in Turkey. In the elections of October 1969, TİP lost most of its parliamentary seats.⁵⁹

The U.S. embassy in Ankara understood the implications of a strong radical left in Turkey. An April 1967 report stated that DİSK was “of greater concern to the United States than its size might indicate.” “Its leaders,” the report continued, “can be expected [t]o create incidents embarrassing to United States business interests and the United States official presence.” Moreover, the report indicated DİSK’s close relations with the Labor Party and the high probability of confrontation between the radical left and the Demirel government.⁶⁰

The Demirel administration and leftist activists, much like Adnan Menderes and his detractors in the late 1950s, had already entered into a vicious cycle of crackdown and backlash. In early 1966, police detained several intellectuals, including famous novelists Yaşar Kemal and Orhan Kemal, for their leftist activities. Even a middle school student was rounded up for comparing Atatürk to Lenin in an essay. In July 1967, AP deputies removed TİP deputy Çetin Altan’s immunity so that he could be prosecuted for “spreading communist propaganda.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid., 129. Suphi Karaman, “Türk Solu ve Milli Demokratik Devrim” [The Turkish Left and National Democratic Revolution], *Türk Solu* 2, No. 53 (19 November 1968): 3. An expanded version of Karaman’s essay became Mihri Belli, *Milli Demokratik Devrim* [National Democratic Revolution] (Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınları, 1970).

⁶⁰ Embassy Ankara to Washington, “The Status of DİSK,” 4 April 1967, Box 1290, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969 [hereafter CFPF, 1967-69], RG 59, NARA.

⁶¹ *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, 3: 141.

Demirel also went after the CHP, playing on its slogan as “left of center is the road to Moscow” (ortanın solu, Moskova yolu), and accusing it as a fellow traveler of TİP. The political atmosphere in Turkey became toxic. With the AP government’s tacit approval, Alparslan Türkeş, one of the leaders of the 1960 coup and chairman of the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP-Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), formed a paramilitary youth group called “greywolves” (also known as “commandos”).⁶² Clashes between “commandos” and leftist youth turned cities into war zones. When AP’s parliamentary group instituted changes to the electoral law to hinder the Labor Party from making additional gains in the 1969 election, radical youth became convinced that armed action, not democracy, could correct social and economic injustices in Turkey.⁶³ As we shall see in the next section, the activities of these militant groups and the Demirel government’s harsh response created a chaotic scene.

The cycle of crackdown and backlash undermined Turkey’s stability and relations with Western allies to such an extent that the military had to step in. On 12 March 1971, worried that a pro-MDD junta within the officer corps could stage a coup, the Turkish high command issued a public “memorandum.” The generals again seized the commanding heights of politics by falling back on the popular theme of development: “The parliament and the [Demirel] government have plunged our country into anarchy, fratricide, [and] social and economic unrest,” causing “the people [to] los[e] hope in Atatürk’s goal of elevating the nation to the level of modern

⁶² “Demirel Sert Konuştu: Bozgunculara Hayat Hakkı Vermeyeceğiz” [Demirel Spoke Tough: We Will not Let Trouble-makers Live], *Hürriyet*, 27 July 1968; “Türkeş: Bin CKMP’li gence komando eğitimi yaptırıyoruz” [Türkeş: We are training to a thousand CKMP youth as commandos], *Hürriyet*, 19 August 1968. Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi – Republican Peasant-Nation Party (CKMP) was MHP’s original name.

⁶³ Under the 1964 electoral law, seats in the Grand National Assembly were apportioned through the “largest remainder method,” which favored smaller parties. In 1968, AP change the law and instituted a system of proportional representation (the so-called “d’Hondt system”), which favored larger parties.

civilization” and “placing the future of the Republic of Turkey in danger.” Demirel got the memo. He resigned the same day.⁶⁴

Instead of assuming direct control, the 12 March regime worked through the TBMM. Until October 1973, the generals “encouraged” the parliament to limit constitutional rights and liberties through amendments and to impose martial law in 11 provinces. Martial law units rounded up hundreds of suspects and military tribunals executed a few.

During the 31-month-long “12 March regime,” Turkey experienced four non-partisan and “technocratic” cabinets that worked at cross-purposes with legislators. AP deputies and senators, angry at military-backed cabinets for elbowing them out of power, worked to undermine the technocrats. Meanwhile, Bülent Ecevit led an internal revolt in the CHP against the octogenarian İnönü (who had succeeded Atatürk in 1938) and took over as the leader of the center-left. Under Ecevit, the CHP was hardly more cooperative with the military than the AP.⁶⁵

The mutual distrust between the TBMM and the generals erupted during the presidential elections in spring 1973. The military let it be known that it wanted Chief of General Staff Faruk Gürler to replace the outgoing president, Cevdet Sunay, who had made the transition from the barracks to the presidency in 1966. Sunay even appointed Gürler as a senator to facilitate his succession. Instead, the parliamentarians elected a kind-mannered retired admiral, Senator Fahri Korutürk, on 6 April 1973.⁶⁶ After the October 1973 election and the formation of a coalition government between Ecevit’s CHP and the Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan, the military returned to its barracks.

U.S. influence probably contributed to Turkey’s experience of “proxy” military rule. In January 1971, two months before the 12 March memorandum, Frank Cash, the State

⁶⁴ “12 Mart Muhtırası,” *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, 3: 263.

⁶⁵ “Ecevit CHP Genel Başkanı” [Ecevit Becomes CHP Chairman], *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, 3: 290.

⁶⁶ Under the 1961 constitution, only members of the TBMM could become president.

Department's country director for Turkey, told the Turkish Air Force chief of staff, General Muhsin Batur, that the military should not take charge. "One of the most helpful things Turkey had going for it," Cash told Batur, "was that it was developing [u]nder a [d]emocratic [r]egime, and that the loss of this rare status would be a grave setback not only to Turkey and to other developing countries throughout the world, but also to those countries like the US seeking to further precisely this kind of development." Cash reminded the Turkish general about the 1967 colonels' coup in Greece and the Congressional embargo. "If the [Turkish] military took over," he said, "it would be a great tragedy."⁶⁷ On 15 March, three days after the generals' memorandum, Cash repeated the same words to a close friend of the chief of staff of the Turkish Naval Forces.⁶⁸ The U.S. Congress did not impose an embargo on Ankara for the 1971 coup.

From 1964 until 1973, Turkey saw rapid but highly unequal socioeconomic modernization. Despite the 1971-73 "interim regime," the country maintained its democratic institutions. Throughout the period, however, Turkey's tradition of authoritarian modernization threatened its socioeconomic gains. An overbearing state prevented the transition to an export-driven market economy, an outcome that poor fiscal and monetary policies exacerbated. More importantly, the influx of rural immigrants to the city, the rise of labor and youth activism, and heavy-handed government response threatened political order. Cyprus compounded these troubles in the mid-1960s and turned the United States into a scapegoat for all of them.

Pandora's Box Opens: Cyprus, the Radical Left, and Violent Anti-Americanism in Turkey

Although the Cyprus dispute triggered the rapid rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey, its origins had nothing to do with the United States. In 1878, Britain wrested the Mediterranean

⁶⁷ "Memorandum of Conversation" 16 January 1971, Box 2639, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-73 [hereafter SNF 70-73], RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁸ "Memorandum of Conversation," 15 March 1971, Box 2639, SNF 70-73, RG 59, NARA.

island from the Ottoman Empire to control the Suez Canal. After World War II, led by the Orthodox Church and the militant group EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston–National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), the Greek Cypriot majority demanded unification (*enosis*) with Greece. The Turkish Cypriot minority demanded the island’s division (*taksim*) between Greece and Turkey.⁶⁹ In 1959, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, together with the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, signed the London and Zurich accords. The accords forbade *enosis* and *taksim*. The agreements also reserved political privileges for Turkish Cypriots: while the Cypriot president would be Greek, the vice president would always be Turkish, and no legislation could pass without the approval of the Turkish communal assembly.⁷⁰

After independence in 1960, Archbishop Makarios III of the Cypriot Orthodox Church, who had led the anti-British campaign, became president. Dr. Fazıl Küçük, head of the *taksim* movement, assumed the vice presidency. Because Cyprus did not develop into a functioning polity, Makarios announced a plan to abrogate the Turkish community’s veto in late 1963.⁷¹ Seeing the proposals as a step toward *enosis*, Turkish Cypriots opposed Makarios.⁷² As the war of words turned into armed clashes and Turkish Cypriots’ situation worsened in spring 1964, Ankara began to weigh its options. Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, who foresaw that “a clash between Greece and Turkey would be madness,” warned that “if Turkey decides to enter

⁶⁹ Rauf Denktaş, *Rauf Denktaş’ın Hatıraları* [The Memoirs of Rauf Denktaş] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1996), 1: i-ii.

⁷⁰ The full text of the accords can be found in *Documents Relating to the Founding of Cyprus, Including the Treaty of Guarantee, 1959*; <http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/treaty.htm#1>; accessed 2 September 2012.

⁷¹ Dimitri Bitsios, *Cyprus: Vulnerable Republic* (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975), 217.

⁷² Before proposing the changes, Makarios ordered Minister of Interior Polycarpus Georgadjis to implement the so-called Akritas Plan, which aimed to coerce the Turkish Cypriot community into accepting *enosis*. Georgadjis was allegedly still an active EOKA member and “Akritas” was his *nom de guerre*. The full text of the Akritas Plan is available in Glafcos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition* (Nicosia: Alithia, 1989), 1: 212-20.

the insane asylum, we shall not hesitate to follow her.”⁷³ Indeed, he soon sent thousands of Hellenic Army regulars to the island to deter Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü.

Greek intervention worsened the situation. On 5 June 1964, the U.S. embassy in Ankara reported that a Turkish military operation in Cyprus was imminent. To stop İnönü, President Johnson dispatched a threatening message that would shake U.S.-Turkish relations to their core: “Your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step without the full consent and understanding of its allies.”⁷⁴ Johnson asked former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to mediate between Greece and Turkey. Acheson, who had brought the two sides into NATO, gave up after lengthy negotiations: “We spent two months in the worst rat race I have ever been in,” he grumbled, “in trying to deny Greeks and Turks their historic recreation of killing one another.”⁷⁵ The conflict ended in September 1964 after Ankara carried out limited airstrikes on the island and the Greek Cypriots unilaterally abrogated Turkish Cypriots’ veto rights.

For a decade before 1964, public opinion in Turkey had been stoked with anti-Greek sentiments because of Cyprus (as illustrated in the pogroms in İstanbul and İzmir on 6-7 September 1955). As the Johnson letter became something of an open secret, an anti-U.S. crescendo rose in Turkey. On 27 August 1964, 1,000 students gathered near the U.S. embassy in Ankara to protest the United States for not supporting Turkey in Cyprus. Their banners read “America, do not play with our pride,” “you cannot buy us off with your dollars,” and “Yankee go home!” The following day, a larger group that also included army officers, bureaucrats, and

⁷³ Quote from Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 131-132. Andreas Papandreou would serve as prime minister later on in the 1980s and 1990s. Andreas’s son, also George, was prime minister of Greece from 2009 until 2011.

⁷⁴ “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ankara,” 5 June 1964, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter *FRUS*], 1964-1968, 16: 107-10.

⁷⁵ Quoted in Douglas Brinkley, *Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-1971* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 218-19.

housewives assembled in front of the U.S. embassy. On 29 August, a crowd of 50,000 chanted anti-U.S. slogans in Istanbul.⁷⁶

As the junior FSO Robert Dillon pointed out,⁷⁷ Cyprus opened the metaphorical Pandora's Box in Turkey: opinion-makers, ranging from the Islamist Necip Fazıl Kısakürek to the moderate Ecvet Güresin, condemned the United States for its alleged complicity in the plight of Turkish Cypriots. They called upon Ankara to reorient its foreign policy. Even the normally guarded İnönü expressed frustration. In an interview with *Time* magazine, İnönü said that he "had trusted the American leadership and now I am being punished for it." The man who had laid the foundations of the U.S.-Turkish alliance as president in the 1940s began to question the merits of the U.S. alliance as prime minister in the 1960s.⁷⁸

Ironically, the Johnson letter and its damage to U.S.-Turkish relations was the result of a misunderstanding. In June 1964, İnönü wanted to avoid an operation in Cyprus because the Turkish Navy did not have amphibious landing crafts. As a former general, İnönü knew that defeat in Cyprus would be a disaster for his country's foreign relations as well as domestic peace. He hoped that, by feigning intervention, he could get Washington to rein in Athens and the Greek Cypriots. İnönü informed U.S. ambassador Raymond Hare on 5 June about his decision to send troops to Cyprus, something he did not really want. Unaware of the stratagem, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, together with assistant secretaries Harlan Cleveland and Joseph Sisco, drafted "the Johnson letter." Undersecretary of State George Ball called it "the most brutal diplomatic note I

⁷⁶ "Ankara'da Amerikan aleyhtarı nümayişler" [Anti-American demonstrations in Ankara], *Hürriyet*, 28 August 1964. "Ankarada gençler, Yunan Büyükelçiliğini taşa tuttu" [Youth stone Greek embassy in Ankara], *Hürriyet*, 29 August 1964. The Istanbul crowd also spoke out against Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Soviet Union for their friendly attitude toward President Makarios. "İstanbul dün 'Kıbrıs Kıbrıs' diye inledi" [Istanbul wailed "Cyprus Cyprus" yesterday], *Hürriyet*, 30 August 1964.

⁷⁷ Dillon to Washington, "Impression of Turkish Political Scene Five Months After Home Leave," 9 March 1965, Box 2751, CFPPF, 1964-66, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁸ Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, "Hak Dilenme!" [Begging for One's Rights!] *Büyük Doğu* (7 October 1964): 3, 18; Ecvet Güresin, "Amerikanın politikası" [America's policy], *Cumhuriyet*, 14 May 1964; İnönü quote in "Cyprus: Enmity or Enosis," *Time* 83, No. 16 (17 April 1964).

have ever seen.” Years later, the Turkish diplomat İlder Türkmen admitted that Ankara had “provoked the Johnson letter.”⁷⁹

Even before the Johnson letter, U.S. diplomats understood how Cyprus affected Turkish sentiments. In April 1964, John E. Merriam reported from the U.S. consulate in Istanbul that the city’s “dominant mood” was anti-Greek but it also had “a strong current of anti-Americanism.”⁸⁰ A State Department memorandum around the same time argued that anti-U.S. coverage in the Turkish press was part of a wider discussion of Turkey’s role in the Cold War and Turkish attempts “to find a scapegoat for the turn-of-events.”⁸¹

As alliance fatigue and the frustrations over Cyprus grew, anti-Americanism in Turkey – much of it provoked by the radical left – found fertile ground to grow. The major problem that radical leftists had with the United States was NATO. The Atlantic alliance and U.S. bases in Turkey invited a nuclear war with the Soviet Union; the humiliation in Cyprus gave further proof that NATO and the U.S. alliance did not serve Turkish interests.⁸² A book published in 1970 added weight to these attacks. Authored by the retired colonel Haydar Tunçkanat, a participant in the 1960 coup, *The Inside Story of Bilateral Agreements* questioned whether Ankara had any sovereignty over U.S. bases in Turkey.⁸³ Although Tunçkanat had been discredited in 1966 when

⁷⁹ George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982), 350. Türkmen quote in Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu: Türk-ABD İlişkilerini Değiştiren Olayın Perde Arkası* [The Johnson Letter: The Behind-the-Scenes of the Event that Changed Turkish-USA Relations] (İstanbul: Gendaş, 2002), 55, 107.

⁸⁰ John E. Merriam, “İstanbul Attitudes Against Greeks,” 16 April 1964, Box 2751, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.

⁸¹ “Recent Turkish Reactions to the United States,” 20 April 1964, Box 1, Records Relating to Turkey, 1964-1966, RG 59, NARA.

⁸² “Amerika, Neden Enosisi Yanadır” [Why is America Pro-Enosis?], *Yön*, 10 February 1965; Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Türkiye’deki Amerikan Üsleri” [American Bases in Turkey], *Yön*, 26 November 1965.

⁸³ Haydar Tunçkanat, *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü: İktisadi, Askeri, Siyasi* [The Inside Story of Bilateral Agreements: Economic, Military, Political] (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1970).

he claimed to possess U.S. official documents allegedly showing how Washington manipulated Ankara, his 1970 book became a best-seller in Turkey.⁸⁴

In opposition to Ankara's Cold War partnership with Washington, anti-U.S. Turks fell back on the painful memory of Ottoman decline: they claimed that Turkey had now become a U.S. satellite just as the Ottoman Empire had been a European "colony" in the nineteenth century.⁸⁵ Anti-American activists insisted that U.S. aid was "hush money" for what Turkey lost to the West in exports of raw materials and imports of industrial and consumer goods. When a development project benefited Turkey, such as the Keban Dam on the Euphrates river, the United States gave little aid.⁸⁶ Likewise, said radical leftists, Turkey's petroleum reserves remained untapped because multinational companies, in partnership with the DP in the 1950s and the CHP and the AP in the 1960s, elbowed out the country's own state-owned oil company. Some anti-U.S. critics also believed that international oil companies were selling crude and petrochemical products to Turkey at prices higher than the rest of the world.⁸⁷

Turks with anti-U.S. convictions also asserted that the United States manipulated Turkey's domestic politics: the novelist Yaşar Kemal argued that the ruling Justice Party used heavy-handed methods against the left so that Turkish people would not realize the severity of

⁸⁴ The documents, in turned out, were forgeries. George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 138.

⁸⁵ The prominent sociologist Niyazi Berkes interpreted Turkey's pro-Western policies in the Cold War as a continuation of wrong-headed attempts to "act Western" since the mid-18th century. Niyazi Berkes, *200 Yıldır Neden Bocalıyoruz?* [Why Have We Faltered for 200 Years?] (İstanbul: Yön Yayınları, 1965). Also see İsmail Cem, *Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi* [A History of Backwardness in Turkey] (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1970).

⁸⁶ "Amerika Kebana Hayır Dedi" [America Said No to Keban], *Yön*, 9 October 1964. As a major hydroelectric and irrigation project, the Keban Dam increased Turkey electrical capacity by several fold when it was completed in 1974. The U.S. government was hesitant to finance Keban because of its potential to decrease Syria and Iraq's take from the Euphrates river: "Visit of Prime Minister İnönü of Turkey, June 22-23, 1964, Background Paper: Tab E, Keban Dam," Box 157, NSF, CF, LBJ Library.

⁸⁷ "Dev Şirketler Türk Petrolünü Öldürüyor" [Giant Companies Are Killing Turkish Petroleum] *Yön*, 20 March 1963; Fethi Naci, *Emperyalizm Nedir?* [What is Imperialism?] (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1965), 5-7; Petrolcü (pen name), "Petrolümüze Sahip Çıkalım!" [Let Us Protect Our Petroleum!], *Forum*, No. 266 (1 May 1965):13-14.

U.S. imperialism.⁸⁸ One of the most popular works in Turkish intellectual circles in the late 1960s became the journalist Doğan Avcıoğlu's *The Order of Turkey*, a book that interpreted Turkey's development problems from a leftist perspective. Avcıoğlu concluded that pursuing a "capitalist" and Western-oriented development was folly for an underdeveloped country like Turkey. Instead, he argued for "a national revolutionary model of development."⁸⁹

As Avcıoğlu turned from a moderate leftist into a pro-MDD radical while writing *The Order of Turkey*, his book had a similar effect on Turkish leftists. In *Cumhuriyet* newspaper (one of the most pro-U.S. publications in the 1940s), the young journalist Mehmet Barlas argued that, just as the CIA had overthrown Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953, Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, and Greek Prime Minister George Papandreu in 1967, it had also organized coups in Turkey.⁹⁰ While many radical leftists disliked the DP administration, they argued that, Menderes, too, had been a victim of a CIA plot in 1960.⁹¹ Even the idealistic-looking Peace Corps volunteers, they claimed, worked for U.S. intelligence.⁹²

An article by *Cumhuriyet* columnist İlhan Selçuk, who was arguably the most vocally anti-U.S. Turkish intellectual during the 1960s and 1970s, demonstrated the prevalence of anti-Americanism in Turkey in those days:

⁸⁸ Yaşar Kemal, "Demokrasi Korkusu" [Fear of Democracy] *Yön*, 2 April 1965.

⁸⁹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni (Dün-Bugün-Yarın)* [The Order of Turkey (Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow)] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968).

⁹⁰ Mehmet Barlas, "CIA'nin Marifetleri" [CIA's Deeds], *Cumhuriyet*, 2 May 1966; Mehmet Barlas, "CIA İş Başında: Tahran'da ve Atina'da Harcanan CIA Dolarları" [CIA in Action: CIA Dollars Spent in Tehran and Athens], *Cumhuriyet*, 15 March 1971.

⁹¹ A later study argues that many Turks in those days believed that the CIA overthrew Menderes because he had tried to reach out the Soviets for more development aid: Altan, *Türkiye ve Süperler*, 100-3.

⁹² "27 Mayıs Devriminde Amerikan Gizli Teşkilatının Rolü" [The Secret Role of the American Secret Organization During the 27 May Revolution], *Yön*, 2 January 1963; "Amerikan İstihbarat Teşkilatının Marifetleri" [The Deeds of the American Intelligence Organization], *Yön*, 10 Şubat 1965; "Amerikalılar ve Türk Gençliği" [Americans and Turkish Youth], *Yön*, 6 August 1965; "Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatını Uyarıyoruz" [We are warning the National Intelligence Organization], *Yön*, 13 August 1965; "Barış gönüllüleri hakkında" [On the Peace volunteers] *Cumhuriyet*, 25 July 1966. A Peace Corps volunteer who worked as an English teacher in the central Anatolian town of Kayseri in 1964-66 recalled that, despite the occasional arguments with the locals over Cyprus and U.S. bases, most Turks appreciated his work. Author's interview with Peace Corps volunteer, Charlottesville, 10 June 2009.

I want to write about the new oil refinery, [but the column] turns out to be about America. [I]ron and steel works in Ereğli, it's America. If you're interested in the automobile industry, you end up with America. If you would like to examine the insurance industry, it's America. If you focus on [d]evelopment, it's America. It's [a]s if the dogs in the streets and the cats at home are barking and meowing in American. [I] still haven't found a subject not related to America.⁹³

Selçuk's cartoonish image showed how Turks of radical leftist persuasions believed that their country's Cold War alliance with the United States undermined its development.

As the U.S. war in Vietnam escalated, the country on the other end of Asia entered into the radical leftist discourse and contributed to anti-Americanism in Turkey. In 1966, *Cumhuriyet* columnist Kayhan Sağlamer pointed out that the Vietnam War would destroy agriculture and make the Southeast Asian nation dependent on foreign aid.⁹⁴ The veterinarian and nutritionist Osman Nuri Koçtürk took that argument further: U.S. foreign assistance, especially food aid, aimed to make poor nations dependent on the United States. As evidence, Koçtürk pointed to programs such as "Food for Peace" (PL 480), which sold excess U.S. farm products to countries that faced agricultural shortages. The United States, Koçtürk said, fought in Vietnam to destroy that country's food supply and create a market for U.S. agricultural products.⁹⁵

The Labor Party of Turkey tried to use the brewing anti-Americanism and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam to its advantage. In November 1966, TİP chairman Mehmet Ali Aybar joined the "International War Crimes Tribunal," a civil society initiative that accused the U.S. government of war crimes in Vietnam. After visiting North Vietnam in 1967, Aybar shared his observations with his compatriots.⁹⁶

⁹³ İlhan Selçuk, "Komünizm Tehlikesi ve Amerika" [Danger of Communism and America], *Cumhuriyet*, 4 May 1966.

⁹⁴ Osman Nuri Koçtürk, *Barış ve Emperyalizm* [Peace and Imperialism] (İstanbul: Ararat Yayınevi, 1968); Kayhan Sağlamer, "Pirinç Savaşı: Vietnam faciasından Türkiye için çıkarılabilecek ders" [Rice War: Lessons from the Vietnam disaster for Turkey], *Cumhuriyet*, 8 June 1966.

⁹⁵ Osman Nuri Koçtürk, *Yeni Sömürgecilik Açısından Gıda Emperyalizmi* [Food Imperialism as It Relates to the New Colonialism] (Ankara Toplum Yayınları, 1966); Osman Nuri Koçtürk, *Beslenme ve Yeni Sömürgecilik* [Nutrition and the New Colonialism] (İstanbul: Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı, 1966).

⁹⁶ Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Vietnam'da Gördüklerim* [The Things I Saw in Vietnam] (Ankara: TİP, 1967).

The question of Vietnam affected aspiring revolutionaries in Turkey. Many of them university students with middle and upper class backgrounds and centered at the leftist Ideas' Clubs (Fikir Kulüpleri), these young would-be revolutionaries resolved to tackle their country's underdevelopment. They argued the following: Turkey's educational facilities served only one-third of its population. There was one physician for every 635 people in Istanbul but only one doctor to serve 9,400 individuals in Anatolia. In the 1950s, foreign direct investment was 39 million liras but repatriated profits were more than 120 million liras. Of NATO's 5.8 million troops, 480,000 of them were Turkish, which made Turkey the second largest military force in the Western alliance, an unjust burden on a poor country.⁹⁷

Educational opportunities and the liberal provisions of the 1961 constitution gave radical students access to the works of famous international revolutionaries: Carlos Marighella, Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, Mao Zedong, Régis Debray, and Vo Nguyen Giap.⁹⁸ Of course, there was also the example of Mustafa Kemal and his comrades, who had defeated Western imperialists after World War I. Deniz Gezmiş, a leading student radical and later symbol of armed resistance, called on his peers to prepare for the fight against imperialism.⁹⁹

In 1968, much like their peers around the globe and in response to the Demirel government's increasing repression, radical Turkish youth turned "Yankee go home" from slogan into action. On 16 July, İstanbul Technical University students stoned a hotel hosting sailors from the visiting U.S. Sixth Fleet. When police stormed the school's dormitories to catch the culprits

⁹⁷ Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi (ODTÜ) Sosyalist Fikir Kulübü Tanıtma Broşürü [Middle East Technical University (METU) Socialist Ideas Club Brochure] (Ankara, 1967). A contemporaneous CHP brochure stressed similar points: for every 100 child who graduated from primary school, only 10 could continue on to middle school. Of that 10, only 4 went on to high school and only 2 would get into university.

⁹⁸ Carlos Marighella, *Şehir Gerillası* [The Urban Guerilla] (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1970); Ernesto Guevara, *Savaş Anıları* [War Memoirs] (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1968); Mao Tsetung, *Gerilla Harbi* [Guerilla Warfare] (İstanbul: Payel Yayınevi, 1967); Régis Debray, *Devrimde Devrim* [Revolution in the Revolution] (Ankara: Toplum Yayınları, 1967); Vo Nguyen Giap, *Halk Savaşı, Halk Ordusu* [People's War, People's Army] (Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1968).

⁹⁹ Deniz Gezmiş, "Gençlik ve Antiemperyalist Kavga" [Youth and the Anti-imperialist Fight], *Türk Solu* 2, No. 53 (19 November 1968): 7.

and prevent new attacks the following day, one student was fatally injured. His schoolmates responded by beating up American sailors along Dolmabahçe pier and throwing them overboard. Protests broke out in other cities.¹⁰⁰

Robert Komer's appointment as U.S. ambassador to Turkey in November 1968 made a bad situation worse. Known as "Blowtorch Bob" for his managerial toughness, Komer seemed like the ideal choice for a hard post. However, his previous duties tainted Komer's mission in Ankara before it even began: "Blowtorch" had served in the CIA as an analyst from 1948 until 1960 and headed the notorious rural pacification program (Phoenix) in Vietnam.¹⁰¹ For Turkish critics of America, Komer's ambassadorship meant that Phoenix was coming to their country.¹⁰² When the U.S. envoy arrived in Turkey in November 1968, massive demonstrations broke out in İstanbul and Ankara. During Komer's visit to Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara on 6 January 1969, students overturned and burned his car.¹⁰³

Another Sixth Fleet visit in February 1969 created pandemonium in İstanbul. Thousands of activists from 76 radical youth groups staged demonstrations throughout the week of 10 February. Even female students, who normally stayed away from political rallies, organized anti-U.S. protests. This time, however, the far-right hit back. Ostensibly annoyed at radical students' "disrespecting" the Turkish flag (few leftists carried it during protests), the far-right demonstrators held "Respect the Flag" (Bayrağa Saygı) meetings and public prayers on 14 February (in an ironic image, some of the conservative students were pictured prostrating before

¹⁰⁰ "Amerikalıları protesto gösterileri kana bulandı: 35 yaralı" [Protest against Americans turned bloody: 35 injured]; "Ankara'da Amerikalılara ait binaların camları kırıldı" [American buildings' windows broken in Ankara]; "Karaya çıkan denizcileri kalkanlı polisler korudu" [Police used shields to protect sailors coming on land]; "İzmir'de Amerikan Kütüphanesinin camları kırıldı" [Windows of American Library in Izmir broken] *Hürriyet*, 18 July, 19 July, 20 July, 22 July 1968.

¹⁰¹ Department of State Press Release, 18 November 1968, Box 157, NSF, CF, LBJ Library.

¹⁰² Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 139.

¹⁰³ "Teknik okul öğrencileri Amerikan bayrağı ile Komer'in resmini yaktı" [Technical school students burn American flag and Komer's picture], *Hürriyet*, 18 January 1969.

the U.S. fleet).¹⁰⁴ The leftist counter-protest on 16 February turned into a battle. With encouragement from the police, “commandos” ambushed groups of radical students near Beyazıt Square and severely beat them. With two students dead and another 200 wounded, the event came to be called “Bloody Sunday” (Kanlı Pazar). Demirel and the AP cabinet blamed the violence on TİP; student revolutionaries blamed AP and the United States.

Amidst the violent anti-Americanism in Turkey, the Nixon administration recalled Komer in May 1969 but tempers did not cool.¹⁰⁵ In June 1969, protestors trashed the U.S. military’s logistics group in Ankara (TUSLOG) and beat the five American servicemen working there. Public opinion began to turn more forcefully against the United States. In a September 1969 survey, 47 percent of workers said they believed that the United States exploited Turkey. Another 25 percent said they were not sure. The survey also showed that, the higher the educational level of respondents, the more anti-U.S. they became.¹⁰⁶

In October 1969, the image of U.S. “domination” of Turkey, TİP’s electoral defeat, and rightist backlash convinced leftist youth groups that their only option was to take up arms. That same month, the Federation of Ideas’ Clubs renamed itself the Federation of Revolutionary Youth (Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu–Dev-Genç) and declared a “war of liberation” against the United States and its “collaborators” in Turkey.¹⁰⁷

On 18 March 1970, Dev-Genç affiliated groups wrecked several American businesses in Istanbul. On 2-3 October, they bombed CENTO headquarters and the United States Information

¹⁰⁴ “MTTB Başkanı ‘Bu Gösteriler Komünistler İçin Fırsattır’ [MTTB President: “These Demonstrations are an Opportunity for Communists] *Hürriyet*, 14 February 1969.

¹⁰⁵ Per U.S. tradition, outgoing administrations are expected to leave ambassadorial appointments to their successors. “Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State,” 7 May 1969, *FRUS* 1969-1972, 29: 1043-47.

¹⁰⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 130.

¹⁰⁷ ODTÜ Sosyalist Fikir Kulübü [METU Socialist Ideas’ Club], *Kurtuluş Savaşımız, Sosyalizm, Bilim, Üniversite* [Our War of Liberation, Socialism, Science, University] (Ankara, 1969); Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyalist Fikir Kulübü [Hacettepe University Socialist Ideas’ Club], *Dünya’da, Türkiye’de Devrimci Mücadele ve Gençlik* [Revolutionary Struggle and the Youth in the World and Turkey] (Ankara, 1970).

Agency building in Ankara. The U.S. embassy became a target on 21 November. Attacks against the embassies of U.S. allies followed. By targeting such places, the young militants hoped to foment a national uprising in Turkey.¹⁰⁸ On 15 February 1971, a group led by Deniz Gezmiş kidnapped U.S. Air Force Sgt. James R. Finley in Ankara. In less than 24 hours, they released the African American airman (Turkish leftists held a sense of solidarity toward America's underprivileged). On 4 March, the same group kidnapped four U.S. radar operators and threatened to kill them unless they were paid a hefty ransom. Unable to execute unarmed people, Gezmiş and his comrades released those American captives as well.¹⁰⁹

The Demirel government's inability to stop such attacks and resolve economic problems brought about the 12 March 1971 "memorandum." Turkey's praetorian guards initially wanted to avoid the 27 May junta's bloodletting but they quickly changed their minds when Dev-Genç-affiliated militants kidnapped and killed the Israeli consul-general Ephraim Elrom in Istanbul on 17 May 1971. After Deniz Gezmiş and his friends Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan were captured, a military tribunal sentenced them to death in early 1972. The three men had not killed anyone but the 12 March regime felt the need to set an example.¹¹⁰

Another group that called itself the People's Liberation Army of Turkey kidnapped three NATO technicians in the Black Sea town of Ünye in March 1972. They offered to swap the two Britons and one Canadian with their condemned comrades. Military units soon tracked down the kidnappers (who were betrayed by the very peasants they were trying to "liberate"), killing them as well as the hostages in a firefight. On 6 May 1972, Gezmiş, Aslan, İnan were executed. For the deaths of their friends, Turkish revolutionaries blamed Ankara as well as Washington.

¹⁰⁸ Margaret Krahenbuhl, *Political Kidnappings in Turkey, 1971-1972* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977), xii.

¹⁰⁹ The Gezmiş group's kidnappings are covered in Erdal Öz, *Deniz Gezmiş Anlatıyor* [Deniz Gezmiş Relates] (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1976), 27-35.

¹¹⁰ "Deniz Gezmiş ve Arkadaşları İdam Edildi" [Deniz Gezmiş and Friends Executed], *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, 3: 295.

The 12 March regime, despite its brutality, brought a sense of calm. U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew's visit in October 1971 went uneventfully. In October 1973, Secretary of Transportation Claude Brinegar did not face protests when he led the U.S. delegation to the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Republic of Turkey. Brinegar also attended the opening ceremony of the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul. At a moment when Turks realized an age-old dream of connecting Europe to Asia, they showered their American guest with flowers. The scene was nothing like what U.S. sailors had encountered in 1968 and 1969.¹¹¹

This strange love-hate complex with America manifested itself after the deaths of former U.S. presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson. When Truman passed away on 26 December 1972, the U.S. embassy in Ankara set up a book of condolence. James W. Spain, the deputy chief of mission at the time, related the spectacle as follows:

For Truman, [w]ho had come to Turkey's aid in its time of need, the line waiting to sign the book stretched around the block. Every high government official came. Military officers wore U.S. shoulder patches from their service in Korea. [O]ne old gentleman insisted on introducing his 30-year-old son to me. "He was a baby in my arms when we stood [i]n İstanbul and looked down at your battleship *Missouri* come to save us from the Russians," he said. "We will never forget!"

Turks never forgot Johnson either. When LBJ died in January 1973, his condolence book at the U.S. embassy had "only a few signatures, the highest ranking being that of chief of protocol."¹¹²

On the whole, Turkish perceptions of the United States worsened from 1964 until 1973. The Cyprus crisis opened the floodgates and, despite Ankara's independence from Washington, the Turkish radical left blamed the United States for what were essentially the costs of modernization. Because Turkey's democratically-elected authoritarian governments and the

¹¹¹ Brinegar reported the processions to Nixon as follows: "We were sitting in a car that carried a big sign designating me as the representative of the United States. Several thousand Turks came toward us [and] applauded and even threw flowers into the car." Brinegar to Nixon, 21 November 1973, Box 70, White House Central Files [hereafter WHCF], Subject Files [hereafter SF], Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library [hereafter Nixon Library].

¹¹² James W. Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey: Memoirs of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 30.

military regime of 1971-73 suppressed radical leftists, these groups turned to political violence. Successful armed uprisings around the globe, especially Vietnam, created seemingly plausible alternatives for the young radicals. Thus, the violent anti-Americanism that Turkey experienced in the 1960s and 1970s was a result of that country's tradition of authoritarian modernization, rapid but unequal development, and its Cold War alliance with the United States.

The United States Deals With an Autonomous, Autocratic, and Stable Iran

Iran's domestic events and its foreign policy in the 1964-73 period – especially relations with the United States – bore little resemblance to what they were in the 1940s and 1950s. Political protests were rare, the economy grew at unprecedented rates, and the Shah enjoyed immense political security. As oil revenues rose, Tehran became unreceptive to U.S. aid and advice. The Shah pursued Iran's national interests independent of Washington and even argued that his country's modernization should set an example to other developing countries.¹¹³

Indeed, Iran seemed like an ideal modernizing country in the 1960s and 1970s; its socioeconomic transformation was nothing if not breathtaking: GDP increased from \$10.4 billion in 1960 to over \$50 billion in 1977. The oil industry accounted for much of that growth: its share in the country's GDP surged from 18.6 percent in 1964 to 45 percent in 1976.¹¹⁴ Iran produced over two million barrels of oil per day (bpd) in 1967, 5 million bpd in 1972, and exported most of it. Petrodollars filled state coffers.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile, services and non-oil industry supplanted agriculture as the leading economic sector. Before the White Revolution, agriculture had produced a quarter of the national income

¹¹³ Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *The White Revolution* (Tehran: Kayhan, 1967), 171-73.

¹¹⁴ Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 107.

¹¹⁵ One-half of the Iranian government's \$1 billion budget in 1967 came from oil revenues. Julian Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 45, 68, 167. Oil production figures from Andrew Scott Cooper, *Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 52.

and employed over 56 percent of the labor force. By 1976, its share in GDP and the labor force decreased to 9.8 and 34 percent, respectively. The non-oil industry's contribution to GDP increased from 15.8 percent in 1964 to 22.5 percent in 1971 while services constituted 37.7 percent of GDP in 1964 and 40.1 percent in 1973. By the mid-1970s, two-thirds of Iranians worked in industry and services.¹¹⁶ Of the country's tens of thousands of factories and workshops, 89 percent were privately owned.¹¹⁷

Human development was just as impressive: as infant and maternal mortality declined, Iran's population increased from 19 million in 1956 to 35 million in 1976. Literacy reached 30 percent in 1966 from 15 percent in 1956.¹¹⁸ Life expectancy at birth, which was 44 in 1960, reached 55 by 1975.¹¹⁹ While Iran had 52,000 students in higher education in 1966, that figure reached 450,000 ten years later. An additional 67,000 students pursued undergraduate and graduate degrees in the United States and Europe, mostly on state scholarships. Improvements in primary and secondary education kept pace.¹²⁰

Iran's impressive socioeconomic development from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s meant that the Shah enjoyed the steadiest years of his rule. For much of the period, aside from the military and SAVAK, the core of the Shah's supporters were elements of the modern middle class, especially the Progressive Club (Kanoon-e Motaraqqi). Formed in 1959 as a semi-formal network of senior bureaucrats in the National Iranian Oil Company and the Plan Organization, the Progressive Club's mission was to debate and find solutions to Iran's socioeconomic troubles. According to Amir Abbas Hoveyda, a leading member of the group and later prime minister, the

¹¹⁶ Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, 107-9.

¹¹⁷ Bhariar, *Economic Development in Iran*, 170-83.

¹¹⁸ Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran: An Economic Profile* (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1977), 14-15.

¹¹⁹ Life expectancy figures from the World Bank's online database: <http://data.worldbank.org>; accessed on 2 June 2012.

¹²⁰ Nearly 55,000 of that 67,000 were in the United States. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, 113-14.

Progressives wanted “to turn economic development [into] a [reality].” They believed that, by working within the system, the modern middle class could “pave the way to development.”¹²¹ The Shah, for his part, liked the Progressives because they were focused on socioeconomic matters. He welcomed their forming a political party, the New Iran Party (Hezb-e Iran Novin), which gained a majority in the Majles in early 1964. Hasan Ali Mansour, the leader of the Progressives, became prime minister on 7 March 1964.

The Mansour cabinet’s first challenge was to pass the status of forces agreement (SOFA), a legal document clarifying the jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in allied countries. Remembering how capitulations had allowed foreigners to evade local courts during Qajar times, Iranian officials seldom waived the right to try U.S. servicemen in their courts after World War II, which caused a backlash in the United States.¹²² In early 1964, the Johnson administration signaled to the Shah that his habitual requests for more weapons could be honored if his government were to sign a SOFA for U.S. personnel in Iran.¹²³

The problem with the U.S.-Iranian SOFA was that it included an addendum that extended immunity to the relatives of U.S. military personnel in Iran. It is not clear why the Johnson administration insisted on a provision that U.S. military families did not enjoy in other countries. What is clear is that, despite being hand-picked by the Shah, deputies of the twenty-first Majles (elected in October 1963) did not wish to ratify the agreement. Even Justice Minister Mohammed Bahari objected to the agreement because it “smacked of colonialism.”¹²⁴

¹²¹ Quotes from Abbas Milani, *The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution* (Washington: Mage, 2000), 142, 154.

¹²² Pfau, “The Legal Status of American Forces in Iran,” 142-50.

¹²³ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975), 361-63

¹²⁴ Milani, *Persian Sphinx*, 160.

The SOFA and its effect on anti-Americanism in Iran will be covered in the next section but its two important repercussions need to be mentioned here. The SOFA ratification debate brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini back into politics. Following Khomeini's imprisonment after the June 1963 riots, Prime Minister Mansour, with the help of SAVAK chief, General Hasan Pakravan, had secured the release of the sexagenarian cleric from house arrest.¹²⁵ Amidst the ratification of the U.S.-Iranian treaty in October 1964, Khomeini again denounced the Shah and his dealings with the United States. This time, the Pahlavi regime exiled the ayatollah to Turkey. In 1965, Khomeini moved to the city of Najaf in Iraq, one of most prominent centers of Shia Islam, which allowed him to expand his network of supporters inside Iran.¹²⁶

The second major result of the SOFA ratification was more dire: on 22 January 1965, a Fedayan-e Islam militant shot Prime Minister Mansour outside the Majles to avenge the regime's maltreatment of Ayatollah Khomeini. Hoveyda, a former diplomat, NIOC chairman, and Mansour's deputy, became prime minister. For the next thirteen years, Hoveyda tried to act as an intermediary between the Pahlavi regime and the country's intelligentsia and middle class; in fact, the Iran Novin Party turned into an instrument of the Shah's will.

Although several scholars have criticized Johnson for enabling the Shah's authoritarianism and his weapons purchases,¹²⁷ the historical record reveals a more complicated picture. Initially, the Johnson administration worked to keep the Shah focused on reform and not military affairs. In June 1964, prior to the Shah's meeting with Johnson at the White House, NSC staff member Robert Komer suggested that the president should "shift the conversation to [the Shah's] reform program." To stroke Johnson's ego, Komer alluded to the Great Society program

¹²⁵ Milani, *Persian Sphinx*, 173.

¹²⁶ Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 139.

¹²⁷ Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (3rd ed.; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 221-27; James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 154-215.

and wrote to his boss that “we want [the Shah] to catch [y]our enthusiasm for domestic reform.”¹²⁸ Komer gave the president a separate memorandum outlining a list of items “the Shah will like to hear” at his meetings with LBJ, almost all of it aiming to steer the conversation away from military affairs. Clearly, the Johnson administration still hoped that the Shah would engage in political as well as socioeconomic reform in Iran.¹²⁹

U.S. government agencies, too, focused on the Shah’s democratic deficit in the mid-1960s. A CIA report in December 1964 pointed out that the Shah no longer enjoyed the support of the clergy and landlords and had not built an alliance with the peasantry and urban labor in its stead. The report expressed concern that new economic disruptions could undermine the gains of the White Revolution.¹³⁰

The State Department’s INR bureau observed the situation along similar lines in 1965:

[T]o weaken the religious structure of Iranian society, as the Shah appears to be doing, believing this necessary to carry on his campaign to modernize Iran, has proven to be a dangerous course of action. Popular reactions to this policy are already apparent. As reaction[ary] as the present clergy is, the very nature of religion in Iran is such that it is capable of change and adaptation.

The report further assessed how Khomeini and other clerics could have helped the Shah:

Although Khomeini is reactionary and provincial in outlook, [t]here are few leaders in Iran who [could] [f]ormulate [a] religious justification for modernization. Khomeini is recognized as the leading philosophical exponent of *ijtihad* [sic], the Shia doctrine whereby change can be adapted to an Islamic framework. [T]he power of the ulema might have been used to justify and institutionalize the changes. Had the Shah consulted with the leaders of the religious community, considered their ideas, and had he given [them] a constructive role to play, opposition [f]rom religious [circles] would have been considerably lessened.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Documents 33 and 34, both titled “Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson,” 5 June 1964, *FRUS* 1964-1968, 22:71-73.

¹²⁹ “Memorandum for the President,” 5 June 1964, Box 27, NSF, Komer Files, LBJ Library.

¹³⁰ “Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” Washington, 11 December 1964, *FRUS* 1964-1968, 22: 116-17.

¹³¹ “Paper Prepared in the Department of State,” 1965 [exact date unknown], *FRUS* 1964-1968, 22: 122-23.

Interestingly, even as the Shah retained his absolutist rule in the 1960s and 1970s, he continued to praise democracy. In a meeting with the Senate president and the Majles speaker in December 1969, he reportedly said that “the people must be allowed a greater say and be given real freedom in elections at every level: the regional councils, the municipalities, and the Parliament itself.” Asadollah Alam, who now served the Pahlavi king as court minister, recognized that democratization was “the right policy.”¹³²

But another entry in Alam’s diary reveals the Shah’s and his inner circle’s mixed feelings about attaining modernization through an open political system: Alam noted “our greatest success lies in having put the clergy, landlords, chieftains, and communists firmly in their place.” Toughness against opponents guaranteed “the fate of the monarchy, provided that HIM [His Imperial Majesty] lays the foundations of democratic rule.” “In today’s world,” Alam continued, “autocratic rule [i]s neither acceptable nor likely to survive.”¹³³

Mohammed Reza Shah had neutralized his opponents so effectively that he had little cause to change the nature of his rule. In the past, U.S. diplomats, secretaries of state, and even presidents had counseled him on how to run his realm. When such efforts failed, CIA operatives and U.S. generals would pressure him to support U.S. actions – such as they had done during the 1953 coup. The Shah’s August 1967 visit to the United States showed that those days were gone. One of the backgrounders that Walt Rostow sent to President Johnson warned how “steeped in centuries of experience with Russian and British interference in Iran’s internal affairs (and some would add American interference), the Iranians are hypersensitive to anything smacking of foreigners’ lecturing them on how to run their country.” Whereas Komer had suggested to Johnson in 1964 to keep the Pahlavi king focused on reform, Rostow advised Johnson in 1967 to

¹³² Asadollah Alam, *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969-1977*, ed. Alinaghi Alikhani (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 110.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 121.

avoid topics such as party politics, religion, and freedom of the press and to concentrate on “economic development and the Shah’s ‘White Revolution’ program” lest he offend the Shah.¹³⁴

As Iran’s domestic scene calmed down and its economy boomed, the Shah became more assertive abroad. The most important aspect of the Shah’s new foreign policy was improving relations with the Soviet Union. Following his June 1965 visit to the USSR, the Shah accepted Moscow’s offer of \$290 million in low-interest credit for the construction of a steel mill and a machinery plant in Esfahan. Another agreement in 1968 provided for the expansion of that steel mill, construction of new lead and zinc mills, Soviet prospecting for minerals in Iran, and rebuilding the rail-line between Tehran and the town of Jolfa on the Soviet border.¹³⁵ The two sides also agreed to build irrigation and hydroelectricity dams on the rivers that demarcated their borders. By the late 1960s, Iran became the largest Middle Eastern market for Soviet nonmilitary goods and the largest recipient of Soviet civilian aid after India and Egypt. Over 3,000 Soviet advisers served in Iran at the time, the largest group anywhere in the Third World.¹³⁶ Likewise, the Soviet Union became Iran’s largest non-oil export market.¹³⁷ Relations improved to such a point that Tehran even bought weapons from Moscow.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Rostow to Johnson, “Visit of the Shah of Iran, August 22-24, 1967,” 22 August 1967, Box 9-1, Confidential File, CO 110, LBJ Library.

¹³⁵ “Technical, Industrial, and Financial Agreement Between the USSR and Iran,” 13 January 1966; “Agreement on Cultural Relations Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Imperial Government of Iran,” 22 August 1966; “Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Iran Concerning Economic and Technical Cooperation,” June 22, 1968, in Basil Dmytryshyn and Frederick Cox (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: A Documentary Record of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, 1917-1985* (Princeton: The Kingston Press, 1987), 377-410.

¹³⁶ Richard Herrmann, “The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946-1988,” in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), *Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 70.

¹³⁷ Iran’s non-oil exports amount to \$278 million in 1971, \$100 million of which was sold to the Soviet Union. *Enqelab-e Safid va Siyasat-e Mostaqel-e Melli-ye Iran* [The White Revolution and Iran’s Independent National Policy] (Tehran: Vazarat-e Amur Kharejeh, 1351/1972), 55.

¹³⁸ From 1966 to 1970, Iranian military imports from the USSR totaled \$344 million. Although that figure constituted only 12 percent of Iranian military purchases and 85 percent of the Iranian military hardware still came from the United States in the same period, the Shah wanted to signal that he had alternatives. Herrmann, “The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946-1988,” 70.

The U.S. government understood Iran's new bearing. In 1966, the CIA described "the Shah's [a]cceptance of a Soviet steel mill" as "a testimony to his new feeling of confidence."¹³⁹ The State Department observed that "the Shah's independent position must be understood as part of a longer trend to which Mossadeq [sic] over a decade ago had given new impetus – [t]he emergence of Iran from a quasi-colonial status to one in which [it] would exercise [p]ower over its own affairs."¹⁴⁰ These analyses showed that the U.S.-Iranian alliance was becoming one of equal partners. When USAID terminated its assistance program in Iran after "graduating" it from the category of "developing country" in 1967, U.S. tutelage had come to an end.¹⁴¹

As the Shah improved relations with Moscow, he began to worry about Iraq. In 1968, when the Arab nationalist Baath Party took over in Baghdad, it set its gaze on Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan province and the Arvand/Shatt al-Arab waterway.¹⁴² In April 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty administering shipping on the Arvand. The treaty had given Iraq suzerainty over the waterway and forced Iranian ships using the ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan to pay tolls to Iraq. In order to get Baghdad to recognize the median line on the Arvand as the boundary, the Shah began supporting Iraqi Kurdish groups that were fighting Baghdad for autonomy.¹⁴³

Imperial Iran also undertook tough oil diplomacy from the late 1960s onward. Not only did the Shah demand a greater share of profits from the oil consortium, he also sought to control the production and pricing of Iran's oil, badgering Western companies to pay him \$1 billion for the Iranian crude they sold on world markets. Although the Shah received a figure below that demand in 1969, he got what he wanted at the OPEC meeting of February 1971 in Tehran, where

¹³⁹ "Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency," 30 March 1966, *FRUS* 1964-1968, 22: 227.

¹⁴⁰ "National Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State," 2 February 1967, *FRUS* 1964-1968, 22: 343.

¹⁴¹ "Administrative History, Agency for International Development," 222, [undated], Box 1, Administrative History, Agency for International Development Volume I, LBJ Library.

¹⁴² Aryeh Yodfat, *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 34.

¹⁴³ Alam, *The Shah and I*, 39, 327.

international oil companies agreed to increase producer countries' profit margins. The 1971 victory paved the way for greater price increases in 1973.¹⁴⁴

More petrodollars ushered a greater role for Iran in the Persian Gulf. In 1968, when Britain declared that it would grant independence and end its security commitments to the Arab emirs of the Gulf by the end of 1971, the Shah moved to fill the vacuum. Even though Iran had laid claim to Bahrain until the turn of the twentieth century, it recognized the independence of the island in August 1971. Washington and London remained silent when, on 30 November 1971, Iran landed marines on the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs (supposedly administered by the emirate of Sharjah) at the mouth of the Hormuz Straits.¹⁴⁵ In 1973, Iran sent an expeditionary force to help Sultan Qaboos of Oman fight the South Yemen-backed rebellion in Dhofar.¹⁴⁶ Beyond the Gulf, the Shah supported other U.S. allies, too, by donating his F-5 fighter jets to South Vietnam, Jordan, and Morocco.¹⁴⁷

Unlike their predecessors, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were comfortable with the Shah's assertiveness. They saw Iran as a bulwark against potential troublemakers, especially Iraq, and they were reluctant to arbitrate territorial disputes between Iran and Arab powers in the Persian Gulf.¹⁴⁸ In a June 1970 memorandum, Kissinger informed Nixon that "there is a substantial and positive role Iran can play in providing security and stability [in] the Persian Gulf

¹⁴⁴ Cooper, *Oil Kings*, 146.

¹⁴⁵ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 198. On the Shah's Bahrain policy, see Roham Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968-1970," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 37, No. 2 (August 2010): 159-77.

¹⁴⁶ According to one U.S. government report, Iran had a brigade of 3,000 soldiers as well as transport aircraft, helicopters, and fighter jets in Oman. See "Background Paper: The Dhofar Rebellion," 9 January 1974, Box 14, Presidential Country Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. On Iran's role in the Dhofar rebellion, see James F. Goode, "Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972-75," *Iranian Studies* 47, No. 3 (May 2014): 441-62.

¹⁴⁷ Alam, *The Shah and I*, 374, 468-69.

¹⁴⁸ "Telegram 2225 from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State," 25 May 1970, *FRUS* 1969-1972, E-4.

after the British leave.”¹⁴⁹ Thus, when Nixon visited the Shah in May 1972, he had little to do but acquiesce to the Shah’s demand to purchase any conventional U.S. weapons. The subsequent \$16 billion arms trade between the United States and Iran revealed the interdependence between the two sides. “Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,” writes the historian Roham Alvandi, “was an architect, not an instrument, of the Nixon Doctrine in the Persian Gulf.”¹⁵⁰

Despite all its achievements, however, much was rotten in the Pahlavi kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s. The Shah’s political authoritarianism created problems for the Iranian economy not even the petroleum-fueled growth could mitigate. According to the historian Abbas Milani, “the Shah had a pseudo-Socialist, statist vision [w]here the state could and should become an economic leviathan.”¹⁵¹ In one of his most infamous interviews with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in 1973, the Shah insisted that his government would outlive Western regimes and singled out Scandinavian countries for contempt: “I achieve[d] more than the Swedes,” he said, then sneered: “[H]uh! Swedish socialism! [I]t didn’t even nationalize forests and water. But I have.”¹⁵² The Shah was too modest: aside from forests and water, his regime nationalized Iran’s only private television network, the first private university in Shiraz, and the richest private mines in the 1960s. By the time of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the practice of seizing property had become normal in Iran.¹⁵³

Autocracy created other problems. After the White Revolution, the Pahlavi state failed to provide adequate credit and training to farmers while too many farmers received plots too small to provide sustenance. Although it was illegal to sell land received under the land reform

¹⁴⁹ “Memorandum for the President,” 25 June 1970, Box 601, National Security Council (NSC) Files, CF–Middle East, Nixon Library.

¹⁵⁰ Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” *Diplomatic History* 36, No. 2 (April 2012): 372. Also see Stephen McGlinchey, “Richard Nixon’s Road to Tehran: The Making of the U.S.-Iran Arms Agreement of May 1972,” *Diplomatic History* 37, No. 4 (Sept. 2013): 841-60.

¹⁵¹ Abbas Milani, *The Shah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 263.

¹⁵² Fallaci, “Interview with the Shah of Iran,” 16, 19.

¹⁵³ Milani, *The Shah*, 263.

program, many farmers sold off their holdings to immigrate to the cities.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, because tea plantations, orchards, and mechanized farmlands were exempt from redistribution, many landlords used legal loopholes to retain *de facto* control over their property.¹⁵⁵

In the face of failed land reform, the Iranian government turned to private corporations to start large agro-businesses and increase efficiency. The plan did not work: from 1962 until 1972, even as the total output of foodstuffs (wheat, barley, rice, and sugar) increased and the agricultural sector grew at 3.6 percent a year, demand for food rose at 12.5 percent per annum.¹⁵⁶ Despite mechanization and increased use of fertilizers, productivity rose slowly. Meanwhile, large dams, deep wells, and extensive water usage dried up the traditional man-made underground water tunnels (*qanats*), which further hurt small farmers.¹⁵⁷

Iran faced a serious food shortage by the early 1970s. While the country had been generally self-sufficient in agriculture until the early 1960s, its annual food imports totaled \$2.5 billion by the early 1970s (and would reach \$4 billion by the end of the decade).¹⁵⁸ The Pahlavi state's attempts to control food prices worsened the problem. Because the Cereal Organization offered low prices, farmers sold 85 tons of their wheat (less than one-tenth of 1 percent of total production) to the state while Iran imported over 1.25 million tons. Foreign wheat cost the state an average of 2,500 rials (about \$33) more per ton than what it paid to domestic producers. Imported grain was then sold to millers and bakers at a discount in order to keep bread prices low.¹⁵⁹ No one thought of saving hard currency by paying Iranian farmers a fair price.

¹⁵⁴ Miklos, *The Iranian Revolution and Modernization*, 39.

¹⁵⁵ Eric J. Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 121.

¹⁵⁶ Miklos, *The Iranian Revolution and Modernization*, 38-40.

¹⁵⁷ The number of combines, tractors, and fertilizers increased from 900, 6,000, and 18,000 tons in 1962 to 1,800, 23,000, and 32,800 tons in 1971, respectively. Figures from Mohammad Javad Amid, *Agriculture, Poverty, and Reform in Iran* (London: Routledge, 1990), 121-22.

¹⁵⁸ Eric J. Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 121.

¹⁵⁹ Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran*, 114.

The decline in Iran's countryside affected its cities as well. The percentage of Iranians living in urban areas grew from about one-third of the population in 1956 to one-half by 1976. By 1973, there were only 1.6 million residential dwellings (27 percent of it in Tehran) for an estimated 2.8 million urban households—a shortage of 1.13 million units. Even though the Iranian government allocated five percent of GDP to housing projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s, poor implementation caused building material to be directed to high-end housing projects. The majority that could not afford expensive homes built squalid dwellings.¹⁶⁰ Escaping the social control of their rural landlords, former villagers offered a receptive audience to radical clerics.¹⁶¹

Iran's unprecedented economic growth and political stability created many winners – the Shah being the most prominent among them. Unlike the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, Iran in the 1964-73 period seemed like the ideal modernizing country. As Imperial Iran's fortunes improved, it dealt with its neighbors and the United States in a much more self-confident manner. Nonetheless, violent anger against the Shah and the United States from the mid-1960s onward reflected the weaknesses of the Pahlavi regime.

Autocracy, Militant Radicalism, and Anti-Americanism in Iran

While the Shah expected his compatriots to receive the White Revolution as a blessing, the inequalities borne out of rapid socioeconomic development hurt his regime in the 1960s and 1970s. As Iran became more urban, more educated, and more opulent, the Shah assumed the mantle of an absolutist monarch and Iranian politics turned archaically authoritarian.¹⁶² This mismatch between rapid socioeconomic development and autocracy radicalized the intelligentsia

¹⁶⁰ Amuzegar, *Iran: An Economic Profile*, 106-7; Mohammed Gholi Majd, "On the Relationship Between Land Reform and Rural-Urban Migration in Iran, 1966-1976," *Middle East Journal* 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992): 440-55.

¹⁶¹ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 535-56.

¹⁶² The historian Ervand Abrahamian calls this phenomenon "the politics of uneven development." Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 419-49.

and clerical groups and convinced some young Iranians to take up arms against the Pahlavi regime and its supposed benefactor, the United States.

Much as the Cyprus crisis set the stage for anti-Americanism in Turkey, the passage of the SOFA in October 1964 marked the opening salvoes of Iran's violent anti-Americanism. Akin to the misunderstandings over the Johnson letter in Turkey, the effects of the SOFA in Iran were also unintended: when discontent against the agreement grew in the fall of 1964, Prime Minister Mansour lied about the legal status of the relatives of U.S. servicemen in Iran. Meanwhile, the Shah used popular disgruntlement for his own ends: he did not want to be perceived as forcing the Majles to rubber-stamp an unpopular agreement and he wanted to show that there was a genuine political opposition in Iran. Thus, not only did the Pahlavi king tolerate criticism against the SOFA bill in parliament, he encouraged it.¹⁶³

The ruse backfired. Ayatollah Khomeini, who had remained quiet after his release from prison earlier in 1964, began to lash out against the SOFA, the Shah, and the United States:

[The Majles deputies] have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog. If someone runs over a dog belonging to an American, he will be prosecuted. Even if the Shah himself were to run over a dog belonging to an American, he would be prosecuted. But if an American cook runs over the Shah or the *marja*, [n]o one will have a right to object.¹⁶⁴

Like many of his compatriots, Khomeini drew connections between his resentment against the United States, Iran's underdevelopment, and his nation's former oppressors:

Are we to be trampled underfoot by the boots of the Americans simply because we are a weak nation? Because we have no dollars? America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America and the Soviet Union is worse than both of them. Each is worse than the other; each one is more abominable than the other. But today we are concerned with this malicious entity that is America.

¹⁶³ Milani, *Persian Sphinx*, 161-62

¹⁶⁴ "Speech Sixteen: The Disclosure of the Revival of the Capitulation Bill by the Shah and His Rubber-Stamp Parliament," *IRIB World Service*, <http://www2.irib.ir/worldservice/imam/speech>; accessed 15 September 2012.

Let the American President know that in the eyes of the Iranian nation, he is the most repulsive member of the human race today because of the injustice he has imposed on our Muslim nation. Today, the Quran has become his enemy. The Iranian nation has become his enemy. Let the American government know that its name has been ruined and disgraced in Iran.¹⁶⁵

As Khomeini's defiance spun out of control, the Shah, notwithstanding Mansour's and SAVAK Chief General Pakravan's advice, exiled the dissident ayatollah to Turkey in November 1964. A year later, Tehran asked Ankara to dispatch Khomeini to Iraq, where it was hoped that more senior *mujtahids* would overshadow the relatively junior ayatollah. Instead, residency in Najaf, a major site for Iranian pilgrims, brought Khomeini closer to his supporters.¹⁶⁶

The Iraqi exile caused Khomeini to turn from a tough critic into an uncompromising revolutionary. The charismatic cleric's writings and sermons in exile, especially his famous 1970 treatise, *Islamic Government: Guardianship of the Jurist*, reflected this change. Khomeini had not called for the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime in 1963-64 (at least not clearly); in *Islamic Government*, however, he declared Islam as the "religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice; [w]ho desire freedom and independence; [w]ho struggle against imperialism." Until the arrival of the Hidden Imam, all governments, unless they were led by learned Islamic jurists, were illegitimate. Khomeini claimed that "Islam [d]oes not recognize monarchy and hereditary succession" and called for the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime.¹⁶⁷

In the early 1970s, however, the Shah had little reason to fear clerical opposition, irrespective of whether they came from radicals such as Khomeini or moderate constitutionalists such as Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Kazem Shariatmadari. The feeling of invincibility allowed the Shah to stage a lavish self-coronation ceremony in 1967 (he never had one after ascending the

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 139.

¹⁶⁷ Quotes from "Islamic Government" in Hamid Algar (ed.) *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 28, 31.

throne in 1941) and to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971. When Tehran assumed complete control of its oil production in 1971 and spearheaded the OPEC price hike two years later, the future brimmed with hope for Imperial Iran.

Yet not everyone saw things the Shah's way. From the mid-1960s onward, the Confederation of Iranian Students, National Union (CISNU) increased its opposition to the Pahlavi regime and the United States. From their congress in Karlsruhe in mid-1965, the Iranian student federation in West Germany called upon compatriots at home "to hold the banner of freedom high until the day of liberation [from the Shah's regime]" and condemned the United States for "propping up the Shah."¹⁶⁸

CISNU-affiliated dissident groups connected their struggle against autocracy in Iran with anti-imperialist movements in Cuba, Vietnam, Palestine, and South Africa. Bahman Nirumand, a dissident writer in West Germany, related his country's problems to other anti-imperialist struggles as follows: "What is at stake [in Vietnam] is not only the head of [South Vietnamese Premier] Marshal Ky [but also] the Shah's head, the heads of the guerrillas in South America, and the heads of the African viceroys of the Free World." The success of the anti-imperialist North Vietnam, Nirumand said, would spell doom for U.S.-allied regimes elsewhere.¹⁶⁹ CISNU congresses from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s denounced U.S. military interventions in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and Cambodia. In many of the congresses' minutes, "death to American imperialism" mixed with "death to dictatorship" in Iran. Vietnam may have been on the other end of Asia, but it was not too far from the minds of Iranians.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ "Masoubat-e Hashtomin Kongre-ye Federasyon-e Daneshjuyan-e Irani dar Alman va Berlin-e Gharbi" [Decisions of the Eighth Congress of the Federation of Iranian Students in Germany and West Berlin], Box 1, Hamid Shawkat Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University [hereafter Shawkat Collection].

¹⁶⁹ Bahman Nirumand, *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 189.

¹⁷⁰ These arguments clearly had reflections within Iran: as the American political scientist James Bill traveled through northwest Iran in April 1966, he was surprised to hear a Turkmen mullah asking why the United States bombed "Saigoon" and whether it intended to do the same to Iran. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 9.

Beyond messages and publications, CISNU activists organized protests and connected with international NGOs to raise awareness about human rights violations in their homeland. From the mid-1960s through the 1970s, whenever the Shah visited a city in Western Europe or North America, CISNU activists organized protests. In 1971, the group compiled a book detailing the Pahlavi regime's human rights abuses against political opponents – the first instance where the practice of extended detentions, torture, and mass incarcerations in Iran came to the attention of Western audiences.¹⁷¹ In the second half of the 1970s, the efforts to raise awareness about human rights abuses in Iran would bear fruit, forcing the Shah to pay closer attention to the issue in the final years of his rule.¹⁷²

Of course, the most effective opposition against the Shah took place inside Iran. Ali Shariati, an early CISNU member, became especially successful upon his return to Iran after completing his doctorate in sociology at the Sorbonne in 1962. Born in Khorasan in 1933, Shariati had been raised by a religiously devout family. When he went to Paris on a state scholarship in 1959, Shariati came in contact with the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon that criticized the West's treatment of Third World countries. Especially Frantz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth*, a personal description of the Martinique-born psychiatrist's experiences in abandoning the French military to join the Algerian fighters during the Algerian Revolution, made a deep impression on Shariati. His Persian translation of Fanon's works – especially the idea of mobilizing the oppressed (*mostazafin*) against the oppressors (*mostakbarin*) – became the ideological keystone for radical Iranians who resented the Pahlavi autocracy.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ *Documents on the Pahlavi Reign of Terror in Iran: Eyewitness Reports and Newspaper Articles* (Frankfurt: CISNU, 1971).

¹⁷² Matthew Shannon, "'Contacts with the Opposition': American Foreign Relations, the Iranian Student Movement, and the Global Sixties," *The Sixties* 4, No. 1 (Jun. 2011): 1-29.

¹⁷³ Ali Rahnama, *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariati* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 105-7.

Shariati is even more important for this study because he used a modernist discourse to criticize the Pahlavi regime, thus laying the ideological groundwork for the Islamic Revolution. From the late 1960s until his arrest in 1972, Shariati gave popular lectures at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad institute in Tehran. Building on his academic training, the French-educated sociologist combined Islamic concepts with the language of class conflict, democracy, and modernity, which appealed to Iranians of all walks of life. His reinterpretation of key Shia figures, especially Imam Hossein, gave Islam a revolutionary power it had not enjoyed before. When Shariati declared “every month is Moharram, every day is Ashura, and everywhere is Karbala” in reference to Imam Hossein’s uprising and subsequent massacre at Karbala in 680, he equipped Iranians with one of the most potent slogans that would rock Iran in 1978-79.¹⁷⁴

Although Ali Shariati is better known for his works such as *Fatima is Fatima* and *Islamology*, many of his lectures also touched on the themes of oppression and modernization, which had significant implications for how the United States was viewed in Iran. In one lecture in May 1972, Shariti pointed out that, in ancient times

from Palestine to Iran, to Egypt, to China, to wherever society and civilization stretch[e]d itself, we [the oppressed] were made to carry stones to build pyramids, great palaces, and glorious temples. [O]ur fate was to lift heavy loads, to be oppressed and to be flogged and other than this, nothing. [A]nd now, my brother, in a society where our enemy stands before us in a powerful system where he rules in one sense, more than half of the world, and in another sense, all of the world, he is building our minds for a new generation of slavery.¹⁷⁵

In fact, the theme of anti-imperialism became so salient in Iran that it also affected moderate political observers and their views on the United States. In 1965, the physician Mahdi Bahar published a book titled *The Shameful Legacy of Colonialism* (Miraskhavar-e Este’mar), which denounced U.S. policy toward Iran as “petroleum imperialism.” Unlike previous

¹⁷⁴ Rahnama, *An Islamic Utopian*, 130, 176-7, 315.

¹⁷⁵ Ali Shariati, *Yea, Brother! That’s the Way It Was* (Tehran: The Shariati Foundation, 1979), 10, 11, 18.

imperialist powers, which competed for exclusive authority over colonies, Bahar accused the United States of maintaining a global open door policy to exploit the resources of developing countries such as Iran. “America’s imperialism [is] the basis of the modern [global] economy,” Bahar argued, calling for developing countries “to protect themselves from America’s attack.”¹⁷⁶

Indeed, Iranians who believed that that the U.S. government and American entrepreneurs wanted to exploit their country had an easy time to back their claims: in May 1970, 35 leading American industrialists and investors, joined by fellow Iranian entrepreneurs, held a 6-day conference in Tehran. The Tehran Investment Seminar, the largest of its kind at the time in a Third World country, included an all-star cast: James A. Linen of Time, Inc., David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank, Donald Kendall of Pepsi, Donald Burnham of Westinghouse, Najeeb Halaby of Pan American Airlines. U.S. development experts David Lilenthal and Eugene Black, who had experience working in Iran, were also present.¹⁷⁷

Although Iran’s political and economic elite welcomed the U.S. businessmen, middle-class nationalists and religious groups did not. Many denounced the gathering as a “conference of imperialists.” From Najaf, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that “any agreement that is concluded with these American capitalists and other imperialists is contrary to the will of the people and the ordinances of Islam.”¹⁷⁸ Mohammed Reza Saidi, a student of Khomeini, publicly criticized the conference. SAVAK subsequently arrested Saidi and tortured him to death on 10 June 1970.¹⁷⁹

Intellectual radicalism, combined with the Shah’s ostentatious displays of power and autocracy, convinced Iran’s young radicals to take up arms. Two guerilla organizations led the

¹⁷⁶ Quotes from Mahdi Bahar, *Miraskhavar-e Este’mar* [The Shameful Legacy of Colonialism] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1344/1965), 135-45; 547.

¹⁷⁷ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 180-82.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 181.

¹⁷⁹ Ali Davani, *Nahzat-e Rohaniyun-e Iran* [The Clerical Movement of Iran] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang-e Imam Reza, 1360/1981), 5: 309-23.

armed opposition against the Pahlavi regime in the 1970s: the Marxist Fedayan-e Khalq (People's Defenders) and the more religious Mujahedin-e Khalq (People's Warriors).

Although the two groups never posed a threat to political stability in Iran (unlike far-right and far-left groups in neighboring Turkey), their actions illustrate how and why anti-Americanism took a violent course. In February 1971, a small band of Fedayan operatives stormed a gendarmerie post in the village of Siahkal in Gilan province in the Caspian region (the same area where Mirza Kuchik Khan had led the *Jangali* rebellion in the 1920s). By initiating armed conflict, the militants hoped to ignite a popular revolution.¹⁸⁰ But just like their comrades in Turkey in 1971-72, the revolutionaries in Iran were reported to the authorities by the very villagers they were hoping to liberate. Despite the disappointment, the militants fought on. During the 2500th anniversary celebration of the Persian Empire at Persepolis in October 1971, the Fedayan bombed power lines in Tehran and the Iranian-American Cultural Center. Earlier in 1970, the Marxist group had robbed two banks to pay for the arms they had imported from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.¹⁸¹

The Mujahedin were even bolder than the Fedayan: they attempted to kidnap U.S. ambassador Douglas MacArthur II on 30 November 1970. During Richard Nixon's visit in May 1972, the Islamic group set off bombs against various U.S. targets in Tehran. A traffic accident near Reza Shah's mausoleum that ignited a fuel truck right before Nixon's visit to the tomb may have targeted the U.S. president.¹⁸² Other Americans were not as lucky as their president. On 2 June 1973, Mujahedin militants assassinated Lt. Col. Lewis Hawkins, the deputy chief of the U.S. military mission in Tehran. In 1975 and 1976, the Mujahedin killed more U.S. citizens. Between

¹⁸⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988) and Peyman Vahabzadeh, *A Guerilla Odyssey: Modernization, Secularism, Democracy, and the Fadai Period of National Liberation in Iran, 1971-1979* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2010).

¹⁸¹ Vahabzadeh, *Guerilla Odyssey*, 25.

¹⁸² Alam, *The Shah and I*, 230.

1971 and 1975, the two armed groups conducted 31 bombings and bomb threats against American organizations and facilities. The USIA and the Iran-American Society buildings were targeted six times; the U.S. embassy twice; and the Peace Corps building once.¹⁸³ From 1971 until 1977, a total of 341 militants lost their lives in gun battles, executions (judicial and extra-judicial), torture, suicide, and “disappearance.”¹⁸⁴

Despite the increasing viciousness of anti-Americanism in Iran in the 1964-73 period, there were brief moments of pro-Americanism as well. In August 1967, a visiting American poet joined eleven Iranian poets for a night of poetry reading at the Abraham Lincoln Library of the USIA building in Tehran. An American researcher who attended the event relates the spectacle as follows: “Most of these poets, who were among the leading voices of Iran’s conscience during those days of tight Pahlavi control, had never before had any contact with Americans.” The encounter left a nice if brief feeling of amiability toward America among Iranian literati.¹⁸⁵

The Apollo 11 crew, who visited Iran as part of their world-wide tour in 1969, also impressed Iranians. Like many of his compatriots, Asadollah Alam was particularly struck by the humility and politeness of the three astronauts. “If it had been us or the Russians, the Germans or even the French who’d just come back from the moon,” Alam said, “we’d be puffed up like peacocks.” But the American spacemen “were so modest and kept such a low profile that you’d never have guessed the immensity of their achievement.”¹⁸⁶

On the whole, however, Iranian perceptions of the United States soured by the early 1970s. For much of the 1960s and early 1970s, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi paid lip service to democracy and development but only delivered on the latter, with partial success. The rise in oil

¹⁸³ Figures from Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 191.

¹⁸⁴ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 480.

¹⁸⁵ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 398.

¹⁸⁶ Alam, *The Shah and I*, 98.

prices in the late 1960s and the OPEC price hike in 1973 shielded the Shah from making tough economic choices and the need to transition to a free market democracy.

In this context, the Shah managed to mobilize more foes than loyalists. Poorly implemented land reform pushed villagers into the cities, where they joined other Iranians to form a receptive audience to a revolutionary reinterpretation of Islam. The decline of the countryside also angered Iran's agricultural producers. Autocracy, corruption, and economic mismanagement offended the modern middle class; some of Iran's educated folks began to take up arms to voice their grievances. The pillars of Iran's modernization in the 1964-73 period – unequal development, authoritarianism, and militant radicalism – would form the perfect political storm that would hit the Iranian scene in the second half of the 1970s.

Conclusion

From 1964 until 1973, the debilitating effects of the war in Vietnam and the rise of new players in the international system led Washington to recalibrate its global strategy. While Lyndon Johnson tried to decrease tensions with communist countries, his successor, Richard Nixon, made it a priority, realizing that the quagmire in Vietnam necessitated a recalibration of means and ends. The Johnson and Nixon administrations' pursuit of *détente* encouraged U.S. allies to chart a more independent course in their foreign policy in the 1964-73 period.

As the United States became relatively less powerful, the nature of its alliances with Turkey and Iran changed – a fact that had much to do with the transformation of the two countries. The tremendous gains in national income, industrialization, education, literacy, and public health improved the lives of Turks and Iranians of all walks of life. But the combination of unequal socioeconomic development and political repression offended many groups in the two countries, who began to perceive the U.S. alliance as a detriment to national interests. Many

Turks and Iranians also saw the war in Vietnam as proof of American “imperialism” in action; they accused the United States of having “imperialistic” aims toward their countries as well. Young radicals in Turkey and Iran decided to stage armed uprisings similar to the ones in Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam to thwart “American imperialism.”

Despite sharing similar root causes and comparable patterns, anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran evolved somewhat differently. The ethnic strife that broke out in Cyprus in 1963-64 initiated the anti-U.S. anger in Turkey. Turks, who expected U.S. support against Greek attempts to unify the island with Greece, received the Johnson letter instead. Many Turks began to criticize their country’s alliance with the United States and the U.S. role in Turkey.

The resulting anti-U.S. sentiment played a big role in Turkish politics. As AP chairman and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel attacked the center-left CHP and the far-left TİP in the late 1960s, he garnered for himself and for the United States many enemies. Anti-U.S. critics – especially those on the far left – saw the nationalist Demirel as a “puppet of U.S. imperialism.” To throw off “Yankee imperialism” in their country, young Turkish radicals took up arms against their own government. The ensuing violence, in which U.S. military and diplomatic personnel also became targets, led to a breakdown in public order in Turkey by the early 1970s. In March 1971, the military once again stepped in to “correct” the civilians.

Unlike Turkey, Iran enjoyed stability at home and abroad in the 1964-73 period as Mohammed Reza Shah became the undisputed Persian potentate. Access to more petrodollars and weapons began to turn Iran into a regional power. With U.S. and Israeli support, the Shah armed Iraqi Kurds to force Baghdad into compromising over the Arvand/Shatt al-Arab waterway. In 1971, in the wake of Britain’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the Shah acquired the strategic islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs.

Despite these successes, the status of forces agreement with the United States in 1964 turned a new page in anti-Americanism in Iran. While the Shah's confrontation with Khomeini offended the clergy and devout Iranians, the failures of land reform and the lack of a competitive political system prevented the Shah from building a long-lasting alliance with the masses. While Iran's modern middle class was the major beneficiary of the Shah's reforms, only some of its members supported the Pahlavi king. Overall, even as the Shah's regime appeared robust, its authoritarianism made the externalities of modernization unbearable for many Iranians.

Unlike neighboring Turkey, where anti-American groups were primarily radical leftists who relied on anti-imperialist, modernist, and sometimes patriotic themes, anti-U.S. forces in Iran combined nationalism and Islam with anti-imperialism and modernization. Young Iranians who saw Mohammed Reza Shah as a U.S. puppet formed armed groups to attack the Pahlavi state as well as U.S. interests in Iran. By employing violent means, groups such as the Mujahedin-e Khalq and the Fedayeen-e Khalq hoped to initiate a popular uprising that would lead to a revolution in their country.

The 1964-73 period proved a critical turning point in the history of Turkey and Iran and in their relations with the United States. Even though a liberal, democratic, and egalitarian economic development did not guarantee a violence-free polity (as many West European countries experienced during 1968 and its aftermath), the political elites in Turkey and Iran undermined the prospects for stability and democracy in their countries by employing heavy-handed methods against students and labor activists, thereby radicalizing their opponents. After the mid-1970s, the two countries' authoritarian political systems would prove even more inadequate in coping with the challenges of modernization. The United States would once again receive the blame for the shortcomings of Turkish and Iranian leaders.

Chapter 5

Anti-Americanism Settles In, 1974-1980*

Introduction

From 1974 until 1980, anti-Americanism settled into its prominent role in Iran and Turkey. Despite the strains between Washington and Tehran over the latter's role in hiking the price of petroleum in global markets, U.S. support for Mohammed Reza Shah continued. After the revolution and the formation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used anti-U.S. sentiments to mobilize supporters and neutralize opponents. The hostage crisis of November 1979, when radical students attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held American diplomats hostage until January 1981, severed diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis of July-August 1974, the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Ankara. Political groups in Turkey, ranging from the center-left to the far-right, adopted the anti-U.S. arguments of the radical left.

Much like previous years, international dynamics from 1974 until 1980 defined the options of U.S., Turkish, and Iranian leaders. The price hike by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 initiated a global recession. After the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975, Washington's ability to project power declined further. The United States and the Soviet Union continued to engage in *détente* yet they exploited Third World conflicts. *Détente* began to unravel and Cold War tensions rose in the second half of the 1970s. Finally, modernization theory ceased to be the foreign policy ideology of the United States as the connections tying democracy, free markets, and development weakened throughout the world.¹

* Parts of this chapter previously appeared in Barın Kayaoğlu, "The Limits of Turkish-Iranian Cooperation, 1974-80," *Iranian Studies* 47, No. 3 (May 2014): 463-78.

¹ Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2012); Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the*

In this global context, the fates of the United States, Turkey, and Iran became more intertwined. Facing impeachment over the Watergate scandal, President Richard M. Nixon resigned on 9 August 1974 and Vice President Gerald R. Ford, formerly a Republican congressman from Michigan, became president. Given his limited experience in foreign policy, Ford relied on Henry Kissinger, now secretary of state as well as national security adviser, to manage U.S. relations with the world. Offended by Watergate, Kissinger's secretiveness over national security matters, and Ford's pardoning of Nixon, the Democratic 93rd and 94th Congresses began to fight the executive branch over national security policy.²

One of the first confrontations between Congress and the Ford administration emerged over Turkey and Cyprus. Tensions on the Mediterranean island flared in July 1974 after a Greek nationalist coup overthrew President Makarios. When Turkey sent military forces to the island, the U.S. Congress, under pressure from Greek American lobbies and angry at the Turkish government for allowing farmers to resume the cultivation of opium, imposed an arms embargo on Ankara. In response, Turkey closed those U.S. bases on its territory that operated outside the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations coincided with economic and political instability in Turkey. The OPEC price hike, combined with Ankara's imprudent policies and wrong-headed foreign currency regime, triggered an economic crisis that would last through the early 1980s. While many Turks blamed the U.S. embargo for their economic troubles, they also

Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 207-330; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1994). On the collapse of *détente* and the resumption of Cold War tensions, see the third volume of Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

² James T. Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1-107. On the Watergate scandal, also see Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, *All the President's Men* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974); Barry Sussman, *The Great Coverup: Nixon and the Scandal of Watergate* (New York: New American Library, 1974).

accused Washington for stoking the political violence in their country through the local affiliates of NATO's stay-behind network, the so-called Operation Gladio.³

The shifts in international affairs, U.S. domestic politics, and U.S.-Turkish relations affected the ties between Washington and Tehran. With pressure from civil society groups, such as Amnesty International, Congress began to question the Pahlavi regime's human rights violations and U.S. arms sales to Iran.⁴ Meanwhile, to fight domestic stagflation, the Ford administration tried to moderate the Shah's stance in OPEC and lobbied exporters such as Saudi Arabia to lower oil prices. The embargo on arms sales to Ankara, as well as the closure of U.S. bases and the chaos in Turkey, enhanced Tehran's already-prominent regional position and Pahlavi Iran seemed destined to become regional superpower in the mid-1970s. But when other OPEC members decided to lower prices in late 1976, the Shah faced a politically disaffected public facing an economic bust after 15 years of unprecedented boom.⁵

By the time Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977, America's options regarding the global Cold War, Turkey, and Iran were not promising. Carter, a moderate Democrat from Georgia, made human rights one of the central pillars of his foreign policy, which highlighted the clash between America's ideals and its interests once again. The plight of Soviet minorities and political dissidents complicated relations with Moscow.⁶ The rise of popular

³ Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

⁴ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 219-33. On human rights in Iran under Mohammed Reza Shah, see Matthew K. Shannon, "American-Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights during the Pahlavi Era," *Diplomatic History* [online source], <http://dh.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/06/19/dh.dhu019.full.pdf+html>; accessed 20 August 2014; Ervand Abrahamian, *Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 73-123.

⁵ On diplomatic efforts to bring down oil prices, see Andrew Scott Cooper, *Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 291-387; Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New ed.; New York: Free Press, 2009), 615-34

⁶ "Soviet Dissidents and Jimmy Carter," <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB391>; Digital National Security Archive, National Security Archive, George Washington University [hereafter DNSA-NSA]; accessed 1 June 2014.

socialist movements in Central America threatened the stability of pro-U.S. regimes in the Western Hemisphere. Domestic opposition to nuclear disarmament and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ended *détente*.⁷

In Iran, the U.S. emphasis on human rights forced the Shah to relax some of the more repressive aspects of his regime. Opposition to the Pahlavi regime manifested itself first as critical commentary in 1977, then sporadic riots in early 1978, and finally as a popular revolution in late 1978. With the fall of the Shah in early 1979 and the hostage crisis later that year, the United States and Iran started their own cold war. After Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in September 1980, many Iranians accused Washington of backing Baghdad.

The revival of Cold War tensions, the revolution in Iran, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan made the potential loss of Turkey an unacceptable option for the United States. With the Carter administration's encouragement, Congress lifted the arms embargo on Turkey in September 1978. Prior to the Turkish coup of September 1980, Washington supported Ankara's attempts at economic liberalization. After the coup, the Carter administration endorsed the new military regime in Ankara and Turkey remained a U.S. ally. These events would have a profound effect on anti-U.S. sentiments in both countries.

The Decade of Shocks: Détente Ends, Cold War Tensions Re-Escalate

The global upheavals of the 1974-80 period are crucial to understanding U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran, as well as the political economies and anti-U.S. sentiments in the two countries. The shocks of the 1970s started with the OPEC price hike in early 1973 and gained

⁷ On U.S. foreign policy under Carter, see Nancy Mitchell, "The Cold War and Jimmy Carter," in *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Leffler and Westad (eds.), 3: 66-88; J. Michael Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986); William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986); Scott Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009); Robert A. Strong, *Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2000).

pace with the Arab oil embargo that lasted from October 1973 through March 1974 (OPEC would keep petroleum prices high through the end of 1976).⁸ Later in 1974, the revelation that White House staff had hired the burglars who had broken into the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate complex in 1972 led to Nixon's resignation – the first for a president in U.S. history. Until 1980, such events as the fall of South Vietnam, civil wars in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, the revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion of the latter, and humans' destructive effects on their environment – gave the impression that the world was turning inside out.⁹

The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations tried to make the best of a tough situation and enjoyed some success. Following the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, Henry Kissinger convinced the Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli governments to disengage their forces.¹⁰ In 1975, one of the crowning accomplishments of *détente* came in the form of the Helsinki Accords. 33 states from Europe, together with the United States and Canada, recognized each other's national borders, agreed to settle disputes peacefully, and pledged to respect their citizens' human rights. The accords would help to undermine communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.¹¹

Jimmy Carter's presidency (1977-81) proved to be an important turning point in the Cold War. The first person from the Deep South to be elected president since the Civil War, Carter

⁸ Much of the information for this section comes from Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J. Sargent (eds.), *Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

⁹ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 229-313; Chris Sue Saunders Onslow, "The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976-1990," in *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Leffler and Westad (eds.), 3: 222-43. For studies on environmental concerns during the Cold War, see J.R. McNeill, "The Biosphere and the Cold War," in *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Leffler and Westad (eds.), 3: 422-44; J.R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger (eds.) *Environmental Histories of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Stephen Macekura, "Of Limits and Growth: Global Environmentalism and the Rise of 'Sustainable Development' in the Twentieth Century," (Ph.D. diss.; University of Virginia, 2013); Nick Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State," *The Journal of American History* 89, No. 2 (Sept. 2002): 512-37.

¹⁰ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (3rd ed.; Washington: Brookings Institution, 2005), 130-176.

¹¹ Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

came into the White House with little experience in foreign affairs. He compensated for that shortcoming through his discipline and personal faith. As one of his senior advisers in the National Security Council (NSC) wrote later on, owing to his training as a naval officer and nuclear engineer, Carter “believe[d] complex problems could be best tackled by careful study, detailed planning, and comprehensive designs.”¹² As an evangelical Christian determined to elevate human rights into a key component of U.S. foreign policy, Carter underscored the moral competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹³

Initially, the Carter administration made significant progress on the diplomatic front: it removed a major headache for the United States with the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977 by turning over the U.S.-built waterway, which had remained under U.S. control since its opening in 1914, to Panama. In the Middle East, Carter brokered the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978, which led to the first peace treaty between the Jewish state and an Arab nation. In June 1979, Carter signed the second agreement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.¹⁴

Although Carter’s foreign policy initially appeared idealistic, after the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, hard-headed realism gained the upper hand.

¹² Quandt, *Peace Process*, 177.

¹³ Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, argues that his boss “came to the Presidency with a determination to make U.S. foreign policy more humane and moral.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 48. For a glimpse of how Carter related his faith and roots to his election, see Jimmy Carter, *Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 21-26. For studies on human rights in the United States and elsewhere, see Barbara Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Sarah B. Snyder, “‘A Call for U.S. Leadership’: Congressional Activism on Human Rights,” *Diplomatic History* 37, No. 2 (Apr. 2013): 372-97; Petra Goedde, William Hitchcock, and Akira Iriye, (eds.), *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Rosemary Foot, “The Cold War and Human Rights,” in *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Leffler and Westad (eds.), 3: 445-65; David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 28, No. 1 (Jan. 2004): 113-44; Kenneth Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,” *The Journal of American History* 86, No. 3 (Dec. 1999): 1231-50.

¹⁴ See note 7 for studies on U.S. foreign policy during the Carter years.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, admitted later on that "when a choice [h]ad to be made [b]etween projecting U.S. power or enhancing human rights (as, for example, in Iran), [p]ower had to come first."¹⁵

Indeed, this shift in the Carter administration's priorities reflected changes in the foreign policy ideology of the United States in the 1970s. Most modernization theorists in the 1950s and early 1960s had advised developing nations to maintain a democratic system, respect free initiative and private property, and provide socioeconomic opportunity for their citizens. By the 1970s, those connections loosened and modernization theory lost its clout as the foreign policy ideology of the United States.

Many scholars have focused on how the Vietnam War, the decrease in U.S. foreign aid, and the rise of militant movements caused the Johnson and Nixon administration to lose interest in development and democratization abroad. The United States, critics charge, came to rely on "strong" anti-communist dictatorships because they were immune to "subversion."¹⁶ Indeed, a few scholars did laud authoritarian modernization for its perceived "strengths" at the time.¹⁷

¹⁵ Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 49.

¹⁶ Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, *The Alliance that Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

¹⁷ In 1968, the influential political scientist Samuel Huntington argued that, because the United States had taken an "exceptional" path to development in which democracy preceded industrialization and urbanization, developing nations had to follow the Soviet and not the Americans example: form a single-party government first, develop socioeconomic resources next, and only then establish a pluralistic society. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1, 461. Other thinkers at the time thought the armed forces should manage modernization. See Hans Speier, "Preface," in John J. Johnson (ed.) *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), v.

But the end of modernization theory as a prescription for democratic development related to events on the ground rather than the preferences of U.S. leaders and academics. During the decade of shocks, developed countries such as Norway, Sweden, and West Germany became more involved in international development efforts while Japan surpassed the United States as the largest supporter of global development.¹⁸ In the meantime, U.S. allies Spain, Greece, and Portugal began their evolution from military dictatorships into democracies while Argentina, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Uruguay became more authoritarian.¹⁹ China, for its part, treaded a less conventional path: After Mao Zedong's death in 1976, the Central Kingdom, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, abandoned its communist dogmas and initiated market reforms that would define its later rise in world politics.²⁰

While tectonic shifts occurred on the international stage during the 1974-80 period, a sense of decline overtook U.S. society.²¹ The Watergate scandal shook the American people's faith in their government.²² After years of boasts of victory and "peace with honor" in a war that killed hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and tens of thousands of U.S. troops, Americans witnessed the fall of the pro-U.S. government of South Vietnam to communist North Vietnam in

¹⁸ Ekbladh, *Great American Mission*, 259. Also see Massimiliano Trentin, "Modernization as State Building: The Two Germanies in Syria, 1963-1972," *Diplomatic History* 33, No. 3 (June 2009): 277-313.

¹⁹ Of course, virtually all of the authoritarian regimes would democratize in the 1980s and 1990s. See Catharine E. Dalpino, *Deferring Democracy: Promoting Openness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000); Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Meredith Woo-Cumings, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Bradley R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Kui Wai Li, *Capitalist Development and Economism in East Asia: The Rise of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea* (London: Routledge, 2002).

²⁰ Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); David W. Chang, *China Under Deng Xiaoping: Political and Economic Reform* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).

²¹ On contemporary accounts of U.S. "decline," see Leo P. Crespi, *Trends in Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Economic Strength and the Impact of the Dollar Decline* (Washington: International Communication Agency, 1979); Joseph Churba, *The Politics of Defeat: America's Decline in the Middle East* (New York: Cyrco Press, 1977); Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy; American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974); Peter Schrag, *Decline of the WASP* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971).

²² Keith W. Olson, *Watergate: The Presidential Scandal That Shook America* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003). Also see note 2 in this chapter.

April 1975. Things did not go well for the U.S. economy either: the OPEC hike increased the global price of crude oil from \$3.05/barrel in 1973 to \$9.68/barrel in 1974 (a figure that would occasionally approach \$30/barrel before late 1976), which triggered inflation and an economic downturn.²³ Unemployment rose to 8.5 percent in 1975 and the United States experienced double-digit inflation for the first time since the 1940s.²⁴

Amidst these upheavals, the legislative branch of government tried to assert greater control over the executive branch. In 1973, the U.S. Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, which curtailed the president's ability to deploy the military into combat without legislative authorization. The following year, Congress added the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act and forced the Soviet government to choose between allowing its Jewish citizens to emigrate or losing its "most-favored nation" trade status with the United States.²⁵

U.S. intelligence activities also came under scrutiny. In 1975, a Senate committee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-ID) began to investigate the U.S. intelligence community's role in the Watergate scandal, the illegal surveillance of U.S. citizens, and the overthrow and assassination of foreign leaders. When the committee's report in 1976 suggested that "Congress take action to bring the intelligence agencies under the constitutional framework," it tacitly acknowledged that some U.S. government agencies had violated the law.²⁶

²³ "Table 73 – Crude oil prices in nominal and real terms, 1970-2006 (\$/b)," *OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006* (Vienna: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2007), 117; http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2006.pdf; accessed 22 April 2014. Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 337.

²⁴ Figures from "Table Cb18-22 – Real gross domestic product – trend and fluctuations: 1952-2001 [Okun-Phillips decomposition]," *Historical Statistics of the United States*, <http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/search/searchTable.do?id=Cb18-22>; accessed 20 August 2014.

²⁵ On the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, see Noam Kochavi, "Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish Emigration, and the Demise of *Détente*," *Diplomatic History* 29, No. 3 (June 2005): 503-30.

²⁶ U.S. Senate, *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), iii, <https://archive.org/details/finalreportofsel01unit>, accessed 1 May 2014. The House of Representatives commissioned a similar panel (the Pike Commission) although its finally reported was never officially released because of bipartisan bickering. Also see Kathryn Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret*

Finally, in tandem with the emergence of transnational civil society groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (the latter won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977), Congress made it harder for the executive branch to extend foreign aid and sell weapons to countries that violated human rights, a dynamic that would have significant repercussions for U.S.-Iranian relations in the final years of Pahlavi rule.

As domestic battles raged in the United States, *détente* began to crumble and Cold War tensions re-escalated abroad. Civil wars broke out in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique saw Cuban troops fighting along leftist guerillas with Soviet support against U.S. and South African-backed militias.²⁷ Another war in the Horn of Africa brought *détente* to an end: When Somali dictator Siad Barré attacked Ethiopia to capture the Ogaden region in 1977 and Moscow lavished the Ethiopians with heavy weapons and troops, Zbigniew Brzezinski had no doubt that Moscow had “buried” SALT and *détente*.²⁸ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 killed any hope that the process of easing Cold War tensions could be revived.²⁹

In the wake of the Iran hostage crisis, the collapse of *détente*, and the re-escalation of Cold War tensions, domestic opposition against Jimmy Carter mounted. Sen. Ted Kennedy, a Massachusetts Democrat and younger brother of the late John F. Kennedy, challenged Carter for their party’s nomination for the 1980 election. Carter eventually secured the candidacy but lost the presidency to his Republican opponent, Ronald Reagan. Reagan, with the help of international partners such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, West German

Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and the FBI (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

²⁷ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 207-49.

²⁸ Louise P. Woodroffe, *Buried in the Sands of Ogaden: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Détente* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2013).

²⁹ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 300-29. The Afghan *mujahedin* had no affiliation with the Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iran.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Pope John Paul II, and, most importantly, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, would play a key role in ending the Cold War in the late 1980s.³⁰

Although the United States enjoyed many diplomatic victories in the 1974-80 period, uncertainty and successive shocks left their marks on the global scene. The OPEC price hike triggered a global energy crisis and economic recession, which also affected the United States. As Washington and Moscow became more embroiled in local wars in the Third World, their attempts at *détente* came to an end. These global dynamics played an important role in the political and economic problems that confronted Iran and Turkey in the second half of the 1970s.

Pahlavi Iran: The Making of a Regional Superpower, the Unmaking of a Regime

From 1974 until revolutionary troubles broke out in 1978, the stability of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime and his increasing independence from Washington remained constant factors in U.S.-Iran relations.³¹ With visions of turning Iran into a "Great Civilization" (Tamaddon-e Bozorg) and one of the world's top five industrial powers by the end of the twentieth century, Mohammed Reza Shah advocated a "big push" to accelerate socioeconomic development.³² In a meeting with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger on 4 March 1975, Minister of Economics and Finance Hushang Ansary gave those ideas concrete meaning.

³⁰ On the end of the Cold War, see James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Christian Caryl, *Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2013); Archie Brown, "The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, edited by Leffler and Westad (eds.), 3: 244-66; Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 338-450; John O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World* (Lanham: Regnery, 2006); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Revised ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 342-79; Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1994); Eric J. Evans, *Thatcher and Thatcherism* (3rd ed.; London: Routledge, 2013); James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2009). For other studies on the end of the Cold War, see note 1 in this chapter.

³¹ Much of the material for this section comes from Amin Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 133-207.

³² Abbas Milani, *The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution* (Washington: Mage, 2000), 267-68.

The Iranian government aimed to reach a gross national product (GNP) of \$193 billion for a projected population of 42 million by 1983 (thus increasing per capita from about \$2000 to \$4500), a figure Ansary argued “would compare favorably with Europe.”³³

To that end, the Shah, despite his economists’ advice to the contrary, forced the Plan Organization to revise the Fifth Plan (1973-78) in August 1974 and increase total development spending from \$32.2 billion to \$67.5 billion – virtually all of Iran’s projected oil revenues from the OPEC price hike.³⁴ Most analysts at the time were upbeat yet cautious about the strategy of developing through petrodollars. Whenever subordinates warned the Shah that pumping more petrodollars into Iran’s still-underdeveloped economy could upset social and economic stability and trigger a revolution, they heard the standard royal retort: “have you not read my books on the subject?”³⁵ The Pahlavi king’s misguided self-confidence and habitual tampering with fiscal policy upset an economy that was already under inflationary pressures.

The Shah made even bolder moves on the political front. In March 1975, he forced Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda to consolidate his New Iran Party and two other legal political blocs under the Resurgence Party (Hezb-e Rastakhiz). The Shah seems to have picked up the idea

³³ Memorandum of Conversation, 4 March 1975, Box 9, Nat.Sec.Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library.

³⁴ *The Royal Road to Progress: A Survey of the Achievements of the Shah-People Revolution* (Tehran: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1974), 9. The oil bonanza ultimately brought Iran over \$75 billion in revenues from 1973 through 1978: Table 5 in Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 102-3.

³⁵ Milani, *Persian Sphinx*, 268-70. Contemporary accounts of Iran in the 1970s are Jane W. Jacqz (ed.), *Iran: Past, Present, and Future: Papers and Recordings from the Aspen Institute / Persepolis Symposium* (New York: Aspen Institute, 1976); Robert E. Looney, *The Economic Development of Iran: A Recent Survey with Projections to 1981* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Ehsan Yar-Shater (ed.), *Iran Faces the Seventies* (New York: Praeger, 1971). For a discussion of Iran’s political economy during the decade, see Hossein Razavi and Firouz Vakil, *The Political Environment of Economic Planning in 1971-1983: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 234-331.

of a single-party state from President Anwar Sadat, who was busy liquidating Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab Socialist Union to form his own National Democratic Party in Egypt.³⁶

That the Shah resorted to such autocratic measures was somewhat puzzling – especially in light of his regime's stability after the mid-1960s and his background. Given his schooling in Switzerland and constant pronouncements in support of democracy as crown prince and king, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi seemed to link modernization to political openness.³⁷ Although his personal views on women were somewhat misogynistic, the Pahlavi king had given Iranian women the right to vote in the early 1960s. The Shah also kept an open mind in his personal life: he countenanced the romantic escapades of his eldest daughter, Princess Shahnaz, and his twin sister, Princess Ashraf. Likewise, although the Shah took his Shia Islamic faith seriously, he respected his elder sister Princess Shams's conversion to Catholicism.³⁸

But if the Shah's strength and personal experiences should have encouraged him to democratize Iran, regional events in the 1970s dissuaded him. While political violence resurfaced in neighboring Turkey, another coup d'état in Pakistan on 4 July 1977 saw General Zia ul-Haq overthrowing Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Shah told his court minister, Asadollah Alam, to expect a similar coup in Turkey. He claimed to have "heard that the Turks are casting glances at our system here in Iran," then rendered a tirade against democracy: "how can you build a nation by fragmenting its politics into opposing camps? Whatever one group builds, the other

³⁶ Abbas Milani, *The Shah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 379-82; Milani, *Persian Sphinx*, 276-78. Of course, "development through the single-party" was a popular idea at the time. See note 17 in this chapter for a brief discussion.

³⁷ "If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch," the Shah wrote in 1961, "then I might be tempted to sponsor a single [p]arty such as Hitler organized or such as you find in Communist countries." Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 173.

³⁸ Milani, *The Shah*, 336.

will endeavor to destroy.”³⁹ At another time, he told Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil that he would “never let anarchy disguised as democracy to infiltrate my land.”⁴⁰

The U.S. government did not have much to say on these matters. Washington faced formidable challenges in the 1970s so it became more dependent on strong regional allies such as Tehran. In fact, the United States went far to accommodate the Shah. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Johnson administration acceded to the royal request so U.S. diplomats had very little interaction with the Shah’s opponents from the mid-1960s until the revolution.⁴¹ In May 1972, the Nixon administration agreed to sell the Shah any conventional U.S.-made weapon, a policy that continued under Ford and Carter.

Washington, of course, knew the dangers facing the Pahlavi kingdom. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 34-1-75) in May 1975 pointed out that, although there was “little prospect during the next few years for a serious challenge to the Shah’s authoritarian control over Iran’s internal affairs and programs, [his] monopoly of decision-making and [g]reater repression of opposition will incur certain political costs.” Those costs included “growing alienation and dissent, including terrorism, on occasion with anti-U.S. overtones,” “limited bureaucratic [e]ffectiveness in implementing the Shah’s ambitious objectives,” and “the stifling of political institutions which could maintain stability after the Shah’s demise.”⁴²

The Ford and Carter administrations, however, could do little to get the Shah to change course. Washington needed his cooperation in many areas: The Pahlavi king supported anti-communist governments in the Middle East and elsewhere. He barred the Soviet Union from using Iranian airspace to supply Egypt and Syria during the October 1973 war against Israel.

³⁹ Alam, *The Shah and I*, 552.

⁴⁰ Çağlayangil, *Çağlayangil’in Anıları*, 160.

⁴¹ Martin F. Herz, *Contacts with the Opposition: A Symposium* (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1979), 17, 26-27.

⁴² National Intelligence Estimate, 9 May 1975, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 27: 346-67.

After the war, he refused to join the Arab oil embargo.⁴³ Tehran also took part in the so-called “Safari Club” that assisted anti-communist regimes and movements in Africa: it procured West German-licensed mortars from Ankara and passed them on to Somali dictator Siad Barré during the Ogaden War.⁴⁴ For his own defense, the Shah ordered \$14 billion worth of U.S. military equipment in 1974-77, much of it too sophisticated even for NATO allies. As a result, Iran became the largest arms purchaser from the United States. (A running joke at the time was that the Pahlavi king read arms corporations’ catalogs like *Playboy* magazine.)⁴⁵ And aside from trading with the West and purchasing nuclear technology from France and West Germany, Tehran extended billions of dollars in credits to West European countries. It was a testament to Iran’s growing importance that Kissinger developed a habit of informing the Shah of regional and global events and even sending explanations about President Ford’s public speeches.⁴⁶

The Shah, however, also stood up to the United States until the revolution broke out in 1978. For example, he constantly rebuffed U.S. requests that OPEC lower the price of oil. To President Ford’s letter of 9 September 1975, asking for a cap or decrease in petroleum prices, he wrote a brief retort: It was unfair for Iranians “to tolerate a decrease of about 35 percent in [their] purchasing power” while the price of items they bought from the United States had increased “300 or 400 percent” in just 18 months.⁴⁷ To Court Minister Alam, Pahlavi told how he really felt: “Have you seen the letter I received from that idiot, Ford?” and wondered “what on earth

⁴³ Kissinger mentioned Tehran’s refusal to let the Soviets use Iranian to President Ford and General Scowcroft: Memorandum of Conversation, 7 February 1975, Box 9, Nat. Sec. Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library.

⁴⁴ Mohamed Heikal, *The Return of the Ayatollah: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini* (London: André Deutsch Ltd., 1981), 112-16.

⁴⁵ The \$14 billion figure comes from CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, “Arms Sales to the Third World, 1977” (October 1978), Table 3, p. 4, Electronic Declassification Project [hereafter EDP], NLC-31-125-4-1-4, Carter Library. *Playboy* anecdote from Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 436.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Washington to Tehran, 17 April 1975 and Washington to Tehran, 10 September 1975, Box 13, PCF – MESA, Ford Library; Washington to Tehran, 6 October 1976 and Washington to Tehran, 6 October 1976; both documents in Box 14, PCF – MESA, Ford Library.

⁴⁷ “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” 11 September 1975, *FRUS* 1969-76, 27: 432-34.

made him send such a letter.” He debated whether “[Secretary of the Treasury William E.] Simon or that devil Kissinger [p]ut him up to it.”⁴⁸

The Nixon and Ford administrations had already become frustrated with the Shah. In late 1973, Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger discussed charging Iran more for its weapons purchases.⁴⁹ Likewise, Treasury Secretary Simon argued with Kissinger over supporting other OPEC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to lower the price of oil.⁵⁰ These episodes demonstrated that the Shah had cause to become more skeptical about the United States – if not downright anti-U.S. Annoyed with U.S. machinations, he suggested to U.S. ambassador Richard Helms in December 1976 that shortfalls in petrodollars could force Iran to cancel weapons purchases from the United States and that Tehran could turn over its regional security obligations to Washington and Riyadh.⁵¹

The Pahlavi king, however, actually became more assertive in his foreign and defense policy. He sought to revitalize CENTO by proposing to build joint defense industries with Turkey and Pakistan. He offered \$1 billion to Ankara to build modern highways in Turkey and improve his realm’s overland trade with Europe.⁵² The Shah assumed a more balanced approach in his relations with Israel and the Arab world in order to gain more influence with the latter.⁵³ He

⁴⁸ Asadollah Alam, *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969-1977*, ed. Alinaghi Alikhani (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 440.

⁴⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, 26 December 1973, Box 3, Nat. Sec. Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library.

⁵⁰ Cooper, *Oil Kings*, 170-79, 200-201. A more extended discussion of the Simon-Kissinger feud is available in Andrew Scott Cooper, “Showdown at Doha: The Secret Deal that Helped Sink the Shah of Iran,” *The Middle East Journal* 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2008): 567-91.

⁵¹ Helms to Kissinger and Rumsfeld, “Possible Change in Iranian Foreign Policy,” 31 December 1975, Box 14, PCF – MESA, Ford Library.

⁵² Finance Minister Ansary told U.S. officials in March 1975 that Iran would have to increase the capacity of its seaports from 4 million tons that year to 80 million tons by 1983. Figures from Memorandum of Conversation, 4 March 1975, Box 9, Nat.Sec.Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library.

⁵³ Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 42-60; Zia H. Hashmi, *Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey: Regional Integration and Economic Development* (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1979).

resisted U.S. attempts to establish safeguards over Iran's nuclear program.⁵⁴ Finally, in order to neutralize the criticism against his regime in the U.S. press, through his former son-in-law and ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, the king of Iran lavished influential people in Washington with expensive gifts.⁵⁵

The concurrent tumult in U.S.-Turkish relations, coupled with Congress's vocal criticism of the Pahlavi regime's human rights record and arms sales to Tehran, made the Shah question the reliability of the United States as an ally. The U.S. embassy in Tehran and the national security bureaucracy in Washington warned throughout 1976 about potential "course changes" in Iran's foreign policy and its improving relations with Moscow.⁵⁶ As Congressional opposition to Iran's military orders mounted in 1976, Kissinger went so far as to complain that the United States was "playing with fire." "We have thrown away Turkey and now Iran," Kissinger protested, and rendered one of his most prescient predictions: "if we get rid of the Shah, we will have a radical regime in our hands."⁵⁷

Indeed, just as Pahlavi Iran was on the brink of regional superpowerdom, it all unraveled. In December 1976, when OPEC countries lowered the price of petroleum to help global economic recovery, Tehran's oil revenues began to decrease. In order to cover the shortfall, Jamshid Amouzegar, who replaced Hoveyda as prime minister in August 1977, imposed austerity measures. Raising taxes, enforcing "price controls" on the *bazaar* by using overzealous *Rastakhiz*

⁵⁴ Roham Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 126-71; William Burr "A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 65, No.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2009): 21-34.

⁵⁵ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 319-79. The following work offers a critical overview of how American journalists covered Iran from 1953 until 1978: William A. Dorman and Mansur Farhang, *The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).

⁵⁶ Tehran to Washington, 13 January 1976, Box 14, PCF – MESA, Ford Library; Kissinger to Ford, "Message for the Shah of Iran," 11 February 1976, Box 2, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974-77, Ford Library; Oakley to Scowcroft, "U.S.-Iranian Relations and Arms Deal With Moscow," 10 December 1976, Box 13, PCF – MESA, Ford Library.

⁵⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, 5 May 1975, Box 11, Nat. Sec. Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library. Kissinger comment from Memorandum of Conversation, 3 August 1976, Box 20, Nat. Sec. Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library.

youth activists as “inspectors,” and decreasing government spending to fight inflation triggered a major economic downturn and popular disgruntlement.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, to alleviate criticism against his regime in the West over human rights issues, the Shah welcomed the leading international human rights jurist William Butler to Iran. Butler’s advisory mission from 1975 through 1978 led the Pahlavi state to reform its judicial procedures, especially political prisoners’ pretrial detention and access to a lawyer. The Shah also ordered SAVAK to cease using torture and the Amouzegar cabinet to ease press restrictions. Through these measures, the Pahlavi king hoped to establish a good rapport with Jimmy Carter.⁵⁹

The Shah did establish good relations with the American president, which may have clouded the U.S. government’s judgment of subsequent events. When Carter visited Iran on 31 December 1977, he called it “an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world,” for which he praised “the great leadership of the Shah.”⁶⁰ Although mass riots erupted barely one week after Carter’s visit, events seemed to be under control by the summer. NSC staff member Gary Sick relates in his memoirs that neither Iran-watchers in Washington nor the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, William Sullivan, deemed the Shah’s overthrow to be likely in mid-1978.⁶¹ Such was the Carter administration’s confidence in the Pahlavi regime that, even when mass riots spun out of control after the fire-bombing of a movie theater in Abadan and the massacre of hundreds of demonstrators by government forces in Tehran’s Jaleh Square on 8

⁵⁸ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 498.

⁵⁹ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (3rd ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 214-17.

⁶⁰ “Tehran, Iran Toasts of the President and the Shah at a State Dinner,” *The American Presidency Project*; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7080>; accessed 3 January 2013.

⁶¹ Gary Sick, *All Fall Down* (New York: Random House, 1985), 40-41, 60.

September 1978 (“Black Friday”), a high-level meeting did not convene in Washington to discuss Iran for another two months.⁶²

Ambassador Sullivan was the first U.S. official to raise the possibility that the Shah might not survive. On 9 November 1978, in a secret telegram aptly titled “Thinking the Unthinkable,” Sullivan argued that, if the Shah abdicated, Ayatollah Khomeini should be persuaded to assume “some sort of Gandhi-like position in the political constellation.”⁶³ In Washington, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance claimed that political reform could defuse popular anger against the Shah. National Security Adviser Brzezinski, however, argued for gradual liberalization only after a full-scale crackdown on protestors. President Carter, irritated for not being fully informed of the situation until that point, commissioned former Undersecretary of State George Ball to write a report on the Iranian scene. Ball, hardly a fan of the Shah, argued that Pahlavi was finished and that the United States should reach out to the opposition.⁶⁴ Without a response to his 9 November telegram, Sullivan began to negotiate with regime opponents on his own volition.⁶⁵

Several structural factors contributed to the Shah’s downfall. Authoritarian modernization was the most important one: Iran in the 1970s was a very different place from what it had been in the late 1940s: it was urbanized and industrialized, literacy rates reached 50 percent. The youth and middle-class professionals were fairly well-educated, attuned to global trends, and demanded political participation. By emphasizing his role in these successes, the Shah ensured that he would also receive the blame for occasional failures. Indeed, when the revolution gained force in

⁶² Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 128.

⁶³ Quoted in Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (3rd ed.; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 225. It should be noted that Sullivan does not mention the Gandhi reference when discussing the crucial telegram in his memoirs: William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 202.

⁶⁴ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 252-53.

⁶⁵ Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, 204. On the limitations of U.S. decision-making during the Iranian Revolution, see Ofira Seliktar, *Failing the Crystal Ball Test: The Carter Administration and the Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran* (Westport: Praeger, 2000).

late 1978, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi lacked the most important tool that might have saved him: independent political institutions to channel popular anger.⁶⁶

Not only did the Shah fail to give space to autonomous political actors, he also mismanaged the one institution that he deemed essential to his regime's stability: the military. Unlike the army that overthrew Mosaddeq in 1953 or their Turkish counterpart, the Iranian armed forces of 1978-79 were in no shape to carry out a coup on behalf of their king. For years, the Shah had barred his senior commanders from planning operations without his knowledge lest he became the target of a coup. Furthermore, as the army lost hundreds of conscripts to desertion every week in late 1978 and early 1979, the generals who led those young boys had little inclination to spill the blood of their fellow Iranians.⁶⁷ Thus, when President Carter sent U.S. Air Force General Robert E. Huyser to Tehran in January 1979 to gauge the Iranian military's likelihood of controlling the situation, he realized that his Iranian counterparts had neither the will to pull the trigger nor the operational plans for taking over critical areas such as main squares and avenues, power plants and post offices, TV and radio stations.⁶⁸

Despite these weaknesses, however, from the autumn of 1978 until revolutionary forces prevailed over the royalists on 11 February 1979, the collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy was not a foregone conclusion. On top of structural dynamics, contingent factors were critical.

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was the most critical factor. Some historians argue that, after proclaiming his "White Revolution" in 1963, by harping on his regime's "revolutionary" nature,

⁶⁶ Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Updated ed.; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 322-23.

⁶⁷ Gholam Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of the Shah* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 533.

⁶⁸ Robert E. Huyser, *Mission to Tehran* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 88. On the Iranian military's role during the revolution, see Sepehr Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 21-114. Also see "Special Study on Collapse of Iranian Military," enclosure to Memorandum, "Review of Military Assistance Policy in Light of Recent Experience," 25 June 1979, EDP, NLC-21-18-10-1-7, Carter Library.

the Shah may have planted the idea of a genuine revolution in his people's mind.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the Shah's habitual indecisiveness, which had first caused him problems during his standoff with Mosaddeq in 1953, reemerged in 1978-79: The Pahlavi king first cracked down on protestors. But struggling with cancer and hoping to save the throne for his then-19-year-old son, Crown Prince Reza, he tried to reach out to his people in a televised speech on 5 November 1978: "as Shah of Iran as well as an Iranian," he declared, "I cannot but approve your revolution." "I swear," he continued, "that [p]revious mistakes, lawlessness, oppression, and corruption will not happen again."⁷⁰ The ill-fated address only hardened revolutionaries' resolve.

Pahlavi's mercurial personality also affected his relations with the Carter administration. From 1963 until 1978, the Iranian king did not brook foreign interference in his domestic affairs. The Americans accepted that.⁷¹ But the Shah had a conspiratorial outlook so he believed that the revolution was raging because the United States and Britain wanted to topple him for his role in raising oil prices. He hoped that placating Washington and London could save his throne. "What do these Americans want?" the Shah bemoaned several times during the revolution. "What have I done to you?" he said to U.S. and British diplomats during the crisis.⁷²

Another event that doomed the Pahlavi regime was the oil workers' strike, which began on 21 October 1978. Before the revolution, Iranian workers had been barred from organizing strikes and political rallies. In return, the regime paid workers to keep quiet – and they did. But labor's loyalty to the Pahlavi regime was only as deep as its pockets.⁷³ In March 1975, when minimum monthly wages were 3,600 rials, the Shah declared that, by the end of the Fifth Plan

⁶⁹ Milani, *The Shah*, 263; Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 323.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Milani, *Persian Sphinx*, 294.

⁷¹ James Goode, *The United States and Iran in the Shadow of Musaddiq* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 187.

⁷² Milani, *The Shah*, 386, 391.

⁷³ While Tehran workers had radios and 80 percent of them possessed television sets, workers in other parts of the country prospered similarly. See Assef Bayat, *Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience of Workers' Control* (London: Zed Books, 1987), 47, 59.

period in March 1978, they would increase to 12,000 rials/month (\$170). Of course, because of the shortfall in petrodollars, the Pahlavi state failed to deliver on that promise, which required an annual increase of approximately 50 percent over three years anyway. With their economic hopes dashed and their fellow Iranians in revolt, industrial workers joined the ranks of the protestors. Without any access to petrodollars, the Pahlavi state began to crumble in late 1978.⁷⁴

Finally, the Shah took an ill-fated step in September 1978 by asking Saddam Hussein to expel Khomeini. Whereas Khomeini's stay in Iraq had allowed him to keep contact with his followers at home, the ayatollah's relocation to France turned him into the "spiritual" leader of a wide array of revolutionaries with divergent ideologies. These groups benefited from Iran's rapid modernization: the country's state-of-the-art telecommunications system meant that the ayatollah and his supporters could simply pick up the phone to reach their supporters at home.⁷⁵ Add the obliviousness of Khomeini's secular allies about his past declarations for an "Islamic government" (partly because the Pahlavi regime had banned the ayatollah's works), the bishop was well-placed against the king and other players on the chessboard of Iranian politics.

From 1974 until 1977, the equilibrium in U.S.-Iran relations shifted. As Tehran became free from Washington's influence and the oil bonanza enabled the Shah to establish absolute control over his realm, Pahlavi Iran began to assume the role of regional superpower in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The single-party system and the Shah's decision to spend all petrodollars, however, put new pressures on Iran's political economy. When an economic crisis hit in 1977, the Pahlavi regime lacked the institutions to address popular frustrations. The Shah's indecisiveness, his

⁷⁴ Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, 111; Habib Ladjevardi, *Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 241.

⁷⁵ Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, 199; Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 182-98.

inability to understand the causes of the revolution, and the revolutionaries' good fortune (especially Khomeini's French exile), brought the Pahlavi regime to an end. Two weeks after Mohammed Reza Pahlavi departed Iran on 17 January 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from France. Khomeini's political skills in establishing himself as the new Persian potentate and his effective appeal to the religious sentiments and anti-U.S. biases of his compatriots would turn anti-Americanism into one of the main ideological pillars of Iran's new regime.

"The Americans Can't Do a Damn Thing": The Revolution, the Hostage Crisis, and the Collapse of U.S.-Iranian Relations

Before he succumbed to cancer on 27 July 1980, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wrote a book titled *Answer to History*. The deposed monarch called the recent revolution in his kingdom "a counterrevolution whose proclaimed goal is to annihilate all that our White Revolution accomplished." The "unholy alliance of red and black" (Pahlavi's definition for the *ulama* and the radical left), had pre-empted the free elections scheduled for spring 1979. Pahlavi claimed he was overthrown because he was turning Iran into a democracy; he suggested that he was secretly ousted by the United States, Britain, and France, and the Soviet Union.⁷⁶

These claims must have come as news to the revolutionaries. As discussed in the fourth chapter, like many developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s, anti-Americanism in Iran merged with radical leftist and anti-imperialist discourses. What was peculiar about Iran's case was that, through the writings and public lectures of the French-educated sociologist Ali Shariati, ancient symbols of Shia Islam conjoined with leftist radicalism and anti-U.S. sentiments to form

⁷⁶ Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *Réponse à l'histoire* [Answer to History] (Paris: A. Michel, 1979). Quotes from the English translation: *Answer to History* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), 159, 171, 189.

the ideological basis of the revolution; an ideology opposed to secular liberalism and socialism as well as the Shah's authoritarian and ostensibly Western-oriented modernization.⁷⁷

Shariati's ideological framework allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to expand his appeal. From his exile in Iraq, Khomeini emphasized not only piety for Iranian Muslims as individuals, but the necessity for the oppressed (*mostazafin*) masses to overthrow the Pahlavi oppressors (*mostakberin*) to liberate Iran. For Khomeini, the struggle between the two social classes (*tabaqat*) and religious awakening were the ultimate solution to American imperialism and Iran's underdevelopment.⁷⁸ In a 1972 letter to Iranian students in North America, the ayatollah defended Islam in such terms: "Imperialism of the left and imperialism of the right have joined hands in their efforts to annihilate the Muslim peoples and their countries. [T]hey have come together in order to enslave the Muslim peoples and plunder their abundant capital and natural resources."⁷⁹ Not just Iran, he warned, but Muslim countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq had to resist the West as well as the Soviet Union.⁸⁰

Khomeini also cultivated good relations with other anti-Shah activists before the revolution. Although no fan of Mosaddeq, Khomeini reached out to the leaders of the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), a group composed of religious members of the National Front, who would play a prominent role in the early years of the Islamic Republic. LMI, led by the progressive cleric Ayatollah Mahmoud Talaqani and the engineer and college professor Mahdi Bazargan, who would become the revolutionary government's first prime minister, also included the economist Abolhassan Bani Sadr, who would become the first president of the Islamic

⁷⁷ Quotes from Keddie, *Modern Iran*, 202-4. On Ali Shariati's philosophy, see Kingshuk Chatterjee, *Ali Shariati and the Shaping of Political Islam in Iran* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Ali Rahnema, *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariati* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 88-370.

⁷⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 47-48.

⁷⁹ Quotes from "Message to the Muslim Students in North America," in Hamid Algar (ed.) *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 209.

⁸⁰ Moin, *Khomeini*, 148-49.

Republic; Ebrahim Yazdi, deputy prime minister and foreign minister under Bazargan; the Georgetown-educated activist Sadeq Qotbzadeh who would replace Yazdi as foreign minister; and Mostafa Chamran, a Texas A&M and Berkeley-trained engineer whose CV included years of guerilla warfare against the Pahlavi government and other pro-U.S. regimes in the region.⁸¹

The royal regime's opponents made sure that, even as the Shah continued to assert greater independence from Washington in the 1970s, the people of Iran would see the U.S. alliance and Pahlavi rule as harmful to their country. In a series of lectures in 1974, Abolhassan Bani Sadr harangued against the Pahlavi king for establishing "a cult of personality" and forcing his fellow Iranians to worship him. The future president brought out an old Mosaddeqist idea as well: in order to achieve true independence in world affairs, Iranians had to throw off foreign "domination," destroy "centers of amassed power," and pursue "negative equilibrium."⁸²

Making the people of Iran believe these arguments was not hard: the average Iranian did not see the benefit of U.S. weapons or the commerce with other Western countries. Moreover, trade brought many Americans to Iran – businesspeople, engineers, military personnel, tourists – whose number increased from 8,000 in 1970 to 50,000 by 1977. Not all Americans were respectful of their Iranian hosts and their customs. "The very best and the very worst of America," writes the political scientist James Bill, "were on display in the cities of Iran."⁸³

The State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) warned about the inherent dangers of increasing commercial and military relations between Washington and Tehran. In an October 1975 report titled "New Trends in Iranian Terrorism," the INR argued that the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization's (MKO) targeting of U.S. military and diplomatic

⁸¹ For a comprehensive analysis of the LMI, see Houchang Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990).

⁸² Abolhassan Bani Sadr, *The Fundamental Principles and Precepts of Islamic Government* (Lexington: Mazda Publishers, 1981), 23-28, 67-74.

⁸³ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 211, 381.

personnel “appeal[ed] to nationalist, anti-foreign sentiment” among Iranians who “resent[ed] government corruption, as well as the materialism of modern Iran, which is widely associated with the U.S.” The report predicted that the number of Americans living in Iran would reach 80,000 by 1980, which would “provide abundant targets [for the MKO].”⁸⁴

The Shah’s domestic policies, especially the single-party experiment, gave further ammunition to the opposition and alienated virtually every social group that had a stake in the Pahlavi regime. Chaired first by Prime Minister Hoveyda, the *Rastakhiz* Party forcefully enrolled bureaucrats and professionals into its rolls and harassed anyone who refused to join. To fight inflation and undermine alleged *bazaari* influence over the economy, the *Rastakhiz* promoted producers’ and consumer’s cooperatives and recruited overzealous college students as “inspectors” against “price gougers.” As the 1970s ended and anti-Shah and anti-U.S. sentiments fused with each other, Iranians became more receptive to the radical opposition.⁸⁵

Despite the constrained political environment, some Pahlavi loyalists did speak out against economic mismanagement. In a speech on the senate floor in 1976, Qassem Lajevardi pointed out that, of the 104 state-owned companies, all but one (the National Iranian Oil Company), were losing money. Senator Lajevardi, one of the country’s wealthiest industrialists, blamed the problem on the state’s interference in the economy: generous wages, the White Revolution’s principle of distributing profits to workers, and the Hoveyda cabinet’s “anti-price gouging” campaign hurt market confidence and killed potential investments.⁸⁶ The senator’s criticism of the Pahlavi regime’s pseudo-socialist economic policies, however, fell on deaf ears.

⁸⁴ “Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,” 7 October 1975, *FRUS* 1969-1976, 27: 437-38.

⁸⁵ Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 195.

⁸⁶ Milani, *The Shah*, 336-37.

As the Pahlavi regime eased press and speech restrictions and improved its human rights practices in 1977, disgruntled voices grew louder. In May, 53 of Iran's most prominent jurists and law professors wrote a letter to the Shah and condemned the lack of an independent judiciary. Former National Front leaders Karim Sanjabi, Dariush Forouhar, and Shapour Bakhtiar wrote their own letter the following month and criticized the Shah's economic policies, especially the botched land reform program. In fall 1977, several current and former members of the National Front, including Mahdi Bazargan, established the Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights and organized a civil resistance movement.⁸⁷

The event that triggered the revolution was an article published on the pro-Pahlavi daily *Ettelaat* on 7 January 1978. Hoping to discredit Ayatollah Khomeini, the article labeled the septuagenarian cleric a British agent who was actually Indian, a womanizer, and author of erotic Sufi poetry. The following day, 4,000 theology students marched in Qom and clashed with police. A few protestors died and several dozen were wounded.⁸⁸

As protests spread in the spring and then spun out of control in the fall of 1978, the Carter administration professed support for the Shah. Ironically, such pronouncements harmed both the Iranian king and U.S. interests in Iran. When the president reaffirmed U.S. support for Pahlavi two days after the Jaleh Square massacre on 8 September, many Iranians "became convinced that Carter approved the massacre and that the United States was now determined to oppose the revolution at all costs."⁸⁹ The Shah complained to Ambassador Sullivan that Carter's declarations were not helping.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Ibid., 391; Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran*, 347-54.

⁸⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin* (London, I.B. Tauris, 1988), 30.

⁸⁹ Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 258.

⁹⁰ Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, 204.

As the revolutionary storm gained strength, Ayatollah Khomeini exploited the paradox between the Carter administration's support for human rights and its relations with the Shah by ratcheting up his anti-American jeremiads: "[Carter] says human rights are inalienable and then he says, 'we have military bases in Iran; we can't talk about human rights there.'" "Respect for human rights is feasible only in countries where [the Americans] have no military bases." As far as Khomeini was concerned, Carter "use[d] the logic of bandits."⁹¹ The ayatollah's uncompromising stance vis-à-vis the Shah and Washington enamored him to his compatriots.

Notwithstanding four decades of U.S. support for the Shah, after the revolutionaries prevailed over royalist forces on 11 February 1979, relations between Washington and Tehran remained correct – though they did deteriorate. When militants of the Marxist Fedayan-e Khalq group attacked the U.S. embassy on 14 February, revolutionary guards, led by Deputy Premier Yazdi, drove them out. Meanwhile, even as the Carter administration recognized Iran's new regime, it protested the excesses of the revolutionary government – especially the mistreatment of religious minorities and political executions (one of the victims was former Prime Minister Hoveyda).⁹² Throughout spring and summer 1979, the provisional government led by Mahdi Bazargan canceled many of the Shah's military contracts from U.S. arms manufacturers, withdrew from CENTO, and joined the Non-Aligned Movement. Nonetheless, until the hostage crisis in November 1979, the Bazargan government and other moderate elements of the revolution worked hard to maintain a functional relationship with Washington.⁹³

⁹¹ Quotes from "In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the Revolution," in Algar (ed.) *Islam and Revolution*, 224.

⁹² "A Brief Overview of the Iranian-U.S. Relationship," 10 January 1980, 32-37, EDP, NLC-6-30-6-5-1, Carter Library. According to this report, nearly 700 people would be executed by the end of 1979.

⁹³ On U.S.-Iranian relations during the nine-month period from the revolution until the hostage crisis, see Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 261-93.

Part of the reason why U.S.-Iran relations remained uneasy was because Iranians fought each other over their country's future. For most Iranians, the revolution represented Mohammed Mosaddeq's dream: freedom and independence. Prime Minister Bazargan and the LMI hoped that constitutional government could finally set root in Iran. To strengthen his fellow moderates, Bazargan frequently referred to his background with the National Front and his admiration of Mosaddeq. On the anniversary of the legendary statesman's death on 5 March 1979, hundreds of thousands people marched from Tehran to Ahmadabad to hear Ayatollah Talaqani's oratory in honor of Mosaddeq.⁹⁴ Liberal nationalism appeared as the most potent force in Iran.

Other Iranians, however, had different ideas. The country's Kurdish, Arab, and Turkic minorities demanded political autonomy and cultural freedom. Revolutionary militias disabused them of those notions in 1979-80. The radical left argued that Iran should take an anti-U.S., socialist, and Third Worldist path. Meanwhile, high-profile assassinations against members of the *ancien régime* and the revolutionary government made moderation a losing proposition.⁹⁵

As Iran tried to find its way at home and abroad, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi sought a country to settle down and receive treatment for his cancer. For months, the former ruler of Iran stayed in Egypt, Morocco, and Mexico. After weeks of public and private pressure from American dignitaries who either had business dealings with the Shah or felt obliged to help an old friend, Carter let the Shah into the United States on 22 October 1979.⁹⁶

Pahlavi's American sojourn, however, evoked memories of the CIA's role in the overthrow of Mohammed Mosaddeq and the Shah's return to Iran in August 1953. On 4

⁹⁴ Christopher de Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Very British Coup* (London: Bodley Head, 2012), 277-78.

⁹⁵ For a list of prominent victims of political assassinations at the time, see Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 269.

⁹⁶ Milani, *The Shah*, 417-30. One detailed study claims that U.S. banks in which Iranian state assets worth billions of dollars were deposited, hoped that the Shah's arrival in the United States would lead to a breakdown in the relations between Washington and Tehran and prevent the Islamic Republic from withdrawing them: Mark Hulbert, *Interlock: The Untold Story of American Banks, Oil Interests, the Shah's Money, Debts, and the Astounding Connections Between Them* (New York: Richardson & Snyder, 1982).

November 1979, a group of religious college students, who dubbed themselves “Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam,” stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took American personnel hostage. The students had fantasized about extraditing the Shah to Iran but they had neither informed Khomeini beforehand nor intended to keep the Americans for long.⁹⁷

Khomeini, worried about U.S. retaliation, thought of asking the youngsters to turn over the hostages to the government. But he quickly realized the benefits of the hostage crisis. After an overwhelming majority of Iranians voted in favor of abolishing the monarchy and forming an “Islamic Republic” on 31 March 1979, Khomeini, despite feigning disinterest in politics, made sure that the new constitution would institutionalize his “guardianship of the jurist” doctrine.⁹⁸ However, opposition from another senior cleric, Grand Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari and his Muslim Republican People’s Party, made that far from certain.

With the constitutional referendum scheduled for 3 December 1979, Khomeini seized the opportunity. To Monsignor Annibale Bugnini, the Papal nuncio mediating the release of the American hostages, Khomeini ranted against both the Shah and the United States: For the past 15 years, he said, “35 million Iranians lived under America’s colonial yoke.” The Shia Muslim cleric told the Roman Catholic priest that the Shah had “killed and injured hundreds of thousands of his people” and had given “[h]is country’s oil to America in return for weapons and ammunition.” Instead of asking for the release of the Americans, Khomeini told the Vatican’s representative to get the Carter administration to extradite the Shah to Iran.⁹⁹

Khomeini spoke even more candidly to his young followers. “Today,” he told a group of revolutionaries on 26 November, “the mind and voice can only stand against America.”

⁹⁷ Interview with Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, *Iran and the West* [Video Documentary] (London: BBC, 2009), Episode 1.

⁹⁸ Moin, *Khomeini*, 225-27.

⁹⁹ Quotes from “Sokhnan-e Emam Khomeini Khetab be Nemayنده-ye Pap dar Qom” [Imam Khomeini’s Remarks in Talks with the Pope’s Representative] in *Chahar Peyam-e Tarikhi-ye Emam* [Four Historic Messages of the Imam] (Tehran: Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, 1979), 5-16.

“Whatever chant you have, say it against America. Whatever rally you have, make it against America.” “Gather your own strength,” he continued, “and [do] your own military training and [g]ive military training to anyone who is inclined likewise. The land of Islam must be completely militarized and have military training.”¹⁰⁰ “The Americans,” Khomeini told a group of “Students Following the Line of the Imam,” “can’t do a damned thing.”¹⁰¹

Khomeini accomplished all of his major objectives through the hostage crisis: he forced the moderate Bazargan government to resign, neutralized Shariatmadari, and won the December 1979 referendum. The new constitution created a complex web of elected and non-elected institutions, at the pinnacle of which stood the “Leader of the Revolution,” also known as “Supreme Leader.” Through his new title, Khomeini, hitherto a symbol, officialized his rule. The ayatollah’s supporters also bestowed him the title of “Imam,” a designation reserved for the twelve holiest leaders of Shia Islam.

The hostage crisis, of course, proved disastrous for both Washington and Tehran. In the ensuing standoff, the Carter administration seized Iranian assets abroad, cut diplomatic ties with Tehran, and undertook a failed rescue attempt to save the hostages. Perhaps more than any other problem, including the collapse of *détente*, economic stagflation, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran hostage crisis cost Jimmy Carter the 1980 election.¹⁰²

Iran, meanwhile, had to live with the consolidation of Khomeini’s rule and his ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. The revolutionary chaos – especially the purge of purportedly pro-Pahlavi officers from the military – encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran

¹⁰⁰ “Qesmāti az Sokhnān-e Emām Khomeini be Pasdaran-e Markaz-e Tehran dar Qom” [Excerpts from Imam Khomeini’s Remarks to the Guards of Central Tehran in Qom], in *ibid.*, 23-27

¹⁰¹ Moin, *Khomeini*, 227.

¹⁰² Carter, *Keeping the Faith*, 563-80.

in September 1980. Iranians became convinced that Washington had provoked the Iraqi dictator to punish their country for the hostage crisis.¹⁰³

From 1974 until 1980, Iranian perceptions of the United States took a turn for the worse. Notwithstanding the ups and downs in U.S.-Iran relations and the Shah's assertion of greater independence from Washington, opponents to the Pahlavi regime believed their country to be subservient to the United States. U.S. leaders' visibly positive relations with the Shah allowed his opponents to cast him as a tool of "American imperialism."

Yet the revolution of 1978-79 was not about the United States per se: the people of Iran rose up to demand independence, freedom, and the blessings of modernity without the Pahlavi regime's secularism, repression, and economic incompetence.¹⁰⁴ A series of mishaps – the most important of which was the Shah's arrival in the United States on 22 October 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis – allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to use anti-U.S. discourses to carve out a formal political role for himself at the expense of Iran's moderates. With the collapse of U.S.-Iranian relations, the Islamic Revolution's "death to the Shah" slogan became semantically one and the same with "death to America."

The Turkish Military Solves Ankara and Washington's Opium, Cyprus, and Chaos Problems

For much of 1974-80, Turkey looked even worse than Iran. Despite the apparent calm under the 1971-73 military regime, serious problems awaited U.S.-Turkish relations, one of which was opium – a primary ingredient of heroin. Until the 1960s, heroin abuse had not been a

¹⁰³ Kermit Roosevelt, *Counter coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For the story behind Roosevelt's memoirs, see "Iran 1953: The Strange Odyssey of Kermit Roosevelt's *Counter coup*," <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB468/>; DNSA-NSA; accessed 1 June 2014. For an analysis of Middle Eastern perceptions of the CIA, see Douglas Little, "Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East," *Diplomatic History* 28, No. 5 (Nov. 2004): 663-701. For a discussion of the "paranoid style in Iranian politics," see Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 111-31. Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The Nuzhah Plot and Iranian Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, No. (2002): 645-66.

¹⁰⁴ On the modernist discourses of the pro-Khomeini faction during and after the revolution, see Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 1-38.

major problem for the United States. But a free social environment and U.S. troops in Vietnam falling prey to drug addiction and bringing their habits home introduced the potent narcotic to a greater number of Americans.

The Johnson administration had claimed that 80 percent of the heroin sold in the United States was manufactured with Turkish raw opium and pressured the Demirel government to halt poppy cultivation.¹⁰⁵ After Nixon's declaration of a global "war on drugs" in 1971, the image that the heroin destroying America's youth originated from Turkey gained strength and U.S. pressure increased.¹⁰⁶ Following the coup of 12 March 1971, Washington took advantage of Ankara's need for political backing and persuaded the military-backed technocratic government to ban the cultivation of opium poppies.¹⁰⁷

The opium ban offended Turkish public opinion. U.S. promises of financial aid did not satisfy dispossessed farmers and many Turks resented U.S. interference in their internal affairs. After the transition to civilian rule, the coalition government of the secular Bülent Ecevit's Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party (MSP) officially repealed the ban on 1 July 1974.

In and of itself, the Turkish decision to resume opium cultivation did not worsen relations between Washington and Ankara. Even though some members of the U.S. Congress asked the

¹⁰⁵ The origins of the "80 percent" figure is not clear but one of the earliest references comes from David C. Acheson, "Turkish Opium Project," 3 December 1965, enclosure to David C. Acheson to Joseph A. Galifano, 13 December 1965, Box 11 (2 of 2), White House Confidential File [hereafter CF], Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library [hereafter LBJ Library].

¹⁰⁶ The image probably had to do with the mass appeal of books and movies such as the *Godfather* and *The French Connection* in which Turkish opium played an important role. For Nixon's "war on drugs" speech, see "Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control," *The American Presidency Project* [hereafter APP], <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048>, accessed 5 April 2014.

¹⁰⁷ Two concise summaries of opium as a problem in U.S.-Turkish relations are James. W. Spain "The United States, Turkey, and the Poppy," *Middle East Journal* 29, No. 3 (Summer 1975): 295-309; George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 191-98. For a more detailed study of the "war on drugs," see Edward Jay Epstein, *Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America* (revised ed.; New York: Verso, 1990).

Nixon administration to cancel military sales to Turkey, such sanctions did not take effect.¹⁰⁸ The “Golden Triangle” region of Southeast Asia (the borderlands of Burma, Laos, and Thailand) quickly filled the gap from the Turkish ban while other opium-producing allies such as Iran, Pakistan, and Thailand did not implement similar measures.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the Turks reassured their American allies that only licensed farmers would be allowed to grow opium; the government would operate factories to make sure that the harvested crop could only be used for the pharmaceutical industry; and offenders of anti-narcotics laws would face stiff penalties.¹¹⁰

As opium tested the U.S.-Turkish alliance, troubles re-emerged in Cyprus. On 15 July 1974, a coup backed by the colonels’ junta in Athens, overthrew Cypriot President Makarios. Although Turks – mainland and Cypriot – had little love lost for Makarios, the specter of Cyprus’s unification with Greece compelled Ankara to act. Turkey refused to be outflanked by its NATO ally and sought to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority, which had suffered at the hands of Greek nationalists after the island gained independence from Britain in 1960.¹¹¹

Washington and London wanted to prevent Turkish military action. On 17 July 1974, Kissinger informed Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-AR), the chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, that the U.S. objective was to “stop [a] Turkish intervention [in Cyprus]” and to prevent a wider Greek-Turkish war. Echoing the Johnson administration’s logic during the 1964 crisis, Kissinger wished to prevent the two U.S. allies’ dispute from advancing Soviet interests in the region. To Fulbright’s question on an arms embargo on Athens and Ankara, the secretary of state responded that he “would not be unsympathetic” – especially because it would

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, the letter of 2 May 1974 from Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-MN) to President Nixon in Box 634, National Security Council Files, Country Files – Middle East [hereafter NSC Files – CF/ME], Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library [hereafter Nixon Library].

¹⁰⁹ One of Nixon’s advisers on anti-narcotics policy admitted this point: Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 149.

¹¹⁰ Ambassador William Handley to Washington, “Narcotics: Meeting with Foreign Minister,” 24 June 1971, Box 633, NSC Files – CF/ME, Nixon Library. Turkish position on the opium question obtained from *Facts on Turkish Poppy* (Ankara: Directorate General of Press and Information, 1974).

¹¹¹ Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün* [30 Hot Days] (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976), 21.

forestall “an international confrontation.”¹¹² Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan opposed Ecevit’s suggestion that London and Ankara invoke their status as guarantors of the London-Zurich Accords of 1959 to carry out a joint military operation on the island: Cyprus “needed fewer Greek troops,” said Callaghan, “not more Turkish troops.”¹¹³

Despite U.S. and British opposition, Turkey sent its forces to the island on 20 July. Turkish forces captured a small stretch of land in the north and a ceasefire came into effect. Initially, the intervention raised cautious optimism on the international scene because it precipitated the collapse of the juntas in Athens as well as Nicosia. Constantine Karamanlis, the grand old man of Greek politics, came home from exile to serve as interim prime minister and rebuild democracy.¹¹⁴ Meanwhile, American, British, Greek, and Turkish diplomats, together with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, met in Geneva. The talks came to a standstill over the issue of separate zones for the Turkish Cypriot minority. On 14-16 August, Ankara forcibly expanded the area under its control to cover one-third of the island.¹¹⁵

Watergate had a key impact on the Cyprus crisis.¹¹⁶ Unlike Lyndon Johnson, who enjoyed broad support at home in 1964, Nixon’s domestic choices in July 1974 were limited to impeachment and resignation; he was in no position to send a “Nixon letter” to Ecevit. Also unlike 1964, Washington could not nudge London to play its traditional part in Cyprus. Mired in its own financial and energy crises, Britain was in no shape to cooperate with Turkey or stop it.

¹¹² “TELCON – Sen. Fulbright / Sec. Kissinger,” 17 July 1974, Box 26, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons) [hereafter Kissinger Telcons], Confidential File, Nixon Library. On the evening of 19 July (U.S. time), Nixon also supported the idea of a temporary arms embargo on Athens and Ankara when he learned that Turkey had begun landing troops in Cyprus. See “TELCON – HAK/PRESIDENT,” 19 July 1974, Box 26, Kissinger Telcons, Confidential File, Nixon Library.

¹¹³ James Callaghan, *Time and Chance* (London: William Collins, 1987), 340; Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2001), .

¹¹⁴ Karamanlis would go on to win the parliamentary elections in November 1974.

¹¹⁵ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 158. On the Cyprus question, see Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2001); Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988).

¹¹⁶ Callaghan confesses that he did not appreciate this fact at the time: Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, 358.

Callaghan tried to get Kissinger and the U.S. State Department to threaten Ankara with “military opposition if they attempted to advance further [in Cyprus]” but to no avail.¹¹⁷

Deterring Ecevit may not have worked anyway: İsmet İnönü had trusted the United States in 1964; Ecevit learned from his predecessor’s mistake. İnönü had prompted Johnson’s letter by letting the U.S. ambassador know that he would send forces to Cyprus; Ecevit informed the U.S. government of the impending military operation only at the last minute on 20 July 1974.¹¹⁸

The second operation, however, turned the tide of international opinion against Ankara. European allies and the U.S. Congress signaled that they would impose an embargo on Turkey unless it reached an agreement with the Greeks and Greek Cypriots.¹¹⁹

Instead of compromising, however, Turkish leaders squabbled with each other. Even though Ecevit was open to a diplomatic settlement with the Greek side, he wanted to capitalize on his new-found image as the “conqueror of Cyprus” in early elections. However, the Islamist Erbakan, Ecevit’s partner in government, opposed giving back any land “conquered by the Muslim Turkish army.” Erbakan was even less willing to see his secular partner win in early elections so he walked out of the coalition. Ecevit resigned on 18 September 1974.¹²⁰

Without any political party to take over, non-partisan bureaucrats formed a cabinet in November 1974. Lacking a political base, the caretakers failed to conduct diplomacy. When the militant Greek group EOKA threatened to wage guerilla warfare against Turkish forces in Cyprus, Ankara expelled Greek Cypriot civilians from Turkish-controlled areas. On 5 February

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 353, 356-7.

¹¹⁸ Ecevit’s strategic thinking and discussions with U.S. and British officials on 15-20 July come from Birand, 30 *Sıcak Gün*, 119-25.

¹¹⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Diyet: Türkiye Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar, 1974-1980* [Requital: International Bargains Over Turkey, 1974-1980] (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1987), 64-79.

¹²⁰ Birand, *Diyet*, 43-44.

1975, seeing the Turkish military presence in Cyprus as a violation of U.S. foreign aid laws and the main obstacle to a diplomatic solution, Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey.¹²¹

On 31 March 1975, Süleyman Demirel, chairman of the center-right Justice Party (AP), entered into a coalition with Erbakan's MSP and Alparslan Türkeş's far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Two months later, the so-called Nationalist Front coalition announced that, unless the U.S. Congress lifted the embargo, it would abrogate the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1969 and close 30 U.S. bases that operated outside of NATO provisions.¹²²

To prevent base closures, Ford pressured Congress to repeal the embargo. He told a group of Republican congressmen that, not only did the embargo make the Turks reluctant to a compromise in Cyprus, it also pushed them to "the other side." Ankara had recently concluded a \$700 million economic and commercial agreement with Moscow, Ford said, which did not bode well for the Western alliance. The opium-Cyprus connection manifested itself as the Republican legislators asked Ford whether Ankara had relaxed its control over poppy farmers to punish the United States. The president responded negatively and underlined the dangers of maintaining the arms embargo: "If we don't move, Turkey [w]ill take action which will basically hurt NATO."¹²³ Congress, however, did not budge. The Demirel government suspended the DCA, closed down the bases on 25 July 1975, and formed a new army in İzmir not detailed to NATO.¹²⁴

Ford and Kissinger could have done little to prevent Turkish retaliation. Turks pointed out that the U.S. Congress had not passed similar sanctions against Greece. As far as they were concerned, Washington was siding with Athens. Indeed, it was Greece's good fortune that the

¹²¹ Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 36-45.

¹²² Birand, *Diyet*, 127-36.

¹²³ Memorandum of Conversation, 10 July 1975, Box 12, National Security Adviser – Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977 [hereafter Nat. Sec. Adv. – Memcons], Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library [hereafter Ford Library].

¹²⁴ There are two numbers regarding closed U.S. bases: "Kapalı 31 Amerikan üssü kararı bekliyor" [31 Closed American Bases Await Decision] *Hürriyet*, 8 April 1978. Another source cites 25 U.S. bases that operated in Turkey outside the NATO framework: Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 165.

colonels' junta, which had triggered the crisis by organizing the 15 July 1974 coup in Cyprus, collapsed a week after the botched takeover. The U.S. Congress would not impose an embargo against Prime Minister Karamanlis while he was rebuilding democracy in Greece.¹²⁵

Successful Greek American lobbying efforts in the U.S. Congress on behalf of the sanctions intensified Turkish resentment.¹²⁶ As President Ford pointed out, much of the problem was U.S. demographics: Greek Americans were numerous and influential; Turkish Americans, not so much. "I am an honorary member of AHEPA [American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association] and I have Greek friends," Ford told a bipartisan group of legislators in February 1975, admitting that he did not have a single Turkish American friend as a kid.¹²⁷

In fact, the U.S. embargo had less to do with Greek advantages than with Turkish leaders' shortcomings. The Ecevit-Erbakan coalition failed to see how expanding the area under Turkish control in Cyprus in could turn international opinion against Ankara. Even then, a compromise with Greece and Greek Cypriots from August 1974 through February 1975 could have prevented the U.S. embargo. Instead, Turkish leaders bickered with each other and prolonged the deadlock.

Not only did the political instability undermine the interim government of November 1974-March 1975, the caretakers also played a bad hand horribly. Sadi Irmak, the prime minister, appointed Melih Esenbel, Turkey's ambassador to the United States, as foreign minister. At a time when Ankara needed its envoy in Washington, Esenbel was in the Turkish capital, which did not help his country's lobbying efforts in the U.S. Congress.

¹²⁵ On U.S. relations with Greece during the 1974 crisis and afterward, see James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 185-212.

¹²⁶ Two Greek American members of Congress, Rep. John Brademas (D-IN) and Rep. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD, who was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1976), were especially influential in mobilizing the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate. For further reading on this topic, see Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984).

¹²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, "Turkish Aid Cutoff," 6 February 1975, Box 9, Nat.Sec.Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library. On the Ford administration's efforts to facilitating a solution in Cyprus and preventing Congress from implementing an arms embargo on Turkey, see the primary source documents in *FRUS* 1969-76, 30: 683-702.

Not that Demirel fared better. It was bad enough that he formed a coalition with Erbakan and the ultra-nationalist Türkeş because both leaders opposed meaningful concessions in Cyprus. Worse, Demirel also ran the economy maladroitly. With his sights on the next election, which was not until October 1977, he pursued populist economic policies by raising wages while stabilizing prices, which caused inflation. “Nobody should expect me to raise prices before the election” summarized the outlook of the usually sensible Demirel.¹²⁸

The OPEC price hikes deepened Turkey’s self-inflicted wounds. As global oil prices tripled and then quadrupled, Ankara did not reflect the increases on domestic consumers even as the value of the lira plummeted. The foreign trade deficit worsened so much that, by 1976, exports shrank to only one-third of imports. Economic depression hit in 1977: the Turkish central bank’s checks began to bounce on international markets, massive fuel and food shortages appeared, and regular power blackouts set in. While different cabinets headed by Demirel and Ecevit tried to overcome the problem by devaluing the lira, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) refused to extend credit until 1978, which only worsened Turkey’s predicament.¹²⁹ As we shall see in the next section, Turkish public opinion blamed the United States for these problems.

One of the main culprits for Turkey’s woes in the late 1970s was its command economy. Although Ecevit and Demirel both deserve blame for contributing to the problem with their populist policies, Necmettin Erbakan exemplified the farcical nature of state-run economies. As a three-time deputy prime minister in the 1970s, Erbakan liked to hold groundbreaking ceremonies for the “heavy industries” that would set the roots for his “great Turkey” vision. In 1976, a senator and a deputy from the CHP went to their home province of Erzurum to look into the construction of one such “heavy industry.” The idle foundation of the factory, a block of iron bars

¹²⁸ Quoted in Birand, *Diyet*, 113.

¹²⁹ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985* [Economic History of Turkey, 1908-1985] (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1988), 103-4, 116.

and hardened cement small enough for the lawmakers to bring back to Ankara in their car, showcased Erbakan's industrialization pipe dream.¹³⁰ Unfortunately, neither CHP nor AP politicians connected the dots between the MSP leader's little "heavy industries" and their own role in Turkey's problematic style of development.

As the economy worsened, Turkey's politics became more unstable and its social life more violent. From April 1975 until the 12 September 1980 coup, Demirel formed a total of five cabinets (all Nationalist Front coalitions) and Ecevit led two. Even though the AP and CHP were both centrist parties and they garnered a total of 78 percent in the 1977 elections, Demirel and Ecevit refused to form a grand coalition because of their mutual and well-publicized antipathy. The tensions at the top echelons of politics poisoned society. From 1975 until 1980, approximately five thousand people died – mostly at the hands of MHP sympathizers and radical leftist militants.¹³¹ Among the victims were Kemal Türkler, the president of the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Syndicates (DİSK), Nihat Erim, two-time prime minister during the 1971-73 period, and the respected journalist Abdi İpekçi. İpekçi's killer, Mehmet Ali Ağca, would escape prison under dubious circumstances and attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981.

The upheaval that engulfed Iran in the fall of 1978 saved U.S.-Turkish relations. President Carter, who had promised during his 1976 campaign to maintain the arms embargo until Ankara made concessions in Cyprus, pressed Congress to end the sanctions. He specifically engaged African-American members of Congress, many of whom represented districts that suffered from drug-related crimes and had supported the embargo against Turkey because of the opium

¹³⁰ *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi, 1923-2000* [Encyclopedia of the Republic, 1923-2000] (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), 3: 354.

¹³¹ Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 320.

question. Carter also asked his predecessor, Gerald Ford, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lobby Congress.¹³² In September 1978, the U.S. Congress lifted the embargo.

The Carter administration viewed Turkey through the prism of Iran. In a December 1978 report, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pointed out how Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (who replaced Demirel in early 1978) seemed confident that the West would give aid to Turkey in order to avoid a second Iran.¹³³ In a memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski that month, NSC staff member and Turkish affairs expert Paul Henze discussed whether Turkey was “susceptible to the Iranian sickness.” The answer was a qualified negative: “Turkey is [f]ar ahead of Iran in political evolution,” Henze wrote, and added that, unlike Iran, “religious fundamentalism [h]as not grown in recent years.” Furthermore, he added, the Turkish “military stands ready to intervene to keep the political system functioning if serious problems develop.”¹³⁴

Regional events reinforced Ankara’s importance. On 3 December 1979, a month into the Iran hostage crisis, NSC staff member Stephen Larrabee wrote to Brzezinski that, “at a time when Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Americanism are on the rise in the Middle East, Turkey remains an important [a]lly in an increasingly unstable [a]rea.” “In fact,” Larrabee continued, “if present trends continue, Turkey may be our only reliable friend in the area.”¹³⁵

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, Ankara became even more irreplaceable for Washington. After Carter declared the Persian Gulf vital to U.S. national interests and off-limits to potential aggressors in his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980 (the so-called “Carter Doctrine”), he sent a directive to his subordinates. The president

¹³² Carter to Jordan, “Turkish Arms Embargo,” 5 July 1978, Box 37, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library [hereafter Carter Library].

¹³³ Zaring to Henze, “Memorandum on Turkey,” 22 December 1978, EDP, NLC-18-7-9-2-4, Carter Library.

¹³⁴ Henze to Brzezinski, “Is Turkey Susceptible to the Iranian Sickness?” 15 December 1978, EDP, NLC-15-20-5-13-4, Carter Library.

¹³⁵ Underlines from original document: Larrabee to Brzezinski, “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey and Greece,” 3 December 1979, EDP, NLC-17-131-9-1-8, Carter Library.

highlighted the need to “strengthen Turkey’s capabilities to serve as a ‘threat-in-being’ on the flank of any Soviet intervention in the Gulf region.”¹³⁶

As the Carter administration sought to help Turkey, Turkish leaders found ways to help themselves. On 24 January 1980, the government of Süleyman Demirel (who replaced Ecevit the preceding November) announced a far-reaching economic liberalization program that included freeing currency exchange rates and commodity prices, freezing wages, decreasing farm subsidies, and suspending labor strikes with the overall aim of building a competitive and export-oriented economy. In March 1980, the Demirel cabinet inked the comprehensive Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with the United States.¹³⁷

Taking advantage of industrial and agricultural shortages in Iran, Turkey also signed a lucrative trade deal with its eastern neighbor in June 1980. The \$500 million barter and credit agreement between the central banks of the two countries allowed Turkey to import cheap oil from Iran and enabled Iran to buy industrial goods and agricultural produce from Turkey. At a time when the Turks suffered from hard currency shortages and a major foreign trade deficit (\$3 billion in imports and \$2.5 billion in exports), the agreement gave them a breath of fresh air.¹³⁸

The start of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 helped Turkey’s trade with both belligerents. Between 1979 and 1984, over 40 percent of Turkish exports went to Iran and Iraq. Turkish-Iranian commerce reached \$2.5 billion in 1985 and Ankara became Tehran’s third largest trading partner. Following the destruction of petroleum facilities in southern Iraq, the

¹³⁶ Carter to Vice President et al, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” [undated], EDP, NLC-17-141-8-2-7, Carter Library.

¹³⁷ On the DECA negotiations, see James W. Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey: Memoirs of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary* (New York: Praegar, 1984), 31-34.

¹³⁸ Tülümen, *İran Devrimi Hatıraları*, 182-83.

Kirkuk-İskenderun pipeline, with its terminus on Turkey's Mediterranean coast, became Iraq's main oil export route. By the time the war ended in 1988, Baghdad owed Ankara \$3 billion.¹³⁹

Notwithstanding positive trends, Turkey's domestic political situation deteriorated in 1980. When President Fahri Korutürk's term ended on 6 April, the Grand National Assembly failed to elect his successor despite 103 rounds of voting. Meanwhile, political violence worsened: In the first eight months of 1980, over 2,000 bank robberies, kidnappings, and bombings took place and more than 1,900 people were killed.¹⁴⁰ The proverbial straw that broke the camel's back came on 6 September when an MSP-sponsored rally in Konya, ostensibly to protest Israel's declaration of Jerusalem as capital, turned into demands for a *sharia* state in Turkey. The Turkish high command feared that their country could fall apart like Iran. On 12 September, Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren abolished the constitution and parliament. In the ensuing round-up, the military regime sacked several thousand faculty members and teachers, captured hundreds of thousands of small arms and ammunition, imprisoned hundreds of thousands of political activists and militants, tortured most of them, and executed a few.¹⁴¹

Much like the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations before the 1960 and 1971 coups, the Carter administration had hoped in 1979-80 that Turkey would remain a democracy. The NSC's Paul Henze commented in 1979 that General Evren "does not favor [i]ntervention [e]xcept in the most extreme circumstances."¹⁴² Evren's own superiors were more naïve than Henze: Bülent Ecevit admitted later on that he had appointed the general to the highest position in the Turkish

¹³⁹ Figures from Evren Altınkaş, "The Iran-Iraq War and Its Effects on Turkey," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 1, No. 4 (2005): 142-43; Mustafa Aydın and Damla Aras, "Political Conditionality of Economic Relations Between Paternalist States: Turkey's Interactions with Iran, Iraq, and Syria," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 27, No. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 2005): 31.

¹⁴⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül* [12 September] [Video Documentary] (İstanbul, 1998), Episode 7.

¹⁴¹ Birand, *12 Eylül*, Episodes 6-7-8-9.

¹⁴² Henze to Brzezinski, "Turkish Chief of Staff Kenan Evren," 6 June 1979, EDP, NLC-27-5-9-10-7, Carter Library.

military because he considered Evren to be “uninterested in politics.” Ecevit said he had actually wondered whether the mild-mannered Evren could control the restive military.¹⁴³

As the likelihood of a coup increased in mid-1980, Henze expressed his concerns to Brzezinski as follows: “any degree of military takeover in Turkey will be a problem for the Carter administration,” but if a coup did occur, he argued, “it would be a serious error if we took a schoolmarmish attitude [a]nd suspended aid or reduced our cooperation with Turkey.”¹⁴⁴ It is not clear whether U.S. officials conveyed those sentiments to the commander of the Turkish Air Force, General Tahsin Şahinkaya, who broke off his trip to Washington on 11 September, returned to Ankara, and participated in General Evren’s takeover. But the Carter administration did recognize the new government in Ankara.

From 1974 until 1980, three issues affected U.S.-Turkish relations: the CHP-MSP coalition’s decision to resume opium cultivation, the U.S. arms embargo on Ankara over its intervention in Cyprus, and the collapse of order in Turkey. The resumption of opium production offended U.S. lawmakers but it was only after Cyprus that they imposed the embargo. Meanwhile, Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel, despite leading Turkey’s largest moderate parties, failed to make tough choices over Cyprus and the economy. Events in neighboring Iran salvaged U.S.-Turkish relations by convincing U.S. lawmakers to lift the embargo. The 12 September 1980 ended the chaos in Turkey and reset U.S.-Turkish relations.

Opium, Cyprus, Gladio: Anti-Americanism Strikes Back in Turkey

The events of 1974-80 injected a heavy dose of anti-Americanism into the Turkish body politic. It all started with opium. Immediately after the 12 March 1971 coup, rumors circulated

¹⁴³ Birand, *12 Eylül*, Episode 4.

¹⁴⁴ Henze to Brzezinski, “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey and Greece,” 25 July 1980, EDP, NLC-27-5-9-10-7, Carter Library.

that the technocratic government could bow to U.S. pressure and ban opium cultivation. Opinion-makers were not impressed. Ragıp Üner, a physician and independent senator, labeled the poppy as an “indispensable source of medicine” and “the bread winner” of many Turkish farmers. “If America’s youth consume opium because of the [w]ars in Korea and Vietnam,” Üner wrote, “Turkey cannot be responsible for it.” The senator pointed out that the United States should talk to Iran, Afghanistan, India, and East Asian countries about its drug problem.¹⁴⁵

The ban offended Turks in other ways. They felt that compensation was inadequate. The centrist daily *Hürriyet* claimed that Washington’s offer of TL525 million (\$35 million) was below what the farmers would lose (TL6 billion – \$400 million).¹⁴⁶ *Hürriyet* also admonished Washington not to lose sight of the French connection: one headline claimed that it was French secret service agents, not Turkish farmers, who smuggled heroin into the United States.¹⁴⁷

The opium question continued to attract press through the 1973 elections. One think-piece in the leftist *Cumhuriyet* in January 1972 called for using the ban as an opportunity to develop Turkey’s pharmaceutical industry and to divert raw opium in that direction once farming resumed. A four-part series on the same paper reported that U.S.-sponsored programs designed to help farmers switch from poppy to alternative crops had failed.¹⁴⁸

By late 1973, most Turks agreed that the opium ban was untenable. When CHP chairman Bülent Ecevit and MSP chairman Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition government in January 1974, they promised to repeal the ban. Neither leader, however, acted on anti-U.S. sentiments.

¹⁴⁵ Ragıp Üner, “Afyon Sorunu ve Amerika” [The Opium Question and America], *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1971.

¹⁴⁶ “Haşhaştan Gerçek Zarar: 6 Milyar Lira” [The Real Loss from Hashish: 6 Billion Liras], *Hürriyet*, 12 November 1971. The U.S. side argued that the \$400 million figure included projected losses in illicit sales and refused to pay that amount: Ambassador William Handley to Washington, “Opium,” 24 June 1971, Box 633, NSC Files – CF/ME, Nixon Library.

¹⁴⁷ “Eroin Şebekesini Fransız Gizli Servis Şefi Yönetiyor” [French Secret Service Chief Runs Heroin Network], *Hürriyet*, 18 November 1971.

¹⁴⁸ Ahmet Kerse, “Afyon Savaşı” [Opium War], *Cumhuriyet*, 5 January 1972; “Haşhaşsız Kalan Topraklar” [Lands Without Hashish], *Cumhuriyet*, 11-14 July 1973.

Ecevit was a committed social democrat and fiercely patriotic but he neither opposed Turkey's NATO membership nor its alliance with the United States. A graduate of the American Robert College in İstanbul, the new prime minister had lived in the United States in the 1950s. Despite having pleasant memories from Henry Kissinger's famed "International Seminar" at Harvard University, Ecevit recalled his unease with the racial segregation he had witnessed while working as a guest journalist for a North Carolina newspaper.¹⁴⁹

Erbakan did not dislike the United States either. With a Ph.D. in engineering, he appreciated America's scientific and technological advances. As a staunch Islamist, however, Erbakan believed that Turkey's Western-oriented reforms since the 19th century had been misguided. Unlike Ecevit's CHP, which remained loyal to Atatürk's secularism, Erbakan's MSP argued that Islam should play a greater role in Turkish society. As part of its ideology of "National Vision" (Milli Görüş), which mixed elements of nationalism and socialism, the MSP argued that state-led development – especially expanding heavy industries – was the only way for Turkey to return to its Ottoman glory.¹⁵⁰ Erbakan also opposed Turkey's alliance with "Christian" countries and advocated closer relations with fellow Muslim nations. Although the CHP and MSP held similar views on social justice and national independence, their sharp disagreements over women's rights and religion made them strange bedfellows.

Before tensions over opium merged with the Cyprus crisis and triggered the U.S. arms embargo, centrist opinion-makers and political leaders remained cautiously optimistic about Turkey's strategic commitments to the West: being part of organizations such as NATO was still

¹⁴⁹ Altan Öymen, "Ecevit'in Hayatını Ecevit Anlatıyor: 'Bu Yazı Sen Gitmeden Çıkarsa Can Güvenliğinden Kaygı Duyarız'" [Ecevit Relates Ecevit's Life: 'It Will Worry Us If This Article Comes Out Before You Leave'] *Cumhuriyet*, 22 December 1974; Altan Öymen, "Ecevit Siyasi Hayatını Anlatıyor: 'Kissinger, Eşine Resimlerimizle Birlikte Adlarımızı Tek Tek Ezberletmişti,'" [Ecevit Relates His Political Life: 'Kissinger Had Made His Wife Memorize Our Names With Our Pictures'], *Cumhuriyet*, 8 January 1975.

¹⁵⁰ The introduction of an MSP booklet on industrialization discussed the issue by referring to the greatness of the Ottoman Empire: *Milli Görüş Açısından Türkiye'nin Sanayileşmesi* [The National Vision on Turkey's Industrialization] (İstanbul: MSP Üsküdar Gençlik Teşkilatı, 1975), 5-7.

better than neutralism.¹⁵¹ After the embargo, however, many Turks ascribed cynical motives to U.S. sanctions. Ecevit, no longer prime minister and with no hope for early elections, argued that the CHP's stance on opium had actually caused the U.S. embargo. Cyprus was just a pretext, he contended, and backed his claim by highlighting the resolutions in the U.S. House of Representatives in the spring of 1974 calling for sanctions against Ankara. Although those resolutions never passed the committee stage (and thus never reached the floor), many Turks came to believe that America was bent on punishing Turkey no matter what.¹⁵²

Negative views of the United States intensified after February 1975 as the Turkish side realized that the embargo would not be temporary. When Ambassador Esenbel came back to Washington from his brief tenure as foreign minister in May 1975, he expressed "distress" to Ford and Kissinger about popular reactions in Turkey. The resentment against the United States was growing so much that even Esenbel "had to do some criticizing of [the U.S.] to relieve the pressure." "We have to find a way out," the Turkish ambassador said.¹⁵³

Although there was a will, there was no way: throughout 1975, Ford personally lobbied senators and representatives to change their position, but to no avail.¹⁵⁴ The best he could do was to look the other way when Mohammed Reza Shah told him that he would ignore the congressional embargo send some spare parts to the Turkish Air Force.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ See for example, the descriptive book by the journalist Metin Toker (who was also İnönü's son-in-law) arguing that Ankara should stay in NATO despite the costs: Metin Toker, *NATO 25 Yaşında: Tamam mı, Devam mı?* [NATO is 25 Years Old: Over or Continue?] (Ankara: Türk Atlantik Andlaşması Derneği, 1974).

¹⁵² The Ecevit version of the opium-Cyprus story has even affected some scholars: See, for example, Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu* [White War: The Opium Question in Turkish-American Relations] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1996). It is worth noting that Ecevit wrote a preface for Erhan's book and reiterated his claim that opium, not Cyprus, had caused the arms embargo.

¹⁵³ Memorandum of Conversation, 16 May 1975, Box 11, Nat.Sec.Adv.—Memcons, Ford Library.

¹⁵⁴ See the memoranda of conversation between Ford, Kissinger, and members of Congress from March, May, and June 1975 in *FRUS* 1969-76, 30: 718-22, 724-25 747-65.

¹⁵⁵ Kissinger informed Ford that "Iran is now supplying spares to the Turkish Air Force" in Memorandum of Conversation, 18 April 1975, Box 11, Nat.Sec.Adv.—Memcons, Ford Library. The Shah personally informed Ford and Kissinger about what he was doing during his U.S. visit the following month. Memoranda of Conversation, 15

Until the embargo ended (and even afterward), Turkish leaders frequently informed their American counterparts of their disappointments. When Demirel met Ford on the sidelines of the Helsinki Conference in June 1975, he drew attention to the absurdity of the sanctions: Washington was withholding military items that Ankara had already purchased. Now, the Americans were asking compensation for their storage. “Turks fought with the United States in Korea,” Demirel told Ford, “we have a cemetery there.” Why the United States mistreated an ally in such a way, the Turkish prime minister said, “we don’t understand.” Ford recounted the exchange to his cabinet and confessed that he did not have a response either: “How the hell do you answer a question like that? This arms embargo just makes no sense.”¹⁵⁶

Bülent Ecevit expressed his frustration along similar lines to Ford and Kissinger during his visit to the United States as opposition leader in 1976. “We were not an easy ally” in 1974, he admitted, but “the Turkish people developed friendly attitudes toward the United States and NATO.” “There were no slogans and no anti-American demonstrations,” Ecevit said.¹⁵⁷

Even Turkey’s usually taciturn generals were bitter. In an interview on the eve of his retirement in March 1978, Chief of General Staff Semih Sancar complained how the United States not only blocked arms shipments to Turkey but it also prevented other NATO allies from extending military and economic assistance to Ankara. Sancar further claimed that Washington had organized a surreptitious “economic embargo” by blocking Turkish exports through international financial institutions.¹⁵⁸

May and 16 May 1975, Box 11, Nat. Sec. Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library. Also see Scowcroft to Kissinger, 23 May 1975, Box 12, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia [hereafter PCF - MESA], Ford Library.

¹⁵⁶ Memorandum for the Record, 6 June 1975, Box 12, Nat.Sec.Adv. – Memcons, Ford Library.

¹⁵⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, 29 July 1976, Box 20, Nat.Sec.Adv.– Memcons, Ford Library.

¹⁵⁸ “Amerika Vermiyor ve Verdirtmiyor” [America Doesn’t Give and Doesn’t Let Others Give], *Hürriyet*, 6 March 1978.

That previously pro-U.S. Turks could utter such words validated radical leftists' past criticism against the U.S. role in their country's security and development. *Cumhuriyet* columnist İlhan Selçuk wrote in late 1974 how "Turkey became America's forward outpost, cheap base, and cheap source of troops" after World War II. The bitter truth was that "Washington can cut off aid, [it] can cut off petroleum, [it] can do anything." "It's not [America's] fault," Selçuk continued, it's [the fault of] [t]he foreign-dependent, collaborationist, comprador, [and] servile class [of Turkey]."¹⁵⁹ When the embargo came into effect two months later, Selçuk expressed surprise that his compatriots were surprised. The Johnson letter in 1964 had made clear what Turkey could and could not do with U.S. weapons. Turkish people, Selçuk wrote, had to "wake up" to the folly of tying their national security to U.S. defense requirements.¹⁶⁰

The U.S. embargo convinced those Turks at the political center and the right that their country should end its reliance on the United States. In January 1975, the Ankara Chamber of Commerce organized a high-profile conference attended by cabinet ministers and the military high command where the participants agreed that, if Turkey wanted to become modern, it had to produce its own weapons.¹⁶¹ Later that year, a young MHP sympathizer published an influential book and made the case for a "national war industry." Unless Turkey developed its indigenous defense industries as well as its own civilian manufacturing and engineering infrastructure, Ali Bayındır claimed, it ran the risk of becoming the object of manipulation by "capitalist and communist imperialists" – the United States and the Soviet Union. If successful, however, Turkey could become a "leader in the Middle East" and "usher a third bloc" in world affairs.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ İlhan Selçuk, "ABD Askeri Yardımı" [USA Military Aid] *Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1974.

¹⁶⁰ İlhan Selçuk, "Washington Tutarlıdır" [Washington is Consistent] *Cumhuriyet*, 5 February 1975.

¹⁶¹ *Türkiye Milli Harp Sanyii Semineri* [Seminar on the National War Industry of Turkey] (Ankara: Ankara Ticaret Odası, 1975).

¹⁶² Ali Bayındır, *Milli Harp Sanayi* [National War Industry] (İstanbul: Milli Hareket, 1975), 71-72. Bayındır's ideas came from his first book, titled *Milliyetçi Sanayi Sistemi* [Nationalist Industry System] (İstanbul: Milli Hareket, 1973).

Ironically, even though successful state-owned defense companies did come into existence during the embargo period, much of Turkey's initial arms manufacturing would involve the production of U.S.-licensed weapons systems such as the F-16 fighter jet and the Stinger shoulder-launched air defense missile.

As discussions on foreign and defense policy continued and Turkey's political and economic conditions worsened in the second half of the 1970s, many Turks blamed the United States and the CIA for their country's troubles. As a result of the Church and Pike committees' investigations into the CIA's activities, U.S. espionage became a subject of discussion in Turkey. The memoirs of Philip Agee and Victor Marchetti, both former CIA officers, also had an impact. Although the controversial books actually had little to say on CIA activities in Turkey, their Turkish translations sold well and generated wide press coverage.¹⁶³

Whereas those Turks who resented the U.S. influence in their country could only speculate about the nefarious CIA activities in the past, they now had proof and they merged it with the ongoing troubles at home and in their country's relations with the United States. Mirror-imaging similar sentiments in Greece, İlhan Selçuk claimed that Henry Kissinger had triggered the Cyprus crisis in collusion with the Greek junta. Selçuk claimed that, Kissinger, through the CIA station in Athens, convinced the Greek junta that toppling the neutralist Makarios would lead to the division of Cyprus in Greece's favor and secure the island for the Western alliance.¹⁶⁴

Opium elicited similar conspiracy theories, the most damaging of which was that the Nixon administration had sacrificed the Demirel government in March 1971 for refusing to ban

¹⁶³ Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: A CIA Diary* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1975). Agee's book was translated into Turkish as *CIA Günlüğü* [CIA Diary] (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1975). Victor Marchetti, "Bir CIA Ajanının İtirafı" [The Confessions of a CIA Agent], *Cumhuriyet*, 25-27 March 1975.

¹⁶⁴ İlhan Selçuk, "Kıbrıs 1975" [Cyprus 1975], *Cumhuriyet*, 31 December 1974. The Marchetti revelations mentioned in note 163 contributed to this conspiracy theory. A prominent proponent of the Greek version of this conspiracy theory is the British journalist Christopher Hitchens. See his *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Verso, 2001) and *Cyprus* (London: Quartet Books, 1984). For a rebuttal, see Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 185-212.

poppy cultivation. Instead of a radical leftist, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil expressed that thought. Çağlayangil, a senior AP deputy, foreign minister under Demirel, and often lampooned as “America’s man in Ankara,” told the pro-CHP journalist İsmail Cem (himself a future foreign minister) that the Nixon administration had encouraged the 12 March coup to install a government amenable to banning opium.¹⁶⁵ Another leftist intellectual took that argument further and claimed that, because raw opium constituted one of main ingredients of medicinal drugs, the ban was a ploy to kill the Turkish pharmaceutical industry.¹⁶⁶

These comments reflected how a broader group of opinion-makers in Turkey became much more critical of the United States in the second half of the 1970s. In an expanded version of his 1974 book, the conservative academic and corporate manager Metin Eriş wrote that the United States controlled Turkey in a manner quite similar to the way the Soviet Union handled its satellites. In fact, claimed Eriş, Washington and Moscow secretly cooperated for joint world domination. “American and Russian imperialism” worked together to suppress potential competitors such as the European Community and Japan. Eriş further asserted that, because both superpowers were self-sufficient in oil, they inflamed Third World crises, especially in the Middle East, to manipulate global energy supplies. Turkey, just like other developing countries, had to break free from the straight-jacket of the Cold War.¹⁶⁷

As they established moral parity between Washington and Moscow, many Turks also came to believe that the CIA provoked political and social tensions in their country. The left – radical as well as moderate – accused U.S. agents of creating unrest by training the MHP’s youth

¹⁶⁵ İsmail Cem, “Çağlayangil 12 Mart’ı Açıklıyor” [Çağlayangil Explains 12 March], *Politika*, 12 March 1976. Çağlayangil reiterated his position in his memoirs: İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *“Kader Bizi Una Değil, Üne İtti”*: *Çağlayangil’in Anıları* [“Fate Has Pushed Us not to Flour, But to Fame”: The Memoirs of Çağlayangil] (Reprint; Ankara: Buke Yayınları, 2000), 86-87, 356.

¹⁶⁶ Aytunç Altındal, *Haşhaş ve Emperyalizm* [Hashish and Imperialism] (İstanbul: HAVASS Yayınları, 1979).

¹⁶⁷ Metin Eriş, *Amerikan-Rus Emperyalizmi* [Amerikan-Rus Emperyalizmi] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1974).

group, the “Greywolves.” In 1976, Bülent Ecevit mentioned to President Ford and Henry Kissinger the popular belief among leftist circles that the CIA controlled the Greywolves.¹⁶⁸ At home, Ecevit warned about the “counter-guerrilla,” NATO’s stay-behind network in allied countries that had been commissioned to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe (Operation Gladio). Ecevit claimed that, because the Soviet invasion never came, the Turkish Gladio, composed of military, police, and intelligence officers and their civilian assets (primarily MHP sympathizers), saw the rise of the CHP as a communist takeover by other means. Thus, the shadowy network tried to intimidate his party.¹⁶⁹

Many events in the late 1970s gave credibility to the Turkish left’s Gladio hypothesis but two stand out. On 1 May 1977, 500,000 demonstrators gathered at İstanbul’s Taksim Square to celebrate International Labor Day and to express solidarity with the CHP, which they expected to win a majority in the upcoming elections. But when snipers opened fire at the crowd from multiple directions, a stampede broke out, and police panzers chased fleeing demonstrators. In what came to be known as “Bloody 1 May,” 37 people died and many more were injured.¹⁷⁰ Muhittin Cenkdağ, one of the prosecutors who investigated the incident, claimed that “scores of people with American names,” with the help of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT), had come to İstanbul the day before and rented rooms at a hotel overlooking Taksim.¹⁷¹

A larger and better-coordinated massacre took place in the southern town of Maraş in December 1978. After rumors emerged on 19 December that “communist Alevi” had

¹⁶⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, 29 July 1976, Box 20, Nat.Sec.Adv.–Memcons, Ford Library.

¹⁶⁹ Ecevit personally had close encounters, which he suspected to be Gladio’s work. In June 1975, rightist activists stoned Ecevit’s bus and fired shots at the CHP chairman. On 29 May 1977, he survived another assassination attempt in İzmir. On Ecevit’s and his fellow leftists’ views on Gladio, see *12 Eylül*, Episode 4.

¹⁷⁰ *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, 3: 422-23.

¹⁷¹ Birand, *12 Eylül*, Episode 3. The historian Halil Berktaş, who was a demonstrator on “Bloody 1 May,” argues that the episode started off as a gunfight among different leftist factions: İsa Tatlıcan, “Türk solu, 1 Mayıs 1977’de Taksim’de öldü” [The Turkish left died on 1 May 1977 in Taksim], *Sabah*, 28 April 2014, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2014/04/28/turkiye-solu1-mayis-1977de-taksimde-oldu>, accessed 1 June 2014.

firebombed a movie theater showing a nationalist film, several thousand men from the city's Sunni majority carried out pogroms against the Alevi minority. Because local police units proved unable (or unwilling) to suppress the rioters, it took nearly a week and military units from surrounding provinces to crack down on the attackers. The Alevi minority, many of them CHP supporters, asserted that shadowy elements of the state had coordinated the Maraş massacre. They disputed the official death count of 105.¹⁷²

Beyond the Gladio, leftist Turks saw an American hand in their country's economic problems. After extending \$450 million to Turkey in April 1978, the IMF asked the Ecevit government to undertake additional reforms for new credits. Reluctant to lose the support of labor unions and unwilling to turn Turkey into a market economy (which he equated with Western colonialism anyway), Ecevit demurred.

As conditions worsened, Turkey's business community raised its voice. Vehbi Koç, president of the country's largest commercial and industrial conglomerate, criticized state-owned enterprises for their inefficiency. Vehbi's son and vice president, Rahmi, argued that the Turkish private sector could do a better job than the state-owned businesses with the help of foreign direct investment.¹⁷³ In 1979, TÜSİAD (Association of Industrialists and Businessmen), Turkey's largest business advocacy group, launched an ad campaign calling on politicians to resolve their differences and institute economic reforms.

Prime Minister Ecevit, however, was unable to square the CHP's social democratic circles with economic liberalization. Without bold moves on the economic front, shortages worsened and citizens waiting in line for such basic items as bread and cooking oil became a common

¹⁷² *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi*, 3: 452-53.

¹⁷³ "Rahmi Koç: Yabancı sermayeyi en uygun şekilde kullanacak olgunlukta'yız" [Rahmi Koç: We are mature enough to use foreign investment in the most appropriate way] *Hürriyet*, 5 February 1976; "Koç: Yeni yatırımlar derhal durdurulmalı" [New investments must be stopped at once] *Hürriyet*, 21 December 1977.

sight. A single word marked the memory of Ecevit's third ministry in Turkish minds: "kuyruk" (queue). Given TÜSİAD President Feyyaz Berker's contacts with the Carter administration, the prime minister suspected that Washington was punishing him for his refusal to initiate economic reform and denying the U.S. military greater access to the bases and airspace of Turkey.¹⁷⁴ Unable to overcome the economic crisis, Ecevit resigned on 12 November 1979. The left's accusation that TÜSİAD had collaborated with Washington to open up the national market to foreigners and Turkish air space and bases to the U.S. military were confirmed when the Demirel government instituted a comprehensive economic liberalization program in January 1980 and signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement two months later.

The immediate causes of anti-Americanism in Turkey from 1974 until 1980 were the opium question and the U.S. arms embargo on Turkey. Just as the Cyprus crisis of 1964 ushered a wider discussion about U.S.-Turkish relations and its effect on Turkish modernization, opium and the embargo opened up a broader debate on Washington's role in Turkey's defense and development requirements. Whereas the Turkish radical left had contended that the United States harmed Turkey's development from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, the moderate left and the political right also began to use the radical left's anti-U.S. discourses after 1974. As political and economic instability set in the second half of the 1970s, Turks from across the political spectrum suspected that the United States was behind their country's problems.

Extremist anger in the late 1970s, however, was too powerful and widespread for any single entity to manipulate. In fact, even those radical leftist and ultra-nationalist students, who participated in the violence claimed that "foreign interests" manipulated them, failed in their occasional negotiations to put aside their differences – thus thwarting Turkey's "foreign

¹⁷⁴ The record of National Security Adviser Brzezinski's April 1977 meeting with the Turkish businessmen's delegation led by Berker reveals that the talks focused exclusively on the Cyprus dispute: Memorandum of Conversation, 29 April 1977, Box CO-56, White House Central File, Subject File, Carter Library.

enemies.”¹⁷⁵ Those young men and women, of course, were hardly alone: experienced statesmen such as Demirel and Ecevit never exuded the moral and political fortitude to stem the tide of violence either. The collective failure of Turkey’s political elite and civil society to negotiate their differences through democratic means and blaming their problems on the United States led to the coup of 12 September 1980.

Conclusion

For part of the 1974-80 period, *détente* appeared to be the order of global affairs and Cold War tensions seemed to ease. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations tried to maintain unity in the Western alliance while negotiating with the Soviet Union and China.

The 1970s, however, were neither peaceful nor tranquil. Civil wars in Africa, the OPEC price hike, the fall of South Vietnam, tensions in the Middle East, and the apparent march of global communism made U.S. policy-makers uneasy. The OPEC crisis led to an economic downturn at home while the Watergate scandal led to a crisis of confidence in the U.S. government. Domestic constraints affected Washington’s ability to project power abroad.

The fluctuations in global tensions and U.S. domestic politics had a significant impact on U.S. relations with Iran and Turkey. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi asserted Iran’s role as regional superpower thanks to the glut of petrodollars. As he tightened his grip by forming a single-party system in 1975, the Shah pursued wrong-headed economic and fiscal policies, which undermined his regime. Political and economic frustrations, coupled with the Shah’s mishandling of the revolutionary crisis in late 1978, led to the collapse of the monarchy in February 1979 and the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

¹⁷⁵ Ultra-nationalist and leftist students held several meetings at the onset of the troubles in 1976: “Silahları bırakalım” [Let us put down the guns], *Hürriyet*, 15 November 1976; “Görüşmeye hazırız” [We are ready to meet], *Hürriyet*, 16 November 1976; “Masaya oturdular, anlaşılamadılar” [They sat down, they couldn’t reach an agreement], *Hürriyet*, 20 November 1976.

After the revolution, pent up anger against the United States occasionally reared its head in Iran while relations between Washington and Tehran remained correct but not at all friendly. The hostage crisis changed all that. In November 1979, to protest the Shah's arrival in the United States, pro-Khomeini students attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took American personnel hostage. Ayatollah Khomeini, as part of his plan to establish himself as the new Persian potentate, embraced the students and redeployed anti-U.S. discourses to galvanize popular support against moderate elements of the new regime. The 444-day captivity of U.S. diplomats in Tehran, the consolidation of clerical rule in Iran, the commencement of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980, and Jimmy Carter's defeat at the hands of Ronald Reagan two months later altered the course of America and Iran's domestic and foreign policy.

The global Cold War, U.S. domestic politics, and events in Iran also changed the course of U.S.-Turkish relations and Turkey's political economy. In the summer of 1974, the CHP-MSP coalition's decision to repeal the U.S.-sponsored opium ban coincided with the escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions in Cyprus. When the Turkish military took over the northern parts of the island in July-August 1974, the U.S. Congress slapped Ankara with an arms embargo. Turkish leaders, unable to resolve their differences or initiate economic reform, failed to come up with a meaningful solution to the Cyprus dispute as well.

Turks from across the political spectrum drew similar lessons from the opium question, the Cyprus dispute, and the U.S. arms embargo: They saw all three dynamics as part of a U.S.-Greek conspiracy. Turkish public opinion came to believe that their country should become more independent from the United States for its own development and security. As economic conditions worsened and political violence increased in the second half of the 1970s, many Turks claimed that their domestic troubles were a result of American machinations. Although most

Turks welcomed the military coup of 12 September 1980 because it put an end to their misery, many also suspected that the United States had supported the coup to avoid a “second Iran.”

In the end, the Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the 1980 coup in Ankara had a destructive effect on the polities of both Turkey and Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini pushed out moderates and liberals from the government and solidified the institutions that hindered Iran’s political and economic prospects. In Turkey, a new constitution in 1982 formalized the military’s outsized role in politics even after the transition to civilian rule in 1983, choking the political and economic evolution. In the end, the core elements of authoritarianism in the two countries remained intact and hampered development and democratization well into the twenty-first century. Although anti-Americanism prevailed in Turkey and Iran and expressions of positive sentiments toward the United States were non-existent for much of the 1970s, loving and hating America would remain salient dynamics in the two countries beyond 1980.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Why did Turks and Iranians love and hate the United States during the Cold War? Soviet demands for bases and territory from Turkey and the lingering presence of Red Army troops in Iran after World War II led Turks and Iranians to see the United States in a positive light. America's wealth and technology also appealed to the people and political leaders of the two countries; they hoped that cooperation with Washington would make them secure and developed.

But their political leaders' poor decision-making and the messy nature of progress meant that the socioeconomic development of Turkey and Iran took much longer than what their peoples had envisioned. When Turks and Iranians began to realize in the late 1950s that their U.S. alliances made them neither safe nor developed, they turned against the United States.

As discussed in chapter one, anti-U.S. sentiments in Turkey and Iran during the Cold War drew from the traumatic memory of the decline of the Ottoman and Qajar empires. Loss of territory, uprisings, and fiscal and economic instability in the nineteenth century convinced the political elites of the two countries that the state should spearhead modernization efforts. Turkish and Iranian modernizers wanted to adopt Western science and technology but they considered Western ideologies such as liberalism and socialism to be anathema to their goals. As constitutional revolutions in the two countries failed to secure the social, economic, and political rights of their citizens, nationalism – with its emphasis on a strong, developed country – formed the crux of Turkish and Iranian modernization.

Despite the similarities, the Qajars faced more obstacles on the road to modernization. Britain and Russia frequently cooperated at Iran's expense in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – a fact illustrated by the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 and London and Moscow's

refusal to let Tehran build railroads. The Ottomans, however, could play multiple European powers against each other. Tehran also lacked the Ottoman state's financial base so it had to endure more humiliating commercial capitulations than İstanbul did.

Differences in nation-building extended to other areas: while Sunni-majority Turkey always enjoyed a clerical class subordinate to governmental authority, it was not until the 1920s that the *ulama* in Shia-majority Iran came under some degree of state control. As such, the rulers of Turkey retained greater political autonomy than their counterparts in Iran. While İstanbul (and Ankara after 1923) expanded the elemental functions of a state from the mid-nineteenth century onward – physical infrastructure, a standing army, civil courts, and public education – it was not until the 1920s that Tehran undertook lasting social, economic, and political reforms.

Turkey and Iran shared another important characteristic after World War I: charismatic rulers who accelerated development through autocracy. In the 1920s and 1930s, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran both engaged in “development through power.” Both leaders expelled foreign forces, suppressed domestic insurgents, and abolished the capitulations (except for the British oil concession in Iran). Atatürk and Reza Shah also improved infrastructure, expanded public education, and secularized the court system.

But the founder of modern Turkey and the Iranian king did diverge in several respects. In the mid-1930s, Atatürk withdrew from day-to-day politics and cultivated the institutions (especially the parliament) that would exercise authority after his death. In Iran, however, Reza Shah's rule became increasingly arbitrary and other political actors and institutions lost their autonomy. Following the Anglo-Soviet invasion and Reza Shah's abdication in favor of his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1941, Iran's political system liberalized but its parties and

parliament remained weak. The constitutional convention of 1949 expanded the monarch's prerogatives, which allowed Mohammed Reza Shah to elbow out other political actors later on.

It was odd for Turkey and Iran to become allies with the United States at the onset of the Cold War: their authoritarian approach to modernization did not comport with the U.S. understanding of progress. For much of its history, a general consensus existed in the United States that development and social order should be enmeshed with the autonomy of the individual, free enterprise, and limited government. Especially after the abolition of slavery in 1865, local, state, and federal governments facilitated a capitalist market in a pluralistic polity. From the early republic to post-Civil War Reconstruction and from the Progressive Era through the New Deal, attempts to expand the reach of government, even when successful, encountered significant resistance in the United States.

As chapter two shows, the collapse of the Grand Alliance right after World War II ushered in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States and helped to institutionalize the growth of government in America, a process that was already underway with the Great Depression and World War II. The leaders of the Kremlin, faithful that their communist creed would herald a global utopia, resisted the spread of free markets and pro-U.S. regimes around the world. As the Soviets expanded their domains in Eastern Europe and appeared to be doing the same in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean, Washington decided to “contain” Moscow. Given their threat perceptions and their location on the southern borders of the USSR, Turkey and Iran became key U.S. partners in the Cold War.

At first, the people and leaders of the two countries perceived close relations with the United States as beneficial. While Turkey transitioned to multiparty democracy after 1945, U.S. assistance programs such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan helped with its defense

requirements and development needs. Iran, too, benefited from U.S. help. Mired in the oil dispute with Britain, Iran gained from U.S. political support vis-à-vis the Soviets in 1946-47, Point Four, and American weapons.

Pro-U.S. perceptions in Turkey and Iran, however, were rather ephemeral. From 1945 until 1954, pro-Americanism in Turkey was enthusiastic but volatile. Whenever the United States gave dollars and arms, Turks lauded America. But if Washington failed to meet Ankara's expectations in aid and security guarantees, Turkish views of the United States soured. This back-and-forth continued until Ankara joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.

Pro-Americanism in Iran was less enthusiastic than in Turkey because Iranians did not agree on what to expect from the United States. Conservatives advocated an alliance with Washington to negate British and Soviet influence. Liberal nationalists such as Mohammed Mosaddeq pursued friendly relations with the United States but hoped Iran would remain neutral in the Cold War. The Tudeh, a small but powerful communist party, engaged in anti-U.S. agitation. Though much has been said about the U.S. role in the coup against Mosaddeq, chapter two shows that most Iranians maintained their cautiously positive views about America; Britain, not the United States, bore the brunt of Iranian anger for Mosaddeq's downfall in 1953.

From the mid-1950s until the early 1960s, pro-U.S. sentiments in Turkey and Iran began to erode. Chapter three shows how the Democrat Party government in Ankara, which had taken over from the Republican People's Party in 1950, pursued misguided economic initiatives and became more authoritarian. After the May 1960 coup, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations worked to move Turkey back to democracy and orderly development. Although Turks appreciated U.S. assistance during this period, they also became disillusioned over the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

In Iran, pro-Americanism vanished and anti-U.S. sentiments spread because of Mohammed Reza Shah's imprudent policies. Eisenhower and Kennedy expected the Shah to implement socioeconomic and political reform. The Pahlavi king, however, felt too insecure in the face of an alleged coup attempt in 1958 and coups in Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. While the Shah's reluctance to initiate reform and his autocratic tendencies offended the liberal middle class, talk of land reform alienated the hitherto pro-Pahlavi landowners and clerics. When the Shah finally declared his "White Revolution" program in 1963 and consolidated his autocratic rule, Iranians turned against the United States. They came to believe that Washington encouraged their king's autocratic rule to exploit their country's oil riches.

As discussed in chapter four, Turkish and Iranian perceptions of the United States and their relations with Washington underwent tectonic shifts from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s. The social and economic reforms that U.S. administrations had backed since 1945 bore fruit. The economies of the two countries experienced sustained growth while their societies became more urban and educated. As a result, Ankara and Tehran could finance their own modernization and exert autonomy from Washington.

Despite such positive developments, however, anti-Americanism turned violent in the two countries. Aside from employing brute, repressive force, Turkish and Iranian political elites did not know how to deal with radical leftist groups exasperated by the inequalities of rapid modernization. As the radical left accused their leaders of being "American lackeys," U.S. diplomats, servicemen, and businesses found themselves on the receiving end of the violent militancy directed at the Turkish and Iranian governments. Although such virulent expressions of anti-U.S. sentiments modulated in Turkey in the late 1970s, as discussed in chapter five, events such as the opium question, Cyprus, and the U.S. arms embargo sustained anti-Americanism.

Meanwhile, continued U.S. support for the Shah in Iran infused the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 with anti-U.S. fervor. With the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War, U.S.-Iranian relations collapsed. In contrast, Turkey's September 1980 coup kept Ankara in the Western alliance.

A brief discussion of Turkey and Iran after 1980 illustrates how the two countries' relations with Washington and the successes and failures of their modernization efforts continued to influence their views of the United States. For much of the 1980s, anti-Americanism remained a potent force in Iran's domestic and international politics. Iranian leaders saw foreign interference in the region – especially Western support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War – as an existential threat against their regime and territorial integrity.¹

But the U.S.-Iranian cold war also had its moments of thaw: the Iran-Contra affair, Tehran's help with kidnapped Westerners during the Lebanese civil war, and the overtures of presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami to mend fences with Washington suggested that Iran was eager to turn a new page with the United States. Khatami expressed regret over the hostage crisis of 1979-81 and organized public vigils to show solidarity with America after the attacks of 11 September 2001. With the blessing of Ruhollah Khomeini's successor, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Khatami government helped Washington to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan with the help of the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance in 2001-02.²

¹ On U.S.-Iranian relations after 1980, see Trita Parsi, *A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 97-284; James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 261-315.

² On Iran-Contra and post-1980 U.S.-Iranian relations, see Malcolm Byrne, *Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014); "The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On," <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/>; Digital National Security Archive, National Security Archive, George Washington University; accessed 5 July 2014; Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, 409-46; Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance*, 110-284. On Iranian help in Afghanistan in 2001-02, see Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, "A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan" (Washington: National Defense University, 2011), 15-19, http://www.fes-asia.org/media/Peace%20and%20Security/Untitled_attachment_00031.pdf, accessed 5 July 2014; James Dobbins, "How to Talk to Iran," *Washington Post*, 22 July 2007.

But flawed U.S. and NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, the Bush administration's accusation in 2002 that Iran was part of an "axis of evil," and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 once again inflamed Iranian suspicions of the United States. Thanks to Washington's continued support of Israel at the expense of Palestinians and the occasional U.S. threat against Iran's nuclear program – "all options are on the table" – Khomeini's "Great Satan" label reappeared in Iranian politics.³

Yet even as the Islamic Republic maintained its anti-U.S. posture, pro-Americanism made a comeback among ordinary Iranians. During the Cold War, the Pahlavi regime's authoritarianism had catalyzed anti-Americanism in Iran. Because of the enmity between the Islamic Republic and the United States after 1980 and the ayatollahs' inability to end repression and provide socioeconomic opportunity – the root causes of the Islamic Revolution in 1978-79 – Iranians developed positive views toward the United States.⁴

Iran's new pro-Americanism came out into the open in 2009. Before the Iranian presidential election, supporters of reformist candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi used symbols reminiscent of the 2008 campaign of Barack H. Obama, the first African American to become U.S. president and the first U.S. chief executive to acknowledge his country's role in Mosaddeq's overthrow.⁵ When the controversial incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was declared the winner, fraud allegations became rampant and younger Iranians

³ Abbas Amanat, "Khomeini's Great Satan: Demonizing the American Other in Iran's Islamic Revolution," in Abbas Amanat and Magnus T. Bernhardsson (eds.) *U.S.-Middle East Historical Encounters: A Critical Survey* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 158-59. Also see William O. Beeman, *The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other* (Westport: Praeger, 2005).

⁴ Nicholas D. Kristof, "Hugs from Iran," *The New York Times*, 13 June 2012; Christopher Thornton, "The Iran We Don't See: A Tour of the Country Where People Love Americans," *The Atlantic*, 6 June 2012; Azadeh Moaveni, "Stars (and Stripes) in their Eyes," *Washington Post*, 1 June 2008; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Those Friendly Iranians," *The New York Times*, 5 May 2004. For a more nuanced view on the resurgence of pro-Americanism in Iran, see Sara Beth Elson and Alireza Nader, *What do Iranians Think? A Survey of Attitudes on the United States, the Nuclear Program, and the Economy* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2011).

⁵ Babak Rahimi, "Inside the Iranian Elections," *PBS*, 12 June 2009, <http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/524/iranian-elections.html>, accessed 5 July 2014.

took to the streets. Aside from the age-old slogan, “death to the dictator!,” the Iranian protestors also chanted “Obama is with us” (a play on the phrase “Ou-ba-ma,” which literally means “he is with us” in Persian). But as it became clear that the United States would do little other than showing verbal solidarity with the protestors, “Obama is with us” turned into “Obama, you are either with them [the mullahs] or with us.”⁶ Events in 2009 proved how Iranian views of the United States sprang from the Middle Eastern country’s political and economic turmoil.

Anti- and pro-U.S. sentiments ebbed and flowed in Turkey as well. Several dynamics improved U.S. standing in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s – among them Washington’s hands-off approach to Greek-Turkish disputes, U.S. support for Ankara’s crackdown on the Kurdish militant group PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and American backing for Turkey’s European Union bid and Turkish attempts to expand influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.⁷ President Bill Clinton’s 1999 visit to Turkey, which took place in the wake of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in Kenya with the CIA’s help, was a smashing success. USIA-sponsored surveys in 1999 and 2000 showed that 61 percent of Turks held “favorable” views toward the United States – the highest for a Muslim-majority country.⁸

After 9/11, however, the tide turned strongly against the United States and Turkey emerged as “the most anti-American country” in the world. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 83 percent of Turkish citizens held “unfavorable” views of the United States in 2007, surpassing all other countries, including Iraq and Pakistan.⁹

⁶ Abbas Milani, “With Them or With Us,” *New Republic*, 5 November 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/them-or-us>; accessed 5 July 2014.

⁷ On U.S.-Turkish relations from 1980 through the early twenty-first century, see Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future* (London: Routledge, 2004); William Hale, *Turkey, the U.S., and Iraq* (London: SOAS, 2007).

⁸ See Table A2 in Monti Narayan Datta, *Anti-Americanism and the Rise of World Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 228.

⁹ “Global Unease With Major World Powers,” *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, 27 June 2007, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/global-unease-with-major-world-powers>; accessed 1 July 2014; Brian J.

Turkish anger at America after 9/11 related to U.S. policy toward the Middle East and the effects of that policy on Turkey. Many Turks saw the “war on terror,” especially the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as a U.S. attempt to control Middle East oil by dividing up Turkey and establishing an independent Kurdistan. In March 2003, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey rejected a bill to let 60,000 U.S. troops through its territory to occupy Iraq. Following the U.S. invasion, the PKK emerged from its hideouts in northern Iraq and resumed its attacks against Turkish forces.

The roots of Turkey’s new anti-Americanism shared much with anti-U.S. sentiments in the Cold War period. As mentioned earlier, anti-Americanism in Turkey during the Cold War built on the traumatic memory of Ottoman decline. Loss of territory to national uprisings in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had coincided with Western imperialism at the expense of Ottoman Turkey. At the turn of the twenty-first century, many Turks saw U.S. policy in the Middle East as a continuation of Western imperialism – even as their government cooperated with Washington over issues such as regional security and NATO expansion.¹⁰

Several overarching themes and issues emerge from the study of the social, economic, and political development of Turkey and Iran, their relations with the United States during the Cold War, and anti-Americanism in the two countries. In both Turkey and Iran, brief phases of democratic and liberal opening punctuated long periods of authoritarianism. In moments of liberalization, democrats in the two countries either turned to authoritarianism after gaining power or ceded influence to more authoritarian elements; the desire to develop rapidly made authoritarianism an alluring option for Turkish and Iranian leaders. Democrats such as Mohammed Mosaddeq and Adnan Menderes resorted to authoritarian measures; moderates such

Grim, “Turkey and Its (Many) Discontents,” *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, 25 October 2007, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/10/25/turkey-and-its-many-discontents>; accessed 1 July 2014.

¹⁰ Stephen F. Larrabee, *Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009).

as Mahdi Bazargan and Abolhassan Bani Sadr lost to Khomeini; the political mistakes of Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel paved the way for General Kenan Evren.

This is not to argue that Turkey and Iran maintained their “Oriental” and “despotic” essence. Quite the contrary: the economy, society, and politics of the two countries underwent massive changes between 1945 and 1980: Turkey transitioned from a single-party regime to a multiparty democracy and, notwithstanding successive military interventions, maintained the basic elements of a democracy. Its agrarian economy industrialized and its society became more literate, educated, and urban. Iran, too, changed at an unprecedented rate between 1945 and 1980: It had a democratic political system at the onset of the Cold War and experienced moments of liberal opening in 1960-62 and in 1979-80. By the time of the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s social and economic indicators were nearly equal to those of its Turkish neighbor.

As proposed in chapter one, this study also explored (albeit indirectly) whether Turkey and Iran really have presented vastly different models for other Middle Eastern countries: the answer is decidedly negative. Turkey has not really merged free market capitalism with a secular democracy; Iran’s Islamic regime has not met the material and spiritual needs of its people.¹¹ Thus, the claims that Turkey would serve as a better inspiration for the Arab world than Iran or

¹¹ Mustafa Akyol, “Turkey vs. Iran: The Regional Battle for Hearts and Minds,” *Foreign Affairs* [online], 21 March 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137343/mustafa-akyol/turkey-vs-iran?page=show>; Mona Moussavi, “Iran and the Arab Awakening,” *LSE Middle East Centre Blog*, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/files/2012/04/Iran-and-the-Arab-Awakening-FULL-VERSION.pdf>. In 2011, a majority of Egyptians stated that they wanted their country to resemble Turkey: “2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,” http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2011/11/21%20arab%20public%20opinion%20telhami/1121_arab_public_opinion.pdf. All links accessed 2 January 2013. The idea of Turkey and Iran serving as different models for the Middle East seems to be an old one: Turkish Ambassador Tülümün relates in his memoirs that, in his farewell dinner in Tehran in 1983, the ambassadors of several Arab countries wished for Turkey to succeed. Otherwise, they said, they would all “become Iran.” Turgut Tülümün, *İran Devrimi Hatıraları* [Memories of the Iranian Revolution] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1998), 250.

that Turkey and Iran could both play positive leadership roles in the Middle East in a way compatible with U.S. interests are wishful thinking, not useful policy recommendations.¹²

This brings us to one of the key questions of this study: what role did the U.S. government play in the development of Turkey and Iran and in the evolution of anti-Americanism in the two countries? During the Cold War, successive U.S. administrations from Truman through Carter defined and pursued U.S. interests in Turkey and Iran with remarkable consistency. Washington wished pro-Western market democracies would take root in Ankara and Tehran. Turkish and Iranian leaders, however, sidelined democracy for the sake of growth and stability, which created turmoil, undermined development efforts, and hurt U.S. prestige in the two countries. Cold War constraints forced U.S. decision-makers to accept the domestic choices of their Turkish and Iranian counterparts. Thus, anti-Americanism was not just a by-product of modernization or an inevitable reaction to U.S. global power but the result of the actions of American, Turkish, and Iranian leaders.

The story of Turkey and Iran's Cold War alliance with the United States and their experiences with authoritarian modernization brings us to how the United States can help the developing world without fueling anti-Americanism in the future. During the Cold War, Washington endorsed authoritarian leaders in allied countries yet seldom exerted direct control over those leaders' social and economic policies; thus, local actors bear ultimate responsibility for their socioeconomic and political development. In future crises around the world, American leaders are likely to face the dilemma of preserving stability and promoting freedom; it is unlikely that America's interests will comport with its ideals all the time.

¹² For works advocating improved U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran to help the transformation of the Middle East, see Stephen Kinzer, *Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future* (New York: Times Books, 2010); Soner Çağaptay, *The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century's First Muslim Power* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2014); Vali Nasr, *The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat* (New York: Doubleday, 2013), 95-141.

Even though Washington's ability to shape global dynamics and local events in developing and transitional countries will be more circumscribed, there are a few meaningful ways to help such nations. Many scholars have shown how countries that mesh market capitalism, inclusive and representative political institutions, and respect for the rule of law produce better economic results. Sustainable and long-term growth is unlikely without liberal democracy. And liberal democracy is unlikely to take root without liberal and democratic actors and institutions.¹³ Accordingly, while short and medium-term needs may vary, U.S. diplomacy in the long run should promote just, free, and competitive political and economic systems around the world. Naturally, upholding free market democracies abroad necessitates addressing social and economic injustices inside the United States without injuring citizens' rights and liberties.¹⁴

If the Cold War proved anything, it showed how societies that respect their peoples' political and economic freedoms while balancing them with social justice inspire citizens to innovate and produce wealth. Therefore, it is smart politics – in developing as well as developed nations – to empower the populace through the free market and a democratic political system while maintaining social and economic justice. Correcting mistakes in such an environment would be less painful than it would be under non-inclusive and non-representative systems. Political leaders throughout the world would be wise to bear that in mind. So might U.S. officials, if they wish to ease global anti-Americanism.

¹³ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown, 2012); Michael Mandelbaum, *Democracy's Good Name: The Rise and Risks of the World's Most Popular Form of Government* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Fareed Zakaria, *Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 146-60; Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

¹⁴ On this question, see Richard N. Haass, *Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order* (New York: Basic Books, 2013) and Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, *That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back* (New York: Picador, 2011).

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