

Divided by Place: The Enduring Geographical Fault Lines of American Politics

Brian Kal Munis

Philipsburg, MT

M.A. Political Science, University of Montana, 2015

B.A. Political Science, University of Montana, 2013

A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Virginia for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Politics

University of Virginia

August 2020

© 2020

Brian Kal Munis

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the role of place – symbolically charged spatial units that constitute psychologically meaningful categories – in the American politics. Overall, I argue that place, perhaps the most fundamental basis of group delineation – distinguishing “us over here” from “them over there” – continues to exert considerable sway over a non-trivial portion of the American electorate, campaign advertising, and representational style.

In this dissertation, I develop a rich theoretical account of the political psychological structures of place, detailing the nature of concepts such as place identity and place resentment, as well as specifying the conditions under which these psychological structures matter for politics.

Political media, such as campaign advertising, activate voters’ place identities, thereby increasing the likelihood that voters use place as a heuristic to evaluate candidates and other political objects. I document and explain variation in place-based appeals in political advertising and in Congress members’ social media feeds. Place appeals are common throughout the country and exert significant effects on how voters evaluate candidates. Moreover, politicians appear to use place appeals strategically, with more vulnerable members of Congress developing a more place centered, as opposed to nationalized, representation style.

Regarding voting behavior, I account for how place-based resentments correspond with support for America’s parties, President Trump, and vote choice in the 2018 midterms. In addition, I demonstrate how candidates’ place-based characteristics activate voters’ place identities. Overall, despite the forces of nationalization and partisan polarization that some assume has already resulted in a transcendence of American politics beyond the local and particular, I find that place is a potent political psychological force in contemporary American politics.

Overall, the findings in this dissertation contribute to debates surrounding several important topics in political science, including partisan polarization, nationalization, the urban-rural divide, and representation.

To my parents Brian and Tammy, for your unending love and support.

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	1
<i>That All Politics Are No Longer Local Does Not Mean That No Politics Are Local: Considering Nationalization</i>	6
<i>Place: What is it and Why Focus on its Role in Politics?</i>	12
<i>Resentments based in Geography: The Power of Place Beyond Roots and Place Identity</i>	15
<i>A Preview of the Remainder of the Dissertation</i>	17
Chapter 2. A Theory of Place in American Political Behavior	20
Protecting Our Public Lands vs. Protecting Our Borders: A Father/Son Quarrel in the Montana Mountains	21
Place: Its Construction and Importance in Heart and Mind	26
<i>Sociological Tradition</i>	29
<i>Human Geography Tradition</i>	29
<i>Place and Modernity</i>	31
<i>Place and Exclusion</i>	32
The Social and Political Psychology of Place	33
<i>Place Attachment</i>	36
<i>Place Identity</i>	37
<i>Place Consciousness and Place-based Resentment</i>	40
Figure 2.1. Subnational Place-based Psychological Constellation (Hypothetical Individuals) ..	43
General Conditions Under Which Place Becomes Politically Salient	45
<i>Threat</i>	46
<i>Communication of Elites</i>	48
<i>Social Sorting</i>	49
Place, Salience, and Political Campaigns	50
<i>Place and Advertising</i>	52
<i>Place and the Digital Homestyle</i>	53
Place as a Basis for both Unifying and Divisive Superordinate Identities	53
Conclusion	56
Chapter 3. Measuring Place-based Resentment	57
What is Place Resentment	59
Developing Survey Based Measures	66
Table 3.1 Place Resentment Scale Items	69
Validating Place Resentment	71

Place resentment is unidimensional.....	72
Place resentment is distinct	73
Who is Resentful?	74
Figure 3.1 Means and Distributions of Place Resentment by Place Type.....	76
Table 3.2: Predictors of Place Resentment	79
Discussion and Conclusions	82
Chapter 4: The Occurrence and Effects of Place-based Political Communications	85
Place-based Political Ads, or, Home, Home on the Range, Where the Deer and the Antelope Play on Constituent Priors.....	87
<i>Documenting the Occurrence of Place-based Political Advertisements</i>	<i>89</i>
Table 4.1 Share of U.S. Senate Advertisements Featuring Place-based Appeals: 2010-2016	92
Table 4.2 Types of Place-based Ads	93
<i>Explaining the Occurrence of Place-based Ads.....</i>	<i>95</i>
Table 4.3 Predicting the Proportion of Place-based Ads.....	96
<i>The Effects of Urban and Rural Place Appeals</i>	<i>100</i>
Figure 4.1 Example Stimuli for Each Experimental Condition.....	102
Figure 4.2 Marginal Heterogenous Treatment Effects	103
Talk Local to Me: Place and the Digital Homestyle.....	104
<i>Basic Patterns of Place-based Rhetoric on Congress Members' Social Media Pages.....</i>	<i>107</i>
Figure 4.3 Place and the Digital Homestyle in the 114th and 115th Congresses	108
Table 4.4 Congress Members Who Reference Local Topics the Most and Least by Congress	109
<i>Predicting Place-based Rhetoric on Congress Members' Social Media Pages</i>	<i>110</i>
Table 4.5 Predicting the Proportion of Place-based Posts in Congress Members' Facebook Feeds.....	111
Figure 4.4 Place-based Digital Homestyle by Partisan Lean in the 114th and 115th Congress	113
Conclusion	114
Chapter 5: Place and Voting	116
Candidate Centered Angle: Preferences for Locally Rooted Candidates in the Age of Hyper-Partisanship and Nationalization	117
<i>One of Us: Preferences for Rooted Candidates</i>	<i>120</i>
<i>Heuristics and Voting</i>	<i>123</i>
<i>Place Identity and Localism in Political Psychology</i>	<i>124</i>
<i>Study 1: Observational Analysis of 2019 Lucid Survey Data</i>	<i>126</i>

Table 5.1: Logistic Regression Analyses—Place Identity and Attitudes Regarding Candidate Roots.....	130
Figure 5.1: Predicted Probability of Beliefs Regarding Local Candidates by Place Identity ..	131
Table 5.2: Marginal Effect of Place Identity on Attitudes Regarding Candidate Roots	131
<i>Study 2: Conjoint Experiment.....</i>	<i>132</i>
Table 5.3: Conjoint Attributes and Levels.....	133
Figure 5.2: Candidate Attribute Level Marginal Means – All Choice Tasks	139
Figure 5.3: Candidate Attribute Level Marginal Means – Primary Election Choice Tasks....	140
Figure 5.4: Candidate Attribute Level Marginal Means – General Election Choice Tasks	141
Voter Centered Angle: Place-based Resentment and Voter Preferences	144
Table 5.4: Marginal Effect of Place Resentment on Party Evaluations	149
Figure 5.5: Predicted Values of Difference in Party Evaluation by Place Resentment	149
Figure 5.6. Marginal Effect of Place Resentment on Evaluations of the Democratic Party	150
Figure 5.7: Predicted Probability of 2016 Presidential Vote by Place Resentment	153
Figure 5.8: Predicted Probability of Nov. 2018 Trump Job Approval by Place Resentment ..	154
Table 5.5: Marginal Effects of Place Resentment on Voting Democratic in 2018 (CCES)	157
Figure 5.9: Marginal Effects of Place Resentment on Voting Democratic in 2018 (CCES).....	157
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	160
Key Lessons Learned	161
Appendix.....	166
Chapters 1 & 2	166
Chapter 3	166
Chapter 4	177
Chapter 5	181
Chapter 6	190
References.....	191

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are quite a few people who deserve recognition here. I'm not sure that I'd go so far as to say that this dissertation wouldn't have been possible without their help throughout the past few years, though (I know, I know, it's a great cliché line, though). But, if that's close to being true of anyone, it would be my parents, Brian and Tammy Munis, to whom I've dedicated this dissertation.

Though neither of my parents attended college, they always encouraged me to – rarely directly and never forcefully, but always gently, warmly, and persistently. As far as words are concerned, what probably had the strongest impact were my dad's warnings about what lay ahead if I didn't pursue a college education. Even when the money was good at the Butte copper mine where he works, he'd say things like “trust me, you don't want to do something like this” or “you might be able to make a living doing this, but you won't enjoy it much and it won't fulfill you.” My mom echoed these sentiments and, importantly, when I nearly dropped out after a rough freshman year of undergrad, she demanded that I do better rather than drop out, even though dropping out really did seem like the most natural path at that time. More important than those words, though, and more directly related to me completing the PhD without too much trouble was the example my father set. I can't recount the number of times that I witnessed my father come off of a 12 hour nightshift at the mine and then immediately go work a day of pest control (a small business my mom and dad started to keep our family afloat after my dad was temporarily laid off when the mine shut down in 2000), spin wrenches for my brother and I at the motocross track, or any number of other things. I remember one hot July afternoon outside of Dillon, MT, during my own short stint as a blue-collar worker, when, after having just finished crawling out from below the crawlspace below a house we were spraying (for bugs), I had a nice chat with our client. He told me about how, as a young man, he had been a summer hand on my family's ranch, working for my grandfather. He told me that it was working alongside my grandfather putting up hay, fixing fence, and herding cattle where he learned the true definition of a hard day's work. I guess it's where my dad learned it, too. Making my way through graduate school has never felt overly difficult, certainly not overwhelming, and the biggest reason for that, I think, is the perspective gained from observing my parents all these years. What I've been doing these past five years certainly doesn't qualify as hard work. In fact, I'm reluctant to call it work at all (and, no, it's not because I love it so much). And I'm not just talking about the coursework and research that I've completed – the six independent courses I taught, and five courses I TA'd while in grad school weren't much work either. And, what's more, I am pretty confident I won't ever have to work all that hard for the rest of my life (with any luck anyhow). The son of a copper miner/two pest exterminators earning his PhD at a fine public institution and (we hope) never having to put in a back breaking hard day's work in his life? Perhaps the American Dream ain't quite dead after all. Again, thank you Mom and Dad.

I next want to acknowledge my wonderful, smart, and supportive partner, Olyvia Christley. Nobody has been there for me on a day to day basis like you have these past 3.5 years. I managed to finish “on time” and without ruffling more feathers than I already have because of

you. Thank you for always being so willing to help, comfort, and, when I needed it, question me. I hope that my opportunities to reciprocate may yet prove to be boundless.

Next are my siblings, uncle Stephen Munis, Serbian family, and my best friend from my childhood, Danny McGuire (the PhDs will have to wait a bit longer still). My brother Connor and sister Bridgette have given me unwavering support throughout this whole process and, indeed, my entire life (well, Connor wasn't around for the first 8 years, but that aside...). There's simply too much to say for me to begin to put it on paper here but suffice to say that you two are my "ride or dies." Speaking of siblings, thank you also to sister McKenzie and brother Levi (and family), who I like to think have supported me in their own way. Thank you to my uncle Stephen for showing a great deal of interest and enthusiasm for what I have been doing the past few years; it means a lot. While I'm listing family members, thanks to Misty, Stony, and Munja for inspiring me to try to be a bit more carefree and at peace with the world like they *usually* are. Many thanks also to Milica, Lazar, Miloš, Zoran (*počivaj u miru*) and Violeta for all your love and support from Serbia. Thank you to my good friend Danny, who has been very encouraging from the start of my grad career to the present moment, and who has always shown way too much interest in my work – our rural Montana road trips during my first two years at UVa will always be cherished memories.

Next up, I want to thank a handful of grad colleagues who also happen to be dear friends: Richard Burke, Benjamin Helms, Boris Heersink, Nicholas Jacobs, and Anthony Sparacino. I am most thankful to you five for providing much needed intellectual community and comradery during my time at UVa. You've all made my work considerably better than it would have otherwise been (especially you, Nick – I can't wait to write at least a few more papers with you!). Richard and Ben, I am immensely grateful for our many evenings in the various bars, taverns, and breweries in and around Charlottesville where we engaged in intellectual conversation, discussion of public affairs, and general fraternity – it truly made my final two years of grad school feel like something out of a novel and I doubt I'll ever experience anything like it again (except at our reunions, which I hope prove to be numerous). Other members of the UVa PhD alumni family who have gone out of their way to provide guidance, and for which I am ever grateful, include Kenny Lowande, Andrew Clarke, Emily Sydnor, and Abhishek Chatterjee. Graduate student friends and colleagues outside of UVa who have been especially supportive over the years include Joe Phillips, Zoe Nemerever, and Jessi Bennion – thank you!

Now it's time that I thank several faculty members. I want to start by thanking two non-UVa faculty: Rob Saldin and Kathy Cramer. Rob was the first teacher I ever had that saw any considerable potential in me (read: he noticed that I was weird enough to *maybe* be an okay academic) and encourage me to think seriously about pursuing an academic path– an idea that had first come to me 18 months prior to my meeting Rob while I was bumming around Serbia during the summer of 2012. Rob has since become a good friend and I proudly consider him to be my most valuable mentor. If not for Rob, I very likely wouldn't have been admitted to UVa's grad program and I definitely wouldn't have landed the post doc at Johns Hopkins. Thank you, thank you, and a thousand times and more, thank you, Rob.

Kathy Cramer, meanwhile, has been the most supportive person of my dissertation project and has probably done more to promote my work than anyone. Over breakfast in the Spring of 2018, Kathy made a strong case for me embarking on this particular dissertation project. Then, at MPSA in spring of 2019, Kathy agreed to be part of my dissertation committee. Since then she has made my work better and, most importantly I think, been more encouraging than I ever could have imagined. Thank you so much, Kathy – I am convinced that you are the nicest person in all of political science and I consider myself lucky be mentored by you. I've learned a lot from you and hope that I've been able to return that favor with this dissertation (even if only a little!).

I want to extend thanks to my other four committee members Nicholas Winter, Paul Freedman, Justin Kirkland, and Jerry Clore. Nick, you were a big help at the conceptualization stage, especially regarding the relationship between place and race. I am also grateful for the various programming assistance and that you gave me access to your CCES module (it made Chapter 5 possible). As an aside, I will always find great humor in the fact that, owing to our radically different backgrounds, our greatest moments of bonding came during office visits where we (you approaching it from an urban angle and me from a rural one) would ponder whether there was even such a thing as suburban identity and, if so, what in the hell it might entail. Paul, thank you for being so upbeat and for providing such clear feedback. Most, of all, though, thank you for encouraging grad students to put what's best for themselves and their career first – that mindset should be the norm. And, Paul, if you ever come visit your sister in Montana, please stop in. Justin, I wish we had overlapped longer at UVa. Thank you for stepping in during my fourth year and immediately doing such great work on my behalf. Your energy is infectious and it, along with your strategic sense and desire to see grad students succeed in today's difficult environment, helped me a great deal as I prepared for and navigated the job market, negotiated job offers, etc. – thank you! Jerry, thank you for teaching me so much about affective and cognitive psychology, for allowing me to participate in your lab, and for including me in the goings on in the UVa social psych community. More than anything though, thank you for the strong support you gave me during my second and third years – it came at a time when I needed someone to let me know that it wasn't me. Looking at the names of the faculty I just listed, I can't believe that a first gen student who posted sub 3.0 GPAs in both high school and undergrad wound up with two members of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (Jerry and Kathy) on his committee – amazing how far a little encouragement from teachers goes... and a pinch (or a lot) of luck, too.

Other UVa faculty I want to mention include Sid Milkis, Rachel Augustine-Potter, and Lynn Sanders. Sid, your enthusiasm and upbeat demeanor was always a welcome departure in an environment where people all too often take themselves far too seriously. I also appreciate the wealth of knowledge imparted in your APD seminar and that you were so willing to reach out to several departments on my behalf during my first job market cycle. Rachel, the advice you gave me at two key junctures in my grad career was very much appreciated and was by no means taken for granted. Lynn, thank you for always being a friendly and compassionate voice, for looking out for me in my early years in the program, and for helping shape this dissertation while it was in its infancy.

I must also express my gratitude to my two research assistants: Arif Memović and Nicole Huffman. Arif and Nicole are both bright, talented, and hard working. Arif is an “old hand” when it comes to assisting me with my research and, more importantly, one of my best friends. I look forward to the next steps in our friendship and to helping you in any way that I can to get you to where you want to be career wise. Nicole, meanwhile, is brimming with potential and I am thrilled that she will be attending grad school. It’s been a pleasure getting to teach you, have you as a research assistant, to successfully win research grants with you, and to conduct research with you. I can’t wait to see all that you accomplish, Nicole!

Lastly, I am thankful for a *place* that is near and dear to my heart: Montana. Where I am from is perhaps my greatest source of inspiration. People who know me would probably say that my writing a dissertation about place constitutes a gross and unbridled example of “meseach.” Yep, guilty as charged.

Chapter 1: Introduction

“You look into rural areas, and we’re not seen, but there’s a lot of us that’ll come out of these hills if it keeps getting worse....it would be all guerilla warfare...I would probably be an officer in that effort.”

—Larry Caldwell Piercy, Jr., a fervent supporter of President Donald Trump from Middletown, VA who spoke of the possibility of a civil war should Trump be removed from office via impeachment, (Reuters interview, 10/29/2019).

“Well, they [the Matt Rosendale campaign] wanted to nationalize the race, and we wanted to talk about issues that impacted Montana...and I think Montanans connected up with that...I was a Montanan. I still farm. I was raised there, work there, raised my kids there, was educated there—the whole works—and I think people could relate with that.”

—U.S. Senator Jon Tester (D-MT), in an interview with MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow (11/30/2018), responding to a question regarding how he won re-election to a third term in a “red state” in 2018.

Near and Dear to the Heart: The Local Versus the National in American Electoral Politics

Of all the various framings used to describe the 2018 midterm elections, perhaps the most broadly used and accepted among them was the notion that this cycle had become considerably “nationalized.” In particular, a common view was that these midterm elections were, even more so than usual, a referendum on the President—Donald J. Trump in this case. So much was this the case that the Brookings Institution, when asking experts on various U.S. states to assist in analysis of key midterm Senate elections, requested specifically that writers reflect on the role that Trump was playing in each race.¹ The dominant view among prominent observers was that people seeking to understand the elections unfolding before them need not burden themselves with pondering the particularities of the various states and districts; rather one need only think about geographical variation in opinion regarding Trump and related national level concerns, such as the Kavanaugh confirmation and the like.

When the votes were tallied, some results emerged that were hard to ignore. While there was an overwhelming focus on the degree to which the midterms were nationalized, a non-trivial

¹ I know, because I was one of those writers. See: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/10/26/race-for-the-senate-2018-key-issues-in-montana/>

number of candidates who had *localized* their races won.² This becomes all the more noteworthy when one considers that many of these candidates were running as Democrats in pro-Trump districts. In West Virginia, Senator Joe Manchin ran as a true member of the “West Virginia tribe” and “West Virginia Democrat” on his way to being comfortably reelected in a state that went for Trump by some 42 points just two years earlier.³ This was an especially significant result since West Virginia was once among the most friendly in the country to Democrats at all levels of government, but in recent decades the national Democratic brand has grown increasingly toxic in eyes of most West Virginians—reaching a shockingly high water mark in the 2016 presidential race. Even for the likes of Joe Manchin, who has long cultivated a homestyle based in West Virginia authenticity and who has posted a moderate voting record along the way, many election prognosticators early on anticipated that the highly nationalized political environment of 2018, coupled with the West Virginia electorate’s brisk march toward fully embracing the Republican party, would be too much to overcome. The Manchin campaign responded to these trends by doubling down on Manchin’s connection to West Virginia as a distinctive place and sought continually to remind voters why they like him: his authenticity and understanding of the needs, plights, and desires of his constituents. Crucially, the Manchin campaign framed these positive qualities as being inextricably linked to his strong connection to place. On this score Manchin also drew a contrast between himself and his opponent, West Virginia Attorney General Patrick Morrisey, by highlighting Morrisey’s New Jersey and Washington DC roots (Manchin of course is a WV native) in order to frame him as a carpetbagger. Despite the valiant efforts of the Morrisey campaign, West Virginia Republicans,

² Of course, this is not to say that the Democrats wouldn’t have won by more in a counterfactual world that is less nationalized. What these election results do suggest, however, is that some claims regarding the grip of nationalization over the American political mind have likely been overblown.

³ <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1811/07/CPT.01.html>

dozens of nationally GOP aligned organizations, and the President himself (Trump campaigned against Manchin the state multiple times) to nationalize the race and paint Manchin as a run of the mill Washington Democrat, Manchin successfully won reelection whilst running a highly localized campaign. Meanwhile, all three Democrats running for U.S. House seats in the state lost by double digits.

Far away from the Mountain State and under the Big Sky in the land of mountains,⁴ Montana's Democratic Senator Jon Tester found himself in a similar position to his co-partisan colleague from West Virginia. A so-called "red state Democrat," Tester was tasked with defending a seat whose constituency had went for the President by 20 points two years prior.⁵ Unlike Manchin, Tester had never won more than fifty percent of the vote before and, to make matters worse, President Trump made defeating Tester a top and highly personal priority. While Tester would have always been a top target in 2018, his sinking of Trump's nominee for Secretary of the Department of Veteran Affairs, Dr. Ronny Jackson, for alleged ethical violations and other misconduct drew the President's ire in a severe way—even provoking the President to publicly call for Tester's resignation and vowing to exact his revenge. Trump visited Montana an unprecedented four times in as many months to campaign against Tester, exclaiming to those in attendance at his rallies that he could not understand how Tester was ever elected in a state that clearly loved him so much. What's more, Trump told his audience that he "knows Montana" and Montana is, to Trump, nothing if not Trump Country. In addition to the President's visits, Vice President Pence visited three times, and Donald Trump Jr. on four separate times. Moreover,

⁴ The literal meaning of "Montana" or, more formally, montaña, in Spanish is mountain.

⁵ So called because Montana is in actuality a deeply "purple" state. While Montana has long reliably cast votes for Republicans in elections for the U.S. House and Presidency, Montanans been nearly as reliable in their votes for Democrats at the levels of governor and U.S. Senate.

Tester's opponent, Montana Insurance Commissioner Matt Rosendale, went all in on Trump—attempting to link himself to the President to a degree matched by few others across the country that year. Factor in that a Republican running close to Trump had won a special election for the state's lone U.S. House seat in 2017 and it would appear that Tester stood a good chance of losing his seat if nationalization had permeated the minds of the Montana electorate. Tester, though, like Manchin, triumphed. On his way to posting his largest victory to date—and garnering over 50% of the vote for the first time in his three victories—the Tester campaign ran a thoroughly localized, place centric, campaign, playing up the seven fingered Senator's background as a third generation Montana dirt farmer. Like Manchin, Tester relentlessly attacked his opponent, whom his campaign dubbed “Maryland Matt,” for being an outsider and wannabe rancher out of touch with Montana values. And, despite a flurry of visits from Trump and his various surrogates to the state, Tester chose to go it alone; purposefully declining to bring in any national Democratic actors, such as Barack Obama and others, rallying support for Democrats in other states. On the same day, Tester's fellow Democrat, Kathleen Williams, running for the state's at-large house seat, lost the same electorate by five points. A native of California, Williams simply did not have the luxury of running such an overtly place centered campaign as Tester's.

Looking beyond just those candidates who won, it would appear that going local may have also helped a number of losing candidates perform markedly better than their co-partisans had in 2016. In West Virginia's third congressional district, for instance, Richard Ojeda ran as a loyal son of West Virginia who, after a distinguished military career, had returned to his native state only to find that many of its coalfield communities were “worse off than what [he] saw in Iraq and Afghanistan.” He improved upon the 2016 Democratic candidates' vote share by over

30 points. In South Dakota, where Democrats have been shut out of the governor's office for forty plus years, Billie Sutton came within four points of defeating Republican Kristi Noem, who was reelected to a fourth term occupying the state's at-large House seat by nearly 30 points in 2016. Sutton ran a very similar campaign to Tester, eschewing his party's national brand by focusing on his multigenerational ties to rural communities in the state, whereas his opponent stayed national by pledging her fealty to Trump.

These elections are particularly striking considering recent scholarship in political science on the "nationalization" of American news media and political behavior (Hopkins 2018), which has been embraced by the American punditry community to an unusual degree. In addition to these races, there were many more others where localized campaign strategies appeared to resonate with voters, such as Abbie Finkenaur's triumph in Iowa or Chris Pappas's successful roots focused campaign in New Hampshire—I have merely highlighted some of the most noteworthy here. In addition, place centered campaigns are not a phenomenon isolated to the 2018 electoral context, as many similar races unfolded in 2016 as well (an election cycle also thought of by many as being highly nationalized), not to mention previous cycles. In the 2016 Montana gubernatorial election, for example, Democrat Steve Bullock ran a folksy, place centered campaign rooted in Bullock's Montana native status against a high-quality Republican opponent who was framed by the Bullock campaign as being an "outsider" from New Jersey "out of touch" with "real" Montanans. Bullock ultimately won handily on the very same day that the same Montana electorate handed Trump a resounding 20-point victory. Results such as these are striking because scholars and pundits who are particularly bullish on the effects of nationalization would suggest that it should be rather rare to see candidates running localized or place centric campaigns in the first place, let alone winning elections or significantly

outperforming partisan benchmarks on the backs of such campaigns. In this dissertation, I assess the extent to which such campaigns are rare and what accounts for that variation. Moreover, I also assess whether these campaign strategies are effective in contemporary American politics.

In the next section, I review the literature on nationalization, paying particularly close attention to Daniel Hopkins's *The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized* (2018), considering the extent of evidence for the nationalization thesis and what, if anything, it suggests for the role and place and context more generally in American politics.

That All Politics Are No Longer Local Does Not Mean That No Politics Are Local: Considering Nationalization

In the seminal book dedicated to the topic, Daniel Hopkins defines nationalization as a process through which “national political divisions infuse subnational politics,” which results in a scenario wherein political orientation at *all* levels of government “is primarily national in orientation” (2018, p. 34). Nationalized political behavior has two facets. The first concerns the ideas and considerations that form the basis of public opinion and political action. When political behavior is nationalized on this dimension, citizens utilize national concerns and criteria, such as opinion toward the President, as the primary lens through which to make sense of and evaluate the entirety of the political world—including concerns far removed from national level politics, such as vote choice in a county commissioner's race. The second dimension concerns the orientation of political engagement, wherein nationalization would entail large disparities in engagement (such as voter turnout) between national and subnational levels of government.

Evidence for nationalization of political behavior is mixed. On the second dimension (engagement) the evidence is relatively compelling. Over the past several decades, the gap in turnout between presidential and mayoral races in major cities has grown mightily. The turnout

gap between presidential and midterm elections has also increased steadily since 1990, with 2018 being a major exception. Beyond voter turnout, there is also evidence of asymmetrical national vs. state engagement when one looks at other metrics, such as campaign donations. It has been shown that the gap in total number of within jurisdiction donors for candidates for US Senate versus gubernatorial candidates has mostly widened since 2006 (Hopkins 2018). While it is true that evidence gleaned from donation data is somewhat less compelling than turnout data, since we can easily imagine that some within jurisdiction donors could be motivated to donate to senate candidates to combat the influence of out-of-state donors (which is naturally higher for senators than for governors, given the national nature of the office that influences politics beyond any single state), overall it appears rather clear that nationalization of political engagement has occurred to a significant extent in recent decades. However, with midterm turnout hitting a 50 year high in 2018, it would seem possible that we are not yet nationalized beyond the point of no return even on the dimension of participation.⁶

Evidence regarding the extent to which nationalization has occurred along the first dimension (evaluative criteria) is much more mixed. Those who argue that political behavior has nationalized considerably on this dimension point to the degree of correspondence between presidential votes and votes for state and local offices. Evidence here is mixed, however, as it would appear that, for example, while the correspondence in county two-party vote share for presidential and gubernatorial elections has increased steadily and significantly during the 21st century for those states who hold their gubernatorial elections during midterm years, we have observed mostly the opposite trend during this same period in states whose gubernatorial election coincides with the presidential election (Hopkins 2018). This suggests either that gubernatorial

⁶ <https://www.npr.org/2018/11/08/665197690/a-boatload-of-ballots-midterm-voter-turnout-hit-50-year-high>

elections during midterm years are subjected to a significantly greater degree of nationalizing forces, or that, possibly by chance, states that hold gubernatorial elections during election years are much more prone to ticket splitting for one reason or another—potentially due to contextual considerations.⁷ In any event, while an increasing correspondence between presidential and gubernatorial votes at the national level during midterm election years could be interpreted as nationalization, such an interpretation remains far from conclusive. Indeed, to this point, scholars of nationalization have yet to conclusively demonstrate whether the causal arrow is pointing in their hypothesized direction.⁸

While the empirical literature on nationalization remains in its nascent stages, a literature on the contextual effects of public opinion is more fully developed. The most robust of these relationships concerns economic evaluations. As Reeves and Gimpel (2012) have argued, “Far from being an echo chamber of the national media, voters form their attitudes about the economy based on their limited exposure to their localities, variously defined” (531). These findings have been replicated by others (e.g., Hopkins 2018) and the influence of local considerations on economic attitudes has been shown to affect those high and low in political engagement equally (Cutler 2007). Qualitative analyses focusing on rural communities have also found considerable evidence that rural Americans make sense of politics through experiences and conditions rooted in their communities (Cramer 2016; Wuthnow 2018). Recent work has put forth some evidence

⁷ An alternative explanation more in sync with the nationalization thesis could be that baseline political concerns have nationalized and that voters seek an outlet to voice those national concerns. In midterm years, there is no presidential election in which voters can voice their national concerns so those get directed ‘downward’ to senate and gubernatorial elections. Meanwhile, in states whose gubernatorial elections sync up with presidential elections, voters are able to voice their national concerns in the president race which then frees them up, so to speak, to cast their gubernatorial vote in a way that is less wholly national in terms of the considerations brought to bear.

⁸ This is important since an increasing degree of correspondence between presidential and gubernatorial vote returns in midterm years could be driven either by a nationalization of the first dimension of political behavior or by a localizing of it (i.e., localistic concerns coming to dominate political judgement pertaining to all levels of governance). While addressing this observational equivalence should be a first order concern to future work pertaining to nationalization, doing so is not a concern in this dissertation.

to suggest the limits of contextual effects, though theoretical explanations for such limitations are wanting (Hopkins 2018). In chapter 2, I draw upon place theory to help us make sense of the conditions under which to expect contextual effects attributable to geographical identities, focusing primarily on the importance of place and identity threat in making local concerns salient.

Though the extent to which American political behavior has truly nationalized remains unclear, to the extent that it has at all begs the question of what factors might be contributing to this trend. In his book length treatment of the subject, Hopkins (2018) identifies media as one likely culprit. His descriptive analyses reveal some evidence that media patterns are shifting in a way that promotes nationalization, namely that as Americans “shift to cable news and online news sources, we are leaving behind the sources of what little state and local political information we do receive” and that such a shift can help explain why Americans are on average less knowledgeable regarding state and local politics (226). Overall, Hopkins sees changes in the media market as being more relevant to the second face of nationalization (i.e., engagement). Regarding whether the media are responding to market demand and shifting resources toward enhanced coverage of national politics accordingly, Martin and McCrain (2018) uncover evidence suggesting a mainly supply-side effect. In particular, ownership change of media outlets led to an increase in the proportion of news coverage allotted to national politics at the expense of state and local politics coverage, as well as a resulting decrease in viewership--compelling findings given the high rate of ownership change in the media market throughout the twenty-first century. Overall, existing evidence suggests that while shifts in the media market have skewed coverage toward national news, such shifts are not, on aggregate, desired by and are instead being foisted upon them.

A second factor identified as contributing to nationalization is the options that voters are presented with. Analyses of state and national level party platforms shows that state party platforms have grown more similar over time for both parties, meaning that, for example, the North Carolina Democratic Party platform has begun to look more and more similar to the Oregon and Kansas Democratic Party platforms (Hopkins 2018). It is worth mentioning, though, that there remains significant state level variation in party platforms (Gimpel 1996; Paddock 2005; Coffey 2014). Despite the fact that significant state level variation remains, the platforms are becoming more similar to one another (Democratic platforms moving in a more uniformly liberal direction and Republican platforms in a more uniformly conservative direction), which ultimately contributes to state party polarization, which mirrors national party polarization (Shor and McCarty 2011). Still, however, state parties can diverge from national parties on issues that are of particular importance to their constituencies, such as environmental policy, and individual candidates can engage in this differentiation from national party brands to an even greater extent on a district by district basis (Hunt n.d.). In other words, even if parties are giving voters increasingly similar choices from state to state in ways that mirror the choices at the national level, there remains a great deal of room for parties and individual candidates to break away from national level platforms and brands in order to appeal to localistic particularisms on the ground. The ability to do so, in the words of the candidates themselves (see the Sen. Jon Tester quote at the very beginning of this chapter), is key to candidates competing and winning in places that a wholly national model of politics would not predict.

Though the degree to which political behavior and our politics more broadly have actually nationalized remains an open question, the implications of nationalizing politics are rather severe, particularly with respect to representation. Whether one considers members of the

U.S. House of Representatives or members of the city council, representation suffers when voter behavior and political media is nationalized since it essentially gives representatives a free pass (and may even incentivize them) to ignore the particular needs of the district and instead focus on position taking on national political questions which are often more complex and abstract (read: difficult for voters to comprehend). While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into whether elite behavior has nationalized to the detriment of parochial interests within the House of Representatives or in the chambers of city councils, in chapter four I examine the extent to which members of Congress in recent sessions still focus on local issues in their online communications using social media, as well as the extent to which they make place-based campaign appeals and the effects of such appeals. Overall, I find that members of Congress still focus a great deal on local issues in cultivating their digital homestyle and still rely a great deal on place-based campaign advertising. Moreover, I find that members of Congress appear to turn to place as a strategy to combat nationalization—to distance themselves from the electoral liability of their national party brands.

As my brief consideration of a handful of recent elections at the beginning of this chapter has drawn our attention to, despite the forces of nationalization documented by Hopkins (2018) and others, there appear to remain under certain conditions lucrative paths forward for candidates to appeal to voters by diverting attention away from nationalistic concerns and toward local ones. My focus in this dissertation is not on refuting the nationalization thesis. Indeed, I generally agree with many of its key assumptions, findings, and implications. However, its most extreme conclusion that no politics are local (or soon will not be) is one that falls squarely outside of reason, particularly when considering that existing evidence strongly suggests that nationalization is primarily a phenomenon driven by supply rather than demand (e.g., Martin and

McCrain 2018). Furthermore, I argue that we can understand these conditions or contextual circumstances under which local concerns are likely be most consequential to electoral behavior by drawing upon a theory of *place*, developed heretofore most extensively in geography and environmental psychology. What is more, acknowledging the nationalizing forces at work in American politics (e.g., Hopkins 2018; Martin and McCrain 2018), I argue that a scholarly appeal to place can help us understand and predict the occurrence of contextual effects in American public opinion and political behavior more generally—i.e., beyond campaigns and vote choice.

Place: What is it and Why Focus on its Role in Politics?

“Scholars interested in the linkages between people and environment should care about sense of place not as an end in itself but as predisposing action.”

—Stedman (2002), p. 577

The 1990’s bore witness to revolutionary technological advancements including, most notably, the Internet. As the world began to go “online,” many celebrated this development as the final liberation from the shackles of geography and physical distance. While the population of the United States has trended toward increasing transience over the past several decades⁹, and a burgeoning network of “interchangeable airport terminals and franchise hotels” have facilitated “perpetual movement” (McClay and McAllister, 2014) in American society, the Internet has allowed us to conquer space like never before. Surely not by mere coincidence, several pieces predicting the demise of localistic particularism in politics, as well as calls for scholars to abandon the quest for determining the impact of contextual factors upon political behavior, sprang forward during and immediately after this period (King, 1996). However, as a growing list of recent studies and political events alike have elucidated, place and contextual factors

⁹ This trend has slowed and even slightly reversed in most recent years, however.

continue to play an important role in shaping how citizens process and internalize politics, with important consequences for the determination of mass public opinion and political behavior. In fact, evidence suggests that rather than being displaced by the globalizing features of contemporary life, place may actually become more important as people seek to more clearly define what makes their geographical community, as well as themselves as citizens of those communities, distinctive (Bell, 1992; Moore, 2012). As stated elsewhere, “people’s awareness of being part of the global space of flows seems to have generated a search for new points of orientation, efforts to strengthen old boundaries and to create new ones, often based on identities of resistance” (Paasi 2003, p. 475).

Simply put, place refers to symbolically charged geographic locales that are socially meaningful—and it is precisely this symbolic significance that differentiates places from mere space (Osborne, 2006). The occurrence of social events within a geographic area imbues our surroundings with symbolic meaning, thereby producing psychological attachments. Together, these meanings and attachments form one’s “sense of place” (Williams et al., 2010). Those with a high degree of place identity rely on place in order to locate themselves (Moore, 2012), their thoughts, and their speech as being “not just anywhere (but) somewhere in particular” (Carbaugh and Cerulli, 2013, p.7). In other words, just as places are themselves shaped and given meaning as a result of human interaction within them, they also shape the way that we see ourselves in relation to others and act as lens that colors our perceptions of political, economic, and broader social life.

I subscribe to a theory of place that assumes one’s relationship with their physical surroundings is rooted in concrete experiences within its spatial boundaries. Such experiences are subjectively meaningful and are what imbue places with symbolic meaning. This

experientially constituted symbolism shapes attachment and identity, which are emotionally and socially powerful. While my conceptualization of place is rooted primarily within the joint socio-environmental psychological tradition(s), there are additional theories of place— aspects of which also inform my understanding of place and application of this concept to American politics.

While geographers, sociologists and environmental psychologists have devoted considerable attention to examining how place factors into many social phenomena, the concept has received relatively little attention in political science. Moreover, the scope of existing scholarly investigation in this area remains rather limited and incomplete. For instance, some scholars have investigated how demographic characteristics, such as geographically influenced economic conditions (e.g., farming communities), influence culture and exposure to political information (Agnew, 2014; Campbell et al., 1960). Other researchers have investigated differences between rural and urban areas. Of those studying the “urban-rural divide,” some have argued that the rural v. urban distinction is essentially one based upon class (Black and Black, 1989; Key, 1949), whereas others argue that divide between urban and rural is one based primarily upon a competition for finite resources (Bowen, Haynes, and Rosentraub, 2006). Finally, a more recent stream of research in this area has turned toward investigating how identities rooted in place (what I and others refer to as “place-based identity”) influence how people conceptualize, understand, and think about politics (Cramer, 2016; Cutler, 2007; Jacobs and Munis, 2018; Munis, 2015; Parker, 2014; Walsh, 2012).

Place provides a valuable theoretical lens through which to view American politics generally and our political behavior in particular, given that our representation is apportioned geographically. Living in a place produces attachments (i.e., affective bonds) between the

individual and that place, which ultimately leads to identification with place becoming a central part of how many individuals view the self. That place identity is central to individuals' sense of self is, I contend, an uncontroversial assertion and one that even those who argue that American political behavior has largely nationalized would agree with (Hopkins 2018). What scholars of nationalization would take issue with is the notion that such identities carry with them any political weight these days if indeed they ever did. Drawing on place theory helps us understand partially why where we live remains, for many of us, a consideration that is important to our political behavior. The remainder of this dissertation is left primarily to demonstrating empirically that this is in fact the case.

Resentments based in Geography: The Power of Place Beyond Roots and Place Identity

This dissertation is an investigation of the relevance of place in American electoral politics and representation broadly. If asked to name the two most important trends characterizing American politics over the past forty years, many political scientists would likely point to two theses already touched on to some extent above: partisan polarization (first and foremost) and, relatedly, nationalization. Interwoven with each of these trends has been the emergence of an increasingly deep urban-rural divide. The national Republican Party brand has grown increasingly synonymous with rural America, whilst the Democratic Party has become the party of “urban elites.”

The urbanization of the Democratic Party and the increasingly hinterlandish character of the Republican Party are trends consistent with the “social sorting” of the parties (Mason 2018). Social sorting refers to the process whereby the parties' compositions in the electorate become increasingly distinct from one another in terms of social categories. For instance, in addition to becoming an increasingly rural party, the composition of the Republican Party in the electorate is

becoming whiter, more religious, more male, less educated, etc. This is an important development as, theoretically, as party composition becomes increasingly homogenous (and distinct from that of the out-party), the propensity for denigrating members of the out-party increases, which exacerbates partisan polarization (Mason 2018; Roccas & Brewer 2002).

As one can easily see in the social sorting example I gave above, social identities involved in social sorting frequently come to be highly correlated with one another. Further, in many cases a large number of individuals that comprise the party will share numerous overlapping identities. For example, the number of non-college educated, relatively religious, conservative, white, rural, male Republicans is considerable. As I demonstrate in this dissertation, urban-rural identity is an important piece of the social sorting puzzle. Urban, suburban, and rural are not just signifiers for different “bins” where different types of people live – they serve as the basis for a place-based social identity in their own right and people draw on the beliefs, customs, and behaviors associated with these groups in order to navigate the social world. As I show in this dissertation, politicians frequently appeal to voters on the basis of place –often pertaining to the urban-rural dimension in particular—and do so with some success.

Social sorting along the urban-rural dimension of politics leads to the politicization of urban-rural identity, which makes these identities distinctive from other place-based social identities, such as state-based or municipality-based identities. A consequence of this is that, while place identities such as state-based identities may be used by campaigns as either mobilization or persuasion tools, appealing to urban-rural identities is increasingly a viable strategy only for mobilization. This is particularly true for voters who have developed a sense of urban, suburban, or rural consciousness and place-based resentments associated with that sense of place consciousness. While I develop these ideas much more completely in Chapters 2, 3, and

5, it is worth mentioning here by way of introduction that urban-rural identity is distinctive from other forms of place identity owing to its politicization and, further, that urban-rural identity and the urban-rural divide are best understood as being part and parcel of partisan polarization, whereas other forms of place-identity are not and can even potentially run counter to it.

A Preview of the Remainder of the Dissertation

In chapter two, I introduce and develop a theory of how place, or more specifically, people's attachment to and identification with place, influences political behavior. The model I present allows us to better understand when to predict geographical contextual effects in political behavior. Drawing on literatures in environmental psychology, geography, social psychology, and political science, I argue that each of us lives in multiple geographically defined imagined communities—including the nation, our states, cities, and locale—and that our sense of place regarding these communities constitutes a form of social identity that takes on political relevance when stimuli pertaining to the political environment primes that identity. The emphasizes in particular the theoretical linkages between place identity and vote choice.

Central to my idea of place and political behavior as a way of understanding contextual effects is that people differ in the degree to which they can be said to have a sense of place. In particular, people vary in their degree of place attachment, place identity, and place consciousness. By place attachment, I mean an affective bond between an individual and a particular place or setting. By place identity, I mean a part of one's self-identity cultivated via interaction with a physical environment that allows people to distinguish people like themselves from others in spatial terms. Finally, by place consciousness I mean beliefs that the social standing of one's geographical ingroup is unfairly diminished. In chapter three, I develop and validate a psychometric scale measure (which I call the Place Identity and Consciousness Scale)

of the three aforementioned psychological dimensions of place. The full scale, or the truncated versions discussed in the chapter, are employed in many of the other studies in the dissertation and are a major contribution to the political behavior, political geography, and environmental psychology literatures.

In chapter four, I document the frequency and geographical distribution of televised place-based appeals in Senate contests from 2012-2018 and provide experimental evidence regarding the potential effects of such appeals. In addition, I systematically analyze the Facebook profiles of every member of Congress for the 114th and 115th congresses in order to document the degree to which members of Congress discuss local issues as a central part of developing their digital homestyle. In addition, I explore which candidate and constituency characteristics help explain variation in place centric digital homestyle and campaign appeals. Overall, these studies provide evidence regarding the continued role of place in our representational politics by looking focusing on the junction of political psychology and political communication. I find that place appeals are commonplace throughout the country and, in the case of digital homestyle, are used strategically by vulnerable candidates to distance themselves from their national party.

Chapter five focuses on how place, both as a psychological identity in voters' minds and as a set of observable characteristics in the political world, influences various aspects of public opinion and political behavior. Regarding place as a social identity, I present evidence regarding the extent to which place identity and consciousness explains variation in political attitudes and behaviors, such as for example vote choice in the 2018 midterm elections. Regarding observable place-based characteristics of politics, the chapter includes analyses that whether such characteristics (e.g., where a candidate is from) matter to voters and whether their importance is moderated by respondents' place identity and consciousness. Overall, the chapter provides key

evidence that, while American politics have shifted toward the direction of nationalization gradually over the past two decades, American political behavior is still influenced considerably by place-based concerns.

Chapter 2. A Theory of Place in American Political Behavior

Why does place matter in American politics? Under what conditions is it most likely to matter and for whom? How is it most likely to take shape in electoral politics? In this chapter, I develop a theory of place in politics addressing these questions.

While geographers, sociologists and environmental psychologists have devoted considerable attention to examining how place factors into many social phenomena, the concept has received relatively little attention in political science. Moreover, the scope of existing scholarly investigation in this area remains rather limited and incomplete. For instance, some scholars have investigated how demographic characteristics, such as geographically influenced economic conditions (e.g., farming communities), influence culture and exposure to political information (Agnew, 2014; Campbell et al., 1960). Other researchers have investigated differences between rural and urban areas. Of those studying the “urban-rural divide,” some have argued that the rural v. urban distinction is essentially one based upon class (Black and Black, 1989; Key, 1949), whereas others argue that the divide between urban and rural is one based primarily upon a competition for finite resources (Bowen, Haynes, and Rosentraub, 2006). Finally, a more recent stream of research in this area has turned toward investigating how identities rooted in place (what I and others refer to as “place-based identity”) influence how people conceptualize, understand, and think about politics (Cramer, 2016; Cutler, 2007; Jacobs and Munis, 2018; Munis, 2015; Parker, 2014; Walsh, 2012). It is within this last stream that this dissertation is situated and, ultimately, the goal of this dissertation is build substantially on these prior works to provide the most comprehensive account of place in American politics from an identity lens yet undertaken.

Advancing this literature, my central argument is that, despite technological developments and popular notions of the ever transient and rootless citizen, place exerts a mighty psychological force in the lives of contemporary Americans. Places, as symbolic geographical entities, give rise to perhaps our most fundamental ingroups and outgroups (i.e., we who live here in contrast to those who live elsewhere), which is crucial due to the centrality of groups in determining how we make sense of the world. While place is undoubtedly important in many facets of our day to day life, including consumption habits (Hess & Gottlieb 2009), one might reasonably question whether this is the case when it comes to politics—after all, our consumption of political media has shifted away from concerns over the local and particular and toward the national and abstract due to the nationalization of political media – an apparently supply-side driven phenomenon (Martin and McCrain 2019). Despite these developments, place still matters for American politics. Below, I describe what place is, why it’s psychologically powerful, and lay out the conditions under which it matters for our politics both generally and with respect to our elections in particular.

Protecting Our Public Lands vs. Protecting Our Borders: A Father/Son Quarrel in the Montana Mountains

Place-based concerns factor into our thinking about politics frequently, and under certain conditions can become a dominant consideration upon which we make political judgements. A poignant example was relayed to me during a conversation I had while I was back home during the 2018 holiday season visiting an old friend and classmate from high school. Our conversation took place at dive bar in Philipsburg, Montana, called the “Sunshine Station.” I meet my friend here once or twice a year to catch up. Thirty years old at the time of this particular exchange, he is a married (with two children), high school educated, blue-collar equipment operator whose firm bounces back and forth from one small time mining related contract to the next.

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, given my aspirations to be a political scientist (though, arguably because of this), we had not discussed politics directly since high school. Despite the historical dearth of political conversation between us, I felt that I had a good sense of where his political leanings fell, since he had occasionally, though not often, shared various posts on Facebook praising President Trump and ridiculing national Democratic figures such as Barack Obama, Nancy Pelosi, and Hillary Clinton. While my friend is not a frequent political poster, his father (whom I am also “friends” with on Facebook) shares multiple posts daily—pro Trump and fiercely partisan—and has a “Trump: Make America Great Again” flag outside his single-wide trailer that I had spent much time in with my friend in our youth. Considering what we know about the heritability of partisanship (Jennings and Niemi 1989; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009), the above considerations were reason enough to assume that my friend, like his dad, would be a reliable Republican to the extent that he voted. Our conversation that evening would remind me, however, that context—and considerations of place specifically—can still add wrinkles to these more general/average relationships and expectations.

Our conversation that night started off in with familiar themes—talk of how he fared in the previous hunting season and various gossip and happenings going on around our rural hometown. After about an hour, and a couple of beers, I inquired as to how his father was doing. F(riend): “Oh he’s fine. A little bit crazy, but he’s fine.”

From this I judged that he was partially alluding his to his father’s high volume of posts on Facebook, as his tone and expressions suggested that perhaps I would know what he was referring to, which made sense considering that we had talked in the past about various photos his dad had uploaded to the social media platform.

BKM: “Yeah, his posts on Facebook sure are entertaining.”

F: “Shit, I know it. Y’know me and the old man got in a fight this hunting season.”

BKM: “Oh, you’re kidding! About what?”

F: “We were out hunting and we had just got back to the truck. We start driving up the road, doing a little road hunting y’know, and he brought up the damn election. Y’know, the Tester race.”

BKM: “Oh, right. What did he say?”

F: “Well he asks me who I’m voting for, and you know he’s a big Rosendale guy. All he cares about is party. I tell him ‘I’m voting for Tester.’ He asks me how I can vote for some liberal Democrat. So I told him, ‘Christ, Tester’s no liberal. He’s middle of the road. He’s a Montanan.’ And I told him that I was voting for Tester because he is for public lands, and everything I like to do involves public lands. Huntin’, fishin’, campin’, four wheelin’, everything! And so I says to him, ‘you’re the same way. Everything you like to do involves public lands and Tester is the only one who will protect that.’”

BKM: “Oh, wow. Absolutely. What did he say?”

F: “He brought up the damn refugees and how he could never vote for Tester because Tester voted to allow refugees and was for...what do you call them? You know... the cities where refugees can go to and nobody can do anything about it.”

BKM: “Sanctuary cities.”

F: “Yeah, sanctuary cities. And, you know, don’t get me wrong, I disagree with Tester on the refugees. But I told my dad, ‘I don’t care about the fucking refugees. [If] They come in and come up here and I’ll shoot the sons of bitches! I don’t care. I live here. I live here in Montana, I care about problems here. Tester’s a Montanan and he takes care of things that go on here. I’m not

going to vote for Maryland Matt. He's not even from here. If you want to vote for Maryland Matt, go ahead, but I'm voting for Tester.' (Laughs). And we kept screaming at each other a little more and finally I told him to pull over and let me out (laughs). I called [his wife] and told her to come pick me up!"

While the preceding excerpt may be a single piece of anecdotal evidence gleaned from a spontaneous conversation that took place on a wintry evening in a rural roadside bar, it provides a good example of the potential power of place in our politics and highlights many of the points that I make throughout this dissertation. First, it shows that campaigns can, such as through an all-out place-based assault of the airwaves, successfully shape what many voters understand the election to be all about (e.g., Montana as opposed to national concerns). Second, it shows that when sub-national place categories are salient in electoral contexts, national level concerns (such as attitudes towards the President and immigration in this case) become less important in determining how some people vote. A third point that this example underscores is that place identity (and its associated attitudes) should be theorized as distinct from other identities and intergroup attitudes, such as race and partisanship. In our bar-room conversation example, it is clear that, for my friend, place concerns took precedence over national partisan leanings and attitudes toward immigrants in the context of a U.S. Senate election. Ultimately, each of these three points represents a pillar of a larger consideration that lies at the heart of why scholars of American public opinion and political campaigns should be more attentive to place: in an era of politics characterized by partisan polarization, appealing to place is a potentially fruitful path for candidates to reach out beyond their base and draw in individuals to their electoral coalition who may otherwise be inclined to vote for the other party in a general election context.

Attracting voters on the basis of place may even prove the difference in election outcomes. In partisan primaries, where there is often little variation in candidates' policy platforms, candidates might especially be able to benefit from appealing to place. However, even in general election races pitting Republicans against Democrats where a sizeable majority of voters are likely immune to place appeals—casting votes for their preferred party no matter what—the share of voters “up for grabs” in many states and districts is often large enough to prove pivotal in deciding who wins races and the full 100% of apportioned representation—an important consequence of geographically apportioned single member districts. As David Hopkins summarizes, “winner-take-all methods of vote aggregation within geographically defined constituencies (such as states and congressional districts), magnify the consequences of what can be, and often are, relatively modest variations in mass level preferences from one place to the next.” (2017, p.14). In other words, place does not need to be the dominant factor that a majority, or even a plurality, of voters cast their votes upon. Rather, just enough voters need to care about place in order to swing election outcomes. Furthermore, beyond the impact that place may have on electoral outcomes (as well as the consequences for representation that stem from those results) from one race to the next, such election results may scale up to have larger consequences—such as deciding which party controls entire legislative bodies—beyond the geographical boundaries of any particular set of legislative districts. In the 2018 midterm elections, forty-five (~10%) U.S. House races were decided by five points or less.¹⁰ In the Senate, there were eight (~18%) such races. Whether considering the House or the Senate, the number of competitive races was greater in each case than the partisan differential deciding

¹⁰ <https://decisiondeskhq.com/forty-five-house-seats-decided-by-five-points-or-less/>

control of each chamber, and it is precisely in these sorts of elections where place is likely to have the greatest impact.¹¹

To understand how place-based considerations matter in American electoral politics, we need to understand some basic features human psychology as well as the psychological structures of place. Before putting forth a general model of place and political behavior in addition to a more specialized model of place and voting behavior, I provide a conceptual overview of place and its psychological features: attachment, identity, and consciousness.

Place: Its Construction and Importance in Heart and Mind

The myth of the rootless, placeless, American is popular and widespread. It appears especially popular amongst certain social circles, such as those who work in highly specialized professional (i.e., white collar) settings. This notion is particularly commonplace amongst members of the academe, who typically make multiple major moves throughout their lives, often with little say over where they are moving to, in order to pursue their career.¹² In addition to perceptions of placelessness that arise from personal circumstances, such as moving to pursue career goals, another important factor that contributes to the myth is popular culture, including films, television shows, and even commercial advertisements that deemphasize context,

¹¹ Sticking with the 2018 races for just a moment, four (Arizona, Missouri, Montana, and West Virginia) of the most hotly contested U.S. Senate races appeared to feature place as a major theme.

¹² I mention this here, appreciating that my primary audience are fellow academics (political scientists especially), because in my many meditations on why this line of inquiry has been understudied in American politics, despite it featuring so plainly in many high profile Congressional, gubernatorial, and other races, I consistently return to the fact that so many academics are themselves relatively “placeless.” Coming from a very non-traditional (as far as members of the academy are concerned) background as a first-generation college educated son of the working class from a *very* rural location in Montana, I remain strongly connected to the rural American communities that lay far beyond most college campuses. I thank my upbringing and the shock of entering a professional setting so different from anything I had previously experienced for making me so acutely aware of the power of place, the degree to which it varies generally, and how it is politically important to some people and in some places in particular more so than others. As social scientists, much like with political representatives, I believe that it is important that our collective body not become too distantly removed from the subjects that we seek to understand, which underscores much recent discourse on the value of a diverse faculty.

community, or other group based attachments while instead emphasizing journeys of individual discovery in settings unworthy of note. Consider a 2018 Allstate Insurance commercial in which Dennis Haysbert says, “[the] fact is, Americans move more than anyone else in the world. On average, we’ll live in eleven homes.”¹³ While the information presented in the advertisement is true, it is also potentially very misleading when considered on its own. While Americans are still a relatively mobile people, residential mobility has been declining continuously since 1950 and is lower today than in the 19th century. In other words, common perceptions that technological innovation and the complexities of modern life are associated with ever increasing mobility are false (Fischer 2002). In addition, of those that do move, the majority stay within the same county (56%) or to another county within the same state (20%) (Schacter 2001). In other words, three out of every four moves are not the major cross-country uprooting spectacles that have been mythologized by many. Evidence of preferences regarding mobility is consistent with actual moving behavior, as people indicate much less willingness to move to another state for a better job (44%) as opposed to another city within their state (57%). A final consideration regarding mobility is that most Americans report feeling new attachments to their communities within the first year of moving to a new place, though it does generally require much longer than a year for those attachments to become strong (Wong 2010).

Further evidence against the myth of the placeless American was featured in a 2015 installment of *The Up Shot*, a regular feature of the *New York Times* that emphasizes data journalism. In the referenced installment, contributors Quoc Trung Bui and Claire Cain Miller present data indicating that the average American only lives 18 miles from their mother and that,

¹³ Ad accessed here <https://www.ispot.tv/ad/IZTC/allstate-doll-house-featuring-dennis-haysbert> on February 15, 2019.

despite the popular “perception of Americans as rootless, constantly on the move to seek opportunity even if it means leaving family behind,” the fact of the matter is that “Americans have become less mobile, and most adults – especially those with less education or lower incomes — do not venture far from their hometowns.”¹⁴

While a minority of Americans have moved many times throughout their lives (of which one or more may even be considered “large moves”) and may embody the uprooted placelessness of contemporary mythology, most Americans remain close to home. This is significant because the length of time spent in a space and the number of close social relationships in a space imbues the spatial environment with symbolic meaning. This symbolic meaning lies at the heart of what delineates place as socially meaningful space. Place, while perhaps not as unanimously meaningful as in years past, remains a strong force in the lives of many Americans—varying highly within states, between states, and between regions to be sure. As Cuba and Hummon summarize, “places, as bounded locales imbued with personal, social, and cultural meanings, provide a significant framework in which identity is constructed, maintained, and transformed” (1993, p. 112). Place, then, exerts a degree of stabilizing power over people that reinforces and is reinforced by (i.e., in a feedback loop) their social relationships. Geographers and environmental psychologists believe this process exerts an independent effect in keeping many where they are at. While my conceptualization of place is rooted primarily within the joint socio-environmental psychological tradition, there are additional theories of place—aspects of which also inform my understanding of place and

¹⁴ <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/24/upshot/24up-family.html> accessed on February 15, 2019.

application of this concept to American politics. In the next three paragraphs, I provide a more detailed overview of the major traditions of place theory.

Sociological Tradition

Existing work that takes place as its core concept has conceptualized place in one of three ways. These three traditions comport largely with disciplinary boundaries and therefore can be variously ascribed to sociologists, human geographers, and social/environmental psychologists. First, the *sociological* approach has been developed variously by rural and urban sociologists and social ecologists. Building upon Durkheim's notion of "social space" (1893), which focused primarily upon one's position within social relations broadly considered, other sociologists began to take seriously the geographical elements of social relations and their relationship with human behavior in the mid twentieth century (e.g., Chombert de Lauwie 1956). Once considerations of geography were introduced, urban sociologists especially began to take seriously the geophysical determinants of human action and organizational structures. Spatial considerations provided an increasingly obvious source of analytical leverage for many prominent social trends during this and the immediately preceding period. In particular, the urbanization of the late 19th and early 20th centuries resulted in many shockwaves to American social life, including the diminished quality of social relationships characteristic of urban life due to a cognitive overload that necessitates a cold and impersonal behavioral baseline (Durkheim 1893; Milgram 1970; Wirth 1938).

Human Geography Tradition

A second tradition of place as a lens through which to study human behavior is the *phenomenologically* centered theoretical approach commonly deployed in subfields of *human geography*. This approach focuses upon intentional interaction between humans and their environment, even going so far as to "treat the 'person-in-environment' as an indissoluble unit,

refusing to dichotomize it into a separate organism and separate environment described in physical terms” (Schneider 1986, p. 205). Thus, all of our cognitive and emotional activities, as well as behavior, are oriented by our physical environment. From this perspective, place identity is primarily nurtured through emotional attachments that form mostly outside our conscious awareness. Place identity is thought to be primed primarily by threat (Proshansky et al. 1983) and, because it is cultivated by intentional interaction with the environment, is believed to largely be a function of the duration spent in a particular place (e.g., see Tuan’s (1980) conception of rootedness).

Environmental Psychological Tradition

The third tradition under consideration here, and that which the present study draws upon most heavily, has been developed in *environmental and social psychology*. The theoretical underpinnings of this tradition, like many other theories in social psychology, lay in cognitive self-concept theories (James 1890) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1986; Mead 1934). In this tradition, place identity is part of one’s self-concept or self-identity, which can be defined as conscious self-evaluation and understanding of one’s convictions, interests, and values. In a separate section below in this chapter, I detail place identity more thoroughly and lay the groundwork for describing how it can take on relevance for understanding political behavior.

A point of clarification regarding place is that it is a scalable concept, ranging from micro scale spatial units such as neighborhoods or towns to macro spatial units like regions or states. From an environmental psychological perspective, so long as spatial areas are psychologically “meaningful categories for individuals interacting in and with them,” then they can take on the symbolic meanings constitutive of place and therefore engender place attachment and identity

(Lalli 1992, p. 291).¹⁵ Empirical work has shown that places of varying geographic scales can provide a sense of identity and belonging (Scannell and Gifford 2017) and that place attachment and identity are stronger as the scale increases (Hernandez et al. 2007).¹⁶

Place and Modernity

At first glance, many may assume that the relevance of place is diminishing as a socially consequential concept owing to the forces of modernity, i.e., globalization, technological developments, residential mobility, and other homogenizing and uprooting forces. Across the Western world, many formerly preeminent social groups and institutions that have enjoyed a high degree of social influence throughout much of the twentieth century have diminished in importance. This process has set voters “adrift” to a certain degree (Andweg 1982; van der Meer et al. 2013). In the United States, examples include organized religion, labor unions, and ethnicity (particularly amongst European Americans) as groups once dominant but increasingly less socially and political relevant throughout much of the country’s expanse. Layer on globalization, felt by many as a powerful force of disruption and homogenization, and a “politics of identity” is encouraged as people “attempt to find a harbor of calm in a turbulent sea of hyper-change” (Eatwell 2000, p. 416).

As these formerly dominant social identities wither away, *place* as a point of orientation in the world potentially gains more stock. Regarding globalization, political scientist Jennifer Fitzgerald argues that its emergence “enhances the importance and also threatens the status of

¹⁵ As Lalli (1992) contends, “psychologically meaningful” spatial categories are comprised of two elements: 1. an idiosyncratic construction of space fostered by direct experience/activity within it; 2. social construction derived from communication.

¹⁶ In this study, attachment and identity with an island were stronger than those with respondents’ city and neighborhood. Moreover, attachment and identity were stronger with the city than the neighborhood, illustrating that place attachment and identity can be quite strong for larger symbolic spatial areas. In the American political context, this suggests that regional and state identity, as well as identification with more abstract and general spatial concepts (e.g., rural America) may be similarly strong.

those corners of the world [i.e., places] to which people feel attached (2018, p. 174). If global systems are perceived as distant, depersonalized, and uncontrollable, place represents the opposite of those things (Hess & Gottlieb 2009). Indeed, some recent work in political science focusing on the American case has said that “modern life has not erased the importance of place [...] it may have instead increased the need for people to draw boundaries, to more crisply define their geographic community...and to behave in ways that signal their place-related identities...People are often proud of where they are from and they continue to want you to know it (Cramer 2016, p. 240).

In addition to anxiety over cultural homogenization, a particular fear associated with the change brought by globalization is that of being ‘left behind’ due to technological developments, market interconnectivity, and resulting economic shifts. In the face of such uncertainty, place provides a sense of belonging, pride, and efficacy in addition to social differentiation (Wilton 1998; Kingston et al. 1999; Bess et al. 2002; Fitzgerald 2018). Because the causes of negative change associated with globalization are commonly thought of as being remote and abstract, place can take on a greater significance since it is comparatively close and tangible, e.g., symbolic landmarks and local social interaction (Forrest and Kearns 2001). Thus, rather than signaling the death of place and distance, globalization and accompanying technological developments may be more likely to bolster it as people “retreat” to place centered communities “that promote a much-needed sense of membership” (Fitzgerald 2018, p.5).

Place and Exclusion

As bounded locales imbued with personal and social meaning that serve as a basis for imagined community, places can be the site for both community and exclusion. Fitzgerald (2018) has developed a useful framework for making sense of this. In this framework, Fitzgerald

reconciles these apparently divergent implications by drawing a distinction between the sociological and psychological dimensions of place. When we focus on the concrete social actions—such as actual participation in place-based institutions—we discover that those who frequently engage in such actions exhibit a propensity for inclusionary actions and behaviors. On the other hand, those who do not participate much in such concrete actions but are strongly psychologically identified with place are significantly more likely to exhibit exclusionary attitudes and behaviors. As Fitzgerald summarizes, “this distinction between the social dimensions of local participation and the psychological dimensions of imagining oneself as a member of a particular local community is important for understanding how local ties relate to...political behavior” and help us understand when place is associated with positive effects “for healthy democratic systems” and when it is “predictive of more undesirable consequences” (Fitzgerald 2018, p.12).

As previously noted, this dissertation concerns itself first and foremost with the psychological structures of place. In the chapters ahead, I investigate how place identity and consciousness relate to public opinion. In addition, I explore how these psychological structures are activated and reinforced by political candidates and representatives. In the next section, I provide a detailed overview of each of the three psychological dimensions of place as understood in the environmental psychological tradition and discuss their political implications.

The Social and Political Psychology of Place

Place serves as the premise for geographic imagined community. According to Benedict Anderson, such communities are “*imagined* because the members...will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community (emphasis in original) (1983, p.6). Political scientist Cara Wong notes that,

while Anderson initially applied his treatment of imagined community to the nation, the concept “can also be used to describe many other geographic entities, such as one’s state or city” (Wong 2010, p.4). The boundaries of symbolic communities depend on where someone believes there are those who “have a quality in common.”

While Anderson (1983) concerned the nation, many may assume place to refer to the hyper-local. However, place as imagined community can extend beyond the neighborhood or city to larger symbolic geographic units, such as states, regions, or even broader social-geographic designations such as rural America and urban America. I find it necessary to draw attention to the fact that imagined community differs from the way that we typically deploy the term community in common parlance to denote relatively constrained geographic or social units (e.g., the neighborhood, town, parishes, etc.). Again, “the most important feature of any community is the image that individuals carry in their heads, not the issue of acquaintance with all of its members.” In other words, community and place-based community, much as with place itself, need not be confined to spatial scales that allow for interaction betwixt all of its members. Rather, geographical ingroup attachments are deduced from “feelings of communion amongst its members” as opposed to objective features (Tamir 1995, p. 422). Moreover, the subjective nature of place identity and other associated place-based psychological structures also suggests that any appeals to such identities, particularly those that involve non-verbal cues, are likely to resonate with some but not all members of objective geographic communities, whether at the level of neighborhood, municipality, state, region, or nation.

Understanding how place factors into American political behavior requires us to consider the affective attachments and identifications that individuals hold toward place-based imagined communities. In other words, we need to understand place-based group membership. People

appear to have an intense psychological need for group membership. This need is an ancestral one, and social psychologists have identified four primary psychological benefits provided by group membership: a sense of belonging, distinctiveness, respect, and efficaciousness (Simons and Klandermans 2005). In politics, groups provide an additional benefit—decision making heuristics. Group attachments are understood to be a primary determinant of political cognition and behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Kinder and Kam 2010; Huddy 2013; Achen and Bartels 2016; Mason 2018; Vavreck, Tesler, and Sides 2018). Because the stuff of American partisan politics at the level of political elites involves relatively complex and abstract ideological debates that the average American is not equipped to effectively make sense of (Converse 1964; Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017), groups provide useful heuristics that help people categorize and interpret political information and ultimately make political decisions.

Of particular import to social and political behavior are group memberships that provide a basis of social identity. Social identities are a subset of one's objective and even subjective group memberships (Huddy 2013). By social identity I am referring to group attachments that are central to an individual's self-concept (Tajfel 1981). At the most basic level, individuals make use of social identity to describe themselves ("woman, Catholic, Virginian" and so on). Those who share an individual's social identity are considered ingroup members while those who do not are outgroup members. Social identity is a particularly potent form of group membership because it sees individuals internalize group attachments stemming from perceptions of shared beliefs, feelings interests, and ideas into their core sense of self. In this way, social identity is not just about group membership but about the personal meaning associated with that social categorization. Foundationally for politics, social identity matters

because feeling close to a group increases the likelihood of engaging in participation (e.g., in activities or organizations) related to that group (Wong 2010; Margolis 2018) and shapes how people process information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Nicholson and Hansford 2014) and make political judgements (Klar 2018; Mason 2018). Considering that an overwhelming majority (8 in 10) report that where they live gives them a sense of community (Wong 2010) and one third of Americans consider where they live (both city and state identities) to be among their core identities (Hopkins 2018), I believe that we should consider place as a significant social identity that likely factors in considerably to political behavior. Indeed, the word “community” has been shown to resonate with Americans when they are asked about the reasons for their political engagement (Wong 2010). Understanding the connection between place and political behavior means understanding the psychological constellations of place: attachment, identity, and consciousness.

Place Attachment

The first psychological structure of place that I consider is place attachment. Place attachment can be defined as the affective bond between individuals and a particular spatial setting, such as a neighborhood, town, or state (Hidalgo and Hernandez 2001). Such attachments are cultivated through experience with place. Previous findings in environmental psychology and behavioral geography suggest that place attachment is likely of interest to political scientists. For instance, research suggests that those with higher levels of place attachment are more likely to engage in place protective behaviors when threat to place is perceived (Stedman 2002).

While existing literature in environmental psychology suggests that place attachment can be relevant to politics, the conditions under which this is likely to be the case are much narrower, because place attachment involves affective bonds between an individual and a place itself more

so—or rather—than to other individuals who live in or are otherwise strongly associated with that place. In other words, place attachment is mostly made up of sentiments toward a place and less so toward the place-based community of individuals. An example of this might be the affective linkages that someone who grew up taking regular summer vacations to a particular national park feels toward that particular park. If that park were to become threatened in some way, the individual may feel compelled to defensive action of the place, perhaps writing her Senator over the matter, but her motivation to do so would concern the place itself more so than a particular place-based ingroup. While place-attachment is likely to of import to those studying environmental politics (e.g., it may serve as a basis for an individual to take action in protecting a watershed or other important geographical feature under threat), it is unlikely to matter much for electoral politics, except in those irregular circumstances where localized spatial features (e.g., a stream, mountain, forest, historic building, etc.) are threatened *and* candidates seemingly take opposing stances on the issue. As such, the remainder of this dissertation does not deal in a detailed or sustained manner with place attachment, though I do recommend that the link between place-attachment and political behavior should be the object of future study.

Place Identity

If place attachment mostly involves how individuals feel toward a place itself, place identity involves a much stronger social component featuring perceptions of commonality and identification with the imagined community of place. In their highly cited article on the affective bonds of community, Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) developed a theory of community membership and social identification that features three main elements. First is formal participation in organizations within the relevant spatial area. The second feature is network oriented—focusing on familial and other connections within the spatial area. The third is affective, involving the sentiments or feelings one feels toward their imagined community. Carla

Trentelman (2009), integrates these three elements of Kasarda's and Janowitz's framework with place theory, noting that all three facets apply to place at larger social-spatial scales beyond the neighborhood or municipality, such as, for example, the state or region. As with Trentelman, I consider place identity to involve "connections between residents and [places,...which can be seen to encapsulate the] sentiment regarding the [place] one lives in and an indicator of rootedness" (2009, p. 20). Place identity is that part of an individual's sense of self defined by where they live.¹⁷ It is associated with symbolic physical surroundings that take on an emotional significance owing to the social interaction and other symbolically significant historical events that have unfolded within them. Place identity then is given power through perceptions and memories associated with it.

Like other identities, perhaps the most important aspect of place identity to politics is that it helps individuals differentiate themselves from others—*informing people that 'we' live here in our place, while 'others' live elsewhere*.¹⁸ In other words, place identity imbues individuals with attributes associated with their place, which contain a mixture of attributions directed both externally (toward the other) and toward the self. Together these attributions simultaneously aid individuals in distinguishing themselves from others and in constructing understandings of who comprise their own community. As such, place identity should be thought of as one of multiple identities that an individual embodies, such as gender, ethno-racial, partisan, and other identities.

¹⁷ One may also have a place identity associated with places in which they formerly lived. However, since identification with where one currently lives (and is able to vote) is most relevant to electoral politics, it is what I focus on in this dissertation.

¹⁸ A note of clarification: it is necessary to distinguish between place identity as a subjective form of identity as opposed to an "identity" (in the lay sense) of a particular place itself. While the identity of a particular place encapsulates its unique physical characteristics and the social constructed meanings ascribed to it by various individuals and groups through experience, place identity as self or social identity refers to the identification of an individual with place. Within the context of this dissertation, I am chiefly concerned with the latter since it is ultimately the activation of such identities within the electorate that make place an enduring feature of American politics.

Place identity serves multiple “functions” for individuals; a “recognition function” providing individuals with a sense of environmental security, a “meaning function” that informs behavior, an “expressive-requirement function” involving personal interaction with her environment, a “change mediation function” which limits the degree to which the environment may be appropriated, and a “defense function” which helps sooth anxiety and promotes a sense of security (Proshansky et al. 1983). From these considerations it is clear that place identification is affective and symbolic in nature rather than economic (Haga and Folse 1971). Finally, as I explain in greater detail below, as with other identities, whether place identity is salient is context dependent (Stryker 1980; Tajfel and Turner 1986).

Communities are seen as “relational and geographic, with no predominant vision of what a community must entail.” This is to say that our community, or our place, is not only geographic but is also defined in comparison to what it is not—i.e., “those” places over there (Wong 2010, p. 60). The characteristics that define a place are not only geographical but also social. Consider, for instance, the culture and values associated with Western and Midwestern states. As distinctive places, Western states as imagined communities are rough, independent, and individualistic. These traits are thought to be born out of the very rugged, mountainous, and rural landscapes that comprise them. Midwestern states, meanwhile, are oft viewed as understated, humble, and embodying the spirit of hard work—associations no doubt rooted in the farming economy that the relatively dry and harsh climate and sprawling plains geography has necessitated for economic survival since the arrival of European settlers.

Place identity, like many social identities, is amenable to politicization depending on contextual considerations. For instance, place identity is strongly associated with a willingness to get involved personally to improve one’s community above and beyond other respondent

attributes such as social class and education (Wong 2010). On the other hand, place identity has been linked to exclusionary political attitudes and behaviors (Fitzgerald 2018), including a willingness to ban books that are offensive to fellow community members (Wong 2010). Pointing strongly to the political possibilities of place in her recent book, Jennifer Fitzgerald likens “localism” (a community based form of high place identity at the municipal or small regional level) to nationalism, noting that taking pride in place and feeling connected to it while being supportive of others who share such feelings “parallels the concept of nationalism, resting on positive feelings toward fellow members, a profound sense of belonging, [and] a source of identity and pride” (2018, p. 159). While subnational identities are similar to national ones in the way just described, they also appear to operate in some psychologically distinct ways as well (Wong 2010). Because the United States is rather unique in the size and scope of its federal structure, it is an ideal case in which to study the political influence of subnational identities such as those associated with states and the urban-rural continuum.¹⁹

Place Consciousness and Place-based Resentment

Though previous studies have shown that place identity appears to predispose individuals to action under certain conditions, it is *not* an inherently political identity. Indeed, social identification (e.g., place identity) merely “refers to an individual’s awareness of belonging to a certain group and having a psychological attachment of group-based perception and shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other group members.” Note that there is nothing inherently political about group identity and its associated affective attachments. Group identities that are non-political in essence (i.e., social identities other than those associated with partisanship, ideology, and other intrinsically political categories) obtain inherent political

¹⁹ Regions are yet another subnational spatial unit of relevance to American politics. However, I do not take up regional identity in this dissertation.

relevance when groups obtain *consciousness*, defined as “in-group identification *politicized* by a set of ideological beliefs about one’s group’s social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests” (McClain et al. 2009, pp.474-476.) Building upon Cramer’s pathbreaking work on this topic, I conceptualize place consciousness, and associated place-based resentments directed at place-based outgroups, as being a unidimensional psychological construct substantively composed of three facets (or domains) that relate to power dynamics perceived as unjustly discriminating against one’s ingroup. These facets or substantive domains can be conceived of as dealing with 1) cultural politics (i.e., whose way of life is respected), 2) representational (i.e., who do those in power listen to), 3) distributional politics (i.e., who gets what and/or how much).²⁰


Political scientists interested in the effects of place in political psychology should direct the bulk of their examination at place consciousness first. Place consciousness is, by definition, politically meaningful and is likely to be associated with exclusionary, fractious, and perhaps even outright discriminatory attitudes and behavior. Such behavior stems naturally from the stuff of place consciousness, a psychological orientation built upon resentment of geographical outgroups as well as the social, political, and economic systems perceived to unjustly denigrate their ingroup’s status within those hierarchies. Place consciousness is likely a persistent affliction in nearly any political system predicated on competition for the geographic allocation of finite resources. For this reason, political scientists, who have largely overlooked this phenomenon until recently (Cramer 2016), should focus their efforts to further develop the nascent literature on this topic. To this end, this dissertation examines how place consciousness is associated with

²⁰ Further discussion of these facets, as well as a novel measurement strategy, are presented in Chapter 3.

vote choice and attitudes toward various policies and other features of contemporary American governance.

For each of the three psychological features introduced above, strength can vary greatly from one individual to the next—even within the same geographical community. In Chapter 3, I develop and test a psychometric scale that allows researchers to quantify levels of place consciousness (well validated measures of place attachment and place identity already exist). In addition to variation in strength, it should also be noted that, recollecting that place is scalable to symbolic spatial units of virtually any size, that psychological constellation of place can also vary wildly from one individual to the next. One individual, for example, may embody a high degree of place attachment and identity to their town, state, and rural America in general while only harboring a sense of place consciousness for their rural identity. A second individual may feel some degree of attachment to their city but only have identify strongly with their state and harbor no sense of place consciousness whatsoever, and so on. For all three place-based psychological structures considered in this dissertation then, individuals will vary in terms of their existence and strength at different levels of place. This idea is captured in Figure 2.1, which depicts two hypothetical individuals. Individual I is weakly attached to her neighborhood, strongly identified with her town and state, possesses no significant regional affection to speak of, and harbors moderate consciousness/resentment along the urban-rural continuum.

Figure 2.1. Subnational Place-based Psychological Constellation (Hypothetical Individuals)



Place Level: A. Neighborhood; B. Town/City; C. State; D. Region; E. Urban-Rural. Psychological Feature: None (solid fill), Attachment (diagonal line), Identity (dotted), Consciousness (vertical lines). Strength: Low (green), Moderate (blue), High (orange).

Place attachment, identity, and consciousness, which I collectively refer to in this dissertation as an individual's sense of place, have been shown to impact civic and political orientations and actions, including political trust in local institutions (positive relationship) volunteering within a community (positive relationship) and supporting raising taxes to improve their community (positive relationship) (Wong 2010). While the nascent state of this literature over the past decade has begun to flesh out the political relevance of place identity across multiple spheres of American political behavior, including participation and attitudes toward fundamental government activities such as taxation, the degree of import that place identity enjoys on other major areas of public opinion and political behavior remains largely unexplored. For instance, systematic investigation of how place figures into electoral politics, both on the supply and demand side, has been limited. This dissertation represents a significant advancement in this area by investigating the role that place plays in both mass and elite level behavior

regarding campaigns and, in the process, provides evidence that appeals to place are an important campaign strategy in their ability to appeal to those with a highly developed sense of place.

Place identity, much as with other forms of social identity is as much about who is not an ingroup member as who is, or what the place is not versus what it is. We construct and cling to identity because of the human need to differentiate ourselves from others. Geographical delineation is perhaps the most fundamental and basic form of social separation—we are from here and they are from over there. We should expect place identity to be a durable force in ‘American politics, if for no other reason than our representational and administrative systems being fundamentally geographic. The essence of democratic politics is competition over the allocation of finite resources. States are pitted against one another, communities against other communities, and, on occasion, such as when issues involving environmental regulation and natural resources come to the fore, regions against regions. Over time, persistent competition and perceptions of unfairness that arise in the hearts and minds of those who “lose” can breed resentment (Cramer 2016), which makes the fault line of place a particularly ideal fracture for politicians to prime disharmony in order to mobilize votes. Take, for example, Scott Walker (former governor of Wisconsin) mobilizing rural Wisconsinites against an internal enemy: Wisconsin urbanites. Or, consider 2014 Republican nominee for U.S. Senate in Virginia, Ed Gillespie, and his attempts to mobilize Southwestern Virginia coal country against Democratic incumbent, Mark Warner, for allegedly selling out the region to Washington regulatory agencies and a distant liberal environmental elite. Fundamentally, we should expect place to matter in politics because it is, quite literally, all around us and because our political system is geographic in nature. Taken together, these considerations provide fertile ground for elites to prime voters and attempt to sway public opinion on the basis of place.

General Conditions Under Which Place Becomes Politically Salient

As Wong (2010) shows using conventional behavioral research techniques, and as Cramer (2016) provides evidence for using an ethnographic approach, place-based identities appear to play a substantial role in how people interpret political information and make political decisions. However, our picture of how and to what extent place identities impact American politics remains far from complete. For instance, while we know that *local* place identities (i.e., those associated with one's city) matter for policy preferences and participation pertaining to local politics, it remains unclear whether these relationships scale to identities and politics associated with larger spatial units, such as at the state level. Further, while we have limited ethnographic evidence that state and urban-rural identity matter for electoral politics at the state level (Cramer 2014; Parker 2014), we are still wanting for a broader and more systematic treatment of this question beyond the two states covered by previous research, especially now that place appears to have been a major theme throughout the country in the 2016 and 2018 elections.

Before moving on to a discussion of place in electoral politics, it is prudent to discuss the general conditions under which place may be important politically. Indeed, a goal of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of political psychology and voting behavior by developing a framework that both posits powerful place-based psychological structures and pays attention to the environmental factors necessary for such structures to be activated and impactful politically: that is, to become salient. I define salience as the relevance of an activated identity for a given situation.²¹ In general terms, I hold that the strength and salience of place-based psychological features varies from place to place, as well as across individuals within those

²¹ My definition here draws significantly on that used by Ashley Jardina (2019, p. 37).

places. Under *certain conditions*, place affects people's political choices. In other words, the power of place identity is episodic and contextual. Its relevance to politics depends on environmental factors, such as problems that may arise that are place centered or when political elites activate it – such as in campaign ads or social media posts. Place identity is not different from any number of other identities in this regard (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013). Indeed, even partisanship – the most political of social identities – may lose its power in some political contexts, such as in non-partisan local races. So, what considerations matter for place? Below, I cover three considerations that I contend matter for the relevance of place identity and politics: 1. threat to place identity; 2. elite messages; 3. partisan social sorting.

Threat

As a general rule, perhaps the foremost consideration regarding the activation of place as a relevant consideration is threat. Those who are strongly place identified are apt to feel personally threatened if they perceive their place to be under threat. Previous research on social identity has found that external threats, whether authentic or merely perceived, lead to activation of group identity (Grant & Brown 1995; Jardina 2019; Kinder & Sears 1981). Social identity theory holds that contexts in which social hierarchy becomes unstable generally increase the salience of relevant social identities (Tajfel 1974). In these situations, the identities of low-status groups become salient in order to promote collective action in pursuit of positive changes to the status quo, while high-status group identities become salient to resist those changes (Branscombe et al. 1999; Jardina 2019). Further, within those groups, not everyone responds the same way – strong group identifiers are more likely to respond to threats collectively than are weak group identifiers (Doosje, Spears & Ellemers 2002). As the population of various places (i.e., symbolic geographies) shrink, whether that be in rural America more broadly or regarding an entire state's population, place identity may become more salient for people who live there.

Roger Eatwell captures the link between place identity, threat, and the hostility that some feel toward outsiders in Britain. He notes that “hostility toward Bangladeshi’s, or yuppies, in Millwall can be ‘explained’ not as racism or envy, but within a discursive strategy which posits a largely mythical – holistic, rooted, communitarian life which is being destroyed by change” (1998, p. 30). In other words, those for whom place supplies meaningful psychological structures may feel animus toward outsiders perceived as “taking over” a place, not because of ethnic/cultural prejudice against various groups of outsiders, but rather due to an aversion toward the anticipated change to a place caused by an influx of a group of outsiders. The specter of such change is understood as a threat to place and, therefore, a threat to self. This threat to self may motivate action to defend one’s place and status, which may result (perhaps frequently so) in exclusionary outcomes.

To date, there are several studies linking place identity activation with perceptions of place threat. Stedman finds that “—we are willing to fight for places that are more central to our identities and that we perceive as being in less-than-optimal condition. This is especially true when important symbolic meanings are threatened by prospective change” (2002, p. 577). Other work shows that when people are cued to how immigration might change the fundamental character of a community, they see immigration as a threat to place (Hopkins 2010). Robert Wuthnow also documents this linkage qualitatively, as it pertains to the urban-rural divide, in a book length treatment (2018). Within Wuthnow’s framework, key to the political import of rural Americans’ place identity is the affective response triggered by a perception of *threat* to their place and community (Wuthnow 2018, p. 16). Wuthnow provides numerous potential sources of threat that may induce anxiety in rural Americans. These sources include an influx of newcomers to the area, population decline, brain drain, rampant drug abuse, economic stagnation or

downturn, and the perception of rapid cultural change. Wuthnow argues convincingly by utilizing a rich collection of data derived from dozens of interviews that rural Americans demonstrate a high propensity toward action when they perceive that their community is under threat, because their strong identity with the community means that they themselves feel threatened, even if it is unlikely that they will endure objective material harm (see especially, Wuthnow 2018, p, 43).

Communication of Elites

The second avenue through which place identity can achieve political salience is elite messages. The contours of public opinion are shaped substantially by the content of news media (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992). Even scholars who study public opinion from the “ground up” (as opposed to from the top down) readily acknowledge that the mass media and political leaders play an eminently important in determining the broad topics and considerations that the masses think about and discuss (Cramer 2016). Media and political elites are not just key in priming considerations, including social identities, they also channel those considerations in a particular direction to impact politics. For example, media coverage of the growing numbers of Latinx peoples, partially due to immigration, and the ever shrinking share that whites comprise in the United States appears to have led to the rise of racial anxiety and white identity among many white Americans, which political elites – especially Republicans – have been able to tap into (and channel) for electoral gain (Jardina 2019). This linking of social identity and group attitudes with policy positions and, by extension, political parties can also occur in subtle and covert ways (Winter 2008). The media and political elites can, and do, prime and channel place identities and their associated attitudes.

Social Sorting

The third consideration regarding the saliency of place identities is “social sorting” (Mason 2018). Social sorting “involves an increasing social homogeneity within each party (Mason 2018, p. 18). As Mason and her colleagues have shown, social sorting in America has been on the rise in recent decades, which has contributed to affective partisan polarization (Mason 2016; 2018; Mason & Wronski 2018). While these works have discussed at length how the parties have sorted in terms of ideological, religious, and racial groupings, place-based identities have not been incorporated into this framework. This is somewhat surprising when one considers recent that has shown that a large and growing gulf has emerged, beginning in the 1990s, along the urban-rural dimension in terms of voting behavior and partisan identity (Hopkins 2017). Perhaps work on social sorting does not pay heed to geography due to concerns over the epiphenomenality of geographic polarization. In other words, to date, work on social sorting seems to implicitly assume that geographic categories – such as urban and rural – are simply correlated with factors such as religious, racial, and ideological identities, rather than by exerting their own force on the social sorting process. Put yet another way, the assumption seems to be that geographic communities are simply bins (filled with different proportions of identities identified as important for social sorting) rather than as the basis for identities that matter for the social sorting phenomenon.

I argue that subjective group membership within symbolic geographic communities constitutes a meaningful social identity (i.e., place identity) and that there is significant utility in considering urban-rural identity, as one type of place identity, as an important *identity* dimension (as opposed to merely a site for compositional differences to accrue) along which the parties have sorted socially. Moreover, place identity along the urban-rural dimension fits well into the social sorting framework both in terms of objective sorting and subjective sorting (Mason &

Wronski 2018). Objectively, using election returns as our guide, rural Americans have increasingly sorted into the Republican Party since the mid-1990s, while urban areas have become increasingly Democratic. Suburbanites, for their part, swung sharply toward the Democrats in the 2018 midterms, though time will tell if this trend will continue in future years. Social sorting becomes psychologically potent, however, once group members “successfully perceive the cumulative alignment between their ingroups and the in-party” (Mason & Wronski 2018). Given the predominance of the urban-rural division narrative in American political discourse, particularly following the 2016 presidential election, it is a reasonable assumption that Americans have absorbed this narrative and that a sizeable share of voters now see the electorate as socially sorted along the urban-rural dimension (Zaller 1992). Like other identities, once place identities sort objectively and subjectively into partisan camps, their salience is heightened with respect to partisan electoral politics.²²

Place, Salience, and Political Campaigns

The previous section dealt with three general factors that can raise the salience of place identities across a range of particular contexts. In this section, I narrow the focus to a discussion of the ways in which place identities become salient as campaigns unfold during and electoral process. While social sorting is a relevant factor regarding urban-rural place identity and American behavior, and while place threat can certainly exogenously increase the salience of place around elections, the primary means through which place is (or isn’t) made salient in American electoral politics is through the strategic decisions and messages of politicians.

In the European context, national level identities are a major driver of voting behavior, being associated especially with electoral support for radical right win parties (Lubbers and

²² This is true absent of, or in addition to, the other two considerations that heighten the saliency of place identities: place threat and place-based elite messages.

Coenders 2017). This association appears to be driven by a desire to protect one's national community from various threats, including immigration, Europeanization, and globalization. In an especially thorough study, Fitzgerald (2018) finds that the link between radical right support and place identity extends to local place identity as well.

To date, place identity and the attitudes linked to it has not been the subject of extensive quantitative analysis with respect to *voting behavior*, especially in American politics (Fitzgerald 2018). There have, however, been several qualitative studies linking place identity to voting behavior. Cramer (2016) details how, in Wisconsin, Scott Walker “tapped into rural consciousness” (p. 186) by verbally attacking the benefits enjoyed by undeserving public employees, vowing to take on the urban centers in the state (namely Madison and Milwaukee), and demonstrating that he identifies with small towns (p. 206). Wuthnow (2018) tells a story of how “moral outrage,” a concept very akin to Cramer’s (2016) place resentment/place consciousness concept, is the key element mattering for rural vote choice. According to Wuthnow, moral outrage lead rural voters to cast their vote in favor of “cleaning house” or, in other words, in favor of up-ending the status quo – making populist candidates particularly attractive (Wuthnow 2018, p. 10, pp. 113-114). Parker (2014) argues that, for candidates, demonstrating a connecting to place is “essential” and can, such as in the 2012 U.S. Senate race in Montana at the core of his book, make the difference in a close election. In the next two subsections, I discuss two avenues through which politicians can seek to make place salient: campaign advertising and through their cultivation of their digital homestyle on online social media.

Place and Advertising

To make place salient in elections and capitalize on that salience in a systematic way, candidates and political parties need to court voters on the basis of place. In elections where communication environments feature place-centric frames and symbolic geographic imagery, voters' relevant place identities will be primed. This can occur episodically, such as when candidates draw upon state-based or district specific local place identities, or on a routine and recurring basis, such as the Republican party's consistent focus on rural communities in recent decades. Perhaps the primary way that parties and individual candidates court voters on the basis of place is in political advertising. Radical right parties in Europe, for instance, employ rhetoric in their advertising that appeals to those for whom place is particularly meaningful (Fitzgerald 2018). For example, recent ad campaigns for the National Front Party in France and the Freedom Party of Austria have included "Toulain for the Toulannais" and "Vienna for the Viennese," respectively (Fitzgerald 2018, p. 25).

In the United States, due to the nature of our representational system, which is based upon single member districts of varying geographic scope (i.e., from tiny districts in geographical terms, such as New York's 14th district, to goliath districts such as Alaska's at-large district), place-based appeals take on many forms, ranging from neighborhood based appeals to state wide appeals. The volume of place-based advertisements that voters could potentially be exposed to varies a great deal across the country. At the Senate level, for instance, voters in Montana may be inundated by such messages while voters in other states such as Maryland may rarely be exposed to such advertisements. In Chapter 4, I document and explore variation in the frequency of place-based advertising at the Senate level across several cycles, as well as shed initial light on the effects of place-based appeals.

Place and the Digital Homestyle

Another major way that politicians prime place identity in voters is in their cultivation of what I refer to as their “digital home style” on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. As Fenno informs, a “home style” is how representatives strategically present themselves to their constituents in order to maximize their shot at obtaining their first order priority: reelection (1978). Fenno identifies three components of home styles: 1. presentation of self; 2. resource allocation; 3. framing of activities in Washington. It is readily apparent from a quick scroll through the social media feed of any member of Congress that they use social media to communicate with constituents regarding each of these components. Connecting and building trust with constituents is what an effective homestyle should achieve. Some members (and their staff members) appear very well attuned to place and emphasize local concerns to a great extent. Unlike political advertisements, the cultivation of digital homestyle is a ceaseless process for elected officials and is therefore a key way through which place identity can become salient (and remain salient) on a district by district basis. In Chapter 4, I explore variation in the degree to which members of Congress are attuned to local considerations in their digital home styles.

Place as a Basis for both Unifying and Divisive Superordinate Identities

Perhaps the most significant way that place identity has been shown to be relevant for electoral politics is by helping parties expand their electoral coalition beyond their natural base. In Europe, radical right-wing parties have used place appeals to bring women, ideological left or center left individuals, and those who are relatively pro-immigration into their electoral fold (Fitzgerald 2018). This is noteworthy as each of these groups are, overall, very unlikely to support the radical right. The ability of parties to attract voters beyond their base by tapping into voters’ sense of place is highly important and could prove to be the difference between winning and losing in close electoral contexts. David Parker documents such an election in *Battle for the*

Big Sky (2014). Parker demonstrates how the Democrat in the 2012 U.S. Senate race ran a campaign rooted heavily in place-based appeals and effectively made the race a competition over who was the most authentically Montanan. Focus group evidence demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach – even staunch Republican voters begrudgingly gave Senator Jon Tester (the Democrat) credit for appearing as an authentic Montanan. So, too, did the election returns – Tester triumphed over a remarkably strong challenger in a cycle that proved very unfriendly to Democrats generally.

Place identities are superordinate identities. Within the Common Ingroup Identity Model, superordinate identities are relatively “large” or broad identities with a number of smaller identities, including some that may be opposed to one another, nested within them (Gaertner et al. 1993). Some superordinate identities serve to unite rival groups, thus expanding a party’s typical electoral coalition. Appeals to American identity as a common superordinate identity, for example, have been shown to temporarily reduce racial tensions and improve support for tax policies designed to promote racial equity (Transue 2007). Other superordinate identities, however, fail to serve as bridge to unite rival outgroup identities nested within them. In fact, making some superordinate identities salient may sometimes drive an even deeper wedge between rival subgroups – as was the case in experiments seeking to prime gender as a unifying superordinate identity as a means to build solidarity between Republican and Democratic women that backfired (Klar 2019).

In order for a superordinate identity to be unifying, it must meet a series of conditions. First, “members of competing subgroups must have the potential to conceive of themselves as a single, superordinate group rather than as two separate groups” – they must share a subjective sense of identity regarding the same superordinate identity group. Second, “members of each

subgroup must share a common perception of what it means to be part of that superordinate group and, as such, must share ‘common superordinate goals’ (Brewer 1996, pp. 291-303; Klar 2019, p.611). Klar found that womanhood failed to serve as a unifying superordinate identity because Republican and Democratic women have different understandings of what it means to be a woman. Taking these two conditions into account, we can surmise which forms of place identity may serve as unifying superordinate identities and which may be divisive superordinate identities.

In order for a place identity to be unifying, it must not be politicized in partisan or ideological terms. In the U.S., identification with one’s state (e.g., Texas identity) should generally qualify as a potential unifying (i.e., coalition expanding) identity. While many Americans think of presidential electoral geography in terms of “red states and blue states,” those terms refer to compositional factors rather than those of social identity. States such as Montana and West Virginia, for example, where Republican presidential candidates have done exceptionally well in recent elections but where Democrats at the state level have had considerable success running place centered campaigns, provide strong anecdotal evidence to support this claim. More local place identities, such as with a municipality, are also likely to be largely apolitical (in terms of partisanship and ideological concerns) and, thus, have unifying potential. On the other hand, I contend that urban-rural identity is a divisive superordinate identity due to geographic polarization and social sorting (Hopkins 2017; Mason 2018). As the parties sort along the urban-rural dimension, appealing to a sense of rural or urban identity will be unlikely to expand one’s political base since the very notion of, say, rural identity will have become politicized, thereby violating the second condition stipulated above that members of

each competing subgroup (e.g., Republican ruralites and Democratic ruralites) must share a common conception of what it means to be part of that superordinate group.²³

Conclusion

I have argued that geographical considerations, be they place identity or attitudes about different geographical groups (e.g., place resentment) are likely to play an important part in how some Americans evaluate political candidates and other features of American politics. This is likely the case for some symbolic geographic communities more so than others, and not every individual within those objective groups will harbor a strong sense of geographic identity and strong geographic attitudes. By in large, we should not expect many forms of place identity, such as those linked to the town or state that one lives in, to be chronically politically salient. Urban-rural place identity, however, especially among rural people, appears to be approaching the point chronic long-term saliency, if we are not already at that point, due to the social sorting of the parties along the urban-rural dimension. However, even those identities that are not chronically salient can be made temporarily salient, such as when politicians prime place identity to appeal to voters. From urban-rural place identity to state place identity, political scientists should care about geography beyond simply studying compositional effects because place serves as a basis for social identity that voters use to makes sense of politics.

²³ Appeals to urban-rural place identity may still work for attracting true independents, however. Indeed, social sorting along the urban-rural dimension may help Republicans to capture a higher share of the rural independent vote and, likewise, for Democrats to capture a higher share of the urban independent vote – assuming that independents are aware of this trend and are exposed to geographic appeals to pull them in.

Chapter 3. Measuring Place-based Resentment

In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump shocked the world by narrowly defeating Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton. Trump's remarkably strong performance in rural areas was critical to his victory in pivotal Midwestern states, including Wisconsin and Michigan (Hopkins 2017). Many have explored the factors that make rural voters distinct, and "rural resentment," a politically charged form of geographic identity, packs significant explanatory power (Cramer 2016). In this chapter, I present and validate a novel survey-based measure of place-based resentment. Then, using the results of nationally representative surveys that include this measure, I show that the politicization of place-based identities is not confined to rural areas. Rather, rural resentment is a particular type of place-based resentment that exists – with important variation – across geographic contexts. My measure provides a tool for scholars to explore the contours of geographic animus across multiple contexts.

Kathy Cramer (2016) explores how rural resentment structures the political thought of the people whose conversations she invited herself into in rural Wisconsin. Rural resentment, she argues springs from perceptions that rural areas receive unfair treatment relative to other community types, which leads ruralites to resent urbanites and government, which they view as allied with city interests. These perceptions of unfairness relate to three substantive considerations: 1) cultural elements; 2) distributive politics; 3) representational politics. In other words, Cramer finds that many rural Wisconsinites believe that the government neglects rural areas when distributing resources, that politicians are unconcerned with problems afflicting rural areas, and that urbanites, who are catered to by politicians and the administrative state, look down on them as backward and unsophisticated (2016, pp. 5-6).

Cramer focuses on rural Wisconsin. I contend, however, that people across settings can and do identify with their place, and those identifications can grow into politicized resentments. Just as ruralites may feel shortchanged relative to urbanites by government programs, some urbanites resent electoral rules that advantage rural areas and diminish their voice. Similarly, suburbanites may feel slighted spending on urban infrastructure rather than roads serving suburban commuters. To understand fully the politics of place in the contemporary United States, we must measure place-based identification and resentment systematically across geographic contexts.

In what follows, I develop a theoretical account of place-based resentment that draws on research in environmental psychology, geography, and sociology, in addition to political science. Next, while place resentment encompasses considerations of distribution, representation, and culture, I show that these elements covary such that the overall measure is unidimensional and reliably measured.²⁴ Next, I demonstrate that place resentment is distinct – both conceptually and empirically- from several related attitudes, including populist (Schulz et al. 2017), affective political identity polarization (Johnson-Grey 2018), and racial resentment (Kinder & Sanders 1996). Next, I examine the demographic and attitudinal antecedents of place resentment. I find higher levels of place resentment among men, rural residents, younger Americans, those who identify closely with their place, and those high in racial resentment. Interestingly, the relationship between place resentment and partisanship varies across place type: place resentment is highest among Republicans in the suburbs and among Democrats in the cities.

²⁴ In this, place resentment parallels racial resentment, which encompasses both prejudices and values (e.g., Kinder & Sanders 1996, pp. 291-294), but is unidimensional empirically due to its central emotional theme.

Perhaps most surprisingly, partisanship is not associated with place resentment in rural areas. Finally, I conclude with suggestions for how future research should explore the place of place resentment in American politics and public opinion.

What is Place Resentment

From election night 2016 onward, pundits and scholars alike have exhibited renewed interest in the geographical fault lines of American politics. In particular, the so called urban-rural divide has surged to the fore of our collective political imagination. Resultingly, Cramer's fortuitously timed book (2016) has risen to prominence as a top explanation of this divide. Cramer approaches her ethnographic work in rural Wisconsin from the vantage point of social identity theory, which holds that people's awareness of belonging to a group and psychological attachments to those groups hold considerable sway over behavior, such as predisposing people toward in-group bias (Tajfel & Turner 1986). In contexts involving competition, such as politics, ingroup bias stemming from social identity can result in hostility toward outgroups and intergroup conflict (Tajfel & Turner 1986). Though political scientists have long understood mass public opinion to be strongly influenced by the groups to which individuals belong (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964), a growing number of political scientists have put a newly sharpened point on the "groupy-ness" of politics by grounding their work in social identity theory (Achen & Bartels 2016; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002; Huddy 2015; Mason 2018). Cramer's contribution to this literature is her discovery that a sense of identity linked to *place* forms a unique and consequential part of rural Wisconsinites' political psychology.

Place, here, refers to symbolically charged spatial units that constitute psychologically "meaningful categories for individuals interacting in and with them" (Lalli 1992, p. 291; Osborne 2006). As geographers, sociologists, and environmental psychologists have illustrated, people are attached to the places where they live, and places serve as a basis for shared place-

based social identity (Agnew 1996; Cuba & Hummon 1993A; Lalli 1992; Low & Altman 1992). “Place identity” refers to a sense of belonging to a group whose membership is defined by living in a particular place and having a psychological attachment of group-based perception with other group members. Despite the fact that Americans are a relatively mobile people, previous studies show people develop meaningful place attachments quickly (Cuba & Hummon 1993B).

There is evidence of place identity being of consequence to electoral politics in terms of mobilization (Panagopoulos, Leighley & Hamel 2017; Wong 2010) and determinations of vote choice (Parker 2014). Place identity and the “local interest” also appears to factor in significantly to citizen’s economic appraisals (Cutler 2007). Recent experimental work also sheds light on the power of place-based cues in political advertisements and suggest that ruralites evaluate negatively candidates that are portrayed as urban (out-group hostility) but do not respond particularly positively or negatively toward rural candidates, whereas urbanites evaluate significantly more positively urban candidates on some dimensions (in-group bias), but do not have strong responses toward candidates portrayed as rural (Jacobs & Munis 2018).

This chapter builds upon previous work on place identity to develop the concept of place resentment. As a general rule, place identity should be thought of as a prerequisite to place resentment. Indeed, place resentment results when place identity and geographical grievance intersect. Place resentment emerges when place identity rises to the level of group consciousness due to a sense that their status in society as members of a symbolic geographical community has been unjustly and deliberately diminished by those wielding the levers of power (Cramer 2016; Miller et al. 1981). In other words, not everyone who possesses high levels of place identity will also harbor high levels of place resentment, but the two concepts are strongly linked. Place resentment should be thought of as being overtly political, stemming from place-based

aggrievement pertaining to one or more substantive considerations, such as inequities in representation, distributive benefits, and/or cultural recognition and respect.

While preexisting measures of place identity have been developed and validated in environmental psychology (Hernandez et al. 2007; Hidalgo and Hernandez 2001; Lalli 1992; Nanzer 2004; Stedman 2002), no such measures exist for place resentment – understandable as most environmental psychological research does not focus on politics per se. Developing a measure of place resentment is necessary not only to build upon the environmental psychological and other literatures on place identity, but also in order to build upon qualitative work in this area (Cramer 2016; Wuthnow 2018), which finds that many ruralites have come to resent urbanites generally, as well as government itself, which many ruralites perceive as fundamentally unfair in terms of the communities they listen to and direct resources toward (urban communities at the expense of rural communities). Place resentment helps us understand why rural voters' preference for conservative Republican candidates that run on small government messages is not due to ideological principle, but rather is a means of striking back at the systems of power that they perceive as stacking the deck against them (Cramer 2016). Developing a measure of place-resentment will allow us to investigate these relationships beyond a single community or state.

Like many other measures of group-based animus, such as racial resentment, place resentment is a unidimensional construct. Just as there are many considerations that may lead an individual to harbor racial resentment as a particular form of racial prejudice, there are different considerations that can form the basis for an individual's place-based resentment. For instance, one might feel that other geographic communities receive unfair attention from political representatives on a myriad of issues relative to her own yet perceive no other unfair geographic political treatment. Another person may not perceive unfair treatment by politicians and yet feel

that their community and others like it do not receive their fair share of government resources and feel that the lifestyle of people in their community is undervalued relative to that of those who live in other types of communities. While the substantive considerations that form the basis of these two hypothetical individuals' aggrievement are not the same, the place-based resentments that they give rise to are psychologically equivalent in kind. My argument that place resentment is unidimensional in structure is based in a cognitive psychological understanding of resentment more broadly, holding that resentment can be summed up as disapproval toward others enjoying desirable (yet undeserved) rewards that are more bountiful relative to those enjoyed by oneself and one's ingroup (here focusing on perceived place-based inequities) (Ortony, Clore & Collins 1990). In other words, while different events or concerns may give rise to resentment, its emergent structure is uniform and it is precisely this structure, as applied to geographical political concerns, that my measure seeks to capture.

Conceptualizing place resentment broadly (i.e., beyond just rural resentment) helps us better understand American politics. Assessing variation in place resentment across the urban-rural spectrum, how these levels of place resentment vary across the country, and the different ways and degrees to which these different types of place resentment are associated with other attitudes and behaviors will likely teach us a great deal about the nature of the urban-rural divide, partisan polarization, and other topics. Regarding the relationship between place resentment such and vote choice, for instance, one might expect key differences to emerge in the strength to which place resentment is associated with vote choice across the urban-rural divide. While testing this is beyond the scope of this article, this is especially likely to be the case if there are systematic differences in the communicative environment foment, prime, and channel place resentment. For example, we should expect the connection between rural resentment and vote

choice may be stronger if rural voters are courted more frequently on the basis of place per se – especially if one party (e.g., the Republican Party) accounts for a majority of these types of appeals. While prior research in this emerging area is sparse, existing evidence suggests that a significantly higher proportion of place-based campaign advertisements are rural focused (Munis 2015). Ultimately, as with any group-based phenomenon (aside from partisan identity), the link between place and politics is not inevitable nor is it immutable – candidates, media actors, and other influential actors create and shape those links.²⁵

While political scientists have already begun to assess the enduring effects of place identity and place resentment in the era of partisan polarization, the bulk of scholarship in this nascent literature—including nearly all book length treatments of this topic—have employed qualitative public opinion research techniques (Cramer 2016; Parker 2014; Wuthnow 2017). To date, no survey measures of place resentment have been developed. This is problematic because survey research remains the most common and valuable tool utilized by scholars of mass political behavior. Several scholars have suggested we need a measure of place resentment in order to assess its role beyond Wisconsin (Albertson & Kushner-Gadarian 2017; Carmines & Schmidt 2017; Wolbrecht 2017), and beyond the rural context (Eliasoph 2017), and to explore its role in shaping opinions expressed privately in surveys, as opposed to publicly in focus groups (Albertson & Kushner-Gadarian 2017; Davis 2017). It is my hope that the new measure presented in this chapter will help spur much further research investigating the behaviors and preferences tied to place resentment.

²⁵ For a thorough account, focusing on racial identity, of how shifts in the political communication environment is linked to the political potency of social identities, see Jardina (2019).

In addition to concerns over the generalizability of findings gleaned from qualitative investigations of the role of place resentment in our politics (Albertson & Kushner-Gadarian 2017; Carmines & Schmidt 2017; Wolbrecht 2017), concerns have also been raised regarding whether place-based attitudes are actually distinct from other attitudes. In particular, many have expressed concern over the extent to which expressions of rural resentment are actually socially desirable expressions of underlying racial prejudices (Carmines & Schmidt 2017; Schildkraut 2017; Wolbrecht 2017). The basic logic undergirding these criticisms appears to be rooted in facts pertaining to the spatial distribution of racial groups, with rural areas being predominantly white and urban areas significantly less so. Others are more open to the idea that place resentment is perhaps sufficiently distinct from racial attitudes, but believe more research is needed to demonstrate this persuasively (Davis 2017; Herschey 2017). Such concerns appear legitimate on their face, especially considering that some urban related terminology, such as “inner city,” is racialized (Millington 2011; Rhodes & Brown 2018).²⁶

Other scholars have voiced concern that place resentment may actually be a particular expression of populist attitudes. The reasoning is that rural resentment “in evidence in Wisconsin evokes the long-standing American populist trope that contrasts ‘the people’—a virtuous but besieged majority—with malevolent, powerful minorities of all sorts,” which is consistent with the nation’s “populist, ‘counter-subversive’ tradition” (Dudas 2017, p. 523).

Still others have questioned whether place-based animosity is actually a geographically centered expression of partisanship (Herschey 2017; Schildkraut 2017). As these critics note, partisanship functions as a social identity – the primary content of which is affect as opposed to

²⁶ In developing my items for the place resentment scale, I consciously avoided terms to the extent possible that could be tinged with racial or class-based associations.

ideology (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012; Kinder and Kalmoe 2016), is the strongest and most reliable determinant of political attitudes (Achen & Bartels 2016; Converse 1964; Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002). This, coupled with the fact that parties in the electorate have a strong geographical component, with the rural share of the Republican base and urban share of the Democratic base rising continuously since the mid 1990s (Hopkins 2017), leads these critics to call into question one of the most forceful conclusions to date regarding place resentment: that “for at least some people, place matters more than just as a proxy for which partisans are where. It is a part of some voters’ fundamental sense of self and...scholars should spend more time measuring identities [such as place] that are more meaningful to people than partisanship” (Cramer 2016; p. 217). Dismissing place resentment as geographically centered partisan expression is unreasonable, however, if we accept that place serves as the basis for social identity as established by environmental psychologists, geographers, and others. Just as race serves as the basis for social identity, so does place. Furthermore, just as race-based animosity is not merely an expression of race centered partisanship, neither is place resentment geographically based partisan bickering. Empirically, existing evidence suggests that partisan composition of one’s neighborhood does not exert a strong influence over place satisfaction (Hui 2013). While partisanship may indeed be correlated to both race and place in interesting ways, these three constructs are psychologically distinct.

In sum, there is considerable reason to expect that place resentment, while embodying three substantive considerations, manifests in politics as a unidimensional construct. Moreover, while place resentment shares conceptual elements with class, race, party, and populist-based resentments, it is meaningfully distinct. This should not be surprising, considering that the “demagogue of space” is perhaps the most fundamental way that humans have delineated “us”

from “them” over the course of history (Enos 2017).²⁷ Regarding its substantive content, though previous work has directed the bulk of its focus to issues concerning distributive politics, it is clear that place resentment *can* involve cultural and representational concerns as well (Cramer 2016, p. 5; Eliasoph 2017). As such, place resentment measures should include items providing coverage of more than one substantive domain from which resentment might spring. In the paragraphs that follow, I develop and validate such a measure—what I call simply the “place resentment scale”—distinguish it from other relevant political attitudes and demonstrate its ability to help explain political phenomena of interest.

Developing Survey Based Measures

I developed a 13 item measure of political resentment designed to capture political acrimony that is geographical in nature. These questions cover three substantive political domains (distributional, representational, and cultural concerns) identified by prior research that place-based resentments center on (Cramer 2016; Wuthnow 2017). Once initially devised, I recruited nearly a dozen scholars with expertise in political psychology to scrutinize the items in both individual and group-based settings. These scholars varied in their degree of familiarity with existing work on place, but were familiar with the concept’s definition and the literature on groups and political behavior. I did not provide a specific definition of place resentment, but informed my panel of experts that the measure sought to capture geographic animosity stemming from perceptions of unjustly unequal status between geographic groups. I asked them to assess the items on three criteria: item structure (e.g., avoiding ambiguity); construct validity (i.e., do

²⁷ While Enos (2017) concerns the effects of objective spatial group arrangements, this chapter deals with subjective identification with symbolic spaces and imagined geographic community. While both interact with other social considerations, including race, those relationships detailed by Enos are more determinative and less variable than those involving place-based identity.

the items relate to the underlying theoretical concept?); and content validity (i.e., do the items represent all important aspects of the construct?). This step was crucial since determining the quality of the measure across these three criteria necessitates qualitative judgement and I deemed that drawing upon a panel of experts was preferable to relying on my own judgement alone. Regarding the first criterion, item wording was refined if deemed overly wordy, ambiguous, grammatically deficient, or otherwise in need of technical revision. The latter two criteria, construct and content validity, were primarily used to remove initial items that were either repetitive or missed the mark in terms of relating to place resentment. However, the final item list was also evaluated as to whether it seems to satisfactorily capture to the greatest extent possible the construct of interest: place resentment.

I conducted cognitive interviewing to explore the validity of the items (Willis 2004). I recruited a small group of lay individuals living in urban and rural areas in two disparate regions of the United States. Each person read the items both silently and aloud, indicated whether each item made sense to them, and described what they took each item to mean, what considerations came to mind when considering each item, how they would answer each item, and why. This process provided me with qualitative evidence that my items appeared to comprise a valid measure and, importantly, that the items that I had settled on after consulting with other academics made sense to a non-technical audience.

This three-step process (initial development, expert review, and cognitive interviewing) yielded thirteen items—four reflecting distributive politics, four pertaining to political representation, and five related to cultural concerns. The distributive politics items capture attitudes about fairness in the allocation of public resources. Items related to representation measure respondents' perceptions of the degree to which voices of places like their own are

heard or whether other types of places are privileged by those in power. “Cultural” items, meanwhile, measure whether respondents are aggrieved and/or hostile related to perceived geographical values and lifestyles. Despite these being three distinct substantive concerns, I expect these items to hold together on a single underlying latent attitudinal dimension: (place-based) resentment, as explained above.

All items, which are listed in Table 3.1, are designed to assess respondents’ perceptions regarding the relative position of their place-based ingroup vs an outgroup commonly portrayed as being dominant over, or, in competition with, their ingroup (Miller et al. 1981). Because we should not constrain our theorizing about *place* resentment to rural areas, these questions are designed to allow researchers to measure place resentment across the urban-rural continuum by using the same questions by logically programming the survey to show the relevant place-based ingroup and outgroup based on respondent characteristics. An advantage of this approach is that it facilitates comparisons between different place types and lends a great deal of flexibility to researchers.²⁸

²⁸ Though this chapter focuses on demonstrating the usefulness of this scale for studying the role of place resentment along the urban-rural continuum, questions could easily be modified to examine place resentment attached to other place identities, such as regional identity (either nationally, e.g., Appalachia, or within states, i.e., “out-state Wisconsin”). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the question of level of geographic aggregation. Clearly some people identify with their urban, suburban, or rural status, while others may identify with place at other levels, such as their neighborhood, town, state, or region. Given the importance of rural identification in the accounts of Cramer and others, and the importance of urban and rural in contemporary political discourse, I focus there.

Table 3.1 Place Resentment Scale Items

<u>Items</u>	<u>10 item scale</u>	<u>4 item scale</u>
<u>1. Distributive 1:</u> My community gives more in taxes to [out] in my state than we get back.	X	
<u>2. Distributive 2:</u> When [in] are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give [out] special favors	X	X
<u>3. Distributive 3:</u> We wouldn't have to waste tax dollars bailing out [out] in [R state] if people just moved away.	X	X
<u>4. Distributive 4:</u> Decades of technological and economic changes have made it difficult for some [in] and [in_adj] communities in [R state] to improve on their own.	X	X
<u>5. Representational 1:</u> In recent elections in [R state], there have been too many candidates who narrowly represent the interests of [out].	X	
<u>6. Representational 2:</u> [out] have too much say in [R state] politics.	X	X
<u>7. Cultural 1:</u> People in [out] areas in [R state] don't understand or respect the [in_adj] lifestyle and what [in_noun] do for fun.	X	
<u>8. Cultural 2:</u> It's fair to say that [in_noun] in [R state] are harder working because it's more difficult to get by in [in] than [out].	X	
<u>9. Cultural 3:</u> Despite what some people say, [in] and [in_adj] communities are the "real America." (alternative: "... the "real [R state])	X	
<u>10. Cultural 4:</u> [in_adj] areas in [R state] have a distinct culture that is often misunderstood by people in [out].	X	
Cronbach's alpha:	0.84	0.68
Cronbach's alpha rural:	0.85	0.69
Cronbach's alpha urban:	0.82	0.65

Note: Item wording is meant to be tailored depending on where respondents live. For rural respondents: [in] = small towns, [out] = urban areas, [in_adj] = rural, [in_noun] = rural folks, [out_noun] = cities; for urban respondents: [in] = cities, [out] = rural areas, [in_adj] = urban, [in_noun] = urbanites, [out_noun] = small towns; for suburban respondents: [in] = suburbs, [out] = urban areas, [in_adj] = suburban, [in_noun] = suburbanites, [out_noun] = cities.

Place resentment items were “micro-tailored” to respondents based upon the state in which they live, as well as how they self-identity along the urban-rural continuum.²⁹ In both samples, those who identify as non-urbanites respond to place resentment items directed toward urbanites as the outgroup. Taking cues from recent work, treating urbanites as the relevant outgroup for questions posed to self-identifying rural respondents is a straightforward choice (Cramer 2016; Wuthnow 2017). In the CCES data, respondents who indicate that they live in suburbs or towns were also presented with questions measuring attitudes toward urbanites as the outgroup. Prior research suggests that this is an appropriate choice. Suburbs, whose very existence is defined by their peripheral orientation to urban areas, have been “psychologically” understood as “an anti-urban” phenomenon (Phillips 1969). Cramer also notes that many people she interacted with in “small or medium-sized cities or even suburbs...exhibited something like a rural consciousness—they identified as residents of communities that were outside the orbit of power, resources, and respect of the main cities in the state” (2016, p. 139). For urban respondents in both samples, rural people were presented as the outgroup in the questions. As a jumping off point, this decision is justifiable when one considers research indicating that many urbanites see rural people as “dumb, boorish, and bigoted” (Gimpel & Karnes 2006) as well our

²⁹ In the Lucid sample, respondents chose from a 6-category item ranging from “very urban” to “very rural.” On the CCES sample, respondents selected from a 4-category measure featuring categories “urban,” “suburban,” “town,” and “rural area.”

contemporary political moment where media narratives frequently pit urban vs. rural areas against one another, especially regarding electoral politics.

Validating Place Resentment

To validate my unidimensional measure of place resentment, two surveys were conducted in a five-month period. The first was conducted by Lucid among a nationwide online sample of Americans ($N = 2,000$).³⁰ The second was conducted as part of the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) among a nationally-representative online sample ($N = 1,000$) conducted as part of the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).³¹ As Table A3.1 shows, both samples comport well with nationally representative samples, such as the American National Election Study.³²

Racial prejudice is measured via four items from the racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sanders). Respondents' populist orientations were measured using Schulz et al.'s full three-dimensional measure of populist attitudes (2017). I modified these items slightly so as to pertain more directly to American politics (e.g., substituting words such as "parliament" for "Congress" and the like). To capture affective polarization, I utilize Johnson-Grey's "Political Identity Polarization" measure, which focuses on animosity directed at ideological ingroups and

³⁰ Lucid is a relatively new firm that provides researchers access to panels that yield high quality, nationally representative data. In a recent validation study, Coppock & McClellan (2019) find that Lucid results track well with high quality samples well-regarded by the political science community, including the American National Election Study (ANES).

³¹ All models utilizing CCES data use the weights calculated by YouGov/CCES.

³² Samples are also representative in terms of urban-rural: 22% in two rural-most categories in the Lucid data and 19% as "rural areas" in the CCES data.

outgroups (2018).³³ Measures of place attachment and place identity were drawn from previously validated scales in environmental psychology (Hidalgo and Hernandez 2001; Hernandez et al. 2007; Lalli 1992; Nanzer 2004; Stedman 2002). All items for all scales (including place resentment) are measured using a 5-point Likert scale of agreement running from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

Place resentment is unidimensional

As noted above, despite the various substantive domains that place resentment relates to, I conceptualize place resentment as a unidimensional attitude comprised of resentment toward outgroups. All 13 items from the place resentment scale were utilized in an iterated principal factor exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using the promax rotation method. Results of the EFA utilizing the Lucid sample indicate a unidimensional structure of place resentment. The solution was optimized by excluding factors with low communalities, which resulted in 10 items remaining—four focusing on cultural concerns, two focusing on representational concerns, and four focusing on distributional concerns. These items share a high degree of variance ($KMO = .90$) and load substantially on one factor—see loadings in Table A3.3. In addition, multiple criteria (including comparisons of factor eigenvalues and scree plot analysis) indicate a unidimensional factor structure (eigenvalue = 3.48). For the scree plot, see Figure A3.1. The variance explained by this factor is on par with other well validated measures commonly used in political science research, such as symbolic racism (Henry and Sears 2002; Tarman and Sears

³³ While much existing work on affective polarization focuses on animus between partisans, Johnson-Grey's (2018) measure focusing on animus between ideological identities (liberal v conservative) is applicable to studying affective polarization given the degree to which the parties are now sorted in terms of ideological identity (Levendusky 2009; Mason 2018).

2006). Moreover, internal consistency of the measure is high (Cronbach's alpha = .84).³⁴

Together, consistent with theoretical expectations, these findings suggest a unidimensional structure for place resentment.

Place resentment is distinct

To determine whether place resentment is distinct from other constructs, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was undertaken on the Lucid samples. A six-factor model was specified (one for place resentment, racial resentment, affective polarization, and each of the three dimensions of populism proposed by Schwarz et al. (2017)). Values for root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA = 0.063; c.i. = 0.061, 0.065; $p < .001$) and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR = 0.072) statistics indicate good model fit (Hooper et al. 2008; Hu and Bentler 1999; Stieger 2007).³⁵ As shown in Table A3.4, place resentment items load substantially (loadings higher than .5) on the hypothesized latent factor. Covariances between place resentment and other latent factors in the CFA model are quite modest (ranging from 0.25 to 0.35), which supports the idea that place resentment is a distinctive attitude. This conclusion is also supported by weak Pearson's r correlation coefficients between my unidimensional place resentment measures and racial resentment ($r = 0.13$), political identity polarization ($r = 0.19$), populism – anti-elite sentiment ($r = 0.22$), populism – governance by regular people ($r = 0.17$), and populism – belief that ‘the people’ are homogenous ($r = 0.28$). An additional CFA, presented in Table A3.6, confirms that the place resentment scale is distinct (from a measurement standpoint) from place identity and place attachment as well, with good model fit (RMSEA =

³⁴ Moreover, internal consistency is high for both urban (Cronbach's alpha = 0.82) and rural (Cronbach's alpha = 0.85) self-identifiers alike.

³⁵ Confirmatory factor analysis was run in R using the *laavan* package (Rosseel 2012). RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation. SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual.

0.067; SRMR = 0.055). Appreciating that survey researchers are often pressed for space, a separate CFA was run utilizing a truncated 4 item version of the place resentment measure, with results indicating similarly satisfying internal consistency and discriminant validity—see Table A3.5.

Additional evidence regarding the validity of these measures stem from regression results that indicate that evaluations of ruralites (as captured by a feeling thermometer ranging from 0-100) become significantly more negative, on average, as place resentment amongst urbanites increases. Similarly, amongst ruralites, on average, evaluations of urbanites become significantly more negative as place resentment increases.³⁶ These results indicate a bias toward the place-based outgroup in both cases. No significant association emerged whatsoever for ingroup evaluations, however, after controlling for ingroup identity strength. These results are consistent with groups theory (Miller et al. 1981), which informs that group identity is as much ingroup focused as outgroup focused. In other words, these results forcefully illustrate that if one is interested in the political hostilities that are rooted in geography per se, a measure of place identity is not enough. It is this need that my place resentment measure aims to satisfy.

Who is Resentful?

Results from exploratory factor analysis presented above give us confidence that place resentment is unidimensional. Confirmatory factor analysis results provide further reassurance

³⁶ Controlling for racial resentment, populism, affective polarization, place identity strength, party ID, age, gender, and household income. Coefficients for variables of interest are presented in Table A3.7 in the Appendix. Only models for place resentment amongst urbanites and ruralites were possible due to the way urban-ness and ruralness were measured in the Lucid sample and because no measures of attitudes toward urbanites and ruralites were present in the 2018 CCES.


regarding the measure's internal qualities, as well as evidence that my measure of place resentment is largely distinct from other constructs that scholars have surmised place resentment may be a proxy for (Carmines & Schmidt 2017; David 2017; Dudas 2017; Herschey 2017; Schildkraut 2017). My next task is to further explain place resentment by showing which type of people are most likely to harbor place resentment. Below, I report findings showing that, in samples of the country as a whole, males, ruralites, and those who harbor high levels of place identity and racial resentment are more likely to express higher levels of place resentment, whereas older Americans are less likely to harbor higher levels of place resentment. There are, however, some subtle differences in the relationships that emerge across the urban-rural continuum, which I describe below.

To determine which factors are significant predictors of place resentment, multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions models were fitted to the data. These models were fitted to both the Lucid and CCES datasets. Models were run on the full Lucid and CCES samples, as well as on data subsetting by place type regarding urban-rural designations. The Lucid models feature a normalized racial resentment scale, binary college education variable, partisan identity, age (in years), sex, region, an ordinal household income variable, urban-rural place perception, place identity, and a variable indicating whether the respondent is white or non-white. CCES models feature a normalized racial resentment measure, binary college education variable, partisan identity, ideological identity, age, sex, region, urban-rural place perception,

Before running the regression models, I conducted one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) models to discern whether, in isolation, place resentment varies significantly across urban, suburban, and rural communities. Results in both samples indicate that there are significant mean differences in place resentment across urban-rural continuum, with rural areas

harboring the highest amount of place resentment on average.³⁷ Specifically, pairwise comparisons using a Tukey’s post-hoc test indicated that rural respondents exhibited significantly higher levels of place resentment on average than other groups, though, within the Lucid sample, “very urban” respondents had significantly higher average levels of place resentment than other urban categories. These results indicate that place resentment occurs across all sorts of places, while being strongest in rural areas (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Means and Distributions of Place Resentment by Place Type



Next, I ran a series of OLS regression models to assess which respondent characteristics predict higher levels of place resentment even after accounting for all other variables in the model. Results from my multivariate models on the full Lucid and CCES samples indicate that

³⁷ A statistically significant difference between groups was determined in both the Lucid [$F(5, 15) = 33.77, p < 0.001$] and CCES [$F(2, 3) = 39.40, p < 0.001$] samples.

place resentment levels are highest, on average, in rural areas –confirming the basic relationships identified in the ANOVA models discussed above. Suburbanites also posted significantly higher levels of place resentment than urbanites. That place resentment is so much higher among ruralites than non-ruralites is noteworthy in keeping with other studies that point to an asymmetry in the influence of place-based factors, wherein place appears more salient, more meaningful, and more potent among ruralites (Cramer 2016; Jacobs & Munis 2018). Reasons for this asymmetry are unclear and should be the subject of further investigation by researchers.

Results from the full Lucid sample also indicate a strong positive relationship between place identity and place resentment. As noted in the front end of this chapter, this is to be expected because place identity should be understood as a pre-requisite of place resentment (though, again, not all who strongly identify with the ingroup will develop these resentful attitudes toward outgroups). These results further validate by measure by establishing its concurrent validity. Additional significant predictors of place resentment in the full sample include racial resentment and being male, whereas age is a significant negative predictor. Results from models looking narrowly at specific community types (i.e., urban, suburban, and rural) show that racial resentment and age do not uniformly predict place resentment in all communities – racial resentment predicts higher values of place resentment in both rural and suburban areas, but not urban areas, while older age values predict lower levels of place resentment only in urban areas (urban youth are more resentful toward rural areas and ruralites, on average, than are older urban residents). The significant positive association between racial resentment and place resentment among ruralites and suburbanites strongly suggests that there is likely a racial component to rural and suburban resentment toward cities and their inhabitants,

even if, as Cramer (2016) contends, it may not necessarily be the dominant component – this is an especially noteworthy result.

Another component associated significantly with place resentment in a number of the models presented in Table 3.2 is respondent race. Specifically, non-white respondents exhibited significantly higher levels of place resentment in the full Lucid sample – a relationship that was marginally significant ($p = 0.068$) in the full CCES sample. Examining the subsetting models, we see that this result appears to be driven mainly by suburban and urban areas, where non-whites exhibit significantly higher levels of place resentment on average, even after accounting for other factors. These findings signal that place resentment may matter for explaining variation in minority public opinion, a major growth area in behavioral political science.

A final noteworthy consideration based on the results presented in Table 3.2 is partisanship. The most interesting relationships between place resentment and partisanship emerge in the models subsetting by urban-rural designation. Urban Democrats exhibit significantly higher levels of urban resentment, on average, than both independents (in the Lucid sample) and Republicans (in both samples). Suburban Republicans, meanwhile, posted significantly higher levels of resentment toward cities than suburban Democrats. Finally, no significant relationship emerged between respondent partisanship and rural resentment in either sample. Regarding urbanites and suburbanites, is not clear what we should make of these findings. Indeed, there are several possibilities. Considering geographic polarization, increasing resentment toward rural areas among urbanites, and toward urban areas among suburbanites, may push these individuals closer to the Democratic and Republican parties respectively. The true directionality may also be reversed – that is, identifying with the Democratic party as an urbanite and with the Republican party as a suburbanite may lead to higher levels of urban and

suburban resentment respectively, perhaps due to the rhetoric of parties and affiliated actors such as candidates, media personalities, activists, etc. Also worth thinking about is that no particular partisanship relationship emerges among the rural subset of my sample. This tells us that there is no apparent link between partisanship and rural resentment – when controlling for numerous factors, rural Democrats and independents are no less resentful toward urbanites, on average, than are rural Republicans. This is even more noteworthy if one recalls that rural resentment is, on average, significantly stronger than both urban and suburban resentment. This finding may help us account for the asymmetric nature of geographic polarization – i.e., that rural areas have bolted toward the Republican Party *at the polls* to a greater degree than urban areas have shifted toward the Democratic Party – since these results show that ruralites are equally likely to resent urbanites (who are increasingly associated with the Democratic Party) regardless of partisan identity.

Table 3.2: Predictors of Place Resentment

	<u>Entire Sample</u>		<u>Rural Resentment</u>		<u>Urban Resentment</u>		<u>Suburban Resentment</u>
	<i>Lucid</i>	<i>CCES</i>	<i>Lucid</i>	<i>CCES</i>	<i>Lucid</i>	<i>CCES</i>	<i>CCES</i>
Racial Resentment	0.079*	0.180*	0.180*	0.224*	0.018	0.050	0.272*
	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.075)	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.045)
College Education	-0.012	-0.017	0.016	-0.004	-0.023*	-0.031	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Party ID							
--independent	-0.020	0.043	0.006	0.061	-0.030*	0.001	0.047
	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.056)	(3.00)

--Republican	-0.009 (0.010)	0.058* (0.028)	0.029 (0.016)	0.078 (0.042)	-0.029* (0.013)	-0.080* (0.053)	0.108* (0.034)
Ideological ID	--	0.006 (0.009)	--	0.022 (0.012)	--	0.002 (0.016)	0.002 (0.014)
Age	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.000)	-0.003* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Male	0.035* (0.008)	0.030* (0.015)	0.035* (0.013)	0.003 (0.023)	0.031* (0.010)	0.020 (0.026)	0.054* (0.022)
Region							
--Midwest	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.021 (0.021)	0.023 (0.021)	0.017 (0.030)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.045)	-0.049 (0.028)
--South	0.001 (0.011)	-0.038 (0.020)	0.011 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.046)	-0.055* (0.026)
--West	-0.021 (0.012)	-0.051* (0.023)	0.025 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.033* (0.014)	-0.034 (0.046)	-0.054 (0.032)
Household							
Income	0.000 (0.000)	--	-0.002 (0.001)	--	0.001 (0.001)	--	--
Income							
Change	--	-0.022 (0.009)	--	-0.006 (0.014)	--	-0.016 (0.018)	-0.036* (0.012)

Place							
Perception –	-0.050*	--	--	--	-0.049*	--	--
Urban	(0.012)				(0.013)		
-- More Urban	-0.062*	--	--	--	-0.061	--	--
than Rural	(0.014)				(0,014)		
--Suburban	--	0.099*	--	--	--	--	--
		(0.021)					
-- More Rural	0.039*	--		--	--	--	--
than Urban	(0.016)						
-- Rural	0.066*	0.122*	0.017	--	--	--	--
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.015)				
-- Very Rural	0.100*	--	0.042*	--	--	--	--
	(0.017)		(0.017)				
Place ID	0.17*	--	0.210*	--	0.117*	--	--
	(0.02)		(0.030)		(0.021)		
White	-0.043*	-0.044	0.002	-0.060	-0.053*	0.013	-0.081*
	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.011)	(0.035)	(0.037)
<i>N</i>	1574	805	558	255	1016	231	319
<i>R</i> ²	.21	.29	.26	.37	.16	.14	.44

** $p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*

Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter develops an argument and presents evidence from two surveys that place resentment is a distinct political attitude that can be reliably and validly measured in sample surveys. These results, especially when considered alongside recent qualitative accounts of the significance of place American electoral politics, signal that political scientists should take up the mantle originally bestowed to us by V.O. Key (1949) and recently rediscovered by Cramer (2016), Fitzgerald (2018) and some others regarding the role of identities rooted in place in our politics. As scholars of political behavior return with force to investigations of how group attachments and inter-group dynamics shape mass public opinion and political behavior (Achen & Bartels 2016; Mason 2018; Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck 2018), we must not overlook the influence of identities associated with the most fundamental and ancient force that separates “us” over here from “them” over there (literally): geography and place. Indeed, the political import of place identities appears inevitable when one considers that our systems of administration and representation are fundamentally geographic in nature (Rodden 2019). Taking advantage of the geographic nature of our representation, politicians appeal to these geographical (i.e., place-based) identities in order to gain an edge in electoral campaigns (Cramer 2016; Hunt n.d, Parker 2014), and recent work suggests that these appeals may be effective—particularly in rural areas (Jacobs and Munis 2018). Once in office, many elected officials continue to be sensitive to the place identity(ies) of their constituency—integrating the particularities of place into their “home-

style” that can serve as a central anchoring point in candidates’ representational and electoral brand down the line (Fenno 1978; Parker 2014).

The measure(s) validated in this chapter will allow political scientists to critically assess and investigate empirically the various critiques outlined by many who have critically evaluated Cramer’s (2016) path-breaking work. This measure fills an important gap and will allow researchers to advance our understanding of how and when place resentment is of consequence to our politics, as well as when it is not (Albertson & Gadarian 2017; Carmines & Schmidt 2017; Schildkraut 2017; Wolbrecht 2017). In particular, future work should probe the intersections of race and place. I have shown that place resentment appears distinct from racial, but racial attitudes do appear to be intertwined with place resentment among suburbanites and ruralites. What is presented here is nothing more than a necessary first step – more work is needed.

To sum up, place resentment is worthy of study directly by political scientists. While the sense of geographical injustice that undergirds place resentment may be more common amongst people living in rural areas, it is not unique to them. The stuff of politics is competition, frequently zero sum, over power. The sorts of places that win versus the sorts of places that lose likely shift over time and vary in accordance to particular governmental conditions and other contextual factors. So, while rural voters may feel particularly aggrieved in places like Wisconsin where a small handful of cities appear to ‘run the show’ to their own benefit, urbanites in other states may feel increasingly frustrated by state legislatures, a U.S. Senate, and an Electoral College system that they see as unfairly advantaging rural places to the detriment of places like their own. Moreover, given that the way we administer governance, distribute resources, and allocate representation is fundamentally geographic in nature, we should not expect place resentment to be stamped out anytime soon—especially as parties increasingly

appeal to distinct geographic groups (Bishop 2009; Hopkins 2017; Mason 2018). The inevitability of place resentment demands that we develop a far better understanding of its influence on our politics. The measure of place resentment presented here, in tandem with other path breaking work in this area (Cramer 2016; Jacobs and Munis 2018; Wuthnow 2017), provides a jumping off point for others to begin to flesh out this understanding. In addition to investigating closely the links between place, race, and partisanship, scholars should direct their attention toward understanding how place influences how citizens view and engage with government, as well as how place influences the adoption of policy opinions. Finally, scholars should continue to refine and even generate new measures of place resentment. While scholars of racial attitudes have been improving their measures for the past 30+ years, scholars interested in investigating the enduring role of place find themselves at a much more nascent stage.

Chapter 4: The Occurrence and Effects of Place-based Political Communications

As discussed at some length in Chapter 2, for an identity to be relevant for politics it must be individually salient. Research shows people can simultaneously process approximately seven different considerations in their mind at one time (Taber & Lodge 2013) – making one consideration salient will necessarily bump some other consideration out of mind. Political psychology, then, is very contextual, which makes understanding the information environment at a particular political moment indispensable (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Jardina 2019; Kinder & Sanders 1996; Kinder & Sears 1981; Taber & Lodge 2014). While the number of environmental stimuli that can make an identity salient for politics is quite vast, among the most predominant is political advertising (Holman et al. 2015; Huddy 2003; Valentino et al. 2002).

As anyone who has spent any considerable amount of time in the United States during an election cycle can surely attest, political ads inundate American media – from print to television to radio to the internet. Indeed, avoiding them entirely is, short of living off the grid amongst the grizzlies, wolves, and mountain lions of Montana’s Bob Marshall Wilderness complex, impossible. While political ads have long been ubiquitous throughout the country in even numbered years, the volume of ads inundating voters has skyrocketed since the 2010 *Citizens United v FEC* decision (Fowler & Ridout 2012). Much of the uptick in ads in the post-*Citizens United* era can be attributed to “outside groups” (i.e., Super PACS, 501(c)4 groups, etc.). The fact that most well-monied outside groups are clustered in a few locations (such as in and around Washington D.C.) may have implications for the role that place has overall in political advertising and, by extension, the role that place plays in election outcomes. Because my model of place and political psychology rests on the assertion that place identity must first be activated

by environmental stimuli in order to have relevance to politics, it is necessary that I undertake an exploration of place in candidate communications. To what extent do advertisements feature in place-based appeals? Which electoral and geographic settings are place appeals most likely to appear in? What does the content of place advertising look like? And, crucially, are place appeals effective? These are several questions that I address in this chapter.

Political ads, however, are not the only medium through which politicians attempt to shape the considerations that voters use to evaluate politics. Online social media use on platforms like Facebook has proliferated and, resultingly, so too has the number of Americans who are exposed, whether incidentally or not, to content that their elected representatives post. Representatives curate their social media feeds in order to cast themselves in a favorable light to constituents. This cultivated online presentation of self by candidates on social media is what I refer to as the “digital homestyle” and, like political ads, is an important area to investigate regarding place-based content. Political ads may be key to helping candidates get elected in the first place, but the activities that candidates engage in in between elections can make their reelection prospects more secure. What percentage of candidates’ social media posts are place-based? What contextual factors are associated with a more (or less) place-based digital homestyle?

In this chapter, I use content analysis and a novel survey experiment to address the questions posed above. Regarding political advertising, I find that slightly more than one in three U.S. Senate advertisements aired by candidates’ official campaigns from 2010-2016 were place-based. Moreover, experimental results presented in this chapter suggest that voters are responsive to place-based appeals in several interesting ways. As for social media, during the 114th (2015-2016) and 115th (2017-2018) congresses, a little less than half of Congress members’ official

Facebook posts, on average, were place based (i.e., district focused). So, while it would be a stretch to claim that politicians' ads and social media posts are overwhelmingly place centered, place-based communications from our Congress members are also not uncommon.

Place-based Political Ads, or, Home, Home on the Range, Where the Deer and the Antelope Play on Constituent Priors

While political ads are bemoaned by many, they provide a window into politics that virtually all Americans are exposed to, regardless an individual's level of political interest. They are also the most fundamental and expensive aspect of political campaigns and play a large part in elections on multiple fronts. First, political ads are key in garnering voters' interest in electoral contests due in large part to the emotionally charged nature of political ads (Brader 2006; Freedman, Franz & Goldstein 2004). Getting potential voters to tune into the campaign is important as it increases the likelihood of becoming engaged in the campaign, as well as in voting (Brader 2006; Freedman & Goldstein 1999; Goldstein & Freedman 2002). Second, political ads also represent a considerable source of information for voters, which is especially the case for voters who are not much interested in politics (Freedman, Franz & Goldstein 2004). Third, political ads are a key source of priming effects on the electorate – determining which considerations are top of the mind when voters evaluate candidates and determine who to vote for at the ballot box (Iyengar 1994; Herrnson & Patterson 2000). Ads rely on both *explicit* messages and *implicit* messages to pursue these goals. Ads may try to boost evaluations of the preferred candidate by means of *positive association* or to cast their opposing candidate in a negative light through *demonization*. Some advertisements, known as “contrast advertisements,” may pursue both tactics at once.

Considering these goals, place-based appeals are potentially an effective type of political advertisement. Regarding information provision, place-based appeals may convey to the voter

that candidates are invested in and understand the constituency that they are running. As for priming and the fight to control what the election is understood to be about, place is a useful consideration to run on because place is an abstraction that a broad cross-section of voters can understand and identify with. The significance of this can be best understood using Zaller's Receive, Accept, Sample (RAS) model (1992). The 'receive' or reception part of the model simply pertains to whether a prospective voter is exposed to a media message and capable of taking it in or processing it. Place appeals may have an advantage at this stage due to the fact that most people have considerable knowledge of and experiences within their state or district. This knowledge and experience should allow voters to easily detect and process the locally focused message. In other words, while voters are no more likely to be exposed to any given place-based ad versus any given non-place ad, they may be more capable of processing them, on average. Place-based appeals likely have an advantage at the 'accept' and 'sample' stages in the model, too, with the greatest advantage of place-based appeals coming at the acceptance stage. Acceptance involves "yielding" to an ad's message and storing it in memory – i.e., recognizing the ad's message as true and legitimate. We should expect acceptance of place-based appeals to be more likely among a broader subset of the electorate than ideological or partisan based appeals because, as discussed in Chapter 2, most place-based identities are not politicized in terms of partisan association and, thus, can serve as a unifying superordinate identity (Gaertner et al. 1993).³⁸ In other words, whereas ideological and partisan appeals will be rejected by members of the opposite party, and probably turn off many independent voters who balk at sensationalized partisan and ideological rhetoric, place appeals are unlikely to be rejected out of hand by large

³⁸ As discussed at some length in Chapter 2, many place identities are not politicized. These include most local (i.e., municipality) and state identities. Other place identities, such as rural or urban identity, have seemingly become politicized to some extent in recent years (which I provide some evidence to support, in Chapter 5).

swaths of the electorate. David Parker finds some evidence that place appeals are broadly accepted, noting that “even conservative Republicans” in his focus groups “begrudgingly” gave good marks to a Democratic politician (noting that he “looked like a farmer[...] from a rural community”) who ran a successful and heavily place-based/localized US Senate campaign against a strong Republican challenger in a GOP leaning state (2014, p. 154). Finally, at the ‘S’ or sampling stage of the RAS model, place appeals may also enjoy an advantage over other types of appeals. The reason being that once place has been made politically salient (i.e., after a candidate has been linked to place in voters’ minds), it is likely to be primed periodically throughout the remainder of the campaign by virtue of voters living out their lives within the geographic-social milieu that comprises their place.

In this chapter, I do not provide empirical tests to test the theory above regarding place appeals in an RAS framework. To do so would necessitate multiple article length studies, or possibly another dissertation entirely. However, in what follows, I do conduct research that I see as laying the necessary groundwork that such a research program requires. Namely, I document the occurrence of place-based appeals in recent election cycles and model their occurrence to try to identify factors that explain their occurrence. If place appeals are a rarity in contemporary campaigns, then studying their effects may not be merited. In addition to studies documenting and explaining place-appeals, I present the results of an experiment that (preliminarily) sheds light on the effects of place-appeals.

Documenting the Occurrence of Place-based Political Advertisements

To better understand the prevalence of place appeals in political campaigns, I conducted a content analysis of all U.S. Senate campaign sponsored advertisements aired during the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections. Ads, made available by the Wesleyan Media Project, were

coded by two research assistants. Both research assistants had prior training and experience in conducting content analyses, and were given special instructions on how to code the advertisements for place-based and other criteria – a screenshot of the digital coding interface (i.e., “code sheet” in the parlance of content analysis) and coding instructions are provided in the Chapter 4 section of the Appendix.

Central for this study’s purposes, coders indicated whether each advertisement featured an appeal to place. In political advertising, place appeals are defined as ads that feature symbolic imagery and/or narration that seeks to make a favored (opposing) candidate appear more (less) proximate to voters through reference to symbolically charged geographies within the district (state in the case of U.S. Senate candidates) that the election takes place in. In deciding whether an ad qualified as a place-appeal, coders examined each ad for discursive and symbolic features seemingly related to place-based identities within the state each ad was associated with. Within place appeals, coders coded for whether the ad included a place-threat frame (i.e., whether the ad depicted the state as in danger or under attack), whether the ad features place imagery, whether the ad features a shot depicting the preferred candidate physical in a symbolic geographic setting, whether the ad depicts the favored candidate as being rooted in the state and/or depicts the opposing candidate as being an outsider/carpetbagger, and whether the place appeal is geared primarily at rural areas, urban areas, or neither. Coders also coded for non-place related criteria – most important among those criteria was whether the ad was biographical (only mentioning the preferred candidate), presenting contrast (mentioning both the preferred and opposing candidates), or an attack ad (mentioning only the opposing candidate).³⁹

³⁹ During trainings and testing runs, coders used a more expansive code sheet. However, several items on the originally devised code sheet exhibited low intercoder reliability and were removed. All items/criteria on the final

Content analysis revealed that, from 2010 through 2016, 37% (1,085 of 1,885) of U.S. Senate ads featured a place-based appeal. The average proportion of ads featuring a place appeal for all major party nominees during this same period is 39%. As Table 4.1 shows, variation from one election year to the next is not particularly noteworthy throughout the period examined. These statistics provide evidence that, while not overwhelmingly dominant, place-based appeals are not uncommon. On the other hand, some may interpret these numbers as being rather low – after all, Congress is, by design, supposed to be a parochial institution. Considering the parochial intentions of American legislative design, one might expect over half of Congressional advertisements to feature place-based appeals. While it is understandable that some readers may be underwhelmed by percentage, one must recall, however, that the advertisements analyzed here are for the U.S. Senate. Senators are tasked with representing their entire state – a constituency that is typically much larger and full of a more diverse array of interests than that of a typical U.S. House seat. One can easily imagine how geographic size and scale of social complexity might make place-based appeals relatively difficult to craft in a meaningful sense. Because of the (assumed) relative difficulty in crafting statewide place appeals, the U.S. Senate likely represents a “lower bound” insofar as place appeals are concerned. In other words, if place appeals are not uncommon for statewide federal contests, then they are likely not uncommon for sub-state level constituencies (e.g., U.S. House, state legislature, etc.), as well as non-federal state level offices (e.g., governor).

codesheet demonstrated acceptable levels of intercoder reliability. Information on Intercoder reliability scores are located in Table A4.1 in the Appendix.

Table 4.1 Share of U.S. Senate Advertisements Featuring Place-based Appeals: 2010-2016

	2010	2012	2014	2016	Overall
% of All Ads that are					
Place Based	40%	32%	38%	34%	37%
Mean Proportion of					
Candidates' Ads that	43%	34%	35%	43%	39%
are Place Based					

The principal advantage of place-appeals is that they open up another avenue through which candidates can court voters: place identity. Whether stressing the preferred candidate's proximity to voters on the dimension of place or emphasizing the opposing candidate's lack of place-based understanding, or perhaps even the danger they represent to their place-based community, the goal of place appeals is to make place salient in such a way that benefits the preferred candidate. As discussed in Chapter 2, stimuli perceived to be threatening to a given identity are most effective at activating (i.e., making salient) that identity and allowing it to become 'operable' within a relevant behavioral space (Jardina 2019; Kinder & Sears 1981; Proshansky et al. 1983; Stedman 2002). Though the social scientific literature identifying threat as a particularly powerful pathway to identity activation, just under a quarter (24%) of place-based strongly implied that the state was under threat. Aside from ads conveying a threat to place, ads in which candidates stress their own local roots and/or their opponents lack of such roots also represent a rather "blunt" treatment likely to activate place identity. Twenty percent of place appeals focus on candidate roots. Results in Table 4.2 show that, overall, ads stressing an opponent's lack of roots in the state (i.e., allegations that opposing candidate is a "carpet-bagger"

or outsider who is out of touch with the state) are much rarer than those that emphasize the favored candidate's roots in the district. One possible reason for this is that races featuring one candidate is from the state and another from outside the state may be relatively rare. Another possibility is that focusing on one's own roots is a nice way to introduce oneself to voters, whereas attacking an opponent's lack of roots may risk alienating a sizeable portion of voters, depending on the composition of the state/district. Subtler ways of priming place, such as symbolic shots of recognizable geographic features within the candidate's state (78%), as well as depictions of candidates physically present within those symbolic locales (56%), are more commonplace. Overall, results in Table 4.2 tell us that when candidates to appeal to place in their political ads, they are more likely to opt for a more subtle approach (for example, 58% of place appeals feature imagery as the sole place-based stimulus).

Table 4.2 Types of Place-based Ads

	Threat	Deep Roots	Carpetbagger	Candidate in Place	Symbolic Imagery
% of Place-based					
Ads with Feature	24%	20%	7%	56%	78%

According to my data, place appeals feature most often (46%) in ads that focus exclusively on the preferred candidate. Establishing a connection with constituents through a shared place-based identity then appears to be the most common goal of place-based ads, which makes good strategic sense since place-identity in many cases can serve as a non-politicized superordinate identity through which to expand one's base of support. Place appeals are least often (24%) used in pure attack ads (i.e., ads that focus solely on defaming the opposing candidate). As mentioned above, this may be because the most obvious line of place-based attack would be in those electoral contests in which the opposing candidate was born outside of the

state of the district and lacks strong roots. In states or districts that see a relatively large degree of in-migration, however, this line of attacks runs the risk of backfiring. Furthermore, without some contrast being drawn in the ad to inform the voter of why someone should care about something like candidate roots, these sorts of ads might strike voters as unfair and/or irrelevant. Contrast ads account for 30% of place appeals. Contrast ads provide campaigns a good deal of leverage in shaping the contours of what voters understand the election to be all about since they directly tie both candidates to a given topic. Contrast ads may therefore be the best ad type from a priming standpoint, if making a place a major dimension of the campaign is a desirable goal.

The last set of descriptive statistics pertain to partisanship and the urban-rural divide. Partisan differences are largely negligible. When looking at the total number of individual place-based ads, Republicans account for 52% of all place-based ads compared to Democrats' 48%. However, when one instead uses candidates (rather than individual ads) as the unit of analysis, Democratic candidates dedicated a slightly higher proportion of their overall number of advertisements to place appeals (41%) than Republicans (37%). Results of a two-sample T-test confirm that this difference is not significant ($p = 0.40$). These results suggest that place appeals are a tool of roughly equal importance to both parties. Regarding whether the place appeals seems to target mostly an urban or rural audience, results indicate that the vast majority (71%) of place appeals do *not* directly target either of these community types. Of the nearly three in ten place appeals that do target either urban or rural areas, however, 87% ($n = 258$) are focused on rural areas. In other words, the number of place appeals focused on rural places is nearly 7x that of urban focused ads. This is powerful evidence that rural voters are much more likely to be targeted on the basis of place than are urbanites – a fact of likely consequence to differences in the potency of place among urban and rural voters previously documented (e.g., Cramer 2016).

Explaining the Occurrence of Place-based Ads

To better understand the occurrence of place-based appeals, I used linear regression to model, at the candidate level, what factors predict the proportion of all ads that are place-based.⁴⁰ Overall, I include five predictors: partisan lean, partisanship, election competitiveness, state overall population (in thousands), and state population density. In addition to the aforementioned predictors, I also include state and election year fixed effects in the models. Each of the included predictors helps paint a more complete picture regarding the use of place appeals, as well as American electoral politics more broadly. The partisan lean measure, which gives a sense of the recent partisan loyalties of a state by taking a weighted combination of the last two presidential elections and most recent state legislature contests, will give us a sense of whether place appeals are more commonly deployed in political advertising when the candidates are running in more (or less) favorable states insofar as their partisan affiliation is concerned. To assess whether place-appeals are more (or less) common in competitive races, I include a binary variable (“Close Race” in Table 4.3) that indicates whether the race’s final margin of victory was five points or less. State population density is included to provide a sense of whether place-based appeals are more (or less) common in less densely populated states, which results discussed in the last section showing that place appeals to rural audiences are much more commonplace than those directed at urban audiences might suggest. State population is also included in the models to assess whether place-appeals are more common in more homogenous communities.⁴¹ Lastly,

⁴⁰ The unit of analysis is the proportion of all of a candidate’s advertisements that are place-based during a given election year.

⁴¹ Admittedly, state population is somewhat of a crude proxy for degree of social homogeneity. However, the measure suffices for the purposes of preliminary investigation, if one grants my strong assumption that as the number of people living in a given geographic category (state in this case) increases, so, too will its degree of social diversity.

including candidate partisanship in the model helps paint a more descriptively rich portrait of place in political advertising.

Results listed in Tale 4.3 provide an interesting picture of the role of place in contemporary campaigns. Regarding the degree of partisan conviviality that a state affords candidates, the party lean coefficient is insignificant, which suggests that place appeals are neither more nor less likely to occur in friendly versus hostile environments. While it is easy to imagine an associated advantage with “going local” or placing a great emphasis on place while campaigning in a state or district that leans toward the opposite party, these results suggest that campaigns do not pursue this tactic systematically across the country. With that said, however, it is important to remember that campaign advertisements are but one form of communication that politicians use to shape how voters see them – the strategic advantage of “going local” may be more pronounced (or at least perceived that way by candidates) in other communicative contexts, such as the digital homestyle, which I turn to near the end of this chapter.

Table 4.3 Predicting the Proportion of Place-based Ads

	Coefficient
Partisanship: Democrat	0.0551* (0.0261)
State Population Density	0.0200* (0.0042)
State Population	-0.0004* (0.0001)
Close Race	-0.1118* (0.0418)
Party Lean	0.0004 (0.0007)
Adjusted R ²	0.17

Regarding electoral competitiveness, close contests witness a significantly lower proportion of ads that feature place appeals than non-competitive races. An explanation of these results consistent with the nationalization hypothesis (Hopkins 2018) is that voters predominantly care about national partisan politics and, as such, candidates have an incentive to appeals to national issues that map cleanly onto the national partisan landscape in order that voters are able to receive a clear signal that will motivate them to vote. An alternative explanation, though, is that close elections garner a disproportionate amount of spending by outside groups, most of which are likely located outside of the state in which the election is taking place and who are, therefore, unlikely to have rich understanding of state level particularities necessary to create an effective place appeal. As outside groups spend enormous sums of money on ad buys in competitive states, the dominant narratives or frames of the election likely become more national in character, which would presumably cause the ads put out by the candidates' campaigns themselves to be more national in character so as to allow the campaigns to "respond" to ads put out by the "other side" (including both the opposing campaign as well as their various allies – both far flung and nearby alike).

Frequency statistics discussed in the previous section indicate that, of the subset of place appeals that are either urban or rural focused, rural place appeals were quite common. Based on this finding, one might suspect that place appeals are predominantly a rural state phenomenon. Results, however, do not support the notion that place appeals are more prevalent in rural states. In fact, results suggest that the opposite is true: as population density increases, so, too does the average proportion of campaign ads that are place-based. The groups and identity literature provides a compelling explanation for this finding. Namely, social and political psychologists have long known that group size is an important consideration in determining identity salience

and strength. Brewer (1991) developed optimal distinctiveness theory to account for the empirical regularity regarding relative group size and the strength of ingroup identity (Leonardelli, Pickett & Brewer 2010). In essence, group life revolves around two competing needs: 1.) a need to belong, and, 2.) a need to differentiate from others. Considering these two needs, the optimal group size for ensuring both relevance and strong identity can be thought of as a Goldilocks zone – neither too small nor too large. Groups that are too small are not ideal because they do not provide the requisite community for belongingness. Overly large groups, on the other hand, are not ideal because they do not readily provide an optimal level of differentiation. Considering the above, overwhelmingly rural states (i.e., those whose population density is very low) are likely not the optimal context in which to appeal to place identity because, in the contexts of these states, rural identity does not provide a high sense of differentiation. Similarly, appealing to rural identity may also be inefficient in high population density states where the rural share of the population (or those who identify as rural at least, appreciating that overlap between these categories is not perfect – see, Nemerever & Rogers n.d.) is particularly small and perhaps unable to provide a strong sense of community of belongingness to its members. Taken together with my descriptive finding that politicians appear more predisposed to court rural voters, optimal distinctiveness theory helps contextualize the negative relationship between state population density and the proportion of ads featuring place appeals.

Moving on to state population, results presented in Table 4.3 above indicate a significant positive association between population and the proportion of place-based ads that candidates develop. An intuitive explanation for this finding is that population is a rough proxy for diversity – of identities, ideologies, interests, and more. In *Federalist 10*, Madison made the case for the

“large republic” by arguing that a higher population would equate to a larger number of interests, which would ultimately mitigate the mischiefs of faction. While I am less concerned with the mischiefs of faction, I do make use of the same assumption regarding population size and the diversity of the social fabric, on average. Relative homogeneity is an important consideration here because it relates to the applicability of place identity as a superordinate identity. A highly diverse population should increase the likelihood that no predominant common conception of what a place identity entails for a given symbolic geography emerges. If competing ideas over what an identity entails become widespread, an identity loses its ability to be a binding superordinate identity and, along with it, its strategic value to politicians (Klar 2018). Lastly, results indicate that Democrats, on average and after controlling for the influence of other variables in the model, utilize place appeals at a higher rate in their advertising campaigns than do Republicans.

The analyses above provide a strong, if preliminary, investigation into the content and occurrence of place appeals in political advertising. Overall, place appeals are widespread, and their frequency remained steady across the four election cycles analyzed here. Moreover, because I focused on U.S. Senate elections and state level place identity, which I consider to be a “difficult case” insofar as establishing the political relevance of place is concerned, I am confident that place appeals are widespread among candidates competing for other elected offices, too (other than the presidency). There are limitations to the above analyses, however. The most major limitations are 1) my analysis does not account for how many times place appeals are run relative to non-place ads; 2) I do not explore contextual factors at the level of the media market that place appeals are more likely to be utilized in. Future research should address both drawbacks.

*The Effects of Urban and Rural Place Appeals*⁴²

Now that I have given a broad descriptive overview of what proportion of advertisements feature place-based appeals, what those appeals entail, and which contextual factors do (or do not) predict their deployment in campaigns, I turn briefly to investigate their effects. As a recap, Table 4.1 established that a clear minority of U.S. Senate advertisements appeal to place. I have also established that a majority of place-based ads appeal to place in a subtle way via imagery only. How effective are such appeals – can place-based imagery suffice as a meaningful cue to voters?

To address this question, I conducted a survey experiment. The experiment was programmed in LimeSurvey and features treatments “micro-tailored” to the respondent’s state of residence. Experimental stimuli were designed to mimic a simple mailer or banner advertisement of the sort that most voters encounter regularly during election season. The “mailers” used in this study feature a fictional candidate for U.S. Senate superimposed over a background that either depicts symbolic imagery from the respondent’s state or a plain background. Text, which reads “From Here, For Us! A Real Representative to Fix Washington! Smith for Senate. An Advocate for Taxpayers, Parents, and Excellence in Education”, is standardized across all conditions. Over 100 different stimuli were constructed, including an urban and rural place appeal for each state, as well as one control stimulus. It should be noted that the stimuli in this experiment involve a “single-shot” background imagery based manipulation and, therefore, represent what can be

⁴² A large portion of this subsection is based heavily on, or in some cases lifted wholly from, the first draft of a paper that would become Jacobs & Munis (2018) that I solo-authored on election day 2016, while in transit from Charlottesville, VA to Portland, OR. Upon landing in Portland, I had completed roughly 85% of the paper, but took a break to travel across town to where I was staying and then watched, in a bar full of sobbing anarchists, Donald Trump be declared the winner of the 2016 election (a feat he accomplished mainly due to a dramatic overperformance, relative to benchmarks, in rural America – particularly the rural Midwest). After taking in the ensuing riots for an hour or two, I returned to my friend’s apartment to finish up the paper and sent it to my panel discussant for the 2016 Pacific Northwest Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting. As a side note, writing a paper start to finish in 6 to 8 hrs is a feat that I wish I could pull off much more regularly.

considered a subtle treatment. I assume that any significant effects detected in using a subtle treatment such as this would be stronger in contexts wherein stronger place appeals are deployed.

As noted above, treatment conditions were micro-tailored to each of the fifty U.S. states. This was necessary because place-based social identities are shaped by the distinctive places that subjects are attached to. Rural stimuli were constructed by superimposing an image of a fictitious candidate and generic slogan onto an image of the largest national or state park within each state. The rationale for choosing state and national parks is that the types scenery captured by such photos is likely to be generally representative of the types of geography that are symbolically significant to rural people within each state. Urban stimuli were constructed by superimposing a photo of the fictitious candidate and accompanying slogan onto an image of the skyline of the largest city in each state. The control condition is devoid of geographic imagery entirely.

In total, 879 subjects were recruited for the study on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), in late September of 2016. Respondents took, on average, 3.8 minutes to complete the short survey and were compensated \$0.40 for their efforts. Sample demographics, which are provided in Table A4.2 in the Appendix, are similar to most MTurk studies in that the sample is younger, more Democratic, and better educated than the American population and nationally representative surveys such as the ANES. However, demographics within urban and rural subsamples are more 'representative' *prima facie* than the overall sample.⁴³ For instance, as one would expect, the rural sample was much whiter, more Republican, and less educated than the urban subsample.

⁴³ Urban and rural in this sentence refer to where respondents identified as living, *not* the condition they were randomly assigned to.

Figure 4.1 Example Stimuli for Each Experimental Condition




Note: Example stimuli for Kentucky. Top Left: Rural condition; Top Right: Urban condition. Bottom: Control condition.

Respondents were first asked to indicate their favorability toward the fictional candidate using a sliding scale feeling thermometer running from 0-100. Because I am primarily interested in how candidates are evaluated in a way that would matter for election outcomes, I collapsed the feeling thermometer responses to create a dichotomous measure of approval: respondents who set the feeling thermometer at 50 or above were coded as approving of the candidate, whereas those whose feeling thermometer rating was below 50 were coded as disapproving of the candidate. Using a logistic generalized linear model, I regressed the binary approval measure onto the treatment variable, respondent urban-rural identity, and an interaction of these two variables. I assess this interaction effect because, unlike in many experimental contexts, I am not interested in the average treatment effect (which, predictably, were null in this case). Rather, I am

interested in heterogeneous treatment effects in this case because my theoretical model holds that place appeals are relevant to politics because they activate place identities, and how voters respond to a place appeal depends in some cases, such as in the context of this study where urban and rural place appeals are used, on the place identity that they hold. In other words, we should not expect urbanites and ruralites to respond to an urban place appeal in the same way. While urbanites may react favorably to such an appeal, ruralites will likely respond unfavorably (Cramer 2016).

Figure 4.2 Marginal Heterogeneous Treatment Effects



Results plotted in Figure 4.2 show that, compared to very urban respondents who saw a rural place appeal, very urban respondents exposed to an urban place appeal were, on average, significantly *more likely* to approve of the fictional candidate. Specifically, very urban respondents in the urban treatment condition were 13% more likely to approve of the candidate

than very urban respondents in the rural condition. Rural and very rural respondents exposed to the urban place appeal were, on average, significantly *less likely* to approve of the candidate than were those exposed to the rural appeal. Very rural respondents in the urban treatment condition were 21% less likely to support the candidate than very rural respondents in the rural condition, while rural respondents in the urban condition were 14% less likely to support the candidate than rural respondents in the rural condition. Results presented here shed light on the strategic value of place appeals. In states or districts with a substantial proportion of rural voters, vilifying the opposing candidate as a snobbish city slicker – or someone otherwise out of touch with the hinterland – could be electorally beneficial. On the other hand, connecting with voters via a mutual urban place identity in districts with a relatively high urban population share could also be an effective strategy.

Big picture wise, these results are important in two major respects. First, they provide strong evidence that even subtle place appeals, such as those that only feature symbolic imagery rather than using blunter and more powerful themes, such as threatening frames or narratives pertaining to candidate roots, have a causal impact on how voters evaluate candidates. Second, these results provide evidence that place matters for both urban and rural voters, though slightly more for rural voters, which is consistent with previous qualitative research (Cramer 2016).

Talk Local to Me: Place and the Digital Homestyle

Evidence from political advertisements show that place-appeals are commonplace throughout the country during campaign season and are an effective way of courting voters. However, members of Congress are nearly *always* trying to put their best foot forward to voters, not just during campaign season. Indeed, while reelection may not be legislators' only goal, it is best understood as their primary goal since all others goals they might have depend on its regular

realization (Mayhew 1974). To pursue this first order priority, legislators engage in a perpetual marketing campaign aimed at selling themselves to the electorate. To accomplish this goal, they claim credit for new laws they believe will be appreciated by a majority of their constituents (Mayhew 1974; Grimmer 2013), engage in “advertising” – including by valorizing purely symbolic gestures, such as introducing doomed legislation (King 1997; Mayhew 1974), share details from their personal lives, such as the hobbies they enjoy, to make themselves appear relatable (Goggin 2016; Parker 2014), and go to great lengths to portray themselves as knowledgeable about and well-plugged into their constituency (Ansolabehere et al. 2000; Grimmer 2013). Politicians increasingly rely on social media to accomplish these tasks. In this chapter’s final study, I explore what percentage of Congress members’ Facebook content is localized or place-based, as well as what factors account for the variation in its prevalence from one member to the next.

Members of Congress (MCs) often cultivate a “home-style” consistent with the place-based identities of their constituents. In essence, the term home-style refers to the ways in which MCs conduct and project themselves while at home in their constituencies (Fenno 1978). Relevant to my interests in this chapter, it has been found that “place shapes the narratives and manners in which candidates aim to connect with constituents” (Parker 2014, p. 246). In other words, evoking a shared sense of place via references to issues particular to the constituency, as well as to common understandings and values rooted in the geographical elements within it, are ways that MCs can incorporate place into their home-styles.

Homestyle encapsulates three main functions– the presentation of self, district resource allocation decisions (e.g., where are district offices located), and framing one’s legislative priorities and activities in D.C (Fenno 1978). In the age of social media, two of these three

functions can be carried out online. Whether on Facebook, Twitter or Snapchat, MCs and other politicians use social media to connect with their constituents by curating a feed of textual posts, photos, and videos meant to construct an image both of who they are as an individual person as well as an elected representative. Furthermore, candidates' social media feeds are, on the whole, easier to access than the parts that comprise the non-digital homestyle. A few minutes worth of searching and scrolling allows constituents to gather a wealth of information on the recent happenings of their representatives involving both work, play, and everything in between – everything that the candidate thinks will make a favorable impression with the largest possible swath of voters, that is. While certainly still a possibility, it would take considerably more time and effort for constituents to track down the press releases, newspaper articles covering events that their representatives attended in the district, and other content (not to mention having to actually attend the events in person rather than tune in on Facebook Live) that comprise the traditional non-digital homestyle. All of the above suggests that the same strategic decision calculus that goes into the non-digital homestyle likely also applies to the digital homestyle and, as such, MCs' social media feeds are an optimal data source for studying how candidates strategically present themselves to voters.

As the final empirical investigation in this chapter, I examine and explain the occurrence of place-based content on MCs's Facebook pages. To do so, I make use of a dataset published by Pew Research.⁴⁴ The dataset features information regarding the content of MC's Facebook posts during the 114th and 115th congresses. In all, the data encapsulates members from both the U.S.

⁴⁴ The dataset is called "Congressional Rhetoric on Facebook (2015-2017) Estimated Support, Opposition, and Local Topics Dataset." The dataset was last accessed on 06/18/2020 at: <https://www.people-press.org/dataset/congressional-rhetoric-on-facebook-2015-2017-estimated-support-opposition-and-local-topics/> . A methodological summary regarding these data was accessed on 06/18/2020 at <https://www.people-press.org/2018/07/18/methodology-93/> .

House and U.S. Senate and features 1,068 rows, where each row corresponds to the official Facebook account of an MC within a given congress. Of the three variables in the Pew Dataset, I only make use of one: local topics percentage. This variable is a measure of the proportion each MCs' posts total number of Facebook posts that are place-centered (i.e., they mention "local topics"). According to Pew, their coders (which were used to train a machine learning classification algorithm) were instructed to code posts as featuring place-based content if "the post concerned a specific local event, institution, organization or individual."⁴⁵ To make the dataset useful for multivariate analysis, my research assistant, Nicole Huffman, and I merged in various variables corresponding to each congress member, such as partisanship, whether they were born in the district, DW-Nominate measures, 538 partisan lean metric, and other variables.⁴⁶

Basic Patterns of Place-based Rhetoric on Congress Members' Social Media Pages


In the 114th and 115th congresses, the average proportion of place-based Facebook posts for all MCs was 0.46 ($\sigma = 0.15$) or 46%. This proportion is much greater than the average proportion of political ads that are place-based for all Senators (39%), which I discussed earlier in the chapter. A two-sample T-test revealed that the average proportion of place-based posts were significantly higher in the 114th congress ($\mu = 0.48$, $\sigma = 0.14$) than in the 115th congress ($\mu = 0.43$, $\sigma = 0.15$), $t(1066) = 5.55$, $p = 0.00$. The five-point difference between the two congresses is considerable. I speculate that the difference may be due in part to the heightened divisiveness and intensity of focus on the White House since President Trump was elected (recall that the 115th congress corresponds to 2017 and 2018, the first two years of Trump's presidency). From

⁴⁵ <https://www.people-press.org/2018/07/18/methodology-93/>

⁴⁶ My dear friend and colleague Richard Burke also assisted in helping me track down and merge in DW-Nominate scores.

his virulently racist remarks regarding the events of August 2017 in Charlottesville, VA, to his misogynistic comments directed toward Dr. Christine Blasey Ford and numerous other women, to investigations into his campaign's malfeasance during the 2016 election, and beyond, Trump dominated headlines during the 115th congress to an unusual degree. Trump's newsfeed inundation likely forced MCs to spend an inordinate amount of time reacting to the president and other national events, at the expense of place centered content. This interpretation is supported by the data: the average proportion of place-based posts among Republican MCs stayed roughly the same at ~48% in both congresses, while the average proportion among Democratic MCs plummeted from 49% in the 114th congress to 37% in the 115th congress. This asymmetric temporal trend leads to the overall partisan difference in the whole sample being significant between Republican ($\mu = 0.48$, $\sigma = 0.13$) and Democrats ($\mu = 0.43$, $\sigma = 0.16$), $t = 5.53$, $p = 0.00$.

Figure 4.3 Place and the Digital Homestyle in the 114th and 115th Congresses



Comparing chambers, the average proportion for U.S. House members ($\mu = 0.47$, $\sigma = 0.14$) was significantly higher than among U.S. Senators ($\mu = 0.42$, $\sigma = 0.16$), $t = 4.60$, $p = 0.00$. This difference is not especially surprising since, aside from the seven states with only a single U.S. House district, Senators' constituencies are considerably larger both geographically and in terms of population size than those of U.S. House members. These differences in geographical and population size have been found to relate to differences in representational style that lead to, amongst other things, less of an onus on needing to appear in tune with every development – political or otherwise – that takes place on the ground in the constituency (Crespin & Finocchiaro 2013; Fenno 1998; Lee 2004; Miller 1990; Parker & Goodman 2013).

Table 4.4 Congress Members Who Reference Local Topics the Most and Least by Congress

114 th Top 5	114 th Bottom 5	114 th Top 5	114 th Bottom 5	115 th Top 5	115 th Bottom 5	115 th Top 5	115 th Bottom 5
<u>House Members</u>	<u>House Members</u>	<u>Senators</u>	<u>Senators</u>	<u>House Members</u>	<u>House Members</u>	<u>Senators</u>	<u>Senators</u>
Chris Gibson (<i>R-NY 19</i>): 0.85	Alan Grayson (<i>D-FL 9</i>): 0.13	Thomas Carper (<i>D-DE</i>): 0.79	Jeff Sessions (<i>R-AZ</i>): 0.10	Dana Rohrabacher (<i>R-CA 48</i>): 0.80	Nancy Pelosi (<i>D-CA 12</i>): 0.06	John Hoeven (<i>R-ND</i>): 0.77	Rand Paul (<i>R-KY</i>): 0.06
Filemon Vela (<i>D-TX 34</i>): 0.81	Nancy Pelosi (<i>D-CA 12</i>): 0.13	Heidi Heitkamp (<i>D-ND</i>): 0.77	Bernie Sanders (<i>I-VT</i>): 0.12	Ryan Zinke (<i>R-MT</i>): 0.75	Maxine Waters (<i>D-CA 43</i>): 0.07	Lisa Murkowski (<i>R-AK</i>): 0.68	Bernie Sanders (<i>I-VT</i>): 0.10
Dwight Evans (<i>D-PA 2</i>): 0.79	Paul Ryan (<i>R-WI 1</i>): 0.14	Joe Donnelly (<i>D-IN</i>): 0.76	Harry Reid (<i>D-NV</i>): 0.16	Kurt Schrader (<i>D-OR 5</i>): 0.72	Jerrold Nadler (<i>D-NY 10</i>): 0.08	Heidi Heitkamp (<i>D-ND</i>): 0.68	Brian Schatz (<i>D-HI</i>): 0.11
John Mica (<i>R-FL 7</i>): 0.79	John Boehner (<i>R-OH 8</i>): 0.14	Joe Manchin III (<i>D-WV</i>): 0.75	Johnny Isakson (<i>R-GA</i>): 0.17	Dave Loebsack (<i>D-IA 2</i>): 0.72	Eliot Engel (<i>D-NY 16</i>): 0.09	Jerry Moran (<i>R-KS</i>): 0.68	Patty Murray (<i>D-WA</i>): 0.13
Tim Walz (<i>D-MN 1</i>): 0.78	Jim Bridenstine (<i>R-OK 1</i>): 0.15	John Hoeven (<i>R-ND</i>): 0.72	Rand Paul (<i>R-KY</i>): 0.18	Glenn Thompson (<i>R-PA 5</i>): 0.71	Jim Bridenstine (<i>R-OK 1</i>): 0.11	Joe Manchin III (<i>D-WV</i>): 0.66	Patrick Leahy (<i>D-VT</i>): 0.16

Interestingly, MCs who were born in the district that they represent post a significantly higher proportion of place centered content ($\mu = 0.47$, $\sigma = 0.15$) than MCs who were not born in their district ($\mu = 0.45$, $\sigma = 0.15$), $t = 2.10$, $p = 0.04$. Intuitively, this makes sense and, as we will see in Chapter 5, is vindicating evidence for why many people support homegrown candidates –

a belief that they are more in touch with and invested in the districts that they represent. Bivariate relationships rarely tell the full story, however, and whether this result holds in the multivariate model presented in the next section will be a much stronger test regarding whether homegrown candidates are more place focused in their representational style.

Predicting Place-based Rhetoric on Congress Members' Social Media Pages

Like political advertising, politicians (or, more likely, their staffs) make strategic choices regarding what to post about on Facebook and how to frame that content for constituents. The volume of posts referencing local topics – i.e., place-based posts – is a strategic political decision, or more accurately the summation of a long list of political decisions made each time a post is made. While the descriptive analyses presented in previous subsection give us a strong sense of how strongly place features in the digital homestyle overall, they do little to inform regarding which contexts place features more or less prominently. To answer this question, I estimated a multivariate linear regression model using the proportion of Facebook posts featuring local/place-based topics as the dependent measure.

For predictors, the model includes a binary variable indicating whether the MC was born in their district, a continuous measure of the partisan lean of the member's district, a binary variable indicating whether the MC is a moderate legislator, and MC partisanship, as well as congress and chamber fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the congress and chamber levels. The model was estimated using the 'fixest' package in R (Bergé 2018). Legislators were classified as moderates if they fell within the third (i.e., middle) quintile on DW-NOMINATE's first dimension (Poole & Rosenthal 1997). As for partisan lean, as in the political advertising data, I used 538's Partisan Lean measure, which I recoded so that, for each MC, positive values

indicate that the district is more favorable toward their party, whereas negative values convey the opposite.

Results, which are listed in Table 4.5, indicate that, on average, homegrown MCs and ideological moderates post a significantly higher share of place-based posts to their Facebook feeds, whereas representing a district that is more favorable to your party is associated with a significantly lower share of place-centered posts, on average. No significant relationship emerged with respect to MC partisanship. Each of these uncovered relationships tell an interesting story and further our understanding of representation in the United States. I explain the significance of each of these findings in turn.

Table 4.5 Predicting the Proportion of Place-based Posts in Congress Members' Facebook Feeds

	Coefficient
Partisanship: Democrat	-0.0270 (0.0473)
Homegrown Candidate	0.0222* (0.0063)
Ideology: Moderate	0.0607* (0.0212)
Party Lean	-0.0021* (0.0001)
Adjusted R ²	0.19
N	1,068

First, regarding homegrown candidates, widely held beliefs that rooted candidates are more likely to exhibit an understanding of and willingness to address local needs are supported (Tavits 2010; Valdini & Suominen 2005). Even after accounting for member party, ideology, and how partisan-friendly their district tends to be, homegrown MCs post a two percentage points

higher proportion of local or place-based posts to their official Facebook feed, on average, than MCs born outside the districts there were elected to represent. While some have decried preferences for homegrown candidates as bordering on xenophobic, these findings suggest that homegrown candidates do systematically differ, at least in some respects, in terms of their representational style.⁴⁷


Second, results indicate that moderates' average proportion of place-based social media posts is, on average, six percentage points greater than that of more ideologically extreme members. This finding squares nicely with other studies in the representation literature that, for instance, show that moderate legislators are more likely to pursue pork, credit claim, and avoid partisan discourse where possible (Grimmer 2013a, 2013b; Radford & Sinclair 2016). Because I control for the partisan lean of the district, confidence that moderates' more non-partisan representational style is shaped to a great extent by forces not directly related to the overall partisan persuasion of the district.

Lastly, the party lean coefficient sheds important new light on how vulnerable legislators navigate the digital homestyle. The relationship is plotted in Figure 4.4. Results strongly suggest that legislators who represent districts that favor the opposite party in presidential and state legislative elections, such as Montana's Jon Tester (D) or West Virginia's Joe Manchin III (D), compensate for this by localizing their digital homestyle. In other words, more vulnerable members shield themselves by disengaging, relatively speaking, from ideological and partisan posts regarding the national issues of the day and instead opt to post more about local goings on in the constituency. That this relationship exists even after controlling for membership ideology

⁴⁷ For example, see: <https://www.mtpr.org/post/infrastructure-attack-ads-and-conrad-burns-legacy>

is particularly noteworthy, as it suggests that simply localizing one's presentation of self and her legislative activities may provide enough cover to allow members to vote their true preferences, tow the party line, etc. In other words, vulnerable members may not necessarily need to moderate their voting behavior so long as they localize the presentation of their record. That said, this study only documents that this tactic has been deployed in recent congresses and does not speak whatsoever to its effectiveness – a question that future work should evaluate directly.

Figure 4.4 Place-based Digital Homestyle by Partisan Lean in the 114th and 115th Congress



Note: Bivariate linear relationship. The red vertical bar at 0 on the x-axis represents a completely neutral or balanced district in terms of a weighted average of presidential and state legislative partisanship, per 538's Partisan Lean metric.

Conclusion

This chapter has established that place appeals, whether found in political advertising or in social media posts authored on behalf of members of Congress, play a considerable role in political communication in the United States. In political ads, place appeals prime place identity both implicitly and explicitly through rhetoric and/or imagery conveying variously that their place is under threat and that the favored candidate is the one to address that threat, that the favored candidate shares and values a mutual place identity with constituents, or that the opposing candidates does not understand or value the place identity(ies) of the district. My experimental evidence shows that these appeals, even in their most subtle form, are effective in shaping public opinion. Scaled up both in terms of volume and treatment power, I have no reason to suspect that these advertisements would not prove impactful in real world elections.

This chapter also shows that place appeals comprise a higher proportion of representatives' posts than they take up as a proportion of political ads. My investigation of place in the digital homestyle revealed several important findings regarding contemporary representation. First, legislators born in their district reference local topics at a significantly higher average rate than legislators not born in the district. Second, more intensely place centered representational styles appear to be a strategy deployed by MCs who represent districts that are inhospitable to mildly hospitable toward their party. Legislators, in other words, appear to believe that "going local" allows them to distance themselves from their party's brand and cultivate a personal vote anchored in place. Third, there is some preliminary evidence that national level politics can encroach upon and lessen place focused representation under some conditions, such as when Democratic MCs' average digital homestyle pivoted sharply away from place in the first two years of the Trump administration, while Republicans stayed the course.

For an identity to exert behavioral effects, it must be salient. For an identity to become salient, it must be primed by some environmental stimuli. In politics, the most widespread and useful stimuli typically take the form of various forms of political communication, whether yard signs, online banner ads, televised political advertisements, opinion articles, social media posts, etc. This chapter has demonstrated that place-based appeals are widespread, impactful, and correlated with characteristics of MCs and the districts that they represent. Since place appeals enjoy some degree of prominence in contemporary politics, we should expect place to also influence public opinion and political behavior, a topic to which I turn in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Place and Voting

As shown in Chapter 4, candidates across the United States continue to draw on place in their political advertising and digital homestyle in order to appear more proximate (both figuratively and literally) to their constituents. Further, chapter 4 showed that place-based appeals appear to resonate with some voters. What effect, however, does place have on voter preferences in a more complex decision space? Do voters care, for instance, about place-based candidate attributes when other considerations, such as partisanship, are present as well? And, beyond candidate attributes, how do place-based attitudes – namely place resentment – factor in to vote choice?

In this chapter, I investigate whether place matters for American electoral politics. I approach this topic from two primary angles, and this chapter deals with each in turn. The first angle is candidate centered, involving the place-based characteristics of candidates (e.g., biographic details such where the candidate was born, accent, etc.) that influence voters. The candidate centered angle, in other words, assumes that there are varying elements of candidates' profiles that are related to place and that these place-based elements may matter to voters. In the empirical tests in the first half of this chapter, I test whether one place-based characteristic, candidate roots (i.e., birthplace), seems to matter to voters and whether there is any evidence that such characteristics might be especially meaningful to those who harbor a strong sense of place identity. The second angle is voter centered, involving whether voters' place-based attitudes (i.e., place resentment) are systematically related to partisan politics, including electoral contests. In the latter half of this chapter, I use nationally representative survey data to assess whether urban, suburban, and rural resentments toward the 'place-based other' are capable of predicting how

voters feel toward the parties, as well as which party they voted for in the 2018 midterm elections.

Results indicate that even in an age of partisan polarization and nationalization, voters care about the place-based attributes of political candidates – showing a clear preference for candidates born in their state. While this preference is especially pronounced in decision tasks that mirror primary elections (i.e., when candidate partisanship is not a competing consideration), it remains significant even after partisanship is considered. I also show that place matters in American electoral politics beyond the background characteristics of candidates running for office. Feelings of deprivation pertaining to how Americans understand the relative (in)equality of urban, suburban, and rural communities, predicts attitudes toward the parties, as well as vote choice in the 2018 midterms.

Candidate Centered Angle: Preferences for Locally Rooted Candidates in the Age of Hyper-Partisanship and Nationalization

Previous research has identified particularistic candidate attributes as being of notable importance in single member “first past the post” electoral districts (Cain et al. 1987; Carey & Shugart 1995; Popkin 1994). This has been especially true in the United States, where candidate characteristics are often front and center—at times even perhaps more salient in voters’ minds than party labels (Hunt n.d.; Michelson 2005; Parker 2014). Generally, scholars understand this importance to be rooted in political psychology. A candidate’s local roots can serve as an information short-cut suggesting that the candidate may be better attuned to local issues and concerns (Tavits 2010), and a local candidate may also prime respondents’ place identities, thus activating in-group vs. out-group considerations that could alter election outcomes (Collignon & Sajuria 2018). Recent news coverage and scholarly work (e.g., Parker 2014) pertaining to Congressional elections in the United States has suggested that local roots may still be an

effective way of garnering votes, with recent high profile cases of this strategy including the political campaigns of Joe Manchin in West Virginia, Jon Tester in Montana, and Abby Finkenauer in Iowa (amongst many others).

However, while local roots and the politics of place may have been an important force in American politics in the past (e.g., Key 1949), there is reason to question whether this is still the case. Two trends—partisan polarization and the nationalization of political discourse—that have characterized our recent political epoch may both threaten the role of non-partisan geographically particular considerations, such as candidate roots. Why this is the case becomes clear when one thinks about the nature of polarization and nationalization. Partisan polarization in the mass electorate has been conceptualized variously as involving either a growing ideological gulf between adherents of the two parties (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008), or a growing mutual disdain for members of the opposite party, despite marginal changes in ideological composition of the mass electorate (Fiorina et al. 2005; Iyengar et al. 2012). Both conceptualizations of polarization imply a diminished role for non-partisan considerations in elections, such as place, since increasing partisan divergence (whether ideologically or socially) should equate to partisanship becoming more meaningful to voters. Similarly, because nationalization can be defined as the predominance of national partisan considerations in the evaluation of politics at every level, from fence viewer (a local elected office in Massachusetts, Vermont, and Nebraska) to President of the United States (Hopkins 2018), considerations that do not feature as part of the national partisan discourse are, in theory, pushed to the margins of relevance.

If local considerations, such as candidate roots, do still matter, we should expect that they are most likely to matter to those individuals who identify strongly with where they live. Though

the relationship between place identity and politics is understudied as a whole, existing work suggests that place identity may be a key driver of political participation (Panagopoulos et al. 2017; Wong 2010), as well as how individuals interpret politics and situate themselves within socio-political hierarchies (Cramer 2016). Apart from the expected positive association between place identity and a preference for candidate roots in the current study, I focus on place-based identities in this chapter because, if local considerations are to matter both currently and in the future, it is likely among the highly place-identified that they will continue to be a central concern moving forward, despite the forces of nationalization and partisan polarization.

Concerning place-based candidate characteristics, I make two central arguments in this chapter. First, I argue that candidate roots are still an important consideration to voters, both when individuals are asked directly about candidate roots, as well as when respondents reveal their preferences when considering candidate roots alongside numerous other information criteria, including partisanship. Secondly, I argue that, while respondents will on the whole express a preference for candidates with local roots, those high in place identity will be especially likely to express this preference. To support these arguments, I undertake a mixture of observational and conjoint experimental analyses. I find that, on average, respondents indicate a preference for homegrown candidates in both single dimension survey tasks (where respondents are asked directly to assess candidate roots) and multidimensional conjoint tasks (where candidates choose their preferred candidate based on a litany of randomly generated information, including partisanship, candidate roots, and a host of other categories). In addition, my evidence shows that those who identify strongly with place are especially likely to endorse the importance and desirability of candidate roots, irrespective of where they live along the urban-rural

spectrum. These results provide strong evidence that candidate roots remain an important and enduring heuristic utilized by contemporary American voters.

One of Us: Preferences for Rooted Candidates

Investigation of local advantages enjoyed by native sons and daughters running for political office represents a rich and well-developed area of inquiry in political science. Such research was initially undertaken by V.O. Key in *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949), who argued that Southern voters in the early twentieth century were prone to distinguishing among candidates along geographic lines rather than policy ones. Key noted that this “friends-and-neighbors” voting was especially pronounced in the home counties of candidates, with decaying effects in neighboring and more distant counties. At the time of his writing, Key’s observations provided a major insight into electoral behavior and pushed back against the notion popular during the period that voters were singularly preoccupied with partisanship and policy when evaluating candidates.

Following Key’s pathbreaking work, a bevy of scholars extended the friends and neighbors model to contexts beyond the South. Across a broad array of contexts, ranging from local contests to American presidential elections, a voluminous amount of evidence was uncovered in support of Key’s (1949) claim that residency and proximity were primary determinants of candidate support: a candidate garners support “not primarily for what he stands for or because of his capacities, but because of where he lives” (37). Research finds that at the presidential level, candidates receive up to a four-point boost in their home states (Lewis-Beck & Rice 1983). Similarly, vice presidential tickets garner an additional three percentage points on average in their home states (Heersink & Peterson 2016). An abundance of evidence has also been found in investigations of state-wide contests (Gimpel, et al. 2008; Bowler, Donovan, and

Snipp 1993; Aspin & Hall 1987) and local elections (Brunk et al. 1988; Johnston 1974; Tatalovich 1975). Meredith (2013) suggests that the electoral effects of the friends and neighbors vote can spillover to other races, specifically finding that local candidates running for high profile state level races influence vote share for their co-partisans in down ballot races. Most recently, Panagopoulos, Leighley, and Hamel (2017) have argued that place clearly matters for mobilization - when candidates and citizens share a “home county,” individuals are more motivated to turn out to vote.⁴⁸

On the whole, this literature suggests that, at least at one time, a desire for descriptive representation extended beyond considerations such as gender, race, and ethnicity to include place identity (Childs & Cowley 2011). Consistent with descriptive representation more broadly, it is assumed that many desire local candidates due to the belief that local candidates are more likely to understand local needs and, thus, be more likely to address those needs (Shugart, Valdini & Suominen 2005; Tavits 2010). While there is some reason to believe that a preference for local candidates may be most impactful in single member districts, given how central candidate personalities are in such races, local preferences have been documented in other electoral systems as well, suggesting that this may be a more universal preference (Carey & Shugart 1995; Childs & Cowley 2011; Collignon & Sajuria 2018; Jankowski 2016).

Owing to the preponderance of evidence accumulated in the friends and neighbors literature, there can be little doubt that homegrown candidates enjoyed an electoral advantage, whether via mobilization or persuasion, throughout the American patchwork during the twentieth century. Whether this advantage exists today, as well as whether it is due to a genuine preference

⁴⁸ Recently, these results have been replicated and extended—see Panagopoulos and Bailey (2019).

for local candidates (rather than a spurious result owed to endogenous factors, such as canvassing advantages) is less clear. This ambiguity is partially due to relatively little research being conducted on this question in recent years. As importantly, however, are considerations that, to some, may cast the continued relevance of friends and neighbors voting into doubt, namely partisan polarization (Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2018) and a recent trend toward nationalization (Hopkins 2018). Indeed, as the world continues to “shrink” and as the forces of globalization and nationalization bear down on our social and political lives, prominent scholars have dismissed the need for thinking about contextual factors of political behavior (Hopkins 2018; King 1996). It should also be noted that scholars have not been alone in their suspicion that the role of geography and physical proximity in shaping political behavior is diminishing.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, a nascent literature conceptualizing place as a form of social identity has emerged that suggests that establishing a candidate’s place-based bonafides can be instrumental in capturing the hearts and minds of some voters, particularly amongst the rural population (Cramer 2016; Jacobs & Munis 2018; Parker 2014).

In this chapter, I undertake a fresh investigation of friends and neighbors voting in an age of national partisan polarization. Using observational data, I employ logistic regression to

⁴⁹ As an illustrative case, the 2016 gubernatorial election in Montana pitted Democratic incumbent and Montana native, Steve Bullock, against Greg Gianforte, a Californian who spent considerable time living in New Jersey. The Montana Democrats successfully framed Gianforte as an outsider who was out of touch with Montanans on issues that mattered most to them, chiefly the right to access public land for recreation, though political observers disagreed as to whether it mattered much to voters—some arguing that this framing helped carry Bullock to a narrow win over his Republican challenger in a year where Trump won the state by over 20 points, while others maintained that candidates’ place of birth mattered not to voters. For an overview of Democrats’ efforts to play up their candidate’s in-state roots to voters and a take on the role it may have played in the 2016 Montana gubernatorial election, see: David Greene, “A Singing Cowboy, A Millionaire, and Rifles Dominate Montana Special Election,” NPR News. URL: <http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=526349463>, Editorial Board, “Remember Why Gianforte Lost Nov. 8,” Billings Gazette. URL: http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/mailbag/remember-whygianforte-lost-nov/article_a500ce8f-4374-591f-a1b6-44b3bfb5cb6b.html. Note, however, that Montana Public Radio reporter, Chuck Johnson, repeatedly cast doubt on the importance of candidate place of birth; see, for example (beginning at around 3:00): <http://mtpr.org/post/infrastructure-attack-ads-and-conrad-burns-legacy>

explain variation in attitudes regarding the importance of candidate birthplace. Then, using a conjoint experiment, I assess whether voters exhibit a preference for “homegrown candidates” in the face of other considerations known to be determinative of vote choice, such as partisanship. My results show that, despite partisan polarization and the forces of nationalization, preferences for local candidates remain a phenomenon worthy of consideration by public opinion scholars and others.

Heuristics and Voting

Dating back to the early behavioral studies pioneered by the Columbia and Michigan schools, perhaps the most consistent, near axiomatic finding in political science has been that the mass public apparently possesses a low level of political knowledge, on average (Achen & Bartels 2016; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). However, research has also found that even low-information voters are able to make decisions efficiently by relying upon cognitive short-cuts, also referred to variously as cues or heuristics (Downs 1957; Mondak 1993; Popkin 1994). In the context of candidate evaluation, heuristics allow voters to venture a reasonable guess as to what the various candidates stand for, with far less than complete information (Lupia & McCubbins 1998—though, see Achen and Bartels 2018).

Without a doubt, the most powerful heuristic for voters in the candidate evaluation process is partisanship. In a world in which the parties are sorted and increasingly polarized on ideological grounds, partisan labels provide voters information regarding the broad contours of candidates’ policy preferences. Apart from its overtly political quality, partisanship is a powerful political heuristic owing to the fact that party identification serves for many as a stable social

identity for many voters (Green et al. 2002), and increasingly one that acts a sort of super-identity encompassing multiple group memberships (Mason 2018).

While partisanship is the most important heuristic that voters rely on, it is not the only heuristic that voters use to choose among candidates. Prior research has identified a number of other candidate identity related traits that function as useful information shortcuts, including ethnicity and race (Brady & Sniderman 1985; Bullock 1994; McDermott 1998), gender (McDermott 1997, 1998; Ono & Burden 2018), class (Carnes & Sadin 2015; Sadin 2014), and job experience (Atkeson & Hamel 2018; Bond et al. 1997; Kirkland & Coppock 2018). Group identities serve as a heuristic because they allow individuals to infer that the candidate will think like them, or perhaps safeguard the interests of the group. Apart from a few recent exceptions, scholars have largely overlooked how peoples' place identity (i.e., psychological attachments to the where they live, work, and play that comprise a key component of individuals' sense of self) could serve as a useful political heuristic. Considering that geographical identities serve as a fundamental way for individuals to distinguish themselves from others (Agnew 2014; Cramer 2016; Wong 2010), as well as evidence that many voters assume homegrown candidates to be better at understanding local (and, thus, "their") problems and needs (Tavits 2010), I examine more carefully how place can serve as a heuristic in the candidate evaluation process.

Place Identity and Localism in Political Psychology

Previous studies suggest that voters use candidate related place-based cues when determining who to vote for (Collignon & Sajuria 2018; Hunt n.d.; Key 1949; Parker 2014). Campaigns also appear to make explicit and strategic appeals to place in order to entice voters (Cramer 2016; Jacobs & Munis 2018; Parker 2014). Place acts as a heuristic because it serves as the basis for social identity. Social identities are group attachments that comprise an essential

component of individuals' sense of self (Tajfel 1981). Place identity (or place-based identity) differentiates people from one another by signaling that "we" live here, while "others" live elsewhere. Moreover, place identity provides individuals with a sense of security and informs their behavior (Cramer 2016; Lalli 1992; Proshansky et al. 1983; Tamir 1995; Stedman 2002). As outlined in Chapter 2, place identities, like many other identities such as ethnicity or gender, are not inherently political identities. However, if activated by environmental stimuli, they can become politically salient temporarily. Previous research has shown that, once activated, place identity can be important regarding both mobilization (Panagopoulos & Bailey 2019; Panagopoulos et al. 2017; Wong 2010) and vote choice (Collignon & Sajuria 2018; Parker 2014). From the above, two hypotheses can be proposed:

Hypothesis 1: On average, respondents will prefer homegrown (i.e., local) candidates to non-local candidates.

Hypothesis 2: There is a significant and positive relationship between place identity and the likelihood of preferring homegrown candidates.

To assess whether candidates' place of birth continues to be a meaningful cue to voters, both observational and experimental techniques were utilized. Using observational survey data (Study 1), I assessed beliefs regarding the importance of candidate birthplace and whether homegrown candidates make better representatives. Then, in Study 2, using a discrete choice conjoint experiment, I exposed respondents to two hypothetical candidates for U.S. Congress wherein I vary two place-based candidate characteristics: current place of residence of the candidates and candidates' birthplace (whilst simultaneously varying a litany of other factors, including partisanship).

Study 1: Observational Analysis of 2019 Lucid Survey Data

I make use of a novel dataset featuring two questions pertaining to place and politics, which I utilize as dependent measures below—one question that directly captures the self-reported importance respondents place on candidate roots, and a second question regarding whether respondents believe that rooted candidates are better able to understand the needs and problems facing their constituents.⁵⁰ The question wording for each of these DV's was “micro-tailored” to the each respondent's state of residence in order to prime them to think about their own electoral context rather than consider the question in a broader abstract sense. These questions are ideal for the purposes of this chapter, as they allow me to directly assess support for local candidates, as well as beliefs regarding what sets local candidates apart from others. These data are comprised of a nationally representative non-probability sample and were collected in Spring of 2019 (sample demographics data are presented in Table A5.1).

The key independent variable used to assess Hypothesis 2 above is a five-item psychometric scale measure of place identity comprised of slightly modified (micro-tailored to respondents' place of residence) items from well validated place-identity scales (Hernandez et al. 2007; Lalli 1992; Nanzer 2004; Stedman 2002). These items, which are listed in Table A5.2 of the Appendix, have a high degree of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.87) and were combined into a normalized scale measure. As control variables, I included a range of respondent level variables that previous studies have established as being highly predictive of vote choice, including a normalized measure of racial resentment (Kinder & Sanders 1996), a normalized measure of populist attitudes (Schulz et al. 2017), party identification, level of education, age,

⁵⁰ Question wording for the two dependent measures are as follows: (1.) How important do you think it is for candidates running for Congress in [Respondent state] to have been born in [Respondent state]?; (2.) In general, do you think that candidates born in [Respondent state] are better at understanding the values and needs of people in [Respondent state] than candidates born elsewhere?

sex, region, race (binary variable indicating whether the respondent is White), and urban-rural classification.

To assess respondents' reported beliefs regarding candidate roots, basic descriptive statistics are utilized. Namely a percentage of respondents within each response category for each of the questions is reported. To determine whether high place identifiers are more likely to regard candidate roots as important, as well as believe that homegrown candidates are better attuned to the needs of their constituents, a series of logistic regression models are estimated for each dependent measure including the variables listed above. Because a large number of respondents reported that they believe it is "moderately important" or "very important" that candidates running for Congress in their state to have been born there, I dichotomized the variable, where 1 = "very important" and 0 = all other responses. This decision is defensible as it is those in the "very important" category I am most interested in, since it can reasonably be assumed that these are the group of respondents for whom candidate roots could potentially matter in the voting booth. In addition to standard logit coefficients, the predicted probability of being in the category coded 1 for each variable are reported at different levels of place identity. Finally, the marginal effect of place identity on the probability of being in the category coded 1 for each dependent measure is also calculated at different points along the urban-rural continuum.

First, basic frequency statistics were examined to determine the percentage of respondents who selected each response category for the question "how important do you think it is for candidates running for Congress in [R state] to have been born in [R state]?" The distribution of responses indicates that a majority of respondents' report candidate roots as being either moderately (33.9%) or very important (36.1%). Together, less than 1/3rd of respondents

reported that candidate roots were only slightly important (14.7%) or not at all important (15.3%). Considering recent nascent work on nationalization, these results—particularly that “very important” netted a plurality of responses—are somewhat surprising. These descriptive findings lend some support for Hypothesis 1, though are unconvincing on their own since real world candidate evaluation involves assessing candidates on multiple dimensions (e.g., partisanship, gender, political experience, etc.). Moreover, while this question is useful in capturing respondents’ general attitudes toward homegrown Congressional candidates in their states, due to how the question is worded we cannot conclude whether respondents are reporting their own personal attitudes or whether they are reporting what they assume to be the average or typical response of their fellow state residents.

Next, basic frequency statistics were also examined to determine what percentage of respondents answered “yes” to the question “In general, do you think that candidates born in [Respondent state] are better at understanding the values and needs of people in [Respondent state] than candidates born elsewhere?.” As with the previously analyzed question, a sizeable majority of the respondents answered the question in a favorable light for native born candidates, with some 63% of respondents selecting “yes.”⁵¹ These results are consistent with existing theory regarding why voters might prefer local candidates (Tavits 2010). Regarding our hypotheses, if we assume that voters prefer candidates who are more attuned to the values and needs of their constituents, then these numbers would appear to provide additional support for Hypothesis 1.⁵²

⁵¹ Within the Qualtrics survey interface that respondents used to respond to the survey, the original response options for this question were Yes, No, and Unsure/Don’t Know. For subsequent logistic regression analysis, the No and Unsure/Don’t know categories were collapsed into a single category, coded as 0 for purposes of analysis.

⁵² As with the other survey question regarding candidate roots, this question is not without its problems. Most notably, because this question employs a simple yes/no/unsure list of response options, there is some concern regarding acquiescence bias (i.e., the propensity of respondents to select the “yes” option even if truly they are unsure or believe the opposite).

To evaluate my second hypothesis, I now turn to describing a series of logistic regression models—see results in Table 1. In Model 1, I regress a binary variable capturing whether respondents reported a candidate’s place of birth (either in the district or not) as being very important on place identity and a vector on controls. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the likelihood of reporting that it is very important that congressional candidates be born in the state in which they are running increases as place identity strengthens, on average, after taking into account the influence of other factors. Predicted probabilities, plotted in the left-hand pane of Figure 1, indicate that those high in place identity ($Pr = .46$) are over twice as likely as low place identifiers ($Pr = .21$) to report that candidate birthplace is a very important consideration. In addition, owing to a spurt of scholarship focusing on distinctions in public opinion between urban and rural areas (e.g., Cramer 2016; Hopkins 2017; Jacobs & Munis 2018), as well as the fact that many recent high profile cases of candidate birthplace taking on a high degree of salience having occurred in rural states, I also estimated the marginal effect, along the urban-rural continuum, of place identity on the likelihood of indicating that candidate roots are very important. Results of this marginal effects analysis, which are presented in Table 2, indicate that the marginal effect of place identity is significant and remarkably similar in magnitude across the urban-rural continuum, which suggests that those high in place identity are more likely to be attracted to local candidates, irrespective of where they live. Model 1 results suggest that those higher in place identity are significantly more likely to be within that 36% of respondents who indicated that they find candidate roots to be very important than those with lower place identity. Together, these results provide strong evidence that place, despite recent trends in American politics, could still matter for our elections.

Table 5.1: Logistic Regression Analyses—Place Identity and Attitudes Regarding Candidate Roots

	<u>Very Important that Candidates be</u>		<u>Local Candidates Better</u>	
	<u>Born in My State</u>		<u>Understand Values & Needs</u>	
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Place Identity	1.35* (0.27)	1.04 (0.58)	1.10* (0.24)	1.67 (0.53)
Racial Resentment	0.71* (0.26)	0.69* (0.26)	0.72* (0.27)	0.75* (0.27)
Populism	10.44* (1.01)	10.44* (1.01)	8.69* (0.92)	8.70* (0.93)
Partisanship -independent	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.24 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.18)
-Republican	0.26 (0.14)	0.28 (0.14)	0.23 (0.14)	0.22 (0.14)
Education	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)
Age	-0.02* (0.00)	-0.02* (0.03)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
Male	0.24* (0.24)	0.24* (0.12)	0.31 (0.11)	0.31* (0.11)
Region -midwest	0.21 (0.17)	0.21 (0.17)	0.07 (0.18)	0.08 (0.18)
-south	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.15)
-west	-0.24 (0.18)	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.23 (0.17)
Household Income	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
Place Perception	-0.027 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.04 (0.04)	0.16 (0.11)
White (race)	-0.17 (0.04)	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)
Place Identity X Place Perception	--	0.10 (0.16)	--	-0.19 (0.15)

<i>N</i>	1566	1566	1566	1566
<i>Pseudo R</i> ²	.12	.12	.10	.10

Figure 5.1: Predicted Probability of Beliefs Regarding Local Candidates by Place Identity




Table 5.2: Marginal Effect of Place Identity on Attitudes Regarding Candidate Roots

Place Perception	Candidate Roots Importance			Local Candidates Better Understand Constituent Needs		
	$\frac{\delta y}{\delta x}$	P> t	95% Confidence Interval	$\frac{\delta y}{\delta x}$	P> t	95% Confidence Interval
“Very Urban”	0.24	0.01	[0.07, 0.40]	0.31	0.00	[0.15, 0.46]
“Somewhat Urban”	0.25	0.00	[0.13, 0.38]	0.27	0.00	[0.15, 0.38]
“More Urban than Rural”	0.26	0.00	[0.16, 0.36]	0.23	0.00	[0.13, 0.32]
“More Rural than Urban”	0.28	0.00	[0.17, 0.39]	0.19	0.00	[0.08, 0.30]
“Somewhat Rural”	0.29	0.00	[0.14, 0.44]	0.15	0.04	[0.01, 0.29]
“Very Rural”	0.30	0.00	[0.11, 0.49]	0.11	0.26	[-0.08, 0.30]

Next, a nearly identical set of models were estimated, the only difference being that the belief that local candidates are more understanding of constituents’ values and needs was set as the dependent variable. Results for Model 3, presented in Table 1, indicate that higher levels of place identity are, on average, associated with an increased likelihood of belief that local (i.e., born in the district) candidates are better able to understand their constituents. The right pane of Figure 2 shows that estimated shift in probability of this belief is substantial, from low levels (Pr = .49) to high levels of place identity (Pr = .72). Similarly, the estimated marginal effects of place identity on the belief that local candidate are more attuned to constituent needs are positive

and significant across the urban-rural divide, except in very rural areas, with highest magnitudes in urban areas.

Altogether, the results of these models provide considerable evidence in favor of both hypotheses. These results lend especially strong support to Hypothesis 2, suggesting that place is particularly meaningful cue in the candidate evaluation process to those high in place identity. Evidence regarding Hypothesis 1, however, while supportive, is less convincing, particularly insofar as general election (i.e., partisan) elections are considered, given the multidimensional nature of candidate evaluation and vote choice, and the outsized role that other considerations play in that process, particularly partisanship. To gather more compelling evidence regarding Hypothesis 1, we now turn to Study 2, an original conjoint experiment.

Study 2: Conjoint Experiment

Data for Study 2 are comprised of a nationally representative sample of 1,000 individuals comprising one module of the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)—sample demographics are listed in Table A5.2. These data were collected in two waves in the fall of 2018. Respondents were presented with seven randomly generated candidate pairings and were tasked with choosing the profile from each pairing that they found most preferable. Which candidate is chosen by respondents comprises the dependent measure, while the randomized levels of the candidate attributes serve as the independent measures in the subsequent conjoint analysis. Since the levels of the candidate attributes are fully randomized, each candidate profile has an equal probability of being generated. Candidate attributes included gender, deliberative style, current residence, where the candidate grew-up/childhood hometown, political experience, veteran status, partisanship, and education history. Two of these attributes, current residence and where the candidate grew up, serve as place cues. Both place related attributes were micro-

tailored to each individual respondent's state of residence. For current city of residence, candidates were listed as either residing in the largest city, by population, in the Respondent's state, or in a randomly chosen town of approximately 10,000 individuals in the Respondent's state (care was taken in each case to ensure it was an actual small town, rather than a neighborhood or suburb of a larger city). For the where the candidate grew up attribute, candidates were presented as either having grown up in a city from the opposite coast (New York City for a respondent from Montana or Nebraska, Los Angeles for a respondent from Virginia or Iowa), the largest city within the state from which the highest number of migrants flow into the Respondent's state (e.g., Los Angeles, CA for a respondent from Montana, Boston, MA for a respondent from New Hampshire), a small town of approximately 10,000 individuals in the respondent's state, or the largest city within the respondent's state.

Table 5.3: Conjoint Attributes and Levels

<u>Attributes</u>	<u>Levels</u>			
Gender	Female	Male		
Partisanship	Democratic	Republican		
Current City of Residence*	Town	Big city		
Where Candidate Grew Up*	Coastal city	Out of state city	In-state town	In-state big city
Political Experience	Served in U.S. House	New to politics		
Veteran Status	Not a veteran	Marine veteran	Army veteran	
Deliberation Style	Collaborates and cooperates with others	Acts decisively and takes charge		
Education	Ivy League Degree	College Degree		

Including a forced-choice conjoint experiment is advantageous as it allows me to address several inferential difficulties posed by the form of observational analysis featured in Study 1 and, thus, allows me to better triangulate on Hypothesis 1. Methodologically, conjoint experiments provide three basic advantages over observational approaches. First and foremost amongst these advantages is that conjoint experiments, in the context of candidate evaluation studies, allow the researcher to assess the potential causal effect of particular levels of conjoint profile attributes/characteristics (e.g., the effect a candidate being born within the state in which they are running versus being born outside of it) (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto 2014). A second advantage of conjoint studies is that they allow us to assess the impacts of particular attribute levels while simultaneously varying a litany of other attributes that may impact decisions, whereas, in standard survey research (including the observational analysis in Study 1 of this chapter), it is typically the case that attitudes are measured along a single dimension (i.e., where additional considerations are not varied and may not even be present for consideration). This is an important advantage of conjoint experiments, as it allows the researcher to discern variously the effects (if calculating the average marginal component effect) or overall respondent preferences (if calculating conditional marginal means) associated with profile attribute levels relative to other randomly varying levels. A third benefit of conjoint design is that, relative to standard observational and experimental approaches that utilize survey responses, they help mitigate so called demand effects and social desirability bias (Caruso, Rahnev, & Banaji 2009). Respondents' concerns regarding social desirability and researcher demand are both forms of bias wherein respondents obfuscate their true preferences because of others' (perceived) expectations. In the case of social desirability bias, respondents conform with norms deemed acceptable in broader society, whereas a demand effects scenario is one in which respondents

attempt to appease the researcher by providing results that the researcher is assumed to desire. Because conjoint experiments randomly vary levels for a multitude of attributes simultaneously, it lessens respondents' ability to discern what particular facet(s) of conjoint profiles the researcher is interested in.

In the context of this study, respondents are forced to choose between two competing candidate profiles, whose attribute levels are varied randomly. A “forced choice” design is appropriate in this case as it is most reflective of the decision task that voters face when they actually cast a ballot in elections (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto 2013). As is standard in the conjoint literature in political science, I make three simplifying assumptions (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto 2013). First, I assume stability and no carryover effects, which means that potential outcomes remain stable between choice tasks and that treatment exposure in previous tasks does not influence respondent decisions in subsequent tasks. Second, I assume no profile-order effects, which simply means that the order in which respondents encounter profiles on their screen does not influence the decisions the respondent would make. The third and final assumption is that attribute levels are randomly generated, which guarantees (assuming proper randomization) that potential outcomes are statistically independent of the conjoint profiles.

Regarding Hypothesis 1, I am primarily interested in discerning overall respondent preferences toward candidate characteristics (place cues, in this case) in a multidimensional decision space. Because of this, I calculate and present conditional marginal means below.⁵³ In the context of a forced choice conjoint design, the marginal mean of an attribute level represents the average level of favorability for profiles featuring that particular attribute level, averaged

⁵³ Both conditional marginal means and average marginal component effects are calculated using the *cregg* package in R (Leeper 2019).

over all levels of other attributes. As Leeper et al. detail, “in the common forced-choice design with two alternatives, marginal means have a direct interpretation as probabilities” (2018, p. 6)

As multiple recent papers have carefully argued, marginal means are a more appropriate quantity of interest for researchers who are interested in preferences regarding particular characteristics (or feature/attribute “levels” in conjoint parlance) of evaluative objects, rather than the causal effect of characteristics on overall profile evaluation captured by another common estimation strategy (Leeper et al. 2018; Clayton et al. 2019). This same logic applies to research contexts in which subgroup heterogeneity is an interest (Leeper et al. 2018). The most common estimate calculated in the extant social science literature employing conjoint designs is the average marginal component effect (AMCE) proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2014). The AMCE has proven highly attractive to many researchers, as it measures the causal effect of a change in a particular attribute level on respondents’ overall favorability of a profile, averaged over all other respondents and attributes. However, the AMCE is not an appropriate quantity for researchers interested in preferences, as interpreting them as overall respondent preferences for attribute levels is misleading due to the nature of their calculation—chiefly, the causal effect of an attribute level change is always calculated in comparison to a baseline. In calculating marginal means, I remove the need to derive estimates in relation to a baseline category, which, while not providing the clean causal interpretation of the AMCE, provides an appropriate estimate of respondent preferences, which is among the focuses of this chapter.⁵⁴

Figure 2 plots the probability that favored candidates featured a particular attribute level, as well as a 95% confidence interval for each estimate, for all 7000 decision tasks. Consistent

⁵⁴ However, because AMCEs have been the most common estimate presented in previous conjoint papers in political science, I also include plots of AMCEs in Figures A5.1-A5.3 in the Appendix.

with Hypothesis 1, I find that candidate roots (i.e., where candidates were listed as having grown up/their childhood hometown) mattered significantly in the candidate selection process. More specifically, respondents appeared to have a significant preference for candidates who grew up in big cities within respondents' own states, whereas candidates who grew up in coastal cities and in states from which the most migrants flow to respondents' states were significantly less likely to be selected. Candidates from smaller towns within the respondents' home states were not significantly less likely nor more likely to be selected. Respondents did not appear to demonstrate strong feelings one way or the other regarding where candidates currently reside. These results comprise clear evidence of place functioning as a meaningful cue in a survey task meant to simulate candidate evaluation and selection processes. Apart from the magnitude of the marginal mean corresponding to partisan (in)congruence, which political scientists have long understood to be the most prominent consideration in political evaluation (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002), the candidate roots place cue appears to "matter" as much as any other candidate characteristic, when considering the results of all candidate selection tasks.

Figure 5.3 presents marginal means for decision tasks ($n \sim 3,400$) that simulated a primary election (i.e., both candidate profiles were of the same party). The pattern of results closely resembles that of Figure 5.2. When evaluating two candidates of the same party, respondents preferred candidates from large cities within their state, whereas candidates from other states were less likely to be preferred. Once again, candidates from small towns in the respondents' states were neither significantly more likely nor less likely to be preferred. Current candidate residence was not significantly associated with preference either way. These results support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that place is perhaps a meaningful cue to voters when evaluating two candidates of the same party.

Figure 5.4 features the marginal means associated with decision tasks simulating a general election environment (i.e., wherein the two candidates presented are of opposite parties). Based on what we know the extant literature on vote choice and candidate evaluation, this subset of the data represents the most difficult test for Hypothesis 1, due in large part to the dominating influence of partisan cues in the candidate evaluation process, particularly in the era of national polarization (Hayes & Lawless 2016; Hopkins 2018; Jacobson 2017). Results indicate that candidates who grew up in in-state large cities were significantly more likely to be chosen as the favorable candidate. While no significant relationships emerged between other candidates roots levels and candidate selection—thus making the results of the “general election analysis” differ from both the primary and combined total analysis—the marginal mean associated with roots in a large in-state city was the only attribute level apart from candidate partisanship to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Together, these results along with those from the other two conjoint analyses provide considerable evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1 and suggest that place, via candidate roots, can function as a meaningful cue in the candidate evaluation process—even in general election contexts.

Figure 5.2: Candidate Attribute Level Marginal Means – All Choice Tasks




Figure 5.3: Candidate Attribute Level Marginal Means – Primary Election Choice Tasks





Figure 5.4: Candidate Attribute Level Marginal Means – General Election Choice Tasks



This chapter provides substantial evidence, using multiple samples and methodologies, to support the conclusion that place, via candidate roots, endures as a relevant cue to voters. These results cast doubt on the view, held by many cynical observers of politics, that partisanship is the only consideration that matters in the age of polarization. On the other hand, the results presented above also speak to the power of partisan cues and are thus consistent with the larger body of political science. Indeed, in Study 2, four distinct attributes (and ten attribute levels spread across those four levels) were significantly associated with a candidate being either more or less likely to be selected in conjoint decisions tasks simulating a primary election. However, in conjoint decision tasks simulating general election contests, with partisanship labels present, only one of these four attributes (and only a single level within it) remained significant—place, in the form of candidate roots. While these findings reaffirm the primacy of partisanship, they also suggest that public opinion scholars’ neglect of considerations of place, perhaps humankind’s most ancient and foundational form of social delineation, is misguided.

Similarly, this chapter’s results also speak to recent work on nationalization (Hopkins 2018). To recap, I find that respondents show a preference for homegrown candidates—both when asked directly as well as when presented with a multidimensional candidate choice task. My results, focusing on candidate evaluation, join other work reporting that the local still matters in Americans’ political thinking (Cutler 2007; Reeves & Gimpel 2012). To the extent that nationalization of political behavior has occurred, these results suggest that it may be a mostly supply-side driven phenomenon. This perspective is in keeping with other recent work, such as Martin and McCrain’s study showing that, despite a recent pivot toward the nationalization of news, most folks disdain these developments rather than demand them (2019). As regards recent and future electoral politics, this chapter’s results suggest that the strategy of localizing races

through local roots and place identity employed by, for example, Democrats in prominent 2018 Congressional races in Iowa, Montana, and West Virginia, is one that is worth considering throughout the country, in both primary and general elections—particularly in states and districts where average levels of place identity are high (Hypothesis 2). The findings presented above regarding place identity and the importance of candidate roots to voters extend recent findings from the European context (Collignon & Sajuria 2018) and provide evidence that subnational identities are still of relevance to American electoral politics.

Despite the benefits of the mixed methods approach, and the general persuasiveness of the findings, this study is not without its drawbacks. The most central weakness of this chapter's study of place-based candidate characteristics, as well as any study that relies wholly on one or both methods employed here, is that I am not observing real world behavior. A number of different strategies could be used by scholars in future studies to address the external validity related weaknesses of this chapter, including perhaps the use of field experiments using place-based stimuli to prime place identity regarding some aspect of electoral politics. A second weakness of this chapter is that Hypothesis 2, while strongly supported by results of several models in Study 1, was not able to be evaluated in Study 2 due to the lack of a place identity battery being present on the CCES. Future work should address this weakness by assessing whether high place identifiers reveal distinct preferences, particularly regarding place-based characteristics, in a multidimensional decision space.

In all, the above results speak to the continuing relevance of place, even in time period in which the relatively new forces of national polarization have joined with perennially salient aspects of American politics, including race, to grip nearly all facets of American political life. In

particular, the findings presented above speak to place as an apparently enduring—and potentially powerful—heuristic in American politics and elections.

Voter Centered Angle: Place-based Resentment and Voter Preferences

Following the 2016 election, it became clear that the rural-urban divide is one of the most electorally consequential fault lines in contemporary American politics. This dissertation is motivated in part by social science’s clear inability to satisfactorily account for the geographical antecedents of the Trump phenomenon, especially in terms of his historic dominance in rural areas from coast to coast. Geographic polarization or the “urban-rural divide” is a powerful trend in American politics (Hopkins 2017) a useful heuristic for journalists and others who seek to understand American politics. Is there anything particularly “urban” or “rural” in the urban-rural divide or is it an artifact of the different groups of people who cluster together in these different types of communities?

As discussed at length in Chapter 2, the structure of the American political system should lead us to expect geographic tension and confrontation. Our federal structure invites local, state, and federal politicians and bureaucrats to construct and administer policy in a way that reflects prevailing political, social, and economic differences – a process that gives rise to and reinforces geographic cleavages. In terms of national voting patterns, it is clear that rural areas have trended Republican in recent decades, whereas urban areas have become more Democratic. Caught midway between urban and rural in a geographic sense, suburban communities have trended toward both parties during this period, trending Republican in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but swinging back toward the Democrats over the past ten years but especially since the 2016 election. Despite these trends and preliminary evidence from a single U.S. State (Cramer 2016), it remains unclear whether place resentment is systematically related to public opinion.

Results presented in Chapter 2 give us confidence that place resentment is properly understood as a unidimensional construct. Confirmatory factor analysis results provide further reassurance regarding the measure's internal qualities, as well as evidence that my measure of place resentment is largely distinct from other constructs that scholars have surmised place resentment may be a proxy for (Carmines & Schmidt 2017; David 2017; Dudas 2017; Herschey 2017; Schildkraut 2017). Ultimately, however, political scientists are interested in whether place resentment is associated with important political outcomes (i.e., political opinions and behaviors). Below, I provide evidence that place resentment meets this criterion by uniquely accounting for variation in attitudes toward the political parties as well as in accounting for respondents' self-reported vote choice in the 2016 presidential and 2018 midterm Congressional elections, even after controlling for other factors, such as racial resentment.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit regression techniques were employed to assess whether place resentment is capable of explaining variation in several outcome measures: the difference (Republican minus Democratic) in feeling thermometers (0-100 scale) evaluations of the two major American parties, as well as each party's feeling thermometer in isolation in the Lucid sample, as well as respondent self-reported vote choice in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election and support for President Trump at the time of the 2018 midterm elections, as recorded in the 2018 CCES. In total, nine separate OLS models (four per continuous outcome measure) were fitted to the Lucid data. Three models utilize the full 10 item place resentment model to assess its explanatory capacity alongside the handful of explanatory constructs it was pitted against in the CFA, as well as a vector of control variables.⁵⁵ Three models include a condensed

⁵⁵ Control variables include subjective party ID, place perception, education, gender, age, region, household income, and race. As best practice dictates, control variables were included if they could plausibly correlate in a meaningful

five item measure that features a predominance of culturally related items. In addition, three models include a separate four item model predominantly comprised mainly of items related to distributive politics. The choice to include OLS models featuring three different place measures are used to demonstrate the flexibility of the place resentment scale (appreciating that other researchers will not always be in a position to be able to field the full 10 item measure) by allowing the reader to note the similarity in results across all models. All other control variables and other explanatory variables of interest included in the 10 item models are also included in the condensed models. Because many scholars interested in place resentment are likely interested in the heterogenous “effects” of place resentment, these models feature multiplicative interaction terms to assess whether the association between place resentment and evaluations of the two major parties is moderated by respondents’ subjective place types.⁵⁶ Predicted values and marginal effects for models featuring the full ten item scale are discussed in detail below.

In addition to the OLS models, a series of probit regressions were run using the same 4 item measure featured in three of the OLS models. Because I am constrained by the measures included in the CCES for this analysis, I was unable to include the full assortment of competing constructs identified by the literature, though the racial resentment measure and full standard list of control variables were included.⁵⁷

Expectations

For the OLS models of respondents’ evaluations of the two major parties, based on previous research suggesting that Americans’ partisan proclivities have polarized geographically,

way to both place resentment and the outcome measure. Complete regression tables for these models are reported in the Appendix.

⁵⁶ The term “effect” here is used in a causally innocent manner. To be sure, I make no pretense in this chapter that the relationships uncovered in my analyses are anything other than descriptive.

⁵⁷ In all models, key attitudinal measures are normalized to have a minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 1.

with ruralites seemingly increasingly attracted to the Republican Party and urbanites becoming more Democratic (Hopkins 2017), I expect that greater levels of place resentment will be associated with a positive difference in party evaluation (favoring the Republican Party) amongst ruralites, whereas higher degrees of place resentment amongst urbanites will be associated with a negative difference in party evaluation (favoring the Democratic Party).

Regarding respondents' self-reported presidential vote choice in 2016 and approval of President Trump in Autumn 2018, I expect that significantly higher levels of place resentment will be positively associated with reporting having casted a vote in Donald Trump for ruralites. This expectation is rooted in Trump's surprisingly strong performance in these community types in 2016 (Hopkins 2017). Similarly, I expect that rural resentment will be associated with voting for Republicans in the 2018 Midterm Elections.

Results

I estimated a series of OLS regression models to assess whether place resentment (measured with three separate sets of items across these models) significantly accounts for variation in attitudes toward the two political parties. This was modeled primarily using the difference in feeling thermometer ratings of the Democratic and Republican parties as the dependent measure, though supporting analyses of attitudes toward the parties individually are also discussed. Full results of all models are presented in Tables A5.3 and A5.4 of the Appendix. In all models, place resentment is a significant factor that accounts for unique variation in attitudes toward the parties across at least some part of the urban-rural continuum, holding constant the effects of racial attitudes, populist orientations, affective polarization, place identity, and a vector of control variables. That place resentment significantly predicts individual attitudes toward the parties even after accounting for the influence of these other variables is rather

remarkable considering the large volume of existing evidence that suggests these factors to be highly predictive of attitudes toward the parties and their candidates (e.g., Abramowitz 1994; Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012; Kinder & Dale-Riddle 2012; Miller, Shanks & Shapiro 1996; Schaffner, MacWilliams & Nteta 2018; Tesler 2016).

Regressing the difference in respondents' thermometer score ratings of the two parties on an interaction term of place resentment and subjective place type (i.e., where respondents locate themselves on the urban-rural continuum) reveals that the relationship between place resentment and evaluation of the two parties is divergent across the urban-rural divide.⁵⁸ Marginal effects estimates are listed in Table 5.4 and predicted values are plotted in Figure 5.5. Marginal effects results indicate that, on average, a high level of place resentment is associated with a significant shift in evaluations of the parties that favors the Republican Party amongst ruralites. This boost in evaluations favoring the Republicans is largest – an estimated 31-point swing – amongst those who identify as living in “very rural” areas. The marginal effect of place resentment amongst the most urban respondents is negative (favoring Democrats), but insignificant. As we see below, however, place resentment does matter systematically for urbanites. Figure 5.6 shows, for instance, that the marginal effect of place resentment, after accounting for all other variables in the model, was greater than 20 pts (on a 100 pt feeling thermometer) among those identifying as very urban and greater than 10 points for those identifying as somewhat urban.

⁵⁸ For the sake of space, interaction models using only the full 10 item measure are discussed here. Findings do not diverge in any noteworthy way when using the 5 item or 4 item measures.

Table 5.4: Marginal Effect of Place Resentment on Party Evaluations

Place Perception	Difference Between the Parties (GOP- Dem)			Democratic Party		
	$\frac{\delta y}{\delta x}$	P> t	95% Confidence Interval	$\frac{\delta y}{\delta x}$	P> t	95% Confidence Interval
“Very Urban”	-9.61	0.29	[-27.56, 8.33]	23.75	0.00	[9.07, 37.27]
“Somewhat Urban”	1.43	0.84	[-15.03, 12.17]	15.45	0.00	[4.47, 25.40]
“More Urban than Rural”	6.75	0.26	[-4.85, 18.35]	7.15	0.10	[-1.78, 15.16]
“More Rural than Urban”	14.93	0.03	[1.86, 28.00]	-1.16	0.81	[-10.80, 7.71]
“Somewhat Rural”	23.11	0.01	[5.98, 40.24]	-9.46	0.13	[-22.08, 2.51]
“Very Rural”	31.29	0.01	[8.87, 53.72]	-17.76	0.03	[-34.41, -1.63]

Figure 5.5: Predicted Values of Difference in Party Evaluation by Place Resentment





Figure note: The dependent variable is the difference, Republican minus Democratic, in expressive evaluations of the two parties (captured by 101 point feeling thermometers). Higher values of the dependent variable are interpreted as indicating a stronger preference for the Republican Party over the Democratic Party.

Next, I look at respondents' attitudes toward the two parties in isolation (in addition to the difference in evaluations) helps to paint a more complete picture of the relationship between

place resentment and party attitudes. Results focusing on evaluations of the Democratic Party are presented in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.6. Marginal effect estimates indicate that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in place resentment among self-identified urbanites is associated with substantial positive increases (estimate for those living in “very urban” areas = 23.11, $p < 0.01$) in evaluations of the Democratic Party. Amongst most rural respondents, marginal effects estimates are negative and insignificant, though it is worth noting that the estimate among “very rural” respondents is substantively large and statistically significant (estimate = -17.73, $p = 0.03$).

Figure 5.6. Marginal Effect of Place Resentment on Evaluations of the Democratic Party



Results from models of respondents’ evaluations of the Republican Party are presented in Table A5.3 and Figure A5.3. Results indicate that moving from the minimum to maximum level of place resentment is associated with a consistent and moderate boost in evaluations of the GOP across the entirety of the urban-rural divide. At first glance, a positive marginal effect estimate


across all place types is somewhat surprising considering the GOP's generally poor performance in urban areas in recent years. However, while the marginal effects are relatively homogenous in magnitude across the urban rural divide, their practical consequences are quite different, owing to differences in baseline levels of receptiveness toward the Republican Party across the urban rural divide. On average, place resentment is associated with a moderation of Republican Party evaluations amongst urbanites that is associated with a more neutral outlook of the Party, whereas it generally strengthens *already positive* attitudes amongst ruralites. The most illustrative example concerns "very urban" respondents, for whom the difference (~23 points) in predicted support for the Democratic Party at the minimum and maximum levels of place resentment is nearly twice as large as the difference in support for the Republican party at those same levels (~14 points). In all, then, these results, while somewhat complex in their joint interpretation, are in keeping with expectations – since cosmopolitanism is generally considered a trait of left-leaning people, we can expect that place might be a predictor of more conservative leanings.

Next, I evaluate the association between place resentment and Trump support—in 2016 and 2018—across the urban-rural spectrum utilizing the 2018 CCES. Probit regression was utilized in order to assess the explanatory power of place resentment using the four-item measure of place resentment included in one the modules of the 2018 CCES. Respondents' self-reported vote choice during the 2016 presidential election was selected as the dependent measure owing both to previous speculation that place resentment likely factored into many voters' decision to support Donald Trump, as well as further speculation that this may again be the case in 2020

(e.g., Cramer 2017; Jacobs & Munis 2018; Mendelberg 2017).⁵⁹ I find that those high in place resentment are significantly more likely than those low in place resentment to report having voted for Trump in 2016, on average, after controlling for the other variables in the model. Predicted probabilities of respondents reporting having voted for President Trump in 2016 are presented in Figure 5.7. As place resentment increased, the likelihood of respondents reporting a 2016 vote for Trump increased sharply among rural respondents, moderately among urbanites, and not at all amongst suburbanites. Largely, these results are consistent with expectations, though it is somewhat surprising that urban resentment was associated with self-reported Trump support in 2016 given the media narrative surrounding the 2016 election. A possible explanation may stem from the fact the fact that, in recent decades, Republican candidates have appealed to rural voters in geographic terms, whereas Democrats' attempts to appeals to urbanites on the basis of shared "urban-ness" have been much more limited. Donald Trump, meanwhile, in addition to appealing to rural people directly in some cases, also portrayed himself in 2016 as someone who would defend and revitalize American communities, which may have resonated to some extent with urbanites for whom place and community is more central (relative, of course, to other urbanites).

⁵⁹ The analysis includes only those who indicated they cast a ballot in the 2016 election.

Figure 5.7: Predicted Probability of 2016 Presidential Vote by Place Resentment




Next, using the 2018 CCES data, I fit a probit model of evaluations of President Trump’s job performance.⁶⁰ Predicted probabilities of 2018 Trump support are plotted in Figure 5.8. Results indicate that, in 2018, place resentment was only significantly associated with an increased probability in supporting Trump amongst ruralites. Overall, this suggests that there may have been some erosion in support for Trump among resentful urbanites from 2016 to 2018, which would be consistent with, among other things, the “Blue Wave,” which saw Democrats capture control of the U.S. House of Representatives due to their ability to flip a large number of seats, the vast majority of which were in urban (and inner suburban) districts. Overall, the association between place resentment and support for President Trump is appreciable, particularly amongst ruralites, and provides further evidence that place resentment is politically consequential. More broadly, these results reveal that place resentment appears to be more

⁶⁰ The CCES captures evaluations of presidential job performance by utilizing a four-category measure—strongly approve, approve, disapprove, strongly disapprove. For analyses, I collapsed the categories to create a binary variable: 1 = approve, 0 = disapprove.

operative amongst ruralites relative to other groups, which buttresses Cramer’s (2016) argument that rural resentment is, as of yet, more politically potent than urban and suburban resentment.

Figure 5.8: Predicted Probability of Nov. 2018 Trump Job Approval by Place Resentment (CCES)



Moving beyond 2016 retrospection, Trump approval in November of 2018, and general feelings toward the parties, I next consider whether place resentment predicts (reported) voting behavior in a real-world election: the 2018 midterm election.⁶¹ As those who follow politics well know, 2018 proved to be a “Blue Wave” election in which Democrats fared quite well throughout the country.

Though there was not a particularly strong regional pattern to the Democrats’ success, another geographic pattern was apparent. Despite overwhelming success in a Blue Wave year,

⁶¹ While 2016 retrospection (see Figure 5.7) involves a “real world” election, it was measured two years after the fact. Meanwhile, 2018 midterm vote choice was measured immediately following the 2018 election and is therefore likely more reliable. As one indicator that this is the case, consider that in 2018, 55.46 percent of the CCES sample indicated that they voted, which is about 7 points higher than most indicators of the eligible turnout, while 79 percent of the sample indicated that they voted in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, or almost 20 points higher than the voting-eligible turnout.

Democrats fared much better in highly urbanized states and districts (in terms of population share). This now familiar pattern of Democratic strength in urban areas raises one significant question: was Democrats' success in urban and suburban states and districts a result of strictly non-place oriented compositional effects, due to urban-rural place considerations, or both? In other words, was Democrats failure to breakthrough in any meaningful sense in rural areas due to geography per se, or was it due to the types of groups who do (not) live in rural areas, or both? To investigate this question, I run a series of probit regression analyses on respondents' vote choice in the 2018 U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and gubernatorial races.

Control variables included in the model include the respondents age, sex, education level, region, ideological identity, partisan identity, hostile sexism, household economic change during the past year, and racial resentment. While each of the variables included in this list could conceivably be related to both place resentment and vote choice, and therefore should be controlled for, three of these variables are particularly important variables to control due to the particular political context in which the 2018 midterms took place. First, it is especially important to include a measure of sexism in the model given that this was a midterm election year, which generally are thought of as in some respect a referendum on the president and his party, and that the President Trump has a long history of making explicitly sexist remarks against his political opponents, various celebrity acquaintances and rivals, as well as women more broadly – a fact that seems to have helped him garner the support of those who register high on various measures of sexism, including those included on the CCES (Schaffner et al. 2018). Second, it is essential that a measure of racial resentment is included in the models for similar reasons. While there is considerable evidence spanning a broad timespan that racial resentment is systematically correlated with support for Republican candidates (Kinder & Dale-Riddle 2012;

Kinder & Sanders 1996; Knuckey 2011; Knuckey & Kim 2015; Tesler 2016), President Trump has been especially earnest in his attempt to fuse whites' racial animosities with support for himself and his party, with some apparent success (Hooghe & Dassonneville 2018; Schaffner et al. 2018). Third, there is considerable evidence for the retrospection hypothesis – the idea that when it comes time to vote, voters punish incumbents if they perceive that their own lot has become worst off since the incumbent took office, even if the source of individuals' loss is wholly apolitical (Achen & Bartels 2016; Bloom & Price 1975; Healy & Malhotra 2016; Heersink et al. 2017). Given the preponderance of evidence in favor of the retrospective voter hypothesis, it is essential to account for whether respondents perceived their economic condition to have become worse over the previous year (i.e., during the second year of Trump's presidency).


Results indicate that rural resentment is a significant predictor of vote choice in all three models, being associated with a significant decrease in the likelihood of voting for a Democrat for all three offices examined – marginal effects are listed in Table 5.5 and plotted in Figure 5.9. Marginal effects of suburban and urban resentment fail to reach statistical significance yet are sizeable in multiple cases. Considering the relatively small sample size that a single CCES module affords, these results are suggestive that place resentment may matter systematically for vote choice among urbanites and suburbanites as well as rural people. That said, it is worth underscoring that the relationship between rural resentment and voting behavior appears much more systematic than that associated with both suburban and urban resentment. This finding is in keeping with other recent studies, including the experimental findings in Chapter 4 of this dissertation as well as Cramer's qualitative findings, that place-based considerations appear most politically potent among rural subpopulations. As campaign advertisement and social media

content analyses presented in Chapter 4 support, this is likely due to (or at least reinforced by) the fact that place appeals are much more likely to be rural focused than focused at other community types. Place for rural people then is more strongly fused to politics and plays a significant role in rural voter behavior in our geographically polarized age.

Table 5.5: Marginal Effects of Place Resentment on Voting Democratic in 2018 (CCES)

	<i>2018 U.S. House</i>		<i>2018 U.S. Senate</i>		<i>2018 Governorships</i>	
Place of Residence	$\frac{\delta y}{\delta x}$	95% Confidence Interval	$\frac{\delta y}{\delta x}$	95% Confidence Interval	$\frac{\delta y}{\delta x}$	95% Confidence Interval
Urban	-0.001	[-0.181, 0.179]	0.024	[-0.150, 0.198]	0.177	[-0.069, 0.424]
Suburban	0.135	[-0.039, 0.310]	-0.047	[-0.236, 0.141]	-0.061	[-0.216, 0.094]
Rural	-0.135	[-0.267, -0.002]	-0.486	[-0.680, -0.292]	-0.456	[-0.729, -0.184]
	<i>N</i> = 568	<i>R</i> ² = 0.80	<i>N</i> = 438	<i>R</i> ² = 0.80	<i>N</i> = 450	<i>R</i> ² = 0.77

Figure 5.9: Marginal Effects of Place Resentment on Voting Democratic in 2018 (CCES)



To speak to more practical matters, what the results presented in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.9 mean for partisan politics during the Trump administration is worth considering. The key insight

to be gleaned here is that the Democratic Party faces a geographical problem of the sort that the Republican Party simply does not (yet). Properly understood, in fact, it appears that Democrats have a *true* or *real* geographical problem, whereas the Republicans have an epiphenomenal or compositional one. When people point to Republicans' woes in the cities and (increasingly) suburbs, what they are actually alluding to is that the Republican Party fairs poorly with the types of people who are relatively concentrated in urban areas – highly educated people, younger people, ethnic and racial minorities, etc. Democrats, meanwhile, have fared ever more poorly in rural areas (Hopkins 2017) due not just to compositional factors, such as the fact that rural populations are more religious and less educated on average, but also due to political concerns that are genuinely political. In other words, it seems there is something about rural life and the resentments it breeds among many who live it that systematically turns rural voters away from Democratic candidates. Heidi Heitkamp and Joe Donnelly, two Democratic former U.S. Senators who lost in their relatively rural states of North Dakota and Indiana respectively in 2018, recently started a new 501(c)4, called the One Country Project, whose stated goal is to “be a bridge between rural communities and the Democratic Party” by “reopening the dialogue with rural communities, rebuilding trust and respect, and advancing an opportunity agenda for rural Americans.”⁶² My results here suggest that the Democratic Party broadly should strongly consider heeding Heitkamp's and Donnelly's advice.

Conclusion

Empirical studies presented in this chapter provide strong evidence that, despite polarization and nationalization trends, place-based considerations play a strong role in how

⁶² Accessed on 06/04/2020 at: <https://onecountryproject.com/#about>

voters think and behave when it comes to electoral politics. The conjoint experiment presented in this chapter shows that the place-based characteristics of candidates, such as whether they were born and raised in the district, matter to voters. These effects are particularly strong in primary election evaluation tasks but remained significant in general election tasks – being the only concern besides partisanship that mattered to voters. Results from a separate survey indicated that those who harbor a strong sense of place identity are most likely to find these characteristics important.

Candidate characteristics and voters' level of place identity are not the only way that place matters in determining winners and losers in American elections. Place-based resentment, which emanates from perceptions of people living in some communities fail to get the respect and access to resources that they deserve, is a potent force that shapes partisan politics and electoral outcomes. While this chapter contains some limited evidence that urban resentment is systematically correlated with evaluations of the two major parties, only rural resentment (i.e., not urban resentment or suburban resentment) appears to be a significant predictor of voter behavior, even after controlling for racial attitudes, partisanship, ideology, sexism, and a multitude of other factors. As I have speculated throughout this dissertation, as well as provide some evidence for in Chapter 4, this is likely at least partially due to politicians being much more likely to appeal to rural voters in such a way that enflames and capitalizes on geographic animus.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

A consistent belief throughout history, the course of “progress,” and technological advancement is that the tripartite demagogic forces of space, distance, and the parochial are withering in relevance and will one day pass into irrelevance altogether. Language standardization, the printing press, railways, telegraphs, automobiles, television, commercialized air travel, cellular phones and the instantaneous exchange of information over the internet using a web of interconnected phone lines, satellites, fiber optic cables, and LTE towers – each of these and other developments have been both celebrated and bemoaned as bringing us ever closer, blow by blow, to the knockout punch that will finally vanquish the provincial in particular and usher us into a state of homogenized cosmopolitan bliss. While we may very well be marching steadily in that direction, it has become abundantly clear in recent decades that local and peculiar will not wither away and die without a fight (Eatwell 1998; Fitzgerald 2018; Wuthnow 2018). Indeed, across the Western world, place-based attachment and identities may have never been so cherished as they are now that the homogenizing forces of globalization leave people desirous for a sense of community and meaningful group affiliation.

Regardless of how Americans feel about globalization and how those feelings are or are not translated into desire for community, American federalism keeps geographic or place-based community alive.⁶³ As I have argued at various points throughout this dissertation, a country whose administrative and representative systems are so strongly rooted in geography as the United State’s all but guarantees the relevance of geography to representation, elections, and public opinion – particularly in a single-member district electoral system.

⁶³ The “double-security” bit is referencing *Federalist 51*.

This dissertation documents how place still matters in American politics, from how politicians represent us, to how campaigns are run, to how voters evaluate and select candidates. This dissertation also presents, in the form of a new attitudinal measure, a tool that I hope will allow other researchers to carry out their own research regarding place-based animus and American politics. And, as importantly, this dissertation also provides a strong theoretical framework to make sense of it all. While I believe this dissertation succeeds in providing numerous insights, below I recap what I consider to be among the most interesting lessons learned that it imparts.

Key Lessons Learned

Place Identity and Place Resentment are Distinctive and Separable from Related Constructs

Following the publication of Katherine Cramer's (2016) landmark book-length study of the role of place and rural resentment in the political psychology of rural Wisconsinites, a considerable number of political scientists quickly cast doubt on Cramer's core concepts. What Cramer referred to as "place," so many critics alleged, was *actually something else* dressed up in more palatable language. The largest camp of critics charged that place identity and rural resentment was, in fact, just white identity and racial resentment speaking from beneath a folksy veil of social desirability— a sort of curious Schrodinger's bigot, to be sure (e.g., Carmines & Schmidt 2017; Schildkraut 2017; Wolbrecht 2017). Others charged that what Cramer referred to as place was actually negative partisanship (Herschey 2017) or populism (Dudas 2017).

In Chapter 3, however, I make the case in both theoretical and empirical terms that place resentment is a unidimensional concept distinct, though related in some interesting ways, to partisanship, populism, and racial resentment. Extensive synthesizing and development of theory, a laborious survey measure generation process, factor analysis, and several statistical

tests establishing the place-resentments scale's validity together provide a thorough case for why we should regard place resentment as a distinct attitude that stems from place identity and a sense of deprivation.

Members of Congress Appeal to Place Strategically on the Campaign Trail and in Office

For any given social identity to matter in politics (or any other social context), it must be salient (Huddy 2003). Identities become salient when individuals are exposed to stimuli cognitively associated with that identity. In politics, political advertisements and other content that flow from political candidates are among the most prominent and universally encountered stimuli capable of priming identities and making them temporally politically relevant. Content analyses of campaign advertisements and social media posts officially associated with current office holders in the U.S. Congress and others vying for those offices show that place-based political ads and social media posts have been common throughout the United States in the second decade of the twenty-first century. This descriptive finding is important in its own right, as it provides evidence that the necessary condition (place-based stimuli to prime place identity) for the political relevance of place identity is met in the real world. Moreover, results from a novel experiment, presented in Chapter 4, confirm that place-based appeals are able to effect how candidates are evaluated by voters.

While studies regarding place-based appeals in political advertising demonstrate that they are widespread across the country and capable of impacting political evaluation, evidence regarding the prevalence of place in Congress members' "digital homestyle" on social media are important in two major respects. First, this evidence reinforces one of the key takeaways from the political advertising data: namely that place appeals are commonplace throughout the United States. Secondly, evidence suggests that vulnerable members of Congress whose party is

generally out of step with presidential and state legislative voting in their districts use place strategically to cultivate a personal vote centered on the local.

Candidate Roots are Meaningful to Voters' Political Psychology and for Representational Style

A serendipitous finding, in the sense that I did not undertake this dissertation with any intention of investigating candidate roots beyond their potential use as a place-based heuristic, involves the somewhat surprising importance of candidate roots. In Chapter 5, I find that many voters, despite claims by some that the American public is hopelessly polarized along national partisan battle lines, reveal a preference for homegrown candidates in both primary election *and* general election contexts. Moreover, those with strong place identities are significantly more likely to support homegrown candidates and believe that homegrown candidates are more apt to understand the needs and concerns of their constituents.

Meanwhile, surprising evidence uncovered in Chapter 4 supports voters' beliefs that homegrown candidates are more attuned to the constituency. Homegrown candidates more proactively incorporate place into their digital homestyle, issuing a higher proportion of place-based posts on their social media accounts, than do candidates who were born outside of the districts that they represent. Connection to place, then, appears to influence the behavior of representatives as well as voters.

The Urban-Rural Divide is Not Simply Reducible Compositional Differences

Perhaps the most important lesson of this dissertation for understanding American politics concerns the urban-rural divide. While pronounced differences between urban and rural voters have appeared recurrently throughout American history, the urban-rural divide has become a driving force in American partisan polarization from the mid-90s onward. While

journalists have made much ado about the urban-rural divide in recent years and have generally given serious treatment to the urban-ness and rural-ness of the divide, the general tone in the political science community (albeit mainly on Twitter, since very little work has been done on this topic to date recently) has been that the urban-rural divide has emerged due to compositional differences (i.e., the demographics of urban areas versus rural areas) between urban and rural areas rather than being rooted urban and rural place identities or other social factors that stem from living in urban and rural areas. While it is certainly partially compositional, my findings in the latter half of Chapter 5, which show that place resentment predicted support for President Trump, as well as vote choice in the 2018 midterm elections, provide robust evidence that place resentment is a significant driver of the urban-rural divide and America's deepening geographic polarization. Moreover, discovering that place resentment predicts political outcomes in national samples convincingly shows that place resentment is at the center of the urban-rural divide *throughout* the United States, not just in Wisconsin as others have questioned (e.g., Albertson & Kushner-Gadarian 2017; Carmines & Schmidt 2017; Wolbrecht 2017).

Concluding Statement

Place provides a valuable theoretical lens through which to view American politics generally and American political behavior in particular. Living in a place produces affective bonds between the individual and that place, which ultimately leads to identification with place becoming a central part of how many individuals view themselves. Peoples' predisposition toward place identity, however, is but one side of the coin. What ensures the relevance of place in American *politics* is the structure of American institutions. Representation is apportioned geographically, which, combined with our single member district system, privileges geography to a unique extent politically. This fact shapes how our representatives go about their jobs and

present themselves to their constituents, how citizens understand politics, how candidates campaign, and, ultimately, how many voters determine who to vote for.

There has been more research conducted on place and American politics in the past decade than in the preceding 40 years. I am happy to have had a unique opportunity contribute to this nascent literature during my time at UVa. More work, though, is sorely needed. Investigation of place attachments and policy attitudes, especially as they relate to housing policy and climate policy, would surely be a fruitful line of research. A focus on place identities other than state identity and urban-rural identity would also be useful – regional identity seems a promising place to start. I could go on – what I just mentioned is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. I hope the momentum continues to build in this area: there is still so much yet to learn.

Appendix

Chapters 1 & 2

There are no Appendix materials for the first two chapters.

Chapter 3

Table A3.1: Survey Sample Statistics

	Lucid Sample	2018 CCES Module	2016 ANES
Age	44.42	48.03	49.58
% Female	51.58	59.30	51.30
% White	74.61	75.80	68.8
% Democratic	48.15	45.89	45.6
<i>N</i>	2000	1000	4217

Source: Lucid sample collected in March 2019. 2018 CCES data collected in November and December of 2018. Comparison statistics taken from the ANES 2016 Pilot Study available at:

TABLE A3.2: Item Wording for the Place Resentment Scale

<u>Items</u>	<u>10 item scale</u>	<u>4 item scale</u>
1. <u>Distributive 1</u> : My community gives more in taxes to [out] in my state than we get back.	X	
2. <u>Distributive 2</u> : When [in] are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give [out] special favors.	X	X
3. <u>Distributive 3</u> : We wouldn't have to waste tax dollars bailing out [out] in [R state] if people just moved away.	X	X
4. <u>Distributive 4</u> : Decades of technological and economic changes have made it difficult for some [in] and [in_adj] communities in [R state] to improve on their own.	X	X
5. <u>Representational 1</u> : In recent elections in [R state], there have been too many candidates who narrowly represent the interests of [out].	X	
6. <u>Representational 2</u> : [out] have too much say in [R state] politics.	X	X
7. <u>Representational 3</u>: Most politicians in [R state] understand the needs and problems of [in_adj] areas.*		
8. <u>Representational 4</u>: Government employees in state and federal agencies implement policies in a fair way to help people everywhere, including [in].*		
9. <u>Cultural 1</u> : People in [out] areas in [R state] don't understand or respect the [in_adj] lifestyle and what [in_noun] do for fun.	X	
10. <u>Cultural 2</u> : It's fair to say that [in_noun] in [R state] are harder working because it's more difficult to get by in [in] than [out].	X	
11. <u>Cultural 3</u> : Despite what some people say, [in] and [in_adj] communities are the "real America." (alternative: "... the "real [R state])	X	
12. <u>Cultural 4</u> : [in_adj] areas in [R state] have a distinct culture that is often misunderstood by people in [out].	X	
13. <u>Cultural 5</u>: [out] and the people who live in and around them make all of [R state] a better place to live.*		
Cronbach's alpha:	0.84	0.68
Cronbach's alpha rural:	0.85	0.69
Cronbach's alpha urban:	0.82	0.65

Items that are struck through did not load substantially on the factor and so were dropped to optimize the model.

Note: "[R state]" with R's state of residence.

Replace [in], [out], [in_adj], and [out_adj] based on respondent's place-type:

	[in]	[out]	[in_adj]	[in_noun]	[out_noun]
city & other:	cities	rural areas	urban	urbanites	small towns
Suburb:	suburbs	urban areas	suburban	suburbanites	cities
Rural area:	small towns	urban areas	rural	rural folks	cities

Question type: Matrix table / grid

Table A3.3: Exploratory Factor Analysis for Items Measuring Place Resentment

N°	Item	Wording	1	h^2	M	SD
1	cult1	People in [out] areas in [R state] don't understand or respect the [in_adj] lifestyle and what [in_noun] do for fun.	.64	.41	3.34	1.08
2	cult2	It's fair to say that [in_noun] in [R state] are harder working because it's more difficult to get by in [in] than [out].	.69	.53	3.22	1.15
3	cult3	Despite what some people say, [in] and [in_adj] communities are the "real America." (alternative: "... the "real [R state]).	.64	.40	3.51	1.14
4	cult4	[in_adj] areas in [R state] have a distinct culture that is often misunderstood by people in [out].	.58	.34	3.65	1.00
5	dist1	My community gives more in taxes to [out] in my state than we get back.	.58	.33	3.30	0.97
6	dist2	When [in] are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give [out] special favors.	.51	.26	3.61	1.02
7	dist3	We wouldn't have to waste tax dollars bailing out [out] in [R state] if people just moved away.	.54	.30	2.66	1.18
8	dist4	Decades of technological and economic changes have made it difficult for some [in] and [in_adj] communities in [R state] to improve on their own.	.53	.27	3.16	1.24
9	rep1	In recent elections in [R state], there have been too many candidates who narrowly represent the interests of [out].	.54	.30	2.93	1.17
10	rep2	[out] have too much say in [R state] politics.	.64	.41	2.97	1.10
Eigenvalue			3.48			
Cronbach's Alpha			.84			

Note. Factor analysis applying principle axis method and promax rotation; KMO = .90; $N = 1,714$.; item values are 5 pt. Likert style, with higher values indicating more agreement.

Table A3.4: CFA for Items Measuring Place Resntment (Full 10 item), Populism, Affective Polarization and Racial Resentment.

N°	Item	Wording	Factors						M	SD
			1	2	3	4	5	6		
1	place1	People in [out] areas in [R state] don't understand or respect the [in_adj] lifestyle and what [in_noun] do for fun.	.69						3.34	1.08
2	place2	Despite what some people say, [in] and [in_adj] communities are the "real America." (alternative: "... the "real [R state]).	.74						3.51	1.14
3	place3	[in_adj] areas in [R state] have a distinct culture that is often misunderstood by people in [out].	.60						2.93	1.17
4	place4	In recent elections in [R state], there have been too many candidates who narrowly represent the interests of [out].	.56						3.90	0.98
5	place5	My community gives more in taxes to [out] in my state than we get back.	.56						3.30	0.97
6	place6	When [in] are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give [out] special favors	.79						3.22	1.15
7	place7	We wouldn't have to waste tax dollars bailing out [out] in [R state] if people just moved away.	.52						3.61	1.02
8	place8	Decades of technological and economic changes have made it difficult for some [in] and [in_adj] communities in [R state] to improve on their own.	.62						2.66	1.18
9	place9	When [in] are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give [out] special favors	.65						3.15	1.24
10	place10	[out] have too much say in [R state] politics.	.74						3.15	1.20
11	anti1	MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people.		.72					4.12	.90
12	anti2	The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people.		.58					3.97	.99
13	anti3	People like me have no influence on what the government does.		.48					3.48	1.14
14	anti5	Politicians talk too much and take too little action.		.68					4.21	.87
15	sov1	The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.			.76				4.06	.94
16	sov2	The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken.			.71				4.11	.93
17	sov3	The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.			.73				3.92	.95
18	sov4	The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people.			.63				4.28	.85
19	hom1	Ordinary people all pull together.				.68			3.85	.88
20	hom2	Ordinary people are of good and honest character.				.69			3.78	.85

21	hom3	Ordinary people share the same values and interests.	.66		3.48	1.01
22	aff1	Most [conservatives/liberals] are motivated in part by their hatred of [poor people/for America].	.86		3.27	1.14
23	aff2	[Conservative/Liberals] are generally good people.*	.37		2.90	1.00
24	aff3	Most [conservatives/liberals] are [unsophisticated rednecks/lazy people who want government handouts].	.80		3.05	1.14
25	aff4	I generally dislike [conservatives/liberals].	.75		3.29	1.07
26	aff5	[Conservatives/Liberals] have gained so much power in American society that they are on the verge of destroying the country.	.78		3.74	1.08
27	race1	Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.		1.08	3.34	1.25
28	race2	Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.*		.70	2.86	1.35
29	race3	Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.*		.68	2.89	1.26
30	race4	It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.		.99	2.94	1.30
Cronbach's Alpha			.84	.72	.85	.78
(RMSEA = 0.067; SRMR = 0.055)						

Table A3.5: CFA for Items Measuring Place Resentment (Condensed 4-item), Populism, Affective Polarization and Racial Resentment.

N°	Item	Wording	Factors						M	SD
			1	2	3	4	5	6		
1	place1	People in [out] areas in [R state] don't understand or respect the [in_adj] lifestyle and what [in_noun] do for fun.	.46						3.30	1.25
2	place2	We wouldn't have to waste tax dollars bailing out [out] in [R state] if people just moved away.	.76						2.46	1.02
3	place3	Decades of technological and economic changes have made it difficult for some [in] and [in_adj] communities in [R state] to improve on their own.	.79						2.39	1.15
4	place4	[out] have too much say in [R state] politics.	.78						3.17	1.13
6	anti1	MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people.		.72					4.12	.90
7	anti2	The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people.		.58					3.97	.99
8	anti3	People like me have no influence on what the government does.		.48					3.48	1.14
9	anti5	Politicians talk too much and take too little action.		.68					4.21	.87
10	sov1	The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.			.76				4.06	.94
11	sov2	The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken.			.71				4.11	.93
12	sov3	The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.			.73				3.92	.95
13	sov4	The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people.			.63				4.28	.85
14	hom1	Ordinary people all pull together.				.68			3.85	.88
15	hom2	Ordinary people are of good and honest character.				.69			3.78	.85
16	hom3	Ordinary people share the same values and interests.				.66			3.48	1.01
18	aff1	Most [conservatives/liberals] are motivated in part by their hatred of [poor people/for America].					.86		3.27	1.14
19	aff2	[Conservative/Liberals] are generally good people.*					.37		2.90	1.00
20	aff3	Most [conservatives/liberals] are [unsophisticated rednecks/lazy people who want government handouts].					.80		3.05	1.14
21	aff4	I generally dislike [conservatives/liberals].					.74		3.29	1.07
22	aff5	[Conservatives/Liberals] have gained so much power in American society that they are on the verge of destroying the country.					.78		3.74	1.08
23	race1	Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.						1.08	3.34	1.25

24	race2	Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.*	.70	2.86	1.35						
25	race3	Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.*	.68	2.89	1.26						
26	race4	It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.	.99	2.94	1.30						
Cronbach's Alpha			.68	.72	.85	.78	.78	.78			

(RMSEA = 0.070; SRMR = 0.072).

Table A3.6: CFA for Items Measuring Place Resentment (Full 10 item), Place Attachment, and Place Identity.

			Factors				
N°	Item	Wording	1	2	3	M	SD
1	place1	People in [out] areas in [R state] don't understand or respect the [in_adj] lifestyle and what [in_noun] do for fun.	.69				
2	place2	Despite what some people say, [in] and [in_adj] communities are the “real America.” (alternative: “.... the “real [R state]).	.74			3.51	1.14
3	place3	[in_adj] areas in [R state] have a distinct culture that is often misunderstood by people in [out].	.60			2.93	1.17
4	place4	In recent elections in [R state], there have been too many candidates who narrowly represent the interests of [out].	.56			3.90	0.98
5	place5	My community gives more in taxes to [out] in my state than we get back.	.56			3.30	0.97
6	place6	When [in] are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give [out] special favors	.79			3.22	1.15
7	place7	We wouldn't have to waste tax dollars bailing out [out] in [R state] if people just moved away.	.52			3.61	1.02
8	place8	Decades of technological and economic changes have made it difficult for some [in] and [in_adj] communities in [R state] to improve on their own.	.62			2.66	1.18
9	place9	When [in] are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give [out] special favors	.65			3.15	1.24
10	place10	[out] have too much say in [R state] politics.	.74			3.15	1.20
11	attach1	I am happy living in my [in_adj] [R state] community		.90		3.89	1.13
12	attach2	I feel like I belong in my community.		.99		3.73	1.14
13	attach3	I would like to live in my community for a long time.		.98		3.67	1.22
14	attach4	I feel attached to my community		1.0		3.61	1.19
15	attach5	I would regret having to move away from my community.		.99		3.42	1.30
16	attach6	I feel at home in my community.		.94		3.92	1.10
17	iden1	Living in my [in_adj] [R state] community has helped make me who I am.			.82	3.55	1.21
18	iden2	My community is important to me.			.92	3.80	1.08
19	iden3	I feel that my community is part of me.			1.0	3.52	1.17
20	iden4	I identify with my community.			1.0	3.57	1.15
21	iden5	My community doesn't mean that much to me.*			.65	3.47	1.27
Cronbach's Alpha			.84	.93	.87		

(RMSEA = 0.067; SRMR = 0.055)


Table A3.7: Place Resentment and Evaluations of Urbanites and Ruralites

	Urbanite Feeling Thermometer (OLS)		Ruralite Feeling Thermometer (OLS)	
	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Rural</i>
	<i>Respondents</i>	<i>Respondents</i>	<i>Respondents</i>	<i>Respondents</i>
Place Resentment	-5.74 (5.09)	-40.13* (7.69)	-40.18* (4.82)	9.10 (7.37)
Racial Resentment	-11.36* (3.24)	-1.16 (4.87)	-2.86 (3.43)	3.14 (4.15)
Populism – Citizenry as Sovereign	0.92 (0.86)	2.97* (1.29)	0.97 (0.85)	2.52* (1.02)
Populism – Anti-Elite	-0.35 (0.92)	-1.36 (1.42)	0.49 (0.85)	0.74 (1.13)
Populism – Belief that People are Homogenous	1.55 (0.89)	4.14* (1.16)	2.97* (0.86)	2.36* (1.04)
Education	0.01 (0.98)	0.69 (0.60)	-0.56 (0.44)	1.07* (0.51)
Party ID --independent	-5.21* (2.62)	1.09 (3.00)	-4.89 (2.69)	4.46 (2.71)
--Republican	-2.02 (1.78)	-5.033* (2.47)	4.28* (1.80)	6.77* (2.24)
Age	0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.09* (0.04)	0.14* (0.05)
Male	-2.59 (1.46)	-2.40 (2.05)	-0.55 (1.49)	-0.34 (1.74)
Region --Midwest	-2.34 (2.25)	2.00 (2.97)	1.26 (2.22)	4.60 (2.72)
--South	1.36 (1.93)	-0.85 (2.59)	3.25 (1.99)	1.05 (2.37)
--West	-1.03 (2.00)	-4.21 (3.08)	2.36 (2.07)	-1.56 (2.78)

Household Income	0.19 (0.12)	-.04 (0.17)	0.05 (0.13)	-0.033 (0.15)
Place Perception	-1.92* (0.91)	-4.65 1.37*	1.49 (0.94)	-1.31 (1.16)
Place ID	17.54* (3.38)	11.84 (4.51)	14.35* (3.51)	27.75* (4.21)
White	1.21 (1.76)	-0.06 (2.81)	3.29 (1.81)	2.66 (2.95)
<i>N</i>	986	536	981	545
<i>R</i> ²	.09	.16	.17	.28


* $p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A3.1: Scree Plot of Eigenvalues from Factor Analysis of Place Resentment Scale



Note: The scree plot above shows one dominant dimension with a large difference between the eigenvalues of the first and second factors, and smaller differences between the next 8 eigenvalues. This is strongly suggestive of unidimensionality.

Figure A2: Means and Distributions of Place Resentment by Party ID (5 Cat)



Chapter 4

Political Advertising Content Analysis Guidebook Instructions for Coders

Place Appeal: reference to particular geographic considerations related to the district or state candidate seeks to represent.

Regarding *rhetoric*, do not count passing or incidental references to the state or district, such as phrases like “I am running to represent state x” or statements concerning how national policy priorities may benefit people such as workers more broadly, including those in their district. Also do not count mentions of places outside the relevant state or district if the candidate does not relate such mentions explicitly back to the state or district.

Regarding *imagery*, do not count scenes where the place is ambiguous, such as those in which the backdrop is too cropped in or blurry to make out where it is, or generic factory (or other) settings where the specific location is not readily apparent. Also do not count scenes from locales clearly outside the constituency (e.g., shots of the Capitol in the District of Columbia). The following count: shots of symbolic landscapes, rural/agricultural communities, city skylines, buildings, and other place specific features that members of the district could likely identify as being within the district or state. Examples of place imagery for a candidate running for US Senate in VA include: the city skyline of Richmond, VA, UVa’s Rotunda, a shot of the Blue Ridge, picturesque agricultural land in the Shenandoah valley, etc.

Threat to place: appeals suggest that the place (either the state or district as a whole or a particular locale within the state or district) is under attack, diminishing, in poor condition, or otherwise under threat. Only count if the nature of the threat is made rather explicit.

Place Imagery: appeals feature symbolic visual scenes that are implicitly suggested or explicitly identified as being part of the relevant state or district. For more on what counts and what does not, see the imagery description under the “place appeal” category description.

Do not count inside of buildings (such as factories) that aren't explicitly identified as being in the district. Do not count cropped in shots where the background scenery in background is not discernible. Do not count scenes in the back yard. Do not count scenes in the "paid for/and I approve this message" scene at the very beginning or end of ads.

Candidate in Place: appeals feature shots in which the candidate is pictured in place specific sites.

Urban-Rural: does the ad focus more upon urban or rural areas in the district or state? If there is no particular focus regarding the urban-rural continuum you should select “neither/both.” Similarly, if the focus is mostly on suburbs/exurbs, you should select “neither/both” and make note of this in the comment section at the bottom of the page. If the appeal focuses roughly equally on both urban and rural places you should select “neither/both.”

Candidate Mentioned or Shown

Code highest applicable category for the extent to which each candidate appears or is referred to:

4 Picture, video, or audio: image or clearly-identifiable voice of the candidate in the ad itself (not the “paid for” section).

3 Actual Name: reference to the candidate’s name (not simply “my opponent”), in spoken words or visual text in the ad itself.

2 In ‘paid for’ only: avored candidate named and/or pictured in the statement of who paid for, approved, or authorized the ad.

2 Vague/generic only (for opponent): reference to the opponent that does not say actual name or show image (e.g. “my opponent” or “the incumbent”).

1 NO reference: there is no reference whatsoever to the candidate.

TRAIT

Be sure to identify specific element(s) for any trait you code.

Rootedness: Preferred candidate: the appeal emphasizes the preferred candidate’s connections to the place, such as multi-generational family ties, birth, or years spent living in the place.

Opposing candidate: the ad portrays the opposing candidate as an outsider lacking credible roots to the state or district.

Screenshots of the Political Ads Content Analysis User Interface Used by Coders

Screenshot of interface coders used for ads deemed place appeals. Red ink were content categories that were included in testing, but did not achieve high intercoder reliability to be retained for the full study:

YOUR UVA ID IS 0KMDAC
You have 58 ads available for coding

MUNIS UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Political Cognition Laboratory

Political advertisement

traits from the positive or negative tone of the ad:

- **Place defender:** Preferred candidate: the appeal characterizes the favored candidate as one who will defend the place on the national stage from interests who may harm her. Opposing candidate: characterizes the opposing candidate as one who will betray the place for personal, partisan, or other gain.
- **Rootedness:** Preferred candidate: the appeal emphasizes the preferred candidate's connections to the place, such as multi-generational family ties, birth, or years spent living in the place. Opposing candidate: the ad portrays the opposing candidate as an outsider lacking credible roots to the state or district.
- **Place Values:** Preferred candidate: the appeal portrays the preferred candidate as possessing a distinctive set of values that have been shaped significantly by the state or district. Opposing candidate: the ad portrays the opposing candidate as possessing values that are opposed to

Does ad include a place appeal? ☐ no ☒ yes

Does the place appeal portray a threat to place? ☐ no ☒ yes

Does the ad feature place imagery? ☐ no ☒ yes

Does the favored candidate appear in place? ☐ no ☒ yes

Is the place appeal directed primarily at urban or rural voters? ☐ urban ☐ rural ☒ both ☐ neither

To what extent does the ad focus on place? ☒ misses theme ☐ minor theme ☐ major theme

Is the appeal populist? ☐ no ☒ yes

Favored Candidate **Opponent**

To what extent is candidate mentioned or shown?

Favored Candidate: ☒ 4 Picture, video, or audio ☐ 3 Actual name ☐ 2 In 'paid for' only ☐ 1 NO reference

Opponent: ☒ 4 Picture, video, or audio ☐ 3 Actual name ☐ 2 Vague/generic only ☐ 1 NO reference

Traits

Place defender: ☒ no ☐ defender ☐ no ☐ place-traitor

Rootedness: ☒ no ☐ rooted ☐ no ☐ outsider

Place values: ☒ no ☐ has place values ☐ no ☐ lacks place values

Place first: ☒ no ☐ puts place first ☐ no ☐ puts over place

Where would you place each candidate based on this ad?

Favored Candidate: very liberal 50 very conserv.

Opponent: very liberal 10 very conserv.

Click if you have any concerns or comments about coding this ad

Please explain briefly

Screenshot of interface once coder discerned it was not a place appeal:

YOUR UVA ID IS 0KMDAC
You have 58 ads available for coding

MUNIS UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Political Cognition Laboratory

Political advertisement

traits from the positive or negative tone of the ad:

- **Place defender:** Preferred candidate: the appeal characterizes the favored candidate as one who will defend the place on the national stage from interests who may harm her. Opposing candidate: characterizes the opposing candidate as one who will betray the place for personal, partisan, or other gain.
- **Rootedness:** Preferred candidate: the appeal emphasizes the preferred candidate's connections to the place, such as multi-generational family ties, birth, or years spent living in the place. Opposing candidate: the ad portrays the opposing candidate as an outsider lacking credible roots to the state or district.
- **Place Values:** Preferred candidate: the appeal portrays the preferred candidate as possessing a distinctive set of values that have been shaped significantly by the state or district. Opposing candidate: the ad portrays the opposing candidate as possessing values that are opposed to

Does ad include a place appeal? ☐ no ☒ yes

Is the appeal populist? ☐ no ☒ yes

Favored Candidate **Opponent**

To what extent is candidate mentioned or shown?

Favored Candidate: ☒ 4 Picture, video, or audio ☐ 3 Actual name ☐ 2 In 'paid for' only ☐ 1 NO reference

Opponent: ☒ 4 Picture, video, or audio ☐ 3 Actual name ☐ 2 Vague/generic only ☐ 1 NO reference

Traits

Place defender

Rootedness

Place values

Place first

Where would you place each candidate based on this ad?

Favored Candidate: very liberal 85 very conserv.

Opponent: very liberal 17 very conserv.

Click if you have any concerns or comments about coding this ad

Please explain briefly

Table A4.1: Advertising Content Analysis Intercoder Reliability

	Krippendorff's Alpha
Place Appeal	0.88
Place Imagery	0.67
Urban-Rural	0.80
Place Threat	0.65
Rootedness	0.63
Candidate in Place	0.69
Candidate Mentioned	0.92
<i>N</i>	187

Table A4.2: Survey Sample Statistics

	MTurk Sample	ANES 2016 Pilot Study
Age	37.30	48.06
% Male	52.41	47.50
% White	56.34	72.91
% College Degree	60.43	35.83
% Republican	27.97	32.08
<i>N</i>	879	1200

Chapter 5

Table A5.1: Survey Sample Statistics

	Lucid Sample	2018 CCES Module	2016 ANES
Age	44.42	48.01	49.58
% Female	51.58	56.50	51.30
% White	74.61	74.10	68.8
% Democratic	48.15	44.50	45.6
N	2000	1000	4217

Source: Lucid sample collected in March 2019. 2018 CCES data collected in November and December of 2018. Comparison statistics taken from the ANES 2016 Pilot Study available at:

TABLE A5.2: Item Wording for the Place Identity Scale

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>
<u>Item 1:</u> Living in my [place_adj] [Respondent_state] community has helped make me who I am.	3.55	1.21
<u>Item 2:</u> My community is important to me.	3.79	1.08
<u>Item 3:</u> I feel that my community is part of me.	3.52	1.17
<u>Item 4:</u> I identify with my community.	3.58	1.15
<u>Item 5:</u> My community doesn't mean that much to me.	3.47	1.27
Cronbach's alpha = 0.87		

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs)

While marginal means are more appropriate for interests in the paper, I also calculate the AMCEs for each attribute level, since this is the most conventionally reported in papers using conjoint design. As Hainmueller et al. (2014) detail, AMCEs have a clear casual interpretation. Baseline categories are those attribute levels whose points in the Figures below that lie precisely at 0 and have no confidence interval band.

AMCE equation:

$$\Sigma\{EY_{ijk}|T_{ijkl} = t_1, T_{ijk[-l]} = t, \mathbf{T}_{i[-j]k} = \mathbf{t}\} - E[Y_{ijk}|T_{ijkl} = t_0, T_{ijk[-l]} = t, \mathbf{T}_{i[-j]k} = \mathbf{t}]\} * p[T_{ijk[-l]} = t, \mathbf{T}_{i[-j]k} = \mathbf{t} | (T_{ijk[-l]}, \mathbf{T}_{i[-j]k}) \in \tilde{T}]$$

Where:

i = any given respondent

l = component number (attribute level number)

j = profile number

k = choice task

t_x = profile set

$T_{ijk[-l]}$ = vector of $L - 1$ treatment components, where L equals the total number of components

\tilde{T} = intersection of support of the first and second halves of the equation (those parts of the equation on either side of the multiplication symbol)

The above estimated quantity represents the effect of a given attribute level on the probability that a profile is selected, marginalizing over the distribution of other attributes.

Figure A1. Average Marginal Component Effects for All Conjoint Decision Tasks




Figure A2. Average Marginal Component Effects for Primary Election Conjoint Decision Tasks




Figure A3. Average Marginal Component Effects for General Election Conjoint Decision Tasks




Figure A5.3: Predicted Republican Party Feeling Thermometer Values at Different Levels of Place Consciousness Across the Urban-Rural Continuum




Table A5.3: Place Resentment and American Electoral Politics

	<u>Republican Party Feeling</u>			<u>Democratic Party Feeling</u>			<u>2016 Trump Vote</u>	<u>Nov. 2018 Trump</u>
	<u>Thermometer (OLS)</u>			<u>Thermometer (OLS)</u>			<u>(Probit)</u>	<u>Approval (Probit)</u>
	<i>Full Scale</i>	<i>5 item</i>	<i>4 item</i>	<i>Full Scale</i>	<i>5 item</i>	<i>4 item</i>	<i>4 item (CCES)</i>	<i>4 item (CCES)</i>
Place Resentment X Place Perception	0.06 (2.32)	0.19 (2.16)	0.09 (1.97)	-8.17* (2.59)	-6.85* (2.38)	-6.91 (3.72)	--	--
Place Resentment X Place Category (CCES) -- Suburban	--	--	--	--	--	--	-2.44* (1.09)	-1.02 (1.00)
-- Rural	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.14 (1.21)	1.32 (1.02)
Place Resentment	14.64 (8.12)	11.22 (7.48)	9.57 (6.83)	31.28* (9.45)	25.77* (8.64)	23.01* (7.51)	2.10* (0.72)	0.91 (0.71)
Racial Resentment	25.02* (2.91)	25.62* (2.91)	24.87* (2.88)	-17.90* (2.91)	-15.11* (3.15)	-18.90* (2.90)	2.04* (0.47)	1.95* (0.40)
Populism – Citizenry as Sovereign	-1.08 (0.73)	-1.07 (0.73)	-0.97 (0.73)	0.53 (0.75)	0.60 (0.75)	-27.62* (11.13)	--	--
Populism – Anti-Elite	-4.09* (0.79)	-4.04* (2.98)	-3.89* (0.78)	-4.70* (0.76)	-4.71* (0.77)	-4.62 (0.76)	--	--
Populism – Homogenous Population	2.91* (0.76)	2.98* (0.75)	3.09* (0.75)	2.27* (0.80)	2.30* (0.80)	2.23* (0.80)	--	--
Education	-0.04 (0.35)	-0.04 (0.35)	-0.07 (0.34)	0.73 (0.37)	0.06 (0.37)	0.09 (0.37)	-0.07 (0.20)	-0.33 (0.19)
Party ID – independent	6.74* (2.06)	6.69* (2.05)	6.50* (2.03)	-33.54* (2.17)	-33.63* (2.17)	-33.15* (2.16)	1.21* (0.24)	0.89* (0.23)
--Republican	41.43* (1.61)	41.39 (1.61)	41.52* (1.61)	-42.51* (1.63)	-42.45* (1.63)	-42.38 (1.63)	2.45* (0.25)	2.35* (0.22)
Age	-0.94* (0.37)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.27)	0.00 (0.01)
Male	1.02 1.22	1.26 (1.21)	0.97 (1.21)	-1.24 (1.27)	-1.02 (1.26)	-1.45 (1.27)	0.20 (0.20)	0.37* (0.16)

Region								
--Midwest	0.24 (1.81)	0.7 (1.80)	0.17 (1.80)	2.24 (1.84)	2.05 (1.84)	2.08 (1.85)	-0.10 (0.38)	0.37 (0.27)
--South	3.83* (1.63)	3.72* (1.61)	3.88* (1.62)	1.65 (1.65)	1.35 (1.65)	1.60 (1.65)	-0.38 (0.34)	0.04 (0.24)
--West	-0.58 (1.77)	-0.53 (1.77)	-0.80 (1.76)	-0.43 (1.73)	-0.48 (1.73)	-0.84 (1.72)	-0.87* (0.36)	-0.02 (0.27)
Household Income	0.01 (0.10)	0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.08 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Place Perception (Continuous)	-0.79 1.42	-0.70 (0.61)	-0.79 (1.17)	3.86* (1.58)	3.30* (1.53)	2.11 (1.26)	--	--
Place Category (Categorical)-- Suburban	--	--	--	--	((1.63* (0.63)	0.67 (0.50)
--Rural	--	--	--	--	((-0.64 (0.69)	-0.69 (0.58)
Place ID	12.12* (2.79)	12.53* (2.81)	13.12* (2.75)	4.29 (2.91)	4.44 (2.95)	4.58 (2.86)	--	--
Sexism	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.08 (0.30)	1.37 (0.30)
White	1.47* (1.59)	63.32* (8.94)	61.23* (8.91)	0.09 (1.67)	-57.78* (8.63)	-58.07* (8.63)	-0.00 (0.27)	-0.31 (0.21)
<i>N</i>	1454	1461	1465	1482	1490	1493	600	724
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	.55	.54	.55	.51	.51	.51		
<i>Pseudo R²</i>							.75	.69

* $p < 0.05$ Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5.4: Place Consciousness and Differences in Evaluations of the Parties

Place Consciousness X Place Perception	8.11* (0.02)
Place Consciousness	-17.68 (11.90)
Racial Resentment	43.94* (4.24)
Populism – Citizenry as Sovereign	-1.77 (1.04)
Populism – Anti-Elite	0.75 (10.06)
Populism – Homogenous Population	0.55 (1.88)
Education	-0.13 (0.52)
Party ID	
--independent	39.43* (2.46)
--Republican	82.95* (2.35)
Age	-0.10 (0.05)
Male	2.04 (1.79)
Region	
--Midwest	-1.06 (2.61)
--South	2.85 (1.79)
--West	0.79 (2.47)
Household Income	-0.04 (0.15)
Place Perception	-4.50* (2.06)

Place ID	7.63* (4.22)
White	0.66 (2.35)
<hr/>	
N	1405
R^2	.67
<hr/>	

*OLS regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). * $P < 0.05$*

Chapter 6

No supplementary information associated with the last chapter.

References

- Abramowitz, A. I. (1994). Issue evolution reconsidered: Racial attitudes and partisanship in the US electorate. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1-24.
- Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2008). Is polarization a myth?. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(2), 542-555.
- Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2016). *Democracy for Realists: Why elections do not produce responsive government*. Princeton University Press.
- Agnew, J. A. (2014). *Place and Politics (Routledge Library Editions: Political Geography): The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* (Vol. 1). Routledge.
- Albertson, B., & Kushner Gadarian, S. (2017). Forum on The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker and Anxious Politics. *Political Psychology*.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verso books.
- Andreweg, R. B. 1982. *Dutch Voters Adrift: On Explanations of Electoral Change 1963-1977* (Doctoral dissertation, Leiden University).
- Ansolabehere, S., Snyder Jr, J. M., & Stewart III, C. (2000). Old voters, new voters, and the personal vote: Using redistricting to measure the incumbency advantage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 17-34.
- Anton, C. E., & Lawrence, C. (2014). Home is where the heart is: The effect of place of residence on place attachment and community participation. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 40, 451-461.
- Aspin, L. T., & Hall, W. K. (1987). The friends and neighbors effect in judicial retention elections. *Western Political Quarterly*, 40(4), 703-715.
- Atkeson, L. R., & Hamel, B. T. (2018). Fit for the Job: Candidate Qualifications and Vote Choice in Low Information Elections. *Political Behavior*, 1-24.
- Bell, M. M. (1992). The fruit of difference: The rural-urban continuum as a system of identity. *Rural Sociology*, 57(1), 65-82.
- Bergé, L. (2018). "Efficient estimation of maximum likelihood models with multiple fixed-effects: the R package FENmlm." *CREA Discussion Papers*.
- Bess, K. D., Fisher, A. T., Sonn, C. C., & Bishop, B. J. (2002). Psychological sense of community: Theory, research, and application. In *Psychological Sense of Community* (pp. 3-22). Springer, Boston, MA.
- Bishop, B. (2009). *The Big Sort: Why the clustering of like-minded America is tearing us apart*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Black, E., & M. Black. (1989). *Politics and Society in the South*. Harvard University Press.

- Bloom, H. S., & Price, H. D. (1975). Voter response to short-run economic conditions: The asymmetric effect of prosperity and recession. *American Political Science Review*, 69(4), 1240-1254.
- Blumer, H. (1986). *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. University of California Press.
- Bond, J. R., Fleisher, R., & Talbert, J. C. (1997). Partisan differences in candidate quality in open seat House races, 1976-1994. *Political Research Quarterly*, 50(2), 182-299.
- Bowen, W. M., Haynes, M. E., & Rosentraub, M. S. (2006). Cities, tax revenues, and a state's fiscal future: the value of major urban centers. *Public Budgeting & Finance*, 26(1), 47-65.
- Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Snipp, J. (1993). Local sources of information and voter choice in state elections: Microlevel foundations of the " friends and neighbors" effect. *American Politics Quarterly*, 21(4), 473-489.
- Brady, H. E., & Sniderman, P. M. (1985). Attitude attribution: A group basis for political reasoning. *American Political Science Review*, 79(04), 1061-1078.
- Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses. *Political Analysis*, 14(1), 63-82.
- Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and content of social identity threat. *Social identity: Context, commitment, content*, 35-58.
- Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17(5), 475-482.
- Brunk, G. G., Ramesh, S., & Adams, J. (1988). Contagion-based voting in Birmingham, Alabama. *Political Geography Quarterly*, 7(1), 39-47.
- Bullock, C. S., III. (1994). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districting formats, and the election of African Americans. *Journal of Politics*, 56(4), 1098-1105.
- Cain, B., Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. (1987). *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P.E., Miller, W., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American Voter*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Carbaugh, D., & Cerulli, T. (2013). Cultural discourses of dwelling: Investigating environmental communication as a place-based practice. *Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture*, 7(1), 4-23.
- Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4), 417-439.
- Carmines, E. G., & Schmidt, E. R. (2017). A Discussion of Katherine J. Cramer's *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 527-528.

- Carnes, N., & Sadin, M. L. (2015). The “Mill Worker’s Son” Heuristic: How voters perceive politicians from working-class families-and how they really behave in office. *Journal of Politics*, 77(1), 285–298.
- Caruso, E. M., Rahnev, D. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Using Conjoint Analysis to Detect Discrimination: Revealing Covert Preferences from Overt Choices. *Social Cognition*, 27(1), 128-137.
- Childs, S., & Cowley, P. (2011). The politics of local presence: Is there a case for descriptive representation?. *Political Studies*, 59(1), 1-19.
- Clayton, K., Ferwerda, J., & Horiuchi, Y. (2019). Exposure to Immigration and Admission Preferences: Evidence From France. *Political Behavior*.
- Coffey, D. (2014). Issue Ownership vs. Conflict Extension: Understanding State Party Polarization. Paper presented at the State Politics and Policy Conference, May 15, Bloomington, Indiana.
- Collignon, S. & Sajuria, J. E. (2018). Local means local, does it? Regional identification and preferences for local candidates. *Electoral Studies*, 56, 170-178.
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. *Critical Review*, 18(1-3), 1-74.
- Coppock, A., & McClellan, O. A. (2019). Validating the demographic, political, psychological, and experimental results obtained from a new source of online survey respondents. *Research & Politics*, 6(1), 2053168018822174.
- Cramer, K. J. (2016). *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. University of Chicago Press.
- Crespin, M. H., & Finocchiaro, C. J. (2013). Elections and the Politics of Pork in the US Senate. *Social Science Quarterly*, 94(2), 506-529.
- Cuba, L., & Hummon, D. M. (1993). A Place to Call Home: Identification with dwelling, community, and region. *Sociological Quarterly*, 34(1), 111-131.
- Cuba, L., & Hummon, D. M. (1993). Constructing a sense of home: Place affiliation and migration across the life cycle. In *Sociological Forum* (Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 547-572).
- Cutler, F. (2007). Context and attitude formation: Social interaction, default information, or local interests?. *Political Geography*, 26(5), 575-600.
- Darr, J. P., Hitt, M. P., & Dunaway, J. L. (2018). Newspaper Closures Polarize Voting Behavior. *Journal of Communication*, 68(6), 1007-1028.
- Davis, D. (2017). A Discussion of Katherine J. Cramer's *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 525-526.
- Doosje, B., Spears, R., & Ellemers, N. (2002). Social identity as both cause and effect: The development of group identification in response to anticipated and actual changes in the intergroup status hierarchy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 41(1), 57-76.

- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Dudas, J. R. (2017). A Discussion of Katherine J. Cramer's *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 523-524.
- Durkheim, E. (1893). *The Division of Labor in Society*. Simon and Schuster.
- Eatwell, R. (2000). The rebirth of the 'extreme right' in Western Europe?. *Parliamentary affairs*, 53(3), 407-425.
- Eliasoph, N. (2017). Forum Book Symposium: The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. *Political Communication*, 34(1), 138-141.
- Enos, R. D. (2017). *The Space Between Us: Social Geography and Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Esarey, J., & Sumner, J. L. (2018). Marginal effects in interaction models: Determining and controlling the false positive rate. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(9), 1144-1176.
- Fenno, R. F. (1978). *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Longman Classics Series)*. London, England: Longman Publishing Group.
- Fenno, R. F. (1998). *Senators on the campaign trail: The politics of representation* (Vol. 6). University of Oklahoma Press.
- Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2005). Culture war. *The myth of a polarized America*.
- Fischer, C. S. (2002). Ever-more rooted Americans. *City & Community*, 1(2), 177-198.
- Fitzgerald, J. (2018). *Close to Home: Local Ties and Voting Radical Right in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Forrest, R., & Kearns, A. (2001). Social cohesion, social capital and the neighbourhood. *Urban studies*, 38(12), 2125-2143.
- Fowler, E. F., & Ridout, T. N. (2013, February). Negative, angry, and ubiquitous: Political advertising in 2012. In *The Forum* (Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 51-61). De Gruyter.
- Frasure-Yokley, L., & Wilcox-Archuleta, B. (2019). Geographic Identity and Attitudes toward Undocumented Immigrants. *Political Research Quarterly*, 1065912919843349.
- Freedman, P., & Goldstein, K. (1999). Measuring media exposure and the effects of negative campaign ads. *American journal of Political Science*, 1189-1208.
- Freedman, P., Franz, M., & Goldstein, K. (2004). Campaign advertising and democratic citizenship. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4), 723-741.

- Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 4(1), 1-26.
- Gilroy, P. (2013). *There ain't no black in the Union Jack*. Routledge.
- Gimpel, J. G. (1996). *National Elections and the Autonomy of American State Party Systems*. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Gimpel, J. G., & Karnes, K. A. (2006). The rural side of the urban-rural gap. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 39(3), 467-472.
- Gimpel, J. G., Karnes, K. A., McTague, J., & Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2008). Distance-decay in the political geography of friends-and-neighbors voting. *Political Geography*, 27(2), 231-252.
- Goggin, S. N. (2016). *Personal Politicians: Biography and its role in the minds of voters* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley).
- Goldstein, K., & Freedman, P. (2002). Campaign advertising and voter turnout: New evidence for a stimulation effect. *Journal of Politics*, 64(3), 721-740.
- Grant, P. R., & Brown, R. (1995). From ethnocentrism to collective protest: Responses to relative deprivation and threats to social identity. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 195-212.
- Green, D. P., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2004). *Partisan hearts and minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters*. Yale University Press.
- Grimmer, J. (2013 a.). Appropriators not position takers: The distorting effects of electoral incentives on congressional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3), 624-642.
- Grimmer, J. (2013 b.). *Representational style in Congress: What legislators say and why it matters*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hayes, D., & Lawless, J. L. (2016). *Women on the run: Gender, media, and political campaigns in a polarized era*. Cambridge University Press.
- Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2010). Random events, economic losses, and retrospective voting: Implications for democratic competence. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 5(2), 193-208.
- Heersink, B., & Peterson, B. D. (2016). Measuring the vice-presidential home state advantage with synthetic controls. *American Politics Research*, 44(4), 734-763.
- Heersink, B., Peterson, B. D., & Jenkins, J. A. (2017). Disasters and elections: Estimating the net effect of damage and relief in historical perspective. *Political Analysis*, 25(2), 260-268.
- Henry, P. J., & Sears, D. O. (2002). The symbolic racism 2000 scale. *Political Psychology*, 23(2), 253-283.
- Hernández, B., Hidalgo, M. C., Salazar-Laplace, M. E., & Hess, S. (2007). Place attachment and place identity in natives and non-natives. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 27(4), 310-319.

- Herrnson, P. S., & Patterson, K. D. (2000). Agenda setting and campaign advertising in congressional elections. *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections*, 96-112.
- Herschey, M.R. (2017). Forum Book Symposium: The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. *Political Communication*, 34(1), 134-137.
- Hess, D. J., & Gottlieb, R. (2009). *Localist movements in a global economy: Sustainability, justice, and urban development in the United States*. MIT Press.
- Hidalgo, M. C., & Hernandez, B. (2001). Place attachment: Conceptual and empirical questions. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 21(3), 273-281.
- Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M. (2008). Structural equation modelling: Guidelines for determining model fit. *Articles*, 2.
- Hopkins, D. A. (2017). *Red Fighting Blue: How Geography and Electoral Rules Polarize American Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hopkins, D. J. (2010). Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), 40-60.
- Hopkins, D. J. (2018). *The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized*. University of Chicago Press.
- Hooghe, M., & Dassonneville, R. (2018). Explaining the Trump vote: The effect of racist resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 51(3), 528-534.
- Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling*, 6(1), 1-55.
- Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. *Political Psychology*, 22(1), 127-156.
- Huddy, L. (2003). "Group Identity and Political Cohesion." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 511-58. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Huddy, L. (2013). From group identity to political cohesion and commitment. *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 737-773.
- Hunt, C. R. (n.d.). Beyond Partisanship: District Roots and Reelection in the Modern Congress.
- Hunt, C. R. (n.d.). Power of the Personal: How District Roots Dictate Legislator Campaign Spending.
- Iyengar, S. (1994). *Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). *News that matters: Television and American opinion*. University of Chicago Press.

- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 76(3), 405-431.
- Jacobs, N., & Ceaser, J. W. (2016, December). The 2016 Presidential Election by the Numbers and in Historical Perspective. *The Forum* 14(4), 361-383.
- Jacobs, N.F., & Munis, B. K. (2018). Place Based Imagery and Voter Evaluations: Experimental Evidence on the Politics of Place, *Political Research Quarterly*, 72(2), 263-277.
- Jacobson, G. C. (2017). The Triumph of polarized partisanship in 2016: Donald Trump's improbable victory. *Political Science Quarterly*, 132(1), 9-42.
- James, W. (1890). *The Principles of Psychology*. New York. Holt and company.
- Jankowski, M. (2016). Voting for locals: Voters' information processing strategies in open-list PR systems. *Electoral Studies*, 43, 72-84.
- Jardina, A. (2019). *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jennings, M. K., & Niemi, R. G. (2014). *Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents* (Vol. 68). Princeton University Press.
- Jennings, M. K., Stoker, L., & Bowers, J. (2009). Politics Across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(3), 782-799.
- Johnson-Grey, K. M. (2018). *Expressing Values and Group Identity Through Behavior and Language* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California).
- Johnston, R. J. (1974). Local effects in voting at a local election. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 64(3), 418-429.
- Kasarda, J. D., & Janowitz, M. (1974). Community Attachment in Mass Society. *American Sociological Review*, 328-339.
- Keith, M. (2005). *After the cosmopolitan?: Multicultural cities and the future of racism*. Routledge.
- Key, V.O. (1949). *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: A.A. Knopf
- Kinder, D. R., & Dale-Riddle, A. (2012). *The end of race?: Obama, 2008, and racial politics in America*. Yale University Press.
- Kinder, D. R., & Kam, C. D. (2010). *Us against them: Ethnocentric foundations of American opinion*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, D. R., & Kalmoe, N. P. (2017). *Neither Liberal Nor Conservative: Ideological innocence in the American public*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. (1996). *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40(3), 414.

- King, A. (1997). The vulnerable American politician. *British Journal of Political Science*, 27(1), 1-22.
- King, G. (1996). Why Context Should Not Count. *Political Geography*, 15(2), 159-164.
- Kingston, S., Mitchell, R., Florin, P., & Stevenson, J. (1999). Sense of community in neighborhoods as a multi-level construct. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 27(6), 681-694.
- Kirkland, P. A., & Coppock, A. (2018). Candidate choice without party labels. *Political Behavior*, 40(3), 571-591.
- Klar, S. (2018). When Common Identities Decrease Trust: An Experimental Study of Partisan Women. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3), 610-622.
- Knuckey, J. (2011). Racial resentment and vote choice in the 2008 US presidential election. *Politics & Policy*, 39(4), 559-582.
- Knuckey, J., & Kim, M. (2015). Racial resentment, old-fashioned racism, and the vote choice of Southern and Nonsouthern whites in the 2012 US presidential election. *Social Science Quarterly*, 96(4), 905-922.
- Lalli, M. (1992). Urban-related identity: Theory, measurement, and empirical findings. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 12(4), 285-303.
- Lauwe, P. H. C. D. (1956). *La vie quotidienne des familles ouvrières*.
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. (1944). *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.
- Lee, F. E. (2004). Bicameralism and geographic politics: Allocating funds in the House and Senate. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 29(2), 185-213.
- Leeper TJ (2019). *cregg: Simple Conjoint Analyses and Visualization*. R package version 0.3.1.
- Leeper, T. J., Hobolt, S. B., & Tilley, J. (2020). Measuring subgroup preferences in conjoint experiments. *Political Analysis*, 28(2), 207-221.
- Leonardelli, G. J., Pickett, C. L., & Brewer, M. B. (2010). Optimal distinctiveness theory: A framework for social identity, social cognition, and intergroup relations. In *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 43, pp. 63-113). Academic Press.
- Levendusky, M. (2009). *The Partisan Sort: How liberals became Democrats and conservatives became Republicans*. University of Chicago Press.
- Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Rice, T. W. (1983). Localism in presidential elections: The home state advantage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 548-556.
- Lubbers, M., & Coenders, M. (2017). Nationalistic attitudes and voting for the radical right in Europe. *European Union Politics*, 18(1), 98-118.
- Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can citizens learn what they need to know?*. Cambridge University Press.

- Margolis, M. F. (2018). *From politics to the pews: How partisanship and the political environment shape religious identity*. University of Chicago Press.
- Martin, G. J., & McCrain, J. (2019). Local news and national politics. *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), 372-384.
- Mason, L. (2016). A cross-cutting calm: How social sorting drives affective polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 80(S1), 351-377.
- Mason, L. (2018). *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity*. University of Chicago Press.
- Mason, L., & Wronski, J. (2018). One tribe to bind them all: How our social group attachments strengthen partisanship. *Political Psychology*, 39, 257-277.
- Mayhew, D. R. (1974). *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (Vol. 26). Yale University Press.
- McDermott, M. L. (1997). Voting cues in low-information elections: Candidate gender as a social information variable in contemporary United States elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(1), 270-283.
- McDermott, M. L. (1998). Race and gender cues in low-information elections. *Political Research Quarterly*, 51(4), 895-918.
- Michelson, M. R. (2005). Does ethnicity trump party? Competing vote cues and Latino voting behavior. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 4(4), 1-25.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, Self and Society*. University of Chicago Press.: Chicago.
- McClain, P. D., Johnson Carew, J. D., Walton Jr, E., & Watts, C. S. (2009). Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of racial identity in American politics?. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 471-485.
- McClay, W., & McAllister, T. (Eds.). (2014). *Why Place Matters: Geography, Identity, and Civic Life in Modern America*. Encounter Books.
- Meredith, M. (2013). Exploiting friends-and-neighbors to estimate coattail effects. *American Political Science Review*, 107(4), 742-765.
- Milgram, S. (1970). The experience of living in cities. *Science*, 167(3924), 1461-1468.
- Miller, A. H. (1990). Public judgments of Senate and House candidates. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 525-542.
- Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981). Group Consciousness and Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 494-511.
- Miller, W. E., Shanks, J. M., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1996). *The new American voter* (pp. 47405-7103). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Millington, G. (2011). *'Race', Culture and the Right to the City: Centres, Peripheries, Margins*. Springer.

- Mondak, J. J. (1993). Public opinion and heuristic processing of source cues. *Political Behavior*, 29(2), 167–192.
- Moore, D. (2012). Subaltern struggles and the politics of place: Remapping resistance in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands. *Cultural Anthropology*, 13(3), 344-381.
- Munis, B. K. (2015). The Occurrence of Place-Based Narrative in US Senatorial Campaign Advertisements, Unpublished MA Thesis.
- Munis, B. K. (2018, November 02). Race for the Senate 2018: Key issues in Montana. *Brookings Institution*. Retrieved January 31, 2019, from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/10/26/race-for-the-senate-2018-key-issues-in-montana/>
- Nanzer, B. (2004). Measuring sense of place: a scale for Michigan. *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 26(3), 362-382.
- Nemerever, Z., & Rogers, M. (n.d.). Measuring the Rural Continuum in Political Science. Unpublished Working Paper.
- Nicholson, S. P., & Hansford, T. G. (2014). Partisans in robes: Party cues and public acceptance of Supreme Court decisions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(3), 620-636.
- Ono, Y., & Burden, B. C. (2018). The contingent effects of candidate sex on voter choice. *Political Behavior*, 1-25.
- Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1990). *The cognitive Structure of Emotions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Osborne, B. S. (2006). From native pines to diasporic geese: Placing culture, setting our sites, locating identity in a transnational Canada. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 31(1).
- Paasi, A. (2003). Region and place: regional identity in question. *Progress in Human Geography*, 27(4), 475-485.
- Paddock, J. (2005) *State and National Parties and American Democracy*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Panagopoulos, C., & Bailey, K. (2019). “Friends-and-Neighbors” Mobilization: A Field Experimental Replication and Extension. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 1-14.
- Panagopoulos, C., Leighley, J. E., & Hamel, B. T. (2017) Are Voters Mobilized by a ‘Friend-and-Neighbor’ on the Ballot? Evidence from a Field Experiment. *Political Behavior*, 1-18.
- Parker, D. C. (2014). *Battle for the Big Sky: Representation and the Politics of Place in the Race for the US Senate*. CQ Press.
- Parker, D. C. (2018). Following Fenno: Learning from Senate Candidates in the Age of Social Media and Party Polarization. In *The Forum* (Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 145-170).
- Parker, D. C., & Goodman, C. (2013). Our state’s never had better friends: Resource allocation, home styles, and dual representation in the Senate. *Political Research Quarterly*, 66(2), 370-384.
- Phillips, K. P. (1969). *The Emerging Republican Majority*. Princeton University Press.

- Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1997). *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford University Press.
- Popkin, S. L. (1994). *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Proshansky, H. M., Fabian, A. K., & Kaminoff, R. (1983). Place-identity: Physical world socialization of the self. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 3(1), 57-83.
- Radford, J., & Sinclair, B. (2016). *Electronic Homestyle: Tweeting Ideology*. Working Paper.
- Reeves, A., & Gimpel, J. G. (2012). Ecologies of Unease: Geographic context and national economic evaluations. *Political Behavior*, 34(3), 507-534.
- Rhodes, J., & Brown, L. (2018). The rise and fall of the ‘inner city’: race, space and urban policy in postwar England. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1-17.
- Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6(2), 88-106.
- Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling and more. Version 0.5–12 (BETA). *Journal of statistical software*, 48(2), 1-36.
- Sadin, M. L. (2014). *A wealth of ambivalence: How stereotypes about the rich matter for political attitudes and candidate choice*. PhD thesis, Princeton University.
- Scannell, L., & Gifford, R. (2010). The relations between natural and civic place attachment and pro-environmental behavior. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 30(3), 289-297.
- Scannell, L., & Gifford, R. (2017). The experienced psychological benefits of place attachment. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 51, 256-269.
- Schacter, J. (2001). Geographic mobility: March 1999 to March 2000. *Current Population Reports. US Census Bureau, Washington, DC*.
- Schaffner, B. F., MacWilliams, M., & Nteta, T. (2018). Understanding white polarization in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism. *Political Science Quarterly*, 133(1), 9-34.
- Schildkraut, D.J. (2017). A Discussion of Katherine J. Cramer's The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 529-530.
- Schneider, G. (1986). 13. Psychological Identity of and Identification with Urban Neighborhoods. *Quality of Urban Life: Social, Psychological, and Physical Conditions*, 203.
- Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2017). Measuring populist attitudes on three dimensions. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 30(2), 316-326.
- Shor, B., & McCarty, N. (2011). The ideological mapping of American legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3), 530-551.

- Shugart, M. S., Valdini, M. E., & Suominen, K. (2005). Looking for locals: voter information demands and personal vote-earning attributes of legislators under proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 437-449.
- Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). *Identity crisis: The 2016 presidential campaign and the battle for the meaning of America*. Princeton University Press.
- Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis. *American Psychologist*, 56(4), 319.
- Stedman, R. C. (2002). Toward a social psychology of place: Predicting behavior from place-based cognitions, attitude, and identity. *Environment and Behavior*, 34(5), 561-581.
- Steiger, J. H. (2007). Understanding the limitations of global fit assessment in structural equation modeling. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 42(5), 893-898.
- Stryker, S. (1980). *Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version*. Benjamin-Cummings Publishing Company.
- Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2013). *The Rationalizing Voter*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Information (International Social Science Council)*, 13(2), 65-93.
- Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*. CUP Archive.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter group behavior in S Worchel & WG Austin (Eds) *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago: Nelson.
- Tamir, Y. (1995). The enigma of nationalism. *World Politics*, 47(3), 418-440.
- Tarman, C., & Sears, D. O. (2005). The conceptualization and measurement of symbolic racism. *The Journal of Politics*, 67(3), 731-761.
- Tatalovich, R. (1975). "Friends and Neighbors" Voting: Mississippi, 1943-73. *The Journal of Politics*, 37(3), 807-814.
- Tavits, M. (2010). Effect of local ties on electoral success and parliamentary behaviour: The case of Estonia. *Party Politics*, 16(2), 215-235.
- Tesler, M. (2016). *Post-racial or most-racial?: Race and politics in the Obama era*. University of Chicago Press.
- Transue, J. E. (2007). Identity salience, identity acceptance, and racial policy attitudes: American national identity as a uniting force. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 78-91.
- Trentelman, C. K. (2009). Place attachment and community attachment: A primer grounded in the lived experience of a community sociologist. *Society and Natural Resources*, 22(3), 191-210.
- Tuan, Y. F. (1980). Rootedness versus sense of place. *Landscape*, 24, 3-8.

- Valentino, N. A., Hutchings, V. L., & White, I. K. (2002). Cues that matter: How political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns. *American Political Science Review*, 96(1), 75-90.
- Van der Meer, T. W., Van Elsas, E., Lubbe, R., & Van der Brug, W. (2015). Are volatile voters erratic, whimsical or seriously picky? A panel study of 58 waves into the nature of electoral volatility (The Netherlands 2006–2010). *Party Politics*, 21(1), 100-114.
- Walsh, K. C. (2012). Putting inequality in its place: Rural consciousness and the power of perspective. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3), 517-532.
- Williams, A., Kitchen, P., DeMiglio, L., Eyles, J., Newbold, B., & Streiner, D. (2010). Sense of place in Hamilton, Ontario: Empirical results of a neighborhood-based survey. *Urban Geography*, 31(7), 905-931.
- Williams, D. R., & Vaske, J. J. (2003). The Measurement of Place Attachment: Validity and Generalizability of a Psychometric Approach. *Forest Science*, 49(6), 830-840.
- Willis, G. B. (2004). *Cognitive interviewing: A tool for improving questionnaire design*. Sage Publications.
- Wilton, R. D. (1998). The constitution of difference: space and psyche in landscapes of exclusion. *Geoforum*, 29(2), 173-185.
- Winter, N. J. (2008). *Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race and Gender Shape Public Opinion*. University of Chicago Press.
- Wolbrecht, C. (2017). A Discussion of Katherine J. Cramer's *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 527-528.
- Wong, C. J. (2010). *Boundaries of Obligation in American Politics: Geographic, National, and Racial Communities*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wuthnow, R. (2018). *The Left Behind: Decline and Rage in Rural America*. Princeton University Press.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge University Press.