Why Affiliate? Independent Candidates in Emerging Democracies

The Case of Afghanistan Since 2001

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A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December, 2016

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The Case of Afghanistan Since 2001

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Abstract

Why do some party leaders participate under their party label while others forego party affiliation? This dissertation uses new micro-level evidence to address the variation in affiliation decisions of party leaders. It advances our understanding of the prevalence of non-party candidates in emerging democracies by addressing, in a unified framework, *preference* for non-affiliation and *capacity* to participate in elections without the financial, organizational, and ideological support of political parties. I contend that office seekers will forego party affiliation if: a) their political party is associated with negative legacies of the previous authoritarian regime, and b) they can use more electorally appealing means to gather electoral support. The first condition shapes office seekers' preference to forego party affiliation, and the second condition determines their capacity to run a campaign without the organizational, financial, and ideological support of a political party. I find that office seekers form multi-ethnic pre-electoral alliances as substitutes to political parties to mobilize electoral support during elections.

For my mother, Nadira Masoomi-Omar, who has given me her unconditional love in abundance

To the memory of my father, Omar Parwak, to whom I owe my aspirations in life

And for my husband, Tariq Ahmadi, whose love and friendship have made our years together the best years of life

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Chapter One

Introduction

Abdullah Abdullah became the Chief Executive Officer after he reached a deal with Ashraf Ghani (the current president) following the highly disputed 2014 presidential elections. When I met Abdullah in his office in 2012, he was preparing to enter the presidential race as the main opposition figure. In his first run for presidency in 2009, Abdullah had participated as independent despite the fact that he was a prominent leader of the Jamiat-i Islami party. In fact, he was one of many party leaders who were foregoing their party affiliation in elections. When I asked him why he ran as independent in 2009 elections, his answer was not convincing on the face of it. He said that he ran as independent because he was not an active member of any party, current, or movement at the time. Abdullah's answer to my question revealed an important underlying pattern: leaders of certain political parties wanted to distance themselves from the legacies of their parties without having to openly state it. In other words, there was something about certain political parties that gave their leaders disincentive to associate with their parties. As my research advanced, it became clear that leaders of political parties of the past, i.e. parties that existed prior to the Taliban regime, tended to disassociate themselves from the legacies of their parties, which were largely negative, by foregoing their party affiliation, while leaders of parties that were formed after the 2001 transition were more likely to run under their party labels.

Historically, political parties in Afghanistan have played relatively more prominent roles in politics under authoritarian regimes than they do today under democratic governance. In early 1900s, the first political associations were created as

secret organizations to lobby the King to change the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy (Farhang, 1992; Ghubar, 1967; Habibi, 1974). However, these circles disappeared as the King cracked down on them in 1909, killing most of their leaders (Ruttig, 2006, p. 7). In 1940s and 1950s, however, political movements were formed outside the ruling aristocracy as a result of experiments in modernizing the education system that were brought about by King Amanullah between 1919 and 1929 (Gregorian, 1969, p. 239-244). Due to their anti-monarchist outlook, however, the regime cracked down on these parties. Consequently, some vanished while others relaxed their demands and opted for constitutional monarchy (Bezhan, 2012). The 1960s, on the other hand, was arguably the golden age of political parties in Afghanistan, as they started to organize politics, stage protests, and send representatives to the parliament. During this period, political parties represented specific programs and ideologies (Bezhan, 2013; Kakar, 1995; Roy, 1988; Ibrahimi, 2012).

The period of direct rule by political parties came with the 1978 Sawr "Revolution," a military coup that brought to power the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA hereafter). It also ended the golden age of political parties as the PDPA started cracking down on other political parties, eventually succeeding to completely annihilate its rival leftist parties and send to exile the rightist parties. This period, which also coincided with the direct invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union (1979-1989), saw significant political brutality initiated by the party in power against its political opponents as well as the civilian populations (Louis, 1980; Dorronsoro, 2005; Kakar, 1995; Ruttig, 2006).

The PDPA rule came to an end in 1992 when the Mujahedin parties, who had been putting up armed resistance against the PDPA regime and the Soviet occupiers, toppled the Soviet-backed communist regime and established the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. However, the Mujahedin parties soon became involved in bloody civil wars, which killed and displaced thousands of civilians. That is, the Mujahedin parties' rule too was marred with violence and brutality until it was ended by the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996 and most of the rest of the country in 1998 (Christia, 2009). Hence, in the two periods that political parties had ruled directly, the population had experienced extreme brutality and violence. And it was the leaders of those parties who sought to distance themselves from the legacies of their parties during the post-2001 presidential elections by running as independent.

A close confidant of the renowned commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, Abdullah was the diplomatic face of the Jamiat party, one of the seven Mujahedin parties, during the war of resistance and the years of Mujahedin's direct rule. Hence, Abdullah's answer to my question, though intended to hide the fact that he was trying to distance himself from the legacies of his party, was revealing in that very sense. When I asked him *how* he was able to run his campaign as independent, i.e. without the help of a political party, he claimed that he had the support of the people, respected personalities, and even that of the Jamiat party. This answer too turned out to be cliché as I kept hearing similar answers from other independent candidates that I interviewed. Hence, the rest of my research efforts focused on uncovering the factors that shaped office seekers' preference for affiliation and factors that gave them the capacity to forego party affiliation.

Specifically, my research is an inductive study of *why* leaders of the parties of the past decide to forego party affiliation and *how* they are able to overcome the costs of elections as independents in the context of mass politics and free political competition in post-2001 Afghanistan. The dissertation considers these questions in comparison to the decision of leaders of newly formed parties who, contrary to the leaders of old parties and under the same electoral rules, participate as their party nominees. Based on an in-depth study of the three presidential elections in post-2001 Afghanistan and the legacies of ruling parties of the past, I suggest new hypotheses to explain the striking patterns of party affiliation among leaders of old and new parties in national elections with the hope that they will be tested more systematically in the future using evidence from comparative cases.

I draw on two sets of data to identify the mechanisms that drive affiliation decisions among Afghan office seekers: thirty three newly gathered interviews with candidates as well as national and international observers of Afghan electoral politics, and archival research on office seekers' campaign speeches and platforms. The interviews were conducted during nine months of fieldwork in Afghanistan. Additionally, I use electoral data, national and international press coverage, data collected by on-sight research institutions, and published interviews of politicians to identify the factors that enable office seekers to forego party affiliation during elections. The evidence from post-2001 Afghanistan provides new insights on dynamics of affiliation decision in emerging democracies, while addressing both preference and capacity in one unified framework advances our understanding of the conditions under which non-affiliation becomes both desirable and attainable.

Current understandings of non-affiliation have almost exclusively focused on explaining office seekers *preference* for non-affiliation and have heavily emphasized the effects of institutional variables in shaping office seekers' preferences (McFaul, 2001; Golosov, 2003; Moser, 1999; Mainwaring, 1999). Studying post-Soviet Russia, Smyth (2006) has argued that mixed electoral systems work as sorting mechanisms, giving some candidates incentives to participate as partisan while urging others to not affiliate. Studies coming out of Latin America, on the other hand, have emphasized the nature of the political system and the distinct character of emerging democracies as factors that affect party affiliation decisions. Mainwaring (1999) has argued that presidential systems encourage non-party candidates by allowing them to make populist appeals to voters, while Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) have argued that the emergence of television as a major campaign vehicle before political parties have taken strong roots in the society has greatly reduced office seekers' need for political parties' mobilization resources.

Two points are important to make about the current studies of non-affiliation: first, the majority of these studies have focused only on variables that measure essential features of electoral and political regimes, leaving out the effects of non-institutional factors in shaping elites' preferences and determining their behaviors. The study of post-2001 Afghanistan reveals that office seekers make vastly different affiliation decisions (e.g. some run as independent while others participate as party candidates) under the same electoral and political systems. Addressing the variation in party affiliation decisions under the same electoral rules in post-2001 Afghan elections, i.e., different politicians making different decisions about party affiliation under the same institutions, will advance the discussion on preference formation by problematizing the causal effects

of institutions. In addition, in post-2001 Afghanistan the assertion that the emergence of mass media has reduced the need for political parties as voter mobilization tools does not provide a convincing argument because in most parts of the country, voters do not have access to television, radio, or even electricity. Importantly, even if the spread of mass media helps to explain the decline in party affiliation, it cannot explain why some politicians choose to affiliate while others do not. Hence, explicit attention must be paid not only to the incentives that institutions provide to political parties and those who will lead or join them, but also to other factors that give office seekers incentives to join or leave parties. I find that historical legacies of political parties are a strong determinant of whether office seekers will run under their party label or decide to forego party affiliation (discussed in more details below).

Second, the question regarding office seekers' *capacity* to run successful campaigns as independent has received relatively little attention in the literature on prevalence of independent candidates in emerging democracies. That is, we know very little about *how* office seekers are able to win elections as independents without the organizational and financial help of political parties in the age of mass politics and free political competition. To my knowledge, Hale (2005) is the first work to address capacity in the context of post-transition party development and affiliation dynamics. Studying single member district elections to the lower house of the Russian parliament (the Duma), Hale has introduced the concept of 'party substitutes' to explain absence of party development. He has found that these "party substitutes," which in post-Soviet Russia take the form of provincial political machines and politicized financial-industrial groups, are able to out-compete political parties in the provision of electoral goods and services.

My dissertation will extend the logic of 'party substitutes' to national elections. Typically, national elections require much larger investments in voter mobilization efforts than district level elections, where candidates campaign within a particular locality. As such, the strategies that they use to mobilize electoral support must be extensive enough to target a national audience. Understanding what kinds of alternative means office seekers use to mobilize electoral support in national elections will give us insight on not only how independent candidates run successful campaigns in national elections but also why national, inclusive political parties are a rarity in many emerging democracies.

The Argument

I argue that office seekers will forego party affiliation if a) their political party is associated with negative legacies of the previous authoritarian regime, and b) they have electorally more appealing means available to them to gather electoral support. The first condition shapes their preference for non-affiliation, while the second condition determines their capacity to run a campaign without the organizational, financial, and ideological support of a political party. Typically, transitions to democratic rule bring with them mass participation and free political competition. Under those changed circumstances, old regime elites need to formulate their strategies accordingly to preserve their elite status and survive politically. The kinds of strategies that they choose will be influenced in large part by the legacies of their political parties under the previous regime. Following Kitschelt et al (1999, p. 19), "Legacies at least initially shape the resources and expectations that help actors to define their interests and to select the ways and means to acquire political power." In authoritarian regimes where political parties

have ruled directly (e.g. single-party regimes), those parties are typically the torch bearers of the legacies of the pre-democratic regime. Hence, in the post-transition phase, leaders of those parties will be influenced by the legacies associated with their political parties in defining their interests and strategies.

In the literature on affiliation decisions of office seekers in emerging democracies, the effects of legacies of political parties on their leaders' strategies have been neglected. My dissertation starts to fill this gap. However, because the legacy variable has been neglected is not sufficient justification for focusing on the effects of legacies of political parties on office seekers' affiliation decisions. Instead, one should demonstrate that by including the legacy variable in our analysis, we can substantially improve our theoretical understanding of the affiliation decisions among office seekers and the prevalence of independent candidates in emerging democracies. Throughout the dissertation, I seek to do this by showing how the legacies of political parties have shaped the affiliation decisions of their leaders.

Since new democracies by definition have had authoritarian pasts, the legacies of the pre-democratic regime and political parties associated with the regime can be largely negative.[1] Consequently, leaders of those parties are more likely to distance themselves from the legacies of the previous regime, and by extension of their political parties. Empirically, one observes significant variation in electoral strategies used by leaders of

[1] Legacies of political parties need not be negative in every authoritarian regime. In fact under certain circumstances, political parties have stood up in opposition to the authoritarian leader (i.e., the Spanish Communist Party resisting Francoism, different Italian guerilla parties organizing armed resistance against Fascism). Correspondingly, these cases have witnessed the establishment of relatively strong parties and party systems post-transition. The objective of my research is to specify the extent to which negative legacies of political parties shape the decisions of politicians under certain conditions.

old parties and leaders of parties that have formed during the post-transition phase. Leaders of old parties, ones associated with negative legacies of the previous regime, run as independent (i.e. not under their party label) or under a new party label and formulate their platforms and campaign speeches in ways that sit them apart from the legacies of their political parties, e.g. condemning the policies of the previous regime or over-emphasizing democratic values. Leaders of newly formed parties on the other hand, run under their party label, and their platforms and speeches are based on programmatic appeals. Their tendency to make programmatic appeals (as opposed to clientelistic appeals) is perhaps due to the fact that these newly formed political parties lack access to state resources that will enable them to make clientelistic offers to the electorate in return for their vote. Instead, they rely on programmatic appeals to set their parties apart from parties of the past. Studying the divergent decisions among leaders of new and old parties in post-2001 Afghanistan reveals the importance of the effects of historical legacies on affiliation decisions of office seekers in post-transition elections.

Post-transition mass politics and free political competition requires a lot of investment in time and money from office seekers. In established democracies, typically political parties provide office seekers with those resources. How then, in emerging democracies, can independent candidates afford to forego their party affiliation and participate in elections without the organizational, ideological, and financial support of political parties? I argue that the answer lies in the availability of viable alternatives to mobilize electoral support. For an independent candidate to participate in national elections without the support of a political party, it is crucial to have access to alternatives means of gathering electoral support. My research on post-2001 Afghanistan reveals that

office seekers use pre-election coalition formation with leaders of ethnic groups, regional leaders, and influential religious figures to mobilize electoral support. Coalition members campaign for the office seeker and mobilize their respective electoral bases in return for the vice presidential posts, cabinet positions, and other perks. In short, while legacies of political parties shape their leaders' incentives whether to affiliate or forego affiliation, building multiethnic pre-election alliances as viable alternatives to political parties is a determinant of the capacity of independent candidates.

I find that the success of these alternative strategies in winning political office depends on a host of factors including the size of the pre-election coalition, the alliance's inclusivity, and the relative strength of the competing alliances (e.g. counter-alliances). Nonetheless, these pre-election alliances are short-term arrangements formed for the sole purpose of winning the presidency, and their members can change from one election to the next. The members are picked based on their ability to mobilize electoral support for the coalition formateur. In post-2001 Afghanistan, where social relations are built on a complex network of overlapping and cross-cutting loyalties, formateurs have to form oversized, multiethnic coalitions to account for uncertainty over voter preferences.

Why Afghanistan?

I focus on party politics in post-2001 Afghanistan for two main reasons. First, post-2001 Afghanistan provides a unique opportunity to reexamine the dominant explanations for the prevalence of non-party candidates in emerging democracies. The literature that has addressed the phenomenon of prevalent non-partisanship among office seekers in emerging democracies has emphasized the effects of formal institutions in shaping office

seekers' preference for non-affiliation. However, in post-2001 Afghanistan, leaders of some parties run as independent while leaders of other parties participate as their party candidates under the same institutional rules. Hence, post-2001 Afghanistan provides a challenging "most likely" case (Eckstein, 1975; Lijphart, 1971) with which to test the institutional explanations for prevalent non-partisanship in emerging democracies.

The second reason concerns post-2001 Afghanistan's relevance to an emerging literature on the role of political parties in new democracies. Studies of established democracies have attributed an important theoretical role for political parties in organizing politics and providing office seekers with ideological, financial, and organizational support. However, a new set of democracies, the so-called 'third-wave' democracies, has challenged the assertion that political parties play a prominent role in electoral politics. As Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, p. 167) have put it most succinctly, "For the history of liberal democracy until the 1980s, the answer to John Aldrich's (1995) question, Why Parties? was obvious to political candidates: parties provided a huge, almost indispensable electoral advantage. In many post-1978 competitive regimes, this advantage is marginal or non-existent." My study of post-2001 Afghanistan advances the discussion by shedding light on *how* the history of political parties in emerging democracies affects the behavior of office seekers, i.e. legacies of political parties determining whether party leaders will rely on their political parties or use alternative strategies to mobilize electoral support during elections. In turn, the behavior of party leaders may have a negative effect on development of political parties, reinforcing the marginal advantages of political parties in emerging democracies. Below I will discuss both these points in details.

***Institutional Explanation of Non-affiliation*:** in its simplest form, the institutional hypothesis predicts that the nature of political and electoral systems determine office seekers' affiliation decisions. Specifically, presidentialism (Mainwaring, 1999) and majoritarian electoral systems are understood to encourage independents by inhibiting party consolidation (Golosov, 2003b; Moser, 1999; Stoner-Weiss, 2001). Given the political and electoral institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan (presidentialism and majoritarian electoral rules), it presents the "most likely" case for the institutional hypothesis (Eckstein, 1975; George and Bennett, 2005). However, ample variation in affiliation decisions of office seekers in post-2001 Afghanistan brings the institutional hypothesis under scrutiny. That is, the institutional hypothesis cannot explain why some office seekers form parties and participate under their party labels in national elections when electoral institutions supposedly encourage non-partisanship. Hence, studying post-2001 electoral politics in Afghanistan presents an opportunity not only to reexamine the institutional hypothesis but to identify distinctly non-institutional factors, such as historical legacies of political parties, in determining affiliation decisions.

My research finds that the kinds of institutions that were adopted in post-2001 Afghan context are products of political choice. They were chosen as a result of the strength of actors who were, and preferred to remain, independent. At the time of institutional selection, strong, national parties did not exist to assert their interests, which allowed the anti-party politicians to push for the choice of institutions that preserved their interests and power at the expense of political parties. In short, institutional selection in post-2001 Afghanistan strongly supports the claim that institutional design resembles the preferences of institution makers motivated by self-interest.

Political Parties in New Democracies: In comparison to parties in advanced democracies of Western Europe and North America, parties in emerging democracies appear more volatile (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005), less institutionalized (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Riedl, 2008; Dix, 1992; Stockton, 2001), with weak voter attachments (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Manning, 2005; Dalton and Weldon, 2007), and less reliant on programmatic appeals (Keefer, 2007; van de Walle 2003; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Toka 1999), while party systems are not always organized along salient social cleavages (Dix, 1989; Kitschelt, 1992). The most prominent accounts of the puzzle of party behavior in third-wave democracies have emphasized timing (Dix, 1989) to distinguish between parties in old and new democracies. By this logic, parties in emerging democracies behave differently because they have emerged in a different context than their counterparts in advanced democracies. In emerging democracies, factors such the availability of universal suffrage and direct communications via mass media have weakened the partisan attachments among constituencies. That is, party mechanisms are no longer used to fight for universal suffrage rights or to appeal to voters (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Schmitter, 2001). In Western Europe, working-class parties integrated workers into the political system and provided fundamental sources of identity (Chalmers, 1964; Pizzorno, 1981). By contrast, in new democracies candidates for executive office can get their messages across on television without the need to rely on well-developed party organizations (Sartori, 1989), allowing the emergence of highly personalistic parties (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 187). Moreover, in some of these democracies (post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine, Afghanistan) candidates can gain ballot access

without a party and can win elections as independents (see Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Smyth, 2006), while voter attachments to political parties are weak (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Manning, 2005; Dalton and Weldon, 2007), and parties rely less on programmatic appeals (Keefer, 2007; van de Walle, 2003; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Toka, 1999).

The timing thesis, however, obscures considerable diversity and complexity in functioning and character of political parties in emerging democracies. The critical role that political parties play in democratic politics has been confirmed in many studies of the emerging democracies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014; Randall and Svasand, 2003a; Clapham, 1993; Diamond et al, 1989; Dix, 1992). Meanwhile, recent studies of emerging democracies have identified additional variables that affect the character and functioning of political parties in emerging democracies. For instance, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) have found empirical support for historical legacies as a crucial variable affecting the current levels of party system institutionalization. Similarly, based on a study of sub-Saharan African countries, LeBas (2011) has found that the strength of (opposition) political parties is directly affected by the legacies of the previous authoritarian regime. Manning (2005), in his study of African democracies, has found that the electoral systems that these countries adopted after independence are generally a legacy of colonial history, with French and British colonies adopting winner-take-all, and Belgian and Portuguese colonies opting for proportional representation. Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) have found that in African democracies, the experience with colonialism left a weak history of political competition and self-rule, which in turn affected the character of political parties that emerged after independence. In short, these

studies have found that historical legacies can affect different aspects of party politics in post-transition phase.

My dissertation contributes to this understanding by highlighting the role of legacies of the ruling parties of the pre-democratic regime in shaping party leaders' electoral strategies during post-transition elections. The leaders of the ruling parties of the past associated with negative legacies are likely to forego party affiliation in post-transition elections. Meanwhile, by choosing to forego their party affiliation, those leaders effectively undermine their political parties' standing and chances of development. They essentially demonstrate to both their party and to voters that they can stand in elections without the support of their respective political parties. Following Cox and McCubbins (1993), the party reputation is a collective good, and party leaders are selected and appointed to protect that good. When party leaders select out of a party and decide to run as independent, they undermine the collective good that they were chosen to protect. Leaders of newly formed parties (e.g. parties that have formed after the democratic transition), on the other hand, promote their party's reputation by running under their party label and advertising its platform. In short, I find that legacies of the previous regime can affect the development of political parties through the electoral strategies of party leaders.

Methodology

I use process tracing to carry out with-in case analysis based on qualitative data from newly gathered interviews, published speeches and platforms of office seekers, electoral data, and historical records of the policies of the previous regimes. My intent for the

choice of methodology is two-fold: description and evaluation of hypothesized causal relations and processes (Collier, 2011). The first step is crucial because, to my knowledge, an in-depth and systematic description of political parties and electoral politics in post-2001 Afghanistan has not been carried out by political scientists so far. At best, one can find sporadic policy papers, journalistic pieces, and special reports, none of which provide a complete and detailed account of the state of political parties and candidates in Afghanistan after its transition in 2001. My research addresses this empirical gap by carrying out a careful process-tracing to identify and systematically describe patterns of party affiliation among leaders of old and new parties and the interaction of formal rules and party dynamics.

. Concerning the second goal, I use process tracing for two purposes; 1) to evaluate alternative hypotheses offered by the literature to explain the prevalence of non-party candidates in new democracies, and 2) to generate new hypotheses inductively (Mahoney, 2012; Bennett and Checkel, 2012), using evidence from the study of post-2001 Afghanistan. Through process tracing, I identify novel causes of the variation in affiliation decisions of leaders of old and new political parties in post-2001 Afghanistan. The empirical chapters of the dissertation use the history of political parties under previous regimes in Afghanistan to identify the legacies of the ruling parties of the past. Office seekers' campaign speeches and platforms are analyzed to look for the effects of those legacies on the platforms and speeches of leaders of the ruling parties of the past. The contrast between the language used in the platforms and speeches of the leaders of old and new parties provide evidence in favor of the hypothesized causal link between legacies of political parties and their leaders' strategies to distance themselves from those

legacies by running in post-2001 elections as independents. I assess the alternative institutional hypothesis for explaining the prevalence of non-party candidates by providing a detailed narrative (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 210) of institutional selection in post-2001 Afghanistan based on newly gathered interviews with those involved in the process of institutional selection, national and international observers, and published and unpublished reports and documents concerning the choice of institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, like any method, process tracing is not without limits. The first challenge is determining whether pieces of a research count as good process tracing (Waldner, 2011: 7). Second, when conducting causal-inference tests, doubts may be raised regarding the appropriateness of the tests employed (Collier, 2011, p. 828). Finally, missing variables and measurements error can be serious issues undermining the value of the conclusions and predictions reached by a particular research (Collier, 2011: 828; George and Bennett, 2005, p. 222). These problems are potentially compounded in a single-case study design, when the risks of measurement error and omitted variables are higher (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). In my study of post-2001 Afghanistan, I have attempted to minimize some of these problems. For instance, I have collected evidence from diverse sources, where possible, to identify and address factual errors and misunderstandings; I have made multiple observations within the post-2001 Afghan case, collecting new evidence independent of the evidence that led to generation of hypotheses; and I have capitalized on ample within-case variation to control for confounding variables. However, I acknowledge the need for further systematic evidence to test the

hypotheses that I have inductively generated through my study of party politics in post-2001 Afghanistan.

Scope Conditions

Although I develop an inductive theory of affiliation decisions among office seekers in post-2001 Afghanistan, the underlying logic of the theory should apply to office seekers and electoral politics in other democracies. However, office seekers' decision to turn away from political parties in elections is a phenomenon most widely observed in emerging democracies. Unlike established democracies of North America and Western Europe, political parties in emerging democracies do not enjoy the same level of party-rootedness in the society. In some emerging democracies, political parties often do not play a critical role in elections, and it is not unthinkable for candidates to succeed in elections without the support of political parties. Consequently, my theory of affiliation decisions is temporally restricted to transitional democracies, i.e., explaining office seekers' behavior in emerging democracies.

I conceptualize political parties in broad terms to include armed factions-turned-parties, ideologically driven organized political opposition, and sectarian or ethno-linguistic organizations. Such broad conceptualization allows for understanding and studying political parties as organizations with varying legacies of armed resistance, political violence, or organized political opposition. Based on this reconceptualization of political parties, my theory becomes relevant for explaining office seekers' behavior in post-conflict democracies, or cases that have experienced armed conflict or political violence carried out by political parties.

Finally, the choice to run without a party label in executive elections is allowed only in a handful of emerging presidential democracies. Hence, any study of party leaders' decision to forego their party affiliation during presidential elections is inevitably limited to those democracies that allow such a choice.

It is important to note that this dissertation does not address the question of origins of political parties in new democracies or their varying legacies. I take those as given and seek to explain how parties' legacies affect the strategies of party leaders when faced with mass politics and competitive elections in the post-transition context.

Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in three parts, one theoretical and two empirical. Part one, comprised of Chapter 1, describes patterns of affiliation among office seekers in post-2001 Afghanistan and offers an inductive theory of affiliation decisions among Afghan office seekers. Part two, made up of Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, presents the empirical evidence from post-2001 Afghanistan to support the theoretical claims made in Chapter 1. Specifically, Chapter 2 lays down the dependent variable, affiliation decision, over three presidential elections and two parliamentary elections in post-2001 Afghanistan. For each election, I identify office seekers as belonging to one of the two groups, leaders of old political parties and leaders of newly formed political parties, and provide a description of their electoral strategies. In this Chapter, I also provide evidence of party decline over time. Chapter 3 empirically addresses the effects of historical legacies on office seekers' affiliation decisions. Using newly collected interviews with office seekers and press coverage of candidates' campaign platforms and interviews, I demonstrate that

leaders of old political parties use the kind of rhetoric in their platforms and interviews that helps distance them from the legacies of their political parties, while leaders of new political parties make programmatic appeals. Chapter 4 provides an empirical discussion of the pre-electoral coalitions that office seekers form prior to each election as alternative strategies to mobilize electoral support. Chapter 5 evaluates the effects of institutions on office seekers' preferences for affiliation. I demonstrate that the choice of post-transition institutions is endogenous to the structure of power during the transition phase and that those institutions endogenously condition office seekers' affiliation preferences. Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks, lays down the contributions of my study, and discusses the prospects of democratic consolidation in contemporary Afghanistan.

Chapter Two

An Inductive Theory of Affiliation Decisions

"I belong to Jamiat Party, but [my party] is my history—not my present."

Hafiz Mansoor, MP from Kabul and presidential candidate in 2004[2]

In 2004, Afghans voted in the first democratic elections in Afghanistan's history to choose their head of state. In the elections, eighteen candidates ran for presidency, thirteen of whom participated as independent (that is, non-party) candidates, as the electoral system presented candidates with the choice to either run under a party label or participate as independent. However, many of the "independent" candidates were leaders of political parties that existed prior to the 2001 transition (former Mujahedin parties and former Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan), while the candidates who participated under their party labels mostly belonged to political parties that had formed *since* the 2001 transition. The few leaders of old parties who did participate as their party nominees had formed splinter parties under new names. Importantly, the leaders of old and new political parties operated under the same institutional and environmental constraints. However, their responses to those constraints were vastly different (Figure 1 illustrates this pattern). Studying the variation in affiliation decisions in post-2001 Afghanistan among leaders of new and old parties provides a unique opportunity for controlled comparison. That is, the variation allows us to focus on pertinent explanatory variables

[2] Mansoor formally participated as "independent" in the presidential elections and as the candidate of Jamiat in 2010 parliamentary elections. He lost his presidential bid but won a legislative seat in the Wolesi Jirga.

while controlling for non-related variables to explain the puzzle presented by the post-2001 electoral politics in Afghanistan.

Figure 1: Variation in affiliation decisions among party leaders in post-2001 presidential elections



To explain the variation in affiliation decisions of leaders of old and new parties in post-2001 Afghanistan, I ask three specific questions: under what conditions do party leaders turn away from their political parties? What types of parties give their leaders disincentives for party identification? And, what types of candidates can afford to forego their party affiliation? I address these questions inductively and suggest new hypotheses to explain the patterns of behavior among party leaders who participate in post-transition national elections. The empirical chapters of the dissertation provide some evidence in favor of the hypotheses generated here. However, further research is necessary to test the hypotheses definitively.

In post-2001 Afghanistan, why did leaders of old political parties turn away from their party in national elections either by participating as independent or running under a new party label? How were they able to run their campaigns without the organizational and financial support of their political parties? And, what can explain the variation in affiliation decisions among leaders of old and new political parties? To address these

questions, I focus on the conditions that shape office seekers' preferences, and the conditions that determine their capacity, in deciding to participate in elections as independent or as a party nominee. In order to understand why party leaders turn to or turn away from their political parties, we need to examine the context in which they make their decisions. Specifically, we need to examine if (1) there is an incentive for the office seekers to turn to or turn away from political parties. Further, in the presence of incentives to turn away from political parties, we need to examine if (2) it is feasible to win elections without a political party, and (3) there is at least one superior solution to forming, or affiliating with, a political party.[3]

Office seekers are those who aspire to winning public office, be it the presidency or a legislative seat, in order to gain access to power and resources of the state. I retain the view that office seekers are rational actors, but that they are constrained by their institutional and structural environment. The aim is to identify the different conditions under which an office seeker will find it beneficial to turn to or turn away from political parties.

I define independent candidates as those whose name on the ballot appears alone instead of alongside a political party.[4] Absence of party affiliation on the ballot signals that independent candidates do not subscribe to any political party's platform. As such,

[3] Explaining party formation, John Aldrich (1995: 58) writes: "since forming or even affiliating with a political party is a voluntary choice of a politician, it is critical to examine the particular setting to see if (1) there is an incentive for politicians to turn to parties, (2) it is feasible (not, for example, a potential solution that founders on a collective action problem), and (3) there are no superior solutions—or at minimum that politicians actually did act on the incentives by creating or employing the agency of a party." Turning this logic around, we can examine the setting to explain non-affiliation.

[4] I have chosen this minimalist definition because in post-2001 Afghanistan not every candidate who has registered as independent is truly a non-party candidate. The focus of this dissertation is on those candidates who are party leaders but who decide to forego their party affiliation to participate in national elections.

they may not receive any funding from political parties and have to rely on private donations, their personal assets, and funds from the state. In addition to financial challenges, independent candidates also have to overcome institutional obstacles (signature or deposit requirements) to their electoral success (Brancati, 2008). Consequently, running as independent is costly as far as organization and finances of campaigns are concerned (with higher costs for presidential campaigns).

Given the costs of running as independent, *why* do old party leaders forego their party affiliation, and *how* can they overcome those costs? I argue that office seekers will forego party affiliation if a) their political party is associated with negative legacies of the previous authoritarian regime, and b) they have electorally more appealing means available to them to gather electoral support. The first condition shapes their preference for non-affiliation, while the second condition determines their capacity to run a campaign without the organizational, financial, and ideological support of a political party. Put differently, the critical factor that shapes party leaders' decision whether to run under their party label or run as independent is historical legacies of political parties. Candidates' ability to carry out their electoral campaigns without the help of their political parties, on the other hand, is determined by the availability of party alternatives to mobilize electoral support. Party alternatives can take many forms depending on the context in which they exist or are formed. In post-Soviet Russia, for instance, they take the form of "provincial political machines and politicized financial-industrial groups" (Hale, 2005, p. 148). Afghanistan, on the other hand, has multiple politicized ethno-linguistic groups that can be readily mobilized for electoral purposes, although the ethno-linguistic groups are geographically dispersed, and regional interests often crosscut

ethno-linguistic cleavages. Given the social structures of Afghanistan, building pre-electoral alliances among leaders of ethnic groups, regional leaders, and religious figures function as party substitutes and provide office seekers with the financial and organizational support necessary to mobilize the electorate. These alliances are multiethnic in nature, often include multiple members of the same ethno-linguistic groups to account for geographic dispersion of such groups, and incorporate regional and religious interests by including regional leaders and religious figures. The success of these party alternatives depends on a host of factors including the size and inclusivity of the coalition, the extent of social resources that alliance members possess, and the strength of counter-alliances.

Historical legacies here refer to the kinds of legacies that political parties are associated with as a result of their direct rule in the near past. Historical legacies have been recognized as crucial variables in affecting present day party system institutionalization (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011, p. 576), the choice of post-transition electoral institutions (Manning, 2005), the strength of the opposition parties after independence (LeBas, 2011), and the character of post-independence political parties (Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014). I contend that legacies of political parties exert a strong effect on affiliation decisions of their leaders in post-transition elections. Following Kitschelt et al (1999, p. 19), "Legacies at least initially shape the resources and expectations that help actors to define their interests and to select the ways and means to acquire political power." In a similar vein, I argue that historical legacies of political parties exert substantial effects on how political parties are perceived by both candidates

and voters, and that that perception informs office seekers' affiliation decisions in post-transition context.

Since new democracies by definition have had authoritarian pasts, the legacies of the ruling parties of the past (e.g. political parties that have controlled the state and the government in the past) may be largely negative.[5] Those legacies can be institutional (Hale, 2005; Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011), social (Millar and Wolchik, 1994), and economic in nature (Barany and Volgyes, 1995). Institutional legacies include party organization, ideology, and degree of party system institutionalization. Social legacies consist of state-society relationship, public services, as well as intended and unintended consequences of the party's rule. Economic legacy, self-evidently, refers to the economic system during the party's rule and the financial well-being of the citizens. I understand legacies of political parties in terms of expectations they have generated in association with *old party rule*. In transitional democracies, where ruling parties of the past may have been involved in initiating violence, or in single-party authoritarian regimes, where political parties may have committed criminal acts, expectations generated by party rule may be particularly gloomy.[6] Under such conditions, I argue, the very notions of the

[5] Legacies of political parties need not be negative in every authoritarian regime. In fact under certain circumstances, political parties have stood up in opposition to the authoritarian leader (i.e., the Spanish Communist Party resisting Francoism, different Italian guerilla parties organizing armed resistance against Fascism). Correspondingly, these cases have witnessed the establishment of relatively strong party systems post-transition. The objective of my research is to specify the conditions under which legacies of political parties can be negative, and what kind of impact those legacies may have on party politics after the democratic transition.

[6] In Afghanistan, political parties carried out violent political suppression during the Communist rule from 1977 to 1992, with the intra-party rivalries between Khalq and Parcham factions leading to direct Soviet intervention in 1979, which left behind an estimated three million dead and disabled and ruined much of the country. During the 1990s, the Mujahedin parties, which had mainly formed along ethnic and linguistic lines to fight against the Soviet occupation, initiated ethnic tension that led to violent civil wars from 1992 to 1996. Such legacies may exist, to varying degrees, in other emerging democracies as they come out of authoritarianism.

'brand name' and 'standing decision' may work against leaders of old parties in post-transition democratic elections.

How do office seekers respond to such legacies when making their decision to participate in elections as either partisan or independent candidates after the democratic transition? In post-transition context, legacies of political parties influence elites' affiliation decisions through *uncertainty* over the preferences of voters and consequently their chances of winning the elections. Uncertainty, defined as "imprecision with which political actors are able to predict future interactions" (Lupu and Riedl, 2012, p. 1), becomes particularly magnified in the context of post-transition mass politics and free political competition where office seekers have to compete for the votes of a broad electorate. Typically, a democratic transition shakes up the structures of power that existed prior to the transition, often discrediting the main political actors in the *ancien regime*; it brings with it free electoral competition and mass politics—previously not experienced by the elites; it entails the entry of new political actors in the political arena with different and often opposing set of interests to those of old regime elites; and the preferences and priorities of the electorate are not fully clear. Office seekers will formulate their electoral strategies under such conditions of severe uncertainty.

It is important to note that the effects of uncertainty over voter preferences on office seekers' affiliation decisions will be conditioned by the institutional and environmental contexts. Majoritarian electoral systems typically require successful candidates to command a broad base of support that can be translated to an electoral majority, while proportional representation systems allow for representation of smaller political parties with narrower bases of support. Meanwhile, in divided societies with no

majority ethno-linguistic or religious groups, political parties that form along those social cleavages often have limited national appeal. *Hence, uncertainty over voter preferences is particularly consequential under majoritarian electoral systems in divided societies.*

Given this context, two predictions are possible: first, leaders of old political parties, the ones directly associated with negative legacies of the past, will be particularly sensitive to uncertainty over voter preferences when formulating their electoral strategies because these parties have been discredited as a result of the transition. The leaders of the parties of the past cannot resort to nostalgia due to their parties' violent rule in the past, nor can they rely on patronage or extremism to mobilize electoral support (Grzymala-Busse, 2002, p. 175).[7] Consequently, in order to avoid making appeals based on their past performance, they have incentives to distance themselves from the legacies of their political parties. They can do so either by running under a new party label or participating as independent. Second, leaders of new political parties' response to uncertainty over voter preferences will be the opposite because newly formed political parties do not suffer any association with negative legacies of the past. To the contrary, new political parties can capitalize on their association with the democratic transition and can pose as better alternatives to the parties of the past. Consequently, leaders of newly formed parties have incentives to participate under their party label in post-transition elections.

The causal effects of historical legacies are most strongly felt during the first few elections when politicians try to distance themselves from legacies of the previous regime, which may include violence and suppression resulting from political party rule.

[7] Grzymala-Busse (2002) writes on the evolution of the communist successor parties in East Central Europe, where in some cases their "rebranding" brought them electoral success. However, as I will demonstrate, in post-2001 Afghanistan the parties of the past have not been able to "redeem" their past due to the rise of viable alternatives to political parties and restrictive institutional context.

However, in subsequent elections, other calculations may take precedence as politics starts to move away from the past, and as new issues inevitably emerge that require a change in politicians' electoral strategies. (In formal language this scenario is referred to as multi-stage coordination game in which elites' assumptions, and as a result their behavior, are markedly different during different stages of the game.) Nonetheless, the effects of historical legacies may not go away entirely in the short run. In fact, it may be reinforced by the institutions in place after the transition (discussed below)

So far, I have discussed the factors that shape office seekers' preference on whether to run under their party label or abandon their brand name in national elections. However, the decision to forego party affiliation can be logistically costly for office seekers, as political parties help subsidize campaigns expenditures and provide organizational and institutional support to their nominees. How can office seekers overcome those costs when running as independent? I argue that the answer lies in the availability of alternative strategies to office seekers to gather electoral support. More specifically, in countries where the law permits candidates to run for national office as independent (that is, without party affiliation), office seekers who prefer to remain independent of their political parties will seek out other viable alternatives that offer the kinds of support typically provided by political parties. In such contexts, following Hale (2005), "party substitutes" will compete with political parties in the provision of electoral goods and services.

What kinds of alternative strategies are available for office seekers to substitute for political parties? As with office seekers' response to uncertainty over voter preferences (discussed above), their choice of the alternative strategies are also

contingent on contextual factors. In multi-ethnic countries where politics is organized along ethnic cleavages, and no ethnic groups comprises the majority of the population, no single group can realistically expect to place their candidate in the national office on its own.[8] That is, "A candidate for national office who happens to be from one ethnic group cannot expect to win votes from other groups through direct appeals. She must recruit other politicians who can solicit those votes on her behalf" (Arriola, 2013, p. 241). Under such conditions, office seekers have incentives to solve the coordination problem among voters by creating multiethnic electoral alliances before each election. Building multiethnic electoral coalitions are usual in a number of third-wave democracies. In fact, in African democracies both the incumbent and the opposition have used multiethnic coalitions to mobilize support during elections (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; van de Walle, 2007). Building on this literature, I argue that these multiethnic alliances work as viable alternatives to political parties as they provide the coalition *formateur*—the candidate of a multiethnic coalition—with the resources typically provided by political parties.

A formateur is the incumbent who has access to resources of the state that can be used to buy off the support of the politicians from other ethnic groups and the main opposition who can make a realistic claim on future access to state resources. Under what conditions can politicians use state resources to guarantee their electoral victory (e.g. buy off loyalties of the leaders of other ethnic groups)? I argue that such behavior is facilitated in what Chandra (2007, p. 6) has called "patronage democracy," where "the

[8] In parliamentary democracies of Western Europe, a political party decides to form a pre-electoral coalition if it is not strong enough to win the majority of votes in the upcoming elections (Golder, 2006). When political parties or independent office seekers realize that they cannot win the elections on their own, they have incentives to solve the coordination problem among voters by creating some sort of pre-electoral arrangement that will present voters with government alternatives at election time (Golder, 2006).

state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and…elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state." In such a democracy, the state is dominant vis-à-vis the private sector as a source of jobs and provider of services, and the elected officials have the ability to distribute the vast resources controlled by the state to their supporters on an individualized basis. The formateur, who possesses high political power (measured in terms of current or future access to state resources), can promise to share the resources of the state with an exclusive group of people in return for their endorsement. The alliance partners endorse a formateur in return for vice presidency, cabinet seats, control of specific ministries, or other privileges (exile forgiveness, formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic demands). While the incumbents can readily deploy state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, the opposition has to emphasize her likelihood of winning access to state resources in the future, i.e. the likelihood of her victory in the elections. In short, three conditions are critical for multiethnic coalitions to work as viable alternatives to political parties: 1) politicized ethnic cleavages, 2) no majority ethnic groups, and 3) patronage-based political systems. If these conditions exist, multiethnic coalitions become attractive party substitutes.

The kinds of coalition partners that formateurs recruit are typically influential ethnic leaders but also regional leaders and religious figures. These leaders possess high social power, which I operationalize in terms of actors' ability to command the loyalties of a particular segment of the population—what Michael Mann (1986, p. 6) refers to as

"mastery exercised over other people."[9] Hence their endorsement of a particular formateur is critical to increasing the formateur's chances of winning the elections. Possession of social resources will encourage alliance seeking behavior because only those high on political resources can brunt the costs of building strong coalitions. Which coalition they will join is determined by three factors: a) an invitation from the formateur, b) the perceived viability of the coalition, and c) the perks promised to the alliance seekers. All else being equal then, alliance seekers will prefer to join the coalition that they perceive as the most viable and that promises them the maximum perks in return for their electoral support for the formateur (which may be proportional to the electoral weight the members bring to the coalition). However, the final decision on who to include in the alliance usually lies with the formateur.

Formateurs, however, face what is commonly referred to as the commitment problem in trying to recruit alliance partners. Following Posner (2005, p. 105), commitment problem, the fact that "politicians' promises to share the spoils of power with members of other groups are not likely to be viewed as credible," poses the main obstacle to coalition building. I argue that one way for the formateur to address the commitment problem is making her promises public. However, this strategy works better for some seats than others. For instance, the choice of the vice-presidential candidate is made public prior to the elections but usually not those of cabinet members. Formatuers may also put together informal lists of cabinet members or find other ways to convince

[9] An obvious question arises here: if the incumbent did not possess high social resources how did she come to power in the first place? One possible answer lies in the nature of the negotiated transition to democracy, where the person that comes to power may deliberately be a compromise candidate and not the most powerful elite. In the 2001 transition in Afghanistan, Karzai was certainly one such figure. He commanded a very small group of militias and did not have a prominent political past when he was chosen to head the Afghan Interim Authority. However, his incumbent status gave him significant advantage in the subsequent elections to initiate strong electoral coalitions and hold on to power for the next decade.

alliance partners of their commitment. Finally, those running for a first term in office may attempt to make stronger commitment in compensating their alliance partners and fulfilling their commitment than those who run for a second term in office. First time candidates with the intention to run for a second term want to appear committed to their future alliance partners.

Formateurs and alliance seekers facing alliance choices are confronted with two main considerations, respectively: winning the elections and maximizing access to resources of the state. Hence, everyone wants to be part of a coalition that guarantees victory. However, the alliance seeker will also want to be part of a winning coalition that promises the largest share of the resources of the state (e.g. cabinet posts). From the perspective of the formateur, the more inclusive the coalition is, the higher her chances of winning the elections. From the perspective of the alliance seeker, however, a highly inclusive coalition means fewer perks for each member of the coalition, and it may not be her first preference to be part of an oversized coalition. However, given her desire to be part of a coalition that wins the elections, and because of the instability inherent in a minimum winning coalition[10], the alliance partner may become willing to be part of an oversized coalition that can win office than a coalition that promises more perks but has a lower chance of winning. Such a coalition will increase the likelihood of victory in

[10] Riker's (1962) "size principle" dictates that coalitions that allow the division of gains to the smallest number of members—"minimum winning coalition"—are most ideal. However, Ordeshook (1986) has demonstrated that "minimum winning coalitions" are inherently unstable because the members who receive lesser payments are always vulnerable to defecting to another "minimum winning coalition" with the promise of receiving more than what they get from their current coalition. In regime transitions with prospects of nationwide elections, elites do not want to risk losing an ally whose defection will not only cost them the electoral edge, but it will benefit their opponents. All else equal, elites want to build "grand" coalitions to secure electoral victory in transitional contexts.

national elections, which is the primary concern of both the formateur and the alliance seeker.

Building a grand coalition is perceivable in post-transition contexts where political control is positive-sum. Political transitions to democracy are generally followed by a period of economic prosperity and increased state resources as the newly formed government receives monetary assistance from international stakeholders, and political posts become available for redistribution. Those elites who gain access to power and resources of the state can divide up the resources to a larger number of people to buy off loyalty and avoid redistributive conflict.[11] An oversized pre-electoral coalition will not only guarantee victory, but it will also reduce the uncertainty that such an alliance will face if minimum winning coalitions are to be formed (Weingast, 1979). From the perspective of the formateur, there are enough political resources (cabinet posts, public offices, etc.) to go around as far as the investment pays off on election day. From the perspective of the alliance seeker, it is good to be part of the majority coalition not just because it is more likely to win, but also because she is certain to be included in the oversized coalition (as opposed to being replaced by another alliance seeker in a minimal winning coalition).

A second reason why an oversized coalition will prevail is uncertainty over voter preferences. This issue becomes particularly important in contexts where social relations are complex, and cleavages are cross-cutting. The complex nature of such social relations means that no leader may have the full support of their ethno-linguistic or regional group.

[11] Post-transition politics may also be perceived as positive-sum game because competitive elections promise rotation in office and future payoff even if someone does lose out in the current elections.

Ethnic groups may not be concentrated geographically and may find that their regional interests prevail that of their ethnic allegiance.[12] Under such circumstances, a fomateur cannot rely on one alliance partner to deliver the votes of an ethnic group. She will seek to bring in multiple leaders from the same ethnolinguistic group to increase her confidence in receiving the votes of that ethnic group. She will also build alliances with regional and religious leaders who may exercise influence over multiple ethnolinguistic groups.

Pre-electoral coalition formation is understood as a process involving four stages: 1) the decision to create a coalition prior to an election; 2) selection of potential recruits and negotiation between the formateur and potential recruits (the potential recruits may be involved in multiple negotiation processes with other formateurs, as they try to secure the best deal for themselves); 3) agreement on portfolio allocations to each coalition member based on their contribution to the overall vote share of the coalition and making the coalition public; 4) participation in elections as a coalition (adopted from Carroll and Cox, 2007 game theoretic treatment of pre-electoral coalitions among political parties). Such coalitions provide office seekers with electoral services typically provided by political parties.

The success of these alternative strategies in winning political office depends on a host of factors including the size of the coalition, its inclusivity, and the relative strength of the competing alliances (e.g. counter-alliances). Only those who possess

[12] In Afghanistan, ethnic groups are dispersed geographically and their allegiances are divided between different ethnic and regional leaders. For instance, Hazaras are dispersed in three parts of the country, central highlands, the northern province of Balkh, and Kabul province. As such, their loyalties are divided among the Tajik leader in the north (Atta Noor) and two Hazara leaders (Mohammad Mohaqqeq and Karim Khalili), while more educated Hazaras have supported the technocrat Hazara returnee, Ramazan Bashardost.

disproportionately large political resources can afford to build large, inclusive, and strong alliances. Typically, the incumbent benefits from such dynamics.

The theoretical discussion above generates three new hypotheses inductively in the hope that they will be rigorously tested against data from other case-studies:

H1. Office seekers are more likely to forego party affiliation during elections if their political parties are associated with negative legacies of the pre-democratic regime. Conversely, leaders of political parties not associated with negative legacies of the previous regime are less likely to forego their party affiliation during elections.

H2. Leaders of parties associated with negative legacies are likely to look for party substitutes during elections, while leaders of parties not associated with negative legacies will rely on their political parties for provision of electoral goods and services.

H3. Leaders of old parties will form oversized, multiethnic pre-electoral alliances as viable alternatives to their political parties to compete in elections.

The participation of leaders of political parties as independent in post-2001 Afghan politics has had significant consequences for democratic consolidation. The absence of national political parties poses a serious challenge to issues of representation and accountability. The pre-electoral coalitions that are formed among elites are different from political parties in their longevity and formal organizational apparatus shared by members of the coalition. These coalitions are formed based on elites' electoral concerns and not as devices to represent the interests of the citizens. Because these coalitions are short-term arrangements, the members of governing coalition can leave their current

coalition and join another one in the upcoming elections—escaping any prospects of accountability for the policies of the previous government.

Absence of national political parties can be addressed by providing political elites with incentives to form parties. Efforts to change or modify constitutional regimes and electoral institutions in ways that advantage political parties (parliamentary system, proportional electoral rules) might be one effective way to provide incentives for party formation. Raising the costs for independent candidates relative to partisan candidates, such as signature requirements and vote thresholds, may push office seekers towards forming or joining political parties. Finally, public education campaigns to raise awareness about the benefits of political parties as mechanisms of representation and accountability may also have an effect on changing the negative attitudes of both the voters and the office-seekers towards political parties.

This dissertation is an attempt to understand why political parties are the weakest link in emerging democracies. It challenges the institutional explanations as the most prominent answers offered for the poor performance of political parties in new democracies and calls attention to studying the variables that have previously been neglected in the literature. The inductive study of post-2001 Afghanistan suggests that legacies of political parties exert strong effects on party leaders' perceptions of electoral victory and consequently inform their electoral strategies. Political parties that are associated with negative legacies under the pre-democratic regimes give their leaders disincentives to run under their party label due to concerns of uncertainty over voter preferences. Under these conditions, office seekers use viable alternatives to political parties to gather electoral support. My dissertation moves beyond the view of political

parties as the only or most attractive providers of electoral services and brand names to institutions whose legacies will determine their usage under changed, democratic conditions (mass politics, free political competition, universal suffrage). In this view, political parties in new democracies are not weak because citizens' political demands are met through other means, but because their legacies have deemed them an electoral liability, and as a result politicians do not invest in their progress and development. Instead, to achieve their short term electoral goals, they rely on viable alternatives or party substitutes during democratic elections, based on the evidence from post-2001 Afghanistan.

Chapter Three

The Dependent Variable: Affiliation and Non-affiliation

Independent candidates have featured prominently in Afghan elections since Afghanistan's 2001 transition to democracy. However, many candidates who run as independent are indeed leaders of old political parties (that is, parties that existed prior to the 2001 transition), while those who participate under their party labels are either leaders of newly formed political parties or the ones that have splintered from old political parties. In addition, despite their initial efforts to assert themselves as important players, newly formed political parties have experienced consistent decline in national elections. In Chapter 2, I laid down the causes of affiliation decisions among party leaders in post-transition contexts. This chapter has three objectives: first, to give definitions and measurements of key concepts (i.e., state power, regime type); second, to present a chronological narrative of the three Afghan presidential elections held in 2004, 2009, and 2014 to highlight the variation in affiliation decisions among office seekers and present evidence of party decline in national elections; and third, to provide a discussion of the state of political parties in the legislature. The overarching goal is to provide empirical background for the proceeding chapters of the dissertation. The organization of the chapter follows the order of the objectives of the chapter.

Key Concepts: Definition and Measurement

The unit of analysis in this study is individual candidates who face the choice to either run under their party label or participate as independent (i.e., non-party candidate) in

legislative elections. I assume that office seekers are rational actors who are constrained by their structural and institutional environment. Such approach helps us understand why similar structural and contextual factors can influence actors' perceptions and preferences in different ways. Throughout the dissertation, I demonstrate that office seekers are able to forego party affiliation when they have other means of gathering electoral support. Merging rational choice and qualitative methods, I present an analytical framework that outlines the limits of party affiliation.

The dissertation is concerned with political parties and elections in emerging democracies. I use Chandra's (2007, p. 6) definition of the term democracy as a system in which "the political leadership is chosen through competitive elections." Many emerging democracies have not reached the level of maturity experienced by established democracies of Western Europe and North America. Consequently, using the maximalist definition of democracy will disqualify many of the emerging democracies as possessing democratic regimes. Hence, I have chosen the minimalist definition for the sake of inclusion and simplicity. The regime type in Afghanistan since its 2001 transition resembles what Chandra (2007, p. 6) calls "patronage democracy." In a patronage democracy, "the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and…elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state." In such a democracy, the state is dominant vis-à-vis the private sector as a source of jobs and provider of services, and the elected officials have the ability to distribute the vast resources controlled by the state to their supporters on an individualized basis.

I measure state dominance in terms of its degree of centralization and state's financial assets. State centralization is a measure of state's administrative control, management of public finances and state assets, and political control. A state is highly centralized if provincial and local governments are fully dependent on the central government for their administration and finances (e.g. the central government approves the provincial and local budgets and manages provincial and local affairs), and the power to appoint provincial and local leadership rests within the executive. Usually, presidential systems enjoy a significant degree of centralization as political power is concentrated in the executive branch. The financial resources of the state could come from natural resources that the country is endowed with, industrial and agricultural production and export, or from international monetary assistance, especially true of newly emerging democracies (historically, organizations such as USAID, International Foundation for Election Systems, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund have provided monetary assistance to support democratic initiates in emerging democracies, in addition to individual country pledges).

Political parties are generally classified based on their origins and organizational features (Duverger's 1954 cadre versus mass parties), their functions (Neumann's 1956 parties of individual representation versus parties of democratic integration), and their relationship with the state (Katz and Mair, 1995 elite versus mass parties). Much of this categorization and classification, however, is used to explain political parties in Western Europe. Political parties in emerging democracies, however, differ from their Western counterparts. Unlike Western European political parties, in many emerging democracies political parties have preceded legislative politics (Linz and Stepan, 1996) with

implications for their categorization. Generally, in emerging democracies nationalist demands, armed opposition, and ethnic fractionalization have given rise to political parties in the aftermath of the democratic transition (e.g. the Mujahedin parties in Afghanistan, the Indian National Congress Party, the Front de Liberation Nationale in Algeria, the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Croatian Democratic Union, and the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to name a few). Consequently, my definition of political parties is inevitably broad to include nationalist movements- and armed organizations-turned-parties, ethnic parties, as well as ideological groups.

An ethnic party is "a party that overtly represents itself as a champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and that makes such a representation central to its strategy of mobilizing voters" (Chandra, 2004, p. 3). Ethnic parties draw their support from their ethnic groups. I take the term "ethnic group" to refer to "the nominal members of an ascriptive category such as race, language, caste, tribe, or religion" (Chandra, 2004, p. 2-3). As this dissertation will demonstrate, ethnicity informs a lot of the choices that Afghan office seekers and voters make. For instance, the majority of the former Mujahedin parties are formed along ethno-linguistic lines, people generally vote for their co-ethnics in elections, and alliance formation among elites occurs with ethnic considerations in mind (although in the last case, alliances are intentionally multi-ethnic). However, when making claims about ethnic behavior, how can we be sure that we are not deducing the behavior of individuals from the collective behavior of the group? In order to control for ecological bias, we can seek to uncover the conditions under which ethnic voting is theoretically expected. Consistent with Chandra's (2004) claim, I find that ethnic behavior in Afghanistan is instrumentally

rational. People vote for their co-ethnics under conditions of severe information constraints. Meanwhile, elites mobilize their ethnic base during elections; however, they refrain from making ethnic-based appeals during elections when the size of their ethnic group is smaller than the threshold necessary to win the elections.

State Resources and Centralization of the Afghan State

When Afghanistan transitioned to a democratic regime in 2001, the state was significantly weakened by the years of war and financial turmoil. However, when the Taliban regime was toppled in 2001 through a military campaign led by the United States and carried out by the United Front forces (referred to as the Northern Alliance in western media and scholarship), the tide started to turn. The newly transitioned Afghan state received pledges of financial assistance as well as infrastructural support from a coalition of forty nine states, which boosted the state capacity and turned it into the key player in post-transition context. Meanwhile, the Constitution that was adopted in early 2004 concentrated vast powers in the executive and turned the state into a highly centralized entity. The centralized state with substantive resources at its disposal had consequences for party politics and democratic experience in post-2001 Afghanistan, providing the basis for patronage democracy. This section presents evidence of the centralization and resources of the Afghan state.

State Resources: the process of state building in post-2001 Afghanistan began at Bonn when four groups of Afghan delegates met to decide on post-transitional arrangements. The United Nations hosted the negotiations and together with the international community played a key role in shaping the capacity of the Afghan state. The most

important contributions of the international community were to rebuild the military and financial capacity of the Afghan state by rebuilding the Afghan national army and pledging financial assistance to pay for the state bureaucracy.

The first round of financial pledges from the international community came forth in early 2002. In Tokyo Conference in January, the international community pledged to give a cumulative amount of more than $4.5 billion multi-year civilian aid to Afghanistan, as well as in-kind pledges without specifying the monetary values (Tokyo Conference, 2002). The Afghan government continued to receive donations after the 2001 transition. The United States alone appropriated nearly $103.2 billion dollars for Afghanistan's reconstruction between 2002 and 2014. The reconstruction fund was allocated under different categories, which included Security ($58.84 billion)—supporting the training and equipping of Afghan security forces, Governance/Development ($25.96 billion) aimed at economic, social and political development efforts, Civilian Operations ($8.05 billion), Counternarcotics ($7.55 billion), and Humanitarian ($2.78 billion)—largely implemented through USAID and international organizations (SIGAR, 2014; see also Tarnoff, 2010). Table 1 is a summary of specific divisions for which funds were distributed.

Table 1: Cumulative Amounts Appropriated, Obligated, and Distributed FY 2002-2014 ($ Billions)

	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed	Remaining
ASFF (Afghanistan Security Forces Fund)	$57.33	$48.92	$46.65	$9.59
CEPR (Commander's Emergency Response Program)	$3.67	$2.29	$2.26	$0.06

AIF (Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund)	$1.22	$0.89	$0.23	$0.92
TFBSO (Task Force for Business and Stability Operations)	$0.8	$0.73	$0.55	$0.22
DOD CN (DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities)	$2.93	$2.61	$2.61	$0.32
ESF (Economic Support Fund)	$17.53	$14.66	$11.71	$5.43
INCLE (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement)	$4.42	$3.55	$2.95	$1.38
Total 7 Major Funds	**$87.90**	**$73.64**	**$66.95**	**$17.91**
Other Reconstruction Funds	$7.23			
Civilian Operations	$8.05			
Total	**$103.17**			

In addition to the categories detailed in Table 1, the United States provided direct funds to the government to pay for certain recurrent costs. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) channeled funding to Afghan government through the Recurrent Cost (RC) Window and the Investment Window. As of March 20, 2014 more than $2.97 billion of ARTF funds have been "disbursed to the Afghan government through the RC Window to assist with recurrent costs such as salaries of civil servants. The RC Window supports the operating costs of the Afghan government because the government's domestic revenues continue to be insufficient to support its recurring costs" (SIGAR 2014, p. 83). The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations projects for instance funded activities that facilitated private investment, industrial development, banking and financial system development, to name a few (Table 2 summarizes the yearly amount of funding the Afghan government has received). The availability of these funds to the state made it the most important provider of jobs and services in the country,

establishing its dominance vis-à-vis the private sector, which encouraged patronage-based relations between the state and the subjects.

Table 2: External funds for the Afghan State between 2007 and 2014

U.S. Congress Appropriations by Fiscal Year ($ Billions)	
2007	$10.04
2008	$6.18
2009	$10.39
2010	$16.17
2011	$15.86
2012	$14.66
2013	$9.66
2014	$6.62
Total	**$89.58**

As a result of the relative security and stability of post-2001 years (until recently), Afghanistan's GDP grew from over $7 billion in 2006 to $20.04 billion in 2014, while the annual GDP growth rate jumped from 5.6% in 2006 to 14.4% in 2012 (reaching over 21% in 2009), although the growth rate dropped to 1.3% in 2014 due to increased insecurity in the country (The World Bank). The Afghan GDP, however, is driven by, and highly dependent on, foreign aid: 64% of the Afghan budget is comprised of aid given by the United States, 26% by other donors, and only 10% self-funded (Cordesman, 2014, p. 36). This dependence on foreign aid may prove detrimental for the state when the foreign assistance eventually dries up.

Afghanistan possesses significant mineral resources—amounting to an estimated $1 trillion by a group of American geologists in 2009. These resources include huge deposits of iron, copper, cobalt, gold, and lithium (Risen, 2013). Afghanistan is also

geographically well-located to export those resources to the rapidly growing markets in China, the Indian sub-continent, and the Persian Gulf. However, those resources remain severely undeveloped, as no large scale mining industry currently operates in Afghanistan. The Aynak Copper Deposit, one of world's largest untapped deposits, located in Logar province south of Kabul, was contracted to the Chinese MCC-Jiangxi Copper Consortium in 2008 for $808 million (Aynak Copper Contract, 2008). However, it is not clear what kind of impact it has had on the overall national budget, especially after China has been trying to renege on the contract as a result of drop in price of copper, China's slowing economic growth, and lack of security and safe transportation routes in Afghanistan (Daniel and Harooni, 2015). For the time being, the Afghan state cannot depend on its natural resource wealth to fund its budget, since there is no mining industry or infrastructure in place, and it may take decades for Afghanistan before it can fully exploit its mineral wealth.

State Centralization: as discussed above, centralization of the state is a measure of the degree to which the periphery is dependent on the center fiscally, administratively, and politically. At the onset of the transition, the Afghan state was considerably weak as various armed groups exercised authority over portions of the country and the administration. However, this pattern started to change in the coming years as a result of the military presence of ISAF, large scale disarmament and reintegration of the armed groups into the National Army, and the training and equipping of a large national security force, which could implement the will of the state. Meanwhile, the Constitution that was adopted in early 2004 granted significant powers to the executive, turning it into the most powerful branch of the government. The Constitution also gave the center the power over

allocation of funds to provinces. Hence, more than a decade after its transition, the Afghan state changed from a fragmented state to a highly centralized entity (see Evans et al, 2004 and Lister, 2007 on centralization of Afghan state).

During the Bonn Talks in 2001, the participants requested the deployment of some international security forces to Kabul, much to the initial reluctance of the United Front delegation.[13] At the time of the Talks, the Afghan state did not possess a national army, as the army personnel had been long dismantled (in 1992 after the Mujahedin took control of the state by ousting the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime, the national army disintegrated along ethnic lines and absorbed by different Mujahedin factions). Meanwhile, the control of most of country was in the hands of the Mujahedin forces, who not only possessed their own militias, but who also had received significant amount of weaponry from the U.S. as the military campaign to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan relied heavily on mujahidin militias to fight on the ground (Tanner, 2002, p. 289-320). Former Mujahedin's de facto military control of the country made the rest of the stakeholders in Afghan politics, namely the returning technocrats and the royalists represented by the Rome Group in the Talks, concerned about the prospects of post-2001

[13] The United Front was initially opposed to deploying any security force to Afghanistan. When Qanooni was asked during a Bonn press briefing on November 28 whether he would favor a multi-national force on the ground in Afghanistan, he said there was no need for any outside peace-keeping force as the country was fully secure. However, other delegations, particularly the Rome group favored some sort of multi-national force primarily in Kabul with the potential to be extended to other parts of Afghanistan (Sirat Press Briefing). Interestingly however, on November 29 in a press briefing, Qanooni claimed that their position on the deployment of foreign troops was misunderstood. "We clarified our position yesterday and we said that the issue of the deployment of foreign international forces is debatable within a peace package. What we said was that at the moment because there is peace in Afghanistan and security we do not see reasons for the deployment of the international forces. The intention was not to oppose the deployment of foreign troops to Afghanistan. We aren't yet in a transitional period. At the moment the United Front is in control of most of the country. Our official position is that once there is a transitional mechanism for Afghanistan established, and if that evolves, due to reasons that require or necessitate the presence of international peacekeeping force, then we will go with that. We will not oppose that" (Qanooni press briefing, 29 November 2001).

political power sharing. Consequently, they pushed with their request for the deployment of peacekeeping forces.

The U.N. Security Council approved the deployment of a peacekeeping force of between 3,000 and 5,000 troops. These forces became known as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Britain agreed to supply 1,500 troops and lead the ISAF forces in Afghanistan; the first British Royal Marines arrived in Bagram Airport on December 21—just in time for Karzai's inauguration on December 22.[14] The primary objective of the ISAF was to "enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure that Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists" (NATO, 2015). At its height, ISAF was more than 130,000 strong with troops from 51 NATO and partner nations (Table 3 demonstrates ISAF's geographic expansion in Afghanistan). The ISAF presence made any form of military action by the armed groups against the Afghan government non-feasible and gave the Afghan state the time and the resources to put together a large national army.

As the data above indicate, the security sector is the biggest sector in the national budget, and its expenditures are well over half of the national expenditure (including core and external expenditures). The Afghan security forces are comprised of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), made up of 352,000 soldiers and

[14] Qasim Fahim, the commander of the United Front armed militias, agreed to deployment of around 5,000 ISAF troops to the capital. However, he refused to withdraw his forces from Kabul. James Dobbins, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan, tried to pressure him on the basis of the Bonn Accord in which the signatories, including Qanooni, had "pledge[d] to withdraw all military units from Kabul." However, Fahim had interpreted that as his troops staying off the streets of Kabul. Eventually, General McColl had to agree with Fahim's forces staying in barracks, while the Afghan Police and the ISAF would patrol the streets of Kabul (Dobbins, 2008: 109-110).

police, which International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helped train since the 2001 transition. In December 2014, the ISAF operations as the provider of security in Afghanistan ended and the Afghan security forces assumed full responsibility for security (NATO, 2015). Building the Afghan National Army was a successful experience in the sense that it was accepted by the majority of the population as the national security forces, and the only armed resistance to the ANA comes from the Taliban insurgents. However, despite the vast investments in the Afghan security forces, the ANA has faced challenges in maintaining its personnel and meeting the standards of a highly capable army. High desertion and low re-enlistment rates at the ANA have required it to replace a third of its entire force every year. The stated reasons for desertion include corruption among army officers, poor food and equipment, indifferent medical care, and Taliban intimidation of the soldiers' families (Nordland, 2012). These problems notwithstanding, the Afghan state has been successful in bringing the majority of the Mujahedin armed factions under the civilian control.

Table 3: Stages of ISAF Expansion in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2006 (see ISAF Map 2008 for visual data)

ISAF Expansion in Afghanistan			
Stages	**Mission**	**Month and Year of Completion**	**Geographical Area**
Stage 1	Assessment and Preparation	October 2004	North of Kabul
Stage 2	Stabilization	September 2005	Western Afghanistan
Stage 3	Transition	July 2006	Southern Afghanistan
Stage 4	Redeployment	October 2006	Eastern Afghanistan

Source: Bowman and Dale (2009)

In addition to providing security and financial assistance to Afghanistan, the international community started a number of programs to disarm and reintegrate different armed groups into the legal system in order to decrease the power of regional commanders and armed groups vis-à-vis the central state. The first such program began in 2003 and was referred to as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). The main target of the DDR was the so-called Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), the anti-Taliban coalition mainly consisting of the former Mujahedin who helped oust the Taliban in 2001. The DDR was succeeded by another program, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) in 2006. All illegal armed groups remaining after DDR were outlawed by the Afghan government. DIAG ended in 2011 (Derksen, 2014; Stapleton, 2008).

The DDR, which squarely targeted the former Mujahedin forces, got under way in October 2003 with the creation of Afghanistan's New Beginnings Program (ANBP) under the auspices of the UNAMA and UNDP. The DDR program aimed at decommissioning military formation and units and at disarming 100,000 members of the AMF. The program was funded by Japan (as the lead donor), the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada with $167 million dollars over three years. By January 2005, the number of the AMF disarmed had reached 35,030, of which 31,191 were enrolled in the re-integration program of their choice, e.g. teacher training, small business, demining, Afghan National Army, and Afghan National Police, to name a few (Chrobok, 2005). DDR ended in February 2005. Even though DDR failed to demobilize and reintegrate all non-Taliban armed groups, one of its main achievements was the collection of the heavy weapons (Stapleton, 2008). However, this initial success was turned into a nightmare when the heavy weapons were deactivated, per the

recommendation of the newly empowered technocrats, and stored in depots around the country. The deactivated heavy weapons were then illegally sold to the Taliban for the price of the metal (author's interview with Kohestani).[15] Consequently, the Taliban insurgents started to threaten the relative stability of the Afghan state, armed with heavy weapons. Between 2001 and 2010, the international coalition death toll rose from 7 personnel to 708 per year (iCasualties, 2009). With increased threat from Taliban insurgents, DIAG was introduced.

DIAG was created to target the disbandment of illegal armed groups, those that were outlawed by the Afghan government at the conclusion of the DDR. DIAG was supposed to be an entirely Afghan-owned and managed process, and it was formally managed by the internationally supported joint Secretariat and the Afghan-owned Disarmament & Reintegration Committee (D&RC), headed by the then second Vice-President Karim Khalili (*UNDP/ANBP/DIAG* 2006). Unlike DDR, DIAG did not offer direct incentives to individual commanders and members of illegally armed groups, and the process supposed to depend on law enforcement. However, both the identification of illegal armed groups and enforcement of DIAG objectives (disbanding the illegal armed groups) were plagued with difficulty and confusion (Stapleton, 2008). Nonetheless, by 2009 DIAG was perceived as successful for targeting one third of Afghanistan's 367 districts and officially disbanding 27% (over 500) of the 1800-2000 identified illegal armed groups (Poulton, 2009, p. 34).

[15] Kohestani is a political analyst, a Bonn 2001 participant, and the leader of Nuhzat-e Democratic Afghanistan/Afghanistan Democratic Movement, a newly formed party. His political affiliation goes back to the Maoist parties of the 1960s.

While programs such as DDR and DIAG established state's monopoly over legitimate use of force and minimized any military challenge against the government, concentration of administrative, fiscal, and political powers in the central government turned the Afghan state into a highly centralized entity. Most staffing decisions are made in Kabul, and all staff are employees of the central government, taking direction from the center through their respective ministries. The national government formally owns all the revenues and provincial expenditures are allotted through central ministry budgets. Finally, all political positions (governors, chiefs of police) in the subnational level are appointed by national government (Evans et al, 2004, p. 3).[16] And provincial departments of line ministries, as well as the governor's office, have virtually no discretionary spending power and limited input into planning (Lister, 2007, p. 4). In recognition of the imbalance in center-provincial relationships, there have recently been efforts to reform the process as part of country's July 2012 Tokyo Conference commitment.[17]

The provinces are comprised of a set of departments from most ministries, which are secondary budgetary units and receive allocations at the discretion of the ministry (the primary budget unit). They exercise little latitude in determining their own structure; the internal structure of each department is made by the parent ministry in negotiation with the Office of Administrative Affairs. Provinces have no budget per se; the budgetary allocations for provinces are the total of the administrative decisions that have been made by the various Kabul ministries. Provinces have no independent authority to borrow

[16] The level of administrative centralization is so high that all administrative decisions from granting high school diplomas to approving retirement benefits all have to be approved by the relevant ministries in Kabul.

[17] The government received $15 million from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Afghan Incentive Fund, in recognition of progress on the commitment it made to develop a provincial budgeting policy (Korshak, 2014).

money. Lastly, provinces collect a range of locally generated revenues of behalf of the central government, and all the tax and customs rates are set by the central government. As tertiary budget units, the districts are even more dependent on the administrative decisions made by the relevant provincial level departments of the Kabul ministries (Evans et al, 2004, p. 4-5).

The centralization of the provincial budget allocation and execution allows the central government to exercise a lot of influence over provinces, which has made the international donors concerned. A USAID report summarizes the issues with the budget system in Afghanistan as "lack of a mechanism or process for provinces to provide input into national budget process, low budget execution, weak communication between Line Ministries and their provincial departments on planning and budgeting processes" (USAID, 2012, p. 6-7). There were two donor-supported efforts to reform the provincial budgeting process, the 2007 and 2012 provincial budgeting pilots, undertaken by the Ministry of Finance. The pilot programs represented the first comprehensive program for building capacity of provincial line directorates in preparing development project proposals and budget estimates across the 34 provinces through regional training events and follow up technical assistance. The objective was to bring in line provincial development needs with budgeting priorities of line ministries. However, "disagreements between the Afghan government and donors over the source of funding for proposed projects resulted in the cancellation of the pilot projects" (SIGAR, 2014, p. 139).

The most important power of the Afghan state is political, with a lot of power concentrated in the executive branch. The 2004 Constitution gives the president sweeping powers over provinces, independent agencies, and other branches of the government.

According to Article 64 (13) of the Afghan Constitution, the president has the power to appoint "high ranking officials" including the provincial and district governors. The same Article grants the president the authority to appoint and dismiss all judges. According to Article 7 of the Law on Structure, Duties, and Mandates of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the president appoints the Commission's leadership. The Presidential Decree No. 23 grants the president the right to appoint the leadership of the Independent Election Commission, while the Electoral Law allows the president to appoint all five commissioners of the Electoral Complaints Commission. The Constitution also grants the president the power to appoint one third of the Upper House (Meshrano Jirga) members (Article 84).

To sum up this section, the combination of a highly centralized administrative, fiscal, and political system and generous international financial assistance has turned the Afghan state into the most important player in post-2001 politics. The relative monopoly of the state over provision of jobs and services has turned the regime into a patronage democracy. Meanwhile, the availability of state resources to form patronage relations has proven detrimental to formation and development of strong, national, representative parties, as those with access to state resources have used them to build pre-electoral alliances with individual elites in order to mobilize electoral support during elections.

The following section discusses the dependent variable of this study—affiliation decision—in details over three presidential elections and will provide evidence of party decline over time. It will also discuss the effects of access to resources of the state on office seekers' ability to turn away from political parties.

The Dependent Variable: Affiliation Decisions

In post-2001 elections in Afghanistan, some office seekers have participated under party labels while others have turned away from political parties by formally running as independent. My dissertation seeks to address this variation in affiliation decisions.

The new Afghan Constitution, adopted in early 2004, designates presidentialism as the political system of the country. According to Article 61 of the Constitution, president is elected by a majority of the valid votes cast in an election by the voters through free, general, secret and direct vote (also Article 20 of the Electoral Law). If no candidate wins more than 50% of the valid votes, a runoff election should be held between the two top vote-getters within two weeks after the election results have been announced.[18] For presidential elections, the whole country is a single electoral constituency. Consequently, the candidates should campaign throughout the country and draw on the support of the majority of the population, which requires significant investment in time, money, and organization. Given the scale of investment in presidential campaigns, we should expect party leaders to turn to their political parties for organizational and financial support. However, in post-2001 presidential elections, leaders of old political parties have publicly distanced themselves from their political parties by running in elections as independent. This section provides an overview of the affiliation decisions among office seekers in three presidential elections that have taken place in Afghanistan since its 2001 transition to democracy.

[18] The 2013 amendment to the Electoral Law added further specifications for the runoff elections: "In case of equality of votes amongst more than two candidates who have obtained the most votes in the first round, those two candidates who meet the highest criteria shall be selected as candidates for the second round. The highest criteria are as follows respectively: 1-Level of education, 2- Academic rank, 3-Work experience in the governmental and non-governmental organizations." The amendments to the Electoral Law are in author's possession and will be discussed in Institutional Selection chapter.

The 2004 Presidential Elections

The year 2004 marked the first democratically held presidential elections in Afghanistan's recent history. The field was crowded with 18 candidates contesting the executive office. However, only four candidates (22%) registered under a party label, while the rest of the candidates participated as independent. Among the independent candidates, four were leaders of political parties of the past, while three of the four party candidates belonged to political parties that have formed after the 2001 transition. Only one of the party candidates was a leader of an old party running under a new party label. The rest of the candidates included the newly empowered head of the Transitional Authority Hamid Karzai, political newcomers, and single issue candidates—all of whom participated in the elections as independent. While prevalence of independent candidates in presidential elections is theoretically interesting, this dissertation seeks to explain the variation in affiliation decisions among leaders of old and new parties. In other words, I seek to explain why some party leaders participate under their party label while others turn away from their parties. Figure 2 below summarizes the patterns of affiliation among candidates for the 2004 presidential elections.

Figure 2: Dynamics of party affiliation among the 2004 presidential candidates



The 9 October 2004 elections were administered by Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), which was created through Presidential Decree No. 40 on 26 July 2003, and mandated to prepare, manage, convene, and oversee the elections through Presidential Decree No. 110 on 18 February 2004. The JEMB consisted of eleven members, six being the Commissioners of the Interim Afghan Electoral Commission, and five international electoral experts appointed by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan. On the day of the elections, eight million Afghans turned up to vote. When the results were announced, the leaders of both old and new political parties were able to master roughly one fifth of the total votes each, regardless of their affiliation status: the combined vote share of the four party candidates was 19% of the total valid votes, while the leaders of old political parties who had participated as "independent" won a combined share of 22.8% of the total valid votes. Among the rest of the candidates, all of whom ran as independent, Karzai alone claimed 55% of the total

valid votes.[19] Table 4 provides the complete list of the 2004 presidential candidates, their affiliation status, and their vote shares.

Table 4: 2004 Presidential Election Results by Vote Shares

No.	Candidate	Political Party	% of Votes
1	Hamid Karzai	Independent	55.4
2	**Yunus Qanooni**	**Hezb-e Nuhzat-e Mili Afghanistan**	**16.3**
3	Haji Mohammad Mohaqqiq*	Independent	11.7
4	Abdul Rashid Dostum*	Independent	10.0
5	**Abdul Latif Pedram**	**Hezb-e Congra-e Mili Afghanistan**	**1.4**
6	Massoada Jalal	Independent	1.1
7	**Syed Ishaq Gilani**	**Nuhzat-e Hambastagee Mili**	**1.0**
8	Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai*	Independent	0.8
9	Abdul Satar Serat	Independent	0.4
10	Hamayon Shah Asifi	Independent	0.3
11	**Ghulam Faroq Nijrabi**	**Hezb-e Istiqlal-e Afghanistan**	**0.3**
12	Syed Abdul Hadi Dabir*	Independent	0.3
13	Abdul Hafiz Mansoor*	Independent	0.2
14	Abdul Hadi Khalilzai	Independent	0.2
15	Mir Mohammad Mahfouz Nedaee*	Independent	0.2
16	Mohammad Ebrahim Rashid	Independent	0.2
17	Wakil Mangal*	Independent	0.1
18	Abdul Haseeb Aryan	Independent	0.1

Valid Votes: 8024,536
Invalid Votes: 104,404 (1.3% of total votes)
Total Votes: 8128,940
*****Mohaqqiq and Dostum were both leaders of their respective parties, Mansoor, Dabir, and Ahmadzai were junior leaders of Jamiat party, Mangal was a former People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) junior leader, and Mir Mohammad Mahfuz Nedaee was the leader of Ittehad-e Melli bara-ye Azadi wa Demokrasi (National Union for Freedom and Democracy), which formed by "liberally minded intellectuals coming back from exile in 1986 as a result of Najibullah's controlled multi-party system (see Ruttig 2006, p. 13-14), but they all participated in elections as "independent."

[19] The figures in this paragraph are taken from the Independent Elections Commission website and do not reflect the extent of electoral fraud thought to have been committed during the elections. Nonetheless, there is general consensus among national and international observers of the Afghan elections as well as among candidates that the 2004 presidential and the 2005 parliamentary elections, conducted by the JEMB, have been the cleanest elections held since the 2001 transition. While electoral fraud has been a serious problem in post-2001 Afghan elections, this dissertation does not address the issue in a systematic fashion. The topic of electoral fraud in Afghan elections merits its own research and data collection.

Source: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan

Leaders of Old Political Parties: the majority of the leaders of old political parties (Mujahedin parties and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan or PDPA) that participated in the 2004 presidential elections formally ran as independent. This group included Mohammad Mohaqqiq of Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardom-e Afghanistan, Rashid Dostum of Junbish-e Melli-ye Afghanistan, Hafiz Mansoor, Ahamd Shah Ahmadzai, and Hadi Dabir of the Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, and Wakil Mangal of the PDPA. Chapter 1 argued that leaders of old parties turn away from their political parties when their party is associated with negative legacies of the past. In fact, Qanooni was the only leader of an old party who participated in elections under a party label. Nonetheless, he did not participate as the candidate of Jamiat and formed his own splinter party, the National Movement of Afghanistan later renamed New Afghanistan. This section provides an overview of these candidates' campaign profile and their vice-presidential choices.

Mohaqqiq was a well-known leader of the Wahdat-e Islami Party from the Afghan Jihad era. However, in the 2004 presidential elections he decided to run as independent and came third with 11.7% of the total votes. As the theory laid down in Chapter 1 predicts, his decision to participate in elections as "independent" demonstrates leaders of old parties' concern over the effects of negative legacies of their political parties. Wahdat-e Islami was one the main warring groups during the Afghan civil war (between 1992 and 1996), and it recruited its members, and drew its support, almost exclusively from the Hazara ethnic group. Consequently, Mohaqqiq had incentives to turn away from his political party and hope to appeal to a larger constituency by not

running under a narrowly defined party label—a strategy that did not appear to have helped his presidential bid as his national vote share reflected the size of the Hazara community (over 11% of the total population).

In the meantime, Mohaqqiq did not possess the kind of political resources that would allow him to build a strong pre-electoral coalition. He was appointed the Planning Minister in the Interim Authority in 2001, but he was replaced by Bashardost, a Hazara technocrat, in the Transitional Administration. He was a potential vice-presidential candidate in the Transitional Administration given that he was one of the two main Hazara leaders, but Karzai instead chose Khalili, the other influential Hazara leader, as one of his five vice-presidents instead. Consequently, he picked two relatively unknown running mates on his ticket, Naseer Ahmad Ensaf and Abdul Fiaz Mehr Aayeen. Mohaqiq won the Hazara-dominated Bamyan and his home province of Daikondi by landslide (76% and 84% respectively), but he was not very successful elsewhere in the country. Khalili was able to steer some of the Hazara vote away from Mohaqqiq (mainly in the capital, Kabul) in favor of Karzai on whose ticket he was running. This point demonstrates the uncertainty over voter preferences. Even though Karzai had included in his coalition a prominent Hazara leader, Mohaqqiq effectively took away a lot of the Hazara support from Karzai's ticket.

Mohaqqiq's status prior to 2004 presidential elections was in many ways comparable to that of Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Junbesh Party, who also registered as "independent" in the 2004 elections. Like Mohaqiq, Dostum was the leader of a political party deeply associated with negative legacies as one of the main participants in the civil wars, and a party whose support and membership were

exclusively drawn from a minority ethnic group (Uzbek). Hence, by running as independent, he hoped to appeal to constituencies beyond his Junbesh support base. However, with Atta Noor of Jamiat increasingly challenging Dostum's influence in the North, his electoral appeal remained limited to the Uzbek community as he won 10% of the total vote—reflecting roughly the size of the Uzbek community in Afghanistan.

In addition, Dostum did not have any access to political resources that would make him a credible formateur with the ability to build a strong pre-electoral coalition. Unable to attract important coalition partners, he made an alliance with Shafiqa Habibi and Wazir Mohammad—two relatively little-known figures nationally, for his vice-presidential nominations. Shafiqa Habibi was one of the two female vice-presidential candidates in the 2004 elections, and her connections to Dostum went back to 1990s when Habibi and her husband fled to Mazar-e Sharif during the intramujahedin wars in Kabul. She had served as a presenter on the state TV channel in the 1980s and more recently as the head of the Afghan Women Journalists Union. Habibi is an Ahmadzai Pashtun from Logar province who was expected to bring Dostum some of the Pashtun vote.[20] Nonetheless, Dostum's alliance did not earn him the votes he needed to win the elections. He won Faryab and his home province of Jozjan by landslide and also won Sar-e Pul and Takhar with 48% and 39% of votes respectively. In the rest of the country, however, he did not do well, especially in Pashtun-dominated provinces (his vote share in Logar, for instance, was a mere 45 votes or 0.1% of the votes). In 2009 presidential elections, however, Dostum will see his base of support eroded as Atta Noor, an ethnic

[20] Author does not have any further information on Dostum's second running mate at the moment.

Tajik from Jamiat party, emerged as a regional leader exercising considerable influence over Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara residents in northern Afghanistan.

Abdul Hafiz Mansoor, a Tajik from Panjshir Valley, claimed to represent the legacies of the legendary Ahmad Shah Masoud. He is a junior leader of Jamiat Party but ran as independent in the elections, with his vice-presidential nominees, Sayyed Mohammad Iqbal Monib (Uzbek) and Mohammad Ayub Qasemi (Hazara). Mansoor claimed that he chose his vice-presidential running mates based on their ethnicity. They had to be from ethnic groups other than the presidential candidate's ethnic group with whom they would run on the same ticket. The calculation, he noted, was that co-ethnics of his VPs would see themselves represented on the ticket and vote for the ticket (author's interview with Mansoor). Nonetheless, Mansoor's alliance partners were not influential within their ethnic groups to bring Mansoor votes, and he won only 0.2% of the total votes.

The former communist Wakil Mangal, who participated in elections as "independent" and won 0.15 of the total votes, is an ethnic Pashtun from Khost province who studied zoology in Kabul University before getting his master's degree from the former Soviet Union and a doctoral degree from Moldavia. Mangal was affiliated with the pro-communist regime in Kabul and stopped professional work after mujahedin's takeover of Kabul in 1992. Mangal's running mates were Mohammad Yunus Mughul and Dina Gul.

Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, also a former mujahed who worked for Rabbani and later Sayyaf and was the Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1995 to 1996, participated as

"independent" with Aminullah Shefajo and Abdul Manan Uruzgaani as his vice-presidential running mates. He won 0.8% of the national vote. Sayed Abdul Hadi Dabir of Jamiat Party also participated as "independent" and picked Abdul Rashid and Dad Mohammad as his vice-presidential nominees. He too did not have a national appeal and ended up with 0.3% of the votes. With Qanooni in the race, all Jamiat strongholds voted overwhelmingly for him, strategically abandoning other, less well-known candidates with Jamiat backgrounds.

In 2004 presidential elections, Qanooni was the only leader of an old party, Jamiat, who ran as a party candidate. However, he did not participate as the candidate of Jamiat; instead, he formed his own party. Qanooni's decision to form a new party hints at his concern with being associated with negative legacies of the Jamiat party, one of the main warring groups during the civil wars. He called his platform "the new doctrine for Afghanistan." Having played a pivotal role during the Bonn 2001 negotiations as the representative of the United Front, Qanooni highlighted his achievements for the post-2001 democratic regime during his campaigns (discussed in Chapter 3). Qanooni worked as the Interior Minister in the Interim Administration and Minister of Education in the Transitional Administration[21] and emerged as Karzai's main challenger in 2004 elections threatening to command the electoral support of a number of different groups including former mujahedin supporters, the youth, and the educated in the capital.[22]Also, as the

[21] For the Transitional Administration, Karzai was under pressure from the international community to broaden the basis of his government, which meant curbing the influence of the Panjshiri faction of Shura-i Nazar. Ideally, he would remove Fahim from the Ministry of Defense. However, Fahim was too powerful at the time and could not be easily removed. Consequently, Karzai removed Qanooni from the so-called power ministry of Interior and made him the Minister of Education because his replacement was less consequential for Karzai than Fahim's removal (author's interview with Barnett Rubin).

[22] Qanooni was young, well-educated (holding a degree in Law and Sharia from Kabul University and Masters in Sociology), and a moderate politician from the Jamiat party, who was also good-looking and

most well-known Tajik candidate in the race he could commend the Tajik vote, the second largest ethnic group in the country.[23] Qanooni did not, however, enjoy the same advantages that Karzai did as an incumbent. That is, Qanooni did not possess the same political resources that were at Karzai's disposal as the head of the Transitional Administration, and as such he had a difficult time attracting strong alliance partners. Karzai was able to sway some of the most important figures whose support for Qanooni's presidential bid would have created a serious challenge to Karzai. These figures included Abdullah Abdullah, who was promised to remain in his post as the Minister of Foreign Affairs after the 2004 election (and did not publicly support Qanooni's presidential bid), and Atta Mohammad Noor whom Karzai promised to make the governor of Balkh. Noor's support of any presidential candidate was crucial because he enjoyed considerable influence in the Northern provinces of Balkh and Samangan. Noor's support of Karzai was particularly important with Abdul Rashid Dostum in the race, who also exercised a lot of influence in the North. Hence, building an alliance with Noor meant taking away the electoral support from two challengers at once, Qanooni and Dostum. In 2004 presidential elections, Noor pledged support for Karzai. Hence, with Karzai pulling all the strings, Qanooni was not able to get any notable personalities on his ticket.

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dressed in western style. Qanooni was also close to Ahmad Shah Massoud (his representative in Pakistan from 1982 to 1988) and threatened to win the votes of Massoud loyalists. He also played a key role as the chief negotiator for United Front in Bonn 2001 negotiations that established the democratic regime in Afghanistan. Hence, he had earned a reputation for being a modernist and reformist. Consequently, Karzai had to build a coalition that could balance against the Qanooni ticket.

[23] No current accurate estimate of the ethnic composition of Afghanistan is available because of absence of census data since early 1970s, but there is an informal consensus among Afghans that Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group, commending around 40% of the population size, while Tajiks make up between 20% and 30% of the population, with Hazaras and Uzbeks composing around 10% each, and the rest of the population divided among Baluchis, Aimaqs, Turkmens, Pashaees and Nooristanis (discussed in more details in Coalition Formation chapter).

The first vice-presidential candidate on Qanooni's ticket was a relatively unknown Pashtun, Taj Mohammad Wardak, who had fled the rule of the Taliban to the United States and held U.S. citizenship. Karzai had made Taj Mohammad the governor of Paktia province during the Interim Authority. However, that appointment did not last very long because the local power-holders did not want him as the governor of Paktia. Karzai then removed Wardak from his post, and made him the Minister of Interior in his Transitional cabinet following Qanooni's replacement as the Interior Minister in 2002 (*BBC News*, 2002). Qanooni formed a coalition with Wardak because he needed a Pashtun on his ticket to attract the Pashtun vote. However, Wardak was not a very influential Pashtun leader, and he could not bring Qanooni the Pashtun vote from the southern and eastern provinces—not even his home province of Wardak. In fact, Karzai won in Wardak province with 61% of the votes in 2004 elections. Consistent with theoretical expectations laid down in Chapter two, Qanooni's lack of electoral support in Wardak province despite having a Wardaki VP on his ticket points to the uncertainty associated with voter preferences. The predominantly Pashtun Wardak province voted for Karzai and not for Qanooni despite the fact that a Wardaki was on Qanooni's ticket.

Qanooni's second vice-presidential choice was Sayyed Hussain Alemi Balkhi, who was a Hazara from Balkh province and was picked to bring Qanooni some of the Hazara vote as well as some votes from Balkh province (with Mohaqqiq in the race and Noor supporting Karzai, Qanooni wanted to ally with someone who could balance out these two individuals' influence in his favor in northern and central Afghanistan). Balkhi was a former Mujahed and a religious scholar, but he did not possess a large followership that could translate into electoral support. As such, his alliance with Qanooni did not

bring the desired outcome. Karzai won Balkh with 30% of the votes, and Mohaqiq swept through the Bamyan and Daikondi Hazara-dominated central provinces. In short, Qanooni's relative failure in building a strong pre-electoral alliance was mainly because Karzai emerged as the actor with a clear advantage in building a grand coalition. Yet, Qanooni's relative success in comparison to the other two major former mujahedin leaders in the race, Mohaqqiq and Dostum, was due to his status as the main opposition leader. As a Tajik, moderate, less controversial, and more educated candidate, he could make a stronger appeal to a larger group of people: Qanooni's ethnic support base was larger than those of Mohaqqiq and Dostum (as Tajiks make a larger ethnic group than Hazaras and Uzbeks), and he was not associated with the kinds of atrocities that both Dostum and Mohaqiq were as main leaders of Junbesh and Wahdat parties respectively.

Leaders of New Political Parties: consistent with the theoretical predictions made in Chapter two, the leaders of newly formed political parties who participated in 2004 presidential elections all ran under their party labels. They did so because their political parties did not suffer any association with negative legacies of the past. This group included Sayyed Ishaq Gailani, Abdul Latif Pedram, and Ghulam Faroq Nijrabi. This section discusses the profiles of party candidates in 2004 presidential elections.

Sayyed Ishaq Gailani participated in the 2004 elections as the candidate of his own political party, the National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan. A well-known and well-regarded Mujahed, he was not involved in the civil wars and as such was not associated with the legacies of the Mujahedin parties. Gailani is the nephew of the well-known Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani, the leader of Mahaz-e Melli (one of the original seven mujahedin parties). During the Jihad era, Gailani was a member of the Mahaz party until

1984 when he left Mahaz to form his own party. However, under the Zia ul Haq regime in Pakistan, no political parties outside the original seven could legally register. Consequently, Gailani registered his party as an NGO in Peshawar. When the Political Parties Law was adopted in 2003, he was the first to register his political party (author's interview with Gailani). Hence, his political party was formally new even though its roots went back to the Jihad era. As such, his party did not suffer from any association with negative legacies of the mujahedin parties. Moreover, Gailani is a vocal advocate of human rights and gender equality, and his party's basis of support and policy appeals are broad, giving him incentives to participate under his party label. He picked Mohammad Ismail Qesmatyar and Baryalai Nasrati as his running mates neither of whom was member of his party and Nasrati had his own political party, which disintegrated soon after it was registered (author's interview with Gailani). Gailani is an ethnic Pashtun who was born and raised in Kabul. He received the highest share of his vote in the southern province of Zabul (6%), but his national vote share was only 1.0%.

Latif Pedram, a returning technocrat, registered his National Congress Party upon his return to Afghanistan after the 2001 transition. Pedram attracted controversy by questioning the practice of polygamy among Afghan men and women's divorce rights (or lack of them thereof). He also earned a reputation as anti-Pashtun for his proposed plan to change the central system to federalism (Musheni, 2006).[24] He nominated Haji Ahmad Niro and Qasem Masoomi as his running mates. He won 14.1% of the votes in his home

[24] While the idea of federalism is not popular among many Afghans (due to misperception that federalism may result in disintegration of Afghanistan), it is more fiercely resisted among Pashtuns than other ethnic groups. One explanation may be that because most of the wealth is concentrated in Tajik-dominated northern and western provinces of Afghanistan due to revenues coming from the trade between the northern and western neighbors of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the most fertile lands are also located in the northern and western parts of the country. In short, in a federal system, the Pashtun-dominated provinces of Afghanistan will not be self-sufficient.

province of Badakhshan and 2.7% of the votes in Kabul, where he campaigned intensely.[25] Pedram's national vote share was only 1.4%.

Ghulam Farooq Nijrabi, a medical doctor, ran as the candidate of Independence Party of Afghanistan with his two running mates, Abdul Fatah and Abdul Hanan. A physician by profession, Nijrabi was a total newcomer to politics and did not command any significant social or political resources. His running mates also were not influential figures, and he ended up with 0.3% of the national vote share.

Non-Party Candidates: This group consisted of those candidates who did not belong to any political party. The members of this group were mostly little known politicians, returning technocrats, and political outsiders. With the stark exception of Hamid Karzai, most of the rest of the members of this group were resource-poor, single-issue candidates with little to no national appeal. What made Karzai stand out was his unrestricted access to resources of the state, available to him by virtue of being an incumbent. Resource-poor candidates run in elections as independent for a number of possible reasons, including inability to join a party, long-term goals, and desire to "sell" themselves as worthwhile alliance partners in the future to formateurs with the most advantage. This section discusses the profile of these candidates.

Karzai emerged as the most important candidate in 2004 because he had governed during the interim and the transitional periods and as such enjoyed the advantages of an incumbent. The most important advantage he had was access to resources of the state,

[25] In a press conference in Kabul in running up to the 2004 presidential elections, Pedram claimed that he had "radical leftist goals" for the future of Afghanistan (author was in the audience). His radical leftist claims coupled with his extreme Tajik nationalism earned him some reputation among intellectuals, the students, and the disaffected Tajiks. However, for the mainstream Tajiks, the moderate Qanooni was a better choice.

which he used to form alliances with other influential politicians in return for electoral support and run his political campaign. When Karzai was selected the Chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA hereafter) at the conclusion of the Bonn Accord in 2001, he possessed no military power and political influence, especially in comparison to the United Front leaders. What happened in Bonn however enhanced Karzai's political power, which he then used to win the elections as the head of the Transitional Administration in 2002.

Evidently, Karzai did not use the state resources to build a political party (he had expressed distaste for political parties on multiple occasions). Instead, consistent with theoretical predictions laid down in Chapter two, he built strong electoral alliances with a number of political elites, including the former mujahedin leaders and the returning technocrats. His most public alliance partners were his running mates on his presidential ticket—Ahmad Zia Massoud of Jamiat-e Islami and Karim Khalili of Wahdat-e Islami, as each presidential candidate nominated two vice-presidential running mates according to the new Afghan Constitution (the choice of two vice-presidents on each presidential candidate's ticket is discussed in details in Institutional Selection Chapter). Karzai chose his vice-presidential running mates carefully—picking out elites who could bring him the votes of their constituents during the elections.[26]

[26] The nature of the alliances that office seekers form prior to elections will be discussed in Coalition Formation Chapter. However, it suffices to note here that the alliance partners were picked based on their social resources (ethnic, religious, or regional influence). Hence, most of the alliances that were created (in the form of presidential tickets) had members of three of the four main ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek. In other words, every presidential candidate chose his or her running mates from the other three ethnic groups. For instance, a Pashtun presidential candidate would choose his vice-presidential candidates from Tajik, Hazara, or Uzbek ethnic groups, while a Tajik presidential hopeful will seek his vice-presidential nominees with Pashtun, Hazara, or Uzbek ethnic backgrounds. I have started building a database on vice-presidential candidates' ethnic backgrounds based on my interviews with office seekers as well as domestic press reports. According to the data collected so far (reported in more details in Coalition

Karzai's first vice-presidential nominee, Zia Massoud (brother of the renowned anti-Soviet Jamiat commander Ahmad Shah Massoud), was picked to attract the Tajik vote, or at least defray some of Qanooni's electoral support from the northern provinces of Panjshir, Takhar, and Badakhshan.[27] By including Zia Massoud in his electoral alliance, Karzai could divide Qanooni's support base. The second vice-presidential candidate on Karzai's ticket was Karim Khalili. Khalili is the leader of the Wahdat-Islami party (he succeeded Abul Ali Mazari, who was assassinated by the Taliban), and he commends the loyalty of the Hazaras in Kabul and in parts of the central provinces of Bamyan and Daikondi. Karzai placed him on his presidential ticket to take away some of the Hazara vote from his other challenger, Mohammad Mohaqqiq who is the leader of the break-away Wahdat party and holds sway over Hazaras of Balkh and certain parts of Kabul as well as his home province of Daikondi. Neither of Karzai's running mates, however, was able to bring Karzai victory among their constituencies, underlining the uncertainty over voter preferences. They were, nonetheless, able to take away some of the electoral support from Karzai's rivals, Qanooni and Mohaqqiq, among Tajik and Hazara voters respectively.

In addition to his vice-presidential nominees, Karzai made alliances with regional power holders in return for promise of public office or other perks. One such alliance was made with Abdullah in return for keeping him as the Foreign Minister and with Atta

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Formation chapter), even party candidates chose their running mates based on their ethnic backgrounds, and only one vice-presidential nominee on one presidential ticket came from the same political party as the presidential candidate (Faroq Nijrabi picked one of his VPs from his political party in 2009 elections).

[27] Reportedly, Karzai dropped Fahim from his presidential ticket under pressure from Francesc Vendrell, United Nations and European Union Envoy to Afghanistan, and his colleagues who feared the prospects of Fahim becoming the president in case something happened to Karzai. When Karzai put Fahim back on his presidential ticket in 2009, his choice was not met with enthusiasm from Vendrell (Siddique, 2009). In 2004 elections, Zia Massoud was a safe replacement for Fahim as the VP nominee because he was Jamiati but not nearly as controversial as Fahim.

Noor in return for making him the governor of Balkh province. Both Abdullah and Noor were Jamiat members, potential Qanooni supporters. However, in 2004 presidential elections, they pledged their support for Karzai. Access to resources of the state enabled Karzai to put together a grand coalition, outweighing all other coalitions, which paid off during the elections. He won the 2004 presidential elections with over 55% of the total votes.

The rest of the candidates in this category included returning technocrats and political newcomers, and their share of the national vote ranged from 1.4% to 0.1%. These candidates lacked both political and social resources to make a national appeal or build strong alliances. Some of them formed political parties and ran under their party label, but most of them participated as "independent." The rest of this section will provide a discussion of these candidates and their vice-presidential nominees in two specific categories: returning technocrats and political newcomers (those with little or no political background and recognition).

Returning Technocrats: The returning technocrats, Sirat, Asefi, and Nadaee, had been away from Afghanistan for decades before the 2001 transition. As a result, they did not command a constituency they could electorally mobilize during the elections. Abdul Satar Sirat, "independent" candidate, is a Tajik intellectual with a Ph.D. in Islamic studies from Pacific Western University, California. He had served as the Chief Justice and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1969 to 1973. He picked Qazi Mohammad Amin Weqad (former Hezb-e Islami member and Pashtun from Nangarhar province) and Abdul Qader Amini as his vice-presidential nominees and won 0.4% of the total votes. Humayoon Shah Asefi, brother-in-law of late King Zahir, too participated as

"independent" alongside his running mates Abdullah Rahmati and Nilab Mobarez (one of the two female vice-presidential nominees, a medical doctor, and Pashtun). He won 0.3% of the total votes. Mir Mahafoz Nadaee (Pashtun), who served as Minister of Mines and Industries in Karzai's Transitional Cabinet, also ran as independent in 2004 presidential elections. He had a master's degree in Management from Switzerland and a doctorate degree in geochemistry from Moscow University. He too was not very well-known in Afghan politics and could not build a strong coalition that will bring him a large share of the national vote. He picked Sayyed Mohammad Aaref Ebrahimkhel and Mohammad Hakim Karimi as his running mates and won only 0.2% of the total votes.

Political Newcomers: In the newcomers' category, Masooda Jalal (Tajik), the only female presidential candidate in the race, and a medical doctor by profession, participated in the elections as independent. She chose Mir Habib Sohaili (Pashtun) and Sayyed Mohammad Alem Amini (Hazara) as her vice-presidential candidates. She received 1.2% of the votes in Kabul where she enjoyed her most influence as a medical doctor and 1.1% of the total votes. Abdul Hasib Aryan, an ethnic Tajik and former police Colonel, vowed to give equal rights to women as his campaign promise. He picked Del Aqa Shekeb and Sayyed Yahya as his running mates. Also a newcomer in the political scene, Aryan did not have a national appeal and ended up with 8,373 or 0.1% of the total votes. Abdul Hadi Khalilzai was the oldest candidate (72) and a lawyer by profession. He picked Khudai Noor Mnado Khail and Khuda dad Irfani as his running mates and won 0.2% of the total votes. Mohammad Ebrahim Rashid, another newcomer in Afghan politics, came from a Pashtun family of landowners and studied in Germany. He chose as his

presidential nominees Sayyed Mohammad Hadi Hadi and Hamed Taheri—also not well-known figures. Rashid won 14,242 or 0.2% of the votes.

Given such low probability of winning for more than two thirds of the candidates, it is puzzling why they participated in the elections in the first place. One explanation may lie in the fact that ballot access laws were lenient, which encouraged many candidates to want to test the waters. The Electoral Law, which was adopted in 2004, required the candidates to show 10,000 signatures or copies of voter registration cards of eligible voters and deposit 50,000 AFS. In addition, there was no geographically designated area where the signatures could be collected from, e.g. they could be collected from one geographical area and did not have to be representative of the country. Absence of any kind of restriction on signature collection allowed candidates to easily collect signatures among their ethnic or tribal groups, or their kinsmen (author's interviews with presidential and parliamentary candidates). Meanwhile, the monetary deposit (an estimated US$1,041 at 2004 currency exchange rate), which would be refunded to the candidate if they won at least 10% of the national vote in the election, was quite affordable. Consequently, presidential hopefuls would not incur huge costs by participating in the elections. If an agent had the ambition to participate in the elections, the ballot access laws created little obstacles to her pursuit.

A second possible explanation may be that these candidates wanted to establish themselves as vote getters, which could make them desirable alliance partners for office seekers in future elections. The 2001 Bonn arrangements, which created five vice-presidential posts for the head of the Interim Authority—given to individuals from different ethnic groups and backgrounds, and Karzai's decision to keep at least two vice-

presidential posts during the Transitional Administration elections, which he filled with elites who could bring him the votes that he needed created incentives for political elites to showcase their ability in commending a significant portion of the national vote. Given the relatively low costs of running for executive office, the 2004 presidential elections provided elites with the opportunity to demonstrate the extent of their social power. This was certainly true of both Mohaqqiq and Dostum who participated in the 2004 elections and established themselves as solid voting blocs with their share of 11% and 10% of the national vote respectively. They did not run in the next two national elections, but they both were recruited as alliance partners by the top candidates in the race. Hence, in their case, participating in the first national elections defined their role as important and highly demanded alliance partners.

A third explanation for losing candidates' participation in elections may be their desire to attract attention to an issue (political or non-political) that they are passionate about. Political outsiders have been mostly identified as such candidates (see Brancati, 2008, p. 650-51). Latif Pedram, who came fifth with 1.4% of the total vote, and Hafiz Mansoor, who earned only 0.2% of the total vote, ran on nationalist platforms opposing Pashtun political dominance. Hasib Aryan for instance vowed to bring equal rights for women.[28] Neither of the issues that these candidates raised attracted nationwide attention, but they may have served as motivating factors for the three candidates' decision to participate in elections even though they may have known that they did not have a high chance of winning the presidency. Regardless of the candidates' motives, the 2009 elections saw the highest number of candidates taking part in the top race.

[28] Information taken from "Who is who in Afghanistan?" database.

2009 Presidential Elections

Contestation in 2009 presidential elections was high. A total of 32 candidates participated in the elections but only 5 (16%) of them ran under a party name, 3 of whom were leaders of old political parties and 2 were leaders of new political parties. None of the leaders of old parties who participated as party candidates ran under the label of their former parties; they all formed new political parties. Leaders of old parties who ran as "independent" dropped from 6 candidates in 2004 to four candidates in 2009. Finally, the number of leaders of new political parties contesting the elections dropped from 3 in 2004 to 2 in 2009, reflecting the constraining effects of the institutional environment on political parties' development. The rest of the field was populated by candidates who did not belong to old political parties nor did they form new political parties. Figure 3 is a visual presentation of the affiliation dynamics among candidates in 2009 presidential elections and Table 5 provides a list of all the participants, their party affiliation, and their percentage share of the total votes.

Figure 3: Dynamics of party affiliation among 2004 presidential candidates



Table 5: the 2009 Presidential Elections

No.	Candidate	Political Party	% of Vote
1	Hamid Karzai	Independent	49.67
2	Abdullah Abdulla*	Independent	30.59
3	Ramazan Bashardost	Independent	10.46
4	Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	Independent	2.94
5	Mirwais Yasini*	Independent	1.03
6	**Shahnawaz Tanai***	**Da Afghanistan Da Soli Ghorzang Gund**	**0.64**
7	Dr. Frozan Fana	Independent	0.47
8	Mullah Abdul Salam Rakity	Independent	0.43
9	**Dr. Habib Mangal***	**Hezb-e Nuhzat-e Farageer-e Democracy wa Taraqi-e Afghanistan**	**0.41**
10	Motasim Billah Mazhabi*	Independent	0.4
11	**Abdul Latif Pedram**	**Hezb-e Kangara-e Milli-e Afghanistan**	**0.34**
12	Mohammad Sarwar Ahmadzai	Independent	0.31
13	Sayed Jalal Karim	Independent	0.29
14	Mrs. Shahla Ata	Independent	0.23
15	**Mahbob-U-llah Koshani**	**Hezb-e Azadagan-e Afghanistan (Afghanistan Liberated Party)**	**0.22**
16	Alhaj Abdul Ghafor Zori	Independent	0.2
17	Haji Rahim Jan Shirzad	Independent	0.16
18	Zabihullah Ghazi Nooristani	Independent	0.14
19	Abdul Jabar Sabit	Independent	0.13
20	Mohammad Hashim Tawfiqi	Independent	0.11
21	Bismillah Shir	Independent	0.1
22	**Dr. Ghulam Faroq Nijrabi**	**Hezb-e Istiqlal-e Afghanistan (Afghanistan Independence Party)**	**0.1**
23	Abdul Hasib Aryan*	Independent	0.1
24	Eng. Moin-ul-din Ulfati	Independent	0.08
25	Gul Ahmad Yama	Independent	0.07
26	Mullah Ghulam Mohammad Rigi	Independent	0.07
27	Mohammad Akbar Oria	Independent	0.07
28	Bashir Ahmad Bizhan	Independent	0.05
29	Sangin Mohammad Rahmani	Independent	0.05
30	Hidayat Amin Arsala	Independent	0.05
31	Abdul Majid Samim	Independent	0.05
32	Zia-ul-Haq Hafizi	Independent	0.04

Total Valid Votes: 4,597,727

Invalid Votes: 156,725
Invalidated Votes: 68,638 (due to candidate withdrawal(s))
Total Votes: 4,823,090
*signifies members of old political parties
Combined Vote Share of Party Candidates: 1.71%
Source: Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan

The high rate of participation in 2009 elections had some unintended consequences for the top vote getters: with the vote being divided onto 32 candidates, winning the 50% plus one vote became more challenging in comparison to 2004 elections. Consequently, no candidate passed the threshold required to be declared a clear winner. In the first round, Karzai won 49.67% of the votes, while Abdullah came second with 30.59% of the total votes. According to the Electoral Law, a runoff election was to be held between the two most-voted candidates within two weeks after the announcement of the election results. However, Abdullah conceded the election to Karzai because of security concerns over holding a second round of elections. Karzai was elected for his second five-year term despite his declining popularity among voters. His electoral success, once again, was the result of a brilliant coalition building strategy that once again gave him an edge over his challengers. Karzai kept some of his allies from the previous elections and added new ones. Meanwhile, the majority of the returning candidates (those who had taken part in 2004 elections) introduced new vice-presidential nominees, which suggests the instability of the pre-electoral coalitions.

Leaders of Old Parties: In the 2009 elections fewer leaders of old political parties participated as "independent" than they did in 2004, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Chapter Two that the effects of negative legacies on office seekers' perceptions exert the strongest effects during the initial elections, and that in

subsequent elections other calculations may take precedence. From the ex-Mujahedin parties, Abdullah and Yasini participated as independent. Three former PDPA leaders, Tanai, Mangal, and Koshani, formed new parties and participated as their parties' nominees, while a forth ex-PDPA member participated as independent. The ex-Taliban, Rakity, also participated as independent.

Abdullah emerged as the most important opposition to Karzai's reelection bid in 2009. Abdullah had resigned from his post as the Foreign Minister in 2005, and since then was posing as the main opposition. Meanwhile, with the kind of political recognition that he had received in Afghan politics throughout the years (as Massoud's representative during the jihad era, as reformist during the 2001 transition, and as the moderate Foreign Minister in post-transition years), he was considered the most viable opposition figure. Instead of building a political party, however, Abdullah formed the coalition of Ta'gheer wa Omid (Hope and Change). In order to be able to counter Karzai's ticket, Abdullah needed a strong Pashtun figure as his running mate. Even though Abdullah's father is Pashtun, he is more closely associated with Tajiks due to his political association with Shura-ye Nazar and Jamiat in general. Hence, he needed an influential Pashtun VP nominee to take away some of the Pashtun votes from Karzai. He also needed an alliance partner from one of the two minority ethnic groups, Hazara or Uzbek. However, Abdullah's counter-alliance strategy was not successful in comparison to Karzai's, who formed the largest coalition of all. As Chapter two predicted, forming grand coalitions is a function of having access to power and resources of the state. As the incumbent, Karzai was the formateur with the most advantage, while Abdullah could only draw on his likely future access to power and resources of the state to attract alliance partners.

Abdullah nominated Humayon Shah Asefi (Pashtun), a failed presidential contender from the previous elections, and Cheragh Ali Cheragh (Hazara), a medical doctor who had served as the President of the Institute of Medicine in Kabul (2003) and as Medical Advisor and Chief of Academic Affairs in the Ministry of Higher Education (2005). Asefi was a royalist who had little influence in Afghanistan's contemporary politics (brother-in-law of the late King, won only 0.3% of the votes in 2004 presidential elections), and Ghiragh was a newcomer in the political scene, who did not have the kind of appeal to Hazara voters that did Mohaqqiq or other Wahdat leaders. As an academician, Cheragh was not known beyond Kabul's intellectual circles. Although Abdullah did command a followership among Tajiks, his choice of running mates did not appear to have helped him in winning the votes of non-Tajiks by large numbers. Abdullah received only 18.1% of the votes in the Hazara-dominated Bamyan, and 6.6% in Daikondi, another Hazara-dominated province, which suggests that Cheragh was not able to bring him the Hazara vote. Asefi too could not help bring Abdullah the Pashtun vote, as Karzai swept through the Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern provinces (75% in Nangarhar vs 6% for Abdullah; 73.8% in Kandahar vs 9.1% for Abdullah; 72.5% in Nimroz vs 13.9% for Abdullah; and 72.5% in Helmand vs 5.3% for Abdullah).

Abdullah's most important alliance building success was Noor's support for his candidacy. However, Noor's influence in the north was checked by Dostum's appeal to Uzbek and Turkman voters, who was recruited by Karzai (discussed below). Although Abdullah won Balkh and Samagan provinces (vote percentages discussed above), he was unable to win Juzjan, Sar-i Pul and Faryab (all of which went to Karzai). As discussed in Coalition Formation chapter, Abdullah was unable to recruit the influential Hazara

leader, Mohaqqiq, who could bring him the votes in Hazara- dominated Daikondi and Bamyan.[29] Mohaqqiq allied with Karzai, suggesting that he perceived Karzai as more viable than Abdullah, although soon after the elections Mohaqqiq became critical of the president for not keeping his promises (Mohaqqiq claimed that Karzai did not give the promised posts to Hazaras, discussed in the preceding footnote).[30]

In 2009 elections, an increasing number of leaders of old parties participated under party labels. However, they exclusively formed new political parties instead of running under the old party labels. These candidates included Shahnawaz Tanai who formed Da Afghanistan Da Soli Ghorzang Gund—the Peace Movement, Habib Mangal who formed Hezb-e Nuhzat-e Farageer-e Democracy wa Taraqi-e Afghanistan—the Democracy and Progress Party, and Mahboobullah Koshani who formed Hezb-e Azadagan-e Afghanistan—the Liberated Party. All three were former PDPA (the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) members. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Tanai was Chief of the Army Staff, Chief of the notorious KhAD Intelligence Network, and Minister of Defense (1988-1990).[31] He nominated Nisar Ahmad Salemi and Mohammad Jan Pamir as his vice-presidents and ended up with 0.64% of the total votes. Habib Mangal Ambassador to Moscow from 1980 to 1986, nominated Dawood Rawesh and Nafas Jahid as his running mates and won 0.41% of the

[29] Abdullah wanted Mohaqqiq to be his vice-presidential nominee on the ticket (instead of Cheragh). However, knowing the importance of his alliance to Karzai and Abdullah, Mohaqqiq was negotiating with both of them at the same time. In fact, Abdullah did not register his candidacy until 5pm the last day of registration, hoping that Mohaqqiq will join his ticket. However, when Karzai accepted Mohaqqiq's wishes (giving five ministries to Hazaras and changing Daikondi from a district to a province, among other things), Mohaqqiq supported Karzai's candidacy, and Abdullah had to go with Cheragh (author's interview with Sediqullah Tuwhidi, Head of Advocacy Department & Media Watch).

[30] Karzai had Khalili, the Hazara leader on his ticket as his first VP nominee. However, he also recruited Mohaqqiq, the other influential Hazara leader, which suggests office seekers' concern over uncertainty in voter preferences.

[31] In Helmand, one spectator threw his shoes at Tanai during his campaign rally (Ilyas, 2009).

votes. Koshani was the Deputy Prime Minister in Najibullah government and chose Mohammad Zahir Aslami and Abdul Rashid Payam as his running mates. He won 0.22% of the total votes.

The three former PDPA candidates' choice of running under a new party name is consistent with the theoretical predictions of this dissertation. Given PDPA's notoriety and perceived voter distrust of the party due to the atrocities committed under the party's rule in the 1980s-1990s, the former PDPA members preferred to form new parties to signal their departure from the legacies of their former political party.[32]

Meanwhile, one ex-PDPA member, Motasim Billah Mazhabi, did not form or join a political party and participated as independent. He nominated Mohammad Nasim Rawza Baqi and Eftikhar Ahmad Yousofzai as his running mates, and won only 0.4% of the total votes, slightly lower than the vote share of his fellow ex-PDPA members who participated as partisans. The three former PDPA members also could not build strong alliances with other political elites to win office. Consequently, party formation was a relatively more viable strategy for the ex-PDPA candidates. Nonetheless, it will be hard to assess the extent to which their party affiliation may have affected their miniscule share of the national vote, given that it could have been caused by other factors, such as lack of national appeal or inability to form large alliances. The electoral fate of these four candidates suggests that party affiliation was almost inconsequential for their electoral victory (or failure).

[32] Since the 2001 transition in Afghanistan, Non-governmental Organizations such as National Democratic Institute have provided support for political parties on fundamental organizational and planning principles. Although it is not acknowledged, such organizations may also have provided emerging political parties with start-up funds, hence providing incentives for candidates to form parties. Since political parties were not allowed to receive funding from foreign sources, no official record of the funds possibly provided for the new parties is available. On other forms of support for political parties, see NDI.org/Afghanistan.

The former mujahed, Mirwais Yasini who was Lower House Deputy Speaker after he won a seat in the 2005 legislative elections and was reelected to Wolesi Jirga with second highest votes, also participated as independent, nominating Ammanullah Payman and Abdul Qayoom Sajadi as his VPs. He won 2.94% of the total votes, coming fifth. Mullah Abdul Salam Rakity, an ex-Taliban and former Member of Parliament (2005), also ran as independent and nominated Mohammad Ajmal Habib Safi and Mohammad Sediq. He won 0.43% of the votes.

Leaders of New Parties: by the 2009 elections, the number of leaders of new parties contesting the elections had fallen. The institutional environment was not conducive to political party development, which hit the new parties the hardest, as they did not possess many resources that old political parties did, i.e., they were not formed along ethnic or linguistic lines, and did not have a "natural" support base. Latif Pedram and Faroq Nijrabi were the only leaders of new parties to participate in the 2009 elections and the combined vote share of both candidates was 0.45% of the total votes.

Latif Pedram participated as the nominee for his Hezb-e Kangara-e Milli-e Afghanistan (the Congress Party), and Ghulam Farooq Nijrabi participated as the nominee for his Hezb-e Istiqlal-e Afghanistan (Independence Party). However, they both introduced new vice-presidential nominees for the 2009 elections. Pedram chose Noor Ahmad Barzeen Khatebi and Mohammad Ayoub Qasem. Nijrabi too introduced two new vice-presidential nominees, Abdul Wakil and Ghulam Jailani Sediqi. None of the vice-presidential nominees that these two candidates chose were well-known political figures, which suggests both Pedram's and Nijrabi's inability to attract influential running mates. This was partly because neither Pedram nor Nijrabi were considered viable candidates

(they did poorly in 2004 presidential elections) and as such unattractive to important alliance seekers.

Non-Party Candidates: this category was, like in 2004 elections, populated by newly empowered politicians, political outsiders, and returning technocrats, all of whom ran as independent. The most important candidate in this category was Karzai who was seeking a second term in office. Karzai continued his strategy of building alliances with critical elites instead of investing in forming a strong presidential party. Meanwhile, two other notable candidates that emerged in this category were the returning technocrats Ramazan Bashardost and Ashraf Ghani. The rest of the candidates in this category did not leave any significant mark behind and claimed negligible shares of the national vote.

Having been the head of the state for over seven years, Karzai had made political connections with a number of influential figures in Afghanistan whose help he needed to win the elections. Being the incumbent, once again, he was the formateur with the most advantage to build the strongest and largest coalition. In running up to the 2009 elections, Karzai used the political resources at his disposal to renew his alliance with those who had supported him in 2004 elections and to build new alliances with those he needed in the upcoming elections. Karzai pursued a very aggressive coalition building strategy partly because Abdullah was emerging as a strong opposition. With Abdullah in the race, Karzai had to build a stronger alliance with the Panjshiris (Zia Massoud was not helpful in 2004 elections in bringing Karzai the Tajik vote from provinces such as Panjshir, Takhar and Badakhshan). Hence, he replaced Massoud with General Fahim, the most powerful Shura-i Nazar commander who was also the Minister of Defense during the Interim and Transitional Administrations as well as one of the five vice-presidents during

the Transitional Administration, as his running mate. Even though Abdullah won the Tajik-dominated Badakhshan and Panjshir (50% and 68.1% respectively), Karzai managed to get a significant percentage of votes in both provinces (34.2% and 29% respectively) most likely because he brought Fahim into his coalition. Karim Khalili, his vice-president in 2004, was re-nominated as the second VP.

A major blow to Karzai reelection bid came when Noor decided to support Abdullah's campaign.[33] By 2009, Noor had solidified his influence over the northern provinces of Balkh, Kunduz, and Samangan, and his alliance was essential for any successful presidential ticket (Noor's support of Karzai's bid in 2004, for instance, gave him a comfortable lead in many of these provinces over Qanooni). Karzai knew that Noor's support for Abdullah will be debilitating to his campaign. So, he sought to replace Noor, and the obvious choice was Dostum who rivaled Noor's influence in Northern provinces and could check Noor's support for Abdullah in favor of Karzai. However, Dostum was living in exile in Turkey at the time, after he was removed from his (largely ceremonial) post as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief in 2008 due to allegations of abducting and torturing his political rival, Akbar Bai, and was unofficially exiled to Turkey for a year. In 2009, however, Karzai ended Dostum's exile in return for his support of Karzai's reelection campaign. Dostum returned to Afghanistan on August 16 and immediately gave a televised speech calling on his supporters to vote for Karzai (Farmer, 2009). The post-election results suggest that Dostum may have brought the balance needed for Karzai's ticket. In Samangan, only one percentage point separated

[33] Noor was the only governor who publicly supported Karzai's rival, Abdullah, which suggests that he had solidified his influence over the northern province of Balkh to the extent that Karzai could not threaten his removal. Atta Noor continued his governorship despite Karzai's victory in 2009.

Abdullah from Karzai (43.5% vs 42.5% respectively). In Balkh their vote shares were close (44.2% for Abdullah, 39.6% for Karzai). In Juzjan however, Dostum's home province, Karzai led by a large margin (58.0% vs 25.3% for Abdullah), and in Faryab, a Dostum stronghold, Karzai was still in the lead although with a slightly smaller margin (59.9% vs 29.7% for Abdullah). Hence, Karzai's alliance with Dostum was nothing short of brilliant in off-setting a potential Abdullah victory in the north due to Noor's support for his campaign.[34]

Bashardost was the surprise candidate of the 2009 elections. He was a Hazara returnee who had lived in France for over 20 years and held multiple degrees, including a master's degree in Law and a doctoral degree in Political Science from France. A complete newcomer in Afghan political scene, Bashardost surprised both domestic and international observers when he came third in the 2009 presidential elections, winning 10.46% of the total votes. Bashardost's VP nominees were Mohammad Mosa Barakzai (Pashtun, professor) who taught at the Agriculture Institute, and Afifa Ma'roof, who worked for Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission. Neither Bashardost nor his running mates were influential people. However, his populist platform and western style of campaigning won him the votes of those who were disaffected with Karzai but who also did not view the former mujahedin leaders as a better alternative. Bashardost returned to Afghanistan after the 2001 transition and worked in different official capacities. In 2003, Bashardost became the Director of European and Western Political Affairs Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2005, he became the Planning Minister. Bashardost was openly critical of the government, accusing ministers

[34] In addition to exile forgiveness, Dostum reportedly received monetary payments from Karzai (discussed in details in Coalition Formation chapter).

of corruption, and had to resign from his post under domestic and international pressure. He participated in 2005 parliamentary elections and was elected as a representative of Kabul with the third highest number of votes. He participated in 2009 elections as independent, travelled to almost all 34 provinces to campaign without any bodyguards or armored vehicles (offered by the government to accompany every candidate, but Bashardost refused to use them), and campaigned out of a tent across from the Parliament building in Kabul (author's interview with Bashardost). In many ways, Bashardost was an atypical candidate in Afghan elections in which he tried to remain truly independent, not forming alliances with any other individuals or groups beyond his running mates.

The second somewhat notable figure among the candidates was Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun scholar, who had returned to Afghanistan after the 2001 transition to participate in the government. Ghani was one of the so-called "Beiruti Boys" (along with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, Khalilzad, professor of political science in Providence University and former Finance Minister, Ahadi, and the Chancellor of Kabul University, Popal) who had attended the American University of Beirut. He later went to the U.S. and received a Ph.D. in Anthropology from Columbia and joined the World Bank as lead Anthropologist. Highly educated, he worked at various capacities in post-2001 government. Prior to the 2009 election, he served as Chief Advisor to Karzai during the Interim Authority, as Minister of Finance from 2002 to 2004, and as Chancellor of Kabul University in 2005. Ghani hired Hilary Clinton's campaign manager to manage his campaign (author's interview with Bashardost). Nonetheless, he won only 2.94% of the total votes in the 2009 election coming forth behind Karzai, Abdullah, and Bashardost. Although he had earned a name for himself among Kabul's intellectual and political

circles, in 2009 Ghani did not enjoy a national appeal to be considered a viable candidate. He nominated Mohammad Ayoub Rafiqi and Mohammad Ali Nabizada (Tajik), two unknown personalities, as his vice-presidential nominees.

Among the returning candidates (who had participated in the 2004 presidential elections), Mohammad Hasib Aryan participated as independent and nominated Fatah Ghanikhil and Mirza Mohammad Mia as his running mates, not the same nominees from the 2004 elections. Aryan won 0.1% of the total votes, same as his vote share in 2004 elections. Two female candidates participated in the 2009 elections, and both ran as independents. Frozan Fana, a medical doctor and a political newcomer, and Shahla Atta, the Lower House MP and psychologist by profession, who too was not known politically prior to her legislative appointment. Fana (Tajik) picked Nasimullah Darman and Ghulam Jailani Satari as her vice-presidential nominees and won 0.47% of the total votes, coming eighth. Atta ran with Abdul Habib Siar and Gul Mohammad Urozghani as her vice-presidential nominees and won 0.29% of the votes, coming fourteenth.

Sarwar Ahmadzai, a peace negotiator and political newcomer, participated as independent, nominating Mohammad Karim Jalili and Sayed Rasool as his VPs. He won 0.31% of the total votes. Sayyed Jalal Karim was a math prodigy, peace negotiator, and businessman, who participated as independent and nominated Faiz Mohammad Daqiq and Ghulam Abas Walizada Behsoodi. He won 0.29% of the total votes.

Abdul Ghafor Zori, Chief of Finance of Nimroz from 2001-2003, Head of the Chamber of Commerce in Nimroz from 2006 to 2007, participated as independent and won 0.2% of the votes. His vice-presidential nominees were Mohammad Zahir Aslami

and Abdul Rashid Payam. Haji Rahim Jan Shirzad, who had helped run Karzai's campaign in 2004 in Pakistani refugee camps, now claimed to "defeat Karzai in a landslide, if the vote is fair" (Wikileaks, 2009). He nominated Mohammad Assara and Malik Shakirullah as his running mates. However, neither he nor his VP nominees enjoyed the name recognition that could bring him the "landslide" victory he had desired. He won 0.16% of the total votes.

Zabihullah Ghazi Nooristani, also independent, ran with Mohammad Zubair and Aqa Sayed as his running mates and won 0.14% of the votes. Abdul Jabar Sabit, appointed Attorney General in 2005 and removed from his position in 2008 due to corruption charges, also ran as independent with Mohammad Ali Mohammadi and Abdul Jabar Raufi as his running mates and managed to get 0.13% of the total votes. Mohammad Hashim Tawfiqi, a Daud Khan admirer, had worked at different government posts under Daud Khan. He participated in elections as independent, nominated Shah Wali Rohani and Ghulam Ali Amin as his running mates, and won 0.11% of the total votes. Bismillah Shir, a business man, participated as independent with his running mates Mohammad Hassan Tawhidi and Deputy Sikandar Khan Hussain. He won 0.10% of the total votes.

The last nine candidates all won below 0.10% of the total votes, which include Moin ul din Ulfati[35] who ran with Khan Mohammad and Nadia (female); Gul Ahmad Yama who had served in the Education Ministry and taught at The Leadership College and ran with Ahmad Shah Asar and Sulaiman Ali; a senior cleric Mullah Ghulam

[35] According to a New York Times article (Gall, 2009) Ulfati's two vice-presidential candidates withdrew to support Karzai, and he had to register two new running mates the day before the registration deadline.

Mohammad Rigi[36] who ran with Wali Mohammad Aksir and Baz Mohammad Yaftali; Mohammad Akbar Oria who ran with Abdul Zahir Mirzakhil and Zulmay Faqiri; Bashir Ahmad Bizhan who was Pedram's Deputy of Congress Party but decided to part ways with Pedram and run in elections as independent with vice-presidential nominees Abdul Ghafar Erfani and Fatima Naeemi (female); Sangin Mohammad Rahmani whose first vice-presidential candidate was Rajabgul but the second vice-presidential candidate was unknown; Hedayat Amin Arsala, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the mujahedin government and one of the vice-presidents during the transition government (2002-2004), ran with Mohammad Ismail Qasimyar and Dost Mohammad Omari; Abdul Majid Samim who ran with Obaidullah and Sayed Shah Aqa; and finally Zia ul Haq Hafiz who ran with Sayed Mohammad Baqir Misbahzada and Haji Sayed Ahmad Hamdard. None of these candidates, with the exception of Arsala were nationally known and could not realistically expect to win. However, their vote share may be minuscule due the fact that too many candidates participated in the elections. That is, the vote was divided over a large pool of candidates. In 2014 however, the number of candidates dropped significantly thanks partly to changes to ballot access requirements, but also to the increasingly expensive campaigns.

The 2014 Presidential Elections

The 2014 presidential elections, held on April 5, marked the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan's recent history. The 2014 elections were interesting in many respects. First, the number of party nominated candidates dropped considerably in both

[36] The same New York Times article (Gall 2009) also reported that Rigi's second deputy and his campaign manager also withdrew from the race. He told NYT that "They told me I would get $200,000 for myself, but I said I am not selling myself."

absolute and relative terms (only one out of eight candidates ran under a party label). Second, newly formed political parties did not nominate any candidates. Finally, the only party candidate in the elections, Abdullah Abdullah, ran as the candidate of a Mujahedin party, Jamiat-e Islami. Despite their initial efforts, newly formed political parties found it difficult to cope with institutional and environmental constraints they faced, and as a result they faded away from the national electoral scene. Meanwhile, participation of leaders of old parties under their party label suggests that the effects of negative legacies of political parties on the electoral strategies of leaders of old parties may be going away with each subsequent elections, as political discourse moves away from the past and focuses on the future. Nonetheless, participation of two leaders of old parties as independent in 2014 elections demonstrates that some old party leaders still prefer to distance themselves from their political parties in national elections.

Figure 4: Affiliation Patterns in 2014 Presidential Elections



The number of candidates dropped significantly in 2014 presidential elections in comparison to the first two elections thanks in part to changes in ballot access and registration laws. The Electoral Law was amended three times before the 2014 elections (the reasons for amendments to the Electoral Law are discussed in Institutional Selection Chapter. The most recent (2013) amendments to the Electoral Law required nominees to submit a far larger number of voter signatures (100,000 signatures of eligible voters from at least 20 provinces, with a minimum of 2 percent from each province) than previous elections and to make a much higher financial deposit (one million AFS or approximately 17,500 USD). Meanwhile, having to campaign in the majority of the provinces due to the new ballot access laws, campaigns became increasingly costly, which deterred some candidates from participating. Nonetheless, a total number of 27 candidates registered their candidacies, but only eight candidates were qualified to participate in the elections. As was expected by many observers of Afghan politics, the first round of elections did not produce a clear winner because most candidates had chosen their running mates very carefully as far as the extent of their influence was concerned. Consequently, the vote was divided up in a way that nobody was able to muster the 50% plus one vote to be declared the winner in the first round, with Abdullah winning 45% and Ghani winning 31.6% of the total votes. Abdullah and Ghani competed in runoff elections, in accordance with the Electoral Law. However, the runoff election was replete with accusations of systematic fraud committed by the Ghani team (Ahmed and Rosenberg 2014), and after months of controversy and near-crisis, the two top runners created a National Unity Government in which a new post was created for Abdullah as the CEO and Ghani, who was claimed to have won the majority of the votes, became the president.[37] Table 6 lists

[37] The exact number of votes each candidate had won was not disclosed due to Abdullah's request.

the candidates who participated in 2014 presidential elections, their affiliation choice, and their share of the total votes from the first round of elections.

Table 6: 2014 Presidential Elections

No.	Candidate	Political Party	% of Votes (first round)
1	Abdulla Abdullah	Jamiat Party	45
2	Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	Independent	31.56
3	Zalmai Rasoul	Independent	11.37
4	Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf*	Independent	7.04
5	Qutbuddin Hilal*	Independent	2.75
6	Mohammad Shafiq (Gul Agha Sherzai	Independent	1.57
7	Mohammad Daud Sultanzoy	Independent	0.46
8	Hedayat Amin Arsala	Independent	0.23

Total Votes: 6604546
Source: Independent Electoral Commission
*Signifies leaders of old parties who participated as independent

With Karzai out of the race, it was not immediately apparent who would challenge Abdullah's opposition status in 2014 elections. There were a few possible indicators however: first, it was important which candidate Karzai will favor. The general concern was that whomever Karzai favors will challenge Abdullah and win the elections, as Karzai would use state resources to make the victory of his favorite candidate possible. However, Karzai did not endorse any candidate publicly (including his brother who eventually withdrew from the race in favor of Zalmai Rasoul), although news of Karzai favoring Zalmai Rassoul, who had served as the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation in 2002, the Chairman of National Security Council from 2002-2010, and Minister of

Foreign Affairs from 2010-2013, was surfacing around the time the nominees registered their candidacies.[38]

Rassoul (Pashtun) nominated Zia Massoud (Tajik, brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud) as his first vice-president and Habiba Sarabi (Hazara), a former female governor of Bamyan, as his second vice-president—a typical Pashtun-Tajik-Hazara alliance in post-2001 Afghan elections. Massoud was expected to attract the Tajik vote for Rassoul's ticket while Sarabi's inclusion was hoped to take away some of the Hazara vote from Abdullah's ticket who was running with Mohaqiq, the most influential Hazara leader. However, neither of the VPs was able to bring Rassoul the intended votes as Abdullah swept through the Tajik and Hazara dominated provinces. Even though Ghani's team accused some government officials of backing Rassoul's campaign (Ahbrimkhil and Sahil, 2014), there were no convincing evidence of government's heavy involvement in Rassoul's campaign. However, the evidence that election and palace officials supported Ghani's campaign in the runoff elections were widespread (discussed in details in Coalition Formation chapter). Hence, it is quite possible that Rassoul was a cover-up candidate, but that Ghani was the ultimate beneficiary of the government backing.[39] It is also possible that with Rassoul out of the race, Karzai's government preferred Ghani's victory over Abdullah's. Since Abdullah was ahead of Ghani by roughly 12 percentage points in the first round of elections, the government had to up the scale of systematic

[38] Karzai's brother, Qayum Karzai, briefly considered running for office in 2014. Karzai refused to support his brother's candidacy, and Qayum, apparently unable to mobilize electoral support, dropped out of the race—putting his political weight behind Rassoul who was believed to be Karzai's favorite (Hasrat-Nazimi, 2014).

[39] The New York Times (Gall, 2014) reported that the accusations of pressure campaign by government officials and ballot-box stuffing in favor of Ghani's team were supported by some international and domestic observers. Reportedly, more than two million ballots out of roughly eight million cast were fraudulent.

fraud to make Ghani's victory possible.[40] In short, the Karzai factor was not decisive in the first round of elections in boosting a particular candidate as viable, but it was significant in the runoff elections in guaranteeing a Ghani victory. Rassoul ended up with only 11.37% of the votes in the first round of election, while Ghani won 31.56% of the total votes in the first round.

A second factor that was important in identifying the main challenger to Abdullah's status as the opposition was other candidates' ability to form coalitions with important alliance seekers that would help them mobilize the electoral support necessary to put them to the top. Ghani, the former Finance Minister, close advisor to Karzai, and the Head of the Transition Process had built political connections inside Afghanistan since the 2001 transition and a reputation as a reformer outside of Afghanistan. As such, he enjoyed the name recognition and the political connections necessary to build a strong pre-electoral coalition that will challenge Abdullah. The most important, yet controversial, decision he made was to recruit Dostum as his first vice-presidential nominee.[41] Dostum was an important "vote bank" who carried the electoral support of the Uzbek community in Afghanistan. However, he was also accused of war crimes by the UN (and Ghani himself at one point). Nonetheless, for Ghani, electoral considerations outweighed concerns over Dostum's past. A few days after Ghani registered his ticket,

[40] Not only did a large margin separate the two top candidates in the first round, but also almost all the remaining candidates from the first round backed Abdullah's campaign in the runoff elections, especially Rassoul who had won over 11% of the total votes in the first round, which raises questions regarding the outcome of the runoff elections putting Ghani ahead.

[41] Ghani's decision to ally with Dostum was obvious since he wanted to win over the Uzbek voters. However, Dostum's decision to get into an alliance with Ghani (and not another major candidate such as Abdullah) was less obvious. In fact, Dostum wanted to get on Abdullah's ticket, but Abdullah did not think he will need Dostum's alliance given Atta Noor's support of Abdullah's campaign (Noor could bring Abdullah the vote of the northern provinces), and he rejected Dostum's (and Dostum's foreign backers, namely the Turkish government's) offer to be one of Abdullah's running mates (author's interview with Jawed Kohestani). Ghani, however, made Dostum his first vice-president in return for his electoral support.

Dostum issued an apology on his facebook page to those who had suffered during the civil wars (see Clark for an analysis of Dostum's apology). Although his apology received mixed reactions (*Tolo News*, 2013)[42], Dostum delivered on the day of the election, when Ghani won the votes of most of the northeastern provinces. Ghani's second vice-presidential nominee was a Hazara intellectual, Sarwar Danesh, who had served in a number of official positions including the Ministry of Justice, Deputy Ministry of Education, and governor of his home province, Daikondi. Danesh was supported by the Hezb-e Wahdat of Khalili (Karzai's second vice-president), and was expected to bring Ghani some of the Hazara vote. Danesh's influence, however, was curbed by that of Mohaqqiq on Abdullah's ticket, which claimed the Hazara vote in both Bamyan and Daikondi.

With Ghani and Rasoul in the race, it became less obvious who was the most credible candidate. Abdullah, who had been posing as the main opposition figure since 2005, faced two candidates who had a similar claim on the presidency. In running up to the elections, it was becoming apparent that Ghani was stronger than Rassoul. Some estimates even put him ahead of Abdullah. One estimator of these three candidates' relative electoral strength was three nationwide and highly publicized pre-election polls, one conducted by Tolo commercial TV station with largest viewership in the country, one conducted by Glevum Associates, an independent incorporation, and one conducted by Democracy International. Tolo TV surveyed 1,300 respondents from 34 provinces over the phone in October 2013, 75% of whom were urban residents and 41% were women. Everyone was asked one question: "Who do you think is the best candidate, among all the

[42] Access the article here: http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12213-dostum-apologies-for-actions-during-civil-war-receives-mixed-response

candidates for the Presidency?" Half of those surveyed claimed that there is no "best" candidate (12%) or that they did not know who the "best" candidate was (38%). Of those who provided a preference, 21% said Abdullah is the "best" candidate (30% in central provinces, perhaps because Mohaqqiq was on Abdullah's ticket) and 23.6% picked Ghani as the "best" candidate (with 20% of his support coming from north and northeastern regions, suggesting the influence of his first vice-presidential choice, Dostum). In this survey, only 0.9% of the respondents said Rassoul was the "best" candidate.

Glevum Associates conducted a national level survey of 2148 Afghans from 34 provinces between November and December of 2013 using face-to-face interviews. The survey results indicated that Ghani had a 4% lead over Abdullah (29% compared to 25% respectively) while 11% of the respondents were undecided. The rest of the candidates including Rassoul scored below 10%. From the Glevum sample, 60% of the respondents said they had heard "a lot" about the elections, 32% had heard "a little" and 8% had heard "Nothing"—with 47% of those who had heard "a lot" about the elections receiving their information from radio followed by family members, TV, and friends and neighbors. When asked whether Karzai's endorsement of a candidate will affect their voting preference, 85% of the respondents said they will not be swayed by the president's endorsement (Glevum Associates, 2013).

Democracy International conducted its poll in December 2013, and 33% of their respondents said they will vote for Abdullah, 26% for Ghani, and only 6% for Rassoul. When asked how much the inclusion of the first vice-presidential candidates affect their voting, Dostum (and Ismail Khan, Sayyaf's first VP nominee) appeared to be the most influential with 38% of the respondents claiming it affected their decision "Very much."

Khan (Abdullah's first VP, Pashtun) appeared inconsequential as only 12% of the respondents said he affected their decision "Very much" (with 52% responding "Not at all" and 30% choosing "To some level"). Massoud, Rassoul's first VP nominee, too scored low with 20% saying his choice affected their decision "Very much," 31% saying "To some level," and 35% choosing "Not at all" (Democracy International, 2013).

All three polls found that presidential tickets' ethnic composition had a direct influence on respondent preferences. Ghani did well among the respondents in northern and northeastern Uzbek-dominated provinces, (suggesting the influence of his vice-presidential candidate, Dostum) and Pashtun-dominated southern provinces (due to his own ethnic background as a Pashtun). Abdullah did well among the respondents in Hazara-dominated central provinces (perhaps due to the influence of Mohaqqiq) and Tajik-dominated northwestern provinces (he is closely associated with Tajiks, even though his father is Pashtun). Meanwhile, the individual-level evidence from the three surveys was consistent with provincial-level election outcomes in the first round of elections (electoral data from the run-off elections were not made public). During the first round, Abdullah won the majority of votes in Badakhshan, Takkhar, Balkh (perhaps due to Noor's support of Abdullah's ticket), Samangan, Badghis, Herat, Bamyan, Daikundi, Sar-e Pul, Panjshir, and Parwan—all Tajik or Hazara dominated areas. Ghani won most votes in Juzjan, Faryab, Farah, Paktia, Nangerhar, Logar, Khost, Paktika, and Laghman—all Uzbik or Pashtun dominated areas. The vote in some of the southern provinces was almost equally divided between Ghani and Rassoul (a Kandahari Pashtun).

The rest of the candidates in the 2014 presidential race consisted of the former mujahedin leaders (Sayyaf, Hilal, and Sherzai) and technocrats (Sultanzoi and Arsala).

However, they were not able to make a national appeal, and they collectively polled a little over 12% of the national vote. Rasul Sayyaf (Pashtun), leader of the Dawat Party and MP from Kabul ran as independent with Ismail Khan (Tajik, the former governor of Herat and former Minister of Water and Energy), and Abdul Wahab Erfan (Uzbek), a teacher from Takhar province. With these two vice-presidential nominees, Sayyaf had hoped to attract electoral support from Herat and Takhar provinces. However, his ticket at best could appeal to a relatively small, rural, extremely religious segment of the population. He won 7.04% of the total votes, while only winning 3.81% of the votes in Takhar and 11.8% of the votes in Herat. Qutbudding Hilal (Pashtun), spokesperson of Hezb-e Islami Hekmatyar during the 1990s and, more recently, member of Hezb-e Islami peace delegation to Kabul nominated Enayatullah Enayat (Uzbek, former governor of Jowzjan and Badghis) and Mohammad Ali Nabizada (Tajik, second VP for Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai in 2009 presidential elections) as his vice-presidential running mates. He competed for the votes of that small segment of the population that Sayyaf's ticket was hoping to attract, and may have divided that vote. He won 2.75% of the total votes.

Gul Agha Sherzai (Pashtun, former Mujahedin commander), originally from Kandahar and governor of Nangarhar, was mainly after the Pashtun vote from both Kandahar and Nangarhar, but he also nominated Sayyed Hussain Alemi Balkhi (a Shiite religious figure from Balkh) and Mohammad Hashem Zaer (Uzbek), former governor of Jowzjan in the hopes to attract electoral support from the northern provinces of Balkh and Jowzjan (and the votes of the Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups). Not only did he not do well in the north (winning 0.38% of the votes in Jowzjan and 0.41% of the votes in Balkh), his vote share in Kandahar and Nangarhar was also negligible (16.02% and

1.02%, respectively), as Rassoul collected 53.96% of the votes in Kandahar and Ghani won Nangarhar with 59.8% of the votes.

Daud Sultanzoy (Pashtun), former MP from Ghazni and Tolo TV talk show host ran with Farid Ahmad Fazli (Tajik, former Minister of Mines) and Kazima Mohaqqiq (Hazara, female, university lecturer). He ended up with 0.45% of the total votes. Hedayat Amin Arsala (Pashtun) was hoping to appeal to the educated Pashtuns and chose to run with General Khodaidad (Hazara, former Counternarcotics Minister) and Safia Sediqi (Pashtun, former female MP). He won 0.23% of the total votes.

By the 2014 elections, the participation of party affiliated candidates in presidential elections dropped significantly (as demonstrated in Figure 5). The drop was particularly sharp among candidates of newly formed parties, despite their energetic participation in the first two elections. The decline in participation of party affiliated candidates was largely due to anti-party efforts of the Karzai government. Fearing the rise of old political parties as important players in Afghan politics, Karzai made several successful attempts to undermine party development. Karzai's anti-party efforts also negatively affected the participation of political parties in legislative elections and by extension their presence in the National Assembly. The following section discusses the status of political parties in the legislature.

Figure 5: Participation of Party Candidates in the three presidential elections



Political Parties in the National Assembly

In the Afghan National Assembly, unlike in the legislatures of mature democracies of Western Europe and North America, political parties do not organize politics. In effect, they do not play any role in legislative politics at all. This section seeks to demonstrate that lack of political party development in the legislature is a result of Karzai government's anti-party policies. In the two legislative elections that have been held since Afghanistan's transition to democracy, the government has constantly manipulated the rules and has imposed restrictions on political parties, which have impeded the development of political parties. Nonetheless, Karzai government has been able to get away with designing and implementing anti-party policies in the first place because of the absence of strong political parties during the transitional phase to demand their rights and carve out a place for themselves in Afghan politics.

The first legislative elections were held in 2005, a year after the 2004 presidential elections were held. The Electoral Law, adopted in 2004, designated Single Non-Transferable Vote to govern the conduct of legislative elections (the choice of SNTV is discussed in Institutional Selection Chapter). Under SNTV, candidates do not have to run under a party label and can stand in elections as independent. Given the option, scores of independent candidates registered to run in the first democratically held legislative elections. The number of candidates who were officially affiliated with a political party in the two parliamentary elections was only a fraction of the total number of candidates who took part in each election (see Table 7 below). However, many political parties claimed to have their members running in the elections. That is, many candidates were unofficially party candidates. For instance, political parties such as Hezb-e Islami, Jamiat-e Islamic, and the Republican Party, as well as the former PDPA factions told the Crisis Group (2006, p. 8) that they had many members of their parties elected to the National Assembly.

Table 7: Percentage of Party Affiliated Candidates in the two Legislative Elections

Affiliation and Electoral Success in Afghan Wolesi Jirga (lower house) Elections (all districts)						
Year	Total No. of Candidates	Total % Party Affiliated (Crisis Group)	Total % Party Affiliated (NDI)	% Party Affiliated in Parliament (Crisis Group)	% Party Affiliated i Parliament (NDI)	% Party Affiliated in Parliament AREU
2005	2707	12%		14.5%		35%
2010	2506		9%	12%	36%	

Nonetheless, the choice of party members to run as independent does not tell us much about party members' concern over legacies and types of their parties for one

important reason: during the 2005 parliamentary elections, candidates were disallowed to mention their party affiliation on the ballot (author's interview with Afghanzai[43]; see also JEMB, 2005). Given the restriction, it is hard to know if candidates preferred to distance themselves from their parties by participating as independent.[44] The restriction also made it difficult to know how many candidates anticipated running under a party label. Some observers of the Afghan elections have provided estimates of the total number of party affiliated candidates in the elections, as well as the percentage of successful party-affiliated candidates in the legislature (see Table 7 above). However, the estimates vary considerably from one institution and expert to the next, which demonstrates the difficulty with understanding party affiliation decisions among parliamentary candidates. In a report in 2012, the Democracy International reported that "three-fourths of Afghan MPs surveyed do not identify with a political party at all. Less than a fifth of respondents, 18.2%, report identifying with a party" (Oo and Ober, 2012, p. 27). Adding to the confusion is what Larson (2009, p. 12) calls "a culture of political ambiguity," where political parties do not disclose information about the size of their membership and the number of their members in the parliament, and the MPs are reluctant to declare their party allegiance.

The Karzai government made numerous other efforts to prevent the development of strong political parties. One such effort occurred right before the 2010 parliamentary

[43] Farid Afghanzai has worked at different capacities in both the Supreme Court and the Independent Election Commission Secretariat. He was also one of the authors of the 2007 proposed reforms to the electoral rules.

[44] Some observers, however, did find a tendency among candidates to not associate themselves with political parties for concerns over negative reputation of political parties. In interviews with more than 160 candidates leading up to elections, NDI observed that "some candidates avoided associating with political parties because they were concerned about the negative public perception of political parties. As a female candidate in Ghazni commented to NDI, 'People hate the political parties, and the parties have not done anything for the people' (NDI, 2010, p. 65).

elections. In 2009, a new law was decreed by the president, which required political parties to register 10,000 members (up from 700 members in the original law) from at least 22 provinces, 2% from each province. Consequently, only five parties could register in time for the 2010 parliamentary elections, and 34 candidates (out of 218 requests) were allowed to have their party name on the ballot (NDI, 2010, p. 65-66). The new requirements made it particularly difficult for newly formed political parties to meet. In the absence of public funding for political parties (discussed in Historical Legacies Chapter), the newly formed political parties were at severe disadvantage to recruit members from the majority of the provinces. Although the old political parties survived the manipulation of the rules, they were unable to transform themselves from ethnic parties to national, inclusive parties, as they were unable to gain strength through elections.

The biggest blow to political party development, however, came when Karzai approved a new regulation on political parties in early 2012, calling on parties to establish offices in a minimum of twenty provinces, and provide the office addresses to the justice ministry. Meanwhile, the Justice Ministry did not make the application of the rule clear until almost a year later, when it started sending warning letters requesting from the parties to submit their lists of provincial headquarters by 4 April 2013. Only eight of the fifty five political parties submitted their replies before the deadline. Government officials claimed that the goal of the regulations was to drastically reduce the number of parties. After the April deadline passed, a Justice Ministry statement to the local media said that none of the registered parties satisfied the requirements for legal activity (Crisis Group, 2013, p. 6-7). The new parties once again were hit by the

regulations disproportionally, as the majority of them appeared unable to achieve the required number of offices. “Shutting out smaller parties from the political process would in fact marginalize many of Afghanistan’s nascent secular, democratic and youth-oriented political initiatives. Many of these groups criticized the regulations in an April 2013 meeting with 30 political parties in Kabul” (Crisis Group, 2013, p. 10).

In addition to manipulating the rules, the government tried to block efforts to reform the Electoral Law. In 2007, the Independent Election Commission, under the leadership of Ma’navi, put together a proposal that would change the current electoral rules to a mixed system of SNTV and proportional representation. The proposal went to the Cabinet where it was rejected (author’s interview with Afghanzai). Only two ministers at the time agreed with the proposal, the Foreign Minister, Spanta, and the Minister of Finance, Ahadi, who was the leader of the Afghan Millat Party (author’s interview with Spanta). In 2008, a similar proposal sent to the Wolesi Jirga was rejected under the executive pressure, even though there was “considerable amount of support in Parliament for the parallel system of SNTV and a party list” (Larson, 2009: 10). Finally, another proposal to change SNTV to a mixed system of SNTV and PR was defeated in the Wolesi Jirga in 2013 (Crisis Group, 2013: 5). In the words of Fahim Hakim, Commissioner and Deputy Chair of Human Rights Commission, “The president does not believe in political parties. Political parties were given the chance to form, but they were not given the opportunity to take part in the elections” (author’s interview with Hakim).

Given Karzai’s access to power and resources of the state, forming a strong presidential party was entirely feasible. Hence, it is puzzling that he did not form a party. On multiple occasions (during his televised speeches and interviews), Karzai had

expressed distaste for political parties and had blamed political parties for the ills in Afghan politics.[45] He did not belong to a political party in the past and expressed no desire to form one in post-2001. Nonetheless, his decision to not form a strong presidential party may have had other reasons besides his anti-party inclinations. Had Karzai formed a political party, he would be constrained by the institution in pursuit of his personal goals. That is, Karzai may have been concerned about political parties' constraining effects on his basically unchecked behavior. Hence, he had incentives to not form a party, and he made an effort to prevent other political parties from gaining strength.

The institutional constraints on political parties in post-2001 Afghanistan made it difficult for political parties to evolve and become the organizers of politics in the legislature. However, the choice of institutions was endogenous to structures of power during the transition phase. At the time Afghanistan was transitioning to a democratic regime, strong, national political parties did not exist to assert their weight and affect institutional selection. Consequently, the institutions that were adopted were hostile to political party development.

Conclusions

This chapter presented a detailed discussion of the state of political parties in the three presidential and two parliamentary elections as well as a narrative of the variation in office seekers' affiliation choices. I also sought to provide definition and measurement of

[45] In an interview with The Atlantic (Mashal, 2014), Karzai claimed that "a strong foundation for such a [democratic] system can only be found in a political system more reliant on communities rather than political parties." This statement reflects Karzai's outlook towards political parties in post-2001 Afghanistan. See also the Crisis Group report (2005, p. 6) for a discussion of Karzai's distrust of political parties.

key concepts that make up the building blocks of this dissertation. The overall purpose of the chapter was to provide the empirical background for the subsequent chapters.

Chapter Four

Historical Legacies

Political parties have generally been credited for providing electoral services to both candidates and voters, including reducing the costs of voting by providing information short cuts, supplying candidates with name recognition as well as organizational, financial, and ideological support, and providing the most efficient route to elective office. However, in Afghanistan since its transition to democracy in 2001, some office seekers have publicly distanced themselves from political parties by foregoing their party affiliation at elections. Specifically, leaders of political parties that existed under the pre-democratic regime forego their party affiliation in elections (while leaders of parties that have formed since the democratic transition participate under their party label). In Chapter two, I argued that legacy of political parties is a critical variable in determining office seekers' affiliation decisions. Based on the inductive study of post-2001 Afghanistan, I hypothesized that office seekers are more likely to forego party affiliation during elections if their political parties are associated with negative legacies of the pre-democratic regime. Conversely, leaders of political parties not associated with negative legacies of the previous regime are less likely to forego their party affiliation during elections. This Chapter will present some evidence in favor of the hypothesis. However, further research is needed to test the hypothesis rigorously.

The first piece of evidence that yields some support to the hypothesis above comes from a comparison of the platforms and speeches of the leaders of old parties to

those of the leaders of newly formed parties during the three presidential elections (2004, 2009, and 2014). Candidates' platforms and speeches were gathered through inquiry into the archives of domestic and international media that covered Afghanistan's post-2001 presidential elections. The kinds of appeals that leaders of the two types of parties make to voters tell us a lot about how their electoral strategies are informed by the legacies of their political parties. As a second piece of evidence, I present newly gathered interviews with presidential candidates, members of the Independent Election Commission, civil society leaders, and heads of Non-governmental Organizations (NGO), which also reveal the effects of legacies of political parties on party leaders' strategies.

In addition to providing supporting evidence for the hypothesis above, this chapter evaluates the effects of the institutions on office seekers' affiliation decisions. I have argued that electoral institutions do not determine the preferences of the office seekers in regards with their party affiliation. The mere fact that leaders of both old and new political parties come to different affiliation decisions under the same electoral rules suggests that the electoral rules could not have been the determining factor in party leaders' decision whether to turn to or turn away from political parties. Further, as will be discussed in Institutional Selection Chapter, post-2001 institutional selection was endogenous to the structures of power that existed during the transition phase. That is, the electoral institutions were deliberately designed in ways that will give those in power an advantage in elections. Nonetheless, electoral institutions do condition office seekers' strategic responses to uncertainty inherent in the post-transition context and mediate the effects of independent variables onto the outcome variables. That is, institutions function as intervening variables. For instance, under majoritarian electoral rules elites' strategic

response to uncertainty is different from their strategic response under proportional electoral rules. Uncertainty over voter preferences made partisan appeals risky for the leaders of old parties

In post-2001 Afghanistan, elites' decision to either turn to or turn away from political parties was determined by the variation in historical legacies of political parties. The parties of the past were associated with legacies of violence and civil war during their direct rule in the previous regimes, and their leaders were concerned over the kinds of expectations that their party rule had generated. They had to form their post-transition electoral strategies under conditions of uncertainty over voter preferences, especially when they were facing electoral competition from new parties, which were not associated with negative legacies of the past and from newly empowered individuals with regional or international backing. Under these conditions, making partisan appeals to voters appeared risky. Leaders of old parties not only publicly distanced themselves from their political parties by running as independent candidates, but they also went out of their way to denounce the legacies of the previous regimes in their platforms and speeches. Under a presidential system and majority electoral rules, they had to appeal to broad electorates not just their party base to succeed in elections.

The former Mujahedin political parties' basis of support in Afghanistan is limited to their ethnic groups. However, no single Mujahedin party commands the support of their entire ethnic group, with the exception of Junbesh-e Islami, which until recently has had a monopoly over the Uzbek vote.[46] Meanwhile, the ethnic composition of

[46] The outcome of the first round of the 2014 presidential elections, however, suggests that Dostum, the leader of Junbish Party may no longer hold a strong sway over the Uzbek and Turkman voters. Dostum was the first Vice-presidential candidate on Ashraf Ghani's ticket in 2014 elections, and Ghani expected to win

Afghanistan is such that no ethnic group makes up the majority of the population (Table 8 provides an estimate of political parties' ethnic basis of support). Although recent estimates of the ethnic composition of Afghanistan are not available,[47] there is general consensus that Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group making up about 42% of the population, with Tajiks the second largest ethnic group comprising 27% of the population, Hazaras and Uzbeks making up 11% of the population each, and the rest of the population comprised of Turkmans, Aimaqs and Baloochis (see Katzman, 2015, p. 2-4). The support base of the former People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was even more limited than that of the former Mujahedin parties. In the absence of a significant working class in Afghanistan, the communist ideology of the PDPA never reached beyond a negligible percentage of the population. As Table 8 demonstrates, PDPA currently does not enjoy any influence in Afghanistan.

Table 8: Political Parties' Ethnic Basis of Support

Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara/Shia	Uzbek
Hezb-e Islami	Jamiat-e Islami	Wahdat-e Islami	Junbesh-e Milli
Dawat-e Islami	Kangara-e Milli*[48]	Wahdat-e Islami-e Mardom	

the votes of Turkic-dominated Northern provinces of Afghanistan. However, with the exception of Jowzjan and Faryab provinces, Abdullah was well ahead of Ghani in other provinces with Uzbek and Turkman majority or significant minority groups. See Ali (2014) for a detailed discussion of split in Uzbek vote.

[47] The last census in Afghanistan was done between 1973 and 1977 under Dauod Khan's government. The absence of security and a strong central government have not allowed for carrying national censuses in the last four decades. Further, since the post-2001 transition, the issue of ethnicity and ethnic composition of country have become highly politicized issues. For instance, the Afghanistan Bureau of Statics website provides data on the size and settlement patterns of the population, but it does not provide any data on the ethnic composition of the country (cso.gov).

[48] Kangara-e Milli (National Congress) is a new party led by Latif Pedram and commands the support of the Tajik nationalists and some support in its leader's native Badakhshan. However, it cannot compete with Jamiat-e Islamic in attracting Tajik supporters. In fact, the signs of its waning strength appeared when the deputy of the party, Ahmad Bezhan, broke away from Kangara and participated in 2009 presidential elections as independent while Pedram himself has been elected the leader of a newly emerging, ultra-nationalist Tajik party called Tajikan Party.

Afghan Millat*[49]	Naween[50]	Harakat-e Islami

* Star next to a party name signifies new party. The rest are former Mujahedin parties and splinter parties.
Source: NDI (2011, p. 17) and Roy (2003, p. 4-5).

The data in Table 8 indicate that there is ample uncertainty over ethnic support for the old political parties. That is, leaders of old parties cannot even draw on exclusive support of their ethnic groups to win votes, giving them further incentives to broaden their appeal beyond their political parties by running in elections as independent.

The leaders of new political parties, the ones that formed after the 2001 transition, faced the same environmental and institutional challenges as did the old parties. However, their response was vastly different from those of the old party leaders in formulating their electoral strategies. They participated under their party labels because newly formed parties did not suffer any association with negative legacies of the past. Hence, leaders of those parties capitalized on their association with the democratic transition and presented themselves as better alternatives to old parties. Moreover, since the newly formed parties were neither publicly funded nor did they possess material resources like the old parties to build clientelistic support networks, they decided to make programmatic appeals to voters. All the new political parties, with the exception of Kangara-e Melli (Congress) and Afghan Millat (Afghan People), posed as multi-ethnic parties with democratic platforms (Larson, 2009; *Political Parties of Afghanistan*, 2005). The leaders of these new parties could make low-risk, broad, programmatic appeals in

[49] Afghan Millat's origin goes back to 1960s (and even earlier under different names). However, it was inactive in Afghanistan during the last four decades. The party was registered in 2003 after the Political Parties Law was passed. Hence, I have categorized it under the "new parties" label because of its long period of political inactivity and its lack of association with the legacies of the PDPA and the Mujahedin regimes.
[50] Naween is Qanooni's splinter party from Jamiat-e Islami.

their platforms and campaign advertisement to capitalize on the uncertainty surrounding voter preferences.

Before providing the evidence on office seekers' campaign platforms and speeches, it is important to provide a detailed discussion of the legacies of the old political parties. The following section gives an overview of the legacies of the PDPA as the ruling party in the 1970s and 1980s. The PDPA regime brutally suppressed all kinds of opposition during its direct rule and facilitated the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which left an estimated three million dead and disabled. The section also provides a narrative account of the civil wars initiated by the Mujahedin factions during the 1990s that destroyed major cities including Kabul and killed and displaced thousands of people.

Legacies of Political Parties in Afghanistan

Legacies of political parties of the last four decades in Afghanistan (late 1970s to 1990s) are largely negative. The major political parties of this recent past were of two varieties: the communist Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Islamist Mujahedin factions. The PDPA came to power in 1978 through a bloody coup, marking the first time in the history of Afghanistan of direct political party rule. The PDPA's more than a decade long rule was brutal as it ruthlessly suppressed political opponents and caused large scale civilian death and displacement. The PDPA continued its rule until 1992 when the regime was toppled by the Mujahedin factions. Consequently, the PDPA disintegrated and its members either fled the country or were absorbed by the various Mujahedin factions. The Mujahedin factions, on the other hand, unable to form a consensus government in 1992, initiated a destructive civil war that lasted for four years

until the Taliban forces captured Kabul in 1996 and drove the Mujahedin parties out of 95% of the country by 1998. The years of infighting among Mujahedin factions left them weakened and fragmented. Hence, when the first democratic presidential elections were scheduled for 2004, unlike the former communist parties in East Central Europe who successfully 'rebranded' (Grzymala-Busse, 2002, p. 175), the PDPA and the Mujahedin factions were largely discredited; they could not resort to nostalgia due to their violent rule in the past, nor could they rely on patronage or extremism to mobilize electoral support. Consequently, the leaders of these parties had to choose electoral strategies that were likely to succeed in competitive presidential elections under majoritarian electoral rules. Their electoral strategy was to distance themselves from the legacies of their political parties in the hopes to appeal to broad electorate. Hence, the leaders of the former PDPA ran under new party labels while the leaders of the Mujahedin factions participated in elections as "independent" (i.e., not party affiliated).

***The PDPA*:** The PDPA was established in 1965 (under the name Association of Democrats, see Kakar, 1995: 54) as a result of the relative political freedoms of the Constitutional Decade and in running up to the parliamentary elections in the same year. The PDPA split into two factions in 1967, Khalq (Masses) under Noor Mohammad Taraki and Parcham (Banner) under Babrak Karmal but were pressured into a reunion in 1977 by the Soviets (Rubin 1995, p. 26). Both factions were jointly referred to as PDPA and followed the same ideology, although they differed in the social power base of the majority of members. Khalq mainly recruited from among newly educated of rural background while Parcham recruited from the middle and upper ranks of the urban elite

(Rubin, 1995: 26; Bradsher, 1999:4; Giustozzi, 2013: 325). Khalq was mainly Pashtun, Parcham was multi-ethnic (Roy, 2003: 4; Rubin, 1995, p. 26).

The first year of the PDPA rule was turbulent due to internal disagreements between the two factions of the Party. The Khalq faction was suspicious of Parcham, which had a stronger foothold in the army ranks, and tried to purge its leaders. Being outraged with the sacking by Khalq, Parcham leaders asked for help from the Soviet Union. The Soviets were concerned about the growing hostilities between the two factions, persecution of Parchamis, and consequent instability of the PDPA regime in the face off the threat of Western influence through the Mujahedin factions. They decided to install Babrak Karmal of Parcham to power in a Soviet-backed coup, followed by a full blown invasion. The Soviets were hoping that Karmal will reunite the two factions that were on the verge of sectarian disintegration (Louis, 1980). However, not only did the inter-factional rivalry not stop, but the PDPA regime intensified its suppression of all kinds of political opposition to the regime. The Soviet invasion gave the Afghan government the backing of the Red Army to carry out their repressive policies.

The ruthless suppression of the opposition during this period resulted in thousands of deaths and disappearances, which were directly associated with the PDPA rule. Violence during the PDPA rule took two forms: 1) political arrests and subsequent imprisonment and execution of political opponents (largely the Maoists and the members of intelligentsia that opposed the Soviet invasion) in urban centers[51], and 2) indiscriminate bombardment and destruction of the villages where they faced armed

[51] On 10 October 1979, Hafizullah Amin, the Khalqi leader who replaced Nur Mohammad Taraki in a coup, published a list of 12,000 prisoners killed by Taraki, 7,000 of whom were Hazaras (Dorronsoro, 2013, p. 104) perhaps to set himself apart from his predecessor. However, the same pattern of political executions continued under the PDPA leaders that succeeded Amin.

opposition from the Mujahedin (freedom fighters), who were supported financially and militarily by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Two episodes of mass rebellions in opposition to the Soviet-backed PDPA regime, and the government's subsequent crackdown, which killed thousands of protestors and civilians have been recorded: the 15 March 1979 uprising in Herat, famously referred to as the Qeyam-e 24 Hoot (referred to by its date in solar calendar), and the 22 February 1980 uprising (also remembered by its date as Qeyam-e 3 Hoot) in Kabul. The government crackdown on the uprising was followed by mass arrests and executions in the days after the demonstrations.

The Herat uprising of 1979 was significant because it was carried out against the PDPA regime, a few months before the former Soviet Union's direct invasion of the country, and the brutality with which the uprising was subdued was associated with the PDPA. The uprising was unique in the sense that no other mutinies before it (the mutinies of the garrisons in Mazar and Kabul) had resulted in the power falling in the hands of the insurgents. Additionally, the Soviet air power intervened directly from the Soviet Union, which to some was an anticipation of the invasion that occurred in December of that year. The insurgents included peasants, mullahs, teachers, townsmen, and Maoists, who were joined by the 17th division. The Maoist artillerymen, Sardar Khan and officer Gholam Rasul Khan played an important role in coordinating with the insurgents (Dorronsoro, 2013, p. 98-100). With the joining of the 17th division with the insurgents, they were able to take complete control of the city for four to five days, until they were subdued through bombing campaigns, which killed civilians as well as those taking part in the uprising. According to some claims, somewhere between 5000 and 50,000 people were killed during the crackdown and the months of rounding up the suspects that followed by the

Khalqi intelligence agency, AGSA.[52] One mass grave was discovered in 1992 in the north of Herat, which held the corpses of 2000 people, although it is not determined whether those people were killed before or after the uprising (Gammell, 2015, p. 2). The memories of the Herat uprising are kept alive in Herat city with statues built around the city to mark different moments of the five-day uprising (see Latifi, 2014) and in a museum in the city (Jillani, 2015).

The 3 Hoot uprising was a mass opposition against the Soviet invasion of the country, which was facilitated by the PDPA regime. Like the Herat uprising, insurgents of different backgrounds and persuasions took part in the 3 Hoot uprising in Kabul, although opposition parties' activists (the Sazman-e Azadibakhsh-e Mardom-e Afghanistan, Hezb-e Harakat-e Islami, and Hezb-e Islami) played a critical role in inciting rebellion and organizing the people. They had persuaded shopkeepers to close their shops and had distributed anti-government night letters (shabnama) to encourage people to come out and protest the Soviet occupation. The night before the uprising, protestors got on their rooftops and started chanting "Allah o Akbar," similar to what had happened in Herat and Kandahar uprisings (Kakar, 1995, p. 114-116; Gammell, 2015). The next day, on 22 February 1980 (3 Hoot 1358) thousands of protestors took to the streets in various locations in Kabul city. The protestors were met with security forces on the streets, and after they refused to disperse, the security forces fired onto the crowd shooting down the front row protestors. After protestors occupied the police headquarter in Khushal Mina, where the police forces gave the protestors their weapons, heavy

[52] In an interview (Gammell, 2015, p. 2), Ismail Khan claimed that 24,000 people were killed during the Herat uprising. Meanwhile Dorronsoro's (2013, p. 101) interview with a Parchami expatriate in Germany in 1989 put the estimate at 25,000. Olivier Roy (1990, p. 108) estimated the numbers to have been between 5,000 and 50,000.

artillery, including bombers, tanks and missiles, was used to subdue the protesters. An estimated 800 people were killed during the 3 Hoot uprising and thousands more arrested, many of whom were summarily executed (Kakar, 1995, p.117). The uprisings such as 24 Hoot and 3 Hoot alerted the communist government and the Soviet occupiers that the challenge to their power should be taken seriously. Consequently, political arrests in urban centers and mass murders intensified in the Pul-e Charkhi prison.

The repression carried out by the PDPA and its Soviet backers was not limited to the cities and city residents. During the PDPA rule, rural Afghanistan witnessed severe indiscriminate violence. On the patterns of war inside Afghanistan, Louis Dupree (1984, p. 234-236) reported that the strategy the Soviets used was "search-and-destroy" missions, which targeted main guerrilla force areas, the 'rubbleization' of Afghan villages, and 'migratory genocide.' The Soviets had divided the Afghan countryside into three combat zones. Zone I was free-fire zone, where the Soviets would shoot at anything that moved. This zone included all the villages on both sides of the main roads to the first or second lines of hills. Zone II extended for about a day's walk into the hills in either direction and were mujahedin territory. Most of the villages in Zone II were 'rubbleized' by Soviet bombing raids. Zone III consisted of areas that were more than a day's walk away from Zone II, where some farmers and their families stayed to farm their lands.

Although the use of torture in interrogation of political opponents during the PDPA rule was very usual, documents of such crimes are rare if available at all. The only available documents are autobiographical accounts of those who made it out of the Pul-e Charkhi prison alive, either by making deals with the interrogators, as a result of change

in the leadership of the party,[53] or by "miracle" (those who got out of summary executions by playing dead and dug themselves out of mass graves). Mohammad Osman Hashemi's (2005) autobiography is one such document. Hashemi, a professor of physiology and doctor of medicine, took up anti-government activities after the fall of Daoud regime. He and seven of his friends started a group called "Movement for the National Unity" and started recruiting new members. However, he was arrested and taken to the Secret Service Headquarter, where he was ruthlessly tortured by Assadullah Sarwari, the Head of the Secret Service.[54] During his interrogations, he encountered Dr. M. Ali Akbar, who was the leader of another anti-government group and with whom Hashemi had talked to about joining forces. He too had been brutally tortured. Both Hashemi and Dr. Akbar were sentenced to death and Dr. Akbar eventually executed. The tension between the two factions of PDPA and eventual invasion of Soviet Union bought Hashemi time in the prison. He was finally released from the prison on 6 January 1980, as part of a mass release of political prisoners under Babrak Karmal of Parcham faction. Hashemi writes about hundreds of prisoners who were brought to Pul-e Charkhi during the time he was there, and were tortured and executed.

[53] This behavior was usual among the communist leaders. When Hafizullah Amin removed Noor Mohammad Taraki through a coup, he published the list of the prisoners who had been executed under Taraki's rule. When Najibullah replaced Karmal in 1986 as both the leader of the party and the president, he released political prisoners (including author's mother) in a goodwill gesture.

[54] Hashemi describes his torture in graphic details. He was beaten by Sarwari with his hands and feet tied and he was given electric shock. He writes that "After a while there was no more screaming. A wave of convulsion traveled my entire body without forcing out of me even a moan. Not because I managed to swallow my scream but because I was unable to scream. I was totally exhausted. I could not move a mussel or make a sound. For the first time since I was apprehended, I thought about death. I suffered silently, and I wished to die. I had reached that juncture where death appears as the angel of deliverance. The angel of death was my only hope of being rescued from torture. I wished my heart would stop under one of those electrical shocks, so that I no longer be tormented. Life had become unbearable. Pain had become unbearable. But the angel of death did not take me. I was to live and endure" (2005, p. 61).

The suppression of political opposition during the PDPA rule was observed by international organizations such as Amnesty International, who reported in March 1991 on torture and long-term detention of prisoners without trial. They reported on state-run facilities where different types of torture, including beating, the application of electric shock, extracting nails, and sleep deprivation, were used (Amnesty International, 1991). In another report in August 1991, Amnesty International wrote on unfair trials by special tribunals. The report said "According to the information Amnesty International had received, thousands of political prisoners including prisoners of conscience, have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and to death by special tribunals set up outside the normal judicial system. These sentences have been passed under successive government administrations in Afghanistan since early 1978" (Amnesty International, 1991). In 1978, Amnesty International maintained that at least 12,000 political prisoners languished in Pul-e Charkhi prison without trial (cited in Girardet 1985, p. 121).

Despite PDPA leaders' attempts to distance themselves from their party's past, the negative legacies of the PDPA followed them for years to come, as evidence of the crimes committed by the party kept surfacing. In 2013, for instance, the Dutch prosecutor's office published the names of 5,000 prisoners killed during the first 20 months of the Communist rule after the 1978 coup. The publication of the list ended families' more than thirty years wait for their loved ones who had disappeared at the start of the communist rule (Clark, 2013). The list was first referred to in the Sun Journal on 10 November 1989. Reportedly, the list was published by Najibullah government (president from 1986 to 1992) perhaps to 'try to distance themselves from the past' (*Sun Journal*, 1989). The New York Times wrote on 9 November 1989: "The release of the

victims' names was part of a broader strategy by the Najibullah Government of disavowing its past. By representing itself as regretful about past excesses and eager to build a democratic, Islamic state, Mr. Najibullah and his ruling People's Democratic Party hope to carve a place for themselves" (Burns, 1989). However, the list included only those prisoners killed during the presidency of Taraki and Amin, not the ones that were killed during the time when Najibullah was the head of KhAD. In 2015, the Dutch police arrested and charged Seddiq Alamyar for the massacre committed during the 19-20 April 1979 in village of Kerala in Kunar province. Alamyar commanded the elite '444' Unit in 1979, which killed "hundreds of men and boys" (Clark, 2015). These were a few instances reminding both the people and the leaders of the PDPA of the kinds of legacies the party was associated with.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came to an end when, on 14 April 1988, officials of the four principle nations, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States, came together in Geneva to sign the Geneva Agreement. The Accord committed the USSR to a withdrawal timetable, which would start on 15 May 1988 and would be completed within nine months of its start. The Accord also committed the United States and the USSR to symmetrical guarantees not to support the fighting partied (the Mujahedin and the PDPA regime, respectively). The Mujahedin factions, however, were not a party to the Accord, and they issued a statement in Peshawar on the eve of the signing indicating that the resistance forces were not bound by the agreement. They called on the Mujahedin guerrillas to continue the fight until the Kabul regime was overthrown. The Soviet army's withdrawal was completed on 15 February 1989. However, despite United Nation's efforts to resolve the Afghanistan conflict by

negotiating a peace settlement between the Mujahedin and the PDPA regime, the Mujahedin refused to negotiate with the PDPA. In April 1992, the PDPA regime collapsed and was replaced by the interim mujahedin government, headed by Sebghatullah Mojaddedi. Some members of PDPA fled the country while others were absorbed by Mujahedin factions (Parchami Tajiks joining Jamiat, and Khalqi Pashtuns joining Hezb-e Islami) (Crisis Group, 2005). The collapse and disintegration of the PDPA in 1992 meant that the party was severely discredited and its base of support entirely disrupted. The negative legacies of the PDPA during its fourteen-year rule constrained the actions of its leaders in post-2001 Afghanistan as they formed their electoral strategies to participate in democratic elections.

The Mujahedin Factions: the former Mujahedin factions-turned-parties, like the PDPA, suffered association with negative legacies during their direct rule in 1990s. After the Mujahedin factions captured Kabul in 1992, there was no democratic mechanism in place to allocate power and state resources through political competition. The disagreement over power sharing arrangements led to a full-blown civil war, involving most of the mujahedin factions, which lasted for four years before the Taliban captured Kabul and put an end to the intra-mujahedin civil war. The physical destruction, loss of life, and internal displacement and immigration that occurred as a result of the devastating wars initiated by the Mujahedin factions severely discredited those parties. When the 2001 transition opened the scene to free political competition, the leaders of the former Mujahedin parties tried to distance themselves from the legacies of their parties, as they perceived identifying with their political parties electorally risky.

The origins of the mujahedin factions went back to 1960s. In 1969 the Islamist Jawanan-e Mosalman (Muslim Youth) emerged as part of a global effort to push for the establishment of an Islamic State (Bezhan, 2013; Ibrahimi, 2012). After experiencing political suppression by the government, the Islamist factions went to Pakistan where they were well received and were supported by Pakistan as well as Western and Arab countries to fight the Soviet-backed PDPA regime. They gained importance as a political force after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, and they received significant amounts of military and financial assistance from the USA and Saudi Arabia. The military aid to Afghan Mujahedin in Pakistan was channeled through the Pakistan government, which decided to limit the flow of the financial and military help to the Sunni Islamist groups, the 'Peshawar Seven,' while the nationalist and leftist resistance groups were excluded (Ruttig, 2006, p. 10).[55] The Shiite Islamist groups were very fragmented until Tehran forced eight major Shiite groups, the 'Tehran Eight,' to unite under Shura-ye I'tilaf-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Coalition Council of Afghanistan), from which Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami (Islamic Unity Party) was created in 1989 (Ruttig, 2006, p. 12). During the years of Soviet occupation, these factions operated as armed resistance groups inside Afghanistan, but their political wings were located in Pakistan where some of them maintained their own schools and training camps and drew support among the refugee groups (Ewans, 2002, p. 154-156).

The resistance against the Soviet occupation was widespread and involved the majority of the Afghan population. However, mujahedin factions' individual basis of

[55] In fact, the Zia ul Haq regime in Pakistan did not even allow any other political parties to be formed outside the Group of Seven. Sayyed Ishaq Gailani, the leader of the Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Melli party registered his party as an NGO in Pakistan due to restrictions on political parties (author's interview with Gailani).

support was inevitably narrow given the dispersed nature of the resistance against the Soviet Union and the PDPA government. The various factions operated in the geographic regions of the country where their ethnic or linguistic groups were concentrated, and they recruited heavily from their ethnic groups. The ethnic nature of the mujahedin factions was reinforced by the onset of the civil wars when they became rival warring groups after they could not agree on a post-communist power sharing arrangements. During the civil wars, too, the various factions relied on their ethnic or linguistic groups for recruitment, although the years of fighting witnessed alliance formation among different factions (the minority Tajik-Uzbek-Hazara alliance against the majority Pashtuns in 1992—see Christia, 2009, p. 85).

The Mujahedin factions suffered a direct association with the violence inflected on the civilian population during the 1992-1996 civil wars, which claimed many lives, the exact record of which does not exist. When the mujahedin forces took over Kabul in 1992, they could not agree on the distribution of political power. After a transitional period of six months, Rabbani became the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. In the absence of strong international and regional support for power-sharing mechanisms, Rabbani's government, which had inherited a relatively weak state, faced armed challenge from other mujahedin factions. The intra-mujahedin wars started initially between the Jamiat-e Islami of Rabbani forces and those of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami. However, in the next few years, the war was fought among constantly changing alliances, until the Taliban's takeover of Kabul in 1996. While the war of resistance against the Soviet occupation took place mostly in rural areas, the intra-mujahedin wars

were fought largely in the capital and other urban centers, killing many civilians and almost entirely destroying Kabul.

The Afghanistan Justice Project (2005) has created a report on the deaths and suffering of civilians during different periods of war including the civil wars of 1992-1996 using interviews with victims, their families and neighbors, as well as press reports. The report provides a chronology of the wars throughout the four years and gives a narrative of the crimes, such as indiscriminate attacks, rapes, abductions, and summary executions committed by warring parties, as well as the involvement of all mujahedin parties including Jamiat-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islmai, Hezb-e Ittihad-e Islami, Hezb-e Harakat-e Islami, and Junbesh-e Melli in the civil wars and the crimes committed by those parties. Using mainly witness accounts and press reports, the Afghanistan Justice Project (2005) report concludes that nearly 1,000 people were killed in bombing raids alone.[56]

The violence that took place during the civil wars destroyed the reputation of the Mujahedin factions. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC hereafter) published a report in 2005, which surveyed the respondents' perception of human rights violations during the 23 years of war, divided in three periods: the 1978-1992 Soviet-Communist rule, the 1992-1996 Mujahedin rule, and the 1996-2001 Taliban rule. The results were based on a consultation process comprising of two components: 1) the application of a survey to 4151 respondents to test for their preferences, and 2) the convening of over 200 focus group discussions with over 2000 participants to test for

[56] In a report titled "Blood Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity," Human Rights Watch estimated that tens of thousands of people may have died during the intra-mujahedin civil wars. The Report is published in 2005 by Human Rights Watch.

perceptions. The research was conducted in 32 of the 34 provinces as well as among refugee populations in Iran and Pakistan. The results indicate that 69% of the 4151 respondents have identified themselves or their immediate families as direct victims of serious human rights violations during the 23-year period. In focus groups of 2,000 participants, almost 400 had experienced torture or detention either themselves of someone in their immediate family (AIHRC, 2005, p. 8-10).

The AIHRC (2005) concludes that in the three periods investigated (the Communists, the Mujahedin, and the Taliban), no period was perceived as more or less violent, although there was some variation in the gender composition of violations reported during different periods—with more men reporting violations during the Soviet-Communist period[57] and more women reporting abuse during the Mujahedin period. The same percentage of men and women reported violations during the Taliban period.[58] Respondents were asked "Which parties or individuals do you think are responsible for violations?" The highest number of respondents, almost 700 of the 800, identified the "Taliban--"with over 600 respondents identifying "Domestic Communists" as the second highest. A little over 300 people identified "All Governments in 23 years," while almost 300 respondents identified "All Mujahedin" as responsible for violations (p. 12). For the Soviet-Communist era, the perpetrators were identified as those involved in the Khalq

[57] Female arrests were not unusual during the Soviet-Communist period, however, as women were politically active in the anti-government leftist organizations. The author's mother was arrested in connection with anti-government activities in 1985 and was sentenced to sixteen years of prison. She was among about twenty other females who had been arrested by the state security forces for anti-government activities. When Najibullah came to power in 1986, he soon released political prisoners in a gesture to set himself apart from his predecessors and announced his National Reconciliation (Musaleha-ye Melli) program to enter into a settlement with the mujahedin parties. Sleep deprivation was commonly used to interrogate female prisoners.

[58] When asked "When were you victims of a conflict-related crime?," 16% mentioned Soviet-Communist rule, 18% said Mujahedin period, and 11% reported the Taliban period, with 8% reporting violations in two periods and 17% reporting violations in all three periods (p. 11).

and Parcham factions, members of the intelligence agency, Khedamate Etla'at Dawlati (KhAD), and members of the Soviet army. The participants also identified many Mujahedin faction leaders as the perpetrators of the Mujahedin era (p. 12; see also Rubin 2010, p. 133-35).

The results of the two reports suggest that leaders of old parties were perhaps justified to perceive identification with their political parties as electorally risky and seek to distance themselves from the legacies of their political parties. In fact, the Asia Foundation has carried out a survey directly measuring confidence in specific institutions and organizations, including political parties, for a number of consecutive years. Table 9 provides a comparison of the level of confidence in institutions in six consecutive years. Based on the survey results, political parties are the second least trusted institutions, only slightly more trusted than local militias.

Table 9: Percentage of people who have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in specific institutions and organizations

Institutions	(%) Confidence (Great deal + Fair amount)					
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Afghan National Army	87	88	89	91	91	93
Afghan National Police	86	83	82	84	79	83
Religious Leaders	--	--	--	--	--	74
Electronic media such as radio, TV	84	74	76	70	71	72
Community Shura/Jirga	--	71	69	67	66	70
Newspapers, print media	77	62	63	62	57	69
Community Development Councils	--	64	65	64	61	68
Provincial Councils	--	69	65	62	62	67
Provincial Government	--	--	--	--	--	67
Provincial Development Committee	--	--	--	--	--	64
Parliament	--	--	--	--	59	62
Public Administration	--	61	55	57	57	62
Independent Election Commission	65	--	57	67	54	59
International NGOs	57	65	64	66	54	56
Government ministries	--	58	51	53	54	56
Government Justice System	38	48	46	46	48	55

Municipality	--	48	42	46	46	55
National NGOs	57	59	62	61	55	54
Political Parties	44	39	43	47	43	47
Local militias	31	33	36	37	34	36

Source: Tariq, Ayoubi, and Haqbeen (2011: 69).
The survey respondents (over 6,500 in 2011) were asked: "*Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in the following institutions?"*

After the Political Parties' Law was adopted in 2003, almost all the Mujahedin leaders formally registered their factions as political parties; some formed their split factions and registered them as political parties; and, a few formed brand new parties. The majority of the former PDPA members formed new parties and did not register the PDPA. Nonetheless, with the exception of a few, the leaders of old parties turned away from their political parties during presidential elections by participating as independent or running under a new party label. This pattern was most strongly felt during the early elections. However, by the third presidential elections, although the participation of party candidates fell considerably, the only party candidate in the race belonged to an old political party, which is consistent with the theoretical expectations of this dissertation that the effects of legacies of political parties are most strongly felt during the early elections and that other calculations may take precedence in the subsequent elections. The following section provides a discussion of the political parties that formed after the 2001 transition.

Newly Formed Political Parties

The 2003 Political Parties Law laid down the legal framework within which political parties could operate. Soon after the adoption of the Law, over a hundred political parties registered, the majority of whom were brand new (i.e., not existing as official political

parties before the 2001 transition).[59] A number of international organizations provided technical support and training to the newly formed political parties to help them define their roles in the new political system. However, the institutional and environmental context made it difficult for the new political parties to become important players in post-2001 electoral politics. Consequently, the newly formed parties failed to reach their potential as diverse, national organizations, while their role in national elections consistently waned. This section provides an overview of the status and structure of the newly formed political parties in post-2001 Afghanistan.

Unlike their counterparts in mature democracies, political parties in post-2001 Afghanistan do not aggregate or represent the preferences of the citizens, nor do they function as channels between the government and the citizenry. As demonstrated above, the old political parties, mainly the former Mujahedin and former PDPA, were formed along narrow ethno-linguistic and ideological lines, and they functioned either as autocratic forces or as armed resistance groups (turned-rogue militias). However, the more recent wave of political party formation has taken place in a democratic context, under a political parties law, which states that "the political system of the state of Afghanistan is based on principles of democracy and pluralism of political parties" (Article 3). Consequently, the new political parties in Afghanistan are inevitably different from their old counterparts in a number of dimensions including diversity, commitment to democracy, and policy appeals.[60] Yet, they are similar to old political parties in their

[59] Some parties that are categorized as new were active during the 1960s, such as the Afghan Millat and some leftist parties. However, such parties were not active during the last three decades prior to the 2001 transition. Further, none of those parties ever ruled directly or were involved in the civil wars. Hence, for the sake of simplification, I have categorized them as "new" parties.

[60] It is important to note that not all newly formed political parties advocate democratic values. More recently, some parties have emerged that promote a conservative, anti-West, anti-democratic political

limited role as political actors who aggregate and channel the preferences of the electorate.

The newly formed political parties are diverse organizations as far as gender and ethnicity are concerned. Article 6 of the 2003 Political Parties Law indirectly discourages party formation along ethno-linguistic or sectarian lines, as it states that political parties shall not incite violence on ethnic, racial, religious, or sectarian grounds. Consequently, the newly formed political parties have had incentives to recruit their members from different ethno-linguistic and sectarian backgrounds. Larson (2009, p. 7) reports that the newly formed political parties, what Larson refers to as "new democratic parties," have "a stated commitment to bridging ethnic divides and have not resorted to increasing support networks on the basis of ethnic representation." Furthermore, because most of the newly formed parties recruit the balk of their members from Kabul, their membership is inevitably diverse, reflecting the diversity of the population of Kabul.[61] The newly formed parties also have more women members, some at the senior leadership positions. The gender diversity in new political parties may be as a result of the efforts of international agencies working with political parties often requiring the political parties to send women representatives to training workshops as party delegates, to let women hold positions within or at the head of women's councils or committees within the party, or to

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stance. These radical movements, such as Jamiat-e Islah and Hizb ut-Tahrir, compete well with other new parties in attracting young and educated urbanites seeking a generally non-violence alternative to insurgency. Such parties attract members by providing services such as free internet access and free computer literacy classes. "These groups occupy a vacuum that the political parties have not been able to fill, in that they are at once technologically savvy, demonstrate an interest in and connection with international affairs, are well organized, and speak with a religious authority that resonates with many young Afghans" (Larson, 2015, p. 5).

[61] The NDI (2011) reports that the majority of the newly formed political parties do not have offices outside Kabul and a few other urban centers, suggesting that their political activities, including recruiting members, are limited to residents of Kabul. Although according to the Political Parties Law, they have to recruit their members from at least 22 provinces with 2% from each province, this requirement does not appear to be enforced effectively.

offer opportunities for women to run for provincial council or parliamentary seats (Larson, 2015: 5). Finally, the new political parties, unlike their old counterparts, have broader policy appeals, as they have "made commitments to political pluralism and democratic principles" while denouncing fundamentalism (Larson, 2009, p. 6).

Nonetheless, the newly formed political parties, despite their potential to make broad appeals to the electorate, have faced several institutional and financial constraints that have not allowed them to evolve from young, small organizations to mature, inclusive, and national parties. First, these new parties struggle to compete with old parties in attracting their core, ethnic supporters as the old parties continue to receive the support of their co-ethnics. Second, the new parties do not have public funding to start up and sustain organized activities (open offices in different provinces, advertise their platforms).[62] Finally, the electoral rules have made it particularly difficult for new political parties to gain strength through elections.

Political parties do not receive public funding, which affects the newly formed parties disproportionally compared to the former Mujahedin parties who possess broader networks of financial support and possibly receive funds from regional and international stakeholders. Lack of public funding for political parties makes them dependent on membership fees, which many party members cannot afford to pay, and donations from individual members of the party. For instance, the National Solidarity Movement of

[62] According to NDI's findings, Afghan Millat is the only new party with offices in most provinces of the country. "Afghan Millat is an exceptional party in that it has established mechanisms of connecting with local level supporters in the provinces in which it has offices. Other parties do not appear to have structures in place within the party to incorporate the views of the local members" (2011, p. 20). The report adds that most parties only have permanent offices in Kabul and one or two other provinces due to absence of consistent resources. Although after the 2009 reform in Political Parties Law parties have increased the number of their offices in different provincial locations to collect registration documents, these offices are staffed only by the manager and one or two support staff (2011: 19).

Afghanistan collects a fee of 50Afs per month from those members who can afford to pay the fee. However, most of the members cannot afford to pay the membership fee and the revenue from the membership fees does not cover party expenses (author's interview with Gailani, the founder and Chair of the NSMA). Reporting results of interviews with leaders of new political parties, Larson (2009, p. 19) claims that lack of public funding is considered a principal reason for new political parties' current inactivity and limited contribution to democratization. Among the new political parties, Afghan Millat is the only party that can successfully compete with the former Mujahedin parties regionally and in sending its members to parliament. Afghan Millat's success is partly due to its efforts to establish mechanisms to connect with local level supporters through regional offices. It has gained support in eastern, western, and southern Afghanistan, mainly among Pashtun voters, as it advocates Pashtun nationalism (NDI, 2011, p. 20). The Afghan Millat website is silent on sources of funding for the party. However, the success of the party suggests that it is well-funded.

The newly formed parties have a weaker connection with their representatives in the Parliament because they do not have the resources to hold regular meetings, while the former Mujahedin factions hold meetings in the private homes of the leaders of the parties (Larson, 2009, p. 14). The weak connection between new political parties and their representatives in the Parliament also suggests low party discipline. Party discipline in general is hard to achieve among party representatives in the Parliament because voting is not based on roll calling. When voting on an issue, MPs raise cards of varying colors to indicate their vote choice. The number of votes gets recorded, but the names of the MPs are not noted. Given the nature of the voting system in the Parliament, it is hard

for parties, in general, to discipline their members to vote along party lines. However, old political parties are more successful in disciplining their members than are newly formed parties.[63]

The institutional context within which political parties operate has proved an impediment to party development, disproportionally affecting the new parties. The 2003 Political Parties Law declares that the "political system of the state of Afghanistan is based on principles of democracy and pluralism of political parties" (Article 3). However, in practice, attempts have been made to curb the influence of political parties in elections and prevent party development. In 2005 parliamentary elections, political parties were allowed to nominate or endorse candidates, but those candidates were not allowed to use party symbols on the ballot (Crisis Group 2005, p. 2). As a result, party candidates could not be differentiated on the ballot paper. In 2009, a new law was decreed, which required political parties to register 10,000 members (up from 700 members in the original law) from at least 22 provinces. Consequently, only five parties could register in time for the 2010 parliamentary elections, and 34 candidates (out of 218 requests) were allowed to have their party name on the ballot (NDI, 2010, p. 65-66). The increased membership requirements were easier to meet by the old parties who had established networks of support they could draw on than by the new political parties with no established

[63] Among the former Mujahedin parties, Jamiat appears to exercise the most discipline among its members. This is demonstrated by the relatively high seat share of the party in Wolesi Jirga, which it has possibly achieved by reducing the number of its candidates per electoral district to prevent vote splitting (solving the strategic entry problem). Jamiat was also successful in convincing Abdullah to run under the party's label in 2014 presidential elections. However, the most important show of Jamiat's party discipline came when the 2005 Wolesi Jirga was getting ready to elects its president. Rabbani, the founder and leader of Jamiat, was thought to be Karzai's preferred choice to become the president of the Wolesi Jirga. However, Rabbani stepped away from the elections, allowing Qanooni to stand for the election against Sayyaf of Dawat party, with one condition: Qanooni's return to Jamiat party, who had formed a splinter party (Crisis Group, 2006, p. 10). Qanooni accepted the demand and stood for the election (author's interview with Afghanzai), which he won.

mechanisms to recruit members from 22 provinces. Finally, a new regulation on political parties, decreed in early 2012, requires parties to establish offices in a minimum of twenty two provinces and provide the office addresses to the Justice Ministry. The new parties once again were hit hard by the regulations, as only very few of them appeared to be able to achieve the required number of offices.[64] "Shutting out smaller parties from the political process would in fact marginalize many of Afghanistan's nascent secular, democratic and youth-oriented political initiatives. Many of these groups criticized the regulations in an April 2013 meeting with 30 political parties in Kabul" (Crisis Group, 2013, p. 10).

Many observers of the Afghan electoral politics have blamed the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) for the weakness of political parties, as the system does not give candidates any incentives to join a political party. The government has resisted efforts to change SNTV to a mixed system on multiple occasions, including a proposal in 2013 to change the SNTV system to a mix of SNTV and PR (Crisis Group, 2013, p. 5). Table 10 demonstrates the relative seat share of the old and new political parties in the lower house of the National Assembly, the Wolesi Jirga.

Table 10: Parties' Seat Share in Wolesi Jirga

Party	WJ Seats 2010	WJ Seats 2005
Jamiat-e Islami	**17**	**22**
Wahdat-e Islami Mardum	**11**	**9**
Junbish	**10**	**15-33***
Jamhori	9	N/A**
Wahdat-e Islami	**7**	**3**

[64] The National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan, headed by Ishaq Gailani, for instance has offices in 24 provinces, and each office outside Kabul has two staff members and two guards (author's interview with Gailani).

Mahaz-e Milli	**6**	**3**
Afghan Millat	4	8
Dawat-e Islami	**4**	**9**
Paiwand-e Milli	4	1
Harakat-e Islami	**4**	**1 to 3**
Hezb-e Islami	**1**	**0**
Mutahed-e Milli	1	8
Adalat-e Islami	1	0
Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Milli	1	3
Wahdat-e Islami Millat	1	0
Eqtedar Milli	1	4 to 12
Niaz Milli	1	0
Naween	1	13
Musharakat-e Milli	1	N/A
Jamhorikhwahan	0	0

Source: NDI (2011: 29).
Mujahedin parties are in bold.
**The range of numbers indicates uncertainty over true partisan identities of Wolesi Jirga members.
**** N/A indicates that the party either was not registered in 2005 or did not field any candidates.**

So far, I have discussed the legacies of political parties in Afghanistan. The following section provides the empirical evidence on how those factors inform elites' decisions regarding party affiliation. The evidence presented below provides support for the hypothesized relationship between party legacies and party leaders' affiliation decisions.

Presidential Candidates' Campaigns

The election campaigns in post-2001 Afghanistan revealed significant differences between the approaches of the former Mujahedin and former PDPA candidates on the one hand and candidates of new political parties on the other hand. Regardless of whether they were running as "independent" or under a new party label, the leaders of old parties sought to distance themselves from their past legacies using various techniques, such as criticizing the legacies of their parties, focusing heavily on current issues and immediate

solutions, and emphasizing national unity, human rights, and gender equality.[65] The leaders of new political parties, on the other hand, made programmatic appeals to different segments of the population, i.e. farmers, workers, youth, the educated, women, and environmentalists. The former Mujahedin leaders' participated in presidential elections in significant numbers. However, among all the former Mujahedin leaders who participated in the three presidential elections since the 2001 transition, only one ran under the label of a Mujahedin party in 2014 (Abdullah ran as the candidate of the Jamiat party) while one formed a new party and ran under his new party label. All the rest of the former Mujahedin leaders participated in elections as "independent." Most of the former PDPA members, on the other hand, formed new political parties and participated in elections as the candidates of their political parties. Meanwhile, all the leaders of new political parties who participated in presidential elections ran under their party labels. Based on the platforms and speeches of office seekers, the following section provides a narrative of presidential candidates' during the three presidential elections.

2004 Presidential Elections

The 2004 presidential elections marked the first democratic elections in Afghanistan's history. The field was crowded with eighteen presidential hopefuls. Among those, seven were former Mujahedin leaders, three belonged to former PDPA, and the rest consisted of leaders of newly formed parties, the newly empowered Karzai, returning technocrats, and political newcomers. In this section, I will analyze the electoral strategies of the first two groups, the leaders of the old parties (the PDPA and the Mujahedin) and the leaders of

[65] None of the old political parties are famed for their inclusiveness and egalitarianism. Meanwhile, they are almost exclusively associated with violations of human rights.

the newly formed parties. The discussion is inevitably limited to those candidates whose platforms and campaign speeches are publicly available and those who agreed to be interviewed by the author.

The former Mujahedin Leaders: In 2004 presidential elections, seven out of the eighteen presidential candidates were former Mujahedin leaders. Among those, six ran as independent and one as candidate of a new (splinter) party. In addition to running in elections as "independent" or under a different party label, the former Mujahedin leaders used two additional tactics to keep their core supporters (mujahedin fighters, their co-ethnics) but to not alienate the rest of the voters. First, almost all of the former Mujahedin leaders explicitly signaled a departure from the past and promised new approach and new thinking. Second, to mobilize their core supporters, the candidates strategically used certain images of the popular leaders from the *Jihad* period. For instance, Qanooni[66], Abdullah[67], and Mansoor of Jamiat party used the legendary Ahmad Shah Massoud's photos on their posters to signal their association with Massoud who is very popular among non-Pashtuns and many Pashtuns as the symbol of resistance against the Soviet occupation. Meanwhile, they printed targeted posters for their campaigns in different regions of Afghanistan. For instance, when campaigning in the Northern provinces,

[66] For a picture of Qanooni's poster at a rally, refer here: http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-presidential-candidate-yunus-qanouni-48-years-old-news-photo/51551976

[67] For images of Abdullah's posters during his 2009 Campaign in Kabul, see here: http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-afghan-presidential-candidate-and-former-news-photo/89852048/gallery

Abdullah used images of Atta Noor, the powerful governor of Balkh, to signal Noor's support of his campaign.[68]

In 2004, Yunus Qanooni of Jamiat emerged as the most prominent opposition to Karzai. He formed a new party, the National Movement of Afghanistan later renamed New Afghanistan (Afghanistan-e Naween), and participated under his party label in the elections. Qanooni called his platform the "new doctrine for Afghanistan," in which he emphasized rule by people, merit-based governance, the rule of law, and government's subordination to the national parliament. In his platform he also stressed the importance of a government in which all ethnic groups would be represented, balanced and practical programs for disarmament, providing educational and job opportunities for former Mujahedin fighters, and reducing poverty. He mentioned that if elected he would work on a legal framework for the presence of the international forces in Afghanistan. He emphasized his support for the global peace and respect for the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights, but he added that he would also support the organization of Islamic Conference and would expand relations with Islamic countries (*BBC Persian*, 2004). In his campaign, he particularly highlighted his participation in the 2001 Bonn accords, where he headed the United Front (known as the Northern Alliance in western media and scholarship) delegation during the talks (Sayeedi, 2004), to emphasize his supporting role in the 2001 democratic transition.

Mohammad Mohaqqeq, a military commander of Wahdat-e Islami party, had formed his splinter party of Wahdat-e Islami-e Mardom-e Afghanistan but participated in

[68] Refer to this link for a poster of Abdullah with Atta Noor: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/349936/3923301/1250895268560/IMG_0137.JPG?token=F6tJjUVUNZD67G9%2FmVgVApybVFA%3D

2004 presidential elections as "independent." Mohaqqeq claimed he ran as "independent" in 2004 elections because his splinter party was not registered at the time (author's interview with Mohaqqeq). However, in a book published by the Ministry of Justice in January of 2005, Mohaqqeq's splinter party is listed as a registered party, making his claim highly suspect (Political Parties of Afghanistan 2005, p. 434). In his campaign platform, Mohaqqeq emphasized the need for administrative reform, establishment of a functioning and accountable government that would reduce the distance between the government and the governed, strong judicial system to prevent any abuse of power, and balance of power inside the government as the only means to guarantee stability in Afghanistan. He promised to work towards the fulfilment of the civil society, freedom of expression, political reforms, and increased participation of women in the social sphere. He added that reconstruction of "new thinking" is an important part of his plans because war has not just caused physical destruction, but that political thinking has also been damaged and needs reconstruction (*BBC Persian*, 2004).[69]

Hafiz Mansoor of Jamiat party also participated as "independent" in 2004 presidential elections. The most important campaign promise he made was to change the presidential system to a strong parliamentary system, which will become "the bridge between the despotic regimes of the past and democratic future regimes" (*BBC Persian*, 2004). His second campaign promise concerned national security. He promised to collect what he called "dispersed arms" first and then, after relative security and stability is

[69] The link to a summary of Mohaqqeq's campaign platform can be accessed here: http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/story/2004/09/040928_mj-afg-candidates-mhqq.shtml

achieved, to transfer them to the national army's depots (*BBC Persian*, 2004).[70] To the question of why did he participate as "independent" he said: "I belong to Jamiat Party, but [my party] is my history—not my present." He elaborated that political parties in Afghanistan are generally historic, are not currently active as political actors, and cannot give directions to their followers (author's interview with Mansoor).

Leaders of New Political Parties: In the 2004 presidential elections, three new parties fielded their candidates who participated as their party nominees: Sayed Ishaq Gailani of the National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan, Ghulam Faroq Nijrabi of Independence Party and Latif Pedram of the National Congress Party. Gailani is a former Mujahedin commander. He had the membership of the Mahaz-e Islami party, which his uncle led, until 1984. However, in 1984 he resigned from Mahaz and tried to form his own party. At the time, Zia ul Haq was the president of Pakistan, and he did not allow any other party beyond the seven original Mujahedin parties to form. Gailani had to register his party as an NGO in Peshawar. When the Political Parties Law was passed in 2003, he was the first to register his party under the new law (author's interview with Gailani).[71] Gailani's party platform advocates democracy and respect for human rights, calls for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, and is one of the very few platforms to explicitly promote rights of children (the platform is in author's possession).

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[70] For a summary of Mansoor's campaign programs see here: http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/story/2004/09/040910_v-afghanhafiz.shtml and for the script of his complete platform, see here: http://www.ariaye.com/dari1/candid/mansoor/mansoor.html

[71] Since Gailani's party did not officially exist before 2003, it was not associated with the legacies of the civil war. Hence, I have categorized his party as "new."

In his platform, Nijrabi vowed to bring fundamental social, political, and economic change. He promised to work for class interests, citizens' full rights, and sovereignty of the nation. On economy, he promised to help the agricultural economy to evolve and not be dependent on drug production. He emphasized the importance of including the youth into the government (author's interview with Nijrabi; *Ariaye*).[72] Latif Pedram strongly advocated a federal system. He promised to give more power to the district and provincial councils, while taking away some of the powers of the central government. He called Loya Jirga "a backward institution" even though Article 110 of the Constitution calls Loya Jirga the highest manifestation of peoples' will. In his economic programs, Pedram favored a free-market economy with governmental control and government ownership of certain sectors. Finally, he promised positive gender discrimination to empower women (*BBC Persian*, 2004). [73]

The campaigns and platforms of the former Mujahedin and the leaders of new parties demonstrate both types of candidates' response to uncertainty about voters' preferences. The former Mujahedin leaders tried to appeal to a broad electorate by distancing themselves from the legacies of their political parties, while the leaders of new political parties attempted to achieve their electoral goals by making programmatic appeals.

2009 Presidential Elections

The 2009 presidential field was even more crowded than the 2004 elections as thirty two candidates contested for the presidential post. Among thirty two candidates, only five

[72] Nijrabi's platform can be accessed here: http://www.ariaye.com/dari1/candid/nejrabi/nejrabi.html
[73] A summary of Pedram's campaign platform can be accessed here: http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/story/2004/10/041001_shr-candidate-pedram.shtml

were running under a party label, two of who also ran in 2004 elections. Shahnawaz Tanai and Habib Mangal, former PDPA members, were among the party nominees running under new party labels, while four former Mujahedin leaders, including Abdullah Abdullah, participated as "independent." Meanwhile, Mahboobullah Koshani was the leader of a new political party, the Afghanistan Liberated Party, and ran as a party candidate (alongside Pedram and Nijrabi who had also participated in 2004 elections). This section will focus on campaign strategies of these four candidates.

Leaders of Old Parties: like 2004 elections, 2009 elections also witnessed the participation of leaders of old parties either as independent or under new party labels. Shahnawaz Tanai of the Khalq faction of the PDPA and the Defense Minister during the PDPA rule (1988-1990), registered his party under a different name, Afghanistan's Peace Movement, and participated in 2009 presidential elections as his party's nominee. Like other leaders of the old parties, Tanai sought to distance himself from the legacies of the PDPA first by forming a new party and second by adopting policy positions that would take the focus away from the PDPA rule in the past. In an interview with BBC Persian, he claimed that if he becomes the president, he will ask the foreign forces to leave Afghanistan, adding that there was no difference between the presence of the Red Army and the ISAF forces in Afghanistan. He claimed that like the people of Afghanistan he never agreed with the Soviet occupation of the country. He did not, however, provide any specific programs and plans for how he would govern the country if he won the elections (*BBC News*, 2009).[74] Regardless of his efforts to distance himself from the legacies of his former party, he was not well-received in cretin parts of the country during his campaign.

[74] Tanai's interview can be accessed here: http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/08/090809_a-af-election-tanai-iv.shtml

For instance, in Helmand province he had shoes thrown at him during one of his campaign speeches (*Eslah Online,* 2009)[75], and he won only 0.64% of the total votes. Habib Mangal, also a former PDPA member, ran in 2009 presidential elections under a new party label, the Inclusive Movement of Democracy and Progress of Afghanistan (Mangal participated in 2004 presidential elections as "independent"). In an interview with BBC Persian, he said he was participating under his party label because he wanted to compete under a specific program and not as a personality.[76] Mangal advocated a change from the presidential system to a semi-presidential system (*BBC Persian,* 2009).[77]

Abdullah Abdullah emerged as the most serious opposition to the incumbent Karzai in the 2009 presidential elections. He participated in the elections as "independent," and took pains to emphasize that he never had the membership of the Jamiat Party, with which he was closely associated.[78] However, in 2014, he participated as the candidate of Jamiat party in elections, even though after the 2009 elections he said he will run as the candidate of the National Coalition, a loose coalition of individual personalities and political parties (author's first interview with Abdullah). (Abdullah's decision to run as the candidate of Jamiat in 2014 elections is discussed in the following section.)

Abdullah's campaign slogan for the 2009 presidential elections was "Tagheer wa Omed," which was a direct translation of Obama's campaign slogan in 2008, "Hope and

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[75] The article in Pashto can be accessed here: http://www.eslahonline.net/?p=2179

[76] Mangal's interview can be accessed here: http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/08/090806_ram_election_mangal_iv.shtml

[77] http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/08/090806_ram_election_mangal_iv.shtml

[78] In a Televised interview, Abdullah claimed that he never had the formal membership of the Jamiat party. The author was in Kabul and observed the interview but is unable to find the transcript or video of the interview.

Change." His main campaign promise in 2009 was to change the presidential system to a parliamentary system because, he claimed, a parliamentary system ensures better representation of the interests of the people and provides better mechanisms of accountability that the current presidential system, which is heading towards monopolization of power, does not. He also promised to change SNTV to a mixed electoral system in order to provide equal opportunities for political parties to compete in parliamentary elections. He claimed that he will change the post of governors from appointed to elected in order to change the unchecked influence of the central government over provincial politics. Unlike many other candidates, Abdullah claimed that the relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan is of especial importance and that the U.S. will remain Afghanistan's friend (Abdullah interview with *BBC Persian*, 2009).[79] Abdullah won over 30% of the national votes in the first round of presidential elections in 2009 and qualified to go to the run-off round against Karzai. However, he conceded the elections to Karzai due to security concerns over holding the run-off elections.

Leaders of New Political Parties: in 2009 elections, like in 2004 elections, leaders of newly formed political parties participated under their party labels. Latif Pedram and Farooq Nijrabi were returning candidates from the 2004 elections, and they were joined by Mahboobullah Koshani, the leader of the Afghanistan Liberated Party. Koshani too ran under his party label. In his campaign, he made programmatic appeals, including plans to help the agricultural sector become self-sufficient, inclusion of women in the

[79] The link to the interview can be accessed here:
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/08/090812_ram_abdullah_iv.shtml and here:
http://www.ariananet.com/modules.php?name=Artikel&file=print&sid=11131

society and the provision of maternal leave and benefits to women, and investment in renewable energy as well as sustainable development. Meanwhile, his policies on the issues of national security resembled those of most of the rest of the candidates, when he asserted that there should be a clear timetable for the foreign forces to leave Afghanistan (*Deutsche Welle Dari*, 2009).[80]

Nijrabi's and Pedram's policy appeals had changed little from their 2004 campaigns. In his 2009 campaign, Pedram emphasized bringing the Taliban into the peace process. In his proposed federal system, the Taliban would rule over the southern parts of the country where they are elected. He also advocated the recognition of the Durand line, the disputed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Regarding women's rights, he said his party believed that men and women have equal rights and that this equality should be guaranteed in all aspects of life. Finally, he emphasized the importance of environmental protection and sustainable development (*Deutsche Welle Dari*, 2009).[81]

As the discussion of candidates' platforms and campaigns demonstrates, in 2009 presidential elections, too, the leaders of old political parties tried to distance themselves from the legacies of their political parties, while leaders of newly formed political parties ran under their party labels. The candidates in the two presidential elections behaved consistent with the theoretical expectations laid down in chapter two.

2014 Presidential Elections

[80] Koshani's interview can be accessed here: http://dw.com/p/Iwld
[81] The article can be accessed here: http://dw.com/p/IvSI

The 2014 presidential elections saw a sharp decline in participation of the leaders of new political parties, while the former mujahedin leaders featured prominently—making up four out of eight vote-getting candidates. With the exception of Abdullah, who ran as the member of a Mujahedin party, the rest of the former mujahedin leaders participated as "independent." However, the leaders of new parties were entirely absent from the 2014 elections scene. As discussed above, anti-party measure taken by Karzai government impeded the development of the newly formed political parties despite their efforts to become important players in the electoral politics.

The number of candidates running for the presidential office dropped significantly by 2014 elections, which was perhaps due the changes in the requirements to be able to register for presidential elections. The Electoral Law, which was adopted in 2004, required the candidates to show 10,000 signatures or copies of voter registration cards of eligible voters and deposit 50,000 AFS (estimated US$1,041 at 2004 currency exchange rate) to be eligible to run in presidential elections. In addition, there was no geographically designated area where the signatures could be collected from, e.g. they could be collected from one geographical area and did not have to be representative of the country. Hence, the ballot access laws created little obstacles on the way of those who wanted to run for president. However, the Electoral Law was amended prior to the elections, which required the nominees to submit a far larger number of voter signatures (100,000 signatures of eligible voters from at least 20 provinces, with a minimum of 2 percent from each province) than previous elections and to make a much higher monetary deposit (one million AFS or approximately 17,500 USD). Meanwhile, having to campaign in the majority of the provinces due to the new ballot access laws, campaigns

became increasingly costly, which deterred some candidates from participating. Nonetheless, a total number of 27 candidates registered their candidacies, but only eight candidates were qualified to participate in the elections.

The former Mujahedin leaders who ran in 2014 elections included Abdullah Abdullah, Rasoul Sayyaf, Qutbuddin Hilal, and Gul Agha Shirzai. Abdullah emerged as the most prominent candidate in 2014 elections, winning over 45% of the votes during the first round of elections. For 2014 elections, he focused more on economic programs, promising to create jobs and change Afghanistan's import economy to a self-sufficient producer economy. He identified high unemployment, poverty, and brain drains as the most significant challenges facing Afghanistan and promised to address these issues if elected president (*8am*, 2013).[82] On politics and national security issues, he promised "reform and convergence," his campaign slogan. He promised to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the U.S. and begin talks with the Taliban leadership. However, he emphasized that he will not compromise peace or women's rights to bring the Taliban to the system (*Deutsche Welle Dari*, 2014).[83]

Abdullah did not participate as independent this time; he ran as the candidate of Jamiat-e Islami. However, running under Jamiat's label was not Abdullah's first choice, as in the registration form for the 2014 presidential elections he had indicated that he will be running as the candidate of the National Coalition.[84] He then recalled his form and changed his status from "independent" to Jamiat candidate (author's interview with Afghanzai). He explained his decision as not having "a strong motif" and added that in

[82] The link can be accessed here: http://8am.af/1392/12/06/election-abdullah-program-economic/
[83] The link to Abdullah's interview can be accessed here: http://dw.com/p/1BTwW
[84] The link to National Coalition's website: http://www.nca.af/

2009 the Jamiat leadership had supported his candidacy anyway (author's second interview with Abdullah). Nonetheless, consistent with theoretical predictions of this dissertation, Abdullah's electoral strategy may have changed as a result of changing conditions: by the third presidential elections, new issues started to take precedence as the focus moved away from the legacies of political parties in the distant past to legacies of the Karzai government. By 2014, corruption, insecurity, and unemployment had become the most pressing issues. In 2012, the United Nations reported that Afghans identified corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, as one of the principle challenges facing Afghanistan (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012, p. 3).[85] Consequently, in 2014 candidates focused their campaign messages around fighting the increasing levels of corruption and insecurity, while vowing to create jobs (*Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 2014).[86] Given the change in focus from legacies of previous regimes to corruption, insecurity, and unemployment made running under an old party label inconsequential for Abdullah. Interestingly, however, Abdullah made no particular references to Jamiat platform during his campaign, suggesting that his party affiliation may have been nominal.

Regardless of the changing circumstances, however, some former Mujahedin leaders still chose to distance themselves from their political parties by running as independent. One possible reason may be that none of the rest of the former Mujahedin leaders enjoyed the kind of reputation that Abdullah did as the main opposition figure. Hence, they may have perceived running under their party label as electorally risky.

[85] The report can be accessed here: https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf

[86] The link to 2014 presidential hopefuls' debate on corruption and security can be accessed here: http://www.rferl.org/content/afgha-presidential-election-tv-debates-rferl/25264651.html

Qutbuddin Hilal, a Hezb-e Islami member, ran as "independent" in 2014 presidential elections. He claimed to prioritize bringing peace and work for education, health, and foreign policy (*Azadi Radio*, 2014).[87] Hilal, an ex-Jihadi, told a gathering in Kabul that elections were the best way to bring about political change (*Pajhwok Afghan News*, 2014).[88] Rasoul Sayyaf, the leader of Dawat-e Islami, ran as "independent" and attempted to distance himself from the legacies of the civil war (Sayyaf has been accused of war crimes by many domestic and international observers of Afghanistan). In an interview with Voice of America (February 2013), Sayyaf claimed that except for the times of war, he has not ordered the killing of anybody and that the suffering caused to the people during the civil wars was not intentional. He added that he believed in democracy, women's rights, and freedom of expression as far as they did not contradict Islamic values.[89][90]

Gul Agha Sherzai, another ex-Mujahedin commander and former Kandahar governor,[91] identified bringing peace, improving security, initiating reconstruction projects, expanding higher education, good relations with neighboring countries and the international community among his top priorities in his presidential campaign. In an attempt to distance himself from the legacies of the civil war, Sherzai claimed, "I have practically proved [Sic.] myself as a hero of peace and reconstruction." He also vowed to

[87] The link can be accessed here: http://da.azadiradio.org/content/article/25251412.html
[88] The link can be accessed here: http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2014/02/03/peace-sake-hilal-show-flexibility
[89] Sayyaf's interview can be accessed here: http://www.darivoa.com/content/sayyaf-interview-with-voa-ashna/1852902.html
[90] Sayyaf refused author's interview requests, claiming that he did not want to give interviews to women, which makes it very likely that his campaign promise of equal rights for women was just an electoral strategy to win over female voters and not a genuine belief in equal rights for women.
[91] Though a former jihadi commander, Sherzai's affiliation to the former Mujahedin parties is not known to the author.

defend women's and youth's rights and reopen the schools that were closed down due to security concerns (*Pajhwok Afghan News*, 2014).[92]

The 2014 presidential elections were highly disputed as candidates accused each other of committing electoral fraud. In the first round of elections, no candidate won 50% of the total votes necessary to win the elections, and run-off elections were scheduled between the two top finishers, Abdullah and Ghani, a newly empowered returning technocrat who had served different posts in Karzai's government. Abdullah received the highest percentage of votes in the first round of elections (45%), while Ghani mastered 31.5% of the total votes. Sayyaf, Hilal, and Sherzai each won 7%, 2.75%, and 1.57%, respectively. The run-off elections were marred with accusations by the two candidates of electoral fraud, and the results were not officially announced. After weeks of disputes, demonstrations, and struggle, the two candidates formed the Government of National Unity in which Ghani became the president and Abdullah the Chief Executive Officer.

Like the other two elections, in 2014 presidential elections the leaders of old parties attempted to distance themselves from the legacies of their political parties by running in elections as "independent" and making policy promises that signaled their departure from the past. Despite running under the Jamiat label, Abdullah did not make any references to the party's platform during his campaign, suggesting his lack of commitment to the party's ideology.

Conclusions

[92] The link can be accessed here: http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2014/02/02/sherzai-outlines-priorities-poll-campaign-begins

This chapter argued that in post-2001 Afghanistan elites' decision to either turn to or turn away from political parties can be explained by the variation in historical legacies of the political parties. In Afghanistan, the parties of the past were associated with legacies of violence and civil war during their direct rule in the previous regimes, while new parties did not suffer such negative associations. Consequently, the leaders of old parties used alternative strategies (pre-electoral coalitions, discussed in Coalition Formation chapter) to mobilize voters, while leaders of new parties relied more heavily on their party resources in elections. Meanwhile, formal rules of the game, endogenous to post-transition structures of power and constantly manipulated by the Karzai government, inhibited party development in post-2001 Afghanistan. As a result, the role of newly formed political parties increasingly diminished in national elections to the extent that by the third presidential elections, candidates of new political parties were entirely absent from the scene. Although the old political parties survived the manipulation of the electoral rules, they were unable to transform themselves to national, inclusive political parties. Finally, this chapter analyzed the effects of electoral institutions on party leaders' preferences regarding party affiliation decision and concluded that electoral institutions at best conditioned the choices of the party leaders instead of directly shaping office seekers' affiliation preferences. This was best demonstrated by the variation in decisions of leaders of old and new parties under the same electoral rules.

Chapter 5

Electing Coalitions

"We hold elections, but the president should be Pashtun, and the two VPs should be Hazara and Tajik."[93]

Ramazan Bashardost, MP from Kabul and presidential candidate in 2009

Political parties have not played a significant role in presidential elections in post-2001 Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the law that permits candidates to run as independent, even leaders of political parties have foregone their party affiliation during presidential elections. Chapter Four discussed *why* some party leaders have turned away from political parties in national election. This chapter seeks to explain *how* presidential hopefuls have been able to mobilize the electorate in the absence of organizational, institutional, and financial support of political parties.

In Chapter Two, I argued that office seekers can forego party affiliation (and participate in elections as independent) if they have other means of gathering electoral support, and they perceive those alternatives as electorally more efficient than affiliating with political parties. Those viable alternatives, or "party substitutes," will outcompete political parties in providing electoral goods and services. The kinds of party substitutes available to office seekers depend largely on the context in which they compete for public office. In divided societies, which characterize many emerging democracies, three

[93] Bashardost, two-times presidential candidate and current MP, has been highly critical of the political system in Afghanistan. According to him, the Constitution suffers from inconsistencies.

conditions are conducive to emergence of multi-ethnic coalitions as viable alternatives to political parties: 1) politicized ethnic cleavages, 2) no majority ethnic groups, and 3) patronage-based political systems. When these conditions exist, multiethnic coalitions become attractive party substitutes. In multi-ethnic countries (where politics is organized along ethnic cleavages) with no majority ethnic group, no single group can realistically expect to place their candidate in the national office on its own.[94] That is, "A candidate for national office who happens to be from one ethnic group cannot expect to win votes from other groups through direct appeals. She must recruit other politicians who can solicit those votes on her behalf" (Arriola, 2013, p. 241). Under such conditions, office seekers have incentives to solve the coordination problem among voters by creating multiethnic electoral alliances before each election. I argued that these multiethnic alliances work as viable alternatives to political parties as they provide the coalition *formateur*—the candidate of a multiethnic coalition—with the resources typically provided by political parties.

The kinds of coalition partners that formateurs recruit are typically influential ethnic leaders but also regional leaders and religious figures. These leaders possess high social power, which I operationalize in terms of actors' ability to command the loyalties of a particular segment of the population—what Michael Mann (1986, p. 6) refers to as

[94] In parliamentary democracies of Western Europe, a political party decides to form a pre-electoral coalition if it is not strong enough to win the majority of votes in the upcoming elections (Golder, 2006). When political parties or independent office seekers realize that they cannot win the elections on their own, they have incentives to solve the coordination problem among voters by creating some sort of pre-electoral arrangement that will present voters with government alternatives at election time (Golder, 2006).

"mastery exercised over other people."[95] Hence their endorsement of a particular formateur is critical to increasing the formateur's chances of winning the elections.

The discussion in Chapter two generated two hypotheses pertaining to office seekers' ability to forego party affiliation in the age of mass politics:

H2. Leaders of parties associated with negative legacies are likely to look for party substitutes during elections, while leaders of parties not associated with negative legacies will rely on their political parties for provision of electoral goods and services.

H3. Leaders of old parties will form oversized, multiethnic pre-electoral alliances as viable alternatives to their political parties to compete in elections.

In this Chapter, I provide evidence in support of these two hypotheses using the three presidential elections in post-2001 Afghanistan. The evidence presented here come from newly gathered interviews with key political actors, national and international press coverage, electoral data from the Independent Election Commission, the press briefings from Bonn 2001 negotiations, and secondary sources.

Empirical assessment of the theoretical propositions laid down here requires answering four specific questions. 1) Who are the formateurs and what are their interests? 2) What kinds of elites do they try to recruit in their alliance, e.g. what characteristics make certain actors desirable alliance partners to the formateurs? 3) What are the

[95] An obvious question arises here: if the incumbent did not possess high social resources how did she come to power in the first place? One possible answer lies in the nature of the negotiated transition to democracy, where the person that comes to power may deliberately be a compromise candidate and not the most powerful elite. In the 2001 transition in Afghanistan, Karzai was certainly one such figure. He commanded a very small group of militias and did not have a prominent political past when he was chosen to head the Afghan Interim Authority. However, his incumbent status gave him significant advantage in the subsequent elections to initiate strong electoral coalitions and hold on to power for the next decade.

interests of those who join these pre-electoral coalitions? And 4) why some coalitions are more successful in achieving their goals (i.e. electoral victory) than others?

To answer these questions, I focus primarily on studying the process of negotiations in the initial stages of the transition (the Bonn Accord) and its consequences for various groups of elites, the dynamics running up to the electoral coalitions that formed prior to each presidential election, and voting patterns. Studying the initial stages of the transition highlights the factors that give certain elites strategic advantage in possessing political resources. The strategic advantage that some elites come to possess proves vital in initiating successful coalitions. In game theoretic treatment of pre-electoral pacts in multi-party parliamentary democracies, the unifying assumption is that nature chooses an order in which the parties can propose a coalition (see Carroll and Cox, 2007). A careful process tracing of the negotiations in the transition phase allows us to identify the conditions that give certain actors the advantage to propose coalitions.

Meanwhile, in analyzing the pre-electoral alliances that have formed before each presidential election (2004, 2009, and 2014) we can make predictions regarding the relative electoral success of these coalitions. To empirically assess the success of these pre-electoral alliances in achieving their goals (i.e. electoral victory), I compare pre-election predictions of the success of the major coalitions with post-election voting results. If alliance partners were chosen based on their ability to bring votes for the coalition, post-election voting patterns should be consistent with the initial expectations of the formateur, all else being equal.

Finally, the theory in Chapter 2 predicted that formateurs with most advantage will opt for building oversized coalitions, which is in part made possible by the positive-sum nature of post-transition redistributive politics. That is, the availability of cabinet posts, public offices, and other perks for redistribution allows the formateur with access to resources of the state to build a grand coalition that maximizes its chances of winning the elections. A second reason why an oversized coalition will prevail is uncertainty over voter preferences, which becomes particularly important in contexts where social relations are complex, and cleavages are cross-cutting. The complex nature of such social relations means that no leader may have the full support of their ethno-linguistic or regional group. Ethnic groups may not be concentrated geographically and may find that their regional interests prevail that of their ethnic allegiance.[96] Under such circumstances, a fomateur cannot rely on one alliance partner to deliver the votes of an ethnic group. She will seek to bring in multiple leaders from the same ethnolinguistic group to increase her confidence in receiving the votes of that ethnic group. She will also build alliances with regional and religious leaders who may exercise influence over multiple ethnolinguistic groups. The rest of the Chapter addresses these points empirically.

Formateurs and Alliance Seekers

In Chapter 2, I argued that formateurs are the incumbent and the main opposition, while the alliance seekers are those who endorse the formateurs in return for vice-presidency, cabinet posts, and other perks. Formateur's power in initiating multi-ethnic alliances

[96] In Afghanistan, ethnic groups are dispersed geographically and their allegiances are divided between different ethnic and regional leaders. For instance, Hazaras are dispersed in three parts of the country, central highlands, the northern province of Balkh, and Kabul province. As such, their loyalties are divided among the Tajik leader in the north (Atta Noor) and two Hazara leaders (Mohammad Mohaqqeq and Karim Khalili), while more educated Hazaras have supported the technocrat Hazara returnee, Ramazan Bashardost.

comes from her current or future access to resources of the state; alliance seekers are in demand because they command the loyalties of large segments of the population. Chapter 3 provided evidence of state resources, as well as evidence of patronage based politics in post-2001 Afghanistan, which enable formateurs to use state resources to advance their electoral goals. In this section, I will provide a discussion of alliance seekers' basis of power, i.e. what makes them attractive alliance partners for the formateurs, as well as the evolution of the power of those who eventually become formateurs, in an attempt to identify power ex ante (and avoid the problem of ex post rationalization of alliance formation).

Alliance Seekers: Typically, leaders of ethnic groups or ethnic parties, regional leaders, and religious figures command the loyalties of their ethnic, regional, and religious groups respectively. In order to measure alliance seekers' basis of power, we need to look at the ethnic composition of the country. As the two maps in Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country with geographically dispersed ethnic groups. There are four major ethnic groups, none of which makes up the majority of the population. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group making up around 40% of the population; Tajiks are the second largest group comprising around 30%, while Hazaras and Uzbeks make up around 16% and 10% of the population, respectively (as Table 11 demonstrates, the composition of the 2005 Wolesi Jirga members reflects the ethnic composition of the country). Ethnic divisions in Afghanistan are highly politicized. The four ethnic groups were mobilized into political parties starting in the 1960s, when the former Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Islamist factions, which made up the basis for the former Mujahedin parties, were formed. Those organizations gained in strength over

the next few decades and gained reputation as ethnic parties. Consequently, in the post-2001 context, the leaders of these ethnic parties were the main recipients of their co-ethnics' support. Below, I will briefly trace Afghan elites' social power between 1992 and 2001. I have chosen 1992 as the starting point because the former Mujahedin factions toppled the PDPA regime and took over the state in that year.

Figure 6: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan



Source: Olivier Roy, "The Origins of Afghan Communist Party," *Central Asia Survey,* Vol. 7, No. 2/3, pp.41-57, 1988.

Figure 7: Simplified Ethnic Map of Afghanistan



Source: CNN at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/map.ethnic.afghan.html

Table 11: Ethnic composition of the 2005 Wolesi Jirga

Ethnic Group	# of WJ Members	% of WJ Members
Pashtun	108	43%
Tajik	73	29%
Hazara	39	16%
Uzbek and Turkmen	26	10%
Balochi	2	8%
Nooristani	1	4%
Total	249	100%

Source: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2006), https://www.ndi.org/files/2004_af_report_041006.pdf

The mobilization of ethnic groups into political parties and factions in Afghanistan started in 1960s. The PDPA, which formed in the 1965, split into two factions in 1967, the Khalq (Masses), which was dominated by Pashtuns, and Parcham (Banner), comprised of Tajiks (Bradsher, 1999, p. 4 Giustozzi, 2013, p. 325). Meanwhile, the Islamist party, Sazman-e Jawanan-e Mosalman (the Organization of Muslim Youth) that also arose in the 1960s started fractioning along ethnic lines after its leaders flee to Pakistan and Iran to launch their resistance towards the PDPA regime and later the Soviet occupation. These included the Pashtun-dominated Hezb-e Islami, Ittihad-e Islami, and Mahaz-e Melli; Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e Islami, and Hazara-dominated Wahdat-e Islami, among others. Meanwhile, the Najibullah regime helped create an Uzbek militia group led by Rashid Dostum to fight the Mujahedin. Dostum later called his faction Junbish-e Melli and recruited almost exclusively from among Uzbeks.

However, the armed and trained Mujahedin groups initiated a bloody civil war, which lasted for four years after they toppled the PDPA regime in 1992 (discussed in Chapter 4). During most of the jihad era and the civil war years, ethnicity provided a solid base of military power for the leaders of these factions. After the democratic transition in 2001, this pattern of support continued for the former mujahedin leaders who ran for public office and won the overwhelming votes of their co-ethnics in elections or attracted their co-ethnics' votes for the formateur with whom they formed an alliance. Hence, in post-2001 politics ethnicity provided a crucial source of social power for former Mujahedin leaders, who now needed electoral support of their co-ethnics. This section will briefly trace elites' social power in the period 1992 to 2001.

The year 1992 marked the fall of the Soviet-supported communist regime and the victorious march of the mujahedin factions into the Afghan capital. When the former Soviet Union withdrew her forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the UN sought rather unsuccessfully to facilitate a negotiated transition of power from the communist regime to a coalition of Mujahedin factions. Militarily supplied by the U.S., the Mujahedin groups refused to negotiate with the communist regime, which they forcefully removed in April of 1992 (Rubin, 1995). In the next few years, the mujahedin factions, unable to agree on power-sharing, initiated a brutal civil war, which came to an end in 1996 when the Taliban captured almost 90% of the country, sending the last bits of Mujahedin resistance, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, to the northern provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan. The Taliban forces had effectively put down the Hazara and Uzbek resistance in central and northern Afghanistan, sending the Hazara leader, Akbari, into hiding and the Uzbek leader, Dostum, into self-exile first in Uzbekistan and later in Turkey. By 2001, the military power of Uzbek and Hazara leaders had literally diminished, and Tajik forces were putting out the last bits of resistance. However, all of this changed when, during the U.S.-assisted operation to oust the Taliban regime in November 2001, the Mujahedin groups, now united as the United Front, were rearmed to fight the Taliban on the ground. After the Taliban regime fell, the former Mujahedin leaders recaptured Kabul and the rest of the country. They were also able to reassert themselves as the ethnic and regional leaders they had become during the years of anti-Soviet resistance from 1979 to 1989 and later during the intra-Mujahedin civil wars of 1992-1996.

The anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan took the form of pockets of decentralized warfare organized around ethnic and linguistic cleavages, as leaders of those movements recruited from among their ethno-linguistic groups. However, the resistance that had started as local rebellions was later organized into several ethnic Mujahedin parties: the predominantly Pashtun Hizb-i Islami, the primarily Tajik Jamiat-i Islami, the Uzbek Junbish-i Milli-i Islami, and the Hazara Hezb-i Wahdat, which was founded in 1989 in an attempt to unite nine Shiite parties of the Jihad era. There were a few parties with a religious marker such as Mojaddedi's Islamist Jabha-ye Nijat-i Milli-i Afghanistan and Sayyaf's Wahabi Ittihad-i Islami, and their support for office seekers in post-2001 presidential elections was crucial in winning the votes of certain rural areas.

The various Mujahedin parties were also militarily and financially supplied by different foreign governments with their own political agendas (Rashid, 2000; Katzman, 2014). The outside support that these Mujahedin factions received helped them fight off the Red Army and eventually displace the Soviet-supported communist regime. Meanwhile, the military power of these factions was boosted when, after the dissolution of the communist regime in 1992, they absorbed the military resources (troops and equipment) of the regime. Dostum's Junbish-i Milli, Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami, Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami and Mazari's Hezb-i Wahdat absorbed the respective tribal and regional units (Davis, 1993; Giustozzi, 2004; Sinno, 2015), further strengthening the ethnic and regional ties of the Mujahedin factions.

The boost that the mujahedin factions received from the dissolution of the national army fueled the civil war machine. The 1992-96 civil wars involved almost all Mujahedin factions, as they fought over the control of the capital and other main urban

centers, such as Mazar-i Sharif and Herat. The four years of in-fighting, however, significantly reduced the military power of all Mujahedin factions, making possible their almost complete defeat in the hands of the Taliban in 1998. The Taliban took over Kandahar in 1994 and Herat in 1995—imprisoning Ismail Khan the governor of Herat. They captured Kabul in 1996 and Mazar in 1997. And by 1998, only the provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan were under the control of the United Front.

The civil war era not only aggravated the ethnic and linguistic cleavages as the leaders drew more and more support from their ethnic and linguistic groups, but it added a regional dimension to the conflict, as some mujahedin leaders also established themselves as regional leaders, e.g. Ismael Khan in Herat and Atta Mohammad Noor (aka Ustad Atta) in Mazar-i Sharif. Atta Noor served as a military commander for Rabbani's Jamiat and became the commander of the 7 Afghan Corps after the Taliban lost control of Mazar. In 2004, Noor was appointed governor of Balkh. The regional influence of these elites provided them the kind of social power with which they would bargain their way into pre-electoral coalitions in post-2001.

The United Front (UF hereafter), an alliance of the minority groups (Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks) emerged in 1996 to stop Taliban's territorial advances, and it was formalized as the Shura-i Ali-i Difa (Supreme Defense Council) on October 10, 1996 (Davis 1996, p. 553; Maley 2009, p. 191-192). The UF was seen by many governments (Russia, Iran, India, and Uzbekistan) as the last bastion against the Taliban ascendance, and they were supporting different parties to the UF (Rashid, 2001, p. 200; Coll, 2004, p. 345). The financial support the leaders of the UF factions received from foreign governments helped them pay the salaries of their fighters. So, throughout the years of

civil war, the support base for these parties rested almost exclusively with their ethnic or linguistic groups (see Christia, 2012 for a detailed discussion of Mujahedin factions' bases of power during the civil wars) as they controlled the "employment" and the flow of resources to their co-ethnics.

Nonetheless, by 2001, the Taliban had solidified their control over the majority of the country and had established their brutal regime with the support of the Saudi extremists and Pakistan, which was looking for a viable Pashtun alternative to Hekmatyar who was largely discredited by both the Pashtuns inside Afghanistan (Davis, 1996, p. 184) and by their Pakistani supporters (Rashid, 2001). Meanwhile, the UF suffered a major setback when Al Qaeda killed the renowned leader of the Shura-ye Nazar, Ahmad Shah Masoud (the "Lion of Panjshir") on September 9, 2001, in a terrorist attack (he was succeeded by Mohammad Fahim, his top lieutenant, who also became an important player in post-2001 politics). Hence, at this point, the Taliban remained only marginally challenged internally. However, after the Al Qaeda September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., an overwhelming military attack against the Taliban became imminent as they refused to hand over the Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden.

The Bush Administration sought U.N. backing for military action in Afghanistan. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001 said the Council 'expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks', which was widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban (Katzman, 2014, p. 8). Nonetheless, the U.S. Congress passed S.J.Res. 23, signed on September 18, 2001, which authorized "all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attack that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbor such organizations or persons" (Katzman, 2014, p. 8).

Operation Enduring Freedom began on 7 October 2001, and it was consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and Central Intelligence Agency operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the UF and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces advance by directing U.S. air strikes on Taliban positions (Katzman, 2014; Dobbins, 2008; Rubin, 2013).

The UF forces led the ground offensive against the Taliban forces. Mazar-i Sharif fell on November 9, 2001 to forces led by General Dostum who had arrived back to Afghanistan from his self-exile in Turkey to take part in the ouster of the Taliban regime. The UF forces, despite promises to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—did so on 12 November 2001 (Dobbins, 2008; Katzman, 2014). The Taliban lost the south and east to U.S.-supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The Taliban regime formally ended on December 9, 2001 (Katzman, 2014: 8).

During the three months of military operations to defeat the Taliban, the UF forces were supplied with military equipment by the U.S. to carry out the ground offenses. In addition, the CIA disbursed money directly to UF commanders such as Fahim and Sayyaf, which "ultimately amounted to several hundred million dollars" (Rubin, 2013, p. 18-19). With the money and the military support that these commanders received from the U.S., they were able to strengthen and enlarge their armies and reassert

themselves as important players in the Afghan politics. With the establishment of the Afghan Interim Authority in 2001 and the creation of the Afghan National Army (ANA hereafter), the militias of these commanders were disarmed and reintegrated into the ANA (discussed later). However, the former Mujahedin leaders preserved their influence over their co-ethnics by installing themselves in important government posts and representing the benefits of their ethnic and linguistic groups.[97] In short, while their military power had diminished due to the large-scale disarmament efforts of the international community (discussed in Chapter 3), the former Mujahedin leaders still carried the loyalties of their ethnic, linguistic, or regional groups.

Nonetheless, with the exception of Dostum until recently, no Mujahedin leader commanded the loyalty of his entire ethnic group. This was because ethnic groups were organized in more than one politico-military faction. In other words, multiple parties claimed to represent a particular ethnic group, e.g. Hezb-e Islami splinter faction, Mahaz-e Melli, and recently Afghan Millat are all predominantly Pashtun parties, while Jamiat and recently Congress Party both claim to represent the interests of the Tajiks. Although the Wahdat party splintered between Mohaqqeq and Khalili, the latter does not hold much sway over the Hazara community perhaps because he is too closely associated with the Karzai government, having served as his Vice President since the selections of the Interim Authority, while Mohaqqeq has posed as an opposition figure and has advanced the Hazara interests. Table 12 provides an estimate of key political actors' social power

[97] For instance, Abdul Rashid Dostum campaigned for making Uzbek language Afghanistan's third official language during the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003 and succeeded, while Mohaqqeq made his support of the Karzai presidential bid partly conditioned on changing Daikundi into a province.

based on the size of their community, the degree of influence they exercise on their community, and their region of influence as well as likely foreign backers.

Table 12: Elites' social power in post-2001 Afghanistan

Key Political Actor	Region of Influence	Size of Community	Ethnicity	Likely Foreign Supporters	Influence over community	National Vote Share
Hamid Karzai	S, SE	38-40%	Pashtun	The U.S.	Partial*	55.4% (04), 49.7% (09)
Ashraf Ghani	S, SE		Pashtun	The U.S., Pakistan	Partial*	31.5% (14)
Abdullah Abdullah	N, NE, W	27-30%	Tajik	India	Partial**	30.6% (09), 45% (14)
Yunus Qanooni	N, NE		Tajik	India	Partial**	16.3% (04)
Atta Noor	N		Tajik	Germany	Full***	
Ismail Khan	W		Tajik		Partial***	
Mohamad Mohaqqiq	Central	11-16%	Hazara	Iran	Full	11.7% (04)
Karim Khalili	Central	11-16%	Hazara		Partial	
Rashid Dostum	N	8-10%	Uzbek	Turkey	Full	10% (04)

*Even though Pashtuns make up the largest group in the country, Karzai's influence on the Pashtun community has been limited for two reasons: 1) due to tribal rivalries, and 2) as a result of absence of security in southern and eastern parts of the country, which has negatively affected voter turnout, and the presence of Taliban sympathizers in those regions. Consequently, Karzai could not rely solely on the Pashtun vote to win the elections, and he formed alliances with the other three major ethnic groups prior to each presidential elections. Ghani, a returning technocrat, also does not enjoy the full support of the

**Qanooni and Abdullah's influence among Tajiks has been curbed by other political parties, such as the Tajik nationalist Congress Party, and regional leaders, such as Atta Noor, whose support of Karzai in 2004 was critical in winning him the Tajik vote in Balkh province, and Ismail Khan who brought Karzai the Tajik vote in Herat and Badghis provinces in 2004.

***Noor enjoys a lot of influence in the northern region of Afghanistan, while Ismail Khan commands some loyalty in the western region. Nonetheless, neither of them is a national figure and their influence is limited to their regions not the entire Tajik population.

The numbers in parentheses signify the year in which the individual ran for office. The spaces left blank in this row belong to those elites who have not participated in presidential elections.

In this section, I provided a narrative of the politicization of ethno-linguistic cleavages in Afghanistan and the extent to which different elites command the loyalties of their ethno-linguistic groups. It is worth emphasizing that no single leader can command the loyalties of an entire ethnic or linguistic group due to the complex nature of cleavages in contemporary Afghanistan. As is clear from the discussion above, ethnic, linguistic, regional, and religious cleavages overlap and cross cut each other in contemporary Afghanistan in ways that do not allow monopolization of the social power among ethno-linguistic, regional, and religious leaders. As we will see below, this reality has introduced a significant degree of uncertainty in forming multi-ethnic coalitions, encouraging the formation of over-sized coalitions where the formateurs try to include as many ethno-linguistic, regional and religious leaders in their pre-electoral coalition as possible.

Formateurs: this section will provide a discussion of who formateurs are and where their power comes from. Two types of elites become formateurs: 1) the incumbent who possesses legal (and extra-legal) influence over deployment of the resources of the state (legal influence includes the incumbent's constitutional powers, i.e., the power to appoint cabinet members, governors, and judges, while extra-legal influence may include the ability to manipulate electoral institutions and use state resources to gain advantage in elections). And 2) the main opposition who does not have any power over deployment of state resources in the present, but who has the highest likelihood of gaining access to such resources in the future.[98] However, before addressing the dynamics of pre-electoral

[98] I have chosen to exclude other determinants of power, such as autonomous control over money, land, militias, etc., for two reasons: first, it is extremely hard to find an accurate estimate of elites' monetary resources, share of land, and possession of militias due to extreme secrecy in making such resources public. For instance, rumor has it that Abdurrab Rasoul Sayyaf, a former mujahedin leader and MP and a

coalition formation and its consequences for party development, we need to provide a narrative of how elites reach the status of formateurs. To achieve this task, I will analyze the evolution of elites' relative power during the transition phase to understand the differences among individuals that allow actors to achieve strategic advantage. I use primary and secondary sources, as well as domestic and international press coverage to identify elites' bases of power. The primary sources include published interviews (not conducted by author) of the main Afghan and international actors involved in the 2001 transition, the 2001 Bonn Accord press briefings, and newly gathered interviews by the author.

The 2001 transition to democracy shook up the dynamics of power that existed prior to 2001 and brought to prominence little-known politicians and the returning exiles, while the previously powerful elites saw their basis of power eroding. The transition also presented the newly empowered elites with grand opportunities, as the international community propped their position vis-à-vis the old elites and pledged large sums of money to rebuild the country. Finally, the political arrangements reached during the Bonn 2001 negotiations provided the basis for an institutional framework that would systematically advantage the newly empowered Karzai over the old regime elites. Below, I provide a narrative of the dynamics of the transition, which I have constructed primarily using published interviews of Afghan elites and international officials, as well as the Bonn press briefings. The narrative, however, is consistent with Dobbins (2008), Rashid (2001 press reports), and Rubin (2012).

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presidential contender in 2014 presidential elections owns numerous lands in his birth place, Paghman. However, the land is registered under the name of his relatives, not himself. Second, mujahedin militias were disarmed and reintegrated into the Afghan National Army, which demobilized the mujahedin militias and paid them well to stay in the ANA. Possessing militias became costly for Afghan elites, which suggests that even if they do possess militias, they may be small in numbers.

Bonn Accord and Its Consequences

The Taliban regime was ousted from power on 12 November 2001 through a military operation led by the U.S. air force and carried out by the former Mujahedin fighters on the ground. Upon the fall of the Taliban regime, the UN offered to host a conference in Bonn in December 2001 that would allow the relevant Afghan parties to negotiate the details of post-war governance. The 5 December 2001 Bonn Accord accomplished four objectives: (1) it determined the structure and functions of an Interim Authority; (2) it came up with a timetable for the convening of an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council) to be held in June 2002 to elect the head of the Transitional Administration; (3) it set up a time to hold a Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003 to ratify the proposed draft constitution for Afghanistan; and (4) it proposed that the first nationwide presidential elections be held in 2004.[99] The specific outline set forth in Bonn for the process of transition removed a lot of uncertainty about the post-Taliban governance. The Bonn participants selected the relatively unknown Hamid Karzai, who was heading a small

[99] The results achieved at Bonn were in line with the broad agenda of the five-point plan that Lakhdar Brahimi, the Secretary General's Special Representative to Afghanistan, proposed to the UN Security Council on November 13, 2001. His proposed five-point plan was: "1) The UN would convene a meeting as soon as possible, at a venue still to be determined, of representatives of the Northern Alliance and existing processes, later complemented with representatives of other groups to ensure a fair representation of all Afghan society, to agree on a framework for the process of political transition. 2) This meeting would then suggest concrete steps to be followed, to convene a Provisional Council, which would be composed of a fairly large and representative group of Afghans, drawn from all ethnic and regional communities. The Provisional Council could be chaired by an individual recognized as a symbol of national unity around whom all ethnic, religious and regional groups could rally and could have several deputy chairmen who would conduct its day-to-day proceedings. The credibility and legitimacy of the Provisional Council would be enhanced, if particular attention were to be given to the participation of individuals and groups, including women, who have not been engaged in armed conflict; 3) This Provisional Council would propose the composition of a transitional administration and a programme of action for the period of political transition, to last no more than two years, as well as arrangements for security; 4) An Emergency Loya Jirga would then be convened to approve the transitional administration, its programme of action, its proposals for security, as well as to authorize the transitional administration to prepare a constitution; 5) The transitional phase would result in the convening of a second Loya Jirga, which would approve the constitution and create a government" Brahimi's briefing to the UN Security Council, http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/brahimi-sc-briefing.htm.

group of Pashtun resistance militias against the remaining Taliban forces in Qandahar, as the Chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority. The incumbency status later enabled Karzai to carry out a successful coalition building strategy that would keep him in office for one transitional and two elected terms.

The two most crucial issues during the Bonn negotiations were coming up with an interim administration that will govern Afghanistan until a transitional authority could be elected and agreeing on the presence of some sort of multinational military force in Kabul (and elsewhere in Afghanistan) to maintain security (Bonn Press Briefings, 2001). These two issues were significant in light of what was happening in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. The United Front forces entered Kabul on November 13, a day after the fall of Kabul, despite requests from Washington not to (Dobbins, 2008) and established a *de facto* rule in the capital. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of the UF, was the official Head of State and occupied Afghanistan's seat in the United Nations. Upon entering Kabul, he moved in to the Presidential Palace. Hence, the obvious concern was that the UF will try to hold on to power and exclude other relevant political elites. The Bonn negotiations were expected to address this concern and make possible the transfer of power from the UF to a neutral, reconciliatory party.

Upon settling in Kabul, the UF leadership called on all Afghan factions to come to Kabul for negotiations (Abdullah Frontline Interview, 2002).[100][101] Why would the UF

[100] Abdullah's interview can be accessed here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/abdullah.html

[101] In response to the UF's call on other Afghans to come to Kabul for negotiations, Brahimi pleaded with them on the grounds that saying so made them sound like the Taliban and as such not really serious about negotiating. The UF, under the pressure from the UN, did agree to send their representatives to Bonn to negotiate with other Afghan groups that aspired to taking part in Afghanistan's future government.

voluntarily want to share their power with other factions, especially when they held between 70 to 90 percent of the country at that point? Two possible explanations exist: first, the UF leadership had realized that going it alone is not an option for them any longer. Although the strongest military power in the country at the time, the UF leaders understood that they were limited in maintaining their hold on power. A loose coalition of different Mujahedin factions, who had in fact fought one another during the 1990s civil war (see Christia, 2010 for more details), the UF was unable to defeat the Taliban when they captured Kabul in 1996. So, there was no guarantee that they will be able to prevent a similar situation were they to alienate the international community by insisting on keeping the power all to themselves. They also knew that if they disregarded the international community's emphasis on a broad-based government, they could possibly face an overwhelming military campaign similar to the one that defeated the Taliban in November. The U.S. and the UN involvement necessitated some sort of power-sharing arrangement not only between various factions of the Mujahedin, but also those political actors outside of Afghanistan that were newly mobilized.[102]

Brahimi's interview with Frontline May 4, 2002: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/brahimi.html.

[102] Certain groups of Afghans had started mobilizing outside Afghanistan before and in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban regime and wanted to take part in post-Taliban politics. Regarding these processes taking place among Afghan exiles prior to December Bonn Accord to take part in post-Taliban political arrangements, Brahimi told the Security Council that "Afghans themselves have been talking widely about how to achieve these [peace and security] objectives. The discussions in Rome between the former king of Afghanistan and the representatives of the United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (commonly known as the Northern Alliance), have raised these discussions to a new level. Discussions are also taking place in many other fora inside and outside of Afghanistan, including within the Cyprus process and the Peshawar Convention. In these fora Afghans have been proposing a series of steps and mechanisms for establishing a transitional administration that would pave the way for a stable government. It is time to bring these existing initiatives into a common framework and to broaden the process in a manner that would pave the way for a stable government. A common theme in these proposals has been the emphasis on the convening role of the United Nations to bring the parties together." The Security Council Briefing, Nov. 13, 2001.

A second possible explanation for the UF's behavior could be that its leadership presumed that if talks are held in Kabul, they will have the best bargaining position vis-à-vis other Afghan factions, especially those who had mobilized outside the country, e.g. the Afghan exiles who had mobilized in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban regime and who wanted to share in the post-transition power. The UF's military power was unmatched inside Afghanistan, while the returning elites did not enjoy any (military or political) support inside the country. Hence, the UF's power could have easily intimidated other parties taking part in the negotiations as far as their share of power in the transitional government was concerned. As we will see below, the asymmetries of power proved decisive in Bonn regardless, as was apparent in each group's relative share of the seats in the Interim Authority, with most cabinet positions going to the UF delegates. However, in the next few years, the balance of power started shifting in favor of the newly empowered elites, as the former Mujahedin leaders were removed from their posts, under pressure from the international community, and their militias were disarmed and reintegrated into the Afghan National Army.

The structure of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA hereafter), established at the conclusion of the Bonn Accord, was determined by the dynamics of negotiated transition. On the one hand, the AIA's composition resembled the United Nation's insistence on the creation of a broad-based government that represented most of the major Afghan factions and ethnic groups, and on the other hand it reflected the realities of the Afghan politics at the time. In addition to the UF, three other groups took part in the Bonn negotiations: the Rome Group, a delegation of Afghan exiles loyal to the former king, Zahir; the Cyprus Process, consisted of Afghan émigrés in Iran; and the Peshawar Group, convened by

Afghan residing in Pakistan.[103] The last two groups had mobilized in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and were invited to the Bonn Talks by Brahimi who had visited them in their respective countries of residence. These two groups did not possess any military or political power both inside and outside Afghanistan and resembled interest groups more than established political blocs.[104] The Rome group carried relatively more political clout thanks in part to two particular events.

By early 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud was effectively putting up the last bits of resistance against the Taliban advances in Afghanistan. Having retreated to Panjshir in 1996, Massoud had felt the need not only to form alliances with other warring groups inside Afghanistan, whose political power too was threatened by the Taliban advances (see Christia 2012 for details), but to gather international support in order to be able to defeat the Taliban. At the same time, The U.S. was becoming concerned by the fact that the Taliban were hosting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and wanted to help Massoud in his efforts to fight the Taliban and destroy Al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan. The UN and the U.S. were trying to facilitate discussions between Massoud and the former king, Zahir, who was residing in Rome since his disposal from power by his cousin, Daoud Khan, in 1973. The Rome Group, with the help of Francesc Vendrell[105] was seeking to create a political framework for a national transition in Afghanistan (See Rubin, 2013 for

[103] To my knowledge, there is no information on the ethnic composition of these three groups, while the UF delegation was multi-ethnic. However, it is possible to assume that the Rome Group, given that it was a former King loyalists, was predominantly Pashtun, although there were important non-Pashtun personalities also included in the Rome Group. The Cyprus Process, given that it was formed in Iran, was possibly predominantly Tajik, and the Peshawar Convention was most likely multi-ethnic.

[104] At the conclusion of the Bonn Accord, the Peshawar Convention ended up with one member on the Interim Authority and the Cyprus Process with none. Brahimi, during the closing session of the Bonn Accord on December 5 told journalists that the Cyprus Process did not want to be included in the Interim Authority because they claimed to be a peace group only, with no aspirations for power (Bonn Closing Session, 2001) https://www.unric.org/de/frieden-und-sicherheit/26330.

[105] Vendrell was the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA) from 2000-2001. He also served as deputy to the United Nations' Special Representative for Afghanistan, Brahimi, during the Bonn Accord.

more details). However, when Massoud was assassinated on September 9, 2001, negotiations with the Rome Group were halted until October of that year.

In October, the UF sent a delegation of its representatives to Rome to talk to the royalists about a blueprint for the future of Afghanistan. However, with the U.S. attack on the Taliban becoming imminent after Al Qaeda's attacked on the U.S. on September 11, the UF did not want its delegation to make any decisions about a future government in Rome perhaps because they understood that the Taliban regime will be ousted, and as the only military force in Afghanistan they will not have to negotiate with any outside groups. Instead, the groups decided on a follow up meeting in which fifty people from the UF and fifty people from the Rome Group will come together and form a government. When the UF delegation returned back to Afghanistan, the leadership council of the UF reviewed the decision. The council wanted the follow up meeting to be held in Afghanistan (Abdullah Frontline Interview, 2002).[106] Although the meeting never took place, by November 2001, the Rome Group had asserted itself as a political bloc with strong aspirations for political power in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

A second, but related, event gave Rome Group further say in post-Taliban negotiations: Hamid Karzai[107], who was a member of the group, was fighting the Taliban

[106]Dr. Abdullah's interview with PBS Frontline on April 5, 2002 can be accessed here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/abdullah.html

[107] Karzai came from a political background of no particular solid alignment. He served as the deputy Foreign Minister in the government of Rabbani following the 1992 mujahedin victory, but he was arrested by Qasim Fahim (his Vice-President during the Afghan Transitional Authority and again from 2009 to 2014 when he died of a heart attack) for alleged cooperation with Hekmatyar of Hezb-i Islami who was fighting the Rabbani government at the time. When he was released, Karzai fled to Pakistan where he worked for reinstating Zahir Shah (his family had historically supported Zahir Shah) after he was disillusioned by the Taliban government whom he at first recognized as a legitimate government that will stop the violence. After his father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, was assassinated reportedly by the Taliban in 1999, he decided to work closely with the UF, and travelled to the US and Europe in 2000 to attract support for a Pashtun anti-Taliban movement. After the US-led military campaign to overthrow the Taliban in 2001

forces in Qandahar with a small group of militias when the Bonn talks were taking place. Before September 11 attacks on the U.S., Karzai had travelled to the United States to gather support for an anti-Taliban movement. He entered Afghanistan with the purpose of mobilizing local support against the Taliban on October 8 or 9, 2001. Once inside Afghanistan, he asked for help from the U.S. through the Rome Group and directly by contacting the U.S. embassy in Pakistan. He was not only supplied weapons and foodstuff; the U.S. sent American soldiers and air force to back up Karzai's resistance (Karzai Interview, 2002).[108] Karzai was able to receive the kind of American support that he did because the Rome Group was promoting him as someone who could unify Pashtun resistance against the Taliban, as he was among the very few Pashtun leaders resisting the Taliban at the time. Meanwhile, Karzai's military resistance, however small, gave the Rome group a military arm in Afghanistan and could add to their bargaining power during Bonn negotiations. However, this strategy did not bring the Rome Group the intended results when the U.S. started promoting Karzai as a viable candidate for the chairman of the Interim Authority. The Rome Group intended Karzai to be the military commander not their political leader, as they had envisioned a political role for the former king, Zahir.

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started taking shape, Karzai slipped back into Afghanistan to organize anti-Taliban forces among the Pashtun tribes of the South. Abdul Haq was another commander associated with the Rome Group resisting the Taliban in Qandahar with a small group of militias. He, however, was captured and executed by the Taliban in October 2001, within days of entering Afghanistan. Haq came from a background of political prominence during the anti-Soviet war. He was a commander from the Arsala family in Nangarhar province, and brother of the late Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir, and the previous governor of Nangarhar , Haji Din Mohammad (Rubin 2013). Haq came to Peshawar in September 2001, after a decade of living in Dubai, and was sent to Afghanistan to create an opposition alliance inside Afghanistan against the Taliban (see the Guardian's Report on Haq's execution, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/28/terrorism.afghanistan1). When Karzai entered Afghanistan, however, unlike Haq he received significant military support from the United States in resisting the remaining Taliban forces in Qandahar (discussed later).

[108] The interview can be accessed here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/karzai.html

At the beginning of the Bonn talks, the Rome Group was pushing for a central role for the former king in the future government of Afghanistan (Sirat Press Briefing, November 29, 2001). However, they quickly learned the limits to their power and influence (compared to that of the UF) when Rabbani and other UF leaders opposed giving any significant role to Zahir Shah in the interim or transitional governments. The Rome Group eventually agreed to a ceremonial role for the former king to preside over the Emergency Loya Jirga, but it was also the only group present in Bonn that opposed Karzai's candidacy. They instead suggested Abdul Sattar Sirat as their candidate for the head of the Interim Administration.[109] Sirat, too, had to withdraw his candidacy when he realized that he did not have the support of the UN, the U.S., and the Afghan representatives in Bonn. The UN and the U.S. preferred a Pashtun candidate (Sirat is an ethnic Tajik), and other Afghan groups favored Karzai's candidacy over that of Sirat (see Dobbins, 2008, p. 89-91). Hence, the road was paved for Karzai to gain strategic advantage over other elites aspiring to be the head of the Interim Authority.

The UF, which had entered the negotiations from a position of advantage, realized that their power was not without checks, once the Bonn negotiations got to the point where they needed to make very specific compromises under pressure from the UN, the U.S, and Russia. After the Bonn participants agreed on the formation of an interim authority to rule over Afghanistan for six months before the Emergency Loya Jirga could be held to elect the head of a transitional administration, they were asked to submit lists

[109] Dobbins (2008, p. 89) writes that "Oddly enough, the one faction in Bonn that proved least ready to jump onto the Karzai bandwagon was his own—the royalists, or the Rome group. This delegation contained several older and more experienced personalities who regarded Karzia as a relative newcomer; instead, they fancied themselves for the top position. Their position did not seem to reflect any hostility to Karzai per se but indicated rather the personal ambitions of men who, in their view, had a greater claim on the highest office."

of their candidates for the cabinet posts. Brahimi was then going to create a short-list from those names given to him to fill 29 posts (Bonn Press Briefings). The UF delegation had to make a hard decision regarding the cabinet posts in the Interim Authority, as their leaders were already heading various ministries in Kabul, and the UF had to ask some of them to give up their posts (Dobbins, 2008). Rabbani, the standing president of Afghanistan who had moved back to the presidential palace after the recapture of Kabul by the UF forces, was initially reluctant to give up control over decision-making. On December 1, he gave a press conference in Kabul in which he expressed discontent over the Bonn process. The UF delegation in Bonn, he said, did not have the authority to elect the Afghan president or decide on the composition of the Afghan Interim Authority. He wanted the Bonn process to only decide on the establishment of a national council and the Loya Jirga, but he did not give the delegation any authority to decide on the individual members of each body.[110] Bonn talks stalled after Rabbani called the UF delegates to return to Kabul, which made both the UN and the U.S. concerned about the negotiations breaking down. However, the transition was about to shake up the old structures of power and bring new actors to the political scene. Two events occurred that signaled to the UF leader his waning political power.

The U.S., concerned that the UF delegation may pull out of the Bonn discussions, decided to exert some pressure on the UF leaders in Kabul. Khalilzad called both Ismail Khan and Dostum, the two strong commanders of the UF, to gain their support for the Bonn process, which they gave him. He also called Rabbani directly, as did the German foreign minister, Fischer (Dobbins, 2008). Meanwhile, the Russian envoy to Bonn sent

[110] The report of the press conference can be accessed here: http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/december/dec1rr2001.html

Rabbani a message that he should allow the UF delegation to make the agreement that international community favors. Otherwise, their support for the UF will not continue (Abdullah Frontline Interview, 2002). Hence, the UF leadership found itself increasingly under pressure from the U.S. and Russia to authorize the delegation to reach an agreement in Bonn. Meanwhile, the UF saw some internal pressure from its younger leaders who understood the limits that they were facing and wanted to get the best possible deal for themselves in Bonn as far as inclusion in the future government of Afghanistan was concerned.[111]

The senior members of the UF, Rabbani and Sayyaf, were reluctant to make any concessions to other groups. However, the younger members of the Front, Qanooni and Abdullah, at first tried to convince their senior leadership to make concessions in Bonn. But when Rabbani kept insisting on his position, they were ready to by-pass him and make an agreement in Bonn anyway. When the delegates in Bonn were asked to submit their lists of candidates for the Interim cabinet, Qanooni, the head of the UF delegation in Bonn, called Abdullah to tell him that the expectation in Bonn was to reach an agreement on the Interim cabinet members and asked for his opinion. Abdullah told him to make the deal, but that he should not concede on the Ministry of Defense and the Intelligence

[111] The UF leaders were not just responding to the international pressure in having to make concessions. They also realized that the international community was willing to help Afghanistan's reconstruction. As the Bonn negotiations went on, the UN representatives tried to tie the results of the Bonn Accord to the Berlin Conference (December 5, 2001) and Tokyo Conference (January 2002), where the donor countries were meeting to decide on how much money they will donate to Afghanistan's reconstruction. The participants were constantly reminded that the results of the Bonn Accord were very important for the donors' conferences (Fawzi Press Briefing, Nov. 27, 2001). An Afghan state funded by the international community had a lot to offer, and the UF leaders who realized this opportunity wanted to guarantee their access to the financial resources of the state, instead of international sanctions on an already anemic state, in case they did not want to come to an agreement regarding the transfer of power from Rabbani to Karzai.

Service.[112] He then started pressuring Rabbani to send a list to Qanooni. Rabbani, under both internal and external pressure, created a list of 36 people, on which Abdullah's and Qanooni's names did not appear (Abdullah Frontline Interview, 2002). In Bonn, the original list that Rabbani put together was modified, and Abdullah's and Qanooni's names were added to the list. This move further undermined Rabbani's influence over the process of negotiations and carved a place for both Qanooni and Abdullah in the new political order, which they later used to their advantage when they made their presidential bids in 2004 and 2009, respectively.

In deciding the composition of the Interim Authority, Brahimi had to create a short list out of 150 names that each Afghan delegation provided him to populate the Interim cabinet (Fawzi Press Briefing, 2001). Qanooni, the head of the UF delegation, demanded not only the three most important ministries of Foreign, Interior, and Defense, but also two-thirds of the seats on the Interim cabinet. His claim was based on the fact that the UF had many factions, each of which expected to be represented in the Interim government. The representatives of Iran, and Russia, as well as Khalilzad tried to pressure Qanooni to moderate his demands. He finally agreed to give up three seats, while three new ministries were created to include members of other delegations into the Interim cabinet. At the end, 29 ministries were divided up among the three delegates (the Cypress process did not receive any seats in the Interim cabinet), 16 of those seats went to the UF (Dobbins, 2008, p. 95-96). The three men from the strong Panjshiri faction of the Jamiat-Islami, Abdullah, Qanooni, and Fahim, were able to secure for themselves the three "power" ministries of Foreign, Internal, and Defense respectively. When Ahamd

[112] In fact, on November 29, two days into the Bonn meeting, Qanooni said in a press briefing that they would like to come up with the names of people occupying the interim administration (Qanooni Press Briefing 2001).

Fawzi, Brahimi's spokesman at Bonn, was asked about whether some groups will carry more weight in the short list Brahimi was trying to produce, Fawzi replied:

> Question: Would all the groups be equal partners in the interim administration, or some groups would be more equal? Answer: Well, as we know, in politics some are more equal than others. And I can't see how you can avoid that here. You have groups that carry a little more representative weight than others. I don't know what the quota system will be yet. The most important thing that we are trying to achieve is ethnic balance (Press Briefing, December 4, 2001).

Of the remaining seats, eight went to the Rome Group, three to independent individuals, and one to the Peshawar Convention. Rabbani was not given any official position in the Interim Authority, but his name was mentioned in the official text of the Bonn agreement in return for his compromise to step down and transfer power to Hamid Karzai who was elected the Chairman of the Interim Authority.[113]

Even though the UF succeeded in claiming more than half of the cabinet posts on the Interim Administration, most of its members were not able to keep their political power in the years that followed. The most important event in negatively affecting the political power of the former Mujahedin leaders in general was the process of disarmament of the mujahedin fighters and their reintegration into the national army. Once their militias were demobilized and disarmed, they no longer could pose a military threat and could be relatively easily removed from their posts or assigned to less important positions—outcomes that the international community desired, given the violence associated with the Mujahedin's direct rule in the 1990s.[114] What happened in

[113] The official text of the Bonn Agreement can be accessed here: http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm

[114] In the Afghan Transitional Administration, before the disarmament programs were underway, Karzai was under pressure from the UN to remove Fahim, one of three Panjshiris, from his post as the Defense

Bonn is consistent with the literature on regime transitions, which claims that strong outgoing elites are able to negotiate favorable transition outcomes for themselves (Aguero, 1992), but that what they get may last only for a short time (Geddes, 1999). Nonetheless, the basis of former Mujahedin leaders' social power remained largely intact as they kept the trust and loyalties of their ethno-linguistic groups or regional constituents.

Among the former Mujahedin leaders, Abdullah was the only exception who managed to preserve, and in some ways increase, his political power in the years following the 2001 transition. Due to his previous posts as an advisor to Massoud during the Jihad era, Chief of Staff and Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry from 1992 to 1996, Deputy Foreign Minister in 1997, and acting Foreign Minister in 1999, and his ability to speak English fluently, Abdullah played a pivotal role during the transition as he was the key negotiator between the UN and his United Front. Never having been an official member of the Jamiat party and serving diplomatic posts throughout the jihad and civil war years, Abdullah did not come with the baggage that other mujahedin leaders did. That is, unlike most other Mujahedin leaders, he was not directly associated with the violence committed under the Mujahedin rule. He served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs during both the Interim Authority and Transitional Administration but resigned from his position in 2005 and distanced himself from the increasingly unpopular Karzai government. In 2009, he formed the Coalition of "Change and Hope" and ran against

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Minister. However, Fahim was too powerful at the time, possessing a significant militia force that he could mobilize effortlessly. Consequently, instead of removing Fahim from his post, Karzai moved Qanooni from the Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Education (author's interview with Rubin). However, in running up to the 2004 presidential elections, after disarmament had already started, Karzai did not make Fahim his vice-presidential running mate, and he was removed from his post as the Minister of Defense after Karzai's victory in the elections.

Karzai in presidential elections, coming second with over 30% of the votes. Ever since, he has established himself as the main opposition figure, although he was not able to match Karzai's political power as the incumbent. Karzai gained strategic advantage when he was selected the head of the Interim Authority and consequently gained access to resources of the state. Using those resources, he was able to win the election for the head of the Transitional Authority and exercise significant influence over post-transition institutional design. The institutions that were chosen further solidified his power and allowed him to affect the alternatives available to his competitors.

Karzai's coming to power, however, was not entirely accidental. After the fall of the Taliban regime, the UN and the U.S. were concerned over who will head the Afghan state. The U.S., in particular, did not favor an UF leadership for the future of Afghanistan and was promoting the idea of a broad-based government preferably headed by a Pashtun (Haass Frontline Interview).[115] Karzai had visited the U.S. in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, and was perceived as a reconciliatory figure (Rice Frontline Interview, 2002).[116] However, the U.S. did not directly promote Karzai's candidacy for the future government of Afghanistan. When Dobbins met with Abdullah on 18 November 2001 to talk about holding a conference in Bonn, he told him that the U.S. was as much a part of the victory over the Taliban as were the UF, and thus should have a say in who will be the head of the Afghan government. He also emphasized that it was important to come to a political agreement regarding the transfer of power from the UF, who had already established a *de facto* rule over Kabul, to a conciliatory figure. Abdullah

[115] The interview can be accessed here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/caftertaliban.html

[116] The interview can be accessed here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/rice.html

assured Dobbins that the UF was ready for a transfer of power to a Pashtun leader, and he mentioned Karzai specifically as a viable candidate (Abdullah Frontline Interview, 2002). Abdullah and other UF leaders knew Karzai from the time when he had briefly served as the Deputy Foreign Minister in Rabbani's government, and they were aware of the resistance he was trying to put up against the Taliban in Qandahar. Karzai neither had a sizeable militia force (compared to UF itself) nor was he politically influential inside Afghanistan. The UF leaders took him as someone they could push around and control if he became the head of the transitional government, while the UF would look good in the eyes of the U.S. and the international community for its willingness to let go of the executive power. As it turned out, however, the UF leaders made a gross miscalculation regarding Karzai, who emerged as a very important player in post-transition Afghanistan. Being elected the head of the Interim Authority and later the Transitional Administration, Karzai became the elite with the most advantage to build the strongest electoral coalitions prior to each presidential election (2004 and 2009). Consistent with the theoretical expectations specified earlier, Karzai who did not possess significant social resources (as he was very little known in Afghan politics) used his political power to attract important alliance partners who helped him win the two national elections.

Karzai's political power came from his access to resources of the state. Although the Afghan state was significantly weakened by 2001 due to decades of war, and the national army was virtually non-existent, the international involvement in rebuilding the Afghan state and the Afghan national army effectively changed that dynamic, as discussed in Chapter 3. The military and financial support that the Afghan state received after the 2001 transition turned the state into the most important player in Afghan politics

and the largest provider of jobs and services. Meanwhile, when designing the institutions (the constitution, the electoral rules, the political parties law), Karzai turned the state into a highly centralized political entity (also discussed in details in Chapter 3), which made access to resources of the state further concentrated in the hands of the president. Karzai would later use the political office and the economic resources available to him to build strong alliances with the returning technocrats, to please his international supporters, and with certain Mujahedin leaders and regional power holders, which served two purposes. On the one hand, Karzai was able to minimize the potential threat to the stability of his rule by bringing into the system powerful groups and individuals. On the other hand, his coalition building strategy with such elites would bring Karzai the votes of those leaders' ethnic or regional constituencies in 2004 and 2009 presidential elections.

Karzai's access to political and financial resources of the state was guaranteed when he was elected the Head of the Transitional Administration during the Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council), and it was not until 2009 presidential election that a relatively strong opposition figure, Abdullah, challenged his reelection bid. The Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ hereafter), was planned to be held in June 2002, according to the agreed-on timetable in Bonn. A 1500-member delegation, ELJ was supposed to elect the Transitional Administration that would govern for 18 months before the first countrywide presidential elections would determine the president of Afghanistan. The 1500 delegates to ELJ consisted of 450 people appointed by various interest groups, and the rest locally elected members from the (at the time) 32 provinces of Afghanistan. Four different groups took part in the ELJ: Pashtun tribal leaders from the south and east (who comprised more than 300 of the 1000 elected delegates), Tajiks from the Panjshir valley,

Jihadis or the ex-Mujahedin leaders, who preferred a strict religious state and were against the presence of any foreign force, and the modernizers and technocrats (Rashid 2006). This kind of grouping signaled an important shift in coalition dynamics. The UF started to show signs of fragmentation, as the Panjshiri faction of Shura-i Nazar looked after its own interests and not the collective interests of the UF, although the rest of the Mujahedin leaders still represented a specific bloc. Tribal and regional distinctions too started to emerge as separate interests. Finally, the technocrats emerged as an important group that would play a significant role in the future coalitions.

At the ELJ, Karzai was the only feasible candidate to head the Transitional Administration, once Rabbani and Zahir Shah[117] announced their withdrawal as candidates for the head of the state, and Zahir Shah pledged allegiance to Karzai. The international community had its own preference for a strong executive, preferably Karzai, who could act as both head of the state and the executive president, rather than allowing

[117] Zahir Shah was initially considered a candidate for the head of the Transitional Government and Pashtuns as well as some Mujahedin supported his role as an executive President and as the Head of the State. However, Rashid (2002) writes, this appeared contrary to the deal that Zahir Shah was presented with three weeks before the Loya Jirga by Karzai, the Tajik faction within the cabinet, and the international community: that he accept the ceremonial role of 'Father of the Nation.' The former king now hesitated to accept the deal, as he was encouraged by his supporters in the so-called Rome Group and some of his family members to become the head of the state and endorse Karzai as his prime minister. Pashtun tribal leaders as well as some minority ethnic group representatives, who felt marginalized by the Panjshiri faction of UF that controlled not only the army, the police, the intelligence service and the state run media, but also held significant positions in Karzai's cabinet, soon joined the supporters of the former King. Some other non-Pashtun elites, including the Uzbek strong man and the leader of the Junbish party, Dostum, who commanded 100 elected delegates in the Loya Jirga, started giving their support to Zahir Shah, as did some elected delegates from Herat and some Hazaras from central Afghanistan. However, he stepped down once Karzai, the 'power ministers' (Abdullah, Qanooni, and Fahim), the Americans, and the international community asked him to withdraw his candidacy. On June 10, 2002 Zahir Shah announced that he withdraws his candidacy and endorses Karzai's candidacy instead (Sebenius, 2004; Rashid, 2002). Zahir Shah's forty-year reign from 1930s to 1970s was marked with relative peace and prosperity, and he appeared as an inevitable candidate. However, the worries over Zahir Shah's candidacy were numerous and shared by a number of people: some worried that he was old and would not be an effective executive; others thought he was polarizing; some were concerned that his election as head of the state will unleash competition within the Rome Group members for premiership and policy making influence and as a result undermine the government (Rashid, 2002). His article can be accessed here: http://www.democraticfundamentalism.org/globalization/countries/afghanistan/20020611rashidrellirga.htm

for two centers of power under a president and a prime minister (Rashid 2002). Karzai won the ELJ elections with 80% of votes cast by a secret ballot[118] and was now in a position to make political deals with different groups of elites to select his cabinet members.

The Panjshiri faction of the UF (Shura-i Nazar, SN hereafter) was growing more and more reluctant to make any concessions on the posts its leaders held in the Interim Cabinet. On June 8, 2002 the Defense Minister Fahim said the present cabinet should be endorsed by the Loya Jirga without any major changes. Karzai understood that alienating the Panjshiris was not to his best interest, as they still enjoyed significant military power and political influence. At the end, despite all the discontent expressed by the leaders of other ethnic groups and Mujahedin factions, Karzai kept most of the SN leaders in their positions. In return, both Abdullah (who continued his post as the Foreign Minister) and General Fahim (who not only kept his position as the Defense Minister, but also became one of the five vice-presidents) supported Karzai's presidency and campaigned for him to become the Head of State.

The Bonn Talks had produced an institutional framework that served Karzai's political ambitions well. In an attempt to help create a broad-based government, five vice-chair posts were created and were filled with leaders of ethnic and minority groups. This feature allowed for a Pashtun president surrounded with vice-presidents from other ethnic or minority groups. Karzai used those five vice-presidential posts (and added a number of new positions) as bargaining chips to make deals with various individuals and

[118] There were two other contenders, Masouda Jalal, a medical doctor with no political background, and Mahfoz Nadai, an Uzbek army officer, poet, and deputy government minister. Both candidates had gathered enough signatures to be on the ballot but won 11% and 7% of the votes respectively (Gupwell, 2002).

groups to attract their support in return for the position. The Vice-Presidents in the Transitional Administration included Fahim who was the most powerful Tajik, Karim Khalili who was an ethnic Hazara and one of the main leaders of Wahdat party, Hedayat Amin Arsala who was an Afghan returnee associated with the Rome Group, Abdul Qadir who was an ethnic Pashtun with significant influence in eastern Afghanistan, and Nematullah Shahrani who was an ethnic Uzbek and a scholar. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Karzai insisted to include this feature in the Constitution as it was being drafted. He did succeed in keeping the vice-presidential posts, although the number was reduced to two instead of five posts. The dynamics of alliance building among the presidential candidates and key individuals, who would occupy cabinet seats, during the ELJ foreshadowed how electoral politics will be conducted before each presidential election in the years that followed.

To sum up, this section sought to analyze the evolution of elites' relative power during the transition phase in order to understand why some individuals achieve strategic advantage over others, and how they use that advantage to affect the alternatives available to other persons or groups. In order to do so, I provided a narrative of the dynamics of the 2001 transition in Afghanistan and how the transition shook up the old structures of power and brought to prominence previously unknown personalities. The section demonstrated that asymmetries of political power are a decisive factor in determining elites' capacity to build strong, multi-ethnic coalitions. I identified the incumbent and the main opposition as those elites with high political power by virtue of their current and future access to resources of the state, respectively. The following

section discusses in details the coalitions that formed before each presidential election since the 2001 transition.

Coalition Formation Dynamics in 2004 Presidential Election

By the time the first nationwide presidential election of 2004 was under way, a number of important events had occurred. First, ISAF had fully secured control over Kabul and was expanding beyond the capital to north of Kabul, as more and more militias were being disarmed and reintegrated into the Afghan National Army. Second, a Constitutional Loya Jirga adopted the Constitution of Afghanistan in early January 2004, which gave sweeping powers to the president and created a highly centralized state. Third, the Afghan Transitional government continued to receive aid from donor countries for reconstruction, which helped strengthen the economic basis of the central state and paid for the training and equipping of the National Army. Meanwhile, Karzai was receiving covert cash from the C.I.A. to buy off loyalty and keep the so-called warlords in line.[119] As the elections were under way, no candidate enjoyed both high political *and* social resources to win decisively under majoritarian electoral rules.[120] Consequently, candidates embarked on coalition building strategy to mobilize electoral support. Karzai's status as the head of the Transitional Authority, which was elected for two years, allowed him to use the resources of the state to build coalitions with ethnic and regional leaders. Meanwhile, a number of former Mujahedin leaders, returning technocrats, and

[119] New York Times reported on April 28, 2013 that the Afghan government has been receiving "wads of American dollars packed into suitcases, backpacks and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags" from the C.I.A. for over a decade. Reportedly, the former and current Karzai advisors have said that the money has been used to pay off warlords, lawmakers, and others on whose support Karzai depends. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/world/asia/cia-delivers-cash-to-afghan-leaders-office.html

[120] Even the incumbent Karzai did not possess high social resources, as he was previously not known to people and did not command the loyalties of any particular community. He came to power under exceptional circumstances that did not require him to be politically and socially strong.

newcomers participated in the elections (discussed in Chapter 2) and tried to build counter-alliances to that of Karzai's. However, asymmetries of power proved decisive in determining candidates' capacity to form strong pre-electoral coalitions.

In Chapter 2, I argued that alliance seekers prefer to be part of a coalition that offers the most perks and is most likely to succeed. Based on this assumption, every alliance seeker should prefer to enter the coalition of the formateur with highest advantage. In the 2004 presidential elections, it was not difficult to identify the most viable candidate in the race. While every candidate could potentially be a formateur, Karzai's access to resources of the state made him the formateur with the most advantage in forming pre-electoral coalitions—an advantage no other elite enjoyed. Hence, all the major alliance seekers, those who aspired to public office, material benefits, or non-material demands, should have preferred to be part of Karzai's alliance. However, coalition formation is driven by both supply *and* demand. Karzai had a large pool of alliance seekers to choose from in order to guarantee him a decisive victory. However, his choice of the alliance partners was in large part a function of his competitors' extent of national support. That is, he tried to choose alliance partners who could balance against other important presidential contenders. Hence, he pursued an ambitious alliance formation strategy, and the strategy he used brought him 55.4% of the votes on October 9, while the most serious challenger to Karzai, Qanooni, came a distant second with only 16.3% of the national vote. Even though Qanooni attempted to build a strong counter-alliance, Karzai was able to sway most of his potential supporters, including Atta Noor of Jamiat-e Islami (who was appointed the governor of Balkh) and Abdullah (who remained in his post as Foreign Minister).

There were two kinds of alliance seekers Karzai could recruit in his coalition: 1) the former Mujahedin leaders, most of whom were also leaders of ethno-linguistic groups or had regional influence; and 2) the retuning technocrats whom the international community favored (Salahuddin and Motevalli, 2009),[121] but did not possess any support base inside Afghanistan and could not offer electoral support to the formateur. Karzai recruited from both groups and built an oversized coalition, which is consistent with the theoretical expectations laid down in Chapter 1. The theory predicted that post-transition politics is positive-sum, as the new democratic regime receives monetary assistance from international stakeholders and political posts become available for redistribution. As a result the new system offers new opportunities due to increased state capacity and economic growth. Karzai used those new opportunities available to him to recruit the former Mujahedin leaders for their electoral support and the returning technocrats to keep the west content.[122] The following section will discuss in details the alliances Karzai made with both the former Mujahedin leaders and the technocrats.

Karzai-Ex-Mujahedin Alliance: For Karzai to win 50% plus 1 vote in national elections, it was necessary to attract the electoral support of former Mujahedin leaders who commanded the loyalties of their ethno-linguistic groups or regional constituencies. Some of the former Mujahedin leaders, such as Qanooni, Mohaqeq, and Dostum,[123] were

[121] The article can be accessed here: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-idUSTRE5BI0J120091219

[122] As it turned out, the returning technocrats were not assigned to offices based on their expertise. For instance, Ghani, an anthropologist by profession, was appointed Finance Minister. Meanwhile, some technocrats have been accused of corruption by various sources.

[123] In a way, the 2004 presidential elections provided an opportunity for some elites to showcase the extent of their national appeal. Dostum and Muhaqqeq, for instance, knew that their chances of winning the elections were slim, given that they both were leaders of minority ethnic groups and lacked the political power to build large coalitions. However, they participated in elections to establish themselves as solid voting blocks. Neither Mohaqqeq nor Dostum participated in the subsequent presidential elections. However, they were among the most demanded alliance partners in the next two presidential elections. In

challenging Karzai in the elections, which could potentially claim the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek votes respectively. Karzai had to find alliance partners that could balance out the votes that will go to the former Mujahedin leaders participating in the elections. Using the financial and political resources at his disposal, he made political deals with a number of these leaders to do just that. His presidential ticket and the composition of his first elected cabinet shed light on the strategy he used to garner 50% plus more than one votes on the eve of the election.

Karzai's 2004 presidential ticket included two vice-presidential candidates: Ahmad Zia Masoud, brother of late Ahmad Shah Masoud, who essentially replaced General Fahim as a Panjshiri Tajik in Karzai's team, and Karim Khalili of Hazara Wahdat Party. He picked Masoud to balance against his most viable contender, Qanooni[124], who was well-known in Afghan politics and had a less controversial background than Dostum who was alleged of human rights abuses. He was also more viable than Mohaqqeq, who was from a historically underrepresented minority group in Afghan politics, with no appeal to none-Hazara voters. Karzai's strategy may have paid off in Tajik-dominated Badakhshan, where Qanooni was expected to win by a large

2009, Karzai brought Dostum back from exile in return for his electoral support, and he swayed Mohaqqeq from becoming Abdullah's Vice-presidential candidate by promising him five ministerial positions as well as changing Diakundi from a district to a province.

[124] Yunus Qanooni was the UF chief negotiator in Bonn in 2001 and served as the Interior Minister in the Interim Administration and the Education Minister in the Transitional Administration. He established his own political party, Hezb-e-Nuhzhat-e-Mili Afghanistan (Afghanistan's National Movement, later named Afghanistan-e Naween or New Afghanistan) to run against Karzai in 2004. A native Panjshiri Tajik, he led in north eastern provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Samangan, Panjshir, Kapisa, and Parwan, and the central province of Ghor in 2004 presidential elections. However, he won only a meager 16.3% of the total votes. This may have been partly due to Karzai's popularity in 2004, but it could also have been a result of his inability to recruit important alliance partners that would help him electorally. According to Royesh (2012: 404-05, translated from Farsi), Qanooni tried to persuade Mohaqqeq to join his team instead of running in the elections independently, but Mohaqqeq rejected his offer. Nonetheless, Mohaqqeq's decision may have been affected by the perceived low viability of Qanooni as a contender for the national vote. Royesh, a Mohaqeq campaign activist in 2004 elections, also writes that Mohaqqeq tried to replace Khalili on Karzai's presidential ticket, but Karzai went with Khalili instead. At the end, Mohaqqeq decided to participate in the elections as a presidential contender.

margin but ended up winning 39.8% of the vote, while 30.1% went to Karzai. Qanooni did however win Panjshir with 95.1% and Parwan with 57.7% of the total votes.

Karzai's choice of the Hazara leader, Khalili, as his second vice-president was to balance against Mohaqqeq who was expected to win the Hazara votes in central provinces of Bamyan and Daikondi (although Balkh has a significant Hazara population, Dostum was expected to claim the northern Hazara votes due to his regional influence in the north). Nonetheless, Mohaqqeq claimed victory in Central Afghanistan by winning Bamyan with 76% and Daikondi with 84% of the vote. Khalili, who historically had more influence over the Hazaras living in Kabul (see Christia, 2012), may have helped Karzai win the Hazara vote in the capital (he won Kabul with 53% of the vote while Mohaqqeq came third, after Qanooni, winning only 17.9% of the votes).

Perhaps the most important deal that Karzai made was with Atta Mohammad Noor, an influential Tajik UF commander who was the governor of Balkh province during Rabbani's government in the 1990s. Karzai promised to appoint Noor as the governor of Balk, and Noor publicly supported Karzai's candidacy during the 2004 election (Mukhopadhyay, 2009). Noor was supposed to bring Karzai the northern vote, where he challenged Dostum's influence. Karzai led in Balkh province with 29.8% and Kunduz with 45.6% of the votes (Qanooni and Dostum won 25.8% and 23.4% of the votes respectively in Balkh). Nonetheless, Dostum swept through his home province of Jozjan (78%), Faryab (72.9%), and Sar-i Pul (47.7%).

Noor's support of Karzai was important in another respect: it demonstrated Karzai's viability as a candidate relative to his rival Qanooni, whom Noor did not support

despite the fact that they were both members of Jamiat party. This was also demonstrated by Abdullah's support of Karzai in return for the promise of keeping his post as the Foreign Minister. In conformity with the theoretical expectations laid down in the first chapter, both Noor and Abdullah supported Karzai's presidential bid because he was the most viable candidate to win the elections given his access to the kinds of political and financial resources that Qanooni, Mohaqqeq, and Dostum did not have. Karzai used the resources at his disposal to also ensure his victory in electorally important provinces such as Herat and Badghis.

Leading up to the presidential election of 2004, influence over Herat was contested between Herat's governor, Ismael Khan, and his archrival, Amanullah Khan, while the central government did not have a strong control over the province. The rivalries between the two commanders took the form of military attacks, to the extent that the ANA and the ISAF forces moved in to Herat to take control of the situation and help a consistently weakened Ismael Khan. Knowing Ismael Khan's popularity in Herat, Karzai did not want to remove him from his post as the governor, something that his administration wanted to do for a while. However, after Amanullah Khan's military attacks on Ismael Khan's forces, Karzai had to remove Ismael Khan from his post. Nonetheless, Karzai insured a victory in Herat for himself by appointing Ismael Khan the Minister of Water and Energy (Waldman, 2004). Karzai won Herat, which saw the second largest voter turnout, with 57.8% and Badghis with 60.7% of the votes.

Karzai's strategy to form alliances with various former mujahedin leaders helped him win the 2004 elections. He swept through the Pashtun dominated eastern and southern provinces, won Kabul with 53.0% of votes, and won the elections with 55.4% of

the total vote, while Qanooni finished second with a meager 16.3% of votes. Mohammad Mohaqqeq and Rashid Dostum came third and fourth by winning 11.7% and 10% of the total votes respectively, which demonstrates the extent of their social resources as those votes came entirely from the provinces populated by Hazaras and Uzbeks respectively (Figure 8 is a visual representation of candidates' vote shares by province). In running up to 2009 presidential elections, however, Karzai had to pursue a more aggressive coalition formation strategy for a number of reasons: first, the security situation was deteriorating not only in certain provinces but also in the capital, which made Karzai appear not in control of the situation; second, high levels of publicized government corruption and lack of growing employment opportunities led to public discontent (voiced through numerous media outlets) with Karzai's government, and Karzai could no longer count on popular support as he did during the 2004 presidential elections; finally, and most importantly, Abdullah Abdullah was emerging as a strong opposition leader who could recruit the support of significant "vote banks" such as Noor, who had solidified his base of power in Balkh, and Mohaqqeq who did not have particularly good relations with Karzai since the 2004 presidential elections.

Figure 8: 2004 Presidential Elections, Leading Candidates Map



Source: Independent Electoral Commission of Afghanistan

Karzai-Technocrats Alliance: By 2004, Karzai, under pressure from the international community, was attempting to reduce the number of the former Mujahedin leaders, especially those of the Shura-i Nazar faction, in his government (author's interview with Rubin) and increase the number of technocrats. Building alliances with the Afghan émigrés was ideal because they were highly educated and possessed the expertise to run the country. However, such alliances were not electorally valuable, as the technocrats did not have a political following in Afghanistan. Luckily for Karzai, there were enough public offices for redistribution, and Karzai could accommodate both key former

Mujahedin leaders as well as the technocrats, although his cabinet was more heavily drawn from the technocrats.

In the cabinet, only two former Mujahedin leaders were present, Abdullah and Ismail Khan; the rest were western educated technocrats (Waldman, 2004).[125] The Minister of Defense, Fahim, was replaced with the returning émigré Rahim Wardak. Fahim was also sacked from his vice-presidential post. Interestingly, he did not challenge or oppose Karzai's decision in any way.[126] The Interior Ministry went to Ali Ahmad Jalali, an Afghan returnee, which was previously held by Qanooni before Karzai made him Minister of Education prior to 2004 elections. In 2005 Abdullah resigned from his post and became a vocal opposition. The Foreign Ministry went to Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, a Political Scientist and professor.

The Karzai-technocrats alliance, although it pleased Afghanistan's Western allies who thought of the technocrats as being more competent, could not bring Karzai the electoral support he needed in the next elections. Hence, prior to the 2009 presidential elections, Karzai once again found himself in need of rebuilding alliances with former Mujahedin leaders.

2009 Elections Alliances

In running up to 2009 elections, two particular events signaled to Karzai that he needed to pursue a more ambitious alliance formation strategy than he did in 2004. First, Karzai's popularity had dropped considerably since the 2004 presidential elections, as only one-

[125] The article can be accessed here: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/24/world/asia/new-cabinet-in-afghanistan-includes-more-technocrats-and-fewer.html

[126] Karzai, using his constitutional power to appoint one third of the Meshrano Jirga (the upper house) members, appointed Fahim to Meshrano Jirga after the 2005 parliamentary elections were held.

third of the population (31%) supported his reelection (Filkins & Ellick, 2009).[127] And second, Abdullah was emerging as a strong challenger to Karzai (Gall, 2009).[128] Unlike the 2004 presidential elections, in 2009 a Karzai victory was not obvious. Nonetheless, Karzai still had an upper hand in using state resources to build an oversized coalition and sway Abdullah's potential supporters. Karzai also had access to extra-legal resources that Abdullah did not. Using his executive powers, he had considerably weakened the Independent Election Commission, the institution in charge of administering, supervising, and conducting elections by appointing his sympathizers as commissioners (Galbraith, 2009).[129][130] Hence, when it was time for new elections, Karzai embarked on a shrewd alliance formation strategy with former Mujahedin leaders.

Karzai's most important alliance partners were his vice-presidential nominees. Perhaps being unimpressed by Zia Massoud's limited influence among Tajiks, Karzai dropped him and made Fahim his first vice-presidential nominee. Fahim was very influential among Tajiks and his alliance with Abdullah could have proved detrimental for Karzai's ticket. By offering to make Fahim his first VP nominee, Karzai effectively deprived Abdullah of making any deals with Fahim. Abdullah, being most closely

[127] The article can be accessed here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/asia/16afghan.html
[128] The article can be accessed here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/world/asia/24abdullah.html
[129] The article can be accessed here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/opinion/28galbraith.html
[130] Karzai used all means to keep the appointment of the commissioners the sole power of the president. In 2008, the Independent Election Commission drafted an amendment to the structure and working procedures of the IEC and sent it to the Ministry of Justice for consideration. However, the mechanism by which the commissioners were appointed was not change. The Wolesi Jirga, when considering the draft, changed the appointment procedures for the IEC commissioners by making president's appointees subject to a vote of confidence by the WJ. The draft was adopted by the WJ and sent to the president for endorsement. However, Karzai referred the law to the Supreme Court to review for constitutionality of the appointment mechanism. The Supreme Court ruled the provision unconstitutional, arguing that the Constitution specified which high-ranking officials were subject to a vote of confidence from the WJ, and that all other officials could not be made subject. See Barakzai (2013, p. 4), here: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR338-2014%20Presidential%20and%20Provincial%20Council%20Elections%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf

associated with Tajiks, could not offer Fahim the vice-presidential nomination; he had to choose his VPs strategically from the other two ethnic groups, Pashtun and Hazara. Hence, Fahim went for the first VP post instead of supporting his fellow UF member and Tajik. Fahim may have also perceived Karzai as more viable than Abdullah. Meanwhile, Karzai kept Khalili as his second VP nominee to continue receiving the Hazara vote in Kabul. At the same time, he was bargaining with Mohaqqeq who held a lot of sway over Hazaras in central Afghanistan, and whom Abdullah wanted as his VP nominee. That is, Karzai knew that Khalili alone could not bring him the Hazara votes, given Mohaqqeq's influence among the Hazaras in central Afghanistan. Mohaqqeq, knowing that he was highly demanded, kept Abdullah waiting until 5pm on the last day of registration while bargaining with Karzai (author's interview with Tawhidi and Afghanzai). At the end, Mohaqqeq went with Karzai (NPR.org, 2009)[131], while Abdullah had to settle for another Hazara VP nominee, Cheragh Ali Cheragh, the dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Kabul University. Cheragh was a medical doctor and a professor of medicine whose influence was limited to the intellectual circles of Kabul.

Karzai also started making political deals with certain leaders in the hopes of receiving votes from their followers. For instance, soon before the 2009 presidential election, he made a deal to allow General Dostum to return to Kabul from his informal exile to Turkey for allegedly kidnapping and torturing a political rival. Upon arrival, Dostum gave a televised broadcast calling on his supporters to vote for Karzai (Farmer,

[131] See here: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111639248

2009).[132] This alliance partner was particularly important to Karzai's presidential bid because Noor, who had a lot of influence over the vote of the Northern provinces, announced his support for Abdullah's campaign. This was a clear instance of the complex nature of social cleavages at work, as Noor, a regional leader, and Dostum, an ethnic leader, both claimed the loyalties of northern Afghanistan residents, who include Tajiks, Pashtuns, Turkmans, and Hazaras. Hence, Karzai wanted to bring Dostum into his alliance in the hopes to sway some of Abdullah's support in the northern Afghanistan.

Although Abdullah was the strongest opposition leader, Karzai was still in possession of substantially more political and financial resources than Abdullah to buy off alliance partners. Prior to 2009 elections, Dostum and Mohaqqeq bargained collectively to become members of one of the alliances. The Junbish-Wahdat combination claimed to control over twenty percent of votes nationwide (Humayoon, 2010). Karzai made certain to attract the Junbish-Wahdat alliance. He received Mohaqeqq's support by promising his party, Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardom, five ministerial positions in the next cabinet (Mohmand, 2009), the governorship of the provinces of Jaghuri and Behsood, and sending a few ambassadors to foreign countries (Royesh, 2013, p. 462). While Dostum was able to bring decisive victory for Karzai from the Jozjan province (58% as opposed to 25.3% of votes that Abdullah won), Mohaqqeq was not able to draw on his promise to help Karzai win the Hazara populated areas (instead, the Hazara vote went to highly educated Ramazan Bashardost who was a Hazara returnee and ran on a populist agenda). Mohaqqeq's inability to bring the Hazara support

[132] The article, accessed on June 6, 2013, can be accessed here: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6042713/Afghan-warlord-General-Dostum-returns-home-to-campaign-for-Hamid-Karzai.html.

to Karzai's electoral ticket demonstrates the uncertainty over voter preference facing alliance formateurs and the need to build oversized coalitions. Even though Karzai had two major Hazara leaders in his coalition, he was not able to receive the majority of Hazara votes.

In addition to attracting important alliance partners, Karzai tried to dissuade potential candidates who could divide the Pashtun votes. Gul Agha Sherzai[133], the governor of Nengarhar province since 2005, wanted to challenge Karzai in 2009 elections. He made public his attempts to recruit Ahmad Zia Massoud, Karzai's vice-president in 2004 elections, as his running mate (Associated Press, 2009) and could create a significant problem for Karzai's reelection bid not because Sherzai had a national appeal to win the election, but because his candidacy could deprive Karzai of the eastern Pashtuns' vote. Karzai is a Qandahari Pashtun who almost exclusively commanded the votes of the southern Pashtuns in previous elections. However, his appeal to eastern Pashtun voters was neither given nor guaranteed. Sherzai was also a Qandahari Pashtun. However his then four years of governorship of Nangarhar could win him eastern Pashtuns' support, effectively dividing the Pashtun vote. One week before the candidate registration deadline (May 8), Karzai invited Sherzai to the Presidential Palace for a meeting. Although details of the meeting were not made public, after the meeting Sherzai announced that he will not challenge the incumbent (*BBC Persian*, 2009). Sherzai remained in his post as the governor of Nangarhar until 2013 when he decided to resign from his post and run in 2014 presidential elections. Karzai won Nangarhar with 75% of the votes in 2009 elections.

[133] Sherzai was a mujahedin commander who captured the first territory from the Taliban in 2001 with assistance from American Special Forces and airstrikes ("Who is who in Afghanistan" database).

Another potential Pashtun challenger to Karzai during the 2009 presidential election was former Finance Minister Anwar ul Haq Ahadi who was the leader of one of the very few relatively well-organized political parties, the Afghan Mellat. Also known as Afghan Social Democratic Party, the Afghan Mellat has an ultra-Pashtun ethnocentrism and carries its support among the liberal and educated Pashtuns, which make up a very insignificant portion of the Pashtun electorate ("Who is who in Afghanistan?" Database). Ahadi was a returning technocrat who had studied in the American University of Beirut and had lived and worked in the U.S. most of his life. Consequently, he did not possess any natural base of support in Afghanistan and was not a viable candidate. However, in an attempt to keep even a fragment of the Pashtun vote from being divided, Karzai tried to discourage Ahadi from pursuing his candidacy. Soon after Ahadi announced his candidacy, Ghulam Jailani Popal, Afghan Mellat's deputy and Karzai ally, announced that Afghan Mellat party did not endorse Ahadi as the party's candidate (*Tol Afghanistan*, 2009). Ahadi's presidential bid was therefore severely undercut as he could not draw on other significant social or political resources to run a successful campaign. Ahadi dropped out of the presidential race, and he was appointed the Minister of Finance. However, he received 'no confidence' vote in the Wolesi Jirga but served as Executive Advisor to the President in Economic Affairs in 2010 and became Minister of Commerce and Industry later that year. Hence, even though Ahadi dropped out of the presidential race, Karzai kept him close as part of his strategy to maintain a grand coalition with the former mujahedin leaders as well as the technocrats whose expertise he could use in his government.

Karzai won 49.7% of the total votes in 2009 presidential elections, while Abdullah won 30.5% of the total votes. Since none of the candidates won the majority of the total votes, a run-off election was supposed to take place. However, Abdullah conceded the elections to Karzai because of inherent difficulties with holding a run-off election, but also because he was aware of Karzai's capacity to commit large-scale, systematic fraud. Karzai was announced the winner of the 2009 presidential elections, even though many Afghan elite believe that Abdullah was the winner of the 2009 elections (author's interview with Gailani, Saleh, Massoud, and Kohestani).[134]

Pre-electoral Coalitions Prior to 2014 Presidential Elections

The 2014 presidential election marked the first democratic transfer of power in the history of Afghanistan. Eight candidates[135] participated in the elections, and with the exception of one candidate (Abdullah), the rest of them participated as independent. Each candidate pursued coalition formation and, like the 2004 and 2009 elections, the relative strength of the candidates in forming pre-electoral coalitions was determined by asymmetry of power. However, with Karzai out of the race, no candidate had a clear advantage over others to form a grand coalition that will guarantee a decisive victory in

[134] For electoral results by province refer to this page: http://www.iec.org.af/results_2009/resultsProvince.html

[135] Originally, 27 candidates registered to participate in 2014 presidential election. However, the Independent Electoral Commission disqualified 17 candidates for not meeting the candidacy criteria (they either had dual nationalities or did not amass enough voter cards). In the next few days, two more candidates were disqualified for similar reasons. The number of candidates for presidential elections had shrunk considerably during the 2014 election (from 32 candidates in 2009) for two reasons: first, the passage of a new electoral law in 2013 increased the signature requirement for the candidates from 10,000 (in the previous elections) to 100,000 of eligible voters from at least 20 provinces of the country, with at least 2 percent from each province, and raised the deposit of 50,000 Afghani in 2004 and 250,000 Afghani in 2009 to one million Afghani (approximately $17,500) in 2014 (for more details on the new law, see van Bijlert 2013). Second, election campaign became increasingly costly as the potential candidates had to campaign not just in Kabul and other major cities, but also in rural areas and provinces that were less secure (increasing the costs of security protection as well).

the first round of the elections. As a result, no candidate won the 50% plus one of the total votes, and run-off elections were held in accordance with the electoral rules between the two front runners, Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. Both candidates absorbed the unsuccessful candidates from the first round into their alliances in the hopes to win the votes of their constituencies. However, Ghani pursued an aggressive alliance formation strategy by not only taking some of the presidential candidates and their vice-presidential candidates into his alliance, but also by forming alliances with tribal heads in the south.[136] He was also accused of widespread electoral fraud by Abdullah's team during a controversial five-month long election process. On 21 September 2014, the Independent Electoral Commission announced the winner of the run-off election but did not release the results after Ghani and Abdullah agreed on establishing a Government of National Unity (GNU). In the new government, Ghani became the president, while a new post was created for Abdullah as the CEO. The process of the 2014 elections demonstrated the absence of the elite with clear advantage in building a strong coalition and winning the elections, and this reality was reflected in the composition of the new GNU.

Prior to the elections, two broad electoral camps started emerging, the Electoral Union of Afghanistan, which was an opposition alliance mainly made up of the former mujahedin leaders, and the so-called pro-Palace camp, which consisted of the Afghan technocrats who had made a reputation for themselves by occupying different posts

[136] Ghani is a Pashtun from Logar province and does not have an uncontested followership in the southern provinces of Qandahar, Helmand and Nimroz. He needed to make alliances with Pashtun tribes because Abdullah had attracted two important Pashtun leaders into his coalition, Zalmai Rassoul, who received a large portion of the votes in the southern provinces (30% in Nimroz, 27% in Helmand, and 53% in Qandahar), and Ghul Agha Sherzai, a Qandahari Pashtun who was the Governor of the eastern province of Nangarhar, and could potentially sway the eastern Pashtun votes for Abdullah.

during the post-transition governments.[137] However, these arrangements were short-lived as they each were unable to announce a joint candidate who would run in the elections. Instead, members of both camps tried to lure other camp's members to form separate alliances with them. When the final list of the candidates was revealed, the majority of the presidential tickets were a mix of former mujahedin leaders and the newly empowered technocrats with certain lists formed purely of technocrats or mujahedin leaders.

With the incumbent Karzai out of the race, the electoral field was wide open for competition. After the 2009 presidential election, Abdullah had emerged as a relatively strong opposition candidate (winning 30.5% of the total votes in 2009). However, his strength in attracting alliance partners depended on other contenders' profiles. Abdullah was able to obtain the support of key actors, such as Fahim (who was Karzai's first vice-president in 2009 election), Mohaqqeq (who allied with Karzai in 2009 election), and Atta Noor (who supported Abdullah in 2009 elections, although he was not on his presidential ticket). He also managed to get a Pashtun, Mohammad Khan of Hezb-i Islami and former MP, on his ticket although Khan was not a very influential Pashtun leader and was unable to bring significant Pashtun vote for Abdullah.[138] Abdullah's ability to win the election in the first round was curbed by other contenders' ability to form broad-based coalitions with former mujahedin leaders, technocrats, and regional powers. One such contender was Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, who had also participated in

[137] For a detailed discussion of the two camps, see Ruttig (2013).

[138] Khan ran in 2005 parliamentary elections and won a seat, which he could not keep in 2010 parliamentary elections. Abdullah tried to ally with Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal who was the leader of the Islamic Party, a break-away branch of Hezb-i Islamic and Minister of Economy in Karzai's 2009 cabinet (Kakar 2013). However, Arghandiwal, a more influential Pashtun than Khan, did not accept Abdullah's offer.

the 2009 elections and had made quite a reputation for himself as the Senior Advisor and Transition Process Head (he earned the name "Transition czar") when he oversaw the transition of security from ISAF to Afghan security forces.

Ashraf Ghani's presidential bid in 2009 was quite unsuccessful and earned him 2.9% of the total votes. However, prior to 2014 presidential elections, he too embarked on a coalition formation strategy that placed him among top contenders in the elections. He recruited the Uzbek leader, Dostum, whom he had previously called "a known killer" (Harrison, 2014) as his first vice-president, and the Hazara intellectual, Sarwar Danish, who had served as the Governor of Hazara-dominated Daikondi province and the Minister of Justice (2004-2009) as his second vice-president. In the first round of elections, Ghani's first vice-presidential candidate brought him the Uzbek vote in Juzjan (69%) and Faryab (65%), while his second vice-presidential candidate failed to draw on his influence in Daikondi to bring him more than 11% of the votes (Abdullah won Daikondi with more than 75% of the vote). Nonetheless, Ghani was able to master 31.56% of the total votes in the first round, enough to send him to run-off election against Abdullah. Ghani pursued an aggressive coalition formation strategy prior to the run-off elections and recruited Zia Massoud[139], the first vice-presidential candidate on Rasoul's team. The effects of Ghani's coalition formation strategy on his victory were obscured by

[139] Pajhwok Afghan News reported on May 25, 2014 that Ghani had promised to make Massoud his third VP by amending the constitution (Qureshi, 2014). However, Ghani inaugurated him as the Special Representative of the National Unity Government in reform and governance affairs ("Who is who in Afghanistan?" database).

accusations of widespread, state-assisted electoral fraud when he was announced the winner of the 2014 run-off elections.[140]

After the results for the first round of elections were announced, a run-off election was constitutionally mandated to be held among the first two candidates with the highest votes (Abdullah with 45% and Ghani with 31.56% of the total votes). On June 8, 2014 the Afghan Analysts Network team wrote that "Over the last few weeks, more or less all prominent Afghans have been faced with the question of which campaign to attach themselves to. Negotiations have gone through ebb and flow, with the candidates sometimes pursuing those with possible vote banks and prestige, and in other cases sitting back waiting to be courted themselves" (AAN Team, 2014). Abdullah picked up Zalmai Rassoul who came third in the first of round of elections (11.3% of votes), Sayyaf's team, which came fourth in the first round of elections (7.04% of votes), and Gul Agha Sherzai, who came sixth (1.57% of votes) with their VP candidates, except for Zia Massoud who joined Ghani's campaign (with the hopes to be the third VP). In conformity with the

[140] On the day of the run-off elections, Kabul Police caught Zia ul Haq Amarkhail, the head of the Independent Electoral Commission, with two truckloads ballots that he was taking to an unknown location. According to the IEC rules, each truck carrying ballots should have been escorted by the police. These two trucks were not. The case was sent for investigation, but Amarkhail continued to serve as the head of the IEC. See the report here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sK4F9P7bFJo. In the next few days, he left Afghanistan with his family to Dubai without informing any authorities but was photographed returning by himself. He then resigned from his post "for the sake of national unity." See the reports here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtPOQWepAt. On June 22, 2014 Tolo News reported Abdullah team's release of an audio supposedly of Amarkhail, the head of the Independent Electoral Commission, who has been giving orders to his inferiors to carry out ballot stuffing. In one of those audio phone conversations, Amarkhail talks to an unidentified member of the Ghani team, taking orders from him. The report can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqZRIu2zKYw. On October 25, 2014, Tolo News reported the accusation on Independent Electoral Commission's state-funded lavish needs. The report claimed that based on the evidence received by the Tolo News, the members of the IEC have used the IEC budget for personal use (paying for their trips to India with their families and for medical expenses in India). The report further claimed President Karzai has paid for armored vehicles for the members of the IEC using the code 91 and has paid 100,000 monthly rents for the members of the IEC. Amarkhail, who was at the center of the accusations, has purchased iPhone 5. The report in Farsi can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWZuCrXN1A8. Amarkhail was never arrested for the alleged election fraud.

theoretical expectations, alliance seekers sought the candidate with the highest number of votes in the first round of elections, as he appeared the more viable of the two candidates. However, in the 2014 run-off elections, the strength of the candidates' coalition did not determine the outcome of the elections, as electoral fraud played a more significant role. Mahmud Karzai, brother of the outgoing president, too opted for the Abdullah campaign, although his other brother, Qayyum Karzai supported Ghani's campaign. Amrullah Saleh, ex-chief of Afghanistan's intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Ismail Khan, the former Herat governor, neither of whom had supported Abdullah in the first round, also joint the Abdullah campaign.[141]

The 2014 run-off elections proved controversial as accusations of voter fraud were mounted against the Ghani team and no legal steps were taken to address those accusations. Based on those accusations, Ghani appeared to have had the unprecedented support of the Palace in winning the elections. The outgoing president appointed the IEC commissioners and controlled the electoral and judicial institutions, and from the reports cited above it appears that he used those resources at his disposal to help Ghani win the election. Abdullah's team protested the audit process and walked out of the process. Nonetheless, Abdullah once again conceded the elections to his rival for concerns over eruption of violence and chaos. He did not do that before signing a deal with Ghani to create a Government of National Unity. Ghani was sworn in on September 30 as the President and Abdullah as the CEO, with his two VP candidates inaugurated as his deputies.[142]

[141] For detailed information on pre-run-off alliances see (AAN Team, 2014).
[142] For a detailed discussion of the inauguration ceremony see Clark (2014).

Conclusions

This chapter sought to explain independent candidates' capacity to compete in elections without the organizational and financial support of political parties. I argued that office seekers will use alternative strategies to mobilize electoral support if they perceive those strategies as electorally more effective than building or joining political parties. One such available strategy for presidential contenders in post-2001 Afghanistan was to build pre-electoral alliances with individual elites who carried the electoral support of their particular constituencies (i.e. their ethno-linguistic groups or their regional constituencies). The empirical sections of the Chapter identified the conditions that gave some elites strategic advantage over others, demonstrated power asymmetries, and analyzed the dynamics of coalition formation prior to each presidential election. The empirical evidence largely supported the theoretical predictions made in Chapter 2. The pre-electoral coalitions that formed prior to 2004, 2009, and 2014 presidential elections demonstrated the effects of asymmetries of power on the size and strength of the coalitions. While every presidential contender could technically be a formateur, only those who possessed high political power were able to build strong, oversized coalitions.

Chapter 6

Institutional Selection

"People know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does."

Michel Foucault

The idea that institutions shape actors' preferences to act in a certain way is a widely held belief. Institutional parameters have been used as independent variables to explain policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political and electoral regimes. However, in this Chapter I argue that in post-2001 Afghanistan institutions are products of political choice. That is, institutional choice is a result of designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects. To empirically demonstrate institutional endogeneity, I will present a detailed analysis of the drafting and adoption of the Constitution as well as the choice of the electoral rules in post-2001 Afghanistan. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter is based on newly gathered interviews with key political actors who participated in the process of institutional selection, unpublished letters exchanged between the international constitutional experts and government officials, official publications, politicians' memoirs, and reports produced by research institutions studying post-2001 politics in Afghanistan.

A growing literature in comparative politics has questioned the role of institutions as independent variables shaping social outcomes and has claimed that institutional design and institutional change are best described by the preferences of institution makers

who act rationally and strategically (Lijphart, 1994; Geddes, 1996; Boix, 1999; Taagepera, 2002). Institutions such as electoral rules are selected by elites, and they may design those rules in ways that will give them an advantage in the elections (Boix 1999; Benoit 2007; Colomer 2005). The problem of endogeneity in theoretical analysis refers to the reversal of causal direction between the dependent and independent variables (King et al, 199, p. 185-86). As this Chapter will demonstrate, institutional selection in post-2001 Afghanistan strongly supports the claim that institutional design resembles the preferences of institution makers motivated by self-interest. The institutional argument will be considered and refuted as a competing explanation for affiliation preferences among Afghan office seekers (the main dependent variable of this research). I will demonstrate that power asymmetry is the main determinant of institutional choice.

An institutional explanation of the post-2001 outcomes in Afghanistan would emphasize the adverse effects of presidentialism and SNTV on party leaders' decision to forego party affiliation in national elections. Presidentialism has been understood to discourage political parties by allowing candidates to make direct, populist appeals to the electorate (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 264). Meanwhile, SNTV system, because of its focus on candidates and not on parties, has been expected to discourage party affiliation (Brancati 2008: 654). However, as the empirical sections of this Chapter will demonstrate, presidentialism and SNTV were chosen as a result of the strength of actors who were, and preferred to remain, independent. At the time of institutional selection, strong, national parties did not exist to assert their interests, which allowed the anti-party Karzai to push for the choice of presidentialism and SNTV.

Institutional endogeneity, however, does not take away entirely from the importance of institutions in effecting choice. Specifically, the institutional context within which actors operate limits the options available to them and conditions their decisions. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, certain institutional features in post-2001 Afghanistan limited the choices available to elites and subsequently constrained their behaviors. Further, institutions were constantly manipulated to obtain the preferences of those in power. Hence, the institutions that the powerful designed brought the intended consequences that the designers had envisioned.

A distinct feature of post-2001 Afghanistan was the role played by international actors during the institutional selection process with significant implications for the institutional framework that was eventually adopted. The international actors exerted strong influence on the role of religion in the new Constitution and the type of political system. Rubin (2013, p. 158) writes that "From the start of the drafting [of the Constitution], international actors made it clear that, although they accepted that the new constitution would declare Afghanistan an Islamic state, they did not want any explicit reference to sharia in the text." Meanwhile, the UN and the U.S. supported the adoption of a presidential system (author's interview with Massoud, Mansoor, Mahdi, Ma'navi, and Gailani)[143] out of concern that in the absence of moderate, democratic political parties and presence of armed groups, a parliamentary system might produce a fragmented body dominated by warlords, regional factions, and even drug traffickers

[143] Some of the interviewees to care to note that Zalmai Khalilzad, then President Bush's special representative to Afghanistan, may have exaggerated the U.S. position on certain issues. Khalilzad was a Karzai supporter from the beginning, and some accused him of ethnic nationalism. During the Constitutional Loya Jirga, he strongly supported Karzai's choice of the political regime, claiming to communicate the preferences of the U.S. However, some interviewees claimed that he presented his preferences as the preferences of the U.S.

(Rubin, 2013, p. 157). In a letter to Lakhdar Brahimi dated 18 December 2003 (after the Constitutional Loya Jirga had begun), Rubin made some recommendations to address the disagreements that had emerged in the Jirga. He asked that the UN, the U.S. and other international advisors to use their offices to suggest the following to the Jirga participants regarding president's powers: oppose "greatly expanding the number of issues on which the president requires the approval of the parliament, as this could cripple him [Karzai];" all sides should agree that "the constitution as written does not require any particular method of choosing governors;" and the judiciary should be made accountable by creating an independent judicial commission to administer the judiciary.[144] The content of the letter, and the subsequent institutional framework that was adopted, demonstrate international actors' direct and effective involvement in the process of the adoption of the Constitution and indicates their desire for a strong presidential system.

The empirical sections of the Chapter are organized into three separate parts: the following section will discuss endogeneity of Afghan's institutions with regard to the drafting of the constitution; section three will discuss the adoption of the electoral rules and as the features of the electoral institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan as well as their consequences for democratic governance; the final section will present the concluding remarks on endogeneity of institutions. The goal is to identify the conditions under which the political and electoral regimes were chosen in post-2001 Afghanistan, to identify the main actors and their preferences, to uncover the effects of power asymmetries on actors' ability to affect institutional choice, and to find if institutions have independent effects on affiliation decisions of office seekers.

[144] Barnett Rubin kindly made the letter available to the author.

The Adoption of the Constitution

Institutional selection in post-2001 Afghanistan, like in any post-conflict society, was marked with struggle among various groups of elites, each of whom wanted to design rules of the game in ways that would advantage them. This section provides a narrative of the process of the writing and adoption of the Constitution in post-2001 Afghanistan, identifying the relevant actors, their interests, and their relative strengths. The narrative presented here is reconstructed based on newly gathered interviews with key players in the three stages of the writing, revising, and adoption of the Constitution. While the narrative is consistent with the existing accounts of the process of the drafting and adoption of the Constitution presented in Rubin (2013), Rutting (2014), and International Crisis Group (June 2003, December 2003), the level of details provided here go well beyond these existing accounts. I will demonstrate empirically, that Karzai's position as the head of the Transitional Administration enabled him to choose institutional arrangements that preserved his status. He preferred a presidential system with sweeping powers for the executive. Hence, contrary to the claim that presidentialism encourages non-affiliation, this section will demonstrate that Karzai chose a presidential system because he was, and preferred to remain, independent of political parties.

When the Constitution of Afghanistan was being drafted in 2003, there was a government already in place with its own set of interests and the ability to influence institutional design. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 2001 transition made the little-known Karzai the head of the Afghan Interim Authority. In 2002, Karzai was elected the head of the Transitional Authority, which strengthened his control over transitional politics. Karzai's government was the recipient of significant political and financial support from

the U.S. and the international community (discussed in Chapter 2). Importantly, the government was unified in pursuit of its interests because Karzai was able to solve the coordination problem by introducing selective incentives (Olson, 1965),[145] which was facilitated by the availability of political resources to him as the head of the Transitional Administration. Meanwhile, in 2003, when the Constitution was drafted, Karzai did not face many institutional constraints. In the absence of a legislative body at the time to approve Karzai's appointees, he had full control over distribution of posts in the government. Meanwhile, most of the cabinet members in Karzai's Transitional Administration were returning technocrats who did not enjoy any support inside Afghanistan. These members had incentives to bandwagon with Karzai. Consequently, at no time during the process of drafting, reviewing, and adopting the constitution did any major signs of division among the members of Karzai's cabinet emerge.

In addition to the government, led by Karzai, there was a second set of actors with competing interests: the United Front, which consisted of most former Mujahedin leaders. I will refer to the UF as the opposition. Unlike the government, the opposition was not united in pursuit of interests and its demands (Rubin, 2013, p. 156). One reason for the fragmentation among the opposition was the strategy that Karzai used to keep certain key members of the UF, such as Fahim, Abdullah, and Khalili, in his government. For instance, Karzai used selective incentives to attract the support of certain key members of the UF. Karzai's strategy was successful, as these three key members

[145] Mancur Olson, in The Logic of Collective Action, argued that "*rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest*" (1965, p. 2, emphasis in original). So, the apparent instances of collective action, he argued, were explained by the presence of selective incentives: "Only a *separate and selective incentive* will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way. In such circumstances group action can be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately, like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather *selectively* toward the individuals in the group" (1956, p. 51, emphasis in original).

actively promoted Karzai's position during the drafting, revising, and adoption of the Constitution (discussed in details below).

Meanwhile, during the adoption and of the Constitution, some overlapping and cross-cutting cleavages also emerged. For instance, the majority of Pashtuns supported Karzai while most of the minority groups, with the exception of Baluchis who were recruited by Pashtuns, supported the opposition (Ruttig, 2014). In some cases, elites' ideological background featured as the stronger cleavage, e.g. Pashtun former Mujahedin leaders supported the opposition, while non-Pashtun technocrats supported Karzai. In other cases, ethnicity beat the ideological background as the stronger cleavage of the two, i.e., Pashtun Mujahedin leaders supported Karzai, while non-Pashtun technocrats sided with the opposition (discussed in details below). The latter was a result of Karzai's successful use of the ethnic card with some former Mujahedin leaders. Nonetheless, self-interest dominated all other calculations as individual elites sought to pursue their personal goals (of gaining access to power and resources of the state) in designing the institutions.

Karzai and his international and domestic supporters had strong preference for a highly centralized, presidential system. Karzai also preferred no prime minister but multiple vice-presidents, although he wanted to limit the succession period for three months in case something happened to the president while in office (author's interview with Massoud, Ma'navi, Mahdi, and Mansoor; Rubin, 2014). The latter was a measure to protect the president against the vice-presidents who might threaten to get rid of the president. Meanwhile, the opposition, which included leaders of minority ethnic groups preferred a parliamentary system (author's interview with Masoud, Mahdi, and

Mansoor), while some leaders of regionally concentrated minority ethnic groups, such as Dostum of Junbish party, wanted more autonomy for provinces (Crisis Group 2003: 7). At the end, Karzai's preferences prevailed over those of the opposition's. Karzai's success in drafting a constitution that reflected his preferences was in big part due to the powers vested in him as the head of the state.[146] It was also due to the support of important actors, such as the U.S. and the UN (represented by Khalilzad, President Bush's Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 and the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, and Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Afghanistan, respectively), who were hoping for the creation of a strong central government capable of bringing the regional strongmen under the control of the central government. Lastly, the fragmentation among former mujahedin groups also played well into the hands of Karzai who used carrots for some and sticks for others. The process of writing, revising, and adopting the Constitution is discussed in further details below.

As the head of the Transitional Administration,[147] Karzai was given the mandate to appoint the members of a drafting commission that would write the draft constitution,

[146] During the 2001 Bonn negotiations, the UN and the US wanted to mediate a post-transition settlement for Afghanistan that provided for a strong central government able to stabilize Afghanistan. As such, when the United Front delegates proposed a political arrangement with a president as a figure head and a strong prime minister, the UN and US mediators tried to get the Rome Group to object to the proposal (also because it would be a Shura-i Nazar-dominated arrangement with the risk of alienating the Pashtun majority). At the end of the negotiations, the United Front was pressed to get rid of the prime ministerial post and agree to a strong president with powers to appoint ministers, governors, the members of constitutional commissions, and Supreme Court justices (author's interview with Barnett Rubin). Consequently, Karzai, who was elected the chairman of the Interim Authority, was the ultimate political beneficiary of a strong executive.

[147] During both the Bonn Accord and the Emergency Loya Jirga, the U.S. and UN representatives operated under the assumption that Afghanistan's stability depended on whether or not a Pashtun was the head of the state (author's interview with Rubin). The frame of reference for this assumption is the two hundred years of Pashtun political rule, which has led to the assumption that another Pashtun head of state would guarantee continuity and stability. This assumption however is not well-founded as instability in

as well as appointing the members of a review commission that would revise the draft constitution. Under these conditions, the stage was set for Karzai to assert his influence on the process of drafting and eventually adopting the Constitution by appointing his sympathizers to these two commissions. The general structure of the process of writing, revising, and adopting the Constitution was laid out in the 2001 Bonn Agreement. According to the Agreement, the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA hereafter) was to form a commission, called the Constitution Drafting Commission, within two months of its inauguration, which will write a draft Constitution with assistance from the United Nations. The draft Constitution was to be debated and adopted in the Constitutional Loya Jirga, which was to be held within eighteen months of the inauguration of the Transitional Administration.

The details of the process of constitutional selection were worked out later with the help of the United Nations. After the draft constitution was prepared by the Constitutional Draft Commission, another commission, called the Constitutional Review Commission, was formed to revise the draft constitution based on the input from the Afghan citizens and legal experts and scholars. Both commissions were supported by a Secretariat, which provided technical, administrative, logistical and financial services (UNDP Report 2002-2004).[148] The revised draft was then to be debated and adopted in

Afghanistan has had many reasons, the ethnicity of the ruler not even the strongest reason. Afghanistan's recent history is plagued with unstable, Pashtun governments, with the exception of Zahir Shah's forty year reign, which ended with a coup carried out by another Pashtun, his cousin Dauod Khan.

[148] A step by step description of the process of writing, revising and adopting the new Constitution is provided by the Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan on March 10, 2003. However, the report obscures the struggle between the relevant elites during the process of writing, revising, and adopting the Constitution. This section goes beyond the report to fill in the gaps such reports have left in the narrative of constitution selection in Afghanistan.

the Constitutional Loya Jirga (Table 13 summarizes the timeline for the process of writing, revising, and adopting the Constitution).

Table 13: Constitutional Selection Process

Timeline for the Constitutional Selection Process		
Stage One: *Tasweed* (Drafting)	**Stage Two: *Tadqiq* (Finalizing)**	**Stage Three: *Tasweeb* (Adoption)**
Begin: Nov. 3, 2002 End: March 31, 2003	Begin: April 26, 2003 End: Oct. 15, 2003*	Begin: December 14, 2003 End: January 4, 2004

*The revised draft Constitution, according to the UNDP Report (The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003), was made public on 3 November 2003.

The Constitutional Loya Jirga was initially scheduled to be convened in October 2003. However, the drafting stage and particularly the revising stage took longer than originally intended. Although the delay was justified under the "need for extensive public information and comprehensive public consultation" (The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003), it was the struggle among actors at different stages of the constitutional selection process that slowed down the adoption of the new constitution. Meanwhile, during the finalizing stage, the draft constitution, after it was revised based on public consultation results (discussed below), was sent to the Palace to be debated among the National Security Council (NSC hereafter) and cabinet members (author's interview with Massoud and Ma'navi). This step was neither specified in the official reports on the process of constitutional selection nor ever publicized.

Throughout the process of writing and revising the Constitution, the government of Hamid Karzai exerted influence over the content of the document. Karzai and his supporters also tried to influence the process of adopting the Constitution during the Constitutional Loya Jirga proceedings.

The Constitutional Drafting Commission

The nine-member Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC hereafter) was tasked with writing the preliminary draft of the constitution, which would provide the Constitutional Review Commission with a set of recommendations. Members of the CDC were appointed by Karzai on October 5, 2002 through a presidential decree, and it was inaugurated formally on November 3, 2002 by the former king, Zahir. Nimatullah Shahrani, one of the five vice-presidents in Karzai's Transitional Cabinet, chaired the CDC. The newly appointed committee members formulated the bylaws and the working plan of the CDC. In writing the draft, the CDC members used the 1964 Constitution as a guide. They also consulted with constitutional experts from around the world. There were two potentially contentious issues that the draft constitution needed to address: the role of Islam in the constitution and the type of the political system. The opposition was divided on the issue of religion, as some members (some leaders of Jamiat-e Islami and Ittihad-e Islami) advocated for a strong role for Islam in the Constitution, while others (Junbish in particular) did not see any need to include any references to Sharia in the Constitution (Crisis Group, 2003, p. 9). The government on the other hand was under pressure from outside actors demanding the acceptance of international standards and avoiding any reference to Sharia in the Constitution (Rubin, 2013, p. 157-58). The Constitution that was adopted tried to strike a balance between secularism and religion, but the result was a document with contradictions: Article 3 states that "No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan," while Article 7 commits Afghanistan to observing the United Nations' Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the issue of the regime type, even though the

draft constitution called for a semi-presidential system with a prime minister, Karzai strongly preferred a pure presidential system. The opposition, Qanooni in particular, wanted a prime ministerial post directly elected by parliament and not subordinate to the president (Rubin, 2013, p. 156; author's interview with Massoud). On this issue, however, the preferences of the government prevailed, as we will see below.

The CDC prepared a preliminary draft of the Constitution and submitted it to President Karzai on 31 March 2003. Although the draft Constitution was not made public, a copy of it leaked to media. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* published a report on 24 April 2003 on the preliminary draft Constitution (Tarzi, 2003). The report claimed that most articles of the draft were directly transcribed from the 1964 Afghan Constitution, only replacing the term "king" with "president" in some articles (in some instances, the authors even had forgotten to replace the word "king" with "president"). Meanwhile, there were some notable diversions from the 1964 Constitution. The new draft was more secular by stating that sovereignty belonged to the people (as opposed to God as in the 1964 Constitution). Also, it was less restrictive than the 1964 Constitution on religious freedom. For instance, the role of Hanafi (Sunni) school of jurisprudence was diminished by making the religious requirements vague for the head of the state (e.g. the new draft stated that the president should be Muslim and not a Hanafi Muslim as in the 1964 Constitution). The new draft also allowed non-Muslim Afghans a degree of freedom in practicing their religion (in the 1964 Constitution, religious minorities could worship "within limits determined by laws of public decency and public peace").[149]

[149] The *Radio Free/Radio Liberty* report can be accessed here: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1340617.html

The compromise between an entirely Sharia-based constitution and one that was overly liberal for a country with 97% Muslim population was a result of the conflict between the members of the Drafting Commission, who were mostly trained in legal Islamic law on the one hand, and foreign advisors who were concerned about the compatibility of the constitution with democratic values on the other hand. Shahrani, the Chairman of Drafting Commission, for instance wanted a bigger role for Islamic law in the Constitution, while Barnett R. Rubin (Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center on International Cooperation Afghanistan Pakistan Regional Program), who advised the Drafting Commission on writing the draft Constitution, proposed a more secular and liberal Constitution. The disagreement between the two was resolved with the President's mediation. In trying to balance between the two poles, constitutions of secular Islamic states, such as Syria and Egypt were used to write certain articles in the draft Constitution (author's interview with Ma'navi).

The new draft was written under direct influence of the sitting government, and it reflected the preferences of the president and his supporters. Reportedly, Article 12 of the preliminary draft envisaged presidentialism, Karzai's preferred system, while the issue of centralization (as opposed to a decentralized, federalist system that was advocated by some regional elites) was unequivocally stated in Article 103 of the draft. Another issue that highlighted the influence of the Palace on the drafting process was the mention of two deputies for the president[150] (one in charge of civilian affairs, one of military and

[150] The 2001 Bonn Accord created five vice-presidential posts in the Interim Authority to include all minority ethnic groups and women in the government so that the government is perceived as broad-based. However, Karzai kept the five VP posts in his Transitional Administration because it helped him build alliances with important political elites in the country. That is, the VP posts served Karzai's political ambitions well as he was able to bring in his government potential political rivals and place them in high profile yet practically weak positions. By giving these posts to leaders of minority ethnic groups, he was

security affairs) and rules for succession. The draft indicated that if something happens to the president in office, the vice president in charge of civilian affairs will assume the presidential duties for a period of three months before nationwide elections could be held; Article 19 reemphasized the rules for succession in presidency (Tarzi, 2003). The specification of rules of succession demonstrates Karzai's attempt to protect himself against his vice-presidents' ambitions who may have aspired to presidency and acquiring it by getting rid of the president.

The preliminary draft that was completed at the end of March was supposed to be revised based on the input from the public before it was sent to the Constitutional Loya Jirga for adoption. The opinions of the population were gathered through an extensive campaign of public education and public consultation, which was planned to begin on May 1 and end on June 30, 2003. The Constitutional Review Commission was created with the primary responsibility to carry out the consultation with the people of Afghanistan both inside and outside Afghanistan (see The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003; and the Report prepared by the Secretariat of the Constitutional Review Commission, 2003 for details on the process of public consultation phase). However, the draft appeared to have been revised based on the preferences of the Palace.

The Constitutional Review Commission

The 32-member Constitutional Review Commission of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (the Commission hereafter) was appointed by Hamid Karzai on 23 April

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also able to attract the electoral support of those ethnic groups for his reelection bid. Ruttig (2014) also writes on Karzai's preference for multiple VPs.

2003 through a presidential decree. Six members of the drafting committee were appointed to the new Commission, including Professor Nematullah Shahrani as the Chairperson, Professor Abdul Salam Azimi, Mohammad Musa Marufi, Mohammad Musa Ashari, Rahim Sherzoy, and Sarwar Danish (Ashraf Ghani's current VP). The Commission was responsible to consult widely with the people of Afghanistan on what kind of constitution they preferred, revise the Draft Constitution accordingly, and present it for approval to the Constitutional Loya Jirga by August 2003.

The public consultation was done in 32 provinces of Afghanistan and among Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. During the consultation phase, in addition to meetings held with people and key figures in the society, people were encouraged to submit written memoranda making recommendations for the Draft Constitution. The public consultation process was to be coordinated by the Kabul office and eight regional offices in other provinces—with eight national mobile consultation teams traveling to each region and covering all provinces while one team would remain in Kabul. These offices were located in Kabul, Jalalabad, Gardez, Bamyan, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz, Peshawar, Quetta, Tehran, and Mashhad and remained active throughout the process of public consultation. The Commission was responsible to prepare a report analyzing the views of Afghans gathered during the public consultation. However, the report on the results of the public consultation was, to my knowledge, never made public despite the Secretariat's promise to publish them. Consequently, it is not clear how the revision of the draft Constitution was affected by public input. Fazel Ahmad Ma'navi, who was Deputy Supreme Court Justice and worked at the Secretariat of the Constitutional Drafting Commission, claimed that about 70% of the respondents

preferred a parliamentary system of government. However, because the president and his supporters wanted a presidential system, it was not even considered (author's interview with Ma'navi). The author cannot verify the number due to lack of access to the results of the Public Consultation.

After the Constitutional Commission reviewed the Draft Constitution, it passed on the revised draft for further revisions to the National Security Council (NSC hereafter).[151] The NSC revised the draft by going over every article and deleting and re-writing certain articles without regard to how different parts of the constitution interact before sending it back to the Constitutional Commission for "technical" redrafting. The Constitutional Commission, which had been redrafting the Constitution until August 30, 2003 (the day before the NSC started its revisions), was told by the president to stop revising the Constitution and instead concentrate on analysing the results of the consultations done with the general public. International experts such as Barnett R. Rubin tried, in vain, to tell the NSC and the president that the Commission is incapable of producing an objective analysis of the consultations, and that so far they have only taken those points that support what they want to do. Brahimi advised the president that instead of continuing to revise the draft in this manner, he should establish a committee of the most engaged and intelligent people in the cabinet and NSC to work on it in consultation with the experts. However, Tayeb Jawad, the Presidential Chief of Staff assured Rubin in a meeting on September 1, 2003 that there was very little left of the revisions, and that the

[151] The NSC and the cabinet started reviewing the draft Constitution either in August or September of 2003, and the revised draft was formally presented to the President on October 15, 2003. The draft was made public on November 3, 2003—suggesting that further revisions took place in the Palace between October 15 and November 3. To my knowledge, this step of reviewing and revising the draft constitution was not made public. The report prepared by the UNDP on the process of selecting the constitution does not make any mention of this step.

NSC could complete its deliberations soon.[152] However, still concerned about the progress of the NSC, Rubin wrote to Brahimi on September 2, 2003 that "[t]he process of drafting currently under way cannot possibly produce the required result. It is impossible to draft a complex document such as a constitution in a large group such as the National Security Council."[153] The NSC was supposed to conclude the discussions on the draft Constitution by September of 2003.

During the Commission's and the NSC's review of the draft Constitution, revisions to the draft were proposed by both international advisors (Guy Caracassonne, Yash Pal Ghai, and Barnett R. Rubin) and national elites. However, the joint NSC-CRC commission revised the draft based on the preferences of the sitting president and his supporters—i.e. creating a strong presidency and a highly centralized system. In a memorandum dated 5 August 2003 Ghai and Rubin made technical suggestions regarding clarifying the role of religion, the status of fundamental rights, and the system of government. On the last one, they suggested that the arrangement in the draft Constitution, which established both a president and prime minister with powers divided between them, would create divisions at the heart of government, and that a type of executive presidential system would be best suited for Afghanistan. However, to prevent ethnic or regional monopoly of power by the executive, they suggested certain safeguards, i.e. that the president must receive not only a plurality of votes nationally but also at least 20 percent of the votes in at least 60 percent of the provinces (20 out of 32 at the time). They also suggested that the president should not serve more than two terms

[152] The information in this paragraph comes from a letter Barnett R. Rubin sent to Brahimi, Arnault, Yash Pal Ghai, and Kawun Kakar on September 1, 2003. The letter is in author's possession.
[153] The letter is in author's possession.

(the draft Constitution had no term limits for presidency), and the vice-president who will be elected along with the president on a common ticket should serve out the remainder of the presidential term if necessary. On 6 September 2003 in another document the authors reported that "The NSC first abolished the post of prime minister in favor of a full presidential system with French-style two round presidential elections and without the various safeguards we recommended" ("Short Summary of Suggestions for the Constitution," pg. 3).[154]

The former mujahedin leaders, in particular the Shura-i Nazar members, were divided on what kind of political system they preferred and whether there should be one vice-president or two (author's interview with Massoud; Rubin, 2013, p. 156). Fahim[155], Abdullah, and Khalili (who occupied important posts in Karzai's government) supported the choice of presidential system (author's interview with Mahdi and Massoud). Fahim, who had been promised the vice-presidential post, wanted one elected vice-president and no prime minister (Rubin, 2013, p. 156; author's interview with Massoud); Khalili wanted a presidential system with two vice-presidents—wanting the second vice-presidential post for himself (author's interview with Massoud). Qanooni, who had his eyes on the prime minister's post, however preferred a parliamentary system with executive powers for the Prime Minister (Rubin, 2013, p. 156).

When the form of government was debated in the NSC, Qanooni was the strongest opposition voice in resisting the removal of the prime ministerial post as he had

[154] The document is in author's possession.
[155] Fahim was the most influential Shura-i Nazar leader at the time as the military leader of the faction with the ability to mobilize his militias. Karzai needed to keep Fahim on his side using selective incentives. He had promised Fahim the vice presidency in return for his support of Karzai's position (author's interview with Massoud).

envisioned himself for the post since the 2001 Bonn Accord. In an attempt to get back at Fahim for his support of the elimination of the prime ministerial post, Qanooni tried to insure a weak vice-presidency. In a letter to Brahimi, Arnault, Yash Pal Ghai, and Kawun Kakar dated 1 September 2003 Rubin wrote that Sayed Tayeb Jawad, President's Chief of Staff, told him that there was near unanimity in the cabinet in favour of a presidential system. Meanwhile, Karzai wanted an elected VP because he thought that if the VP is elected, the president cannot dismiss him or her. As such, the president will be afraid to give an elected VP a lot of authority. An appointed VP on the other hand could be given many authorities, and the president can always dismiss him or her if he or she threatens the president. Karzai also preferred that the VP succeed the president not for more than three months because succeeding to the whole term will give VPs an incentive to get rid of the president.[156]

Meanwhile, some Mujahedin leaders in the opposition feared a strong presidency and suggested curbing some of the powers of the president. Wali Massoud (brother of the renowned commander Ahmad Shah Massoud) who represented the United Front suggested that the governors should be selected through consultation with Provincial Councils instead of being appointed by the president. The PCs would suggest a list of people from which the president could pick one. However, Karzai did not respond to Massoud's proposals. When he confronted Karzai for not responding to his proposals, Karzai told him that if he answered to his proposal he had to consider others' requests as well. Karim Khalili, the Hazara leader of Hezb-e Wahdat, wanted two vice-presidential posts, envisioning one of those posts for himself. Fahim was opposed to the idea of two

[156] The letter is in author's possession.

VPs and told Karzai that if he added another vice-presidential post, all bits were off between them (author's interview with Massoud).[157] The second vice-presidential post was not added in the draft sent to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, although Karzai had to cave in to Khalili's request when he needed the Hazara vote in the Constitutional Loya Jirga to pass the Constitution.

When Massoud met with Karzai, Karzai told him that he was creating trouble for him by suggesting decentralization and giving autonomy to provinces. Massoud left the meeting with Karzai, unhappy. A couple of days later, Karzai's brother, Qayyum, came up to him and asked if he wanted to meet with Karzai as he was more willing to work things out. When Massoud went to meet with Karzai, Karzai told him to talk to Shahrani, Azimi, and maybe Ash'ari (the three members of both the Drafting and the Review commissions) to see if they had the time to bring those changes. Massoud was made to believe that these three were the most important decision makers in this process. When Massoud went to see them about the changes, they said they were told not to accept the changes. Massoud asked them who the real players were, and they mentioned some names to him, which he did not mention in his interview. When Massoud proposed the creation of a Constitutional Court to interpret the Constitution because the Supreme Court

[157] Wali Massoud's proposals for changing the draft Constitution are also summarized by Barnett R. Rubin in a document dated December 19, 2003. The document is in author's possession. He was one of the very few voices who was concerned about long-term consequences of the new Constitution and did not try to advance his interests. Barnett R. Rubin kindly provided the author with the English translation of Ahmad Wali Massoud's proposals to revise the Draft Constitution. Rubin wrote that Massoud had not received any official comments from the government on those proposals as the Draft Constitution was being reviewed by the NSC and Cabinet members (The English translation is dated 19 December 2003). This point was confirmed by Massoud in an interview I conducted with him. He told me that until two weeks before the Constitutional Loya Jirga was planned to be held, Karzai had not responded to his suggested changes.

could not solve those problems, Karzai told him that he was trying to create another government (author's interview with Massoud).[158]

Regarding the electoral rules for electing the president, Ghai and Rubin suggested that the simple majority system with the possibility of run-off elections will be difficult to work in Afghanistan due to logistic reasons (the difficulty with not knowing when the results from the first round will be announced, the expensive and dangerous nature of the elections, and the hardship with which voters get to the polling stations). They suggested the alternative vote system where voters get to rank the candidates.[159] The authors however did acknowledge the difficulties of administering such a system in Afghanistan with a largely illiterate electorate and inexperienced electoral staff (In "Suggested Changes to the Draft Constitution," unpublished document). In the draft that was made public on November 3, 2003 the French two-round system, proposed in the original draft Constitution and revised by the Constitutional Commission, was adopted. For the run-off elections, the NSC and Cabinet members opted for 50 percent majority (as opposed to a more complex plurality system suggested in the draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Commission).

The draft Constitution underwent multiple revisions when it was considered in the Commission and in the NSC. The revisions that took place both in the Constitutional Commission and in the NSC demonstrated the short-term preferences of those in office at the time and not a technical analysis of the consequences of different systems in

[158] In a document dated 19 December 2003, Rubin writes about Massoud's proposals and government's lack of response to those proposals. The document is in author's possession.

[159] In this system, if no candidate won a majority of first-choice votes, the vote counters would eliminate the candidate with the smallest number of first-choice votes, or the candidate with the largest number of last-choice votes. They would adjust the rankings accordingly and count again until a decisive winner could be identified.

Afghanistan. The president and the former Mujahedin leaders were not the only group looking after their own interests. The returning technocrats too asserted influence on the revision of the draft Constitution to make it more responsive to their status. During the review of the draft Constitution, the NSC and Cabinet members removed most restrictions on dual citizenship and citizenship of spouses (mostly for ministers). The dual citizenship restrictions disproportionately affected the returning technocrats working for the government, most of whom either had citizenship of another country or foreign spouses or both. The removal of those restrictions points to the influence the returning technocrats exercised in the Transitional Administration.

About a week before the draft Constitution was sent to CLJ for approval, Rubin wrote in a confidential document (prepared at the request of senior diplomats of a Western country) that the draft Constitution was a "deeply flawed document that will not be able to provide a framework for stable and effective governance to Afghanistan."[160] Some of the troubling issues that Rubin identified in that document included the vote of no confidence on individual ministers (he thought this will be used as a tool by conservative MPs to hurt the president), absence of strong enough safeguards to prevent the abuse of power by the president (i.e., the conditions for impeachment are limited to "most serious crimes" and do not include abuse of power, corruption, and other forms of political misbehaviour, no independent institutions to curb the power of the president), and the judicial review power given to the Supreme Court (which in combination with Article 3, which states that "In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the sacred religion

[160] Rubin wrote this document "in the hope that senior international officials may be able to bring these concerns to the attention of most influential Afghans, some of whom have indicated their interest in hearing these ideas." Rubin kindly provided the author with a copy of the document.

of Islam and the values of this Constitution," can create a blocking institution).[161] However, regardless of the problems identified by national and international experts in the draft Constitution, it was sent to the Loya Jirga for approval.

Constitutional Loya Jirga: 14 December 2003 to 4 January 2004

The struggle among political elites to secure their interests in the new Constitution continued into the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ hereafter). The two political camps that had dominated the discussions over writing and revising the draft Constitution continued to exert influence in the CLJ: the government (Karzai camp), and the opposition (the former Mujahedin camp). Meanwhile, the Karzai camp was dominated by Pashtuns, while the former mujahedin camp was populated by Tajiks and other minority groups such as Hazaras and Uzbeks. Each group wanted to revise the draft Constitution in a way that would guarantee their survival and serve their interests. The draft that was presented to the CLJ for approval heavily favored Karzai and his supporters' position since his group was the stronger of the two given Karzai's access to political resources as the sitting president. As discussed above, Karzai was able to exert a lot of influence during the writing and revising stages of the draft constitution. In the CLJ, too, the interests of the President's group prevailed, as the other group fragmented and the U.N. and the U.S. propped up Karzai's position (each for different reasons). The draft Constitution was debated over 22 days, and at the end, no valid, formal vote was cast for adopting the Constitution. Instead, the Chair of CLJ asked all the delegates to stand up and pray for peace and for rain (after years of draught in Afghanistan). As the delegates stood up, the

[161] Regarding the judicial review provisions Rubin writes that "[a]t the last minute the government removed the Constitutional Court from the draft, but it then hurriedly transferred the power of judicial review to the Supreme Court" (Rubin document for the senior diplomats of a Western country). Establishing a constitutional court was suggested by Wali Massoud.

Chair, in an emotional plea, declared the Constitution "adopted" (author's interview with Massoud, Ma'navi, and Mansoor; see also Ruttig, 2014).

The CLJ was established by a presidential decree on 15 July 2003.[162] The decree also contained the procedures for electing the delegates to the CLJ. In implementing the decree, the Secretariat developed a two-track election process, including an indirect election process to determine the 344 delegate seats from among the ELJ district representatives and special category elections to determine women and minority delegate seats. The number of delegates participating in the CLJ was designated at 500; 450 of those delegates were indirectly elected (i.e., not directly elected by the entire electorate) as follows: 344 members elected through secret ballot by the district representatives who participated in the first phase of the Emergency Loya Jigra in May 2002, 42 members elected by representatives of refugees in Pakistan and Iran, internally displaced people, Kuchis, Hindus and Sikhs in accordance with the provisions of article five of the decree, and 64 women elected by women representatives in the 32 provinces.[163] The other 50 delegates were appointed by the president of the Transitional Administration, 25 of whom were eligible women, and the other 25 were selected from among legal scholars, specialists of constitutional law, and other experts.[164] Two delegates were appointed from among the disabled community as a result of lobbying by the Comprehensive Disabled

[162] The Decree is in author's possession.
[163] For more details on the election of delegates see The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003.
[164] In addition to the elected and appointed delegates, a number of personalities were invited as observers who could not vote or express their views. These included members of the Cabinet of the Transitional Administration (33 persons), chief of the Supreme Court (1 person), Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commission (35 persons), and chairpersons of Judicial Commission and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (2 persons). Meanwhile, other senior government officials including governors, deputy governors, district administrators, mayors, army, police and National Security Directorate personnel were not eligible to participate in the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

Afghanistan Program (CDAP), bringing the number of delegates to 502 people. The task of the delegates was to discuss and ratify the draft constitution that had been written by the Constitutional Draft Commission and revised by the Constitutional Review Commission and the NSC.

The meeting of the CLJ began on December 14, 2003 in a big tent at the inner compound of Kabul Polytechnic Institute. The meeting infrastructure included: CLJ Main Assembly Hall, ten smaller tents (two entrance tents, two office tents, three break-out tents, two VIP guests tents and one kitchen tent). The break-out tent housed ten committee rooms as well as 'overflow' space (The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003). One of the small tents was reserved for Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and Zalmai Khalilzad, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, where they would facilitate deal-making and apply political pressure on delegates to get through controversial articles in the draft Constitution.[165]

In order to provide security for the participants of the CLJ and to prevent any interference in the CLJ process, a security task group was established by the Asia Foundation under the auspices of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Security was provided by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Kabul Police Forces supported by a group of embedded trainers from ISAF and security

[165] Khalilzad, and to a lesser extent, Brahimi were accused of supporting Karzai's position by many delegates and observers in the CLJ. Khalilzad, was among the strongest advocates of a centralized system and a strong presidency. His role in the process of negotiations was perceived by many as too interventionist. One person that I interviewed called him a "viceroy," a sentiment shared by many elites I interviewed (author's interview with Gailani, Massoud, Mansoor, Mahdi, and Ma'navi). Brahimi too supported presidential system and tried to pressure the opponents of the presidential system into accepting it (author's interview with Massoud, Mahdi and Ma'navi). See also J Alexander Their (2006/07) on the subject.

advisors contracted by the Asia Foundation (The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003).

While the creation of the CLJ was dictated in 2001 Bonn Agreement, the rules of procedure for ratification of the draft constitution were not laid out in the Agreement. The July 15 Presidential Decree, which established the CLJ, did not specify the rules of procedure either. However, at the opening ceremony of the CLJ, Karzai presented the delegates with rules of procedure in the form of another presidential decree, which faced immediate resentment from delegates (Ruttig, 2003). Hafiz Mansoor of Jamiat-e Islami Party, a journalist by occupation, objected to the decree and to the notion that no option was given to the delegates to choose from, i.e. between different systems of government, as Karzai had strongly supported the adoption of a presidential system and rejected the parliamentary system in his opening speech (author's interview with Mansoor).[166] In his speech at the opening ceremony, Mansoor said 'First of all, we must vote on the future political system of our country,' which brought the conflict among the pro-Karzai and opposition forces (mainly non-Pashtun former mujahedin leaders) to full light. The discussion, however, was supressed and no vote on the rules of procedure was cast (Ruttig, 2003).

The CLJ delegates elected the leadership of the CLJ, based on the rules of procedure introduced by Karzai in the presidential decree, through secret ballot. The elected body included a Chair, three deputy chairs and two Rapporteurs, referred to as the Leadership Bureau. The elections for the Bureau took place on the first and second day of

[166] Mansoor was removed from his post as the head of the National Television a few days before the CLJ began because he had criticized the process of writing and revising the draft Constitution (author's interview with Mansoor; see also Ruttig 2014).

the CLJ. The operational procedures for the election process were exactly the same as the regional elections and conducted by the Constitutional Commission election team. In the elections for the Chair, four candidates nominated themselves and 489 out of 502 delegates cast a ballot while 13 abstained (The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan 2003). Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, the leader of the National Liberation Front (one of the seven original Mujahedin parties) and a pro-Karzai candidate, was elected the Chairman of the Jirga in a contested, two-round election.[167]

The rules of procedure also dictated the establishment of ten working groups, which would produce and submit proposals for amendments to the draft Constitution to the Reconciliation Committee, which was comprised of the chairs, deputy-chairs and secretaries of each working group. The task of the Reconciliation Committee was to identify articles that were approved by all working groups and to try to reconcile working-group views on contentious articles, which technically involved proposing new language to harmonize the competing views. The recommendations from the Reconciliation Committee were then put forth to the plenary, where the delegates would vote on individual paragraphs. The delegates were divided into ten working groups by members of the Secretariat, and they were of equal numbers, balanced along regional, ethnic and gender lines. In each working group, a Chair was elected through secret ballot elections or selected through voice call, while the deputy chairs and the secretaries were appointed (selected) by the Bureau in order to correct any imbalances in ethnic, gender, and social composition in the working groups. Two members of the Constitutional Commission were also appointed to sit in each group and provide clarification and

[167] In the second round, Mujaddedi won 255 votes while Hafiz Mansoor of Jamiat-e Islami won 154 votes.

assistance on the revised Draft Constitution in case there were questions. Two members of UNAMA and the Constitutional Commission Secretariat monitored the working groups to record their progress. As directed by the Leadership Bureau, the working groups read through the revised draft Constitution article by article and either voted or simply noted proposed amendments or revisions to each article (The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, 2003, p. 26-27).

In general, the northern delegates were opposed to the presidential system and centralization of power, while most southern Pashtun delegates (although not the royalist Pashtuns at first) and the returning technocrats advocated presidentialism and centralization of power. Those who were actively advocating the presidential system (such as Ashraf Ghani, Qayyum Karzai, Anwar ul Haq Ahadi, and Ali Ahmad Jalali—all of them returning technocrats except Qayyum Karzai) argued that the need for presidential system derived from the current instability and weakness of institutions in the country. Meanwhile, some opponents of the presidential system, also recognizing the need for a strong central government, suggested a phased transition from the presidential system to a parliamentary system after the end of the first elected term of the president.[168] International advisors such as Rubin, who was advising Brahimi, also supported presidentialism as a more effective system for the post-conflict Afghanistan than a parliamentary system. He also opposed "expanding the number of issues on which the president require[d] the approval of the parliament, as this could cripple him," although making some other high-level appointments such as the head of National Directorate of

[168] All these points are reported in Rubin's memorandum to Brahimi, dated 18 December 2003.

Security subject to parliamentary approval, he thought, was not a bad idea (laid out in the memorandum send to Brahimi on December 18, 2003).

The debate over the draft Constitution was tense as neither camp wanted to compromise on the issues that were of most importance to them, namely the type of government, the national languages, the language used in the national anthem, the powers of the president, the authorities of the National Assembly, and the interpretation of the Constitution. As tension increased, Mujaddedi blocked debate over controversial issues in the CLJ, and "Discussions and more crucial decision making shifted more and more to a smaller tent next to the *Loya Jirga* tent where US Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, of Afghan origin, and UN envoy Brahimi mediated and twisted arms" (Ruttig, 2014, p. 2-3). As Brahimi and Khalilzad tried to help broker deals between competing elites, they were accused by some delegates of using their position to support Karzai's position on the Constitution. In a confidential memorandum dated December 18, Rubin wrote to Brahimi about his meeting with Amrullah Saleh, one of the younger leaders of the Shura-i Nazar. Saleh was concerned that the president's group, the U.S. Embassy, and perhaps the U.N. (although he had put the latter in the form of a question rather than a statement) were using money, influence, pressure, offers of jobs, and other means to push through the existing draft Constitution. Rubin also reported his encounter with a group of delegates from the northern and central provinces (Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, Parwan, Kabul, Balkh, Bamyan, Jauzjan, Samagan, Sar-e Pul, Ghanzni, Wardak, and Ghor), most of them Uzbeks and Hazara, with some Turkmen and Tajiks, who complained about being excluded from the process of decision making by the chairs of the working groups. They told Rubin that the elections and selections were unfair, and that government was in

control.[169] In an interview conducted by the author, Muhayddin Mahdi, a CLJ delegate who opposed the presidential system (because he thought it led either to ethnic tyranny or personal tyranny) also made similar remarks about the role of both Brahimi and Khalilzad in propping up Karzai's position (this sentiment also came up in author's interviews with Gailani, Mansoor, and Massoud).[170]

As the controversy over the type of government continued, those participants that did not want a presidential system were told not to vote. Consequently, the voting was postponed for several days because those delegates were reluctant to vote since they were not given a choice. With continued deadlock, Brahimi and Khalilzad approached Massoud and told him that the draft Constitution needed to get passed without changing the presidential system. Massoud's pleas that it was not in Afghanistan's interest did not change their mind (author's interview with Massoud). The Karzai camp was eventually able to get the presidential system approved by using a combination of invoking ethnicity (to mobilize Pashtun delegates in support of presidentialism), promising political

[169] A copy of the memorandum is in author's possession.

[170] The author cannot confirm or reject the notion that the U.S. and the U.N. were involved in carrying out activities they were accused of by many delegates. However, certain elements' support of Karzai's position in return for government posts or other political favors does demonstrate the deal-making dynamics in trying to get the draft Constitution passed by the CLJ. Fahim and Abdullah's support for the presidential system and their continued service in Karzai's Transitional Administration is one such example. Karzai had also promised Abdullah that in the closing ceremony, he will give the anthem as a gift to all ethnic groups in Afghanistan. That is, he will make the national Anthem either a melody or in all national languages of Afghanistan in return for Abbdullah's support of presidential system. However, he did not deliver on his promise, and the anthem stayed in Pashto (author's interview with Massoud and Mansoor). Not only was Fahim and Abdullah's behavior inconsistent with the rest of Shura-i Nazar members, they were also discredited among United Front delegates (as Saleh reported to Rubin) who opposed the presidential system, with further exception of Atta Mohammad Noor, who was promised to become the governor of Balkh. Khalili of Wahdat Party also supported Karzai's position in return for adding a second vice-presidential post and giving him the post. Meanwhile, Rubin wrote in an unpublished document (in author's possession) that "There are persistent reports that the president or the US ambassador promised Sayyaf control over judicial appointments in return for support of the presidential system." Rubin too could not verify the authenticity of these reports.

rewards, bribes, and threatening to use violence.[171] Rubin, in an unpublished document, made a milder statement regarding Karzai's use of ethnic card to gather support for the presidential system among Pashtun delegates. He wrote that the form of government that was established by the CLJ, a presidential system, was "supported most strongly by Pashtuns" (Rubin 2004, p. 2).[172] Regardless of what methods were used to mobilize Pashtuns, Karzai was able to get his preferred political system passed in the Constitutional Loya Jirga using his dominant position vis-à-vis the fragmented opposition.

The Constitution that was "approved" established a presidential system with two vice-presidents rather than one. On the last day of the CLJ, Rubin observed[173] that adding the second vice-presidential post signified an alliance between the presidency and Hazaras. Marshal Fahim of Shura-i Nazar, who was eying the vice-presidential post, was against creating a second vice-presidency. However, he was unable to deliver anything for Karzai's camp at the CLJ (as he was discredited among United Front delegates). Karim Khalili of the Wahdat Party was rewarded with the second vice-presidential

[171] Ruttig (2014, p. 3) observed: "To get the unorganized Pashtun delegates in line to support the presidential system, Karzai's main allies in the assembly—his brother Qayyum, finance minister Ashraf Ghani, rural development minister Hanif Atmar, and [former mujahedin leader, Abdul Rabb Rassul] Sayyaf played the ethnic card, capitalizing on the deep mistrust many Pashtuns have for the Northern Alliance mujahedin who had denounced them to US forces as 'Taleban'. In cases where this pressure was not sufficient, promises and small gifts were added. 'Look how many delegates now brandish new mobile phones', Waqif Hakimi, another Jamiati, quipped. 'Do you think they had them before?' A vote in the loya Jirga costs around 300 dollars, a UN staff member told me, and political leaders who were able to deliver a whole group of delegates even receive 5,000 dollars. Kabul's former mayor, Fazl Karim Aimaq, also a Jamiati, said he and his friends had been threatened: after the loya Jirga, he was told, they would be 'taken care of' if they continued to support a parliamentary system." Thomas Ruttig was working with the office of the European Union's Special Representative in Kabul at the time and was present throughout the CLJ proceedings. His article used here is a re-print of an article he wrote for a Swiss weekly, Wochenzeitung, immediately after the Jirga ended.

[172] A copy of the report is in author's possession.

[173] The unpublished document that Rubin wrote, "A Brief Look at the Final Negotiations on the Constitution of Afghanistan", is in author's possession. The article has been published on this site: http://www.kabul-reconstructions.net/index.php?id=293

position as a gift for his promised support for Karzai's position. Rubin writes that the second vice-presidential post was a concession to ethnic groups other than Pashtuns and Tajiks, "which suit[ed] the palace very well. The president had always preferred multiple vice presidents and accepted the single vice presidency as a concession to Fahim" (Rubin, 2004, p. 2).

In addition to type of government, a number of other issues also created intense debate among the delegates. The centralization of power was one such issue. The draft Constitution had created a highly centralized political system. Despite attempts by Wali Masoud and Uzbek and Hazara delegates, the Constitution does not compromise on decentralization of power and the appointment of governors (the president appoints governors). The Constitution says that the central government may delegate authorities to local units according to the law, but there is little detail on how it will work in practice (Rubin "A Brief Look at the Final Negotiations on the Constitution of Afghanistan," unpublished document).

The issue of national language and the language of the national anthem also proved controversial. Ruttig (2014) wrote that the Pashtun majority was fighting fiercely to keep Pashto as the sole national language. However, the opposition group consisted of minorities from northern and central Afghanistan (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Turkmens) resisted the linguistic domination of Pashtuns. As a result of the opposition resistance, Dari was made the second official language and Uzbeki and Turkmen—jointly referred to as Turki in the Constitution, became "the third official language in areas

where the majority speaks them" (Ruttig, 2014, p. 3).[174] Meanwhile, the national anthem remained in Pashtu despite Karzai's promise (to Abdullah) to either change it to a melody or to a mix of all languages.

The CLJ as an enterprise to adopt the Constitution was not considered legal by some observers. In an interview with the author, Ma'navi, a Supreme Court judge, questioned the legal basis for the CLJ because the representatives were not directly elected. Furthermore, most delegates were ordinary people who did not understand the importance of adopting a Constitution. For instance, the issue of language used in the national anthem was discussed passionately for days, when more important structural issues were left out. Ma'navi was not supportive of writing and adopting the Constitution at the beginning of the transition, and he told Brahimi that the conditions for writing and approving a constitution did not exist in 2003. His rationale was that in that stage of the transition, foreign advisors could influence the process and the content of the Constitution, which was not good in most cases (i.e. Khalilzad's interference with the process and the content of the Constitution). At the same time, the Mujahedin were considerably strong at the time, and they too could affect the process and the content of the Constitution, while ordinary people could not express their opinions effectively. Ma'navi wanted to wait for such time when the legitimacy of the Constitution could be based on popular participation—adopted by directly elected representatives.[175]

[174] Ruttig's article was reprinted from 2004.

[175] Ma'navi believed that the UN representatives and the ambassadors from other countries who were involved in the process of the transition in Afghanistan were trying to build their CVs by helping to accomplish something in Afghanistan. Consequently, they did not think through the consequences of certain decisions that were made in post-transition Afghanistan. He recalled one instance when Khalilzad came to Supreme Court and wanted the Court to "interpret" the article that said if a candidate died during the first round of elections before the results were announced, the elections will be held again. Khalilzad

Despite all the controversy and struggle, the goal of the CLJ was achieved on 4 January 2004. No valid vote was cast on the Constitution, but it was adopted nonetheless. Karzai and his supporters had succeeded in designing rules of the game in ways that advantaged them. The concessions they had to make to the opposition camp were minimal because the Karzai camp was considerably more powerful than the fragmented opposition group. A few of those compromises were even reversed in the text of the Constitution that was published as it was different from the draft the delegates approved in the CLJ (author's interview with Gailani, Mansoor, Ma'navi).

On the last day of the CLJ, 600 copies of the draft that was adopted were distributed to the participants. However, when the text of the Constitution was published by the Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission in late January 2004, Mansoor and his group alleged that four details (in articles 16, 50, 64, and 161) were different from the copy that was adopted in the CLJ. Ruttig (2014) crosschecked the allegations in 2004 on the bases of both copies and confirmed the allegations to be correct in three cases. In Chapter 1 (article 16), one paragraph was added saying 'Current national academic and administrative terminologies in the country shall be preserved.' During the CLJ, objections were raised that some key institutions had traditionally carried Pashto names only (e.g. Pashto terms are used in legal ranking, military ranking, administrative ranking, and academic ranking). The added paragraph perhaps was a move to keep

was concerned that it was logistically hard to hold the elections again if one of the candidates died. As a solution, he proposed that the U.S. embassy should send a letter to Supreme Court, officially asking the Supreme Court to "interpret" the clause in a way to remove the requirement of holding the elections again. However, he was told that the U.S. embassy did not have the authority to make such request. He then said they will do it through the Ministry of Interior. Ali Ahmad Jalali was the Interior Minister at the time. He sent the letter to Supreme Court and the Court shamelessly "interpreted" an obviously worded clause as saying that it means if a candidate dies on the day of election from 7am to 4pm. Ma'navi refused to sign the decision because to him the clause was obviously worded and did not need any interpretation. Such actions set a precedent for misusing the Constitution and abusing the powers of the Supreme Court.

Karzai's Pashtun majority satisfied by keeping the linguistic dominance of Pashto. Article 50 omitted a stipulation that administrative reforms should be undertaken only 'after the authorization by the National Assembly.' The aim of this change may have been to make it hard to change or reform the current system. In Article 64, paragraph 11, the term 'approval' (of some appointments by the National Assembly) had been changed to a weaker version, 'confirmation' (from taswib to ta'yin).[176] During the CLJ, the word 'confirmation' was changed to 'approval' (of president's appointments by the National Assembly) as a result of extensive campaigning by Massoud and some other delegates. The purpose of the change was to take away some authority from the president and give to the National Assembly. By replacing "confirmation" with "approval," in order to restore the authorities granted to the president in the draft Constitution, the published text effectively reversed the decision reached in the CLJ in this regard. On the last allegation (article 161), Ruttig found that there had been confusion over the numbering of the articles.[177]

Hence, the new Constitution was designed to solidify the president's power and influence. Instead of presidentialism encouraging independent, populist candidates in post-2001 Afghanistan, the independent (non-party) Karzai was able to choose a presidential system as a result of his relative strength vis-à-vis the opposition. Karzai was able to use his power and influence to build major alliances, buy off loyalty, and commit large-scale, systematic fraud to secure his victory in the elections that followed. His power and influence kept him in office for over twelve years, even though his popularity

[176] The difference between the two terms in English language is not significant. However, in Farsi-Dari the meaning of each term conveys different degrees of authority.
[177] The author was not able to obtain a copy of the Constitutional text distributed during the last day of the CLJ. However, the CLJ participants I talked to confirmed that they had kept their copy and would give it for publication when the time was right (author's interview with Gailani and Mansoor).

had dropped significantly after the first presidential elections in 2004 (discussed in Chapter 4). Meanwhile, the pure presidentialism established in the Constitution considerably raised the stakes, which led to heightened competition among elites for winning the presidency.[178] Curiously however, the Constitution did not establish the electoral rules for the legislature. Barakzai (2013) writes that although the electoral system for the legislature was discussed in the Constitutional Drafting Commission, it was removed from the draft Constitution because of the uncertainty and divergent views over which electoral system should be chosen for Afghanistan. The electoral rules were adopted through a different process (discussed below).

Adopting the Electoral Law

The process by which the electoral rules for the legislature were adopted was not made public, and consequently the details of the process are not entirely known. Unlike the process of adoption of the Constitution, choosing the electoral rules for the legislature was not done through an elaborate, multi-stage process involving all the main political actors in the country. Rather, the main decision makers in choosing the electoral rules appeared to be the government (namely, Karzai and his cabinet) and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Most importantly, the electoral rules were chosen without consultation with, or input from, political parties. In fact, efforts by some political parties to prevent the adoption of the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV hereafter) did not affect the decision to adopt it. The conventional explanations and analyses of prevalence of independent candidates in Afghan elections and the relatively

[178] The high degree of concentration of power in the executive also led to intense competition among Afghanistan's neighbors as they tried to support certain candidates.

weak role that political parties play in elections have been blamed on the SNTV. However, this section will demonstrate that the choice of SNTV was endogenous to the weakness of political parties at the time of adoption of the electoral rules. That is, the government was able to adopt SNTV precisely because at the time of the adoption of the electoral rules, strong political parties did not exist to exert their influence on the choice of electoral institutions. Hence, SNTV was adopted as a result of the strength of actors who were—and preferred to remain—independent of parties. Asymmetries of power were decisive in the choice of the electoral institutions, as the powerful, independent Karzai chose institutions that gave him an advantage in post-2001 politics and advanced his anti-party agenda (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3).

As mentioned above, a discussion of the electoral laws governing the conduct of the legislative elections was not included in the Constitution. Consequently, the adoption of the electoral rules for the legislature occurred through a separate process in 2004.[179] As with the constitutional drafting process, international electoral advisers provided technical advice on the electoral system choice. However, Karzai and his core supporters, mainly the returning technocrats, the majority of whom were independent (i.e. not party affiliated), had their own preferences for the choice of electoral rules. Karzai had gained strength vis-à-vis the former Mujahedin leaders by being selected the head of the Interim Authority at the conclusion of the Bonn Accords. Consequently, his main concern was to preserve his power by not allowing the former Mujahedin leaders to gain power. Choosing the "right" electoral rules could help him achieve his goal.

[179] It is important to note that when the electoral rules were being discussed, political parties had already acquired legal status under the 2003 Political Parties Law and close to 100 political parties had already registered. However, none of those parties were strong enough (national, inclusive) to exercise influence over the process of the adoption of the electoral rules.

The first draft of the electoral law, which was proposed by the international electoral advisers (in UNAMA) in February 2004, suggested a proportional representation system with closed party lists. The draft had envisaged 34 national seats for Wolesi Jirga elections to be contested by political parties whose candidates would appear on closed but not secret lists. However, the cabinet rejected the proposal "on the grounds that it was too complicated and gave too much power to the (jihadi) parties" (Bijlert, 2013, p. 2) and chose SNTV from among alternatives systems. The choice of SNTV was challenged by a group of around 50 political parties, who pushed for the adoption of a mixed system. However, UNAMA went with the choice of the Palace (author's interview with Kohestani, leader of Nuhzat-e Democratic Afghanistan/Afghanistan Democratic Movement). The unsuccessful attempt of political parties to influence the choice of the electoral system vividly demonstrates the weakness of political parties vis-à-vis the president and his cabinet, which was dominated by non-party, independent personalities. In fact, many observers of the post-2001 institutional engineering shared the sentiment. Larson (2015, p. 3) wrote: "The selection of SNTV electoral system by Afghan and international actors was a deliberate choice intended to exclude parties because of the violent reputation parties had acquired in the war years and partly to stymie opposition to the new government."

The Afghan Electoral Law was approved by the Council of Ministers on 12 May 2004 and was adopted through a presidential decree. The proponents of SNTV "including the United States government, electoral authorities, and President Karzai" justified the choice of the electoral system by citing "ease of voter education and of voting; promotion of women by encouraging them to run as independents; and decreasing the power of

parties dominated by warlords" (NDI, 2004, p. 6). Under SNTV in Afghanistan, each elector has one vote in multi-member provinces; candidates who receive the highest votes are sequentially awarded seats assigned to each province. The SNTV system encourages the participation of independent candidates and presents political parties with great challenges in solving the strategic entry problems.[180] The system favors large, highly disciplined, and sophisticated political parties, "few of which existed in Afghanistan prior to the elections" (NDI, 2004, p. 5).

In addition to the choice of SNTV, a number of other decisions were made by the UN that adversely affected the performance of political parties. When the first parliamentary elections were held in 2005 under SNTV, the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEBM hereafter)[181]—the institution in charge of conducting elections before the Independent Election Commission was created—disallowed political parties to print their party symbols on the ballot. Justifying the decision, JEMB authorities claimed that "Consideration was given to the possibility of using the symbols of the political parties that are registered with the ministry of justice. However, as political parties are likely to be supporting more than one candidate…the use of these symbols would not uniquely identify candidates on the ballot."[182] Although JEMB's decision appeared to have been logistical, not a political one, it did prevent political parties from gaining strength through elections during the founding elections. In the next few years, however, Karzai

[180] For parties to succeed under SNTV, they must first have an accurate estimate of their potential supporters in a certain constituency. And, second, they must field the number of candidates that will maximize the seats they can win based on their estimated support base. Both steps require a high degree of party discipline and organization—both of which are missing among the majority of political parties in post-2001 Afghanistan.

[181] Before the Independent Election Commission was formed, elections were conducted by the JEMB, which was created by President Karzai through Decree no. 39 of 26 July 2003.

[182] The article can be accessed here: http://www.iec.org.af/jemb.org/eng/electoral_system/jembs_candi_symbol_background.pdf

deliberately manipulated the electoral rules to further weaken political parties and blocked any efforts to reform the Electoral Law.

As SNTV was implemented, it became apparent that most of the suggested merits of the system proved inaccurate in the Afghan context: SNTV in multi-member districts produced lengthy ballots, which made it difficult for voters to search for their candidates among 100 to 400 names; and female candidates who ran as independent encountered many challenges in identifying resources, such as volunteers, financing, and mobility to run adequate campaigns. Consequently, many women ran as party candidates while claiming to be independent (NDI, 2004, p. 6). Furthermore, in every legislative election since 2001, the votes have been divided among a large pool of candidates, making the final results almost random, while the margins have been almost negligible, and the wasted votes effectively have made up the majority of votes (Bijlert, 2013, p. 6).

For legislative elections to the Wolesi Jirga (Pashto term meaning House of People), the provinces serve as multi-member, electoral districts. There are 249 seats in the Wolesi Jirga, 239 of which are allocated among the provinces in proportion to their population, while ten seats are reserved for Kuchis (non-resident population of the country). Kabul is the largest electoral district with 33 seats, and Panjshir, Nimroz, and Noorestan are the smallest electoral districts with 2 seats each.[183] Voters cast a single, non-transferable vote for their candidate, and the top vote getters fill in the seat quota for their province. Sometimes, only a few votes separate the person who fills in the last seat and the highest losing candidate. And, some representatives are elected to the Wolesi Jirga with as little as a couple of dozen votes.

[183] See here for seat allocation: http://www.iec.org.af/2012-06-30-11-03-03/seat-allocations

The shortcomings of SNTV have led to a number of efforts to reform the electoral rules. In 2007, the Independent Election Commission proposed changing the SNTV to a mixed electoral system, two-thirds SNTV and one-third party list. However, when it went to the Council of Ministers for consideration, it was rejected (author's interview with Afghanzai; see also Bijlert, 2013, p. 6). In the Council of Ministers, only two ministers, Dadfar Spanta and Anwar ul Haq Ahadi, were in favor of the changes, but the majority voted to reject the proposal (author's interview with Spanta). There were two further efforts by the Independent Election Commission to reform the electoral rules with no success: in 2008, a similar proposal to the one suggested in 2007 was sent to the Wolesi Jirga only to be rejected under the executive pressure, even though there was "considerable amount of support in Parliament for the parallel system of SNTV and a party list" (Larson, 2009, p. 10). Finally, another proposal, made by the Independent Election Commission under the leadership of Ma'navi, to change SNTV to a mixed system of SNTV and PR was defeated in the Wolesi Jirga in 2013 (Crisis Group, 2013, p. 5; Bijlert, 2013). The defeat of the proposed reforms for a mixed system in 2013 was partly due to the fact that at that point strong political parties did not exist in the Wolesi Jirga to exert their influence.

In addition to blocking efforts to change the SNTV to a mixed electoral system, Karzai tried to change the Electoral Law in ways that would disadvantage political parties and prevent the development of strong political parties. One such effort occurred right before the 2010 parliamentary elections. In 2009, a new law was decreed by the president, which required political parties to register 10,000 members (up from 700 members in the original law) from at least 22 provinces, 2% from each province.

Consequently, only five parties could register in time for the 2010 parliamentary elections, and 34 candidates (out of 218 requests) were allowed to have their party name on the ballot (NDI, 2010, p. 65-66). The new requirements made it particularly difficult for newly formed political parties to meet. In the absence of public funding for political parties (discussed in Chapter 3), the newly formed political parties were at severe disadvantage to recruit members from the majority of the provinces. Although the old political parties survived the manipulation of the rules, they were unable to transform themselves from ethnic parties to national, inclusive parties, as they were unable to gain strength through elections.

In early 2012, Karzai approved a new regulation on political parties requiring parties to establish offices in a minimum of twenty provinces, and provide the office addresses to the Justice Ministry. Meanwhile, the Justice Ministry did not make the application of the rule clear until almost a year later, when it started sending warning letters requesting from the parties to submit their lists of provincial headquarters by 4 April 2013. Only eight of the fifty five political parties submitted their replies before the deadline. Government officials claimed that the goal of the regulations was to drastically reduce the number of parties. After the April deadline passed, a Justice Ministry statement to the local media said that none of the registered parties satisfied the requirements for legal activity (Crisis Group, 2013, p. 6-7). The new parties once again were hit by the regulations disproportionally, as the majority of them appeared unable to achieve the required number of offices. “Shutting out smaller parties from the political process would in fact marginalize many of Afghanistan’s nascent secular, democratic and

youth-oriented political initiatives. Many of these groups criticized the regulations in an April 2013 meeting with 30 political parties in Kabul" (Crisis Group, 2013, p. 10).

The choice of the electoral rules and the constant manipulation of the Electoral Law by the Karzai government to prevent the development of political parties have had perverse effects on democratic governance. In the absence of strong, organized political parties, legislative politics has been unpredictable and chaotic. The legislators who have entered the parliament as independent are not bound by party ideology or discipline. Consequently, numerous accusations of corruption and bribery have been made against the lawmakers, including the allegations of collecting bribes from ministers the lawmakers can threatened to vote off (using their power to give vote of no confidence) (see Bijlert, 2013, p. 1) or bribing presidential appointees who need parliament's approval (Clark, 2010) and illegal trade (BBC News, 2013).[184] Further, in the absence of political parties to discipline their members, individual lawmakers are vulnerable to executive pressure and manipulation. Larson (2010, p. 1-2) found that "while pre-election politicking…has generated a prominent (and very public) chasm between the Wolesi Jirga and the Karzai administration, under the surface exist connections between MPs and the executive that threaten to strip the parliament of any of the monitoring and oversight capacity it currently has."

The president can exert considerable influence on Meshrano Jirga (Pashto term for house of elders) as well by appointing one-third of its members. The rules for Meshrano Jirga elections are different from the Wolesi Jirga elections. The size of Meshrano Jirga is three times the number of exiting provinces (102 seats). One third of

[184] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22511143

the members are appointed by provincial councils, one third of them by district councils, and the last one third by the president. Within fifteen days of the establishment of the Provincial Councils, the members elect one of its members to a seat in the Meshrano Jirga by absolute majority for a period of four years. If no candidate receives more than half the votes in the first round, run-offs will be conducted between the candidates with the two highest vote totals until one member receives a majority of votes.

Appointment of individuals to the Meshrano Jirga for a five-year term by the president takes place within two weeks of presidential inauguration. The Law dictates that the president should invite civic organizations, political parties, and the public to nominate individuals to be appointed to the Meshrano Jirga. The nomination period would remain open for one week. No more than seven days following the closing of nominations, the Office of the President shall forward to the IEC nomination papers for those individuals it intends to appoint. The IEC would verify the eligibility of those individuals and shall advice the Office of the President no later than seven days following receipt of the nominations. In practice, however, the president has incentives to appoint his/her supporters to these posts, as Meshrano Jirga shares responsibilities with the Wolesi Jirga to ratify, modify or abrogate laws and legislative decrees, approve plans for economic development and of the state budget, create, modify, and abrogate administrative units, ratify international treaties and agreements or abrogate Afghanistan's membership of them. Hence, political calculations inform the president's appointments to the Meshrano Jirga.

Conclusion

The primary goal of this chapter was to assess the effects of electoral institutions in shaping elites' affiliation preferences in post-2001 Afghanistan. To accomplish this goal, I carried out a careful process tracing of institutional selection in post-2001 Afghanistan. As the empirical sections of the Chapter demonstrated, the choice of political and electoral regimes in post-2001 Afghanistan was directly affected by the preferences of the ruling elites who faced a relatively weak opposition and weak political parties. The independent Karzai preferred a strong presidential system and weak political parties, and he designed the rules to accomplish those goals. The Chapter refuted the institutional hypothesis on the grounds of endogeneity of institutions. However, endogenizing the choice of institutions does not take away from the importance of the institutional framework in constraining choice. In fact, this Chapter found that the institutional context restricted actors' behavior during post-2001 elections in predictable ways, a conclusion also reached in Chapter 4.

Conclusion

Party Substitutes in Place of Parties

Political parties are assigned, at least in theory, important roles in democracies. They are expected to organize politics, aggregate preferences, and function as a channel between the government and the governed, to name a few. Historically, political parties have fulfilled many of these roles in advanced democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Australia, to the extent that "modern democracy" has been equated to "party democracy" (Katz 1980: 1; Schattshneider 1942: 1). Even though political parties in advanced industrial democracies have increasingly had to share the political scene with the media and single-issue organizations, they still provide the best means for collective political action (Webb, Farrell, and Holliday, 2002). In emerging democracies, however, the story of political parties is different. Political parties that fulfill the functions attributed to them are few and far between; national, inclusive, and institutionalized parties are the exception rather than the rule; and, in many emerging democracies, political parties find it hard to compete with powerful individuals and party substitutes in provision of electoral goods and services. This dissertation has been an attempt to understand why political parties are the weakest link in emerging democracies. In post-2001 Afghanistan, party leaders have distanced themselves from their political parties in national elections by participating as independent, while multiethnic pre-election

coalitions have been used as substitutes to political parties in providing office seekers electoral goods and services.

This dissertation challenges the institutional explanations offered for the poor performance of political parties in new democracies and calls attention to studying the variables that have previously been neglected in the literature. Under what conditions do party leaders choose to forego their party affiliation in post-transition elections, and why do they opt for party substitutes to gather electoral support? The inductive study of post-2001 Afghanistan suggests that legacies of political parties exert strong effects on party leaders' perceptions of electoral victory and consequently inform their electoral strategies. Political parties that are associated with negative legacies under the pre-democratic regimes give their leaders disincentives to run under their party label due to concerns of uncertainty over voter preferences. Under these conditions, office seekers use viable alternatives to political parties to gather electoral support.

In this chapter, I take the opportunity to reflect on the broader implications of my research as it relates to the marginal role of political parties in emerging democracies and the consequences of absence of strong national parties in many new democracies for prospects of democratic consolidation. I also highlight some of the most important shortcomings of my dissertation in the hopes that future research will revisit the hypotheses generated by my inductive study of post-2001 Afghanistan and will address the questions that I have left unanswered.

Implications for the Role of Political Parties in Emerging Democracies

The weakness of political parties in emerging democracies (relative to those in advanced democracies) has been most strongly attributed to the difference in time period during which political parties have emerged in new democracies. Based on the timing thesis, structural factors, such as the extension of universal suffrage at the time of the democratic transition and the availability of mass media, have weakened the need for political parties to mobilize the electorate based on their political demands. As such, political parties in emerging democracies have not been able to present themselves as the vanguards of voting rights and other political demands with serious consequences for their development as organizations of representation and governance. My dissertation moves beyond the view of political parties as the providers of electoral services and brand names to institutions whose legacies will determine their usage under changed, democratic conditions (mass politics, free political competition, universal suffrage). In this view, political parties in new democracies are not weak because citizens' political demands are met through other means, but because their legacies have deemed them an electoral liability, and as a result politicians do not invest in their progress and development. Instead, to meet their short-term electoral goals, they rely on viable alternatives or party substitutes during democratic elections, at least based on the evidence presented in this dissertation.

However, based on this study one cannot make a decisive statement about the relationship between politicians' long-term political goals and party development in emerging democracies. The explicit assumption about the relationship between politicians' long-term electoral goals (staying in power, becoming a career politician) and party formation and development is that politicians have incentives to organize in

political parties to meet their long-term political goals (Aldrich 1995). To study this relationship in new democracies where political parties are not developed, we need to carry out further research over a longer time horizon (given how young some of the emerging democracies are).

The Shortcomings of the Dissertation and Avenues for Future Research

This dissertation faces a problem with understanding and directly measuring preference. Given the incentive to misrepresent, how can we measure what true preferences of politicians are when taking a particular course of action? Regarding party leaders' decision to forego their party affiliation during elections, how can we become certain what drives their preference? Should we ask them directly? If so, how many individuals should we ask (e.g. what is a reasonable sample size that will reduce the margin of error)? Or should we analyze their actions to understand their true preference? Further research that is partly informed by studies in behavioral psychology will be a potentially fruitful venue to explore.

Empirically, this dissertation falls short in terms of presenting direct evidence from the leaders of political parties on why they chose to forego their party affiliation during elections. Despite their centrality to my argument, I was able to interview only nineteen candidates, fourteen of whom had run as independent and five of whom had participated as party candidates. The small sample size made it impossible to draw any systematic and strong conclusions about office seekers' preferences regarding party affiliation. One important reason for not being able to amass more interviews with candidates for presidential elections was their unwillingness to give interviews due to

concern over security. Politicians are constantly victims of targeted killings and suicide attacks. As such, they are not willing to meet with people they do not know. Given the resultant shortage of direct interviews with office seekers, I did my best to reconstruct the preferences of party leaders based on their campaign platforms and their official interviews during the campaign season.

Looking beyond these shortcomings, this dissertation has presented new evidence about why party leaders forego their party affiliation during national elections and how they are able to make up for the absence of organizational and financial resources of political parties. The resulting analysis raises questions about the prospects of democratic consolidation, government stability, representation, and accountability in the absence of national political parties. Will a democracy survive and take roots in the absence of political parties? Although the answer to this question depends on one's theoretical persuasion regarding the role of political parties in democracies (normative vs positivist), a comparative analysis of countries with relatively more institutionalized parties and party systems and those with no institutionalized parties and party systems may yield some insights on the relationship between institutionalized political parties and democratic consolidation.

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