The United State: Nationalization and its Consequences for State Legislatures

Richard Burke

Rockaway Park, New York

Bachelor of Arts, Fairfield University, 2017

Abstract

This research explores the relationship between nationalization and legislative behavior/legislative outcomes. Nationalization in this context refers to split-ticket voting between national and state offices (Hopkins 2018). I theorize that the extent to which a state is nationalized should have consequences for how legislators behave and how legislatures function. If legislators know they are evaluated by the same criteria as national representatives, they have electoral incentives to provide their constituents with the partisan cues that animate national politics. Preliminary analyses suggest that while nationalization does not appear to impact in-chamber behavior, it does have consequences for state policy outcomes.

1   A Tale of Two States

In early 2017 a wave of turbulence swept over national politics. Donald Trump won the presidency after mounting one of the most divisive campaigns in recent memory. With Republican members of Congress cheering Trump's victory and Democrats in Congress calling for Trump's impeachment, partisanship was illuminating all elements of national politics. The aftermath of Trump's victory continues to influence all facets of American politics.

State political actors in Washington were among the first to challenge the Trump administration. Attorney General Bob Ferguson (D-WA) made national headlines as the first attorney general to legally challenge the controversial travel ban on 7 majority-Muslim countries. In addition to Ferguson, Governor Jay Inslee (D-WA) joined the fight, characterizing the travel ban as "unjustified chaos and cruelty" (Wang 2017). Governor Inslee pledged to use his resources as governor to challenge the Trump administration.

The national political climate was driving state politics in Olympia as well. In response to Republicans in Congress slashing the capital gains tax, Inslee proposed implementing a statewide capital gains tax. A second issue of concern in Washington's state legislature was gun control, an issue which legislators agreed to place on the ballot for voters to decide. Climate change served as a third important consideration in Olympia as the legislature extensively debated implementing a statewide carbon tax. Based on this brief glance at Washington's agenda it is difficult to discern any differences between the legislature in Olympia and the legislature in DC. The ideological-intensity of the agenda, the relationship among parties and ideologies, and the way elected officials communicate with their publics seem to resemble national politics.

Traveling to the east coast state of Rhode Island, state politics looks quite different. Governor Gina Raimondo (D-RI), a self-described moderate, made no mention of inequality, climate change, or President Trump in her 2017 State of the State address (Raimondo 2017). In fact, the Democratic governor was cheering on the state's eco-

nomic success which she attributed to tax cuts on energy and business. In the 2018 Rhode Island gubernatorial election, the key issues were marijuana legalization and school safety (Domings & Goggin 2018). The subdued ideological intensity of their state was not lost on Rhode Island politicians. As 2018 drew to a close, Governor Raimondo held up the political climate in her state as pleasantly distinct from the political climate in Washington D.C. (Anderson 2019).

It was not just the Governor who seemed to be taking a page from a different playbook. The issues in the Rhode Island legislature were astonishingly parochial. *The Providence Journal* highlighted a state permitting system for food trucks, a mandate for carbon monoxide detectors and health coverage for mastectomies as the signature legislation of the 2018 legislative session (Gregg & Anderson 2018). This agenda was not championed by partisan purists. The Speaker of the Rhode Island House Nicholas Mattiello (D-RI), who hails from a district that voted overwhelmingly for Trump in 2016, was credited by an anonymous mailer for keeping drivers licenses out of the hands of undocumented immigrants.

This brief overview of the political culture in these two states suggests that states can vary in their attunement to national politics. On the one hand, we see Washington where state issues parallel national issues. Here there is a tight sort between ideology and partisanship among elected officials. This has consequences for the legislature's agenda which provides ample opportunity for parties to differentiate themselves from one another on an ideological basis. In Rhode Island, understanding national political dynamics offers little insight in a state which eschews traditional ideological, partisan politics. The agenda in the Rhode Island legislature appears to be oriented around addressing non-ideological, valence concerns rather than standing up for an ideological picture of what government should look like.

What might account for the differences among these two states? The national partisan leans in these two states do not vary at all. Both states voted for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump by the exact same margin. In both states Hillary Clinton received 54 percent of the vote, while Donald Trump received 38 percent of the vote.

Where a sharp difference does exist is with respect to the relationship between state and national voting. While 38 percent of Rhode Islanders voted for Donald Trump, Rhode Islanders only sent 5 Republicans to the 38-seat Senate and 9 Republicans to the 75-seat House. In Washington which also had 38 percent of its vote allocated to Trump, Republicans were elected to 21 of the 49 seats in the Senate and 41 of the 98 seats in the lower chamber. This disparity in partisan representation is due to split-ticket voting. In Washington in 2016, the percent of the vote for Democrats in state legislative races was approximately one-to-one with the presidential vote for Hillary. However, in Rhode Island in 2016, there was a 12 percentage point difference between Hillary Clinton's share of the two-party vote and Democratic candidates share of the two-party vote for state legislative offices.

Political scientists have begun to pay more attention to the way in which national politics shapes state politics. In line with Tip O'Neill's famous, "All politics is local", many theories of political science held that national politics was an aggregate of local politics. One example of this is distributive politics. Distributive politics suggested that locally-orietned concerns, specifically the goods brought back to one's district, were what drove electoral outcomes (Mayhew 1974; Weingast, Shepsle & Johnson; 1981; Kriner & Reeves 2015).

This old paradigm is reversed in Daniel Hopkins' (2018) work, *The Increasingly United States*, which argues that politics across all levels of government are organized by national politics. Hopkins' work offers an intriguing path for scholars of representation as he argues that there is no longer a distinct local criteria in American elections. Instead, there is one national criteria - party- which determines who is elected to office.

Nationalization in the contemporary context is intricately related to polarization. Scholars have examined polarization as a development occurring in the electorate (Abramowitz 2010). Political psychologists suggest that this division by partisanship has become so sharp and persistent at the national level that it has formed something akin to social identities among citizens (Mason 2018). This change among voters has been found to have consequences for legislatures. Scholars of Congress have found

that these changes in the electorate have coresponded with increasing levels of polarization and partisan teamsmanship among members of Congress (McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2006, Lee 2009).

This project began as a search for legislatures which do not operate under the confines of national political discourse. Are there states in America that have high degrees of autonomy from national politics? If so, what consequences does this have for legislators and policy outcomes? There are good reasons to imagine that states may be able to escape the national, polarized climate. First, the concerns in state politics should be more local and less symbolic since districts tend to be organized into smallers units. Secondly, people typically get their information about state politics from different sources. Finally, elected representatives in state offices may have systematically different motivations and predispositions than political actors at national levels.

First, I examine states where it appears that citizens a criteria to make decisions about local politics that is unique from the way they make decisions about national politics. Hopkins (2018) demonstrates that voters' decisions at the national-level increasingly spillover to decisions at different levels of government. While as a trend this is true, I begin by assuming that it is not occurring in all states equally. This is to say that some states are more directed by the national political tides than others. Using split-ticket voting between state legislative and presidential elections as a measure of nationalization, I find considerable variation. In Virginia there was a 14 percentage point difference in voting for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 and Democrats in state legislative elections in 2017. Meanwhile, in 5 states (Massachusetts, California, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Ohio), the vote for the Democratic candidate for president is within .5 percentage points of the total votes garnered by Democratic candidates in competitive state legislative election. This variance in vote between national and state elections suggests that voters are motivated to varying degrees by national criteria depending on their state.

Taking this variation in the orientation of local voters to national politics, I ask

the fundamental question of representation: does the chracter of the electorate matter? I argue that the extent to which an electorate is nationalized does matter for the aggregate-level behavior of legislatures. Specifically, I argue that in more nationalized legislatures we should see greater ideological homogenetity within parties, less polarization, greater efficiency, and higher levels of spending on collective goods. My findings suggests that in the context of a national climate which is divided and polarized, the relationship between national and local voting matters for legislatures. While it does not seem to impact in-chamber behavior, it does have consequences for policy outcomes.

2   Literature Review

This paper seeks to understand nationalization and its consequences for political representation. Nationalization begins with the electorate. Dating back to Stokes (1967), scholars have examined the role in which constituency-specific concerns play in mobilizing voter turnout. In the realm of Congressional voting, Brady, D'Onofrio, and Fiorina (2000) examine how constituency-specific concerns have historically had varying degrees of impact on how citizens vote. Conceptualizing the electorate in terms of cleavages, Gimpel (1996) examines the variance in overlap between state electoral cleavages and national electoral cleavages discovering considerable variation in cleavage overlap. In state legislative elections, Rogers (2015) finds that state-level elections are increasingly determined by national-level forces. Furthermore, Sievert and McKee (2018) examine nationalization as vote choices among senators, governors, and presidents and find that while nationalization is generally increasing, there are some important regional variations.

In addition to a change in the electorate, nationalization also refers to distinct institutional changes in American politics. For one, government itself has become increasingly nationalized, with national authorty submerging state and local authority. Another source of nationalization in America has been the economy which has become

increasingly less distinct among different localities and regions (Bensel 1984). Scholars of political parties have found that parties also have become increasingly centralized (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Klinghard 2010). Recent work reveals increasing overlap between state party platforms and national party platforms (Hopkins & Schickler 2016). The final institution which has been studied through the lens of nationalization is the media. Scholars have shown that recent developments in the media have provided Americans with an increase in information about national politics to the detriment of state and local information (Martin & McCrain 2019 ; Enda, Matsa & Boyles, 2014).

While nationalization has been studied as a phenomena in the electorate and within institutions, only recently have we seen systematic analysis on how nationalization in the electorate impacts institutional actors. A growing body of empirical evidence demonstrates that nationalization may have important consequences for representation. Garlick (2017) shows that when national issues become salient to state legislators, greater polarization can emerge within the legislature. Tasaunovitch and Warshaw (2014) find high levels of congruence between constituent preferences estimated from national survey data and the ideological behavior of their state and local representatives (see also Lax & Phillips 2012, Caughey & Warshaw 2018). This departs from earlier work which suggested that responsiveness and representation within state and local politics is less about ideology and more about satisfying concrete demands of constituents (Adrian 1952, Bailey & Rom 2004, Peterson 1981).

By examining varying degrees of nationalization, this paper seeks to make contributions to legislative politics and state politics more generally. Given the tools of spatial-modeling and ideal-point estimates, legislative scholars have become accustomed to thinking of legislators as guided by preferences/ideology that range along a conservative to liberal continuum (Krehbiel 1998, Brady & Volden 1998, Poole & Rosenthal 1997, Shor & McCarty 2011, Bonica 2014). However, as Lee (2009) argues it is possible to imagine legislative behavior as guided by something which is also "beyond ideology", specifically, non-ideological concerns that pertain to valence issues. By examining variation in nationalization, this research seeks to understand how leg-

7

islatures are organized when ideology is not the central organizing principle. While this paper focuses on the states, previous case studies have focused on the Gilded Age Congress where concerns were largely non-ideological and concerned with patronage (Lee 2003).

Finally, this research examines an important source of variation among states. Scholars of state politics have discovered a number of crucial ways in which states are distinct from one another. Elazer (1966) found that political cultures varied dramatically on the basis of state. Scholars have also examined how party systems vary in important respects among states (Mayhew 1986). In matters of policy, there is evidence to suggest significant variation in fiscal priorities across states (Jacoby & Schneider 2001). Professionalism is another key determinant of state politics (Kousser 2005, Grumm 1971, Squire 1992). In addition to these important concerns, I find that nationalization is another crucial feature of a state which can shape policy outcomes within a state.

3   Why Nationalization Matters

As with any story of representation, this research seeks to understand the relationship between publics and the elected officials charged with representing them. I make the common assumption of a strong relationship between the demands of the electorate and the behavior of legislators (Mayhew 1974). In order to thoroughly sketch out the character and consequences of nationalization in the states, my theory rests on three layers: electorates, legislators, and legislatures. Specifically, I build an argument which examines the way legislatures vary on the basis of how localized or nationalized the aggregate state electorate is.

3.1   Voters

My model of the voter draws from the work of Zaller (1992). Specifically, I hold that voters' attitudes and beliefs are influenced by numerous, and at times inconsistent,

considerations. In this context, nationalization matters because it changes the arrangement of considerations in the minds of voters who are making decisions at the state-level.

In localized electorates, the most important considerations for voters are the personal qualities which the candidates possess. In these electorates, the partisan cues which operate at the national level of public discourse are not accessible to voters. Rather, in localized electorates, voters are mobilized by the mutual ties which they have with a candidate. Scholars of political behavior have identified this as "friends and neighbors voting" (Tatalovich 1975, Rice & Macht 1987). Furthermore, voters are likely to vote on the basis of who represents their interests. Research has shown that local issues are the ones most likely to be grounded in self-interest, since local concerns can be more easily measured in terms of quantifiable benefits and costs (Einhorn 2001; Self 2003). Therefore, in localized electorates the most important considerations are voters' personal knowledge of a candidate and the perceived capacity of a candidate to represent their interest.

In nationalized electorates, the national partisan discourse is accessible to voters in their decision-making at state and local levels. Previous work suggests that considerations which operate at the national level are distinct from local considerations. Sears (1993) demonstrates that national political evaluations and decisions are frequently driven by symbolic concerns as opposed to more measurable and tangible ones. These symbolic considerations typically take place within the context of a social identity group (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002, Mason 2018). Central to this model of partisanship as social identity is the zero-sum thinking it encourages. When voters in the electorate are thinking in terms of their partisan identities, they are thinking in terms of teams and looking to elect members who are capable of taking on the other "team". Therefore, in nationalized electorates, in addition to support for their party's candidate, voters are also motivated by negative partisanship (Iyengar& Westwood, 2015).

3.2 Legislators

My argument that the electorate shapes legislative behavior assumes that legislators are responsive to the demands of constituents. This has been a central finding of most studies of representation (Mayhew 1974, Canes-Wrone et. Al, 2002). Even in state and local politics, there is strong evidence to suggest that legislators are responsive to the demands of their constituents (Tasaunovitch & Warshaw 2013, Lax & Phillips 2012, Caughey & Warshaw 2018). Therefore, assuming that their constituents matter, I theorize that legislators will behave differently on the basis of how localized or nationalized the voting behavior of their constituents are.

As Hall (1996) shows, legislative participation is to some extent driven by electoral demands. Legislators elected by localized electorates are likely to invest their resources in order to brand themselves as problem-solvers and thus construct an image as a work horse rather than a show horse (Payne 1980). This strategy is a result of their inability to rely on partisan cues to win reelection. Instead, they portray themselves as advocates for common problems in their community. Issues which are likely to have high return on investment for legislators in localized electorates are good government concerns such as: fighting corruption, efficient state bureaucracies, and collective goods that are outside of partisan/ideological cleavages such as roads, public safety, and recreation. Scholars of state and local politics frequently portray local government as centered around these non-ideological goods (Adrian 1952, Bailey & Rom 2004, Peterson 1981). Thus, in localized electorates, I expect that legislators will be motivated by concerns which are beyond ideology (Lee 2009). Meaning that their concerns will typically fall outside of the unidimensional, conservative-liberal framework.

Since legislators in localized electorates have distinct electoral goals, their means for achieving these goals should have important consequences for their in-chamber behavior. In chamber, these legislators are primarily concerned with access to the legislative agenda so that they can use state resources to solve the problems of their district. Since legislators in localized elecotrates have differing priorities and since these priorities do not conflict as they are oriented around their specific constituencies,

10

legislators should be more willing to trade votes across party lines (Follet 1925).

The task which legislators receive from their constituents is different in nationalized electorates. In nationalized electorates, the primary electoral task for legislators is to make national partisan considerations accessible to their constituents. An efficient way to do this is to incorporate issues that are typically confined to the national agenda into one's legislative style. For example, if a legislator's constituents show intense fear or concern about immigration, she may sponsor legislation that places strict penalties on harboring undocumented immigrants. She may do so even though her constituents' fears are not rooted in a tangible demand (there is low immigration in the state) and the state's capacity to act is fairly limited (states have fairly low capacity to enforce immigration policy). However, this is a successful strategy because her electoral interests do not task her with identifying and solving problems which impact her constituents. Rather, her electoral interests task her with developing a brand that is most consistent with the national partisan/ideology of her constituents.

Legislators in nationalized electorates confront an electorate which is organized on the basis of party into two distinct groups. As a result, the electoral strategy for these legislators involves mobilizing their partisan base of supporters as is the case for many national officeholders (Panagopoulis 2016). In order to reward their team, legislators in nationalized electorates seek to provide particularized benefits. These are benefits which can only be enjoyed by some of their constituents. Examples of these particularized benefits include, healthcare and welfare. By allocating common resource pools to specific groups, particularized benefits make accessible to constituents the cleavages that organize partisanship at the national level.

Since legislators in nationalized electorates want to cue their voters' national considerations, cooperation within the chamber is a liability. Bipartisanship submerges the salient differences among parties and therefore the capacity for legislators to send partisan cues to their constituents is greatly decreased if they behave in a bipartisan fashion. As a result, how a legislator votes in chamber should be determined by how members of the other party are voting. Furthermore, legislators should politicize the

legislative process in order to send ideological signals to their constituents. This may include grandstanding to build an ideological brand (Kirkland & Slapin 2017). It may also include proposing divisive amendments and obstructing to bring to the attention of the constituent their stance on an issue relevant to national political discourse.

3.3 Legislatures

My ultimate interest is how the relationship between the electorate and legislators has aggregate-level consequences for legislatures. Thus, I assume that aggregate-level behavior of legislatures is the consequence of micro-level incentives electorates place on individual legislators. The final section of my theory considers localized versus nationalized legislatures.

Due to the incentives which legislators have in localized electorates, I expect that the relationship between parties and ideology will be weaker in legislatures elected by localized electorates as opposed to nationalized electorates. Parties often build brands to serve the interests of their members (Cox & McCubbins 1993). Since localized legislators are primarily interested in passing legislation that solves problems specific to their constituents, parties construct brands that center on valence issues. As Powell and Butler (2014) demonstrate, building a party brand on valence issues can be a powerful motivator for state legislators. Since the party brand in localized legislatures is constituted by non-ideological issues, it is less problematic to have wide ideological diversity among members.

To address the electoral needs of their members, parties in nationalized legislatures devise brands on the basis of ideology. For instance, in nationalized legislatures, Republicans may gather in the legislature to propose a property tax cut or reduce social welfare-spending. Similarly, in nationalized legislatures, Democrats may propose raising the state's minimum wage or passing a bill to address carbon emissions in the state. Such legislative acts represent ways for members of the party to satisfy the electoral needs of their members. Since partisanship is so heavily dependent upon ideology in these legislatures, we should expect to see less ideological diversity within parties in

nationalized legislatures.

Hypothesis 1: In nationalized legislatures, there is greater ideological homogeneity among members of the same party.

Nationalization should also have important implications for polarization. Anzia and Jackman (2013) find that parties control the legislative agenda like in states as they do within Congress. Therefore, as ideological diversity increases the capacity to get ideological legislation onto the floor decreases since there is greater variance around the party median (Cox & McCubbins 2005). Therefore, the bills which do get to the floor should be less adequately described by a liberal-conservative dimension and thus should be explained by an alternative dimension which is non-ideological.

Not only should the types of bills vary, but so should the incentives to cooperate. In localized legislatures, cooperation is important since members are elected to solve concrete problems. Members are thus rewarded by constituents on the basis of their access to the agenda. In short, localized legislatures should be governed by an ethos of universalism as opposed to majoritarianism (Weingast, Shepsle & Johnsen 1981). In nationalized legislatures, conflict among parties within the legislature is an essential strategy for both parties. Conflict is necessary to provide the perception of teams which their electorate is responsive to. On account of an agenda that is more ideological and incentives that pull against cooperation, I anticipate that nationalized legislatures have greater levels of polarization.

Hypothesis 2: Nationalized legislatures have greater levels of polarization.

Third, I theorize that the lawmaking process should look quite different depending on if the electorate is nationalized. In localized legislatures, where members are motivated by non-ideological concerns, the lawmaking process should be more efficient as members are primarily concerned with policy-creation. In nationalized legislatures, the lawmaking process is also a means of signaling to constituents. As Frances Lee (2016) identifies, in polarized legislatures, symbolic and divisive votes often function in ways that enable members to signal crucial partisan differences to their electorates. These votes are largely divorced from any functional concerns for making laws. There-

fore, in nationalized legislatures we should see the legislative process become more politicized. This should result in a more inefficient lawmaking process. To clarify, by efficiency here I mean the proportion of legislation passed divided by the proportion of legislation proposed.

Hypothesis 3: Nationalized legislatures have greater levels of inefficiencies.

Finally, we can imagine that the electoral context and the extent to which it is nationalized has important consequences for the fiscal priorities of states. In localized electorates, legislators seek to pursue unifying issues that enable them to maximize the support of their constituents who vote on the basis of personal criteria and connections to the legislator. Therefore, more local legislatures should focus on collective goods which provide less opportunity for partisan consciousness to arise among members of different groups within the state. In nationalized legislatures, since partisan teams are a salient category, legislators are not trying to appeal to everyone. Instead, they are trying to appeal to their party and the interest groups that constitute their party. As a result, legislatures in nationalized states will spend more on particularized benefits which benefit some constituencies over others. In more localized legislatures, we should see greater spending on collective goods that benefit all constituents.

Hypothesis 4: Nationalized legislatures spend more on particularized benefits.

4   Data and Measurement

4.1   Measuring Nationalization

Measure of Nationalization:

$$1- \mid \%TwoPartyVoteforDemPresCandidate - \%TwoPartyVoteforDemStateLegCandidates \mid$$
(1)

My measure of nationalization relies on aggregate voting behavior. Specifically, I measure nationalization by measuring the degree to which aggregate voting for state officeholders is related to voting for national officeholders. I look to parties to gauge the content of decisions which voters make. Although there is some variance between state party cultures and the national party culture, I assume that national parties and state parties provide similar choices. I assume that there is no state where the Democratic party advocates less government intervention in the state's economic affairs or more government intervention in social issues than the state's Republican Party. Therefore, when voters within a state support one party to the same degree at the state level as they do at the national level, I assume that this is because they are using the same criteria to elect representatives at the state level as they do at the national-level. On the other hand, when voters decide to vote for one party at the national-level and another party at the state-level, I assume that the criteria which they use to make decisions about state politics is different from the criteria which they use to make decisions about national politics. Thus, I exclude the possibility that split-ticket voting is necessary to satisfy the same criteria.

To measure the aggregate-voting behavior of states, I first construct a measure of the state's national voting. My primary measure of a state's national voting is the percentage of the two-party vote allotted to the Democratic presidential candidate. To obtain this measure, I use data on presidential elections provided by the MIT Election Lab (2017).

The second step in measuring aggregate-voting behavior is to measure a state's voting at the state level. To do so, I use Carl Klarner's (2018) data on state legislative election returns. This data omits two states, Louisiana and Missouri. To construct my measure of state partisanship, I calculate the total percent of the two-party vote received by Democrats in state legislative elections. I only consider elections in which there was both a Republican and Democratic choice on the ballot. Since it is unlikely that challenger-less races occur randomly, my measure likely overestimates the two-party comeptition in states where one party is particularly dominant.

Having compiled both a measure of a state's aggregate-voting behavior at the state and national level, I operationalize my concept of nationalization. My measure of nationalization is constructed by subtracting the absolute difference between the percentage of the vote for the Democratic candidate for president from the percentage of the vote for Democratic candidates in state legislative elections from 1. My reason for subtracting the difference from 1 is so that the independent variable of interest for my analysis can be properly interpreted as increasing.

My electoral data spans from 1980-2016 and is organized by two-year increments. In order to maximize my capacity for inference, I create measures of presidential votes for mid-term election years. I do this by averaging the percent of the two-party vote which was allotted to the Democratic candidate in the preceding and subsequent elections. For example, I take the average of the 1992 and 1996 presidential votes for Bill Clinton in Kentucky, to calculate the value of the presidential vote in 1994 for Bill Clinton in Kentucky.

For state legislative elections that take place in off-years, Virginia, and New Jersey, I match the state election to the presidential election by subtracting 1 from the year of their state elections. For Mississippi, where off-year elections take place before the presidential elections I match the election year to the presidential year by adding 1. For the states that hold election to legislative office every four years, Alabama, Maryland, Nebraska, Mississippi, and North Dakota, I use the same averaging process as I do for the presidential vote. If in a given year only one chamber is up for reelection, as is the case in state's where the lower-chamber is elected every two years and the upper-chamber is elected every four years, I count only the vote for the chamber up for reelection in that year.

Why choose presidential voting as opposed to voting for another national office? For one, there is good reasons to imagine that some of the local influences which I theorize impact state legislative elections may also be impacting who is elected to Congress. Conventional theories of Congress which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, argue that serving the local electorate is essential to victory for members of Congress. In

these theories, electoral success for members Congress is contingent upon their "home style", bringing goods back to their district, and performing constituency-services for members of their district (Fenno 1973, Mayhew 1974, and Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina 1987). In the contemporary era of partisan polarization in the House, it is convenient to imagine that voter's decision on who should represent them in Congress is driven by national concerns. It is important to remember that as recently as 1992, Mississippians, who showed little support for President Clinton's candidacy, still sent an entire Congressional delegation of Democrats to Washington. Furthermore, in a not insiginificant number of Congressional races, parties simply do not compete. As a result, this may force split-ticket voting that would not occur if there were another candidate to compete with. Ultimately, the vote for the president offers the best insight into where the state falls within national debate, since presidents both set the national agenda and have very limited non-ideological resources for gaining votes, unlike members of Congress. In the appendix, I estimate all of my models using the state-wide two party vote among competitive Congressional races.

It should be noted that I use voting data in a way distinct from Sievert and McKee recent measure of nationalization (2018). The measure provided by Sievert and McKee defines nationalization in terms of the congruence between the party of the presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial choice in a given state. This measure leads Sievert and McKee to conclude that Midwestern states are the least nationalized. By measuring nationalization as the overlap between a state's partisan choices these three offices, Sievert and McKee exclude states with competitive parties. When considering nationalization as the overlap between national and state-level decision-making, states with competitive parties may be the states which are most sensitive to the national tides of politics. According to my theory, in competitive states, political actors will try to highlight the distinctions among parties and will likely invoke national partisan cues to do so.

4.2 Dependent Variables

Next, I examine four dependent variables of interest which arise from my four hypotheses. It should first be noted that since I anticipate these variables changing in response to the electorate, I match them so that they come one-year after the state's most recent election. For instance, if a state's most recent election was 1992, I pair it with the 1993 measure of polarization. Or if a state's most recent election was 1991, I pair it with the 1992 measure of polarization. Therefore, I take special care to ensure that states with off-year elections in my dataset, Mississippi, Virginia, and New Jersey, are properly matched with the dependent variable of interest.

First, I hypothesized that in more nationalized states we should see higher levels of ideological homogeneity within parties. To measure within party heterogeneity, I used Adam Bonica's (2016) DIME dataset. The DIME dataset creates ideal-points for candidates on the basis of campaign contributions. My reason for using the DIME ideal-point estimates is because they calculate ideological scores which are not the products of the electoral context rather than legislative behavior, since they rely on campaign contributions. The data which pertains to state and local politics extends back to 1990. First, I measure ideological heterogeneity by party, that is Republican and Democrats. I then measure ideological heterogeneity by governing status. To measure party heterogeneity by party, I calculate the standard deviation for ideal-points by year, state, chamber and party. I then took averaged the standard deviation for both chambers and created a measure of heterogeneity among Republicans and Democrats for the entire legislature. I repeated this procedure to calculate heterogeneity by majoirty party and minority party status.

My second hypothesis pertains to polarization. To address this question I use the Shor and McCarty (2011) dataset which estimates ideal-points for legislators using both roll-calling voting and survey responses. My reason for using the Shor and McCarty dataset is because it calculates ideal-point estimates in a way that is influenced by in-chamber activity, specifically roll-call voting. This dataset spans between 1991-2016. To calculate a measure of legislature polarization, I average the difference

between party mean's in each chamber and thus create a measure of polarization that captures the entire legislature.

For my purposes, there are two limitations to using the Shor and McCarty dataset. While I argue that ideology as conservative to liberal continuum becomes less relevant in organizing localized legislators, the measure constructed by Shor and McCarty ensure that their measure is influenced by a legislator's ideology because of its reliance on survey data. Since their measure is also reliant on roll call voting, it is still useful for my purposes since the measure is at least partially-influenced by in-chamber activity. A second limitation of the dataset is that the ideal-point estimates are not dynamic. Each legislator in the dataset is assigned one static ideal-point. As a result, in order for the measure to update it is entirely dependent upon replacement.

My third hypothesis deals with legislative efficiency. To measure this I use William Hicks' (2016) data on legislative efficiency. Hicks' measure of efficiency involves enacted bills divided by initiated bills in a given year. The data provided by Hicks spans from 1991-2009.

My fourth hypothesis deals with state spending. To measure state spending, I use the Jacoby and Schneider (2011) measure of fiscal priorities. This data extends from 1980-2011. This measure assesses proportions of state spending on a unidimensional scale which ranges from spending on particularized benefits to spending on collective goods. Increases in the value of this score signify that the state is prioritizing spending on collective goods rather than particularized benefits. The authors define collective goods as infrastructure and education, while defining particularized benefits as spending which includes welfare and healthcare spending, as well as goods that go to specific interest groups (Jacoby & Schneider, 2001, 2009).

4.3 Control Variables

When considering the effects of nationalization on legislative behavior it is important to think about potential omitted variables that are strongly correlated with nationalization and potential dependent variables of interest. Since presidential voting drives

one measure of nationalization, and most presidential voting is actually fairly close (with two-party candidates both receiving around 45-55 percent of the vote), localized states where there is a wide gap between presidential voting and state-level voting are likely to be states where there is low-electoral competition within the state. I define low electoral competition as both a high percentage of safe seats and high average win margins. To account for this, in all of my statistical tests, I control for percentage of safe seats and win margins in a given state. These variables were obtained from Carl Klarner's (2013) dataset on electoral competition.

Relatedly, weak party competition will also have implications for chamber composition. This may have important consequences for my dependent variables of interest since my dependent variables measure what is taking place within chamber and what policy outcomes the chamber generates. For example, in Rhode Island, a state which has low levels of nationalization according to my measure, 84 percent of the chamber are members of the Democratic party. It is not difficult to imagine why having a large majority party may impact legislature outcomes. To account for this possibility, I control for proportion of Democrats in the chamber. This measure can also be found in Carl Klarner's (2013) measures of electoral competition.

5 Analysis

5.1 Examining Nationalization

I will first provde an analysis of my measure of nationalization, the primary independent variable of interest. Figure 1 captures the change in mean nationalization over time among all states. As we can see, the average level of nationalization has remained consistently above .87 since 1980. By 1990, nationalization reached .95 and for most state it has remained near .95 since then. Not only is nationalization getting smaller over time, but there is less variance as Figure 2 demonstrates. To address, whether there is a statistically significant increase in nationalization over time I graph the results of a Pearson's correlation test with nationliazation as one variable and year as

the other (Figure 3). As we can see, nationalization is increasing over time at a rate which is statistically significant.

Figure 1: Nationalization By Year, 1980-2016

Figure 2: Variance in Nationalization by Year, 1980-2016

Figure 3: Nationalization Trend, 1980-2016

Secondly, I examine within state variations. Based off of the results plotted in Figure 4, we can see that some states are more nationalized than others. Levels of nationalization over a 36 year period range from approximately .88 to .98. Figure 5 captures the fluctuations in nationalization within states. As demonstrated by this figure, some states have fairly stable levels of nationalization while other states are more dynamic, becoming more nationalized in one election cycle and less nationalized in the next.

Figure 4: Mean Nationalization by State

Figure 5: Variance in Nationalization by State

If nationalization for most states is fairly high, why would we imagine it is important? In general, the largest differences I am examining is a 13 percentage point difference between national voting and state voting. In terms of variance among states, the widest range we see is approximately 7 percentage points. In short, if most states fall between .87 and .975 on my measure why should nationalization matter? It may be hard to imagine that as small of a variation as 5-10 percentage points in voting can significantly alter the way in which legislatures behave. However, recent work has shown that "margins matter" and that much of the change in American politics can be accounted for by small changes in voting (Hopkins 2017). Small fluctuations in the level of nationalization may lead to significant difference in states where there is competition in the legislature for partisan control. Or it may transform a one-party state into a seemingly competitive state.

For example, imagine in State A at Time 1 the Democratic Party candidate for president receives 46 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, Democrats running for state legislative office receive 55 percent of all votes cast in state legislative elections. This margin ensures them a majority. According to my measure of nationalization, State A at Time 1 is nationalized at .91. Suppose that in State A at Time 2, the Democratic Party's presidential candidate receives 47 percent of the vote and Democrats running

for state legislative office, in competitive races, only receive 51 percent of the vote. This state has a level of nationalization that is .96. This is only a .05 change. It is not difficult to imagine how this small change in nationalization might matter. In cases like these, as nationalization increases, the majority party becomes insecure of it present power. In order to justify its control of the statehouse, the party may begin to rely on strategies that differentiate itself from the minority party and the culture of the legislature may change as a result.

5.2 Tests of Hypotheses

In seeking to draw inferences about the nature of nationalization, I want to ensure that changes in the dependent variables are not being driven by factors related to year-specific and state-specific phenomena. Typically, a two-way fixed effects models would be a useful way of eliminating this possibility. However, since nationalization is increasing over time in a fashion that is statistically significant, a few model specifications are necessary. Rather than using a two-way fixed effects model, I rely on a first-differences estimator to calculate coefficients for the proceeding regression analyses. The first-differences estimator provides an important way to remove collinearity between year fixed-effects and the upward direction of my independent variable, nationalization.

For my first statistical test I assess whether increases in nationalization are associated with decreases in ideological heterogeneity within the parties. First, I examine nationalization's impact on Republicans and Democrats. According to Table 1, while nationalization decreases the amount of ideological heterogeneity for both Republicans and Democrats, this relationship is not statistically significant.

Perhaps nationalization exerts itself upon parties on the basis of governing status. Since majority parties, have the task of governance, I would expect that they would become particularly homogeneous as a result of nationalization. As Table 2 shows, there is no statistically significant relationship between nationalization and majority party heterogeneity. Similarly, there is no statistically signifciant relationship between

nationalization and minority party heterogeneity.

Table 1: Nationalization and Party Heterogeneity, by Republicans and Democrats

	Dependent variable:	
	Republican Heterogeneity	Democratic Heterogeneity
	(1)	(2)
Nationalization	−0.178	−0.071
	(0.232)	(0.136)
4 Yr. Average Win Margin	0.001	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Balance	0.470***	−0.286***
	(0.057)	(0.034)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	−0.004**	−0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	363	363
R^2	0.170	0.285
Adjusted R^2	0.137	0.257
F Statistic (df = 4; 348)	17.843***	34.735***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Nationalization and Party Heterogeneity, by Governing Status

	Dependent variable:	
	Majority Party Heterogeneity	Minority Party Heterogeneity
	(1)	(2)
Nationalization	−0.085	0.106
	(0.096)	(0.176)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	−0.003**	−0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.002)
4 Yr. Average Win Margin	0.001	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Balance	0.083*	−0.071
	(0.049)	(0.091)
Observations	313	311
R^2	0.043	0.051
Adjusted R^2	-0.140	-0.131
F Statistic	2.917** (df = 4; 262)	3.514*** (df = 4; 260)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These results seem to dispute my theory that in less nationalized states ideology becomes less crucial to determining party of legislators. These results, while suggestive,

should be viewed in light of a potential limitation to the data used to test them. Specifically, DIME ideal-points become more robust as there are more donors whose donations are used to calculate ideal-points. One limitation of the measure then is that for many state legislative races there are small numbers of donors. Hence, the strength of the ideal-point estimate is lessened. Furthermore, since many donations to state politicians are coming from in-state donors, it is difficult to assess how adequately the score captures the "national" ideology of the legislator. For the measure to completely fit my purposes, contributions to state legislators should come from randomly from across the country.

My second hypothesis states that, nationalization should increase polarization in state legislatures. Using the Shor and McCarty dataset, I do not find a statistically significant relationship between nationalization and polarization (Table 3). One reaon why we may not see the theorized effect is because roll call voting is different in state legislatures than it is in Congress. Since roll call votes are rarely salient at state-levels, perhaps partisanship in voting is not an effective way to send signals.

Table 3: Nationalization and Polarization

	Dependent variable:
	Polarization
Nationalization	0.256
	(0.269)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	0.009***
	(0.003)
4 Yr. Avg. Win Margin	−0.007***
	(0.003)
Balance	−0.546***
	(0.133)
Observations	356
R^2	0.082
Adjusted R^2	−0.068
F Statistic	6.851*** (df = 4; 305)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

My third statistical test assesses whether nationalization changes the efficiencies of legislatures. My results suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship between nationalization and legislative efficiency (Table 4). Considering this finding

26

in light of the polarization finding, the fact that a null result emerges here is not surprising. Given that the average citizen probably has little knowledge of votes within a state legislature, legislative signaling actions which yield greater inefficiency may not be an effective strategy in states where there is less media coverage of in-chamber behavior.

Table 4: Nationalization and Legislative Efficiency

|	*Dependent variable:*
	Efficiency
Nationalization	−0.203
	(0.175)
Balance	0.147
	(0.089)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	0.002
	(0.002)
4 Yr. Avg. Win Margin	−0.001
	(0.001)
Observations	321
R^2	0.013
Adjusted R^2	-0.144
F Statistic	0.943 (df = 4; 276)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

My final statistical test examines whether or not nationalization impacts policy outcomes, specifically spending priorities. I find that there is a statistically significant relationship between increases in nationalization and decreases in the amount of spending on collective goods to particularized benefits(see Table 5 and Figure 5). The magnitude of this effect can be interpreted as a 10 percent change in nationalization yields a .6 percent change in spending priorities from collective goods to particularized benefits. This finding supports my theory that nationalization reduces the benefits to legislators in providing non-ideological goods to all citizens of the state. Instead, in nationalized electorates, citiizens electorally reward legislators who provide goods to particular groups within the state. Furthermore, since there is likely a strong relationship between a legislature's agenda and how they manage resources, the fact that differences in nationalization seem to yield different fiscal priorities also suggests that nationalization has consequences for a state's agenda.

Table 5: Nationalization and Fiscal Priorities

	Dependent variable:
	Fiscal Priorities
Nationalization	−0.061***
	(0.009)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	−0.0001
	(0.0001)
4 Yr. Avg Win Margin	−0.0001*
	(0.0001)
Balance	0.048***
	(0.004)
Observations	674
R^2	0.280
Adjusted R^2	0.224
F Statistic	60.810*** (df = 4; 624)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 6: Nationalization and Fiscal Priorities

6   Discussion & Conclusion

The findings presented suggest that nationalization does not impact what goes on within state legislatures in terms of roll-call votes. Nationalization does not seem to make the process more efficient nor does it seem to make the process more polarized. Therefore, while state legislators in more nationalized contexts may attempt to signal to their constitutents on the basis of national considerations it may be done so through the electoral context.

28

Where nationalization does have some important consequences for policy outcomes. The findings presented here suggest that nationalization increases the amount of money which a state spends on particularized benefits. It is important to note here that spending in a state, along with budgeting more broadly, may be influenced by more than just legislatures. Certainly governors and bureaucratic administration plays an important role here.

In conclusion, I theorized that the degree to which the electorate in a state is nationalized should have important consequences for how legislators within a state operate. From a theory of the electorate, legislators, and legislatures I derived four hypotheses. Specifically, I hypothesized that nationalization leads to more homogeneous parties, higher levels of polarization, a more inefficient lawmaking process, and increased spending on collective goods. Of these four hypotheses, I find strong support for the final hypothesis that nationalization leads to more money being spent on collective goods.

Moving forward, this line of research would be improved by a consideration of the agenda. The primary mechanism in my theory of nationalization is that nationalization yields an agenda which has a greater emphasis on issues that are salient at the national level. None of the four tests provided directly measure the agenda, however, they are all related to the agenda in some way. The ideological composition, polarization, efficiency, and spending priorities of a state are all intricately connected to the agenda. Future research, would benefit by seeing if it is the case that more nationalized states have agendas which look similar to the national agenda.

Appendix

I re-estimate all of my models using a measure of national party-lean that comes from Congressional voting. As we can see from the results, when calculating my measure nationalization using the two-party vote in competitive Congressional races we find no statistically significant relationships with the dependent variables of interests.

Table 6: Nationalization and Party Heterogeneity, by Republicans and Democrats

	Dependent variable:	
	Republican	Democrat
	(1)	(2)
Nationalization (Congress)	0.004	−0.071
	(0.146)	(0.086)
4 Yr. Avg. Win Margin	0.001	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Balance	0.466***	−0.293***
	(0.058)	(0.034)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	−0.004**	−0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	363	363
R^2	0.169	0.286
Adjusted R^2	0.135	0.257
F Statistic (df = 4; 348)	17.666***	34.882***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 7: Nationalization and Party Homogeneity by Governing Status

	Dependent variable:	
	Majority Party	Minority Party
	(1)	(2)
Nationalization (Congress)	0.061	0.049
	(0.060)	(0.109)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	−0.003**	−0.005**
	(0.001)	(0.002)
4 Yr. Avg. Win Margin	0.001	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Balance	0.083*	−0.068
	(0.049)	(0.091)
Observations	313	311
R^2	0.044	0.051
Adjusted R^2	-0.139	-0.132
F Statistic	2.991** (df = 4; 262)	3.472*** (df = 4; 260)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 8: Nationalization and Polarization

	Dependent variable:
	polarization
Nationalization (Congress)	0.129
	(0.167)
4 Yr. Avg. Safe Seat	0.008***
	(0.003)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	−0.007***
	(0.003)
Balance	−0.527***
	(0.133)
Observations	356
R^2	0.082
Adjusted R^2	-0.069
F Statistic	6.768*** (df = 4; 305)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Nationalization and Legislative Efficiency

	Dependent variable:
	Efficiency
Nationalization (Congress)	0.067
	(0.111)
Balance	0.114
	(0.085)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	0.002
	(0.002)
4 Yr. Avg. Win Margin	−0.001
	(0.001)
Observations	321
R^2	0.010
Adjusted R^2	-0.148
F Statistic	0.692 (df = 4; 276)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Nationalization and Fiscal Priorities

	Dependent variable:
	Fiscal Prioritiesl
Nationalization (Congress)	−0.004
	(0.007)
4 Yr. Perc. Safe Seat	−0.0001
	(0.0001)
4 Yr. Avg. Win Margin	−0.0001
	(0.0001)
Balance	0.055***
	(0.004)
Observations	674
R^2	0.224
Adjusted R^2	0.163
F Statistic	44.994*** (df = 4; 624)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

References

[1] Abramowitz, Alan. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy.* New Haven: *Yale University Press*, 2010.

[2] Adrian CR.1952. *Some General Characteristics of Non-Partisan Elections. American Political Science Review.* 76:466-476.

[3] Anderson, Patrick. "Gov. Gina Raimondo praises R.I. as an example for rest of country", *The Providence Journal*, January 1, 2019. Print.

[4] Anzia, Sarah F., and Molly C. Jackman. 2013. Legislative Organization and the Second Face of Power: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures. *Journal of Politics* 75 (1): 210-224.

[5] Bailey MA, Rom MC. 2004. "A Wider Race? Interstate Competition Across Health and Welfare Rrograms" *Journal of Politics* 66:32647

[6] Bensel, Richard Franklin. *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980.* Madison, Wis: *University of Wisconsin Press*, 1984.

[7] Bonica, Adam. "Mapping the Ideological Marketplace." *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 2 (2014): 367-86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24363491.

[8] Bonica, Adam. 2016. Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections: Public version 2.0 [Computer file]. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Libraries. ¡https://data.stanford.edu/dime¿

[9] Brady, David W and Craig Volden. *Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy From Carter to Clinton.* Boulder, Colo: *Westview Press*, 1998.

[10] Brady, David. Robert D'Onofrio, and Morris P. Fiorina, 2000, "The Nationalization of Electoral Forces Revisited". In Continuity and Change in House Elections (eds.) David W. Brady, John F. Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina, 130-148. Palo, Alto, CA: *Stanford University Press.*

[11] Butler, Daniel, Eleanor Neff Powell. "Understanding The PartyBrand: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Valence, 2014", *Journal of Politics , 76(2): 492-505.*

[12] Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting. *American Political Science Review 96 (1). Cambridge University Press*: 12740. doi:10.1017/S0003055402004276

[13] Caughey D,Warshaw C. 2018. "Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States,19362014 . *American Political Science Review* 112: 24966

[14] Chhibber, Pradeep K, Ken Kollman and Ebook Central - Academic Complete. *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition In Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States.* Princeton, N.J: *Princeton University Press*, 2004.

[15] Cox, Gary W and Mathew D McCubbins. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government In the House.* Berkeley: *University of California Press*, 1993.

[16] Cox, Gary W and Mathew D McCubbins. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government In the U.S. House of Representatives.* Cambridge, New York: *Cambridge University Press*, 2005.

[17] Domings, Nick and Caroline Goggin. "Where candidates stand on key issues in the race for RI governor" , November 2, 2018. *WPRI.com.* Web.

[18] Fischel, William. 2001. *The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies.* Cambridge, MA. *Harvard University Press.*

[19] Einhorn, Robin L. 2001. *Property Rules: Political Economy in Chicago, 1833-1872,* Chicago: *University of Chicago Press.*

[20] Elazer, Daniel J. 1966. *American Federalism: A View from the States*. New York: Crowell. Reprint, New York: *Harper & Row*, 1972.

[21] Enda, Jodi, Katerina Eva Matsa, and Jan Lauren Boyles. 2014. "American's Shifting Statehouse Press." Washington, DC: *Pew Research Center*.

[22] Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members In Their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown*, 1978.

[23] Follett, Mary Parker. [1925]1942. "Constructive Conflict." In *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett*, eds. H. C. Metcalf and L. Urwick. New York: *Harper*.

[24] Garlick, A. (2017), "National Policies, Agendas and Polarization in American State Legislatures:2011-2014" *American Politics Research*, 45(6), 939-979, *SAGE Publications*.

[25] Gimpel, James. 1996. *National Elections and the Autonomy of the American State Party Systems*. Pittsburgh, PA: *University of Pittsburgh Press*.

[26] Green, Donald P, Bradley Palmquist and Eric Schickler. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven: *Yale University Press*, 2002.

[27] Gregg, Katherine and Patrick Anderson. "Political Scence: New laws ring in with the new year", *The Providence Journal*, December 30, 2018.

[28] Grumm, John G. 1971. "The Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative Performance." In State and Urban Politics, eds. Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky. Boston, MA: *Little, Brown*.

[29] Hall, Richard L. *Participation In Congress*. New Haven, Conn: *Yale University Press*, 1996.

[30] Hicks, William, 2016, "Replication Data for: Partisan Competition and the Efficiency of Lawmaking in American Legislatures, 1991-2009", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/X7PCPB, *Harvard Dataverse*, V1, UNF:6:qesceq3BTegR+vyPP2yXig== [fileUNF]

[31] Hopkins, Daniel J. *The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. The University of Chicago Press*, 2018.

[32] Hopkins, Daniel J. and Eric Schickler. The Nationalization of State Party Platforms, 1918-2014. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 2016, and the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, September 2016.

[33] Hopkins, David A. *Red Fighting Blue: How Geography and Electoral Rules Polarize American Politics*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: *Cambridge University Press*, 2017.

[34] Jacoby, William and Saundra Schneider.2001. "Variability in State Policy Priorities: An Empirical Analysis". *Journal of Politics 63: 544-568.*

[35] Jacoby, William and Saundra Schneider.2009. "A New Measure of Policy Spending Priorities in The American States". *Political Analysis 17-1-24*

[36] Kirkland, Justin and Jonathan Slapin. 2017. "Ideology and Strategic Party Disloyalty in US Congress", *Electoral Studies 49:26-37.*

[37] Klarner, Carl, 2018, "State Legislative Election Returns, 1967-2016", *Harvard Dataverse*

[38] Klarner, Carl, 2013, "Other Scholars' Competitiveness Measures", *Harvard Dataverse.*

[39] Klinghard, Daniel. *The Nationalization of American Political Parties, 1880-1896.* Cambridge [U.K.], New York: *Cambridge University Press*, 2010.

[40] Kousser, T. (2005). *Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism.* Cambridge, New York: *Cambridge University Press.*

[41] Krehbiel, Keith. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. University of Chicago Press*, 1998.

[42] Lax JR , Phillips JH. 2012. "The Democratic Deficit in the States". *American Journal of Political Science, 56:14866*

[43] Lee, Frances E. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles and Partisanship in the US Senate.* Chicago, London: *The University of Chicago Press*, 2009.

[44] Lee, Frances E. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign.* Chicago, London: *The University of Chicago Press*, 2016.

[45] Levendusky, Matthew. *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans.* Chicago, London: *University of Chicago Press*, 2009.

[46] Martin, Gregory J., and Joshua McCrain. Local News and National Politics. *American Political Science Review. Cambridge University Press*, 113. doi:10.1017/S0003055418000965.

[47] Mason, Lilliana. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press*, 2018.

[48] Mayhew, David R. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven: *Yale University Press*, 1974.

[49] Mayhew, David R.*Placing Parties In American Politics: Organization Electoral Settings, and Government Activity In the Twentieth Century.* Princeton, N.J:*Princeton University Press*, 1986.

[50] McCarty, Nolan M, Keith T Poole and Howard Rosenthal. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches.* Cambridge, Mass: *MIT Press*, 2006.

[51] *MIT Election Data and Science Lab*, 2017, "U.S. President 19762016", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/42MVDX, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:FZvueEJodLoC6wCGns/31A== [fileUNF] Cite Dataset

[52] Miler, Kristina C. *Constituency Representation In Congress: The View From Capitol Hill.* Cambridge [U.K.], New York: *Cambridge University Press*, 2010.

[53] Payne, James L. Show Horses and Work Horses in the United States House of Representatives. Polity 12, no. 3 (1980): 428-56. doi:10.2307/3234215.

[54] Peterson PE. 1981.*City Limits.*Chicago: *University of Chicago Press.*

[55] Poole, Keith T and Howard Rosenthal. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting.* New York: *Oxford University Press*, 1997.

[56] Raimondo, Gina. "State of the State Address". January 17, 2017. Speech is available at: http://www.governor.ri.gov/newsroom/speeches/2017/state-of-the-state.php.

[57] Rice, Tom W. and Alisa A. Macht. 1987a. Friends and neighbors voting in statewide general elections. American Journal of Political Science 31(2):448452.

[58] Sears, David. 1993. "Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory." *In Explorations in Political Psychology*, (eds.) Shanto Iyengar and William J.McGuire, 113-149. Durham NC. *Duke University Press.*

[59] Self, Robert. 2003. *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland.* Princeton, NJ: *Princeton University Press.*

[60] Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. 2011. The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures. *American Political Science Review 105 (3).Cambridge University Press*: 53051. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000153.

[61] Sievert, Joel and Seth McKee. Forthcoming, 2019 "Nationalization in US Senate and Gubernatorial Elections", *American Politics Research*

[62] Squire, Peverill. 1992. "Legislative Professionalism and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 69:70.*

[63] Stokes, Donald. 1967. "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces." In *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*, (eds.) W.N. Chambers and W.D. Burnham, 182-202. New York: *Oxford University Press.*

[64] Tatalovich, Raymond. 1975. "'Friends and neighbors"voting: Mississippi, 1943-73."' *Journal of Politics 37(3):807814.*

[65] Tausanovitch C, Warshaw C. 2014. "Representation in Municipal Government". *American Political Science Review. 108 : 60541*

[66] Theriault, Sean M.*Party Polarization In Congress.* Cambridge, New York: *Cambridge University Press*, 2008.

[67] Wang, Amy. "How Washington state became the epicenter of resistance to Trump's agenda", *Washington Post*, February 5, 2017.Print.

[68] Warshaw, C. [Forthcoming, 2019] "Local Elections and Representation in the United States", *Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 22.*

[69] Weingast, Barry, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclasical Approach to Distributive Politics". *Journal of Political Economy. 89:642-64.*

[70] Zaller, John. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* Cambridge [England], New York: *Cambridge University Press*, 1992.