EDUCATING FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS? HISTORIES OF SCHOOLING IN KENYA'S DADAAB AND KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMPS

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by

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ABSTRACT

EDUCATING FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS? HISTORIES OF SCHOOLING IN KENYA'S DADAAB AND KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMPS

Chrissie Monaghan

This account explains continuities in the challenges of providing access to quality education for refugees trapped in protracted situations (PRS) despite several shifts and changes in education policies and programming between 1992 and 2012. Through UNHCR archival documents and interviews with refugees as well as policymakers and program officers with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its implementing partners, I reconstruct the contemporary education histories of Kenya's Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. I then comparatively analyze these narratives for critical junctures to determine how and why changes occurred to refugee education and on what unit level. Finally, I collectively consider these junctures for what they reveal about the conditions under which changes to refugee education occurred in the past and how UNHCR officers and refugees might occasion lasting changes to the challenges of refugee education in the future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deep gratitude to the many refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma and community services, education, and program officers at the UNHCR and its partner agencies who shared with me their hopes, dreams, frustrations, and hardships, mostly with regards to refugee education but also their lived experiences in the camps or in the corridors and conference rooms of the UNHCR offices in Nairobi and Geneva. I am humbled and honored to have the opportunity to represent their stories here.

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This work is dedicated you—friends, family, colleagues, professors, and mentors. It is the sum of so many personal and professional experiences these past years but also a beginning—the first of the same story about refugees and education that I will write in different ways in the years to come.

CEM

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADEO-African Development and Relief Organization
ECD-early childhood development
DRC-Democratic Republic of the Congo
EFA-Education for All
EE-Environmental Education
EiE-Education in Emergencies
GCE-Global Citizenship Education
GLOBE-Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment Program
INEE-Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO-International Non-Governmental Organization
IP-Implementing Partner
IR-International Relations
IRC-International Rescue Committee
IRRES-International Relief and Rehabilitation Services
KCPE-Kenya Certificate of Primary Education
KCSE-Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education
LWF-Lutheran World Federation
MoE-Ministry of Education
NGO-Non-Governmental Organization
NRC-Norwegian Refugee Council
PEP-Peace Education Program
PRS-Protracted Refugee Situations
PTA-Parent Teacher Association
SMC-School Management Committee
SPLA-Sudanese People's Liberation Army
UNDP-United Nations Development Program
UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNESCO-United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF-United Nations International Children's Fund
WFP-World Food Program
WTK-Windle Trust Kenya
WUSC-World University Service of Canada
YEP-Youth Education Pack


Bokolmayo
Kobe
Hilaweyn
Dillo
Megado
Kakuma
Kakuma camp
Lake Turkana
UGANDA
KENYA
SOMALIA
Ifo
Dhobley
Dagahaley
Ifo 2
Dadaab
Alinjugur
Kambioos
Hagadera
NAIROBI
Nairobi Regional support hub
Liaison Office Somalia

PROLOGUE

DADAAB CAMP

I spotted the building from fifteen kilometers away, rising up from the dusty, windswept plain.
"What is that?" I asked Saleem, my fixer for the week who was on the phone talking hurriedly in Somali in the front seat of the Hilux truck. We were heading away from Ifo and towards Dagahaley by way of Ifo 2, the newest sub-camp in Dadaab.
"A school," he replied without pausing his conversation.
"It's two stories… how is that even possible here?"
My question was not in reference to the logistical or practical challenges of construction but rather to the twin anomalies represented by the very existence of the building—its permanence and sheer size. Schooling had taken place under trees for years in Dadaab. While there were now many brick and mortar classrooms, the education sector always faced significant budgetary shortfalls. These were reflected in student to teacher ratios of 150:1, a chronic lack of textbooks for students, and many school buildings with crumbling walls, doors falling off their hinges, and an acute shortage of desks. And yet, someone had marshaled the funds for this school.
Saleem ended his call and turned to face me. "You know, it's the biggest building in the camp and the only one that's two stories," he said.
"We can go there?" I tried to phrase it as a question though it sounded more like a statement.
He checked his watch. "If you want to go there, we can go there but no more than fifteen minutes. It's in Ifo 2—that's where the security is bad—still bandits and the police don't really have things under control."
Saleem indicated to the driver that we should make a left across the untracked expanse. As we drew closer the contrast sharpened between the school and the surrounding landscape—a new stucco building that towered over hundreds of dilapidated tents made of twisted branches and plastic sheeting.
"Only fifteen minutes," Saleem repeated as we climbed out of the truck.
I quickly walked inside and into an open courtyard, craning my neck upward to take in the breezeways connecting a dozen second-story classrooms. It looked almost identical to my suburban public high school in northern California.
"Let's go find the principal," Saleem said, motioning me up the stairs and into a classroom at the top. "Just wait in here."
Turning to survey the room, I noticed a man sitting on an elevated office chair in front of a battered desk, typing on a laptop computer.
"Hello," I said, stepping forward so that I could shake his hand and give my now-automatic introduction. "My name is Chrissie Monaghan and I'm a researcher working

on writing the history of education in Dadaab and Kakuma. Are you a teacher or principal here?"
"You said the history of education in Dadaab camp?"
I nodded in reply. Before I could explain further, he turned his laptop screen towards me. On the open Word document, he had typed 'The Educationist: Education in Dadaab since 1994.'
"You're writing the history of education in Dadaab!" I exclaimed.
I couldn't help firing off questions in quick succession. What's your name? Where are you from? How long have you been in the camp? How long have you worked in the school? What do you plan to do with your narrative?
He took each one in turn, calmly explaining that his name was Michael, he was from Uganda and had been in the camp since 1993. He had first been a teacher, then a head teacher, and eventually a quality assurance officer. He had just started writing an hour before I walked in and was about to tell me what he might do with the account when Saleem returned.
"I can't find the principal," he said. "And anyway we should get going, we've been too long here."
"Wait we have to stay," I said, recounting my brief exchange with Michael.
In the time it took to do so, Michael had reached into his bag and found a handful of photos.
"Take a look at these," he said, "I was a young man then." I gently accepted the dog-eared, sepia prints, eyeing a blackboard propped under an acacia tree, a group of preschool children sitting cross-legged on mats in a darkened room, Michael with shovel in hand standing next to a partially-constructed building.
"The principal of this school is actually one of my former students. We were in the can schools then."
"Can schools?"
"Someone from CARE had the idea. USAID had sent all of these supplies in large tin cans…like oil drums. There were thousands of them. So we cut them in half, pounded them out flat, and then used them to build school walls."
I began again with another series of questions. When did you build the can schools? How long did they last? What's your role as a quality assurance officer? Would you be available to meet tomorrow for an interview?
Before Michael could answer, Saleem intervened. "Yes—tomorrow," he said. "I'll make all the arrangements with you and send a taxi in the morning."
"Wait just one more question," I said, as Saleem tried in vain to hasten me towards the door. "Why write the history of education in Dadaab?"
He looked at his computer screen for a moment, considering his words, then looked back at me. "For years part of my job for CARE and other NGOs was putting together reports and newsletters about the development of education to share with donors and they always wrote the refugees out. Like the agencies were the ones deciding everything and taking the credit for everything. But so much of what happened was up to us—we helped to build the education system. And people should know."
As we walked down the stairs towards the truck, I thought suddenly of a quote that had struck me since first reading it the previous year: "The relationship between structure

and agency is dialectical and history is the synthesis."[1] *The irony was not lost upon me that I was lapsing into a cerebral reverie in the middle of Dadaab camp. The memory of the temperature-controlled classroom where a dozen other graduate students and I had dissected the meaning of these words commingled with the unrelenting heat and the taste of dust in my mouth.*

In that moment, the narrative I would tell took shape, one that reconstructs the ways in which individuals—refugees and a handful of program officers and policymakers—played a far more determinative role in developing and implementing the education program in Dadaab and Kakuma than has been acknowledged in UNHCR reports or scholarship on refugee education.

Back in the truck, I scribbled my thoughts in a notebook before they were lost to the wind, the rumbling of the diesel motor, or the interviews that awaited in the afternoon. I held the two-story school in sight for as long as I could, only shifting my gaze towards Dagahaley, just visible on the horizon, when the building eventually receded into the distance in the rearview mirror.

[1] Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 11.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War era, education took on new significance as a global policy priority. Political leaders and heads of multilateral and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) declared with increasing frequency that universal access to basic schooling was a primary means of expanding and strengthening democratic, liberal institutions throughout the world.[1] Basic education was deemed critical in decreasing poverty, promoting environmental sustainability, and mitigating or preventing the occurrence or recurrence of intractable civil wars throughout sub-Saharan Africa and central and Southeast Asia.[2] However, states mired in conflict as well neighboring states offering refugee status to those displaced by conflict were more often than not unable or unwilling to maintain the provision of education services to conflict-affected populations.[3]

As a temporary, humanitarian response, an array of non-state actors, including bilateral aid agencies, multilateral organizations, and international and local NGO's mobilized to fill this void. However, the protracted nature of conflicts strained the conceptual and practical capabilities of these non-state actors to provide long-term,

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[1] See: Stephen J. Ball, *Global Education Inc.: New Policy Networks and the Neo-Liberal Imaginary* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012).
[2] See Marc Sommers, "Children, Education and War: Reaching Education for All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict," (Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Series, CPR No. 1, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2002), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/06/2002835/children-education-war-reacing-education-all-efa-objectives-countries-affected-conflict. See also Sobhi Tawil and Alexandra Harley, "EFA, Conflict and Terrorism," *Norrag News*, 2003, 43-47.
[3] See Alan Smith. "Education in the Twenty-First Century: Conflict, Reconstruction and Reconciliation," *Compare* 35, no. 4 (2005): 373-391.

sustainable education services. This was particularly the case for refugees residing in camps (effectively transnational spaces for reasons that will be subsequently explained) for indeterminate lengths of time in countries of asylum.[4] After all, free and compulsory basic education is legally and normatively considered the responsibility of states; moreover, formal education has historically been for the purpose of cultivating national citizenship through assimilation into an "imagined community."[5] Foundational to the project of universal access to basic schooling are the twin aims of nation-building and state-building. As a consequence, the UNHCR, the UN agency mandated to protect and assist refugees, and the community-services and protection officers under its employ struggled to answer real and immediate questions stemming from such a puzzle—that is, how to deliver education for the state but not by the state. These questions included: What curriculum and language of instruction should be utilized? Who should teach? How many grade levels should be offered? How much funding should be allocated to education? And how might that funding be secured?

The UNHCR has undertaken, and continues to undertake, efforts to answer these questions, most recently through the implementation of its *Education Strategy 2012-2016*.[6] However larger ideational and institutional challenges remain. Here I offer only an introductory snapshot. First and foremost, UNHCR's founding statute stipulates that the UNHCR must fund all of its operational costs (98 percent of its total budget) from bilateral organizations or the private sector (e.g. corporations, philanthropic

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[4] See Tony Waters and Kim LeBlanc, "Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling Without a Nation-State." *Comparative Education Review* 49, no. 2 (2005): 129-147.
[5] See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*., (London: Verso Books, 2006).
[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Education Strategy 2012-2016," (Division of International Protection, 2012), http://www.unhcr.org/5149ba349.html.

organizations, or individuals) for discrete, one-year funding cycles.[7] This renders funding for refugee education in camps dependent upon states or private organizations, which by-and-large have not viewed refugee education as a basic need nor one that aligns with their strategic interests. Additionally, under UNHCR's founding mandate, three durable solutions are available to refugees: third country resettlement, local integration, or repatriation to refugees' country of origin.[8] Throughout the post-Cold War era, there have been significant restrictions on third country resettlement as well as local integration into host countries just as the protracted, long-term nature of intrastate conflicts has become clear. The average length of stay in a refugee camp is now seventeen years, during which time refugees are restricted from seeking wage-earning employment or moving freely outside of the camps.[9] As a result, there is limited viability to the three durable solutions. And yet, the UNHCR recently framed education in its *Education Strategy 2012-2016* as both a durable solution and as "critical to achieving durable solutions."[10] This, along with the other challenges and puzzles confronting refugee education deserve explanation.

Today, there exist conceptual frameworks and policy precedents that position education as a life-saving, protective service that are leveraged by UNHCR's education and community services officers to advocate for funding for education in camps. However, more than two decades ago when many camps were rapidly established throughout the world in response to large influxes of refugees at the end of the Cold War, such documents, tools, and frameworks did not exist. Answers to these questions

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[7] See Gil Loescher, Alexander Betts, and James Milner. *UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection Into the 21st Century* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2008).
[8] See Gil Loescher, "The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy," *International Migration Review* 35, no. 1 (2001): 33-56.
[9] See Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp, "A Surrogate State?: The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations," (UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, New Issues in Refugee Research, Researh Paper No. 168, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4981cb432.html.
[10] UNHCR, "Education Strategy," 7.

regarding what to teach, to whom, and for how long were contingent, debates surrounding them often contentious, and the decision-making process constrained by a wide range of competing if not divergent interests of the UNHCR and the individuals working within it as well as host states, UNHCR's donors, and of course refugees themselves. Nevertheless, between 1992 and 2012, education policies and programs were developed, implemented, and changed. *Educating for Durable Solutions?* tells this story, with a particular focus on Kenya's Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps.

To date, scholars have captured only a sliver of the development of UNHCR's "global" policies and programs for refugee education, and even less of the ways in which these policies are implemented over time in particular camp settings. Why has the contemporary account of UNHCR's development and implementation of policies and programs for refugee education been so narrowly drawn? There are three reasons. One is simply the research design of the handful of studies that have been conducted. In the past two decades, the UNHCR has commissioned a number of "policy-relevant" qualitative case studies and analytic reports to determine the educational needs of populations residing in camps. These studies describe the number of students enrolled in schools, teacher to student ratios, annual per pupil expenditures, and opportunities for refugees to access secondary and/or higher education. In other words, these reports capture "policy relevant" information that UNHCR's policymakers and program officers might utilize to determine where a particular camp stands relative to UNHCR's benchmark goals. In short, they ask "what" questions, rather than "how" or "why" questions.

The second reason is the difficulty of fitting refugee education into the larger story of "globalization" and "global governance" in the post-Cold War era. Globalization

refers both "to the intensification of [national] economic integration" as well as "the increasing volume and rapidity of flows of people, ideas, and culture across traditional territorial borders of the nation-state."[11] Yet global governance, that is political integration of transnational actors (e.g. UN agencies) for the purpose of negotiating responses to problems that affect more than one state or region, has not kept pace.[12] The durability of the international system of sovereign, territorialized nation-states accounts for why this is so and will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters. However, the terms state, nation, nation-state, international, and global—each central to the arguments developed throughout this account—require clarity of definition prior to proceeding.[13] States are territorial, legally sovereign entities, constituted by institutions (e.g. legislative and juridical) that govern and represent the interests of citizens. Nations are communities bound by common language(s) and cultural practices as well as shared histories; yet, these communities often transcend state boundaries or are not represented by the state in which they reside. Nation-states are conceptualized as sovereign territorial entities whose citizens belong to the same nation; however, rarely do states and nations correspond precisely. The term international denotes interactions by state and non-state actors across the borders of sovereign states while the term global refers to any phenomena that transcend states. Since the end of the Cold War, the expanse of protracted intra-state conflict has led to a meteoric rise in the number of refugees crossing state borders in search of asylum. To craft a new narrative of the development of refugee education

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[11] See Karen Mundy and Caroline Manion, "Globalization and Global Governance in Education," *Globalization and Education: Integration and Contestation across Cultures* (2014): 39.

[12] See Thomas Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, *Global governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). See also Michael Barnett, et al. "Power in Global Governance," *Power in Global Governance* (2005): 1.

[13] These definitions represent predominant thinking in International Relations, the discipline whose theoretical frameworks I rely upon throughout my account.

requires thinking differently (i.e. historically rather than with a presentist orientation) and in turn asking different questions (i.e. "why" and "how" rather than "what") about its placement within a shifting configuration of national and international social, political, and economic institutions as well as global policy priorities.

The final reason is linked closely to the preceding two. That is, the challenge of employing new conceptual and methodological tools capable of understanding and explaining the policies and programs of refugee education. The conceptual approach I take in the pages that follow for reasons I will explain further in Chapter 3 is that of Constructivism, a framework from the discipline of International Relations. Methodologically, I utilize comparative and contemporary historical analysis as well as critical junctures analysis, tools that have frequently been employed in Constructivist studies. By relocating refugee education at the crossroads of national, international, and global policymaking, this account offers a deeper, more nuanced understanding than previous accounts of refugee education's role as "cause, effect, problem, and possible solution"[14] in relation to the rise and expanse of protracted intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, by focusing on Kenya's Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, this account traces why and how global policies and priorities for education (in this case refugee education) reflect, on the one hand, broad ideational and institutional structures at particular moments in time, and on the other, the actions and agency of individuals—education, community services, and program officers as well as refugees. My interest is in identifying critical junctures where structure and agency intersect, or rather, in capturing this dialectic in order to understand and explain changes to refugee education.

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[14] Jackie Kirk, "Education and Fragile States," *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 5, no. 2 (2007): 181.

Why Dadaab and Kakuma? Established ca. 1992, both camps currently host refugees fleeing ongoing and/or recurring conflicts throughout a number of states in the volatile region of East Africa. However when first established, Dadaab was comprised primarily of women and girls from Somalia and designed to host approximately 90,000 refugees[15] while Kakuma held 20,000 refugees, the majority of whom were unaccompanied male youths.[16] In the ensuing twenty-years, these numbers have grown exponentially and at approximately 500,000[17] and 190,000[18] refugees respectively, Dadaab and Kakuma are at present the two largest camps in the world. They are also fairly well known in the American media, Kakuma in particular, having been the destination sought by the "Lost Boys of Sudan,"[19] and also in academic circles as a number of UNHCR programs have been piloted and evaluated in both camps, including Environmental Education, the Women Victims of Violence Project, and Peace Education. For these and other reasons later discussed, Dadaab and Kakuma have rich, contemporary histories of education that are more similar than they are different. Yet, the differences are revealing. A narrative reconstruction of the education history of either camp would, on its own, shed light on the myriad challenges of refugee education. When these narratives are considered comparatively and within the broader institutional context of the UNHCR and the ideational landscape of the post-Cold War era, the root causes of these challenges come into sharp focus.

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[15] See Cindy Horst, *Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope With Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya*., Studies in Forced Migration, Vol. 19, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).
[16] See Bram Jansen, "The Accidental City: Violence, Economy, and Humanitarianism in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya." (2011).
[17] United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, "Global Report 2013-Kenya," (UNHCR, 2014).
[18] Ibid.
[19] The Lost Boys of Sudan is the name given to over 20,000 Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups who were displaced and/or orphaned during the second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). A number of films, including God Grew Tired of Us, War Child, and most recently The Good Lie, and popular non-fiction books, including "What is the What" and "They Poured Fire on Us From the Sky" offer accounts of the Lost Boys in Kakuma and upon resettlement to the United States.

Some of the challenges are already known. The 2011 *Refugee Education: A Global Review*[20] commissioned by the UNHCR concluded that there were seven urgent challenges of refugee education, ranging from limited access to post-primary education to the inherently political nature of curricular content that can exacerbate societal conflict.[21] Statistics included in the report detailed that across 92 camps surveyed throughout the world, 24 percent of primary school aged children (ages six to eleven) and 64 percent of secondary school aged youth (ages twelve to eighteen) remained out of school.[22] Across these same camps, teacher-pupil ratios averaged 1:70.[23] Additionally, education received only 2 percent of humanitarian aid and only 38 percent of requests for education funding were met.[24] In Dadaab and Kakuma, these figures are worse. Across both camps, 50 percent of primary school aged children and 95 percent of secondary school-aged youth remain out of school.[25]

As a means of understanding and explaining these challenges and those previously mentioned, this account asks and answers three interrelated questions: What education policies and programs were developed, implemented, and changed in Kenya's Dadaab and Kakuma camps between 1992 and 2012? What were the underlying causal mechanisms that drove changes when they occurred? What are the lived educational experiences of refugee students, their families, and teachers in relation to the range of education policies and programs throughout this period? At the time this research was undertaken in 2012, I bounded my inquiry to the preceding twenty-years, beginning in

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[20] Sarah Dryden-Peterson, "Refugee Education: A Global Review," (UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, New Issues in Refugee Research, 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/4fe317589.html.
[21] Ibid., 11.
[22] Ibid., 12.
[23] Ibid., 14.
[24] Ibid., 17.
[25] Ibid., 40.

1992 with the founding of the two camps and shortly following the start of the post-Cold War era.[26] Primarily, this account explains continuity in the challenges of refugee education throughout this twenty-year period, despite significant changes on multiple levels—UNHCR's Headquarters, UNHCR's Nairobi Branch Office, and Dadaab and Kakuma's field offices—to policies and programs for refugee education. However, throughout the three years spent conducting this research, changes have continued, most notably the development and implementation of UNHCR's *Education Strategy 2012-2016*.[27] An account of how and why this particular change happened and the discontinuity in the challenges of refugee education it might in fact bring about are included in my summative analysis.

I draw three overarching conclusions from reconstructing the contemporary educational history of Dadaab and Kakuma. First, in the concomitant eras of globalization and the post-Cold War, the state is still the dominant form of subjectivity. As a result, non-state actors like the UNHCR might initiate changes in "global education policy" but change ultimately happens through the state. Second, ideas matter. Ideas about the responsibility of states to provide funding for education in emergencies and the purposes of education in these contexts act as advocacy tools, which individuals working within the UNHCR and other organizations can leverage to loosen and at times even change institutional constraints. Therefore, research capable of conceptually and empirically strengthening these ideas is crucial for policymaking and helps to bridge the gap between education scholars and education practitioners working in emergency contexts. Finally, capturing and sharing the institutional memory of individuals who

[26] The fall of the Berlin wall in 1991 is generally agreed upon as the start of the post-Cold War era.
[27] UNHCR, "Education Strategy,".

worked to develop and implement education policies at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland as well as on the ground in Dadaab, Kakuma, and other camp settings provides important context for both current and new policymakers and program officers at the UNHCR and other organizations. Up until this point, policymakers and program officers have made decisions within a context that, at its widest, might span that of their immediate predecessors. Understanding the present through a more holistic prism of the past might make possible new or different directions in the future—something akin to driving forward with the help of the rearview mirror.

All three conclusions go against the grain of conventional thinking in the fields of international development studies in education with a focus on globalization and Education in Emergencies (EiE). Scholars of globalization and education argue that "globalization," has created the conditions by which the territorialized nation-state is no longer the primary unit of political organization.[28] As a result, they contend, states now mediate rather than regulate the demands of non-state actors, which include multinational corporations (e.g. Exxon Mobile), multilateral organizations (e.g. World Trade Organization), and private philanthropic organizations (e.g. the Gates Foundation). Their scholarship has endeavored to show, theoretically and empirically, the ways in which non-state actors have exerted considerable influence on the financing and content of formal education. In the first instance, education is increasingly considered a private commodity that prepares individual workers to access global labor markets rather than a public good that prepares citizens to participate in the social and political institutions of nation-states. Considering the erosion of the nation-state a fait accompli, these scholars

[28] See Andy Green.,*Education, Globalization and the Nation State*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). See also Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres, eds. *Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives*. (New York: Psychology Press, 2000).

have made repeated calls for "paradigm-puncturing" theories and methods that "advance ways of seeing and studying education policies *transnationally.*[29]

In contrast, *Educating for Durable Solutions?* shows that in transnational spaces such as refugee camps, nation-states (donor as well as host states) determinatively shape the financing and content of education—albeit with the guiding force of an invisible hand. What do I mean by this? First and foremost, bilateral organizations fund approximately ninety-percent of UNHCR's annual operating costs.[30] That the UNHCR is completely reliant upon donor states is an institutional design set forth in UNHCR's founding statute, specifically for the purpose of preventing the ability of a non-state actor to operate autonomously of nation-states. Why and how this is so will be explained with greater detail in the following chapter. While in recent years the UNHCR has looked to private philanthropic organizations to make up for budget shortfalls resulting from an increasing number of protracted refugee situations (PRS)[31] throughout the world (including Dadaab and Kakuma) as well as significantly reduced contributions from donor states, efforts so far have yielded limited success. In no sector is this felt more acutely than education, as it is the first service for which funding is restricted or cut altogether during budget crises. In terms of what is actually taught, UNHCR's community-services, education, and program officers in consultation with refugees more often than not must choose, when establishing camp schools, between the national curriculum and language of instruction of the host state or the state of origin(s). As we will see in subsequent chapters, in Dadaab and Kakuma the Kenyan national curriculum

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[29] Antoni Verger, Hulya K. Altinyelken, and Mario Novelli, eds. *Global Education Policy and International Development: New Agendas, Issues and Policies*, (London: A&C Black, 2012), 3.
[30] Loescher, Betts, and Milner, *Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection,* (2008).
[31] The UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as "one in which 25,000 or more displaced persons find themselves in a longstanding and intractable state of limbo with no prospect of a solution." See Crisp and Slaughter, *Surrogate State,* (2009).

has been taught since 1994 with English as the primary language of instruction, even though, as previously mentioned, refugees are confined to these camps and prevented from legally integrating or seeking wage-earning employment in Kenya. In short, UNHCR's "global" education policies and programs as well as the three durable solutions are state centric in concept and practice. The theories and methods utilized in this account therefore advance ways of seeing and studying *the nation-state* and it's role in shaping education policies and programs in transnational spaces.

For scholars and practitioners in the field of Education in Emergencies, the state as a unit of analysis has by-in-large been eclipsed by the dizzying array of non-state actors involved in prescribing education policies and programs as well as providing education service delivery in conflict-affected states and refugee camps.[32] These institutions include bilateral aid agencies (e.g. the USAID), international NGOs (e.g. the UN and its branch agencies, including the UNHCR), and local NGOs. In refugee camps, this constellation of institutions assumes particular significance as the UNHCR works with Implementing Partners (IPs), typically INGOs and NGOs, to deliver basic services (i.e. food, water, shelter, healthcare, and education) to refugees. Yet, host states exert considerable influence in the provisioning of these services; in relation to education, they can prohibit camp schools, refuse to grant accreditation to camp schools through the Ministry of Education, as well as deny students the opportunity to sit for national exams.

That the nation-state has been obscured in EiE scholarship is reflective of what has been, until recently, a practitioner-oriented field, initially founded as the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) in the year 2000 by a small cadre of

[32] Dana Burde, "Education in Crisis Situations: Mapping The Field." (Creative Associates International, Inc., Basic Education Support Project, United States Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.: 2005).

education officers who had worked with a number of INGOs throughout the 1990's to provide education services in "emergency" situations (i.e. large influxes of refugees) in refugee camps. During a series of meetings held over two days at UNHCR's Headquarters, this group put forward a research agenda for the field intended to deepen policymakers and practitioners' conceptual and practical knowledge of "best practices" of education service delivery and programming in emergency situations. A subsequent wave of evidence-based research (e.g. impact evaluations) conducted in conflict-affected states (e.g. Afghanistan) or states recovering from conflict (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina) asked whether or not particular education policies or programs "worked" and utilized qualitative methods, particularly single or comparative case studies, to draw conclusions and make recommendations to policymakers. Curiously, while practitioners' experiences with and efforts to address the challenges of refugee education were central to the founding of the field, there have since been only a handful of studies conducted in camps. In conflict-affected and post-conflict states as well as in refugee camps, studies designed to advance conceptual knowledge of education in emergencies have been fewer still.

Educating for Durable Solutions? endeavors to bring refugee education back into focus within the wider field of EiE and is designed to bridge the persistent gap in the field between practical and conceptual knowledge. Rather than ask whether certain education policies or programs worked in Dadaab and Kakuma, this account considers the range of education policies and programs in these two camps since their founding and asks why and how they were developed and implemented in the first place. That is, what ideas, institutions, and interests—of individuals as well as donor and host states—acted as constraints or alternately as opportunities in relation to refugee education at different

moments? This necessarily involves utilizing new theoretical and methodological approaches to ask different questions about the challenges of refugee education.

Chapter 3 details the ways in which Constructivism as well as comparative historical analysis and critical junctures analysis are particularly well suited to doing so. The primary task of IR is to understand and explain relationships within and between states as well as non-state actors and the conditions under which conflict occurs. As such, IR has much to offer EiE scholars in considering the ways in which education interventions in emergency situations help to mitigate or alternately facilitate conflict. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of literature in the fields of EiE as well as Refugee Studies and briefly reviews the ways in which refugee education has been treated in international development and education literature. In relation to refugee education, EiE literature deals directly with challenges of service delivery and choices of curriculum, language of instruction, and certification but rarely situates these challenges within broader institutional or ideational contexts. In contrast, Refugee Studies literature offers detailed analyses of the UNHCR's institutional organization and operations as well as normative ideas regarding forced migration and protracted exile in the post-Cold War era but has seldom engaged with refugee education. Finally, international development studies in education literature explores how non-state actors have developed and diffused global education policies throughout the world since the end of the Cold War but has yet to engage with the role played by the UNHCR in these processes. This account initiates a much-needed and mutually beneficial cross-disciplinary dialogue between these three fields.

Chapters 4 and 5 reconstruct the contemporary education history of Dadaab and Kakuma, chapter 4 between 1992 and 2002 and chapter 5 between 2003 and 2012. As I explain in chapter 4, during the 1990's, universal education was increasingly conceptualized as a global policy priority and as a basic service central to UNHCR's mandate to protect and assist refugees in exile. However, public declarations often substituted for direct action. Many school-aged children in Dadaab and Kakuma remained out of school; those in attendance, particularly in the early years, learned under trees without textbooks or writing materials, unsure whether their schooling would lead to opportunities for secondary education or employment. UNHCR's community-services officers, the majority of whom had no experience with or interest in education, were tasked with liaising with UNHCR's implementing partners in the camps to establish schools, make decisions about curriculum, hire and train teachers, as well as manage the disbursement of funds for education from one year to the next. More often than not, UNHCR's implementing partners in Dadaab and Kakuma also had limited interest or experience in education service delivery. However, refugees—community leaders, parents, teachers, and students—advocated and mobilized for education. They ultimately decided on the Kenyan school curriculum in both camps, constructed the first school buildings, and successfully lobbied the UNHCR to establish secondary schools as well as make incremental increases to the stipend wages paid to refugee teachers.

Chapter 5 continues tracing continuity in the challenges of refugee education in Dadaab and Kakuma throughout the 2000s. Despite the deployment of UNHCR education officers to both camps, the founding of INEE and later the founding of the Global Education Cluster designed to provide an open formal forum for coordination and

collaboration amongst UN agencies and NGOs on the provision of education services in humanitarian crises, approximately the same number of school-aged children remained out of school. The majority of those in attendance continued without textbooks or other learning materials, still unsure whether their schooling would lead to further opportunities. On the one hand, the number of students in Grade 8 earning passing scores on the exam required to matriculate to secondary school far exceeded the limited number of places available in the secondary schools that had been established in Dadaab and Kakuma. On the other hand, most secondary school graduates were only able to find employment as teachers in the very schools where they had once been students. Seeking employment outside of the camp was and still is prohibited by the Kenyan government and beyond teaching there are a limited number of jobs (e.g. translators, fixers) with the UNHCR or the UNHCR's implementing partners inside the camp. These graduates would comprise over fifty-percent of the teaching staff in both camps, earning wages far below the handful of Kenyan teachers employed by the UNHCR in camp schools. Thus in part, the purpose of education in Dadaab and Kakuma has been to provide an increasingly educated teaching workforce in the continued absence of durable solutions.

Chapter 6 analyzes the education narrative of Dadaab and Kakuma drawn in the two preceding chapters for critical junctures, that is, "moments when outcomes during significant transitions establish distinct trajectories."[33] These moments include initial decisions over curriculum, language of instruction, and near-exclusive emphasis on the provision of primary education made when the two camps were founded in 1992; the piloting of the Peace Education Program in Dadaab and Kakuma in 1998; the founding of INEE in 2000; the 2006 "emergency" in Dadaab; the 2011 "emergency" in Dadaab; and

[33] Paul A. David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." *The American Economic Review* (1985): 332.

the publication of UNHCR's *Refugee Education: A Global Review*[34] in 2011 and subsequently UNHCR's *Education Strategy 2012-2016* in 2012.[35] Each reveals how and why change happens—the dialectic between structure and agency—as well as the different unit levels (e.g. ideational, institutional, host/donor state interest, Dadaab and Kakuma's field offices) upon which changes to refugee education and the lived educational experiences of refugees do or alternately do not occur. Finally, chapter 7 considers recent developments to refugee education since 2012 and explores the policy implications suggested by comparatively analyzing Dadaab and Kakuma's contemporary educational histories.

Ultimately, this account seeks to answer a crucial question: what is refugee education for? The agencies that fund and provide education in refugee camps speak often of its vital role in post-conflict state-building and nation-building, *the only thing refugees will carry with them to re-build their country* they proclaim. Yet refugees, when asked what their education is for, reach for words that allude to intangibles—becoming informed and contributory members of their communities in Dadaab and Kakuma, feeling a sense of accomplishment and experiencing important milestones, such as graduation. "I don't know what I will be able to do with this or how far I'll be able to go," one student stated. "I just focus on getting to the next level. With education you can be somebody here." The following pages explain the challenges of refugee education and tell stories of why, for reasons ranging from geopolitical security to individual dignity, refugee education matters.

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[34] Dryden-Peterson, "Global Review."
[35] UNHCR, "Education Strategy."

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research on education in emergencies and education as a global policy priority—on the one hand as a response to the occurrence of multiple, on-going and recurring intra-state conflicts that catalyzed "emergency" situations and on the other as a consequence of "globalization"—has become vast. Yet engagement with and critical analysis of refugee education, particularly attendant conceptual and practical challenges, has been largely overlooked or eclipsed altogether in these accounts as well as in those drawn from the field of Refugee Studies. The following chapter reviews these distinct bodies of literature, articulating the gaps that exist within and between each, and situating my account as a bridge across them.

Education in Emergencies

That refugee education is foundational to the field of Education in Emergencies is not well known outside of the handful of practitioners who convened in Geneva at UNHCR's Headquarters between November 8 and November 10, 2000 to establish what would become the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). This meeting followed upon a strategy session held at the second Education for All (EFA) Forum in Dakar, Senegal in April of that same year. During the session, it was concluded that multiple emergencies occurring throughout the 1990's (e.g. intrastate wars throughout sub-Saharan Africa and the Central and Southeast Asia that resulted in mass displacement of peoples across international borders) had significantly impeded the

realization of basic, universal education for all, a global policy priority set forth ten years prior at the first World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand. Emergencies also included natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes, floods, famine), which displaced large groups of people, often rendering them under the temporary care and protection of UN agencies and partner INGOs mandated to provide basic services (including education). Education in emergencies thus became central to achieving EFA—a claim that education and community services officers under the employ of UNHCR, UNESCO, and UNICEF (the three UN agencies providing education in emergency situations) could and did utilize when advocating for education to be included in emergency responses and promoting donor understanding of education in emergencies. However, these education and community service officers needed research that furthered initial reports published in the late 1990s [1] and that documented and disseminated best practices of education in emergencies as well as demonstrated the ways in which education in emergencies is a vital, life-saving, human right that aligned with EFA goals.

The resultant literature, primarily commissioned by UN agencies and a handful of partner INGOs, builds a case for access to basic education in conflict, post-conflict, and refugee camp settings.[2] With minimal variance, these guidebooks, manuals, and concept

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[1] See Pilar Aguilar and Gonzalo Retamal. "Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: A Discussion Document." (United Nations Children's Fund, 1998). See also Mary Joy Pigozzi, "Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach." (UNICEF, 1999).

[2] See Peter Buckland. *Reshaping the Future: Education and Postconflict Reconstruction*. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2005). See also Lynne Bethke and Stadt Braunschweig, "Global Survey on Education in Emergencies." (Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2004); Eldrid Midttun, "Education in Emergencies and Transition Phases: Still a Right and More of a Need." (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2000); Sudan Nicolai, "Education in Emergencies: A Tool Kit for Starting and Managing Education in Emergencies," (Save the Children UK, 2003); Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn. "The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict," *Network Paper: Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)* 42 (2003): 1-36; Margaret Sinclair, "Planning Education In and After Emergencies," (UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning, 2002); Marc Sommers, "The Education Imperative: Supporting Education in Emergencies. (AED, 2003); Marc Sommers, "Co-Ordinating Education during Emergencies and Reconstruction: Challenges and Responsibilities," (UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004); Carl Triplehorn. "Education: Care and Protection of Children in Emergencies: A Field Guide," (Save the Children US, 2001).

papers draw upon case studies and authors' field-based experiences to outline the ways in which basic education in emergencies provides children and youth a sense of normalcy and routine; psychosocial support; life skills for their immediate environment (e.g. landmine awareness, prevention of HIV/AIDS); protection from recruitment into armed groups; and knowledge/skills necessary for post-conflict state-building and nation-building. The phrasing of these titles is indicative of the what is presented as instructional and advocacy-oriented content found within: *The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict;*[3] *Planning Education in and After Emergencies;*[4] *The Education Imperative: Supporting Education in Emergencies.*[5] In these initial accounts, refugee education as a field in its own right with its own particular political and legal contexts and institutional arrangements is subsumed within a wider discourse and defense of education in emergencies. This would have significant consequences for refugee education (policies/programs as well as research) as the long-term, non-emergent, protracted nature of refugee situations became clear.

A subsequent wave of research (reflective and empirical), conducted primarily by scholars who approached the field of EiE from critical perspectives, offered different understandings of the ways in which education was far from protective and in many cases had contributed to or exacerbated conflict. Bush and Saltarelli's (2000) seminal study, citing a range of cases and examples from conflicts throughout the 1990's, catalyzed this trend in the field's founding moment by describing the "two faces of education." The "negative" face, the authors explain, reveals itself in asymmetrical access to education services and the production of textbooks, particularly history texts that reify differences

[3] Nicolai and Triplehorn, "Role of Education."
[4] Sinclair, "Planning Education."
[5] Sommers, "Education Imperative."

between ethnic and cultural groups. To be "positive" and by extension protective, they maintain that education service provision is not enough; instead questions must be asked and answered regarding what constitutes relevant, appropriate, quality education. Other studies expanded upon Bush and Saltarelli's premise by demonstrating through case studies conducted in conflict-affected states (e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina, Indonesia, Rwanda), the ways in which schooling practices via curricula, pedagogy, and/or segregationist policies can enhance or alternately mitigate latent social, ethnic, and political divisions.[6] The scholars conducting these studies increasingly called for new theoretical and methodological approaches capable of better understanding and explaining the complex and dynamic relationship between education and conflict. Refugee camp schools, viewed as far removed from conflict in refugees' home countries, were not necessarily considered sites that could advance this research agenda.

Scholars responding specifically to a number of the above-mentioned studies and more broadly to the field of EiE made similar calls. For example, Kagawa argues that discourses focused on access to education in emergencies belie an "economic development" rationale and approach to education service provision that curtails wider discussions of the ways in which education in emergencies can and should address

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[6] See Dana Burde, *Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). See also, Lynn Davies, *Education and conflict: Complexity and chaos*, (Milton Park: Routledge, 2003); Lynn Davies, "Schools and War: Urgent Agendas for Comparative and International Education," *Compare* 35, no. 4 (2005): 357-371; Lynn Davies, "Educating Against Extremism: Towards a Critical Politicisation of Young People," *International Review of Education* 55, no. 2-3 (2009): 183-203; Lynn Davies and Christopher Talbot, "Learning in Conflict and Postconflict Contexts," *Comparative Education Review* 52, no. 4 (2008): 509-518; Tony Gallagher, *Education in Divided Societies*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Elisabeth King, *From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jackie Kirk, "Education and Fragile States," *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 5, no. 2 (2007): 181-200; Mieke TA Lopes Cardozo, "Sri Lanka: In Peace or In Pieces? A Critical Approach to Peace Education in Sri Lanka," *Research in Comparative and International Education* 3, no. 1 (2008): 19-35; Tejendra J. Pherali,,"Education and Conflict in Nepal: Possibilities for Reconstruction." *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 9, no. 1 (2011): 135-154; Ritesh Shah, "Goodbye Conflict, Hello Development? Curriculum Reform in Timor-Leste," *International Journal of Educational Development* 32, no. 1 (2012): 31-38; Alan Smith, "Education in the Twenty-First Century: Conflict, Reconstruction and Reconciliation," *Compare* 35, no. 4 (2005): 373-391; Alan Smith and Tony Vaux, "Education, Conflict and International Development," (DfiD, 2003).

comprehensive development towards quality of life for all.[7] He concludes by cautioning researchers from accepting, prima facie, the rationales, discourses and terms—particularly the term emergency—utilized by agencies providing education services as he queries what constitutes an "emergency" and who decides. Rappleye and Paulson further Kagawa's argument by declaring that the field of education in emergencies is "stuck in its own emergence" because it has yet to develop common theoretical and conceptual frameworks as well methodological tools capable of empirically studying the impact of education interventions across a range of contexts.[8] They also highlight the divergent approaches to research on education in emergencies by practitioner-oriented studies, which offer generalizable "best practice" lessons, and alternately academic scholarship, which tends to provide detailed single-case studies and conclude by advocating for context-specific approaches to education interventions in emergency situations.

In her comprehensive survey of methodological approaches utilized in EiE publications throughout the first ten years of the field, Wright finds that descriptive case-studies of post-conflict reconstruction predominate, with a particular focus on whether particular interventions "work."[9] She also finds that there is a dearth of research on education and natural disasters as well as refugee education, particularly in protracted situations. Concurring with Rappleye and Paulson, she concludes that the lag in development of new and different methodological and theoretical frameworks reflects a

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[7] See Fumiyo Kagawa, "Emergency Education: A Critical Review of the Field." *Comparative Education* 41, no. 4 (2005): 487-503. See also Fumiyo Kagawa, "Whose Emergencies and Who Decides? Insights from Emergency Education for a More Anticipatory Education for Sustainable Development," *International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable Development* 2, no. 3 (2007): 395-413.

[8] Julia Paulson and Jeremy Rappleye, "Education and Conflict: Essay Review," *International Journal of Educational Development* 27, no. 3 (2007): 340-347.

[9] Laura Wright, "Education in Emergencies: Research Methodologies Identifying Successes and Gaps," (MA Thesis, University of Toronto, 2010).

problematic use of EiE research for EiE advocacy and project design. Approximately a decade after the field was founded, advocacy for the inclusion of education in emergencies—one of the primary aims of the research agenda initially set-forth—had become a focal point of critiques intended to advance the field. I suggest this is the gulf that actually separates EiE practitioners and scholars—that is, differential understandings of the context in which practitioners work, how decisions are made regarding the provision of education in emergency situations, and the ways in which research is or can be utilized as a lever to secure funding for education. The account in the chapters that follow seeks to bridge this gap by utilizing new theories and methods to explain the challenges of refugee education, re-situating refugee education as a distinct subfield within with the wider field of EiE, and offering a deeper and more nuanced understanding of an institutional context (i.e. the UNHCR and its implementing partners) in which practitioners have and continue to advocate for education as a basic service in emergent and protracted refugee situations (along with food/water, shelter, and healthcare).

Refugee Education

Continued calls for new methodological approaches to EiE research and robust critiques, not only of education interventions in emergency situations but also of the research conducted on these policies and programs have yet to specifically include refugee education.[10] That this is so indicates on the one hand the ways in which refugee

[10] See Mario Novelli and Mieke TA Lopes Cardozo, "Conflict, Education and the Global South: New Critical Directions." *International Journal of Educational Development* 28, no. 4 (2008): 473-488. See also Dana Burde, "Assessing Impact and Bridging Methodological Divides: Randomized Trials in Countries Affected by Conflict," *Comparative Education Review* 56, no. 3 (2012): 448-473; Sarah Mundy and Karen Dryden-Peterson, *Educating Children in Conflict Zones: Research, Policy, and Practice for Systemic Change--A Tribute to Jackie Kirk*, (New York: Teachers College Press, 2011).

education has been subsumed within the wider field of EiE and on the other certain challenges that inhere in conducting research on refugee education—foremost among them gaining access to camps as an independent researcher. With few notable exceptions (explicated below), the majority of studies conducted were commissioned by UN agencies (primarily the UNHCR) or partner INGOs.[11] These publications describe particular programs or initiatives (e.g. the International Rescue Committee's Healing Classroom Initiative or the UNHCR's Peace Education Program) and include suggestive findings of the impact of different programs on participants. They also highlight the ways in which refugee education provides children and youth a sense of normalcy and routine; psychosocial support; life skills for their immediate environment (e.g. landmine awareness, prevention of HIV/AIDS); protection from recruitment into armed groups; and knowledge/skills necessary for post-conflict state-building and nation-building—the same discourse utilized throughout EiE publications.

Seldom considered are the purposes of refugee education in non-emergent, protracted situations and the ways in those purposes may substantially differ from education in conflict and post-conflict contexts (which, as previously explained, most commonly constitute "emergency situations"). Additionally, in making a case for refugee

[11] See Lyndsay Bird, "Surviving School: Education for Refugee Children from Rwanda 1994-1996," (UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning, 2003). See also Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot, and Daiana B. Cipollone, *Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries*, (Herndon: United Nations Publications, 2001). Sarah Dryden-Peterson and Lucy Hovil, "Local Integration as a Durable Solution: Refugees, Host Populations and Education in Uganda," (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2003); Jackie Kirk, "Education and Fragile States," *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 5, no. 2 (2007): 181-200; Jackie Kirk, "Certification Counts: Recognizing the Learning Attainments of Displaced and Refugee Students," (UNESCO, International Institute for Education Planning, 2009); Jackie Kirk and Rebecca Winthrop, "IRC Healing Classrooms Initiative: An Initial Study in Ethiopia," (Unpublished Manuscrip*t,* International Rescue Committee, 2004); Claas Morlang and Sheri Watson, "Tertiary Refugee Education Impact and Achievements: 15 Years of DAFI," (UNHCR, 2007); Anna P. Obura, "Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda, (UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning, 2003); Margaret Sinclair, "Education in Emergencies, "Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries," (UNESCO, International Institute for Education Planning, 2001); Marc Sommers, "Peace Education and Refugee Youth," (UNHCR, EPAU Working Paper, 2001); Marc Sommers, "Islands of Education: Schooling, Civil War and the Southern Sudanese (1983-2004)," (UNESCO, International Institute for Educational Planning, 2005).

education by commonly highlighting [positive] program impact, the UN and its partner agencies have not made clear the practical and conceptual constraints they face in providing educational services in camp settings. Neither have the majority of non-commissioned studies—either desk reviews of existing publications[12] or case studies primarily conducted with refugees residing outside of camp settlements.[13] The former help to illustrate discursive and programmatic trends as well as gaps in refugee education (e.g. limited opportunities for refugees to access secondary or higher education), while the latter shed light on particular challenges (as well as opportunities) refugees face in seeking to access education services in their countries of asylum (e.g. documentation/certification of education achievement in refugees' home countries and different curricula/language of instruction).

As mentioned above, however, a few noted studies conducted by independent researchers engage with the specific challenges that inhere in the content, structure, and provisioning of education in refugee camps. Waters and Leblanc identify paradoxes that make problematic the development of refugee education programs, including the challenge of non-state actors (i.e. the UNHCR) determining curriculum and pedagogy, and the ways in which traditional purposes of schooling (e.g. the cultivation of

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[12] See Jane Lowicki and Allison Pillsbury, "Untapped Potential: Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict. A Review of Programs and Policies," (The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2000). See also Jacqueline Mosselson, Wendy Wheaton, and Paul St John Frisoli, "Education and Fragility: A Synthesis of the Literature," *Journal of Education for International Development* 4, no. 1 (2009): 1-17; Ronald G. Sultana.,"Looking Back Before Moving Forward: Building on 15 Years of Comparative Educational Research in the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies* 13, no. 2 (2008): 9-25.

[13] See Sarah Dryden-Peterson, "'I Find Myself as Someone Who is in the Forest': Urban Refugees as Agents of Social Change in Kampala, Uganda," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 19, no. 3 (2006): 381-395. See also Katarzyna Grabska, "Marginalization in Urban Spaces of the Global South: Urban Refugees in Cairo," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 19, no. 3 (2006): 287-307; Elizabeth Grossman, Sue Kippels, and Michelle Zhang, "Urban Refugee Education in Uganda: A Solution from the Non-Formal Education Sector," (MA Thesis, Harvard, 2012).

citizenship and economic development) simply do not exist in refugee camps.[14] As they succinctly argue:

> Schooling is a prerequisite for effective participation in the modern world of nation-states. Refugees, by definition stateless, are therefore outside both the modern economy and modern society. Creating education systems for refugees is always embedded in this paradox, which is the root cause of why it is difficult to implement or, in Anderson's term, to "imagine" such programs.[15]

While the authors offer thumbnail sketches of these paradoxes across five refugee situations (Afghanistan, Thailand, Tanzania, Somalia, and Malawi), Oh and Van der Stouwe provide an in-depth case study of education programming (and its attendant challenges) provided to refugees in seven camps serving primarily Karen refugees along the Thai-Burmese border.[16] They focus particularly on how the UNHCR and its partner NGOs facilitate inclusion or alternately exclusion of a large number of school-aged children in the camps through policy choices regarding curriculum and language of instruction (the Burmese curriculum is taught in a particular dialect of the Karen language that many refugees don't know or speak) and a lack special education programming for disabled refugee children that renders many without opportunities to access formal schooling. While illustrative of some of the nuances and complexities of refugee education in camp settings, the study does not shed similar light on why nor how the UNHCR and its partner NGOs make particular decisions (e.g. curriculum, language of instruction) that result in inclusion or exclusion to, in, and through education in camps. A brief study conducted by these same scholars at the same sites examines educational

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[14] Tony Waters and Kim LeBlanc, "Refugees and Education: Mass Public Schooling Without a Nation-State," *Comparative Education Review* 49, no. 2 (2005): 129-147.
[15] Ibid. 140.
[16] Su-Ann Oh and Marc van der Stouwe, "Education, Diversity, and Inclusion in Burmese Refugee Camps in Thailand," *Comparative Education Review* 52, no. 4 (2008): 589-617.

change over the twenty-year period since the camps were founded.[17] They conclude that, "after years of trial, error, and practice, educational services are now provided in a relatively effective and efficient manner."[18] However, what those changes were, and again how and why they came about, remains unexamined, and therefore the mechanisms and processes that account for change unknown.

Finally, Smith seeks to address the gap that exists regarding decision-making processes for refugee education policies in camp settings throughout the world (with a specific focus on education services in camps for Burundian refugees in Tanzania) by critically examining the influence of economic, political, and security interests of donor and host states as well as non-state actors (i.e. the UNHCR and its implementing partners).[19] Through a wide range of interviews with policymakers and practitioners at UN agencies and partner NGOs as well as Tanzanian and Burundian government representatives, she traces when "education for repatriation" and "education for durable solutions" appeared in UNHCR's education policy guidelines and manuals (ca. 1990) and how these discursive trends subsequently influenced decisions in camps regarding curriculum and language of instruction as well as became inscribed in INEE "best practice" guidelines and their manual for Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies.[20] She also foregrounds "the state" as a "problematic" and until now "un-problematized" primary donor of UNHCR's operations. Doing so makes clear how donor state interests rarely align with the long-term funding of operations in non-emergent,

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[17] Marc Van der Stouwe and Su-Ann Oh, "Educational Change in a Protracted Refugee Context," *Forced Migration Review* 30 (2008): 16.
[18] Ibid., 29.
[19] Sarah Katherine Smith, "Education for Repatriation: Refugee Education Policy-Making Globally and for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania," (PhD diss., Teachers College, Columbia University, 2013).
[20] Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies, "Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies," (INEE, 2004).

protracted encampment situations, further complicating notions of "education for repatriation" and "education for durable solutions." By deconstructing and interrogating discursive, state-centric frameworks and the determinative role they have played in education programming in camps through an in-depth case study, Smith significantly advances literature on refugee education. However, as she acknowledges, future research must capture the lived experiences of refugees in relation to the "enactments and reconstructions of education policies and their role in the policymaking process."[21] This account aims to do precisely that as well as explain why and how throughout the post-Cold War era education policies and programs were developed, implemented, and changed, globally and in Dadaab and Kakuma camps.

Refugee Education in Dadaab and Kakuma Camps

When compared to research conducted on refugee education across camps throughout the world, a disproportionate number of single or comparative case studies have been undertaken in Dadaab and Kakuma (either directly commissioned or sponsored by the UNHCR). As previously mentioned, this reflects the long-term nature of both camps, the number of education initiatives that have been piloted there (e.g. Environmental Education, Peace Education), and up until recently in Dadaab,[22] the relatively secure and stable environment in which researchers are able to conduct fieldwork. However, these inquiries have not yielded expansive understandings or explanations of the challenges of education in either camp or refugee education more broadly.

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[21] Smith, "Education for Repatriation," 244.

[22] Starting in 2011, Western practitioners and aid workers became targets. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Dadaab: Walking the Fine Line Between Helping Refugees and Risking Lives," http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4ed3bc316&query=Dadaab

In terms of single case studies in Dadaab, a handful have focused on girls and women's access to formal and non-formal education.[23] The primary questions examined through interviews with UNHCR and partner NGO staff and to a lesser extent refugees include: what opportunities are available and who does or alternately does not have access? Buck and Silver extend this inquiry by critically engaging with UNHCR's schooling practices in Dadaab through an anthropological prism via extensive ethnographic work.[24] They consider the ways in which basic education advances an "enlightenment agenda" intended to transform "traditional" practices of Somali women and girls. They conclude that woman and girls maneuver their educational experiences to make their own meanings (as leaders in their communities, small business owners, teachers, or wives and mothers). Epstein employs similar methods to examine the ways in which schooling provided by the UNHCR in Kakuma is intended to rehabilitate children made vulnerable fleeing on-going war in Sudan and to facilitate liberal, democratic state and nation-building upon repatriation (echoing Buck and Silver's "enlightenment agenda" argument).[25] He suggests that refugees have instead utilized their education experiences in Kakuma to rehabilitate pastoralist economies in southern Sudan and also to "make

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[23] See Ahmed Sheikh Abdullahi, "Factors Affecting Refugee Girls' Access to Basic Primary Education in the Dadaab Camps of Garissa District of Kenya," (PhD Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2011). See also Nancy M. Kavua, "Factors Affecting Somali Refugee Girls' Access and Retention in Primary School Education: A Case of Hagadera Refugee Camp in Dadaab Garissa County, Kenya," (PhD Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2013); Nicholas M Kavulu, "School Based Factors Influencing Girls' Retention in Secondary Schools; A Case of Dadaab Refugee Camp Garissa County Kenya," (PhD Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2013); Issack A. Korio, "Factors Influencing Access to Primary Education in Ifo Refugee Camp in Dadaab Refugee Complex, Kenya," (PhD Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2014); Jackline Kathambi Murithi, "Factors Influencing Performance of Girls in Primary Schools in Dadaab Refugee Camp in North Eastern Kenya," (PhD Dissertation, University of Nairobi, 2012).

[24] See Patricia Buck and Rachel Silver, *Educated for Change?: Muslim Refugee Women in the West*, (Charlotte: Information Age Pub., 2012). See also Patricia Buck and Rachel Silver, "Tradition, Enlightenment, and the Role of Schooling in Gender Politics Among Somali Girls and Women in Dadaab," *Refugees, Immigrants, and Education in the Global South: Lives in Motion* (2013): 116.

[25] See Andrew I. Epstein, "Education Refugees and The Spatial Politics of Childhood Vulnerability," *Childhood in Africa* 2, no. 1 (2010): 16-25. See also Andrew I. Epstein, "Dinka Youth and the Culture of Formal Schooling in Postconflict South Sudan," *African Childhoods: Education, Development, Peacebuilding, and the Youngest Continent* (2012): 173.

their own meanings" in their adult lives. These accounts contribute different understandings of the purpose(s) of refugee education that conflict with those often advanced in practitioner-oriented publications (i.e. "education for repatriation" and "education for durable solutions").

Studies conducted in both camps have sought to comparatively map the educational landscape for primary, secondary, and higher education. Wright specifically considers challenges stemming from UNHCR's institutional organization and management in her detailed description of educational opportunities in Dadaab and Kakuma.[26] Through interviews with NGO staff, she concludes that there are significant issues related to access, quality, funding, and lack of community and parental support and that "collaboration is the take-away message—collaboration between the Government, UNHCR, NGOs, international donors and participation by refugee communities in the development of an effective education system."[27] In terms of higher education, Wright and Plasterer, also through interviews with NGO staff, document [limited] opportunities for adult literacy and training, teacher training programs, remote on-line learning programs, and scholarships to universities in other countries.[28] They maintain that Kenya and host states in general "must come to understand the social benefits of education for both refugees and host communities" and that "international efforts should advocate for [higher] education."[29]

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[26] Laura-Ashley Wright, "The Case of Refugee Education in Kenya: An Analysis of Kakuma and Dadaab," (PhD Dissertation, Wolfson College, Oxford University, 2010).
[27] Ibid., 68.
[28] Laura-Ashley Wright and Robyn Plasterer, "Beyond Basic Education: Exploring Opportunities for Higher Learning in Kenyan Refugee Camps." *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 27, no. 2 (2012).
[29] Ibid., 52.

Dryden-Peterson provides much-needed institutional and ideational context that ultimately renders untenable the recommendations made by Wright and Plasterer.[30] She explains the ways in which UNHCR's focus on basic education reflects EFA's global policy priorities for education, which center around universal access to "quality, basic primary education" with a focus on literacy, numeracy, and basic life skills. However, she makes a case for the increased provision of secondary and higher education in camps by highlighting the protective role of both via increased opportunities for employment and additional years in school that help to prevent against military recruitment. Citing a study that demonstrates that upon repatriation, 70 percent of refugees who had access to higher education while in exile became civil servants and a further six percent joined the teaching work force,[31] she circles back to the widely advanced notion that education (basic, secondary, and higher) facilitates both repatriation and durable solutions.

In sum, neither previous studies of refugee education in protracted situations broadly nor in Dadaab and Kakuma specifically, account for how and why changes to education policies and programs occur over time yet ultimately do not yield fundamental changes to the challenges of refugee education. Single and comparative case studies conducted by interviews with staff at UN agencies and partner NGOs as well as with government representatives can and do account for decision-making processes that determine education policies and programs at particular moments, but not the role played by refugees in influencing these decisions nor (again) change overtime. Finally, when considering refugee education as indistinct from the wider field of Education in

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[30] Sarah Dryden-Peterson. "The Politics of Higher Education for Refugees in a Global Movement for Primary Education," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 27, no. 2 (2012).
[31] See Claas Morlang and Carolina Stolte, "Tertiary Refugee Education in Afghanistan: Vital for Reconstruction," *Forced Migration Review* 30, (2008): 63.

Emergencies, legal and political contexts as well as institutional arrangements particular to education in protracted refugee situations remain unexplained or explained away. Literature from the field of Refugee Studies helps in part to bring these contexts and arrangements into focus.

Refugee Studies

The field of Refugee Studies has much in common with the field of Education in Emergencies, particularly its practitioner oriented focus, which also seeks to document and disseminate "best practices" of protection and assistance to refugees. In the majority of publications (e.g. guidebooks, field manuals, annual reports) and scholarship, refugee education, alternately framed and operationalized by the UNHCR as either a protective service or a commodity of assistance, is mentioned in passing, subsumed within wider accounts of the provision of other basic services (i.e. food, water, shelter, and healthcare). This is indicative of the status long-held by refugee education within the UNHCR since the organization's founding until very recently—by in large ignored, but not entirely invisible. Refugee Studies scholars, like EiE scholars, have also made calls for the application of methods and theories that offer expansive explanatory possibilities to the challenges of protection and assistance to refugees. Many of them have been answered through a combination of historical analysis and conceptual frameworks appropriated from the discipline of International Relations (e.g. Security Studies), both of which offer insight to the specific challenges of refugee education when EiE and Refugee Studies literatures are considered collectively.

The majority of accounts start by tracing back to UNHCR's founding mandate and statute, "an organizational culture [at the UNHCR] that makes innovation and change

difficult."[32] UNHCR's core mandate is "to provide, on a non-political and humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and seek permanent solutions for them."[33] When the UNHCR was established to regulate states' responses to refugees following World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom were particularly influential in determining the scope and design of the institution.[34] Neither state wanted the UNHCR to regulate or dictate its own response to refugees (ibid). Subsequently, the institutional design of the UNHCR set forth in the founding statue stipulates that only administrative expenditures are financed by the general United Nations budget; all operational costs are raised through voluntary contributions from donor states and funding is only allocated in one-year cycles.[35] Steiner, Gibney, and Loescher explain that, "this dependence continues to be the most significant means through which states are able to control the scope of the UNHCR's work"[36]

Since the UNHCR was founded more than sixty years ago, the geopolitical landscape has undergone significant changes. Initially tasked with coordinating the immediate repatriation and resettlement of approximately two million refugees in Western Europe, by the 1980's the UNHCR was administering long-term assistance and programming to more than ten million refugees following large refugee movements catalyzed by protracted wars of decolonization across Africa and Central and Southeast

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[32] Gil Loescher, Robert Baldwin, and Henry Rothstein, *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 268.
[33] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 428 (V), "Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees," 1950.
[34] See Loescher, Betts, and Milner, *Politics and Practice of Protection*, 2008.
[35] See Gil Loescher, "UNHCR at Fifty: Refugee Protection and World Politics," *Problems of Protection. The UNHCR, Refugees and Human Rights*, (2003): 3-18.
[36] Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil Loescher, eds., *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, (New York: Psychology Press, 2003), 27.

Asia.[37] Whereas third country resettlement was initially UNHCR's preferred durable solution, and local integration was prioritized throughout the 1960's and 1970's,[38] in 1985 UNHCR's Executive Committee passed a Conclusion that emphasized repatriation over resettlement or local integration.[39]

This Conclusion was a sweeping response to efforts undertaken throughout the early 1980's by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which had sought to invest funds in host states to induce the inclusion of refugees in host states' development strategies.[40] In effect, this move would have transitioned financial support away from the UNHCR to the UNDP and therefore significantly reduced the scope of UNHCR's operations and budget.[41] Thus, to guarantee and legitimize its continued relevance and even existence, temporary asylum and the provisioning of programs that facilitated repatriation became UNHCR's proclaimed raison d'être. Yet, despite declarations to host states that refugees were a temporary problem and would voluntarily repatriate to their home countries, in 1986 the UNHCR revised its institutional mandate to include the provision of long-term assistance and rights-based advocacy to refugees.[42] That the UNHCR appeared to be talking and acting in circles reflects its ambiguous position of "on the one hand representing states' interests and being dependent on donor state

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[37] See Gil Loescher and James Milner, "The Missing Link: The Need for Comprehensive Engagement in Regions of Refugee Origin," *International Affairs* 79, no. 3 (2003): 595-617.
[38] See Beth Elise Whitaker, "Changing Opportunities: Refugees and Host Communities in Western Tanzania," (Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1999). See also Barbara Harrell-Bond, "Are Refugee Camps Good for Children?," (UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper, Vol. 29, 2000).
[39] B. S. Chimni, "From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems. 1999." (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2004), 59.
[40] See Harrell-Bond, "Refugee Camps Good." See also Whitaker, "Changing Opportunities."
[41] Jacob Stevens, "Prisons of the Stateless," *New Left Review* 42, (2006): 53.
[42] See Gil Loescher, James Milner, Edward Newman, and Gary Troeller, eds., *Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications*, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008).

funding and on the other needing to influence states in order to persuade them to fulfill their humanitarian mandate towards refugees."[43]

This ambiguity takes on even greater significance in protracted refugee situations—a term coined in the year 2000 by the head of UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit to describe long-term encampments established as a consequence of chronic and/or recurrent intrastate conflicts throughout the 1990's. In protracted refugee situations the UNHCR came to operate as a surrogate state with minimal or no oversight or assistance provided by host states.[44] Though camps—often known as "settlements" had housed refugees in countries of asylum since the end of the second World War, until the 1980's refugees had been able to exercise a high degree of economic self-sufficiency (through farming, hunting, the establishment of small business, and even wage-labor employment). However, host states were increasingly subject to neoliberal structural adjustment programs (SAPs) commonly associated with "globalization," which significantly reduced government spending for social services.[45] Consequently, they became reluctant to support the integration of refugees to whom those services had often been extended.

Efforts undertaken by the UNDP to include refugees in host states' development programs *might* have helped to incentivize the continued provisioning of services to refugees by host states as well as opportunities for local integration. Instead, by the end of the Cold War, many states had chosen to abrogate altogether service provision to refugees to the UNHCR, continuing to grant asylum to refugees only under the condition

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[43] See Loescher, Betts, and Milner, *Politics and Practice of Protection*.
[44] Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp, "A Surrogate State?: The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations," (UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009).
[45] See Phillip W. Jones, "On World Bank Education Financing," *Comparative Education* 33, no. 1 (1997): 117-130.

that refugees be restricted to camps.[46] At the same time, a growing number of NGOs (e.g. Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee) assumed progressively greater responsibilities in providing assistance to refugees and donor governments channeled more official funds through NGOs to these high-profile relief programs (e.g. war in the former Yugoslavia).[47] Consequently, the UNHCR found it increasingly difficult to fully fund its expanding budget and respond to the massive expanse of refugees following the end of the Cold War that now required costly care and maintenance operations in camps.

These changes—restrictive encampment policies concomitant with UNHCR's budgetary shortfalls—significantly impacted refugees' access to formal education. In settlements, refugees had generally attended local primary and secondary schools, yet once restricted to camps they were, with few exceptions, prohibited from attending schools in surrounding communities. Thus, in addition to providing food, water, shelter, and healthcare, the UNHCR also assumed responsibility for providing basic education for refugees residing in camps under the organization's management. Yet many senior policymakers and program officers within the UNHCR questioned whether education services were included in UNHCR's mandate to "protect and assist" refugees and further argued that educational services were not lifesaving and therefore should be the first line-item cut when budgets were restricted. "Do you want them to eat or go to school?" quipped a senior-level administrator.

Faced with a growing number of responsibilities, refugees under its care and protection, and challenges funding its operations, the UNHCR began [again] to frame differently the significance and scope of its work. Protracted refugee situations were

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[46] See Harrell-Bond, "Refugee Camps Good."
[47] See Gil Loescher and James Milner, "The Long Road Home: Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa," *Survival* 47, no. 2 (2005): 153-174.

increasingly presented as urgent matters of international peace and security and the UNHCR succeeded in situating refugee movements as central elements in numerous UN Security Council Resolutions.[48] Camps were frequently described in UNHCR publications as places where high levels of violence occur, particularly between refugees and host communities.[49] Research commissioned by UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit documented a range of security issues in refugee situations, including attacks by rebel governments, rape and sexual abuse, armed robbery, arbitrary arrest and forced conscription, the trafficking of women and children, arms trafficking, drug smuggling, and recruitment of child soldiers. [50] In some cases (e.g. camps in Zaire hosting Rwandan refugees) this resulted in the release of targeted funds to camps intended to mitigate or stabilize these "emergency" situations. However, by in large, donor support waned the longer camps were in existence and host governments would occasionally cite these reports as evidence that "refugees are a source of insecurity…legitimating their exclusion or forcible repatriation from countries of asylum."[51]

"Education for repatriation" and "education for durable solutions" were terms devised by a handful of UNHCR program officers in response to host states' increasingly restrictive asylum policies and threats of refoulement.[52] On the one hand, framing education in these ways served to highlight its role as a protective, life-saving service and

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[48] See Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher, and James Milner, *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection*. (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013).
[49] See Jeff Crisp. "A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya," (UNHCR, 1999). See also Jeff Crisp, "A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps," *African Affairs* 99, no. 397 (2000): 601-632; Bupinder S Chimni, "From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems, (Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1999); Whitaker, "Changing opportunities."
[50] See Jeff Crisp. "A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Refugee-Populated Areas of Kenya," (UNHCR, 1999).
[51] Crisp, "State of Insecurity," 10.
[52] See Betts, Loescher, and Milner, *Politics and Practice*.

thus progressively align the provision of educational services with UNHCR's core mandate. On the other, for refugees trapped in protracted situations, the education policies and programs implemented in camps under the guise of "education for repatriation" have seldom aligned with refugees' needs, particularly those (numbering in the millions) for whom "the end of their exile is nowhere in site."[53]

Ultimately, scholarship in the field of Refugee Studies offers historical context for why and how the UNHCR has come to operate as a surrogate state as well as the constraints it faces in doing so because of the ways in which states continue to control the scope of the work of the UNHCR (a non-state actor) in transnational spaces. These constraints are particularly evident when considering the conceptual and practical challenges of providing education to refugees in protracted situations. They include one year funding cycles while the provisioning of educational services requires multi-year commitments; sustained questions within the UNHCR of whether and how education aligns with the institution's mandate; and answers by those endeavoring to show the ways in which it does so (i.e. "education for repatriation") that have lasting implications for the education services provided in camps. That historical analyses of the UNHCR as an institution reconstructed primarily through UNHCR archival documents have not been extended to include the camps it manages through the lived experience of those residing there (and for whom limited archival records are maintained) is a notable lacuna in Refugee Studies scholarship that this account seeks to address. Finally, literature in the fields of EiE and Refugee Studies mentions yet does not fully engage with the impact of "globalization" on refugees. A brief review of literature in the field of international development studies helps to explain further the progressively greater role played by the

[53] Gil Loescher and James Milner, "Understanding the Challenge," *Forced Migration Review* 33, (2009): 9-11, 37.

UNHCR and other non-state actors in education service provision in the post-Cold War era.

International Development Studies: Globalization and Education

Scholars in the field of international development studies with a focus on globalization and education examine the conditions under which education policies move from one locale to another,[54] why and how global education policies are developed,[55] and the ways in which non-state actors are both cause and effect of the diffusion of global education policies.[56] The titles included in this review are necessarily suggestive and not exhaustive as literature in the field of globalization and education is vast yet only tangentially touches upon the ways in which "emergency situations" have facilitated the expanse of global education policies. Significant here is not so much what has, but rather what has not, been said. That is, the opening of new spaces for education policy formulation and transfer beginning in the late 1980's and early 1990's was concomitant with the expanse of protracted civil wars that typified conflict in the post-Cold War era. Consequently, the role and influence of UN agencies, INGOs, and NGOs in education policymaking as well as education service delivery expanded dramatically in contexts of

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[54] See Neil Selwyn and Phillip Brown, "Education, Nation States and the Globalization of Information Networks," *Journal of Education Policy* 15, no. 6 (2000): 661-682. See also David Phillips and Kimberly Ochs, "Processes of Policy Borrowing in Education: Some Explanatory and Analytical Devices," *Comparative Education* 39, no. 4 (2003): 451-461; Gita Steiner-Khamsi, ed., *The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending*, (New York: Teachers College Press, 2004); Gita Steiner-Khamsi, "The Politics and Economics of Comparison," *Comparative Education Review* 54, no. 3 (2010): 323-342.

[55] See Stephen Carney, "Negotiating Policy in an Age of Globalization: Exploring Educational "Policyscapes" in Denmark, Nepal, and China," *Comparative Education Review* 53, no. 1 (2009): 63-88. See also Anja P. Jakobi, "Global Education Policy in the Making: International Organisations and Lifelong Learning," *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 7, no. 4 (2009): 473-487; Fazal Rizvi, and Bob Lingard. *Globalizing Education Policy*. (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013); Antoni Verger, Hulya K. Altinyelken, and Mario Novelli, eds., *Global Education Policy and International Development: New Agendas, Issues and Policies*, (London: A&C Black, 2012).

[56] See Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres, eds., *Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives*, (New York: Psychology Press, 2000). See also Roger Dale, "Specifying Globalization Effects on National Policy: A Focus on the Mechanisms," *Journal of Education Policy* 14, no. 1 (1999): 1-17; Stavros Moutsios, "Power, Politics and Transnational Policy-Making in Education," *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 8, no. 1 (2010): 121-141; Karen Mundy, *Education For All and the New Development Compact*, (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2006).

protracted conflict, particularly in refugee camps. This account strengthens the nascent relationship drawn between globalization and education and EiE/refugee education[57] by detailing the ways in which the UNHCR is central to the expanse of global education policies and the provisioning of educational services by non-state actors.

Several accounts have focused on the widening role played by the World Bank in financing and providing education in "developing" states, most notably under the auspices of Education for All as a global policy priority.[58] Yet, these large organizations often partner with much smaller INGOs and NGOs to actually provide and manage educational services. That a host of UNHCR's implementing partners (i.e. INGOs and NGOs) were moved to the front lines of education service delivery in camps, the majority of which are located in "developing" states, when the UNHCR began operating as a surrogate state is a particularly important, untold story in wider accounts of globalization and education as well as EiE/refugee education and Refugee Studies. As will be detailed

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[57] See Lynn Davies and Christopher Talbot, "Learning in Conflict and Postconflict Contexts," *Comparative Education Review* 52, no. 4 (2008): 509-518. See also Jeremy Rappleye, "Reflections on Some Challenges Facing Resurgent Interest in South-South Transfer in Education: A Case for Re-Conceptualization," *Journal of the Society for International Education* 5, no. 1 (2008): 65-78; Jeremy Rappleye and Julia Paulson, "Educational Transfer in Situations Affected by Conflict: Towards a Common Research Endeavour," *Research in Comparative and International Education* 2, no. 3 (2007); Christopher Talbot, "Education in Conflict Emergencies in Light of the post-2015 MDGs and EFA Agendas," (Norrag Working Paper 3, 2013). http://www. norrag. org/en/publications/working-papers. html, 2013.

[58] See Mark Bray and M. V. Mukundan. "Management and Governance for EFA: Is Decentralisation Really the Answer?," (Comparative Education Research Centre, Faculty of Education, University of Hong Kong, 2003). http://portal. unesco. org/education/en/ev. php-URL_ID 25755. See also Michael Crossley, Mark Bray, and Steve Packer, "Education in Small States: Policies and Priorities," (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2011); Phillip W Jones, *World Bank Financing of Education: Lending, Learning and Development*, (Milton Park: Routledge, 2007); Jonathan Murphy, "The World Bank, INGOs, and Civil Society: Converging Agendas? The Case Of Universal Basic Education in Niger," *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 16, no. 4 (2005): 353-374; Colette Chabbott, *Constructing Education for Development: International Organizations and Education For All*, (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013); Colette Chabbott and Francisco O. Ramirez, "Development and Education," in *Handbook of the Sociology of Education*, (New York, Springer US, 2000), 163-187; David Coleman and Phillip W. Jones, *United Nations and Education: Multilateralism, Development and Globalisation*, (Milton Park: Routledge, 2004); Karen Mundy, "Educational Multilateralism in a Changing World Order: Unesco and the Limits of the Possible," *International Journal of Educational Development* 19, no. 1 (1999): 27-52; Karen Mundy, *Education For All and the New Development Compact*, (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2006); Karen Mundy, "Global Governance, Educational Change," *Comparative Education* 43, no. 3 (2007): 339-357.

in Chapters 4 and 5, many of these organizations have little or no experience, capacity, or interest in education service delivery.

A handful of recent studies have attempted to situate refugee education within wider accounts of global migration propelled by globalization. Bartlett and Ghaffar-Kucher take a wide-ranging approach to the study of schooling and migration, seeking to collapse what they argue is an overstated distinction between immigrants and refugees as "ethnographic attention to the lived experience of mobile people reveals the permeability of these categories."[59] They further argue that anthropological concepts and a transnational lens are necessary in studies of "the new social and cultural formations that emerge from the expanded flow of goods, people, and ideas between countries in a globalized world."[60] Their claims echo those made by Robertson who, as previously mentioned, advocates for "paradigm puncturing" theories and methods in the field of globalization and education that "advance ways of seeing and studying education policies transnationally."[61]

However, through ethnographic research conducted in refugee camps in Thailand, Banki, in Barlett and Ghaffer-Kucher, demonstrates the continued relevance of the distinction between immigrants and refugees by considering the ways in which mass repatriation negatively impacts educational services (via diminished goods, labor, and capital directed to the education sector) for populations left behind in protracted refugee

[59] Lesley Bartlett and Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher, eds., *Refugees, Immigrants, and Education in the Global South: Lives in Motion*, (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 3.
[60] Ibid., 10.
[61] Antoni Verger, Hulya K. Altinyelken, and Mario Novelli, eds., *Global Education Policy and International Development: New Agendas, Issues and Policies*, (London: A&C Black, 2012), 3.

situations.[62] She also clearly articulates one of the central challenges of refugee education, stating:

> In the context of education the lack of incentives stems from the uncertainty of the resolution of protracted refugee situations, making it difficult to develop original and creative ways to think about what students should learn and how they might put it to use in the future. Simply put, neither external education planners nor refugees themselves (as students or planners) know where they will be in the future, making systemic and curriculum design very difficult.[63]

While immigrants often too face uncertainty regarding their future, the political and legal contexts of their movement across state borders differ substantially from those of refugees, particularly those confined to camps. Banki's account also demonstrates the reaches and limits of anthropological concepts (e.g. transnationalism) and methods (e.g. ethnography) to understand and explain the challenges of refugee education. While she shows that the UNHCR and its implementing partner NGOs have taken over the role of educational planning and provision from the host states (e.g. Thailand) in the camps included in her study, she also intimates without directly implicating the durability of "the state" by detailing the ways in which both donor states and host states determine (often by limiting) the flow of human and material resources to camp schools.

Thus, fully exposing these dynamics requires conceptual frameworks (and methods) that advance ways of seeing and studying the state and its role in shaping education policies and programs in transnational spaces. Finally, the ethnographic approach taken, similar to descriptive case studies widely utilized in EiE scholarship, asks and answers "what" questions through detailed descriptive analysis. For example, Banki concludes her analysis by stating that, "over the course of PRS, education is shaped by negotiations among camp administrators, humanitarian agencies, the host

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[62] Bartlett and Ghaffar-Kucher, *Refugees, Immigrants, and Education*, 110-154.
[63] Ibid., 139.

country, the international refugee regime, and refugees."[64] Yet her ethnography does not reveal what those negotiations were, why and how they took shape, and changes that did (or did not) occur to refugee education as a result.

These "why" and "how" questions remain unasked across the distinct fields of Education in Emergencies, Refugee Studies, and International Development Studies with a focus on globalization and education. When considered collectively, descriptive case studies, ethnographies, and institutional histories reveal the numerous, interrelated challenges of refugee education in protracted situations. These include the ways in which states constrain the UNHCR from effectively functioning as a surrogate state; how attempts to loosen these constraints (e.g. reframing the scope of its work for "repatriation" and "security") have in turn shaped and constrained UNHCR's provisioning of educational services in camps (e.g. "education for repatriation"); the ways in which basic education via Education for All became a global policy priority central to state-building and nation-building in the concomitant eras of globalization and the post-Cold War; and yet how education in the transnational spaces of refugee camps is necessarily for wholly different purposes. What remains obscured are actual occurrences or possibilities of change for the challenges of refugee education—a process that the conceptual and methodological approaches previously taken cannot capture and explain.

[64] Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY, METHOD, SITES

Scholars from the discipline of International Relations developed Constructivist theories and rely upon historical analysis in their studies precisely for the purpose of explaining changes to the international system of nation-states in the post-Cold War era and the ways in which non-state actors increasingly influence states' actions. Because they are central to my account, and I suggest offer expansive theoretical and methodological possibilities to the study of refugee education (and by extension EiE), I carefully outline the ontological and epistemological premises of Constructivism; the ways in which historical analysis is utilized as a primary methodological approach in Constructivist Scholarship; and how I specifically utilize them to reconstruct and analyze the educational histories of Dadaab and Kakuma. I then detail my process of data collection in UNHCR's archives and Dadaab and Kakuma camps as well as with current and former education and community-service officers and policymakers. Explicating the ways in which I accessed and navigated both camps as an independent researcher is particularly important to the narrative I have been able to reconstruct by doing so.

Constructivism

Constructivism challenges the basic ontological premises of Realism, which have predominated IR theorizing since the disciplines' inception.[1] Realists assume that states' interests and relations between sovereign states that comprise the international system are

[1] See Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).

prima facie "given in nature" and therefore unchangeable.[2] These relations are as follows: 1) sovereign states act only in their own self-interest and are in competition with one another over a finite amount of material resources; and 2) the international system of states is anarchic because there is no supra-state system of governance to mediate competition for resources between nation-states.[3] Realists further assume that states' interests are to maximize the resources at its disposal for the purpose of competing with other states and to maintain its own sovereignty, or alternately stated, to survive.[4]

Constructivists take a different ontological position than Realists by historicizing the international system of sovereign states that was institutionalized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.[5] Rather than assuming anarchy simply exists "in nature" Constructivists take as their starting point that the current anarchic system is socially constructed and therefore changeable. In other words, "anarchy is what states make of it."[6] Neither do Constructivists assume that states' interests are given in nature but instead determined by states' interaction with other states and, increasingly, non-state actors. State identities are also the basis of state interests. Identities take shape around systems of governance and collective histories, but foremost around states' desire for legitimacy.[7] Alternately explained, states want to maximize resources and remain sovereign, but they also want to be perceived as legitimate by other states.[8] So too do non-state actors (e.g. the UNHCR) operating as surrogate states that are reliant upon states to fund their

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[2] See John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* 83, (2007).
[3] See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 02 (1978): 167-214.
[4] See James D. Fearon "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 03 (1995): 379-414.
[5] See John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47, no. 01 (1993): 139-174.
[6] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 02 (1992): 392.
[7] Ibid.
[8] See Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (2003): 491-542.

operations.[9] This is significant when considering that the majority of studies on refugee education have been commissioned or sponsored by the UNHCR and commonly highlight positive program impact. Documenting and discussing, for example, the ways in which corruption and mismanagement of funds by implementing partners as well UNHCR sub-offices are related to the challenges of refugee education potentially undermines UNHCR's perceived legitimacy. Yet corruption and mismanagement are part of the educational histories of Dadaab and Kakuma camps. Independent research is vital in the inclusion of these and other dimensions in accounts of refugee education.

Because of an ontological starting point in which the relationship between states is socially constructed rather than given in nature, Constructivist epistemology examines the processes by which ideas become normative or institutionalized. In other words, Constructivists do not endeavor to capture the Truth, but rather demonstrate the ways in which Truth is constructed and maintained. In this way, Constructivism is a post-Modernist enterprise interested in real-world, empirical problems and puzzles rather than metaphysical debates of positivist versus normative knowledge claims. Constructivists also seek to apprehend when, how, and in what ways the boundaries of Truth frame the "stock of ideas in good currency" that are available at any given time.[10]

Offering critical explanations of the "at times bewildering proliferation of education interventions"[11] and why and how certain education policies are chosen over

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[9] See: Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Cornell University Press, 2004. See also: Michael Barnett. "Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel's road to Oslo." *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1 (1999): 5-36; Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst. *International organizations: the politics and processes of global governance*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
[10] See: Michael D Jones and Mark K. McBeth. "A narrative policy framework: Clear enough to be wrong?." *Policy Studies Journal* 38, no. 2 (2010): 329-353.
[11] Karen Mundy and Sarah Dryden-Peterson. *Educating Children in Conflict Zones: Research, Policy, and Practice for Systemic Change--A Tribute to Jackie Kirk*. Teachers College Press, 2011, 1.

others in protracted refugee situations directly aligns with Constructivist research agendas. So too does the interest of EiE scholars in bridging what Wendt terms the epistemological division between explanatory knowledge and practical knowledge.[12] Explanatory knowledge, most often produced by scholars, is necessarily backward looking, "since we can only explain what has already occurred, although there is hope that with good explanations we can predict the future."[13] Policymakers and practitioners, in contrast, need "knowledge about what to do, which is necessarily forward looking, since it is about how we should act in the future."[14] Constructivist research designs seek to provide knowledge that bridges this divide by answering three questions: How and why have policy [and program] choices been made in the past? What works and on what scale? And what goals should we pursue?

At first glance, it might appear that inquires of "what works" fall into the same category as assessments and reports that evaluate the impact of education interventions relative to benchmarks that measure increases (or decreases) in access to education and/or access to quality education in refugee camps. However, the benchmark of "what works" measures education interventions relative to substantively different metrics. For example, refugee education might be assessed in camps and/or refugees' home, host, or third countries of resettlement relative to conflict mitigation or perpetuation; increased employment opportunities; or the strengthening or erosion of human rights. The third question is closely related to the second question and also helps to further make clear the divergence between Constructivism and Realism. Because Realism ontologically

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[12] Alexander Wendt. "Driving with the rearview mirror: On the rational science of institutional design." *International Organization* 55, no. 04 (2001): 1019-1049.
[13] Wendt, "Driving with the Rearview Mirror," 2001, 1022.
[14] Ibid.

assumes that "international politics is a realm condemned to eternal conflict (e.g. anarchy)…the future cannot be any different from the past."[15] Formal education is by implication a static institution in Realist theories, one that merely reflects of transmits "knowledge" that maintains the anarchic international system. In Constructivist theories, formal education is a dynamic institution that reflects, but can also play a role in transforming, the international systems. For EiE and scholars of refugee education, questions of what goals we should pursue in and through education in refugee camps (as well as conflict-affected states) are critical. As Novelli argues, "it is time for us [EiE scholars] to think through our own relationships and alliances, what we agree with and what we oppose, and to put forward alternative strategies and proposals."[16]

In order to do this, Constructivist studies rely heavily on historical reconstruction and analysis to explain problems or puzzles of the present by showing how and when ideas become bound into institutions and in turn shape identities and interests.[17] Constructivist accounts most often utilize a narrative format, defined as a "sequencing of fragmented or discreet events that are read retroactively, as a single entity."[18] Narratives do not provide "law like statements,"[19] but rather explain the context or structure in which agents (e.g. policymakers, practitioners) develop and implement certain policies and programs over others. Scholars taking a Constructivist approach often perform a "two-step" in which they analyze their narrative reconstructions for "critical junctures" that determine the subsequent range of choices and actual possibilities available to

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[15] Wendt, "Driving with the Rearview Mirror," 2001, 1048.
[16] Mundy and Dryden-Peterson ed. *Educating Children in Conflict*, 2011, 65.
[17] See: Martha, Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. "Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics." *Annual review of political science* 4, no. 1 (2001): 391-416.
[18] Michael Howlett and Jeremy Rayner. "Understanding the historical turn in the policy sciences: A critique of stochastic, narrative, path dependency and process-sequencing models of policy-making over time." *Policy Sciences* 39, no. 1 (2006), 2.
[19] Audie Audie, and Cecelia Lynch, eds. *Strategies for research in constructivist international relations*. ME Sharpe, 2007, 36.

policymakers and practitioners for the purpose of helping to inform future policy or programming decisions.[20]

In recent years, IR theorists have increasingly debated definitions of and criteria for what precisely constitute "critical junctures" in order to better apprehend significant change, particularly with regards to institutions. While there is broad consensus amongst them that "history matters" in understanding and explaining the present, the challenge is analyzing history and determining how an event that might appear to be a period of transition or incremental change is in fact a critical juncture.[21] Generally, critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the structural (e.g. economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on action are significantly relaxed for a short period with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to individual actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions have lasting impact. Mahoney and Thelen further highlight the importance of agency and individual choice, arguing that "groups and individuals are not merely spectators as conditions change but rather strategic actors capable of acting on openings provided by such shifting, contextual conditions."[22] They conclude that critical junctures are thus moments of "structural indeterminism when willful actors shape outcomes...and demonstrate the power of agency by revealing how long-term development patterns can hinge on decisions of the past."[23]

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[20] See: John G. Ikenberry. "History's heavy hand: institutions and the politics of the state." *Unpublished manuscript* (1994).
[21] See: Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol. "Historical institutionalism in contemporary political science." *Political science: The state of the discipline* 3 (2002): 693-721.
[22] James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. "A theory of gradual institutional change." *Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency, and power* (2010): 1-37.
[23] Mahoney, "A Theory of Gradual Change," 2010, 20.

Additionally, Capoccia and Keleman maintain that a critical juncture lasts for a relatively short period of time compared to the duration of the new status quo it initiates; are moments when contingency becomes paramount; and are rare events as the normal state of an institution is either of stability or one of constrained, adaptive change.[24] Thus analyzing critical junctures requires considering "what happened in the context of what could have happened"[25] and comparatively considering critical junctures in which the same kind of actors act in a similar strategic environment and face similar challenges yet ultimately make different decisions. Soifer suggests that analyses of critical junctures should also necessarily include the conditions at work during the critical juncture.[26] That is, the "permissive conditions that represent the easing of constraints or the structures that make change possible"[27] and the "productive conditions that in the presence of permissive conditions produce the outcome or range of outcomes that are reproduced after the permissive conditions disappear and the juncture comes to a close"[28]

Considered collectively, these scholars establish critical junctures as swift, significant, encompassing moments when certain conditions ease structural constraints such that individual actors or groups can make contingent choices that establish a new status quo. They maintain that analyses should mark the duration of a critical juncture by the emergence and disappearance of permissive conditions as well as reconstruct steps in the decision-making process by identifying which decisions were the most influential, what options were available and viable to the actors who undertook them, and these actors' impact and their connections to other important decisions. Finally, they urge

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[24] Giovanni, Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen. "The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism." *World Politics* 59, no. 03 (2007): 341-369.
[25] Capoccia and Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures," 2007, 347.
[26] Hillel Soifer "The causal logic of critical junctures." *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 12 (2012): 1572-1597.
[27] Soifer, "The Causal Logic," 2012, 1570.
[28] Ibid.

comparative analyses of critical junctures as doing so helps to focus on important actors, moments, and choices while omitting less relevant contextual details and also makes clear that one moment constituting a critical juncture with respect to one institution, site, or unit level may not constitute a critical juncture with respect to another.

Research Approach, Sites, and Analysis

Neither Kenya nor the UNHCR have disclosed formal procedures for acquiring permission to conduct research in Dadaab and Kakuma. Yet permission is required by Kenya's Department of Refugee Affairs as well as by management offices in both camps. Researchers have previously acquired access to Dadaab and Kakuma as well as other camps via sponsorship by the UNHCR and/or UNHCR's implementing partners, that then often organize and manage where researchers go (or do not go) in the camps, how they get there (usually in SUV's with NGO logos prominently displayed on side doors) and who they do (or do not) speak with. Refugees more often than not remain out of reach. In short, knowledge production about the camps is by in large dictated by those managing the camps whose primary interest is in representing their work in ways that maintain their own legitimacy. As a result, many stories remain untold.

It was far from my primary interest in telling different stories about the challenges of refugee education to undermine the legitimacy of the UNHCR and its implementing partners. Rather, my aim was to make known the ways in which individuals (e.g. administrators and staff at the UNHCR and its implementing partners as well as refugees) have navigated, loosened, and at times changed ideational and institutional constraints that determine the challenges of refugee education. With these thoughts in mind, I was committed to accessing and navigating both camps as an independent researcher and also

conducting research in UNHCR's archives, which contained documentary evidence not previously utilized in accounts of refugee education in Dadaab and Kakuma camps.

I spent three weeks in UNHCR's archives in Geneva, Switzerland, reviewing approximately 1000 memorandums, policy briefings, mission reports, white papers, curricular materials, and meeting minutes. The majority of these were drafted and circulated in UNHCR's Education Unit. However, more than two hundred documents came from UNHCR's Finance, Fundraising, and Executive Management Committee Units, which offered insight into the internal workings of UNHCR's Headquarters, particularly where the Education Unit is situated relative to other Units. In short, Units are prioritized differently depending on their proximity to UNHCR's core mandate to protect. The Education Unit was relocated to different units (e.g. Division of Program Support and Management, Division of Emergency, Security, and Supply, Division of International Protection) a handful of times between 1992 and 2012; each move impacted UNHCR's education policies and programs, particularly in terms of the financial and human resources devoted to education.

Through a combination of persistence and luck, I received permission from Kenya's Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) to conduct research in Dadaab and Kakuma. I identified a handful of scholars who had conducted independent research (unrelated to refugee education) in both camps who shared key insights regarding individuals to contact at the Department of Refugee Affairs and at UNHCR's camp offices in Dadaab and Kakuma as well as how to approach UNHCR's implementing partners and request accommodation in their compounds while conducting my fieldwork. I spent approximately one-month in Kakuma and was able to stay in the compound of the

Lutheran World Federation (LWF), which has served as UNHCR's implementing partner for education in Kakuma since 1997. LWF did not organize or manage my research. Neither did the UNHCR, whose compound I stayed in for approximately one week while conducting my fieldwork in Dadaab. Why and how was this the case? I believe it has much to do with presenting my research as an effort to reconstruct the education histories of Dadaab and Kakuma camps, which seemed "neutral" and "non-political" to government officials as well as to personnel at UNHCR's camp offices and partner NGOs considering my requests. At least this is what they often professed.

As previously mentioned, Dadaab and Kakuma are significantly different and their education histories reflect these differences. While the camps' distinct features will be fully drawn and analyzed in the chapters that follow, I provide a brief overview here and also note a handful of shared features. Both Dadaab and Kakuma are located in remote, ecologically, and politically marginal areas of Kenya. The Northeastern Province where Dadaab is located is a vast stretch of semi-arid land populated by Somali-Kenyan nomadic pastoralists. Because of the ways in which colonial and later de-colonial borders were drawn, the Somali-Kenyans are legally Kenyan citizens yet culturally Somali (e.g. they speak Somali dialects as well as Arabic, practice similar tribal customs as those found in Somalia, and practice Islam).[29] As such, there has been far less tension and conflict between Somali refugees residing in Dadaab (who continue to constitute ninety-five percent of the camp population)[30] and the host community, than between refugees residing in Kakuma in the northwest region of Kenya and their host community—the

[29] See: Cindy Horst. *Transnational nomads: how Somalis cope with refugee life in the Dadaab camps of Kenya*. Vol. 19. Berghahn Books, 2006.
[30] See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Global report 2013-kenya." UNHCR, 2014.

Turkanas.[31] The Sudanese refugees initially comprising the majority of the population and later refugees from multiple countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Tanzania) who migrated or were relocated by the UNHCR had little in common (e.g. language, customs, livelihood practices) with the semi-nomadic pastoralist Turkana, save for the competition they engaged in over scare resources, particularly water and firewood. In Dadaab and Kakuma, the average rainfall is approximately thirteen inches per year[32] and clusters of trees dot an otherwise barren landscape. While the UNHCR and its implementing partners allocate an average of three liters of water per day to refugees in both camps as well as 10kgs of firewood every two weeks that refugees use for cooking, both rations fall short of refugees' minimum needs.[33] Tensions have resulted in violent conflict, particularly around Kakuma, when refugees venture into the host community in search of these resources.[34]

Culturally, Islamic faith has shaped, and continues to shape, all facets of public and private life in Dadaab. The early morning call to prayer is played over loud speakers throughout the camp at 5:30 am daily. Women and girls typically wear the jijab, a long loose-fitting garment that covers the entire body save for hands, face, and head, along with the hijab (a head veil) or the niqab (a face veil). Female circumcision, alternately known as female genital mutilation (FGM), carried out before girls reach adolescence is widely practiced throughout Dadaab and complex networks of clan alliances determine marital arrangements. Unions of Somali youth are often arranged and early marriage of girls (i.e. before the age of fourteen) is not uncommon, though has become less prevalent

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[31] See: Bram J. "The accidental city: violence, economy and humanitarianism in Kakuma refugee camp Kenya." (2011).
[32] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Global report 2013-kenya." UNHCR, 2014, 2.
[33] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Global report 2013-kenya." UNHCR, 2014, 5.
[34] See: Jeff Crisp. "A state of insecurity: The political economy of violence in Kenya's refugee camps." *African Affairs* 99, no. 397 (2000): 601-632.

since the camp was first founded, in part due to efforts of the UNHCR and its implementing partners. These efforts include the provision of education, which offers opportunities for girls to access livelihood opportunities and in turn delay marriage.

In contrast to a high degree of cultural uniformity in Dadaab, there is significant cultural as well as demographic variance in Kakuma that has widened over the years. Several sects of Christianity are observed in Kakuma without substantively influencing public practices. While women as well as men tend to dress "conservatively" (e.g. men wear long sleeves and pants while women wear long dresses or skirts), they predominately wear "Western" clothing. However, female circumcision/FGM is also practiced throughout the camp and marriages are often arranged by male relatives; early marriage is less commonly practiced than in Dadaab though still happens widely. While the clan rivalries that catalyze and fuel on-going conflict in Somalia have not, by and large, been reproduced in Dadaab, the sharp cleavage across Nuer and Dinka tribal lines in Sudan has periodically resulted in violent clashes between these groups in Kakuma. Though the Nuer and Dinka tribes share similar ethno-historical backgrounds (e.g. they speak closely related languages and practice similar coming of age, marriage, and family rituals), hostility and rivalry over land and resources has long-characterized their relationship.[35] This pattern has continued in Kakuma, where conflicts are waged between Nuer and Dinka over land allocated to the groups by the UNHCR for housing—particularly over land proximate to food distribution centers, water pumps, and other camp services (e.g. health clinics, schools). The UNHCR has tried various conflict-prevention or mitigation strategies, including settling different communities between the

[35] See: Jok Jok Madut and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson. "Sudan's prolonged second civil war and the militarization of Nuer and Dinka ethnic identities." *African Studies Review* 42, no. 02 (1999): 125-145.

Nuer and the Dinka (e.g. Ethiopians and later the Congolese) to provide a buffer zone and minimize the two groups' interaction as well as implementing the Peace Education Program, though tensions continue to arise.

The camps are also significantly different in terms of their design and layout, however the term camp is somewhat misleading as they have for all intents and purposes grown into cities. In fact "accidental cities" is the term coined by anthropologists to refer to Dadaab and Kakuma (and subsequently several other refugee camps).[36] They are *accidental* because an institutional arrangement meant to be temporary has taken on characteristics of settlement and habitation that were never intended and *cities* because Dadaab and Kakuma contain market places, schools hospitals, mosques, churches, running water, electricity, transportation via car and motorbike taxis as well as Kenya's third and tenth largest populations respectively (compared to all cities throughout the country).[37] However, the economic development and social change that is in part both cause and effect of the camps' burgeoning populations has led to ad hoc and haphazard growth. When they were first established in 1992, Dadaab housed approximately 180,000 Somali refugees across three sub-camps (Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera) while Kakuma housed approximately 20,000 Sudanese refugees.[38] Both camps offered little beyond temporary shelters made of plastic sheeting that stretched across the horizon and a handful of semi-permanent health clinics, food distribution centers, water pumps, as well as offices and bunkhouses for staff at the UNHCR and its implementing partners, cloistered together in a fenced compound. These compounds were and are some of the

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[36] See: Bram J. Jansen "The accidental city: urbanisation in an East-African refugee camp." *Urban Agriculture magazine* 21 (2009): 11-12.
[37] See: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. "Kenya Census 2014." Available http://www.scribd.com/doc/36672705/Kenya-Census-2009
[38] See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Global report 2013-kenya." UNHCR, 2014.

only enclosed spaces in Dadaab and Kakuma—there are no perimeter fences and no de facto regulation of who comes and goes (though the Kenyan government has made it increasingly difficult for refugees to travel throughout the country without necessary documentation).[39]

At the time of writing, Dadaab is now home to 500,000 refugees, ninety-five percent of whom are Somali (with a small number of Burundians, Ugandans, Ethiopians, and Eritreans).[40] Kakuma has swelled to 190,000 refugees from more than ten countries throughout Eastern and Central Africa.[41] In Dadaab, there are approximately 10,000 third-generation refugees born to parents who were also born there.[42] In Kakuma, this number was last reported to be approximately 6,000.[43] There are now five sub-camps in Dadaab as Ifo II and Kambios have been added in recent years and four zones have been added to Kakuma I, labeled by number (i.e. Kakuma II, III, and IV) as well as the most recent zone simply referred to by refugees and agency staff as "the new area." From end to end, Dadaab is more than sixty kilometers across and Kakuma is approximately forty kilometers.

Walking through Kakuma I feels somewhat akin to walking through Kibera, a slum just outside of Nairobi, or other townships throughout Africa (e.g. Soweto in South Africa). On the main, unpaved thoroughfares (none of the roads or side streets are paved in either camp), markets and restaurants owned and operated by refugees abound. On just one city block, there were four Ethiopian restaurants, one pharmacy run by Somalis, two

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[39] See: Bram J. Jansen. "7 Two decades of ordering refugees." *Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday Politics of Crisis Response* (2013): 114.
[40] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Global report 2013-kenya." UNHCR, 2014, 2.
[41] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Dadaab: World's Biggest Refugee Camp 20 Years Old*. 21 February, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4f437d839&query=third%20generation
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.

curio shops managed by Congolese, a clothing store where knock-off designer jeans were displayed prominently out front, and a copy shop. A maze of electric wires run ziz-zag across the rooftops and women and children sit on woven mats under awnings, selling a portion of their UNHCR food rations either unprepared (e.g. unground maize) or prepared (e.g. ugali—ground maize flour cooked with water into a dense porridge) and packaged in plastic bags. Music ranging from American rap to afro-pop pulses from shops and restaurants and pedal bike and motorbike taxis weave amongst crowds of refugees buying and selling goods as well as the gleaming Land Cruisers that transport UNHCR or implementing partner staff from one field location to the next.

Dadaab's Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera are comparatively more subdued, in part because of a general conservatism practiced by Somalis as well as significant security issues discussed further below. Nevertheless, there are vibrant marketplaces selling items ranging from metal cookware to fruits and vegetables, flip flop sandals made from used tires, khat (a plant with amphetamine-like stimulants that is chewed as a social custom), and cell phones. There are Somali restaurants where scents of cumin, cardamom, and sage from goat meat stews occasionally (and pleasantly) overpower odors emanating from the camels and goats that graze on piles of trash as Somali-Kenyans herd them throughout the camp. In both Dadaab and Kakuma, "economic development" has been made possible through vast networks of family members living in refugees' home countries or who have resettled abroad and send remittances or arrange for the transport and delivery of other goods (e.g. Ethiopian coffee, teff flour used to make the traditional Ethiopian flatbread "injera"). Many refugees also migrate to the camps with significant economic capital, having been prominent businessmen and in some cases women in their

home countries who were able to seek asylum deliberately rather than haphazardly (though they are the exception rather than the rule).

However, "development" takes time. The recently established sub-camps in Dadaab and Kakuma's zone IV and "new area" are a far cry from the camps' long-established areas. They offer a glimpse of what Dadaab and Kakuma must have looked and felt like in the beginning. There are shelters made entirely of plastic sheeting or walls made of mud-bricks with plastic sheeting covering the roofs, a handful of food distribution centers, and water pumps. There is hunger and thirst. There are highly educated refugees who are more than qualified for incentive jobs (e.g. healthcare, administrative, teaching) with the UNHCR and its implementing partners, yet they reside far away from the agencies' compounds or sites of work (e.g. schools, health clinics) and would spend the majority of their incentive wages on transportation. Instead of working, they remain idle. There is vast openness and un-crowded streets. And as such there is a certain stillness, a quiet in these new areas, interrupted only by the rip-roar of motorbike taxis that drive back and forth, looking to make one-hundred shillings to transport refugees to markets in the old areas. They remind one that this is in fact 2012 and not 1992. Beyond that, there is little else—for now.

My research experience in each camp reflects a number of their differences. In Kakuma, I traveled around by motorbike taxis and also walked everyday from the LWF compound to the marketplace in Kakuma I to have lunch at one of the many Ethiopian restaurants owned and operated by refugees. Word quickly spread throughout the camp that I was an independent researcher and refugees began approaching me to share their own stories or refer me to friends or family members who had played a significant role in

shaping the education system. I visited and conducted interviews (both individual and focus groups) with teachers, administrators, and students at all twenty-six primary schools, six secondary schools, the vocational school, and the higher ed learning center. Many current teachers were former students whose entire education careers had taken place in Kakuma. Several administrators (e.g. principals, deputy principals, and quality assurance officers) had been in Kakuma since the camp was founded and offered accounts of the entire development of the education system. Finally, I conducted interviews with the current Education Officers at UNHCR and LWF. In total, I interviewed 120 teachers, students, administrators, and education officers in Kakuma.

Navigating Dadaab was different. In 2011, Al Shabaab[44] infiltrated Dadaab and has maintained a steady presence there, targeting out-of-school youth for recruitment, raiding the homes and businesses of community leaders, detonating a number of bombs in heavily trafficked marketplaces, and kidnapping or killing several aid workers.[45] As a result, the majority of NGOs conduct their operations from their compounds and no longer send international staff into the camp. When coordinating my research with the UNHCR, I was provided a handful of independent "fixers" from whom to choose. The fixer I ultimately worked with, Saleem, had worked for more than a decade in Dadaab and arranged the four armed-guards that the UNHCR mandated accompany any aid worker, journalist, or researcher. Saleem strongly encouraged spending the minimum amount of time necessary in the camps. It took five days to conduct interviews with teachers, students, and administrators in primary and secondary schools and vocational and higher ed programs in each of Dadaab's five sub-camps as well as conduct interviews

[44] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Twin Blasts in Dadaab Raise Concern of Worsening Security.* 21 December, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4ef1ec326&query=Dadaab
[45] Ibid.

with education officers at all implementing partners involved in education service provision. In total, I interviewed 67 teachers, students, administrators, and education officers in Dadaab.

Finally, I interviewed twenty current and former UNHCR senior and mid-level community service, education, protection, and program officers.[46] With hundreds of hours of interviews and thousands of pages of documents in hand, I proceeded to reconstruct the educational histories of both camps to answer: What education policies and programs were developed, implemented, and changed in Kenya's Dadaab and Kakuma camps between 1992 and 2012 and what were the lived educational experiences of refugee students their families and teachers in relation to the range of education policies and programs throughout this period? I did so by chronologically ordering the events described in these documents and transcripts and further coding and ordering the events by one of seven unit levels within each year.[47] Narrative strands quickly appeared as, for example, developments at UNHCR's HQ in Geneva were considered alongside of developments occurring at the same time in Dadaab and/or Kakuma camps. So too did changes in discourse, policies, and programming. When considering these changes according to characteristics constitutive of critical junctures, the unit level upon which changes occurred to refugee education broadly, and education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma specifically, became clear as did the underlying causal mechanisms that drove changes.

[46] The unit levels are as follows: 1) broad ideational related to state and non-state actors in the post-Cold War era; 2) ideational specifically related to EiE; 3) institutional specifically related to UNHCR; 4) institutional specifically related to UNHCR's Education Unit; 5) UNHCR Nairobi Branch Office; 6) Dadaab camp; and 7) Kakuma camp.

The account and analysis that follow of the comparative education histories in Dadaab and Kakuma serve as a bridge across Education in Emergencies, Refugee Studies, and International Development Studies literatures reviewed in the preceding chapter. Collectively considered, this scholarship contextualizes the challenges of refugee education as well as makes clear a lacuna—actual occurrences or possibilities of change to those challenges. Constructivist theories offer a prism through which changes to education policies and programs in both camps were captured via comparative historical analysis and critical junctures analysis and continuity in the fundamental challenges of refugee education explained. For the purpose of protecting their anonymity, the majority of those whom I interviewed are not referred to by name but rather by their position title and affiliated agency (e.g. former UNHCR program officer, current teacher). However, I include the names of a handful of key figures and trace their stories in the proceeding chapters. Simon, Suad, Michael, Abdulahi, and Al Nuur by their own description "grew up" or "spent their lives" in the camps that they refer to as "home" and have played significant roles in different ways in the development of Dadaab and Kakuma's education programs. Their stories keep focus, throughout the recounting of wide-ranging institutional and ideational developments to refugee education, on what it means and what is at stake in teaching and learning in Dadaab and Kakuma.

CHAPTER 4

1992-2012:
FROM EMERGENCY EDUCATION TO EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES

Kakuma I, 1992[1]



Dadaab, Ifo, 1992[2]

[1] P Moumtzis. "Kakuma Camp" June 1992. UNHCR. Available http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2011/mar/24/kakuma-refugee-camps-in-pictures

[2] P Moumtzis. "Ifo Camp" May 1992. UNHCR. Available http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2011/mar/24/dadaab-refugee-camps-in-pictures

"I was not that big when I was in the army—I was still small," Simon Puot recalled. "In Sudan I had been an army officer with an SPLA faction. Then I had a problem with my eyes because of operating a machine gun. So I was released for treatment with all of the minors who came here. That was until February 17th, 1992. There was nothing when we came here. It was bare without people. Without anything." Simon was one of 12,000 unaccompanied minors, mostly boys, transported by the UNHCR from hastily established makeshift camps in the small town of Lokichogio to Kakuma refugee camp ninety kilometers southeast in Kenya's Great Rift Valley. "Kakuma means nowhere in Swahili," a UNHCR program officer remarked. "And it was not so much a camp then, more a long, narrow expanse of land" between the forked Tarach River. Some had been orphaned during the Second Sudanese Civil War, an on-going series of internecine conflicts between the central government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)—a rebel group seeking to establish an autonomous Southern Sudan.[3] Others had been child soldiers, forced or voluntarily conscripted into the SPLA. They had first walked more than one thousand miles east to refugee camps in Ethiopia in 1991. When war broke out in Ethiopia later that same year, they walked another five hundred miles southwest to Kenya, arriving in Lokichogio in early 1992. Most were fleeing conflict or escaping induction into the SPLA. A few, like Simon, had been released by the SPLA to seek medical treatment for injuries sustained while fighting.

[3] See: Millard Burr. "Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, 1983-1998." *Conflict in the Nuba Mountains: From Genocide-by-Attrition to the Contemporary Crisis in Sudan* (2014): 89.

Kenya: Mass Influx and Emergency Education

The UNHCR was overwhelmed in Kenya during 1992 with the arrival of an average of nine hundred refugees daily.[4] By December of that year, over 427,000 refugees were hosted in twelve camps and four border sites, mainly in the semi-arid desert region of Kenya's North Eastern Province bordering Somalia and inhabited by Somali-Kenyans. Several thousand people had arrived in Kenya in the preceding years seeking asylum from repressive regimes of Mengitsu Haille Mariam in Ethiopia[5] and Siad Barre in Somalia[6] as well as the civil war in Sudan. However, the fall of those regimes in 1991 and the subsequent escalation of violence in both countries amongst different factions vying for political control catalyzed mass migration to Kenya. Yet, "while the number of refugees has increased tenfold, [UNHCR] staff and facilities have not increased with corresponding rapidity" wrote a UNHCR social services officer in a report submitted to UNHCR HQ in February.[7] "Influxes into camps and the lack of food and water as well as other facilities have caused malnutrition and innumerable deaths. Lack of staff to coordinate and put things in place has compounded the problems. Inexperienced staff have been deployed with very few senior staff to supervise and give direction. Forgery of documents, alleged bribery, and corruption have increased difficulties."[8]

The report was primarily referring to Liboi and Ifo camps, both established in 1991 and by the beginning of 1992 providing asylum to more than fifty thousand Somali

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[4] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Kenya Information Bulletin*. UNHCR, 1993.
[5] See: Messay Kebede. *Ideology and Elite Conflicts: Autopsy of the Ethiopian Revolution*. Lexington Books, 2011.
[6] See: Alex De Waal. *CLANS-IN-ARMS Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
[7] Marie Lobo. *Kenya Social Services Mission January 20-Februart 16, 1992*. UNHCR, 1992, 4.
[8] Lobo, *Kenya Social Services*, 1992, 7.

refugees, the majority of whom were women and children.[9] In Liboi, just eighteen kilometers from Somalia, refugees were frequently attacked by Somali bandits and food aid vehicles, and other supplies were regularly stolen in cross-border raids.[10] Southwest of Liboi and one hundred kilometers from the Somali border, Ifo was also subject to raids albeit less frequently than Liboi.[11] Because of the comparative security offered further inland, the UNHCR established two additional camps adjacent to Ifo in 1992—Hagadera in March and Dagahely in June.[12] These three sub-camps camps comprised the Dadaab camp complex, designed to host approximately ninety thousand people—just half of the number of refugees registered by the UNHCR by the end of the year.[13] "It was ad hoc as more and more people came across and there was no thought given to the layout of the camp," a former UNHCR community services officer recalled. "I think there was a failure reading the context…there was no indication that Somalia was a political situation that would be solved. There was every indication that this would be long term. And yet the planning was *let's see what happens tomorrow*."

The UNHCR was not alone in approaching its operations in the post-Cold War era with an optimism that belied the rapid escalation of conflict throughout the world beginning in 1991. "Fukuyama had declared the end of the history…massive repatriation operations had just been completed for Afghans, Mozambicans, and Cambodians. The new conflicts—we thought they were temporary—instability before the stable order fully took hold," a former senior program officer at UNESCO explained. Yet, by mid-1992, it became clear to senior staff at UNHCR's Branch Office in Nairobi that the refugee

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[9] Nyrovia Whande. *Kenya: An Assessment of the Situation of Women and Children, August 8-September 7, 1991*. UNHCR, 1991.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Lobo, *Kenya Social Services Mission*, 1992.
[12] UNHCR, *Kenya Information Bulletin*, 1993.
[13] Ibid.

situation in Kenya required the mobilization of implementing partners to assist with camp management and the provisioning of basis services. In Dadaab, CARE was contracted as the implementing partner for all services, while in Kakuma, the UNHCR partnered with a number of NGOs including IRC and Médecins Sans Frontières as well as Radda Barnen, the Swedish section of Save the Children International.[14]

More than fifty-percent of the refugee population in Dadaab, and seventy-percent in Kakuma, were school-aged children.[15] However, a former UNHCR community-services officer explained that, "initially it was very much a focus on water, sanitation, and health...at that point there was very little attention to the education sector. It was much more *if there is time.*" The provision of educational services was also viewed by many within the UNHCR as a potential "pull factor into Kenya"—that is, a service highly valued by refugees that by-in-large was not widely accessible in Somalia or Sudan that might "pull" persons to seek asylum in the camps even if there was not an imminent threat to their lives in their home countries. A former UNESCO program officer recalled that, "there were a lot of high-level officers at that time who were philosophically opposed to education because they argued refugees would come for education and stay for education. Which completely overlooked the fact that there were wars going on." A 'Kenya Education Mission Report' filed in May 1992 maintained that "the main thrust of assistance was to stem the tide of the refugee influx and therefore if education [was] to be provided it had to be organized in such a way that it did not create the conditions for asylum-seeking."[16]

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[14] CARE, IRC, MSF, and SAVE are major international humanitarian aid agencies delivering a broad range of emergency and long-term relief international development projects in more than ninety countries throughout the world.
[15] Lobo, *Kenya Social Services Mission*, 1992.
[16] Kenneth Lutato. *Kenya Education Mission.* Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1992, 20.

Yet, others argued that refugees were demanding education in camps and that educational activities "should be initiated as soon as possible."[17] This debate played out in a series of reports published by officers from UNHCR's Protection and Community Services units. One report recommended that, "educational programs should be organized in the camps"[18] and detailed that, "the Branch Office [in Nairobi] is developing a comprehensive education system for the new caseload."[19] However, another report circulated three months later indicated the Branch Office was supposedly "no longer contemplating the development of a comprehensive education program as had been stated in the cabled clearance of the program, but only to support those educational activities which had already been started."[20] These activities included continued support for a limited number of scholarships for refugees to complete vocational higher ed training through the DAFI Program[21] established earlier that year, as well as the distribution of reading materials in the camps.

The matter was not officially settled. However, by May CARE had begun converting a former UNHCR compound in Dadaab into a school and by July, International Relief and Rehabilitation Services (IRRES) was officially contracted as the implementing partner for education in Kakuma.[22] In both camps, refugees had already organized classes for school-aged children and were holding lessons each morning under acacia trees. Teachers were those refugees who had attained the highest level of education in their home countries. Al Nuur, among the first teachers in Dadaab, recalled,

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[17] Lobo, *Kenya Social Services Mission*, 1992, 17.
[18] Lutato, *Kenya Education Mission*, 1992, 14.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Nyrovia Whande. *Registration and Needs Assessment of Southern Sudanese Minors*. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1992, 7.
[21] The Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative Fund (DAFI provides a limited number of scholarships for refugees to attend in universities and polytechnic institutions. DAFI has distributed approximately thirty scholarships per year to refugees residing in Kenya since 1992.
[22] Whande, *Registration and Needs Assessment*, 1992.

"I was eighteen years old when I arrived. I had gone to secondary school in Somalia…there were no classrooms, no textbooks then. It was the people who were learned who were handling the learners." However, the learned spoke different languages and had been taught with different curricula. Under one tree an Ethiopian teacher might deliver lessons in Amharic while under the next in Arabic and then still another in English. "At the beginning it was one teacher to two-hundred students—it was emergency education."

When CARE and IRRES began formalizing education programming, questions of language of instruction as well as which curriculum to implement were discussed at length in a series of consultations with refugee communities in Dadaab and Kakuma. UNHCR's *1992 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees*[23] offered no clear answers. UNHCR's previous policy guidelines for education issued in 1988 focused heavily on post-primary education and outlined selection criteria for awarding scholarships to refugees to attend universities in countries of asylum.[24] However, the 1992 *Guidelines*, developed and issued following the 1990 World Conference on Education for All, departed significantly from the previous policy and specified that emphasis should be placed on implementing primary education and that if the situation was thought to be temporary, the curriculum and language of instruction from refugees' home countries should be utilized to help facilitate repatriation.[25] If the duration of asylum was thought to be longer, then a "mixed curriculum that faces both ways and

[23] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *1992 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees.* Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1992.
[24] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *1988 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees*. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1988.
[25] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Guidelines*, 1992, 18.

incorporates lessons from refugees' home and host countries should be utilized."[26] If the situation was long-term, the *Guidelines* recommended implementing the national curriculum of the host country.[27] Thus from a policy standpoint, choice of curriculum and anticipated duration of exile were closely linked.

Yet, how long would refugees remain in Dadaab and Kakuma camps? No one knew for sure and speculation varied. In Dadaab, leaders from the refugee community indicated to CARE that schools should follow a Somali curriculum, though the language of instruction should be a combination of Somali and English. In Kakuma, refugees advocated strongly for the Kenyan curriculum with English as the language of instruction. UNHCR consulted with the Kenyan Ministry of Education (MoE). Beyond stating that it would be easier to acquire Kenyan, rather than Sudanese or Somali curricular materials, and that the UNHCR would have to register the schools in Kenya if students were to acquire certification of primary and secondary school completion, the MoE remained uninvolved. While community services officers considered possibilities in both camps for vocational education programming as well as accelerated-learning courses, these were not widely supported in the Nairobi Branch Office, as they were not included in the *1992 Guidelines*. And so it went that CARE took up the task of acquiring curricular materials from Somalia and IRRES ordered copies of the Kenyan curriculum. Ultimately CARE was unable to get hold of the Somali curriculum and UNESCO was contracted to write a "mixed-curriculum" which covered grades one to four using a handful of rescued Somali textbooks and inputs from Somali teachers.

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[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

An 'Education Mission' conducted in Dadaab and Kakuma by an officer from UNHCR HQ in May (1992), prior to the beginning of "formal" schooling activities, recommended that "the structures constructed to house schools be simple, temporary ones; that the teaching force for the camp schools be recruited from the refugee communities; and that 'incentive wages' rather than 'salaries' should be offered to encourage refugees to teach."[28] Very little education infrastructure existed in Somalia, Sudan, or Ethiopia especially outside of major cities and access beyond primary schooling was rare save for children of the elite. However, in contrast to Somali and Sudanese refugees, many Ethiopian refugees had grown up in cities and attended or completed university. "Teachers were anyone with basic education from Somalia or Sudan" a former UNHCR community services officer explained, "but the Ethiopians were highly educated and really played a role in setting up the schools, especially in Kakuma."

Regardless of their qualifications, all refugee teachers received the same "incentive" of 500 Ksh per month. Equivalent to fifteen US dollars, incentive wages were the source of "a lot of conflict between the implementing partners and the refugees," remarked Abdhulahi a former refugee teacher in Dadaab. The *1992 Guidelines* stipulated that refugee teachers should be given "incentives" (in cash or in kind) not formal salaries "since they receive relief assistance for helping their communities…also because of the constraints of humanitarian funding."[29] These twin rationales, that refugee teachers were not "real" teachers because they lacked formal certification and that refugees were not in need of "salaries" because their needs were provided by the UNHCR, were used time and

[28] Lutato, *Kenya Education Mission*, 1992, 16.
[29] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Guidelines*, 1992, 43.

again by UNHCR and implementing partner staff when negotiating with refugees who regularly advocated for increases in the amount they were paid. While reports indicated that low-incentive wages helped lead to substantial teacher turnover, these same reports maintained that, "the concept of salary should [nevertheless] be avoided since this leads to comparisons with home or host country levels…which is simply not sustainable."[30]

In July and August, CARE and IRRES began five-day teacher training courses which primarily covered basic content, lesson planning, and behavior management. In both camps, formal schooling commenced in September in split-shift sessions—morning and afternoon—to accommodate more learners with classes still held under trees. In Dadaab, reports indicated that about a quarter of school-aged children residing in the camp enrolled in classes while in Kakuma the number was closer to half.[31] In schools in both camps, boys outnumbered girls--"at least ten to one" recalled Abdulahi. "Girls were generally prohibited from attending by parents who wanted them to remain in the home—there was a lot of cultural interference back then." This cultural interference included early marriage, widespread beliefs and expectations regarding the roles and responsibilities that girls and women fulfill in households (e.g. cooking, cleaning, child-rearing), as well as general perceptions that women ought not participate in public life and spend the majority of their time at home. Collecting firewood from the host community outside of the camp was a notable exception to this last normative rule and one that subjected girls and women to frequent violent attacks, particularly sexual assault, by members of the host community as well as refugees.[32] A former UNHCR community

[30] Margaret Sinclair, *Education Mission to Tanzania and Kenya July 4-30*. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1994, 8.
[31] Sinciar, *Education Mission*, 1994, 22.
[32] Dominique Rabiller. *Regional Education Workshop Report Nairobi March 6-10*. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1994.

services officer recalled that, “we would say to male community leaders and elders, you have to stop sending women and girls out to collect firewood or at least do not send them out without a male family member. For the most part they shrugged and said it was women’s work.”

In Kakuma, many of the unaccompanied boys remained out of school to seek work, earning a couple of shillings for collecting firewood or transporting bags of food from distribution centers to refugees homes. “It was also a challenge because we had to support ourselves—we had no parents to cook meals or do any of the work of taking care of a household. We were just living together in groups of ten or so,” explained Simon, the Sudanese refugee who had migrated to Kakuma seeking medical treatment for his eyes. Additionally, while the majority of students were going to school for the first time, those who had previous access to education in their home countries had to decide whether to start over in lower primary school (grades 1-4) or forego schooling altogether. Upper primary (grades 5-8) and secondary were not offered. Many chose not to enroll.

That the schooling provided consisted solely of lower primary classes reflected “EFA goals, which emphasized basic primary education. So that’s what UNHCR offered—the absolute minimum,” a UNHCR community services officer explained. “Education was a box to check off on the form submitted to HQ. Primary education—available? Tick. Yes. That’s it. And because it was an add-on, there were no UNHCR education officers. It fell to community services to liaise with the implementing partners. I fought for education, but I wasn’t an educationist.” CARE and IRRES also had limited experience with the provision and management of education services, “though CARE had an education officer looking after the running of education activities and there was some

structure." Al Alrahman, an Islamic organization, also provided structured schooling in the form of madrassas (alternately called doksis) in Dadaab. Abdulahi explained that, "they had very good foundations—every student had school books and they offered a midday meal. This alone was enough to attract many children."

The doksis also provided early childhood programming (ECD) for refugee children in Dadaab while in Kakuma refugees organized their own ECD schools, building rudimentary shelters out of mud bricks. "The ECD schools were built even before the primary schools—we never taught under trees," recalled an ECD teacher. "All of the teachers were just ladies from the community who were not trained, but the UNHCR provided some small incentive wage and also thread and cotton so we could sew our own puppets for the lessons we would teach. And also we provided some porridge everyday for the students." Materials for school buildings as well as textbooks, teachers' texts, notebooks, pens/pencils, and chalkboards were not provided as readily for the primary school programs. Meals were not provided at all. "It took some months, but they eventually supplied us with some plastic sheeting so we built temporary structures," Simon recalled. "Because we didn't have textbooks in the early years, we just depended on what the teacher said. Whatever they wrote on the board is what we wrote." A former student from Dadaab explained further that, "most of the teachers tried, but the agency [CARE] had a policy that anybody who could read and write could be a teacher. And then the environment—under the trees we had the sun and the wind, inside we had the wind that would pound against the plastic sheeting—the type of learning was difficult."

In early 1993, CARE and IRRES had begun to distribute textbooks and notebooks to students as well as additional construction materials, primarily wood posts and chicken

wire, to parents. “Early on the agencies asked parents to form Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Dadaab and School Management Committees (SMCs) in Kakuma to assist with building, maintenance, and other management issues,” explained Al Nuur. “These parent groups became very influential—they were the go between from agencies to the community.” In Kakuma, the SMCs had organized the construction of the ECD schools. In Dadaab, parents held weekly meetings with teachers to review students’ progress and discuss any issues teachers might be having. Incentive wages were frequently discussed. In February, with parents’ support, teachers met with CARE to demand an increase in wages. When wages were not increased, the teachers went on strike. “This lasted for months—all schools closed down,” recalled Abdulahi. “It completely paralyzed the school system. Most teachers and parents supported it, though as weeks turned into a month and then two, people started saying ‘we have to get the kids back in school.’ And then the incentive wage was raised to 1500 Ksh.”

In Kakuma, SMCs also met regularly with teachers “though the involvement was not the same because it was a children’s camp,” a UNHCR community services officer explained. “And there were so many boys who wanted to go to school and the Ethiopians were willing to teach, though schools were opening faster than IRRES could hire teachers.” In 1993, CARE was managing eight primary schools in Dadaab and approximately six thousand students for a population of almost two hundred thousand refugees. However in Kakuma, there were nineteen primary schools and fourteen thousand students for a population of thirty thousand refugees. “The majority of us who came to Kakuma wanted education,” Simon stated. “That was one of the biggest problems in Sudan—because there were no quality services for people in the south, no

structures for education. But in the north there was far greater access. So it was the willingness of many of those among us that we should go to school."

The story of the "lost boys," as this group of Sudanese minors in Kakuma came to be known, gained increasing media attention. Newspapers reported refugee teachers declaring to students that "education is your mother and your father" and that education was the reason for their flight from Sudan.[33] Yet, "I don't buy that," argued a former UNHCR community services officer. "There was a war going on—they were evading or fleeing conscription—they would have been cannon fodder otherwise. It's not doing them justice saying they only came for education. However, the press helped with a little more funding for the school program in Kakuma, while in Dadaab—the press wasn't good, especially after Mogadishu. Implementing the education program was difficult there." The "press" to which the officer referred, in relation to Kakuma, often depicted the camp as akin to "never-land" where the "lost boys" were under the care and protection of the UNHCR, living together in makeshift families, and going to school. The large number of out-of-school youth and generally challenging conditions in the camp or the camp's schools were seldom reported on.

In stark contrast to the "never land" of Kakuma, Dadaab was portrayed by the American media as a veritable wasteland and the nation of Somalia writ large as hostile to "American" or "Western" ways of life after Somali militia and armed civilian fighters shot down two US Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu in October 1993.[34] Subsequent

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[33] See: Melinda B. Robins. "'Lost Boys' and the promised land US newspaper coverage of Sudanese refugees." *Journalism* 4, no. 1 (2003): 29-49.

[34] Commonly referred to as 'Black Hawk Down,' on October 3, 1993, Somali militia and armed civilian fighters shot down two US Black Hawk helicopters. The subsequent operation to secure and recover the crews of both helicopters resulted in 18 deaths, 80 wounded, and one helicopter pilot captured among the U.S. raid party and rescue forces. See: Cori Elizabeth Dauber. "The Shot Seen'Round the World: The Impact of the Images of Mogadishu on American Military Operations." *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 4, no. 4 (2001): 653-687.

humanitarian and development aid directed by the United States or its European allies towards Somalia, or Somali refugees, came under intense scrutiny. A former UNESCO program officer explained that, "because there was such a public outcry in the US after 'Black Hawk Down,' Americans weren't going to openly support programming in Dadaab…education programming or any program at all actually."

Providing and managing educational programming in both camps was also made difficult by widespread discussion that a large number of Somali refugees were going to repatriate. Operations reports published by UNHCR HQ declared: "The large number of spontaneous returns is a clear indication that voluntary repatriation on a massive scale can be expected to take place. Now that the refugee emergency is over, priority is being given to repatriation so that refugees can rebuild their countries!"[35] While more than forty thousand Ethiopians and fifty thousand Somalis did return to their home countries, almost 400,000 refugees remained in Kenya by the end of 1993.[36] The vast majority resided in Dadaab and Kakuma, whose numbers only grew as smaller camps closed and refugees who did not repatriate where transferred to the two camps.[37]

While UNHCR reports proclaimed that focus would shift to refugee education to support repatriation, "the internal discussions were very different," explained a former UNHCR community services officer. "In the [UNHCR] office in Nairobi every excuse was given why education should not be prioritized. You can just tell from the staffing situation. In what at the time was the biggest refugee scenario in the world, there still was not a single education specialist." The same reports also indicated a significant increase

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[35] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Repatriation of Somali in Cross-Border Operation.* UNHCR, 1994, 2.
[36] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Repatriation of Somali*, 1994, 1.
[37] These camps included Liboi, Utange, Marsabit, and Walda. When the camps closed, approximately twenty-thousand refugees from these camps were transferred to Dadaab and Kakuma.

in school enrollment, "but that's donor driven. Enrollment numbers might increase, but that usually just meant more kids were packed in a classroom." Despite increasingly overcrowded classrooms in the temporary school shelters, a small number of textbooks and notebooks that were shared by a greater number of students, and instruction by teachers who in many cases had limited education and training, refugee students "came every day. Especially in Kakuma. They were there from the day the term started until the day it ended. And then many would go straight back across the border to fight for the SPLA, coming back when school began again."

Back and forth movement across the border was far less frequent in Dadaab. "The security situation was much worse there and also the majority were women and children—they hadn't been combatants," a former UNHCR protection officer explained. "Schools in Dadaab held different significance," as safe meeting spaces for communities and also places to pass the time. Al Nuur recalled that, there was no market then, so the only interesting place was the school. CARE provided lamps in the evenings so we would come there and study and adults would gather to tell stories in the courtyard—schools were the center of the community." Additionally, UNHCR also launched in October 1993 the Women Victims of Violence in Project in Dadaab, a non-formal, community-based education program, in response to rape in and around the camp as well in Somalia where rape was known to have been used as a "weapon of war" prior to refugees' migration.[38] The Project provided support groups for women and girls to meet and discuss their experiences, offered counseling for victims by a professional Somali woman rape counselor as well as livelihood and skills training and initiated measures to improve physical security around the camps, including the construction of thorn-bush fencing

[38] Whande, *Kenya: An Assessment*, 1991, 3.

around refugees' homes. At the UNHCR Branch Office, community-services officers frequently cited these examples to Senior Operations officers.

> We argued all the time—kicking and screaming that schools and education programming is protective--keeping kids from going back across the border in Sudan and giving kids and everyone from the community places to gather in Dadaab. There need to be more funds and resources to provide more classes, extend school hours, train teachers, provide options for all the adolescents who were out of school. Yet the answer was the same: we are providing education. Case closed.

UNHCR personnel with the ability to direct increased funding towards refugee education remained unmoved at the Branch Office. However, Lutheran World Federation (LWF), UNHCR's implementing partner responsible for camp management in Kakuma, invited the NGO Don Bosco to implement a vocational education program. "By the end of 1993, we were running classes out of a mud house at the edge of the camp. Eighty students were learning carpentry, masonry—the basic trades," one of founders of the program explained.

Don Bosco Mud House, 1993.[39]

In the two years that had passed since the establishment of Dadaab and Kakuma, CARE and IRRES had developed and implemented primary school programs for grades 1-8. There were fourteen primary schools in Dadaab and approximately nine thousand students enrolled in classes—about five percent of the 180,000 refugees that resided in

[39] Luke Bryant. "Original Don Bosco School, Kakuma." Photograph, 1993. Bryant's Personal Photo Archive.

Dadaab throughout that time.[40] In Kakuma, sixteen thousand were enrolled in school—about forty percent of Kakuma's growing population of thirty-five thousand.[41] Refugees with previous educational experience had been hired and trained as teachers and classes were taking place primarily in temporary shelters made of plastic sheeting and mud bricks though some schools in Dadaab had corrugated sheet roofs and cement floors.[42] Additionally, some classes had a handful of rough-hewn desks or benches though most students sat on the floor "which made writing difficult," a former refugee student recalled. "Especially when classes were crowded, there was no surface to write on because the classroom was full from wall to wall with students." Learning materials were few, though the same former student recalled a strong commitment "to learning as much as I could, so I could go back home and be somebody." His sentiment was widely shared. However, despite notions, also widely shared, amongst refugees as well as staff at the UNHCR and its partner NGOs that "repatriation would happen quickly," in the first months of 1994 conditions were deteriorating in Somalia and Sudan. In Somalia, peace talks failed between warring clans,[43] while in Sudan the SPLA had splintered along tribal lines—Nuer and Dinka—catalyzing episodic sectarian violence between these groups in southern Sudan as well as in Kakuma.[44]

In January 1994, UNHCR's Education Unit—comprised of the Senior Education Officer and two assistants as well as a DAFI scholarship officer—participated in a series of meetings over the course of four days with education officers from UNESCO. Given the number of conflicts and subsequent refugee crises that had occurred in the preceding

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[40] Sinclair, *Education Mission*, 1994, 4.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Sinclair, *Education Mission*, 1994, 8.
[43] UNHCR, *Kenya Information Bulletin*, 1994.
[44] Ibid.

years, it was decided that these two organizations, along with UNICEF, would revive a previously established UN/NGO Working Group on Refugee Education. Education officers from UNESCO and UNICEF were to meet every two months in Geneva with UNHCR's Senior Education Officer and make arrangements for joint activities in the field. In Dadaab, UNESCO assisted CARE with teacher training and continued printing and distributing copies of the "mixed Somali curriculum" they had previously written.

UNESCO did not undertake similar operations in Kakuma, where reports indicated growing challenges with IRRES as the implementing partner for education.

> They [IRRES] have refused to share records with the Nairobi Branch Office that account for how education funds are being spent. They are running a program where there is a shortage of textbooks and blackboards, classes are being held only between 8am and 11am, and new teachers are not receiving training. Finally, while alleged, there are indications that IRRES has purposely burned down the warehouse storing textbooks and other supplies to cover up theft of materials that presumably were sold for profit in Loki or Lodwar.[45]

In May of that year, IRRES was asked to cease its work in Kakuma and the Branch Office began considering possibilities for a new implementing partner for education.[46]

When selecting an implementing partner in any service sector, UNCHR prioritized NGOs that were able to at least partially fundraise the cost of their operations. To manage the education program in Kakuma, the Branch Office approached the IRC and Radda Barnen. The IRC was managing medical services and providing rehabilitation programs to disabled adults and youth, while Radda Barnen was providing a range of social services, primarily foster care arrangements, to unaccompanied minors. "IRC said they were willing to do it, but they couldn't bring in their own funding," explained a former UNHCR program officer. "Radda Barnen said they were only interested in working with UAMs, not in education and didn't want to offer any secondary school

[45] Margaret Sinclair. Education Mission to Tanzania and Kenya July 4-30. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1994, 10.
[46] Sinclair, *Education Mission*, 1994, 11.

programs. However, it was thought they could bring in funding from Save the Children International. Ultimately after some back and forth Radda Barnen agreed. But it was a shaky beginning."

A mid-year report on refugee education in Tanzania and Kenya conducted by UNHCR's Senior Education Officer concluded that, "it [was] hoped Radda Barnen would bring the education program in Kakuma up to the standards of Dadaab, where the program is well managed by CARE."[47] That this report as well as others issued throughout that time comparatively considers Dadaab's education program to be "stronger" than Kakuma's, reflected a belief then widely held by UNHCR staff. On the one hand, it was often noted that there were greater challenges in implementing the education program in Dadaab and that far fewer students were enrolled in camps schools (twenty percent in Dadaab compared to almost forty percent in Kakuma).[48] On the other, the same report further outlines that there was an education officer employed by CARE in each of Dadaab's three sub-camps and a school campaign organized by community-services officers was significantly increasing enrollment (though exact figures were not disclosed). Additionally, UNESCO's in-service training and support to Somali teachers was leading to improvement in quality of instruction as teachers were "now planning and delivering lessons rather than just writing text on the board that students would copy."[49] UNESCO's teaching materials also "incorporated elements of education for peace," that

[47] Sinclair, *Education Mission*, 1994, 14.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Margaret Sinclair. *UNESCO Education Mission January 12-15*. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1994, 27.

were potentially "of interest to UNHCR, UNESCO, and UNICEF to develop for future programming in camps settings."[50]

The report and organizational interest in education for peace might have been alluding to Kakuma as one of those settings. Throughout 1994, violent clashes erupted frequently between Nuer and Dinka youth. "Word would reach the camp of a raid carried out against one or the other group in southern Sudan and groups would carry out reprisals in Kakuma," a UNHCR protection officer recalled. That the SPLA maintained a presence in the camp also "stirred conflict and unrest on multiple occasions." In addition to an SPLA officer "essentially appointed to manage Kakuma, SPLA Generals were known to be traveling back and forth between Sudan and Kakuma," the same officer remarked. In the late summer, shortly before the UNHCR introduced a food-rationing system and opened recently-constructed food distribution centers, thousands of refugee youth from both communities rioted and destroyed the new centers. "The UNHCR's interpretation was that the riot was being motivated by the SPLA so they could keep food aid from the camp going across the border. A different viewpoint shared by staff from the partner agencies was that the kids had nothing to do…no voice. And unless they were engaged, they had nothing to lose."

Funding and Supplemental Education Programming

Under the management of Radda Barnen, the fall school term began in Kakuma with the distribution of new textbooks and teachers aids and classes took place under newly constructed makutti structures—four poles arranged in a rectangle connected by plastic sheeting with a roof made of palm fronds. Arrangements were made for students

[50] Dominique Rabiller. *Regional Education Workshop, March 6-10*. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1995, 17.

enrolled in the Don Bosco vocational program to build desks and benches as well as assist with the construction of new classrooms. Meanwhile, PTAs in Dadaab had also undertaken the construction of the more permanent makutti buildings, "even pouring cement floors in all the new schools for foundation and updating the schools previously built," Al Nuur recalled. A handful of Kenyan national teachers were also hired in Kakuma to teach newly added upper primary (Grades 5-8) courses, particularly Swahili. Kenya's national language, "Swahili was disastrous for us," Simon recalled. "We had grown up speaking Arabic, had been studying in the camp in English, and now we had to learn Swahili which was a real challenge."

Despite incremental improvements across both camps in terms of education infrastructure, teacher training, and distribution of school materials, education funding remained precarious. Problems releasing funds from the Branch Office to the sub-offices in Dadaab and Kakuma were the result of a shortfall in funding that stemmed from "donor fatigue for Somalia as well as the shifting of funding priorities towards Central Africa to more than one million Rwandese refugees," detailed an end-of-year review of Kenya's operations.[51] "The Rwandan genocide and resulting refugee crisis in Zaire changed the whole humanitarian field, including emergency education," remarked an implementing partner program officer. "Inside the UNHCR, there was serious dialogue about what emergency operations were and were not doing. 40,000 people had died of cholera in the camps for Rwandese refugees in the first month. There was a real push for Minimum Standards in all sectors."

[51] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Kenya Information Bulletin*. UNHCR, 1995, 6.

In the education sector, a handful of unofficial minimum standards were introduced in early 1995 as *Revised Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees*,[52] which replaced the *1992 Guidelines*. In the *1995 Guidelines*, class sizes of no more than 40 were recommended as was offering refugee teachers a basic incentive wage that would help to ensure the sustainability of programming.[53] Additionally, all education programs were to receive at minimum temporary shelter, writing materials, and blackboards. Increasing importance was also placed on utilizing refugee education to meet "psychosocial needs after trauma and to convey life-saving skills for survival, including landmine awareness, peace education, and environmental awareness."[54] Similar to the *1992 Guidelines*, it was recommended that the curricula offered in camp schools match the "durable solution" that was envisioned as most viable (i.e. curriculum of the home country for temporary asylum, mixed curriculum for medium term, and curriculum of the host country for long-term situations).[55]

In Dadaab, refugees, as well as UNHCR and partner staff, were increasingly coming to view the situation as long term. "PTAs had begun discussing the implementation of the Kenyan curriculum in the camp schools," Al Nuur explained. "Some parents said their children would never go home and they needed to be able to sit for the Kenyan national exams that might lead to opportunities for secondary schooling. Other parents argued that Somali history and culture would be lost." In a series of meetings subsequently undertaken with CARE, it was decided that in lower primary, children would still use the UNESCO "mixed-curriculum" and receive instruction in

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[52] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Revised Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees.* Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1995.
[53] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Revised Guidelines*, 1995, 8.
[54] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Revised Guidelines*, 1995, 11.
[55] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Revised Guidelines*, 1995, 15.

Somali while in upper primary they would utilize the Kenyan curriculum taught in English and Swahili. Implementation was gradual and began with the hiring of a handful of Kenyan national teachers as well as in-service training for current teachers provided by CARE and UNESCO. Additionally, the Women Victims Against Violence Project was piloted in Kakuma in the fall of 1995. However, a former UNHCR program officer remarked that:

> Implementing the project in Kakuma was a prime example of education as a commodity and box checking on the part of the UNHCR. While sexual assault was a very well known and documented problem in Dadaab, this was just not the case in Kakuma. It's not that rape *never* happened in the camp, but at that time there were simply not many women and girls—it was still mostly unaccompanied male youth. Yet money was directed to the program.

In addition to the introduction of the Kenyan curriculum in Dadaab and the Women Victims Against Violence Project in Kakuma, in the fall of that same year a supplemental Environmental Education program was piloted in both camps. With partial funding from UNESCO, the Environmental Education (EE) program was implemented in Dadaab and Kakuma as part of the science curriculum and included hands-on, place-based modules (e.g. energy conservation, sustainable shelter, local laws and traditions on natural resource use). The purpose of the program was to raise awareness and subsequently minimize the environmental impact of refugee influxes on surrounding communities. In the semi-arid desert regions where Dadaab and Kakuma were located, temperatures regularly climbed above one hundred degrees Fahrenheit.[56] Water was scarce, firewood for cooking scarcer, and there was competition over both between refugees and their host communities. Competition had frequently resulted in conflicts between refugees and host communities, "which harm refugee women and children disproportionately because they are the refugees primarily sent out to collect these

[56] Christopher Talbot. *Environmental Education: A Concept Paper*. UNHCR, 1996, 13.

resources," outlined a concept paper on EE.[57] An Environmental Education officer stationed in the Branch Office oversaw the supplemental training of teachers on EE, "which had the benefit of strengthening the quality of teaching all around because it wasn't just content but pedagogy that focused on students," the officer explained. Teaching methods and concepts beyond rote memorization or "skill and drill" were introduced to refugee teachers through the supplemental EE teacher training, including "experiential" and "place-based" learning. "Teachers were given the chance to practice taking students outside, using the environment as a classroom, or bringing rocks, soil, other natural materials into the classroom and letting students get tactile feeling for them. But teachers also incidentally started to apply these approaches to their other "formal" subjects."

The EE officer post was the first devoted specifically to education in the Branch Office. A Regional Education Workshop held in Nairobi in March had recommended that "in large education programs [such as Dadaab and Kakuma], the job description for community services officers should clearly outline education functions and in addition the position title should be "Community Services/Education Officer."[58] As a former UNHCR program officer explained, "while Education had fallen to Community Services for a long time, there was no real incentive for Community Services to focus on education in addition to all of the other things they were tasked with. So Education had to become part of what people were hired to do and what they were held accountable for." While this recommendation was not incorporated by the Branch Office that year, beginning in 1996 in Dadaab, a community services officer with CARE took up a post as

[57] Talbot, *Environmental Education*, 1996, 4.
[58] Rabiller, *Regional Education Workshop,* 1995, 12.

an education officer, "which forged a strong link between Community Services and Education," stated Michael, the former teacher writing his own history of education in Dadaab camp. He explained that:

> The can schools are example of why this link was important. We needed more schools built but we didn't have the materials. However, there was a community services officer who had a stock of USAID tins and told the education officer he could use them if he wanted. So the education officer met with parents and they came up with a plan to cut the tins and hammer them flat so they could be used as sheeting for school walls. CARE provided some timber so all the new schools were made of USAID cans and many of the mukatti schools were eventually replaced by the can schools as well.

USAID Cans[59]

Two boys standing beside a USAID Can School[60]

[59] Oli Scarff. "All Used Up." Photograph. 1996. Getty Images.
[60] Oli Scarff. "Tin Can Schools." Photograph. 1996. Getty Images.

In July of that year, at a Global Representatives meeting held at UNHCR HQ, participants from UNHCR, UNESCO, UNICEF, and a number of other NGOs reflected on the nature of humanitarian work in the post Cold War era. The meeting report signaled a decisive shift from the early 1990's regarding the scope of UNHCR's operations, concluding that, "the initial euphoria generated by the end of the Cold War has dissipated and given way to a more sober appreciation of constraints imposed upon multilateral action: a lack of consensus regarding the protection of civilians in countries affected by armed conflict and the limited capacity of UNHCR in relation to the responsibilities it has been asked to assume."[61] One month later, UNICEF published the *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*[62] alternately known as the *Machel Report*, so named for the report's author Graca Machel. Examining the ways in which children and youth had been mobilized, sensitized, and traumatized across multiple conflicts in the preceding five years since the end of the Cold War (e.g. the Bosnia and Yugoslav wars, Rwanda), the report concluded that international organizations must undertake activities that strengthen the protection of children and youth. The report also identifies education as a primary protective activity in conflict-affected states as well as in refugee camps and "advanced the notion that child protection was a core responsibility of the UNHCR," an education officer explained.

In the first months of 1997, in response to the *Machel Report*, the UNHCR set up a Children's Trust Fund administered by the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Children. "The coordinator, who saw education as a fundamental right for children, suddenly had more of an impact because there was funding behind the post," a former UNHCR

[61] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Representatives Meeting Report*. UNHCR, 1996, 3.
[62] Graça Machel. *Impact of armed conflict on children*. UNICEF, 1996.

program officer explained. A report summarizing outcomes from a Global Community Services/Education Workshop held later that year detailed that, "in response to an internal follow-up strategy to the *Machel Report*, the UNHCR has established a Trust Fund to strategically reorient protection and programming for children and adolescents. For the first two years, this fund will support pilot projects to address critical protection concerns and promote peace."[63] Dadaab and Kakuma were to serve as the pilot sites for UNHCR's Peace Education Program.

In May of that year, two Peace Education Officers were initially hired in the Branch Office to develop the program. "One was an education specialist, the other was a peace specialist," a former UNHCR program officer recalled. "From the UNHCR's standpoint, put the two together, you have 'Peace Education.' But the peace specialist had absolutely no field experience—didn't last more than a month." The Peace Education Officer who remained spent several weeks in each camp, holding focus group interviews with a range of groups within the refugee community (e.g. women, elders, different clans and tribes) to discuss whether or not a peace education program should be implemented and if so, how the program might be structured.

> Over the course of those meetings, refugees would say that it's not enough that our kids just learn this…we need to learn this for ourselves. In Kakuma, they would refer to the eight refugees who had died the previous year in clashes between Nuer and Dinka, and in Dadaab, to the large number of women who reported being raped in the camp. So we developed a community program as well.

Initially it was thought the school program would be implemented in the regular curriculum as part of civics or social studies, "however we decided we needed to be able to call it PE so kids knew what they were learning. There was a subject called Pastoral Care and it was a single period once a week where kids did absolutely nothing. And so

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[63] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Community Services/Education Workshop, October 26-November 1*. UNHCR, 1997, 33.

we said, 'well, this is the best substitute for Pastoral Care you could get.' And that's where we wound up putting it."

The school-based Peace Education program was comprised of a series of activities covering fourteen concept areas arranged in a "spiral curriculum" where new lessons built upon those of the previous weeks. Forty PE teachers per camp were hired and trained in "pedagogy that was really student centered and experiential," remarked a former program officer. "It didn't require reading or writing but rather facilitation skills. Like the Environmental Education teacher-training had done, this helped to improve the quality of instruction in the camp because teachers utilized these approaches in the other classes they taught." In Dadaab, CARE placed Peace Education in the mid-morning on Thursday where Pastoral Care had previously been slotted. However in Kakuma, Lutheran World Federation, the new implementing partner for education, relocated Pastoral Care period to Monday morning during the first period. The Peace Education Officer remarked that, "it would seem as though LWF made a conscious effort to put Peace Education where it would be least effective. That was often when school assembly was held so students would miss first period." Nevertheless, 42,000 students across the two camps participated in the program the pilot year.[64]

Implementing Partner Arrangements and UNHCR Management Structure

That LWF had assumed responsibility as the implementing partner for education in Kakuma in mid-1997 "came down to UNHCR's growing concerns over funding," a program officer explained. When the UNHCR had approached both the IRC and Radda Barnen in 1994 to take over from IRRES, Radda Barnen was ultimately selected because

[64] Margaret Sinclair. *Education Mission to Kenya March 8-15*. Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1997, 20.

of the financial and human resources it could direct to the education program in Kakuma through the organization's affiliation with Save the Children International. In early 1997 when Radda Barnen indicated to the UNHCR that it did not want its contract renewed, the IRC had again submitted a proposal to the UNHCR. "However LWF came with some of its own funding and IRC couldn't match those resources," a former implementing partner program officer recalled. Though IRC had begun to offer supplemental education programming for disabled youth "and LWF had no education specialist and was primarily responsible for food distribution, all of the sudden it became the provider of education. And it was not really in a position to do that."

Around the same time, UNHCR's Inspection and Evaluation unit conducted a *Review of UNHCR's Implementing Arrangements*.[65] The internally-circulated report found that in the past decade the number of UNHCR's partners had quadrupled and that partners were managing approximately $500 million disbursed annually by the UNHCR. However, the report concluded that, "despite their decisive importance, the attention dedicated to implementing arrangements was limited," and that selection of implementing partners was "decentralized, ad-hoc, and passive—with the UNCHR waiting for partners to come to them."[66]

By way of addressing this and other issues of organizational decision-making, particularly what services ought to be prioritized and how UNHCR's expanding operations could be funded and managed, the UNHCR had for the past eighteen months conducted a comprehensive review of its management structure entitled 'Project Delphi.' In short, Delphi instituted a new policy of 'decentralized' decision-making to country

[65] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Review of UNHCR's Implementing Arrangements. Inspection and Evaluation Service, UNHCR, 1997.
[66] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Review of Implementing Arrangements*, 1997, 33.

Branch Offices and sub-offices at the camp level that would be implemented over the next two years. UNHCR HQ would set global policy priorities and issue guidelines and standards for each unit "that would help heads of Branch and sub-offices hold implementing partners accountable."[67] Additionally, heads of office would be given complete discretion over the annual budget allotted to their operation amongst the different units (e.g. community services, protection). "So it came down to who could fight for their service in budget meetings over one big pot of money," a former UNHCR program officer explained. "And because there were no education officers at the country level in Kenya or anywhere else, there was nobody to fight for education."

Under the new management structure instituted by Delphi, addressing many of the recommendations made in UNHCR's 1997 global *Review of Education Activities* would prove increasingly difficult. The *Review* concluded that:

> 1) Staff at all levels are unclear about the purpose, objectives, and coverage of refugee education programs
> 2) UNHCR's focus on primary education precludes a large number of adolescents from receiving any educational programming
> 3) UNHCR's average annual per pupil expenditure of $21-$28 in camp schools was insufficient to provide any degree of quality programming.[68]

Recommendations included increasing per-pupil expenditure to a minimum of $40, developing minimum standards for all types of refugee education as part of the new management system, and shifting refugee education policy from "primary education" to "basic education." While primary education "was in some countries cut off in Grade Six and very inflexible—nothing but standard school programming, we could argue that basic education went up to Grade 8," a former UNHCR community services officer explained. "Basic education was also a term utilized in EFA but it had previously been made

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[67] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *The State of UNHCR Staff*. UNHCR, 2000, 22.
[68] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Review of UNHCR's Education Activities*. Inspection and Evaluation Service, UNHCR, 1997, 52.

synonymous with primary education. Because one of the goals of EFA was basic literacy and numeracy, we reasoned we could advocate for accelerated learning programs or remedial courses for out-of-school adolescents."

Per the *Review's* recommendations, the education programs in Dadaab and Kakuma were doing well when compared to camp schools throughout the world. For the 1997/1998 academic year, $41 was spent per pupil, a handful of community services officers as well as the Environmental Education and Peace Education officers in the Branch Office were strong advocates for education, and there was supplementary and vocational educational programming for adolescents, albeit limited.[69] Don Bosco in Kakuma had expanded its enrollment capacity every year since it had begun offering classes in 1993, and in the summer of 1997 had moved from the original mud house school building into a large vocational training center that included several workshops for woodworking, masonry, carpentry, electrical wiring and repair, and auto mechanics.

Don Bosco Vocational Training Center, 1997[70]

Don Bosco Wood Workshop; Commissioned Desks[71]

In Dadaab, a handful of students were provided textbooks and weekly tutoring from a Kenyan national teacher to help them independently prepare for the Kenyan

[69] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Education Review*, 1997, 32.
[70] Luke Bryant. "Don Bosco Vocational Training Center." Photograph, 1997. Bryant's Personal Photo Archive.
[71] Luke Bryant. "Don Bosco Wood Workshop." Photograph, 1997. Bryant's Personal Photo Archive.

Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE)[72] in 1998. Additionally, the PE program "really strengthened the quality of teaching in the camps, and we also we got more access to information about the education sector itself," a UNHCR community service officer explained. "It was no longer just statistics or quarterly reports from the implementing partners delivered to the Branch Office, because the Peace Education officer regularly visited all the camp schools over the course of several months. It became difficult to pretend issues were not there."

Nevertheless, in early 1998 problems loomed. In Kakuma, LWF announced that it would not be able to match the funding previously provided by Radda Barnen, despite financial commitments made at the time the organization assumed responsibility for the education sector. Additionally, several thousand Somali refugees had been transferred by the UNHCR from Dadaab to Kakuma in the concluding months of 1997 to ease overcrowding in Dadaab, though plans had not been undertaken to expand capacity in camp schools or make arrangements to facilitate the transition from the Somali to Kenyan curriculum for Somali students in lower primary. "They were just enrolled in the schools, though many didn't speak any English and our classrooms became very crowded," recalled a former teacher. Suad Mohammed was one of several hundred incoming students for whom classes were held under trees as they had once been in 1992.

> We came in the middle of the term and it was hard because we didn't know English at the time—only Somali. And we were in the shade then but in Kakuma there is lots of dust. So sometimes I could not concentrate. I could not even see the teacher in front of me. Some days it would start raining and then it was very hard to learn. There were eighty students going to school under the tree, but I was one of only seven girls.

[72] The Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) is a certificate awarded to students after completing the approved eight-year course in primary education in Kenya. The subjects examined include Math, English, Swahili, Social Studies, Science and Religious Studies (Christian/Islamic/Hindu), and Social Studies, including Kenyan History.

For Simon and many other students in both Dadaab and Kakuma who had begun their primary schooling in 1992, they were approaching the end of Grade 8 "and wanted to sit for the KCPE and go to secondary school. Parents were demanding the same, arguing for what purpose had their kids been attending classes all these years if they couldn't continue," a former UNHCR community services officer explained. "There was real unrest—teachers in both camps organizing strikes to increase the incentive wages, resources that were stretched to the limit because there was another 'budget crisis' at HQ. Yet we got to thinking in the Branch Office, 'what about the Children's Trust?'" With grants from the Trust, Ifo Secondary School (in Dadaab) and Kakuma Secondary School were constructed from cement blocks and opened in the fall of 1998.[73]

Throughout that year, momentum was gathering behind secondary education at UNHCR HQ. A former UNHCR Education Officer explained that, "the High Commissioner at the time had a particular interest in refugee education and eventually became angry about the neglect of education within her program. So she asked one of the assistant education officers to prepare a concept paper on the establishment of an independent Refugee Education Trust." However at the same time, "the Director of the Division of Operational Support was making budget cuts to respond to the crisis and abolished the post of the Senior Education Officer in June." By August, three Assistant Education Officers remained at HQ to manage an Education Unit responsible for making education available to more than five million school age refugees throughout the world. "What a signal to send to the international community about the UNHCR's stance on education in emergencies," declared the same education officer.

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[73] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Country Report, Kenya*. UNHCR, 1998, 4.

The financial crisis—a shortfall of $400 million—and subsequent cuts were the result of what the UNHCR increasingly recognized as long-term care and maintenance programs with no solutions in sight and shrinking donor support. The majority of UNHCR's operations were funded by fifteen bilateral agencies, though contribution levels fluctuated from year to year depending upon the priorities of the governments the agencies represented.[74] A number of possibilities for expanding the donor base were under consideration, particularly the cultivation of corporate and philanthropic organizations, however the credibility of UNHCR's operations was a concern. "To retain the goodwill and adequate financial support of new and existing donors, UNHCR must show that its budgeting and implementation of refugee programs are cost-effective and have valid objectives,"[75] stated an internally circulated Report on Donor Relations. However in terms of education, "nobody wants to fund "soft operations," a former education officer explained. "You build a school, take a photo, show the donors, and everyone is happy. You train teachers and improve the quality of instruction and that's invisible. Every single year we had to try and make education new and exciting. That's just not how education works."

In Dadaab and Kakuma, budget cuts halted the construction of 34 school classrooms and the maintenance of several others. Blackboards were crumbling and several of the mud brick walls had holes large enough so students could walk in and out as they would a doorway.

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[74] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Appeal*. UNHCR, 1998, 7.
[75] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Donor relations and Mobilizing Resources*. UNHCR, 1998, 3.

Blackboard, Kakuma; 1998[76]

Unity Primary School, Kakuma; 1998[77]

However, "the GLOBE program provided an opportunity for the photo op that year," recalled an education officer. The Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment Program (GLOBE) was developed by then Vice President of the United States Al Gore. "The High Commissioner was trying to strengthen the relationship between the UNHCR and the United States to secure additional funding and in a meeting between the High Commissioner and Vice President it was decided it would be a good idea to pilot GLOBE in Kakuma—the constant guinea pig for any pilot in the 1990s," a former education officer remarked. GLOBE required that students collect and analyze water and soil samples, enter the data on a computer, and then email that data so it could be published on GLOBE's website. The same officer further explained that, "these were camps with no electricity and the staff at UNHCR barely had access to the Internet. UNHCR funds were allocated to LWF for GLOBE but there was never an actual program so the money was just pocketed. However, sure enough photos were taken of refugee children collecting samples."

In both camps, textbooks and other school materials were increasingly shared amongst a growing number of students. "There was a strain on everything—one book for

[76] Luke Bryant. "Broken Blackboard." Photograph, 1998. Bryant's Personal Photo Archive.
[77] Luke Bryant. "Extra Entryways of Unity." Photograph, 1998. Bryant's Personal Photo Archive.

every ten learners, maybe two or three desks for one hundred students in a class. We used to fight over these things," recalled a former student. In the final months of the year, PTAs approached CARE and asked that the Kenyan curriculum be fully adopted across all grade levels. "CARE was initially reluctant because the mixed-curriculum textbooks had just been reprinted by UNESCO and were about to be distributed, but the parents were adamant," Abdulahi, explained. "So ultimately CARE agreed, though for some years after, most teachers were teaching the Somali curriculum because they didn't know how to teach the Kenyan curriculum."

Standards and Best Practices of Refugee Education

While the Education Unit at UNHCR HQ and education programs in camps were significantly strained in 1998 from beginning to end, the publication that year by UNESCO (in consultation with UNHCR and UNICEF) of *Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: Some Lessons from Recent Experience*[78] furthered the development of the nascent field of education in emergencies. The first publication to outline and synthesize "best practices," *Rapid Educational Response* was a "how to guide" as well as an advocacy tool for community services and education officers that made a case for emergency education as a protective and lifesaving service, "especially in refugee situations."[79] In 1999, the publication by UNICEF of *Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach*[80] catalyzed new discussions and debates amongst staff at UNHCR, UNESCO, and UNICEF as well as other INGOs (e.g. Save the Children) about how to conceptualize education in emergencies. *Rapid*

[78] Pilar Aguilar and Gonzalo Retamal. "Rapid Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: A Discussion Document." International Bureau of Education, 1998.
[79] Aguilar and Retamal, *Rapid Educational Response*, 1998, 2.
[80] Mary Joy Pigozzi. "Education in emergencies and for reconstruction: a developmental approach." *UNICEF*, 1999.

Educational Response proposed a "humanitarian aid" model during emergencies, while *Education in Emergencies* advocated for a "development" model that included planning before, during, and after emergencies.

The education programming offered in Dadaab and Kakuma as well as other long-term care and maintenance situations throughout the world was situated squarely between these two models. Education programming was expanding to include secondary schooling as well as other supplementary courses (e.g. Peace Education and vocational training)—that is, becoming long term in scope. However, funding and planning continued to occur in one-year cycles. For the Peace Education Program, the $500,000 granted from the Children's Trust to run the pilot was renewed in 1999 to maintain the Kenya program as well as pilot Peace Education Programs in refugee settlements in Uganda and Liberia. "The glory years when we had $500,000 just to spend in Kenya were amazing," recounted a former program officer. "That first year, we had more money than was necessarily needed but every dollar was spent because otherwise the second year we would have only been granted the amount spent from the $500,000 the first year." The same was true of UNHCR's General Program funding. The same program officer explained that:

> Let's say you give an officer $1 Million USD for the first year to run the operation in their sector but he only manages to spend $750,000. Doesn't matter what the reasons are—maybe it was given mid-year so it couldn't all be spent in time—a very common problem. Next year, when the officer has sorted out those problems and really needs the money, he's given $750,000. Everybody is incentivized to spend every single dollar, regardless of how. The notion of single-year "emergency" General Program funding simply doesn't work because it can't encompass recurring costs, like teachers' salaries or capital works that take a long time to plan.

Despite the budget crisis and cuts to operations and staffing in 1998, the building of classrooms resumed in both camps in 1999 and schools were increasingly comprised

of four or five buildings, each divided into as many classes, and arranged in a rectangular compound enclosed by a large fence.

Upendo Primary School; Hagadera, Dadaab. 1998[81]

In Dadaab refugee teachers received an increase of 500 Ksh, raising their monthly incentive wage from 1500 to 2000 Ksh.[82] Also in Dadaab, UNHCR brought on Windle Trust Kenya (WTK) as an implementing partner managed by CARE to provide English language courses to newly settled francophone refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). CARE also opened Unity Upper Primary School that was officially registered with the Kenyan Ministry of Education. "Unity was the first registered school in the camp and the only exam center," Michael explained. "This meant that the learners would prepare to sit for the KCPE at the end of Grade 8 from the moment they started there in Grade 6." Former students recalled that "from the beginning, Unity was the place to be—it was the center of everything. There was an exam at the end of Grade 5 to go to Unity, however anyone who passed could go—there were no quotas." Yet, these same former students recounted challenges once they got to Unity. "The first year, the student-to-teacher ratio was at least one hundred to one and there were lots of drop outs

[81] Stanley Nyale. "Upendo Primary School." Photograph, 1998. Stanley Nyale's Personal Archive.
[82] Equivalent to approximately $30 USD. Available http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/

because people were failing Kiswahili. There was also not a single textbook in the school so we were just copying from the blackboard."

There were also a limited number of textbooks for primary and secondary school students in Kakuma, though for different reasons than in Dadaab. During a regional workshop for refugee education organized by UNHCR in Tanzania, a large discrepancy was noticed in the cost per textbook reported by LWF and CARE. A former UNHCR program officer explained that "for no reason other than you had two different officers from the Nairobi Branch Office coordinating with the implementing partners for education, one for LWF the other for CARE, they never talked with one another or compared notes. But at this workshop it happened that I had both partners' accounting sheets side by side." It turned out that for the same textbooks, LWF was reporting costs substantially higher than those reported by CARE. "This caused a huge furor and as it was being investigated it was discovered there were all sorts of things being overcharged with kickbacks going straight into pockets of LWF staff. Turned out there had been a huge problem with textbook distribution for years despite so much money going into textbooks." Nevertheless, when the investigation was concluded months later, LWF remained the implementing partner for education.

While there were no changes to implementing-partner arrangements in Kakuma, significant changes to the demographic of the camp population were underway. Early that year, the US State Department announced that more than 12,000 'Lost Boys' would be resettled to the United States over the next two years.[83] "After that it was no longer a children's camp in the way it had been since 1992," a UNHCR community services

[83] See: Julianne Duncan. "Sudanese "lost boys" in the United States: Adjustment after six months." In *United States Catholic Conference, Washington, DC*. 2001.

officer explained. “There were about 40,000 refugees in Kakuma at the time, mostly Sudanese but some Somali and Ethiopians. Once resettlement started, the UNHCR began transferring Congolese, Ugandans, Burundians to the camp.” These new groups brought with them experiences of living in different camp settings and new approaches to living in Kakuma, in part facilitated by remittances sent from relatives in refugees’ home countries or who had resettled abroad. “There had been a small market in Kakuma but suddenly there were shops, restaurants, even taxis to get you from Kakuma 1 to the end of the new extension, Kakuma 2, and back—all of these business were operated by refugees,” a program officer recalled. It was around this time that Kakuma took on the characteristics of an “accidental city.” As Kakuma’s informal economy grew, so too did tensions and conflicts between refugees and the Turkana people of the host community. What had started as conflicts over resources like firewood and water that refugees and the Turkana needed to survive now also became conflicts over inequity. “Many refugees were now living much better than the Turkana,” a protection officer explained. “UNHCR’s conflict-mitigation strategy was to offer Peace Education courses to the Turkana as well as allow a number of school-aged Turkana to attend camp schools.”

As the end of the year approached, the Director of UNHCR’s recently established Regional Office in Nairobi initiated discussions with the Peace Education officer working in the Branch Office regarding establishing a regional Peace Education Officer post. The officer recalled that, “I had to say to him, we can’t do that. We don’t even have an education officer. So within a couple of months he got an education officer—the first education officer in the UNHCR system who was not based in HQ. We couldn’t believe it,” a former UNHCR program officer remarked. In Geneva, discussions were also

underway that in early 2000 led to the re-establishment of the Senior Education Officer post. When the second Education For All Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal in April of that year, staff members from UNHCR's Education Unit played a significant role in the inclusion of the provision of education in emergencies in the resultant Dakar Framework for Action that replaced the Jomtien Declaration signed ten years previously at the first Education For All Conference. A UNHCR education officer recalled that:

> At Dakar, there was a high-level meeting of about seventy people, including several education ministers from around the world, pulled together by a handful of officers working on education in emergencies—one each from the World Bank, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), UNESCO, UNICEF, and UNHCR. And after several rounds of discussion, these officers managed commitments that were subsequently inserted into the Dakar Declaration that all parties present would do everything possible to provide education in crisis and to conduct educational programs in such a way as to lead to peace.[84] So in one phrase we had the authority to work on education in crisis and conflict but the crucial thing emerging from the meeting was the ministers called upon UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNESCO to convene a process of networking for education in emergencies.

Advocating for Education in Emergencies

In November, UNHCR hosted a two-day meeting in Geneva where representatives from the three agencies founded the Network for Education in Emergencies; during the early months of 2001 the name was changed to *Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies*, the word "interagency" included by UNHCR's then Senior Education Officer in an effort to denote the collaborative design and intent of the network. "Before INEE, you had education officers for different NGOs and UN Agencies working in remote, isolated places like Dadaab and Kakuma almost alone," stated a former UNHCR education officer. "But from the end of 2000 onward, they were

[84] The exact phrasing found in the Dakar Framework (2000) states that all EFA partners are committed to "meet[ing] the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct[ing] educational programs in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict." See: UNESCO. *The Dakar Framework for Action: Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments: Including Six Regional Frameworks for Action*. UNESCO, 2000, 19.

connected via the INEE website, an online platform where they could share information and ideas and establish a community of practice."

In the interim months between the Dakar Conference and the interagency meeting on education in emergencies held in Geneva, UNHCR's newly appointed Senior Education Officer organized a bilateral agreement between UNHCR and NRC to supply "seconded" NRC education officers to refugee camps throughout the world, including Dadaab and Kakuma. "Because of the relationship between a handful of Senior Education officers at different agencies, a lot was pushed through in a short period of time," a former UNHCR program officer explained. "The secondment arrangement was one example. These officers were a strong pillar in keeping education going because UNHCR wasn't really allocating funding to education officers and NRC was filling the gap," a former UNHCR education officer explained. The NRC officers seconded to Dadaab and Kakuma helped to facilitate both pre and in-service teacher training and oversaw textbook distribution as well as the construction of additional school buildings in both camps, including two new secondary schools in Dadaab, one in Dagahaley and the other in Hagadera.[85] "I remember things really improved that year," Al Nuur stated. "It seemed as though every child had a textbook and was learning inside a classroom."

The groundswell of support for education in emergencies and UNHCR's education program was short-lived. By the middle of 2001, UNHCR's Senior Education Officer "was on the way out and nobody knew if the post would be filled," a former UNHCR education officer explained. In the months prior to leaving, the Senior Education Officer commissioned a comprehensive review of the Peace Education Program, which found that participants had developed a range of conflict resolution skills that helped to

[85] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2001, 4.

diffuse conflict between different groups within the same camp and between refugees and the host communities.[86] All of the curricular materials for the Peace Education Program were also made available on the INEE website and a consultant was brought on to write the first set of "good practice guides." Both the materials and guides were subsequently posted on INEE's website. Additionally, arrangements were made to relocate the Peace Education Program from UNHCR to UNESCO, as the grant, from the Children's Trust, supporting the program would not be renewed. "This was incredible," remarked the former Peace Education Officer, "because one of the officers at UNESCO who had long been a supporter of Peace Education literally hovered outside the bathroom to talk to the officer with the means of bringing the program over. That officer said yes and secured another two years of UNESCO funding."

For the Refugee Education Trust initiated in 1998 and by the year 2000 established as an independent NGO under Swiss law, two more years of UNHCR funding was also secured. As an NGO affiliated but not managed by the UNHCR, the Refugee Education Trust was supporting the expansion of secondary and post-graduate programs in camps throughout the world. "Even though there were a lot of people at HQ saying we don't have the mandate for secondary education—just basic education—they couldn't argue with the independent funding from private donors," a former UNHCR program officer explained. In Dadaab and Kakuma, several hundred students were enrolled in secondary schools "though there were so many challenges then," a former refugee student at Kakuma Secondary School stated. "Because there was only one secondary school for the whole camp, many of us had to walk very far every day and there were no

[86] Anna Obura. "UNHCR Peace Education Programme in Dadaab and Kakuma, Kenya; evaluation summary." *Geneva: UNHCR* (2002).

school meals—we remained with hunger most days. There was also a high turnover rate amongst teachers and that year they decided to strike."

While throughout the 1990's teachers had organized strikes in Dadaab every year or two to raise incentive wages, strikes had seldom occurred in Kakuma. A former teacher explained that, "the chairman of the teachers had a meeting with all the head teachers and presented demands to LWF and UNHCR and explained our incentive hadn't been raised in a number of years. When they refused we already had support from all of the primary and secondary schools to strike." However, the ECD teachers elected not to participate. "The chairman approached us and asked 'why shouldn't you join us? If something good will come, you will be there.' However we told them we had no reason for striking," a former ECD teacher recalled. All schools closed except for ECD schools. "I supported the teachers, but I also was mad because I endured a lot to be at school and everyday that passed was one more day of being idle and not advancing," a former student explained. After two weeks, the incentive was raised by 500 Ksh per month and classes resumed.

So too did cuts to financial and human resources for education programming at UNHCR HQ by early 2002. The newly appointed High Commissioner did not share his predecessors' interest in refugee education and the post for an officer to oversee the Refugee Education Trust was abolished. Under new management operating in an office outside of UNHCR HQ, RET continued field operations by shifting its focus to conduct pre and in-service training with refugee teachers. The partnership with UNHCR, however, was terminated. By the middle of 2002, RET was no longer financially supporting secondary education in camps. Additionally, the newly appointed Senior

Education Officer had previously held several posts at UNHCR as a Senior Protection Officer and head of sub-office, though did not have a background in education. At UNESCO, changes to senior staff members also resulted in cuts to the special funding that had supported the Peace Education Program. "Basically the officers who had been strong advocates for education were having knives thrown at their programs and this all happened around the same time," an education officer explained. In Dadaab and Kakuma, UNHCR's Peace Education and Environmental Education programming formally concluded at the end of spring term. Questions remained open throughout the summer and into the fall term as to whether an NGO might take responsibility for continuing to financially support these supplemental programs.

Nevertheless, in late 2002 when the new *2003 Education Sector Policy and Guidelines*[87] were issued, they represented many of the conceptual and practical developments in the field of education in emergencies that had taken shape in the preceding two years. Whereas the *1995 Revised Guidelines* had focused almost exclusively on access to primary education, the *2003 Policy and Guidelines* emphasized universal access to 'Basic Education' that covered grades 1-8. Additionally, the document included the provisioning of secondary education in camps as well as supplemental programming for adolescents, stating that "secondary schooling is an essential motivating factor for primary students and also provides a cadre of educated persons to become school teachers, health workers, and administrators [in the camps]."[88] Increasing emphasis was also placed on the quality of education provided in camp schools; guidelines aimed at promoting quality included "in-service training, instructional

[87] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *2003 Education Sector Policy Guidelines*. UNHCR, 2003.
[88] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Education Policy Guidelines*, 2003, 19.

time of a minimum of twenty-five hours per week for core subjects, and certification of school exams recognized by the host/home government."[89] Finally, the new policy stated that, "UNHCR will deploy an emergency education coordinator to support rapid educational response."[90] An education officer explained that, "the 2003 Guidelines were subject to a whole committee of staff throughout different units at UNHCR and it was really a struggle to get things included like "basic" rather than "primary" ed. But in the end some real gains were made."

With the publication in 2002 of *Education in Emergencies: A Tool Kit For Starting and Managing Education in Emergencies*[91] by Save the Children, and the one-thousand-page *Guidebook for Planning Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction*[92] by UNESCO, gains also continued to be made in the field of Education in Emergencies. "There were fourteen people at the time who were contributing to the UNESCO volume and we were all on a train traveling to Paris for the initial consult. Someone made a joke that if the train wrecked, Emergency Education would basically stop, but it wasn't completely a joke," an education consultant recalled. "The collective knowledge of the field and the direction it took rested in the hands of a core group of mostly practitioners who had spent the '90s working on providing education in manmade and natural disasters throughout the world."

As for the direction of education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma, refugee students, parents, and teachers continued advocating throughout the year for increased

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[89] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Education Policy Guidelines*, 2003, 22.
[90] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Education Policy Guidelines*, 2003, 9.
[91] Susan Nicolai. *Education in emergencies: a tool kit for starting and managing education in emergencies*. Save the Children UK, 2002.
[92] UNESCO. *Guidebook for planning education in emergencies and reconstruction*. UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2002.

access to primary and secondary school and improvements to the quality of instruction. In late 2002, teachers organized another strike in Kakuma; schools again closed for two weeks and reopened when wages were increased by another 500 Ksh per month. In Dadaab, secondary school students organized a strike to protest the quality of teachers. "They demanded that CARE employ more Kenyan teachers who had bachelors in education and could teach Swahili, especially as many would sit for the KCSE[93] the following year," Michael recalled. "It took time, but by December a handful of Kenyan teachers were brought on to teach the upper level secondary school courses." In both camps, girls were also enrolling in lower primary school and advancing to upper primary and secondary school in greater numbers. Suad recalled that:

> Female teachers had started coming and talking to the community and encouraging parents to send their girls to school. That was the first year I had a female teacher. The school I had started at under the tree was now an actual school building with several classrooms, called Horseed Primary. I would go into the staffroom and see male, male, male and I would say 'madame, why can't you become the head teacher and she would laugh and say maybe you will be the first head teacher here someday. I couldn't think that far, all I could do was focus on getting to secondary—it was a competition between me and my four brothers. We would wake up at four am and start reading with a torch. Imagine you are just in grade 4 and you wake up so early in the morning because you want to be number one because becoming number one is the only guarantee to advancing. But my teacher would encourage me throughout the day when I grew tired. She would say 'you have a bright future.' And I would say, 'how can I have a bright future in this camp under the hot sun?'

[93] The Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) is a certificate awarded to students after completing the approved four-year course in secondary education in Kenya. The subjects examined include Math, English, Swahili, Biology, History, Religious Studies, and Chemistry or Physics.

CHAPTER 5

2003-2012: EDUCATION GUIDELINES, STANDARDS, PRIORITIES, AND STRATEGIES

Kakuma (Zone II), 2003[1]

Dadaab (Ifo), 2003[2]

[1] John Shabani. "Kakuma Zone II." Photograph. June, 1993. Available http://johnshabani.blogspot.com/2012/07/john-shabani-visited-kakuma-refugee.html

[2] B Press. "Ifo Camp" Photograph. May 2003. UNHCR. Available http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2011/mar/24/dadaab-refugee-camps-in-pictures

Between 1992 and 2002, Dadaab and Kakuma had sprawled outward, semi permanent or permanent mud brick or concrete-slab homes and buildings replacing temporary plastic-sheet shelters as more and more refugees sought asylum in the two camps. At the start of 2003, approximately 130,000 refugees resided in Dadaab's three sub-camps,[1] several thousand less than what they population had been when the camp was initially founded as throughout the 1990s many of the camp's residents had been relocated to Kakuma; a limited number had resettled or repatriated. Eighty thousand refugees resided across three zones in Kakuma.[2] While the camps' populations were by and large evenly dispersed across their three distinct areas, Ifo and Kakuma I (the original camps), were the center of commerce and activity—full of refugee-owned-and-operated markets, shops, and restaurants. While Dadaab was still comprised almost exclusively of Somali refugees, in the later 1990's and early 2000's men and boys had fled Somalia in far greater numbers than in previous years and now matched women and girls one to one.[3] Kakuma, initially a children's camp for Sudanese youth, was now cosmopolitan in character with refugees from several countries throughout East and Central Africa (e.g. Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda) as well as Somali refugees relocated from Dadaab.

In 2003, approximately 24,000 students were enrolled in camp schools in Dadaab and 28,000 were enrolled in Kakuma's schools.[4] In Dadaab, boys outnumbered girls in primary school classrooms five to one while this figure was four to one in Kakuma. For secondary school, boys outnumbered girls ten to one across both camps.[5] Student-to-

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[1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2004, 6.
[2] Ibid.
[3] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Report-Kenya*, 2004, 20.
[4] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Report-Kenya*, 2004, 19.
[5] Ibid.

classroom ratios were about 80 to 1 in Dadaab and 100 to 1 in Kakuma and across both camps there were about 75 students per teacher.[6] Results of the KCPE exams that qualified students to matriculate to secondary school averaged slightly higher in Kakuma—about 220 out of a possible 500 (a score of 250 was needed to qualify for secondary school); in Dadaab the average score was 210.[7] In Kakuma, approximately 20% of students who took the exam earned qualifying marks while approximately 13% earned qualifying marks for secondary school matriculation in Dadaab.[8] An evaluation report on UNHCR's refugee education program conducted across seventy-two other camps throughout the world concluded that to improve education access and quality in Dadaab, an additional 350 teachers were required while an additional 260 were needed in Kakuma.[9] In comparison, the average number of additional teachers recommended for the other camps included in the report was twenty per camp,[10] though this large difference in part reflects the sheer size of Dadaab and Kakuma when compared to other camps that tend to be significantly similar (e.g. between 5,000 and 15,000 refugees).[11]

Unlike their predecessors, who developed and implemented Dadaab and Kakuma's education programs when the camps were initially founded, the community services and education officers employed by the UNHCR and its implementing partners in Dadaab and Kakuma now worked to increase enrollment (particularly of girls), improve exam scores, and hire and train more teachers by drawing upon the conceptual and policy frameworks, guidelines, and minimum standards for refugee education that

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[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Report-Kenya*, 2004, 20.
[7] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Report-Kenya*, 2004, 19.
[8] Ibid.
[9] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Education Evaluation*. Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR, 2003.
[10] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Education Evaluation, 2003, 15.
[11] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Education Evaluation, 2003, 19.

had developed over the course of the preceding ten years. They also did so as part of a growing network of education in emergency practitioners. These concepts, frameworks, and forums simply did not exist for policymakers and practitioners at the UNHCR and its implementing partners in the early 1990s, had been emergent in the late 1990s, and were evolving by the early 2000s—a process that would continue and, as we will see, increasingly guide the work of their successors.

Minimum Standards: Towards Development and Implementation

In 2003, Simon Purot was hired by LWF to teach at his former primary school in Kakuma. "I was not a trained teacher," he stated. "But I had sat for the KCSE in November 2002 and found myself back where I started." Simon was one of approximately 150 secondary school graduates from Kakuma Secondary School's first graduating class, wondering if there would be opportunities to pursue higher education. "We hoped we might go to university—there was talk of possible scholarships, but we were waiting and seeing." Windle Trust Kenya, the NGO that been providing accelerated English language courses to refugees in Dadaab since the late 1990s, had begun offering a handful of bursaries for Dadaab's secondary school graduates to attend colleges and universities in Kenya as well as in the United Kingdom and Canada though had not yet extended the program to Kakuma's secondary school graduates. "Opportunities for scholarships were very few and you had to have the highest marks on the KCSE," explained a former student who had been among the first recipients of a Windle Trust scholarship. "Most secondary school leavers got jobs with the NGOs in the camp as incentive staff." Many became teachers.

That the teaching workforce in both Dadaab and Kakuma was infused with a cadre of refugees who had completed their entire academic career in camp schools "really helped to improve quality, in part because they were helping us as much as they could and making it better for us then it had been for them," a former student recalled. "These teachers would spend time with us after school, answering our questions, but most others you had to book an appointment and they would give you five minutes or less—it was hard." Nevertheless, these new faculty members faced many of the same challenges as their contemporaries and predecessors without secondary degrees teaching in Dadaab and Kakuma camp schools—foremost amongst them shortfalls in textbooks and overcrowded classrooms. A former student recalled that:

> The first two years in secondary school, we were without textbooks for science class. So there were five of us who would pool our money—two shillings each and we would rent the textbook from a boy in the camp whose parents could afford to buy them. It cost 10 shillings for two days and we would take turns copying around the clock.

UNHCR's 2003 *Global Report on Kenya Operations* documented a ten-percent gap between identified needs and the available budget in the education sector.[12] The report concluded that, "in Dadaab, the UNHCR could not address the need for the construction of 385 additional classrooms to meet the minimum standards of one classroom for fifty students."[13] In Kakuma "the textbook-to-student ratio of 1:8 and desk-to-student ratio of 1:5 did not constitute a proper learning environment."[14]

Minimum Standards and the UNHCR's capacity or, alternately, difficulty in meeting them were new features of UNHCR's annual reportage, which since 1998 had included mid-year and summative Global Reports of all country operations as well as

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[12] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2004, 2.
[13] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2004, 11.
[14] Ibid.

Global Appeals to support operations for the upcoming year. Since the founding of INEE in November 2000, the Network's steering members had convened a handful of follow-up meetings regarding the development and implementation of a set of standards for education in emergencies. In March 2002, at a meeting held in UNESCO's Headquarters in Paris, it was determined that the standards would be formatted following SPHERE processes and models. SPHERE was and continues to be the internationally recognized set of common principles and universal minimum standards for the twin pillars of "Protection" and "Assistance" across several sectors of service delivery of humanitarian responses to manmade and natural disasters. SPHERE's directors were considering including a chapter on education, as a service that fell within the remit of assistance though was central to protection, in the SPHERE Handbook. Working groups with representative members from UN Agencies as well as NGOs were formed and in the proceeding twenty-four months, these groups set about defining and identifying metrics as well as guidance notes for five core categories. Conceptualized as processes rather than outcomes, the five categories included protection, access and learning environment, teaching and learning, teachers and other education personnel, and education policy and coordination. "The Standards and the SPHERE chapter brought people together and also gave UNHCR a set of global standards that it could begin to make observed," a working group member remarked.

Or, as indicated by UNHCR's *2003 Global Report on Kenya Operations*, identify the ways in which the Minimum Standards were not being observed in camp schools. "There were only a very limited number of published reports that actually detailed education services," a UNHCR program officer recalled. Indeed, *Global Reports on*

Kenya Operations from previous years included only the "successes" in Dadaab and Kakuma's education programs, offering updates such as "enrollment numbers remained high,"[15] "forty-nine new classrooms were constructed,"[16] or "the education sector provided employment for 826 refugee and 66 Kenyan teachers."[17] However, changes in reportage, as well as hope and anticipation expressed by working group members that "Standards and the SPHERE chapter would help in advocacy for increased resources to be directed both in and outside of our organizations," did not yield immediate change to education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma (or other refugee camps throughout the world).

Minimum Standards: Protection

In March of 2003, Carl Triplehorn and Susan Nicolai published *The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict*.[18] Their article articulated, further than previous publications, the ways in which education is life-saving and protective (physically, psychosocially, and cognitively) for children and adolescents (boys and girls alike) who constitute a particularly vulnerable group in times of war by virtue of their dependence on adult care. Their conclusions were a call to action, first and foremost for recognition by humanitarian and development agencies that child protection is integral to emergency education activities, and secondarily for in-depth, empirical research on education interventions that enhance the protection of children. However, a former UNHCR program officer remarked that, "while the paper really resonated with the community of practitioners working together closely at the time to develop the field, a

[15] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 1998, 4.
[16] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2000, 2.
[17] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2001, 7.
[18] Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn. "The role of education in protecting children in conflict." *Network Paper: Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)* 42 (2003): 1-36.

research agenda didn't catch on. The sentiment was the paper had already said what needed be said."

Yet in the summer of 2003 when conflict erupted between several hundred Turkana and Sudanese refugees, nothing was said of the ways in which Kakuma's schools sheltered several thousand refugees fleeing armed attacks carried out by the Turkana that followed a dispute over cattle and land rights for grazing in the areas surrounding the camp. Nine refugees and two Turkana were killed in the two-week conflict, which displaced more than 8,000 refugees from Kakuma III, where the majority of fighting occurred.[19] When the UNHCR suspended operations after the first week, halting food distribution, water, and health services, clashes nevertheless continued. "I remember feeling scared that conflict we had fled in our country had found us again in the camp," a former student recalled. "However we had classes during the day and were living in the school at night so before long things felt normal."

Questions of the ways in which UNHCR's operations did or alternately did not guarantee the security and protection of refugees in "protracted refugee situations" were considered, and subsequent evaluations conducted in the final months of 2003 and early the following year. A term coined in the year 2000 by UNHCR's Head of Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit that replaced "long-term care and maintenance operations," protracted refugee situations were increasingly the focus of UNHCR's senior management. A series of reports published by UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit detailed the ways in which protracted refugee situations were "incubators for future problems…festering crises than can nurture instability and conflict with large, disaffected

[19] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Aid Resumes in Kakuma As Fighting Ceases, 25 June, 2003, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3ef9c181d&query=kakuma

populations relying on subsistence level handouts, who are prime targets for recruitment into armed groups."[20] Children and youth in protracted refugee situations "were among those at highest risk of military recruitment."[21] Education, the reports concluded, "was among the most effective means of providing protection as well as assisting [children] in preparing for their future and preventing further conflict both within the refugee setting and in the longer term."

Issues of conflict and the role of refugee education in mitigating, or in the absence of education alternately facilitating, conflict were not new. In Kakuma, community service and education officers had throughout the 1990s documented mobilization by the SPLA of Sudanese youth in the camp and the ways in which youth would leave Kakuma to go and fight with the SPLA in Sudan when the school term ended and return the day the new term began. In Dadaab, initiatives to enroll girls in school and specific programs (e.g. UNHCR's Women Victims Against Violence Project) had been implemented to help prevent violence that was known to disproportionately impact girls and women. However, when framed within wider contexts of the compounding challenges of "protracted refugee situations," issues of conflict and violence as well as military recruitment in the camps, particularly of youths, received renewed and increasing attention by UNHCR senior management. For the "Operations Review Board" at UNHCR HQ, which allocated resources to operations on the basis of UNHCR's global priorities, "protection" was central to preventing prioritization. "This term—prioritization—was very familiar to field staff because it often corresponded with budget

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[20] Jeff Crisp. "A state of insecurity: The political economy of violence in Kenya's refugee camps." *African Affairs* 99, no. 397 (2000), 632.
[21] Jeff Crisp. "No solution in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa." *Center for Comparative Immigration Studies* (2003), 12.

reductions," remarked a UNHCR community services officer. "When you submitted your funding request and the amount granted was far less, the usual explanation was 'prioritization.' So we tried again and again to document, provide evaluations, and continue showing how education in camps was protective."

Minimum Standards: Access and Learning Environment

For Suad, the Somali student in Kakuma who competed with her brothers to be number one in their class, education was protective in precisely the ways community services and education officers endeavored to demonstrate. Suad recalled that:

> In 2004, I was going to finish number one in my class and had been offered a scholarship to attend secondary at a boarding school outside of the camp. But my Dad wanted me to marry the next year when I turned fourteen. It was my mom who saved me. She said let her finish her studies. Basically, I would be forced to marry or I could do well in school. So I promised my Dad—I said please give me this chance. I promise I will work hard and pay the dowry you would get. My Dad accepted this.

Suad's scholarship had been awarded by Jesuit Refugee Services, an NGO that had begun offering a handful of scholarships each year for girls in Kakuma to attend boarding schools across Kenya for primary and secondary education. However, female refugee children would also before long be able to attend an all-girls boarding school in Kakuma. In October of 2002, the actress Angelina Jolie, UNHCR's Goodwill Ambassador, had visited Kakuma and reported being overcome by the number of out-of-school girls she saw and interviewed. "On this trip, my concern has become the plight of refugee women and particularly girls. In the camp, thousands of girls are out of school because of both early and forced marriage," she stated in a press release.[22] Shortly afterwards, Jolie contributed $200,000 to UNHCR's operations in Kakuma, earmarking $50,000 of her

[22] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jolie Gives Refugee Girls a Shot at School in Kenya, 14 October, 2002, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3daae1974&query=angelina%20jolie

donation to build a boarding school for "vulnerable" girls in the camp.[23] By the spring of 2003, construction had commenced on "Angelina Jolie Primary Boarding School." 150 girls were enrolled when the school opened the following year.[24] "It was a protection center—a boarding school for those girls who were facing FGM or early marriage or who had been orphaned," the Head Teacher of Angelina Jolie explained. "LWF had started doing child protection in addition to being the implementing partner for education, so their education officer and child protection officer worked together to identify children to place in the school."

Angelina Jolie, Kakuma, 2002[25]

Angelina Jolie Primary Boarding School, 2003[26]

In 2004, Windle Trust Kenya had also started distributing sanitary pads to girls as community-service officers had found that many girls without access to these resources remained at home during their monthly periods. Similar outreach efforts were undertaken in Dadaab to help facilitate the increased enrollment and attendance of girls who in both camps were still outnumbered by boys five to one in primary school and ten to one in secondary school. By early 2005, enrollment figures in Dadaab's primary schools, for

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[23] Ibid.
[24] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *World Refugee Day Final Report*, 20 June, 2004, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=53a417149&query=angelina%20jolie
[25] M. Furor. "Angelina Visits Kakuma." Photograph. October, 2002. UNHCR. Available http://www.unhcr.org/3daae1974.html
[26] M. Furor. "Angelina Jolie Boarding School." Photograph. September, 2003. UNHCR. Available http://www.mariellafurrer.com/#/celebrity/angelina-jolie---kakuma-kenya/jolie_forsite_009A

girls as well as boys had significantly improved compared to previous years. “We had a primary supervisor for education employed by CARE that year who would just walk through the blocks and recruit students,” recalled Al Nuur, who had been one of the first teachers in Dadaab and was by then was a Head Teacher at a primary school in Ifo. “He would talk to parents, talk to children who were out of school when classes were in session. He was a one-man campaign to get kids in school. And it worked. All schools were crowded—150 learners to one teacher.”

Additionally, FilmAid had begun operating in Dadaab in 2005 as one of UNHCR’s implementing partners in the Community Services sector and had undertaken a school awareness raising campaign. An NGO that uses film to disseminate educational information on topics ranging from HIV awareness to refugees’ rights as well as provide “psychological relief” through Hollywood movies or cartoons, FilmAid had been operating in Kakuma since 2001 and now offered nightly screenings in both camps. “Everyone from the community came out to watch,” a former student recalled. “They would start setting up the screen on the truck just before sunset and people would gather and gather. Didn’t matter whether it was short documentary films with informational messages or shows intended for children.”

Film Aid Setting Up, Dadaab[27]

Filmaid Screening, Kakuma, 2005[28]

Minimum Standards: Teachers and other Education Personnel and Teaching and Learning

In Kakuma, LWF and other NGOs (e.g. Windle Trust) had also focused on expanding girls' enrollment in camp schools, particularly helping girls matriculate to secondary school, and had achieved measured, incremental improvements. In contrast, in Dadaab the community-mobilization efforts undertaken by CARE education officers as well as FilmAid targeting girls as well as boys had swiftly and significantly increased primary school enrollments; almost forty percent of school-aged children in the camp

[27] Samuel Irungu. "Setting up at Sunset, Hagadera." Photograph. March, 2005. FilmAid.
[28] Samual Irungu. "Overhead Shot of Audience, Kakuma I." Photograph. June, 2005. FilmAid.

were enrolled in school by mid-2005.[29] However, additional schools or classrooms were not built to accommodate burgeoning enrollment nor were additional teachers hired. The resultant overcrowded classrooms sparked unrest amongst teachers in the camp who had renewed talks of organizing a strike to increase their incentive wages. "Teachers felt proud of the work they were doing and how so many were bringing their kids to school but they said we should be paid to do this job," explained Michael, the Ugandan refugee who by then had been promoted to Head Teacher of Unity Upper Primary School in Dagahaley. Michael further recalled that, "the Education Coordinator for CARE came to one of the meetings teachers had organized and addressed the crowd by saying 'I hear you so called teachers think you deserve higher pay.' The strike which, hadn't been certain, began right then, lasting for two weeks until wages were increased by 500 shillings. To suggest we weren't real teachers. People felt belittled." Parents also decided to stage protests outside of UNHCR and CARE's field compounds in Dadaab's sub-camps. "Parents and even children really took the lead," a former teacher recalled. "They would hold signs that read "Donimeyno," which is Somali for "we don't agree."

Later that year, when CARE attempted to open an all-girls primary school in Ifo in the hopes of further increasing female enrollment and also reducing the student to teacher ratio, "were very opposed," Michael remarked. "They had tried telling CARE and UNHCR no, but after a couple of days they just went to the school and took all of the girls home. They said 'you will serve our students wherever they are with the boys. This is our culture and you don't do things special for the girls.'" A former teacher explained further that, "in some ways, the status of girls and women was changing in the camp. Parents were more willing to allow girls to go to school but observance of Islamic

[29] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2005, 9.

traditions dictated that girls shouldn't really be without boys in public—and schools were public." In contrast, agencies' efforts to increase girls' access to schools in Kakuma were widely supported by refugees of different national and tribal groups. A teacher recalled that, "when Angelina Jolie opened, there was a general excitement throughout the camp about what the school represented—a chance for girls to get an education but especially some of the most vulnerable girls. Boys sometimes talked about wanting their own school, but they didn't really seem to begrudge girls the opportunity."

In addition to enrollment campaigns and distribution of materials that would help to increase female enrollment in school as well as the provision of a limited number of scholarships available for students to attend secondary school and higher education outside of the camps, beginning in late 2005 agencies undertook efforts to raise students' exam scores on the KCPE and KCSE. Passage rates and average scores across both camps had generally remained the same each year since students had begun taking the KCPE in 1998. For the KCSE where students sit for seven out of 10 possible subjects and are given an aggregate score based on their performance across the seven subjects, passage rates and scores and also remained the same though student performance was considerably worse when compared to the KCPE. In 2005, only nine students in Kakuma out of 284 who took the exam earned marks on the KCSE that qualified them to attend college or university.[30] Out of those 284 students, 26 girls took the exam and only one passed.[31] In Dadaab, seven students out of 230 who took the exam passed, none of whom were girls.[32] "Since students had first been sitting for the exams, you either performed or you dropped out—nobody really paid attention," a former teacher recalled. Prior to the

[30] Kanere Refugee Press. *End of Year Marks, 2005*. Kanere, December 2005, 17.
[31] Kanere Refugee Press. *End of Year Marks, 2005*. Kanere, December 2005, 18.
[32] Ibid.

start of the 2006 school year, both LWF and CARE hired Kenyan national teachers, deploying one or two in each of the camps' primary or secondary schools to teach the upper-level classes and improve the quality of instruction. Additionally, in both Dadaab and Kakuma, as a means to try and further increase girls' matriculation to the camps' secondary school, the minimum required KCPE score was set to 180 while for boys the score remained 250.

Implementing partners' efforts yielded improvement in both camps to students' KCPE scores. For the 2007 school year, passage rates rose to over thirty percent in Kakuma from twenty percent in previous years and over twenty-five percent from what had previously been thirteen percent in Dadaab.[33] About 440 students, eighty of them girls, enrolled in Kakuma Secondary School where additional classrooms and teachers had been added to accommodate the increased number of students.[34] In contrast, once capacity had been reached in Dadaab's secondary schools (360 places), UNHCR and CARE, rather than expand schools' capacity, changed the minimum qualifying score from 250 to 260 for boys, though the minimum KCPE score of 180 required for girls remained unchanged. "That excluded about sixty learners," Michael recalled. "They were really devastated though a number took Grade 8 again the following year and sat for the KCPE again to try and earn a higher score so they could go to secondary." In 2008 when KCPE exam scores were returned to Dadaab's students, more than four hundred had scored over 260.[35] Still, each secondary school maintained an enrollment capacity of 120. Michael recalled that, "CARE announced they would change the minimum score from 260 to 265. So elders from the communities met and agreed there was a need for

[33] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Mid-Year Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2006, 3.
[34] Ibid.
[35] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2008, 12.

additional secondary schools for those who had earned a score of 250 and they established community secondary schools." Refugees reached an agreement with UNHCR and CARE that the community secondary schools would be run out of two or three classrooms at a primary school in each sub-camp. Michael further explained that, "communities hired teachers and paid their salaries and also made classroom and school repairs. Each school had about sixty students enrolled. They were managed as well if not better than the UNHCR secondary schools."

Minimum Standards: Education Policy and Coordination

In Dadaab, increased attention and funding from the UNHCR occasioned by a series of emergencies beginning in 2006 had also made a significant difference in the education sector. In the first months of that year, an average of 250 Somali refugees were crossing the Kenya border daily, fleeing intensifying conflict in South and Central Somalia.[36] Similar to influxes in the early 1990's, the majority of incoming refugees were women and girls, more than half of whom were under the age of eighteen.[37] The arrival of approximately twenty-five thousand refugees by September of that year strained the capacity of UNHCR and CARE to provide emergency shelter or other basic services.[38] Issues with service delivery were compounded two months later when heavy rains flooded Ifo and Dagahaley sub-camps.[39] More than twelve thousand refugees lost their mud-brick shelters to floods and UNHCR's main supply route from the town of

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[36] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Refugees Arriving in Kenya Amidst Fears of Renewed Fighting in Somalia*, 15 September, 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=450ace3e4&query=Dadaab.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, After Fleeing Conflict, Refugees Uprooted Again by Kenya Floods, 22 November, 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=456424ca2&query=Dadaab

Garissa to Dadaab was cut off when the road was subsumed underwater.[40] "The situation was dire," a program officer explained. "There were thousands of newly-arrived refugees as well as thousands of established refugees who had just lost their homes, and no way to get supplies in." The UNHCR air dropped more than two hundred tons of relief supplies and temporarily relocated ten thousand refugees to higher ground at a new sub-camp named Ifo 2 between Ifo and Dagahaley.[41] Despite the floods, "we still took the KCPE and KCSE exams scheduled for late November," a former student recalled. The student further explained that, "schools closed for one week and some learning materials were swept away. But then we came back—we had lessons in water, and we did our exams in water."

Somali refugees displaced by flooding; 2006[42]

Prior to the floods, Dadaab was already under consideration for selection as a "priority operation" by a task force comprised of representatives from several different UNHCR Bureaus (e.g. the Africa Bureau, East Africa Regional Bureau). The task force was assembled by the newly hired Senior Education Officer, who had assumed the post

[40] Ibid.
[41] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Kenya: Airlift to Flood-Affected Refugee Camps in Dadaab*, 28 November, 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=456c15f42&query=Dadaab
[42] AFP, "Torrential Rain Displacement." Photograph. November, 2006, Available http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2011/mar/24/dadaab-refugee-camps-in-pictures

from the Senior Education Officer previously brought on in 2002. "We looked at school enrollment rates, number of refugees residing in the camp, how long the camps had been there, opportunities for durable solutions," explained a former UNHCR education officer. The same officer explained further that:

> The idea in identifying priority operations was to help develop a strategy for working with education because there were some guidelines, but there wasn't a strategy." While previous efforts undertaken to prioritize refugee education had targeted the entire sector, this approach prioritized particular camps as sites where the education sector would be given priority. Rather than spreading resources thinly, it was thought this would be a way to have a bigger impact in a limited number of camps to show what increased funding and resources could do for education.

Priority operations, including Dadaab, received additional funding for education as well as seconded NRC education officers, deployed on a rotating basis to the camps for a period of three to six months. Kakuma was not selected as a priority operation and did not receive additional funding for education nor seconded NRC education officers. Another former education officer recalled that, "in part, the "emergency" in Dadaab resulted in the camp's selection. Overall Dadaab's figures were worse than Kakuma's in terms of enrollment and exam scores—so that's where focus was directed."

While UNHCR's institutional focus narrowed on education programming in Dadaab, Kenya was chosen as a "roll out country" for the newly established "Education Cluster." An element of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda, the "Cluster Approach" had been initiated in 2005 by the Interagency Standing Committee, a forum for coordination, policy development, and decision-making involving key UN and NGO partners. The Approach aimed to strengthen partnerships (i.e. clusters) between UN Agencies and NGOs as well as improve field-level coordination in specific sectors/areas of response by placing responsibility for leadership and coordination of these issues with a specific operational agency. The first round of clusters did not include education. However, a

former UNHCR education officer explained that "INEE had strong backing from its institutional members—Save the Children, UNICEF, IRC and they said this is outrageous—there must be an education cluster. It took a year, but in November 2006 an education cluster was established with UNICEF and Save the Children as joint leaders."

By early 2007, the Education Cluster had assembled an Advisory Group that included UNESCO, WFP, UNHCR, the IRC, ChildFund International and INEE and had undertaken a mapping exercise designed to identify gaps as well as capacities in education preparedness and response at global and country levels.[43] Lack of funding for education in emergencies was identified as a priority concern, particularly as the mapping exercise noted that Education was one of the least funded clusters across multiple countries and appeals. "If you just consider the UNHCR that year, they were entering year two of a "financial crisis" and the same old arguments were coming up—so you want us to cut food and water so kids can go to school," an education officer explained. "The budget for education was relatively small compared to many other sectors, but at the mention of any crisis it was more exposed than other sectors." As a means of minimizing an anticipated budget shortfall, UNHCR's Education Unit, in coordination with the Fundraising Unit, began actively fundraising amongst private-sector donors.

From Minimum Standards and Guidelines to Education Strategies and Priorities

Coordination with the Fundraising Unit was part of UNHCR's recently developed *2007-2009 Education Strategy*,[44] which took as its overall goal a thirty-percent increase in school enrollment rates (including primary, secondary, and higher ed) across all camps

[43] See: Leonora MacEwen Sulagna Choudhuri, and Lyndsay Bird. "Education sector planning: working to mitigate the risk of violent conflict." UNESCO, 2011.

[44] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *2007-2009 Education Strategy.* UNHCR, 2007.

throughout the world by 2009 (with targeted increases of ten percent per year).[45] This overall goal aimed to address an enrollment gap identified in a 2005 report which found that at least one-third of refugee children and adolescents in camps were out of school.[46] "While there had been several revised guidelines for education, the most recent issued in 2003, there had never been an overall plan or strategy with specifically-stated objectives, benchmarks, and timelines," remarked a former UNHCR education officer. The *Strategy* explicitly aligned with UNHCR's *Agenda for Protection*,[47] *Overall Strategic Objectives*,[48] *Global Priority Issues for Children*,[49] as well as EFA and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and identified a number of challenges (e.g. lack of trained teachers, overcrowded classrooms, and poor construction and maintenance of school buildings).[50] Seven objectives were outlined for the purpose of realizing the Strategy's overall goal. These objectives included access and retention, safety and quality, post-primary education, capacity building, partnerships, resources, and monitoring and evaluation. Finally, the Strategy concluded by anticipating the impacts of its successful implementation:

1) The right to education for all children of concern is safeguarded in all phases of operations and results in increased enrollment and retention rates.
2) Quality and safety of learning environments is improved and results in increased attendance rates, especially for girls
3) Protection risks faced by adolescents are reduced through strengthening access to post-primary education
4) Partnerships are reinforced and more funds and projects are available to address education gaps in emergencies and in repatriation/reintegration contexts.[51]

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[45] United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, *Education Strategy, 2007*, 3.
[46] Ibid.
[47] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Agenda For Protection*. Division of International Protection, UNHCR, 2006.
[48] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Overall Strategic Objectives*. Office of the High Commissioner, UNHCR, 2006.
[49] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Priority Issues for Children*. Division of International Protection, UNHCR, 2005.
[50] United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, *Education Strategy, 2007*, 4.
[51] United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, *Education Strategy, 2007*, 45.

Shortly after the launch of the Strategy, Nike Inc. and Microsoft entered a partnership arrangement with the UNHCR and launched the ninemillion campaign through the website ninemillion.org, to "give more than 9 million children living in refugee camps better access to education, sport, and technology."[52] The ninemillion campaign was already active in other "developing" countries (e.g. Venezuela, Panama), however in partnering with UNHCR, Nike Inc. endeavored to "build UNHCR's capacity to increase access to quality protective services through education and sports for refugee children with a special emphasis on girls, by increasing direct investment and product donations as well as strengthening the capacity of community organizations to design, implement, and monitor children's programming."[53]

And so it went that two multinational corporations undertook efforts to build the capacity of a multilateral organization to provide education services to refugees with a focus on access, quality, protection, and girls. In 2008, Microsoft built an "Information Technology Center" in Ifo with 36 computers that was intended to "provide basic education for school children and IT skills training to older refugees."[54] Nike also donated approximately $500,000 to education programming in Dadaab.[55] In 2009, the grant was utilized to construct approximately forty additional classrooms and hire and fund the incentive wages of approximately sixty refugee teachers in schools throughout Dadaab's three sub-camps as well as incorporate and fund the three community secondary schools as part of UNHCR's formal education program.[56] A former UNHCR

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[52] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR and Business Partners Give Refugee Kids a Voice Through NineMillion Campaign,* 24 January, 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=45b789bc2&query=ninemillion
[53] Ibid.
[54] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Appeal 2009 Update*. UNHCR, 2008.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.

education officer explained that, "through Nike's ninemillion.org website, anyone could go and make donations to priority countries or operations so individual donations were also reaching operations like Dadaab. There was a spiral upwards—more strategies with fundraising. Also the NRC secondments increased operations. So things started to get better."

In Dadaab, also as part of the operation's priority status, NRC initiated the Youth Education Pack (YEP) for the 2009 fall term, enrolling 150 students in a one year vocational and life skills training program.[57] YEP was specifically designed to target out of school youth and prepare them to return to formal schooling or help them to acquire skills (e.g. mechanics, carpentry) that would allow them to start their own small business or gain employment. "There were no vocational programs in the camp before YEP," Michael remarked. "Though it was slow to catch-on, Somalis are generally entrepreneurial and have great knowledge of how to start and manage their own businesses. There were even questions raised of why this program was needed."

Educating for Repatriation?

Beginning in late 2007 UNHCR undertook a large-scale voluntary repatriation operation to Sudan for the seventy thousand refugees then residing in Kakuma.[58] The Second Sudanese Civil War had formally ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.[59] The Agreement specified broad principles of governance and power-sharing between the SPLA and the government in Khartoum and also formally established 2011 as the year in which a referendum would be held that

[57] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Country Operations Plan-Kenya. UNHCR, 2009.
[58] United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, *UNHCR Resumes Repatriation of Sudanese From Kenya*, 28 November, 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=474d7a8e4&query=Kakuma
[59] See: Edward Thomas. *Against the gathering storm: securing Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement*. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2009.

would determine whether the region of southern Sudan would remain part of Sudan or gain its independence.[60] The repatriation operation had begun slowly with several hundred refugees electing to return to Sudan in 2005 and 2006. However in 2007 the UNHCR initiated information campaigns for refugees detailing the repatriation process and providing security updates from southern Sudan. By June of that year, several hundred refugees per month were returning to Sudan from Kakuma, transported by UNHCR buses and planes. Simon, who had received a scholarship in 2004 to study Social Administration at Makerere University in Uganda, had returned to Sudan in 2006. "I was actually based in Lokichoggio but worked for a development NGO as a field coordinator and was frequently in the field supervising programs in southern Sudan," he recalled.

That Simon was able to leave the camp to pursue post-secondary education was rare but not prohibited by the UNHCR or the Kenyan government. The World University Service of Canada (WUSC) had since 2003 provided between five and ten scholarships per camp each year for refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma to formally resettle to Canada and acquire Canadian citizenship while pursuing a bachelor's degree at a Canadian university.[61] The students with the highest KCSE scores were selected. For those who did not receive a WUSC scholarship but still scored high enough on their KCSE exams to attend college or university, they were only able to do so through remittances from wealthy family members outside of the camp or through private, informal philanthropic arrangements. Volunteers affiliated with church groups or NGOs visiting the camp for several weeks had, on occasion, sponsored the continued studies of refugees whom they

[60] Thomas, *Against the Gathering*, 2009.
[61] See: Robyn Plasterer. Transnational Philanthrophy: Somali Youth in Canada and Kenya. Education Unit, UNHCR, 2011.

met during their trip. Simon had been one of them. However, unlike the WUSC students whose scholarship came with formal resettlement, privately sponsored refugee students were still under the strictures of Kenya's de facto encampment policy and were not able to locally integrate in Kenya or other countries in which they studied (e.g. Uganda) upon completion of their bachelors' degrees. The majority returned to the camps and took up incentive jobs—their higher ed degrees qualifying them for positions as secondary school teachers or Head Teachers at one of the camps' primary schools earning the same incentive wage as other teachers. However, many, like Simon, decided to repatriate and utilized their degrees to gain employment, at full salary, often with humanitarian or development NGOs in Sudan or Somalia (or other countries throughout East and Central Africa).

By early 2008, as the UNHCR expanded its repatriation operation in Kakuma, camp schools had begun to close down as several thousand Sudanese were leaving each month for southern Sudan. "For a short time, there were plenty of desks, textbooks, maybe twenty or thirty learners in a class," a former teacher recalled. By the end of the summer, approximately forty thousand refugees remained in Kakuma, including five thousand Sudanese who chose to forego voluntary repatriation.[62] "I had spoken with family in Sudan and heard the situation in our region was not good, so I decided to stay," the same teacher explained. "However, UNHCR passed a policy for the 2008 fall term that Sudanese could no longer be employed as teachers or incentive workers, so for a time I was not working." A policy was also enacted for the Sudanese students who remained. Those who had sat for the KCPE in November 2008 were unable to enroll in

[62] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Resume Refugee Returns from Kenya to South Sudan,* 12 December, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4942790e4&query=Kakuma

secondary school, regardless of whether or not they had earned the qualifying score. Additionally, those in Grade 8 were not allowed to sit for the KCPE that year. Approximately 400 of the 460 students who passed the KCPE exam in 2008 were Sudanese; none were eligible to matriculate to Kakuma Secondary.[63] A former student explained that, "if you were Sudanese in primary or upper secondary, you could stay on but others really struggled. For me, I would have gone to secondary but instead was idle the whole year, re-reading my Grade 8 books to pass the time." Several implementing partners also found their budgets significantly reduced or cut entirely. A former UNHCR program officer remarked that, "UNHCR was directing almost all funds to the repatriation operation and only providing services for the other nationalities in the camp. Some agencies pulled out, others consolidated or reduced their activities."

By the end of 2009, only eight primary schools and one secondary school remained open in Kakuma. However, several thousand Congolese fleeing renewed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo[64] had arrived in the camp and more than twelve thousand Somali refugees were in the process of being transferred from Dadaab.[65] For the recently relocated Somali refugees, many of whom had previously owned thriving businesses in Somalia and later Dadaab, building new businesses in Kakuma was a matter of top priority. "When the Somalis came, they comprised more than half of the population at Don Bosco," the Head Teacher recalled. "However, many didn't finish the full course of studies. They either got jobs with family businesses or started their own business and figured it out as they went along." Car taxis now competed with motorbike taxis, Somali restaurants opened next to Ethiopian restaurants, electrical

[63] Kanere Refugee Press. "Exam Score Update." Kanere, January 2009.
[64] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2009, 4.
[65] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*, 2009, 6.

wires fed by generators that provided cable TV were strung up between homes; for a small fee, refugees could pay to "get on the grid." Kismayo Primary, a private primary school established and managed by the Somali community, also opened its doors for enrollment before the start of the second term in May. "The Somalis bought the school that had been closed down after the Sudanese repatriation for a small fee from the UNHCR. Except for the religious teachers who were Somali, all the teachers were Kenyan nationals," a Congolese refugee explained. He elaborated further that, "you didn't have to be Somali to attend though it was for the most part only Somalis who could afford to pay the school fees—500 Ksh per month that paid the full salaries of the Kenyan teachers. It was not easy, but I managed to send my children. It was the best primary school in the camp."

Kismayo Primary School, 2010[66]

In Kakuma's LWF-managed schools, newly hired Congolese refugees "really brought up the level of teaching and learning," a former teacher explained. "Almost all of those hired as teachers had completed or were attending university in the Congo before they came." That spring, LWF also contracted with Kenya's Masinde Muliro University, a for-profit private university, to provide a distance teaching certification course for

[66] Jean-Michelle Batakane. "Kismayo." Photopgraph, July, 2010. Personal Archive.

Kakuma's incentive teachers. A teacher explained that, "by that time, all primary school teachers had completed secondary school either in the camp or in their home country so they could qualify for the Masinde Muliro certificate. The lecturer would come from the university and teach in the evenings and during breaks between terms." Suad was one of the teachers enrolled in the course. She recalled that, "when I returned to Kakuma after completing secondary I was hired to teach in my old school, Horseed Primary. I saw there were still very few girls in the school, so I would go into the community and talk with the parents. They would say their daughters could come if they were in my classroom or with another female teacher." In the spring of that year, Windle Trust had also begun offering supplemental remedial classes for girls on the weekends in primary schools throughout the camp. Suad remarked further that, "little by little parents were saying ok and more and more girls wanted to come," a former teacher recalled. "We really tried to encourage them to set their sights on the KCPE and then secondary and even beyond."

Education Strategies in Emergencies

By the spring of 2009, funding for all operations in Dadaab was running precariously low. Since the beginning of the year, twenty thousand Somalis had been settled in Ifo, Dagahaley, or Hagadera.[67] The three sub-camps were already collectively sheltering more than 260,000 refugees and UNHCR staff expected that several thousand more would arrive in the coming months due to intensifying conflict in the Somali capital of Mogadishu and its surrounding regions as well as prolonged drought throughout the

[67] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Dadaab Camps Under Severe Strain As Somalis Continue to Flee to Kenya*, 27 March, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=49ccf5ad2&query=Dadaab

entire country.[68] By the end of the summer, an additional thirty thousand Somalis were registered at a rate of sixty-four hundred refugees per month.[69] The newly arrived school-aged refugees were integrated into existing schools, many of which adopted a split-shift system to accommodate populations that doubled and in some cases tripled. "We held classes from 8 to 11 for the first ninety or so learners and then from 12:30 to 3:30 for the next ninety learners," a former teacher recalled. "It was especially difficult in the lower primary classes because many children were coming to school for the first time. Some were older but regardless of age they started there."

Keeping pace with the influx rendered many of the goals established in Dadaab's *2009-2011 Education Sector Strategy*[70] difficult if not impossible to achieve. As a follow-up to UNHCR's *2007-2009 Education Strategy*, CARE, in consultation with PTAs, community leaders, and teachers, identified six camp-specific strategic objectives. These included targeted increases in the capacity of secondary schools, improvement in the quantity, quality, and motivation of teachers, increases in girls' access to education as well as vocational training and scholarship opportunities, and decreases to the number of out of school youth.[71] To realize the 2009 goals, the Strategy estimated that an additional 237 teachers, 5500 textbooks, 126 classroom renovations, and $79,000,000 would be required beyond the approved education budget.[72] Unfortunately, these human and material resources did not come. However, more Somali refugees did and by the end of

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[68] Ibid.
[69] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Chief Visits Dadaab-Draws Attention to Dramatic Somali Refugee Crisis,* 5 August, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4a7955db6&query=Dadaab
[70] CARE. *Dadaab Education Sector Strategy 2009-2011*. CARE, 2009.
[71] CARE, *Dadaab Strategy*, 2009, 4.
[72] CARE, *Dadaab Strategy*, 2009, 10.

the year, more than 300,000 resided in Dadaab.[73] Heavy rains and then flooding also came, replacing the drought, which had spurred refugees to seek protection and assistance in Dadaab throughout the preceding year. As staff with the UNHCR and its implementing partners hastily built flood walls from sandbags, relocated an additional ten thousand refugees from Dadaab to Kakuma, and continued registering new arrivals, classes continued much as they always had.

For UNHCR's Education Unit, 2010 began with the launch of a new *2010-2012 Education Strategy*.[74] Reports indicated that little progress had been made in meeting UNHCR's Global *2007-2009 Education Strategy's* overall goal of a thirty-percent increase in school enrollment by 2009. At of the end of that year, more than one-third of primary school aged children and two-thirds of secondary school aged children remained out of school across camps throughout the world.[75] The *2010-2012 Education Strategy* set a more modest target of a ten percent enrollment increase by the end of 2012 and focused on a set of streamlined objectives, including increased access and enrollment, improved quality, and enhanced protection.[76] "While enrollment figures had remained more or less static for years despite the strategy, there was reason to be cautiously optimistic," remarked a UNHCR program officer. Between 2007 and 2009, the global education budget had shown small improvements compared to previous years.[77] "Though education was still one of the least funded sectors overall, funding for education was proportionately higher than it had ever been. It was something to build on."

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[73] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Prepares for Possible Flooding in Dadaab Refugee Camps*, 6 November, 2008.
[74] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *2010-2012 Education Sector Strategy*. UNHCR, 2010.
[75] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Education Strategy*, UNHCR, 2010, 10.
[76] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Education Strategy*, UNHCR, 2010, 15.
[77] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2009.

In Dadaab, at the start of the 2010 school year, Windle Trust replaced CARE as the implementing partner for the secondary education program. A program officer explained that, "CARE was one of the largest implementing partners in the camp—they were overwhelmed by their involvement in almost every activity and overstretched with the influx. So UNHCR decided Windle Trust would assume responsibility for secondary education." By the fall of that year, Windle Trust had formally registered all six secondary schools with the Kenyan Ministry of Education. Michael, who had recently been hired by CARE as a quality-assurance officer for Ifo's schools explained that, "Windle had a good working relationship with the Ministry. By getting the schools registered, all could serve as exam centers for the KCSE, and the Ministry would also deploy quality-assurance officers to help with monitoring and evaluation." For the teachers recently tasked with completing multiple forms that tracked weekly and monthly enrollment, attendance, number of books, number of desks, and several other metrics as part of the new Education Management Information System (EMIS) that UNHCR had implemented in Dadaab, the additional assistance was welcomed. "EMIS was implemented first in the priority operations to help identify trends and changes and determine where the education programs were relative to the goals of the [2010-2012] *Education Strategy*," a UNHCR program officer explained. However, many teachers felt encumbered by the new reporting requirements. "The forms took a long time to fill out and were yet another thing to do at the end of the day," a former teacher remarked.

Amidst changes to implementing-partner arrangements and the introduction of the new information management system, the Borderless Higher Education for Refugees (BHER) program was established in Dadaab. The outcome of a series of workshops

attended by representatives from a number of different universities and agencies, BHER was structured as a two-year program that combined in-person and online courses leading to accredited diplomas in teaching as well as community health, development, business, and natural sciences.[78] Courses would be taught at a newly constructed learning center funded by a grant from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development in Dadaab Town, a small outpost adjacent to the camp. "Several of the secondary school teachers employed by Windle Trust were amongst the first to enroll in the program," Michael recalled. He further explained that, "opportunities for scholarships were very limited but there was room for a couple hundred students through BHER and those participating were visible in the community. For primary and secondary school students, it really gave them something to work for."

Changes were also underway for the Education Unit at UNHCR HQ. Just before the end of the year, the Unit was moved from the Operational Solutions and Transitions Section to the Division of International Protection. A former UNHCR program officer explained that, "there had been maneuvering within the UNHCR to try and put education higher on the agenda of global policy priorities. And the thought was the only way this could be done was to make education less about service delivery and more about protection so that it would directly align with UNHCR's core mandate." The move saw a substantial increase in education funding that extended to the country level. In Kenya, UNHCR's 2010 budget for Dadaab and Kakuma's education programs had been

[78] These included the African Virtual University, Kenyatta University in Nairobi, Windle Trust, York University, and the University of British Columbia.

approximately 2.4 million USD;[79] the 2011 education budget was increased by almost seventy-percent from the previous year to 4.1 million USD.[80]

Yet, this marked increase in education funding was not enough to keep pace with the influx of refugees in Dadaab. By April 2011, more than thirty thousand Somalis had arrived to the camp and found that it was already holding 360,000 refugees—four times its maximum capacity.[81] With nowhere to go in or outside of the camp, the newly-arrived Somalis resided in temporary shelters surrounding Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera. More than one thousand refugees continued arriving daily.[82] Asylum-seekers fled widespread, episodic violence carried out by "Al Shabaab," meaning "the youth" or "youngsters" in Arabic.[83] A militant Islamist organization affiliated with Al Queda, Al Shabaab sought to control crop-producing regions in central and southern Somalia as well as the capital of Mogadishu.[84] Asylum-seekers also fled famine, which in the preceding year had spread throughout these regions—a direct outcome of Al Shabaab's expulsion in early 2011 of humanitarian agencies that had been providing food and health aid in response to ongoing drought.[85] The majority of children arrived to Dadaab suffering from acute malnutrition.[86] As with previous influxes, UNHCR and its implementing partners in Dadaab were strained beyond their capacity to respond to refugees' emergent needs.

Through coordination efforts initiated by the Education Cluster, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Food Program (WFP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding

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[79] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Appeal-Kenya, 2011*. UNHCR, 2010.
[80] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2011.
[81] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Number of Somali Refugees Grows Sharply in 2011*, 29 April, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4dba949d9&query=Dadaab
[82] Ibid.
[83] See: David Shinn. "Al-Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia." *Foreign Police Institute*. 7 (2013).
[84] Shinn, *Al-Shabaab*, 2013.
[85] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Disturbances at Kenya's Dadaab Complex as Somali Influx Grows*, 1 July, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4e0da1499&query=Dadaab
[86] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Staggering Malnutrition Rates as Quarter of Somalia Population Uprooted*, 5 July, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4e12f1f36&query=Dadaab

to manage the emergency situation in Dadaab.[87] WFP set up temporary food distribution centers near the new settlements and rapidly scaled up its food distribution program. FilmAid offered daily screenings of films that provided information regarding registration as well as basic services, including education, available to refugees. UNICEF set up seven temporary tent schools that offered lower primary classes to more than ten thousand children. However, tens of thousands more remained out of school, and as a UNICEF program officer remarked, "the best recruiting place for Al Shabaab to go were the streets where all of the out-of-school kids passed time during school hours."

By September, Kambios was established as a fifth sub-camp in Dadaab and sixty thousand refugees that had temporarily been sheltered outside of the camps' formal boundaries were relocated to Kambios as well as Ifo 2.[88] However, any sense of stabilization amongst UNHCR and its implementing-partner staff as well as refugees was fleeting. In October, gunmen kidnapped two field staff working for Médecins Sans Frontières in Ifo 2 by overtaking their vehicle.[89] The gunmen shot the driver and forced him from the car before driving the MSF vehicle and two field staff across the Kenya-Somalia border to the town of Kismayo. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the kidnapping as well as a bomb attack in Ifo and a landmine explosion in Hagadera in December of that year that killed two Kenyan policemen.[90]

The Government of Kenya responded by dispatching additional police to the camp, while the UNHCR and its implementing partners suspended all non-lifesaving

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[87] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Helping the Most Vulnerable in Dadaab,* 10 August, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4e42a1999&query=Dadaab

[88] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, As Somalis Stream Into Kenya, UNHCR Races to Build a New Refugee Camp, 3 August, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4e39583f9&query=Dadaab

[89] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Walking the Fine Line Between Helping Refugees and Risking Lives*, 28 November 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4ed3bc316&query=Dadaab

[90] Ibid.

operations.[91] "The Kenyan national teachers stopped coming for one month," Al Nuur recalled. He elaborated that, "schools still remained open in the hands of incentive teachers. We were determined not to stop classes even though Al Shabaab had basically infiltrated the camp and was targeting community leaders, a lot of them teachers, who they thought were working with the UNHCR and the police." Several new implementing partners had just begun operations. These included African Development and Emergency Organization (ADEO) in Ifo and Ifo 2 and LWF In Hagadera and Kambios, both of which had replaced CARE as the implementing partner for primary education in those sub-camps. CARE remained UNHCR's implementing partner for education in Dagahaley. "Nobody really talked about the change when it happened," Michael recalled. "However, CARE was again really stretched during the emergency and it was too big of a job for just one agency. In fact that same change was made in several sectors." A UNHCR program officer explained that, "there was a lot of emergency funding directed to Dadaab in 2011, which meant that UNHCR could partner with more agencies. Some took over or assisted with ongoing programs, others started new programs. For almost twenty years it had basically been UNCHR and CARE but by the end of the year there were thirty implementing partners in the camp." Whether or not these new implementing-partner arrangements would make substantive changes to persistent challenges in Dadaab's education programs was unknown.

[91] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Alarmed Over Recent Security Incidents in Dadaab*, 21 December, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4ef1dddf9&query=Dadaab

The magnitude of those challenges was brought into sharp focus just before the start of the new year with the publication of *Refugee Education: A Global Review*.[92] Commissioned by the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit at the UNHCR, the figures included in the comprehensive report "made clear that the UNHCR was not upholding its mandate to protect children," a UNHCR program officer remarked. The *Review* detailed that across ninety-two camps throughout the world approximately one-quarter of primary-school-aged children and two-thirds of secondary-school-aged youth remained out of school.[93] Additionally, only thirty-eight percent of requests for education funding were met each year and globally there were only two Education Officer positions.[94] Prior to publication, the report had been presented at UNHCR's annual Executive Committee meetings, attended by Senior Officers across all Divisions as well as well the High Commissioner. However, a program officer explained that:

> Just before the presentation was made, there was a lot of unease expressed by the High Commissioner regarding the critical nature of the report. But a particularly influential officer in the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit who was a big proponent of education struck a deal that the publication of the report would be delayed by one month and the presentation would go on—basically to slightly lessen the impact so the presentation and publication were not happening at the same time.

The newly appointed Senior Education Officer was among those attending the ExCOM meeting when the report was presented. A UNHCR program officer explained that, "the new Officer had a vision, had been in the field of education with UNICEF for a number of years, and was very clear about the future direction the Education Unit would take. And now there was a report that could provide all of the evidence that was needed to push things forward."

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[92] Sarah Dryden-Peterson. *Refugee Education: A Global Review*. UNHCR, 2011.
[93] Dryden-Peterson, *Global Review*, 2011, 5.
[94] Dryden-Peterson, *Global Review*, 2011, 9.

The development of a new *2012-2016 Education Strategy*[95] was quickly undertaken. "There were expectations as well as support from many at headquarters that the Strategy be more than lofty goals," remarked a program officer. "So the Strategy addressed point by point issues that were raised in the report and provided mechanisms for achieving targeted goals." These mechanisms included:

- Developing and/or strengthening partnerships with Ministries of Education in host states as well as strengthening collaboration with UNICEF
- Contracting with implementing partners that have proven experience with education service delivery and management
- Placing UNHCR staff with education expertise in Community Services and Program positions in regional offices and in operations with large education programs
- Implementing Education Management Information Systems in all camps
- Incorporating information and communication technology to expand access to education, particularly tertiary and higher ed.[96]

That there was a significant increase in UNHCR's global education budget for 2012 indicated the degree of support at UNHCR HQ. In Kenya, UNHCR's education budget was approximately 11.5 million USD, twice as much as the preceding year.[97] In Dadaab and Kakuma, newly appointed UNHCR education officers in each sub-office worked with the implementing partners for education to develop multi-year education strategies specific to each camp. In Dadaab, increased funding was utilized to convert semi-permanent can schools to permanent school buildings and build several new schools in Ifo 2 and Kambios. Painted murals proclaiming the importance of education adorned newly constructed exterior walls and were also hung inside classrooms. Phrases included, "Education is our only way out of poverty," "Education sets every individual free. Embrace it," and "If you wish to harvest peace, unity, democracy, and development, plant education."

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[95] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *2012-2016 Education Strategy.* Division of International Protection, UNHCR, 2012.
[96] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Education Strategy*, 2012, 25.
[97] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 17.

Hagadera Secondary School, 2012[98]

Additional funds were also utilized in Dadaab to increase incentive wages for refugee teachers to 10,000 Ksh, and provide additional pre and in-service teacher training and certification through a partnership arrangement with Mt. Kenya University, a for profit university. In Kakuma, several additional Kenyan national teachers were hired, a computer lab and training center was opened at Don Bosco, and incentive wages were also increased, albeit from 4750 to 5000 Ksh. "Many teachers were upset that their wages were half of what teachers were being paid in Dadaab," remarked an education officer. "But even though the work was the same, the context between the two camps was different." The "context" to which the education officer referred included years of increased funding directed to Dadaab as a result of the camps' status as a "priority operation," as well as a far greater number of campaigns and strikes organized by teachers and PTAs that had incrementally increased teachers' incentive wages.

Yet, while "emergencies" facilitated increased education funding to Dadaab when compared to Kakuma, their frequent occurrence and lasting impact also impeded the

[98] Getty Images. "Education Mural, Dadaab." Photograph, September, 2012. Available http://www.istockphoto.com/photo/education-in-dadaab-refugee-camp-24446401

development of the camp's education programming. In 2012, there were 22 primary and six secondary schools across the camp.[99] 43 percent of primary-school-aged children were enrolled in school while the enrollment rate at secondary schools was twelve percent of those eligible.[100] However, of the sixty percent of primary school children out of school in Dadaab, seventy percent were girls.[101] Passage rates on the KCSE exam remained less than ten percent.[102] The average KCPE score had risen to 240, though there still remained a considerable gap between girls' average marks and passage rates. On the KCPE, girls averaged 170 and ten percent who sat for the exam passed. That year, only two girls passed the KCSE.[103]

By the summer of 2012, though the emergency situation had stabilized in Dadaab, security problems persisted for refugees as well as humanitarian aid workers. The UNHCR and its implementing partners limited the number of staff deployed to the sub-camps each day and mandated field staff travel with armed security guards in convoys of three or more SUVs. Additionally, operations were increasingly managed directly by refugees, including the education program. Thirty schools across the five sub-camps remained in the hands of refugee teachers, program managers, and quality-assurance officers. However, many teachers were still targeted by Al Shabaab. Al Nuur recalled that, "I was attacked in the school after classes had ended for the day. Somebody came and wanted to take me out. There were two—one was waiting outside and the other entered. Some teachers tipped me off so I jumped over the fence and ran."

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[99] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 12.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.
[102] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*, 2012, 14.
[103] Ibid.

Of the security situation and refugees' increased responsibilities for management of field operations, Michael explained that, "it was difficult. We were tasked with maintaining the structure, with keeping things running. All we could do was keep trying. ADEO did not work out in Ifo and Ifo 2 so they were replaced just after one year by Islamic Relief and that organization had their own challenges, especially in terms of paying teachers." Nevertheless, by the fall of that year, Islamic Relief had marshaled the funds to break ground on a new, two-story primary school in Ifo 2. "They secured outside donor support. Basically, the school was a sign to the community in Ifo 2 that it would be given the same resources and attention as the other sub-camps in Dadaab."

Mwangaza Primary School, 2012[104]

Mwangaza Primary School Courtyard, 2012[105]

Not long after, Al Nuur and his family were transferred to Kakuma for protection. So too was Abdulahi along with his family. Shortly after Al Nuur arrived in Kakuma, he was appointed as Head Teacher of Al Nuur Primary School in Kakuma III. "I served for a very short period of time as head teacher at a nearby primary school, but when they were preparing to open this school to accommodate the number of Somali refugees who had been transferred from Dadaab because of the overcrowding, the LWF education officer said 'here is the school for you.'" Abdulahi was hired as an incentive quality-assurance

[104] Saleem Abdi Muhammed. "Mwangaza Primary School" Photograph. June 2012. Personal Archive.
[105] Saleem Abdi Muhammed. "Mwangaza Primary School Courtyard." Photograph. June 2012. Personal Archive.

officer for all LWF schools. Meanwhile, several hundred refugees were arriving each day from South Sudan, which had become an independent state following a referendum held in January as specified by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accords.[106] Many had repatriated in 2007 and 2008 and found themselves once again fleeing violence waged by groups vying for control over territory and contesting where the boundaries of the new state had been drawn.[107] They returned to a Kakuma that in many respects had changed in the intervening years. Of the camp's one hundred thousands residents,[108] Somalis accounted for just over half of the total population, while the remaining refugees came from ten countries, including Burundi, Ethiopia, and Democratic Republic of the Congo.[109] Markets had grown, NGOs had come and gone, and several schools that had once been filled beyond capacity with students were closed and in disrepair, overridden with termites and filled with dust and sand.

Closed Secondary School, Kakuma II, 2012[110]

However, much remained the same as lessons carried on in thirteen primary schools and three secondary schools,[111] taught by teachers with varying degrees of education and formal training, and attended by students who still shared textbooks and

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[106] See: Thomas, *Against the Gathering*, 2009.
[107] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Kakuma Camp Exceeds its 100,000 Person Capacity*, 6 August, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=501fdb419&query=Kakuma
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Jean-Michelle Batakane. "Tarach Secondary School." Photopgraph, July, 2012. Personal Archive.
[111] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 11.

when there were none simply copied what the teacher wrote on the black board. While KCSE exam scores and passage rates had declined even further since the Sudanese repatriated in 2007,[112] improvements continued to be made on KCPE exams for boys as well as girls. 718 students sat for the KCPE exam that year, including 163 girls. The average score was 260 and more than fifty percent of students earned passing marks that qualified them for secondary school.[113] For the first time, a female student (from Angelina Jolie Primary Boarding School) earned the highest mark in the camp on the exam, scoring 379.[114]

In Horseed Primary School, where Suad was the newly appointed Head Teacher, several hundred children, boys and girls, attended classes in newly built classrooms funded by the Queen of Qatar, UNHCR's newest funding partner for education. However, in the final months of that year, Suad had delegated management responsibilities of Horseed to the Deputy Head Teacher and traveled to Qatar where she helped to announce the Educate a Child Initiative. With a multi-million dollar grant and multi-year partnership with the UNHCR, the Initiative aimed to enroll 170,000 school-aged refugee children in primary school in camps throughout the world, including Dadaab and Kakuma.[115] "Refugee children are forgotten children," Suad remarked in her address to the audience. "Yet they deserve an education just as children in Canada, the United States, or Europe."[116]

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[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Kanere Refugee Press. *Exam Score Update*. Kanere, December 2012.
[115] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *New Initiative to Enroll 172,000 Refugee Children in School*, 20 November, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=50aba6d06&query=Kakuma
[116] Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

CRITICAL JUNCTURES: 1992-2012

Between 1992 and 2012, there were several events that shaped the development and implementation of education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma camps. Ideationally, education became a global policy priority and education in emergencies was increasingly included in international education policy agendas (e.g. EFA) designed to achieve universal access to basic schooling. Institutionally, the UNHCR developed and strengthened policy frameworks and strategies for refugee education and a number of individuals under the employ of the UNHCR, particularly a handful of education and community-services officers, further aligned education with UNHCR's core mandate to "provide international protection to refugees." Programmatically, students who were initially taught (by other untrained refugees) without any specific curriculum and under trees were now being relocated to semi-permanent and then permanent school buildings. Over time refugees advocated successfully for the implementation of the Kenyan national curriculum with English as the language of instruction and later for the inclusion of secondary schooling for primary school graduates who achieved passing marks on the KCPE. Additionally, during this period, opportunities for higher education were also made available to refugees, albeit on a limited basis, and the teaching workforce was eventually comprised primarily of graduates from Dadaab and Kakuma's secondary schools and higher ed scholarship programs.

Nevertheless, challenges of refugee education persisted. These included significant funding shortfalls, a limited number of personnel tasked with overseeing education programming at the UNHCR or its implementing partners, high numbers of out-of-school children and youth, lack of textbooks, overcrowded classrooms, and high rates of attrition from lower primary to upper primary and then again from upper primary to secondary, which reflected low passage rates on the KCPE. While in Kakuma gender parity was achieved in lower primary school by 2012, in both camps girls continued to be disproportionately underrepresented in upper primary and secondary school when compared to boys. Perhaps most significantly, there remained a lack of consensus (conceptually as well as practically) amongst administrators and staff at the UNHCR and its implementing partners, as well as refugees, regarding what refugee education is and should be for. This broad spectrum of events, occurring on multiple levels and indicative of continuity as well as change, begs two questions. Have there been any significant (as opposed to the aforementioned incremental) changes to refugee education broadly, and to the education programs in Dadaab and Kakuma specifically, between 1992 and 2012? Have these changes made any difference in the lived experience of refugees—to, in, and through education? And, if so, what insight might be gained from analyzing the conditions under which those changes occurred or perhaps occurred differently between the two camps?

The following chapter answers the preceding questions by analyzing the education narrative of Dadaab and Kakuma drawn in Chapters 4 and 5 for "critical junctures." As outlined in chapter 3, critical junctures are distinct from incremental change or periods of transition. Instead, they are swift, significant, and encompassing

moments when certain permissive conditions ease structural constraints such that individual actors or groups can make contingent choices that establish a new status quo. In this chapter, I identify and analyze six distinct critical junctures in the narratives of the development of Dadaab and Kakuma's education programs. I suggest these junctures allow for further comparative analysis of the differences as well as similarities in the camps' policies and programs for refugee education, why and how changes to refugee education happen, and the different unit levels upon which changes to refugee education did or alternately did not occur between 1992 and 2012. The first juncture includes initial decisions over curriculum, language of instruction, and near-exclusive emphasis on the provision of primary education made when the two camps were founded in 1992. The second juncture was the piloting of the Peace Education Program in Dadaab and Kakuma in 1998, which was followed by the founding of INEE in 2000. The fourth critical juncture was the "emergency" in Dadaab in 2006 followed by Dadaab's 2011 "emergency." The final major juncture was the publication of UNHCR's *Refugee Education: A Global Review* that same year and subsequently UNHCR's *2012-2016 Education Strategy*. I consider each critical juncture in turn and then analyze these moments within, and comparatively across, Dadaab and Kakuma. Doing so further reveals four emergent permissive conditions, each independently sufficient to loosen the structural constraints of refugee education.

It is worth noting prior to proceeding that the conclusions drawn regarding why and how changes to refugee education happen would likely seem banal for the community-services officers, education officers, and refugees who undertook or experienced these critical junctures. However, for a far larger number of policymakers,

practitioners, and scholars who endeavor to address the numerous, interrelated challenges of refugee education, why and how change happens remain largely unknown. This knowledge is vital. While I ultimately argue that the critical junctures subsequently reviewed did not change the broader ideational and institutional constraints of refugee education outlined in chapters 2 and 3 (e.g. EFA policy framework, UNHCR's one-year funding cycle), I also argue that change is possible and made all the more so once it has been understood and explained.

1992: Primary Education, Curriculum, and Language of Instruction

Prior to the first World Conference on Education for All (EFA) in 1990, UNHCR's policy guidelines for education had focused heavily on post-primary education and outlined selection criteria for awarding scholarships for refugees to attend universities or vocational schools in countries of asylum. When human and material resources were devoted to primary or secondary schooling for refugees, they were often to secure the inclusion of refugees in local schools near refugee settlements. However, EFA emphasized universal access to basic primary education for school-aged children and over time provided an overarching policy framework for UNHCR's education and community-services officers developing and implementing education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma. While other options were considered for inclusion in the camps' education program (e.g. accelerated learning programs, vocational courses), ultimately, due to the global mandate set forth by EFA, officers were able to now secure funding for education, albeit on a limited basis, by providing primary schooling.

However, EFA did not provide a "blueprint" for the provision or management of education services in the camps nor did UNHCR's *1992 Guidelines for Education*

Assistance.[1] The *Guidelines* were suggestive rather than prescriptive; additionally, there were only a handful of individuals at the UNHCR who had experience or expertise in Education available to participate in decisions regarding what should be taught, to whom, and for how long, though "primary" schooling was widely considered to include Grades 1-8. Importantly, as evidenced in chapter 4, most UNHCR community-service officers and program planners consider the camps, and refugee education, to be temporary. They were not planning for the establishment of a permanent education system – so structures, curriculum, teacher training and related infrastructure were not considered long term.

Unlike the provision of other services (e.g. the type or amount of food or materials for shelter), refugees in both camps exerted considerable influence in the decision-making process regarding what was taught and in what language, precisely because there was no blueprint or precedent. In Kakuma, refugees advocated strongly for the Kenyan curriculum with English as the primary language of instruction, while in Dadaab refugees advocated for the Somali curriculum taught in both English and Somali. Refugees' decisions were primarily based on their perceptions of the duration of their exile in Kenya as well as opportunities for further study or employment. The Sudanese in Kakuma envisioned staying in Kenya for a number of years and hoped to pursue higher education in Kenya or abroad; in contrast, the Somalis thought their stay would be more temporary and expressed less interest in higher education or employment opportunities beyond what was available in Somalia.

Once the decision was made to develop and implement primary education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma, community-services and education officers, as

[1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *1992 Guidelines for Educational Assistance to Refugees.* Program and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, 1992.

well as refugees, were effectively "locked into" that system, despite attendant challenges that subsequently arose. For the first several years of education programming in Kakuma, the Kenyan national curriculum presented challenges in terms of the language of instruction, as only a limited number of refugee teachers were able to teach in English. Additionally, until a handful of Kenyan national teachers were hired in the late 1990s, there were no refugee teachers able to provide instruction for Swahili courses. The Somali curriculum in Dadaab that was offered until the mid 1990s allowed students' to learn in Somali and Arabic, their primary languages, however this curriculum did not allow them to earn certification of school achievement through sitting for national exams that qualified them for advanced study. When refugees decided to forego the Somali curriculum in favor of the Kenyan curriculum, they were able to do so with limited resistance from UNHCR and its implementing partner CARE, though students subsequently faced the same challenges with language of instruction as students in Kakuma. Nevertheless, that refugees were able to successfully advocate for this curricular change suggests there was a degree of contingency and agency that remained for refugees in Dadaab, even though the critical juncture itself had long passed.

Demographic and cultural differences between the two camps in part account for Dadaab's refugees' comparatively expansive and lasting agency. Until the late 1990s, with the arrival of a large number of refugees from East and Central Africa, Kakuma was a "children's camp." While Dadaab was largely comprised of women and children when it was founded, there were nevertheless a significantly greater number of adults (men as well as women) in the camp who were active in PTAs and were far more influential in determining the structure and content of what was taught (e.g. first a hybrid Somali

curriculum and later the Kenyan curriculum) and the resources and upkeep provided to schools. Simply stated, Sudanese adolescents in Kakuma did not have the same ability to collectively mobilize and advocate for, as well as influence, the education programming provided to them.

Even more significant than challenges students faced in school, focusing almost exclusively on primary education in both camps resulted in thousands of school-aged adolescent refugees being excluded from the camps' education system. As described in chapter 4, the consequences of their exclusion included years of idleness, restive behavior in the camps (e.g. riots and the destruction of newly opened food distribution centers in Kakuma), as well as recruitment into armed groups. Stated differently, violence facilitated in and through camp schools (or lack of access to camp schools) has rendered children and youth in the camp as perpetrators or victims of violence and can and has perpetuated or exacerbated violent conflict in refugees' country of origin. While community services and education officers acknowledged that accelerated learning programs and vocational education, in addition to primary education, would have better served the needs of adolescents and helped to curtail violence in the camps, these officers were tightly bound by the institutional constraints of EFA (e.g.) which subsequently bound them to the ideational constraints of universal primary access to basic education.

In sum, in 1992 when Dadaab and Kakuma were founded, lack of a blueprint and precedent, as well as a limited number UNHCR staff with a background in education, provided the permissive conditions in which community services and education officers as well as refugees decided upon primary education and the Kenyan (or alternately the Somali) curriculum with English or Somali as the language of instruction. Once these

decisions had been made, regardless of the challenges they presented in terms of school-aged refugees access to school or student learning in school (with the exception of a curricular change in Dadaab from the Somali curriculum to the Kenyan curriculum), they constituted the status quo of education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma.

1998: Peace Education Program

In 1998 a Peace Education Officer was contracted to develop and pilot UNHCR's Peace Education Program (PEP) in Dadaab and Kakuma to deal with the ongoing and pervasive violence between refugees in the camp and between refugees and host communities. Importantly, she was an educationist by training and had significant experience in education service delivery in development and humanitarian contexts with other UN Agencies. As such, the Officer was able to capitalize on a window of opportunity through implementing PEP widely across both camps, purchasing durable, high-quality materials, and utilizing teacher training from PEP to strengthen the overall quality of teaching in both camps through introducing teachers to student-centered and experiential methods of instruction. Additionally, the Officer was able to advocate in the Nairobi Branch Office for increased attention to the education sector (e.g. through simply providing updates about what was and was not happening in schools in the camps) and incidentally provide oversight to the Education Program (e.g. uncovering corruption with textbook purchase and distribution by UNHCR's implementing partner for education in Kakuma).

The success of the PEP program (by and large measured by refugees' enthusiastic reception as well as anecdotal reports from the camps that the program was mitigating violence between different groups of refugees and refugees and their host communities)

had unforeseen impacts at UNHCR's Regional and Branch Offices in Nairobi. Foremost amongst them was the hiring of a full-time Education Officer in 1998 by the Director of the Regional Office—the first education officer in the UNHCR system who was not based at UNHCR HQ. Because the Director had wanted to make the Peace Education Officer a full-time post but could not do so without first hiring an Education Officer, he leveraged the authority of his position to make a decision that significantly impacted the education sector through the addition of personnel in what had long been a critically understaffed unit. This meant, in effect, that there was an officer who would advocate for increased education funding for Dadaab and Kakuma and be directly responsible for overseeing and coordinating with UNHCR's implementing partners for education in the camp (a task that had previously been one of many that had fallen to community-services officers).

Three interrelated events enabled this sweeping, decisive change. First, The *Machel Report* published in late 1996 had catalyzed increased attention and activity amongst Senior Management within the UNHCR towards the education sector, particularly the ways in which education generally and "peace education" specifically might mitigate or protect against the impact of armed conflict on children. Second, the subsequent establishment within the UNHCR in early 1997 of the "Children's Trust Fund" made funding available for supplemental education programming, including Peace Education. That the fund was administered by a Senior Coordinator for Refugee Children who incidentally saw education as a fundamental right for children and used his position to disperse the funds at his disposal towards UNHCR's education program and leverage for additional funds was also decisive. Finally, UNHCR's then Senior Education Officer

was, like the Peace Education Officer, an educationist and had significant experience in education policymaking and programming at the UNHCR and other UN Agencies. The Senior Education Officer had initially conceptualized the Peace Education Program in 1996 though had been unable to secure funding. When the Children's Trust was established, the Senior Education Officer successfully directed part of the trust funding that could have gone to any number of other supplemental programs towards Peace Education.

In sum, institutional interest in and support of education programming allowed Senior Officers to utilize their positions to first direct human and material resources to PEP and subsequently utilize the momentum from Peace Education to direct human and material resources to UNHCR's education program through the hiring of an East Africa Regional Education Officer. By 1999, as the UNHCR responded to a significant funding shortfall that impacted operations across the organization, the Senior Education Officer post at UNHCR had been abolished and funding for Peace Education was cut as swiftly as it had been granted. While the window of expansive maneuverability for individuals in support of education within the UNHCR closed, the Education Officer post in Nairobi remained.

2000: INEE

The founding of the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies in late 2000 was a boon for the status of refugee education in the UNHCR. By in large, UNHCR's Senior Education Officer created the permissive conditions that facilitated the founding of INEE and the resultant partnerships and collaboration that, through practice and research, strengthened education programming in refugee camps. Like the Peace

Education Officer as well as the Senior Education Officer who preceded him, this Senior Education Officer was an Educationist by training and also had significant experience in education service delivery in development and humanitarian contexts with other UN Agencies, and particularly with the UNHCR. For the time he held the post, the Officer was able to maximize his knowledge and experience of the UNHCR and UN system to direct increased resources to the Education Unit. By arranging to have initial and later regular consultative meetings at UNHCR HQ in Geneva, Education Officers were frequently brought together from several major multilateral organizations and NGOs; the relationships amongst officers that were established or strengthened at these meetings led to direct action across a range of education programs in refugee camps.

Particularly beneficial was the relationship between the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the UNHCR, which resulted in a secondment arrangement that deployed education officers to Dadaab and Kakuma as well as other camps. These seconded officers significantly strengthened the education programs in both camps by providing oversight and coordinating with implementing partners and also assisting with teacher training. Second, INEE catalyzed a wave of evidence-based research with regards to “best practices” as well as efforts to develop Minimum Standards for education interventions in emergency contexts (including refugee situations). Officers from different organizations collaborated to produce and publish reports and other academic and practitioner-oriented literature that advanced this agenda and increased attention, within the international community, to ‘Education in Emergencies.’

When the Senior Education Officer resigned the post in mid-2001, his successor did not have the same experience, expertise, or interest in education. As a result, the

groundswell of status and support for the Education Unit at the UNHCR subsequently diminished. INEE meetings were no longer held at Geneva HQ and the focus of practitioners and scholars within the network shifted away from refugee education to education in conflict-affected states. Subsequently, refugee education as a field in its own right, with its own particular political and legal contexts and institutional arrangements, was subsumed within a wider discourse and defense of education in emergencies. This has, in part, prevented conceptual and practical consideration of the ideational and institutional challenges that have rendered, and continue to render, refugee education a puzzle—that is, how to deliver education for the state but not by the state. Nevertheless, the guidelines, manuals, and concept papers directly put forward by INEE, that simply did not exist for refugee education throughout the 1990s, became the overarching policy frameworks (along with EFA) guiding the development and implementation of UNHCR's strategies for refugee education throughout the 2000s that continue to the present day.

2006: "Emergency" in Dadaab

As described in Chapter 5, the 2006 "emergency" in Dadaab, caused by a large influx of Somali refugees coupled with flash floods that cut off supply routes into the camp, resulted in Dadaab's selection as a "priority" operation for inclusion in the newly appointed Senior Education Officer's *2007-2009 Education Strategy*. The "emergency" constituted permissive conditions that facilitated increased funding and focus on Dadaab that had lasting implications for the camp's education program long after the emergency ended. Dadaab's selection as a "priority" operation immediately resulted in substantial increases in Dadaab's education budget, the deployment of additional NRC education

officers, as well as the addition of a vocational education program for out of school youth that was implemented and managed by the NRC. In the longer term, institutional partners including Nike and Microsoft continued directing increased education funding to Dadaab as well as building education infrastructure. Nike's donation of $500,000 was utilized to construct forty additional classrooms and fund incentive wages for an additional sixty refugee teachers in school's throughout Dadaab's three sub-camps as well as incorporate and fund the three community secondary schools into UNHCR's formal education program. The "Information Technology Center" that Microsoft built in Dadaab offered refugees' IT skills training, which many refugees' utilized to secure incentive jobs with the UNHCR and its implementing partners.

Kakuma did not have an "emergency" of the same magnitude throughout its contemporary history and was not selected as a priority operation. Indeed, at the same time Dadaab was receiving increased education funding as a "priority" operation, funding for Kakuma's education program was significantly reduced and redirected to the repatriation operation for the camp's Sudanese refugees. Reduced funding, the subsequent closure of schools, as well as a policy implemented that year that prevented Sudanese youth who elected to remain in Kakuma from attending upper primary or secondary school resulted in a large number of out-of-school youth. This included 400 out of 460 students who passed the KCPE exam and were prevented from matriculating to Kakuma secondary. In sharp contrast, the programs initiated in Dadaab, occasioned by the camp's status as a priority operation, expanded lasting formal (i.e. secondary school) and non-formal (i.e. vocational school) education opportunities for Dadaab's adolescent

refugees—a population that had long been largely excluded in both camps from UNHCR's refugee education program.

2011: "Emergency" in Dadaab

As also described in Chapter 5, the 2011 "emergency" in Dadaab caused by a rapid, mass influx of refugees fleeing drought, famine, and widespread episodic violence carried out by Al Shabaab in Somalia constituted permissive conditions that brought a large number of NGOs into the camp. Additionally, the camp's porous borders—a direct consequence of the emergency—facilitated the infiltration of Dadaab by Al Shabaab. In terms of education programming, UNHCR was now tasked with overseeing and coordinating five implementing partners for education, each with different capacities and experience in education service provision for refugees. Additionally, "emergency funding" utilized to bring on a range of new implementing partners was in turn utilized by these partners in new ways that did not necessarily facilitate increased enrollment for refugee children or adolescents nor enhance the quality of teaching and learning; the construction of the two-story primary school in Ifo 2 is a prime example.

However, while partners' discretionary spending was not curtailed, their operations were when Al Shabaab targeted NGO staff and the UNHCR and its implementing partners, subsequently, restricted the number of staff and Kenyan national teachers deployed to the sub-camps. Consequently, education programming was managed directly by refugees who nevertheless continued to be paid the same incentive wages despite their expansive responsibilities. Additionally, in contrast to NGO staff and Kenyan national teachers, the targeting of refugee teachers by Al Shabaab did not result in measures designed to enhance their protection. Instead, many were simply relocated to

Kakuma, some of the most experienced and qualified teachers among them, including Al Nuur and Abdulahi. After the emergency was declared over, the new agencies operating in the camp remained. So too did Al Shabaab. These new implementing-partner arrangements and significantly heightened challenges with security continue to constitute Dadaab's status quo.

2011-2012: UNHCR's 2011 Global Review of Refugee Education and 2012-2016 Education Strategy

As with UNHCR's Peace Education Program in 1998, as well as the founding of INEE in the year 2000, a handful of Senior Officers were able to facilitate three events between 2011 and 2012 that constituted a watershed for the Education Unit at UNHCR HQ and subsequently for education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma. First, the Senior Officer in UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit who commissioned the *Review* encouraged and supported the author undertaking the *Review* to critically examine UNCHR's policies and programs for education and publish her full, uncensored findings. The same Senior Officer arranged for the author of the *Review* to present these findings at UNHCR's annual Executive Committee meeting, attended by UNHCR's Senior Management. The *Review* detailed the large number of out-of-school children across camps throughout the world as well as a dearth of human and financial resources allocated to UNHCR's education program that made clear to those in attendance that UNHCR was not upholding its mandate to protect refugee children.

Second, at the same time the report was published, UNHCR's newly appointed Senior Education Officer was undertaking significant reforms to the Education Unit that through "internal maneuvering" had recently been relocated within UNHCR's International Protection Unit. From the standpoint of UNHCR's organizational structure,

this move directly aligned education with UNHCR's mandate to protect. The new Senior Education Officer was an educationist by training and had extensive experience developing education policies and programs with other UN Agencies, particularly UNICEF. The Senior Education Officer and the author of the Global Review subsequently collaborated to develop UNHCR's *2012-2016 Global Education Strategy* that addressed point-by-point issues raised in the report and provided mechanisms for achieving targeted goals.

Finally, to oversee the development and implementation of the *Strategy*, the Senior Education Officer secured funding for several new junior and mid-level Education Officers at UNHCR HQ as well as UNHCR Regional, Branch, and sub-camp offices by establishing several strategic partnerships with a number of initiatives, including the Education Child Initiative as well as the Global Partnership for Education. Consequently, the newly appointed education officers worked with implementing partners in several camps to develop multi-year, camp-specific strategies designed to meet the needs and goals of each camp. In Dadaab, increased funding was utilized to convert semi-permanent can schools to permanent school buildings and build several new schools, as well as to increase incentive wages and provide additional pre and in-service teacher training. In Kakuma, several Kenyan-national teachers were hired, a computer lab and training center was opened, and incentive wages were also increased, though they still remained half of what incentive teachers earned in Dadaab.

In sum, UNHCR's Senior Education Officer capitalized on an opportunity to direct substantial human and material resources to the education programs in camps throughout the world, made possible by a Senior Officer in UNHCR's Evaluation and

Policy Analysis Unit who commissioned the *2011 Global Review of Refugee Education*. While a limited number of reports and analyses on UNHCR's education program had previously been commissioned and published in the 1990s and 2000s, and a number of education strategies had also been developed and implemented beginning in 2007, their impact was limited and goals set for student enrollment, education achievement, and funding were seldom realized. However, at present, UNHCR's *2012-2016 Global Education Strategy* is firmly instituted as the framework that guides camp-specific strategies and sets the benchmarks and criteria by which each camp's education programs are monitored and evaluated.

Critical Junctures 1992-2012: Comparative Analysis

Collectively and comparatively analyzing these six critical junctures offers insight regarding the conditions under which changes occur to refugee education broadly and specifically to education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma. I suggest these moments indicate four emergent permissive conditions, each independently sufficient to loosen and allow actors to navigate the ideational and institutional challenges of refugee education but not, as of yet, fundamentally change these challenges. I consider each in turn and conclude by discussing their implications for future policies and programs for refugee education.

First, Senior Education Officers with expertise in education as well as several years of experience in the education sector at the UNHCR and other UN agencies are able to either recognize permissive conditions and capitalize on them to strengthen UNHCR's education program or, alternately, make their own permissive conditions to the same effect. The development and implementation of the Peace Education Program

in 1998, the founding of INEE in 2000, and the development and implementation of UNHCR's *2012-2016 Global Education Strategy* were the direct result of the efforts of Senior Education Officers who knew how to navigate and act upon UNHCR's particular institutional arrangements. During the time these officers held the Senior Education post, swift and decisive changes with lasting implications to refugee education at the global and camp level occurred. These changes include the addition of junior and mid-level Education Officer posts. This substantial increase in education officers has resulted in better oversight and coordination with UNHCR's implementing partners in Dadaab and Kakuma (and other camps), as well as increased advocacy for the allocation of continued or increased levels of funding for education at UNHCR's annual budget meetings. Considered differently, in 1992 there were approximately four UNHCR education officer positions, all of them located at UNHCR HQ. In 2012, there were approximately sixty education officer posts; eight at UNHCR HQ and the remainder at UNHCR Regional and Branch Offices as well as sub-camp offices throughout the world. Previously, community-services officers would advocate for refugee education if, incidentally, they had an interest in that sector. However, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, there were few personnel within the UNHCR who could or would leverage their position to direct increased human or financial resources for refugee education. As a result, education in camps was seldom prioritized and was the first line item in the budget to be reduced or cut altogether during funding crises.

Senior Education Officers with expertise and experience in education have also facilitated the development of conceptual and policy frameworks for refugee education, including several revisions to UNHCR's *Guidelines for Refugee Education* (e.g. 1992,

1995, 1998, 2002, 2007) as well as Minimum Standards for education programming in camps. Each report or Guideline increasingly aligned education with UNHCR's central mandate to "provide international protection to refugees" and provided benchmarks against which to measure and report on the education services the UNHCR was or alternately was not providing to refugee children and youth. As has been noted, conceptual and policy frameworks as well as minimum standards for refugee education specifically, and education in emergencies more broadly, simply did not exist throughout the 1990s when initial decisions were made in Dadaab and Kakuma regarding what should be taught and to whom. Questions of how long were answered by EFA, which stipulates that universal primary education is a global policy priority. However, in refugee camps, education policies and programs designed and implemented under the auspices of EFA have left tens of thousands of adolescents out of school, resulting in restive behavior in camp as well as mobilization into armed groups. This suggests that in order for refugee education to be truly protective and thus align with UNHCR's core mandate, formal and non-formal education developed and implemented for refugee adolescents must be provided by UNHCR and its implementing partners in Dadaab and Kakuma as well as other refugee camps throughout the world (in addition to the strengthening of primary education as well through pre and in-service teacher training, the hiring of additional teachers to reduce student to teacher ratios, and the construction of additional schools and classrooms).

Second, "emergency" situations in camps attract greater funding as well as human resources for operations, including the education sector. On the one hand, increased funding and staffing are utilized to meet shortfalls occasioned by the emergency. On the

other, increased funding and staffing can, and occasionally do, remain after the "emergency" is declared over, constituting a new status quo. This was the case in 2006 when the emergency caused by a significant influx of refugees as well as flooding in Dadaab considerably contributed to the camp's selection as a "priority" education operation. This selection in the immediate and long-term resulted in substantial increases to the education sector budget, the deployment of additional seconded NRC education officers, the addition of a vocational education program implemented and managed by the NRC, and increases in education infrastructure with the construction of more classrooms as well as an IT skills center. This was also the case in 2011 when "emergency funding" in response to another mass influx of refugees into Dadaab resulted in the addition of a large number of NGOs and UNHCR's new arrangements for implementing partners for education—five NGOs across the five sub-camps when they had, for almost twenty years, only partnered with one.

However, while emergencies can facilitate increased funding, personnel, and number of implementing partners for education, these increases have seldom kept pace with the known education needs of refugees—neither those of newly arrived asylum seekers nor refugees already residing in the camp. For this latter population, increased emergency funding did not reach their schools, but rather was distributed amongst a greater number of implementing partners to utilize largely at their discretion. For those newly arrived, the number of emergency tent schools has also been significantly less than what is required to actually accommodate the number of school-aged refugee children and adolescents. Additionally, emergency tent schools have exclusively offered lower primary classes, in effect excluding adolescents from attending. For example, the seven

temporary tent schools that offered lower primary classes set up by UNICEF in 2011 enrolled ten thousand students. However, more than one hundred thousand refugees, at least half of whom were school-aged, had arrived that year. As such, at least forty thousand remained out of school—the majority of whom were adolescents and thus prime targets for voluntary or forced recruitment by Al Shabaab. While some eventually enrolled in upper primary or secondary school at established camp schools, or alternately pursued vocational programming, the vast majority did not. Additionally, for those children in tent schools, student to teacher ratios averaged 350 to 1 and there were no textbooks or other learning materials.[2]

This suggests that despite more than a decade of the development of conceptual and practical knowledge regarding best practices of education service delivery in emergency situations, for newly arrived refugees, education is not delivered in such a way as to meet their urgent (e.g. war-related trauma, malnutrition, medical) and emergent needs. This further suggests, that again, in order for refugee education to be truly protective and thus align with UNHCR's core mandate, UNHCR's Education Unit must increase its capacity to provide emergency education for adolescents as well as children. In protracted refugee situations, like Dadaab and Kakuma, this necessitates conceptualizing emergency education as distinct from refugee education for those already residing in camps.

Third, working relationships (formal and informal) between Senior Officers in education as well as other sectors at the UNHCR and a number of other UN Agencies (particularly UNICEF and UNESCO) as well as INGOs with a mutual interest in

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[2] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Back to School in the World's Largest Refugee Camp*, 5 September 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4e64e2ac9&query=Dadaab

strengthening education programming also make possible substantive changes to refugee education. In part, UNHCR's Senior Education Officers help to coordinate these relationships. For example, holding INEE meetings at UNHCR HQ that brought together officers from different organizations facilitated collaborative efforts in research and programming for refugee education (e.g. the publication of 'Best Practices' and 'Minimum Standards' or arrangements for seconded NRC officers). While the UNHCR has, in the post Cold War era, increasingly focused on refugee children who constitute more than fifty percent of the world's refugees,[3] they are still a population whose basic needs, foremost among them education, are often deprioritized, or overlooked altogether, by UNHCR staff outside of the Education Unit, and by UNHCR as an organization. As a former UNHCR education officer remarked, "donors often hesitate to direct funding to education because children don't die immediately from a lack of it."

Partnership arrangements with agencies that have experience, expertise, and mandates specifically related to children, particularly child protection and children's rights can and have helped to address this gap. For example UNICEF, which during the 2011 emergency in Dadaab signed a Memorandum of Understanding to assist with programming (including education) for children in the camp, is mandated by the UN General Assembly "to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs, and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential." Considered differently, UNHCR's education and community services officers have long undertaken efforts to directly align education with the organization's mandate to protect refugees, as doing so has been the only way to prioritize education programming. While they have become fewer in number with each passing year since Dadaab, Kakuma, and many other

[3] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Trends Report.* UNHCR, 2012.

refugee camps were established in the early and mid-1990's, there are those within the organization who continue to maintain that the provision of education is by and large outside of UNHCR's mandate. By partnering with agencies and organizations (e.g. UNICEF) for which child protection and/or education is clearly articulated in their mandate, UNHCR increases the number of education officers with expertise and experience in education, in turn substantively improving education programming in camps. Additionally, partnering with these organizations that often fund their own operations in the camps, also bypasses what can become legalistic arguments (e.g. whether education is part of UNHCR's mandate) amongst UNHCR policymakers and program officers about the scope and scale of education services the UNHCR should or should not provide.

However, there are institutional constraints upon full partnership and collaboration between UNHCR and other agencies in terms of the delivery of basic services to refugees. As UNHCR's founding statute stipulates that the organization must fund all of its operational costs (98 percent of its total budget) from bilateral organizations or the private sector, UNHCR is in competition with these agencies for funding and has previously been unwilling to cede its operations to other agencies for fear of becoming irrelevant (e.g. as discussed in chapter 2 when UNHCR halted the proposed initiative by the United Nations Development Program, which sought to invest funds in host states to induce the inclusion of refugees in host states' development strategies). Yet, UNHCR's officers can continue to forge working relationships amongst education officers at other agencies and seek to increase both informal and formal

partnerships that have demonstrably improved education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma.

Finally, refugees can determine or change the content, scope, and scale of education programming—in effect make their own permissive conditions that have lasting impact. When Dadaab and Kakuma were founded, refugees were the primary decision-makers over matters of curriculum and language of instruction, and a handful of years later in Dadaab, refugees successfully advocated for a curricular change from the Somali to the Kenyan curriculum. These decisions constitute the status quo of what is taught as well as the language of instruction. Particular opportunities and challenges in education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma have taken shape as a result. Opportunities include formal certification of education achievement and the potential (albeit limited) for refugees to advance to secondary school or higher education programs in the camps, Kenya, or beyond through sitting for the KCPE or KCSE. Resultant challenges include initial difficulties teaching and learning English as well as persistent difficulties teaching and learning Swahili. Efforts by UNHCR and its implementing partners to improve education programming also take shape, in part, as a result of these challenges and opportunities (e.g. the hiring of Kenyan national teachers to teach Swahili).

Refugees in both camps have also made decisive incremental changes that, while not critical junctures, have nevertheless been decisive in shaping Dadaab and Kakuma's education programs overtime. I mention them briefly here as doing so helps to further reveal how change does or alternately does not happen to refugee education in camps. Between 1992 and 2012, teachers in both camps have organized and waged a number of

strikes that led to increases in their incentive wages, though teachers in Dadaab were successful in advocating for wages that by 2012 were exactly twice as much earned by teacher in Kakuma. PTAs and SMCs helped mobilize and support teachers' strikes. In Dadaab, PTAs also established and managed their own community secondary schools that were subsequently formally incorporated into UNHCR's education program. Doing so considerably expanded education opportunities for refugee adolescents. Refugees in both camps have assumed and subsequently retained responsibility for directly managing education programming when UNHCR and its implementing partners have restricted, or suspended altogether, their operations during emergencies (e.g. in Dadaab during the 2011 emergency). Finally, many refugees have taken their education from Dadaab and Kakuma's camp schools and returned to those same schools as teachers—substantially improving the quality of instruction, which in turn has helped to increase passage rates on KCPE exams (although this has not yet yielded substantial improvements in students' KCSE scores in either camp).

Refugees' role in determining, shaping, maintaining, as well as improving teaching and learning in Dadaab and Kakuma suggests that UNHCR and its implementing partners can, and effectively do, partner with refugees to deliver education programming, although they seldom acknowledge this partnership as such. Instead, refugees are more often than not viewed as passive recipients of aid, unqualified for "salaried" jobs, regardless of their academic or professional qualifications. For refugees seeking to earn academic and professional qualifications in camp schools, their achievements continue to be viewed by UNHCR and its implementing partners as things they will carry with them when they leave the camp. Yet by and large, refugees have

carried them from one sub-camp or zone to another, growing from students in camp schools to members of the camps' increasingly educated incentive workforce. By acknowledging that refugee education is as much for who they are and who they become for the duration of their exile as it is for durable solutions, the UNHCR can work with refugees as partners whose capacity, commitment, and continued aspirations for the education they receive, and that many later deliver, far surpass those held by even the most experienced and committed of UNHCR's implementing partners.

The question that remains is whether the six critical junctures and subsequent changes to education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma analyzed in this chapter changed the numerous, interrelated challenges of refugee education in protracted situations and resulted in lasting, substantive improvements. After all, improvement does not necessarily inhere in change, and a critical juncture occurring with respect to one institution, site, or unit level may not constitute a critical juncture with respect to another. I explore and answer this question in the concluding chapter, to which I now turn.

CHAPTER 7

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN REFUGEE EDUCATION: DRIVING FORWARD WITH THE REARVIEW MIRROR

This contemporary historical account has explained that despite changes between 1992 and 2012 to policies and programs for refugee education on multiple levels ranging from UNHCR's Global Headquarters, the Nairobi Branch Office, camp field offices, and implementing-partner arrangements, the challenges of refugee education in Dadaab and Kakuma camps remained. By the end of 2012 in Dadaab, 60 percent of refugee children remained out of primary school[1] and 70 percent of those out of school were girls.[2] The average KCPE score had risen to 240,[3] though girls marks continued to average 170.[4] 70 percent of students who took the KCPE did not earn scores that qualified them to matriculate to secondary school.[5] As such, 90 percent of refugee youth remained out of secondary school.[6] Additionally, 90 percent of students who took the KCSE did not earn scores that qualified them to pursue higher education.[7] That year, only 2 girls passed the KCSE.[8] In Kakuma, 50 percent of refugee children remained out of primary school though in lower primary classes the number of girls evenly matched that of boys.[9] The average KCPE score was 260;[10] approximately half of the students who took the KCPE

[1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 12.
[2] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 13.
[3] Ibid.
[4] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 14.
[5] Ibid.
[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 15
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 12.
[10] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 13.

did not earn scores that qualified them to matriculate to secondary school,[11] and 85 percent of refugee youth remained out of secondary school.[12] Like Dadaab, 90 percent of students who took the KCSE did not earn scores that qualified them to pursue higher education.[13]

However, statistics tell only a small part of the story. Critical junctures have resulted in the implementation of the Kenyan national curriculum with English as the primary language of instruction in Dadaab and Kakuma, the addition of UNHCR education officer posts, the strengthening of policy frameworks and strategies for refugee education that further aligned education with UNHCR's core mandate "to provide international protection to refugees," new and different implementing-partner arrangements, and the development of informal and formal partnerships with other UN agencies and INGOs that increased UNHCR's capacity to provide education in camps.

However, for all but a handful of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma who secure WUSC scholarships and formally resettle to Canada and acquire Canadian citizenship while pursuing a bachelor's degree at a Canadian university, completing secondary school or higher education qualifies them for incentive jobs with UNHCR and its implementing partners in the camps. The vast majority become incentive teachers, many at the same primary and secondary schools where they had previously been students. And the years pass by. Stated differently, these changes have not occasioned or been occasioned by changes to broader ideational and institutional constraints that still render refugee education a puzzle. That is, how and in what ways the UNHCR, a non-state actor whose work is determined by states that fund the organization's operation, can and

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[11] Ibid.
[12] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Operations Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2012, 14.
[13] Ibid.

should deliver education to refugees, trapped in protracted situations, who are unable to repatriate to their home state, resettle to a third state, or locally integrate into their host state. However, Constructivism, the guiding conceptual framework of this account, assumes that the change, and even total transformation, of the international system of territorialized nation-states is possible because relations between states are socially constructed, historically contingent, and therefore changeable.

In what follows, I review the ways in which persistent yet different challenges to refugee education are brought into focus, by comparatively considering the differential outcomes and impact of critical junctures in Dadaab and Kakuma. I then discuss their implications for UNHCR's refugee education programming as well as for future research on refugee education. I conclude with a brief review of developments since 2012 to refugee education broadly and to education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma specifically that indicate change will continue yet challenges will remain.

As outlined in the introductory chapter, there is a dearth of literature that explains the development of UNHCR's global policies and programs for refugee education and even less that explains the ways in which these policies and programs are implemented over time in particular camp settings and shaped differently by a range of external events—natural disasters (e.g. flooding), ideational shifts regarding asylum in the post-Cold War era (i.e. from temporary to protracted) and/or global education policy (EFA), as well as the migration and movement of different peoples into and out of the camps. Many of the challenges of refugee education have previously been identified in commissioned reports as well as qualitative case studies conducted in camps or across camps. These challenges include limited access to post-primary education, a large number of out-of-

school children and youth, high student-to-teacher ratios, lack of classroom space, limited opportunities for pre or in-service training for teachers, a limited number of UNHCR Education Officer posts, and significant funding shortfalls for education, as well as persistent questions writ large regarding what refugee education is or should be preparing students for (e.g. nation-building/state-building upon repatriation, employment with the UNHCR and its implementing partners in the camps, social cohesion and protection). However, these studies describe challenges as they appear at the time the study is conducted and seldom provide historical context that explains them. In short, previous studies ask "what" questions rather than "how" or "why" questions.

Collectively considering distinct bodies of literature (i.e. Education in Emergencies, Refugee Studies, and International Development Studies) contextualizes these challenges within broader ideational and institutional challenges, including UNHCR's founding statute that stipulates the UNHCR must fund all of its operational costs (98 percent of its total budget) from bilateral organizations or the private sector for discrete one year funding cycles. As discussed in chapter 2, this renders funding for refugee education in camps dependent upon states or private organizations, which by-and-large have not viewed refugee education as a basic need. Additionally, the long-term, protracted nature of refugee situations in the post-Cold War era (i.e. the average length of stay in a refugee camp is now seventeen years, during which time refugees are restricted from seeking wage-earning employment or moving outside of the camps)[14] compounds institutional funding challenges through, for example, donor fatigue. Ideationally, EFA, the guiding policy framework of UNHCR's education policies and programs has, in the

[14] See: Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp. *A surrogate state?: The role of UNHCR in protracted refugee situations*. UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2009.

post-Cold War era, led the organization to focus almost exclusively on primary education at the expense of secondary, vocational, and supplemental education. As a result, tens of thousands of refugee youth have remained out of school and idle in camps, thus vulnerable to restive behavior or recruitment into armed groups. Also, questions of what refugee education is for become acutely pronounced in protracted refugee situations, where it is unknown whether refugees will resettle to a third country, locally integrate into a host country, or repatriate to their home country. Subsequently, questions regarding what curriculum should be taught, by whom, and for how long persist.

Contextualizing the challenges of refugee education does not explain them nor account for the ways in which community services and education officers at the UNHCR and its implementing partners as well as refugees answered the questions posed above. What is lost are the ways in which these actors initiated changes to the challenges of refugee education over time, albeit differently and on different unit levels, and why they did so. After all, in Dadaab and Kakuma, the Kenyan national curriculum was taught, primarily by refugees, with a focus on primary education, and there were limited opportunities for refugees to access secondary, vocational, or higher education.

The contemporary education histories of Dadaab and Kakuma reconstructed in chapters 4 and 5 ask and answer why and how this was so and also bring to light new challenges which have not been previously documented. These challenges include the capacity of UNHCR's implementing partners to provide and manage education programming, as well as a lack of oversight of implementing partners, which in-part helped to facilitate corruption (e.g. officers at LWF inflating the cost of textbooks and pocketing the difference) of some, although not all, implementing partners. Additionally,

as described in chapters 4 and 5, that a number of UNHCR's officers tasked with coordinating implementing partners providing education in Dadaab and Kakuma, as well as advocating for human and financial resources to be directed towards education programming, had little or no previous experience in the education sector was a significant challenge at different moments. This was particularly the case during UNHCR's "budget crises," when education funding was often the first line item cut from the budget. As a former education officer remarked, "the rationale of the senior program officers who were the real budget makers and cutters was always 'let's get rid of education first because its not lifesaving.'"

Yet, the narratives of senior and mid-level community services, education, protection, and program officers at the UNHCR and its implementing partners as well as refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma make clear that despite the wide range of challenges confronting refugee education, education programming in the camps developed and changed as the years passed. Ad-hoc and informal lessons taught under trees by the most learned in the refugee communities newly arrived from Somalia or Sudan gave way to structured, formal lessons taught in two-story school buildings by Kenyan-national teachers or refugees, many of whom had completed their primary and secondary education, and even higher education, in camp schools. These developments by-and-large reflected the ways in which individuals—education and community-services officers and refugees—made decisions that on the one hand were shaped by institutional constraints and a shifting ideational landscape regarding the purposes of formal education in emergency settings, and on the other by their willingness and ability to navigate and

loosen these constraints as well as recognize and capitalize upon opportunities for change.

Comparative Analysis

Comparatively considering the education narratives of Dadaab and Kakuma and the ways in which their education programs paralleled as well as diverged from one another at particular moments also offers insight regarding the potential for changes in response to the challenges of refugee education. As outlined in chapter 3 and then illustrated throughout chapters 4 and 5, the two camps are significantly different—demographically and culturally as well as geopolitically. Dadaab and Kakuma's education programs reflect, but also defy, these differences. Also as illustrated in chapters 4 and 5, there have been comparatively greater resources (human and financial) allocated to education programming in Dadaab. However, enrollment rates and student performance on exams continues to be considerably higher in Kakuma. Additionally, there are proportionally more primary and secondary schools in Kakuma, (27 primary and 7 secondary compared to Dadaab's 40 primary and 6 secondary schools) for a population that is approximately one third the size of a Dadaab. I suggest two phenomena account for Kakuma's comparatively greater education opportunities and outcomes.

First, education was valued and prioritized in Kakuma, initially amongst Sudanese adolescents when the camp was established and later by Ethiopians as well Congolese, Ugandans, Burundians, and others who came to reside in the camp. Education was seen as the means by which further education and employment opportunities could be accessed. While many Somali refugees in Dadaab similarly valued education, it was not accorded the same widespread status or importance, nor seen as necessary for future

employment amongst a highly entrepreneurial community. Additionally, for many Somalis, UNHCR's formal, secular education programming diverged too sharply from their cultural practices and values (e.g. Arabic language, Somali history and culture, Islamic faith). Thus, alternatives to UNHCR schools were available in Dadaab (i.e. madrassas) while there were only UNHCR schools in Kakuma (with the exception of Kismayo Private School that was eventually established in 2010), resulting in lower enrollment in Dadaab's UNHCR schools and therefore less demand for the construction of schools and classrooms. In Kakuma, all-girls schools and boarding schools were welcomed by refugee communities and facilitated the increased enrollment of girls in primary and later secondary schools and, subsequently, an increasing number of female teachers in camp schools, which in turn facilitated increased enrollment of girls. However, refugee communities in Dadaab refused the implementation of all-girls schools. As a former teacher explained, "while more parents, over time, were willing to allow girls to go to school, observance of Islamic traditions dictated that girls shouldn't really be without boys in public—and schools were public."

Second, events in Somalia have had considerably greater impact on Dadaab generally, and Dadaab's education program specifically, when compared to the ways in which events in Sudan (and other countries throughout the region) have impacted Kakuma. In short, Somalis have fled en masse into neighboring Kenya seeking asylum from chronic intra-state conflict as well as famine that was both cause and effect of conflict. These influxes into Dadaab strained the capacity of the UNCHR and its implementing partners to provide basic services, including education, to refugees. However, these "emergencies" also resulted in funding and staffing that on the one hand

were utilized to meet shortfalls occasioned by the emergency and on the other remained and continued to benefit the programs after the emergency was declared over. For example, Dadaab's selection as a "priority education operation" following the 2006 emergency occasioned greater funding and the deployment of seconded NRC education officers. Additionally, Dadaab's emergencies have also facilitated the addition of implementing partners across all sectors that increase the number of incentive jobs available to refugees. That Al Shabaab has maintained a steady presence in the camp since 2011, prompting the UNHCR and its implementing partners to restructure their operations to limit the number of staff deployed to the sub-camp each day, has also placed direct responsibility of programs, including education, into the hands of refugees.

However, incentive jobs in other sectors pay the same wage as those in the education sector and are viewed by refugees as less time-intensive and therefore preferable when compared with teaching. As a result, far fewer secondary school graduates in Dadaab have taken up posts as incentive teachers and subsequently, fewer qualified and certified teachers comprised Dadaab's teaching workforce. Additionally, because Al Shabaab has targeted refugee teachers (along with other community leaders), many of Dadaab's most experienced and qualified teachers were for their protection relocated to Kakuma.

That Kakuma's education outcomes and opportunities are comparatively greater than those in Dadaab, despite greater human and material resources directed to Dadaab's education program, indicate that while a lack of funding and personnel are primary challenges of refugee education, simply expanding education budgets and hiring or seconding additional staff will not necessarily yield linear improvements to refugee

education. These additions have been shown in both camps to facilitate expansive enrollment as well as higher passage rates on national exams; however, while they are necessary for change, they are not necessarily sufficient to catalyze change. Additionally, highlighting these camps' different contemporary education histories should not obscure their shared narrative. That is chronic shortfalls in resources, shifting implementing partner arrangements, significant numbers of out-of-school children and youth, very limited opportunity for post-primary education or employment beyond incentive wage work with the UNHCR and its implementing partners—ultimately, continuity in the challenges of refugee education.

Overarching Conclusions and Implications

Reconstructing Dadaab and Kakuma's education histories makes clear three overarching conclusions and attendant implications for future programming. First, in the concomitant eras of globalization and the post-Cold War, the state is still the dominant form of subjectivity. As outlined in chapter 2, host states pass laws restricting refugees to camps (e.g. Kenya's encampment policy implemented in the late 1980's), donor states determine the scope of the work of non-state actors like the UNHCR through allocating or alternately withholding funding to particular sectors or operations (e.g. "donors seldom direct funding to education because children don't immediately die from lack of it"), and education curricula and certification are still state-centric in design. Scholars and practitioners of education in emergencies have seldom considered what constitutes relevant, appropriate, and transferable curricula for refugees regardless of whether and where they resettle, repatriate, or locally integrate, as well as during their indefinite period of exile in the camps. Were they to do so, questions might include: beyond basic

literacy and numeracy, what knowledge do refugees need? Is this knowledge different than state-centric curricula designed to assimilate citizens into nation-states? And what might comprise a "global" curriculum?

While these questions have yet to be considered in relation to refugee education, political leaders, heads of UN agencies, particularly UNESCO and other INGOs, as well as education scholars and practitioners have in recent years reached a foregone conclusion that "global citizenship education" is a primary means of addressing "global challenges." Foremost amongst these challenges is "global conflict" (including interstate wars, intrastate conflict, as well as terrorism), that is both cause and effect of globalization and mass global migration (forced and voluntary). Through helping children and youth "re-imagine" the community—from national to global—in which they, as citizens, belong and take part, global citizenship education has been deemed as critical in mitigating or preventing the occurrence or recurrence of intractable conflict as well as helping to equip students with global competencies (e.g. "international awareness," "appreciation of cultural diversity" and "ability to read, write, and speak in more than one language")[15] necessary to secure jobs in a global marketplace. Or so the thinking goes. Indeed, in 2012 the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon launched the five-year "Global Education First Initiative" (GEFI) that outlined three key global policy priorities for education: putting every child in school, improving the quality of learning, and fostering global citizenship via global citizenship education.[16] UNESCO has published a number of reports, and a host of UN agencies, NGO's, national education

[15] There is no definitive set of guidelines that specify what constitutes "global competencies," however a handful organizations have published reports and briefings that attempt to do so. See: Jed Willard. *What is a Global Competency?* NAFSA, 2013. See also: National Education Association. *Global Competences is a 21st Century Imperative.* NEA, 2014.

[16] UNESCO. *Outcome Document of the Technical Consultation on Global Citizenship Education: An Emerging Perspective*. UNESCO, 2013.

ministries, and individuals throughout the world have mobilized to implement GCE in states' national K-12 curricula through a series of on-going conferences, working groups, and initiatives.

Yet, declarations about the imperative of GCE, and discussions amongst program planners regarding what might constitute global competencies, overlook or exclude altogether consideration of the needs of seventeen million refugees residing in camps throughout the world (more than half of whom are children)[17] that arise as a direct result of the conflicts that GCE is intended to counterpose. For these other "global" citizens, or rather citizens of nowhere (after all, Kakuma means nowhere in Swahili), the challenges they face in accessing education, let alone relevant, appropriate and transferable education, and the limited opportunities for formal employment or citizenship that refugee education affords, tell us a lot about the state of the nation-state—primarily its durability.

However, although states are currently the dominant form of subjectivity with objective consequences for refugees (e.g. state-centric notions of citizenship, education for state and nation-building, UNHCR's institutional arrangements) this might, and likely will, not always be so. According to Constructivist theories, that non-state actors (e.g. UN agencies) in the post-Cold War era are increasingly influencing state behavior or assuming responsibilities (e.g. service provision, governance) previously considered the sole responsibility of states indicates the potential for ideational and institutional change. As such, the Constructivist theories and attendant methods utilized in this account (e.g. comparative historical analysis, critical junctures) were a prism through which conditions that permitted changes to happen to refugee education broadly, and Dadaab and Kakuma

[17] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Trends Report.* UNHCR, 2012.

specifically, could be apprehended. As outlined and analyzed in chapter 6, these include "emergency" situations and corresponding increases to human and material resources directed to emergency operations, including the education sector; Senior Education Officers at the UNHCR with expertise in education as well as several years of experience in the Education sector at the UNHCR and other UN agencies; working relationships between Senior Officers in Education as well as other sectors at the UNHCR and a number of other UN agencies and NGOs with a mutual interest in strengthening refugee education; and refugees, who can mobilize to determine or change the content, scope, and scale of education offered in camps. These conditions have not yet been sufficient to catalyze institutional and ideational changes to the challenges of refugee education. However, knowing the conditions under which individuals have previously catalyzed changes to refugee education on multiple levels ranging from UNHCR's Global Headquarters, the Nairobi Branch Office and Dadaab and Kakuma's field offices as well as implementing partner arrangements might, in the future, allow other individuals to recognize, leverage, or even create conditions capable of doing so.

The last point of this first conclusion relates closely to the second overarching conclusion. That is, ideas matter. Ideas about the purpose of states to provide funding for education in emergencies can act as advocacy tools, which individuals working within the UNHCR and other organizations can utilize to leverage and at times even change institutional constraints. In the concomitant eras of globalization and the post-Cold War era, universal basic education has increasingly been deemed critical in expanding and strengthening democratic, liberal institutions throughout the world and in turn mitigating or preventing inter and intra-state as well as "global" conflict. However, throughout this

same period, states' legal and normative responsibilities as well as commitment to fund and provide universal access to basic education to those residing in their territorial boundaries has significantly declined.[18] States' shrinking role in funding and providing education is both cause and effect of the expansive role of non-state actors in these twin arenas. States mired in conflict, as well as neighboring states offering refugee status to those displaced by conflict, have been rendered unable, but more often than not unwilling, to maintain the provision of education services to conflict-affected populations, particularly refugees. Rather than incentivize states or try and hold them accountable for continued and inclusive education service provision, non-state actors have instead put themselves on the front lines of education service delivery. As discussed in chapter 2, the UNHCR has done so and indeed assumed the role of a surrogate state responsible for the provision of all basic services to refugees in camps, in part for the purpose of guaranteeing and legitimizing its continued relevance.

However, because non-state actors are ultimately reliant upon states for funding, states' interests determine what operations and sectors do or alternately do not receive financial support. While states and UN agencies continue to make declarations regarding the fundamental importance of education, these have yet to be matched by significant increases to humanitarian and development funding for education. Most recently there has been considerable discussion by UN agencies and INGOs regarding establishing a pooled fund for education as a "global public good."[19] The rationale for these proposals

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[18] See: Pauline Rose and Martin Greeley. "Education in fragile states: capturing lessons and identifying good practice." *Draft paper prepared for the Development Assistance Committee Fragile States Working Groups, Service Delivery Workstream, Subteam for Education Services* (2006).

[19] See: Stephen J. Ball. *Global education inc: New policy networks and the neo-liberal imaginary*. Routledge, 2012. See also: Susan Robertson, Karen Mundy, and Antoni Verger, eds. *Public private partnerships in education: new actors and modes of governance in a globalizing world*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012; Antoni Verger. "Framing and

include the economic value of human capital and a return on investment that incentivizes the private sector (e.g. corporations) whose growth will be reliant on developing workers from developing countries.[20] Occasionally, these discussions include the ways in which a pooled fund might bolster education service provision in conflict-affected states or for refugees.[21] However, excluded from these discussions are the ways in which education is a fundamental human right,[22] as well as a multiplier right that allows other rights to be accessed and guaranteed.[23]

For children whose exile is a consequence of the denial or violation of their rights either by omission or commission of their state of origin, UN agencies, foremost among them the UNHCR, have an obligation, by mandate, to protect both children and children's rights to, in, and through education. Since the founding of Dadaab and Kakuma (and many other refugee camps throughout the world), this has taken the form of providing ad hoc education programming for which funding is precarious. However, as will be discussed further in subsequent sections of this chapter, the UNHCR can and should do more. Even in small ways, prioritizing and promoting the right to education for refugees is an important part of strengthening access to, and the quality of, refugee education. For example, as outlined in chapter 4, the Dakar Declaration issued in 2000, which included a provision on the ways in which education in emergencies is protective, helped catalyze the founding of INEE in large part through the efforts of UNHCR's then Senior Education Officer. The same officer directed the groundswell of interagency

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selling global education policy: the promotion of public–private partnerships for education in low-income contexts." *Journal of Education Policy* 27, no. 1 (2012): 109-130.

[20] See: Rebecca Winthrop and Gib Bulloch. "The Talent Paradox: Funding Education as a Global Public Good." Brookings Institute, 2012. Available http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/11/06-funding-education-winthrop

[21] Rebecca Winthrop. *Punching Below Its Weight: The US Government Approach to Education in the Developing World. A Special Focus on Conflict Affected and Fragile States*. Brookings Institute, 2013.

[22] See: United Nations General Assembly. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations, 1948, Article 26.

[23] See: Katarina Tomasevski. *Education denied: Costs and remedies*. Zed Books, 2003.

collaboration and support for education in emergencies to refugee education programming in camps (e.g. through the deployment of seconded NRC education officers to Dadaab and Kakuma).

Finally, capturing and sharing the institutional memory of individuals who worked to frame and develop education policies and programs at UNHCR Headquarters as well as those who implemented and experienced education policies and programs on the ground in Dadaab and Kakuma provides a very different understanding, than an impact evaluation or an assessment of education outcomes, of what is at stake and what matters when it comes to refugee education. These "policy relevant" studies and resultant reports are utilized by UNHCR policymakers and program officers to determine where a particular camp stands relative to UNHCR's benchmark goals. As illustrated in chapters 4 and 5, these reports consistently document a high number of out-of-school refugee children and youth, high student-to-teacher ratios, low textbook-to-student ratios, and low test scores on summative exams (e.g. the KCPE and KCSE). Yet, they offer no insight regarding the ideational and institutional challenges of which these figures are a direct result, how to navigate or change these challenges, nor ultimately how the future of refugee education can be any different than the past. However, a narrative reconstruction of past education policies and programs that were implemented in Dadaab and Kakuma, and an analysis of this narrative for critical junctures, reveals that in the dialectic between structure and agency, individuals—officers with the UNHCR and its implementing partners as well as refugees—have exercised tremendous agency. Their stories, told and analyzed in this account, demonstrate not only that changes to many of the challenges of

refugee education are possible but also how more substantive, lasting changes might be possible in the future.

The implications for UNHCR's refugee education program that I offer here, drawn from the overarching conclusions discussed above, explicate further how the agency of individuals, revealed in this account to be far more determinative in shaping refugee education than has been acknowledged in UNHCR reports (or previous scholarship on refugee education), can be utilized to catalyze institutional and ideational change to the challenges of refugee education. First, UNHCR's education officers can and should increasingly utilize additional policy frameworks beyond EFA to advocate for increased human and financial resources for refugee education as well as facilitate the development of new and different ideas regarding what constitutes relevant and appropriate education for refugees. EFA made possible the inclusion of basic education (i.e. Grade 1-8) in Dadaab and Kakuma as well as other camps throughout the world, though significantly limited possibilities for vocational, supplemental, non-formal, secondary, or higher education in the camps—education programming that might align better with refugees' needs during their exile and after, regardless of whether they resettle, repatriate, or locally integrate.

At least two alternative frameworks might allow for new conceptual and practical development of the content, scope, and scale of refugee education in camps. The first is UNHCR's core mandate to protect refugees. When education and community-services officers have previously and progressively aligned refugee education with UNHCR's core mandate, increased human and financial resources have been directed to education programming in camps and also allowed for the development of programming beyond

basic education. Senior, mid-level, and junior officers in the Education Unit can utilize UNHCR's global publications, updates, field research, and other reportage to make clear the ways in which refugee education, under the auspices of EFA, does and alternately does not realize UNHCR's mandate, particularly by highlighting the heightened vulnerability of out-of-school youths to restive behavior and recruitment into armed groups. The second framework is a rights-based approach to education, grounded in international law. In contrast to education for nation-building, state-building, economic development, or durable solutions, a rights-based approach to education sees education as an end in itself, rather than merely a means for achieving other ends, and thus allows for expansive possibilities for the structure and content of education, beginning with asking new questions. As the former UN Special Rapporteur on Education remarked, "the focus on hardware—funding of schools—stifles the asking of key questions: what should be taught, who should do the teaching, how should this be done; in sum, what is education for?"[24]

A rights-based approach to education allows expansive consideration by political leaders and heads of multilateral and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) not only of what refugee education is and should be for but also of host states' legal responsibilities for providing and funding refugee education. Under a rights-based framework, states are the primary funders and providers of public schooling for all children, regardless of legal status, residing within their state borders.[25] In the post-Cold War era the UNHCR has assumed the role of a surrogate state in funding and providing schooling to refugees in camps. However, this arrangement has been shown throughout

[24] Tomasevski, *Education Denied*, 2003, 57.
[25] Tomasevski, *Education Denied*, 2003, 22.

this account to result in massive funding shortfalls that in turn result in persistent challenges for refugee education (e.g. high numbers of out-of-school children and youth, high student-to-teacher ratios). In effect, this arrangement prevents UNHCR from upholding its mandate to protect refugees. UNHCR program officers and policymakers can and should work with host states to progressively increase host states' responsibilities in providing and funding refugee education, in part by allowing refugees to attend local public schools. As a means of doing so, the UNHCR can and should also partner with other UN agencies that can invest funds to induce the inclusion of refugees in host states' development strategies, including education (e.g. the United Nations Development Program), or that have a direct mandate and extensive experience working with host states to enhance the protection of children (e.g. UNICEF).

Additionally, officers in UNHCR's Education Unit can and should develop better emergency responses and increased capacity for refugee education during massive influxes in protracted refugee situations. While it is often unknown precisely when influxes will happen, a brief survey of the contemporary education histories of Dadaab and Kakuma makes clear that influxes into the two camps, caused by manmade and natural disasters in Somalia, Sudan, and other countries throughout East and Central Africa, will continue. The dozen tent schools that have previously been provided, that offer basic education to less than half of the tens of thousands of school aged children and youth who arrive during influxes, has rendered many of the most vulnerable in the camps without access to school. Again, this arrangement, or rather, UNHCR's lack of preparedness and capacity to provide emergency education, prevents UNHCR from upholding its mandate to protect refugees. The previously discussed suggestions,

particularly increased funding and the inclusion of refugees in local schools as well as partnerships with other UN agencies, can greatly help to expand UNHCR's capacity and preparedness to provide emergency education.

So too can research and reportage undertaken by the officers in UNHCR's Education Unit as well as in UNHCR's Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit on the ways in which lack of access to schooling negatively impacts refugee children and youth. While a rights-based approach to education might compel host states to action through leveraging their interest in attaining or maintaining legitimacy, donor states' interest is often in attaining or maintaining state and regional stability and security. Refugee children and youth who are restive and recruited into armed groups, in part as a direct consequence of lack of access to schooling, undermine the interests of donor states. Conclusively demonstrating through research the ways in which this is so might compel donor states to increase education funding and/or consider more sustainable funding mechanisms beyond one-year funding cycles for refugee education.

In sum, UNHCR's education officers can and should utilize their agency to advocate for refugee education through alternative policy frameworks distinct from EFA, including UNHCR's core mandate to protect, as well as a rights-based approach to education. Doing so offers the possibility of catalyzing changes to the ideational and institutional challenges of refugee education. These alternative policy frameworks further the conceptual and practical development of refugee education beyond the provision of basic schooling and allow for consideration, by political leaders and heads of multilateral and international non-governmental organizations, of host states' legal responsibilities for providing and funding refugee education, as well as the ways in which the UNHCR

might partner with other UN agencies that can help to facilitate host states in doing so (e.g. the United Nations Development Program, UNICEF). Finally, by conducting research on the ways in which lack of access to schooling negatively impacts refugee children and youth, officers in UNHCR's Education Unit as well as Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit can demonstrate to donor states the ways in which it is in their interest to direct increased funding to refugee education as well as to consider developing sustainable funding mechanisms.

Conclusion

In the post-Cold War era, education has taken on new significance as a global policy priority and has been deemed critical in mitigating or preventing the occurrence or recurrence of intractable civil wars that have typified conflict for more than twenty-five years. The field of Education in Emergencies has been established and has advanced conceptual and practical knowledge of "best practices" of education service delivery and programming in conflict-affected states. Still, very little is known about refugee education, particularly in protracted situations, and, especially, why and how programs are developed and implemented, and change over time. As a means of understanding and explaining the challenges of refugee education, this account has reconstructed and comparatively analyzed the contemporary education histories of Dadaab and Kakuma camps—the two largest camps in the world—from when they were established in 1992, just after the end of the Cold War, to 2012, when I undertook this research. Three interrelated questions have been asked and answered: What education policies and programs were developed, implemented, and changed in Kenya's Dadaab and Kakuma camps between 1992 and 2012? What were the underlying causal mechanisms that drove

changes when they occurred? What are the lived educational experiences of refugee students, their families, and teachers in relation to the range of education policies and programs throughout this period?

Primarily, this account has explained the continuity in the challenges of refugee education throughout this twenty-year period, despite significant changes to policies and programs for refugee education across multiple levels. These changes have yet to substantively change the ideational and institutional challenges of refugee education—that is state-centric models of funding and content, delivered to and through non-state actors like the UNHCR and its implementing partners. Nevertheless, this account has endeavored to show that change is possible to ideas and institutions as well as to interests, and can be occasioned by individuals—refugees, program officers, and policymakers—who recognize conditions for change or who make their own conditions. By telling stories of those who study and teach in Dadaab and Kakuma, and for whom camp schools have provided protection, intellectual challenge, normalcy and routine, social cohesion, as well as further opportunities for education or employment, this account has also endeavored to make clear what refugee education is for, and why it matters. "You see," explained a current refugee teacher who had completed his education in Kakuma's primary and secondary schools, "when a bank gives a loan for a year or two, it charges interest. I came here when I was a young man and now I am old and my life has passed me by. The UNHCR isn't going to give me the full interest on my life here, but something has been paid back through education."

Future Research

The theoretical and methodological approaches utilized in this account—Constructivism, comparative historical analysis, and Critical Junctures—provide expansive possibilities for future researchers to ask other new questions about refugee education or answer previously asked questions in new ways. Here I briefly outline three directions for future research. First, reconstructing and analyzing the contemporary education histories of other protracted situations (e.g. several camps on the Thai-Burma border; camps for Bhutanese refugees in Nepal) would simply make known more of how and why education programming developed and developed differently in different camps and allow for comparative histories and analyses of the development of education programming across camps throughout the world. Second, critically examining UNHCR's implementing partners, and how their different institutional mandates and organizational structures differently impact UNHCR's education programming. Very little is known about these organizations, yet they are on the front line of education service delivery in camps. Studies focusing on implementing partners would provide insight regarding their [differing] capacities as well as possibilities for the UNHCR to build capacity. Finally, critical analyses of funding for education programming in camps and of the ways in which framing refugee education in particular ways (e.g. education for repatriation, education for peace-building) impacts funding over time (increases and decreases) would help to make known the dynamics of this relationship as well as offer insight regarding what appeals to donor states' interests in funding refugee education.

These are but three possibilities related to specific issues that are intended to shed light on larger questions with which I suggest education scholars and practitioners must

contend to address the ideational and institutional challenges of refugee education. That is, what is the role of the state, the nation and the nation-state in transnational spaces? How and why is refugee education in states' interest to fund and support? How does the state-centric model of education (e.g. national curricula and certification) provide or alternately not provide refugees with the knowledge they need? I suggest that approaching the study of refugee education as an independent researcher is of critical importance in asking and answering both specific and broad questions. This is not for the purpose of circumventing the UNHCR, but rather of telling different stories and gathering different information, particularly from and with refugees, than the institutional constraints of the UNCHR necessarily permit (e.g. legitimacy and limited funding for such research). As a final note, I maintain that critically considering the present by asking why and how questions about the past is also of particular importance, specifically for what the past reveals about continuity and change. As such, it is to the present and developments to refugee education and Dadaab and Kakuma's education programming in the three years since 2012 that I now turn.

Update: Refugee Education Programming Since 2012

Following the implementation of UNHCR's *2012-2016 Education Strategy*, newly appointed UNHCR education officers in Dadaab and Kakuma's sub-offices worked with the implementing partners for education in each camp to develop multi-year education strategies. These strategies by-and-large reflect the camps' different contemporary education histories. Five objectives were prioritized in Dadaab, including:

1) Increasing equality of access to education
2) Improving quality of education
3) Cultivating the value of education as a protecting and empowering force in children's lives

4) Increasing the capacity of implementing partners, education officials, and teachers to deliver reliant programming on cross-cutting issues
5) Improved planning, implementation, monitoring, and reporting through coordination and capacity building.[26]

Kakuma also prioritized five objectives:

1) Improving learning achievements in primary school
2) Ensuring that schools are safe learning environments for refugee girls, boys, and young people
3) Improving access to formal secondary education opportunities for refugee young people
4) Improving access to higher education opportunities for refugee young people
5) Ensuring that opportunities for education are lifelong and available according to need.[27]

A recent update on the impact of the global and camp-specific strategies indicated that there had been "substantial progress in primary school enrollment with a ten percent increase globally for the 2013-2014 year."[28] However, despite the implementation of a split-shift system in Dadaab and Kakuma's primary schools intended to facilitate increased enrollment as well as quality (through reducing high student-to-teacher ratios), enrollment has remained at approximately forty-percent for school-aged children in Dadaab[29] and fifty-percent for school-aged children in Kakuma.[30] Additionally, overcrowding continues, albeit at figures that because of the split-shift average across both camps at approximately 80:1 rather than 160:1.[31] In terms of secondary schooling, enrollment in both Dadaab and Kakuma has actually decreased in recent years "due to financial constraints,"[32] though exact figures were not disclosed by the UNHCR. Refugee teachers in both camps report persistent challenges in terms of lack of textbooks, desks, and other school supplies, as well as the state of [dis]repair of many school buildings and

[26] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Joint Strategy for Education in Dadaab 2012-2015*. UNHCR, 2011.
[27] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Kakuma Education Strategy 2013-2016*. UNHCR, 2012.
[28] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Progress Report on the 2013 Global Strategic Priorities*. Division of International Protection, UNHCR, 2014, 20.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Progress Report*, 2014, 22.
[32] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Progress Report*, 2013, 23.

the continued need for accelerated education programming for adolescents that would allow them to matriculate to primary and secondary schools. "We are in a very dire situation," remarked an education officer in Kakuma. "The draw down in 2008 has increased problems in terms of the provision of resources and especially with the emergency…we have not caught back up."

The emergency to which the Officer referred is the influx of more than forty thousand refugees fleeing violence in the newly established South Sudan since 2013.[33] Many of these refugees had previously repatriated from Kakuma to South Sudan in 2007 and 2008 and found themselves again arriving at an expanse of wide open land, this time in Kakuma IV. Emergency tent schools established in early 2014 provided lower primary education to more than seven thousand children and adolescents, many of them unaccompanied boys.[34] Yet many more remained out of school as the enrollment at tent schools was stretched beyond capacity. "Providing education in emergencies remains a key challenge,"[35] concluded the update on the impact of the *2012-2016 Education Strategy*. Yet, the update also concluded that the *Strategy* has, nonetheless, catalyzed efforts to strengthen technical capacity, with 60 education officers now working in UNHCR operations around the globe, up from only 7 in 2011.[36] Whether and how this strengthened technical capacity will strengthen education programming in Dadaab and Kakuma for the approximately 150,000 children and youth enrolled in schools

[33] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Working to Cope with Thousands of People Fleeing South Sudan*, 7 January 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=52cbf3939&query=kakuma
[34] Ibid.
[35] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Progress Report*, 2013, 23.
[36] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Progress Report*, 2013, 17.

across both camps and the approximately 250,000 out-of-school children and youth in these camps remains unknown.[37]

Hope Primary School; Kakuma IV, 2014[38]

Students inside Hope Primary School, Kakuma IV, 2014[39]

[37] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Report Mid-Year Update-Kenya*. UNHCR, 2014.
[38] Christine Monaghan. "Hope Primary School." Photograph. June, 2014.
[39] Christine Monaghan. "Students of Hope Primary School." Photograph. June 2014.

EPILOGUE

KAKUMA CAMP

I walked with Simon in and between the thirteen tents, empty on this Sunday afternoon, which comprised Hope Primary School. The sun had climbed high in the cloudless sky and I felt beads of sweat running down my back.

At the edge of the tents, we stopped in front of a small wooden shack—the school's office—and Simon produced a key from his pocket, opening the door and allowing me to enter first. We took seats facing one another, his desk between us.

"Perhaps we could start with how you came to be Head Teacher at Hope School," I said.

He spoke softly, his voice just audible above the unrelenting wind that blew dust into the office between the rough-hewn walls as he recounted his story.

"When I came back to Kakuma in February 2014, it was by bus rather than on foot. I had worked in the new government of South Sudan for fourteen months but resigned because of the bureaucracy and the inadequacy of individuals and institution leaders, especially the minister, deputy minister, and secretary. But I was vocal about all of this and was targeted as a result. They had my house set on fire, and I lost three of my brothers but escaped with the rest of my family and came here."

I listened intently as Simon recalled being hired by LWF to oversee Hope Primary School shortly after he arrived in Kakuma as well as establishing nearby Japan School in response to the overcrowding at Hope School.

"LWF said they would provide thirty new tents, but after months those tents did not come. However, because I worked in humanitarian management in South Sudan, I had a number of contacts and asked for tents to be provided from the NGO AAR Japan and desks and other materials to be provided from a handful of others. So at what they call Japan School, they have desks, supplies, and currently 3800 students. This is the only example I have of schools in Kakuma started by refugees themselves."

I thought of the row of Japan School tents that I had earlier observed in passing on my way to Hope School and how much more sturdy and ordered they seemed when compared to the dilapidated UNICEF tents outside Simon's office.

"And how many students are enrolled in Hope Primary," I asked.

"More than 4,000 but there are so many out of school—especially those coming from South Sudan who were in secondary school. I put 1100 on the waiting list for Somali Bantu Secondary School in Kakuma II. They're just idle in the community, and they're angry. Some of them came here and asked if they could just come and study Class 7 because that's they highest grade we have at Hope. Just to have something to do."

I asked about textbooks, chalkboards, and other school materials, rightly anticipating Simon's answer.

"We were donated ten chalkboards but they are small in size. In the wind time you have to hold them and this is not an easy job. As for learning materials, we have no textbooks. They've not been distributed yet. Also, all of the primary schools have a feeding program

in the camp, except for Hope School. We are now going on seven months without one, which also makes learning very difficult."

By then, the office had become stiflingly hot and Simon indicated we could again venture outside, exchanging still heat for gusts of warm air.

We walked again amongst the tents, slowly and deliberately, and I eyed Japan School, just visible on the horizon as Simon began speaking again.

"There is a need to inform whoever might read your story that in Kakuma there is a gap and the only way to improve this gap is for people to know that Kakuma is the second home to everyone here. This is where I grew up, this is where I was educated, this is where I acquired my basic knowledge about education. So this is a second home to me, which put me in a position to make myself a professional based on the services in the camp."

We had reached the edge of Hope School and Simon signaled to a motorbike taxi that slowed to a stop beside us. Before climbing onto the back of the bike, I turned to Simon and asked one more question.

"Do you see yourself returning to South Sudan?"

Without pause he responded.

"The story of 2007 and 2008 will not repeat itself. Because people have already seen the performance of the government and they know the government is not meeting expectations. That it is not safe for them in South Sudan. But this is not the perspective of the UNHCR and the implementing agencies. They think we are in transition, so they will not put up permanent structures. If they were to talk to any of us, they would know.