

The Effects of Negative Group Primes

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Abstract

My paper examines the effects of negative group primes on policy preferences. My primary hypothesis states that negative group primes will have an effect not only on the policy preferences of respondents who receive the primes about a group in which they are not a member (out-group), but they will also be affected by negative primes about their own group (in-group). For members of the more powerful groups, the negative out-group primes are very likely to have an effect on policy preferences in ways that widen gaps in public opinion. However, negative in-group primes are unlikely to have an effect on their political attitudes. For members of the less powerful groups, the inverse will be the case as they resist these negative primes by supporting policies linked to their groups with greater furor.

To test these hypotheses, I have conducted experiments on three sets of group – male and female, Caucasian and African American, mainline and fundamentalist Protestant. These groups were selected for two reasons. First, there is compelling evidence in literature of political behavior of gaps in policy preferences. Second, they represent groups with impermeable and permeable membership boundaries.

The results suggest that negative out-group primes affect the attitudes of members of the more powerful. However, the effects differ across groups, sometimes in unexpected ways. For whites, the negative African-American primes increased their support for social welfare spending and racial policies. For mainline Protestants, the negative fundamentalist primes decreased their support for social welfare spending and spending for the environment but more supportive of school vouchers and equal roles for

women. With all but one exception, these results run counter to my hypotheses. While the negative out-group primes affect whites and mainline Protestants in similar ways, it is unlikely that the cause is the same. In the case of gender, negative female primes decrease support for programs such as social welfare programs per my hypotheses. It is clear from the results that group members interact and conflict in the political realm in very different ways. The results for members of less powerful groups are less clear.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Priming Negative Group Attitudes

During a hard-fought race for the U.S. Senate seat of New York, the televised debates between Hillary Rodham Clinton and Representative Rick A. Lazio received considerable attention from both state and national press. Apart from their positions on the issues, one episode in the first debate received notice by political commentators and voters alike. During a discussion of campaign finance, Lazio walked across the stage to demand Clinton sign a pledge concerning “soft” money. This action was interpreted as a markedly aggressive move by Lazio and some believed it cost him the support of female voters, who viewed him less favorably after the debates. The Clinton campaign used this episode to frame the first and subsequent debates. A reporter for the *Buffalo News* describes the post-debate spin following the third debate.

For its part, Clinton’s team, once again, portrayed Lazio as overly strong-armed. Lazio “took the low road” and appeared as “a bully,” said Mandy Grunwald, a Clinton advisor and friend. “I think people are not interested in that kind of bullying” (Precious 2000).

The Clinton campaign tried to diminish support for Rick Lazio through its use of negative characteristics or traits already associated with males. In an election in which female voters were crucial, Clinton was attempting to win over female voters or at the very least distance them from Lazio, the male candidate. One of her lines of attack was to portray her male opponent as a “bully” and “aggressive,” negative traits that female voters would find were easily accessible. Likely, the hope in the Clinton campaign was that female votes would evaluate Lazio based on these standard negative male traits and

vote against him on election day. However, the negative characterization of Lazio may also have had an effect on male voters.

Two years after the Clinton-Lazio race, we find a similar example in the Massachusetts gubernatorial election. The male candidate, Mitt Romney, attacked his female opponent, Shannon O'Brien, based on expectations about her gender. In the final televised debate between the two candidates, Romney twice criticized O'Brien's behavior as "unbecoming," an implicit attack on O'Brien for failing to meet gender stereotypes. While Romney's comments can be interpreted as simply dismay over O'Brien's aggressive campaign, they might also be seen as an attack on O'Brien who is violating gender expectations with regard to her campaign style as well as her uncharacteristic desire to hold a high public office. The subtle aspects of this attack resemble Mendelberg's research about race and priming effects (2001).¹ Romney's comment briefly became a gender issue in the campaign as the media's coverage following the debate focused on his controversial remarks (Beardsley 2002). Ultimately, Romney defeated O'Brien whose unfavorability ratings with both genders had increased throughout the course of the campaign.

These are just two instances of politicians using attributes or traits to prime the public to consider negative aspects of their opponents' group. Indeed, these explicit attacks directly link a negative aspect about the candidate that is easily accessible psychologically for potential voters because it is linked with a group of which the candidate is clearly a member. Moreover, explicit attacks are a common element of political discourse in the form of campaign ads and comments by the candidates. Other

¹ Mendelberg (1997, 2001) found strong evidence that racial attacks, which do not directly link a policy or candidate with negative stereotypes of African Americans, are effective in shifting attitudes. I will discuss her research in greater depth later in this chapter.

instances of group priming suggest that subtlety is a more common and powerful way to affect public opinion. Racial group priming is often inserted into the political campaigns in the most subtle ways through the use of coded language such as “law and order,” and political ads that discuss the candidate’s position on policies such as welfare with images of African Americans without directly mentioning blacks (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino *et al.* 2002). These campaign ads seek to subtly attempt to remind potential voters of the negative stereotypes closely associated with a group without ever directly stating the stereotypes often through the use of visual images. Whether implicit or explicit, the effects of these group primes are felt beyond political elections to include public opinion on a range of policies associated with particular groups. In fact, they may contribute to widening the chasms that we find in specific issue domains for different groups such as compassion issues across gender groups. This dissertation will specifically examine the effect of negative group primes on gaps in public opinion.

Public Opinion Gaps and Group Primes

From its founding, the United States has been replete with groups organized for social and political purposes. In the mid-nineteenth century, Tocqueville marveled at the extent to which the United States was characterized by its vast numbers of voluntary societies. In addition to offering a sense of identity to their members (Brewer 1991; Tajfel 1981; Turner 1987), groups help organize the political views of their members according to their historic concerns and political interests. In the case of African Americans, their struggle for freedom from slavery and for legal equality has shaped their support for racial policies including affirmative action and their support for the political party that backed their efforts to gain civil rights. As African Americans became

associated with race and welfare policies, public opinion in many ways became set in terms of opposing groups with an overwhelming majority of blacks supporting these policies and whites opposing them (Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996). In other instances, opinion over issues such as compassion and use of force are less contentious between men and women but there still exists sizable opinion gap.

Political communication, be it campaign debates as seen in the Clinton-Lazio and Romney-O'Brien debates or political ads such as the "Willie Horton" ad, attempt to capitalize on the well established gaps in political opinion and affect toward the out-group. It often appears that the more subtle, implicit attacks are more effective than explicit attacks. However, in the case of framing literature, the evidence suggests that explicitly linking one group with a policy or describing the effect of a policy as benefiting one group over another does have a strong affect on policy attitudes. Whether implicit or explicit, these studies suggest that priming effects centered on a less powerful, or minority group, can have a substantial effect on policy preferences. In this chapter, I will review research about priming negative group attitudes and their affect on political attitudes as well as suggest where this dissertation contributes to the field.

There is convincing evidence that the dominant group in a group conflict is affected by their negative views of the out-group. Nowhere is this more clearly the case than for whites regarding their feelings about blacks, the out-group, and its effect on their policy attitudes. Sniderman and colleagues find that white individuals with little formal education approach issues of racial equality through the lenses of their feelings toward African Americans (Sniderman *et al.* 1991, Ch. 5). Other methods for assessing whites' feelings about African Americans and their effects on policy preferences have used

experiments in which survey respondents were randomly assigned to one of two questions that contained slightly different question wording. In a series of experiments, Nelson and Kinder (1996) manipulated questions so that some respondents received questions that referred to an unpopular out-group such as homosexual men and drug users as recipients of money for AIDS research, or a question that pitted support for AIDS research against spending federal money to find cancer. They describe the framing conditions that include negative out-group references as group-centric because they specifically link a group with a particular policy outcome. They found that respondents' attitudes toward the out-groups had a stronger effect on their policy preference when given the survey question with the group-centric wording (Nelson and Kinder 1996, 1067 and 1069).

In the same article, Nelson and Kinder (1996) went one step further when they explored the effect of priming research subjects with images of whites and blacks devoid of any comments about political issues or candidates. Research subjects in their experiment were given the cover story that they needed look at ten photos as part of the researchers attempt to update a standard psychological measure. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Members of the control group viewed images of Caucasians occupied with daily activities. In the stereotypic group, research subjects were primed with four of the ten photos showing blacks engaged in negative stereotypical activities such as drug use and panhandling. In the counter-stereotypic group, subjects received four photos of counter-stereotypic behavior in which African Americans were depicted as hard-working and family-oriented (*Ibid.*, 1070). They found that attitudes toward blacks had a far greater effect on opposition to affirmative action when the

subjects were primed with stereotypic photos of African Americans compared with the counter-stereotypic and control groups (*Ibid.*, 1072). These findings lend strong support to the view that the attitudes of whites can be strongly affected by implicit primes that make no direct references to African-Americans as the possible beneficiaries of certain policies.

Mendelberg (2001) and Valentino and colleagues (2002) make a valuable distinction between implicit and explicit racial priming. Mendelberg defines an implicit racial appeal as “one that contains a recognizable – if subtle – racial reference, most easily through visual references” (Mendelberg 2001, 11). The work of Mendelberg and Valentino, which I discuss in greater detail below, is particularly relevant to my research because they contribute to my hypothesis regarding how dominant group members might react to negative primes about the less powerful group members. If Mendelberg and Valentino are correct, explicit frames may result in research subjects expressing views that emphasize their support for the norm of equality rather than resentment toward the out-group members resulting in less support for programs that benefit their group members. These results run somewhat counter to the model of group-centric attitudes put forth by Nelson and Kinder (1996).

Mendelberg argues that the most effective form of racial appeal will contain images that activate easily accessible stereotypes about African Americans without directly mentioning race so that the message retains a level of ambiguity and does not disturb the individual’s ambivalent feelings about his or her negative racial predispositions. To test her hypotheses, she randomly assigned research subjects to one of three treatments – explicit racial, implicit racial, or counter-stereotype racial group – in

which they watched manufactured television news segment about potential gubernatorial candidates in Michigan.² Mendelberg found that racial resentment had the strongest effect on attitudes about race policies when subjects received the implicit racial treatment in which they viewed a story that contained images of blacks but did not contain verbal references to African Americans. To a much lesser extent, the similar results were found in other issue domains such as poverty and spending (Mendelberg 2001, 200). Per her hypotheses, explicit racial appeals were largely ineffective because they no longer contained ambiguous messages. Rather, their clear racial appeal resulted in the research subjects downplaying their negative racial predispositions in favor of attitudes about equality that are considered the social norm.

Rather than use manipulated newscasts as Mendelberg and others have (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Nelson *et al.* 1997), Valentino and colleagues (2002) created five bogus political ads about presidential candidate George W. Bush in which the narrative remained the same but the images in the ad were altered. The control group viewed an ad with race neutral images such as the Statue of Liberty. The remaining four groups were primed with images of blacks and/or whites who appeared either as deserving or undeserving recipients of health care provided through federal funding. They found that the interaction between racial attitudes/issues³ and the undeserving blacks prime had a strong effect on the subjects' candidate preference in the 2000 presidential election in Bush's favor (Valentino *et al.* 2002, 81). However, primes

² In addition to the experimental research design, Mendelberg used cross-section data from the 1988 National Election Study to examine the effect of the "Willie Horton" ad aired by the campaign for George Bush against their Democratic opponent Michael Dukakis on respondents' views of the presidential candidates. Her findings suggest that the implicit phase of the Horton message benefit Bush.

³ Valentino and colleagues tested models including racial attitudes for racial resentment, laissez-fair racism, and blacks have too much influence. They also examined the effect of the primes with racialized issue opinion for affirmative action and welfare spending on candidate preference (Valentino *et al.* 2002, 81).

that included positive images of African Americans undermined racial attitudes to the advantage of Al Gore.

These studies offer compelling evidence of the strength of group primes on policy and candidate preferences. There are aspects of this research that remain largely unexplored that I hope to address in this project. First, these and other studies have largely overlooked the effects of negative group primes on in-group members despite mounting evidence, which suggests primes or frames are not universally effective. For instance, Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) found that different frames for gun control received different levels of acceptance according to the respondent's party identification. Respondents accept frames that match their party's position on the issue and largely reject alternative frames.

Other studies suggest that racial groups can resist negative group primes and frames. In an example of white subjects' exposure to negative white primes, Valentino and colleagues found that the undeserving white prime and its interaction with racial attitudes had an insignificant effect in candidate preference (Valentino *et al.* 2002, 86). Concerning their frame about federal government assistance for the poor, even Nelson and Kinder (1996) are forced to admit that the frame did not have a significant effect on nonwhite respondents. They write,

The critical interaction was positive and significant for white respondents, as expected ($b = .17, p < .05$). For nonwhites, this coefficient was *negative* ($b = -.60$), indicating that attitudes toward the poor were actually *less* important in the group frame condition for nonwhites. While this striking reversal defies easy explanation, it does suggest that framing strategies that appeal to negative social stereotypes will not be universally effective (Nelson and Kinder 1996, 1065).

That which perplexes Nelson and Kinder lies at the very heart of this dissertation. Their research suggests that group membership may affect the extent to which a frame is

accepted or rejected. In the study, nonwhites were not affected by the negative frame that characterized the poor as “people who don’t really need the help.” Nonwhites, who were more likely to have a lower socio-economic status, resisted the negative description of the poor as freeloaders.

Second, the virtual monopoly of research about the effects of negative out-group primes and frames is largely a result of the limited focus on race and racial issues. With this focus on race, virtually all the studies exclude nonwhite research subjects or respondents (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 1996⁴; Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Nelson and Kinder 1996⁵; Valentino *et al.* 2002). As the portions of the studies above suggest, attacks on one’s own group may be a different matter (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Valentino *et al.* 2002). In the final section of her book, Mendelberg (2002) suggests that the effects of primes may vary across different groups. For the American context, she considers group membership based on one’s gender and sexual orientation. She suggests that both women and homosexuals have faced challenges of negative stereotypes but like African Americans have achieved greater levels equality before the law and political influence in recent years. Unlike blacks, women and homosexuals do not elicit deeply rooted feelings of fear and resentment.⁶

In this dissertation, I will attempt to simulate the negative group primes that one often finds in the political arena and examine their effect on individuals’ attitudes toward

⁴ Kinder and Sanders (1996) used non-black respondents exclusively for Experiments I and II and included separate analysis for whites and blacks in Experiments III and IV in Chapter 7.

⁵ Nelson and Kinder (1996) use non-black research subjects and respondents for both race related experiments (Experiment III and IV).

⁶ Mendelburg notes that homosexuals still face stigma. Nevertheless, it is increasingly the norm that homosexuals should generally be treated equal to heterosexuals (Mendelburg 2001, 246-9). The U.S. Supreme Court to overturn *Bowers vs. Hardwick* (1986) with *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003) is further evidence of the legal gains that homosexuals are making. In the case, a narrow majority of the Court upheld a Georgia law that outlawed homosexual and heterosexual sodomy.

a range of policies in which past research strongly suggests one should find group differences in attitudes. The primes are proxies for negative attacks on a candidate's group or one that is closely identified with the candidates' political party. Unlike past literature, my research will examine the effects of negative group primes on several groups with permeable and impermeable group boundaries. I hypothesize that gaps in policy preferences are affected by negative stereotypes about particular groups. More specifically, I hypothesize that attacks on the less powerful group such as females will widen the public opinion gap on gender gap issues. By using group primes rather than explicitly framing policies⁷ (Druckman 2001; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Kinder and Sanders 1990, 1996; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nelson *et al.* 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999), this research offers a different approach to examining how respondents form attitudes on a range of policies. It attempts to simulate some of the subtle and not so subtle use of group stereotypes in the policy debates and political campaigns in which coded language such as "aggressive" or "lazy" is often employed to remind voters of negative stereotypes. According to research about the mass media and political campaigns, these negative stereotypes are frequently evoked and reinforced (Dixon and Linz 2002; Dixon and Linz 2000; Mendelberg 1997). The use of these stereotypes affects not just the group employing them but also the group under attack. The attacked group members are often psychologically well equipped to fight back, perhaps because they have built up psychological defenses against the negative perception of their group. We see this in literature about racial stereotypes in which African-American research

⁷ The difference between primes and frames lies with their operationalization. Frames are a way of shaping the debate over one particular policy. One could frame the debate over affirmative action as leveling the playing field or reverse discrimination against whites. Whereas primes refer to repeated exposure to one type of news story (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), visual stereotypes (Nelson and Kinder 1996), or negative group traits in the case of this dissertation.

subjects reject negative evaluations about their performance of a task, when they believe that their evaluator knows their race, by attributing their poor marks to the racial prejudice of the person evaluating them (Crocker *et al.* 1991).

Statement of Hypotheses

Having briefly described literature about group primes and related subjects, I will now turn to a more detailed discussion of my hypotheses. My primary hypothesis states that group primes affect gaps in the policy preferences. These effects are mediated by one's group membership and the relationship of one's group and other groups in the realm of politics. More specifically, I hypothesize that negative group primes will have an effect not only on the policy preferences of respondents who receive the primes about a group in which they are not a member (out-group), but they will also be affected by negative primes about their own group (in-group).

With regard to negative in-group primes, dominant (more powerful or majority) group members have the luxury of taking their identity for granted. Their status allows them to exercise a form of hegemonic culture control in assessment, formation and to some extent inoculation from certain stereotypes, whereby their negative characteristics or traits can be disregarded as socially acceptable within certain limits. For instance, male aggression is accepted in terms of aggressively pursuing a job but is not accepted in extremes such as violence. Thus, I hypothesize that the dominant group will not be affected by negative in-group primes (**H1**).

Conversely, the negative out-group primes are very likely to have a strong effect on policy preferences for dominant group members in ways that widen the preference gaps by increasing support for policies that group members already tend to support (**H2**).

This hypothesis is grounded in the voluminous literature on stereotypes by which one associates particular characteristics, traits, behavior and expectations about a social group (Kunda 2001, ch. 8). These stereotypes can become so deeply ingrained that they become easily accessible and strong schema, particularly for racial stereotypes. In one prominent study of stereotype accessibility, white subjects were subliminally primed by showing them words associated with African-American stereotypes on a computer screen (Devine 1989). In the second part of the experiment, subjects were asked to evaluate descriptions of a fictional person, Donald, whose race/ethnicity was not stated. Subjects exposed to heavy doses of the negative primes evaluated Donald as more hostile, despite the fact that the subliminal primes included no explicit words about aggression or hostility, than the other groups that were exposed to little or no negative priming. To Devine and others, the results of this study suggest that racial stereotypes are so prevalent as to be automatically accessible.⁸ Similar results were found in studies in which white subjects were subliminally shown photos of African Americans (Bargh *et al.* 1996). The white subjects, who were subliminally primed with African-American photos, expressed reactions that were more angry and hostile when a planned mistake in the computer-assisted experiment program occurred.

Research has demonstrated that these stereotypes have an impact on policy preferences in cases where the policy appears to benefit one group in particular. Thus, one finds that forms of racial prejudice or stereotyping affect policy views regarding affirmative action, busing, and welfare programs for whites (Bobo 1997; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Gilens 1995, 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schuman and Bobo 1988;

⁸ There are studies that refute Devine's assertion that there is not difference between high- and low-prejudiced persons in the automatic activation of racial stereotypes (Kawakami et al. 1998; Lepore and Brown 1997).

Sears *et al.* 1979; Sniderman *et al.* 1991). Feelings about homosexuals affect support or opposition toward increasing spending for HIV/AIDS research for heterosexuals (Jennings and Andersen 1996, Rogers *et al.* 1993, Stipp and Kerr 1989).

Perhaps most importantly, there is considerable evidence that explicitly linking negative out-group groups with a policy can have a substantial effect on policy preferences. Using random assignment of respondents to either a “stripped” or “framed” policy question, support appeared to decline when policies such as enterprise zones and school funding when the survey questions specifically mentioned “blacks” compared with similar questions that framed the policy as supporting the “poor” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 188-191). Similarly, when some respondents were reminded that AIDS was associated with homosexual men, the “blame the victim frame,” the respondents gave greater weight to their feelings about homosexuals in evaluating their views about their support for government funding of research about AIDS (Nelson and Kinder 1996, 1065-1067).

As the work about explicit group primes suggests, there is an important caveat to my second hypothesis, which I will call the Mendelberg hypothesis. If the research subjects are exposed to negative out-group primes, particularly for white subjects exposed to negative black frames, they will resist the effects of the primes. Because this dissertation uses explicit group primes in that the directly link group members with negative traits even though the primes do not specifically refer to any policy, I hypothesize that the negative out-group primes will actually decrease the racial gap because white research subjects will be more supportive of racial policies (**H2a** or the Mendelberg hypothesis). This hypothesis is based on Mendelberg’s argument that the

experience of race in America is unique among groups that have had to challenge existing power structure and social norms to gain equality. When whites are exposed to explicit links between negative racial appeals with a policy, respondents' attitudes will be shaped by the norms of equality (Mendelberg 2001, Ch. 9).

Regarding less powerful groups, they are not solely at the mercy of the dominant group.⁹ I hypothesize that the less powerful group members will not be affected by negative out-group, or more powerful group, primes (**H3**). They demonstrate a limited acceptance of the superiority of the dominant group (Bettencourt *et al.* 2001). However, I hypothesize that less powerful group members are more likely to be affected by negative primes about their own groups in ways, which increase their support for policies that past literature suggests their group supports (**H4**). The negative in-group primes will result in a backlash effect in which the in-group members express stronger support for policies that benefit their group or that are generally supported by its members. For example, an African-American subject is more likely to support a policy related to the social welfare state when s/he is exposed to the negative African-American prime than for either the control group or the negative Caucasian/white priming treatment.

An example of resistance to negative in-group primes is found in a study of white and African-American respondents by Fazio and colleagues (1995). In their experiment, undergraduates were asked to determine whether a word was positive or negative.

Between being shown the words, they were subliminally primed with photographs of

⁹ I define less powerful group according to their political strength in the number of their members serving in Congress and their ability to influence legislation that benefits their group. Examples of less powerful groups are racial minorities such as African Americans and Hispanics, females, and homosexuals. While they have a degree of legal equality, their group lags behind in political power and representation. I also include fundamentalist Protestants as a less powerful group because they still represent a numeric minority and are often criticized by mainline and evangelical Protestants for their overzealous approach.

either a white or a black person. The reaction time in which respondent evaluated the words was effected by the race of the person in the photo. Per expectations, white respondents were quicker to evaluate a word as negative after seeing a photo of an African American and quicker to say that a word was positive after viewing a photo of a white person. However, what is most interesting about this study is that African-American subjects were more likely to evaluate a word as positive after seeing a photo of a black person, which suggests that they resisted negative stereotype activation for their own group. When they viewed a photo of a white person, African-American subjects expressed negative evaluation of the word more quickly.

Other studies suggest that subjects will disregard negative feedback about themselves or their impermeable group by crediting it to prejudice. In one such study, subjects were asked to complete a task then were negatively evaluated (Crocker *et al.* 1991). Through random assignment, some of the subjects knew the gender or race of their evaluator while others did not. Both women and African Americans had higher self-esteem when they saw their evaluator because they could attribute their negative evaluation as evidence of the prejudice of the evaluator. Similarly, the work of Jackson and her colleagues (1996) suggests that membership sometime necessitates “social creativity” whereby a negatively perceived group will judge itself according to different standards to cast the group in a better light.

Dissertation Preview

In Chapter 2, I review the methodology to be used in this dissertation including selection of groups to study. I will also discuss in detail my experimental survey design. Unlike framing experiments, my experiment does not manipulate a single question.

Rather than expose research subjects to different images in a newscast or bogus campaign ad, I have inserted a series of four questions asking how common the subject believes certain traits or attributes describes a certain group. Subjects were randomly assigned to receive surveys with a set of questions about negative in-group, negative out-group, or neutral traits.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine the role of identity in cases involving groups with impermeable boundaries. Chapter 3 examines the role of racial/ethnic identity when research subjects are exposed to negative characteristics or traits about Caucasians or African Americans. In this experiment, I have a clearly defined relationship between two racial/ethnic groups in which one is the majority and the other the minority group. The race experiment also serves as a baseline of analysis for the two subsequent experiments. In Chapter 4, the impermeable groups under scrutiny are gender groups. Because of the numeric equality and strives by women for equal rights, the status of the groups may be appear to be perceived as relatively close.

Chapter 5 studies the effect of negative primes on members of two groups with permeable boundaries – mainline Protestants and fundamentalist Protestants. Mainline Protestants have traditionally been viewed as the culturally dominant force in the American religious context. They will be compared with fundamentalist Protestants, a much smaller group, which has been much vilified during the last two decades as overly zealous with their conservative political and religious views.

Finally, Chapter 6 reviews the three sets of experiments in terms of the hypotheses. I attempt to form limited generalizations about what my findings mean for

attitudes about policy preferences. I also suggest areas of potential research based on my findings.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss my research design and its development in detail. I address three key points -- experimental design, selection of groups and research subjects. In the course of discussing my research design, I also review alternative methods of research and experimental designs that I opted not to use.

The unit of analysis for this project is the individual, not a group or an institution. Much has been written about the ability of groups and social movements to affect policy implementation, preservation and redirection through issue framing (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Snow *et al.* 1986). Likewise, numerous studies of the mass media provide evidence that it often relies upon, and reinforces stereotypes and group frames to shape the news (Dixon and Linz 2002; Dixon and Linz 2000; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989; Mendelberg 1997). While I use these studies to inform my understanding of dominant versus less powerful groups, the role of groups in policy debates and the important role of primes, my research seeks to explore psychological processes by which feelings about groups, especially one's own group, can affect change in individual support or opposition for a policy.

Experimental Research Design

To test my hypotheses about group primes and policy attitudes, I use the posttest-only control group design (Campbell and Stanley 1963). All research subjects were randomly assigned to one of four self-administered surveys - out-group treatment, in-group treatment, out-group control and in-group control. The subjects in the out-group

and in-group treatments received questionnaires that contained a block of questions probing their views of either an out-group (e.g., male subjects were asked about females) or an in-group (e.g., male subjects were asked about males). Members of the treatment groups received a survey that contained a block of four questions near the beginning of the survey. These questions asked how common the subject believed an attribute described their group or an out-group. For the treatment group, all four questions asked about negative attributes such as “emotional” for females or “aggressive” for males. Members of the control groups received questionnaires with a block of questions containing neutral group characteristics or traits. They provide context for research subjects to respond to the later questions about policy attitudes.

There are several important advantages of this research design. Most importantly, the posttest-only control group design increases internal validity by randomly assigning research subjects to a treatment or control. It is therefore possible to isolate the treatments as the cause of any changes in policy attitudes. Without the ability to randomly assign treatments, one is left with the alternative of comparing the results of surveys, preferably using the same respondents in a panel design, taken after policy debate or campaign in which few or no group references were used compared with debate or campaign in which negative group references were widely used toward one group. In the unlikely event that history and the existence of a suitable panel surveys met these requirements, it would still be virtually impossible to isolate the effects of group priming from other factors that may be related but difficult to measure.

The posttest-only control group design has the added advantage of convenience and simplicity in administering the questionnaires compared with research designs that

use pretests (Campbell and Stanley 1963, 25-26). In the case of my research, it would be particularly difficult to coordinate pre-and posttests.¹⁰ The pretest might come at the expense of research subject's feelings of trust and anonymity because identification numbers such as Social Security numbers would be necessary to match pre- and posttests. If there was not a sufficient lapse in time between the pretest and posttest, the pretest could potentially alert subjects to pay closer attention to the issues raised in the survey, which would lead to biased results in the posttest. With the inclusion of control groups in my research design, the information gained from the pretest would likely be of marginal value compared with the costs.

The primary disadvantage of this research design is a weak external validity. My experimental design can simulate aspects of negative priming during policy or political debates. But it is an imperfect simulation. Therefore, my conclusions are limited to psychological processes of individuals when their own group or an out-group is attacked. It is difficult to generalize the findings on policy attitudes. For instance, I cannot directly apply my findings to the Clinton-Lazio election. However, I can speculate based on the results of the analysis as well as suggest some directions for future research.

Context Effects

While this study uses priming to affect policy preferences, the research design might best be described as context effects. I incorporate context effects using a block of questions asking about specific negative characteristics and traits about the in-group and an out-group, thereby priming negative group attitudes. The attributes come from responses from eighty-seven undergraduate students to open-ended questions in the

¹⁰ I suspect that it would be particularly difficult to use a pretest and posttest for congregation members in churches. Later in this chapter, I will discuss my selection of religious groups and specific churches.

pretest of the survey instrument. The pre-test participants were asked to what three negative traits they thought were commonly used to describe members of six different groups. Then they were asked to rate how accurate these traits were in describing members of the groups, which was designed to offer the respondent a way to distance him or herself from potential taboo or insensitive statements about a group. The results were open-ended questions were used to shape existing survey questions used to explore perceptions of groups (Devine 1989; Domke *et al.* 1999; Power *et al.* 1996). Most recently, Domke and colleagues employed these survey questions to examine racial bias in the news media. I also made a slight revision in the question by reversing the order of responses from “1=very uncommon” and “7=very common” so that respondents will receive “1=very common” and “7=very uncommon” as reinforcement of the negative attitudes toward their group.

The basic logic of context effects, as well as priming and framing effects, argues that survey respondents make decisions off the top of their heads from a number of different considerations (Zaller 1992; Tourangeau *et al.* 2000). Their responses can be affected by small changes in question wording, response options (scaling or branching), and order (Schuman and Bobo 1988; Schuman and Presser 1981; Schuman *et al.* 1981; Schwarz *et al.* 1991; Sullivan *et al.* 1978). A classic example of the substantial effects of question order involves Communist reporters in the United States and American reporters in Russia in which a desire for consistency appeared to affect responses.¹¹ Likewise,

¹¹ When respondents were first ask about American reporters in Russia, they were very supportive of the right of American journalists to report stories from within Russia. However, they also expressed considerable support for the rights of Russian reporters in the U.S. When respondents were first ask about Communist reporters, they were far less supportive of their right to report in the U.S. compared to when the questions were reversed. Desire to be consistent contributed to fewer respondents supporting an American reporter’s right to report in Russia compared with the questions reversed.

studies of framing effects find that manipulations through question wording can reorder the weight that respondents give different arguments involving policy preferences, particularly when policy is linked to unpopular out-groups (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 1996; Nelson and Kinder 1996). Experiments involving agenda-setting and priming effects use more elaborate experimental designs through the editing of television news reports to demonstrate that news stories can affect which issues one views as most important and how one evaluates political figures and institutions (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

Likewise, context effects have been found to affect survey responses. Tourangeau and colleagues refer to context as “unconditional” effects in which subsequent questions are affected by context questions regardless of responses to those questions. They offer an example of unconditional effects from an earlier study (Tourangeau *et al.* 1989).

One group received a series of questions about the military threat posed by the Soviet Union just before the question on defense spending; a second group received a series of questions about the need for arms control before the defense spending question. Regardless of how they answered the Soviet threat items, the respondents who answered these questions first showed higher levels of support for increased defense spending than respondents in the other group. Evidently, even among those who did not see the Soviets as posing much of a threat, the questions still engendered favorable reactions to an increase in the defense budget (Tourangeau *et al.* 2000, 199).

Additionally, they believe that conditional effects occur when responses to context questions are important for determining the direction of response for the target questions as well as their correlations. In both cases, they argue that context affects survey responses. This study assumes that the context effects are unconditional.

As with any research design, there exist potential problems. Literature on context effects does not always support the hypothesis that question order matters. Question order or context is weak in cases in which the context questions are separated from the target question or if the context questions are scattered throughout the survey (Tourangeau *et al.* 1989). Furthermore, self-administered surveys find less than convincing evidence of order effect (Schwarz and Strack 1988; Schwarz and Hippler 1995). Unlike telephone interviews, researchers cannot control the order in which respondents answer question in a self-administered survey.

I have designed the experiment to minimize these potential problems. First, the context questions are administered as a block of four questions. This is an attempt to avoid the problem that Tourangeau and colleagues identified regarding sporadic use of context questions and targets. Second, respondents are instructed in writing and orally about the importance of answering the questions in order in which they appear in the survey and not to skip around from question to question.

There are certain benefits from using this research design. This method of experimentation permits me to expose respondents to a greater number of negative characteristics and thus a stronger treatment than one or two sentences in a shortened, manipulated newspaper article. It offers the opportunity to examine the effects on multiple issues rather than limiting the experiment to a few questions containing frames. Moreover, this research design is an experiment within an experiment. Not only does it seek to address my primary research question, it also introduces an experiment about true context effects not simply effects of question order because the experiment alters the context of virtually the entire survey instrument. Finally, because past research suggests

that context effects are minimal at best, any statistically significant results to policy preferences are even more impressive. The effect of the context primes demonstrate how powerful they are in shaping attitudes.

Selection of Groups

This study will examine three sets of groups – males and females, Caucasians and African Americans, and mainline and fundamentalist Protestants. Gender and religion experiments expand research about group primes beyond racial groups. Given the voluminous literature about the effect of racial primes, the race experiments have been included in this study as a baseline of comparison with gender and the religious groups. The race experiment also serves as a potential caveat to my hypothesis that exposure to negative out-group primes will affect dominant group members by increasing gaps in policy preferences.

For all three sets of groups, there exists considerable research about the sizable gaps in opinion for certain issue domains between the groups (Conover 1988; Jelen 1991; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999; Kellstedt and Corwin 1991; Kellstedt *et al.* 1994; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Page and Shapiro 1992; Smidt 1988). In the case of gender, men and women have different views of policies involving the use of violence and compassion issues. For race, there are sizable differences in attitudes concerning policies closely associated with racial issues such as affirmative action and social welfare, and policies marginally connected such as trust in government (Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996, 30-31). Research about religious groups finds a considerable gap in the attitudes of mainline and fundamentalist Protestants¹² over moral issues such as abortion and prayer

¹² Mainlines and fundamentalists represent opposite ends of the religious spectrum for Protestants. One major distinguishing trait is their view of Scripture. Fundamentalists hold that Scripture is inerrant, which

in school. This dissertation will examine the effect of negative primes on policies where past research would strongly suggest I should find differences in policy attitudes.

Particularly in the case of gender and race, there are clearly differences in group status and political influence. It is difficult to argue that equality in socioeconomic status and political representation exists between Caucasians and African Americans. One finds that African Americans have lower average incomes, lower education levels, and higher unemployment rates. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rate for whites has hovered around 5.0% during the first half of 2002. During the same time period, unemployment for African Americans has fluctuated between 9.6 and 11.2 percent. In the national politics, one finds that the Congressional Black Caucus has a mere thirty-eight members, including a delegate from the District of Columbia, out of five hundred thirty-five seats in Congress or roughly seven percent. When one compares the percent of African Americans in Congress to national population estimates (12.8% in 2000), one finds even greater disparity between the two racial groups.

In the case of gender, women have a slight numeric advantage over men in the United States with fifty-one percent. In the last forty years, they have made great strides in reducing their gap in education and income. However, top positions in private and public sections still show signs of the persistence of an “old boys” network. In 2001, there were only six female CEOs among Fortune 500 companies (*Fortune* 2001). The 107th Congress (2000-2002) has thirteen female senators and sixty-two representatives.

means that every word came directly from God. Mainlines maintain that Scripture is divinely inspired but it is shaped by the imperfect humans to wrote it.

For religious groups, I have selected two extremes within Protestantism. Mainline Protestants¹³ represent the extreme on the left and fundamentalists¹⁴ the right extreme both in Christian theology and politics. In the 1980s, fundamentalists revealed a renewed willingness to engage in the political process with their support for the Moral Majority, an interest group founded by Jerry Falwell in 1979, and Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. A growing number of scholars began to study the new Christian Right. They observed the opposition of fundamentalists to legal abortion, homosexuals in the armed forces, the Equal Rights Amendment, and their willingness to use military force in international conflicts (Jelen 1991; Kellstedt and Corwin 1991; Kellstedt *et al.* 1994; Smidt 1988). Meanwhile, mainline Protestants largely appear to be mirror opposites in their policy attitudes, which stem from their less literalistic view of the scripture, a more accepting attitude toward homosexuals as seen in their willingness to debate the issue of ordination of homosexuals, and a readiness to allow women to assume leadership roles within the church (Hunter 1990; Wuthnow 1988).

I find substantive differences in status between the two groups. When respondents are limited to Christians only in the 1996 Nation Election Study¹⁵, roughly three times as many respondents describe themselves as moderate to liberal compared to fundamentalists. There are clear socioeconomic differences between the two groups. Members of mainline denominations tend to have higher average education levels than fundamentalists (McSween 2000). Large mainline churches still command a certain

¹³ Generally accepted mainline denominations include Presbyterians (PCUSA), Episcopalians, some Baptists, Methodists, Congregationalists, Disciples of Christ, and Lutherans (ELCA) (Ahlstrom 1972; Hutchinson 1989).

¹⁴ Examples of fundamentalist denominations include Missouri Synod Lutherans and Southern Baptists (Ammerman 1990; Hill 1993; Winston 1993).

¹⁵ Note that the 2000 National Election Study did not contain a similar question about how the respondent would describe his or her kind of Christianity. The 1996 NES question is the most current data about religious traditions using a national random sample.

degree of prestige within their communities despite a sizable decline in their national membership.¹⁶ Moreover, fundamentalists represent an often vilified religious minority as one sees in results of the feeling thermometer¹⁷ question about fundamentalists.

...[R]oughly 15 percent of the total ANES samples (and approximately 20 percent of white non-Christian fundamentalists) harbored intensely antagonistic sentiments toward Christian fundamentalists – that is, they rated this group no higher than 30° on the absolute scale and at least 20° colder than the individual average mean rating for all the other groups (Bolce and de Maio 1999b, 513).

The research subjects of the experiments vary according to the groups. For the race and gender experiments, the subjects are undergraduate students at several academic institutions. For religious groups, I enlisted congregation members for the experiment. It is necessary to use congregation members rather than students because students at non-religious academic institutions are less likely to have a strong religious attachment. I selected churches that are members of denominations generally recognized as fundamentalist or mainline Protestant. I focus on particular denominations to reduce one of the problems identified by Lyman Kellstedt concerning religious identification. Kellstedt (1989) found that survey respondents frequently use multiple and often contradictory identifiers in expressing their religious identity. By selecting by denomination, I reduce some confusion caused by multiple responses by labeling the research subjects according to denomination. I will compare this label against a question asking the subject to describe their religious identity as fundamentalist, evangelical, charismatic, Pentecostal, mainline or other.

¹⁶ The percentages of mainline and fundamentalist Protestants serving in Congress are not available. Sources containing biographical information of members such as *The Almanac of American Politics* (2002) include only vague indication of religious identification. The information is insufficient to determine whether the denomination is mainline or fundamentalist. For example, Lutheran could either be Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, the mainline Lutheran denomination, or Missouri Synod Lutheran, the fundamentalist Lutheran denomination.

¹⁷ Feeling thermometers ask survey respondents how cold or warm they feel about a particular person or group with 0 as cold, 50 as neither cold nor warm, and 100 as warm.

Results of Survey Pretest

In March 2002, a pretest of the survey instrument was administered to eighty-seven undergraduates at Presbyterian College who were currently enrolled in a political science course. The sample demographics are clearly not representative of the nation as a whole (refer to Table 2.1). The sample is largely composed of males (64.0%) and Caucasians (87.2%). The median age of the sample is 20 years old compared with the national median of 35.8 years. Politically, this sample identifies far more with the Republican Party (48.6%) and less with the Democratic Party (24.3%)¹⁸ than the national average (24% Republican and 34% Democrat in 2000)¹⁹ (Abramson *et al.* 2002, 171). The mean of political ideology falls almost exactly on the point of “moderate, middle of the road.” Fortunately, the pretest was not designed to reflect national averages but to generate a list of negative group traits.

The pretest survey included a series of open-ended questions in which respondents were asked to think of three negative traits or characteristics that describe mainline Protestants, fundamentalist Protestants, Caucasians/whites, African Americans/blacks, men, and women. They were also asked to how well the characteristic describes the group – very well, fairly well, or not very well. Only 57.5% of the sample answered any of the open-end questions. Of those who did offer answers, mainline and fundamentalist Protestants proved more challenging than the other groups. However, the answers given for the two faith traditions closely matched my expectations.

¹⁸ Numbers for Republicans and Democrats comes from percentage estimated with “no preference” category as missing values.

¹⁹ Figures for party identification come from National Election Studies 2000 weighted data.

Table 2.1

Demographic and Political Characteristics	Percentages for Pretest	United States Census (2000)
Gender		
Male	64.0	49.1
Female	36.0	50.9
Race		
White	87.2	75.1
African American/Black	9.3	12.3
Asian	1.2	3.6
Other	2.3	9.0
Political Party		
Democrat	21.4	--
Republican	42.9	--
Independent	23.8	--
No preference	11.9	--
Political Ideology		
Extremely liberal	1.2	--
Liberal	16.7	--
Somewhat liberal	22.6	--
Moderate, middle of the road	21.4	--
Somewhat conservative	15.5	--
Conservative	20.2	--
Extremely conservative	2.4	--
(<i>Mean</i> = 4.03)		

The top four results of the open-end questions for group traits appear below (Figure 2.1). The results of the open-end responses were reinforced and modified with results from other studies about negative traits associated with race such as African Americans being lazy (Devine 1989; Gaertner and McLaughlin 1983; Kawakami *et al.* 1998; Krueger 1996; Lepore and Brown 1997) and gender such as females being emotional (Ashmore and Del Boca 1979; Banaji *et al.* 1993; Bem 1974; Jackman and Senter 1980; McCauley and Thangavelu 1991). The results for the religious groups were modified using characteristics mentioned in the mass media (i.e., “zealous” fundamentalist or “frozen chosen” for mainlines). Given that most research has focused

Figure 2.1

Caucasians/whites <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oppressive • Elitist • Racist • Materialistic 	African Americans/blacks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quick to blame others • Lazy • Violent • Poor
Males <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domineering • Chauvinist/sexist • Arrogant/cocky • Aggressive/violent 	Females <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emotional • Passive/weak • Demanding • Conniving/scheming
Mainline Protestants <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liberal • Boring/uptight • Self-centered • Elitist²⁰ 	Fundamentalist Protestants <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremist • Close-minded • Conservative • Racist

on race and the perception of traits associated with African Americans, the pretest was particularly valuable for the gender and religious groups.

Finally, the neutral traits for the control groups used two techniques. The first experiment that I conducted was the gender experiment. The neutral traits in the gender study were adjectives that do not describe humans – clear, drafty, leafy, and green. This technique for the neutral characteristics is similar to those used for response time experiments by psychologists in which subjects are primed with adjectives not appropriate for humans or non-sense words (Gaertner and McLaughlin 1983). In the race and religion experiments, the neutral traits were changed to traits that might describe humans but were not directly relevant to either racial or religious groups (clear, shy, jumpy, and quaint). The neutral traits were developed from the middle range of

²⁰ The fifth characteristic listed for mainline Protestant was “hypocritical.”

likeability ratings of five hundred fifty-five personality-traits (Anderson 1968).²¹ I changed the neutral traits used in the experiments in response to a concern that research subjects in the gender experiment found the neutral traits confusing.

Statistical Models

Finally, it is necessary to briefly discuss the statistical models used the dissertation. Most of the analysis in the dissertation relies on tests comparing statistical differences between group using Pearson *chi*-square and analysis of variance. For the multivariate analysis, I use maximum likelihood estimation because it contains properties of consistency, efficiency, asymptotic normality, and invariance (Long 1997, 33). Because they have binary and ordinal categories, the dependent variables are good candidates for ML estimation. For hypothesis testing by which insignificant variables can be reduced from the model, I use the Wald, or Score, test (Long 1997, Chapter 4). The Wald test is roughly equivalent to other tests such as the Likelihood Ratio test and the Lagrange Multiplier test but has the slight advantage of simplicity in programming in STATA. All the probit and order probit models in this dissertation were initial run with both party identification and ideology. If either or both variables were statistically insignificant according to the Wald test, it was dropped in favor of presenting a simpler model with a stronger goodness of fit for the overall model.

²¹ For specific list of traits used in all experiments, please refer to Appendix A.

Chapter 3: Race Experiments

Introduction

Perhaps now more than ever, coded language and symbolism dominate politics as Senator Pete V. Dimenici lamented about politicians to *The Washington Post* reporter Helen Dewar, “We’re getting better at symbolism. You need more symbols when you don’t have much substance” (Dewar 1991). Coded language and its effects are particularly prevalent in the politics of race (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991, Ch. 10; Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gilens 1999; Jamieson 1992; Mendelberg 1997, 2001). Controversial campaign ads for President George Bush (1988) and Senator Jesse Helms (1990) played indirectly to negative stereotypes of African Americans through the use of visual ads. In the case of President Bush, an ad entitled “Weekend Passes” criticized presidential candidate Michael Dukakis’s decision as the governor of Massachusetts to allow the weekend furloughs for first-degree murders in contrast to Bush’s support for the death penalty. The ad shows a mug shot of an African-American male, Willie Horton. The narrator says, “Despite a life sentence, Horton received 10 weekend passes from prison. Horton fled, kidnapped a young couple, stabbing the man and repeatedly raping his girlfriend.” In the case of Senator Helms, his ad showed a pair of white hands crumpling a piece of paper. The narrator says, “You needed that job, you were the best qualified. But they gave it to a minority because of racial quotas. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is.” The final image of the ad shows a handshake between a white hand and a black hand indicating that an African American was awarded the job.

Both Bush and Helms's ads evoke easily accessible stereotypes about African Americans without ever explicitly stating them as Senator Clinton's campaign did when it labeled its male challenger as an aggressive bully. Bush's "Weekend Passes" ad evokes stereotypes about African-American males as violent, criminal and dangerous. Helms's racial quota ad elicits stereotypes about African Americans as lazy and lacking a strong work ethic. The Bush and Helms ads were credited by many with helping win the votes of whites. For Helms, the ad may have meant victory in a tight election.²² In addition to contribution of these campaign ads to possible electoral victories, they also contribute to the continuing racial gap between whites and African Americans. For instance, whites are less inclined to support federal spending for welfare programs as they have increasingly been linked to blacks (Gilens 1999).

The Racial Gap

One of the most enduring gaps in public opinion appears between African Americans and whites. In 1954, Berelson and colleagues noted that African Americans were more likely to vote for Democrats than Republicans because of "the relief and welfare programs of the New Deal" (Berelson *et al.* 1954, 73). In the fifty years since they conducted their research, U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the "separate but equal" doctrine in the case, *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* (1954), and Congress passed the groundbreaking Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Through affirmative action and equal rights legislation, African Americans gained unprecedented access to institutions of higher education and new job opportunities. During this fifty year period, the racial gap between identification with one of the two major political

²² Senator Jesse Helms won with 52.5% of the vote despite polls prior to the election which indicated that Harvey Gantt, the African-American mayor of Charlotte, held a narrow lead (Jamieson 1992).

parties increased with African Americans as they expressed strong support for the Democratic Party in response to issues that affect their group (Dawson 1994, 109).²³ Meanwhile, Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Miller (1991) argue that party realignment had occurred among whites, particularly among Southerners, as the Democratic and Republican Party became polarized along racial issues.²⁴ In the South, the once single-party dominance of the Democratic Party gradually gave way to challenges from the Republican Party as they captured state houses, seats in Congress, and won gubernatorial elections.

The racial gap clearly exists in a range of public policies, particularly in the case of racial policies both explicit policies such as preferential hiring and programs that assist blacks, and implicit policies such as sanctions on South African in the 1980s and federal support for education (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 30). In addition to these policies, there is a substantial divide between African Americans and whites regarding support of social welfare programs for which the popular perception views African Americans as the primary recipients (Gilens 1999). They also appear for issues involving trust in government and use of force that might seem unrelated to racial or social welfare policies. Examining public opinion from 1986 to 1992 on a range of issues, Kinder and Sanders found that African Americans were less trusting of government, less supportive

²³Perceptions of how hard the two major political parties work on issues important to African Americans taken from the 1984-1988 National Black Election Panel Study.

	1984		1988	
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
Not hard at all	6	37	8	34
Not too hard	20	38	20	33
Fairly hard	46	15	50	24
Very hard	28	10	22	9

²⁴ Abramowitz and Saunders argue that party realignment was based on ideological realignment rather than racial attitudes (Abramowitz 1994; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). However, this view is less widely accepted among political scientists.

of the war against Iraq in 1991, and expressed greater support for more open immigration policies compared with white survey respondents (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 30).

The extent to which the attitudes of Caucasians are driven by racial resentment or racism is topic of considerable debate. Mass media scholars point to the skewed image that broadcast media shapes for the poverty. For instance, studies of news content demonstrates that local reporting of crime stories suggest that black criminals and white victims are far more likely to make the news compared with the actual percentages of such cases (Dixon and Linz 2002). Political scientists point to overt versus more subtle forms of racism. Overlaying these different perspectives, the role of racial stereotypes is evident. As discussed in Chapter 1, racial stereotypes are deep-rooted and easily accessible. Reinforcement of negative black stereotypes such as lazy or violent through photos of a black welfare mother, or survey questions that remind respondents that some think blacks haven't earned advantages such as racial quotas have robust effects on policy preferences.

For scholars of the mass media, declining support for social welfare policies by whites is closely associated the media's portrayal of poverty as having a black face. Media studies find the face of crime and poverty in broadcast news is largely dominated images of African Americans (Dixon and Linz 2000). These images do not necessarily correspond with reality. Martin Gilens writes,

“...even those definitions [of the underclass] that result in the highest percentages of African Americans consider the underclass to include at least 40 percent nonblacks, in contrast to the magazine [*Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News and World Report* between 1950 and 1992] portrait of the underclass as 100 percent black (Gilens 1999, 129).

These images have an effect on public support for social welfare policies. Gilens argues that the decrease in support for welfare is attributable to the image of poverty as a problem for blacks, not whites (Gilens 1999).

Given the prevalence of black stereotypes and negative media images, political scientists have questioned to what extent are the attitudes of whites affected by overt racism versus racism concealed as symbolic racism or racial resentment. Sniderman and colleagues (1991) contend that an overt racism affects the opposition of Caucasians toward racial equality policies as measured by subtracting the feeling thermometer score for whites from the feeling thermometer score for blacks. In their research on reasoning chains, their results show that a unit increase in positive affect toward blacks decreases the opposition to racial equality policies, particularly for individuals with little education (Sniderman *et al.* 1991, 84 and 86). However, other scholars argue that white attitudes are driven more by symbolic racism or racial resentment by which whites express their negative views of African Americans through belief that they do not live up to values such as a strong work ethic, thereby concealing an overtly racist view which is socially unacceptable (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConohay 1986). As part of their research, Kinder and Sanders examined the effect of different questions, which contain policy frames commonly encountered in the mass media (Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1987), have on policy attitudes. They found that the respondents gave greater weight to racial resentment in determining their policy preferences for government assistance to blacks and affirmative action when they received the reverse discrimination framed question (Kinder and Sanders, Ch. 7).

There is creditable evidence to support the claim that white Americans feel a sense of racial resentment toward African Americans. As discussed in Chapter 1, racial resentment or negative racial predisposition plays an important role in the attitudes of whites toward political candidates and policies when research subjects are primed with negative images of blacks (Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Valentino *et al.* 2002). When the primes run counter to stereotype or are too explicit, the effect of racial resentment is diminished (Mendelberg 2001, 200; Valentino *et al.* 2002, 81, 85-86).

Studies examining another potential source of the racial gap, self-interest, have found little evidence to suggest that it is driving attitudes towards policies such as busing (Sears *et al.* 1979; Sears *et al.* 1980; Gatlin *et al.* 1980; McConahay 1982; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996). In these and other studies, attitudes are strongly affected by symbolic or modern racism although at least one study about race-related attitudes suggests that self-interest can affect action rather than attitudes (Green and Cowden 1992). In a study of attitudes about the reapportionment of school funding, Tedin (1994) found that self-interest may have a greater effect on symbolic values, which in turn affect policy preferences. While self-interest generally does not appear to be a major factor in respondents' opinions, there is support for group interest (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Nelson and Kinder 1996). These studies suggest that individuals view certain policies as advantageous or threatening to their racial group. For instance, whites feel threatened by affirmative action policies when the questions explicitly pit black against white. As these studies have shown, there still exists a deep racial divide in which the attitudes of white respondents are affected by their perceptions of African Americans and their acceptance of racial stereotypes.

In conclusion, the racial gap between whites and blacks appears on a range of policies, especially those which appear to have explicit links with African Americans such as affirmative action and social welfare spending. When whites believe that a policy chiefly benefits African Americans, their attitudes often reflect resentment toward blacks through less support for these programs. As literature about framing and priming suggests, the attitudes and resentments of whites are in some ways malleable through the influence of subtle cues in political communication be it the image of an impoverished African American, or a question that sets blacks against whites (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Valentino *et al.* 2002). Their attitudes may also be affected when they believe that their racial group is in some way threatened, not just in the individual self-interest of survey respondent. In general, these studies suggest that the research subjects in my study should express different degrees of support for policies according to their racial/ethnic group. More specifically, the negative racial primes will affect the racial gap. In this study, the racial primes are a series of questions about how common four negative traits are among either whites or blacks. Because one of the treatments includes primes that are overtly negative toward African Americans, Mendelberg's research would suggest that the Caucasian subjects will express attitudes in that are more supportive of racial equality than subjects who do not receive the African-American treatment because the explicit nature of the primes have forced the respondents to think explicitly about race and their commitment to norms of equality. In addition, the negative white primes should have little effect on either black or white subjects because they are seen as running counter to racial stereotypes (Valentino *et al.* 2002).

Data and Methodology

In the race experiments, research subjects were undergraduates in four political science courses and one Afro-American studies course at the University of Virginia and Howard University. A total of three hundred and eight students participated in the study. Forty-six students were dropped from the study because they described their racial/ethnic group as one other than Caucasian or African American.²⁵ In order to obtain a large enough sample of African Americans, it was necessary to oversample black students. To this end, I surveyed additional undergraduates at the University of Virginia and included students from Howard University, a predominately African-American institution. The completed sample resulted in one hundred sixty-eight subjects identifying themselves as Caucasian/white; ninety-four identify themselves as African American/black.

The research subjects were told that the survey was part of a dissertation about racial and political attitudes. They were instructed to answer the questions in the order in which they appeared in the survey. The order of the questions was particularly important because the experiment relied on manipulating the context of the surveys in order to affect policy preferences on a range of issues. However, the subjects could skip any questions that they didn't wish to answer. Finally, they were instructed that more than one survey would be distributed and they were not to discuss the survey questions with each other until after they had completed it.

Unbeknownst to the subjects, they were randomly assigned to one of four groups – negative primes for whites (33.4%), negative primes for African Americans (32.1%), neutral primes for whites (17.2%), or neutral primes for African Americans (17.2%). The

²⁵ Mainly, these respondents listed the Asian (17 subjects), other (27 subjects), or refused to answer to race question (2 subjects).

Table 3.1

Demographic Characteristics	Percentages for Research Subjects	Percentages for United States (2000)	Percentages for Virginia (2000)
Gender			
Male	41.8	49.1	49.0
Female	58.2	50.9	51.0
Hispanic Identity			
Yes	4.2	12.0	4.7
No	95.8	88.0	95.3
Race/Ethnicity			
White	54.9	75.1	72.3
African American	30.7	12.3	19.6
Asian	5.6	3.6	3.7
Other	8.8	9.0	4.4
Year in College			
1 st	18.8	--	--
2 nd	23.4	--	--
3 rd	38.0	--	--
4 th	17.9	--	--
5 th or more	1.9	--	--

negative and neutral primes appeared near the beginning of the surveys (refer to Appendix A). The group primes consisted of four questions asking the research subject how common he or she believed a list of traits or attributes described a particularly racial group. The negative traits used for the negative white and black primes were included because they were the most common answers to open-ended questions in a pre-test given to undergraduates at Presbyterian College in March 2002 and they received high scores in past research about commonly held racial stereotypes (Devine 1989; Gaertner and McLaughlin 1983; Kawakami *et al.* 1998; Krueger 1996; Lepore and Brown 1997; Stephan and Rosenfield 1982).

As Table 3.1 demonstrates, this sample is not representative of the national or state population. The sample has a much larger proportion of African Americans because

it was necessary to oversample in order to gather a larger enough sample for statistical analysis. However, the percentage of persons of Hispanic descent is very similar to percentage found in the state of Virginia. Because the sample is drawn from undergraduates at two universities, it is not surprising that the median age is 21 years old, which is nearly fifteen years younger than the median national age (35.8). The largest percentage of students (38%) was in their third year of college. This sample also contains a larger percentage of female students than the national average.

The Racial Gap in the Race Experiments

The survey used for the race experiments concentrates on issues in which the literature strongly suggests I should find racial differences between Caucasians and African Americans. Indeed the racial gap is dramatic. I will examine the racial gap for five policy domains – social welfare and education spending issues, crime and military issues, racial policies, causes of poverty, and issues of equal opportunity. Tables 3.2 through 3.6 show only issues in which there was a statistically significant difference ($p < .05$) in two-tailed tests.

In Table 3.2, I find stark differences in the attitudes of whites and African Americans on social welfare and education spending issues. African-American subjects in the study expressed overwhelming support for increases in spending for aid to the poor (76.3%), federal assistance for blacks (80.6%), health care (84.9%), Medicaid and Medicare (72.0%), public schools (96.8%), and Social Security (63.7%). White subjects were roughly twenty to thirty percentage points less supportive of spending increases for these programs. In the case of assistance for blacks, only twenty-one percent of whites supported spending increases compared with roughly eighty-one percent of African

Table 3.2

Social Welfare and Education Spending Issues	White	Percentages African American	Difference*
Aid to Poor People			
Increase	47.3	76.3	-29.0
Same	44.2	21.5	22.7
Decrease	8.5	2.2	6.3
Assistance for Blacks			
Increase	21.0	80.6	-59.6
Same	56.2	18.3	37.9
Decrease	22.8	1.1	21.7
Health Care Spending			
Increase	57.7	84.9	-27.2
Same	36.2	15.1	21.1
Decrease	6.1	0.0	6.1
Medicaid and Medicare			
Increase	40.8	72.0	-31.2
Same	50.3	26.9	23.4
Decrease	8.9	1.1	7.8
Public Schools Funding			
Increase	84.2	96.8	-12.6
Same	14.5	2.2	12.3
Decrease	1.2	1.1	0.1
School Vouchers			
Favor	33.1	56.4	-23.3
Oppose	66.9	43.6	23.3
Social Security			
Increase	41.4	63.7	-22.3
Same	48.8	31.9	16.9
Decrease	9.9	4.4	5.5
Welfare			
Increase	29.7	41.9	-12.2
Same	43.6	47.3	-3.7
Decrease	26.7	10.8	15.9

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the whites and African Americans according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of white subjects minus opinion of African-American subjects.

Table 3.3

Spending on Issues of Law Enforcement and Defense	White	Percentages African American	Difference*
Dealing with Crime			
Increase	53.9	67.7	-13.8
Same	42.4	30.1	12.3
Decrease	3.6	2.2	1.4
Dealing with the Drug Problem			
Increase	29.4	63.4	-34.0
Same	41.1	23.7	17.4
Decrease	29.4	12.9	16.5
Defense			
Increase	33.9	18.7	15.2
Same	40.0	44.0	-4.0
Decrease	26.1	37.4	-11.3

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the whites and African Americans according to Pearson *chi-square* in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of white subjects minus opinion of African-American subjects.

Table 3.4

Racial Policies	White	Percentages African American	Difference*
Equal opportunity for blacks and whites is very important but it's not really the government's job to guarantee it.			
Strongly agree	12.5	2.1	10.4
Somewhat agree	26.2	9.6	16.6
Neither agree nor disagree	10.7	7.4	3.3
Somewhat disagree	30.4	35.1	-4.7
Strongly disagree	20.2	45.7	-25.5
Government should help blacks			
Government should help blacks	8.3	25.6	-17.3
•	7.0	18.6	-11.6
•	20.4	25.6	-5.2
•	21.0	18.9	2.1
•	22.9	5.6	17.3
•	14.6	3.3	11.3
Blacks should help themselves	5.7	2.2	3.5
Colleges and universities should reserve openings for black students through quotas			
Strongly favor	13.3	45.2	-31.9
Not so strongly favor	20.6	45.2	-24.6
Not so strongly oppose	29.1	5.4	23.7
Strongly oppose	37.0	4.3	32.7

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the whites and African Americans according to Pearson *chi-square* in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of white subjects minus opinion of African-American subjects.

Americans, a sixty percent difference in support. Blacks were also more supportive of spending increases for welfare and school vouchers. In the case of welfare, both whites and blacks predominately supported maintaining current spending levels. In the issue of school vouchers, two-thirds of whites opposed using tax funds for school vouchers that could be used for the school of the parents' choice. However, a majority of African Americans supported school vouchers, which matches recent studies of school choice and vouchers (Rose and Gallup 2002).

Regarding issues involving crime and military issues, I again find sizable racial differences. Roughly two-thirds of African Americans support spending increases for federal programs dealing with crime and the drug problem. In contrast, a slight majority of whites supports increasing spending to deal with crime and a plurality supporting maintaining current spending levels for the drug problem. In the case of spending on defense, a plurality of both Caucasians and African Americans support maintaining current spending levels. Africans Americans are more likely to express support for decreases spending while Caucasians are more likely to support spending increases.

Not surprisingly, I find dramatic racial differences in support for explicit racial policies such as racial quotas for colleges and universities (Table 3.4). African-American subjects were much more likely to disagree either somewhat or strongly (80.8%) with the statement that equal opportunity is not the job of government to guarantee. A slim majority of white subjects (50.6%) disagreed with the statement. In the case of government effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks, African Americans were supportive of a role for government in helping blacks while whites were more likely to support views in between government support and the view that blacks

should help themselves. Finally, the issue of quotas for colleges and universities is one that is highly salient to the population of this sample of currently enrolled undergraduate students, particularly in light of recent policy changes by a number of states and challenges to racial quotas before the U.S. Supreme Court. I find that black subjects were overwhelmingly supportive (90.4%) of racial quotas for colleges and universities. In contrast, sixty-six percent of white research subjects oppose the racial quotas.

In Table 3.5, I find that whites and African Americans have very different perspectives about the causes of poverty. African-American subjects expressed views that individuals are poor because they have inadequate work ethic. In three of five questions regarding the causes of poverty, there were statistically significant differences between whites and African Americans, which are presented above. A majority of whites disagree with the statement, “The poor are poor because the wealthy and powerful keep them poor.” However, a large majority (71.0%) of African Americans agree either strongly or somewhat with the statement. Similarly, a majority of Caucasians disagree with the statement, “The poor are poor because the American way of life doesn’t give all people an equal chance.” Again, most (84.9%) of black subjects agree with the statement. Concerning the work ethic of poor individuals, a majority of white subjects (58.1%) agreed that anyone could get a job if he or she wanted one while a majority of blacks (64.9%) disagreed.

I find similar results in Table 3.6 regarding issues of equal opportunity. African Americans were extremely supportive of governmental actions to ensure equal opportunity for all (Equal 1 and 6) compared with whites. They strongly disagreed with

Table 3.5

Causes of Poverty	White	Percentages African American	Difference*
Wealthy and powerful keep them poor			
Strongly agree	7.8	21.5	-13.7
Somewhat agree	30.1	49.5	-19.4
Somewhat disagree	34.3	22.6	11.7
Strongly disagree	27.7	6.5	21.2
American way of life doesn't give all people an equal chance			
Strongly agree	15.7	38.7	-23
Somewhat agree	24.1	46.2	-22.1
Somewhat disagree	35.5	9.7	25.8
Strongly disagree	24.7	5.4	19.3
Anyone who wants to work can get a job			
Strongly agree	17.4	4.3	13.1
Somewhat agree	40.7	30.9	9.8
Somewhat disagree	31.1	31.9	-0.8
Strongly disagree	10.8	33.0	-22.2

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the whites and African Americans according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of white subjects minus opinion of African-American subjects.

statements that suggested that actions to provide equal opportunity has gone too far (Equal 2) or that it is not that big of a problem (Equal 3 and 4). Rather African-American subjects believed that it should be a high priority for society (Equal 1). While whites generally held views similar to African Americans (Equal 1 through 5), they were far less enthusiastic about endorsing the view that equal opportunity should be an important priority for the country. They were also more likely to express ambiguous attitudes about equal opportunity as shown in the subjects expressing that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the statements.

Table 3.6

		Percentages		
	Issues of Equal Opportunity	White	African American	Difference*
Equal 1	Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.			
	Strongly agree	44.9	73.1	-28.2
	Somewhat agree	35.9	21.5	14.4
	Neither	8.4	1.1	7.3
	Somewhat disagree	9.6	2.2	7.4
	Strongly disagree	1.2	2.2	-1.0
Equal 2	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.			
	Strongly agree	6.0	1.1	4.9
	Somewhat agree	13.8	3.2	10.6
	Neither	16.8	3.2	13.6
	Somewhat disagree	28.1	17.0	11.1
	Strongly disagree	35.3	75.5	-40.2
Equal 3	This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.			
	Strongly agree	2.4	3.2	-0.8
	Somewhat agree	15.6	2.1	13.5
	Neither	14.4	1.1	13.3
	Somewhat disagree	33.5	23.4	10.1
	Strongly disagree	34.1	70.2	-36.1
Equal 4	It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.			
	Strongly agree	3.0	0.0	3.0
	Somewhat agree	14.4	2.2	12.2
	Neither	18.6	11.8	6.8
	Somewhat disagree	32.9	25.8	7.1
	Strongly disagree	31.1	60.2	-29.1
Equal 5	If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.			
	Strongly agree	16.2	37.2	-21.0
	Somewhat agree	30.5	42.6	-12.1
	Neither	19.8	5.3	14.5
	Somewhat disagree	26.3	12.8	13.5
	Strongly disagree	7.2	2.1	5.1
Equal 6	One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.			
	Strongly agree	14.5	48.9	-34.4
	Somewhat agree	21.1	34.0	-12.9
	Neither	16.3	10.6	5.7
	Somewhat disagree	31.9	3.2	28.7
	Strongly disagree	16.3	3.2	13.1

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the whites and African Americans according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of white subjects minus opinion of African-American subjects.

In addition to the range of differences in policy attitudes, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 demonstrate the differences between whites and African Americans in their party identification and ideology. The African-American subjects more strongly identified with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology compared to white subjects. In fact, no black subjects identified themselves as strong or weak Republicans. Only one African American identified him/herself as an independent leaning Republican. Similarly, no African American identified him/herself as conservative or strongly conservative. By contrast, whites were more bimodal in the distribution of their party identity and ideology.

Table 3.7

Party Identification	Percentages		
	White	African American	Difference*
Strong Democrat	24.6	29.8	-5.2
Not very strong Democrat	14.4	28.7	-14.3
Independent, leaning Democrat	13.2	27.7	-14.5
Independent, other, and apolitical	6.0	12.8	-6.8
Independent, leaning Republican	4.8	1.1	3.7
Not very strong Republican	21.0	0.0	21.0
Strong Republican	16.2	0.0	16.2
Means	3.80	2.27	1.53

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .000$) between whites and African Americans according to Pearson *chi*-square.

Party Identity: 1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican

* Difference is calculated as opinion of white subjects minus opinion of African-American subjects.

Table 3.8

Ideology	White	Percentages	
		African American	Difference*
Extremely liberal	8.4	10.8	-2.4
Liberal	28.1	40.9	-12.8
Somewhat liberal	17.4	18.3	-0.9
Moderate	9.0	23.7	-14.7
Somewhat conservative	21.6	6.5	15.1
Conservative	12.6	0.0	12.6
Extremely conservative	3.0	0.0	3.0
Means	3.57	2.74	0.83

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .000$) between whites and African Americans according to Pearson *chi*-square.

Ideology: 1=Extremely liberal, 7=Extremely conservative

* Difference is calculated as opinion of white subjects minus opinion of African-American subjects.

Next, I examine how whites and blacks view their own racial/ethnic group and the other in terms of their feelings about each group and their assessment of the negative group traits used in the group primes. Not surprisingly, both racial groups express warmer views toward their own racial group than the other racial group. In the case of whites, the differences between the feeling thermometers for blacks and whites are close with roughly seven percent difference in scores. However, there is a substantial difference (31.1 points) between the mean scores of blacks and whites for black subjects. African Americans give their own group a score thirteen percent higher on average than whites give their own racial group. With regards to the group primes, these differences between whites and blacks were most prominent for the negative group primes about whites.

Table 3.9

Feeling Thermometer Scores for Racial Groups	Means	
	White	African American
Blacks	70.9	90.4
Whites	77.7	59.3

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .000$) between whites and African Americans according to ANOVA tests.

Feeling Thermometers: 0=Cold, 100=Warm

Table 3.10

	Racial Traits	Means	
		White	African American
African American	Aggressive	4.06	3.78
	Hostile*	4.54	3.82
	Lazy	4.56	4.68
	Criminal	4.17	4.25
White	Oppressive	4.74	4.26
	Elitist*	3.59	2.78
	Racist*	4.06	3.16
	Act superior*	3.71	2.50

Note: Traits were scored from 1=very common and 7=very uncommon.

* = $p < .05$ in ANOVA tests between whites and African Americans

For the racial traits, the different attitudes of whites and blacks are more evident with regard to the negative traits for whites, not blacks. For each of the traits in the negative white treatment, Caucasians were on average more likely to say that each trait was common for their racial group than their scores for African Americans, which is reflected in the higher scores for the African-American traits than many of the traits for whites. On average, the African-American research subjects believed that many of the negative traits were common for whites such as elitist, racist and act superior. Unlike the example of the primes for blacks, there was a significant difference between the attitudes of whites and blacks for almost every negative white trait.

There were few racial differences between whites and blacks for the negative African-American traits. Whites were more likely to view the negative traits for aggressive and hostile as uncommon for blacks compared with the responses given by African Americans about their own racial group. However, African Americans were slightly more resistant to the negative characterization of members of their racial group as lazy or criminal. There was only a significant difference in the case of hostility.

Tests of Priming Hypotheses – White Subjects

It appears that my sample of white and black undergraduates mirrors many of the racial gaps in political attitudes, which are commonly found in the literature. Next, I turn to the hypotheses regarding the effects of the experimental treatments. The whites represent the dominant racial group. As such, I hypothesize that they are more likely to be affected by negative out-group primes (**H2**) than negative in-group primes (**H1**). The out-group primes are similar to the framing experiments to which a negative out-group is specifically referred in a survey question (Nelson and Kinder 1996). Negative out-group primes will increase racial gap by further pushing white subjects against social welfare programs, more negative views about the poor as responsible for their own actions, and equal opportunities as something that our country has already obtained. However, the Mendelberg hypothesis (**H2a**) argues for the reverse. It states that the explicit negative racial primes will stimulate for white respondents issues involving support for equality, which will result in their increased support for social welfare and racial policies.

At first glance, the results of the group primes appear to be rather limited in the case of white research subjects. There were no statistically significant effects when comparing the negative black primes, negative white primes, and combined control

Table 3.11

Causes of Poverty	Percentages of White Research Subjects	
	African-American Primes	All Other Primes
Wealthy and powerful keep them poor		
Strongly agree	10.3	6.5
Somewhat agree	29.3	30.6
Somewhat disagree	44.8	28.7
Strongly disagree	15.5	34.3
Simply don't want to work hard		
Strongly agree	7.0	9.3
Somewhat agree	24.6	38.9
Somewhat disagree	28.1	34.3
Strongly disagree	40.4	17.6

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between those who received the out-group primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for white research subjects only.

groups. When I examine the effect of the negative white or black group primes compared with the other groups combined, I find that the negative white primes significantly affect only one policy, ban on handguns. In Table 3.11, white subjects were less likely to strongly disagree and more likely to somewhat disagree with the statement, “The poor are poor because the wealthy and powerful keep them poor.” The negative black primes shift opinion more toward disagreement with the statement. The opinion of the treatment group for African-American primes is similar to those held by the African-American research subjects.²⁶ They were much more likely to strongly disagree with the statements, “Many poor people simply don’t want to work hard.” Whites who received the negative black primes more strongly disagreed with the statement than the African-

²⁶ Strongly agree = 21.5%; Somewhat agree = 49.5%; Somewhat disagree = 22.6%; Strongly disagree = 6.5%

Table 3.12**Ordered Probit Model for Equal Opportunities**

Variables	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
African-American Primes	.250 (.206)
White Primes	.652 (.221)**
Ideology	-.485 (.059)**
Feeling Thermometer for Blacks	.010 (.005)**
Cut1	-2.781
Cut2	-1.800
Cut3	-1.138
Cut4	-.194

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Feeling thermometer is coded 0=cold and 100=warm.

The dependent variable is coded 1=strongly agree and 5=strongly disagree.

Only white research subjects were included.

** = $p < .050$

Table 3.13**Predicted Probabilities for Equal Opportunity**

with Ideology and Feeling Thermometer set at mean

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
White Primes	.009	.067	.140	.340	.445
No Primes	.042	.173	.228	.343	.213

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only white research subjects were included.

American subjects.²⁷ The narrowing of the racial gap due to the negative out-group primes would appear to contradict my hypothesis that the negative out-group primes will increase the racial gap (**H2**). However, it does support the Mendelberg hypothesis for race (**H2a**).

As the next several tables will reveal, these results conceal a far more interesting story about the effects of the group primes when I look at statistical models that control for variables such as party identification, ideology and feelings toward blacks. In most of the models in which one of the group primes affected policy preferences, it is the negative African-American primes that have a statistically significant effect per my hypothesis that dominant group members are more likely to be affected by attacks on the less powerful group (**H2**). In one instance, the negative white primes have a significant effect on the policy preferences of the research subjects contrary to my hypothesis that in-group primes will have not affect for dominant group members (**H1**) (Table 3.12). Not only do the negative white primes have a significant effect, but increase the likelihood that whites will disagree with the statement, “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.” As one might expect, conservative ideology increases the likelihood that they will agree with the statement. Warmer feelings toward blacks as measured by the feeling thermometer increases the likelihood of disagreeing with the statement.²⁸

Table 3.13 demonstrated the effects of the negative white primes on the predicted probabilities for equal opportunities/rights with ideology and the feeling thermometers

²⁷ Strongly agree = 5.4%; Somewhat agree = 22.6%; Somewhat disagree = 35.5%; Strongly disagree = 36.6%

²⁸ Affect toward blacks, which was measured by the feeling thermometer, did not affect policy attitudes of any of the other models in which either the in-group or out-group treatments were statistically significant.

Table 3.14**Ordered Probit Models for Social Welfare Spending**

Variables	Aid to Poor	Medicaid and Medicare
African-American Primes	.432 (.234)*	.428 (.230)*
White Primes	.098 (.237)	.161 (.233)
Party Identity	--	-.241 (.045)**
Ideology	-.459 (.066)**	--
Cut1	-3.245	-2.280
Cut2	-1.33	-.440

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Dependent variables are coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.

Only white research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Table 3.15**Predicted Probabilities for Social Welfare Spending**

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
<i>Aid to Poor</i> ^a			
African-American Primes	.024	.425	.551
No Primes	.059	.562	.379
<i>Medicaid and Medicare</i> ^b			
African-American Primes	.040	.472	.488
No Primes	.090	.588	.322

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only white research subjects were included.

^a = Ideology set at mean

^b = Party identity set at mean

for blacks set at their mean. Clearly the white prime has the greatest effect on strongly disagreeing with the statement that the country has gone too far for equal rights. The in-group prime increases the predicted probability of strongly disagreeing with the statement from .21 to .45. Though the effect of the negative white primes does not result in percentages that resemble the strong disagreement of African Americans (75.5%) in Table 3.6, it appears that attacks on one's own racial group that includes "racist" and "oppressive" does slightly narrow the wide gap between all white subjects (35.3%) and blacks subjects (75.5%).

Predominately, the white research subjects were affected by the negative black primes. The out-group primes do not increase the racial gap. Rather it appears that the negative black primes decreased the racial gap. Those who received the negative African-American primes became more supportive of federal spending for aid to the poor, and Medicaid and Medicare, which supports the Mendelberg hypothesis (**H2a**) (Table 3.14). For both social welfare programs, every unit increase in conservative or Republican identification decreases support to additional government spending. Table 3.15 demonstrates the effect of the African-American primes in moving whites from support for maintaining current spending levels to support for spending increases for aid to poor, and Medicaid and Medicare. If we think of the predicted probabilities of percent support for spending (55.1% for poor and 48.8% for Medicaid and Medicare), support by whites seems limited compared with the overwhelming support expressed by the entire sample of African-American research subjects (76.3% and 72.0% respectively in Table 3.2). It is an increase compared with no primes and the results of the entire sample of white research subjects (47.3% and 40.8% respectively).

Table 3.16**Ordered Probit Models for Causes of Poverty**

Variables	American way of life doesn't give all people an equal chance.	Poor simply don't want to work hard.
African-American Primes	-.411 (.203)**	.480 (.206)**
White Primes	-.169 (.213)	.066 (.210)
Ideology	.298 (.054)**	-.285 (.053)**
Cut1	-.300	-2.402
Cut2	.565	-1.038
Cut3	1.647	-.067

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Dependent variables are coded 1=strongly agree and 5=strongly disagree.

Only white research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Table 3.17**Predicted Probabilities for Causes of Poverty**

(American way of life doesn't give all people an equal chance.)

with Ideology set at mean

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
African-American Primes	.175	.291	.369	.165
No Primes	.090	.223	.405	.282

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only white research subjects were included.

Table 3.18**Predicted Probabilities for Causes of Poverty**

(Poor simply don't want to work hard.)

with Ideology set at mean

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
African-American Primes	.035	.282	.367	.316
No Primes	.086	.407	.332	.174

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only white research subjects were included.

The models for causes of poverty both support and contradict my hypotheses. In Table 3.16, the negative African-American primes are statistically significant in the two models involving attitudes concerning the causes of poverty. Indeed the out-group primes are stronger in these models than the previous ones. In both ordered probit models, out-group primes increase the likelihood that white subjects will be less supportively of the view that the poor are responsible for their own condition and more supportive of the view that systemic problems are the causes of poverty. As one might expect, every unit increase in ideology toward a more conservative ideology increases the likelihood that one will blame the poor. The predicted probabilities in Table 3.17 demonstrate a similar pattern to that of Table 3.13 in that the most dramatic differences appear in the category of strongly disagree. With ideology set at its mean, the negative African-American treatment for the “American way of life” increases support for the statement at the expense of the probability of disagreeing with the statement. In the case of the statement that the poor don’t want to work hard, the probability of voicing weak agreement decreases roughly .12 with strong disagree increasing by .15.

In instances where the experimental treatments were statistically significant, the out-group primes were more likely to affect policy attitudes than the in-group primes. In all five models, the negative group primes narrowed the racial gap contrary to my hypothesis that dominant group members will be affected by negative African-American primes in ways that increase the gap in policy preferences (**H2**). Rather the alternative hypothesis (**H2a**) states that negative black primes will decrease policy gaps for the dominant racial group (Caucasians) in reaction to the explicit nature of the group primes. It appears that the alternative hypothesis is correct in the case of race.

Tests of Priming Hypotheses – African-American Subjects

For the African Americans, I hypothesize that they are more likely to be influenced by negative attacks on their own group in the form of negative in-group primes, rather than out-group primes (**H3**). Negative in-group primes will push African-American subjects' attitudes toward greater support for spending on social welfare, against the view that poverty is the fault of the poor, agreement that equal opportunity is still a problem, and support for racial policies such as preferential hiring (**H4**). For all but one of the models presented below, the in-group primes affect attitudes. However, the direction of the change is counter to my hypothesis in one instance in the *chi*-square analysis and two instances in the multivariate analysis. I believe that these unexpected results reflect a divide between policies that directly affect the lives of the research subjects and those that do not affect them. In the case of policies that have a more direct effect and are therefore more important, the negative in-group causes the research subjects to become more supportive.

As with the case of white research subjects, the results of the group primes appear to be rather limited. There were no statistically significant effects when comparing the negative black primes, negative white primes, and combined control groups. When I examine the effect of the negative in-group primes compared with the other groups combined, I find that the negative black primes significantly affect two policies. In the case of preferential hiring and promotion of African Americans, the negative black primes increase the favorability of the program (Table 3.19). Regarding the statement, "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country," African Americans clearly disagree (Table 3.20). The strength with which they disagree varies according to

Table 3.19

Preference in Hiring and Promotion of Blacks	Percentages	
	African-American Primes	All Other Primes
Favor	88.9	63.3
Oppose	11.1	36.7

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between those who received the in-group primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for African-American research subjects only.

Table 3.20

We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.	Percentages	
	African-American Primes	All Other Primes
Strongly agree	0	1.5
Somewhat agree	10.7	0
Neither	3.6	3.0
Somewhat disagree	25.0	13.6
Strongly disagree	60.7	81.8

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between those who received the out-group primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for African-American research subjects only.

group prime. For the subjects who received the in-group primes, they were more apt to somewhat disagree than the subjects in the other treatment and control groups.

When I turn to the multivariate analysis, the results are similar with regards to the effect of the in-group primes and the mixed results for the direction of change in attitude. As Table 3.21, this model supports my hypothesis about the effect of the in-group primes and its direction of their impact (**H4**). The negative in-group primes increases the likelihood of supporting preferential hiring for blacks.

As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, the negative African-American primes dramatically increase the probability of supporting preferential hiring, particularly compared with out-

Table 3.21
Probit Model for Preferential Hiring for Blacks

Variables	Preferential Job Hiring for Blacks
Constant	.168 (.230)
African-American Primes	1.053 (.394)**
White Primes	.357 (.333)

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.
The dependent variable is coded 0=against and 1=for.
Only African-American research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Figure 3.1




Table 3.22**Ordered Probit Model for Government Helping Blacks**

Variables	Government Should Help Blacks
African-American Primes	-.640 (.276)**
White Primes	-.714 (.270)**
Cut1	-1.256
Cut2	-.583
Cut3	.114
Cut4	.862
Cut5	1.262
Cut6	1.706

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

The dependent variable is coded 1=government should help blacks and 7=blacks should help themselves.

Only African-American research subjects were included.

** = $p < .050$

group primes. The probability that a black research subject will support racial hiring preferences after receiving the negative African-American primes is nearly ninety percent. For research subjects who received the negative white primes, they were more likely to oppose the policy.

In Table 3.22, I find that both negative black and white primes affect the likelihood that African Americans will support the view, “government should help blacks.” While this model reveals that the out-group primes are significant contrary to my hypothesis (**H3**), the in-group clearly increases the racial gap per expectations (**H4**).

However, negative African-American primes decreases support for spending on welfare contrary to my fourth hypothesis (Table 3.23). As was the case for white subjects, the African-American primes appear to narrow the racial gap. For the welfare model, an increase toward more conservative ideology increases the probability that

Table 3.23**Ordered Probit Model for Welfare Spending**

Variables	Welfare
African-American Primes	-.599 (.308)*
White Primes	-.393 (.297)
Independent ^a	.483 (.254)*
Ideology	-.200 (.110)*
Cut1	-2.004
Cut2	-.463

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Dependent variables are coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.

Only African-American research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

^a = Independent, other and apolitical party identity, excluding leaning independents

Table 3.24**Predicted Probabilities for Welfare Spending**

with Ideology set at mean and no Independent Party Identity

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
African-American Primes	.177	.526	.297
No Primes	.063	.407	.529

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only African-American research subjects were included.

Table 3.25**Ordered Probit Model for Issues of Equal Opportunity**

Variables	If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.
African-American Primes	.569 (.290)**
White Primes	.314 (.278)
Ideology	.293 (.105)**
Cut1	.719
Cut2	1.973
Cut3	2.189
Cut4	3.206

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

The dependent variable is coded 1=strongly agree and 5=strongly disagree.

Only African-American research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Table 3.26**Predicted Probabilities for Equal Opportunity**

with Ideology set at mean

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
African-American Primes	.257	.462	.065	.175	.041
No Primes	.472	.403	.038	.076	.011

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only African-American research subjects were included.

African Americans will support spending less for welfare. Interestingly independent party identification, excluding those who lean toward the Democratic or Republican parties, increases the probabilities of supporting more spending for welfare.²⁹

In Table 3.24, I find the predicted probability of supporting increases in spending substantially drops when the research subjects are exposed to the negative black primes. Consider the results of the samples of African-American and white research subjects for welfare (refer to Table 3.2). Nearly forty-two percent of black subjects supported spending increases while 29.7 percent of white subjects supported increases. For blacks who received the negative black primes, the predicted probability of their support for spending increases (29.7) is identical to the percent of support by the entire white sample.

The model for equal opportunity (Table 3.25) also runs counter to my hypothesis about the direction of the effect of the in-group primes on African-American subjects. The negative African-American primes increase the likelihood of disagreeing with the statement that there would be fewer problems with greater equality. Every unit increase in ideology toward a more conservative ideology increases the likelihood that African Americans will disagree with the statement. In Table 3.26, the striking change between no primes compared with in-group primes concerns the category for strong agreement with the statement. The negative African-American primes result in a dramatic drop (.22) in the probability of strongly agreeing with the statement about equal opportunity.

The results of these models suggest that the African-American subjects were almost exclusively affected by negative black treatment. The effect of the treatment was

²⁹ As Table 3.7 shows, no African-American subjects selected a Republican Party identification. Only one selected independent, leaning Republican.

not uniform. In the case of welfare spending and equal opportunity, the negative African-American treatments resulted in the narrowing of the racial gap. I find that African Americans are susceptible to negative group attacks in that they appear to realign their policy preferences more closely with attitudes with those held by white research subjects. The reverse was the case for preferential hiring of blacks and government help for blacks. For these models, the treatment resulted in a widening of the racial gap, particularly in the case of preferential hiring.

The differences between these two sets of models may lie in the nature of policy and the self- or group-interests of the research subjects. Welfare, in particular, is a policy that the mass media portrayed as having a black face (Gilens 1999). In light of the prevalence of these images and stories reinforcing negative racial stereotypes, it would seem that African Americans are not always able to psychologically fight back against the negative group priming for issues such as welfare policy. For issues that have more directly relevant to the subjects' lives such as job hiring and government help for blacks, the negative in-group primes motivate the research subjects to more vigorously support these programs.

Conclusion

In the race sample, I find numerous differences between white and African-American research subjects on a range of policies including social welfare policies, crime and military issues, racial policies, causes of poverty, and equal opportunity. When both white and black research subjects received the negative group primes, they were predominately affected by the negative black primes as my hypotheses predicted. However, the direction of the effect of primes largely ran counter to my second

hypothesis that negative out-group primes should result in the widening of the racial gap. In the case of white research subjects, the negative black primes increased the predicted probability that the subject would support greater spending for social welfare programs and view the causes of poverty as systemic rather than due to laziness. These results do support the Mendelberg hypothesis (**H2a**) that whites will become more supportive of policies related to race when the racial primes are explicit because they will elicit support for racial equality.

For African-American research subjects, the negative black primes also proved to have the strongest affect on policy preferences. In only one model, the negative white primes affected attitudes about racial policy – government should help blacks. The effects of the negative black primes were mixed. They increased the likelihood of favoring preferential hiring and promotions for blacks, and believing that the federal government support for blacks. However, the negative in-group primes increased the likelihood that one would disagree with the statement, “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.” They also decreased the likelihood of supporting federal spending for welfare.

Chapter 4: Gender Experiments

Introduction

In the 1980 presidential election between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, political scientists and observers noticed a potentially new trend in voting behavior. They observed that men cast substantially more of their ballots for the Republican candidate than the Democratic sitting president. Since the 1980 presidential election, this pattern has been observed more or less in every presidential election (Norrande 1997, 156).

Subsequent research suggests that the gender gap for party identification is largely due to men's migration from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party and independent identification. Kaufman and Petrocik found strong evidence that the gender gap for party identification was largely driven by men switching identification from Democratic Party to the Republican Party. Moreover, women were not so much changing their party identity to Democratic Party as retaining their old party identification. They suggest that these differences are largely driven by differing attitudes toward welfare state issues (Kaufman and Petrocik 1999). These results seem logical in light of the shifts in the two major political parties' support for issues related and important to women over the last fifty years such as the Democratic Party's support for social welfare programs (Sanbonmatsu 2002, 108; Wolbrecht 2000). In contrast, Norrande finds evidence from National Election Study data between 1952 and 1994 that men describe their party identity as independent, particularly for independents who lean toward one of the two major parties, in greater numbers than women who are more likely to be weak partisans (Norrande 1999b).

Further research about the gender gap finds that there are particular issue domains that generate large gaps in policy preferences such as compassion issues³⁰ and use of force/violence issues. More specifically, women are more supportive on compassion issues (Cook and Wilcox 1991; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Women are also more supportive of stricter gun laws than men.³¹ Men are more supportive of using force for military engagement as in the case of the Gulf War of 1991 (Conover and Sapiro 1993), increasing defense spending, and the death penalty for convicted murderers than women (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Smith 1984). In 2003, women were initially much less supportive of taking military action in Iraq compared with men. In an interview on the News Hour, Richard Morin of the *Washington Post* observed, “There is a huge gender gap on the war. About two-thirds of all men support it, but only about half of all women currently back the war” (March 6, 2003).³² Once the war began, females support for the war increased although remained below those of males.³³ In his examination of the gender gap on a range of violence and use of force issues across numbers survey questions, Smith observed, “Differences averaging about 10 percentage points are found on most question dealing with law enforcement and criminal punishments...” (Smith 1984, 384). On gender issues such as views on abortion, research finds little evidence of the gender gap (Andersen 1997; Gilens 1987).

A number of explanations have been offered about the source of the gender gap from the role of motherhood affecting policy preferences to a difference in attitudes

³⁰ Compassion issues includes support for policies and programs that benefit vulnerable members of society such as the elderly, women and children.

³¹ A survey conducted by the Princeton Research Associates found a 25% gap between male (45%) and female (70%) support of stricter gun control laws (Erikson and Tedin 2001, 203).

³² Based on survey results from a *Washington Post*-ABC poll conducted between February 26 and March 3.)

³³ Based on survey results of *Washington Post*-ABC polls conducted April 2-6.

toward feminists. Research refutes certain of these alternatives such as gender consciousness (Gurin 1985) and motherhood (Conover and Sapiro 1993). Conover's work about the effect of feminist identity repeatedly supports the hypothesis that strong feminist identity is correlated with more liberal views on the question of ideology, the use of force and foreign affairs, and priorities about domestic spending (Conover 1988, Conover and Sapiro 1993). While women are more likely to identify themselves as feminists than men, feminist identity is not the same as gender membership. Cook and Wilcox find that a gender gap exists for non-feminists as well as feminists. They conclude, "This suggests that the gender gap is *not* due to increasing numbers of feminist women, who are offset by, yet different from, feminist men" (Cook and Wilcox 1991, 1120).

Given its potential importance, it is not surprising that candidates for the two major political parties have attempted to capitalize on the gender gap by highlighting their positions on particular issues to win over male or female voters to their party. The pursuit of these voters is now so widely discussed in the mass media that each election cycle bares a new catch phrase. Norrander writes, "Journalists labeled the election of ... 1994 the "Year of the Angry White Male," and 1996 the "Year of the Soccer Mom" (Norrander 1999a, 145). The analysis below explores what effect linking issues or candidates to negative gender characteristics, as the Clinton campaign did with Rick Lazio in the 2000 senate race in New York, has on policy preferences, which Kaufman and Petrocik as well as others have suggested in turn affects voting behavior.

I also find that expectations about a candidate according to his or her gender are an important element of voting behavior. These expectations come in two forms. First,

gender affects expectations about a candidate's area of issue expertise and concern (Paolino 1995). For instance, female candidates are expected to focus on "women's" issues such as education programs and concern for the elderly while males are generally perceived as more competent on issues of international relations and the military, the very issues in which I find a sizable gender gap. In a study of Senate elections in 1992 with female candidates, female voters were more likely to cast votes for the female candidate based on their interest in having the Senate take on gender issues such as sexual harassment in the wake of the hearings on Clarence Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court than solely based on the candidate's shared gender (Paolino 1995). Second, common gender stereotypes affect expectations about the traits of the candidates, and are closely related to beliefs about the candidate's qualifications on certain issue domains. As Huddy and Terkildsen describe the findings of their experimental model of gender traits and candidate perception,

[t]ypical female traits such as warmth, sensitivity, and compassion were thought to qualify female candidates for dealing better with compassion issues, such as education, health care, and the problems of the poor and aged. Assertiveness, aggressiveness, and self-confidence, typical male traits, were thought to aid male candidates in coping better with military or police crises (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993, 140).

Thus, issues and stereotypes are closely related in the case of gender. The mass media can affect policy preferences by priming the public with gender stereotypes and issues of gender equality (Terkildsen and Schnell 1997). Female candidates are expected to support compassion issues while male candidates are expected to understand issues of defense and foreign affairs (Kahn and Goldenberg 1991). During any particular election cycle, the salience of a particular issue will affect the extent to which gender stereotypes

are used by the candidates and how effective they are. As I hypothesize, female primes will most likely affect the policy preferences for both males and females.

Data and Methodology

In this study, the gender experiments were designed to explore the effect of negative group primes on policy preferences. The negative gender primes reflect the results of open-ended questions in the pre-test survey in which respondents were asked to think of negative traits that describe males and females. These primes also mirror some of the negative gender stereotypes that have been used in the course of highly contentious campaigns between male and female candidates. Aggressive, a charge leveled by Hilary Rodham Clinton against Rick Lazio, was included as a negative trait for males.

My sample consisted of a total of two hundred and twenty undergraduates from eleven undergraduate courses in political science and sociology at the University of Virginia. Ninety-nine subjects identified themselves as male; one hundred nineteen identified themselves as female. Two research subjects did not identify their gender and were subsequently dropped from the study. The research subjects were told that the survey was part of a dissertation about gender and political attitudes. They were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups – negative primes for men (32.3%), negative primes for women (32.7%), neutral primes for men (16.8%), or neutral primes for women (18.2%). The negative and neutral primes appeared near the beginning of the surveys as questions about characteristics or traits belonging to a particular group (refer to Appendix A).

Because this sample was drawn from undergraduates at a Southern university, it is clearly not a representative sample of nation. The median age of the research subjects

Table 4.1

Demographic Characteristics	Percentages for Research Subjects	Percentages for United States (2000)
Gender		
Male	45.4	49.1
Female	54.6	50.9
Race/Ethnicity		
White	73.8	75.1
African American	17.3	12.3
Asian	3.3	3.6
Other	5.6	9.0
Year in College		
1 st	.9	--
2 nd	13.2	--
3 rd	33.3	--
4 th	50.2	--
5 th or more	2.3	--

was 20 years old compared to a much higher median for the national population (35.8 years old). A majority of the sample were in their fourth year of undergraduate studies. The racial/ethnic breakdown of the research subjects is comparable to the nation as a whole with the exception of a larger percentage of African Americans among research subjects and fewer expressing other racial or ethnic identities.

The Gender Gap in the Gender Experiments

An analysis of the data from the gender experiment shows that there are a number of statistically significant differences between male and female research subjects' opinions on a range of issues. Tables 4.2 through 4.7 show only issues in which there was a statistically significant difference ($p < .05$) in a two-tailed tests. On compassion issues or social welfare spending, I find that women are far more supportive than men of increasing the federal government spending on a range of social welfare issues (refer to Table 4.2). The differences between male and female preferences are over twenty-five

Table 4.2

Compassion Issues	Male	Percentages	
		Female	Difference*
AIDS Research			
Increase	60.6	76.9	-16.3
Same	32.3	21.4	10.9
Decrease	7.1	1.7	5.4
Aid to Poor People			
Increase	36.4	61.9	-25.5
Same	49.5	28.8	20.7
Decrease	14.1	9.3	4.8
Health Care Spending			
Increase	55.1	72.9	-17.8
Same	35.7	25.4	10.3
Decrease	9.2	1.7	7.5
Medicaid and Medicare			
Increase	38.1	62.4	-24.3
Same	54.6	35.0	19.6
Decrease	7.2	2.6	4.6
Social Security			
Increase	32.7	47.5	-14.8
Same	48.0	44.9	3.1
Decrease	19.4	7.6	11.8

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the genders according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of male subjects minus opinion of female subjects.

Table 4.3

Crime and Foreign Policy Issues	Male	Percentages	
		Female	Difference*
Dealing with the Drug Problem			
Increase	26.5	29.7	-3.2
Same	31.6	50.8	-19.2
Decrease	41.8	19.5	22.3
War on Terrorism			
Increase	39.4	30.8	8.6
Same	42.4	35.9	6.5
Decrease	18.2	33.3	-15.1

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the genders according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of male subjects minus opinion of female subjects.

percent in favor of increases in spending by the federal government for two policies - aid for the poor, and Medicare and Medicaid. While not as striking as the differences just described, there are also statistically significant differences in support for federal spending on AIDS research, health care, and Social Security with women consistently expressing greater support for spending.

This pattern is largely reversed in the case of foreign policy initiatives (refer to Table 4.3). Males are more supportive of increases in spending for the war on terrorism. There is little difference between men and women support for increasing spending to deal with the drug problem. Rather the difference appears in men's willingness to decrease spending by over twenty percent compared with women.

There are also a number of differences regarding the attitudes about the role of women and protection for women from job discrimination (Table 4.4). For the role of women, research subjects were asked if they believed that "women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government" (1) or "a woman's place is in the home" (7). On the whole, subjects were very supportive of an equal role for women with a mean score of 1.87. Women are significantly more supportive of equal role (1.59) than men (2.20).³⁴ Sixty-three percent of female subjects indicated support for "1 - Women and men should have an equal role." Roughly forty-six percent of the males in the sample offered the same response.

Female subjects also had a very different perception of sexual harassment and job discrimination against women in the work place compared with male subjects (Table 4.4). There were statistically significant differences in the attitudes of male and female subjects. For the prevalence of job discrimination against women, female subjects were

³⁴ The difference of means for male and female subjects was statistically significant ($p < .000$).

Table 4.4

Sexual Harassment and Job Discrimination	Percentages		
	Male	Female	Difference*
Women Face Job Discrimination			
A lot	9.1	28.6	-19.5
Some	82.8	71.4	11.4
Not at all	8.1	0	8.1
Laws Against Job Discrimination			
Favor	78.5	91.5	-13.0
Oppose	21.5	8.5	13.0
Protection From Sexual Harassment			
Too much	20.6	5.1	15.5
Enough	62.9	44.4	18.5
Too little	16.5	50.4	-33.9

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the genders according to Pearson *chi*-square and Fisher's exact test.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of male subjects minus opinion of female subjects.

Table 4.5

Party Identification	Percentages		
	Male	Female	Difference*
Strong Democrat	6.1	20.5	-14.4
Not very strong Democrat	16.2	17.1	-0.9
Independent, leaning Democrat	22.2	23.1	-0.9
Independent, other, and apolitical	20.2	16.2	4.0
Independent, leaning Republican	15.2	6.8	8.4
Not very strong Republican	9.1	11.1	-2
Strong Republican	11.1	5.1	6.-

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the genders according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of male subjects minus opinion of female subjects.

Table 4.6

Feeling Thermometer Scores for Gender Groups	Means	
	Male	Female
Women*	74.2	82.3
Men	72.8	72.7
Feminists*	41.3	63.0
Women's Movement*	53.4	72.5

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .000$) between the genders according to ANOVA tests.

Feeling Thermometers: 0=Cold, 100=Warm

* = $p < .01$ in ANOVA tests between males and females.

Table 4.7

		Means	
	Gender Traits	Males	Females
Females	Emotional	2.46	2.33
	Dependent*	3.46	3.94
	Demanding	3.63	3.44
	Conniving	4.12	4.24
Males	Aggressive	2.65	2.83
	Domineering	2.84	3.17
	Power hungry	2.70	2.83
	Arrogant	2.95	2.72

Note: Traits were scored from 1=very common and 7=very uncommon.

* = $p < .10$ in ANOVA tests between males and females

far more likely to believe that discrimination occurs a lot (28.6%) than male subjects (9.1%). Given these results, it is not surprising that women were overwhelmingly supportive of laws protecting women against job discrimination (91.5%). Female subjects were also believed that more needed to be done to protect women from sexual

Per expectations about the gender gap, I find that there are statistically significant differences in party identification on a seven-point scale. As Table 4.5 reveals, women identified with the Democratic Party more than men did in all Democratic categories including independents who lean toward the Democrats. The most notable example of this difference appears for strong Democrats (20.5% for females and 6.1% for males). However, there is no significant difference in the strength of partisanship between the two groups.

Next, the feeling thermometer for men is virtual identical for males and females (Table 4.6). The means of male and female subjects for the male feeling thermometer was roughly 73, with a difference of five hundredths of a point. The difference in the

feeling thermometers occurs for women and women's groups. Women's feelings toward their own gender group, feminists, and the women's movement were considerably warmer than men. There is roughly a twenty-point difference in feelings about feminists and the women's movement.

Finally, there is only one significant difference between the perception of the negative traits for males and females. At a higher level of statistical significance ($p < .10$), females more likely to believe that "dependent" is a trait that is uncommon among females (3.94) compared with males (3.46). Female and male research subjects had very similar perceptions of the negative gender traits. Both males and females appear more likely to respond that the negative male traits are common.

Tests of Priming Hypotheses – Male Subjects

Having established that there are number of significant gender differences, I come to the effect of the priming experiments on policy preferences. I will examine the effects of negative in- and out-group primes on male research subjects, then female subjects. Because males are the dominant gender group, I hypothesize that they are less likely to be affected by negative in-group primes (**H1**) and more likely be affected by negative out-group primes (**H2**) because the stereotypes about women are easily assessable for male subjects. Further, negative out-group primes will increase the gender gap by pushing male subjects to support decreasing spending for social welfare programs. Finally, the Mendelberg hypothesis (**H2a**) relates only to the race experiment so is not relevant for this experiment.

Table 4.8

Social Welfare Programs	Percentages	
	Female Primes	All Other Primes
Aid to Poor		
Increase	14.7	47.7
Same	76.5	35.4
Decrease	8.8	16.9
Food Stamps		
Increase	5.9	27.7
Same	79.4	50.8
Decrease	14.7	21.5
Health Care Spending		
Increase	33.3	66.2
Same	51.5	27.7
Decrease	15.2	6.2
Medicaid and Medicare		
Increase	24.2	45.3
Same	57.6	53.1
Decrease	18.2	1.6
Social Security		
Increase	18.2	40.0
Same	51.5	46.2
Decrease	30.3	13.8
Welfare		
Increase	14.7	38.5
Same	52.9	40.0
Decrease	32.4	21.5

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between those who received the female primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for male research subjects only.

Table 4.9

Do you think that enough is being done to protect women from being sexually harassed?	Percentages	
	Female Primes	All Other Primes
Too much	24.2	18.8
Enough	75.8	56.3
Too little	0	25.0

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .01$) between those who received the female primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for male research subjects only.

Table 4.10

Spending on War on Terrorism	Percentages	
	Female Primes	All Other Primes
Increase	32.4	43.1
Same	58.8	33.8
Decrease	8.8	23.1

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .01$) between those who received the female primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for male research subjects only.

The data support these hypotheses. There are no instances in which the negative male primes compared with neutral primes and/or negative female primes showed a significant change in attitudes. As one sees in Tables 4.8-4.10, the results of the female primes compared with all other primes are remarkable. The negative female primes result in male research subjects increasingly expressed support for the status quo through their support for spending the “same” for social welfare spending, war on terrorism and maintaining current protection for women from sexual harassment. The negative female primes significantly decrease support for a range of social welfare programs for males. The average drop in support for spending increases is twenty-six percent in favor of maintaining current spending levels. Concerning protection from sexual harassment, there were no males who received the negative female primes who responded that was insufficient protection for women while there was roughly a twenty percent increase in the category of “enough” (Table 4.9). The one surprise occurs in Table 4.10. As with the earlier tables, it is the female primes that affect policy preferences compared with the other control and treatment groups. Instead of increasing the gap I find between males and females with regards to spending increases, the female primes decrease support more

Table 4.11**Ordered Probit and Probit Models**

Variables	Health Care	Medicaid and Medicare	Social Security	Welfare
Female Primes	-.694 (.322)**	-.646 (.323)**	-.761 (.300)**	-.821 (.308)**
Male Primes	-.137 (.326)	.065 (.314)	-.413 (.290)	-.652 (.303)**
Party Identity	--	--	-.225 (.071)**	--
Ideology	-.246 (.098)**	-.309 (.102)**	--	-.502 (.095)**
Race (Nonwhite)	.881 (.388)**	.619 (.340)*	--	--
Cut1	-1.764	-2.447	-2.262	-3.238
Cut2	-.287	-.200	.784	-1.695

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Dependent variables are coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.

Only male research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

on the war on terrorism. With respect to decreases in spending (33.8% to 58.8%) and spending the same (23.1% to 8.8%) on the war on terrorism, the gender gap is widens.

When I examine multivariate analysis in which I control for other variables such as party identity and ideology, the negative female primes still have a strong affect on policy preferences by widening the gender gap. Males, who are overall not very supportive of social welfare programs, became even less supportive once primed with negative traits about females. In Table 4.11, it appears that males are more likely to be affected by negative primes about women than men, while controlling party identification, ideology and race. Only in the case of welfare are the negative male primes statistically significant. In that case, the male primes like the negative female

Table 4.12**Predicted Probabilities for Social Welfare Spending**

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
<i>Health Care</i> ^a			
Female Primes	.437	.440	.122
No Primes	.224	.485	.291
<i>Medicaid and Medicare</i> ^a			
Female Primes	.272	.650	.078
No Primes	.126	.684	.192
<i>Social Security</i> ^b			
Female Primes	.272	.527	.201
No Primes	.089	.445	.466
<i>Welfare</i> ^c			
Female Primes	.298	.538	.164
No Primes	.097	.475	.428

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.
Only male research subjects were included.

^a = Ideology set at mean and race set at white

^b = Party identity set at mean

^c = Ideology set at mean

primes appear to increase the likelihood of supporting a decrease in federal spending but to a lesser extent. For the four social welfare programs shown in Table 4.11, the negative female primes decrease the likelihood of supporting increases in federal government spending controlling for all other variables. Of these four models, there were statistically significant gender differences for three of these programs – Social Security, health care, and Medicaid and Medicare (refer to Table 4.2). These results suggest that negative female primes contribute to the widening of the gap between male and female attitudes.

The other variables in the model follow expected patterns. For Social Security as the dependent variable, I find that as one increasingly identifies with the Republican Party one is more likely to support cuts in federal spending. Similarly, as one becomes

less supportive of federal spending for health care, Medicaid and Medicare, and welfare controlling for all other variables. Finally, nonwhite subjects are more likely to support increases in federal spending for health care, and Medicaid and Medicare.

In the case of these four models, I find that the negative female primes have a significant effect on policy attitudes including variables such as party identity, ideology and race. Table 4.12 provides the predicted probabilities of male subjects' priorities on federal spending when exposed to the female primes compared with no exposure with all other variables set at their mean or zero for dummy variables. The results are dramatic. Exposure to the negative female primes lowers the probability of supporting in federal spending for health care, Social Security, and welfare by approximately .20, or twenty percent. The effect of the female primes is even greater for spending increases. The predicted probabilities of supporting increases in spending for Social Security and welfare drop by .26 for male subjects exposed to the female primes. For Medicaid and Medicare, exposure to the female primes increases the predicted probability of supporting decreases in funding by .15 while decreasing support for increases in spending by .11.

Tests of Priming Hypotheses – Female Subjects

For the lower-status gender group, I hypothesize that the females are more likely to be influenced by the negative female primes than male primes. Negative female primes will push female subjects' attitudes toward greater support for spending on compassion issues (or welfare state programs), and decrease support for issues related to violence and use of force issues because the negative in-group primes will activate the group interest of females in protecting certain programs and heighten their disfavor with other programs and policies. An analysis of the data yields mixed findings regarding the

Table 4.13

Social Welfare Programs	Percentages	
	Female Primes	All Other Primes
Health Care		
Increase	85.7	67.5
Same	11.4	31.3
Decrease	2.9	1.2
Medicaid and Medicare		
Increase	82.4	54.2
Same	14.7	43.4
Decrease	2.9	2.4

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between those who received the female primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for female research subjects only.

Table 4.14

Dealing with Crime**	Percentages	
	Female Primes	All Other Primes
Increase	22.9	49.4
Same	71.4	48.2
Decrease	5.7	2.4

Note: There are statistically significant differences between those who received the female primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for female research subjects only.

* = $p < .07$

** = $p < .05$

hypotheses. For social welfare programs, the negative female primes increase support for health care, and Medicaid and Medicare compared with all other primes (Table 4.13).

When female subjects received the negative female primes, they became less supportive increasing federal spending for dealing with crime (Table 4.14). Again the female primes widen the gender gap.

Table 4.15**Ordered Probit Models for Social Welfare Spending**

Variables	Aid to Poor	Medicaid and Medicare
Female Primes	.469 (.285)	.614 (.311)**
Male Primes	.641 (.293)**	-.196 (.275)
Republican ^a	-1.692 (.325)**	--
Ideology	--	-.303 (.088)**
Cut1	-1.555	-3.054
Cut2	-.242	-1.193

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Dependent variables are coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.

Only female research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

^a = Republican Party identification, excluding Republican leaning independents

Next, I turn to the results of the multivariate analysis. Controlling for such political variables as party identification and ideology, the results of the group primes are more complex than the two tables above suggest. Like the race experiment, it appears that the members of less powerful group (females) are affected by both attacks on their own group as well as the negative male primes. In Table 4.15, group primes increase the likelihood of supporting federal spending on aid to the poor, and Medicaid and Medicare. However, attitudes toward aid to the poor are affected by the negative male prime while Medicaid and Medicare are affected by negative female primes.

Republican identification, excluding Republican leaning independents, was significant in the models involving aid to the poor. Republican identification increased the likelihood of favoring decreases in federal spending. The impact of Republican

Table 4.16**Ordered Probit Models for Law Enforcement**

Variables	Dealing with Crime	Dealing with the Drug Problem
Female Primes	-.287 (.269)	-.459 (.254)*
Male Primes	-.781 (.274)**	-.417 (.256)
Republican ^a	--	.569 (.302)*
Ideology	--	--
Cut1	-2.242	-1.060
Cut2	-.088	.396

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.
 Dependent variables are coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.
 Only female research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

^a = Republican Party identity, excluding Republican leaning independents

identification rather than party identification, as in the case of male subjects, is likely due to the distribution of party identification for the female subjects in the study. As Table 4.5 reveals, sixty percent of female subjects identified themselves as strongly Democrat, not so strongly Democrat or Democratic leaning independent.

In regard to the issues concerning law enforcement, the negative female primes decrease in the likelihood of supporting federal spending. Here again, the evidence of the effectiveness of in-group versus out-group primes is mixed. While the negative male primes have a significant effect for attitudes on crime, it is the negative female prime that has a significant effect on decreasing support for spending to deal with the drug problem.

Table 4.17**Predicted Probabilities for Social Welfare Spending**

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
<i>Aid to Poor^a</i>			
Female Primes	.025	.215	.759
Male Primes	.018	.178	.804
No Primes	.065	.339	.596
<i>Medicaid and Medicare^b</i>			
Female Primes	.005	.196	.799
Male Primes	.033	.445	.522
No Primes	.022	.380	.598

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.
Only female research subjects were included.

^a = Republican identity set at zero

^b = Ideology set at mean


Table 4.18**Predicted Probabilities for Law Enforcement**

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
<i>Dealing with Crime</i>			
Female Primes	.030	.543	.427
Male Primes	.079	.670	.251
No Primes	.015	.453	.532
<i>Dealing with the Drug Problem^a</i>			
Female Primes	.277	.522	.201
Male Primes	.266	.523	.210
No Primes	.149	.505	.346

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.
Only female research subjects were included.

^a = Republican identity set at zero

^b = Ideology set at mean

Figure 4.1

Overall, these results suggest that female subjects are influenced by either in-group or out-group primes. Whether it is the male or female primes, they further drive a wedge between the attitudes of males and females. These results may suggest that females respond more generally to gender negativity. In turning to the predicted probabilities for the negative male and female primes (Tables 4.17 and 4.18), there is a .21 increase in the predicted probability of supporting increases in spending on aid to the poor and a .28 decrease for spending on dealing crime when exposed to negative male primes. Negative female primes decreased the predicted probability that female subjects would support an “increase” in spending on the drug problem but increased support for spending on the drug problem compared with no primes.

Table 4.19**Probit Model Democratic Identification (including leaners)**

Variables	Democratic Identity
Female Primes	.802 (.351)**
Male Primes	.168 (.319)
Ideology	-.630 (.110)**
Constant	2.016 (.394)**

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.
Only female research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Perhaps most interesting is the effect of the negative female primes on female subjects. The negative female primes increased the probability of supporting greater spending on Medicaid and Medicare by .20. Contrast this twenty-point decrease with the predicted probability for male subjects exposed to the same negative primes. For the male research subjects, the negative female primes decreased the predicted probability of supporting spending increases for Medicaid and Medicare by .11. For this issue, negative female primes were largely responsible for driving a wedge of twenty-four percent between male and female support for spending increases. Among subjects who received negative female primes, the gap in support for spending increases is much larger. With ideology set at its mean for male and female subjects, there is a seventy-two point difference in predicted probabilities (refer to Figure 4.1).

In addition to differences in policy preferences, the literature about the gender gap finds strong evidence a gap in political party identity with men largely supporting the Republican Party and women supporting the Democratic Party. In Table 4.5, I found

substantial differences in party identification on a seven-point scale. These differences were largely unaffected by the negative primes for both males and females. There was one exception in the case of female subjects (refer to Table 4.19). Negative female primes increase the probability of supporting identification (strongly, not so strongly or leaning independent) with the Democratic Party. The male primes were insignificant. As would be expected, subjects are less likely to identify with the Democratic Party as they express increasingly conservative ideology.

Conclusion

The results of this chapter suggest that linking negative characteristics, which are easily assessable stereotypes for a group, can affect the policy preferences for both the group members under attack and the perceptions of group members of outsiders. From the analysis, male subjects were strongly affected by exposure to negative female primes. Solely in the case of welfare, male subjects were affected by negative male primes in a similar but lesser extent than the female primes. For each of the four social welfare policies, exposure to the negative female prime resulted in greater support for spending decreases. It may be the case that the attitudes of male research subjects may reflect a certain degree of gender resentment, unlike the white research subjects in the race experiment whose attitudes appear to be shaped by norms regarding racial equality. Female subjects, on the other hand, were affected by both negative male and female primes for policies involving social welfare programs and law enforcement issues. Instances involving statistically significant priming effects yielded greater support for spending increases for social welfare programs and spending decreases for law enforcement issues such as dealing with crime and the drug problem. These robust

results strongly suggest that negative group primes (or gender negativity) widen the gender gap.

So what do these results suggest might have been the results in the Clinton-Lazio and Romney-O'Brien elections? In the case of the Clinton campaign labeling Lazio as "aggressive," Senator Clinton may have received some benefit by shifting women's attitudes on gender gap issues and indirectly on their vote choice in New York's 2000 Senatorial election. However, it is more likely that Mitt Romney received a greater benefit than Clinton from his attack on Shannon O'Brien's behavior as "unbecoming" during their political debates. Unlike Clinton's attacks on her male candidate, my research suggest that the use of negative female prime ("unbecoming") would decrease male voters' on compassion issues and increase support for law enforcement issues, which may in turn affect vote choice by drive male voters away from O'Brien and toward Romney. Conversely, the female voters may or may not have been affected by the negative female prime.

Chapter 5: Religion Experiments

Electoral Successes and Failures of the Christian Right

Since the 1980s, the Christian Right has been a political force through organizations such as the Moral Majority³⁵ and later the Christian Coalition,³⁶ which were marked by their ability to mobilize at grassroots level and forge close ties with the Republican Party. These organizations and politicians, who recognized their potential electoral strength, encouraged evangelical Protestants to reenter the political arena following many decades of withdrawal. The impetus for their new found political activism came in reaction to changes in American culture and controversial rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the legalization of abortion, an end to prayer in school, and greater leniency on pornography as a free speech issue. Armed with an agenda of moral and religious issues, they met with numerous electoral successes from the election of anti-evolution school board members to Republican victories in capturing the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994, and frequent control of the Senate and the presidency.³⁷

However, there have been some noteworthy failures by the Christian Right. Three such electoral defeats occurred in two religiously conservative states – South Carolina and Virginia. The fourth congressional district of South Carolina is the home of ultra-conservative Bob Jones University in a state where the Christian Coalition

³⁵ The Moral Majority was founded in 1979 by the Reverend Jerry Falwell. In 1984, it was reorganized as the Liberty Federation.

³⁶ The Christian Coalition was founded in 1989 by Pat Robertson with the assistance of Ralph Reed and seed money from the Republican Party.

³⁷ The claims by the electoral success by individuals such as former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Ralph Reed are controversial. For instance, Gingrich claimed a mandate for the Contract with American. Post-election surveys suggest that the public had relatively little knowledge of it.

effectively captured control of the Republican Party organization in the 1990s. In 1998, state senator Mike Fair lost the Republican nomination for the congressional seat to Jim DeMint, a moderate Republican.³⁸ Mike Fair appeared to be perfect candidate to replace Representative Bob Inglis who gained early national attention for his upset victory over incumbent Rep. Liz Patterson with the help of the Christian Coalition in 1992. He had a solid record of conservative votes in the state senate and a host of well-known supporters including Phyllis Schlafly, Gary Bauer, and Ralph Reed who served as his political consultant following his departure for the position as executive director of Christian Coalition (Guth 2000).

In Virginia, Michael Farris and Oliver North also failed to win election as lieutenant governor in 1993 and U.S. Senate in 1994 respectively at a time when the Christian Right claimed credit for Republican victories in U.S. House of Representatives. Like Mike Fair, Farris and North appeared to be strong candidates in a state that was the home of both Jerry Falwell, the former head of the Moral Majority, and Pat Robertson, the founder of the Christian Coalition and the Christian Broadcast Network. Farris had strong credentials with the Christian Right as the executive director of the Moral Majority in Washington state and a leader in the legal defense of home schooling (Rozell and Wilcox 2000). North first became known to the public through his testimony during the Iran-Contra hearings before Congress and later for his outspoken support for conservative religious and political views. The failure of these candidates is attributed to the public's perception that their views were too extreme (Guth 2000, 31; Rozell and Wilcox 2000, 88). The failure of these candidates may be attributable to the public's dislike and

³⁸ Jim DeMint won a run off primary against Fair with fifty-three percent of the vote. He went on to win the general election for Congress.

distrust of the extreme Christian Right. This backlash results in the defeat of candidates who are too closely associated with very conservative religious groups and associations.

Indeed one form of the backlash appears in public attitudes toward Christian fundamentalists, a group closely associated with the Christian Right. Among white non-fundamentalists, Christian fundamentalists are one of the least popular groups on the feeling thermometer scores with an average score of 47° on a scale of zero to one hundred in 1996.³⁹ The only group to receive a lower average was illegal aliens with a score of 35° in 1988 and 1992, and liberals with a score of 44° in 1996 (Bolce and De Maio 1999a, 37). Further, Bolce and De Maio's research suggests that the low feeling thermometer scores for fundamentalist is correlated with negative evaluations of the Republican Party relative to the Democratic Party, and decreased support for the Republican presidential candidates beginning in 1992 (Bolce and De Maio 1999b).⁴⁰ In this chapter, I will examine the effect of the backlash against extreme Christian Right on policy preferences.

The Protestant Schism in the United States

The role of the Christian Right in recent American politics is merely a half drawn sketch without a broader context of religion in United States, particularly the evolution of Protestantism, and its role in the realm of politics. Over one hundred years prior to the Christian Right's reemergence into the realm of politics in the 1980s, a debate was set in motion that would splitter American Protestants into two dominate groups – mainline

³⁹ The average mean for all groups in 1996 was 57°. Christian fundamentalists received an average score of 45° in 1988 and 49° in 1992 (Bolce and De Maio 1999a, 37).

⁴⁰ Bolce and De Maio find that antifundamentalist attitudes affected evaluations of the Republican Party and support for Republican presidential candidates in 1992 and 1996 but not 1988 (1999a, 525 and 529).

Protestants⁴¹ and evangelical Protestants. The debate centered on Charles Darwin's theory of evolution and issues of biblical criticism, both of which challenged Scripture as the literal word of God. In response to these debates, mainline denominations conceded that the stories of creation in the book of Genesis may not provide a literal understanding of humanity's creation (Marsden 1980). Evangelicals, on the other hand, perceived mainline accommodations to the new scientific views of the day as tantamount to a weakening of the faith and resisted mainline trends toward acceptance of Darwinism and biblical criticism in favor of reaffirming the inerrancy of Scripture. Fundamentalists, a subgroup of evangelical Protestantism, viewed themselves in particular as the defenders of a faith true to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.⁴² In the aftermath of this debate following World War I, various Protestant denominations split along theological lines as leading fundamentalists left their denominations, particularly in the case of Baptists and Presbyterians, to create new theological seminaries and denominations (*Ibid.*, 171-184).

From these theological debates, distinct political differences emerged between mainline and evangelical Protestants. The first of these differences appeared with their reaction to the Social Gospel movement and its belief in the need for systemic social change in America. Evangelicals' and fundamentalists' opposition the Social Gospel movement mounted as it became increasingly tied to modern concepts of political

⁴¹ I use the term mainline Protestant prior to schism to denote denominations that were among the largest in size and exercised considerable influence in American society. Post schism, mainline Protestants are found among the old mainline denominations but is now more descriptive of their theological views than the size or influence. Mainline denominations include the Presbyterian Church (USA), some Baptists, Episcopalians, Methodists, Congregationalists, Disciples of Christ, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (Ahlstrom 1972, Hutchinson 1989).

⁴² Fundamentalists took their name from a journal named *The Fundamentals*, published between 1910 and 1915. *The Fundamentals* openly opposed modernist attempts to reconcile science with faith (Marsden 1980, 118-119).

liberalism. They criticized its emphasis on social change at the expense of spreading the Christian message. Further differences emerged as evangelicals and fundamentalists moved from their isolationist view of the U.S. prior to World War I to an activist worldview with a fervent opposition to the spread of communism (*Ibid.*, 85-93). By the time of the Scopes trial in 1925, their political views could be characterized as conservative (*Ibid.*, 92). Rather than pursue their growing political differences, they withdraw from politics for roughly fifty years following their defeat at the Scopes trial. The trial marked a defeat of sorts for fundamentalists as the defense attorney Clarence Darrow largely succeeded in his goal of discrediting fundamentalists through a series of expert witnesses including the very famous session in which he called the attorney for the prosecution William Jennings Bryan to the stand with the purpose of mocking his literalist reading Scripture (Wills 1990). While the political front remained relatively quiet, the theological debate between mainline and evangelical Protestants expanded in new directions with issues of the ordination of women in the 1970s⁴³, the movement to eliminate nuclear weapons in the 1980s, and homosexuality in the 1990s.

Religious Divide

Given these deep theological divisions, it is little wonder that mainline and evangelical Protestants hold such divergent political attitudes and behavior. However, religion is more than one's denomination, or belonging. It also encompasses beliefs and religious behavior, which can reinforce or diminish denominational loyalty. In discussing the religious divide for Caucasian Protestants, I will consider research about

⁴³ In the 1850s, Antoinette Brown Blackwell became the first female ordained in the Presbyterian Church (Strom 2003, 56).

all three aspects of religion – belief, belonging, and behavior.⁴⁴

Mainline and evangelical Protestants⁴⁵ differ with regard to moral and religious issues. Mainline Protestants hold more liberal views on abortion, the role of women, and protection of the rights of homosexuals compared with evangelicals in numerous studies using national samples (Kellstedt *et al.* 1994, 315 and 321; Kohut *et al.* 2000; Layman 2001, 72 and 73). Evangelicals are more supportive of efforts to return prayer to school and generally lower the wall of separation between church and state (Kohut *et al.* 2000, 97-101). Evangelicals are also apt to list moral issues as more important than do mainline Protestants (Kohut *et al.* 2000, 66).

In the late nineteenth century, the debate over the Social Gospel movement divided mainline and evangelical Protestants. Today this debate emerges over issues social welfare spending and the scope of government. Mainline Protestants are more supportive of federal spending for the poor compared to evangelicals and fundamentalists, who resist the expanding scope of government (Kohut *et al.* 2000, 41-44; Wilcox 1986, 1046).

More recently, studies have found substantive gaps between mainline and evangelical Protestants over the issue of environmental protection. In a study of clergy, Guth and colleagues found that evangelicals are far less concerned about issues of environmental protection compared with mainline Protestants, which they attribute to

⁴⁴ Race, particularly for African Americans, trumps religious identity on virtually all political views. For this reason, I have sample from prominently white churches.

⁴⁵ The following studies primarily rely on respondents' self-identification as mainline, evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants.

differing eschatological views (Guth *et al.* 1995). This pattern of the environmental views also holds for the church members (Kohut *et al.* 2000, 48).

In light of their conservative opinions on a range of policies, it is little surprise that evangelicals have increasingly abandoned the Democratic Party for the GOP. A majority of mainline and evangelical Protestants identify themselves as Republicans. However, evangelicals have dramatically increased in their partisan affiliation, activism, and votes for Republicans over the last thirty years (Kohut *et al.* 2000, 76 and 83; Layman 2001). Among those who attending a Republican national convention for the first time, the percentage of evangelicals, who regularly attended church, roughly doubled from six percent in 1972 to nearly thirteen percent in 1992 (Layman 2001, 106).

In contrast with evangelicals, fundamentalists demonstrate more conservative political views.⁴⁶ Fundamentalists are even more likely to oppose abortion under all circumstances (38.6%) compared to evangelicals (26.5%) (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991, 268). They have more conservative views on the role of women, school prayer, pornography, and more supportive of spending increases on national defense (Beatty and Walter 1988, 54).

With regards to religious behavior or religiosity, I find that the different branches of Protestantism are associated with varying levels of church attendance, frequency of praying and reading the Bible. Evangelicals and fundamentalists are more apt to have high levels of religiosity than mainline Protestants (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991, 268;

⁴⁶ Fundamentalists' political conservative is correlated with their religious conservatives. They are distinct from evangelical Protestants in their adherence in the belief of biblical inerrancy, prohibition against women in roles of leadership, belief that salvation is only possible through Christianity, and belief that homosexuality is a sin.

McSween 2000, 27). They are also more likely to say that religion is an important part of their lives (McSween 2000, 27). However, a high degree of religiosity across denominations and religious traditions increases the likelihood that one will support more conservative political attitudes and behavior (Kellstedt *et al.* 1994; Kellstedt *et al.* 1996, 186; Kohut *et al.* 2000, 97-101).

Finally, religious beliefs can either reinforce the views of one's denomination, or diminish its influence when religious belief runs counter to denominational identity (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988). Fundamentalists, who both belong to a fundamentalist denomination and express orthodox or conservative religious, state more conservative views on social issues such as abortion and school prayer and are more ideologically conservative than those who belong to a fundamentalist denomination but do not express religious views common to fundamentalist doctrine (Wilcox 1986, 1046). Similarly, evangelicals who both belong and believe are more likely to identify themselves as Republicans and support pro-life views on abortion (Kellstedt *et al.* 1996, 253). Religious beliefs also affect mainline Protestants in ways that can reduce the religious gap. Conservative or orthodox religious beliefs will diminish the more liberal leanings of identification with a mainline denomination (Kellstedt *et al.* 1996, 253).

Data and Methodology

Unlike the previous two experiments, the sampling strategy for the religion experiments relied entirely on surveying members of churches that are widely recognized as mainline or evangelical/fundamentalist denominations. In the mainline sample, survey

Table 5.1

Demographic Characteristics	Percentages for Research Subjects	Percentages for United States (2000)
Gender		
Male	40.9	49.1
Female	59.1	50.9
Hispanic Identity		
Yes	.7	12.0
No	99.3	88.0
Race/Ethnicity		
White	96.6	75.1
African American	1.4	12.3
Asian	.7	3.6
Other	1.3	9.0
Income*		
Less than \$15,000	2.1	--
\$15-35,000	8.5	--
\$35-50,000	14.9	--
\$50-75,000	30.5	--
\$75-100,000	15.6	--
\$100-150,000	19.1	--
Over \$150,000	9.2	--
Education*		
High school or less	13.2	--
Some college	13.5	--
College graduate	25.7	--
Some graduate work	10.1	--
MA or professional degree	27.7	--
PhD	10.8	--
Age (Median)	58.0	35.8

* = statistically significant difference between mainline and fundamentalists ($p < .05$)

respondents were members of the Presbyterian Church (USA) and the Episcopal Church.⁴⁷ The fundamentalist sample was comprised of members of churches affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention⁴⁸ and an independent fundamentalist church.⁴⁹ The

⁴⁷ The mainline sample includes churches in the states of California, South Carolina, and Virginia.

⁴⁸ The research about the Southern Baptist Convention strongly suggests that the denomination both holds conservative religious beliefs (Hill 1993; Winston 1993) and contains a large number of members who identify themselves as fundamentalists. In a study of ministers and lay church leaders, Ammerman found

mainline sample had one hundred and five research subjects while the fundamentalist sample included only forty-seven research subjects.⁵⁰ The research subjects were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups – negative primes for mainline Protestants (29.6%), negative primes for fundamentalist Protestants (36.8), neutral primes for mainline Protestants (16.4%), and neutral primes for fundamentalist Protestants (17.1%). The negative and neutral primes appeared toward the beginning of the surveys as questions about the traits or attributes belonging to a particular group (refer to Appendix A).

As one sees in Table 5.1, the sample as a whole is not necessarily representative of the nation population.⁵¹ Many of the discrepancies, including racial/ethnic and Hispanic identities, reflect a sample that intentionally concentrates on white Protestants. A comparison between the sample and the national population reveal that my sample includes a larger percentage of females than males, and has a higher median age. The older and more female aspects of the religion sample follow expectations regarding the sample population. Finally, I find that the only significant differences between the mainline and fundamentalist sample occurs for income and education with mainline Protestants recording higher socioeconomic status. Past research finds that evangelicals and fundamentalists are not as highly educated and subsequently have lower income

that 85 percent of respondents agreed that the Bible was the inerrant Word of God (Ammerman 1990, 74). Moreover, fifty-six percent of Southern Baptist ministers identified themselves as fundamentalist in a national survey (Beatty and Walter 1988, 50).

⁴⁹ The fundamentalist sample includes churches in California and Virginia.

⁵⁰ The disparity between samples is due to the low response rate in fundamentalist churches both in terms of members willing to participate in the study and the number of churches agreeing to my request for help with my research. I contacted a total of twenty-three evangelical/fundamentalist pastors with only three agreeing to allow me to survey their members. *(I have every intension of continuing my effects to increase the number of fundamentalists in my sample.)*

⁵¹ The purpose of an experimental research design is to examine a causal relationship. Often the experimental design comes at the expense of external validity and a representativeness of sample.

levels than mainline Protestants. While the religion sample is not necessarily representative of the national population, it does follow expectations for the sample population of mainline and fundamentalists Protestants.

Belonging, Belief and Behavior

Next I turn to the differences between the research subjects in the mainline Protestant sample and the fundamentalist Protestant sample. In Table 5.2, one sees how the research subjects in both religious traditions described their kind of Christianity. Roughly three-fourths of research subjects belonging to mainline denominations described themselves as mainline. Many of those who described themselves as “Other” specified their kind of Christian as Presbyterian or Anglican. Research subjects from fundamentalist denominations predominately describe themselves as evangelical. Only twenty percent describe themselves as fundamentalist. While the fundamentalist sample does not overwhelmingly identify themselves as fundamentalist, an overwhelming percentage (73.2%) hold views associated with fundamentalists, mainly the inerrancy of

Table 5.2

Kind of Christianity	Mainline Denomination	Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Mainline	72.1	22.7	49.4
Evangelical	11.5	45.5	-34
Fundamentalist	0	20.5	-20.5
Charismatic	2.9	2.3	0.6
Pentecostal	1.0	4.5	-3.5
Other	12.5	4.5	8.0

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to *lambda* test.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.3

Authority of Scripture	Mainline Denomination	Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Actual Word of God	4.9	72.3	-67.4
Word of God, not literal	88.2	27.7	60.5
Not Word of God	6.9	0	6.9

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.4

Religious Behavior	Mainline Denomination	Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Attend religious services			
More than once a week	20.2	48.9	-28.7
Every week	51.9	42.6	9.3
Almost every week	24.0	6.4	17.6
Once or twice a month	2.9	2.1	0.8
A few times a year	1.0	0	1.0
Read the Bible			
Several times a day	1.9	12.8	-10.9
Once a day	19.2	34.0	-14.8
A few times a week	32.7	34.0	-1.3
Once a week or less	38.5	14.9	23.6
Never	7.7	4.3	3.4

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Scripture or the “actual Word of God” (Table 5.3). While this sample does not predominately view themselves as fundamentalist Protestants, their views on Scripture are similar. The fundamentalist sample also records higher level of religiosity in terms of attending religious services and frequency of reading the Bible than those in the mainline Protestant sample (Table 5.4).

The Religious Gap in the Religion Experiment

As anticipated, there are a number of significant differences between mainline and fundamentalist Protestants over moral and religious issues, views on homosexuals and the role of women, the environment, social welfare issues, political identity, and affect toward different religious traditions. For all the policies and affect toward other groups, research subjects in the mainline sample took more liberal positions than the subjects in the fundamentalist sample. In Table 5.5, I find that roughly half of the mainline sample views abortion as a personal choice for the woman without legal restrictions. In the case of the fundamentalist sample, nearly half support abortion only in the extreme cases of rape, incest or danger to the life of the mother. Roughly a quarter of the sample opposed abortion under all circumstances. Given fundamentalist opposition to abortion, it is little wonder that 74.5 percent of the sample opposed government funding for abortions. In other moral and religious issues, the mainline sample is less supportive of prayer of any kind being permitted in public schools while roughly fifteen percent of fundamentalists are supportive of requiring Christian prayer in school. Those in the fundamentalist sample are also very opposed (54.5%) to state lotteries as always wrong compared with seventeen percent of the mainline sample.

In Tables 5.6 and 5.7, I see that the fundamentalist sample holds more negative views about homosexuals and more conservative views about the equality of women. The mean feeling thermometer score for homosexuals differs by thirty points for the mainline and fundamentalist samples. Given their negative views of homosexuals, it is not surprising that fundamentalists are less supportive of federal funding for AIDS research and legislation designed to protect homosexuals from job discrimination. Nearly

Table 5.5

Moral and Religious Issues	Mainline Denomination	Percentages Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Abortion			
Always	48.5	6.5	42.0
Other cases	27.7	19.6	8.1
Cases of rape, incest, or danger to mother	18.8	47.8	-29.0
Never permitted	5.0	26.1	-21.1
Government funds for abortion			
Favor	50.5	25.5	25.0
Oppose	49.5	74.5	-25.0
Prayer in School			
Not allowed	20.0	2.1	17.9
General prayer	24.8	29.8	-5.0
Silent prayer	55.2	53.2	2.0
Christian prayer	0	14.9	-14.9
State Lotteries			
Never wrong	36.8	12.1	24.7
Sometimes wrong	46.0	33.3	12.7
Always wrong	17.2	54.5	-37.3

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.6

Homosexuals and AIDS	Mainline Denomination	Percentages Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
AIDS Research			
Increase	44.0	31.1	12.9
Same	49.0	46.7	2.3
Decrease	7.0	22.2	-15.2
Job Protection for Homosexuals			
Strongly favor	48.6	17.0	31.6
Not so strongly favor	31.4	31.9	-0.5
Not so strongly oppose	10.5	21.3	-10.8
Strongly oppose	9.5	29.8	-20.3
Feeling Thermometer for Homosexuals (Mean)	63.2	32.7	30.5

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square and ANOVA in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.7

Role of Women	Mainline Denomination	Percentages Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Equal role for women and men	71.6	21.7	49.9
•	7.8	17.4	-9.6
•	6.9	19.6	-12.7
•	4.9	17.4	-12.5
•	4.9	17.4	-12.5
•	3.9	4.3	-0.4
Woman's place in the home	0	2.2	-2.2

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to ANOVA in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

half of the mainline sample strongly favored job protection (48.6%) and increases for AIDS research (44.0%). Research subjects in the mainline sample were overwhelmingly supportive of an equal role for women and men (71.6%). Roughly twenty-two percent of the fundamentalist sample supportive an equal role while most supported a role somewhere in the middle of an equal role and the view that a woman's place was in the home.

Previous research suggests that evangelicals and fundamentalists are less supportive of efforts to protect the environment (Guth *et al.* 1995; Kohut *et al.* 2000, 48). There are similar findings for the data for the religion experiment (Table 5.8). Sixty-four percent of the mainline sample supports spending increases for environmental protection compared with only twenty-two percent of the fundamentalist sample. Over ninety percent of the mainline sample supports the view that the government should impose strict environmental laws. Research subjects in the fundamentalists were less enthusiastic about the federal government enacting stricter laws.

Table 5.8

Environmental Issues	Mainline Denomination	Percentages Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Federal Spending on Environment			
Increase	64.4	22.2	42.2
Same	27.7	55.6	-27.9
Decrease	7.9	22.2	-14.3
Protect the Environment			
Definitely should	61.2	31.1	30.1
Probably should	31.1	46.7	-15.6
Probably should not	6.8	11.1	-4.3
Definitely should not	1.0	11.1	-10.1

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.9

Social Welfare and School Vouchers	Mainline Denomination	Percentages Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Aid to the Poor			
Increase	55.6	34.1	55.6
Same	36.4	56.8	36.4
Decrease	8.1	9.1	8.1
School Vouchers			
Favor	45.1	76.1	45.1
Oppose	54.9	23.9	54.9
Welfare			
Increase	29.6	6.7	29.6
Same	43.9	53.3	43.9
Decrease	26.5	40.0	26.5

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between the religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies.

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Regarding federal assistance to the poor, subjects in the mainline sample were very supportive of spending increases for aid the poor (55.6%) and for welfare (29.6%). The fundamentalist sample was far less supportive of these programs with thirty-four percent for increases in aid the poor and less than seven percent for welfare. However, the research subjects in the fundamentalist sample were very supportive of school vouchers (76.1%) while the mainline sample was more closely divided with a narrow majority opposed to vouchers.

The political and ideological identities of those in the mainline and fundamentalist sample are nearly polar opposites. The mainline sample is Democratic (24.3% as strong Democrat) and moderately liberal. The fundamentalist is decidedly Republican and conservative. Roughly thirty-eight percent of the fundamentalist sample labeled themselves as strong Republicans. Forty percent described their political ideology as conservative.

The feeling thermometer scores for the religious traditions show both positive affect for one's own group and signs of a positive ecumenical view in the case of the mainline sample. For research subjects in mainline denominations, their mean scores (81.4) for mainline Protestants was the highest score among the different religious groups. Their affect toward fundamentalist Protestants was the lowest score at 56.2. However, the subjects in the fundamentalist sample gave evangelical Protestants the highest mean score (78.1). Given that most of the sample identifies themselves as evangelicals, it is little wonder. They also give mainline Protestants high scores followed

Table 5.10

Party Identification	Percentages		
	Mainline Denomination	Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Strong Democrat	24.3	6.7	17.6
Not very strong Democrat	6.8	0	6.8
Independent, leaning Democrat	15.5	4.4	11.1
Independent, other, and apolitical	14.6	11.1	3.5
Independent, leaning Republican	9.7	28.9	-19.2
Not very strong Republican	9.7	11.1	-1.4
Strong Republican	19.4	37.8	-18.4
Means	3.85	5.40	-1.55

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .000$) between religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square.

Party Identity: 1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.11

Ideology	Percentages		
	Mainline Denomination	Fundamentalist Denomination	Difference*
Extremely liberal	1.0	0	1.0
Liberal	19.0	2.2	16.8
Somewhat liberal	28.0	4.4	23.6
Moderate	18.0	15.6	2.4
Somewhat conservative	19.0	26.7	-7.7
Conservative	13.0	40.0	-27
Extremely conservative	2.0	11.1	-9.1
Means	3.82	5.31	-1.49

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .000$) between religious groups according to Pearson *chi*-square.

Ideology: 1=Extremely liberal, 7=Extremely conservative

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.12

Feeling Thermometer Scores for Religious Traditions	Means	
	Mainline Denomination	Fundamentalist Denomination
Mainline Protestants	81.4	69.0
Fundamentalist Protestants	56.2	66.5
Evangelical Protestants	63.1	78.1
Roman Catholics	80.1	61.1
Jews	79.1	65.9
Muslims	60.5	33.9

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between religious groups according to ANOVA tests.

Feeling Thermometers: 0=Cold, 100=Warm

* Difference is calculated as opinion of mainline subjects minus opinion of fundamentalist subjects.

Table 5.13

	Religious Traits	Means	
		Mainline	Fundamentalist
Mainline	Liberal	3.93	3.37
	Lack enthusiasm	3.52	3.25
	Elitist	3.75	4.00
	Hypocritical	4.58	4.00
Fundamentalist	Close-minded	2.47	2.47
	Extremist	3.09	3.50
	Zealous	3.06	2.86
	Conservative	1.94	2.21

Note: Traits were scored from 1=very common and 7=very uncommon.

* = $p < .10$ in ANOVA tests between mainline and fundamentalist Protestants.

by fundamentalist Protestants. Overall, the feeling thermometer scores in the mainline Protestant sample are higher than those of the fundamentalist sample, with the exception of scores for fundamentalists and evangelicals. The results of the feeling thermometer follow expectations. Mainline research subjects are more accepting of other faith traditions with the exception of fundamentalist Protestants followed by Muslims. Research subjects in the fundamentalist sample held less warm feelings about every faith tradition except for evangelicals and fundamentalists.

Finally, I turn to the negative religious traits. There were no statistically significant differences between the mean scores mainline or fundamentalist Protestants. Both religious traditions felt that the negative traits were more common for the fundamentalists than the negative traits for mainline Protestants.

Tests of Priming Hypotheses – Mainline Subjects

As one sees above, there are substantial differences between political attitudes of mainline and fundamentalist Protestants. In this section, I will look at the effect of the

negative religious group primes on the political attitudes of mainline Protestants. As the dominant group, I hypothesize that members of mainline denominations will not be affected by negative mainline primes (**H1**). However, they will be affected by the negative fundamentalist primes (**H2**). These primes will increase their support for social welfare programs, their liberal views on moral issues and views on homosexuality, and support for measures to protect the environment.

The data do not support these hypotheses. In Tables 5.14 and 5.15, I find that mainline members are affected not by the negative out-group primes but by negative primes aimed at their own religious tradition. For prayer in school, the negative mainline primes greatly increase mainline Protestants' opposition to any prayer allowed in school. For the entire mainline sample, twenty percent supported this view compared with roughly thirty-five percent those who received the negative mainline primes. Similarly, the negative mainline primes increased support for spending additional money on a range of social welfare programs.⁵²

In turning to the multivariate analysis, only the model for the role of women follows my hypothesis that the negative out-group primes will increase the already sizable gap between mainline and fundamentalist Protestants by increasing mainline support for the liberal view that men and women should share equal roles. The mainline primes do not have a statistically significant effect on the model. Per expectations, every unit in party identification toward strong identification with the Republican Party will increase the likelihood of holding a more conservative view of the role of women. If I set party identification at its mean, the predicted probabilities in Table 5.17 demonstrate how

⁵² The following percentages indicate support for spending increases by the entire mainline sample: 31.3% for food stamps, 67.7% for health care spending, 54.9% for Medicaid and Medicare, and 43.0% for Social Security.

Table 5.14

Prayer in School	Percentages	
	Mainline Primes	All Other Primes
Not allow prayer	34.5	14.5
Silent prayer	44.8	59.2
General prayer	20.7	26.3

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .075$) between those who received the out-group primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for mainline Protestant research subjects only.

Table 5.15

Social Welfare Programs	Percentages	
	Mainline Primes	All Other Primes
Food Stamps		
Increase	53.6	22.5
Same	39.3	52.1
Decrease	7.1	25.4
Health Care Spending		
Increase	85.7	60.6
Same	14.3	31.0
Decrease	0	8.5
Medicaid and Medicare		
Increase	75.0	47.3
Same	25.0	44.6
Decrease	0	8.1
Social Security		
Increase	60.7	36.1
Same	39.3	56.9
Decrease	0	6.9

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between those who received the out-group primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for mainline Protestant research subjects only.

strong the affect of negative fundamentalist primes are on attitudes about the role of women. The probability of supporting an equal role for women and men is .849 (or 84.9%). Compare this with Table 5.7 in which roughly seventy-two percent of the entire mainline sample supported an equal role.

In Tables 5.18 through 5.23, the results challenge my hypotheses. While all but the model for welfare spending affected by the negative fundamentalist primes per my hypotheses, the primes increase support for school vouchers, decrease support for spending on aid for the homeless and the environment. These models suggest that priming negative attitudes about fundamentalist Protestants actually affect mainline Protestants' political attitudes in ways that draw them closer to those of fundamentalists. These results are somewhat similar to those found in the race experiment. However, it is unlikely that mainline research subjects were affected by a norm of equality for religion. Rather these results are more likely affected by the acquiescence of mainlines with certain attitudes and behavior of fundamentalist Protestants. The one exception to this pattern is found in the model for welfare spending in which it is the negative mainline primes decreased the likelihood that they would support spending. It is interesting that the mainline Protestants are apt to say that the negative traits used for the fundamentalist primes are more common than the negative mainline traits (Table 5.13). However, their policy preferences become more political conservative when affected by the negative fundamentalist primes.

While the effect of the negative fundamentalist primes runs counter to my hypotheses, the other variables in my models closely follow expectations. In the model for school vouchers (Table 5.18), every unit increase in conservative political ideology is associated with increased likelihood of supporting school vouchers. Increasing warmth toward evangelical Protestants, as measured by the feeling thermometer, will increase the likelihood of support for school vouchers. Given the close political connection between evangelicals and their support for school voucher programs that might be used for

Table 5.16**Ordered Probit Model for Role of Women**

Variables	Role of Women
Fundamentalist Primes	-.589 (.322)*
Mainline Primes	-.138 (.339)
Party Identity	.304 (.069)**
Cut1	1.623
Cut2	1.939
Cut3	2.227
Cut4	2.549
Cut5	3.064

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Dependent variable is coded 1=equal role for women and men and 7=woman's place in the home.

Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Table 5.17**Predicted Probabilities for the Role of Women**

with Party identity set at mean

Role of Women	Percentages	
	Fundamentalist primes	No primes
Equal role for women and men	.849	.679
•	.060	.102
•	.037	.073
•	.026	.060
•	.019	.054
•	.009	.033
Woman's place in the home	0	0

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

Table 5.18**Probit Model for School Vouchers**

Variables	School Vouchers
Constant	-3.577
Fundamentalist Primes	.729 (.386)*
Mainline Primes	.649 (.408)
Ideology	.396 (.122)**
Evangelical Feeling Thermometer	.022 (.007)**

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.
 Dependent variable is coded 0=oppose and 1=favor.
 Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Table 5.19**Predicted Probabilities for School Vouchers**

with ideology and evangelical feeling thermometer set at their mean

	Oppose	Favor
Fundamentalist Primes	.472	.528
No Primes	.745	.255

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.
 Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

religious schools, one would expect there to be a strong correlation between positive affect toward evangelicals and support school vouchers.

In the models for aid for the homeless and welfare spending, every unit increase toward a Republican and conservative ideological identifications decrease the likelihood that the research subject will support spending on these programs. Again the feeling

thermometers for the religious groups affect policy preferences with warmth toward mainline Protestants increasing support for spending and warmth toward fundamentalist Protestants decreasing the likelihood of support. In the model for aid to the homeless, more literal views on the Scripture such as not believing that it is the word of God increase support for spending. Increase in age is associated with decreased likelihood of support for spending on welfare.

Finally, in the model for environmental spending, closer identification with the Republican Party will decrease the likelihood of support for spending. Every unit decrease in the religiosity as measured by frequency of reading the Bible will increase the likelihood of support for spending on environment. The fact that religiosity rather than views on Scripture affects attitudes toward the environment runs somewhat counter to the findings of Guth and colleagues (1995). While religiosity in the form of church attendance was correlated with environmental views, they found that eschatological views rather than religiosity had a statistically significant effect in regression models with separate samples of clergy, religious activists, party activists and the voting public (Guth *et al.* 1995, 675).

Table 5.20**Ordered Probit Models for Social Welfare Spending**

Variables	Aid for the Homeless	Welfare
Fundamentalist Primes	-.591 (.331)*	-.520 (.318)
Mainline Primes	-.170 (.346)	-.693 (.351)**
Party Identity	-.320 (.074)**	--
Ideology	--	-.713 (.127)**
Mainline Feeling Thermometer	.012 (.006)**	--
Fundamentalist Feeling Thermometer	--	-.013 (.006)**
View of Scripture	1.126 (.549)**	--
Age	--	-.326 (.146)**
Cut1	.123	-5.513
Cut2	1.699	-3.760

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

View of Scripture is coded as 1=literal word of God, 2=word of God not literal, and 3=not word of God, written by humans

Dependent variables are coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.

Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Table 5.21**Predicted Probabilities for Social Welfare Spending**

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
<i>Aid for the Homeless^a</i>			
Fundamentalist Primes	.094	.480	.426
No Primes	.030	.321	.649
<i>Welfare^b</i>			
Mainline Primes	.281	.583	.136
No Primes	.105	.563	.332

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

^a = Party identity, mainline feeling thermometer and view of Scripture set at their means

^b = Ideology, fundamentalist feeling thermometer and age set at their means

Table 5.22**Ordered Probit Model for Spending on the Environment**

Variables	Environment
Fundamentalist Primes	-.734 (.355)**
Mainline Primes	-.299 (.371)
Party Identity	-.382 (.077)**
Reads the Bible	.377 (.172)**
Cut1	-2.508
Cut2	-1.084

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Reads the Bible is coded as 1=several times a day, to 5=never.

Dependent variable is coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.

Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

** = $p < .050$

Table 5.23**Predicted Probabilities for Spending on the Environment**

with Party identity and Evangelical feeling thermometer set at their mean

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
Fundamentalist Primes	.065	.381	.553
No Primes	.016	.186	.798

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.

Only mainline Protestant research subjects were included.

Tests of Priming Hypotheses – Fundamentalist Subjects

For the fundamentalist Protestants, I hypothesize that they are more likely to be influenced by negative attacks on their own group in the form of negative in-group primes, rather than out-group primes (**H3**). Negative fundamentalist primes will push their attitudes toward decreased support for spending on social welfare programs and the environment, more conservative preferences for moral and religious issues, and more

supportive of spending on the military (**H4**). As the tables below will demonstrate, there is no clear evidence regarding the hypotheses. This is likely due to the small sample size (N=47).

In Tables 5.24 and 5.25, both the mainline and fundamentalist primes affect the policy preferences of the research subjects. While attacks in the form of negative fundamentalist primes affect political attitudes in Table 5.24, they narrow rather than widen the gap between fundamentalists and mainlines over the issue of state lotteries. Those who received the negative fundamentalist primes were less likely to believe that state lotteries are always wrong (30.8% for fundamentalist primes versus 70.0% for all other primes). Compare these percentages with the percentages in Table 5.5 for the entire mainline and fundamentalist samples in which only 17.2% of mainlines and a majority of fundamentalists (54.5%) of research subjects believed that state lotteries were always wrong. While it is the negative in-group primes that affect the attitudes about the state lotteries, the direction of their effect is contrary to my hypothesis (**H4**). In Table 5.25, the negative mainline primes decrease the percentage of research subjects who support spending increases to aid the homeless compared with all other primes. These results violate my hypotheses that negative out-group primes will not affect policy preferences (**H3**) and primes will increase the religious gap between mainlines and fundamentalists (**H4**).

When I turn to the multivariate analysis, the results do not support my hypotheses. In Table 5.26, negative mainline and fundamentalist primes affect policy preferences for spending on AIDS research and food stamps respectively. For the model involving AIDS research, the negative mainline primes further decrease the likelihood that fundamentalist

Table 5.24

State Lotteries	Percentages	
	Fundamentalist Primes	All Other Primes
Never wrong	23.1	5.0
Sometimes wrong	46.2	25.0
Always wrong	30.8	70.0

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .075$) between those who received the out-group primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for fundamentalist Protestant research subjects only.

Table 5.25

Aid to the Homeless	Percentages	
	Mainline Primes	All Other Primes
Increase	40.0	61.3
Same	40.0	38.7
Decrease	20.0	0

Note: There are statistically significant differences ($p < .05$) between those who received the out-group primes and all other primes/controls according to Pearson *chi*-square in all of these policies for fundamentalist Protestant research subjects only.

Table 5.26

Ordered Probit Models for Spending Priorities

Variables	AIDS Research	Food Stamps
Fundamentalist Primes	-.238 (.416)	.765 (.425)*
Mainline Primes	-1.132 (.473)**	.332 (.469)
Party Identity	.213 (.115)**	-.253 (.117)**
Cut1	-.090	-1.419
Cut2	1.346	.042

Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Dependent variables are coded 1=decrease, 2=same, and 3=increase.

Only fundamentalist Protestant research subjects were included.

* = $p < .075$

** = $p < .050$

Table 5.27

Predicted Probabilities for Spending Priorities
with party identity set at mean

	Decrease Spending	Stay the Same	Increase Spending
<i>AIDS Research</i>			
Mainline Primes	.456	.435	.109
No Primes	.124	.453	.423
<i>Food Stamps</i>			
Fundamentalist Primes	.218	.518	.264
No Primes	.483	.425	.092

Note: Predicted probabilities estimated using CLARIFY in STATA.
Only fundamentalist Protestant research subjects were included.

Protestants will support spending increases. The opposite is the case for spending on food stamps. The negative fundamentalist primes increase the likelihood of supporting federal spending for food stamps as the predicted probabilities demonstrate in Table 5.27.

Conclusion

The results from the religion experiment support past research that finds considerable gaps in the political attitudes of mainline and fundamentalist/evangelical Protestants. These differences appeared in a range of policy domains including moral and religious, issues of homosexuality, the role of women, environmental issues and social welfare policy. In addition, there were significant differences in political identification with the mainline Protestants more closely identifying themselves as Democrats and liberals, and fundamental Protestants identifying with Republicans and conservatives.

The hypotheses state that this religious gap will increase for both mainline and fundamentalist Protestants when they receive the negative fundamentalist primes. However, the evidence does not support these claims. In the case of the mainline sample, the *chi*-squared analysis of the data suggests that the negative mainline primes widen the religious gap. When I control for other variables, the research subjects were most often affected by the negative fundamentalist primes. These primes decreased religious divide in the issue of school vouchers by increasing support and decrease support for aid to the homeless and the environment. For the fundamentalist sample, the small sample size makes inferences difficult. In the few instances in which there are statistically significant results, the findings are mixed.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction

From the Clinton-Lazio debate to the Willie Horton campaign ad, politics is replete with instances of candidates waging a war of words with one particular group as their target. In these and other instances, the public is primed through the implicit or explicit use of stereotypes about one group. Predominately, the work of political scientists has focused on the effects that priming negative racial attitudes about African Americans has on whites (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino *et al.* 2002) or the effects of framing racial policy questions as benefiting African Americans to the detriment of whites (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 1996; Nelson and Kinder 1996). In my dissertation, I have attempted to examine the effects of priming research subjects with group primes that consist of negative traits about either their own group or an out-group. While the results are every bit as complex as the concept of group identity, a coherent picture does emerge from the data. I will begin by reviewing the results in all three studies. Then I will offer two possible explanations for the wide variation in the results.

Results of the Study

Across all three experiments, one result was most evident. There remain strong differences in the policy preferences between each set of groups. As past literature suggests, the African-American research subjects were very supportive of racial policies that benefit their group compared with the support expressed by the white research subjects. They were also very supportive of social welfare programs and viewed the causes of poverty as systemic rather than due to the individual's failure to live up to the

norm of a strong work ethic. In the gender experiment, females were far more supportive than males for compassion issues including social welfare spending, and were much more likely to view sexual harassment as a serious problem for women. Finally, the results of the religion experiment support literature that fundamentalist Protestants are considerably more conservative on a range of moral and religious issues as well as views of the welfare state and the need to protect the environment.

To what extent did the negative group primes affect these great divides in policy preferences? I hypothesized that the more powerful group - whites, males, and mainline Protestants - would most likely be affected by negative out-group primes (**H2**) rather than the negative in-group primes (**H1**). The negative out-group primes will widen the gap in policy preferences. For the less powerful group - African-Americans, females, and fundamentalist Protestants, I hypothesized that they were more likely to be affected by negative primes attacking their own group (**H4**) rather than negative out-group primes (**H3**). Attacks on their group will increase their support for policies where I find sizable gaps in attitudes.

Given the wealth of existing research about the effects of priming and framing racial attitudes, the race experiments will serve as the baseline of analysis for the gender and religion experiments as I attempt to address the question (Refer to Table 6.1). The white research subjects were predominately affected by the negative African-American primes. However, the effects did not follow my second hypothesis. Rather than widening the racial gap, attacks on African Americans results in the Caucasian research subjects expressing greater support for racial and social welfare policies. These results do support my alternative hypothesis that the explicit nature of the racial primes will

Table 6.1**Summary of Study Results**

Hypotheses	Race	Gender	Religion
H1	Supports	Supports	Supports
H2	Opposes	Supports	Opposes
H2a*	Supports	--	--
H3	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
H4	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed

* = The Mendelberg hypothesis (H2a) applies only to race.

increase white support for racial policies (**H2a**).

For the African-American research subjects, the results were mixed. They were predominately affected by negative African-American primes per my hypotheses. However, the effect of the primes increased support for racial policies in instances in which policies were the most relevant to the lives of the African-American undergraduate subjects in my study (preferential job hiring and government support for blacks), and decreased support in other instances where the policies were possibly less relevant to the subjects (welfare spending and fewer national problems with greater equality).

In the gender study, the results support my hypotheses. For male research subjects, the negative female primes decreased the likelihood of supporting increases in spending for a range of social welfare policies including health care and Social Security. Similar to the race experiment, the results for the less powerful gender group were mixed. In the multivariate analysis, the female research subjects were affected by both negative male and female primes contrary to my hypotheses. Whether negative male or female, the primes widened the gender gap by increasing the likelihood that females would support social welfare programs and decreasing their support for law enforcement issues.

The negative female primes also increased the likelihood that the female subjects would identify with the Democratic Party.

The results for the religion experiment are unexpected and somewhat disappointing. For the mainline sample, the research subjects were affected by the negative mainline primes. Those who receive the negative mainline primes were more supportive of spending increases for social welfare and less supportive of prayer in public schools compared with all other primes. Unlike the analysis of the race and gender experiments, these results do not hold up in the multivariate analysis when controlling for other variables such as party identification and ideology. The mainline Protestant research subjects were predominately affected by the negative fundamentalist primes in the multivariate analysis per my hypotheses. However, the effect of the primes runs counter to my hypotheses. Like the race experiments, the negative out-group primes narrow the religious gap by decreasing the likelihood of mainline Protestants support for policies such as social welfare programs and spending on the environment. Regrettably the fundamentalist sample is too small to derive inferences.

Taken as a whole, the data for the three experiments suggests that the more powerful group is almost exclusively affected by negative out-group primes. However, the direction of the effect varies. For both race and religion, the negative out-group primes narrow the gaps in group attitudes toward policy. For gender, the negative female primes widen the opinion gap for males.

While the results for race and religion appear similar for the more powerful group, it is difficult to imagine that a single theory will explain both. In the case of race, it seems logical to assume that the explicit nature of the racial primes, the primes explicitly

link African Americans with negative traits, resulted in white research subjects' attitudes being shaped by their support for the norms of racial equality. Religious groups are subject to a different set of norms. Unlike race, religion is also a permeable group. If the group does not make one feel good about one's self, it is possible in most instances to exit the group. One would assume that religious identity be both strong and very positive. However, I find that the mainline Protestants do not fight back in terms of their support for particular programs. Rather the negative fundamentalist primes narrow the gap in opinion between mainlines and fundamentalist Protestants.

For the less powerful groups, the results are particularly complicated. In the case of race, African Americans are affected by negative primes about their racial group. The effect of the primes is mixed. The negative in-group primes caused the African-American research subjects to be more supportive of some race related policies and less supportive of others. In the gender experiment, females are affected by both male and female primes. Both primes increase support for social welfare programs and decrease support for law enforcement. As for fundamentalists, the limited results are mixed in terms of primes affecting policy preferences and the direction of their effect.

Social Identity

Why are there such significant differences in the results for the three experiments? There are a couple of possible explanations. First, there is clearly a difference in perception of groups and attachment to them. We all belong to any number of groups. Our attachment to one particular group can vary across different contexts and is shaped by the nature of the group as having permeable or impermeable group boundaries. To measure the complexity of group identity, I have opted to use Luhtanen and Crocker's

collective self-esteem scale (1992). The scale has four parts – membership, private, public and identity – within which there are four questions.⁵³ Questions about *membership* asks about one's usefulness or worthiness as a member; *private* examines the worthiness of one's group; *public* asks questions about the context of one's group; and *identity* explores attachment to group. The scale has been used several studies for measuring the social identity of gender and racial groups (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990; Jackson and Smith 1999; Jarvis 1986; Karasawa 1991 Kelly 1988; Luhtanen and Crocker 1992; Stokes 1983).

From Tables 6.2 through 6.4, the results are most dramatic in the case of race. White and African-American research subjects differed for every dimension and every question concerning collective self-esteem, or attachment to one's group. African-Americans expressed stronger feelings of the worthiness of one's membership (SID1, SID5, and SID9) in their racial group as well as worthiness of the group (SID2, SID6, and SID10) compared with the views of white subjects. They also expressed a strong sense of attachment to their group (SID4, SID8, and SID12). However, they believed that their group was perceived more negatively than Caucasians (SID3, SID7, and SID11). Whites, on the other hand, recorded lower levels of collective self-esteem for their racial group for three dimensions (membership, private and group attachment) but much higher for public aspects of group identity.

A similar pattern appeared between males and females in the gender experiments albeit weaker in terms of statistically significant differences according to ANOVA tests.

⁵³ The first experiment that I conducted involved gender. For this experiment, I used a total of sixteen questions. Based on the results of the gender experiment, I reduced the CSE scale to three questions per dimension for race and religion. For the specific questions used in the surveys, refer to the tables below.

Table 6.2

Collective Self-Esteem and Racial Groups

Variable Names	White	African American
SID1*	3.96	5.24
SID2*	4.67	5.44
SID3*	4.04	2.21
SID4*	2.28	3.95
SID5*	4.30	5.37
SID6*	4.69	5.60
SID7*	4.14	2.40
SID8*	3.24	4.88
SID9*	4.75	5.39
SID10*	4.38	5.47
SID11*	4.17	2.75
SID12*	2.57	4.25

Note: Social identity responses were coded 0=strongly disagree (weak identity) to 6=strongly agree (strong identity).

* = Statistically significant differences exist between whites and African Americans ($p < .000$).

Key to Collective Self-Esteem Questions

Variable Names	Questions
SID1	I am a supportive member of the racial/ethnic group I belong to.
SID2	Overall, I often feel that the racial/ethnic group of which I am a member is not worthwhile.
SID3	Overall, my racial/ethnic group is considered good by others.
SID4	Overall, my racial/ethnic membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
SID5	I feel I don't have much to offer the racial/ethnic group I belong to.
SID6	In general, I'm glad to be a member of the racial/ethnic group I belong to.
SID7	Most people consider my racial/ethnic group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other racial/ethnic groups.
SID8	The racial/ethnic group I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.
SID9	I often feel I'm a useless member of my racial/ethnic group.
SID10	I feel good about the racial/ethnic group I belong to.
SID11	In general, others respect the racial/ethnic group of which I am a member.
SID12	My racial/ethnic group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.

Table 6.3

Collective Self-Esteem and Gender Groups

Variable Names	Male	Female
SID1	5.12	5.54
SID2	5.34	5.41
SID3*	4.08	4.22
SID4*	3.01	3.56
SID5*	4.44	4.94
SID6	5.22	5.61
SID7	4.59	4.24
SID8*	3.27	4.15
SID11	5.19	5.42
SID12	5.37	5.34
SID13*	4.34	3.27
SID14*	3.83	4.46
SID15	5.14	5.33
SID16*	4.87	5.24
SID17*	4.33	3.83
SID18	3.82	4.43

Note: Social identity responses were coded 0=strongly disagree (weak identity) to 6=strongly agree (strong identity).

* = Statistically significant differences exist between males and females ($p < .05$).

Key to Collective Self-Esteem Questions and Their Means per Gender Group

Variable Names	Questions
SID1	I often feel I'm a useless member of my gender.
SID2	In general, I'm glad to be a member of the gender I belong to.
SID3	Overall, my gender is considered good by others.
SID4	Overall, my gender has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
SID5	I am a supportive member in the gender I belong to.
SID6	Overall, I often feel that the gender of which I am a member is not worthwhile.
SID7	In general, others think that the gender I am a member of is unworthy.
SID8	The gender I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.
SID11	I am a worthy member of the gender I belong to.
SID12	I often regret that I belong to the gender I do.
SID13	Most people consider my gender, on the average, to be more ineffective than the other gender.
SID14	The gender I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.
SID15	I feel I don't have much to offer to the gender group I belong to.
SID16	I feel good about the gender group I belong to.
SID17	In general, others respect the gender that I am a member of.
SID18	In general, belonging to my gender is an important part of my self-image.

Table 6.4

Collective Self-Esteem and Religious Groups

Variable Names	Mainline	Fundamentalist
SID1	5.37	5.55
SID2	5.45	5.52
SID3	4.65	4.67
SID4	4.71	4.80
SID5	4.92	5.02
SID6	5.52	5.24
SID7	4.14	4.48
SID8	4.61	4.80
SID9	5.19	5.30
SID10	5.38	5.52
SID11	4.94	4.65
SID12	5.04	4.76

Note: Social identity responses were coded 0=strongly disagree (weak identity) to 6=strongly agree (strong identity).

* = Statistically significant differences exist between mainline and fundamentalist Protestants ($p < .10$).

Key to Collective Self-Esteem Questions and Their Means per Religious Group

Variable Names	Questions
SID1	I am a supportive member of the religious group I belong to.
SID2	Overall, I often feel that the religious group of which I am a member is not worthwhile.
SID3	Overall, my religious group is considered good by others.
SID4	Overall, my religious membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
SID5	I feel I don't have much to offer the religious group I belong to.
SID6	In general, I'm glad to be a member of the religious group I belong to.
SID7	Most people consider my religious group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other religious groups.
SID8	The religious group I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.
SID9	I often feel I'm a useless member of my religious group.
SID10	I feel good about the religious group I belong to.
SID11	In general, others respect the religious group of which I am a member.
SID12	My religious group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.

The female research subjects expressed stronger group attachment (SID4, SID8, and SID14) and feelings of group worthiness than the male subjects (SID16). Like African Americans, females believed that their gender group was not considered as positively as males (SID3, SID13, and SID17).

Finally, I come to the collective self-esteem for the religious groups. There were no statistically significant differences between the scores of mainline and fundamentalist Protestants. Across all four dimensions, both religious groups recorded similarly high scores. Mainline and fundamentalist Protestants each felt very positively toward their own religious group and believe that others feel the same way toward their group. Compared with racial and gender groups, there does not exist the same kind of contentious relationship between mainline and fundamentalist Protestants. Because both religious groups have high scores for their collective self-esteem, the negative group primes do not have the same impact as they did for the other experimental groups.

Having demonstrated decreasing differences in the collective self-esteem scale from the race experiment to the religion experiment, it is interesting to compare the results with the feeling thermometer scores for all three experiments. As it expected, the gap between the mean feeling thermometer scores for whites and African Americans is sizable, particularly for blacks. In the case of gender, there is a significant difference between male and female research subjects for their feelings about women, but not men. While there was no difference between the collective self-esteem scores for mainline and fundamentalist Protestant research subjects, there is considerable difference with regard to their feeling thermometer scores.

Table 6.4

Feeling Thermometer Scores for Racial Groups	Means	
	White	African American
Blacks*	70.9	90.4
Whites*	77.7	59.3

Note: Feeling Thermometers: 0=Cold, 100=Warm

* = $p < .000$ in ANOVA tests between males and females.

Table 6.5

Feeling Thermometer Scores for Gender Groups	Means	
	Male	Female
Women*	74.2	82.3
Men	72.8	72.7

Note: Feeling Thermometers: 0=Cold, 100=Warm

* = $p < .000$ in ANOVA tests between males and females.

Table 6.6

Feeling Thermometer Scores for Religious Traditions	Means	
	Mainline Denomination	Fundamentalist Denomination
Mainline Protestants**	81.4	69.0
Fundamentalist Protestants*	56.2	66.5
Evangelical Protestants**	63.1	78.1

Note: Feeling Thermometers: 0=Cold, 100=Warm

** = $p < .002$ in ANOVA tests between males and females.

* = $p < .05$ in ANOVA tests between males and females.

When I compare the collective self-esteem scale with the feeling thermometer scores, each offers a unique perspective on the level of conflict between the groups.

According to the feeling thermometer scores, it would appear that the gender groups are not so different in terms of their views on men. When I turn of the CSE scale, male and female research subjects recorded statistically different views of group attachment for a

number of questions. The reverse is the case for religion where there are significant differences on the feeling thermometer scores but no difference for the CSE scale. These very dissimilar findings suggest that the CSE scale may offer a better perspective of group attachment as well as levels of contentiousness between similar groups.

While the effect of the negative out-group primes is similar for whites and mainline Protestants, the CSE scale and to a lesser extent the feeling thermometer scores suggests that these results do not occur for the same reason. Racial identity is a dominant group identity. Whites and blacks hold very different perspectives about attachment to their racial group and policies that are linked to race. For this reason, the alternative hypothesis appears to be a valid one for the white research subjects. Religious identity is much weaker in terms of group attachment, or collective self-esteem. It is unlikely that the explicit nature of the fundamentalist primes is the reason for the results. Rather it is more likely that mainline Protestants agree with aspects of fundamental Protestantism such as their high level of religiosity and commitment to their beliefs. Rather than causing the mainline research subjects to consider issues of religious equality in the same way that the negative black primes raised issues of racial equality for the white research subjects, the negative fundamentalist primes may result in the mainline subjects expressing political attitudes more similar to the fundamentalist research subjects as a form of agreement with fundamentalist Protestants.

Political Discourse

Race

Another possible explanation for the differences across the three experiment groups is the nature of political discourse in the United States. Race more than gender or

religion continues to be highly contentious although the evolution of racial and gender equality closely parallel each other. Despite certain similarities, the struggle for racial equality has been marked with a level of violence and fear not present in the battle for equal rights for women. The political discourse involving religion has very different from both race and gender. It occurs in two arenas. First, there is ongoing debate about the role of religion in the political sphere, which includes issues of the separation between church and state. Second, there exists a heated debate within and between faith traditions over the issues of how religious beliefs should affect political attitudes and behavior, often referred to as the “culture wars” (Hunter 1991).

The debate over slavery emerged prior to the formation of the United States as a nation independent from Great Britain. As early as 1688, the Society of Friends protested slavery in Germantown, Pennsylvania. By the late 1700s, a growing number of Americans viewed slavery as wrong based on religious, moral, or philosophical grounds. The Civil War brought definitive resolution to the question of slavery but not the issue of race. With the Union’s victory, the Confederate states were forced to support the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as part of the price of their readmission to the Union. The end of slavery only proved the beginning of the battle for African-American equality as southern states in particular enacted Jim Crow laws designed to suppress blacks. It would take another hundred years before African Americans gained legal equality through Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 when the issue of race was transformed from whether African Americans should have legal equality to how equality should be achieved. Affirmative action and the busing of public school children to integrated schools became fervently debated issues. While busing has

largely faded from the political arena, debates continue over the role of affirmative action policies used by colleges and universities in the selection of students.

The political realities and rhetoric dramatically changed following passage of the civil rights legislation. Once single-party control of the Democrats in the South gave way to Republican gains as the Democratic Party became increasingly tied with African Americans and policies that the public believes specifically benefit them. Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue that racial issues more than any other factor were responsible for the realignment of the two major political parties. In reaction to new political realities, Republican candidates such as Richard Nixon began to use the language of implicit racial appeals through their opposition to busing, and support law and order without violating emerging norm of racial equality. “Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, and George Bush learned from southern politicians and made implicit discourse their own, not for the purpose of defending white supremacy but for the purpose of mobilizing white voters and winning elections” (Mendelberg 2001, 102). Attacking Democrats on issues with racial undertones proved very effective at the national and state level. The use of racial coded language remains prevalent and potent in politics.

The ongoing tensions over issues of race likely affected the results of the race experiment. Unlike the gender study, members of the more powerful group became more supportive of policies such as social welfare spending and racial policies when they received negative primes for the less powerful group. These results support my alternative hypothesis that whites will actually become more supportive of policies and programs, which African Americans tend to support, when they receive the negative African-American primes. This stems from the explicit nature of the group African-

American primes and the overwhelming desire not to appear to be a racist. While race a less contentious issue, I might find the Caucasian research subjects less supportive of certain policies when they received the negative out-group primes.

Gender

The evolution of equality for women parallels the struggles of African Americans. As the abolition movement built momentum through the early to mid 1800s, women who played vital roles in the movement began to organize to improve legal standing for their gender through events such as the 1848 Seneca Falls Conference in which the “Declaration of Sentiments” was produced (DuBois 1998; Strom 2003, 53-57). The Civil War brought a temporary suspension of their efforts. Like African Americans, women hoped to gain greater equality during Reconstruction Era through amendments to the Constitution. Failing to gain congressional support for the inclusion of gender with race in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the women’s movement shifted to a more combative legal and political battle over the issue of women’s suffrage.

The temperance movement also played an important role of the evolution of the women’s movement. In the temperance movement, women argued that their sphere of influence, the home, made them particularly sensitive to the issues of alcoholism (DuBois 1998). Thus, they argued that they had a perspective that should be brought to the public realm of politics, which became one argument for why the Constitution should be amended to give women the vote. Temperance organizations such as the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union were so closely tied with the women’s movement that they publicly endorsed women’s suffrage in 1883 (*Ibid.*, 39). Even today one sees that tension exists between female political candidates who use their “expertise” on compassion

issues to garner votes at the same time battling stereotypes that they are only concerned about these issues (Sanbonmatsu 2003).

Despite their efforts beginning in the early nineteenth century, women did not gain the right to vote until 1920 when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. With its mere thirty-nine words, the amendment marked a major step toward equality for women. Following this victory, the women's movement began the campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment, which narrowly failed the lengthy ratification process in 1978. Despite the defeat of the ERA, women won expanded legal rights for equality of membership in organizations (*Roberts v. United States Jaycees*, 1984), property, divorce, and control over reproduction (*Roe v. Wade*, 1973) through the legal challenges in the 1970s and 1980s. These unprecedented advances came on the heels of passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibited discrimination based on sex as well as race.

While there are certain similarities between the equality achieved for women and African Americans, the women's movement did not face the level of violence associated with the civil rights movement. African Americans and the whites who supported the cause of equality were subject to retribution through mob violence including church bombings and lynchings (Branch 1988). The leaders of the women's movement, on the other hand, faced threats and imprisonment for protests (DuBois 1998). Early feminists did not confront the very real possibility that they might lose their lives for the cause of equality.

Moreover, women do not meet the continued underlying resentment and hostility that African Americans experienced. The old myths about women have given way under the weight of new social norms that women are limited equals. No longer is it acceptable

to believe that women lack the mental capacity to compete with men for higher education and careers not traditionally open to women. Not only are record numbers of women attending colleges and universities but the percentage of females is larger than males for undergraduate programs, particularly for nonwhites (Sealey 2002). While women began to demonstrate physical ability such as running the marathon that once was believed impossible or very dangerous for women, they do not possess the level of physical strength that males possess. The propensity of women to focus on the emotional well being of others has been used as evidence that women are not logical in the same way as men are.⁵⁴ Consequently, the social norm for gender equality is preserved but there remains room for public debate about the limits of gender equality unlike debates about race in which one is potentially subject to the very negative label of racist if one fails to support norms of racial equality.

The difference between the norms of equality may offer one reason why the results of the gender experiments diverged from those of the race experiments. Males could express less support for policies in which one finds a gender gap because they were not subject to more rigid taboos of race or issues of social desirability. Rather they could offer positive feelings toward females for their feeling thermometer scores but still express some gender concerns in their attitudes toward social welfare policies.

Religion

⁵⁴ “More women than men (6 out of 10) report that they prefer deciding on the basis of personal impact [Feeling], and certainly there is cultural sanction on this type of behavior on the part of females. More men than women (6 out of 10) report that they prefer to make decisions on the basis of principles, that is, logically and objectively. Thus more men prefer the thinking and more women feeling, although this sex difference is relatively minor and gives little edge in predicting behavior” (Keirse and Bates 1984, 20). Although when Isabel Myers of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Test tested students in twenty-five high schools in 1957, “around 33% of the girls came out as Thinking types” (The Type Reporter 1989).

The political discourse involving religion is very different from race and gender. Freedom of religion was an early principle stated in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Those from faith traditions other than Protestantism found religious equality more of a goal than a reality as Roman Catholics, Jews and small religious sects such as Mormons were subject to open attacks by politicians, who vilified these groups to their own political ends (Ahlstrom 1972).⁵⁵ It was not until 1833 that the last state disestablished its connection with one denomination as the state church.

Today political discourse over religion involves the tension between greater tolerance for different faith traditions while making space in public sphere for religion. Americans have become more tolerant of other religions as Wuthnow discusses in *The Restructuring of American Religion* (1988). The old animosities between Protestants sects became to decline through various denominations' efforts at ecumenism including organizations such as the Interchurch World Movement, 1918 through 1935. In addition, Americans' loyalty to the denominations of their youth was in decline as increasing percentages of individuals married persons on different faith traditions (Wuthnow 1988, 90). Furthermore, public opinion regarding most denominations and different faith traditions is now predominately positive (Rosenfield 1982; *Ibid.*, 91-96).

With an increase in tolerance, there emerged new tensions in the struggle to define the role of religion and religious groups in the public sphere. The most notable example of this tension can be found with the Supreme Court's attempt to define separation of church and state. Through the 1960s under the Warren Court, the wall of separation between church and state grew as the Court ruled against commonly accepted

⁵⁵ The small third party known as the Know-Nothings openly campaigned against Catholics and foreigners.

practices such as nondenominational prayer (*Engel v. Vitale*, 1962), the Lord's Prayer (*Abington School District v. Schempp*, 1963), and Bible verses (*Murray v. Curlett*, 1963) in public schools. However, the high standard established during the Warren Court was lowered by the subsequent Burger Court with the Lemon test (*Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 1971) and Rehnquist Court (O'Brien 1997, 639-649).

In reaction to the Court's decisions during the 1960s, a firestorm was ignited for evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988). With these rulings by the Court, many Protestants became to view themselves as "resident aliens," meaning that they no longer believed that American society was supportive of Christianity but had become hostile towards persons of faith (Hauerwas and Willimon 1989). The reaction of Christians and other persons of faith to a changing society was not limited the decisions of the Supreme Court. Some individuals feel that political debates purposively exclude discussions about the role of one's religious faith in determining the policy positions.⁵⁶ One sees evidence of the "naked public square" in the political rhetoric of the Religious Right. On issues of religious and moral importance such as abortion, even they adopted the language of "family values," which is based upon conservative religious beliefs but avoids using explicitly religious language (Reed 1996).

There is another form of political rhetoric present in addition to the language cleansed of its religious groundings. This rhetorical form takes place between people of faith on the religious left and right.⁵⁷ Those of the religious left and right label the other

⁵⁶ Richard John Neuhaus (1984) described the exclusion of religious symbols and substance from political realm as the "naked public square."

⁵⁷ Hunter suggests that the conflict as occurring between the orthodox and the progressives. The orthodox (Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews) are defined by their commitment to "external, definable, and transcendent authority" while progressivists are defined by "the tendency to resymbolize historic faith according to the prevailing assumptions of contemporary life" (Hunter 1991, 44-45).

as extremists and claim sole religious and political legitimacy (Hunter 1991, 144-148). The deep political and theological division between religious right and left is to some extent possible because denominational loyalties have waned over the last fifty years. With their decline, denominations' ability to define the worldviews of their members also eroded. Political discourse over religious and moral issues became defined by the religious extremes on the left and right.

The results of my religion experiments suggest that religious groups are vulnerable to negative priming about religious groups. The mainline Protestant research subjects had negative feelings about fundamentalist Protestants according to the feeling thermometer scores. Their ratings of the negative fundamentalist primes show that they believe that the traits are fairly common for fundamentalists. Unexpectedly, the negative fundamentalist primes decreased their support for social welfare spending and increased their support for prayer in public schools in the multivariate models. These results contradict not only my hypotheses but they suggest that the "culture war" may not be as pervasive as Hunter and Wuthnow suggest. The effect of the negative fundamentalist primes on the mainline subjects may indicate that there are aspects of the fundamentalist Protestantism with which they agree. Despite their apparent negative views of fundamentalists, the negative primes resulted in the research subjects expressing political attitudes a little closer to those of the fundamentalist research subjects.

Future Research

The complexity of the results of my experiments recommends several potential areas of future research. First, the results of the race and gender experiments suggest that members of the less powerful group are affected by attacks on their own group. There is

little work with regard to how these group members psychologically fight back against attacks on their own group. Further studies involving priming effects should make a greater effort to examine the effect of negative group primes on nonwhites and members of other less powerful groups.

Second, race is a distinctive form of group identity in the American context. Albeit important, race is not the only group identity of importance in political attitudes and behavior. Theories about implicit and explicit priming based exclusively on evidence from experiment about race may offer little with respects to other group identities. Based on the results of the experiment, I would argue that gender would provide a challenge to some previously held concepts about priming effects and group-centric attitudes. It would also advance our knowledge about the role of gender identity in politics by complementing research about perceptions of candidates' competencies and gender gap issues (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993).

A new set of gender experiments could be designed using manipulated campaign ads or television newscasts. It is unlikely that the use of different images of gender will act as sufficient primes as was the case in experiments involving race (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino *et al.* 2002). Campaign ads or newscasts could be created to mirror political attacks such as the 2000 Hilary Rodham Clinton campaign's charges that Rick Lazio acted like a "bully" during the debate or Mitt Romney's criticism that his female opponent's behavior during the debate was "unbecoming." As with my gender experiment, the experiment could involve attacks on the male or female candidate as well as a control group. The experimental treatments might also include counter-stereotype gender attacks.

Because females were affected by both negative male and female primes, it is possible that the female research subjects were affected by negative attacks, not necessary the specific primes. One might create an experiment designed to evoke emotional response. Sullivan and Masters (1988) conducted such an experiment using videotaped excerpts for all the presidential candidates in the 1984 election. The excerpts included facial expresses that were either neutral or happy/reassuring. Their experiments were conducted with and without sound to test if what the candidates were actually saying made a difference in the research subjects' evaluation of the candidates with feeling thermometers. They found that sound didn't have an effect but happy/reassuring facial expression did even when controlling for party identity, issue agreement, and assessed leadership ability. One might construct a similar experiment using negative visual cues, such as the scene of Lazio crossing the stage to demand that Clinton sign the soft-money pledge during their first debate, and potential vote choice.

Third, more research is needed about the basic discourse about different religious groups. The religion experiment used the results of open-ended questions about different religious groups to create the negative primes. Unlike gender and race, there is no existing literature about religious group traits and public perception. To expand our knowledge of attitudes about religious group, one might begin with a rigorous study of how the media covers issues of religion and religious groups through content analysis of major news magazines, television broadcasts, or major national newspapers such as *The New York Times* or *Washington Post*. It might also be useful to explore how elites in political and religious groups view other religious groups. Open-ended questionnaires or interviews might be arranged with persons with the political arm of different faith

traditions. Most of the larger religious groups now have offices in Washington, D.C. and state capitals established to lobby on political issues that are important to their members. Finally, a study of attitudes toward religious groups might also include an examination of how political campaigns have alluded to religious groups or issue through campaign ads and political debates. The results of these studies might be used to improve the religion experiment. Certainly it would be advisable to accumulate a larger sample size of members of different religious groups.

Fourth, it would be particularly interesting to examine the effect of negative primes on political party identification, which is one of the most important factors in determining vote choice. Like religious identity, party identity might be measured a number of different ways: seven-point scale of identity, feeling thermometer toward each party, collective self-esteem scale for one's political party, and level of activities with one political party including monetary contributions. As a core political identity, attacks on one's party affiliation may evoke very different responses by research subjects. Because Republicans and Democrats are roughly equal with regards to power, one would expect that members of each party would only be affected by attacks on the other party. For those with independent and third party identification, they might be affected by the negative primes of the major political party with which they were less supportive.

Appendix

Race Survey

Study on Political Attitudes 2002-2003

Purpose of Study: The purpose of this study is to examine attitudes people hold about a variety of political issues including their racial/ethnic identity.

General Instructions: Please answer each question by circling the number that best represents your view or by writing in responses where appropriate. If you can't answer a question, skip and move on to the next question. *For this study, it is very important that you answer the questions in the order in which they appear in the survey. Please do not skip around from question to question!*

Anonymity: Your answers are completely anonymous and will be released only as summaries in which no individuals' answers can be identified.

Section A. *Interests and Activities*

First, we are interested in your year and major at the university.

1. What year are you in your undergraduate studies?

- 1 1st / Freshman
- 2 2nd / Sophomore
- 3 3rd / Junior
- 4 4th / Senior
- 5 5th or more

2. What is your major(s) or probable major(s)? _____

Section B. *Interest in Politics and Current Events*

Next, we would like to know your interests in politics and current events.

3. How interested in politics and current events are you?

- 1 Very interested
- 2 Somewhat interested
- 3 A little interested
- 4 Not at all interested

4. How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper?

- 1 0 days
- 2 1 day
- 3 2 days
- 4 3 days
- 5 4 days
- 6 5 days
- 7 6 days
- 8 Every day

5. How many days in the past week did you watch the national nightly news?

- 1 0 days
- 2 1 day
- 3 2 days
- 4 3 days
- 5 4 days
- 6 5 days
- 7 6 days
- 8 Every day

Control - Black**Section C. Attitudes about Racial/Ethnic Traits**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *African Americans/blacks*.

6. Clear?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

7. Shy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

8. Jumpy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

9. Quaint?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Control - White**Section C. Attitudes about Racial/Ethnic Traits**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *African Caucasians/whites*.

6. Clear?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

7. Shy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

8. Jumpy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

9. Quaint?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Treatment - Black**Section C. Attitudes about Racial/Ethnic Traits**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *African Americans/blacks*.

6. Aggressive?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

7. Hostile?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

8. Lazy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

9. Criminal?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Treatment - White**Section C. Attitudes about Racial/Ethnic Traits**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *Caucasians/whites*.

6. Oppressive?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

7. Elitist?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

8. Racist?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

9. Act superior?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Section D. *Priorities for Federal Government Spending and Other Political Issues*

10. Now we would like you to consider your priorities for federal government spending on a variety of programs.

		Increase	Stay the same	Decrease
{a}	What about welfare programs?	1	2	3
{b}	What about foreign aid?	1	2	3
{c}	What about food stamps?	1	2	3
{d}	What about aid to poor people?	1	2	3
{e}	What about social security?	1	2	3
{f}	What about environmental protection?	1	2	3
{g}	What about public schools?	1	2	3
{h}	What about dealing with crime?	1	2	3
{i}	What about dealing with the drug problem?	1	2	3
{j}	What about health care?	1	2	3
{k}	What about spending on defense?	1	2	3
{l}	What about Medicaid and Medicare?	1	2	3
{m}	What about tightening the border to prevent illegal immigration?	1	2	3
{n}	What about programs that assist blacks?	1	2	3

11. Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.

- 1 Government should provide many fewer services.
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 Government should provide many more services.

12. Do you favor or oppose a school voucher program that would allow parents to use tax funds to send their children to the school of their choice, even if it were a private school?

- 1 Favor school voucher program
- 2 Oppose school voucher program

13. Do you favor or oppose a ban on the sale of all handguns, except those that are issued to law enforcement officers?

- 1 Favor
- 2 Oppose

14. Let's consider about some problems that are important to America today. As you know, even though America is a wealthy nation, there are still many people living here who are poor. We would like you to read some reasons people have offered that other people.

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
{a}	The poor are poor because the wealthy and powerful keep them poor.	1	2	3	4
{b}	People are poor because there just aren't enough good jobs for everybody.	1	2	3	4
{c}	With all the training programs and efforts to help the poor, anyone who wants to work can get a job these days.	1	2	3	4
{d}	The poor are poor because the American way of life doesn't give all people an equal chance.	1	2	3	4
{e}	Many poor people simply don't want to work hard.	1	2	3	4

Section E. *Issues of Equal Opportunity and Racial Discrimination*

15. Now we would like to read some reasons people have offered why others are poor. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements.

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
{a}	Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.	1	2	3	4	5
{b}	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.	1	2	3	4	5
{c}	This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.	1	2	3	4	5
{d}	It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.	1	2	3	4	5
{e}	If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.	1	2	3	4	5
{f}	One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.	1	2	3	4	5

16. Some people say that because that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion – are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?

- 1 For
- 2 Against

17. Equal opportunity for blacks and whites is very important but it's not really the government's job to guarantee it.

- 1 Agree strongly
- 2 Agree somewhat
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree
- 4 Disagree somewhat
- 5 Disagree strongly

18. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

- 1 Government should help blacks
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 Blacks should help themselves

NA Haven't thought much about issue

19. Some people say that because of past discrimination it is sometimes necessary for colleges and universities to reserve openings for black students. Others oppose quotas because they say quotas give blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion – do you favor or oppose quotas to admit black students? Strongly or not so strongly?

- 1 Strongly favor
- 2 Not so strongly favor
- 3 Not so strongly oppose
- 4 Strongly oppose

Section F. Social Groups and Feeling Thermometers

We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in one particular group or category, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully.

20. For this series of questions, we would like you consider your *racial/ethnic* group.

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Agree	Strongly Agree
{a}	I am a supportive member of the racial/ethnic group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{b}	Overall, I often feel that the racial/ethnic group of which I am a member is not worthwhile.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{c}	Overall, my racial/ethnic group is considered good by others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{d}	Overall, my racial/ethnic membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{e}	I feel I don't have much to offer the racial/ethnic group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{f}	In general, I'm glad to be a member of the racial/ethnic group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{g}	Most people consider my racial/ethnic group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other religious groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{h}	The racial/ethnic group I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{i}	I often feel I'm a useless member of my racial/ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{j}	I feel good about the racial/ethnic group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{k}	In general, others respect the racial/ethnic group of which I am a member.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{l}	My racial/ethnic group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

I'd like to get your feelings toward several groups in American society. I'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer.

Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them.

Cold	Warm
0.....	100.....
	50.....

21. Whites: _____

22. Roman Catholics: _____

23. African Americans: _____

24. Mainline (moderate or liberal) Protestants: _____

25. Asian Americans: _____

26. Evangelical Protestants: _____

27. Hispanics: _____

28. Fundamentalist Protestants: _____

29. Jews: _____

30. Muslims: _____

Section G. *Political Party and Demographic Information*

Now we are interested in your political party and demographic information.

31. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or something else?

- 1 Strong Democrat
- 2 Not very strong Democrat
- 3 Independent, leaning Democrat
- 4 Independent
- 5 Independent, leaning Republican
- 6 Not very strong Republican
- 7 Strong Republican
- 8 Other or minor party
- 9 Apolitical

32. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- 1 Extremely liberal
- 2 Liberal
- 3 Somewhat liberal
- 4 Moderate, middle of the road
- 5 Somewhat conservative
- 6 Conservative
- 7 Extremely conservative

33. Do you consider yourself to be of Hispanic origin?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

34. Please indicate what racial/ethnic category best describes you?

- 1 White
- 2 African American / Black
- 3 Asian
- 4 American Indian
- 5 Pacific Islander
- 6 Other: Specify _____

35. What is your gender?

- 1 Male
- 2 Female

36. In what year were you born? _____

Thank you for your participation in this study!

Study on Gender Attitudes 2002

Purpose of Study: The purpose of this study is to examine attitudes people hold about their gender and a variety of political issues.

General Instructions: Please answer each question by circling the number that best represents your view or by writing in responses where appropriate. If you can't answer a question, skip and move on to the next question. *For this study, it is very important that you answer the questions in the order in which they appear in the survey. Please do not skip around from question to question!*

Anonymity: Your answers are completely anonymous and will be released only as summaries in which no individuals' answers can be identified.

Section A. *Interests and Activities*

First, we are interested in your year, interests and activities at the university.

1. What year are you in your undergraduate studies?

- 1 1st
- 2 2nd
- 3 3rd
- 4 4th
- 5 5th or more

2. In which college/school are you enrolled?

- 1 College of Architecture
- 2 College Arts and Sciences
- 3 Curry School of Education
- 4 School of Engineering and Applied Science
- 5 McIntyre School of Commerce
- 6 School of Nursing

3. What is your major(s)? _____

Section B. *Interest in Politics and Current Events*

Next, we would like to know your interests in politics and current events.

4. How interested in politics and current events are you?

- 1 A great deal
- 2 Fair amount
- 3 A little
- 4 Not at all

5. How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper?

- 1 0 days
- 2 1 day
- 3 2 days
- 4 3 days
- 5 4 days
- 6 5 days
- 7 6 days
- 8 Every day

6. How many days in the past week did you watch the national nightly news?

- 1 0 days
- 2 1 day
- 3 2 days
- 4 3 days
- 5 4 days
- 6 5 days
- 7 6 days
- 8 Every day

7. How many days in the past week did you read an online news source?

- 1 0 days
- 2 1 day
- 3 2 days
- 4 3 days
- 5 4 days
- 6 5 days
- 7 6 days
- 8 Every day

Section C. *Social Groups and Gender*

We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in one particular group or category, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. There are no right or wrong statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully.

8. For this series of questions, we would like you consider your *gender*?

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Agree	Strongly Agree
{a}	I often feel I'm a useless member of my gender.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{b}	In general, I'm glad to be a member of the gender I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{c}	Overall, my gender is considered good by others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{d}	Overall, my gender has very little to do with how I feel about myself.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{e}	I am a supportive member in the gender I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{f}	Overall, I often feel that the gender of which I am a member is not worthwhile.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{g}	In general, others think that the gender I am a member of is unworthy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{h}	The gender I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Control - Female**Section D. Attitudes about Gender Traits**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among women.

9. Clear?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Leafy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Drafty?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Green?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Section D. Attitudes about Gender Traits

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among women.

9. Clear?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Leafy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Drafty?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Green?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Treatment - Female**Section D. Attitudes about Gender Traits**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among women.

9. Emotional?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Dependant?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Demanding?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Conniving?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Treatment - Male**Section D. Attitudes about Gender Traits**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among men.

9. Aggressive?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Domineering?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Power hungry?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Arrogant?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Section E. Gender Roles and Issues

Now we would like to consider your views on gender roles and issues.

13. In the past several decades, there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that a woman's place is in the home. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

- 1 Women and men should have an equal role
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 A woman's place in the home

14. Some people think women face job discrimination. Do you think women face a lot of discrimination on the job, some or not discrimination at all?

- 1 A lot
- 2 Some
- 3 Not at all

15. Do you think that enough is being done to protect women from being sexually harassed in the work place, is too much being done or too little being done?

- 1 Too much
- 2 Enough
- 3 Too little

16. Do you favor or oppose laws to protect women against job discrimination?

- 1 Favor
- 2 Oppose

Section F. Priorities for Federal Government Spending and Other Political Issues

17. Now we would like you to consider your priorities for federal government spending on a variety of programs.

		Increase	Stay the same	Decrease
{a}	What about welfare programs?	1	2	3
{b}	What about spending on AIDS research?	1	2	3
{c}	What about foreign aid?	1	2	3
{d}	What about spending on defense/war on terrorism?	1	2	3
{e}	What about food stamps?	1	2	3
{f}	What about aid to poor people?	1	2	3
{g}	What about social security?	1	2	3
{h}	What about environmental protection?	1	2	3
{i}	What about public schools?	1	2	3
{j}	What about dealing with crime?	1	2	3
{k}	What about dealing with the drug problem?	1	2	3
{l}	What about health care?	1	2	3
{m}	What about Medicaid and Medicare?	1	2	3
{n}	What about tightening the border to prevent illegal immigration?	1	2	3

18. Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.

- 1 Government should provide many fewer services.
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 Government should provide many more services.

19. Do you favor an increase in the federal budget deficit in order to cut the taxes paid by ordinary Americans?

- 1 Yes, favor
- 2 No, don't favor

20. Do you favor cuts in spending on domestic programs like Medicare, education and highways in order to cut the taxes paid by ordinary Americans?

- 1 Yes, favor
- 2 No, don't favor

21. Do you favor cuts in spending on defense or foreign aid programs in order to cut the taxes paid by ordinary Americans?

- 1 Yes, favor
- 2 No, don't favor

22. Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

- 1 Waste a lot
- 2 Waste some
- 3 Don't waste very much

23. Do you favor or oppose a school voucher program that would allow parents to use tax funds to send their children to the school of their choice, even if it were a private school?

- 1 Favor school voucher program
- 2 Oppose school voucher program

24. Do you favor or oppose a ban on the sale of all handguns, except those that are issued to law enforcement officers?

- 1 Favor
- 2 Oppose

25. Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling our relations with foreign countries?

- 1 Approve
- 2 Disapprove

26. Strongly or not so strongly?

- 1 Strongly
- 2 Not so strongly

27. Would you say that the Bush administration made the United States much more secure from its foreign enemies, somewhat more secure, somewhat less secure, much less secure or didn't it make much difference either way?

- 1 Much more secure
- 2 Somewhat more secure
- 3 No difference
- 4 Somewhat less secure
- 5 Much less secure

Section G. *Health Issues*

28. How important do you think it is for elected officials to devote funding for medical research on heart disease?

- 1 Very important
- 2 Somewhat important
- 3 Not too important
- 4 Not an issue for elected officials

29. Thinking about health care issues that affect men, how important do you think it is for elected officials to devote funding for medical research on men's health issues such as prostate cancer?

- 1 Very important
- 2 Somewhat important
- 3 Not too important
- 4 Not an issue for elected officials

30. Thinking about health care issues that affect women, how important do you think it is for elected officials to devote funding for medical research on women's health issues such as breast and ovarian cancers?

- 1 Very important
- 2 Somewhat important
- 3 Not too important
- 4 Not an issue for elected officials

Section H. Social Groups and Feeling Thermometers

We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in one particular group or category, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. There are no right or wrong statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully.

31. For this series of questions, we would like you consider your *gender*?

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Agree	Strongly Agree
{a}	I am a worthy member of the gender I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{b}	I often regret that I belong to the gender I do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{c}	Most people consider my gender, on the average, to be more ineffective than the other gender.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{d}	The gender I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{e}	I feel I don't have much to offer to the gender group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{f}	I feel good about the gender group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{g}	In general, others respect the gender that I am a member of.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{h}	In general, belonging to my gender is an important part of my self-image.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

I'd like to get your feelings toward several groups in American society. I'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer.

Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them.

0.....50.....100

32. Men: _____

33. Women: _____

34. African Americans: _____

35. Women's Movement: _____

36. Whites: _____

37. Feminists: _____

38. Hispanics: _____

Section I. *Political Party and Demographic Information*

Now we are interested in your political party and demographic information.

39. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or something else?

- 1 Strong Democrat
- 2 Not very strong Democrat
- 3 Independent, leaning Democrat
- 4 Independent
- 5 Independent, leaning Republican
- 6 Not very strong Republican
- 7 Strong Republican
- 8 Other or minor party
- 9 Apolitical

40. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- 1 Extremely liberal
- 2 Liberal
- 3 Somewhat liberal
- 4 Moderate, middle of the road
- 5 Somewhat conservative
- 6 Conservative
- 7 Extremely conservative

41. Please indicate what racial/ethnic category best describes you?

- 1 White
- 2 African American / Black
- 3 Asian
- 4 American Indian
- 5 Pacific Islander
- 6 Other: Specify _____

42. What is your gender?

- 1 Male
- 2 Female

43. What is your age? _____

Thank you for your participation in this study!

Study on Religious Attitudes 2003

Purpose of Study: The purpose of this study is to examine attitudes people hold about their religious identity and a variety of political issues.

General Instructions: Please answer each question by circling the number that best represents your view or by writing in responses where appropriate. If you can't answer a question, skip and move on to the next question. *For this study, it is very important that you answer the questions in the order in which they appear in the survey. Please do not skip around from question to question!*

Anonymity: Your answers are completely anonymous and will be released only as summaries in which no individuals' answers can be identified.

Section A. *Interest in Politics and Current Events*

First, we would like to know how closely you follow current events.

1. How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper?

- 1 0 days
- 2 1 day
- 3 2 days
- 4 3 days
- 5 4 days
- 6 5 days
- 7 6 days
- 8 Every day

2. How many days in the past week did you watch the national nightly news?

- 1 0 days
- 2 1 day
- 3 2 days
- 4 3 days
- 5 4 days
- 6 5 days
- 7 6 days
- 8 Every day

Section B. *Religious Beliefs and Practices*

Next we would like to find out about your religious beliefs and practices.

3. Which one of these words best describes your kind of Christianity?

- 1 Fundamentalist
- 2 Evangelical
- 3 Charismatic
- 4 Pentecostal
- 5 Mainline
- 6 Other [Specify: _____]

→ 4. How strongly do you feel this word describes you?

- 1 Strongly
- 2 Not so strongly

5. On average, how often do you attend to religious services?

- 1 More than once a week
- 2 Every week
- 3 Almost every week
- 4 Once or twice a month
- 5 A few times a year
- 6 Never

6. People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?

- 1 Several times a day
- 2 Once a day
- 3 A few times a week
- 4 Once a week or less
- 5 Never

7. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you read the Bible?

- 1 Several times a day
- 2 Once a day
- 3 A few times a week
- 4 Once a week or less
- 5 Never

8. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?

- 1 The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
- 2 The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
- 3 The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.

Control - Fundamentalist**Section C. Attitudes about Traits of Religious Groups**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *fundamentalist Protestants*.

9. Clear?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Shy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Quick?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Jumpy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Control - Mainline**Section C. Attitudes about Traits of Religious Groups**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *mainline Protestants*.

9. Clear?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Shy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Quick?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Jumpy?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Treatment - Fundamentalist**Section C. Attitudes about Traits of Religious Groups**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *fundamentalist Protestants*.

9. Close-minded?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Extremist?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Zealous?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Conservative?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Treatment - Mainline**Section C. Attitudes about Traits of Religious Groups**

Please indicate your impression of how common certain attributes or traits are among *mainline Protestants*.

9. Liberal?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

10. Lack enthusiasm?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

11. Elitist?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

12. Hypocritical?

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Very common |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Very uncommon |

Section D. *Priorities for Federal Government Spending and Other Issues*

13. Now we would like you to consider your priorities for federal government spending on a variety of programs.

		Increase	Stay the same	Decrease
{a}	What about welfare programs?	1	2	3
{b}	What about spending on AIDS research?	1	2	3
{c}	What about food stamps?	1	2	3
{d}	What about aid to poor people?	1	2	3
{e}	What about social security?	1	2	3
{f}	What about environmental protection?	1	2	3
{g}	What about public schools?	1	2	3
{h}	What about dealing with crime?	1	2	3
{i}	What about dealing with the drug problem?	1	2	3
{j}	What about health care?	1	2	3
{k}	What about Medicaid and Medicare?	1	2	3
{l}	What about aid to homeless?	1	2	3

14. Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.

- 1 Government should provide many fewer services.
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 Government should provide many more services.

15. On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the environment?

- 1 Definitely should be
- 2 Probably should be
- 3 Probably should not be
- 4 Definitely should not be

16. Do you favor or oppose a school voucher program that would allow parents to use tax funds to send their children to the school of their choice, even if it were a private school?

- 1 Favor school voucher program
- 2 Oppose school voucher program

17. Do you favor or oppose a ban on the sale of all handguns, except those that are issued to law enforcement officers?

- 1 Favor
- 2 Oppose

18. In the past several decades, there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that a woman's place is in the home. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

- 1 Women and men should have an equal role
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7 A woman's place in the home

19. Which of the following views comes closest to your opinion on the issue of school prayer?

- 1 By law, prayer should not be allowed in public schools.
- 2 The law should allow public schools to schedule time when children can pray silently if they want to.
- 3 The law should allow public schools to schedule time when children as a group, can say a general prayer not tied to a particular religious faith.
- 4 By law, public schools should schedule a time when all children would say a chosen Christian prayer.

20. Recently there has been a lot of talk about job discrimination. Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination? Strongly or not so strongly?

- 1 Strongly favor
- 2 Not so strongly favor
- 3 Not so strongly oppose
- 4 Strongly oppose

21. Church members have often disagreed on the morality or immorality (rightness or wrongness) of certain kinds of activities or behaviors. Do you consider buying state (government) lottery tickets always wrong, sometimes wrong, never wrong, or are uncertain?

- 1 Always wrong
- 2 Sometimes wrong
- 3 Never wrong
- 4 Uncertain

22. There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Please circle the opinion best agrees with your view.

- 1 By law, abortion should never be permitted.
- 2 The law should permit abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.
- 3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need to the abortion has been clearly established.
- 4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

23. Would you favor or oppose a law in your state that would allow the use of government funds to help pay for the cost of abortions for women who cannot afford them?

- 1 Favor
- 2 Oppose

Section E. *Social Groups and Feeling Thermometers*

We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your membership in one particular group or category, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about this group and your membership in it. There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully.

24. For this series of questions, we would like you consider your *religious* group.

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Agree	Strongly Agree
{a}	I am a supportive member of the religious group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{b}	Overall, I often feel that the religious group of which I am a member is not worthwhile.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{c}	Overall, my religious group is considered good by others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{d}	Overall, my religious membership has very little to do with how I feel about myself.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{e}	I feel I don't have much to offer the religious group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{f}	In general, I'm glad to be a member of the religious group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{g}	Most people consider my religious group, on the average, to be more ineffective than other religious groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{h}	The religious group I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{i}	I often feel I'm a useless member of my religious group.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{j}	I feel good about the religious group I belong to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{k}	In general, others respect the religious group of which I am a member.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
{l}	My religious group is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

I'd like to get your feelings toward several groups in American society. I'd like you to rate that group using something we call the feeling thermometer.

Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them.

Cold	Warm
0.....	100.....
	50.....

25. African Americans: _____

26. Mainline (moderate or liberal) Protestants: _____

27. Whites: _____

28. Fundamentalist Protestants: _____

29. Hispanics: _____

30. Evangelical Protestants: _____

31. Homosexuals _____

32. Roman Catholics: _____

33. Jews: _____

34. Muslims: _____

Section F. Political Party and Demographic Information

Now we are interested in your political party and demographic information.

35. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or something else?

- 1 Strong Democrat
- 2 Not very strong Democrat
- 3 Independent, leaning Democrat
- 4 Independent
- 5 Independent, leaning Republican
- 6 Not very strong Republican
- 7 Strong Republican
- 8 Other or minor party
- 9 Apolitical

36. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- 1 Extremely liberal
- 2 Liberal
- 3 Somewhat liberal
- 4 Moderate, middle of the road
- 5 Somewhat conservative
- 6 Conservative
- 7 Extremely conservative

37. What is the highest level of education you completed?

- 1 Did not finish high school
- 2 High school graduate
- 3 Some college or 2-year college degree
- 4 4-year college degree
- 5 Some graduate work
- 6 Completed masters or professional degree
- 7 Advanced graduate work or Ph.D.

38. Are you married now and living with your (husband/wife)--or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never married?

- 1 Married
- 2 Widowed
- 3 Divorced
- 4 Separated
- 5 Never married

39. Which range best describes your annual household income from all sources. That would be before taxes and other deductions.

- 1 Less than \$14,999
- 2 \$15,000 to \$34,999
- 3 \$35,000 to \$49,999
- 4 \$50,000 to \$74,999
- 5 \$75,000 to \$99,999
- 6 \$100,000 to \$149,999
- 7 Over \$150,000

40. Do you consider yourself to be of Hispanic origin?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

41. Please indicate what racial/ethnic category best describes you?

- 1 White
- 2 African American / Black
- 3 Asian
- 4 American Indian
- 5 Pacific Islander
- 6 Other: Specify _____

42. What is your gender?

- 1 Male
- 2 Female

43. What is the year were you born? _____

Thank you for your participation in this study!

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