Polybius' Classroom:

A Historian's Approach to Practical Education

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Chapter One

Learning from Experience and the Value of History in Polybius

Introduction

The value of Polybius' text as a historical source for the events in the Mediterranean and especially the expansion of Roman power during the latter half of the third and first half of the second centuries B.C. is unquestioned. Polybius' reputation as an author, on the other hand, has suffered greatly ever since the withering criticisms of his style by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De comp. verb.,* 4.110). Such sentiments, reinforced by Polybius' own claims to have composed a history of simple style (e.g. 16.17.9-11) and dedicated above all to truth (e.g. 1.14.6), have often distracted scholars from the true depth and complexity of Polybius' work.[1] As a result, the text of this important historian has not, until recent years, been studied with the kind of historiographical approaches fruitfully applied to other ancient historians during the past few decades. Although the work of Walbank,[2] for example, has been of monumental significance to the study of Polybius, ultimately his approach is a historical one, and he was generally skeptical of such literary analyses.

On the other hand, the remarkable frequency with which Polybius pauses or digresses from his historical narrative in order to offer his own authorial comments has naturally drawn

[1] Cf. the similar complaints of Maier (2012c), 1-16 and McGing (2013), 181-2.
[2] In addition to the three volumes of his *Commentary* on Polybius (1957-79), Walbank's contributions have come in the form of a monograph on the historian (1972) and numerous articles, many of which have been assembled into two volumes of collected papers (1985 and 2002).

the attention of modern scholars.[3] The consequence has been the tendency to focus entirely on the programmatic or theoretical passages of Polybius and to consider these passages largely irrelevant to the historical narrative.[4] One such scholar has even argued that, because of the abundance of methodological statements, any attempts to understand his approaches to historiography based on his *actual practice* – that is by studying the composition of his narrative – are not only unnecessary but also "unwise."[5] This approach rests on the assumption that any inferences drawn from a study of the narrative are inherently less reliable than the programmtic statements of the author himself. While the work of these scholars has been significant in sorting out many of the difficult and sometimes apparently contradictory statements made by Polybius in such passages, however, important and enlightening aspects of his work have been too often obscured by the assumption that, if there is anything significant about a particular passage of Polybius' work, the historian will always take the time to tell us what that is.[6]

Other studies, like that of Pédech (1964), have provided important analysis of the major factors influencing Polybius' conception and composition of history or, like those of Eckstein (1995) and Champion (2004a),[7] have addressed specific questions about the historian's world-

[3] For Polybius' practice in utilizing such digressions, see Walbank (1972), 46-8. On the novelty of Polybius' assertive authorial voice, see Marincola (1997a), 10-11. Polybius' method of providing detailed explanations and analysis for the historical narrative has been identified by some (Pédech (1964), 43-53; Petzold (1969), 3-20; and Sacks (1981), 171-8) with what the historian refers to as "*apodeictic* history".

[4] See e.g. Petzold (1969), Mohm (1977), Sacks (1981), and Meissner (1986).

[5] Sacks (1981), 9.

[6] For a more inclusive approach to the understanding of Polybius' historiographical principles, see e.g. Dreyer (2013).

[7] Eckstein (1995) shows convincingly that questions of morality (as opposed to an entirely Machiavellian approach) play a significant role in Polybius' analysis of history and the lessons to

view. But the tendency still has been to regard each individual theme in Polybius' work on its own without sufficient consideration for the overall scope and purpose of his history.[8]

The essential questions about Polybius' work that I will seek to address are the historian's views on the proper approach to history, the lessons to be learned from the past, and history's ultimate value to society. For although not unique in defending the value of history, Polybius places particular emphasis not only on the practical benefits of history but also on the necessity of practical experience, on the part both of the reader and of the historian, in order fully to appreciate the lessons to be learned from history. This prominent role of practical experience in Polybius' approach to history, then, creates a connection between the historian, the reader, and the subjects within his historical narrative. As I will demonstrate, the text of Polybius' history becomes for this reason not just a compilation of practical lessons to be memorized by the reader but an ongoing commentary on the proper way to learn those lessons and to pass them on to others.[9]

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be learned from it. Champion (2004a) provides a comprehensive analysis of Polybius' depiction of the different peoples and nationalities of his history and shows that, while the historian will alter such depictions depending on the demands of a particular context, the Romans have much more in common with the logical Greeks of Polybius' work than the unreasonable barbarians.

[8] For recent attempts to correct the general lack of narratological approaches to Polybius in comparison to the more prominent historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, see Maier (2012a), 145 n. 8, to which Maier (2012b) and (2012c) should be added. Fresh and welcome approaches to Polybius can be found in the recent volume of essays on Polybius dedicated the memory of F. W. Walbank and edited by Gibson and Harrison (2013). For similar complaints that studies of Polybius have lacked the literary and historiographical treatments afforded to other historians, see e.g. Davidson (1991), 10; Marincola (2001), 113; and McGing (2013), 181-2.

[9] For a recognition of the important meta-historical aspects of Polybius' work, see Davidson (2009), 134.

I will necessarily begin here, however, with Polybius' own views on the value of history and his promise to succeed in fulfilling this potential where those before him have failed. I will then examine more specifically both what and how, according to Polybius, the reader can learn from history. Finally, we will see that Polybius' recommendations for the reader – most importantly the emphasis on practical experience – have much in common with the ways in which the historian himself ought to research and compose history.

The purpose of the work: Polybius' preface

From the opening lines of his work, Polybius of Megalopolis emphasizes the didactic value of history and of his own work in particular. By way of a subtle *praeteritio*,[10] in which he inverts the typical structure of the rhetorical device, Polybius suggests that if it were the case that the praise of history had been disregarded (παραλελεῖφθαι) by his predecessors in the writing of history,[11] then perhaps it would be necessary for him to encourage all men to take up the study of such written accounts of the past (τῶν τοιούτων ὑπομνημάτων) on the grounds that there is no more ready means of correction for mankind than the knowledge of past events.[12] Polybius then continues by noting that all prior historians have asserted that the knowledge of history is the truest education and training for public life; and, furthermore, that

[10] For this rhetorical technique, also called *paraleipsis* or *occultatio*, see *Rhet. Her.* (4.37) with the comments of Calboli (1993), 358-9. Kennedy (1972, 35) noted the use of this technique later by Polybius in the speeches of Eumenes to the Roman Senate, in which the king repeatedly suggests that he will say nothing about his own personal desires but then proceeds to do exactly that (21.18-21).

[11] εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀναγράφουσι τὰς πράξεις παραλελεῖφθαι συνέβαινε τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἱστορίας ἔπαινον (1.1.1).

[12] διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἑτοιμοτέραν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης (1.1.1).

the clearest and only instructor how to endure well the changes of fortune in such a life is the knowledge of reversals suffered by others.[13] Therefore no one, he concludes, and least of all himself, would think it necessary to repeat what has been said so well and so often in the past (1.1.3).

This rhetorical device with which Polybius begins his work has the twofold effect of recognizing but also challenging his predecessors. First, Polybius acknowledges his place in a tradition of previous historians who have emphasized the potential benefit of history for their readership. Although the specific historians to whom Polybius refers here remain obscure, the notion was not uncommon among ancient historians.[14] Most famously, Thucydides asserts that, although the lack of fantastical elements in his work may make it less pleasing (ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται, 1.22.4) to his reader, it will be sufficient if judged beneficial (ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει). We may conclude, furthermore, that Polybius is sincere in attributing such comments to others before Thucydides as well.[15] He is not the first, therefore, to claim that his history will have a practical utility for current and future generations, and, by conceding this fact at the very start of his work, he

[13] ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν (1.1.2).

[14] Walbank concludeed in his *Commentary* (1.39) on this passage that it is not possible to identify specifically the previous historians whom Polybius has in mind here because the idea was so commonplace. Sacks (1981) agreed (158). For other passages in which ancient historians discuss the benefit provided to their reader, see Herkommer (1968), 128-36 and Marincola (1997a), 43 n. 28. Marincola notes that although the theme is common, it is not, even by Polybius, cited as the primary motivation for writing history.

[15] For Polybius' later allusion to this passage of Thucydides, see below on 3.31.12.

presents himself as a humble successor in this trend and confesses his debt to the historians who came before him.[16]

The underlying message of this opening paragraph is, however, more subtle. Through the use of the *praeteritio*, Polybius here implies that, in spite of the efforts of his predecessors, more remains to be said and achieved in the didactic aspect of history. If the comments and the products of his predecessors had truly been sufficient, Polybius might genuinely claim that he does not need to add his praise to the potential value of history. But, of course, he does offer this praise, both here and at many other points throughout his work. Although many have recognized that history should offer such a benefit to its readers, therefore, Polybius' preface suggests that previous accounts of history have not necessarily lived up to their promise. It is this failure of previous historical accounts that will justify Polybius' own new approach to history.[17]

After introducing the initial subject of his work at the end of this opening chapter (1.1.5),[18] Rome's subjugation of the entire inhabited world in less than fifty-three years (220-167 BC) and then suggesting the supremacy of this empire in comparison to previous ones

[16] For the significant influence in general that previous historians, particularly Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, had on Polybius as well as his departures from them, see McGing (2010), 52-66.

[17] For more on the specific lessons which Polybius provides in his history and his expansion of these from previous historians in order to focus on practical matters, see Walbank (1990), 263-6.

[18] Polybius later extends the scope of his work to include events down to the year 146 BC (3.4-5). For an overview of the questions of composition posed by this apparent revision, see Walbank's *Commentary* (1.292-6). For Polybius' personal motivations for including this extension to include events in which he was personally involved, see McGing (2010), 75-6.

particularly in the geographical scope of their dominion (1.2.1-7),[19] Polybius returns to the theme of the benefit of history. Here, at the conclusion of his preface, the historian claims that the work itself will demonstrate the advantages that a "pragmatic history" (ὁ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας τρόπος, 1.2.8), such as his, provides to those who study it (τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν). As Sacks (1981) noted (181-2), this concluding statement directly answers Polybius' opening comments on the benefit of history, which are here summed up with the emphatically placed introduction of the term πραγματικὴ ἱστορία. Polybius' conception of pragmatic history, therefore, plays a crucial role in his desire to provide a practical benefit to his readers through his work and is his answer to the failures of his predecessors to provide the benefit they had promised.

Pragmatic History

At the beginning of Book 9, Polybius contrasts the type of history which he has undertaken with other methods which, while having a certain appeal to some, entail less practical benefit to the reader (9.1). With an approach we will see repeated by the historian, the historian here divides history into three categories (9.1.4): genealogies (ὁ γενεαλογικὸς τρόπος), local histories detailing colonies, foundation stories, and blood-ties between cities (ὁ περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ κτίσεις καὶ συγγενείας),[20] and lastly the deeds of nations, cities, and rulers (ὁ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων καὶ δυναστῶν). While each of

[19] For the common refrain among ancient historians that their subject is greater than all previous ones, see especially Marincola (1997a), 34-43, who includes discussion of Polybius and this passage in particular (37-8).
[20] Polybius here specifically attributes this kind of history to Ephorus.

these attracts a particular type of reader, the final category, which Polybius identifies with the kind of history he himself has chosen to write (9.1.5), is intended specifically for the man involved in politics (τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν, 9.1.4).[21] Simply put, therefore, pragmatic history for Polybius is to be distinguished from other types of history because its content is limited strictly to events (πράξεις) themselves and is written not simply to please the reader but for the benefit of one personally involved in similar events.[22]

Beyond such generalizations, however, the full implications of the term πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, of which he does not provide a precise definition, are more complicated and difficult to delineate.[23] Because Polybius' definition of pragmatic history and the purpose of his entire work are intrinsically linked, I hope that the approach offered throughout this dissertation will contribute to a more complete understanding of this term. One point of dispute, however, which holds particular relevance for the present discussion, has been the extent to which the term has specific didactic connotations for Polybius.[24] Walbank (1972), in response to the discussion of the term by Petzold (1969), argued that "clearly to say that πραγματικὴ ἱστορία

[21] As Marincola (1997a) notes, Polybius' work actually contains material and lessons appropriate for a much wider audience than the historian here imagines (24-5). Nevertheless, it is Polybius' distinction between his work and those of other historians that concerns us here.
[22] Walbank (1972) also made the direct connection between this passage and Polybius' general conception of πραγματικὴ ἱστορία (55-6). For Polybius' reasons for choosing to write this particular type of history, see below on 9.2.
[23] Polybius' definition of the term πραγματικὴ ἱστορία has been much discussed. For their interpretations, see Gelzer (1955); Walbank's *Commentary*, 1.6-11; Pédech (1964), 21-32; Petzold (1969), 3-20; Walbank (1972), 56-8; Mohm (1977), 8-28; Sacks (1981), 178-86; Fornara (1983), 112 n. 31; Meissner (1986); Marincola (2001), 121-2; and McGing (2010), 66-7.
[24] For comments on the specific didactic qualities of pragmatic history for Polybius, see Ziegler (1952), 1501-3; Gelzer (1955), 88; Walbank's *Commentary*, 1.7-8; Pédech (1964), 30-31; Petzold (1969), 7-8; Walbank (1972), 56 n. 148; Mohm (1977), 161-2; Sacks (1981), 182-3; and Luce (1997), 127-9.

is of direct practical and didactic use is not the same thing as saying that πραγματικὴ ἱστορία *means* 'history with a direct practical and didactic use' (56 n. 148)." This is of course true, and I do not intend to argue for a specific definition of πραγματικὴ ἱστορία which limits the meaning of the term to its instructional purpose. But there is no disagreement here about whether or not πραγματικὴ ἱστορία is used by Polybius for didactic purposes. Clearly, beginning with the opening chapters and continuing throughout his work, he expresses a desire to teach through his history. Indeed, he even specially refers to the type of knowledge gained through history as a "teacher" (διδάσκαλον, 1.1.2).

The question is rather whether this didactic purpose is the defining characteristic of πραγματικὴ ἱστορία. As Sacks (1981) pointed out (183), Polybius also applies the term to at least part of the history of Timaeus of Tauromenium (τὸ πραγματικὸν αὐτῷ μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας, 12.27a.1) but also argues elsewhere (e.g. 12.25h-i) that because of the numerous faults of Timaeus as a historian, his work lacked clarity (ἔμφασις), which Sacks showed to be a critical component of history if it is to provide benefit to the reader.[25] It would appear, then, that such a work may qualify as a πραγματικὴ ἱστορία for Polybius even if it does not offer the kind of benefit that such a history should. McGing (2010, 67), moreover, adds that Polybius also faults previous historians who covered the career of Hannibal for falsely introducing gods and heroes into πραγματικὴ ἱστορία (3.47.8) and similarly criticizes the attempt of Aulus

[25] On the historian Timaeus in general, see most recently Baron (2013). For the meaning and importance of ἔμφασις for Polybius (and other authors) in the composition of a truly beneficial history as well as his particular association of the term with πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, see Sacks (1981), 36-48.

Postumius to compose this particular kind of history (39.1.4).[26] To this list of previous historians described by Polybius as writing πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, we may also add Phylarchus (παρ᾽ ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν, 2.56.3), who is censured at length by Polybius for composing his history in the manner of tragic poets (καθάπερ οἱ τραγῳδιογράφοι, 2.56.10).[27]

Although Polybius makes no specific mention of the didactic potential of the works of these other historians, such statements, as McGing concludes, demonstrate that Polybius did not regard himself as unique in attempting to write πραγματικὴ ἱστορία. Furthermore, the reason that Polybius never explicitly defines the term is that he must have assumed it would have already been familiar to his readers.[28] In each of the cases mentioned, however, it is worth noting that Polybius only mentions the attempts of other historians to write πραγματικὴ ἱστορία in order to criticize explicitly their efforts.[29] Although he recognizes that

[26] On Polybius' criticism of previous historians in general, see Walbank (1962) and Meister (1975), who included discussion of Polybius' polemic against the historians of Hannibal (155-9). For possible identities of the historians of Hannibal and for more on A. Postumius Albinus, see Walbank's *Commentary* (1.381 and 3.726, respectively).

[27] While the debate about so-called 'tragic history' has been extensive, fundamental is Walbank (1960), who put to rest the notion that Polybius is responding in passages such as this to a specific school of tragic historians originating from the Peripatetics and ultimately responding to Aristotle's distinction between tragedy and history in the *Poetics* (9.1451a38-b5). More recently, Marincola (2013) shows that Polybius' censure of Phylarchus rests not so much in his sensational narrative but in the composition of such a narrative in a manner that obscures and distorts the truth (see also D'Huys (1987), 222-31). Marincola provides extensive bibliography on previous discussions of 'tragic history' (73 n. 1).

[28] Although the term itself does not appear before Polybius, Pédech (1964) concluded that it must have been in circulation prior to Polybius and was not invented by him (32).

[29] For the common use of polemic by ancient historians in order to distinguish their own works, see Marincola (1997a), 217-37, esp. 222 and 229-32 on Polybius. Although criticism of his predecessors is rampant in Polybius' work, Marincola notes (222) that the historian repeatedly emphasizes that, while intentional falsehoods should be aggressively censured, mistakes should be pardoned (see e.g. 12.7.6 and 12.12.4-5). In particular, Polybius describes his personal correspondence with the historian Zeno, in which Polybius politely corrected the latter's

others have set out to write this kind of history, therefore, Polybius does not regard them as having done so successfully. In a manner similar to his preface, therefore, such statements by Polybius acknowledge that he is not the first to write πραγματικὴ ἱστορία but also suggest that his work seeks to correct the failures of his predecessors in this particular genre. While Polybius recognizes that not all previous efforts to write πραγματικὴ ἱστορία have fulfilled their didactic function, moreover, the suggestion that this *should* be a significant element of such history remains.

The education of statesmen: history and practical experience

The question of how Polybius seeks to achieve this didactic goal through the proper composition of a πραγματικὴ ἱστορία is critical to our understanding of Polybius' work and his reasons for writing such a history at all. As Polybius' subsequent discussions of the value of history will indicate, moreover, the matter is not as simple as he initially suggests. Although Polybius in the opening chapters of his work clearly asserts that such history is the "truest education" (1.1.2) for active political life, he qualifies this statement soon after in his first book. After his account of the unexpected defeat of the Roman army in Africa under the command of M. Atilius Regulus in the First Punic War (1.32-4), Polybius pauses to reflect on the lessons to be learned from this particular reversal of fortune (1.35).[30] Recalling the statements of his opening

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topographical mistakes (16.20). Therefore, although the kind of criticisms evident here are common in Polybius, the historian does not universally censure all previous attempts to write history in general. Nor, however, does he explicitly praise the attempts of others to write πραγματικὴ ἱστορία.

[30] In Chapter Two, I will discuss in more in detail Polybius' representation of this defeat, his analysis its causes, and the lessons to be learned from it. The particular lesson here that

chapter, he then states that he has explicitly mentioned these lessons in order to offer a means of "correction" for those reading his work.[31] He then explains his views on this matter further. There are, in fact, two methods for mankind of changing for the better, he claims, either through one's own personal misfortunes or through those of others.[32] But while the former means of instruction is more vivid (ἐναργέστερον), the latter occurs without personal suffering (ἀβλαβέστερον). For this reason, Polybius suggests, we must seek out the latter method, learning from the misfortunes of others, and ought not willingly to choose the former (1.35.8). He then concludes by linking this ability to learn from others to the study (ἐμπειρία) of pragmatic history, which he here calls the best education for real life.[33]

Although Polybius here certainly recommends the study of history as a preferable alternative to personal suffering in this passage, he does not (unlike in the preface) adhere to

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Fortune is mutable will be of particular importance throughout this study as it is perhaps the primary lesson that Polybius attempts to convey in his work (e.g. Hannibal's speech to Scipio Africanus before Zama (15.6.5-15.7.9) discussed in Chapter Three; and the speech of Aemilus Paullus (29.20) and its reception by Scipio Aemilianus covered in Chapter Four). For the theme elsewhere in Polybius, cf. 3.31.3 with Walbank's *Commentary* (1.358-9), where he noted a number of other similar passages in Polybius (e.g. 8.21.11, and 23.12.4) as well as the parallel of the memorable reflections of Croesus upon the funeral pyre in Herodotus (1.86.6). Thornton (2013) discusses the recurring theme in a number of these passages as well and reads them in the context of Polybius' diplomatic advice to the Romans in their newly won prosperity (220-221). For an overview of the important but notoriously difficult to define role of Fortune (Τύχη) in Polybius, see especially Walbank's *Commentary* (1.16-26); Pédech (1964), 331-54; and Walbank (1972), 58-65; and Maier (2012c), who provides a comprehensive analysis of the term in Polybius and other authors as well as previous scholarship on the subject (210-48).

[31] ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην χάριν τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διορθώσεως (1.35.6).

[32] δυεῖν γὰρ ὄντων τρόπων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταθέσεως, τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων (1.35.7).

[33] ἐξ ὧν συνιδόντι καλλίστην παιδείαν ἡγητέον πρὸς ἀληθινὸν βίον τὴν ἐκ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας περιγινομένην ἐμπειρίαν (1.35.9).

the claim that history is in fact the most effective means of education. And while much of the language of this passage clearly recalls Polybius' preface, the historian here has redistributed some of that language. Before, he had claimed that the memory of others' reversals of fortune was the most vivid (ἐναργεστάτην, 1.1.2) and indeed only teacher that would enable one to bear well the inevitable vicissitudes of fortune. Here (1.35), however, he admits not only another possible way to learn such lessons, i.e. through personal experience, but one that is even more vivid (ἐναργέστερον). Polybius, therefore, appears in this passage to contradict the claims of his preface. History, he now suggests, is not actually the only means of instruction for men of action, nor does it even necessarily offer the most meaningful lessons. Rather, history is here recommended as a less effective but relatively painless method of acquiring the knowledge otherwise gained from the experience of personal misfortune.

The concept of "learning through suffering" is, of course, common, even proverbial, in ancient Greek thought.[34] Polybius clearly in this passage recognizes this principle by acknowledging that personal experience, which he equates with personal suffering, holds superior didactic value while suggesting that the fundamental advantage of history rests in the lack of suffering (cf. ἀβλαβέστερον, 1.35.7) involved. But the inconsistencies between this passage and Polybius' preface reveal that the historian is struggling to resolve two apparently opposing concepts. As a historian, he must align himself with the view, as he does in his preface, that history offers a tangible benefit to his reader or else the entire endeavor becomes meaningless. As someone who has had an active career in public life himself, however, he also

[34] E.g. Homer (*Il.* 17.32), Hesiod (*Op*. 218), Aeschylus (*Ag.* 176), Herodotus (1.207.1), and Plato (*Sym.* 222B). For the importance of this theme for Herodotus, especially in his depiction of Croesus, see Stahl (1975), Shapiro (1994), and Pelling (2006).

understands that practical experience is an invaluable aspect of anyone's training for such a life and, although he does not go so far as to say that it is the only way, he does suggest here that such experience is a more effective way to acquire wisdom.[35]

Ultimately, the goal of Polybius' pragmatic history will be to resolve this tension between history and personal experience. Based simply on the programmatic statements of Polybius which we have seen so far, however, it is difficult to understand how the historian intends to do this. The implication at 1.35 that history serves simply as a secondary source for knowledge that can be more clearly learned from practical experience is insufficient. Such a view suggests, moreover, that history and practical experience ultimately offer the *same* lessons albeit in different ways. But as we are about to see, this too is undermined by Polybius' later comments on the specific and distinct value of history.

Learning from the past

In spite of the implication by Polybius at 1.35 that history provides a vicarious means of learning the same lessons typically acquired through personal experience, the historian argues later (3.31) that there are in fact some things which simply cannot be learned on one's own. If every person, he suggests there, were self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης, 3.31.2) for every circumstance, then knowledge of the past (τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἐπιστήμην) would be good but not necessary (καλὴν μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίαν). But since no one can predict the demands of future circumstances (3.31.3), Polybius continues, the wisdom gained from the

[35] For Polybius' career and its impact on the nature and composition of his history, see Marincola (2001), 113-16 and Maier (2012b), 328.

knowledge of the past is necessary (ἀναγκαίαν εἶναί φημι…τὴν τῶν παρελληλυθότων ἐπίγνωσιν, 3.31.4) in the preparation for an active life.[36] As he goes on to explain (3.31.5-10), history allows a statesman to gain knowledge about others, such as foreign nations or their leaders, which could not be acquired so readily through personal experience.

The initial suggestion here by the historian that the knowledge available to humans from their own experience is limited finds a parallel in Polybius' discussion of the proper research methods for a historian (12.4c.4-5). Ideally, he claims there, a historian would conduct all of his research through personal autopsy, but, given the practical limitations on the ability of a single person to visit every location, he must sometimes rely on second-hand accounts. In the same way, Polybius here argues that ideally one should be able to acquire the knowledge necessary for an active life on one's own (αὐτάρκης) but, given that this is impractical, history serves as a necessary back-up. The parallel between these two passages suggests an overlap in Polybius' mind between the roles of the historian and the statesman – or student of history – which will be developed further in the course of this chapter. In the present passage, however, the implication that it is beneficial and even necessary for a statesman to conduct research similar to what is required of a historian challenges Polybius' statements on the benefits of history at 1.35, where it it suggested that personal experience is the best means of education. As will become clearer from the remainder of this passage, history no longer serves merely as a

[36] Maier (2012c), which expands upon the issues raised in (2012a), offers a useful analysis of the apparent contradiction in Polybius between the unpredictable nature of human events and the suggestion that knowledge of history can be applied to present and future circumstances. As he rightly concludes, while Polybius acknowledges that the future is for the most part unforeseeable, what few insights may be gained from the study of history offer a distinct advantage over complete ignorance and blindness to common trends.

secondary but readily available substitute for the kind of knowledge ideally gained through practical experience. Rather, history now is depicted as a source of important knowledge that cannot be acquired in any other way.

The specific examples that Polybius cites here of the kind of knowledge which one person on his own would have difficulty obtaining focus on foreign nations who might become serviceable allies in difficult times. He does not here limit the type of information about foreign nations which could prove useful in such situations, however, to the kind of ethnographic or geographic knowledge which might be acquired simply by visiting a foreign county for oneself. Rather, Polybius suggests, the kind of knowledge especially important for anyone in search of and attempting to persuade potential allies comes from the *history* of these foreign peoples. Polybius asks, for example, how one might adequately influence others if one has no knowledge of the memory of their past (εἰ μηδὲν εἰδείη τῆς τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ ἑκάστους ὑπομνήσεως, 3.31.6). In addition to enhancing one's ability to persuade such peoples, he continues, past actions (τὰ δὲ παρεληλυθότα τῶν ἔργων, 3.31.8) are a more reliable indicator of the character of such peoples than the dissembling postures of the present and, therefore, form a better basis for choosing potential allies.

Not only, therefore, would it be impractical for anyone to visit personally every foreign nation which might prove relevant in the future, but, even if this were possible, simple observation of the people and places there would be insufficient according to the examples cited here. Conversely, a statesman, like a historian, must inquire into the history of such people in order to obtain the information which will be most useful to him. The knowledge of

history, therefore, offers potential benefits to future statesmen which are available from no other source.

As Polybius indicates at the conclusion of this passage (3.31.11-13), the particular aspect of history that enhances this benefit in his view is the analysis of the causes and effects of historical events.[37] Before (3.6.6), Polybius had complained that previous historians failed to distinguish between the beginning (ἀρχή) of a war and the cause and pretext (αἰτίας και προφάσεως). Later (3.7.3; cf. 22.18.6), moreover, he emphasizes a further distinction between the αἰτία, the actual cause, and a πρόφασις, which he defines as an alleged pretext separate from the real cause.[38] In doing so, of course, Polybius has adopted but also adapted the terminology applied by Thucydides to his analysis of the causes of the Peloponnesian War (1.23).[39] In this passage (3.31), moreover, Polybius is attempting to justify his current

[37] Cf. 12.25b, where Polybius adds that with the inclusion of causes history becomes fruitful (ἔγκαρπος, 12.25b.2), allowing the reader to apply similar circumstances from the past to those in the present and to foresee what is about to happen (τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον, 12.25b.3). Mohm (1977) discussed this passage in conjunction with 3.31 (183-8).

[38] In his *Commentary* on the first passage (1.306), Walbank notes that αἰτία and πρόφασις are only initially grouped together because of the immediate context but that, as the later passages will indicate, they are indeed to be regarded as significantly distinct. On Polybius' distinction between the three terms in general, see also Pédech (1964), 75-93; Petzold (1969), 8-11; Walbank (1972), 157-60; Mohm (1977), 151-8; Sacks (1981), 123-4; and McGing (2010), 6-80. Derow (1979) discussed Polybius' actual practice in sorting out the causes of the events, in particular the Second Punic and Third Macedonian Wars, and emphasizes Polybius' interest in the reasons and not the responsibility for such aggression (9-13). Derow (1994) further compares Polybius to Herodotus and Thucydides on this subject.

[39] On the meanings of the terms αἰτία and πρόφασις in ancient Greek authors, see Pearson (1952), who compared the Polybian usage with that of Thucydides (esp. 217-21), and, on πρόφασις in particular, Rawlings (1975). For more on the relationship between Polybius and Thucydides here, see also Walbank's *Commentary* (1.305-6), where he suggests that Polybius is here offering a silent criticism of the Thucydidean terminology. For further discussion and bibliography on Thucydides' use of the terms, see Hornblower (1991), 1.64-6.

discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War (3.28.5-30.4)[40] by arguing that it is only through understanding of the causes of such matters that history becomes truly beneficial to the reader (cf. 3.7.4-7). If such elements are excluded from history, Polybius concludes, then what remains becomes a showpiece and not a lesson (τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται, 3.31.12), which offers pleasure for the moment but no benefit for the future (καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν, 3.31.13).[41] This clear allusion (ἀγώνισμα) to Thucydides (1.22.4) by Polybius creates an impression similar to that of his preface,[42] as Polybius here both acknowledges his debt to Thucydides but also suggests that his approach to history offers a marked improvement to that of Thucydides, in this case through Polybius' revision of the appropriate role of causation in history and the terms employed for it.

In this passage, then, we can see more clearly the distinctive benefits Polybius believes to be offered by the study of history and by his history in particular. By creating a logical

[40] On the origins of this war and Polybius' analysis of them, see especially, in addition to Walbank's *Commentary* (1.356-8); Walbank (1983); Lancel (1995), 47-9; and Rich (1996). I will return to this topic in Chapter Three to discuss Hannibal's role in providing the only explicit πρόφασις for this war in Polybius' work (3.15.9).

[41] Cf. 38.4, where Polybius claims that the true purpose of history is not to please the ears of the readers (ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τέρπεσθαι, 38.4.8) but to correct their minds (ταῖς ψυχαῖς διορθοῦσθαι). For the common contrast between pleasure and benefit in Hellenistic historians, see Walbank (1990) who also discussed but amended (esp. 260-63) the views put forward by Mohm (1977, 121-33) on the distinction between positive and negative forms of pleasure in Polybius. This theme will be significant to my discussion in Chapter Four of the exemplary aspects of Polybius' work and in particular his characterization of Scipio Aemilianus (see especially 31.30.1).

[42] The echo of Thucydides here was noted by Meyer (1924, 343 n. 2) and was supported by Walbank in his *Commentary* (1.359). For Thucydides' use of the term, see Hornblower (1991), 1.61-2. For more on this passage and on Polybius' debt to Thucydides in general, see Walbank (1972), 40-43.

structure for the events of the past, the historian enables the reader not simply to learn the details of past events but to realize why, how, and to what effect those events occurred, which in turn becomes valuable information to be applied to present and future circumstances. While Polybius does not here argue explicitly that history is unique in providing this service, his initial suggestion that no one is entirely self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης, 3.31.2) in every respect underlies the entire passage. The understanding of the causes of events, therefore, is both what makes history beneficial to the reader and what makes it distinct from other forms of learning.

Polybius' implication at 1.35 that history serves simply as a pain-free method of learning from the experiences of others is inconsistent with his more specific analysis of the particular lessons of history and their value for a statesman. This does not mean, however, that practical experience disappears from Polybius' views on the education of statesmen and the role of history in that education. As we shall see in the following section, practical experience will remain an important and even necessary aspect of this process for Polybius, as even a history properly written in all the ways prescribed by Polybius cannot achieve its full potential unless the reader is himself actively engaged in practical affairs.

Definitions of Learning in Polybius

Books 9 and 10 of Polybius' work form a distinct unit in which the historian pays particular attention to specific tactical and strategic lessons necessary for a general in the field.[43] For Polybius the purpose of these books reflects, in a more focused and technical

[43] See Sacks (1981) for these two books as a unit in which Polybius gives special attention to military science, possibly adopted from his *Tactics*, in order to provide a focused education on the subject for his reader (125-30).

manner than in Book 1, the general purpose of his work as a whole to educate future men of action through his written narrative. It is significant, therefore, that in Book 9 (9.14) he again returns the topic of the proper ways to acquire knowledge, and once more demonstrates his awareness that history is not the only or even necessarily the best method for this goal. Polybius' focus here specifically on the knowledge necessary to be a successful general might suggest that, unlike the more broadly applicable comments which we have seen so far, the relevance of this passage is more limited. As we shall see, however, the historian frames this advice in terms which reflect his previous programmatic statements. For this reason, Polybius' recommendations in the following passages specifically for commanders in the field will help to shed light on the more general statements discussed previously.

After listing some of the most essential things about which any commander must have sufficient knowledge, including the importance of secrecy, geography, and astronomy (9.13), Polybius in this passage claims that there are in fact three ways that such knowledge can be acquired (9.14.1): experience (τριβή), inquiry (ἱστορία), and methodical study (ἐμπειρία μεθοδική).[44] Polybius clarifies this distinction as the passage continues. The best (κάλλιστον, 9.14.2) option, he explains, is for a general himself to learn (τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν) information such as the nature of the people and places of the area where he will conduct his operations. This first and preferable option corresponds to the first method listed

[44] Cf. 11.8.1-3, where Polybius similarly divides methods of learning into three parts with slight variation. For comparison of the two passages, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.139 and 279), where he concluded that the differences are not significant.

initially, τριβή.[45] When it comes at least to such basic reconnaissance, therefore, Polybius suggests that personal experience is the ideal method, again applying a superlative (κάλλιστον) which he had previously used of learning from history (1.35.9).

The second best method listed here of acquiring such information, by contrast, is to inquire carefully (δεύτερον δ᾽ ἱστορεῖν ἐπιμελῶς, 9.14.3), which obviously refers us back to the term ἱστορία listed above. Although ἱστορία is commonly used by Polybius to mean "history", i.e. written accounts of the past such as those composed by himself and others,[46] the context of this passage suggests a more specific definition: the practice of using guides (τῶν καθηγουμένων) familiar with local surroundings. The specific and atypical meaning of ἱστορία here caught the attention of Sacks (1981), who noted that of over one hundred instances of the term in Polybius, it is only in this passage that ἱστορία refers specifically to "verbal interrogation" (128-9). As Sacks and others have noted, moreover, when Polybius returns in Book 11 to the three methods of learning, the second element (ἱστορία) is replaced by an unmistakable reference to written accounts (τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, 11.8.1).[47] The conclusion drawn by Sacks to explain the meaning of ἱστορία in the first instance is that this

[45] He further defines the term below, moreover, as "experience in the army" (δι᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς στρατιωτικῆς τριβῆς, 9.14.4), thus making clear the meaning of term in this passage.
[46] As Mauersberger's *Polybios-Lexicon* (1957-2006) indicates, the term in Polybius can apply to writing history (II.2.a), history in general (II.2.b), or a particular work of history (II.2.c). Although not the first definitions listed, these take up over three-quarters (over one-and-a-half columns) of the entry (1.3.1202-4).
[47] In his *Commentary* on this passage (2.279-80), Walbank suggests that although the term ὑπομνήματα in Polybius often refers specifically to technical treatises, this is not always that case and there is not need to assume this specific meaning. Cf. 9.2.7, where it is applied to Polybius' own work, and 1.1.1. For the use of the term by Polybius and others, see Marincola (1997a), 180.

passage is based directly on Polybius' *Tactics*, where ἱστορία presumably had the particular meaning of "verbal interrogation". In the latter passage from Book 11, he further suggests, Polybius confused even himself with this distinction and therefore adopted the other, more common, meaning of the term: written accounts of the past.

While the term may have held in Polybius' *Tactics* the specific meaning evident here, any confusion on the part of the historian in this passage serves as a window into his thoughts on the matter. What these passages suggest, in fact, is that for Polybius there is less distinction between the study of history and the use of guides than we might assume. Rather, for Polybius, the historian is in fact very much like a guide with knowledge of specific information, which is of practical value to someone like a general among people and places otherwise foreign to him. As we have already seen, in fact, Polybius also attributes to the study of history the practical benefit of such information gained about foreign people and leaders (3.31). This interpretation, moreover, is given added significance by the rest of the sentence (9.14.3), where Polybius states that it is necessary for the followers (τοῖς ἑπομένοις), i.e. the readers, always to have trust (πίστιν) in their guides. As we shall see, this is reflected in practice by Polybius, as the historian often explicitly takes pains to provide such πίστις for his readers in the accuracy of his account of history.[48]

The third option listed by Polybius in this passage is systematic study (ἐμπειρία μεθοδική). As becomes clear in the remainder of the passage, Polybius regards this as a

[48] See especially Chapter Four, where on multiple occasions (e.g. 6.54.4 and 31.30.2) employs exemplary passages as proof (πίστις) for his interpretation of events. For examples and discussion of the overlap between the trust (and healthy skepticism) of commanders toward their guides and historians in their sources, see Maier (2012b), 305-9.

special category of scientific study through which one can learn subjects such as astronomy and geometry which will often be beneficial to a commander.[49] The acquisition of this knowledge, he states, requires learning and scientific study (τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας προσδεῖται μαθήσεως καὶ θεωρημάτων, 9.14.5), but he does not suggest any specific methods here for going about this study. In the later passage from Book 11 where he again discusses these three methods of learning, however, Polybius links this kind of scientific study with wisdom that is passed down from knowledgeable men (τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων ἀνδρῶν παραδόσεως, 11.8.2). While there is no direct mention of written treatises of any sort here, this recognition that such technical knowledge can best be gained from others as opposed to personal experience at least opens the door to the idea that, like the previous category (ἱστορία), ἐμπειρία μεθοδική may also be an aspect of education for a statesman in which history plays an important role.

These categories detailing potential avenues of education for a general, therefore, have much in common with Polybius' prior statements regarding the didactic value of history and the role of personal experience. While ideally such a general would acquire any necessary information on his own through his own experience (τριβή), Polybius recognizes here that for practical reasons one must sometimes resort to methods of inquiry (ἱστορία), which in Polybius' view includes history proper. Furthermore, Polybius suggests here that there is certain technical knowledge which can only be gained through study and, therefore, must be learned from others. Although it is only implied here, it will become more apparent in the

[49] For this specific definition of ἐμπειρία in Polybius, which is distinct from experience (τριβή), cf. Maier (2012b), 313 n. 47.

following section that Polybius in fact regards this last category of the systematic study (ἐμπειρία μεθοδική) of scientific matters as an important component of history as well. Again, therefore, history is described as providing access to knowledge which cannot be gained from personal experience.

Science and History

With this tripartite classification of sources of knowledge, Polybius introduces an additional aspect to the value of history. Scientific study (ἐμπειρία μεθοδική), as it is described by Polybius, provides a kind of technical knowledge not included in the previous passages on the proper methods of education for future statesmen. Such technical knowledge is of particular interest to the historian because it is in this area that Polybius sees evidence of significant progress in the past. When ἐμπειρία μεθοδική is incorporated into history, then, as we will see is Polybius' goal, history will become not just a means of recording that progress but a source for further progress in the future.

The connection between scientific study (ἐμπειρία μεθοδική) and history becomes clear in Polybius' justification at the beginning of Book 9 of his decision to write this type of πραγματικὴ ἱστορία and its particular relevance during his own time (9.2). He gives two reasons here for why he has chosen to write pragmatic history (ὁ πραγματικὸς τρόπος, 9.2.4) as opposed to previous writers whose works focused on topics such as genealogies, myths, and the foundations of cities (9.2.1).[50] The first reason is that in contrast to the other

[50] For Polybius' distinction between pragmatic history and these other types of accounts, see above on 9.1.

types of history mentioned, which cover events from the distant past, pragmatic history offers fresh material by dealing with more contemporary events (9.2.4). The second and more significant reason for us is that pragmatic history is the most beneficial (τὸ πάντων ὠφελιμώτατον, 9.2.5), especially at the current time when human knowledge and skills (τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας) have become so advanced that diligent students (τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας) are able to deal systematically (μεθοδικῶς) with nearly any circumstance that they encounter. In this passage at the beginning of Book 9, which anticipates the language (ἐμπειρία μεθοδική) of the later passage on the three methods of instruction, therefore, there is further evidence that Polybius views pragmatic history as one of the primary ways by which such technical and scientific knowledge can be acquired.

By connecting pragmatic history with the progress in science and technology evident during this time period, moreover, Polybius is promoting not only the benefit which such history provides to the reader but also the important role that history itself plays in that progress.[51] The significance of history in this respect is further developed by Polybius in the following book, when the historian pauses his narrative to discuss the techniques of fire-signaling and the development of these techniques over time (10.43-7). The connection

[51] For the suggestion that this passage is indicative of a much more widespread belief in the idea of progress during the Hellenistic Age, see Edelstein (1967), 142-3. Dodds (1973) also supported this interpretation, although he limits it to the field of science, which Polybius is discussing here (18). Both scholars suggest that this passage demonstrates Polybius' belief not simply that progress has occurred in the past but that it can be expected to continue into the present and future. It is the role of pragmatic history in this process, I am suggesting, that underlies this belief for Polybius. Although this so-called "Whig" view of history as the inevitable march of progress is no longer common, the extent to which Polybius and other ancient authors held such a view remains an important question for the interpretation of their works.

between this passage and his comments at the beginning of Book 9 is made by Polybius himself, as he concludes his discussion of fire-signaling by repeating his claim that, at the time he was writing, scientific studies had progressed to such an extent that the knowledge of them had for the most part become systematic.[52] Finally, Polybius concludes by directly linking this kind of scientific study to history by claiming that such knowledge in fact is the most beneficial aspect of history properly composed (διὸ καὶ τοῦτο γίνεται τῆς δεόντως ἱστορίας συντεταγμένης ὠφελιμώτατον, 10.47.13). The link suggested in Book 9 between technical, scientific knowledge and history is, therefore, made explicit here. The role that history plays, moreover, both in the acquisition of such knowledge and in the progressive development of that knowledge over time is further evident from the digression on fire-signaling which immediately precedes these comments.

In this digression, Polybius describes three stages in the development of the technique of fire-signaling. The first is the original and simple (ἁπλῆ, 10.43.5) system, which relied on prearranged signals for specific events and was therefore useless (ἀνωφελής) in communicating complex or unexpected messages (10.43.5-10). The second system described by Polybius (10.44) was created by Aeneas Tacticus, the author of a treatise here named *Strategics* (τὰ περὶ τῶν Στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα, 10.44.1), who set out to correct (διορθώσασθαι) the flaws of the previous system by expanding the number of prearranged messages available to the two communicating parties. Polybius concludes that, although an

[52] ἔφαμεν γὰρ πάντα τὰ θεωρήματα καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰληφέναι τὰς προκοπάς, ὥστε τῶν πλείστων τρόπον τινὰ μεθοδικὰς εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας (10.47.12).

improvement on the previous system, this technique nevertheless remained flawed because it still was based on predetermined and relatively simply messages and therefore still could not account for the unexpected (10.45.1-5). The third and final system included here (10.45.6-46.10) was crafted by two otherwise unknown figures, Cleoxenus and Democleitus, and perfected by Polybius himself (10.45.6). This technique relies on an alphabetical system using multiple torches to convey complete sentences and, therefore, avoids the limitations of the previous systems which could only communicate prearranged signals.

At each step in this progression of fire-signaling techniques history plays a significant role, but the distinction between these stages demonstrates Polybius' point that history has become especially beneficial at the present time. For each of the innovations in this technique described by Polybius, for example, the innovator is also an author and his development is presumably preserved in his own writings.[53] In the case of Aeneas Tacticus, his work serves merely as a means of recording his innovation and disseminating the technique to others. There is an additional aspect to the role of history in the case of the final, more complicated, system, however, because the innovations of Cleoxenus and Democleitus serve as a foundation which Polybius himself uses to perfect the system that they created, a direct link which does not apply to the previous example. History, therefore, becomes not only a means of preserving and spreading information but also the basis for future progress.

As he has done elsewhere, then, Polybius here demonstrates the value and even the necessity of history not just in the preservation of the past but in the advancement of human

[53] This must be inferred from the lack of any other explanation by Polybius of how he learned about them, but he does specifically mention the writings of Aeneas Tacticus here (10.44.1). On more on Aeneas, see Whitehead (1990). For the other authors see Lammert, *RE*, "Kleoxenos (2)," 11.1.807; and Hultsch, *RE*, "Demokleitos," 5.1.132.

knowledge. As before, however, the process is not that simple, as Polybius extends his discussion of the final complex technique of fire-signaling by arguing that the perfection of this technique cannot be achieved simply by reading about it but also requires practice (προμελετᾶν δεῖ, 10.47.3). In fact, the historian frames this addendum with a generalization about the difference between the practice of such complex techniques when someone is first informed of them (τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων πρῶτον λεγομένων, 10.47.4) and when that person has achieved familiarity with them (πάλιν κατὰ συνήθειαν γινομένων). As a basic example of this, he provides the example of reading, in which a child must first sound out each letter but eventually is able to read fluently and without hesitation (10.47.6-10). It is for this reason, Polybius concludes, that instead of abandoning tasks which appear difficult at first, we must rely on habit (ἕξις), through which all good things can be attained by mankind (10.47.11). While the technical advances and complexity of Polybius' times, therefore, have increased the need and value of pragmatic history, history alone does not offer a complete education in the mastery of such matters. While it can provide a blueprint, especially for such complex procedures, as Polybius emphasizes in this passage, practical experience and practice remain important components of this process. Like the child learning to read, theoretical knowledge alone will not achieve the desired results, but practice and experience are required before such techniques can be truly mastered. As a result, both practical experience and historical knowledge become linked in a relationship that allows for the utilization of past innovations and lays the foundation for further progress in the future.

To return to the discussion about the various ways detailed by Polybius to acquire knowledge, we can see now with greater clarity the considerable overlap and connection

between them. Scientific study (ἐμπειρία μεθοδική), which involves especially technical matters and must be learned from experts, is in fact an important component of Polybius' concept of pragmatic history. Such studies, however, also require practical experience and application of the knowledge gained in this way in order to reach their full potential. This final conclusion – that, in this technical education necessary for a successful general, history and personal experience must work *together* to form an effective instructional process – may have important implications for resolving the tensions and apparent contradictions which we have seen in Polybius' previous comments on the didactic value of history as opposed to practical experience. Polybius' specific focus in Books 9 and 10 on these kinds of technical matters, however, makes it unclear to what extent these comments apply in the historian's view to the education of statesmen more generally. Before exploring the relationship between these passages further, however, we must first add one more piece to this puzzle: Polybius' requirement that a historian himself acquire practical experience.

Practical experience and the historian

In Book 12, which is framed as a critique of previous historians, especially Timaeus, Polybius presents his own views on the appropriate qualities and necessary conduct for the successful composition of pragmatic history.[54] In the course of this analysis, Polybius offers a comparison between the writing of history and the practice of medicine (12.25d). The study of medicine, he argues, can be divided into three parts: the theoretical study (λογικοῦ,

[54] For an overview of Polybius' polemic against prior historians, see above note 26. Additionally, for the specific criticisms of Timaeus in Book 12 and the potential biases of Polybius, see Walbank (1972), 48-55; and Baron (2013), 58-88.

12.25d.3), the analysis of diet and way of life (διαιτητικοῦ), and the practice of surgery and pharmaceutics (χειρουργικοῦ καὶ φαρμακευτικοῦ).[55] Although all are important aspects of medicine, he continues, most make the mistake of placing far too much emphasis on theoretical study at the expense of actual practice and experience. The same is the case for pragmatic history (τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας, 12.25e.1). As Polybius goes on to argue, this too can be divided into three parts: the study of written accounts (τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι πολυπραγμοσύνην), the personal observation of cities and places (τοῦ περὶ τὴν θέαν τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν τόπων...), and experience in public affairs (τοῦ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς).[56] Again, Polybius suggests, while each of these remains important for a historian, the problem with an author like Timaeus is his complete reliance on written accounts (12.25e.4-7).[57]

Like other similar threefold divisions we have seen made by Polybius, here again we see an emphasis on the distinction between practical experience and the knowledge gained from written sources. As the remainder of the surviving text of Book 12 will indicate, moreover, Polybius believes that the first two categories, reading books and personal inquiry, are essentially worthless without the benefit of practical experience. In the following chapter, for example, Polybius turns his attention to the historian Ephorus and the errors in his account of

[55] On this threefold division and Polybius' probable sources for it, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.388-9).
[56] On this threefold division by Polybius, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.391), where he argued that really only the first category fits the analogy with medicine; Pédech (1964), 32; Walbank (1972), 71-3; Mohm (1977), 31-4; Sacks (1981), 25-6, who noted importantly that Polybius is here criticizing Timaeus' overall attitude toward history and not simply his research methods; and Marincola (1997a), 72.
[57] For this specific criticism of Timaeus, which may not be entirely fair, see Walbank (1972), 50-52; and Baron (2013), 66-8.

the battles between the Thebans and Spartans at Leuctra and Mantinea (12.25f). Because Ephorus had no experience (ἄπειρος, 12.25f.3) with land battle of this sort, Polybius claims, he was not able to provide an accurate account of these battles. As Polybius goes on to explain, when such an account is written by those who only read books (ὑπὸ τῶν βυβλιακῶν, 12.25g.2), pragmatic history loses its practical value (τὴν πραγματείαν ἄπρακτον γίνεσθαι). The historian, therefore, must have a fundamental knowledge about the kinds of events he will relate, in this case land battles, in order to understand properly any information gained from other sources.

Polybius' specific criticism of learning from books is further elucidated later in Book 12, when he again levels a similar attack against Timaeus (12.27). More specifically, he attacks Timaeus for his reliance on written accounts (διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, 12.27.3; cf. ἐκ τῶν βυβλίων, 12.27.4) of events instead of the questioning of eyewitnesses (περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις, 12.27.3).[58] Polybius frames this entire discussion, moreover, as a contrast between seeing and hearing beginning with a quotation from Heracleitus that "the eyes are more accurate witnesses than the ears (ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες, 12.27.1)," and then censuring Timaeus because he avoids research based on sight (διὰ τῆς

[58] Sacks (1981) in his Appendix B (203-9) discussed this definition of Polybius' term "ἀνάκρισις" and the apparent contradiction between the historian's criticism of Timaeus' use of eyewitnesses (12.28a.7, see below) and the praise for such practices in other passages such as this (cf. 12.4c.2-5). For more on the contradiction, see Walbank, (1972), 73-4; Schepens (1975a); and Mohm (1977), 44 n. 113. Sacks resolved the problem by noting that for Polybius the proper examination of eyewitness involves a critical discretion on the part of the inquirer, which must be grounded in his own experience, as was discussed above.

ὁράσεως) while relying entirely on hearsay (διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, 12.27.3).[59] This emphasis upon "seeing for oneself" plays a significant role in historiography going back to Herodotus[60] and will remain a prominent feature both of Polybius' work and of my present study. In this case, however, the historian makes a further distinction between the two types of "hearing" which he is discussing here: the study of books and the questioning of eyewitnesses (12.27.3). Timaeus' fault lies, therefore, not simply in his reliance on his "ears" but again in his sole reliance on books, which Timaeus (perhaps naturally) prefers because reading can be done without danger or suffering (χωρὶς κινδύνου καὶ κακοπαθείας, 12.27.4).

By relying entirely on written accounts, however, Polybius argues that Timaeus has neglected the second type of "hearing", personal inquiry (πολυπραγμοσύνη, 12.27.6), a task which, although requiring much hardship and expense (πολλῆς μὲν προσδεῖται ταλαιπωρίας καὶ δαπάνης),[61] Polybius describes as a very great part of history (μέγιστόν ἐστι μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας).[62] In contrast to Timaeus, Polybius then cites the texts of Ephorus (12.27.7=*FGrH* 70.110), Theopompus (12.27.8-9=*FGrH* 115.342), and finally Homer (12.27.10-11= *Od.* 1.1-2, 1.3-4, and 8. 183), all suggesting the benefits of personal involvement in real

[59] For Polybius' views on the importance of autopsy for a historian, see Sacks (1981), 48-66 with specific discussion of this passage at 62-3.
[60] On the importance of autopsy for ancient historians in general, see especially Schepens (1980) and Marincola (1997a), 63-86. For the term in Herodotus in particular, see e.g. 2.29.1, where Herodotus validates his information by claiming to be an eyewitness of it himself, and 3.115.2. For more on Herodotus and direct knowledge, see Asheri's *Commentary* (1.15-16).
[61] For the common emphasis in ancient historians on the amount of effort required both in the research and composition of history, see Marincola (1997a), 148-58.
[62] This is essentially the sense rendered by Paton and retained in the new edition of the Loeb (2011), which translates this last phrase as "the most important part of history" (447). Sacks (1981) took this phrase to refer to the great amount of effort required (62), but although Polybius does discuss this aspect of such inquiry later (12.28a.4-5), I do not think this is what he means here.

world affairs. While the first two quotations are drawn from previous historians, however, and seem to describe specifically the same type of research into material for history that Polybius is discussing,[63] the quotations from Homer by contrast describe not a historian but the hero Odysseus. These lines, moreover, portray the hero as a man who has wandered much (μάλα πολλὰ πλάγχθη, *Od.* 1.1-2) and has seen the cities of many men (πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα, *Od*. 1.3), but also as one who has suffered much hardship (πολλὰ…πάθεν ἄλγεα, *Od.* 1.4) and cut his way through the wars of men and grievous seas (ἀνδρῶν τε πτολέμους ἀλεγεινά τε κύματα πείρων, *Od.* 8.183).

This picture of Odysseus both describes a kind of personal inquiry and fact-gathering similar to the previous quotations and additionally supports Polybius' suggestion that such research is difficult and often comes at a price. Significantly, however, unlike in the previous examples, Odysseus is not conducting this research for the purpose of writing history. He nevertheless becomes, for many of the reasons suggested in this passage, a model for historians in Polybius, who in fact frequently compares himself to the Ithacan hero.[64] Polybius makes this point explicit, moreover, in the following chapter (12.28), when, immediately after the quotations from Homer, Polybius concludes that the seriousness of history also requires such a man.[65] With this statement, which perhaps recalls the emphatic first word (ἄνδρα) of the *Odyssey*, Polybius presents Odysseus as an ideal historian because of the vast experience

[63] On the fragments of Ephorus and Theopopmus, see Jacoby (2 C, p. 64 and 2 BD, p. 397, respectively) along with Walbank's *Commentary* (2.409).
[64] For Odysseus' role in Polybius as a model for historians and for Polybius himself, see Walbank (1972), 51-2 and Marincola (1997b), esp. 16-25 on Polybius.
[65] δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας πρόσχημα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ζητεῖν (12.28.1).

described in the previous quotations. He then broadens this claim with a more general statement (12.28.2-5), an adaptation of the famous passage of Plato's *Republic* (5.473c11-e4), that history will be best served when either men with practical experience (οἱ πραγματικοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν) write history or when historians consider practical experience (τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἕξιν) necessary for the writing of history.[66]

In Polybius' view, therefore, the experience necessary for an aspiring historian is not to be gained simply by tagging along with those involved in practical affairs and observing events but rather requires personal participation in these affairs as an active πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ.[67] For Polybius, moreover, Odysseus represents not simply a kind of inquisitiveness, although this is part of it, but rather much more broadly the kind of real-world experience which is gained from his many struggles and defines him as a quintessential πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ. The suggestion by Polybius in Book 12 that such broad personal experience is necessary for any successful historian brings us back to the now familiar contrast between history and practical experience. Whereas previously the study of history, along with personal experience, has been regarded by Polybius as important, even necessary, training for an active career and, furthermore, practical experience has also been portrayed as critical in the ability to understand properly and to utilize the benefits of history, we see here that such experience is

[66] Maier (2012b) analyzes Polybius' representation of individuals in his historical narrative who exhibit qualities which overlap with the characteristics of good historians. Maier begins by rightly noting the significant lack of attention paid to this passage by previous scholars (296 with note 4). For the implications of this overlap between commander and historian for Maier's broader discussion of the apparent tension in Polybius' text between the didactic purpose of history and the unpredicability of human events, see (2012c), 273-340 (esp. 276-7 on this passage).

[67] For Polybius as an innovator in this respect, see Marincola (2001), 136-7.

also necessary for the writing of history in the first place. In Polybius' view, history is not only intended for the πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ but also must be written by one.[68]

In the following chapter (12.28a), Polybius reveals further that the practical experience necessary in his view for a proper historian applies not simply to the interrogation of witnesses or first-hand investigation but to the experience of a statesman in general. In impugning the research methods of Timaeus, Polybius mocks his predecessor's claim to have incurred expense and hardship (δαπάνην καὶ κακοπάθειαν, 12.28a.3) in his research about foreign peoples. Such research, Polybius claims, however, whether based on written accounts or on the interrogation of eyewitnesses,[69] cannot be conducted properly by those who have no experience (τοὺς ἀπείρους, 12.28a.8) with the sort of matters into which they are inquiring, such as infantry engagements, sieges, and naval battles.[70] This, he explains, is because the inquirer contributes just as much to the investigation as those providing the information.[71] Someone without experience (ἄπειρος, 12.28a.10) of such matters, therefore, would be able neither to question properly those who were present nor even to understand what had happened if he were present himself (οὔτε συμπαρὼν γνῶναι τὸ γινόμενον). Without a previous active involvement in such affairs, therefore, a historian will lack the knowledge

[68] For Polybius as a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ himself, see Davidson (2009), 124 and McGing (2010), 14-15.

[69] τὸ συνάγειν ὑπομνήματα καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων (12.28a.7).

[70] Cf. Sacks (1981), who noted that, in Polybius' view, "without *empeiria*, then, the use of eyewitnesses is largely ineffectual" (64).

[71] οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον ὁ πυνθανόμενος τῶν ἀπαγγελλόντων συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ἐξήγησιν (12.28a.9).

necessary to create an accurate and useful account of historical events, even if he has witnessed those events first-hand.

Through all of this, we can see that the writing of history for Polybius involves a balanced combination of the three elements discussed initially in the analogy to medicine (12.25d-e): the study of written sources, personal inquiry, and practical experience. In Polybius' view, moreover, the first of these is most preferred by flawed historians like Timaeus because of the lack of sacrifice involved, while the last is most lacking, even in others like Ephorus, and is therefore the area in which Polybius sees the most opportunity for improvement through his own work.

We have now seen, therefore, a repeated distinction made by Polybius between learning from experience and the knowledge gained from reading history, while at the same time we have also seen the recognition that the two are in fact often interdependent. Similarly, at 1.35 for example, Polybius suggested that one significant difference between learning from others (i.e. history) and learning from one's own experience is that the former method can be pursued without personal harm (ἀβλαβέστερον), just as here learning from books is described as the least dangerous option.

The difference in this case, however, is that Polybius here strongly criticizes historians like Timaeus for relying too much on this easy method, whereas at 1.35 he clearly recommends that students of history should take advantage of the opportunity to learn without personal danger. Sacks (1981) saw an unresolved contradiction for Polybius in these two precepts in that the historian fails to recognize the logical conclusion that the reader and future politician also requires practical experience in addition to the study of history (191-2). As I have shown,

however, Polybius has indicated elsewhere that practical experience is an important aspect of education, at least when it comes to the technical knowledge necessary for potential generals (see above on 10.47). Nevertheless, Sacks was correct to note that role of practical experience in the education of statesmen more broadly is not clear from Polybius' programmatic statements on the matter and is certainly complicated by the historian's initial claim the study of history is the best education for public life (1.1.2).

Conclusion

The ideal solution for reconciling Polybius' complicated and often conflicting statements about the relative roles of practical experience and history would be not to choose one or the other but rather to pursue a balanced approach that combines both. Just as the historian must not rely entirely on books, so the training of those engaged in public affairs must not and cannot be based entirely on personal experience. But if the roles of the historian and statesmen are truly parallel, as Polybius claims (12.28.2-5), then the reverse should also be true. That is, while a historian must sometimes make use of written accounts of the past, a statesman must augment his study of history with real life experience. While Polybius acknowledges, in spite of his attacks on Timaeus (e.g. 12.27), that secondary sources do form part of the necessary research of a historian (12.25e), the proper education of a statesman is less clear. On the one hand, Polybius claims that personal experience offers more vivid (ἐναργέστερον, 1.35.7) instruction. But there he also suggests that one should avoid the personal suffering which such experience entails in favor of the less painful study of history.

Contrary to the common assumptions about the effect of Polybius' prominent authorial voice within the text, therefore, the historian's views on the practical value of history for future statesmen are not made clear by his frequent discussions of the subject, in which there is a good deal of confusion and contradiction. Further inquiry is, therefore, required. Clarification of the historian's views, however, must be searched for not only in the abstract programmatic passages discussed above but also within Polybius' historical narrative itself. This approach is justified, moreover, by the parallels developed by the historian so far. Not only is πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, in Polybius' view, to be written by and for the πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ but is also written *about* such men.[72] The text, therefore, for Polybius is not just a fulfillment of his promise to recollect the deeds of the past, but, perhaps more importantly, becomes a model of his educational project in practice. Through their successes and failures, that is, the historical figures depicted by Polybius will demonstrate not only the appropriate lessons for the reader but also how those lessons were (or should have been) learned.

If this is true for Polybius – and it will be the purpose of this work to show that it is – then the narrative of Polybius will both reflect and potentially clarify the issues discussed in this

[72] Davidson (2009), 134. As a possible objection to this overlap of roles, particularly between the historian and the politician in Polybius, one might note Polybius' defense of the harsh criticism which he had leveled at his fellow Greeks on account of the Achaean War (38.4). But it is the task of the historian, he explains, to adhere to the truth even if that means the censure of compatriots (38.4.5-6), whereas a politician in such circumstances should defend his fellow countrymen, as indeed he himself had once done, at all costs (38.4.7). As Thornton (2013) has recently proposed, however, the main purpose here is not to insist on a clear distinction between the politician and the historian but rather to use this as a rhetorical device in order to lend authority to his own analysis of the events (216-17). In any case, Thornton adds, Polybius clearly violates this "principle" elsewhere (27.9-10) by employing his history in defense of his compatriots. For more on the importance of impartiality in Polybius, see Marincola (1997a), 164-5.

chapter. First, Polybius' account of events will indicate the value of practical experience. Chapters Two and Three of my dissertation will focus on two cases in which Polybius has chosen to highlight particularly significant instances of the ability to learn in this way. In Chapter Two, for example, I will show the special focus that Polybius places on the ability of the Roman people as a whole to learn from their own experiences and misfortunes and to make improvements based on these lessons. This trait will be evident both in Polybius' theoretical analysis of the development of their constitution in Book 6 and in his historical narrative, especially of the First and Second Punic Wars. Next (Chapter Three), I will focus on Polybius' representation of Hannibal as a leader who makes mistakes at the beginning of his career but over time learns important lessons from his experience, the same lessons in fact which Polybius consistently attempts to impart to his reader. For Hannibal, however, the story does not end there. In Polybius' representation of him, the great Carthaginian general will also attempt to teach the lessons that he has learned to others. In this way, the character of Hannibal will demonstrate the overlap in Polybius between the role of the historian and the πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ. Just like Odysseus, Hannibal represents for Polybius a man of action who also serves as an appropriate model for future historians.

At the same time, Polybius' narrative should also reflect his repeated emphasis on the study of history as an important component of the education of a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ. In Chapter Four, I will examine the exemplary value for future generations that Polybius finds in the past. This will be evident first in his famous analysis of the aristocratic funeral at Rome, which contains significant overlap with Polybius' understanding of the exemplary value of history. Secondly, I will show how figures within the historical narrative such as L. Aemilius

Paullus and his son, Scipio Aemilianus, reflect Polybius' promotion of history in this regard both by respecting the exemplary models of their ancestors and by attempting to motivate others through the use of such *exempla*. Finally, in Chapter Five, I will examine the ability of characters within Polybius' narrative to learn the more complex and difficult lessons of the past of the sort which he is attempting to convey through his own work. As will become clear from this analysis, however, Polybius is highly pessimistic that people in the past have had much success in this regard or have demonstrated any real willingness to learn from history as they should. An important exception to this tendency in Polybius is the great Roman general Scipio Africanus, who is depicted by Polybius as conducting historical research and adapting accordingly. For Polybius, figures such as Africanus will demonstrate that it is not only possible but of great benefit to learn from the lessons of the past, but, as he and others within the text will show, such lessons only acquire their true potential value when taken in combination with practical experience for all those involved, from the historian to the reader.

Chapter Two

Collective Practical Experience in Polybius

Introduction

As we saw in Chapter One, Polybius, as a *pragmatikos aner* writing a *pragmatic history*, regards practical experience as an important factor in shaping the lives and careers of those engaged in public affairs. While I will discuss later (Chapter Three) the ways in which this becomes evident of Polybius' characterization of individuals within his historical narrative, especially Hannibal, the primary focus of this chapter will be on the significance of such practical experience in the historian's depiction of collective groups of people. As we shall see, the peoples of other nations, such as the Gauls and Carthaginians, often struggle to learn and change their behavior based on their experiences, but the Roman people demonstrate a particular ability to adapt without the aid of others following the setbacks which they encounter during Polybius' account of the first two Punic wars. Polybius' emphasis on the ability of the Romans to learn collectively from their experiences will not only relfect and inform the historian's comments on the relative benefits of history and experience discussed in Chapter One, but will also play a central role in his depiction of Roman progress and success during this period. The resulting implication that Polybius regards the Romans as especially able to learn in the ways which he recommends to his own readers will be reinforced throughout the course of my study, such as in Polybius' analysis of the Roman aristocratic funeral (Chapter Four) and in his depiction of the great Roman general, Scipio Africanus (Chapter Five).

In Polybius' narrative of the First Punic War in Book 1, we will see that the ability of the Roman people to adapt on their own and the experience gained in that war is what, for Polybius, allows the Romans to embark upon a new frontier of naval warfare, where they match and eventually defeat the Carthaginians in the arena where they are strongest, the sea. During the Second Punic War, the war against Hannibal, the Roman ability to learn from their own experiences enables them first, in Book 3, to learn the appropriate way to respond to defeats in their own land and to react with determination and resolve after their devastating losses at Cannae. Finally, I will demonstrate the way in which the Romans, in their engagements subsequent to Cannae, learn the value of one exceptional individual and ultimately entrust their fortunes to Scipio Africanus, who successfully leads them to the defeat of Hannibal and victory in the war.

Significantly, however, the emphasis by Polybius on the importance for collective groups, such as the Romans, of learning from their own experiences is not only evident in these passages of the historical narrative but also in the more abstract and theoretical discussions of Book 6. In his famous account of the cycle of constitutions (*anakyklosis*), for example, we will see that the presence or absence of such experience is for Polybius an important catalyst in the positive or negative changes that occur in this cycle. Additionally, the mixed constitution, which is able to check the instability evident in the *anakyklosis*, was uniquely developed by the Romans, according to Polybius, by learning and adapting based on their experiences. We will see a clear overlap and relationship, therefore, between these theoretical analyses in Book 6 and the events in Polybius' historical narrative. I will begin, therefore, with the political

discussions of Book 6 and will then proceed to demonstrate the significance of these passages for Polybius' narrative of the events mentioned above.

Reason and practical experience in the *anakyklosis*

In the opening chapter of his work, Polybius famously promises to describe how and by what type of constitution (πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας, 1.1.5) the Romans gained control of nearly the whole world in less than fifty-three years. With a direct reference to this passage (6.2.3), the historian offers in Book 6 a digression from the historical narrative in order to address the second element of this initial promise: the Roman constitution.[73] Although Book 6 is not preserved in its entirety, enough survives to provide a fair sense of the overall content and structure of Polybius' analysis.[74] In addition to the specific and detailed treatment of Roman institutions provided in this digression, for example, Polybius begins the book with a more general discussion of political theory (6.3-9), which includes Polybius' account of the cycle

[73] Book 6 is without question the most famous part of Polybius' work, and the bibliography on it is correspondingly extensive. General treatments of this book are provided by Walbank (1972) 130-56; Pédech (1964), 302-30; and McGing (2010), 169-202. More specific bibliography on Book 6 up to 1970 can be found in Walbank's *Commentary* (1.635-6 and 2.645) and (1972), 130. Of these, Brink and Walbank (1954) on the composition of the book; and Cole (1964) and (1967, esp. 163-70) on Polybius' sources, are especially significant. Notable subsequent studies include Trompf (1979), 4-115; Hahm (1995); and Walbank (1998). For a survey of the political theories of Polybius and the influence of previous philosophers on him, see Aalders (1975), 105-12.

[74] Although the first five books of Polybius are preserved intact, the rest are fragmentary. The majority of Book 6, however, survives in the *exerpta antiqua* of the *Codex Urbinas.* As Nissen (1871) showed, moreover, the order of these long excerpts in the manuscript is consistent with Polybius' original composition (252-4). The overall content and shape of the book, therefore, is reliably established. For more on the fragments of Book 6, see Walbank's *Commentary* (1.635); Moore (1965), 55-61; Walbank (1972), 130-32; and, most recently, Erskine (2013), 232-3.

of constitutions (*anakyklosis*),[75] followed by an analysis of the constitution established by Lycurgus at Sparta (6.10).

Each of these last two elements, the theoretical *anakyklosis* and the Lycurgan constitution, will be important for my following discussion of the significant role of practical experience and the ability to learn from it in Polybius' work. Furthermore, the essential function of practical experience in these passages will create a direct connection between the political discussions of Book 6 and other portions of Polybius' work in which practical experience is given a similar emphasis. In this way, we will see that the largely theoretical passages of Book 6 are relevant to Polybius' historical narrative in a manner that modern scholars have typically missed.[76] In spite of the historian's claim that the natural pattern of constitution succession detailed in the *anakyklosis* is universally applicable (6.4.11-13 and 6.9.10-14), for example, such scholars have frequently noted that the patterns established by Polybius in this theoretical cycle do not in fact find significant parallels in his historical

[75] The *anakyklosis*, which will be treated in more detail below, has been much discussed by modern scholars. For an early general treatment, see Ryffel (1949), 180-228. More specifically, many attempts have been made to trace the sources of Polybius' account. In his *Commentary* (1.643-5), Walbank presented the possibilities (and previous bibliography on the subject) but concludes that precise identification of these sources is not possible. See further Cole (1964), 443-65. Alonso-Núñez (1986) argued that, while Polybius' account of the *anakyklosis* is rooted in Greek political theory, this particular version was adapted specifically as an introduction to his treatment of Roman constitution. For the common fascination with constitutional change in both Greek philosophy and Greek historiography, see Liddel (2010), who connects this with the attempt to create universal history.

[76] Momigliano (1969), for example, claimed "the relation between [Book 6] and the rest of Polybius' work is not easy grasp, and I venture to believe that Polybius himself would have been embarrassed to explain it (27)." Alonso-Núñez (1986) concluded that "Polybius' political theory has hardly any impact upon his treatment of historical events (17)." For other concurring scholars, see Hahm (1995), 10 n. 12.

narrative.[77] While it is certainly true, however, that Polybius has not created in these theoretical passages a precise blueprint for his historical narrative, we will see that the same principles of change and improvement which have defined both his notion of the didactic purpose of history and the composition of his historical narrative have likewise shaped the abstract political analyses of Book 6.

Polybius presents two accounts of the cycle of constitutions in Book 6, the first of which is a general sketch of the process (6.4.7-10), while the second offers more extended discussion (6.5.4-9.9).[78] As Polybius describes it in both passages, the natural progression of constitutional forms begins with a primitive state of monarchy that follows some natural catastrophe which resets the cycle. The cycle then proceeds through six other forms of government. These include the three basic types of constitutions, kingship, aristocracy, and democracy; as well as the degenerate versions of each of these, tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlarchy or mob-rule. At each stage in the cycle following the primitive monarchy, the positive form of government is replaced by the corresponding negative form beginning with kingship/tyranny, followed by aristocracy/oligarchy, and lastly democracy/ochlarchy.

The *anakyklosis*, therefore, is to be imagined as having multiple peaks, at which the state is governed harmoniously under a positive constitution, with corresponding low-points

[77] Notable recent attempts to counter this perception can be found in Balot (2010); McGing (2010), 169-94; and Maier (2012c), 27-37.
[78] Hahm (1995) points out that the recognition of these two distinct versions is critical to a proper understanding of the *anakyklosis* (12). Podes (1991) distinguishes between macro- (societal) and micro- (individual) focus in the two accounts and concludes that Polybius does not successfully reconcile the differences between the two versions.

represented by negative and destructive governance.[79] Each instance of a simple constitution in its positive form represents an improvement on the previous state of affairs, while each of the degenerate forms necessarily implies the opposite. Understanding how and why the changes occur, then, is not just critical to a proper appreciation of the *anakyklosis*, as Polybius himself states (6.4.12), but is also important for the historian's overall views on the nature and causes of human improvement and failure, for which practical experience again will play a critical role.

The first important change to occur in the cycle, however, is not from one of the six constitutional forms to another but rather the shift from the primitive state of monarchy (μοναρχία) to the first constitutional government, kingship (βασιλεία). In his initial summary of the cycle, Polybius makes a sharp distinction between this primitive state and the remainder of the cycle. After some catastrophic event which has reset the cycle to the beginning, Polybius asserts that this state of monarchy develops naturally (φυσικῶς, 6.4.7) and without deliberate organization (ἀκατασκεύως). In the second and longer account of the *anakyklosis* (6.5.4-6.9.9), moreover, Polybius again distinguishes between the primitive state of monarchy and the constitutional forms that follow by defining the initial state as similar to those found in other animals (καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, 6.5.6; cf. 6.5.8 and 9).

[79] Numerous attempts to reconcile this cyclical model with Polybius' alternative claim that each state as a whole follows a biological model of growth, peak, and decline have met with little success. Walbank laid out the fundamental difficulties in his *Commentary* (1.645-7). For full bibliography of the issue, see Hahm (1995), 11 n. 13. Ultimately, we must accept that, to the extent that Polybius' two models, the cyclic and biological, are consistent with each other, this rests in the peak and decline of each simple constitutional type and is not to be applied to the cycle as a whole.

This focus on the natural development of the primitive state and the similarities with the animal world, however, do not mean that the rest of the cycle occurs in any way outside of or contrary to a natural development. Polybius in fact repeatedly emphasizes the natural aspect of the entire *anakyklosis* and not just its initial state.[80] The distinction between monarchy and the rest of the cycle beginning with kingship, therefore, is not between a natural and an unnatural process. Nevertheless, there is a distinct contrast drawn between the spontaneous origin of primitive government and the onset of kingship, which introduces the rest of the cycle. Polybius presents this distinction in a μέν/δέ construction, which contrasts the development of primitive monarchy with that of kingship, as the latter is created with deliberate organization and a correction of the previous state (μετὰ κατασκευῆς καὶ διορθώσεως, 6.4.7). While they are still "natural", therefore, the more advanced societies represented by the six constitutional forms of government are defined, in contrast to the primitive state of monarchy, by the active and intentional drive by humans to organize and improve their society in a way that distinguishes them from other animals.

This desire for "correction" (διόρθωσις), moreover, holds particular significance for Polybius because of his claim at the outset of his work that precisely this kind of correction is offered by historical works such as his own (1.1.1). As we shall see, however, the corrections that occur in the *anakyklosis*, as it is presented by Polybius, are not based on any extended

[80] In the initial summary, for example, he explicitly describes the onset of both aristocracy (φύεται, 6.4.8) and oligarchy (κατὰ φύσιν, 6.4.9) as occurring naturally and, immediately following this introductory sketch, suggests that the same applies to each stage in the cycle (τὰς ἑκάτων κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις καὶ μεταβολάς, 6.4.11). Finally, in the later more detailed account of the *anakyklosis*, he uses this same phrase (κατὰ φύσιν) specifically of the initial establishment of kingship (6.7.1). Cf. Hahm (1995), 11.

knowledge of history but rather on the personal experience of those involved. On the other hand, the inability of those in each state to maintain the knowledge gained from their own experience over time leads to the inevitable degenerations inherent in the cycle and overall instability of the simple constitutions. The ability to learn and adapt based on their experiences, therefore, is what will distinguish the more advanced societies in the *anakyklosis* from the primitive society and from the animal world. Without the ability to transmit this knowledge through history, those societies remain unstable.

In the case of the first constitutional form (βασιλεία), however, the citizens have no significant experience with another advanced and organized society upon which they might draw for the institution of this form of government. Rather, in Polybius' account of the *anakyklosis*, kingship develops when an understanding of what is good and just (and their opposites) arises among humans.[81] As Polybius goes on to explain in the following chapter (6.6), men, who alone of animals possess intelligence and reason (μόνοις μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ, 6.6.4),[82] are able to employ these faculties in the creation of an organized society applying to their own lives the examples of injustice that they see around them (6.6.5). When, for example, they see examples of goodness and justice in members of their society or examples of the opposite behavior, the positive behaviors are granted emulation and imitation (τὸ μὲν ζήλου καὶ μιμήσεως τυγχάνειν, 6.6.9), while the negative ones receive avoidance

[81] τότε πρώτως ἔννοια γίνεται τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις (6.5.10).

[82] For discussion of the important and positive impact of λογισμός in Polybius, see Pédech (1964), 84 and 211-19; and Champion (2004a), *passim* with a list of Polybian usages in Appendix C (255-9).

(τὸ δὲ φυγῆς). Finally, the individual who is especially able to recognize and support these positive examples wins the allegiance of the population and is chosen king (6.6.10-11).

As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Four, this ability to imitate or avoid certain types of behavior based on the *exempla* offered by others plays a critical role in Polybius' conception of the potential benefits of history and in the composition of his own historical narrative.[83] Of course, the hypothetical people at this early stage of the *anakyklosis* do not have the benefit of such historical knowledge. Polybius, however, employs a similar principle in this case by emphasizing the need for them to rely on the imitation of others in order to establish the fundamental principles of goodness and justice. In the subsequent stages of the *anakyklosis*, moreover, the people will be able to rely on their own experiences with previous forms of government to institute change. But in this early stage of the creation of kingship, this experience is also lacking, and thus the reliance on the imitation of others becomes necessary for "correction" to occur.[84]

As the people of this hypothetical society gain experience with specific types of government, however, they begin to utilize this experience in their conduct. In summarizing this initial development into kingship (6.7.1-4), Polybius adds an additional factor that allows the people to choose the best rulers. At first they allow the kingship to remain hereditary,

[83] See e.g. 9.9.10, where Polybius justifies a lengthy description of the parallel conduct of Hannibal and Epaminondas based on the hope that his readers will become emulators (ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται) of the behavior of these generals.

[84] As we shall see, the necessity that this lack of experience creates for these people to imitate others and the benefits imitation in such circumstances will apply not just to Polybius' representation of this first stage in the *anaykyklosis*, but to situations in his historical narrative as well. See below, for example, on the Romans at the start of the First Punic War (1.20).

based on the assumption that the children will share the virtues of their parents (6.7.2). If this fails, however, they themselves elect their own kings with an eye toward their newly formed preference for reason and thought over passion and bodily strength. Polybius notes, furthermore, that this is possible only because they now know based on real-life experience (πεῖραν εἰληφότες ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, 6.7.3) the difference between the two.[85]

This emphasis on practical experience will remain instrumental in the rest of the *anakyklosis*. For example, the descent to oligarchy from aristocracy occurs because the generations following the first aristocratic leaders lack experience both in misfortune and in the civic values of equality and free speech (ἄπειροι μὲν ὄντες κακῶν, ἄπειροι δὲ καθόλου πολιτικῆς ἰσότητος καὶ παρρησίας, 6.8.4). Furthermore, similar circumstances arise during the creation of democracy, which is specifically created in order to avoid the problems evident in kingship and aristocracy (6.9.2). Finally, the experience of other forms of government remains significant during the transition from democracy to ochlarchy, when the positive form persists as long as the people have experience with the horrors of oligarchy (6.9.4) but erodes when the following generation loses this experience (6.9.5). The majority of the transitions in the *anakyklosis*, therefore, are explicitly linked to the possession or lack of practical experience.[86]

[85] While the rulers themselves have changed, the implication by Polybius here is that the overall makeup of the population has not, as they have been present long enough to remember both good and bad examples of one-man rule. Polybius makes no indication here that the people have passed on knowledge of their own experience to later generations.
[86] For more on experience as a catalyst for the *anakyklosis*, see Hahm (1995), 23-4 and 31.

In the degeneration from kingship to tyranny, on the other hand, the role of practical experience is not made explicit. While this transformation occurs, like the others, when the behavior of the rulers changes in later generations, Polybius attributes this deterioration to an increased addiction by these rulers to their bodily appetites (ἐπιθυμία, 6.7.7). This is accompanied, however, by the novel assumption by these new rulers that they should behave and dress in a way that clearly distinguishes them from their subjects, which is in direct contrast to the attitude of the original holders of the kingship (6.7.5-7). There is the implicit suggestion, therefore, that these later generations have failed to receive the appropriate wisdom and attitudes of their ancestors and that this failure leads directly to excesses and ultimate demise of their supremacy. This suggestion, moreover, is supported by Polybius' later description of the degeneration from aristocracy to oligarchy, as it is marked by a similar increase in the indulgence of the ruling class, which is in this case explicitly tied to the lack of personal experience of later generations (6.8.4-6).

Once Polybius' account of the *anakyklosis*, therefore, has moved away from the primitive monarchy and into the cycle of more advanced governments founded on λογισμός, the most consistent factor that either enables the establishment of a positive form of government or permits the rise of a negative one is the presence or absence of practical experience among either the rulers or those whose chose them. Additionally, there is no indication in the *anakyklosis* that one generation can pass on to later generations the knowledge that they have gained from their own experience. Upon the inevitability that this knowledge will die with the generation that earned it, therefore, rests the instability inherent in the *anakyklosis*.

Practical experience and the mixed constitution

It is primarily this inherent instability of simple constitutions that Polybius is attempting to demonstrate with his account of the *anakyklosis*. His purpose in exposing the weaknesses of these forms of government, moreover, is to draw a contrast between simple constitutional forms, such as those described in the *anakyklosis*, and a mixed constitution composed of all three positive forms (kingship, aristocracy, and democracy), which Polybius believes to be the best type of constitution (ἀρίστην...πολιτείαν, 6.3.7).[87] Ultimately, Polybius will describe the Roman constitution at its peak during the time of the Second Punic War as a prime example of the success and stability offered by this kind of mixed constitution.[88] Initially, however, the model cited by Polybius as the most familiar example of a mixed constitution is not that of the Romans but rather the constitution established by Lycurgus at Sparta (6.3.8).[89] The distinction drawn by Polybius between these two examples of the mixed constitution will again introduce the significant role of practical experience into Polybius' discussions of political theory.

Following the *anakyklosis* Polybius describes in more detail the way in which Lycurgus was able to avoid the instability that defines this cycle by instituting a mixed constitution at

[87] The most comprehensive modern study of the theory of the mixed constitution in Polybius is that of von Fritz (1954). For more, see Walbank's *Commentary* (1.639-41 and 1.647-8); Graeber (1968); Nippel (1980); and Alonso-Núñez (1999).

[88] For discussion of the notable problems and omissions in Polybius' description of the Roman πολιτεία as a balanced and mixed constitution, see, most recently, Seager (2013) with bibliography of the considerable prior scholarship on the subject. Seager concludes that Polybius deliberately misrepresents the Roman constitution as a mixed form of government in order to reconcile his claim that the Romans possessed a constitution superior to all others with his assumption that a mixed constitution is the best form of government.

[89] For Polybius' omission of the reforms of Cleomenes III in his representation of the Spartan constitution in Book 6, see Shimron (1964).

Sparta (6.10). At the end of this section, Polybius offers a contrast between the constitution of Lycurgus and that of the Romans (6.10.12-14).[90] The primary difference between the two constitutions that he emphasizes here, however, lies not in their final composition but in the manner in which they were created. Lycurgus, on the one hand, created the Spartan constitution through his own foresight and λόγος, without having suffered any adversity himself (ἀβλαβῶς).[91] The Romans, by contrast, although they ultimately reached the same end as Lycurgus, did so not through λόγος but over a period of time by learning from their own struggles and experiences (διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων), and then making improvements based on the knowledge that they had gained from their misfortunes (ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις).[92]

The exact historical events and processes which Polybius envisions here remain obscure, because the historian's account of early Roman history, which originally followed this statement and is known to modern scholars as the *archaeologia*, has been almost entirely lost.[93] In the *archaeologia*, Polybius probably demonstrated how the Roman constitution developed from the reign of Romulus down to the Decemvirate in a progression similar to the *anakyklosis*, until the cycle was broken by the development of the mixed constitution in the

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[90] For more on this contrast, see especially von Fritz (1954), 152-3; Walbank's *Commentary* (1.662-3); Pédech (1964), 324-6; and Petzold (1977), 278-9.

[91] ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν λόγῳ τινὶ προιδόμενος πόθεν ἕκαστα καὶ πῶς πέφυκε συμβαίνειν, ἀβλαβῶς συνεστήσατο τὴν προειρημένην πολιτείαν (6.10.12).

[92] Ῥωμαῖοι…οὐ μὴν διὰ λόγου, διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων, ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀεὶ τῆς ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις ἐπιγνώσεως αἱρούμενοι τὸ βέλτιον (6.10.13-14).

[93] See Walbank's *Commentary* (1.663-4) for an overview. For the dangers of attempting to reconstruct Polybius' *archaeologia* from the treatment of the theme in Cicero's *De re publica*, see especially Walbank (1998), 53-5.

final stage.[94] But the precise "struggles and experiences" which Polybius depicts the Romans as suffering through and learning from during this period are irrecoverable.

Nevertheless, our understanding of Polybius' broader historiographical principles and of his account of the *anakyklosis* will enable us better to understand the significance of this distinction between the respective developments of the Spartan and Roman constitutions (6.10.12-14). We can see in this passage two important factors which will be explored further in this chapter.[95] The contrast between the abstract and theoretical process of Lycurgus and the Roman ability to learn from experience reflects the contrast between history and practical experience which is so important to Polybius' understanding of the didactic purposes of history. We will see that this emphasis on the Roman ability to learn from experience is significant for Polybius' depiction of the progress achieved by the Romans in the course of his historical narrative as well. The second contrast evident here, and one which we shall also see in the

[94] See Pédech (1964), 314-15; and Walbank (1964), 248-9. As Walbank pointed out in his Commentary (1.664), while it is tempting to view this *archaeologia* as motivated by a desire to produce a historical example for the theory of the *anakyklosis*, it is more reasonable to assume rather that the abstract discussion of the *anakyklosis* was included primarily because it corresponded so closely in Polybius' view to his version of early Roman history. This would help to explain why, in spite of Polybius' emphasis on the widespread applicability of the *anakyklosis* (6.4.12 and 6.9.11), the Roman constitution is the only good example in his work in which the *anakyklosis* can be seen in practice (cf. Petzold (1977), 278-9, 285-6, and 288-9). On the relationship between the *anakyklosis* and early Roman history, see also Walbank (1993a), 19-20.

[95] For this two-fold contrast, cf. Alonso-Núñez (1999), 12.

historian's depiction of the Romans elsewhere in his work, is the distinction between the role of an individual law-giver like Lycurgus and the collective process at Rome.[96]

While the notion that the Roman constitution was unique in its collective development over a long period of time as opposed to the foundation legends of a single law-giver common in Greek states is not so explicitly stated in other historians, it is characteristic of other accounts of early Roman history.[97] There is, moreover, a striking similarity between the analysis of Polybius here and a statement attributed to Cato the Elder in Cicero's *De re publica* (2.2).[98] Cato, according to Cicero, used to say that the Roman constitution was superior to almost all others because in those others it had typically been individuals who had established each state with its own laws and institutions,[99] while the Roman constitution had been developed not by the genius of one man but by those of many over many generations.[100] Here, moreover, the development of the Roman constitution is specifically contrasted with those of Crete and Sparta, which had been established by a sole lawgiver, and with that of Athens, where multiple

[96] For other passages within Book 6, such as the accounts of the aristocratic funeral (6.53-4) or military discipline (6.37), which Polybius uses to emphasize the collective benefits of the Roman constitution in preference to the individual, see Erskine (2013), 240-44.

[97] See Cornell (1978), 135-6 for discussion. As he mentioned, Dionysius of Halicarnassus represents a notable exception, which results from his desire to depict Rome in the mold of a Greek city-state.

[98] Although Polybius was contemporary with Cato and even suggests that they knew – or at least knew of – one another (35.6), the connection between these two men and their works is notoriously problematic. Astin (1978) doubted any significant intellectual influence between them (226). Eckstein (1997), by contrast, who discusses the debate in detail and with prior bibliography (192-8), ultimately argues in favor of a significant connection between Polybius and Cato.

[99] *quod in illis singuli fuissent fere, qui suam quisque rem publicam constituissent legibus atque institutis suis*.

[100] *nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio, sed multorum, nec una hominis vita, sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus*.

changes had occurred over time but had been on each occasion instigated by a single person. As in Polybius, therefore, the creation of the Roman constitution as described by Cato is the product not of a single individual nor even of a series of successive individuals but at all stages as a collective enterprise.

This passage from Cicero attributed to Cato extends, moreover, to the second aspect of the contrast drawn by Polybius as well: the Roman reliance on practical experience over time as opposed to the initial foresight of a law-giver like Lycurgus. The reason attributed to Cato by Cicero for his preference for the Roman method is that it is not possible for either the genius (*ingenium*) of one man or even of many men to possess adequate foresight at any given time (*uno tempore providere*) without the aid of actual experience and time (*sine rerum usu ac vetustate*). As in Polybius, therefore, this account describes the development of the Roman constitution as distinct both in the progress accrued through experience and time and in the collective nature of that progress, which did not depend on the influence of a prominent individual at any stage in its development.

While it is impossible to determine the precise relationship between these comments attributed to Cato and the passage of Polybius discussed here (see above note 98), the strong parallels between the two passages suggest that Polybius is not presenting an isolated view of the development of the Roman constitution.[101] Rather, these parallels indicate that Polybius is here representing a widely held and influential view about the significance of early Roman history. The broader importance of this passage will be further supported by the connections

[101] Nor, as Walbank implied in his *Commentary* (1.663), is this simply an off-hand comment inserted by Polybius to create a transition to the *archaeologia*.

between the contrasts developed here, the historian's historiographical principles, and his historical narrative.

The distinction here between the theoretical approach taken by Lycurgus without exposure to personal suffering and the Roman ability to learn from their experiences is reminiscent of Polybius' comments on the two methods of education available to future statesmen: history and practical experience.[102] Although Polybius does not indicate here where Lycurgus got his idea for the mixed constitution,[103] for example, the historian in this passage describes the process of that design in terms reminiscent of his discussions of history itself. First, Lycurgus' use of foresight (προιδόμενος, 6.10.12) is similar to what Polybius suggests should be done by readers of history in general.[104] More specifically, Polybius explicitly claimed earlier in this passage that Lycurgus designed the mixed constitution for Sparta because he was able to predict the instability of simple constitutions exhibited in the *anakyklosis* (6.10.2-6). The Spartan law-giver, therefore, is being depicted by Polybius as a

[102] The significance of this passage for Polybius' larger project, moreover, has also been recognized by Champion (2004a, 91-2), who notes a parallel between this passage and Polybius' claim at the conclusion of Book 6 to have described the Roman constitution not just in theory but also through experience (μὴ τῷ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν, 6.58.1; cf. 5.33.6-7). This, Champion concludes, allows Polybius "to take on an ambiguous or indeterminate cultural status between Greece and Rome" by employing both methods himself. While this is an intriguing observation, we have seen from the passages discussed in Chapter One that there is more to this, because it is precisely this overlap between *logos* and *pragmata* that for Polybius constitutes the distinctive composition of pragmatic history (for the connection between history and *logos*, see e.g. 12.25.d-e).

[103] Later (10.2.9-11), Polybius expresses doubts about Lycurgus' claim to have received the design of the Spartan constitution from the oracle at Delphi.

[104] See e.g. 12.25b, where Polybius claims that the inclusion of causes in history allows the reader both to apply past events to the present and to foresee what is about to happen (τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον, 12.25b.3).

model reader of history, as the ability to predict these changes is the historian's expressed purpose in including a detailed account of the *anakyklosis* at the start of this book.[105]

Additionally, Polybius' claim that Lycurgus instituted the Spartan constitution without suffering any personal harm (ἀβλαβῶς, 6.10.12) corresponds to the historian's suggestion in Book 1 that history is preferable to personal experience as a means of education precisely because it involves less personal harm (ἀβλαβέστερον, 1.35.6). As a result, Lycurgus becomes a prototype for the vicarious methods of learning also provided by the study of history.

The Romans, by contrast, do not benefit from the kind of theoretical design attributed to Lycurgus but rather must undergo a long process of trial and error. Although he uses different nouns here, this process based on personal experience strengthens the correspondence between this passage and that in Book 1 (1.35), where Polybius contrasts practical experience with learning from history based on the fact that the first involves personal misfortunes while the second educates through the misfortunes of others (τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων (1.35.7). Furthermore, the Romans here have specifically made improvements based on the knowledge gained in their own reversals of fortune (ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις, 6.10.14). The deliberate choice of this term again recalls Polybius' programmatic statements about history, which he specifically associates in his

[105] Cf. 6.4.12 and 6.9.11. Maier (2012c) also notes the parallel between the foresight and calcualtion of Lycurgus and Polybius' description of the benefits of learning from history (47-9). Although he also notes the connection between this and Polybius comments at 1.35 on the benifits of studying history, as Lycurgus, like a reader of history, is able to avoid personal suffering, Maier does not discuss Polybius' suggestion there that personal experience is a more effective method of instruction.

preface, for example, with the recollection of the reversals of others (τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν, 1.1.2). The Romans, therefore, are portrayed here as developing their constitution through a process of practical experience which, although clearly viewed by Polybius as valuable, nevertheless involves significant pain and suffering because it occurs without the vicarious lessons afforded by the study of history.

In light of the historian's complicated and often confusing statements discussed in Chapter One about the relative value of the two methods of education available to future statesmen, history and practical experience, the question that immediately arises is which of these two methods of development, the Spartan or the Roman, Polybius believes to be preferable. Later in Book 6 (6.50), Polybius claims that the Roman constitution was superior to that of Lycurgus since the Roman constitution facilitated the expansion and preservation of their empire; but that of Lycurgus, while ideally suited for domestic affairs, failed the Spartans in foreign policy. Scholars have correctly noted, however, that Polybius does not anywhere explicitly attribute the superiority of the Roman constitution at its peak to the unique manner in which it was developed.[106] Unlike in the statement attributed to Cato, who according to Cicero claimed that the Roman constitution was superior to all others specifically because of the manner in which it was created,[107] Polybius does not comment, at least in the surviving text, on the relative value of either method but merely states that they arrived at the same end.

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[106] See Walbank's *Commentary* (1.662), where he corrected Taeger's (1922, 13-14) suggestion that Polybius explicitly states a preference for the *development* of the Roman constitution. Cf. Walbank (1980), 53.

[107] *Is dicere solebat ob hanc causam praestare nostrae civitatis statum ceteris civitatibus, quod*... (*De re pub.* 2.2).

If the historian had indicated a connection between the manner in which the Roman constitution was created and the ultimate superiority which it achieved, we might expect this detail to have been included in his now lost *archaeologia* where this process of development was described more fully. But when describing the flaws of the Spartan constitution (6.48-9), Polybius again mentions the foresight of Lycurgus (6.48.2) and further suggests that, although the constitution was successful in producing moderate individuals, as a collective state Sparta was too ambitious and aggressive (6.48.7-8). Because each of these details recalls the distinctions made earlier about the developments of the two mixed constitutions, there is at least the suggestion here that Polybius has the earlier passage in mind as he explains the superiority of the Roman constitution.

Although Polybius' possible preference for the Roman method of developing a constitution must remain tentative without any surviving corroboration from the historian, it at least increases the potential significance in Polybius' mind of the ability of the Romans collectively to learn and adapt based on their experiences. The importance of this exceptional ability of the Romans becomes further evident in comparison with the role that such practical experience plays in the *anakyklosis*. As we saw above, the ability to learn from experience was central in the *anakyklosis* to the development of positive forms of government, while the absence of it led directly to the degeneration into their negative counterparts. The Romans operate in a manner similar to those imagined operating within the *anakyklosis* as they learned and adapted based on their experiences. The important difference, however, is that, while those living under each hypothetical example of a simple constitution in the *anakyklosis* forget their lessons over time and allow their state to degenerate, the Romans preserved their

improvements over a long period of time until they arrived at the mixed constitution. This is ultimately what makes the Romans exceptional in this respect, as they not only learn from their experiences but also *remember* the lessons which they have learned.

In attempting to determine this relationship between the creation of these mixed constitutions and the *anakyklosis*, however, the distinction that Polybius draws between the role of λόγος in the development of the constitution of Sparta (λόγῳ τινί) and the relative lack of it in the case of Rome (οὐ μὴν διὰ λόγου), has caused some confusion among modern scholars. It has been noted, for example, that, because rational thought also plays a significant role in the *anakyklosis*, the methods of Lycurgus actually have more in common with this cycle than the process experienced by the Romans.[108] This, however, would indicate a contradiction by Polybius who repeatedly points out that the history of the Roman constitution more than any other follows the outlines of the *anakyklosis*.[109] The term used by Polybius in the *anakyklosis*, however, is not λόγος but rather λογισμός, which, for example, is listed as one of the defining characteristics distinguishing men from animals (6.6.4) and enables the initial development of advanced societies.[110]

This suggests that there is an important difference between the λογισμός that is so critical to the organization of any advanced form of government and the λόγος, which is specifically absent in the case of Rome. Clearly, those who have seen a problem here are right

[108] See e.g Hahm (1995), 39 and Champion (2004a), 91.
[109] See 6.4.13 and 6.9.12-14.
[110] In his *Commentary* (1.662-3), Walbank, following Pöschl (1936, 74 n. 53) argued that "οὐ μὴν διὰ λόγου" is not to be pressed as the Romans can hardly have failed to employ reason, which assumes that λόγος is here the equivalent of λογισμός.

to conclude that the Romans did not form their constitution without the aid of rational thought. The contrast that Polybius is drawing here, however, is between the kind of rational thought that is based on personal experience (i.e. λογισμός) and a more theoretical and abstract process which is not (i.e. λόγος).[111] This theoretical method of organizing a system of government, moreover, is absent from the *anakyklosis* and is distinct from the type of experience-based λογισμός that is found there. Thus the experience-based improvements made by the Romans have more in common with the *anakyklosis* than the abstract and theoretical λόγος employed by Lycurgus.

But while the Romans form their constitution their personal experience, the ultimate success of the Romans in developing the mixed constitution is made possible by their additionally ability, in contrast to the nations envisioned in the *anakyklosis*, to remember and to preserve the improvements which they have made over a period of time. If Polybius did view the Roman method as preferable to that of Lycurgus, which is plausible, his preference may have rested on this combination of experience and memory and not on experience alone. This suggestion that the Romans' success is characterized by Polybius as the result of their ability to learn from their experiences, moreover, will also be evident in Polybius' historical narrative, especially during the First and Second Punic Wars, but here again we will see that their success is not based on this ability alone.

[111] For the understanding of the term λόγος, cf. 6.3.8, where Polybius claims that the concept of the mixed constitution is evident in real life (ἔργω) and not just in theory (λόγω).

Roman innovations in the First Punic War

Actual examples of constitutional changes at Rome during the period covered by Polybius' historical narrative are relatively rare. The most important feature of the mixed constitution is, after all, its stability, at least as it is portrayed in Book 6 of Polybius (see e.g. 6.10.7). In order to find relevant examples of the Roman ability to learn from experience, therefore, we must look more broadly at Roman behavior and not be limited to specifically constitutional reforms. This approach, furthermore, is warranted by Polybius' own expansive conception of the term πολιτεία, which includes both customs (ἔθη) and laws (νόμοι) (6.47.1).[112] In addition to what are in modern terms the strictly constitutional elements which we have seen so far, for example, Polybius also includes in Book 6 discussions of the Roman army (6.19-42), funeral processions (6.53), and economics (6.56).[113] The ability of the Romans to make adaptations based on their past experience and misfortunes, therefore, need not be limited to specifically constitutional changes but may involve a wide range of customs and institutions.

If we broaden our parameters in this way, we do in fact find examples in Polybius' narrative of the Romans showing a distinct ability to adapt and learn collectively. In his discussion of the Roman military in Book 6, for example, Polybius offers a description of the Roman cavalry (6.25). The weapons which the Romans used in their cavalry, Polybius states, had been copied from the Greeks when their own proved inadequate (ἀδοκίμου τῆς χρείας

[112] Martínez-Lacey (1991) discusses Polybius' broad use of these terms together to encompass the notion of "culture".
[113] For the importance of including all of these elements of Roman society described in Book 6 in Polybius' concept of the term πολιτεία, see Erskine (2013), 233-5.

οὔσης, 6.25.8). At the conclusion of this passage, Polybius explicitly states no one else is able to match the Romans' ability to change their customs and to imitate a better course (ἀγαθοὶ γάρ, εἰ καί τινες ἕτεροι, μεταλαβεῖν ἔθη καὶ ζηλῶσαι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι, 6.25.11). Again, therefore, Polybius argues that the Romans have this unique ability to adapt (μεταλαβεῖν ἔθη) when circumstances demand it; and, again, he portrays this as a collective trait (Ῥωμαῖοι). In this passage, however, the historian adds a second element: that they are also uniquely able to imitate the superior methods of others (ζηλῶσαι τὸ βέλτιον).[114] There is no indication in the passages discussed above, however, that this ability to imitate others applies in Polybius' view to the development of their constitution.[115] But the emphasis here on the unique ability of the Romans to adapt when necessary *is* reminiscent of the progressive changes which they have made to their constitution. Thus the additional focus on the imitation of others here is not a contradiction of Polybius' analysis of the creation of the Roman constitution, but this does add to the Roman methods of improvement an addition component which must be taken into account. Both aspects of Roman progress will play an important role in the Roman innovations and success during the First Punic War.

Scholars have already recognized, in fact, that there is strong connection between this passage in Book 6 on imitating others and Polybius' account in Book 1 (1.20.9-16) of the

[114] Cf. the contrasting depiction of Athens presented in Thucydides' account of Pericles' funeral oration (2.37.1), where Pericles claims that the Athenians serve as an example to others rather than imitate them (παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους).
[115] Again, if Polybius did make any such suggestion, it would probably have occurred in the now lost *archaeologia*.

Romans' first attempts at shipbuilding at the start of their first conflict with Carthage.[116] Before this, as Polybius tells us, the Romans had no experience in shipbuilding (ἀπείρων ὄντων, 1.20.10), but because of their remarkable courage they attempted to meet the Carthaginians at sea even without the necessary experience (πρὶν ἢ πειραθῆναι τοῦ πράγματος, 1.20.12). Luckily, however, before they met the Carthaginians in an actual battle, they managed to capture a Carthaginian ship, which they used as a model (ταύτῃ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι, 1.20.15) for the rest of their fleet. If not for this event, Polybius concludes, the Romans would have never been able to achieve their design of matching the Carthaginians on the sea because of their complete lack of experience (διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, 1.20.16) in naval warfare.[117]

As in the case of the development of their constitution, therefore, Polybius again does not attribute the design of this fleet to any individual but rather throughout the entire chapter (1.20) refers only to the Romans as a whole. In the absence of prior naval experience, then, they are forced to turn to the second element mentioned by Polybius in the passage just discussed (6.25.11) by imitating the Carthaginian design. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Four, the imitation of the example (παραδείγμα) set by others is an important component of Polybius' conception of the purpose of history. By noting that the Romans built their fleet in this way, therefore, Polybius is acknowledging that the Romans do not rely *exclusively* on their own practical experience when making reforms but rather are open to the

[116] See e.g. Walbank's *Commentary* (1.75) and Pelling (2007), 25.
[117] Walbank noted in his *Commentary* (1.75) on this passage that the ability of the Romans to imitate their opponents is a common theme found in other authors and provides examples. He also argued, however, that Polybius has exaggerated the importance of this particular event, which suggests that, although common, the theme plays a particularly important role in Polybius' version of events.

imitation of others when necessary. But while this alternative method enables the Romans for the first time to assemble a substantial fleet of ships, this does not lead directly to Roman success against the Carthaginians. In the very next chapter (1.21), in fact, Polybius describes how many of these ships are almost immediately trapped in the harbor and captured by the Carthaginians, a loss for which Polybius directly blames the recently appointed commander of the fleet, Cn. Cornelius Scipio (1.21.4-7). Without the benefit of the practical experience which has served them well in other areas, therefore, the Romans are unable to capitalize on their newly fashioned fleet.

But of course, the Romans do not give up their attempts to design a fleet that will match the Carthaginians on the open sea. Following this initial defeat, the Romans decide to improve their fleet with the unprecedented innovation of the so-called "ravens", which allowed them to attach themselves to and board enemy ships (1.22.3-11). Unlike in the previous example, however, Polybius makes no mention of the origin of or inspiration for this advance in naval warfare. In fact, he only claims that some unnamed person proposed this idea to the Romans (ὑποτίθεταί τις αὐτοῖς, 1.22.3) before describing their construction in painstaking detail.[118] As Beck (2013) notes, however, other sources attribute the invention of the "ravens"

[118] Maier (2012a, 153-4) discusses a similar use of the indefinite article by Polybius later in Book 1 to introduce the runaway Roman slave Spendius (1.69.4). By connecting this passage with, for example, Herodotus' introduction of Themistocles (ἦν δὲ τῶν τις Ἀθηναίων ἀνὴρ, 7.143.1) and Xenophon's introduction of himself into his *Anabasis* (ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, 3.1.4), Maier argues that Polybius' reader would have immediately recognized a character introduced in this way as consequential (see 153n.34 for his comparisons to previous passages). See also, Maier (2012c), 152-9. While the indefinite article in this passage (1.22.3) is similarly significant, the important difference here is that the individual in question remains unnamed.

specifically to the Roman commander C. Duilius,[119] who, according to Polybius, had just been appointed commander of the navy (1.22.1). Polybius might have made this connection as well but chose instead to obscure the role of any specific individual in this innovation by leaving the inventor himself anonymous. The effect of this indefinite pronoun, therefore, is that it reinforces the collective nature of Roman progress and anticipates the contrast made between Rome and Sparta in Book 6.

In the case of the "ravens," moreover, the idea seems to emerge spontaneously, as Polybius gives no indication that any model was used for this new design. The historian does, however, suggest that this innovation was a direct attempt to correct the failures of the original fleet, which he describes here as inferior and difficult to maneuver (ὄντων δὲ τῶν πλοίων φαύλων ταῖς κατασκευαῖς καὶ δυσκινήτων, 1.21.2). The historian here implies, therefore, that this is a case in which the Romans have learned from their previous failure and adapted accordingly. This time, moreover, with the addition of the "ravens" to their ships, the Romans win a surprising victory in their next engagement (1.23), in which the Carthaginians lose fifty ships and are terrified by the novelty (καταπλαγέντες τὴν καινοτομίαν, 1.23.10) of these new devices. In the following year (257 BC), under the new commander C. Atilius Regulus, the Romans again meet the Carthaginians on the sea (1.25.1-4) and engage them on equal terms (1.25.5). During his narrative of the next year (256 BC) in the war, Polybius describes at length the battle of Ecnomus (1.26-8), during which the historian again notes that the battle was mostly equal (1.28.4) but that the Carthaginian fear of the "ravens" made them too timid

[119] Beck (2013), 133 with n. 32, citing Zonaras (8.11), Frontius (*Str.* 2.3.24), Florus (1.18.9-10), and *De vir. ill.* (38.1).

(1.28.11), resulting in a Roman victory (1.28.13). While the "ravens" have allowed the Romans a slight advantage and some success, therefore, they are not at this point decisively superior to the Carthaginians in all aspects of naval operations.

Polybius makes this clear in his account of the follow year (255 BC), in which Polybius again records a significant Roman naval victory (1.36.10-12) but immediately follows this with an account of a great storm which destroyed most of the Roman fleet (1.37). The historian claims at this point that no greater reversal of fortune (περιπέτειαν, 1.37.3) had ever occurred at one time in the history of naval warfare. Furthermore, he explicitly states that the cause of this misfortune should be assigned not to fortune but to the commanders of the fleet,[120] whose recklessness led them needlessly to expose the ships to the dangers of the storm (1.37.4-6). Although the fleet is then rebuilt, moreover, the Roman ships are again destroyed by a storm (1.39.1-6), after Polybius describes how they first were stranded in shallow water because of the inexperience (διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, 1.39.3) of their commanders, who then led them perilously (παραβόλως, 1.39.6) into a dangerous location. In spite of their adaptations and improvements, therefore, Polybius clearly sees the Romans at this point as having much to learn about naval warfare.

At this point, in fact, Polybius claims that because of the size and number of these disasters,[121] the Romans decided not to rebuild the fleet and abandoned the sea completely for a period of two years (1.39.7-12). When the Romans return to the sea (1.41) with designs on

[120] ἧς τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ οὕτως εἰς τὴν τύχην ὡς εἰς τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐπανοιστέον (1.37.4).
[121] διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων (1.39.7); cf. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων περιπετειῶν (1.39.9).

Drepana, the last Carthaginian stronghold in Sicily (1.41.6), their naval blockade is eventually defeated by the Carthaginians (1.50-51), who according to Polybius still possessed swifter ships and superior rowers (1.51.4). Subsequently, the Roman fleet is completely destroyed by another storm, while the Carthaginians are saved by the experience and foresight of their commanders (1.54.6-8). This results in the decision by the Romans again to abandon their naval operations (1.55.2).

By emphasizing the repeated misfortunes suffered by the Romans at sea up to this point, Polybius is highlighting the fact the Romans, in spite of their improvements, remained until this time inferior to the Carthaginians in every aspect of naval warfare. The historian is also, however, dramatically setting the stage for further Roman progress in this arena which will eventually result in Rome's victory in the war. The final and decisive stage in this progress occurs for Polybius when the Romans decide almost five years later to refit their fleet and test the Carthaginian navy a third time (1.59.1-2). This time they again base their improvements in ship-building upon the model of a captured ship, in this case by imitating the troublemaking "ship of the Rhodian" (1.59.8), after it had repeatedly made a mockery of their blockade of Drepana (1.46.10-12). Furthermore, this progress in the art of shipbuilding is again attributed not to any specific individual but to the Romans as a whole (Ῥωμαῖοι, 1.59.1), as Polybius has consistently assigned credit for innovations to the Romans collectively while typically assigning blame for failure to the folly and inexperience of individual commanders.

In this case, however, Polybius emphasizes that the reform in the design of the ships was complemented by strategic changes as well, since the Romans decided to lighten the load

carried by their ships in battle and to select their most unwavering and well-trained marines to man them (1.61.1-2). In contrast to their other improvements, Polybius does not claim that the Romans copied the practices of the Carthaginians in this respect. Rather, these improvements appear to be the result of the lessons learned by the Romans from their previous failures, as they are a direct response to the problems with the Roman fleet previously cited by Polybius as the cause of the defeat at Drepana (1.51.4). For the first time in the series of innovations in the course of this war, therefore, the Romans combine the two methods which they had employed earlier: the imitation of a Carthaginian model (cf. 1.20 on the first fleet) *and* the lessons learned from experience (cf. 1.21 on the "ravens").

The Carthaginians, by contrast, had by this time completely neglected these important facets of naval combat, Polybius claims, as their ships were loaded down and their crews were untrained (1.61.4). As a result, he concludes, the circumstances in the ensuing battle were the opposite of Drepana and, consequently, so were the results (1.61.2), as the Romans finally won a decisive victory. It is, however, only through a combination of the two methods of improvement alluded to by Polybius in the passages of Book 6 and because of their ability not to forget or abandon the improvements which they have made that the Romans are able to secure their ultimate victory over the Carthaginians in the First Punic War.

Xanthippus and the Carthaginians

As was suggested above, there is an important distinction in Polybius' narrative between the progress made by the Romans in their navy during the war and the corresponding

decline in this respect for their opponents. The Carthaginians, however, do make important improvements in their military forces during the First Punic War, but in their case this is done by adapting their tactics on land in order to face the superior Roman infantry. But as we shall see, the progress which the Carthaginians make in this aspect of the war is achieved in a manner distinctly different from that of the Romans. After having already suffered a significant defeat in their own land in northern Africa near the town of Adys (1.30), for instance, the Carthaginians do not learn from their tactical mistakes and adapt. Rather, they yield their authority to Xanthippus the Lacedaemonian, who had been given military training at Sparta, on the condition that he teach them the necessary reforms (1.32-3). By following his lead, they were in fact able to adjust their tactics in such a way as to enable them to defeat the Roman army under the command of M. Atilitus Regulus in the ensuing battle (1.34).

The way that the Carthaginians achieve these reforms, however, is clearly at odds with the way that the Romans tend to make similar reforms, which is on their own, collectively, and from their own experience. Even when the Romans have shown an affinity for copying the practices of others when their own experience is lacking, as at the start of the war (1.20), they have done so of their own accord and without the direct teaching of a foreigner like Xanthippus. The Carthaginians, by contrast, had the opportunity to learn from actual experience but still required the aggressive action of another to impose reforms upon them.

Polybius himself emphasizes this contrast with a quotation from Euripides: "one wise plan conquers many hands" (ἓν σοφὸν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χεῖρας νικᾷ, 1.35.4).[122] In this way, he explicitly distinguishes the Carthaginian reliance on a single individual, Xanthippus, from the Roman tendency, which we have seen repeatedly, to act and learn collectively. The historian adds here, moreover, that at that time the maxim was proved through the events themselves (τότε δι᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἔλαβε τὴν πίστιν). Polybius' narrative of the success achieved by Xanthippus demonstrates this lesson to the reader. Significantly there is no suggestion here that the Romans themselves at this time learned the lesson about the value of such an individual in spite of their direct experience and ultimate setback against Xanthippus. As we shall see, Polybius returns to this theme of the value of such an individual later, when it is applied among others to the genius of Hannibal, and the Romans will in fact learn this lesson as well based on their experience with another such individual, Scipio Africanus. Here, however, Polybius allows the distinction to remain as the Romans continue to behave and develop collectively during the course of the First Punic War.

Rather, Polybius here focuses on the important lessons of this passage for his reader by pausing to reflect on the lessons to be learned from Regulus' defeat (1.35). It is in this passage that Polybius makes the distinction between two types of learning, personal experience and the misfortunes of others (i.e. history), discussed in Chapter One. The ostensible point being made by Polybius here is that this episode offers an opportunity for the reader to learn from the misfortunes of Regulus (διὰ τῶν Μάρκου συμπτωμάτων, 1.35.2). The lessons specifically

[122] This line from the lost play *Antiope* was often quoted by later authors and may derive from a collection of quotations (see Walbank's *Commentary*, 1.94).

proposed by Polybius here are, furthermore, the common precept not to trust too much in fortune, especially during times of prosperity (τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, 1.35.2) as well as the value of a single talented individual discussed above (1.35.2-4).[123]

The contrast between the Roman and Carthaginian approaches to learning which has been developed in the preceeding narrative may well be what inspired Polybius to emphasize in this passage the distinction between learning from others and learning from personal experience, and here to revise his initial comments on the didactic significance of history (see the discussion of this passage in Chapter One, pp. 11-14). At this point when his historical narrative, through the success of Xanthippus, has demonstrated the potential value of vicarious instruction, Polybius returns to the theme of the benefits offered by history. But, significantly, the prior and indeed coming success of the Romans, who learn in quite a different fashion, makes it no longer possible for Polybius to obscure the significant and indeed essential role of personal experience in his vision of an ideal educational process. As we have seen, moreover, it is precisely this ability to learn collectively from their experiences *combined* with the ability to imitate others that ultimately leads to the Roman success over the Carthaginians, who serve as a direct contrast to the Romans in their methods of change and improvement.

[123] For the recurrence of both of these themes elsewhere in Polybius as well as the possible sources for his interpretations of this episode, which is also recorded by Diodorus (23.15.1-6) but may ultimately derive from Philinus, see Walbank's *Commentary* (1.92-4). Sacks (1981) discussed Polybius' combination of moral and practical lessons to be drawn from this episode (135).

Learning from experience: The Romans and the Gauls

The ability of the Romans to learn collectively but independently based on their own experiences is not limited in Polybius' narrative to the First Punic War or to naval technology. In Book 2, Polybius describes the subsequent wars between the Romans and the Gauls, where again the Romans are distinguished by their ability to learn and adapt based on their experiences. In this case, Polybius singles out their ability to learn both the nature of the Gallic soldiers and the weaknesses of their particular type of sword (2.33.1-3). The Roman tribunes (χιλίαρχοι), Polybius tells us, had gathered this information from past battles (συνεωρακότες γὰρ ἐκ τῶν προγεγονότων κινδύνων, 2.33.2), and by imparting this wisdom to their troops they lead the Romans to a decisive victory against the Insubres in 221 B.C. This statement again looks ahead to the "διὰ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων" that defines the development of the Roman constitution. This victory, moreover, is achieved in spite of a serious tactical blunder by the Roman general, Flaminius (2.33.7). The adaptive abilities of the Romans as a whole, therefore, proved to be significant enough to overcome the faults of an individual leader.

A further emphasis is placed on this trait of the Romans when it is contrasted with its absence in the case of the Gauls. After the earlier victory of the Romans over the Gallic forces at Lake Vadimon in 282 BC, Polybius also emphasized the great benefit that the Romans gained from their experiences in this war, as they would go on to face Pyrrhus, whose soldiers were both trained in battle and accustomed to the horrors of war (2.20.8-10). This is immediately contrasted with the reaction of the Gauls to their defeat. So long as those who had witnessed

these terrible events survived, the Gauls kept a peace that lasted forty-five years (2.21.1). The next generation, however, driven by illogical passion and having never experienced or seen such defeats, renewed hostility with the Romans (θυμοῦ μὲν ἀλογίστου πλήρεις, ἄπειροι δὲ κἀόρατοι παντὸς κακοῦ καὶ πάσης περιστάσεως, 2.21.2). Polybius' analysis of this decision is filled with concepts that anticipate the *anakyklosis*. The presence of θυμός coupled with the lack of λογισμός suggests a primitive society akin to the base state of monarchy in the cycle. The failure of one generation to maintain the lessons of the past corresponds with each stage of degeneration in the cycle from a positive to a negative form of government. Just as Polybius portrays the Roman ability to make progress as based on their ability to maintain such lessons from the past, he sees, in the absence of such an ability for a more primitive society like the Gauls, a necessary cycle of disaster and defeat.

Learning from experience in the Second Punic War

Having presented the introductory background material in the first two books of his work, Polybius turns in Book 3 to the start of his narrative proper in the 140th Olympiad and his account of the Second Punic War.[124] This period is critical to the present study, not just because it represents the moment in Polybius' mind when world events merged into a unified whole (σωματοειδῆ, 1.3.4), but also because it is during this period that, as Polybius claims, the Roman constitution reaches the peak of its development (6.58.3-8). It is, additionally,

[124] Sacks (1981) discussed Polybius' distinction between the first two introductory books and the rest of his work but concluded that the primary distinction is one of quantity and not purpose (115-18 and 172-8).

following the conclusion of this book with the Battle of Cannae that, after using Books 4 and 5 to bring affairs in the East to the same point, Polybius shifts to the digression of Book 6 that has been discussed above. Cannae, moreover, is the moment to which the historian returns at the end of this digression as his primary example of the resilience and superiority of the Roman system of government, and especially the resolute stability of the Roman Senate (6.58).[125] Book 3, therefore, warrants special attention in our study of the development of the Roman constitution.

Before the Battle of Cannae, the Roman army under the command of C. Flaminius had already suffered a significant defeat at Lake Trasimene. At 3.85.7-10, Polybius tells of the report of this defeat at Rome and the reaction to it by the Roman people. When the news was announced to the common people (τοῖς ὄχλοις), Polybius describes a level of disturbance beyond that evident even at the battle itself (3.85.8). He further characterizes this reaction as without moderation (οὐ μετρίως) and cites as a reason for it the people's lack of experience with this type of report and affair (ἄπειροι καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος, 3.85.9). The Senate, however, did not overreact, but retained its reason (ἐπὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος ἔμενε λογισμοῦ, 3.85.10). Unlike previous examples, Polybius here does not present the Romans as acting in a unified manner but emphasizes the distinction between these two groups. In doing so, he is also using language that again anticipates important themes of his theoretical discussions in Book 6. The negative result of the common people's lack of experience with this

[125] For Polybius' deliberate choice to describe the Roman constitution at this point, which not only returns to the disaster at Cannae but also immediately precedes his narrative of the subsequent Roman recovery, see Erskine (2013), 235.

particular type of event again reflects the similar consequences of such inexperience within the *anakyklosis*, while λογισμός, which in this case is evident only in the Senate, again serves as a positive and stabilizing force.

This distinction, however, between the reaction of the common people and that of the Senate clearly contrasts with the situation which Polybius will soon describe following the even greater disaster at Cannae. While Polybius notes the fear among the people during this later disaster (3.118.6), in that case, he will not emphasize the immoderation of their reaction and quickly describes how the people are calmed by reassurances from the Senate (3.118.7). At the time of Lake Trasimene, however, the inexperience of the Roman public with τὸ πράγμα of this sort leads to a different result.

Polybius' emphasis on the initial disturbance over the defeat of Flaminius and his army at Trasimeme, moreover, is compounded when the news reaches Rome of a second defeat, when the reinforcements sent to assist Flaminius are themselves routed (3.86). The result of this second reversal of fortune (ἐπιγενομένης καὶ ταύτης τῆς περιπετείας, 3.86.6) and the report of it at Rome, however, is that there is now distress both among the people and the Senate.[126] Polybius' primary example of the stability in the face of disaster, therefore, fails to apply to this event. This is an example of yet another περιπέτεια, however, from which the Romans will eventually learn.

The fact that the Senate had now suffered the same consternation as the general public leads directly in Polybius' view to the decision of the Romans to abandon the system of elected

[126] οὐ μόνον τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν σύγκλητον αὐτὴν συνέβη διαταραπῆναι (3.86.6).

magistrates and entrust control of affairs to a dictator (3.86.7). In fact, Polybius is so determined to connect the decision to appoint a dictator with the recent disturbance in the Senate that he separates this initial mention of the dictatorship from his more detailed description of the position which comes at 3.87.6-9. In the intervening chapter, Polybius narrates the coinciding movements of Hannibal and the report at Carthage of his success. When he returns, therefore, to his full description of the dictatorship, he can discuss it in more detail without interrupting these parallel narratives. He has, however, made sure to highlight what he indicates is an important link between the disturbance of the Senate and the appointment of a dictator.

When Polybius finally offers his description of the nature of the dictatorship, as well as the man chosen to fill the position, Q. Fabius Maximus, he offers an objective and even positive assessment, especially of the man himself. Fabius, he tells us, was a man distinguished for his intellect and naturally talented (ἄνδρα καὶ φρονήσει διαφέροντα καὶ πεφυκότα καλῶς, 3.87.6). Similarly, in his initial description of the office of dictator, Polybius does not show open hostility toward the position by describing it as purely tyrannical in nature. He does, however, emphasize that this position falls outside of the typical balance of powers present in the Roman constitution. According to Polybius, the dictator was completely independent (αὐτοκράτωρ) in contrast with the Consuls, who in many cases are dependent upon the Senate; and all other magistracies, except the tribunes, are dissolved on his appointment (3.87.8).[127]

[127] Polybius' assessment here is controversial because in conflicts with Cicero's judgment that the power of the dictator is, in fact, checked by the aristocracy (*De re pub.,* 2.56). Von Fritz (1954, 469-70, n. 7) argued that this contradiction can be removed by assuming that Polybius

Unfortunately, though Polybius tells us that he will treat the office of the dictatorship in more detail later, this portion of Book 6 has been lost. It is difficult, therefore, to make definitive judgments regarding Polybius' opinions about the role of the dictator in the mixed constitution of Rome. In light of the strong preference that Polybius later shows in Book 6 for the merits of the balance of powers in the mixed constitution, however, we might expect that this unchecked power of the dictator would be portrayed by Polybius as inherently bad. In the *anakyklosis*, however, constitutions governed by absolute rulers occur in both positive (kingship) and negative (tyranny) forms. Although Polybius does not use the terms in these passages, therefore, there is no indication in either that for Polybius one man rule is inherently bad. Rather, it becomes problematic in Book 6 because, like other monolithic constitutions, it is liable to instability.

Polybius' approval of Fabius, however, was not shared by the public at Rome or by his *Magister Equitum*, M. Minucius (3.90.6), who took advantage of the public disapproval of Fabius' tactics of delay and hesitancy to engage the enemy in order to improve his own political standing (3.90.6). Minucius, after temporarily taking command of the army while Fabius attended to religious matters at Rome, blatantly ignores his orders from Fabius (3.94.9-10) and engages in a successful conflict with the enemy (3.102). As has now become usual for Polybius, the historian next reports the reaction at Rome to news of the events in the battle (3.103.1-3).

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and Cicero are describing different stages in the development of the dictatorship and that Polybius may have made this more clear in the later, now lost, passage. Polybius also seems to be mistaken in claiming that the other magistrates stepped down upon the appointment of the dictator (see Walbank's *Commentary,* 1.422). What is significant here, however, is that, regardless of what Polybius may have said in Book 6, he has, in this passage, chosen to emphasize the independent nature of the dictatorship.

Whereas previously those in Rome had shown excessive despair at the report of a defeat, they now are disproportionately overjoyed (περιχαρεῖς, 3.103.1) at the news of success. In Polybius' version of events, this overreaction and favor for Minucius, coupled with the simultaneous condemnation of Fabius, leads directly to the unprecedented appointment of Minucius as co-dictator (3.103.4).

For Polybius, however, Minucius' dictatorship, while its powers are on equal footing with that of Fabius, was not obtained in the same way. While Fabius became dictator as a result of the combined reactions of the Senate and the people to the second defeat of the Roman forces at Lake Trasimene, Polybius is emphatic about the point that Minucius was appointed by the motion of the people alone. Polybius had already noted Minucius' connection with ὁ ὄχλος (3.90.6) and now states that his power as dictator came from the goodwill and decree of the multitude (διασαφηθείσης τῆς τε τοῦ πλήθους εὐνοίας καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δεδομένης ἀρχῆς, 3.103.5). While these details may well be based on historical facts, the emphasis which Polybius places on the forces behind Minucius' appointment is clearly significant and creates a distinct contrast between Minucius and Fabius. The direct association of Minucius with the common people, whose tendancy to overreact has already been faulted by Polybius, without the moderating support of the Senate will allow the historian to draw similar lessons about the respective roles of the Senate and the people from the events that follow.

This contrast continues to deepen as the events surrounding the co-dictators unfold. Polybius claims that the support and honors granted by the people made Minucius twice as

bold (διπλασίως παρωρμήθη…κατατολμᾶν, 3.103.5), while Fabius was only strengthened in his resolve (βεβαιότερον μένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλήψεως, 3.103.6). With the mounting conflict becoming evident to the dictators themselves (3.103.7), they reach an agreement to divide the army (3.103.8). In the following battle, Minucius is predictably overly aggressive in his attack and, after suffering substantial losses, is saved only when Fabius comes to his aid (3.105.1-6). In order to drive home for his readers the lesson to be learned from his account of these two dictators, Polybius reports that it was obvious to those present at the battle that the daring (τόλμα) of Minucius had put everything in jeopardy, only to be saved by the prudence of Fabius (3.105.8). Back at Rome, moreover, a further lesson becomes clear, as they learn the difference between the recklessness and vainglory of a common soldier (στρατιωτικῆς προπετείας καὶ κενοδοξίας) and the forethought, calculation, and sense of a general (στρατηγικὴ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμὸς ἑστὼς καὶ νουνεχής, 3.105.9).

Polybius, therefore, does not use the appointment and subsequent success of Fabius as an opportunity for the Romans to learn the value of such an individual leader as opposed to their previous collective tendencies. As we shall see, the historian saves this lesson for later. Rather, the lesson which he highlights here rests in the differences between these two types of leaders and the risks inherent in entrusting power to an untested individual. The contrast between Fabius and Minucius that has been emphasized throughout this narrative by Polybius, moreover, is not simply between daring and caution, or between a soldier and a general. More broadly, the contrast has been between two dictators, one of whom was appointed with the Senate and people responding in unison to news of a defeat, while the other was supported

solely with the support of the people, who had reacted excessively to success. For Polybius, therefore, the lesson to be learned is that the common people have a tendency to overreact to situations such as those described and that there is inherent risk in allowing a state to be governed by their fickle passions.

What is especially significant about this series of events as Polybius presents them is that over the course of Book 3 the Romans manage to learn this lesson. As was noted above, and emphasized by Polybius in Book 6, the reaction at Rome to the defeat at Cannae is very different than those narrated previously. Although there is fear in the city (3.118.6, cf. 3.112.7), the emotions are not, as before, described by Polybius as being disproportionate to the events, and these fears are quickly calmed by the encouragement of the Senate (3.118.7). Whereas previously the common people had let their fear and distress set them at odds with the reasoning of the Senate and the Senate had even later followed them in their despair, neither of these mistakes is repeated on this occasion. Instead, the people follow the lead of the Senate, which responded so courageously (ἀνδρωδῶς) that they demonstrated to Polybius how the particular nature of the Roman constitution led them not only to rise from this defeat but to go on in a short time to become master of the inhabited world (3.118.9).

Polybius' characterization of the ability of the Romans to learn and adapt through their experiences is not only implicitly developed through the course of the narrative of Book 3, but is explicitly made by Polybius regarding the joint dictatorships of Fabius and Minucius. Following the battle in which Fabius' caution saves the Roman army from the complete destruction that would have resulted from Minucius' recklessness, Polybius notes that from

that point on the Romans heeded the commands of Fabius because they had been taught by their experiences (διδαχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, 3.105.10). Again the historian uses language about the Romans that anticipates his evaluation in Book 6 that their constitution developed διὰ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων. While he is applying this concept to a specific point about the authority of Fabius in the passage, we have seen that this conflict between Fabius and Minucius, which parallels that between the common people and the senatorial class, has much wider implications during the lead up to the Battle of Cannae. The fact that Polybius explicitly states that the Romans learned this lesson from their own experience (τὰ πράγματα) directly reinforces the impression that this is a theme that extends broadly to the Roman actions both before and after Cannae, and their ultimate ability to rebound from this devastating defeat.

The value of one exceptional individual

By making the Battle of Cannae the final episode of his narrative of Roman affairs in the first six books of his work and returning to it at the end of the digression of Book 6 itself, Polybius marks the Battle of Cannae as the pinnacle of the development of the Roman constitution.[128] This does not mean, however, that after this moment the Romans cease learning in the manner that Polybius has depicted thus far. In fact, the development which Polybius has demonstrated in the Romans over the course of Book 3 does not culminate in a

[128] Brink and Walbank (1954) showed that (contra Walbank (1943)), although there may have been later revisions and some exceptions, Books 1-6 were probably planned, written, and published as a whole (see especially 100-101).

climactic Roman victory over Hannibal, but simply enables them to respond to the resounding defeat at Cannae with reason and resolve. While the ability to learn collectively from their mistakes has given the Romans a significant level of resilience, it has not up this point enabled them to defeat the genius of an individual leader like Hannibal.

Eventually, of course, the Romans are able to overcome Hannibal under the leadership of Scipio Africanus. But, as we shall see, Polybius' depiction of Africanus' central and individual role in the eventual Roman victory over the Carthaginians is at odds with the colletive portrayal of the Romans evident thus far. Rather than undermining our reading of Polybius' represenation of Roman success during this periord, this new development reinforces Polybius' protrayal of the remarkable ability of the Romans to improve and adapt, as Polybius will depict the rise of Africanus as the result of yet another improvement made by the Romans based on their own experiences.

As was discussed above, the collective intelligence displayed by the Romans in Polybius' narrative of the First Punic War stands in contrast to the Carthaginian reliance on individuals like Xanthippus. In the Second Punic War, this contrast continues as the constant collective behavior of the Romans stands out against the focus on the individual leadership of Hannibal.[129] In a passage from Book 9 (9.22-5), for example, Polybius pauses to reflect on the character of Hannibal. He begins with the bold claim that of all that befell both sides in the war, Romans and Carthaginians, the cause was one man and one intellect (εἷς ἦν ἀνὴρ αἴτιος

[129] For the important role that exceptional individuals play as agents of causation in Polybius' narrative, see Pédech (1964), especially 208-9, where most of the passages to be discussed here are listed but with little comment on the relationship between them.

καὶ μία ψυχή, 9.22.1). Such a great and wondrous thing, he continues a little later (9.22.6), is a man and intellect perfectly suited in his original construction for whatever he attempts in the realm of human affairs.[130] This focus on the individuality of Hannibal, which shares its sentiment with Polybius' earlier comments on the significance of Xanthippus,[131] again contrasts with Polybius depiction of the Romans, who, as this passage indicates, up to this point have had no individual leader with the same impact on the course of events.

This characterization of the Romans changes for Polybius, however, under the leadership of Scipio Africanus, whose role will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. It will be sufficient to note here that in Polybius' view the Romans for the first time with Africanus entrust themselves to an individual leader equal to the talents and prominence of Hannibal. After Africanus' defeat of Hannibal at Zama, for example, Polybius concludes that Hannibal had done everything possible in the battle to achieve victory (15.15.3-16.5), but that in this case the proverb was proved true: "though good, he met another better (ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν, 15.16.6)."[132] By placing the individual ability of Africanus on equal footing with that of Hannibal in this way, Polybius indicates the exceptional position that the

[130] οὕτως μέγα τι φύεται χρῆμα καὶ θαυμάσιον ἀνὴρ καὶ ψυχὴ δεόντως ἁρμοσθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασιν πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν ὁρμήσῃ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων.
[131] Cf. εἷς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μία γνώμη... (1.35.5). In his *Commentary* on the description of Hannibal (2.150), Walbank also noted this parallel as well as the additional one discussed below but does not comment on the significance of this. Maier (2012c), too, highlights these passages and similar statements by Polybius as evidence of the importance of exceptional individuals in Polybius' work (54-5).
[132] For the possible sources of this ultimately obscure proverb, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.464-5).

young Roman commander holds among the others who had faced the Carthaginian general but with less success.

Polybius' view that the ultimate Roman victory over Hannibal was only made possible when they obtained an individual leader whose talents were a match for their great adversary, moreover, is made even more explicit in Book 18, where Polybius discusses the advantages of the Roman legion in contrast to the Macedonian phalanx (18.28-32).[133] In this passage, Polybius decides to omit discussion of the role of military techniques in the Second Punic War because, he claims, the Roman defeats in this war was due neither to their armament nor to their formations but rather the skill and attention of Hannibal (τὴν ἐπιδεξιότητα τὴν Ἀννίβου καὶ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν, 18.28.6). As proof of this, he cites the end of the war, for, Polybius concludes, when there was a general in command of the Romans having ability equal to that of Hannibal (παραπλησίαν δύναμιν ἔχοντος Ἀννίβᾳ, 18.28.8), victory soon followed. For Polybius, therefore, any Roman advantages were mitigated by the talent of Hannibal until they found a general of equal abilities in Scipio Africanus.

While this sudden emphasis on the individual talents of Africanus conflicts with the collective portrayal of the Romans previously, this change in strategy on the part of the Romans was not regarded by Polybius as random or accidental. Rather, the decision to abandon their reliance on collective action and to place their hopes in a talented and prominent individual is again the result of the lessons learned by the Romans. Although they have had the opportunity to learn this lesson before in the case of the Spartan Xanthippus, they had failed to do so. In

[133] For a discussion of this passage as an example of Polybius use of comparative methodology, see Pédech (1964), 423-4.

the cases of Fabius and Minucius, moreover, the lesson learned focused more on the dangers of an individual like Minucius than on the benefits offered by Fabius. Nor, surprisingly, is there any indication in the surviving text of Polybius that the Romans learn this lesson from their defeats at the hands of Hannibal himself. Rather, the episode in which they finally learn the value of one talented individual occurs in Book 8 during the siege of Syracuse in 215-14 BC (8.3-7).

In this case the talented individual who earns the praise of Polybius is the famous mathematician and inventor, Archimedes, whose machinations repeatedly thwart the Roman attempts to capture the city. At the conclusion of this passage, Polybius in fact describes Archimedes in terms strikingly similar to those that he will use of Hannibal in the following book, as he here also reflects on the fact that "such a great and wondrous thing does one man and one intellect perfectly suited to certain affairs appear to be."[134] This emphasis on the individual ability of Archimedes is evident in the beginning of the narrative of this siege as well when he notes that the Romans embarked upon their mission with high hopes because they did not account for the ability of Archimedes (οὐ λογισάμενοι τὴν Ἀρχιμήδους δύναμιν, 8.3.3). Polybius here also directly contrasts the individual ability of the Syracusan with the Roman tendency to rely on their collective efforts by claiming that the Romans also did not foresee that one intellect is on some occasions more effective than many hands together (οὐδὲ

[134] οὕτως εἷς ἀνὴρ καὶ μία ψυχὴ δεόντως ἡρμοσμένη πρὸς ἕνια τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα τι χρῆμα φαίνεται γίνεσθαι καὶ θαυμάσιον (8.7.7).

προϊδόμενοι διότι μία ψυχὴ τῆς ἁπάσης ἐστὶ πολυχειρίας ἐν ἐνίοις καιροῖς ἀνυστικωτέρα, 8.3.3).[135]

In addition to highlighting the individual ability of Archimedes here, therefore, Polybius also indicates the limitations of the Roman reliance on collectivity, or "many hands", when opposed by an individual leader of such talent.[136] Significantly, however, unlike the example of Xanthippus from the First Punic War, Polybius indicates that this time the Romans learned this lesson. After making this claim about the strength of "many hands", Polybius concludes that the Romans came to understand the truth of his statement from the events themselves (τότε δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἔγνωσαν τῶν ἔργων τὸ λεγόμενον, 8.3.3). While Polybius' reader, therefore, learns this lesson early on through the facts of the narrative, the Romans take considerably longer to appreciate this message in spite of the fact that they had the benefit of first-hand experience of these events. When presented with a similar experience in the case of Archimedes, however, the lesson finally sinks in for the Romans, and their own understanding of this subject now matches that of Polybius' readers. What this means for the historical narrative, moreover, is that the Romans can now apply this lesson learned at Syracuse to their continuing conflict with Hannibal by responding with a talented individual of their own.

Although this means a departure from their previous reliance on collectivity, the Roman ability to learn from experience remains a definitive charateristic in Polybius' narrative.

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[135] In his *Commentary* (2.71) on this passage, Walbank noted parallels for this sentiment in other authors and states that this is a favorite theme of Polybius. Indeed it is, but, as I have indicated, the passages in which this theme is repeated are not unrelated.

[136] For the common opposition in Polybius, including the passages discussed here, between "the one" and "the many," see Walbank (1995), esp. 205-7.

Although Cannae is viewed by Polybius as the height of the development of the Roman constitution, the adaptablity of the Romans continues to serve them well even after this pivotal moment by providing them with the means eventually to defeat Hannibal once and for all. As we will see in Chapter Five, the specific choice of Africanus as their champion against Hannibal is even more significant because of Polybius' depiction of Africanus as uniquely able and willing to learn from the lessons of history. Thus the combination of Roman collective experience and individual historical research results in the unrivaled Roman dominion over the Mediterranean.

Conclusion

Consistently, therefore, both in the First and Second Punic Wars, Polybius depicts the Romans as learning from and adapting based on the lessons which they learn from their own experiences and misfortunes. While not the only factor in their success, this ability plays a crucial role in Polybius' depiction of the Roman rise to power during this period. His comment in Book 6 about the similar development of the Roman constitution is thus not simply an idle remark included for sake of transition or drawn arbitrarily from another source. Rather, it is characteristic of Polybius' larger portrayal of the Roman people and the unique qualities that enabled their unprecedented ascendancy. As the parallel passage attributed to Cato by Cicero indicates, moreover, this representation by Polybius is indicative of a more widespread belief which the Romans held about themselves.

Whether this is the direct result of Polybius' analysis or whether he was influenced in this respect by those in Rome, we cannot know for sure. But there is some indication that even

if the idea that the Romans possessed a unique ability to learn from their experiences did not originate entirely with Polybius, the historian may at least be responsible for the extensive development of the notion which we have seen in his text. This suggestion is warranted by the fact that not only has Polybius integrated the theme into this historical narrative but also because of the correspondence of this theme with his broader views about the necessary role of practical experience in the education of statesmen and in πραγματικὴ ἱστορία itself. If we return to the contrast between the λόγος of Lycurgus and the practical lessons of the Romans in the development of their respective constitutions, however, we can now confirm that this is not a simple reproduction of the learning from history/ learning from experience contrast drawn by Polybius in the passages discussed in Chapter One. While Lycurgus is represented in terms that reflect a student of history, there is more to Polybius' characterization of the Romans than the mere ability to learn from experience. Although it is a less prominent factor in their improvements, for example, the Romans also demonstrate an ability to imitate others in a way that it is not unlike a reader of history. This occurred primarily, however, when they had no practical experience upon which to draw, such as their initial creation of a fleet in the First Punic War. The successes which resulted from this ability, moreover, were only substantial when combined, as at the end of the war, with the lessons gained from experience.

The second element, moreover, which makes the Romans unique in this respect is that, unlike the Gauls discussed above or the hypothetical citizens of the *anakyklosis*, the Romans do not forget the lessons that they have learned. Although an explanation of how exactly the Romans are able to remember and maintain their progress may have been contained in Polybius' lost *archaeologia*, however, the historian does not appear in the surviving text to give

much rationale for this seemingly important distinction. But this omission is at least in part mitigated by Polybius' consistent emphasis on the collective nature of Roman progress. When the historian focuses on specific individuals or even, as he does in the *anakyklosis* on a specific generation, the reader will naturally assume that, unless the historian says otherwise, any lessons or knowledge gained by that person or generation will be limited and contained. By consistently claiming that "the Romans" learned a particular lesson, however, Polybius obscures this problem. In reality, for example, there is no reason to assume that the Romans who learned about the value of one exceptional leader at Syracuse were the same people who decide to entrust the fortunes of the war to Scipio Africanus. But by obfuscating individual identities and simply referring to "the Romans", Polybius avoids dealing with this inconsistency. In this way, he is able to create a general picture of collective Roman progress based on shared experiences which first enabled them to break the cycle instability characteristic of the *anakyklosis* and then facilitated their remarkable rise to power.

Chapter Three

Hannibal, Practical Experience, and the Model Historian

Introduction

The significant role which practical experience and the ability to learn from it plays in Polybius' representation of the Roman people and their successes confirms the overlap suggested in Chapter One between Polybius' methodological statements and his historical narrative. Thus far, however, we have only dealt with the ability (or inability) of collective groups of people (i.e. the Romans, the Carthaginians, or the Gauls) to learn and adapt based on their own experiences. In this chapter, we will turn to the emphasis placed by Polybius on the importance of practical experience in his characterization of individual statesmen and, in particular, the Carthaginian general Hannibal. By tracing the development of Hannibal from a young and inexperienced commander to a wise and experienced general, we will see that Polybius uses the character of Hannibal to demonstrate the value that practical experience holds for whoever is willing to learn from and respond to it. Thus the ability to learn from experience, which elsewhere plays a central role in the historian's conception of πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, is not in his historical narrative reserved for the Romans alone but is applied also to their great adversary.

As Polybius stresses the importance of practical experience not just for the reader and future statesman but also for the historian, this survey of Hannibal's development will also show that, as Hannibal acquires this experience, he correspondingly enhances his own ability to relate to others the lessons which he has learned from that experience. Thus Hannibal

becomes in this way not just a model statesman for Polybius demonstrates the qualitites of a proper historian. Through this characterization of Hannibal, Polybius confirms and reinforces the principle, which he discusses especially in Book 12 (see Chapter One), that there is a significant overlap in his view of the roles of both the historian and the statesman. Not only does Hannibal learn from his experience in a manner that enables him to become a model historian, but his abilities to conduct research, to form *exempla* for his soldiers, and to interpret the past in his speeches facilitate his success as a leader. As a result, we can see that Polybius' understanding of the overlap between historian and statesman works both ways as not only does someone with experience in public affairs constitute the ideal historian, but a leader demonstrating the qualities of a proper historian is able to achieve success in the field.

Polybius' characterization of Hannibal

As perhaps the most influential individual leader of the time period covered by Polybius' work, Hannibal receives special attention from the historian. When Polybius pauses in Book 9 (9.22-6) to reflect upon the character (φύσις, 9.22.7) of the great Carthaginian general,[137] he claims that Hannibal alone was the cause of all that happened both to the Romans and to the Carthaginians in the Second Punic war (9.22.1). In direct contrast to his collective portrayal of

[137] Polybius' approach in seeking to evaluate Hannibal in this manner is consistent with Gill's distinction between 'character-viewpoint' and 'personality-viewpoint' as defined by his studies of Plutarch and Tacitus (1983), Greek tragedy (1986), and ancient literature more generally (1990). The 'character-viewpoint', which he argued is the primary focus of ancient authors, seeks to evaluate and pass judgment on the individual based on his actions and behavior. The 'personality-viewpoint', on the other hand, which is a more modern approach, seeks to understand the individual in a more psychological manner without the same emphasis on moral judgment. I will, therefore, preserve the term 'character' as opposed to 'personality' in my discussion of Polybius' depiction of Hannibal and others.

the Roman people, Polybius' primary focus on the Carthaginian side rests squarely on the individual impact of Hannibal. As we saw in Chapter Two, Polybius here singles out Hannibal — in language similar to that also used of Archimedes (8.8.7) – as a great and marvelous subject (μέγα τι φύεται χρῆμα καὶ θαυμάσιον, 9.22.6). By describing Hannibal in this way, Polybius is not simply identifying him as an exceptionally talented leader. Rather, the choice of the adjective θαυμάσιον carries a deeper significance for the historian, as the historiographic connotations of this word – both for Polybius and for historians in general after Herodotus – suggest that in Polybius' view Hannibal represents a historical subject especially worthy of attention and study.[138]

Appropriately, therefore, Polybius' portrayal of Hannibal throughout his work has attracted substantial attention from modern scholars. Fundamental to the role of such figures in the text of Polybius is Pédech (1964), who discussed the central role that historical people (both individuals and collectives) play in shaping the events of history (204-53).[139] For Pédech, Hannibal was one of the primary examples of the great heroes of Polybius (215-16), who are defined by reason and calculation instead of emotion and irrationality.[140]

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[138] Cf. Herodotus' promise to record deeds both great and marvelous (ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, 1.proem) and Polybius' claim that what is special about his own work and the marvelous fact of his times (τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἡμετέρας πραγματείας ἴδιον καὶ τὸ θαυμάσιον τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καιρῶν, 1.4.1) is that Fortune had inclined the affairs of nearly the whole world in one direction. For more on the significance and meaning of θῶμα in Herodotus, see Hartog (1980), 243-9. For Herodotus' description of both ethnographic and historical "wonders" to establish connections between these two aspects of his work, see Munson (2001).

[139] See especially 204-10 on the fundamental importance of historical actors in Polybius' understanding of historical causation.

[140] Pédech (1964) suggested further that Polybius deliberately suppresses the negative aspects of Hannibal's character in order to achieve this positive characterization and is noticeably

Later scholars, however, have challenged or emended Pédech's suggestion that Hannibal is presented as an invariably positive figure by Polybius. For Eckstein, for example, Polybius' representation of Hannibal's early career is a prime example of the historian's emphasis on the folly common in youth.[141] Champion (2004a) also sees some ambiguity in the depiction of Hannibal by Polybius and argues that the negative qualities attributed to Hannibal are indicative of the historian's characterization of the Carthaginians as a whole (117-21). The discrepancies between the views of these scholars can be explained, however, by two aspects of Polybius' portrayal of Hannibal which will be traced in this chapter. First, as Pédech recognized, on a fundamental level the historian clearly regards Hannibal as a naturally talented and remarkably capable leader. But this does not mean, as Eckstein and Champion point out, that Hannibal does not make mistakes, especially early in his career. For Polybius, however, the fundamental qualities which make Hannibal so remarkable enable him not simply to overcome his early mistakes but also to learn from them.[142] Thus the negative behavior which Hannibal demonstrates as a young man becomes central to Polybius' representation of the Carthaginian

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embarrassed when he admits that such negative qualities exist in the opinions of others (9.22.7-10). For a full discussion by Pédech of the two opposing character types in Polybius with examples of each, see 216-29. Other individuals representing this prototype for him include Hamilcar, Scipio Africanus, and Aemilius Paullus. For a list of passages, in which individuals including Hannibal are portrayed as the rational hero, see 242-3.

[141] On Hannibal in particular, see especially Eckstein (1989). Eckstein (1995) discusses examples in Polybius of youth as a typically negative quality (140-50).

[142] As Gill (1983) showed, it is not inconsistent with the practice of ancient historiography to see a change in character occur in the historian's portrayal of certain individuals. This, however, is not the primary focus of this study. Rather, my interest is in the way Hannibal learns and develops as a leader as opposed to an alteration of his innate character or fundamental morality. Nevertheless, this approach is consistent with Gill's suggestion that the 'character-viewpoint' places "much more stress on education and conscious self-modification," while the 'personality-viewpoint' involves a "more complex, less fully conscious processes of change" (478, n. 58).

general as an example of the success and progress that can be achieved when one is willing to learn from personal experience.

The New, Young General

Hannibal is introduced by Polybius in Book 2 (2.36), when, following the assassination of his brother-in-law Hasdrubal in 221 BC, the Carthaginians granted command of their forces in Spain to Hannibal while he was still a young man (ὄντι νέῳ, 2.36.3). They did this, Polybius claims, based on the readiness of mind (ἀγχίνοιαν) and boldness (τόλμαν) which he had displayed up to that point in his career (ὑποφαινομένην ἐκ τῶν πράξεων). In this introduction to one of the most important figures in his history, therefore, Polybius indicates that although the new general possessed a certain amount of practical experience, in which these positive characteristics had become evident, he was nevertheless still of a relatively young age. While this passage supports Polybius' general view of Hannibal as a naturally talented leader by emphasizing the age of the young general, it also sets the stage for the youthful mistakes which will follow.

After offering a fresh introduction to his work at the beginning of Book 3 (3.1-5) and his discussion of the proper distinction between the beginning (ἀρχή), the cause (αἰτία), and the pretext (πρόφασις) of a war (3.6-12),[143] Polybius picks up his narrative of events in Spain with the selection of Hannibal as general (3.13.3-4). In spite of his youth, Hannibal's first actions as general win the praise of the historian, as Hannibal is commended for the generous

[143] On Polybius' distinction between these terms and the importance of causation for his work, see my discussion in Chapter One, pp. 17-19.

(μεγαλοψύχως) manner in which he treats his troops and the good-will inspired by his actions (3.13.8). As a result of his victory in the following year over local Spanish tribes against whom he faced a significant disadvantage (3.14.4-5), Hannibal is described by Polybius as pragmatic (πραγματικῶς), intelligent (νουνεχῶς), and calculated (κατὰ λόγον). Although young and relatively inexperienced at this time, therefore, Hannibal handles himself and his duties well, while doing nothing to earn the censure of the historian.

This is not the case, however, in the subsequent scene in Polybius' narrative, when Roman envoys arrive at New Carthage and meet Hannibal there to protest his hostilities with the city of Saguntum (3.15). Instead of the wise and calculating general whom we have just seen, Hannibal's response to these envoys, who are roundly rebuked, is according to Polybius inspired by his violent emotions and lack of reasoning.[144] Hannibal's behavior at this meeting, furthermore, is precisely what leads Eckstein (1989) to conclude that Polybius' portrayal of the Carthaginian general does not adhere to Pédech's model of a Polybian "grand hero."[145] In addition, Eckstein (1995) identifies the qualities of unchecked emotion and irrationality which Hannibal exhibits here as indicative of Polybius' common portrayal of youthful folly (144-5).[146] And Polybius, in fact, explicitly attributes this behavior to Hannibal's youth (3.15.6). As this is the second time that Polybius has emphasized the age of the young general, this strongly

[144] πλήρης δὲ πολεμικῆς ὁρμῆς (3.15.6); καθόλου δ' ἦν πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου (3.15.9).

[145] Pédech (1964) concluded that the behavior displayed by Hannibal at New Carthage is simply the result of a momentary bout of impatience and, therefore, bears little significance for the overall characterization of the Carthaginian general by Polybius (217). Cf. Eckstein (1995), 144-5.

[146] These same qualities are also what Champion (see above) sees as representative of Polybius' broader characterization of the Carthaginians.

suggests that the characterization of Hannibal at New Carthage is not simply an insignificant anomaly in an otherwise homogeneous portrayal by the historian. Rather, the overlap between Hannibal's behavior here and that of other youths in Polybius indicates that this is representative of a larger theme regarding the potential shortcomings of young and relatively inexperienced leaders.

To be sure, this characterization of Hannibal at New Carthage seems to be at odds with the initial portrayal of him given by Polybius in the preceding narrative. The thoughtful and calculating general who had achieved initial military success against the Spanish tribes has suddenly succumbed to emotion and irrationality in the face of a challenge from Rome. But Polybius is not presenting a simple paradigm in which Hannibal's youth inevitably produces failure and misjudgment. What we have, rather, is a more complicated picture in which an individual's youth poses potential pitfalls even for an otherwise talented and thoughtful general.

The impact of Hannibal's treatment of the Roman embassy at New Carthage, however, is not immediately clear. Polybius plainly states that he would have been better served if he had asked the Romans to give back Sardinia and the tribute which they had unjustly (ἀδίκως) taken, while threatening war only if they should refuse these terms (3.15.10). Unless we read into this statement the suggestion that Polybius expected that the Romans might have consented to such a proposition, which is doubtful, he does not indicate here that Hannibal's rash behavior is what directly caused the war.[147] The Romans realize that they will have to

[147] Eckstein (1989) rightly recognizes the importance of this passage, but in support of his view he cites a passage from later in Polybius (11.19.6-7), where the historian claims that, had Hannibal dealt with Rome last instead of first, he would have achieved the success that

fight a war and sail off to Carthage to present their case there (3.15.12). The only effect that Polybius directly attributes to Hannibal's conduct is that his failure to present a logical and accurate defense of his actions gave the impression that he was initiating the war unjustly (ἀδίκως, 3.15.11), but the historian does not explicitly conclude that this was the cause of future hostilities. The importance of this point for Polybius is emphasized by the juxtaposition between the previous injustices committed by the Romans and the appearance of injustice here by Hannibal.[148] The absence of any significant direct impact of Hannibal's behavior on the subsequent action of the war, however, strongly suggests that Polybius' reason for highlighting this episode rests rather on his interest in characterizating this young general.

Polybius offers a more specific reason for Hannibal's behavior at New Carthage and the change from his more level-headed conduct in the past. In addition to his youth, Polybius states that Hannibal's behavior here was inspired by the good fortune of his recent endeavors (ἐπιτυχὴς δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, 3.15.6). While his youth did not prevent the general from achieving this initial success in admirable fashion, it had a negative impact on his ability to handle that success with the appropriate humility and moderation. As we shall see, this will

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ultimately eluded him (8). He concludes, therefore, that both passages represent Polybius' underlying critique of the poor timing of the war for Hannibal, which was motivated by his youthful passion and ultimately resulted in his defeat. Rich (1996), however, is probably right to conclude that the passage in Book 3 is not necessarily a criticism of the entire policy of war with Rome but rather of Hannibal's specific response to the envoys (9 n. 36), although in support of his view he cites 3.30.4-5, which does not necessarily represent approval of the timing either. See also Lancel (1995), 49 (all references to this book are from the translation published in 1998). As I intend to make clear, this passage nevertheless remains important for Polybius' representation of Hannibal's behavior in this critical moment at the start of the war, even if it does not embody Polybius' entire reasoning for Hannibal's ultimate defeat or a specific criticism of the timing of the war.

[148] For more on this, see Eckstein (1995), 101.

become an important theme for Polybius, as he repeatedly emphasizes the importance for leaders of recognizing the fickle nature of Fortune and the impermanence of success.[149]

Polybius' disapproval of Hannibal's conduct at New Carthage, moreover, is not based simply on the obvious hatred and anger which the Carthaginian displays toward the Roman envoys. Rather, the historian here faults the specific logic with which Hannibal attempts to defend his actions against Saguntum. In response to the complaints of the envoys, Hannibal argued that he was defending the interests of Saguntum against Rome because the Romans, he claimed, had unjustly intervened in a civil dispute there and executed a number of the Saguntine leaders (3.15.7). Polybius found this explanation obviously contrived and illogical, and it is specifically this argument which he describes as inspired by emotion and irrationality (3.15.9).

The language Polybius uses here highlights the importance of Hannibal's mistake in the eyes of the historian. Because of his emotion and lack of logical thinking, Polybius states, Hannibal did not make use of the true causes for his actions but resorted to illogical excuses (διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς αἰτίαις οὐκ ἐχρῆτο, κατέφευγε δ' εἰς προφάσεις ἀλόγους, 3.15.9). By providing an excuse (πρόφασις), and indeed an illogical one, for his actions at the start of this war instead of the true cause (αἰτία), Hannibal here in fact violates Polybius' recent insistence that in the writing of history those ideas must remain distinct.[150] Hannibal, therefore, fails here to meet the standards of Polybius, and this improper explanation

[149] For this theme in Polybius, see Chapter One, note 30 on 1.35.

[150] In his discussion (3.6-12) of these terms, for example, Polybius claims that it is necessary especially to be on guard against and to seek out the actual causes of each event (οὐδὲν οὕτω φυλακτέον καὶ ζητητέον ὡς τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου τῶν συμβαινόντων, 3.7.4). For more on this topic, see my discussion of this passage in Chapter One, pp. 17-19.

of his own actions is not simply an insignificant instance of logical inconsistency but rather holds a much deeper importance for Polybius.[151]

Although the purpose in providing a proper analysis of causes for important events like the start of this war is ultimately so that they may be correctly understood by the reader, the first step in this process, and the one that Polybius is defending in his earlier digression (3.6-12), is a proper understanding and examination of these causes by the historian himself. It is into this paradigm, therefore, that Hannibal fits as well. In fact, as Walbank notes in his *Commentary* (1.323), this passage provides an important component in Polybius' analysis of the causes of the Second Punic War, as it is only here that a πρόφασις is explicitly provided for it.[152] Polybius has previoiusly provided what he believes to be the true cause of this war: the hatred of Hannibal's father, Hamilcar, toward Rome; the affair at Sardinia in 238 B.C.; and the Carthaginian success in Spain (3.9.6-10.6).[153] Hannibal, by contrast, wrongly gives illogical excuses.[154] For Polybius, therefore, Hannibal serves as an example of the wrong way to do history.[155]

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[151] For the theme of providing baseless excuses for one's actions instead of the legitimate reasons, cf. Thucydides' claim that the Corinthians, in response to Spartan accusations that they were violating their oaths by forming an alliance with Argos, resorted to a pretext (πρόσχημα, 5.30.2) instead of stating the real injuries done to them.

[152] See also Rich (1996), 9 n. 32.

[153] See Chapter One, note 40.

[154] Cf. Polybius' criticism of Fabius Pictor's statement that the cause of the war was the greediness and desire for power of Hasdrubal (Φάβιος δέ φησιν…τὴν Ἀσδρούβου πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαρχίαν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου, 3.8.1), which Polybius similarly describes as illogical (ἀλογία, 3.9.2).

[155] On the similar role of Xerxes in Herodotus, see Grethlein (2009), who discusses the ways in which the Persian king fails as both a student and author of history and the importance of his role in elucidating Herodotus' views on the proper role of history.

As a result, this passage becomes significant on multiple levels. In Polybius' larger analysis of the origins of the Second Punic War, we are given here the false pretext for the war. In addition, by putting this pretext into the mouth of a character in his narrative instead of presenting it himself, Polybius has given his readers a negative *exemplum* in Hannibal of the wrong way for a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ to behave.[156] This gains added significance because it demonstrates the overlap between the role of a general and that of a historian in Polybius' definition of a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ.[157] This double role is practically seamless in Polybius' narrative, because in his own conception of the role of a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ there is little distinction between the two.

Polybius' portrayal of Hannibal at New Carthage, therefore, represents the general's behavior as defective in three significant ways. First, as is characteristic of youth in Polybius' historical narrative, Hannibal is here driven by passion and emotion instead of rational consideration. Second, although he had demonstrated rational thought in gaining his recent victories, he does not handle his success with the appropriate moderation and humility, which leads him to abandon such restraint. Third, by relying on an unreasonable pretext for his actions instead of the true cause, Hannibal is shown to be flawed in his larger role as a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ, who ought to understand the principles of a proper historian in addition to those of a successful general.

[156] In Chapter Four, I will discuss in more detail Polybius' use of *exempla* and their importance in his view for the value of history.
[157] See Chapter One, pp. 30-37. Maier (2012b) examines a number of common characteristics shared in Polybius by historical figures and proper historians.

The beginnings of Hannibal's maturation

Hannibal's behavior at New Carthage, however, does not result in immediate negative consequences for the Carthaginians. When Hannibal leaves New Carthage in order to resume his military campaign by seizing the very town of Saguntum which had been the center of the dispute with Rome, he again displays the appropriate behavior of a general and achieves success (3.17). He does not embark upon the siege casually but rather foresees the numerous advantages that would result from the capture of the city (3.17.4). Then during the operation itself, Hannibal makes himself an example (ὑπόδειγμα) to his army by sharing in the labor (3.17.8). Finally, after successfully capturing the city and winning a large amount of treasure, Hannibal is able to make strategic use of this treasure, just as he had foreseen (3.17.7), in order to earn the goodwill both of his troops and of those back in Carthage (3.17.10). Thus, Polybius concludes, Hannibal was not mistaken in his original calculations (οὐ διεψεύσθη τοῖς λογισμοῖς) and accomplished his goal (3.17.11).

Polybius is presenting a favorable depiction of the Carthaginian general. Instead of letting his emotions dominate his actions, Hannibal is more thoughtful and calculating.[158] Not only does Polybius approve of the general's actions at Saguntum, moreover, but he claims that those actions served as a positive example for others. Notably, a figure who had previously served implicitly as a negative example for Polybius is now explicitly presented as a positive one.

This is not the first time that Hannibal has been depicted by Polybius in a positive fashion. This episode, therefore, does not necessarily represent an immediate and definitive

[158] For the positive role of λογισμός in Polybius, see Chapter Two, note 82.

shift in character or a complete correction by Hannibal of the problems at New Carthage. He still must prove the ability to remain temperate in the wake of success, to control his emotions under any circumstance, and to act in a way befitting all aspects of Polybius' vision of a proper πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ. We begin to see signs, in fact, that Hannibal is beginning to fulfill this role when Polybius brings his narrative back to affairs in Spain after a lengthy digression on the history of treaties between Carthage and Rome (3.21-27) and a discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War (3.28-32).[159] At this point, Polybius provides a detailed account of the Carthaginian forces complete with exact numbers of troops, ships and elephants (3.33.9-16). This account is so detailed that Polybius pauses here to assure his readers of the precise accuracy (ἀκρίβεια, 3.33.17) of his information, which, he admits, would have been difficult even for someone present at the time to attain. The historian offers as a guarantee of this accuracy the claim that his information had come directly from Hannibal himself in the form of a bronze tablet, which was made by the Carthaginian general while he was in Italy and is regarded by Polybius as completely trustworthy (πάντως... ἀξιόπιστον, 3.33.18).[160]

In this passage, therefore, Polybius is establishing Hannibal himself as the most reliable historical authority for the information which he has just presented.[161] In addition, the

[159] For Polybius' account of these treaties and the apparent pro-Roman bias evident in this passage, see Serrati (2006).

[160] Cf. 3.56.4 and Livy 28.46.16. For more on Hannibal's monument at Licinium and Polybius' use of it, see Walbank' *Commentary*, 1.364-5; Pédech (1964), 387-8; Sacks (1981), 13; Eckstein (1995), 280; and especially Jaeger (2006). On the use of such monuments by ancient historians in general, see Marincola (1997a), 101-3 with specific reference to this passage.

[161] Jaeger (2006) also explores this overlap between the role of Hannibal in creating this inscription and that of the historians who make use of it (391-6). Her focus, however, rests more on Livy, who, as she notes (391), himself compares the study of history to the examination of monuments (Pref. 1).

language used here indicates that Hannibal's ability to obtain this information and then to preserve it for later generations holds particular significance for Polybius.[162] In particular, the term ἀκρίβεια is used elsewhere by Polybius specifically to describe the precision and accuracy necessary for the proper composition of history. Previously in Book 3 (3.21.9), for example, Polybius used the same word in order to justify his elaborate treatment of the history of treaties between the Romans and Carthaginians. Such ἀκρίβεια, he claims, is necessary both so that those actually involved in such deliberations will be accurately informed about historical facts and so that students of history will not be deceived by less accurate historians (3.21.10).[163] In this passage, therefore, we can see again that ἀκρίβεια is relevant both to those involved in practical affairs and to the ability to pass on information through history, a relevance which Polybius will repeat in his description of Hannibal's inscription.[164]

The significance which Polybius places on ἀκρίβεια in historiography and more specifically in the use of documentary evidence such as Hannibal's monument is further developed by a comparable passage in Book 12, where the historian criticizes his predecessor

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[162] For more on the importance of ἀκρίβεια in ancient historiography, see Thucydides 1.22.1-2; and Marincola (1997a), 68. On Thucydides' definition of the term, see Hornblower (1987), who translated it as "conformity to reality" (37). For the importance of a speaker being worthy of trust (ἀξιόπιστος) in order to produce a rhetorically persuasive speech, see Aristotle (*Rhet*. 1.2.1356a.1-13).

[163] In his *Commentary* (1.337), Walbank supported the reading of "statesmen" and "students" adopted here.

[164] At 3.21.10 Polybius specifically refers to the importance of ἀκρίβεια for students (οἱ φιλομαθοῦντες) of history, but this need not complicate the issue. Polybius, for example, could also be described as a student of history when he learns information from Hannibal's inscription just as his own readers learn the information from him. See also 5.31.3, where Polybius claims to have given sufficient ἀκρίβεια to his readers for them to understand his account.

Timaeus for his account of the colony of Locri in southern Italy (12.5-16).[165] In comparison with another description of this colony found in Aristotle, Polybius claims that the information found in Timaeus is clearly lacking in truth (12.5.4).[166] He then goes on to give his reasons for this conclusion throughout the remainder of this section. According to Polybius, Timaeus had claimed to have visited the mother city of this colony in Greece in order to research the history of its foundation (12.9.2). There, he had reportedly been shown a written treaty between the two cities and a number of decrees, all of which had contradicted the account of the foundation recorded by Aristotle (12.9.3-6).

Typically, the utilization of documentary evidence as a source for information would not have been inconsistent with Polybius' views on proper historical research.[167] According to Polybius, however, the fault of Timaeus is that he has not specifically identified where he discovered these documents, as there are two groups of Locrians in Greece (12.10.1-3).[168] Polybius finds this especially surprising because Timaeus is particularly famous for the ἀκρίβεια which he typically displays in such matters (12.10.4). Timaeus' failure to live up to his reputation in this instance, however, leaves his readers with no way to check his

[165] For more on this passage, see Pearson (1987), 43-4 and 98-105.
[166] In his *Commentary* on this section, Walbank (2.330-1) speculated that Aristotle's account was from a portion of his *Constitutions*, which does not survive, and further suggested that Polybius may have never read Aristotle's account himself but rather learned of it through Timaeus' text and his own visit to Locri.
[167] For Polybius' own use of such documentary evidence, see Pédech (1964), 377-89.
[168] For the easy confusion between the two, cf. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.3) with the note of Krentz (1995), 197.

information themselves (12.10.5). In addition, Polybius here states that this results in the inability of Timaeus' readers themselves to obtain ἀκρίβεια regarding his account of Locri.[169]

The emphasis placed by Polyibus on ἀκρίβεια in this passage creates a parallel between the bronze tablet of Hannibal and the critique of Timaeus, both of which involve documentary evidence and ἀκρίβεια.[170] On the one hand Timaeus fails to provide ἀκρίβεια regarding the location of the evidence he has cited, which prevents those using his history from achieving ἀκρίβεια themselves. Hannibal by contrast does achieve an impressive level of ἀκρίβεια in a much more challenging context and, by recording it in an inscription, has allowed those who view the monument, in this case Polybius, to gain and reproduce this same level of ἀκρίβεια. Hannibal, in other words, has done almost exactly what Timaeus is criticized for failing to do. Whereas Timaeus, therefore, is portrayed by Polybius as a failed historian and one who notably lacked practical experience, Hannibal is here depicted as a man of practical affairs who also exhibits the proper conduct of a historian. In this way, the Carthaginian general has taken an important step in rounding out his qualifications as a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ.

Hannibal's research for the march to Italy

After this detailed enumeration of the Carthaginian forces, Polybius' narrative returns to Hannibal as he begins his march toward Italy (3.34). Before his departure, Polybius claims,

[169] See also 12.26d and 27, where Timaeus is criticized in more general terms for his lack or misuse of ἀκρίβεια, along with Sacks (1981), 57 on that passage.
[170] I am not suggesting that one passage is necessarily directly reminiscent of the other but rather that both are representative of Polybius' larger historiographical program and inform one another as such.

Hannibal had gathered intelligence clearly (σαφῶς γὰρ ἐξητάκει) about the people and the land into which he was about to embark (3.34.2-3).[171] This intelligence included the quality of the land around the Alps and the Po, the population of the people, the quality of the men in war, and their hostility toward Rome, which resulted from previous wars. This last point is given added significance here by Polybius, as he reminds us that he has recounted this very war in his previous book so that we might be able to follow adequately the coming narrative.[172] This same information, therefore, that Polybius requires his reader to learn from his own history in order to understand what is to follow has also been learned by Hannibal himself.[173] Clearly, Hannibal is at this point doing things right.

After a digression on the importance of geographical knowledge (3.36-8), which is followed by a local geography and the measurements of Hannibal's march into Italy (3.39), Polybius' narrative returns to the situation in Transalpine Gaul at the time (3.40), Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone, and the battle with Gallic forces that ensued there (3.41-3). This battle was won by the Carthaginians and Hannibal; in Polybius' words, "events came together for [Hannibal] according to his design" (κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτῷ συντρεχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, 3.43.11). Hannibal is here directly contrasted with the "barbarians," for whom what happened was entirely contrary to their expectations (παραλόγου τοῦ πράγματος φανέντος αὐτοῖς, 3.43.10).

[171] Maier (2012b) includes the verb ἐξετάζειν (along with πολυπραγμονεῖν and ἱστορεῖν) among the actions appropriate for a historian (see especially 11.19a.2) and lists examples in which historical figures adhere to this model (300-304). For examples specific to Hannibal including this passage, see 303 n. 22.

[172] Polybius' account of the war between Rome and the Celts is found at 2.23-35.

[173] Cf. Polybius' claim shortly after this that a description of the local geography will prevent the subsequent narrative from becoming "unclear" (ἀσαφῆ) to his reader (3.36.1).

Champion (2004a) argues that, although Polybius held Hannibal in high regard, much of the Carthaginian general's behavior reflects typically barbaric traits in Polybius (117-121). While this is true of the examples cited by Champion, which occur in the scene at New Carthage early in the war, a different picture emerges here where Hannibal is contrasted with his "barbarian" opponents. As Champion demonstrates in his analysis of Polybius' portrayal of Roman group character, the historian's notion of barbarity in his work is not fixed but is often dependent upon the context and people involved (see especially 235-39). We can see this principle at work in the case of Hannibal as well, as he is cast in a more favorable light in comparison with the barbarity of the Gauls than when facing the relatively more civilized Romans. This contrast with the Gauls has the additional function of demonstrating the ongoing development of Hannibal's leadership, as he is depicted here not with the typically barbaric qualities of irrationality and unchecked emotion but rather as pursuing a more reasoned and calculated approach.

Hannibal next takes this opportunity to assemble his troops in order to encourage and tell them about the road ahead (3.44). His first method in doing so is to bring before them the leaders of the Gallic tribes inhabiting the area around the Po, whose territory would be critical to their safe passage into Italy (3.44.5-10). In addition to offering their support to the Carthaginians, the Gauls remind their audience of the quality of their land and the eagerness (προθυμία) of the men there, who would be joining the campaign against Rome (3.44.8). Upon hearing this, the Carthaginian troops are encouraged (3.44.7). In addition, Polybius' reader is reminded that Hannibal himself had already obtained this very information before embarking on the journey (see above, p. 108 on 3.34.2-3). The acute investigation of Hannibal

mentioned above is, therefore, reinforced by the use of this information to encourage his troops. Through his employment of these Gauls, moreover, Hannibal demonstrates his ability not only to acquire important information but also to communicate that information to others.[174]

Hannibal next addresses the troops himself (3.44.10-13).[175] He first reminds his troops of their past actions (τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων, 3.44.10) and that even in difficult situations they had never failed under his leadership. He then reminds them of the other difficulties that they had overcome, such as the crossing of the river, and notes that they themselves were now eyewitnesses (αὐτόπται) of the eagerness (προθυμία) and friendly disposition of the local tribes toward them (3.44.11). Finally, Hannibal concludes by urging his troops to conduct themselves in a way worthy of their past actions (τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων ἀξίους, 3.44.12).[176]

[174] In his comparison of Livy's account of this scene with Polybius', Feldherr (2009a) also discusses the parallels between Hannibal and Polybius and notes, additionally, Hannibal's use of the manifest presence (ἐνάργεια, 3.44.1) of the Gallic chieftains to encourage his troops (314-16).

[175] For general discussions of the speeches in Polybius, see especially Walbank's *Commentary* (1.13-14); Pédech (1964), 254-302; Walbank (1965), esp. 7-18, which includes Polybius' debt to Thucydides; Wooten (1974), who provides a rhetorical analysis; and McGing (2010), 86-91. On this speech in particular, cf. Livy 21.30.2-11, with Walbank's *Commentary* 1.379. Livy puts the speech after the Carthaginian loss in cavalry skirmish (3.45 in Polybius), where it is meant to revive the spirits of his troops. For a comparison between the versions of Polybius and Livy, who employs his predecessor's criticism of other historians within the speech of Hannibal, see Levene (2010), 149-53.

[176] In spite of the distinction between πράξεις and ἔργα elsewhere, Polybius appears to use the words as synonyms for the sake of variation both here and in other passages (cf. 6.53.2-3, discussed in Chapter Four, p. 149).

In speeches of this type, it is a common *topos* for the speaker to remind his audience of their past deeds in order to offer them encouragement.[177] By recalling the past events which his own troops have just experienced, therefore, Hannibal is conforming to a positive Polybian mold. In this speech, however, Polybius has Hannibal go beyond a mere recollection of the past with the choice of the word 'αὐτόπται,' with which Hannibal characterizes his troops. As was discussed in Chapter One, there is general preference both in Polybius and in other ancient historians for "the eyes" over "the ears" in the acquisition of information. The specific term 'αὐτόπτης', moreover, is used in significant historiographical contexts going back to Herodotus,[178] and this is true of Polybius' use of the term as well. He uses the term four times of himself with respect to material that he is describing and at least three other times of other historians or of history in general.[179] This term is also used by Polybius in passages unrelated to the writing of history, but in almost all of these cases he is describing envoys who are attempting to collect information from a foreign location.[180] The choice of the word in this passage, therefore, where it refers not to information in a foreign location but specifically to past events, recalls the broader historiographical implications of the term. By reminding his

[177] For the specific appeal by a general to past victories as a *topos* in such speeches, see Woodman and Martin (1996, 347) on Tacitus' *Annals* (3.45.2). For other examples in Polybius, see e.g. Aemilius Paullus speaking before Cannae (3.108.3-109-5), Scipio Africanus addressing his troops in Spain (11.31.2), Hannibal again before the Battle of Zama (15.11), and Flamininus at Cynoscephalae (18.23).

[178] See Chapter One, note 60.

[179] Polybius calls himself αὐτόπτης at 3.4.13, 10.11.4, 12.2.1, and 29.21.8. The term is applied to other historians at 3.58.8 and 12.4d.4; and with regard to history in general terms at 1.4.7. See also 4.38.12 and 15.20.4. For more on the importance of eyewitness for Polybius' historiography, see 12.27 and 12.28a.

[180] See 1.46.4, 5.66.9, 15.22.4, 21.21.1, 5.6.5, and 33.8.3. The only other two instances of the word in Polybius occur at 2.21.2 and 18.35.5.

audience that they are themselves αὐτόπται to the events which he is describing, therefore, Hannibal is showing his own understanding of the broader historiographical principles reinforced throughout Polybius' work.

Hannibal's crossing of the Alps: Polybius and his predecessors

Following the adjournment of this assembly, Polybius next reproduces the report to the camp by scouts of a cavalry skirmish with Roman forces in which most of the Carthaginian side had been destroyed (3.45). With his position now betrayed to his enemy, Hannibal then advances his forces from their camp and, after constructing a bridge in order to transport his elephants across the Rhone (3.46), reaches the crossing of the Alps, which will occupy the next ten chapters (3.47-56). Characteristically, Polybius prefaces his account of this significant moment with a historiographical comment on the faulty descriptions of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps found in previous historians (3.47.6-48.12).[181] His critique of his predecessors in this passage rests on the falsity and incongruity (3.47.6) both of their characterization of Hannibal's actions and of their geographical representation of the crossing itself. Furthermore, he views their reliance on divine and other fantastic explanations of Hannibal's unexpected success as inappropriate for πραγματικὴ ἱστορία (3.47.8).

As evidence for these criticisms, Polybius argues that it makes little sense for these previous historians to claim that Hannibal would have been so illogical (ἀλογιστότερος) as to lead such a massive army on this dangerous path without first gaining the requisite knowledge

[181] The identity of these historians is not clear. See Walbank's *Commentary* (1.381) for some speculations.

to ensure their safety, including knowledge of both the country itself and the people inhabiting it (3.48.1-4). Secondly, these historians are faulted for not even themselves having sufficient knowledge of this same information, because they had never bothered to research it (ἱστορήσαντες) in person (3.48.6-7).[182] As a result, Polybius concludes, they are left behaving like writers of tragedy, who are forced to introduce divine elements in order to bring an illogical plot to a suitable conclusion (3.48.8-9).

As we have seen, these points are not haphazardly introduced here by Polybius but rather have been developed over the course of his narrative of Hannibal's advance toward Italy. Before even embarking on this march, Hannibal had, according to Polybius (3.34.2-3), made careful inquiries into precisely the same information regarding the land and people around the Alps. In order to make this point clear, Polybius restates it here using the same language (ἐξητάκει σαφῶς, 3.48.11). In addition, Polybius has previously emphasized the significance of this information when he represented Hannibal as using the same information to encourage the spirits of his troops in the face of the daunting challenge that lies ahead of them (see above, p. 109-10 on 3.44.8).

Whereas other historians had failed to do their research about the area around the Alps, Polybius concludes this passage by noting that he had done a careful investigation (ἱστορηκέναι) and had personally inspected (κατωπτευκέναι) the area in question

[182] For Maier's (2012b) discussion of the implications of this verb in Polybius for the research methods of a historian, see above note 171 on 3.34.

(3.48.12).[183] In order to cast himself as a proper historian, therefore, Polybius has put himself in the shoes of Hannibal and recalled his own passage over the Alps along the same route.[184] The parallel, therefore, works both ways. Hannibal through careful investigation of the facts in advance of his journey demonstrates the level of inquiry which must be conducted by a proper historian, while Polybius as a historian must mimic the feats of the general in order to fulfill his own duties. Both serve to define the proper behavior of the well rounded πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ.

This portion of Polybius' narrative culminates with an impressive scene, when the general leads his army onward and after nine days reaches the summit of the mountain (3.53.9). As their past sufferings and the anticipation of those to come had taken a toll on the morale of the Carthaginian troops, Hannibal assembles his army on this summit in order to attempt once again to encourage them (3.54.1-2). For this task he makes use of the view of Italy (τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν)[185] now laid out before them and once again reminds them

[183] On the timing and circumstances of Polybius visit to the Alps, see Walbank's *Commentary* (1.382) with relevant bibliography and (1972), 11 n. 53 and 120, where he suggested that Silenus is an additional source for Polybius' information.

[184] Levene (2010) discusses this aspect of Polybius' approach and the ways in which Livy both adopts and responds to it (154-5).

[185] The term ἐνάργεια holds important historiographical implications with respect the emphasis by Greek historians on the visualization of the past (see Walker (1993)). Although it has been argued that the term holds significant historiographical connotations for Polybius, which reflect and respond to a Peripatetic tradition (see e.g. Schepens (1975b)), Sacks (1981) urged caution (149-53). The term used by Polybius specifically of the writing of history, Sacks argued, is more likely to have been ἐνέργεια than ἐνάργεια. Based on the characterization of Hannibal which we have seen, however, Polybius' use of the term here may reflect his knowledge the broader historiographical significance of the term. Cf. 3.44.1 discussed by Feldherr (2009a), 321. For the rhetorical significance of this term for Hannibal and other speakers in Polybius, see Pédech (1964), 284. For the role of vision in ancient historiography, see most recently Zangara (2007).

of the lands and friendly inhabitants that await them in the valley of the Po (3.54.2-3). Again, therefore, Polybius reinforces the importance of this information and Hannibal's consistent and successful[186] utilization of it at the pinnacle moment of his journey across the Alps.[187]

Hannibal and the Romans: A new phase of the war

After concluding this section of his narrative with Hannibal's descent into Italy (3.56.1-4) and the arrival of P. Scipio (the father of Scipio Africanus) at Pisa from his operations in Spain (3.56.5-6), Polybius begins a new phase in his account of the Second Punic War, which will occupy the remainder of Book 3 up to the Battle of Cannae, by boasting that he had now brought his narrative, the leaders of both sides, and the war into Italy (3.57.1).[188] This authoritative claim is marked by a *syllepsis* which places the author in control not only of his own narrative but also of the actors and events contained in it. In this way, the author not only marks the new phase of his narrative but also inserts himself into the narrative in a manner that again blurs the distinction between historian and historial agent. Just as Polybius depicts Hannibal in the mold of a historian, he here also gives himself an active role in his own narrative.

[186] The historian claims that in this way Hannibal at least to some extent emboldened his men (ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, 3.54.4).
[187] Miltsios (2009) discusses Polybius' effective technique in this passage of enabling the reader to share the perspective of the Carthaginians as they behold this spectacular scene (502).
[188] καὶ τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἠγάγομεν. For the use of this technique by ancient authors, see Lieberg (1982). Clarke (1999) discusses the way in which Polybius here creates a link between the different aspects of his history: the narrative, the leaders, and the setting (94). For the suggestion by an author that he is himself performing the contents of his work, see Oakley's *Commentary* (4.344) on Livy, 10.31.10 (*agimus*).

This transition in the text is then followed, as is typical in Polybius, by a methodological digression on the appropriate place for detailed geographical information in a universal history such as this (3.57-59).[189] The historian is then ready to begin his narrative of the events of the war in Italy. By clearly demarcating this new phase of the war in this way, Polybius is emphasizing a significant change in setting and circumstances which will have an impact on his depiction of Hannibal's leadership. While the maturity gained by Hannibal in his arduous journey from Spain will serve him well in the action ahead, the specific experiences of that journey will now have less relevance in this new phase of the war, which brings Hannibal into direct opposition to Rome and her commanders, the first of whom is the aforementioned P. Scipio. In fact, when he first learns that Scipio has already brought his forces across the Po and is close at hand, Hannibal cannot believe the report (3.61.1). His disbelief is compounded because he had previously made an effort to calculte the position of his adversary. He had deliberated (συλλογιζόμενος) on the difficulty of the voyage by sea (3.61.2) and inquired (ἱστορῶν) into the nature and distance of the march from the sea to the Alps (3.61.3). Such behavior represents that of a positive Polybian figure and had served Hannibal well up to this point. But in this case he comes up short and is left in a state of amazement and bewilderment (ἐθαύμαζε καὶ κατεπέπληκτο) at the feat of his Roman opponent (3.61.4). This feeling of surprise and astonishment is matched both by Scipio himself (3.61.4-6) and by the people at

[189] The historian here again brings himself into his work by emphasizing his personal familiarity with the locations which he is describing (3.59.7-8). He claims, moreover, that because of this first hand knowledge he is enabled both to correct (διορθωσάμενοι) the ignorance of earlier historians and also to make these areas familiar to the Greeks, which recalls the opening statement of his work that history is the best means of correction (διόρθωσις) for mankind (1.1.1). Here, 'history' is Polybius' particular brand of history and 'mankind' includes his predecessors in historiography.

Rome (3.61.7-9), when they receive reports that Hannibal has brought his army across the Alps and is already in Italy.[190]

As was noted above (see note 138 on 9.22.6), for Polybius and other ancient historians a marvelous (θαυμάσιον) subject is especially worthy of historiographical study. But Polybius' use of the related verb (θαυμάζειν) suggests that the result of such historiographical study ought to be to remove the marvelous aspects of the subject through rational inquiry. For example, the historian repeatedly advises his reader *not* to marvel (θαυμάζειν) at a particular feature of his own work, which, he then goes on to explain, is both justified and necessary.[191] Conversely, Polybius also commonly suggests that one should "marvel" at the works of his predecessors because of their *flawed* historical accounts.[192] The surprise attributed to Hannibal and the Romans here suggests a lack of proper knowledge and inquiry on both sides.

This is only the first of a series of instances in Book 3 in which Polybius emphasizes the increasing level of distress among the Roman people upon hearing some disturbing report of Hannibal's operations until they learn to temper their reaction following the Battle of Cannae.[193] At the outset of these operations in Italy, however, Hannibal shares in this feeling of

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[190] In his *Commentary* (1.395-6), Walbank described the parallelism being developed between the two generals and its foreshadowing of their upcoming parallel speeches. By noting the improbability that either general would have actually been surprised by the present circumstances, Walbank showed that this is in fact part of a "rhetorical elaboration" on the part of the historian. Davidson (1991) discusses Scipio's surprise at Hannibal's crossing in connection with Polybius' earlier critique of historians who exaggerate the difficulty of the pass as a method for the historian to contrast these views with his own (12).

[191] E.g. 1.12.8, 3.33.17, 3.57.6, and 4.42.1.

[192] E.g. 2.62.2 and 2.63.1 (Phylarchus); and 3.26.2 (Philinus). While more common, the negative connotation of this verb with reference to previous historians is not universal in Polybius (see e.g. 3.59.3).

[193] For more on this, see my discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 75-83.

amazement, since, despite his best efforts to acquire and analyze the necessary information, the Carthaginian general finds himself in an unexpected predicament. Coupled with the similar shock of his adversary Scipio, this universal astonishment at the present circumstances helps the historian to reset the stage for this new phase of the narrative. While Hannibal's inquires have served him well so far, Polybius in this way indicates that the Carthaginian general now faces a fresh challenge, as he must reach a similar level of knowledge about his new opponents.

The first major engagement of the war in Italy occurs when the armies of the two generals clash at the Battle of Ticinus, where Scipio and the Romans suffer defeat (3.65-68.8). Prior to this battle, Polybius records the speeches given by each general in order to rouse the spirits of their troops for the coming battle (3.62-4).[194] The parallelism between the two generals developed by Polybius in the preceding chapters as well as in these corresponding speeches clearly invites a comparison between them. In a previous speech (3.44.10-13) similar to this, we have seen Hannibal relying strongly on the past as a model and instructive device for his troops to follow.[195] In Scipio's speech, which is the second of the two given here (3.64), the Roman general also relies heavily on the past experiences of his troops, just as Hannibal had done on previous occasions. Although he acknowledges that his troops have no recent experience with this particular foe (3.64.3), for example, he nevertheless reminds them of past

[194] Although pre-battle speeches such as this composed by ancient historians, including those in Polybius, typically employ common *topoi*, which have been compiled by Albertus (1908), Iglesias Zoido (2007) has shown that historians from Thucydides onward thoughtfully incorporate and adapted these *topoi* to meet the specific contexts and goals of their texts. On the failures to appreciate that such pre-battle speeches are essentially rhetorical fiction, see Hansen (1993). For these two speeches before Ticinus in particular, cf. Livy, 21.40-4. According to Walbank's *Commentary* (1.397), Scipio would not have expected a battle at this time, and therefore it is unlikely that he actually gave any speech at all (see also Walbank (1965), 12).

[195] Cf. above, pp. 110-11 on this passage, where such appeals to the past are noted as a *topos* in pre-battle speeches.

Roman victories over the Carthaginians (3.64.4) and mentions specifically the cavalry skirmish near the Rhone, where they had turned Hannibal to flight (3.64.6-7).[196] The truth of his words combined with their faith in the speaker makes the Roman forces eager for the coming battle, and they are, therefore, dismissed from the assembly (3.64.11).[197] By appealing to the past in this way, therefore, Scipio's speech adheres to a familiar *topos* even in this new phase of the war in which there is not an immediate parallel available to him.

Hannibal takes a different approach (3.62-3). Although he briefly reminds his troops of their recent sufferings in the crossing of the Alps as a deterrent to any thought of retreat (3.63.7), the focus of his speech is much different than that of Scipio. Instead of using the past as an *exemplum* for his troops, Hannibal creates one of his own to suit his purpose (3.62). Before addressing his soldiers, Hannibal brings before them a number of starving Gallic prisoners that had been captured during the march and arranges a combat between a few of them selected by lot. The winner of this combat is promised a wealth of prizes, while the losers face death. When the spectacle was completed, the losers were envied by the other prisoners just as much as the victors, as even the vanquished had been rewarded with a reprieve from their current suffering (3.62.10). This response was shared by the Carthaginian troops, who reserved their pity for the remaining prisoners being led away (3.62.11).[198]

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[196] Davidson (1991) discusses Scipio's reinterpretation of the past, specifically Hannibal's motive in crossing the Alps, in this speech (13).

[197] For a comparison between Polybius' version of this speech and Livy's, see Ullman (1932) and Levene (2010), 272-3.

[198] Cf. the spectacle described by Xenophon (*Ages.* 1.25-28 and *Hell.* 3.4.16-19) at Ephesus, where Agesilaus organizes a competition among his own troops and separately has his war prisoners stripped naked in view of his army. Polybius, in fact, knew of this passage of Xenophon and later refers to it directly (10.20.7; cf. Dillery (1995), 86-7). While Xenophon concludes, however, that the goal of the competition was to inspire courage and that the

Instead of relying on historical *exempla*, as Scipio does, Hannibal contrives this exhibition in order to give his troops a more relevant model for the new and unfamiliar territory in which they find themselves.[199] As he points out in his speech, the Carthaginians are now in a similar position to these prisoners, as they must either win or die in order to avoid the worse fate of being captured alive (3.63.3-6).[200] Through this spectacle, which Polybius terms a παράδειγμα (3.63.14),[201] Hannibal enables his troops to learn from the misfortune of others (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων, 3.63.2) in a situation where their own past experience was lacking.

We have seen Hannibal explicitly described as serving as an example both for his own soldiers and by implication for Polybius' readers.[202] This episode involving the captive Gauls,

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purpose of the naked prisoners was to produce contempt for the enemy, Polybius chooses to emphasis the pity aroused in the Carthaginians at this sight. For further parallels between this passage of Xenophon and other passages of Polybius, see McGing (2010), 61-4.

[199] Chaplin (2000) uses Livy's account of this episode as an example of Hannibal's skillful use of *exempla* early in his career in contrast to less successful later examples (65-6).

[200] For this common *topos* in the speeches of invading generals going back to Homer, see Iglesias Zoido (2007), 143 and, more specifically, Nicias' speech at Syracuse in Thucydides (6.68.3). In Polybius, however, it is the active creation by Hannibal of an *exemplum* which represents this *topos* that stands out.

[201] The term παράδειγμα is used generally by Polybius for a 'model', which in some cases overlaps with his definition of ὑπόδειγμα as norm to which others conform (see Schweighaeuser's *Lexicon Polybianum*, 314 and 465 respectively (all references to this work are from the reprinted (1822) edition)). For this meaning see, for example, my discussion in Chapter Two (p. 65) of the Romans use of a captured Carthaginian ship as a παράδειγμα for their own shipbuilding (1.20.15, cf. 1.59.8). In many cases, however, a παράδειγμα is more specifically for Polybius a negative example to be avoided by others. Kings and states in Polybius, for example, often punish rebels or enemies in order to make an example of them and warn others against such actions (e.g. 4.23.8, 4.53.4, and 5.111.7).

[202] See above (p. 103) on 3.17.8, where Polybius applies the term ὑπόδειγμα to Hannibal. For an example of a Polybian character serving as a παράδειγμα, see 11.10.5 of Philopoemen. For the importance of exemplarity in Polybius and further analysis of characters within the historical narrative who demonstrate this, see my discussion in Chapter Four.

however, places Hannibal in a different role, in which instead of serving as an *exemplum* himself, he contrives one for his audience as a historian would do.[203] In fact, Polybius uses this same term, παράδειγμα, of this exhibition as he will of his own *exempla*. When commenting on the character of Philip V of Macedon, for example, Polybius claims that his character serves as the clearest παράδειγμα for those pragmatic men (τῶν πραγματικῶν ἀνδρῶν) seeking to gain improvement (διόρθωσις, cf. 1.1.1) from the study of history (7.11.2).[204] In the same way, Hannibal is portrayed as successfully (3.63.14) providing such improvement for his own audience through the use of an *exemplum* which he has fabricated himself.

This reading of Hannibal's creation of this *exemplum* is reinforced by his emphasis to his soldiers on the benefit of learning from the misfortunes of others, which corresponds to Polybius' own views on the advantages of history.[205] Hannibal, in fact, echoes not only this sentiment but even Polybius' previous language, when he encourages his own soldiers to see clearly in the misfortunes of others the similar fate that awaits them (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων ἐναργῶς θεασάμενοι τὸ συμβαῖνον, 3.63.2; cf. 3.63.8).[206] By framing this episode in such language, Polybius portrays Hannibal as a leader who understands and employs the principles which the historian has laid out concerning the proper role of history and the

[203] Davidson (1991) also sees a parallel between Hannibal's audience and the reader of Polybius, as the former is "located securely within the greater arena which is the *Histories*" (16). As a result, he claims, "there is no great break between the participants and the readers." For more on the distinction between internal and external audience, see Chaplin (2000), 50-3.
[204] See also 18.13.7, where Polybius gives historical examples to support his claims about traitors.
[205] See especially 1.35, which is discussed more fully in Chapter One, pp. 11-14.
[206] And compare Polybius' claim that there are two ways to seek improvement, through one's own misfortunes and through those of others (τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, 1.35.7). For Hannibal's emphasis on visualization in this and later speeches as a rhetorical *topos*, see Wiedemann (1990), 298.

benefits offered by it. Although we have seen Hannibal depicted as understanding historiographical principles before, this represents a development in Polybius' characterization of the Carthaginian general, who in this new phase of the war is able to fashion an *exemplum* for his soldiers in order to convey an appropriate lesson that they could not have learned from their own past experiences.

Cannae and alternate versions of the past

The Carthaginian victory that follows these speeches is the first in a series of victories for Hannibal in Italy over the Roman forces leading up to Hannibal's victory at Cannae. His defeat of Scipio at Ticinus is followed immediately by a larger victory over Scipio's co-consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, at the Trebia (3.66-75). Hannibal's prudence prior to this engagement is commended by Polybius as the work of a good leader (ἡγεμόνος ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ, 3.69.13). In the following year (217 BC), Hannibal faces a new opponent in the consul C. Flaminius, whom he overwhelms in a decisive victory at Trasimene (3.77-85). In the build-up to this battle, Hannibal is praised by Polybius for his careful inquiries (3.78.6-79.1) and pragmatic calculation (80.4). He is even singled out by Polybius in a digression on the importance of understanding the character of one's enemy (3.81). After Flaminius' death and the election of Q. Fabius Maximus as dictator (3.87.6), even given the greater challenge reflected by this new foe who refuses to fight him, Hannibal is depicted as making wise calculations based on his sound knowledge of the local geography (3.91).[207] This repeated praise for the Carthaginian general,

[207] On Polybius' own understanding of geography, a subject to which he devoted the entirety of Book 34, see Walbank (1948) and (1972), 122-8; and Pédech (1964), 515-97. Although geography may be subordinate to other aspects of historiography, such as causation, for

which accompanies his string of victories over the Romans in Italy, creates a wholly positive portrait of Hannibal in this segment of Polybius' narrative. He is doing what is expected of a Polybian πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ, and it is paying off.

In 216 BC, the Romans elect two new consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro (3.106.1). This sets the stage for the concluding chapters of Book 3, which recount the preliminaries, the engagement, and the aftermath of the Battle of Cannae (3.106-118). As he had prior to the first engagement of the war in Italy at Ticinus (see above, pp. 118-22 on 3.62-4), Polybius recounts parallel speeches of the opposing generals, Paullus and Hannibal, before this final battle of Book 3. This time the Roman general speaks first (3.108-9), but, again, much of Paullus' speech is dedicated to the past events of the war (3.108.3-109.4). Because these experiences have been largely negative ones for the Roman side, Paullus is challenged with the task of reinterpreting these events in order to offer encouragement his soldiers that this battle will turn out differently than those of the past.[208]

Paullus offers a number of arguments in support of this view. In the previous battles, he argues, only one of the two consuls had taken the field against the Carthaginians and had done so with freshly levied troops (3.108.6).[209] These troops, moreover, were at the disadvantage of having had no experience against this particular foe (3.108.7). In support of these arguments, Paullus offers the specific examples of Trebia (3.108.8) and Trasimene (3.108.9). The Romans who fought at Trebia, he claims, had only arrived from Sicily on the previous day, although this

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Polybius (see Sacks (1981), 132 n. 23) it is clearly an important and necessary component of his conception of the proper understanding of history.

[208] Davidson (1991) discusses how Paullus is engaging here in a "competition of readings" in his reinterpretation of the previous battles of the war (13-14).

[209] Cf. 3.89.5-7 for support of Paullus' view of the relative inexperience of the Roman troops fighting the Carthaginians.

is not consistent with Polybius' narrative of the battle (cf. 3.68-9). In his *Commentary* (1.442), Walbank called this inconsistency a "rhetorical exaggeration" on the part of Paullus, but it is also evidence of the strain in his arguments regarding this alternative version of the past, in which he bends the truth in order to be convincing. In addition, as Walbank also noted here, by limiting his examples to Trebia and Trasimene, Paullus has omitted the initial battle at Ticinus. This omission is consistent with the Roman point of view, because, according to Polybius, as soon as news of this battle had reached them, the Romans were already finding excuses to convince themselves that Ticinus did not count as a defeat (3.68.9).[210] Nevertheless, we again have here an example of a variant reading of the past which Paullus has adopted in order to support his argument that the previous battles of this war are not appropriate models for predicting the outcome of the coming battle at Cannae.

This speech by Paullus and his reinterpretation of the events of the preceding narrative in Book 3 create a foil for the speech of Hannibal that follows. After an intervening skirmish in which the Romans enjoy initial success (3.110), Hannibal gives his own pre-battle address to his troops (3.111). Polybius' placement of this speech, which Livy omits, enables Hannibal also to respond to a recent loss (ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, 3.111.1) by his own side, which he must counter with his own reading of the past in order to avoid the demoralization of his troops. He does this by reminding his audience of their previous victories over the Romans, the same events which Paullus had been forced to discredit (3.111.6-8). In this case, however, the events of the past require little explanation as Hannibal asks what words (λόγος, 3.111.7) would encourage them more than their actions themselves (αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων). In dismissing

[210] For more on this point, see Davidson (1991), 13.

the need for extensive elaboration on his part, Hannibal is both acknowledging the inherent power of personal experience and also implicitly rejecting the arguments of Paullus, who attempted to transform the past with precisely the type of λόγος that Hannibal here disavows.

Although the contrast between words and deeds is obviously not original to this passage, we can see now that Polybius deliberately employs different *topoi* in Hannibal's various speeches in order to reflect the general's development over the course of the war. Hannibal here, for example, is depicted as recognizing the progress which he and his troops have achieved and the advantages granted to them by their own experiences. In past speeches, Hannibal reminds us, he had resorted to producing examples (μεθ' ὑποδειγμάτων, 3.111.6) for his soldiers in order to make his point. While we have seen Hannibal using examples from the past in his previous speeches, he is probably referring here to his use of Gallic captives to create an artificial *exemplum* for his soldiers at the start of their campaign in Italy, as he is explicitly contrasting these "examples" with the actual experiences of his troops.[211] While his previous tactics were effective and necessary at the time because authentic examples were lacking, therefore, Polybius has Hannibal here argue that actual past experience is a more effective means of conveying these important lessons.[212] Not only should the benefit of this experience, therefore, make his soldiers more confident for the coming battle, but it has also made Hannibal himself a more effective leader than he had been at the start of the campaign, when such models from the past were not available to him.

[211] See above, pp. 119-22 on 3.62-3. Polybius uses the term παράδειγμα in that passage, but there is some overlap in Polybius' use of these two related terms (see the note there).
[212] Cf. 1.35, where practical experience is granted similar value by Polybius.

Hannibal, moreover, demonstrates in this speech that he benefits not simply from his experience in the campaign but also from his accurate knowledge and reading of the past. Polybius shows this when he has Hannibal remind his troops that they had already defeated the Romans *three* times in battle (3.111.7). This reference to the Battles at Ticinus, Trebia, and Trasimene is given significance with the contrast of the Roman point of view, which was espoused by Paullus, that Ticinus did not count.[213] Hannibal is, therefore, shown to be giving his own reading of the past by this direct contrast with the parallel speech of Paullus. Moreover, although Polybius does not directly comment on which version he believes to be correct, his narrative of the war in Italy suggests that Ticinus ought not to be overlooked. Simply by giving the battle the attention that he has (3.65-68.8), the historian implicitly argues for the importance of the episode as a historical event. The impression given here, therefore, is that Hannibal is not only presenting his own reading of the past but one that is more in line with that of Polybius and, therefore, superior.[214]

Hannibal's advice to Tarentum

Following Books 4 and 5, in which Polybius brings his account of affairs in Greece up to the time of Cannae, and Book 6, where he turns to political theory and his analysis of the Roman constitution, the text of Polybius becomes significantly fragmentary.[215] As a result,

[213] See Walbank's *Commentary*, 1.443.
[214] Davidson (1991, 13-14) argues, furthermore, that the results of the Battle at Cannae settle the dispute between the two sides over these alternate reading of the past based on Polybius' comment that there was after Cannae universal agreement that the Romans had been defeated (ὁμολογουένως γὰρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡττηθέντων, 3.118.8).
[215] For more on the fragmentary nature of the text of Polybius and the challenges presented by it, see Sacks (1981), 11-20; Derow (1982), 526-7; and Thompson (1985).

tracing the linear development of a character such as Hannibal, as has been done for his career up to this point, becomes much more difficult. Nevertheless, Hannibal continues to have a significant presence in the surviving fragments of Polybius, which cover the remainder of the Second Punic War and the life of the Carthaginian general. We will in this narrative be able to get some idea of how Polybius portrays the continued development of Hannibal through the later part of his career.

The first sustained fragment in which Hannibal takes a prominent role in the action involves his siege and capture of Tarentum in the winter of 213/12 (8.24-34). At the conclusion of his account of Hannibal's success in helping the Tarentines to expel the Roman garrison from their city, Polybius describes the final stage in which the Roman garrison had taken refuge in the city's citadel (8.31-4). When Hannibal embarks on the task of besieging these Romans, his goal is not simply to expel them from their stronghold. He believes that it is central to his overall purpose that the Tarentines take an active role in the enterprise in order to give them confidence in their ability to stand up to the Romans on their own without the help of the Carthaginians in the future (8.32.4 and 8.33.3). This sets up the final scene of the fragment, when Hannibal carefully hints at his plan to the Tarentines in the hope that they will catch on and seem to have taken the initiative themselves (8.34.2-10).

In his description of Hannibal's plan for besieging the Roman garrison in the citadel of Tarentum, Polybius first reminds us of his own description of the position of the citadel and its command of the main port of the city (8.34.3).[216] Like Polybius and now the reader, Hannibal

[216] Polybius here refers to an earlier description of the city itself, which presumably immediately preceded this fragment but is now lost. For more, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.109).

observes (συνορῶν) this same information and, based on his own understanding of the situation, teaches (ἐδίδασκε) the Tarentines that the citadel would quickly fall if cut off from the sea (8.34.5). By describing Hannibal as a teacher in this passage, Polybius again places the general in a role similar to that of a writer of history.[217] The Tarentines, although they understand what Hannibal has taught them, are, however, unable to apply the information by coming up with a plan to implement his suggestion, as their own ships are stuck in the harbor (8.34.6-7). Hannibal then hints to the Tarentines that they are in fact very close to controlling the sea themselves, but unable to catch his meaning they become dumbfounded (ἐκπλαγεῖς, 8.34.8).

The cryptic and artful way in which Polybius has Hannibal reveal his plan makes an impression not only on the Tarentines but also on the reader, who similarly has not been told what Hannibal has in mind and is left to infer his design. It is not until we have been led to this comparable state of confusion that Polybius explains to us that Hannibal had observed (συνεωρακώς) that the land separating the harbor from the sea was narrow enough to drag the ships across on carts and into the open sea (8.34.9). When the Tarentines are also told this plan, they react with amazement at Hannibal himself (ἐθαύμασαν τὸν ἄνδρα), praising both his intellect and courage (8.34.10).[218] Hannibal's success in this scene is demonstrated by the enthusiasm and triumph which the Tarentines achieve in implementing his plan and driving the Romans from their city (8.34.11-12).

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[217] Cf. for example 1.1.2, where Polybius describes the knowledge of history as a teacher (διδάσκαλον).

[218] Cf. above on Hannibal's own amazement at his opponents (3.61.4). Here, however, the verb clearly is used in a positive sense as Hannibal is explicitly praised for his conduct.

As I have suggested, this sequence leaves Polybius' reader in much the same position as the audience of Hannibal. While the basic information about the general position of the citadel and harbor were made available to the reader at the start of the episode, as it was to Hannibal and the Tarentines, the details crucial to Hannibal's plan are withheld until near the end, when they are also revealed to the Tarentines themselves. The effect of this delay is twofold. By placing the reader in the same position as the people of Tarentum, who are Hannibal's audience in the scene, we are meant to be struck with an equal amount of admiration at the genius of Hannibal's plan. At the same time, just as the Tarentines are put into the role of the audience, Hannibal is cast in the role of the historian. He first carefully gathers the necessary information and then proceeds to instruct his audience to use that information to their advantage. Polybius has even allowed his historical agent to reveal this information to both his own reader and to the Tarentines at the same time, instead of letting the reader in on the secret in advance.

Polybius is able to employ this narrative technique of using a figure such as Hannibal to convey important information to the reader because he has already established Hannibal's credentials as a reliable source of information and knowledge. This shows that Polybius' emphasis on, for example, the ἀκρίβεια of Hannibal's monument or the *exemplum* which the general creates for his soldiers not only allows the historian to characterize the Carthaginian general but also plays an important role in Polybius' presentation of his historical narrative. This use of Hannibal to convey significant messages to the reader will continue in Polybius' representation and utilization of this important figure.

Hannibal's change in Fortune

In the following book, Polybius begins his account of the 142nd Olympiad (211-208 BC), which he will cover in Books 9 and 10 (9.1.1).[219] After a prefatory introduction to this book, the first surviving fragment involves Hannibal's attempts to break the Roman siege of Capua (9.3-9). When these Romans under the command of Ap. Claudius Pulcher refuse to give battle to the Carthaginians, Hannibal tries to draw them away from their siege by marching on Rome itself (9.4-5). Although this takes those at Rome completely by surprise and causes a great disturbance there (9.6.1-2), Polybius claims that the city was saved by a chance event (τυχικὸν σύμπτωμα, 9.6.5). That is, because the consuls happened to be enrolling their armies on that day, a large number of troops were coincidentally assembled at Rome (9.6.6-7).[220] Not only did the presence of these soldiers convince Hannibal to abandon his assault on the city (9.6.8), but his goal of drawing the Romans away from Capua was thwarted when Pulcher did not take the bait (9.7.1-8). Hannibal only managed to salvage some measure of success by attacking the town of Rhegium, which was the last of the Southern Italian cities still in Roman hands (9.7.9-10).[221]

Following his account of these strategic maneuvers by Hannibal and his Roman adversaries, Polybius reflects upon the analogous situation and strategy of Epaminondas of Thebes prior to the Battle of Mantinea in 362 BC (9.8). Similar to Hannibal, Epaminondas had avoided an initial battle with the Lacedaimonians, who had assembled their forces at Mantinea,

[219] For these two books as a unit with a particular focus to military science, see my discussion in Chapter One, pp. 19-20.
[220] For the uncertainty about the exact purpose and identity of these troops, whom Livy does not mention, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.126).
[221] Walbank made this final point in his *Commentary* (2.127).

and had marched on Sparta itself (9.8.2-5). Again, however, an unexpected turn of events (γεγομένης δὲ περιπετείας) thwarts his attempt to capture the city, when a deserter reveals his plans to Agesilaus (9.8.6). When Epaminondas then returns to Mantinea knowing that the Spartans had left it undefended, he finds that the Athenians have arrived in time to secure the town for the Spartans (9.8.7-12.). Polybius concludes by remarking that previous writers have been right to deem Epaminondas' actions here to be those of a good general (ἀγαθῷ στρατηγῷ)[222] and that, although he was superior to his enemies, he was inferior to the power of Fortune (τῆς δὲ τύχης ἥττω, 9.8.13).[223]

As Polybius makes clear in the following chapter, he sees this historical *exemplum* of Epaminondas as comparable (παραπλήσιον) to the situation of Hannibal (9.9.1).[224] Not only do they both take similar strategic actions, but both fail only as the result of a chance turn of events (9.9.3).[225] Polybius then concludes this segment of his narrative by claiming that the reason he has presented these parallel events is not to praise the generals themselves but so that they might serve as *exempla* for others to follow (9.9.9-10). The lesson which he hopes to convey to his readers is that, regardless of the success or failure of such expeditions and the

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[222] Cf. the similar phrase applied to Hannibal at 3.69.13 discussed above.

[223] Although this passage was mentioned by both Walbank's *Commentary* (1.18) and Pédech (1964, 349) in their respective discussions of the role of Fortune (Τύχη) in Polybius, neither discussed it in any detail. Maier (2012c) discusses the significance of this passage as evidence of the inability even of those in Polybius' narrative who do everything right to control completley the course of events (283-4). For a similar notion applied by Polybius to Philopoemen, see 23.12.3.

[224] For his part, Walbank in his *Commentary* (2.130) agreed that the parallel exists, except for the fact that Hannibal never actually returned to Capua, as Epaminondas did to Mantinea.

[225] Although Polybius originally described what happened to Hannibal as a τυχικὸν σύμπτωμα, he here repeats the term περιπέτεια, which he had also applied to the situation of Epaminondas.

apparent danger involved, the courage and intelligence of their design is worthy of admiration and emulation.[226]

In this fragment, therefore, we can see one of the ways in which Polybius employs historical *exempla* in order to educate his reader.[227] Instead of relying on his narrative of Hannibal's actions alone in order to convey these lessons, Polybius reinforces his own history with a second level of historical *exempla*, in this case that of Epaminondas, which he draws from a more remote period. As Sacks (1981) recognized, Polybius draws more attention to the specific actions of generals in Books 9-10 than in the rest of his narrative in order to augment the tactical lessons that are central to this portion of his work (126-7). This helps in part to explain the sudden intrusion of these secondary historical *exempla* into the text, as the historian is especially concerned in this part of his work with the lessons which future generals ought to learn from his narrative. What the historian does not address, however, at least in the surviving text, is why this lesson requires two *exempla* instead of just one. If, as Polybius claims, the entire purpose of recalling Epaminondas at this point is that his actions and their results precisely reflect those of Hannibal, then the reader gains no new material for the purpose of emulation. The second *exemplum* only reinforces the lesson of the first, and this alone is an inadequate justification for the intrusion of a historical episode from such a distant time and place.

What Polybius' discussion of Epaminondas does do, however, is creates another layer of historical *exempla*. The example of Epaminondas is different from that of Hannibal because by

[226] Davidson (1991) discusses the importance of the *perception* of danger in these *exempla* and deals with the textual difficulty and probable lacuna here (11-12).
[227] Polybius' use of *exempla* in this and other passages will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

the time of the Second Punic War the events of Mantinea had already entered the realm of historical *exempla* in their own right, as Polybius notes with his mention of the previous historians who covered it (9.8.13). This *exemplum*, therefore, is available not only to Polybius' reader but to Hannibal himself. To be sure, Polybius nowhere suggests that Hannibal decided to march on Rome specifically because of his knowledge of what happened at Mantinea. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a historical *exemplum* in this passage creates a dual role for Carthaginian general, in which he serves both as an *exemplum* himself and as someone who understands the lessons provided by history.

As Polybius makes clear in this passage, however, the specific lesson which he is emphasizing with these *exempla* rests with the courage of the generals in spite of the risks involved and *not* with the results (see above, pp. 131-2 on 9.9.10).[228] If the lesson to be drawn from the example of Epaminondas were that in the end he failed to take Sparta, that is, then Hannibal should be faulted for his march on Rome, which similarly ended in failure because of a chance event. But clearly Polybius' purpose is not to blame but to praise both generals here. While Hannibal, therefore, in this passage is portrayed as reflecting Epaminondas' positive example of courage in the face of danger, Polybius is not here suggesting that the Carthaginian has yet come to understand the important lesson that Fortune is fickle and can quickly turn success into failure. Significantly, however, as will become clear from Hannibal's speech to Scipio Africanus before the Battle at Zama, this is a lesson which Hannibal learns here from his own experience and his unlucky march on Rome.

[228] For the "anti-Machiavellian" approach of this passage, see Eckstein (1995), 20-21 with 21 n. 91 on the lack of recognition of this passage by other Polybian scholars.

The Battle of Zama: Hannibal and Scipio Africanus

Once Scipio Africanus had established a foothold in Northern Africa and enjoyed some military success over the Carthaginian forces there in the spring of 203 BC, the Carthaginians decide to recall Hannibal from Italy in order to protect their own country (14.9.8-11). Thus begins the final phase of the war, in which Hannibal will meet the Roman general at the Battle of Zama, where the Roman victory in this war was finally realized. Polybius' account of this decisive battle is thankfully preserved in a lengthy fragment from Book 15 (15.1-20) and includes a fascinating report of a private meeting between Hannibal and Africanus prior to the battle itself (15.6-8).[229] This encounter, in which Hannibal attempts to dissuade his counterpart from a risky battle, offers Polybius an opportunity to cast the elder Carthaginian general as a wizened and veteran mentor for his Roman adversary.[230]

At this meeting, the Carthaginian general addresses his Roman counterpart first with the goal of convincing him that risking their armies in battle would be in the interest of neither side (15.6.5-15.7.9). The majority of this speech focuses on the role of Fortune (Τύχη) in human affairs and the constant unpredictability of it (15.6.6-7.6). Hannibal reminds Africanus, for example, that following the Battle of Cannae, he had himself been in complete control of Italy and had marched on Rome itself, but was now, thanks to a shift in Fortune, fighting for his own

[229] For the sources and veracity of Polybius' account of this meeting, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.451-2). For Livy's reworking of Polybius' account of this meeting, see Levene (2010), who notes that Livy expands on the theme of "fortune" in Hannibal's speech to Scipio but ultimately disagrees with Polybius' notion of the role fortune played in the battle itself (286-7).

[230] Eckstein (1995) describes Hannibal as "older, sadder, and wiser" in this scene than he was prior to the war (145). For Hannibal's mistaken assumption here that Africanus is young and inexperienced, see my discussion of this passage in Chapter Five, pp. 209-14.

survival and the preservation of his country (15.7.3-4).[231] Whereas previously we have seen Polybius promoting this view as the narrator of his history,[232] this time the lesson comes from the mouth of Hannibal himself. In this passage, therefore, Polybius uses Hannibal as a mouthpiece through which he promotes the important lessons of his own history.[233]

Polybius, moreover, represents Hannibal here not merely as an arbitrary spokesman for this theme of the fickle nature of Fortune but as someone who has learned this lesson himself through his own experiences (δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, 15.6.8). We will recall in fact that during his initial action as a general at New Carthage, Hannibal was criticized by Polybius for his response to the Roman envoys, which was inspired in part by his overconfidence resulting from his recent military success (ἐπιτυχὴς δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, 3.15.6). While the young Hannibal at New Carthage did not yet understand that Fortune does not reside long in the same place, therefore, this is a lesson that he has now learned over the course of his career and, more specifically, from his failed march on Rome (see above, pp. 130-33 on 9.3-9).

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[231] For this *topos*, see for example the speech in Thucydides (4.17.4-18.5) delivered at Athens in 425 BC by Spartan envoys seeking peace. While the offers of both Hannibal in Polybius and the Spartans in Thucydides are rejected, however, Thucydides significantly claims later that the Athenians – unlike Africanus in Polybius – came to regret their decision (4.27.2). The reader of Polybius who also knows Thucydides, therefore, will see the wisdom in Hannibal's words. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Five (pp. 209-14), however, Africanus' position is different than that of the Athenians because of his prior knowledge about the subject, and his rejection of Hannibal's offer is not a dismissal of this important lesson about the nature of Fortune.

[232] Cf., for example, the lesson which Polybius draws from the defeat of Regulus in Book 1 to distrust fortune, especially in times of success (τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, 1.35.2).

[233] As Walbank noted in his *Commentary* on this passage (2.452), it is not unlikely that Hannibal himself would have actually shared this common Hellenistic view with Polybius. My interest, however, is not in the views of the historical Hannibal but in Polybius' characterization of him.

Although Hannibal has been able to learn this lesson with the benefit of his own experience, he suggests that it will be challenging to convey this lesson to Africanus because of the Roman's youth and inexperience of defeat (15.7.1).[234] To compensate for Africanus' lack of personal experience Hannibal encourages the young man to observe (σκόπει) the affairs (τὰ πράγματα) of his own career in order to learn the intended lesson (15.7.2). This puts Hannibal in a familiar role, in which he draws on the past, like a historian, in order to convey some message or lesson to his audience. Previously, however, the examples which Hannibal had relied on were shared experiences between himself and his audience (his soldiers). This time his role comes closer to that of an actual historian, as he attempts to convey a lesson based on events at which his audience (Africanus) was not actually present and therefore has no personal first-hand knowledge or experience of.[235] As Hannibal recognizes, this makes his task more difficult, but it also makes his development as a historian more pronounced and advanced.[236]

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[234] Eckstein (1995) rightly points out that Hannibal's perception of Africanus in the scene before Zama echoes Polybius' portrayal of Hannibal himself at New Carthage (145).

[235] Marincola (2001) similarly notes that Hannibal here is using himself as an *exemplum* for Scipio of this important theme for Polybius (147). Balot (2010) also recognizes Hannibal's attempt to impart to Scipio the lessons gained from his own sufferings as well as Polybius' use of Hannibal as a mouthpiece to promote the lessons of history (18-19). His discussion, however, focuses more on Hannibal's ability to learn from the past like a student of history than his attempts to convey those lessons to others like a historian.

[236] Admittedly, this reading is complicated by Hannibal's claim here that he will not draw on material from the remote past but from his own times (μὴ τὰ τῶν προγεγονότων, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, 15.7.2). This does leave some distance between Hannibal's role in this scene and that of a historian who is himself relating events at which he was not present, as Polybius is doing here. Hannibal's point here, however, is not that the past is useless in conveying such lessons but simply that a more recent example will hopefully be more effective for his purpose. Polybius himself, we will remember, will also write about events from his own life later in his work.

In addition to this private meeting before the Battle of Zama, Africanus and Hannibal are also both given pre-battle speeches to their troops by Polybius, similar to the speeches which the historian places before the Battle of Cannae (see above, pp. 123-6 on 3.108-10).[237] Although both of the generals speaking before Cannae relied heavily on their own interpretations of the past to inform their messages to their troops, Africanus' speech before Zama only offers a brief and generalized bid for his troops to be brave by remembering their past conflicts,[238] while the rest of the speech focuses on the potential results of victory or failure in the coming battle. Hannibal's speech, on the other hand, falls very much in line with his speech before Cannae, where he had reminded his troops of their previous victories over the Romans in Italy in order to convince them that the outcome at Cannae would be the same.

Here, moreover, in language similar to that used in Scipio's speech, Hannibal gives a general exhortation for his troops to remember the number of their past battles against the Romans.[239] Unlike Africanus, however, Hannibal devotes the remainder of his speech to this theme (15.11.7-12) and even lists the specific victories to which he is referring: Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae (15.11.8). Just as at Cannae Hannibal represents a leader who appropriately values the lessons of the past and even demonstrates that he has continued his education by adding Cannae to his list of examples. [240]

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[237] For Walbank's view that elements of these speeches recur at multiple points in Polybius' work and the implications of this for the composition of the speeches, see (1965), 12-13.

[238] ἠξίου γὰρ μνημονεύοντας τῶν προγεγονότων ἀγώνων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίγεσθαι (15.10.2).

[239] μνησθῆναι δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν προγεγονότων αὐτοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγώνων (15.11.6).

[240] Significantly before Cannae, Hannibal had included the Battle at Ticinus, along with Trebia and Trasimene, in his list of Carthaginian victories, while Paullus had omitted it. While his replacement of Ticinus with Cannae here recognizes the superior importance of Cannae, this

The major difference between this speech before Zama and Hannibal's previous speech before Cannae is, of course, that this time the Carthaginians *lose*. In spite of his claim that, both in terms of number and of strength, the current Roman forces were only a remnant of their previous opponents, whom they had repeatedly defeated (15.11.10-12), Hannibal's army is defeated by Scipio's (15.12-14). But as Polybius makes clear both in his narrative of the battle and in his assessment following it, he does not regard Hannibal's pre-battle analysis to be wrong. Although the Romans at first rout the mercenary soldiers that Hannibal had placed in the front line (15.12-13),[241] Polybius describes their clash with Hannibal's own troops (15.14) as equally matched.[242] The Romans only win in Polybius' account because reinforcements under the command of Massanissa and Laelius fortuitously (δαιμονίως, 15.14.7) arrive just in time.[243] There is no indication in Polybius' account of the battle itself, therefore, that Hannibal is in any way to blame for the defeat or for his prior assessment of the circumstances.

In a manner that is remarkable for a historian quick to blame generals for their mistakes,[244] Polybius devotes the next two chapters immediately following his account of the

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does not contradict the view the view that Ticinus was of significant import to Hannibal in contrast to his Roman counterparts. The omission of Ticinus, here, rather preserves the tri-colon in his list, while introducing the more recent and more consequential example of Cannae.

[241] For Polybius' view that mercenaries are typically unreliable and inferior to native soldiers, see Eckstein (1995), 125-9.

[242] Polybius claims that the two armies were equal in number, in spirit, in courage, and in equipment (ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοῖς φρονήμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ τοῖς καθοπλισμοῖς παραπλησίων ἀμφοτέρων, 15.14.6). Hannibal's point prior to the battle is that the Roman forces were inferior in number and in courage not to his own present army but to the previous armies which his troops had faced.

[243] For this meaning of δαιμονίως in Polybius, cf. 27.16.5 and Mauersberger's *Polybios-Lexikon* (1.2.393).

[244] See, for example, my discussions in Chapter 2 of the repeated blame cast on Roman generals for their failures in battle (e.g. 1.24.4-7, 1.39.3, and 3.105.8).

battle to explicitly exonerating Hannibal of responsibility for the results at Zama (15.15-16).[245] Hannibal, he claims, had done everything in his power which a good general ought to have done based on his long experience in practical affairs (15.15.3, cf. 15.16.5-6).[246] In addition to the general's management of the battle itself, the historian also includes in his judgment Hannibal's actions before the battle in his meeting with Africanus and his acknowledgment of the vicissitudes of Fortune (15.15.4-5). The results of the battle, in fact, prove Hannibal's assessment correct, as lucky timing by the Romans (cf. above on δαιμονίως, 15.14.7) played a critical role in the final outcome. Instead of using this final defeat as an easy opportunity to censure Rome's great enemy, Polybius makes every effort to frame this battle as a vindication of Hannibal's wisdom and talent. Although the results at Zama demonstrate for Polybius the ultimate fragility of Fortune for an individual like Hannibal, this does not diminish the historian's esteem for the progress achieved and the lessons learned over the general's eventful career.

Hannibal's anger at the Carthaginian Senate

Hannibal's final appearance as an active participant in the extant portion of Polybius' historical narrative occurs in the Carthaginian Senate in the aftermath of their defeat at Zama (15.19). Although the Roman ambassadors sent by Africanus had just proposed rather lenient

[245] This passage becomes important for Eckstein's (1995, 210-11) arguments on the non-Machiavellian nature of Polybius' world view, as the historian is unequivocally proposing here that it is not the outcome but the quality of one's conduct that is most important. See also Pédech (1964), 218-19. For Maier (2012c), this passage represents another example of the inability of individuals in Polybius' work to control the outcome of events even when they do everything which they should (289-91).

[246] πάντα τὰ δυνατὰ ποιήσας κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνατον, ὅσα τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἔδει στρατηγὸν καὶ πολλῶν ἤδη πραγμάτων πεῖραν εἰληφότα.

terms (15.18) to the Carthaginians, an unnamed Carthaginian senator rose in order to oppose their proposal (15.19.2). Unable to bear such idiocy, however, Hannibal forcefully pulls this man from his podium in order to silence him. Because this was contrary to their custom and sense of decorum, the other senators admonish Hannibal for this action, and he begs their forgiveness (15.19.3-4). He then goes on to give his reasons for supporting the acceptance of Scipio's terms (15.19.5-7), and the Senate, after concluding that he spoke wisely (φρονίμως) on the matter, accepts the treaty (15.19.8-9).

Because Polybius seems to decribe Hannibal as first overly violent but then calm and reasonable, Wiedemann (1990) has argued that in this episode "Polybius seems to be indicating that he is uncertain whether Hannibal is civilised or barbarous; it is unclear whether he tries to control his audience through *logos* or through *bia*" (298). Such a reading would indeed complicate the portrayal of Hannibal that has been suggested thus far. Although the young and inexperienced Hannibal at New Carthage was certainly overcome by his emotions and failed to employ the appropriate *logos*, his behavior has become more controlled and rational, as he has increasingly acquired experience and learned from it. It would, therefore, undermine this progress which Polybius has developed over the course of his narrative if we see Hannibal revert to the behavior of his youth at this late point in his career.

This interpretation, however, overstates the violence of Hannibal's actions before the Senate. In fact, Polybius seems to downplay Hannibal's physical response to the senator, which is only briefly mentioned, in comparison to the logic and rationality to his subsequent speech, which is much more developed. The historian may have felt it necessary to include the episode

because he believed it to be factual,[247] but he has not overly emphasized the violence or emotion of Hannibal's actions.[248] Rather, Hannibal offers a thoughtful apology and ultimately convinces the Senate of his position with a rational and appropriate speech. The portrait of Hannibal which ultimately emerges from this scene, therefore, is consistent with the wise and tempered character that the general has become after much experience, and Polybius has perhaps even gone out of his way to depict him in this way.

Conclusion

Polybius' final assessment of Hannibal occurs in Book 23, where Polybius compares the lives of Philopoemen, Hannibal, and Scipio Africanus, all of whom, according to Polybius, died in the same year (23.12-14).[249] In what survives of Polybius' discussion of Hannibal in this fragment, the historian focuses on the general's remarkable ability to preserve the loyalty and unity of his diverse army over such a long time and journey (23.13). This fact, Polybius claims, is the best evidence available for his conclusion both that Hannibal possessed an innate talent as a general and that he much excelled others with respect to practical ability (23.13.1).[250]

[247] In his *Commentary* (2.471) on this passage, Walbank himself gave no reason to doubt the anecdote, which also occurs in Livy (30.37.7-11).

[248] Polybius here uses none of the words such as ὁρμή, ἀλογία, θυμός, or βιαίος, which he uses to describe Hannibal's behavior at New Carthage.

[249] For more on the precise date of the deaths of each of these men and the problems presented by Polybius' synchronism, see Walbank's *Commentary* (3.235-39) with additional bibliography. For an analysis of Polybius' use of such death notices for didactic purposes, see Pomeroy (1986), although this passage is not discussed in detail.

[250] θαυμαστόν ἐστι καὶ μέγιστον σημεῖον γεγονέναι τῇ φύσει τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολύ τι διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον. For the significance of the term θαυμαστόν, see above on 9.22.6.

This brief assessment of Hannibal offers two separate but important points. First, Polybius indicates here that Hannibal's ability as a general was part of his nature (τῇ φύσει). This may seem at odds with the view that Hannibal develops and improves over the course of his career. We will remember, however, that even from the moment he was chosen as general, Hannibal achieved success on the battlefield and was praised by Polybius for his conduct and ability.[251] Polybius, therefore, makes it clear that from the start of his career Hannibal possessed a certain natural ability even before he had gained much practical experience.

Secondly, Polybius remarks on Hannibal's superiority to other men in his handling of practical affairs (πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον). This last phrase, however, is not as simple and straightforward as it first appears. In this context, "ὁ πραγματικὸς τρόπος" seems on the surface simply to refer to the political and military responsibilities of a leader such as Hannibal.[252] Elsewhere in Polybius, however, this term has much broader implications, where it is used specifically for the kind of history which Polybius himself is writing.[253] Polybius' choice of this phrase here, therefore, introduces connotations much more complicated that simply "statesmanship." It means that Hannibal excelled not just as a military commander but as a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ, a role which for Polybius encompasses all of the various aspects of Hannibal's leadership discussed thus far. These include not just his actions in the field but also his abilities to learn from experience, to remember and interpret the past, and to communicate these lessons to others. As we have seen at multiple times, when Hannibal finds it necessary to

[251] See above, pp. 96-7 on 3.13-14.
[252] The Loeb edition (Vol. 5.483) translates it here as "statesmanship."
[253] See 9.2.4. Cf. 1.2.8., where the overlap between this phrase and πραγματικὴ ἱστορία becomes evident.

motivate his army in the face of repeated challenges over many years, which is exactly the indication of success that Polybius has chosen here, it is these abilities upon which he relies. Hannibal's leadership and success in this greatest of challenges rests, in the view of Polybius, at least as much on his ability to learn from and communicate the lessons of the past as it does on his innate talent as a general. It is these aspects of his leadership, moreover, which must be developed over time with the aid of experience. Hannibal's behavior at New Carthage demonstrated that it was this facet of his leadership that was initially lacking. Experience and understanding of the past, however, were able to correct his initial flaws and ultimately produce one of the greatest leaders the world had ever seen.

Polybius' representation of Hannibal as both a successful leader and as a model historian indicates that his suggestion elsewhere of an important overlap between the two roles (see Chapter One, pp. 29-37) is not simply an off-hand comment but a deeply held belief by Polybius in the connection between the two. The reciprocal nature of this relationship in which historians are aided by practical experience while leaders gain an advantage through the approaches of a historian suggests that this is another way in which Polybius has inserted his own role as historian into the text of his narrative. Just as we saw earlier that Polybius describes himself as actively in control not only of his narrative but of the figures and events within it (see above on 3.57.1), the historian here imaginies how the qualities which he is able to demonstrate in his current profession would similarly enable success in public affairs. While

Polybius own career as a statesman was cut prematurely short, he is in this way able reclaim his place in the events of history.[254]

In spite of his remarkable innate talent and his demonstrated ability to learn from his experiences, however, Hannibal failed to capture Rome after his victory at Cannae and was defeated by Scipio Africanus at Zama. But if Hannibal represents for the historian the ultimate value of practical experience, then why does he fail? The fact is that in Polybius' view Hannibal represents an even more fundamental lesson for the reader. This lesson, moreover, is the most important one that Hannibal himself learns over the course of his career: the fortunes of even the best and most prosperous men are subject to change. This is the lesson which Hannibal ignored at New Carthage, learned in his march on Rome, preached to Africanus before Zama, and demonstrated once and for all in his final battle. The implications of this turn of events for Polybius' views on the relative values of history and practical experience are significant. Although Hannibal's career clearly demonstrates that the ability to learn from one's own experience is of great value and importance, this ability alone is insufficient. If one is to avoid the sufferings and misfortunes which also marked Hannibal's career, personal experience *must* be combined with the study of history. This is how Polybius' reader can hope to succeed even where one of the world's greatest general has failed.

[254] Davidson (2009) makes a similar claim about Polybius' motives in composing this particular type of history (134).

Chapter Four

Polybius' Exemplary History: The Aristocratic Funeral and Scipio Aemilianus

Introduction

In the previous chapters, we have seen that the value assigned by Polybius to practical experience in his evaluation of broader historiographical concepts and the education of statesmen plays a significant role in the framing of his historical narrative as well, both with respect to collective groups (the Roman people) and individuals (Hannibal). This, however, represents only one part of Polybius' conception of the proper instruction for potential statesmen. His claim in the opening chapter of his work that the knowledge of the past is the most readily available means of correction for mankind indicates that we should similarly expect history to play an important role in the education of statesmen and in his understanding of the course of human events.

In this chapter, therefore, we will turn our attention to the ways in which the value of this knowledge of the past is itself emphasized in the course of Polybius' work. More specifically, this chapter will focus on the importance of the past in providing *exempla* for future generations. The detailed analysis of both the deeds and the characters of historical individuals will prove important for Polybius not only to preserve the memory of those who have passed but also because it is precisely the memory of such men that will inspire future generations to achieve similar levels of greatness. This aspect of Polybius' vision of the benefit of history corresponds to the practice of exemplary history evident in ancient historiography

both before and after Polybius.[255] Although Polybius' contribution to this mode of historiography has often been discounted,[256] this remains in his mind an important aspect of his work and one that is more developed than is often recognized.

Polybius' recognition of this aspect of history will become evident not just in the manner in which he composes his own narrative in order to create these *exempla*, but also as figures within that narrative realize the value of past *exempla* themselves and even actively create such *exempla* for others. Just as we saw in Chapter Two a distinct emphasis by Polybius on the Roman people and their ability to adapt based on their collective experiences, individual Romans such as Scipio Aemilianus and his father, Aemilius Paullus, will prove especially mindful of past *exempla* and adept at utilizing exemplary models for their own purposes. Polybius, however, does not represent the ability of these Romans to remember and make use of the past as arising spontaneously but rather again draws a connection between the behavior of Romans evident in his narrative and the Roman institutions depicted in Book 6.

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[255] For a recent discussion of the exemplary mode of ancient historiography along with relevant bibliography, see Roller (2009). For the practice of paradigmatic history in Greek historiography prior to Polybius, see Dillery (1995), who demonstrates the importance of this method in Xenophon's *Hellenica* (see esp. 250-51), as well as its development before Xenophon and in particular Ephorus' significant role as a pioneer in the explicit moral evaluation of historical subjects (127-30). Chaplin (2000) extensively explores the exemplary methods of Livy and, furthermore, discusses the use of *exempla* by the major Greek historians (7-11) as well as the historians of Rome, including Polybius, prior to Livy (16-29). Pownall (2004) surveys the use of moralizing *exempla* in the fourth century specifically by Plato (38-64), Xenophon (65-112), Ephorus (113-42), and Theopompus (143-75). On the last of these authors, see also Flower (1994). Fornara (1983) suggested that Polybius' particular use of *exempla* to educate statesmen was inspired specifically by his exposure to Roman historiography (113-15).

[256] See e.g. Chaplin (2000), who argues that Polybius did not significantly influence Livy's focus on the importance of *exempla* in history (24-5); and Roller (2009), who describes Polybius' treatment of the naval victory of C. Duilius (1.22-23) as 'historicist' rather than 'exemplary' (228-9). For the contrary view that there is no major distinction between Polybius and other historians of Rome in this respect, see Balot (2010), 15.

More specifically, Polybius' understanding of the important role of *exempla* in the composition of history and in the benefit of history for future statesmen is evident in his description of the aristocratic funeral at Rome (6.53-5). In particular, the visualization of the past evident in Polybius' portrayal of this custom – even those parts of it which are heard and not strictly speaking seen – will emphasize the connection between the memorial of the past during the aristocratic funeral and the *exempla* included in Polybius' own history, which are similarly described in visual terms. Additionally, the way in which Polybius uses the example of Horatius Cocles to provide proof (πίστις) of his claims about the aristocratic funeral will reveal an additional level at which *exempla* operate in Polybius' work, as the *exempla* presented in the course of his narrative also become evidence available to the historian to support the veracity of his own interpretation events.

My investigation of the exemplary nature of Polybius' work will confirm the important role which the memory of the past plays not just in his programmatic statements about the value of history but also in his historical narrative. Just as his description of the *anakyklosis* and the development of the Roman mixed constitution provided a framework for understanding important characteristics of the Roman people evident in his historical narrative (Chapter Two), Polybius' analysis of the aristocratic funeral also establishes a blueprint for the role of *exempla* in the rest of his work. This again confirms that the apparent "digressions" of Book 6 and other parts of Polybius' work are relevant to the remainder of his narrative in a manner often under-appreciated.

In addition to highlighting the important historiographical principles and approaches which will recur in the historical narrative, Polybius' account of Roman institutions such as the

aristocratic funeral will help us better to understand that narrative by emphasizing the particularly Roman ability to heed these principles. Just as Polybius draws a connection between the collective, experience-based development of the Roman constitution and the similar adaptations made by the Romans during the Punic Wars (Chapter Two); the aristocratic funeral will provide a basis for understanding, for example, the particular concern of Scipio Aemilianus with living up to the examples of his ancestors and the consequences of this effort in Polybius' depiction of the subsequent career of this prominent Roman.

I will begin here with Polybius' account of the Roman aristocratic funeral and the relationship between the historian's interpretation of the purpose of this custom and his similar statements on the purpose of his own history. The story of Horatius Cocles which follows the description of the funeral in Book 6 will further develop the connection, in Polybius' interpretation, between the aristocratic funeral and history. Finally, I will turn to the narrative itself in order to show how Polybius employs the historiographical principles underlined by the aristocratic funeral in his portrayal of the careers of important Roman figures such as Scipio Aemilianus.

The aristocratic funeral

As part of his description and analysis of the Roman constitution in Book 6, Polybius also discusses some of the particular Roman customs which he believes have contributed to their remarkable success and have given them an advantage over other states.[257] One such custom

[257] For discussion of Polybius' view of both laws (νόμοι) and customs (ἔθη) as integral components of the constitution, see 6.47.1-2 with Martínez-Lacey (1991).

which captured the attention of the historian in this respect is the funeral procession which occurred upon the death of an illustrious man and was followed by a funeral oration celebrating his life and achievements.[258] Polybius' account of this event (6.53-4), which he then connects to the famous story of Horatius Cocles (6.55), is one of the earliest and most detailed surviving depictions of this custom and is justly celebrated. This passage is of particular importance for the present discussion because Polybius' primary interest in this specific custom lies in its preservation of the memory of the past and the benefit this presents to those in attendance.

Polybius begins his description of this Roman custom by claiming that at Rome whenever one of the famous men (τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν, 6.53.1) dies, his body is carried to the forum. There, either his son or another relative comes forward and speaks about the virtues (τὰς ἀρετὰς, 6.53.2) of the deceased and about the deeds he accomplished in his life (τὰς ἐπιτετευγμένας ἐν τῷ ζῆν πράξεις). As a result, the historian notes, not only those who took part in those deeds (μὴ μόνον τοὺς κεκοινωνηκότας τῶν ἔργων, 6.53.3), but also those who did not are reminded (ἀναμιμνησκομένους) of his accomplishments.[259] This recollection, moreover, occurs because the oration enables those in attendance to envision the past events (λαμβάνοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰ γεγονότα). As a result, the loss (τὸ σύμπτωμα) of the deceased is believed to be shared by the whole community.

[258] For Polybius' presentation of this custom as one distinct and alien from the Greek world, see Champion (2004a), 94-5.

[259] Again, Polybius seems to regard πράξεις and ἔργα as synonyms (cf. 3.44.10-12 discussed in Chapter Three, p. 110).

The historian then goes on to describe the ancestor masks (τὴν εἰκόνα, 6.53.4; πρόσωπον, 6.53.5) that were placed at a conspicuous location in the house and produced for this and other occasions (6.53.4-5).[260] These masks were worn by surviving members of the family, who rode in chariots during the funeral procession to the rostra where the funeral oration was delivered (6.53.6-9). After his description of this event, Polybius concludes that there is no more noble sight (κάλλιον... θέαμα, 6.53.9)[261] than this for a young man eager for fame and good conduct (νέῳ φιλοδόξῳ καὶ φιλαγάθῳ).[262] For who, he famously concludes, would not be inspired by the images of such men with a reputation for virtue (τὰς τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῆ δεδοξασμένων ἀνδρῶν εἰκόνας, 6.63.10)?[263]

The spectacle of these ancestor masks and of the funeral procession through the city is the first component of the benefit this custom provides for the Roman people, as the images of such famous men paraded in front of them would encourage the youth to aspire to achieve similar fame and accomplishments.[264] Polybius prefaces his account of this procession with a brief description of the funeral oration, which would have followed the procession to the forum, because this oration is an important component in preserving the "reputation for

[260] For a comprehensive study of these ancestor masks (*imagines*) in Roman culture, see Flower (1996). See also Champion (2004a), who discusses the ancestor masks along with the surviving sources for them and other relevant bibliography (57-8).
[261] Cf. τί δ᾽ ἂν κάλλιον θέαμα τούτου φανείη (6.53.10).
[262] For the didactic element of the masks of high-profile ancestors, which is noted by Polybius and others, and the potential burden this caused for a young Roman in such a family, see Flower (1996), 220-21.
[263] For more on the role of this custom in generating positive moral behavior, see Eckstein (1995), 65.
[264] For Polybius' emphasis on the educational value of the procession and the parallels with the parade of Roman heroes imagined by Virgil (*Aen*. 6.756-886), both of whom highlight the visual impact of the procession, see Flower (1996), 110-11.

virtue" which is central to the positive impact of the masks. This connection between the image of the masks and the funeral oration is enhanced, moreover, by the historian's depiction of both as a visual process. Those in attendance do not simply hear the record of the deceased man's accomplishments, but they are able to visualize them (6.53.3), which, in combination with the repeatedly emphasized visual contribution of the masks, enhances the impact of the entire event upon the audience.[265]

Polybius then goes on to discuss further the nature of this funeral oration and its impact upon the audience (6.54).[266] Not only does the speaker eulogize the particular man who has died, but he also recounts the success and accomplishments of each of the other notable members of the family (τὰς ἐπιτυχίας ἑκάστου καὶ τὰς πράξεις, 6.54.1), whose masks would also have been brought out for the occasion. By constantly renewing the report of the virtue (τῆς ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ φήμης, 6.54.2) of these noble men, Polybius claims, the fame (εὔκλεια) of their noble actions is immortalized, and their reputation (δόξα) for acting on behalf of their country becomes publically recognized and passed down to later generations. Most importantly (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, 6.54.3) young men are encouraged to endure anything on behalf of the community in order to obtain the fame that attends good men such as these (τῆς συνακολουθούσης τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐκλείας).[267] By placing a similar emphasis

[265] For these masks as a form of *exempla* and the importance of visualization in the impact of such *exempla*, see Chaplin (2000), 14.
[266] The surviving fragments of these funeral orations were originally collected and analyzed by Vollmer (1892). For more recent studies including previous bibliography, see especially Kierdorf (1980) and Flower (1996), 128-58.
[267] Cf. Sallust, *Jug.* 4.5-6. For more on the moral training of young men suggested in this passage, see Petzold (1969), 79 and Eckstein (1995), 149.

on the fame and reputation of past generations, therefore, Polybius depicts the funeral oration as serving an inspirational function much like that of the procession.[268]

The aristocratic funeral and history

This analysis offered by Polybius on the aristocratic funeral at Rome reflects the historian's views on the value of history and can help us better to understand other aspects of his work.[269] The pursuit of fame and reputation inspired by the funeral will also prove to be an important motivating factor toward noble behavior for individuals in Polybius' historical narrative. Crucially, the specific role of the past in establishing this motivation suggests a connection in Polybius' mind between the positive effects of this Roman custom and history itself.

The relationship between Polybius' account of the aristocratic funeral and the goals of his own history is evident in the parallel obituaries of Philopoemen, Hannibal, and Scipio Africanus (23.12-14).[270] At the conclusion of this digression from his historical narrative, Polybius attempts to justify the intrusion.[271] These character sketches have been included, Polybius claims, for the sake of the fame of the departed (τῆς τε τῶν μετηλλαχότων ἀνδρῶν εὐκλείας ἕνεκεν, 23.14.12) and to inspire later generations toward noble deeds

[268] As Pédech (1964) observed, Polybius suggests that the youth are not necessarily inspired to emulate the specific deeds which are described by the speaker but rather will have confidence as a result of such orations that they will achieve a similar level of fame, if they too make sacrifices on behalf of their country (429).
[269] Fornara (1983) suggested that the aristocratic funeral at Rome directly inspired Polybius' similar approach to history (114-15). See also, Davidson (2009), 130.
[270] This parallel is also briefly noted by Eckstein (1995), 250 n. 46.
[271] For the common practice among ancient historians of providing an explanation or justification for digressions from their narrative and other examples of this, see Oakley's *Commentary* (3.185) on Livy's digression on Alexander (9.17-19).

(τῆς τῶν ἐπιγινομένων παρορμήσεως πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων).[272] Polybius, at least at this significant moment, envisions his history as providing a service very similar to that of the aristocratic funeral at Rome, as both strive to inspire great deeds in the future by promoting the fame that is generated by such actions in the past.[273]

The parallel between the aristocratic funeral and history is further developed by Polybius' emphasis on the visualization of the past inherent in this custom. While this ability to visualize the past is provided first, appropriately, by the funeral procession itself, those who have the opportunity to hear the subsequent funeral oration memorializing the deceased and his ancestors are also depicted by Polybius as not only being reminded (ἀναμιμνησκομένους, 6.53.3) of the past but also being able to visualize it (λαμβάνοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰ γεγονότα).

While this description of an auditory process in visual terms may seem counter-intuitive at first, it very closely reflects the effects which Polybius suggests elsewhere are produced by the study of history.[274] Davidson (1991), for example, shows that Polybius uses visual imagery to represent various perspectives and interpretations of historical events through the eyes of

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[272] Cf. Polybius' emphasis on the fame (τῆς...εὐκλείας, 6.54.3) that attends those memorialized in the funeral after their death; and his claim that Horatius Cocles (discussed below) exemplifies the drive toward noble deeds (πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων, 6.55.4) produced in Romans by their institutions.

[273] Flower (1996) discusses the significant doubts, which were also expressed by the Romans themselves, about the historical accuracy and reliability of the stories preserved in family traditions and memorialized at such funeral orations (145-50). Although she notes the concern of some ancient historians about this issue, Polybius does not make such concerns an element in his discussion, since this would have undermined the parallel between this custom and history, which for Polybius must be true.

[274] For the importance in Greek historiography in general of producing narratives which enable the reader to visualize events through ἐνάργεια, see Walker (1993), esp. 370-71 on Polybius.

the historical agents within his narrative. Polybius, in fact, in a number of instances applies similar language to this passage in his descriptions of his own history or of those of others.[275] In his digression on the courage and daring displayed by Epaminondas and Hannibal in their analogous marches upon the capitals of their respective opponents (9.9), Polybius claims that he has included this comparison in his narrative not simply in order to praise these men but for the benefit of future leaders, who by recalling (ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι, 9.9.10) and visualizing (ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες) such events will be inspired to emulate (ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται) them.[276] This explanation by Polybius of his historiographical practices closely corresponds to his analysis of the aristocratic funeral. Each of these methods of recalling the past not only reminds the audience of the exemplary behavior of others but even brings such actions vividly before their eyes.

The purpose of each is to inspire that audience to strive to behave in a way that reflects the actions of these past figures. But Polybius' expectation for his history, at least in this passage, extends beyond that of the aristocratic funeral in this respect, since he explicitly claims that others will emulate the actions of men like Hannibal and Epaminondas. As was noted above, however, the aristocratic funeral and the funeral oration are simply described as promoting the fame generated by selfless actions on behalf of the country as a goal for all to

[275] See e.g. 3.3.6 (θέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰς Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Κεφαλλήνων ἀτυχίας), where Polybius describes his own work; 5.11.7 (λαβὼν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν), which refers to the reader of history; and 15.34.2 (τιθέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν), where the phrase is applied to rival historians.

[276] The entire clause reads "ἵνα τῶν μὲν ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται." For the ambiguity regarding what specifically such future readers are imagined to be recalling in contrast to what they will visualize, along with the probable lacuna following this sentence, which may have helped to clarify this, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.132-3).

strive toward. Nevertheless, the role which the knowledge of the past plays in inspiring later generations remains fundamental both to history and to the aristocratic funeral. For Polybius, then, part of the appeal of the aristocratic funeral as an important and effective Roman custom lies in the fact that it accurately displays in practice the goals of his history.

The example of Horatius Cocles

This connection between the aristocratic funeral and history is further defined and developed by the passage which immediately follows Polybius' analysis of the funeral in Book 6. As proof (πίστιν, 6.54.4) of his claims about the motivational impact of the aristocratic funerals upon the Roman public, Polybius cites the frequent practice of single combat and self-sacrifice displayed by Roman soldiers fighting on behalf of their countrymen and the willingness of Roman citizens to put their loyalty to their country ahead of their devotion to their own families (6.54.4-5). Many such stories, Polybius states, are recounted (ἱστορεῖται, 6.54.6) among the Romans,[277] but he has chosen one to serve as an example and as proof of his claims (ὑποδείγματος καὶ πίστεως ἕνεκεν). This famous story is that of Horatius Cocles' solitary stand in defense of Rome against an invading force at the bridge over the Tiber River (6.55).[278]

The story goes (λέγεται, 6.55.1), Polybius tells us, that Horatius held off the enemy by himself in front of this bridge, while he ordered his compatriots to retreat and cut down the bridge behind him, an act which astonished the enemy for its steadfastness and

[277] For this meaning of the verb ἱστορεῖν in Polybius, see Mauersberger's *Polybios-Lexikon* (1.3.1201-2), where this passage is listed under the second (II) main heading, 'to report', and overlaps with Polybius' use of the verb to refer to the writing of history.
[278] For the possible origins of this story, of which Polybius' version is the earliest (cf. Livy 2.10), see Walbank's *Commentary* (1.740-41).

courageousness even more than the strength displayed by Horatius (6.55.1-2).[279] Horatius then jumped into the river fully armed and drowned, thereby demonstrating that he valued the security of his country and the fame that would follow these actions (τὴν ἐσομένην μετὰ ταῦτα…εὔκλειαν, 6.55.3) more than his own life.[280] This story demonstrates, the historian concludes, the drive and ambition for noble deeds (ὁρμὴ καὶ φιλοτιμία πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων, 6.55.4) which is instilled in young men at Rome by institutions such as the aristocratic funeral just described.

Multiple versions of this legendary story of Horatius at the bridge survive from ancient authors and references to it are widespread in ancient texts, in which Horatius is often cited as an *exemplum* for future generations.[281] By introducing his own account with the verb λέγεται, Polybius indicates that he is aware of other such versions.[282] Through this recognition of the lasting memory of the story of Horatius and by alluding to the fame (εὔκλειαν) which Horatius would earn for his actions, Polybius subtly acknowledges that Horatius has been successful in his desire to become an exemplary model for future generations.[283] But through his emphasis on the promise of fame not simply as a consequence but as a motivating factor in Horatius' actions, Polybius gives a different meaning to the anecdote than that commonly found in other

[279] For the emphasis on daring (τόλμα) in this and other passages, see Davidson (1991), 19.
[280] In Livy's version, by contrast, Horatius survives (*incolumis*, 2.10.11).
[281] For a full analysis of the various surviving version of the story including this passage of Polybius, see Roller (2004). He counts over thirty instances where the story is at least mentioned (2) and discusses these as an illustration of his definitions of exemplary discourse in Roman literature (10-28).
[282] See Walbank (1993), who noted further that Polybius is less critical of the legend than Livy, who inserts some skepticism into his account (188).
[283] Roller (2004), 2.

authors. Instead of framing this story as an *exemplum* to be emulated by later generations, Horatius is presented by Polybius as an example of a Roman who, like an audience member at the aristocratic funeral, is motivated to achieve glory because of his own knowledge of the past.

The story of Horatius is, however, not a contemporary example from Polybius' time but a historical tale from the distant past.[284] If Polybius' aim was simply to demonstrate the effect of the aristocratic funeral upon Romans at this time, a contemporary example might have been more appropriate. But Polybius chooses a story from the distant past and indicates that this story has itself become entrenched in the historical tradition (ἱστορεῖται, 6.54.6; and λέγεται, 6.55.1). This choice of a story preserved in history enables Polybius to highlight both the success of institutions like the aristocratic funeral in inspiring such noble action and self-sacrifice and Horatius' own success in fulfilling his goal of achieving lasting fame. Crucially, however, Horatius' fame has been preserved not just by the recollection of his deeds at the funerals of himself and his descendants, but also by history. The story of Horatius demonstrates for Polybius the parallel roles of history and the aristocratic funeral both for preserving the past and for inspiring future generations.

The conscious awareness by Horatius of this process and his role within it, as he is willing to sacrifice his own life precisely because he has faith that the fame of his actions will be preserved, becomes a template for the representation of particular individuals, especially Romans, in Polybius' text. In particular, Scipio Aemilianus will fit a similar mold of a Roman who shows an acute awareness of the exemplary models of the past and a desire to become an *exemplum* himself. This parallel becomes further developed and significant because of

[284] Livy dates the event to the second year of the Republic (2.9.1). For more on the exact date, see Roller (2004), 2 n. 1.

Polybius' decision to frame Horatius not primarily as an *exemplum* to be emulated but as "proof" (cf. πίστιν, 6.54.4; and πίστεως ἕνεκεν, 6.54.6) of the historian's analysis of the aristocratic funeral. Clearly, again based on his repeated insistence on the familiarity of the story, Polybius views the example of Horatius as reliable evidence in support of his arguments because the story is so widely recognized and established in history. This suggests that Polybius believes history itself to have an important role in establishing these *exempla* as reliable evidence.

The example of Scipio Aemilianus which Polybius establishes in his own history will also reflect this belief. Just as Polybius recounts the story of Horatius as an example and as proof (ὑποδείγματος καὶ πίστεως ἕνεκεν, 6.54.6) of his interpretation of the aristocratic funeral, the example of Aemilianus similarly serves multiple roles in the course of Polybius' narrative, where the established reputation of this Roman also becomes a source of evidence which the historian can cite in support of his own interpretation of events.

Scipio Aemilianus as an exemplary figure

In the course of his narrative of the career of Scipio Aemilianus, Polybius will depict this Roman as actively framing himself as an *exemplum* both for contemporary Romans and for later generations.[285] First, however, Polybius lays a foundation for this portrayal of Aemilianus by

[285] Although modern scholarship on Scipio Aemilianus was for a long time focused on the notion of a "Scipionic Circle" of prominent men surrounding this important Roman figure (see e.g. Brown (1934)), this idea has since been discredited. Zetzel (1972), for example, showed that the dialogues of Cicero's *De republica* and *De amicitia* represent dramatic settings created by the author and are not reliable historical evidence of such a circle. For other skeptical approaches, see Strasburger (1966); Astin (1967), 294-306; and Forsythe (1991). Gruen (1992)

introducing him as a young man especially concerned with living up to the examples set by his own ancestors in a manner consistent with the historian's discussions of the purposes both of the aristocratic funeral and of history.

In a long fragment (31.22-30), which probably followed Polybius' report of the death of L. Aemilius Paullus,[286] the historian embarks on a lengthy digression, in which he provides a character sketch focusing initially on Paullus but then primarily on Paullus' son, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus. With this extended digression on the character of Aemilianus, with whom Polybius enjoyed a close and long-lasting personal friendship,[287] the historian claims to be fulfilling an earlier promise to his readers to recount both how the Roman had achieved his extraordinary reputation while still a young man and how the two of them had formed such a strong relationship (31.23.2-3). These two points are in fact interrelated as it was through their friendship that Polybius aided his young companion in earning and solidifying this remarkable reputation.

On one occasion, after the two sons of Paullus had successfully petitioned for Polybius to be allowed to remain in Rome, the historian explains, the elder Greek found himself walking

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argues that the rejection of such a circle ought not to obfuscate the importance of the *philhellenic* attitudes of Aemilianus and his contemporaries, and specifically discusses the influence of Polybius on Aemilianus in this respect (252-8).

[286] For the context of the fragment, see Walbank's *Commentary* (3.36-7 and 492-3). Pédech (1964) suggested that the funeral of Paullus is what inspired Polybius' reflections on the significance of the aristocratic funeral discussed above (428-9). Indeed, the historian claims here that the surest sign of Paullus' virtue was that he enjoyed the same reputation after his death as he did when he was alive (31.22.1-2).

[287] For Polybius' personal relationship with Aemilianus and the rest of his family, see the Introduction to Walbank's *Commentary* (1.3-6); and Champion (2004a), 17. Friedländer (1945) argued that Polybius' representation of this friendship is based upon Plato's account of relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, although Walbank in his *Commentary* (3.496) was characteristically skeptical of this suggestion.

alone with Aemilianus (31.23.5-6). At this point, Aemilianus asked why Polybius never addressed him directly but only the elder of the two brothers (31.23.7-9). As the young Roman went on to explain, he was especially concerned that Polybius viewed him, as he believed most other Romans did, as lazy and uninterested in civic life (31.23.10-11). What bothered Aemilianus most, however, was the implication that he was regarded as a poor representative of his illustrious family (31.23.12). After assuring his young friend that he did not in fact hold such negative opinions, however, Polybius promised to aid Aemilianus in his efforts to earn the good reputation he desired and to live up to the renown of his ancestors (31.24.8).[288] Polybius concludes his description of this encounter by reporting Aemilianus' great pleasure at this promise, which he believes will finally allow him to be worthy of his household and ancestors (τῆς οἰκίας ἄξιος εἶναι καὶ τῶν προγόνων, 31.24.10).

From the beginning of his characterization of Aemilianus, therefore, Polybius focuses on the young Roman's desire not simply to win fame and glory in the eyes of his peers but more importantly to live up to the example set by his forefathers.[289] As a result, Polybius' education of Aemilianus and subsequent focus as a historian on the admirable character traits developed by the young Roman extend well beyond the initial concern about a reputation for laziness expressed by Aemilianus. Polybius describes Aemilianus' ensuing pursuit of a more respectable reputation as an impulse toward and emulation of noble things (ὁρμὴ καὶ ζῆλος τῶν καλῶν,

[288] On Polybius' education of Aemilianus, see Astin (1967), 14-16; Walbank (1977), 143-4, who argued that this passage is an integral part of the last ten books of Polybius and not simply a late addition, and that the initial characterization of Aemilianus here recalls the similar introduction of Africanus (10.3.1); and Eckstein (1995), 148-50.

[289] For more on this, see Astin (1967), 19-21, who suggested that Aemilianus was more concerned with living up to the expectations of his adoptive family, although of course conscious of his biological family as well.

31.25.2).[290] In striving to achieve this broad nobility of conduct because of the reputation of his ancestors, Aemilianus fits Polybius' depiction of other young Romans who are inspired to greatness by the spectacle at the funerals of illustrious men (6.53-4).[291] For Aemilianus the examples of the past carry even more weight as they originate not just from any famous Roman but from his own family. This emphasis on the value of the past in offering a valuable model for an aspiring young man and the challenge of living up to that model will continue to play a central role in Polybius' characterization of Aemilianus, his struggle to achieve this goal, and ultimately the realization of Aemilianus' own position as an exemplary figure for others to emulate.[292]

As his digression on the character of Aemilianus continues, Polybius defines more precisely the virtues which Aemilianus subsequently pursued by describing the young Roman's successful efforts to establish a widely recognized reputation (δόξα) for three specific character traits: temperance (σωφροσύνη), which he exhibited by his resistance to the temptations of extravagance and luxury after the fall of Macedon; nobility of conduct (καλοκἀγαθία), which he displayed in his management of family inheritance and financial matters; and courage (ἀνδρεία), which he earned in the sport of hunting.[293] The historian then

[290] Cf. Polybius' claim that the story of Horatius demonstrates the drive and ambition for noble deeds (ὁρμὴ καὶ φιλοτιμία πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων, 6.55.4) inspired by Roman institutions such as the aristocratic funeral.
[291] Davidson (2009) briefly notes this parallel as well (130).
[292] For external evidence that Aemilianus himself cultivated his image as a representative of old Roman *mores*, see Champion (2004a), 179-80.
[293] For Polybius' analysis of each of these traits and the way Aemilianus earned a reputation for each of them, see 31.25.2-8; 31.25.9-28.9; and 31.29, respectively. McGing (2010, 61-3) argues that Polybius' characterization of Aemilianus here, and in particular the emphasis on financial integrity, is based upon Xenophon's similar characterization of Agesilaus (e.g. *Ag.* 4.1-6).

concludes this digression by informing the reader of his reasons for going on at such length about the character of his friend (31.30). Such an account (τὴν τοιαύτην ἱστορίαν, 31.30.1), he believed, would on the one hand be pleasing to the old (ἡδεῖαν μὲν...τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις), while also being beneficial to the young (ὠφέλιμον δὲ τοῖς νέοις).[294] Although older generations appear, in Polybius' view, to be no longer in need of such lessons,[295] the historian is clearly framing Aemilianus even in this early digression as an exemplary figure, whose conduct and character represent an instructive model to be emulated by the younger readers of his history.[296] Polybius' characterization of his Roman friend, therefore, looks in two directions as Aemilianus strives to equal the example of his ancestors in the past while at the same time he is becoming a positive *exemplum* for others in the future.

Polybius does not end his explanation of this digression there but goes on to give a third reason for the apparent intrusion on his narrative. The most important (μάλιστα, 31.30.2) reason for this extended digression, Polybius claims, is to establish proof (πίστιν) for the

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Walbank (1998, 57-8) suggested that in Polybius' description here of extravagance and luxury, which had a significant role in the corruption Aemilianus' contemporaries (31.25.6-7), reflects the decline of the mixed constitution predicted by Polybius in Book 6 (6.57). See also Balot (2010), who discusses Aemilianus' role in reversing the trend of decline (18).

[294] In his *Commentary* on this passage (3.514), Walbank noteed that this statement is unique in Polybius' work in the suggestion that history offers an entertainment value for the old, while the young require something more substantial. For the distinction between the younger and older segments of an audience, cf. Thucydides description of the speech of the Athenians at Sparta (1.72), which he claims was intended to provide an account to the young (τοῖς νεωτέροις ἐξήγησιν, 1.72.1), who did not experience the events, and a reminder to the old (ὑπόμνησιν...τοῖς τε πρεσβυτέροις) of the things about which they already knew. Polybius here revises this distinction to fit the theme of pleasure/benefit, which is also common in Polyibus' work (see Walbank's *Commentary*, 1.7 n. 12; and Sacks (1981), 122-44).

[295] Walbank (1990), 265.

[296] For more on the benefit to the reader as a common element of character sketches in Polybius, see McGing (2010), 27-8.

reader in the coming narrative of Aemilianus' career, which may otherwise seem incredible.[297] Just as the example of Horatius is introduced to provide proof (πίστιν, 6.54.4) of the impact of the recollection of the past promoted by the aristocratic funeral, these examples of Aemilianus' character will serve a similar function for Polybius' historical narrative. If readers understand Aemilianus' true nature, the historian believes, they will not attribute his successes to mere fortune but will understand the true causes (τὰς αἰτίας, 31.30.3) of his achievements.

This digression, therefore, is not randomly inserted here simply to extol the virtues of the historian's friend. Rather, in the eyes of Polybius, there is a direct connection between the character traits established here and the subsequent narrative about Aemilianus, in which those traits will again be on display.[298] This suggests that the benefit offered by Aemilianus' example will extend into that narrative as well and will even become more important, as the reputation which he earned as a young man becomes solidified by the historically significant achievements of his career.[299]

[297] For Polybius' use of character sketches to establish proof for his narrative in a manner similar to a forensic orator, see Wiedemann (1990), 294.
[298] For more on the role of an initial character sketch like this one, which precedes the narrative of an individual's career, see Pédech (1964), 244.
[299] For more on the importance of character in generating trust, see Marincola (1997a), 131, where he discusses the ways in which figures within Polybius' historical narrative earn trust in their own speeches. Such individuals include the elder Scipio (3.64.11) and Philopoemen (11.10.4-5). For a further example of the connection between a character sketch and Polybius' historical narrative, see 10.5.9 on Scipio Africanus, whose finest qualities, the historian claims, will be further demonstrated by his own deeds.

Aemilianus as an *exemplum* for his contemporaries

This connection between the description of the character of Aemilianus and Polybius' subsequent narrative of his friend's career becomes even more significant because of the multiple levels at which this relationship operates. The noble conduct of Aemilianus serves not only as a positive model for the readers of Polybius' history but also for the contemporaries of Aemilianus within the text. When Polybius claims that his young friend had performed deeds in his hunting expeditions that were illustrious and worthy of memory (καὶ λαμπρὸν ἀεί τι ποιῶν καὶ μνήμης ἄξιον, 31.29.9), for example, the historian is not only referring, as he often does,[300] to the commemoration of those deeds by means of history. He is also more specifically drawing attention to the reputation (δόξαν; cf. δόξαν πάνδημον, 31.29.11) which Aemilianus enjoyed among his contemporary fellow citizens.

Clearly, therefore, there are two levels at which the *exemplum* of this model young Roman is operating: as a historical *exemplum* for posterity and for others within the historical narrative itself. This suggests that the effects of Aemilianus' value as an *exemplum* for Polybius do not simply apply to hypothetical future readers of Polybius' work but rather have been witnessed by the historian in action. The fact that the noble character of Aemilianus is not only emphasized by Polybius himself but is also represented as widely recognized by his contemporaries will prove especially significant to Polybius when, as we shall see below, the historian again appeals to Aemilianus' character as "proof" of claims made elsewhere in the historical narrative.

[300] See e.g. below, p. 178 on 38.21.3.

The multiple levels at which the exemplarity of Aemilianus operates in Polybius' text finds further support in the subsequent narrative, when the positive model set by Aemilianus serves not simply as a potential example which his contemporaries *might* imitate, but one which has an actual impact on their behavior. This impact occurs in the narrative concerning the disgraceful conduct of the Roman troops during the Celtiberian War in 152/1 BC (35.4). When the previous commander in Spain and those who had served with him brought to Rome reports of their difficulties in the war and the courage of the enemy, Polybius reports, an unexpected level of fear gripped the young Romans (ἐνέπεσέ τις πτοία τοῖς νέοις παράλογος, 35.4.3), who represented the potential recruits for the coming campaign. This cowardice, which is presented in highly critical terms by Polybius, was so pervasive that enrollment in the army was disrupted at all levels, including that of military tribunes and legates for the general (35.4.4-6).

When the Senate and leaders at Rome were unable to handle this shameful behavior (35.4.7), it is Scipio Aemilianus who is credited by Polybius with restoring the willingness of his peers to participate in the war. By emphasizing the youth of Aemilianus in this passage (νέος μὲν ὤν, 35.4.8), Polybius highlights Aemilianus' status as a peer to the other youth instead of that of a superior. The young Roman was able to re-inspire his peers, however, not by admonishing them directly or by an inspirational speech. Rather he set himself up as an example of selfless and courageous conduct by requesting to be sent to Spain himself even though it would have been in his own best interests to go to Macedonia, to which he had already been summoned (35.4.8-12). As a result of this gesture, a transformation occurred

among those previously reluctant to enlist, who afterwards willingly enrolled as officers or soldiers (35.4.14).

The reason given by Polybius for this change of attitude is that these other young men's motivation for enlisting resulted from their desire to avoid an unfavorable comparison with Aemilianus (ἐκτρεπόμενοι τὸν ἐκ παραθέσεως ἔλεγχον, 35.4.14). As Polybius portrays this transformation of the Roman youth, therefore, it is the positive example of Aemilianus that is the decisive factor.[301] This episode demonstrates in practice the ultimately positive results that an exemplary figure such as Scipio Aemilianus is able to produce not just for posterity but for those in his own time.

Establishing "proof" of Scipio's later conduct

The effect of such an *exemplum* upon the young, however, represents only one of the reasons given by Polybius for his emphasis on the outstanding character of Aemilianus. Another, and the one which he identified as the most important, is the historian's desire to support the veracity of his own narrative. That is, the historian has claimed that his description of Aemilianus' character will provide proof (πίστιν, 31.30.2) for the later events which he will narrate. This element, too, is further developed by Polybius' narrative of the cowardice of the Roman youth and Aemilianus' response, as the historian directly relates this episode to his

[301] Such a negative characterization of the function of exemplary role models may seem at odds with the positive vision presented by Polybius in his description of the aristocratic funeral, where it is the *good* reputation promoted by the custom that has such an impact upon the young men in attendance. This potential objection is not to be pressed, however, as Polybius presents *exempla* elsewhere as operating in both ways at the same time (see e.g. Aemilianus' simulaneous expression of desire to live up the positive examples set by his ancestors and conern about the negative opinion of his peers (31.23.10-12)).

previous description of the virtues of Aemilianus.[302] These virtues included the young Roman's reputation for courage. Although Aemilianus had initially expressed concern about his reputation for laziness, Polybius went on to describe how, with Polybius' own help, the young Roman had sought to correct this reputation and the live up to the example of his ancestors by pursuing a wider set of virtues.[303] Polybius' description of these virtues of Aemilianus form a substantial part of the character-sketch which the historian described as proof for his narrative of Aemilianus' career and is, therefore, relevant to Polybius' account of his young friend's courageous offer to volunteer for the war.

The relationship, however, between this event in the historical narrative and Polybius' description of Aemilianus' previous attempts to attain these virtues is complicated. As the historian notes here, Aemilianus had already gained a widely recognized reputation for nobility of conduct (καλοκἀγαθία) and temperance (σωφροσύνη), as the historian had previously described. In this earlier discussion of his friend's efforts to establish a public recognition of such virtues, however, Polybius also claims that through his hunting exploits Aemilianus had already achieved a similar reputation for courage (ἀνδρεία).[304] Why then does the historian

[302] "Having achieved a recognized reputation for nobility of conduct and temperance, but with that of courage still lacking... (τὴν ἐπὶ καλοκἀγαθίᾳ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ δόξαν ὁμολογουμένην πεποιημένος, τῆς δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρείᾳ φήμης προσδεόμενος, 35.4.8-9).
[303] See above note 293.
[304] On Aemilianus' hunting expeditions, in which Polybius himself took part, and the unorthodox but effective way in which this established Aemilianus' courageous character, see 31.29, where the historian explicitly claims that Aemilianus at this time gained a widely recognized reputation for this trait (ἐξεφέρετο τὴν ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρείᾳ δόξαν πάνδημον, 31.29.11).

later claim that such a reputation was lacking (see note 302), thus necessitating his courageous offer to serve in the Celtiberian War?[305]

The historian's explanation that his opening character-sketch of Aemilianus is primarily intended to help establish the truth of the subsequent narrative provides a potential solution. That is, by demonstrating the courage evident in Aemilianus' accomplishments in the relatively artificial arena of hunting, Polybius lays the foundation for the more consequential events of his friend's career, in which this courage is more profound, more significant, and even potentially more incredible.[306] In this way, Aemilianus' unexpected offer to volunteer for the Celtiberian War becomes more believable because his courage has already been introduced to the reader.

Moreover, as was the case with the previous aspect of Polybius' stated purpose in providing the extended digression in Book 31 on the character of Aemilianus (i.e. benefit to the young), the establishment of credibility for the narrative also operates at two levels for distinct audiences. On the one hand, the initial presentation of the young man's character traits supports the truth of the following narrative in the eyes of the readers of Polybius' history. At the same time, however, Aemilianus himself is actively cultivating his own reputation for the

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[305] Walbank noted this apparent contradiction and points to a partial solution in his *Commentary* (3.646-7), where he indicated that Polybius initially describes the sport of hunting as practice for establishing a reputation for courage (μεγίστην ἔδει καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ποιήσασθαι, 31.29.1), whereas the Celtiberian War provided an opportunity to display this character trait in the real life circumstance of warfare.

[306] For the common assertion by ancient authors that hunting was an effective method of training for war, see e.g. Cicero (*N. D.*, 2.161). Further examples were discussed by Aymard (1951), 469-76. As for the specific goal emphasized by Polybius here of establishing a good reputation among one's peers, however, the historian claims that the practice of hunting was not the traditional way for a young Roman to achieve this (31.29.12). Rather, most of Aemilianus' peers would have attempted to acquire such reputation in the law courts. This more common method, therefore, would serve a similar function for aspiring politicians, but Aemilianus was able to achieve his reputation without directly harming any of his peers (31.29.11).

contemporary audience of his peers, an effort which reflects the goals of the historian. As Polybius notes, Aemilianus' successes in hunting, in addition to being recorded in Polybius' history, were also recognized by the Roman public at that time (31.29.11). When this young man steps forward to volunteer to serve in the Celtiberian War, therefore, his offer has more credibility in the eyes of the other Romans and, consequently, has a more profound impact, because reports of his courage have already circulated based on his hunting exploits. As they are aware of this previous example, the other young Romans regard his gesture as legitimate and react by changing their behavior.

Establishing "proof" of the veracity of historical narrative

As I suggested above, the publically acknowledged nature of Aemilianus' reputation for nobility is emphasized by Polybius because this enables him to appeal to the character of this Roman as evidence or proof in other parts of his text. Consequently, Polybius' use of Aemilianus as an *exemplum* in order to support the accuracy of his own narrative extends beyond this one episode and even beyond the narrative of Aemilianus' own career. Earlier in his work (18.35), and even before the introduction of Aemilianus into the narrative, in fact, Polybius cites the young Roman, along with his biological father Aemilius Paullus, as evidence (μαρτυρίας δὲ χάριν, 18.35.3) that men of integrity still existed at Rome following the victory of T. Quinctius Flamininus over Philip V of Macedon at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC. Because of the leniency which Flaminius displayed toward Philip after the battle, there was widespread suspicion, according to Polybius, especially among the Aetolian allies of Flamininus, that the Roman general had accepted bribes from the Macedonians (18.34.6-8). By citing the examples

of these other Roman generals who had displayed similar leniency after a great victory, Polybius attempts to defend Flamininus against the charge of bribery on the grounds that he was not the only Roman of his time to behave in this way. Polybius then describes the restraint exhibited by L. Aemilius Paullus following his victory at Pydna in 168 (18.35.4-8) and the similar integrity evident in Aemilianus' behavior after the sacking of Carthage in 146 (18.35.9-12). The use of these parallel *exempla* was necessary in the case of Flamininus, Polybius claims, because although in the past no Roman general would have been accused of such behavior, the historian was not able to say the same about his own times (18.35.1-2).[307]

The purpose of these *exempla* for the historian is to convince the reader of the reliability of his narrative, just as the earlier story of Horatius reinforces Polybius' account of the aristocratic funeral (6.54.4) and the later digression on the character of Aemilianus supports the historical narrative of his career which follows (31.30.2). In this passage, however, the value of such *exempla* differs from what we have seen so far. In the case of Aemilianus, for instance, examples of the young Roman's character were introduced in order to provide a foundation for the subsequent narrative regarding the career of Aemilianus himself. Here, on the other hand, the example of Aemilianus, along with that of his father, is intended to support the historian's reliability in his defense of Flamininus, an entirely different person.

[307] This statement has played a central role in the debate over Polybius views on the decline of Roman society during this time. Walbank's (1980) view was that although the idea of Roman decline is present in Polybius' work, it is not very important to the historian's world view. Eckstein (1995), however, argues that a clear distinction emerges in Polybius after the Second Punic War, when Roman morals began a noticeable and significant decline, although figures like Paullus and Aemilianus represent notable exceptions (229-233). Champion (2004a) recognizes that the issue is complicated but ultimately decides that the negative examples of Roman behavior at this time outweigh the positive (144-69), while McGing (2010) is more cautious in doubting that any such statements represent the historian's final verdict on the matter (164-7).

The historian in fact recognizes the limitation of his use of *exempla* in this way, as he does not suggest that they will prove the truth of his conclusions regarding Flamininus but rather asserts that these *exempla* will simply demonstrate that his interpretation is not impossible.[308] This distinction rests primarily on the fact that the *exempla* share similar circumstances with the events following Cynoscephalae but do not involve the same people. Presumably, another anecdote supporting the integrity of Flamininus himself would offer more concrete proof for the historian. As such an example was apparently lacking, however, Polybius has used the next best thing.

These examples, moreover, are not, as is typically the case, drawn from earlier events in history to be applied to the current narrative but rather anticipate events occurring much later both in time and in Polybius' history. As a result, these *exempla* are not available to Flamininus as a participant in the history,[309] nor (more importantly) are they yet familiar to the reader, who has not reached the relevant portions of the historical narrative. Polybius addresses this issue by stating that the truth of his claims about the restraint exhibited by Aemilianus after the sack of Carthage must be verified by the reader on his own, who by conducting the appropriate research about the man will find his reputation in this respect to be undisputed among the Romans.[310]

In this case the historical narrative alone does not provide sufficient support for the truth of the historian's claims, at least in part because the reader has not yet encountered the

[308] τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν ἀδύνατα λέγειν (18.35.3).
[309] Cf. the discussion in my previous chapter (pp. 130-33) on Epaminondas as an example for Hannibal (9.9), who does have the opportunity to learn from the historical *exemplum*.
[310] περὶ δὲ τούτου πάλιν τἀνδρὸς ὁ ζητῶν ἀληθινῶς ἀναμφισβήτητον εὑρήσει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὴν περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δόξαν (18.35.12). Cf. 18.35.8 for Polybius' similar statement regarding the *exemplum* of Aemilius Paullus.

later passages about Aemilianus. Rather, the reader is charged with actively investigating (ὁ ζητῶν) for himself the truth of the claim. This research will lead the reader to discover the universally recognized reputation that Aemilianus will be so intent on establishing for himself.

This adds a further dimension to the relationship between Aemilianus' reputation with his contemporaries and the historical narrative discussed above, as the two not only operate on parallel tracks but also directly inform one another. That is, Aemilianus' reputation, which he builds among his peers and is then passed on by them to others, subsequently becomes evidence which the historian can appeal to in support of his narrative, even with respect to his representation of other individuals. The historical narrative itself at the appropriate time also strives to establish that reputation in order to lend further credence to the subsequent narrative. Each aspect of Aemilianus' reputation and thus the value of his *exemplum*, therefore, becomes intertwined and dependent upon the other.

Polybius' narrative of these *exempla*

As readers of Polybius' history, we also have the opportunity to examine each of these *exempla* as they are presented in the historical narrative. In doing so, we will discover that these are not simply two random examples of contemporary Romans who behaved in a way similar to Flamininus after a momentous victory. Rather, they are related to one another in a way that further highlights the significance of such *exempla* both for the reader of the history and for those involved in it.

First, in a short fragment of Book 29, Polybius relates the speech given by Aemilius Paullus to his troops after his victory at Pydna and capture of King Perseus (29.20).[311] As we saw in a number of speeches given by Hannibal and others discussed in Chapter Two, it is not uncommon for Polybius to use the direct speeches of his characters in order to promote the broader principles of his history. Similarly, Polybius uses this particular speech to represent Paullus' victory not just as an *exemplum* to instruct his readers or to add validity to other similar episodes, but also as an opportunity for Paullus himself to offer a lesson to the members of his council.[312] After placing Perseus in front of their eyes (ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, 29.20.1), the victorious Roman warns his audience neither to be overly boastful in times of success (μήτε μεγαλαυχεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθώμασι) nor to be arrogant or implacable toward anyone (μηδὲν ὑπερήφανον μηδ᾽ ἀνήκεστον περὶ μηδενός). It is precisely when enjoying success in life, he goes on, that one should particularly keep in mind the potential opposite fortune (29.20.2), as in this way one might just barely in times of prosperity be revealed to be a measured person (καὶ γὰρ οὕτω μόλις ἂν ἐν ταῖς εὐκαιρίαις ἄνθρωπον μέτριον ὄντα φανῆναι, 29.20.3).

Although little else remains of Polybius' description of Paullus' conduct in the aftermath of his victory at Pydna, this plea to behave with moderation in times of success reflects the historian's earlier characterization of him to suggest the incorruptability of Flamininus. Paullus not only acts in this way himself as Polybius had previously indicated, but also strives to convey the importance of such behavior to his troops by pointing to Perseus as a negative

[311] See Walbank's *Commentary* (3.28 and 392) for the origin and placement of this fragment.
[312] Cf. Plutarch, *Aem.* 27.1, who identifies those present at this speech as Paullus' sons, step-sons, and younger officers.

exemplum.[313] For, as Polybius has the Roman general conclude in his speech here, the difference between fools and wise men is that the former are educated by their own misfortunes while the latter are educated by those of others (29.20.4).[314]

This sentiment accurately reflects Polybius' own concept of the value of history.[315] In this case, however, the historian will demonstrate his historiographical principles in practice, as the lesson offered by Paullus at this time is also passed on to his son, Scipio Aemilianus, who was in fact present at the time of this speech.[316] The impact of this lesson is evident when Aemilianus finds himself in a similar situation following the sack of Carthage (38.20-21), the same episode to which Polybius has already drawn our attention in connection with Flamininus and Paullus.

As we have seen already, Polybius' initial characterization of Aemilianus emphasized the young Roman's desire to live up to and emulate the examples of his ancestors. More specifically, Polybius earlier suggests that Aemilianus learned to behave with integrity and moderation in financial matters directly from his father (31.25.9-10).[317] There is other evidence which suggests that Aemilianus actively promoted the parallel between himself and his father by holding sacrifices and games, for example, following the capture of Carthage in the same

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[313] Balot (2010, 16-17) discusses Paullus' role as an important *exemplum* in Polybius and argues furthermore that Paullus' presentation of his defeated enemy is intended to contrast with the more celebratory nature of the Roman triumph, which the historian elsewhere criticizes (e.g. 30.22.1-12, although, as Walbank notes (3.445), the games described there did not necessarily coincide with the triumph itself).

[314] τοῦτο γὰρ διαφέρειν ἔφη τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων, διότι συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀτυχίαις παιδεύεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τῶν πέλας.

[315] See e.g. 1.1.2 and 1.35 discussed in Chapter One.

[316] Although this fact does not appear in the surviving text of Polybius, it is confirmed in multiple other sources. For more on these, see Pédech (1964), 352 n. 100.

[317] For more about Aemilianus' proposed emulation of his father in this respect, see Eckstein (1995), 76-7 and 79-82; and Champion (2004a), 158-9.

manner as Paullus had at Amphipolis after his own victory.[318] Scholars have also noted that Aemilianus' desire to emulate his ancestors and more specifically his father is evident in his behavior in this passage of Polybius after the sack of Carthage.[319]

At this time, when he also won the praise of Polybius for his moderation in times of success, Aemilianus, just like his father, brings the conquered leader of his enemy before his own troops and for his part explicitly remarks on the ability of fortune to produce examples (παραδειγματίζειν, 38.20.1) of such men. After describing Hasdrubal's haughty behavior (38.20.2), Aemilianus goes on to ask who, after having such an example in front of their eyes (ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, 38.20.3), would fail to realize the necessity of neither saying nor doing anything arrogant (ὑπερήφανον), being only human (ἄνθρωπον ὄντα). In this speech, which so closely reflects not only the sentiment but even the language of his father's,[320] Aemilianus demonstrates that he has learned from his father's example.[321] The lesson offered by Paullus allows him not simply to act in a way that coincides with these precepts, as we shall see in the next section, but also in this case to pass that lesson on to others using the same technique as his father.

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[318] Astin (1967), 76.

[319] See Pédech (1964), 352 and Walbank's *Commentary* (3.721).

[320] Cf. ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν and ὑπερήφανον (29.20.1); and ἄνθρωπον...ὄντα (29.20.3). The words and phrases shared by these two speeches are admittedly commonplace in Polybius. It is the accumulation of the shared language, however, that creates a strong resonance between the speeches. For other examples in Polybius of ὑπερήφανος as a criticism of those who are arrogant in times of success, see 8.24.1, 10.36.3, and 36.13.2.

[321] After discussing Paullus' speech after Pydna, Marincola (2001) remarks that "in the later books, Paullus' role seems to have been taken up by his adopted son, Scipio Aemilianus," which he connects to Scipio's behavior after the fall of Carthage, but he does not elaborate further (147-8).

The two *exempla* which Polybius uses to support his judgment of Flamininus' probably honesty are not chosen randomly as exhibiting the similar behavior of other Romans. Rather they are closely linked in Polybius' narrative, as the example of Paullus inspires and gives rise to that of Aemilianus. By framing the behavior of Aemilianus in this way, Polybius is demonstrating not only his friend's desire to match the examples represented by his family, but also the power of such *exempla* in encouraging such behavior. As I have already noted, however, these specific *exempla* were not available to Flamininus, as he preceded both of them. Nevertheless, by showing that such *exempla* are not only still evident among Roman men in his time but that the power of *exempla* of past model behavior remains effective in reproducing such behavior among subsequent generations, Polybius supports his claim that the decline of Roman morals was not so widespread and inevitable that men like Flamininus should necessarily be considered corrupt.

These two episodes again demonstrate the multiple levels at which such *exempla* operate in the text of Polybius. Both, of course, serve as examples of model behavior, which offer a potential benefit to the reader by indicating how aspiring leaders ought to conduct themselves. Secondly, an *exemplum*, such as that of Paullus, can inspire emulation by those within the text of the historical narrative, as is evident in the case of Aemilianus. Finally, the effectiveness of such *exempla* in reproducing similar behavior can be used to establish the credibility of the narrative itself by suggesting that so long as the past has the power to inspire model behavior, men can be expected to live up to the standards which it represents.

Aemilianus fulfills his role as a positive *exemplum*

Although in the previous scene Polybius demonstrates that Aemilianus has not only learned but even reproduced for his own troops the same lesson offered by his father, it is not until the next chapter that we see the Roman commander live up to these words through his own behavior. In the dramatic scene following the sacking and burning of Carthage (38.21), Polybius, who was present, reports that his friend Aemilianus turned to him and expressed fear and foreboding that a similar fate awaited Rome (38.21.1). With this statement, Aemilianus wins the praise of the historian, who remarks that it is not easy to name something more pragmatic and thoughtful (πραγματικωτέραν καὶ νουνεχεστέραν, 38.21.2) than this.[322]

As Polybius goes on to explain, his admiration for the thoughtful reflection of his friend results from the fact that at a time of great success (ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κατορθώμασι, 38.21.3) Aemilianus has taken consideration (ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν) for his own country, the potential reversal of circumstances (τῆς ἐναντίας περιστάσεως), and the mutability of fortune (τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐπισφάλειαν).[323] Aemilianus' behavior here, in the view of the historian, specifically reflects the advice given by Paullus after his victory at Pydna. Polybius again emphasizes this connection by reproducing language which recalls Paullus' own speech at that time.[324] Aemilianus, therefore, is not simply reciting for others the words which he had

[322] Balot (2010) argues that Polybius is here using Aemilianus to redefine Roman "manliness" as "courage or strength that is informed by moderation, justice, and rationality (17)."
[323] On the role of "Fortune" in Aemilianus' prediction, see Eckstein (1995), 268-9.
[324] Cf. ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθώμασι (29.20.1) and τῆς ἐναντίας τύχης ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν (29.20.2).

heard his father articulate after Pydna, he is also revealing that he has taken them to heart by recognizing their validity in the present circumstance and behaving accordingly.[325]

Polybius concludes this climactic scene by proclaiming Aemilianus' statement to be characteristic of a man who was great, accomplished, and, finally, worthy of memory (ἀξίου μνήμης, 38.21.3). Polybius is declaring that Aemilianus' pragmatic response in this time of great success qualifies as an appropriate *exemplum* to be included in history. Paullus and his son had both produced their conquered foes as negative *exempla* to illustrate their points about the dangers of arrogance in times of good fortune. Aemilianus, however, now offers through his own actions a positive *exemplum* of how one should behave at such times. He is, therefore, "worthy of memory", as the reader is able to learn from his example.

Conclusion

With his portrayal of Scipio Aemilianus, his close personal friend, Polybius effectively exhibits the multifaceted role that *exempla* play in his work. At a fundamental level, of course, such an individual can be modeled by the historian as a positive *exemplum* which, much like those memorialized at a Roman aristocratic funeral, will inspire later generations to pursue fame and glory for themselves. Additionally, Aemilianus represents for Polybius such an important *exemplum* because of the young Roman's own respect for the examples offered by the past and in particular the illustrious history of his own ancestors. Like Horatius at the

[325] McGing (2010, 54-5) discusses the similarity between this and other passages in Polybius and similar sentiments in Herodotus such as Solon's advice to Croesus (1.32) and Amasis' warning to Polycrates of Samos (3.40). While the general theme is certainly Herodotean, this need not obfuscate the more direct relationship between Aemilianus' behavior and the advice of his father.

bridge, that is, Aemilianus exemplifies not just an individual who achieved great fame but demonstrates for the reader the value of holding the *exempla* of the past in such high regard. With his depiction of Aemilianus, therefore, Polybius strives to create a cyclical pattern in which future generations recognize the value of past *exempla*, endeavor to achieve great fame themselves, and thus become positive *exempla* for others.

The cyclical nature of *exempla* such as this operates at an additional level in Polybius' narrative as well, as the positive example set by figure like Aemilianus becomes evidence in support of the historian's version of events elsewhere in the narrative. Whether he is seeking support for his later narrative of Aemilianus' career or for his depiction of other individuals such as Flamininus, the positive example established in Aemilianus serves as a valuable tool to be wielded by the historian. This helps to explain, moreover, why Polybius is so eager to emphasize the reputation which Aemilianus enjoyed among his contemporaries and even to depict the effects of his positive example upon their behavior. In this way, the historian is attempting to establish an authority for his own work beyond the pages of his narrative as he develops a picture of Aemilianus as an already widely recognized example of good character. Polybius' confidence that his assertions will be validated by a reader who accepts the historian's challenge to conduct his own research into such matters (18.35.12) probably results from Polybius' personal relationship with Aemilianus and first-hand observation of his friend's reputation. This task which remains for the historian then is to extend this fame to posterity through his own work. In this way, Polybius fulfills once and for all the promise made to his young friend to help Aemilianus achieve the fame which he desires and to match the renown of his ancestors (31.24.8).

In spite of Polybius' suggestion that the aristocratic funeral already serves a similar function at Rome, the historian nevertheless views his own work as a significant contributor to the preservation and spread of *exempla*, as it has the potential to reach a much wider audience than this specifically Roman custom. The parallels between the two contribute to the idea developed in Chapter Two that Polybius regards with particular admiration the Roman ability, through their customs and institutions, to preserve and to capitalize on the memory of the past. Previously, we have seen Polybius depict the Romans as a collective group learning from and developing based on their past experiences. Here, by contrast, the historian shows how the aristocratic funeral creates a recurring connection between exemplary individuals in the past and those in later generations. Thus a more complete picture emerges in Polybius' work of a Roman society built upon the fundamental principle that success and progress result directly from the preservation of the past.

Chapter Five

Learning from History in Polybius' Historical Narrative

Introduction

We have now seen a number of prominent individuals in Polybius' historical narrative who are depicted as representatives of the historian's own historiographical principles. Hannibal (Chapter Three), for example, repeatedly demonstrates knowledge of Polybius' broader historigraphicl principles and is able to employ these to his own benefit. Scipio Aemilianus (Chapter Four) frames himself as an *exemplum* for others (e.g. 35.4) in a manner consistent with the exemplary goals of Polybius' own work. But these were exceptional individuals, and we have not seen evidence in Polybius that humans in general (with the exception of the Romans (Chapter Two)) commonly learn the lessons which they should.

More importantly for our attempt to clarify the relative educational values of history and experience in Polyibus, we have seen little indication so far in Polybius' text of the ability to learn *specific* lessons based on knowledge of the historical past or the experiences of others. In spite of the collective nature of their progress, Polybius describes the developments made by the Roman people as based on experience (τὰ πράγματα). Similarly, the lessons which Hannibal learns over the course of his career result from his own personal experience and not from the experiences of others. At least in these cases, practical experience has had an important impact in Polybius' historical narrative.

Our study of Polybius' representation of Scipio Aemilianus, by contrast, has shown that the memory of the past also plays an important role in Polybius' narrative, but on its own this

role is incomplete. While Aemilianus seeks to match the fame preserved by the *exempla* of his ancestors (e.g. 31.24), these examples – much like those of the aristocratic funeral – serve simply as a generic inspiration to achieve fame and distinction. Polybius nowhere explicitly portrays Aemilianus as imitating the specific actions or behavior which he has learned from the history of his family.[326]

But although the inspirational force of history which was emphasized in the previous chapter is one aspect of Polybius' historiographical goals, this is only a small part of the ultimate didactic purposes which Polybius has for his own work. In order for history to provide the *practical* education envisioned by Polybius, it must serve a much more specific and practical end by offering particular examples of behavior to be imitated or avoided by potential statesmen.[327] In this chapter I will investigate further this aspect of Polybius' work and, more specifically, the extent to which historical figures within the narrative are represented as learning from situations in history similar to their own circumstances. As we shall see, despite Polybius' insistence on the practical value of history in this respect, the historian repeatedly complains in his work about the inability of people in general to learn from the specific lessons available to them from history. But the historian's generally pessimistic view on this subject serves to emphasize any particular exceptions in which figures within Polybius' narrative do learn specific lessons from their research into the past. We will see one such prominent

[326] While we have seen that Aemilianus adopts the message and language used by his father, Aemilus Paullus, after Pydna (29.20), we will remember that the young Aemilianus witnessed his father's speech firsthand.

[327] See e.g. 4.32-4, where Polybius argues on behalf of an alliance between the Arcadians and the Messenians by describing historical examples in which their disunity invited hostility from the Lacedaemonians. He then concludes with his advice to these peoples that by bearing these examples in mind they adhere to their alliance in the future (4.34.11-12).

exception in Polybius' depiction of the Scipio Africanus who is specifically represented as inquiring into the failures of his predecessors in command of the Roman armies in Spain and learning specific lessons which will inform his own campaign there.

The practical lessons of history

The specific practical lessons which Polybius suggests are available from history become evident in the particular emphasis which the historian places on the technical knowledge such as astronomy, fire-signaling, and siege-tactics, which he believes to be especially important for successful generals.[328] As I have shown, history in such cases provides an effective means of transmitting technological progress to future generations, who will be able both to utilize and to advance the developments of the past. For Polybius, however, history also has a significant role to play in this area of instruction by providing historical examples of individuals who demonstrate the importance of such knowledge in practice either by successfully exhibiting the benefits of technological knowledge or by their failure to do so.

In the course of a long digression on the art of generalship in Book 9 (9.12-20), for example, Polybius emphasizes the importance of a detailed understanding of astronomy for a commander in the field (9.15.1-19.4).[329] Of the nearly five chapters which he devotes to this subject, however, only the first (9.15) focuses specifically on the astronomical principles which are especially important for military success, such as the order of the Zodiac and the phases of the moon for reckoning the time of the night. In each of the subsequent chapters, the historian

[328] For the technical lessons offered by these two books and the technique of fire-signaling in particular (10.43-7), see my discussion in Chapter One, pp. 24-9.
[329] For more on Polybius' tactical advice in this digression, see McGing (2010), 39-40.

frames his instruction in the context of a specific example from the past of the impact of astronomy on a practicing commander.

Polybius begins (9.16), however, by offering praise not of a historical figure directly but of Homer for his depiction of Odysseus, whom the historian calls a man of great leadership (τὸν ἡγεμονικώτατον ἄνδρα, 9.16.1), as a leader who carefully observes the movements of the stars.[330] Although Polybius does not in the surviving portions of his work express doubts about the existence of Odysseus as a historical figure, we should note first the historian's subtle indication here that it is the poet (τὸν ποιητὴν) – and not Odysseus – who should be commended. The emphasis here, therefore, is not on Odysseus' behavior *per se* but on the poet's representation of it.

Of all the examples cited by Polybius in this fragment, Odysseus is the only positive example of a leader who exhibits the proper attention to astronomy promoted in this passage. As the historian states, the remaining instances demonstrating the significance of astronomy are selected as examples (ὑποδείγματος χάριν, 9.16.5) of behavior to be avoided rather than imitated. In these subsequent chapters, Polybius recalls the failures of four generals from history: Aratus, the Achaean commander (9.17); Cleomones III of Sparta (9.18.1-4); Philip V of Macedon (9.18.5-9); and Nicias the Athenian (9.19.1-4).[331] Because of poor timing, each of these men, Polybius explains, had experienced a significant setback while in command of an

[330] For Odysseus' role in Polybius as a model for historians and for Polybius himself, see Chapter One, pp. 33-4.

[331] For the extent of Polybius' knowledge of Greek history, see Walbank (1993a), especially 21-2, where Walbank concluded that Polybius' understanding of fifth-century history was rather superficial, whereas he shows more familiarity with the events of the fourth century.

army. While the historian notes the flaw in each commander's plan,[332] he gives little detail in this passage about the specific steps which one might take to avoid similar mistakes. With the exception of the proper method for determining the necessary length of ladders, which Polybius describes in detail at the end of the passage (9.19.5-9), he merely suggests that the rest of the problems can be solved through inquiry into astrology.[333] The absence of detailed analysis of the more specific astrological principles involved in these mistakes thus indicates that it is not the primary purpose of these examples to provide the reader with specific instruction of astrology.

What, then, is the historian's purpose in describing at such length the failures of other generals in history? The ostensible goal of this digression is, of course, simply to demonstrate that a basic knowledge of astronomy is an important attribute of a successful general. But if this were the only point to be made, one, or perhaps two, examples would have surely sufficed. If Homer should be praised, moreover, for his *positive* representation of Odysseus, then why does Polybius place so much emphasis on *negative* examples? The repetition of similar mistakes throughout history has the further effect of demonstrating that the lack of sufficient knowledge about this matter is in fact common even among such well-known historical figures as these. In addition, by placing these negative examples after the sole positive example of Odysseus, Polybius frames these four subsequent generals not only as examples of the failure to display a sufficient understanding of astronomy but as men who ignored the positive

[332] Aratus should have used two signals instead of one (9.17.9); Cleomenes did not account for how short the nights were at that time of year (9.18.2); Philip, in addition to bringing ladders which were too short (9.18.5), arrived prematurely for his attack (9.18.6); and Nicias was surprised by a lunar eclipse (9.19.1).

[333] ἐκ μὲν οὖν ἀστρολογίας μέχρι τῶν προειρημένων πολυπραγμονητέον (9.19.5).

example found in Homer.[334] This digression, therefore, is not only about the common failure to understand astronomy, but it is also about the common failure to understand the lessons of the past. By emphasizing that the example of Odysseus already exists in Homer, Polybius suggests that this positive example not only was available to the generals who failed to observe it but also remains available to his own readers. Thus in this case, the primary problem that must be corrected by Polybius' work is not the absence of positive historical examples but rather the failure of subsequent leaders to heed them.

Pessimism about learning from history

This apparent pessimism about the practical ability of such leading men to learn from the example of history is surprising, given Polybius' repeated emphasis on the potential inherent in history to instruct and improve. In spite of these examples of failure, by contrast, Polybius elsewhere suggests that it should not be difficult to learn from history. In the very same book, in fact, and only a few chapters earlier, where he is commenting on the lesson that trickery and opportunity are often more consequential in military operations than open force, Polybius claims that for a willing student this fact is easy to learn from the past (εὐχερὲς τῷ βουλομένῳ καταμαθεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων, 9.12.2). Any failure to learn from history, therefore, does not result from some difficulty inherent in this form of instruction nor does it dissuade the historian from attempting to teach these lessons to his own reader.

[334] Although Polybius elsewhere implies that examples of good behavior are more appropriate to history than examples of the opposite (2.61.6 and 11-12); Sacks (1981) rightly notes that this suggestion is not to be pressed (143 with n. 47), as Polybius' bias in favor of the citizens of Megalopolis, who are the subjects of this passage, and his eagerness to criticize their treatment by Phylarchus have greatly influenced his comments.

Nevertheless, Polybius repeatedly expresses throughout the course of his work his own dismay at the fact that men in general have typically failed to learn the lessons available to them from history. In Book 5, for example, Polybius describes the siege of Selge by Achaeus in 218 BC (5.75). While their city was under this siege, the historian claims, the Selgians made a serious error in allowing people from the enemy camp outside to enter the city in order to purchase provisions (5.75.1). This allowance, in fact, nearly cost the Selgians their city when they were betrayed by one of their own citizens who had hidden some of these soldiers from the camp within his house (5.75.8-76.11). In addition, Polybius notes here that this same error had proved destructive to many such cities in the past (5.75.2-3) but that men remain naïve (νέοι, 5.75.4) to the danger because they fail to keep ready in their minds the misfortunes of those in the past (τὰς τῶν πρότερον ἐπταικότων ἐν ἑκάστοις περιπετείας, 5.75.5). Polybius then concludes by lamenting that men fail to take precautions in such circumstance even though they are able to gain experience in such matters from history and their own investigations (δυνάμενοι... ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης περιποιεῖσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην ἐμπειρίαν, 5.75.6).[335]

In this passage, Polybius is not simply commenting of the failure of the Selgians in this particular instance to learn from the examples of history and avoid the similar mistakes of the past. Rather, he goes beyond the direct implications of this particular incident to apply the

[335] For this meaning of πολυπραγμοσύνη, cf. 12.27.6. For more on this term in Polybius, its distinction from ἐμπειρία, and the importance of this trait for the historian himself, see Sacks (1981), 56-9. Maier (2012b) discusses the overlap between Polybius' use of the related verb (πολυπραγμονέω) for the inquiries conducted both by historians and by historical figures within the narrative (300-304).

fault to mankind at large, whom he describes as the most gullible of all animals.[336] Not just here but at all times, the historian claims, the tendency of the human race is to ignore the lessons available to them from history.[337] The passage discussed above (9.15.1-19.4), in which Polybius recalls multiple examples of historical figures who had failed to adhere to the exemplary model offered by Homer in his depiction of Odysseus, represents not an anomaly in the views of Polybius but rather the typical failure of men in such situations.

This is a failure, of course, which Polybius hopes will be corrected by his own work. As Walbank noted in his *Commentary* on 5.75 (1.601), Polybius offers his reader specific lessons on the avoidance of similar tactical errors in the field in passages such as the one discussed above from Book 9 (9.12-20). Nevertheless, this pessimism about the effectiveness of history in achieving this goal is evident even beyond the passage just mentioned. Again, after his own concentrated attempt to impart such lessons to the readers of his history in Books 9-10, Polybius expresses similar cynicism about the human ability to learn in this way in response to Philip V's capture of Cius in 202 BC (15.21.3-8). Here Polybius once again negatively compares humans to wild animals, who are able to learn from other animals about the dangers of traps (15.21.6). Men, however, after in some cases hearing about and in others even seeing the

[336] μοι δοκεῖ πάντων τῶν ζώων εὐπαραλογιστότατον ὑπάρχειν ἄνθρωπος, 5.75.2. Polybius uses the term 'εὐπαραλογιστότατον' only one other time in the extant portions of his work, at which point he applies it to the common mob of men (πᾶς ὄχλος εὐπαραλόγιστος ὑπάρχει, 11.29.9).

[337] As Pédech (1964) noted, Polybius is not speaking here specifically of "pragmatic history" but rather about the knowledge of the past in general (30).

similar destruction of cities,[338] nevertheless carelessly approach the same traps which have ensnared others (15.21.7).

The repetition of this sentiment here and the comparison between men and beasts reinforces the conclusion that this pessimism is not simply an isolated or extreme aspect of Polybius' overall views on the subject, but rather constitutes a fundamental belief about the unwillingness of humans to learn in this way. In this passage, the historian extends his criticism by claiming that men not only fail to learn the second-hand lessons of history which they hear about (ἀκούοντες), but are not even able to learn from those events which they see for themselves (ὁρῶντες). Since Polybius suggests elsewhere that it is easier to learn from the eyes than from the ears,[339] his criticism of the human failure to learn based even on what they see for themselves further deepens the doubt expressed by Polybius in the educational promise of history (hearing), which presents an even greater challenge.

Additionally, Polybius' doubts to this effect are not only applied, as in the previous examples, to abstract or generic instances of men's failure to heed some prevalent but unspecified historical model. Nor for Polybius do specific examples of such historical models that are commonly ignored only come from the distant and remote past, as was the case with the *exemplum* of Odysseus discussed above. In fact, Polybius also claims that the human tendency to disregard even specific historical examples from more recent and familiar events is common and widespread. In a fragment (22.16) in which Polybius is probably criticizing the

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[338] οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι τὰς μὲν ἀκούοντες ἀπολλυμένας πόλεις ἄρδην τῷ προειρημένῳ τρόπῳ, τὰς δ᾽ ἀκμὴν ὁρῶντες.

[339] See e.g. Polybius' criticism of the research methods of Timaeus (12.27) discussed in Chapter One, pp. 31-2.

harsh treatment of Egyptian rebels by Ptolemy V in 186/5 BC,[340] for example, the historian expresses his regret that although all men admire Philip II of Macedon (θαυμάζουσι μὲν πάντες Φίλιππον, 22.16.2) for his magnanimity after his victory at Chaeronea, they nevertheless fail to imitate his conduct (μιμοῦνται δ᾽ ἥκιστα τὴν τοιαύτην προαίρεσιν, 22.16.3).[341]

The "magnanimity" (μεγαλοψυχία) displayed by Philip II toward the Athenians after Chaeronea, moreover, is cited and praised by Polybius in at least two other passages (5.10.5 and 18.14.14).[342] This historical event, therefore, and Philip's conduct during it clearly hold a prominent place in the historian's formulation of the history of Greece.[343] In addition, his suggestion that even a historical event as significant and well-known as this fails to inspire imitation by others suggests an ultimate pessimism on the part of the historian that any historical event has achieved the correction of subsequent generations which he intends for his own history. While this pessimistic view of the didactic force of history calls into question the purposes of Polybius' own work, which were discussed in Chapter One, we will remember that there too we saw a suggestion by the historian that the works of previous historians had failed

[340] For the placement and context of this fragment, the text of which is not easily legible, see Walbank's *Commentary* (3.203) along with Walbank's and Habicht's note in the revised Loeb translation (2012, 5.434 n. 55).
[341] For mimesis in Polybius (and the related verb used here), see Sacks (1981), 155. Cf. 12.25b.3.
[342] Thornton (2013) argues that the magnanimity repeatedly attributed to Philip II in these passages is emphasized by Polybius in order to impress the value of such behavior upon the current Roman political establishment (222-4).
[343] Walbank (1993a) discussed Polybius' partiality toward Philip II, who was a benefactor of Megalopolis, the home of the historian (21-2). Walbank (1994) further noted the inordinate amount of praise for Philip II by Polybius in spite of the historian's knowledge of other contrasting judgments (28-9 and 38-40). Balot (2010) discussed Polybius' non-Machiavellian interpretation of Philip's behavior (12-13).

to meet their promise to provide practical lessons to their readers. The further implication of the passages discussed here is that the fault for this lies not only with previous historians but also with their readers, who even when aware of the lessons of history are unwilling to adapt their behavior accordingly.

The challenge for Polybius, therefore, is to not simply to record appropriate examples from history but to inspire his reader to learn from them. Although we will see at least one exception in the historian's representation of Scipio Africanus, Polybius' usual approach to this difficulty is not the portrayal of positive examples of specific individuals who defy the general human tendency to ignore the lessons of history. Rather, just as he focused on the negative examples of generals who failed to observe properly the principles of astronomy, the historian also provides specific examples of individuals central to his own narrative who failed to learn the available lessons of history.

Philip V and the failure to learn from history

The example of Philip II's behavior after Chaeronea, for example, is for Polybius an *exemplum* ignored not only by people in general but even more specifically by the later Macedonian king, Philip V. In Book 5 (5.10.1-5), Philip II is cited along with two subsequent Macedonian kings, Antigonus Doson (5.9.8-10)[344] and Alexander the Great (5.10.6-9), as examples of victorious leaders who displayed commendable leniency toward their conquered foes. This digression on earlier Macedonian kings is introduced by Polybius initially in order to

[344] Le Bohec (1993) provides a comprehensive treatment of the life and career of Antigonus, in which he also discusses Polybius as a historical source for this material with a list of important passages (20-24).

demonstrate the serious folly evident in the conduct of Philip V during his ruthless destruction of the Aetolian citadel Thermum, along with the temples and statues there, during the Social War in 218 BC (5.9.1-7).[345] Polybius' critical judgment of Philip V's behavior here will be justified, he claims, by these examples (παραδείγμασιν, 5.9.7), which he has drawn not at random but from the king's very own house (ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οἰκίας ταύτης).[346]

The preliminary purpose of this digression on previous Macedonian kings is to provide support for Polybius' own analysis of the events in his historical narrative.[347] Following his account of these earlier examples of the correct policy which ought to be adopted in victory, Polybius adjusts the significance of these historical *exempla* by focusing on Philip V himself (5.10.9-11). The heir of these previous kings, he states, although he was constantly keeping their conduct in his mind (τότε Φίλιππον ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντα συνεχῶς, 5.10.9) and was constantly attempting to prove that he was the true heir of Philip II and Alexander,[348] nevertheless made no attempt to be their emulator (ζηλωτὴς, 5.10.10) in this and other such matters.

In this way, the historian reframes his digression on previous Macedonian kings as *exempla* which not only verify his own judgments about Philip V but now also portray the current king as someone who knew about but failed to learn from the examples of history. The

[345] For Polybius' interest in and judgment on the "laws of war", see Walbank (1971), 90-91.
[346] For the οἰκία of Philip V as referring to all Macedonian kings and not just Antigonids, see Walbank (1993b), 1725-7, who cited other examples of similar treatment.
[347] For Polybius' use of such *exempla* to provide "proof" (πίστις, e.g. 6.54.4 and 31.30.2) for his own narrative, see Chapter Four.
[348] For further evidence that Philip V was in fact sensitive to this issue of his descent and made conscious efforts to prove his relationship to the earlier line of Macedonian kings, see Walbank (1940), 258-9; his *Commentary* (1.548); and (1993b), 1727-8.

sentiments and language of Polybius in this passage reflect similar statements made elsewhere by the historian regarding the value of his own history in providing such exemplary models to inspire and improve later generations. Following his account of Hasdrubal's death in 207 B.C., for example, Polybius explains why the actions displayed in his depiction of this Carthaginian general, who although defeated had died courageously in battle, are worthy of knowledge and emulation (ἄξιος ἐπιστάσεως εἶναι καὶ ζήλου, 11.2.4) by the reader. While history also offers many examples (πολλὰ γὰρ ὑποδείγματα τῶν τοιούτων πεποίηκεν ὁ προγεγονὼς χρόνος, 11.2.8) of leaders who had exhibited disgraceful behavior in defeat, Polybius explains, the historian Hasdrubal as an example which will demonstrate to the reader both the dangers of exposing oneself in battle and the nobility of self-sacrifice when all hope is lost (11.2.11).[349] Here again, Polybius claims that such lesson from history are easy to understand if the reader is only willing (εὐχερὲς τῷ βουλομένῳ καταμαθεῖν, 11.2.8).

In the earlier passage from Book 5, Philip V explicitly fails in the task which Polybius prescribes for his own readers. The failure of the Macedonian king in this instance is even more pronounced, however, because it occurred not simply out of ignorance of any positive *exempla* but rather, just as many others (cf. 22.16.3), out of an unwillingness to emulate those which he had in his mind. It is precisely this will to change, moreover, which Polybius suggests elsewhere (cf. above, p. 186 on 9.12.2) is the primary obstacle to the improvement of later generations based on the knowledge of history. For Philip, as for us all, history offers readily available

[349] Cf. the passage discussed above (9.9), where Polybius justifies his digression on the courage of both Epaminondas and Hannibal in their parallel marches upon enemy cities as an intended model for future statesmen, who, by remembering (ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι, 9.9.10) and visualizing (ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες) such actions, will be able to emulate (ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται) theses exemplary generals.

lessons from which it is not difficult to learn. But like many others in Polybius' view, Philip is simply unwilling to do this.

Additionally, because Polybius specifically emphasizes that these *exempla* for Philip are not drawn from just anywhere but from the members of his own house, the failure to emulate them offers a contrast to the conduct of figures like Scipio Aemilianus, whose acute awareness of the expectations placed upon him by the famous examples of his ancestors is emphasized and praised by the historian.[350] Significantly, however, Scipio had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct of his father and hearing firsthand the influential speech given by Paullus after Pydna (29.20). Philip V, by contrast, is not presented by Polybius as enjoying the benefit of autopsy for his knowledge of the examples offered by past generations of his house and, therefore, must rely solely upon the medium of history.

Nevertheless, the result of Philip V's unwillingness to heed the examples offered to him by his predecessors, Polybius concludes, is that the Macedonian king conducted himself in a manner opposite to his predecessors and, therefore, earned the opposite reputation (τῆς ἐναντίας ἔτυχε...δόξης, 5.10.11).[351] Again this emphasis on reputation finds parallels in the historian's discussions elsewhere of the importance of the knowledge of the past for preserving the δόξα of great men in order to inspire future generations.[352] The contrast offered by Philip

[350] See e.g. 31.23.12 and my discussion of it in Chapter Four, p. 160.
[351] For a survey of Polybius' treatment of the character and career of Philip V, see McGing (2010), 97-117.
[352] See e.g. my discussion in Chapter Four of the aristocratic funeral at Rome, which, Polybius claims, is intended to solidify the reputation (δόξα, 6.54.3) of the deceased for later generations. Similarly, Scipio Aemilianus demonstrated this principle in action both by recognizing the glorious reputation of his ancestors and by struggling for a reputation of his own which would match theirs (e.g. 31.29.9 and 11).

V demonstrates the significant and lasting effect of his failure to heed the examples of the past and represents for the historian an all too common example of the human tendency to ignore the lessons of history.

Philip V and the failure to teach through history

Following this digression on previous Macedonian kings whom Philip V ought to have imitated, Polybius concludes that the crimes committed at Thermum represented the behavior of a tyrant, not a king (5.11.6), and then offers two explanations for the current king's error in this regard (5.12.5-8).[353] The first is the youth of Philip at this time (5.12.5),[354] which as we have seen is a common explanation in Polybius for the faults of statesmen.[355] Secondly, Polybius cites as the cause of these crimes the poor advice and influence primarily of Demetrius of Pharos upon the young king (5.12.5-8).[356] Taken together, these two reasons presented by

[353] Polybius argues that, in his conduct at Thermum, Philip matches the same sort of lawlessness (παρανομία, 5.11.2) for which he claimed to be punishing the Aetolians. For more on this term, which Polybius tends to use in connection with particularly barbaric behavior, see Champion (2004a), 243-4. For the connection between Polybius' judgment that Philip V exhibited tyrannical behavior and the historian's political theories of Book 6, see McGing (2010), 189-90.

[354] For the date of Philip's birth, see Walbank (1940), 295. He would have been around twenty at this time.

[355] For Philip V as an example of youthful folly, see Eckstein (1995), 145. More recently, McGing (2013) demonstrates that the matter, both in general and specifically with respect to Philip, is more complicated. In the case of Thermum under discussion here, McGing concludes that, although Philip had demonstrated talent beyond his years, he was not able to overcome his youthful follies in this episode (193-4).

[356] At the same time, Polybius absolves Aratus, the other primary advisor of Philip at this time, of any responsibility for the crimes committed at Thermum. For more on Polybius' assignment of blame here, see Walbank (1967), who suggested it is rash to exonerate Aratus completely although Polybius may in the end be correct to place the blame primarily on Demetrius (54-5). For Polybius' negative characterization of Demetrius in general, see Pédech (1964), 45 and 243-4; and Eckstein (1994).

Polybius for Philip's poor behavior at Thermum establish the potential for the development by the historian of the character of the young king once he matures and escapes the negative influence of his advisors.[357] If we look to Polybius' later depiction of Philip V, when he is much older, in fact, we find a different estimation of the educational value of history on the part of the Macedonian king.

In an isolated fragment from Book 23 (23.11), Polybius relates a speech which Philip V allegedly delivered to his two sons, Perseus and Demetrius, in an attempt to reconcile the quarrel between the two of them.[358] In order to convince his sons about the dangers of such sibling rivalry, Philip, according to Polybius, urged them to pay attention to this theme in the examples from the past which they have read about in tragedy, stories, and history (ἀναγινώσκειν τὰς τραγῳδίας καὶ τοὺς μύθους καὶ τὰς ἱστορίας, 23.11.1).[359] Although Philip claims here that all three offer examples of others who had reconciled their differences for the sake of their countries (23.11.2-3), however, the specific examples which he goes on to highlight in Polybius' version of this speech are not tragic or mythical but historical (23.11.4-7).

First, he points to the kings of Sparta, who ruled in harmony for all of Spartan history until the constitutional changes of Cleomenes (23.11.4-5, cf. 2.47.3); and secondly he reminds his sons of the contemporary example of Eumenes and Attalus, whose kingdom of Pergamum

[357] On Polybius' judgment that Philip V's overall behavior improved dramatically after his defeat at Cynoscephalae, see 18.33, which is discussed by Eckstein (1995), 97-8.
[358] The princes clashed openly in 182 BC, which is when this speech is set (Walbank (1940), 246-7). Cf. Livy (40.8.7-20), who records the speech given by Philip here in similar terms. Chaplin (2000) discusses the reframing of the *exempla* in this speech by Livy to suit his own readership (80-82). For Polybius' possible sources for this speech, see Pédech (1964), 269-70.
[359] For the distinction between μύθος (false) and ἱστορία (true), as well as a discussion of these three categories as offering moral instruction to the reader, see Walbank (1960), 226-9.

prospered under their mutual cooperation (23.11.6-7).[360] Philip's choice of these historical figures as exemplary models for his sons demonstrates that he now at least claims to recognize the value of remembering and imitating such positive models. Although he draws the second example from contemporary times, the example of the dual kings of Sparta clearly comes from the historical past. Philip is portrayed by Polybius in this passage as explicitly promoting history and the *exempla* offered by it as an instructional model for his sons.

The contrast between the views expressed here and the criticism previously directed at Philip for his failure to heed similar advice himself as a young man suggests that Polybius is either representing a more mature character in this scene or emphasizing the hypocrisy of Philip's speech.[361] In spite of the content of this speech, however, Polybius does not, at least in the surviving fragment, use this as an opportunity to emphasize that the elder king actually learned these lessons himself based on his own knowledge of history. Although Philip demonstrates here a knowledge that one should learn in this way, the emphasis of the passage is rather on his *failed* attempts to teach these lessons to his sons.[362] In the case of the kings of Sparta, for instance, Philip indicates that he himself has turned the attention of his sons toward these examples many times before;[363] and similarly claims that he has placed the kings of

[360] For Polybius' obituaries of these two kings, see 18.41 (Attalus) and 32.8 (Eumenes).
[361] Millar (1987) similarly noteed the "older and perhaps wiser" depiction of Philip by Polybius in this passage (11).
[362] Chaplin (2000) notes the similar failure of Philip depicted in Livy as well as the subsequent failures of Perseus, who inherits from his father this inability to learn from the past (81-2).
[363] ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι βασιλεῖς πολλάκις ὑμᾶς ἐπέστησα (23.11.4).

Pergamum before the princes' own eyes (τιθεὶς ἐναργῶς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, 23.11.6).[364] Philip is depicted by Polybius in this scene not as a successful student of history but as an example of failure to communicate effectively the lessons of history, since despite his best efforts he is not able to instill proper behavior in his sons through his historical lessons.

Furthermore, the king concludes by admonishing his sons because although they had heard these examples, they did not take them to heart (ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀκούοντες οὐχ οἷον εἰς νοῦν ἐλαμβάνετε, 23.11.8)[365] but rather took the opposite (ἐναντίον) course. In the end, therefore, this episode does not challenge but rather reinforces the now familiar refrain in Polybius' work that, even when men know the examples of history, they typically fail to abide by the lessons offered by them. Although the reaction of Perseus and Demetrius to their father's speech is not preserved in the surviving text of Polybius, the historian's subsequent narrative would certainly have emphasized Philip's failure to communicate effectively this lesson to his sons. Not only were the two brothers not reconciled after this speech, but shortly afterward Perseus conspired against and arranged the death of his brother, Demetrius (cf. Livy 40.24). This again would have given Polybius the opportunity to demonstrate the consequences of the failure to learn from the examples of the past.

In this case, the failure of the two princes reflects the similar failure of their father as a young man, who in the same way was aware of previous examples, but did not heed them and

[364] Polybius uses similar language when describing the historian's task of placing material before the eyes of the reader both with respect to his own history (e.g. θέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, 3.3.6) and to that of other historians (e.g. τιθέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, 15.34.2).

[365] Cf. 38.20.3 (discussed in Chapter Four, pp. 175-6), where Scipio Aemilianus asks his troops who after *seeing* the examples which he has described to them would not take in mind (ἃ τίς οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν θεασάμενος ἐν νῷ λάβοι) the lesson being offered.

instead followed the opposite path (cf. above on 5.10.9-11). Philip's different approach in his maturity to the value of history, therefore, has not stopped his sons from making a similar mistake or rectified this common human deficiency.

Scipio Africanus' research into the past

Polybius' general pessimism about the willingness of humans to learn from the examples of the past is, therefore, matched by his portrayal of people within his history, such as Philip V and his sons, who also fail to adopt the lessons found in history. Although we have seen examples of figures within the narrative, such as Scipio Aemilianus and the mature Philip V, who at least respect the value of the past in offering positive *exempla*, we have nevertheless yet to see an example of an individual who actually conducts research into past events and adapts his behavior in response to the lessons found there. We find an exception to this pessimistic trend, however, with the introduction of the great Roman leader, Scipio Africanus, into the historical narrative.

Polybius' narrative of Africanus' career begins in the Spring of 209 BC, when the young general has taken command of the Roman forces in Spain previously under the authority of his father and uncle. In the extended fragment that has been preserved of this narrative, the historian will describe Africanus' exploits at the head of this army and more specifically the siege of New Carthage and its subsequent capture from the control of the Carthaginians (10.6-20). As we have seen, it is common in Polybius for youthful commanders to make significant mistakes early in their career because of unchecked emotion and lack of rational calculation.[366]

[366] See e.g. my discussions of Hannibal (3.15.6) and Philip V (5.12.5).

Although Polybius similarly emphasizes the youth of Africanus at the start of his command in Spain,[367] the young Roman general demonstrates a remarkable ability to avoid the mistakes which Polybius commonly attributes to others in this position.[368]

In addition to his admirable character traits and natural talent,[369] for which Polybius offers extensive praise in a digression on these qualities in the opening chapters of this book (10.2-5),[370] Africanus' early success in Spain in spite of his lack of previous experience as a general is in fact attributed by historian to his willingness, in contrast to Philip V, to investigate and learn from the lessons offered by the past. In the case of Africanus, the *exemplum* to which he turns is that of his father and uncle, his direct predecessors both in his command in Spain

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[367] Polybius notes that Africanus' handling of this situation and more specifically his precise calculations (ἐκλογισμῶν τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων, 10.6.12) in the decision to invest New Carthage were notable given that he was only twenty-seven years old at the time (ἔτος γὰρ ἕβδομον ἔχων πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι, 10.6.10). Later, Polybius again emphasizes the Roman general's age (10.9.1) in praising the young commander for his ability to keep his plans secret from everyone but his closest confidant, C. Laelius. For further examples, see 10.4.8, where he is underestimated by his mother because he is so young; and 10.40.6, which describes his treatment of the Spanish tribes after his victory at New Carthage.

[368] For Africanus as one of the few individuals in Polybius able to have success despite their youth, see Eckstein (1995), 146 with n. 107. Eckstein also notes that this Roman commander compares favorably in this aspect to both Hannibal and Philip V, who each make mistakes because of their youth.

[369] Like Hannibal, Scipio Africanus fits into the model outlined by Pédech (1964) of an ideal Polybian commander, who relies on reason and calculation and is not governed by emotion (219).

[370] In this passage, Polybius offers an alternative to the "Scipionic Legend", which was widespread in the Augustan period but already in existence by the time Polybius was writing. The proponents of this legend held that the remarkable success of Africanus' career was due to some divine or supernatural aid that attended him throughout his life. Polybius argues that this success was in fact due to the exceptional rational abilities of the great Roman general. For a comprehensive study of this legend and Polybius' reaction to it, see Walbank (1967b), which includes discussion of previous bibliography (54-7), the state of the legend by the time of Augustus (54), and support for the existence of substantial elements of the legend before Polybius (63). For discussion of the legend in other authors along with Polybius, see Haywood (1933), 9-29.

and in his own family. Upon his appointment to the army in Spain, Polybius claims, Africanus right from the beginning conducted investigations at Rome (ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἱστορῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, 10.7.1) into the causes and circumstances surrounding the stunning defeat of the armies commanded by his father in uncle in Spain at the hands of the Carthaginians and their allies.

Although the verb ἱστορεῖν has a range of meanings for Polybius, who sometimes uses it as simply 'to investigate', the historian also uses this verb specifically of historiography.[371] Just a few chapters earlier, for example, Polybius uses the verb of this very narrative when he claims that he is about to give an account of Africanus' actions in Spain.[372] The overlap between these two meanings is evident, of course, in Polybius' use of the verb to refer to the research necessary for a historian in order to write properly his historical account.[373] Because Africanus is not here gathering information, for example, about the journey ahead or engaging in reconnaissance about the position of his opponents, but is rather specifically researching the

[371] Mauersberger's *Polybios-Lexikon* (1.3.1201-2) lists Polybius' use of the verb under two main headings: (I) 'to investigate' and (II) 'to report'. For the first meaning, see e.g. 3.61.3, where Hannibal is described as doing an investigation of the journey ahead in his march toward Rome. In this sense, it overlaps with a number of other verbs used by Polybius of the proper behavior of generals but is not the most common. See Pédech (1964) for a list of such passages (242-3). This passage and that about Hannibal just mentioned are the only examples in Pédech's list, in which this particular verb is employed. For Polybius' related use of the noun ἱστορία, see my discussion of 9.14 in Chapter One, pp. 20-22.

[372] μέλλοντες ἱστορεῖν τὰ πραχθέντα Ποπλίῳ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν (10.2.1). Cf. Polybius' criticism of Timaeus for giving false accounts in his history (πολλὰ ἱστορεῖ ψευδῆ ὁ Τίμαιος, 12.7.1). Both of these passages are listed under the second heading (II) of Mauersberger's *Polybios-Lexikon* (1.3.1202).

[373] See e.g. Polybius' claim that Timaeus conducted insufficient and lazy research (ὑπὲρ ὧν Τίμαιος κακῶς καὶ παρέργως ἱστορήσας, 12.4.4). Mauersberger's *Polybios-Lexikon* (1.3.1201) lists both this passage and 10.7.1 in the first heading under the sub-category (I.2) 'to gather information'.

events of the past, Polybius' choice of this verb gains added significance. By emphasizing this diligent inquiry into the history of the previous Spanish campaign, Polybius is portraying Africanus as a positive example of the kind of historical investigation neglected by so many others.[374]

Polybius' depiction of Africanus' inquiry thus extends beyond even the historian's portrayal of Scipio Aemilianus, as Africanus did not have the benefit of witnessing first-hand the events in Spain about which he is eager to learn. Additionally, this particular *exemplum* is especially appropriate for Africanus not just because he will soon find himself in similar circumstances at the command of the very same army but also because the example offered comes from members of his own family. Such *exempla*, as we have seen, hold particular significance in Polybius' view because of the powerful sway which the memory of ancestors holds for present generations.[375]

The young Africanus' investigation into the failures of his predecessors in Spain before setting out for his own command, moreover, does not simply represent an isolated comment inserted by the historian but plays a significant role in Polybius' account of the general's subsequent actions upon assuming this position. In the opening passage of his narrative of Africanus' command in Spain, Polybius describes a scene in which Scipio has assembled his army on the banks of the Ebro in order to address and encourage them for their present

[374] Maier (2012b) notes (304 n. 24) the overlap between Africanus' behavior here and the research done by a proper historian but does not discuss further the implications of this for Polybius' characterization of the general. See also, Maier (2012c), 63.

[375] As was discussed above (pp. 192-3) on 5.9.7, Polybius claims that Philip V ought to have heeded the *exempla* offered because they same from his own house. For the special significance of such *exempla* at Rome, see my previous chapter on Scipio Aemilianus and the aristocratic funeral.

campaign (10.6). In the speech which he delivers in this passage, Africanus draws directly upon the lessons that he has learned from his research into the causes of the prior defeats suffered by this army and bids his soldiers not to be discouraged by their past reversal of fortune (τὴν προγεγενημένην περιπέτειαν, 10.6.1).[376] He argues rather that these Roman forces had never been defeated by the Carthaginians on the basis of valor (οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἡττῆσθαι, 10.6.2) but because of the treachery of their Celtiberian allies and the recklessness of their own generals in allowing themselves to be cut off from each other. These two specific points are in fact the exact same conclusions which Polybius claims Africanus learned in his research about the previous campaigns (10.7.1).

Africanus goes on to argue that in the present situation the opposite is now true, as the Carthaginians have lost the loyalty of their allies and their own armies are too spread out (10.6.3-5). Based on this reading of the past, Scipio concludes that the Romans should approach the coming campaign with the confidence that the results will consequently be different this time around (10.6.6).[377] Not only does he properly conduct this inquiry into the past, therefore, he is able to apply the lessons which he learned from that inquiry to the present situation in which the roles of the two armies have been reversed and to communicate effectively his conclusions to the army. Although such attempts to recall and interpret the past are common elements of such pre-battle speeches (see note 376), the critical difference in this

[376] For the standard *topos* in pre-battle speeches of past defeats, cf. my discussion in Chapter Three of similar speeches by Hannibal (e.g. 3.44.10-13, 3.111, and 15.11). The distinction here will rest on Africanus' use of examples which he did not experience himself.

[377] Davidson (1991) quotes this passage as an example of the re-interpretation of history evident in Polybius' work and describes Scipio here as "rewriting the history of his father's campaigns earlier in the war" (20). Davidson (1991) further notes on this passage the recurring pattern in Polybius of a father's ambitions being achieved by his son (20 n. 47).

instance is that Scipio was not present in Spain at the time of these events and, therefore, had to acquire his knowledge of them through historical inquiry.

Africanus' research into the fate of his father and uncle in Spain and the reasons for their defeat serve him well not only in his initial attempt to inspire his troops prior to the campaign but also during the campaign itself. After obtaining further information about the current situation in Spain (10.7.4-5), Scipio, Polybius reports, decides not to risk an immediate engagement with the Carthaginians because of the defeat of those before him (διὰ τὸ προηττῆσθαι τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, 10.7.6) as well as his own present numerical inferiority. More explicitly, Polybius explains, Scipio is afraid that he will suffer the same fate as his uncle and father.[378] As a result, the new general will instead pursue a different course and focus his attention on the city of New Carthage (10.8.1). In Polybius' judgment Africanus' understanding of the past and his ability to learn from the mistakes of his predecessors plays a crucial role in his remarkable success in restoring the Roman prominence in Spain at this time.

In the speech (10.11.5-8) which Africanus delivers to his troops on the day prior to this assault on New Carthage, the general again returns to the information and lessons he had acquired through his diligent research. According to Polybius, Scipio first presents to his troops the very arguments (ἀπολογισμοῖς, 10.11.5) which had persuaded him to attack New Carthage. Polybius adds that these were the arguments which he himself had discussed above (ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἄρτι πεποιήμεθα λόγον). In this, he refers us back to

[378]κατάφοβος ἦν μὴ ταῖς αὐταῖς Γναΐῳ τῷ θείῳ καὶ Ποπλίῳ τῷ πατρὶ περιπέσῃ συμφοραῖς. Polybius' use of the verb περιπίπτω here corresponds to Scipio's own use of the term περιπέτεια above (10.6.1) and emphasizes the potential link between Scipio's own situation and that of his predecessors.

10.7-8, where he had discussed Scipio's inquiries into the previous campaigns in Spain, as well as the current Carthaginian positions there and the circumstances at New Carthage, all of which had informed Scipio's decision to mount an attack on the city.[379] Polybius concludes that the precise calculation (ἀπολογισμοῖς ἀκριβέσι, 10.11.8) of this speech, combined with Africanus' promise of golden crowns as rewards for exceptional displays of courage in the battle and his controversial claim that Poseidon would aid their victory[380] produced great passion and enthusiasm among the men.[381] Although the examples of the past are neither the only subject of the general's research nor the only feature of this speech, they nevertheless play an essential role in his overall strategy and his efforts to convince his soldiers of its efficacy.[382]

Polybius' praise for Africanus' conduct up to this point in the campaign, moreover, is born out by the general's subsequent victory and the capture of New Carthage (10.12-20). The Roman general's effort to re-write the history of his nation's involvement in Spain by correcting the mistakes of his predecessors persists as he continues his campaign. He returns to the theme in fact during his final challenge in command of the army there when he is forced to suppress the revolt of the Spanish prince, Andobales, after which Spain is secured under Roman control (11.31-3). Prior to this final engagement in Spain, Africanus addresses his troops in

[379] Eckstein (1995) addresses this characterization of Scipio by noting that Polybius shows Scipio "rationally analyzing the causes of Roman defeat, even before he left Rome" and once in Spain is "presented as a diligent researcher and planner" (178).
[380] For the inconsistency between Polybius' placement of this mention of Neptune and Livy's (26.45.9), where it is postponed to the following day, see Walbank's *Commentary* (2.193-6); Walbank (1967b), 67-8; and Scullard (1970), 58-7. All defend Polybius' time-frame. Eckstein (1995) discusses the potential "Machiavellian" interpretation of this passage (85-6).
[381] For more on the mixture of these three elements in Scipio's speech, see Pédech (1964), 279.
[382] Pédech (1964) included Scipio's inquiries both into the previous campaigns in Spain and into the current situation at New Carthage in his list of qualities which define Scipio as an ideal Polybian figure, but he does not discuss them in further detail (219).

typical fashion in order to rouse their spirits for the coming battle (11.31). He begins this speech by enumerating the past battles of these troops against the joint forces of the Spaniards and the Carthaginians (ἐξηριθμήσατο τοὺς προγεγενημένους αὐτοῖς ἀγῶνας, 11.31.3). As they had proved successful in each of these previous encounters, he concludes, there should be no doubt that they will now prove victorious against the Spanish troops alone (11.31.4). The Roman general then reveals that he intends to refuse the aid of their Spanish allies in this battle (11.31.5) in order to prove to all that the success of this war was the result of Roman efforts alone (11.31.6). In the end, Polybius claims that this speech was successful in stirring the spirits of the men and preparing them for the coming battle (11.31.8).[383]

Again, it is typical of pre-battle speeches for a general to recall the past in order to strengthen the spirits of his troops.[384] In fact, we have already seen Africanus himself employ a similar technique in his first address upon taking command of this army in Spain prior to their siege of New Carthage (10.6). At that time, however, the inexperience of the new commander in the field forced him to recall the campaigns of his predecessors, about which he had learned through his own research at Rome. In these previous campaigns, moreover, the Romans had been defeated, which presented the general with the task of proving that this coming campaign under his own command would be different. The subsequent success of the Romans against the Carthaginian and Spanish forces ultimately proved this interpretation of the past correct.

In this final address to his troops in Spain, however, Africanus is in a different situation. The shared experience between himself and the soldiers over the course of the current

[383] Champion (2004a) highlights this speech of Scipio along with his subsequent actions against the Spanish rebels as an example of Roman foresight and calculation in contrast to the irrational behavior of the barbarians (73-4). For this portrayal of the Spanish, see 11.32.5-6.
[384] See above note 376.

campaign provide him with sufficient material that he is not forced to appeal to the historical *exempla* of his predecessors. His claim that the Romans had always proved victorious in these engagements (11.31.4), in fact, indicates that he is now limiting his recollection of past battles to those of the current campaign at the exclusion of the defeat of his predecessors, which he recalled in his first speech. The events of the current campaign, in which Africanus was personally involved, had the additional advantage of supporting his argument that the Romans should have no doubts about their future success because of their unblemished record, a point which would of course be undermined by any reminder of the failure of previous Roman commanders.

As his speech continues, however, Africanus betrays his own memory of the failure of the Roman forces under the command of his father and uncle. In the previous speech, we will recall, the young general had argued that in spite of their previous losses, the Roman forces in Spain had never been defeated by the Carthaginians in terms of their own valor (οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἡττῆσθαι, 10.6.2), but rather because of the treachery of their allies and the folly of their generals. In the present speech, Africanus seeks to prove that point once and for all. His decision to reject any aid from the Spaniards in this engagement, he claims, will make it clear to all (ἵνα φανερὸν γένηται πᾶσιν, 11.31.6) that the ultimate Roman victory over the Carthaginians in Spain was not, as some say (καθάπερ ἔνιοί φασιν), won because of their Spanish allies but because of Roman valor and excellence (ταῖς Ῥωμαίων ἀρεταῖς καὶ τῇ σφετέρᾳ γενναιότητι). This decision is intended to demonstrate the validity of Africanus'

initial interpretation of past Roman failure in Spain by verifying the superior quality of the Roman forces.

By having Africanus indicate that he wishes to make this point "clear to all", Polybius is portraying the Roman as a leader concerned for the impact of his actions beyond his immediate audience. In this speech, that is, Africanus appears to recognize that there will be alternative interpretations of these events which must be actively resisted. Just as he has offered his own interpretation of the past in both of these speeches in order to achieve a desired effect on his own troops in the present, so will these events and the interpretation of them be important to subsequent events in the future. By incorporating this element into Africanus' speech, Polybius is again, therefore, drawing attention to the multiple levels at which *exempla* operate within his work. Not only do such events serve as models for Polybius' reader, but Africanus as a character within the narrative is depicted as actively creating and shaping this *exemplum* himself for present and future audiences.

Finally, Polybius describes the effect of this speech on the troops themselves,[385] as it produced such great confidence among the Roman forces that it was as if they could see the enemy in front of them and were about to fight the battle then and there (11.31.8).[386] As we saw above, Philip V's failed attempt to represent historical *exempla* to his sons was described by Polybius in visual terms, using language similar to that which he uses of the process of

[385] For the significance of the reaction of internal audiences to the *exempla* cited by speakers in Livy, see Chaplin (2000), 50-72. Although Livy's version of this speech by Africanus (26.41.2-25) has a similarly strong impact on the Roman troops (26.42.1), unlike in Polybius Livy has Africanus appeal to the *exempla* of Rome's past defeats at the hands of Hannibal (Chaplin (2000), 64-5)).

[386] τῷ δὲ πλήθει τοιαύτη παρέστη προθυμία καὶ θάρσος ὥστε παραπλησίους εἶναι πάντας ἐκ τῆς ἀπόψεως τοῖς ὁρῶσι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μέλλουσιν ὅσον οὔπω πρὸς αὐτοὺς διακινδυνεύειν.

writing history. In his article on the importance of sight for Polybius and his historiographical principles, moreover, Davidson (1991) discusses the significance of visualization for the experience of the readers as well, who should be able to "see" the events described to them in order for history to achieve its full effect (14).[387] In this case, however, it is not the past which Africanus' soldiers are visualizing but the future of the coming battle.[388] As we have seen, this also in Polybius' view is a significant effect of history, since when properly conducted it allows the reader not only to recall the past but to foresee the future.[389] The striking visual effect of this speech, in which Africanus draws heavily upon his own understanding of the past, emphasizes the general's exceptional success in representing the historiographical precepts of the historian himself by learning from the past, applying to his campaign what he has learned, and conveying to his troops the lessons gained from his research.

Learning from experience or from history?: Hannibal and Africanus

This positive portrayal of Scipio Africanus' campaign in Spain as a young man sets the stage for Polybius' narrative of the Roman general's invasion of Africa, where he meets and

[387] For examples from Polybius, see e.g. 3.38.5, 8.1.4, and 9.9.10 (τὰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες). See also my discussion in the previous chapter (pp. 148-55) of Polybius' description of the reaction of the audience at the Roman funeral oration, who are similarly able to visualize the events of the past (λαμβάνοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰ γεγονότα, 6.53.3).
[388] For the ancient philosophical notion of φαντασία, which includes an element of imagination similar to that described here by Polybius, see Watson (1988), Silverman (1991), and (among her numerous publications on the subject) Sheppard (1997), which cites further bibliography.
[389] Cf. above, note 37 on 12.25b.3 (τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον).

ultimately defeats Hannibal at the Battle of Zama in 202 BC (15.1-19).[390] For Polybius, this campaign represents a new phase of the war, which now takes on a new beginning (ὁ πόλεμος ἄλλην ἀρχὴν εἰλήφει, 15.3.1), more serious and hostile than it had been before.[391] The qualities that have defined Africanus up to this point such as his respect for the examples of the past remain significant as the Roman general faces this new and even more perilous situation. For example, early in this campaign Africanus refuses to maltreat the Carthaginian envoys who have just returned from a mission to Rome (15.4.5-12) in spite of the previous treachery of the Carthaginians against his own. Polybius, moreover, portrays this action as an attempt to defend the proverbial "good deeds of [his] forefathers" (πατέρων εὖ κείμενα ἔργα, 15.4.11). Although the origins of this phrase are obscure,[392] we can nevertheless see Scipio here respecting and adhering to the positive example of the past in spite of the temptation of his present circumstances and the negative example offered by the Carthaginians.[393] This again

[390] For the parallel lives of Hannibal and Africanus, as they are developed in Livy, see Rossi (2004), who reads Scipio as the antithesis of Hannibal. Levene (2010), however, argues that Africanus is not quite the antithesis Rossi suggests and contrasts Livy's presentation with that of Polybius (231-35).

[391] The historian thus here includes a brief "proem in the middle," a technique which is both more developed and more widely recognized in Latin poetry (see further Conte (1992)). Polybius also describes Africanus himself as recognizing this troubling new beginning to the war at the start of this book (15.1.2). Cf. 3.6.6 for the importance of distinguishing between the beginning (ἀρχή) of a war and the cause and pretext (αἰτίας και προφάσεως), which I have discussed previously. For contrast, cf. Polybius' criticism of Hannibal for his improper analysis of the causes of the Second Punic War in his discourse with the Roman envoys at New Carthage (3.15.9).

[392] See Walbank's *Commentary* (2.445) for some possibilities and the suggestion that Polybius made use of a collection of proverbs.

[393] Champion (2004a) points to this passage as an example of Polybius' portrayal of Scipio Africanus, along with Scipio Aemilianus, as "paragons of Roman ancestral virtue, in sharp contrast with many of their contemporaries" (174).

places Africanus in a distinctly different category from leaders like Philip V who ignore the positive examples set by their ancestors.

It is a similar display of magnanimity by Africanus, furthermore, that catches the attention of Hannibal after the pardon and release of some Carthaginian spies (15.5.8) and consequently inspires Hannibal to arrange the meeting (15.6-8) between the two leaders on the eve of their climactic battle at Zama. In Chapter Three, I discussed Hannibal's message to Africanus (15.6.4-7.9), in which the Carthaginian lectures his Roman counterpart about the mutability of Fortune, a lesson which he has learn from his own career. Polybius composed this scene not simply in order to enhance his characterization of Hannibal but more importantly to contrast directly the two most prominent figures of this war and the distinct paths they have taken to achieve their success.

This contrast is highlighted by Polybius when, in spite of the wisdom displayed in Hannibal's speech, Africanus dismisses the arguments of his opponent and refuses his offer of peace. Specifically in response to Hannibal's lesson about the inconsistency of fortune, Africanus responds that he looks to matters of fortune no less than anyone else (βλέπειν δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς τύχης οὐδενὸς ἧττον, 15.8.3) and strives to understand human affairs as much as possible (τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων στοχάζεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν). Africanus then devotes the remainder of his speech to an explanation of his reasons for rejecting the specific conditions of peace proposed by Hannibal and his justifications for continuing the war (15.8.4-14). Hannibal's Roman counterpart appears, therefore, to ignore the lesson vitally important to Polybius' work that Fortune is unpredictable.

The behavior of Africanus after his victory in the coming battle (15.17) suggests a different interpretation. There, Polybius has Africanus claim that his decision to treat his defeated foes with magnanimity (μεγαλοψύχως, 15.17.4) had been reached in recognition of the nature of fortune and human affairs (τῆς τύχης καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων). The historian thus explicitly depicts Africanus as respectful of the sentiments contained in Hannibal's advice.[394] When Africanus suggests to Hannibal before the battle, therefore, that he does pay attention to matters of Fortune, he is being sincere. His refusal to accept Hannibal's terms is not a denial of the lesson that Fortune is fickle but rather a repudiation of the self-serving goals for which Hannibal employs it before the battle.[395]

Hannibal's mistake, then, lies not in the lesson itself but in his assumption that Africanus would be ignorant of it because of his relative lack of experience. This mistake results from Polybius' representation of Hannibal as a leader who learns only through his own personal experience. As we have seen, by contrast, Africanus – uniquely in Polybius – has shown a willingness to learn in another way: through the study of history. At the start of his career the young Roman conducted research (ἱστορῶν, 10.7.1) into the campaigns of his predecessors in Spain before he had left Rome to take up his command. Polybius there explicitly states that as

[394] Balot (2010) rightly recognizes the connection between the two passages but interprets the clemency of Africanus after the battle as evidence that the Roman has in fact learned from Hannibal's advice (19). Even before Zama, however, Polybius repeatedly emphasizes the clemency of Africanus. This meeting between the two generals, for example, was initially inspired by Hannibal's admiration for Scipio's clemency toward some captured Carthaginian spies (15.5.8; see also 10.40.6). The Roman general's behavior following the battle, therefore, is consistent with his previous character and does not suggest a significant transformation inspired by Hannibal's message.

[395] As Balot (2010) notes (19), Hannibal's clear self-interest in his speech to Africanus does not undermine the legitimacy of his point, but it does suggest that Polybius' reader is a more appropriate audience for the speech than Africanus.

a result of this research, Africanus determined (συλλογιζόμενος) the causes of his father's downfall (τὴν περιπέτειαν).[396] It is also this same περιπέτεια about which the Roman general later reminded his troops in his initial address to them (10.6.1). All along Africanus has shown that he understands the potential reversal of fortune which threatens the careers of all commanders in the field. He has learned this, however, not from his own experience with such a reversal, but from his research into the history of the downfall of his father and uncle in Spain before him.

Hannibal's failure to understand this aspect of Africanus' character is emphasized by Polybius when the historian has the Carthaginian general claim that Africanus is in need of this lesson from someone with practical experience because he is still very young (διὰ τὸ νέον εἶναι κομιδῇ, 15.7.1). Earlier in his narrative of Africanus' career, Polybius has often noted the Roman general's youth in similar terms.[397] But as McGing (2010) points out (186), the reference to the youth of Africanus becomes strained in this later stage of the war, seven years after the Roman general first took command in Spain, when he was now 34. Elsewhere in Polybius, the term νέος refers to a young man roughly between the ages of fifteen and

[396] The term περιπέτεια in Polybius usually refers to a negative turn of events, as it does here (see also, e.g. 1.23.1). It can also, however, be a positive reversal of fortune (21.26.16 and 32.8.4). Even when referring to a "chance occurrence", such as the timely enrollment of a legion at Rome, which frustrated the attack of Hannibal on the city (9.9.3), the term still implies a shift in fortune for those involved. For the full range of meanings, see Mauersberger's *Polybios-Lexikon* (2.1.299-301). For and the importance which Polybius places on such events for their instructive value, see Sacks (1981), 132-3. For Aristotle's famous discussion of the role of a περιπέτεια in the plot of a tragedy, see *Poet.* 1452a.22-29.

[397] E.g. καὶ γὰρ ἦν κομιδῇ νέος (10.4.8) and ᾗ κομιδῇ νέος ὢν (10.40.7).

thirty.[398] Africanus' age at this time does not fall within Polybius' typical use of the term. Importantly, this label is applied to Africanus here not in the voice of the narrator but is composed by Polybius in the speech of Hannibal. The problematic identification of Africanus as still young and inexperienced invites the reader to question Hannibal's assumptions about the naivety of his Roman opponent.

In his reply to Hannibal, the Roman general characteristically demonstrates not just his knowledge of the past but also his concern for his present actions as an example for the future. If he should fail to punish the Carthaginians for their treachery in breaking the peace treaty, he tells Hannibal, then they would learn (διδαχθῶσι, 15.8.11) that they could do this without repercussions in the future (εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν). As was the case in his final address to his troops in Spain (11.31), Africanus here again shows his awareness of the historical implications of his own actions and the potential *exemplum* that they will represent for others. Whereas Hannibal, therefore, consistently looks to his own past experiences for wisdom, Africanus looks both to the historical examples of others and to the future impact of his own actions.

Conclusion

This concern for the future is a trait which we also have seen represented in Africanus' adopted grandson Scipio Aemilianus, who in this way also follows in the footsteps of the forefathers for whom he expresses great respect. But the explicit characterization of Africanus as a young man who conducts specific research into historical examples and employs the

[398] Eckstein (1995), 141 n. 90. The term is used of T. Quinctius Flamininus (18.12.5), whom Polybius describes as not over the age of thirty.

lessons learned from them in his strategic decisions, the speeches to his troops, and the meeting with his great adversary Hannibal, remains distinctive. In contrast to Polybius' repeated affirmation that common men, and even prominent leaders like Philip V, typically fail in this fundamental aspect of practical training, Africanus stands out as an exceptional model of a πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ.

Based on this characterization of this great Roman general, Polybius uses the meeting of Hannibal and Africanus before Zama to juxtapose the two different approaches to learning which are available to mankind: learning from personal experience and learning from history.[399] On the one hand, Hannibal has learned from his own experience about the mutability of Fortune, a lesson fundamental to Polybius' work. Africanus, by contrast, learns the same lesson from his knowledge of the historical past. But Hannibal's erroneous assumption that Africanus is too young and inexperienced to understand such an important lesson has further relevance here. Africanus is no longer the new, untested general that he was when he was granted command of the Roman forces in Spain. His knowledge of history, that is, is now augmented by his own practical experience as a general during that previous campaign. When Polybius' quotes the proverb in reference to Hannibal's defeat at the hands of Africanus that "though good, he met another man better" (ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν, 15.16.6), the historian is not simply referring the contrast between practical experience and the knowledge of history. To be sure, Polybius creates a positive portrayal of Hannibal as an example of the value of practical experience and goes to great lengths to exonerate him of any blame in the defeat. But Africanus is extraordinary for Polybius because

[399] See e.g. 1.35.7-10 discussed in Chapter One, pp. 11-14.

he augments his own experience with reseach into the past experiences of others and, therefore, represents a complete πραγματικὸς ἀνήρ with the benefit of both.

The exceptional nature of Africanus among those in Polybius' historical narrative in this respect has significant implications for the historian's broader views on the potential benefit of history. Although Polybius portrays Africanus as unique in his willingness to learn from history, he is at the same time eager to dispel the notion that there was anything miraculous about the success enjoyed by this great Roman general.[400] The research which Africanus conducts at Rome before leaving for Spain, in fact, appears rather unremarkable until it is compared with the repeated failure of so many others in Polybius to do the same, even when relevant historical lessons are readily available to them. Thus for Polybius' reader the example of Africanus demonstrates that a basic willingness to heed the lessons of history is not only a fundamental element of training for practical life but an action which can truly set someone apart from the masses of people who fail to perform this simple task.

[400] See above, note 370 on 10.2-5 for Polybius' attempts to counter the popular "Scipionic Legend".

Conclusion

We have now come a long way from the subtle criticisms of previous historians evident in Polybius' preface, criticisms which become more pointed and obvious in the course of his work. While ultimately one cannot miss the disdain which Polybius expresses for the failures of his predecessors to compose truly beneficial πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, the careful reader will now see that the responsibility for the failures of the past lies not just with previous historians but also with their readership, who have too often been unwilling to accept even the most obvious and well-known lessons of history. How then will Polybius and his reader succeed where so many before have failed?

The answer to this question lies at the heart of Polybius' work. Our survey of Polybius' text has shown us that the answer to this question is ultimately the answer to the fundamental question with which Polybius defines his history: "How and by what type of constitution nearly the whole world in less than fifty-three years fell under the sole rule of the Romans (1.1.5)."[401] Although obviously not alone in success or in earning the praise of the historian, the Romans have found a special place in our study of the proper means of education and improvement in Polybius. The advantage enjoyed by the Romans in Polybius' view begins with their remarkable ability – not just of special individuals but of their collective population – to adapt and learn based on their past experiences and failures. And although even the simple societies of the unstable *anakyklosis* demonstrate some ability to learn in a similar fashion, the distinctive

[401] πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων

quality of the Romans rests in their ability to remember and preserve these lessons over time and generations.

The relationship between this ability of the Romans and their remarkable success reveals that the second part of Polybius' opening question – "by what type of constitution" – is not answered solely by the digression of Book 6. Rather, the Roman constitution, by which Polybius means not just their government but all of their customs and institutions, is inextricably and reciprocally linked to their past experiences and the lessons learned from them. That is, the superior quality of the Roman constitution is on the one hand the direct result of – in contrast to the Spartan constitution of Lycurgus –a long process of experience-based reform (6.10.12-14). At the same time, Roman customs such as the aristocratic funeral, which is also included in Polybius discussion of the Roman "constitution" (6.53-4), have instilled in Roman society an innate reverence for the exemplary value of the past. The memory of the past then is both fundamental to the creation of their constitution and in turn reinforced by it. While these specific institutions and their development are described in Book 6, the relationship between the Roman constitution, which Polybius suggests was fundamental to Roman success, and the Roman ability to learn from the past is relevant much more broadly throughout Polybius' work.

The values promoted by the aristocratic funeral become evident in Polybius' representation of great Roman leaders such as Aemilius Paullus (29.20) and Scipio Aemilianus (e.g. 31.24, 35.4, and 38.21). Such men demonstrate in Polybius not only the appropriate respect for the *exempla* of the past but, by becoming model *exempla* themselves, also represent the continuation of those values into the future. This cyclical and recurring process

which Polybius depicts in his Roman subjects stands in contrast to other great figures in his text, most notably Hannibal. While Hannibal too has earned the respect and praise of the historian, who uses the Carthaginian general as a model of the great value of practical experience in the education of future leaders, Hannibal's success for Polybius is ultimately a dead-end. In spite of the fact that Hannibal's ability to learn from his experience teaches him valuable lessons and even enables him to become a model historian in Polybius' view, the absence for the Carthaginians of institutions rooted in the preservation of the past results in the lack of an audience on Hannibal's side who will not only hear but also pass on the wisdom gained by their great leader.

The one man in whom Hannibal believes he has found a suitable pupil has no need of the wisdom which Hannibal has acquired. Scipio Africanus is underestimated by Hannibal in Polybius' portrayal because, unlike Hannibal, Africanus benefits from a culture that values and preserves the past. The Romans, in fact, only entrust their fate to Africanus after learning from their past failures against another exceptionally talented individual, Archimedes. All that is left for Africanus to do is to take the simple – although too commonly neglected – step of investigating and learning from the specific lessons offered by those previously in his position.

How then did the Romans come to rule the world in such a short period of time? The answer is that they were propelled by a special combination of experience-based adaptability, an institutionally entrenched respect and preservation of the past, and at least one exceptional leader willing to combine his practical experience with the lessons of history. This answer helps us to address the question of Polybius' complicated and apparently contradictory statements regarding the didactic value of history discussed in Chapter One. In these passages, Polybius

appeared sometimes to suggest that the study of history is the ideal method of instruction for future statesmen and other times to indicate that personal experience is more important. We have now found strong evidence in support of the suggestion that it is not one method or the other – experience or history – which Polybius promotes, but an interdependent combination of both. This combination of approaches, which Polybius applies specifically to the technical training of future military commanders (9.14), is relevant both to the historian's broader didactic purposes and to his understanding of the remarkable success of Rome. Polybius' role through his own history, which emphasizes this dual approach, is to spread this method of Rome's success across national boarders and future generations. In this way, Polybius hopes to correct the failures of his predecessors and to convince his readers to accept the lessons offered by his history.

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