Turkish Foreign Policy in Cyprus and Azerbaijan: A Structural Realist Interpretation

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

Introduction.

The course of Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the modern Republic has generally been one of non-intervention in international crises. Indeed, Turkish troops have been deployed for combat in only two conflicts since the end of the War of Independence following the First World War: Korea and Cyprus. Most scholars agree that Turkish involvement in Korea was designed to facilitate Turkey's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and is an important study in Turkish foreign policy in its own right. However, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 poses more intriguing questions about the nature of Turkish foreign policy making; it was this policy initiative that was pursued in direct defiance of the interests of the NATO alliance, threatening the viability of the very security arrangement for which Turkish involvement in Korea had been pursued.

Conventional wisdom, and indeed the official line of Turkish foreign policy elites, holds that the willingness of the Turkish government to gamble with the survival of the NATO alliance was prompted by a profound moral and legal obligation to protect the Turkish minority of Cyprus from possible genocide at the hands of Greek Cypriot extremists. This conventional wisdom falls dramatically short of a complete explanation of Turkish policy in Cyprus when one contrasts that episode with a more contemporary one, similar in a number of crucial respects. The eruption of ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis on Turkey's eastern frontier that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union has failed to elicit the same assertive response as did the situation in Cyprus. Ethnic affinity with the Azerbaijanis has certainly provided a similar emotional impetus for intervention, yet despite occasional saber-rattling, decisive actions were taken against neither the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, nor against Armenia proper. This apparent anomaly poses the question of what factors, if not ethnic affinity,

explain why Turkey intervened military in one case, but refrained from such action in the other.

The hypothesis presented in this thesis is that the divergent policy outcomes observed in the cases in question can best be explained structural realist terms. This thesis demonstrates that the exercise of assertive foreign policy by Turkey in the cases examined was a function of a composite variable called geopolitical constraint, composed of the interpreted probability of Soviet or Russian reciprocation, the degree of leverage exercised by the American executive on Turkish decision-making, and the presence of a regional hegemonic threat to assertive policy. It is important to note that no one of the above three factors is sufficient as an explanatory variable. Nor is the claim made that any one is a necessary condition. Rather, any combination of them, if resulting in a low value of the composite variable geopolitical constraint, does serve as a sufficient explanation of assertive policy outcome. Expressed in Boolean terms:

> policy outcome = f (geopolitical constraint),
> where geopolitical constraint = (high probability of Soviet/Russian reciprocation) *or* (high degree of American leverage) *or* (presence of regional hegemonic threat);
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> when geopolitical constraint = 0, policy outcome = intervention
> when geopolitical constraint > 0, policy outcome = non-intervention

The above hypothesis is tested in chapters one and two by employing Mill's Method of Difference. To isolate geopolitical constraint as a sufficient explanation for policy outcome, alternative explanations posited by contending theoretical approaches to foreign policy are carefully refuted in chapter two. This is followed in chapter three by an exposition of crucial variation in geopolitical factors across the two cases. The result of this analysis is the conclusion that for these two cases of Turkish foreign policy response to ethnic conflict, geopolitical factors are sufficient to explain the observed divergence.

Chapter 1: Background of the Cases.

Cyprus.

In 1974, the Turkish military invaded the Republic of Cyprus, ostensibly to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from impending oppression, and possible genocide, at the hands of a reactionary military junta. Turkey's intervention in Cyprus was uncharacteristic of its foreign policy to date. While Turkey had intervened in the Korean conflict, that involvement was undertaken multilaterally, under the aegis of the United Nations. Despite earlier brushes with intervention in Cyprus in 1964 and 1967, the summer of 1974 marked the first time in the history of the modern Turkish Republic in which Turkey unilaterally, and without the sanction of any international organization, intervened outside its own borders.

The Turkish intervention of 1974 was precipitated, in the short term, by the ouster of Greek Cypriot leader and internationally recognized President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III. Makarios, who was leader of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, had assumed leadership of the Greek community on Cyprus immediately following the Second World War, and was vocal in his attacks upon British colonial rule of the island. He had in fact appeared before the United Nations in 1951 to denounce British rule and request that the principle of "self-determination" be applied to the "Cypriot people." This appeal was, however, a euphemism for *enosis*, or political unification of Cyprus with the Greek mainland, an ideal born out of the Greek struggle for independence from Ottoman Turkey in the 1820s and a fervent political idea even after the cession of Cyprus to Britain in 1878.[1] When a second appeal to the United Nations went unheard in 1954, Makarios' underground militia, *Ellenikos Organismos*

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[1]Eric Solsten, ed., *Cyprus: A Country Study* (Washington: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1993), 20.

Kypriakon Agonsiton, the Hellenic Organization of Cypriot Fighters, or EOKA, reacted swiftly and violently, initiating a campaign of terror against the British occupying forces. Although Makarios appealed to the Turkish Cypriot leadership not to intervene, their leadership under Dr. Fazil Küçük, reacted by forming their own underground organization to "protect Turkish Cypriot interests."[2]

Until the eruption of wide scale ethnic conflict on the island, Turkish policy toward the Cyprus question was largely ambivalent. The Turkish leadership was certain that Britain would never relinquish control of the island, preferring to retain it as a strategic deterrent to Soviet expansion in the Middle East. In 1948, during an address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak stated that "there is not a Cyprus problem as such." After the 1950 transition of power from Atatürk's Republican People's Party to the Democrat Party, an identical policy line was pursued under Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü: "We don't see any reason for a change in the status quo of Cyprus."[3] But after the threat of *enosis* came closer to realization, the Democrat Party administration in Ankara came to enunciate a policy of cession of Cyprus to Turkish control. However, by the late 1950s, in order not to upset the NATO alliance, the Turkish leadership agreed to a plan envisioning an independent Cyprus with a consociational form of government between the two Cypriot communities.[4]

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[2]Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1982), 56.

[3]Suha Bolukbasi, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*. Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, no. 15 (Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America, 1988), 25.

[4]Suat Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," in Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 180. The Constitution required that the President of the Republic be a Greek Cypriot, the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot, each elected solely within their respective communities, and that the legislative and judicial bodies be apportioned between the two communities on a seventy percent Greek, thirty percent Turkish basis. Makarios was elected President, and Küçük Vice-President. See Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.

Despite the agreements of 1959 and the 1960 Constitution, ethnic conflict between the two Cypriot communities erupted a number of times during the 1960s. In November 1963, President Makarios advanced a proposal to "eliminate impediments to the functioning of the government," which effectively disenfranchised the Turkish community and paved the way for the revocation of the 1960 Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance, the only *international* documents precluding *enosis* with Greece. The ethnic violence that erupted after the Turkish community's refusal to accept the proposed modifications, resulted in the insertion of United Nations peace-keeping forces in 1964. The failure of UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus) to adequately protect the Turkish community from EOKA terrorism elicited strong Turkish reaction both in 1964 and in 1967. In both cases, the crisis was abated and Turkish intervention was averted.[5]

In November 1973, a military coup d'état in Athens ousted the democratic government of Greece and brought Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides to power. Ioannides was convinced that President Makarios posed a threat to the interests of the Greek Cypriot community, for a number of reasons. Beginning in 1968, Makarios softened his stance on *enosis,* and participated in the intercommunal negotiations held in Beirut until 1974. In addition, Makarios' leftist politics and frequent visits to Communist capitals were anathema to the far right tendencies of the Athens military junta. In the spring of 1974, Cypriot intelligence warned Makarios of a plot, engineered by the new EOKA-β paramilitary group and the Athens government. In response, Makarios requested that the 950 Greek officers stationed on Cyprus pursuant to the 1960 Treaty of Alliance be recalled to Greece, and accused the Ioannides regime of plotting against his life and

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[5]Only after a blunt warning from US President Lyndon Johnson did Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu call off an invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1964. After strategic air raids by the Turkish Air Force and mobilization of Turkish forces along the Thracian border with Greece in 1967, US special envoy Cyprus Vance averted not only intervention in Cyprus but possible direct conflict between Turkey and Greece.

threatening the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Thirteen days later, on 15 July, the Cypriot National Guard, in concert with EOKA-β and large contingencies of Greek troops, overthrew the Makarios government and established a military regime under the leadership of *enosis* proponent Nicos Sampson.[6]

Turkish reaction to the events in Cyprus was swift. The Turkish armed forces were placed on alert, as they had been in 1964 and 1967. On 17 July, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit flew to London to meet with British leaders, in an attempt to garner support for intervention in Cyprus; the Greek government had made no official response to Turkey's invitation to meet in London. Ecevit urged joint British-Turkish action, within the terms of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which reserved the right of intervention on the part of any of the three Guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey, and Britain) should the terms of the Constitution be abrogated. Britain declined Ecevit's request, "preferring a solution which would not jeopardize British interests on the island."[7] The United States sent Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco to London and then on to Ankara and Athens in the hope of defusing the situation and preventing, as Cyrus Vance had done in 1967, the impending clash between Greece and Turkey.[8] Sisco's diplomatic efforts failed however and in the early morning hours of 20 July, some 30,000 Turkish troops invaded the island.[9]

Azerbaijan.

The ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis has its roots in the status of the region known as Nagorno-Karabakh, established as an autonomous republic of

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[6]Solsten, 42.
[7]Zaim M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 79.
[8]Solsten, 42.
[9]Paul M. Pitman, III, ed., *Turkey: A Country Study* (Washington: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1988), 73.

Azerbaijan in 1924, despite its ethnic Armenian majority. Although ethnic tensions between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijanis erupted as early as 1960, it was not until 1988 that open hostility between the groups occurred. In February, the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh voted for unification with Armenia; the decision sparked overt ethnic violence. Despite efforts by Moscow to quell the conflict, it only intensified in the following years.[10]

Early in 1992, after the official dissolution of the Soviet Union on 31 December 1991, the 366th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the Soviet (now CIS) Army began its gradual withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh. Unhampered by the presence of Commonwealth troops, the Azerbaijani military initiated an assault on the region's capital, Stepanakert, but quickly lost ground to the Karabakh infantry. In a response to the destabilization of his government in the operation's aftermath, President Mutabilov dissolved the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan and inaugurated a new National Council whose membership co-opted the nationalist forces of Abulfaz Elchibey's Popular Front, the primary threat to Mutabilov's regime. The political situation in Baku continued to regress, however, as Armenia proper entered the conflict directly following the complete removal of CIS forces from Nagorno-Karabakh. Mutabilov was forced to resign and flee to Nakhichevan on 6 March following a series of Azerbaijani defeats in Karabakh and the massacre of Azerbaijani civilians by Karabakh forces in the village of Hojali. The National Council replaced him with interim President Yakub Mahmedov.[11]

International reaction to the events in Azerbaijan was slow in coming. The United States, however, realizing its policy of non-recognition may have actually exacerbated Yerevan's willingness to intervene, quickly recognized Baku on 15 March.

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[10]Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies* (Washington: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1995), 94-96.
[11]Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (London: Harper Collins, 1994), 94.

Prime Minister Demirel launched a campaign to bring international attention to bear on the crisis. His diplomacy resulted in both NATO and CSCE calls for cease-fires, but it was Tehran that beat Ankara to the task.[12]

The relative calm of the cease-fire was broken in mid-May 1992, when on 14 May, Mutabilov, returning to Baku from Nakhichevan, led a bloodless coup against the Mahmedov government by garnering support among the more nationalist elements in the National Council. Immediately, Mutabilov declared his intention to sign the Collective Defense Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Tashkent on 15 May. But the Popular Front organized against the policy and, on 15 May, toppled Mutabilov, forcing him to flee to Moscow. He was replaced with interim President Isa Gambarov. The governmental crisis in Baku precipitated a powerful Armenian offensive that captured the Azerbaijani town of Lachin, located within Azerbaijan proper between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Armenian forces bombed the Azerbaijani settlement of Sadarak in Nakhichevan. Within weeks, Armenian and Karabakh forces had occupied all of Nagorno-Karabakh and a sizable portion of Azerbaijan itself.[13]

On 7 June 1992, the leader of the Popular Front, Abulfaz Elchibey, was elected President of Azerbaijan. Elchibey, in sharp contrast to his predecessor Mutabilov, was unequivocally opposed to any concessions on the Karabakh issue. Within a week, Baku ordered a new offensive against the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.[14] By the end of 1992, the Azerbaijani army had regained control of nearly one quarter of Nagorno-Karabakh, and feeling he had achieved the upper hand, Elchibey sought out negotiations with the Armenians in order to exercise his new found leverage. An Azerbaijani refusal to the terms laid out in the secret *tête-à-tête* in Moscow resulted in a

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[12]Ibid., 95.
[13]Ibid., 96.
[14]Ibid., 99.

renewed Armenian offensive in January 1993. The stinging defeats of Azerbaijani forces in January and February were matched with a new offensive on March 17 against the Azerbaijani city of Kelbajar, effectively creating a new corridor from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.[15]

The newest Armenian offensive resulted in a destabilization of Elchibey's power. Between April and May, Elchibey's government lost considerable legitimacy among the Azerbaijani elite, primarily due to the failure of his negotiations with Armenian President Levon Ter Petrossian in Ankara following President Özal's funeral and the collapse of negotiations held in Moscow in mid-May. Sensing that General Husseinov of the Azerbaijani army was gaining popularity among government elites and fearful of a coup against him, Elchibey ordered an offensive against the renegade military leader at Ganja. The offensive collapsed and Husseinov marched on Baku. Elchibey fled to Nakhichevan and Haidar Aliyev was elected President, with Husseinov as Prime Minister.[16]

Aliyev's accession to power marked the end of Turkey's window of opportunity in Azerbaijan. Aliyev's pro-Russian and pro-Iranian tendencies resulted in cool relations between Baku and Ankara, and even though relations have improved significantly since 1993, Turkey's influence with the Azerbaijani government has diminished considerably.

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[15]Ibid., 100-1.
[16]Ibid., 102-3.

Chapter 2: Analysis.

Methodology.

To address the question posed by the different policy outcomes outlined in the preceding section, I employ a methodology developed by John Stuart Mill. In his 1884 work *A System of Logic*, Mill argues that correlation can be demonstrated between variables, even for a limited number of cases, by following one of the two basic methods of experimental inquiry he lays out. The Method of Agreement is employed to isolate the crucial similarity when outcomes are similar; the Method of Difference is employed to isolate the crucial difference when outcomes are different. Mill writes that "in order to apply to the case the most perfect of the methods of experimental inquiry, the Method of Difference, we require to find two instances which tally in every particular except the one which is the subject of inquiry." If, Mill, expounds, we find a difference in another variable, we have an "*experimentum crucis*: a real proof by experience."[1] It is this latter method of experimental inquiry that is employed here.

While Mill's Method of Difference can be used to effectively demonstrate correlation of variables, theory must be used to posit causal links between them. Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, in an article on social scientific inquiry, provide a succinct discussion of Mill's Method of Difference and cite a number of works in the social sciences that have effectively utilized the methodology, coupled with theoretical discussion, to demonstrate "rudimentary" causal links between variables.[2] Indeed, Skocpol and Somers cite articles by Robert Brenner and Gary C. Hamilton as particularly

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[1]John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1884, eighth ed.), 610.

[2]Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History and Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (April 1980): 174-197.

useful, as they "employ comparative history to refute alternate competing arguments about their primary concerns."[3] In the tradition of these scholars, this thesis seeks not only to demonstrate correlation between geopolitical factors and policy outcomes, but to employ structural realist theory to posit causality between them, while illustrating the shortcomings of competing explanations from contending theoretical schools.

In this chapter, potential explanatory variables are assessed, using Mill's Method of Difference, to determine if crucial covariation exists between them and the dependent variable. The analysis demonstrates an absence of the crucial variation that is a necessary precondition for the use of theory to draw causal links. Mill's Method, then, allows us to reject these variables as explanatory. In the final chapter, the variables posited by structural realism are assessed, demonstrating the necessary correlation with policy outcome that was found absent in contending explanations. Structural realism is then used to posit the causal link between these variables and foreign policy outcome.

Motivating Interest: A Crucial Similarity.

Although this thesis seeks specifically to explain divergence in two cases of *policy outcome*, the important issue of *motivating interest* is raised in the analysis. Indeed, the analysis laid out in this section is relevant only if similarity in motivation to act can be demonstrated across the cases. If the *motivating interest* in the Cyprus case was crucially different from that in the Azerbaijan case, we have no room for further comparative analysis of *policy outcome*. Before a comparative analysis of the constraints on policy outcome can be undertaken, it must be demonstrated that Turkish interests in both cases were sufficiently similar to elicit an interventionist response. The following

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[3]Ibid.: 186. See Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," *Past and Present* 70 (February 1976): 30-75, and Gary C. Hamilton, "Chinese Consumption of Foreign Commodities: A Comparative Perspective," *American Sociological Review* 42 (6) (December 1977): 877-891.

section will demonstrate that Turkish national interest in the cases in question was indeed similar, and was largely based upon geopolitical calculations of national security.

Cyprus. The most compelling evidence for assertive policy with regard to Cyprus is geopolitical. It is crucial to understand that while Turkish interest in Cyprus is based in part on ethnic affinity with the Turkish minority there, the island is also strategically important to Turkey's national defense.[4] It has been posited that had there been no Turkish minority in Cyprus, the cession of the island to Greece might have been acceptable to Turkey,[5] but the evidence tends to contradict this assertion. Turkey's policy prescriptions, and thresholds of acceptability regarding any solutions to the Cypriot crisis underwent considerable modification following the early 1950s. Prescriptions have varied widely from cession of the island to Turkish control, partition (*taksim*) between Greece and Turkey, tripartite government under Greece, Turkey, and Britain, consociational independence, partition once again, and finally regional autonomy for the Turkish minority.[6] But all of these proposals shared one common element: Cyprus was not to come under the complete occupation of any power other than Turkey. This fact underscores the geopolitical importance of Cyprus to the Turkish leadership.

When Cyprus first became an issue for the Turkish leadership in the 1950's, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes reasoned that Cyprus was quite different from other cases of *dis Türkler*, or "outside Turks." The difference was essentially that the Turks of Cyprus inhabited a strategically important plot of real estate. In Cyprus, a change in sovereignty that would enable unification with Greece would threaten to upset the delicate strategic balance established between the two countries by the Treaty of

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[4]Suat Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," in Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 137.
[5]David Barchard, *Turkey and the West* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 49.
[6]Bilge, 180.

Lausanne.[7] Viewed in these terms, Turkish interest in Cyprus was not based upon ethnic irredentism, rather on preserving the status quo in the region.

Much has been written on the tensions between Greece and Turkey regarding the Aegean. Greece has repeatedly pressed for extension of its territorial waters in the sea from six to twelve miles from its coastline. Correspondingly, Greek authorities have requested the extension of Greek airspace from six to ten miles. Turkey, however, has steadfastly opposed such revisions. Due to the proximity of the Greek islands to the Turkish coast, Turkey claims that such revisions would effectively turn the Aegean into a "Greek sea" by severely restricting access to Turkish ports on the Aegean. Ankara therefore has termed any such modifications in existing demarcation a *casus belli*.[8] The imminent clash between Greece and Turkey in March 1987 over demarcation of the Aegean continental shelf and the February 1996 crisis over ownership of the islet Imia/Kardak serve as contemporary reminders of the seriousness with which both states take the Aegean balance.

Turkish and Greek interest in the status of Cyprus is a logical extension of the balance of power game played between the two countries in the Aegean. Cyprus lies merely forty miles south of the Turkish coast, in the extreme northeastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea and dominates the shipping routes from the Mediterranean ports of Antalya, Mersin, and Iskenderun. For that reason, the occupation of Cyprus by a power hostile to Turkey could result in devastating effects on the Turkish economy and national security. Indeed, because of Greece's position in the Aegean, its annexation of Cyprus would effectively complete a potential blockade of the Turkish coast. Moreover, the

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[7]Andrew Mango, *Turkey: Delicately Poised Ally*, The Washington Papers III (28) (Beverly Hills and London: SAGE Policy Papers, 1975), 34. It is important to note that prior to the late seventies and early eighties, Greece and Turkey were fairly comparable in terms of population size, economic strength, and military resources. See also Barchard, 49.

[8]Andrew Mango, *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role* (Westport, CT: Prager, 1994), 124-5.

island, unlike the Greek islands of the Aegean, is large enough for any hostile power to deploy sufficient military power for a sustained air, naval, or amphibious campaign against mainland Turkey.[9] In this way, the question of Cyprus is "an inseparable element in the balance of power between [Greece and Turkey] established at . . . the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 . . . Thus in the ultimate analysis, both Greece and Turkey have vital interests in Cyprus and neither is willing to forgo her influence in the island. The two communities [the Greek and Turkish Cypriots] . . . serve as leverage for Greece and Turkey to provide their foreign policy [and national security] goals in Cyprus."[10]

Azerbaijan. Turkish policy regarding the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has evolved considerably since the inception of the crisis in 1988. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crisis was considered an internal matter of that state and was largely ignored by the foreign policy elite in Ankara. In spite of occasional media coverage and sympathetic public opinion, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was, for all intents and purposes, a non-issue in Ankara. Indeed, in a statement issued during a meeting with President George Bush in January 1990, President Özal discounted the impact of public opinion about the conflict on his government's policy, and, alluding to the Shi'ite majority in Azerbaijan, stated that the issue was of much greater relevance to Tehran than to Ankara.[11]

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a re-evaluation of Turkish interests in the region was undertaken. The collapse of Soviet control of the Muslim Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia at the end of 1991 initiated a new phase in Turkish foreign policy. A number of scholars have pointed

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[9]Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, *Turkey's Security Policies* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), 17.
[10]Kemal H. Karpat, "War on Cyprus: The Tragedy of Enosis," in Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, 186-7.
[11]Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), 66.

to Turkey's new "eastern orientation" as a possible alternative to complete integration in the European Union, a prospect which has recently become increasingly elusive for Ankara. An indefinite postponement of its full membership has elicited a disillusionment among the governing elite and the populace that has been compounded by the favorable reception of application bids by Austria, the Baltic States, and even Cyprus.[12] Although both the United Kingdom and Germany have pursued efforts to speed up Turkey's admission, Greece has remained intransigent in its opposition, exerting a perpetual veto in an effort, most observers agree, to "extort" Turkish concessions on the Cyprus issue.[13] It was in the light of what Turkish leaders have perceived as a general anti-Turkish sentiment among Western European leaders that Ankara embarked upon new foreign policy initiatives in post-Soviet Eurasia. Such a re-orientation is not novel; the perceptions of Western indifference to Turkish interests in 1964 precipitated a complete re-evaluation of Turkish relations with the West, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East and Islamic world. As Bruce Kuniholm has noted, "[the] Turks have occasionally recognized the desirability of exploring alternative means for assuring their security [both politically and economically]"[14]; Turkish policy toward the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia since 1992 is indicative of this kind of reassessment.

The Republic of Turkey was at the forefront of the wave of diplomats that flooded into Central Asia and the Caucasus after the fall of the Soviet Union; indeed, Ankara was the first state to recognize the independence of them all,[15] and by the spring of 1992, Ankara had established full ambassadorial relations with the five Turkic

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[12]Mellem Müftüler, "Turkey and the European Community: An Uneasy Relationship," *Turkish Review* 7 (33) (1993). See also Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (2) (1991): 41 and John Murray Brown and Edward Mortimer, "An Outsider Looking In," *Financial Times* (21 January 1994): 5.

[13]Brown and Mortimer.

[14]Kuniholm: 42.

[15]Nuzhet Kandemir, Ambassador of the Turkish Republic, "Statement at the University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies" (1 October 1992).

republics of the region.[16] In addition, Turkey instituted a number of programs to extend its economic and political influence to the fledgling states. Ankara offered $1.1 billion in credits and technical assistance to convert the Cyrillic script of the region to Latin, although the effort has meant with limited success.[17] In addition, the Turks developed a new satellite television channel called *Avrasya*, or Eurasia, that broadcasts Turkish language programs across the region.[18] The Turkish Minister of State, at the Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States in early 1992, promised ten thousand scholarships for Central Asian and Azerbaijani students to study at Turkish institutions.[19]

Turkish economic overtures in the first year of independence were equally numerous. Economic and technical cooperation agreements were signed with the five Turkic republics and vocational programs in banking, and fiscal and tax reform were extended to help in the transition to market economies.[20] Plans for constructing a superhighway from Istanbul to Alma-Ata were developed and Turkish airlines instituted direct flights to the five Turkic capitals in an effort to replace Moscow as the new transportation hub for the region.[21]

Azerbaijan, being the most proximate of the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, assumed a new geopolitical status in the calculations of Turkish foreign policy. Because of Ankara's heightened interest in the political and economic exploitation of Central Asia, the Turks have a vested interest in the political and economic stability of Azerbaijan; because of Azerbaijan's geographic location astride the transportation routes

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[16]Louise Lief, "Fire, Fury, and Nationalism," *U.S. News & World Report* (6 July 1992): 45.
[17]"The Front-Line Friend," *The Economist* (12 September 1992).
[18]Lief: 46.
[19]Turkish Minister of State, "Statement at the Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States," (22 January 1992).
[20]Ibid.
[21]Peter Fuhrman, "Follow the Ancient Silk Road," *Forbes* (14 September 1992): 393, and Lief: 46.

from Turkey to Central Asia, it serves as a stepping stone for any expansion of Turkish interests in the region.[22] Moreover, the petroleum richness of Azerbaijan, in its own right, gives the country added importance in Turkish foreign policy calculations. Equally important to Ankara in its calculations *vis-à-vis* Azerbaijan, and more important since the direct intervention of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, were unrenounced irredentist claims by Armenia against what Yerevan calls "Turkish Armenia," the vast area of northeast Turkey whence almost two million Armenians were deported to Syria and Palestine during Ataturk's turkification campaigns of the 1920's.[23]

Concluding Remarks. The above discussion has demonstrated that Turkish interests in both Cyprus and Azerbaijan were similar. Aside from ethnic affinity with the populations embroiled in conflict, maintenance of the territorial status quo was the overriding and vital Turkish interest in each case. Indeed, stability in all of Turkey's borderlands is considered the primary objective of Turkish foreign policy, and has been so since the establishment of the Republic.[24] When Turkish national security was threatened in each case by a change in the territorial status quo of these regions, the option of direct military intervention was considered by the foreign policy elite. Following sections illustrate this point well. Having demonstrated that the motivation to use force in each case was similar, it is now possible to examine the conditions under which that motivation was translated into policy and those under which it was not.

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[22]Tadeusz Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan's Triangular Relationship: The Land Between Russia, Turkey and Iran," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 129.

[23]James Wylie, "Turkey Adapting to New Strategic Realities" *Jane's Intelligence Review* 4 (10) (1 October 1992): 448.

[24]Based on author's conversations with diplomats at the Turkish Embassy in Washington (4 and 10 April 1996).

Contending Theoretical Explanations.

The major schools of thought in foreign policy theory may be categorized either in reference to the level of analysis: international or domestic; or in reference to the unit of analysis: structures, institutions, or ideas. A juxtaposition of these categories yields five mutually exclusive and contending theoretical camps: international institutionalism; domestic institutionalism; societal structuralism; constructivism, or the ideational approach; and structural realism. As stated above, the hypothesis presented in this work is derived from the structural realist approach, and so this theoretical framework will be discussed at length in the final chapter. The other contending approaches and their implications for the cases in question will be examined below in light if the available evidence.

International Institutionalism. International institutionalists, also known as neo-liberals in international relations theory, posit that such international institutional structures as international law and international organizations alter foreign policy calculations by political elites.[25] In a recent article, Stephen A. Kocs argues that the use by neorealists of international structure as a constraint on foreign policy is useful, but that it falls short of a complete explanation in ignoring the constraints imposed upon rational actors by international legal and organizational structures. "In other words, international legal norms prohibit states from waging war on other states for reasons of pure power politics . . . Thus, in contrast to neorealism, which views international structure as *inducing* war, the law-based model views international structure (today, at any rate) as creating pressures that *inhibit* war."[26]

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[25]See Stephen Kocs, "Explaining the strategic Behavior of States: International Law as System Structure," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (4) (December 1994): 535-56; Oran Young, *International Cooperation* (1989), 11-30 and 58-80; and Louis Henkin *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy* (1979), 39-87.
[26]Kocs: 547-8.

International institutionalism posits that when international law and international organizations are present, a state will be constrained from adopting assertive foreign policy initiatives. For this theoretical approach to foreign policy to effectively explain the Turkish foreign policy outcomes in question, it must demonstrate that a substantive difference exists between the international institutional constraints on Turkish policy between 1974 and 1992-1993. The following discussion demonstrates that there was no effective difference, and hence there was no variation on the causal variable posited by this school of thought to explain foreign policy outcomes.

The first Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 was ordered under the aegis of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The Treaty of Guarantee, signed among Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, was quite explicit in its provisions for direct, unilateral, military intervention. Article 3 of the treaty states:

> "In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. "Insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."[27]

It was this article that Turkey invoked as its *casus belli* after the Sampson coup threatened the independence of Cyprus through *enosis* with Greece. Despite opposition in international forums by Greece to the initial Turkish action, there was no explicit condemnation by any other state or international body to the intervention. In fact, in its resolution 573 of 29 July 1974, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

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[27]"Treaty of Guarantee, signed by the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 16 August 1960," in Necati M. Ertekün, *The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus* (Oxford: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1981), 151.

stated that the Turkish intervention was "the exercise of a right emanating from an international treaty."[28]

During the height of the push for intervention in Azerbaijan by the Turkish political elite, leaders invoked Turkey's right of intervention under the 1921 Treaty of Friendship Between Russia and Turkey. The treaty does include a relevant article, which states:

> "Both contracting parties [Russia and Turkey] agree that the Nakhichevan district . . . shall form an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan, on condition that the latter cannot transfer this protectorate to any third state. . ."[29]

Although this article does not explicitly authorize direct military intervention by Turkey in the Nakhichevan region, it has been interpreted by leaders within both Russia and Turkey to grant guarantor powers to Turkey to prevent a change in the territorial or political status quo of the exclave. Without doubt, there was a belief among much of the Turkish foreign policy making apparatus that, after Armenian forces shelled the town of Sadarak in Nakhichevan, that a dispatch of Turkish troops to the region would not contravene international legal norms.

A further criticism of the international institutionalist approach is that there is little compelling evidence that international institutions possess true constraining power, or, for that matter, much permissive power.[30] Had the Treaty of Guarantee not existed in

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[28]Zaim M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 104ff. It is interesting to note, however, that reaction by international bodies to the second phase of the Turkish intervention was dramatically different and led to condemnation on a large scale.

[29]"Treaty of Friendship Between Russia and Turkey, 16 March 1921," in J.A.S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973: A History and Guide with Texts* (New York: Stein and Day, 1974).

[30]It has been argued that international law should not be judged on the record of international legal violations, but on the record of successes. The problem, however, is that there is no effective means of determining whether so-called successes are results of international law, or other constraining factors, including geopolitical ones. See Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1979).

1974, it is difficult to argue effectively that Turkish intervention would have been avoided by the political elite. Indeed, although the treaty was utilized by the Turkish government to justify its first phase of intervention, the second phase, which expanded the scope of the Turkish deployment, was unaccompanied by any international legal justification and elicited strong international condemnation. At most, the Cyprus case leads one to view international law as a means of justifying actions taken for other reasons. It is interesting to note that the rationale employed by the Turkish leadership in 1992 and 1993 to justify a policy of non-intervention was not couched in terms of international law, rather it was couched in terms of preference for multilateralism.

In short, the international legal variable lacks effective explanatory power when applied to the cases under examination. Not only is there no sufficient variation on this variable across the cases, but further examination of the cases casts doubt on its relevance to policy makers beyond justificatory power.

Domestic Institutionalism. Domestic institutionalism posits that domestic governmental institutions impose requirements and constraints on the exercise of foreign policy, and that the execution of policy initiatives is therefore determined by these arrangements.[31] In theory, domestic institutions can range from government bureaucracies to implicit rules governing the behavior of political elites. There can indeed be considerable overlap between the latter and what has been called political culture. The impact of Kemalism on the foreign policy making process will be discussed

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[31]See Stuart J. Kaufman, "Organizational Politics and Change in Soviet Military Policy," *World Politics* 46 (April 1994): 355-82, in which the author argues that the external policies of the Soviet Union/Russia were primarily contingent upon the balance between facets of the foreign policy/national security apparatus. See also Graham Allison's work "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 63 (3) (September 1969): 689-718, expanded into *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), in which the author claims that organizational process and bureaucratic politics paradigms outperform the rational actor paradigm of the neorealist schools.

below in the section on constructivist explanations; hence, the emphasis of this section is on the explicit, constitutionally dictated relationships between branches of the Turkish foreign policy apparatus. In order to demonstrate a causal link between domestic institutions and policy outcome, the domestic institutional approach must illustrate some crucial difference between the foreign policy apparatus of 1974 and that of 1992-1993. The following section examines the differences in these institutions, but concludes that the differences are insignificant in explaining the disparity between policy outcomes in 1974 and 1992-1993.

In every constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly has enjoyed some rights over the exercise of foreign policy. It has always possessed the powers of treaty ratification, declaration of war, approval of the dispatch of troops to foreign countries, and approval of the stationing of foreign troops within Turkey. However, in practice, the Grand National Assembly has functioned chiefly as a rubberstamp body, meeting in order to lend official public support to foreign policy decisions made by the executive. Indeed, the political tradition of executive primacy in foreign policy matters has relegated legislative approval to a mere afterthought in the policy making process. Both the dispatch of Turkish troops to Korea in 1950 and to Cyprus in 1974 are examples of executive policy initiatives that were approved by the Grand National Assembly *ex post facto*.[32]

Since 1960, executive control of foreign and security policy has been embodied in the National Security Council. The body consists of the president, the prime minister, the chief of the general staff, the ministers of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs, and the commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie.[33] The ascendancy of

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[32]Saban Calis, "The Turkish State's Identity and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 6 (2) (Spring 1995):138-9.
[33]Ibid.:144.

the NSC in foreign policy matters relegated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a role of information gathering and dissemination; indeed the 1960 Constitution marked a profound shift in the balance between the military and the civilian bureaucracy in policy formulation, perhaps a reaction of the coup leaders to what they deemed the anti-Kemalist tendencies of the Menderes administration in such matters.[34] The 1982 Constitution further strengthened the NSC's hand in matters of foreign policy.

The only substantive difference, however, in the policy apparatuses of 1974 and 1992-1993 is the relative power of the president *vis-à-vis* the prime minister within the NSC. Prior to the 1982 Constitution the role of president was largely ceremonial and the responsibilities of foreign policy were securely those of the prime minister. The prime minister was delegated the authority to convene the NSC to consider the execution of policy initiatives. However, in response to the parliamentary crises of the late seventies, the 1982 Constitution delegated far reaching powers to the president, especially in the realms of national security and foreign policy.[35] The power to convene the NSC passed to the president. As a result, the president assumed a more visible role in the formulation of foreign policy. Indeed, the presidencies of both Kenan Evren and Turgut Özal were characterized by an international role never witnessed in the years of the Second Republic.

In analyzing the differences between the 1974 and 1992-1993 apparatuses, then, one finds that the latter was characterized by a more powerful president and the former by a more powerful prime minister. This does not constitute an effective explanation, however, for the differences in policy outcomes in the cases in question, for two reasons.

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[34]Barchard, 17 and Paul M. Pitman, III, ed., *Turkey: A Country Study* (Washington DC: Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 1988), 287.

[35]Gisbert H. Flanz, "Turkey," in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1994). See also Calis:139 and Pitman, 234.

The first is substantive: despite the shift in power from prime minister to president between 1974 and 1992, the nature of decision-making in the NSC remained based on consensus. Indeed, despite Ecevit's visible role in foreign policy in 1974, the unanimous agreement of the NSC with his recommendations was necessary for intervention in Cyprus to take place. Likewise, Özal's recommendations to the NSC would similarly be subject to consensus before implementation. Furthermore, there is a logical inconsistency: Özal's rhetoric was decidedly pro-interventionist, yet he chose not to exercise his constitutional prerogative to convene the NSC to authorize intervention in 1992 or 1993. In short, there is not sufficient variation on the independent variable to make a strong case for its relevance. Furthermore, assuming its relevance, the observed outcome is inconsistent with the implication of the theory; a more powerful, interventionist president failed to employ his leverage within the NSC to adopt a more assertive policy.

Societal Structuralism. Societal structuralism, like structural realism, posits that foreign policy decisions can be understood as if they are made by unitary rational actors, and are functions of cost-benefit calculations conditioned by existing structural constraints. However, in contrast to the realist approach, societal structuralists contend that the relevant structures are not international, but domestic in nature. Class interests are seen as the most crucial force acting upon the decision-making elite. Robert Gilpin's work *War & Change in World Politics* is indicative of societal structuralism. Gilpin does concede that the international system, or environmental factors, may provide the incentive to act, but argues in the final analysis that execution of a policy initiative is itself contingent upon domestic, or societal factors, crudely amalgamated as "the relationship between private and public gain . . . In other words, the necessary condition within a state for it to attempt to change the international system is that domestic social

arrangements must ensure that the potential benefits to its members of carrying out this task will exceed the anticipated cost to its members."[36]

In political practice, the interests of segments of society are represented by party organizations. While there is little doubt that partisan politics have been very influential in the development of domestic policy in Turkey since 1950, there is contention over the impact of public opinion and partisan politics in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Conventional wisdom in studies of the Turkish political system by and large discount the impact of public opinion on the formulation and execution of foreign policy; Turkey therefore falls neatly into what Risse-Kappen would call the strong state category.[37] Saban Calis has pointed out that in Turkey, foreign policy has traditionally been accepted as a matter of "high policy," and that decisions in the areas of foreign or security policy have always risen above the fray of domestic politics.[38] Although David Barchard argues that in Turkey, as in "other late-modernizing countries, the role of public opinion in foreign policy is obtrusive, with press coverage of many topics being noisy and emotional," he concedes that the role of public opinion, while quite visible to the observer, is much narrower than in other Western societies. He argues that almost every facet of the Turkish political spectrum, with the possible exception of the Marxists, agrees that the military is the final arbiter of national security policy: "although successive political parties have coloured Turkey's foreign policy to some extent, causing emphasis to shift from time to time, foreign affairs have always been treated as national

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[36]Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 97-8.
[37]T. Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43 (4) (July 1991): 479-512. Risse-Kappen argues that the impact of public opinion on the formulation of foreign policy varies widely across democracies as a function of how insulated the foreign policy apparatus is from the public and partisna politics. Risse-Kappen develops three ideal types: the strong state (exemplified by France), the strong society (exemplified by the United States), and the consociational state (exemplified by Germany).
[38]Calis: 136.

rather than party-political matters."[39] Dankwart Rustow posits that a remarkable continuity in Turkish foreign policy has existed in spite of often radical internal political changes since the advent of "intense partisan controversies" in the 1960s, because policy makers, and the public at large accept the fact that "politics, no matter how bitterly fought at home, stops at the water's edge."[40]

It has been posited by some, however, that domestic changes in recent decades have increased the importance of public opinion and partisan politics in the outcomes of foreign policy decisions. Indeed, Graham Fuller has argued that "Turkish democracy, while incomplete, is creating a society far more open to discussion of once-forbidden ideological taboos such as communism, Islam and the Kurdish issue."[41] Duygu Sezer argues that the emergence of true multi-party democracy and the "expansion of liberal democratic institutions [have] encouraged freedom of thought and speech," resulting in the emergence of numerous political parties. This internal political transformation, coupled with changes in the electoral system, has given smaller parties a greater voice in the exercise of foreign policy and the once unquestioned monolithic Turkish foreign policy has ceased to exist.[42] In this way, more diffuse interest groups have been able to affect the outcomes of foreign policy decisions.

If we assume that public opinion and partisan politics have become a factor in the formulation and execution of Turkish foreign policy since the emergence of multi-party democracy, it is necessary to compare these factors in the two cases under examination to determine what explanatory power they have, if any, in these cases. In 1974, there was considerable public and partisan support for an assertive policy initiative toward the

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[39]Barchard, 42.
[40]Dankwart Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), 84-5.
[41]Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation," in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser with Paul B. Henze and J.F. Brown, eds., *Turkey's New Geopolitics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 38.
[42]Sezer, 10.

Cyprus situation. The opposition parties, including Demirel's Justice Party, rallied behind the Ecevit government on the question of intervention. Moreover, Ecevit's popularity soared in public opinion polls after the intervention, and he was hailed in the popular press as the greatest Turkish hero since Atatürk. Indeed, Ecevit sought to take advantage of the widespread support for his policy by calling for early elections soon after the intervention, in order to reap the benefits of his popularity for the Republican People's Party.[43]

From 1992 to 1993, the level of public support for intervention in Azerbaijan was similarly high. There was a "euphoric" response among the Turkish populace for the policies pursued by the Demirel government in recognizing and expanding ties with the new republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. But the chief source of political opposition was the official policy of neutrality in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.[44] There was little political support for a reticent policy, even among Demirel's own party ranks. Yet, even President Özal, whose interventionist rhetoric was among the most strident of the centrist political leaders, refrained from convening the National Security Council to recommend intervention to the Prime Minister and the Grand National Assembly.

In both cases, there was overwhelming support among the public and among their political leaders for interventionist policies. Yet an assertive policy was pursued only in 1974. Once again, no significant variation on the proposed variable is exhibited across the cases; thus, this potential explanation may be discounted.

Constructivism. Constructivism, also known as the ideational approach, posits that structural and institutional models fall short of a complete explanation of the process

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[43]Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 11.
[44]Sabri Sayari, "Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia," in Banuazizi, 179, 189.

of policy-making by ignoring the impact of ideas. "Both realism [structuralism] and institutionalism assume that self-interested actors maximize their utility, subject to constraints. In such models, actors' preferences and causal beliefs are given, and attention focuses on the variation in the constraints faced by actors. Most analysts who rely on such approaches have neglected ideas to a minor role."[45] While some constructivists argue a determinant, or causal, role for ideas in the policy process, many more adopt a less ambitious orientation, arguing instead that ideas are permissive, acting not as causes, but as "filters" through which interest is formed and acceptable policy options are made available to political elites.[46]

The Turkish Republic stands as an illustrative case of the extent to which political culture determines, or even constrains, the policy choices of the political elite. In the literature on the politics of Turkey, there is consensus on the identification of Kemalism as the political culture of the elite. Some scholars of Turkish politics have argued that Kemalism is a veritable ideology, and it has even been described as the new religion of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, in a recent article, Saban Calis argues quite vehemently that Kemalism has become so ingrained in the institutions of Turkish policy-making that deviation from the course laid down by Atatürk decades ago is impossible.

The fact of the matter is, however, that Kemalism is not a coherent ideology. Although rife with symbolism, its own mythology, and the personality cult of its founder, the principles of Kemalism are not clearly defined. The fact that these principles serve only as a broad framework for the execution of policy by the Turkish political elite means that republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism

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[45]Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4.

[46]See David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics* 11 (2) (January 1979): 127-46. For an argument of ideational determinacy, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

have undergone constant reformulation and interpretation by successive political leaders. Indeed, since the advent of multi-party democracy in 1950, the degree of religion's role in society interpreted as "Kemalist" has varied widely. Moreover, the Kemalist principle of statist economic development has been virtually abandoned since the 1980 adoption by the Demirel government of an economic liberalization program.[47]

It has been observed by some writers on Turkish affairs that recent years have seen a more pronounced departure from Kemalist dicta regarding foreign policy. Graham Fuller has recently written that "much of the revered Atatürkist tradition - so valuable and critical to national survival in an earlier era of Turkish history - is coming under re-examination. With a lessening of some Atatürkist values - statism, isolationism, elitist paternalism, avoidance of Islamic and pan-Turkic ideological interests - factors such as nationalist/pan-Turkist and Islamic ideologies have greater room for influence."[48] In fact, this "re-examination" is not a new phenomenon. The Kemalist dictum of "peace at home, peace abroad," implying the pursuit of introspective isolationism,[49] came under re-examination immediately after the Second World War, when international conditions demanded an active Turkish alliance with the West against a threatening Soviet Union. Turkish involvement in Korea and enthusiastic participation in NATO and similar treaty organizations designed to curb Soviet expansion were all violations of a strict interpretation of Atatürk's foreign policy prescriptions. In these cases, Kemalism was bent to accommodate the structural necessity of active alliance against the Soviet threat.[50]

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[47]Pitman, 72.
[48]Fuller, 40.
[49]See Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Over the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
[50]Sezer, 13. Sezer claims that ideology played a minimal role in the formation of the Turkish-Western alliance.

Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and Turkish interest in Azerbaijan in 1992-1993 were likewise beyond the scope of Atatürk's prescriptions. Both represent sharp departures from the policy of cautious isolationsism designed to facilitate internal development. Today, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials will say that interest in these areas is essential to upholding the Kemalist principle of "peace at home, peace abroad", because, they say, instability on Turkey's borders is a threat to national security.[51] Hence, the core of Kemalist foreign policy is not introspective isolationism, but self-preservation. The history of Turkish foreign policy since the Second World War underscores the realist assertion that international structure determines the course of foreign policy. Changes in the international structure, be it the threat of Greek control of Cyprus, or disintegration of Azerbaijan, resulted in reinterpretation of the political culture of Kemalism to suit the imperatives of national security. Political culture, in the final analysis is largely epiphenomenal: it neither dictates national security interests, nor policy initiatives; rather, it is dictated by the structural imperatives and the policies executed in order to address them.[52]

Concluding Remarks. A number of important issues have been addressed in this section. Clearly, the situations in Cyprus in 1974 and Azerbaijan in 1992 and 1993 were very similar in the minds of Turkish policy makers. Not only were Turkic populations under assault, but vital security and economic interests of the Turkish Republic were being threatened by a violent changes in the status quo. These threats resulted in the

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[51]Based on author's conversations with diplomats at the Turkish Embassy in Washington (4 and 10 April 1996).

[52]Interestingly, the writings of two of the more prominent proponents of the constructivist argument imply the same conclusion, despite their arguments against it. See Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security* 17 (4) (Spring 1993): 119-150, and Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 244-6.

consideration of direct military intervention by Turkish political leaders, yet only in 1974 was such a policy actually implemented.

Employing Mill's Method of Difference, this section examined a number of potential explanatory variables posited by contending theoretical approaches to foreign policy to address this disparity. In each instance, the evidence showed the variables in question to be ineffective as explanations either because they exhibited no variation with the dependent variable (international law, public opinion and partisan politics) or because any variation was counterintuitive to the theoretical approach itself (foreign policy apparatus, political culture). This analysis allows one to discount these variables as explanatory in the policy outcomes observed.

In the following section, I examine a number of variables posited by the structural realist school of foreign policy to have explanatory power in questions of policy outcome. While this approach may not *completely* explain the variance in policy outcome, it does offer a much more powerful explanation than those variables addressed in this chapter.

Chapter 3: Structural Realist Assessment.

Structural realism posits that geopolitical calculations determine the execution of foreign policy initiatives. Derived from the realist school of international relations, structural realist explanations of foreign policy adopt the same assumptions about the units involved, their interests, and the nature of the international system as does realism itself. States act as though they were unitary rational actors that seek to preserve their security in an anarchic international system.

The father of structural realism, Kenneth N. Waltz, was wary of conflating international relations theory with a theory of foreign policy:

> "Balance-of-power theory is a theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states. The theory makes assumptions about the interests and motives of states, rather than explaining them. What it does explain are the constraints that confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by itself the theory cannot explain those reactions. They depend not only on international constraints but also on the characteristics of states . . . *To explain the expected differences in national responses, a theory would have to show how the different internal structures affect their external policies and actions.* A theory of foreign policy would not predict the detailed content of policy but instead would lead to different expectations about the tendencies and style of different countries' policies."[1]

Waltz' caveat, however, is not well founded. Foreign policy can be explained by structural realism, independent of unit-level analysis. If interests and motives are held constant, the policy pursued by a state to achieve those interests will be determined by the constraints imposed upon it by the international structure. Such an approach to foreign policy theory was adopted by Waltz' successors, including his student, Stephen

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[1]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 122-3. Italics added.

Walt. In his work *The Origins of Alliances* and the article "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia," Walt effectively argues that the policy of alliance formation is based not upon some domestic level characteristics, but upon structural imperatives.[2] Structural realism can indeed explain why a state, concerned with preserving its own security, would adopt a policy of alliance with other powers, a policy of neutrality, or a policy of assertive intervention. This thesis is based upon the contention that foreign policy, like any form of state behavior in an anarchic international system, can effectively be explained in structural realist terms.

For both cases of Turkish foreign policy under examination, a number of geopolitical variables can be tested as possible constraints on the exercise of Turkish foreign policy initiatives. As outlined in the introduction, they include: the perceived threat of Soviet or Russian reprisal, the degree of leverage exercised by the United States government on the Turkish government, and the existence of a hegemonic competitor in the region in question. Evidence will be presented below to demonstrate crucial variation of the these variables across the cases. This final use of Mill's Method of Difference illustrates that the geopolitical variables posited by international structuralism sufficiently explain the difference in policy outcomes observed in the cases investigated. Structural realism allows us, then, to draw causal links between the presence of powerful geopolitical constraints and the adoption of Turkish foreign policy initiatives. When geopolitical constraints, be they in the form of Soviet threat, American leverage, or Iranian hegemonic competition, are present, the adoption of interventionist Turkish

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[2]Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), and Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

policy is precluded; in contrast, when they are absent, Turkish policy assumes a more assertive character.

The evidence shows that in 1974, the balance of threat between Turkey and the Soviet Union was relatively low. Due to the gradual development of detente between the two countries between 1964 and 1974, the Turkish government came to see Moscow as less of an immediate threat to its interests. Furthermore, the Turkish leadership was relatively assured that a negative Soviet response to Turkish intervention in Cyprus would not be forthcoming. In sharp contrast, the balance of threat between Turkey and Russia in the Caucasus in 1992 and 1993 was much higher. Despite the return of titular democracy to Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian designs in the Caucasus gradually appeared more and more irredentist. Turkish initiatives in the region met with cautious remonstrances from Moscow. In May 1992, it will be shown, when Turkish intervention was imminent, the Shaposhnikov letter, which stated in no uncertain terms Moscow's intention to prevent a direct intervention by Turkey in the region, effectively deterred an assertive Turkish policy. Again in April 1993, when Turkish decision-makers adopted a stronger policy toward Armenia, direct intervention was avoided primarily because of the continued presence of Russian forces along the Armenian border. In short, the balance of threat between the Soviet Union/Russia and Turkey was markedly different in the two cases under investigation.

In addition, the degree of leverage exercised by the United States on the Turkish political elite was markedly different in the two cases. In 1974, the American executive was embroiled in the Watergate scandal. In addition, President Nixon's covert foreign policy initiatives *vis-à-vis* Cambodia had elicited strong reaction from Congress in the form of the 1973 War Powers Act, severely limiting the foreign policy latitude formerly enjoyed by the executive. Furthermore, the improved relationship between Ankara and

Moscow had weakened Washington's ability to use the "Soviet menace" as an effective restraint on Turkish initiatives. While it is difficult to argue that American leverage restrained Turkish policy in any substantive way in the early 1990s, there is little doubt that its weakness in 1974 facilitated a policy of intervention in Cyprus.

Finally, the existence of a hegemonic rival in the regions in question demonstrates an important difference between the two cases. In 1974, no state had the potential to exercise hegemonic influence over the Turkish Cypriot community in the way that Iran stood as a threat to Turkish influence in Azerbaijan in the 1990's. Furthermore, the threat of Iran's capability to incite religious fundamentalism in Turkey (whether real or imagined) and its support for the Kurdish uprising in the southeast underscored Iran's ability to curtail Turkish foreign policy initiatives in the region.

The following sections examine the geopolitical variables outlined above as they pertain to each case. It will be shown that in 1974 a low level of Soviet threat and a prescribed American executive allowed the Turkish government to adopt an assertive policy with regard to Cyprus. In contrast, a strong Russian interest and military presence in the Caucasus, coupled with Iranian competition for influence in Baku, prevented the exercise of a similar policy there in the early 1990s. In short, the following discussion will show that in 1974, geopolitical constraint, lacking high values of any of the above variables, took on a Boolean value of zero, resulting in assertive foreign policy. In contrast, the effective presence of two of the variables in 1992-1993 resulted in a positive value of geopolitical constraint, resulting in restrained policy.

Cyprus.

The most compelling factors for intervention in 1974 relate to Turkey's assessment of its strategic position in the international community. In the decade that

had passed since the first crisis of intervention in 1964, a number of geopolitical constraints that had earlier prevented the free exercise of Turkish intervention had been greatly relaxed. Relations with the Soviet Union had undergone significant detente after the 1964 crisis, and the leverage once exercised by the US executive on Turkish foreign policy decisions had significantly declined, due first of all to improved Turco-Soviet relations, and secondly to a severely prescribed executive in Washington.

Soviet Detente. Due to the deterioration in US-Turkish relations after the 1964 Cyprus crisis Turkey had pursued a more independent foreign policy course with respect to Europe, the Middle East, and particularly the Soviet Union. The gradual relaxation of tensions between Turkey and the Soviets that had been initiated by the Soviets in the 1950s, rapidly accelerated after the Soviets perceived a decline in Turkish confidence within NATO following the "Johnson letter" debacle of 1964. By the early 1970s, while Turkey still respected and honored its obligations to the Western alliance, the foreign policy of *bagimsiz Türkiye*, or "free Turkey", had resulted in an almost cordial political atmosphere with the Soviets and a level of economic cooperation that confounded American policy makers.

Indeed, Turkey found the Soviet Union to be a major source of diplomatic support on the issue of Cyprus in the decade following the 1964 incident. This was no doubt prompted by the perception on the part of the Soviets that a family feud within the NATO alliance could well serve the interests of the Eastern bloc. This is not to imply that Ankara played only a receptive role to Soviet overtures. In fact, there is evidence that much of the bilateral diplomatic activity that ensued was initiated by the Turkish government as part of its new, independent policy. In short, the pursuit of Turkish-Soviet detente was mutual.

Only two weeks after the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev on 15 October 1964, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin made an official state visit to the Kremlin, the first such visit between the two nations since before the Second World War. This unprecedented diplomatic overture resulted in a major Soviet concession to the Turkish position on Cyprus; a joint communique was issued by the two states, recognizing the existence of two national communities in Cyprus, each enjoying international legal rights.[3] This was a complete departure from the policies pursued by the Khrushchev regime, which had repeatedly expressed its full support for the Makarios government, and had, in 1964, agreed to consider a request by Cypriot foreign minister Kyprianou for Soviet armaments.[4] In January of the next year, Chairman of the Soviet Presidium Nikolai H. Podgorni promised that the Soviet Union would not fulfill Kyrpianou's request for military assistance. The same month, Andrei Gromyko issued a statement adopting the Turkish proposal, first issued by Prime Minister Inönü in 1963, that the Cyprus question could only be solved through the implementation of a federal system between the two ethnic communities.[5] For the hard-line communist government of Leonid Brezhnev to pursue a policy of rapprochement with Turkey, at the expense of support for the avowed socialist government of Makarios in Cyprus, serves as a strong indication that the Soviets felt comfortable they could, after the Johnson letter fiasco, exert a much stronger influence in Turkish policy.

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[3]Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish Soviet Relations," in Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 93.

[4]Suha Bolukbasi, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*. Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, no. 15 (Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America, 1988), 116.

[5]Bolukbasi, 116 and Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, *Turkey's Security Policies* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), 32. Podgorni's statement accompanied an official Soviet apology for the aggressive rhetoric and territorial claims made by Stalin against Turkey following the Second World War. An official revocation of those claims had been made following Stalin's death in 1953.

While noteworthy, the Soviet overtures of 1964 to 1965 were the continuation of a policy of largely unrequited rapprochement with Turkey that began with the installation of the Khrushchev government in 1953. What is more noteworthy, however, is that the Turkish response, while still cautious, was considerably more receptive after 1964. Turkish moves toward detente were, in fact, inordinate, and seemed directed as much toward demonstrating Turkish independence from NATO and the US as they were toward establishing rapprochement with the Soviets. The same month that the Soviets adopted the Turkish solution to the Cyprus question, Turkey declined to participate in NATO multi-lateral force exercises.[6] After the accession of Süleyman Demirel's Justice Party government in 1965, Ankara banned test flights of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in Turkey, and in 1967 signed an economic cooperation pact with the Soviet Union that made Turkey the largest third world recipient of Soviet aid.[7] In a more proximate episode, the Turkish government allowed the Soviets to fly through their air space en route to Egypt during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, but refused American requests to ship supplies to Israel through Turkish bases.[8] The history of Turkish foreign relations after the 1964 Johnson letter is one of gradual, but marked, assertion of independence from the United States, often with policy changes that seemed threatening to Western interests. While Turkey maintained its alliance with the West, there is no doubt that the 1964 Cyprus crisis acted as a catalyst for the re-evaluation of Turkish interests in the alliance and the normalization of relations with the Soviets.[9]

When the Sampson coup erupted in Nicosia in July 1974, the Turkish leadership was sure that it could intervene militarily with little negative reaction from the Soviets.

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[6]Karpat, 93.
[7]Bolukbasi, 119.
[8]Stanley Karnow, "Tough Turkey," *The New Republic* 171 (5 October 1974): 12-3.
[9]Suat Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," in Karpat, 171.

The accession of the right-wing Ioannides military junta in Athens in 1973 had precipitated open Soviet antagonism toward Greece,[10] and the Soviets had therefore come to see opposition to *enosis* as, not only a tool in its rapprochement with Turkey, but an important component of its own strategic policy in the Mediterranean as well.[11]

The Soviet Union's fundamental interest in Cyprus was the preservation of the *status quo*, which at least in the *official* statements of the Turkish government, was an interest shared with Ankara. Either *enosis* or partition would jeopardize the neutrality of Cyprus, the former placing the strategically located island under the control of one NATO ally, the latter dividing it between two. Such an occurrence would, the Soviets reckoned, be quite damaging to their ambitions in the Middle East, especially in their relations with Syria.[12] Moscow was convinced that the Sampson coup would result in Greek control of the island; Turkish intervention in Cyprus, on the other hand, so the Soviets believed, would be undertaken to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the state.

When the Sampson coup succeeded in deposing Makarios on 15 July, the Soviet response was swift. On 16 July, a letter "couched in strong language" was dispatched by Soviet Ambassador Ezhov to Greek Foreign Minister Mavros, prompting concern in Athens that the Soviet Union might respond militarily to return Cyprus to the *status quo ante*.[13] In fact, a US Defense Department leak to American newspapers claimed that Soviet airborne units had been placed on alert, though a Tass report denied it.[14] After a meeting with Turkish President Korutürk on 16 July, Soviet Ambassador Grubyakov stated only that "In this difficult period for Cyprus, the Soviet people are on the side of,

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[10]Sezer, 32.
[11]Kemal H. Karpat, "War on Cyprus: The Tragedy of Enosis," in Karpat, 197.
[12]Dev Murarka, "The Island Seen From Russia," *New Statesman* 88 (26 July 1974): 105.
[13]See *The Times* (London) (17 July 1974).
[14]See *New York Times* (20 July 1974): 1.

that is, with, those struggling against the rebels [i.e., the Sampson coupists]."[15] This statement gives some indication that the Soviets had agreed to support a decision made by Ecevit by this time to invade the island,[16] in order to return it to the *status quo ante.* Further indication of this assertion is given by the second official Soviet government statement on 22 July, two days after the Turkish intervention. In it, the Turkish intervention was praised as an act designed "to enable the legitimate government of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios to remove all Greek servicemen from the island" and as the only solution to a situation in which all "peaceful ways of settling the conflict had been exhausted." It was not until after the Turks announced their intention to maintain a permanent military presence on Cyprus that Soviet support wavered, evidenced by a noticeable change in the tone of the third official Soviet position issued on 28 July.[17]

During the landing of Turkish forces on Cyprus, and until Ecevit's announcement of the permanence of the Turkish presence and the call for a federal solution on July 22, the Soviets demonstrated strong support for the initiative. The Soviets had even offered to assist Turkey in the operation if Ankara deemed such assistance necessary.[18] Only after a *de facto* partition of the island and long term occupation by Turkish troops became imminent, did the Soviet Union withdraw its support. Turkish prevention of Cypriot *enosis* with "fascist" Greece was laudable in Moscow, but partition served only to dilute the electoral strength of AKEL, the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Cyprus, and to raise threats of a more substantial and permanent NATO presence on the strategically

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[15]Robert M. Cutler, "Domestic and Foreign Influences on Policy Making: The Soviet Union in the 1974 Cyprus Conflict," *Soviet Studies* XXXVII (1) (January 1985): 63.
[16]Ecevit had decided to intervene a day after the ouster of Makarios. Karnow: 13.
[17]Cutler: 65-6.
[18]Karpat, 199.

located island.[19] It is interesting to note, however, that despite some remonstrances against the Turkish position and the institution of the second phase of intervention, Moscow remained somewhat supportive of the Turkish position in hopes that Turkey might fall into the Soviet orbit with the quickly expanding rift between Ankara and the NATO alliance.[20]

Absence of Effective American Leverage. In addition to the certainty of Soviet acquiescence, at least in the first stage of intervention, Ankara was also convinced of American impotence in the matter. Whereas President Johnson had relative *carte blanche* in the 1964 and 1967 crises, the Nixon administration's foreign policy initiative was severely prescribed. Not only had the Presidency been stripped of much of its foreign policy power by the enactment of the 1973 War Powers Act as a result of the Vietnam experience, but the sitting administration was in the midst of the Watergate scandal. The United States executive was indeed embroiled in a debilitating conflict with the Congress. The weakened condition of the US foreign policy apparatus was not lost on the leadership in Ankara.

Prior to the Sampson coup, the US State Department evinced a surprising lack of concern over the destabilizing situation in Cyprus. Despite embassy reports of rising tensions between Makarios and the Cypriot National Guard,[21] the State Department largely dismissed the possibility of a Greek engineered coup; even the warnings of

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[19]Sezer, 32 and Karpat, 202.
[20]Murarka: 105.
[21]By 1974 the Cypriot National Guard had come under the complete control of the Greek officer contingent stationed on Cyprus pursuant to the 1960 Treaty of Alliance. Moreover, the National Guard's commanding officer, Colonel Papadakis, was overtly in league with the EOKA-β terrorist organization. Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Times Books, 1977), 96.

Cypriot Ambassador Nikos Dimtriu early in the year went virtually unheard.[22] It was not until the third week of June that the US State Department recognized the seriousness of the situation in Cyprus. In response to a CIA report, based ostensibly upon direct contact with General Ioannides, that the Greek junta was indeed preparing an imminent move against Makarios, Joseph Sisco, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and a veteran of the 1964 Ball mission to avert Turkish intervention that year, requested that US Ambassador to Athens Henry Tasca issue a direct warning to Ioannides. The mission, however, was bungled; Tasca was unable to contact Ioannides directly, and failed to inform Washington of the problem. This, coupled with the absence of an official protestation to the Greek ambassador in Washington, according to a Greek foreign ministry, relegated Tasca's remonstrances to "window dressing" and was not perceived in Athens as a serious objection to the Greek intervention.[23] It seems that Greek perceptions had been colored by the history of US support for the right wing regime in Athens and the absence of any concerted statement by Washington to avert the impending coup.

Ankara viewed the weakness of American protests to Athens "with an awareness of both mounting risk and mounting opportunity."[24] It has been argued that the American foreign policy establishment failed to apply significant pressure on Athens because of the Nixon administration's pronounced affinity for the Greek regime and equally pronounced disdain for President Makarios. President Nixon viewed the Athens regime as a "bastion of stability" and a bulwark against Soviet designs in the eastern Mediterranean. Nixon's sentiment toward the Greek junta was described in the

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[22]Ibid., 94-5.
[23]Ibid., 101.
[24]Ibid., 107-8.

contemporary press as a feeling of "community."[25] Nixon's distrust of the Makarios regime was described in the contemporary press as "antipathy, if not outright paranoia."[26] From a Turkish perspective, the United States would not be expected to oppose the deposition of the Makarios government either diplomatically or militarily.

Indeed, when the Sampson coup erupted on 15 July, the American response was largely ambivalent. State Department press briefings were vague on the issue of American policy toward the coup government, underscoring "the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Cyprus and the existing constitutional arrangements," but coming short of issuing any criticism of the Sampson regime or recognition of the legitimacy of the Makarios government.[27] Secretary Kissinger disclosed later in interviews that public pronouncements against the Sampson regime were avoided, so that Ankara could not use them "as an invitation card to invasion."[28] In effect, the US had adopted the position that the Sampson coup was a *fait accompli*; US diplomatic efforts were directed not at rectifying that situation, but at preventing an intervention by the Turks, which would potentially precipitate war between the two NATO allies. Furthermore, Kissinger was apprehensive that conflict between the two nations might result in the accession of an anti-American regime in Athens.[29] So the Americans pursued a passive stance toward the Sampson coup in an attempt to ward off a Turkish intervention. In Washington, condemnation of Sampson by the United States equaled a green light for the Turks. That was to be avoided at all costs. However, the perception was quite different in Ankara.

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[25]Murarka: 106.
[26]Ibid.: 106.
[27]"United Nations Calls for Cease-Fire in Cyprus," *Department of State Bulletin* 71 (12 August 1974): 262-5.
[28]Stern, 113.
[29]Ibid., 113-4.

Several months after the Turkish invasion, a senior diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed that the Turkish foreign policy elite was convinced in the first few days after the coup that the United States was on the verge of recognizing the coup government: "We felt that if we delayed our intervention, America was going to recognize Sampson. We read the statements by [State Department Spokesman] Robert Anderson. I told my government that the United States would recognize Sampson if you don't move now."[30] It seems that the weakness of the United States stance *vis-à-vis* Sampson led the Turks to suspect American support for the government. This assessment was no doubt compounded by the belief that the Nixon administration was considerably opposed to Makarios and was favorably disposed to the Ioannides regime. It is important to note that despite the perception of a pro-Sampson policy, Turkey decided to intervene. There was considerable disparity between American perceptions of and the reality of the government's leverage on Turkish policy. *Vis-à-vis* the United States, the concern seems to have been more one of timing the intervention to prevent a messy diplomatic situation than one of calculating adverse American response.

An examination of the negotiations between the United States and Turkey between the coup and the intervention demonstrates the absence of American leverage and the Turkish pre-occupation with a quick intervention, in accordance with the above evidence. On the evening of 17 July, Joseph Sisco was dispatched on a mission to avert an impending Turkish intervention in Cyprus, an occurrence that Sisco and the rest of the State Department were coming to see as almost inevitable. During a seven hour meeting in Ankara with Ecevit during the 18th, the Prime Minister issued a list of demands that Sisco was convinced would never be accepted by the military junta in Athens: the removal of the 650 Greek officers in control of the Cypriot National Guard; the removal

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[30]Ibid., 114-5.

of Nicos Sampson from power; the imposition of a federal arrangement for Cypriot government; permanent access to the sea at Girne (Kyrenia) for Turkish forces stationed on Cyprus; United Nations imposed restrictions on the import of foreign arms to Cyprus; and the restoration of President Makarios to power, a demand that was later rescinded. Sisco was given thirty-six hours to secure Greek compliance. Sisco's assessment, wired to Kissinger after the meeting was concluded, was that Ecevit's consultations, including those with the British a few days earlier, were intended only to legally justify an intervention already decided upon.[31]

Sisco's meeting with the Greek junta leaders produced only a concession on replacing the Greek officer corps. At midnight on the 19th/20th, Sisco met again with Prime Minister Ecevit and US Ambassador to Ankara William Macomber. The Turkish National Security Council had already approved an invasion. When Sisco asked for another forty-eight hours to negotiate, Ecevit's response revealed the truth in Sisco's earlier suspicions: "The United States and Turkey both made mistakes [earlier, in 1964 and 1967.] The United States by preventing Turkish military action and Turkey by accepting. We should not make the same mistakes."[32] Four hours later, Ecevit received Sisco and Macomber once again to inform them that the Turkish armada had set sail for the Cypriot coast, saying, "We have done it your way for ten years, and now we are going to do it our way." To Sisco's repeated request for an additional forty-eight hours, Ecevit replied with hyperbole, "You now have *eight hundred* forty-eight hours."[33]

The Turkish attitude toward American pressure is evidenced by the words of a Turkish diplomat involved in the crisis in Washington: "The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our

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[31]Ibid., 117-8.
[32]Ibid., 118.
[33]Ibid., 120.

problems once and for all. *Unlike 1964 and 1967, the United States' leverage on us in 1974 was minimal.* We could no longer be scared off by threats of the Soviet bogeyman."[34]

Concluding Remarks. Ankara was correct in its strategic assessments prior to intervention in Cyprus. The significant rapprochement with the Soviets and the executive paralysis in Washington assured the Turkish leadership that "neither the US sixth fleet nor the Soviet *Eskadia* would move against her."[35] Interestingly enough, Turkish success in the initial intervention was coupled with a further deterioration in American responsiveness, to allow the Turks to further consolidate their position in Cyprus in the middle of August. Between the first and second phases of intervention, the US House of Representatives had voted for impeachment, Nixon had resigned and Ford had succeeded him.[36] It was widely believed among the political elite that President Ford was sympathetic to the Turkish position in Cyprus.[37] Despite the condemnation of the second phase of the intervention by the world community and the removal of Soviet support for the Turkish operation in Cyprus, Turkish officials saw their intervention as a strategic success.

Azerbaijan.

While Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 can be explained with respect to geopolitical calculations of Soviet and American leverage, similar geopolitical factors

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[34]Stern, 116. Italics added.
[35]Sezer, 29.
[36]Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), 99.
[37]George S. Harris, "Turkey and the United States," in Karpat, 72. Indeed, Ford and Kissinger were opposed to the Congressional decision to suspend military aid to Turkey in December 1974. See also Karpat, 202.

have acted to constrain assertive Turkish policy in Azerbaijan. Unlike the situation with Cyprus, the Turkish government, in 1992-1993, found its latitude for action in the Caucasus severely prescribed by Russian and Iranian interests in the region.

The Russian Factor. Russian interests in its "near abroad" did not disappear with the collapse of the Soviet regime. The suggestion by Ankara that it is interested in creating a Turkic commonwealth, and that it may be in the interest of the region to "abandon the ruble zone," has sparked concern in Moscow that Turkish policies may constitute a direct threat to Russian interests there.[38] The creation of a new ethnically based economic cooperation bloc would serve not only to fragment the Commonwealth of Independent States in which Russia can exercise some degree of its former hegemony, but could, in Moscow's estimation, spark further secessionist movements among the Turkic populations of the Russian Federation, such as the Bashkirs or Tatars. Russia's current crisis in Chechnya serves as a portent of what greater ethnic identification among Turkic peoples could spell for large, and economically important, regions of Russia proper.[39] Turkish economic and political overtures to the region have fed fears in Moscow of a loss of influence in what it sees as its strategically vital borderlands, and hence, Moscow has fervently opposed an escalation of that interference to military levels.

Two instances in the course of the conflict in Azerbaijan illustrate the primacy of the Russian factor in dissuading Turkish military intervention. The first is the crisis of May 1992 during which direct Armenian intervention facilitated the expansion of the conflict to Azerbaijan proper and the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan. The second is

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[38]Graham E. Fuller, "The New Geopolitical Order," in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser with Paul B. Henze and J. F. Brown, *Turkey's New Geopolitics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 37 and 68.
[39]Tatarstan, including the region around the city of Kazan' is one Russia's more industrial areas.

the renewed Armenian offensive of March to April 1993, which eventually led to the ouster of Turcophile President Abulfaz Elchibey in June.

May 1992. The Armenian backed offensive of May 1992 succeeded in establishing a corridor of Armenian controlled territory between Armenia proper and Nagorno-Karabakh through the Azerbaijani town of Lachin. In addition, Karabakh forces bombarded the Azerbaijani town of Sadarak in the exclave of Nakhichevan. Nakhichevan, an autonomous region of Armenia legally under Azerbaijani jurisdiction, has defense arrangements with Turkey under the 1921 Treaty of Friendship Between Russia and Turkey. The government of Prime Minister Demirel found itself in much the same quandary that it had experienced earlier in the year after the Hojali massacre; its cautious policies *vis-à-vis* the conflict elicited caustic criticism from among a number of political factions within Turkey.[40] President Özal, who had convened the National Security Council to consider military intervention in mid-March, openly demanded a more assertive policy from the Demirel government: "We will send troops to Nakhichevan. We must send them there without hesitation -- otherwise, the events occurring in Nagorno-Karabakh could be repeated there."[41] Özal suggested that Turkey should "scare the Armenians a little bit," by instituting a blockade or mobilizing troops. Another government official questioned Turkey's official policy of neutrality regarding the conflict and suggested that some decisive moves be taken.[42] The leader of Özal's Motherland Party, Mesut Yilmaz, issued a party policy statement underscoring the

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[40]Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), 95.

[41]*Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* XLIV (21) (24 June 1992): 16 from "Intervention by Turkey Could Lead to Catastrophe," *Izvestiya* (22 May 1992): 4. Iranian arrangements for a cease-fire in March pre-empted any aggressive recommendations coming from the NSC.

[42]Alan Cowell, "Turks Find Demand But Few Deals So Far in Central Asia," *New York Times* (4 August 1992).

"party's support to a request to send troops," and emphasizing that "the Motherland and the Turkish people cannot condone the continuation of such timid policies [as those pursued by Demirel]."[43] Even some members of Demirel's True Path Party were openly critical of his cautiousness; True Path Party assembly member Coskun Kirca called for measures to act "as a deterrent against Armenia" including the supply of armaments to Azerbaijan, the mobilization of Turkish troops along the Armenian border, and the implementation of reconnaissance flights over Armenia.[44]

The impetus for intervention was heightened by an additional contrast with the March incident. In March, President Yakub Mahmedov had requested that Turkey not intervene, stating that he preferred to appeal for CSCE mediation. That fact had helped Demirel sell his policy of non-intervention to an angry National Assembly and undercut President Özal's aggressive rhetoric.[45] But although the Baku government did not request Turkish intervention in May, the Foreign Minister of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, Riza Ibadov, issued a statement in which he said, "We want Turkey's urgent help. Armenians don't understand diplomatic pressure."[46] In the face of such strident governmental pressure and an implied request by Nakhichevan for military intervention, Demirel succumbed, promising the exclave that Turkey would "provide assistance" and that direct military intervention was indeed now "possible."[47] Pursuant to the Constitution, which grants authority to deploy troops to the National Assembly, Demirel stated that that body would have to consider the issue.[48] The

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[43]"Turkish Party Urges Troop Dispatch to Nakhichevan," *Reuters Library Report* (20 May 1992).
[44]Sami Kohen, "Turkey Avoids Force in Armenia Strife" *Christian Science Monitor* (8 June 1992): 6.
[45]Nadire Mater, "Turkey: Doves Outfly the Hawks on Ankara's Nagorno-Karabakh Policy" *Inter Press Service* (11 March 1992).
[46]"Turkey Warns Armenia Over Attacks on Azeri Lands" *Reuters Library Report* (19 May 1992).
[47]"People's Front Takes Power in Baku," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* XLIV (20) (17 June 1992): 12 from Konstantin Eggert, "European Community Accuses Armenia of Aggression Against Azerbaijan," *Izvestia* (20 May 1992): 1, 5.
[48]"Turkish Party...," *Reuters Library Report* (20 May 1992).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement announcing that military intervention was no longer ruled out of Turkish policy toward the crisis, and *Izvestia* reported the apparent convergence of Özal's and Demirel's foreign policy prescriptions for Azerbaijan.[49]

Demirel had acquiesced to pressure from the political elite in Ankara to consider military intervention in Nakhichevan. But before he could refer the issue to the Grand National Assembly, Demirel issued a statement that was a complete about-face. Claiming that no "interlocutor" could be found in Baku, Demirel stated that Turkey could not intervene militarily. "[Turkey] cannot possibly take a gun and run over every time there is a conflict."[50] In effect, Demirel exercised his prime ministerial veto as a member of the National Security Council. The impetus for the sudden change was a statement issued by Russian Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov on May 20, in response to growing alarms in Moscow that Turkey was on the verge of intervening in Nakhichevan. Shaposhnikov's statement was a warning leveled at any foreign intervention, stating that such an interference might result in the escalation of the conflict into a "third world war." Moreover, and in less ambiguous address, Shaposhnikov insinuated that intervention by Turkey, a NATO member, against Armenia, a signatory to the Treaty for Collective Defense signed in Tashkent five days earlier, would be tantamount to an attack by NATO against the CIS.[51] The threat was apparently taken quite seriously by Ankara, considering the fact that some 23,000 troops of the Russian Fourth Army were stationed in Armenia, several thousand of which were poised at the Turkish border.

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[49]Eleanor Randolf, "Iran, Turkey Denounce Armenian Aggression," *Washington Post* (20 May 1992): A25, and Konstantin Eggert, "People's Front Takes Power in Baku," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (17 June 1992): 12.

[50]Xu Wenquen, "Ankara Prefers Diplomatic Efforts to Stop Armenians' Attack on Azeri Land," *Xinhua General Overseas News Service* (21 May 1992).

[51]Fuller, 78, see also *Izvestia* from 21 May 1992.

Their commander, Colonel Viktor Zhukov, warned that his forces would be the first the resist any Turkish attempt to intervene.[52]

The stiff warning from Shaposhnikov had what Dilip Hiro called a "chastening effect" on Turkish policy. Demirel issued a statement denying Russian accounts that Turkey had mobilized any troops along the Armenian border and assured the international community that Turkey had no intention of intervening militarily.[53] Demirel's government turned immediately to diplomatic efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and was even successful in securing Boris Yeltsin's endorsement of a condemnation of Armenian aggression on May 26.[54] Although direct military intervention by the Turks was avoided, there is suspicion that Ankara provided military attaches to Baku to train Azerbaijani forces, coming short of providing armaments pursuant to an earlier request by the Azerbaijani government.[55] It seems that Russian policy was not a categorical defense of Armenian policies, rather was designed to keep Turkey out of the Caucasus regardless of the impetus for Turkish intervention.

April 1993. Following the renewal of Armenian offensives in early 1993, Karabakh forces were able to open yet another unobstructed corridor from Armenia proper to Nagorno-Karabakh by occupying the Azerbaijani city of Kelbajar. When the Armenian victories prompted President Elchibey to declare a two month state of emergency on 3 April, Turkey responded by closing its borders and airspace to all Armenian-bound

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[52]Justin Burke, "Azeris May Appeal to Neighbors," *Christian Science Monitor* (22 May 1992): 6; "Middle East," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (24 June 1992): 16-17; and Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies* (Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995): 75.

[53]Michael Parks, "Turkey Tries to Rally Opposition to Armenia," *Times of London* (27 May 1992): A4.

[54]Hiro, 97.

[55]Henry Kamm, "Turkey Seeks Security Advantage in Region's Ex-Soviet Nations," *New York Times* (27 June 1992).

transportation, producing a virtual blockade of the country. Once again, the Demirel government found itself criticized on all political fronts for failing to adopt a tougher stance *vis-à-vis* the Armenians. Calls for decisive action were made from parties as political opposed as the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan to the Motherland Party to the Republican People's Party of Atatürk himself.[56]

Official government statements reflected the gravity of the situation; Foreign Minister spokesman Ferhat Ataman said that the crisis had escalated to such a point that the very existence of Azerbaijan was at stake.[57] Despite the actual mobilization of troops along the Armenian border and declarations that it would dispatch troops to Nakhichevan, Ankara refrained from actual military intervention, and denied reports in *Milliyet* that reconnaissance flights had been made over the Armenian border. Dilip Hiro asserts that the embargo placed on Turkey following the Cyprus intervention of 1974 was foremost on Turkish policy makers' minds in April and no one in Ankara wanted to see another Western imposed economic embargo.[58] Furthermore, having been dissuaded a year earlier by the Shaposhnikov declaration, Ankara was not prepared to threaten Russian interests in the Caucasus again. Since the previous year, the number of Russian troops stationed in Armenia had gradually increased from the 23,000 of May 1992 to almost 50,000 by the end of 1993.[59]

After the accession to power of President Haidar Aliyev in June 1993, relations between Ankara and Baku flagged, as the new government undertook new diplomatic initiatives with both Moscow and Tehran. Haidar Aliyev was in fact a former KGB leader and politburo member. It is asserted that the assistance given the Armenians in the

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[56]Gao Shixing, "Government Urged to Use force against Armenia," *Xinhua General Overseas News Service* (6 April 1993).
[57]*Mideast Mirror* 7 (67) (6 April 1993).
[58]Hiro, 75.
[59]Curtis, 75.

previous year against the Azerbaijanis was part of a calculated Russian policy designed to destabilize Elchibey and facilitate the rise of Aliyev, thereby sharply curtailing Turkish influence in Baku. Indeed, in a complete reversal of Elchibey's policy toward the Russians, Aliyev brought Azerbaijan back into the CIS in September, giving Moscow a mandate for settling the crisis. The same month, Russia requested a revision of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, negotiated between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in 1990, in order to augment its forces in the Caucasus. In January 1994, Russia and Azerbaijan entered discussions on the dispatch of Russian troops to Azerbaijan to bolster its defenses against the Karabakh Armenians.[60] The time for assertive Turkish policy had come and gone.

The Iranian Factor.

The history of Iranian influence in Azerbaijan far outdates the cultural inroads made by Ankara since the collapse of the Soviet regime. The Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828) divided the whole of Azerbaijan between Persia and Russia and established Persian hegemony over the southern half of greater Azerbaijan. The treaty was designed by St. Petersburg to outflank Ottoman expansion in the Caucasus and extend Russian influence toward the Persian Gulf, but gave rise to the "Azerbaijan Question" that still preoccupies Iranian policy toward the region.[61]

In the summer of 1918, the Ottoman army took advantage of the destabilized situation in Russia and occupied both the newly declared Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (the northern region) and the Iranian administered province of Tabriz

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[60]Ibid., 67-8.

[61]Tadeusz Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan's Triangular Relationship," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 118.

(southern Azerbaijan), and declaring the cession of the north to the Empire and the creation of an Ottoman protectorate in the south. For the first time, the issue of "Turkism" appeared as a threat to the stability of the Iranian state, and after the defeat of Turkey in 1918, a process of Persianization of Tabriz was undertaken by Tehran to shore up the country's territorial integrity. In order to protect itself from Soviet irredentism, the independent Democratic Republic in the north attempted a confederation with Iran in November 1919, but the Iranian *majlis* refused to ratify the entire agreement because of British stipulations that infringed upon Tehran's sovereignty in the matter. In March 1920, however, the Democratic Republic did conclude an Iranian-Azerbaijani Treaty of Friendship and Commerce.[62]

The independent republic was short-lived and Soviet national policy in Azerbaijan was designed to divorce it from Iranian influence, as well as Turkish influence. The alphabet was latinized to drive a wedge between Baku and Tehran. The term "Azerbaijani" was coined by the Soviet regime to replace the previous term Turkic (*Tiurkskii*) in order to distinguish the population from the Turkish nation Atatürk was creating in Turkey. In 1940, the alphabet was changed to Cyrillic to facilitate communication between Moscow and Baku, and to obstruct Turkish influence.[63]

While the Soviets were careful to diminish Iranian or Turkish influence in Azerbaijan, they also worked to destabilize Iran by instituting a "One Azerbaijan" campaign. The campaign reached its apex during the Soviet occupation of northern Iran in the Second World War and the formation of the Soviet puppet state of Azerbaijan under Sayyid Jafar Pishevari after the War. Pan-Azerbaijani policies were abandoned during the brief period of detente between Tehran and Moscow, but after the Islamic

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[62]Ibid., 120-1.
[63]Ibid., 121-2.

Revolution, the campaign was re-instituted under Haidar Aliyev, the current President of independent Azerbaijan. Once again, the campaign was disbanded under Gorbachev's *perestroika* reforms as "an unnecessary irritant in relations with Iran."[64]

A largely perennial policy of Azerbaijani irredentism since the end of the First World War made Tehran particularly cautious of Azerbaijani independence movements in the late 1980's and early 1990's. When Turkey recognized Azerbaijani independence in 1992, Tehran's response was highly critical. Turkey had been first to recognize Baku, not only for symbolic importance, but to pre-empt an Iranian recognition that Ankara felt would undercut Turkish diplomatic inroads in the region.[65]

This tension between Tehran and Ankara over Azerbaijani independence was indicative of the sour state of affairs between the two countries since the Islamic Revolution. Ankara suspected Tehran of exporting the revolution to Turkey's large Shi'ite *Alevi* population, and Tehran openly condemned Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as an enemy of Islam.[66] Furthermore, Iran had been suspicious of Turkish intentions during the Iran-Iraq War, believing Ankara had designs on the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq (which were in fact the last territories surrendered by the Turkish government in the peace settlements following the War of Independence).[67] Iranian-Turkish relations were less than beneficent at the moment of Azerbaijani independence.

Iranian concerns were heightened when control of Azerbaijan fell into the hands of the fiercely Turcophile and irredentist Abulfaz Elchibey. Indeed, Tehran was openly hostile to his government.[68] Iranian calculations were pessimistic: in short, the independence of northern Azerbaijan, especially under a pro-Turkish leader like

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[64]Ibid., 122-4.
[65]Sabri Sayari, "Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia" in Banuazizi and Weiner, 178.
[66]Fuller, 65.
[67]Ibid., 66.
[68]Swietochowski, 130.

Elchibey, could serve only to destabilize Iran's Azerbaijani population and could benefit Tehran in no conceivable way.[69] Tehran's only foreign policy options would be to undercut Turkish influence in whatever way possible and warn Turkey to refrain from assertive policies in the region. An ethnic alliance would serve only to undermine Tehran's own integrity and Tehran was fully aware of this.[70]

Because Iran shares borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan, it enjoys a significant geographic advantage over Turkey. It has sought to exploit this advantage *vis-à-vis* the Turks by obstructing transportation and transit from Turkey to Azerbaijan and the rest of Central Asia, despite Ankara's attempts to establish some arrangement through the Economic Cooperation Council (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union).[71] Furthermore, Iran covertly supplied support for Kurdish guerrillas in southeast Turkey during Turkey's October 1992 offensive against the PKK. The support was intended to serve as a signal to Turkey to adopt a more passive role *vis-à-vis* Azerbaijan or suffer more of the consequences of Tehran's ability to exacerbate Turkey's domestic ethnic problems.[72]

After the Aliyev coup of June 1993, the balance between Iranian and Turkish influence in Baku shifted. Aliyev, despite his earlier involvement with the Soviet "One Azerbaijan" campaign has developed close ties with Tehran and has purportedly revoked irredentist claims against Iran.[73] Aliyev's rise to power has, then resulted not only in improved relations with Moscow, but with Tehran as well. As in the case of Russian leverage in the Caucasus, it appears that Iranian policy too was pragmatic as the expense of ideological or religious considerations. The Iranian tendency to support Armenia in

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[69]Fuller, 84.
[70]Graham E. Fuller, "The New Geopolitical Order" in Banuazizi and Weiner, 35-6.
[71]Andrew Mango, *The Challenge of a New Role* (Westport, CT: Prager, 1994), 4.
[72]Sayari, 188.
[73]Swietochowski, 132.

the conflict with Azerbaijan, like Moscow's, was reversed once the political climate shifted against Turkish influence.

Concluding Remarks. The change in leadership in Baku signaled the closing of Turkey's window of opportunity to act decisively in the Caucasus. Aliyev, in sharp contrast to his predecessors, espoused strong affinities for the Russians and Iranians, and although relations between Ankara and Baku have improved significantly from their nadir in 1993 when Elchibey was ousted, Ankara no longer finds itself with as much latitude *vis-à-vis* Baku to act assertively. The above assessment of Turkish policy toward Azerbaijan and Armenia from recognition of the republics to the installation of President Aliyev has shown the considerable degree to which Russian and Iranian interests in the Caucasus severely curtailed Turkish freedom to maneuver, even when such intervention would have been welcome in Baku.

Conclusion.

What are the factors that determine the course of a state's foreign policy? That is the ultimate question posed in the study of foreign policy theory. Although this thesis cannot present a definitive answer to that query, it has provided a useful study of Turkish foreign policy that sheds some light on what factors may be predominant in the final analysis.

This thesis has examined two cases of Turkish policy in response to very similar instances of ethnic conflict. Although Turkish national interest and ethnic consideration in each case were strikingly similar, policy outcomes exhibited a surprising incongruence. The analysis presented in this thesis has sought to explain this apparent anomaly. In the second chapter, Mill's Method of Difference was employed to determine if policy outcome covaried with explanatory variables posited by a number of contending theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy. All the variables examined in that section either exhibited no significant variation across the cases, or exhibited variation that contradicted the expected relationships predicted by the theoretical approaches from which they were taken. This analysis demonstrated the inability of international institutionalism, domestic institutionalism, societal structuralism, and constructivism to adequately explain the observed policy outcomes.

The final chapter of this thesis presented additional analysis of variables posited by structural realism to be explanatory in the study of foreign policy. Unlike the variables examined in chapter two, these variables demonstrated decisive covariation with the observed policy outcomes. When the combination of these factors resulted in low levels of geopolitical constraint, Turkish policy assumed an assertive character; when their combination assumed high levels of geopolitical constraint, Turkish policy was more reticent. This crucial variation of these factors with the dependent variable

allows for a causal explanation of policy outcome consistent with the precepts of structural realism: international structures determine the behavior of states in an anarchic international system in which security in the primary goal.

The conclusion presented by this work is not that geopolitical factors are *solely* determinant of policy outcome. Rather, in theoretical terms, geopolitical analysis serves as a sufficient and much more efficient and convincing means of explaining the outcomes of foreign policy decisions that are, no doubt, results of infinitely complex calculations. But this thesis demonstrates, at least for these two cases of Turkish foreign policy, that structural realism can account for a great deal of the observed variation in policy outcome.

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