The Ethics and Moral Psychology of Plato’s *Phaedo*

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Introduction

Much has been written on Platonic ethics and moral psychology. And, much has been written on Plato’s *Phaedo*, the dialogue that portrays Socrates’ last day and death. But rather little has been written on the ethics and moral psychology of the *Phaedo*. Perhaps this is not surprising. After all, aside from being a dramatic masterpiece, the dialogue has quite the philosophical payload, including four proofs of the immortality of the soul, an argument for Plato’s theory of learning as recollection, and perhaps the first elaboration on the metaphysical theory of Forms. As a result of this embarrassment of riches, commentators working on the dialogue have plenty to puzzle over aside from ethics and moral psychology. Moreover, ethics and moral psychology appear to be given little emphasis in the *Phaedo*, and what is said about them does not seem to add any substance to what we find elsewhere in the corpus. Accordingly, the *Phaedo* seems to offer little to appeal to the interests of scholars working on ethics or moral psychology. Such is the state of scholarship that, for instance, in *Plato’s Ethics* Terrence Irwin’s only real treatment of the *Phaedo* is as part of an investigation into the theory of Forms.

I think that this understanding of the *Phaedo* is misguided. I believe that there is much we can learn regarding ethics and moral psychology from the dialogue. This is not to deny the obvious, namely that overtly ethical passages are in relatively short supply in the *Phaedo*. However, there are two sustained discussions of moral views: in Socrates’ Defense (63e6-69e4)—which includes the Right Exchange (69a5-c2), a passage explicitly contrasting genuine and counterfeit virtue—and in a passage I call the ‘Reprise’ (80c1-84b5). Both of these passages are packed with important ethical details, and both

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1 As far as moral psychology goes, since Socrates argues for the immortality of the soul, no one could deny that the dialogue is concerned with the nature of the soul, and so, psychology. But, moral psychology does
come at watershed moments in the dialogue. The former is Socrates’ meticulous apology for philosophy and his attitude toward death. Furthermore, it sets the agenda for the subsequent arguments, as the balance of the discussion is aimed at justifying one of its key assumptions, namely that the soul is immortal. The latter is a passage that recalls many of the elements from Socrates’ Defense. And, Plato highlights the significance of the Reprise by concluding it with a long silence wherein most present reflect upon its content, undoubtedly an invitation for us as readers to reflect on it also.

I believe that Plato is drawing the reader’s attention to these passages because he takes them to be fundamental to the dialogue and the nature of ethics. But in order to see and appreciate their significance, as interpreters, we must do a lot of work. The present study is the beginning of this work. And, as I shall try to show, this work is worth it, both for our understanding of the dialogue and for our understanding of Platonic ethics generally. In what follows I will offer a comprehensive interpretation of the ethics and moral psychology of the *Phaedo* that demonstrates that these are central issues—perhaps the most central—in the dialogue. Moreover, as I will argue, the *Phaedo* contains an ethical theory that differs significantly from the traditional understanding of Platonic ethics. Accordingly, the dialogue is an indispensable text in Platonic ethics. I make the case for these claims as follows.

In Chapter One I inquire into the relationship between virtue and wisdom in the *Phaedo*. In order to do so I consider in detail three passages: Socrates’ Defense (63e6-69e4), The Right Exchange (69a5-c2), and the Reprise (80c1-84b5). I argue that properly understood all three passages—along with an explicit characterization of wisdom
(φρόνησις)\(^2\) at 79d1-4—indicate that Socrates holds that virtue does not require the possession of wisdom, but instead requires the desire for wisdom. Thus, I argue that the view of virtue we find in the *Phaedo* is strikingly different from the traditional understanding of virtue in the early dialogues—where virtue is usually identified as wisdom—and the *Republic*—where virtue requires wisdom.

I provide several arguments for this radical interpretation of the relationship between virtue and wisdom. First, I argue that Socrates does not hold that wisdom is required for virtue. My argument for this is based on Socrates’ characterization of virtue as what purifies the soul of bodily desires, and so, separates the soul from the body. And, because possessing wisdom requires that the soul be separate from the body, virtue is what facilitates the pursuit (and ultimately the possession) of wisdom. Thus, wisdom is not required for virtue, but instead virtue is required for wisdom. Second, I argue for my interpretation based on Socrates’ exhaustive dichotomy—present in all three passages—of philosophers and body-lovers. Unlike non-philosophers, who are only motivated by bodily pleasure/pain, and so at best possess a form of merely apparent virtue, the philosopher, who alone possesses true virtue, is only motivated by wisdom. So, with regard to motivation, the most significant difference between apparent virtue and true virtue is that the latter is motivated by wisdom. Thus, genuine virtue is characterized by desiring wisdom. Finally, I argue that Socrates makes it plain that the reason that philosophers are virtuous is because virtue is required for the soul to continue pursuing and possessing wisdom after death (83e4). So, virtue is desired because it is required for

\(^2\) As I discuss below, throughout the *Phaedo* Socrates consistently employs ‘φρόνησις’ rather than ‘σοφία’ to refer to wisdom. Indeed, he only uses ‘σοφία’ twice in the entire dialogue (96a7 and 101e5), and in neither case does it refer to the highest cognitive state, that is, the state sought after by the philosopher (see Johnson (unpublished): 11-12).
wisdom. Thus, I argue, true virtue is characterized not by possessing wisdom, but by *aiming* at wisdom.

I turn to the moral psychology of the dialogue in Chapter Two. This chapter is structured around two inquires. The first inquiry is about the nature of the relationship between the soul and bodily desires, pleasures, pains, and appetites. In particular, I ask whether bodily desires originate in the body and then impinge upon the soul, or whether they originate (and exist) in the soul and only refer to bodily states. Put another way, I ask whether the body is a subject of motivational states alongside the soul, or is the soul alone the subject of motivational states. Previous investigations into this issue tend to rely exclusively on individual passages with the hope of uncovering a claim that provides a conclusive answer one way or the other. But, as I argue, these investigations stall because passages can be proffered in favor of each interpretation. Accordingly, I seek out a fundamental Platonic tenet in the dialogue that brings with it a commitment to one reading over the other. As I argue, because Plato thinks that even disembodied souls can experience bodily desires, we can conclude that bodily desires belong to the soul, even if they refer to and are initially instigated by the body.

The second inquiry is about the nature of the soul in the *Phaedo*. In particular, I ask whether it is unitary and wholly rational, as it seems to be in many of the Socratic dialogues, or is it constituted by more than one part, including non-rational elements, as in the *Republic*? As I point out, the results of my first inquiry in this chapter may suggest that the soul is partite; given that it houses bodily desires along with rational desires, it looks as though the soul must consist in appetitive and rational parts. However, based on the Affinity Argument, as well as other characterizations of the soul in the dialogue, I
argue that the soul is unitary and it likely consists in a rational element alone. In order to make sense of bodily desires, and the divide between philosophers and body-lovers, I suggest that the soul desires exclusively to be with what is real and true. Thus, bodily desires arise when the body deceives the soul into thinking that the corporeal is real and true. And, whereas philosophers get it right in taking the Forms to be what is most real and true, body-lovers are deceived by the body into taking the corporeal as the most real and true, thus desiring it.

In Chapter Three I return to the issue of virtue in the *Phaedo*. Whereas the primary focus of Chapter One is genuine virtue, in this chapter I turn my attention to the psychological conditions that fall short of genuine virtue. In particular, my concern is the relationship between two psychological states Socrates identifies in the Right Exchange and Reprise, respectively: apparent virtue and political virtue. My primary question in this chapter is whether these two apparently distinct states are actually one and the same.

In order to answer this question—and so get clear on the Phaedonic view of deficient virtue, and fill out our picture of the ethical landscape of the dialogue—I first consider the possibility that political virtue is distinct from apparent virtue. The most promising version of this view holds that people with political virtue are motivated by beliefs about virtue, whereas those with apparent virtue act only on the basis of bodily pleasure and pain, disregarding virtue. Although this interpretation seems to fit with the view that we find in the *Republic*, I argue that this cannot be the way to understand political virtue in the *Phaedo*. Plato’s view in the *Phaedo* is that all non-philosophers are body lovers (68b7), and so motivated only by bodily concerns. Hence, given the moral psychology of the dialogue, there is no space for someone to be motivated by virtue
(whether on account of a belief or any other attitude toward it) while being a body-lover. Thus, because all non-philosophers are ultimately motivated only by bodily concerns, there is no distinction between apparent virtue and political virtue. Thus I argue that in the dialogue there is only a single form of deficient virtue, apparent virtue. This conclusion, however, does not imply that all non-philosophers are the same with regard to apparent virtue, a curious claim that many commentators ascribe to Socrates in the dialogue. This is because apparent virtue is the exchange of some bodily experiences for others. That is, apparent virtue requires, for instance, that one forego a bodily pleasure for the sake of another pleasure in the future. But a point that all other commentators seem to miss is that this does not imply, nor should we otherwise think, that all non-philosophers (consistently) engage in these exchanges. Instead, only those with apparent virtue do. Thus, I argue that the *Phaedo* provides us with a comprehensive picture of virtue, including genuine virtue, apparent virtue, and viciousness.

The topic of Chapter Four is Plato’s conception of philosophy in the *Phaedo*. As I argue in Chapter One, possessing virtue requires desiring wisdom. Another way of putting this point is that possessing virtue requires that one be a philosopher. Thus, it is clear that the value of philosophy and its role in acquiring virtue and wisdom are central to the dialogue. Moreover, a careful reading of the dialogue reveals that what matters in particular is being a philosopher in the right way. Plato makes this concern manifest by putting in Socrates’ mouth phrases like ‘the correct way to do philosophy’ 15 times across Socrates’ Defense and the Reprise. In the final chapter I seek to understand how exactly Plato understands the right way to do philosophy, and so, to possess virtue.
My strategy for teasing out this conception of philosophy is to consider its opposite, the wrong way to do philosophy. I argue that Plato’s emphasis on the right way to do philosophy implies that he is concerned to distinguish it from its counterfeit.\(^3\)

Accordingly, I set out the possible practitioners of counterfeit philosophy. Based on the groups we find in the *Phaedo* itself, I argue that there are three suspects: the *antilogikoi* (contradiction mongers), the Natural Philosophers, and the Pythagoreans. I argue that we can look to *Republic* VI and VII as well as the *Euthydemus* in order to adjudicate between these three groups. And, by doing so, I conclude that the *antilogikoi* are the people who are doing philosophy the wrong way in the *Phaedo*. I then use the picture of the *antilogikoi* to construct a characterization of genuine philosophy, which is distinguished by a pursuit of the truth through skill and unwavering faith in argumentation.

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\(^3\) Not unlike how genuine virtue must be distinguished from its counterfeit, apparent virtue.
Chapter One: The Relationship between Virtue and Wisdom

I begin this study with an investigation into a fundamental ethical concern in the *Phaedo*, the relationship between virtue and wisdom. Although some work has been done on this issue, we lack a comprehensive treatment of how virtue and wisdom relate to one another in the dialogue. In the Introduction I suggested that the allure of the dialogue’s other philosophical puzzles and the fact that explicitly ethical passages are the minority in the work explain the general lack of scholarly explorations of ethics in the *Phaedo*. But when it comes to the question of how virtue and wisdom relate, further factors are at play. In particular, when commentators consider this question, they tend to focus attention on a notoriously difficult passage, which I’ll call ‘the Right Exchange’ (69a5-c2). The Right Exchange is certainly about the relationship between virtue and wisdom, so scholars are correct to consult it for an answer to this question. But the fixation with this vexing passage has caused commentators to overlook and disregard other passages that bear on the issue. Furthermore, although there are subtle differences among readings, the dominant interpretation of the Right Exchange is that it expresses the view that wisdom is required for virtue. But, since this view is treated in greater detail elsewhere in the corpus, and because aside from the Right Exchange the *Phaedo* does not seem to have

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4 For some recent examples see, Kraut 2010: 53 and Vasilou 2012: 20. See also Gooch 1974 who argues that wisdom is a means to virtue. Luce 1944 argues that in the passage Plato identifies virtue and wisdom (cf. Pakaluk 2004: 109. On this view, then virtue trivially requires wisdom, since they are the same condition. Bobonich 2002: 16-18, 34 and Beere 2011: 254 both read this passage as setting out a “double role” for wisdom in regards to virtue, and so thinks that virtue requires wisdom. The only contemporary scholar who denies that the Right Exchange is an expression of the view that virtue requires wisdom is Weiss 1987, though see Bostock 1986: 30-35 and Bluck 1955: 3-5. The view I argue for here seems to be similar to how at least some Neoplatonists read the Right Exchange. For instance both Damascius (84-98) and Olympiodorus (188-122) in their commentaries on the *Phaedo* identify the genuine virtue in this passage as ‘purifying virtue’ which consists in part in withdrawing reason from everything external to it.
much to offer about this view, scholars seem to think that the dialogue cannot extend our understanding of Plato’s thinking on the relationship between virtue and wisdom.

I do not believe that the dominant interpretation of the Right Exchange is correct. Nor do I believe that the view that virtue requires wisdom is reflected elsewhere in the dialogue. In fact, I believe that several other passages in the *Phaedo* indicate that the very opposite relationship holds between virtue and wisdom, namely that wisdom requires virtue. And, I think that once we appreciate these passages, and the Right Exchange is integrated into the dialogue as a whole, a new reading of the passage emerges. My aim in this chapter is to show this, and in doing so argue that in the dialogue Socrates maintains that wisdom requires virtue. In particular, I will show that his view is that someone has virtue not by possessing wisdom, but by desiring wisdom, and that possessing virtue is required to pursue and ultimately to possess wisdom.

Because the dominant interpretation of the Right Exchange is the main reason from within the dialogue that commentators ascribe to Socrates the view that virtue requires wisdom, much of my concern will be with undermining this reading. In order to do so I will consider the context of the Right Exchange, a passage that I’ll call ‘Socrates’ Defense’ (63e6-69e4)\(^5\) in which Socrates justifies his commitment to philosophy and his willingness to die. As we shall see, Socrates’ Defense seems to rule out the view that virtue requires wisdom, and instead indicates that wisdom requires virtue. Then I will consider the aspects of the Right Exchange itself that are usually taken to support the dominant interpretation that virtue requires wisdom. I will argue that properly understood these features in fact support my contention that in the dialogue wisdom requires virtue.

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\(^5\) Pakaluk 2003 and 2004 employ the same name.
Finally, I will consider a passage that I gloss ‘the Reprise’ (80c1-84b5), which recalls the key themes of Socrates’ Defense. I will argue that in the Reprise Socrates is explicit that philosophers desire virtue because it is necessary for wisdom, which supports my claim that in the dialogue wisdom requires virtue.

1. The immediate context of the Right Exchange

As noted above, commentators approaching the passage I am calling the ‘Right Exchange’ tend to isolate it from the rest of the dialogue. Given its difficult language and the nearly impenetrable metaphor at its heart, the impulse to zero in on the sentence is understandable. If we consider the passage in its context, however, our interpretive job is actually made easier. For, although it may be opaque to us, Socrates introduces the Right Exchange as a way to illuminate a point. Thus, understanding its context should help us make sense of the passage by revealing the end to which Socrates employs it. Accordingly, in the following two sections I set out the context of the Right Exchange, beginning with what immediately precedes it.

The *Phaedo* portrays Socrates on his final (embodied) day. For his part, though, the fact that he is about to die does not necessitate an inquiry into immortality. Instead, Socrates wants only to have a philosophical discussion with friends; he does not have an

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7 Beere 2011 is an exception.
8 Bailly 2011: 297 is correct that “the metaphor serves no other purpose than to illustrate something that is taken to be somehow in need of clarification in the context.” Yet, it is for this reason he resists the strategy of using the context to explain the Right Exchange, presuming that the passage must be clearer than its context. My point, though, is that it is only by knowing and appreciating the context that we can see what the sentence is supposed to clarify. Further, the context constrains what counts as proper interpretation of the sentence. Given that the sentence and its metaphors are meant to clarify something that precedes it, our interpretation cannot conflict with the view it is aimed at making perspicuous. Cf. Pakaluk 2004: 112.
9 As reported by the dialogue’s namesake. For a discussion of how Phaedo the philosopher may bear on the dialogue, see Boys-Stones 2004. For a thorough discussion of the historical Phaedo’s life (as well as some interesting points of connection with the dialogue) see Dusanic 1993.
ax to grind or a philosophical agenda. Rather, his arguments for immortality are precipitated by questions from his friends, who want to know why it is so easy for him to accept his death and to abandon them (63a5). In an attempt to respond—Socrates’ Defense (63e6-69e4)—he argues that death, i.e., the separation of the soul from the body, affords the philosopher the opportunity to acquire what she most desires, (pure) wisdom. Indeed, this leads him to characterize philosophy as practice for death (64a3). In making this claim and explaining why he not only accepts, but actually looks forward to death Socrates does not argue that the soul is immortal. Rather, he simply assumes that this is so. And, were it not for Simmias and Cebes, who request a reason to accept this assumption, the conversation may have taken another direction after Socrates’ Defense.

Unlike Simmias and Cebes, I am not concerned with the assumption that the soul is immortal. Indeed, in this study I will not consider in detail any of Socrates’ four arguments for the immortality of the soul. Instead, here I want to focus on Socrates’ Defense itself. I will consider the earliest stages of Socrates’ Defense below, but for now I want to look at the end of it, as this provides the immediate context for the Right Exchange.

By 67e2 Socrates concludes that that those who practice philosophy should not resent death, and so, has fulfilled his friends’ request to explain why he accepts death so

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10 cf. 67a1: “either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death.” Here I do not take a stance on whether or not Socrates genuinely endorses this strongest version of the view that we cannot possess wisdom while embodied. Along the way, however, I will point out relevant passages that could be taken in support of the claim that he does and that he does not. For our purposes, though, it is important to realize that if Socrates denies the possibility of embodied wisdom, and the dominant interpretation is correct and he believes that virtue requires wisdom, then we left with the view that he denies the possibility of embodied virtue. See Pakaluk 2003: 107-108 who notes but is not bothered by this. Vasiliou 2012: 25 does think it is problematic, but thinks that it is a problem that is not solved until the Republic when Plato allows the possibility of embodied wisdom. Importantly, if my reading is correct, and wisdom requires virtue, then we need not saddle Socrates with this view, that is not only peculiar, but also conflicts with his explicit claims that embodied virtue is possible (see note 83 below).
easily. In light of his conclusion, Socrates argues that whoever does resent death is not a lover of wisdom, but is a body lover (τις φιλοσώματος). Although he does not say it, from this we can surmise that if someone is not a philosopher, she is a body lover. Thus, at the most general level, there are two types of people: philosophers and body lovers. This dichotomy will be important in subsequent investigations throughout this study, but for now what matters is that corresponding to these two different types of people are two different types of virtue: the genuine of the philosopher and the deficient virtue of the body lover. Indeed, the contrast between these two forms of virtue is the subject of the Right Exchange. Accordingly, let’s see what Socrates says about genuine and deficient virtue just prior to the Right Exchange.

In the lead up to the Right Exchange Socrates discusses two virtues in particular, courage and temperance. He begins by talking about what is called ‘courage’ (ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία) and what is called ‘temperance’ (ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην). According to Socrates, what is called ‘courage’ is what enables a person to face death (68d4) and what is called ‘temperance’ is the quality of not getting overtaken by passions and keeping them orderly (68c5-d1), and that people with this quality keep away from certain pleasures. Since these actions—facing death and avoiding certain bodily pleasures—are surely courageous and temperate, respectively, we

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11 We can be more specific with body lovers, as Socrates says that one who is a body lover will also be a money lover (φιλοχρήματος), an honor lover (φιλότιμος), or both. It is worth pointing to this because it is an example that shows that Socrates thinks a single action can have more than one end (i.e., an action can be aimed at honor, and so, also at bodily pleasure). Thus, even though I will argue Socrates thinks virtue is required for wisdom, we can see that he has the resources to allow that an action can be aimed at virtue and wisdom at the same time.

12 I discuss this passage in much greater detail in Chapter Three, which deals with deficient virtue in the dialogue.
can surmise that what is called ‘virtue’ results in virtuous action. And, although they are merely called ‘courage’ and ‘temperance,’ and not courage and temperance themselves, Socrates says that they apply to the philosopher. Indeed, he is explicit that what is called ‘courage’ belongs more to the philosopher than to anyone else (68c2) and that what is called ‘temperance’ belongs only to the philosopher (68d1).

Although what is called ‘courage’ and ‘temperance’ apply to the philosopher more so than non-philosophers, in this passage Socrates indicates that body lovers can have some form of courage and temperance, and can engage in courageous and temperate actions. We know because Socrates asks Simmias to reflect upon the courage and moderation of other people, that is, non-philosophers (ἐννοησαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, 68d3). Furthermore, he also discusses the courageous among them (αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρείοι, 68d6), who face death, and the temperate among them (οἱ κόσμοι αὐτῶν, 68e1) who keep away from certain bodily pleasures. Thus, it is clear that Socrates thinks that non-philosophers can possess some form of virtue. But it is also clear that what they possess is not genuine virtue. For, Socrates says that in the case of body lovers, their virtues arise through the very opposites of what they are taken to be, with their courage coming from fear and cowardice (δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλία, 68b6) and their temperance coming from intemperance (τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δὲ ἀκολασίαν αὐτούς σεσωφρονίσθαι, 69a2). As Socrates says, non-philosophers act courageously for fear of evils they take to be greater than death, while they act temperately by mastering certain pleasures because they are mastered by others. Because of this feature, Socrates criticizes the virtue of body lovers as strange (ἄτοπος, 68d2), unreasonable (ἄλογον, 68d1).

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13 Of course, there could be contexts in which facing death is not courageous but is foolhardy. However, in general facing death would be courageous.
68d6), and in some way impossible (ἀδύνατον, 68e3). Given that this form of virtue is possible—Socrates attributes it to at least some body lovers!—this last criticism cannot be that it is contradictory or literally impossible. Instead, his point is that it would be impossible for true virtue to come from its opposite. Yet, since body lovers mistake their deficient virtue for true virtue, they believe that the impossible has happened.¹⁴

These criticisms, in particular the final criticism, bring Socrates to the Right Exchange, which I take to be an attempt to clarify his concerns with the virtue of non-philosophers and contrast it with the genuine virtue of philosophers. Because the passage is vital to this issue, here I will quote in full, beginning with the Greek text.

Now here is Grube’s translation (modified), with the controversial Greek intact.

Dear Simmias, I fear this is not the correct exchange with regard to (πρὸς) virtue, that is exchanging pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, and fears for fears, the greater for the less, just as with coins. Instead, the only correct coin for which one ought to exchange them is wisdom.¹⁵ And, buying and selling all of these

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¹⁴ To be clear, Socrates thinks that nothing can come from its opposite. Thus, cowardice is not the opposite of the courage of the body lover, but it is the opposite of true courage. So too, intemperance is not the opposite of the body lover’s temperance, but it is the opposite of true temperance.

¹⁵ As I noted in the General Introduction (note 2), Socrates always employs ‘φρόνησις’ when discussing the philosopher, only using ‘σοφία’ twice in the entire dialogue (96a7 and 101e5) to refer disparagingly to the perceived intelligence of non-philosophers. Beere 2011: fn 26 suggests that this is to highlight the centrality of practical reasoning in the dialogue. But, this cannot be correct, as practical reasoning is absent from the dialogue. Johnson (unpublished): 11-12 suggests that this is to emphasize that wisdom is a process to acquire virtue. As we shall see, this suggestion is not viable since wisdom is not used to acquire virtue.
pleasures, pains, and fears for this [i.e., wisdom] and μετὰ this we have true
courage, temperance, justice, and the whole of true virtue, which is μετὰ wisdom,
regardless of whether pleasures, fears, or all such things be present or absent. But,
exchanging these things for one another apart from wisdom is, if you like, an
image of virtue, and is fit for a slave, lacking anything sound or true. But, in truth,
temperance, justice, and courage are a purification (καθαρσίς), and perhaps
wisdom itself is a purification (καθαρμός).

There are several prima facie reasons in favor of the dominant interpretation of the Right
Exchange. Here I will set out the three strongest reasons to think that in it Socrates is
indicating that virtue requires wisdom. First, although it is rather cryptic, most
commentators read the coin metaphor as saying that bodily pleasures, pains, and fears
should be traded for the true coin, wisdom, which is then used to purchase virtue. Thus,
on this reading, wisdom is prior to and required for virtue. Hence, virtue requires
wisdom. Second, although I have left them in the Greek, the most common translations of
‘καθαρμός’ and ‘καθαρσίς’ take the former to be the process that results in the latter.¹⁶
Thus, had I followed the usual translation, the final clause of the sentence would have
identified wisdom as a purificatory process (καθαρμός), and virtue as the resulting
purified state (καθαρσίς).¹⁷ Thus, interpreters take virtue to be the result of (the
possession of) wisdom. Hence, virtue requires wisdom. Finally,¹⁸ in this passage Socrates
explicitly says that the difference between the deficient virtue of body lovers and true

¹⁶ Indeed, these translations appear to be ubiquitous among scholars working on this passage within the last
century and a quarter. In fact, Geddes 1885 seems to be the most recent scholar to translate the words as I
will argue we should.
¹⁷ The earliest argument for this view comes from Luce 1944: 61-62, who takes καθαρσίς as ‘consummated
purification’ and ‘καθαρμός’ as ‘purificatory rite.’
¹⁸ One might also think that in the first line, the ‘πρὸς,’ can be translated as ‘for,’ which would support the
dominant interpretation. But, ‘πρὸς,’ here must mean ‘with regard to.’ After all, Socrates cannot mean
literally that bodily pleasures are turned over for virtue.
virtue is that the latter is with (μετά) wisdom, but the former is not. If, as commenters suggest, this ‘with’ means ‘accompanied by,’ then in order to have virtue, one must have wisdom. Hence, virtue requires wisdom.

So, it appears that there is overwhelming evidence in favor of the dominant interpretation. In the next three sections I will argue that we need not and should not read the Right Exchange this way. In turn I will refute each prima facie reason to read the Right Exchange as an endorsement of the claim that virtue requires wisdom. I will begin by circling back to the start of Socrates’ Defense.

2. Separating the soul in Socrates’ Defense and the coin metaphor

In this section I will consider the beginning of Socrates’ Defense. In doing so we shall see that Socrates’ attitude toward wisdom seems to preclude the view that virtue requires wisdom, which I will argue is reason to think that this is not the correct way to understand the Right Exchange. Along the way, I will also offer a new understanding of the coin metaphor.

As we have seen, in the Phaedo Socrates is charged by his friends to defend attitude toward death. His defense is predicated on his devotion to philosophy. As this name suggests, philosophy (φιλοσοφία) is the love of wisdom, and so a philosopher (φιλόσοφος) is a lover of wisdom.19 But, according to Socrates, it is difficult to be a lover

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19 Although ‘σοφία’ is absent as the freestanding goal of the philosopher in the dialogue, the term is implied throughout by Plato’s use of ‘φιλόσοφος.’ In addition to loving σοφία, as the name suggests, throughout the discussion Socrates says that the philosopher loves φρόνησις, truth (τὸ ἀληθές, 66b4), and learning (τὸ μάθημα, 67b2). Thus, it seems that we must allow that Socrates thinks that a person can love and desire more than one thing. More importantly, he seems to think that a person can love and desire one thing on account of loving and desiring something else. Thus, as I understand it, Socrates’ view is that there is a chain of desires consisting in closely related concepts (cf. Diotima’s explanation for why we desire immortality in the Symposium). In fact, a little reflection shows how these desires might fit together. The philosopher desires truth (τὸ ἀληθές), about certain things (i.e., Forms). Perhaps possessing this truth is
of wisdom while the soul is embodied. Due to distractions from bodily desires and
distortion from the senses, the soul cannot attain wisdom, at least not in its purest form,
or be with what is most real and true, unless it is free of the body. This is because “it is
not permitted (μὴ οὐ θεμπτὸν) that what is impure can partake in what is pure” (67b1).
But since what the philosophers are after is pure (66a1, 67a6), they will not have it while
embodied (66e4). Hence, Socrates does not resent death, but in fact welcomes it as it
will free him from his body and enable him to have what he ultimately desires.

This brief sketch of Socrates’ explanation captures several themes that dominate
the dialogue, chief among them is the view that the body presents serious obstacles to
philosophizing. But, what matters most for our current concern is that even this sketch of
Socrates’ Defense calls into question the suggestion that in the Right Exchange Socrates
conceives of wisdom as a means to anything, even virtue. After all, his defense is
premised on the fact that what philosophers ultimately desire is wisdom. Even without
saying anything about virtue—which is the case, as he does not mention it until just
before the Right Exchange—his defense proper seems to preclude the possibility that
wisdom is desired as a means, at least as a means to virtue. Rather, wisdom, since it is

\[\sigmaοφία. \text{ Hence, the philosopher desires } \sigmaοφία \text{ on account of her desire for the truth. Learning (τὸ μάθημα) is the process by which we become wise, that is come to be in a position to possess the truth. Hence, she desires learning, because she desires } \sigmaοφία, \text{ because she desires the truth. On this suggestion, φρόνησις would be the sort of thinking that is constitutive of grasping the truth.} \]

\[20 \text{ It is on the strength of this passage that commentators attribute to Socrates the view that we cannot possess wisdom while embodied. But, below we shall see that Socrates does allow that we can experience wisdom prior to corporeal death. If this is so, then it looks like Socrates does think that we can possess wisdom while embodied. But, then we have the question of why he denies that we can here. Below (note 49 I will offer a speculative suggestion.} \]

\[21 \text{ Possibly, though, as a means to possessing truth, which the philosopher also desires. See note 18.} \]
what the philosopher desires, is the end.\textsuperscript{22} This is corroborated by what Socrates says about practicing philosophy while embodied.

Given her desire for wisdom, and the body’s interference with this goal, the philosopher realizes that she must get as far from the body as possible (65c4). By doing this, and employing pure thought (66a3), the philosopher will reach the object of her desire, if anyone does (εἴπερ τις καὶ άλλος ὁ τευχόμενος τοῦ ὄντος, 66a6). But, in order to employ pure thought, and attempt to reach wisdom, the philosopher must separate her soul as much as possible from the body (65c3, 65d1). Importantly, although death is the complete separation of the soul from the body (67d2), the philosopher can separate her soul from her body, at least to some extent, before death.\textsuperscript{23} This practice (τὸ μελέτημα 67d4) of separation and freeing the soul is necessary for pursuing (while embodied) and acquiring (once disembodied) what dominates the philosopher’s entire existence, namely wisdom (66b5). Importantly for understanding the relationship between virtue and wisdom, though, is that Socrates says that the act of separating (τὸ χωρίζειν) is purification, or in the Greek, ‘κάθαρσις’ (67c3).\textsuperscript{24} Of course, as we saw above, just a few

\textsuperscript{22} Although it appears that much of what Socrates says in his defense applies only to philosophers (e.g., desiring wisdom, not resenting death), he surely thinks that what he says should apply to all people. That is, all people should desire wisdom because they desire happiness, and wisdom is required for happiness (cf.81a3). So, if all people realized this, they would not resent death. Cf. Beere 2011: 259. As I argue in Chapter Two, all souls desire to be with what is most real and most true. So, if a soul is able to break free from the deception of the body, the person will desire wisdom, which is the case for the philosopher.

\textsuperscript{23} As we see later in the dialogue, unless a person does this while the soul is embodied, the soul will not leave the body pure, and so, will fail to separate even in death.

\textsuperscript{24} I include the articular infinitive—‘τὸ χωρίζειν,’ or ‘to separate’—because Plato did. This is the only such occurrence in the passage, and is important. I take the point to be that separating, not separation, is purification, not being purified. One is struck in reading this passage at the number of times Socrates repeats similar points but perhaps in slightly different ways. His interlocutors are philosophically inclined and bright, so this is not due to a deficiency on their end. Rather, he is taking care to make clear these important but subtle points. In this case, he is trying to spell out the following. To separate, especially in the present-tensed infinitive, is an ongoing and uncompleted process. Thus, as I shall argue, virtue is (or enables) the process of separating, which is necessary for achieving the goal of separation, which in turn is required for acquiring wisdom.
pages later, in the Right Exchange Socrates claims that virtue is (a) κάθαρσις. Thus, by connecting the dots, we see that Socrates thinks that virtue is a type of κάθαρσις, or purification. But, if this is so, and purification is required for wisdom, then the dominant interpretation of the Right Exchange, and indeed the dialogue as a whole, gets the relationship between wisdom and virtue exactly backwards: virtue is required for wisdom.

In short, Socrates’ view of philosophy opposes the consensus understanding of the relationship between virtue and wisdom, as he his identifies virtue with what purifies and so separates the soul from the body, enabling it to acquire wisdom. But, recall that one reason that interpreters ascribe to him the view that virtue requires wisdom is the coin metaphor, which they read as saying that pleasures, pains, and fears, are sold for the true coin, wisdom, which, in turn, is cashed in for virtue. However, if we look closely at the metaphor, we can see that Socrates never says this, nor does he imply it. Instead, what we see in the coin metaphor is precisely what we should expect given the whole of Socrates’ Defense. Non-philosophers mistakenly think that exchanging pleasures for pains, etc., is virtue. But, this is the wrong exchange for (i.e. with regard to) virtue. That is, this exchange does not constitute virtue, and thinking that it could is thinking that the impossible (ἀδύνατον, 68e3) is possible. But, Socrates never says that the right exchange...

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25 Regarding virtue, Socrates says that it is ‘κάθαρσις τις.’ This could be put, as Grube renders it, as ‘some kind’ of purging. But, the straightforward reading is ‘a purging.’ This makes perfect sense—the virtues are ‘a purging’ or ‘the purging’ of bodily states, which is precisely what we have just seen. Furthermore, if ‘κάθαρσις’ in the first example lacks the ‘τις’, then Socrates is saying that separation is what (all) relevant κάθαρσις is. Hence, any example of κάθαρσις will be an example of separation. See Sophist 226d5 to 230e3 for a discussion about purifying in general and its different species.

26 Of course, if virtue and wisdom are identical, then each is required for the other. But, it should be clear that my interpretation rules out this possibility.

27 For instance, refraining from a second slice of cake only because you do not want to feel ill later is not true temperance (even if refraining from the cake, considered in itself, is the temperate action in this situation).
is trading wisdom for virtue, as the usual interpretation maintains. Instead, he says that the right exchange is trading bodily sensations for the true coin, wisdom. And now we know what Socrates has in mind here. To exchange or trade something is to give it away for something else (ideally for something of greater value). This is exactly what the philosopher does, giving up bodily concerns and sensations for something of greater value, wisdom. And, of course, this giving up of bodily sensations and concerns is the same as separating the soul from the body. Thus, it is not that we should exchange wisdom for virtue, or even exchange bodily sensations for virtue. Rather, the claim here is that the proper exchange of trading bodily sensations for wisdom is virtue.

We can come at this same conclusion from another direction. Body lovers love bodily pleasure. Philosophers love wisdom. The relationship between both groups and their objects of desire is not quite as perspicuous as it would be if Plato had employed parallel terminology to refer to body lovers and philosophers. On the one hand, the term ‘body lover’ makes reference to one of the components of the body-soul composite, not to a separate object of desire. On the other hand, the term ‘philosopher’ does refer to a separate object of desire, but not to a component of the body-soul composite. If we wanted, we could amend Plato’s terms in the following way. Instead of calling them ‘body lovers,’ we could call them ‘bodily-pleasure lovers.’ Or, instead of calling them ‘philosophers,’ we could call them ‘soul lovers.’ These suggestions help to elucidate

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29 Bluck 1955: 154-156 correctly claims that this metaphor is supposed to show that the fundamental difference between philosophers and non-philosophers is motivation: “The emphasis throughout, in fact, is not on method, but on ends...It is purely a question of values” (156).
30 Or, perhaps put less rhetorically, is what allows us to make this exchange. Though, as I noted above, since Socrates employs the Right Exchange to clarify his view about wisdom, genuine virtue, and the deficient virtue of the body lover, we should not be surprised that he is a little emphatic, if not rhetorical.
32 We can’t call them simply “pleasure lovers” because pleasures are not limited to the body in the Phaedo (cf. “the pleasures of learning” at 114d5) and presumably body lovers do not love pleasures of the soul.
Socrates’ point in the Right Exchange. Begin with Socrates’ commitment that philosophers alone are capable of true virtue. In contrast, body lovers, those who desire bodily pleasure in the way that philosophers desire wisdom, have a deficient form of virtue. Now, consider what sorts of exchanges characterize the actions of both groups. As we know, the deficiently virtuous body lovers exchange what they take to be a lesser bodily pleasure for a greater one, or accept a lesser fear in order to avoid a greater fear. This is because above all, they value bodily pleasure. Hence, their currency is bodily pleasure. But, when they trade one pleasure for another, the result is not true virtue, but some kind of counterfeit virtue. So, whereas the body lover desires and trades everything for bodily pleasures, the philosopher desires wisdom and trades bodily pleasures for it. Thus, while the exchange perpetrated by the body lover is counterfeit or imaginary virtue, the exchange of the philosopher is true virtue. That is to say, virtue is not the result of the proper exchange, but is the proper exchange of bodily sensations required for wisdom.

There is one final formulation of the view worth trying on to help make the point. Virtues, that is, true virtues, are good-making qualities of, in this case, the soul. Thus, virtues are required for the soul to be good. In the context of Socrates’ Defense and the

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33 The word Socrates uses in the Right Exchange is ‘σκιαγραφία.’ See Chapter Three for discussion.
34 As noted above, Weiss 1987: 58-59 agrees.
35 We can find indirect support for my reading of the coin metaphor in an unlikely place. In a fragment Heraclitus claims that “it is hard to fight against impulsive desire; whatever it wants it will buy at the cost of soul” (85). Beyond the overlap in using currency and purchasing metaphors, this fragment and my reading both employ them to the same end—warning against the dangers posed to the soul by bodily desire. As we shall see in Chapter Four, later in the dialogue Socrates seems to invoke another tenet of Heraclitus, namely the claim that the world is constantly in flux.
36 As we shall see below, I am not suggesting that Socrates does not think that the philosopher wants virtues also for themselves. At any rate, here Socrates links the possession of wisdom with being happy (not the possession of virtue). He says that the person who dies and goes to be with the gods will be happy. In light of his description of what the divine is like, (pure, everlasting, etc.) which is what the Forms are like, it is the case that happiness is due to wisdom, not virtue. Further, since Socrates never gives any indication that
Phaedo as a whole, the goal of the philosopher is wisdom, since this is what she loves and desires. In order to achieve this goal, the soul must be separate from the body (or at least as separate as possible from bodily desires and sensations). Thus, a good soul—a soul capable of achieving its goal—is a pure soul. And, since the virtues are what make a soul good, the virtues are what separate and purify the soul. This, I take it, is just another way of spelling out the coin metaphor, which, as we can see, should not be interpreted as saying that virtue requires for wisdom.

3. Translating ‘καθαρσίς’ and ‘καθαρμός’

From the foregoing we can see that neither the context of the Right Exchange nor the coin metaphor, properly understood, jibe with the dominant interpretation. Instead, both point to the view that virtue is required for wisdom. In this section I turn to the second piece of purported evidence for the standard reading of the Right Exchange. Recall that the usual translations of ‘καθαρσίς’—the word associated with virtue—to pick out the pure state, and ‘καθαρμός’—the word associated with wisdom—to pick out the purificatory process indicate that wisdom leads to virtue. Now, as we have seen in the previous section Plato himself employs ‘καθαρσίς’ to refer to the process of separating, rather than as completed separation. Hence, this word should not be understood as pointing to a state of purity, that is, a completed process. My task in this section, then, is to consider the case for the translation of ‘καθαρμός.’ By taking a careful look at other relevant passages where Plato employs this word I will argue that the translation needed

being with the gods involves anything other than wisdom we have no reason to think that happiness comes from some additional activity one can do only with the gods.

37 In fact, this alone gives good reason to think that καθαρμός should not be understood as a means to καθαρσίς. After all, if καθαρσίς is the process of separating, then it is a means. So, if καθαρμός were a means, it would be a means to a further means, leaving us without an identifiable end in this discussion.
for the dominant interpretation of the Right Exchange cannot be correct. Indeed, as we shall see, the proper way to read ‘καθαρμός’ in this sentence is actually incompatible with the claim that virtue requires wisdom.

Let’s begin with the stretch of argument from 226d5 to 230e3 in the *Sophist*, a passage that comprises Plato’s most extended treatment of ‘καθαρμός.’ In this part of the dialogue the visitor from Elea identifies refutation as the most fundamental or important type of cleansing (καθαρότατον, 230e2). In order to arrive at this conclusion, though, he begins with a definition of cleansing in general—one that applies to the body as well as the soul. To refer to this general cleaning, which is a type of separation (διάκρισις), he employs the word ‘καθαρμός’ (226d5). After Theaetetus agrees with this definition, the visitor claims that cleansing has two parts, this time using ‘καθαρτικὸν’ (‘a cleansing thing’) rather than ‘καθαρμός.’ He then sets out to discuss the types of cleansing that have to do with the body, employing this time a form of ‘κάθαρσις’ (226e2) Thus, in the span of a few lines the visitor, and hence, Plato the author, uses three words, all to refer to the same activity, ‘cleansing.’ His usage appears to be interchangeable, however a careful study of the text reveals that the visitor only uses ‘καθαρμός’ when referring to the most generic sense of ‘cleansing,’ employed to start the passage (cf. 227d3 and 227d5). Admittedly, we should not put too much weight on these lines, and so can only tentatively suggest that ‘καθαρμός’ in the *Sophist* refers to cleansing in general. But, even without this speculative suggestion, we can say with confidence that in this passage ‘καθαρμός’ and ‘κάθαρσις’ are very close, if not identical, in meaning. Furthermore, the passage as a whole must be taken seriously as providing insight into Plato’s view of the

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38 If we applied this view to the Right Exchange, the result would be that wisdom is the cleansing in general, with virtues being particular types of cleansing. Such a view would be similar to what we see in the *Protagoras*, where all the virtues are aspects of wisdom.
relationship between these two terms, as it constitutes the most careful and extended
discussion of καθαρμός and κάθαρσις in the corpus.

So, contrary to the usual translation of these words in the Right Exchange, the
passage from the Sophist gives us some reason to think that Plato conceives of
‘καθαρμός’ as being roughly equivalent to ‘κάθαρσις.’ This passage, however, does not
give us sufficient reason to reject the usual translation. For, even if the Sophist is a good
indication of how Plato employs these terms in general, we must be open to the
possibility that he uses them differently at times, and we must also consider the specific
context in which he uses them in the Right Exchange. In particular, we must be sensitive
to Socrates’ appropriation of religious language and imagery in the passage that follows
the Right Exchange.39 In this passage Socrates caps off his defense by suggesting that the
people who established the initiation rites (τὰς τελετὰς, 69c2) thought that it was the true
philosopher who would enter the afterlife pure and be with the gods, while everyone else
would enter unpurified and suffer in the mire (ἐν βορβόρῳ, 69c5).40 Thus, given the
Orphic context, we should not be surprised if the usage of ‘καθαρμός’ is not the same as
when Plato stipulates its meaning in the Sophist. In fact, several interpreters who argue
for the usual translation do so on precisely these grounds.41 Accordingly, in order to make
the strongest case against the usual translation, I must take into account other passages
where Plato employs these words in a religious context. Here I will show that there is

39 See Luce 1944.
40 This discussion cannot be isolated from the end of the Right Exchange, which introduces the Orphic
overtones by employing ‘καθαρμός’ and ‘κάθαρσις.’
41 For the definitive statement of the view, see Luce 1944.
such a passage and that it supports understanding καθαρμός as the result, not the process of purification. The passage in question comes from the Republic.\footnote{Luce 1944 cites two passages in favor of his reading. In fact, one of the passages he cites is this passage from the Republic. Pace Luce I will show that properly understood this passage supports my reading. The other passage, Phaedrus 244e, underdetermines the correct way to translate the word. So, although it does not support my view, it also does not support the usual translation.}

At the beginning of Republic II Glaucion and Adeimantus resume the case against justice Thrasymachus attempted in book I. In order to do so, they set out the conventional view of justice, namely that it is only valued for its consequences but is bad in itself. People, they say, would prefer to act unjustly but are too weak to do so. In this context Adeimantus considers the popular opinion that being just is more difficult and less profitable than being unjust. On this view because injustice is more profitable, the unjust can afford to purchase absolution for their bad deeds. He puts the point so:

And they [defenders of this view] present a noisy mob of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, born of, as they say, Selene and the Muses, in accordance with which they perform sacrifices. And they persuade not only private individuals but also cities that unjust actions of the living or the dead can be redeemed and purified through sacrifices and pleasant games (λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοί ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδίας ἱδονῶν, which they call ‘initiations,’ (τελετάς) release people from horrible experiences after death, while terrible things await those who don’t make these offerings (364e4-365a3, Grube’s translation, with modifications).

It is important to note the conceptual connections present in what Adeimantus says.

People want to be redeemed and καθαρμοί, which I (following Grube) translate here as ‘purified.’ Thus, this is the goal, that is, the end. They are told that they can achieve this goal through (διὰ) sacrifices and fun games, which they call ‘initiations’ (τελετάς). This is to say that sacrifices, etc. are initiation rites, which lead to the goal of καθαρμός.\footnote{Cf. 366a5: ‘initiation rites have great power and the gods have the power to release’ (αἱ τελεταί ὧν μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί). The word ‘λύσις’ is joined with ‘καθαρμός’ at 365a1. The point here is that the initiation rites will please the gods, who, in turn, have the power to release one from her evil deeds. Thus, one can achieve the goal—purity—by pleasing the gods through initiation. On this view, one need}
Thus, in the *Republic* passage ‘καθαρμός’ is explicitly described as the end, not the means. This is further reinforced by the identification of initiation rites that are the means to this end. Accordingly, I submit that in this passage in the *Republic*, replete with religious overtones, Plato employs ‘καθαρμός’ in the very way I am suggesting he does in the Right Exchange.

Of course, this passage from the *Republic* does not mean that Plato never uses the word ‘καθαρμός’ to refer to a purificatory process, let alone to deny that this is the way the word is used in the religious and Orphic tradition. But, this does undermine the usual, and I think problematic, translation of ‘καθαρμός’ in the Right Exchange. Given what Plato writes in *Republic* II, it is not the case that whenever he employs ‘καθαρμός’ in Orphic contexts, he is referring to the process of purification, rather than the state of being purified, which is what some proponents of the usual interpretation claim. Thus, since we have no independent reason for translating ‘καθαρμός’ as a means, and what precedes the Right Exchange fits much more naturally with taking it as an end, we should do so.

In fact, though, I want to suggest that the passage from the *Republic* itself provides us with some positive reason to translate ‘καθαρμός’ in my preferred way. This is because the relevant religious similarities in the respective passages in the *Republic* and *Phaedo* extend beyond the single word. Both passages warn against the dangers of arriving at the underworld ‘uninitiated’ (ἀτέλεστος) in contrast to the preferable fate of

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not worry about purifying her soul through philosophy and virtue, but instead can bribe the gods for release from vicious actions prior death. In contrast, in the *Phaedo* Socrates claims that the only way to purify one’s soul is through philosophy and virtue.

44 It is worth noting that it is not Socrates but Adeimantus who says this in the *Republic*. This might give us more reason to think that he is using the words felicitously (i.e., without employing them in a peculiar way to make a point below the surface).

45 Luce 1944: 62.
those who have undergone initiation and purification. Since it reflects the conventional view, in the *Republic* the initiated are the wealthy who have been able to pay for their purification. The *Phaedo*, of course, gives Socrates’ account, which holds that the initiated are the people who have practiced philosophy in the right way (οἱ περὶ λογισμὸν ὀρθῶς). Thus, given the similarities in the passages, we should expect that Plato is using his terms consistently (even if in other works he employs them with different meanings). And, since the *Republic* clearly requires taking ‘καθαρμός’ as an end, we should expect it to mean the same in the *Phaedo* passage.

Although the *Republic* passage undermines the evidence for the usual translation, while also providing positive evidence in favor of rendering ‘καθαρμός’ to refer to an end, one might still discount this support since it comes from a different dialogue. Fortunately, there is one final passage to consider against the interpretation that ‘καθαρμός’ indicates the purification process. This passage, which is from the *Phaedo* itself, is at 82d4. We shall consider this section of the dialogue in greater detail below, so for now, let’s focus only on the relevant line. The line in question in Greek is: αὐτὶ δὲ ἠγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἑκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ.

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46 Perhaps we can go even further in identifying relevant similarities between the passages. Recall that before the Right Exchange in the *Phaedo* Socrates distinguishes between true courage, true temperance, and their “what is called” counterparts. Corresponding to this discussion is the concern with conventional justice in *Republic* II. According to both passages, those participating in the conventional, so-called virtues nonetheless are said to act virtuously (*Phd* 68d6-68e, *Rep* 359b4-c2). Moreover, in the *Phaedo* Socrates says that the deficient courage and temperance of non-philosophers arise from their opposites. And, given the conventional reasons for acting justly in the *Republic*, it would not be a stretch to say this is the case with this condition. After all, on this view people agree to act justly because they lack the power to act unjustly, and so, it seems most profitable (δοκεῖ λογιστέλειν, 359a1). Thus, they are acting justly out of greed or injustice. It may also be fair to speculate that the same points are implicit about piety in this stretch of the *Republic*. The conventional view of piety is characterized as permitting bribery to the gods so that one is released from punishment for vicious actions in life. Thus, sacrifices and offerings to the gods, which are surely pious actions, arise from a fundamental misunderstanding of the gods, bottoming out in disrespect toward them. Thus, such deficient piety also arises from its opposite, impiety.

47 Weiss 1987: fn 24 incorrectly cites this in favor of the reading of ‘καθαρμός’ as a process. It is important to note the “τε καὶ,” which connects the ‘λύσις’ and the ‘καθαρμός’ in contrast to the ‘τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ.’ This
Aside from the word being contested, ‘καθαρμός,’ Plato’s meaning is pretty straightforward. In this sentence Socrates is claiming that the philosopher believes that one must not act in any way contrary to philosophy, and its release and καθαρμός.

Consider what the philosopher believes on the usual translation of ‘καθαρμός’, namely that she should not do anything contrary to (her) purificatory process. Not only is this awkward, it is also obscure. What would it be to act contrary to a process? It could mean that one should not act so as to prevent, or undo, the performance of the rite. But, neither suggestion—nor, I maintain, any suggested understanding of what this could mean—is preferable to the reading of the line if we translate ‘καθαρμός’ as ‘being pure’ On this translation the philosopher believes that she must not do anything contrary to (her) being pure. Hence, she believes that she must not do anything to make her soul impure, which we know amounts to indulging in the pleasures and pains of the body. Thus, since the same word is used later in a similar context and most naturally means ‘being pure,’ we should translate it so in the Right Exchange.

Based on the foregoing, I submit that we should not translate ‘καθαρμός’ as ‘purificatory process.’ On the one hand, if we use the Sophist passage as our guide, we should not think that there is any significant difference between ‘καθαρμός’ and ‘κάθαρσις.’ Thus, unless we think that the terms are synonymous in the Right Exchange—which we should not think—then we are free to allow context to color the meanings of both. In this case, as I have argued above, the context demands that

suggests that these three are not all the same, but that philosophy is something related but different from the other two. Thus, we have the idea that we should not do anything that contradicts philosophy or our release and purity.

48 If this were the proper way to translate these words, then this passage would constitute evidence in favor of identifying wisdom and virtue, the view associated with Socrates in many early dialogues. However, even if this were the case, the evidence in favor of this interpretation of the relationship between virtue and wisdom is meager, especially in the face of all of the other support for thinking that virtue and wisdom are not identical in the dialogue.
‘κάθαρσίς’ refer to the process and ‘καθαρμός’ to the result. On the other hand, if we follow the Republic passage along with the other passage from the Phaedo, we again find no support for the usual translation. On the contrary, we find support for the translation of ‘καθαρμός’ as the result. Either way, then, we have good reason to translate ‘καθαρμός’ as the end state, rather than as the process. And, as we have seen, in his defense Socrates uses ‘κάθαρσίς’ to refer to a process of purifying. Given this, it is clear that the last part of the Right Exchange is not an endorsement of the view that virtue requires wisdom. Instead, properly understood this clause supports the reading that virtue is required for wisdom.

4. ‘μετά’ in the Right Exchange

In the previous two sections I have argued that both the coin metaphor and the appropriate translations of ‘καθαρμός’ and ‘κάθαρσίς’ speak against reading the view that virtue requires wisdom into the Right Exchange. Thus, only one piece of evidence remains in favor of the dominant interpretation. As we saw above, on two instances in the Right Exchange Socrates seems to indicate that virtue is a certain action of exchange performed with (μετά) wisdom. Thus, these instances seem to express the view that wisdom is needed for virtue, and so, provide evidence that virtue requires wisdom. Here I argue that we need not, and should not, read these instances of ‘μετά’ as supporting the dominant interpretation. I will do so by considering a passage where Socrates explicitly describes wisdom.49 I will show that this passage compels us to reject the common

49 This passage could be cited as evidence to suggest that despite his earlier claims, Socrates actually countenances the possibility of embodied wisdom (cf. Butler 2012: fn. 27). As we shall see, in the passage Socrates is talking about an experience of wisdom while the soul is embodied (or, at least, not “dead” in the usual sense yet). Thus, it looks like the soul can experience wisdom while embodied. But, as we saw, he
understanding of the two instances of ‘μετά’ in the Right Exchange and translate the ‘μετά’ in a way that precludes the view that virtue requires wisdom. If my argument succeeds, then there will be no reason remaining to believe that according to Socrates in the dialogue virtue requires wisdom.

Before offering my new evidence against translating ‘μετά’ as ‘with,’ I would like to begin by recalling a significant reason to oppose this translation. As we have already seen, earlier in Socrates’ Defense Socrates denies that people can possess wisdom while embodied. Accordingly, it would be surprising that just a few pages later he should indicate that virtue is done with wisdom, that is, requiring wisdom. But, of course, this is precisely what the usual translation requires.

If we turn to Socrates’ explicit discussion of wisdom, we can see further reason to deny the translation of ‘μετά’ as ‘with.’ At 79d1-6, as part of his argument that the soul is (likely) immortal because it is more similar to the incorporeal, which is immortal, than the mortal corporeal, Socrates says:

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\text{ὅταν δὲ γε αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν σκοπή, ἐκείσε ὀîtreται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἦπὶ ὑπὸ καὶ ὕθαναν καὶ ὀσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἦπὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτή καθ᾽ αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῆ αὐτῆ, καὶ πέπαιναι τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἦπὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὀσαύτως ἔχει, ἀτε τοιοῦτον ἐφαπτομένη; καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα ὕφθοις κέκληται;
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seems to deny this explicitly at 66e4. But, this may not be so. One possibility is that that Socrates’ apparent pessimism between 66b1 and 67b1 does not undermine the possibility of attaining momentary purity. His point at 66e4 may be about when we have a body and while our soul is contaminated by it (cf. 66b3, ἐκεῖνος ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπαθημένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ἡμῖν). This allows that we can achieve small windows of purity, which, as we shall see, seems to be indicated in the passage where Socrates describes wisdom. This need not undermine Socrates’ decision to die, however. Death is preferable because it is permanent separation, with which we will never be interrupted from philosophy by the body again.

Even if he softens his stance later in the dialogue, we might expect him to be consistent about this issue within the same context (i.e., his defense).

As we have seen (note 10), Socrates can consistently maintain that virtue requires the possession of wisdom and that we cannot have wisdom while embodied as long as he also accepts that we cannot have virtue while embodied. Further, it could be argued that for all that Socrates says in the Right Exchange, he might think that no one, not even philosophers, have genuine virtue. However, as we shall see, later in the dialogue Socrates explicitly attributes genuine virtue to philosophers.
When the soul investigates itself by itself (αὐτῆ καθ᾽ αὐτῇν), it departs (οἴχεται) there to the pure, everlasting, immortal, and always the same, and being like this, it always stays there whenever it is by itself and is able to do so; it stops from wandering and remains always the same, since it is grasping (ἐφαπτομένη) what is always the same. And, its experience (πάθημα) is what has been called wisdom?\(^{52}\)

This is a striking passage, and one that has not received nearly the attention it deserves.\(^{53}\) I cannot do it justice here and will not try. Instead I will only focus on the aspects relevant to the current inquiry. In order to do so, I will catalogue what Socrates says here about wisdom and consider each aspect in turn.

First, we are told that [1] the soul is investigating (σκοπῇ) itself by itself (αὐτῆ καθ᾽ αὐτῇν). Hence, it is not at all relying on the body, but, as we know from Socrates’ Defense, must be employing thought alone (cf. 65c2-65e4). This alone is sufficient to get us to the second point Socrates sets out, namely that [2] the soul is separated from the body in some way (cf. 65c5).\(^{54}\) But, Socrates also makes this clear by claiming that the soul departs (οἴχεται) when it is itself by itself. Of course, wherever the soul departs to, this departure entails that it leaves the body in someway. Third, [3] the soul departs to be with the Forms, which we know because Socrates spends the time leading up to this passage identifying the Forms with what is pure, everlasting, immortal, and always the same (cf. 78d2-79a5). Fourth, once separated from the body, [4] the soul grasps, or is in communion with the Forms. The verb here is ‘ἐφάπτω,’ which Socrates has already used

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52 As I shall suggest, this seems to suggest that wisdom (φρόνησις) is an experience, not a state, or something that is strictly speaking possessed. If this is correct, then we can see where wisdom (φρόνησις) fits into the chain of desires mentioned above (note 15). We desire wisdom (φρόνησις)—the experience of communing with the Forms, hence, grasping the truth—because we desire to possess the truth, or σοφία. Despite this, we can allow that wisdom (φρόνησις) can play a double role in the dialogue and so Socrates can occasionally speak of it as something that can be possessed.

53 For some exceptions, see Beere 2011: 265 and Butler 2012: 119-120 who consider it briefly.

54 At 65c5 Socrates says that the soul has said “goodbye” to the body (χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα). As we shall see below (note 77), this phrase is employed throughout the dialogue as having an important relationship with the soul’s pursuit of wisdom.
in relation to the Forms, denying the possibility of grasping any of them with the senses (65d6). Thus, this fourth point corroborates my understanding of the third point, namely, that Socrates is describing a situation in which the soul is with the Forms.

Finally, Socrates says that this experience of the soul has been called ‘wisdom.’ The Greek word for ‘experience’ here is ‘πάθημα,’ which refers to something that affects or happens to something else. Thus, wisdom is what happens to the soul when it is separate from the body and in communion with the Forms.

In light of this catalogue, let’s return to the two instances of ‘μετά’ in the Right Exchange. As we have seen, most commentators take both instances to mean ‘with wisdom,’ as in ‘accompanied by wisdom.’ If this were correct—and Socrates’ claim is that virtue is a certain action done accompanied by wisdom—then, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, it would appear that he maintains that virtue requires wisdom.

55 It is also used of the philosopher, in contrast to the sight lover, in the Republic (484b3): “those who are able to grasp what always is the same in all respects are the philosophers” (Grube’s translation).
56 Strictly speaking, he asks. But, since he does so in such a way to expect an affirmative answer, for all intents and purposes he is making a statement.
57 It is curious that Socrates says that this experience is ‘what has been called’ (κέκληται) ‘wisdom.’ This is strange because similar phrases have been used to distinguish the ‘what is called’ from the actual article. This was the case with ‘what is called’ courage (η’ ονομαζόμενη ἀνδρεία) and temperance (η’ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομαζομένη σωφροσύνη). It also occurs in the case of so-called pleasures (60b2 ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ήδόν) to refer to bodily pleasures, as opposed to the pleasures of the soul (cf. 114e4). Another instance comes at 107c2, where Socrates refers to “what we call life” (ἐν ὧν καλοῦσι τὸ ζῆν). I take it that his point here is that since the soul is immortal, our lives last longer than our embodiment, which is usually mistaken for “life.” In the present passage, though, surely Socrates does not mean to imply that what he has just described is not true wisdom. Relatedly, it cannot be the case that most people would even call the experience just described ‘wisdom,’ if only because most people do not think the Forms exist. Here I think it is important to notice the perfective tense of the participle, translated as ‘has been called.’ This suggests that an action (in this case, the calling) that has been completed. Accordingly, Socrates must mean that what he has just described is what they have been calling ‘wisdom’ all along. Of course, although it is only in this passage that it is made explicit, as we can see from our analysis so far, this suggestion seems sound.
59 A sixth point, which is not vital for the question at hand, is that Socrates says that the soul is in this place “whenever” (ὅτανπερ) it is “able” (ἐξή). This indicates that the soul is not always able to have this experience. But, if wisdom only occurred when the soul were permanently free of the body, that is, dead, then there would be no need for this qualification. But, since Socrates does make this qualification, it must be that this experience is not always available to the soul, which can only be because of its association with the body. Accordingly, it looks like Socrates thinks that we can experience wisdom while still alive, even if only for a short time.
Indeed, normally this would be a fine translation of ‘μετά’ with the genitive, which is what we have in both instances. But, given what Socrates says about wisdom here, there are several problems for the usual translation. The biggest, and I think insuperable problem is that it does not make sense to talk of performing an action accompanied by a separate experience. But, according to Socrates, wisdom is the sort of thing that we experience—it is a πάθηµα [5]. In order to rehabilitate the usual translation one might amend ‘accompanied by wisdom’ to ‘while having the experience constitutive of wisdom.’ But, even this cannot help. The difficulty is that wisdom occurs when the soul is separate from the body [1 and 2] because wisdom is the experience of grasping the Forms [3 and 4]. But, it is incoherent to talk about performing any corporeal act while experiencing wisdom understood this way, as corporeal acts surely require the soul to be embodied. This is a problem for the usual translation even if we set aside the fact that Socrates calls wisdom an experience. That is, even if wisdom were the sort of state we could possess (and not only experience), according to what Socrates says here, we could only possess it when the soul is itself by itself and grasping the Forms [1-4]. But, it is not clear how we could perform actions in the corporeal world with wisdom, if wisdom requires that the soul be removed from the corporeal world. Thus, I submit that we cannot make sense of the usual translation of ‘μετά’ given Socrates’ explicit conditions for experiencing or even possessing wisdom.

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60 Of course, when someone performs a virtuous action, or any action for that matter, she has an experience. But, this reading would require a second, apparently simultaneous, experience of wisdom that goes along with the experience of virtue.

61 It is worth pointing out that the Right Exchange contrasts wisdom with bodily pleasures, pains, and fears. Importantly, pleasure, pain, and fear are all experiences. Accordingly, we perhaps should expect wisdom to be an experience also.
Fortunately, there are several other options for translating ‘μετά.’ I will consider the two most promising alternatives. The first alternative to consider is that ‘μετά’ with the genitive (as we have it in the Right Exchange) can mean ‘on the side of.’ If we insert this meaning of ‘μετά’ into the Right Exchange, then the result is that Socrates is claiming that someone with true virtue is on the side of—that is, chooses in preference over other options—wisdom rather than bodily experiences. Importantly, this understanding of ‘μετά’ does not require the possession of wisdom, as someone can side with wisdom, that is, prefer it or align herself with it, even if she does not possess it. Notice also that although this translation of ‘μετά’ fits with my understanding of 79d1-6, it does not rely on it. That is, we can understand ‘μετά’ as ‘on the side of’ even if wisdom is a state that can be possessed, not only an experience. On this suggestion, then, Socrates is claiming that true virtue requires being on the side of wisdom, not bodily pleasure, pain, or fear.

For our purposes it is worth considering another passage that is commonly translated with this meaning of ‘μετά.’ The passage I have in mind is Apology 32b8-c1. In this passage Socrates is making his case to the jury that someone who is committed to justice must live a private, not a public, life. To illustrate his point he reports that when he was on the Council the other members tried to coerce him to proceed with an illegal trial. In spite of the threat of prosecution Socrates refused because, as he puts it, he believed that it was it better to run the risk on the side of the law and justice (μετά τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου) rather than side with those acting unjustly for fear of punishment or death.

Two features of this passage are significant for our purposes. First, in the Apology

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62 See LSJ entry for ‘μετά’ A.II.
63 Weiss 1987: fn. 18 cites this passage from the Apology in favor of her translation of ‘μετά’ as ‘aiming at.’
64 cf. Grube’s translation.
Socrates denies possessing wisdom and knowing anything worthwhile (e.g., 21d3). Accordingly, he does not know what justice is and so does not think that he possesses the virtue of justice. Thus, he cannot mean that he acted with justice in the sense of possessing justice. Of course, we find the same situation in the Right Exchange. Socrates has already indicated that humans cannot possess wisdom while embodied. So, as in the Apology Socrates cannot mean that a philosopher acts with wisdom, that is, possessing wisdom. Instead, as in the Apology Socrates in the Right Exchange must mean that the philosopher acts on the side of wisdom. Second, in this passage in the Apology Socrates contrasts being motivated by justice with being motivated by fear. And, he employs ‘μετά’ to express these contrasting motivations. So too, in the Right Exchange Socrates contrasts motivations. The main difference between the passages is that in the Right Exchange Socrates contrasts siding with (i.e., being motivated by) wisdom over fear and pleasure instead of siding with justice over fear, which is the contrast in the Apology.65

The second alternative to consider is that ‘μετά’ with the genitive can indicate the manner in which an action is performed.66 Thus, on this suggestion, the Right Exchange would indicate that actions performed from true virtue are actions that are performed in a wise manner.67 Importantly, performing an action in a wise manner does not require the

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65 This suggestion also makes better sense of the claim in the Right Exchange that exchanging bodily sensations apart from wisdom is not true virtue. The Greek here is ‘χωρὶς φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ,’ without philosophy and understanding.’ Instead, here he intends to say ‘separate from,’ meaning something like ‘without regard to,’ ‘cut off from,’ or ‘distinct in thought.’ This, of course, is exactly what we expect from the body lover, who only values bodily pleasure and so acts without regard to wisdom. In contrast, the philosopher values truth and wisdom, and so does everything with an eye toward these. In fact Bluck 1955: 156 suggests a translation of “not related to wisdom” to get at this same point I am making here.

66 See LSJ entry A.III for ‘μετά.’ Thanks to Dan Devereux for this suggestion.

67 Similarly, ‘μετά’ with the genitive can also mean ‘in accordance with’ (see Smyth 1691.1). I suggest that acting ‘in accordance with’ wisdom might have a meaning close to ‘acting wisely’ or ‘acting in conformity to wisdom.’
possession of wisdom but instead can mean that that the action conforms to wisdom.\(^\text{68}\)

And, since wisdom requires separating the soul from the body, we can see why Socrates would think that true virtue is action that conforms to wisdom.

So, to sum up, in this section we have seen good reason to reject the usual translation of ‘µετά’ in the Right Exchange as ‘with,’ as requiring possession. This translation does not sit well with Socrates’ earlier denials that people can possess wisdom while embodied. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Socrates’ description of wisdom, according to which wisdom is an experience. In the place of this usual translation, I have suggested two alternatives: ‘µετά’ can mean ‘on the side of’ or it can be used to indicate the manner in which an action is performed. Unlike the standard translation as ‘with,’ both of these alternative translations of ‘µετά’ fit with Socrates’ description of wisdom as an experience. Importantly, though, they also work well even if in the Right Exchange Socrates is referring to wisdom as a condition that can be possessed, not as an experience. Thus, I submit that Socrates’ use of ‘µετά + wisdom’ in the Right Exchange does not provide any reason to accept the dominant interpretation, according to which virtue requires wisdom.

5. Philosophical motivations for virtue in the Reprise

When we first encountered the Right Exchange above there seemed to be three reasons to accept the dominant interpretation, according to which virtue requires wisdom. I have not only undermined each purported reason, but also have shown that properly understood each aspect of the passage precludes this interpretation. Moreover, I have provided a new interpretation of the relationship between virtue and wisdom in the Phaedo. Before I end

\(^\text{68}\) See Gorgias 526c3: “όσίος βεβιωκυάν καὶ μετ’ ἀληθείας”
this chapter, though, I want to consider the only other passage in the dialogue where virtue is discussed at length. As we shall see, between 80c1 and 84b5, a passage that I have glossed as ‘the Reprise,’ Socrates returns to the themes of his defense. I will argue that these aspects bolster the reading of Socrates’ Defense I set out in section two above. Thus, the Reprise reinforces my claim that Socrates rejects the view that virtue requires wisdom. Finally, as we shall see, this passage provides further evidence for my contention that Socrates believes that wisdom requires virtue. I will begin my investigation of the Reprise with an overview of the passage before showing directly how it bears on the issue at hand.

By 80c1 Socrates has offered Simmias, Cebes, and the others present three arguments for the claim that the soul is immortal.69 These arguments aim only at showing that the soul is immortal; they say nothing about what happens to a soul once it leaves the body. This issue is taken up in the Reprise,70 where Socrates explains that although all souls are immortal, they do not all share the same post-embodied experience. He identifies two general fates, corresponding to two general types of souls. One type of soul, which is “filled with” (81c2) the physical from constantly being with it and engaging with it, will linger in the corporeal world after bodily death.71 Such souls will subsequently be reincarnated into creatures that conform to their embodied habits. The other type of soul, which is pure and free from bodily elements, will depart to be with the gods after corporeal death. Of course, these two types of souls correspond to the two

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69 With the fourth (and final) argument coming later in the dialogue.
70 It is also discussed at length in the myth at the end of the dialogue. For a discussion of how these two passages relate, see Chapter Two.
71 Indeed, if death is the soul’s complete separation from the body (64c5) and such souls are infused with bodily elements—and so, have not completely separated from the body—then they have done a poor job of dying. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that they have not trained to die through philosophy.
types of people in Socrates’ Defense: body lovers and philosophers, respectively.\(^{72}\)

Socrates spends the rest of the Reprise warning against the dangers of bodily pleasures and explaining how philosophy alone can help.

On an overview of the passage, then, we can see that like Socrates’ Defense, the Reprise is concerned with the distinction between philosophers and body lovers. If we scrutinize the passage further, we find more relevant similarities. For instance, in the Reprise Socrates evokes the conception of philosophy as training for death (81a1), which is familiar from his defense (64a33). Relatedly, both sections highlight the ways in which the body interferes with the soul. In Socrates’ Defense, the body prevents the embodied soul from acquiring wisdom. In the Reprise, corporeal elements infuse the souls of body lovers, tethering them to earth even after bodily death. Unlike the pure disembodied souls of philosophers, such souls are forbidden from joining the gods after death.\(^{73}\) Importantly, the reason in both cases is the same, a law (\(\theta\epsilon\mu\iota\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma\ 67\beta2\) and \(\theta\epsilon\omicron\omicron\varsigma\ 82\beta1\)) prohibiting the impure from interacting with the pure.

Along with these similarities the Reprise also returns to the topic of virtue. After introducing the idea of reincarnation, Socrates says that the non-philosophers who will be happiest after returning to bodies are those who practice “popular and political virtue” (ο\(\iota\ \tau\eta\eta\ \delta\mu\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\ nu\ kai\ \pi\omega\omicron\iota\nu\iota\kappa\iota\kappa\iota\ ν\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\omicron\iota\nu\, \ 82\alpha6-\beta1\)).\(^{74}\) In Chapter Three I will argue that this refers to the same sort of virtue that Socrates criticizes in the Right Exchange. For present

\(^{72}\) If his description in this passage weren’t enough to prove this, recall that Socrates takes being a non-philosopher to be a sufficient condition for being a body lover. Thus, although he does not refer to them as body lovers, since he contrasts them with philosophers, we can be sure that they are body lovers. Note that he does refer to some of them as money lovers (82c4) and others as honor lovers (82c5). But, as we have seen, these are simply two different ways to be a body lover.

\(^{73}\) Since Socrates says that the souls will join a race of creatures suitable to their original embodied habits, it is not a stretch to conclude that while embodied the philosopher’s soul, by striving toward wisdom, is habituating itself to be god-like.

\(^{74}\) Fittingly, since they practiced social virtue, they will return as social creatures, like bees and ants.
purposes, though, it suffices to point out that this virtue is deficient in comparison with the genuine virtue of the philosopher. We know this much because those with popular and political virtue are reincarnated, while the philosophers, that is, those with genuine virtue, join the gods after corporeal death and enjoy permanent disincarnate existence. Moreover, it is relevant that Socrates associates popular and political virtue with “what people call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’” (ἡν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, 82b1). Recall that in Socrates’ Defense, just before the Right Exchange, Socrates brings up what is called ‘courage’ and what is called ‘temperance.’

So, with regard to virtue, we see two points of connection between the Reprise and Socrates’ Defense: a contrast between genuine virtue and a deficient form of virtue, and a mention of what is called ‘virtue.’ Importantly, in this passage Socrates also sets out non-philosophical motivation for acting temperately, which he says is the fear of losing out on bodily sensation (82c3-5). This, of course, is similar to what he claims earlier about the temperance of non-philosophers. And, again as in the earlier counterpart, in the Reprise Socrates contrasts these motivations with what leads philosophers to act temperately. In short, he maintains the philosopher avoids bodily desires because she knows that she must not do anything contrary to philosophy, her release, and her consummated purification (κοθαρμός, 82d3). Less than one Stephanus page later, at

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75 Socrates does not explicitly say ‘temperance,’ but instead “mastering and not surrendering themselves to [bodily desires],” which recalls the earlier definition given of what is called ‘temperance,’ namely, “not to get swept off one’s feet by one’s passions” as well as the earlier characterization that people with this form of temperance “master certain pleasures.”

76 It is worth noting in particular that Socrates talks about the motivations of those who practice philosophy in the right way (e.g., οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι, 82c2). See Butler 2012: 116-120. Beere 2011: fn 8 and Vasilou 2012: fn 4 also note this peculiarity. Chapter Four is an investigation into why this might be and what exactly Socrates might mean by ‘practicing philosophy in the right way.’

77 As discussed above. It is also worth noting that in doing all of this the philosopher must “say goodbye” to the body lovers (82d1-2). The Greek here is “χαίρειν εἰπόντες” without any object. Grube translates the line as “dismisses all of these things,” supplying as the object the fears and bodily pleasures which motivate
83b4, Socrates reiterates the point, saying that the philosopher believes that the release (λύσει) of her soul must not be opposed, and so stays away from pleasures, pains, and desires as much as possible (οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἠδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ᾽ ὁσον δύναται).

We can see, then, that in the relevant respects, the Reprise harmonizes with Socrates’ Defense regarding the virtue of the philosopher in contrast to the virtue of others and regarding the dangers and obstacles of the body. For our present purposes, though, I must mention the way in which Socrates goes beyond his defense at the close of the Reprise. After a description of what happens when philosophy takes hold of the soul, just before the end of the Reprise Socrates returns to how bodily sensations prevent the soul entering into the afterlife pure. According to him each bodily pleasure and pain fastens the soul further to the body (83d3). This makes the soul corporeal and “full of body” (τὸῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα, 83d7), which, as he has already stated, prevents it from departing purely (καθαρῶς ἀπικέσθαι, 83d7) and denies it a share in the divine, pure, and uniform (ἄμορφος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας, 83e2).

virtuous action in body lovers. Of course, this makes sense as philosophers do avoid such states as much as possible. However, given that the philosophers travel a different road than body lovers, context pushes us to think Socrates means that the philosopher says “goodbye” to non-philosophers, at least the politically virtuous ones. Furthermore, we find an example of a politically virtuous person in the dialogue, namely the guard who administers Socrates the hemlock. And, both times he is mentioned this language is used. At the end of the dialogue, just before taking the poison, Socrates says “goodbye” to him (116d2), although he does not say it to his friends. Also, early in the dialogue, Crito lets Socrates know that the guard advised that people get heated when they talk, and so, require more poison. Through Crito Socrates says “goodbye” to him (χαίρειν αὐτόν, 63e2). In both cases, the philosophical person dismisses the non-philosophical person before searching for wisdom. At the beginning of the dialogue, after Crito stops worrying about what the guard said, Socrates can present his argument (λόγον ἀποδούναι) in defense of philosophy. At the end, Socrates says “goodbye” to the man with the hopes that he will be able to continue his philosophizing after his soul leaves the body. One final piece of evidence worth noting is that at 65d6 Socrates also uses this phrase about the soul of the philosopher “saying goodbye” to her body in order to be with the Forms. I take it that because in this case the soul strives to be “itself by itself,” the philosophical soul is not only dismissing the bodily desires, but in some sense departing the body altogether.

78 This is because for all people, whenever a soul feels a violent pleasure or pain, at the same time it inevitably (ἀναγκάζεται) believes that what caused this feeling is most real (ἀληθέστατον) (83c4-5). Socrates refers to this as the greatest evil (ὁ πάντων μέγιστον τε κακόν). Yet, he also later says that no evil one can suffer is worse than the hatred of arguments, misology (89d1). I take this issue up in Chapter Four.
Importantly for our inquiry, Socrates says that it is on account of these things that the true philosopher is temperate and courageous (τούτων τοίνυν ἐνεκα οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, 83e4). This passage ends with Socrates claiming that when the philosopher’s soul is freed from bodily sensations (λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, 84a2) it follows reason, always staying with it to gaze at and be nurtured by the true and the divine (θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου τρεφομένη) until death when it can escape to a place of the same kind (84b1-2).

The take-home message of this passage is nearly identical what we found in Socrates’ Defense: the philosopher, whose soul is as pure as can be, will alone experience a divine afterlife, and so, should be confident. Accordingly, we have good reason to think that the view in the Reprise is the same as the view in Socrates’ Defense. By way of supporting this contention, though, I want to draw our attention to two features of this passage. In doing so, we shall also see that the Reprise confirms my above interpretation of the end of Socrates’ Defense.

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79 This term is “lovers of learning,” but used interchangeably with “philosophers” throughout (cf. 82c2 and Rowe 1993: 198 and Burnet 1911: 74)). Robins 2003: 15 disagrees that these are interchangeable terms, but this seems to be in tension with the text.

80 It is important to recognize that the reasons for virtuous action are several (‘τούτων’, i.e., ‘these’), but that they all boil down to being pure. That is, the philosopher is not virtuous only so that she can share in the divine after death. Instead, the point is that the philosopher is virtuous because bodily sensations corrupt the soul, making it impure, and hence not permitted to engage with the pure, either while embodied (67b1) or after death (82c1). Thus, although it is surely the case that such an afterlife is the most pleasant, and that while embodied the pleasures of learning (114e4) are the most pleasurable experiences (and perhaps only real experiences of pleasure), we need not conclude that the philosopher’s motivations for virtue are hedonistic. For a discussion, see Chapter Three.

81 Socrates’ description of the soul of the philosopher “gazing” at the true and divine should remind us of his earlier description of wisdom at 79d1-6, where, as we have seen, he claims that the philosopher’s soul always stays with what is pure, ever existing, immortal, and unchanging. In both passages the soul arrives at this place through a certain form of reasoning. Thus, given the similarities, it must be that what Socrates is describing here in the Reprise just is another characterization of wisdom. Furthermore, according to what Socrates says here, wisdom is only experienced when a soul is free from bodily sensations. Finally, as in the earlier passage, Socrates here indicates that the soul can have this experience prior to death. Thus, this line seems to speak against the view that we cannot possess wisdom while embodied.
First, Socrates’ reference to temperance and courage in this passage is significant. Recall that these are the two virtues initially brought up at the end of Socrates’ Defense. Thus, the fact that Socrates invokes these two virtues can provide us with some confidence that he has the same view in mind as earlier. Furthermore, as noted earlier in this section, in the Reprise Socrates reiterates that body lovers act virtuously because of bodily pleasures, pains, etc., which is the view from his defense. But, at the end of the Reprise he finally states unequivocally the motivation of the philosopher. The philosopher is virtuous (κόσμοι εἰςι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, cf. 68d6) so that she can be pure, which is required for sharing in the divine, true, and real after death. Thus, since both passages express the same view, it must be the case that earlier Socrates intended that virtue is required for wisdom. Indeed, this is precisely what I argued above, claiming that in Socrates’ Defense virtue is characterized as what purifies the soul of the body. Second, Socrates’ description of the soul of the philosopher “gazing” at the true and divine should remind us of his earlier description of wisdom where he claimed that the philosopher’s soul always stays with what is pure, ever existing, immortal, and unchanging. In both cases, the soul arrives at this place through a certain form of reasoning. Thus, given the similarities, it must be that what Socrates is describing here in the Reprise just is another characterization of wisdom. Furthermore, according to what Socrates says here, wisdom

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82 Vasiliou 2012 argues that in the Phaedo philosophers do not have full virtue (cf. Rowe 1993: 150-151 for a similar view regarding the of the Right Exchange). He doesn’t consider this passage, but would presumably say that in it Socrates refers to less-than-true virtue, which Vasiliou takes to be political virtue (which, for him differs from the deficient virtue in the Right Exchange). But, this cannot be correct because as we see those with political virtue are reincarnated, in contrast to those Socrates is discussing here. Accordingly, Socrates must have in mind full virtue here.

83 The fact that Socrates here explicitly attributes virtue to the philosopher bears on how to understand the relationship between virtue and wisdom. As noted above (note 10) If Socrates denies the possibility of embodied wisdom and he believes that virtue requires wisdom, then he would have to deny the possibility of embodied virtue. But, as we can see, he believes that embodied virtue is possible. Hence, he must accept the possibility of embodied wisdom, or he must deny that virtue requires wisdom. As I have argued, we have good reason to endorse the second disjunct. (cf. Weiss 1987: 63).
is only experienced when a soul is free from bodily sensations. Hence, virtue is required for wisdom, which is precisely the relationship we saw in Socrates’ Defense.\(^{84}\)

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have offered a new understanding of the relationship between virtue and wisdom in the dialogue, in large part by providing a new reading of the Right Exchange. Contrary to the dominant interpretation, I have argued that in this passage, and in the *Phaedo* as a whole, Socrates does not believe that virtue requires wisdom, but instead holds that virtue is required for wisdom. To close the discussion, I shall sum up my understanding of virtue in the dialogue by considering some questions that might remain about this interpretation.

On my reading genuine virtue, that is, the virtue of the philosopher is understood as what purifies the soul. We have seen that in Socrates’ Defense virtue is what separates the soul from the body. And, in the final section of this chapter we saw that in the Reprise Socrates claims that philosophers are virtuous because they desire to leave the body pure so that their souls can be with the divine, real, and true. Thus, philosophers alone acquire virtue, and do so, at least in part because doing so is necessary for wisdom, which they desire.

This conception of virtue and this view about its relation to wisdom give rise to several questions.\(^{85}\) One question regards the stability required for virtue. Virtue requires stable beliefs, which is one reason that the view that virtue requires wisdom is attractive;

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\(^{84}\) These two points jointly corroborate our reading of ‘\(\text{μετὰ φρονήσεως}\)’; true virtue results in virtuous action performed with wisdom as a goal.

\(^{85}\) One other significant question that remains is why this view of virtue and wisdom is—or at least seems to be—so different from what we find elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. I address this question in the Conclusion once my whole interpretation is complete.
wisdom ensures the stability required for virtue. But, if virtue does not require wisdom, then what ensures the stability in the philosopher’s beliefs required for virtue?

There are two responses to this concern available to my reading. First, the philosopher’s unwavering desire for wisdom ensures stability. That is, because it is what she desires above all, the philosopher always performs actions that aim at wisdom. Hence, since she is always aiming at wisdom, she will have the stability required for virtue. Second, although on my reading wisdom is not required to possess virtue, we should nonetheless expect that the philosopher would be very close to wisdom, and so would have a set of entrenched true beliefs about virtue, which are established through philosophical activity. Thus, the philosopher’s love of wisdom would secure her stable beliefs about virtue, which would in turn assist her in her continued pursuit of wisdom.

Another question regards the value of virtue. My interpretation seems to suggest that virtue is desired not for its own sake, but as a mere means to an end. But, this seems troublesome, as virtue, especially for Socrates, is and should be valuable for itself. Fortunately, my interpretation need not be saddled with the problematic view that virtue is a mere means. Instead, as we have seen, in the *Phaedo* Plato countenances a chain of related desires. The philosopher desires truth and reality, and so, desires wisdom, the experience of grasping true things and being with what is most real. The fact that wisdom is required for the possession of truth does not mean that the philosopher does not really desire wisdom or see it as valuable in itself. So too, the fact that virtue is required for wisdom does not mean virtue is merely instrumentally valuable. On the contrary, virtue

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86 As we shall see in Chapter Four there is a very high standard in the dialogue for who counts as a true philosopher; one must be very far along in order to meet this standard.
87 I do not want to stake a claim either way on whether in the *Meno* Socrates claims in earnest that true belief can suffice for virtue. But, if he does, it would seem to fit nicely with what I am suggesting here.
88 See notes 19 and 52 above.
can be instrumentally valuable as well as inherently valuable.\textsuperscript{89} Furthermore, we should notice that the purification of the soul is necessary for wisdom, but that it also appears to be sufficient for it. From what we have seen, as long as the soul is “itself by itself,” that is, pure and free from the body, it will experience wisdom. This, after all, is the natural condition of the soul, since it is more like the divine than the corporeal (79c1). Thus, virtue facilitates, and to some degree just is, the soul being in its natural state. Finally, as I have just pointed out, on my reading although she may lack wisdom, the philosopher would have considerable insight into virtue. Thus, we can be confident that the philosopher would believe that virtue is intrinsically valuable, and so be motivated by virtue itself. Furthermore, because she understands the value of virtue, a philosopher would never perform an action that is contrary to it, both because she would see the disvalue in such an action, and because she would realize that such an action would be contrary to wisdom, the standard for all of her actions and aim of all of her pursuits.\textsuperscript{90}

If the foregoing is correct, then we can see that the view in the \textit{Phaedo} shares some important points of contact with other dialogues, in particular with the \textit{Republic}. It is well known that in the \textit{Republic} Plato defines virtue, specifically justice, not in terms of actions, as was conventionally the case, but instead in terms of (the ordering of) the soul. As it turns out, on my interpretation, in the \textit{Phaedo} Plato also offers a revolutionary way of defining virtue. Rather than being an action of a certain type, what distinguishes

\textsuperscript{89} On the dominant interpretation of the Right Exchange, wisdom is required for virtue, which leads to this same concern for the value of wisdom. For a response to this concern—indeed the same sort of response I am offering here for my interpretation—see Gooch 1974.

\textsuperscript{90} Along similar lines, it seems that on the view in the \textit{Phaedo} the philosopher would not have any reason to act viciously. Socrates claims that all wars, civil discord, and battles are the result of trying to satisfy bodily desires (66c5). Since the philosopher disavows bodily pleasures and keeps bodily desires to a minimum, it seems that she would have no positive motivation ever to engage in such activities. And, although Socrates does not say it, it is plausible that all vicious activities are the result of trying to satisfy the body.
true virtue in the *Phaedo* is the motivation for that action, namely the desire for wisdom.\(^91\) Moreover, as we have seen, in the *Phaedo* virtue is what purifies the soul, enabling it to separate from the body and be with the divine, true, and real and so, experience wisdom. Thus, in fact, the view in the *Phaedo* and the view in the *Republic* are closer than they may initially seem, as both present virtue as a state of the soul;\(^92\) the difference is that whereas in the *Republic* the state of soul in question is health (ὑγίεια, 444d5), in the *Phaedo* purity.\(^93\)

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\(^91\) See Wilberding 2009: 373-374 for the suggestion that the *Republic* also provides a motivations-based account of virtue.

\(^92\) There are concerns that this conception of justice in the *Republic* causes a “gap” between the conception of justice Socrates is challenged to defend and the conception of justice with which he responds (see. Sachs 1963). This concerns strikes me as similar in spirit to the second concern considered above for my reading of the *Phaedo*.

\(^93\) Even in the *Republic* purification is required for virtue, at least in the case of kallipolis (cf. 394e2). And, if one is so inclined, we can understand Socrates’ last lines—charging Crito with performing a sacrifice to Aselepius—as an indication that his soul, finally completely pure and free from the body, will be healthy (cf. the use of ὑγίεια at 69b6 in describing the contrast between genuine and counterfeit virtue).
Chapter Two: Bodily desires and the soul

In this chapter I turn to the moral psychology of the *Phaedo*. My aim is to consider the nature of desire and the nature of the soul as portrayed in the dialogue. Already in Chapter One we saw some ways in which these issues bear on the ethical theory of the dialogue. Perhaps the most significant among them is Plato’s exhaustive dichotomy of body lovers and philosophers. According to the dialogue, the fundamental difference between these groups is that body lovers desire bodily pleasure whereas philosophers desire wisdom. And, as a result of these defining desires, body lovers are only capable of deficient virtue, but philosophers are capable of genuine virtue.

My investigation in this chapter is structured by two questions. The first question is whether or not the body, along with the soul, is a subject of motivational states. That is, do bodily desires belong to the body, or do they belong to the soul, with the body merely causing them? I will argue that bodily desires in fact belong only to the soul, although the body is responsible for causing them. The second question is whether or not the soul is uniform. My answer to the first question might lead us to presume a negative response to this second question. After all, if bodily desires belong to the soul, then it seems plausible to think that in the *Phaedo* the soul consists in rational as well as non-rational parts, which give rise to them. Nonetheless, I will argue that the evidence available in the dialogue suggests that the soul is uniform.

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94 Recall that we might alternatively characterize the dichotomy as being between body lovers and soul lovers, or as between bodily pleasure lovers and wisdom lovers.

95 Following Socrates’ lead, I include fears among bodily desires. It might be the case that when Socrates treats fear as a species of bodily desire, he is implicitly limiting the discussion to fears relating to the body, not unlike how he often speaks of pleasure when he really means bodily pleasure. At any rate, given that honor lovers are body lovers, Socrates must maintain that honor is species of bodily pleasure. So, in this dialogue he is working with an inclusive conception of what counts as a bodily pleasure, such that it seems to be every sort of pleasure that does not relate to knowledge and wisdom.
I argue for these answers as follows. I begin by considering recent arguments for and against ascribing bodily desires to the body. As we shall see, these arguments tend to be constructed on the basis of interpretations of individual passages. I will argue, however, that we must look beyond passages and search for some fundamental principle(s) in the dialogue that commits Plato either to ascribing bodily desires to the body or to the soul. From here I argue that the two descriptions Plato gives us of the disembodied soul indicate that the soul, not the body, is the subject of bodily desires. Thus, this opens up the possibility that the soul has parts, one or more of which are responsible for bodily desires. However, I argue that the evidence points to a uniform soul, though one with multiple functions. Finally, I close the chapter with a brief explanation of how bodily and rational desires might both arise from a more general desire in the soul, a desire to be with what is most real and true. In doing so, I will offer a characterization of the soul in the *Phaedo*.

1. **Two views about bodily desires**

In this section I begin my investigation into bodily desires. I will start by considering arguments in favor of identifying the body as the subject of bodily desires. Call this the ‘subject view.’ I will then consider arguments in favor of identifying the soul as the subject and the body merely the source of bodily desires. Call this the ‘source view.’ As we shall see, the debate between proponents of these opposing views tends to center on individual passages. I will close this section by expressing concerns about the limits of this sort of approach to the issue at hand, and offer a new way forward.
1.1 The subject view

The subject view is the most widely accepted account of bodily desires in the *Phaedo*.\(^96\) On this view the body is itself the subject of desires and not merely the origin point of them. Although the subject view is often endorsed, it is rarely elaborated on or defended. However, Jacques Bailly has recently set out an argument in favor of it. Accordingly, I will follow his lead and consider his reasons for favoring this understanding of bodily desires in the dialogue.

We can categorize Bailly’s evidence for the subject view into three types. First, Bailly cites passages where Plato explicitly describes the body as using force against the soul; he includes in this group passages that portray the body as imprisoning the soul. According to Bailly, these passages suggest that the body is capable of motivating the soul, and so must be the subject of motivation. Second, Bailly cites passages wherein Socrates describes the soul as conversing with bodily desires, which he takes to suggest that these desires are outside of the soul, and hence, do not belong to the soul. Third, Bailly cites Plato’s claim that heat, thirst, and hunger are in the body, which he takes to indicate that these motivational forces are in the body. In order to consider Bailly’s case in greater detail I will set out the evidence from each group and show how he uses it to support the subject view.

I will begin with the first type of evidence, taking first passages that show the body forcing the soul. According to Bailly when Socrates claims at 81b1-5 that the body “bewitches” the soul he “ascribes motivational capacity directly to the body” (291). The Greek word translated as “bewitches” is “γοητεύω,” which seems to me to indicate more

of an epistemic misleading rather than a forcing.\textsuperscript{97} Hence, it is less than clear that this passage ascribes motivational capacities to the body. Fortunately for Bailly, there is further evidence of this sort. For instance, at 83d2 Socrates says that each pleasure and pain “fastens [the soul] to the body with a sort of rivet.” Bailly holds that the straightforward reading of this passage indicates that the body has its own motivational force (293).\textsuperscript{98} And, in this case he seems correct, as this passage suggests that the soul is somehow forced into the body. It seems that in order to be able to effect such forcing, the body must be able to apply motivational pressure on the soul, presumably in the form of bodily desires.

In addition to the foregoing, as evidence for the subject view Bailly offers Socrates’ metaphor of the philosopher’s soul as a prisoner in the body. At 82e1-6 Socrates claims that the soul is imprisoned in the body, clinging to it. And, what is worse, according to Socrates, is that this imprisonment is due to desires, and so, the prisoner (i.e., the soul) contributes “to his own incarceration most of all.” As we shall see below, commentators may point to this passage as reason to reject the subject view, as it claims that the soul most of all imprisons itself via bodily desires. Thus, it may seem that the imprisonment comes about from the soul’s own desires for the bodily, which suggests that bodily desires actually exist in the soul, not the body. However, Bailly lays stress on the claim that the prisoner “is contributing” to his own incarceration, which he thinks indicates that soul is neither alone nor primarily responsible for the imprisoning. Of

\textsuperscript{97} See for instance Gorgias 483e6.
\textsuperscript{98} Even the start of this passage includes a notion of force, as Socrates claims that the souls of all people necessarily (ἀναγκάζεται) believe that the cause of each intense pleasure or pain is most real. Indeed, there is no doubt that Plato frequently writes about the body and bodily desires in such terms (cf. also the punishments of souls in the afterlife which happen necessarily ‘ἀνάγκη,’ 114a3). In contrast he consistently describes philosophy as gentle, employing persuasion rather than force. See especially 82d6-83b6.
course, the other party, and indeed the more responsible party, is the body. And, since on this metaphor the body is imprisoning—that is forcing—the soul, it again appears that the body is capable of its own motivation, and so, the subject of desires.

Turning now to Bailly’s second type of evidence. He cites in favor of the subject view the fact Socrates depicts the soul as conversing with bodily desires. The relevant passage is at 94d1-5, where Socrates discusses how the soul opposes the body. Bailly sees two features of this passage that support the subject view. First, Socrates claims that the soul is “holding converse with (bodily) desires and passions and fears, as if it were one thing talking to a different one.” Since two parties are required for a conversation, Bailly takes this passage to suggest that the bodily desires and passions belong to the body, rather than the soul. Thus, this passage indicates that the body is the subject of bodily desires. Second, Socrates claims that the manner of conversation employed by the body is “by gentle threats and exhortations.” Bailly analyzes these interactions between the soul and the body as minimal conversations, of the sort one would engage in with a dog or lower animal (295). Thus, according to Bailly, not only does this passage provide support for the subject view, it also shows what sort of subject the body is; on Bailly’s reading, the body is likened to a dog. So, it is non-rational, but nonetheless the subject of its own motivational states.

The final piece of evidence for the subject view—the piece which Bailly declares is the strongest evidence—comes from a passage where Socrates says that heat, thirst, hunger, and the like are in the body. At 94b7-c1 Socrates lists a few examples of bodily affections (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα), including heat, thirst, and hunger all of Socrates says are “in”
the body. Thus, as Bailly understands it, these are motivational states that are literally in
the body, not the soul. Hence, the body is the subject of motivational states (294).

1.2 The source view

Let’s now turn to the source view, according to which the soul, not the body, is the
subject of bodily desires. Although it is by far the minority view among commentators,99
Jonathan Beere has recently developed and defended the source view. According to
Beere, bodily desires belong to the soul and are only ‘bodily’ insofar as they are
motivational states that “would not be felt if the soul had not been embodied” (264).100
Hence, the body is the source, but not the subject of bodily desires. Below I will attempt
to explain bodily desires in greater detail, but for now I want to consider the evidence
Beere offers for the source view.

A good deal of Beere’s support for the source view comes from undermining the
evidence for the subject view. For instance, he argues that the “κατὰ τὸ σῶμα” at 94b7
should not be, as Grube has it, affections “of the body,” but instead can and should be
translated as the affections “felt in virtue of the body” (263). As Beere rightly points out,
this translation does not commit Plato to the claim required by the subject view, namely
that these affections are felt by the body. There is a difficulty with this reading, however.
The problem is that “καύματος” means “heat,” not “the sensation of heat.” Beere
responds to this difficulty by arguing that Socrates is speaking loosely here (263, fn. 22).
Thus, Beere maintains that this passage need not lend any support to the subject view.

99 In addition to Beere, see Rowe 2007: 117-118.
100 Note that Beere is not claiming here that bodily desires require that the soul be currently embodied, only
that having been bodied is necessary. Although I disagree with certain aspects of Beere’s treatment, I do
endorse this characterization of bodily desires, since, as we shall see, I maintain that souls can possess
bodily desires post-embodiment.
There are two further pieces to Beere’s negative argument. First, he considers the passage at 94d, discussed above, where Socrates claims that the soul converses with bodily desires and passions. Of this passage he writes, “[it] clearly is making a metaphorical, not literally true, comparison between this inner psychological dynamic and an interaction between two distinct things, it is strong evidence against the view that the body is a source of motivation independent of the soul” (264). His reasoning is not perspicuous, but as I understand it he is arguing here that the presence of a metaphor presupposes the falsity of what the metaphorical claim would mean literally. So, in this case, if we took Socrates literally, he would be saying that there are two distinct subjects conversing. But, since we know that he is being metaphorical, this must be literally false. So, only the soul, and not also the body, is a subject of motivation.

Second, Beere contends that the metaphor of the imprisoned soul provides a “decisive refutation” of the subject view (264). As Beere reads it, the point Plato is making with this metaphor is that the soul imprisons itself on account of its desire for things that provide bodily pleasure. Thus, the metaphor seems to attribute to the soul bodily desires. However, as we have seen above, Bailly takes the same metaphor as evidence for the opposite view. Recall that Bailly’s point is that in this metaphor the soul is described as a collaborator in its imprisonment. Accordingly, he takes this to suggest that the body likewise has motivations of its own.

In response it seems open to Beere to claim that Bailly is taking the metaphor too literally. That is, he could argue that Plato uses this metaphor to express his view that the soul is imprisoning itself with its own desires. And, perhaps regrettably, Plato does this in

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101 By “independent of the soul” Beere must mean “in addition to the soul.” For, he is not arguing against the view that a body without a soul could have motivation.
a way that may make it sound as if it works in tandem with an entity other than itself. Thus, if we look at the point of the metaphor, Beere might claim, we can see that it is not commitment to the subject view. Furthermore, because the metaphor is clearly aimed at ascribing to the soul bodily desires, we do not need to ascribe these desires to the body as well. Hence, on balance, Beere would say, this passage provides support for his view, the view that the body is merely the source of bodily desires.

Unfortunately for Beere, it seems that this would not be the final word. For, a proponent of the subject view could point to independent evidence that suggests that the body might be more than only the source of bodily desires. What I have in mind is the passage at 84d2-84d6: “Because every pleasure or pain provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body and to weld them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that truth is what the body says it is. As it shares the beliefs and delights of the body, I think it inevitably comes to share its ways and manner of life…” We already saw the beginning of this passage above, as Bailly cites it as evidence for the subject view. However, it is the last bit of this passage that I want to consider. In this part of the passage the soul is said to come not only to believe what the body believes but also to delight in (“χαίρω”) what the body delights in. This suggests that the soul not only takes delights and experiences pleasure in the bodily, but so too does the body. That is, it seems that in this passage Socrates is saying that the body itself experiences pleasure. So, if as is reasonable to think, pleasure and motivation are linked, Socrates seems to be saying that the body is an independent subject of motivation. This is also suggested by the final part of the claim here, namely that the soul comes to share the manner of life of the body. Since this suggests that the body has its own independent way of life—one that the soul
may or may not conform to—this passage seems to portray the body as an independent subject.

Undoubtedly, Beere could offer an alternative interpretation of this passage, one that is amenable to the source view. The possibility for this sort of endless exegetical volley suggests that this sort of approach cannot provide us with a solution to the question of bodily desires. In its place, I want to venture that the best way to resolve this puzzle would be to offer a deep, foundational commitment in the dialogue that entails (or at least strongly indicates) one view or the other. Such a commitment would provide us with an answer to the question at hand, and in turn, would furnish us with a principled way adjudicate between competing interpretations of ambiguous passages. Indeed, in the course of his discussion Beere posits such a commitment, though he does not exploit its potential value to resolving the issue. According to his interpretation, in the *Phaedo* the person is identical to the soul. And, since the question at hand is one about the motivations of the *person*, it follows that if the soul is the person, the soul is the only subject of motivations. Put another way, if the person just is the soul, then the motivations of the soul must be the motivations of the person because there is nothing more to a person than the soul.

If Beere is correct that in the *Phaedo* the person is identical to the soul, then it does not seem that the view that the body is a subject of motivation and desires is coherent. This is because if the body is distinct from the person, then it could not be the subject of the relevant motivation, the motivation of the person.\(^{102}\) Of course, it may be the case that the body is a subject of its own motivational states even if it is a separate

\(^{102}\) Perhaps this explains Rowe’s dismissive evaluation of the subject view: “any half-decent philosopher would have to say that [bodily appetites] belong to the soul” (2007: 117).
entity from the person. Still, even if this is the case, and the body could be a subject of motivational states, it is no longer relevant to the larger question at hand, which is asking about the moral psychology of the person. Thus, if this is the only version of the subject view that survives, we must conclude that its defender is playing a very different game than we are. However, even if the body is separate from the person, given that the soul and the body are joined in a certain way, it still makes sense that the body could be the source of bodily desires in the soul. Thus, if Beere is correct that the person just is the soul, then it must be the case that the source view is correct. Accordingly, we shall now turn to the question of whether Beere is correct in his claim that the person is identical to the soul.

2. The person, the soul, and the body

In this section I want to consider whether Beere is correct that in the *Phaedo* Plato thinks that the person just is the soul. Although he does not set them out explicitly, we can pull out from Beere’s discussion three reasons to favor his contention. I will proceed by setting out these three reasons, which I will then evaluate in turn in order to determine whether or not they support his claim. I will argue that ultimately none of them do. But, if we are careful to keep several issues separate, then Beere’s argument will still bear fruit. First, we must keep separate the truth of the conclusion from the soundness of the argument used to support it. That is to say, a conclusion may be true even if the argument for it fails. Second, we must keep separate the support provided by reasons for the argument for which they are offered and the support they might provide for a different

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103 Not exactly keeping separate a hypothesis and its consequences as Socrates advises (101e), but close enough for present purposes.
argument. That is, we must consider whether any of the reasons proffered give us reason to think that the soul is the subject of bodily desires even if they do not support the strict identification of the person and the soul. With these prefatory remarks out of the way, let’s proceed to Beere’s reasons.

I will begin with what I take to be the weakest reason Beere offers for the identification of the person and the soul. He claims that all people most desire wisdom, writing, “Socrates strongly suggests that wisdom is… what all people want above all, although some people have ended up so confused by their bodies that they themselves no longer realize this” (263). From this starting point Beere concludes that the simplest explanation for the fact that people desire wisdom is that people just are souls.

Beere’s second reason is that Socrates believes that he (i.e., Socrates) will survive corporeal death. Indeed, although Beere does not cite the passage, Socrates makes his attitude clear when Crito asks how they shall bury him (Socrates) after he dies. In response to Crito Socrates laughs and says that they can bury him any way they would like if they can catch him (115c5). This response reflects Socrates’ belief that he will not be present after the death of his body, but instead will be making his way to the afterlife.\(^\text{104}\) Beere reasonably infers that Socrates’ attitude toward his post-corporeal existence rules out identifying the person as the body; after all, Socrates is denying that he will be present when only his body is present. But, Beere also thinks it rules out identifying Socrates the person with the body-soul composite, as Socrates thinks he will still survive when the composite has ended. Thus, Beere concludes, the only option

\(^{104}\) See Sorabji 2006: 33-35 who also cites this passage as evidence that Plato identifies the person and the soul.
remaining is that Socrates takes himself to be his soul. And, so it seems that people are identified with (their) souls.

Beere’s third reason is that the myth at the end of the dialogue seems to portray souls as people. As Beere points out, souls are depicted as having a full complement of embodied behaviors, from desiring food, sex, and drink,\(^{105}\) to remembering embodied experiences, and asking for and granting forgiveness. Thus, as Beere puts it, “there is no suggestion in the later depictions of death that death involves leaving a part of oneself behind” (263). And so, if a person is the same subject with or without a body, or put another way, a person is the same if she is an embodied soul or a disembodied soul, it seems that the person just is her soul.

As I have already indicated, I do not believe that any of these reasons compels us to Beere’s conclusion that the soul and the person are identical. I’ll make this case, beginning with the first reason, namely that all persons want wisdom. Chief among the problems with this reason is that there is not any direct textual evidence for Beere’s claim that Socrates believes that wisdom is what all people want above all. Now, there might be a sense in which all people want wisdom. For instance, in other dialogues we find Socrates committed to the view that all people want what is good. On this view, then, if all people want the good, and wisdom is the good or necessary for its possession, then in one sense all people do want wisdom. Or again, as Beere sets out earlier in his paper, all people want virtue, and if philosophers—lovers of wisdom—are paradigms of virtue, then all people should want to be philosophers and love wisdom. But, these claims do not require that the person is the soul. They are claims not about human personhood, but

\(^{105}\) As Beere notes, this evidence comes from 81e-82b, not from the myth. As we shall see below, if Beere wanted to shore up his argument, he would have to show that the myth and the Reprise are consistent with one another in the relevant respects. I take up this task below.
about wisdom as the highest human good. Relatedly, Socrates repeatedly identifies philosophers as the people who alone love wisdom. Thus, it seems that Socrates’ view is that the only people who desire wisdom above all are philosophers. And, even if Beere’s arguments showed that all people desire wisdom in the relevant sense, or if there were direct textual evidence for this claim, it still would not be sufficient for identification. Given that Socrates characterizes the soul as the ruler in the relationship with the body (80a1-4, 94b3), if a person were a soul-body composite, then we would still expect that the desire of the soul would be the considered desire of the person. Put another way, in other dialogues the soul is consistently described as the most important part of the person, from which it follows that the soul naturally sets the motivational agenda for the person as a whole. Of course, in these contexts, as in the Phaedo, the majority of people are not clear minded, and so although they should prioritize the desires of the soul, they do not. Thus, even if in the Phaedo all people should or in some sense do desire wisdom, this does not give us any grounds in determining between whether the person just is the soul, is the soul-body composite, or something else.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that as it stands, Beere’s first reason is based on an argument that is missing a premise. In particular, the argument relies on the missing premise that the soul itself desires wisdom. Without this premise, even if Socrates

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106 For instance, see the Right Exchange. Even someone who resists my interpretation of this passage would still agree that only the philosopher trades bodily experiences for wisdom.
107 For instance, at Crito 48a1, clearly referring to the soul, Socrates asks Crito whether this part of us is inferior to the body (ἡ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκέλευ, ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ δὲ τε ἁδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν). Even at the end of his career, Plato continues to write this way. In the Laws the Athenian announces that all people are made up of two parts (τὰ δ’ αυτὸν διίτα πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ πᾶσιν, 726a4), with the soul being the holiest part and also the part that most belongs to the person (πάντων γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοῦ ψυχῆς θεοτάτων, οἰκεῖοτάτων δὲν, 726a3).
108 This seems to be Aristotle’s view. In Book IX of Nicomachean Ethics he writes, “[a]nd just as a city and every other composite seems to be above all its most controlling part, the same is true of the human being” (1168b30-1169a1, Irwin’s translation).
maintained that all people desire wisdom, we would still not get to the conclusion that the person is the soul. As far as I can tell, the closest that the *Phaedo* comes to this missing premise is Socrates’ claim that the soul is imprisoned in the body.\(^{109}\) This might be taken to suggest that the soul—not only the soul of the philosopher, but perhaps the soul of every person—naturally desires to be free of the body so that it can pursue wisdom. Thus, if this is correct, then it seems that all souls do desire wisdom.

Unfortunately for Beere, I do not think we should read this passage as supporting the view that all souls desire wisdom, and so, supplying the missing premise. Granted, I do believe that the passage supports the view that souls *naturally* desire wisdom. But, this is different than the claim that all souls *actually* desire wisdom, which seems to be the claim that Beere needs.\(^{110}\)

Let’s now consider Beere’s second reason, namely that Socrates thinks that he will survive corporeal death. There are two problems with trying to leverage Socrates’ conviction about his post corporeal existence into evidence for identifying the person and the soul. One problem is that even if Socrates is identified with his soul, we cannot confidently conclude that all people are likewise identified with their souls. Throughout the *Phaedo*, and indeed throughout the Platonic corpus, we see that Socrates is concerned above all for wisdom and the condition of his soul. And, as we have seen, in the *Phaedo* he contrasts those who desire wisdom as he does, with those who desire bodily pleasures. In fact, Socrates’ concern for wisdom is so great that he not only does not care for bodily

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\(^{109}\) One might, though Beere does not, cite the end of the *Republic* where Socrates characterizes of the soul as loving wisdom (611e1-4).

\(^{110}\) Below I will argue that all souls desire to be with what is most true and most real. As a matter of fact this is the same as desiring wisdom. But, because most souls are deceived by the body into thinking what is corporeal is most real and most true, only the soul of the philosopher desires wisdom in the relevant sense (i.e., *de re*).
sensations, he advises that we actively avoid them. From this we can surmise that Socrates (and philosophers in general) is different from other people. So, what holds for Socrates may not hold for others. Moreover, in the case at hand, it could be that Socrates’ care for the soul has affected his identity, such that he really has become identical to his soul.\footnote{There could be at least two possible explanations for how this could happen. One is that the self stands above the soul and the body and that it can identify with either one or the other. This is perhaps suggested by a literal reading of the line at 64e2, where Socrates says that the philosopher turns himself away from the body and toward the soul. Another is that the person begins as the body-soul composite but by following either bodily desires or rational desires, the person becomes identified with either the body or the soul. Cf. Nussbaum 2001: 222: “neither Plato nor Aristotle thinks of a theory of personal identity as a matter of value-neutral fact. It articulates our deepest values.” See also Gerson 2014: 428.} However, non-philosophers have not effected such an identification due to their neglect of their souls. Thus, Socrates could be correct in his belief that he will survive corporeal death because he is his soul without this implying that all people are their souls. The other problem is that Socrates can consistently believe that he will survive corporeal death in virtue of his immortal soul persisting and also deny that the person just is the soul. In order to see this point more clearly, consider a similar sort of case. In this case unlike most people Xanthippe cares about her sense of humor above all. While embodied she pursues only humorous endeavors and develops only her sense of humor. But, even though all she wants to care about is humor, due to her natural empathy for people—a condition of her embodiment—there are just some jokes she cannot make. Perhaps, for instance, she cannot bring herself to tease her husband about his snub nose. Further, other desires impinge on her, and quelling them takes away from time in which she could be crafting more comedic material. As far as the afterlife goes, though, Xanthippe looks forward to it because she believes that after corporeal death all that remains is our sense of humor. But, this does not mean that Xanthippe needs to deny that while she is embodied she consists in more than just her sense of humor. Sure, she
believes that when she dies she will carry on because her sense of humor will. But, this
does not require her to think that before this time, she is only her sense of humor. Indeed,
in this case, we see that before death there are other aspects of her self that inhibit her
sense of humor from flourishing. Thus, in this case, the fact that Xanthippe thinks that
she will survive as her sense of humor alone is consistent with her thinking that while she
is embodied, she is more than just her sense of humor. So too, the fact that Socrates
thinks that he will carry on as his soul does not require us to conclude that he thinks that
he just is his soul prior to corporeal death.

This takes us to Beere’s third reason. Recall that he claims that Plato’s portrayal
of souls in the afterlife in the myth shows that people just are souls. But, like Beere’s first
two reasons, the myth also fails to support his conclusion. The problem here is similar to
the problem brought out with the Xanthippe case above. That is, the myth is compatible
with the denial that the person just is the body because the fact that people exist in the
afterlife is consistent with the possibility that while the soul is embodied the person is
something other than just the soul but lives on in virtue of the soul living on. For our
purposes, the most plausible alternative is that the while the soul is embodied, the person
is the composite, \(^{112}\) but when the body dies, the person lives on because her soul persists.
Beere himself notes this possibility but rejects it out of hand in favor of the strict
identification of the person and the soul, claiming that there is no evidence that the body
is a part of us (262-263). However, the lack of direct textual evidence for identifying the
person as the body-soul composite can hardly count against it, as Beere’s preferred view

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\(^{112}\) See Dört 1982: 211.
also lacks direct evidence; Socrates never explicitly commits himself to one view or the other about the identification of persons.\textsuperscript{113}

In fact, though, I think that there is reason to deny Beere’s claim that there is no direct evidence for the claim that the person is the composite of soul and body. It seems to me that there is such evidence. In particular, at 79b1 Socrates explicitly claims that one part of us is the body, the other part is the soul (φέρε δὴ, ἦ δ’ ὃς, ὀλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή;). Thus, here Socrates seems pretty clearly to be committing to the composite view. Further, Beere claims that Socrates does not think that when we die we leave a part of ourselves behind (263). However at 106e2-3 Socrates claims just this, saying, “when death comes to a man, the mortal part of him dies but his deathless part goes away, safe and indestructible” (ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον τὸ μὲν θνητὸν, ὡς εἰσεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, τὸ δ’ ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἰχεται ἀπίον, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.) Thus, pace Beere, Socrates does seem to think that when a person dies she leaves a part of herself behind (even if for his part Socrates does not think he is leaving anything of value behind). But, since Beere is correct that the myth does seem to portray souls as full persons, it seems that Socrates’ view is that while embodied the person is the soul-body composite, but that the person becomes exclusively the soul when the body perishes. Thus, it seems that Beere is not correct in claiming that the person just is the soul.

\textsuperscript{113} Of course, proponents of the subject view might want to argue that there is indirect evidence of the composite view. Surely they would claim that the fact that the person has bodily desires that reside not merely in the soul but in the body of the person indicates that the person is a soul-body composite. Thus, Beere cannot deny the composite view has indirect support until he provides independent reason to reject the subject view. For, whether or not the body has its own set of desires is precisely what is at issue. So, Beere cannot deny that Socrates’ talk of bodily desires is indirect evidence for the composite view until he has shown that the source view is correct without already assuming that the person just is the soul.
3. The disembodied soul

If the foregoing is correct, then there is good reason to deny Beere’s contention that the person just is the soul in the *Phaedo*.\(^{114}\) Thus, he cannot argue that because the person is the soul, the source view is correct. But, I do not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Indeed, as I suggested at the outset of the previous section, we must keep separate several issues. Accordingly, I want to separate Beere’s ultimate conclusion that the source view is correct from his argument for that conclusion (i.e., that because the person is the soul the source view is correct). Also, I want to separate the utility of Beere’s reasons for his claim that the person is the soul from the truth of this claim. In particular, I want to consider the utility of Beere’s third reason, namely Plato’s portrayal of the disembodied soul. Rather than using this reason to argue for the identification of the person and the soul, and then using this intermediate conclusion to argue for the source view, I want to use this reason to argue for the source view directly. Thus, I want to suggest that Plato’s portrayal of the disembodied soul is the fundamental commitment in the dialogue that can help us to resolve our question about bodily desires.

Here is my argument. Plato’s the portrayal of souls after corporeal death reveals something relevant about the disembodied soul. Further, it is reasonable to think that the soul while disembodied is relevantly similar to the soul while embodied.\(^{115}\) So, if the disembodied soul is the subject of bodily desires, then it is reasonable to conclude that the embodied soul is the subject of bodily desires. Hence, if the disembodied soul can

\(^{114}\) With all that I have argued, however, I do not want to commit myself either way on the question of whether the person just is the soul. I am simply pointing out that Beere has not given us sufficient reason to accept this identification, and that it is not necessary for supporting the source view.

\(^{115}\) Notice that what I require is actually weaker than this. If the disembodied soul can possess bodily desires but the embodied soul does not, then it would mean that upon dis-embodying the soul gains a new capacity. So, I do not need it to be the case that in all ways the disembodied and embodied souls are similar. Instead, all I need is that the disembodied soul does not acquire new capacities upon dis-embodying.
possess bodily desires, then it is reasonable to conclude that the embodied soul can possess bodily desires. Thus, if the disembodied soul can possess bodily desires, then there will be no need to posit the body as the subject of bodily desires. Thus, if the disembodied soul can possess bodily desires, then the source view is correct.

So, the goal of this section is to consider in greater depth the question of whether or not the disembodied soul can possess bodily desires. I will do so by considering the two passages where Socrates discusses disembodied souls in the *Phaedo*: 80e1-81e3 (an early section of the Reprise) and the myth at 107d4-114d1. I will begin by setting out the relevant details of each passage and testing their fit with one another. In doing so, my aim is to present the passages as they stand, free—to the degree possible—of interpretation. I will offer my interpretation of the passages once I have set them out.

### 3.1 Initial discussion of disembodied souls (80e1-81e3)

As I have just noted, here I will attempt to set out the passages in a neutral manner. However, it is worth mentioning upfront that according to one popular reading, Socrates is being ironic in the passage at 80e1-81e3.\(^{116}\) This may well be the case. However, here I will try to present the passage as is, without committing to or ruling out this interpretation. At any rate, even if some commentators think it is obvious that Socrates is not speaking in earnest, such an interpretation nonetheless requires arguments to support it. And, we can only come to these arguments if we first see the passage in its own right, and then argue which aspects, including possibly all of them, Socrates does not endorse. Accordingly, here I will only stick to what Socrates says.

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Coming directly after the Affinity Argument, the passage at 80e1-81e3 contrasts the condition of the souls of the philosopher and the non-philosopher at the time of corporeal death. According to Socrates, the soul of the philosopher is pure and “drags nothing bodily with it” (80e1) because it has had no willing association with the body. Because it is pure, Socrates says, it goes to the invisible and divine, which is like itself, where it can be happy, “having rid itself of confusion, ignorance, fear, violent desires, and the other human ills” (81a3-4).\textsuperscript{117} In stark contrast, Socrates says that the non-philosopher’s soul is “polluted and impure when it leaves the body, having always been associated with it and served it.”\textsuperscript{118} Because of the constant association with the body, the soul comes “to hate and fear and avoid that which is dim and invisible to the eyes but intelligible and to be grasped with philosophy.”\textsuperscript{119} As a result, Socrates indicates that such a soul will not escape “pure and by itself.” Instead, the soul will be “permeated by the physical, which constant intercourse and association with the body, as well as considerable practice has caused it to become ingrained in it” (ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε οἴμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὁ αὐτῆ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἄει συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σῶματον;). This bodily element (ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς) that infuses the soul is “heavy, ponderous, earthy, and visible,” making the soul heavy and causing it to be “dragged back to the visible region in fear of the unseen and of Hades” (81c6-d1). So these souls do not make it to Hades, but, as

\textsuperscript{117} Note that Socrates says that the pure soul, that is the soul in its natural state, does not have any “violent desires” (ἀγρίων ἐρώτων). This not only does not rule out that the pure soul still has desires, it might in fact suggest it.

\textsuperscript{118} “Polluted and impure” is “μεμισμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος” which mean ‘polluted (morally)’ and ‘unclean’ or ‘impure.’

\textsuperscript{119} ‘with’ rather than ‘by’ in Grube’s translation.
Socrates says “we are told” they wander around graves and monuments and can be seen by people on account of being visible.

There are several features to note about Socrates’ characterization of the wandering disembodied souls. First, Socrates explicitly identifies them as belonging to inferior people, and connects their lot to their previous embodied lives, claiming, “these are not the souls of good but of inferior men, which are forced to wander there, paying the penalty for their previous bad upbringing.” Second, he tells us how long the wandering lasts: “[t]hey wander until their longing for that which accompanies them, the physical, again imprisons them in a body…” Finally, Socrates says that it is “likely” that they will be “bound to such characters as they have practiced in their life.” Thus, here Socrates turns from a discussion of the condition of disembodied souls to a discussion of reincarnation.

3.2 The myth (107d4-114d1)

After Socrates’ final argument for the immortality of the soul he returns to the topic of its disembodied existence. The myth is worthy of consideration in its own right, but for our purposes I will focus only on what Socrates says about the disembodied soul in particular.

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120 For a thorough discussion of the myth, and how it relates to other Greek underworld myths, see Edmonds 2004. Edmonds (140) maintains that the Phaedo myth is meant to express the same content as the discussion that precedes it. As we shall see, I generally agree.

121 Rowe 2007: 107 interprets the myth both as an account of the afterlife and as an allegory for embodied life. Such a view is consistent with my reading. Dorter 1982 only goes in for the allegorical reading. Such a reading might threaten to undermine my claim that we can learn about the soul by considering its disembodied portrayal in the myth. However, my claim is undisturbed by a purely allegorical reading of the myth, since the soul in the myth is still meant to represent the soul in embodied life. At any rate, the important similarities between it other Platonic afterlife myths provide us with good reason to think that the Phaedo myth is meant to be more than an allegory for embodied life, even if Socrates does not mean it to be completely literal.
In order to understand the myth, we must begin with what Socrates says a few lines prior to it. He claims that it would benefit the wicked if the soul were not immortal. This is because death would then allow the wicked to be done with the wickedness in their soul. As the soul appears to be immortal, however, this means that they will carry their wickedness to the afterlife. For, Socrates says, “the soul goes to the underworld possessing nothing but its education and upbringing, which are said to bring the greatest benefit or harm to the dead right at the beginning of the journey” (107d4-5).

From here Socrates begins the myth by reporting what “we are told” about a soul’s journey to the afterlife. According to what “we are told,” after death a soul is led by its guardian spirit down a single path to a certain place, judged, again follows a guide to the underworld, where the soul stays for a prescribed amount of time before being guided back to earth.

After setting out this very general sketch of the soul’s complete afterlife journey, Socrates registers his disagreement with it. He points out that the route to Hades must not be simple, as otherwise the soul would not need a guide. Instead of being simple, Socrates claims that there must be many forks in the road and intersections. But, as he says, these forks and intersections are not obstacles for the well-ordered and wise soul (κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχή) as it follows the guide, not being ignorant (οὐκ ἐγνώει) of the path. Furthermore, as it makes its way this sort of soul comes across fellow travelers and gods to help it find its proper destination. The body-loving soul does not have a smooth trip, however. In fact, Socrates says that such souls stay near the body and the visible world. Finally, after much resistance and suffering (πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα) the soul is led by force and pain (βίᾳ καὶ μόρις) by its guardian spirit from the
visible world. As this sort of soul travels it is shunned by other souls on account of its previous impure deeds, and so it journeys alone, getting lost, until it is carried by force (ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης φέρεται) to its fitting destination.

As important as are Socrates’ amendments to the common view (i.e., “what we are told”), we must not overlook what he does not criticize or alter. Notice that in the common view souls are guided back from the afterlife following their punishment. Thus, this version is committed to reincarnation. But, as we have seen Socrates does not challenge this aspect of the common version of the myth. Thus, I suggest, we can take this to be an implicit acceptance of reincarnation. As we shall see, a bit later Socrates provides further evidence that reincarnation is included in his version of the afterlife myth.

After a long interlude about the true structure of the earth, Socrates resumes the discussion of disembodied souls at 113d1. Here he explains the system of rewards and punishments that awaits the souls when they reach their destinations. From what Socrates says, it appears that souls are sorted into four categories corresponding to whether they (1) lived a good and pious life, (2) an average life, (3) committed only curable crimes, or (4) were incurable on account of their crimes.

Let’s begin with the first group. Among the souls that Socrates places into group (1) are people who purified themselves sufficiently through philosophy (114c3). Socrates says that these souls are sent to live with the gods, in a pure dwelling place, and be altogether without a body forever (ἀνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, 114c5). Because Socrates explicitly says that these souls will live forever without

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122 Socrates is not explicit about whether souls from group (1) belong exclusively to philosophers, and only some of them have been sufficiently purified, or whether there are non-philosophers in this group. Rowe 1993: 288-289 (cf. Bobonich 2002: 21) argues for the former suggestion, and I am inclined to agree.
a body, it is clear that they will avoid reincarnation. However, his claim here betrays a commitment to reincarnation for other souls. For, if there were no reincarnation in the myth, then the fact that philosophers exist forever free from bodies would not be worth mentioning, as this would be the case for all souls. But, since Socrates does mention it, we can conclude that most other souls will not be free from the body going forward. Hence, Socrates must accept reincarnation as part of his myth.

So much then for souls from the first group. As for the souls from (2), these souls are sent off to be purified by penalties (καθαρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδίκημῶν διδόντες δίκας) for any wrongdoing and rewarded for any good deeds. The souls from (3) are souls that committed crimes but did so in a fit of temper but felt badly about it for the rest of their lives. Socrates says that these souls must (ἀνάγκη) be thrown into Tartarus. But, after one year they are thrown out of Tartarus and shout to and beg forgiveness from those whom they have harmed. Only if they are forgiven can these souls step out of the Acherusian lake and have their punishment come to an end. If they are not forgiven, then they are taken back to Tartarus, and the process begins again. Finally, those in (4) are thrown into Tartarus and never emerge.

With these details of reward and punishment, Socrates wraps up the myth, but not before taking a moment to reflect upon it. He claims that no reasonable person would accept that things are exactly as the myth has them. Now, this might make it seem that Socrates does not endorse what is in the myth. However, to infer this would be to forget Socrates’ epistemic humility regarding matters of great importance. Indeed, Socrates would say the same thing about the arguments he has offered for the immortality of the soul (cf. 107b3). Furthermore, after this disclaimer, Socrates proceeds to say that

123 For a similar claim following a similar myth, see Gorgias 527a6.
believing that the myth or something like it is a noble risk to take.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, just as Socrates recommends, we need not insist that he endorses everything about the myth, but I submit that it is a good belief to hold that he does.

3.3 Comparing the two portrayals

My claim is that if Plato portrays the disembodied soul as the subject of bodily desires, then we have good reason to think that the embodied soul (and not the body) is also the subject of bodily desires. So, we must determine whether the antecedent is true: does Plato portray the disembodied soul as the subject of bodily desires? In order to answer this we must tease out the characterization of the disembodied soul from the two passages just set out.

As noted, many commentators hold the view that Socrates is not sincere in the passage at 80e1-81e3. While I agree that there are at least some aspects of this passage that seem incredible, as I have suggested, there is reason to believe that he does endorse the myth, or at least something like it. And, because there are doctrinal overlaps between the myth and 80e1-81e3, it cannot be the case that Socrates is being insincere about the whole of this first passage. For instance, on the most general description both passages tell the same story: souls depart from their dead bodies and are eventually reincarnated, save for the souls of philosophers.\textsuperscript{125} Given this similarity between the general details, as interpreters we must make an effort to compare the two passages to determine which

\textsuperscript{124} Cf. \textit{Meno} 86b4-e1, where Socrates offers a similar disclaimer after his discussion of recollection. Of course, as we know from our dialogue, Socrates certainly accepts recollection. Thus, the \textit{Meno} coupled with the \textit{Phaedo} seems to give good evidence that the fact that Socrates offers a disclaimer should not be understood as a rejection on his part of all of what precedes it, and certainly not a rejection of the big picture included therein.

\textsuperscript{125} And per the myth the incurable souls also (113e5).
particular aspects of 80e1-81e3 reflect Socrates’ beliefs. Further, only by considering the passages together can we discriminate which features of 80e1-81e3 can be used to fill out the overall picture of disembodied souls in the *Phaedo*. In order to do so, I will compare the two portrayals of the disembodied soul, starting with relevant discrepancies.

I will begin with a caveat. Perhaps the most bizarre aspect of 80e1-81e3 is that certain souls, perhaps even most souls, are not reincarnated into human bodies, but into animals suiting their characters. This aspect of 80e1-81e3, I take it, is the smoking gun so to speak that convinces commentators that Socrates is not sincere in this part of the dialogue. Below we shall see good reason to think that Socrates is committed to at least certain aspects of this first passage. As a result, it is difficult to adjudicate between the possibilities that Socrates believes that souls can be reincarnated into non-human animals, and that he is simply having a bit of fun with his interlocutors and their Pythagorean interests. Fortunately, for our purposes we need not decide between these two options, as this is a question about the possible destinations for re-embodied souls, which does not bear on our understanding of the disembodied soul.

Turning now to an issue on which I must take a stance: the passage at 80e1-81e3 and the myth appear to conflict with one another regarding what happens to the soul after it leaves the body but before it is reincarnated. According to the first passage, it seems

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126 In fact, I think that we should be open to the possibility that there are some aspects of the first passage that more accurately reflect Socrates’ beliefs. After all, he claimed that we should believe the myth or something like it, suggesting that the myth may fall short of the complete story. So, it is possible that the first passage fills in some of the details that are inaccurate in or missing from the myth.


129 Furthermore, although the myth is committed to reincarnation, Socrates does not indicate whether all reincarnated souls return to human bodies, or whether some can be reborn into non-human bodies. Thus, given the silence of the myth on this issue, there is no contradiction.
that at least some souls of body lovers never depart the corporeal world. Instead, Socrates says that they wander around graves and monuments until they are imprisoned in bodies again. However, the myth seems to indicate that all souls travel out of the corporeal world to be judged and then punished or rewarded. Granted, in the myth Socrates acknowledges that souls that are passionately attached to bodies do remain with them for a long time, even these souls are eventually lead away by force. Thus, it appears that our two treatments of disembodied souls disagree about whether all souls leave the corporeal earth.

What makes this discrepancy especially strange is that in the section of the myth in question Socrates explicitly refers back to the first passage (108b1). It may seem that by explicitly referencing the first passage in the myth, Socrates is signaling that he thinks the two passages are consistent. However, it seems just as plausible to think that Socrates refers back to the first passage in the myth to correct what he said earlier. That is, he may want to recall the first passage to signal that what he is saying in the myth trumps what he said then. Either way, given the importance of the system of rewards and punishments in the myth, we must side with the myth here, and take it that Socrates’ considered view is that all souls depart the corporeal world eventually, even if some take a long time to do so.

130 See Rowe 1993: 268.
131 The resolution of another possible discrepancy follows from this suggestion as well. The passage at 80e1-81e3 seems to suggest that some souls remain impure at the time of reincarnation, whereas in the myth it seems that all souls that are reincarnated are purified (by punishment). But, if I am correct to reject the view that some souls are reincarnated without leaving the corporeal world, then we must also reject the possibility that some souls are reincarnated without being punished, and so, purified.
With this discrepancy cleared away, what can we say about the disembodied soul? In particular, does it have bodily desires? Because it provides more detail regarding the disembodied soul, let’s begin with 80e1-81e3.

There seems to be very strong evidence in this passage that the soul continues to possess bodily desires after corporeal death. Indeed, the passage portrays certain souls as remaining in the corporeal world, and doing so precisely because they still desire physical comforts. Further, Socrates explicitly says that the souls remaining in the corporeal world will have desires (ἐπιθυμία, 81e1) and it is these desires that will cause the souls to be reincarnated. Thus, it seems that we should readily accept that a disembodied soul can possess bodily desires. And if a disembodied soul, i.e., the soul free of the body, can have bodily desires, there appears to be no reason to ascribe bodily desires to the body. Instead, bodily desires can belong exclusively to the soul.

Unfortunately, we cannot reach this conclusion quite so easily. The main problem is that in the passage at 80e1-81e3 the disembodied soul is portrayed as, well, not completely disembodied. Instead, Socrates says that these souls are “permeated by the physical,” which “has become ingrained” in these souls, and that they have become “heavy” and so are “dragged back down to the visible region.” Thus, it seems that these souls still are directly and physically connected to their bodies in some way. And so, it seems that we cannot rule out their persistent bodily components as being the explanation for their persistent bodily desires. Accordingly, we seem to be back at square one with regards to the subject of bodily desires.

132 Furthermore, in this passage disembodied souls have fears (and these fears are sometimes identified as the reason that the souls remain in the corporeal world). Accordingly, if fears are similar in nature to bodily desires, then this seems to provide further evidence that disembodied souls can have bodily desires.

133 Note that the fear of Hades, the invisible, is also credited with being the cause of their staying on earth (81c6-d1).
But, does Socrates seriously believe that these souls are polluted with actual, physical and corporeal elements? It simply does not seem that he can mean this literally based on the characterization of the soul in the Affinity Argument. There, Socrates claims that the soul is invisible (79b6) and is most like the “uniform and indissoluble” (80b1). If this is correct, then the soul itself is incorporeal. And more to the point, it does not seem that the soul is the sort of entity that could be “permeated” by corporeal elements, or that corporeal elements could become “ingrained” in, as there would be nothing physical for the corporeal elements to adhere to. Thus, I offer that Socrates’ claim that some disembodied souls have corporeal elements is best interpreted metaphorically. Further, it seems that if the metaphor means anything—which it undoubtedly does—it is that a disembodied soul can have persistent bodily desires, which keep the soul connected to the corporeal world. And so, it once again seems that in the passage at 80e1-81e3 the disembodied soul is wholly incorporeal but nonetheless can have persistent bodily desires.

Let’s now turn to the myth. Initially the myth appears silent about the characterization of the disembodied soul. However, if one presses it a little bit, the myth seems to betray a commitment to a soul that can have corporeal elements. After all, as we have seen, some souls in the afterlife are portrayed as engaging in activities that seem to require a body. For instance, souls converse with one another and forgive one another. Moreover, souls are portrayed as experiencing punishment, which would seem to require

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134 Some commentators think he is. See Woolf 2004: 117 and Price 2011: 38. Given that the soul is otherwise portrayed as incorporeal, such interpretations owe us an explanation of how the corporeal could fasten to the incorporeal, which, as I argue, seems impossible.
135 Perhaps this raises the question of what connects the soul to the body in the first place. This, of course, is a difficulty for all dualists, and so is not grounds to object to the present interpretation.
136 Recall that these elements of the myth lead Beere to conclude that the person exists in the afterlife.
a body that can receive the punishment.\textsuperscript{137} Thus, it seems like souls in the myth have bodily elements, and so even if souls have persistent bodily desires after corporeal death, we cannot conclude that such desires belong to the soul.

I believe that both aspects of the myth can be explained to a sufficient extent without positing corporeal elements in the disembodied soul. Regarding the souls communicating with one another, I think that we do not need to take Socrates literally here. In order to espouse the myth, and to put it in terms accessible to his audience, Socrates needs to anthropomorphize souls in the myth. Thus, what he says about them may not reflect what he believes souls are actually like in the afterlife. Here it is important to bear in mind that Socrates says that he is not sure about all the details of the myth. It may well be that he is not committing to the portrayal of souls as if they had bodies in the afterlife.\textsuperscript{138}

So, I think we can understand these aspects of the myth without positing corporeal elements for the soul. But, what about punishment in the myth? As I have suggested, this seems to require that the soul have corporeal elements in order to absorb the punishment. Can punishment, then, be explained away? I believe that it cannot. The notion of post-embodied punishment is consistent throughout the \textit{Phaedo}, and seems to supplement Socrates’ argument in favor of philosophy and his willingness to die. For instance, in the Right Exchange, Socrates says that in contrast to the philosophical soul, those who have

\textsuperscript{137} As part of punishments souls are “carried along the Acherusian Lake” (114a6) and they “cry and shout… and beg them to allow them to step out” (115b1). All of these actions seem to require bodies. But, more importantly, the sense that the myth gives the reader is that the reason these punished souls are crying, shouting, and begging is because they are experiencing physical pain.

\textsuperscript{138} Even if one wanted to insist that souls communicating with one another—in particular, asking for and receiving forgiveness—is a vital component of the myth, there are resources in the dialogue that may help explain how this is possible without a body. In the Affinity Argument Socrates suggests that the gods can see what is invisible to the human eye (79b4-6). This opens up the possibility that gods, and perhaps disembodied souls, can interact with the invisible in ways not mediated by senses.
lived viciously will suffer in the afterlife (69c4). Again, as we have seen, just before the
myth, at 107c5 Socrates says that if the soul were not immortal, it would be a boon for
the wicked. His point must be that it would be better for them if the soul were mortal
because if it is immortal, then it will be punished for the wickedness perpetrated while
embodied.

So, it seems that Socrates is deeply committed to the view that some souls are
punished after corporeal death. Thus, this may seem to suggest a disembodied soul with
corporeal elements. But, as we have seen, this conflicts with Socrates’ most protracted
discussion of the soul. That is, the Affinity Argument seems to indicate that the soul is
incorporeal. So, it seems that we have uncovered two commitments in the dialogue: that
the soul is incorporeal and that the soul can be punished in the afterlife. Accordingly, we
must try to find a way to understand these commitments as compatible. That is, we must
try to find a way to explain punishment that does not rely on a soul with corporeal
elements.

I believe that we can do this by imagining how an incorporeal soul could be
punished. In order to do so, we must first consider what sorts of souls are being punished.
There can be no doubt that all punished souls are non-philosophical souls. This is so in
light of the conjunction of two commitments Socrates stakes in the dialogue. First, he
makes it plain throughout the dialogue that philosophers are the only people whose souls
are purified, and so avoid punishment. Second, he claims that anyone who is not a
philosopher is a body-lover (68b7). So, I want to suggest that frustrating the desires of
these body-loving souls would amount to a form of punishment, indeed, the perfect sort
of punishment for such souls.\footnote{Frustrating and ultimately frustrating away the bodily desires of body-loving souls would also be a way of purifying these souls.} The view that I am advocating, then, is that body-loving souls have persistent bodily desires, which cannot be satisfied because they are disembodied, which causes these souls to suffer. Further, the more a soul is committed to the body and bodily desires, the more it would suffer upon being disembodied, as its most intense desires would necessarily be frustrated. Thus, my suggestion is that we can provide a fully satisfactory explanation of punishment without positing a disembodied soul with corporeal elements. Notice that this picture is not only consistent with a disembodied soul that having bodily desires, it actually requires it. Thus, if my suggestion about punishment is correct, then we have good reason to think that in the myth certain souls have persistent bodily desires.

So, it seems that in both relevant discussions in the *Phaedo*, Plato portrays disembodied souls as capable of possessing bodily desires. And, since this holds for disembodied souls, we should think that it holds also for embodied souls. Accordingly, there is no reason to posit the body as the subject of bodily desires. Instead, bodily desires belong exclusively to the soul, although the body is responsible for initially giving rise to them. Thus, the source view is correct.

4. *The soul: uniform or composite?*

I have just argued that the soul, not the body, is the subject of bodily desires. Now I shall address the second main question of this chapter, whether the soul is uniform or composite. Put another way, is the soul a single, non-partite entity with different sorts of
desires, or is it partite, with each part having its own peculiar set of desires? As I suggested at beginning of this chapter, my defense of the soul as the subject of bodily desires might suggest that the soul is composite, with a non-rational part housing bodily desires. Moreover, Plato famously argues in favor of a composite soul in the *Republic*. And, since our dialogue was written around the same time, we might expect to find the tripartite soul in the *Phaedo* as well. I will begin, then, by considering whether the Phaedonic soul is tripartite like the soul in the *Republic*. I will argue that there is good reason to think not. From here I will turn to the question of whether or not the soul in the *Phaedo* has parts at all. Again, I will argue in favor of a negative response. I will close by offering a sketch of the soul in the *Phaedo*.

### 4.1 Evidence against tripartition

As is well known, in the *Republic* Plato divides the soul into three parts: reason, spirit, and appetite. Each part has its own corresponding object, or cluster of objects, of desire. And, these three parts of the soul correspond to three types of people: philosophers, honor lovers, and money lovers. Of course, in the *Phaedo* Plato also categorizes people into these same three groups. So, the fact that in the *Phaedo* Plato identifies the same three groups of people as in the *Republic* might give us reason to think that in the *Phaedo* he accepts the tripartite soul just as in the *Republic*.141

Although it is true that both dialogues categorize people as either philosophers, honor lovers, or wealth lovers, there is some reason to doubt that they are operating with

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140 Of course questions like *what does it mean to say that a soul has parts?* and *what is the metaphysical status of the distinction between soul parts?* are important. Like other discussions of this issue, the present inquiry can proceed without answers to these questions.

141 See Burnet 1911: 40 who argues this. See Hackforth 1955: 56 who denies it.
the same system of classification. Recall that in the *Phaedo* Socrates claims that failing to be a philosopher is sufficient for being a body lover (68b6). Moreover, as Socrates says in this same passage a body lover can be a money lover (φιλοχρήματος), an honor lover (φιλότιμος), or both. So, in the *Phaedo* honor lovers and money lovers are just species of body lovers. Hence, unlike the *Republic*, in the *Phaedo* there are only two types of people, philosophers and body lovers.

By way of making this point explicit, let’s spell it out a bit more. As we have seen in the *Phaedo* there are people who love the soul and there are people who love the body. But, as we know, the people who love the body can be further specified as people who love wealth and people who love honor. Money lovers must be lovers of sensual pleasure. This is implied by Socrates’ claim early in his defense that the desire for wealth results from care for the body (66d1). And, as for the honor lovers, we know that they too are body lovers. Thus, as curious as it may seem, Plato must think that the pleasure experienced via honor is a form of bodily pleasure. Thus, when someone pursues honor, she is pursuing something bodily. Thus, whereas in the *Republic* honor as an object of desire is distinguished from bodily pleasure as an object of desire, this is not the case in the *Phaedo*. Thus, even if honor is distinguished from some other bodily pleasures (i.e., sensual pleasures), both refer back to the body in some way. That is, while they may be generated by different parts of the body—perhaps honor pleasures are generated by the heart and sensual pleasures by other parts—they come from the body nonetheless. Thus, if the question is whether or not we need to posit parts of the soul that

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142 See Chapter One, p. 16.

143 See Chapter One and note 94 in the present chapter.

144 It is also confirmed by Socrates’ discussion of the reincarnation of vicious non-honor loving body lovers. As Socrates says in the Reprise, these are the people who practiced gluttony, lust, and drunkenness. For a discussion, see Chapter Three, pp. 104-105.
correspond to the desires of the body, then because the desire for sensual pleasures and the desire for honor are both identified as bodily pleasures, in the *Phaedo* we do not need to posit a spirited part of the soul. Instead, we only need a more general non-rational part of the soul to do the job, one that can accommodate these two types of bodily desires.\(^{145}\)

4.2 The question of partition

Based on the foregoing, it seems that the Phaedonic soul is not tripartite as in the *Republic*. Furthermore, if the soul of the *Phaedo* has parts at all, it likely only has two parts: a rational part and a non-rational part. Here I will consider the strongest textual evidence in favor of and against such partition, beginning with the former.

There appears to be evidence throughout the *Phaedo* that Socrates takes the soul to have parts. In several places in the dialogue Socrates refers to the soul “gathering itself together” (67c5, 80e3, and 83a5).\(^{146}\) It would seem that in order for the soul to be able to “gather itself together” it must consist in parts that can be gathered. This seems especially the case in the first instance of this phrase, as Socrates speaks of a soul “gather[ing] itself and collect[ing] itself out of every part of the body” (αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὐτὴν πανταχώθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἄθροιξεσθαι, 67c5), which suggests that the soul can be in different parts of the body, again implying that the soul has parts.

Although these passages appear to provide good reason to think that the Phaedonic soul has parts, the evidence is far from decisive. Two considerations show why. First, we must consider the possibility that Socrates does not intend the phrase to be

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\(^{145}\) Of course, this leaves open the possibility that the soul has more than two parts, and parts that differ from those we find in the *Republic* (cf. *Gorgias* 493a). But, it shows that positing a spirited part would be redundant.

\(^{146}\) Cebes also invokes the idea of the soul gathering itself together at 70a5. See Gallop 1975: 143.
taken literally. Indeed, in other dialogues we find Socrates speaking this way. For instance, in the *Protagoras* after Protagoras’ great speech Socrates says that he had to pull himself together (328d4). Importantly, in this passage he employs the word “συναγείρω,” which he also employs at *Phaedo* 67c5. Of course, in the *Protagoras* Socrates does not literally mean that his parts were dispersed and he needed to collect them. Instead, he must simply mean that he needed to compose himself in the non-literal sense. Perhaps, then, this is the sort of meaning that Socrates intends in the *Phaedo*.

Second, and more significantly, even if Socrates is being literal with the phrase, it does not show that the soul has parts in the sense in question. The idea of the soul gathering itself up, with needing to be collected from every section of the body suggests perhaps something more like the Democritean view of the soul. On this view the soul is composed of a large number of atoms but they are all the same. Indeed, given Socrates’ interlocutors and their concerns about what may happen to the soul after death, it might not be surprising that Socrates would adopt such language. In contrast, the three parts of the soul in the *Republic* differ from one another whether or not they are each individually composed of soul atoms. Further, these are not the sorts of parts that would be gathered up together, as in the *Republic* the characterization of justice as a harmony of the soul indicates that they are always together, even if they are often ordered badly. Thus, Socrates’ talk of the soul gathering itself need not imply that he endorses a partite soul in the *Phaedo*.

As for evidence of a uniform soul, as we have seen the Affinity Argument provides strong reason to think that the soul does not have parts. Recall that this argument

147 See 70a5-6: “They think that after [the soul] has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and dissolved…it is dispersed like a breath or smoke.” See also 77d6: “You seem to have this childish fear that the wind would really dissolve and scatter the soul…”
aims at proving that the soul is immortal by comparing it with the Forms. We need not rehearse the details of the argument here, as it will suffice to point out that Socrates says that the Forms are invisible, divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, and always the same. The last few characteristics are especially relevant for our purposes because they confirm that the Forms do not have any parts. Thus, if as Socrates claims, the soul resembles the Forms with respect to these characteristics, then there is good reason to think that the soul is uniform.

Although this is strong evidence that the Phaedonic soul is non-composite, it is open to challenge. In the Affinity Argument Socrates does not say that the soul is exactly like the Forms. Instead, he is more reserved, claiming only that the soul resembles (ἔοικα, 80a5) the divine. Nonetheless, I think that there is still good reason to think that the soul is non-composite in the dialogue. For several reasons I think that Socrates’ caution in claiming that soul only resembles the Forms should not make us doubt that the soul is non-composite. First, it is not clear how the soul could even resemble the Forms if it were composite. Second, it is not obvious that Socrates only says that the soul resembles the Forms because it is partite while the Forms are not. Instead, for all he actually says, he might think that the soul is exactly like the Forms with regard to being uniform, but that the soul falls short of the Forms with regard to some other aspect. Finally, at 95c3 Socrates sets his caution from the Affinity Argument aside and asserts that the soul is divine (θεοειδὲς). Thus, outside of the context of the Affinity Argument—which is an argument by analogy, and so can only secure a likely conclusion—Socrates can claim

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148 This comes in the course of Socrates recapping Cebes’ cloak objection. I take it that Socrates is saying something like, “I believe that the soul is divine, but you, Cebes, are arguing that even if I am correct, it still does not follow that it is immortal.” If this is the right way to understand the dialectic here, then Socrates is committing to the belief that the soul is divine.
what he really believes (not only what he is justified in believing on account of the Affinity Argument). And, as we see here, he believes that the soul is divine.149 But, since we know from the premises of the Affinity Argument, which again surely reflect Socrates’ actual beliefs, what is divine is non-composite. Thus, we can conclude that Socrates maintains that the soul is non-composite, that is, is uniform.150

4.3 A sketch of the soul

I have just argued that the balance of textual evidence favors the view that the soul in the *Phaedo* is uniform. Before I end the discussion of the soul, however, I want to consider two potential difficulties for this conclusion. First, it is undeniable that the soul in the *Phaedo* has multiple functions, which seems to suggest that it has multiple parts. Second, there is still the question of how to explain bodily desires without positing an appetitive part of the soul alongside the rational part. Absent such an explanation, we might think that there is still good reason to believe that the soul in the *Phaedo* has parts. In the course of responding to this difficulty I will offer a characterization of the soul in the *Phaedo*.

I will begin with the first difficulty. Because of our present concern with bodily desires, the discussion in this chapter has focused primarily on the affective or desiderative function of the soul. But, the Phaedonic soul is also undoubtedly capable of learning, memory, understanding, and believing, and so, must have a cognitive or epistemic function. The fact that the soul has two distinct functions would indicate that

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149 Cf. 84b3, where Socrates is explicit that the soul is akin to the divine. Also, although 79d3 comes in the course of the Affinity Argument, in this passages Socrates does not hedge his bets, but instead asserts that the soul is akin to the divine.
150 The possibility that the soul, in its natural state, is uniform is hinted at in the *Republic* (612a2-5). See Bluck 1955: 3.
contrary to the foregoing Plato must have thought that the soul has two parts, one corresponding to each function. But, this need not be the case. In short, even in the Republic where the soul has different parts, a single part of the tripartite soul possesses distinct functions. This is most readily seen in the case of the rational part of the soul, in which the cognitive function may be most prominent, but which also possesses a desiderative aspect. Thus, although the fact that the soul has multiple functions does not require that it has multiple parts.

Turning now to the second difficulty. As I suggested at the start of this chapter we might presume that if the soul is the home of bodily desires, then the soul is partite. So, if the soul is uniform, how can we explain bodily desires existing alongside rational desires?

In order to answer this question I want to offer a suggestion as to the most fundamental aspect of the soul in the Phaedo. I suggest that the Phaedonic soul is characterized by the desire to be with what is most real or true. There are two passages that together motivate this characterization. First, there is a passage at 79d1-5. In Chapter One this passage was relevant as it provides a description of the soul’s experience of wisdom. But, for our present purposes it serves a slightly different purpose. So that we can see this purpose, I quote the relevant portion of the passage again:

When the soul investigates itself by itself, it departs there to the pure, everlasting, immortal, and always the same, and being like this, it always stays there whenever it is by itself and is able to do so; it stops from wandering and remains always the same, since it is grasping what is always the same…

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151 Woolf 2008: 3 sets out two possible explanations for the value of truth in the Phaedo. But, he does not include what we might call the ‘teleological’ value of truth, according to which the soul values the truth because it (the soul) is akin to what is most true.
In this passage Socrates claims that the soul stays with the Forms, that is, what is divine, most real, and most true, as long as it can. Thus, we infer that the soul itself desires to be with what is divine, most real, and most true.

But, in the second relevant passage, we learn that the soul can be deceived about what is true and real. At 83c2-d4 Socrates explains this phenomenon, claiming that the greatest evil\textsuperscript{152} is,

> [t]hat the soul of every man, when it feels violent pleasure or pain in connection with some object, necessarily (ἀναγκάζεται) believes at the same time that what causes such feelings must be very clear and very true, which it is not…And doesn’t this experience tie the soul to the body most completely…Because every pleasure and pain provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body…It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that truth is what the body says it is. As it shares the beliefs and delight of the body, I think it inevitably comes to share its ways and manners of life…\textsuperscript{153}

In this passage we see that pleasures and pains cause the soul to think that the corporeal is what is most real and most true. And, importantly, this is what ties the soul to the body. That is, Socrates is claiming that the fact that the soul comes to think that what is corporeal is most real is what ties the soul to the body. This, of course, is because, as we saw in the previous passage, the soul desires to be with what is most real and true. What has gone wrong to the soul in the second passage is that because of the body the soul has become deceived about what is most real and true. In the first passage the soul is free from the body and so can experience what is in fact most real and true. But, in the second passage the soul is deceived, and so mistakes the corporeal for what is most true and real. But, the explanation for why the soul gets bound to the body is the same as why the free

\textsuperscript{152} Grube’s translation with modifications. In Chapter Four I discuss how this evil relates to misology, which Socrates also identifies as the greatest evil. See pp. 167-168.

\textsuperscript{153} See also 81b1-5. In this passage Socrates explains that the soul accustomed to the bodily comes to hate what is dim and invisible to the eyes, preferring what it can see and touch.
soul stays with the Forms while it can: the soul desires to be with what is most real and true. The only difference is that the free soul is correct, while the bound and bodily soul is mistaken.

If this is correct, then we can see that in the *Phaedo* there is no real cleavage between the desiderative function and the epistemic function; the soul seeks the truth because it wants to be with the truth.\(^{154}\) But, this also provides a way to understand the relationship between the rational desires of philosophers for wisdom and truth, and bodily desires. Whereas bodily desires are usually characterized as floating free from epistemic constraints, in the *Phaedo* Plato intimately connects bodily desires with a desire for the truth. If this is correct, then in a real sense bodily desires are not different in kind from rational desires, as both sorts of desires are the result of a more general desire for truth and reality. What distinguishes bodily desires and the desire for wisdom is what the soul believes is real.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have investigated into bodily desires and the nature of the soul in the *Phaedo*. I began by considering whether bodily desires belong to the soul or to the body. When addressing this question most commentators attempt to find an answer by balancing individual passages against one another. But, as we have seen, interpreting individual passages can only take us so far with this issue. In discussing bodily desires, Socrates is given to the frequent use of metaphors. This causes difficulties for interpreters determining when he is speaking literally and when metaphorically. Further, even when a

\(^{154}\) Broadie 2001: 305-306 argues that the soul “is essentially a valuing power” (cf. Robins 2003: 8-9). I think that we can get even more fundamental and identify the main value of the soul: truth and reality.
passage is determined to be metaphoric the greater difficulty of how far to push the 
metaphor arises. Moreover, the nature of a dialogical discussion complicates matters. In 
such a discussion Socrates might adopt a way of speaking to appeal to his interlocutors 
that serves him in making a larger point but that also obscures a subordinate point (in this 
case, the nature of bodily desires). Furthermore, given that it is a dialogue, we should 
allow that at times Socrates speaks loosely about an issue.  

Because of these difficulties, I have parted ways with other commentators in 
search for a solution as to the home of bodily desires. I have argued that by looking at 
how the disembodied soul is characterized in the dialogue, we can determine whether or 
not bodily desires belong to the soul. As I have argued, in both passages where he 
discusses it, Socrates presents the disembodied soul as capable of possessing bodily 
desires. Further, I have argued that this gives us strong reason to think that the embodied 
soul can also possess bodily desires. Thus, I have concluded that the soul, and not the 
body, is the subject of bodily desires. 

In the final part of the chapter I turned to the nature of the soul, considering in 
particular whether it is uniform or composite. I have argued that Socrates’ commitment to 
the divinity of the soul provides good reason to think that the soul is uniform. I have also 
argued that the fundamental feature of the Phaedonic soul is its desire to be with what is 
most true and real. With this characterization in hand, I suggested that bodily desires do 
not differ in kind from rational desires. Both sorts of desires stem from the soul’s 
overarching desire to be with what is most true and real, but bodily desires reflect the 
soul’s mistaken belief that this is the corporeal. 

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155 Beere falls back on this fact only when presented with a passage that read strictly undermines his 
reading. See p. 55 above.
Before I conclude this chapter, I would like to consider briefly perhaps the most pressing moral psychological issue in the Platonic corpus, *akrasia*. According to most interpretations, in his early dialogues Plato portrays Socrates as denying that *akrasia* is possible. But in the *Republic* Plato countenances the possibility of acting against one’s better judgment. Furthermore, he is able to explain this phenomenon because he has introduced the tripartite soul. So, now our question is: does Plato in the *Phaedo*—a dialogue that was written around the same time as and shares affinities with the *Republic*, but which also holds to the uniformity of the soul—accept the possibility of *akrasia*?

Socrates does not address the question of *akrasia* in the dialogue, but he does perhaps show his hand on the issue in a few passages. For instance, in the Autobiography near the end of the dialogue, Socrates claims that the explanation for the Athenians condemning him was that it seemed best to them to condemn him (98e1). Likewise, he claims that his belief that it was more honorable and right to accept his execution explains why he did not escape (99a2). Thus, in this passage Socrates indicates that, at least in these cases, people act in accord with their judgment about what is best.

This same view seems to be suggested at the end of Socrates’ Defense and in the Right Exchange. As we have seen, Socrates indicates that when non-philosophers face death, they do so because of some greater fear, and when they pass on a bodily pleasure, they do so in order to secure a greater bodily pleasure or to avoid a greater pain. And, since we know from the Right Exchange, the only standard of value for non-philosophers is bodily pleasure, it seems that here Socrates is saying that they always act in accord with what they think is best. Indeed, the same can be said for the philosopher, who thinks that wisdom is valuable above all, and so bases her decisions on what is most conducive
to wisdom. Furthermore, as many commentators have noted, this discussion—in particular the explanation for the actions of non-philosophers—calls to mind the argument from the end of the *Protagoras*, which Socrates employs precisely to deny the possibility of *akrasia*.\(^ {156} \) Thus, this seems to suggest quite strongly that in the *Phaedo* Plato denies that people act against their better judgments. So, putting this into the terms of our foregoing discussion, it seems that in the dialogue people always act in accordance with their best judgments about which actions will secure their soul the chance to be with what is most real and most true.

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\(^{156}\) I discuss the relationship between the *Phaedo* and this argument from the *Protagoras* in greater detail at the end of Chapter Three.
In Chapter One I argued that genuine virtue does not require possession of wisdom but instead the desire for it. I made the case for this interpretation primarily by focusing on three passages: Socrates’ Defense, the Right Exchange, and the Reprise. As I noted, in each passage Socrates contrasts the true virtue of the philosopher with a deficient form of virtue of non-philosophers. In the first two passages, Socrates’ Defense and the Right Exchange, Socrates contrasts genuine virtue with a counterfeit form of virtue, which in this chapter I will label ‘apparent virtue.’ In the third passage, the Reprise, he contrasts genuine virtue with a state that he calls ‘popular or political virtue,’ or as I call it for brevity, ‘political virtue.’ In the present chapter I will zero in on these discussions of deficient virtue with an eye toward how apparent virtue and political virtue relate to one another. In particular, I will ask: are they distinct from one another, one and the same, or is one a species of the other? I will argue that in the Phaedo political virtue is properly understood as a species of apparent virtue. Thus, strictly speaking, there is only one form of deficient virtue in the dialogue.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will set out what Socrates says about apparent virtue and political virtue. Second, I will consider the possibility that these states are distinct. To do so I will begin with evidence internal to the Phaedo before turning to evidence from outside of the dialogue. Along the way I will also spell out and consider a characterization of political virtue as distinct from apparent virtue. Third, I will give reason to reject the evidence offered in favor of distinguishing the states, and argue that political virtue in the Phaedo is a species of apparent virtue. Finally, I will fill
out the picture of deficient virtue in the dialogue by considering Plato’s ultimate
evaluation of apparent virtue, and whether and how agents with apparent virtue might
differ from one another in regards to their virtue.

1. Preliminary discussions of apparent virtue and political virtue

Before considering their relationship to one another I will begin by setting out in detail
what Socrates says about apparent virtue and political virtue. In the discussion of
apparent virtue I will argue that it is hedonistic. Here I shall leave open the question of
how, if at all, political virtue relates to hedonism, and so apparent virtue, as I will
entertain arguments to this effect in the subsequent sections.

1.1 Apparent virtue

As we saw in Chapter One, Socrates introduces the topic of apparent virtue at the end of
his defense. Initially, and explicitly, Socrates focuses only on courage and temperance,
but in the Right Exchange he mentions justice (69b3 and 69c1), and indicates that there
are apparent forms of each virtue. Here I will set out in full what Socrates says about
apparent virtue and then consider how to understand his comments.

After Socrates has concluded that a person who loves wisdom, that is a true
philosopher, will not fear death, the following discussion ensues: (Grube’s translation
with modifications):

Then, you have sufficient indication, he [Socrates] said, that any man whom you
see resenting death was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of body (φιλοσόματος),
being either a lover of wealth (φιλοχρηματος), a lover of honor (φιλότιμος), or
both (ἀμφότεροι).
It is certainly as you say.

And, Simmias, he said, does not what is called ‘courage’ (ἡ ὑνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία) belong most (μᾶλστα) to men of this disposition?

Most certainly.

And the quality of temperance, which even (καὶ) the majority call ‘temperance’ (οἱ πολλοὶ ὑνομαζοῦσι σωφροσύνη), that is, not to get swept off one’s feet by one’s appetites, but to treat them with disdain and orderliness, is suited only (μόνῳς) to those who most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy?

Necessarily so, he said.

If you are willing to reflect on the courage and temperance of other people (τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην), you will find them strange.

In what way, Socrates?

You know that they all consider death a great evil?

Definitely, he said.

And the courageous among them (αὕτῶν οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι) face death, when they do, for fear of greater evils.

That is so.

Therefore, it is fear and terror that make all men courageous, except the philosophers. Yet, it is illogical to be courageous through fear and cowardice.

It certainly is.

What of the temperate among them (οἱ κόσμοι αὕτῶν)? Is their experience not similar? Is it licentiousness of a kind that makes them temperate? We say this is impossible, yet their experience of this simple-minded temperance (ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην) turns out to be similar: they fear to be deprived of other pleasures which they desire, so, they keep away from some pleasures because they are overcome by others. Now, to be mastered by pleasure is what they call licentiousness, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures because they are mastered by others. This is like what we mentioned just now, that in some way it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them temperate.

That seems likely.
Dear Simmias, I fear this is not the correct exchange with regard to virtue, that is exchanging pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, and fears for fears, the greater for the less, just as with coins. Instead, the only correct coin for which one ought to exchange them is wisdom. And, buying and selling all of these pleasures, pains, and fears for this and with this we have true courage, temperance, justice, and the whole of true virtue, which is on the side of wisdom, regardless of whether pleasures, fears, or all such things be present or absent. But, exchanging these things for one another apart from wisdom is, if you like, an image of virtue (σκιαγραφία), and is fit for a slave (ἀνδραποδώδης), lacking anything sound or true. But, in truth, temperance, justice, and courage are a type of purificatory process, and perhaps wisdom itself is a state of being purified.

Much of this passage is opaque. But one aspect of it that is clear is that non-philosophers deal only in pleasures, pains, and fears. Thus, this form of deficient virtue—which Socrates calls an image of virtue and so I have labeled ‘apparent virtue’—is based on a calculation of bodily experiences. Indeed, there is a consensus among commentators that the deficient virtue described here is the same as the hedonic calculus identified as virtue itself in the Protagoras. That the virtuous among non-philosophers are hedonistic is obvious from the Right Exchange (the last paragraph quoted), where they are said, for instance, to exchange less pleasure for more pleasure. Thus, the virtuous non-philosophers—and indeed all non-philosophers—use bodily experiences alone as the standard by which they judge actions, and so, are hedonists.

Although it is deficient and based only on the hedonic calculus, the apparent virtue of non-philosophers does share some points of contact with genuine virtue. In the Right Exchange, we see that at least for some non-philosophers the hedonic calculation does result in a sort of virtue, granted one that is ‘slavish’, that is, ‘fit for a slave’ (ἀνδραποδώδης). Furthermore, although it is merely apparent virtue, it does result in

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157 As noted in Chapter Two, fear must somehow be a bodily experience since non-philosophers are all body lovers. Presumably it is a species of bodily pain (or perhaps the anticipation of bodily pain).
virtuous behavior on these occasions. For, based on hedonic calculus, some non-
philosophers, the “courageous among them,” face death, and the “temperate among
them” control certain bodily appetites. Thus, we should understand apparent virtue as
hedonic calculation that results in virtuous action.

In light of this understanding of apparent virtue, how are we to characterize what
Socrates says “is called ‘courage’” and what he says “is called ‘temperance’”?\textsuperscript{158} Based
on the fact that it is non-philosophers who seem to be doing the calling in question, and
they are the ones who can possess apparent virtue, it seems plausible to think that “what
is called (virtue)” is the same as apparent virtue.\textsuperscript{159} However, I do not think that this is the
case. The main difficulty that this reading faces is that Socrates relates what is called
‘courage’ and ‘temperance’ to philosophers. As we can see in the passage, Socrates says
that what is called ‘courage’ belongs most (\(\mu\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\)) to the philosopher and that what is
called ‘temperance’ belongs only (\(\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\)) to the philosopher. So, if what is called
‘courage’ and ‘temperance’ were the same as apparent courage and apparent temperance,
then Socrates would be saying that the philosopher has apparent courage and temperance.
But, the genuine virtue of the philosopher is diametrically opposed to the merely apparent
and slavish virtue of non-philosophers. So, Socrates cannot think that what is called
‘virtue’ is the same as apparent virtue.

Since we know that what is called ‘virtue’ is not apparent virtue, let’s consider
what else it might be. We can begin with what is called ‘temperance,’ as the text is
forthcoming with an answer. Socrates identifies what is called ‘temperance’ as “not to get

\textsuperscript{158} It is no accident that Plato focuses on courage and temperance in this passage, given the overlap
between these two virtues as depicted here. As we see, the courage of non-philosophers involves
intemperance because it is ultimately about bodily pleasures and pains. And, their temperance involves
cowardice because it involves acting from fear of the loss of pleasure.

\textsuperscript{159} Most commentators seem to assume that this is the case. See for instance Kraut 2010: 54.
swept off one’s feet by one’s appetites, but to treat them with disdain and orderliness.” Thus, he is explicit that what is called ‘temperance’ is what people usually take to be temperance, namely keeping one’s appetites in check. In fact, this sounds as if it just is temperance. Shortly we will have to consider why it is not, but first let’s use this insight to help us with the case of what is called ‘courage.’

Unfortunately, Socrates is not quite as explicit about what he means by ‘what is called ‘courage.’’ Fortunately, though, he does say enough so that we can tease out what he means. The key line comes when Socrates says that when non-philosophers are courageous, it is fear that makes them so. There are two points to make about this claim. First, Socrates is not here ascribing to non-philosophers genuine courage; this belongs only to the philosopher. Second, although their actions are the result of merely apparent courage, nonetheless, the non-philosophers in question are performing the courageous action in these situations. And, since in these situations non-philosophers are said to face death, we know that the courageous action to which Socrates refers is facing death. Above we saw that what is called ‘temperance’ is how one might conceive of temperance, and this present claim gives us reason to think the same thing about what is called ‘courage.’ For, in fact, facing death is importantly related to courage.\(^{160}\) Thus, it is safe to conclude that what is called ‘courage’ is just that, i.e. willingness to face death.\(^{161}\)

If these suggestions are correct, then we can understand why Socrates ascribes what is called ‘courage’ and what is called ‘temperance’ to philosophers. The philosopher

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\(^{160}\) Indeed, the typical common Greek notion of courage was limited not only to facing death, but specifically facing death in military contexts (see *Nicomachean Ethics* Book III chapter 6).

\(^{161}\) Rowe 1993: 146-147 concludes that what is called ‘courage’ is fearlessness in general (cf. Hackforth 1955: 57). However, for non-philosophers, at any rate, what is called ‘courage’ is the result of a calculation. But, it is not clear how fearlessness could be the result of any calculation. Indeed, the very notion of a calculation indicates that there are fears on both sides, but that one fear outweighs the other. And, even though one fear is outweighed, it persists.
willingly faces death because she not only does not see it as an evil, she has lived a life preparing for it.\textsuperscript{162} However, some non-philosophers face death, too.\textsuperscript{163} This is why Socrates does not claim that what is called ‘courage’ belongs only to the philosopher. Rather, it belongs most (\(\mu\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\)) to the philosopher, presumably because the philosopher acts courageously more consistently than non-philosopher (who will only do it if the calculation comes out) and the philosopher does it most willingly, as non-philosophers face death but would prefer not to do so. But, whereas what is called ‘courage’ belongs most to the philosopher, what is called ‘temperance’ belongs only (\(\mu\omega\nu\omicron\zeta\)) to the philosopher. This, of course, makes sense because although the apparently virtuous non-philosopher does not get swept off her feet by passions, she does not treat them with disdain and orderliness, as only the philosopher truly does.

\textsuperscript{162} There is a question about whether or not the philosopher fears death when acting courageously (see Gosling and Taylor 1982, and Weiss 1989). Indeed, this has caused much consternation among commentators, because if the philosopher does fear death, then it seems that like the non-philosopher, she is engaged in an exchange of one fear for another. But, there seems to be good textual reason to think that the philosopher does not fear death at all, as she has been preparing for it. On my understanding of virtue in the dialogue, these difficulties dissolve. For, on my reading, the philosopher does not fear death, as the only thing she values is wisdom. This, however, does engender a puzzle about why the philosopher would bother acting courageously. I think there are two reasons. First, as I argued in the conclusion of Chapter One, so long as the philosopher has beliefs about the Form of Courage, she would see that acting contrary to courage would be acting contrary to wisdom, which she values, and so would not do so. Second, from a practical standpoint, if a philosopher did not act courageously, she would risk allowing her city to be taken over and being captured and enslaved, either of which would make it more difficult to continue pursuing wisdom.

\textsuperscript{163} It is not clear what it is the non-philosophers fear more than death so that they face death willingly. It seems that the obvious possibility is that the shame of not acting courageously. However, it is befitting of a genuinely virtuous person to fear acting shamefully. So, perhaps what the non-philosopher fears is the negative social consequences of acting shamefully, rather than actually acting shamefully. This fits nicely with the possibility that apparent courage is the virtue of honor lovers (and apparent temperance is the virtue of money lovers). Still, if most people believe that the soul ceases to exist after death, then it is not clear how they could calculate that they should face death, for death would put an end to any future pleasure, even if that pleasure was dampened by shame. Perhaps there are some cases where not facing death would mean a lifetime (however short) of extreme pain. But, this does not seem that it could account for all or even most non-philosophers’ courageous actions. Thus, there must be another way to explain the calculation that results in a non-philosopher facing death. I suspect that the explanation is that the calculation takes into account how likely each outcome is. So, even if death is very fearful, as long as it seems unlikely enough compared to the likelihood of pain from not facing death, then the numbers would prescribe facing death, and hence, acting courageously. For a different explanation, see Beere 2011: 81-82.
But now the question arises, why are these merely what is called ‘virtue,’ not simply virtue? I suspect the problem is that they reflect a superficial understanding of what virtue really is. In particular, just as we see Socrates’ interlocutors do in so many discussions in other dialogues, non-philosophers here (are reported to) conceive of virtues in terms that emphasize actions—facing death and not getting swept away by passions. Thus, non-philosophers think that courage *just is* facing death willingly, and that temperance *just is* not getting swept away by passions.164 But, this is not a complete understanding of what these virtues are.165 And, in the Right Exchange we get further insight into what the problem is with these superficial characterizations of virtues: they disregard the motivations for acting.166

We are now in a position to diagnose the various ways that non-philosophers go wrong regarding virtue. First, they mistake what virtue really is. And, although what they call ‘courage’ and ‘temperance’ (and presumably the other virtues) is not wholly off base, their understanding of what virtue is is incomplete and thus mistaken.167 Second, they do not have genuine virtue, but instead merely apparent virtue. This shortcoming, in turn,

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164 Annas 1978: 445 makes a similar point about justice, putting the issue in terms of act-centeredness vs. agent-centeredness. Of course, it is likely that if pressed most non-philosophers would be able to go beyond actions and claim that virtues are states of the soul. But, surely they would not agree that the motivation for wisdom is what makes an action virtuous. After all, non-philosophers believe that philosophers might as well be dead.

165 In fact, we occasionally see Socrates adopting this conventional conception of virtue (e.g., *Meno* 88a5-bc1 and *Euthydemus* 278e2-282a5) that does not include wisdom.

166 Beere 2011: 280 thinks that non-philosophers do recognize the necessity of acting for the right reason in virtue (they simply fail to do it). I think the concept of virtue that Plato ascribes to them here, though, is comparable to the conception implicit in Protagoras’ ‘Great Speech’ (*Protagoras* 320c6-328d2) according to which virtue concerns only actions and not motivations. Indeed, as we shall see, there are significant similarities between the non-philosopher’s view of virtue in the *Phaedo* and Protagoras’ view of virtue. At any rate, even if Beere is correct, I am not convinced that non-philosophers would not believe someone to be genuinely temperate if she abstained from another drink tonight only in order to avoid a headache tomorrow.

167 Gallop 1975: 99 suggests that virtue terms are misapplied by non-philosophers. Insofar as they do not refer to a psychological condition, this is correct. But, the many do seem to track reliably (even if not infallibly) which actions are virtuous and which are not.
has two problems of its own. One is that even when non-philosophers act virtuously, they do not have the proper motivation for acting. Instead of acting for the sake of wisdom, they act for the sake of bodily pleasure. The other (which follows from the first) is that their apparent virtue is unstable. For, although non-philosophers with apparent virtue do perform virtuous actions, this is merely accidental, resulting from their calculation rather than from a proper motivation. Thus, in circumstances where the calculation does not favor acting virtuously, the non-philosopher will not act virtuously. Hence, although it appears that they have genuine virtue, what they have is merely apparent virtue.

Before turning to Socrates’ discussion of political virtue, there are two final observations worth making. First, given that, as I have claimed, apparent virtue is hedonistic, non-philosophers are not only mistaken about what virtue is, but they seem to have an incoherent attitude about it. For they call virtue one thing, albeit mistakenly, but their actions and motivations, insofar as they stake out bodily pleasure as the only value, commit them to it being something else. That is, they seem to think that there is some standard of virtue aside from pleasure—they think that courage is facing death willingly and temperance is not getting swept away by passions—but their actions betray

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168 We could frame this problem in a way that is independent of my interpretation of virtue in the dialogue. Instead of criticizing them for failing to act for the sake of wisdom, non-philosophers could also be criticized because they do not act for the sake of virtue and wisdom.

169 See Vasiliou 2012: 18

170 See, for instance, the example of Gyges’ ring in the Republic.

171 Kraut 2010: 55 claims that non-philosophers have conflicting beliefs about virtue, but thinks that one of the beliefs is that virtue is valuable in itself. However, there appears to be no evidence here, and I shall argue no evidence in the passage about political virtue, that this is the case. In fact, all evidence in the dialogue suggests that if a non-philosopher reflected and then answered honestly, she would have to admit that she believes virtuous action is only valuable when it increases bodily pleasure.

172 This, it seems to me, is precisely what we see at the end of the Protagoras, where the many are committed to hedonism but also believe that a person can act against her better judgment.

173 Exactly what this standard is, or how non-philosophers think about it, is not clear. I will tentatively suggest that Plato thinks that people simply have certain intuitions about virtues. See Annas 1978: 446, 450.
a commitment to hedonism, and hence, take bodily pleasure as the only standard of value.

Second, the characterization of apparent virtue anticipates the recollection argument in certain relevant aspects. In the recollection argument we see that sticks and stones at the same time participate in both in equality and inequality. So too, in Socrates’ Defense we see an action performed from apparent virtue participates in virtue and in its opposite. For instance, an apparently temperate action participates in both temperance (because it is a temperate action) and intemperance (because it is an intemperate action).

1.2 Political virtue

The topic of political virtue comes up in the Reprise shortly after the Affinity Argument. As we saw in Chapter One, in this passage Socrates returns to the themes set out in his defense, arguing for the superiority of philosophy, though this time by considering the fate of souls after corporeal death. Here I will begin with a summary of the context of his comments before setting out what he says about political virtue.

According to Socrates, unlike the souls of philosophers, which join the gods after corporeal death, the souls of inferior people (81d5, τὰ τῶν φαύλων) do not leave the body pure and they also ultimately return to the corporeal world in a new body. Socrates outlines three general types of corporeal destinations for inferior souls. Since the third destination belongs to those with political virtue, which I will elaborate on below, here I will only mention the first two. The first two destinations, then, are gluttonous animals for people who practiced gluttony, lust, and drunkenness, and vicious animals for people who practiced injustice, tyranny, and theft. Although he does not say it, it is not a stretch to think that the gluttonous animals are preferable to the vicious as far as a destination for
souls. For, not only are the human characters who end up in these animals considered most ignoble by Plato, these animals are also considered violent and ruthless by Greeks, as opposed to the indulgent but harmless gluttonous animals. At any rate, it is at this point that Socrates brings up political virtue and the re-embodied destinations of those who possess it. His portrayal goes as follows (Grube translation with modifications):

The happiest of these [non-philosophers], who will also have the best destination, are those who have practiced popular and political virtue (οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες), which they call temperance and justice (ἡν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην) and which are developed by habit and practice and without philosophy or intellect (ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυίαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ). How are they the happiest?

Because it is likely that they will again join a social and gentle group either of bees or wasps or ants, and then again the same kind of human group, and so be moderate (μέτριος) people.

That is likely.

No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lovers of learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from bodily passions, master them, and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority, i.e., money lovers fear, nor for fear of dishonor or ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honors, that they keep away from them.

See for instance the discussions of tyrants in the Gorgias and the Republic.

For general discussion of these animals, see Aristotle’s History of Animals. See Lonsdale 1979: 150-152 for a specific discussion of attitudes toward wolves and wild dogs. There are ample literary examples confirming my hypothesis. For instance, in the Birds Aristophanes depicts the concern that a kite might steal a goat. In the Iliad we see the Myrmidons negatively compared to ravenous and furious wolves taking down a stag, as well as an ass that escapes to indulge in a field and cannot be dragged away even with violence. Finally, in the Anabasis Xenophon portrays them as the standard of wantonness and insolence.
The next two sections of this chapter are devoted to investigating the relationship between political virtue and apparent virtue. But before I turn to this investigation, I want to draw out a few points about this passage that will guide our discussion. First, Socrates says people with political virtue are the happiest (εὐδαιμονέστατοι) of non-philosophers and that they will have the best destination. Thus, not only will they have the best experience of non-philosophers after death, it seems that their political virtue provides for them the best life possible for non-philosophers. Second, Socrates says that people call political virtue ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’ (ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην). Thus, the names ‘temperance’ and ‘justice,’ as employed by non-philosophers refer to political virtue. Socrates, however, does not say that the many call these virtues ‘political virtue.’ But, we can see that political virtue is comprised of what non-philosophers call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice.’ Third, there is a gap between what non-philosophers call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’ and what in fact constitutes these virtues. Indeed, this is borne out by Socrates’ subsequent claim that these two traits, whatever they are, come about from habit and practice, and without philosophy and intellect (ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονοῦσιν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ). Thus, these psychological states are developed, and so presumably settle into the soul, absent the relevant cognitive aspect(s) required for genuine virtue. This point sheds important light on how not to categorize political virtue. For, it cannot be the case that political virtue is a species of genuine virtue, consisting of genuine temperance and genuine justice. Instead, political virtue is a deficient form of virtue. Finally, this passage ends with Socrates contrasting the motivations of the philosopher for mastering bodily passion with the motivations of

176 Further evidence for this is that philosophers alone have genuine temperance and genuine justice, but political virtue belongs to non-philosophers.
non-philosophers. Philosophers keep away from bodily passions, master them, and do not surrender to them because they know that the soul must be pure when it leaves the body. Non-philosophers, on the other hand, seem to fall into one of two groups with motivations that correspond to their characters. One group of non-philosophers, money lovers,\textsuperscript{177} avoids bodily passions (when they do) for fear of wasting their money, while the other group, the honor-lovers, does so for fear of dishonor and bad reputation. Given the way he talks here, there can be little doubt that Socrates is discussing acting temperately. However, it is less than clear whether he is here still thinking about political virtue or has reverted to the topic of apparent temperance, or whether he thinks political virtue and apparent virtue are the same, and hence, he is thinking about both. So, I want to turn now to this investigation.

\textbf{2. The case for the distinction}

I will now consider the relationship between apparent virtue and political virtue. This discussion will span the next two sections. In the present section I will consider the possibility that apparent virtue and political virtue are distinct. In order to do so I will examine evidence that they are different psychological conditions. Furthermore, I will set out a recent characterization of political virtue in the dialogue, according to which it is distinct from the hedonism of apparent virtue. In the next section I will give reason to doubt the evidence that favors distinguishing apparent virtue and political virtue, as well

\textsuperscript{177} Socrates says “the many \textit{kai} money-lovers,” which may suggest that these are two distinct groups. But, he is best understood as describing the many as body lovers, which suggests an epexegetical use of \textit{kai} reflected in my translation. A close alternative is that Socrates is saying “the many who are money lovers,” which leaves open that some of the many are money lovers and some of the many are honor lovers.
as provide evidence that political virtue is a species of, and so not distinct from, apparent virtue.

2.1 Evidence in favor of the distinction

I will begin by considering evidence from within the Phaedo itself that supports distinguishing political virtue from apparent virtue. Then I will consider evidence from the Republic that suggests that these are distinct conditions.

Based on what we have seen above, there are several reasons to think that apparent virtue differs from political virtue in the Phaedo. First, Socrates seems to evaluate apparent virtue differently than he does political virtue.\(^\text{178}\) Whereas Socrates disparages apparent virtue, criticizing it as slavish (ἀνδραποδόδης, 69b6), he seems to esteem political virtue, saying that those who possess it will be the happiest of the non-philosophers and that they will enjoy the best fates after death. Thus, given these apparently very different appraisals, it seems that Socrates must think apparent virtue and political virtue are different states.

Another reason is that based on what Socrates says, apparent virtue and political virtue seem to differ in terms of their origin. In particular, Socrates says that political virtue comes from habit. He does not indicate how one comes to possess apparent virtue—whether it is through habit, education, or something else (perhaps nature per the first line of the Meno)—but he does say that at least in the cases of apparent courage and temperance, they come through their opposites. So, perhaps rather than coming through habit, it is best to say that apparent virtues come from vices. But, this simply pushes the question back, as now the issue becomes trying to determine the origin of this vice. And,

\(^\text{178}\) See Vasiliou 2012: 17-18.
unfortunately, the text does not seem to furnish an answer to this question. At any rate, we can confidently say that political virtue is acquired by habit, but we cannot say the same about apparent virtue. So, it is possible that these states have different origins.

Furthermore, apparent virtue might not even be the sort of state that is acquired. For instance, since it amounts to trading bodily experiences for other bodily experiences, it may be the default state, such that it is what we begin with and maintain, unless we acquire some other condition, like political virtue.

Because Socrates says that political virtue comes from habit and practice but not philosophy, some commentators conclude that it must consist in true beliefs about the intrinsic value of virtue.\textsuperscript{179} The thinking here is that what is habituated are true, stable beliefs about virtue (in contrast, perhaps, to knowledge about virtue engendered by philosophy). If this interpretation is correct, then this constitutes a third, and decisive, difference between political virtue and apparent virtue. Although apparent virtue allows someone to act virtuously, it is not stable, and does not seem to consist in beliefs about virtue itself.\textsuperscript{180} But, on this view, political virtue does involve true and stable beliefs about virtue, which then motivate the politically virtuous agent to act in accordance with these beliefs, and so, act virtuously.

There is, however, no indication in the \textit{Phaedo} that people with political virtue have any beliefs about virtue, stable, true, or otherwise. But, if we leave the \textit{Phaedo} and turn to the \textit{Republic}, we find evidence for this very view. In the \textit{Republic} at 429b4-430c4, as part of a larger attempt to identify the virtues in a city, Socrates and Glaucon discuss

\textsuperscript{179} See Kraut 2010: 56.
\textsuperscript{180} The hedonic calculation of apparent virtue will issue in true beliefs about what is virtuous in a situation. So, perhaps it results in true beliefs about what actions are virtuous (whether or not these are beliefs about the actions \textit{as} virtuous). But, as I shall discuss in the final section of this chapter, it is not about the intrinsic value of virtue.
the definition of courage. According to Socrates’ view, courage is a power of
preservation of the belief about what should be feared and not abandoning it in the face of
pains, pleasures, desires, or fears (430b1-2). Furthermore, courage preserves a correct
(ὀρθῆς) belief that is inculcated by laws (νομίμου). Importantly for our purposes,
Socrates says that this is a definition of political courage (πολιτικήν γε, 430c4). Thus, it
seems that Socrates is here evoking the same distinction between political virtue and
genuine virtue he stakes out in the Reprise. And, since political virtue as discussed here
in the Republic seems to consist in true, stable beliefs about virtue, there is reason to
think that this is also the case in the Phaedo. And, if this is the case, and political virtue
consists in true beliefs about virtue, then it must be distinct from apparent virtue.

This Republic passage provides further, even more direct evidence that political
virtue is distinct from apparent virtue in the Phaedo. For, in this passage Glaucon, with
the approval of Socrates, contrasts political courage with a state that consists in correct
beliefs about what is to be feared but that does not come from education and has nothing
to do with the law. Importantly for our purposes, Glaucon says that this state is found in
animals and slavish people (ἀνδραπoδoδη). Of course, at the end of the Right Exchange
passage Socrates criticizes apparent virtue as slavish (ἀνδραπoδoδης, 69b6). Thus, it
seems that Plato has the same state in mind in both passages, namely, apparent virtue.\(^{181}\)
The upshot of this is the following. In the Republic Plato distinguishes between what he
there calls ‘political courage’ and slavish courage. Generalizing from courage to virtue, in
the Republic there is a distinction between political virtue and slavish virtue. And, since
Plato discusses political virtue and apparent, that is, slavish virtue, in the Phaedo, and

indeed employs similar language in both dialogues, there is reason to think that he likewise distinguishes them in the *Phaedo*.

### 2.2 A characterization of political virtue

In light of the evidence canvassed above, it seems plausible that apparent virtue and political virtue are distinct. But, if political virtue is not apparent virtue, and so not hedonistic, what is it? Above we saw a promising initial characterization when we considered the view that political virtue might involve true belief—as opposed to the knowledge—about virtue. Indeed, Iakovos Vasiliou has recently made the case for this interpretation of political virtue. Accordingly, we should now turn to how he characterizes political virtue as distinct from apparent virtue, and, of course, genuine virtue.

On Vasiliou’s reading the person with political virtue intends to perform the virtuous action, conceiving of it as virtuous. However, this person does not have wisdom—only the person with genuine virtue has wisdom—but instead has mere belief.\(^{182}\) Although they do not amount to wisdom, because the politically virtuous agent’s beliefs are the result of habit, they are set firmly in her soul. So, this person acts virtuously based on her stable beliefs about virtue. In contrast, although the person with apparent virtue in fact performs the virtuous action, she only does so accidentally. This is because, as we know, the person with apparent virtue is aiming at maximizing pleasure or minimizing pain, not at acting virtuously. It is for this reason, according Vasiliou, that

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Socrates likens apparent virtue to an image (σκιαγραφία), or more literally “shadow painting” (18).183

In addition to distinguishing it from apparent virtue in this way, Vasiliou further classifies political virtue into two kinds (13). On the one hand there is political virtue that consists in beliefs that are habituated in an agent about what is considered virtuous in her city (but which may not actually be virtuous). Thus, this person may or may not have correct beliefs about what virtue is, or what in any given case is the genuinely virtuous action. Nonetheless, when she acts, she acts because she conceives of her action as virtuous. Call this ‘inferior political virtue.’ On the other hand, there is political virtue that is the result of a proper education in a good city, and hence, the possessor will have true habituated beliefs about genuine virtue. According to Vasiliou, we find this latter form of political virtue—call it ‘superior political virtue’—in the Republic, where citizens are raised and educated by laws set up by philosopher rulers who can inculcate true beliefs about virtue (15-16).184

There is a significant upshot from Vasiliou’s distinction between inferior and superior political virtue. Given that the former does not require any true beliefs about virtue, on Vasiliou’s view political virtue is not characterized by true beliefs about virtue. Instead, the common thread binding both types of political virtue is that they are characterized by the intention to perform the virtuous action.185

Vasiliou’s distinction between inferior and superior political virtue is attractive, as it seems intuitively correct that an agent’s intentions should count morally, so that one is

183 Compare with Kraut 2010: 56 who holds that this term indicates just the opposite, namely, that it is not wholly illusory, but only superficial.
184 For his discussion of political virtue in the Republic see Vasiliou 2008, especially 8.2 and 8.3.
185 Kraut 2010: 54-55 also emphasizes the importance of motivation in his discussion of political and apparent virtue.
given credit for intending to do the right thing even if she is factually incorrect about what it is. More importantly, Vasiliou’s emphasis on intention reflects the relevant discussions in the dialogue, which both focus on an agent’s motivation for virtuous action, not her beliefs.

But, this distinction also leads to a difficulty for Vasiliou’s view when taken in conjunction another one of his interpretive claims about the *Phaedo*. For, Vasiliou maintains that the philosopher in the *Phaedo* does not have genuine virtue (15-16, 24). And, there are two strong reasons to think that this is correct, assuming, as Vasiliou does, that genuine virtue requires (full) wisdom. First, Socrates indicates that we can only attain the knowledge constitutive of wisdom when we are dead (67a1). Second, wisdom requires possessing an account of the Forms (76b3), and it does not seem that anyone, even Socrates, has an account of the virtue Forms (23-24). To these two reasons, Vasiliou adds a third, weaker reason. At the end of the *Phaedo* the eponymous narrator says that Socrates was the most virtuous person they had ever known. Vasiliou reads this claim as suggesting that even Socrates, the paradigmatic philosopher, did not have true virtue, as he was only the most virtuous, not fully virtuous person they had known (21-22). Hence, if Socrates does not have wisdom, no philosopher has wisdom, and so, does not have genuine virtue. But, since the philosopher does not have merely apparent virtue, she must have political virtue. So, since on Vasiliou’s view, there are two types of political virtue, it is an open question about which type the philosopher has.

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186 He distinguishes between the philosopher in the *Phaedo*, who only has political virtue, and the philosopher in the *Republic*, who does have wisdom and so genuine virtue.

187 Given this, it seems that Vasiliou thinks that in the *Phaedo* only the philosopher has political virtue. Perhaps, though, he believes that some non-philosophers have inferior political virtue in the dialogue. If not, however, then Vasiliou and I are actually in agreement that non-philosophers in the dialogue at best have merely apparent virtue.
The obvious answer to this question is that the philosopher has superior political virtue. If this is so, then, assuming that she has true beliefs about virtue, the philosopher in the *Phaedo* has the same sort of virtue as the non-philosopher citizens in the *Republic*. And, indeed, Vasiliou highlights several similarities between these groups. In particular, he maintains that both believe in but lack knowledge of the Forms. Further, he claims that both have attained their politically virtuous characters by engaging in particular practices (30). Hence, Vasiliou claims that in the *Republic* “the example of the Phd-Philosopher [i.e., the philosopher in the *Phaedo*] is now generalized to the populace of the Kallipolis” regarding habituation and engagement in a set of practices (30).

Despite these similarities, though, even on Vasiliou’s own terms there are problems with identifying the virtue of the philosopher in the *Phaedo* with the virtue of the citizen in the *Republic*. First, Vasiliou explicitly claims the type of political virtue found in the Kallipolis is due to the fact that the citizens are ruled by wise leaders (15-16). But, in the *Phaedo*, there are no such leaders, so it is not clear how philosophers would come to acquire true beliefs about virtue. In spite of the absence of philosopher rulers in the *Phaedo*, Vasiliou seems to think that the philosopher will have true beliefs about wisdom, and so superior political virtue. And, indeed, this seems fair. There is a second problem, though. For, according to Vasiliou, the philosophers in the *Phaedo*, unlike the non-philosophical citizens in the *Republic*, are engaged in a practice that is ultimately aimed at wisdom (30). Of course, this is not an insignificant difference, and is

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188 This leaves open the question of whether both forms of political virtue are present in the *Phaedo*. That is, does Vasiliou believe that non-philosophers can have inferior political virtue in the dialogue? Or, does he think that non-philosophers at best have apparent virtue?

189 Assuming, of course, that even if someone had a few true beliefs about virtue this would not qualify her for superior political virtue. For, it seems that in order to have this form of political virtue, one must have all, or at least mostly, true beliefs, and perhaps also reason to think that her beliefs about virtue are true. But, if Vasiliou allows for the philosopher in the *Phaedo* to meet these requirements, it is not clear why he thinks that they cannot have wisdom.
one that might well play a role in the sort of virtue an agent has, especially if motivation is as important in virtue as Vasiliou thinks. If this is the case, then it seems that the philosopher in the *Phaedo* does in fact have a different sort of virtue than the non-philosopher citizen in the *Republic*, be it a species of political virtue or not. But, since Vasiliou maintains that the philosopher in the *Phaedo* does not have genuine virtue, and that the citizens in the *Republic* have superior political virtue, it seems that he should think that there are three types of political virtue: inferior political virtue, superior political virtue, and, if perhaps, philosophic political virtue.

Of course, Vasiliou might want to push back and insist that the desire for and pursuit of wisdom plays no role in what sort of virtue a person possesses. Fortunately, we do not need to decide whether or not he has the resources to do so. For, as we shall now see, there are more significant problems with his interpretation of political virtue in the *Phaedo*.

### 3. Rejecting the distinction

In the previous section we saw the case for distinguishing political virtue and apparent virtue. In doing so we considered reasons to think that political virtue differs from apparent virtue. Additionally, we saw a characterization of political virtue in the *Phaedo*. Despite these reasons and this characterization, I believe that political virtue is not distinct from apparent virtue, but is instead a species of apparent virtue. In this section I will make the case for this claim. As we shall see, all of the evidence that favors distinguishing political virtue from apparent virtue is open to question. In contrast, there

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190 In Vasiliou 2008 he denies any difference between the motivations of philosophers and non-philosophers (267), suggesting he either set aside the question of motivation for wisdom, or thinks it is common among the two groups.
is very strong reason to think that in the *Phaedo* political virtue is a form of apparent virtue. Before making this argument, though, I want to consider Vasiliou’s claim that the philosopher in the *Phaedo* has political virtue.

3.1 The philosopher has genuine virtue

Below I will argue against the characterization of political virtue as distinct from apparent virtue, but I want to pause briefly to object to Vasiliou’s claim that the philosopher in the *Phaedo* has political virtue, not genuine virtue.\(^{191}\) I believe that there are two significant problems with this claim, either of which on its own would be sufficient to reject this aspect of Vasiliou’s view.

The first problem with this claim is that, as we saw in Chapter One, at 83e4 Socrates explicitly says that philosophers *are* temperate and just.\(^{192}\) This is in contrast to those with political virtue, as Socrates never says that they have temperance or justice or that they are temperate or just.\(^{193}\) To this Vasiliou might reply that at 83e4 Socrates is best understood as talking about political temperance and justice. If this were so, then his view would remain intact, and in fact this passage would support the reading that philosophers have political virtue. However, throughout the dialogue whenever Socrates does not qualify virtue terms—normally by prefacing the virtue with ‘what is called,’ but also by saying something to the effect of “the temperate among non-philosophers”—he is

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\(^{191}\) These problems apply to Vasiliou’s view whether or not he distinguishes between superior political virtue and philosophic political virtue as I discussed above.

\(^{192}\) Socrates here refers to ‘lovers of learning’ but uses this term interchangeably with ‘philosophers.’ See note 79 in Chapter One.

\(^{193}\) Recall that he says that political virtue is “what is called ‘temperance’ and ‘justice,’” which as we have seen indicates that he is not referring to the genuine virtues here.
referring to the genuine virtue. And, since Socrates does not add any qualifiers in this passage, we can conclude he is referring to genuine temperance and justice at 83d7. Hence, Socrates says that philosophers have genuine virtue, not merely political virtue as Vasiliou claims.

The second problem is that Socrates at least three times says that philosophers will be with the gods in the afterlife (69c5-d6, 82b7-c2, 114c3). Indeed, Socrates has good hope that he will be among the true philosophers who get to be with the gods after corporeal death (69d5). In contrast to the philosopher, people with political virtue do not live with the gods after corporeal death, but instead are reincarnated (82b4). Thus, Socrates must think that the philosophers of the *Phaedo* do not merely have political virtue, for otherwise he would think that they are reincarnated and do not join the gods after death. Hence, the philosopher must have genuine virtue.

3.2 Objecting to evidence for the distinction

We have just seen good reason to resist Vasiliou’s contention that in the *Phaedo* the philosopher has political virtue rather than genuine virtue. Of course, this aspect of Vasiliou’s view can float freely from the claim that political virtue is distinct from apparent virtue. Here I want to argue against this latter and more basic claim. First, I will object to the reasons considered above in favor of distinguishing the two states. Second, I will provide positive reason to think that political virtue is a form of apparent virtue.

I shall begin by considering those reasons internal to the dialogue for thinking that apparent virtue is distinct from political virtue. Recall that the first reason was that

\footnote{He does sometimes add ‘real’ (ἀληθής) when referring to genuine virtue, as at 69b3, but does not always do so, as at 69b7.}
whereas Socrates seems to disparage apparent virtue, referring to it as an image of true virtue, and saying that it is fit for a slave, he seems positive about political virtue, saying that its possessors are the happiest of non-philosophers.\(^{195}\) The brief but effective objection to this as evidence is to point out that these different evaluations are consistent with one another.\(^ {196}\) That is, Socrates can surely at the same time hold that some person has a condition that is fit for a slave and that that person is the happiest of all non-philosophers. Indeed, in the context of the Right Exchange, Socrates says that apparent virtue is fit for a slave and is an image of true virtue to highlight and stress the value of genuine virtue. In the Reprise, though, the initial contrast is not between deficient virtue and genuine virtue but is between non-philosophers with deficient virtue and non-philosophers who lack it. That is, in the Reprise Socrates’ point is that given the pitiful state of non-philosophers, those with apparent virtue—lacking in value as it does compared to genuine virtue—are still in a better condition than those who lack it.\(^ {197}\) And, it is well worth pointing out that Socrates does not say that people with political virtue are happy, which would be a real indication that he thinks that political virtue is properly valuable. Rather, he says that they are the happiest (εὐδαιμονέστατοι) of non-philosophers. Although this may seem to indicate that they are happy, it does not. In Greek as well as in English, the claim that someone is the happiest member of some group is consistent with that person being unhappy. And, given that Socrates a bit earlier claims that a person can only be happy when she is with the divine, immortal, and wise

\(^ {195}\) It is worth pointing out that Kraut 2010: 56 does not take Socrates’ use of ‘σκιαγραφία’ to be as strong a condemnation as most commentators do. Instead, Kraut interprets it to suggest a “thin” and “underdeveloped” understanding of virtue.  
\(^ {196}\) Indeed, Kraut 2010 thinks that both passages are about the same psychological condition, but seems also to think that they present it in different lights. 
\(^ {197}\) On Socrates’ own terms this makes sense, as people with apparent virtue are the least likely of non-philosophers to act viciously.
(81a4), people with political virtue are not happy, in life or in the afterlife. So, all Socrates is saying when he calls those with political virtue the happiest of non-philosophers is that given the miserable condition of other non-philosophers, those with political virtue are the happiest, at least by being the least miserable. Again, this is all consistent with this condition being fit for a slave, as given that humans are capable of genuine virtue, anything short of it is not worthy of them.

The second reason considered above for distinguishing political virtue from apparent virtue was that Socrates indicates that the former arises from practice and habit but he does not indicate that this is so for the latter. This perhaps suggests two different origins, which would seem to require two different states. Of course, such an inference is not warranted, as there could a single state that is the result of two different processes in different people. For instance, some people might be naturally disposed to having a low resting heart rate, while others have to train extensively to attain one. Or, for a more Platonic example, in Book VI of the Republic Socrates indicates that there are two ways for someone naturally inclined to philosophy to become philosophical, guidance from philosophical rulers in a well-ordered state, and divine dispensation (492e5-7).

But, even if we grant the inference that two different origins indicates two different psychological states, there is still reason to doubt that apparent virtue and political virtue are distinct. For, Socrates never actually says what the origin of apparent virtue is. Thus, given what Socrates says, it could be the case that apparent virtue also

198 Thus, I think that Kraut 2010: 54-55 overstates the case in writing that those with political virtue are not only praiseworthy for their virtuous actions, but because of their virtuous intentions. There is nothing in the text that suggests that they have such motivations, and indeed, textual evidence suggests that they perform virtuous actions aiming at pleasure and avoiding pain. And, although Kraut is correct to point out that Socrates does not think that most people are exceedingly vicious, this does not require that Socrates believe that most people have virtuous motivations. It can be enough that they perform virtuous actions. And, indeed, it is the actions—both good and bad—for which souls are rewarded and punished in the afterlife (113e1).
arises from habit and practice. And, if this were the case, there would be no difference in origin for apparent virtue and political virtue, re-opening the possibility that they are the same.

Indeed, a bit of reflection upon what apparent virtue is suggests that it is plausible that it *does* come from habit and practice. To see this, recall what apparent virtue is: it is the exchange of pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, and fears for fears. But now consider what a successful exchange of, for instance, pleasures for pleasures would require. Surely it requires that the person give up certain pleasures in exchange for others. But, an exchange of pleasures need not require that both pleasures are present to the person. That is to say, although one of the pleasures involved in the exchange might be present, the other pleasure might be in the future. Furthermore, recall that the person with apparent virtue does act virtuously—the person with apparent courage faces death, and the person with apparent temperance resists her appetites. Of course, they act on account of other fears and other pleasures, but they still act virtuously. And, not everyone does. After all, Socrates makes a point of saying “the courageous among non-philosophers” and “the temperate among non-philosophers,” which indicates that not all non-philosophers have apparent courage or apparent temperance. Thus, while some non-philosophers do exchange pleasures for other pleasures, others, perhaps most, do not.199 What could explain the difference? For instance, as body lovers, the person with apparent temperance and the person who lacks it both desire and value bodily pleasure. So, their

199 Bobonich 2002: 485 incorrectly claims all non-philosophers engage in the wrong exchange, and that this is sufficient for apparent virtue. This results in the absurd conclusion that all non-philosophers have apparent virtue. Of course, in a sense even non-philosophers without apparent virtue give up certain pleasures by indulging in other pleasures. But they do not *exchange* (καταλλάσσω) any pleasures, as an exchange requires that one has the pleasures in hand and then trades them away, rather than simply losing out on them (cf. Bailly 2011: 296). Thus, all non-philosophers trade in bodily pleasures, but not all exchange them.
ultimate desires and valuations cannot be the difference. But, for some reason the person who lacks apparent temperance does not make the exchange for the greater pleasure.

And, the most likely explanation for this is that she gives in to the present pleasure. So, the person with apparent temperance does not give in to the present pleasure, but instead successfully exchanges it for a greater pleasure, presumably one in the future.

Importantly for our purposes, this must be the sort of ability that one has to develop and train. And, since not every non-philosopher has it, and it does not come from wisdom, this ability to resist present pleasure, and so engage in a successful—albeit wrongheaded—exchange of pleasures, that is, to have apparent virtue, must come from practice and habit. Hence, a proper understanding of apparent virtue suggests that like political virtue, it comes from habit and practice.

The final reasons for distinguishing apparent and political virtue considered above came not from the *Phaedo* itself, but from the *Republic*. As we saw, the *Republic* seems to provide evidence that political virtue consists in true beliefs about the value of virtue. And, because the *Republic* distinguishes between political courage and slavish courage—indeed, describing it in the same way as apparent virtue in the *Phaedo* (“ἀνδραποδώδης”)—it seems to provide conclusive evidence that political virtue is distinct from apparent virtue in the *Phaedo*. Indeed, I believe that this passage from the *Republic* constitutes the most persuasive evidence to think that political virtue is distinct

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200 In the *Protagoras* Plato describes the phenomenon, diagnosing the problem as a failure of measurement. In keeping with this, we might want to say that what happens here is that she wrongly believes that the present pleasure is greater than the future pain.

201 Perhaps some people have it naturally, but at the very least, it is the sort of condition that can be developed through practice and habit. Indeed, although Protagoras argues in his great speech that virtue can be taught, his notion of ‘teaching’ seems much closer to inculcation through practice and habit, rather than anything straightforwardly cognitive. See Barney 2005: 120.

202 This does not undermine the claim that the apparent virtues also come from vices. The ability to engage in a profitable exchange of bodily pleasures might come from habit, but that does not mean that it also is not still vicious.
from apparent virtue in the *Phaedo*. However, as I shall now argue, if properly understood, this passage does not in fact warrant this conclusion.

It should be clear that in order to undermine the support that the *Republic* passage is supposed to afford, all that I need to do is show that it is not about political virtue or apparent virtue as discussed in the *Phaedo*. That is to say, I do not need to deny that political virtue in the *Republic* is constituted by true beliefs about virtue. Still, I do think that there is reason to doubt that in the *Republic* political courage consists (only) in true belief about courage. This is because what Socrates says in this passage is that courage is the power to preserve true belief about what one should fear and not fear (τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν τε πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἔγραψε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, 430b1-2) That is, courage is what allows the belief to stay in place in the face of pains, pleasures, desires, or fears. Thus, based solely on what Socrates says here, political courage does not appear to be belief itself (about, presumably the Form of courage) but it is instead something else that preserves belief. Of course, a politically courageous person would have to possess true beliefs, since true beliefs must be present for there to be some power that maintains true belief. But, it does not seem that here political courage strictly speaking is true belief. Thus, if this is so, then the *Republic* passage does not support the interpretation that holds that in the *Phaedo* political virtue is true belief about virtue.

Of course, the fact that Socrates calls courage a ‘power’ of preservation of true belief is consistent with political courage being some sort of true belief about courage. After all, it could be that what preserves the belief is something about the belief. For

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203 But notice there is no reason to think that these beliefs are about courage. Instead, they appear simply to be beliefs about what sorts of things to fear. Thus, someone could learn what to fear without ever being taught anything at all about the Forms.
instance, the belief may be inculcated in such a way that by its very nature it is preserved, so that there is a sense in which political courage really is true belief. Fortunately, I do not need to stake my claim on this, as there is a more decisive reason to deny that this passage should determine how we understand the relationship between political virtue and apparent virtue in the *Phaedo*.²⁰⁴

In short, despite employing the same vocabulary, it is not clear that the *Republic* passage is about the same states that we find in the *Phaedo*. Indeed, there is good reason to doubt that the relevant passages in both dialogues are concerned with the same states.²⁰⁵ Let’s begin with the condition that Glaucon in the *Republic* calls ‘slavish.’ Although Socrates does apply the same term—‘ἀνδραποδώδης’—to apparent virtue in the *Phaedo*, there is reason to think the conditions to which this term applies are not the same. As we know, apparent virtue in the *Phaedo* is characterized by exchanging bodily pleasures and pains for other bodily pleasures and pains. However, there is no indication, aside from the term ‘slavish,’ that Plato is referring to the same sort of state in the *Republic* passage. The sort of courage mentioned in the *Republic* is instead characterized by a lack of education, in contrast with political courage, which is inculcated through education and the law.²⁰⁶ Thus, for all Plato writes in the *Republic* passage, he may be referring to a sort of rashness. Evidence in support of this suggestion can be found in what else Plato writes about this sort courage that we seem to find in the passage in the *Republic*. For, in addition to saying that it is slavish, Glaucon also compares it to the

²⁰⁴ For a discussion of political courage in the *Republic* see Wilberding 2009.

²⁰⁵ Alternatively, even if they are the same states, Plato has either changed his view of these states, or is presenting them in such a different way, that the *Republic* passage cannot inform us about these states as presented in the *Phaedo*. See Archer-Hind 1883: Appendix I, where he distinguishes between two types of political virtue in Plato’s corpus, and argues that what we find in the *Phaedo* is apparent virtue.

²⁰⁶ See Kamtekar 1998: 5 for the same point. Although we ultimately agree that slavish courage in the *Republic* differs from the hedonic-based slavish courage in the *Phaedo*, Kamtekar takes the *Republic* version to be the result of fear of punishment, rather than rashness as I suggest.
courage you find in animals (θηριώδη). Such a description is notably absent from the Phaedo passage. But, it is present elsewhere in the corpus, namely in the Laches. At 197b Nicias distinguishes between courage and rashness (θρασύτης). For our purposes it is significant that Nicias says that the latter is had by animals (as well as by children) and that most people mistake it for courage. Importantly, he does not appear to be ascribing to animals the hedonic calculus characteristic of apparent virtue. More importantly, the very idea of rashness, which is characterized by haste and a lack of consideration, runs contrary to any sort of hedonic calculus, which requires one to delay before deciding which available action to perform. Instead, Nicias identifies this condition not as aiming at pleasure but as lacking sense (ἄνοια). This is similar to what Glaucon says in the Republic, as he is talking about a condition mistaken for courage that comes about without learning. Accordingly, although all three passages—the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Laches passages—discuss something that is mistaken for courage, it seems like the Phaedo discussion of apparent courage is the odd man out, differing as it does from the other two.

If the foregoing is correct, then we have reason to doubt that the state referred to as ‘slavish’ in the Republic is the same state as apparent courage in the Phaedo, even

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Moreover, actions like facing death in order to protect cubs, which are popularly attributed to lions—one of the animals mentioned in the Laches discussion (196e3)—are not typically considered hedonistic. See also Symposium 207a5–c1 where animals are described as acting for the sake of love, willing to die and face starvation for their offspring. Of course, according to the Phaedo people with apparent courage do face death, but as we have seen, it is not entirely clear what their thought process is in these situations.

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Thus, for this same reason, although in the Laches Nicias reports that the many call rashness ‘courage’ (197b3), it seems that this cannot be the same as what is called ‘courage’ in the Phaedo. What is called ‘courage’ in the Phaedo applies to those with apparent courage. But, apparent courage is the result of a calculation. And, it does not seem that rashness could be the result of a calculation.

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Glaucon claims that he is sure that Socrates does not make this mistake, which implies that others do. Plato’s view need not be inconsistent across the three passages, as the mistake may well lie with the many who have an incorrect and inconsistent conception of courage.
though both are in some way slavish\textsuperscript{211} and could be mistaken for genuine courage. Hence, we have reason to doubt that this passage of the Republic draws the same contrast between apparent virtue and political virtue found in the Phaedo. But, this still leaves the possibility that the notion of political courage from this passage of the Republic is the same as the notion of political virtue in the Phaedo. And, if this were the case, then there would be reason to think that in the Phaedo Plato distinguishes between political virtue and apparent virtue. For, on this suggestion political virtue in the Phaedo would be the same as political virtue in the Republic. And, since political virtue in the Republic is surely not the same as apparent virtue in the Phaedo\textsuperscript{212}, it would follow that political virtue in the Phaedo is not the same as apparent virtue. However, I think there is good reason to doubt that political courage in the Republic passage maps onto political virtue in the Phaedo.

One reason is that political virtue is inculcated in importantly different ways in the Republic and in the Phaedo. As we have seen, in the Republic political courage is the result of education (παιδεία). But, in the Phaedo political virtue is the result of habit and practice (ἐξέθους τε καὶ μελέτης) without understanding (ἀνευ νοῦ).\textsuperscript{213} Thus, whereas political courage in the Republic necessarily has a cognitive element, this is not the case

\textsuperscript{211} It is worth pointing out the based on the text in the Republic what Glaucon calls ‘slavish’ is the true belief, not courage. And, we know from the Meno (97e2) that true beliefs that are not tied down are liable to run away, like slaves. If this is what Glaucon has in mind, then the contrast is between true beliefs that are stable and true beliefs that are not stable. On this reading there is no reason at all to assimilate this passage of the Republic to the Phaedo. Hence, this passage from the Republic would not constitute evidence that apparent virtue and political virtue are distinct in the Phaedo. Thanks to Dan Devereux for this suggestion.

\textsuperscript{212} Cf. Barney 2005: 120.

\textsuperscript{213} In the Myth of Er at the end of the Republic Socrates does mention people who “participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy” (619d1). Vasiliou 2012: 9 takes this to be the same sort of state as referred to as ‘political courage’ at 430b. However, given that in the Myth of Er these people participate in virtue through habit, it seems more likely that they are the people with political virtue in the Phaedo (cf. Barney 2005: 120). Hence, I disagree with Broadie 2005: 100 that the people mentioned in this bit of the myth of Er are genuinely virtuous.
with political virtue in the *Phaedo*, which suggests that they are different psychological conditions.\(^{214}\)

Another reason is that there does not seem to be any room for political courage in the *Phaedo*, as political virtue seems to be exhausted by what is called ‘temperance’ and ‘justice.’ Socrates says, “[t]he happiest of these [non-philosophers]… are those who have practiced popular and political virtue, which they call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’” (82b1). Thus, he seems to restrict political virtue, in this context at any rate, to some kind of temperance and some kind of justice. So, there does not appear to be the possibility of political courage in the *Phaedo*, which suggests that the *Republic* passage is about some other sort of state, albeit with a similar name.\(^{215}\)

Someone might want to push back and suggest that at Socrates’ omission of courage at *Phaedo* 82d1 does not rule out there being a form of political courage in the same way there is political temperance and justice. However, there is good evidence from elsewhere in the corpus that the term ‘political virtue’ refers only to temperance and justice.\(^{216}\) Perhaps the most striking and certainly the most extended example can be found in the *Protagoras* during Protagoras’ ‘great speech’ (320c6-328d2). Throughout

\(^{214}\) In his translation of the *Republic* Paul Shorey suggests in a note at 430b that Plato has four grades of courage, the middle two of which are political courage. Shorey maintains that the higher of the two is described in this passage, leaving open the possibility that the lower form, which is perhaps lower because it is not the result of education, is what we find in the *Phaedo*. Thanks to Dan Devereux for this suggestion.

\(^{215}\) In fact, it is possible that this passage in the *Republic* is not meant to refer to human virtue at all. Instead, in this passage Socrates may mean that he has identified the courage of the polis, as opposed to genuine courage. That is, he has identified what it is that makes a city courageous. See Kamtekar 1998: fn. 8. If this is the correct way to understand political courage in this passage of the *Republic*, then there can be no doubt that it does not match political virtue in the *Phaedo*. Thanks to Dan Devereux for this suggestion.

\(^{216}\) Hence, we would have to conclude that in the *Republic* what is glossed as ‘political courage’ does not fit in with what is meant by ‘political virtue’ in some other dialogues, at least dialogues that pre-date the *Republic*. However, it seems plausible that even in the *Republic* strictly speaking political virtue is limited to temperance and justice. At 500d5 Socrates refers to ‘temperance, justice, and the whole of δημοτικὴ τέχνη’ virtue.’ Recall that in the *Phaedo* Socrates employs the same word when identifying political virtue (“τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν”). Thus, even in the *Republic* Plato appears to limit what we have been calling ‘political virtue’ to temperance and justice. If this is correct, then we would need an alternative explanation of political courage in Book IV of the *Republic*. For a possibility, see previous note.
this speech the Sophist refers to temperance and justice as ‘political virtue,’ but never mentions courage, be it as a virtue, as a part of political virtue, or as a part of the political art. Thus, it seems that in the Protagoras political virtue is restricted to temperance and justice. Moreover, given that the Protagoras ends with Socrates and Protagoras identifying virtue with hedonic calculation, we can conclude that the same goes for political virtue discussed in his speech.217

If we turn to the end of Diotima’s speech in the Symposium we find a similar discussion. Diotima does not explicitly identify temperance and justice with political virtue, but she does characterize them as dealing with the proper ordering of cities and households (209a5), which is precisely how Protagoras identifies political virtue prior to his speech (319a1). Thus, it seems that the Protagoras and the Symposium agree regarding political virtue, in particular in identifying it with forms of temperance and justice. Moreover, at the very end of her speech, Diotima contrasts this political virtue with the genuine virtue of the philosopher.218 In fact, she implies that the political virtue of the best non-philosophers is an image of virtue (212a4, εἴδωλα ἄρετής), which, of course, is similar to what Socrates says about apparent virtue in the Right Exchange, calling it ‘σκιαγραφία’ of true virtue. Thus, in the Symposium Plato unflatteringly describes political virtue—again limited to temperance and justice—in the same way he does apparent virtue in the Phaedo.

217 As noted above (note 201), the ‘teaching’ advocated by Protagoras seems much more like training and habit-forming, which is precisely how political virtue in the Phaedo is inculcated.
218 It should not be forgotten that Socrates is reciting this speech and almost certainly is the author of it.
By investigating these two passages from other dialogues, we see that Plato—perhaps following common use—restricts political virtue to temperance and justice. Thus, this gives us reason to think that Plato is employing this same notion of political virtue in the *Phaedo*, as again he limits it to temperance and justice. This, in turn, gives us good reason to think that the discussion of political courage in the *Republic* is importantly different from the discussion of political virtue in the *Phaedo*. Hence, there is good reason to think that this passage from the *Republic* does not shed relevant light on the relationship between apparent virtue and political virtue in the *Phaedo*. Accordingly, even if we understand the *Republic* passage as contrasting political courage with a type of slavish courage, this gives us no reason to think apparent virtue differs from political virtue in the *Phaedo*. It also means that the characterization of political courage in the *Republic* is not the same as political virtue in the *Phaedo*. Moreover, by considering the passages from the *Protagoras* and *Symposium*, we have at least some reason to think that political virtue in the *Phaedo* is the same as apparent temperance and apparent justice. As I shall now argue, there is sufficient reason from within the *Phaedo* itself to draw the same conclusion.

3.3 Political virtue as apparent temperance and apparent justice

I have just argued that the evidence does not warrant distinguishing between apparent virtue and political virtue in the *Phaedo*. In this section I want to offer positive evidence that they are not distinct states. We know from the foregoing that political virtue is

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219 To these two we could also add the passage at *Republic* 500d5, which also seems to exclude courage from political virtue. See note 216 above.
restricted to some form of temperance and justice. Accordingly, I will argue that political virtue is apparent temperance and apparent justice.

One reason to think that political virtue is a species of apparent virtue is the fact that it is developed through habit and practice. As I argued above, a full understanding of apparent virtue reveals that it is the sort of state that is developed through practice and habit. And, in order to effect a successful exchange, non-philosophers must gain control over their bodily passions, and must do so through training, practice, and habit. Of course, as discussed above, the fact that two states both arise from habit and practice is not enough to conclude that these states are the same. Fortunately, there are other reasons that support my view.

A second reason, related to the first, is the contrast that Socrates sets up between how non-philosophers acquire political virtue and how philosophers acquire temperance and justice. Because Socrates says that political virtue arises without philosophy or understanding (ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, 82b2), he is implying that philosophers acquire temperance and justice with philosophy and understanding. If we recall the conception of genuine virtue I argued for in Chapter One, we can see what Socrates has in mind here. On my interpretation, virtue is characterized not by possessing wisdom but by desiring it. According to this reading, Socrates’ point here is precisely what we would expect of apparent virtue. His point is that political virtue is not developed through philosophy, that is, the sort of reasoning that separates the soul from the body. Put

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220 Although I agree with Irwin 1995: 384, who claims that political virtue is a species of apparent virtue, I do not think it is a superior type of apparent virtue; it simply is apparent temperance and apparent justice. Moreover, I take it that Irwin thinks that there is a form of political courage in the dialogue, which I deny. 221 Strictly speaking, political virtue is ‘what is called ‘temperance’ and ‘justice,’” which, as we have seen, refers more to actions than full character states. However, since Socrates is talking about non-philosophers who participate in what is called ‘temperance’ and ‘justice,’ we know that they have merely apparent temperance and justice.
another way, these sorts of virtues are developed without a desire for wisdom (philosophy), and so, the actions that issue from political virtue are not performed with an eye toward the acquisition of wisdom. Furthermore, because these psychological conditions reflect a lack of care for wisdom, and instead concern only bodily experiences, they do not in any way relate to nous, or that part\(^{222}\) of the soul that pursues wisdom.\(^{223}\) Instead, political virtue, like all other apparent virtues, is concerned with the senses and with bodily appetites.

We can reach this same conclusion without invoking my interpretation of genuine virtue. It is clear that in this section of the dialogue Socrates contrasting how those with political virtue acquire it and how philosophers acquire genuine virtue. But, based on this contrast alone it is underdetermined whether political virtue is a species of apparent virtue or a separate form of deficient virtue. There are two aspects of the Reprise that suggest the former reading. The first is that although he introduces them as “popular and political virtue” (οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν, 82a6-b1), Socrates also says that they are “what people call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice’” (ἥν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, 82b1). Of course, this is precisely the terminology Socrates uses when he interjects the topic of virtue into the discussion before the Right Exchange. And, one upshot of that earlier conversation was the distinction between genuine virtue and apparent virtue.

The second relevant aspect of the Reprise—which I believe constitutes decisive evidence that political virtue is a species of apparent virtue—is what Socrates says

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\(^{222}\) For convenience I use ‘part’ loosely, since, as I have argued in Chapter Two, the soul does not have parts in the usual sense.

\(^{223}\) See 65ε7 (αὐτῇ τῇ διάνοιᾳ), where Socrates uses ‘διάνοια’ to refer to ‘thought’ (i.e., the faculty of thinking) rather than ‘understanding,’ meaning something like ‘knowledge.’ See also Archer-Hind 1883: 19 who thinks there is no distinction between nous and dianoia in the dialogue.
motivates non-philosophers to act temperately. As we have seen, shortly after mentioning political virtue, Socrates contrasts the philosopher’s motivations for avoiding bodily passions with the motivations of the money lover and the honor lover. Because it is important, I will again quote in full.

No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and who is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lover of learning. It is for this reason, my friends, Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from bodily appetites, master them, and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for the fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority, i.e., the money lovers fear, nor for the fear of dishonor, and ill-repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honor, that they keep away from them.

Two features of this quote support my interpretation of political virtue. One is that although Socrates does not explicitly mention temperance here, it is clear that he is referring to it. Context clearly requires that he is talking about either temperance or justice, since this passage immediately follows his introduction of the political versions of these virtues. Moreover, it is evident from the text that he is concerned with “mastering and not surrendering” to [bodily desires], which recalls the earlier definition of what is called ‘temperance,’ namely “not to get swept off one’s feet by one’s appetites” (68c6-d1), as well as his earlier claim that people with apparent temperance “master certain pleasures” (69a1). And, as when he discusses apparent virtue earlier, he is here allowing that non-philosophers can act temperately, but that they do so for reasons relating to bodily desires.

The other feature of this passage that supports my interpretation is Socrates’ mention of money lovers and honor lovers. There is good reason to conclude that

\footnote{Importantly, Socrates says that “even the majority call ‘temperance,’” not getting swept away by passions, implying that this is a correct description of temperate action.}
Socrates means to count people with political virtue among the money lovers and honor lovers. Indeed, Socrates’ earlier claims commit him to including people with political virtue among the money lovers and honor lovers. That is, it must be the case that his claim here about non-philosophical motives for acting temperately applies to those with political virtue. As we know, in this passage Socrates is contrasting the motivations of philosophers for acting temperately with the motivations of money lovers and honor lovers. Importantly, though, Socrates earlier identifies money lovers and honor lovers as subspecies of body lovers (68c1). And, he also claims that if one is not a philosopher (i.e., a lover of wisdom), then one is a body lover (68b6). Thus, all non-philosophers, including those with political virtue, are either money lovers or honor lovers (or both). Thus, even those people with political virtue act temperately for the reasons Socrates here contrasts with philosophical reasons. And, as we know, in the Right Exchange Socrates identifies apparent virtue as dealing with exchanging bodily pleasures for other bodily pleasures. Hence, because political virtue also involves this very same exchange, it must be the case that political virtue is the same as, or at least a species of, apparent virtue. And, since we know that political virtue is what people call ‘temperance’ and ‘justice,’ we can conclude that political virtue is a species of apparent virtue, namely, apparent temperance and apparent justice.

4. Further questions about deficient virtue

I have now argued that political virtue is a species of apparent virtue in the Phaedo. Thus, in the Phaedo apparent virtue is the lone form of deficient virtue. Before I conclude, however, I want to consider two remaining questions about this condition. First, how

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does Plato ultimately evaluate possessors of apparent virtue? Second, is apparent virtue uniform, or can there be differences within the category?

As we have seen, one reason that scholars distinguish political virtue from apparent virtue is that Plato seems positive in his evaluation of the former but not the latter. To recap, Socrates says that those who possess political virtue will be the happiest of non-philosophers, but he claims that apparent virtue is slavish, and “shadow painting” compared with genuine virtue. As I have pointed out above, however, it is perfectly consistent for a single state to be slavish but for its possessors to be the happiest, and even best, of the slavish people. Indeed, this seems to be corroborated by the fact that immediately before introducing political virtue, Socrates seems to indicate that all non-philosophers are bad (φαῦλος, 81d7, in contrast to ἀγαθός, 81d6).

So, these passages are consistent with one another, but what is the evaluation that they are meant to communicate? I think on balance the evidence tips in the favor of a positive evaluation. In addition to being happiest of non-philosophers, there are several other pieces of evidence that suggest this conclusion. Perhaps first and foremost, people with apparent virtue do perform virtuous actions. Although they do not perform them for

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226 If I am correct that political virtue is a species of apparent virtue consisting in apparent temperance and apparent justice, one might wonder why will those with political virtue in particular (and not apparent virtue in general) be the happiest of non-philosophers. I suggest the answer is that Socrates must think that it is possible for someone to have apparent courage without having apparent temperance or apparent justice, and vice versa. And, given what it might take to possess apparent courage—a willingness to face physical dangers—it might well be the case that someone with this condition is more likely to act viciously or violently—perhaps out of anger—than someone with apparent temperance and apparent justice, which requires control over passions. Thus, it seems plausible that there is not a unity of apparent virtue, and that those who only possess apparent courage are more likely to act viciously than those with apparent temperance and justice.

227 It seems that even in the earlier passage, not everything Socrates says about apparent virtue is condemnation. For he calls the temperance of (at least some) non-philosophers εὐήθη, which can mean ‘naïve.’ Indeed, he later uses it to refer to himself at 100d4, and Thrasymachus says it of him in the Republic at 349b.

228 See Bobonich 2002: 485. It is possible that Socrates means to exclude those souls with political virtue from the group of bad souls. Indeed, as we shall see, Plato does seem to evaluate souls with apparent virtue positively, and he claims that they go to the best place upon re-embodiment.
the correct reasons, this does not make their actions worthless. After all, whatever their reasons, people with apparent virtue can be counted on to do the right thing in many situations, especially in a city with decent laws and law enforcement. And, those with political virtue in particular can be counted on to contribute to the civic harmony of the city. Further, the politically virtuous act well because of something about themselves, namely control over their passions. Second, as we see in the myth, their virtuous actions result in rewards for disembodied souls in the afterlife (113e2). Moreover, the souls of the politically virtuous come back in gentle and social creatures. And, since Socrates claims that the destination of a soul matches its character (81e3), we can surmise that he thinks that these people are gentle and social. Finally, Socrates claims that just as with regard to height most are somewhere in between very short and very tall, with regard to goodness most people fall somewhere between very wicked and very good (90a1-3).

Thus, at the very least Plato does not here think that to fail to have genuine virtue makes someone completely vicious. So, Plato does not have a pessimistic view of non-philosophers. And, since only philosophers have genuine virtue, he must think that it is the people with apparent virtue who make up the not-virtuous-but-decent portion of humanity.

Let’s turn now to the second question, whether or not possessors of apparent virtue can differ with regard to their apparent virtue. An affirmative answer to this question seems to be required by 90a1, which, as we just now noted, indicates that people range from the very wicked to the very good. Indeed, if we take the comparison with height at face value, then we must conclude that there are considerable and fine-grained

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229 Pace Kraut 2010 54-55.
230 See Chapter Two for discussion.
231 See Kraut 2010: 54.
differences regarding apparent virtue among its possessors. Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to think that all people with apparent virtue are uniform regarding this condition. What, then, distinguishes people with apparent virtue from one another with regard to their condition?

One possible difference is the frequency or consistency with which they act virtuously. That is, some people with apparent virtue might act virtuously most of the time—indeed perhaps even all of the time—while others might not. There seems to be textual support for this suggestion. Once again, the myth is relevant. For, in the myth we see that people with apparent virtue are both rewarded for acting well and punished for acting badly. So, it is not a stretch to think that there are differences among the apparently virtuous in terms of how often they act well and act badly. This is also suggested when Socrates initially discusses apparent courage. At 68d5 Socrates says, “And the brave among them [i.e., non-philosophers] face death, when they do, for fear of greater evils.” Here Socrates seems to indicate that people with apparent courage do not always face death when they have the opportunity to do so. Of course, this does not mean that they do not always act courageously when they might; sometimes facing death might be rash, not courageous. But, this line does allow that there can be times when it would be courageous to face death and the person with apparent courage does not do it. Thus, especially when taken in conjunction with the myth, this seems to suggest that people with apparent virtue can, and do, fail to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that people with apparent virtue differ among each other in the frequency and consistency with which they act virtuously. And, based on what we know about apparent virtue, this difference is
explained by differences in the amount of control an agent has over her bodily passions, so that the more control one has, the more apparent virtue one has.

Another possible difference is the way apparently virtuous agents conceive of their actions. We have already considered a stronger version of this proposal when exploring the relationship between political virtue and apparent virtue. The thought there was that people with political virtue possess and act on beliefs about the intrinsic value of virtue. Thus, these agents conceive of their actions as virtuous and are motivated by this conception. Although this was not the correct understanding of political virtue, we can now entertain the possibility that some apparently virtuous agents—not necessarily only those with political virtue—do conceive of their actions as virtuous.232 Of course, because non-philosophers are motivated only by bodily pleasure and pain, they would never be motivated by the fact that they believe an action is virtuous (i.e., they would not be motivated by virtue itself). So, they would not conceive of a virtue as intrinsically valuable. But, might a non-philosopher value virtue instrumentally? That is, could a non-philosopher value virtue insofar as she believed that virtue always maximizes long-term pleasure? If the answer is ‘yes,’ then there could be people with apparent virtue who conceive of actions as virtuous and so perform them.

In order to determine whether or not this is a possibility, we must consider what it would mean for a non-philosopher to conceive of her action as virtuous. As we have seen, non-philosophers understand virtue in terms of actions; what is called ‘courage’ is facing death willingly, what is called ‘temperance’ is treating bodily passions with disdain and order. This understanding of virtue has two significant upshots for the issue at hand. First, non-philosophers can believe that an action is virtuous, and that belief will

232 For this understanding of apparent virtue, see Bobonich 2002: 17.
not bring with it any motivation because what they think is virtue is really what is merely called ‘virtue.’ That is, they can believe that an action is virtuous, but since they have a superficial conception of what virtue is, they can never truly conceive of an action as virtuous. Importantly, though, this shows that a non-philosopher can conceive of an action as virtuous without that conception providing her with any motivation to act. Accordingly, it is certainly possible that some people with apparent virtue do conceive of their actions as virtuous.

The second upshot is that there is, in fact, a consensus among non-philosophers about what virtue is. That is, given that all non-philosophers call the same actions ‘courageous’ and the same actions ‘temperate,’ there is widespread agreement about what these virtues are. Thus, in general non-philosophers will recognize when someone acts virtuously. But, by the same token, they will recognize when someone acts viciously. And, for this reason, it seems that all people with apparent virtue would have to take into account whether or not a prospective action is virtuous when they go about performing their hedonic calculation. After all, legal punishments and negative social repercussions would be likely to follow any vicious action. Thus, in order to engage in profitable exchanges, people with apparent virtue would have to be sensitive to what is called ‘virtue’ and would have to act in accordance with what they believe is virtuous. So, I suggest that it is not only possible that people with apparent virtue conceive of their actions as virtuous and value virtue instrumentally, it must be so widespread among them that this would not in fact be a difference among possessors of apparent virtue.

233 And, in light of this agreement, it seems that non-philosophers are not subjectivists or relativists. Indeed, although they are hedonistic and accept that pleasure is the standard of value, they do not seem to think that their own pleasure determines what is virtuous.

234 Indeed, in his speech Protagoras recommends that one claim to be just even if one is unjust, stressing the negative consequences for acting unjustly and being exposed as vicious.
Perhaps it seems like I am ascribing to the non-philosophers of the *Phaedo* a wildly implausible and uncharitable view. However, it is worth considering the ethical view of the most well known hedonist of antiquity, or any era, Epicurus.\(^{235}\) We know from his extant works and from reports of his views that Epicurus advised honoring virtues only if they bring pleasure, but saying ‘goodbye’ to them if they did not.\(^{236}\) Further, Epicureans portrayed the virtues as slaves to pleasure, with the sole function of guarding a person from pain or alerting her when a potential action might have negative social consequences.\(^{237}\) Despite this disdainful attitude toward virtues, Epicurus thought one should always perform virtuous action. For, he believed that no one could ever be completely confident that her vicious actions would remain concealed.\(^{238}\) It seems to me that this is the very sort of view that Plato attributes to the best of the non-philosophers in the *Phaedo*, namely those with apparent virtue.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued that there is only one form of deficient virtue in the *Phaedo*. As we have seen, this deficient virtue is hedonistic, based on a calculation of bodily pleasure and pain. I want to close by considering whether or not we should understand genuine virtue in the dialogue as hedonistic, albeit enlightened.\(^{239}\)

One reason to think that genuine virtue is ultimately hedonistic is that Socrates does indicate that there are “pleasures of learning” (114e1). And, since philosophers are

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235 It is also worth noting that Epicurus claimed that the soul is material and mortal. Since this is the sort of view Socrates argues against in the *Phaedo*, perhaps it was widely held.

236 LS 21M. Note that we find a similar phrase employed in the *Phaedo*. In particular, see 82d1, where the philosophers “says ‘goodbye’” to bodily concerns. See my discussion in Chapter One, notes 54 and 77.

237 LS 21O.

238 LS 22A.

239 For this interpretation, see Gosling and Taylor 1982.
lovers of learning (82c2), they must be lovers of this sort of pleasure just as body lovers are lovers of bodily pleasure. Another reason is that Socrates refers to bodily pleasures as “so-called” (τὰς ἡδονὰς καλομένας τὰς τοιάδε, οἶνον σιτίον τε καὶ ποτόν, 64d1). This, of course, is similar to his phrases “what is called ‘courage’” and “what is called ‘temperance,’” both of which refer to an incomplete understanding of virtue. Hence, it is possible that what are called ‘pleasures’ are likewise incomplete approximations of genuine pleasures.\(^{240}\) Thus, bodily pleasures are not the most pleasant pleasures, if they are pleasures at all. But, there are genuine pleasures, namely the pleasures of learning. And, since the philosopher pursues learning and wisdom above all else, it looks like the philosopher pursues genuine, or at any rate the highest, pleasures above all else. Thus, the philosopher, like all other people, pursues pleasure above all else, with the one caveat, that the philosopher is the only person who gets it right. Nonetheless, the philosopher, like all other people, is hedonistic.\(^{241}\)

While this sort of interpretation hits on one important aspect of the philosophical life in the dialogue, namely that it is certainly the most pleasurable life, it misidentifies the motivation of the philosopher for choosing this life. The philosopher does indeed act virtuously so that she can pursue wisdom, both in this life and the next. And, this culminates with the philosopher spending eternity in the most pleasant way possible, with the gods, contemplating. However, there is no indication whatsoever that the philosopher pursues wisdom \textit{because} this afterlife is the most pleasant fate.\(^{242}\) Indeed, given that the philosopher values wisdom above all else, it is clear that the pleasure associated with pursuing and possessing wisdom must not account for any of the philosopher’s

\(^{240}\) See Gallop 1975: 76, cf. 60b2
\(^{241}\) Gosling and Taylor 1982.
motivation. Thus, in the *Phaedo* Plato denies the theory of psychological hedonism, the claim that humans are motivated only by pleasure, because he thinks that there are some people, philosophers, who value something other than pleasure. Yet, as we have seen, in the *Phaedo* all non-philosophers are hedonistic. Because of this, they cannot possess genuine virtue, but at best deficient virtue.
Chapter Four: The right way to do philosophy

In Chapter One I argued that in the *Phaedo* virtue is a function not of possessing wisdom (φρόνησις) but of desiring it. That is to say, having virtue does not require that one be wise, but instead that one be a philosopher. My reading, then, puts serious weight on what it is to be a philosopher, and the related question of who counts as a philosopher. As I shall argue in this chapter, these issues are clearly on Plato’s mind in the *Phaedo*.

The question of who counts as a philosopher arises early on in the dialogue. At 61c3 Socrates asks Simmias whether or not he thinks that the poet Evenus is a philosopher. And, just a few lines after raising the initial question, at 61c6 Socrates introduces the notion of partaking worthily in philosophy.243 The idea that only some people do philosophy worthily—or as Socrates often puts it in the dialogue, are true philosophers—recurs fifteen more times in the dialogue, with all instances being contained in Socrates’ Defense and the Reprise.244 The prevalence of such an idea indicates not only that Plato distinguishes between the correct and incorrect way(s) of doing philosophy, but that this distinction is a serious concern in the dialogue.

In this chapter I want to explore this distinction, and ultimately leverage it into a characterization of (true) philosophy. My argument proceeds as follows. I will first attempt to discern who Socrates thinks is doing philosophy the wrong way. In order to do so, I will set out all of the possible false practitioners of philosophy found in the dialogue.

243 ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν
244 See 61c5, 63e10, 64a4, 64b6, 66b2, 67b4, 67d8, 67e4, 68a7, 68b1, 69d1, 81a1, 82c3, 83b5, 83e5, as well as 64e2, which is the one example in the text that does not come from Socrates, but instead from Simmias. The majority of these passages deal with separating the soul from the body, including through death. But, it would not be sufficient to say simply that the genuine philosopher separates her soul from her body, because this leaves open the vital questions of how the philosopher does this, and what it means to separate the soul. As we shall see, my positive characterization of true philosophy below explains both.
Next, I will consider Platonic discussions of false philosophy outside of the *Phaedo*, looking in particular at *Republic* VI and VII and the *Euthydemus*. I will then return to our primary dialogue and apply these insights to identify the false philosophers in the *Phaedo*. Finally, after identifying them, I will use the characterization of the false philosophers to offer a positive account of the correct way to do philosophy in the *Phaedo*.

1. **False philosophers and doing philosophy the wrong way**

Although Socrates never utters the phrase “the wrong way to do philosophy” or any variant of it, as I have suggested, there is reason to think that he is preoccupied with such a practice in the *Phaedo*. And, although he does not explicitly identify anyone as a false philosopher, as we shall see, there are several groups who might plausibly be classified as false philosophers in the dialogue. In this section I will canvass each group, explaining why we might think that they engage in philosophy in the wrong way.

1.1 **The antilogikoi**

In the course of Socrates’ warning against misology, hatred of argumentation, he brings up the first of our false philosophy suspects. These potential practitioners of philosophy in the wrong way are the *antilogikoi*, a group of self-professed wise men who argued by

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245 One may want to distinguish between these notions. For instance, one might think that the notion of ‘doing philosophy the wrong way’ implies that the person is actually a philosopher, just a bad one, while the notion of ‘false philosopher’ implies that she is not even a philosopher. However, in keeping with Plato, I treat these notions interchangeably.

246 At this point in the investigation there is no reason to rule out the possibility that Socrates has more than one group in mind as engaging in philosophy in the wrong way. However, we will see below good reason to think that there is a single group of false philosophers.

247 I leave this word un-translated in order to remain neutral about who constitutes this group. As we shall see, there is evidence for and against identifying the Sophists as *antilogikoi*. 
way of contradiction. Because the antilogikoi engage in verbal disputes and employ argumentation to contradict views they encounter, they would be prime targets to be considered as counterfeit philosophers. Here I will explain why.

Socrates twice mentions the antilogikoi in the dialogue. It will be instructive to look at both passages, beginning with the one just mentioned. At 90b3-c5, after comparing misology with misanthropy, Socrates says the following:

The similarity lies rather in this: It is as when one who lacks skill in arguments puts his trust in an argument as being true, then shortly afterwards believes it to be false—as sometimes it is and sometimes it is not—and so another argument and then another. You know how those in particular who spend time studying contradiction (τούς ἀντιλογικούς) in the end believe themselves to have become very wise and that they alone have understood that there is neither soundness nor reliability in any object or in any argument, but that all that exists simply fluctuates up and down as if it were in the Euripus, and does not remain in the same place for any time at all (ὐλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὀντα ἀτεχνῶς ὁσπερ ἐν Εὐρῖπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδένι μένει).

At 101e1-102a1, as an aside about method in his discussion of the explanatory role of the Forms, Socrates says:

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248 Even if Miller 2015: 159-160 is correct that the practice of antilogic does not have “an intrinsically negative connotation in Plato” it is plain that in this context the antilogikoi are a particular group with a certain set of practices, and Plato evaluates both negatively.

249 Miller 2015: 160, following Kerferd 1981: 67, takes this passage to indicate that Socrates agrees with the flux theory of the antilogikoi. The key to this interpretation is that Socrates says that the antilogikoi think they are wise because they alone (monoi) have understood that there is no soundness in things and that all that exists fluctuates. According to Miller we should read this line as an indication that the antilogikoi are wrong to think that they alone have come to this understanding because Socrates himself also understands it. But, if as Miller has it Socrates’ wording reflects an agreement with flux theory, it would also reflect an agreement that there is nothing sound or reliable in any argument, since this is also what Socrates claims that the antilogikoi think that they alone understand. But, Socrates surely does not agree to this; he vehemently denies that there is nothing sound in any argument. Thus, we cannot take this sentence to indicate an agreement with flux theory (even if, perhaps, Plato agrees with a limited form of the theory, namely one that applies only to the corporeal world).

250 Hackforth 1955: 110 notes that variants of the word techne appear four times in this passage. He rightly points out that Plato criticizes the Sophists for lacking a techne, most notably in the Gorgias.

251 This sounds much like the view of Heraclitus, which Plato connects to Protagoras and other thinkers in the Theaetetus.
but you will not jumble the two together [i.e. the hypothesis and its consequences] as the debaters (οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ) do by discussing the hypothesis and its consequences at the same time, if you wish to discover the truth. This they do not discuss or give any thought to, but their wisdom (σοφία) enables them to mix everything up and yet to be pleased with themselves, but if you are a philosopher, I think you will do as I say.

From these passages we can identify three problematic characteristics of the antilogikoi that render it plausible that they engage in philosophy the wrong way. One is that they are not concerned with the truth. Indeed, they deny that there is any truth at all, either in arguments or in the world. Another is that the antilogikoi do not employ a proper method of argumentation. As we see in the second passage, the antilogikoi jumble the hypothesis and its consequences. And, based on their conviction that nothing is true, we can see why they would have this attitude toward arguments, an attitude that leads them to abuse, rather than to use them properly. The final characteristic is that these thinkers believe that they have wisdom. Although Socrates’ ascription of wisdom is certainly ironic, given their ability to win arguments, the antilogikoi were likely not alone in thinking that they were wise.

So, given their (ab)use of arguments and their claim to wisdom, we can see that the antilogikoi would be prime candidates for practicing philosophy in the wrong way.

There is one further reason to favor them as the false philosophers. This reason is that

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252 This is one of only two times that Socrates uses ‘σοφία’ in the entire dialogue. The other passage, which I mention below, is in reference to the Natural Philosophers.
253 Furthermore, if we take into account 91a3, we can see that the antilogikoi are interested not in truth but only in victory in argument. Thus, we can include this as a fourth characteristic of the antilogikoi.
254 One might think that an antilogikos could not be a misologist because an antilogikos uses arguments, while a hater of arguments would avoid them (see Miller 2015: 161). But, I take it that what misologists really hate is genuine argumentation. As a result of this hatred most misologists would likely avoid arguments. However, it is plausible that some would disdain genuine argumentation (and perhaps arguments themselves) but see that they can employ argumentation to their own ends. And, since they deny that arguments can succeed in delivering truth, they would have no qualms about doing so. These people, I suggest, who are antilogikoi. Moreover, as haters of argumentation, they might be motivated to turn others against argumentation, which could be accomplished through antilogic. Nothing in my analysis, however, rides on whether or not an antilogikos could be a misologist.
scholars agree that Plato identifies antilogic with the Sophists. As we know from the Apology many Athenians, including his first accusers, incorrectly lumped Socrates in with the Sophists. Because of this misidentification, Plato had reason to contrast Socrates’ (and his own) philosophy with the “philosophy” of the Sophists, especially in the dramatic context of Socrates’ last day.

Despite the above, there is reason to doubt that the antilogikoi—whether they are meant to be identified as the Sophists, overlap with the Sophists, or be completely distinct from them—are the group doing philosophy the wrong way in the Phaedo. The reason is that they are only mentioned in two brief passages. And, although there is no explicit discussion of the wrong way to do philosophy, we might expect that whichever group engages in it would have a more prominent role in the dialogue than two passages.

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256 For a thorough discussion of the issue, including a list of the types of sophists identified by Aristophanes in the Clouds, see Edmunds 2006. Also, see Vander Waerdt 1994 for provocative arguments that Aristophanes was not using Socrates as a stand in for the Sophists in the Clouds, but instead was attacking Socrates’ particular practice. Even if this is the case, it is clear that in the Apology Socrates describes his first accusers as mistaking him for a Sophist.
257 The fact that the Sophists were associated with antilogic is reason to think that Plato may have them in mind as the antilogikoi and so as false philosophers. As further evidence for the suggestion that the Sophists are the false philosophers, one might cite the mention of Evenus. As we saw above, the question of who counts as a philosopher initially arises when Evenus is mentioned. In the Phaedo Socrates indicates only that Evenus is a poet (60d6); he does not suggest that Evenus is a Sophist. But, in the Apology Socrates identifies Evenus as a Sophist (19e1-20c1, cf. Phaedrus 267a), claiming that he charges a fee for teaching virtue. So, it seems that Socrates in fact considers Evenus a Sophist. I do not have the space to devote to the question of why Socrates asks whether Evenus is a philosopher and accepts an affirmative answer (see Rowe 1993: 123). There seems to be no doubt, however, that based on the subsequent discussion that Evenus is not philosophizing correctly, if philosophizing at all. Ebert 2001 takes philosophos, the term in question, to be a Pythagorean term (see also Peterson 2011: chapter 5, esp. 167-169). Thus, Ebert argues that Socrates is in earnest in identifying Evenus as a philosophos because he believes that Evenus is a Pythagorean. But, this view places too much emphasis on the term philosophos alone, failing to consider the number of other ways—including ‘lover of learning’—Socrates employs to point to the relevant way of life. Moreover, even if Pythagoras was the first to call himself a philosophos, by the time of the Phaedo, the term was not limited to Pythagoras, or Pythagoreans. Hence, it is highly doubtful that Socrates is asking whether or not Evenus is a Pythagorean when he asks if he is a philosophos.
1.2 Natural Philosophers

One group of thinkers whose views are discussed in greater detail than those of the antilogikoi is the Natural Philosophers. And, if we consider how Socrates presents Natural Philosophy, we find reason to think that its practitioners are doing it in the wrong way.\(^{258}\) I’ll begin with what Socrates has to say about Natural Philosophy before explaining why Plato might think that it is the wrong way to do philosophy.

In what he presents as an intellectual autobiography (96a4-100b1), Socrates claims that upon discovering Natural Philosophy he was “wonderfully enthusiastic about the wisdom called natural inquiry” (θωμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα τάυτης τῆς σοφίας ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν, 96a4). This is because he thought it would be good to know the causes of things. But, as he says, he was dissatisfied because although his study made him set aside his former opinions about causes, it provided nothing acceptable with which to replace them. After this initial disappointment, however, he learned that Anaxagoras identified nous as the cause of everything. Unfortunately, he was once again disappointed when realizing that Anaxagoras attributed real causal power not to nous but to air, ether, water, and the like.\(^{259}\) As a result of these disappointments he turned away from Natural Philosophy and “[took] refuge in discussion and investigate[d] the truth of things by means of words,” ultimately positing Forms as causes.

Even in this brief outline of Socrates’ experience with the views of Natural Philosophers, we can see why Plato may have thought they did philosophy in the wrong way. First of all, in the sentence I quoted in the preceding paragraph, Socrates claims that

\(^{258}\) See Robins 2003: 14, who identifies the Natural Philosophers as ‘potential philosophers.’ As noted above, there does seem to be a difference in principle between someone doing philosophy the wrong way and a false philosopher. If we were countenancing this difference, then we would likely put the Natural Philosophers in the former category. However, as I have suggested, Plato does not make this distinction.

\(^{259}\) For a discussion of Plato’s critique of Anaxagoras, see Mason 2013.
Natural Philosophy is a sort of wisdom (σοφία). Above I expressed serious doubt that Socrates ascribed wisdom to the antilogikoi in earnest. Although the same might be said about Socrates’ claim here, there seems to be a significant difference between the antilogikoi and the Natural Philosophers with regard to wisdom. Whereas the former disregard the truth, and indeed even deny that there is any truth, the latter likely proceed based on the assumption of the existence of truth and the possibility of discovery.260 Thus, unlike the antilogikoi, Socrates might believe that the Natural Philosophers genuinely are pursuing wisdom, but doing so in the wrong way.

So, there is reason to think that the Natural Philosophers really are in the business of pursuing wisdom. But, if we consider what Socrates says about the sorts of causes that are accepted in their field, then we can see reason to think that Natural Philosophers are philosophizing in the wrong way. As Socrates describes it, Natural Philosophy only posits explanations that are found in and limited to the corporeal world. For instance, a credible theory in Natural Philosophy is that our blood is the cause of our thinking. The one apparent exception to Natural Philosophy’s limitation to the corporeal world is Anaxagoras’ theory that nous is the only cause. But, as noted above, Socrates rejects this theory because nous is impotent and unnecessary in Anaxagoras’ system, which instead explains everything in terms of the corporeal. Thus, perhaps the most persuasive reason to think that the Natural Philosophers do philosophy the wrong way is that their

260 Shipton 1979: 46 (cf. Blank 1986: 150) argues that the antilogikoi are the Natural Philosophers. If this is correct, then the Natural Philosophers are not genuinely engaged in a search for the truth. But, this identification does not seem correct. Although the first passage that mentions the antilogikoi does attribute to them the view that all things fluctuate up and down never remaining the same (ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδὲνι μένει), which sounds like the view of Heraclitus, and perhaps all Natural Philosophers, in the autobiographical section, Socrates does not indicate that this is the view of Natural Philosophers. Moreover, he never relates the two groups in the dialogue.
investigations do not look beyond the corporeal world.\textsuperscript{261} For this reason, Natural Philosophers pursue wisdom in the wrong way across two metrics. First, they are looking in the wrong place—the corporeal rather than the incorporeal world—for wisdom. Second, and perhaps worse, their inquiries actually move them further from genuine wisdom; their inquiries reinforce the illusion that the corporeal world exhausts reality, and in doing so, tie them further to the corporeal world.

There is one final point in the case against the Natural Philosophers.\textsuperscript{262} As noted above, in the \textit{Apology} Socrates claims that his first accusers confused him, willfully or not, with the Sophists. But, the Sophists were not the only group of thinkers with whom Socrates was wrongly aligned. Referencing Aristophanes’ portrayal of him in the \textit{Clouds}, at 19b6 Socrates says that his original accusers claimed that he “stud\[ies\] things in the sky and below the earth,” the domain of Natural Philosophers. And at 26d2-e2 when Meletus tells the jury that Socrates says that the sun is stone and moon is earth, Socrates asks whether he thinks he is prosecuting Anaxagoras—the one Natural Philosopher Socrates mentions by name in the \textit{Phaedo}—as these are his theories. So, the fact that Socrates was confused with the Natural Philosophers means that Plato had an interest in


\textsuperscript{262}Eduard Zeller’s interpretation of Socrates’ intellectual autobiography can provide another piece of evidence worth mentioning that the Natural Philosophers may be identified as the wrong way to do philosophy. Scholars have debated about whether or not the autobiography Socrates presents is supposed to be historically accurate, perhaps accurate not of Socrates but of Plato, or altogether a fiction (see Hackforth 127-131, Rashed 2009: 119-122, Vander Waerdt 1994: ch.2). According to Zeller, the passage is not meant to be accurate for Socrates or for Plato, but for \textit{philosophy} itself (398, cf. Hackforth 1955: 130). Thus, if this were correct, then we would have reason to think that Natural Philosophy was indeed philosophy, but was going about it the wrong way. I doubt that Zeller’s reading of this section is correct, but one does get the sense at times in the dialogue that Socrates is philosophy personified. In particular, both Socrates and philosophy are said to be gentle and employ persuasion (in contrast to bodily force) to draw someone toward the truth.
distinguishing Socrates from Natural Philosophers, which perhaps makes it plausible that they are the thinkers who engage in philosophy the wrong way. \footnote{See Robins 2003: 14}

1.3 The Pythagoreans

The final group of thinkers to consider is the Pythagoreans. And, if presence in the dialogue were the only criterion for judging the contest of false philosophy, then the Pythagoreans would win hands down given all of the Pythagorean overtones in the \textit{Phaedo}. Beginning with the dialogue’s outer frame, the setting is Phlius, a hub of Pythagorean activity at the time. Further, Phaedo narrates Socrates’ last day to Echecrates,\footnote{See Horky 2013: 107-109 for discussion and speculation about Echecrates, including that he was “somewhat of an amateur historian” and that Timaeus considered him the “last of the Pythagoreans.”} a Pythagorean and student of Philolaus,\footnote{Diogenes Laertius 8.46.} an important and well-known Pythagorean philosopher.\footnote{For a discussion of Philolaus, see Huffman 1999: 78-85.} As for the inner frame, Socrates’ two main interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, are at least thinkers with Pythagorean leanings, if not card carrying Pythagoreans.\footnote{Most scholars agree that Simmias and Cebes are at least pretty familiar with Pythagoreanism (see Crooks 1998 and Sedley 1995). Some go further and identify them as Pythagoreans (see Blattberg 2005: 111, Dorter 1982: 9, Mitscherling 1985, and Morgan 2010: 72, among others). Rowe 1993: 7 seems to go the furthest in the other direction, casting doubt on their Pythagorean credentials, and instead identifying them as Socratics. Because immortality (and reincarnation) is considered by most to be a central Pythagorean commitment, it may seem like the fact that Simmias and Cebes doubt it is evidence that they are not Pythagoreans. Even if this is a central Pythagorean commitment (though see Betegh 2014), bona fide Pythagoreans, like Echecrates, can doubt it. Moreover, preeminent Pythagoreans, like Philolaus, could posit views—like his harmony view of the soul—that appear to conflict with it (see Sedley 1995: 12).} Indeed, they mention explicitly that they heard about the prohibition on suicide from Philolaus. In addition to these dramatic details, the \textit{Phaedo} contains discussions of Pythagorean theories, including, but not limited to purification,\footnote{This is not to say exclusively Pythagorean given that they are common to Pythagoreanism and Orphism.} and the
immortality and reincarnation of the soul, which feature centrally in the Right Exchange, the Recollection Argument, the Reprise, and the myth.  

Because of these Pythagorean elements, a prevailing view in the literature is that the dialogue reflects Plato’s burgeoning interest in Pythagoreanism. Indeed, a reading that has gained traction over the past few decades is that the dialogue is meant to depict Socrates as a Pythagorean. That is, the dialogue is meant to show that based on Pythagorean doctrine Socrates himself is more of a Pythagoreans than those who identified themselves as such. Buoyed by this sort of interpretation, some scholars have even explored the possibility that the historical Socrates was conversant in and perhaps inclined toward Pythagorean views. In light of the popularity, and in some cases, persuasiveness of these readings, it might seem like a non-starter to suggest that in the dialogue Pythagoreanism is depicted as the wrong way to do philosophy. However, there is reason to think that this is the case.

Let’s begin with Pythagoras himself. According to tradition, Pythagoras was the first person to employ the word *philosophos*, using it in reference to himself. Thus, if Plato were aware of this tradition, then he may have wanted to consider whether or not Pythagoras (and his followers) was a *philosophos* in the correct way. Moreover, in spite of, or perhaps because of this reputation, Pythagoras was the target of criticism for his

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269 Moreover, the only positive view that Simmias himself offers is the harmony view of the soul, a theory attributed to Philolaus.
270 Gerson 2014 resists this interpretation, not because he denies that Plato has Pythagorean interests, but because he holds that Plato was a Pythagorean before he wrote any dialogues.
271 Rashed 2009
272 For relevant discussion see Rashed 2009.
273 As far as suspects go, the Pythagoreans have the best claim to doing philosophy in the wrong way, understood in one sense. Unlike the *antilogikoi*, the Pythagoreans would genuinely be engaging in philosophy, or at least trying to be. And, unlike the Natural Philosophers, they did not limit their search for wisdom to the corporeal world. But, in spite of this, as we shall see there is reason to think that they are doing philosophy in the wrong way.
274 See Kahn 2001: 68 and Riedweg 2005: 90-98. Morrison 1958: section III denies that there is any Pythagorean coloring to the word by the mid-fifth century.
approach to philosophy and for his views. For instance, Heraclitus’ criticized Pythagoras’ approach to inquiry, in particular the diversity of his intellectual interests. Thus, although Plato may have embraced some Pythagorean theses, including those mentioned above, this does not require that he esteemed the sort of philosophizing used to explore and defend them. Indeed, it could plausibly be the case that Plato believed that Socratic or Platonic philosophy was needed to defend these theses properly.

This case can be strengthened if we set aside Pythagoras—about whom Plato, like us, may have actually known very little—and focus on his followers. Pythagoreans were composed of two, evidently opposed, factions: the *akousmatikoi* and the *mathematikoi*. The *akousmatikoi*, who followed the *akousmata*, the ‘things heard’, of Pythagoras took themselves to be the true Pythagoreans. Because of their approach to the teachings of Pythagoras, the *akousmatikoi* were not known as great thinkers, and perhaps never worked to develop the ideas beyond what Pythagoras (was believed to have) said. This shortcoming may be on dramatic display in the *Phaedo* with regard to the prohibition on suicide. In this exchange Socrates says that Evenus should follow him to death, although it may not be right for him to end his own life. Cebes responds quizzically to Socrates’

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275 Including his belief in reincarnation, which was mocked by Xenophanes (see Huffman 1999: 70).
276 See Riedweg 2005: 50-52. Of Pythagoras and others, Heraclitus claimed: “Much learning does not teach the mind; otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus” (see Hussey 1999: 90). But, Heraclitus may have also felt that Pythagoras was disingenuous in his philosophical beliefs, calling him “a polymath of evil trickery” and “the chief of swindlers” (see Huffman 1999: 71). Of course, all of these criticisms may have been more rhetorical than substantive, aimed at discrediting someone else with a claim to wisdom.
278 See Kahn 2001: 15. See also Horky 2013: chapters 1 and 2 for a thorough discussion of both groups. For other ways in which Pythagoreans may have differed among themselves see Betegh 2014, which argues that the Pythagoreans disagreed among themselves as to what the teachings of Pythagoras really were.
279 Huffman 1999: 78.
280 Horky 2013: 4 claims that they accepted the sayings of Pythagoras without critical reflection on them. Cf. Rashed 2009: 125. Gower 2008: 339 likely has the *akousmatikoi* in mind when he claims that in the dialogue Plato wants us to see the difference between the ‘unquestioning cult’ around Pythagoras and Socrates’ emphasis on intellectual autonomy.
contention that perhaps Evenus should not end his own life. Socrates, in turn, is surprised and asks whether he has not “heard” (ἀκηκόατε) about such things during his time with Philolaus. Cebes replies that he has not heard anything clear (σαφῆς) on the issue.\textsuperscript{281} Thus, this might be a dramatic example to illustrate how some Pythagoreans approached doing philosophy—they have philosophical beliefs but have not worked them out. If this were the case, then we could see why such thinkers might be considered to be doing philosophy in the wrong way.

Of course, Plato may have not have intended the exchange on suicide to cast doubt on the philosophical approach of Simmias and Cebes.\textsuperscript{282} After all, in the dialogue as a whole Simmias and Cebes comport themselves well and prove to be adept and clever thinkers capable of offering and critiquing arguments. But, these qualities might be the strongest evidence that Pythagoreans love wisdom in the wrong way.\textsuperscript{283} That is, the way that the dialogue proceeds might be evidence that Plato had serious concerns about Pythagorean philosophical practice. In particular, Plato may believe that Pythagorean practice leads to misology.

Above I considered Socrates’ warning against misology in connection with the \textit{antilogikoi}. It is important to realize, however, that one need not be an \textit{antilogikos} to be a misologist. Socrates claims that what he says applies in particular, or especially (µάλιστα) to the \textit{antilogikoi}, which implies that it applies to others as well. And, for the purposes of

\textsuperscript{281} A few lines later Cebes says about the prohibition on suicide in particular that although he has heard of it from Philolaus and others, he has not heard a clear account of the issue (61e6). See Peterson 2011: 170. It is also worth noting along these lines that at the very beginning of the dialogue Echercrates claims that in Phlius they have not been able to get a clear (σαφῆς) account of what happened on Socrates’ final day (57b2).

\textsuperscript{282} In fact, some commentators take this very passage to support the opposite conclusion to the one just considered, namely that Simmias and Cebes are not Pythagorean \textit{akousmatikoi} but rather Pythagorean \textit{mathematikoi} (see Peterson 2011: 169).

\textsuperscript{283} This reading need not require that we take Simmias and Cebes to be Pythagoreans. The weaker claim, that they proceed in discussions in a Pythagorean fashion, is sufficient.
our present discussion, we must be sensitive to the context of Socrates’ warning. Socrates introduces, elaborates on, and warns against misology after Simmias and Cebes offer their objections to the Affinity Argument. Thus, the context may be taken to indicate that Socrates is concerned that Simmias and Cebes—perhaps standing in for Pythagoreans in general (or at least Pythagoreans of a particular stripe)—are in danger of becoming (and making others) misologists. To put the point another way, something about the discussion compels Socrates to warn against misology at this juncture. And, because his warning is directly preceded by their objections, there is reason to think that Simmias’ and Cebes’ objections are what compel him to do so. Of course, it may be that the reactions of those listening to the discussion—Phaedo reports that all present were exhibiting signs of nascent misology, as is Echecrates to whom Phaedo is reporting—that compels Socrates to warn against the condition. But, even so, it is undeniable that the objections of Simmias and Cebes move all present, save for Socrates, to this condition. Thus, there is reason to think that Simmias and Cebes are flirting with misology, and the explanation for this may be that they are philosophizing in the wrong way.

It might reasonably be objected that the preceding interpretation paints with too broad a brush. For, although the misology warning follows both Simmias’ and Cebes’

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284 We might bolster this point by considering the contrast between Simmias and Cebes, and everyone else, after Socrates concludes the Reprise. Whereas most others, Socrates included, were concentrating on what Socrates had just said, Simmias and Cebes are discussing their concerns with his view. While this might be praised as evidence of critical minds, it could also be seen as a lack of concern for the truth, as opposed to a desire for victory in discussion. That is, rather than taking seriously someone’s view, their first instinct is to object to it.

285 See Blattberg 2005: 111 and Crooks 1998: 122-123. Blattberg claims that one of the main aims of the Phaedo is to criticize the excessive skepticism of Pythagoreanism. However, he does not provide any independent proof that the Pythagoreans were skeptics, let alone excessively skeptical, nor does he offer any explanation as to why their doctrines would lead to skepticism. He does indicate that part of the problem is with their desire for certainty, but this actually conflicts with what Simmias reports as his own view. At any rate, we may—as I am suggesting, though not necessarily endorsing, here—infer that Plato has these concerns based on how the dialogue proceeds. But, this is different from beginning with the assumption, as Blattberg seems to do, that the Pythagoreans were extreme skeptics, and then allowing this assumption to inform our reading of the dialogue.
objections, we need not think that Socrates is aiming it at both, even if he is aiming it at one of them. Thus, we must be open to the possibility that Socrates’ is meant to be warning either Simmias or Cebes, but not both. So, in terms of our overarching question—who is it that does philosophy in the wrong way—it might be that it is one of Socrates’ interlocutors, but not the other.\(^{286}\)

When commentators discriminate between Simmias and Cebes, it is usually the former that comes out looking better.\(^{287}\) And there seems to be good reason for this, as Simmias appears to be committed to several Socratic tenets. For instance, before offering the harmony theory, he expresses doubt in the possibility of acquiring clear knowledge in life, and suggests that in its place we should strive to adopt the most irrefutable theories. Furthermore, after the final argument Simmias remains uncertain about what has been said, which Socrates seems to indicate is good, as it will motivate him to continue examining the hypotheses they have used.\(^{288}\)

In contrast to Simmias, there seems to be reason to be concerned with Cebes, and so, reason to see him as the target of Socrates’ warning. Perhaps the most significant evidence connecting Cebes to misology is that he is “the most difficult of men to persuade by argument” (77b1). Thus, this might be taken as evidence that Cebes is already beginning to be overly skeptical of argumentation, a sign that he is on the road to

\(^{286}\) Even if we take this tack, it does not necessarily exonerate Pythagoreanism. One possibility is that although it does not necessarily lead to misology (since on this assumption both Simmias and Cebes are Pythagoreans but it only endangers one of them), this way of philosophizing has the strong potential to do so. Another possibility is that Simmias and Cebes are not the same sorts of Pythagoreans, and whichever of the two is on the road to misology belongs to the type that philosophizes wrongly. Finally, there is the possibility that neither Simmias nor Cebes is meant to be a stand in for any type of Pythagorean. Even so, if one of them is supposed to be emblematic of the wrong way to do philosophy, then identifying which one it is would serve our purposes of determining the wrong way to do philosophy in the dialogue.

\(^{287}\) See Shipton 1979 for the following points. See also Sedley 1995: 17-18. For an unusual discussion of Simmias and Cebes, according to which each is meant to represent a different extreme, see Spitzer 1976.

\(^{288}\) Morgan 2010: 79 thinks this is one of the main points of the dialogue, namely, that Socrates wants us to continue philosophizing after he is gone.
hating arguments altogether. In addition to Cebs’ skepticism, we might be concerned about the way he proceeds in argumentation at times in the discussion. In particular, during the Affinity Argument Cebs raises what appears to be an irrelevant point, perhaps in the manner that a lover of victory would. In discussing the soul Socrates asks whether or not it is visible, to which Cebs replies “it is not visible to men” (79b3). Socrates clarifies that he meant whether or not it is visible to men, and asks Cebs whether he thought they meant visible to someone other than men. Cebs agrees that they meant visible to men. This short interaction, then, might show that Cebs has a tendency to try to exploit and amplify small ambiguities, which might strike us as a tactic of an antilogikos.

In spite of these potential red flags with Cebs’ character and the apparent points in favor of Simmias, David Sedley has argued that it is in fact Simmias who is in danger of misology (Sedley 1995). According to Socrates, misology arises as the result of accepting and rejecting many arguments before coming to believe that no argument is sound. As Sedley emphasizes, according to this passage what in particular leads to misology is an uncritical acceptance of arguments, which then must be abandoned because they are problematic (14). And, in contrast to Cebs, who, as we have seen, is identified as skeptical of arguments that come his way (cf. 63a2, 77b1), Simmias is more credulous. Thus, according to Sedley, Simmias is the one in danger of misology. Indeed, as Socrates points out, in order to endorse the harmony view, Simmias has to jettison the

289 In fairness to Cebs, we might think that in contrast to Simmias’ objection to the Affinity Argument, which Socrates points out conflicts with Simmias’ acceptance of recollection, and then dispatches easily, Socrates esteems Cebs’ objection. Indeed, Socrates claims that his is an important problem (96a1). It seems that if Cebs were on the verge of becoming a misologist, Plato would not ascribes to him such a worthwhile argument for fear that it might paint misology in a good light.

290 In addition to this, at 95b3 Socrates tells Cebs not to boast (“μὴ μὴγα λέγε”) which might suggest that Cebs is not taking the proceedings seriously enough.
Recollection Argument, to which he has already agreed. And, when Socrates points this out, Simmias immediately abandons his new view. So, in the span of a few pages we see Simmias change his mind twice on the very same issue. Moreover, departing from other readings, Sedley negatively evaluates Simmias’ remaining uncertainty. Since, it comes from Simmias’ self-professed pessimism about the human capacity for knowledge (107b1), Sedley thinks that his skepticism goes beyond what is healthy. Furthermore, Sedley believes that because of this skepticism, Simmias has given up the hope for certainty, and is no longer searching for it, but is content to settle for probability, as indicated by his stated reasons for positing the harmony theory.  

Of course, an alternative way to read the misology passage, one that exculpates Simmias and Cebes, and perhaps Pythagoreans at large, is to see it as a general warning to those trying to practice philosophy. Perhaps Socrates’ thought is that the feeling of misology is natural when one who lacks the techne of argumentation (90d1) engages in, or witnesses, a philosophical discussion about an important and difficult issue. That this is a possibility for people in whom the love of wisdom has not taken complete root explains why Socrates points to the dangers of misology. That is, because it is a danger, one must be warned against it in order to guard against it. Moreover, even if we think that the Phaedo represents Plato’s attempt to provide solid justification for true but unsubstantiated Pythagorean views, we need not conclude that he thinks that

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291 For present purposes, there is no pressing need to object to Sedley’s reading of Simmias. But, there are concerns with it. Sedley’s reading requires that Simmias go through the stages leading up to misology very quickly, since he goes from too credulous to too skeptical in the span of the discussion. Moreover, Simmias’ pessimism regarding the human capacity for certainty does not seem to arise from his acceptance and then rejection of arguments in the discussion. Instead, his position appears to be longstanding, and hence, does not seem to be a sign of a slide into misology (cf. Bolotin 1987: 46).

292 The same can be posited as an explanation as to why Plato, as the author of the dialogue, inserted the warning, as a warning to his readers. Indeed, Echecrates’ reaction to Phaedo’s retelling of the discussion might be meant to anticipate the reader’s reaction.
Pythagoreans do philosophy in the wrong way, or, using Socrates’ initial phrase, do not “partake worthily in [philosophy]” (61d1). Instead, we might think that Pythagoreans are potential philosophers in need of Socratic training in order to learn to love wisdom the correct way. Thus, despite the foregoing, it remains difficult to say with certainty that the Pythagoreans are the group Plato has in mind as doing philosophy in the wrong way.

2. False philosophers outside of the Phaedo

We have just considered the three most likely groups of false philosophers in the Phaedo. As we have seen, evidence can be offered for and against identifying each candidate group as the target of Plato’s concern. And, because there seems to be little else in the Phaedo to assist us in deciding between these groups, we must look outside the dialogue for help. Fortunately, the Republic and the Euthydemus both feature discussions that deal with the issue of false philosophers. Accordingly, I here set out the relevant aspects of these discussions to help us to adjudicate between the groups set out above.

In Book VI of the Republic Socrates continues making his argument that the rulers of his ideal state would be philosophers. Although all present follow along and agree with Socrates, Adeimantus claims that most people would still resist their conclusion. According to him, most people believe that philosophers are either depraved or, if they are decent, then they are useless (487d1). Socrates’ response to the latter

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293 Scholars overwhelmingly agree that Plato composed the Phaedo and the Republic around the same time. Bluck 1955: 3 goes further, suggesting that these two dialogues were planned together in advance. Whether or not this is the case, and indeed, whether or not the dialogues are contemporaries, there is good reason to use Republic VI, at any rate, to understand certain aspects of the Phaedo. The reason is that the same view of the relationship between virtue and wisdom that I argue we find in the Phaedo appears in Republic VI. I make the case for this claim in the Conclusion.

294 Apparently the view is that it is fine to “dabble” in philosophy while still young in order to round out one’s education. This should be compared with Isocrates’ claims that Platonic philosophy is not really
criticism—that the decent philosophers are useless—is the famous ship of state analogy, with which he argues that decent philosophers are useless because of the current constitution of the state, not the nature of philosophy. For our purposes, though, it is Socrates’ reply to the former criticism, namely that most philosophers are depraved, that is most important.

Socrates’ response is that because most people with philosophical natures abandon philosophy due to the current, corrupted condition of states, those who are not naturally suited to philosophy take it up. These people, in fact, have defective natures, but since they see that philosophy, which has a certain prestige, has been “orphaned” (495c2), they swoop in and live a life they are unworthy of. And, in doing so, these people give philosophy a bad name (cf. 499e1-500b4).

Unfortunately, Socrates does not have much to say about these fraudulent philosophers, and what he does say is of little help (on its own, at least) in determining who this group is. For instance, he says that these people were the best at their own low arts before fleeing them to go to philosophy (495d3). He also says that members within this group of posers are always disparaging one another and indulging in their love of quarrels (φιλαπεχθήμων, 500b3). This claim may seem to indicate that Socrates has the Sophists in mind.295 After all, Sophists are often thought of as contentious, both in the sense that they battled with words, and in the sense that they were disliked by many other political groups. Moreover, since they were competing for the same clientele, the Sophists had reason to disparage each other. Indeed, we see this in some of Plato’s philosophy at all but a sort of mental gymnastics that is good to prepare the mind for actual philosophy (Antidosis 266). See Natali 1987: 23,7 and note 300 below.

295 Hackforth 1952: 143 takes this to be a reference to Isocrates (cf. de Vries 1953). Below (note 300) I explain why I think this is incorrect.
dialogues. However, based on what else he says—and what he does not say—in this discussion, Socrates cannot believe that the Sophists are the fraudulent philosophers. We know that whoever this group is, most people take them to be proper representatives of philosophy, which is why philosophy has a bad name. However, in his explanation of the corruption of those with philosophical natures, he explicitly claims that most people call the Sophists ‘sophists’ (493a3). Hence, people distinguish the Sophists from the (false) philosophers, indicating that these groups are not one and the same. Of course, it could be the case that people simply call the Sophists ‘sophists’ while at the same time thinking that the Sophists are philosophers. However, if this were the case, we should expect Socrates to say so. But, he does not. Moreover, the way he describes the Sophists, as private teachers, does not resemble anything he says about the false philosophers. Indeed, Socrates actually defends the Sophists (to some degree), claiming that they are not the great corruptors of youth that most people say they are (492a4-b1). Accordingly, it seems that Socrates does not think that the Sophists are the counterfeit philosophers. But, whom he does have in mind remains a mystery. At least, that is, until we turn to Book VII.

Toward the end of Book VII Socrates cautions against exposing young people to dialectic because (at least in the current state) they treat it as a game of antilogic (ἀντιλογία 539b2). Further, once they have been refuted and refuted others a number of times, they come to disbelieve everything they believed before. And, in so acting, they slander (διαβάλω) the whole of philosophy (τὸ ὀλον φιλοσοφίας). In contrast, Socrates says, someone who is older will not play at contradictions (ἀντιλέγοντα) but will engage

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296 In the dialogue named for him, Protagoras barbs Hippias for teaching his students useless subjects (318e3). And, in the dialogue named for him, Meno claims that Gorgias ridiculed (other) Sophists for claiming to teach virtue (95c2).

297 It is worth noting that Protagoras identifies himself as a sophist in the dialogue named after him (316c4-317c3). He never, however, suggests that he is a philosopher.
in discussion searching for the truth and bring honor to the philosophical way of life (539c3). Thus, here Socrates contrasts those who engage in argumentation with the aim of contradictions with those who engage in it with the aim of truth, which is what genuine philosophy concerns. And, whereas the former bring disrepute to the whole of philosophy, the latter honor it. Importantly, the fact that the people who engage in argumentation only for the sake of contradicting someone bring disrepute to the whole of philosophy suggests that outside observers mistake them for philosophers.298

So, in this passage from Book VII Socrates identifies an activity that is mistaken for—and so gives a bad name to—philosophy. If we put this passage together with the passage from Book VI, then we get the result that the practitioners of this activity are the false philosophers who are to blame for the bad reputation of philosophy. And, as we can see from Book VII, the activity in question is antilogic. Of course, this is the very activity that the antilogikoi in the Phaedo are engaged in. Thus, these passages from the Republic give us strong reason to suspect that the antilogikoi are false philosophers in the Phaedo. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that in this passage in Republic VII Socrates frames his concern about dialectic in a way that recalls one of his comments about the antilogikoi in the Phaedo. As we saw above, in the Phaedo Socrates says that the antilogikoi end up believing that they are wise because they realize that there is no soundness in any argument or anything in the world. So too, in Book VII Socrates says that the people who engage in antilogic come to disbelieve everything that they believed.

298 At Republic 498a2 Socrates mentions people who think that they are fully trained in philosophy having studied in youth but abandoning it when they get to the hardest part, the giving a rational account (χαλεπώτατον το περὶ τούς λόγους). This suggests that what precedes the giving of an account is also philosophy. So, perhaps this is what these characters are engaged in, but are engaged in without aiming at the truth or aiming at an account of what they discuss.
before, suggesting that they are, or at least on the road to being, the *antilogikoi* he describes in the *Phaedo*.

Books VI and VII of the *Republic* seem to provide good evidence that the *antilogikoi* are the false philosophers in the *Phaedo*. If we turn to our second dialogue, the *Euthydemus*, we find confirmation for this conclusion. The *Euthydemus* consists in Socrates relating to Crito his interaction with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, two brothers who claim to teach virtue and wisdom. Despite their claims to prodigious knowledge, as we see throughout the dialogue these brothers do not have virtue or wisdom to teach, nor are they capable of teaching anything. To put it bluntly, they are ridiculous.\(^{299}\) For our purposes, though, we need not review their antics; instead we will pick up the dialogue in its final scene.

Near the conclusion of the dialogue it is Crito who is relating to Socrates an interaction he had. According to Crito, an unnamed person\(^ {300}\) who witnessed Socrates’

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\(^{299}\) Gifford 1905:15-16 considers the possibility that at least some of the arguments in the dialogue are meant by Plato to mock Antisthenes. This is plausible given the fact that Antisthenes was a rival of Plato’s and was interested in contradictions. Moreover, he was a former student of Gorgias who was considered anti-theoretical. And, although Antisthenes was a follower of Socrates and is present in the *Phaedo* he may have conflated Socrates with the Sophists. Finally, according to Diogenes Antisthenes wrote his *Satho* about Plato after Plato mocked him for trying to prove the non-existence of contradiction. None of this should be taken to indicate that Dionysidorus and Euthydemus were not real people. On the contrary, we have evidence from elsewhere that they existed; Xenophon mentions Dionysidorus in *Memorabilia* and Plato and Aristotle mention Euthydemus in *Cratylus* (386d) and *Rhetoric* (ii 24), respectively.

\(^{300}\) Many commentators presume that this person is meant to be Isocrates (see, for instance, Cooper’s introduction to the dialogue in *Plato: Complete Works*). In fact, given that this unnamed person is a writer of court speeches (and believes himself to be wise), which was the case for Isocrates, this presumption seems warranted. However, I do not think it is correct. First, as Morrison 1958: 210 points out, at the dramatic date of the dialogue Isocrates would have been 17, too young to be the person with whom Crito talks. Second, the unnamed person in the *Euthydemus* says that philosophy (φιλοσοφία, 304e5) is worthless. But, Isocrates would not say this about philosophy, which he thinks is a worthwhile endeavor, and something he takes himself to be engaged in (for how to understand Isocrates’ conception of philosophy, see Wilcox 1943 and Timmerman 1998). Isocrates’ criticism of Plato was not that Plato did philosophy, but instead that what Plato did was not philosophy. At *Antidosis* 266 he writes, “I do not, however, think it proper to apply the term “philosophy” to a training which is no help to us in the present either in our speech or in our actions, but rather I would call it a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy” (for a relevant discussion, see de Vries 1953). This is to say that the disagreement between Isocrates and Plato was in part over the nature of philosophy, not whether philosophy was worthwhile.
encounter with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus cited the interaction as evidence that philosophy is worthless (304e3-305a1). It is the unnamed person’s reaction to the brothers that links the *Euthydemus* and *Republic*. For, Crito’s unnamed discussant inhabits the very sort of position that in the *Republic* most people are said to inhabit: this person confuses false philosophers for true philosophers, and as a result, thinks that philosophy is disreputable and useless. Thus, I venture that in the *Euthydemus* we see two examples—Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—of the sort of people described in *Republic* VI with defective natures responsible for philosophy’s bad reputation. That is, in the dialogue we find two people who are not psychologically equipped to be philosophers, but are engaging in philosophy anyway, and as a result, cause others to conclude that it and its practitioners are worthless. Hence, we find two people who are examples of the false philosophers described in *Republic* VI.

There is further evidence throughout the dialogue to support this suggestion. Importantly, it seems that the brothers also take themselves to be philosophers. Indeed, Socrates explicitly requests that they persuade Clinias to take up philosophy (275a4) because they are the best people to urge someone to philosophy (275a1). Thus, they are presenting themselves to the world as philosophers. Yet, as we know from their displays—and the impression they make on those present—they are pitiful at arguing.

Accordingly, if the unnamed person in the *Euthydemus* were Isocrates, he would deny that what Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were doing is philosophy, but rather a useless form of mental gymnastics. Given that Plato and Isocrates disputed over the nature of philosophy, and which of the two of them was engaged in true philosophy, it seems like Isocrates would be a viable candidate for the false philosopher in the *Phaedo*. However, there is no evidence from the dialogue itself that would support his candidacy. Moreover, although there appear to be allusions to Isocrates in *Republic* VI (487c5 mentioned above, as well as 598a2, and 504b1-c4), he does not seem to be the sort of person Socrates has in mind as the depraved philosopher. Indeed, in the *Phaedrus* Socrates claims that Isocrates has the love of wisdom in his mind (279a6), suggesting that if he is anyone from Book VI, he is a natural philosopher who has been corrupted.

301 In contrast to Protagoras (see note 296 above). Also unlike Protagoras, who explicitly identifies himself as a sophist, there is no suggestion in the *Euthydemus* that the brothers are sophists.
Moreover, at the very end of the dialogue Socrates advises Crito to consider philosophy itself, not those who practice it, if he wants to determine whether or not it is valuable. Thus, Socrates is acknowledging that the brothers are engaged in philosophy but are not engaged in it in the correct way. But, despite his irony in praising the brothers throughout the dialogue, Socrates knows as well as we do that they are not worthy of philosophy, being neither skilled enough to offer worthwhile arguments, nor interested in the truth. Hence, they seem to be paradigmatic false philosophers.

In addition to the portrayal of the brothers as poor specimens of philosophers, there are other points of direct contact between the *Euthydemus* and *Republic* VI. Rather than offering arguments aimed at the truth, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus provide arguments aimed at refuting and embarrassing their interlocutors, and pretty bad arguments at that. Thus, although they are not labeled as such, it would be fair to characterize the brothers as lovers of quarreling. Moreover, above I noted the curious claim from *Republic* VI that the false philosophers have left their own petty crafts to take up philosophy, and this is exactly what the brothers have done; formerly they were trained in and trained others in armored fighting as well as verbal fighting in courtrooms (271c2-272b3). Hence, prior to taking up philosophy, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were practitioners of other, lesser, arts. Thus, these brothers are well matched to Socrates’ description of the unworthy and loathsome practitioners of philosophy in the *Republic*.

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the dialogue named for the former are portrayed as engaging in philosophy, but doing it in a poor, and indeed, damaging manner. Based on this portrayal, the brothers also fit the description of the group of

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302 According to 498a2 (see note 298 above) the brothers may in fact be engaged in philosophy to some degree.
unworthy philosophers in *Republic* VI. Since *Republic* VI is the most sustained and detailed discussion of false philosophers in the corpus, based on the evidence just adduced, we can conclude that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are paradigm examples of people engaging in philosophy in the wrong way. This alone suggests that Plato has a similar group in mind in the *Phaedo* when he hints at the wrong way to do philosophy. And, given the similarity between relevant aspects of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* VI along with *Republic* VII, we can be confident that this is the case. Thus, I offer that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus do philosophy in the wrong way according to the *Phaedo*.

Having followed the trail of the false philosopher through the dialogues and finally coming to the explicit examples of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, what remains is to compare them with the list of suspects from the *Phaedo* itself canvassed above. Fortunately, this exercise presents no obstacles, as it is plain that the brothers are perfect examples of the *antilogikoi* mentioned in the *Phaedo*. Thus, it follows that in the *Phaedo* the *antilogikoi* are the people who are doing philosophy the wrong way. I’ll turn now to what this can tell us about Plato’s view on the correct way to do philosophy.

3. A characterization of true philosophy

The above discussion draws to a close the investigation into which group in the *Phaedo* is identified as engaging in philosophy the wrong way: it is the *antilogikoi*. Now it is time for this investigation to pay dividends, as I have hypothesized that identifying the wrong way to do philosophy would aid us in determining what true philosophy looks like in the *Phaedo*. Accordingly, in this section I will consider what doing philosophy the wrong way might tell us about its genuine counterpart. I will also consider what positive
evidence we find about doing philosophy the right way in the *Phaedo*. I will begin the final stretch of the investigation with the *antilogikoi*.

Above we saw that there are two instances in the *Phaedo* where Socrates mentions antilogic explicitly. I also suggested, however, that the fact that there are only two passages, both of which are brief and far from explicit is reason to doubt that the *antilogikoi* are the false philosophers in the dialogue. But, both passages, in particular the first passage, come at important junctures in the discussion. Moreover, as this final section will reveal, although brief, both passages provide key characteristics of the *antilogikoi* that contrast with genuine philosophy, but also that make it so similar to genuine philosophy so as to be dangerous. In order to begin to see this, let’s recall what Socrates says about the *antilogikoi*.\(^{303}\)

In the first passage, at 90b3-c5, we see that the *antilogikoi* are not interested in truth. Instead, these thinkers reject the possibility of truth, believing that all arguments (and even all things that exist) are unreliable and unstable. Moreover, they think that they are wise on account of this belief. In the second passage, at 101e1, Socrates says that they mix up the hypothesis and its consequences, discussing them both at the same time. Whatever it is that Socrates has in mind, we can at least be confident that he is taking issue with their method—or lack thereof—of argumentation. Because they do not

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\(^{303}\) Above, when I initially discussed the *antilogikoi* I suggested the possibility that the Sophists are the *antilogikoi* or at least part of them. This, as I noted, is the consensus view. In this section, however, I have argued that in *Republic* VI the Sophists are distinct from those who do philosophy in the wrong way. But, this group has turned out to be the *antilogikoi*. Accordingly, in *Republic* VI the Sophists are distinct from the *antilogikoi*. This leaves us with two general possibilities. One possibility is that the view in the *Phaedo* differs from the view in *Republic* VI with regard to the Sophists. Perhaps this difference is explained by Plato changing his mind about the Sophists. Or, perhaps it is explained by a difference in emphasis, or a particular point Plato is making in one of the dialogues. The second possibility is that Plato never includes the Sophists in with the *antilogikoi* (even if the Sophists employ similar arguments). If this were the case it might suggest that Plato held the likes of Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus in a higher regard than the consensus scholarly view maintains. This would be a significant discovery, one that would influence our understanding of many of the dialogues featuring Sophists. At any rate, for present purposes, I will remain agnostic about the relationship between the Sophists and the *antilogikoi* in the *Phaedo*. 
distinguish the hypothesis from its consequences the *antilogikoi*, even if they were interested in truth, would not be able to evaluate an argument properly in order to test and acquire true beliefs.\(^{304}\)

If these are features of doing philosophy the wrong way, then we can use them to help characterize true philosophy. The second passage indicates that engaging in philosophy the right way requires inquiring into questions with the proper method.\(^{305}\) The first passage proves even more fruitful. From it we can surmise that engaging in philosophy the right way requires believing both in the possibility of discovering truth and in the power of argumentation to deliver us to truth. Moreover, if we attend to the lines that precede it—where Socrates mentions people who lack skill in argument—and the lines that follow it—where Socrates says that it is pitiable to blame reason rather than one’s own lack of skill when one has unwisely accepted an unsound arguments—we see that engaging in true philosophy requires one to remain convinced of the power of argumentation in the face of setbacks. Further, these surrounding lines show us that rather than abandoning reason, a true philosopher will strive to become more skilled at understanding and evaluating arguments. Moreover, all of this reinforces the point we have already seen, namely that those who philosophize in the wrong way, unlike those who do it correctly, lack skill in the proper method of arguing.

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304 Although found outside of the *Phaedo*, it is worth mentioning a brief discussion about antilogic from the *Republic*. As an aside at 454a1-4 Socrates mentions to Glaucon that antilogic has the ability to ensnare people without them realizing it. In particular, Socrates says that people can think that they are engaging in discussion (διαλέγεσθαι) but are actually engaged in contentious arguments (ἐρίζειν). Further, he says, “they pursue mere verbal contradictions of what has been said and have a dispute about what has been said rather than have a conversation” (Grube’s translation with modifications). This passage, then, suggests that antilogic deals not in what is real, but only in words. In contrast, philosophy, and the true philosopher, are concerned exclusively with what is real.

305 Compare Diotima’s depiction of the “ladder of love” in the *Symposium* (210a5-212b1), which prescribes the proper order in which someone should move to more and more abstract conceptions of beauty.
If we consider the first passage, 90c1-4, in its context, we can tease out further features of the true practice of philosophy. Recall that Socrates brings up the *antilogikoi* in the course of his warning against misology. The *antilogikoi*, it seems, are the most extreme examples of misologists, as they are completely convinced that arguments are useless in acquiring truth (because they deny the existence of truth) and, perhaps because they spread their disease to others by displaying arguments aimed at contradictions rather than truth. Thus, genuine philosophers will use arguments to pursue the truth and engender in others a love for wisdom. This is precisely what Socrates requests Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to do for Clinias in the *Euthydemus*. Of course, they cannot, but as we see (e.g., 278e2-282a5), it is Socrates who can do this.

We must also take heed of what Socrates says about misology more generally. In Socrates’ estimation, “[t]here is no greater evil one can suffer than to hate argumentation (λόγους μισήσας)” (89d1). Observant readers of the *Phaedo* will note that Socrates earlier claims that the “greatest and most extreme evil” is that every time someone experiences an intense pleasure or pain, she necessarily thinks that what caused it is most real and true (83c1-4). I take it that Socrates has not contradicted himself in making these two apparently disparate claims about the greatest evil. But still, we must seek to understand how it is that these two evils are the same.\(^{306}\) I suggest that it is because they both lead someone to abandon (or fail to pursue) arguments and to come to the erroneous and disastrous conclusion that there is no reason to search for truth either inside or outside of the corporeal world.\(^{307}\) By this same metric, then, there is a sense in which misologists,

\(^{306}\) See Gallop 1975: 153-4, who suggests that these two evils “may, in Plato’s view, be related.” Also, see Stern 1993: 93 for a different understanding of how these two evils relate.

\(^{307}\) In the *Republic* Socrates mentions misology (411c4-e3). There he says that this condition can be caused by the weakening, deafening, and blinding of the love of learning in someone’s soul on account of an
and so the *antilogikoi*, are the worst off of all people. Whereas other body lovers, on account of their commitment to the body and the bodily, believe that the corporeal world alone contains truth, the *antilogikoi* deny that truth exists even here.\(^\text{308}\) Accordingly, the soul, which I have argued desires only to be with what is true and real, is in a way more cut off from what it desires in the case of the *antilogikoi*.\(^\text{309}\)

This point brings us to Socrates’ only explicit characterization of philosophy in the dialogue, namely that philosophy is practice for death. In fact, at 64a1 Socrates identifies practice for dying and death\(^\text{310}\) as the one aim (οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι) of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner. By contrasting them with the *antilogikoi*, we can see how philosophy is preparation for death. The *antilogikoi* disavow truth and as a result abuse argumentation rather than using it to pursue truth. Moreover, their disdain for reason is the greatest evil insofar as it will keep their souls from ever escaping their corporeal prison. True philosophers, on the other hand, are aiming at separating their souls from their bodies. And, we see that they do this by believing in the possibility of truth and by believing that argumentation and

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\(^{308}\) According to what Socrates says after his discussion of misology and *antilogic*, it seems that philosophizing the wrong way ultimately collapses into the deviant form of honor loving (i.e., the species of honor loving that does not issue in political virtue). At 91a1 Socrates comments that he is in danger of not having a philosophical attitude toward their discussion but instead having the attitude of a lover of victory (ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως) who cares only about winning an argument rather than pursuing the truth. Of course, Socrates *does* have a philosophical attitude toward the discussion—he is only in danger of not having one—for, as he says, he is only concerned with convincing himself of the truth (91a6). What this suggests, then, is that *antilogikoi* are lovers of victory, a species of honor loving.

\(^{309}\) As noted above (note 307) Socrates also mentions misology in the *Republic*, there claiming that it weakens and makes deaf and blind the soul’s love of learning. Later in the dialogue Socrates says that by its very nature the soul is philosophical because it is akin to the divine (611d6-e1). Thus, in the *Republic* misology cuts the soul off from its very nature. I am arguing that this is also the case in the *Phaedo*.

\(^{310}\) Ebrey (forthcoming): 16 argues that death and being dead are different states. On his view death requires separation of body and soul while being dead requires separation of body and soul and that the soul is itself by itself.
reason will be their deliverance. Thus, it is plausible that these commitments, along with skill in the correct method of argumentation, are what define the true philosopher.\footnote{Most of the debate with regards to characterizing the true philosopher in the \textit{Phaedo} revolves around the question of whether or not the philosopher is ascetic (for instance, see Woolf 2004, Butler 2012, and Ebrey (forthcoming)). I do not include asceticism on the list of features of the true philosopher because asceticism of a certain kind follows from these characteristics I have listed. That is to say, abstaining from bodily pleasures, etc., is a sign that one is a philosopher, not primary and defining feature of a philosopher. Avoidance of the bodily is precisely what most people think of when they think of philosophers 64a2-c1), but this betrays a superficial understanding of the philosopher and why she is like this (“they are not aware of the way that true philosophers are nearly dead” 64b6). Put another way, the philosopher does not engage in mere avoidance of bodily pleasures, although this follows from her love of wisdom and devotion to reason (cf. Bluck 1955: 150). This devotion to reason weakens the force of bodily desires (cf. \textit{Rep.} 485d3-6: “[w]e surely know that when someone’s desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened…[t]hen when someone’s desires flow toward learning and everything of that sort, he’d be concerned, I suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself, and he’d abandon those pleasures that come through the body—if indeed he is a true philosopher and not merely a counterfeit one”) and at the same time leads her to realize that the corporeal is not real, which will, in turn, make her less attracted to anything bodily. Thus, asceticism of a sort follows from a true love of wisdom. But, can a love of wisdom follow from asceticism alone? According to the picture that we get in the \textit{Phaedo} being separate from the body (whether before or after corporeal death) is sufficient for the soul to be with the Forms (79d1-4). Thus, if being ascetic without yet loving wisdom were to separate the soul from the body, it seems that this would be sufficient for the soul to be with the Forms, which would in turn, make the person a lover of wisdom. However, given that the soul is imprisoned in the body until philosophy gets hold of it (82d6), it seems psychologically impossible that a person could be ascetic in the right way (that is, not for the ultimate purpose of avoiding bodily pain or for fear of missing out on pleasure) such that the soul could become separate from the body without first loving wisdom.}

Given the presence of the theory of Forms in the \textit{Phaedo} and the significant role they play in several of the arguments in the dialogue, it is worth entertaining whether true philosophy also requires one to have a particular cognitive attitude toward Forms. For instance, perhaps a true philosopher must have (complete)\footnote{I add the parenthetical to leave open the possibility that there is a distinction between knowledge that a Form exists and knowledge of what the Form is, only the latter of which would require an account, and so, would be complete.} knowledge of the Forms.\footnote{Vasiliou 2008: 237-242 argues that this is the case in the \textit{Republic}.} This, however, cannot be the case. First of all, as we have seen\footnote{See p. 117 above} the evidence suggests that Socrates is a philosopher and takes himself to be one. But, it is not obvious that Socrates has (complete) knowledge of the Forms, since when given the opportunity to endorse the claim that he has such knowledge, he does not take it (76b5). Second, it seems that the correct view must be that one is a true philosopher before acquiring...
knowledge of the Forms, which is surely constitutive of wisdom. After all, it must be the case that one acquires (complete) knowledge of the Forms by being a true philosopher. Thus, if being a true philosopher required possessing (complete) knowledge of the Forms, one would have to possess this knowledge before being a philosopher, but, there would be no way to acquire it. Hence, being a true philosopher cannot require knowledge of the Forms.

Since being a true philosopher cannot require knowledge of the Forms, perhaps it only requires belief in the existence of the Forms.\(^{315}\) This would stand to reason since the Forms are most real and most true. And, not only is pure reality and truth what the soul itself desires,\(^{316}\) since we have seen that the genuine philosopher is committed to truth, it would seem to follow that she is committed to what is most true, Forms. Moreover, in *Republic* VI Socrates says something that might indicate that believing in the Forms is required of true philosophers. He asks Adeimantus whether, “the majority [can] in any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful itself, as opposed to the many beautiful things, or the reality of each thing itself, as opposed to the corresponding many?” Adeimantus answers in the negative, which leads Socrates to claim “[t]hen the majority cannot be philosophic” (493e1-494a2).\(^{317}\) Thus, it looks like Socrates is suggesting that one must believe in the Forms in order to be a true philosopher.\(^{318}\)

Of course, this passage from *Republic* VI need not be read as indicating that one must already believe in Forms in order to count as a true philosopher. Instead, the


\(^{316}\) See Chapter Three.

\(^{317}\) This should be compared with the argument against the lovers of sights and sounds at the end of Book V (474c3-480a5). See Vasiliiou 2008: 237-242.

\(^{318}\) To this list we might also add the conception of philosophy as preparation for death, which seems to require the belief that the Forms exist. However, as we shall see, this need not be the case.
passage could be understood as indicating that someone who cannot accept the existence of the Forms cannot be a philosopher. Thus, a necessary condition for being a philosopher is the ability to believe in the Forms. However, this is not to say that being a true philosopher requires that one already believe in the Forms.\textsuperscript{319}

Moreover, it is worth pointing out that it seems to be the case that in the \textit{Phaedo} belief in the Forms is not sufficient for being a philosopher. This is because Simmias and Cebes, as well as perhaps all of those present in the \textit{Phaedo}, believe in the existence of the Forms. Indeed, at 77a2 Simmias says that nothing else is more evident to him than that the Forms exist. But, at the same time, there is good reason to doubt that either Simmias or Cebes is a true philosopher.\textsuperscript{320} As we see from their discussion of Evenus—whom they think engages in philosophy worthily—they do not know what a true philosopher looks like, which suggests that they are not true philosophers themselves. Moreover, this shows that they are not fully committed to the philosophical tenet that the aim of a philosopher is practicing for death, as they identify Evenus as being committed to the bodily. This same point can be gleaned from their unwillingness to let Socrates die. In the final scene no one present, including Simmias and Cebes, is able to hold back their tears.\textsuperscript{321} While we might sympathize with them, this display is evidence that those present

\textsuperscript{319} We might find the same point in the background in the argument against the lovers of sights and sounds in Book V (see 476c2). Moreover, we might understand the argument fundamentally as setting out what the power of knowledge is in comparison to the power of opinion, rather than an argument about who is and who is not a philosopher. Further, although one of Socrates’ points in this argument is that philosophers have the power of knowledge insofar as they study things in themselves, this does not require that they have knowledge of the Forms at the outset of this study.

\textsuperscript{320} This is not to say that they are engaging in philosophy the wrong way. Rather, they are on their way to becoming philosophers; they just have further way to go. See Bluck 1955: 149, who writes, “Before he has passed through the initial training, he is not a philosopher at all: his love of true wisdom is not born until he ‘begins to catch sight of’ the ultimate aim”.

\textsuperscript{321} Jansen 2013: 348-349 rightly points out that whereas Socrates admonishes his friends for weeping at his death (117d4-e2), he accepts, if not praises, the tears of the guard who delivers the hemlock (116d5, “καὶ νῦν ὃς γενναίως με ἀποδυκρῖει”). Jansen’s explanation is that unlike Socrates’ friends, who weep uncontrollably and on account of death, the guard is controlled and weeps only for the loss of a new friend.
are still, to some degree at least, controlled by their bodily emotions and appetites. Hence, we can infer that to some degree, however small, they are still body lovers, which, as we know, means that they cannot yet be philosophers. Thus, since Simmias and Cebe believe in the Forms but are not yet philosophers, we can at least conclude that believing in Forms is not sufficient for being a true philosopher.

So, in the Phaedo believing in Forms does not seem to be sufficient to be a philosopher. And, according to the Republic, belief in the Forms might not be necessary for being a philosopher. To all of this, there is one final, and complicated, piece of evidence to consider. What I have in mind is the case of the historical Socrates. It seems that given the dramatic context of the Phaedo—Socrates’ death—and what rides on being a true philosopher—having virtue and enjoying a proper afterlife—we should be surprised if Plato chose this dialogue to deny, even if only implicitly, that (the actual) Socrates was a true philosopher. But, there is reason to believe that Socrates did not believe in Forms, at least not as separable as they are in Plato’s middle dialogues. This evidence comes from Aristotle, who explicitly claimed that Socrates did not separate out the Forms (Metaphysics 1.6, 987a31-b10; 13.4, 1078b29-31; 13.9, 1086a30-b12). Thus, if Aristotle’s report is correct, and if belief in the Forms were required to be a true philosopher in the Phaedo, then we would have to think that—despite the portrayal of the character Socrates in the dialogue—the historical Socrates was not a true philosopher.

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While this is plausible, another explanation could be that Socrates’ friends claim to love wisdom and desire to be philosophers, and so, the fact that they succumb to their emotions is more shameful since they are not comporting themselves as philosophers.

Here I am assuming that the Socrates that we find in the early dialogues reflects to some considerable degree the historical Socrates, or at least Plato’s understanding of him.

Nehemas 1990: 10-12 (cf. Peterson 2011: 2511-254) raises a similar concern for trying to distinguish between Socrates’ elenchus and the methods of the Sophists.

For a discussion, and an argument for the possibility that the historical Socrates did separate the Forms, see Brink (unpublished).
Of course, I cannot resolve this issue here. Nor, I think, do I have to do so, as I shall explain. However, it is worth pointing out the available evidence that might contradict Aristotle’s testimony.\textsuperscript{325} Perhaps the most compelling evidence comes from the \textit{Euthyphro}, the dialogue that is staged just before Socrates’ trial. In this dialogue, which scholarly consensus puts as an early work, Socrates seems to commit to the existence of Forms. In interrogating the dialogue’s namesake about piety Socrates says,

\begin{quote}

instruct me then what this form itself (\textit{με αὐτήν δίδοξον τὴν ἠδέαν}) is, so that I may look upon it (\textit{ἀποβλέπων}) and, using it as a model (\textit{αὐτῆ παραδείγματι}), say that an action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not (6e3-5, Grube’s translation with modifications).\textsuperscript{326}
\end{quote}

In this passage Socrates quite clearly commits himself to the existence of a form of piety. Moreover, he here claims that possessing knowledge of the form piety would enable someone to judge whether or not an action is pious. Thus, this passage seems to provide us with strong evidence that even in the early dialogues Socrates accepts the existence of the forms.

Some commentators might resist this conclusion by arguing that this passage does not commit Socrates to the separate existence of forms, and so, not to Forms in the relevant sense. They might argue that what Socrates says only commits him at most to immanent forms. Thus, they might say that even if Socrates accepts some version of forms in the \textit{Euthyphro}, what he accepts differs significantly from what we find in the middle dialogues, including the \textit{Phaedo}.

\textsuperscript{325} In addition to considering evidence along these lines, some scholars question whether Aristotle was in position to know Socrates’ view. See Burnet 1911: xxiii-xxv, Kahn1996: 83-87, Rowe 2007: 43, 48, and Notomi 2013: 51-54.

\textsuperscript{326} For a recent discussion of this passage see Gerson 2014: 412-16 Gerson argues that evidence such as this indicates that Plato never had a Socratic period in his written philosophy, rather than indicating that the historical Socrates may have believed in the existence of Forms.
There are several counterpoints to such an argument, however. First, based on what he says in this passage Socrates must think that there is at least a sense in which the form can be separated from its instances. After all, he requests that Euthyphro provide him with the form of piety, separate from examples of pious actions. Second, it is significant that Socrates says that he wants to look upon (ἀποβλέπων) this form of piety that is separate from examples of piety. Although “looking upon” something might seem to require that it be in the corporeal world, we must remember how Socrates talks about Forms in the *Phaedo*. For instance, at 65d4 in discussing the Forms, Socrates asks Simmias, “have you ever seen any of these with you eyes” (ἠδὴ οὖν πῶποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες). Thus, both in the *Phaedo* and the *Euthyphro* although Socrates employs language relating to literal sight, what he actually means is a sort of mental ‘seeing’ with which one grasps forms. Third, we can make a similar point about Socrates’ use of the word ‘model’ (παράδειγμα) in this passage from the *Euthyphro*. The very notion of a model suggests that it stands apart from its instances, which, of course, is a primary feature of separate Forms. Importantly, in middle dialogues Plato indicates that Forms are models. For instance, in Book VI of the *Republic* at 484c4 Socrates contrasts the philosophers, who have knowledge of the Forms, with non-philosophers who “have no clear model in their souls, so that they are incapable of… looking to what is most true, making constant reference to it, and studying it as exactly as possible” (μηδὲν ἐναργῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐχόντες παράδειγμα μηδὲ δυνάμενοι… εἰς τὸ ἀλήθεστατον ἀποβλέποντες κάκεισε ἂει ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἴον τε ἀκριβέστατα). This passage emphasizes the intelligibility of Forms, indicating that they can be understood as models in the soul, which can be (mentally) looked at (“ἀποβλέποντες”), referred to, and
studied. Fourth, we can point out what Socrates says about the Forms in the *Phaedo* itself. In the lead up to his final argument Socrates refers to the Forms as being ‘much spoken about’ (πολυθρύλητος) and says that in discussing Forms he is not going to say anything new but will say what it is that he has never stopped talking about (100b1-4). So, according to Socrates in the *Phaedo*, the Forms are not new to him or to his discussions. This indicates that Forms, as they are presented in the *Phaedo* are also in dialogues that predate the *Phaedo*.

So, there is good evidence from the dialogues to doubt Aristotle’s claim that Socrates did not countenance separate Forms. In fact, there is also tantalizing evidence from outside of Plato’s dialogues that suggests that the historical Socrates did believe in separate Forms. In the *Clouds* Aristophanes has one of Socrates’ students use the phrase “αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτὸ,” ‘itself by itself’ (193-195). Of course, this is the phrase Plato employs in many dialogues, including the *Phaedo* (e.g., 83b1), to designate the Forms. Importantly, in this passage from the *Clouds* the phrase is part of a punch line, which likely means that it would be broadly recognizable as being affiliated with Socrates. Moreover, the passage is about looking toward the heavens and learning, which suggests that the phrase is linked with contemplation, just as it is in Plato’s works. Finally, since Aristophanes wrote the *Clouds* some two decades before Socrates’ execution, we know that the playwright was not borrowing this phrase from Plato’s dialogues, but instead attributing it to Socrates himself. Accordingly, in the *Clouds* we find a phrase associated with the Forms of the middle dialogues being associated with Socrates, which provides some further evidence that Socrates believed in something like the Forms.

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For these reasons, then, it seems that evidence tips in the favor of the view that the historical Socrates (at least as understood by Plato) did believe, to some degree, in the separable Forms. Of course, this does not mean that true philosophy in the *Phaedo* requires belief in the Forms. Indeed, there is reason to think that although all philosophers believe in the Forms, it is not a fundamental feature of true philosophy. Instead, belief in the Forms follows from four more fundamental features of true philosophy.328

First and foremost,329 true philosophy requires a commitment to the truth.330 Second, it requires a commitment to employing reason to pursue truth. Because this requires the devaluation of the bodily, in contrast to the rational, the commitment to reason is what effects the separation of the soul from the body. Hence, insofar as death is the separation of the soul from the body (64c3), philosophy is preparation for death.331 Third, it requires a faith in argumentation, such that in the face of refutation and argumentative difficulty, a true philosopher looks for better arguments and seeks to improve her own skill in argumentation, rather than finding fault in argumentation itself and abandoning it.332 Finally, true philosophy requires employing the proper method of argumentation to test claims and beliefs, and to evaluate the arguments of others.333

328 So, in this way even if the historical Socrates did not believe in the existence of Forms, I suggest that what Plato portrays in the *Phaedo* is a natural extension of Socrates’ beliefs and philosophy.
329 See Dilman 1992. As Woolf 2007 argues this desire for the truth could come apart from the belief in the existence of the Forms, should the Forms not exist. But, unlike Woolf, I do not think there is any tension in the dialogue. For, more than anything the philosopher wants truth, even if that truth is that the soul is mortal and that Forms do not exist.
330 I take it that being a true philosopher is a normative notion. So, in Woolf 2007: 2 the parenthetical claim that the pursuit of truth for its own sake is what philosophers should be engaged in is incoherent, as one could not be a true philosopher without being engaged in this pursuit.
331 Woolf 2004: fn 49 takes the myth to imply that wisdom and virtue only motivate insofar as they are required for a blessed afterlife. But, this gets the picture the wrong way round; the very reason that a blessed afterlife motivates the philosopher is because it will allow for the continued pursuit of wisdom. Hence, the philosopher welcomes death precisely because of her desire for truth.
332 These three features together provide another way in which we can understand philosophy as the preparation for death. The philosopher does not desire death itself, but death insofar as it is the separation of the soul from the body. Thus, from the commitment to the pursuit of truth with reason through
If these features—all four of which are formal—correctly capture the qualities of true philosophy, then a true philosopher would be committed to searching for truth outside of the corporeal world. This is because a true philosopher would never give up on searching for the truth with argumentation. As a result, a true philosopher would undoubtedly come to believe in something like the Forms.

Before closing I would like to draw our attention to three final points about these features and this characterization of true philosophy. First, if this characterization is correct, then one can see why Plato included in the dialogue a warning against misology. Because philosophy requires argumentation, it is dangerous, since unless one develops skill as well as faith in argumentation, one can become a misologist. Indeed, all of argumentation it follows that true philosophy is preparation for death inasmuch as a philosopher has developed her reason to the point that she will be able to continue the search for truth outside of the corporeal world, where truth does not exist. The Forms per se need not exist for truth to exist outside of the corporeal world. Indeed, in the Apology Socrates indicates that in death he might have the chance to continue his pursuit of truth in the afterlife without presuming it is because he will be with the Forms. Moreover, one can be an anti-materialist without subscribing to the theory of Forms. And, we have reason to believe that the historical Socrates was an anti-materialist (Rashed 2009: 122), and hence, denied that truth would be found in the corporeal world.

333 In addition to setting this discussion out as a paradigm of how to proceed, along the way Socrates draws attention to at least a few aspects of the proper method. Obviously, Socrates explicitly states that one must keep distinct the hypothesis from its consequences, testing the latter first before moving up to the former. Following Blank 1986, Sedley 1995: 16-17 and Jansen 2013: 33-34 argue that in the discussion of method Socrates also sets out how to deal with an interlocutor who is too quick to accept a view on offer. Finally, Elton 1997: 313 has argued that Socrates provides the Affinity Argument as an example of a way not to argue. His claim is that Socrates rejects analogical arguments and offers the Affinity Argument to bring Simmias and Cebes to see the problems inherent in such arguments. 334 Blank 1986, Sedley 1995: 16-17 and Jansen 2013: 33-34 all suggest that cooperative discussion brings with it the dangerous possibility that an interlocutor will agree too readily to a hypothesis without scrutinizing it thoroughly. Given how much they admire Socrates, it seems that Simmias, Cebes, and the others are in the greatest danger of this pitfall while engaging in philosophy with Socrates. Thus, in a perverse way, in contrast to their concerns, they may be in a better position to pursue philosophy once Socrates is gone. Along similar lines, Gower 2008 argues that Socrates’ reason for offering his intellectual autobiography is “to subvert the very notion of a philosophical authority-figure” (331) and to show the necessity of independent thinking in philosophy. For a counter to this interpretation, see Hoinski 2008. 335 Jacquette 2013: 6 claims that all one needs is faith in argumentation because “[s]kill in handling arguments can then be expected to take care of itself, occurring naturally through participation in the activity of dialectic.” But, this seems to overstate the case, as in order to develop skills, which may be needed to maintain the faith in argumentation, one will have to participate in dialectic correctly and with the right people (see Republic 359c4). Moreover, although faith alone may stave off misology, it seems doubtful that faithful participation in dialectical discussions is sufficient to acquire skill and become a
those present, and even Echecrates hearing the discussion second hand, begin to show
signs of misology based on witnessing a genuine philosophical conversation. Thus,
Socrates warns his friends to be on the lookout for the symptoms of misology, and
exhorts them to continue looking for and developing better arguments and better
argumentative skills. More than exhorting them to do this, he models how to do it,
setting himself out as the opposite of the misologist. And, with his persistence in and
commitment to argumentation, his unwillingness to abandon rational discourse even on
this, his final day, he serves as an example to his friends—and to all of us—of how to
respond to challenges in the search for truth.

Second, these features also allow us to see why Plato conceives of the antilogikoi
as doing philosophy the wrong way. The antilogikoi appear similar to true philosophers
based on the second and third characteristics above. That is, antilogikoi focus on
argumentation, which, to those who do not understand what philosophy is, appears like a
commitment to argumentation. Moreover, because of their use of argumentation and their
ability to win verbal disputes, such people will appear to be committed to reason, but in
fact will be merely clever (at best). Hence, Plato is concerned that the true philosopher
be distinguished from those who may appear to be philosophers but are actually frauds.

Even more important than philosophy’s public reputation, though, is that people inclined

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336 Morgan 2010 argues that Socrates wants to show that he is dispensable and wants his interlocutors to
learn to do philosophy for themselves. Spitzer 1976 argues that the immortality that is really argued for in
the dialogue is not that of the soul but of the argument (i.e., rational discourse).
337 See Republic 539c4: “He will imitate someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look
for truth…”
338 Depending on the situation, an antilogikos may also give the impression that he is concerned with the
truth. However, of all of the characteristics of the false philosopher, it is precisely the lack of concern—
even disdain—for the truth that defines him. In contrast to the false philosopher, a body-lover is in a way
concerned with the truth, it is just that she believes the corporeal world to be the most real, and so pursues
truth without reason or argumentation.
toward philosophy (in the case of the *Phaedo*, Socrates’ friends) need to be aware of the difference between true philosophy and *antilogic*. For, mistaking antilogic for philosophy is a sure way to become a misologist yourself and to take others with you.\(^{339}\)

Finally, I want to suggest that this characterization of true philosophy conforms reasonably well to how Socrates portrays himself and his conception of philosophy in the *Apology*.\(^{340}\) There, Socrates eschews possessing wisdom and instead claims only to have human wisdom, which arises as a result of his awareness that he lacks true wisdom.\(^{341}\) It is precisely this awareness that compelled Socrates to his investigations; because he was aware that he lacked wisdom, he worked to attain it.\(^{342}\) As we know from his reports in his defense speech, and from Plato’s other dramatic portrayals of the character based on him, this work included developing a method for testing and evaluating claims and arguments, the *elenchus*. Importantly, this method was employed rationally, faithfully, and always guided by the desire for the truth, not for mere victory.\(^{343}\) So, even in the crucible that is the *Phaedo*, when Plato’s new philosophical views begin to move to the forefront of the dialogues, Socrates still remains a true philosopher. And, I would venture

\(^{339}\) Indeed, according to *Republic* 454a1-4 (see note 304 above) people accidently engage in antilogic thinking that they are engaged in genuine discussion. Curiously, Socrates refers to antilogic as an art (τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης). But, it seems that it is an art that can be dabbled in without intending to do so.

\(^{340}\) Butler 2015 provides a rather different argument than the one I offer here for the same conclusion (cf. Notomi 2013). He also makes the case that the view we find in the *Apology* conforms to what Socrates says about philosophy and the philosopher in the *Apology*.

\(^{341}\) See Futter 2013

\(^{342}\) Whether or not it is genuinely Plato’s work, the *Clitophon* shows that an awareness of one’s own ignorance is not sufficient to be a philosopher. In response to realizing he lacks wisdom, Clitophon wants simply to be told by Socrates or anyone else—Sophists included—what virtue is, rather than doing the philosophical work to get closer to an understanding of virtue.

\(^{343}\) Given the context of the *Apology*, both in terms of the audience and in terms of what is relevant, we should not be surprised that Socrates does not offer much detail about any positive views he has. See Burnet 1911: l-li.
that it is precisely through his practice of Socratic philosophy that Plato was able to develop these views that moved beyond Socrates’ own.\textsuperscript{344}

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued for a certain conception of philosophy in the *Phaedo*. Given that I have earlier argued that it is not possessing wisdom but desiring it that makes one virtuous, this chapter sheds light on what it is to be virtuous according to the *Phaedo*. There is another issue, however, that I have not touched on, namely how one becomes a true philosopher.

Although he does not furnish us with an answer to this question, Socrates does provide a description of what it is like to become a philosopher:

> The lovers of learning know that when philosophy gets hold of their soul, it is imprisoned in and clinging to the body… the lovers of learning know that philosophy gets hold of their soul when it is in this state, then it gently encourages it and tries to free it… Philosophy then persuades the soul to withdraw from the senses insofar as it is not compelled to use them and bids the soul to gather itself together by itself, to trust only itself and whatever reality, existing by itself, the soul by itself understands… (82d6-83b5).

A bit after saying this Socrates continues by claiming that once philosophy has freed the soul, it realizes that “while being freed” it would not surrender to the bodily passions that had imprisoned it in the first place (84a2). This makes it sound like a conversion to philosophy is permanent, since philosophy has freed the soul, which will have no reason to surrender itself again.\textsuperscript{345} And, given the nature of the soul,\textsuperscript{346} it only has reason to

\textsuperscript{344} See Most 1993 for the provocative argument that Socrates’ famous and enigmatic last words are meant as an indication that Plato, as opposed to other Socratics, is his philosophical heir and “custodian of his arguments” (110).

\textsuperscript{345} If this is correct, then perhaps once someone is a philosopher in the fullest sense, she will have no reason to indulge in bodily pleasures, etc., as she will know that they are not (the most) real. Thus, her avoidance
remain free. That is, the free soul will have no motivation to engage in bodily activities, as it will realize that the body is what previously imprisoned it. Socrates does not indicate how much time elapses between when philosophy initially takes hold of the soul and when the soul has become freed. However, the idea that philosophy does take hold of the soul and then encourages and persuades it to free itself suggests that once this happens, freedom is a near inevitability.

If this is correct, although we would like to know how exactly philosophy persuades the soul to withdraw from the senses and rely only on reason, the more pressing question is how does someone get to the point that philosophy can take hold of her soul? Surely this requires that one engage in earnest in philosophical discussions in the manner of a true philosopher. And, given that Socrates twice encourages his friends to continue such discussion when he is gone (78a5 and 107b3), Socrates must hope that by the time he takes the hemlock he has convinced them that this is something they can and must learn to do without him.

\[346\] See Chapter Two.

\[347\] As Woolf 2004: fn.40 points out, in this passage the soul is portrayed as passive. This seems to indicate that at best the soul can get itself in position to be taken hold of. But, if the soul is completely passive, it is not even clear how it can do this much. That is, it seems completely out of a soul’s control as to whether or not philosophy ever takes hold of it.
Conclusion

In this study I have advanced an interpretation of the ethics and moral psychology of Plato’s *Phaedo*. Although this interpretation is now complete, as always with philosophy, further work remains. So, I want to conclude by offering some suggestions as to the direction such work might take, as well as how my present findings might apply to Plato scholarship more generally. Before doing so, however, I want to tie together the arguments from my four chapters.

In the *Phaedo* we see Socrates on his final (corporeal) day, as reported by our dialogue’s namesake to a group of eager listeners. These listeners want to know the details of Socrates’ last day and of what he said. Phaedo’s audience is right to be eager, as the details of both are remarkable. But, that Socrates ends his time on earth as he does—by engaging in philosophy—is unremarkable. It is unremarkable because this is how he wants to spend every day.\(^{348}\) Indeed, based on his defense speech in the *Apology*, we know that his commitment to living philosophically is one reason why he is about to be executed. Here, in the *Phaedo* he is able to give a proper defense of philosophy to a philosophically inclined jury. And, in doing so, he reveals to them, and to us, why philosophy is worth dying for and is so important.

According to the Reprise and the *Phaedo’s* myth, unlike other souls, the soul of the philosopher avoids reincarnation and spends eternity with the gods. As we know from throughout the dialogue, eternity spent in this way holds the promise that the philosopher will be able to attain what she wants, wisdom (φρόνησις) and truth. Indeed, the desire for wisdom and truth will continue to motivate the philosopher after corporeal death, just as

it is what motivates her in her embodied life. Because she engages in philosophy the right way, that is, by pursuing the truth above all else, and doing so with skill in argumentation and unwavering faith that it will deliver her to truth, the philosopher will free her soul from its bodily prison. In doing so, her soul will be able to satisfy its only desire, to be with what is most real and true. Indeed, all souls share this desire. But, because souls of non-philosophers are deceived by bodily pleasures and pains into thinking that the corporeal world is most real and true, they desire only to be with the bodily, and so, remain enslaved by the body, even when they no longer inhabit it. As a result, the desire for truth is perverted into bodily desires, which rule the lives (and afterlives) of non-philosophers and become the standard for all of their decisions. It is for this reason that all non-philosophers are body lovers. And, as body lovers, they think that virtue results from exchanging one bodily experience for another. For instance, they think that temperance is foregoing the possibility of a current pleasure in order to experience less pain in the future. But, this is not genuine virtue. So, at best non-philosophers can only possess merely apparent virtue, which results from consistently engaging in these sorts of exchanges. The philosopher, though, does possess genuine virtue, which is the result of exchanging everything for what she desires, wisdom and truth. Thus, true philosophy brings with it virtue, and this is also what frees the soul from the body, enabling it to be with what is most real and true.

_Avenues for future research_

Because it offers a new interpretation of virtue, the soul, and philosophy, which is positioned at the forefront of the dialogue, my dissertation opens new possibilities for
research both within the *Phaedo* and throughout the corpus. Here I will suggest a few possibilities that hold promise.

By design, the present study of the *Phaedo* focuses almost exclusively on ethics and moral psychology. Thus, unlike other large-scale investigations into the dialogue, which tend to emphasize the four arguments for immortality, my dissertation does not devote space to working out these arguments. Instead, I have used the insights from them to help to make sense of the ethics and moral psychology of the dialogue. This approach to the arguments for immortality, then, leaves open at least two possible areas for future research within the *Phaedo*. First, with my interpretation of the fundamental aspects of the dialogue now in place, I could return to the individual arguments for immortality. It is likely that considerable headway can be made in understanding these arguments now that the overall themes and concerns of the dialogue have been laid out.

A second, related investigation would concern the relationship among the arguments themselves. How do the arguments Socrates advances for the immortality of the soul relate to one another? Why does he offer them in the order that he does? And, why does Plato offer them in this order? In terms of priority, the second two questions rank ahead of the first, as the rationale for their order would likely shed light on the individual arguments. The current study suggests several possible explanations for the ordering of the arguments. For instance, the arguments might be ordered in increasing difficulty and subtlety, aimed at improving the interlocutors’ (and readers’) skill in arguing, a trait needed for true philosophy. Relatedly, the earlier arguments might have flaws that could be exposed under scrutiny, so as to provide room for evaluating and

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349 For instance, are the Cyclical Argument and the Recollection Argument meant to be a single argument, with the former proving continued existence of the soul after death and the latter proving pre-existence before birth?
criticizing arguments, perhaps in the way Socrates prescribes in his methodological
discussion. Or, it might turn out that the arguments proceed in such a way that Socrates is
able to model faith in argumentation, even in the face of argumentative setbacks.

Aside from examining Socrates’ arguments for immortality, a third direction for future research would be to look more closely at the dramatic elements of the dialogue. Among the many questions worth considering about these aspects of the dialogue perhaps the most basic and the most pressing is ‘why is the Phaedo so dramatic?’ In particular, since bodily pleasures and pains keep the soul imprisoned in the body, why did Plato risk inducing sympathy and sadness in his readers at the death of Socrates? Of course, given that it portrays Socrates’ dying day, evoking these emotions is inevitable to some degree, save for avoiding this day as a setting for any dialogue, or perhaps ending the dialogue before the hemlock is administered. But, as a dramatist, Plato seems to heighten the emotions beyond the necessary point by having those present weep and lament as they do, unable to hold back their tears. So, why would Plato risk exposing his readers to such a scene and opening us up to experiencing the same dangerous emotions experienced by those with Socrates?

There are answers available to these questions amenable to the interpretation of the dialogue for which I have argued above. For instance, Martha Nussbaum has suggested that Plato included the emotional outbursts in order to highlight how a true philosopher, Socrates, acts. Thus, on this suggestion, Plato may have included these aspects in order to make more vivid how exactly a true philosopher acts. Nussbaum has

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350 Elton 1997 argues that this is the case with the Affinity Argument. Bluck 1955: 18 maintains that Plato only thought that the final argument was convincing but used the others to show the necessity of a non-mechanistic view to undergird any successful argument for immortality.
351 Nussbaum 1992: 126 claims: “Socrates the hero, by contrast, confidently pursues the search for understanding...”
also offered another, more provocative explanation. According to her other suggestion, if we as readers feel overcome by emotions while reading the dialogue, Plato expects us to “reprimand” ourselves, just as Socrates does to those overly emotional characters.\(^{352}\)

Thus, on this suggestion these elements might act as a litmus test for ourselves to determine how far we are from being true philosophers (at least on the metric of susceptibility to emotions). But, even if this second suggestion is correct, and Plato included these elements so that we can diagnose whether we are true philosophers, how are we supposed to react if we experience dangerous emotions? That is, how are we to reprimand ourselves, and how would this make us better at loving wisdom? The difficulty is that according to the dialogue, a person becomes a philosopher by coming to love wisdom and pursuing the truth in the correct way. But, how must one respond to emotions in order to facilitate this attitude toward truth? Along with this question there is room to investigate the dialogue’s view of shaping (or pruning) the emotions with regards to moral education and character reformation more generally.\(^{353}\)

In addition to these areas for further research with the dialogue itself, perhaps the most fertile possibilities would arise from trying to reconcile aspects of my interpretation with what we find elsewhere in Plato’s corpus. To this endeavor there can be no other starting point than the conception of virtue and its relationship to wisdom. As we have seen, if my interpretation is correct, then it seems that the view of virtue in the *Phaedo* is

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\(^{352}\) Nussbaum 2001: 131.

\(^{353}\) This point can be extended to a related concern about punishment. Given Socrates’ claim that intense pleasures and pains necessarily connect the soul to the body (83c3-d1), what is the proper form of punishment for wrongdoing? Elsewhere Plato seems to think that punishment via the infliction of pain could cause a wrongdoer to associate pain with whatever criminal action she previously associated with pleasure. On this view, then, punishment can rewire someone’s appetites so that she no longer has a desire for vicious activities. Thus, painful punishment is beneficial for the punished (see Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 108-132). However, based on what we find in the *Phaedo*, such punishment would forge the bond between the soul and the body, and so, would not rehabilitate the wrongdoer in the true sense. Indeed, on this view, punishment might even be bad for the punished.
radically different than the views found everywhere else in Plato’s works. So, why is the view of virtue found in the *Phaedo* so different from what we find elsewhere in the dialogues?

Of course, there are answers to this question that do not require looking outside of the dialogue. For instance, maybe the dialogue’s dramatic setting furnishes us with a solution; perhaps Plato wanted to provide an understanding of virtue that would allow Socrates to be virtuous on his final day while remaining true to Socrates’ disavowal of wisdom. Or, Socrates’ particular interlocutors and audience—all of whom seem to be philosophically inclined, in contrast to many of Socrates’ interlocutors in other dialogues—might explain the peculiar view. Finally, it is possible that the absence of ‘σοφία’ (at least genuinely ascribed) holds the key. Recall that ‘σοφία’ occurs only twice in the dialogue and is never associated with the true philosopher. Instead, ‘φρόνησις’ is always used to refer to the wisdom sought and experienced (79d1-4) by the philosopher. Thus, this leaves open the possibility that the dialogue is consistent with other Platonic views on the relationship between wisdom as σοφία and virtue.

While these and perhaps other explanations are available, I want to venture the possibility that the view that I have argued we find in the *Phaedo* might actually be present in other dialogues. That is, in answer to the above question, it might be the case

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354 For instance, Rowe 2007: 97 claims that the apparent differences in doctrine between the *Apology* and the *Phaedo* are due to the difference in Socrates’ audiences. Also, as we saw in Chapter Four, the *Phaedo* is infused with many Pythagorean elements, which perhaps might explain the dialogue’s unusual view of virtue. Finally, it is worth acknowledging—even if we as historians of philosophy are not in a position to pursue—the possibility that the historical personage of our narrator, Phaedo, who composed philosophical Socratic dialogues, bears on this aspect of the dialogue. See Boys-Stones 2004 for the claim that the psychology in the dialogue is presented ‘from the point of view’ of the historical Phaedo’s psychological theory (23).

355 Thus, σοφία might be identical with virtue, or it could be required for virtue. Of course, both views would engender puzzles about the relationship between σοφία and φρόνησις.

356 For instance, one might suggest that the notion of virtue we find in the dialogue is peculiar to this particular discussion. The most likely conception of virtue would presumably be ‘purifying’ virtue, which Damascius: 84-88 and Olympiodorus: 118-124 discuss. See note 4 above. Cf. Bluck 1955: 4.
that the view in the *Phaedo* is not anomalous. If this were so, then the present study could be the first step in a new understanding of Platonic ethics more generally. Although I cannot undertake such a task here, I will offer a few preliminary observations that motivate my suggestion that this view of virtue is not limited to the *Phaedo*.

In Chapter Four I noted that in Book VI of the *Republic* we find what appears to be the Phaedonic view of virtue. Here I will defend this suggestion and provide textual evidence that the view I have argued for from the *Phaedo* is what we find in Book VI.

At the conclusion of *Republic* Book V Socrates argues that philosophers alone possess knowledge. Socrates’ first order of business of Book VI is to show that in addition to possessing knowledge philosophers are superior to other potential rulers with regards to virtue (484d6). The way Socrates argues for this claim suggests that Plato has in mind a conception of virtue similar to what I have argued we find in the *Phaedo*. This is because Socrates does not argue that since philosophers alone possess wisdom, they are the only potentially virtuous rulers, which is how we would expect him to argue if the possession of virtue requires the possession of wisdom. Instead, he argues that someone who is a true philosopher (εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἄλλ᾽ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος τις εἶ, 485d6) will have all of the virtues on account of her philosophical nature, that is, her love of wisdom and truth (485c4).357 This is because “when someone’s desires flow toward learning and everything of that sort, he’d be concerned, I suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself and he’d abandon those pleasures that come through the body”

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357 There are, of course, alternative interpretations. For instance Lane 2007 argues that this section of Book VI is about natural virtue rather than genuine/complete virtue. However, this interpretation does not suit Socrates’ explicit purpose, which is to show that philosophers are virtuous, not merely naturally virtuous.
Thus, this seems to be the view found in the *Phaedo*. Moreover, as in the *Phaedo*, the first two virtues that Socrates mentions in *Republic* VI as following from the philosopher’s desire for wisdom are temperance (485e2) and courage (486b2), which he connects with the fact that the philosopher will not think death is terrible. According to this passage from the *Republic*, the philosopher’s virtue results from her desire for wisdom, which, in turn, leaves her without any desires for anything in the corporeal world. This, of course, is what I have argued is the case in the *Phaedo*.

I believe that in addition to the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, we can find other passages throughout the corpus where Plato expresses this central aspect of the Phaedonic view of virtue by portraying the philosopher as wholly uninterested in the corporeal world. For instance, near the end of Diotima’s speech in the *Symposium* the philosopher ascending the ladder of love is said to grasp the Beautiful itself, which is not polluted by the ‘great nonsense of mortality’ (πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, 211e2). Indeed, to call mortal things—which given the contrast with the divine just are corporeal things—‘nonsense’ not only expresses a lack of concern for them, it seems to betray a disdain for them. And, if as is presumably the case, we can generalize from the example of Beauty to other Forms, then all corporeal concerns, even if they participate in the relevant Forms somehow, are nonsense compared with Forms themselves. We find a similar point in Book VII of the *Laws*. At 803 b4 the Athenian says, “[n]ot that human affairs are worth taking very seriously—but take them seriously is just what we are forced to do, alas.”

These passages suggest that the philosopher does not care—or at least would prefer not to

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358 This is not to suggest that the virtues arise *automatically* from a desire for wisdom (see Ferrari: 2009: 132). Indeed, as we have seen, it takes considerable work to be a true philosopher, to have one’s desires actually flow toward learning, and so, to have virtue on this view.

359 Saunders’ translation. cf. 804b3, where the claim is that our human nature makes us like puppets, and so, hardly real.
have to care—about anything in the corporeal world, and is instead truly concerned only with the divine. Because this view is at the heart of my understanding of virtue and wisdom in the *Phaedo*, investigating such passages, and trying to sort out how they fit in with the whole of Platonic philosophy, would be a natural extension of the current project.

In addition to these topics, there are several other issues that were uncovered in the course of my inquiry into the *Phaedo* that could serve as future research projects. For instance, in Chapter One we saw that unlike other interpretations, on my interpretation the philosopher can possess virtue while embodied. An important, and perhaps far-reaching project would be to investigate whether this puzzle arises elsewhere, and if so, how it is resolved. The same goes for questions surrounding political or civic virtue. As part of my argument in Chapter Three I offered evidence that, at least in dialogues before the *Republic* Plato seems to hold that political or civic virtue consists only in justice and temperance. A larger project would be to investigate why this is so, and consider any implications for Plato’s view beyond what I have argued for here. Finally, in Chapter Four we saw evidence from the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* that suggests that the Sophists are distinct from the *antilogikoi*. Because the Sophists are associated with *antilogic*, further work is required to make precise sense of this evidence. Moreover, this same evidence might be used to support the possibility that Plato evaluated the Sophists more favorably than traditionally interpreted. Accordingly, it would be valuable to pursue this evidence with these issues in mind.

Because it is such a rich dialogue, falling at the intersection of Plato’s early dialogues and his mature works, there are other issues beyond those mentioned here that
are worthy of investigation. Indeed, the very fact that an inquiry like the one just
completed could generate so many avenues for future research vindicates my starting
claim that the dialogue contains important insights into Plato’s ethical views and moral
psychology. Of course, my hope is that my present study has not only made good on this
claim, but that it has begun to make sense of these aspects of the dialogue.
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