Perceptual and Cognitive Qualia

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A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty
Of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

University of Virginia
May, 2020

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Abstract

by

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From the time you wake up from a dreamless sleep, there is a three-dimensional, multisensory, fully immersive movie playing in your head. This movie includes *perceptual experiences* that seem to include felt qualities like the soft, smooth feel of your pillow, or the visual blueness of the ocean. The movie also includes *cognitive experiences* like the realization that 'Today is Friday', and perhaps seeing that this means you will be meeting an old friend for dinner. There is something in common among all of these experiences: something it is like experientially simply to have them.

My dissertation seeks to explain the experiential feel of perceptual and cognitive experiences by saying what their common underlying structure is. Specifying something's underlying structure can explain its other properties, as when, for example, specifying the underlying structure of a skyscraper can explain its property of being a certain height, or being able to withstand a hurricane of a certain strength. Similarly, philosophers of perception offer accounts of the fundamental structure of experiences in attempts to explain why they feel the way they do.

I propose that both perceptual and cognitive experiences fundamentally consist in an immediate awareness of, or acquaintance with, qualities 'in the head.' Our immediate awareness of these intrinsic, introspectively accessible *qualities*, which I call qualia, determines the felt character ('phenomenal character') of our experiences. Compare the sense data theory, which

says perceptual experience consists in an acquaintance with mind-dependent *substances*—sense data—which really are the way they appear.

Leading claims of the new theory include: (i) experience is a subject's acquaintance with her own qualia, where acquaintance is an irreducible *relation to* qualia, not an *instantiation* of (intrinsic) qualia. (ii) qualia are instantiated by the subject, not the experience, and so enter in as *constituents* in the relation of acquaintance. (iii) qualia *intrinsically represent* external objects; that is, qualia in virtue of their intrinsic properties are 'about,' or are 'of', or 'point at,' external objects. (iv) One version of my theory says that perceptual qualia point by their intrinsic properties *resembling* the properties of worldly objects, while cognitive qualia point not by resembling. If the indirect realist, resemblance version of the perceptual qualia theory explains phenomenal character better than contemporary theories, then it has the historical significance of reviving a kind of resemblance account, akin to those held by Early Modern philosophers. The dissertation is also significant because there has been little overlap between the literatures on philosophy of perception and of cognition, and little overlap between philosophy of perception and debates over panpsychism. (i)-(iv) are defended at length.

Philosophers of perception distinguish between experiences that seem to be about the external environment—e.g. seeing mountains, feeling the coolness of a breeze—and (aspects of) experiences that don't—e.g. the blurriness of vision, feeling dizzy, orgasms. Philosophers have argued for standard qualia theories by appeal to non-outward pointing experiences. They do not argue for these theories by saying they account best for outward-pointing experiences. Chapter 1 is significant because it motivates a novel kind of qualia theory by arguing it accounts best for what it's like to have both outward pointing and non-outward pointing experiences.

Suppose you are looking at the orange leaves of a maple tree. One theory says this visual experience fundamentally consists in an acquaintance with those very leaves, their orangeness, and their shape. That theory is called naïve realism, a main rival to my qualia theory. Chapter 2 argues that the external qualities that naïve realism appeals to for constituting phenomenal character must be non-physical (mental or neutral), fundamental, and ubiquitous. If these properties are mental, then naïve realism entails panpsychism (i.e. mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous). If they are neutral, then naïve realism is at odds with three influential theories of mind and world (dualism, idealism, and physicalism) and, I argue, entails panprotopsychism (i.e. protoconsciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous).

Is there something it is like to think a conscious thought? Suppose you're reading an email chain. You read it from top to bottom, but it makes little sense because, unbeknownst to you, you're reading the conversation backwards. Then you read it bottom to top, and it all makes sense. What it is like to read the email chain the second time with understanding is noticeably different. Some philosophers maintain that felt differences like these are fully accounted for by sensory phenomenal character: e.g. by what it's like to imagine scenes in one's head, 'hear' one's inner voice, and changes in emotions. Others think there is more to the feel of such cognitive experiences than sensory character. Chapter 3 argues for the view that there is more to it. That there are irreducibly cognitive feels occasions a case for a theory of cognitive experience to account for them. I then sketch some reasons to prefer a cognitive qualia theory.

Philosophers of mind have fought over whether the mind is physical (physicalism), or whether it has irreducibly mental aspects (dualism). In the last decade philosophers have explored a third option, which says that irreducible mentality, including consciousness or thought, is ubiquitously instantiated in the natural world (panpsychism). Some are interested in

panpsychism because it agrees with the intuition that mental states aren't made out of matter, while providing a door for mental states to enter into causal relations with the external world. Panpsychists seek to explain experiences like ours by appeal to the combination of experiences at the fundamental level of reality. But they worry about how this might work. For instance, it's hard to see how the sensations of electrons' spinning up or down, or the sensations of any fundamental particles, could add up to the feel of the sun on one's face. Chapter 4 argues that my qualia theory can help solve this problem for panpsychists. Though the qualia theory neither entails nor is entailed by panpsychism, this chapter provides a reason for those attracted to panpsychism to favor the qualia theory.

This dissertation offers a new, unified account of the nature of perceptual and cognitive experience. Experience is an immediate awareness of qualities 'in here' that intrinsically point at the objects of experience.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to my advisers Harold Langsam, Walter Ott, and Brie Gertler for their many hours helping me with this dissertation. I thank Brie who, even while she ascended to the post of Dean of Arts and Sciences, continued to excel at bouncing around inchoate versions of my ideas with me; I profited greatly from her helping me see the eagle's eye view of the issues. I thank Walter, whose dealing out potentially view-changing objections in quiet, friendly fashion aided my thought immensely—only after I realized the questions were really bombs in favorable dress, of course! Most of all I thank Harold, my supervisor, whose steady and enthusiastic guidance turned a forgettable objection to a seminar paper, from my first year of graduate school, into a full-fledged theory of perceptual experience. These three are wonderful philosophers, but perhaps more importantly they show genuine care for their graduate students. Brie always went out of her way to send me detailed suggestions within hours of attending my presentations, and found creative ways to provide me with additional funding. Walter always, within a week, returned my papers with incisive comments, and answered emails even into the late hours of the night. And Harold, though his views on perception clash with my own, always worked with me magnanimously while challenging me to produce the best dissertation I could. I enjoyed the many hours I spent in his office debating and clarifying my ideas.

I am grateful to the philosophy faculty and staff at the University of Virginia for the nurturing environment they cultivated; they have only brought me good while I have been here. Thanks also to my fellow graduate students (at the time) for their helpful discussion on chapters of my dissertation. This list includes James Darcy, Andrei Marasoui, Derek Lam, Jonathan Barker, Nick Rimell, Matt Andler, Nikolina Cetic, and Bill Vincent.

Thank you also to my longtime friends, Omer Sagy, for the bike rides and hikes while discussing my ideas, and Frederick Johnson, for preparing me the evenings before my proposal defense and dissertation defense. I thank the Super Smash Brothers and Crossroads communities in Charlottesville, VA for keeping me sane while I have been here. Thank you to my parents, who always encouraged me to study what I loved. And thank you to Abigail, whose excitement and pride at my completing the dissertation surpassed even my own.

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CHAPTER 1

The Perceptual Qualia Theory

Abstract. As I look at a white teacup on its plate, I have an associated conscious visual experience, complete with something it is like to have that very experience—that is, complete with some phenomenology. When I close my eyes and merely imagine that same scene, I have another conscious experience, this time missing some key phenomenology from the first experience. What's missing is the seeming immediate awareness of consciousness-independent objects themselves. Qualia theories have typically been silent on how to account for this phenomenology. I argue that a new qualia theory accounts for this phenomenology across veridical and hallucinatory experience better than the leading theories of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue the most intelligible account should appeal to experience's being, fundamentally, an irreducible relation of conscious awareness, and that what a subject is aware of are a special kind of qualia: introspectively accessible intrinsic properties of the subject that represent—intrinsically!—the properties of external objects.

Keywords: phenomenological directness, transparency, perceptual experience, qualia, naïve realism, representationalism, adverbialism, sense data, hallucination

§1 Phenomenological Directness & Transparency. My perceptual experience of a white teacup seems to put my mind in a kind of direct perceptual contact with it and its properties. By this I mean the teacup phenomenally seems *immediately present* to me in a way it never does

when I merely consciously think or imagine it is in front of me: [1] I don't seem to be aware of the teacup in some mediated way, as one might argue is the case when I am aware of a photograph or video appearance of it; rather *the teacup itself* seems present to me. This 'phenomenological directness' of perceptual experience often compels us to believe in the actual presence of the objects presented. Boyd Millar (2014) explains how to isolate the two essential components of phenomenological directness:[2]

> *Object-immediacy*. Concrete objects seem to be presented directly, or immediately, to our consciousness.
>
> *Object-distinctness*. These objects that seem immediately present to us also seem separate, or *distinct,* from our consciousness of them.[3]

We isolate object-immediacy when we compare our visual perceptions of a teacup with our consciously thinking about or visualizing them. To isolate object-distinctness consider your brute sensation of colored phosphenes as you press on your closed eyes for some time. The phosphenes seem immediately present to you in a way they do not when you merely think about or imagine them later. Yet they don't seem to be presented as existing apart from your very experience of it. That is, this brute sensation possesses the phenomenology of object-immediacy but not object-distinctness. We isolated these two phenomenological features by considering other kinds of experience. But only perceptual experience possesses both. Hence phenomenological directness, the conjunction of object-immediacy and object-distinctness, is distinctive of perceptual experience.

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[1] Millar (2014, p.235) introduces phenomenological directness similarly.

[2] Philosophers of perception use different terms to refer to phenomenological directness. For example, Adam Pautz (2007) seems to refer to this phenomenology with the terms 'perceptual presence' and 'presentational phenomenology'. I use Millar's terminology of 'phenomenological directness' because he explicitly spells out its constituent phenomenological features.

[3] Millar (2014, p.240) says object-distinctness is the seeming presence of something distinct from one's *experience* of it. This accords with my saying it is the seeming presence of something distinct from one's *consciousness* of it.

To seem to be aware of an object, one must seem to be aware of some of its properties in *some* sense. For instance, without seeming to be aware of the greyness, roundness, hardness etc., of the boulder, it quickly becomes hard to see how one could seem to be aware of any boulder at all. This is not to say a seeming awareness of properties of objects reveals much about the nature of those properties, nor that actual such awareness does. It is just to note that phenomenological directness goes hand in hand with seeming immediate awareness of property instantiations.

Philosophers of perception have been captivated by the phenomenon of transparency. The intuitive idea behind transparency is that when one tries to turn attention to one's perceptual experience, the experience is 'transparent' in that one thereby seems aware of external objects and their properties, and never (or not usually) properties of the experience. I'll interpret transparency as i) phenomenological directness *plus* ii) the thesis that we can never be, or usually are not, aware of intrinsic properties of experience:

Phenomenological Directness: Object immediacy + Object distinctness.

Transparency: Phenomenological Directness + No (Usual?) Awareness.

So insofar as we are interested in transparency, we should be interested in phenomenological directness. Even if one rejects some version of transparency—e.g. qualia theorists like Block (1996) and Kind (2008) reject the stronger version according to which we are never aware of properties of experience—one may accept phenomenological directness.

This paper argues that a novel hybrid theory of perceptual experience accounts for phenomenological directness better than leading rival theories. The literature in the philosophy of perception has it that only certain kinds of theories account for this kind of phenomenology: representationalism or naïve realism. So it is significant that the offered theory is in an important sense a *qualia theory*. The paper's conclusion is significant more generally because accounting

for aspects of experience's phenomenology is a primary motivator for the leading perceptual theories (e.g. Harman 1990, Tye 2000, Pautz 2007, Millar 2014, Fish 2009, McDowell 1994, Kennedy 2009, Langsam 2017, Loar 2003b, Block 1996, Kind 2008).

We may understand experiences to be mental states or events that possess phenomenal properties. The phenomenal character of an experience is what it's like altogether to have that experience. That is, it's the sum of all the phenomenal properties of that experience, where phenomenal properties are understood neutrally regarding what theory might account for them. Perceptual experiences are experiences that are characteristic of the various sense modalities such as vision, hearing, and touch. Only perceptual experiences possess phenomenological directness, the conjunction of two phenomenal properties: object-immediacy and object-distinctness.[4] Perceptual experience may be veridical, or non-veridical. The latter include illusion, in which some of the properties presented as being instantiated are not instantiated, and hallucination, in which some of the objects presented as existing don't exist. Henceforth I will use 'experience' as shorthand for perceptual experience unless otherwise noted. Following Siegel (2006), a mental state is a representational state, or 'has representational content,' if and only if it has accuracy or truth conditions. I use the terms 'representational' and 'intentional' interchangeably.[5]

[4] One might think an experience of one's own bodily pains counts as a perceptual experience, while holding that pain experiences lack object-distinctness. For these philosophers, object-distinctness will not be an essential feature of perceptual experience. To them I say that I offer a theory of those perceptual experiences that seem to be as of objects that exist independently of our experience.

[5] Some philosophers distinguish intentional from representational properties. For example, David Papineau (2014) maintains that in order for an experience to represent x, x must really exist. This may be because he, like all externalists about representation, think that for a mental state M to represent (something of the kind) o implies the actual existence of (something of the kind) o or the reliable causation of M by o or some other external (e.g. functional or social) relation which includes o. Nevertheless, he thinks an experience e may still be intentional in that its intrinsic nature 'suits [it] excellently for certain representational purposes', even if the environment that e is suited to represent does not exist. When speaking specifically about qualia as I conceive of them, I will speak of a

In §2 I will explicate a new qualia theory of perceptual experience and how it accounts for phenomenological directness. §3 argues that adverbialist qualia theories do not account as intelligibly for phenomenological directness. §4 argues that representationalism that does not appeal to qualia accounts less intelligibly for object-immediacy. §5 argues that even disjunctivist naïve realism does not account intelligibly for phenomenological directness across veridical and nonveridical experience. §6 argues that the qualia theory is more ontologically sparse than sense data theory while still accounting for phenomenological directness. If successful, this paper constitutes a powerful phenomenological reason to prefer the proffered theory over these rivals.

§2.1 Qualia Theories & Intelligible Explanations. A theory of perceptual experience is a theory of what the ontological structure of perceptual experience fundamentally consists in. A constraint on such theories is that it accounts for phenomenal character (Logue 2017, p.43-44). The common thesis of qualia theories is that there are qualia instantiations, and that these account for what Crane (2006, p.142) calls the 'qualitative aspects' of phenomenal character, such as the phenomenal feel of redness, blurriness, and orgasms. Standard qualia theories say qualia are introspectively accessible, non-representational, intrinsic properties of experience that (partially) determine phenomenal character. Standard qualia theories are silent about how to account for transparency and phenomenological directness. I will offer a qualia theory that is a full-fledged theory of perceptual experience, which accounts for both phenomenological directness and the qualitative aspects of phenomenal character.

If some feature(s) of the phenomenology posited by a perceptual theory is *a priori deducible* from the ontological structure posited, then I will say the perceptual theory

kind of representing x that does not require an external relation. In those cases, when speaking of qualia themselves, I tacitly dispense with the distinction between intentional and representational.

'intelligibly accounts' for this phenomenology.[6] I use the terms 'derivable' and 'deducible' interchangeably. Moreover, I say x provides a more intelligible account of y than z just in case it is more obvious that y can be a priori deduced from x than z. One way to spell out why y is more obviously derivable from x than z is that x gives a simpler explanation of, or has less premises validly leading to, y than z (where, to avoid a limit case of accounting, x=/=y by stipulation). But I intend to remain neutral about how exactly to cash out 'more obviously derivable'. I take more intelligible accounts of phenomenal character to be preferable over less or non-intelligible ones, where available.

Harold Langsam (2018) gives a principled argument why a priori or 'intelligible' explanations for phenomenal character are preferable. In short, he argues that experiences and their phenomenal characters are property instantiations, and that perceptual theories are theories of the nature of the properties instantiated. And we'd expect the link from the nature of a property to the nature of its instantiation to be a priori. E.g., just knowing the nature of the property of being expensive we can know a priori the nature of an instantiation of expensiveness, e.g. know what it is for a car outside my window to be expensive. This is not to say we thereby know why the car is expensive rather than cheap. For this requires causal and economic knowledge, which is a posteriori. Similarly, knowing the nature of the property of being an experience, which includes its ontological structure, we should be able to know a priori the nature of instantations of experience, which includes their phenomenal character.

How might we come to know the nature of the ontological structure of experience? The following thesis would suffice:

[6] If the feature of the ontological structure is phenomenological directness itself, then would this be a limit case of 'accounting'? Yes. However, presumably perceptual theorists should explain the essential phenomenology of experience via features of the ontological structure other than the phenomenology (e.g. by saying some features of the structure *constitute* the phenomenology, where constitution is asymmetric).

> *Revelation*. Just by introspecting the phenomenal character of experience (or how things 'phenomenally seem') we are thereby in a position to know a priori, or have justified beliefs about, the full essential nature (including the ontological structure) of experience.

Revelation is controversial, and I do not assume it.[7]

But philosophers of perception maintain that experience's phenomenal properties are best explained by the ontological structure *their* theories posit. As an example, Millar (2014, p.250) argues that his representationalist structure suffices for object-immediacy. How does Millar know or justifiably believe this? Presumably, by reflecting on that structure from the armchair. To best make sense of such claims there must be a relevant sense in which we all presuppose something like Derivation:

> *Derivation*. By reflecting on a putative ontological structure of experience, one is thereby in a position to know a priori, or have justified beliefs about, whether experience will have some phenomenal property or kind of phenomenal character (if one has had an experience that instantiated that phenomenal property or kind of character before).[8]

Revelation and Derivation are both epistemic theses. Revelation describes an epistemic move from phenomenal character to ontological character, and Derivation a move from ontological character to phenomenal character. Revelation and Derivation do not imply each other.[9]

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[7] For example, Lewis (1995), Tye (2005, fn.16), Allen (2016), and Mendelovici (2018) reject Revelation. Goff (2017) defends Revelation at length. Most of the literature on Revelation focuses on Revelation about color, though not all; see Goff (ibid.) and Mendelovici (ibid.).

[8] The clause 'if one has had an experience that instantiated that phenomenal property or kind of character before' is required to avoid the implication that we could know the phenomenal character of an experience just by learning about the ontological structure of that experience via a textbook.

[9] One might think Derivation implies Revelation given the following premises:

1. We can move a priori from ontological character to phenomenal character (Derivation).
2. Only from one particular ontological character can we a priori deduce some relevant phenomenal character.

C. So, the theory with that ontological character is true. (from 1, 2.)

Notice that if (1) and (2) are true a priori, then Revelation is true a priori. For if one's experience instantiates some relevant phenomenal character, then one can use (1) and (2), where (2) specifies the relevant phenomenal character one has instantiated, and move a priori to some ontological character's being true (i.e. Revelation is true). (1) seems a priori if true at all. (2) seems a priori if true as well; arguing for (2) is the sort of project many philosophers of perception with different theories have undertaken from the armchair, and so is at least not

David Papineau (2002) once asked how we should expect it to feel to be in a brain state with such-and-such physical properties. This thought may be used to challenge Derivation. It brings to light the explanatory gap between physical properties and phenomenal properties. I merely note that even physicalist representationalists do not focus on the physical properties qua physical in explaining phenomenal character, but rather on their representational nature. Moreover, philosophers of perception may implicitly deny some stronger version(s) of Derivation, according to which every last aspect of ontological structure is relevant in deducing phenomenal character.[10]

§2.2 A New Qualia Theory. Here is the theory. A perceptual experience is a *primitive relation of consciousness of* (or direct acquaintance with, or immediate awareness of) one's own *qualia*, which represent external entities. I opt for a primitive mental, non-causal, and non-representational relation. An initial reason for this is for the sake of a more intelligible

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obviously true: I aim to show in this paper that my qualia theory, like naïve realism, can yield phenomenological directness in veridical experience. A consequence is that this argument for why derivation implies revelation fails.

Notice that an analogous argument also won't work to show Revelation implies Derivation. The attempt might go like this.

3. We can move a priori from phenomenal character to ontological character (Revelation).
4. If (3), then after having an initial experience, e1, and finding out its ontological character (a la Revelation), one can know whether a possible experience, e2, will have similar phenomenal character just by reflecting on its ontological character.

C2. So, we can move a priori from ontological character to phenomenal character (Derivation). (from 3, 4.)

The problem is that (4) assumes:

4.5 From similar ontological character we can a priori deduce similar phenomenal character.

But (4.5) assumes (C2): to know we can derive similar phenomenal character from similar ontological character requires knowing we can derive phenomenal character from ontological character. So this argument cannot be used to show non-circularly that Revelation together with (4) implies Derivation.

[10] One might fear that such a priori moves from ontology to phenomenal character rest on spatialized pictures of things that mislead: e.g. a diagram of the sense data theory might trigger a 'wouldn't feel direct!' phenomenological judgment. But, first it's not right that only diagrams are involved. As we'll see, I use thought experiments when reasoning e.g. that qualia (or even sense data) must be *intrinsically* intentional to account for the phenomenology. Moreover, one might enlist a priori premises in addition to the ontological structure in making the derivation.

explanation. That experience *is* genuinely an irreducible mental relation (ontology) most intelligibly explains why we *seem* to be related to objects without there seeming to be causal or representational relations involved (phenomenology). I will give further arguments against experience's being reducible to a causal relation later in the paper.

On my theory the subject and the qualia instantiated in her are the sole constituents of the experiential relation. Because qualia are constituents in this relation, and perceptual experience *is* a relation, qualia are not strictly speaking properties *of experience*. (Properties of experience would include, when one instantiates the relation: having-a-phenomenal character, being-polyadic, having-qualia-as-constituents, and so on.) Instead qualia are intrinsic properties *of the subject*. This unorthodox move is a natural result of the theory's saying perceptual experience is a relation. The move is in keeping with the spirit of qualia theories. For qualia are still consciously or introspectively accessible intrinsic components of experience that determine phenomenal character. (A component c of some entity e is a property, constituent, part, or aspect of e.) Conscious awareness of one's own qualia *constitutes* the phenomenal character of one's perceptual experience on this theory.

The nature of any given quale on my theory, a property of the subject, is such that there is an a priori link between a state's involving a conscious awareness of that quale and that state's having some phenomenal property. And the nature of complexes of qualia—e.g. a complex of 'red29', 'tomato-round', and 'bright' qualia—is such that a state's involving that complex has some phenomenal character. Compare how it is in the nature of any given sense datum,[11] a

[11] The sense data theory says perceptual experience is an acquaintance with mind-dependent substances that are exactly as they appear.

substance, that there is an a priori link between a state's involving a conscious awareness of that sense datum and that state's having some phenomenal character.

Prima facie, qualia are assessable for accuracy if they contribute to phenomenal character. For the best way of describing phenomenal character involves saying, for example: 'The experience is such that I seem presented with a green apple, or green qualities instantiated in such-and-such way together with shape qualities in such-and-such way.' That is, the most apt descriptions of phenomenal character imply accuracy conditions. To observe this is not yet to take a stand on whether phenomenology explains intentionality, or vice versa. But it does suggest that qualia or states that include qualia go hand-in-hand with that state's being intentional, i.e. have accuracy conditions. This qualia theory says that phenomenal character is constituted by both the representational properties supplied by the qualia, as well as by the non-representational non-causal awareness/acquaintance relation to qualia *itself*.[12] Though phenomenological directness is the focus of this paper, I appeal to modifications of the awareness relation to account for the qualitative aspects of phenomenal character. For instance, I say we are aware blurrily of qualia to explain blurry vision.[13]

The posited qualia are by nature *intrinsically intentional*. That is, qualia in virtue of their essential intrinsic properties represent substances, properties, and relations.[14] Why say qualia must be *intrinsically* rather than *extrinsically* intentional? Or, for that matter, why say qualia are

[12] We may say the awareness relation is a source of the experience's intentionality in some sense because it is an immediate awareness *of* qualia, which thereby yields an indirect awareness *of* the objects and properties the qualia represent. Such intentional directedness (to qualia) may be distinguished from the relation's being representational in the way qualia are representational.

[13] Crane (2006, p.130-131) and Kind (2008, p.288-290) argues blurry vision, for instance, is not best explained by an appeal to intentional properties, contra Tye (2000).

[14] One might worry that intrinsic intentionality, since it is internalist, faces Putnam's 'magic' or circularity/regress worries. See Mendelovici (2018 Ch9 & unpublished) and Loar (2003b) for possible replies.

representational at all? My main response will be to offer thought experiments. In section 2.4 I'll argue that intrinsically intentional qualia can intelligibly explain phenomenological directness in more experiences than extrinsically intentional qualia.

The second reason is a simplicity consideration I make here. It could be argued that a modified qualia theory—different from mine only in that qualia are necessarily connected to representational properties but do not intrinsically represent—might fare just as well against rival perceptual theories. Even if so, the intrinsically intentional qualia theory would be simpler in virtue of not having to appeal to further, extrinsic properties of qualia, giving us a reason to prefer it.

The third is that intrinsically intentional qualia can explain why, usually, we seem to be aware of that which the qualia represent, rather than qualia themselves. Compare with a dot on a map, which represents a city. An awareness of the dot won't make it seem like one is aware of a city. I suggest this is because the dot only represents the city in virtue of properties extrinsic to the dot: in particular, the mental states of those who view maps. *We're* doing the work of actively taking the dot to represent something, and so of course we notice the dot. By contrast we do not usually notice qualia, which are intentional in themselves. It seems no accident, then, that the Loarian (2003a, §6) strategy for noticing qualia requires actively conceiving of the experience as *lacking* any of its referents, and attending to what phenomenally remains.

Before replying to an objection to the third reason, I first distinguish between:

a) in virtue of what is some state a representation at all? And
b) in virtue of what is this state a representation of this or that thing?

My theory gives a definite answer to (a). The source of at least one kind of representation, the kind involved in perception, is intrinsically intentional qualia. But it remains ambiguous about

(b) in order to be ecumenical vis-à-vis a *primitive account of representatio*n, which for our purposes leaves it primitive how qualia represent, and *representation as resemblance*, which says that a mental state represents F only if some component of it, in our case some quale, is really F.[15] This ecumenical answer to (b) involves saying that different phenomenal characters are produced by an awareness of different quale with natures that represent different entities. For starters, an instantiation of 'reddish' quale may represent redness in the external environment, whereas a 'squarish' quale and 'roughness' quale will represent other features.

Objection: There is an easier explanation why we don't mistake the dot for a city: The dot represents the city; its *extrinsically* representing the city is irrelevant. My response appeals to the *way* qualia intrinsically represent. On the resemblance account, qualia in virtue of their intrinsic properties represent by *resembling* that which they represent. We can then explain why we seem aware of that which the quale represents by analogy. When a bartender is presented with a fake ID, it may seem to her that she is presented with a genuine ID, due to their resembling each other in virtue of each ID's intrinsic properties.[16] On the primitive account, a quale primitively

[15] One might go in for qualia's primitively representing F. If this is conjoined with the thesis that primitively representational entities cannot be instantiated by the non-mental, external world, then primitively representational qualia goes well with the idea that there is something special about the mind.

[16] See Ott (2016, §3) for a contemporary defense of representation as resemblance from classical objections like the ubiquity of resemblance but not representation, the symmetry of resemblance but not representation, and the prima facie insufficient particularity of resemblance. Searle (1983 p.59, 2015 Ch8) appeals to Berkeley's objection that external objects, being intrinsically invisible, just could not resemble ideas or sense data (or qualia, for that matter). My reply is that sense data or qualia may give intrinsic flesh to extrinsic or structural properties, which are really instantiated by external objects and so may resemble/represent. A strong view says representations only represent structural or relational properties (e.g. Sollberger, 2015). My own view is that qualia may really represent intrinsic properties, too, like primitive colors, and that perceptual experience is perhaps not 'perfectly veridical' as a result (see Chalmers, 2006).

Yet another route is to go is representation as truth. If truth here is construed externally, such representation won't be able to make sense of the phenomenology in hallucination, since we wouldn't be able to represent that which doesn't exist. If we go in for internalistic representation as truth, on which the truth conditions for the experience are set by the subject (e.g. Mendelovici 2018 Ch9 & unpublished), then this seems to water down the explanation of the phenomenology. For even if a subject s's mental state m represents o because s *takes* m to represent o, this seems more apt to explain s's thoughts being about o rather than explaining m's perceptual phenomenology.

intrinsically represents an entity, e, and one will thereby seem aware of that which the quale represents.

For what it's worth, it seems to me the resemblance account is more conducive to intelligibly accounting for perceptual phenomenal character: e.g., the reason it *seems* that I am aware of an instance of red is because I really am aware of an instance of red. As we shall see in chapter 3, I prefer some other account for cognitive qualia. This will help account for the difference between perceptual and cognitive phenomenology.

§2.3 Accounting for Phenomenological Directness. To account for object-immediacy the theory appeals to the special nature of the irreducible awareness relation and to the nature of qualia. The nature of the relation is such that it gives us a direct or *immediate* access to certain qualia instantiations. Nothing comes between the subject and her own phenomenally vivid qualia. The subject's mind thus has a kind of direct perceptual contact with qualia, and so they are immediately present to her. And because the qualia instantiated together *intrinsically* represent particular objects, it is objects that seem immediately present.

To account for object-distinctness the theory may appeal either to the intentional nature of qualia, or its consciousness-independent nature. Qualia may i) represent a counterfactual property of existing apart or distinct from our conscious awareness of them. Or we may stipulate that ii) qualia have an intrinsic nature such that they may be instantiated by one even when one isn't consciously aware of them. Or (iii) qualia may represent their consciousness-independent nature. Those who favor the resemblance version of the theory, if they favor (iii), should also opt for (ii), while the primitive version does not require (ii) in addition to (iii).

One may be aware of some properties of qualia, such as their consciousness-independent nature, while unaware of their property of being instantiated by the subject. That is, like others, I

deny Revelation. It is not revealed to the subject that the property instantiations she is immediately aware of in experience are properties of *herself*. We may defer to phenomenology in deciding what properties one is aware of in a given experience.

The ontological structure posited combines qualia theory, relationalism, and intentionalism. The relationalism is found in the immediate awareness relation, which best explains the relational phenomenology of phenomenological directness. Qualia theory provides the instantiated properties that we can be aware of, which gives the best explanation for why we seem aware of instantiated properties rather than abstract or unexemplified properties. The intentionalism, found in the intrinsic intentionality of the qualia, explains why we seem to be related to objects that are F. One might think that helping itself to so many ontological posits limits the paper's argumentative force. My response is that the conclusion of the paper may be interpreted conditionally: if one is looking for the most intelligible explanation of phenomenological directness across veridical and non-veridical experience, then one has a reason to favor this qualia theory over its rivals.

It was by appealing to the ontological structure of experience that we were able to see why an experience might possess both object-immediacy and object-distinctness (=phenomenological directness). I don't think it's conceivable that experience has my theory's ontological structure without experience's possessing phenomenological directness. If I am correct, then it intelligibly accounts for phenomenological directness.

§2.4 Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Intentionality. Why think the nature of qualia are required to explain object-distinctness? The idea would be that *habitually taking* the objects presented in experience to be consciousness-independent suffices for or causes object-distinctness. This taking-as-consciousness-independent may involve some sort of cognitive work done by the

mind, perhaps in the form of habitually employing a concept like CONSCIOUSNESS-INDEPENDENCE: this-thing-here-would-exist-independently-of-my-consciousness-of-it. We might be said to 'project' consciousness-independence on the qualia in this way, and do so without the qualia themselves representing objects to be consciousness-independent.

One way for concept employment to contribute to the phenomenology appeals to there being something it is like to employ a concept, i.e. by appealing to conceptual or cognitive phenomenology—the kind of phenomenology characteristic of what it is like to employ concepts or have conscious thoughts. But note that *cognitive* phenomenology is relatively phenomenologically subtle compared to *sensory* phenomenology—phenomenology typically associated with sensory experiences like sight, touch, and taste. Just compare merely employing the concept DANGER vs. the sensory phenomenology involved in having a fight-or-flight response. But object-distinctness, the phenomenology of seeming to be presented with physical objects that are *distinct existences from our consciousness of them*, seems more salient than whatever additional phenomenology cognitive phenomenology could bring to the table. I don't think employing such concepts (to qualia) suffices for object-distinctness. For the addition of (the phenomenology of) thinking that what is presented to me is a consciousness-independent object won't make it *phenomenally or perceptually* seem consciousness-independent.[17] Now,

[17] One might argue that conceptual phenomenology can bring enough additional phenomenology to account for object-distinctness. This may involve an appeal to conceptual phenomenology's explaining the two different ways of perceiving a painting of a duck-rabbit, a difference which is quite phenomenologically salient. But perceiving the duck-rabbit painting *as a painting of a duck* versus *as a painting of a rabbit* seems mostly to be accounted for by switching attention to different patterns of the features of the painting. (Note that Carruthers 2011 makes the stronger point that perceiving it as a painting of a duck vs. as a painting of a rabbit may be *entirely* chalked up to attending to a difference in sensory phenomenology. My argument doesn't require this stronger point.) The example of the duck-rabbit would thus give us a difference primarily in sensory phenomenology, which on my theory is accounted for by awareness of different patterns of qualia. If correct, then the duck-rabbit example doesn't show that conceptual phenomenology, construed as an *alternative* to merely appealing to qualia, is phenomenologically salient enough to account for something like object-distinctness.

some philosophers think cognitive phenomenology is reducible to sensory phenomenology. Those philosophers won't be able to invoke cognitive phenomenology as an *alternative* to mere awareness of qualia for explaining object-distinctness, since on my theory awareness of qualia is what explains sensory phenomenology.

Another way for concept employment to contribute to phenomenology would simply be to cause it. Suppose that as soon as Mary is born VR goggles are pulled over her eyes. The goggles stream live video of her immediate frontal surrounds. By stipulation no property instantiated by the VR headset is intrinsically intentional. And yet, we can imagine that Mary will eventually take the many scenes depicted by the goggles to be of the external world, and this might even cause her to have perceptual experiences having object-distinctness. Why not take this thought experiment to indicate that intrinsically intentional qualia need not be appealed to for explaining object-distinctness? Indeed, perhaps it is the *extrinsic* intentionality of the VR headset's video imagery—due to being reliably caused by Mary's real immediate surroundings—which eventually induces and thus accounts for object-distinctness.

One problem with this line of thought is that even if nothing about the VR headset is intrinsically intentional, Mary's qualia might well be, and they might in this way represent the scene depicted by the goggles to be consciousness-independent, intelligibly yielding object-distinctness. That is, some story involving intrinsic intentionality may be what underlies the apparent conceivability of the VR scenario.

Second, consider a brain that is randomly assembled in outer space, complete with accompanying vat—a 'cosmic swampbrain.'[18] That qualia are *intrinsically* representational explains how hallucinatory experiences, even that of a cosmic swampbrain's, could have object-

[18] C.f. the cosmic swampbrain mentioned by Papineau (2014, p.5).

distinctness. For intrinsic intentionality does not depend on the genuine existence of the physical objects that are represented, which are absent in hallucination. Nor does it depend on a history of physical objects reliably causing that experience type, which is absent in a cosmic swampbrain's hallucinations. Meanwhile, extrinsic intentionality does depend on either the genuine existence of that which is represented, or a history of their reliably causing the corresponding experience type. So extrinsic intentionality cannot explain object-distinctness, or awareness of other properties of objects, in as many cases as intrinsic intentionality.

Third, consider a single-experiencer or 'Boltzmann Brain'. It only ever has one experience, has no memories of other experiences, and its one experience possesses phenomenological directness, which includes object-distinctness. For a clear example, suppose the experience represents the lower-level properties, such as shapes and colors, which non-Boltzmann Brains like us might call an experience of the Grand Canyon. The present qualia theory explains object-distinctness in a way which doesn't require that an experience be embedded in relations to other experiences, nor memories of other experiences. It does so by appealing to intrinsically intentional qualia.

An objector might state that they cannot conceive of a Cosmic Swampbrain, nor a Boltzmann Brain. This may be due in part to their already holding a descendant of a Cartesian view, such as Farkas's (2013, p.109). Her view says that object-distinctness (she calls it 'experience-independence') is constituted by a network of cross-modal and predictable relations between multiple experiences or memories of experiences. Object-distinctness is instantiated once, for example, I have had multiple visual experiences of a fire as I walk closer to and then further away from it, and these experiences correspond with warmth experiences becoming more

and less intense in a predictable manner. I thus experience the fire as existing distinctly from my experience(s) of it.

For a conceivability argument to be good, it seems too tall an order to convince those who already hold an opposing view. The Boltzmann Brain shows that our *pre-theoretical concept of object-distinctness*, at least, does not pick out nor is constituted by any such network of relations. My unfriendly reply, then, is that I did not ask the reader to conceive of the Boltzmann Brain in conjunction with a Cartesian view's obtaining. The task instead was merely to conceive of the Boltzmann Brain. The friendlier part of the reply is to accommodate the idea that perceptual experience early in life may not be fully mature, lacking object-distinctness, while later in life matures and possesses object-distinctness. The qualia theory may say, for instance, that a very young child does not notice that the entities they are immediately aware of (which are, *de re*, qualia) instantiate consciousness-independence (or that their experience represents consciousness-independence), similar to how one will never come to be aware that they are properties of oneself.[19] It seems to me the objector confuses the conceivability of the

[19] Another issue with Farkas's (2013) proposal is that the explanation for why we take warmth experiences to be of a consciousness-independent fire makes an appeal to visual experiences of the fire that already have object-distinctness, and thus the object-distinctness of the visual fire experiences are left unexplained. But let us grant that experiences may somehow bootstrap each other into having object-distinctness, just in virtue of all being interrelated in this way, without appealing to any one experience's being the original source of object-distinctness. The main problem is that explaining object-distinctness via such structures obtaining across multiple perceptual experiences is unintelligible or non-transparent. For there seems to be no reason why an experience related in this predictable way to experiences within or across different sense modalities must yield object-distinctness. This might give us a reason to believe that our experiences are caused by something that is really consciousness-independent, but that seems different from endowing experience with object-distinctness. And I argued earlier that taking something to be consciousness-independent, construed via conceptual phenomenology, won't plausibly suffice for object-distinctness.

This objection, together with the Cosmic Swampbrain and Boltzmann Brain apply equally to Masrour (2013)'s proposal for explaining object-distinctness. Masrour's proposal adds to Farkas's 'cross-modally coherent' correlations between sensations explanation a sort of phenomenological awareness of those correlations. If I'm right that such structure won't explain object-distinctness, then I an awareness of such structure won't help, for the structure isn't present in the Boltzmann Brain.

Woodward (2019) makes an argument from imagination for why reductive phenomenal intentionalists like Farkas and Masrour fail to explain object-distinctness (Woodward calls it 'phenomenological objectivity'). His idea is that if their reductive phenomenal intentionality cannot explain object-distinctness in imagination, then it

crossmodal network of predictable relations between experiences as *constituting* object-distinctness with conceiving a way of *causing* it.

§3 Against Adverbialism. This is the first relational qualia theory to be offered because it is the first theory to combine qualia theory and relationalism into one theory.[20] Tye (2016, §9) discusses 'relational' qualia theories, but he uses the term 'qualia' as a synonym for phenomenal character in the context of discussing naïve realism, and not the intrinsic and introspectively accessible components of experience within the subject that qualia theorists are concerned with.

Brian Loar's (2003b) perceptual theory combines qualia theory with intentionalism; it says qualia are intrinsically intentional, and so is a non-standard qualia theory. But it does not say perceptual experience is a relation. Loar's qualia theory is thus adverbialist. Adverbialism says that experience is nothing more nor less than modifications of a subject that can be characterized by adverbs specifying how one is 'appeared-to'. It therefore cannot avoid a version of a classic objection to adverbialism: it's hard to account for why experience (phenomenally) seems to be a relation of awareness by saying experience does not essentially involve any relation.[21] This obstacle to adverbialism is relevant because phenomenological directness implies that we seem in experience to be *related* immediately to objects.

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cannot explain it in perception. I don't think Woodward's argument gets off the ground because arguably, and contra Masrour (2013) and Millar (2014), object-distinctness isn't present in imagination: e.g. a red rubber ball in one's imagination isn't presented as existing independently of that very imagination experience.

[20] The present theory is a counterexample to Crane's (2006) claim that qualia theories would be adverbialist, i.e. non-relational, if they attempted to account for all aspects of phenomenal character (including intentional or non-qualitative aspects).

[21] Crane (2006, p.142-143), for example, notes adverbialism's inability to account for the seeming relationality of perception as a 'familiar reason' for rejecting adverbialism. He cites Martin (1998) as an example. Another contemporary example is Foster (2000, p.181-185), who cites adverbialism's absence of a relation to a 'sensory object' as why it cannot account for the seeming presentation of an 'external reality'. Langsam (2018) also cites this as a fatal flaw of adverbialism, and rejects Loar's theory for this reason.

Adverbialists may decline to explain the relational phenomenology, or deny its existence altogether. But then this is why representationalism and naïve realism are considered the leading players in the phenomenology game, and not adverbialism. Loar's holding that qualia represent external objects to explain the seeming relationality of experience doesn't help. For on Loar's theory intentionality is intrinsic. So there are no relevant relations for Loar to appeal to in explaining why experience seems phenomenologically to be a relation.[22] And an appeal to Loarian qualia's representing experience to be relational to explain the relational phenomenology is not as intelligible as experience's actually being relational. Moreover, it's at least not obvious that experience normally *represents itself* to be anything. Meanwhile, phenomenological directness is ubiquitous in perceptual experience.

§4.1 The Content View vs Qualia Theory. Representationalism says that perceptual experience is a mental state or event of representing the world to be a certain way. Some versions say representational contents involves the subject's standing in a relation to these contents, which are often thought to consist of intentional or abstract objects—for example, propositions. The view says (a subject's relation to) representational contents or intentional properties fully determine phenomenal character. Traditionally, representationalism does not appeal to anything like an awareness of qualia, nor to intrinsic intentionality. I shall call these versions of

[22] Mendelovici (2018, §9.3.1 & fn.25) addresses something like this objection to the adverbial theory. In short, her response is that even if intentionality (for our purpose here read: experience) phenomenally seems to be a relation, such seemings cannot be right. They cannot be right because they support a kind of relational view that we know is false: naïve realism. The reason we know naïve realism is false is that it posits a mental relation that makes external objects 'psychologically available' to subjects. Yet "No ordinary relation can allow us to literally entertain tables and chairs, to take hold of objects existing in the concrete world and bring them into our minds to make them available to our cognitive [or experiential] systems" (Mendelovici 2018, 204). My response is that these seemings at best support the idea that experience is a relation to instantiated properties, and need not support naïve realism. That is, I deny that Revelation *would* support naïve realism (c.f. Goff 2017, Ch1), while remaining neutral on whether Revelation obtains. As an aside, the naïve realist may admit in response to Mendelovici's objection that they posit no ordinary relation. It is precisely the fact that they posit a non-ordinary, primitive mental relation that makes their theory fit well with the idea that there is something special about the mind. I will reject naïve realism in §5 for a reason other than Mendelovici's.

representationalism versions of 'The Content View'.[23] I will argue that content views cannot account for object-immediacy and hence phenomenological directness.

Most philosophers think some version of the Content View must be right. Perhaps the best reason to believe in it is if it accounts for phenomenal character best across both veridical and non-veridical experience. For how does my current experience feel? Like a case of something's appearing red and round to me, where my experience is correct if there is something red and round. Describing phenomenal character by describing at least some representational content is something the Content View has in common with my qualia theory.

As an initial objection, naturalistic versions of the Content View cannot account for phenomenological directness in this way for the Cosmic Swampbrain and Boltzmann Brain. This is because, like qualia theories that don't appeal to intrinsically intentional qualia, these versions of the Content View appeal to extrinsic intentionality: experience represents in virtue of external relations such as tracking, causal, or teleological-causal relations between the experience and external objects. And these may also require some kind of history of regularities between experience and its objects to yield correctness conditions. But it is counterintuitive to say the Cosmic Swampbrain and Boltzmann Brain cannot have an experience with phenomenological directness.

§4.2 Appealing to Special Contents. Suppose the content theorist is fine with accounting for phenomenal character only in regular subjects, perhaps because they think intrinsic intentionality is too exotic. He might try accounting for object-immediacy by appealing to the special nature of the representational contents unique to perceptual experience. For instance, Millar (p.248-250) suggests that the representational contents of a perceptual

[23] Contemporary defenders of the content view include Searle (1983), Tye (1995), Pautz (2007), and Millar (2014).

experience of a given object includes that *this experience directly causally depends on that object*. A perceptual experience of an object 'directly causally depends' on that object when:

> i) The causal connection between the object and experience doesn't involve the mediation of any distinct experiences, and
>
> ii) The experience is generated automatically (i.e. not under the control of one's volition) by a causal link to the present state of the object.

The move above is an instance of a general strategy that appeals to *some* difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience (=special contents) in order to account for *the* difference between them (=object-immediacy). Let us grant that Millar has isolated propositional content that is really unique to perceptual experience. He thinks an experience's having this content endows it with object-immediacy.

Still, it's a mystery how an experience's having the content of an abstract proposition that has an extra clause concerning direct causal dependence is any more likely to have object-immediacy than an experience with content without such a clause. A more intelligible explanation here would say that in an experience with object-immediacy one stands in a relation of immediate awareness to properties that are really instantiated, rather than to abstract objects or unexemplified properties. My qualia theory appeals to the more intelligible explanation, whereas the Content View does not.

To see this, here is a conceivability argument. Suppose a futuristic Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation device emits a signal that gives rise to a conscious thought in you. Suppose this thought directly causally depends on an electromagnetic coil within the device. That is, the thought is generated automatically in you by the coil, and we don't have some other, causally mediate experience before or simultaneous with that thought. And the thought has content like *the coil is now operating nearby, and this very thought directly causally depends on that coil's*

operating. Still, the thought lacks object-immediacy.[24] Perhaps philosophers like Millar could dig in their heels and just assert that the 'thought' generated by the coil would have object-immediacy, given its content. But the conceivability argument at least shows it's not a priori deducible from an experience's having the content of direct causal dependence that it has object-immediacy. So this special content explanation for object-immediacy isn't as intelligible as the qualia theory's.

The prospects for the special contents strategy is worse than considerations of a priori deducibility indicate. For even if one rejects Revelation, one can accept that we can say something about what our experiences represent: e.g. we can tell an experience represents that grass is green, even if we disagree about whether that experience essentially involves an acquaintance with grass, sense data, sets of possible worlds, qualia, or ideas in the mind of God (Mendelovici 2018, Ch1). Experience seems to represent intrinsic properties of objects and their relations to other objects around them, but never causal relations to the experience itself. The special contents strategy for explaining object-immediacy is incompatible with this observation.

A content theorist who agrees that relational properties aren't represented might argue that instead of representing a relational property between the object and the experience, experience represents the object as having a causal power. This might avoid a violation of the deliverances of introspection if somehow the causal power in question isn't a relational property with the experience as a constituent. This strategy fails. For experience does not seem to

[24] Demirclioglu (2016) attempts a similar point by instead using the case of a thought that represents a book's being on the table and directly causing that very thought. Millar (2014, 249) anticipates this, saying that one could not believe such a thought. Supposing for argument such a reply could work against Demirclioglu, it seems not to work against the TMS case, in which genuine direct causation occurs.

represent objects as having *powers* to cause those very experiences of them (not least because powers are supposed to be properties of agents).[25]

A Searlian (1983, Ch2) might argue that experiences do seem to represent causal relations between themselves and their objects. Our experiences seem to us to be passive in the sense that our having them isn't up to us. For example, we couldn't will for an experience of the sound of waves crashing to end, sans covering our ears. Perhaps this seeming passivity just is the experience's representing direct causal relations between themselves and their objects. So if the experience seems passive, then it seems to represent such relations. One problem with this is that passivity is a counterfactual property. And since we can't seem to be phenomenally aware of or acquainted with counterfactual properties, experience can't seem to represent counterfactual properties. Instead, all that seems represented are the intrinsic properties of objects and their relations to each other. A second problem is that, conceivably, a thought is passive in this same sense, without possessing object-immediacy: e.g. in the futuristic TMS case, or when an idea springs to mind due to an encounter with an object.

Tye (1996, p.53) denies we can always tell what our experiences represent (e.g. in orgasms). But even if reductionist representationalists like Tye deny this, there is a reason why they should think experiences never represent that causal relations obtain between themselves and their objects. For given Tye's causal/tracking and teleological notion *of representation*, plus the idea that experiences *represent* causal relations (to account for object-immediacy), he'd be committed to saying that his experiences are caused by causal relations. But experiences aren't caused by causal relations: they're caused by states of affairs, events, or substances that stand in causal relations. (C.f. Shoemaker's 1994, fn.7 objection to his own version of the qualia theory.)

[25] See chapter 2, p.44-45 for an argument against our perceiving dispositional properties of objects instead, which need not be properties of agents.

What if a version of the content view (or non-relational qualia view, for that matter) says all it is to have the phenomenology of immediacy is to have an experience that doesn't represent its being voluntary or caused by another experience? The idea is that the default for experience (this paragraph read: mental state with phenomenal properties) is immediacy: object-immediacy isn't something 'added' to special kinds of experiences but rather *a lack* of the experience's representing its being causally mediated by some other experience or its being involuntary. The problem with this strategy is that we can and sometimes do have thoughts, which lack object-immediacy, that don't represent their being voluntary or being caused by other experiences. Instances may include when one suddenly has a spontaneous and original idea. So a lack of mediation content doesn't suffice for object-immediacy.

§4.3 Appealing to a Special Relation. The content theorist, instead of merely appealing to representational content to explain object-immediacy, might appeal to a special *relation* to intentional or abstract objects. This strategy could avoid the Boltzmann Brain and Cosmic Swampbrain objections, too, if it is a relation to genuine abstracta, since we may grant such subjects may be related to abstracta without any causal history with the objects of experience. What if the content theorist posited an immediate awareness of abstract objects to explain phenomenological directness in hallucination?[26]

My response is twofold. First, if one subscribes to a popular and elegant principle of instantiation, it is just as difficult to see how we could be aware of uninstantiated properties as we could be of nonexistent objects. This principle says that, for properties, to be is to be exemplified or instantiated. (It is especially attractive to those favoring a sparse ontology for

[26] Papineau (2014) hints at relations to abstracta being unable to account for sensory phenomenal character, and Langsam (2018) explicates further such an argument. This section develops this kind of argument for the distinctive phenomenology of phenomenological directness.

properties; see Orilia [2011, §5.1]). Even if some properties could be exemplified by abstract objects, surely shape, size, location, and color properties are not among them. For abstract objects exemplifying these properties are plausibly not abstract objects. Exemplifying these properties seem to go together with exemplifying causal properties, and abstracta are by definition a-causal.

Second, suppose uninstantiated shape, size, and color properties can exist uninstantiated after all (i.e. exist *as* abstracta). But existing in this impoverished and ghostly way does not help. For uninstantiated shape, size, and color properties, even if they could inhere in or be essentially related to abstracta, would not seem to be instantiated shape, size, or color properties upon immediate awareness. The content theorist could instead posit an indirect or *mediate* awareness relation, but this would fail to explain intelligibly how we seem to be immediately aware. What if content theorists maintained we are immediately aware of abstract objects that essentially represent the world as being a certain way? Propositions are prime examples of abstract objects that are like this. But the *way* propositions represent don't endow our beliefs with object-immediacy. This is because propositions presumably represent in virtue of their properties; and awareness of properties of abstracta cannot intelligibly make it seem as if one is aware of instantiated properties of concreta. Neither would other abstract objects that represent in this way, and they all represent in this way, for they all represent in virtue of their properties. So achieving object-immediacy by appealing to awareness of essentially representational abstracta cannot work. What if the content theorist posited an awareness relation that is a kind of representational relation that can 'enhance' abstract objects to appear concrete? But a representational awareness that 'enhances' abstract objects in this way is plausibly a *mediate*

awareness relation, and so doesn't explain object-*im*mediacy as intelligibly as the qualia theory's posited relation.

What if the content theorist, not beholden to the naïve realist's immediate awareness, made an appeal to some other kind of relation to abstract objects? For instance Pautz's (2007, p.497-499) representationalism attempts to yield phenomenological directness (he calls it 'perceptual presence') by saying: Perceptual experience's phenomenal character is identical to one's *sensorily entertaining* contents of propositions or complexes of uninstantiated properties.

My objection takes the form of a dilemma. The special relation posited by the content theorist is either a kind of property awareness or it is not.[27] If it is, then we are aware in hallucination of properties of abstract objects that won't, upon awareness, intelligibly account for the sensory nature of phenomenological directness. Pautz's 'sensorily entertaining' relation is designed to make the objects and properties a proposition concerns seem present to one's mind in a way they never do when consciously thinking or imagining them. However, this falls prey to an instance of an objection I made above: this kind of awareness 'enhances' the proposition one is related to so that one seems aware of something concrete. This renders the relation a *mediate* relation, and so does not explain as intelligibly why we seem *immediately* related. On the other hand, if the relation is not a kind of property awareness, then perceptual experience is not an awareness of anything at all. For to be aware of anything we must be aware of properties of things. But as before, to account for our seeming immediate awareness of instantiated properties by saying experience is not an awareness of anything is not as intelligible an explanation.

[27] Pautz (2007, p.499) wishes to leave it open on his theory whether the sensorily entertaining relation is a kind of awareness.

Objection: There is simply nothing problematic about saying that every perceptual experience *seems* like an immediate awareness of something, but that some of them do not *actually* involve awareness of anything.

Response: It's possible in experience to sometimes be aware of something, and sometimes not aware of something (e.g. in hallucination), on a looser sense of being 'aware.' It's not possible for the ontological structure of experience to sometimes *be* (identical/be constituted by) an awareness of something and sometimes not, unless one believes different ontological structures obtain between veridical and hallucinatory experience (i.e. disjunctivism is true). I will argue against disjunctivism in §5. Here I clarify that an experience's *being* an immediate awareness of something (ontology) is a more intelligible explanation for there seeming to be an immediate awareness of something (phenomenology) than an experience's *not* being an immediate awareness of something. The more intelligible explanation why we seem aware of something, even in hallucination, is that we really are aware of something.

One might suggest that the content view could account for object-immediacy in the way Descartes does in the Principles—through habituation. For example, people wearing the VR goggles discussed earlier might come to experience the world as immediately presented to them, even though it took time and haptic/visual correlation to achieve that experience. My objections to cognitive phenomenology accounting for object-distinctness, as well as the Cosmic Swampbrain and Boltzmann Brain, apply here for object-immediacy too.

§5.1 Naïve Realism. Contemporary naïve realism is the view that i) veridical perceptual experience consists of a primitive relation of immediate awareness, or acquaintance, or consciousness of mind-independent physical things and their properties, and ii) one's awareness

of physical objects constitutes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience.[28] Proponents and opponents of this contemporary understanding of naïve realism have held it is especially well-suited to accounting for phenomenological directness: Perceptual experience *seems* to be "an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us" (Strawson 1979, p.47) because it really *is* an immediate consciousness of things existing independently of us. And it seems that these mind-independent objects and their properties constitutively shape phenomenal character because they in fact do so. Naïve realism is thus not only sufficient for phenomenological directness in veridical experience; it also accounts for it in the most intelligible way.

§5.2 Naïve Realism *cum* Abstracta. I will explain why naïve realisms require a different ontological explanation for phenomenological directness in hallucinatory experience. Then I will argue that disjunctivist naïve realisms (=naïve realisms that posit different ontological structures for veridical and hallucinatory experience) do not account for object-immediacy in hallucination as intelligibly as 'common-factor' (=non-disjunctivist) theories. This will pave the way for preferring the qualia theory, which I'll argue more intelligibly accounts for phenomenological directness across veridical and hallucinatory experience.

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[28] Historically, 'naïve realism' has been used to refer to a type of direct realism. Naïve realism in its contemporary sense should be distinguished from the direct realism of the early moderns and ancients. Direct realism makes three claims:

> Realism: ordinary physical objects have mind-independent existence.
> Directness: our perception of these objects isn't mediated by the perception of other entities like sense-data.
> Naiveness: these objects have all the features we perceive them to have.

But in contemporary philosophy, most theories of perception endorse at least Realism and Directness. Many also endorse a qualified version of Naiveness, usually barring properties like primitive color (in part by saying that for perception to be veridical does not require the environment to really instantiate primitive color). *Contemporary naïve realism* adds to Realism, Directness, and Naiveness the claims that a) external world objects are constituents of veridical perceptual experience, and b) what it is like to have such experiences is 'shaped' or explained (constitutively) by those very objects and their properties. Contemporary defenders of naïve realism include Fish (2009), Martin (2002), McDowell (2013), and Langsam (1997) & (2017).

For external things and their properties to figure into and determine the phenomenology of perception, as the naïve realist says, those things must really exist and their properties really be instantiated. But in hallucination and illusion some of those particulars don't exist, or some of those properties aren't instantiated.[29] In light of this naïve realists usually take a disjunctivist route: They say that veridical experiences are one metaphysical kind of mental state or event while hallucinations are of a different kind, i.e. have different ontological structure. A disjunctivist naïve realist may postulate that in hallucination we are aware of clusters of *uninstantiated* complexes of sensible properties like shape, size, and color properties. Mark Johnson (2004) offers a common-factor version of this view, on which both veridical and hallucinatory perception constitutively involve an awareness of sensible properties (instantiated in veridical, uninstantiated in non-veridical). But I've argued that perceptual theories that appeal to a relation to abstracta cannot account for object-immediacy. This objection applies to naïve realism just as much as to the content view.

On Fish's disjunctivist naïve realism, hallucination would just *consist of* acquiring certain beliefs but has no phenomenal character. Pautz (2013, §2) argues that because of this, hallucination cannot *explain* why we acquire these beliefs; for similar reasons hallucination cannot *justify* these beliefs. I extend his point: a hallucinatory experience surely at least justifies my belief that my experience possesses phenomenological directness. But if naïve realists like Fish are correct then I am not so justified. Some may deny that we are justified in believing in phenomenological directness, perhaps because they deny phenomenal character in hallucination and dreams, and say the process of coming to believe there is phenomenological directness while sleeping or hallucinating is unreliable or otherwise unjustificatory. Nevertheless, we shouldn't

[29] Moore (1922, p.244-246) and Price (1932, p.62) argue that naïve realism has an adequate response to the argument from illusion. Even if successful this argument goes through for hallucination.

rule out the metaphysical possibility of evil demon or Matrix-like scenarios with phenomenological directness. If denying such possibilities were so easy, then the problem of the external world never gains traction. But there is at least a problem to be dealt with. So we should explain the possible, even if not actual, hallucinatory phenomenology if we can.

Common factor and disjunctivist naïve realisms that appeal to abstract objects do not intelligibly explain phenomenological directness in hallucination due to the nature of abstracta. My qualia theory offers a common factor ontological explanation. The ontological structure that explained phenomenological directness in veridical experience is the very same structure that explains it in non-veridical experience: a consciousness or immediate awareness of intrinsically intentional qualia. The only relevant difference between hallucination and veridical experience is that the latter's qualia instantiations are causally downstream of objects that really are out there.

§5.3 Disjunctivist Naïve Realism *cum* Qualia Theory. What if the naïve realist, wise on the failures of appealing to abstracta, took on a disjunctivist view on which the naïve realist structure obtains for veridical experience while this paper's qualia structure obtains for hallucination? This naïve realist hopes to account for same phenomenal character between a veridical experience and hallucination by appealing to different ontological structures. That is, they hope to account for the same phenomenal property (=phenomenological directness) via instantiations of different properties: in particular, via instantiations of the property of standing in immediate awareness of x, and the property of standing in immediate awareness of instantiated qualia that essentially represent x.

We need to hear from the naïve realist how the same one (phenomenal) property can be instantiated by *two* further and different property instantiations. The naïve realist might reply that we see this all the time. For instance, instantiations of the same one property REDNESS may be

found in a property instantiation of MAROON and a property instantiation of SCARLETT. This doesn't yet get us the possibility of phenomenal sameness, however. For even though an instantiation of MAROON is *similar* to that of SCARLETT (because RED is instantiated in both), they are still noticeably different. And why? Because they are different property instantiations that include instantiating other properties besides RED.

Suppose for the sake of argument that the naïve realist can show that one property may be instantiated by two very different property instantiations to explain phenomenal sameness (and hence phenomenological directness in veridical and hallucinatory experience). Here I highlight a general problem for disjunctivism that common-factor views like my qualia theory do not face. The problem is that, given the possibility of phenomenal sameness between veridical experience and subjectively indistinguishable hallucination, we should prefer a perceptual theory that can account for this possibility intelligibly. If we consider cases of lucidly dreaming about a cheesecake, in which one realizes one is asleep and dreaming, *and* one notices that phenomenological directness is present in the dream experience, then this actuality of phenomenal sameness (with a veridical perception of a cheesecake that looks or tastes the same) makes accounting for it intelligibly all the more pressing.

Disjunctivist theories in principle cannot account for phenomenal sameness in an intelligible way. For (relational) ontological structure to account for phenomenal sameness intelligibly would be to say something like: The reason why what we're aware of in veridical experience *seems to be the same* as what we're aware of in indistinguishable hallucination is that what we're aware of *really is the same*. But disjunctivist theories cannot say this because they do not give the same ontological structure for veridical and hallucinatory experience. The present

qualia theory does say this and hence intelligibly accounts for phenomenal sameness. Naïve realist:

> Sure, I cannot account for phenomenal sameness intelligibly in the way you've cashed out 'explaining phenomenal sameness intelligibly'. But the naïve realist and qualia disjunctivism I've offered can account for phenomenological directness intelligibly in veridical experience, and it can account for phenomenological directness intelligibly in hallucination—just in a different way. So I can still account for phenomenological directness in just as many experiences as your qualia theory can, and intelligibly so in each case, on some intuitive notion of intelligibility.

Response: We want to be able to say that what we're aware of (=certain property instantiations) is really the same in both of these subjectively indistinguishable experiences. This is because what we're aware of is supposed to explain perception's phenomenal character on both naïve realism and the qualia theory. The same phenomenal character, p, is a priori deducible from awareness of the very same instantiated properties a, b, c (if we specify that these properties are all one is aware of). Meanwhile, the same p does not seem to be deducible from the awareness of a, b, c, on the one hand, and awareness of d, e, f on the other (where a, b, c =/= d, e, f, respectively). The *most intelligible* explanation for why the phenomenal character is the same would be that what we're aware of is the same.[30]

[30] My view is a version of indirect realism, which says one is indirectly aware of external objects in virtue of being directly aware of internal entities. Searle (2015, p.39-48) argues that philosophers have been driven to indirect realism by a fallacy of ambiguity made when contemplating the following premise in the argument from hallucination: In both the veridical case and the hallucination case we are 'aware of' something (conscious of something, see something). He maintains that indirect realists confuse 'awareness of' in an intentional sense (e.g. I am aware of the table) with 'awareness of' in the constitution sense (e.g. I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand, where that awareness just *is* the pain). Because of the ambiguity, and in the face of hallucination, indirect realists are driven to saying that we are aware (intentionally) of the experience/seeing, and then by the spreading step also aware (intentionally) of the experience in the veridical case. The experience/seeing thus 'gets in the way' of a direct (intentional) awareness of external objects. Searle says this is an instance of confusing the content of experience with the direct object of experience; we think there is something in common between veridical and subjectively indistinguishable hallucination, and mistakenly say that it is the direct object that must be the same, something internal like a sense datum. But in fact it is just the representation/experience/sensation that is the same. The sober direct realist, by contrast, says in the representation/experience we might be said to be aware of (having) the experience *in the constitution sense*, but this does not imply that we are aware (intentionally) of anything in the hallucination case. So we are never aware (intentionally) of the experience itself. What we are

To supplement the point, consider a case in which we drive by a farm and see a barn while heading east. A little later in the day we drive back west and see what seems to be the very same barn. We shouldn't think that some other barn has been erected in its place since our first passing it. This wouldn't be the most intelligible explanation, and should not be preferred unless a more intelligible explanation is unavailable, e.g. when there is some good reason to think the same barn is no longer there. But if the same one barn can explain why we seem to see the same

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directly aware of (intentionally) is the external object in veridical experience, and nothing in hallucination. Representations or sense data-like entities thus don't 'get in the way' of the external object once we distinguish between these uses of 'aware of.' Searle says contemporary naïve realists likewise do not spot the fallacy. They therefore reject a different premise in the argument from hallucination: that there is a common element between the veridical and hallucination case—a metaphysically common experience. For they do not realize they can just deny that one is aware (intentionally) in the hallucination case, while maintaining that the common element is the representation or sensation or experience or *awareness of the experience (in the constitution sense).* Strawson (2015, p.242) and Hatfeld (2016, p.35, 37), like Searle, have views on which internal representations/sensations/experiences are how we *directly* perceive the world, without their being an intermediary object of (intentional) awareness.

Reply: A confusion between the 'aware of' of constitution and of intentionality need not be the motivation for indirect realism, nor naïve realism for that matter. Crane & French (2017, §3.1.3) note that phenomenological facts may be the reason for positing an awareness of mental items. My reply to Searle on behalf of indirect realists is an instance of this strategy. Indirect realists may posit an (intentional) awareness of internal entities in order to *explain*, in the most intelligible way, why the same phenomenological directness is (or could be) present in both veridical and hallucinatory experience. That is, we can say that in both veridical and hallucinatory cases we are really aware (in the intentional sense) of something because that best explains why we seem aware (in the intentional sense) of something in both cases. Now, if we explain (intentional) awareness of external objects by (intentional) awareness of internal objects, won't we have to explain (intentional) awareness of internal objects in the same way, too? Searle has suggested we would thereby be vulnerable to an infinite regress of homunculus-like explanations. But all theories of perceptual experience offer constitutive explanations of experience/awareness that appeal to some bottom line: some to a type of causal relation, some to a type of mental acquaintance relation, some to no relation. My qualia theorist says the subject's direct awareness and the qualia are the primitives. Just the subject and her qualia are needed, no homunculi. And because I distinguish (intentional) awareness of qualia from mere instantiation of qualia, my view avoids Searle's charge of 'seeing the seeing.' For we are directly aware (intentionally) of qualia. And qualia themselves are not identical to the experience/'seeing.' Instead the experience is, in the constitution sense, an immediate (intentional) *awareness relation to* qualia. This chapter argues that this account of experience best explains why it seems we are immediately aware, in the intentional sense, of external objects.

This motivation for indirect realism avoids Harman's (1990, p.35-40) version of the objection, too. By explaining the phenomenal character of perception in terms of an (intentional) awareness of internal mental items, we wouldn't by parity of reasoning be committed to saying that Ponce De Leon was looking for a mental fountain of youth. For positing a mental fountain of youth doesn't explain the phenomenal character of his looking for such a fountain. Perhaps (intentional) awareness of a mental fountain could be a candidate constitutive explanation for what it's like to imagine one, but this doesn't entail he is looking for a mental fountain of youth, either.

barn each time, this same good explanation is preferable. Similarly, in the case of the ontological structure of perception, we shouldn't think that what we seem to be aware of in indistinguishable veridical and hallucinatory experience is different if we already have available the same good explanation for each case: an awareness of the same instantiated qualia.[31] This same good explanation has a nugget of intelligibility—call it the 'phenomenal sameness nugget'— that is unavailable to disjunctivist theories.

Disjunctivist naïve realism that borrows the qualia structure for hallucination has the upper-hand in accounting for phenomenological directness in veridical experience in a more intelligible way. But my qualia theory has the upper-hand in accounting for phenomenal sameness more intelligibly: what we are aware of between indistinguishable veridical and hallucinatory experience seems to be the same because they are in fact, or *de re*, the same: they turn out to be intrinsically intentional qualia. Which theory one prefers depends on which nugget of intelligibility is more important to one. The phenomenal sameness nugget may become more important to one when reflecting carefully on lucid dreaming that has phenomenological directness.

§6. Sense Data vs. Qualia Theory. How does the proffered qualia theory compare with the sense data theory? The sense data theory says experience is an awareness of mental images that really have the properties they appear to have. For instance, what accounts for seeming to be aware of a curved orange leaf is an awareness of a mental image that is really curved, orange, and leaf-shaped. If we further specify that the awareness relation is an *immediate* awareness of the instantiated properties of sense data, then the theory can account intelligibly for object-

[31] This thought experiment supports Martin's (2004) assertion that if there were a good indirect realist explanation of phenomenal character for both veridical and hallucinatory experience, then we don't need naive realism.

immediacy; and if we specify that the mental images *intrinsically represents* an object that is consciousness-independent, then the theory yields object-distinctness, too.

This version of the sense data theory can account for phenomenological directness in an intelligible way. But we should note that accounting for the phenomenology in this way involves postulating sense data that are additional substances that are not identical to the subject. Perhaps they exist independently of the subject altogether. Or perhaps they somehow exist within the subject. Still, we can account for phenomenological directness without these additional ontological substances by appealing to an immediate awareness of intrinsically intentional qualia instantiated by the subject. Ontological parsimony favors the qualia theory because qualia inhere in one substance, the subject, whereas sense data are additional substances.

One might wonder whether the present qualia theory can account for experiences of multiple objects as well as sense data theory can, since the qualia turn out to be properties of only one substance, the subject. Relatedly, one might worry that what it's like to be aware of a collection of properties is distinct from what it's like to be aware of an object that instantiates those same properties.[32] But, first, a priority monist says that all the concrete properties are instantiated by one entity, the Cosmos. This is similar to how I say a subject is aware of properties instantiated by one entity, the subject. We don't usually say that phenomenology settles the priority monist debate. And, second, it seems to me that a 'clump' of property instantiations may instantiate together to form one complex, while a different clump may instantiate together as a distinct complex of qualia. We need not appeal to different substances or bare particulars underlying those property instantiations to yield phenomenological directness as of multiple objects.

[32] A related, though different because crossmodal, issue is raised in Blazej Skrzypulec in 'The Structure of Audio-Visual Consciousness" (forthcoming).

If one takes phenomenological directness seriously in both veridical and non-veridical perceptual experience, then one has a powerful reason to prefer my qualia theory over adverbialism, the content view, naïve realism, and sense data theory. Philosophers of perception may welcome this new theory to the debate. It combines qualia theory, intentionalism, and relationalism to better account for an ordinary and essential phenomenological data point of experience.

CHAPTER 2

Does Naïve Realism Imply Panpsychism or Panprotopsychism?

Abstract. The hills of a swath of Swiss grassland seem to shape the contours of that landscape. The hills don't seem to *cause* the contours of the landscape to have the shape it does. Rather, those hills seem to shape the contours of the landscape by *being* or *constituting* those contours. A contemporary theory of perceptual experience, Naive Realism, says that external objects and their properties similarly shape the contours of one's conscious experience—in particular, by constitutively shaping *what it's like* for one to have a conscious experience. I will argue that the properties that shape one's conscious experience in this way must be rather special. They must be nonphysical, fundamental, and ubiquitously instantiated. If these properties are mental, then, Naïve Realism implies Panpsychism, the theory that fundamental mentality is instantiated throughout the natural world. If these properties are neutral, then I argue that Naïve Realism precludes two important theories of mind and world—Dualism and Idealism—while also putting more distance between Naïve Realism and a physicalist metaphysics than without. Moreover, these neutral properties are plausibly *protoconscious*.

Keywords: perception, naïve realism, panpsychism, panprotopsychism, fundamentality

§1 Maple Trees and Glaciers. There is something it is like for me experientially to look at a red maple tree. The bark of the tree is dark grey, and rough with cracks here and there. The trunk

itself is quite thick. Up above, its leaves are a striking reddish orange. The leaves are arranged opposite from each other on the twigs. Each individual leaf is divided into three leaflets that emanate from a single central point.

Why is it that the most intuitive way of describing what it is like to be in that visual experiential state is to describe what I am looking at? One theory of the ontological structure of perceptual experience explains this in an elegant way. It says that the dark greyness and rough surface of the tree bark are genuine constituents of experience, and so can constitutively 'shape' its phenomenal character. And they are constituents of my experience because the experience is itself an irreducible relation of consciousness (or awareness or acquaintaince), which brings these very property instantiations to figure in (=at least partially constitute) what it is like to have the experience.

The answer to the question is thus that describing what I am looking at just is to describe the experience. This is because what I am looking at—the property instantiations of the tree—really are constituents in the relation of experience. I *seem* to be perceptually acquainted with the reddish orange color and tripartite shape of the leaves because I *really am* acquainted with these property instances, again in virtue of the nature of the consciousness/acquaintance/awareness relation. Perceptual experience's phenomenal character consists in my consciousness of property instantiations or objects in the external world. This theory about veridical perceptual experience is one of the theories brought up in chapter 1—naïve realism. Contemporary adherents include McDowell (1994, 2013), Langsam (1997, 2017), Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), Brewer (2008, 2011), Fish (2009), Campbell (2009, 2014), Kalderon (2011), Logue (2012), Hellie (2013), Genone (2014), and Demirclioglu (2016).[33]

[33] Not all in this list are explicit about their commitment to external world objects constituting or 'shaping' phenomenal character. But my argument is that naïve realists who wish to explain phenomenal character in this

> The phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as color and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you (Campbell 2002: 116).

In one way or another, the naïve realists cited above commit to something like what Campbell expresses here: that the phenomenal properties of perceptual experience, which constitute phenomenal character, are explained by or consist in a relation to external world objects and their properties. William Fish (2009, 6) gives a vivid illustration of the difference between mind-independent objects and their properties entering into constitutive—versus causal—explanations of phenomenal character.

> Consider the following scenario: looking down at a glacial valley, I say to you, "Can you see how the glacier shaped the contours of the landscape?" Here, 'shaping' is being used in a causal sense—the glacier shaped the contours of the landscape by causing the elements of the landscape to be the shape they are. On this reading of 'shaping,' the claim that external objects "shape the contours" of conscious experiences would in fact be compatible with *any* metaphysically realist theory of perception. But if I were to ask instead, "Can you see how the sides of the hills shape the contours of the landscape?" I would be using 'shaping' not in a causal sense but rather in a constitutive sense—on this reading, the hillsides shape the contours of the landscape by actually *being* the contours of the landscape. This, I suggest, is how we should understand the naive realist's claim that external objects and their properties shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience: they shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience by actually *being* the contours of the subject's conscious experience (Fish 2009, 6).

Even naïve realists that don't explicitly say phenomenal character is constituted by the external environment must be appealing to a constitution relation between phenomenal character and external objects or their properties. For if they say phenomenal character is ultimately explained

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intuitive way—it's the primary reason for preferring naïve realism over other theories of perceptual experience—should be committed to panpsychism or panprotopsychism. 'Direct realists' who don't believe that external objects shape phenomenal character are hard to distinguish from other perceptual theorists like representationalists, who likewise accept Directness and Realism (see fn.28).

by being caused by external objects, then they'd be giving the same explanation of phenomenal character as other, non-naïve realist theories of experience, such as standard representationalism. And naïve realists take their explanation of phenomenal character to be better than, and thus different from, that offered by non-naïve realist theories.

I will argue that this elegant explanation of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience commits one to an exotic metaphysical thesis. Something about the intimate relation posited by naïve realism implies that the external objects and some of their properties that figure in the experience must have fundamentally nonphysical (i.e. mental or neutral) aspects. More specifically, naïve realism either implies that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world (i.e. *panpsychism*), or that neutrality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world (i.e. *neutralism*). For now, let mentality denote that which has a mental nature, and neutrality as that which has a neutral nature. If naïve realism implies neutralism, I'll argue it also implies the panprotopsychist thesis that protoconscious properties—properties that are relevantly a priori linked to phenomenal properties—are fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. I remain neutral on whether fundamentality is ungroundedness, perfect naturalness, or primitivity (i.e. unanalyzability). By 'ubiquitous in the natural world' I mean instantiated throughout the natural world.

A few more preliminaries are in order. An experience is a state or event such that there's something it is like to be in it. Perceptual experiences are experiences characteristic of the various sense modalities that seem to involve the presentation of external world objects and their properties. Perceptual experiences may be veridical or falsidical: the physical things may really be as they are presented or not. I focus on veridical perceptual experiences because naïve realism

is only a theory about veridical perceptual experience. And to keep things simple I focus on veridical visual experience, sometimes using 'experience' as shorthand for this.

I sometimes say that external objects or their property instantiations 'figure in' the phenomenal character of experience to avoid any connotation that they *wholly* constitute phenomenal character. This is because while naïve realists maintain that external world objects or their property instantiations *partially* constitute phenomenal character, they say it is the consciousness of these objects or property instantiations that wholly constitute phenomenal character.

In §2 I argue that the core posit of naïve realism—the intimate relation between the subject and external object—acquaints us with a particular kind of property of external objects: 'perfect properties,' which are characterized by their intrinsicness, simplicity, and primitiveness. I will then argue that perfect properties are either mental or neutral (i.e. nonphysical), fundamental, and ubiquitous (§3). Here is a preview of the main argument of the paper, premise by premise.

> P1. If naïve realism is true, then external world property instantiations figure in (=partially constitute) phenomenal character (DEFINITION).
> P2. External world property instantiations, to figure in phenomenal character in a way that explains phenomenal character, must really be as they are presented. (PREMISE)
> P3. Some of these external world property instantiations are presented as 'perfect properties' (i.e. are intrinsic, simple, and primitive). (PREMISE)
> P4. So, some of these external world property instantiations that figure in phenomenal character are perfect (from 2 and 3). (LEMMA).
> P5. These perfect properties are nonphysical. (PREMISE)
> P6. These perfect properties are fundamental. (PREMISE)
> P7. These perfect properties are ubiquitous. (PREMISE)
> C. Hence, if naïve realism is true, then some of the external world property

> instantiations that figure in phenomenal character—viz. the perfect properties—are fundamental, nonphysical (=mental or neutral), and ubiquitous (from 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7).

So, naïve realism implies panpsychism or neutralism. If neutralism, I show in §4 how this commits naïve realism to the ubiquitous instantiation of protoconscious properties. I also point out that a commitment to the ubiquitous instantiation of fundamentally neutral properties precludes dualism and idealism for the naïve realist, and puts more distance between naïve realism and a physicalist metaphysics than without.

I have explained the definition of naïve realism, which yields P1. §2.1 argues for premise 2, §2.2 argues for P3, §2.3 defends P3 from objections, and §2.4 considers a related objection to P2. §3.1 argues for P5, §3.2 for P6, and §3.3 for P7. §4 points out further interesting consequences of C for naïve realism.

§2.1 Hills and Constitution: Support for Premise 2. The explanation of the phenomenal character of experience given by naïve realism is elegant in that the phenomenal properties are plausibly a priori derivable from their given fundamental structure of veridical experience: (e.g.) the *seeming* awareness of the reddish orange color and tripartite shape of the leaves, a phenomenal property, is a priori deducible from a *genuine* awareness of reddish orange color and tripartite shape of the leaves. No other theory of perceptual experience accounts for phenomenal character by appealing to portions of the external environment being constituents of (the phenomenal character of) perceptual experience. Importantly, in order for this constitutive explanation of phenomenal character to work, the objects and properties must really be as they are presented. To see why, think again to Fish's example of a constitutive explanation of the shape of the landscape. If the hills that *are* the contours of the landscape have together a shape that is little or nothing like the shape of the landscape, then citing the hills and their properties in

a constitutive explanation of the landscape's shape fails. For the landscape's shape would not be a priori derivable from the hills and their properties. Similarly, the objects and properties of the environment that, according to naïve realism, are the contours of our phenomenal character, better be as they seem for us to derive a priori the phenomenal character. This elegant explanation of phenomenal character that is supposed to be better than non-naïve realist explanations requires P2.

§2.2 The Presentation of Perfect Properties: Support for P3. What kind of properties must figure in the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in a way that satisfactorily explains phenomenal character? To answer this question it will help to consider another question: Which properties of the tree do we seem to be aware of in having the perceptual experience of the tree?

It must include the red, orange, and brown colors of the tree that give us the tree's shape. 'Colors' in this context shouldn't be interpreted to be the surface reflectance properties of the tree that cause certain experiences in us when light is reflected from those surfaces. For, as the naïve realist should accept, colors understood in this way could not adequately constitute the phenomenal character of our color experiences. For this would be to understand color as a dispositional property to reflect certain wavelengths of light. Dispositional properties themselves do not and could not intrinsically appear any way at all. For dispositional properties are counterfactual properties, and counterfactual properties do not themselves appear (Campbell 2002, Millar 2014).

Shoemaker (1994, p.28) gives an example of feeling weight or heaviness. We may take this as a putative counterexample to the impossibility of feeling or perceiving a dispositional property. I don't think it is ultimately plausible, for we can distinguish perceiving an instantiation

of a dispositional property from perceiving a manifestation of a dispositional property. Suppose a vase has the dispositional property of shattering if dropped from a certain height. As the vase is shattering, I can be said to perceive a property (instance). But that property (instance) I perceive isn't the vase's *disposition to shatter*. Rather it is the *vase's shattering*, an event that is not a disposition but rather a manifestation (not an instantiation) of that disposition. Describing an object's disposition to x involves describing its x'ing in not just the actual world but other worlds, too—i.e. dispositions are ineliminably modal. But I do not perceive that the vase would shatter given certain conditions; I merely perceive its actually shattering. At best, I might *infer* by perceiving its actually shattering that the vase would shatter under similar circumstances, e.g. if a piano were dropped onto it. Similarly, in feeling the weight of an object on Earth, I do not perceive its disposition to fall toward the Earth with a certain force, but merely its actually falling to the Earth with a certain force.[34]

Representationalists like Byrne and Tye deny that dispositional properties cannot appear: an object's colors appear in the sense that in the right circumstances, including correct lighting conditions, they *cause* in us various experiences of color from various angles. But this would not be to give the *naïve realist constitutive* explanation of color experience. Colors that could not appear in a non-causal way could not contribute to phenomenal character in the constitutive naïve realist way. For the naïve realist, the colors that constitute the phenomenal character of a

[34] One might suggest that perceiving a disposition is analogous to perceiving a mountain. Even though I perceive only one side of the mountain, I still count as perceiving the mountain. Similarly, one might say, even though I only perceive the part (or aspects) of the disposition relevant to the vase's shattering in the actual world, and I don't see the parts of the disposition relevant to the vase's shattering in other possible worlds, I still count as perceiving the disposition. But this requires identifying a disposition with (the set of) all of its possible manifestations, and including each possible manifestation as a part—a counterintuitive view.

Heil (2012) has a view on which there are properties with a dual nature, being both dispositional and categorical. Even given Heil's account, perceiving the vase's actually falling is not to perceive the dispositional aspects of that property. The Heilian naïve realist should still buy into color as having a partially categorical/intrinsic nature to explain the categorical phenomenology.

visual color experience must be as they are presented to be in experience: intrinsic properties instantiated on the surfaces of external world objects.

They are also presented as simple, i.e. have no parts. Perhaps not all colors are 'maximally simple', as Chalmers (2006) surmises. For perhaps (e.g.) a shade of orange is a composite of yellow, red, and brightness. But at least these non-maximally simple colors' underlying properties would be intrinsic and simple. That a given shade of color is presented as being simple should be distinguished from what is meant by "the color of that wooden table's" being simple. When one refers to the color of a wooden table in this way, one refers to many different shades of colors instantiated in various patterns across the table's surface, which together seem to make up a complex 'color' of the table; but each of the individual shades instantiated thus-and-so are simple.

Finally, if these intrinsic and simple colors are really as they are presented, they must be primitive—i.e. unanalyzable, especially in terms of anything other than color. To borrow Chalmers' (2006) terminology, these colors would be 'perfect': intrinsic, simple, and primitive.[35] We may note that perfect colors aren't all that seems presented in perceptual experience;

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[35] The claim that colors are perfect does not depend on the thesis of 'Revelation'. Revelation about color may be understood as the conjunction of the following two theses (Allen 2016, 132):

> a) Infallibility: if it seems to be in the essential nature of the colors that *p*, then it is in the essential nature of the colors that *p*;
>
> b) Self-Intimation: if it is in the essential nature of the colors that *p*, then it will seem to be in the essential nature of the colors that *p*.

Not all naïve realists accept Revelation, e.g. Allen (2016). This is okay. That colors are perfect need not require support from (b) nor (a). My argument will be that if colors are to contribute to the phenomenal character of experience in the way naïve realists want (i.e. constitutively), they better be perfect. For if they are not perfect, then this would block the naïve realist explanation for why describing what it is like to have an experience involves an appeal to perfect property instantiations. By depending on neither (a) nor (b) I leave it open that there may be aspects of the essential nature of colors that aren't revealed in experience.

Chalmers gives other examples such as perfect height, perfect brightness, perfect pain, and perfect itchiness. I'd say properties like perfect coldness, perfect loudness seem presented too. But I will focus on color because it keeps the discussion familiar, and because color seems an especially vivid aspect of our phenomenology. Because the color literature is familiar, and some naïve realists are explicit about their views on color, we will be able to consider various objections they might make.

My focus on color does not make my argument susceptible to Logue's (2017, p.50-51) contention that naïve realism need not imply color primitivism and instead may just imply that, for instance, shape properties are as experience reveals. For as we'll see, my argument runs so long as there are some perfect properties, e.g. perfect size, perfect brightness or darkness, that are ubiquitously instantiated. It's also worth saying that a naïve realism that doesn't commit to color primitivism is one that doesn't explain, in the elegant naïve realist way, what are perhaps the most vivid and familiar aspects of our phenomenology: color phenomenology. And since this sort of naïve realist concedes that there are other, non-naïve realist explanations that perfectly adequately account for perhaps the most salient aspect of visual phenomenology—color phenomenology—then it becomes less clear why we need the putatively superior naïve realism to explain any other aspects of phenomenal character.[36] It's also plausible that shape phenomenology comes along for free given color phenomenology.

[36] Logue (2017) further argues that the possibility of an Edenic world—in which primitive properties are instantiated everywhere, and naïve realism entirely explains the seeming presentation of such properties—shows that naïve realism is *actually* true. For the Edenic possibility shows that it's possible for a mind-independent entity like perfect redness to be a constituent of my experience; that is, our experiences are *capable* of having mind-independent properties as constituents, and so even if no perfect redness is actually instantiated, naïve realism is true. But, I say, if it's possible for color phenomenology to be accounted for in a non-naïve realist way, then it's possible for any other kind of phenomenology to be adequately accounted for in such a way. And so it's possible that naïve realism isn't true, and so not actually true. We reach a standoff regarding what's possible. Compare the standoff regarding the possibility of a necessary perfect being's existing, or not.

Not all color primitivists are naïve realists about experience, and as we shall see in the next section, not all naïve realists are Color Primitivists in the sense described. But I'll defend the idea that they should be in order to constitutively explain, in the naïve realist way, the phenomenal character of color experience. Color primitivists include Hacker (1987), J. Campbell (1994), (2005), McGinn (1996), Watkins (2005), and Gert (2006), (2008). It's not obvious that all color primitivists think color is metaphysically fundamental (an ontological notion), even though they think color is primitive (an epistemic notion), though I shall argue they should.

One might worry that because naïve realism posits an irreducible non-intentional relation to the world, then there is a prima facie problem in determining which precise properties are presented to us in experience in a phenomenal sense, and which arise from further interpretation on the part of the subject. (Actually, it seems to me the same problem may be posed against representationalist views as well.) Still, perhaps we can all agree that lower-level properties such as color, shape, and smell seem presented in a phenomenal sense, even if some disagree about whether higher-level properties (such as a tree's being presented *as a tree*) are so presented. First, I'll argue that naïve realists cannot explain why color seems presented to us in a phenomenal sense without appeal to perfect colors (§2.3). I'll later highlight some deficiencies for naïve realists that say color phenomenology arises from 'further interpretation' on the subject's part (§2.4).

§2.3 Some Objections to P3 (or P2). Not all naïve realists hold that color is simple, intrinsic, and primitive. For example, Fish (2009) holds that color is a complex physical property. He distinguishes between an object's color and its shades. He takes its color to be an intrinsic surface reflectance property that determines the range of shades an object exhibits under normal lighting conditions. And its shade he takes to be a relational property between the

object's intrinsic surface reflectance property and the intrinsic reflectance properties of the object's surrounds and spectral distribution of the illuminant (2009, 157-158). Fish analyzes color and shades this way to avoid the argument from illusion against naïve realism (ibid., 157-159). But the problem is that these ways of analyzing color and shade do not account intelligibly for experiences of *particular shades* of color: we cannot a priori derive, from shades understood *relationally* being constituents of one's visual experience, the seeming presentation of any particular *intrinsic* shade of color on the surface of an object. It may be suggested that the intrinsicness of color could explain the seeming presentation of particular intrinsic shades of color. But still, it's hard to see how color as a determinable, even though intrinsic, could constitutively explain the phenomenology as of an *intrinsic determinate shade*. Naïve realists who do not posit perfect shades of color instantiated on the surface of physical objects have not yet accounted for the phenomenal character of visual experience, which seems to present perfect shades of color. And to say that an awareness of a complex physical property *causes* our seeming awareness of perfect color would be to give an ultimately causal explanation of perfect color experience, no better than non-naïve realist explanations.

Keith Allen is a naïve realist who (2016) holds that colors are complex properties, too. He holds that color include aspects of its nature that are not revealed in experience, including non-chromatic aspects (i.e. aspects that cannot be described using purely chromatic vocabulary, such as 'every shade of orange is reddish'). Allen (ibid., Ch7) also says experience reveals only *some* aspects of the nature of color. That is, he rejects Revelation, which for our current purpose says experience reveals all aspects of the nature of color. Perhaps a naïve realist could employ this rejection of Revelation to explain why experience seems to present simple rather than complex colors: even though an object essentially has complex colors, that have both chromatic

aspects that experience reveals, as well as chromatic and non-chromatic aspects that are not revealed, experience only reveals some chromatic aspects or shades of colors, each of which are simple. But so long as naïve realists like Allen say the chromatic aspects of color we *are* aware of are intrinsic, simple, and primitive—which they must in order to account for phenomenal character by deriving it from the structure and constituents of experience—then my argument still runs.

Similarly, if a naïve realist were to deny that color is perfect, and hold that in color experiences we are undergoing some sort of illusion when we take the objects themselves to instantiate perfect colors: then even though we're only aware of their *looking perfectly colored* (c.f. Kalderon 2011, §8), these perfect color 'looks' of the object we are aware of would be the intrinsic, simple, and primitive properties my argument requires. This would be so even if these 'looks' are instantiated by the spatial region between the object and the subject rather than by the object itself, a case of illusion.

Alternatively, one might deny that there is any color phenomenal character, and that instead we merely cognize that there is color. But this would be to drop any attempt to explain the phenomenal character of color experience.

§2.4 Objections to P2 (and P3). Another way for the naïve realist to resist the instantiation of perfect color would be to challenge the notion that the properties that are said to constitute phenomenal character must really be as they are presented, i.e. deny P2. Naïve realists who hold that representation is involved in experience, e.g. such as McDowell (1994), have resources to draw from in denying P2. For example, they might say the relation has a representational nature: The consciousness relation, by its nature, makes the subject *only seem* to be aware of perfect properties by being a kind of 'perfect-lens' through which we view the

world: It is part of the nature of this lens that it adds to the phenomenal character of our experience the seeming awareness of perfect properties. Perhaps it is also part of the nature of this consciousness relation that it acquaints us with objects that don't really instantiate perfect properties. In this way they may deny that the properties that are said to be constituents in experience are really intrinsic, simple, or primitive, as they seem to be presented.

My main reply is that appealing to the nature of the consciousness relation to layer on perfect properties over the object, which acts as a 'the blank canvas' on which to project, is a projectivist-style explanation of phenomenal character, not a naïve realist one. The central projectivist thought is that some of the properties we attribute to things are not 'really out there' to be discovered but are instead projected out onto the world by us, or by our perceptual systems (e.g. Boghossian & Velleman, 1989). By contrast, the naïve realist wants to say that the features we attribute to things really are out there to be discovered via becoming constituents of the experiential relation. The general problem is that external world objects and their extrinsic properties, without the perfect properties, cannot contribute to phenomenal character as of perfect properties in the constitutive, non-causal way that naïve realists require.[37] And my responses to Logue's (2017) objection from earlier applies here as well.

[37] Here is a specific example. Suppose that an extrinsic property of the maple leaf is a constituent of my experience of that leaf. More particularly, let's say that my experience of the leaf is partly constituted by a surface reflectance property: e.g. the property of being disposed to reflect light within a certain wavelength band. And suppose somehow that the consciousness relation adds to the experience's phenomenal character by 'layering' a perfect property—perfect orangeness—over the surface reflectance property. By *layering a property, x, over another property, y*, here I just mean that what it is like for me to have the experience includes what it is like to seem to be aware of x, and not y. Perhaps this seeming perfect orangeness *represents* the surface reflectance property.

One problem with this strategy is that this leaves unexplained why the surface reflectance property should figure in experience. Our naïve realist wanted to explain phenomenal character in terms of properties of the external environment. But here, at least, the property instantiation that is said to figure in phenomenal character doesn't contribute to phenomenal character any more than on a causal theory of experience, which says the most intimate relation between subject and object is a causal relation. None of the phenomenal character is a priori derivable from this extrinsic property's figuring in experience. Rather, it seems that it is the representational consciousness that is doing all of the work. The explanation for how the property contributes to phenomenal character becomes brute or unintelligible—perhaps in terms of *brutely causing* my experience as of perfect

Moreover, running naïve realism without a realist primitivism about colors would entangle one in a version of the many properties problem. The many properties problem was originally raised by Jackson (1977) against adverbialist theories of perception, on which experience is nothing more nor less than modifications of a subject. In this context, the problem is that there would have to be some account of how we pair up the (illusory or projected) color property with the right surface, in the right way. Tye (1984) is an unconvincing attempt (because entirely stipulative) to solve this for adverbial theories.

The many properties problem, as well as my earlier response to Logue, are applicable to Chirimuuta's (2015, §6.2, §7.2) view which is a conjunction of color adverbialism with naïve realism. On this version of Chirimuuta's view, colors aren't intrinsic properties on the surfaces of objects, nor properties of inner mental states, but rather are relational properties instantiated by a naïve realist perceptual event. Chirimuuta takes the perceptual event to be a relation between an inner or psychological item, which may involve neural states, and an outer or distal item. But as before, there seems to be no non-stipulative way of pairing up such adverbialist colors with external objects. We may also note that on Chirimuuta's view colors are only instantiated when there are perceptual events, which is counterintuitive.

Another objection to premise 2 relies on the idea that there is a third relatum in the naïve realist experiential relation.

> [P]erceptual experience is a matter of a person's conscious acquaintance with various

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orange. Naïve realism loses its appeal over other theories of experience. Perhaps instead naïve realism only requires the physical surface of the maple leaf to figure in the experience. This physical surface won't appear any way to us, for again, physics doesn't reveal any of the intrinsic properties of objects to us. Instead we may treat this physical surface as a sort of blank canvas upon which the consciousness relation may layer perfect properties, like perfect color.

The problem remains, however. Why appeal to the surface, which doesn't appear at all, when we can just appeal to the consciousness relation to do all of the work? We might say that at least the surface can provide the spatial relations that I am aware of in perceiving the maple leaf. But why couldn't the representational nature of the consciousness relation give us this? For if it can inject perfect colors into phenomenal character, then it can give us the shapes and relations between shapes, too, and hence the spatial relations.

> mind-independent physical objects from a given spatiotemporal point of view, in a particular sense modality, and in certain specific circumstances of perception (such as lighting conditions in the case of vision). These factors effectively conjoin to constitute a third relatum of the relation of conscious acquaintance that holds between perceivers and the mind-independent physical direct objects of their perceptual experience. Thus, the experiential variations noted above, and any others along similar lines, may all perfectly adequately be accounted for by variations within this third relatum. (Brewer 2011, p.95)

Crane and French (2017) summarize Campbell, Brewer's, and Fish's views of the third relatum as follows.

> Bill Brewer (2011) agrees with Campbell that a third relatum is needed in naïve realist accounts of perceptual experience, where the third relatum includes the sense modality of the experience, the spatio-temporal point of view, and other relevant circumstances of perception but he does not specify what exactly these circumstances are. William Fish (2009) takes a similar position, arguing that the third element should include idiosyncracies of the perceiver's visual system as well as attentional facts about the perceiver since two ordinary perceivers viewing the same object from the same position may nonetheless differ in the character of their visual experiences, depending upon how good their eyesight is (for example) and how they distribute their attention.

One relatum is the subject, another the object of experience, and the third is constituted by facts about the spatiotemporal point of view, circumstances of perception (e.g. lighting), the experience's sense modality, idiosyncrasies of the perceiver's visual system (e.g. quality of eyesight), and one's distribution of attention. A naïve realist might then say color phenomenology is constituted in part by facts that make up this third relatum. This may suggest an object's color isn't really intrinsic after all, even if it is presented as intrinsic—an objection to premise 2. Alternatively, it may suggest color isn't presented to be intrinsic—an objection to premise 3.

Regarding the objection to premise 3, there are counterexamples. Suppose one were to view a coin from an angle such that the two-dimensional portion of one's visual field it covers is elliptical. Nevertheless, even though a fact about a third relatum is involved in how the coin looks to one (the viewing angle), this doesn't suffice for the coin's shape to look elliptical or

non-intrinsic. Instead, it still looks like a circle, just a circle appearing from an angle. That's how circles look (from angles). And the circular shape still appears intrinsic to the coin, no matter how many paces one takes around it. Similarly, when viewing a white table under red light, the lighting condition (third relatum) may be constitutively involved in how the color of the table looks. But whether one judges the table to be white under red light, or plain red, the table's (particular determinate shade of) color is still presented as intrinsic. (This is so even if one can tell that the particular intrinsic shade of color it has is in part *caused* by some external source. A property *p*'s being caused by an object *n* doesn't preclude *p*'s being intrinsic to object *o* (where n=/=o). For example, a pillow's intrinsic shape may be altered when one rests on it, but that doesn't preclude its shape from being intrinsic.)

Regarding the objection to premise 2, if a naïve realist cites the three-place relation that constitutes intrinsic color looks to suggest the color itself need not be intrinsic, then they run into problems. For no matter how we cut it, the particular determinate shade of color still *looks* (phenomenally) to be intrinsic. This requires an accounting. The following adds to my earlier reply to a view like Fish's (for instance): There's nothing about the involvement of a third relatum that could make it seem as if one were aware of an *intrinsic determinate shade* of color. One might have a more relaxed view about how to account for the presentation as of an intrinsic determinate shade. Perhaps one might take some intrinsicness here (e.g. from the intrinsicness of the surface reflectance property), some determinateness there (e.g. from the determinateness of the shade, taken to be a relational property between the object's intrinsic surface reflectance property and the intrinsic reflectance properties of the object's surrounds and spectral distribution of the illuminant), and even some intrinsicness 'in here' from one's neural tokens. But the addition of one's intrinsic neural properties as constituents to color phenomenology—facts about a third relatum—doesn't plausibly yield the seeming intrinsicness of the determinate

shade itself, which remains relational. One's attention on the color, where color we may grant is intrinsic (even though dispositional), doesn't seem to help either. For i) phenomenally speaking, we train our attention on an object's color by focusing on its particular determinate *shade* of color. And the most plausible external candidates of the specific shade are relational, as on Fish's view. ii) No amount of attention on properties *a* and *b*, where *a* is intrinsic and *b* extrinsic, can make *b* seem intrinsic. By analogy, no amount of attention on the blue, North side of a tower could make the yellow, West side look blue, even though both are constituents of the tower. Similarly, though (intrinsic) color and (extrinsic) shade are both constituents of color phenomenology, no amount of attention on the color could make the particular shade look intrinsic (even granting that, somehow, we could attend to the determinable color and determinate shade simultaneously).

Naïve realists like Fish and Brewer, without the perfect properties, and even while citing a three-place experiential relation, can at best offer grounding (or causal) explanations of color phenomenology. This is because grounding (and causal) relations do not require that the grounds (or cause) yield grounded (or caused) entities that are anything like the grounds (or causes) taken together. This contrasts with naïve realist, constitutive explanations, which require that the constituents taken together resemble the constituted. The analogy of the hills constitutively shaping the landscape falls apart if, once again, the shape of the hills taken together are little or nothing like the shape of the landscape.

§3.1 Perfect Properties are Nonphysical. These properties are plausibly non-physical. Perhaps the strongest argument for this is a conceivability argument. Given all of the physical facts about the world, we could not a priori deduce the vivid perfect colors that the naïve realist

should say are spread out across the maple tree. One way to establish that they are not a priori deducible would be to run the following conceivability argument (c.f. Chalmers 2002).

> 1. It's conceivable that all of the physical facts obtain without perfect properties being instantiated.
> 2. Therefore, the perfect properties are not a priori deducible from the physical facts (i.e. facts about extrinsic properties).

For 'conceivable' read 'conceptually coherent'. For 'physical facts' read 'the facts given to us by the physical sciences'. One way to motivate (1) is to point out that the physical sciences don't say anything about the intrinsic nature of external world objects, or the intrinsic nature of physical events (Russell 1927, 384). Rather they just give us their extrinsic properties, such as their structural, logico-mathematical and causal properties, including what causal effects physical things have on other things. The structural properties of colors might include the similarity relations of the wavelength bands they are associated with. But perfect colors are intrinsic, simple, and primitive: they seem to be something new over and above what the physical sciences give us. So it is conceptually coherent to have the facts of the physical sciences, which are extrinsic, obtain without there being perfect color instantiations, i.e. (1) is plausible. (2) straightforwardly follows. This goes also for other perfect properties like perfect height, perfect brightness, and perfect wetness. We have at least prima facie evidence that perfect properties aren't physical, and instead are nonphysical.

This way of motivating (1) is perhaps too strong. For one might think that dispositional properties could not be instantiated absent intrinsic properties that are their categorical bases (e.g. Williams, 2011). And, the thought goes, just because physics and chemistry don't tell us about the categorical bases of worldly objects doesn't mean that their intrinsic properties, whatever they are, couldn't have a physical nature. While Russell (1927), Lockwood (1989), and

Chalmers (1996, p.134-136) argue that fundamentally mental properties may avoid being epiphenomenal by being the categorical bases of the physical, extrinsic properties, my argument would cast a wider net if it could accommodate philosophers like Papineau (2002). Papineau (ibid., p.22 fn.7) maintains that Chalmers' intrinsic phenomenal properties are just intrinsic physical properties instantiated in a certain configuration. My move is to say, first, that the perfect properties are not themselves phenomenal properties. And second, the perfect properties such as perfect color do no causal work on the physicalist picture. It would be extraordinary coincidence to say that perfect greenness is the categorical basis of a particular sort of surface reflectance property of an object, such that under normal lighting conditions that object reflects just the wavelengths of light that produce in normal observers experiences of perfect green. And the intrinsic nature of the molecules that constitute an object's surface are unlikely to be (perfectly) green. More likely than not, then, perfect greenness would not play any causal role on the physicalist picture. This is a reason to think that perfect colors and other perfect properties should not be included in a physicalist ontology, even if other undiscovered (or undiscoverable) intrinsic properties may.

There is a related way to deny physics only supplies relational or extrinsic facts. One might, like Strawson (2006), say there are further physical facts about the (first-order) properties of the fundamental objects that make up the world. But Strawson's further physical facts turn out to be facts about *ubiquitous and irreducible consciousness*. In the present context—I am arguing that naïve realism implies panpsychism or panprotopsychism—this gives the game away for the naïve realist. For the objection assumes panpsychism (even if one takes an electron's irreducible consciousness to be 'physical' in some sense).[38]

[38] The sense of 'physical' that Strawson (2006) ultimately invokes is equivalent with 'concrete' or 'that which exists in the world.' This understanding of physical is controversial. It rules out dualism and idealism by definition. But

One may say that the further physical facts aren't facts about consciousness, as Keith Allen (2015) implies. Allen argues that the irreducible colors that naïve realism appeals to for explaining color experiences don't commit one to anti-physicalism, for two reasons (let 'narrowly physical' denote entities that are posited by the physical sciences):

> 1) Naïve realist colors are "physical in an undemanding, non-technical, sense of 'physical' according to which tables, chairs, galaxies, people and the like are all 'physical things'—in contrast, for instance, to sensations, ghosts, or souls (cf. Stroud 2000: Ch3)."
>
> 2) Naïve realist colors are also 'physical' in a more technical sense because they are normally taken to supervene, either nomologically or by metaphysical necessity, on narrowly physical properties like surface reflectance profiles.

(1) seems to imply that anything that isn't a sensation, ghost, soul, etc.—i.e. anything that isn't a phenomenally conscious property or substance—counts as physical. There are reasons to prefer the more technical definition of physical that (2) assumes. It says that the physical facts are those which physics posits or necessitates.

First, this more technical definition of the physical is the definition prevalent or assumed in the literature: to name just a few, Davidson (1970, p.141), Lewis (1999, p.33-34), Chalmers (2002/2009, p.2), and Jackson (1982, p.51). Perhaps the reason why it is more prevalent is that it makes available an attractive physicalist metaphysics of the world: given this sort of principled way of categorizing the concrete facts—the facts posited or necessitated by physics—we are supposed to get all the other concrete facts for free, such as the biological or psychological or functional facts. By contrast, if (1) were given as a definition of the physical, this would rule out phenomenally conscious properties and substances from being physical.

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surely the debate between physicalism, on the one hand, and dualism or idealism on the other, is not merely terminological. Even if one were to concede that such intrinsic consciousness is physical, then the resulting physicalist panpsychism is quite alien to traditional physicalism.

Another deficiency of (1) is that it does not leave room for fundamentally neutral entities, understood as fundamentally *neither* mental nor physical. This rules out by fiat a perfectly coherent version of Russellian Monism, according to which all fundamental concrete entities are events, which are fundamentally neither mental nor physical, but which are the building blocks of the mental and physical (see Stubenberg, 2016).

Similarly, given (1), primitive colors would then count as physical. But many physicists would reject that there are primitive colors precisely because the physical facts don't seem to necessitate facts about primitive colors, nor other perfect properties. After all, the physical properties appealed to for giving a mechanistic, causal explanation of our color experiences don't include any appeal to perfect color. One might say that there must be *some* intrinsic properties that are the underlying 'flesh' for the structural and relational properties that physics posits. But facts about such intrinsic properties need not be facts about perfect properties. They might be facts about consciousness, as Strawson (2006) argues. So physics doesn't necessitate the perfect properties.[39]

(2) gives a sufficiency condition for perfect colors to be physical: by supervening either i) nomologically or ii) by metaphysical necessity on narrowly physical properties. We've already seen reasons why perfect colors don't supervene by metaphysical necessity on the physical properties. So even given the assumption that x's supervening metaphysically on narrowly physical properties suffices for x to be physical, perfect properties are plausibly not physical.

[39] One might have the view that all consciousness is relational, as the naïve realist does. If so, they can rule out the Strawsonian possibility that consciousness is intrinsic. They might then deduce that the intrinsic properties that are the underlying categorical basis of physical properties are the perfect properties. So, the extrinsic physical properties necessitate the intrinsic perfect properties, or vice versa. The problem for this strategy is that it's conceivable that not all consciousness is relational. For example, some possible hallucinations have phenomenal properties that don't even seem to be relational. So it's still a live possibility that the intrinsic flesh of physical properties might not be the perfect properties. The argument that perfect properties are necessitated by the physical properties, which relies on the premise that only the perfect properties could be the intrinsic 'flesh' for physical properties, fails.

And merely supervening *nomologically* on narrowly physical properties is too weak a notion of the physical. After all, dualists coherently take phenomenally conscious properties to supervene nomologically on narrowly physical properties. This indicates that for any x to supervene nomologically on narrowly physical properties, y, does not suffice for x to be physical. Altogether, naïve realism is further at odds from a physicalist metaphysics than one might have thought. (Of course, commitment to the naïve realist's irreducible awareness relation already precludes physicalism for the naïve realist, understood as the thesis that all concrete facts are fundamentally physical facts. But an additional commitment to fundamentally nonphysical properties being ubiquitously instantiated is a significant ontological burden.)

There is another reason why naïve realists should commit to more than the facts that physics supplies. Pautz (2017, p.25-28) has pointed out that the resemblances between physical properties like spectral reflectance properties of objects don't bear the resemblance relations to each other we'd expect, given the resemblance relations between the phenomenal properties of perceiving those objects.[40] For instance, the wavelength reflection profile of a blue ball is not as similar to that of a purple grape's as that of a green leaf, contra what we'd expect given the phenomenal similarities between our experiences of them (Pautz 2017, p.25).



Figure 2.2 Reflectances of grapes, a blue-looking ball, and a leaf. From MacAdam (1985)

[40] He makes a similar point about chemical properties in olfactory experiences.

I'd add to Pautz's point about resemblance a point about dissimilarity.



Color	Wavelength (nm)
Violet	380-450
Blue	450-495
Green	495-570
Yellow	570-590
Orange	590-620
Red	620-750

Each color on the color wheel is 'phenomenally opposite' of the color right across from it through the central point. But this oppositeness is not replicated at the level of wavelength bands associated with each of the colors. For one, the only opposites wavelength-wise are red and violet. But there are many phenomenal opposites on the color wheel. We might say that 570 nm is roughly the 'middle' amount of detectable light, and that wavelength bands that are 'mirrored opposites' across this line are at least phenomenally opposite (e.g. blue and orange). But this solution doesn't work for the green and yellow bands, which are not phenomenally opposite.

A naïve realist might say that the intrinsic surface reflectance properties of objects *ground* the relevant phenomenal properties. For similarity relations that obtain between grounds a, b, c, need not obtain between the grounded x, y, z, respectively; and vice versa, similarity relations that obtain between the grounded, x, y, z, need not obtain between that which ground them, respectively. A problem for this solution is that the constitution/grounding relations appealed to would be "totally arbitrary and unsystematic" (Pautz 2017, p.28). By contrast our neural responses 'in here' line up nicely with phenomenal character, unlike the physical properties of the items we perceive 'out there' (ibid.). I add to Pautz's reasoning: the only way

for naïve realism to be on a par with non-naïve realist theories vis-à-vis accounting for the phenomenal resemblances is to posit the perfect properties, which bear the sought after resemblance relations. For example, perfect purple is really more like perfect blue than perfect green. But the perfect properties go beyond what the physical sciences posit or necessitate, as argued earlier.

The perfect properties are nonphysical. Does that entail they are mental? An argument for perfect properties being mental rather than merely nonphysical could say that they are mental simply because they are, or can be, constituents of mental entities. Compare the Early Moderns' claim that mental entities ('Ideas') just are that which are perceived, i.e. are part of experiences. If this is right, then perfect orange would be mental because it is, or could be, a constituent of the naïve realist's experiential relation, a mental entity. An assumption of this argument is that *only* mental entities could be constituents of mental entities. This argument might be resisted by the thought that physical properties like spatial properties of objects could be constituents of naïve realist experience.[41] Of course, this way of resisting the argument begs the question against their being mental. But someone might note, as Hobson (2013, 554) does, that some reason must be given why only mental entities could enter as constituents into the naïve realist consciousness relation.[42]

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[41] One might here think of Chalmers' (2006) assertion that it's hard to accept that mental objects (like experiences) instantiate perfect height. But on naïve realism, experiences don't instantiate perfect height. Instead they are *relations to* properties like perfect height, where perfect height is thereby a *constituent* or *relatum*—not a property--of the experience.

[42] Mendelovici (2018) seems to give an argument from spookiness against the naïve realist mental relation. Her idea is that any relation that brings things like tables and chairs 'before one's mind' in a way in which we have such 'intimate cognitive access' to them is spooky enough to reject. I suggest one reason why it might be spooky is that the intimate cognitive access is such that some of the nature of the physical object is thereby revealed. Mendelovici's point can then be interpreted as expressing, in part, the viewpoint that a relation that brings physical things to be constituents of mental entities, such that the intrinsic nature of those physical things is thereby revealed, is spooky enough to reject. But the naïve realist could then say, first, that their perceptual

Even if the perfect properties that are said to be constituents in the experiential relation cannot be a priori derived from a complete list of all the fundamental physical facts, this by itself does not mean the perfect properties must be mental. For it is still open that they are fundamentally *neutral*.

There are various notions of a neutral property in the literature. A resistance to perfect properties being mental work on some notions, but not on others. It won't work on the *Both View* of neutrality, which says a basic entity is neutral if, and only if, it is intrinsically both mental and physical. (Basic entities may be substances, events, tropes, universals, etc.) For full-blown panpsychism is compatible with (e.g.) perfect orange being fundamentally mental and fundamentally physical. But it may work on the *Constituent View* of neutrality, which says that a basic entity is neutral if and only if it could be a constituent of both physical and mental non-basic entities. For example, given naïve realism, perfect orange may be a constituent both of a leaf, which is physical, and one's visual experience, which is mental. It may also work on the *Neither View* of neutrality, on which a basic entity is neutral if and only if it is intrinsically neither mental nor physical, conjoined with some thesis about necessary conditions for being mental: e.g. suppose it's necessary that mental entities must have phenomenal properties, i.e. have something it is like to be in that state. A perfect orange instantiation conceivably doesn't have anything it is like to be that very instantiation; it's also quite conceivable that there is nothing it is like for a wall to instantiate perfect orange (so not mental); nor can a perfect orange instantiation be derived from the physical facts (so not physical). So on the *Neither* and

relation isn't fully nature revealing of their relata (e.g. Allen 2016), and second, that some reason must be given why we cannot know at least some of the nature of physical entities by experiencing them.

Constituent views of neutrality, perfect orange counts as genuinely neutral. Perhaps there are other views of neutrality on which this move works as well, though I won't go into them here.

Because of the coherence of the idea that perfect properties are neutral, my conclusion in this section is not that naïve realism entails perfect properties that are mental, but rather perfect properties that are nonphysical, i.e. either mental or neutral.

§3.2 Perfect Properties are Fundamental. Perfect properties are plausibly *fundamental*. There are two established notions of fundamentality in the literature—that of perfect naturalness and ungroundedness. I will consider these as well as an additional notion of fundamentality and argue that perfect properties are fundamental on all three notions.

Here is an outline of my argument for the fundamentality of perfect properties. 'Is' here should be read as the is of identity. It should be read as the 'is' of predication in the parenthetical clauses.

F1. If fundamentality is ungroundedness (or if the ungrounded is fundamental), then perfect properties are fundamental (because ungrounded).

F2. If fundamentality is perfect naturalness (or if the perfectly natural is fundamental), then perfect properties are fundamental (because perfectly natural).

F3. If fundamentality is primitivity (or if the primitive is fundamental), then perfect properties are fundamental (because primitive).

F4. Fundamentality is either primitivity, ungroundedness, or perfect naturalness (or that which is primitive, ungrounded, or perfectly natural is fundamental).

C. Therefore, perfect properties are fundamental.

First, consider fundamentality as ungroundedness (Paul, 2012, p. 221; Demarest,

2015, p. 334; Bennett, 2011, n. 3 and n. 6). I will take the grounding relation to be an asymmetric relation of ontological dependence between facts. For a concrete fact (=fact about a concrete entity, where entity may include substances, property instantiations, events) to be ungrounded is for it to obtain not in virtue of another concrete fact. That perfect properties are primitive indicates that facts about their instantiations are ungrounded. For if e.g. perfect color cannot be analyzed, then what further, more fundamental facts could ground perfect color instantiations? We might suggest that the reason why the maple leaf is perfectly orange is because of certain processes that arise in the tree that end in perfectly orange maple leaves growing on the twigs. But this is to give a causal explanation, not an explanation in terms of other grounds (more fundamental facts). It does seem that perfect color instantiations are ungrounded, and therefore fundamental on the ungroundedness conception of fundamentality.

Second, consider fundamentality as perfect naturalness (Sider 2011, 292; Crisp 2007, fn.5; Eddon 2013). Let the perfectly natural properties be the properties that are minimally necessary to characterize the way the world is (a la Lewis 1986, 59-60). It does seem that to describe a naïve realist world without referring to the perfect properties, including the perfect colors, would be to undercharacterize the naïve realist world. For the naïve realist requires that the world, or the objects within it, are the way they seem in order to derive facts about phenomenal character from the awareness of objects and their properties, which on their view constitute phenomenal character. That is, in order for the world or the objects within it to appear in the way they do, they must instantiate perfect properties. This enables the naïve realist to explain why external objects can appear as they do by being constituents in the experiential relation. So perfect properties are plausibly perfectly natural on the naïve realist view of the world. Perfect properties are fundamental given fundamentality as perfect naturalness.

Third, consider fundamentality as primitivity. This account of fundamentality says that which is primitive is fundamental. It has not been defended in the literature, although there are proponents (e.g. Nedelisky, unpublished). Dorr & Hawthorne (2013) have pointed out that it's tough to distinguish perfect naturalness from primitivity. It is analytic that perfect properties are fundamental given fundamentality as primitivity, since perfect properties are primitive.

Fundamentality as primitivity should be distinguished from primitiveness about fundamentality. Primitiveness about fundamentality says fundamentality is undefinable, or that it is primitive what is fundamental. Tahko (2018, §1.4) cites Fine (2001) as gesturing toward this notion of fundamentality when he says that it is the world's intrinsic structure that is fundamental. But perfect properties seem as good a candidate for being constituents in the world's intrinsic structure as any property, so would count as fundamental on this view. Tahko (ibid.) also cites Schaffer's (2009, p.351) idea that "The primary is (as it were) all God would need to create." It seems that the perfect properties couldn't be left out by God to create the world as it seems to be presented. So the perfect properties are fundamental given primitiveness about fundamentality, too.

That perfect properties are fundamental need not imply that each perfect property must be of its own fundamental kind. For perhaps they may all fall under one fundamental kind: the mental, or the neutral.

§3.3 Perfect Properties are Ubiquitous. These points generalize beyond the perfect properties of the maple tree, since we can have perceptual experiences of many different kinds of external objects. But if fundamental mental or neutral properties are instantiated across all of these objects, then fundamental mentality or neutrality really would be ubiquitous. And they do seem to be. For we can have perceptual experiences of many sorts of entities all throughout the

natural world—some via technologically advanced telescopes—and all of them are presented to us as having perfect properties, such as perfect color. Even portions of outer space are presented as instantiating perfect blackness, perfect darkness, perfect coldness; and the objects within those regions are presented as having some perfect color, some perfect brightness, perfect heat, or perfect size.

§3.4 Generalizing Claim. Naïve realism says that external world objects, or at least certain of their property instantiations, figure into the phenomenal character of experience. And perfect properties of external world objects must be appealed to in order to explain phenomenal character in the elegant way that naive realism offers. At least some of these ubiquitous mental or neutral property instantiations are fundamental. So naïve realism implies panpsychism or neutralism.

Notice that my main argument does not rely on claims about what kinds of entities can be constituents in our perceptual experiences or minds.[43] Rather, the properties presented to us in experience must be the way they are presented if they are to constitute phenomenal character in the way the naïve realist wants: the maple leaf *looks* perfectly orange and perfectly maple-shaped to me because it *is* perfectly orange and perfectly maple-shaped, and are constituents of phenomenal character on naïve realism. Some argumentation reveals that they are mental or neutral, and fundamental. We can also infer that perfect properties are ubiquitous in the natural world, as experiences of objects other than the maple tree begin to reveal.

[43] Paul Coates (1996) argues that naïve realism implies idealism. My argument differs from Coates's argument in at least two ways. First, mine argues that naïve realism implies panpsychism, not the stronger thesis of idealism. Idealism is stronger than panpsychism in the sense that panpsychism leaves room for fundamentally physical facts of external world objects, whereas idealism does not. Second, my main argument does not use as a premise that only mental items can be constituents of experience, which, as Hobson (2013, 554) points out, is unmotivated. Rather, I argue that in order to account for phenomenal character in this intimate, constitutive, non-causal way, the properties that figure in phenomenal character must really be the way they are presented as being. And some reflection on these perfect properties reveals that they are i) mental, ii) fundamental, and iii) ubiquitous. So naïve realism implies panpsychism.

§4. Or Naïve Realism Entails Panprotopsychism. So far I have concluded that naïve realism (plus the view that we have some veridical experiences) implies panpsychism, or the neutralist thesis that there are fundamentally neutral properties of external objects. It's obvious why naïve realism's implying panpsychism is a significant conclusion. Entailing neutralism is also a significant conclusion.[44] For it adds a new fundamental ontological category to one's ontology. A naïve realist in avoiding panpsychism by embracing fundamentally neutral properties must reject dualism (understood roughly as the thesis that not all fundamental concrete facts are physical facts, and those that aren't are mental facts) and idealism (understood as the thesis that all fundamental concrete facts are mental facts). (Let concrete facts denote facts about the concrete world and the substances, relations, properties, tropes, etc. that inhabit, instantiate, or obtain within it.)

The neutralist entailment becomes even more interesting when it is seen that these fundamentally neutral properties might be naturally interpreted to be the protoconscious properties posited by panprotopsychism. Panprotopsychism says that the protoconscious properties are fundamental and ubiquitously instantiated in the natural world. According to Goff (et. al 2017, §2.3; 2015), protoconscious properties are fundamental properties from which we can a priori deduce, i.e. 'transparently account for,' phenomenal properties. As he puts it, the basic idea is that if you could magically perceive all the protoconscious properties involved in transparently accounting for my conscious life (assuming panprotopsychism is true), then you could in principle deduce what it is like to be me (ibid.). Similarly, for Chalmers, the protophenomenal are non-structural properties that are involved in constitutively accounting for

[44] One might think naïve realism's entailing neutralism, though significant, is not a surprising conclusion. E.g., Colin McGinn (1996) expresses color primitivism and basically acknowledges that they are neutral. He is not a naïve realist.

the phenomenal (2016, p.31). Arguably, the perfect properties are one type of protoconscious property. If you were to list precisely the perfect properties you were naively aware of at some time (and I had been naively aware of those same properties before), then I could in principle deduce what it was like for you to have that very perceptual experience. So naïve realism implies, if not panpsychism, the thesis that protoconscious properties are fundamental and ubiquitous.

This is not equivalent with saying that naïve realism entails full-blown panprotopsychism. Full-blown panprotopsychism says only protoconscious properties are fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. So on full-blown panprotopsychism, fundamentally conscious properties like the naïve realist's irreducible awareness relation are given a reductive analysis, which is incoherent. It is open to the naïve realist to just accept that there are protoconscious properties while also saying there are fundamental mental relations. That is, they need not commit to full-blown panprotopsychism, even if to avoid panpsychism they should accept the panprotopsychist thesis that protoconscious properties are fundamental and ubiquitous.

One might suggest that in order for perfect properties to transparently account for phenomenal properties, we require an appeal to consciousness *of* the perfect properties. Since the naïve realist appeals to the consciousness relation in a transparent account of one's (perceptual) conscious life, one might say that the perfect properties *by themselves* aren't protoconscious properties.

But from a consciousness of nothing, no phenomenal properties can be deduced. The perfect properties must be appealed to for the naïve realist to a priori deduce the relevant phenomenal properties. So the perfect properties are indispensable to their transparent account of

the phenomenal properties. This suffices for the perfect properties to be protophenomenal. For again, the basic idea is that if you could magically perceive all the protophenomenal properties involved in transparently accounting for my conscious life, then we could deduce what it is like to be me. We may think of the naïve realist's consciousness relation as the 'magically perceiving' relation in this story, and note that the basic idea of a protophenomenal property seems compatible with there being a consciousness *of* protophenomenal properties. Chalmers (2016, p.31) says the protoconscious are neither phenomenal nor structural, and that they are involved in constitutive accounts of the phenomenal. For a naïve realist, the perfect properties meet all of the above requirements.

Additionally, perhaps the most well-known version of panprotopsychism is Sam Coleman's (2016) panqualityism. Among the central theses of his panprotopsychism are:

i) (Possibly) unexperienced intrinsic qualities are fundamental and ubiquitous, and

ii) These are the protoconscious properties.

Perfect properties like perfect color fall under the classification of (possibly) unexperienced intrinsic qualities if anything does. This notion of a protophenomenal property is the only fleshed out notion of a protophenomenal property in the literature (Goff et. al 2017, §3).

One might insist that the protoconscious properties must constitute the phenomenal properties by themselves, without anything else sui generis like consciousness. This seems unfair to demand of protoconsciousness, since on some theories of perceptual experience even consciousness itself doesn't suffice for the phenomenal properties. It is coherent to hold that protoconscious properties are instantiated, fundamental, and ubiquitous without accepting they are the only fundamental concrete properties, contra full-blown panprotopsychism.

Conclusion. The properties revealed to us in naïve realist experience are perfect. These perfect property instantiations are fundamentally mental or neutral, and ubiquitous. So naïve realism implies panpsychism or neutralism. Panpsychism is a significant philosophical commitment. Neutralism rules out dualism and idealism, and puts more distance between naïve realism and physicalism. The present kind of neutralism entails the panprotopsychist thesis that protoconscious properties are fundamental and ubiquitous. Full-blown panprotopsychism is incompatible with naïve realism.

CHAPTER 3

Dialogue and Cognitive Qualia

Abstract. Traditionally, consciousness has been restricted to the realm of perceptual and otherwise sensory experiences. If there is a kind of phenomenology altogether unlike sensory phenomenology, then this was a mistake, and presents a new challenge for naturalizing consciousness. I argue that such cognitive phenomenology exists by appealing to a phenomenal contrast between reading meaningful, as opposed to relatively meaningless, dialogue. I identify five kinds of sensory phenomenology, and argue that they do not plausibly account for the phenomenal contrast, and hence there is cognitive phenomenology. I offer a novel diagnosis for why phenomenal contrast arguments have not been effective on even non-neutral parties to the debate; my argument circumvents the difficulty. I then argue that the phenomenal contrast is naturally characterized as one's seeming to be aware of abstract relations that obtain between different contributions to the dialogue. This can then be used to reinforce the idea that the phenomenal contrast is not wholly constituted by sensory phenomenology. Finally, I present my theory of cognitive experience to account for the cognitive phenomenology, and sketch some reasons to prefer it.

Key words: cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast, thought, consciousness

§1.1 Cognitive Phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology is the phenomenon of there being something it is like experientially to think a conscious thought. Proprietary ognitive phenomenology is cognitive phenomenology that is not reducible to sensory (or 'imagistic') phenomenology. In this paper I argue for two main theses. The first is that David Pitt's (2004) phenomenal contrast argument, which responds to the kind of objections that plague the influential phenomenal contrast cases offered by Strawson (1994), Siewert (1998), and Horgan & Tienson (2002), is unsuccessful (§1). The second is that an argument that uses the phenomenal contrast between meaningful and relatively meaningless dialogue may be mounted to avoid or rebut such objections, and succeeds (§2). §3 provides a 'glossed' version of this argument. This means it includes a premise describing the nature of the phenomenal contrast, and a premise saying that proprietary cognitive phenomenology must be present to account for the nature of the contrast. The characterization of the contrast offered in §3 reinforces the novel phenomenal contrast argument offered in §2 against a more sophisticated objection, and concludes there is proprietary cognitive phenomenology.[45] §4 offers a theory of cognitive experience to account for this cognitive phenomenology.

These results are significant, first, because the target phenomenology is not confined to relatively rare experiences such as mathematical insight. This is a stronger conclusion than that of the most sophisticated phenomenal contrast arguments currently in the literature. Additionally,

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[45] My conclusion, like other phenomenal contrast arguments, entails Irreducibility. It does *not* entail Phenomenal Intentionality:

> Irreducibility: in virtue of being in some cognitive states, one is thereby in a phenomenal state for which no wholly sensory mental state suffices.
>
> Phenomenal Intentionality: in virtue of being in some phenomenal states, one is thereby in an intentional state.

As Chudnoff (2015, p.89) points out, Irreducibility and Phenomenal Intentionality do not entail each other.

proponents of phenomenal contrast arguments have not responded to serious challenges to the in-principle effectiveness of such arguments; this chapter responds. Also significant is my novel and simple diagnosis in §1 for why past 'non-glossed' phenomenal contrast arguments fail. It is significant if there are 'non-glossed' phenomenal contrast arguments that survive the regular objections (a la §2). Finally, some representationalist theories explain the phenomenology of perceptual experiences in terms of representation, and explain representation in terms of natural relations such as causal-teleological relations. If there is irreducibly cognitive phenomenology that is altogether different from the sensory perceptual phenomenology that these representationalist theories attempt to explain, then this presents a new challenge for naturalizing consciousness, a challenge uniquely presented by the proprietary nature of cognitive phenomenology.

I introduce what I take proprietary cognitive phenomenology to be by contrasting it with sensory phenomenology. I take sensory phenomenology to be phenomenology such that what it is like to have it essentially involves seeming to be presented with images, broadly construed.[46] There is something it is like experientially to see green or hear leaves rustling. There is also something it is like to feel a tickling sensation or feel cold, something it is like to consciously imagine snow falling on a crisp moonlit night, something it is like to 'hear' one's 'inner voice' when one thinks 'in words', and something it is like to feel content or at ease. Below is a list of the kinds of experiential states which the above are instances of, respectively.[47]

(i) Perceptual experiences
(ii) Conscious bodily sensations
(iii) Imagistic experiences of a non-linguistic sort

[46] The imagery that seems to be presented in sensory phenomenology is broadly construed in that it includes more than visual imagery: e.g. it may include auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile imagery. I will pass over issues about the ontological status of such imagery, or whether we are really presented with them.

[47] The list is borrowed from Lormand (1996, p.242-3) and Tye & Briggs (2011, p.329).

(iv) Conscious linguistic imagery experiences
(v) Primary emotions

The phenomenology of these mental states may be characterized as kinds of sensory phenomenology. One reason to count, for example, (iii) and (iv) as sensory even though they are not perceptual is because they seem to be fainter 'echoes' of perceptual/sensory states. Another reason is that both parties to the debate believe in this kind of phenomenology, and where we differ is whether there is phenomenology not reducible to that of (i)-(v). I remain neutral about whether some of the phenomenology of (i)-(v) may be subsumed or reduced to the phenomenology of some other of (i) – (v).[48] I follow Tye & Briggs (2011) in assuming that the phenomenology of these states is not essentially conceptual or cognitive.[49] To assume this is an advantage of my argument, since in general an argument is stronger if it gives opponents as many of their assumptions as possible, while still succeeding.

Yet perhaps there is another kind of phenomenology that is not reducible to one or more of (i) – (v)-type phenomenology, and that is essentially conceptual, non-imagistic, or cognitive. Galen Strawson calls this 'meaning-experience' or 'understanding-experience' (1994, 4-13, 182-183, 208-209, 213; 2011a, 286), or what 'it is like experientially to understand a proposition' (1994, 7; 2011b). David Pitt characterizes this phenomenology as 'what it is like to think that p' (2004, 1), or what it is like to 'consciously entertain a content' (ibid., 28). Some philosophers outright deny that there is anything it is like to think that p (e.g. Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson [2007, 129]). Others believe there is something it is like to think that p but maintain that it is

[48] For example, one might think as Prinz (2011, p.178) does that conscious bodily sensations are a subset of perceptual experiences.

[49] Some wouldn't assume the phenomenology of mental states (i)-(v) have no essentially cognitive phenomenology. Montague (2011) would argue my example for (iii) essentially includes conceptual phenomenology, and the same regarding Tye & Brigg's (2011, p.329) own example of consciously imagining a familiar object or person.

reducible to the phenomenology of some of (i) – (v) (e.g. Carruthers & Veillet 2011, Prinz 2011, Levine 2011, Robinson 2011, and Tye & Briggs 2011, Pautz 2013b, Koksvik 2015). And still others believe in cognitive phenomenology that is not reducible to that of (i) – (v), i.e. proprietary cognitive phenomenology (e.g. Strawson 1994 & 2011, Siewert 1998, Pitt 2004 & 2011, Bourget 2010 & 2018, Mendelovici 2010 & 2018, Smithies 2013a & 2013b, Montague 2011, 2016 & 2017, Horgan 2011, Kriegel 2011, Shields 2011, and Chudnoff 2015). Henceforth, this is what I mean by 'cognitive phenomenology.'

The reason I introduce cognitive phenomenology by contrasting it with paradigm cases of sensory phenomenology is that there may be no uncontested way of defining cognitive phenomenology. One way to define it would be as the kind of phenomenology that is associated in representing 'high-level' properties, like natural kind and functional kind properties (Montague, 2017). Montague (ibid., §3.4) acknowledges this definition is incomplete because cognitive phenomenology may be associated with attitude-types, too. Another reason to reject it is if cognitive phenomenology is present in conscious states that don't represent such properties.[50] Perhaps a better way of characterizing cognitive phenomenology is as non-imagistic phenomenology (=phenomenology such that what it is like to have it essentially does not involve seeming to be presented with images, broadly construed).

There are in the literature three ways of arguing for the existence of cognitive phenomenology. One way is to offer purely theoretical arguments, such as Pitt's (2004) epistemological argument that we could not know which occurrent thoughts we are thinking without the presence of such phenomenology. A second way is hypothetical arguments, such as

[50] If the argument spelled out in this chapter is sound, then cognitive phenomenology is also present in seeming to be aware of abstract relations that obtain between different contributions in a dialogue. These don't seem to fall under the class of natural or functional kind properties.

Kriegel's Zoe (2015) conceivability argument, which has the reader take multiple steps ending in conceiving being a sensory zombie that nevertheless has conscious mathematical intuitions. The third way is to help one's interlocutor isolate the relevant phenomenology by drawing attention to pairs of experiences that are sufficiently alike in their sensory phenomenological aspects but that still differ phenomenologically. Instances of the latter method of argumentation, phenomenal contrast arguments, are the subject of this essay.[51]

Chudnoff (2015) points out that finding phenomenology in some phenomenal state that is not present in some other sensory state does not suffice to show cognitive phenomenology. Chudnoff's main idea seems correct: even if an experience, e1, has phenomenology not contained in a sensory experience, e2, this doesn't show that e1 has cognitive phenomenology. For e1 might just have (iii)-type phenomenology that e2 does not. But we haven't shown e1 has cognitive phenomenology. My strategy will be to argue that the relevant e1's have phenomenology that isn't *any* of (i)-(v) type phenomenology.

Martina Furst (2017) attempts to explain why phenomenal contrast arguments have not been effective at persuading philosophers engaged in the cognitive phenomenology debate. Her main idea is that one's *initial focus* on phenomenology, due to one's already held view or biases on the existence of cognitive phenomenology, will trigger self-confirmation effects such as selection effects of features of experience, change-blindness effects, and anti-selection effects for uptake in belief.[52] So even if there is cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments

[51] Chudnoff (2015, p.83-84) classifies hypothetical arguments as a type of phenomenal contrast argument.

[52] An example of change-blindness occurs in 'mudsplashing', in which some high-contrast shapes are splattered over a scene, making it difficult to detect changes in other parts of the scene. Selection effects involve paying attention to certain features of a scene which may affect the beliefs formed from perceiving the scene: e.g., in a scene of a black man with pliers, one may pay attention only to the features pliers share with guns, resulting on one's believing that the man is armed with a gun (Siegel 2013: 240). Another example of a self-confirmation effect is from Shoemaker (1996), in which a fraternity inductee comes to believe he is in pain when an ice cube is pressed

are ineffective because there are systematic processes in place such that a doubter of this phenomenology will miss it. Here I note that a neutral participant to the debate can be genuinely undecided or open about the existence of cognitive phenomenology, and hence lack the biases required for Furst's points to apply.

In the course of the paper I offer a diagnosis for why classic phenomenal contrast arguments have been ineffective even at persuading genuinely neutral parties. To elicit a phenomenal contrast these classic arguments appeal to minimal pair sentences, at least one of which require an unusual or unexpected understanding, unusual words, or difficult syntactic structure. This prompts sensory phenomenology to help understand them. Since the sensory phenomenology in those classic cases play a key role in being able to understand one of the minimal-pair sentences, and hence notice a phenomenal contrast, this enables change-blindness and other selection effects to take place, obscuring cognitive phenomenology. I design my own contrast argument to avoid these pitfalls. In §2.7 I also respond to Koksvik's (2015) argument for the ineffectiveness of phenomenal contrast arguments.

§1.2 Pitt's 'Minimal pair sentences' Argument. In this section I present David Pitt's (2004) 'minimal pair sentences' argument as a case study and argue that it fails.[53] Along the way I also explain why some of the central, but less developed, phenomenal contrast cases in the literature fail (e.g. Strawson's 1994, Siewert's 1998, and Horgan & Tienson's 2002).[54] Seeing

against his throat due to an expectation of pain. Furst suggests something like this may generate false beliefs about the presence of cognitive phenomenology, too.

[53] Pitt (2004, e.g. p.1 vs. p.26) seems ambivalent about whether it counts as a method of *argumentation*. Chudnoff (2015) would classify Pitt's argument, which I consider in §1, as a 'Pure Phenomenal Contrast Argument'. Note that the purely theoretical argument Pitt advances elsewhere in his 2004 does not invoke any phenomenal contrast.

[54] The reason why hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments, e.g. Kriegel's Zoe case (2015), fail is not relevant to my current project. Kriegel attempts to help the reader imagine a sensory zombie, one that has no sensory states whatever, but has phenomenal states when contemplating mathematical truths. Chudnoff (2015, p.93-98) points out that Kriegel offers no non-circular reason why this zombie must have phenomenal states; if Kriegel reverts to stipulation, one might, like Pautz (2013, p.219), say they cannot imagine this zombie: Perhaps we only

the various reasons why will be instructive for mounting a more cogent argument for cognitive phenomenology.

A first simple case is Horgan & Tienson's (2002) 'Time flies!' This can be read as a cliché, or as a command regarding a kind of insect. Try both.

On the more familiar, cliché reading, I suspect many readers won't have to imagine any particular scene to understand it. A simple and satisfying account of the phenomenal contrast involves saying that the other reading, regarding a command to use a stopwatch on insects, involves an unusual or unexpected understanding of the phrase. Because of this, we cannot help but use a sensory crutch—perhaps involving (iii)-type, imagination phenomenology—to help understand it. Alternatively, one might have 'heard' "Time flies!" in a different, perhaps commanding tone on the insect reading, i.e. experienced a difference in (iv)-type phenomenology. This seems to plausibly explain the phenomenal contrast, in part because the sensory phenomenology on the unusual reading was so key to being able to understand it.

Another simple case is Siewert's (1998: 279): 'Before she had a chance to pass the bar, she decided to change directions, but she was not so pleasantly surprised with where she wound up'. One reading concerns an aborted legal career, and another a trip around town. Try both.

The clear and primary difference in phenomenology may be (iii)-type: Many readers don't imagine scenes in their head on the more usual reading—depending on the reader, perhaps the one concerning an aborted legal career. The second reading is less obvious or less usual for the reader, and is more likely to elicit imagined scenes: e.g. of someone walking down a cobbled street and turning away from a brewery. An alternative explanation for why the second reading

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notice phenomenal contrasts between merely entertaining mathematical propositions and having mathematical insights precisely because we are not sensory zombies.

requires a sensory crutch is that there is a stark contrast in meaning between the two readings; this may apply to 'Time flies!' as well.

Within my later discussion of Pitt's (more advanced) contrast cases, it shall become apparent why Strawson's (1994) case of reading a sentence in French before understanding French and reading that same sentence after having learnt French fails. Pitt's contrast cases are also worth interacting with in their own right, since he gives responses to the standard opening replies from doubters of cognitive phenomenology.

Pitt's main strategy is to a) present grammatically well-formed sentences that one will fail to understand on first reading, b) have the reader attend to what it is like on that first reading, and then c) have the reader compare what it is like to read it a subsequent time after having been instructed on how to read it with understanding. Pitt concludes that the difference in phenomenology of the two readings must be cognitive phenomenology present on the second reading but not the first, since the sensory phenomenology is similar enough in the two cases. His argument fails if the doubter of cognitive phenomenology can appeal to a difference in *sensory* phenomenology that plausibly accounts for the phenomenal contrast noticed in (c). Here are the examples Pitt discusses.

1) The boy the man the girl saw chased fled.
2) The boat sailed down the river sank.
3) Buffalo buffalo buffalo buffalo buffalo buffalo buffalo.[55]

(1) is a sentence with 'multiple center-embeddings'. (2) is a 'garden-path' sentence. And (3) is a 'machine-gun' sentence. For most, the experiences of reading (1)-(3) change after one comes to know they mean the same as the following corresponding sentences.

1*) The boy, who was chased by the man that the girl saw, fled.

[55] My objections to Pitt's version of a machine-gun sentence apply also to Horgan & Tienson's (2002) 'Dogs dogs dog dog dogs'.

2*) The boat that was sailed [by someone] down the river sank.
3*) Buffalo that are outwitted by buffalo outwit buffalo that are outwitted by buffalo.

For example, according to Pitt, reading (1) the first time and reading (1) a subsequent time after learning that (1) means the same as (1*) will be phenomenologically different. That difference he claims is accounted for by *consciously thinking* that (1) the subsequent time. This does not occur on the first (couple of) reading(s) because of the strangeness of (1)'s syntactic structure, which leads to a failure to *consciously apprehend the meaning of* (1). Pitt would say that while the conscious linguistic imagery, i.e. (iv)-type phenomenology, is the same on both readings—one's inner voice sounds basically the same when reading the same sentence each time—it still feels relevantly different reading (1) after learning it means (1*). This phenomenal difference is attributed to cognitive phenomenology.

Some philosophers might argue that the difference between initially reading (1)-(3) and reading them after learning they mean (1*)-(3*), respectively, boils down to a difference in how one parses out the sentences. This is an instance of Carruther & Veillet's (2011, p.52) response to Strawson's (1994) case of hearing a sentence in French when one doesn't know French and hearing that same sentence in French after one learns French. For example, these philosophers will say that upon learning that (1) means (1*), one simply pays attention to parts of the sentence in a different order compared to the first reading (e.g. paying attention in (1) first to *the man the girl saw*, then *chased*, then *the boy*, then *fled*, in that order). In other words, there is a difference in order of (iv)-type phenomenology. Perhaps there is also the presence of a general feeling of elation upon reading (1) with understanding, i.e. there is also a difference in (v)-type phenomenology. Together these differences plausibly account for the phenomenological difference between the initial vs. subsequent readings. Hence there is no need to posit cognitive phenomenology to account for the difference.

Pitt anticipates this kind of response by saying that, even if a difference in parsing occurs between reading (1)-(3) initially and reading them after learning they mean (1*)-(3*), respectively, this does not completely account for the overall phenomenological difference. He attempts to avoid the parsing objection by presenting a sentence with a more syntactically transparent structure but with obscure words:

(4) The rhodomontade of ululating funambulists is never idoneous. (Pitt, 28-29)

The hope is that one will not understand (4) on first reading only because of unfamiliarity with the words employed and not because of syntactically opaque sentence structure. When one learns that 'rhodomontade' means *rant*, that 'ululating' means *howling*, that funambulists are *tightrope walkers*, and that 'idoneous' means *appropriate*, one will understand (4). And the phenomenal contrast between reading (4) before acquiring the new vocabulary and afterward cannot be attributed to parsing, since one reads (4) in the same order as before. Something similar to this kind of learning occurs when learning the French vocabulary in Strawson's (1994) classic phenomenal contrast case.

This strategy fails. The general problem is that, upon recently learning unfamiliar words, we are prone to utilizing sensory phenomenology as a crutch to interpret sentences containing those recently learned words. For example, in the case of reading (4) just after having learned the meaning of rhodomontade, ululate, etc., one might just substitute in one's mind the unfamiliar words with the more familiar: instead of reading (4) and understanding it, one really reads and understands:

(4*) The rant of howling tightrope walkers is never appropriate.

So of course reading (4) the second time will be different, since one (or at least I) cannot help but hear one's 'inner voice' utter (4*) instead of (4). The phenomenal contrast in reading (4) before

and after acquiring the new vocabulary might thus be plausibly characterized as a difference in (iv)-type (and perhaps v-type) phenomenology, not cognitive phenomenology. Either this, or it's likely that one visually imagines a scene of howling tightrope walkers, perhaps accompanied with a feeling that it is inappropriate due to its unusualness, where this may boil down to having a feeling of unease regarding the pictured scene. The phenomenal contrast may plausibly be attributed to some combination of (iii), (iv), and (v)-type sensory phenomenology, due to the unusualness either of the words contained in (4) or the scene described in (4).

The believer in cognitive phenomenology might argue that it is only when we've recently learnt the unfamiliar words that we need to use such sensory crutches to understand them. So instead of trying to read (4) immediately after learning the new vocabulary, one might suggest rehearsing the new words and their meanings regularly until their meanings come just as easily as the meaning of rant, howl, etc., and *then* read (4) again.

The problem with this is that by the time this rehearsal process is complete, one's memory of what it was like to read (4) initially will likely have faded enough that drawing conclusions about phenomenal contrasts between reading (4) initially and subsequently will be unreliable. After all, audiophiles often admit they cannot reliably compare the sound signatures of different high-end earphones without listening to them one soon after the other. Surely our memory after the rehearsal process of what it was like to hear our '*inner* voice' when reading (4) initially would be even worse, rendering comparisons unreliable.[56] My objection applies even

[56] One might be confused how there could be any auditory or visual linguistic phenomenology at all in the initial reading of (4), which was without understanding. This confusion might be explained by one's having tacitly rejected an earlier premise in Pitt's argument. That premise says the linguistic imagery in the initial reading and in the subsequent reading with understanding are pretty much the same. I think upon reflection it's quite plausible we have *some* linguistic imagery, e.g. an 'inner voice speaking', even when reading without understanding, which helps supports his premise. The omnipresence of linguistic imagery in reading could also explain how we sometimes do not notice right away that we have transitioned to reading without understanding. For this linguistic imagery can help make the absence of cognitive phenomenology harder to notice right away.

more so to Strawson's (1994) example of reading a sentence in French before understanding French and reading that same sentence after learning French, which would take longer than the suggested rehearsal process. To conclude that the difference between the two readings, before and after, must be due to cognitive phenomenology, rather than a difference in the presence of imaginings (iii-type phenomenology) or linguistic imagery (iv-type phenomenology) or a general emotive feeling of understanding (v-type phenomenology), would be unreliable at best.

How does Pitt respond to the objection that what has been isolated in reading (4) before and after is just the 'experiential difference between reading/hearing a sentence with and without *bewilderment*' (2004, p.29), i.e. a difference in (v)-type phenomenology? Pitt: Either bewilderment is just a lack of understanding or it is some kind of positive state. If the former, then appealing to bewilderment is no objection at all, since what one experiences when understanding a sentence not previously understood is exactly what Pitt is trying to isolate (ibid.). If the latter—the bewilderment is the *presence* of something like cognitive disequilibrium or perhaps some kind of psychosemantic state—then Pitt's solution is to appeal once more to multiply center-embedded sentences like (1). His idea at this juncture is that sentences like (1) *remain hard to understand for long enough* that one may have two experiences, E1 and E2, of reading (1); *both* E1 and E2 lack any feeling of bewilderment because (1)'s novelty has faded by the time of having E1 and E2; but still E2 feels different because only in E2 does one grasp the meaning of (1), after learning it means (1*).

But Pitt's use of multiply embedded sentences fails precisely because they are *too* hard to understand. Just as we required (iii) *or* (iv)-type phenomenology to understand sentences with unfamiliar or newly learned vocabulary, as with (4), the same is the case for sentences with opaque syntactic structures. For try as I might, I confess I just cannot understand

(1) The boy the man the girl saw chased fled.

Instead, what I *am* able to understand is

(1*) The boy, who was chased by the man that the girl saw, fled.

After learning that (1) means the same as (1*) I might, while reading (1) a subsequent time, imagine the scene expressed in these propositions. But then the difference in reading (1) the initial time and the subsequent time can be explained in terms of the presence of imagistic experiences of a non-linguistic sort (i.e. iii-type phenomenology) that is only present on the subsequent reading. One might avoid employing one's imagination when reading (1) the subsequent time. But in that case I predict, again because of the strangeness of (1)'s syntactic structure, one won't be able to grasp the meaning of (1) without one's 'inner voice' uttering something like (1*) instead of (1), or without parsing (1) out differently (as discussed earlier). In other words, the experience of grasping (1) might be 'teased apart' from the experience of relief from any bewilderment caused by (1)'s novelty (i.e. teased apart from any v-type phenomenology). But what is teased apart may plausibly be characterized as (iii)-type or (iv)-type phenomenology, i.e. sensory phenomenology.

The problem lay in the difficulty of understanding these types of sentences, which seems to require sensory phenomenology characteristic of visual and auditory imaginings. Sentences with obscure words that have a transparent syntactic structure likewise cannot be used to demonstrate the presence of cognitive phenomenology. For these either also require immediate sensory crutches, or else the time that elapses during a rehearsal process renders introspective comparisons from memory unreliable. Because the sensory crutches are so crucial to being able to read these sentences with understanding, this may enable systematic psychological processes to obscure cognitive phenomenology.

§2 The Argument from Meaningful Dialogue. To isolate cognitive phenomenology we must avoid the snares of these classic arguments. Note the idea is not that we should find text which, to understand, requires no sensory phenomenology whatsoever. For to understand any text we must first be presented with it, and to be presented with it we must see, hear or feel it (barring some kind of telepathic communication of it!).

I think ordinary *dialogue* fits the bill. There is a salient phenomenal contrast between reading meaningful versus relatively meaningless dialogue. The constructed e-mail chain below includes no sentences with unusual or obscure words, and the syntactic structure of all the sentences involved is simple and transparent. The topic is mundane and not particularly exciting. Attend to what it is like to read each contribution to the conversation/item in the sequence *as you read it*. Begin:

Marilyn: Let me know when done.

Peter: Copy, on it.

Marilyn: I can do the hit. Pitch them on me, but not going to put Jim on it.

Peter: Must be. Per Schruti's secretary, I turned him down flat (and politely) and inquired into opportunities next week.

Marilyn: Wait, this is a terrible topic. Who is Don? Is he with Clinton?

Peter: Not sure if we're talking about Clinton's latest accusations. If not will just say we can't join. Let me know!

Don: Would either the Tuesday or Wednesday times work?
TUESDAY – 7a 8a
WEDNESDAY – 7a, 8a

Peter: Sadly, it cannot as he is on a plane. Can I offer you someone else from our team?

Don: Can this happen tomorrow morning actually? It would be with Schruti Anand for about 15 minutes.

> **Peter:** Checking! Thanks, Don! How long would the segment be? Would you be interviewing?
>
> **Don:** My morning show has been covering the Bush fundraising issue. They'd like to speak with Jim Nicholson. Tomorrow wouldn't work but if he could do it in the next few days that would be great.

One reads the conversation perhaps with little, even if some, sense of what is going on. Perhaps one's phenomenology will be dominated by a sense of puzzlement (v-type) and linguistic imagery (iv-type). One will most likely not comprehend the full meaning of each participant's contributions to the conversation *as one is reading each contribution*, at least not until the end of the conversation.

Now read the same script except this time beginning at the bottom, where Don says "My morning show…," and work your way upward, ending where Marilyn says "Let me know when done." Attend to what it is like to read the contributions in this conversation as you read them.

One should notice a salient phenomenal contrast between reading each individual's contributions to the conversation this time around versus when reading top-down. One may even take some notes on some of the noticeable differences this time around.

In the main bulk of §2 I will argue by process of elimination that this phenomenal contrast cannot be fully accounted for by a difference in sensory phenomenology. Hence there is cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive experiences of understanding dialogue may be characterized as seeming to *consciously grasp* the (fuller) meaning of each individual contribution to the conversation (rather than grasping a stark contrast in meaning). §3 argues for a more detailed positive characterization of this phenomenology, as seeming to grasp particular abstract relations or connections that obtain between each contribution of the dialogue that one couldn't grasp when reading the conversation top-down. If the grasp were unconscious, or did

not cause any additional phenomenology associated with grasping, then this could not explain the phenomenal contrast. I argue in §3 that with the more detailed positive characterization of this phenomenology in place, we may reinforce the main argument of §2 from a more sophisticated rendition of the usual objections. I will conclude that seeming conscious detection of these kinds of abstract relations in ordinary dialogue is best explained by cognitive phenomenology, and present a new theory of cognitive experience—which appeals to *cognitive qualia*—to account for it.

§2.1 Linguistic Imagery. An obvious first objection is that the difference in phenomenology between the top-down and bottom-up readings is just due to the contributions being read in a different order, i.e. a difference in order of conscious linguistic imagery. One's 'inner voice' thus 'sounds' different because of this: e.g. "My morning show…" is 'heard' at the very beginning on the bottom-up reading but near the end on the top-down reading, a difference in (iv)-type phenomenology. For conciseness, I will only speak in terms of auditory linguistic imagery. My points apply equally well to visual linguistic imagery.

Response: It is true that, between the top-down and bottom-up readings, most of the contributions are read in a different order. But every sentence *within a contribution*, and all the words the sentences contain, are still read in the same order. For example, one of Peter's contributions always reads in one's inner voice as 'Sadly', then 'it', then 'cannot', then 'as', and so on in this order regardless of whether it is embedded in the top-down or bottom-up reading. And my claim is that what it is like as one reads any individual contribution – e.g. these very words in this (sense of) order, which is the *same* on either reading – will be *different*.

The objector may instead point to the fact that the overall (iv)-type phenomenology is different because the contributions have a different order *relative to the whole conversation*. But

in this second sense of ‘order’ we should notice that one of Peter’s contributions is presented in the same order on either reading: it is always the sixth contribution made to the conversation. And yet what it is like to read this contribution on the top-down vs. bottom-up readings is different. So on either sense of ‘order’—whether order of words read within each contribution, or order of contribution relative to the whole conversation—the (iv)-type phenomenology is pretty much the same, and so cannot account for the difference in phenomenology (at least for this sixth contribution). The objector might press that this sixth contribution, even though it is the same in the first and second senses of ‘order’, is still ‘heard’ in a different order in a third sense of ‘order’: “Not sure if we’re talking about Clinton’s latest accusations…” is heard in one’s inner voice just after “Is he with Clinton?” on the top-down reading, but just after “WEDNESDAY – 7a, 8a” on the bottom-up reading. But while the objector is correct that there is a difference in order of conscious linguistic imagery in this last sense of ‘order,’ it is obvious that the phenomenal difference in reading Peter’s contribution here does not boil down to this difference. Rather, the phenomenal contrast when reading “Not sure if we’re talking about Clinton’s latest accusations…” on the top-down vs. bottom-up readings is much more plausibly the phenomenal contrast made by more fully consciously grasping the meaning of this contribution on the bottom-up reading (or more of the meaning, or a different meaning).

To see this, let me present a contrast to the above case. Attend to the (iv)-type phenomenology present in top-down vs. bottom-up readings of the following sequence:

G
C
A
D
B
F
E

Noticeably, any phenomenological differences between the top-down and bottom-up readings of this sequence may plausibly be accounted for by an appeal to a difference in (iv)-type phenomenology, specifically to a difference in the order (at least in the third sense of 'order', above) of conscious linguistic imagery. E.g. one will 'hear' "D" just after "A" on the top-down reading but just after "B" on the bottom-up reading. This is unlike the dialogue case, where the difference in phenomenology between top-down and bottom-up readings is not just a difference in order of conscious linguistic imagery. Why? The best explanation is that our grasp of the meaning of each item in the sequence changes in the dialogue example, depending on the order of the reading, but not in the alphabet example: e.g. what it is like to grasp the meaning of "A" is the same no matter whether we 'hear' it as the third item in the sequence or the fifth. But our grasp of the meaning of (e.g.) "Can this happen tonight? It would be Schruti Anand for about 15 minutes" in the conversation case does noticeably change depending on whether we read it top-down or bottom-up. This suggests that the phenomenal contrast between reading a contribution top-down vs. bottom-up is a contrast that consists in more fully consciously grasping the meaning of the item in the sequence, rather than just a difference in the order of conscious linguistic imagery. Even if it is claimed that the grasp itself is unconscious but causes the additional phenomenology, this new phenomenology is not reducible to (iv)-type phenomenology. I will consider a more sophisticated objection regarding (iv)-type imagery later in the paper.

§2.2 Imagistic Experiences of a Non-Linguistic Sort. A second objection is that while what it is like to read a particular contribution to the conversation changes depending on whether it is read top-down or bottom-up, this may be accounted for by an appeal to imagistic experiences of a non-linguistic sort (i.e. iii-type phenomenology). The idea here would be that

one imagines different scenes in one's mind depending on whether one reads the conversation top-down or bottom-up.

I suspect many readers will find it is possible to read the conversation without the use of conscious imaginings, as I did, because of the quite ordinary language used. As we saw earlier, it was difficulty or unusualness of one of the readings, or stark contrast in the meanings between the two readings, in the classic phenomenal contrast arguments that prompted sensory crutches. Unlike the earlier examples of 'Time flies!' or of passing the bar (exam/brewery), understanding the dialogue didn't require an unusual or unexpected interpretation of the sentences. Rather, one already had some sense of the meaning of each contribution on the initial reading, but just grasped more of the meaning on the second reading. The dialogue's syntactic structure is transparent, the words used are quite ordinary, and the dialogue itself isn't difficult to understand when read in the correct, bottom-up order. All of the conditions which seem to induce us to employ sensory phenomenology to help understand in the classic phenomenal contrast cases are not present in the ordinary dialogue case. These conditions, which I'll denote as 'Hard to understand,' is supposed to give a reason why imagery is used. In contrast, there's no reason to think imagery must be present when it's not 'hard to understand':

1. Hard to understand → imagery, & Not hard to understand → not imagery.
2. Not hard to understand.
3. Therefore, not imagery.

One of the most salient physical items talked about in the conversation was the airplane. But imagining objects like these, if one did so at all, does not seem to differ much between the top-down and bottom-up readings, since we understand what an airplane is each time. At best, imagining the airplane on each reading occurred at different points between reading top-down

and bottom-up. But there is a more salient phenomenal contrast that needs to be accounted for than mere difference in order of such imagery.

On the bottom-up reading one might picture Peter and Don talking to each other, and then further up the dialogue pictures Marilyn and Peter talking alone. There seems to be more of a phenomenal contrast than imagining whom was talking to whom, though. And because I stipulated the conversation was conducted over e-mail, I suspect many readers didn't require imagining the speaker's faces at all. At least, one likely did not imagine their faces in as much detail as to differentiate whom was talking to whom.

Perhaps the most decisive reply to an appeal to (iii)-type phenomenology is the existence of people with aphantasia, who are unable to have the kind of mental images involved in conscious visual imagination.[57] I predict that readers who have aphantasia will still notice a salient phenomenal contrast between reading the dialogue top-down and bottom-up with understanding. A fuller conscious grasp of the meaning of each contribution in relation to the other contributions is a better explanation for this phenomenological difference. Imagistic experiences of a nonlinguistic sort are not apt for the task. At least, it is a difference in phenomenology not reducible to (iii)-type phenomenology.

§2.3 A Lack of Emotive Phenomenology. Supposing bewilderment is a positive state of cognitive disequilibrium or psychosemantic state, etc. What of the idea that there is just a *lack* of, or less, bewilderment when reading the conversation bottom-up, as opposed to top-down? But

[57] One might worry that aphantasia may not really involve an absence of visual mental imagery, but rather a deficit in metacognition. Keogh & Pearson (2018) found that "unlike the general population, experimentally naïve aphantasics showed almost no imagery-based rivalry priming. Aphantasic participants' self-rated visual object imagery was significantly below average, however their [self-rated] spatial imagery scores were above average" (ibid., abstract). Their diagnosis is that aphantasics "may have a severe deficiency in the 'what' [neural] pathway, … but not the 'where' pathway (ibid., §3). They conclude the data suggest aphantasia involves "a lack of sensory phenomenal imagery, and not a lack of metacognition" (ibid., abstract).

given our experience of reading the conversation bottom-up, it should be clear this account at best doesn't give the complete picture. For we seem to experience the *presence* of something new and different as we read the contributions to the conversation bottom-up. I am arguing that this was the experience of consciously grasping the meaning of each contribution to the dialogue more fully.

§2.4 New Emotive Phenomenology. One might think the phenomenological difference chalks up to the presence of a general emotive feeling of *familiarity* or *ease* during the bottom-up reading as one understands the conversation better, which is absent on the top-down reading. We may grant that this general feeling of familiarity or ease is nonconceptual or non-cognitive. Instances of this feeling would then be correctly categorized as (v)-type phenomenology. It may be similar to the general feeling of familiarity one might experience as one returns home after a day at the office, or to the feeling of ease when one finds a task to be effortless.

A general feeling of familiarity or ease seems again to miss the mark. To see this more clearly consider another contrast case.

G
F
E
D
C
B
A

There is a phenomenal contrast between reading the items in this sequence top-down vs. bottom-up. Part of this can be accounted for by a difference in (order of) conscious linguistic imagery. And the rest can be accounted for by the general feeling of familiarity or ease appealed to by our objector, the presence of which in this case is explainable by one's history of reciting the alphabet in a particular order. Crucially, there still seems to be some phenomenology missing if

we apply this kind of story to the conversation case, when reading it bottom-up. For we do not just feel some sort of general feeling of familiarity or ease of understanding: rather we seem to be consciously acquainted with something *new* and *different* (i.e. not familiar), which was absent in the top-down reading. The salient difference between this ordered alphabet example and the e-mail example is that one grasps the *meaning* of a given contribution more fully on the bottom-up reading of the e-mail chain. Meanwhile in the ordered alphabet example there is no difference in one's grasp of the meaning of the items when reading bottom-up vs. top-down. For there is no additional or difference of meaning to grasp. The phenomenal contrast between reading the conversation bottom-up vs. top-down is thus better accounted for by cognitive phenomenology.

If we say the fuller grasp of the meaning of each contribution to the dialogue is unconscious, or the fuller grasp of how each contribution relates to the dialogue at hand is unconscious, we haven't explained the new phenomenology. Moreover, if one thinks grasping the meaning on the bottom-up reading of the conversation might cause, but not constitute, the new and different phenomenology, then still, this new phenomenology is not reducible to (v)-type (and iv-type), emotive phenomenology.

§2.5 Non-linguistic, Linguistic, and Emotive Phenomenology Combined. One might argue that even if it's right that the cognitive phenomenology is not reducible solely to (iii)-type phenomenology, or solely to (iv)-type, or solely to (v)-type, nevertheless it may be reducible to all three together. Hence it'd still be reducible to sensory phenomenology. But this objection is a nonstarter. For I (and hopefully the reader, too) experienced the phenomenology of consciously being acquainted with something new and different when reading each contribution bottom-up *without* experiencing all three types of phenomenology (for me, without iii-type). And I've argued that it is cognitive phenomenology. So it is not reducible to all three of (iii), (iv), and (v)-

type phenomenology together, any more than it was reducible to them individually. I also argued above that it is not reducible to (iv)-type and (v)-type together.

§2.6 A Special Instance of Linguistic Imagery. One might argue that the relevant difference between the top-down and bottom-up readings relates to linguistic imagery in the following way. The first step would be to agree that there is increased understanding of the dialogue on the bottom-up reading. The second is to say this increased understanding involves the ability to elucidate what one has read using additional words. And the difference in phenomenology is that in the bottom-up reading one has linguistic imagery of at least some of these additional words. For instance, on the bottom-up reading one understands that Clinton's latest accusations relate to the Bush fundraising issue. So one has linguistic imagery of 'the Bush fundraising issue' as one is reading, or shortly after reading, "Clinton's latest accusations." This doesn't occur on the initial, top-down reading.

My initial response is that linguistic imagery appealed to in this objection differs from the aforementioned phenomenal contrast in terms of its modal properties. The phenomenal contrast I have tried to show between the top-down and bottom-up readings *must* occur in order to feel the difference made by understanding more of the meaning on the bottom-up reading. By contrast, the suggested simultaneous conscious linguistic imagery (e.g. 'Clinton's latest accusations' and 'Bush fundraising issues') *does not always occur or have to occur* while reading bottom-up with understanding. This, again, is due to the selected dialogue's being composed of contributions with syntactically transparent sentences and familiar words, as well as the ease of understanding that fundraising issues relate to accusations. There is also no stark contrast in meaning between a mention of unspecified accusations (on top-down reading, sixth contribution) and a mention of accusations specifically about fundraising issues (on bottom-up reading, sixth contribution). This

is unlike the stark contrast between the two meanings, or the rarity or unexpectedness of one of the meanings, of e.g. 'Time flies!' The factors that prompt a use of sensory phenomenology to understand one of the readings in the classic phenomenal contrast arguments are absent here.

§2.7 Poor Identification and Memory. Koksvik (2015, §4) offers an argument to reject phenomenal contrast arguments, what he calls minimal pair arguments, in general. The idea is that there are many possible contributors to a phenomenal difference between experiences e1 and e2, due to the richness of one's mental life and its constant state of flux. Possible contributors include anything that makes an overall phenomenal difference to one's total conscious state, such as occurrent or remembered bodily sensations, moods, and emotions. But, as Kosvik emphasizes at multiple points: since that which is to be explained just *is some phenomenal difference*, then there are just as many good explanations of the phenomenal difference as there are possible contributors.

Koksvik is cognizant of an objection one might make: the explanandum isn't just any phenomenal difference, but a particular kind of phenomenal difference. His move at this juncture is to say that opponents in this debate should begin with the same datum: that there is some phenomenal difference, not that there is a particular kind of difference—e.g. in cognitive phenomenology.

Notice I don't do this. I began by pointing to there being *some* phenomenal difference: the difference between reading the entries of a dialogue in a backwards order with little understanding, and of reading it in the correct order with fuller understanding. Then I reasoned systematically as to why certain kinds of contributors—sensory states or their phenomenology—do not adequately explain the contrast. Koksvik may counter with the claim that we have poor introspective abilities and memory of our mental goings-on, and that my systematic reasoning

against the adequacy of sensory phenomenology to explain the contrast employs those poor introspective abilities and memories:

> **Poor Identification and Memory.** A large proportion of the episodes that contribute to the richness of our mental lives are of short duration, and are not paid much notice. For this reason, and because our introspective abilities are just not that acute, our mental goings-on are often poorly identified. A mental goings-on which is not correctly identified at the time of occurrence will not be correctly remembered later, and of those that are correctly identified, many fail to be committed to memory. Our mental goings-on are usually poorly remembered. (Koksvik 2015, p.327)

One might even think Koksvik's point applies even more so to my dialogue example than in classic examples like 'Time flies!' For there are more experiences and more time involved in reading the dialogue, so more possible contributors to phenomenal differences between the two readings of the dialogue, and hence more opportunity for memory to go awry or introspective abilities to fail.

Poor Identication and Memory either doesn't apply to the present phenomenal contrast argument, or it is false. It says that mental goings-on are *often* or *usually* poorly identified or remembered. This is compatible with our being able to remember and identify particular mental goings-on very well *when instructed to pay careful attention*. It's true that one's memories may not be so good as to remember the sound signature of earphone 1, heard a day ago, so as to compare it to earphone 2 that one is listening to now, even with careful attention. But we are able to compare fairly accurately the sound signatures of earphones 1 and 2 if we listen to them back to back with careful attention. Likewise, we read the dialogue top-down and then bottom-up back to back. Moreover, sensory phenomenology is especially salient and easy to remember when paying attention. It's plausible, for instance, that one can remember whether (iii)-type phenomenology of speakers' faces was present when asked to reflect on one's reading of the dialogue immediately after reading it. And surely we can tell that some of the relevant

phenomenal contrast was due to a difference in order of auditory linguistic imagery, rather than due to the presence of an itch during the second reading—i.e. we can notice and remember whether the difference was in a particular kind of sensory phenomenology. Kosvik's claim (2015, p.327) about poor memory and introspective abilities is too strong. It is true that our mental lives are rich, but a lot of mental goings-on simply aren't relevant to the phenomenal contrast, and we can tell. The key claims of Poor Identification and Memory seem plausible only if one weren't paying careful attention.

§3 Phenomenal Awareness of Abstract Logical Relations. What might understanding more of the meaning of the dialogue consist in? Because the difference in understanding occurs due to reading the contributions backward and forward, it is plausible that we seem to consciously detect *logical or semantic connections* between the contributions, or between the conscious imagery they elicit, that one was unable to grasp when reading the conversation top-down.

By logical connections I do not mean necessary connections. For example, 'Clinton's latest accusations' could be logically connected in the sense I'm interested in to something other than 'Bush fundraising issues' in another conversational context. Instead I just mean the kind of logical relations that make different contributions in a conversation 'fit' with each other in virtue of their meaning and relevancy to other contributions. For example, 'Can this [interview] happen tonight? It would be Schruti Anand [the interviewer] for about 15 minutes' is relevantly logically related in the above dialogue to 'Sadly, it cannot as he [the interviewee] is on an airplane'. But the question about whether the interview could be scheduled is not logically related to 'The Earth is 5 billion years old', in part because the assertion about the earth's age is not in the dialogue,

and in part because even if it were it would not logically relate, in the sense I'm interested in, to anything else said in the dialogue.

Crucially, the phenomenological awareness of this kind of connection doesn't seem to be captured simply by having the contributions be located near each other. For the text of the contributions remain in the same location on the page on both the top-down and bottom-up readings. Neither is the awareness of this kind of connection captured by having two linguistic images simultaneously or 'side by side': e.g. linguistic imagery of 'the Bush fundraising issue' and 'Clinton's latest accusations' side by side. For, analogously, I may be consciously aware of a can of soda and my phone sitting side by side, but I am not thereby aware of any kind of *logical* connection between them. That is, one is not aware of these relations simply by being aware of spatial relations between the imagery, awareness of which seems not to require anything more than sensory phenomenology. Neither are we aware of these logical or semantic relations by being aware of temporal relations, which seem only to require sequential sensory phenomenology: Having imagery of 'Clinton's latest accusations' and 'Bush's fundraising issue' side-by-side temporally doesn't capture what it's like for us to seem aware of the relevant relation. In the moment of understanding we seem to be aware of *how* such imagery, or the propositions underlying them, are related in terms of their meaning, and this goes beyond mere awareness of temporal or spatial relations.[58]

Another reason to believe these logical relations are abstract, besides not being spatio-temporal, is because they seem to be the kind of relation that hold between abstract items, such as propositions or concepts (perhaps understood as Fregean senses). We seem to be aware of

[58] Some may hold that the relata need to be abstract in order for the relation to be, too. These philosophers may acknowledge that we seem to be aware of the propositions underlying the (linguistic) imagery, since we seem to be aware of a relation that is neither spatial nor temporal.

such logical or semantic relations. Perhaps this suggests that we also seem aware of the abstract concepts that underlie the linguistic images (or being aware of the linguistic images' abstract properties of meaning such-and-such, in addition to the imagery themselves). After all, we may have had different linguistic images while reading —for example, <Bush's fundraising issue>, <Bush's fundraising problem>, <George W's illicit money raising> --and yet seem to be aware of the same one thing that is behind all three—some abstract concept or sense.

In a seeming awareness of an abstract state of affairs, that state of affairs is felt to be before one's mind and a candidate for *de re* thought. But wholly sensory (or imagistic) states don't seem capable of doing this. My reason for this is that sensory, i.e. *imagistic*, phenomenology, if it presents anything, only seems to present items that could inhabit or be instantiated in the concrete world. A brief survey of the (i)-(v)-type mental states seems to support this observation.[59] This does not assume a representationalism according to which content type determines phenomenal type, for example abstract content → cognitive phenomenology. Nor does it assume a phenomenal-intentional theory according to which phenomenal type determines content type. Nor does it assume a naïve realist theory according to which object type constitutes phenomenal type. Rather it requires the less theoretic-committal assumption that phenomenal type (e.g. sensory) *correlates* with content/object type (e.g. concrete content/object). (This does not assume a one-to-one matching between particular phenomenology and particular content.) So there is cognitive phenomenology in seeming awareness of such relations.

Moreover, perhaps not all readers require the claim that cognitive phenomenology is required for experiences that have abstract content like logical relations; that is, my argument

[59] Even conscious linguistic imagery seems to have a spatial-dimensional structure.

need not be a 'glossed' phenomenal contrast argument. Giving a specific characterization of the nature of the phenomenal contrast—its nature is such that one seems to consciously detect abstract logical relations—may already help some to point to the relevant phenomenology, and conclude that *this* is not plausibly any of *that* (i-v type) phenomenology. Either way, I conclude there is cognitive phenomenology.

Can sensory phenomenology account for phenomenology as of an awareness of an abstract relation or property? One might think yes. For example, imagining a red stop sign might seem to make us seem aware of the abstract property REDNESS, and just in virtue of having (iii)-type imagery. Hence, cognitive phenomenology isn't necessary for such seeming awareness of an abstract property.

But imagining a red stop sign is relevantly unlike seeming to consciously detect an abstract logical relation or semantic property. For we imagine instantiated redness when we imagined a red stop sign. (iii)-type phenomenology seems to adequately account for imagining a concrete stop sign, but it is nothing like seeming to consciously detect the logical relation between the abstract concepts underlying linguistic images such as <Bush's fundraising issues> and <Clinton's accusations>. *This* phenomenology seems to be an altogether different kind from *those* (i)-(v) kinds of phenomenology. Offering a positive characterization of the phenomenology aids in picking it out by ostension, which can then be used to resist the idea that additional linguistic phenomenology on the bottom-up reading adequately explains the phenomenal contrast.

Objection: even though seeming to consciously detect logical relations is quite unlike (iii)-type *visual* imagery, this is only so because (iii)-type is quite unlike (iv)-type *auditory* phenomenology. And seeming to consciously detect logical relations just consists in the

additional (iv)-type phenomenology. I don't think this is plausible. For we may have had (iv)-type phenomenology in reading top-down, too, and we can tell that no (iv)-type phenomenology is anything like the phenomenology as of seeming to be aware of logical relations. As argued earlier, such imagery isn't always present due to the ease of understanding the dialogue when reading bottom-up.

I've concluded there is cognitive phenomenology in seeming to grasp logical relations that obtain between different contributions to the dialogue, as well as perhaps in seeming to grasp the abstract concepts or propositions that are related by those relations. But is there *distinctive* proprietary phenomenology?[60] That is, is what it is like to seem to grasp or detect one logical relation between contributions a and b different from what it is like to grasp another logical relation between contributions c and d (where a and b =/= c and d)? It seems to me the answer is yes, if it's true both that a) one detected different logical relations between the top-down and bottom-up readings, and b) seeming to detect different logical relations is required to account for the phenomenal contrast between top-down and bottom-up readings:

> **(A) Don:** Would either the Tuesday or Wednesday times work?
> TUESDAY – 7a 8a
> WEDNESDAY – 7a, 8a
>
> **(B) Peter:** Sadly, it cannot as he is on a plane. Can I offer you someone else from our team?
>
> **(C) Don:** Can this happen tomorrow morning actually? It would be with Schruti Anand for about 15 minutes.
>
> **(D) Peter:** Checking! Thanks, Don! How long would the segment be? Would you be interviewing?
>
> **(E) Don:** My morning show has been covering the Bush fundraising issue. They'd like to speak with Jim Nicholson. Tomorrow wouldn't work but if he could do it in the next few days that would be great.

[60] Here I follow Pitt's (2004, 4) distinction between 'proprietary' and 'distinctive.' He also talks about 'individuative' phenomenology.

For example, Peter's contribution in (B) *as one is reading top-down* is simply an apologetic reply logically related to Don's query in (A), suggesting Tuesday or Wednesday as meeting times. By contrast, on the bottom-up reading, Peter's contribution in (B) is more specifically an apologetic reply about how *Jim Nicholson* can't make it to a meeting tomorrow morning because he is on a plane. That is, bottom-up, Peter's contribution in (B) logically relates to both (C) and (E), and the seeming conscious detection of these different relations as one is reading (B) helps adequately explain the phenomenal contrast. (It need not be accounted for by having a linguistic image of <Jim Nicholson>, due to the ease of understanding 'Sadly, *he* cannot…,' and being able to just see that 'he' refers to Jim without requiring the additional sensory crutches.) Seeming to detect a particular relation between (A) and (B) when reading top-down, and then detecting different relations between (B) and (C) and (E) bottom-up, allows one to conclude that the additional phenomenology is *distinctive*, too, and not just proprietary. Otherwise the key phenomenology I've now characterized as seeming awareness of different abstract relations between contributions would have been the same on the top-down and bottom-up readings. And we cannot account for the key phenomenal contrast by appeal to the same key phenomenology.

Acknowledging the phenomenology as of seeming to detect or grasp some abstract relation does not assume a direct realist account of grasping, nor an indirect realist account of grasping. It just assumes that there is phenomenology associated with grasping, either constituting the grasp or caused by the grasp. I will present and briefly argue for an indirect realist theory to account for such phenomenology.

§4 The Cognitive Qualia Theory. A primary motivation for contemporary theories of perceptual experience is to account for phenomenology. If there is cognitive phenomenology—

phenomenology that is altogether different from any type of perceptual or otherwise sensory phenomenology—then such accounts may not work for that proprietary phenomenology. For one, perceptual experiences have the phenomenal property of seeming to be immediately aware of consciousness-independent concrete objects and their properties (Ch1), whereas cognitive experiences do not. For another, I've argued in this chapter that some cognitive phenomenology is unlike any sensory phenomenology. This motivates a theory of cognition with an aim toward explaining that cognitive phenomenology.

I say that cognitive experience is an irreducible awareness of *cognitive qualia* instantiated by the subject. The qualia are introspectively accessible, intrinsic properties of the subject that constitutively determine the phenomenal character of cognitive experience. [61] Cognitive qualia intrinsically represent abstract objects. The irreducible awareness relation is the relation that brings qualia 'before one's mind' such that the abstracta the qualia represent seem to be a candidate for de re thought.

Cognitive qualia represent abstract objects such as propositions, concepts (or Fregean senses), and abstract relations. I leave it open how cognitive qualia represent.[62] A non-resemblance account's obtaining for cognitive experience—by contrast with, for example, a resemblance account for perceptual experience—may partly explain why the phenomenal character of conscious thoughts is less 'vivacious' than that of perceptual experiences. (A resemblance account doesn't plausibly explain cognitive qualia's representing abstracta, since

[61] Of course, one may also have sensory imagistic phenomenology during cognition as well. Such phenomenology is not accounted for by cognitive qualia.

[62] Perhaps they represent primitively, or alternatively, voluntaristically. Mendelovici's 'Phenomenal Intentionality: A Voluntaristic Theory of Truth and Reference' (unpublished, p.16-17) discusses several types of voluntaristic accounts of representation. Voluntarism is the view that our referents, truth-makers, and conditions of truth and reference are up to us, perhaps because they are stipulated, accepted, or otherwise endorsed by us (ibid., p.16). My cognitive qualia theory is compatible with voluntarism and likewise need not entail phenomenal intentionality.

qualia are concrete whereas abstracta are not.) That the qualia represent abstracta such as propositions and abstract relations, rather than concreta, may also be part of that explanation. In the context of the present paper, one quale might represent some logical or semantic relation, while various other qualia might together represent the two abstract propositions that are so related. An awareness of all of these qualia simultaneously accounts for our seeming conscious detection of an abstract or semantic relation that obtains between two contributions to a dialogue, or between the concepts or propositions that under lie them.

That cognitive understanding experiences involve this primitive awareness relation best explains why we at least sometimes seem to be immediately aware of something, such as abstract states of affairs, in understanding experiences. Theories that don't appeal to irreducible awareness, such as a cognitive analogue of representationalist theories of perception, don't explain this seeming immediate awareness as intelligibly (a la chapter 1). Moreover, cognitive analogues of representationalist theories that say representational relations are causal relations won't work for at least some cognitive experiences. For some cognitive experiences involve representation of abstracta, and abstracta don't stand in causal relations. A nominalism about abstracta in conjunction with a physicalist naturalization of conscious experiences also won't account for irreducibly cognitive, non-sensory phenomenology as intelligibly. For some instances of cognitive phenomenology, including a seeming awareness of abstract relations between contributions in dialogue, or intuiting a mathematical truth, seem to involve representing genuinely (not nominally) abstract states of affairs.

Traditional sense data theories can't seem to explain a seeming awareness of abstracta. For traditionally, sense data represent in virtue of *resembling*, and sense data are concreta.[63] Of

[63] E.g. Hume, who argues for the existence of mental images, which 20th century philosophers later termed 'sense data,' described them as 'fleeting *copies* or representations of other existences,' (Hume 1758, § XII.1, my

course, a contemporary sense data theorist may say there are 'cognitive' sense data that don't represent by resembling, but rather (e.g.) primitively or voluntaristically. Ontological parsimony favors the cognitive qualia theory over this cognitive sense data theory, a la chapter 1 §6.

Cognitive naïve realism (e.g. Chudnoff 2013, p.714) says that cognitive experience is an primitive awareness of abstract objects. This theory does not face any problem of positing causal relations to abstracta, since abstracta are related as *constituents* in experience on this theory. A reason to prefer the qualia theory of cognition is available if one already subscribes to the qualia theory of perception, argued for in chapter 1. Accepting a common-factor theory of perceptual and cognitive experience involves fewer new ontological commitments in one sense: if one already accepts the existence of qualia, awareness of which explains phenomenal character, then one need not posit a new more direct relation to a realm of abstracta, rather than to qualia.[64] (Now, perhaps one holds that different accounts of representation obtain for perceptual qualia versus cognitive qualia, as I do. This would somewhat blunt the ontological parsimony of a common-factor qualia theory over a disjunctivism of perceptual qualia *cum* cognitive naïve realism.)

Another reason to prefer the cognitive qualia theory uses as a premise that we're able to consciously think about impossible abstract entities, such as square circles. Cognitive naïve realism may attempt to explain a seeming awareness of the property of being a square-circle by appeal to an awareness of the property of squareness and an awareness of the property of circularity. Importantly, there seems to be a unity to what it's like to think about a square-circle

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emphasis). This suggests they resemble those other existences. It seems no accident that sense data are supposed to instantiate many of the same properties as that which they represent.

[64] Of course, one may subscribe to a conceptualism about abstracta. This seems to entail that abstracta are mental objects or properties like sense data or cognitive qualia. An awareness of abstracta understood as mental objects or properties seems not to explain as intelligibly why we seem aware of an abstract state of affairs.

as an object in its own right. One may be cognitively aware of the property of being a square, and of the property of being a circle. But this doesn't yet explain the unity in what it's like to think about a square-circle. By contrast, the cognitive qualia theory can appeal to an awareness of a cognitive quale that represents squareness, and an awareness of a cognitive quale that represents circularity, and say that those qualia are instantiated together by the subject. This may better explain the seeming awareness of a unitary square-circle in thought.

One might deny that we are able to think about square-circles because they are impossible. In response, there are many objects or metaphysical theses that philosophers seem able to seriously entertain, even if it turns out they are impossible. One example is a perfect being that exists necessarily if it is metaphysically possible that it exists. If it turns out that a perfect being doesn't exist, then a perfect being doesn't exist in any possible world. But surely philosophers are still able to entertain a perfect being's existence. There is a phenomenological unity to a thought about a perfect being. That unity may be better explained by an awareness of qualia instantiated together that each represent omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, personhood, and so on, than by being cognitively aware of the separate properties of omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and so on that aren't unified in this way. If one is a theist, then my reasoning works for the necessarily existing unicorn; we all agree it is metaphysically impossible, but a thought about it seems to have the unitary phenomenal character I think is best accounted for by the cognitive qualia theory.

A full treatment of the motivation for my theory of cognitive experience over others would require a paper of its own, akin to chapter 1. Here I leave the reader with these prima facie motivations.

Conclusion. Classic phenomenal contrast arguments rely on a minimal pair sentence which had an unusual or unexpected meaning, obscure words, or opaque syntactic structure. This made sensory phenomenology key to understanding the sentence, which may cause selection effects that obscure cognitive phenomenology (a la Furst 2017), preventing those phenomenal contrast arguments from being effective even on genuinely neutral parties to the debate. The argument from meaningful dialogue circumvents this problem. I conclude there is cognitive phenomenology in perfectly ordinary experiences like reading dialogue. I also argued for a positive characterization of this key phenomenology: the bottom-up reading includes phenomenology as of seeming to be aware of abstract relations that obtain between different contributions in the dialogue. This helps the doubter of cognitive phenomenology to point to it, and notice it is unlike any of (i)-(v) type phenomenology. The existence of this phenomenology occasions a prima facie case for a theory according to which cognitive experience is an immediate awareness of qualia that represent abstract objects.

CHAPTER 4

Platonic Idealism: How Forms' Having Minds Solves the Combination Problem

Abstract. William James once pointed out that from 12 conscious human subjects all thinking a unique word in a sentence, it seems absurd to derive a 13th subject consciously entertaining the whole sentence. Constitutive panpsychists aim to constitutively explain our minds and experiences by appeal to other minds—either via an explanation in terms of the minds and experiences of the fundamental physical particles postulated by physics, or via an explanation in terms of a cosmic mind. In light of James's observation, how exactly do those 'micro' or 'cosmic' minds and experiences constitute our own minds and experiences? I offer a novel view that combines Platonism and Idealism, and argue it solves the combination problems while retaining more virtues than other panpsychisms. At the heart of Platonic Idealism is the novel idea that a Form's instantiating or radiating into the concrete world should be analyzed in terms of a mental act by a Form, the act of conjuring up qualities to be aware of, analogous to our imagining a blue block at will. And just as we seem able to will to combine or recombine mental items in imagination and cognition, Forms may will to combine a particular kind of mental item—their awarenesses of their respective kinds of qualities that they ground—to constitute a combined awareness of multiple qualities. This yields an experience like our own, implying a subject of that experience like ourselves. I show how these posits of Platonic Idealism solve the combination problems where other panpsychisms fail.

Keywords: panpsychism, platonism, idealism, combination problem, consciousness

§1 Panpsychism. How do we get the mental out of the purely non-mental? Some philosophers say we cannot, no matter how cleverly we fiddle with or rearrange the non-mental. So they introduce mentality to the fundamental level of reality. The reason why creatures like us have conscious phenomenal experiences according to this solution is due to fundamental mental facts that obtain. This is given by panpsychism, the thesis that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world.[65]

Of course, fundamental mental facts are also given by dualism. Dualism faces causal interaction worries in the face of physical closure, with many dualists opting for the phenomenologically implausible thesis of epiphenomenalism. Other dualists opt for interactionism, and say physics leaves some causal work to be done by consciousness; most physicists would reject this latter route, and it requires a large bet on the future of physics (Chalmers 2016, p.24). Panpsychism is worth exploring in the face of such worries, and the conceivability (e.g. Chalmers 2009) and revelation (e.g. Goff 2017, Ch5) arguments that beset physicalism.[66]

This paper offers a new 'Platonic Idealist' response to the mind-body problem. The theory differs from previously offered panpsychisms due to its reliance on Forms and their natures. I will argue these differences enable it to solve the 'combination problem' better than other versions of panpsychism. This is worthwhile because no current solution to the combination problem for panpsychism has gained much support even amongst panpsychists. It is also worthwhile because, as we'll see, Platonic Idealism utilizes the perceptual qualia theory

[65] This is the definition of panpsychism given in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, 'Panpsychism' (Goff et al 2017). In some papers 'panpsychism' is used more narrowly to refer to a much discussed version, micropsychism, which says that some fundamental physical particles have mental states (e.g. Chalmers 2016a).
[66] Chalmers (2016a) explains how panpsychism avoids the causal interaction argument against dualism and conceivability arguments against physicalism.

from chapter 1. The conclusion may be interpreted to be that, though my qualia theory neither entails nor is entailed by panpsychism, those attracted to panpsychism have a reason to favor my qualia theory.

The best panpsychisms are paired with the thesis that some mental facts go hand in glove with some physical facts. For instance, one version of panpsychism says that the fundamental microscopic physical entities postulated by physics, e.g. quarks and leptons, have something it is like to be them. Moreover, such mentality is the intrinsic nature of some of their physical properties. This allows mentality a place in the causal order without overdetermination, since the physical properties just inherit their causal properties from the mental properties that underlie them. The microscopic physical entities are thus aptly termed 'microsubjects' that have 'microexperiences'—experiences characteristic of microsubjects. Together they can give rise to larger and less fundamental 'macrosubjects' like ourselves who have the kind of ordinary 'macroexperiences' we have. We may call this 'Standard Bottom-Up Panpsychism,' or what is commonly referred to as 'micropsychism.'

A top-down variant says that the fundamental metaphysical entity is the cosmos, and that there is something it is like to be the cosmos.[67] The cosmos is the most fundamental conscious subject, and the subjecthood and experiences of smaller and less fundamental beings like us are derived from its cosmic experiences. Moreover, some of the physical structure of the cosmos is isomorphic with its mental structure, since the mental is the underlying intrinsic nature of at least some of the physical. Let us call this 'Top-Down Panpsychism'.

The salient commonality between these two versions of panpsychism for our purposes is that from the mental facts at the fundamental level of reality we can get, a priori, all the less

[67] Proponents of top-down panpsychism include Goff (2017a, 2017b) and Nagasawa & Wager (2016). Chalmers (2017) discusses idealist versions of top-down panpsychism.

fundamental mental facts. Such an a priori explanation serves to remove the mystery behind how the less fundamental mental facts, like facts about our macroexperiences, obtain. We would be able to 'just see' how such facts fall out from the fundamental facts. The satisfaction found in such an explanation is analogous with the satisfaction found in being able to derive the less fundamental physical facts (e.g. facts about a boulder) from more fundamental physical facts (e.g. facts about the particles or waves involved in the boulder) as conceived by physicists. The 'combination problem' for panpsychism may be seen as a challenge to how we are supposed to derive these less fundamental mental facts—e.g. facts about the mental states of macrosubjects like ourselves—from the more fundamental.[68] It may be viewed as a collection of problems related along this dimension.

For space and ease of exposition, we will consider the combination problem in relation to micropsychism, though analogous versions of the problem apply to Top-Down panpsychism as well (Chalmers 2016b, p.195).[69] I do not consider panpsychisms that appeal to strong or 'radical' emergentism here. For though strong emergentist panpsychism avoids the combination problem, it does so at the cost of not attempting to explain facts about macrosubjects and macroexperiences in a way that is a priori derivable or deducible from the fundamental mental facts.[70]

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[68] Seager (1995) named the problem. Goff (2009) gives a powerful contemporary formulation of it. Chalmers (2016b) gives a comprehensive overview of the problem and the avenues for solving it. Montero (2016) is one philosopher who argues there is no problem to begin with. Proposals for solving it include Coleman (2012, 2013, 2016), Goff (2009b, 2011, 2016), Rosenberg (2004, 2014), and Seager (2010, 2016). Further contemporary discussion of the problem includes Basile (2010), Blammauer (2011), Dainton (2011), Gabora 2002, Goff 2006, Hunt (2011), Montero (2016), Morch 2014, Roelofs (2014), Shani (2010) Skrbina (2011), and Strawson (2006b).
[69] Nagasawa & Wager (2016) and Goff (2017a, 2017b) attempt answers to this problem on behalf of top-down panpsychism. They call it 'cosmopsychism'.

[70] C.f. Lewtas (2018) who argues that the rationalism behind panpsychism makes it an unnatural bedfellow of emergentism.

Section 2 lays out several related combination problems for panpsychism. Section 3 presents a novel version of panpsychism for solving them. Section 4 addresses objections and clarifies the theory.

§2.1 The Subject-Summing Problem. The first combination problem is the subject-summing problem, and begins with a question: How do microsubjects combine to form macrosubjects (Chalmers 2016b, p.8-9)? William James (1895) introduces this problem by asking the reader to consider 12 conscious human subjects lined up together, all thinking a unique word in a sentence. To *a priori* deduce that a new, thirteenth subject is generated from this collection that is consciously entertaining the whole sentence seems hopeless. Analogously, it does not seem to be a priori deducible from any given number of panpsychist microsubjects that there will be any new macrosubjects generated. Or at least, if there is some relation to appeal to that must obtain between these microsubjects to generate a new macrosubject, one needs to specify this relation and when it obtains.[71] The best panpsychisms thus face the following inconsistent dyad.

(1) The existence of a number of fundamental subjects with certain fundamental experiences necessitates the existence of a distinct macrosubject.

(2) It is never the case that the existence of a number of subjects with certain experiences necessitates the existence of a distinct subject.

[71] Goff (2016) proposes that a 'phenomenal bonding' relation obtains when the bonded entities enter into certain spatial relations. It's not obvious why such spatial closeness should differ relevantly from being so close as to have fused brains. In a fused brain case like Montero's (2016) it would seem that the brains' communicating together or transferring information are relevant, rather than the spatial relations they enter into, and there seems no reason why they need to be close together spatially for that: e.g. telepathic communications are conceivable.

In §3.2 I explain how my theory, Platonic Idealism, denies (2). The subject-summing problem may be related to the unity and boundary problems, which ask 'How do microexperiences combine to yield a unified and bounded macroexperience'?

§2.2 The Palette Problem. A second combination problem is the palette problem (Chalmers 2016b, p.11-12). According to physics there are only a handful of physical ultimates (e.g. an electron) and their essential physical properties (e.g. an electron's mass). So there are only so many microqualities of their experiences that underlie those essential physical properties for painting the extravagant landscapes of our phenomenally rich and varied macroexperiences. Let us grant that there may be something it is like for an electron to spin up as opposed to down. And perhaps there is something it is like for a quark as its spatial distance relative to another quark increases. But how could these sort of limited in number, but especially in kind, microexperiences add up to what it's like, for instance, to see a brilliant yellow sun setting behind a glimmering orange ocean, with soft grey and rosy clouds overhead—and the sound of waves crashing against the shoreline? More generally, how is the rich tapestry of a given macroexperience deducible from such basic and limited microexperiences, however combined? Micropsychism thus faces the following inconsistent triad.

(1) Fundamental phenomenal qualities combine to constitute macrophenomenal qualities.

(2) There are only a few fundamental phenomenal qualities (according to standard bottom-up panpsychism in conjunction with the latest physics).

(3) Macrophenomenal qualities are too diverse to be constituted by a few fundamental phenomenal qualities.

I explain in §3.3 how Platonic Idealism denies (2).

§2.3 The Structural Mismatch Problem. A third combination problem is the structural mismatch problem (Chalmers 2016b, p.13-14, 30-34). I follow Chalmers (2016, p.13) in taking microphysical structure and macrophysical structure to be the quasi-mathematical structure of microphysical and macrophysical entities as characterized by physics. And macrophenomenal structure is the structure we find within our phenomenology. Structure includes both 'internal structure' (the internal geometrical structure of a complex physical entity, or the internal structure of a visual field), as well as 'external structure'—the structure of spaces within which properties are embedded or instantiated (e.g. the scalar structure of mass, the three-dimensional structure of color space) (ibid.).

On micropsychism, the micro and macrophysical structure of (e.g.) the brain is supposed to be isomorphic with micro and macrophenomenal structure, respectively. For on micropsychism:

(i) Microphenomenal structure is isomorphic with microphysical structure (because the former is the underlying intrinsic nature of the latter).

(ii) Microphenomenal structure constitutes macrophenomenal structure (this enables the macrophenomenal to be derivable from the microphenomenal).

(iii) Microphysical structure constitutes macrophysical structure (a widely accepted thesis of the physical).

From (i)-(iii), we should expect that:

(iv) macrophysical structure is isomorphic with macrophenomenal structure.

For example, neural structure should be isomorphic with the macroexperiences underlying those neural states (Chalmers 2016, p.13-14). That (iv) follows from (i)-(iii) assumes a plausible principle about structure and structure composition: Let a-d be given structures. If a constitutes b,

c constitutes d, and a and c are isomorphic, then b and d are isomorphic.[72] But the macrophysical structure of the brain isn't even close to isomorphic with macrophenomenal structure (ibid., p.32). This lack of an isomorphic structure may be construed as a threat against panpsychism's promise of the derivability of the macrophysical and macrophenomenal from the microphysical and microphenomenal facts.

My strategy in §3.4 against the structural mismatch argument won't be to deny the plausibility of the premises nor its validity. Rather it will be to explain briefly why Platonic Idealism isn't targeted by this version of the argument, and explain how it is able to deny the analog of (iv) that targets Platonic Idealism.

§2.4 Quality-Awareness Gap. A further combination problem is posed by the question, 'How do microqualities yield a macrosubject's seemingly *relational awareness* of qualities', if microexperiences do not involve irreducible awareness relations? This problem is called the quality-awareness gap.

Coleman (2016) opts to dissolve the problem by reducing macrosubject's awareness to a *functional* property. For him, a macrosubject counts as aware of macroqualities just in case the macroqualities play certain roles in cognitive life. But, as Chalmers (2016b, p.26) points out, given the epistemological gap between the functional and the phenomenal, the strategy leaves it quite unclear how the seemingly relational *phenomenology* of perceptual experiences may be derived.

[72] As Chalmers (2016b, p.32) points out, one way to resist this would be to hold that the rules of composition that govern microphenomenal structure are not the same rules that govern microphysical structure. Chalmers notes it's especially hard to see how this might work if the microphysical property (e.g. mass) is just *identical* to the microphenomenal property (e.g. a certain phenomenal property that plays the mass role). Even if they are not identical, and are merely isomorphic, it's still hard to see how they might compose so differently (ibid.).

Platonic Idealism will answer the problem of the quality awareness gap by positing an irreducible awareness relation at the fundamental level of reality: a fundamental subject's experience consists in an irreducible awareness of qualities. I will later explain how these fundamental awarenesses combine to constitute awareness in macroexperience, or 'macroawareness'.

§3.1 Platonic Idealism. This section sketches out a new metaphysical theory of the natural world, and argues it can provide satisfactory answers to the various combination problems.

The theory on offer is a version of idealism, the thesis that all facts about the universe, or perhaps all concrete facts, are grounded in mental facts.[73] All versions of idealism are a kind of panpsychism (understood as the thesis that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous), but not all versions of panpsychism are a kind of idealism. This is because panpsychism, but not idealism, is compatible with there being irreducibly physical facts.

The theory combines idealism with Platonism, which says that Platonic objects or Forms exist. Forms and their properties are the fundamental constituents of reality. The idealism in the theory yields an unusual thesis: Forms have experiences. Forms and their experiences have mental intrinsic natures or mental categorical bases. Importantly, the complex physical states of the universe are realized by structurally isomorphic (constituents of) conscious mental states had by the Forms.

A Form's experience consists in an irreducible relation of awareness of qualities it 'conjures up'. They conjure up such qualities by volition, just as we seem able to conjure up by

[73] The pros of idealism over panpsychism include the elegance of monism. The cons include the problem of how to account for spatiotemporal relations in a way that ultimately appeals to mentality. This paper focuses on solving the combination problem for idealist panpsychism rather than focusing on cons unique to idealism.

volition a mental image of a blue square when imagining one. There is something it is like for that Form to be aware of a quality it conjures up. For example, there is something it is like for the Form of Redness to be aware of red qualities in such-and-such a way and in such-and-such a location. The red qualities the Form of Redness conjures up to be aware of may be thought of like sense data, except the qualities are intrinsic *properties* instantiated by the Form rather than distinct mental *substances*. I will call these qualities 'qualia,' since they are in the spirit of what qualia theories say they are: introspectively accessible, intrinsic components of experiences that constitutively determine phenomenal character. (A component c of some entity e is a property, constituent, part, or aspect of e.) The underlying intrinsic nature of (e.g.) all red instantiations in the universe are red qualia instantiated by the Form of Redness. This Platonic Idealist theory says that for a concrete property to be instantiated in the concrete world is identical to some Form instantiating some quale. And each Form can only be aware of their own kind of qualia: e.g. The Form of Redness cannot be aware of the blue qualia conjured up and instantiated by the Form Blueness.

Though they are minds, they deserve the name 'Form' rather than 'monad' for the following reason. The kinds of experiences they may have, or the kind of qualia they 'conjure up', or the kind of quality they contribute to or instantiate in the concrete world, are limited to one kind, just as each of Plato's Forms are relevantly related to one kind of property instantiation or imperfect copies. And just like Plato's Forms, each one grounds its respective property instances in the natural world. Platonic Idealism offers an explanation of how Forms instantiate or radiate into the world, rather than leaving it brute as bare Platonism does. A Form's instantiating or radiating into the world is analyzed in terms of a mental act by the Form, the act

of conjuring up qualia by volition. Though this analysis is substantive and controversial, conjuring up mental items in imagination or cognition is an act we all seem familiar with.

One might object that infusing Forms with mentality render them non-abstract—that is, capable of standing in causal relations. But that Forms have i) an intrinsic mental nature and ii) a causal nature seems to be in the spirit of what Plato had in mind.[74] In any case, it is not this paper's purpose to argue for any particular interpretation of Plato, but rather to offer a version of panpsychism that may solve the combination problem.

For Forms, to be is to experience. So let each Form always have some sort of 'background hum' of experiencing, even when it doesn't contribute qualia to the universe. This ensures that Forms have an intrinsic, non-dispositional mental nature, even if Forms are bundles of fundamental kinds of experiences. For example, perhaps for the Form of Redness the background hum is an experience of a faded, encompassing, and undifferentiated red expanse. I intend to remain neutral about whether Forms are mental particulars or substances or substrata that have certain kinds of experiences, or whether Forms are bundles of certain kinds of fundamental experiences.

There is a subject for every experience, since I stipulated that every experience is an awareness of qualia, where this requires a subject to be aware. Does this result in Forms being composed of multiple subjects due to being constituted by multiple experiences, given a bundle theory of Form subjects? No. Even given the bundle version of the theory—which accords with

[74] Some evidence for Forms having a mental nature may be found in the *Phaedo*, where Socrates speaks of being disappointed at learning that Anaxagoras's claim that 'Mind directs and causes all things' actually made no reference to Mind at all (99a-b). Socrates then introduces his theory of Forms, which are the 'real cause' of things. Together this indicates that he conceived of Forms as having a mental and causal nature. Other evidence may be found in *Republic* VI, in which Forms are said to be essentially intelligible. If intelligibility is a mark of the mental for Socrates, this is further evidence for Forms having a mental nature. In the later dialogues such as the *Timaeus* and *Laws*, a divine mind is the cause of the universe, and it uses Forms to serve as models for creation. These models might be fairly characterized as having a mental nature.

the idea that what it is to be a particular Form is to be a subject of awareness for a particular kind of qualia—then we may say consistently that it is the same Form subject for each of the experiences that have only one kind of qualia as components. Hume, likewise, didn't think that it was a consequence of bundle theory that he himself was really many different subjects combined, even if it's true of metaphysical necessity that every experience has a subject. On the substance/substrata version of the theory, it is the particular *mental substance,* which has experiences with one kind of qualia, which has priority in individuating the Form. On the bundle version it is just the *kind of qualia involved in the experiences* that individuates the Form.

On the present theory Forms are fundamental conscious subjects, analogous to other panpsychisms on which microscopic entities or the cosmos are fundamental conscious subjects. There is something it is like to be a Form, in part because there is something it is like for Forms to be aware of their own qualia. In other words, there is something it's like for them to instantiate in, radiate in, contribute to, or imagine their portion of, the concrete world. As a simplified example, let the Form of Brownness, the Form of Circularity, and the Form of Solidity be involved in the realization of a boulder. Some of each of their qualia—not their awarenesses of their qualia—constitute that boulder. The boulder consists in that set of instantiated qualia. This sort of story goes for all physical entities. (If one is bothered by the thought that sets are abstract, and therefore the boulder is abstract, then one may opt for an understanding of concrete objects as a 'collection,' on which collections are non-abstract and just identical to its concrete members/qualia.)

Is there a problem of properties being attributed to the wrong entities? Saying that the boulder consists in the set of instantiated qualia, which are properties of Forms, might seem a bit like saying the redness of a sock helps to constitute a traffic light. More generally, for all p and

all q, if p is a property of q, and q=/=r, then p cannot be a property of r. Qualia are properties of Forms. Forms are not physical objects. So qualia cannot be a property of a physical object. The problem is that the principle is false. Suppose p is whiteness, q is one side of a mountain, and r is the whole mountain of which q is a part. In this instance, q=/=r, and yet p can be a property of r—counterexample. How about a revised principle? For all p and all q, if p is a property of q, q=/=r, and q is not a part of r nor r a part of q, then p cannot be a property of z. Qualia are properties of Forms. Forms are not physical objects. Forms are not parts of physical objects, nor are physical objects parts of Forms. So qualia are not available to constitute properties of physical objects. This time the problem is that the final premise is false: physical objects are in an important sense parts or components of Forms. For according to Platonic Idealism, physical objects just are property instantiations of Forms: e.g. the brownness of the boulder by the Form of brownness, the hardness of the boulder by the Form of solidity, etc.).

One might say that it is unintelligible that the properties of one object, the boulder, are instantiated by many different and independent entities—different Forms. However, this is no more unintelligible than on traditional Berkeleyan Idealism, on which physical objects just are bundles of mental items—Ideas—had by many different subjects—which is to say, not unintelligible. And secondly, consider priority monism. Priority monists say that a property of an object such as a boulder isn't really a property of a boulder, fundamentally; instead, it is a property of the world—the only concrete object that fundamentally, rather than derivatively, exists. And for the priority monist, a boulder just consists in various property instantiations of the world. Similarly on Platonic Idealism, Forms are fundamental while boulders are not. And the boulder is, fundamentally, just a collection of property instantiations of the Forms (of e.g. solidity, brownness, roundness). Forms may be thought of as each containing one part of the

concrete world: the part of the concrete world that instantiates redness, the part that instantiates solidity, the part that instantiates wetness, and so on. So the properties of physical objects are still instantiated by parts of the world. Concrete reality is carved up in terms of irreducible qualities, awareness of which yields the fundamental phenomenal properties. To think that it's preferable to carve up concrete reality in terms of physical properties or physical locations is arguably to reject the idealist spirit of the theory.

A consequence of the theory's idealism is that boulders are constituted, fundamentally, by qualia. I say that the qualia that constitute the boulder *realize* or are the categorical basis for the intrinsic physical properties of the boulder, such as its mass, shape, size, and color. For its dispositional physical properties, such as its weight, an appeal to Forms' dispositions to will for the qualia that constitute the boulder to move in such-and-such directions in such-and-such circumstances is required. Platonic Idealism need not posit microphysical entities, fundamental or not, since it has Forms, their qualia, and volitions to account for all our observations about the natural world. Only in this derivative sense, regarding observations we might have in a physics laboratory as of microphysical entities, are there microphysical entities. I show in §3.4 how replacing microphysical structure with the structure of Forms' experiences solves the structural mismatch problem.

Why posit Forms as fundamental when we could say that macrosubjects are fundamental, such as on traditional Idealism? After all, if macrosubjects were fundamental then there would be no problem of how more fundamental subjects and experiences could combine to form macrosubjects and macroexperiences, and so no combination problems. To answer this question, it helps to ask why panpsychists prefer a version of 'constitutive' panpsychism, such as bottom-up idealism, over Berkeleyan Idealism. (Constitutive panpsychists attempt to give constitutive

accounts of macrosubjects and macrophenomenal states.) The first part of the answer is that it seems to these philosophers that the existence of macrosubjects like our minds are in need of explanation. And the second part is that the type of explanation they are looking for is a type of constitutive explanation that would 'transparently account' for our minds—i.e. a constitutive account from which we could *a priori* deduce the existence of our minds. In a sense, the constitutive panpsychist and physicalist are alike in that both won't settle for anything less than a constitutive explanation of our minds. However, the constitutive panpsychist maintains that the fundamentally physical could never transparently account for the mental.[75] Constitutive panpsychists don't opt for dualism to avoid the causal interaction argument from physical closure, but also because they are unsatisfied with causal or natural law, *a posteriori* explanations of macrosubjects. The preference for a priori constitutive explanations also leads them to reject Berkeleyan Idealism, which offers causal explanations of macrosubjects. Philosophers looking for a deeper explanation of macrosubjects have a reason to prefer Platonic Idealism. And so long as we are looking for a deeper explanation of mind, we should keep digging until there are no more constitutive transparent accounts available. Stopping at macrosubjects is too quick, since we are dependent beings. Forms are a principled stopping point, in part because they are uncaused, and also because it doesn't get much simpler than a mind that can have just one kind of quale.[76]

[75] An exception is Strawson (2016). Note that Strawson's physicalism is a different breed of physicalism than what standard physicalists ascribe to. It says that the categorical basis of the physical is the mental, but that the mental counts as physical.

[76] It's hard to adjudicate what is more simple: many Forms that are simple in virtue of the single kind of qualia they may have, or one cosmic mind that has all the different kinds of qualia. I give a Russellian-Moorean reason for preferring bottom-up panpsychism over top-down panpsychism later in the paper.

There is also a reason to think Forms fit the criteria for fundamentality better than Berkeleyan Idealist macrosubjects. Two criteria for fundamentality guide all extant accounts of fundamentality. The first is the idea that there is a foundation of being, which consists of *independently existing entities*. The second is the idea that the fundamental entities constitute or serve as a *complete basis* that all else depends on (Tahko, 2018). Arguably, Berkeleyan macrosubjects like ourselves do not count as independently existing, since they must be constantly caused by God to exist. But I won't hang too much on this, since it's controversial whether an entity needs to be uncaused to be fundamental. Perhaps one might think Berkeleyan macrosubjects can meet the other key notion behind fundamentality, which is to constitute a complete basis that all else depends on. For according to Berkeleyan Idealism, the rest of concrete reality is ideas, and these ideas all depend for their existence on these conscious subjects. I will later argue that Platonic Idealism gives a better account of, and therefore a better foundation or complete basis for, physical objects and hence the physical world, than Berkeleyan Idealism. As a preview, Forms by their nature provide the basis for different parts of the concrete world: the part of the concrete world that instantiates redness, the part that instantiates solidity, and so on. But Berkeleyan macrosubjects don't by their nature constitute the basis for concrete reality. For though it's said that their cohering experiences as of external physical objects grounds these objects' reality, it turns out that God can ground the existence of all physical objects even if macrosubjects are not perceiving most portions of concrete reality. So Berkeleyan macrosubjects don't really ground the objective concrete world, or at least not as well as Forms do. Forms are better candidates for fundamental entities than Berkeleyan fundamental entities.

One might still have qualms about Forms being exotic. But here we may distinguish between *epistemically exotic* and *metaphysically exotic*. Platonic Idealist Forms are epistemically

exotic in that they seem quite different from us and unfamiliar. But from the Platonic Idealist's perspective, it is really macrosubjects that are *metaphysically exotic*, due to our experiencing many more different kinds of qualia than any one Form can. For the idealist who thinks reality is mental, the measure of metaphysical exoticness arguably should be in terms of complexity in the kinds of phenomenal qualities one can have. Similarly, the physicist has no qualms about positing simpler, more fundamental physical entities so long as these can explain some more complex physical entity. Forms and their experiences constitutively explain macrosubjects and macroexperiences. This is important also because, on idealism, brains are derivative entities and do not have any causal power to generate our experiences, and this leaves the door open for Forms' experiences to explain macroexperiences. As I'll explain in more detail later, physical entities in an important sense lack causal powers because they are derivative entities. I will also explain how brains not having causal powers will help avoid the structural mismatch problem.

§3.2 Solving the Subject-Summing Problem. This section explains how Forms constitutively transparently account for macrosubjects.

The experiences of less fundamental conscious subjects like us are derivable from the experiential profiles of various Forms. Forms can have a collective volition to 'pool together' or 'combine' their *awarenesses of qualia* in such a way as to generate a new conscious experience. An analogy here would be how we in our own mental lives seem able to combine and recombine, via volition, particular mental items. For example, we seem able to imagine the pinkness and greenness of a pink square and green triangle oozing out of their boundaries, so that we end up imagining a green square and pink triangle. We also seem able to combine and recombine different ideas in our cognitive lives, and have cognitive experiences associated with this. Instead of mental items like phenomenal qualities and ideas, here I focus on Forms combining

awarenesses of qualia. For example the Form of Brownness, Circularity, and Solidity will to combine their awarenesses of those qualia that they are contributing to the boulder in order to generate a macroexperience of that very boulder. Analogously, think of four cameras with slightly different perspectives on the same environmental scene feeding into one monitor. The monitor displays a combined and more encompassing image of that scene. The four cameras each stand for the Forms' awarenesses of the qualia they contribute to the boulder, and the monitor stands for the combined awarenesses of all those qualia. The combined awareness of those qualia constitute the generated macroexperience. With regard to an object unperceived by macrosubjects, u, collective volitions enable Forms to synchronize their qualia to constitute u, but what is not present are the collective volitions to combine their awarenesses of the qualia to constitute a macroexperience of u.

Since Forms can only be aware of their own kind of qualia, and since as is plausible every experience must have some subject to have that experience, then we may deduce that whatever subject has this generated experience must be a non-Form macrosubject. I intend to remain neutral on whether macrosubjects are complex mental particulars or substances or substrata that have experiences, or whether they are just bundles of experiences. Macrosubjects persist over time either via a collective volition of the Forms to conjure up and maintain a mental particular that is the possessor of a set of experiences, or via a volition to bundle together certain macroexperiences.

The idea of a collective volition might seem mysterious. But it's not inconceivable (=not conceptually incoherent). For we are already familiar with something in the neighborhood in *collective decisions*. Imagine a village that comes together to decide a course of action, perhaps in light of being raided by the people of a neighboring village. Even if the members of the village

change from day to day, it seems coherent to say that the collective volition persists. Similarly, even if the Forms involved in a macrosubject change from moment to moment, due to the macrosubject's being aware of different kinds of qualia from moment to moment, the collective volition may conceivably persist. Compare this with an animalist view of the self, on which the atoms one consists of change from day to day. Similarly, a macrosubject may persist even though which Forms are involved in that subject change.[77]

The answer this theory gives to the subject-summing problem is thus closely related to its answer to the quality-awareness gap. The Forms' own experiences just are irreducible awarenesses of qualia. From the Forms' pooling their awarenesses of their own qualia together to generate a new macrosubject, it is a priori deducible that the generated subject will have phenomenally conscious experiences of multiple kinds of qualities in the world, i.e. have macroexperiences. We may note that subjects are not simple entities on this theory. But this is to be expected on a bottom-up version of panpsychism, on which macrosubjects are constituted by the experiences of more fundamental conscious subjects (plus perhaps the mental particular, substance, or substrata they decide to feed their experiences into). That macrosubjects aren't fundamental is something that both bottom-up and top-down panpsychism, as well as

[77] One might still worry about hanging so much on the notion of volitions. The literature on this is vast and full of controversy. So attempting to solve the subject-summing problem by appealing to volitions may bring unnecessary murkiness into the picture. In response, I first say that whatever the nature of volitions, it seems clear from the phenomenology that they are involved somehow when we produce imagination experiences and recombine their phenomenal qualities. Something similar goes on in the story in which Forms collectively combine awarenesses or qualia to generate more complex experiences. Second, I intend to characterize volitions in as neutral and noncommittal a way as I can. I leave it open that Forms have libertarian free will, though one is free to believe in determinism and accept that Forms have free volitions of a compatibilist sort. Or perhaps Forms are automatons. I leave it open whether Forms' volitions must be determined by reasons, or whether some teleological account is correct. I remain neutral about whether Forms' knowledge of their own intentions or actions require observation or sensations, and whether such knowledge is inferred or immediate. And I remain neutral about whether their volitions or intentions are special kinds of beliefs (i.e. am neutral on 'cognitivism'), and what it is that distinguishes volitions from other mental states (e.g. which norms, if any, pertain to them).

physicalism, say. §4 explains how macrosubjects being non-fundamental helps to avoid causal interaction and overdetermination arguments.

§3.3 Solving the Palette Problem. Expanding the palette is how Platonic Idealism improves upon micropsychism. Platonic Idealism expands the number and kind of phenomenal qualities to the palette because there are just as many different types of fundamental experiential qualities as there are Forms. And there are very many Forms: as many as there are different kinds of seemingly irreducible phenomenal properties, such as coolness, sweetness, greenness, and so on and so forth. Whatever the final number of Forms, the palette will be large enough to paint the rich phenomenal landscapes of macroexperience that we are familiar with. Platonic Idealism is not limited to the number of fundamental experiential qualities posited by micropsychism, since the fundamental conscious subjects are not physical ultimates that must adhere to the number postulated by physics.

Chalmers (2016b, 29-30) points out that assigning a 'large palette' of experiences to the microsubjects of micropsychism runs into trouble. A large palette version of micropsychism says that physical ultimates have many rich experiences, like the sensation of blue, the feel of coolness, etc. But since only a limited number of experiences may be the underlying intrinsic nature of, say, an electron's spinning up, and since there are only very few physical ultimates according to physics, then the rest of those microexperiential qualities will be epiphenomenal. I'll explain how Platonic Idealism avoids epiphenomenalism in §4.

§3.4 Solving Structural Mismatch. Though there are no fundamentally microphysical entities on Platonic Idealism, an analogous structural mismatch argument may be attempted by speaking of the structure of qualia that constitute physical entities instead of microphysical structure. And though there are no fundamentally microphenomenal states on Platonic Idealism,

we may speak of the fundamental mental or phenomenal states of Forms. The argument would go like this:

> i*) The structure of Forms' qualia is isomorphic with the structure of constituent properties of physical entities (because their qualia is the underying intrinsic nature of the constituent properties of physical entities).
> ii*) The structure of Forms' qualia constitutes the relevant macrophenomenal structure (in particular, qualia are the intrinsic realizers of the structure of the array of properties instantiated in the visual/phenomenal field).
> iii*) The structure of constituent properties of physical entities constitutes the relevant macrophysical structure.
> iv*) But the relevant macrophenomenal structure is not isomorphic to the relevant macrophysical structure.

Platonic Idealism dissolves the problem because the analog of (iv) is false on the theory: The relevant macrophysical structure *is* isomorphic with the relevant macrophenomenal structure. When one has an experience of e.g. a boulder, the structure of the boulder experience is relevantly isomorphic with the structure of the boulder. For the macroexperience just consists in the macrosubject's awareness of the qualia that constitute that very boulder. It is the same boulder qualia that yield the macrophysical structure as the boulder qualia involved in the relevant macrophenomenal structure. Of course, the overall macrophenomenal structure here will have some additional relational structure over the overall macrophysical structure, due to the macroexperience's involving an awareness relation. This difference is to be expected, since the boulder itself, which is constituted by qualia but not an awareness of qualia, doesn't have this relational structure. This story goes for all perceptual macroexperiences and their associated macrophenomenal and macrophysical structure.[78]

[78] A similar story may be given for cognitive macroexperiences. Perhaps Forms' fundamental cognitive experiences, which constitute our cognitive macroexperiences, involve an awareness of qualia that represent individual aspects of abstract objects. And for hallucinatory experiences, some story is available such as the Forms' conjuring up hallucinatory qualia for us to be aware of, where objects constituted by hallucinatory qualia have no causal relevance to the set of non-hallucinatory qualia. The relevant structures here will be isomorphic.

This move is unavailable for micropsychism because the relevant fundamental mental structure is microphysical structure: in particular, the structure of the electrons, quarks, leptons, etc. in the brain, and the relevant macrophysical structure of the brain or neural states it constitutes. For it is the microphenomenal structure of those electrons, quarks, leptons etc. in the brain that was supposed to add up to that macrosubject's macrophenomenal structure on micropsychism. The macrophysical structure of the brain remains not even close to isomorphic with macrophenomenal structure (e.g. Chalmer's 2016b p.32 defense of premise 5).[79]

§4.1 Is this Mind-Body Relation Too Weak? On Platonic Idealism the macrophysical structure *of the brain* has nothing to do with accounting for the macrophenomenal structure of our experiences. For the present view denies that the brain causes experience, and instead offers a constitutive explanation of our experiences. This seems to be a problem because of the close correlation our brains have with our experiences. The objector is asking how my theory can explain the close relation our brains seem to have with our mental states. But on Platonic Idealism this relation is an a posteriori correlation between some (aspects of) mental states of Forms that constitute our brains, and other mental states of Forms that constitute our experiences. So, just have the qualia of the Forms that make up brains correlate with the mental states of the Forms that are involved in macroexperiences.

One might think this is too close to what dualism says about the connection between mind and brain: mere correlation (or perhaps with some added details, epiphenomenalism). But it's preferable over dualism because Platonic Idealism has a readily available story for how there can be mental causation without causal overdetermination. Take an arbitrary bodily movement,

[79] One might go naïve realist with micropsychism, so that the relevant microphysical and macrophysical structure is that of the environmental objects one perceives. But, as Chalmers (2016b, 32) points out, this strategy won't work for the structure of illusory or hallucinatory experiences on micropsychism. See also fn.78.

such as the movement of one's hand through the air. This is caused by one's volition. But one's volition to move the hand consists in various Forms' volitions to imagine their qualia that constitute the hand to move. When the Forms will for their qualia to 'move' in this way, then the actual hand is caused to move. Analogously, in our own mental lives, we seem able to will in an imagination experience for a blue block to move, and thereby cause it to move.

One's volition to move the hand causes the hand to move, and the fact that Forms' volitions move the qualia that constitute the hand does not introduce causal overdetermination. For their volitions just constitute one's macrovolition to move the hand. Moreover, the (qualia that constitute the) brain does not overdetermine the hand's movement because it does not contribute anything causal to the hand's movement. Neural states just correlate with hand movement via collective volitions of the Forms involved in those neural states and the Forms involved in the hand.

It may be objected that the causal closure of the physical is not respected in another sense. For we haven't left room for the physical—in this case, no room for the brain to cause hand movement. But something is going to have to budge. If there is no systematic overdetermination of physical events, then either the brain doesn't cause the hand to move, or the volition which is not identical to nor supervenient on anything in the brain, doesn't. The phenomenological data, if it points anywhere, points toward preferring the causal relevance of the volition rather than the brain. If we say physical events have causal powers at all on Platonic Idealism, they have them only in virtue of Forms' collective volitions to correlate certain (qualia that underlie) physical events, e1, with other (qualia that underlie other) physical events, e2. If physical events have causal powers in this sense, then they have them in a way that doesn't rival the causal powers of Forms' volitions. For mental properties—Forms' volitions—underlie all

causal properties. If one interprets this to result in physical events having no real causal power, then the Platonic Idealist can say it is just a consequence of accepting that physical events qua physical aren't fundamental. There is no systematic overdetermination of mental events qua mental on Platonic Idealism.

Making the relation between our minds and our brains weaker than identity or grounding—though still connected in virtue of both being grounded in different Forms' mental states—is required to avoid the structural mismatch problem between the macrophysical structure of brains and macrophenomenal structure.

§4.2 Why Mental Chemistry? If we accept into our ontology Forms such as Blueness, Roughness, Sweetness, and their associated kinds of experiences, then why not just go in for a Form of a Particular Visual Experience on a Sunny Day of the Statue of Liberty from a Particular Spatial Perspective and Emotional Background Feel? We would not need mental chemistry to explain each of our macroexperiences: each and every possible macroexperience would be deducible from the full unchanging experience of some one Form. A reason to favor this is if one thinks phenomenal-mental chemistry is too exotic.

Response: The seeming irreducibility of some phenomenal qualities is worth explaining. For example, a particular visual experience of the Statue of Liberty is very rich, and can be analyzed into many different phenomenal properties, characterized by terms like lighting, texture, colors, lines, and emotional tinge. Given that the phenomenology of a particular experience is analyzable into more fundamental kinds of phenomenal properties, then the experience seems not to be a fundamental kind of experience after all. Platonic Idealism explains why some kinds of phenomenal qualities seem irreducible or fundamental, while other more complex ones seem reducible: the irreducible ones we can attend to are the only ones that the

mental states of one Form alone explain, while the more complex ones are constituted by the mental states of multiple Forms. The idea in this section is not the earlier motivation for Forms: that because brains' causal powers do not explain macroexperience,[80] Forms should be appealed to. Rather, the idea is to supply a Form for every fundamental kind of experience, due to their having a fundamental kind of qualia, in order to transparently account for something seemingly less fundamental: the complex phenomenal qualities of macroexperience. Similarly, physicists posit a new fundamental entity, e.g. the quark, with an associated fundamental property in their theories when it helps them to constitutively explain something more complex that doesn't seem fundamental, e.g. an electron's behavior.

§4.3 Reducing Macrosubjects from Reality? Phillip Goff (2017a) argues that top-down panpsychisms are better than bottom-up. The idea is that the grounding relation appealed to in bottom-up panpsychism threatens to *reduce* macrosubjects to microsubjects, such that a complete description of reality need not mention macrosubjects at all but only microsubjects. By contrast, the grounding relation on top-down panpsychism is such that it *subsumes* macrosubjects under the cosmic subject, in a way in which macrosubjects must be mentioned in a complete description of reality, to adequately describe the various aspects of the cosmic subject. This objection applies to Platonic Idealism since it gives a bottom-up constitutive explanation of macrosubjects.

Response: A complete description of reality must mention macrosubjects on Platonic Idealism because it must mention the collective volitions of Forms to combine their awarenesses of qualia in such a way as to generate macroexperiences, which imply macrosubjects. This is

[80] Brains' causal powers don't explain macroexperience in part because they have no causal powers, and in part because even if they did it would not transparently account for macroexperience.

because a complete description of reality must adequately describe the Forms and all of their mental states, some of which have content implying macrosubjects.

A related objection to Goff's top-down panpsychism is that parts of a subject are not usually subjects: similarly for aspects of a cosmic subject subsumed by the cosmic subject, as on Goff's theory (Chalmers 2017, p.24). Goff (2017b) answers this objection by positing unconceived nonmental properties of the cosmic subject that can in principle explain the subsumption of genuine macrosubjects by the cosmic subject. But as Chalmers (ibid.) points out, Goff thereby gives up idealism in favor of a sort of cosmic property dualism. Platonic Idealism by contrast preserves the monistic purity of idealism.[81] It requires only an extra appeal to volitions of Forms, and our own intuitive familiarity with volitions' powers to combine and recombine mental items, rather than nonmental properties of Forms.

§4.4 Cosmic Idealism. Why not posit a top-down or 'Cosmic' Idealism on which the fundamental entity is the cosmic subject, and on which unconceived nonmental properties are not appealed to to generate macrosubjects? For instance, why couldn't the cosmos have volitions to organize its mental states such that some of them are compartmentalized and bounded in such a way as to subsume macrosubjects?

Response: One reason to still prefer Platonic Idealism would be because one rejects, as Russell (1918: 36) and Moore (1993: 166) did, a top-down picture of reality on which there is only one fundamental entity. For it is a datum of experience that there are a plurality of things. A related datum is that experience does not (re)present the world as being a single unified whole. Platonic Idealism retains the data. For it says the fundamental constituents of reality include

[81] Monistic purity counts in favor of a theory in that it's more elegant to account for concrete reality with fewer fundamental ontological categories. E.g. monistic purity is a theoretical reason to prefer physicalism over dualism. Chalmers (2017) maintains that monistic purity is a reason in favor of idealism over dualism, too.

many different Forms' experiences. That is, Platonic Idealism carves up our universe in terms of different fundamental qualities, which accords with our phenomenology. Cosmic Idealism requires rejecting the experiential data because there is only one fundamental entity—the cosmos.

§4.5 Unexplained Harmony Between Forms. One might wonder how the Forms could contribute qualia to the physical world in a concerted way so as to constitute the intricate and complex world we inhabit. Do these concerted contributions require a sort of master Form that conducts the orchestra of other Forms?

I appeal again to Forms' ability to have collective or synchronized volitions. Perhaps this involves a kind of complex but rapid or instantaneous deliberation, or perhaps it involves just knowing what the intentions of other Forms are. Perhaps they may have reasons for willing to imagine qualia in the concerted ways that they do. Or perhaps it just pleases them in an a-rational way to imagine in just the ways that they do. Noticing these conceptual possibilities allows Platonic Idealism to remain neutral on whether there must be a master Form that 'conducts the orchestra'.

§4.6 Berkeleyan Idealism. The biggest difference between Berkleyan Idealism and Platonic Idealism is that only the latter offers a constitutive explanation of macrosubjects, whereas the former says macrosubjects are fundamental. In this section I argue that Platonic Idealism is better in its accounts both of perceived and unperceived physical objects. A consequence is that Forms better serve as a complete minimal basis for the concrete world than Berkeleyan microsubjects. Therefore on the complete minimal basis criterion that guides notions of fundamentality, Forms are better candidates for being fundamental.

On Berkeleyan Idealism, the concrete world consists of i) simple mental substances or 'spirits' (e.g. macrosubjects such as ourselves, and God—a cosmic subject), and ii) ideas. The essence or nature of ideas is to be perceived by a spirit. Physical objects are bundles of ideas. A macroexperience of a physical object consists in a spirit's awareness of (components of) these bundles of ideas. There are different possible interpretations of Berkeley on how physical objects persist when they are *unperceived* by macrosubjects. Physical objects may persist as:

a) Ideas of physical object appearances in God's mind.

b) Possible experiences to be had by us given various circumstances.

c) God's volitions or decrees for possible experiences to be had by us given various circumstances (McCracken 1979).

d) The ideas that give content to God's volitions for possible experiences to be had by us given various circumstances (Winkler 1989, 207-224).

(a) is a nonstarter for Berkeley because for God to suffer sensations of physical objects is an imperfection; and God is perfect. Moreover, God's ideas are eternal and unchanging, unlike the ideas of objects he causes in us. If we allowed that these ideas change, and that the objects we perceive are all ideas contained in God's mind, there arises a problem of what counts as a real object or merely possible object.

(b) Gives a counterfactual analysis of physical objects. (c) ties the persistence of physical objects to God's volitions. Both options are unappealing when conjoined with Berkeley's *esse ist percipi* doctrine. For each of (b) and (c) conjoined with this doctrine imply that physical objects pop into and out of existence when they are unperceived, or because God only at particular times wills to cause us to perceive the ideas that constitute those objects (Downing 2013, §3.2.4). Note that, without the *esse ist percipi* doctrine, some objects in the universe are rendered irreducibly

modal. This is counterintuitive, and forfeits the monistic purity of idealism in favor of a new form of dualism, according to which concrete entities are either irreducibly mental (e.g. spirits) or irreducibly modal (e.g. external objects). More importantly, the distinction between real and merely possible objects collapses.

The principle behind (d) is that any volition had by anyone, including God, must have an idea behind it for that volition to have content. If these volitional ideas are perceived by God even while God doesn't occurrently will for a macrosubject to perceive a physical object, then one could appeal to these ideas as anchors for the persistence of physical objects even when no macrosubject is perceiving them. A problem seems to be that the content of these anchors concerns God's planning or intending to cause macrosubjects to have experiences of a physical object. If this is right, then physical objects, when no one is looking at them, seem to be reduced to mere *plans* to cause ideas/sensations in us.

By contrast with extant interpretations of Berkeley's view, on Platonic Idealism the boulder's brownness, circularity, and solidity are really instantiated even when no macrosubject is around to be aware of it—that is, even when the Forms don't will for their *awarenesses* of the boulder qualia to combine to form a macroexperience of that boulder. The boulder is not a plan for such brownness, circularity, and solidity to be perceived by macrosubjects when the right circumstances obtain. Nor does it pop into and out of existence by being tied to Forms' occurrent volitions for us to have macroexperiences of those objects.

With regard to *perceived* objects, on traditional Berkeleyan Idealism, no two subjects can ever in a strict sense be aware of the numerically same ideas of the same one object. For, though a perceived object is a bundle of ideas, the ideas that God causes to be present in macrosubjects A, B, and C's minds are all numerically distinct between A, B, and C. Berkeley is okay with this

because he has a more relaxed view about sameness of objects: A, B, and C count as having the same ideas of the same one object just in virtue of those ideas resembling each other. By contrast, Platonic Idealism says that when A, B, and C have veridical experiences of the boulder at the same time, they may be aware of at least some of the very same (i.e. numerically identical) qualia/property instantiations that constitute that boulder. So Platonic Idealism has a better account of perceived and unperceived physical objects.

Conclusion. Platonic Idealism solves the combination problem. It does so in a way that improves upon contemporary top-down panpsychisms (vis-à-vis monistic purity), cosmic idealism (vis-à-vis experiential data), and other bottom-up panpsychisms that appeal to the limited kinds of mental states of microphysical entities rather than Forms and their natures (vis-à-vis the palette problem and structural mismatch problem). There are metaphysical and phenomenological reasons to prefer it over the more traditional Berkeleyan Idealism. And, like the best panpsychisms, it avoids causal interaction worries as well as conceivability and transparency arguments against physicalism, since idealism is no kind of physicalism. So Platonic Idealism is worth considering seriously. My qualia theory does not entail any version of panpsychism, but Platonic Idealism entails the qualia theory. Those sympathetic to a panpsychist answer to the mind-body problem have an additional reason to favor this dissertation's qualia theory.

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