ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DISMISSAL OF MACARTHUR

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"Anglo-American Relations and the Dismissal of MacArthur"¹

On April 11, 1951, President Harry S Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur. Within hours, American reactions ranged from ecstasy to rage. In San Gabriel, California, the President was burned in effigy. At the University of Washington, students lynched a dummy wearing an Army uniform and clenching a corn cob pipe in its teeth.² In Great Britain, cheers erupted in the House of Commons when Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison announced MacArthur's dismissal.³ One could almost hear a sigh of relief from across the Atlantic. What prompted the United States to discharge MacArthur?

Traditional interpretations portray the Truman-MacArthur controversy as a matter of civil-military relations within the context of a limited war. These scholars allege that MacArthur's inability to accept the Truman administration's limited strategy in Korea resulted in the general's ouster.⁴ More recently, historians have discovered that American officials actually supported some of the strategy espoused by MacArthur. The president dismissed MacArthur only after he realized that the general's presence impeded the implementation of expanded measures in the Far East.⁵

Few contemporary scholars have addressed the role of foreign officials in the dismissal of MacArthur. But, in a July 1990 article in *The English Historical Review*, Peter

Lowe argues that "British protests propelled Truman" to fire MacArthur.⁶ This view falls within a growing body of literature stressing the influence of foreign governments in the conduct of the Korean War in particular and the diplomacy of the cold war in general.⁷ Indeed, post-revisionist historians have used some of these studies to support their overall contention that in waging the cold war, the United States was responding to the demands and entreaties of foreign governments.⁸

By looking carefully at MacArthur's dismissal within the context of Anglo-American relations, we can attempt to evaluate the accuracy of these larger generalizations. We will see that neither the traditional nor the post-revisionist portrayals of the Truman-MacArthur affair are persuasive. Although British documents show that Her Majesty's Government wanted MacArthur fired, American archival materials demonstrate conclusively that the Truman administration discharged MacArthur for its own reasons and not to pacify a disgruntled ally. Truman and his advisers, in fact, fired MacArthur because he complicated the pursuit of Washington's increasingly bold strategy to end the Korean War, a strategy which Britain actually opposed but in the wake of MacArthur's dismissal could not contest.

At the conclusion of World War II, Britain found itself physically and economically devastated by the scourge of

war. Despite having spent almost a quarter of her national wealth in maintaining the war effort, she had accrued enormous debts. Nonetheless, the British still considered themselves a world power. They retained vast influence and property in the Commonwealth and Empire. The exigencies of rebuilding a domestic welfare state, however, soon produced changes in British diplomacy, economy, and politics.⁹

After World War II, the British Labour government became increasingly dependent on American financial and military assistance. In December 1945, the British negotiated a \$3.75 billion loan from the U.S. and agreed reluctantly to demands that the pound be made convertible into dollars. As her exchange problems worsened, Britain's shortage of dollars greatly affected her diplomacy.¹⁰ In 1947, the United Kingdom granted India and Burma independence and asked the United States to assume its military commitments in Greece and Turkey. British receipt of Marshall Plan aid and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (N.A.T.) on April 4, 1949 signified additional British reliance on American financial and strategic assistance.¹¹ Initially, the United States made no firm decision regarding the size of the American troop commitment to Europe. Unable to defend themselves adequately against Soviet expansion, the British officials hoped to inspire the American to deploy a large N.A.T.O. force.

Nevertheless, Britain struggled to maintain autonomy

and to pursue independently its interests. Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin hoped to use American power to contain the Soviets and to defend British holdings in the Far East and Mediterranean. In June 1948, after a Communist insurgency erupted in Malaya, the British dispatched troops to defend their rubber and tin interests.¹² In January 1950, intense political pressure from the China Bloc and public outcry over the mistreatment of American diplomats stationed in China prompted the United States to maintain its support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese. Great Britain, however, recognized the Communist Chinese regime of Mao Tse-tung in order to protect its commercial investments in China and the Hong Kong entrepot trade. Believing Western pressure could alter Communist Chinese behavior, U.S. officials pushed for economic sanctions against China and refused to recognize the Mao regime. U.K. policy makers disagreed and claimed that trade embargoes and political isolation would merely succeed in forging a closer Sino-Soviet alliance. Therefore, the British attempted to preserve diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) and supported Communist Chinese representation in the United Nations.¹³

British officials also tried to maintain autonomy in Europe. Despite fear of the Soviet army on the continent, U.K. policymakers resented American dominance of the

N.A.T.O. alliance. Staunchly independent, Britain also resisted or modified American and French integration schemes such as the European Payments Union and the Schuman Plan.¹⁴ Though cognizant of Britain's decline as a world power, British officials perceived American policy makers as mercurial, inexperienced and overly subject to domestic pressures; consequently, the English attempted to influence U.S. leaders.¹⁵ For some, MacArthur became the embodiment of flawed American diplomacy.

Indeed, Douglas MacArthur challenged almost every tenet of British foreign policy. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (S.C.A.P.) in Japan and later as commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, MacArthur alienated British officials and clashed regularly with British press correspondents. He prevented Britain from exercising authority in the Japanese Occupation and mistreated the British political representative.¹⁶ He challenged British perceptions of the role of the military officer as one separate from that of the politician.¹⁷ An avid "Asia first" proponent and supporter of the Nationalist Chinese, MacArthur claimed that Asia, not Europe, faced the greatest threat from Soviet expansion. The general believed that Europe should provide for its own defense.¹⁸ MacArthur's strategic views, independence, and aggressive machinations frightened and infuriated the British. The eruption of hostilities in Korea soon exacerbated this

volatile relationship.

On June 25, 1950, at approximately 4:00 A.M., 90,000 North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded South Korea. That afternoon, the U.N. Security Council adopted an American proposal calling for international support of the "immediate cessation of the hostilities."¹⁹ Two days later, in response to the rapidly deteriorating situation in South Korea, the U.N. Security Council reconvened and approved an American-sponsored resolution asking members to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area."²⁰

From the outbreak of war in Korea, the British supported the U.N. effort. On 27 June, the Cabinet voted unanimously to endorse American efforts in Korea.²¹ "This is naked aggression," Prime Minister Attlee announced to the House of Commons, "it must be checked."²² Claiming "there would not be a more useful demonstration of the United Kingdom's capacity to act as a world power with the support of the Commonwealth," British officials placed their Far Eastern naval forces at MacArthur's disposal.²³

Privately, U.K. diplomats demonstrated less resolve. They expressed their greatest anxiety over the American decision to station the Seventh Fleet off the coast of Formosa.²⁴ British Ambassador to the United States Sir Oliver Franks warned, "The American action regarding Formosa must certainly deepen the rift between the U.S. and the

P.R.C."²⁵ Fully aware of MacArthur's support for Chiang, the British remained wary of his judgement concerning the Chinese.²⁶

Nonetheless, on July 5, the House of Commons gave its full support to British participation in the Korean War.²⁷ Two days later, the British U.N. delegation approved a joint resolution creating a "unified command" under the aegis of a leader selected by the United States. The following day, Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) selected MacArthur as the head of the U.N. forces.²⁸ Because the Security Council had no direct communication with the general, the United States directed operations in Korea.²⁹

In the U.K., this arrangement drew criticism. Sir Pierson Dixon, a Foreign Office official, recorded his concern that the United States would use atomic weapons in Korea without prior consultation with Great Britain. On July 6, Minister of State Kenneth Younger noted in his diary apprehension at the quality of American military leadership.³⁰ A week later, in the House of Commons, several M.P.s expressed anxiety over MacArthur's command of the U.N. forces in Korea in addition to his substantial administrative duties in the Far East. Additionally, Earl Winterton (Cons.-Horsam) asked Speaker of the House Douglas C. Brown whether or not the Prime Minister exercised control over MacArthur's actions. Brown replied that although Attlee did not instruct MacArthur directly, the general

represented the United Nations, a body in which the British had influence. Brown then upbraided Winterton for "criticising and stabbing in the back the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces."³¹ Parts of the media also denigrated MacArthur's appointment. *The Economist* derided the general's close association with the Republican Party and deemed his selection "a malicious trick of fate."³²

Because of military commitments in Europe, Hong Kong, and Malaya, the British Chiefs of Staff initially decided against contributing any ground or air forces to Korea. However, as U.N. losses mounted and the United States exerted pressure, "strong political and psychological reasons" emerged for supplying land troops. Accordingly, on July 25, Attlee persuaded the Cabinet to approve the transfer of two infantry battalions to South Korea by early October 1950.³³ Still financially and militarily dependent upon the United States, the British were forced to balance their disdain for MacArthur against a desire to preserve the Anglo-American relationship and the American commitment to Europe.

Despite these concessions, the British diplomats remained fearful that U.S. overtures toward the Nationalists could result in Communist Chinese intervention in Korea. The U.K. was not willing to gain a large American NATO commitment at the price of a war with China.³⁴ American actions did little to assuage British trepidation. Although

the United States rejected Chiang's offer of 33,000 troops for deployment in Korea, American officials promised Chiang military assistance.³⁵ When MacArthur indicated that he personally wanted to survey Formosan military needs, the Joint Chiefs suggested that the general appoint an envoy instead of making the dangerous trip himself. But, in deference to MacArthur's stature, they did not stop him from doing so. "If you feel it necessary to proceed personally on the 31st," the J.C.S. wired MacArthur, "please feel free to go since the responsibility is yours."³⁶ Given this leeway, MacArthur traveled to Taipei.

After MacArthur returned to Tokyo, he told the press about Chiang's "indomitable determination to resist Communist domination." The Nationalists and Americans, MacArthur claimed, were now prepared "to meet any attack which a hostile force might be foolish enough to attempt."³⁷ Shortly thereafter, Chiang spoke of a victory ensured by "Sino-American military cooperation" with "our old comrade in arms, General MacArthur."³⁸

The MacArthur-Chiang meeting provoked a tremendous uproar in the United States and abroad. Although MacArthur had consulted the J.C.S. prior to visiting Chiang, the State Department learned of the trip only afterwards.³⁹ MacArthur's failure to file a report until five days after returning from Formosa exacerbated the tense situation created by press speculation. When the American embassy in

Taipei erroneously reported that MacArthur had ordered the dispatch of three fighter squadrons to Formosa, the J.C.S. warned him about issuing such directives without approval from the "highest levels" of the government.⁴⁰

In order to avoid the recurrence of such misunderstandings, Truman sent his trusted envoy W. Averell Harriman to Tokyo "to discuss the Far Eastern political situation with MacArthur."⁴¹ Though MacArthur assured Harriman that "he would, as a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the President," Harriman remained unsure of MacArthur's intentions. "For reasons which are rather difficult to explain," Harriman recorded, "I did not feel that we came to full agreement on the way we believed things should be handled on Formosa."⁴²

These developments greatly disturbed the British. The *Manchester Guardian* denigrated the "MacArthur-Chiang Pact" as "a blow to the West."⁴³ In an article titled "The Menace of General MacArthur," *The Economist* scathingly asserted:

In discussing military plans with Chiang Kai-shek, General MacArthur is not in any way acting for the United Nations. In seeming to countenance Chiang Kai-shek's naval and air blockade of China, in flat defiance of Mr. Truman's instructions, General MacArthur confirms the view that he is not a fit and proper person to be in charge of responsible military operations.⁴⁴

The London *Times* discredited Harriman's denial of any connection between his visit to Tokyo and MacArthur's trip to Formosa.⁴⁵

Such criticism did not escape MacArthur's attention. On August 10, he claimed that the media had "maliciously misrepresented" his visit with Chiang.⁴⁶ Four days later, his headquarters announced:

It is inconceivable that the British Government would attempt to arrogate to itself, under the guise of membership in the United Nations, the slightest warrant or judgment on the propriety of the mission of an American officer in compliance with the orders of his own Government.⁴⁷

In a sharp retort, the London *Times* responded that "Allied headquarters in Tokyo does not show itself to be receptive on fundamental issues to any views which differ from its own." Commenting on the lack of communication between British officials and MacArthur, the *Times* added that the British political representative in Japan, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, had been unable to see MacArthur "for many weeks."⁴⁸

Privately, American diplomats assured British officials that "there had been no change in U.S. policy about Formosa."⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the British remained unwilling to support the Nationalist Chinese. On 16 August, Prime Minister Attlee cabled Fenner Brockway (Lab.-Eton and Slough), "We have made it quite clear that our action in Korea is in accordance with the Security Council resolution and is not concerned with Formosa."⁵⁰

Despite the controversy surrounding Formosa, the United States pressured the British to expedite deployment of its troops to Korea.⁵¹ Lacking substantial military reserves,

the British still hesitated to remove forces from Hong Kong or Malaya.⁵²

But as American military leaders planned the Inchon offensive, their demands for reinforcements grew more insistent. J.C.S. Chairman Omar Bradley told British Chief of Air Staff Lord Arthur Tedder, "A platoon now would be worth more than a company tomorrow."⁵³ On 17 August, the British Cabinet relented and immediately dispatched to Korea two battalions from Hong Kong.⁵⁴ But Esler Dening, a Foreign Office specialist on the Far East, expressed a different British motive for this action. "Now that we have decided to meet the Americans over this," Dening asserted, "we should be in a strong position to make representations to them if they persist in their present policy towards Formosa, which may well land us all in trouble."⁵⁵

MacArthur seemed determined to provide that trouble. In mid-August, he received an invitation to speak before the annual [U.S.] Veterans of Foreign Wars (V.F.W.) convention. On 20 August, in lieu of a personal appearance, MacArthur sent the V.F.W. and the press a message. Though he described Formosa's importance as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" from which the United States could attack China and the Soviet Union, his comments went beyond strategic musings. Flagrantly attacking Truman's foreign policy, MacArthur derided "those who advocate appeasement" by refusing to commit the U.S. military to the defense of

Formosa.⁵⁶

MacArthur issued this declaration at a most inopportune moment. On 24 August, Chou En-lai, the Chinese foreign minister, demanded that the Security Council "take immediate measures to bring about the complete withdrawal of all United States invading forces from Taiwan." Contemporaneously, Soviet delegate Jacob Malik, who had recently returned to the United Nations, began making similar requests.⁵⁷ In response to these charges, Warren R. Austin, the American ambassador to the United Nations, wrote U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie a letter elaborating on Truman's July message to Congress and insisting that the "U.S. would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa."⁵⁸ The administration wanted to assure its allies and the Communists that the United States only wanted to deter a Communist Chinese invasion of Formosa, not intervene in China.

Accordingly, when Truman and his advisors read MacArthur's V.F.W. address in an advance copy of the September 1 edition of *U.S. News and World Report*, they expressed shock and indignation.⁵⁹ The president immediately told Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to order the general to withdraw his message. Because of MacArthur's stature, Johnson hesitated to implement Truman's directives. Johnson felt that the administration should announce that MacArthur's comments represented "only one man's opinion and

not the official policy of the Government." Truman disagreed. MacArthur withdrew his message. In early September, the president fired Johnson.⁶⁰

The British welcomed Truman's initiative.⁶¹ Nonetheless, they remained critical of MacArthur. "It is astonishing," a London *Times* correspondent claimed, "that an individual general-and one who has not visited his own country for fourteen years-should have such political power."⁶² Though restrained in their comments on the U.N. commander, the British Cabinet concluded, "The United States lack all direction in their policy toward China." Accordingly, the Labour government decided to attempt "to influence U.S. policy in the right direction" - toward recognition of the Communist Chinese.⁶³

On 15 September, MacArthur succeeded brilliantly at Inchon. Because the U.N. commander had convinced a dubious administration of the feasibility of the operation, the Inchon landing represented more than a military triumph; it also greatly enhanced MacArthur's influence. The Truman administration became even less likely to challenge the judgment of the general.⁶⁴

The remarkable success at Inchon created the international support required for pursuing the reunification of Korea. In late August, the British Cabinet had recommended that if "United Nations forces . . . enter[ed] North Korea unopposed," steps toward Korean

reunification should be implemented.⁶⁵ Acting on this suggestion, the British U.N. delegation drafted a resolution calling for "all necessary steps be taken to insure conditions of enduring peace throughout the whole of Korea."⁶⁶ Despite British cooperation in the United Nations, American officials continued to direct single-handedly combat strategy. On 27 September, MacArthur received, without British knowledge, authorization for "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces," provided that neither the Soviets nor the Communist Chinese intervened or threatened to enter the war. In these orders, the J.C.S. carefully specified that only South Korean troops were to be used in maneuvers "in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border."⁶⁷

MacArthur immediately submitted his plan for achieving these objectives.⁶⁸ After the U.N. commander decided to regroup his forces instead of implementing "hot pursuit" of the enemy, the Joint Chiefs concluded that, while the X Corps relocated and the Eighth Army received supplies, the enemy would gain valuable time in which he could rebuild his defenses.⁶⁹ Though Bradley later deemed approving MacArthur's strategy a "terrible mistake," neither he nor other members of the J.C.S. overruled the imperious general who so recently had overcome their objections to his plan for the Inchon landing.⁷⁰ The British Chiefs of Staff accepted MacArthur's course of action.⁷¹

On 29 September, the new Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall approved MacArthur's plan. Given MacArthur's reputation for interpreting orders in a manner which suited his needs, Marshall unwisely stated, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel."⁷² The Truman administration hoped, by granting MacArthur permission to enter North Korea, to avoid a controversial U.N. vote on reunification. MacArthur confidently replied, "Unless and until the enemy capitulates, I regard all Korea as open."⁷³

MacArthur's zeal dismayed British officials. On 28 September [his first meeting with MacArthur since 15 June], Sir Alvary Gascoigne reported that MacArthur,

in his present state of overconfidence . . . will likely become more of a dictator than ever and we may have considerable trouble with him in the future If we do not wish him to take further headstrong action as he did on Formosa, . . . he must be ridden by Truman on a very severe curb."⁷⁴

Worried about the possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea, British diplomats learned to their dismay that MacArthur already possessed authorization for operations north of the 38th Parallel.⁷⁵ If the Chinese entered the conflict, British officials declared, General MacArthur would "almost certainly find it a military necessity to bomb Chinese communications lines in Manchuria, to blockade the Chinese coast . . . and even . . . to bomb Peking and South Chinese cities."⁷⁶ Such retaliatory measures would jeopardize British interests throughout the Far East.

Unwilling to reunify Korea at the price of a war with the Soviet Union or China, Bevin asserted that the British must continue to exercise "steadying influence upon the United States" and the British Chiefs of Staff pressed for restraint in Korea.⁷⁷

In spite of this caution, British and American officials received contradictory assessments of the intentions of the Communist Chinese.⁷⁸ Though unaware that the Chinese had deployed troops to North Korea, on October 9, the J.C.S. updated MacArthur's orders:

In the event of an open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case, you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory.⁷⁹

Three days later, again venting their frustration at their lack of input in the creation of strategy in Korea, the British made known their desire for "prior consultation" in the event of Chinese intervention in Korea. They also sought assurance that MacArthur would not embark on operations outside Korean territory "without express sanction from President Truman."⁸⁰

On October 15, Truman met MacArthur on Wake Island.⁸¹ During the conference, MacArthur assured the president that the U.N. forces could easily defeat any attempt by the Chinese to intervene in Korea.⁸² Though the meeting yielded no significant diplomatic or political results, the

British press criticized Truman's failure to include a representative of the United Nations in his entourage and to discuss Formosa with MacArthur.⁸³ After discussing such complaints with Dean Rusk, the American assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, Franks concluded, "we must expect persistence of differences of opinion over the role Formosa is to play in military strategy in the Far East."⁸⁴

For the remainder of October, as the U.N. forces approached the Yalu River, neither American nor British officials attempted to halt the offensive. On October 19th, MacArthur directed his troops to advance within fifty to one hundred miles of Manchurian and Soviet territory. Five days later, when the general lifted restrictions on the use of non-ROK forces near Soviet and Chinese borders, the Joint Chiefs meekly affirmed, "While the Joint Chiefs realize that you undoubtedly had sound reasons for issuing these instructions, they would like to be informed of them as your action is a matter of some concern here."⁸⁵ MacArthur shot back that "military necessity" dictated his orders and that the September 29 message from Marshall telling the U.N. commander "to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel" provided authorization for these maneuvers.⁸⁶ Having no desire to confront MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs allowed him to proceed. Hesitant to question U.S. objectives in Korea, the British withheld their criticism of Marshall's order.⁸⁷ With the

commitment of American troops to N.A.T.O. still pending, Britain took every measure to avoid offending the United States.

Though the U.N. forces began to encounter Chinese "volunteers" in Korea, the Truman administration allowed MacArthur to proceed northward.⁸⁸ On November 6, however, Commander of the Far Eastern Air Force George Stratemeyer delayed the implementation of an unauthorized MacArthur directive ordering a massive air strike along the Manchurian border.⁸⁹ After Stratemeyer described MacArthur's directive to Air Force authorities, Under Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett consulted with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Rusk. After the three agreed that the Chinese might interpret the bombing of the Yalu bridges between Sinuiji (Korea) and An-Tung (Manchuria) as a hostile threat, Rusk noted that the United States had promised to consult Great Britain before attacking Manchuria. Rusk stressed that by initiating such an assault, the United States risked invoking the Sino-Soviet Pact [signed in February 1950] and disrupting proceedings at the United Nations.⁹⁰

Acting on a presidential directive to discover why MacArthur suddenly found this action necessary, the J.C.S. ordered the general to "postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of [the] Manchurian border."⁹¹ MacArthur immediately replied, "Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria."⁹²

After receiving this alarming message, Truman approved the air strike.⁹³

MacArthur's tactics disturbed the British. After the U.N. Security Council voted, despite Soviet opposition, to consider MacArthur's allegations of Chinese aggression in Korea, the British successfully passed a resolution inviting a Communist Chinese representative to participate in the discussion.⁹⁴ Secretly, U.K. officials began discussing proposals for the creation of a demilitarized zone south of the Yalu River.⁹⁵

As Allied opposition to advancing toward the Yalu increased, U.S. officials became concerned. The J.C.S. warned MacArthur that, in the interest of pursuing negotiations with the Chinese, the administration might alter his mission of destroying the North Koreans.⁹⁶ On November 9, as the National Security Council (N.S.C.) prepared to reconsider U.S. objectives in the war, MacArthur denounced "the widely reported British desire to appease the Chinese Communists by giving them a strip of northern Korea."⁹⁷ After extensive deliberations, Truman, Acheson, and the J.C.S. made no alterations in MacArthur's mission; the advance continued.

The British, however, derided the U.N. offensive. *The New Statesman and Nation* called for Attlee to make it clear that "[I]f British troops are to remain in Korea, the Supreme Commander must be a man in whom the British people

have confidence."⁹⁸ On November 13th, U.K. diplomats proposed the establishment of a demilitarized area in North Korea under the joint supervision of the United Nations and the P.R.C.⁹⁹ The British Chiefs of Staff added that mounting air attacks in Manchuria risked escalating the conflict into a global war.¹⁰⁰

Hoping to assuage such fears, President Truman announced that U.N. troops under U.S. command had no intention of carrying hostilities into China.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, on November 21st, Acheson convinced the British to refrain from pressing the buffer zone proposal.¹⁰² Assuring Bevin that "The objectives of the UN Commander in the Field are no more and no less than the stated objectives of the United Nations," the U.S. government allowed MacArthur to proceed.¹⁰³

On November 28th, MacArthur's "end the war offensive" met disaster as the Chinese launched a massive counteroffensive which sent the U.N. troops reeling in retreat. A distraught MacArthur wired the JCS: "We face an entirely new war."¹⁰⁴ As 300,000 P.R.C. troops moved rapidly toward South Korea, the general suggested using Chiang's soldiers for reinforcements. Unwilling to provoke the P.R.C. further, the Joint Chiefs rejected MacArthur's plan. "Your proposal," they explained, "involves world-wide consequences . . . [including a possible] disruption of the essential Allied line-up."¹⁰⁵

The Chinese intervention alarmed the British. On November 29th, the Cabinet noted, "Public opinion in this country was distrustful of General MacArthur's intentions." Yet they also cautioned, "It was easy to criticise the military commander; but were we prepared to ask the United States to relieve General MacArthur of his command?"¹⁰⁶ Deciding to exercise restraint, the British issued no such demand. Speaking before the House of Commons later that day, Bevin urged members not to make MacArthur a scapegoat. Only one M.P., Mr. Mikardo (Lab., Reading, South) launched an overt attack on MacArthur.¹⁰⁷

On November 30th, the British reacted more strongly when Truman carelessly implied that the use of nuclear weapons in Korea was "under active consideration." Already wary of MacArthur's judgment, the president's assertion that the general had "charge of the use of the weapons" terrified the British.¹⁰⁸ Despite a subsequent White House "clarification," seventy-six Labour M.P.s signed a petition derogating Truman's statement and threatened to resign from the House of Commons if Britain supported an expanded war in China.¹⁰⁹ Hoping to mollify the tense situation, Attlee proposed that he go to the United States "to discuss with the President the general situation in the Far East and its effect on defensive preparations in other parts of the world."¹¹⁰

During the Truman-Attlee talks, the prime minister

suggested the acceptance of a cease-fire in Korea in exchange for future consideration of P.R.C. admission to the United Nations and settlement of the Formosa question. American officials bitterly resisted such attempts to "reward the Chinese for their aggression."¹¹¹ Though Truman assured Attlee that the United States would not use atomic weapons before consulting with the British, the president refused to put this agreement in writing.¹¹²

Undeterred, the prime minister raised the "difficult and delicate question of General MacArthur's direction of the effort in Korea."¹¹³ Marshall and Bradley insisted that MacArthur "was doing exactly what he was required to do by the United Nations." Marshall then added that the Pentagon and the State Department exercised joint control over MacArthur's actions. When the British proposed the creation of a committee to direct the war, Bradley sharply retorted, "A war cannot be run by committee."¹¹⁴ Again, the U.K. delegation yielded.¹¹⁵ Despite their differences, both nations agreed to continue the war in Korea under MacArthur's command.¹¹⁶

By late December, Communist Chinese forces reoccupied North Korea and were advancing southward. While the P.R.C. prepared for a New Year's offensive, American diplomats reconsidered U.S. objectives in the Far East. Though they did not want to widen the war to Chinese territory, Washington officials remained convinced that "reverses did

not warrant withdrawal." Thus, the Truman administration decided that American troops would remain in Korea until China "accept[ed] some stabilization."¹¹⁷ As hopes for a reunified Korea dissolved, the J.C.S., on December 29th, modified MacArthur's orders. Concluding that a deployment of additional American troops to Korea would "seriously jeopardize other [U.S.] commitments, including the safety of Japan," and would heighten the risk of a general war in Asia, the Pentagon told MacArthur not to expect any reinforcements for U.N. forces. "Korea," they concluded, "is not the place to fight a major war." Consequently, they ordered the general to maintain positions of "sustained resistance." If China threatened to push U.N. troops off the Korean peninsula, the J.C.S. directed MacArthur "to commence a withdrawal to Japan."¹¹⁸

But MacArthur refused to accept this "defeatist" strategy. Arguing that the hostile troops in Korea represented "the entire military resource of the Chinese nation," the Far Eastern commander pressed Washington officials to use air and naval attacks against China. The general also recommended securing Nationalist reinforcements for "diversionary action" against the mainland and imposing a naval blockade along the Chinese coast. Asserting that these measures would "severely cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage aggressive war," MacArthur pushed for counteractions against the

Communists.¹¹⁹

While policy makers in Washington pondered military strategy, U.S. diplomats sought to get the U.N. General Assembly to condemn China as an aggressor and to impose economic sanctions against the Mao government. Unwilling to levy stronger measures on China, the British elicited support from their Commonwealth and European allies for a cease-fire settlement.¹²⁰ Acheson, however, criticized British attempts at negotiation. On January 5, he warned Bevin that the failure to denounce Chinese aggression "would create a wave of [U.S.] isolationism . . . which jeopardize all that we are trying to do with and for the Atlantic Pact countries."¹²¹

Three days later, negative reactions to Truman's State of the Union message validated Acheson's warning about American isolationism. Though the president did not specifically refer to sending U.S. forces to Europe, he asked for congressional legislation augmenting foreign military and economic aid. Later that afternoon, Senator Kenneth Wherry (R-Neb.) responded to Truman's request by introducing Senate Resolution 8, later known as the Wherry Resolution, stating that "no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty" without congressional approval.¹²² Thus, the "Great Debate" began to rage in Washington. Claiming that the president was

exceeding his powers as commander-in-chief, critics charged the Truman administration with attempting to destroy the American economy by its expansionist foreign policy and denied that the defense of Europe was essential to U.S. security.¹²³

Far from the political squabbling, U.N. troops at the Korean front appeared endangered. On January 9th, though the Chinese had recaptured Seoul and Inchon, the J.C.S. rejected MacArthur's suggestions of December 30.¹²⁴ The following day, MacArthur asked the Pentagon to "clarify" its directive because "of the self-evident fact that my command . . . is of insufficient strength to hold a position in Korea and simultaneously protect Japan from external assault."¹²⁵ After urging MacArthur to delay evacuation for as long as possible, the J.C.S. dispatched Air Force Chief Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins to the Far East in order to survey the Korean front.¹²⁶

MacArthur's anxiety did not escape the notice of British policy makers. In hopes of clarifying whether or not the United States now intended to withdraw from Korea, the U.K. Cabinet sent Sir John Slessor, Marshall of the Royal Air Force, to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joined in Washington by Field Marshall Sir William Slim, the Chief of Imperial General Staff and Franks, the trio attended meetings at the Pentagon on January 15 and 16. The British representatives criticized MacArthur's tendency "to

be too political and too independent of Washington control" and conveyed their desire to for improved military consultation between the United States and Great Britain.¹²⁷ Bradley responded by defending MacArthur's conduct and claiming that the J.C.S. did not wish to alter the structure of the United Nations Command.¹²⁸ Though the situation at the Korean front remained uncertain, American dominance of military strategy persisted.

In mid-January, U.N. troops halted the Chinese advance. After the Chinese rejected a U.N. cease-fire proposal on January 17th, the United States and Britain spent two contentious weeks forging a compromise resolution which condemned China as an aggressor, but which relegated the consideration of economic sanctions to an U.N. Additional Measures Committee.¹²⁹ On February 1st, by a 44-7 vote, the U.N. General Assembly adopted this proposal.¹³⁰

In the following days, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, who replaced General Walton Walker as Eighth Army Commander after the latter died in a jeep accident, revitalized the U.N. effort in Korea. After a series of successful offensives, the U.N. contingent began pushing the enemy northward.¹³¹ This time, however, British policy makers were determined to stop the troops at the 38th Parallel. On February 6th, as Ridgway's men neared Seoul, the British chiefs of staff strongly opposed recrossing the parallel.¹³² Four days later, the cabinet recommended:

that it should be confirmed from the United States Government that there can be no question of a military decision to advance beyond the 38th Parallel until a political decision has been taken, and that the latter decision does not rest with the United States alone, but with the United Nations and, in particular, with those members who are contributing to the United Nations forces in Korea.¹³³

On February 12, the State Department assured Britain that it was not currently contemplating a "major crossing of the parallel."¹³⁴ Later that day, Attlee relayed these views to the House of Commons.¹³⁵

Unfortunately, MacArthur did not share the opinions of his superiors. On February 13th, in the midst of an enemy counteroffensive, he ignored the administration's desire that he not cross the 38th Parallel and denounced the idea of reestablishing it as "wholly unrealistic and illusory." Although MacArthur's latest criticisms received wide attention and provoked new speculation on U.S. objectives in Korea, the announcement provoked no censure from the J.C.S.¹³⁶ A week later, MacArthur announced that he would cross the 38th Parallel if given the opportunity to do so.¹³⁷ Because MacArthur's original U.N. directives remained unchanged, Parliament members began to ask "what limitations have been placed on the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations in Korea, with regard to the crossing of the 38th Parallel by his troops and their possible advance northward."¹³⁸

In early March, the British cabinet decided to seek a

"more formal assurance" from the United States government that the U.N. forces would not cross the 38th Parallel "without a fresh political decision." U.K. officials wanted to stress emphatically that the United Nations must exercise control over the strategy MacArthur applied in Korea.¹³⁹

On March 7th, MacArthur himself validated British concerns. In a press conference held at Suwon, he decried the "savage slaughter" of U.N. troops and predicted that, under current restrictions, "our further advance would militarily benefit the enemy more than it would ourselves."¹⁴⁰ Remaining silent on MacArthur's statement, Washington officials stayed busy drafting armistice proposals. On March 20th, the J.C.S. informed MacArthur that the "United Nations [is] now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea" and asked him to recommend measures "to provide security for U.N. forces" while policy makers pursued cease-fire negotiations.¹⁴¹ Responding the following day, MacArthur withheld comment on the upcoming peace talks and merely asked that "no further military restrictions" be imposed upon his command.¹⁴²

MacArthur's restraint proved fleeting. On March 24, he stunned the world by issuing an ultimatum which not only challenged the Chinese Communists, but also shattered Allied hopes for an early armistice. Because U.N. troops "have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces," MacArthur expounded, the Chinese, who lacked the

industrial capacity to wage modern war, should surrender before they collapsed in defeat. By demanding a total victory in Korea, MacArthur crippled the U.N. peace overture.¹⁴³ The enemy assumed MacArthur spoke for his superiors when, in reality, MacArthur spoke only for himself.

The general's proclamation infuriated several British diplomats. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British U.N. ambassador, inveighed,

If MacArthur thinks that . . . the General Assembly is going to authorize him to extend the war beyond the confines of Korea, he must be only conscious of public opinion in the Philippines, some of the banana states, and the lunatic fringe of the Republican Party.¹⁴⁴

Herbert Morrison, who replaced the ailing Bevin as foreign secretary on March 7th, reiterated "the strength of our views against allowing U.N. forces to advance north of the 38th Parallel" and ordered Franks to tell the Americans that "a clear directive . . . should be given to General MacArthur."¹⁴⁵

That evening, Franks met with Rusk and repeated Morrison's comments. Rusk replied that the MacArthur statement was "unauthorized" and that "action had been taken at the highest level to ensure that this did not happen again."¹⁴⁶ "The government . . . faced a bitter dilemma," Rusk continued, "On the one hand, MacArthur had made a statement explicitly at variance with [U.S.] policy. On the other hand, [if Truman was] explicitly to disown him . . .

foreign policy might be jeopardized including troops for Europe."¹⁴⁷ With the congressional vote on the commitment of U.S. troops to N.A.T.O. only days away, Franks told the Foreign Office that he felt the United States had acted wisely.¹⁴⁸ Five days later, the American embassy in London noted that the MacArthur statement "caused less furor here than expected."¹⁴⁹

Though Jebb warned that the "mad satrap" in Tokyo threatened to embroil the U.N. troops in "full-scale war," on March 30th, Morrison proposed a new attempt to negotiate with the Chinese. Morrison asked the State Department to consider "a new approach to a negotiated settlement in Korea." Such measures were necessary, Morrison asserted, because "it is now unlikely that any further statement by the Unified Command alone would be taken seriously by the Chinese."¹⁵⁰

Though right-wing supporters of MacArthur pressed their colleagues to implement an "Asia-first" strategy and to make Europe responsible for its own defense, the Senate reached an agreement on the commitment of U.S. troops to N.A.T.O. The accord, known as the McClellan Amendment, approved the deployment of four additional American divisions to Europe, but demanded that any augmentation of the force receive congressional approval. Formally approved by the Senate on April 5th, the McClellan compromise gave the Truman administration leeway to push for stronger measures in

Korea.¹⁵¹

Encouraged by the optimistic events at the Korean front, the Joint Chiefs undertook a major review of American policy in the Far East and recommended: (1) that the US forces in Korea should hold the 38th Parallel until a political settlement of the war emerged; (2) that "preparations should be made" for possible air and naval attacks on the Chinese mainland; (3) that, "as a matter of urgency" U.S. officials should "ascertain the policies and objectives of the allies toward Korea and the Far East and their willingness to support possible action against mainland China." After reading these suggestions, Secretary of Defense Marshall forwarded them to the president and the N.S.C.¹⁵²

The J.C.S. also recommended that MacArthur be authorized to attack air bases in Manchuria and on the Shantung peninsula in the event of a "major attack" on U.N. forces originating from outside of Korean territory.¹⁵³ Having previously avoided this sanction, which approved direct attacks on Chinese territory, the J.C.S. suggestion represented a significant expansion of American strategy in Korea. On April 6th, Bradley and Admiral Forrest Sherman, the chief of naval operations, discussed the idea with Franks, and Lord Arthur Tedder of the British chiefs of staff. Though the Americans assured the British that the directive would not be dispatched to MacArthur, the U.K.

diplomats opposed giving the U.N. Commander such authorization. Parliament, Franks declared, "would not take lightly having a decision of this type taken by the U.S. J.C.S. on behalf of all participants."¹⁵⁴

Upon receipt of Franks' cable, the Foreign Office asserted that the American J.C.S. exaggerated the enemy threat. Vehemently opposed to augmenting MacArthur's power, British diplomats expounded, "It is essential that firm control over MacArthur should be exercised from Washington."

Morrison resoundingly concluded:

At the moment we are inclined to think that the major danger is MacArthur's rashness and political irresponsibility rather than massive air attacks from outside Korea, though there is of course a connexion between the two inasmuch as the first may provoke the second.¹⁵⁵

Convinced that MacArthur would construe a negotiated cease-fire as defeat, Morrison feared the general would attack China in a desperate attempt to preserve his military reputation. This anxiety prompted Morrison to suspect that MacArthur had inspired a State Department request that Britain postpone its planned Fourteen Nations peace initiative until after U.N. troops halted the recently resumed Chinese offensive.¹⁵⁶

On April 5th, the British were also appalled when the minority leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin (R-Mass), read to the House MacArthur's recommendation of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. In a ringing indictment of Truman's foreign policy,

the general proclaimed:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here . . . we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose this war to Communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable . . . We must win. There is no substitute for victory.¹⁵⁷

But, in the opinion of some British officials, there was a substitute for MacArthur. On April 6th, Will Nally (Lab.-Bilston) introduced to the House of Commons a motion deploring "the continued refusal of General MacArthur to refrain from reckless and irresponsible participation in political controversies" and proclaiming that Parliament "no longer has confidence in General MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces engaged in Korea." Though the M.P.s tabled the motion, it received extensive media attention.¹⁵⁸

On April 6, Bradley brought Truman the latest reports of enemy strength and the J.C.S. proposal for air strikes in Manchuria. Bradley suggested that "the time had come to deploy several atomic bombs to Guam and Okinawa." Descriptions of hostile Soviet maneuvers in Vladivostok and Sakhalin frightened Truman. After conferring with the C.I.A. and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Gordon Dean, the president authorized the dispatch of nine atomic bombs to the Pacific. He also approved the retaliatory measures against China in the event of an attack from outside Korea.¹⁵⁹

Though unaware of Truman's movement of the nuclear weapons, U.K. officials remained critical of MacArthur and concerned that the general would attack Chinese territory.¹⁶⁰ Fearing the general would "create the conditions which would render the authorization applicable," British diplomats continued to oppose the directive authorizing air strikes in Manchuria. They concluded, "Our principle difficulty is General MacArthur He seems to want a war with China. We do not."¹⁶¹

In view of MacArthur's "imminent proximity to the atomic trigger," American policy makers shared many of the same apprehensions that the British so keenly felt. While U.K. leaders shuddered at the thought of MacArthur attacking the Chinese with conventional weapons, American officials were terrified at the prospect of MacArthur mounting an unauthorized nuclear strike.¹⁶² During the period between April 6 and 9, Truman met repeatedly with his advisors. The president clearly delineated between his condemnation of MacArthur's public statements and his support for the strategy now recommended by both MacArthur and the Pentagon.¹⁶³ Though they found MacArthur's forays into political statesmanship highly distasteful, the Joint Chiefs initially hesitated to support his recall. However, now that the possibility of nuclear engagement existed, absolute trust in the theater commander was imperative. MacArthur's controversial interpretation of some of the orders of his

superiors and his penchant for public criticism of Pentagon strategy had destroyed that bond of confidence. On these grounds, the J.C.S. decided, on April 8th, to recommend MacArthur's dismissal.¹⁶⁴

On April 11th, MacArthur learned of his recall from a radio broadcast.¹⁶⁵ News of his dismissal prompted a tremendous uproar in the United States. Right-wing Republicans quickly exploited the clamor and began to press for the impeachment of the president and the secretary of state.¹⁶⁶ On the night following MacArthur's removal, Truman made a speech in which he defended U.S. policy in Korea and asserted that he would not embroil the United States "in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia." But, in a veiled threat, Truman also warned the Communists that they must "choose and bear responsibility" for any ramifications resulting from air strikes on the U.N. forces. The president did not mention the transfer of the atomic bombs.¹⁶⁷

Though the British expressed tremendous relief at MacArthur's ouster, they avoided carefully any overt criticism of American foreign policy. The press stressed MacArthur's military achievements rather than his controversial pronouncements and called for the improvement of Anglo-American relations.¹⁶⁸ Morrison warned the cabinet to avoid "crowing" over the dismissal because "there will be an American as well as a British audience."¹⁶⁹

Speaking before the House of Commons on April 11th, Morrison assured the M.P.s that "our aims [in Korea] are unchanged." He urged his colleagues to continue their support of a negotiated settlement with China. Hoping to quash any criticism of MacArthur, Morrison proclaimed, "In view of the change of command, this episode is now closed."¹⁷⁰

Privately, British diplomats feared that MacArthur's dismissal signified a more aggressive American policy in the Far East. Attempting to assuage U.K. anxiety, Rusk assured Franks, "There will be no lessening of U.S. desire to secure a Japanese Peace Treaty and no change in U.S. views as to the relative importance of Europe and the Far East."¹⁷¹ Nonetheless, facing continued pressure from the J.C.S. on the plan for retaliatory measures in Manchuria, the Foreign Office asserted, "[The] removal of General MacArthur does not radically alter our attitude to [the] American proposal."¹⁷²

Cognizant of the rancor surrounding the recall of MacArthur, Franks declared that "for the time being, . . . it [is] politically impossible for the Administration to do anything which could be construed or misrepresented as appeasement."¹⁷³ On April 15, Rusk warned Franks that heavy U.N. losses resulting from a Chinese air attack would vindicate MacArthur and that continued British opposition to retaliation in Manchuria could engender enough animosity "to break the alliance of our two countries."¹⁷⁴ Though

MacArthur's dismissal had not eradicated their fears of an expanded war in Asia, the British respected the paramount importance of maintaining the Anglo-American partnership and began acquiescing to changes in American policy in the Far East.

On April 19, MacArthur gave a stirring speech to a joint session of Congress in which he eloquently attacked the administration's "Europe first" strategy. He reiterated his criticisms of the restrictions against "hot pursuit" into Manchuria and repeated his proposals for imposing a naval blockade of the Chinese coast and utilizing Nationalist troops as reinforcements. He dramatically affirmed, "Old soldiers never die; they just fade away."¹⁷⁵

As the clamor regarding MacArthur quieted, the Truman administration dismissed several allegations that British pressure prompted Truman to fire MacArthur. Indeed, removing the "greatest irritant" in Anglo-American differences in the Far East granted U.S. policy makers an opportunity. Cognizant that the British could no longer blame MacArthur for divergences in Anglo-American Far Eastern policy, U.S. officials decided to "'cash in' on [the] situation arising because of [the] removal of MacArthur from [the] scene."¹⁷⁶

The rewards reaped from firing MacArthur were great. On April 27, General Ridgway, MacArthur's successor,

submitted a request for authority to attack China in the event of a major air assault on U.N. forces in Korea. On the following day, the U.S. gave Ridgway such authorization.¹⁷⁷ On May 2, after Acheson warned Attlee and Morrison about "a strong wave of anti-British feeling in the United States," the British assented to this prospective change in strategy.¹⁷⁸

In addition to planning for bolder strategy in Korea, the United States revised its Asian policies. The Truman administration adopted measures strikingly similar to some of those advocated by MacArthur. Prior to the general's dismissal, the J.C.S. approved MacArthur's request "to make a show of force" along the Chinese coast.¹⁷⁹ On April 11 and 13, the Seventh Fleet carried out these operations, greatly upsetting the Communist Chinese in the process.¹⁸⁰ On May 1, the U.S. Military Advisory and Assistance Group, headed by General William C. Chase, arrived in Formosa to assist with the training of Nationalist troops.¹⁸¹ On May 17, the administration adopted NSC 48/5, a review of U.S. policy in the Far East which included recommendations for strengthening the defensive capabilities of Formosa; intensifying efforts to block Communist Chinese seating in the U.N.; drafting plans for a blockade of the Chinese coast, implementing military actions against the Chinese outside of Korean territory, and approving the participation of Nationalist troops in Korean combat.¹⁸² These

developments did not escape the attention of Ambassador Franks. U.S. policy in the Far East, he reported, was "drifting . . . in the direction espoused by General MacArthur."¹⁸³

Publicly, however, the Truman administration defended its decision to fire MacArthur. At the Senate hearings held in May and June 1951, administration spokesmen criticized MacArthur's plan for extending hostilities in Korea. Claiming that such actions would involve the United States in a general war with the Soviet Union and would consequently destroy the N.A.T.O. alliance, these witnesses discredited MacArthur's strategy and supported limited combat in Korea.¹⁸⁴

Meanwhile, the war in Korea expanded. On May 18, the British supported a resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly enacting economic sanctions prohibiting the shipment of strategic materiel to North Korea and China. Two weeks later, making a significant concession to U.S. demands, the British agreed to a moratorium on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.¹⁸⁵ In later stages of the war, despite U.K. reservations or opposition, U.N. forces bombed the Yalu River power installations, employed Nationalist troops in covert operations on the Chinese mainland, and engaged in air reconnaissance over Chinese territory.

Because the United States repeatedly downplayed British dissatisfaction with MacArthur, one concludes that neither the persistence nor vehemence of British complaints regarding the general induced his dismissal. When the British did not approve of American strategic plans, U.S. officials often implemented them anyway, as in the case of the advance to the Yalu or the authorization of air strikes against Manchuria. But while the British assumed that such actions resulted from their inability to affect the tactics employed by MacArthur, the United States soon demonstrated the folly of such conclusions. The removal of the volatile MacArthur became the pretext for the implementation of bolder military strategy in the Far East.¹⁸⁶

The MacArthur affair, consequently, prompts one to re-examine the importance of other nations in American decision-making. One must not assume that a seeming congruence between desires of an ally and subsequent American actions resulted from identical motives. Though the evidence that Britain wanted MacArthur dismissed is abundant, British pressure was of much less importance than the internal strategic and political calculations bearing on Washington's decisionmaking. The Truman administration did something the British wanted but for its own reasons and to suit its own perceived interests.

This conclusion has both substantive and methodological implications for cold war history. Post-revisionist

followers of John Gaddis and Geir Lundestad who wish to stress the importance of foreign influence will have to do more than search through foreign archives and show that a foreign government wanted the United States to act in a certain way.¹⁸⁷ They will have to demonstrate that foreign governments prompted the United States to do something it would not have done for its own purposes. Despite all the rhetoric about the utility of international archives and despite the important new information we shall discover about the motives and goals of foreign governments, it is clear that American policy was made in Washington--not in London.

1. The author acknowledges the generous financial assistance of the Harry S Truman Library Institute and the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation.

2. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. 3, *Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1985), 607.

3. *New York Times*, 12 April 1951.

4. See, for example, Trumbull Higgins, *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959).

5. Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur the Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," *International Security* 13 (Winter 1988/89): 50-91; Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

6. Peter Lowe, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-1," *The English Historical Review* 105 (July 1990): 624-653.

7. Examples of post-revisionist approaches to the Korean War include: Ritchie Ovendale, *The English-Speaking Alliance* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985) 211-241; Rosemary Foot, "Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert an Expanded War, December 1950-January 1951," *Diplomatic History* 10 (Winter 1986): 43-57; Peter N. Farrar, "Britain's Proposal for a Buffer Zone South of the Yalu in November 1950: Was It a Neglected Opportunity to End the Fighting in Korea?" *Journal of Contemporary History* 18 (1983): 327-351.

8. Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952" *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (September 1986): 263-277; D. Cameron Watt, "Britain, the United States and the Opening of the Cold War," in *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951* Ritchie Ovendale, ed. (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984); Fraser J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). For a detailed examination of post-revisionist historiography, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Summer 1983): 171-191.

9. For an excellent discussion of the dilemmas facing the Labour government, see Kenneth Morgan, *Labour in Power, 1945-1951* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

10. Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1984), 28-30.

11. The standard work on the Marshall Plan is now Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); for the relationship of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin with American officials, see Alan Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin*, vol. 3, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983); for a brief overview of the Truman Doctrine and NATO, see Richard A. Best, Jr., "Cooperation with Like-Minded Peoples:" *British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945-1949* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 132-136, 149-172.

12. Andrew J. Rotter, *The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 59.

13. Edwin W. Martin, *Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986); William W. Stueck, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward Korea and China, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 131-34.

14. Hogan, *Marshall Plan*, 300-303; 368-372. Geoffrey Warner, "The Anglo-American Special Relationship," *Diplomatic History* 12 (Fall 1989): 483-484.

15. Minute from Sir R. Makins to Mr. Bevin, 17 April 1950, *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, volume 2, *The London Conferences: Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Strategy, January-June 1950* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986): 57.

16. MacArthur clashed notably with Compton Pakenham of *Newsweek* and Frank Hawley of the *London Times*. For additional examples of MacArthur's turbulent relationship with the press, see John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur* (New York: Harper, 1960), 65-69; James, *MacArthur*, 3: 304-05. The enmity MacArthur often directed toward British officials is addressed in Michael Schaller, "MacArthur's Japan: The View from Washington," *Diplomatic History*, 10 (Winter 1986), 1-24; Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin*, 3: 151.

17. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

18. Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 158-180.

19. The UN Charter contained a provision stating that a veto from a permanent Security Council member automatically prohibited commencement of UN action. Because the Soviet Union was currently boycotting the UN as a result of its failure to seat Communist China, the resolution was approved by a vote of 9-0. See Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, 25 June 1950, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950*, volume 7 Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 155-56. (hereafter cited as *FRUS*, year, vol: page). The Korean invasion also provided the U.S. with the rationale for implementing NSC-68. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 89-126.

20. Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, 27 June 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 211.

21. Cabinet Conclusions, 27 June 1950, CAB 128/18, Public Records Office, Kew, England. (hereafter PRO).

22. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 476 (1950), col. 2161.

23. Sir Pierson Dixon memorandum, 28 June 1950, FO 371/84081, FK 1022/30, PRO; Foreign Office (hereafter FO) telegram to Washington, 30 June 1950, no. 2980, FO 371/81655, PRO. British officials also hoped "to use this as a lever by which to force the United States not to reduce European Recovery Plan aid to Britain." Morgan, *Labour in Power*, 423.

24. For greater detail on the movement of the Seventh Fleet, see Memorandum of Conversation on the Korean Situation by Jessup, 26 June 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 178-183.

25. Franks to Younger, 30 June 1950, FO 371/83320, PRO.

26. For British reactions to MacArthur's views on Formosa, see Gascoigne to FO, 3 June 1950, FO 371/83008, F 1015/7, PRO; Franks to Dening, 7 June 1950, FO 371/83320, FC 10345/9, PRO; Strang to Scott, 13 June 1950, FO 371/83320, FC 10345/10, PRO. Martin, *Divided Counsel*, 155-159.

27. *Times* (London), 6 July 1950. It should, however, be noted that S.O. Davies (Lab.) introduced an unsuccessful motion demanding the removal of British naval forces from Korean waters. Ibid.

28. James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, vol. 3, pt. 1, *The Korean War* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, Inc, 1979), 135. (hereafter *The Korean War*).

29. Testifying before a Senate inquiry panel in May 1951, MacArthur correctly asserted, "my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal." For a brief explanation of American control of the U.N. command, see Schnabel and Watson, *The Korean War*, 3: 131-142.

30. Lowe, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General," 628-629.

31. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 477 (1950), cols. 1542-1545.

32. Unsigned article, "The First Casualties," *The Economist*, 22 July 1950, 170. During July 1950, British officials stationed in the Soviet Union attempted to negotiate a cease-fire arrangement in which the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and Formosa and Communist Chinese admission to the United Nations were offered in exchange for the re-establishment of the 38th Parallel. For this initiative and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's negative response thereto, see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 416-419; *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 270-500; Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 198-202; Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, 3: 794-95; M.L. Dockrill, "The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War," *International Affairs* 62 (Summer 1986): 461-462.

33. FO to Franks, 25 July 1950, FO 371/84159, FK 1202/2G, PRO. Additionally, the British augmented their defense and lengthened their conscription obligations from eighteen months to two years. See Henry Pelling, *The Labour Governments, 1945-1951* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 244-245.

34. Martin, *Divided Counsel*.

35. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 412-413; Harry S Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), 343.

36. JCS to MacArthur, 30 July 1950, RG-9, MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives, Norfolk, VA (hereafter MMBA). MacArthur possessed more military experience than any one of the Joint Chiefs. He had served as Superintendent of West Point while

Commander of the Far Eastern Air Force George Stratemeyer was still a cadet. A five-star general, MacArthur outranked even JCS chairman Omar N. Bradley, who did not receive his fifth star until the fall of 1950. See Lawrence Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 40. For additional examples of the veneration with which the JCS treated MacArthur, see J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1969), 125-130, 141-142; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 587, 604-605.

37. *New York Times*, 1 August 1950.

38. *Ibid*, 2 August 1950.

39. Nor did MacArthur include the U.S. Political Advisor in Tokyo, William Sebald, in his entourage. See William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1965), 123; Sebald to Acheson, 3 August 1950, *FRUS*, vol. 6, *East Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 415.

40. JCS to MacArthur, 3 August 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

41. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2: 349.

42. Extracts from Harriman Memorandum of Conversation with MacArthur, 8 August 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 6: 427-30.

43. *Manchester Guardian*, 7 August 1950.

44. Unsigned article, "The Menace of General MacArthur," *The New Statesman and Nation* 40 (12 August 1950): 161.

45. *Times* (London), 10 August 1950.

46. MacArthur Press Release, 10 August 1950, RG-6, MMBA. The State Department was also fully aware of the attacks aimed at MacArthur by the British press. See Acheson to SCAP, 11 August 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

47. *Times* (London), 15 August 1950.

48. *Ibid*.

49. Franks to FO, 10 August 1950, FO 371/83320, FC 10345/19. PRO; Franks to FO, 14 August 1950, FO 371/83320, FC 10345/21, PRO.

50. *Times* (London), 16 August 1950.

51. Douglas to Acheson, 2 August 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 518.
52. Great Britain had 25,000 troops stationed in Hong Kong and an additional 10,000 fighting the Communist insurgents in Malaya. See Bevin to Franks, 14 August 1950, FO 371/84159, FK 1202/6, PRO; Douglas to Acheson, 14 August 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 578-79.
53. Tedder to Chiefs of Staff, 16 August 1950, FO 371/84159, FK 1202/9, PRO.
54. Chiefs of Staff to GHQ, Far East, 17 August 1950, FO 371/84159, FK 1202/10, PRO.
55. FO Minute, 19 August 1950, FO 371/84160, FK 1202/18, PRO.
56. MacArthur to Clyde A. Lewis, 20 August 1950, RG-6, Formosa File, MMBA.
57. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 23 (4 September 1950), 396.
58. Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, *Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part II, 3475. (hereafter MSFE).
59. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2: 355. On 25 August, Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews had also upset the Truman Administration by advocating publicly a preventative war against the Soviet Union.
60. Memo, 26 August 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 65, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. (hereafter HSTL). In May 1951, Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins told the Senate inquiry panel that "There was. . . no clear-cut difference between the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those expressed by General MacArthur." MSFE, 1217.
61. See *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1950; *Times* (London), 29 August 1950. On 31 August, Truman reiterated that the Seventh Fleet would be stationed off the coast of Formosa only for the duration of the war. See *Manchester Guardian*, 1 September 1950.
62. *Times* (London), 30 August 1950. For additional examples of attacks on MacArthur in the British media, see Unsigned article, "The Issue in Formosa," *The New Statesman and Nation* 40 (2 September 1950), 240; D.W. Brogan, "The MacArthur Crisis," *The Spectator* 185 (8 September 1950), 267; Unsigned article, "MacArthur in the Open," *The Economist* vol. 159 (2 September 1950), 440. Although Parliament was not in session

during the Formosan controversy, M.P.s criticized MacArthur during mid-September debates on defense. See *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th ser., vol. 478 (1950), cols. 1001-1002, 1076-1077, 1269, 1340-1342.

63. Cabinet Paper (50) 200, 30 August 1950, CAB 129/41, PRO.

64. For descriptions of how MacArthur garnered support for the Inchon operation, See Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life*, 544-557; Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 33-43. On September 11, President Truman approved NSC 81/1, a bold position paper on Korea. The document recommended advancing ground troops into North Korea provided that no threat of Soviet or Communist Chinese intervention existed. Significantly, NSC 81/1, stipulated that no UN forces "be permitted to extend across the Manchurian or U.S.S.R. borders." See Report of the National Security Council to the President, 9 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 716.

65. Cabinet Paper (50) 193, 31 August 1950, CAB 129/41, PRO.

66. Cabinet Paper (50) 193, 31 August 1950 CAB 129/41, PRO; United Kingdom Draft Resolution on Korea, 25 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 773-774; *Times* (London), 28 September 1950.

67. JCS to MacArthur, 27 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 781-82. Ironically, these orders reached MacArthur as Herbert Graves, counselor at the British embassy in Washington, showed State Department official Livingston Merchant three telegrams describing the likelihood of Communist Chinese intervention in Korea. Stueck, "The Limits of Influence," 81-82.

68. MacArthur to JCS, 29 September 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

69. Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 567-68; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 43-44.

70. Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 568.

71. Dockrill, "The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War," 462.

72. Marshall to MacArthur, 29 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 826.

73. MacArthur to Marshall, 30 September 1950, RG-6, MMBA.

74. Gascoigne to FO, 28 September 1950, FO 371/83008, F 1015/13, PRO.

75. Memorandum by Rusk, 4 October 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 859-862.

76. Makins Minute, 4 October 1950, FO 371/84110, FK 1023/31G, PRO.

77. Bevin, Cabinet Paper (50) 221, 6 October 1950, CAB 129/42, PRO. For the views of the British Chiefs of Staff, see Korea memo, 4 October 1950, FO 371/84110, FK 1023/34, PRO.

78. On 3 October, Chou warned K.M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, that the Communist Chinese would intervene in Korea if non-ROK forces crossed the 38th Parallel. However, deeming Panikkar a "volatile" and "unreliable" reporter, American and British officials discounted this threat. Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation*, 229-230. On October 7th, the United Nations General Assembly, in a 47-5 vote, adopted the British proposal for the reunification of Korea. See *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 904-906.

79. JCS to MacArthur, 9 October 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 915.

80. Memorandum by Jessup, 12 October 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 930-932.

81. For an insider's perspective on the conference, see Phillip C. Jessup, "Research Note, the Record of the Wake Island Conference - A Correction," *Journal of American History* 67 (March 1981): 866-870.

82. Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950. *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 948-60.

83. *Manchester Guardian*, 13 October 1950; *Times* (London) 20 October 1950; Franks to Bevin, 31 October 1950, FO 800, PRO.

84. Franks to Bevin, 20 October 1950, FO 800/517, PRO; 31 October 1950, Ibid.

85. JCS to MacArthur, 24 October 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

86. MacArthur to JCS, 25 October 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

87. Stueck, "Limits of Influence," 89-90.

88. For example, on 28 October, the intelligence section of the Far Eastern Command (FECOM) claimed that almost 300,000 Chinese troops "could be deployed in the Korean War . . . [and] the bulk of [them] . . . are now in positions along the Yalu River at numerous crossing sites." Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation*, 241.

89. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 241-242. On the same day, MacArthur issued a communique denigrating the Communist intervention in Korea as "one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record." *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1051.

90. The Sino-Soviet Treaty contained a defense clause creating a military alliance between China and the Soviet Union in the event that either nation was attacked by Japan or by a Japanese ally. The United Nations was investigating reports of Chinese troops south of the Yalu River and atrocities while also attempting to plan for the establishment of a unified government in Korea. See Rusk Memo, 28 October 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1004-1006; Acheson to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 6 November 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1050-1053.

91. JCS to MacArthur, 6 November 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7:1057.

92. MacArthur to JCS, 7 November 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

93. JCS to MacArthur, 7 November 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

94. *Times* (London), 9 November 1950.

95. For a detailed analysis of this buffer zone proposal, see Peter N. Farrar, "Britain's Proposal for a Buffer Zone South of the Yalu in November 1950: Was it a Neglected Opportunity to End the Fighting in Korea?" *Journal of Contemporary History* 18 (1983): 327-351.

96. JCS to MacArthur, 9 November 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

97. MacArthur to JCS, 9 November 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

98. "MacArthur Rides Again," *The New Statesman and Nation* 40 (11 November 1950): 412.

99. Cabinet Minute, 73 (50), 13 November 1950, CAB 128/18, PRO; FO to Franks, 13 November 1950, FO 371/84113, PRO. Implementation of this proposal would have required the retreat of U.N. forces from their current positions. See Farrar, "A Buffer Zone South of the Yalu," 337.

100. *Ibid.*

101. *Times* (London), 17 November 1950.

102. Bevin to Franks, 23 November 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1217-1218.

103. Franks to FO, 24 November 1950, FO 800/462, PRO. The JCS did recommend to MacArthur that he stop his advance on the hills adjacent to the Yalu; however, the U.N. commander flatly refused this suggestion. Collins to MacArthur, 24 November 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1222-24; MacArthur to JCS, 25 November 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1231-33.

104. MacArthur to JCS, 29 November 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

105. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 280-83; JCS to MacArthur, 30 November 1950, RG-9, MMBA; Initially, MacArthur shared the administration's low appraisal of the Nationalist troops and recommended against their deployment in Korea. See Schnabel and Watson, *The Korean War*, 507.

106. Cabinet Minute 78 (50), 29 November 1950, CAB 128/18, PRO.

107. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 29 November 1950, 5th ser., vol. 481 (1950), cols. 1164, 1256-1260; *Times* (London), 30 November 1950.

108. Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1951* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), 725-728. For analysis of atomic strategy, see Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War"; Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset' American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," *International Security* 13 (Winter 1988/89): 5-49.

109. Foot, "Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis," 45.

110. Cabinet Conclusions 80 (50), 1 December 1950, CAB 128/18, PRO. On December 6th, MacArthur's repeated criticisms of the limitations placed on his command (e.g. the "privileged sanctuary" of Manchuria) prompted Truman to forbid military and diplomatic officials stationed abroad from commenting publicly "on military or foreign policy" without prior approval from Washington. See *New York Times*, 1 December 1950; *Times*, (London), 4 December 1950; *MSFE*, 3532-34.

111. Memorandum of Conversations, 4 December 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. 3, *Western Europe*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 1720-1723. For an examination of British diplomacy from December 1950 to January 1951, See Rosemary Foot, "Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis."

112. Meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, 7 December 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1462.

113. Memorandum, 7 December 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 3: 1758-1761; Record of Conversations, 7 December 1950, FO 800/462, PRO.

114. Ibid.

115. Foot, "Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis," 50.

116. The delegations also accepted the augmentation of the military capabilities in both nations, the rapid appointment of a NATO Commander, and cooperation on the allocation of raw materials. See Final Communiqué, 8 December 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 3: 1783-1787.

117. Memorandum of Conversation, 27 December 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1600-04.

118. JCS to MacArthur, 29 December 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1625-26.

119. MacArthur to JCS, 30 December 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 1630-33. Four days later, MacArthur completely contradicted himself. In a private meeting with Gascoigne, he advocated the simultaneous withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and imposition of economic sanctions against China. Comparing this statement to others issued in the same period prompts one to conclude that MacArthur intentionally misled Gascoigne. Gascoigne to FO, 3 January 1951, FO 371/92756, FK 1022/25, PRO.

120. FO to Franks, 31 December 1950, FO 371/92756, PRO.

121. Acheson cable, 5 January 1951, *FRUS*, vol. 7, *Korea and China*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), pt. 1, 1951, 27-28.

122. U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 82d Congress, 1st session, 94.

123. Spanier, *Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, 155-160.

124. These included the use of Nationalist troops in Korea, air and naval attacks against Manchuria, and the imposition of a naval blockade against the Chinese coast. See JCS to MacArthur, 9 January 1951, RG-9, MMBA.

125. MacArthur to JCS, 10 January 1950, RG-9, MMBA.

126. *MSFE*, 737-738. The two discovered, to their pleasant surprise, that MacArthur had greatly exaggerated the danger of the situation in Korea. See J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton-

Mifflin, 1969), 255; Memorandum, 19 January 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 102-105.

127. Lowe, "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General," 639-641.

128. Ibid, 641-643.

129. Dockrill, "The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations, and the Korean War," 467-471. On 29 January, MacArthur's characterization of the Korean War as a "crusade" to "free Asia" drew criticism from British officials. Memorandum, 30 January 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 146.

130. Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 1 February 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 150-151.

131. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 331-339.

132. Chiefs of Staff to Lord Tedder, 6 February 1951, FO 371/92757, FK 1022/32, PRO.

133. Cabinet Paper (51) 46, 10 February 1951, CAB 129/44, PRO.

134. Memo on the Korean Situation, 12 February 1951, Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Box 10, Topical File on the Restudy of the Question of the 38th Parallel, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. (hereafter HSTL).

135. *Times* (London), 13 February 1951.

136. *MSFE*, 3539; *Times* (London), 16 February 1951.

137. *Times* (London), 21 February 1951. MacArthur's statement may have been prompted by his frustration with Washington officials. On February 15, MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs to approve an FEAF attack on Rashin. Though the UN Commander contended that Rashin served as a vital supply link between the Soviet Union and Korea, the Pentagon rejected his request. MacArthur's glowing reputation no longer endured among Pentagon leaders. See MacArthur to JCS, 15 February 1951; JCS to MacArthur, 21 February 1951, RG-9, MMBA. On March 1st, the Pentagon upset the general again by denying his request to mount air strikes on hydroelectric facilities along the Yalu River. See MacArthur to JCS, 26 February 1951, RG-9, MMBA; JCS to MacArthur, 1 March 1951, RG-9, MMBA.

138. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 484 (1951), cols. 1743-1745.

139. Cabinet Minute 17 (50), 5 March 1951, CAB 128/19, PRO.

140. *MSFE*, 3540-41. On March 15th, in an interview with Hugh Baillie, the President of United Press, MacArthur made similar assertions. Again, Washington failed to reply. See *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 234-235.

141. JCS to MacArthur, 20 March 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 251.

142. MacArthur to JCS, 21 March 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 255. On the same day, British Minister of State Kenneth Younger, after consulting with U.S. officials, told the House of Commons that the 38th Parallel would not be recrossed prior to full consultation by the governments involved. See *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 485 (1951), cols. 2677, 2679. Additionally, the British Cabinet reiterated its view that "it would be most inexpedient for the United Nations forces to advance north of the 38th Parallel." See Cabinet Minute 22 (51), 22 March 1951, CAB 128/19, PRO.

143. *MSFE*, 3541-42. Foot, *Wrong War*, 133-134.

144. Jebb to FO, 24 March 1951, FO 371/82813, FK 1096/7, PRO.

145. FO to Franks, 24 March 1951, FO 371/92813, FK 1096/8G, PRO.

146. Though the JCS considered relieving MacArthur, they feared the "startling" consequences of doing so. Therefore, they instead reprimanded MacArthur by drawing his attention to the Presidential directive of 6 December which restricted public statements made by U.S. officials. See JCS to MacArthur, 25 March 1951, RG-6, MMBA; Memo, 24 March 1951, Acheson Papers, Box 66, HSTL; Franks to FO, 24 March 1951, FO 371/92813, FK 1096/9, PRO.

147. Franks to FO, 24 March 1951, FO 371/92813, FK 1096/9, PRO.

148. Ibid. Interestingly, the *London Times*, expressed "admiring approval" for MacArthur's "bold gesture in inviting the enemy commander to conclude a truce in the field" See *Times* (London), 26 March 1951. The *Washington Post* mirrored this opinion. See *Washington Post*, 27 March 1951.

149. Gifford to Acheson, 29 March 1951, Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Box 10, HSTL.

150. Morrison's proposal, which became the Fourteen Nations peace initiative, called for all of the nations with forces in Korea to declare jointly their desire for an independent unified Korea and for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. After issuing this statement, the signatories were to negotiate a cease-fire with the Soviets and the Communist

Chinese. See Morrison telegram, *FRUS*, 1951, 7:280-282; Memorandum by Johnson, 30 March 1951, *Ibid*, 7: 278-280.

151. *Editorial Note*, *FRUS*, 1950, 7: 22-25; *New York Times*, 6 April 1951.

152. Schnabel and Watson, *The Korean War*, 470-471.

153. Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, 485.

154. Memorandum by Nitze, 6 April 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 307-309.

155. Franks to Franks, 6 April 1951, FO 371/92757, PRO; FO to Franks, 6 April 1951, FO 371/92757, PRO.

156. *Ibid*.

157. Martin to MacArthur, 8 March 1951; MacArthur to Martin, 20 March 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 298-299. For negative British response to the Martin letter, see FO Minute, Shattock to Scott, 5 April 1951, FO 371/92813, FK 1096/17, PRO. On the same day of Martin's floor speech, the London *Daily Telegraph* published a conversation between the general and the newspaper's military correspondent in which the former allegedly claimed that the "United Nations forces were circumscribed by a web of artificial conditions." The reporter concluded MacArthur's inability to identify a "definite objective" in the Korean War had created a "situation [which] would be ludicrous if men's lives were not involved." *Daily Telegraph* (London), 5 April 1951, quoted in Acheson, p. 520.

158. *Manchester Guardian*, 7 April 1951; *Times* (London), 7 April 1951; Scott to FO, 9 April 1951, FO 371/92814, FK 1096/21, PRO. Simultaneously, the Foreign Office attempted to quell reports of Anglo-American "split" on Korea. See FO 371/92813, FK 1096/18, PRO; Franks to FO, 7 April 1951, FO 371/92813, FK 1096/19, PRO.

159. Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 235-236; Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," 72-73. By April 10th, Truman had informed eighteen legislators, including several who opposed his policies in the Far East, that nuclear weapons were being dispatched to the Pacific. See Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy," 74.

160. This anxiety prompted Chester Ede, the Home Secretary, to complain publicly, "We cannot control MacArthur because we do not pay him." *Manchester Guardian*, 9 April 1951.

161. FO to Franks, 9 April 1951, FO 371/92757, PRO; For the views of the Defence Committee, see C.O.S. (51), FO 371/92757, PRO.

162. Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 236.

163. Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," 74.

164. The JCS also continued to withhold the message authorizing air strikes on Manchuria and relaying the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Pacific. Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, 631-635. Kenneth Younger, British Minister of State appeared to share the JCS sentiments. The April 8 edition of the *London Observer* quoted him deriding "such irresponsible statements as seem to come out at frequent intervals from highly placed quarters, without the authority of the United Nations, or indeed any member government." See *MSFE*, 3193.

165. Though the administration planned for Secretary of the Army Frank Pace to fire MacArthur in person, reports that a Chicago newspaper had discovered the impending dismissal prompted the announcement of MacArthur's ouster in a late night press conference. James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 3: 599-600.

166. *New York Times*, 15 April 1951.

167. *Truman Public Papers*, 1951, 223-227, 235.

168. *Times* (London), 12 April 1951, *Manchester Guardian*, 12 April 1951; Unsigned article, "After MacArthur," *The Economist* vol. 160 (14 April 1951): 843-844.

169. However, the Minister of Defence Emmanuel Shinwell, notorious for making untactful comments to the press, publicly announced: "Commanders will have to understand they are subordinate to administration. Fortunately, we have no trouble of that kind in this country, though occasionally our admirals and generals let themselves go." Morrison expressed extreme irritation at Shinwell's carelessness. See Gifford to Acheson, 11 April 1951, Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Box 10, HSTL.

170. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 486 (1951), cols. 1025-1028.

171. Franks to FO, 11 April 1951, FO 371/92814, FK 1096/26, PRO; Memorandum, 11 April 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7:330-333.

172. FO to Franks, 11 April 1951, FO 371/92757, PRO; After the MacArthur dismissal, British officials learned that the President had already approved the JCS directive. "But," Franks asserted, "the whole matter is not finalised pending the outcome of our discussions." See Franks to FO, 13 April 1951, FO 371/92757, FK 1022/39, PRO.

173. Franks to FO, 14 April 1951, FO 371/90903, AU 1013/17, PRO.

174. Franks to FO, 15 April 1951, FO 371/92757, FK 1022/41, PRO.

175. MSFE, 3553.

176. Acheson cable, 17 April 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 352-353.

177. Ridgway to JCS, 27 April 1951, *FRUS*, 7: 385-386; JCS to Ridgway, 28 April 1951, *Ibid*: 386-387.

178. Gifford to Morrison, 1 May 1951; FO to Franks, 4 May 1951, FO 371/92063, PRO.

179. MacArthur to JCS, 25 March 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 1608-09; MacArthur to JCS, 4 April 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, 7: 1616-1619.

180. These operations involved the augmentation of U.S. naval forces patrolling the Formosan Straits in order to demonstrate the strength of the American commitment to the Nationalist Chinese. See *New York Times*, 13-14 April, 1951; Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War*, 142-143.

181. Foot, *The Wrong War*, 139-140.

182. NSC 48/5, 17 May 1951, *FRUS*, 7: 35-39.

183. Franks to FO, Weekly Political Summary, May 19-25, FO 371/90904, PRO.

184. Foot, *The Wrong War*, 136.

185. Memorandum of Conversation by Hickerson, 1 June 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, volume 2, *The United Nations, the Western Hemisphere* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979): 251-253.

186. On September 24, 1951, George Clutton, head of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Foreign Office, claimed, "MacArthur's disappearance removed from supreme authority not merely a man of dictatorial and very forceful character, but someone whose continued presence in Tokyo was by reason of his personality a source of tension and nervousness that affected all our

lives." See Clutton to Scott, 24 September 1951, FO 371/92656, FJ 1203/4, PRO.

187. For criticism of American provincialism, see John Lewis Gaddis, "New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Summer 1990): 405-423; Geir Lundestad, "Moralism, Presentism, Exceptionalism, Provincialism, and Other Extravagances in American Writings on the Early Cold War Years," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Fall 1989): 527-545.

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