

One is Not Born a Greek: Josephus and Cultural Identity in the *Against Apion*

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Introduction

The paradoxes of the life of Flavius Josephus present Classicists with remarkable opportunities for exploring such critically important themes as multiculturalism in antiquity, Roman violence and the trauma it engenders from the perspective of one of its victims, and the tensions of conflicting loyalties for provincial natives subject to Roman imperialism. The astounding stroke of fortune that is the near-complete survival of Josephus' known Greek corpus, which preserves a remarkable volume of deeply personal reflections from a man who was located at the nexus of the events that gave rise to the Flavians, and brought low Jerusalem, should not be lost on us. Yet Josephus' cultural identity was more complex even than the familiar image of Jewish priest and enemy combatant turned Roman citizen under imperial patronage. Such complexity and its attendant tensions are on display in the first sentence that has survived of Josephus' works, in which we are presented with a picture of conflict: the external conflict of wars and *this* war, the literary conflict of competing accounts of this war, and the internal conflict of the author's personal history. Thus the *Jewish War* (hereafter *BJ* for *Bellum Judaicum*) 1.1–3:

Ἐπειδὴ τὸν Ἰουδαίων πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον συστάντα μέγιστον οὐ μόνον τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ παρειλήφαμεν ἢ πόλεων πρὸς πόλεις ἢ ἔθνων ἔθνεσι συρραγόντων, οἱ μὲν οὐ παρατυχόντες τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ' ἀκοῇ συλλέγοντες εἰκαῖα καὶ ἀσύμφωνα διηγήματα σοφιστικῶς ἀναγράφουσιν, (2) οἱ παραγενόμενοι δὲ ἢ κολακεία τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἢ μίσει τῷ πρὸς Ἰουδαίους καταψεύδονται τῶν πραγμάτων, περιέχει δὲ αὐτοῖς ὅπου μὲν κατηγορίαν ὅπου δὲ ἐγκώμιον τὰ συγγράμματα, τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς τῆς ἱστορίας οὐδαμοῦ, (3) προυθέμην ἐγὼ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν Ἑλλάδι γλώσσει μεταβαλὼν ἃ τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις τῇ πατρίῳ συντάξας ἀνέπεμψα πρότερον ἀφηγήσασθαι

Ἰώσηπος Ματθίου παῖς ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ἱερεύς, αὐτός τε Ῥωμαίους
πολεμήσας τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον παρατυχὼν ἐξ ἀνάγκης·

Since the war that the Jews joined against the Romans (the greatest not only of wars among us, but virtually the greatest even of those of which we have received report, either of cities clashing against cities or peoples against peoples), is being recorded by some who were not present at the events, but in a sophistic manner by those who assemble random and discordant narratives from report, (2) and by others who, although they were present, out of flattery toward the Romans or hatred toward the Jews are telling lies about the events, and their writings comprise accusations here, praise there, but nowhere the accuracy of history, (3) I set myself the task of telling to those subject to the hegemony¹ of the Romans, translating into the Greek language, what I had previously composed in my ancestral language and sent to the inland barbarians, I, Josephus, son of Matthias, priest of Jerusalem, who myself both went to war against the Romans at first and later was among them by necessity.

There are several obvious conflicts or oppositions on display in this proem: first of all, the war of the Jews against the Romans (τὸν Ἰουδαίων πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον), which is set in opposition to the many previous nameless wars of the recorded human past and which Josephus claims has bested all of these, implying a contest of wars over which was greatest. The agonistic claim that the war that is the subject of one's monograph is the greatest war of all time is of course a well-known Greek historiographical topos which goes back to Thucydides and, to a degree, to Herodotus.² The polyptoton in the descriptions of the warring parties in the phrase πόλεων πρὸς πόλεις ἢ ἐθνῶν ἔθνεσι συρραγέντων has a Homeric ring to it, recalling the frequently imitated imagery of *Iliad*

13.130–1: φράξαντες δόρυ δουρί, σάκος σάκει προθελόμεν· / ἀσπίς ἄρ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε,

¹ Mason observes that ἡγεμονία is a standard Greek translation for *imperium*. S. Mason 2001: 9 n. 34, citing H. J. Mason 1974: 144–51.

² cf. Thuc. 1.1.2: κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὥς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων.

κόρυς κόρυιν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνήρ· (...Spear with spear encircling and shield with overlapping shield;/ shield pressed upon shield, helm upon helm, and man upon man...).³ In these passages, the two parties, indistinguishable from one another in the repetition of the same term, differ only in their inflections which mark the violence that they either enact or that is enacted upon them, while it is understood that each party is at once subject and object of violence. With the engagement of *BJ* 1.1 with the *Iliad* as well as with well-known war monographs, Josephus has marked this war as an event that is to be viewed through the lens of the great wars of the Greek past. Before he has even completed a sentence, Josephus has situated the *BJ* firmly within the Greek historiographical tradition, and even gestured toward the *Iliad* which exercised a perennial influence over Greek historiography.⁴

The next opposition evident in the passage is the literary contest over the true account of the war, in which Josephus presents three parties: first, those who were not present at the events of the war (οὐ παρατυχόντες τοῖς πράγμασιν) and accordingly cannot report from autopsy, resulting in allegedly nonsensical accounts. Next, Josephus describes those who were present but whose accounts are so skewed by bias that they do not contain the accuracy which Josephus presents as the expectation of the genre of history (τὸ ... ἀκριβὲς τῆς ἱστορίας).⁵ Third, in the final clause of the passage he mentions for the

³ See also *Il.* 16.214–15. See Skutsch 1985: 724–5 for a list and discussion of imitations in both Greek and Latin, including Ennius *Annales* F 584. While Livy 28.2.6 is the only prose imitation mentioned by Skutsch, Thuc. 2.84.3 furnishes an example in Greek (καὶ ναῦς τε νῆϊ προσέπιπτε).

⁴ See esp. Strasburger 1982 and Rood 2007: 153–8 with bibliography on the influence of Homer on the development of Greek historiography.

⁵ The issue of bias viewed as inimical to historiographical truth has of course received much attention in recent decades (see esp. Woodman 1988, Kraus and Woodman 1997: 1–8, and Marincola 1997: 158–74). I will discuss Josephus' view in the *CA* that bias (whether partiality or enmity) is antithetical to truth and marks a work as not properly belonging to the genre of history in some detail in Chapter 1, pp. 38–41.

first time what we may consider his personal conflict, or the opposition of two phases of Josephus' own life: the fact that he changed sides during the war (αὐτός τε Ῥωμαίους πολεμήσας τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον παρατυχὼν ἐξ ἀνάγκης).

There is, however, a fourth opposition to be found in this passage, more subtle than the other three: the antithesis between Ἕλληνες and βάρβαροι, so widespread in Greek literature beginning in the late 6th century and throughout antiquity, is apparent in Josephus' description at 1.3 of the *BJ* as a translation into Greek (Ἑλλάδι γλώσση μεταβαλὼν) of an earlier work composed in his "ancestral language" (τῇ πατρίῳ (sc. γλώσση)) and sent to the "inland barbarians" (τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις).⁶ These inland βάρβαροι, who are presented as able to read the Jews' "ancestral language," are presented in contrast to the Hellenophone subjects of Roman hegemony.⁷ We thus observe that in his deployment of the classical antithesis, Josephus has positioned the Jews among the βάρβαροι, and the Greeks, now transformed into those literate in the Greek language, as subjugated to the Romans. It is striking for Josephus to suggest that he includes himself and his own people among the βάρβαροι, often a pejorative term in classical and post-classical Greek. Though the term is frequently neutral in Josephus' corpus, there are rea-

⁶ On the antithesis, see esp. E. Hall 1989: 172–189.

⁷ Josephus returns to what we might call his two audiences, the Aramaic and the Greek, at 1.6, where he describes them more explicitly:

ἀτοπον ἡγησάμενος περιδεῖν πλαζομένην ἐπὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ Πάρθους μὲν καὶ Βαβυλωνίους Ἀράβων τε τοὺς πορρωτάτω καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ Εὐφράτην ὁμόφυλον ἡμῖν Ἀδιαβηνοὺς τε γινῶναι διὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπιμελείας ἀκριβῶς, ὅθεν τε ἤρξατο καὶ δι' ὅσων ἐχώρησεν παθῶν ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ὅπως κατέστρεψεν, ἀγνοεῖν δὲ Ἕλληνας ταῦτα καὶ Ῥωμαίων τοὺς μὴ ἐπιστρατευσαμένους, ἐντυγχάνοντας ἢ κολακείαις ἢ πλάσμασι.

"I considered it absurd to ignore the fact that the truth was going astray after such important events, and that the Parthians, Babylonians, the most remote of the Arabians, our kin beyond the Euphrates, and the Adiabeniens knew precisely on account of my diligence whence the war began, through how many misfortunes it progressed, and how it ended, while the Greeks and those of the Romans who did not go on the campaign were ignorant of these things, having read either flatteries or fabrications."

sons to suspect that the pejorative valence is operative here, and is yet ironic.⁸ Josephus has here inverted some of the typical associations attached to the parties in the antithesis, for in his presentation, it is the βάρβαροι who are in possession of truth in the form of Josephus' Aramaic account of the war, while their Hellenophone counterparts have previously had access only to versions of the events that are so distorted by ignorance or bias as to fall short of the exacting standards for truth of the genre of history (ὁ δ' ἀκριβὲς τῆς ἱστορίας οὐδαμοῦ).⁹ The invocation of the antithesis in this inverted form has the rhetorical effect of bolstering Josephus' historiographical authority, as he presents himself as the only historian bearing the light of truth from the enlightened βάρβαροι to the benighted Greek-speaking world. Josephus thus accepts and yet inverts the terms of a classical Greek way of thinking, positioning himself among the βάρβαροι, on the one hand, and yet also as the Hellenophone envoy between the Ἕλληνες and the βάρβαροι, thus presenting himself as having a foot on the Greek side of the divide.¹⁰

One is hard pressed to locate a contemporary scholar who accepts Josephus' presentation of the Aramaic precursor of the *BJ* at face value.¹¹ Just as the *Jewish Antiquities* (hereafter *AJ* for *Antiquitates Judaicae*) is manifestly not a translation of the Hebrew

⁸ Though often a neutral term in Josephus' corpus. See Ch. 3, 211–217, and esp. n. 80 on the use of the term in Josephus.

⁹ Josephus clarifies his view that the authors of these allegedly false histories are explicitly Greeks when he revisits the topic at 1.13–16.

¹⁰ I will return to Josephus' use of the Ἕλληνες/βάρβαροι antithesis, as it is used in the *CA* and throughout Josephus' corpus, in Chapter 3, pp. 211–217. There I argue that Josephus deliberately casts the Jews as βάρβαροι and inverts the normal valence of the terms more explicitly than at *BJ* 1.3, yet his framing of humanity in these terms also marks his participation in Greek ways of thinking, and thus constitutes a piece of his performance of a Greek cultural identity, which I will elaborate further in Chapters 2 and 3.

¹¹ Mason provides a recent summary of the state of the question of the Aramaic *War* in Mason 2016b: 15–17. See also Chapter 4, p. 257 n. 55.

Bible, but is an original composition displaying the generic conventions of Greek historiography which retells, recasts, and reshapes the Biblical narratives along with substantial extra-Biblical material,¹² it is not plausible that the *BJ* represents a translation (μεταβαλὼν at *BJ* 1.3) of an Aramaic text in any normal sense of the word.¹³ It is, however, plausible that Josephus composed something like diaries or letters during the war (he claims to have recorded the events while they happened at *CA* 1.49, though he does not indicate in which language),¹⁴ which had some kind of relationship to the narrative we possess. This possibility is not excluded by Josephus' description of the composition of the *BJ* at *CA* 1.50: "when the whole project had been prepared ... I thus made my account of the history" πάσης μοι τῆς πραγματείας ἐν παρασκευῇ γεγεννημένης ... οὕτως ἐποιησάμην τῶν πράξεων τὴν παράδοσιν). This is speculation; we are as ignorant of this lost Aramaic work as was the Hellenophone audience Josephus envisions in the opening of the *BJ*; his claim of their ignorance of the Aramaic version is central to the rhetoric of his justification for composing the *BJ* at all.¹⁵

If (as seems to be the case) the Aramaic *BJ* existed only in some markedly different form or genre from the Greek, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that narrative history is composed by Josephus *only in Greek* and in accordance with the distinctive generic conventions of Greek historiography such as are on display in the *BJ*. Though Josephus

¹² Josephus thus participates in the tradition of the "re-written Bible," on which, see Vermes 1961 and bibliography assembled at p. 108, n. 5 below.

¹³ See Hata 1975 on the translation of this verb.

¹⁴ Mason claims that something like this is plausible. Mason 2016b: 16–17.

¹⁵ Josephus' presenting a work at its opening as *unnecessary, but for X* becomes a familiar motif with the poem of the *CA*, as I will discuss in Chapter 2.

claims that his Aramaic work, and elsewhere the Hebrew Bible, “count” as history, and indeed are superior to Greek exemplars of the genre (however vaguely these Greek works may be defined), Josephus’ extensive historiographical survivals are also manifestly Greek in far more than just language: they are themselves exemplars of the Greek tradition. This suggests that we have in Josephus’ corpus a remarkable instance of a phenomenon documented and analyzed by John Dillery: some non-ethnic Greeks encountering the Greek historiographical tradition conceive of history as fundamentally a Greek exercise.¹⁶ It is striking that Josephus positions his own work firmly within the tradition of Greek historiography by means of such devices as the intertextuality and use of *topoi* discussed above even while he critiques Greek historians and claims that their works do not meet the demands of the genre of history.¹⁷

We may wonder, perhaps, what can explain such a striking contradiction or paradox, and further whether Josephus is running a risk of the kind much discussed by post-colonial theorists: has Josephus adopted the conventions of the very culture that has marginalized the Jews in an attempt to fight back against his marginalization, but in the process accepted the very terms and categories that have produced his marginalization? In Spivakian terms, is Josephus a subaltern attempting to speak?¹⁸ Or, has Josephus fallen

¹⁶ See Dillery 2015, esp. 195–219.

¹⁷ Josephus presents historians whose works allegedly do not meet with his view of the demands of the genre as *not* history on several occasions throughout his corpus, notably in the *CA*, which I discuss in Chapter 1, pp. 51.

¹⁸ Spivak 1988.

into what some historians have termed the “Trevor-Roper trap?”¹⁹ Dillery summarizes the issue of the Trevor-Roper trap, which concerns contemporary scholars of Sub-Saharan Africa: “in responding to Hugh Trevor-Roper’s notorious claim that “Black Africa” had no history and was consequently “unhistoric,” they might merely “squeeze the past of Black Africa” into the very categories envisioned by Trevor-Roper and might thereby define the African past precisely in the terms Trevor-Roper insisted on for “history.””²⁰ The question of the risks inherent to the identity Josephus attempts to sustain as a historian and intellectual is deeply significant, and I will devote considerable attention to it in Chapter 4. At this juncture, I want to head off the question as phrased above, because it seems to involve certain problematic assumptions about Josephus’ identity, namely that Greek culture and Greek identity are something that at some point in Josephus’ life were superimposed upon a native or prior Jewish identity that at some earlier point was free of the influence of Greek culture. Such an understanding is not acceptable in view of the pervasive influence of Greek language and culture in Jerusalem from the time of the Seleucids through Josephus’ lifetime, and in particular in the Herodian court, with whose remnants Josephus was connected at least in his later life.²¹ As Rajak has argued, Josephus’ statements at *Vita* 8–12 about his early education are vague, even if they are suggestive of the elements of formal Jewish education that are better attested beginning in

¹⁹ See, esp. Fuglestad 1992 and Dillery 2015: 216–17 on the application of the Trevor-Roper trap to antiquity.

²⁰ Dillery 2015: 216, citing Fuglestad 1992: 310.

²¹ See Rajak 1983: 51–8. See esp. *CA* 1.51 on Josephus’ connection with Herodians.

the following century.²² Josephus appears to be more invested in presenting himself as a sort of *Wunderkind* than in providing details.²³ As Rajak rightly observes, we cannot infer from silence that Josephus hereby indicates that he did not receive something resembling the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία of the Greek tradition. If anything, Josephus' description of himself at *Vita* 8 as admired as an adolescent διὰ τὸ φιλογράμματον ("on account of my love of book-learning") is at least suggestive of Greek educational conventions, though not explicit.²⁴ We do not have evidence of a "pre-Greek" Josephus, nor should we expect to find any; it would be more surprising if an elite male of Josephus' status had no formal Greek education prior to reaching adulthood.²⁵ That Josephus in all likelihood did receive such education is by no means contradicted by *AJ* 20.263, where he describes his education without any reference to the chronology of his life, and presents both the Jewish and Greek traditions as a balanced pair:

ἔχω γὰρ ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ τῶν ὁμοεθνῶν πλεῖστον αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχώριον παιδείαν διαφέρειν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δὲ γραμμάτων ἐσπούδασα μετασχεῖν τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀναλαβὼν, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὴν προφορὰν ἀκρίβειαν πάτριος ἐκώλυσεν συνήθεια.

²² Rajak 1983: 26–31.

²³ Mason applies the term to Josephus, and observes that such a characterization of the subject is typical of Greek biography as well as of other Greek literary genres. Mason 2001: 14–15, n. 66. See Rajak 1983: 28–9 on parallels in the Jewish tradition.

²⁴ I find Rajak's dismissal of the possibility that the word suggests Greek education unjustified. See Rajak 1983: 28. The term is rare; it is found in Diogenes Laertius *V.Ph.* 4.30.4, 7.167.1, and 9.113.1, where it describes three philosophers, and Plutarch *de Sollertia Animalium* 963c, where it occurs in the pairing φιλόλογος καὶ φιλογραμμάτους.

²⁵ Rajak remarks that "we should consider it probable that he had not read any of the Classical Greek authors before he went to Rome. He would have plenty of time to do this during the second part of his life." Yet this is speculative, and as I will discuss below, assumes that Josephus could have attained the high level of Greek rhetoric and learning evident in the *BJ* in about five years' time. See Rajak 1983: 62. I have a great deal to say about the Greek education of men of Josephus' status in Chapters 2 and 3; for the present, I will remark that my discussion is drawn from Swain 1995, Morgan 1998, and Goldhill 2001, among others.

For my countrymen agree that I excel them most in our native παιδεία and I endeavored to have a share of Greek letters and poetic learning by taking up grammatical practice, which my native usage has prevented as regards accurate pronunciation.

In Chapter 4 I discuss this passage in terms of how Josephus presents himself as uniquely positioned to compose the *AJ* because of his remarkable bicultural identity. At present, let us observe that Josephus lays claim to both Jewish and Greek traditional educations without indicating that the Greek came only later in life.

I observed in my analysis of the opening lines of the *BJ* above that Josephus positions the *BJ* within the Greek tradition; that is to say that when Josephus appears to us in the extant literary record, he does so as a Greek historiographer. This characterization extends far beyond the proem in a work that is identifiable as a Thucydidean war monograph, composed in a belletristic Atticizing Greek, borrowing motifs from poetry, and dotted with speeches that reveal a sophisticated engagement with the rhetorical trends of the nascent Second Sophistic.²⁶ Mason is correct to conclude that Josephus could not have done this in Aramaic and then translated into Greek; it is not only implausible but unnecessary to suggest, as Rajak does, that Josephus attained this high level of Greek παιδεία, building only on oral proficiency in the Koine, in the five years between his arrival at Rome and his Hellenophone literary debut after 75.²⁷ Instead, in all of Josephus' extant works, we are presented with a man so thoroughly conversant with the Greek his-

²⁶ See Mason 2016a: 20–137 on literary elements of the *BJ* generally; on the speeches of the *BJ*, see Almagor 2016. On Greek poetry and the *BJ*, see Feldman 1985, 1988, and 1998b and Chapman 2005. On Atticism in Josephus, see bibliography assembled in Chapter 2, p. 128, n. 55.

²⁷ Thackeray also believed this incredible, but his infamous conclusion that Josephus was not in fact responsible for the more sophisticated, allusive, and classical elements of his prose has long since been laid to rest. See Thackeray 1927: 100–24, Rajak 1983: 62–4, 233–236.

toriographical tradition as to be quite at home among the Hellenophone intellectuals of the period; my arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 in particular will show how this is true in the case of the *CA*.

Josephus' engagement with Greek terms and Greek frameworks for viewing the world such as the Greek/barbarian antithesis should thus not be interpreted as the acceptance of a foreign worldview or a foreign set of terms, even though Josephus describes himself overtly in terms of his Jewish lineage at *BJ* 1.3 (Ματθίου παῖς ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ἱερεὺς), for he also positions himself decidedly among the Greeks at a level beyond that of his explicit claims of identity. And herein lies a crucial conflict or opposition more subtle than those discussed above: the thoroughly Greek historian inserts into his history a distancing of himself from Greek historians framed in terms of his Jewish identity. The tension evident here in Josephus' first Greek lines is made even more explicit and becomes a central theme of his final extant work, the treatise *Against Apion*. I have opened this dissertation with the proem of the *BJ* because it presents as it were a cross section of many of the themes I will explore at length in the *CA*. While Josephus begins his Greek historiographical career with a few brief polemical statements against people identified as Ἕλληνας and an argument over what constitutes true history, in his final work he returns to these themes, but presents a large-scale systematic argument against Greeks and their historiography. At the same time, the "Greekness" of Josephus' presentation in the *CA* is equally, if not more pronounced than in the *BJ*.²⁸ Given the difference in scale between

²⁸ To some degree they are merely different, as the two works belong to different genres. I will describe in Chapter 2 how Josephus atticizes his Greek to a greater degree in the *CA* than in any of his other works.

the opening of the *BJ* and the whole of the extant Greek *CA*, we observe in Josephus' final work a remarkable paradox of identity.

The Paradox of the Against Apion: the Medium and the Message

Readers of Josephus' historical works, the *BJ* and the *AJ*, can hardly fail to observe how persistently Josephus describes his history in personal terms. Though it is hardly difficult for the reader to imagine why the *BJ* and *Vita* (an autobiographical account of Josephus' activities during the Judeo-Roman war of 66–73 CE, likely published as an “appendix” to the *AJ*) should contain considerable material on Josephus' own involvement in the war, it is no less the case that throughout the *AJ*, Josephus frames the history of the Jewish people as the collective history of his own people, made strikingly personal through his frequent use of first person plural pronouns: to Josephus, Jewish history is the history of “us” (ἡμῶν). Josephus' histories are both highly rhetorical and apologetic, and the version of events for which he argues is generally presented in personal terms (though to varying degrees). In the *CA*, however, Josephus abandons apologetic historiography to compose an apologetic treatise on, among other things, the validity of his earlier historiographical works.²⁹ In the *CA*, Josephus' defense of his own works and his defense of the Jews, their way of life, and their own claims about their collective past, collapse into each other. This suggests that for Josephus, there is a fundamental

²⁹ Attempts to define the genre of the *CA* are fraught with difficulty. Tcherikover 1957 decisively put to rest the earlier view that the *CA* is representative of a non-extant tradition of contemporary Jewish apologetics. The lack of close parallels and clear antecedents makes the *CA* something of an outlier, though as I will argue in Chapter 4, the *CA* is not utterly without parallel. On the generic classification of the *CA*, see also Goodman 1999, Barclay 2007: XXX–XXXVI and 2016.

equivalence between himself as a historian and his work, between his people's story and themselves. The same equivalence holds for Josephus' alleged critics and detractors, which leads Josephus to explore at length what it means to be Greek, and what it means to be Jewish.

With an author so deeply attuned to the personal dimensions of his histories, it is hardly surprising that he expresses a striking self-consciousness of the operation of power in the interchange of cultural production. The Greeks, in this regard, maintain an undeserved monopoly on intellectual prestige, according to Josephus, while much older eastern peoples (namely, the Egyptians, Babylonians, Phoenicians, and Jews) have historiographical traditions that are better at producing true accounts because the historical methodologies of these peoples are, according to Josephus, superior to those of the Greeks. Josephus claims that his histories, in particular the *AJ*, have been mistrusted by their audience because of Greek ignorance of Jewish history and Greek malice toward the Jews. In short, Josephus draws a direct line from the marginalization of the Jewish tradition in the Hellenocentric cultural milieu of the elite to the poor reception of his *magnum opus* that he describes in the opening of the *CA*. As in the opening of the *BJ*, Josephus frames the *CA* at the outset as an attempt to set the record straight in an atmosphere of competing falsehoods. If Jewish historiography (namely, the Hebrew Bible and by extension the *AJ* which Josephus presents as a translation of the Hebrew Bible) is true, then the Greeks, whose historiography neither noticed nor valued Jewish historiography, must be wrong. The systematic dismantling of Greek historiographical prestige constitutes Josephus' primary strategy in defending the *AJ* against its alleged detractors.

Amid Josephus' critique of the power wielded by the Greek tradition, identity is my theme: both Josephus' identity in the *CA* as he presents it to his readers in the explicit claims about himself and his people, but also as he presents himself in more subtle and non-explicit ways. I am likewise concerned with the inverse: what he says about others, namely the Greeks, against whom he defines himself and Jews. The remarkable paradox of Josephus' identity in the *CA* is that his arguments against Greek historiography and Greek culture more broadly defined are made with language, rhetoric, and in accordance with literary and ideological tropes that are fundamentally Greek. The *CA* contains a profound disjuncture in form and content, medium and message. To be sure, Josephus' statements contrasting Greeks and Jews and presenting starkly opposing differences between the two peoples are an exercise in self-presentation: he overtly identifies himself with the Jewish practices described, and defines himself and Jewish historians against Greeks. Yet Josephus does so in a form so thoroughly Greek, and so markedly demonstrative of a particular Greek identity that was in vogue (particularly in his use of Atticism), that it is possible to say that Josephus plays the part of a Greek while denouncing the Greeks. This dissertation seeks to map, define, and contextualize this paradox, and ultimately, to account for the questions it raises: is Josephus guilty of self-contradiction or even hypocrisy in the *CA*? Does the profound Greekness of the treatise undermine its explicit claims (or the reverse)? What could motivate or sustain such a paradoxical identity? Is Josephus unique in enacting such a paradox?

The State of the Question

Scholars in recent decades have widely observed that Josephus' argumentative strategies in the *CA* are of Greek derivation.³⁰ There are two outstanding contributions which have presented this fact as a contradiction or paradox, and which have also been influential to my study. The first is Shaye Cohen's brief yet pithy 1988 article, "History and Historiography in the *Against Apion* of Josephus." Here Cohen argues that the *CA* represents an example of historical criticism as much as it is an example of apologetic literature. As Cohen attempts to unpack the major inconsistencies of the text, he observes: "The *Against Apion* may attack the reliability and integrity of Greek historiography, but it is from the Greeks that Josephus learned the idea and techniques of historical criticism. Josephus attacks the Greeks with their own weapons."³¹ Cohen's chief contribution in this piece, in addition to his description of Greek parallels for Josephus' primary anti-Greek arguments, is his presentation of the complexity of the *CA*'s many affinities to other texts, namely Plutarch's *On the Malice of Herodotus*, and what he calls the "ethnocentric" Greek works of the eastern authors Manetho of Alexandria, Berossus of Babylon, and Philo of Byblos. Cohen seeks to show the weaknesses in Josephus' arguments, and the ways in which they contradict his historical works, while opening up new avenues of exploration of the *CA*, in many cases calling directly for further study. This dissertation in part answers Cohen's call. For instance, while Cohen very briefly notes parallels between Josephus in the *CA* and the above-mentioned authors, I explore the similarities between them in greater detail, and with particular attention to questions of identity. While Co-

³⁰ e.g. Schäublin 1982, Cohen 1988, Dillery 2003, and Barclay 2007.

³¹ Cohen 1988: 5.

hen's vague conclusion that the *CA* "is a complex work that faithfully mirrors the ambiguous place of Judaism in the ancient world"³² does not in itself offer a substantial answer to the issue raised in the essay, Cohen has succeeded in raising significant questions of the *CA*, and though he nowhere voices my central question overtly, it appears to me that the question *why* Josephus should use the "weapons of the Greeks" against them is at least suggested.

John Barclay, in both his 2005 article "The Empire Writes Back: Josephan Rhetoric in Flavian Rome" and 2007 commentary to the *CA* (the first in English), has gone furthest in addressing the apparent contradiction in form and content in the *CA*, though Barclay does not frame this contradiction in the same terms that I do. I will analyze Barclay's contribution in detail in Chapter 4; for the present it will be sufficient to remark that Barclay applies postcolonial theory to his interpretation of the *CA*,³³ which he views as an example of Bhabhan hybridity.³⁴ That is to say, according to Barclay, Josephus wrote the *CA* as himself a member of a subjugated culture, and as an attempt at self-representation of his subjugated culture (i.e. his arguments about Jewish accounts of the Jewish past), yet composed it according to the norms and expectations of the dominant culture, which Barclay generally terms "the Greek (and Roman) tradition."³⁵ Yet, argues Barclay, Josephus' appropriation of the conventions of Greco-Roman historiography is

³² Cohen 1988: 11.

³³ See my introduction to postcolonial theory, Chapter 4, pp. 227–9.

³⁴ See esp. p. 230 n. 13 below.

³⁵ e.g. Barclay 2007: LXXI.

effected in a way that subtly destabilizes them. My work in this study owes a profound debt to Barclay's extremely learned commentary, which is without question the most significant contribution to the study of the *CA* in two decades. Barclay has also presented the major advance of describing what Josephus does in the *CA* in terms of power: domination and subordination, competing regimes of truth, and the attempt of self-representation by a Jew who was a native of conquered Judea. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4, however, I find that Barclay's postcolonial interpretation does not adequately account for either the form or the content of the treatise, and this stems to a large degree from Barclay's elision of Greeks and Romans. That is to say, Josephus explicitly targets the Greeks, and he does so in a decidedly Greek form. Yet Barclay interprets Josephus' target as tacitly Romans, the wielders of imperial force, and the treatise's (Greek) form as an act of participation in the dominant (i.e. Roman) culture. To give only the barest summary at this juncture, the profound Greekness of the *CA* is largely invisible to Barclay in this interpretation.³⁶ Barclay's interpretation of Josephus' explicit refutations of Greeks as a tacit refutation of Romans, whom Josephus could not freely refute out of fear, problematically transforms the *CA* into an anti-Roman cipher, while Josephus' critiques of specific Greeks and their historiographical practices can be better explained as written about *Greeks*.

My question concerns all things Greek in the *CA*, and how Josephus constructs himself in relation to Greek culture. Because of this, Barclay's reconstruction does not

³⁶ Though not in the individual notes of the commentary, in which Barclay painstakingly traces Greek literary, rhetorical, and historiographical precedents for Josephus' maneuvers. To me, Barclay misses the forest for the trees.

satisfactorily advance the question as I formulate it. My analysis will focus on Greeks and Greek culture, which are ubiquitous in the treatise. Romans, on the contrary, hardly figure in the *CA*, a break with Josephus' usual interest in and engagement with Romans and their history in his other works. This curious break is something I revisit in Chapters 3 and 4, where I take it to be significant to the Greekness of the treatise in its own way, as some of the authors of the Second Sophistic deliberately sought to minimize or ignore the contemporary political reality of Roman rule.

Terms and texts

I will offer a brief comment on my choice of the terms “Jew” and “Jewish” as my translation of Ἰουδαῖος. The translation of Ἰουδαῖος is a matter of some debate,³⁷ and while I have long considered the arguments on either side to be sufficiently balanced to justify either “Jew/Jewish” or “Judean,” I chose to use “Judean” in my previous work on the *AJ* and indeed throughout this dissertation until the final version, persuaded by Mason's arguments.³⁸ At present, however, it is mere weeks since hundreds of white supremacists marched not one hundred feet from where I compose this sentence, in a manner deliberately evocative of both the Nazi regime and the Ku Klux Klan, and chanted, among other repugnant and irrational slogans, “Jews will not replace us.” In the wake of the attempt of anti-Semitic ideologues to lay claim to the grounds of this university by

³⁷ See esp. Mason 2009: 141–84, Reinhartz 2014. This question appears to have initially risen from scholars of Matthew's gospel, and when applied to this text, concerns the particular issues of anti-Semitism/anti-Judaism that are a matter of considerable debate. See discussion in Reinhartz.

³⁸ Mason 2009: 141–84.

means of violence, and in view of Reinhartz's admonition against erasing Jews from the study of the ancient world, I feel a moral compulsion to render Jews and the Jewish traditions of antiquity, as Josephus engages with them in the *CA*, unambiguously visible in my work, and I have accordingly revised my language.

Finally, a note on the Greek text of Josephus' corpus is in order. The recent critical edition of the *CA* produced by the Münster group (Siegert 2008) represents the most significant advance in over a century on what is generally considered the most difficult of all of Josephus' works to reconstruct.³⁹ Siegert's text is based on a revised stemma, the first such revision since Niese.⁴⁰ I have used Siegert's text of the *CA* throughout this dissertation, though I have edited for punctuation and typographical errors (Siegert's text is largely unpunctuated). On the rare occasion that I have printed a variant reading, I have indicated that I have done so and my reasoning. Books 1–10 of the *AJ* have benefitted from Nodet's recent critical editions; the *Vita*, similarly, has benefitted from Siegert, Schreckenberg, and Vogel's. Accordingly, I have used these where I cite from these texts. For both the *BJ* and for books 11–20 of the *AJ*, I have used Niese as the best available text, however lamentable this state of affairs may be.⁴¹ Throughout this dissertation, I have indicated where major textual problems may impact the interpretation of a passage. All translations of Josephus and other Greek and Latin texts are my own.

³⁹ Leoni 2016: 315.

⁴⁰ Niese 1889a and b. I discuss the manuscript tradition of the *CA* in greater detail in Chapter 2, pp. 140–2.

⁴¹ See Leoni 2016 for a study of the history and current state of the texts of Josephus.

Chapter 1:

Josephus vs. the Greeks: Explicit Claims of Identity and Difference in the *CA*

Introduction

Readers of the *Against Apion* cannot fail to observe the stark contrast that Josephus presents between Jewish ways of living, thinking, and writing history, and Greek, and the polemical tone with which Josephus argues for the superiority of Jewish traditions over and against Greek. This is indeed one of the primary themes of a work which lacked consensus in antiquity as to its title. Multiple variants are reported, but Porphyry's testimony (*de Abstinencia* 4.11) regarding the title πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας ("Against the Greeks") reveals that this theme was particularly salient for at least some of Josephus' readers in antiquity.¹ Josephus, however, also creates a closely related opposition, that between himself and specifically Greek intellectuals, both named historians and unnamed critics. Josephus' position among his fellow intellectuals (whether predecessors or contemporaries), and the validity of his historical works are among the chief objects of the defense presented in the *CA*. My aim is to examine Josephus' self-presentation (both the implicit and the explicit) in the *CA* as an individual, that is, as an intellectual and histori-

¹ See Barclay 2007: XXVIII–XXX. While the standard classical usage of πρὸς would lead us to render this title something more like "in response to the Greeks," (see the final examples cited at LSJ C.4), Niese, observing that there is no indication that this title is original, remarks that Porphyry may have created it on the model of similar Christian texts (e.g. the Greek title of Origen's *Contra Celsum*, much cited in this dissertation, is Πρὸς Τὸν Ἐπιγεγραμμένον Κέλσου Ἀληθοῦς Λόγον). See Niese 1989: iii, cited by Barclay 2007: XXIX–XXX.

an, and also as a member of the collective and historical body of Jewish historians, a body whose definition forms the terms of Josephus' self-identity as a historian.² For Josephus, this Jewish intellectual identity is explicitly defined against key components of the Greek intellectual tradition. Josephus thus positions himself as an outsider to Greek culture. As will become evident in Section II of this chapter, Josephus is also concerned with creating a stark contrast between Greeks and Jews on topics not directly related to his identity or reputation as a historian, but which have considerable bearing on his larger portrait of cultural difference.

The focus of this chapter is on the content of Josephus' overt claims of self-identity, as well as of collective Jewish identity. In Chapters 2 and 3, I will turn to the forms and constructs with which Josephus makes these claims that, in an apparent contradiction, locate Josephus within Greek culture, the community of Greek intellectuals, and the traditions and conventions of Greek literature. Although detailing Josephus' explicit claims of difference may not appear to be groundbreaking at first pass, it is nevertheless important to establish what exactly these claims are and to avoid overstating or exaggerating how Josephus presents them; not all of his claims are absolute, and he changes his position when it suits his argument. My presentation of the content of the *CA* will allow us to observe and analyze the apparent contradictions between form and content in the *CA*.

Josephus devotes significant attention to Greeks and Greek culture in two major sections of the treatise (1.6–59 on historiography and 2.145–296 on constitutions or νόμοι). Accordingly, in the first two sections of the chapter, I discuss these portions of the

² Throughout the *CA*, Jews are more frequently signaled by forms of ἡμεῖς than by forms of Ἰουδαῖοι; this is perhaps Josephus' chief means of locating himself within the Jewish people.

treatise, in which Josephus treats historiography (1.6–59) and constitutions or νόμοι (2.145–296). As I will show, Josephus is concerned with many of the same themes in his characterization of Greek and Jewish cultures in both sections. In the interest of a thorough discussion of Josephus’ explicit statements about Greeks and Greek culture, I will devote Section III of this chapter to a discussion of Josephus’ statements of difference between Jews and Egyptians. This is important because, as my analysis will show, Josephus expresses a different attitude toward Greeks when Egyptians are the primary target of his polemic. In the same vein, Egyptians receive different treatment when Greeks are in Josephus’ sights. While the broader focus of this dissertation is Josephus’ self-presentation and self-construction vis-à-vis Greek culture, my discussion of Josephus’ treatment of Egyptians will draw attention to the complexities and scope of Josephus’ statements of difference, as well as signal the centrality of Josephus’ pro-Jewish apologetic to the purpose of the *CA*.

What is a Greek, anyway?

Before launching into my analysis of the *CA*, some discussion of terms is in order. The category “Greek” is notoriously slippery in antiquity generally, and no less so in the *CA*. What or who Josephus means when he refers to Greeks or uses any other ethnic signifier to describe people in the *CA* can be complicated, as Josephus’ meaning is not altogether straightforward in every instance. In the *CA*, Josephus frequently intends “Greek” (Ἕλληνες) to indicate ethnicity, as I will demonstrate.³ Hall defines ethnicity as

³ This differs somewhat from his use of the term Ἕλληνες in his other works, where it does not primarily indicate ethnicity. See Rajak 2001: 137–146.

both the self-consciousness of belonging to an ethnic group, and the “dynamic process that structures, and is structured by, ethnic groups in social interaction with one another.”⁴ The membership of an ethnic group is defined by the criteria of “a putative subscription to a myth of common descent and kinship, an association with a specific territory and a sense of shared history.”⁵ In Josephus’ discussion of historiography (1.6–59), he associates Greek historians with the territory of Hellas (thus having a historiographical tradition which suffered from local conditions of climate) at 1.10, a striking claim which I will elaborate further below. What is significant here is Josephus’ association of Greeks with a discrete territory, as this fulfills a primary criterion of Hall’s definition of ethnicity. In his discussions of Greek νόμοι and νομοθέται in Book 2, he connects Greeks and their laws explicitly to individual cities, such as Athens and Sparta, and thus shows further evidence of his association of Greeks with specific territory (as well as with civic identity). He furthermore lambasts alleged Greek ineptitude at recording their origins at an early date (in comparison with purportedly superior Near Eastern record-keeping), resulting in nonsensical myths and oral traditions (e.g. 1.10–11, 20–2). This implies that Josephus understands Greeks as a people who share stories of common origin(s), even if he considers such stories incoherent or otherwise problematic. Finally, Josephus envisions a shared Greek history that unites the authors of the literary/historical accounts of the

⁴ Hall 2002: 9.

⁵ Hall 2002: 9. See also pp. 9–19 with bibliography. See also Isaac 2004: 35, whose criteria for “ethnic group” include shared history and “a cultural tradition of its own,” as well as Fraser 1983, cited in Isaac 2004, who gives a wider range of relevant criteria including religion and language. Hall, however, holds that features such as language and cultural practices, while highly visible, are “secondary *indicia*” (Nash’s “surface pointers,” Nash 1988: 10–13) of group identity. It is important to underscore that current theories of ethnicity stress that ethnicity is primarily a social construct, rather than essentializing and grounded in biology, as outdated models held. Accordingly, I have avoided the language of “race” (Isaac 2004: 25–33). See further Hall 1997.

Greek past, whom Josephus dates by references to such events as the Trojan War (in the case of Homer at 1.12: “...and he was manifestly born later than the Trojan War,” ... οὗτος δὲ καὶ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν ὕστερος φαίνεται γενόμενος) and Persian Wars (in the case of the earliest historiographers at 1.13: “... they preceded the Persians’ invasion of Greece (N.B. τὴν Ἑλλάδα) by a brief period.” ...βραχὺ τῆς Περσῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατείας τῷ χρόνῳ προύλαβον). That is to say, Josephus uses these events as temporal markers around which he organizes the Greek past.⁶ It is thus apparent that in these instances, Josephus’ conception of Greeks accords with Hall’s definition of ethnicity in classical antiquity: the Greeks, according to Josephus, are associated with a specific territory, subscribe to stories of common origins, and are connected by a shared past marked by significant events such as the Trojan War and Persian Wars. We can understand “ethnicity” to be more or less the meaning of the term γένος, which Josephus applies to Greeks at 1.69.⁷

The term γένος generally indicates a birth or kinship group, and thus often something very like “ethnicity,” but also commonly means something like “family” or “clan.” That the term is applied to Greeks only once, in contrast to Josephus’ frequent use of the term throughout the *CA* in reference to Jews and Egyptians suggests, however, that the category “Greek” operates differently in the *CA* than other groups named by ethnic signi-

⁶ The treatment of the fall of Troy, along with the first Olympiad, as epochal markers in the organization of the Greek past, as well as in synchronism, was a practice well established in the Greek tradition. See Burkert 1995, Feeney 2007: 77–86, Dillery 2015: xxx–xxxi.

⁷ In an effort to avoid the anachronistic “race” (LSJ AI) as a translation of a term that most frequently refers to a kinship or birth group (actual or constructed), I have frequently left the term untranslated throughout this dissertation. Because, however, the term γένος has such a wide semantic range, I have translated it on occasions where it appears to mean something different from “ethnicity” as defined above, and where I think a translation will clarify my interpretation of the Greek.

fiers, as the Greeks are described as a kinship group with less frequency.⁸ Josephus does not always appear to use the term Ἕλληνες to indicate ethnicity, and even Josephus' descriptions of Greeks that fit the criteria enumerated by Hall can shift throughout the treatise.⁹ In the following two chapters, I turn to how the term can be used to signify specific cultural practices or education as a category separate from ethnicity. Josephus in particular expresses awareness of how claims to terms expressing identity can be bestowed (in the case of Roman citizenship at 2.40), falsified (e.g. in the case of Apion, as I discuss in Section III), or adopted along with the νόμοι associated with an ἔθνος (as in the case of adoption of Jewish ways). The relationship of any person or people to the terms expressing group identity that are used to describe them is thus not always a straightforward matter of birth or kinship. It will be particularly apparent in Section III that Josephus finds the slipperiness of such terms useful for his rhetorical purposes. But first, let us examine Josephus' treatment of Jews and Greeks on the topic of historiography.

I. Historiography

Josephus brings the issue of historiography to the fore by framing the entire treatise in the proem (1.1–5) as a response to critics of both himself as a historian, and of Jews as a whole, specifically with regard to their antiquity relative to Greek civilization.

The priority of the Jewish γένος is presented at 1.1 as one of the chief claims of the *AJ*

⁸ For comparison, Josephus uses the term with reference to Jews 10 times, with reference to Egyptians 12 times, exempting quotations from other authors. On the ambiguity of whether some uses refer to the Jewish people, see Barclay 2007: 26 n. 130 on the use of the term at 1.32, *Ibid.* 81 n. 433 at 1.130, and *Ibid.* 286 n. 814 at 2.202.

⁹ For example, I discuss below how Josephus' restriction of Greek historiographical output to the region of Ἑλλάς at 1.9–10 conflicts with the locations of Greek historians listed at 1.16.

(ὅτι . . . παλαιότατόν ἐστι) and as the chief point of mistrust by Josephus' detractors at 1.2: συγχονὺς ὁρῶ . . . τεκμήριόν τε ποιουμένους τοῦ νεώτερον εἶναι τὸ γένος ἡμῶν τὸ μηδεμιᾶς παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱστοριογράφων μνήμης ἠξιῶσθαι. . . ("I see that there are many who . . . consider as a sign of our γένος being rather recent the fact that it is thought worthy of no mention at all among the famous ones of the Greek historiographers. . ."). For Josephus, there is a close connection between his identity as a historian and the specific claims about Jews made in his histories, which have reportedly met with disparagement (βλασφημίαις) and mistrust (ἀπιστοῦντας). The claims of Josephus' alleged accusers touch him not only as a member of the collective body of Jews, but personally as an author and historian. This explains why 1.6–59 is devoted not only to asserting the validity of non-Greek (and in particular, Jewish) historiographical traditions, but to asserting the validity, indeed the superiority, of Josephus' own historiographical methods over and against the Greeks'. It also explains why 1.6–59, the first major section of the *CA*, is particularly dense with statements of difference between Greeks and Jews, and Greeks and Josephus, as Josephus develops the Greek/Jewish opposition, and his own position within it.

In this section of the chapter, I will analyze Josephus' claims of difference with respect to historiography. As I will show, Josephus' central claim is that the Jewish tradition has produced true historical accounts, which is proven by the consensus of the tradition, while the Greek tradition has produced false accounts, as proven by its internal discord. In support of this claim, Josephus presents a sophisticated argument for the causes of such difference. Yet his claim goes beyond mere difference: Greek and Jewish histori-

ography are not merely opposites (though Josephus does present them as such); there exists between them a relationship of power that is uneven. The historiographical traditions of the Jews and of other ancient non-Greek peoples, according to Josephus, have been unjustly marginalized among hellenophone intellectuals;¹⁰ hence the unfair and ignorant criticism of the *AJ*. What Josephus describes is effectively Hellenocentrism. It is important not to lose sight of Josephus' purpose in displaying this element of power as I discuss the nuts and bolts of his attempt to dismantle it. His claim is, of course, presented as motivated by the critics of the *AJ* and their ilk, who believe in a Greek monopoly on historiographic truth, as Josephus claims at 1.6, the opening of the section:

πρῶτον οὖν ἐπέρχεταιί μοι πάνυ θαυμάζειν τοὺς οἰομένους δεῖν περὶ τῶν παλαιωτάτων ἔργων μόνοις προσέχειν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι καὶ παρὰ τούτων πυνθάνεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἀπιστεῖν.

First, it occurs to me to marvel quite a lot at those who think that, concerning the most ancient events, it is necessary to pay attention to the Greeks alone and to learn the truth from them, but to mistrust us and other people.

Josephus thus frames this discussion of historiography from the outset as containing a fundamental opposition between the Greeks (τοῖς Ἑλλήσι), who are privileged with trust, and all other peoples, among whom Jews are singled out (ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις). The idea of trust surfaces frequently in 1.6–59 as a sort of currency of prestige in the field of historiography.¹¹ The denial of trust to all non-Greek historians marks their intellectual subordination, while the deference paid to Greek historians marks their intellectual privilege and dominance. Josephus' use of the first person pronoun here sig-

¹⁰ I will go into much greater detail about the hellenophone elite who comprise Josephus' literary peers, audience, and rivals in the following chapters.

¹¹ cf. Barclay's observations on trust/credibility in the *CA*. Barclay 2005: 32–3.

nals his own position within this opposition. His statement that he “marvel[s] quite a lot” (πάνυ θαυμάζειν) at this imbalance creates the impression that it is obviously or strikingly wrong. His argument will culminate in his assertion that the complete reverse of this assessment is true at 1.58. Here Josephus concludes the arguments of the “digression” (παρέκβασις at 57) of 6–56, stating that he has “made it sufficiently clear that the recording of ancient history is native to the barbarians more than to the Greeks.” (ἱκανῶς δὲ φανερόν, ὥς οἶμαι, πεποιηκῶς ὅτι πάτριός ἐστιν ἢ περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀναγραφὴ τοῖς βαρβάροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς Ἑλλησι...).¹² The language of 1.58 closely recalls that of 1.1 (ἱκανῶς μὲν ὑπολαμβάνω ... πεποιηκέναι φανερόν). Josephus uses this similar formulation to signal that his conclusion at 1.58 fulfills the task he set for himself in his proem to defend the claims of the *AJ*, which he introduced in 1.1. Both the ring-composition and the explicit description of what comes before 1.57 as a digression indicate that Josephus views this first segment of the *CA* (whether or not one isolates the proem as a programmatic opening, as I have generally done) as distinct, and motivates my treatment of 1.6–59 as a discrete unit.

Consensus and Discord

Josephus supports his central claim about the truth of the respective historiographical traditions with the argument that consensus across a historiographical tradition

¹² I will discuss in greater detail the significance of the choice of the word βαρβάροις in Chapter 2, pp. 210–216.

proves the truth of the tradition's accounts, while variation within a tradition indicates the opposite. This view of historiography finds its fullest statement at 1.26:¹³

ὅλως δὲ τὸ πάντων ἐναντιώτατον ἱστορία πράττοντες διατελοῦσι. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀληθοῦς ἐστὶ τεκμήριον ἱστορίας, εἰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἅπαντες ταῦτα καὶ λέγοιεν καὶ γράφοιεν· οἱ δ' εἰ ταῦτα γράψαιαν ἐτέρως, οὕτως ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὶ φανεῖσθαι πάντων ἀληθέστατοι.

In short, they (sc. the Greeks) persist in doing the exact opposite of history; for it is a proof of true history, if concerning the same things everyone should both say and write the same things. But they, if they wrote these things differently, believed that in this way they would appear the truest of all.

While Josephus never expressly states the negative side of his “proof of true history” (ἀληθοῦς...τεκμήριον ἱστορίας) by describing something like a false or untrue history, the idea is implicit in his description of Greek historiographers, who only believed that they would have the appearance of truth. Josephus' use of superlatives (ἐναντιώτατον, ἀληθέστατοι) in this passage emphasizes the starkness of the contrast he draws between Greek methods and truth, as well as the magnitude of the alleged failure of the Greek tradition that he attempts to convey. His condemnation is absolute.

Josephus first develops the theme of non-consensus or inconsistency as a problematic feature of the Greek historiographical tradition and inimical to truth explicitly at 1.16–18, where he gives a catalogue of Greek historiographers who contradict or correct one another. The passage is worth quoting in full:

περίεργος δ' ἂν εἶην ἐγὼ τοὺς ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπισταμένους διδάσκων ὅσα μὲν Ἑλλάνικος Ἀκουσίλαος περὶ τῶν γενεαλογιῶν διαπεφώνηκεν, ὅσα δὲ διορθοῦται τὸν Ἡσίοδον Ἀκουσίλαος, ἢ τίνα τρόπον Ἐφορος μὲν

¹³ This claim is a species of argumentation from *consensus omnium*, which is widely attested among Stoic and Epicurean sources. As Obbink remarks, it is an argument that is more rhetorically useful than logically sound. Obbink 1992: 197–8.

Ἑλλάνικον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ψευδόμενον ἐπιδείκνυσιν, Ἐφορον δὲ Τίμαιος, καὶ Τίμαιον οἱ μετ' ἐκεῖνον γεγονότες, Ἡρόδοτον δὲ πάντες. (17) ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν Σικελικῶν τοῖς περὶ Ἀντίοχον καὶ Φύλιστον ἢ Καλλίαν Τίμαιος συμφωνεῖν ἤξιωσεν, οὐδ' αὖ περὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν οἱ τὰς Ἀθίδας συγγεγραφότες ἢ περὶ τῶν Ἀργολικῶν οἱ τὰ περὶ Ἄργος ἱστοροῦντες ἀλλήλοις κατηκολουθήκασιν. (18) καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ βραχυτέρων, ὅπου γε περὶ τῆς Περσικῆς στρατείας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πραχθέντων οἱ δοκιμώτατοι διαπεφωνήκασιν; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης ὡς ψευδόμενος ὑπὸ τινων κατηγορεῖται, καίτοι δοκῶν ἀκριβεστάτην τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν.

It would be excessive if I tried to instruct those who know better than myself about how many ways Hellanicus differs from Acusilaus concerning the genealogies, or on how many points Acusilaus corrects Hesiod, or in what manner Ephorus shows how Hellanicus has falsified most things, as Timaeus does to Ephorus, and those who have come after him do to Timaeus, and everyone does to Herodotus. (17) Not even concerning Sicilian history did Timaeus deign to agree with Antiochus, Philistus, or Kallias;¹⁴ nor again have the Atthidographers followed one another on Athenian history nor have the historians of Argos concerning Argive history. (18) And why should I speak about the histories of individual cities and lesser histories, when even concerning the Persian invasion and the deeds that were done in it the most famous historians disagree? And even Thucydides has been accused of lying on many counts by some, even though he appears to have composed his account most accurately.

The catalogue of 16–18 represents Josephus' argument for the inconsistency of the Greek tradition at its most developed, here bolstered by his appeal to consensus in his claim that he is preaching to the choir (τοὺς ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπισταμένους διδάσκων). Josephus essentially creates a genealogy of Greek critics of their historiographical predecessors, going so far as to utilize genealogical prose style in his phrasing: Ἐφορος μὲν Ἑλλάνικον ...,

¹⁴ On the construction οἱ περί τινα as a periphrasis for the person, see LSJ C.I.2 and Dillery 2015: viii–ix n. 7 with bibliography.

Ἐφορον δὲ Τίμαιος καὶ Τίμαιον οἱ μετ' ἐκεῖνον γεγονότες...¹⁵ This Greek historiographical genealogy creates the impression that this polemical attitude toward one's predecessor is the defining trait of the entire tradition. It is virtually an ancestral trait of the Greeks.¹⁶ Josephus is of course correct that polemic is an essential element of Greek historiography, but Greek historiographers would not have recognized his claim that it is inherently problematic.¹⁷ Likewise, Josephus' claim that consensus across a tradition marks historiographical truth does not resonate with the extant discussions of truth among Greek historians and historical critics, who were concerned primarily with the relationship of truth to impartiality.¹⁸

The genealogy of Greek historiographical one-upmanship is answered by the description of the genealogical records of the Jewish priest-historians at 1.30–36 (it perhaps also demonstrates Josephus' priestly skill at record-keeping), to which I shall return shortly. At 1.37–8, Josephus asserts that this Jewish priestly pedigree, which is assured by the genealogies, is directly responsible for the harmony of the Jewish tradition, which forms a pointed contrast to the Greek genealogy of discord of 1.16–18:

¹⁵ A similar structure can be observed at 1.221, where Josephus describes the tendency among some authors to slander peoples and cities out of envy or for shock value. He does not call them “Greek” here, and thus I do not consider this an overt statement of difference, but it does fit Josephus' claims of Greek historiographical individualism and polemic, not least because his named examples are Greeks: Θεόπομπος μὲν τὴν Ἀθηναίων, τὴν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων Πολυκράτης, ὁ δὲ τὸν Τριπολιτικὸν γράψας, οὐ γὰρ δὴ Θεόπομπος ἐστὶν ὡς οἴονταί τινες, καὶ τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν προσέλαβεν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ Τίμαιος ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις περὶ τῶν προειρημένων καὶ περὶ ἄλλων βεβλασφήμηκεν.

¹⁶ Compare with Josephus' concluding remark at 1.58 that “the recording of ancient history” (ἡ περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀναγραφὴ) is “ancestral” (πάτριος) among the barbarians, not the Greeks.

¹⁷ See esp. Marincola 1997: 217–257.

¹⁸ A concern which Josephus elsewhere expresses, as I will demonstrate below. On impartiality and truth, see esp. Woodman 1988, Kraus and Woodman 1997: 1–8, and Marincola 1997: 158–74.

εικότως οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαίως, ἅτε μήτε τὸ ὑπογράφειν¹⁹
 αὐτεξουσίῳ πᾶσιν ὄντος μήτε τινὸς ἐν τοῖς γραφομένοις ἐνούσης
 διαφωνίας, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῶν προφητῶν τὰ μὲν ἀνωτάτω καὶ παλαιότατα
 κατὰ τὴν ἐπίπνοιαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μαθόντων, τὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτοὺς ὡς
 ἐγένετο σαφῶς συγγραφόντων, (38) οὐ μυριάδες βιβλίων εἰσι παρ' ἡμῖν
 ἀσυμφώνων καὶ μαχομένων, δύο δὲ μόνα πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι βιβλία τοῦ
 παντὸς ἔχοντα χρόνου τὴν ἀναγραφὴν, τὰ δικαίως πεπιστευμένα.

Naturally—or indeed necessarily—(since not everyone has the license to add their own writings, nor is there any internal discrepancy in what is written, but the prophets alone learned, on the one hand, the earliest and most ancient history from divine inspiration, and on the other hand, they composed the events of their own times exactly as they happened) (38) we do not have countless books which are discordant and rivaling each other, but only twenty two books containing the record of the whole of time, and these are justly trusted.

Josephus must mean that the Hebrew scriptures are trusted (πεπιστευμένα) by Jews (and not by Greeks), as the premise of his entire argument is that Jewish and other non-Greek histories have not been trusted by the critics of the *AJ* (1.6). It is of course well known that Josephus' characterization of the Hebrew scriptures as utterly lacking internal discrepancy is not accurate,²⁰ even if he is generally correct that they characteristically show less of the authors' individuality and overt polemic than the Greek tradition. Josephus is thus able to take advantage of the very ignorance of Jewish historical writings that he has lambasted in his alleged critics in his apparent assumption that they will not be aware of any internal contradiction within the Jewish tradition. The ignorant reader is expected to

¹⁹ I have printed and translated τὸ ὑπογράφειν, which is the reading L, and more difficult to construe than the conjectures of Niese (τοῦ συγγράφειν) and Schreckenberg (τοῦ γράφειν). Nevertheless, as Siegert has approved of the reading of L, and the articular infinitive can be construed as an accusative of respect (Smyth §2034e), while μήτε is explained as normal use with the articular infinitive (Smyth §2028), I see no reason to adopt an emendation. See Siegert 2008, Vol. 1: 104.

²⁰ Well-known examples include the two creation narratives in Genesis 1 and 2, and the substantial overlap in material between the books of Chronicles and the books of Kings and Samuel, which appears to be due to the Chronicler using Kings and Samuel as source material. See Ackroyd 1993.

trust that Josephus' description of the scriptures is accurate, when in fact the description bears a closer resemblance to the *AJ* with its elision of contradictory accounts.²¹

The Historian's Character and Lineage

I will now turn to a discussion of what Josephus presents as the causes of the opposition between Jewish historiographical consensus and Greek historiographical discord. It is somewhat artificial to distill these causes into separate sub-headings, as I have done, because they are closely interlinked in Josephus' presentation. Breaking the discussion into these subsections, however, aids the clarity in my presentation.

Josephus argues that one of the main causes of the opposition between Greek historiographical discord and Jewish consensus is found in the stark differences in character and lineage that he sees between the respective historians themselves. He presents Greek historians as characterized by competitive individualism coupled with a total lack of institutional control over who is allowed to write history at all. These claims are found at 1.24–5, where Josephus remarks on Greek historians' motives for writing:

οἱ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ γράφειν ὀρμήσαντες οὐ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσπούδασαν, καίτοι τοῦτο πρόχειρόν ἐστιν αἰεὶ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, λόγων δὲ δύναμιν ἐπεδείκνυντο, (25) καὶ καθ' ὅντινα τρόπον ἐν τούτῳ παρευδοκίμησιν τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπελάμβανον, κατὰ τοῦτον ἡρμόζοντο, τινὲς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν τραπόμενοι, τινὲς δὲ πρὸς χάριν ἢ τὰς πόλεις ἢ τοὺς βασιλέας ἐπαινοῦντες· ἄλλοι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ κατηγορεῖν τῶν πράξεων ἢ τῶν γεγραφότων ἐχώρησαν ἐνευδοκίμησιν τούτῳ νομίζοντες.

For those who rushed into writing were not serious about the truth (and yet this promise is always on offer) but displayed their skill with words, (25) and in whatever way they thought that they would surpass the fame of

²¹ Feldman 1998a: 560–2.

others in this endeavor, to this they conformed themselves, some turning to telling myths, others, as a favor,²² praising cities or kings. Still others embarked upon accusations against deeds or those who had written them because they thought that they would gain a reputation from this.

Josephus thus characterizes Greek historians as not having a serious attitude toward their histories by his description of their rushing into writing (ἐπὶ τὸ γράφειν ὀρμήσαντες) and their lack of enthusiasm for the truth. They are motivated, says Josephus, by a desire for fame or reputation (παρευδοκίμῃσιν, ἐνευδοκίμῃσιν), which they have pursued by whatever avenue (καθ' ὅντινα τρόπον) they expected would bring them this. Josephus describes three such alleged avenues: mythology (τὸ μυθολογεῖν), encomium of cities or kings (τὰς πόλεις ἢ τοὺς βασιλέας ἐπαινοῦντες), and polemic against historical events or historiographers (τὸ κατηγορεῖν τῶν πράξεων ἢ τῶν γεγραφότων). He presents each of these as problematic both elsewhere in the *CA* and in his other works.

“Mythology” (τὸ μυθολογεῖν) for Josephus clearly represents stories that he characterizes as (variously) incredible, anonymous, oral in origin (which stands in negative contrast to written accounts, a point on which I will elaborate below), and quite often, immoral.²³ Thus Josephus berates Manetho for allegedly relying on oral or legendary sources at 1.105:

ὕπερ ὧν δ' ὁ Μάνεθως οὐκ ἐκ τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις γραμμάτων, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς ὡμολόγηκεν ἐκ τῶν ἀδεσπότης μυθολογουμένων προστέθεικεν, ὕστερον ἐξελέγξω κατὰ μέρος ἀποδεικνὺς τὴν ἀπίθανον αὐτοῦ ψευδολογίαν.

²² Or possibly, “to curry favor.”

²³ Here Josephus differs somewhat from other Greek authors, as μῦθος and τὸ μυθολογεῖν are not universally negative. See Fowler 2006 and 2011.

Concerning the things which Manetho added that were not from the Egyptians' writings, but as he himself has admitted, from anonymous mythologies, I will later refute part by part, displaying his unbelievable falsehood.

I will discuss Josephus' treatment of Manetho's historiographical methods in greater detail below. For the present, let us observe that Josephus contrasts the "anonymous mythologies" (τῶν ἀδεσπότης μυθολογουμένων) with written documents (τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις γραμμάτων), which, as I will show below, are an important element in the production of true historical accounts. Josephus also presents a distinct connection between Manetho's use of such problematic sources and his alleged "unbelievable falsehood" (τὴν ἀπίθανον αὐτοῦ ψευδολογίαν). When Josephus fulfills his promise to refute Manetho, he refers to Manetho's allegedly dubious sources as τὰ μυθεύόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα at 1.229 and as τοὺς ἀδεσπότες μύθους at 1.287.²⁴ In addition, at 2.120, Josephus characterizes Apion's salacious account of the pack-ass (2.112–14) as μυθολογία, an account which Josephus has dismissed as patently absurd. At 2.256, he describes how Plato dismissed Homer from his republic, "so that he would not obscure the correct conception of god with myths." (ἵνα δὴ μὴ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ θεοῦ τοῖς μύθοις ἀφανίσαιε.) A similar view of myths as antithetical or harmful to an appropriate conception of god is found in the opening of the *AJ*, where Josephus invites the attentive reader to test his account of Moses and to decide "whether he conceived of the nature of god worthily and always attributed to him deeds that were appropriate and kept his account pure of all of the shameful mythology found among others." (εἰ τὴν τε φύσιν ἀξίως αὐτοῦ κατενόησε καὶ τῇ δυνάμει πρεπούσας ἀεὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀνατέθεικε πάσης καθαρὸν τὸν

²⁴ See Dillery 2015: 205–6, and further discussion below, pp. 92–3.

περὶ αὐτοῦ φυλάξας λόγον τῆς παρ’ ἄλλοις ἀσχήμονος μυθολογίας ... at 1.15). Mythology, in this instance, is both shameful and unworthy of the divine. Josephus thus consistently characterizes myths and myth-making as problematic and antithetical to truth, whether historiographical or theological.²⁵

According to Josephus, the second way that Greek historians allegedly sought personal glory was the praise of cities or kings (τινὲς δὲ πρὸς χάριν ἢ τὰς πόλεις ἢ τοὺς βασιλέας ἐπαινοῦντες); that is, he turns to the issue of bias, which he consistently presents as unequivocally inimical to historiographical truth.²⁶ Thus at *CA* 1.223, Josephus claims that certain anti-Jewish slanders originated among the Egyptians, which were then propagated by certain authors who, “wanting to gratify them (sc. the Egyptians), attempted to falsify the truth.” (βουλόμενοι δ’ ἐκείνοις τινὲς χαρίζεσθαι παρατρέπειν ἐπεχείρησαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.) A similar critique of alleged historiographical bias is found in the *AJ* in two passages in which Josephus disputes with the accounts of Nicolaus of Damascus.²⁷ At *AJ* 14.9, Josephus refutes Nicolaus’ report that Antipater, father of Herod the Great, was a descendant of the first Jews to return to Judea from the Babylonian exile:

²⁵ We may note, however, that this characterization holds for theoretical discussions of myth and myth-making; there are instances of Josephus using Greek myths in his historical works without describing the process of telling them as μυθολογεῖν. See e.g. *BJ* 3.419–20, where Josephus describes the geography of the town of Joppa in part by identifying it as the location where Andromeda was chained to the rock by the sea. Josephus’ comment that the impressions left by the chains that are still visible “confirm the antiquity of the story” (ἐνθα καὶ τῶν Ἀνδρομέδας δεσμῶν ἔτι δεικνύμενοι τύποι πιστοῦνται τὴν ἀρχαιότητα τοῦ μύθου), in other words using the Judean landscape as a temporal marker of the Greek past, has the effect of both recalling Herodotus’ procedure of using the non-Greek present to prove the claims of the Greek past, but also of subordinating Greek myth to the realia of a Judeocentric worldview.

²⁶ The view that historiographical truth was widely understood as the lack of bias within both the Greek and Roman historiographical traditions is argued by Woodman 1988 and Kraus and Woodman 1997: 1–8. See also Marincola 1997: 158–74. For an argument for this view in Josephus, see Mason 2009: 7–15.

²⁷ I analyze these passages and Josephus’ characterization of Nicolaus in them at length in Teets 2013: 94–9.

“But he says these things as a favor to Herod, Antipater’s son, who became king of the Jews by some chance ...” (ταῦτα δὲ λέγει χαριζόμενος Ἡρώδῃ τῷ παιδὶ αὐτοῦ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐκ τύχης τινὸς γενομένῳ...). The allegation of deliberate flattery is set against Josephus’ assertion of Antipater’s Idumean origins (14.8), with the implication that the alleged deliberate flattery has resulted in a false account.

A more damning discussion of Nicolaus’ alleged historiographical failings is found at *AJ* 16.183–6, where Josephus excoriates Nicolaus’ alleged omission of a rather fabulous instance of divine retribution Josephus claims occurred when Herod attempted to rob the tomb of David and Solomon in Jerusalem:

τούτου καὶ Νικόλαος ὁ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἱστοριογράφος μέμνηται τοῦ κατασκευάσματος, οὐ μὴν ὅτι καὶ κατήλθεν, οὐκ εὐπρεπῇ τὴν πράξιν ἐπιστάμενος. διατελεῖ δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον χρώμενος τῇ γραφῇ· (184) ζῶντι²⁸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ κεχαρισμένως ἐκείνῳ καὶ καθ’ ὑπηρεσίαν ἀνέγραφεν, μόνων ἀπτόμενος τῶν εὐκλειαν αὐτῷ φερόντων, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶς ἀδίκων ἀντικατασκευάζων καὶ μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς ἐπικρυπτόμενος, (185) ὅς γε καὶ τὸν Μαριάμμης θάνατον καὶ τῶν παιδῶν αὐτῆς οὕτως ὡμῶς τῷ βασιλεῖ πεπραγμένον εἰς εὐπρέπειαν ἀνάγειν βουλόμενος ἐκείνης τε ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τῶν νεανίσκων ἐπιβουλὰς καταψεύδεται, καὶ διατετέλεκεν τῇ γραφῇ τὰ μὲν πεπραγμένα δικαίως τῷ βασιλεῖ περιττότερον ἐγκωμιάζων, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν παρανομηθέντων ἐσπουδασμένως ἀπολογούμενος. (186) ἐκείνῳ μὲν οὖν πολλὴν ἂν τις, ὡς ἔφην, ἔχοι τὴν συγγνώμην· οὐ γὰρ ἱστορίαν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλὰ ὑπουργίαν τῷ βασιλεῖ ταύτην ἐποιεῖτο.

Nicolaus, the historiographer contemporary with him (sc. Herod), also mentions this monument, but, because he understood that the deed was unseemly, he does not mention that he (sc. Herod) also entered the tomb. Indeed, he continues to treat his writing in this manner in other respects as well. (184) For, since he was in Herod’s kingdom and was with him while he was still living, he wrote in a way that was gratifying to Herod and as a service to him. He touched upon only that which brought Herod glory, but

²⁸ Niese’s reading (Niese 1887–95). Cf. Wikgren 1963: 282 ζῶν τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ καὶ συνὼν αὐτῷ; Latin *nam vivente rege et cum eo degens* (Niese 1887–95 Vol. 4: 32 n.1).

painted many of his egregious injustices in the opposite colors and concealed them with utmost zeal. (185) Because he wished to elevate the death of Mariamne and her sons (which was carried out so cruelly by the king) to something acceptable, Nicolaus falsely accused her of licentiousness, and the youths of treachery. He continuously praised Herod's just deeds excessively in his writing and defended his law-breaking zealously. (186) However, one might readily pardon him, as I said, because he did not compose this as a history for others but as a service rendered to the king.

Josephus' description of Nicolaus' historiographical wrongdoing appears to be virtually a textbook case of what he accuses the Greeks of doing at *CA* 1.25: Nicolaus, Josephus alleges, sought both to do favors for (κεχαρισμένως) and praise (ἐγκωμιάζων) the infamous king. The result, according to Josephus, is similar to that of the Greeks who practice "the exact opposite of history" (τὸ πάντων ἐναντιώτατον ἱστορίᾳ) at 1.26: Nicolaus produced a work which was not a history at all (οὐδ' ... ἱστορίαν), but an act of service (ὑπουργίαν) to Herod. In Josephus' judgement, if a historian transgresses the exacting standards of accurate historiography, the composition produced necessarily and entirely loses its claim to the genre. Thus Josephus asserts that his own composition of the *BJ* should not be considered a work tainted by bias at *CA* 1.52, where he has described certain distinguished members of his audience: "And these men all gave testimony that I championed the truth carefully, and they are not the sort to have held back or kept silent, if I altered or left out any of the events out of ignorance or favoritism." (οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ἐμαρτύρησαν, ὅτι τῆς ἀληθείας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμελῶς, οὐκ ἂν ὑποστειλάμενοι καὶ σιωπήσαντες, εἴ τι κατ' ἄγνοιαν ἢ χαριζόμενος μετέθηκα τῶν γεγονότων ἢ παρέλιπον.) Josephus' relationship to the Flavian emperors has of course left him vulnerable to precisely this charge; he cer-

tainly lived in circumstances similar to those to which he directly attributes Nicolaus' alleged pro-Herod partisanship (mere contemporaneous habitation within his kingdom). Perhaps Josephus felt his vulnerability and sought to forestall the suspicion by calling as witness to his veracity both Jewish and Roman readers, though the defense was notoriously ineffective for many of Josephus' subsequent readers.

Finally, at *CA* 1.24–5 Josephus condemns Greek polemic and criticism, which I have discussed above. Greek historians have practiced these three problematic approaches to historiography, Josephus alleges, for the purpose of seeking fame or reputation, rather than truth. Thus, they conformed themselves (ἡρμόζοντο) to these various strategies, rather than to the truth, with the result that their tradition as a whole is characterized by variation. The claim that the Greeks wrote history in part to display “their skill with words” (λόγων δὲ δύναμιν ἐπεδείκνυντο) is a theme to which Josephus returns at 1.27, where he concedes that Greek historians are superior to Jewish historians (ἡμᾶς) in one respect:

λόγων μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις δεινότητος δεῖ παραχωρεῖν ἡμᾶς τοῖς συγγραφεῦσι τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῆς περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀληθοῦς ἱστορίας καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ τῆς περὶ τῶν ἐκάστοις ἐπιχωρίων.

As for language,²⁹ and cleverness with language, it is necessary for us to yield to Greek historiographers, but surely not likewise concerning the true history regarding the ancients, and especially not the history of what is indigenous to each.

Josephus' contrast between “cleverness with language” and true history recalls the disjunction between the appearance of truth (ἐνόμιζον ... φανεῖσθαι ... ἀληθέστατοι) in the

²⁹ λόγοι could also mean “stories” or “fiction,” as it does at 1.45.

minds of Greeks and true history at 1.26.³⁰ Josephus thus presents a contrast between Greek historiographical false appearances and non-Greek truth. The concession that opens 1.27 does not turn out to be much of a prize for Greek historiography after all.

The Jewish tradition, says Josephus, maintains a very different relationship to the idea of conformity, and a different relationship of the historian to his craft. Josephus describes strict requirements of lineage for those who attain the priesthood, the class of men to whom the right to write history is the exclusive domain.³¹ He compares the Jewish priesthood and their institutional control over historiography to the better known examples of the Egyptian priesthood and the Chaldeans (1.28), but asserts that the Jewish priests exercised the same if not greater care (ἐπιμέλεια at 1.29) over their historical records. The Jewish priests, says Josephus, were not only “the best men and servants of the cult of god” (τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ τῇ θεραπείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ προσεδρεύοντας), but the Jews’ ancestors took steps to ensure that the γένος of the priesthood remained “unmixed and pure” (ἄμικτον καὶ καθαρὸν), which Josephus describes at 1.31–6 as essentially a tightly-controlled system of genealogical record keeping that spans the diaspora and has created an unbroken documented succession of priests stretching over two thousand years (1.36). The emphasis on purity of lineage is striking and generally out of sync with the other qualifications Josephus outlines for historians in the *CA* (i.e. character, sure knowledge, literate bilingualism, all of which might be described as merit-based credentials), but is in

³⁰ The trope of eloquence v. truth is a common one. See, for instance, Thuc. 1.21, Plut. *De tranquillitate animi* 464f; also Janson 1964: 133–4.

³¹ Alongside the prophets, that is, who according to Josephus did not maintain a precise succession (ἀκριβὴ διαδοχὴν), the result of which was that the histories produced after the time of Artaxerxes “were not considered worthy of the same trust...” (πίστεως δ’ οὐχ ὁμοίας ἤξιωται) at 1.41. On Josephus’ confusing shift from priests to prophets in their role of historiographical production, see Barclay 2007: 28 n. 150.

keeping with Biblical strictures.³² This underscores the Jewish priesthood and its control over historical records as a point of difference from Greek historiography. Josephus concludes at 1.37 that what is important about the control of the lineage of the priesthood is that it ensures that not just anyone has the license to write history (μήτε τὸ ὑπογράφειν αὐτεξουσίῳ πᾶσιν ὄντος), which contrasts with his picture of the Greeks. Barclay detects in this passage an echo of the ἐξουσία of the Greeks at 1.20, a connection which underscores this contrast.³³ In his self-presentation, Josephus, as ever in his writings, draws attention to his priestly lineage, here not merely as a component of his elite identity but also as a historiographical credential. He translated the *AJ* from the scriptures, he says at 1.54, “having been born a priest by family” (γεγονὼς ἱερεὺς ἐκ γένους). Josephus’ expression ἐκ γένους connects with his emphasis on lineage in 1.31–6, and informs his reader that he is not just anyone attempting to write history, but has a unique familial qualification that guarantees historiographical authority, and implies that the truth of his history is assured by the institution of the priesthood.³⁴

Ancient Written Records/Recent Oral Traditions

Josephus presents the issue of the character and identity of the historian as closely connected to the presence or absence of early official written records as a cause of non-

³² See Barclay 2007: 25 n. 125 with bibliography.

³³ Barclay 2007: 28.

³⁴ As Marincola points out, citing Rajak 1983 and Cohen 1979, this appeal to priestly authority is designed more for Greek ears than Jewish ears, as Jewish priests were not necessarily regarded as authoritative interpreters of scripture. Marincola 1997: 110–11.

Greek historiographical consensus and Greek historiographical discord.³⁵ For Josephus, this deficiency is closely connected to the relative newness of the Greeks' curation of their past in comparison with the antiquity of institutionalized historiography among non-Greeks.

This idea is found at 1.7, where Josephus asserts that all Greek institutions are recent in their origin, and that concern for historiography is nearly the most recent of all (πάντων δὲ νεωτάτη σχεδὸν ἐστὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢ περὶ τὸ συγγράφειν τὰς ἱστορίας ἐπιμέλεια). He contrasts this with Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phoenicians, and, by way of praeteritio, Jews (1.8), whom even the Greeks agree, (ὁμολογοῦσιν) have a “most ancient and stable tradition of memory” (ἀρχαιοτάτην τε καὶ μονιμωτάτην ἔχειν τῆς μνήμης τὴν παράδοσιν). He further attributes the respective presence or absence of such records to local conditions of climate. Thus at 1.9, he explains that these non-Greek peoples inhabit climates conducive to record-keeping. Greece (τὴν Ἑλλάδα) is contrasted: at 1.10, Josephus describes the frequent obliteration of collective memory in Greece. It is striking that Josephus has restricted the geographical scope of early Greek intellectual output to Ἑλλάς,³⁶ ignoring (perhaps intentionally) the role of Ionia in the development of historiography (let alone other scientific/philosophical works).³⁷ This explanation for the disruption of collective Greek memory derives from the widespread trope of environmental

³⁵ Marincola traces the argument that written traditions are more authoritative than oral ones to Ephorus. Marincola 1997: 103.

³⁶ On the development of the geographical region encompassed by the term Ἑλλάς, see Hall 2002: 125–171.

³⁷ Some important works on Ionia as the hub of early Greek intellectual achievements include Cook 1963, Emlyn-Jones 1980, and Cobet et al. 2007.

determinism.³⁸ Josephus' restriction of Greek historiographers to Ἑλλάς in this description of course disregards the wide range of geographical regions from which the many Greek historians to which he later makes reference (e.g. 1.16) originate.³⁹ Or, quite plausibly, Josephus has taken advantage of the ambiguity of the referent of the word Ἑλλάς itself, which expanded over time from a small region of the Greek mainland to include an area so large as to make Josephus' environmental argument nonsensical.⁴⁰ The slipperiness of the term Ἑλλάς allows Josephus to engage in a rhetorical sleight of hand: he can maintain his argument from environmental determinism, and yet speak of a Greek tradition whose exponents were well known to have originated from a geographical area spanning from Asia Minor to Sicily.

Another of Josephus' causes of the disparity between Greek and Jewish traditions is literacy, a necessary pre-condition for written records. This is Josephus' topic at 1.10–13. Here he claims that the Greeks' tardiness in acquiring literacy is problematic, that it was derivative from the Phoenicians, and that even its late arrival in Greece cannot be dated. He further comments on the controversy over whether the generation of the Trojan War was literate, making the intriguing suggestion that they possessed an earlier form of literacy in his formulation τὴν νῦν οὖσαν τῶν γραμμάτων χρῆσιν. At 1.12, he asserts that the poetry of Homer is the oldest agreed-upon (ὁμολογούμενον) written survival in Greek, yet of relatively recent and uncertain date. Josephus here anticipates his position

³⁸ This idea is perhaps best known from Herodotus and the treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*. See Isaac 2004: 56–74.

³⁹ Hellanicus was Lesbian; Ephorus of Cyme hailed from Asia Minor; Timaeus, Antiochus, Philistis, and Callias were Sicilian.

⁴⁰ Hall 2002: 7, 125–71.

that consensus is an indicator of truth. Pursuing the theme of the late date of Greek literary origins, at 1.13 he states that the first Greek historiographers (namely, Cadmus of Miletus and Acusilaus of Argos) lived only shortly before the Persian Wars. Josephus insists on the relatively recent dates of these Greek figures in order to make his transition to his assertion at 1.14 that the first philosophers (Pherecydes, Pythagoras, and Thales) were the students of Egyptians and Chaldeans, and thus that Greek philosophy (like Greek literacy) is derivative from eastern traditions. The trope of Greek philosophy (and other Greek cultural practices) as derivative from eastern peoples had already gained traction well before Josephus' lifetime.⁴¹ His use of it serves his attempt to undermine the prestige and the trust that Josephus has claimed the Greeks enjoy but do not deserve. His emphasis on the recent date of the first practitioners of these Greek genres contrasts markedly with his claims about the early date of documented Jewish history.⁴²

Furthermore, the absence of early Greek official records, according to Josephus, has had serious ramifications for their historians. In Josephus' presentation, the value of such a tradition is its capacity to "teach those who wish to learn" (τοὺς μαθεῖν βουλομένους διδάξειν) and "refute those who falsify" (τοὺς ψευδομένους ἐλέγξειν) (1.23).⁴³ The assumption of the superiority of official or public (generally, δημοσία or δημοσίᾳ) written documentation—and specifically, early or even contemporary written

⁴¹ See West 1971, Momigliano 1975a esp. 123–50.

⁴² The history told in the *AJ*, Josephus says at *AJ* 1.1, spans 5,000 years.

⁴³ Note the similarities this statement of purpose has to Josephus' statement of purpose for the composition of the *CA* at 1.3: ... ᾠήθην δεῖν γράψαι συντόμως τῶν μὲν λοιδορούντων τὴν δυσμένειαν καὶ τὴν ἐκούσιον ἐλέγξει ψευδολογίαν ... διδάξαι δὲ πάντας, ὅσοι τάληθες εἰδέναι βούλονται περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχαιότητος.

documentation—over other methods or media of historical memory is inherent to Josephus’ argument. This assumption, however, creates the circular idea that a text (if it meets Josephus’ criteria of being official, contemporary, and written by an appropriate author) is itself the proof of its own veracity. Thus for Josephus the stories recorded in ancient public records among Egyptians, Babylonians, Phoenicians, and of course Jews can be trusted precisely because they are found in official written records. Conversely, the orality itself of an oral tradition (such as what lies behind the Homeric corpus) is proof of the uncertainty of the content of that oral tradition: orality is specifically the cause of *διαφωνία* within the corpus (1.11), and is evidence against the veracity of the story. Stable, written records, on the contrary, can instruct the historian (and therefore avert an individualistic impulse toward innovation) and allow for the transmission of unadulterated truth (1.23). It is because the Greeks lack such records that they are forced to write history based on conjecture or invention rather than secure knowledge (1.13); the resulting histories accordingly have a dubious relationship to truth.

In contrast to this picture of Greek history as a late and disorganized arrival on the world stage, Josephus at 1.8 and 1.28 asserts the antiquity (*ἐκ μακροτάτων ἄνωθεν χρόνων*) of the Egyptian and Babylonian institutions of record-keeping, and of Phoenician literacy,⁴⁴ before including Jewish scriptures, described as records (*τὰς ἀναγραφὰς*), among these better-known Near Eastern cultures. These records are, of course, the exclusive domain of each culture’s respective priestly or scribal class. The result of such strict

⁴⁴ Though as Barclay notes, Josephus does not directly claim great antiquity for Phoenician literacy. Barclay 2007: 24 n. 115. In his comments on 1.10, Barclay astutely remarks that Josephus’ inclusion of the Phoenicians allows him to utilize the (Greek) trope of Greek literacy as derivative (and therefore marking Greek culture as inferior). Barclay 2007: 15 n. 48.

institutional control over the production of historical texts is a timeless stability that guarantees the truth and trustworthiness of these peoples' histories. Thus at 1.8, Josephus speaks of the "very ancient and stable transmission of memory" (ἀρχαιοτάτην τε καὶ μονιμωτάτην ... τῆς μνήμης τὴν παράδοσιν) of these peoples, which even the Greeks acknowledge. At 1.29, Josephus expresses the expectation that the permanence of the Jewish priesthood's control over records will continue indefinitely into the future, just as it has endured throughout the long years of the recorded Jewish past. This contrasts strikingly with his descriptions of the constant catastrophes that he asserts at 1.10 afflicted Greece (τὴν Ἑλλάδα), destroyed all prior memory, and necessitated a fresh start of historical consciousness. The Jewish priesthood, says Josephus at 1.34–5, is insulated from such disasters by established procedure.⁴⁵ We see that Josephus presents the age, medium, and stability of the earliest official historical accounts as central to the opposition he presents between Greek and Near Eastern historiographical traditions.

Attitudes

The attitude of the historian toward his tradition is an element of Josephus' argument that is closely related to the matter of institutional control over the identity of the historian (or lack thereof). Historians' attitudes are on the whole, in Josephus' presentation, both symptom and cause of the discrepancy in truth for which he argues. At 1.42, Josephus claims that no Jew has either added to or removed anything from Jewish scrip-

⁴⁵ Though as Barclay has pointed out, Josephus has engaged in rhetorical sleight of hand at 1.30 as he shifts his discussion from the priests as authors and preservers of ancient records to the priests as authors and preservers of their own genealogies. Barclay 2007: 25 n. 125.

tures, and that all Jews have an innate impulse (σύμφυτόν ἐστίν) to consider the scriptures the decrees of god, and even to die for them, which (Josephus claims at 1.43) many Jews have done “in order not to let slip the slightest word against the laws and the records that accompany them” (ἐπὶ τῷ μηδὲν ῥῆμα προέσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μετὰ τούτων ἀναγραφάς). Against this picture of extreme devotion and martyrdom Josephus contrasts the Greeks, who would not be willing to submit to even a small injury to save all of Greek literature from destruction, because they consider their literature to be works of fiction written according to the desire of the authors (λόγους γὰρ αὐτὰ νομίζουσιν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν τῶν γραψάντων βούλησιν ἐσχεδιασμένους at 1.45). Josephus thus depicts both Jews and Greeks as having accurate estimations of the validity of their respective historiographical traditions: the Jewish histories represent θεοῦ δόγματα, and accordingly are objects of devotion worthy of martyrdom, whereas the Greek histories are fictional accounts (λόγους ... ἐσχεδιασμένους) deserving of not even the slightest personal sacrifice.

At 1.46, Josephus expands upon the idea that Greeks do not trust their own histories with the example of recent historians of the Romano-Jewish conflict who he claims have written accounts without any basis in autopsy. Though these historians are unnamed, Josephus strongly implies that he considers them to be Greeks, as the passage functions as an example of the general statement of 1.45, where he describes how Greeks view their own histories as fictional.⁴⁶ It is telling that Josephus describes these historians’

⁴⁶ On the possibility that Justus of Tiberias is at least among the intended target of Josephus’ polemic, see Barclay 2007: 34 n.188 and 38 n. 214. Barclay discusses this as Laqueur’s interpretation (Laqueur 1920), and surveys Laqueur’s critics.

methodologies in terms similar to (if decidedly more negative than) those he uses to describe the written composition of the Homeric tradition at 12. Compare 1.12:

ὅλως δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν οὐδὲν ὁμολογούμενον εὐρίσκεται γράμμα τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως πρεσβύτερον, οὗτος δὲ καὶ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν ὕστερος φαίνεται γενόμενος, καὶ φασιν οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἐν γράμμασι τὴν αὐτοῦ ποίησιν καταλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ διαμνημονευομένην **ἐκ τῶν ᾠσμάτων** ὕστερον **συντεθῆναι** καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ σχεῖν τὰς διαφωνίας.

In general, no writing has been discovered that is agreed among the Greeks to be older than the poetry of Homer, and he was manifestly born later than the Trojan War, and they say that this man did not leave behind his poetry in writing, but it was committed to memory and **assembled** later **from the songs** and for this reason it had many discrepancies in it.

With 1.46:

ἀμέλει καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου νῦν ἡμῖν πολέμου τινὲς ἱστορίας ἐπιγράψαντες ἐξενήνοχασιν οὐτ' εἰς τοὺς τόπους παραβαλόντες οὔτε πλησίον τούτων πραττομένων προσελθόντες, ἀλλ' **ἐκ παρακουσμάτων** ὀλίγα **συνθέντες** τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας ὀνόματι λίαν ἀναιδῶς ἐνεπαροΐνησαν.

Some have actually produced what they called histories even about our recent war having neither gone to the sites nor come near the actual events, but having **assembled** a few **things from false rumors** they have drunkenly mistreated the name of history with excessive shamelessness.

Josephus describes authors without access to the events themselves who assembled (συντεθῆναι, συνθέντες) written compositions from oral sources (orality is explicit in both ᾠσμάτων and παρακουσμάτων). Josephus thus envisions a Greek historiographical method which produces problematic histories (to say the least): in the case of Homer, poetry containing πολλὰς ... διαφωνίας, and in the case of the nameless historians of the Jewish war, an abuse of the name of ἱστορία itself. As at *CA* 1.26 and *AJ* 16.186, Josephus insists that works not produced according to his strictures do not properly belong to the genre of history.

Josephus' Historiographical Identity

Josephus concludes his discussion of historiography with a lengthy defense of his own identity as a historian at 1.47–56, in which he asserts how he has personally met the conditions for creating true histories that he laid out in the preceding chapters. In contrast to the contemporary historians of the war mentioned in 1.46 (περὶ τοῦ γενομένου νῦν ἡμῖν πολέμου τινὲς ἱστορίας ἐπιγράψαντες),⁴⁷ Josephus says of himself at 1.47:

ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πολέμου παντὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶ κατὰ μέρος
γενομένων ἀληθῆ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν ἐποίησάμην τοῖς πράγμασιν αὐτὸς
ᾗπασι παρατυχών·

But I, by contrast, made my account of the war as a whole and of the individual events in it a truthful one because I myself was present at all of the events.

Josephus uses the emphatic first person pronoun, as well as the pronoun αὐτός, to create a contrast to the τινὲς of the previous sentence; his purported presence at all(!) of the events of the war contrasts with his claim that they have not so much as visited Judea, let alone been present at the events of the war. His own presence constitutes his capacity for writing from autopsy. His more detailed comments at 1.49 on the period of his command in Galilee, time as a prisoner among the Romans, and subsequent release provide further claims to historiographical authority:

⁴⁷ See Rajak 1983: 177–200 on the historiography of the Flavian period.

ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ ἡγενομένην⁴⁸ τῶν πραττομένων οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τὴν ἐμὴν γνῶσιν
διέφυγεν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ Ῥωμαίων ὁρῶν ἐπιμελῶς
ἀνέγραφον καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν αὐτομόλων ἀπαγγελλόμενα μόνος αὐτὸς
συνίειν.

During that time...nothing that was done escaped my knowledge, for as I
saw the events in the Romans' camp, I carefully recorded them along with
what was reported by the deserters, since I alone understood them.

The experience which Josephus describes of both observing events in the Roman camp,
hearing and, crucially, understanding the reports of Jewish deserters at 1.49 further con-
trasts with his description of Greek historians at 1.45 who were neither present at the
events nor learned about them from those who knew ((sc. πράγματα) οἷς μήτ' αὐτοὶ
παρεγένοντο μήτε πυθέσθαι παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν.) Josephus' description of
his own carefulness in his record-keeping (ἀνέγραφον) aligns him to a degree with the
careful historical practices of the Egyptians and Babylonians at 1.28 (τὴν περὶ τὰς
ἀναγραφὰς ἐπιμέλειαν), and the Jews beginning at 1.29, specifically with the process of
creating public records on the basis of careful documentation of contemporary events
which Josephus claims at 1.37 was the practice of the prophets.⁴⁹ It also aligns him with
these Near Eastern historians against the carelessness of the Greeks even with regard to
contemporary events: at 1.20, Josephus speaks of the "Greeks' habit of not paying any
serious attention to public records of individual events as they are happening" (τὸ ... μὴ
σπουδασθῆναι παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι δημοσίας ... περὶ τῶν ἐκάστοτε πραττομένων

⁴⁸ Barclay in his translation, like most modern editors including Thackeray, omits the orphaned *γενομένην*, which does not appear in all manuscripts and which is untranslatable with this punctuation, but could otherwise possibly be construed with *πολιορκίαν* (see Gutschmid 1893: 409). Siegert, however, prints it, and so I do, too, but have not forced it into my translation. See also Ch. 4, p. 222.

⁴⁹ Josephus' use of the verb *ἀναγράφω* is standard for historical composition throughout his corpus.

ἀναγραφὰς). Josephus has thus positioned himself within the contrast in historical methodologies that he has mapped out between Greeks and Near Eastern peoples firmly on the side of Jewish historians, who produce historiographical truth.

As I discussed above, Josephus presents both Greeks and Jews as having appropriate and just attitudes toward the written products of their respective historiographical traditions. In Josephus' presentation, Greek attitudes toward their own histories have created a problem for the reception of his own works. At 1.53, he returns to the alleged critics of the *BJ*, who are not necessarily the critics of the *AJ* discussed in the proem of the *CA*, though their attitudes toward Josephus' works are similar. These critics, says Josephus, have judged the *BJ* as if it were an exercise for young men in school: ὥσπερ ἐν σχολῇ μαιρακίων γύμνασμα προκεῖσθαι νομίζοντες.⁵⁰ Both Thackeray and Barclay note the similarity to Thucydides 1.22 (κτῆμά τε ἐξ αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.).⁵¹ Josephus' remark that, contrary to the beliefs of his critics, his history was not a showpiece resembles the Thucydidean topos, but there is more to be said. Josephus appears to have in mind the exercises in declamation that were a chief component of rhetorical training; Thucydides' ἀγώνισμα is more plausibly a reference to competitions in oral performance.⁵² Josephus' slight alteration of the Thucydidean topos by shifting the context from oral performance to formal rhetorical education has the effect of

⁵⁰ A similar construction to ὥσπερ ἐν σχολῇ is found in Plutarch *De Pythiis Oraculis* 403 c: ὅπου δὲ ποικίλον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀπόρητον οὐδὲ δεινόν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πράγμασι μικροῖς καὶ δημοτικοῖς ἐρωτήσεις οἷον ἐν σχολῇ προτάσεις 'εἰ γαμητέον' 'εἰ πλευστέον' 'εἰ δανειστέον'...

⁵¹ Thackeray 1926 p.184 n. a, Barclay 2007: 39 n.215, though Barclay is mistaken in his claim that Thucydides, too, uses the term γύμνασμα.

⁵² See Hornblower 1991: 61–2.

signaling Josephus' awareness of the conventions of this particular institution of Greek παιδεία while subtly using it to belittle his critics. If the *BJ* is a γύμνασμα, its audience, the Greek critics, are the μειράκια at school, a suggestion furthered by the admonition which follows: δέον ἐκεῖνο γινώσκειν, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ἄλλοις παράδοσιν πράξεων ἀληθινῶν ὑπισχνούμενον αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι ταύτας πρότερον ἀκριβῶς, ἢ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἢ παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων πυνθανόμενον. ("It is necessary to recognize that point: that the person undertaking the transmission to others of true events himself needs first to know these things accurately either because he has followed them closely as they happened or because he learns them from those who know.") These Greek critics, Josephus implies, are immature intellectuals in need of knowledge of basic historiographical principles. Josephus' admonition to these critics, mere adolescents in understanding, suggests the instructions of a teacher to pupils; γινώσκειν indicates a process of learning or coming to know.

The content of this Thucydidean topos ties Josephus' (implicitly) Greek readers to the Greek readers of Greek histories at 1.45, who consider (νομίζουσιν) Greek histories to be fictional. Josephus thus describes the readers of the *BJ* as having the same expectation of the *BJ* as they have of Greek histories, which at 1.45, Josephus had claimed was an appropriate estimation of Greek histories. In the case of the *BJ*, however, this expectation has led these readers to slander a true history, and also apparently is grounds for Josephus' decidedly more negative description of these readers as φαῦλοι ... τινες ἄνθρωποι. An attitude that was an appropriate response to the inferior Greek historiographical tradition is given negative moral coloring when it is a response to a true, serious

history. It is as if, for Josephus, Greek readers have been conditioned by the failings of their own tradition to expect all historiography to be essentially the same as their own: insincere and of dubious veracity. Such an expectation would be in keeping with Greek ignorance of Jewish and other Near Eastern histories. The Greek readers of the *BJ*, it would seem, do not know what they do not know: they have not realized that they were not in fact reading a work of Greek historiography, but according to Josephus, a work which is the product of the far more rigorous Jewish historiographical methods.⁵³

There is still more to observe of 1.53 and what follows. Throughout his discussion of historiography, Josephus has been painting a picture of his own identity as a historian, and his position within his Greek/Jewish opposition. As a capstone to his arguments, he presents his fullest and most explicit statement on himself as a historian at 1.53–6:

δέον ἐκεῖνο γινώσκειν, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ἄλλοις παράδοσιν πράξεων ἀληθινῶν ὑπισχνούμενον αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι ταύτας πρότερον ἀκριβῶς, ἢ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἢ παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων πυθνανόμενον. (54) ὅπερ ἐγὼ μάλιστα περὶ ἀμφοτέρας νομίζω πεποιηκέναι τὰς πραγματείας. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαιολογίαν, ὥσπερ ἔφην, ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων μεθερμήνευκα γεγονῶς ἱερεὺς ἐκ γένους καὶ μετεσχηκῶς τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς γράμμασι· (55) τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὴν ἱστορίαν ἔγραψα πολλῶν μὲν αὐτουργὸς πράξεων, πλείστον δ' αὐτόπτης γενόμενος, ὅλως δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων ἢ πραχθέντων οὐδοτιοῦν ἀγνοήσας. (56) πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν θρασεῖς τις ἡγήσαιο τοὺς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μοι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπικειρηκότας, οἳ καὶ τοῖς τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων ὑπομνήμασιν ἐντυχεῖν λέγωσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις τῶν ἀντιπολεμούντων πράγμασι παρέτυχον;

It is necessary to recognize this point: that the person undertaking the transmission to others of true events himself needs first to know these things accurately either because he has followed them closely as they happened or because he learns them from those who know. (54) I believe that

⁵³ As often, Josephus' descriptions of his own works are to varying degrees at odds with the actual works. The *BJ*, a Thucydidean war monograph, is very much a work of Greek historiography at least in its form (see e.g. Mason 2016b).

I myself have certainly done this very thing in both of my works. For I translated the *Archaeology* (as I said) from the sacred scriptures, having been born a priest by family and having possessed a share of the philosophy that is in those scriptures, (55) while I wrote the *War* both myself having brought about many of the events, and having become an eyewitness of most, and above all ignorant of none whatsoever of the things that were said and done. (56) How indeed could one not consider those men arrogant who have attempted to dispute with me about the truth, who, even if they say they read the field notes of the emperors, were not, however, present for events on our side, that of the enemy combatants.

I have already discussed in brief Josephus' description of himself as a priest of priestly lineage as a means of aligning himself with his description of valid Jewish historiographical method, namely in his description at 30–36 of the institution of the Jewish priesthood; his mention of his participation in the φιλοσοφία of the scriptures adds a new dimension to why the priesthood should be a valid historiographical credential.⁵⁴ Josephus' further description of his credentials for composing the *BJ* fulfills the condition for historiographical truth that authors compose only on the basis of sure knowledge: Josephus says he was either personally involved as a doer of deeds (αὐτουργός), that he was an eyewitness (αὐτόπτης),⁵⁵ or that he was not ignorant (οὐδοτιοῦν ἀγνοήσας) of any of the events of the war. He curiously rejects as valid his unnamed critics' method of writing accounts of the war on the basis of the field notes of Vespasian and Titus, which would surely count as learning the truth from those who know it, as described at 1.45 (πυθέσθαι

⁵⁴ Barclay argues that Josephus' presentation of a unique Jewish φιλοσοφία, which is separate from Greek philosophy, allows him to appropriate the Greek term while asserting a superior Jewish equivalent. Barclay 2007: 40 n. 221.

⁵⁵ There is an apparent wordplay between αὐτουργός and αὐτόπτης that has the effect of balancing the historian's fulfillment of the criterion of experience.

παρὰ τῶν εἰδότηων).⁵⁶ Rather than dispute with the emperors' records per se, he asserts that their knowledge was incomplete because it was one-sided. His personal acquaintance with, and direct experience of, the affairs of the Romans' enemies constitutes a superior historiographical credential. Josephus thus locates himself firmly on the side of what he claims is proper, Jewish historical procedure for his composition of the both the *BJ* and the *AJ*.⁵⁷ While Thucydidean and even Herodotean influence may be felt in his language and intertextuality, at the level of explicit claims, Josephus creates a strong contrast between his own historiographical methods and those used by Greeks, positioning himself decidedly as an outsider to Greek historiography. Let us also observe that as Josephus has connected his own marginalization and poor reception as an author to the injustice with which Jewish historiography has always been treated in a Hellenocentric world, so his exoneration and elevation of the Jewish tradition is closely bound with his personal redemption as an author.

Coda on Historiography: The Weakness of Text

I offer some final thoughts to this section on Josephus' discussion of the differences between Greek and Jewish historiography in an attempt to avoid oversimplifying Josephus' assessment of written and oral sources on ancient history. For despite his gen-

⁵⁶ Though the phrase κἄν ... λέγωσιν suggests that Josephus is skeptical of these authors' claim.

⁵⁷ Josephus omits any mention of the fact that nearly half of the *AJ* is not based on the Hebrew Scriptures and is not contemporary history. Josephus thus fails to account for his methodology for nearly a third of his historiographical output. *AJ* 12–20 is, as is well known, composed on the basis of a wide array of sources, known and unknown, and with perceptible variations in prose style. On the composition, sources, and general historiographical issues of the *AJ*, see e.g. Schwartz 2016, Pastor, Stern, and Mor 2011, Feldman 1998a and b, Sterling 1992.

eral claims that early, written, and official documents of the sort carefully curated among Jews, Egyptians, Babylonians, and Phoenicians are the only valid sources, and that oral sources (namely, Greek ῥήματα) are not valid evidence, Josephus also attempts to cope with the limitations he presents as inherent to written documents as historical sources. For instance, Josephus refers to two gaps in the continuous recording and transmission of Jewish historical documents. The first appears at 1.37–8, where in the context of a summary of why Jewish scriptures are “justly trusted” (δικαίως πεπιστευμένα) Josephus remarks that prophets (namely, Moses) learned “the most remote and ancient” of events (τὰ ἀνωτάτα καὶ παλαιότατα) through divine inspiration (κατὰ τὴν ἐπίπνοιαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ). This striking statement (the only one of its kind in the *CA*) implies that it is intrinsically impossible to create official documentation for *all* things, as documentation requires not only scribes, and, of course, writing, but humans and human history. How could the book of Genesis possibly exist as the result of contemporary records kept by the priesthood, when it describes not only events predating the creation of the priesthood, but events predating the creation of humanity?⁵⁸ There is thus an insurmountable gap in the record that exists prior to all possibility of historiography, which is not due to the alleged Greek failure to create and maintain records, but is intrinsic to the concept of the beginning of the world. This gap, in Josephus’ view, can only be bridged by the divine.⁵⁹

At 1.41, Josephus remarks that the failure of prophetic succession resulted in the creation of histories which are less trustworthy than those predating the rule of Artaxerx-

⁵⁸ So Barclay 2007: 29 n. 153. Cf. Dillery’s remarks on Berossus’ deference to the authority of the sage Oannes for his account of time predating human history. Dillery 2015: 239–40.

⁵⁹ Barclay 2007: 28–9 on divine inspiration as foreign to Greek historiographical thinking.

es (πίστεως δ' οὐχ ὁμοίας . . . τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν). While this remark certainly is meant to account for the unique status of the Hebrew canon,⁶⁰ it also signals that Josephus presents the authors' familial identity as a critical element in the production of trustworthy history even when the criteria of autopsy and careful record-keeping are met. In other words, despite the continuous production of contemporary, and even official historical records among the Jews, autopsy and record-keeping are not sufficient to produce trustworthy history; the problem that has derailed the ancient trustworthiness of the Jewish tradition is an error of human reproduction rather than of historiographical composition. Josephus necessarily understands himself to be in this category of historians postdating Artaxerxes (ἀπὸ δὲ Ἀρταξέρξου μέχρι τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνου); he does not equate his own status to that of Moses and the early prophets. Despite the absolute nature of the opposition of true and false histories presented elsewhere in the *CA*, here at least historiographical trustworthiness appears to exist on a spectrum. And the potential for human error exists not only on the side of the production of trustworthy histories but also on the side of the audience. At 1.216, for instance, Josephus observes his own inability to read Greek sources on Jewish antiquity exhaustively. At 1.73, Josephus remarks that he cannot cite the original Egyptian documents, but instead must rely on Manetho's Greek translation. Even more intriguingly, Josephus describes at 1.218 three Jewish historians whose historical errors are excusable "since it was not in their power to follow our writings with complete precision" (οὐ γὰρ ἐνῆν αὐτοῖς μετὰ πάσης ἀκριβείας τοῖς ἡμετέροις γράμμασι

⁶⁰ Barclay 2007: 30–1 n. 169.

παρακολουθεῖν).⁶¹ He does not elaborate why they should have been thus incapable.⁶²

But the comment, along with 1.216, implies strongly that even when a text may be a trustworthy record of the past, the text's reader may have a limited ability to understand or use the text correctly, or even to access it at all. While Josephus does not here fault the texts per se, his remarks invite questions: what exactly is the truth value of a text if the reader cannot read it properly, or conversely, what can make one a good reader of ancient records? In this way, the limitations intrinsic to reading texts resonate with the problems Josephus claims to have had with the audience of the *AJ* that spawned the *CA* in the first place.

II. νόμοι, νομοθέται, and πολιτεῖαι

In the second half of Book 2, a new topic will provide fertile ground for Josephus to return to themes familiar from Book 1. Beginning at 2.145, Josephus introduces his topic for the remainder of the treatise: the Jewish system of governance, or νόμοι. He frames the remainder of the *CA* as a defense against the false accusations of Apollonius Molon, Lysimachus, and “some others” (καί τινες ἄλλοι) by explicitly referring to it as an ἀπολογία at 2.147. He also signals at 2.150 that he will compare the Jewish constitution with the constitution(s) of others:

εἰ δ' ἄρα βιασθείην μνησθῆναι τῶν παρ' ἑτέροις ὑπεναντίως
νενομισμένων, τούτου δίκαιοι τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν εἰσὶν οἱ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὥς
χείρῳ παραβάλλειν ἀξιοῦντες.

⁶¹ See Barclay 2007, p. 124 n. 745 on Josephus' misidentification of Demetrius of Phalerum.

⁶² The problem appears to be linguistic, as τοῖς ἡμετέροις γράμμασι suggests that Josephus refers to the Hebrew scriptures. See Barclay 2007: 125 n. 749 and Schwartz 2007.

But should I ever be compelled to recall those things which have been made law in a contrary manner among others, those men justly have the blame for this who think it right to compare our affairs as though they were worse.

Josephus has not identified Apollonius et al. as Greek per se, nor given any indication that he understands the ἑτέροις or the οἱ of 2.150 (who are not necessarily the same party) as Greeks, and so the final major section of the *CA* is not explicitly framed at the outset as polemic against Greeks, as the first was at 1.6. Nevertheless, it quickly becomes apparent that the others (ἑτέροις) with whose political systems Josephus compares the Jews' are, in Josephus' understanding, Greeks. Accordingly, the second half of Book 2 is replete with overt comparisons between Greeks and Jews, their respective systems of government, and, closely related in Josephus' view, their religious beliefs and practices. Though this section of the *CA* represents about a quarter of the treatise, its theme is not signaled as important in the proem (1.1–5), in which Josephus frames the treatise as a response to critics of the *AJ* and thus fundamentally as an argument about the reception of his historical works. The purpose of the treatise shifts.⁶³ Nonetheless, the themes of 2.145–296 bear a close resemblance to those of the rest of the treatise, including the sources of Apollonius' and Lysimachus' alleged slanders: ignorance and malice (τὰ μὲν ὑπ' ἀγνοίας, τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ κατὰ δυσμένειαν at 2.145).⁶⁴

Of particular significance for my present purposes are the close similarities between what Josephus presents as the causes of the alleged gross disparities between

⁶³ See Barclay's discussion, with bibliography. Barclay 2007: XIX.

⁶⁴ Compare with the characterization of Josephus' detractors at 1.3.

Greek and Jewish νόμοι, and Greek and Jewish historiographical traditions. It is not surprising that Josephus shows himself to be consistent in his diagnosis of the underlying problems in Greek culture, and likewise in his descriptions of their symptoms. For to Josephus, Jewish history and νόμοι comprise a single canon, and though he has separated his discussion of the two topics by a considerable space in the treatise, he presents both as having their origin in Moses. I will begin with Josephus' discussion of the earliest νόμοι in each respective culture.

Oral v. Written: The Earliest νόμοι

As in his arguments concerning historiography, Josephus maintains that the medium of the earliest νόμοι of both the Greeks and the Jews had significant consequences for the value and the duration of the respective νόμοι. This is observed, for instance, at 2.154–6:

φημι τοίνυν τὸν ἡμέτερον νομοθέτην τῶν ὅπουδηποτοῦν μνημονευομένων νομοθετῶν προάγειν ἀρχαιότητι. Λυκοῦργοι γὰρ καὶ Σόλωνες καὶ Ζάλευκος ὁ τῶν Λοκρῶν καὶ πάντες οἱ θαυμαζόμενοι παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐχθὲς δὴ καὶ πρῶην ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον παραβαλλόμενοι φαίνονται γεγονότες, ὅπου γε μὴδ' αὐτὸ τοῦνομα πάλαι ἐγιγνώσκετο τοῦ νόμου παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι. (155) καὶ μάρτυς Ὅμηρος οὐδαμοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως αὐτῷ χρησάμενος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ γνώμαις ἀορίστοις τὰ πλήθη διωκεῖτο καὶ προστάγμασι τῶν βασιλέων· ἀφ' οὗ καὶ μέχρι πολλοῦ διέμειναν ἔθεςιν ἀγράφοις χρώμενοι καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ συντυγχάνον μετατιθέντες. (156) ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης ἀρχαιότατος γεγονώς, τοῦτο γὰρ δῆπουθεν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πάντα καθ' ἡμῶν λέγουσιν, ἑαυτὸν τε παρέσχεν ἄριστον τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἡγεμόνα καὶ σύμβουλον, τὴν τε κατασκευὴν αὐτοῖς ὅλην τοῦ βίου τῷ νόμῳ περιλαβὼν ἔπεισεν παραδέξασθαι καὶ βεβαιωτάτην εἰς ἀεὶ φυλαχθῆναι παρεσκεύασεν.

Now I say that our lawgiver predates the lawgivers mentioned at some other point. For the Lycurguses and the Solons and Zaleucus (the lawgiver

of the Locrians) and all of those admired among the Greeks seem to have been born yesterday or the day before when compared with him, since not even the word “law” was known among the Greeks in ancient times. (155) Homer is our witness, having never used it in his poetry; for it did not exist in his day, but the common people were governed by undefined maxims and the commands of kings, and for a long time afterward they persisted in using unwritten customs and always changing many of them to fit the circumstance. (156) Our lawgiver, on the other hand, who was most ancient (for this is of course agreed upon even among those saying all of the things against us), showed himself to be both the best ruler and counsellor for the common people and, having encompassed the entire condition of life in the law, persuaded them to receive it and made sure it would be preserved forever.

It is apparent that Josephus is contrasting Moses and the Jewish πολιτεία with νομοθέται who are admired by the Greeks (explicitly identified as τοῖς Ἑλλησιν) and their respective constitutions. Firstly, Josephus contrasts the antiquity of Moses with Lycurgus, Solon, and Zaleucus, presented as exemplary Greek lawgivers. Josephus again borrows the famous phrase from Herodotus and Plato (ἐχθὲς δὴ καὶ πρόην) to express the relatively recent date of Greek institutions, which he also applied to Greek historiography at 1.7 and said of Pythagoras at 2.14.⁶⁵ To prove the priority of Moses, Josephus remarks that the word νόμος does not appear in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*.⁶⁶ Here Josephus engages in rhetorical sleight of hand, equating νόμος with written law,⁶⁷ and thus accounting for the absence of the term from the poems by explaining that in Homer’s day, people were gov-

⁶⁵ Though in a variant formulation at 1.7: ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόην.

⁶⁶ This is in fact true, but hardly as significant as Josephus makes it, as the word θέμιστες appears to be the term of choice in the Homeric corpus. See Barclay 2007: 255 n. 586.

⁶⁷ Barclay 2007: 255 n. 585–7. Josephus’ selective interpretation of νόμος is all the more striking given that, according to Rajak, the term became a calque of “Torah” for Hellenistic Jews, and accordingly expanded the range of meanings for νόμος to incorporate the range of the Hebrew Torah, which included ideas such as “teaching” and “instruction.” In other words, Josephus’ insistence on νόμος as written law or precept serves to restrict what is in fact a term of much wider semantic range among Hellenophone Jews in order to create the desired contrast. Rajak 2009: 21–3.

erned by unwritten customs (ἔθεσιν ἀγράφοις), consisting of maxims (γνώμαις ἀορίστοις) and royal commands (προστάγμασι τῶν βασιλέων). The oral nature of this governance is, for Josephus, responsible for its being subject to change (διέμειναν ... πολλὰ τούτων ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ συντυγχάνον μετατιθέντες). This inconsistency stands in contrast to Josephus' claim of the secure preservation (βεβαιοτάτην εἰς ἀεὶ φυλαχθῆναι) of the Jewish constitution. The claims of difference found at 2.154–6 bear a close resemblance to Josephus' discussion of early history and record-keeping at 1.7–27. Once more, orality or the lack of written documents (here νόμοι rather than historical records) results in inconsistency, now manifest as alteration of custom rather than differences among historiographers, and written record results in stability, now of νόμοι rather than of accounts of the past.

Homer once more serves as evidence for early Greek history. As at 1.11, the (possible) non-literacy of the generation of the Trojan War has serious repercussions for the future of Greek culture. If we take Josephus' two discussions of Homer together, we see that at 2.154–6 an oral historiographical composition (as the works of Homer are described at 1.12) testifies to an oral system of governance for Josephus; a motley assemblage of songs (ἐκ τῶν ᾠμάτων ὕστερον συντεθῆναι) attests to “undefined maxims” (γνώμαις ἀορίστοις) that alter with the changing times. Josephus' presentation of the works of Homer as, once more, an authority of sorts on the earliest documented Greek history and customs, makes Homer and the Homeric corpus the curious Greek counterpart of Moses and the Torah. Both traditions have an originator, but they are not equals: where the Homeric corpus gives evidence of the original orality of Greek history and laws, Moses is the first Jewish historiographer, whose works are also the first testi-

mony and record of unchanging Jewish law. Josephus presents the differences between the two as foundational to both respective cultures: as Jewish and Greek historiography and νόμοι began at their inceptions, so they have continued until Josephus' day.

Moses and Monotheism

The importance of this view for Josephus cannot be overstated: everything about what makes Jewish νόμοι superior to Greek depends, in his presentation, on the original νομοθέτης, Moses, his character, and his correct theology. Like Jewish historiography and customs, Josephus insists that Moses needs to be defended from unfair attacks by those who don't understand him at 2.161–2:

τοιούτος μὲν δὴ τις αὐτὸς ἡμῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, οὐ γόης οὐδ' ἀπατεῶν, ἅπερ λοιδοροῦντες λέγουσιν ἀδίκως, ἀλλ' οἷους παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἀνχοῦσιν τὸν Μίνω γεγονέναι καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς ἄλλους νομοθέτας· (162) οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν τοὺς νόμους ὑποτίθενται <Δί>⁶⁸, ᾗ οἱ δ' εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὸ Δελφικὸν αὐτοῦ μαντεῖον ἀνέφερον,†⁶⁹ ἥτοι τὰληθὲς οὕτως ἔχειν νομίζοντες ἢ πείσειν ῥᾶον ὑπολαμβάνοντες.

Our lawgiver himself was just such a person, not a charlatan or a fraud, as slanderers say unfairly, but just the sort which they boast among the Greeks were Minos and the lawgivers after him. (162) For some of these attribute their laws <to Zeus>, others traced theirs back to Apollo and his Delphic oracle, either because they think that this is true or because they suppose this will persuade more easily.

Josephus here asserts a similarity between Moses and Minos (and his unnamed successors) both in terms of personal character and in terms of the purported divine origin of

⁶⁸ Siegert does not print Δί, as it does not appear in the manuscripts, though he clearly translates it (Siegert 2007: Vol. 1 187). The conjecture is Niese's on the basis of the Latin. I have here adopted Niese's emendation in the interest of providing a text that makes sense. It is in any event clear that 2.162 is corrupt in the manuscripts.

⁶⁹ I have diverged from Siegert here as well in adopting Niese's emendation, as Siegert prints the gloss that was incorporated into the manuscripts.

their respective laws. These similarities serve to establish that Moses belongs in the same league with the best and most ancient of Greek νομοθέται according to Greek tradition, in contrast to the view of Moses as a γόης and ἀπατεών (the same terms which Josephus claims are used by Apollonius and Lysimachus at 2.145). The apparent elevation of Moses from the derisive remarks of the slanderers to the ranks of exemplary Greek figures serves both to privilege Greek νομοθέται and to create the foundation for Josephus' comparison of Moses and Greek νομοθέται. For Josephus, what a lawgiver believes about the divine and how well he is able to create laws are inextricably bound together, as is apparent in his framing of the double question at 2.163 that introduces his comparison of lawgivers: "Who was it who established especially good laws and obtained the most just belief about god ..." (τίς δ' ἦν ὁ μάλιστα κατορθώσας τοὺς νόμους καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης περὶ θεοῦ πίστεως ἐπιτυχών...) Accordingly, Moses' monotheistic views will have ramifications for Jewish νόμοι on par with the consequences for historiographical truth Josephus claims for the purported unity of the Jewish historiographical tradition.

Josephus elaborates the reasons for Moses' success in producing for the Jews a πολιτεία that is not only morally and theologically superior to Greek counterparts, but stable and enduring over vast spans of time. One such cause is the system of education with which Moses is credited. Thus at 2.171, Josephus asserts that there are two essential categories of education (ἀπάσης παιδείας ... καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη κατασκευῇ): "instruction by means of language, and through the training of character" (ὁ (sc. τρόπος) μὲν

λόγῳ διδασκαλικός, ὁ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀσκήσεως τῶν ἡθῶν).⁷⁰ Josephus claims that the other lawgivers (οἱ ... ἄλλοι νομοθέται) chose only one side of this apparent mind-body divide, and neglected the other. He gives some examples at 2.172:

... οἷον Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν καὶ Κρήτες ἔθεσιν ἐπαίδευον, οὐ λόγοις, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες Ἑλλήνες ἃ μὲν χρὴ πράττειν ἢ μὴ προσέτασσον διὰ τῶν νόμων, τοῦ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἐθίζειν ὀλιγώρουν.

... as the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans educated by means of habits, not language, while the Athenians and nearly all the rest of the Greeks prescribed what one should or should not do through the laws, but thought little of accustoming people to them by means of deeds.

At 2.173, Josephus continues: Ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης ἄμφω ταῦτα συνήρμοσε κατὰ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν... (“But our lawgiver harmonized both of these with great care ...”).⁷¹ Thus Josephus compares the Jewish system of education exclusively with Greek systems, contrasting the partial Greek systems with the unified, whole Jewish system.⁷² As in his discussion of historiography, Josephus frames unity as an important characteristic of Jewish institutions and as an important point of difference from Greek institutions. At 2.175–8, he draws a contrast between the Jewish custom of weekly reading of the law as a means of ensuring that all Jews know their law, and “most of humanity” (οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων at 176), who do not know their own laws and appoint administrators

⁷⁰ As Barclay remarks, Josephus thus recalls the λόγος/ἔργον antithesis, widespread throughout the Greek tradition, evident also at 1.55, τῶν λεχθέντων ἢ πραχθέντων. See Barclay 2007: 267 n. 673, and Parry 1957: 15–61 on the antithesis in archaic and classical Greek literature. See also Immerwahr 1960 on the concept of ἔργον and its relationship to memory in historiography.

⁷¹ As Aristotle prescribes at *Pol.* 1334b: λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην ... (Barclay 2007: 267 n. 673).

⁷² This description of Athenian education certainly contrasts with that of Thucydides’ in the Funeral Oration, where Pericles makes almost the same contrast between Athenian education (as holistic) and Spartan (as partial) at 2.39.1: καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἥσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν.

(ἐπιστάτας at 177) as legal experts in charge of government administration. It is implicit that “most of humanity” refers generally to Greeks, as this discussion follows the explicit contrast of 2.172–3, where Josephus’ examples were drawn solely from Greeks.⁷³

Moses’ provision that all Jews receive thorough instruction in their νόμοι has an important consequence described at 2.179:

τοῦτο πρῶτον πάντων τὴν θαυμαστὴν ὁμόνοιαν ἡμῖν ἐμπεποίηκε. τὸ γὰρ μίαν μὲν ἔχειν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν περὶ θεοῦ, τῷ βίῳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι μηδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν, καλλίστην ἐν ἡθεσιν ἀνθρώπων συμφωνίαν ἀποτελεῖ.

This most of all has caused our remarkable unanimity. For having one and the same belief about god, and not differing from one another in way of life and customs, produces the most beautiful harmony in human characters.

Uniform education has created a collective theological identity, which contrasts at 2.180 with the widely varying beliefs about god (περὶ θεοῦ λόγους ... ἀλλήλοις ὑπεναντίους) that are common among others (παρ’ ἑτέροις). It is again implicit that these “others” are Greeks, particularly because the specific examples of these contradictory beliefs which Josephus gives were espoused by Greek thinkers and philosophical schools, namely the denial of the existence of god/gods and the denial of divine providence.⁷⁴

The unity of belief and practice produced by Moses’ superior νόμοι mirrors the content of Moses’ monotheistic view of god, described at 2.167 and 193 (εἷς ναὸς ἐνὸς θεοῦ) where Josephus also includes the doctrine that god is uncreated (αὐτὸν ἀπέφηνε

⁷³ ἐπιστάτης was also a technical term for administrative officials in classical Athens, e.g. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 44.1.

⁷⁴ The Epicureans and Skeptics both maintained variations on these views. See Barclay 2007: 271: n. 710 and n. 711 for citations of authors in antiquity who held these views.

(sc. Moses) καὶ ἀγέννητον).⁷⁵ Jewish monotheism contrasts with Greek polytheism, as Josephus at 2.240 describes Greek philosophers' critique of both poets and lawgivers who allow the gods to be "as numerous as they wish, putting on display their being born from one another and their manifold types of births, and distinguishing them by locations and habits, just like species of animals ..." (ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὅπόσους ἂν αὐτοὶ θελήσωσιν ἀποφαινόμενοι ἐξ ἀλλήλων δὲ γινομένους καὶ κατὰ παντοίους τρόπους γενέσεων τούτους δὲ καὶ διαιροῦντες τόποις καὶ διαίταις ὥσπερ τῶν ζώων τὰ γένη). Josephus' descriptions of the Greek gods as inhabiting their respective spheres (2.240), fulfilling their assigned roles (2.241, 242), suffering from their squabbles with one another and with mortals (2.243), and lacking self-control (2.244–6) contrast with his description of the Jewish god as "complete, blessed, and in all ways sufficient" at 2.190 (θεὸς ἔχει τὰ σύμπαντα, παντελὴς καὶ μακάριος, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ πᾶσιν αὐτάρκης). The tales of gods enslaved to mortals contrasts with the Jewish god's description as one who created the universe "not with hands, nor with toil, nor having any need of fellow workers" at 2.192 (ταῦτα θεὸς ἐποίησεν οὐ χερσὶν οὐ πόνοις οὐδὲ τινων συνεργασομένων ἐπιδεηθείς). The division between some gods as givers of good things (δοτῆρας ἀγαθῶν) and others as apotropaic (ἀποτροπαίους) at 2.249 contrasts with the Jewish understanding of god as the willing giver of good things at 2.197. In this presentation, the two theological systems could hardly be more different.

These allegedly problematic Greek ideas about the divinity have their origin in Greek lawgivers' theological shortcomings, as Josephus boldly claims at 2.250:

⁷⁵ I return to Josephus' discussion of the "one temple" below.

τί τοίνυν τὸ αἷτιον τῆς τοσαύτης ἀνωμαλίας καὶ περὶ τὸ θεῖον
 πλημμελείας; ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπολαμβάνω τὸ μήτε τὴν ἀληθῆ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσιν ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς συνιδεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς νομοθέτας, μήθ' ὅσον καὶ λαβεῖν ἡδυνήθησαν
 ἀκριβῆ γνῶσιν διορίσαντας, πρὸς τοῦτο ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἄλλην τάξιν τοῦ
 πολιτεύματος ...

What, therefore, is the cause of such irregularity and error concerning the divine? I suppose that it is their lawgivers' not at all understanding the true nature of god from the beginning, nor, having distinguished an accurate understanding, to the extent that they could grasp it, were they able to fashion the rest of the constitution in light of this ...

Not only did the Greeks' lawgivers fail to hit upon monotheism, but they failed to align their νόμοι deliberately even with the inferior theologies that they did possess. In other words, their failure was twofold: their understanding of the divine was poor from the outset (τὸ μήτε τὴν ἀληθῆ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνιδεῖν), and they created laws that were disconnected from their poor theology (μήθ' ... πρὸς τοῦτο ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἄλλην τάξιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος).⁷⁶ This claim of legislative failure of course contrasts starkly with Josephus' description of Moses' creation of the Jewish constitution as a “theocracy”, that is, a legal system in which all νόμοι are grounded in theology at 2.164–7, to which I shall return shortly. The failure of the Greek lawgivers is also due to their allowing poets to “introduce whatever gods they wanted” (οὔστινας ἂν βούλωνται θεοὺς εἰσάγειν at 2.251) and orators to grant citizenship (πολιτογραφεῖν) to foreign gods. The theme of individual license is continued at 2.252, where Josephus remarks that artists had license to depict the gods in various materials:

πολλῆς δὲ καὶ ζωγράφοι καὶ πλάσται τῆς εἰς τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
 ἀπέλαυσαν ἐξουσίας, αὐτὸς ἕκαστός τινα μορφήν ἐπινοῶν, ὁ μὲν ἐκ πηλοῦ

⁷⁶ The literature on the appropriateness of using the term “theology” in connection with Greek polytheism is vast. For a recent treatment defending the validity of the term, see Kindt 2016 with bibliography, and the other essays collected in Eidinow et al. 2016.

πλάττων, ὁ δὲ γράφων, οἱ δὲ μάλιστα δὴ θαυμαζόμενοι τῶν δημιουργῶν
τὸν ἐλέφαντα καὶ τὸν χρυσὸν ἔχουσι τῆς αἰεὶ καινουργίας τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

Both painters and sculptors enjoyed great license for this purpose among the Greeks, each one inventing some form, one shaping it from clay, another painting, and those artists are especially admired who have ivory and gold as the foundation of their ever innovative works.

The sheer variety of materials used for representing the gods signals that Josephus views this practice as problematic. It also contrasts distinctly with Josephus' explanation for Jewish aniconism at 2.191 that neither any material nor any craftsmanship can properly depict the divinity: "Every material, even if it is very valuable, is unworthy of the image of him, and every art is without art for the purpose of representing him." (πᾶσα μὲν ὕλη πρὸς εἰκόνα τὴν τούτου κἂν ἢ πολυτελὴς ἄτιμος, πᾶσα δὲ τέχνη πρὸς μιμήσεως ἐπίνοιαν ἄτεχνος.) Josephus' statement that the Greeks particularly admire chryselephantine sculptures of deities contrasts even more strikingly with his insistence on the inadequacy of even the most valuable materials for representing the Jewish god. He stresses the individuality of Greek artists with his emphatic use of pronouns (αὐτὸς ἕκαστός), the list of different artistic media, and the emphasis on the license (πολλῆς ... ἐξουσίας) of individual artists. Such emphasis recalls Josephus' characterization of Greek historians as problematically individualistic and competitive, as well as the plethora of historiographical genres from which each author could choose in accordance with his individual ambitions, all to the detriment of historical truth (1.23–7). It is also reminiscent of his discussions of license among historians at 1.37. Finally, this description contrasts markedly with Josephus' insistence on the unity of god and Moses' success in persuading the Jews to his unified conception of god (2.166–7).

Josephus maintains these characterizations of Greeks and Jews in his discussions of their respective cult practices. At 2.253–4, he remarks on the alleged tendency of Greeks to be continually building new sanctuaries in accordance with the will of individuals (τὰ δὲ νεωστὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν βούλησιν ἕκαστος ἰδρύεται) while letting older ones fall into neglect.⁷⁷ Like Greek historiographers who allegedly seek to critique their opponents or introduce innovations into ancient history for the purpose of gaining reputation, Greek cult practice is characterized by individualism, problematic innovation, and instability. This of course contrasts with Josephus' statement about the uniqueness of the Jerusalem temple, the unity of its priests, and the continuity of their service at 2.193:

εἷς ναὸς ἑνὸς θεοῦ (φίλον γὰρ αἰεὶ παντὶ τὸ ὅμοιον), κοινὸς ἀπάντων, κοινῷ θεῷ ἀπάντων. τοῦτον θεραπεύσουσι μὲν διὰ παντός οἱ ἱερεῖς, ἡγήσεται δὲ τούτων ὁ πρῶτος αἰεὶ κατὰ γένος.

There is one temple of the one god (for like is ever dear to like), common to all and belonging to the god who is common to all. This the priests will serve through all time, and the first in accordance with γένος will always be in charge of these.

The uniqueness of the temple is given greater emphasis by Josephus' omission of the definite article in the phrase εἷς ναὸς ἑνὸς θεοῦ, not an unusual construction with the noun θεός, which may be understood to be sufficiently definite by itself in the context of Jewish theology; in the case of ναός, the omission coupled with the repetition of εἷς has the effect of further correlating the singularity of this temple with that of the one god. Such a statement on the Jerusalem temple is of course at odds with several realities, not least of

⁷⁷ Though several glosses have been incorporated into the manuscripts in this passage, the portion quoted is reasonably secure. See Siegert 2008: Vol. 1: 208.

which is the fact that this temple no longer existed at the time of the writing of the *CA*.⁷⁸ The fact that another Jewish temple existed at Leontopolis is also at odds with the picture of singularity and unanimity which is so central to Josephus' argument throughout the treatise, and accordingly is ignored for Josephus' rhetorical purpose.⁷⁹ Josephus has thus argued that there is a large-scale difference between Greek and Jewish conceptions of god/gods and cult practice that can be described in terms of unity, agreement, stability, and uniqueness on the Jewish side, and disagreement, heterogeneity, innovation, and variety on the Greek side.

A similar treatment of innovation is found at 2.182–3, where Josephus remarks that the criticism that Jews have produced no “inventors of new deeds or ideas” (καινῶν εὐρετὰς ἔργων ἢ λόγων ἀνδρας), a charge attributed to Apion at 2.135 and Apollonius at 2.148, stems from Jewish persistence in preserving tradition. He contrasts this with others (ἄλλοι) who “consider it noble to abide by none of their ancestral customs and testify to the skillful cleverness of those who dare to transgress them most” (τὸ μηδενὶ τῶν πατρίων ἐμμένειν καλὸν εἶναι νομίζουσι καὶ τοῖς τολμῶσι ταῦτα παραβαίνειν μάλιστα σοφίας δεινότητα μαρτυροῦσιν). Once more, Josephus does not explicitly identify these others as Greeks. But the formulation σοφίας δεινότητα, as well as the general characterization of these people as loving innovation for its own sake, recalls Josephus' description of Greek historians at 1.23–7 who deliberately wrote “the same things differently” (εἰ ταῦτα γράψειαν ἑτέρως) in order to seem the most truthful (φανεῖσθαι πάντων ἀληθέστατοι),

⁷⁸ See Barclay's discussion. Barclay 2007: 279 n. 769.

⁷⁹ Josephus in fact mentions this temple frequently in the *AJ*. Reeves disputes Josephus' claim at *BJ* 7.420–1 that it was destroyed in the aftermath of the war. Reeves 2005.

prompting Josephus to declare that the Jews yield to the Greeks “as far as regards language and cleverness in language” (λόγων ... ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις δεινότητος), but not in historical veracity. According to Josephus, Greeks enjoy novelty and difference in their lives as citizens as much as in their historiography. He also exploits the ambiguity of the connotations of newness in Greek:⁸⁰ while Apion and Apollonius have intended their judgement of Jews to be a condemnation, Josephus reinterprets their notion of the new (καινῶν) as transgression (παραβαίνειν) of ancestral traditions, thus turning the condemnation on its head: at 2.183, abiding by one’s ancestral custom is “reasonable proof that the custom was extremely well made; for experience convicts customs that do not have this character of needing correction.” (ὅπερ εἰκότως ἂν εἴη τεκμήριον τοῦ κάλλιστα τὸν νόμον τεθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον αἱ πεῖραι δεόμενα διορθώσεως ἐλέγχουσιν.) Unity, stability over time, and monotheism remain, for Josephus, characteristically Jewish traits.

It is precisely Jewish monotheism that has made possible one of Josephus’ most striking remarks in the entire treatise: that Moses has invented theocratic government. Josephus’ θεοκρατία at 2.165 appears to be an original neologism,⁸¹ and one that indicates government in which sovereignty and power are ascribed to god (θεῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ

⁸⁰ As Barclay observes. Barclay 2007: 272 n. 716. Josephus’ characterization of the Greeks as ever-innovating has some parallels with, and could be influenced by, the characterization of the Athenians in Thucydides as innovative (in contrast to Spartan conservatism). See esp. the contrast created by the Corinthian embassy, in which both traits are potentially problematic, at Thuc. 1.70.2: οἱ μὲν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργα ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργα οὐδὲ τὰναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι.

⁸¹ As he himself appears to acknowledge with his expression ὥς δ’ ἂν τις εἴποι βιασάμενος τὸν λόγον. The neologism forms a curious contrast to Josephus’ indictments of invention a few short chapters later.

τὸ κράτος ἀναθείς) and not, as Barclay convincingly argues, held by a priestly class.⁸² A single god such as Josephus has presented, whose nature is unanimously agreed upon by all Jews, is the only sort of god who could possibly function as a head of state. For how could the Greeks' theological system, which is, in Josephus' presentation, not merely polytheistic, but hopelessly varied and characterized by conflicting accounts and beliefs, produce anything like a coherent, unchanging, and unified set of legal doctrines such as the Jews have in the Torah? Instead, the Greeks apparently have as many forms of government as they have ideas about and images of the divine (2.164):⁸³

οὐκοῦν ἄπειροι μὲν αἱ κατὰ μέρος τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων παρὰ τοῖς
ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διαφοραί. κεφαλαιωδῶς ἂν ἐπίοι τις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
μοναρχίαις, οἱ δὲ ταῖς ὀλίγων δυναστείαις, ἄλλοι δὲ τοῖς πλήθεσιν
ἐπέτρεψαν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῶν πολιτευμάτων.

Accordingly, the differences between individual customs and laws among all humankind are endless. To summarize, some have entrusted the power of government to monarchies, some to the power of oligarchies, and others to the common people.

Recall the close connection Josephus presents between good governance and accurate understanding of the divinity (2.163). Accordingly, while Jewish harmony and unity are the product of monotheism, the Greeks' endless variation in law, custom, and character match their myriad competing views of the gods. While Jewish harmony was the effect of Moses' deliberately fashioning his laws in accord with his monotheism, the resemblance between Greek theological and constitutional variation is merely incidental (cf. 2.250).

⁸² In contrast to modern uses of the term. See Barclay 2007: 262 n. 638.

⁸³ Though this passage explicitly claims that these divisions are found among all people, and not specifically Greeks, Josephus has framed 2.163–4 as a *Greek* constitutional debate and inserted theocracy as a new category into the old tripartite categorization. The topos apparently originates in Herodotus 3.80–2 (where the debate is held among the Persians), and as Barclay remarks, is developed at length in Plato *Rep.* 5431–576d and Aristotle *Pol.* Books 4–6. See Barclay 2007: 261 n. 634 for further references.

Moses' monotheistic understanding of god as omniscient, uncreated, immutable, etc. (see 2.166–7), in which the Jewish system of government is grounded, is an idea which Josephus claims some Greek philosophers originally learned from Moses (2.168).⁸⁴ The claim that Greek philosophical precepts are derivative from Jewish ideas is an assertion of common ground between the two cultures (even if Jews have the prized position of priority), which serves in turn as a foundation for further statements of difference: at 2.169, Josephus compares the Greek philosophers named in 2.168 (Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics) with Moses:

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὀλίγους φιλοσοφοῦντες εἰς πλήθη δόξαις κατειλημμένα τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν, ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης, ἅτε δὴ τὰ ἔργα παρέχων τοῖς νόμοις σύμφωνα, οὐ μόνον τοὺς καθ' αὐτὸν ἔπεισεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀεὶ γενησομένοις τὴν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πίστιν ἐνέφυσεν ἀμετακίνητον.

But they taught philosophy to the few and did not dare to disclose the truth of their dogma to the masses, who had been constrained by mere opinions. Our lawgiver, on the other hand, by furnishing deeds in harmony with his laws, not only persuaded his contemporaries, but also implanted an immovable belief in god in their descendants forever after.

The key difference, for Josephus, is the philosophers' audience: Greek philosophers kept their ideas esoteric, while Moses made them law for all of his people and their descendants. Josephus yet again emphasizes unity or harmony as an important element in the preservation of truth that has characterized Moses and Jewish institutions; here the agreement between Moses' words and deeds (τὰ ἔργα παρέχων τοῖς νόμοις σύμφωνα) is the root of his ability to persuade, implying by contrast that Greek philosophers did not

⁸⁴ A view which appears to have originated with Aristobulus of Alexandria. See Barclay's discussion of the influence of Aristobulus on the *CA*, Barclay 2007: 359.

have such unity of words and deeds (even if they allegedly took no interest in teaching their beliefs to the masses).⁸⁵

Against Apollonius: Common Ground

Josephus revisits the idea that Greek institutions are derivative from Jewish institutions in the final chapters of the treatise, in which he shifts to assertions of common ground between Greek and Jewish culture. Josephus' critique of Apollonius Molon serves as a thread connecting the comparisons between Jews and various other cultures between 2.255 and 275. He introduces Apollonius at 2.255:

Ἀπολλώνιος μὲν οὖν ὁ Μόλων τῶν ἀνοήτων εἷς ἦν καὶ τετυφωμένων.
τοὺς μέντοι κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς φιλοσοφήσαντας οὔτε τῶν
προειρημένων οὐδὲν διέλαθεν, οὔτε τὰς ψυχρὰς προφάσεις τῶν
ἀλληγοριῶν ἡγνόησαν· διόπερ τῶν μὲν εἰκότως κατεφρόνησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν
ἀληθῆ καὶ πρέπουσαν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν ἡμῖν συνεφώνησαν.

Now Apollonius Molon was one of those thoughtless and deluded people. Those of the Greeks, however, who practiced philosophy in accordance with truth did not fail in their awareness of any of the above-mentioned ideas, nor were they ignorant of the vain pleas of the allegorists, on account of which they appropriately despised them, and they were in agreement with us regarding the true and fitting concept of god.

Here we observe Josephus asserting that some Greeks, at least, did have a correct understanding of god. Thus Greek philosophy is not intrinsically bad or problematic, as it can be and has been done κατ' ἀλήθειαν, according to Josephus. These true Greek philosophers are, for Josephus, distinct from both the “thoughtless and deluded people” (τῶν ἀνοήτων ... καὶ τετυφωμένων), a subset which includes Apollonius Molon, and the “alle-

⁸⁵ Josephus pointedly describes Plato as an exception at 2.223.

gorists” (τῶν ἀλληγοριῶν), who are presented as yet a further subset among Greek philosophers.⁸⁶ Here we observe Josephus presenting Greeks as heterogeneous, and capable of truth to the extent that they are in agreement (συνεφώνησαν) with Jewish conceptions of god. Josephus names Plato as one of these Greek philosophers, and remarks at 2.256 that Plato banned poets, including Homer, from his πολιτεία in order to prevent incorrect beliefs about the divinity, which responds to his statement at 2.251 that one of the alleged problems with Greek lawgivers was that they allowed poets to introduce whatever stories about the gods they wished. Josephus also asserts that Plato imitated Moses on two other points: giving pride of place to learning the νόμοι in the education (παίδευμα) of citizens, and restricting the citizens’ interactions with foreigners.

The reason for Josephus’ assertion of common ground between Jews and some Greek philosophers becomes apparent at 2.258: it is an important component of his refutation of the alleged criticisms of Apollonius Molon, who Josephus says made accusations against Jews: “... that we do not accept others who have predetermined ideas concerning god nor do we wish to commune with those who prefer to live in accordance with a different mode of life.” (ὅτι μὴ παραδεχόμεθα τοὺς ἄλλαις προκατειλημμένους δόξαις περὶ θεοῦ μηδὲ κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλομεν τοῖς καθ’ ἑτέραν συνήθειαν βίου ζῆν προαιρουμένοις). Josephus asserts at 2.259 that these Jewish customs are in fact “common to all, and not only the Greeks, but the most famous among the Greeks.” (κοινὸν δὲ

⁸⁶ Josephus thus points to internal disputes within Greek philosophy; as Barclay remarks, he probably has Plato in mind, who comments negatively on allegorical interpretation at *Phaedr.* 229e, *Rep.* 378d. Though Josephus does not uniformly reject allegory throughout his corpus (cf. *AJ* 1.24), as Barclay notes, it would be detrimental to his rhetorical aim of disparaging Greek myths about the gods at this point in the treatise to allow for a non-literal interpretation. Barclay 2007: 314 n. 1030–1. On the allegorical tradition generally, see Dawson 1992 with bibliography.

πάντων οὐχ Ἑλλήνων δὲ μόνων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν εὐδοκιμωτάτων.) He gives as examples the Spartans' reputation for hostility to foreigners, and famous instances in Athenian history of those who were prosecuted for unsanctioned theological ideas (2.259–68). Josephus further asserts that these νόμοι are also to be found among the Scythians and Persians at 2.269, in a passage laden with derogatory remarks about these peoples. By aligning Jewish νόμοι with such illustrious Greek exempla (and to a degree, with Scythians and Persians), Josephus strengthens his argument against Apollonius' alleged reproach by providing evidence that Jewish νόμοι are not singular in these particular ways.

Josephus' assertions of commonalities between Jews, Greeks, and other peoples including Persians in the service of his argument for the universality of specific Jewish practices serves as his transition to a denunciation of Apollonius on the grounds of his alleged admiration for Persian νόμοι.⁸⁷ Here he traffics in anti-Persian stereotypes to set up his next move in 2.271, in which he asserts Jewish difference from these alleged Persian customs (which Apollonius allegedly adopted). In particular, Josephus asserts that the castration even of animals (in contrast to Persian castration of children) is considered a crime worthy of death by Jews. At 2.272, he answers what appears to be Apollonius' remarks on the Persians' courage (ἀνδρεία) with the statement that Jews train their courage (τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἡσκήσαμεν) only for the purpose of preserving their laws. At 2.273, Josephus remarks that Jews have no need to imitate (ζηλώσαμεν) the laws of others because they see that others do not persevere in their own customs. This is a pointed

⁸⁷ This admiration (ἐθαύμαζεν) is apparently a comment on material from Apollonius' lost work. See Barclay 2007: 322 n. 1084.

response to his allegation that Apollonius imitated Persian customs. Josephus then lists the Spartan contempt for marriage and Elian and Theban homosexuality as examples of customs which are currently denounced (2.273–5), though they were once thought “most noble and profitable” (κάλλιστα καὶ συμφερότατα). Josephus concludes 2.275 with the remark that these customs were once so prevalent among the Greeks that they invented myths of divine homosexuality and incest in order to justify their own pleasures (ἡδονῶν), which Josephus calls foul and contrary to nature (ἀτόπων καὶ παρὰ φύσιν).⁸⁸ These Greek practices directly contradict Josephus’ earlier comments on Jewish νόμοι regarding sexual and marriage practice (2.199–203), and thus constitute further statements of difference and claims of Jewish superiority. Josephus’ target in the polemic of this convoluted passage is ultimately Apollonius; as Barclay remarks, Josephus appears to be taking advantage of the opportunity to take another jab at Greeks.⁸⁹

As Josephus approaches the conclusion of the treatise, he re-iterates some of his earlier statements of commonality between Greeks and Jews, namely, that Greek philosophers imitated Moses’ laws (2.281), and that Jewish νόμοι are widespread throughout the Mediterranean world (2.282). The relationship which Josephus envisions between the widespread admiration for Jewish ways which he claims and his polemic against Apion, Apollonius, et al. is explicitly stated at 2.285:

⁸⁸ Josephus specifies sex between siblings as the incestuous practice which Greeks justified via myth-making, but he does not specify which Greeks are alleged to have allowed such a sexual practice, or in what historical period. The allegation is surely spurious.

⁸⁹ Barclay 2007: 324 n. 1098.

χρὴ τοίνυν πάντων ἀνθρώπων καταγνῶναι πονηρίαν ἐθελούσιον, εἰ
τάλλότρια καὶ φαῦλα πρὸ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ καλῶν ζηλοῦν ἐπιτεθυμήκασιν,
ἢ παύσασθαι βασκαίνοντας ἡμῖν τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας.

Therefore, those accusing us should lay a charge of deliberate wickedness against all of humankind, if they have been so eager to emulate customs both foreign and bad in place of native and good ones, or they should stop maligning us.

In other words, Josephus has offered evidence that Jews are not so singular at least in some of their customs, and thus cannot justly be singled out for opprobrium. As ever, the particular stance which Josephus takes towards Greeks is crafted to suit his rhetorical need of the moment in the service of his broader aim of defending the Jews and their past. This explains why he can move rapidly between assertions of common ground and polemic. In Section 3 of this chapter, I will explore in greater detail further instances of common ground between Jews and Greeks.

Sparta

I will discuss one final and remarkable comparison that Josephus makes between Greeks and Jews before turning to his treatment of Egyptians: the comparison of Jews and Spartans. Josephus discusses Spartans and their comparative shortcomings at 2.225–35. This section is part of a larger discussion of lofty political ideals, and the relative success of Greeks and Jews at living in accordance with their own ideals. The discussion is framed at the outset by a striking thought experiment at 2.220–2, where Josephus proposes that a hypothetical person might read aloud before “the Greeks” a description of the Jews as a people beyond the known world (ἔξω τῆς γινωσκομένης γῆς at 221) who have

lived in a pious utopia in obedience to their laws for a very long time.⁹⁰ Josephus writes: “All, I think, would be astonished because of the frequent changes among them” (πάντας ἂν οἶμαι θαυμάσαι διὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς παρ’ αὐτοῖς μεταβολάς). As at 1.69, Josephus uses a thought experiment to destabilize Greek conceptions of themselves; here he challenges the inconsistency between the Greeks’ purported ideals and what he claims are their actual attitudes toward the Jews.⁹¹ Here, Josephus uses the thought experiment as a springboard for his claim that the reality of the Jewish way of life surpasses even the imagination of Greek philosophers, whom their fellow Greeks accuse of having created something “absurd” (ὥς θαυμαστὰ συνθέντων κατηγοροῦσι) when they attempt to create constitutions at all resembling Moses’. He singles out Plato at 2.223 as the author of laws that are easier to practice than the Jewish laws, but which are kept from the masses. The prevalence of θαυμ- words in the passage speaks to the inconsistency between Greek ideals and Greek practice that Josephus presents. Plato, though “admired among the Greeks” (θαυμαζόμενος παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν) at 2.223, was also “virtually mocked and ridiculed consistently by those who claim political expertise.” (ὕπὸ τῶν φασκόντων δεινῶν εἶναι τὰ πολιτικά μικροῦ δεῖν χλευαζόμενος καὶ κωμωδούμενος διατελεῖ). Jose-

⁹⁰ As Barclay remarks, the trope of the utopic people beyond the known world has its origins in the *Odyssey*’s Phaeacians, and was well-known through Hecateus of Abdera’s Hyperboreans (see *FGrHist* 264), Euhemerus’ Panchaea in the *ἱερὰ ἀναγραφὴ* (see *FGrHist* 63), and Iambulus’ Island of the Sun (see Diodorus 2.55–60). See also Barclay 2007: 299 n. 900.

⁹¹ At 1.69, Josephus proposes the hypothetical scenario in which Jews assert that the Greeks are not an ancient people because the Greeks are not mentioned in Jewish histories. The Greeks, says Josephus, would find the argument ridiculous, and would cite the evidence Josephus has provided about the lack of early contact between Greeks and Jews, as well as cite Near Eastern testimony to their existence. As Barclay remarks, by inverting the anti-Jewish claim of 1.2, Josephus “raises the prospect of a full-frontal assault on its Hellenocentric presumption.” By offering these hypothetical answers from the Greeks, however, “a potential major cultural clash is thus reduced to a dispute about reasonable demands for evidence.” Barclay 2007: 46 n.275.

phus' comparison of the reception of Plato's laws to the Jews' at 2.225 resembles Greek attitudes toward their historians at 1.45 as essentially works of fiction reveals a consistent thread in Josephus' presentation of how the Greeks engage with their own culture.⁹² This discussion of Plato as a philosopher who never brought about concrete political change also serves as Josephus' introduction to an example of a real Greek lawgiver (or so it was believed),⁹³ Lycurgus of Sparta, and the Spartans themselves. The Spartans are widely admired, says Josephus, for persevering in their obedience to their laws for a long duration (τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐνεκαρτέρησαν), a view that appears to be widespread.⁹⁴ This leads Josephus at 2.226 to assert that there is consensus that obedience to one's νόμοι is a proof of virtue (οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ὁμολογήσθω τεκμήριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι, τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις). This moralizing statement forms the foundation of Josephus' comparison of Spartans and Jews.

For Josephus, the Spartans fall short of the Jews on every count: the relatively brief duration of Lacedaemonian obedience to their laws compares poorly with over two thousand years of Jewish obedience (2.226). The Spartans maintained their νόμοι only so long as they maintained their political autonomy, whereas the Jews have maintained theirs throughout periods of subjugation to Asian rulers (2.227). Furthermore, Jewish νόμοι impose harder trials and labors than Lacedaemonian ones, since the Lacedaemoni-

⁹² Josephus says of the reception of Plato's works: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Πλάτωνος λόγους τινὲς εἶναι κενοὺς νομίζουσι κατὰ πολλὴν ἐξουσίαν κεκαλλιγραφημένους... ("But they consider Plato's works to be just empty words, beautifully written with great license.") This closely resembles his remarks at 1.45 on Greek attitudes toward their histories: λόγους γὰρ αὐτὰ νομίζουσιν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν τῶν γραψάντων βούλησιν ἐσχεδιασμένους.

⁹³ As Plutarch says, everything about the man was disputed. *Lyc.* 1.1.

⁹⁴ Barclay cites Polybius 6.10–11, Cicero *Flac.* 63, and Plutarch *Lyc.* 29.1, 6. Barclay 2007: 301: n. 922.

ans, Josephus says, were responsible only for military training, while their subordinates were responsible for menial labor (2.228–30). The Spartans were not even successful in their one area of toil, the military, for as Josephus says at 2.231, “not only individually but very often as a group they neglected the commands of their law and surrendered themselves along with their arms to their enemies.” (οὐ γὰρ καθ’ ἓνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ πολλαῖς ἀθρόως τῶν τοῦ νόμου προσταγμάτων ἀμελήσαντες αὐτοὺς μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων παρέδωκαν τοῖς πολεμίοις).⁹⁵ As Barclay remarks, the phrase πολλοὶ πολλαῖς echoes Josephus’ statement of 2.219 that “many Jews often already have chosen to suffer all manner of things nobly in order not to utter a word against the law.” (... πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαῖς ἤδη τῶν ἡμετέρων περὶ τοῦ μηδὲ ῥῆμα φθέγγασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον πάντα παθεῖν γενναίως ὑπέστησαν).⁹⁶ The repetition reinforces the contrast that Josephus creates between the two. He further contrasts the alleged Spartan propensity to surrender with Jews at 2.232:

ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν, οὐ λέγω τοσούτους, ἀλλὰ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἔγνω τις προδότας γενομένους τῶν νόμων ἢ θάνατον φοβηθέντας, οὐχὶ τὸν ῥᾶστον ἐκεῖνον λέγω τὸν συμβαίνοντα τοῖς μαχομένοις, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετὰ λύμης τῶν σωμάτων, ὅποῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ πάντων χαλεπώτατος;

Has anyone heard of an example among us—I don’t mean so many, but two or three people—who became traitors to the laws or who feared death—and I don’t mean that easiest kind of death that happens to men in battle, but that accompanied by mutilation of the body, which is considered the most difficult of all?

⁹⁵ The disdain for cowardice and surrender in the Spartan ethos was famous. See e.g. Xenophon *Constitution of the Spartans* 9.3–6 on Spartan punishments for cowardice, and Plutarch *Sayings of Spartan Women* 16 (= *Moralia* 241f).

⁹⁶ Barclay 2007: 303 n. 937.

According to Josephus, Jews excel all other peoples, and the Spartans in particular, in both the discipline with which they adhere to their laws, and in their courage in facing death for their laws.

Throughout Josephus' comparison between Spartans and Jews, there is a distinct element of gender at play. For instance, at 2.229, Josephus makes the striking insinuation that the Spartiates were characterized by softness, even effeminacy, in his description of them as "exempt from all labor, sleek and training their bodies for beauty, they spent their time in the city." (πάσης ἐργασίας ἄφειτοι λιπαροὶ καὶ τὰ σώματα πρὸς κάλλος ἀσκοῦντες ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως διῆγον).⁹⁷ Josephus' description of the Spartiates as soft, urbane, and failing to die in battle (2.231) diverges strikingly from the popular perception of the idealized Spartans as exemplary Greek males. The Jews, by contrast, exhibit the masculine quality of not fearing death (θάνατον φοβηθέντας at 2.232); their death is manly (ἀνδρείως) on behalf of their νόμοι,⁹⁸ and they display "nobility" (τὸ γενναῖον at 2.235) in the face of

⁹⁷ As Barclay notes, Josephus turns many of the descriptions of the Spartans found in Plutarch's *Lycurgus* on their head by depicting them as unmanly. On the masculine virtue typically attached to ascetic training in the Roman period, see van Nijf 2003: 263–86.

⁹⁸ On the gender ideology expressed by ἀνδρεία, see Rosen and Sluiter 2003, esp. pp. 25–58 on the historical development of the semantics of the term, and pp. 263–86 and 287–318 on the rhetoric and ideology of manliness during the imperial period.

death.⁹⁹ Not only, in Josephus' presentation, do the Jews outperform the Spartans in battle and in obedience to their customs, but they also outperform them as men.¹⁰⁰

The comparison between Jews and Spartans could have been suggested to Josephus by the myth of kinship between the two peoples, of which Josephus was well aware (*AJ* 12.225–8, 13.166–70), but does not mention in the *CA*.¹⁰¹ While the myth may have allowed other Jewish authors, and Josephus himself in the *AJ*, to co-opt Spartan prestige and admiration by making the Spartans part of Jewish history, Josephus is able to appropriate these things in the *CA* not by claiming a common origin for the two peoples, but by using a comparison of widely known (if highly selective) “facts” (or rather stereotypes) about the two to undermine Spartan prestige while claiming it as the sole property of the Jews, rather than as something shared. He does this by minimizing the admiration attached to Spartan military achievement by asserting, with irony, at 2.235 that “those who advance boldly with the sword and turn their enemies to flight could not face rules about a regimented life.” (ἀλλ’ οἱ τοῖς ξίφεσιν ὁμόσε χωροῦντες καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξ ἐφόδου τρεπόμενοι τοῖς προστάγμασιν τοῖς περὶ διαίτης οὐκ ἀντέβλεψαν.) The Spartans appear

⁹⁹ On nobility in death in battle as a central element of Aristotle's definition of ἀνδρεία in *EN*, see Deslauriers 2003: 189–92.

¹⁰⁰ It is generally apparent that in all of Josephus' comparisons between Jews, Greeks, and even Egyptians, he is comparing men. It is not merely that this is an inference to be drawn from his discussions of historians, priests, prophets, soldiers, and other exclusively male domains, but also that he goes out of his way on a few occasions to discuss women, creating the firm impression that such instances are exceptions to his discussion rather than the norm. For example, Josephus' remark at 2.181 that “one could hear even from our women and slaves” (καὶ γυναικῶν ἀκούσειεν ἂν τις καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν) that piety is the goal of all elements of daily life indicates that Josephus has not expected his reader to have women and the enslaved in mind in his discussion of Jewish νόμοι.

¹⁰¹ On this myth, see Momigliano 1975a: 113–14, Gruen 2011: 110–11 and 302–7. According to the myth, the Spartans were descendants of Abraham. Drawing attention to any common descent between the Jews and Greeks would not, of course, suit Josephus' rhetorical purpose in this portion of the *CA*, where difference is key.

weak-willed and undisciplined by comparison. Moreover, Jewish perseverance, even in the face of death, is treated as a spectacle (ὥς θαυμαστόν τι θέαμα) by some of the Jews' past conquerors (τινὰς κρατήσαντας) at 2.233. Josephus responds to such an attitude by attempting to normalize the Jews' willingness to die for their νόμοι by trivializing the difficulty others have with the asceticism of Jewish daily life (οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ῥᾶστα δοκοῦντα τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἄλλοι ῥαδίως ὑπομένουσιν). He asserts at 2.234 that "it should not be astonishing if we hold out in a manly way in the face of death on behalf of our laws, in contrast to everyone else." (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ θαυμάζειν, εἰ πρὸς θάνατον ἀνδρείως ἔχομεν ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας.) The denial of the marvelous is a rebuke of the Jews' gawking conquerors, but it also recalls the amazed Greeks at 2.220–1 in Josephus' return to the language of amazement and what the Greeks think is beyond the realm of the possible. Here, the Jews are what the Spartiates don't have the endurance to be; at 2.220–1, they are what the Greeks can only imagine in their most absurd philosophical flights of fancy. Josephus' denial of the marvelous suggests that it is not so much that he presents the Jews as the consummate Spartans, but that he presents the Spartans as failed Jews.

III. Egyptians in the *CA*

This chapter has been devoted thus far to Josephus' engagement with Greeks and Greek culture, and primarily with his explicit statements of difference between Jews and Greeks, which, in view of the volume of such statements, is a major theme of the *CA*. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss Josephus' treatment of authors who originate

in Egypt, as it is an important case for comparison with his treatment of Greeks. Egyptians, and specifically Hellenophone authors who were located in Egypt, are particular targets of Josephus' polemic in the *CA* and are thus in a way the counterpart of Greeks. As Dillery observes, Josephus in fact devotes considerable attention in the *CA* to Egyptian accounts of Jews.¹⁰² Indeed, Josephus devotes a total of 253 chapters out of 616, or roughly 41 percent of the treatise, explicitly to authors who were located in Egypt or are otherwise identified as Egyptian by Josephus.¹⁰³ This is in fact considerably more of the treatise than is devoted to Greek authors, named and unnamed, to literary, philosophical, and mythical themes, as well as to discussions of νόμοι, which are identified by Josephus as Greek: 170 chapters by a generous reckoning, or roughly 28 percent of the treatise.¹⁰⁴ At the opening of the chapter I commented on the abundance of titles for the *CA* that circulated in antiquity, remarking that Porphyry's *Against the Greeks* was a telling indicator of the centrality of Josephus' polemic against Greek culture to the treatise. I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge that the title which has won over most modern scholars (and which I have used throughout this dissertation) is derived from Jerome's description of the *CA* (*Epist.* 70.3.3): *Iosephus antiquitatem adprobans Iudaici populi duos libros*

¹⁰² Dillery 2015: 202 and 214, citing Momigliano 1987: 111 and Barclay 2007: 48.

¹⁰³ i.e. Manetho at 1.73–105 and 227–287, Chaeremon at 1.288–303, and Apion at 2.2–144. I have excluded Josephus' remarks on Lysimachus (1.304–320) in this tally because, though Josephus implies that he considers him an Egyptian by discussing him in sequence after Manetho and Chaeremon, he does not explicitly identify him as Egyptian. Though this Lysimachus was once identified with Lysimachus of Alexandria (= *FGrHist* 382), the current consensus is that these are not the same person. See bibliography in Barclay 2007: 158–9 n. 1018.

¹⁰⁴ I have included in this tally 1.6–68, 161–222, 2.154–6, 168–72, 220–231, 239–269, 273–275, 281. In the remaining quarter or so of the *CA*, Josephus discusses Babylonian and Phoenician sources, as well as, of course, the Jews.

scribit contra Apionem.¹⁰⁵ Thus the prominence accorded to an author identified by Josephus as Egyptian made an impression on some of Josephus' audience in antiquity.¹⁰⁶ Apion was of course an inhabitant of Alexandria, and I will delve into Josephus' problematization of his ethnicity, actual or claimed, below. Barclay has convincingly argued that Josephus exploits the malleability of the term "Egyptian" in the service of his rhetorical aims in the *CA*.¹⁰⁷ In my analysis, I will incorporate elements of Barclay's argument where appropriate, expand upon them, and offer my own contributions to the theme. As my analysis will show, the slipperiness of Josephus' use of the term is part of his larger strategy of creating highly localized (and therefore varied) characterizations of peoples in the service of his defense of the Jews and their past.

The first Hellenophone Egyptian author whom Josephus discusses at length, however, is Manetho. When we compare Josephus' introductions to Manetho at 1.73–4 (Hyksos I) and 1.227–30 (Hyksos II), we find some telling differences in his treatment of this author on the basis of Josephus' claims about differences in Manetho's sources.¹⁰⁸ At 1.73–4, much of Josephus' characterization of Manetho matches his characterization of his own historiographical persona on many points. Detailed discussion of Josephus' remarks on Manetho's bicultural identity and participation in Greek παιδεία (Μάνεθως δ'

¹⁰⁵ Barclay 2007: XXIX–XXX.

¹⁰⁶ A point observed by Jones as well. Jones 2005: 280 n. 3. Eusebius gives a similar description to Jerome's at *Hist. eccl.* 3.9.4: καὶ ἕτερα δ' αὐτοῦ φέρεται σπουδῆς ἄξια δύο, τὰ Περί τῆς Ἰουδαίων ἀρχαιότητος, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἀντιρρήσεις πρὸς Ἀπίωνα τὸν γραμματικόν, κατὰ Ἰουδαίων τηνικάδε συντάξαντα λόγον, πεποιήται καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, οἱ διαβάλλειν καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ πάτρια τοῦ Ἰουδαίων ἔθνους ἐπειράθησαν.

¹⁰⁷ Barclay 2004.

¹⁰⁸ These introductions begin the paraphrases and quotations from Manetho which Dillery helpfully terms "Hyksos I" and "Hyksos II", respectively. I have adopted Dillery's formulations for the sake of convenience. Dillery 2015: xi.

ἦν τὸ γένος Αἰγύπτιος ἀνὴρ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς μετεσχηκῶς παιδείας) will be reserved for Chapter 3, which will also consider the similarities between the description of Manetho's work as a translation of Egyptian sacred documents and Josephus' description of his own activities in composing the *AJ*. For my present purpose, I will note some other elements of the presentation of Manetho's activity that resemble Josephus' self-presentation: Josephus writes at 1.73 that Manetho "convicts Herodotus of having falsified many points of Egyptian history out of ignorance" (πολλὰ τὸν Ἡρόδοτον ἐλέγχει τῶν Αἰγυπτιακῶν ὑπ' ἀγνοίας ἐπνευσμένον). For Manetho to have convicted a Greek author of falsehood and ignorance about his own native historical tradition aligns him closely with Josephus' activity in the first 58 chapters of Book 1, as well as with his stated goal in writing the *CA* at 1.3 to refute the deliberate falsehood of his alleged critics (ὥθήθην δεῖν ... τὴν ἐκούσιον ἐλέγξαι ψευδολογίαν). These similarities in presentation suit Josephus' argument in this portion of the *CA*: Josephus tells his reader at 1.69–72 that he will employ Egyptians, Phoenicians, and Chaldeans as "witnesses" (μάρτυσιν) to Jewish antiquity in his argument against the view that Greek silence is proof against Jewish antiquity, a silence which Josephus works to re-frame as ignorance (e.g. 1.68). This section follows closely on the heels of Josephus' assertion at 1.58 of the superiority of the historiographical traditions of non-Greek peoples (τοῖς βαρβάροις) to Greek historiography. In other words, it suits Josephus' purpose in this portion of the *CA* to assert a certain cultural or intellectual alliance between these peoples (even if Egyptians and Tyrians are defined as enemies to the Jews at 1.70) against the Greeks. This rhetorical pose underlies his descriptions of Manetho's interactions with one particular Greek historiographer.

A different picture emerges, however, when Josephus returns to Manetho at 1.228. The context of this section is Josephus' assertion that the insults and slanders with which Josephus claims the *AJ* has met (at 1.4) in fact originated with Egyptians (1.223), whose relationship with Jews is characterized by Josephus as one of long-standing hate and malice (τοῦ μισεῖν καὶ φθονεῖν) and enmity (ἔχθραν). Josephus describes what he views as key differences between Egyptians and Jews at 1.224–5, namely differences in religious practice and belief, and consistently frames his statements about Egyptians in pejorative terms.¹⁰⁹ Despite some textual trouble at 1.224, it is clear that Josephus presents a stark difference between Egyptian and Jewish cult practice:

... εἴθ' ἢ τούτων ὑπεναντιότης πολλὴν αὐτοῖς ἐνεποίησεν ἔχθραν,
τοσοῦτον τῆς ἡμετέρας διαφορῶσης εὐσεβείας πρὸς τὴν ὑπ' ἐκείνων
νεομισμένην, ὅσον θεοῦ φύσις ζώων ἀλόγων διέστηκε.

...then the opposition of these peoples [sc. Egyptians and Jews] has engendered much enmity, since our cult practice differs from what is customary for them to the extent that the nature of god is at odds with senseless beasts.

Josephus then comments on the ancestral Egyptian practice of worshipping zoomorphic gods, as well as regional variation in cult practices (all of which is described in terms both vague and disparaging).¹¹⁰ The more explicit statements of contrast in 1.224 are thus followed by an implicit contrast with Jewish homogeneity and unity in cult practice.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Barclay remarks that 1.223 signals the shift from positive to negative stereotypes about Egyptians. Barclay 2004: 112.

¹¹⁰ Barclay remarks that Josephus' argument here depends on a hierarchy of being, as well as on widespread disdain or even ridicule of Egyptian animal cult, a topic to which I will return below. Barclay 2004: 122–3.

¹¹¹ As Barclay observes. Barclay 2007: 131 n. 778.

Josephus proceeds to accuse Manetho of departing from the Egyptian sacred records in his *Aegyptiaka* when he recounts the origins of the Jews. He characterizes Manetho's literary product on this point as "incredible tales" (λόγους ἀπιθάνους at 1.229), accuses him of inventing a false person in king Amenophis, and of contradicting his earlier account of the departure of the Shepherd people under Tethmosis some five centuries earlier. After quoting considerable extracts from Manetho's *Aegyptiaka*, Josephus devotes 1.254–87 to refuting the claims contained within them after asserting at 1.253 that he will attempt to disprove them from Manetho's own statements (ταῦτα πειράσομαι διὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων ἐλέγχειν). Manetho's characterization in this second section more closely resembles Josephus' earlier descriptions of Greek historians than his initial description of Manetho at 1.73–4. The motif of convicting or disproving an author from his own statements is explicitly described by Josephus in the proem (1.4) as one of his chief strategies of argumentation, and recurs frequently (thus where he targets Greek historians generally at 1.15, and Apion at 2.5). Josephus also accuses Manetho of speaking foolishly and lying at 1.252 (ληρεῖ καὶ ψεύδεται περιφανῶς) and uses descriptors for various components of Manetho's account such as καταγέλαστον ("ridiculous") at 1.254, εὐηθέστατον ("silliest") at 1.260, and ἄλογον ("absurd") at 1.271. At 1.267 he accuses Manetho again of unwitting falsification (ἐν τούτοις πάλιν οὐ συνήσιν ἀπιθάνως ψευδόμενος). Josephus summarizes the connection between Manetho's variation in his use of sources (a theme introduced at 1.105 and 228–9), and the disparity be-

tween Josephus' characterization of Manetho in his treatment of Hyksos I and Hyksos II at 1.287;¹¹²

ἱκανῶς οὖν γεγονέναι νομίζω καὶ δῆλον δ' ὅτι Μανεθῶς, ἕως μὲν
ἠκολούθει ταῖς ἀρχαίαις ἀναγραφαῖς, οὐ πολὺ τῆς ἀληθείας διημάρτανεν,
ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀδεσπότους μύθους τραπόμενος ἢ συνέθηκεν αὐτοὺς ἀπιθάνως
ἢ τισι τῶν πρὸς ἀπέχθειαν εἰρηκότων ἐπίστευσεν.

I think that it has also been sufficiently clear that Manetho, so long as he followed the ancient records, did not stray far from the truth, but when he turned to anonymous stories he either invented them unconvincingly or trusted some of those who had spoken with the purpose of hate.

The problem with Manetho's historiographical work (according to Josephus) is that only on some points does he follow Josephus' preferred historiographical method of relying on ancient and authoritative records. On other points, he relies on legendary and oral sources, which he calls τὰ μυθεύόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα at 1.229, and τῶν ... εἰρηκότων at 287.¹¹³ We have already seen from the discussion of the Greek tradition at 1.11–27 that oral sources are intrinsically problematic for Josephus. In the Hyksos II narrative he once more aligns historical falsehood with reliance on oral sources. Whereas with Hyksos I, Josephus describes a Manetho whose historiographical method (and, as I will elaborate in Chapter 3, bicultural identity) closely resembled his own, with Hyksos II, Josephus' Manetho more closely resembles the Greek historians of 1.6–59, with their dependence on suspect oral traditions, their self-contradiction, and their ignorance of Jewish affairs. The malicious attitude toward Jews attributed to all Egyptians at 1.223–6 also resembles

¹¹² Barclay also observes that Josephus' negative depiction of Egyptians following 1.223 is a form of ethos denigration befitting an orator. Barclay 2004: 118.

¹¹³ Dillery demonstrates that Josephus uses the verb μυθεύειν both here and throughout his corpus to refer to local oral traditions in contrast to written history. Dillery 2015: 205–6.

the characterization of Josephus' alleged critics in the proem. Dillery has demonstrated that Josephus shows a marked sensitivity to Manetho's historiographical method, to the layers of his text, as well as to the potential for problems of interpolation within the manuscript transmission of the *Aegyptiaka* as it existed in Josephus' day.¹¹⁴ I will add to this only that Josephus is quite astute in deploying his observations about Manetho as a historian in the service of his own rhetorical aims in the *CA*,¹¹⁵ which includes what is effectively a demonstration of the argument advanced at 1.6–59 about what causes a history to be true or false. We also observe in the disparity of Josephus' treatment of Manetho between Hyksos I and II the slipperiness of his characterizations of authors based on their ethnicity: where Josephus aligns Egyptians and Jews with respect to the prestige accorded the Greek historiographical tradition, he is eager to characterize Manetho in terms resembling his own self-presentation. But where Josephus asserts essential differences between Jews and Egyptians, he characterizes Manetho in terms resembling the people he first singled out for difference from Jews: the Greeks.

On the brief treatment of Chaeremon and Lysimachus which follows Manetho and closes Book I it is worth remarking that Josephus is chiefly interested in noting Chaeremon's deviation from Manetho on the expulsion of the Jews from Egypt at 1.293–303. Josephus certainly accuses Chaeremon (and Manetho) of lying and of wholesale invention at 1.293 (οἱ δὲ τὰ ψευδῆ συντιθέντες οὐχ ἑτέροις σύμφωνα γράφουσιν ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς τὰ δόξαντα πλάττουσιν), but more to the point, he is interested in establishing that Egyp-

¹¹⁴ Dillery 2015: 204–14.

¹¹⁵ Barclay 2004: 111 makes a similar observation.

tians, like Greeks, had a historiographical tradition grounded in inconsistency and contradiction. They are willing to deviate from their sacred documents out of envy and malice toward Jews (1.226), and to deviate from other contemporary historians, as Chaeremon deviates from Manetho, and as Lysimachus deviates from both Chaeremon and Manetho (thus at 1.312: οὗτος (sc. ὁ Λυσίμαχος) οὐδὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνοις εὗρεν εἰπεῖν βασιλέα καινότερον δ' ὄνομα συντέθεικεν...).¹¹⁶ This is rather a different picture from that presented at 1.8–9 and 28 of stable, permanent, and reliable Egyptian historical records written and maintained by a priestly class. As with the disparate treatment of Manetho, this later assessment of the Egyptian historiographical tradition serves Josephus' rhetorical purpose of the moment: Josephus is here concerned with discrediting alleged anti-Jewish polemic in these Egyptian sources, whereas at 1.8–9 and 28, he was concerned with isolating the Greek tradition from the more ancient Near Eastern traditions and presenting a stark contrast between the two.

There is a degree of artificiality in my choice to treat Josephus' lengthy response to Apion that constitutes the first half of Book 2 as a continuation of Josephus' treatments of Egyptian sources on the Exodus in Book 1. This is because Josephus himself makes a point of delineating how he is beginning a new topic with his second book in his programmatic introduction at 2.1–2.¹¹⁷ The prominence of Josephus' description of Apion as an Egyptian for his argument, however, forms a thematic link with Josephus' hostile de-

¹¹⁶ If Josephus is presenting Lysimachus as an Egyptian, which is implicit in this passage. See also above, n. 103.

¹¹⁷ Jones in fact argues that Apion should not be seen simply as the next Egyptian in the sequence. Jones 2005: 280 n. 5.

piction of Egyptians at 1.224, and is of course important for understanding his use of the category Egyptian. In lieu of a thorough analysis of ethnic categories deployed by Josephus for the whole of Josephus' treatment of Apion, which would be quite extensive and has been canvassed in recent scholarship,¹¹⁸ I will instead offer an analysis of an important passage as a case study and touch on a few additional significant passages in the treatise. Josephus' sophisticated attention to (and obfuscation of) the finer points of civic and ethnic identity becomes a prominent theme following Josephus' critique of Apion's false etymology of "Sabbath," which Apion claimed was derived from an Egyptian word for genital disease. Josephus writes at 2.28–32:

τοιαῦτα μὲν τινα περὶ Μωσέως καὶ τῆς ἐξ Αἰγύπτου γενομένης τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ἀπαλλαγῆς ὁ Αἰγύπιος Ἀπίων ἐκαινοποίησεν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπινοήσας. καὶ τί γε δεῖ θαυμάζειν εἰ περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψεύδεται προγόνων, λέγων αὐτοὺς εἶναι τὸ γένος Αἰγυπτίους; (29) αὐτὸς γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούναντίον ἐψεύδετο καὶ γεγεννημένος ἐν Ὁάσει τῆς Αἰγύπτου, πάντων Αἰγυπτίων πρῶτος ὢν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ πατρίδα καὶ τὸ γένος ἐξωμόσατο, Ἀλεξανδρεὺς δὲ εἶναι καταψευδόμενος ὁμολογεῖ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τοῦ γένους. (30) εἰκότως οὖν οὗς μισεῖ καὶ βούλεται λοιδορεῖν τούτους Αἰγυπτίους καλεῖ. εἰ μὴ γὰρ φαυλοτάτους εἶναι ἐνόμιζεν Αἰγυπτίους, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ γένους αὐτὸς ἔφυγεν, ὡς οἱ γε μεγαλοφρονοῦντες ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν πατρίσι σεμνύνονται μὲν ἀπὸ τούτων αὐτοὶ χρηματίζοντες, τοὺς ἀδίκως δ' αὐτῶν ἀντιποιουμένους ἐλέγχουσι. (31) πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ δυοῖν θάτερον Αἰγύπτιοι πεπόνθασιν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἐπισεμνυόμενοι προσποιοῦνται τὴν συγγένειαν, ἢ κοινωνοὺς ἡμᾶς ἐπισπῶνται τῆς αὐτῶν κακοδοξίας. (32) ὁ δὲ γενναῖος Ἀπίων δοκεῖ μὲν τὴν βλασφημίαν τὴν καθ' ἡμῶν ὥσπερ τινὰ μισθὸν ἐθέλῃσαι παρασχεῖν Ἀλεξανδρεῦσι τῆς δοθείσης αὐτῷ πολιτείας, καὶ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάμενος τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συνοικοῦντας αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας Ἰουδαίους προτέθειται μὲν ἐκείνοις λοιδορεῖσθαι, συμπεριλαμβάνειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας, ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἀναισχύντως ψευδόμενος.

These are the sorts of things which the Egyptian Apion has invented about Moses and about the departure of the Jews from Egypt, fabricating beyond

¹¹⁸ Recent scholarship on Apion in the *CA* includes Dillery 2003, Barclay 2004, and Jones 2005.

the rest. And why should we be surprised if he has lied about our ancestors by saying that they are Egyptian by γένος? (29) For he himself told the opposite lie about himself, and he who was born in the Egyptian Oasis and was practically the leading man of all the Egyptians forswore his true country and his γένος, and by pretending to be an Alexandrian confirms the wickedness of his γένος. (30) And so accordingly, whomever he hates and wishes to abuse, these men he calls Egyptians. For if he did not consider the Egyptians the absolute worst, he would not himself have fled from his own γένος, as the high-minded are proud of their countries and are called after them, while refuting those who unjustly lay claim to them. (31) But Egyptians have had one of two experiences regarding us: either they pretend to kinship as if they took pride in it, or they absorb us as partners of their own bad reputation. (32) But the noble Apion seems to wish to produce this slander against us for the Alexandrians like some sort of wage for the citizenship that was given to him, and knowing their hate for the Jews who live with them in Alexandria, he intended to slander these Jews, but included all the rest, lying shamelessly on both counts.

In 2.28, Josephus strikingly introduces Apion for the first time as “Egyptian” (ὁ Αἰγύπτιος Ἀπίων). Barclay remarks that Josephus’ claim of Apion’s Egyptian ethnicity constitutes his primary weapon in his response to Apion’s claims of 2.2–144.¹¹⁹ In his commentary, he also details how Josephus deliberately confuses or elides categories of identity throughout his response to Apion.¹²⁰ Whereas elsewhere Josephus delineates distinctions between ethnicity and citizenship, for instance, when it suits his argument (e.g. 2.38), he proceeds at 2.29 on the pretense that Alexandrian citizenship and an Egyptian birthplace are mutually exclusive, which is of course untrue.¹²¹ Josephus elides any dis-

¹¹⁹ Barclay 2004: 119. Barclay asserts that this claim of Egyptian ethnicity is false, but does not demonstrate why this is so. Scholarly opinion has historically varied on whether Josephus is in fact correct. See the summary in Jones 2005: 291–302 with bibliography. Jones is correct in pointing to the importance of current definitions of ethnicity to the question (as opposed to biological definitions of race no longer accepted). See also p. 24 n. 5 above.

¹²⁰ Barclay 2007: 182 n. 92.

¹²¹ The complexities of citizenship and ethnic status in multi-ethnic Alexandria are the topic of considerable scholarly output. Important contributions include Goudriaan 1988, Bilde et al. 1992, Gruen 2002: 54–83

inction between being an Egyptian by place of birth, and being Egyptian by culture and religious practice, for which we have no direct evidence in the case of Apion.¹²² There can be no doubt that Apion did possess Alexandrian citizenship, and thus was not “pretending to be an Alexandrian” (Ἀλεξανδρεὺς δὲ εἶναι καταψευδόμενος) in one very real sense.¹²³ Josephus in fact acknowledges Apion’s citizenship in 2.32, even if his remark that Apion effectively bought it with slanders against the local Jewish population is meant to undermine its legitimacy. Instead, 2.29 makes more sense if Josephus implies that Apion has pretended to an Alexandrian ethnic or cultural identity. An ethnic identity is suggested by the contrast between Apion’s allegedly false claim to Alexandrian identity and his alleged forswearing of “his true country and his γένος” (τὴν μὲν ἀληθεῖ πατρίδα καὶ τὸ γένος).¹²⁴ Jones presents a compelling case for reading Josephus’ response to Apion as in part aimed at denying Apion’s Greek cultural identity through rhetorical craft: by claiming that Apion is an ethnic Egyptian, he can associate Apion with negative prejudices about Egyptians, but wherever Apion appears not to conform to Josephus’ stereotypes about Egyptians, Josephus can accuse him of betraying his own people.¹²⁵ Josephus thus continues to shift between the meanings of these categories in the service of his rhetorical aims.

¹²²Jones 2005: 291–302.

¹²³ Barclay discusses possible historical scenarios for Apion’s acquisition of Alexandrian citizenship. Barclay 2007: 184–5, n. 104.

¹²⁴ Recall Hall’s criteria of territory and kinship for the definition of ethnicity described above, p. 23–5.

¹²⁵ Jones 2005: 295–8. A necessary caveat, however, is in order: as I will discuss below, Gruen has argued that anti-Egyptian prejudice was less widespread and monolithic than many scholars (including Jones) maintain. As I argue below (*pace* Jones), we are on firmer ground assigning the anti-Egyptian prejudice to Josephus’ himself rather than to his audience or broader milieu at Rome. See Gruen 2011a.

Not only in 2.28–32, but throughout 2.2–144, Josephus describes Egyptians (and thus, according to his claims, Apion) in hostile terms. It is not crucial to my purposes to attempt to define the precise nature of this prejudice, that is, whether it constitutes racism, a controversial category to apply to antiquity, ethnic prejudice, or another variety of prejudice.¹²⁶ Without delving into semantics, it is possible to maintain that Josephus displays anti-Egyptian prejudice and asserts it in vitriolic terms. Thus in 2.29, Josephus claims that Apion “confirms the wickedness of the γένος,” considers the Egyptians the “absolute worst,” and labels others Egyptians with the intention of slandering them. Josephus’ assertions of the essential badness of Egyptians differs from his critique of Greeks, even if he asserts that some, at least, of the failings of the Greek historiographical tradition are due to character flaws (1.24–5) and environmental determinism (1.10).¹²⁷ In the case of the Egyptians, Josephus goes so far as to claim that they are sub-human (2.65–6). Barclay maintains that similar prejudice is a commonplace in the extant Greek and Latin literature of classical antiquity, as do many scholars.¹²⁸ He argues that Josephus uses Roman anti-Egyptian stereotypes as a means of gaining rhetorically from aiming at a soft target.¹²⁹ Gruen, however, has convincingly argued that the evidence for widespread anti-Egyptian prejudice in the Roman period is overstated, and that there is in fact better evidence for

¹²⁶ Some important works on this topic in antiquity include Sherwin-White 1967, Isaac 2004, Eliav-Feldon et al. 2009, Gardner et al. 2013.

¹²⁷ On the relationship of environmental determinism to racism, see Isaac 2004: 56–109.

¹²⁸ On anti-Egyptian prejudice, see Isaac 2004: 352–370, Barclay 2004: 121–126, and bibliography assembled by Gruen (Gruen 2011a: 101 n. 138).

¹²⁹ Barclay 2004: 121–4.

more complex attitudes toward Egyptians.¹³⁰ In light of Gruen's analysis, Josephus' anti-Egyptian views appear relatively idiosyncratic. We cannot assume that Josephus' audience necessarily would agree with the assessment of Egyptians presented in this section of the treatise, or that such views can be explained by an attempt to appeal to his audience's preconceptions.¹³¹

Instead, Josephus' hostility toward Egyptians functions as a central pillar of his strategy of turning Apion's alleged slander on its head. Josephus fights fire with fire by responding to the three categories of Apion's alleged slanders, which he defines at 2.6–7, with similar slanders leveled against Apion himself.¹³² Thus he cites Apion's claim that Moses was a native Egyptian at 2.10–11, and responds in part with the assertion of 2.29 that “he himself told the opposite lie about himself.” Josephus' explanation that Apion was the *real* closet-Egyptian (who is ashamed of his own background) allows him to assert an alleged cause for Apion's tale of the Jews' alleged Egyptian origins and dismiss the tale in one stroke. In a similar vein, Josephus attributes Apion's alleged denial of Alexandrian citizenship to the Jewish community of Alexandria to his failure to understand the conventions of citizenship that have allowed him to become an Alexandrian despite his alleged Egyptian ethnicity. Josephus makes this point clear at 2.41: εἰ δὲ τοῦτον ἀφαιρεῖται τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας Ἀπίων, παυσάσθω λέγων αὐτὸν Ἀλεξανδρέα (“If Apion disclaims this type of citizenship, he should stop calling himself an Alexandrian.”)

¹³⁰ See Gruen 2011a: esp. 99–111.

¹³¹ Though some may well have. It is also problematic to assume that Josephus is tacitly attempting to appeal to his audience's preconceptions, as I will argue in Chapter 4.

¹³² These three categories concern the Exodus from Egypt, the slander of the Jewish community of Alexandria, and Jewish temple ritual.

Thus the Alexandrian Jews have as much right to claim the identity as Apion himself. Finally, Josephus responds to Apion's rebuke of Jewish monotheism with a rebuke of Egyptian animal cult—ever an oddity to Greeks and Romans, even if not always subject to opprobrium—at 2.65–6.¹³³ He again uses derogation of animal cult in his response to Apion's story of Jewish worship of an ass-head at 2.81. He even answers Apion's aspersions on Jewish circumcision with the incredible story that Apion himself faced medical circumcision as a form of divine punishment for his blasphemy, and died as a result at 2.143. What Apion maligns in the Jews becomes true of himself, in this case, fatally. Josephus' choice of this strategy of claiming that all of Apion's insults of the Jews are in fact true of himself (whether directly or inverted) as an Egyptian is in keeping in a treatise in which he is deeply concerned with identity and with the defense of the Jews.

It is also worth recalling that Josephus' anti-Egyptian prejudice of 2.2–144 contrasts with the positive statements about Egyptian historiography found at 1.8, 28, and 69–72, where his rhetorical aims are different. Josephus' penchant for varying his characterization of ethnic or cultural groups in the service of particular arguments is not, however, limited to the Egyptians. We may also observe, although as in a mirror dimly in the Latin translation of Cassiodorus, that Josephus continues to deploy positive stereotypes about Greeks in opposition to Egyptians when it suits his argument. Thus at 2.70 Josephus argues that the true instigators of sedition (*seditio*) in Alexandria are ethnic Egyptians of Apion's ilk, and not Jews as Apion has alleged:

¹³³ Gruen 2011a: 77–8.

ipsi igitur molestiae huius fuere principium, nequaquam populo Macedonicam habente constantiam neque prudentiam Graecam, sed cunctis scilicet utentibus malis moribus Aegyptiorum et antiquas inimicitias adversum nos exercentibus.

They (sc. ethnic Egyptians who possess Alexandrian citizenship) were the origin of this trouble, since the population did not at all possess Macedonian steadfastness nor Greek intelligence, but naturally they collectively practiced the wicked customs of the Egyptians and kept at their ancient hostility toward us.

Thus, according to Cassiodorus, Josephus sets the *prudentia* of the Greeks and the *constantia* of the Macedonians against the *malis moribus* and *inimicitias* of the ethnic Egyptians.¹³⁴ Despite our inability to be certain about the exact moral terms which Josephus used to characterize these groups, Cassiodorus allows us to observe that Josephus has presented positive stereotypes of Greeks (and Macedonians) to further his negative depiction of Egyptians in pursuit of his refutation of Apion. This is rather a different picture from that presented of Greeks and Egyptians in the discussion of historiography in Book I. This disparity between Josephus' treatment of both Greeks and Egyptians depending upon Josephus' rhetorical needs of the moment is what I have hoped to convey in this section on Egyptians in the *CA*. For this underscores how Josephus' commitment in the *CA* does not lie either in denigrating Greeks or Egyptians, or in asserting Jewish difference from, or superiority to either of these peoples or their institutions. Josephus is committed primarily to defending the Jews, their history as represented by the *AJ* (and thus by Josephus himself), and their way of life from alleged slanders and attacks by outsiders

¹³⁴ Josephus consistently distinguishes between Greeks and Macedonians in his discussions of Alexandria.

whom Josephus consistently characterizes as motivated by ignorance, malice, or both.¹³⁵ Defense of the Jews is the unbroken thread that runs throughout a work for which many have had difficulty finding a consistent theme or purpose. His lines of attack against Greeks or Egyptians, and his temporary alliances with each against the other, are strategies in the defense of Jews.

IV. Conclusion

It is remarkable that Apion appears to have regarded himself as a cultural Greek, as Josephus claims that Apion listed himself alongside Socrates, Zeno, and Cleanthes as preeminent inventors and thinkers among the Greeks (2.135).¹³⁶ Given Apion's extensive scholarly output in Greek, it is not inconceivable that Josephus might have chosen to attack him for his cultural Greek identity, in keeping with his attacks on other Greek intellectuals elsewhere in the *CA*, rather than as a closet Egyptian with a bad case of self-loathing and pretensions to an undeserved higher status. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the term γένος is applied to Greeks only once, which forms a striking contrast to Josephus' frequent use of the term throughout the *CA* in reference to Jews and Egyptians. This suggests that the category "Greek" can operate differently in the *CA* than other ethnic signifiers. That is to say that though Josephus uses the term "Greek" frequently to indicate ethnicity, ethnicity is not the only operative meaning. In the following

¹³⁵ See e.g. 1.3. 1.213; 2.145; cf. 1.73 on Manetho's claims about Herodotus and 1.212 on Josephus' implication of Agartharchides' malice.

¹³⁶ See also Jones 2005: 295–6 on the evidence for Apion's Greek cultural identity.

chapters, I will delve into the non-ethnic identity widely attached to the term in antiquity: an identity grounded in education.

Josephus may not have taken an interest in attacking Apion as a cultural Greek because, as I will argue, he himself was a participant in Greek culture and has as much claim to Greek cultural identity as Apion himself. As I hope to have made unambiguously clear in this chapter, Josephus only ever explicitly lays claim to one cultural/ethnic identity in the *CA*: he is a Jew. As Josephus is at pains to assert throughout much of the treatise, he sees stark differences between Greek and Jewish cultures, which implies his own difference from Greek culture. He does not even mention his own Roman citizenship, despite discussing what he frames as the generosity of the Romans for bestowing their citizen rights widely (Egyptians excepted) at 2.40–1.¹³⁷ Because Josephus is so intent upon presenting unity as an ancestral Jewish virtue, perhaps he is unwilling to describe explicitly a multiplicity of cultural identities for himself; he characterizes such multiplicity as betrayal in the case of Apion. Even so, I have also examined the places where Josephus has expressed common ground between Greeks and Jews where rhetorically expedient, which opens up the possibility (never realized in explicit terms) that Josephus would concede that he himself shares at least some ideas, νόμοι, etc. with at least some Greeks. In the following two chapters I argue that the commonalities between Josephus and specific Greek culture go much further than this.

¹³⁷ Josephus discusses his Roman citizenship at *Vita* 423.

Chapter 2

Josephus the Greek I: The Greek Language, the Second Sophistic, and the *Against Apion*

Introduction

As I turn now to the form of the *CA*, and how Josephus presents himself and his identity in the non-explicit elements of the treatise, it is fruitful to begin by examining Josephus' self-presentation in the opening of the proem. Here, at *CA* 1.1–3, Josephus describes the circumstances and purpose of the composition of the treatise. He expresses particular concern for the various audiences to which the *CA* is written. Josephus writes:

Ἰκανῶς μὲν ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ διὰ τῆς περὶ τὴν ἀρχαιολογίαν συγγραφῆς, κράτιστε ἀνδρῶν Ἐπαφρόδιτε, τοῖς ἐντευζομένοις αὐτῇ πεποιηκέναι φανερόν περὶ τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν τῶν Ἰουδαίων, ὅτι καὶ παλαιότατόν ἐστι καὶ τὴν πρώτην ὑπόστασιν ἔσχεν ἰδίαν, καὶ πῶς τὴν χώραν ἣν νῦν ἔχομεν κατώκησε· πεντακισχιλίων ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν ἱστορίαν περιέχουσιν ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἱερῶν βίβλων διὰ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς συνεγραψάμην. (2) ἐπεὶ δὲ συχνοὺς ὁρῶ ταῖς ὑπὸ δυσμενείας ὑπὸ τινων εἰρημέναις προσέχοντας βλασφημίαις καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀρχαιολογίαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγραμμένοις ἀπιστοῦντας τεκμήριόν τε ποιουμένους τοῦ νεώτερον εἶναι τὸ γένος ἡμῶν τὸ μηδεμιᾶς παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱστοριογράφων μνήμης ἡξιῶσθαι, (3) περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ᾧθήην δεῖν γράψαι συντόμως, τῶν μὲν λοιδορούντων τὴν δυσμένειαν καὶ τὴν ἐκούσιον ἐλέγξει ψευδολογίαν, τῶν δὲ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐπανορθώσασθαι, διδάξει δὲ πάντας ὅσοι τάληθές

εἰδέναι βούλονται περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχαιότητος.¹

I suppose that I have made it sufficiently clear by means of my history of the *Archaeology*, to those who are likely to read it,² concerning our γένος, the Jews, Epaphroditus, best of men, that it is most ancient and kept as its own its first origin, and how it came to inhabit the country which we currently possess; for I wrote a history in the Greek language encompassing a sum of five thousand years in accordance with our sacred books. (2) But since I see that there are many who give heed to the slanders that have been spoken by some because of enmity and who mistrust what was written by me about the *Archaeology* and consider as a sign of our γένος being rather recent the fact that it is thought worthy of no mention at all among the famous ones of the Greek historiographers, (3) I thought it was necessary to write briefly about all of these matters, to convict the malice and willful falsehood of the slanderers, to correct the ignorance of others, and to instruct all who wish to know the truth concerning our antiquity.

The description in *CA* 1.1 of the scope of the *AJ* and of the fact that it is translated into Greek from the Hebrew scriptures closely resembles Josephus' description of the *AJ* in the *AJ*'s proem (at *AJ* 1.5 and 13).³ The description of the primary historical claims of the *AJ* found in *CA* 1.1 does not, however, particularly accord with Josephus' statements of

¹ 1.3 contains a significant textual problem which renders the sentence confusing as transmitted. The problem lies with the series of infinitives which follow δεῖν, and must, as the text stands in Siegert 2008, be dependent upon it, contrary to Barclay (2007: 7 n. 19), who claims that the final three are irregular infinitives of purpose; but infinitives of purpose normally follow verbs taking accusative objects, and do not normally take additional objects, as these do. Barclay does not cite any parallel examples for what would be indeed a highly irregular set of infinitives of purpose (cf. Smyth §2008–11, Kühner-Gerth II.2 §473.7). Barclay's remarks on this problem, unfortunately, seem to be based on a draft of Siegert 2008 that was changed before publication, as what is printed in Siegert does not match Barclay's claims about that text (see Barclay's remarks on his use of early drafts of this edition, Barclay 2007: LXV–LXVI). He is also incorrect in the placement of Bekker's emendation of καὶ before the first τῶν (Barclay 2007: 7 n.19). This is, perhaps, an unfortunate pitfall of the decision of the editors of the Brill Josephus Project not to print Greek texts with their commentaries (see Barclay 2007: IX–XII). Nevertheless, Bekker's emendation (which Siegert does not print), formed on the basis of the Latin translation (on which see below, p. 141, would only underscore the dependence of all of the infinitives on δεῖν, by which Josephus certainly expresses the tripartite purpose of the treatise, even if he does not use a grammatical purpose construction.

² On this translation of the future participle, see Smyth §2044.

³ *AJ* 1.5: μέλλει γὰρ περιέξιν ἅπασαν τὴν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀρχαιολογίαν καὶ τὴν διάταξιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐκ τῶν Ἑβραϊκῶν μεθρημηνευμένην γραμμάτων. *AJ* 1.13: μυρία δ' ἐστὶ τὰ δηλούμενα διὰ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων, ἅτε δὴ πεντακισχίλιων ἐτῶν ἱστορίας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐμπεριειλημένης ...

the purpose of the *AJ* found in the proem of the *AJ* itself, where he describes the work as having as its purpose historical exemplarity (*AJ* 1.14–15),⁴ motivated primarily by Euphroditus’ persuasion and Josephus’ shame at the prospect of intellectual failure (*AJ* 1.9).⁵ The historicity of the extreme antiquity (ὅτι καὶ παλαιότατόν ἐστι) of the Jewish people is not explicitly the purpose of the history, nor is it in itself a major theme of the work, nor is the “origin” (ὑπόστασις),⁶ nor the acquisition of Judea, even if all of these themes are,

⁴ *AJ* 1.14: τὸ σύνολον δὲ μάλιστα τις ἂν ἐκ ταύτης μάθοι τῆς ἱστορίας ἐθέλησας αὐτὴν διελθεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν θεοῦ γνώμη κατακολουθοῦσι καὶ τὰ καλῶς νομοθετηθέντα μὴ τολμῶσι παραβαίνειν πάντα κατορθοῦται πέρα πίστεως καὶ γέρας εὐδαιμονία πρόκειται παρὰ θεοῦ· καθ’ ὅσον δ’ ἂν ἀποστῶσι τῆς τούτων ἀκριβοῦς ἐπιμελείας, ἅπορα μὲν γίνεται τὰ πόριμα, τρέπεται δὲ εἰς συμφορὰς ἀνηκέστους ὅ τι ποτ’ ἂν ὡς ἀγαθὸν δρᾶν σπουδάσωσιν.
 (“On the whole, anyone who particularly cares to peruse this history would learn that for those who imitate the purpose of god and do not dare to transgress laws that were so well made, everything turns out unbelievably well, and god-given happiness awaits them as a reward. But, on the other hand, to the extent that they step aside from the thorough observance of these laws, profitable things become difficult and whatever they are eager to do, thinking it good, is turned to incurable misfortune.”) Trans. Teets 2013: 92.

⁵ See e.g. Schwartz 1990: 176 and 2016: 51 on *AJ* 1.14 as the main theme of the *AJ*; Mason 1998: 80–7 disagrees; see also Teets 2013: 92–3. On exemplarity as a recurring feature in Greek and Latin historiography, see Chaplin (2000) 5–11 and Dillery 1995: 127–30. A discussion of the purpose of the *AJ* would be incomplete without mention of its location within the tradition of the “rewritten Bible” (the bibliography on which is extensive; see esp. Vermes 1961, Lightfoot 2007: 243–5, Laato and van Ruiten 2008, Zsengellér 2014, and Dillery 2015: 357–9), which is to say that Josephus’ paraphrase of the Bible is also a form of commentary on it. Thus Josephus had purposes for writing the *AJ* (both the expressed and unexpressed) which are of course the product of his own mind in response to his specific context, but which are also conditioned by a literary tradition of which he was certainly aware.

⁶ The term ὑπόστασις is a curious choice for Josephus. Both Gutschmid and Barclay claim philosophical connotations for it (Gutschmid 1893: 386 and Barclay 2007: 4 n. 9). The term in fact has a wide range of meaning and is used across a wide spectrum of genres (though it is generally used in prose after the Pre-Socratics), including philosophy, medicine, and rhetorical theory, but it is also found in the Septuagint and New Testament. Its use is so varied, however, that the conclusion that philosophical connotations are activated in Josephus’ use here seems unjustified, nor is it clear what such a meaning would do for Josephus, as ὑπόστασις generally means something like “sediment” or “thick liquid” in authors such as Aristotle (e.g. *Meteorologica* 382b) and, interestingly, Apion (Λέξεις Ὀμηρικαί F 91). A TLG search reveals that the term is more commonly used by medical writers, which further suggests that it does not necessarily have philosophical connotations. The LSJ’s interpretation of ὑπόστασις in this passage as “a coming into being; origin” is more plausible at LSJ B.I.5, (cf. ὑφίστημι LSJ A.I.1), where *CA* 1.1 is listed alongside LXX Psalm 138 (139).15 and Hermogenes *Id.* 1.10. The combination πρώτη ὑπόστασις is without precedent prior to *CA* 1.1, though Proclus uses it with a similar sense (*In Platonis Alcibiadem* i.68). The general sense of the phrase is sufficiently clear at *CA* 1.1. Barclay remarks that Josephus makes this point here to anticipate his arguments against the alleged claims (presented by Josephus as slanders) that the Jews were Egyptian in origin. τὴν πρώτην ὑπόστασιν ... ἰδίαν thus has connotations of ethnic purity. Barclay further remarks that the term is rare in Josephus, and that the theme of ethnic purity is less prominent in the *AJ* than Josephus suggests here. This underscores my point that *CA* 1.1 does not accord with what Josephus signals as his purpose in the *AJ* itself.

of course, present in the *AJ*.⁷ *CA* 1.1 is thus an unrepresentative summary of the *AJ*. Has Josephus somehow misread or misremembered the main purpose and themes of a work of some twenty years' composition, and for which he wrote a lengthy and explicit proem describing its purpose? This is unlikely; rather, Josephus' selective description of the *AJ* serves as his announcement of the key themes of the current work, introduced in 1.2–3 as a sequel to the *AJ* necessitated (ὥρθην δεῖν γράψαι) by the negative reactions of at least some considerable portion (συχνοῦς) of its audience. The specific claims of the antiquity, the origin, and the settlement of the country of the Jews are decidedly historical claims, here presented as the salient claims of the *AJ*, which, according to Josephus, were adequately established (ικανῶς ... φανερόν) in his second historiographical work (τῆς περὶ τὴν ἀρχαιολογίαν συγγραφῆς); the failure of the *AJ* to convince its audience of these claims results, according to Josephus, not from any inadequacy of the *AJ*, but of its audience. These alleged unfavorable responses of his audience thus appear to be the cause of Josephus' presentation of these claims as the central claims of the *AJ*.

The audience which Josephus describes for the *CA* in 1.2–3 consists of three groups, differentiated in 1.3 by the μὲν ... δὲ ... δὲ construction which coordinates the second, third, and fourth infinitives dependent on δεῖν (τῶν μὲν λοιδορούντων ... ἐλέγξει ... τῶν δὲ ... ἐπανορθώσασθαι διδάξει δὲ ...). None of these groups is defined distinctly enough to give us any clear indication of a specific intended audience, let alone the actual immediate audience of the *CA*.⁸ This, however, is not strictly relevant to my

⁷ See e.g. Barclay 2007: 4 n. 8, Schwartz 2016: 51–55.

⁸ On the possible immediate historical audience of the *CA*, see Kasher 1996: 150–7, Goodman 1999: 50–1, Rajak 2001: 197, Gruen 2005, and Barclay 2007: XLV–LI.

purpose of analyzing how Josephus presents his projected audience, and presents himself and his work in relation to that audience. The first group in the list in 1.3, which I have translated as “the slanderers” (τῶν ... λοιδορούντων), appear to be the same as those who in 1.2 are also described as speakers of defamatory remarks (ταῖς ὑπὸ δυσμενείας ὑπὸ τινων εἰρημέναις ... βλασφημίαις). They are recognizable as the same party by their malice (δυσμενεία). The particular problem that these unnamed slanderers have caused is that others have taken their malicious critiques seriously, and as a consequence do not trust Josephus’ claims in the *AJ* (τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀρχαιολογίαν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ γεγραμμένοις ἀπιστοῦντας). These mistrusting people seem to be the same as the second group in 1.3, characterized by their ignorance (ἄγνοια), a quality which fits the description in 1.2 of their belief in the absence of the Jews in the Greek historians as proof of the Jews’ relative newness. This alleged belief is of course a major theme of the *CA*, to which Josephus returns at 1.58, and which he devotes 1.60–218 to refuting. In the course of this refutation Josephus ascribes at 1.213 two possible motives that Greek historians might have for omitting the Jews from their histories: ignorance and malice (ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες ἔνιοι τῶν συγγραφέων τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ φθόνου τινὸς ...). Josephus thus sees a connection between the omission of the Jews from Greek histories and ignorance or ill-will. This second group among the *CA*’s audience is not malicious or particularly hostile toward the Jews but, according to Josephus, they are simply wrong and need to be corrected (ἐπανορθώσασθαι). The third group (πάντας ὅσοι τἀληθὲς εἰδέναι βούλονται περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχαιότητος) is even more vaguely defined than the first two. Barclay remarks that this group seems more closely connected to the second group and has the rhetorical

function of forming the cap on the tricolon.⁹ True indeed, and we may also recognize in this description of “those who wish to know the truth” a historiographical trope (cf. Thuc. 1.22.4); a similar construct is also apparent in the proem of the *AJ* at 1.9 (... καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινες αὐτῶν γινῶναι τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐσπούδασαν), and, to a lesser degree, in Josephus’ emphasis on “the exactness of the history” (τὸ δ’ ἀκριβὲς τῆς ἱστορίας) in an atmosphere of hostility and falsehood at *BJ* 1.2. These similar formulations in the proems of all three of Josephus’ major works serve to tie together not only his purpose in writing throughout his extant works, but also his projected audience. That Josephus at least notionally expects his audience to have both the *BJ* and the *AJ* in mind throughout his discussion of historiographical veracity is particularly evident at *CA* 1.47–56, where Josephus asserts that his own personal credentials and historiographical methodologies for both the *BJ* and the *AJ* are superior to those of his alleged critics.

While Josephus expects that the audience of the *CA* has also read the *BJ*, his understanding that the audience of the *CA* and the *AJ* are the same people is explicit in the proem. Both the first (the slanderers) and second (the mistrusters) of the audience groups of *CA* 1.2 are presented as people who have read the *AJ*. This is explicit in the case of the latter; in the case of the former, it is implicit, given that the mistrust of the latter group is caused by their attention to the slanders of the former; Josephus thus presents those slanders as directed against the *AJ*. Barclay suggests that 1.1 implies that the audience of the *CA* excludes readers of the *AJ*, since presumably they are already in the know, as Josephus, by his own opening remark, has made his claims “sufficiently clear.” This interpre-

⁹ Barclay 2007: n. 22.

tation, however, is faulty; the affirmation of the validity of the *AJ* in 1.1 is contrasted with 1.2 via the the $\mu\epsilon\nu$... $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ construction not by a description of non-readers of the *AJ*, but of readers who have mistrusted it, and those who have maligned it.¹⁰ We may also remark that Josephus addresses the *CA* to Epaphroditus, the dedicatee of the *AJ* and *Vita*.¹¹ These two points show that Josephus presents his projected audience of the *CA* as to a considerable degree the same as that of the *AJ*.

Within this proem which Josephus has framed as a response to the reception of the *AJ*, 1.3 constitutes a statement of the work's purpose. We thus observe that Josephus frames the *CA* as an installment in a larger ongoing argument with his own audience about the Jewish past. We might consider the *AJ* to be the original installment in this argument as Josephus presents the situation in the *CA*, while noting that in the *AJ* itself, Josephus presents the *AJ* as a continuation of the *BJ* which he had originally intended to be composed as a single work (*AJ* 1.6); in the *BJ*, Josephus frames the *BJ* as a response to allegedly false accounts of the war (*BJ* 1.2; cf. *AJ* 1.4). The participants in this debate, according to Josephus' presentation in the proem of the *CA*, are many and have varied attitudes toward the *AJ*, and Josephus directs the *CA* at them for different purposes at 1.3 in accordance with their respective relationships to the *AJ*. Josephus' "slanderers," for instance, are not only readers of the *AJ*, but also authors (or speakers) in their own right

¹⁰ Barclay 2007: 4 n.4. Barclay has misconstrued the force of the future participle, which he translates as "to those who will read it"; the future participle generally does not express simple futurity. See Smyth §2044. This representation of a hostile segment of Josephus' audience is, moreover, a variety of *captatio benevolentiae*, which is an appropriate element in a treatise composed with a sustained metaphor of forensic oratory (on which, see Ch. 3 pp. 175–7). Josephus seeks his readers' good will by presenting his alleged detractors as malicious. See Cicero *De Inv.* 1.22: *In odium ducentur (adversarii) si quod eorum spurce, superbe, crudeliter, malitiose factum proferetur*.

¹¹ See *AJ* 1.8–9 and *Vita* 430. On Epaphroditus, see Weaver 1994.

who have produced claims of their own which in turn have an audience. The “mistrusters,” however, are the audience of both Josephus and of the “slanderers,” and have sided with the slanderers. Josephus thus expresses a sophisticated understanding of the complexity of his own audience, a literary community with many sorts of actors who do not occupy the same position vis-à-vis the *AJ* (nor, as Josephus anticipates, the *CA*), nor do they have the same stakes in Josephus’ historiographical claims regarding the Jewish past.

While some ancient authors composed their works with an eye on posterity, Josephus does not frame the *CA* in such terms, like Thucydides’ κτῆμα ἐς αἰεῖ,¹² but focuses on the responses of living people. In this way, Josephus makes explicit to a degree unusual in historiography the fundamentally inter-personal, communal, and social nature of all literary publication in Greco-Roman antiquity.¹³ Given the sensitivity and awareness that he displays toward the (purportedly) various positions of his audience members in the proem, it is not surprising to find that Josephus displays an awareness of his own position with respect to his audience, particularly in his remarks on his own credentials and methodologies as a historian at *CA* 1.47–56.

I began this chapter with my analysis of *CA* 1.1–3 in order to draw attention to the inter-personal dimension of the treatise’s composition, which is crucial to my analysis of

¹² See Marincola 1997: 21–2.

¹³ The topic of ancient publication practices and their relevance to Josephus has received considerable attention in recent years, in particular from Mason. The most important aspect of publication for my present purpose is that ancient authors did not generally (like many modern authors) compose their works for a general public audience comprised primarily of strangers, but, at least in the first instance, composed for a local audience comprised primarily of literary peers known to the author. See esp. Mason 2009: 45–67 and 2016a: 80–88.

the question of Josephus' engagement with Greek culture. This is, so to speak, the other side of chapter one's coin. Scholars have long observed that despite Josephus' overt claims against the alleged intellectual presumption of the Greeks (as demonstrated in chapter one), the means by which he makes such claims are decidedly Greek.¹⁴ Indeed, Greek literary and rhetorical tools at the level of the form of the *CA* comprise Josephus' primary means of making his claims of difference from and opposition to Greek intellectual methods and institutions. At times he even uses the very methods of argumentation which he explicitly refutes.¹⁵ Greek παιδεία is indeed nowhere entirely absent in the *CA*. Josephus' use of "the weapons of the Greeks," to use Shaye Cohen's phrase, fundamentally constitutes Josephus' locating himself as the self-conscious author of this text within Greek παιδεία, as a participant in the terms, forms, and (many) ideologies of Greek culture. Nowhere in the *CA* does Josephus overtly lay claim to a Greek identity, such as he describes in his quotation of Clearchus' account of Aristotle's story of an unnamed Jew at 1.180: Ἑλληνικὸς ἦν οὐ τῇ διαλέκτῳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ.¹⁶ Josephus' participation in Greekness is, however, everywhere on display.

To discuss Josephus' display of such a Greek identity within the social context

¹⁴ See esp. Cohen 1988, Barclay 2007 *passim*.

¹⁵ Polemic and criticism spring readily to mind, and can be found on virtually any page of the *CA*.

¹⁶ Josephus gives similar descriptions of intellectuals who have a non-Greek ethnic identity, but who participate in Greek παιδεία, in his introductions to Manetho at 1.73 and Berossus at 1.129. On Josephus' self-positioning in relationship to such authors, and for bibliography, see Ch. 3, pp. 192–4, 199–201. For the fragments of Clearchus of Soli, student of Aristotle, see Wehrli 1948 and Bar Kochva 2010, esp. 40–89. Clearchus is a *recherché* author for Josephus to cite, which is presumably why he sees fit to give him such a thorough introduction: ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους ὢν μαθητὴς καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσόφων οὐδενὸς δεύτερος ("The student of Aristotle and second to none of the philosophers of the Peripatos.") See also Barclay 2007: 102 n. 580. On the meaning of Josephus' conspicuous display of esoteric authors, see Ch. 3, pp. 182–4.

that I have described above, I find it useful to draw from concepts of performance or performativity, originally developed by sociologists, linguistic anthropologists, and feminist theorists.¹⁷ It is not necessary to plumb the depths of the many subtle theoretical variations, but instead will suffice to remark that the general theory holds that identity (whether gender, class, or race, or a combination of these or other such categories) is constructed through the performance of social actions, that is, actions which have a public or social dimension. On the one hand, an individual actor's choices are conditioned by pre-existing expectations or norms of coded behaviors. On the other hand, the actor does not simply passively receive these norms or expectations, but exercises a degree of individual agency in their performance. Identity performance, on this model, is not an expression of a fixed or essential identity that pre-exists the action of the performance; instead, the acts themselves constitute the identity.¹⁸ Individuals may have varying degrees of success in their performance of an identity; they may also deliberately attempt to subvert an identity. It is particularly important to emphasize the understanding that identity is performative rather than essential because of the problematic history of essentializing views of identity in the study of the relationships between Greeks and Jews in antiquity, and their respective cultures and world-views.¹⁹ In this light, the language of performance in discussions of identity is preferable to uncritical assertions that Josephus "displays" an identity, or any other language that suggests that Josephus is merely revealing an identity which pre-

¹⁷ Major works on this concept include Goffman 1959, Austin 1962, Butler 1988 and 1997. See also Hall 2000 for a summary of 20th century work on performativity by linguistic anthropologists.

¹⁸ e.g. de Beauvoir's famous "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." de Beauvoir 1952: 267.

¹⁹ On this history, see esp. Rajak 2001: 535–57, with bibliography.

exists the act of display. This comes too close to essentializing both Greek and Jewish identity. The language of display can, however, be productive when it is understood in the sense similar to “perform”: to put on a display of identity is a performative act. It is in this sense that I use the term “display” in this chapter and the next. Lest this discussion devolve into semantic hairsplitting, let it suffice to say that Greek identity is fundamentally something that one does.

Identity as performance in antiquity is an avenue of inquiry much explored by Maud Gleason in her analysis of masculine identity performance in Favorinus and Polemo in the context of the institution of agonistic oratory and heightened consciousness of deportment-training of the Second Sophistic.²⁰ The language of performance may appear more natural in discussions of declamation, but we must be clear that Gleason is concerned with the performance of elite masculine identity, not with the theatrical performance of speeches *per se*.²¹ Gleason, of course, focuses primarily on the more physical aspects of this identity performance, such as dress, gesture, voice modulation, etc. (as they are described to us in literary survivals; we of course do not have access to the real thing). For Gleason, identity (elite, masculine, Greek) is something that one does. So, too, with Josephus. In her 2001 essay, “Mutilated Messengers: Body Language in Josephus,”

²⁰ Gleason 1995.

²¹ In other words, we must be careful to avoid confusion between the different meanings of “performance,” i.e. OED 1.a. “The accomplishment or carrying out of something commanded or undertaken; the doing of an action or operation.” versus 4.a. “The action of performing a play, piece of music, ceremony, etc.; execution, interpretation.” It is 1.a. that is intended throughout this dissertation, and generally throughout the exponents of performance theory, though some use 4.a. as a metaphor. The meanings, when applied to identity, are not mutually exclusive, however (cf. Goffman’s remarks on the origin of the English word “person” in the Latin *persona*. Goffman 1959: 19–20, citing Park 1950: 49). The crucial distinction that must be understood is that there is no “real” or fixed identity beneath one’s performed identity.

she engages in a similar analysis of body language described in the *BJ*.²² Gleason argues that as a result of his own ambiguous cultural position, “Josephus paid heightened attention in his writings to recording performative nuances of gesture because he knew from experience that self-presentation before diverse audiences requires fine-tuning of one’s cultural identity-construct.”²³ Gleason speaks here of Josephus’ depictions of body language, his literary representations of purported real-life actions. These “diverse audiences” are (presumably) the various sectors of the Jewish population of Galilee and Jerusalem with whom Josephus interacts (in person, with body language) in his narratives of the war, as well as his Roman captors.

I will show in this chapter and the following that Josephus’ literary language and rhetorical strategies in the *CA* likewise exhibit “performative nuances”; I have established that Josephus viewed his audience as diverse, at least in their respective mindsets or attitudes toward the *AJ*. A return to Josephus’ remarks on his audience in the proem is important here: because all acts of self-presentation are acts of identity performance to a degree, we are justified in analyzing the performative in a text whose author is so explicitly self-conscious, even anxious, about how it will be read. My demonstration of Josephus’ awareness of the fundamentally social nature of the publication of the *CA* is, I believe, helpful for my specific claim that literary productions are very much a medium for identity performance. This is the case for any literary work that is intended for an audience, even if no audience is specified or directly addressed, because an authorial voice or per-

²² Gleason 2001.

²³ Gleason 2001: 54.

sona is always a form of self-presentation. In this light, I will argue in this chapter and the next that Josephus' engagement with Greek παιδεία goes rather further than "using the weapons" of the Greeks against them, but that Josephus in fact makes his overt assertions of Jewish, and not Greek identity, in a language, style, and genre, and through techniques and strategies that fundamentally constitute a performance of a self-constructed Greek cultural identity.

Chapters two and three together comprise the other side of chapter one's coin in my overall argument. My focus in this chapter is on the language of the *CA*; in chapter three, I will turn to literary techniques and ideological constructs. In Section 1 of this chapter, I explain why the context of the so-called Second Sophistic is appropriate for my analysis of Josephus' engagement with Greek παιδεία, as well as give some definition to what I mean by the Greek identity that I argue Josephus performs. In Section 2, I discuss language, namely Atticism, as the chief medium of identity performance during the Second Sophistic, before proceeding to analyze Josephus' language in the *CA* in Section 3. Though fairly technical, my analysis of dialectal features in Josephus' Greek is important because it allows me a firm basis on which to argue that Josephus displays deliberate Atticism, and thus performs a Greek identity in this specific arena. In Section 4, I examine his comments on his own experience with the Greek language in the context of Second Sophistic hyperawareness of language.

1. The Second Sophistic and the Greek Identity of the πεπαιδευμένοι

I have already introduced the Second Sophistic as the context in which I will ana-

lyze the *CA* in this chapter and the following. I will offer a few words on why this is appropriate before proceeding to my analysis proper. There has been a tendency in the scholarship of Josephus in general and the *CA* in particular to compare his statements about Greek culture and the Greek language with Latin authors who discuss similar themes.²⁴ It is of course a valid and important procedure to compare Josephus' remarks with similar remarks from his Latin predecessors and (near-)contemporaries at Rome. These Latin authors do not, however, comprise Josephus' full literary context. It is also relevant to situate Josephus in his immediate Hellenophone context at Rome, and this is the incipient Second Sophistic. While some scholars have begun to analyze Josephus in this context,²⁵ Josephus' relationship with the Second Sophistic is an avenue which remains under-explored in current scholarship.²⁶

Some objections to my proposal to analyze Josephus' language in the context of the Second Sophistic may spring to mind at this point. The "Second Sophistic" is a notoriously problematic term in modern scholarship. In addition to what the term even means to begin with and whether it can be meaningfully used to describe a distinct literary movement, one might worry about whether the context of the Second Sophistic can even be applied to an author who was not an orator, or who lived in the first century, or in Rome. All of these possible reservations can be answered without great difficulty.

Consensus among scholars about the precise scope and time period of what the

²⁴ e.g. Rajak 1983:47–8 (see n. 185 below, p. 172), Barclay 2007: 363–9 and *passim*, Mason 2009: 69–102.

²⁵ e.g. Almagor 2016, which examines elements of Second Sophistic declamation in the speeches of the *BJ* and *AJ*.

²⁶ Mason makes passing references to it. See Mason 2009: 59 and 2016: 88 and my remarks below.

Second Sophistic includes is lacking (and probably unreachable). Recent scholarship has acknowledged that, despite Philostratus' use (and possible coinage) of the term in his *Lives of the Sophists* (*VS*), where it refers to a style of display oratory attributed to Aeschines' invention (and thus not limited to the Imperial period), the Second Sophistic is less a distinct, cohesive ancient phenomenon than a modern academic one.²⁷ While most scholars use the term to describe (pagan) Greek prose of the imperial period, they disagree about the nature of the movement or phenomenon, whether it was more cultural or political, which authors or texts ought to be included, and what the temporal and geographical boundaries are.²⁸ Some (e.g. Anderson, Brunt) will limit the category to orators, while others (e.g. Swain) are more inclusive of authors such as Plutarch and Lucian, as well as the extant novels.²⁹ While the heyday of the Second Sophistic may be largely considered to be the second and early third centuries, Philostratus frames its imperial phase as beginning during the reign of Nero, which prompts Swain to give its approximate dates as 50–250 CE.³⁰ Goldhill traces the developments of the trends of the Second Sophistic in imperial Greek literature through a much more expansive range of time, from Polybius to the fourth century, using the phrase “Second Sophistic” as a starting point.³¹ By either reckoning, Josephus' floruit is certainly included within the temporal scope of

²⁷ e.g. Whitmarsh 2005 4–5.

²⁸ See esp. Brunt 1994, Goldhill 2001: 13–5, and Whitmarsh 2005: 8–9 for summaries of these scholarly debates.

²⁹ See Anderson 1993, Brunt 1994, and Swain 1996.

³⁰ Swain 1996: 2.

³¹ Goldhill 2001: 15.

the movement. Another consideration in defining the Second Sophistic is geography. Swain downplays sophistic activity at Rome, and largely restricts his focus to the Greek East. Though he does include Lucian (and Favorinus, though with less extensive treatment), Swain envisions the Second Sophistic as the expression and articulation of elite Greek cultural-political identity as coming from primarily ethnic Greeks.³² There are others, however, who acknowledge the relationship of intellectual activity at Rome in the first three centuries CE to the Second Sophistic.³³ Thus, even if we are dealing with a primarily Eastern phenomenon, it is not inappropriate to examine Josephus' relationship to it. It is very much the case that the trends of the Second Sophistic are already happening in Rome under the Flavians, and are, so to speak, in the air in Josephus' literary environment.

For my own purposes, I will side with Goldhill in using the term to describe a fairly inclusive set of texts, as it is a particularly useful way of talking about some distinctive trends in the Greek literature of this period which can be observed broadly and across genres, and in many cases also observed in other media. As Goldhill observes, the authors included under the heading of the Second Sophistic (by both Philostratus and modern scholars) do not seem to have viewed themselves as sharing a common agenda (political or otherwise), nor can they all be described by a single set of criteria.³⁴ When we raise the question of how, given this lack of obvious cohesion among the ancient au-

³² Though Swain disavows the term "ethnic," his description of those who express Greek identity sounds remarkably close to Hall's definition of "ethnicity," hence my use of the term here. See Hall 2002: 9.

³³ For instance, Sandy 1997 on Apuleius, Crawford 2015 on Tatian, and of course, Schmid 1887: 1–26 on Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

³⁴ Goldhill 2001: 14–15.

thors, along with the acknowledgement of the degree of artificiality of the construct of the Second Sophistic, it is still meaningful to describe the Second Sophistic as a distinct literary movement, an analogy might be made to the standard process for diagnosing mental health conditions. A patient meeting a minimum criteria of possible symptoms will be diagnosed with a given condition, but most patients with a given diagnosis will not manifest all symptoms (e.g. not all who suffer clinical depression experience suicidal thoughts), some symptoms may contradict others (both insomnia and excessive sleeping are symptoms of depression), and when many patients diagnosed with the same condition are compared, their respective clusters of symptoms may vary considerably: one person's clinical depression may superficially look like an entirely different condition than another's, without rendering the label "depression" meaningless.

I find this analogy a useful means of expressing my understanding of how such a wide variety of authors can fall under the heading of the Second Sophistic: themes, ideological constructs, genres, and other literary trends can be observed in clusters, with the result that many individual authors may not resemble one another closely in the particulars, but when the whole field is surveyed, the commonalities are more apparent. Thus Atticism, for instance, while typical of the literary movement, is not executed to the same standard or in the same manner in all Second Sophistic authors, and some self-consciously react against Atticism (Galen), or deliberately satirize it (Lucian). For Atticism is not only a distinctive feature of the literature of the period, but it is also a matter of considerable debate and competitive one-upmanship.³⁵ Additionally, we might compare the many

³⁵ See my discussion of Atticism below, pp. 134–8.

authors of the Second Sophistic who took no interest in Roman cultural achievements or history with Plutarch's serious engagement with the Roman world.³⁶ Thus these apparently contradictory stances can belong to the same literary movement.

As I discussed in the introduction, identity performance has become a mainstream topic in much modern scholarship of the Second Sophistic.³⁷ Though anxiety over the performance of elite male identity may exist in any hierarchical society to a degree, and is certainly in evidence in Greek literature of other periods,³⁸ it is a marked concern of the authors of the Second Sophistic. This is particularly apparent in the lexicographers' tendency to classify prescribed and proscribed words by descriptors of people who use them.³⁹ The desired and contested elite male identity of the period is presented as distinctly Greek, as is seen, for instance, in Phrynichus' telling remarks about the use of approved (δόκιμον) Attic terms as being characteristic of those who are educated (πεπαιδευμένοι), while unapproved (ἁδόκιμον) terms are foreign (ἀλλόκοτον) or barbaric (βάρβαρον).⁴⁰ We thus observe an alignment of non-Attic usages with non-Greek identity, and an implicit alignment of Atticism with Greek identity. This suggests an operative concept of Greekness that is not dependent on ethnicity, as Phrynichus seeks to deny Greek identity to those Greek speakers not conforming to his prescriptions (regardless of

³⁶ See esp. Swain 1996: 87–9. See also Ch. 3, pp. 216–21.

³⁷ e.g. Gleason 1995, Goldhill 2001: 13–15, Whitmarsh 2001, Eshleman 2012.

³⁸ To give only a few examples of scholarship on this issue in the classical period, see Foucault 1986 vol. 3, Loraux 1986, Zeitlin 1996, Wohl 1998, Gilhuly 2009.

³⁹ I discuss the lexicographers in greater detail below, pp. 151–5.

⁴⁰ Kim 2014: 477.

any other basis for a claim to Greek identity that these perceived sub-elite speakers may have had), while at the same time, Phrynichus leaves open the possibility that people of non-Greek ethnicities could claim Greekness if they can speak in the prescribed manner.⁴¹ I will return to the abstraction of Greek identity from ethnicity shortly. We also observe the element of gender in Phrynichus' frequent characterization of the use of terms as either "masculine" or "feminine" (e.g. *Praep. Soph.* 120.9: ὕσπληξ· θηλυκῶς, οὐκ ἀρρενικῶς).⁴² Thus for Phrynichus, the desirable identity to be performed is masculine, educated, and Greek, and the undesirable is feminine, ignorant, and non-Greek. Distinguishing oneself as one of the πεπαιδευμένοι, separate from the ignorant masses, by means of lexical choice, is very much an assertion of elite class identity as well, as the degree of education generally indicated was the preserve of the wealthy few.⁴³ The early third century lexicographer Moeris more explicitly characterizes his own peers by their Greekness in his deployment of the threefold distinction between Ἀττικοί (apparently classical Attic authors), Ἑλληνες (apparently the group with whom Moeris himself identifies), and κοινόν (apparently "the lower end of the linguistic continuum of educated/semi-educated speakers").⁴⁴ Moeris' κοινόν represents an element that could conceivably have a meaningful claim to Greek identity (they are, of course, Greek speakers); Moeris' attempts to differentiate both himself and his apparent peers from them indicates that he,

⁴¹ See Whitmarsh 2001: 116–29 on the accessibility of Greek identity to people of non-Greek ethnicities during this period.

⁴² See also Gleason's analysis of gender identity in Frontinus and Polemo. Gleason 1995.

⁴³ Swain 1996: 28–9.

⁴⁴ See Swain 1996: 51–3. Quotation is from p. 52.

like Phrynichus, is defining a subset of elite Greeks, appropriating the label for the select few in possession of the desirable Greek cultural capital.

Because elite male intellectuals describe themselves in terms of their education so ubiquitously during the period of the Second Sophistic (Josephus is no exception), and so frequently use such descriptions to differentiate themselves from others (thus marking the territory of an identity group), I will use the term *πεπαιδευμένοι* as a shorthand for this loosely defined and contested group (elite Hellenophone men who laid claim to Greek *παιδεία*), and for the identity to which they laid claim and which they sought to police. An example of the claim to and policing of such identity is found in Galen's *De Methodo Medendi* 10.10, where Galen asserts that "it is not permitted to all to speak in public in any of the well-governed cities, but if someone is distinguished and can display *γένος*, upbringing, and education worthy of speaking in the assembly, the laws allow this person to give an oration." (*λέγειν οὐκ ἐφεῖται πᾶσι δημοσίᾳ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν εὐνομουμένων πόλεων, ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἐπίσημός ἐστι καὶ γένος ἔχει καὶ ἀνατροφὴν δεῖξαι καὶ παιδείαν ἀξίαν τοῦ δημηγορεῖν, τούτῳ συγχωροῦσιν ἀγορεύειν οἱ νόμοι.*) As Eshleman comments, Galen makes this claim in the context of complaining about a speaker whose credentials allegedly did not measure up, which reveals Galen's attempt at restricting access to the prestigious public lecture scene within his profession.⁴⁵ Similarly, as I explored in Chapter 1, Josephus sought to restrict which historiographical texts were worthy of the genre, and highlighted the exclusivity of the ranks of Jewish historians, for which *γένος* was a chief criterion. Galen, like so many of his Hellenophone (near-)contemporaries, signals

⁴⁵ Eshleman 2012: 26–7.

that παιδεία is indispensable to this group identity; aristocratic pedigree is likewise necessary (communicated in the demand for γένος); the relationship of elite family status to education is suggested in “upbringing” (ἀνατροφήν). The element of performance is evident in Galen’s insistence that the πεπαιδευμένος not merely be in possession of these attributes, but that he be capable of displaying them (ἔχει ... δεῖξαι).⁴⁶ As scholars have remarked, in a world lacking formal credentials and professional qualifications, the parading of one’s παιδεία (and the denigration of others’) served as one means of legitimizing one’s claim to expertise.⁴⁷

The centrality of the practice and performance of παιδεία to a specific Greek identity for elite men in the Roman period is well documented in recent scholarship.⁴⁸ I have chosen to highlight the Greek element of Josephus’ identity performance precisely because this is the culture he criticizes and constructs himself against in his explicit statements. The elements of class (by which I mean the appeal to elite social position) and gender are by no means absent in the *CA* nor indeed are they absent from the ideologies expressed in the discourse of παιδεία; they are simply less central to my focus. Josephus, of course, himself makes overt claims to elite identity, both in the *CA* and throughout his corpus (e.g. his priestly status (*CA* 1.54), claims to Hasmonean ancestry (*Vita* 2), and connections to the imperial court (*CA* 1.50)). As for gender performance, we may

⁴⁶ Note that in Galen’s formulation, these attributes are not part of the lecture performance per se, but are purportedly enshrined in the law as pre-requisites for being allowed to give public lectures. In other words, Galen’s claim speaks to identity performance outside of the more conventional notion of performance on the stage (or in the *odeon*).

⁴⁷ See e.g. Eshleman 2012: 2, Gleason 1995: xxiv.

⁴⁸ See e.g. Morgan 1998: 23–4, Goldhill 2001: 13–14, Whitmarsh 2001: 116–29 with bibliography.

note, for instance, Josephus' striking concern for the fate of Apion's genitals at 2.143.

This chapter and the following are dedicated to analyzing the non-overt elements of Josephus' identity. Josephus' use of Atticism, the topic of this chapter, is also a performance of one such non-overt element of a specifically Greek elite identity.

My discussion of Josephus' Greek identity is fundamentally grounded in the separation of a perceived or expressed Greek cultural identity from an ethnic or birth-group identity. Even prior to the Macedonian conquest, Greek culture had begun to be abstracted from ethnic identity.⁴⁹ During the Hellenistic period, Greek language and Greek culture were disseminated great distances from the historical peoples and institutions of Greece, and became a sign system, a medium of communication not only between the elites of the East, but among people of all social levels as well. "Greekness" thus was no longer necessarily an ethnic marker, but was also a marker of culture, elite class status, and masculinity.⁵⁰ Not only the Greek Koine, but Greek cultural institutions as well, became a *lingua franca* for the East. As Bowersock writes, Hellenism was not necessarily antithetical to local or indigenous traditions, but on the contrary provided a new means of giving voice to them.⁵¹ Greek culture thus influenced local culture, but this influence also worked in reverse. This system was thus everywhere a hybrid of Greek and local cultures, and thus was nowhere "purely" Greek, nor was Hellenism monolithic. Thus, to speak of

⁴⁹ e.g. Isocrates *Paneg.* 50. The general consensus is that Isocrates at *Pan.* 50 is not attempting to expand the definition of Ἕλληνες (as per Jaeger 1945, Vol. 3: 79–80), but to restrict it. See e.g. Jüthner 1929: 26 ff., Baynes 1955: 144–67, Walbank 1985: 5–6 and 2002: 239–40. Nevertheless, Isocrates has created a definition of Ἕλληνες that is abstracted from γένος and has a strictly cultural referent. The expansion of the term happens in the Hellenistic period.

⁵⁰ Hall 2002: 172–226.

⁵¹ Bowersock 1990: 1–14.

Greek culture in the Hellenistic and Roman periods is always to speak of a hybridized culture, a mutually intelligible yet heterogenous sign system. This is true for both discursive and non-discursive elements of culture (i.e. Greek artistic and architectural idioms, formal institutions such as athletic contests, elements of cult practice or religious belief such as anthropomorphic gods). By Josephus' lifetime, a cultural rather than ethnic identity was widely understood to be the primary significance of the term "Greek." Witness, for instance, the statement attributed to Apollonius of Tyana to the Ionians some time in the first century A.D. (*Ep.* 71):⁵²

Ἕλληνες οἴεσθε δεῖν ὀνομάζεσθαι διὰ τὰ γένη καὶ τὴν ἔμπροσθεν ἀποικίαν, Ἕλλησι δ' ὥσπερ ἔθνη καὶ νόμοι καὶ γλῶττα καὶ βίος ἴδιος, οὕτω καὶ σχῆμα καὶ εἶδος ἀνθρώπων. ἀλλ' ὑμῶν γε οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα μένει τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς νέας ταύτης εὐδαιμονίας ἀπολωλέκατε τὰ τῶν προγόνων σύμβολα. καλῶς οὐδὲ τοῖς τάφοις ἐκεῖνοι δέχονται ἂν ἅτε ἀγνῶτας αὐτοῖς γενομένους, εἴ γε πρότερον ἡρώων ἦν ὀνόματα καὶ ναυμάχων καὶ νομοθετῶν, νυνὶ δὲ Λουκούλλων τε καὶ Φαβρικίων καὶ Λευκανίων τῶν μακαρίων. ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴη μᾶλλον ὄνομα Μίμνερμος.

You think that you ought to be called Greeks because of your families and your status as a former colony, but just as the Greeks have habits, customs, language, and their own mode of life, they likewise have both the shape and appearance of humankind. But you, for the most part, don't even keep your names, but, on account of your recent prosperity, have destroyed the markers of your ancestors. They would rightly not receive you into their tombs, seeing that you have become unknown to them, since indeed you once had the names of heroes and naval-fighters and lawgivers, but now you have the names of the blessed Luculli and Fabricii and Lucanii. I would certainly rather have the name Mimnermus.

In other words, according to (pseudo?-)Apollonius, the Ionians' voluntary loss of τὰ τῶν

⁵² On Apollonius see esp. Bowie and Elsner 2009, chs. 7–9, and on the letters in particular, the authenticity of which is disputed, Jones 2005. Philostratus' depiction of Apollonius' description of his relationship to Vespasian in his appeal to Domitian for his life in the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* bears many striking resemblances to Josephus' depiction of his own interactions with Vespasian and his appeal not to be sent before Nero at *BJ* 3.399–408, not least being the depiction of Vespasian as rising to the principate on the advice and prophecy of eastern mystic or prophetic-type figures.

προγόνων σύμβολα, which is aligned with Greek ἔθη καὶ νόμοι καὶ γλῶττα καὶ βίος ἴδιος, has nullified their claim to being called Ἕλληνες. Apollonius draws a distinction between a mere birth relationship to “Greeks,” and the cultural markers of Greekness, which are, for him, the true basis for the claim to the term Ἕλληνες. We may also note the performative element of Greek identity for (pseudo?-)Apollonius: the Ionians are no longer Greek because they have chosen to behave like Romans in their deliberate adoption of Roman names. This is evidence that in antiquity, at least for some, Greekness was fundamentally something that one does.⁵³ It is within this phenomenon of widespread Greek culture that the πεπαιδευμένοι sought to lay claim to a specific, rarefied, elite Greek identity.

Josephus’ engagement with Greek literature and παιδεία pervades his extant corpus. He has indeed made his literary career writing as a “Greek.” It follows that I am not arguing here that Josephus’ self-presentation as one of the Greek πεπαιδευμένοι is necessarily unique to the *CA*, but it does take on new meaning in this treatise given his overt statements to the contrary, as discussed in Chapter 1, as well as the fact that “the Greeks” themselves are one of the particular targets of Josephus’ polemic. Scholars such as Thackeray, Feldman, and Chapman have documented and analyzed Josephus’ engagement with Greek and Latin prose (in particular, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Sallust) and poetry (especially Homer, Sophocles, Euripides, Pindar, and Vergil) in the *BJ* and *AJ*.⁵⁴

⁵³ See also Whitmarsh’s remarks on Plutarch’s comparison of Lycurgus and Numa, wherein Plutarch proclaims that Numa was the “Grecker” legislator (μακρῶ τιτι τὸν Νομᾶν ἑλληνικώτερον γεγονέναι νομοθέτην φήσομεν 1.10). Whitmarsh 2001: 117–8, citing Swain 1990.

⁵⁴ See Thackeray 1927: 101–124 on Josephus’ engagement with Thucydides, Sophocles, Sallust, Vergil, and various other Greek authors (though this analysis occurs in his problematic essay on Josephus’ “assistants,” on which see below, pp. 167–76, Feldman 1985, 1988, and 1998b on Josephus’ engagement with Greek tragedy (as cited in Chapman 2005: 127), Chapman 2005 on Josephus and Greek poetry; see also Mason 2016a: 20–137 on literary elements of the *BJ*. To quote Chapman, “The fact that poetic references permeate Josephus’ *Bellum* is indisputable.” Chapman 2005: 126.

My aim here is in part to continue this vein of analysis of Josephus and Greek literature in the case of the *CA*.

2. Atticism and the *CA*

The most obvious Hellenizing element of the *CA*, namely, Josephus' decision to write in the Greek language, deserves more attention than it generally receives.⁵⁵ It is something of a commonplace in scholarship of an earlier generation to assert that Josephus was not particularly competent with the Greek language.⁵⁶ Such pronouncements seemed to be invited, or at least justified, by Josephus' claim to have struggled to attain mastery of Greek pronunciation at *AJ* 20.263: τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δὲ γραμμάτων ἐσπούδασα μετασχεῖν τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀναλαβὼν, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὴν προφορὰν ἀκρίβειαν πάτριος ἐκώλυσεν συνήθεια. ("I endeavored to have a share of Greek letters and poetic learning by taking up grammatical practice, which my native usage has prevented as regards accurate pronunciation."), as well as his statement that he employed συνεργοί (Thackeray's "assistants") for the Greek language while composing the *BJ* at *CA* 1.50: χρησάμενός τισι πρὸς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν συνεργοῖς οὕτως ἐποίησάμην τῶν πράξεων τὴν παράδοσιν. ("Having consulted certain collaborators in the Greek language I thus

⁵⁵ Josephus' use of Atticizing Greek (and indeed, his language in general) has received more attention in the scholarship on the *BJ* and the *AJ* than the *CA*. This is not surprising, as these two works (if we include the *Vita* with the *AJ*) account for about 93% of Josephus' extant corpus, and of the remaining two volumes of the *CA*, we should recall that only about 90% survives in Greek. Important works on Josephus' language include Dindorf 1869, Thackeray 1929, Shutt 1961, Pelletier 1962, Schreckenberg 1977, Ladouceur 1983, Feldman 1988, Redondo 2000. On the *CA* in particular, see Schreckenberg 1996, van der Horst 1996, Barclay 2007, and Siegert 2008.

⁵⁶ See, for instance, Laqueur 1920 and Thackeray 1929.

made my account of the history...”).⁵⁷ Let us begin by observing both that Josephus is self-conscious regarding his use of the Greek language, a fact which is significant in itself, and that recent scholarship generally rejects early 20th century condemnation of his skill with Greek,⁵⁸ a change in our understanding of Josephus which opens up the possibility of new inquiries into his Greek without the prejudiced assumptions of earlier generations of scholars.⁵⁹ It is also worth remarking that Josephus’ decision to compose his extant works in Greek is neither obvious nor inevitable. While the cultural power exerted by Greek culture in the imperial period makes the decision far from arbitrary, and the other options available to Josephus were hardly on an even field,⁶⁰ it is at least worth noting that Josephus could have chosen to compose in either Latin—the dominant language of composition for the literature of his city of (by now at least 20 years’) residence—or in his native Aramaic, which he claims to have used for his preliminary version of the *BJ* (whatever the nature of this text) at *BJ* 1.3.⁶¹ Aramaic would not, of course, have made sense given his Roman context. This is worth stating, however, because Josephus makes

⁵⁷ For a fuller discussion of *CA* 1.50, see pp. 167–76 below.

⁵⁸ See esp. Rajak 1983: 46–64.

⁵⁹ I strongly suspect that such condemnation of Josephus’ Greek are ultimately grounded in the anti-Semitic prejudice that pervaded Josephan scholarship until relatively recently.

⁶⁰ As Redondo 2000: 423 remarks with regard to Josephus’ choice of language for the composition of the *BJ*.

⁶¹ For a summary of the scholarly issues surrounding the Aramaic precursor to the *BJ*, as well as recent bibliography, see Mason 2016b: 15–17. On Josephus’ probable knowledge of Latin, see Redondo 2000, with bibliography. Certainly Josephus’ decision to compose the *BJ* and *AJ* in Greek determines his decision to write the *CA* in Greek as well, as they are explicitly described as intended to be read in sequence, and by the same audience. The question, “Why Greek?” nevertheless remains relevant, all the more so given that Josephus claims to have begun his literary career in Aramaic.

frequent references to his own bilingualism throughout his corpus.⁶²

The question “Why not Latin?” is, however, pertinent. Ward in his 2007 article on Latinisms in Josephus’ Greek discusses how, despite the absence of direct evidence, it is both possible and plausible that Josephus learned enough Latin during his tenure at Rome to be capable of “positive performance,” i.e. reading and writing.⁶³ While Ward discusses Josephus’ relationship with Latin as grounds for exploring its possible influence on his Greek, and even offers as one reason for Josephus’ possible motivation for his acquaintance with Latin his own statements (including those in the *CA*) of ambivalence toward Greek culture, it is surprising that he never addresses the reasons why Josephus should choose to write in Greek. If, as Ward argues (unconvincingly), Josephus would have been eager to curry favor with Romans, had accordingly acquired some degree of Latin proficiency as an act of self-preservation, and could find common ground with Romans in a suspicion of or even hostility toward all things Greek, why not write in Latin?⁶⁴ My analysis in this and the subsequent chapter will show that Josephus’ protestations against the Greeks are not to be taken as straightforward expressions of Josephus’ personal views about Greek culture, but are far more complex. They are thus not adequate even as circumstantial evidence for Josephus’ possible motivation to learn Latin. It is, on the contrary, plausible that Josephus’ statements at *AJ* 20.263 about his efforts to study Greek literature in depth in fact display a conscious choice to participate in Greek παιδεία; had

⁶² See e.g. *AJ* 1.6, 20.263, and *CA* 1.54. See also Josephus’ translations of Semitic terms into Greek such as at *BJ* 4.11 and 5.151. There is some ambiguity surrounding whether Josephus refers to Hebrew or Aramaic in his many references to the Semitic languages spoken and written by Jews. See Rajak 1983: 230–2.

⁶³ Ward 2007: 633–6.

⁶⁴ See Ward 2007: 633–6.

he so desired, he surely could have devoted his time to Latin literature instead of Greek. Had he done so, and subsequently composed his works in Latin, the claims of the *CA* put forth in Latin would take on a different resonance. But enough with counterfactuals: as it is, Josephus' choice to compose the *CA* in Greek is itself meaningful.

Despite the fact that there was considerable literary output in Latin in Rome in Josephus' day, he was not alone in choosing to compose in Greek. His contemporary, the philosopher Musonius Rufus, makes for an interesting comparison. Though exiled from Rome in connection with the Pisonian conspiracy, this native of Etruria opted to use Greek, rather than Latin, for his literary productions.⁶⁵ As Whitmarsh remarks, this fact demands explanation, for Musonius' contemporary, Seneca, demonstrated that philosophy could be written in Latin, and the philosophical take on exile be expressed in terms that were "eminently Roman."⁶⁶ Musonius' choice of Greek serves a specific purpose in his self-presentation and self-construction as a Greek philosopher in the tradition of Socrates (and author in the tradition of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*) in relation to both Greek and Roman culture.⁶⁷ By analogy, Josephus' choice of Greek should not be taken as self-evident or "natural." At the very least, it tells against the persistent scholarly determination to see in Josephus a fear of offending Romans on any front,⁶⁸ and an obsequious desire to

⁶⁵ The authorship of the fragments attributed to Musonius is controversial. See Whitmarsh 2001: 141 n. 32, with bibliography. Whitmarsh remarks that the representation of Musonius as a teacher who did not write (his works may have been penned by a student named Lucius) furthers his self-styling as the "Roman Socrates."

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 152. Whitmarsh also situates Musonius (and Seneca) in the context of a Latin philosophical tradition dating back to Lucretius and Cicero.

⁶⁷ Whitmarsh 2001: 152.

⁶⁸ e.g. Barclay 2007: 362–3 and *passim*. See also pp. 217 below.

flatter Romans wherever possible.⁶⁹ *Flavius* Josephus, Roman citizen that he was, and whatever moral coloring one wishes to impute to his actions in the war, nevertheless did not choose to perform the particularly Roman identity of composing as a Latin intellectual.

It is not only the fact that Josephus uses Greek that is important here, but the kind of Greek that he uses. The Greek language itself became arguably the primary site of Greek identity during the Second Sophistic.⁷⁰ Atticism, an imitation of Classical Attic and rejection of the Hellenistic Koine, was central to this new definition of Greek culture. While Josephus writes in what may be called the literary Koine of the first century CE, the consensus among scholars of Josephus' language is that Josephus deliberately Atticized his Greek (though perceived stylistic inconsistencies in the *AJ* remain not entirely accounted for), and thus differs considerably in his language from the authors of the Septuagint.⁷¹ This is true in the *CA* as well as in his other works.⁷² Though Josephus' Greek is by no stretch "pure" Attic, it does not need to be to be considered Atticizing. The ideal Atticism sought by the sophists of the Second Sophistic was always a moving target (likened by Horrocks to a Platonic Form), and no sophist was free from the danger of accusations of solecism (especially given that exactly which classical authors ought to be-

⁶⁹ e.g. Ward 2007.

⁷⁰ Swain 1996: 7. See also Whitmarsh 2001: 273. This is not to suggest that language was not a significant marker of Greekness in earlier periods, too, but instead, as I will discuss, that it takes on a particular salience during the Second Sophistic.

⁷¹ See Feldman 1988: 457 on Josephus' avoidance of the formulations of the Septuagint in the *AJ*. The traditional view that there existed in addition to Koine a distinctive "Jewish Greek" which imitated the structures and idioms of Hebrew (or Aramaic) is now disputed. See De Lange 2007, Horrocks 2014, George 2014. On Josephus as an Atticizer, see Dindorf 1869, Pelletier 1962, Ladouceur 1983, Redondo 2000.

⁷² See Schreckenberg 1996: 52–54, Siegert 2008: 80–81.

long to the canon of texts to be imitated was constantly disputed). We should therefore feel no surprise if Josephus' Greek does not live up to the elevated standards of the second and third century handbooks.⁷³ Furthermore, as Kim discusses, there is some disparity between the normative prescriptions of the handbooks and the practice of Atticism as it comes down to us in extant texts of the Second Sophistic composed in Atticizing Greek.⁷⁴ The handbooks and lexica themselves, moreover, vary widely in their prescriptions.⁷⁵ The act of debating the specifics of ideal Attic and criticizing one's predecessors or contemporaries on its finer points was itself a component of identity performance for authors of the Second Sophistic who address Atticism explicitly. Finally, it is worth remarking that the linguistic trends of the Second Sophistic did not suddenly emerge fully formed in the second century under Hadrian, but were underway, if not yet as developed as they would later become, under the Flavians and earlier.⁷⁶ Thus, there is no firm distinction between Hellenistic, early imperial, and Second Sophistic Greek literary prose, even if we can observe significant differences when the ends of the temporal spectrum (as it were) are compared.⁷⁷ The language and style of Greek literary prose developed continuously from

⁷³ On Atticism as an ideal never possible to be fully realized, see Swain 1996: 34, Horrocks 2014: 133–7.

⁷⁴ Kim 2014. For an example of this disparity, see my discussion of terms for “queen” below, pp. 152–5.

⁷⁵ This is true even within the *corpora* of individual authors: the lexicographer Phrynichus, for instance, includes different authors in his two lexica for which we have substantial surviving testimony, the *Ecloga* and the *Praeparatio Sophistica*. See Strobel 2013: 101.

⁷⁶ We may also note that the earliest unambiguous extant reference to this concern with the Attic dialect is found in Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* 2.3, c. 100 CE, in reference to the language of the sophist Isaeus: “*sermo Graecus, immo Atticus*.” This is remarkably close to the composition of the *CA*. Kim 2014: 475.

⁷⁷ We are significantly hindered in our understanding of such differences by the loss of the large majority of Hellenistic prose, and scholars disagree on the extent to which the intellectual climate in fact changed from the Hellenistic to the imperial period. See Whitmarsh 2005: 16–7 for bibliography.

Polybius to Dionysius to Plutarch and Josephus to Lucian to Herodes Atticus and later Second Sophistic authors.⁷⁸ We will accordingly not be surprised to discover “Hellenistic” features of Josephus’ prose in evidence; it is the presence of deliberate Atticism that is of special concern. In addition to the temporal spectrum just described, we must recognize that even among elite Atticizing authors there existed a spectrum of Atticism. Kim writes: “[While] we can speak of a basic diglossic framework in which the educated language of the elite is separated from that of the non- or less educated masses, within the high category one should imagine a hierarchy of stylistic registers corresponding to particular social contexts and functions - high Attic rhetorical style, various levels of educated speech, less Atticizing literary language, the language of technical literature and popular philosophy, etc.”⁷⁹ The questions which I will consider here are where the *CA* is located on this spectrum, and how in Josephus’ context at Rome in the 90s, his use of Atticism constitutes a performance of identity as one of the *πεπαιδευμένοι*.

Attic Ascendant

A brief overview of the development of Attic as a prestige language is in order before we proceed further, in the interest of establishing the context of Josephus’ engagement with Atticism in the period prior to the Second Sophistic coming into full

⁷⁸ Kim 2014: 474. Kim here remarks that Dionysius’ Atticizing language likely reflects a situation in which imitation of classical models encouraged the use of Attic dialectal forms as well as Attic style. But again, we are faced with the problem of the loss of most Hellenistic prose; as Kim notes, Diodorus and Polybius need not be typical representatives of the style of their times.

⁷⁹ Kim 2014: 471.

swing.⁸⁰ The influence of the Attic administrative dialect, and Athenian literature and educational practices on the Macedonian court of the fourth century was of course responsible for the spread of an Athenocentric Greek culture in the wake of Alexander's conquests. The privileging of Attic Greek over and against other spoken and written forms of Greek is particularly in evidence in the Hellenistic Alexandrian grammatical texts and papyri found in Egypt. As Morgan remarks, all Greek tabular grammars are Attic.⁸¹ While Homer was apparently the most widely read school author in Egypt and elsewhere, and was indeed the central author of the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία,⁸² there are nevertheless no extant Homeric grammars, though glossaries survive in relative abundance.⁸³ By Morgan's analysis, this privileging of Attic had a prescriptive and normative affect, which served to create and enforce class distinctions not only between the educated and the uneducated, but also (since most people who had access to some degree, even a high degree, of literary education did not advance to the level of studying grammar), between the educated and the hyper-educated.⁸⁴ Attic thus marked divisions within the elite, for whom literate education was itself a marker of Greek cultural identity, even for non-ethnic Greeks.⁸⁵ The grammatical study of Attic, moreover, gives an author access to a language that was

⁸⁰ On "prestige language," see Kahane 1986, Dillery 2015: xx.

⁸¹ Morgan 1998: 160.

⁸² On the extant schooltext papyri from Egypt, see Morgan 1998: 53–73.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 166.

⁸⁴ This is particularly the case with formal study of grammar (in which Attic reigned supreme), a field of study which, in contrast to modern methods of language learning, was reserved for the elite of the elite. Morgan 1998: 162–9.

⁸⁵ See Morgan 1998: 74–89, 169–182 (where something very near this view is attributed to Quintilian).

associated with truth and authority.⁸⁶ Thus the privileging of Attic began well before the Second Sophistic. This is worth discussing to underscore the point that the Second Sophistic does not represent a break with the attitudes and postures surrounding the Greek language and its literature in the Hellenistic and early imperial periods, but instead constitutes a new distillation and activation of the approach to Greek begun in Alexandria, an approach which was imbued with new meaning in the historical context of Roman imperialism.

Though in Josephus' lifetime the status of Atticism was not what it would become even a few decades later in the time of Hadrian, Attic style and the imitation of classical models were explicit and self-conscious concerns of intellectuals at Rome as early as the first century BCE. Swain differentiates between the development of Attic style and Attic dialect as markers of Greek culture among intellectuals.⁸⁷ Attic style makes its debut in Hellenophone literature as an end in itself in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *On Ancient Orators*, where Dionysius juxtaposes the Attic style of oratory (ἡ Ἀττικὴ μοῦσα) with the "Asian," reflecting a stylistic debate known from Cicero's *Brutus* and *Orator*, and, as Swain notes, this debate is native to Rome and no reference to it is found in extant Greek sources aside from Dionysius (or indeed elsewhere in Dionysius apart from *On Ancient Orators*).⁸⁸ This is what led Wilamowitz-Möllerndorf to reject the notion that the phe-

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 182.

⁸⁷ Swain 1996: esp. 23–5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* For the older view of Asianism, see Schmid 1887: 4–5.

nomenon of Asianism in fact existed as Dionysius describes it.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, Dionysius takes a distinct interest in promoting Attic style via his essays on classical Athenian orators. Though scholars are in general agreement that Dionysius' vague formulations regarding ἡ Ἀττικὴ μοῦσα (1), or elsewhere τῇ ... ἀρχαία καὶ σώφρονι ῥητορικῇ (2) do refer primarily to style (as opposed to dialect), Whitmarsh remarks that Dionysius also prescribes attention to Attic dialect as well at *Lysias* 2: καθαρός ἐστι τὴν ἐρμηνείαν πάνυ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης ἄριστος κανὼν, οὐ τῆς ἀρχαίας... ("He is pure altogether in his style and is the best standard of the Attic tongue...").⁹⁰ The implicit contrast between τὴν ἐρμηνείαν (most likely "style" or "expression" on analogy with the use attested in *De Comp.* 1; see LSJ A) and τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης suggests that Dionysius is addressing two aspects of Lysias' language, which are for Dionysius distinct. As γλῶσσα regularly denotes language or dialect, Whitmarsh's interpretation is justified (and I will note, it is further underscored by the fact that Dionysius opted for the Atticizing -ττ- form of the term itself). It is also worth remarking that Dionysius describes his esteem of Lysias' Attic style and dialect in terms of purity (καθαρός), an ideology which is central to later descriptions of the use of the Greek language during the Second Sophistic.⁹¹ Thus, as Whitmarsh and others have discussed, Dionysius anticipates many of the trends of the literature of the Second Sophistic, even if the political and cultural conditions of Augustan Rome, and Dionysius' position within those conditions, are rather different from those

⁸⁹ Wilamowitz-Möllendorf 1900. See also Norden 1909, Vol. 1 126–55, Whitmarsh 2005: 51. Not all modern scholars reject Asianism as a real phenomenon, e.g. Horrocks 2014: 99–100.

⁹⁰ Whitmarsh 2005: 50.

⁹¹ e.g. Swain 1996: 43–64.

of second and third century Greece and the authors of that period.⁹² Though we can thus be confident that concern with dialect is at least evident in Dionysius, Swain nevertheless observes a progressive fusing of the idea of Attic style with the revival of the Attic dialect.⁹³ Dionysius Atticizes his language to a degree, but Attic forms are more evident in Plutarch, and even more so in Dio of Prusa. For our purposes here, we can establish that the trends, values, and aesthetics that will crystalize in the second and third centuries are well underway at Rome in the first century CE, which is the environment both of a substantial phase of Josephus' Greek literary education (*AJ* 20.26) and of his immediate audience for all of his Greek works.

3. Josephus' Language in the *CA*

I will now turn to a discussion of the extent to which Josephus participates in linguistic Atticism in the *CA*. Linguistic Atticism is here understood in terms of dialectal variation, lexical choice (which is not necessarily distinct from dialectal variation, and is not differentiated in the ancient lexicographers), and syntax. It is beyond the scope of this project to attempt a thorough analysis of the dialect of the entirety of the extant Greek portion of the *CA*. I will instead proceed by analyzing a few representative markers of

⁹² Whitmarsh 2005: 49–52. See Schmid 1887: 1–26 on Dionysius as the precursor to Second Sophistic Atticism. See also O'Sullivan 2013, who argues that a linguistic or grammatical component was present in the Atticism of the first century BCE. Kim, however, notes that there is some scholarly controversy over whether "Atticizing" is the appropriate term for describing Dionysius' concerns with language (viewed as entirely a matter of style, not dialect, in contrast to Whitmarsh). Some (Gelzer 1979 and Lasserre 1979) prefer the term "classicizing." See Kim 2014: 473.

⁹³ O'Sullivan 2015 argues (though not entirely convincingly) that "linguistic" Atticism was a component of not only Dionysius' but other early imperial intellectuals' discussions of Atticism.

Atticism in the categories of dialectal variation, lexical choice, and syntax.⁹⁴ As already mentioned, the fact that Josephus does not conform to the strictures of second and third century handbooks and lexica is not to be interpreted as a failure to Atticize properly, or as evidence of poor Greek on Josephus' part. My aim is to situate the language of the *CA* in the context of imperial Greek literature, and to determine whether deliberate Atticizing is in fact in evidence. As I have outlined above, the concern with Atticism that typifies the Second Sophistic had its origins with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and certain Hellenophone authors showed an increasing concern for Atticism, culminating in the fever-pitched obsession of the second and third centuries. Since Josephus lived and wrote in the intermediate period between Dionysius and the orators and authors of the handbooks of the second and third centuries, we might reasonably expect that his language would reflect this intermediate position. I will make appropriate comparisons throughout my analysis to other Greek works of the Hellenistic and imperial periods, including examples of less belletristic texts such as the Septuagint,⁹⁵ the novel *Joseph and Aseneth*,⁹⁶ the

⁹⁴ For an overview of the linguistic features of Atticism, see Horrocks 2014: 137–41 and Kim 2014: 469–71. The seminal work on Atticist practice remains Schmid 1887–97.

⁹⁵ As Rajak argues, the term “Septuagint” is problematically anachronistic and reflects a later Christian construct. Rajak 2009: 14–16. I have used it throughout this chapter, however, as this is the title used by the TLG, which I used to collect my data.

⁹⁶ The dating of *Joseph and Aseneth* is a notorious problem. While consensus once held that the novel was a product of the period of the first century BCE through the second century CE, Kraemer 1998: 225–44 argues for a considerably later provenance in the fifth or sixth centuries. Standhartinger, in a 2000 review of Kraemer, critiques this argument in favor of a date near the turn of the common era. The religious background, orientation, or agenda of the text is also controversial. See e.g. Kraemer 1998, Penn 2002, and Nir 2012. Statistics from *Joseph and Aseneth* are based on a TLG search of the text of longer recension (Fink 2008).

Pauline Epistles, Luke-Acts, and the epistle of Barnabas.⁹⁷ I will also on occasion incorporate data from the rest of Josephus' corpus, both for the sake of analyzing Josephus' language overall and for the sake of comparing the *CA* to the historical works to see whether Josephus in fact changes his engagement with Atticism over time, or possibly, across genres.

Analysis of dialect forms in the *CA* is complicated by variation within the manuscript tradition, as Dindorf addresses, and by the specific problems that have plagued the transmission and modern editions of the text of the *CA*.⁹⁸ As Barclay remarks, the *CA* suffers from a dearth of manuscripts, and those that we have are, in Barclay's formulation, "manifestly deficient."⁹⁹ The most glaring textual problem is the lacuna in all Greek manuscripts (including Eusebius' considerable extracts) from 2.51–113, which most likely occurred at a very early date in the tradition.¹⁰⁰ Eusebius' citations of nearly one sixth

⁹⁷ It must be clear that there is considerable variation among these texts, and among the various texts of the Septuagint. To a degree these texts (and in particular the texts of the Septuagint and the New Testament) are representative of the vernacular Koine (Horrocks 2014 106–8, 147) and thus represent important elements of the broad spectrum of imperial and Hellenistic Greek in which I am attempting to locate Josephus. As Janse remarks, even in antiquity the language of the New Testament was considered a reflection of common speech (the language of fishermen, according to Lactantius *Divinae Institutiones* 5.2.17 and sailors, according to Origen *Contra Celsum* 1.62). Janse 2007: 647. The degree to which the eccentricities (when compared with classical Greek) of the Greek of the Septuagint and New Testament reflects the influence of Semitism, on the one hand, and the normal linguistic development of the Koine, on the other, is a famous controversy, though many now recognize a "both/and" solution, e.g. George 2014. The picture that emerges from my selection of texts for comparison is necessarily limited (for instance, it includes little non-canonical Christian literature), due to my efforts to present a snapshot of the language of the *CA*, rather than an exhaustive analysis.

⁹⁸ Dindorf 1869. See also Leoni 2016: 315–7 on the difficulties within the manuscript tradition of the *CA*, Siegert 2008: 65–82, as well as Schreckenberg 1996.

⁹⁹ Barclay 2007: LXI–LXIV provides a useful summary of the history of the text of the *CA*. See also Leoni 2016: 315–17.

¹⁰⁰ Siegert 2008: 66.

of the *CA* across his corpus comprise our best available evidence for the Greek text;¹⁰¹ Cassiodorus' sixth century Latin translation, our only available witness for 2.51–113, leaves much to be desired (fortunate as we are to have even this).¹⁰² The earliest surviving Greek manuscript (complete but for 2.51–113), an eleventh century codex known as L,¹⁰³ formed the basis for Niese's 1889 *editio maior* and *editio minor*; this manuscript was long believed to be our only surviving recension.¹⁰⁴ We are fortunate to have available Siegert's 2008 edition, the first critical edition to re-examine the manuscript evidence since Niese. Siegert's major advance is the argument that a fifteenth or sixteenth century manuscript known as S provides a witness independent of L, as does, to an extent, the fifteenth century E.¹⁰⁵

Though Siegert's text represents the greatest advance in the text of the *CA* in more than a century, it remains the case that the *CA* suffers from too few witnesses, and, with the exception of the Eusebius excerpts, poor ones at that. Not all textual variations can be accounted for, nor can the direction of corruption always be determined. I will nevertheless follow Siegert, comparing with Niese and Thackeray, and noting textual variation where relevant. It must, unfortunately, remain a given that not all forms can be estab-

¹⁰¹ Barclay 2007: LXII. The bulk of these citations are found in books 8–10 of the *Preparation for the Gospel*. Mras' 1954 edition is generally considered a secure text. See Leoni 2016: 316.

¹⁰² Shutt's 1987 retroversion has come under much criticism and is not a reliable text. See Schreckenberg 1996: 78, Siegert 2008: 73.

¹⁰³ Codex Laurentianus 69, 22. Florence.

¹⁰⁴ Niese 1889a and b. Barclay believes that Niese followed L to a fault, more so in the *maior* than the *minor*. Barclay 2007: LXIII.

¹⁰⁵ S is Schleusingensis graecus I, E is Eliensis (located at Cambridge), which terminates at 2.133. See Siegert 2008: 66–8, 75. L, S, and E are the surviving Greek manuscripts apart from excerpts. For a list and discussion of all extant Greek witnesses of the *CA*, see Schreckenberg 1977.

lished with certainty. I have, as a rule, attempted to avoid in my choice of examples passages that have serious textual problems. I have also excluded all passages that Josephus presents as direct quotations of authors, as these will not be representative of his choices.¹⁰⁶

γγν- versus γιν-

The difficulties posed by textual variation for dialect analysis are evident in the editorial choices of readings between forms of γγν- versus γιν- for both γί[γ]νομαι and γί[γ]νώσκω, on which there is some degree of variation among the manuscripts.¹⁰⁷ These difficulties are not, however, insurmountable. Recent work by both Schreckenberg and Siegert has established that despite the problems with the manuscripts of the *CA*, it is nevertheless possible to be reasonably confident in many readings, as well as in the fact that Josephus varied his spellings and lexical choices throughout his corpus.¹⁰⁸ Siegert describes his criteria for his choice of readings for γγν- versus γιν- and other similar choices between Atticizing and Koine forms as one that is less concerned with an editor's

¹⁰⁶ It is not always a straightforward matter to determine what does or does not constitute a direct quotation. As a general rule, I take a direct quotation to be any statement in direct speech introduced by phrases such as λέγει οὕτως, or other phrases indicating as much such as αὐτὸς διηγείται (1.196), ἔστι δὲ οὕτω γεγραμμένον (1.177), or τοιαύτη μὲν τις ἢ θαυμαστή τοῦ γραμματικοῦ φράσις (2.12). I have also excluded indirect statements introduced by φησὶν. On the other hand, any passage in which Josephus may be imitating another author, and where his choices of vocabulary, spelling, and syntax may thus be influenced by another author, must necessarily be considered Josephus' language, as the choice to imitate is his. This must be said given the dominant scholarly paradigm of past centuries that saw Josephus' works as fundamentally compilations of other earlier works, and thus Josephus himself as more of a copyist than an author and artist in his own right. For an overview and critique of this earlier approach to Josephus, see Mason 2009: 103–37. For my own position within this debate as regards the *AJ*, see Teets 2013: 89.

¹⁰⁷ See Siegert 2008: 80–1, and Niese 1889: 4 commentary on 1.5.

¹⁰⁸ Schreckenberg 1996: 53.

interpretation of Josephus' stylistic choices and instead made on the basis of textual evidence alone. This principle is justified according to Siegert because "die literarische *Koine* [*sic*] des 1.Jh. vielfältiger war als die stärker attizistisch normierte Literatursprache der Folgezeit," and thus strict consistency of spellings and forms is neither necessary nor intrinsically desirable.¹⁰⁹ This is in accord with the situation I discussed above, in which those who were exhorting the merits of Atticism in the first century CE and earlier were more interested in prescription than proscription (in contrast to their second and third century heirs). Thus Siegert's criterion of best textual evidence is the more practicable, since even if we might suspect deliberate interference of later transcribers in Josephus' spellings, it is not obvious in which direction attempts to "correct" Josephus would go.¹¹⁰ Both Siegert and Schreckenberg are optimistic that relatively reliable readings are possible for much of the extant text of the *CA*; the problem was that Josephus' works had not (and in the case of the *BJ* and books 12–20 of the *AJ*, still have not) received the attention of text critics to the same degree that many Greek texts from antiquity have (not only

¹⁰⁹ Siegert 2008: 80. See pp. 79–94 generally on Siegert's editorial choices. Siegert is thus in agreement with Schreckenberg, who directly argues against Naber's tendency in his 1888–96 edition of Josephus' corpus to make Josephus' too consistently Atticizing. Schreckenberg 1996: 53.

¹¹⁰ Siegert suggests that Byzantine scribes would be more likely to Koineize Josephus than to Atticize. Siegert 2008: 80. This is, of course, the reverse of the view of Elliott and Kilpatrick on New Testament textual emendation. Elliott follows Kilpatrick (1963) in the view that Atticizing variations in the New Testament manuscripts reflect the interference of scribes influenced by the second century Attic revival (see Elliott 2015: 65–77). It is certainly the case that Josephus' works were known to Christian authors in the centuries following their publication (notably Theophilus of Antioch, c. 180, Clement of Alexandria, late second/early third century, and Eusebius of Caesarea, fourth century). It is thus apparent that manuscripts of Josephus were disseminated in the Greek east with the rise of Christianity. There is no reason to assume, however, that this transmission was responsible for the received Attic forms, as (1) the assumption that Josephus would not have Atticized is intrinsically problematic, and (2) this would not account for the uneven distribution of Attic and Koine forms across Josephus' corpus. Schreckenberg's and Siegert's situating these works in the context first century Atticism provides a more plausible explanation. See Inowlocki 2016 on knowledge of Josephus among Christian Greek authors.

classical texts, but Jewish and Christian texts as well).¹¹¹

Returning now to the issue of γῑγν- versus γιν-, per Siegert's text, out of seven uses of the present system tenses of γῑγνομαι and its compounds that do not occur in direct quotations, six are forms in [-]γιν-,¹¹² one in -γῑγν-.¹¹³ Out of eleven uses of the present system tenses of γῑγνώσκω and its compounds that do not occur in quotations, Siegert prints nine in [-]γῑγν-,¹¹⁴ and two in [-]γιν-.¹¹⁵ We can thus conclude with a reasonable degree of confidence that Josephus prefers, with a small degree of variation, the Koine spelling of γῑνομαι, and the Atticizing γῑγνώσκω.¹¹⁶

-ττ- versus -σσ-

Another example commonly named in modern scholarship as a feature of the At-

¹¹¹ See Leoni 2016 on the current state of critical editions of the works of Josephus.

¹¹² These occur at 1.20, 131, 274, and 2.24, 199, 240. Of the modern editions of the *CA*, Siegert, Thackeray, and Niese are in agreement on all of these forms except 2.199: where Niese and Thackeray have the present infinitive γῑνεσθαι (attested in some codices of Eusebius), Siegert has the future infinitive γενήσεσθαι (attested in Eusebius cod. 1). Siegert 2008 Vol. 1: 197. An additional four instances of forms with γιν- appear in quotations of other authors. See Rengstorf 1973 Vol. 1: 385.

¹¹³ ἐγγῑγνομένας at 2.243. Siegert does not, as a rule, note manuscript variations between γῑγν- and γιν-, presumably because he has already laid out his general criteria for his choices in his introduction. For ἐγγῑγνομένας at 2.243, he does remark in the introduction (Vol. 1: 80) that L and S attest different spellings, which he may have chosen to remark upon due to this form's outlier among Josephus' spellings of γῑνομαι. For the stemma of the *CA*, see Siegert 76–7.

¹¹⁴ These occur at 1.5, 53, twice at 68, 171, 218, 220, 2.37, 154. At 2.154, Niese reports that Eusebius has συγγῑνώσκειν at 1.218 and that Cosmas has ἐγῑνώσκετο (Niese 1889 *loc. cit.*).

¹¹⁵ Both occur in the same sentence at 2.221. For the participle γῑνωσκομένης, Siegert notes that Eusebius has the misspelling γῑνωσκομένης, while S, L, E and the Latin translations have forms of γῑγνομαι (Lat. *constituti*). Siegert 2008 Vol. 1: 203.

¹¹⁶ Schreckenberg 1996: 53 asserts that Josephus shows a preference for forms in γιν- over forms in γῑγν- throughout his corpus, but I have shown that this is not the case for γῑγνώσκω in the *CA*, though it is indeed the case for γῑνομαι.

tic revival is the renewed preference for Attic -ττ- in place of -σσ-.¹¹⁷ The distribution of the Attic form of πράττω compared with the Koine Ionic/Attic hybrid form πράσσω, and in addition the Ionic πρήσσω (common in Homer and Herodotus) proves to be a surprising case that did not conform to my expectations. Polybius exclusively uses πραττ-, while Dionysius overwhelmingly prefers it. All three forms are attested in Plutarch, though he strongly prefers πραττ-.¹¹⁸ They are also all found in Athenaeus, again with a preference for πραττ-, though not as strong as Plutarch's. A number of Atticists of the Second Sophistic exclusively use forms in πραττ-, including Phrynichus and Moeris; Lucian does so in the large majority of his corpus.¹¹⁹ Luke-Acts and Paul, on the other hand, exclusively use forms in πρασσ-. In the Septuagint, forms in πραττ- are rare, occurring only four times in 2 and 4 Maccabees.¹²⁰ Forms in πρασσ- are found somewhat more widely.¹²¹ No forms of the verb appear in either *Joseph and Aseneth* or in the Epistle of Barnabas. I have summarized the total uses of the three spellings of the above authors, excepting

¹¹⁷ e.g. Horrocks 2014: 138, Kim 2014: 470.

¹¹⁸ Plutarch has one use of πρήσσω- at *De Tranquillitate Animi* 465 c.

¹¹⁹ A form in πρασσ- appears at Lucian's *Imagines* 9.8, and in the *De Dea Syria*, Lucian exclusively uses the Ionic spelling πρήσσω-, in keeping with the aims of that particular work. These are the four uses (in the present system) listed in Table 1.

¹²⁰ It is, of course, somewhat misleading to group all of the texts collected in the Septuagint together when they vary in terms of date, locale, and original language. See e.g. Marcos 2000. The respective contexts and purposes of 2 and 4 Maccabees, and their respective modes of engaging with Greek literary and cultural institutions, may help explain why their use of πραττ- forms more closely resembles that of the literary Koine than the rest of the Septuagint texts. On 2 Maccabees, see e.g. Doran 1979, Himmelfarb 1998. On 4 Maccabees, see e.g. Desilva 2007.

¹²¹ Though still not very frequently; the verb appears to be generally uncommon in the Septuagint in all tenses. Forms in πρασσ- are found in Joshua, I Esdras, Proverbs, I and III Maccabees, Job, the Wisdom of Solomon, and Daniel.

some who exclusively use one or another, in Table 1:¹²²

Table 1: *πραττ-* / *πρασσ-* / *πρησσ-* in various authors

	<i>πραττ-</i>	<i>πρασσ-</i>	<i>πρησσ-</i>	Total Forms
Polybius	160	0	0	160
Dionysius	325 (98% of usages)	8 (2%)	0	333
Plutarch	566 (91%)	58 (9%)	1 (0.2%)	625
Lucian	92 (95%)	1 (1%)	4 (4%)	97
Athenaeus	47 (72%)	13 (20%)	5 (8%)	65
Septuagint	4 (22%)	14 (78%)	0	18

We thus see that there is no clear trajectory from the Hellenistic period to the Second Sophistic in terms of the use of spellings of this verb, among the non-Jewish and Christian authors surveyed: Polybius uses the Attic form more consistently than Lucian does. There is, however, a distinct preference for *πραττ-* among most of these non-Jewish and Christian authors, while the Jewish and Christian texts surveyed prefer *πρασσ-* (excepting 2 and 4 Maccabees). These data actually suggest that *πραττ-* was not necessarily perceived as an Atticism per se, since there is no perceptible increasing preference for it over *πράσσ-* among Atticizers.¹²³ It appears that a preference for *πραττ-* characterizes the elite literary Koine, whereas *πρασσ-* is more typical of the non-elite vernacular.

Turning to Josephus, we find that he uses both *πραττ-* and *πρασσ-* throughout

¹²² All data are derived from searches of the TLG; searches exclude compounds of *πράττω*/*πράσσω*.

¹²³ Neither does the verb appear in the lexica of Moeris, Phrynichus, Aelius Dionysius, or the Antiatticist.

much, but not all, of his corpus, and shows a preference for *πραττ-* (166 out of 248 total usages, not counting compounds, compared with 82 total uses of *πρασσ-*: in other words, Josephus uses *πραττ-* about twice as often as *πρασσ-*).¹²⁴ The distribution of Josephus' choice of spellings across his corpus is uneven. The breakdown is as follows in Table 2:

Table 2: *πραττ-* / *πρασσ-* in Josephus

	Total Forms	<i>πραττ-</i>	<i>πρασσ-</i>
<i>BJ</i>	23	23 (100%)	0
<i>AJ</i>	198	117 (59%)	81 (41%)
<i>Vita</i>	10	9 (90%)	1 (10%)
<i>CA</i>	17	17 (100%)	0

Thus we see that Josephus has only a slight preference for *πραττ-* in the *AJ*, but that he exclusively prefers it in both the *BJ* and the *CA* (he does not use compounds of *πράττω* in the *CA*). Not merely the fact that Josephus alternates forms, but that he does so unevenly in different works warrants explanation: that he uses one form exclusively in two of his works is suggestive of a deliberate choice. It is at least plausible that in the *CA*, a work in which Josephus expresses an acute awareness of Greek literary culture and identity, the very culture which he is at pains to disavow, he would be more attuned to and concerned with the norms of the elite Koine. At any rate, his patterns of spelling in the *BJ* and *CA* more closely resemble those of Polybius, Plutarch, Lucian, Phrynichus, and Moeris than the non-elite Koine of most of the authors of the Septuagint, Luke-Acts, and Paul.

¹²⁴ See Rengstorff 1973 Vol. 3: 504–508 for the locations of these forms. Siegert 2008: 80–81 describes the same procedure for the choice between variant readings of *-ττ-* and *-σσ-* as for *-γιν-* and *-γινν-*, and likewise does not print variations in the apparatus.

More illuminating in my inquiry into Josephus' engagement with Atticism is the case of *θάλαττα/θάλασσα*. The *-ττ-* form was certainly perceived by some later Atticists as an Atticizing form, though not by others.¹²⁵ Siegert prints *θάλατταν* (as do both Niese and Thackeray) at *CA* 1.65 on the grounds that the passage is an allusion to Thucydides (strangely enough).¹²⁶ Another instance of the *-ττ-* spelling is found at 2.240 in Josephus' censure of the myths of the many origins of the Greek gods. Four instances of the *-σσ-* spelling are found as well (not counting those occurring in quotations).¹²⁷ Once again, we find that Josephus varies in his usage of Atticizing and Koine forms. Siegert's claim regarding 1.65 is odd, given that Thucydides exclusively uses the *-σσ-* spelling of *θάλασσα*, so it is not clear why Thucydidean imitation should influence Josephus' choice of spelling in this direction rather than the opposite (if the reading indeed reflects Josephus' choice). It may well be the case, however, that the contexts of both 1.65 and 2.240, which nevertheless are more closely engaged with the Greek literary tradition (historiographical and philosophical, respectively) than the contexts of the four cases of the *-σσ-* spellings, sup-

¹²⁵ Thus Lucian has Sigma complain of Tau at *Judgement of the Vowels*. 9.3 *πᾶσαν ἀποκέκλεικέ μοι τὴν θάλασσαν*. ("He has cut me off from the entire sea.") Aelius Dionysius, on the other hand, asserts that *θάλαττα* is Boeotian, and not Attic: *Θετταλοὶ δὲ καὶ Κιτιεῖς οὐχ οἱ κατὰ Φοινίκην, ἀλλ' οἱ περὶ Κύπρον, ὧν πόλις Κίτιον, 'θάλατταν' ἔλεγον καὶ 'πίτταν' καὶ 'καρδιώττειν' καὶ 'Ματταλίαν' καὶ τοιαῦτα, ὅσα οὐδαμοῦ Ἀττικὰ νομίζονται, ἀλλὰ τῶν γειτόνων Βοιωτῶν, τῷ μῆτε Ὅμηρον μῆτε τραγικοῦς μῆτε Θεουκυδίδην ἢ Πλάτωνα κεχρησθαι αὐτοῖς...* ("Thessalians (n.b. Θετταλοὶ) and Citians (not the ones in Phoenicia, but those around Cyprus, whose city is Citeum) used to say 'θάλαττα' and 'πίττα' and 'καρδιώττειν' and 'Ματταλία' and such things as are nowhere customary Attic usages, but belong to their neighbors, the Boeotians, since neither Homer nor the tragedians nor Thucydides or Plato uses them ...").

¹²⁶ Siegert 2008: 80. Siegert does not elaborate on the detected allusion. The passage reads: *ὅλως γὰρ ἅπαντες οἱ παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσπέριον κατοικοῦντες τοῖς συγγράφειν τι βουλομένοις γνωριμώτεροι κατέστησαν, οἱ δὲ ταύτης ἀνωτέρω τὰς οἰκῆσεις ἔχοντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἠγνωσθήσαν*. Certainly the phrase *ἐπὶ πλεῖστον* is uncommon outside of Thucydides before Dionysius, Plutarch, and the authors of the Second Sophistic.

¹²⁷ These appear at 1.60, 68, 314, and 2.121.

ply Josephus with the motivation to Atticize. That is to say, his close engagement with Greek literature, itself a performance of Greek identity, could motivate his use of the Atticizing -ττ-. It is nevertheless the case that with two instances of θάλαττα to four of θάλασσα, Josephus does not display a preference for the Atticizing form in the *CA*. Across Josephus' corpus, there are a total of 96 uses of θάλασσα, 26 of θάλαττα. The distribution across his works is shown in Table 3:

Table 3: θάλασσα / θάλαττα in Josephus

	θάλασσα	θάλαττα
<i>BJ</i>	22	5
<i>AJ</i>	67	19
<i>Vita</i>	1	0
<i>CA</i>	4	2

A survey of other authors reveals the following distribution of usages in Table 4:

Table 4: θάλασσα / θάλαττα in various authors

	θάλασσα	θάλαττα
Polybius	3	247
Dionysius	16	54
Plutarch	364	370
Lucian	13	30
Septuagint	449	0
New Testament	91	0
<i>Joseph and Aseneth</i>	2	0
Epistle of Barnabas	2	0

Note that Plutarch is very nearly even in his use of these forms, which is unexpected, giv-

en his overwhelming preference for πράττ- over πράσσ-. Indeed, Dionysius, Plutarch, Lucian, and Josephus (with the exception of the *AJ*) all display less strong preferences of θάλαττα to θάλασσα than of πράττ- to πράσσ-. One explanation for this is that whereas, as I mentioned above, πράττ- had become standard in the elite literary Koine, θάλαττα/θάλασσα was not standardized. Authors were accordingly less pre-conditioned to prefer one over the other. This data reveals, once again, that Josephus' patterns of usage fall in between the more belletristic texts, the authors of which strongly prefer θάλαττα, and the Koine of the Septuagint and New Testament, the authors of which exclusively use θάλασσα. Of the authors surveyed, Josephus' distribution of the spellings of θάλασσα and θάλαττα most closely resemble Plutarch's, though it is not a particularly close resemblance.

The Dual

We turn now from spelling variation to another example of Atticism, dual forms. Long defunct in spoken Greek by Josephus' lifetime, the dual experienced a revival in the context of Second Sophistic Atticism. The form δυοῖν is specifically prescribed by Phrynichus in his *Eclogae* as the correct Attic usage for the dative, instead of δυσί.¹²⁸ In the *CA*, the dual occurs once in the genitive at 2.31: πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ δυοῖν θάτερον Αἰγύπτιοι πεπόνθασιν.¹²⁹ If we look more broadly at Josephus' corpus, we see a number of additional instances of dual forms, and can thus be assured that the lone instance of *CA* 2.31

¹²⁸ *Eclogae* 180.1.

¹²⁹ Neither Siegert, Thackeray, nor Niese indicate any textual problems within this passage; we may thus be reasonably confident in the text.

is no mere outlier within Josephus' corpus. Josephus uses the phrase τὸ χεῖρε on three occasions in the *BJ*, though not at all in his other works.¹³⁰ This phrase has particular Atticizing credentials, according to O'Sullivan, because it was with this phrase that Dionysius began his deliberate revival of the dual.¹³¹ Other duals are found at *AJ* 4.305 (τοῖν δυοῖν ὁροῖν), 18.187 (τοῖν ποδοῖν), 18.224 (ἐνιαυτοῖν δυοῖν καὶ εἴκοσι), and *BJ* 3.196 (τοῖν δυοῖν). Because the dual had fallen out of use in the Hellenistic Koine and was thus by no means a "natural" reflex, so to speak, in the literary Koine, its very presence when attested with relative security is itself to be taken as a deliberate and marked choice on Josephus' part.

Lexical Choice

Second Sophistic lexicographers were also keen to define correct Attic usage in terms of vocabulary choice and to proscribe words perceived as non-Attic. It is fairly well established that the prescriptions and proscriptions of the lexicographers quite often do not align with the attested usages of fifth and fourth century Attic authors.¹³² This is to a large extent due to the fact that the lexicographers, each in his own way and according to his own criteria, were attempting to create a relatively rigid and unified system of correct usage from classical authors whose individual style and lexical choices varied considerably. This is true even for fifth and fourth century Attic authors. The problems only grew

¹³⁰ These occasions are *BJ* 3.72, 5.73, 6.631.

¹³¹ O'Sullivan 2015: 141, citing Schmid 1893: 50–51.

¹³² On which, see Kim 2014: 477, Anderson 1993: 88–9, Horrocks 2014: 139.

for those lexicographers who attempted to include such authors as Herodotus, Homer, or the Hellenistic poets. There is, thus, a fair degree of variation among the extant lexicographers in terms of the authors they include and the rigidity of their prescriptions.¹³³ Moreover, the terms which lexicographers used to define the groups of people they claimed were the users of approved or athetized formulations are yet another means the Atticists had of constructing their own social identity by drawing distinctions between themselves and others.¹³⁴ While we of course would not expect Josephus to adhere to any of the strict prescriptions for Attic vocabulary that were current in the second and third centuries, it is nevertheless possible to examine whether he shows any preference for vocabulary that would later become associated with correct Attic use. Such a preference would indicate that he is moving in the direction of the later Atticists. I have chosen a few examples of relatively common nouns from some of the extant lexicographers.¹³⁵ Since the lexicographers took a particular interest in obscure terms and phrases, such items are to be found in abundance in the lexica, but an exhaustive search for such terms in the *CA* is beyond the scope of this project. A few examples will instead suffice.

A survey of words for “queen” found in the lexicographers makes for an interest-

¹³³ On this issue of variation, see especially Anderson 1993: 88–9, Swain 1996: 53–6.

¹³⁴ Moeris, for instance, draws a threefold distinction between Ἀττικοί, Ἕλληνες, and κοινόν. Phrynichus creates a broader range of oppositions, but always binary, between terms including οἱ Ἀττικοί, οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, and οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι on the one side, and οἱ πολλοί, οἱ βάρβαροι, ποιηταί, οἱ νῦν ἀμαθεῖς, and οἱ σύρφακες on the other. On these terms of distinction, see esp. Swain 1996: 51–2 on Moeris, Kim 2014: 477 on Phrynichus.

¹³⁵ I have limited my examination of the lexicographers to Aelius Dionysius’ *Ἀττικάι λέξεις* (contemporary of Hadrian), the work of anonymous so-called Antiatticist known as *Ἀττικά ὀνόματα* (late second century), Phrynichus’ *Ἐκλογαί* and Moeris’ *Ἀττικιστής*. These authors are reasonably representative of the range of Atticist lexicographers of the second and third centuries, and have sufficient surviving text to make a comparison. Some general bibliography on the lexicographers includes Erbse 1950, Anderson 1993, Swain 1996, Alpers 1997, and Dickey 2007.

ing case study because one or more appear in all four of my chosen lexica, as well as in all of Josephus' works. Aelius Dionysius writes (as Erbse reconstructs) in his *Attica Onomata* at β 5.1: βασιλεια καὶ βασίλισσα· Ἀττικῶς. Μένανδρος δὲ βασίλινναν λέγει.¹³⁶ Aelius Dionysius' use of a contrastive δὲ implies that he does not consider Menander as representative of Attic usage.¹³⁷ Phrynichus, in his *Eclogae*, states at 197.1: Βασίλισσα οὐδεις τῶν ἀρχαίων εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ βασιλεια ἢ βασιλῖς. The anonymous author of the *Antiatticist* lexicon lists only βασίλισσα, attributing it to the new comic poet Alcaeus and to Aristotle.¹³⁸ Moeris in his Attic lexicon, similar to Phrynichus, writes at 192.27: βασιλειαν Ἀττικοί, βασίλισσαν Ἑλληνες. With these examples, we can thus begin to get a picture of the extent to which there really was no consensus among the lexicographers regarding what constituted proper Attic usage, as well as of the fact that what constituted proper Atticism was an open debate in which lexicographers were responding to one another. Scholars are in general agreement that the lexica of Phrynichus, for instance, a relatively strict Atticist in terms of which authors he considered appropriate models, and the Antiatticist, a far more inclusive lexicographer, were responsive to one another, though the direction of influence is a matter of disagreement.¹³⁹

Let us turn to Josephus' terms for "queen," terms we would expect to appear with

¹³⁶ Erbse 1950: 112.

¹³⁷ This is certainly the comic poet, as the term is attested in a fragment (F 0541.039, Kock 1888); see Erbse 1950 *loc. cit.*

¹³⁸ See Bekker 1814–1821: Vol. 1: 84. On the term "Antiatticist," see Dickey 2007: 97–8.

¹³⁹ Our lack of specific information on the dating of the two works, not to mention the poor state of preservation of both texts, hinders our ability to be certain on such questions. Dickey 2007: 98 gives a brief bibliography of the scholars who discuss this debate.

much greater frequency in his historical works than in the *CA* given the subject matter. Josephus prefers βασιλίσσα (41 usages, 1 in the *CA* at 2.50) to βασιλῖς (21 usages, 2 in the *CA* at 1.98 and 1.100, but these occur in a quotation from Manetho, and thus do not represent Josephus' word choice); forms of βασιλεία and βασιλῖς appear in some manuscript variations for βασιλίσσα in the *AJ*.¹⁴⁰ Overall, Josephus prefers βασιλίσσα in the *AJ* (38 occurrences versus 2 in the *BJ*), βασιλῖς in the *BJ* (11 versus 7 in the *AJ*). If we turn to a brief comparison with other Greek authors, the question of who exactly Phrynichus means by οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀρχαίων is complicated by the fact that the term βασιλίσσα certainly does occur in Xenophon (*Oec.* 9.15), though it is the case that it is not in general use among fifth century Athenian authors. It is, however, widely attested in the Hellenistic era, and occurs in Polybius, Strabo, and the Hellenistic poets. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses βασιλεία exclusively; Plutarch uses all three terms with no marked preference. The term βασιλίσσα is also attested among other authors of the Second Sophistic, including Athenaeus and Arrian. Lucian, indeed, while poking fun at the Atticists' preference for -ττ- over -σσ-, has the letter Sigma complain that βασιλίσσα is yet another word that Lysimachus (who is in fact Boeotian) has stolen from him by changing it to βασιλιττα (a term not elsewhere attested and surely the product of Lucian's invention with satirical intent) in *Judgement of the Vowels* 8.3. Only βασιλίσσα is attested in the New Testament.¹⁴¹ The resulting picture that emerges from all of these authors is one of confusion: Aelius Dionysius appears justified in his claim that both βασιλεία and

¹⁴⁰ See Rengstorff 1973 Vol. I: 317.

¹⁴¹ See Danker and Bauer 1979 (2000 reprint): 170.

βασίλισσα are used Ἀττικῶς, as both terms are in evidence among Atticizers of the Second Sophistic. Phrynichus, on the other hand, may be justified in claiming that none of the ἀρχαῖοι used βασίλισσα, as it is not attested in the fifth century. Yet both terms are also clearly current among Hellenistic authors as well. Is it, then possible, to say that one term is more Attic than the other in the context of Second Sophistic Atticism (as opposed to actual classical usage, in which βασίλισσα is rare)? Josephus' use of βασίλισσα is not out of tune with either his contemporary Plutarch or with at least some prose authors of the Second Sophistic, even if Phrynichus would disapprove of their lexical choices. My analysis of these terms for "queen" thus results in an ambiguous conclusion, as the two terms which he did not use are the maligned βασίλιννα, on the one hand, which is the only term that none of our lexicographers consider Attic, and βασίλεια (following Rengstorf, who follows Niese in rejecting the manuscript variation at *AJ* 13.410), which is asserted to be Attic to the exclusion of βασίλισσα by both Phrynichus and Moeris.¹⁴² It will suffice, however, to observe that Josephus exclusively uses terms for "queen" that are also widely in use by both Plutarch and later by Atticizing authors.

To turn to another example, namely, time expressions meaning "from the beginning" or "originally," Phrynichus prescribes the time expression ἐξ ἀρχῆς in favor of ἀρχῆθεν, which he attributes to the ποιηταί, described only by the clause τῶν δὲ καταλογάδην δοκίμων οὐδεῖς at 66.1. The term is indeed attested in Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles, as well as Herodotus and Polybius. It appears four times in the *AJ*, and

¹⁴² Rengstorf 1973 Vol. 1: 292.

once in the *Vita*.¹⁴³ In the *CA*, however, where the term would certainly suit the content of the treatise, Josephus exclusively prefers Phrynichus' approved ἐξ ἀρχῆς. The phrase occurs 13 times, excluding quotations from other authors.¹⁴⁴ Since the use of ἀρχῆθεν is relatively secure in the text of the *AJ* and *Vita*, the term was available to Josephus in the *CA* as well, and the fact that he exclusively used ἐξ ἀρχῆς must reflect deliberate choice. Whether Josephus deployed ἐξ ἀρχῆς because he perceived it to be more Atticizing is impossible to ascertain, but is at least possible that he did.

As I have already raised the issue of Latin influence in Josephus' writing,¹⁴⁵ it is worth discussing it in greater detail in relation to Atticism. It is generally recognized that the authors of the handbooks proscribed perceived Latinism, which they generally equated to barbarism (a category which could include any perceived non-Attic term).¹⁴⁶ Lucian, as well, humorously describes the humiliation that attaches to the inadvertent use of Latinisms even in spoken language while in the company of the πεπαιδευμένοι.¹⁴⁷ It is certainly the case that all of Josephus' works contain apparent Latinisms.¹⁴⁸ Ward, however, lists far fewer Latinisms in the *CA* relative to the *BJ* and *AJ* (even when the relative

¹⁴³ Rengstorff 1973 Vol. 1: 242.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 241–2. The phrase is used an additional two times in a quotation from Berossus, at 1.136 and 139.

¹⁴⁵ See above, pp. 129–32.

¹⁴⁶ Swain 1996: 40–1, 50–51.

¹⁴⁷ Lucian himself describes ὑγιεία as a calque on the Latin *salve* at *Pro Lapsu* 13. See Swain 1996: pp. 319–20, n. 75.

¹⁴⁸ Though it is not always a straightforward matter to prove whether or not a given usage constitutes a Latinism or has some other origin. On this general problem, see Horrocks 2014: 126–32. See Ward 2007 on Latinism in Josephus.

volumes of the works are taken into account).¹⁴⁹ There is at least one possible explanation for this which has nothing to do with Atticism. Josephus is considerably less concerned with the Roman military and other Roman institutions in the *CA* than in his other works, and thus we would expect him to use fewer calques for Latin technical terms in the *CA*.¹⁵⁰ It is also possible, however, that Josephus has deliberately chosen to use fewer Latinisms in the specific context of the aims of the *CA*, in which his heightened awareness of and engagement with Greek culture could motivate a heightened attention to Atticism; or these reasons are perhaps, to a degree, two sides of the same coin: Josephus' deliberate avoidance of discussion of Roman culture in the *CA* (on which, see Ch. 3, pp. 216–21) is a component of his stance as a cultural Greek; his relative avoidance of Latinism, in comparison with his earlier works, may also be an attempt at Atticizing.¹⁵¹

The use of substantivized adjectives with the neuter article was also a feature of Attic that was revived during the Second Sophistic.¹⁵² Here is a selection of such forms found in the *CA*: τὸ δίκαιον (1.7), τὸ ἐναντιώτατον (1.26), τὸ Σκυθικόν (1.64), τὰ ληθέες (1.11, 1.68, 1.127 and 2.162), τὸ θεῖον (1.162 and 2.250), τὸ ἀδύνατον (1.256), τὸ

¹⁴⁹ See appendices A–C in Ward 2007: 647–9. Despite the fact that Ward argues that Josephus' use of Latinisms does not lessen over time throughout his corpus (unlike apparent Aramaisms), the specific examples which Ward cites (which he notes are not exhaustive and exclude terms for Roman institutions) show a steadily decreasing frequency: 35 Latinisms in the *BJ* (which comes to an average of five per volume, though usages tend to cluster throughout the corpus), 80 in the *AJ* (4 per volume), 3 in the *Vita*, and 3 in the *CA* (1.5 per volume, though we must bear in mind that this is skewed by the lacuna of 2.52–114, or about 10% of the treatise).

¹⁵⁰ Though Ward does not document the instances of such terms. See also Van der Horst 1996: 84.

¹⁵¹ By way of example at this juncture, Josephus does not discuss the Roman πολιτεία in his comparison of constitutions at 2. 151–295. This omission is surely deliberate and has obviated the use of Latin calques for specific Roman political institutions, which do indeed appear in Josephus' other works, such as στρατόπεδον τίθεσθαι for *castrum ponere*, found at, for instance, *BJ* 4.663 and *Vita* 214.

¹⁵² Horrocks 2014: 138.

εὐηθέστατον (1.260), τὸ γενναιότατον (1.298), τὸ θαυμασιώτατον, (1.302, 2.135, and 283), τὸ μετριώτερον (1.303), τοῦναντίον (2.22 and 29), τὸ σύμμετρον (2.24), τὸ παράλιον (2.34), τὸ μέγιστον (2.45), τὸ ἀρχαιότατον (2.152), τὸ πρῶτον μεγαλεῖον (2.157), τὸ χρήσιμον (2.170), τὸ ὅμοιον (2.193), τὸ ἀσελγέστερον (2.244), τὸ φιλεργὸν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν ἐν ταῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων ἀνάγκαις (2.283). These 28 examples show that Josephus uses such abstract formulations regularly in the *CA*.

Potential Optative

The final Attic feature which I will analyze is Josephus' use of the potential optative. The optative mood declined from its full range of uses in classical Greek and was used primarily to express wishes in the Koine.¹⁵³ During the Second Sophistic, the classical uses of the optative (namely, in subordinate clauses and to express potential) experienced a revival, to the point that McKay has remarked that the Attic revival can obscure efforts to study this decline.¹⁵⁴ A thorough examination of Josephus' use of the optative mood in all of its functions in comparison with the range of Hellenophone authors with whom I have been comparing other aspects of Josephus' language is, of course, beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I will focus on the potential optative as Josephus uses it in the *CA*, and compare his practice with that of other authors. The potential optative lends itself to more economical data collection, as it is relatively straightforward to con-

¹⁵³ Horrocks 2014: 102–3. Foucault expresses the following shorthand documentation of this decline: “On a calculé le nombre d’optatifs rencontrés dans cent pages d’auteurs variés et l’on a constaté de grandes différences. Si l’on trouve 330 exemples pour Xénophon, 250 pour Platon, on tombe à 76 pour Strabon, 58 pour Denys D’Halicarnasse, 48 pour Philodème, mais 37 pour Polybe et... 13 pour Diodore de Sicile.” Foucault 1972: 143.

¹⁵⁴ See McKay 1993: 21.

duct TLG searches for ἄν.

McKay correctly remarks that merely counting the occurrences of the optative is not an adequate means of tracing the decline of the mood, as uses are context-dependent: he remarks that wishes are common in dialogue and speech, but not historical narrative.¹⁵⁵ Accordingly, we can observe at the outset that comparing numbers of occurrences of the potential optative will only allow us to see which authors Josephus resembles or does not resemble in a more general sense regarding use of the optative, rather than to make any definite claims about the degree to which Josephus Atticizes in the *CA* by his use of the optative.

There are a total of 47 occurrences of the optative in the extant Greek portion of the *CA* that could be interpreted as potential optatives with ἄν (and which do not occur in quotations of other authors).¹⁵⁶ Some of these occurrences have a formulaic quality, such as the phrase ὡς ἄν εἴποι τις (lit. “one might say”), which occurs four times.¹⁵⁷ A TLG search reveals that this phrase is actually rare in the classical period, and is much more widely used in the imperial period, particularly by Atticizers. Table 5 shows some of these authors.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ McKay 1993: 21.

¹⁵⁶ This includes one at 2.198 in a passage which is omitted in the majority of the manuscripts of Eusebius, but which does occur in what Siegert calls the Y-group, which represents a separate recension of *CA* 2.163–228, and includes manuscripts S, L, and the Latin translations. Siegert 2008: 74–7, 196–7 n. 26.

¹⁵⁷ At 1.7, 167, 2.29, and 165.

¹⁵⁸ This search does not account for variations of the phrase, such as inserted particles.

Table 5: Occurrences of ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις

Dionysius	Dio Chrysostom	Galen	Aelius Aristides	Athenaeus	Lucian
4	6	116	3	2	1

The phrase becomes even more common in later Christian authors such as Eusebius. It does not occur in Polybius, the Septuagint, Plutarch, or the New Testament. Classical Attic authors, of course, preferred the phrase ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, which is a favorite of Plato's, and is found throughout the fourth century orators, as well as in Polybius and Plutarch (and once in Josephus, at *AJ* 15.387).¹⁵⁹ Josephus' use of ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις more closely resembles that of the imperial Atticizers than either the more colloquial Septuagint and New Testament or fifth and fourth century Attic authors. The latter comparison is particularly interesting, as the statistics I have here assembled suggest that the use of the phrase ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις in this period reflects the deliberate revival of the optative by Atticizers, despite the fact that the phrase does not match the usage of classical Attic.

As far as the specific contexts of each of Josephus' uses of the phrase, 1.7 (τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἅπαντα νέα καὶ **χθὲς καὶ πρόην, ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις**, εὐροὶ γεγονότα,), on the relative newness of Greek literature, is, of course an allusion to both Herodotus 2.53 (ὁθεν δὲ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε δὴ αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τέ τινες τὰ εἶδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ **πρόην τε καὶ χθὲς ὥς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ**.), and to Plato's *Laws* 677d, where the relative newness of various Greek cultural achievements is compared with Egypt: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις πάμπολλα, **ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν χθὲς καὶ πρόην**

¹⁵⁹ Variations of εἴποι ἂν τις are, however, fairly widespread among classical Attic authors. Cf. McKay's remarks on Paul's preference for ἐπεῖ τις, McKay 1993: 25.

γεγονότα.¹⁶⁰ We may remark that this particular allusion has the effect of establishing Josephus' learnedness in Greek accounts of their own origins (see also Ch. 3, pp. 182–4 on the display of παιδεία). In terms of language, Josephus has gone out of his way to substitute the potential optative for Herodotus' ὥς εἶπεῖν λόγῳ and Plato's ὥς ἔπος εἶπεῖν.

This substitution can be explained as a deliberate choice to use the optative.

Josephus translates the Hebrew (and Aramaic) term “Korban,” which he describes as an oath in the context of a reference to Theophrastus (who also appears to have described it as an oath) at 1.167: παρ' οὐδενὶ δ' ἂν οὗτος (sc. ὁ ὄρκος) εὗρεθείη πλὴν μόνοις Ἰουδαίοις, δηλοῖ δ', ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων μεθερμηνευόμενος διαλέκτου δῶρον θεοῦ. (“Among no one else but the Jews alone could this (oath) be found, and it (essentially) means, if it is translated from the language of the Hebrews, ‘gift belonging to God.’”) The entire phrase ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις should be read as qualifying δηλοῖ. Here I differ from both Thackeray's and Barclay's translations. Both construe μεθερμηνευόμενος as in agreement with τις and supplementary to εἴποι.¹⁶¹ The problem with this reading is that it ignores the passive voice of the participle, which must be taken in agreement with the subject of δηλοῖ, namely οὗτος.¹⁶² Considering that ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις appears to be a set phrase in Josephus, it has the force of “essentially,” or “practically,” as is its use in 1.7,

¹⁶⁰ Barclay 2007: 13 n. 34. See also below, p. 185 on Josephus' use of the phrase ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόην elsewhere in the *CA*, as well as Dillery 2003.

¹⁶¹ As a result, neither really translates εἴποι. Thackeray's translation is: “Now this oath will be found in no other nation except the Jews, and, translated from the Hebrew, one may interpret it as meaning “God's gift.” Thackeray 1926: 229–31. Barclay's translation is: “This is to be found nowhere except among Jews alone and signifies, as one might translate from the Hebrews' language, “gift for God.” Barclay 2007: 98–9.

¹⁶² LSJ notes that μεθερμηνεύω is frequently used in the passive.

where it is the semantic equivalent of Herodotus' ὥς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ, and the more common classical ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. The reason for Josephus' use of this qualifying expression at 1.167 is that δῶρον θεοῦ is not a literal translation of κορβάν (קרבן); δῶρον alone is, however, a common translation for the term.¹⁶³ Josephus' addition of the dependent genitive θεοῦ represents an explanation.

At 2.29, Josephus refutes Apion's alleged claim of the the Egyptian origin of the Jews with his own allegation of Apion's Egyptian origin:

αὐτὸς γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦναντίον ἐψεύδετο καὶ γεγενημένος ἐν Ὀάσει τῆς Αἰγύπτου, πάντων Αἰγυπτίων πρῶτος ὢν, ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις, τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ πατρίδα καὶ τὸ γένος ἐξωμόσατο, Ἀλεξανδρεὺς δὲ εἶναι καταψευδόμενος ὁμολογεῖ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τοῦ γένους.

For he himself told the opposite lie about himself, and he who was born in Egypt's Oasis and was practically the leading man of all the Egyptians forswore his true country and race, and by pretending to be an Alexandrian confirms the wickedness of his γένος.

Josephus here uses the phrase ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις to soften a claim that is certainly not true (that Apion was the leading man of the Egyptians).

Finally, at 2.165, Josephus uses the expression in his famous coinage of the term 'theocracy':¹⁶⁴ ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης εἰς μὲν τούτων (sc. τῶν πολιτευμάτων) οὐδοτιοῦν ἀπεῖδεν, ὥς δ' ἂν τις εἴποι βιασάμενος τὸν λόγον, θεοκρατίαν ἀπέδειξε τὸ πολίτευμα, θεῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ κράτος ἀναθείς. ("But our lawgiver looked to none of

¹⁶³ The term קרבן is rendered into three different terms in the Septuagint: δῶρον, κληρος, and ξυλοφορία. See Muraoka 1998: 132, with references to Hatch and Redpath 1897–1906. Josephus also translates the term as δῶρον at *AJ* 4.73, where he discusses offerings made by the Nazirites: οἱ κορβάν αὐτοῦς ὀνομάσαντες τῷ θεῷ, δῶρον δὲ τοῦτο σημαίνει κατὰ Ἑλλήνων γλῶτταν. cf. Mark 7:11: ἐὰν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπος τῷ πατρὶ ἢ τῇ μητρὶ, Κορβάν, ὅ ἐστιν, Δῶρον, ὃ ἐὰν ἐξ ἐμοῦ ὠφεληθῇς... On translations of קרבן in antiquity, see Zeitlin 1972.

¹⁶⁴ There is considerable bibliography on Josephus' use/invention of this term, for which see Barclay 2007: 262–3, n. 638. See also Ch. 1 pp. 73–4.

these (systems of government), but created (to practically force the term) a “theocracy” by entrusting the government and power to God.”). In this passage, Josephus uses the expression ὥς ἂν τις εἴποι to soften the introduction of his neologism, explicitly acknowledging the potential perceived awkwardness or unnaturalness of his coinage with the phrase βιασάμενος τὸν λόγον. In all four of these cases, Josephus uses the potential optative for the equivalent of ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. This usage resembles that of Atticizers of the imperial period.

Other uses of the potential optative in the *CA* occur in claims which have their basis in hypothetical or counterfactual ideas. Noteworthy among these is 1.44, where Josephus compares Jews who have gladly endured torture and death for their sacred texts with Greeks: ὁ τίς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν Ἑλλήνων ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ; ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦ καὶ πάντα τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἀφανισθῆναι συγγράμματα τὴν τυχοῦσαν ὑποστήσεται βλάβην· (“Who of the Greeks would endure this for his? But not even on behalf of the destruction of all of their writings would he submit to the slightest harm.”). Another example is found at 2.185, where Josephus discusses the piety of Jewish law: καὶ τίς ἂν (sc. κατάστασις τοῦ πολιτεύματος) καλλίων ἢ δικαιότερα γένοιτο τῆς θεὸν μὲν ἡγεμόνα τῶν ὅλων πεποιημένης, τοῖς ἱερεῦσι δὲ κοινῇ μὲν τὰ μέγιστα διοικεῖν ἐπιτρεπούσης, τῷ δὲ πάντων ἀρχιερεῖ πάλιν αὖ πεπιστευκυίας τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἱερέων ἡγεμονίαν; (“What (sc. arrangement of government) could be more beautiful or more just than the one that has deemed god the ruler of all, that has entrusted the most important affairs to the priests to oversee on the one hand, and on the other hand, has again entrusted to the chief priest of all the rule of the other priests.”). In 2.115, Josephus offers a snide commentary on Apion’s re-

telling of Mnaseas' account of the alleged worship of a pack-ass by Jews (among other things): ἄρα οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἂν εἴποιμεν, ὅτι τὸν κἀνθωνα τουτέστιν ἑαυτὸν Ἀπίων ἐπιφορτίζει καὶ ποιεῖ τῆς μωρολογίας ἅμα καὶ τῶν ψευσμάτων κατάγομον ("Therefore couldn't we ourselves say that Apion is overburdening the pack-ass, which is himself, and weighing it down with nonsense and falsehoods?"). In these two passages, Josephus uses the potential optative in a rhetorical question to achieve a different rhetorical effect than, for instance, that which indicative statements would achieve (i.e. "No Greek ever will die for Greek literature; no arrangement of government is more beautiful or more just."). By inviting the reader to consider unreal possibilities, Josephus clearly expects his reader to conclude that Jews are the most reverent toward their sacred writings (which is evidence of those writings' superiority to others), and that the Jewish constitution is superior to others. The potential optative is thus a useful tool for Josephus' rhetorical aims.

There are also many instances of potential optatives in the *CA* that are used to soften the force of specific claims that Josephus makes. I will list only a few examples: 1.11: οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου δύναιτό τις ἂν δεῖξαι σωζομένην ἀναγραφὴν οὔτ' ἐν ἱεροῖς οὔτ' ἐν δημοσίοις ἀναθήμασιν ... ("Nor indeed would anyone be able to produce a surviving record from that time, either in temples or in public dedications); 1.15: ἢ τίς οὐ παρ' αὐτῶν ἂν τῶν συγγραφέων μάθοι ῥαδίως, ὅτι μηδὲν βεβαίως εἰδότες συνέγραφον ... ("One would readily learn from the historiographers themselves that they composed knowing nothing with certainty ..."); 1.19: Αἰτίαι δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης διαφωνίας πολλαὶ μὲν ἴσως ἂν καὶ ἕτεραι τοῖς βουλομένοις ζητεῖν ἂν φανεῖεν ("Probably many addi-

tional causes of such inconsistency would become apparent to those who wish to look.”).¹⁶⁵ From these examples it is apparent that Josephus uses the potential optative for its rhetorical effects in the service of his specific arguments throughout the *CA*. Thus we see that the context of the *CA* at least in part conditions the use of the potential optative. Josephus could have used other constructions such as straightforward claims in the indicative.

Finally, I will provide some data for a comparison of the frequency of the use of the potential optative in the *CA* with other authors in Table 6.

Table 6: Frequency of the Potential Optative	
Author	Number of Potential Optatives in the first (approx.) 1,000 words
Polybius, <i>Histories</i> Book 1	4
Genesis (Septuagint)	0
2 Maccabees	0
4 Maccabees	3
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, <i>Roman Antiquities</i> Book 1	1
Pauline Epistles (Undisputed)	0
Josephus, <i>Against Apion</i>	6
Plutarch, <i>Malice of Herodotus</i>	1
<i>Gospel of Luke</i>	1
<i>Joseph and Aseneth</i>	0
Lucian, <i>How to Write History</i>	5

Table 6 shows that the *CA* falls roughly between Lucian and Polybius. Let us again recall McKay’s remarks, mentioned above, that mere frequency of use of the opta-

¹⁶⁵ Note that Josephus further qualifies his claim with ἵστως here.

tive will not give us definite figures for tracing the development of the optative, because context affects an author's syntactical choices. Accordingly, for both Plutarch and Lucian, I chose to compare works which share generic similarities to the *CA* (an option not available for all authors, of course), in the expectation that similar (though hardly identical) generic conventions and rhetorical aims might result in similar frequencies of the potential optative. This clearly was not the case with Plutarch, whose *On the Malice of Herodotus* is the outlier among my chosen pagan authors. In the case of Lucian, however, who had the highest frequency of potential optatives of works surveyed, the expectation was closer to the truth: the *CA* is second only to *How to Write History* in frequency of potential optatives. It is also the case that we may take the above figures as indicating in a more general (rather than absolute) sense the trends over time. With the exception of Plutarch, the Greek of the *CA* most closely resembles that of pagan Greek authors, and in particular Lucian. It is plausible that Josephus and Lucian use the potential optative as frequently as they do in a deliberate effort to Atticize their Greek.

To sum up this analysis and draw out some conclusions, Josephus does not, on the whole, go to any great lengths to avoid terms or formulations deemed non-Attic (and therefore proscribed) by second and third century lexicographers. In other words, he does not exhibit the concern with purism that typifies the later Second Sophistic. This is unsurprising in the context of the late first century, when the exhortations to Atticism of Dionysius and Plutarch were more prescriptive than proscriptive. The social pressure to avoid any language perceived as unattested in "the ancients" will become acute (or will at least be presented as such) shortly after the likely date of the *CA*, as we see in Lucian's

expressions of anxiety about the embarrassment attending such *faux pas* in works including the *Pseudologista* and *Pro lapsu inter salutandum*. There are, however, indicators that Josephus does Atticize his Greek to a degree with his use of the dual and relatively frequent use of the potential optative. It appears that Josephus' language occupies a middle ground between the Hellenistic literary Koine and the full-blown Atticism of the Second Sophistic, and is markedly more Atticizing than the Koine of the authors of the Septuagint, New Testament, and other Jewish or Christian texts that I have surveyed such as *Joseph and Aseneth* and the Epistle of Barnabas. It is, in any case, striking that Josephus makes use, to some degree, of perhaps the single most significant tool of "proper" Greek culture of the Imperial period: Attic Greek. As arguably the most salient criterion for inclusion within the group identity of *πεπαιδευμένοι*, Josephus' stylistic and dialectal choices here mark his own self-positioning, and thus performance, as a Greek *πεπαιδευμένος*.¹⁶⁶

4. Josephus' *συνεργοί*

I would like to digress from my main theme briefly, as this analysis of the *CA* in the context of the phenomenon of Second Sophistic Atticism can shed new light on an issue in Josephan scholarship that caused some vexation for scholars in the aftermath of Thackeray's 1929 lecture series, namely, Josephus' *συνεργοί*, which Thackeray translates

¹⁶⁶ It is valuable to here recall Tim Whitmarsh's remark that Greek cultural identity is not reflected by the use of Atticism, but is constructed through it via an active and self-conscious process. Whitmarsh 2001: 273. This remark is in accord with the concept of identity as performance discussed in the introduction to this chapter.

as “assistants.”¹⁶⁷ The passage in question is found at *CA* 1.50 in Josephus’ description of his composition of the *BJ*:

εἶτα σχολῆς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ λαβόμενος, πάσης μοι τῆς πραγματείας ἐν παρασκευῇ γεγενημένης, χρησάμενός τισι πρὸς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν συνεργοῖς, οὕτως ἐποίησάμην τῶν πράξεων τὴν παράδοσιν.

Then, taking advantage of my leisure at Rome, when the whole project had been prepared, having consulted certain collaborators in the Greek language I thus made my account of the history.

Thackeray’s view that Josephus’ use of these “assistants” for various aspects of his composition of the *BJ* and the *AJ*, including “the composition of large portions of the narrative,”¹⁶⁸ though once generally accepted, has been widely critiqued and is no longer credited.¹⁶⁹ Leaving aside the question of the exact role of the συνεργοί in the composition of the *BJ*, there are, however, two other elements of Thackeray’s interpretation of the passage that linger to this day in scholarship, which I will here attempt to dispel. The first concerns the viewpoint that Josephus’ συνεργοί were necessarily his social inferiors; Thackeray certainly believed that Josephus wished to present these “anonymous menials” as such at 1.50.¹⁷⁰ The second is that the passage is a deliberate admission of Josephus’ incompetence at Greek (whether or not scholars agree that this incompetence is real).

The translation of συνεργοί as “assistants” is surely incorrect, and is in fact not

¹⁶⁷ Both throughout this essay and in his 1926 Loeb translation.

¹⁶⁸ Thackeray 1929: 100.

¹⁶⁹ See esp. Rajak 1983: 233–236. Rajak points out the important problem that Thackeray claims to detect the work of the συνεργοί in the *AJ*, whereas Josephus’ remarks at *CA* 1.50 concern the *BJ* exclusively. Schreckenberg 1996: 53 also (correctly) remarks that the participation of the συνεργοί in the composition of the *BJ* does not have ramifications for the textual criticism of the *CA*.

¹⁷⁰ Thackeray 1929: 100.

listed as a meaning of the term in the LSJ.¹⁷¹ Rajak side-steps the problem of συνεργοί to a degree by translating “having enlisted some people (*synergoi*) to help with the Greek” for χρησάμενός τισι πρὸς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν συνεργοῖς, but she at least avoids the connotation of social inferiority.¹⁷² Mason translates “collaborators.”¹⁷³ Barclay offers the terms “colleagues” and “accomplices” as more appropriate translations.¹⁷⁴ The use of χρησάμενος warrants further discussion. Rajak’s “having enlisted” is again preferable to Barclay’s “having made use of,” as is Siegert’s “zog ich ... hinzu.”¹⁷⁵ Mason’s translation with alternative suggestions in brackets at least draws attention to the fact that the translation of this sentence is potentially problematic, even if he does not offer any detail as to why it is, or as to how he chose his words (some of which are themselves problematic).¹⁷⁶ While Thackeray in his Loeb translation in fact leaves the participle untranslated (“with the aid of some assistants for the sake of the Greek”),¹⁷⁷ his 1927 essay is replete with

¹⁷¹ Nor in Danker-Bauer. We need not believe that the possible meaning “helper” (LSJ A 1) carries a similar connotation of social or positional inferiority that “assistant” always does. There are many instances of the term used in circumstances where the unequal relationship envisioned by Thackeray for Josephus and his συνεργοί is not implicit, including Thuc. 3.63.4; places where an unequal power dynamic does seem to be in play include Plutarch *Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 1.5.8. Cf. also Paul’s frequent use of the term, e.g. *Rom.* 16.21.

¹⁷² Rajak 1983: 47.

¹⁷³ Mason 2009: 56. He also suggests “co-workers.”

¹⁷⁴ Barclay 2007: 36.

¹⁷⁵ Rajak 1983: 47, Barclay 2007: 36, and Siegert 2008: 106.

¹⁷⁶ Mason 2009: 56. Mason’s (problematic) translation of the passage reads: “Then, taking advantage of leisure in Rome, with all the work [πραγματεία: argument? material?] now ready and at my disposal, and after I had consulted [or: arranged, furnished, engaged] certain collaborators for the Greek sound, thus I accomplished the transmission of the events.”

¹⁷⁷ Thackeray 1926: 183.

remarks overt and implicit about the alleged social inferiority of the “assistants.”¹⁷⁸

Though Barclay correctly translates συνεργοί as “collaborators,” he remarks that χρησάμενός “suggests that they had inferior status.”¹⁷⁹ A perusal of the LSJ entry for χράω shows that this interpretation is not warranted. The use of χράομαι in the middle with a person in the dative case is relatively rare with a meaning other than “treat as; regard as” (LSJ C IV a), which Josephus cannot mean here without a corresponding predicate dative. We may note that the meaning “use” is attested at LSJ C IV b, citing Plutarch *Moralia*.79d, but in the context of using the writings of Plato and Xenophon, which Plutarch would hardly have considered inferior to his own. Another option is “consult,” attested in the Hippocratic corpus (*De Arte* 5), though the fact that this passage speaks of consulting a doctor could actually be read as suggesting a relationship of uneven status or power. Finally, let us note the substantive use of the participle attested in both Xenophon

¹⁷⁸ Thackeray 1927: 100–24.

¹⁷⁹ See again Barclay 2007: 36. Barclay cites parallel passages for this interpretation. His citation of “*AJ* 4.616” is surely a typo (the passage does not exist); he must have meant *BJ* 4.616, which does not in fact provide a parallel construction, since Josephus does not here use χράομαι. We have here Vespasian, recently proclaimed emperor by his army, sending a message to Tiberius Alexander, governor of Egypt and Alexandria, asking for aid, in which he writes: ὡς αὐτὸς ὑποδὺς ἀναγκαίως τὸ βάρος τῆς ἡγεμονίας συνεργὸν αὐτὸν καὶ βοηθὸν προσλαμβάνει. If anything, Vespasian’s language expresses his reluctance to take upon his shoulders the “weight of rule,” which he has done only “out of necessity.” With ὑποδὺς Vespasian indeed casts himself in the role of subject to the burden of empire; one ought not interpret συνεργὸν αὐτὸν καὶ βοηθὸν προσλαμβάνει as a statement of Tiberius’ inferior status, rather than as Vespasian in fact framing the request as an appeal from an equal to an equal, which συνεργὸν in fact implies. This suits the context better, as Vespasian’s position as emperor is not yet secure at this point, and he does need to acquire willing allies.

As for the second parallel Barclay cites, *AJ* 16.82, the context is Antipater’s plotting against his Hasmonean half brothers by telling false tales of their treachery against Herod the Great, their father: Antipater did not report all the false accusations himself, “but treated the unsuspected as accomplices” (ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐχρήτο συνεργοῖς τοῖς ἀνυπόπτοις). While we do here have an instance of χράομαι with the dative συνεργοῖς, it is not parallel to the use of χράομαι at *CA* 1.50, as here at *AJ* 16.82, συνεργοῖς is in apposition with τοῖς ἀνυπόπτοις, thus the construction is that described at LSJ C IV (without ὡς): treat or regard somebody as something. In any case, it is difficult to see why ἐχρήτο itself should imply social inferiority; Josephus describes these individuals’ inferior status to Antipater in 16.83: they are willing to participate in the conspiracy in the hopes of currying favor with Antipater, whom they expect will succeed his father. Thus this information comes not from the verb itself but from a more explicit description.

and Isocrates, οἱ χρώμενοι, meaning “friends,” a use which does not imply that the persons being “used” are of inferior status. The interpretation of this sentence is, in my belief, hindered by the fact that the term “use” in English, when applied to people, entails a degree of unequal treatment, if not actual exploitation. If we can imagine a sense of “use” which does not carry this connotation, we may come closer to understanding the Greek. To this end, Rajak’s “having enlisted” is preferable, as is “having consulted,” which is very close to Mason’s “after I had consulted.”¹⁸⁰ This is in accord with Mason’s view that the συνεργοί are Josephus’ literary peers, on the grounds that publication in antiquity (as current scholarship now holds, and as discussed above, p. 111 n.13) was generally a local and social affair, in which networks of elite intellectuals shared versions of their works with one another in various states of completion, and might critique or otherwise aid in a work’s completion.¹⁸¹

Josephus’ remarks about his engagement with the Greek language at *AJ* 20.263 are worth examining in brief here as well, since they are, like *CA* 1.50, generally interpreted as Josephus’ confession of linguistic incompetence, the second point I wish to address in this section. Certainly scholars have tended to look at Josephus’ comments on his Greek together.¹⁸² The passage reads:

ἔχω γὰρ ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ τῶν ὁμοεθνῶν πλεῖστον αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν
ἐπιχώριον παιδείαν διαφέρειν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δὲ γραμμάτων καὶ
ποιητικῶν μαθημάτων πολλὰ ἐσπούδασα μετασχεῖν τὴν γραμματικὴν

¹⁸⁰ Mason 2009: 56. Of Mason’s additional suggestions, “engaged” would work well as similar in meaning to “used” but lacking the connotation of exploitation, but “arranged” and “furnished” again are not attested meanings for this use of the middle with dative of person.

¹⁸¹ See Mason 2009: 45–67, with bibliography and 2016: 80–88.

¹⁸² Thackeray 1929: 100–124, Rajak 1983: 47, Mason 2009: 45–67.

ἐμπειρίαν ἀναλαβών, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὴν προφορὰν ἀκρίβειαν πάτριος
ἐκώλυσεν συνήθεια.¹⁸³

For my countrymen agree that I excel them most in our native παιδεία and
I endeavored to have a share of Greek letters and poetic learning by taking
up grammatical practice, which my native usage has prevented as regards
accurate pronunciation.¹⁸⁴

It is certainly the case that Josephus is claiming that he did not achieve precise pronunciation of Greek, here presented as a component of τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, and thus this passage is of course a statement of his imperfect grasp of the language to a greater degree than *CA* 1.50. Rajak observes that Josephus' 'protestations of linguistic inadequacy' are not without precedent in the Roman world, citing examples in earlier authors.¹⁸⁵ In the context of the Second Sophistic, however, Josephus' remarks need not be read as straightforward admissions of inadequacy or incompetence (whether or not they are sincere), and I have belabored the issue of the translation of *CA* 1.50 in order to arrive at this

¹⁸³ The phrase καὶ ποιητικῶν μαθημάτων πολλὰ is omitted in some manuscripts. See Niese 1887–95 Vol. 4: 320.

¹⁸⁴ Several of the terms in this passage warrant further consideration in order to understand what exactly Josephus is describing in terms of his Greek learning. γραμμάτων generally refer not just to letters, but to literacy in general, and more broadly, to literature (See LSJ A IV and Morgan 1998: 9–21, 33–44). ποιητικῶν μαθημάτων, which I have rendered "poetic learning," is paired with γραμμάτων, prompting Feldman in his Loeb translation to treat the two phrases together as a reference to prose and poetry (Feldman 1965: 139). Rajak, on the other hand, translates the two as "Greek letters and poetic disciplines" (Rajak 1983: 47). τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν is an interesting phrase attested only in later authors, in particular medical writers including Galen (*Thrasylbulus* 5.869.2) as well as Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus Mathematicos* 1.66.9), Theodosius of Alexandria, and the anonymous commentaries to Dionysius Thrax. Galen's use of the phrase suggests a highly specialized and erudite engagement with Greek learning (an exhaustive knowledge of all Greek words is described as τοῦτ' ἂν γὰρ ἐρμηνευτικῆς τινός ἐστιν ἢ γραμματικῆς ἐμπειρίας) which he rejects in his recommendation that doctors have a more casual acquaintance with the major dialects of Greek in the interest of better communicating with their patients. This would suggest that Josephus is likely referring to specialized, in-depth, and elite study of the Greek language. Finally, concerning τὴν προφορὰν ἀκρίβειαν, I will note that Rajak convincingly stresses that this statement most likely concerns a regional accent which Josephus learned along with his first Greek in Palestine, which would be perceptible to Greek speakers at Rome, rather than suggesting that he is a novice at Greek. Rajak 1983: 50.

¹⁸⁵ Including A. Postumius Albinus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Rajak 1983: 47–8.

context.¹⁸⁶ Instead, in the emerging environment of Second Sophistic Atticism, proficiency in speaking and composition of *Attic* Greek takes on a new meaning and resonance that is different from Republican Roman suspicion of all things Greek. As I have discussed above, Atticism itself became a site of identity performance within elite cultural Greek circles. The texts of the Second Sophistic are replete with self-conscious statements about the authors' and others' use (or abuse) of Attic. The artificiality of Second Sophistic Atticism, and the awareness on the part of these authors of the profound difficulty of achieving an Atticism that was above reproach are worth considering in our interpretation of Josephus' remarks about his Greek. The proliferation of grammatical handbooks and lexica beginning in the second century alone suggest what Lucian makes more explicit: Atticism is difficult.¹⁸⁷ To be sure, there were no native speakers of classical Attic in the late first century CE (thus Philostratus' Agathion of *VS* 552–4 is a fantasy character); for all Atticizers, this was an exercise in a foreign and artificial language, which one was expected to have to labor to acquire, and the achievement of which was considered an accomplishment, not a natural state—thus imperial Greek is a classic example of diglossia.¹⁸⁸ We may compare Favorinus' remarks in his *Corinthian Oration* on his attainments in Greek culture, which he presents as making him worthy of having his

¹⁸⁶ As Rajak remarks, “the question is by no means one of mastery of the ordinary language, whether spoken or written,” but instead concerned a more sophisticated knowledge of literature and style. Rajak 1983: 49–50.

¹⁸⁷ e.g. *Pro lapsu ad salutandum, Pseudologista*.

¹⁸⁸ See Kim 2014.

statue re-erected in Corinth.¹⁸⁹ Mason remarks that Josephus' statement at *CA* 1.50 makes sense as a response to the atmosphere of hyper-criticism during the Second Sophistic, and even cites Lucian's *Pro lapsu inter salutandum* and *Pseudologista* as comparanda.¹⁹⁰

While Mason is both correct and, to my knowledge, unique in pointing to the Second Sophistic context in his interpretation of this passage, the picture is not complete. Lucian not only satirizes the hyper-critical atmosphere surrounding Attic Greek and its proper use, but he also satirizes the anxiety that Greek speakers such as himself felt in that environment. Thus, the description of one's own shortcomings as a Hellenist was itself a form of posturing for some authors of the Second Sophistic, and thus is itself an identity performance. The descriptions of the difficulty, failure, and dependence on others that attend the effort to speak and write proper Greek are in their own way assertions of the Herculean effort expended in achieving Greekness.¹⁹¹ It is likely that it is no coincidence that we find such strong statements to this effect in authors who assert bicultural identities, such as Favorinus and Lucian. Josephus, as I've demonstrated in Chapter 1, goes to great

¹⁸⁹ The speech was attributed to Dio Chrysostom, thus Dio: 37:25–6: εἰ δέ τις οὐ Λευκανὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαῖος, οὐδὲ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἱπποτρόφων, οὐδὲ τὴν φωνὴν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γνώμην καὶ τὴν δίαίταν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐζηλωκώς, καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἐγκρατῶς καὶ περιφανῶς, ὥς οὔτε τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ Ῥωμαίων οὔτε τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν Ἑλλήνων (εἰρήσεται γάρ) οὐδὲ εἷς τῶν μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἀρίστους ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐκεῖσε πρὸς τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πράγματα ἀποκλίνοντας, τὸν δὲ [προστάτην] πρὸς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀξίωμα καὶ πάνθ' ἀπλῶς προϊέμενον, ἴν' αὐτῷ περιῇ ἐν ἀντὶ πάντων Ἑλληνι δοκεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι – εἴτα τοῦτον οὐκ ἔχρην παρ' ὑμῖν ἐστάναι χαλκοῦν; “If someone who is not a Lucanian, but a Roman, not one of the plebs, but an equestrian, who has emulated not only the language but also the thought and lifestyle and clothing of the Greeks, and has done these things with such self-discipline and so conspicuously as none of the Romans before him has ever done, nor a single one of the Greeks of his own time (so let it be said)—for it is possible to see the best of the Greeks at Rome tending toward Roman ways, but he tends toward Greek ways and is abandoning his property, his political position, and absolutely everything for the sake of this, that one thing remain for him in place of the rest: to seem and to be Greek—so, shouldn't you put up a bronze of this person?”

¹⁹⁰ Mason 2009: 59. See also Mason 2016: 88.

¹⁹¹ We may again recall Favorinus' remarks in the *Corinthian Oration*, see above, n. 189. Lucian's description of παιδεία at *The Dream* 1 is also relevant: τοῖς πλείστοις οὖν ἔδοξεν παιδεία μὲν καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ χρόνου μακροῦ καὶ δαπάνης οὐ μικρᾶς καὶ τύχης δεῖσθαι λαμπρᾶς ...

length to assert his Jewish identity in all of his works. Lucian famously brings his own Syrian identity to the fore in some of his works. Favorinus, whose origin was in Gaul, draws attention to the fact that his Greek identity is something he worked to achieve. A pattern thus emerges among these bicultural authors of drawing attention to both an ancestral or ethnic identity while also drawing attention to an acquired, learned cultural Greek identity. This double identity serves as a form of posturing. Josephus, of course, unlike Favorinus, never asserts that he is trying to be Greek, but his Atticism coupled with his self-presentation as someone who has labored for his Greek language and learning certainly make him seem Greek.

In this regard, there is no real reason to assume that Josephus, who was in all likelihood a fluent speaker and reader of the elite Koine before his involvement with the Roman camp,¹⁹² was at a disadvantage to any significant degree when it comes to composing Attic prose, even if we believe that he in truth did not begin to read any Greek literature until after 71 (which is difficult to believe, given the high level of engagement with Greek literature evident in the *BJ*, likely published between 75 and 79, which would be an astonishing achievement for Josephus in such a short space of time).¹⁹³ But certainly, as Rajak remarks, he would have had ample time to close any literary gap in the twenty-

¹⁹² Rajak 1983: 50.

¹⁹³ Thackeray's "assistant" theory in part is meant to account for this brief space between Josephus' arrival at Rome and the publication of the *BJ*. Thackeray can thus claim that Josephus can achieve such a high level of Greek because it was not in fact he who was responsible for it. Thackeray 1926: 101–2. We may at least remark that Thackeray gives an overly literal interpretation of Josephus' remarks about his education at *Vita* 9–10. Josephus is keen to stress his early education in the Jewish tradition, but this does not necessarily mean that he had no formal education in Greek before he arrived at Rome. It bears remarking that Josephus only claims that he started writing the *BJ* in Greek after his arrival at Rome at *CA* 1.50, not that this marked the beginning of his exposure to Greek literature. Rajak, on the other hand, believes that the interval between 71 and the *BJ*'s publication is in fact sufficient for Josephus to have gained enough of a formal education in Greek literature to produce the *BJ*. Rajak 1983: 62–3.

some years of retirement and self-described devoted study that had elapsed between 71 and the composition of the *CA*.¹⁹⁴ We should at least be cognizant of the fact that we know about this period of study because Josephus wanted us to know about it.

I will leave my discussion of Josephus' language here, having shown that he has taken pains both to compose his treatise in an Atticizing prose (which is inherently an exercise in artificiality), and to describe the pains he has taken with his Greek. Both the labor and the pose of having labored are elements of identity performance that resonate with the particular construction and performance of Greek identity that prevailed in the Second Sophistic. It is also the case that such painstaking care with language is necessarily the result of a deep engagement with Greek literature, and is thus an exercise in *παιδεία*. In the following chapter, I turn to other aspects of *παιδεία* or learnedness as elements of Josephus' performance of Greek identity in the *CA*.

¹⁹⁴ Rajak 1983: 62.

Chapter 3

Josephus the Greek II: παιδεία and the *Against Apion*

Introduction

Because this chapter continues the line of argumentation introduced in Chapter 2, a minimal introduction will suffice. I will here explore Josephus' engagement with Greek παιδεία in the *CA* beyond his language. In section 1, I explore Josephus' deliberate display of his learnedness in Greek literature. In section 2, I turn to how he engages with the term παιδεία itself. Finally, in Section 3, I examine how Josephus frames various elements of the treatise within four ideological constructs that are Greek in origin. These include the reduction of the history of Greece/ethnic Greeks to the history of classical Greece, the philosophical critique of traditional Greek myths, the division of the known peoples of the world into Greeks and barbarians, and the willful ignoring of the intellectual achievements of Romans.

The context of the Second Sophistic remains the operative context in which to understand Josephus' writings as we examine elements of παιδεία in the *CA* apart from the Greek language. I will discuss some of these elements as in accord with trends specific to the authors of the Second Sophistic. Many of them, such as the critique of Greek myth, are in evidence throughout antiquity and cannot be said to be unique to the Second

Sophistic. They nevertheless have such a storied Greek literary pedigree that they serve as effective showpieces for Josephus' performance of identity as one of the *πεπαιδευμένοι*. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Second Sophistic did not emerge fully formed in the second century, but instead developed from trends in the Greek literature of the early imperial period.¹ Authors of the Second Sophistic (as in other periods) also had a deep interest in engagement with classical models and the classical past.² That is to say that the fact that Josephus uses motifs and constructs that are not unique to the Second Sophistic by no means invalidates my locating Josephus in the context of the Second Sophistic. On the contrary, Josephus resembles the *πεπαιδευμένοι* who are his contemporary literary peers precisely in this engagement with the Greek literary tradition. My analysis of the *CA* in both Chapters 2 and 3 reveals a performance of Greek identity by Josephus the sum of which is greater than the parts. For any individual element of the *CA* which I analyze in this chapter may not appear to constitute a smoking gun, so to speak, for my argument for Josephus' performance of identity as one of the *πεπαιδευμένοι*. But taken together with his Atticizing Greek (Chapter 2), all of these elements of the *CA* in concert constitute a performance of educated Greek identity on Josephus' part. As I have discussed, identity (its construction, and anxiety over its successful maintenance) was a concern which the authors of the Second Sophistic were keen to express. Josephus, I argue in this chapter, goes out of his way to present himself as one of the *πεπαιδευμένοι* through his display of his participation in Greek *παιδεία*.

¹ See Chapter 2, pp. 134–8.

² As I discuss in greater detail below, pp. 202–207.

In Chapter 2, I discussed only in brief how by Josephus' lifetime, Greekness had become in many instances a cultural, rather than an ethnic signifier, and was a concept often (but not always) abstracted from one's birth or ethnic group. Before I return to my analysis of the *CA*, I will offer a few words on how the institutions of Greek education or παιδεία specifically became such an important component of elite identity throughout the Mediterranean world. The topic of Greek (and Latin) educational theory is vast and does not need to be surveyed in depth here. Following Teresa Morgan's important 1998 study, I will restrict my focus to the literary aspects of Greek παιδεία, but my reason for doing so is that this is the field that is available for our analysis in the textual remains of the *CA*. The term παιδεία, of course, was used broadly to signify any aspect of education or upbringing (as Josephus himself uses the term at *CA* 2.171 (see pp. 198–9 below)) and was not limited to literature, rhetoric, or philosophy. We do not know whether Josephus himself ever made a habit of engaging in other aspects of παιδεία, such as training at the gymnasium, which would certainly have been perceived as a marker of cultural Greek elite male identity. If we are tempted to interpret his remarks at *AJ* 15.267–76 against the introduction of athletic contests (among other Greek institutions such as theaters) into the region of Judea by Herod the Great as evidence to the contrary, I hope that both the previous chapter and this one will convince the reader that Josephus' overt remarks against the institutions of and stereotypes about Greek culture do not necessarily correlate to his lived practice.³ Greek literate education, however, became a marker of and means of en-

³ Josephus claims that athletic contests were uncustomary and problematic in Judea. This stance has a history dating back to the Hellenistic period and features prominently in later accounts of the Maccabean revolt (e.g. 1 Maccabees 1.14, 2 Maccabees 4.12, 4 Maccabees 4.19–20). On the gymnasium as a hub for problematic innovation in 4 Maccabees, see Desilva 2007: 112.

trance into a Greek cultural identity for non-ethnic Greeks throughout the Hellenistic world, as Morgan describes at length.⁴ The primary elements of this education include not merely basic literacy in Greek, generally achieved via the study of alphabets, syllabaries, and the study of gnomic aphorisms and extracts from literature, but also the study of literature, in particular Homer, and, for the more advanced, grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy.⁵ The supreme importance of this type of education for all who hoped to have any influence or power over the civilized world was championed by educational theorists in both Greek and Latin. In the accounts of and by those who became the leading intellectuals of their days, the values of Greek παιδεία are everywhere on display. We would in fact expect a person of Josephus' elite social position to have access to and participate in Greek culture in this way. I will proceed throughout this chapter by analyzing Josephus' use of and participation in the elements of Greek learning and intellectual values that are touted by Greek intellectuals. As this analysis will show, Josephus was at pains to display his participation in Greek παιδεία, a display which constitutes a performative act of Greek elite identity.

Finally, before I begin section 1, I will remark that it is beyond the scope of this project to provide an exhaustive analysis of Josephus' engagement with Greek culture. Though in Chapter 1 I aimed to catalogue Josephus' statements of difference between Jews and Greeks with something approaching comprehensiveness, the *CA* is so replete with intertextuality with Greek literary texts and philosophical, historiographical, and

⁴ Morgan 1998: 76–89.

⁵ Morgan 1998: 50–73.

rhetorical tropes that I could not hope even to list each incidence. In fact, this very abundance of intertextuality, use of tropes, etc. only speaks to Josephus' thoroughness in his display of παιδεία. For such details, I will refer the reader to John Barclay's 2007 commentary on the *CA*, which is diligent in noting Josephus' prolific use of these features. For my purposes, I have selected elements of the *CA* that I believe would benefit from further analysis.

1. Josephus and παιδεία in the *CA*

Language was only one means of displaying Greek cultural identity for the πεπαιδευμένοι of the period of the Second Sophistic, albeit an important one. Education, or παιδεία, is closely related. The ability to Atticize one's Greek is closely bound up with an intimate knowledge of classical Greek literature and the ability to imitate it. The myriad references to other Hellenophone authors—archaic, classical, and Hellenistic—in the *CA* are best understood as functioning within the context of the conspicuous display of παιδεία constituting a marker of elite Greek cultural identity,⁶ in addition to each reference's immediate function for Josephus' argument.⁷ The status of the language and dialect of Homer, as well as Hellenistic authors, was a matter of controversy among the lexicographers of the Second Sophistic.⁸ We might compare, for instance, Phrynichus' relatively exacting standards with those of the Antiatticist, who included not only lyric poets

⁶ See Anderson 1993: 78–83 and Morgan 1998: 50–89.

⁷ See Schreckenberg 1996: 55–60 and Siegert 2008 Vol. 1: 20–48 for catalogues of Hellenophone authors mentioned in the *CA*.

⁸ See above discussion of the lexicographers, pp. 151–5 with bibliography. On the controversy over Homer, see Swain 1996: 55–6.

such as Sappho and Simonides, but Hellenistic authors such as Theophrastus and Theopompus as well.⁹ Thus Josephus' frequent engagement with non-classical, non-Attic authors does not inherently distance him from the ethos of the Second Sophistic. His criticism of authors ranging from Homer to Apion, even if he criticizes them on entirely different grounds from Phrynichus' proscriptions of the Greek of the Ἑλληνες, finds a place in the debates and controversies of the Second Sophistic. I will proceed with a discussion of Josephus' engagement with other Hellenophone authors as a display of learnedness (and thus a means of signaling one's Greek identity).

The Display of Learnedness

It is generally accepted that within the large number of Hellenophone authors cited by name in the *CA*, many are known to Josephus only through intermediary sources.¹⁰ While this fact may reflect the reality of Josephus' access to texts at Rome, it nevertheless ought not be counted as a mark against Josephus' accomplishments in Greek letters.¹¹ For the fact that he is able to "name-drop" relatively obscure Greek authors creates the impression of elite learning and sophistication, regardless of how and to what extent Josephus was acquainted with the authors in question.¹² That is to say, Josephus' name-drop-

⁹ Swain 1996: 53.

¹⁰ See Schreckenberg 1996: 55.

¹¹ As Schreckenberg remarks, neither Josephus' use of intermediary sources nor the fact that he mistakes the authors of some texts (notably, Hecataeus) significantly impedes our use of these authors for textual-critical purposes; Josephus' use and presentation of these authors conforms to his purposes in writing the *CA*, and are presented in serious terms. Schreckenberg 1996: 60.

¹² It is plausible that Josephus knew many of the authors he cites only through second hand sources. See Barclay's comments *passim*. We may compare Anderson 1976 on Lucian's superficial knowledge of many of the authors he cites.

ping is a performative act aimed at creating a specific effect for his reader: the appearance of learning is the performance; what underlies it is not strictly relevant to the performance itself. We must bear in mind both that even fairly superficial familiarity with literature was considered a mark of learning in the Hellenistic and imperial eras,¹³ and that the ability to recall names and other data that may appear trivial was also widely considered a marker of a sophisticated intellect from classical times onward. We thus have in Josephus' frequent display of named Greek authors (both the more mainstream and the more obscure) yet another instance of a performance of identity as one of the *πεπαιδευμένοι*. Within the broader context of the Second Sophistic, *παιδεία* was fundamentally associated with Greek practice.¹⁴ Its display signaled Greek identity.

Let us take as an example a passage I discussed in Chapter 1 (pp. 30–2), *CA* 1.16–18, which I will quote in full once again in order to allow the reader to observe the abundance of named Greek authors.

περίεργος δ' ἂν εἶην ἐγὼ τοὺς ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπισταμένους διδάσκων ὅσα μὲν Ἑλλάνικος Ἀκουσίλαῳ περὶ τῶν γενεαλογιῶν διαπεφώνηκεν, ὅσα δὲ διορθοῦται τὸν Ἡσίοδον Ἀκουσίλαος, ἢ τίνα τρόπον Ἐφορος μὲν Ἑλλάνικον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ψευδόμενον ἐπιδείκνυσιν, Ἐφορον δὲ Τίμαιος, καὶ Τίμαιον οἱ μετ' ἐκείνον γεγονότες, Ἡρόδοτον δὲ πάντες. (17) ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν Σικελικῶν τοῖς περὶ Ἀντίοχον καὶ Φίλιστον ἢ Καλλίαν Τίμαιος συμφωνεῖν ἡξίωσεν, οὐδ' αὖ περὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν οἱ τὰς Ἀτθίδας συγγεγραφότες ἢ περὶ τῶν Ἀργολικῶν οἱ τὰ περὶ Ἄργος ἱστοροῦντες ἀλλήλοις κατηκολουθήκασιν. (18) καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ βραχυτέρων, ὅπου γε περὶ τῆς Περσικῆς στρατείας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πραχθέντων οἱ δοκιμώτατοι διαπεφωνήκασιν; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης ὡς ψευδόμενος ὑπὸ τινων κατηγορεῖται, καίτοι δοκῶν ἀκριβεστάτην τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν.

¹³ See esp. Morgan 1998 esp. 74–79.

¹⁴ See, for instance, Philostratus *VS* 571.

It would be excessive if I tried to instruct those who know better than myself about how many ways Hellanicus differs from Acusilaus concerning the genealogies, or on how many points Acusilaus corrects Hesiod, or in what manner Ephorus shows how Hellanicus has falsified most things, as Timaeus does to Ephorus, and those who have come after him do to Timaeus, and everyone does to Herodotus. (17) Not even concerning Sicilian history did Timaeus deign to agree with Antiochus, Philistus, or Kallias;¹⁵ nor again have the Atthidographers followed one another on Athenian history nor have the historians of Argos concerning Argive history. (18) And why should I speak about the histories of individual cities and lesser histories, when even concerning the Persian invasion and the deeds that were done in it the most famous historians disagree? And even Thucydides has been accused of lying on many counts by some, even though he appears to have composed his account most accurately.

We thus observe that Josephus can name quite a few Greek historians (ten individuals in this passage). More than this, he can demonstrate knowledge of the historiographical disputes and debates in which they engaged, as well as generic distinctions within the tradition. The *praeteritio* in 1.18 further allows Josephus to showcase his awareness of “the histories of individual cities and lesser histories” while dismissing them as contradictory, creating the impression that he is extremely well versed in both the major works of the Greek historiographical tradition as well as in the minor local traditions of Greek cities. I have discussed the ways in which this passage constitutes a claim of difference between Greek and Jewish historiographical traditions in Chapter 1; it is also the case that the volume of names and genres displayed here serves Josephus’ self-presentation as one of the *πεπαιδευμένοι*.

Intertextuality

¹⁵ On the construction οἱ περί τινα as a periphrasis for the person, see LSJ C.I.2 and Dillery 2015: viii–ix n. 7 with bibliography.

In addition to the ubiquitous references to named Greek authors, Josephus also engages in more subtle displays of learnedness through intertextuality. Dillery has convincingly demonstrated that Josephus in critiquing Apion's *Aegyptiaka* at 2.2–28 also comments on Apion's work as a Homeric scholar, or γραμματικός.¹⁶ Dillery is surely correct in pointing out that Josephus' use of literary-critical terms (in the case of ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόην in reference to the dates of Homer and Pythagoras relative to Moses)¹⁷ and the scholarly technique of etymologizing (in the case of the dispute over the etymology of σάββατον) are efforts to highlight the eccentricity of the scholar in order to undermine his historical claims about Jews. They also function as a display of Josephus' ability to play the role of the literary critic.

In a related fashion, Josephus also puts his learning on display through the use of an allusion to Thucydides. Let us consider the second half of *CA* 1.15. In an aggressively-toned assertion of the lack of truth to be found in Greek accounts of ancient history, Josephus claims:

ἢ τίς οὐ παρ' αὐτῶν ἂν τῶν συγγραφέων μάθοι ῥαδίως, ὅτι μηδὲν βεβαίως εἰδότες συνέγραφον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἵκαζον; τὸ πλεῖον γοῦν διὰ τῶν βιβλίων ἀλλήλους ἐλέγχουσι καὶ τὰναντιώτατα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι.

Who wouldn't easily learn from their authors that they composed knowing nothing securely, but that they each formed their own conjectures about events? Why, for the most part they refute one another by their books and do not hesitate to say the most contradictory things about the same things.

¹⁶ Dillery 2003.

¹⁷ Josephus also uses the phrase ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόην at *CA* 1.7 and 2.154 (in addition to 2.14), as well as at *AJ* 2.348 and 18.243.

The significance of the verb εἰκάζον should not be underestimated as a statement about Josephus' concept of Greek historiographical methods. Let us first note that Josephus is correct in his claim that Greek historians of early Greek history formed conclusions about historical events based on meager evidence (as opposed to the method Josephus advocates of retelling an authoritative ancient document). The verb in fact appears in Thucydides at 1.9.4 in a statement referring precisely to his own method of coping with the available evidence to draw conclusions about Greek pre-history. After using Homer as the sole evidence for Agamemnon's forces during the Trojan War, and acknowledging the possibility that Homer provides only problematic evidence, Thucydides concludes the discussion with the remark: εἰκάζειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ στρατείᾳ οἷα ἦν τὰ πρὸ αὐτῆς. ("It is necessary to conjecture based on this expedition of what sort were those predating it.") One may also recall Thucydides' infamously difficult methodological statements about his use of speeches and eyewitness accounts at 1.22. Though the verb εἰκάζω never appears in this section, what Thucydides describes can readily be characterized as a process involving conjecture, namely, ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἔμοι ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν.

I will not press the point that Josephus necessarily has Thucydides 1.22 in mind in the words discussed thus far, but in the final clause of the section (καὶ τάναντιώτατα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι) Josephus comes close to the word choice of Thuc. 1.22.3, where Thucydides describes the difficulty of writing an accurate history of the war based on eyewitness accounts of events (ἐπιπόνως δὲ ἠύρισκοντο, διότι οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις

ἐκάστοις οὐ ταῦτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ...).¹⁸ An accurate account is difficult because witnesses do not give the same account (οὐ ταῦτὰ) about the same events (περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν). In other words, Thucydides expresses the idea that lack of consensus among sources is a barrier to historical truth. Josephus, of course, depends upon precisely this premise for the broader thrust of his argument, but has broadened the scope and the stakes, for he sees this lack of consensus writ large throughout the entire Greek historiographical tradition and as one of its chief flaws. The tone and the purpose of Josephus' τάναντιώτατα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι are of course very different from Thucydides, but we can see that Josephus has substituted οὐ ταῦτὰ with τάναντιώτατα, expressing the same basic concept (non-agreement), but choosing the superlative form of a positive adjective, thus drawing attention to the extreme level of disagreement which he wishes to present to the reader. That this passage constitutes a verbal echo is felt most strongly in the phrase περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν accompanied by a form of λέγω.

If my analysis is correct and the final clause of 1.15 contains an allusion to Thucydides, Josephus has composed this passage with an attention to the details of word choice from within the Greek historiographical tradition. We thus observe how language and knowledge of the literary canon are not really separate elements of παιδεία. The passage is immediately followed in 1.16–18 by the veritable catalogue of Greek historians discussed above who, according to Josephus, the Greeks themselves claim contradict one another in succession not only on matters of ancient history, but on contemporary history as well. To cap this list of examples supporting the point of 1.15 b (Greek non-

¹⁸ Ephorus in a similar vein comments on the difficulty inherent to preserving accurate historical details over time. *FGrHist* F 9.

consensus), Josephus writes at 1.18: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης ὡς ψευδόμενος ὑπὸ τινῶν κατηγορεῖται, καίτοι δοκῶν ἀκριβεστάτην τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν. (“And even Thucydides has been accused of lying on many counts by some, even though he appears to have composed his account most accurately.”) As I’ve already stated, the catalogue itself constitutes a display of Josephus’ learnedness in the Greek historiographical tradition. Thucydides’ privileged final position in this list, and moreover Josephus’ overt statement that Thucydides wrote what is regarded as the most accurate of contemporary histories, show Josephus’ agreement with the general (but clearly not unanimous) consensus among Greek critics of Thucydides’ preeminence among all ancient historians. That Josephus has used the language which Thucydides uses to mark his own methodological difficulties in arriving at an accurate account in order to express Josephus’ idea of the greater and more damning failure of the entire genre as a truth procedure showcases his ability to compete with the best of the Greeks on their own terms. Moreover, such imitation of classical (and particularly Attic) models is yet another facet of identity performance for the elite Greek intellectual.

Rhetoric

The topic of rhetoric in the *CA* has received considerable attention from Barclay 2007.¹⁹ I will avoid merely repeating Barclay’s many observations about Josephus’ considerable debt to Greek rhetorical practice in the *CA*.²⁰ I will, however, remark here that

¹⁹ See also the brief summary in Goodman 1999: 53–4.

²⁰ See Barclay’s remarks on Josephus’ rhetoric. Barclay 2007 *passim*.

the *CA* is composed with a sustained metaphor of forensic oratory, which is particularly evident in Josephus' frequent descriptions of the authors he quotes throughout his argument as his witnesses (μάρτυρες).²¹ This metaphor is significant as well given the primacy of oratory as a site of the performance and contestation of identity during the Second Sophistic.²² Here the controversial label "Second Sophistic" drives home the importance of rhetoric, as Philostratus observes this phenomenon as one that happens among rhetors. While Josephus was by no means a rhetor, to our knowledge, nor does he describe ever receiving formal rhetorical training, nor giving declamations, his speeches in his historical works certainly evince mastery in rhetorical composition.²³ This suggests strongly that Josephus was a participant in this supremely important element of elite education and identity in the imperial Greek world.

In order to demonstrate how Josephus self-consciously engages with the tradition of Greek oratory, I will offer as a case study an analysis of a brief passage from Josephus' introduction to his critique of Apion. Following a description of Apion's allegedly poor style (and matching character), Josephus remarks at *CA* 2.4:

ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἄνοιαν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων
 ἀλίσκονται λόγων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν μετὰ τινος σπουδῆς γεγραμμένων, καὶ
 χαίρουσι μὲν ταῖς λαιδορίαις, ἄχθονται δὲ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις, ἀναγκαῖον
 ἡγησάμην εἶναι μηδὲ τοῦτον ἀνεξέταστον καταλιπεῖν κατηγορίαν ἡμῶν
 ἄντικρυς ὡς ἐν δίκῃ γεγραφότα.

²¹ The μάρτυς metaphor is also common in historiography; Josephus uses it in his historical works as well, e.g. *AJ* 13.250. On the close relationship between historiography and forensic oratory, see esp. Woodman 1988: 83–98.

²² Whitmarsh 2005: 23–40, though note Brunt's general exclusion of forensic oratory from his definition of "sophistic" during this period, as well as his remarks on the lack of uniformity in what types of oratory ancient authors used the term to describe. Brunt 1994: 30–3.

²³ See Almagor 2016.

But since the majority of humankind, because of their own foolishness, are won over by such words instead of by those written with any seriousness, and take pleasure in insults but are irritated by praise, I considered it necessary not to leave the accusation against us untested which he wrote openly as if in a lawsuit.

Barclay's commentary on this passage is helpful in pointing out how Josephus' overt framing of his critique of Apion as a response to a lawsuit allows him to "respond with all the tricks of the court-room, including exaggeration, appeals to emotion, and (particularly) *ethos*-assaults on his 'accuser.'"²⁴ Barclay is of course correct that Josephus' rebuttal to Apion (2.2–144) is particularly dense with the rhetorical devices which typify forensic oratory, as well as with legal terms (such as κατηγορία). There is more to be said about this passage, however. Josephus gives his audience a glimpse of the man behind the curtain, so to speak. For Josephus shifts from a metaphor of forensic oratory to a simile in his description of Apion's alleged derogatory remarks, which have prompted his response, with the phrase ὥς ἐν δίκῃ.²⁵ The phrase follows logically from the adverb ἄντικρυς²⁶: it is the baldness of the charge that makes it resemble a prosecution speech. Josephus' response will be a response in kind. We may further note (as Barclay does) that Josephus' phrase χαίρουσι μὲν ταῖς λαιδορίαις, ἄχθονται δὲ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις is an allusion to Demosthenes' *De Cor.* 3 (ἕτερον δέ, ὃ φύσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει, τῶν μὲν λαιδοριῶν καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἀκούειν ἡδέως, τοῖς ἐπαινοῦσι δ' αὐτοὺς ἄχθεσθαι). Josephus begins Book 2 by framing it both as a continuation of Book 1 (which he summarizes

²⁴ Barclay 2007: 172 n. 18.

²⁵ The phrase is without parallel in extant ancient Greek literature.

²⁶ Barclay appears to have omitted this adverb from his translation.

in 2.1) and also as a new entity (2.2: ἄρξομαι δὲ νῦν ...). Proemic elements such as an address to Epaphroditus in 2.1 and a statement of purpose in 2.2 further frame the opening of Book 2 as a beginning. And like Demosthenes, Josephus is signaling to his audience near the beginning of his defense against his opponent's charges his belief that he is at a rhetorical disadvantage in the eyes of his audience in this particular way. We thus observe a pattern in Josephus' intertextual engagement with Apion, Thucydides, and Demosthenes: Josephus can don and doff whatever Greek literary hat suits his current purpose in each portion of his argument, and as a means of displaying his παιδεία in sophisticated and subtle ways. It is also here that the performative element of Josephus' self-presentation is particularly apparent: he virtually engages in a form of ἡθοποιία as he adopts each literary persona in turn. At 2.4, Josephus is drawing his audience's attention to the fact that he can play the part of the rhetor, at least in written composition. With the simile ὡς ἐν δίκῃ, he likewise tips his hand and reveals the artificiality of his oratorical pose.

2. Talking About παιδεία

In the atmosphere of competitive display of learnedness of the imperial period, explicit discussions of learning and education are also ubiquitous.²⁷ I will here analyze some of Josephus' explicit remarks about learning, beginning with his use of the term παιδεία, in order to draw out what παιδεία means to Josephus, whether he conceives of it as a fundamentally Greek institution, and how he positions himself in relation to it.

²⁷ See Morgan 1998.

Josephus uses the term παιδεία six times in the *CA*.²⁸ It is striking that four of these six usages occur specifically in the context of interactions or encounters (particularly of a literary variety) between Greeks and non-Greeks, or non-Greeks and the Greek-speaking world. This is certainly the case with Josephus' respective introductions of Manetho and Berossus.²⁹ At 1.73, Josephus writes:

Μάνεθως δ' ἦν τὸ γένος Αἰγύπτιος, ἀνὴρ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς μετεσχηκῶς παιδείας, ὥς δῆλός ἐστιν· γέγραφεν γὰρ Ἑλλάδι φωνῇ τὴν πάτριον ἱστορίαν ἔκ τε τῶν ἱερῶν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, μεταφράσας ...

Manetho was an Egyptian by γένος, a man who had a share in Greek παιδεία, as is evident. For he has written his ancestral history in the Greek language, translating, as he himself says, from the sacred [books] ...³⁰

Only here in the *CA* is παιδεία qualified by the adjective Ἑλληνική, which serves to create a contrast with Αἰγύπτιος, thus drawing attention to a disparity of sorts between Manetho's ethnicity or birth (τὸ γένος) and his education, which is unambiguously Greek. It is worth noting that for Josephus, Manetho's participation in Greek παιδεία is evident primarily in his use of the Greek language, and in his knowledge of Herodotus (not quoted here).³¹ We may, perhaps, detect overtones of Isocrates' *Panegyricus* 50 (... καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἑλλήνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδείας τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.) in both the phrase μετέχω τῆς παιδείας/παιδείσεως (with their respective

²⁸ These occur at 1.21, 1.73, 1.129, 1.181, 2.46, and 2.171.

²⁹ On whom see esp. Dillery 2015 with extensive bibliography.

³⁰ On the textual trouble in this passage, see Gutschmid 1893: 420 and Siegert 2008: 109.

³¹ See Barclay 2007 n. 290. Barclay remarks that Manetho's acculturation was likely more extensive than Josephus acknowledges, given his position in the Ptolemaic court.

modifiers Ἑλληνικῆς/τῆς ἡμετέρας) as well as in the division between birth or origin (τὸ γένος/τοῦ γένους; τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως) and learning (τῆς παιδείας/τῆς διανοίας; τῆς παιδεύσεως). Such an allusion would underscore Josephus' presentation of παιδεία as constitutive of Greek identity.³²

Similarly, 1.129, in his introduction of Berossus, Josephus writes:

μάρτυς δὲ τούτων Βηρῶσος, ἀνὴρ Χαλδαῖος μὲν τὸ γένος, γνῶριμος δὲ τοῖς περὶ παιδείαν ἀναστρεφόμενοις, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τε ἀστρονομίας καὶ περὶ τῶν παρὰ Χαλδαίοις φιλοσοφουμένων αὐτὸς εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐξήνεγκε τὰς συγγραφάς.

Our witness to these matters is Berossus, a Chaldean man by γένος, but well known to those who are devoted to παιδεία, since he himself has published his prose writings on astronomy and on the Chaldeans' philosophies for the Greeks.

The similarity in the basic syntax of these extracts of 1.73 and 1.129 suggest that these introductions are, for Josephus, programmatic.³³ As with Manetho, Josephus has begun his introduction of Berossus with an ethnic identifier which he directly contrasts with the author's status in relation to παιδεία. Josephus thus highlights that for both of these men, γένος and παιδεία belong to separate categories. Whereas for Manetho, Josephus created this contrast between ethnicity and παιδεία by the use of the ethnic qualifier Ἑλληνική, in Berossus' case, Josephus uses a μὲν ... δέ construction to create the contrast, leaving παιδεία unqualified. Yet the fact that an unqualified παιδεία is contrasted with Berossus' identity as a man Χαλδαῖος ... τὸ γένος only underscores that for Josephus, παιδεία is here fundamentally Greek. This is predicated on the fact that Berossus' audience (those

³² See my remarks on *Pan.* 50 in Ch. 2, p. 125, n. 49.

³³ Cf. Gutschmid 1893: 490–1.

among whom his work has become known) are explicitly identified as Greeks (“Ελληνας). Thus παιδεία does not represent, for Josephus, “learnedness” in a universal sense, since he explicitly mentions Berossus’ attainments in astronomy and Chaldean “philosophy,” which on their own would surely mark Berossus as accomplished in non-Greek learning, learning παρὰ Χαλδαίοις.

Yet a further instance occurs at 2.46, where Josephus describes the translation of the Septuagint in the context of his assertions that Alexandrian Jews were held in high regard by their Macedonian rulers. Josephus writes:

ἔπεμψε γοῦν ἀξιῶν ἄνδρας ἀποσταλῆναι τοὺς ἐρμηνεύσοντας αὐτῷ τὸν νόμον, καὶ τοῦ γραφῆναι ταῦτα καλῶς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐπέταξεν οὐ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ Δημήτριον τὸν Φαληρέα καὶ Ἀνδρέαν καὶ Ἀριστεά, τὸν μὲν παιδεία τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν διαφέροντα Δημήτριον ...

(Ptolemy II Philadelphus) certainly sent asking that they dispatch men to translate for him the law, and he tasked with the charge of writing it beautifully not just anyone, but he appointed to this task Demetrius of Phalerum, Andreas, and Aristes, since Demetrius excelled his contemporaries in παιδεία...

It is Josephus’ description of Demetrius that is of particular interest here: his status as a leading intellectual of his day can hardly be doubted, nor can the fact that, as an Athenian of Greek learning, Demetrius’ παιδεία is understood as fundamentally Greek.³⁴ He is certainly dispatched to Judea as an outsider to the Jewish scriptures, and by extension, Jewish learning.

Another example occurs at 1.180–1. In the context of assertions that Greeks not only knew of the existence of Jews, but even admired them, Josephus quotes from

³⁴ Barclay remarks that Josephus follows the *Letter of Aristes* in its incorrect description of the relationship between Demetrius and Philadelphus. Barclay 2007: 194.

Clearchus of Soli,³⁵ who recounts an anecdote attributed to Aristotle about a Jewish man whom he had encountered.

οὗτος οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιξενούμενός τε πολλοῖς καὶ τῶν ἄνω τόπων εἰς
τοὺς ἐπιθαλαττίους ὑποκαταβαίνων Ἑλληνικὸς ἦν οὐ τῇ διαλέκτῳ μόνον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ τότε διατριβόντων ἡμῶν περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν
παραβαλὼν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους ἄνθρωπος ἐντυγχάνει ἡμῖν τε καὶ τισιν
ἐτέροις τῶν σχολαστικῶν πειρώμενος αὐτῶν τῆς σοφίας. ὥς δὲ πολλοῖς
τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ συνφκείωτο παρεδίδου τι μᾶλλον ὧν εἶχεν.

And this man, who both was entertained by many and who used to come down from the inland regions to the seaside, was Greek not only in his language, but also in his soul. And while we were staying in Asia at that time, the man came to the same places, met us and some other scholarly men, and put their wisdom to the test. But since he had been spending time with many men of παιδεία, he, rather (than we),³⁶ imparted something of his learning.

It is the Jewish man's regular association with men ἐν παιδείᾳ, who appear not to be Jewish, that has made him so learned as to be able to instruct the likes of Aristotle.³⁷ Even if the content of the Jew's wisdom (though unspecified in the anecdote) could derive from his Jewish cultural background,³⁸ Clearchus emphasizes that his socialization with learned men was a pre-condition for this ability.³⁹ Clearchus, of course, does not specify

³⁵ See Ch. 2, p. 112 n. 16 for general bibliography on Clearchus. Bar Kochva 2010: 40–89 gives a detailed analysis of this episode.

³⁶ On the translation of μᾶλλον in the absolute sense (“rather”) instead of comparative (“more than”), see Bar Kochva 2010: 50.

³⁷ See Barclay 2007 n. 604. Barclay asserts that these learned men are Greeks. The expression ἐν παιδείᾳ is not common in classical texts (though it does occur at Plato *Rep.* 519c); it is much more widely attested in the Septuagint and in imperial literature, including Lucian (e.g. *Pseudologista* 3.1), Cassius Dio, Aelius Aristides, and even Ephesians 6:4. Clearchus' use of the phrase is thus a relatively early exemplum.

³⁸ Bar Kochva argues compellingly against this possibility. Bar Kochva 2010: 49–53.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

that these men ἐν παιδείᾳ are Greeks, or that this παιδεία itself is necessarily Greek.⁴⁰ We might assume that because Clearchus himself is a Greek intellectual, his understanding of παιδεία would necessarily privilege Greek learning. We should be cautious of this reading, however, precisely because Clearchus is apparently keen to discuss an instance of Greeks (namely, Aristotle), having something to learn from a non-Greek (which indeed fits Josephus' broader agenda in the *CA*). Nevertheless, this παιδεία is best understood as being fundamentally Greek on other grounds. Clearchus' Aristotle describes this Jew as Ἑλληνικός not only in his language, but in his soul. This description not only follows, but, as Barclay argues, is predicated upon the description of this man's regular interactions with others (ἐπιξενούμενός τε πολλοῖς καὶ τῶν ἄνω τόπων εἰς τοὺς ἐπιθαλαττίους ὑποκαταβαίνων), which is the cause of what happens in the following clause: ὥς δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν ἐν παιδείᾳ συνωκείωτο. In other words, it is the Jewish man's association with these men of παιδεία that has made him Greek in both language and soul. Bar Kochva accordingly argues that Clearchus is not attempting to present his reader with "Jewish or Oriental wisdom," and is not so much concerned with the Jew's wisdom as with his deeds, the "great and marvelous endurance of the Jewish man in daily life and his self-control," (πολλὴν καὶ θαυμάσιον καρτερίαν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ) which Josephus mentions at 1.182 but declines to excerpt.⁴¹

Of course, Clearchus' use of the term παιδεία here is not necessarily reflective of

⁴⁰ Though Bar Kochva considers this point self-evident. Bar Kochva draws attention to the fact that the coastal regions of Asia Minor which this Jew is described as visiting would include, of course, Ionia, a major center of Greek intellectual culture, especially in the period before the Alexandrian conquest, which is the period in which Clearchus' dialogue is set. Bar Kochva 2010: 46 n. 21. See also *Ibid.* 47–9 for arguments against the historicity of Clearchus' report.

⁴¹ See n. 38 above.

Josephus' own views, given that this passage is certainly a direct quotation (Josephus introduces the passage with the phrase ἔστι δὲ οὕτω γεγραμμένον). But Josephus has chosen to quote precisely this passage, while summarizing the content of other sections of Clearchus' work in 1.182, and even referring the reader to the original work. In other words, Josephus' use of direct quotation is marked and not an obvious or necessary decision on his part. He has chosen to use the passage to support his own argument, and expressed explicit approval of its content. We can thus infer that he is at least largely in agreement with its terms.⁴²

Another use of the term παιδεία occurs at 1.21. Here, the context is different from the above four passages. In the course of arguing that inconsistencies or disagreements across the Greek historiographical tradition are caused by the lack of official public records among Greeks, Josephus states: οὐ γὰρ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν ἡμελήθη τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀναγραφάς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οὓς αὐτόχθονας εἶναι λέγουσιν καὶ παιδείας ἐπιμελεῖς, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον εὐρίσκεται γινόμενον ... ("For not only among the rest of the Greeks were matters concerning records neglected, but not even among the Athenians, who they say are autochthonous and attentive to παιδεία, is any such thing discovered to have occurred ..."). Whether παιδεία in this passage is specifically a Greek phenomenon is more ambiguous than in the passages above, since Josephus does not qualify the term, or terms for other traits, with ethnic signifiers. The relative

⁴² We may also note that this passage accords with a phenomenon described by Momigliano: to speak of Jews as sages, as purveyors of ancient wisdom to the Greek world, is itself in accordance with Greek expectations of Near Eastern peoples. Josephus' assertions of the priority (and attendant superiority) of Jewish historiography, constitution, and philosophy are of course at the core of the argument of the *CA*; they also serve generally to locate him within Greek frameworks of the intellectual geography of the known world. See Momigliano 1975: 86.

clause carries the implication that one would expect a people (namely the Athenians) who are (at least according to their own myths) autochthonous (and would therefore have inhabited their land for a considerable length of time) and particularly concerned with παιδεία to have kept better records than Athens has actually done. Thus, Josephus casts a hint of doubt on whether the Athenians' reputation for παιδεία is warranted.⁴³ This doubt is in keeping with the sentiment found in 1.6 and 1.58, passages which frame the section on historiographical criticism, namely, that historiographical superiority is the province of Greek historians. In a similar vein, autochthony and παιδεία are believed (by whoever the subject of λέγουσιν is supposed to be) to be attributes of Athenians, but if careful record-keeping is the expected outcome of these characteristics, then we might expect that Josephus would attribute both traits rather to Egyptians, Babylonians, and Jews (though not autochthony, in the case of the Jews), whose traditions of official records are described at 1.28–41. The implication is rather that the Athenians' reputation for both autochthony and learning is suspect. The fact that Josephus claims that the Athenians are known for their attention to παιδεία also implies that for Josephus, παιδεία is fundamentally associated not only with Greeks, but specifically with Athens.

For the final occurrence of the term at 2.171, Josephus uses παιδεία with something of a different sense than in his earlier uses: here it is not fundamentally Greek. Beginning at 2.146, he has shifted in both the structure of his argument and the tone as he moves to his discussion of the teachings of Moses and the πολιτεία of the Jews.⁴⁴ Within

⁴³ We might also here suspect that Josephus implies skepticism of the Athenian myth of autochthony.

⁴⁴ Barclay 2007 esp. 242–7.

this discussion of πολιτεία, Josephus turns the focus midway through 2.171 toward education: δύο μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἀπάσης παιδείας τρόποι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη κατασκευῆς, ὧν ὁ μὲν λόγῳ διδασκαλικὸς, ἄτερος δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀσκήσεως τῶν ἡθῶν. (“Now, there are two modes of all possible παιδεία and preparation in matters concerning customs, one of which is instruction in theory, while the other involves the training of habits.”) He goes on to compare classical Greek education systems unfavorably to that created by Moses, making it clear that here at any rate, Josephus does not use the term παιδεία to signify something that is fundamentally Greek, but that it is explicitly something which Lacedaemonians, Cretans, Athenians, and Jews all practice to varying degrees and with varying outcomes.⁴⁵ The qualifier ἀπάσης signals that he has departed from his normal usage. It thus appears that while Josephus presents παιδεία as fundamentally Greek before 2.171, he reinterprets it in the final half of Book 2. This is in keeping with the larger themes of the treatise, as discussed in Chapter 1: historiography was alleged to be the province of the Greeks, but Josephus systematically dismantles this view, concluding at 1.58 that the βάρβαροι, rather than the Greeks, are the true practitioners of history. We also see Josephus applying other ideologically charged terms to non-Greek peoples (φιλοσοφία, σωφροσύνη, σοφία).

As a final point, it is striking that the term παιδεία occurs with such frequency in connection with the translation of sacred texts of non-Greek cultures into Greek (i.e. at 1.73 1.129, and 2.46), as it reveals that such a literary endeavor is, to Josephus’ mind, fundamentally an exercise in Greek παιδεία. And this activity is precisely how Josephus

⁴⁵ Cf. Josephus’ παρ’ ἡμῖν παιδείαν at *AJ* 20.263.

understands the composition of the *AJ*. Compare in particular Josephus' description of Manetho's activity at 1.73 (γέγραφεν γὰρ Ἑλλάδι φωνῇ τὴν πάτριον ἱστορίαν ἐκ τε τῶν ἱερῶν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, μεταφράσας) with his own descriptions of the composition of the *AJ* at *CA* 1.1 (πεντακισχιλίων ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν ἱστορίαν περιέχουσιν ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἱερῶν βιβλίων διὰ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς συνεγραψάμην.) and 1.54 (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαιολογίαν, ὥσπερ ἔφην, ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων μεθερμήνευκα γεγονώς ἱερεὺς ἐκ γένους καὶ μετεσχηκὼς τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς γράμμασι·).⁴⁶ Josephus thus emphasizes that he translated (μεταφράσας, μεθερμήνευκα) from sacred texts (ἐκ τε τῶν ἱερῶν; ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἱερῶν βιβλίων; ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων) into the Greek language (Ἑλλάδι φωνῇ; διὰ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φωνῆς). This similarity in Josephus' understanding of the nature of the composition of the *AJ* to his presentation of the composition of the *Aegyptiaka*, the *Babyloniaka*, and the Septuagint imply that he views his own composition of the *AJ* as fundamentally an exercise in Greek παιδεία, even if he does not apply the term παιδεία to himself at 1.1. and 1.54.⁴⁷ He thus presents himself as bicultural, Jewish by birth, with a share of (or a participant in) Greek παιδεία, and accordingly, as one of the πεπαιδευμένοι.⁴⁸ It would seem that Josephus' understanding of the *AJ* (and specifically, the fact that it comprises sacred scriptures in "translation") as an exercise in Greek

⁴⁶ Barclay notes the similarities in presentation between Josephus' description of Manetho at 1.73 and of the *AJ* at 1.1 (Barclay 2007: 51 n. 292). Compare also Josephus' descriptions of the work in the proem of the *AJ* itself, at *AJ* 1.5 (ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν προεγκεχειρίσμαι πραγματείαν νομίζων ἅπασιν φανεῖσθαι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἄξιαν σπουδῆς· μέλλει γὰρ περιέξειν ἅπασαν τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχαιολογίαν καὶ διάταξιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐκ τῶν Ἑβραϊκῶν μεθερμηνευμένην γραμμάτων.) Note in particular the emphasis on τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν as the intended audience (cf. on Berossus, *CA* 1.129). For my remarks on the audience of the *AJ*, see Teets 2013: 103–5.

⁴⁷ See also my remarks on the *AJ* as part of the tradition of the "rewritten Bible," in Chapter 2, p. 106, n. 5.

⁴⁸ Josephus describes one segment of his audience for the *BJ* in similar terms at *CA* 1.51, but uses the term σοφία: ... πολλοῖς δὲ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐπίτρασκον, ἀνδράσι καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σοφίας μετεσχηκόσιν...

παιδεία may condition his reaction of surprise that some segment of his audience (who are learned in Greek παιδεία themselves) have not had more respect for the *AJ*.

3. Greek Ideological Constructs and Literary Themes

The second half of this chapter concerns four ideological constructs and literary themes which Josephus uses in the framework of his arguments and which I introduced at the beginning of this chapter. This is by no means a comprehensive account of Greek constructs and themes in the *CA*, for which I will refer the reader to Barclay's thorough treatment.⁴⁹ The four that I discuss here are topics which are both representative of Josephus' practice and which warrant further analysis regarding their function vis-à-vis Josephus' performance of Greek identity. As I described in the introduction to this chapter, Josephus' deployment of these four themes (the reduction of the Greek past to its classical past at the expense of other eras and the present, the philosophical critique of Greek myth, the division of the peoples of the known world into Greeks and barbarians, and the ignoring of Roman cultural achievements) is emblematic of his self-representation as one of the πεπαιδευμένοι, as each of them is either part of a shared currency among the authors of the Second Sophistic (that is to say, the πεπαιδευμένοι of Josephus' day), or locates Josephus within the Greek literary tradition, or both. In this way, and as I will demonstrate for each of them, Josephus' engagement with these themes and constructs is a component of his performance of Greek identity.

⁴⁹ Barclay 2007.

The Greek Past

The construction of Greek cultural identity during the Second Sophistic frequently involved both a revisionism and revitalization of the classical Greek past.⁵⁰ This trend was not limited to the literary production of the Second Sophistic. It can be witnessed in phenomena ranging from the musealization of the classical cities of Athens, Sparta, and Delphi with their concomitant tourist economies and the creation and performance of an idealized version of their respective pasts,⁵¹ to Hadrian's creation of the Panhellenion,⁵² to the classicizing building projects in Athens of Herodes Atticus, whose prominent role as a sophist is inextricably linked to his conspicuous display of material wealth at Athens. As in the literary realm, these trends in the physical landscapes of Greek cities, while they may have reached their peak in the second century, especially under Hadrian, had nevertheless begun with the early principate and were well underway by the Flavian era.⁵³ In the literary realm of the Second Sophistic, authors pointedly created a Greek cultural identity grounded in an idealized Greece that was by then a half-millennium past. This identity was also varied, and constructed in manners specific to the purposes of each individual author. Engagement with the classical past, like the Attic dialect, became an element of identity formation and contestation, and was open to appropriation by non-

⁵⁰ Swain 1996: esp. 65–100.

⁵¹ On the cultural status of Athens during the Imperial period, see Oliver 1981. On Sparta, see Cartledge and Spawforth 1989. On Delphi, see Jacquemin 1999.

⁵² See Spawforth and Walker 1985, Romeo 2002.

⁵³ Such building projects were, of course, a response to the widespread destruction in Greece from the time of Sulla and the Roman civil war (much of which was fought in Greece), but in Athens in particular involved a pointed re-writing of the classical past, as is evident in Augustus' relocation of temples to the city center. See Swain 1996: 74–5.

ethnic Greeks.⁵⁴

This trend is also in evidence in the *CA*. Let us turn to Josephus' comparison of constitutions and encomium of Mosaic Law, which is found at 2.145–286. I will show how Josephus compares an idealized version of the Jewish constitution with not only idealized, but distinctly classicizing and revisionist versions of famous Greek constitutions while largely sidestepping the political realities of contemporary imperial Greece. Josephus frames his discussion of comparative constitutions as a comparison of lawgivers (νομοθέται) and their respective virtue (ἀρετή at 153) and conceptions of the divine. It is in part Josephus' focus on the νομοθέται and the origins of constitutions that steers him toward classical and pre-classical semi-mythical figures. But this does not wholly account for his depiction of Greek πολιτεῖαι, as he presents (in particular) both Athenian and Spartan laws as static and unchanging; nor does he acknowledge the historical reasons for their demise (the loss of autonomy following Macedonian and subsequent Roman expansion). This focus on origins and lawgivers does, however, largely explain Josephus' first brief point of comparison of Greek and Jewish πολιτεῖαι. Josephus compares Greek νομοθέται with Moses at 2.154:

Λυκοῦργοι γὰρ καὶ Σόλωνες καὶ Ζάλευκος ὁ τῶν Λοκρῶν καὶ πάντες οἱ θαυμαζόμενοι παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐχθὲς δὴ καὶ πρόην ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον παραβαλλόμενοι φαίνονται γεγονότες ...

For the Lycurguses and the Solons and Zaleucus (the lawgiver of the Locrians) and all of those admired among the Greeks seem to have been born yesterday or the day before when compared with him ...

This initial claim concerns antiquity, and echoes Josephus' claim at 1.7 that all achieve-

⁵⁴ Swain 1996:7.

ments of the Greek world are recent in comparison with the Jews' and others' achievements.⁵⁵ Athens and Sparta are given immediate prominence, as their respective law-givers need no introduction for Josephus' audience, which Zaleucus apparently does, presumably because his story is more obscure.

Josephus returns to a much lengthier comparison of Greek and Jewish πολιτεῖαι beginning at 2.220, where Josephus discusses how, even at the level of ideals and philosophical imagination, Moses surpasses the best of the Greeks, Plato.⁵⁶ As I discussed in Chapter 1, Josephus makes some significant claims of difference between Spartans and Jews: at 2.225–35, Josephus remarks that Lycurgus and the Spartans have won widespread praise because they persevered in their laws longer than others (τὴν Σπάρτην ἅπαντες ὕμνουσιν, ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐνεκαρτέρησαν at 225).⁵⁷ His presentation of the duration of the Spartan πολιτεία as the primary source of its acclaim (which is certainly attested)⁵⁸ allows him to make the claim that the Jewish πολιτεία, which is far older, is also of a significantly longer duration (2.226).⁵⁹ This allows Josephus at 2.227 to claim that the Spartans adhered to their own laws so long as they maintained their political autonomy, but “when they experienced changes of fortune, they forgot nearly all of their laws.” (καὶ προσέτι λογιζέσθωσαν, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν, ὅσον ἐφ'

⁵⁵ See my discussion of the phrase ἐχθὲς καὶ πρῶην above, p. 185.

⁵⁶ See discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 80–6.

⁵⁷ See Barclay 2007 301 n. 922 and Siegert 2008 Vol.1: 204 on the textual issue with ἐνεκαρτέρησαν. Herod the Great and his court, according to Josephus, were among the admirers of Sparta (see *BJ* 1.515)

⁵⁸ For example, Polybius 6.10–11, Cicero *Flac.* 63, Plutarch *Lyc.* 29.1, 6.

⁵⁹ A comparison of the traditional Jewish and Spartan systems of education has precedent. Momigliano remarks that it is implicit in Hecataeus of Abdera. Momigliano 1975: 84.

ἐαυτῶν χρόνον εἶχον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἀκριβῶς ἔδοξαν τοὺς νόμους διαφυλάττειν, ἐπεὶ μέντοι περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐγένοντο μεταβολαὶ τῆς τύχης, μικροῦ δεῖν ἀπάντων ἐπελάθοντο τῶν νόμων.) Barclay remarks that 2.227 creates a marked contrast with the Jewish perseverance in the face of reversals described in 2.228, but also that Josephus describes the alleged fickleness of the Lacedaemoneans regarding their laws in terms that are deliberately vague: it is in fact difficult to isolate a single and final instance of Spartan loss of hegemony that can be said to coincide with a final abandonment of traditional law.⁶⁰ Moreover, Barclay notes that Spartan law both changed over time and experienced periods of revival throughout the Hellenistic and Imperial periods.⁶¹ In fact, what we know of Sparta during the early principate suggests rather a different picture from what Josephus presents: Roman Sparta had a deep interest in a revivalism of its own past. Beginning under the Flavians and continuing under Trajan and Hadrian, deliberate archaism is evident at the level of formal institutions of cult and governance in Sparta.⁶² While this trend may have reached its zenith under Hadrian, it is nevertheless in full swing during Josephus' lifetime; Plutarch, for instance, appears to have witnessed the revived rituals of the cult of Artemis Orthia.⁶³ In Sparta as in Athens, the physical, cultic, and epigraphic classical revival occurred in many cases at the behest of, or at least with the approval of, the imperial

⁶⁰ Barclay 2007: 301–2, n. 925.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² On Spartan revival under the Flavian emperors and beyond, see Cartledge and Spawforth 1989: 105–119, 207–11.

⁶³ *Lycurgus* 18.2. This work is in keeping with Plutarch's sustained interest in the classical and archaic Greek past (on which, see Vasunia 2005), a theme which is also abundantly evident in *De Herodoti Malignitate*, a work which shares many structural and generic similarities with the *CA*, which I will address in Chapter 4.

regime.⁶⁴

While Josephus' comments at 2.227 certainly constitute a presentation of Sparta as having changed over time and an awareness of a Spartan "now," Josephus also presents the Spartan past and their past adherence to their ancestral νόμοι as all-or-nothing; there are no intermediary historical periods of varying degrees of adherence or gradual change over time. Contemporary Spartans can only, in Josephus' presentation, be meaningfully compared with their classical ancestors, and in this way, Josephus constructs the Spartan past as fossilized, idealized, and static. He asserts that this Sparta no longer exists (in the form of dedication to Lycurgan law), even if he leaves its exact terminus ambiguous. This of course differs from the picture created by Plutarch, and later, to a degree, by Pausanias, of a fossilized Spartan past continuing into the present unchanged.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Josephus' emphasis on the adherence to the laws believed to have been laid down by Lycurgus identifies the Lacedaemonians primarily with their archaic and classical past. He ignores the details of the imperial present, beyond the vague claim that Lycurgus' laws have been forgotten. Josephus' identifying Sparta primarily with its past, however, is (albeit inversely) in line with the efforts at revival that occurred at Sparta during Josephus' lifetime. While we cannot be certain whether Josephus was aware, for instance, of Vespasian's funding for construction at Sparta's theater,⁶⁶ or of any of the other efforts at reviving an idealized Spartan past that were happening during Josephus' lifetime, it was

⁶⁴ On Roman colonial interest in revival at Athens and Sparta, see Swain 1996: 71–72.

⁶⁵ A view which Josephus does present of the Jews throughout the *CA*, however.

⁶⁶ Cartledge and Spawforth 1989: 105, 129.

nevertheless in the air in his day. Josephus' depiction of Sparta in the *CA* is a means of his participating in the trends of the Greek revival and thus can be read as a component of Greek identity performance.

The Critique of Greek Myth

At 2.236, Josephus proceeds to elaborate a theme well known among Greek philosophers as early as Xenophanes: the critique of the received mythical tradition of the gods (primarily exemplified in Homer and Hesiod) on moral grounds. He explicitly frames this discourse as one invented by the Greeks themselves, as at 2.238–9:

... οὐχ οἷόν τε κατασιωπᾶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ λόγου μέλλοντος οὐχ ὕφ' ἡμῶν ἐλεγχθήσεσθαι νῦν αὐτῶν συντιθέντων, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ πολλῶν εἰρημένου καὶ λίαν εὐδοκιμούντων. (239) τίς γὰρ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐπὶ σοφία τεθραυμασμένων οὐκ ἐπιτετίμηκεν καὶ ποιητῶν τοῖς ἐπεφανεστάτοις καὶ νομοθετῶν τοῖς μάλιστα πεπιστευμένοις, ὅτι τοιαύτας δόξας περὶ θεῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐγκατέσπειραν;⁶⁷

... it is not possible to keep silent, especially since the accusation now about to be made was not invented by us ourselves, but has been said by many very reputable people. (239) For who of those admired for wisdom among the Greeks has not censured even the most famous poets and the most trusted lawgivers for originally implanting such opinions about the gods among the masses?

He proceeds from 2.240–249 with a catalogue of criticisms familiar from various Greek critics, from the pre-Socratics to Plato to Lucian. For Josephus to engage in criticism of the myths of the Greek gods on grounds not only of morality but theology more broadly is to align himself with Greek philosophers and critics, and to act in a way that is, in his own presentation, decidedly Greek and contradictory to Jewish πατριά, as he asserts just

⁶⁷ This passage has multiple textual problems. See Barclay 2007: 307 n. 360 and Siegert 2008 Vol. 1: 206.

prior to beginning this critique at 2.237:

ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλόμην περὶ τῶν παρ' ἑτέροις νομίμων ἐξετάζειν· τὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν φυλάττειν πάτριόν ἐστιν, οὐ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κατηγορεῖν, καὶ περὶ γε τοῦ μήτε χλευάζειν μήτε βλασφημεῖν τοὺς νομιζομένους θεοὺς παρ' ἑτέροις ἄντικρυς ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης ἀπείρηκεν, αὐτῆς ἕνεκα προσηγορίας τοῦ θεοῦ.

I myself would not have wished to interrogate the customs of others; for it is our ancestral custom to preserve our own affairs, and not make accusations against those of others; our lawgiver explicitly forbade us to mock or slander those who are considered gods among foreigners for the sake of the very word 'god.'

Josephus, however, freely uses forms of the word θεός throughout his critique of 240–9.

By his own terms, he is presenting himself as violating Jewish practice as laid down by

Moses. We may also observe that Josephus at 2.238–9 presents Greeks against Greeks,

and that he thus does not present Greek theology or mythical traditions as monolithic.

This accords with his broader presentation of Greek culture as typified by discord and

non-agreement. Here Josephus explicitly presents significant common ground between

Jewish theology and Greek philosophy, describing an internal fissure within Greek

thought, and aligning himself (and all Jews) with “those admired for wisdom among the

Greeks” (τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τεθαυμασμένων). Josephus signals his partic-

ipation in Greek learning not only implicitly, through his participation in the critique of

Greek myth, but also explicitly, through his self-alignment with the wisest of the Greeks.

While Greek criticism of traditional myth continued throughout the Hellenistic and imperial periods,⁶⁸ the specific example that Josephus highlights at 2.256 comes from

⁶⁸ These themes are evident in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Roman Antiquities* 1.18–20, as well as in Lucian's *Zeus Rants* and *Zeus Refuted*. It is thus apparent that the theme was also of interest in the context of the Second Sophistic.

the Classical era, namely Plato's expulsion of Homer from the ideal city at *Rep.* 3.398a. He follows this topic with other examples of Greeks whose laws are aligned with Jewish laws, including two further references to Plato, the extreme measures taken by the Lacedaemonians to protect their laws from corruption by outsiders, and examples of brutal Athenian justice exacted from those accused of impiety, namely Socrates, Anaxagoras, Diagoras of Melos, Protagoras of Abdera, and the Athenian priestess Ninos.⁶⁹ All of these examples come from the fifth and fourth century. Even Josephus' descriptions of Scythians (2.269) are derived from Herodotus, and that of the Persians (2.270) is set in the time of the Persian Wars. We thus see that Josephus has selected his points of comparison for Jewish νόμοι with a distinct preference for the classical Greek past, and has chosen to ignore whatever contemporary comparanda might have been available in the Greek world.⁷⁰ Furthermore, at no point in this section does Josephus choose to discuss for comparison any aspects of the Roman constitution, customs, or beliefs about the gods.⁷¹ He has chosen to frame his treatise in Greek terms, about Greek culture, thus framing Greek culture in terms of its idealized classical past, and ignoring any Roman contributions to this particular debate, a theme which I will revisit shortly.

The literary pedigree of the examples that Josephus cites, along with the sheer volume of examples that he brings in from Greek literature, function as a display of learnedness. Josephus also engages with these Greek philosophers and historical persons

⁶⁹ On Ninos, see Dickie 2001: 46–76, 78.

⁷⁰ See Josephus' remark at 2.282, discussed in brief below, p. 215, on the widespread imitation of Jewish customs throughout the entire world.

⁷¹ He has certainly ignored Roman authors who engaged in this debate about the mythic representation of the gods as well. Siegert refers to Varro and Cicero's contributions. Siegert 2008 Vol. 2: 123.

as an active participant in the critique of myth, by which he locates himself within the Greek literary tradition as well as among the *πεπαιδευμένοι* of his own day. As I mentioned in n. 68 above, this theme is prominent in two of Lucian's works, which indicates that it is of interest in the Greek literature of the imperial period. In these ways, Josephus' critique of myth is a component of his performance of Greek identity.

Greeks and Barbarians in the CA

Another set of categories which Josephus deploys throughout the *CA*, and which is part of a fundamentally Greek worldview, is the antithesis between Ἕλληνες and βάρβαροι. This antithesis became a salient component of Greek cultural identity in the fifth century, and continued to be used throughout antiquity.⁷² By the imperial period, when both language and education became primary markers of Greekness, we witness the corresponding phenomenon of perceived lack of elite education and successful Atticism becoming markers of barbarism. Morgan remarks that some educational theorists (including Quintilian and pseudo-Plutarch) use the term βάρβαροι/*barbari* (among other pejorative categories such as “women” and “slaves”) to describe those who have not experienced Greek learning.⁷³ Such a dichotomy between those educated in the Greek tradition

⁷² cf. Hdt. 1.1. See Hall 1989: 172–189. See also Barclay 2007: 41.

⁷³ Morgan 1998: 235. Morgan lists many examples, of which I will supply only one as a representative (Quintilian *Inst.* 2.17.6): ...hanc autem opinionem habuisse Lysias videtur. cuius sententiae talis defensio est, quod indocti et barbari et servi, pro se cum loquuntur, aliquid dicant simile principio, narrent, probent, refutent, et (quod vim habeat epilogi) deprecentur.

and barbarians is also evident in Philostratus' life of Apollonius of Tyana at 3.43.⁷⁴ We may also recall Phrynichus' use of the term βάρβαροι in his *Eclogae* for those who use perceived Koineisms.⁷⁵ While the term βάρβαρος was not universally pejorative throughout antiquity, in the context of Second Sophistic discourse of civilization and elite culture, it takes on distinctly negative overtones, as in the examples cited.

Two themes emerge from an analysis of Josephus' use of the term βάρβαροι in the *CA*: First, Josephus generally uses the term in a pairing with Ἕλληνες, either to encompass the whole of humanity, which is contained within the two categories, or to make a contrast between the two groups of people. Second, the terms often (but not always) have overtones of civilization and its opposite, in which case βάρβαροι functions as a pejorative term.⁷⁶ The first such instance occurs at 1.58 as a capping of Josephus' discussion of comparative historiographies: ἰκανῶς δὲ φανερόν, ὥς οἶμαι, πεποιηκῶς ὅτι πάτριός ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀναγραφὴ τοῖς βαρβάροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς Ἕλλησι... ("I have, I believe, made it sufficiently clear that the recording of ancient history is native to the bar-

⁷⁴ Here Damis the Assyrian describes his experience with Apollonius: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πρῶτῳ ἐνέτυχον τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ τούτῳ καὶ σοφίας μοι ἔδοξε πλέως δεινότητός τε καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τοῦ καρτερεῖν ὀρθῶς, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μνημοσύνην ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδον, πολυμαθέστατόν τε καὶ φιλομαθίας ἤττω, δαιμόνιον τί μοι ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυγγενόμενος αὐτῷ σοφὸς μὲν ᾤθηται δόξειν ἐξ ιδιῶτου τε καὶ ἀσόφου, πεπαιδευμένος δὲ ἐκ βαρβάρου, ἐπόμενος δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ξυσπουδάζων ὄψεσθαι μὲν Ἰνδοῦς, ὄψεσθαι δὲ ὑμᾶς, Ἕλλησί τε ἐπιμίξειν Ἕλληνας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενος.

⁷⁵ See discussion in Chapter 2, pp. 121–2.

⁷⁶ Josephus' use of the terms, and specifically the pairing of βάρβαροι with Ἕλληνες, deviates somewhat from his use of the terms with the rest of his corpus. While he does use the pair to describe the whole of humanity several times in both the *BJ* and the *AJ*, these uses generally do not have the connotations of civilization and its opposite (e.g. *AJ* 4.12, on the conflict between Aaron and Corah: στάσις οὖν αὐτοὺς οἶαν ἴσμεν οὔτε παρ' Ἕλλησιν οὔτε παρὰ βαρβάροις γενομένην κατέλαβεν.) In contrast, a remarkable 14 of 45 uses of the term βάρβαροι and its variants across Josephus' corpus are found in the parallel accounts of the episode of the Parthian invasion of Syria in 40 BCE which resulted in the death of Phaselus, brother of Herod the Great, at *BJ* 1.248–73 and *AJ* 14.330–69. In these accounts, βάρβαροι is used strictly to refer to the Parthians, and is used almost interchangeably with Πάρθοι, but frequently in contexts in which Josephus (or his characters) emphasize the treachery of Parthians. It thus appears to carry a pejorative sense in this episode, and clearly does not here refer to Jews.

barians more than to the Greeks.”) Josephus here inverts the ideological significance of the terms in his assertion that the barbarians are superior to the Greeks at an intellectual endeavor in which the Greeks (according to Josephus) believe they are superior to all others. Barclay argues that the nuance of Greek cultural superiority is activated in this passage.⁷⁷ Siegert disagrees, commenting without elaboration that the term βάρβαροι does not have a negative connotation here.⁷⁸ Barclay, however, must be correct in his claim that Josephus does indeed intend this as a pejorative term, but ironically. Josephus deliberately includes the Jews within this category (along with Egyptians, Babylonians, and Phoenecians); he has elsewhere referred to these peoples together without deploying the term at all (see 1.8–9, 1.28–9); at 1.6, Josephus refers to these four peoples together as ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις (here also contrasted with τοῖς Ἑλλήσι). Because he clearly had other options available for describing these peoples together as a group, there is no reason to think that his use of βάρβαροι is a natural reflex, or even a neutral term.

1.58 is in many ways an important programmatic statement: not only does the term ἱκανῶς form a ring composition with the first word of the treatise,⁷⁹ but it also comes full circle back to Josephus’ statement at 1.6 introducing the problem of the alleged credence reserved solely for Greek historiographers and denied to all other peoples. Josephus has spent the intervening chapters developing at length the alleged prejudice against non-Greek historians, the various deficiencies in the Greek historiographical tradition, and the

⁷⁷ See Barclay, p. 41 n. 231:

⁷⁸ Siegert 2008 Vol. 2: 68.

⁷⁹ Barclay 2007: 41 n. 230.

ancient institutions of non-Greek peoples who have, in his view, made their historiographical traditions superior. At 1.58, he states his conclusion in strong terms, using the loaded term βάρβαροι to draw attention to the absurdity of the alleged prejudice (his reaction to which he initially described as θαυμάζειν at 1.6) which his entire argument has worked to overturn; consequently, he has inverted the pejorative sense of βάρβαροι by using it ironically.⁸⁰

Josephus again returns to the alleged prejudice against non-Greek historiographers at 1.161, where he transitions from a lengthy discussion of Berossus to a discussion of Greek historians who (Josephus claims) include material on the Jews. He writes:

δεῖ δ' ἄρα καὶ τῶν ἀπιστούντων μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀναγραφαῖς μόνοις δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι πιστεύειν ἀξιούντων ἀποπληρῶσαι τὴν ἐπιζήτησιν, καὶ παρασχεῖν πολλοὺς καὶ τούτων ἐπισταμένους τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν καὶ καθ' ὃ καιρὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς μνημονεύοντας παραθέσθαι ἐν ἰδίοις αὐτῶν συγγράμμασι.

It is necessary, I suppose, both to fulfill the inquiry of those who mistrust the barbarian records and who believe it is right to trust the Greeks alone, and to supply many of these (sc. Greeks) who both know our people and who, when they had the opportunity, remembered to include us in their own writings.

⁸⁰ An illuminating comparison can be made with Josephus' remarks at *AJ* 14.187–8, where Josephus introduces his lengthy citations of Roman decrees concerning Jews, with the comment that many people have not believed writings about the Jews by “the Persians and Macedonians (sc. Alexandrians)” because of both enmity (δυσμένεια) toward the Jews and because these writings are inaccessible to them, because they are located among the Jews and “some of the other barbarians.” This situation is contrasted with decrees found in Rome, and which are considered incontrovertible. I quote the passage: ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλοὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς δυσμένειαν ἀπιστοῦσι τοῖς ὑπὸ Περσῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων ἀναγεγραμμένοις περὶ ἡμῶν τῷ μηκέτ' αὐτὰ πανταχοῦ μηδ' ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἀποκεῖσθαι τόποις, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡμῖν τε αὐτοῖς καὶ τισιν ἄλλοις τῶν βαρβάρων, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων δόγματα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν... Though this passage appears parallel to *CA* 1.58 in the inclusion of the Jews among the βάρβαροι, and in the discussion of a widespread mistrust of accounts of Jews, it must be noted that *AJ* 14.187–8 also differs considerably: Josephus describes a different set of mistrusted writings, and here includes “Macedonians,” who of course could be considered Greeks (but not necessarily); he also clearly does not have, for instance, Berossus and Manetho in mind. βάρβαροι are also here not contrasted with Greeks, but with Romans; the term here appears to describe remoteness from Rome, rather than prejudiced assumptions of lack of civilization. Josephus thus does not activate the pejorative sense of the term here, but this does not inform against my reading of *CA* 1.58, as the respective contexts are not as similar as they appear at first glance.

We once more see Greeks and barbarians named in an antithesis (as the contrastive *μὲν ... δὲ* construction reinforces). The term *βάρβαροι* is again indicative of alleged Greek prejudice that denies the cultural attainments of non-Greek intellectuals, specifically historians. At 2.148, Josephus describes the slanders of Apollonius Molon against Jews, writing: λέγει δὲ καὶ ἀφυστάτους εἶναι τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲν εἰς τὸν βίον εὖρημα συμβεβλῆσθαι μόνους. (“He says that we are the dumbest of the barbarians and that on account of this we alone have contributed no innovation to human life.”) Here we find specific claims of cultural prejudice against *βάρβαροι* from a named source. While Josephus attributes the claim to Apollonius, he does so in an indirect statement, which means that it is uncertain whether the original vocabulary choices derive from a text of Apollonius, or originate with Josephus himself. Either way, Josephus has chosen to frame Apollonius’ remarks in these terms, which accord with the alleged view of (many) Greeks toward non-Greeks that Josephus has refuted throughout the treatise. This is the only instance of the term *βάρβαροι* in the *CA* which is not explicitly paired with *Ἕλληνες* by Josephus. The pairing is implicit, however, in that this rhetor of Rhodes is made to represent the Greek viewpoint which Josephus refutes.

In two additional passages, Josephus deploys the *Ἕλληνες/βάρβαροι* antithesis in a different sense, not explicitly activating the prejudice of Greek cultural superiority and barbarian ignorance.⁸¹ Instead, in a more neutral usage, Greeks and barbarians are made to serve as an inclusive shorthand for the entire human race, the inhabitants of the

⁸¹ I will not address a third instance of this usage at 1.201, which occurs in a direct quotation from pseudo-Hecataeus. This certainly does not represent Josephus’ choice of words, even if his decision to quote the passage as corroboration for his own claims is suggestive of his general endorsement of its terms.

οἰκουμένη.⁸² Such a use occurs at 1.116 in Josephus' introduction to Menander of Ephesus. Josephus appears to describe Menander's historical interest in both Greeks and barbarians in part as an explanation for why he should have written anything of relevance to Jewish history; in other words, Menander wrote Jewish history because he wrote everyone's history. But why Josephus should have chosen the terms Ἕλληνες and βάρβαροι rather than an alternative is worth considering. This choice suggests that Josephus sees in Menander the possibility of the inclusion of non-Greek peoples on the world's cultural stage. A similar meaning appears to be at play at 2.282, in Josephus' panegyric of the Jewish constitution. In a description of the widespread imitation of Jewish customs throughout the world, Josephus writes: οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐ πόλις Ἑλλήνων οὐδ' ἡτιςοῦν οὐδὲ βάρβαρον οὐδὲ ἐν ἔθνος ("There is no city of Greeks whatsoever, nor a single barbarian people ...") among whom Jewish customs such as the Sabbath are not observed.⁸³ Though neither of these passages deals with the prejudice of Greek cultural superiority, they both serve the function of unifying the two sides of the Ἕλληνες/βάρβαροι antithesis by presenting the possibility of Greek acceptance of "barbarian" Jews: in the case of 1.116, even barbarians find a place within the Greek historians; at 2.282, even inhabitants of Greek cities choose to observe Jewish customs.

Since Josephus wanted terms for dividing humankind into two opposed groups that serve as shorthand for the whole of humanity, he might have opposed οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι to

⁸² The term οἰκουμένη is indeed used to describe as the scope of the Jewish diaspora at 1.33. Cf. Herodotus *Proem*, Thuc. 1.1.1.

⁸³ There is some textual trouble in this passage over whether to read βάρβαρον (agreeing with ἔθνος) or βάρβαρος agreeing with πόλις. See Barclay 2007: 327–8 n. 1135 and Siegert 2008 Vol. 1: 213.

τὰ ἔθνη, a phrase frequently used in the Septuagint and early Christian literature to refer to non-Jews collectively, and often in opposition to οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι.⁸⁴ Josephus uses this term at *AJ* 13.200 and 19.328, for instance, but does not deploy it in this sense in the *CA*. For Josephus to choose to use Ἕλληνες and βάρβαροι as his two categories is to situate himself within a Greek worldview and Hellenocentric geographical/ethnographical framework. This is all the more apparent in the nuances of cultural superiority/inferiority which are operative in many of Josephus' uses of the terms in the *CA*; nuances which are widespread throughout the literature of the late first century and Second Sophistic period. In this way, by organizing the peoples of the οἰκουμένη into this fundamentally Greek framework, Josephus displays his own position within learned Greek ways of thinking and of seeing the world, thus marking himself as one of the πεπαιδευμένοι.

Romans?

My final example of Josephus' engagement with an ideological construct that is notable among Second Sophistic authors is to be found in his silence on Roman/Latin intellectual achievements in the *CA*. It is remarkable that in the web of competing and interconnected historiographical traditions of the ancient civilizations of the known world which Josephus spins throughout the *CA*, Latin historiography does not figure at all. Indeed, despite the fact that Josephus cites Livy at *AJ* 14.68 (he is referred to as ὁ τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς ἱστορίας συγγραφεύς), Josephus displays no awareness in the *CA* that the Ro-

⁸⁴ e.g. Acts 14.5: τῶν ἐθνῶν τε καὶ Ἰουδαίων.

mans had any historiographical tradition whatsoever in their own language.⁸⁵ This fact is astonishing in itself, and is so glaring an omission in its Roman context that it can hardly have been accidental. Barclay argues that this omission is likely due to Josephus' desire not to offend his Roman/Romanizing audience.⁸⁶ I find this unsatisfactory, as it assumes that Josephus would necessarily level the same critiques against Latin historiography as against Greek, which is neither obvious nor necessary. Though Latin historiography derived from Greek models and thus shared a great many similarities, the extant corpus also displays many differences.⁸⁷ For instance, Marincola notes that Latin historiography uses polemic with much less frequency than Greek.⁸⁸ It is thus possible that Josephus may not have felt that all of his criticisms applied. Roman intellectuals, moreover, believed that Latin historiography had its origins in public records maintained by the *pontifex maximus*.⁸⁹ Regardless of the historical realia behind the priestly *annales maximi*, the tradition surrounding them in antiquity more closely resembles the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Jewish priestly institutions of record-keeping that are the object of Josephus' approbation than the origins of Greek historiography, as described by Josephus on the basis of obser-

⁸⁵ Josephus' awareness of and engagement with Latin literature extends beyond this one citation of Livy. Thackeray detected allusions to the *Aeneid* in the account of the fall of Jotapata at *BJ* 3.319 ff. and 3.433 ff., as well as significant parallels between Josephus' description of John of Gischala at *BJ* 2.585 ff. and 4.85, and Sallust's portrait of Catiline at *Cat.* 5.

⁸⁶ Barclay 2007: 362–3.

⁸⁷ A minimal bibliography on the development of Latin historiography and its relationship to Greek models would include Kraus and Woodman 1997, Kraus 1999, Dillery 2002, Marincola 2007 and 2011, Woodman 2015, and Feeney 2016.

⁸⁸ Marincola 1997: 265–6.

⁸⁹ e.g. Cato *Orig.* 4.1, Cicero *de Orat.* 2.52, Livy 6.1.2, Quintilian *Inst. Orat.* 10.2.7.

vations by Greek historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides.⁹⁰

Josephus' refusal to acknowledge Roman cultural achievements is entirely in keeping with the stance of many authors of the Second Sophistic.⁹¹ His critique of the cultural self-importance of the Greeks is remarkably similar to Swain's characterization of the refusal of many Second Sophistic authors to acknowledge Roman culture as "the strong and pervasive feeling that they [sc. the Greeks] possessed the only culture and history worth having."⁹² Such a stance is certainly in evidence in Plutarch's *De Audiendis Poetis*, in which Plutarch refers exclusively to classical Greek poets (this is also an instance of the idealization of the classical past, as Plutarch ignores, for instance, the Hellenistic poets).⁹³ Josephus expresses awareness of Greek silence concerning the Romans at 1.66, where he remarks that Rome, like the Jews, was neglected by Herodotus and Thucydides. Josephus is not here interested in the Greek neglect of Roman intellectual contributions, but of the very existence of Rome, and offers this observation in his argument that early Greek historians were ignorant of peoples outside of their direct experience, and that their omission of the Jews was due to circumstance. It is perhaps ironic that Josephus himself replicates this particular stance toward Rome while critiquing Greek omission of Jewish culture; at the least, the omission of the Romans aligns with the

⁹⁰ On the *annales maximi*, see Frier 1979, Cornell 1995 and 2013: 141–59, Elliott 2013: 18–74.

⁹¹ Swain 1996: 9, 78–9.

⁹² Swain 1996: 79.

⁹³ Zadorojnyi 2002: 306.

stance taken by many Greek authors.⁹⁴

During the imperial period, it was not only Hellenophone authors who maintained such a view of Roman cultural achievement. Roman imperial ideology maintained, to an extent, what Whitmarsh terms an “imperialist division of labour” whereby “culture” (e.g. the arts, literature, science, rhetoric, etc.) was conceded to Greece, while *imperium* was the sole province of Rome.⁹⁵ This is exemplified in Anchises’ famous lines to Aeneas at *Aeneid* 6.847–52:⁹⁶

Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera,
(credo equidem), vivos ducent de marmore voltus,
orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus
describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent:
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento;
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.

Others will hammer out vivid bronzes more gently, (I truly believe), will draw living faces from the marble, will plead cases better, will map the wanderings of the heavens with a compass, and proclaim the rising constellations; but you, Roman, be mindful of ruling the peoples with *imperium*—these will be your arts—to impose your custom upon peace, to spare the conquered, and to vanquish the arrogant.

Josephus does indeed seem to subscribe to this “imperialist division of labor” to a degree in the *CA*, at least as far as concerns Rome (since he obviously disputes that culture belongs to the Greeks alone). Romans appear in the *CA* infrequently: in his description of the aftermath of the war and his composition of the *BJ* at *CA* 1.47–56, at 1.66 as another

⁹⁴ For Swain, this stance, though very much a political idea, was not necessarily anti-Roman, nor was it meant to inspire anti-Roman political action. Swain 1996: 87–89.

⁹⁵ Whitmarsh 2005: 11–12.

⁹⁶ On this passage, see Austin 1986: 260–4.

people (like the Jews) who were neglected by early Greek historians, at 2.40–41 on the openness of Roman citizenship, at 2.57 (in the Latin translation) on Cleopatra’s betrayal of the Roman people, at 2.62 on Senatorial decrees on the services of the Jews to the Romans during the Augustan era, at 2.71–78 on the historically friendly relationship between Jews and Romans, including Roman *magnanimitas* toward their subjects, and at 2.125 on Egyptian submission (δουλεύειν) to the Romans, and the friendliness of Judea to Rome during the civil wars of the first century BCE. In these instances it is apparent that Josephus discusses Romans primarily in their capacity as a military power and as imperial rulers. They also surface largely as footnotes in a treatise that is primarily about culture, here the province of Greeks and Near Eastern people, but not, apparently, Romans.

Though some Latin authors (Whitmarsh mentions Cicero and Horace in particular) did not share this view of Roman cultural inferiority, it was nevertheless widespread.⁹⁷ Quintilian occupies a middle position: he privileges the Greek tradition, and places Latin at a close second (his decision to compose in Latin notwithstanding). For Greek writers of the Second Sophistic, Latin does not take such a close second. Thus, even though Morgan and others can speak about a “Greco-Roman” education system, there are some significant differences between the Greek and the Latin, and the position of the Latin tradition is actually a major distinction. This puts Josephus, Roman citizen that he is, on the Greek side of this divide. Even Quintilian, whose work was published within a decade of the *CA*, stressed the importance of the primacy of the Greek language

⁹⁷ Whitmarsh 2005: 11–2.

in his ideal education, though he of course advocated for Latin learning in addition to Greek.⁹⁸ Latin learning and intellectual achievements thus play second fiddle to Greek even among Latin-speaking Roman intellectuals. Many writers of the the Second Sophistic maintained their silence on the Romans following the trend of Hellenophone educational theorists of the Hellenistic and imperial periods.⁹⁹ Josephus' silence on Latin historiography in the *CA* is thus a further act in his performance of Greek cultural identity.

Conclusion

The above analysis, when combined with Chapter 2, shows that Josephus in many respects is engaged in a performance of identity as a member of the Greek *παιδευμένοι*, despite his sustained protestations against Greek culture outlined in Chapter 1. It must be the case that he does so deliberately, and to a purpose. As discussed in Chapter 2, Attic Greek was by no means a natural reflex for any Greek speaker of the first century, but required considerable effort. Likewise, Josephus himself describes (in the *CA* and in the *AJ*) the effort that went into his Greek learning and Greek composition. Accordingly, Josephus has created the appearance of extremely sophisticated learnedness, which must be intentional. Furthermore, we should not assume that Josephus has deployed the Hellenocentric ideological constructs discussed in this chapter merely because he has internalized them as an inhabitant of a Hellenocentric cultural milieu (though he may have done so), such that he perceives them as natural categories and thus does not notice that

⁹⁸ *Inst. Orat.* 1.4.1. Note also his catalogue of authors at 12.1.46 ff.

⁹⁹ Morgan 1998: 98–99.

he is using them. Instead, I hope to have shown that in many instances (e.g. his formulation at 1.58: τοῖς βαρβάροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς Ἑλλησι), his use of such frameworks is pointed, in this particular case, actually aimed at subverting the ideology. This, too, should be read as intentional.

This leads us back to the original question of this dissertation: why does Josephus perform such an identity whilst arguing against the validity of Greek culture and asserting Jewish (that is, his own) difference and distance from Greek culture? Though the *CA*, as I have demonstrated, is in many respects in line with the language and trends of Second Sophistic literature, Josephus clearly has very different aims from most authors of the Second Sophistic, and his assertions of Jewish identity distinguish him from those authors who assert their own Greekness in unambiguous terms. In my final chapter, I pursue the question of why Josephus has performed this identity while making these particular claims.

Chapter 4

Ἰώσηπος παράδοξος: Intersectionality and Josephus' Literary Peers

Introduction:

In my first chapter, I demonstrated that Josephus argues for the validity of his claims about Jewish antiquity and Jewish νόμοι in part by means of explicit statements of difference between Jewish and Greek culture. That is, Josephus' assertions of his Jewish identity over and against the hallmarks of Greek culture which Josephus finds problematic constitute a significant element of the content of the *CA*. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that Josephus performs an identity as one of the Greek πεπαιδευμένοι in the dialect, rhetoric, engagement with Greek παιδεία, literary tropes, and ideological underpinnings of the treatise. In other words, the form of the *CA* constitutes a display of Greek identity on Josephus' part. My argument has thus approached the central question of this dissertation: how does Josephus sustain this paradoxical or contradictory identity? What can account for it? Does his presentation of himself as a Greek πεπαιδευμένος undermine his anti-Greek polemic? How does the specter of self-contradiction influence our interpretation of the treatise, when self-contradiction is one of the primary targets of Josephus' criticism of the Greeks?

In case it is not already clear, I am not arguing that there is anything contradictory, or even confusing, about Josephus sustaining a Greco-Jewish identity. Jewish “culture Greeks” had existed since at least the authors of the Greek Bible, and perhaps since the

earliest days of Macedonian domination, as the authors of 1 Maccabees certainly believed. Demetrius the Chronographer in all likelihood was a Greek-speaking monoglot.¹ The prolific writings of Philo of Alexandria are a testament to Greek learning.² Even Herod the Great aspired to Greek παιδεία, though perhaps with mixed success.³ The controversies over “Hellenization” in Judea are not the issue here, nor is the fact that Josephus, as a Jew, displays Greek παιδεία. The puzzle is how Josephus, Greco-Jew that he is, can argue in no uncertain terms that he is not like Greek historians, that there are vast differences between Greek and Jewish cultures, in short, that he is not Greek, while manifestly participating in a culture which he refutes and condemns.

To answer the questions that my analysis thus far has raised about Josephus’ paradoxical identity in the *CA*, I will pursue some avenues that seem obvious, and others that seem less so. In Section I, I discuss Barclay’s postcolonial reading of the *CA*, which represents the most thorough scholarly treatment of the paradox of Josephus’ engagement with Greek culture in the *CA* to date. Because to my knowledge this paradox has never been formulated in the terms of performance that I have employed, it is unsurprising that I find existing scholarly conclusions dissatisfying. I explain why Barclay’s postcolonial framework does not adequately account for the reading of Josephus’ identity in the *CA* which I have presented in the preceding chapters. This critique of Barclay is a necessary exercise because it shows that the question is far from settled. Next, in Section II, I ex-

¹ Dillery 2015: 360.

² See e.g. Koskenniemi 2014.

³ See *FGrHist* 90 F 135.

plore how intersectional feminist theory (perhaps unexpectedly) is immensely useful in mapping how Josephus can express the apparently contradictory identity which he embraces in the *CA*. I do this by examining how what Josephus tells us about his own life—his lived experience as a bicultural intellectual in his unique political and cultural situation, both in the *CA* and in his other works—creates an autobiography of sorts. In this autobiography, Josephus’ awareness of and sensitivity to the operation of power—whether military, political, or cultural power—are frequently and strikingly on display.⁴ My analysis of Josephus’ depictions of power and his relationship to it reveals Josephus as the author in the unique position of composing a work such as the *CA*, with its form and content in apparent contradiction. In Section III, I address the question of how we are to interpret some specific aspects of Josephus’ self-contradiction (i.e. the use of polemic to condemn Greek polemic) by situating the *CA* in the context of comparable practices in other ancient authors. To this end, I make explicit comparisons between the *CA* and Plutarch’s *On the Malice of Herodotus*. These comparisons shows that many of the contradictory ele-

⁴ As a rule, I understand power in the Foucauldian sense: “It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. Power’s condition of possibility, or in any case the viewpoint which permits one to understand its exercise, even in its more “peripheral” effects, and which also makes it possible to use its mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order, must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendant forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. And “Power,” insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all of these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement. One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” Foucault 1978: 92–3 (Trans. Hurley).

ments of the *CA* are neither unique in antiquity nor at odds with standard rhetorical practice. Finally, in the conclusion, I consider the curious case of Philo of Byblos, who makes some strikingly similar comments about Greek intellectuals and their traditions, and the light that Philo can shed on Josephus' apparently paradoxical identity.

I. Barclay's Postcolonial Reading of the *CA*

Postcolonial theory or postcolonial criticism was introduced to the interpretation of the *CA* by Barclay in his 2005 article and 2007 commentary which together represent the most serious attempt both to articulate and to account for the apparent paradox of Josephus' anti-Greek polemic. Because Barclay's contribution to the topic is so significant, I would be remiss if I did not address his arguments and explain why my own interpretation of the paradox differs considerably from Barclay's. Accordingly, I will proceed in this section of the chapter with a brief introduction to postcolonial theory for the sake of clarity, followed by a summary of Barclay's arguments concerning his postcolonial reading of the *CA*. I will then present my arguments against some key elements of Barclay's position, namely, his elision of Roman imperial rule and the Greek intellectual domination described by Josephus in the *CA*, and his position that Josephus was compelled to conceal a desired agenda or critique of Roman culture from his Roman audience. In Section II I will present my case for a different interpretation of the cultural power differential described by Josephus in the *CA*.

Postcolonial Theory

As an attempt to offer a definition of a field in which entire volumes have been devoted to the contest over nomenclature would be beyond the scope of this chapter, I will instead quote Biblical scholar Fernando Segovia's helpful description of the application of postcolonial criticism to Biblical studies as analogous to other critical discourses: "In effect, just as feminist criticism foregrounds the question of gender, liberation criticism that of class, minority criticism that of ethnicity-race, and queer criticism that of sexual orientation, so, I would argue, does postcolonial criticism highlight the question of geopolitics—the realm of the political at the translocal or global level, with specific reference to the phenomenon of imperial-colonial formations. Postcolonial criticism highlights, therefore, the relationship between center and periphery, metropolis and margins—in effect, the imperial and the colonial."⁵ Postcolonial theory has had a lukewarm reception by classicists.⁶ Not all are convinced of its applicability to antiquity.⁷ The sticking point for many is the differences in the historical conditions which are present in antiquity and in the conditions to which postcolonial and subaltern theorists have responded in the modern world. Modern theorists have of course responded to the specific histories of

⁵ Segovia 2005: 23. Segovia comments in a footnote to this excerpt that this statement is not a totalizing definition of any of these fields of critical focus, but is meant to be "useful as a first charting of the terrain within ideological discourse and criticism." Representative introductions to the field of postcolonial theory include Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin: 1998 (second edition 2007), Gandhi 1998, Loomba 1998, and McLeod 2000. See also Segovia 2005: 23–76.

⁶ Will was among the first to assert that scholars of the Hellenistic world were tacitly assuming the stance of the modern European colonizer, namely that colonization (or Hellenization) was mutually beneficial for all parties, and that theories and models developed by anthropologists in the wake of decolonization were productive when applied to antiquity: see Will 1985. See also Bagnall 1997, who builds on Will's main premise, while critiquing many of the particulars of his arguments, in discussing Ptolemaic Egypt.

⁷ A striking recent example is found in Feeney 2016: 83–4. See also Hose 1999. By way of counterexample, Dillery has demonstrated the possibilities that engaging with postcolonial literature can open up to classicists in his comparison of postcolonial South Asian historiography to the histories of Berossus and Manetho. Dillery 2015: 214–9.

colonization, colonialism, decolonization, post-decolonization, etc., which are necessarily different in both major and minor respects (e.g. the role of industrialization, for instance) from those of antiquity. Yet some classicists have failed to recognize that the problem of applying abstract theory across widely varying historical circumstances is a major concern of the field of postcolonial theory and has been since at least the late nineties. I will term this controversy “the danger of homogenization,” borrowing Segovia’s formulation.⁸ There has been (and continues to be) fierce critique of postcolonial theorists who, so it is alleged, theorize in a way that universalizes the historical particulars of specific imperial-colonial circumstances (typically those of the modern British Empire and its aftermath), or in general does not account for the possible differences in imperial-colonial structures and conditions (whether economic, cultural, political, etc.) that are present in imperial-colonial encounters across the globe and throughout history. For instance, Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin outline the need for an inclusive approach which balances “common elements ... especially at the level of ideology and discursive formation” with the historical particulars of individual instances of colonialism/imperialism.⁹ Leela Gandhi sees the danger of homogenization as inherent to postcolonial theorizing: “... the organization of the immediate past under the rubric of colonialism tends to reduce the contingent and random diversity of cultural encounters and non-encounters within that past into a tired

⁸ Segovia 2005: 43.

⁹ Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1998: 191.

relationship of coercion and retaliation.”¹⁰ On the whole, the field resounds with voices calling for balance and the integration of abstract theorizing, on the one hand, and historical particularities, on the other, which need not be seen as mutually exclusive.¹¹

In the context of the application of postcolonial theory to antiquity, I wish to affirm that the fact of non-analogous historical conditions between modern and ancient imperial-colonial situations does not negate the potential or relevance of the set of tools developed (and being developed) by these theorists for our field of study. Because Josephus appears to be particularly concerned with the apparatus and impact of Roman imperial power in the *BJ* in particular, as I will discuss further in Section II, postcolonial theory holds considerable promise for elucidating what is in fact a rare survival from antiquity: an account of the experience of Roman violence and domination from a member of a colonized people. The shadow of Roman imperialism and Roman violence is perceptible in all of Josephus’ works, including the *CA*, despite Josephus’ general lack of interest in all things Roman in this treatise, as I argued in the preceding chapter. Roman subjugation of Judea and Josephus’ personal history vis-à-vis this imperial-colonial encounter are topics that surface in the treatise and are pertinent to my analysis of Josephus’ presentation of his own identity. The question I will explore in this section, however, is whether Barclay’s postcolonial reading of the *CA* succeeds, and to what extent postcolonial theory is helpful to my inquiry in this study.

¹⁰ Gandhi 1998: 171–2. Segovia critiques Gandhi’s restrictive treatment of the phenomena of colonialism and imperialism to modern European imperialism, evident in the phrase “the immediate past” in this quotation. Segovia 2005: 51. Gandhi nevertheless is engaged in a central dispute in the field of postcolonial studies.

¹¹ e.g. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2007: 171–3. See also the summaries provided in Segovia 2005: 25–76.

Barclay and Postcolonial Theory

Barclay introduces postcolonial theory to the interpretation of the *CA* in his 2005 essay. He argues that by asserting the unassailable truth of the Hebrew Biblical canon composed by divine inspiration while also appealing to and upholding Greek historiographical conventions in the *CA*, Josephus destabilizes the “mainstream historiographical tradition” by inserting himself and the Jewish tradition into it. At the same time, argues Barclay, Josephus inserts into the Greek historiographical tradition a “different historiographical logic which unsettles its normal structures of authority.”¹² For Barclay, this represents an example of Bhabhan hybridity.¹³ Barclay offers a similar argument on a larger scale in his 2007 commentary to the *CA*.¹⁴ The two works together constitute his explanation for why Josephus uses rhetorical strategies, tropes, etc. that are decidedly Greek to argue against Greek cultural superiority. Barclay’s most significant contribution is his use of postcolonial theory to highlight the question of who has the authority to produce knowledge about a subjugated people (namely, the Jews) as a significant concern of the *CA*. The historiography about and by subjugated peoples is of course a central issue of postcolonial studies. Also of great value is that Barclay has structured his commentary

¹² Barclay 2005, esp. 41–3.

¹³ *Ibid.* 43 with bibliography. Barclay defines Bhabhan hybridity as “not the “fusion” of cultures, but the emergence of new cultural forms that neither continue the “authentic” native culture nor reproduce the hegemonic culture, but produce a third entity, often unstable and destabilizing. At one level, the “hybrid” product appears to affirm the authority of the dominant culture, by mimicking its modes of discourse; but at another by creating something inevitably different (e.g. “anglicized” rather than “English”), it unsettles, and even mocks, the supposed superiority of the colonial/imperial power.” Barclay 2007: LXIX. See also Bhabha 1994.

¹⁴ See esp. Barclay 2007: LXVII–LXXI.

with longer essays at what Barclay defines as major thematic breaks in the treatise devoted to five distinct “reading options.” Barclay’s intention with this structure, as he describes it in his introduction, is to move beyond the traditional yet problematic view of the commentary as the product of an objective, authoritative scholar who reveals the one true reading of the text. Under the influence of reception theory, Barclay attempts to give voice to other historical readings of the text in addition to his own.¹⁵ In this context, Barclay identifies his own interpretation of the *CA* as postcolonial. Barclay’s intention with this structure is admirable, and to a degree it is successful at elucidating the many layers of meaning that multiple readings of the *CA* makes possible. In some key areas, however, Barclay is less successful, and an analysis of why is important for my larger argument in this chapter.

Despite Barclay’s considerable contribution, his argument is ultimately an unsatisfactory account of the apparent paradox that I am exploring in this study. My dissatisfaction with Barclay’s analysis stems to a large degree from fundamental differences in our readings of the *CA*: in particular, I disagree with Barclay on two main points. First, I find Barclay’s elision of Roman imperial rule and Greek cultural domination, and the interpretation of postcolonial theory that he imposes on this elision, to be problematic. Second, I take issue with Barclay’s view of Josephus as deliberately attempting to avoid overt con-

¹⁵ As Barclay puts it, “The challenge is to create a literary forum in which the commentator deals directly with the text from an explicitly partial standpoint, while giving space to other responsible readings, both actual and potential.” Barclay 2007: LXVII. Barclay identifies five distinct reading options: an ancient “Romanized” audience, an ancient “Judean” audience, ancient Christian reception, modern scholarly reception, and his own postcolonial interpretation.

tradition of Flavian imperial ideology, which Barclay problematically seems to understand as the position, sensitivity, or general identity of his “Romanized audience.”

Some of the problematic elements of Barclay’s approach are exemplified in a statement from his introduction to his commentary on the potential of postcolonial theory for the analysis of the *CA*. Barclay writes: “... postcolonial theory has the potential to unravel the ways in which Josephus both accepts and unsettles the authority of the Greek (and Roman) tradition, restructuring the values he has adopted, and advancing bold claims for Jewish originality and superiority. Viewed from this angle, as an attempt at self-representation, written by a member of a subject nation fully engaged with the dominant cultural tradition, Josephus’ work is a classic “postcolonial” text, and the complexities of his stance nowhere more evident than in *Apion*.”¹⁶ Barclay’s treatment of Greek and Roman culture or historiographical traditions as a single entity is apparent here as elsewhere. This amalgam is found throughout Barclay’s interpretation of the *CA*, and it is clear that Barclay sees Rome as the silent target of Josephus’ critiques of Greeks. This is problematic on two grounds. First, it is not obvious that Josephus would intend his criticisms of Greeks to be secretly directed at Romans. It remains to be demonstrated that Josephus in fact represents the traditions of Romans and the Greeks as forming a unified culture in the *CA*. I argued in Chapter 3 that Josephus presents Greeks and Romans differently, and as having different roles on the world stage. Another problematic aspect of Barclay’s framing of the *CA* as a “classic postcolonial text” is that there was in fact a disjuncture between Roman military dominance of Judea and much of the eastern Mediter-

¹⁶ Barclay 2007: LXXI.

ranean and Greek cultural dominance throughout the same region. Rome had of course colonized Judea, and Josephus had experienced considerable personal loss from the violence inflicted by Roman forces. Yet we cannot simply interpret Josephus' critique of "the Greeks" and their alleged historiographical arrogance as code for "the Romans" and their violent imperialism; the people who, according to Josephus, have laid claim to culture and inappropriately asserted their authority over other peoples' histories (the Greeks) are manifestly not the same people who have engaged in violent imperialism in Judea during Josephus' lifetime (the Romans). Barclay does not adequately engage with the complexities and power dynamics that exist between Greek cultural domination and Roman military domination, an oversight that is also implicated in his description of the *CA* as a "classic" postcolonial text. It is clear enough from Barclay's description what he means by "classic postcolonial text," but it is not clear to me that the *CA*, or Josephus' work as a whole, can accurately be described in this way given the uncoupling of (Greek) cultural and (Roman) political power.

Barclay's description of the *CA* as a "classic" postcolonial text veers into the path of the "danger of homogenization" described above as a central controversy of the field of postcolonial theory. In this light, it is problematic for Barclay to postulate that a "classic postcolonial text" is even possible; certainly Barclay's "Greek (and Roman) tradition" show too little attention to the specific historical conditions of the composition of the *CA*.¹⁷ Such an elision of any distinction between the Greek culture which is Josephus'

¹⁷ I say this without wishing to to paint Barclay with overly broad strokes. Barclay consistently displays considerable attention to detail throughout his commentary, and is invaluable in this respect. The sheer volume of citations in this dissertation from Barclay's commentary show how very indebted to him I am.

explicit target in the *CA* and Roman hegemony, or the actual military and economic domination of Rome over territory including Judea, becomes problematic if we are to practice postcolonial criticism. We run into trouble even with definitions of the central vocabulary of postcolonial analysis. Thus, if we speak of “imperialism” and adopt, for instance, Said’s definition in *Culture and Imperialism* as “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory,”¹⁸ what center can we say exists for Greek culture in Josephus’ representation of it in the *CA*? By what mechanisms does it dominate the eastern Mediterranean? In this regard, it is not irrelevant that Judea had been subject to conquest and colonization by the Seleucids and Ptolemies during the Hellenistic era, that the events surrounding Seleucid imperialism and the subsequent Maccabean liberation were the subject of a body of literature written in Greek by Jews, and that Josephus was familiar with at least some of this literature (and thus with these particular representations of Seleucid postcolonial history). Yet Josephus does not frame the polemic against Greeks in the *CA* as a polemic against Seleucid (or any other Greek/Macedonian) imperial rulers.¹⁹ Josephus instead targets something approaching a classical canon, at once Athenocentric yet also evocative of Alexandria both in its canon-like

¹⁸ Said 1993: 9.

¹⁹Antiochus IV Epiphanes is mentioned in passing in the *CA* at 1.34 in a list of famous imperial invaders whose actions disrupted the institution of priestly records in a passage that has the apparent purpose of assuring the reader that these records do not err: procedures are in place to insure accuracy even in the event of catastrophe. Ptolemy I Soter appears at 1.183–5 in Josephus’ introduction to (pseudo-)Hecataeus. Seleucus appears at 1.206 in passing in an anecdote of Agatharchides, and again at 2.39, where Josephus asserts that he granted citizen rights to the Jewish residents of Antioch. Macedonian imperial monarchs are given greater attention in Book 2, where Josephus discusses the relations between the Jewish community of Alexandria and its rulers from Alexander through Cleopatra at 2.42–60, and Apion’s slanderous accounts of what Antiochus found when he entered the Jerusalem temple at 2.80–111. On these points, Josephus introduces Macedonians for the purpose of refuting Apion’s accounts. The Macedonians are clearly not a central concern or target of Josephus’ in the *CA*.

qualities and in its literary-critical orientation. For instance, Homer is given pride of place at 1.12 as the “oldest agreed-upon” written account in Greek. Though Josephus treats the works of Homer practically as works of historiography, his privileging of Homer within the corpus of Greek literature (however underhanded) accords with the centrality given to the two poems in the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία throughout the Hellenophone world.²⁰ Josephus’ forays into the question of the date, method of composition, and internal inconsistencies of the Homeric corpus at 1.12 and 2.14 put him in the company of the Alexandrian γραμματικοί.²¹ His privileging of Thucydides in the genre of historiography (1.18), and Plato in philosophy (2.223) suggest Athenocentrism almost as much as his Atticism does, a topic I explored in Chapters 2 and 3. Elsewhere, Josephus engages with traditions surrounding Sparta as another representative of Greek culture, as I discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. This lack of an obvious center for Josephus’ targeted Greek culture accords with the globalized Greek culture described in Chapters 2 and 3. Once again, it is important to observe that Josephus does not, on any occasion, equate Greeks and Romans or otherwise imply that Rome is the current center of Greek culture. As I described in Chapter 3, he rather expresses the same “imperial division of labor” described by some Latin authors, wherein the elements of culture (e.g. the arts, philosophy, science) are subordinated to Roman military dominance and consequently relegated to the subjugated Greeks.²² Roman imperial ideology can assert Roman subjugation of Greek culture, but it does not

²⁰ See Morgan 1998: 115.

²¹ As Dillery argues, Josephus deliberately seeks to outplay Apion at his own game as literary critic. Dillery 2003. On Alexandrian Homeric scholarship, see e.g. Pfeiffer 1968, West 2001, Hatzimichali 2013.

²² See Ch. 3, pp. 217–21, and bibliography cited there.

follow that Josephus must view Greeks and Romans as a single “Greco-Roman” entity that dominates on two fronts, the military-political and the cultural/historiographical.

Barclay’s interpretation of the *CA* as tacitly directed against Romans is bound up with his view of the Roman or Romanized audience of the *CA*. My difficulty with Barclay’s reading is twofold: Barclay interprets Josephus’ omissions and silences as having a particular agenda that I find unjustified, and he also appears to understand “Roman/Romanized” as a monolithic category, whose members are united in their intolerance of criticism of Roman culture generally, and of Flavian imperial ideology specifically. Josephus, however, in Barclay’s presentation, appears oddly set apart from these Roman/Romanized audience members, despite his Roman citizenship (*Vita* 423), which gave him a meaningful claim to Roman identity (which he does not press in the *CA*), and despite his discussion in the *CA* of the inclusiveness of Roman citizenship at 2.40. Why Josephus, a resident of Rome for some twenty years, should not be considered Roman/Romanized along with much of his audience is unclear, as is the implicit cultural unanimity of the Romans/Romanized. Bowersock has collected evidence on “foreign” elites present at Rome under the Flavians, arguing that Josephus’ position as a foreign-born elite in residence at Rome with close ties to the reigning imperial family was neither historically unique (cf. Nicolaus of Damascus) nor even unusual during the Flavian period.²³ The former Judean royal family, for instance, was well represented in Rome in Josephus’ day by Berenice and Agrippa II, with whom Josephus claimed a close connection in his capacity as author (*CA* 1.51), but who appears to have been deceased by the time of the

²³ Bowersock 2005.

composition of the *CA*.²⁴ Many of the eminent Latin intellectuals who were Josephus' contemporaries also hailed from outside of Italy. Martial, for instance, spent his early and late life in Spain, and identified as Celtiberian (10.65.3–4). Seneca the Younger was the son of a (famous) native of Spain, the country of origin of Quintilian as well. We also know of Hellenophone intellectuals of eastern origin who spent time in the city, such as Dio of Prusa and Nicetes Sacerdos of Smyrna.²⁵ Visiting Hellenophone sophists apparently were a common sight in the city during the Flavian period.²⁶ Elite circles in Flavian Rome thus appear to have been quite diverse in terms of the origins of its residents.²⁷ The literary culture of Rome was also bilingual.²⁸ In view of this diversity, Josephus himself hardly looks like an outsider in his city of residence. It is also not necessarily the case that Josephus' contemporaries at Rome uncritically accepted the versions of events propagated by the imperial families or their supporters,²⁹ nor is there compelling evidence that intellectuals who could be identified as Roman or Romanized were generally intolerant of

²⁴ For a summary of the controversy surrounding the dating of Agrippa II's death, see Mason 2001: XVI–XIX.

²⁵ Fantham 2013: 184–5. On Dio, see Jones 1978.

²⁶ See Bowersock 1969: 28–9, 44–6

²⁷ Though not, apparently, to the delight of all. Juvenal's speaker in 1.1. lampoons an apparent tide of pretentious easterners living in Rome. See also Statius *Silvae* 4.5.45–8 on Septimius, native of Lepcis Magna: *non sermo Poenus, non habitus tibi, / externa non mens: Italus, Italus. / sunt Urbe Romanisque turmis / qui Libyam deceant alumni*. As Coleman remarks, it is significant that Statius ascribes Italian, rather than Roman, identity in contrast to Septimius' Punic origins, as Roman identity was open to any who could claim citizenship. See Coleman 1988: 169. Attitudes about the multiculturalism of Rome were varied.

²⁸ In the case of Josephus' younger contemporary, Suetonius, even individual authors could be bilingual in their own literary productions. See Fantham 2013: 185–9 and Wallace-Hadrill 1983.

²⁹ Josephus certainly presents himself as expecting that some, at least, of his audience are open to his arguments at *CA* 1.4. The prevalence of reports of those who were punished and/or censored for literary productions interpreted as critical of the Flavian emperors suggests that there were many intellectuals at Rome who voiced dissent from the regime in some capacity. See e.g. Fantham 2013: 190–3 with bibliography.

any criticism of their culture at large.³⁰ Domitian, of course, is consistently presented in the surviving record as dangerously intolerant of criticism, and it is entirely possible that Josephus composed the *CA* under Domitian's regime, and could plausibly have had in mind the potential consequences of running afoul of this Flavian emperor's sensitivities.³¹ This is not, however, what Barclay claims.

The view that Josephus was necessarily constrained from speaking his mind, and the underlying assumption that such constraints are pertinent because Josephus would necessarily have chosen to criticize not only specific Flavian policies but Roman culture in general if he had had the license does not accord with how Josephus presents his own writing process for the *BJ* at *CA* 1.48–52. The passage is worth revisiting:

ἐστρατήγουν μὲν γὰρ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν Γαλιλαίων ὀνομαζομένων ἕως ἀντέχειν δυνατὸν ἦν, ἐγενόμην δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις συλληφθεὶς αἰχμάλωτος καὶ μετὰ φυλακῆς Οὐεσπασιανὸς καὶ Τίτος ἔχοντες ἀεὶ προσεδρεύειν αὐτοῖς ἠνάγκασαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δεδεμένον, αὐθις δὲ λυθεὶς συνεπέμφθην ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας Τίτῳ πρὸς τὴν Ἱεροσολύμων πολιορκίαν. (49) ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ ἔγενετο τῇ³² τῶν πραττομένων οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τὴν ἐμὴν γνῶσιν διέφυγεν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ Ῥωμαίων ὁρῶν ἐπιμελῶς ἀνέγραφον καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν αὐτομόλων ἀπαγγελλόμενα μόνος αὐτὸς συνίειν. (50) εἴτα σχολῆς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ λαβόμενος, πάσης μοι τῆς πραγματείας ἐν παρασκευῇ γεγεννημένης, χρησάμενός τισι πρὸς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν συνεργοῖς, οὕτως ἐποίησάμην τῶν πράξεων τὴν παράδοσιν. τοσοῦτον δέ μοι περιῆν θάρσος τῆς ἀληθείας ὥστε πρώτους πάντων τοὺς αὐτοκράτορας τοῦ πολέμου γενομένους Οὐεσπασιανὸν καὶ Τίτον ἠξίωσα λαβεῖν μάρτυρας. (51) πρώτοις γὰρ δέδωκα τὰ βιβλία καὶ

³⁰ Contemporary Latin literature suggests that cultural and societal criticism was widespread among authors of various genres. See Hutchinson 1993: 3–39.

³¹ See, for example, the wealth of anti-Domitian sources assembled by Penwill, who gives the caveat that the rhetoric some of these sources is probably shaped by a desire to create a sharp contrast between Trajan (and Nerva) and their dynastic predecessor. Penwill 2003: 358–61. See also Mason's argument that Josephus composed certain elements of the *AJ* (namely, on the Jewish constitution and both Jewish and Roman constitutional crises) as deliberately topical themes, if cautiously or ironically presented. See Mason 2003.

³² On the orphaned γενομένην in this passage and my decision not to translate it, see Ch. 1 p. 51 n. 48.

μετ' ἐκείνους πολλοῖς μὲν Ῥωμαίων τοῖς συμπεπολεμηκόσι, πολλοῖς δὲ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐπίπρασκον, ἀνδράσι καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σοφίας μετεσχηκόσιν, ὧν ἐστὶν Ἰούλιος Ἀρχέλαος, Ἡρώδης ὁ σεμνότατος, αὐτὸς ὁ θαυμασιώτατος βασιλεὺς Ἀγρίππας. (52) οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ἐμαρτύρησαν, ὅτι τῆς ἀληθείας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμελῶς, οὐκ ἂν ὑποστειλάμενοι καὶ σιωπήσαντες, εἴ τι κατ' ἄγνοιαν ἢ χαριζόμενος μετέθηκα τῶν γεγονότων ἢ παρέλιπον.

I was in command of those among us who are called the Galileans, for as long as it was possible to hold out. Then I came to be among the Romans when I had been taken as a prisoner of war and Vespasian and Titus, keeping me under guard, compelled me to attend them constantly, at first bound, but later when I had been freed I was sent from Alexandria with Titus to the siege of Jerusalem. (49) During that time nothing that was done escaped my knowledge, for as I saw the events in the Romans' camp, I carefully recorded them along with what was reported by the deserters, since I alone understood them. (50) Then, taking advantage of my leisure at Rome, when the whole project had been prepared, having consulted certain collaborators in the Greek language I thus made my account of the history. I had such abundant confidence in its truth that I thought it best to take as my witnesses first of all those who were the commanders of the war, Vespasian and Titus. (51) I have given my books to them first, and after them to many of the Romans who had campaigned with them, and I also sold my books to many of our own people, to men who have a share in Greek wisdom, including Julius Archelaus, Herod the most august, and the most admirable king Agrippa. (52) And these men all gave testimony that I championed the truth carefully, and they are not the sort to have held back or kept silent, if I altered or left out any of the events out of ignorance or favoritism.

I had much to say of 1.50 in Chapter 2. Here I am interested not in Josephus' remarks about his Greek, but in how the tone of this passage suggests that Josephus is presenting his composition of the *CA* as a process over which he has a considerable degree of control, in the service of his argument for historiographical authority. He is of course chiefly concerned to demonstrate the truth of the *BJ*, which is meant to be assured by his historiographical methods of both autopsy and careful record-keeping. The list of his readers

provides testimony (ἐμαρτύρησαν) to the *BJ*'s truth. Josephus constructs his narrative of control over the composition of the *BJ* by presenting every element of the process after his liberation as an active choice grounded in his unique capacity for knowledge of these events. Thus he does not merely observe the events in the Roman camp, he records them diligently. He does not passively assume the role of historian, but seizes (λαβόμενος) the opportunity of his free time in Rome. He does not write at Vespasian's behest; on the contrary, it is because of Josephus' decision, presented as an act of boldness (τοσοῦτον ... θάρσος), that Vespasian and Titus read the *BJ* and attest to its validity, followed by "many of the Romans who had campaigned with them," all of whom received Josephus' βιβλία as gifts; the illustrious Jews of Herodian pedigree paid Josephus for their copies.³³ Josephus does not simply tell the truth, he champions it (τῆς ἀληθείας πρὸς τὴν).

It is certainly the case that the uneven power dynamics of Josephus' situation are operative in this passage, as Vespasian and Titus outrank Josephus' other readers and are

³³ That Josephus should have sold copies of the *BJ* is striking, and contrary to our expectations of the distribution of literary texts from authors to those within their social circles (cf. Starr 1989: 215). The form ἐπίπρασκον is securely attested in the manuscripts, and is thus not to be interpreted as an interpolation. In the parallel passage in the *Vita*, Josephus asserts that he gave the *BJ* to "many others" in addition to Titus and Vespasian (καὶ ἄλλοις δὲ πολλοῖς εὐθὺς ἐπέδωκα τὴν ἱστορίαν at 362), including Agrippa. Mason argues convincingly that because Josephus describes Agrippa at *Vita* 361–7 as intimately involved in the composition of the *BJ*, it is not plausible that Josephus in fact sold him a copy. See Mason 2001: 149 n. 1499. Because the form ἐπίπρασκον is textually secure, and because Josephus framed this exchange as a very different sort of transaction in the *Vita*, we must conclude that ἐπίπρασκον is used deliberately here (regardless of the historicity of the particular claim). At the least, Josephus' presentation here not merely of the readership of the *BJ*, but of the number of people who came to own copies of the work as large (he claims *many* Romans and *many* Jews in addition to the five named individuals) and varied in their method of acquiring copies has the effect of buttressing his claims to widespread approbation from diverse readers. It is possible that Josephus' claim to have sold, rather than gifted his books to his fellow countrymen is meant to suggest a degree of impartiality in these readers, as it suggests that they were not the sort of close friends to whom we would expect Josephus to give copies as gifts. Because Josephus, both here and in the *BJ*, appears to anticipate being suspected of pro-Jewish bias, such distancing between himself and his Jewish readers may be an attempt to mitigate or avert such suspicion. Since Josephus does not appear to be concerned with avoiding this particular impression of bias at the parallel passage in the *Vita*, this may account for the difference. The appearance of ἐπίπρασκον here may in fact suggest that the scholarly view of such literary commercial transactions as beneath the dignity of the aristocratic author is incorrect. On the practices involved in the production and distribution of book copies in the Roman world, see e.g. Starr 1989, Harris 1989: 175–284, Fantham 2013: 64–5.

accordingly privileged as the “first ... out of everyone.” The elite rank of Josephus’ audience members is surely meant to be relevant to their ability to vouch for the veracity of the *BJ* (though Josephus does foreground their actual experience of the war). I will return to this facet of the passage in the following section. It is important, however, that Josephus suggests that he exerts control over this portion of his readership by his ability to choose who receives copies, and how. He explicitly describes his process as a historian as intrinsically linked to his personal history of armed resistance, capture, imprisonment and compulsory service, liberation and collaboration, and finally, reward and privileged retirement. Yet it is within these conditions of this imperial-colonial encounter that Josephus presents himself as a writer in terms that suggest his own agency and control over the process. If anything, his description of his historical writing as the product of leisure (σχολῆς) suggests freedom just as it is indicative of elite status. Thus, while Barclay’s description of the considerable constraints and self-censorship which he presents as defining Josephus’ environment is again plausible, it is also at odds with Josephus’ self-presentation.

The objection could be raised that Josephus had a vested interest in presenting his works as free of bias and containing the unconstrained truth. Of course, expressions of impartiality are an established topos of imperial historiography, Tacitus’ *Hist.* 1.1 being perhaps the best known example.³⁴ Yet even if Tacitus’ remarks on the suspicion with which historiography was generally met and the repressive conditions under which it was produced during the reign of the Flavians are an accurate reflection of the reality, Jose-

³⁴ See Marincola 1997: 166–70.

phus does not express a similar assessment of the environment of historiographical production at Rome. Certainly he presents a hostile environment in which his works have been discredited and maligned, but not because of his relationship to the Flavians. Josephus' claim to impartiality both here and at the opening of the *BJ* (to which I shall return in Section III) is his bipartisanship, here expressed in his calling to witness both Romans and Jews. If anything, here as at *BJ* 1.9, Josephus appears more concerned that he will be suspected of pro-Jewish bias, rather than pro-Flavian bias. It might be objected that Josephus protests too much, and his presentation of his own autonomy is meant to conceal the constraints under which he operates. This is, of course, possible, but we as we lack direct evidence, the burden of proof must rest on the position that Barclay has adopted, which goes against the grain of what Josephus has to say of himself as a writer in the *CA*.

My final objection to Barclay's underlying assumption that Josephus would have criticized Romans, their culture, and their emperors if he were allowed to speak freely is that Roman imperial policy and culture are frankly alien to the concerns of the *CA*, as I discussed in Chapter 3. There I listed the seven passages in the *CA* in which Josephus mentions Romans at all, and argued (against Barclay) that Josephus' feigned ignorance of Roman cultural achievements is pointed and in line with other authors of the Second Sophistic. In my reading, the *CA* cannot be made to fit Barclay's interpretation of a post-colonial framework, wherein there are only two parties at play in the imperial-colonial encounter: the colonizer, who owns and wields both military and political power and cultural capital (which includes the authority to produce knowledge about the colonized and their history), and the colonized, who are subjugated in both arenas. This is, however, not

the case in the claims that Josephus makes in the *CA*: the Romans have political hegemony, which is not a central theme of the treatise, but it is unambiguously the Greeks who are credited with an undeserved monopoly on cultural production and, most importantly, historiographical authority and veracity.

As I mentioned, I find Barclay's discussion of the problem of representation in the *CA* in terms of postcolonial criticism to be a significant advance, though, as I have argued, Barclay's interpretation of the parties involved does not accord with my reading of the *CA*. That Josephus is so expressly concerned in the opening of the *CA* with the claims of who is in a position to possess or produce accurate knowledge of marginalized peoples should signal that the tools of postcolonial theory are relevant, or should be examined more fully in order for their usefulness in understanding the *CA* to be clarified. This is because the question of ownership of knowledge, or the subjectivity of who is able to know or produce knowledge, has historically been a central question to postcolonial studies. To offer only a crude summary of Spivak's seminal essay, the colonized, oppressed, or subaltern individual cannot speak for himself or herself without reinscribing his or her status as oppressed, because she or he is not capable of any voice except that which is defined by the system or mechanisms of the colonizing culture.³⁵ Does Josephus, by presenting his claims in a form that is so thoroughly Greek, as I have demonstrated, and embodying a Greek identity, effectively erase himself as a Jew? Barclay points to Homi Bhabha's concept of hybridity: "Josephus creates a special form of 'hybridity' which does not simply add to, but subtly destabilizes, the historiographical tradition to which he con-

³⁵ Spivak 1988.

tributes.”³⁶ Certainly Josephus appears to destabilize the norms of Greek historiography with his shocking pronouncements that consensus across an entire tradition is the sole sign of historiographic veracity.³⁷ The problem remains, once again, that the Roman colonizers of Judea are not Josephus’ target in the polemic of the *CA*, and military and political power has been decoupled from any Greek cultural metropolis.

Josephus does, however, describe Greek cultural domination as a real form of domination which exists at a discursive level among his audience and peers, which is to say, among the Hellenophone elite (cf. 1.1–3, 50–2). This domination is presented in the implicit trust granted to Greek historians, and the mistrust to which Jewish historians are subjected at 1.6. It is also to be found in the many accusations of malice toward Jews that are said to motivate both his audience’s poor reception of the *AJ*, and the many points of disagreement Josephus raises with the various authors he cites. This Hellenocentric intellectual domination appears to circulate in the form of the discourse of competition over claims to Greekness among Greek-educated elite men of the Roman imperial world, the *πεπαιδευμένοι* I described in Chapters 2 and 3. Certainly many of these elite males can reasonably be said to be in a position of relative dominance in the economic sphere, if not always the political sphere under the autocratic Flavians. The fact that the cultural domination of the specific Greek identity claimed and performed by the *πεπαιδευμένοι* was decoupled from Roman military and political domination does not mean, however, that the power wielded by the *πεπαιδευμένοι* in the form of cultural capital was not a real

³⁶ Barclay 2007:12. See also Bhabha 1994.

³⁷ Though I do not find this destabilization subtle.

form of power. But because the imperial-colonial encounter between Rome and Judea is largely peripheral to the *CA*, postcolonial criticism is not the ideal theoretical framework with which to analyze the question of the paradox of the form and content of the treatise. I turn instead to a theoretical framework that I find more illuminating to my question.

II. Intersectional Feminism

Feminist theories of intersectionality provide a useful methodology for analyzing the relationship between Josephus' asserted Jewish identity and his performed Greek identity. This may seem an unusual framework with which to approach Josephus because his gender identity and gender performance have not been a central focus of my analysis. I will, however, explain why this methodology is appropriate. First, though, I need to give an overview of what I mean by intersectionality. Intersectionality has been the central framework of feminist theorizing (and to a degree, political activism) since Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term in 1989, though its precursors are found as early as Sojourner Truth's famous speech at the Women's Convention in Akron, Ohio in 1851, as well as in the well-known works of authors and activists such as Audre Lorde, bell hooks, and the Combahee River Collective.³⁸ Generally considered the most significant contribution of feminist theorists to critical theory,³⁹ despite its many critics and fault lines within the academy, it remains the central paradigm within feminist theory, one with which even its detractors must contend. As is apparent in the brief genealogy given above, intersectional

³⁸ See e.g. Combahee 1977, hooks 1981 and 1984, Lorde esp. 1984, Crenshaw 1989 and 1991. See also Cooper's useful summary of the history of intersectional feminist theory. Cooper 2016.

³⁹ Cooper 2016: 385.

feminism was first theorized and enacted by black feminists as a means of articulating, theorizing, and advocating for the specific experiences of black women in the United States. It has since been expanded to analyze the experiences of people who live many different kinds of intersecting categories of identity. To define the theory in brief, intersectional feminist theory seeks to map the intersection of “axes of differentiation,” (to use Carbado’s phrase) or social categories that are subject to or implicated in the operation of social power differentials.⁴⁰ The phenomenon of the intersection of multiple axes results in identities that are understood to be more than the sum of their parts; to give an example, intersectional feminists have argued that black women face unique experiences that cannot solely be defined by racism and sexism operating separately.⁴¹ While the theory was originally and has perhaps been primarily used to analyze the experiences of those who are faced with marginalization or oppression at the intersection of multiple axes, particularly gender and race, some recent work emphasizes the appropriateness of the theory not only for marginalized categories but also for dominant, privileged, or normative categories.⁴² Accordingly Carbado, in defending the utility of the theory against recent detractors, remarks that “the theory seeks to map the top of social categories as well [as the bottom].”⁴³ Thus whiteness, masculinity, heteronormativity, and other contemporary domi-

⁴⁰ Carbado 2013: 818.

⁴¹ See Crenshaw 1989 and 1991 for greater detail.

⁴² Carbado 2013. Despite criticisms suggesting the opposite, mainstream intersectional feminist theorists generally view these categories of identity as social or ideological constructs, contextually dependent, and neither static nor essentializing. See Cooper 2016: 389–90. Similarly, I proceed in my analysis of Josephus’ identity on the assumption that the categories “Jew” and “Greek *παιδευμένος*” are not fixed, natural, or in any way essentializing.

⁴³ Carbado 2013: 814.

nant categories can and, Carbado argues, should be analyzed as intersectional, and can intersect with subordinated categories as well. The implication of Carbado's interpretation of intersectional feminist analysis is that people who live at the intersection of dominant and subordinate categories can experience both privilege and marginalization at the same time, and that this experience may take unexpected forms that one might not have been able to predict on the basis of the individual intersecting categories. To give an example, Carbado analyzes race in the efforts of some gay rights activists to legalize gay marriage by presenting an image of gay men as no different from their straight counterparts, but an image which is tacitly of middle-class, white, and normatively masculine gay men. To summarize briefly, Carbado concludes that the effect of this phenomenon is "a naturalization process through which white gay men are incorporated into a white mainstream identity." Conversely, "people who do not satisfy these intersectional standards are not naturalized as gay within mainstream gay rights advocacy, a naturalized status that is itself a prerequisite for incorporation into the mainstream body of the American nation."⁴⁴ In short, whiteness and normative masculinity are leveraged in the service of securing rights for a single axis of oppression, homosexuality. As in the case of those who inhabit the intersection of multiple axes of subordination, for those whose identities comprise axes of both dominance and subordination, the unique matrix of one's identity creates a lived experience in relation to power that is not reducible to its parts.

This brings me back to Josephus. Intersectional feminism may not seem the obvious critical theory to use for this author, but this is at least in part due to the fact that as a

⁴⁴ Carbado 2013: 835–6.

theory it has been slow to make headway in the field of classics. It is in fact difficult to locate examples of classical scholars who engage with intersectional feminism in their work. Yet I have outlined thus far in this dissertation two distinct categories of Josephus' identity, which may here be described as two axes, and I am attempting to explain how Josephus is capable of embodying both even as he asserts that they are largely mutually exclusive, as I explored in Chapter 1. "Greek" and "Jew" intersect in Josephus' self-presentation in the *CA*. This is possible because, as my analysis has shown, these are categories that are not coterminous for Josephus in the *CA*: "Jewish" is primarily an ethnic category,⁴⁵ described by Josephus in terms of kinship, shared history, religious practices, and, to a lesser degree, language and origins in the territory of Judea, as well as a Jewish παιδεία that is presented as superior to Greek παιδεία. The Greek identity that I have argued Josephus performs is an identity expressed and embodied by elite men throughout the Mediterranean during the imperial period and is primarily articulated in terms of education (and abstracted from ethnicity or birth), hence the widespread designation of such men (both in antiquity and in modern scholarship) as the πεπαιδευμένοι.⁴⁶ The particular variety of Greekness that I have analyzed in the *CA* is primarily performed by Josephus as a specific display of education and learning, the likes of which is the privileged reserve of the elite.⁴⁷ In this way, the Greekness performed and constructed through παιδεία indicates a category that has overtones of masculinity, culture, and elite social status simulta-

⁴⁵ See esp. Mason 2009: 141–84.

⁴⁶ In addition to my discussions in chapters 2 and 3, Gleason 1995 is also relevant to any discussion of elite male identity in the imperial period.

⁴⁷ Morgan 1998: 190–239.

neously, and thus is a category apart from the standard categories of identity that are the typical objects of intersectional feminist criticism (gender, race, class, sexual orientation, disability, etc.). This does not, however, speak against my choice to analyze it as intersectional; it is merely indicative of the unique historical circumstances that pertained in the Roman imperial world.

As I discussed in Chapter 1, when Josephus uses the term “Greek” (Ἕλληνες), he generally, but not always, appears to indicate something very much like ethnicity. The fact that he does not always appear to mean this, in keeping with the larger change over time in what the term signified, makes it all the more possible to analyze the *CA* for an abstract, non-ethnic Greek identity resembling the descriptions of the authors of the Second Sophistic, as it suggests that Josephus was aware of the ambiguity of what may be signified by “Greek.”⁴⁸ This identity is not the same thing as ethnicity: ethnic Greeks are not automatically admitted to the ranks of the πεπαιδευμένοι, nor are men of other ethnicities barred from them. This is important to clarify because when I use the terms Jewish and Greek in this analysis, I am talking about categories that are neither inherently conflicting nor mutually exclusive. Josephus’ use of the term “Greek” throughout the course of the treatise of course depends on its ambiguity: his condemnations are directed primarily at ethnic Greeks, yet where he indicates a bicultural identity, namely, an individual who has a non-Greek ethnicity yet participates in Greek learning (see the strikingly similar formulations Josephus uses to describe the Jews among the readership of the *BJ* at 1.51, discussed below, Manetho at 1.73, and Berossus at 1.129, both discussed in Chapter

⁴⁸ See my discussion of the abstraction of the signifier “Greek” from ethnic identity in Chapter 2, pp. 125–7.

3), Greek παιδεία is always presented as not merely positive but as an integral component of what makes these people uniquely capable of communicating the truth about history. The Greek παιδεία of Berossus, Manetho, and Josephus' Jewish audience members is precisely the Greek identity which Josephus displays as his own.

I will now address a couple of possible objections to my application of intersectional feminist theory to Josephus and the *CA* in the hope of forestalling them. It may seem at first pass that it is not necessary to invoke a theoretical framework not widely used in the study of antiquity simply to make the point that a person can have differing experiences of, or make differing representations of, different facets of his identity, with particular attention to the effects of power wielded by or against each respective facet. Yet because the theory is so widely used outside of the study of antiquity, and served as the foundation to my thinking through my question, I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge both the theory and the theorists who created it. Secondly, the fact that intersectionality is at its core a feminist theory developed in the first instance to elucidate the experiences of particular groups or classes of women, and later expanded to be applied not only to men but to people of non-binary gender identity, does not mean that it is not an applicable framework for my analysis of Josephus' identity even though I have not focused primarily on gender. Because the potential categories of human identity upon which power can operate are seemingly illimitable, and because all such categories presumably can intersect in a person's experience, I see no inherent reason not to analyze the intersection of two facets of Josephus' identity, neither of which can strictly be labelled "gender," and meaningfully describe my analysis as an exercise in intersectionality. On

the other hand, I hope to have made clear in the previous two chapters that for those men who styled themselves the *πεπαιδευμένοι*, and sought to police the boundaries of this identity, the category was always at least in part a gendered category. The masculine ending of this participle, as I have used it throughout this study, is not gender-inclusive.⁴⁹ To the extent that my analysis has elucidated the workings of gender, and in particular masculinities, in the *CA*, my analysis may be considered feminist. But as my central focus has been the “Greek” element of the category of *πεπαιδευμένοι* because of the paradox created by Josephus’ anti-Greek polemic, I would not describe this work as primarily, but rather incidentally, concerned with feminist analysis. This does not, however, speak against my use of intersectional feminist theory to elucidate Josephus’ identity for the reasons just described.

Returning to Josephus, we can speak of the privilege of Greek culture and the marginalization of the Jewish past and its historiographers in the *CA* because Josephus’ own framing of the power differential between the two historiographical traditions suggests that the language of marginalization and privilege are not foreign to Josephus’ own conception of the relationship of Greek and Jewish culture. As I have discussed throughout this project, Josephus is at pains to ground his assertions about historiography generally (the good and the bad) in the identities of the peoples who produce them, including (indeed, foregrounding) his own historical works. He begins the treatise with the goal of unseating Greek historiographers from their position of (undeserved) prestige (1.6), and argues that the allotted portions of prestige and discredit that constitute the status quo

⁴⁹ cf. Smyth §197a.

among the major historiographical traditions should, in fact, be reversed (1.58). Josephus moreover has explicitly connected his historiographical authority to his personal history in the war (thus enabling him to compose on the basis of autopsy) and in his social status and education (thus enabling him to translate the Hebrew scriptures in accordance with their inherent φιλοσοφία). For himself, for the authors of the Hebrew scriptures, and for the Greek historiographers, the personal history and character of the historian is inextricably linked with the veracity of the history composed. For Josephus, this personal history is described in terms of both oppression, suffering, and marginalization on the one hand, and privilege, power, and mastery on the other.

To be clear, it is not my intention to paint a picture of Josephus' Jewish identity as always a marginalized identity juxtaposed to his privileged status as a Greek πεπαιδευμένος. This is not how Josephus presents his own Jewish identity in the *CA* or elsewhere. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Josephus goes to some length in the *CA* to emphasize his priestly lineage, which we can here describe as his elite and privileged position among the Jews of Jerusalem. In the *Vita*, Josephus describes his Hasmonean lineage as well, which I will address below. These are distinctly Jewish categories of privilege. In the case of the priesthood, I discussed in Chapter 1 how Josephus argues that his priestly identity constitutes a historiographical credential that is without parallel among the Greeks.⁵⁰ He thus draws attention to his privileged status among the Jews, using this status to its best advantage in his effort to upend Greek historiographical prestige: the elite

⁵⁰ Though priests at many Greek sanctuaries curated their past in the form of inventories of votive offerings (see Higbie 2003: 260 with bibliography), Josephus is nevertheless correct that the Greek world did not have an analogous tradition of a hereditary professional priesthood.

priestly Jewish historiographers are better at what they do precisely because of their status and lineage, which cannot be said of Greek historiographers whose identities are not under the control of any formal institution. Thus, Josephus' relative privilege (as priest) within a group whose tradition is more widely marginalized (the Jews) becomes a platform from which to dispute both his own personal intellectual marginalization at Rome as well as collective Jewish historiographical marginalization. This marginalization of Jewish historiography among the *παιδευμένοι* is Josephus' primary concern in the *CA*. The fortunes of Jews in the war with the Romans as another vector of oppression receives far less attention (though it is significant in one passage which I will discuss below). In the *BJ* and the *Vita*, as one would expect, this theme is far more prominent.

It is certainly the case that Jews in Judea generally, and Josephus specifically, experienced violence and oppression of various kinds and to varying degrees during the war with the Romans. Yet the experience of the war in Judea, and its fallout, did not affect all Jews uniformly. The differences in the positions and experiences of Jews throughout the course of the war is surely a major theme which Josephus wishes to communicate to the readers of the *BJ*. As I will discuss below, Josephus experienced personal gain as a result of the war, alongside his personal suffering and loss. He became a Roman citizen who was given property in the city of Rome, as well as lands in Judea in compensation for his losses in Jerusalem due to the continued Roman occupation.⁵¹ Later Christian sources provide testimony that he also adopted a Roman name, as is typical for those who are

⁵¹ *Vita* 422–3.

granted citizenship.⁵² The *BJ* is littered with accounts of unnamed ordinary people who, by contrast, had no such good fortune. There is thus no monolithic Jewish experience of marginalization or of Roman domination which Josephus can be made to represent.

These remarks on the experience of Roman subordination in Judea are relevant to my larger argument because Josephus writes autobiographically in all of his works. And because he shows an acute sensitivity to the workings of various kinds of power on his identity, experience, and status, I find it illuminating to explore passages in all of his works to show just how attuned to such power differentials Josephus is. In doing so, I will assemble what amounts to an intersectional autobiography across Josephus' corpus. I will not attempt anything like an exhaustive analysis of all of Josephus' autobiographical statements, as that would be a project of vast scope. The purpose of my survey of a few key passages is to show just how remarkably attuned to and concerned with privilege/high status/prestige, on the one hand, and suffering/oppression/marginalization, on the other hand Josephus is throughout his corpus, as well as the impact of such experiences on his own and others' identity, and finally, to demonstrate that he presents these facets of his experience and identity as integral to his capacity to author his works. Thus, my analysis of the passages from outside of the *CA* in which he is closely concerned with Roman power and its effects will illuminate my analysis of Josephus' intersectional identity in the *CA* by showing the direct line that he draws between his own experiences of oppression and privilege and his capacity to compose true histories in those works. In all of his works, Josephus presents himself overtly as uniquely capable of being the author

⁵² Though Josephus never refers to himself as Titus Flavius Josephus. See Mason 2003: 559 n.1.

that he is because of the precise matrix of oppression and privilege that constitutes his identity. This is significant because my explanation of the central paradox of the *CA* is, to a large degree, an extension of this facet of Josephus' self-presentation: his intersectional identity as a Jewish historiographer who is also a Greek *πεπαιδευμένος* is what makes him uniquely capable of authoring the *CA*.

Josephus' Intersectional Biography

I will begin my survey by returning to the proem of the *BJ*, which contains Josephus' earliest extant remarks about himself that in turn present a striking portrait of intersecting privilege and subordination. He opens the *BJ* (at 1.3) with the claim that the Judeo-Roman war was not only the greatest war of all time (recalling Thucydides), but had also been misrepresented by historians due to pro-Roman bias or anti-Jewish malice (taken together with his comparable remarks on malice at the opening of the *CA*, this becomes a familiar motif throughout Josephus' corpus). Such alleged misrepresentation of so important an event supplies Josephus with his motivation for composing the *BJ*:

προυθέμην ἐγὼ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν Ἑλλάδι γλώσση
μεταβαλὼν ἃ τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις τῇ πατρίῳ συντάξας ἀνέπεμψα
πρότερον ἀφηγήσασθαι Ἰώσηπος Ματθίου παῖς ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ἱερεὺς,
αὐτὸς τε Ῥωμαίους πολέμησας τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον παρατυχὼν ἐξ
ἀνάγκης·

I set myself the task of telling the story to those subject to the hegemony⁵³ of the Romans, translating into the Greek language what I had previously composed in my ancestral language and sent to the inland barbarians, I, Josephus, son of Matthias, priest of Jerusalem, who myself both went to war against the Romans at first and later was among them by necessity.

⁵³ Mason observes that ἡγεμονία is a standard Greek translation for *imperium*. Mason 2001: 9 n. 34, citing H. J. Mason 1974: 144–51.

We see in this passage the same sort of complex biculturalism vis-à-vis his Greek and Jewish identities that we have been concerned with in the *CA*: Josephus' first work, his Thucydidean war monograph, is presented in the first instance as a translation into Greek from an Aramaic original that has already circulated among non-Greeks (τοῖς ἄνω βαρβάροις).⁵⁴ I will not enter the fray of the controversy surrounding whether this Aramaic original existed as Josephus here describes it.⁵⁵ I will also remark only in passing that this is a very different description of the composition of the *BJ* from that found at *CA* 1.47–52, much discussed in this study as an exercise in Greek παιδεία, and different too from the description at *AJ* 20.262–7, which more closely resembles the narrative Josephus creates for himself as an intellectual in the *CA*. Instead, I wish to explore here power (namely, Roman power) and its effects as presented in this opening to the work. The audience is explicitly identified as “those subject to the hegemony of the Romans” (τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίαν), a remarkable statement which probably resonates with one of the possible purposes or goals of the *BJ*: that it forms a sort of parable or cautionary tale on the dangers of rebellion against Roman rule.⁵⁶ The status of his projected audience as subordinated suggests that Josephus views himself as likewise in a position of

⁵⁴ See Hata 1975 on Josephus' use of the verb μεταβαλὼν in this passage.

⁵⁵ Mason 2016b summarizes the history of the arguments. In brief: though in the early 20th century it was generally agreed that the Greek *BJ* as we have it was more or less dependent on an Aramaic original sharing the same basic structure, purpose, etc. (a view chiefly represented by Laquer 1920 and Thackeray 1929), this view is no longer credited, because, as Mason succinctly observes, “The whole frame and political logic depend on a Greek discourse widely shared among eastern Mediterranean elites ...” (Mason 2016:17, see also for bibliography of representatives of this latter view). Mason presents the current consensus that whatever its nature, any Aramaic precursor does not help us understand the *BJ* as we now have it; recent scholarship generally takes little interest in this question (Mason 2016b: 18).

⁵⁶ The phrase is without parallel in the extant tradition.

subordination, as appears to be indicated in the final clauses which express what is arguably the central paradox of Josephus' life: "I ... who myself both went to war against the Romans at first and later was among them by necessity" (αὐτός τε Ῥωμαίους πολέμησας τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον παρατυχὼν ἐξ ἀνάγκης). That Josephus presents himself as at one point an enemy of the Romans suggests that he was also an outsider; yet by the τε ... καὶ construction Josephus indicates that his one time hostility toward and non-inclusion among the Romans is commensurate with his later closeness and participation in their cause, however unwilling.⁵⁷ At the same time, along with his patronymic, Josephus identifies himself with his status as "priest of Jerusalem," (ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων ἱερεύς), the first of many indications that Josephus was a member of the Jerusalem aristocracy, a priest of priestly lineage, and, as he will elsewhere indicate, of Hasmonean pedigree; in short, Josephus was a person of considerable standing before, during, and after the war, a fact to which he draws his readers' attention in all of his works. This high standing which Josephus claims for himself manifestly exists alongside his subordination here and elsewhere, as I will demonstrate.

The expression of Josephus' privileged high status (albeit also subordinated) contained in *BJ* 1.3 is followed shortly thereafter by a portrait of the author's personal grief. The memorable appeal for indulgence from the reader for Josephus' emotional descriptions of his and his compatriots' sufferings is found at 1.11–12:

εἰ δὴ τις ὅσα πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ἢ τὸ ληστικὸν αὐτῶν κατηγορικῶς
λέγοιμεν ἢ τοῖς δυστυχήμασι τῆς πατρίδος ἐπιστένοντες συκοφαντοίη,
διδότω παρὰ τὸν τῆς ἱστορίας νόμον συγγνώμην τῷ πάθει· πόλιν μὲν γὰρ

⁵⁷ There are some remarkable similarities between Josephus' position as described in the *BJ* and Polybius' in the *Histories*. See Cohen 1982, Eckstein 1990, and Gruen 2011b.

δὴ τῶν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίοις πασῶν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπὶ πλεῖστόν τε εὐδαιμονίας συνέβη προελθεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἔσχατον συμφορῶν αὐθις καταπεσεῖν· τὰ γοῦν πάντων ἀπ' αἰῶνος ἀτυχήματα πρὸς τὰ Ἰουδαίων ἡττηθῆναι δοκῶ κατὰ σύγκρισιν· καὶ τούτων αἴτιος οὐδεὶς ἀλλόφυλος, ὥστε ἀμήχανον ἦν ὀδυρμῶν ἐπικρατεῖν. εἰ δέ τις οἴκτου σκληρότερος εἴη δικαστής, τὰ μὲν πράγματα τῇ ἱστορίᾳ προσκρινέτω, τὰς δ' ὀλοφύρσεις τῷ γράφοντι.

But if someone should bring false charges against so many things which I may say in accusation against the tyrants or their bandits or me as I lament over the misfortunes of my country, let him grant sympathy for my suffering, contrary to the custom of historiography. For it happened to my city that it surpassed all others subject to the Romans in good fortune, and fell again into the most extreme disaster. And so I think that the misfortunes of all peoples ever are, by comparison, less than those of the Jews. And no foreigner was responsible for these, which made it impossible to keep my lamenting under control. But if anyone should be a rather harsh judge of my grief, let him assign the events to history, the mourning to the author.

Josephus presents his experience of continued emotional suffering long after the events of the war are past.⁵⁸ The language of grief and lamentation is pervasive in the passage.

Josephus begs for his reader's sympathy for what he presents as an uncontrollable, spontaneous, and transgressive intrusion of his feelings into his writing. The pose of spontaneity is necessarily artificial, particularly in so polished a work as the *BJ*. It is striking how many terms denoting oral expressions of grief Josephus chooses to use to describe his grief, which is presented as perceptible in his writing (ἐπιστένοντες, ὀδυρμῶν). Such expressions create the impression of genuine feeling by suggesting in the oral manifestation of grief something apart from and outside of the written account of the author's feelings. They also serve as a form of *captatio benevolentiae*, since they come at the opening of

⁵⁸ As Mason observes, though in the expression of a different point, Josephus has attached his emotional outburst to the outcome of the war, which was well known to his audience. Mason 2016b: 19.

the work, in line with Aristotle's remarks at *Rhet.* 1408a23–5 that an orator's audience always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally (τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι).⁵⁹

That Josephus presents the manifestation of his suffering in his writing as a transgression of “the custom of historiography” (παρὰ τὸν τῆς ἱστορίας νόμον)⁶⁰ speaks to the identity between the historian and his writing which I have traced in the *CA*, and raises a striking paradox: what is the historian to do if, as Josephus has argued in the *CA*, it is his personal experience (autopsy) which generates his historiographical authority and veracity, yet that very experience was in fact traumatic and has engendered tremendous suffering in the author within a genre to which expression of such personal emotion from the author is not appropriate?⁶¹ For Josephus, the answer is found in his appeal to his audience to engage with his history with a sort of filter in place: the events or facts (τὰ πράγματα) are the proper stuff of history, while grief belongs only to the person who wrote it. Whereas in the *CA* the identity between author and historical text appears absolute, here in the *BJ*, the conventions of the genre of historiography are inadequate for the

⁵⁹ See Marincola 2003: 292.

⁶⁰ Josephus' phrase “τὸν τῆς ἱστορίας νόμον” is without parallel among his predecessors or contemporaries. Later parallels include the 4th century historian and rhetorician Eunapius (*Fragmenta Historica* 206, on a reckless style, ὅπερ ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας οὐκ ἐθέλει νόμος (Dindorf 1870)) and the 5th century church historian Socrates of Constantinople (*Hist. Eccl.* 6, Proem, Line 32, on the historian's promise to present a true narrative, τοῖς νόμοις τῆς ἱστορίας πειθόμενος (Hansen, Maraval and Périchon, 2004–2007)).

⁶¹ The description of Jerusalem's extreme reversal is evocative of tragedy. On tragic elements in the *BJ*, see Mason 2016: 29–30, Chapman 1998. It is not my intention here to raise the specter of “tragic history,” an antiquated scholarly construct that was dealt a lethal blow by Walbank 1955 and 1960. See esp. Marincola 2003 for a discussion of the arguments and for bibliography. As Marincola argues, Greek historiographers deliberately sought to arouse emotion in their readers/hearers (Marincola 2003: 292–302). It is clear from Marincola's analysis of Polybius' remarks on emotion in historiography that this emotion was meant to be directed at characters in histories. There is no indication that historians ever intended their audience to feel sympathy for *themselves*. Thus it is not the presence of emotional language nor the attempt to engender feeling in the audience that appears to violate the “custom of historiography,” but the fact that Josephus, in his authorial voice and speaking autobiographically, expresses the suffering of the characters of his history as also his personal suffering. For an instance of an emotional intrusion into the narrative, see Josephus' apostrophe to the city of Jerusalem at *BJ* 5.19.

full expression of human experience of τὰ πράγματα. There exists a portion of Josephus' experience of the war that exists outside of, beyond, and in excess of what is customary for the historian, but which has nevertheless intruded against Josephus' will. At least, so he presents it. Josephus' presentation of his excess of emotion bordering on a loss of control converges with his picture of authorial control and agency during the composition of the *BJ* at *CA* 1.48–52 in precisely the tight connection between history and historian: for Josephus, both his account of the war and the emotions of his experience of it are fundamentally his own. As in the lengthy strictures on methodology and historiographical credentials of *CA* 1.6–59, Josephus here expresses a consciousness of how one ought to compose history (though the rules, so to speak, are different), but in contrast to the *CA*, Josephus claims in the *BJ* overtly to have violated it. We should be clear, however, that Josephus does not indicate that his violation in any way impacts the veracity of this history; that would undermine the given purpose of the work developed at 1.1–10: to set the record straight amid myriad false accounts. Emotional expression, Josephus tells us at 1.9, is not in the same category as partiality:

οὐ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῖς ἐπαίρουσι τὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀντιφιλονεικῶν αὖξιν τὰ τῶν
ὁμοφύλων διέγων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔργα μετ' ἀκριβείας ἀμφοτέρων διέξειμι,
τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι λόγους ἀνατίθημι τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τοῖς ἔμμαντοῦ
πάθεσι διδοὺς ἐπολοφύρεσθαι ταῖς τῆς πατρίδος συμφοραῖς.

Nor indeed did I decide, contending against those who praise the Romans' actions, to exaggerate those of my own people, but I expound the deeds of both sides with accuracy; I attribute the language used to describe the events to my emotional state and, because of my personal suffering, allow myself to mourn my country's disaster.

Emotional language and the facts that it relates are separable aspects of the work in Josephus' presentation. It is thus apparent that Josephus draws considerable attention to his own suffering and subordination in the opening lines of the *BJ*, while at the same time he displays a degree of privilege in both his elite status as priest and in his role as intellectual and historiographer with a unique mastery of the truth. Josephus has manifestly suffered because he was a Jew residing in Judea, a subjugated territory that faced catastrophic violence at the hands of the Romans, even if he does not overtly blame the Romans for their violence or for his ensuing grief. This suffering does not negate nor is it negated by his relative privilege within the category "Jewish": in the *BJ* and elsewhere, Josephus describes his elite status among the Jews, the very identity which has in part enabled him to become a historiographer. By the same token, it is Josephus' experience of personal subjugation to the Romans (τοῖς ... παρατυχῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης at 1.3) that has engendered his capacity to write his history. We thus see that in the opening of the *BJ*, the intersection of privilege and subordination have created the unique conditions of Josephus' identity as the historian of the war.

Josephus' *Vita* is of course the only one of his works to lay claim to the genre of autobiography.⁶² He includes details about his ancestry, education, social status, and personal history during the war, in keeping with the expectations of the genre.⁶³ An analysis of a few passages from the *Vita* will show how the intersection of Josephus' presentation of his own privilege and oppression create a complex picture of the historian and his in-

⁶² Such as it is. See Josephus' description of the appended *Vita* at *AJ* 20.266. On autobiography in antiquity, see Misch 1951 Vol. 1 and 2.

⁶³ See Mason 2001: XLI–XLIII with bibliography.

v involvement in the war. Let's begin with Josephus' fullest statement of his privileged aristocratic status, found at the opening of the *Vita*, chapters 1–3:

ἐμοὶ δὲ γένος ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄσημον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱερέων ἄνωθεν καταβεβηκός.
ὥσπερ δ' ἡ παρ' ἐκάστοις ἄλλη τίς ἐστὶν εὐγενείας ὑπόθεσις, οὕτως παρ'
ἡμῖν ἡ τῆς ἱερωσύνης μετουσία τεκμήριόν ἐστιν γένους λαμπρότητος. (2)
ἐμοὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἱερέων ἐστὶν τὸ γένος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης
ἐφημερίδος⁶⁴ τῶν εἰκοσιτεσσάρων—πολλὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διαφορά—καὶ
τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ φυλῶν⁶⁵ ἐκ τῆς ἀρίστης. ὑπάρχω δὲ καὶ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ
γένους ἀπὸ τῆς μητρός· οἱ γὰρ Ἀσαμωναίου παῖδες, ὧν ἑγγονος ἐκείνη,
τοῦ ἔθνους ἡμῶν ἐπὶ μήκιστον χρόνον ἡρχιεράτευσαν καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν.
(3) ἐρῶ δὲ τὴν διαδοχὴν·

My family is not undistinguished, having originated from the priests by descent. As the principle of noble birth is unique to each people, so among us participation in the priesthood is a mark of distinguished birth. My family is not only from the priests, but from the first day-course of the twenty-four (there would be much distinction accorded this ancestry), and of the ranks within this day course, I am of the finest. I am also of royal descent on my mother's side; for the children of Hasmoneus, of whom she was a descendant, were the high priests and kings of our people for the greatest duration. I shall tell our succession ...

Josephus proceeds to provide a (suspect) genealogy of his father's line down to himself, which he claims at 6 is recorded thus in the priestly genealogical records discussed at *CA* 1.31–5.⁶⁶ In the above passage, Josephus unabashedly seeks to ensure that his audience understands the important details about the markers of his aristocratic status—namely, that on all counts, he belongs to the *crème de la crème*.⁶⁷ Such self-praise is not out of place in the extant autobiographical *commentarii*/ὑπομνήματα produced at Rome in the

⁶⁴ On the Biblical tradition of the “day-courses” of the Jewish priesthood, and Josephus' possible misrepresentation of his position within them, see Mason 2001: 4–5.

⁶⁵ Josephus also uses φυλή to indicate such divisions of the priesthood at *BJ* 4.155. See Mason 2001: 5 n. 12.

⁶⁶ Mason argues that Josephus' chronology at *Vita* 3–5 does not add up. See Mason 2001: 7–10.

⁶⁷ As Mason indicates. Mason 2001: *ad loc.*, 2016b: 68.

late republic and Augustan era.⁶⁸ Mason correctly observes that Josephus appears to frame the *Vita* within this genre by his introduction to it at *AJ* 20.266: ὑπομνήσω πάλιν τοῦ τε πολέμου καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἡμῖν μέχρι τῆς νῦν ἐνεστώσης ἡμέρας ...⁶⁹

A brief survey of some passages from the end of the *Vita* further illuminates the complexities of Josephus' self-presentation of his relationship to Roman power in this work. For example, at 414, Josephus explains the circumstances under which he married a woman while both were still held captive:

τῆς γὰρ τῶν Ἰωταπάτων πολιορκίας λαβούσης τέλος, γενόμενος παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, μετὰ πάσης ἐπιμελείας ἐφυλασσόμεν, τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τιμῆς ἄγοντός με Οὐεσπασιανοῦ, καὶ δὴ κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ ἡγαγόμεν τινὰ παρθένον ἐκ τῶν αἰχμαλωτίδων ...

When the siege of Jotapata had finally ended, I had come to be among the Romans and was guarded with every care, Vespasian treating me in most respects with honor, and indeed at his bidding I took a certain virgin as wife from among the captive women ...

Josephus here asserts that he was given a position of relative privilege even while a captive of the Romans. His description of the honor (διὰ τιμῆς) he received from Vespasian is an odd juxtaposition with the description of himself as under guard (ἐφυλασσόμεν).

Shortly thereafter, at 417–8, after the capture of Jerusalem, Josephus describes how Titus insisted that Josephus take whatever spoil he wanted from the ruined city, but Josephus requested only the freedom of certain people and some sacred books, because there was no consolation more valuable to him: ἐγὼ δὲ τῆς πατρίδος πεσούσης, μηδὲν ἔχων

⁶⁸ Mason 2001: XLI–XLII, citing Wiseman 1985. Not all autobiographies produced at Rome were Latin; the most obvious model for Josephus' *Vita* is Nicolaus of Damascus' *Περὶ Αὐτοῦ Βιοῦ*, which appears to have been written and published in conjunction with his 144-volume universal history, with the plausible intention of defending his earlier career and relationship to Herod the Great. See Toher 2009 on the possible purpose of the autobiography and Jacoby *FGrHist* 90 for the collected fragments of Nicolaus.

⁶⁹ Mason 2001: XLII.

τιμιώτερον, ὃ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ συμφορῶν εἰς παραμυθίαν λαβὼν φυλάξαιμι ... (“But since my native land had fallen, I considered nothing more valuable, which I might take and keep as a solace for my own misfortunes...” at 418). It is Josephus’ privileged relationship to Titus that affords him the opportunity to take his choice of the plunder, and to make the noble request for the lives of his countrymen and for the sacred scriptures. The Jews who survive by Josephus’ intervention do not share his privileged relationship to Titus. The traumatic devastation of the city, Josephus’ home, has made this privilege appear hollow, however, as it fails to console him for his loss. In a particularly harrowing scene, Josephus describes at 420–1 how on a mission for Titus he observed crucified prisoners and recognized three of his friends among them, and, says Josephus: “I was grieved in my soul and approaching Titus in tears I told him.” (ἤλγησά τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μετὰ δακρύων προσελθὼν Τίτῳ εἶπον.) In response, Titus had the men taken down and cared for; one of them survived. It is again Josephus’ position in relationship to Titus that put him in contact with the crucified men, allowed him to make his request, and prompted Titus to grant it. The crucified Jews do not share Josephus’ access to Titus’ ear. Yet it is Josephus’ pain, as he describes it, which prompts his request, and the violence of Judea’s Roman colonizers which causes his pain. Josephus’ pain is also of a different nature from that of his countrymen who are tortured to death. These passages from the *Vita*, surveyed together, show how Josephus’ claims to high status and privilege, where marked by favor from high-ranking Romans, are also inextricably bound to his experience of subordination to Romans, and sometimes to the experience of horrific violence at Roman hands.

I have offered so far in this section a mere token survey of passages in the *BJ* and *Vita* in which Josephus' experience and claims of both privilege and oppression are on display. Because both the *BJ* and the *Vita* are closely concerned with Romans, their actions in Judea, and Josephus' relationship to them, it is not surprising that Josephus has a great deal to say about his relationship to Roman power and to the privilege and suffering that he experiences because of it. I hope to have illuminated the intersection of Josephus' identity and position vis-à-vis Roman power as a Jew, former enemy combatant, and former war captive who, after being treated in a manner commensurate with his rank in the Roman camp, ultimately moved laterally from a position of considerable privilege and rank as a member of the Jerusalem aristocracy to a similar position of privilege within the Flavian imperial court. Both privilege and oppression can operate simultaneously and be intertwined in the same person.

The particular matrix of power and oppression described by Josephus in these two works is, moreover, also what constitute him as an author: in the opening of the *BJ*, Josephus presents these facets of his identity as not only the sources of his historiographical authority, but as also responsible for the emotional quality of his prose. In the *Vita*, it is Josephus' elite status that serves as his foothold in the genre of autobiography, while his actions and experience in the war serve as the primary subject matter of the work.⁷⁰ Similar themes are to be found in the *CA*, though with less attention to Josephus' interactions with Romans. I will now examine the question of relative privilege and oppression in the *CA* both where Josephus describes the relationship of his identity as an author in connec-

⁷⁰ See again Mason 2001: XLI–XLII and XLVII–L and Mason 2016c.

tion to Roman power, but of more particular interest to my larger question, where Josephus' performed identity as a Greek *πεπαιδευμένος* intersects with his statements about the marginalization of non-Greek, and specifically Jewish, historiography. I will also consider an important passage in the *AJ* in connection to Josephus' engagement with the power exerted by Greek culture.

Intersectionality and the CA

Let us revisit briefly Josephus' description of the process of composing the *BJ* at *CA* 1.48–52, discussed above. I have already examined the power dynamics described by Josephus in this passage and argued that Josephus presents himself as acting with a high degree of autonomy throughout this process (in contrast to Barclay's view of frightened self-censorship). I would like to make some further observations about this passage which I believe have bearing on the current exploration of Josephus' intersectional autobiography, because this passage, like so many of the others explored in this section, shows a remarkable and complex interplay of privilege and oppression. To begin with, Josephus yet again gives his personal history of the war, here in very brief terms, but nevertheless reminiscent of the comparable passages at *BJ* 1.1 and *Vita* 414.⁷¹ Thus *CA* 1.48:

ἐγενόμην δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις συλληφθεὶς αἰχμάλωτος καὶ με διὰ φυλακῆς
Οὐεσπασιανὸς καὶ Τίτος ἔχοντες ἀεὶ προσεδρεύειν αὐτοῖς ἠνάγκασαν τὸ

⁷¹ It is not my intention here to tread the well-worn path of “inconsistencies” in Josephus' varying extant accounts of his activities in the war, or the many other points of overlap in his historical works. The literature on this topic is vast and the various aspersions cast upon Josephus' skill as historian found in much of it are unhelpful. Fortunately, recent work that analyzes these issues while taking into account literary and rhetorical elements in historiography does much to advance the conversation. See with bibliography e.g. Landau 2006, Mason 2009: 103–37, 2016a and 2016b.

μὲν πρῶτον δεδεμένον, αὖθις δὲ λυθείς συνεπέμφθη ἀπὸ τῆς
 Ἀλεξανδρείας Τίτῳ πρὸς τὴν Ἱεροσολύμων πολιορκίαν...

Then I was among the Romans, since I had been taken as a captive, and
 Vespasian and Titus, keeping me under guard, compelled me to attend
 them constantly, at first bound, but later when I had been freed I was sent
 from Alexandria with Titus to the siege of Jerusalem.

Josephus' liberation from physical chains (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δεδεμένον, αὖθις δὲ λυθείς) is presented as a turning point in his capacity to be a historian, for it is his presence with Titus at the siege of Jerusalem that fully facilitates his autopsy and record-keeping, as he describes in 1.50. Everything in this sentence prior to the participle λυθείς with its contrastive δὲ is a story of oppression: captivity, imprisonment, guards, compulsory service,⁷² chains. Josephus' freedom is a highly circumscribed freedom, however. Despite the control over the process of composition present in this passage, Josephus also implies (1) that certain realities of his situation existed by necessity rather than his will (i.e. at 48, he stopped resisting because resistance became impossible (ἕως ἀντέχειν δυνατόν ἦν), and at 49, his service to the Flavians began under compulsion (ἀεὶ προσεδρεύειν αὐτοῖς ἡνάγκασαν)), and (2) that he is in a subordinate position to the Roman command even after his release from bonds (note the passive verb in the construction at 49 συνεπέμφθη ... Τίτῳ, which suggests that Josephus lacked agency on this occasion: there is no implication that he simply could have gone wherever he wanted, even if he implies that he had much greater freedom during his later leisure in Rome.) Josephus, of course, also highlights the privilege he claims for himself during this period, which appears to increase steadily from the moment of his release from bonds. Here as elsewhere, he highlights his

⁷² προσεδρεύειν is a relatively uncommon verb that indicates service or attendance. LSJ 1.

proximity to the Flavian generals, even while still a prisoner, as well as his connections to members of the Judean royal family. As I remarked above, Josephus mentions these particular people as readers who can testify to his truthfulness with the purpose of proving the veracity of the *BJ*; their high (indeed, highest) rank is meant to guarantee their character, and thus the value of their alleged testimony. By associating himself with them (along with Josephus' fellow Jews who "have a share of Greek wisdom" (ἀνδράσι καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σοφίας μετεσχηκόσιν)), and claiming them as audience members, Josephus also lays claim to an elite status for himself.

As I discussed in the previous section, Josephus' claims in *CA* 1.48–52 have the primary purpose of establishing and bolstering his authority as the author of the *BJ*, grounded in autopsy, bipartisanship, and the testimony of elite men. Yet this authority is also inextricably bound to Josephus' intersectional identity, for the very bases for his claims to historiographical authority are his experience in the war (so frequently described in terms of his personal suffering), his experience in both camps (in which his capture, imprisonment, and subsequent privileged status among the Romans are central elements), and his proximity to and relationship with elite Romans, in particular Vespasian and Titus. This relationship is characterized in all of the descriptions I have discussed by the tension of simultaneous subordination and elevation, or relative yet circumscribed privilege rooted in personal loss. As in the opening of the *BJ*, where in Josephus' presentation his relationship to Roman power created his motivation to compose the work, here in the *CA*, it is apparent that the *BJ* is fundamentally the product of Josephus' intersectional identity. By his own presentation, Josephus could never have composed his

war monograph had he not had these precise experiences. In this, we observe again how Josephus practically equates the historical work itself with the identity of the man who composed it. Here alone in the *CA* is the tripartite nature of Josephus' identity—Jewish, Greek, and Roman—fully on display. For the Jewish element of the audience he describes at 1.51 “men who have a share in Greek wisdom” (ἀνδράσι καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σοφίας μετεσχηκόσιν), who are defined primarily by their participation in Greek learning. This participation virtually constitutes a credential for their affirmation of the truth of the *BJ*, thus marked as itself an exercise in the Greek tradition, though paradoxically given Josephus' arguments in the treatise thus far. Josephus' Roman connections and privileged status in the city are otherwise unmentioned in the treatise.

Let us turn to the power differential to which Josephus gives greater prominence in the *CA*: the allegedly undeserved prestige accorded the Greek historiographical tradition at the expense of the credit accorded the traditions of other peoples. Josephus unambiguously asserts that the Jewish historiographical tradition has been marginalized in a Hellenocentric intellectual sphere. This is central to Josephus' first claim in the treatise at 1.6:

πρῶτον οὖν ἐπέρχεται μοι πάνυ θαυμάζειν τοὺς οἰομένους δεῖν περὶ τῶν παλαιοτάτων ἔργων μόνοις προσέχειν τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ παρὰ τούτων πυνθάνεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἀπιστεῖν...

In the first place, it occurs to me to be completely amazed by those who think that one need only pay attention to the Greeks when it comes to ancient history and learn the truth from them, but disbelieve both us and other peoples...

This is perhaps Josephus' clearest statement that Greek historiographers maintain an unearned monopoly of prestige when it comes to ancient history, while Jews are not given the credit they deserve. The point is crucial to the purpose Josephus has set out in the proem of defending the veracity of the *AJ* against his alleged critics: the *AJ* is translated from Jewish histories, and its content by and large cannot be corroborated by the Greek historiographical tradition, even if Josephus will counter the accusation of Greek silence on the Jews with (dubious) examples of Greek engagement with Jewish history. The alleged malice of Josephus' critics at 1.2 is described as intrinsic to the marginalization of the Jewish tradition: this malice motivates their alleged objections to the *AJ*. In short, Josephus presents this imbalance in prestige as fundamental to the composition of a treatise which in his own presentation need never have been written had the *AJ*'s audience been more just in their reception of his magnum opus.

Thus the material I presented in Chapter 1 is closely connected with this claim of marginalization: Jewish historiographical conventions, νόμοι, political organization, and the like are both different from and marginalized by Greek culture. I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3, on the other hand, that Josephus performs an identity as one of the Greek πεπαιδευμένοι at the level of the form of the treatise, which constitutes a display and performance of privilege (namely, elite status) as much as it is a display of a particular claim to elite Greek identity shared by many elite men in the Mediterranean under the Flavian emperors and later. The high level of engagement with Greek learning in everything from the conspicuous display of authors to the more subtle intertextualities to his Atticism all serve to mark Josephus as an elite male, a member of the upper social eche-

lon of the *πεπαιδευμένοι* by this performance as much as the priestly aristocratic status to which he so frequently refers and the wealth he claims are means by which he signals his elite status (Josephus' wealth is implicit at *CA* 1.50, explicit at *Vita* 422, 425, and 429).

Greekness and Greek *παιδεία* as a social category separate from ethnicity becomes, then, a category which can intersect with the category "Jewish" as an ethnic category. The two are thus not mutually exclusive, even if Josephus represents "Jewish" and "Greek" as conflicting in reference to the traditions of primarily ethnic Greeks. Josephus' Greekness is an identity that is registered in its performance without needing to be stated or overtly claimed.⁷³ Most important of all, Josephus is capable of experiencing privilege as a Greek *πεπαιδευμένος* and marginalization as a Jew at the same time. The apparent paradox of Josephus' identity in the *CA* is expressive of this intersection. For it is precisely this exceptional position of intersection that enables him to recognize the workings of power in the intellectual domain because he is in possession of the education, language, etc. that are necessary to participate in the conversation in the first place. Because he is a participant in both the dominant and the marginalized traditions, he is not only capable of seeing that this marginalization exists, but has a vested interest in articulating it in terms that are intelligible to the dominant tradition. The illiterate Jewish slave does not know that Greek historians have ignored her people's history or have denied their antiquity. The elite ethnic Greek aristocrat does not know what he does not know about the Jews, nor

⁷³ Though other non-ethnic Greeks chose to lay explicit claim to it at times.

might he care to be corrected.⁷⁴ It takes a Josephus to be able to see and articulate the power differential between these intellectual traditions.

Josephus comes close to saying as much at the close of the *AJ*. After providing a closing summary of work, reiterating that he has translated from the Hebrew scriptures, Josephus remarks of his efforts, his credentials, and his identity as a writer at *AJ* 20.262–5:

λέγω δὴ θαρσύνων ἤδη διὰ τὴν τῶν προτεθέντων συντέλειαν, ὅτι μηδεὶς ἂν ἕτερος ἠδυνήθη θελήσας μήτε Ἰουδαῖος μήτε ἀλλόφυλος τὴν πραγματείαν ταύτην οὕτως ἀκριβῶς εἰς Ἑλλήνας ἐξενεγκεῖν· (263) ἔχω γὰρ ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ τῶν ὁμοεθνῶν πλεῖστον αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχώριον παιδείαν διαφέρειν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δὲ γραμμάτων ἐσπούδασα μετασχεῖν τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀναλαβὼν, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὴν προφορὰν ἀκρίβειαν πάτριος ἐκώλυσεν συνήθεια. (264) παρ' ἡμῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐκείνους ἀποδέχονται τοὺς πολλῶν ἔθνων διάλεκτον ἐκμαθόντας διὰ τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι νομίζειν τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τοῦτο μόνον οὐκ ἐλευθέρους τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν τοῖς θέλουσι, μόνοις δὲ σοφίαν μαρτυροῦσιν τοῖς τὰ νόμιμα σαφῶς ἐπισταμένοις καὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων δύναμιν ἐρμηνεύσαι δυναμένοις. (265) διὰ τοῦτο πολλῶν πονησάντων περὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν ταύτην μόλις δύο τινὲς ἢ τρεῖς κατώρθωσαν καὶ τῶν πόνων τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν εὐθὺς ἔλαβον.

Indeed I say with audacity since I have completed what I set out to do, that no other person, neither Jew nor gentile, would have been able and willing to produce this history so accurately for the Greeks. (263) For my countrymen agree that I excel them most in our native παιδεία and I endeavored to have a share of Greek letters and poetic learning by taking up grammatical practice, which my native usage has prevented as regards accurate pronunciation. (264) For among us they do not approve of those who have studied thoroughly the speech of many peoples because they consider this pursuit to be common not only to ordinary free men, but also to willing slaves, but they testify to the wisdom only of those who understand our customs unerringly and who are able to interpret the meaning of the sacred scriptures. (265) For this reason, of the many people who have

⁷⁴ On the lack of interest in the Jewish past among Greek intellectuals, see Momigliano 1975a: 92, Bickerman 1952: 68.

labored at this discipline hardly two or three succeeded and took the direct fruit of their labors.

Josephus thus lays claim to a unique capacity as a historian that is grounded in his education in both the Greek and the Jewish traditions, both of which he implies are necessary preconditions for writing a work like the *AJ*. He unambiguously lays claim to rare distinction in Jewish παιδεία and ἄσκησις, asserting in striking terms that “hardly two or three” people have ever reached such attainments among the Jews. His remarks at 264 might give us pause as to my claims that Greek education constitutes an elite identity; Josephus is clearly stating that among the Jews, the study of the “speech of many peoples” (τοὺς πολλῶν ἐθνῶν διάλεκτον ἐκμαθόντας) is considered common to both free men and to “willing slaves” (τῶν οἰκετῶν τοῖς θέλουσι). It is not, however, Greek παιδεία, here represented as the “grammatical practice” of “Greek letters and poetic learning,” that is the target of alleged Jewish disdain, but “accurate pronunciation” of spoken Greek, presented here as a foreign language.⁷⁵ Feeney has recently argued that oral/aural bilingualism was a relative commonplace in comparison with literate bilingualism in the ancient Mediterranean.⁷⁶ Josephus claims that the ability to imitate the speech patterns of Greek-speaking foreigners is set against book learning in the Jewish tradition, over which Josephus asserts rare, virtually unique mastery. All of this is, of course, offered as an excuse for Josephus’ claimed verbal deficiencies, presumably presented as detectable during an oral recitation of the *AJ*.

⁷⁵ In Chapter 2, I cited Rajak’s argument that Josephus is referring to a regional accent of Greek that is perceptible to Greek speakers at Rome (Rajak 1983: 49–50).

⁷⁶ Feeney 2016: 25–30. Though Feeney is primarily interested in Hellenistic Italy, the point is surely relevant to multicultural Judea during Josephus’ lifetime.

The participle θελήσας in 262 is curious and worth unpacking. It is straightforward enough that Josephus claims that no other person would have been capable of composing the *AJ* (μηδεὶς ἂν ἕτερος ἡδυνήθη), but why would no one else have been willing? It may be helpful to consider Josephus' remarks at the work's opening, where he describes his process of composing the *AJ*: he had nearly despaired of the task because of its magnitude (and the difficulty of translation), but chose to persevere because of the desire of his audience (ἦσαν δέ τινες οἱ πόθῳ τῆς ἱστορίας ἐπ' αὐτήν με προύτρεπον at *AJ* 1.8). He was further motivated, he says, by a recollection described at 1.9: "I considered seriously, as to our ancestors, whether they were willing to share out such matters, and as to the Greeks, whether any of them were eager to learn our history." (...λογισάμενος οὐ παρέργως, περί τε τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων εἰ μεταδιδόναι τῶν τοιούτων ἤθελον, καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινες αὐτῶν γινῶναι τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐσπούδασαν.) Josephus next cites the story of the translation of the Septuagint as a historical precedent for his "translation" of the *AJ*: then as earlier, there was an interested audience, in Josephus' words at 1.12, "many people who, like the king (sc. Ptolemy II Philadelphus), are lovers of learning" (τῷ βασιλεῖ δὲ πολλοὺς ὁμοίως ... φιλομαθεῖς). Desire, willingness, and the intellectual curiosity denoted by φιλομαθεῖς all express an attitude or disposition which Josephus presents as a necessary precondition on the part of both parties (audience and author alike) for the composition of the *AJ*, as integral as Josephus' prodigious skill and learning. In this regard, it is significant that Josephus identifies his audience for the *AJ* as "the Greeks," explicitly at *AJ* 1.5.⁷⁷ For what Josephus has done in the *AJ* is make Jewish

⁷⁷ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν ἐγκεχείρισμαι πραγματείαν νομίζων ἅπασιν φανεῖσθαι τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἀξίαν σπουδῆς ... See Teets 2013: 103–5 with bibliography.

history intelligible to Greeks (that is, those in possession of Greek παιδεία), not simply by translating the Hebrew tradition into Greek, for that had already been done in the Septuagint, as Josephus points out to his readers, but by composing a work of belletristic Greek historiography. That is to say, Josephus has composed a work according to the conventions of style, structure, and themes of Greek historiography intended to be read by hellenophone intellectuals, the language and style of which bears little resemblance to the vernacular translation of the Septuagint.⁷⁸ Josephus has written a work on Jewish history in the register and according to the norms of the elite Greek πεπαιδευμένοι.⁷⁹ This leads us back to *AJ* 20.262–5, and Josephus’ assertion that no other person would have been capable of producing the *AJ*. Only a person in possession of the education that is exclusive to the elite, both Greek and Jewish, is capable of this task.

Whereas in the *AJ*, Josephus apparently expected his work to be received by a willing and curious audience, in the *CA*, he describes an audience that has received the history with hostility. It would appear, then, that Josephus’ efforts at making Jewish history intelligible to Greeks has failed, and as I discussed in Chapter 2, according to Josephus the blame lies squarely on the audience and their malicious attitude (at least for some of them).⁸⁰ It is in the *CA*, and not in the *AJ*, that Josephus expresses the marginalization of

⁷⁸ On the language of the Septuagint, see Horrocks 2014: 106–8. On the *AJ*’s stylistic difference from the Septuagint, see Feldman 1988: 457.

⁷⁹ Feldman 1988: 457, Barclay 2005 n. 2.

⁸⁰ Momigliano describes the chilly reception of the LXX by gentiles as a lack of interest on the part of non-Jews in Jewish history that does not conform to pre-conceived ideas about the Jews (Momigliano 1975a: 92). What Momigliano sees as a pattern of Jews failing to make themselves known on their own terms in the Hellenistic era appears to be repeated in Josephus’ remarks on the reception of the *AJ* in the proem of the *CA*.

the Jewish tradition that is the byproduct of the Hellenocentric orientation of the elite *πεπαιδευμένοι* (styled simply “the Greeks” (τοῖς Ἑλλησιν) at *AJ* 1.5). Because Josephus is an elite participant in the marginalized Jewish tradition, he can see its marginalization. Because he is also a member of the Hellenocentric *πεπαιδευμένοι*, he can articulate his experience as a Jew within the norms of the Hellenocentric intellectual tradition. Josephus can be marginalized as a Jew at the same time that he expresses himself in the language of another facet of his identity, an elite Greek *πεπαιδευμένος*. It is, in fact, precisely his position of privilege as a *πεπαιδευμένος* that has afforded him the knowledge of the alleged failings of the Greek tradition. He is capable of his claims of Greek ignorance of the Jews, of the gaps in the record, the silences, because of his extensive reading of Greek literature. He is capable of critiquing alleged Greek malice toward Jews, attitudes of arrogance or envy, because of his rhetorical training. His use of etymology and other tools of the literary-critical trade is made possible by his reading of Alexandrian critics.⁸¹ To put it bluntly, the *CA*—its content as well as its form—would simply not be possible if Josephus was not in possession of such training. In other words, Josephus’ Greek identity is a necessary pre-condition for the composition of the treatise. This is essentially a re-focusing of the question: one should not ask so much why Josephus should choose to utilize Greek critical and rhetorical methods in his dismantling of Greek cultural dominance, but instead why Josephus, who is a Greek *πεπαιδευμένος* by his performed identity and extensive self-cultivation, should attempt to dismantle Greek cultural dominance as well. Rather than undermining his arguments by engaging with Greek rhetoric, intertextuality,

⁸¹ See Dillery 2003.

etc., what Josephus in fact risks is pulling the rug out from under his own feet with his decentering of the culture in which he manifestly participates.

III. Inconsistency, Contradiction, and Oratorical Logic

For the remainder of this chapter, I will approach the paradox of Josephus' identity from the position of the reframing that I outlined above. When we consider Josephus' identity as a Greek *παιδευμένος* to be co-equal with his identity as Jewish, and ask whether his self-contradictions put him at risk of undermining not merely his arguments, but his own identity, it is useful to consider whether there are Greek literary precedents for such contradictions. This is because the question of Josephus' inconsistency contains the tacit assumption that Josephus ought to be consistent or ought to avoid self-contradiction. It is important to consider whether we are imposing a modern value judgement on Josephus that is at odds with the expectations of antiquity.⁸² In this section, I will take up the questions whether or how Josephus is able to "get away" with the apparent contradiction between his criticisms of Greek historiographical practices and his own authorial practices (which are part and parcel of his performed Greek identity), and whether Josephus stands in need of acquittal of the charge of "inconsistency." I will address these questions primarily by comparing analogous practices in other Greek texts, and in particular in Plutarch's *Malice of Herodotus*, a contemporary text displaying the closest generic

⁸² Here it is useful to compare Heath's critique of scholars of Greek tragedy who impose modern standards of "unity" on ancient plays, and find the ancient tragedians falling short of their expectations. See Heath 1989 esp. 5–11.

affinities with the *CA* of any extant Greek work predating the later Christian apologetic works that borrow directly from the *CA*.

I will begin with a review of the two of Josephus' contradictory practices that appear most damning. First, Josephus criticizes the Greeks for refuting one another at 1.15 (ἀλλήλους ἐλέγχουσι), which is precisely what he claims he has set out to do to his alleged slanderers in the proem at 1.3 as one of the primary purposes of the work (τῶν μὲν λοιδορούντων τὴν δυσμένειαν καὶ τὴν ἐκούσιον ἐλέγξαι ψευδολογίαν); he also asserts that he is attempting to refute Manetho's claims at 1.253 (ταῦτα πειράσομαι διὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων ἐλέγχειν), and introduces Book 2 with the stated purpose of refuting "the remaining authors who have written something against us" (ἄρξομαι δὲ νῦν τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους τῶν γεγραφότων τι καθ' ἡμῶν ἐλέγχειν at 2.2). Does Josephus violate the principles he outlines for historians by refuting those who disagree with him, when he has criticized Greek historians for doing precisely this? At least in part, if Josephus were to take the stand in his own defense (an activity he seems always eager to do), he would probably say that these refutations are not equivalent. His criticism is not directed so much at the act of refutation (ἐλέγξαι) per se as at the fact that (in his view) when the entire Greek historiographical tradition is surveyed, the whole of it is characterized by refutation (e.g. 1.15–18), as I discussed in Chapter 1. In contrast, Josephus has asserted unanimity within the Jewish tradition, within which he positions himself. In other words, he might claim that there is no hypocrisy in himself, as a Jew, refuting a Greek or an Egyptian, because they do not belong to the same traditions. Yet because, as I have argued,

Josephus composes the *CA* very much within the Greek tradition, the appearance of self-contradiction remains.

Second, and perhaps more damning, is Josephus' criticism of inconsistency (διαφωνία at 1.19) across the Greek historiographical tradition as indicative of false history. It is a well known issue that Josephus' historical works are brimming with inconsistencies where they overlap in historical material, some minor, some less so.⁸³ Is Josephus thus vulnerable to accusations of inconsistency? Or worse, would it be possible for a critic utilizing Josephus' own argumentative strategies to convict him of falsehood from his own words (cf. of his unnamed critics, at 1.4: ψευδῶς γεγραφότας αὐτοὺς δι' ἑαυτῶν ἐλεγχομένους παρέξω.; of Manetho at 1.253: ταῦτα πειράσομαι διὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων ἐλέγχειν.)? Does he, like his Greek targets, report different facts about the same events (cf. 1.15: ἀναντιώτατα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν...)? Recent scholarship on this question has pointed to Josephus' rhetorical concerns in his respective works as offering an explanation other than incompetence on Josephus' part, as I have noted. A focus on rhetoric will also prove helpful here.

Forensic Oratory and the Logic of Rhetoric

An explanation for how Josephus can get away with this, so to speak, is to be found in the metaphor of forensic oratory discussed in Chapter 3. The *CA* is not, of course, a work of historiography, even if historiography is among its primary themes. Instead, it is an argumentative treatise based on the model of forensic oratory, using the

⁸³ See n. 71 above with bibliography.

rhetorical strategies of oratory, and also the logic of oratory.⁸⁴ It is a strategy of oratory to create logical gaps without the audience's noticing; this is inherent to the device of *praeteritio*, for instance. When we keep this oratorical logic in view, we see how Josephus can expect his audience not to notice that his rhetorical strategies, which are hyper-focused on the needs of the specific argument being made in the moment, may contradict earlier claims or arguments. The audience is expected not to recall earlier specifics, let alone the details of earlier works.

To give an example of how this oratorical logic worked in classical forensic oratory, in *On the Crown*, Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of playing the tragic actor in his indictment of Ctesiphon,⁸⁵ while Demosthenes himself engages in a high degree of theatricality not limited to *On the Crown* in the service of his rhetorical ends, without appearing to take into account his demonization of Aeschines elsewhere on precisely these grounds.⁸⁶ In a striking incident of self-contradiction, at 18.127, Demosthenes creates a negative characterization of Aeschines as playing the tragedian, in particular castigating him for “shouting as if in a tragedy, “O Earth and Sun and Virtue,” and such

⁸⁴ This is not to suggest that the genres are entirely distinct. To the contrary; Woodman has presented the argument that to at least some ancient theorists, historiography was seen as virtually a species of oratory. See Woodman 1988: 83–98.

⁸⁵ Examples include Demosthenes 18.127, 267, and 313.

⁸⁶ For example, Andreas Serafim has recently analyzed how Demosthenes' well known account of the panic that arose at Athens when the report of the loss at Elatea arrived (18.169) is deeply indebted to tragic models of the messenger speech and tragic reversals. The intended effect of this narration, argues Serafim, is to invoke in Demosthenes' audience the intense emotions he describes in order to secure their goodwill toward himself in his subsequent description of himself as the only Athenian willing to speak on the city's behalf in the dramatic silence in the Assembly at 18.170. See Serafim 2015.

things...” (ὥσπερ ἐν τραγωδίᾳ βοῶντα ‘ὦ γῆ καὶ ἥλιε καὶ ἀρετὴ’ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ...).⁸⁷ It is therefore remarkable that Demosthenes himself later in the speech uses similar exclamations, specifically the phrase ὦ γῆ, as a response to his claim that Aeschines has accused him of “Philipism” at 18.294: ὃς γὰρ ἐμοῦ φιλιππισμόν, ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί, κατηγορεῖ, τί οὗτος οὐκ ἂν εἴποι; (“For he who accuses *me* of Philipism,—O Earth and Gods!—what wouldn’t this man say?”). The personification of the earth along with the other gods is doubtless intended to convey the absurdity of the allegation and the outrage it provokes from Demosthenes and that he expects it to provoke in the audience.⁸⁸ He evidently expects his audience either not to remember his comments at 18.127, or not to care that he has himself utilized the same rhetorical device which he criticized Aeschines for using. More to the point, Demosthenes expects his own deployment of the exclamation at this moment to work, to have the expected payout of persuading his audience of the point at hand (that Aeschines’ allegation was patently absurd) just as he expected his criticism of Aeschines’ use of it at 18.127 to have the effect of making Aeschines ridiculous to his audience. Demosthenes can expect to succeed with his apparently contradictory strategies because they serve specific purposes for his particular arguments in the moment. He does not expect that the audience will assess the entire speech for logical consistency as they judge it; they are meant simply to be persuaded point by point.

⁸⁷ As Harvey Yunis remarks, Aeschines did indeed say such things in his peroration. According to Yunis, it is the personification of inanimate entities such as the earth and sun that Demosthenes characterizes as tragic and thus as inappropriate to the present context. See Aeschines 3.260. Yunis 2001: 184.

⁸⁸ As Yunis claims. *Ibid.*

These examples from *On the Crown* certainly establish that such a double standard was neither beyond the pale in the genre of forensic oratory, nor was it without precedent in the Greek oratorical tradition within which Josephus was manifestly working. The context of the oral performance of oratory is a crucial factor in the functioning of what I have termed oratorical logic;⁸⁹ a reader at leisure to peruse a written text and revisit passages at will may notice discrepancies that may be lost on someone hearing an oral performance, in which the speech is experienced linearly.⁹⁰ An analogous dynamic exists in discussions of audiences of Greek tragedy, in which the interpretations of a play may vary considerably depending on whether one considers the position of theater spectators or readers of the text of the tragedy.⁹¹ If we in fact knew that the *CA* was performed orally, this might strengthen my case. It is plausible that Josephus did give a recitation of the treatise in some capacity, as this was a widespread practice for new literary productions in Rome during this period, even for prose works.⁹² We have no direct evidence for such a performance of the *CA*, however. It is also plausible that even without the oral perfor-

⁸⁹ To be sure, the oral and the written are not cleanly distinct categories when it comes to the texts of speeches of fourth century orators such as Demosthenes which have been handed down. See Yunis 1996: 241–7 with bibliography.

⁹⁰ Though Fantham's comments are illuminating, "For many of us it is harder to listen than to read; the eyes have it over the ears, as Horace declared (*Ars* 180–82), and most people are more easily distracted from construing an oral argument than one set out on pages that can be turned and re-turned. But since the Roman scroll was far less easy to unwind to track down a reference or the course of an argument, it is likely that many Romans obtained as much benefit from listening to a public reading as from their own perusal of a text or the more common situation in which they listened to their own readers." Fantham 2013: 207.

⁹¹ See esp. Erp Taalman Kip 1990: 67–98 on the impact of this dynamic on dramatic irony.

⁹² Pliny the Younger mentions recitations of speeches (*orationes*), history (*historiam*), tragedy, and lyric poetry (the latter three as inappropriate to the venue of the *auditorium*) at *Ep.* 7.17.2–3, though Fantham expresses ambivalence about how widespread historiographical recitations in fact were in Rome. See Fantham 2013: 206. There is also evidence of various kinds of oral performances (readings, lectures, improvised declamations) of prose genres including philosophy, biography, and *controversiae* in venues ranging from intimate dinner parties to the public auditorium. *Ibid.* 205–8.

mance of a recitation, Josephus can have expected that at least some people who would come to possess a written text of the *CA* would experience it orally, as it appears that wealthy men often “read” literature by having enslaved servants read it aloud to them.⁹³ It is plausible that hearing an oral reading of the *CA* would be a linear experience not unlike hearing an oration, and that the logic of oratory would function in the treatise as I have just described.

Plutarch’s On the Malice of Herodotus

Regardless of any performance context or the private reading practices of the audience of the *CA*, Josephus’ apparent self-contradictions are fruitfully illuminated by comparison with a work that displays far greater generic similarities than classical forensic oratory, namely Plutarch’s *On the Malice of Herodotus* (hereafter *Malice*). Though like most of Plutarch’s works, it is next to impossible to date *Malice* with certainty, it is plausible that its composition was roughly contemporary with that of the *CA*.⁹⁴ Even more intriguing than the plausibility of the two treatises’ contemporaneity are their striking similarities in purpose, rhetoric, and even the tone adopted by their respective authors

⁹³ See esp. Fantham 2013: 66, 196–9, 208. Fantham discusses Pliny’s description (*Ep.* 9.36) of being read to during mealtimes (p. 199), and suggests that the practice of using enslaved readers may in part have been intended to preserve the eyesight of the privileged elite (p. 66). Fantham also describes wealthy men reading alone (p. 66, 199). Thus the practice of being read to was by no means the sole experience of reading for such elite men, and reading practices need not have been the same for all.

⁹⁴ Bowen suggests that it would make sense if *Malice* were composed around the time that Plutarch had begun writing the *Parallel Lives* in 96. Bowen 1992: 2. Earlier scholarly views that this work must have been the product of Plutarch’s youth due to its alleged immaturity of thought, or that it was a spurious composition, are not generally credited (see e.g. Hershbell 1993: 144 and Marincola 1994: 194 and esp. n. 21 for bibliography) and betray unhelpful preconceptions about Plutarch.

toward the respective targets of their polemic.⁹⁵ Both have strikingly similar purposes set out in their proems. Plutarch writes at the opening of the work at 854F that because Herodotus has treated the Boeotians and Corinthians (among others) with malice (κακοηθεία),⁹⁶ he has deemed it appropriate “to mount a defense on behalf of my ancestors and of the truth at the same time...” ([sc. ἡμῖν] ἀμυνομένοις ὑπὲρ τῶν προγόνων ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ...).⁹⁷ Like Josephus in the *CA*, Plutarch adopts the stance of the apologist on behalf of his ancestors, asserts that historical truth is on the line, and frames his target, namely Herodotus, as motivated in his alleged falsehoods and fabrications (ψεύσματα καὶ πλάσματα at 854F) by malicious intent. Like Josephus, Plutarch composes this work on the model of forensic oratory.⁹⁸ Some of the many sources that he marshals to contradict Herodotus are described as witnesses providing testimony (e.g. 869A), while Herodotus himself is said to testify to his own poor character (858B). Analogous to Josephus’ attempt to dismantle the prestige of the Greek historiographical tradition by arguing for the superiority of Jewish and other Near Eastern traditions is Plutarch’s attempt to dethrone Herodotus as the recognized authority on the Persian wars by asserting the superior authority of local histories and elements of religious cult, including votive objects (among other historiographical sources), almost as if he had taken a cue from

⁹⁵ This comparison is suggested by Cohen, but not pursued in great detail. See Cohen 1988: 3–4.

⁹⁶ κακοηθεία is Plutarch’s preferred term for malice throughout the treatise, and hence I have given it here, but it occurs at 854F only in a conjecture on the content of a lacuna of some three lines. Bowen 1992: 105. That Plutarch must have written something along these lines is evident from the remaining context.

⁹⁷ This sentence is difficult to construe with precision because its opening is lost to the lacuna mentioned above, but its general meaning is nevertheless clear. Bowen 1992: 105.

⁹⁸ Termed “judicial rhetoric” by Seavey. Seavey 1991: 35.

Herodotus himself. As Marincola argues, for Plutarch, the sum of these local traditions represents the true history of the wars, among whom Herodotus is an outlier.⁹⁹ Hershbell has suggested that Plutarch's impassioned defense of the actions of the Delphians is at least in part due to Plutarch's priestly status;¹⁰⁰ though Plutarch does not make such a motivation explicit, priestly status is another commonality between Plutarch and Josephus, who explicitly lays claim to historiographical authority in general on the basis of being a priest, and in particular, argues, for example, against Apion's account of the blood libel (*CA* 2.89–96) from his superior knowledge of the Jerusalem cult and its sanctuary (2.102–9).

It is also significant that both Plutarch and Josephus present their readers with specific precepts on how historiography ought to be composed (or in Plutarch's case how it ought not be composed), which are in turn used to refute their respective targets. The absurdity of Josephus' view in the *CA* that it is a sign of true history that all accounts within a tradition are in perfect agreement (*CA* 1.26) is readily apparent. Similarly, some of the more illogical or unsound items in Plutarch's list have been denounced by scholars as poor historical procedure, a judgement which forms no small part of the general opprobrium with which this work has historically been received.¹⁰¹ The close similarity in this regard suggests that the *CA* is arguably best defined as an exemplum of the genre of historical criticism: Josephus certainly frames it as such in the proem, and only the final

⁹⁹ Marincola 1994: 201–2.

¹⁰⁰ Hershbell 1993: 160–1.

¹⁰¹ See esp. Marincola 1994: 194–6 for a sensible analysis of the problems with Plutarch's precepts. Scholarly disapprobation of the treatise has led some to claim that *Malice* was the work of Plutarch's immature youth, if not a downright forgery (see Marincola 1994: 194).

half of Book II does not obviously fit this mold.¹⁰² Most striking of all in light of our comparison with the *CA*, Plutarch manifestly violates his own rules in *Malice*, and in other works, particularly the *Parallel Lives*.

The proem of *Malice* is followed by a list of eight rules by which one can test a work of historiography for malice on the part of the author. As Marincola has argued, Plutarch has skillfully arranged these rules from what will be most acceptable to his audience to least acceptable.¹⁰³ This arrangement of descending credibility has the rhetorical effect of making all of Plutarch's rules seem more palatable, as Marincola remarks. Like Josephus, Plutarch has presented strictures that manifestly run counter to practices common to the Greek historiographical tradition. Where Josephus denied the validity of criticism, Plutarch has effectively claimed that the only non-malicious history is the encomiastic history, thus appearing to advocate for the historian having an attitude toward his subject matter that was widely considered no less problematic than malice itself.¹⁰⁴ Crucially, Plutarch himself routinely uses the type of abusive language toward Herodotus that he has castigated at 855B. Examples can be found on virtually any page of the treatise.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, he openly accuses Herodotus of having malicious motives in choosing specific

¹⁰² Cohen makes a similar observation. Cohen 1988: esp. 1–4.

¹⁰³ Marincola summarizes Plutarch's eight rules as follows. "The signs of malice are: (1) a preference for words too severe; (2) inclusion of discreditable acts irrelevant to the history; (3) the omission of what is good and noble; (4) a preference for the worse version of some action; (5) a preference for the more discreditable explanation; (6) the assertion that luck, not valor, is responsible for success; (7) indirect attack, e.g. reporting a matter but denying belief in it; (8) use of small praises to make great criticisms believable." Marincola 1994: 195.

¹⁰⁴ Partiality and malice are generally presented as the two sides of the coin of bias (e.g. Tacitus' "sine ira et studio," *Ann.* 1.1). See bibliography on bias in historiography assembled in Ch. 1, p. 37 n. 26.

¹⁰⁵ See Marincola's observation that Plutarch does this in the case of the Thebans at Thermopylae. Marincola 1994: 198.

elements of his history without offering credible evidence of Herodotus' motives, which bears a striking resemblance to his claim of 855F–856A that choosing the worse interpretation is itself an act of malice. It can hardly be denied that Plutarch comes across in *Malice* as more malicious toward Herodotus than Herodotus does in the *History* toward the Boeotians or any of the other Greeks. Such apparent self-contradiction or inconsistency is not confined to *Malice*. Wardman has observed that Plutarch uses in the *Lives* the type of language he proscribes in *Malice*.¹⁰⁶ Pelling also describes a number of examples of *Lives* in which Plutarch appears to conform to the strictures of *Malice*, and others in which he deviates.¹⁰⁷ Biography, of course, is not quite the same thing as historiography, even if the genres often overlap,¹⁰⁸ so it is at least possible that Plutarch could technically evade the charge of self-contradiction. Yet malice toward one's subject is surely an undesirable trait in biography and historical criticism as much as in historiography. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that, as Pelling has shown, many of Plutarch's *Lives* also do not conform to his programmatic statements on biography, or conform only to varying degrees.¹⁰⁹ As Pelling so succinctly puts it, "A writer's programmatic statements can sometimes be a poor guide to his work, and some *Lives* fit Plutarch's theory better than others."¹¹⁰ Rather than interpret Plutarch's non-conformity to his programmatic state-

¹⁰⁶ Though Wardman argues that there is no fundamental inconsistency in Plutarch's attitude toward individuals and their characters between *Malice* and the *Lives*. Wardman 1974: 189–96.

¹⁰⁷ Pelling 2002: 148–52.

¹⁰⁸ See e.g. Momigliano 1971: 65–100. As Pelling remarks, some of Plutarch's *Lives* more closely resemble historiography than others. See Pelling 2002: 152.

¹⁰⁹ Pelling 2002: 102–7. Plutarch's programmatic remarks on biography (and its difference from history) are found at *Alex.* 1.1–2.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* 106.

ments on biography as inconsistency or self-contradiction, Pelling helpfully frames such instances across Plutarch's corpus as variety and versatility.¹¹¹

In this light, the non-conformity of Josephus' historical works to his programmatic statement at *CA* 1.26 does not appear to be unusual; it is certainly not unique. When set beside the analogous features of *Malice*, it is apparent that Josephus' far-fetched claims about the requirements of true history are not singular in *genus*, even if they are in *species*. They also do more in service of his rhetorical aims in the *CA* than reflect any views on proper historiographical methodology that guided his composition of his historical works. We should not lose sight of the fact that Josephus' primary commitment in the *CA* is the defense of the *AJ* from his alleged critics, and by extension, the Hebrew scriptures which Josephus purports to have translated in the *AJ*. His denunciation of Greek historiographical polemic expressed as refutation (ἀλλήλους ἐλέγχουσι at 1.15) and difference (διαφορία at 1.19) is subsidiary to his purpose of refuting his alleged critics. It functions in the treatise as a rhetorical means to an end, a strategy used in the service of arguing what is for Josephus a truth of far greater importance. While his refutation of an author on the basis of self-contradiction certainly leaves him open to being measured by his own standard, Josephus does not appear to expect that this will detract from his purpose because of his *ad hoc* argumentation, which characterizes the logic of oratory described above. It is the truth of the Jewish accounts of the Jewish past that matters to Josephus, and Jews' right to speak for themselves rather than be spoken of by allegedly

¹¹¹ Pelling 2002, esp. pp. 106–7.

malicious Greeks, and not the illogical historiographical principle which Josephus manifestly did not follow in his earlier career. Rhetorical victory need not be airtight.

It is also the case that Josephus' anti-Greek polemic, his refutation of Greek historians and their claims about the Jewish past, is entirely in keeping with the Greek historiographical tradition in which he participates. As he himself makes clear at 1.15–8, polemic is what Greek historians do. As I hope to have shown in Chapter 1, for Josephus, such polemic is the defining characteristic of the tradition; by refuting the entire tradition, Josephus outdoes all of the Greeks in one stroke. In a way, such a move makes Josephus the consummate Greek historian. But what of the potential that Josephus is not merely destabilizing his own identity (for what identity is ever truly stable?), but actively undermining it by his indictment of Greek culture that I raised at the end of the previous section? Has he pulled the rug from under his own feet? This paradox is certainly more central to my larger question than the apparent contradictions just outlined. Because Josephus has a bicultural intersectional identity, as I have shown, he has, so to speak, a foot on two rugs, the Jewish and the Greek. He makes his claims of difference and distance from Greek culture and historiographical practice because, in the moment of these claims, he also asserts his Jewish identity. To belabor the rug metaphor, I will say that Josephus can pull up the Greek rug without harm to himself, because he does so with a foot firmly planted on the Jewish rug in that moment. There is nothing to stop him from replacing the rug, and resuming his two-footed stance. That is to say, Josephus can critique Greek dominance, because he can do so while presenting himself from the position of his marginalized Jewish identity, even while he also embodies a privileged, performative Greek iden-

tity. At the same time, asserting his Jewish identity as a point of difference marking superior historiographical methodology and credentials functions as a rhetorical strategy to win the argument in the zero-sum game of Greek historiography. That is to say, Josephus' assertion of his Jewish identity as an act of historiographical one-upmanship is itself, ironically, a Greek maneuver.

IV. Conclusion: Philo of Byblos

I will conclude this chapter with a final comparison. Josephus was not alone in some of his views about the alleged shortcomings of the Greek tradition, nor was he the only bicultural intellectual of his time to present such views—paradoxically—in decidedly Greek terms. Philo of Byblos, Josephus' younger contemporary, makes some comments about Greek intellectuals in the meager surviving fragments of his Phoenician history that are worth comparing with parts of the *CA*.¹¹² Philo appears to have claimed that he translated his *Phoenician Histories* from the original Phoenician-language texts of the ancient sage Sanchuniathon, whom Porphyry dates to the period prior to the Trojan War and makes a contemporary of Semiramis,¹¹³ and who, according to Philo, had access to sacred texts in the temple of Ammon as well as the Phoenician writings of the culture hero Taautos.¹¹⁴ The parallels that might be drawn between Philo's Phoenician History and Josephus' description of the *AJ* as well as Berossus' *Babyloniaka* and Manetho's *Ae-*

¹¹² All fragment citations of Philo are from Jacoby 1969 *FGrHist* 790.

¹¹³ Eusebius *PE* 1.9.121 = F 1 Jacoby p. 803: 24–804: 12.

¹¹⁴ The claim of translation is found at Eusebius *PE* 1.9.20 (= F2 Jacoby p. 803: 19–24). See the assembled fragments and commentary in Attridge and Oden 1981 and Baumgarten 1981.

gyptiaka are already readily apparent. Eusebius reports Philo's first extant critique of the Greeks at *PE* 1.9.27–8 (= F1 Jacoby 1969 C Vol. 2 p. 805:16–23):

«ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εὖρηται ἐπιμελῶς εἰδέναι τὰ Φοινίκων ποθοῦσι καὶ πολλὴν ἐξερευνησαμένοις ὕλην, οὐχὶ τὴν παρ' Ἑλλήσι· διάφωνος γὰρ αὕτη καὶ φιλονεικότερον ὑπ' ἐνίων μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν συντεθεῖσα». καὶ μεθ' ἕτερα· «οὕτως τε ἔχειν πεπεῖσθαι ἡμῖν παρέστη, ὡς ἐκεῖνος γέγραφε, τὴν διαφωνίαν ὁρῶσι τὴν παρ' Ἑλλήσι, περὶ ἧς μοι τρία πεφίλοτίμηται βιβλία τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχοντα Παραδόξου ἱστορίας.»

“These matters were discovered by me who desired to know Phoenician history¹¹⁵ diligently and who sought out much material not found among the Greeks; for that (sc. Greek sources) is inconsistent and composed by some in a rather contentious way instead of for the truth.” And later: “It occurs to me to be persuaded that it is thus as he (sc. Sanchuniathon¹¹⁶) has written, since I see the discord among the Greeks, concerning which my three volumes that have the title *Incredible History* have been ambitious.”

Like Josephus, Philo presents desire or intellectual curiosity (ἡμῖν ... εἰδέναι τὰ Φοινίκων ποθοῦσι) as intrinsic to his capacity to produce his history. All the more strikingly, Philo critiques Greek historians (or, perhaps, poets) for their inconsistency (διάφωνος, τὴν διαφωνίαν), as well as for their competitiveness (φιλονεικότερον). It is probably not too much of a leap to surmise that Philo saw a relationship between this alleged Greek discord and competitiveness. Josephus, of course, has claimed overtly that inconsistency is the hallmark of the Greek historiographical tradition (e.g. 1.16–18), whereas consistency or consensus across a tradition is a sign of truth at *CA* 1.26:

ὅλος δὲ τὸ πάντων ἐναντιώτατον ἱστορίᾳ πράττοντες διατελοῦσι. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀληθοῦς ἐστὶ τεκμήριον ἱστορίας, εἰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἅπαντες ταῦτα

¹¹⁵ Baumgarten also translates τὰ Φοινίκων as “Phoenician history.”

¹¹⁶ Attridge and Oden 1981: 74 n. 15.

καὶ λέγοιεν καὶ γράφοιεν· οἱ δ' εἰ ταῦτα γράψαιαν ἑτέρως, οὕτως ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὶ φανεῖσθαι πάντων ἀληθέστατοι.

In short, they (sc. the Greeks) persist in doing the exact opposite of history; for it is a proof of true history, if concerning the same things all would both say and write the same things. But they, if they wrote these things differently, believed that in this way they would appear the truest of all.

Philo's comment on the competitiveness of the Greeks also resonates with Josephus' critique of Greek historiographical polemic (most notably at 1.15–18) as well as his characterization of Greek historians at 1.27 as surpassing the Jews and other Near Eastern historiographers only when it comes to “language—and cleverness with language” (λόγων μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις δεινότητος), apparently a reference to style shading into the trope of sophistry. It is remarkable that Philo critiques Greeks for engaging in competitiveness, which he presents as antithetical to truth, and yet in what appears to be a later passage, he describes a separate work in which he engaged ambitiously (πεφιλοτίμηται) with Greek discord.¹¹⁷ While the near total loss of Philo's *Incredible History* makes it impossible for us to assess the tone of that work and Philo's engagement with Greek sources in it, this *testimonium* tantalizingly suggests that Philo himself, like Josephus, may have engaged in the very practices for which he has criticized the Greeks and which he has claimed are antithetical to truth. On the other hand, Philo implies that Greek discord is

¹¹⁷ πεφιλοτίμηται is a rare form attested a mere three times prior to Philo according to a TLG search. φιλοτιμέομαι with περί + genitive is also rare. The verb is frustratingly difficult to translate here, a problem exacerbated by the fragmentary nature of the passage. It must imply a sense of competition with the Greek sources, but with a positive moral coloring that is distinct from the more negative coloring of his earlier description of the Greeks' histories as φιλονεικότερον. How directly Philo meant to contrast these terms is uncertain, given that we do not know what interval separated these passages, or its content, since we have only Eusebius' descriptor καὶ μεθ' ἕτερα. But it is reasonable to understand that Philo has given his literary rivals the more negative characterization, and his own works the more positive spin on what is surely a similar activity (i.e. historiographical polemic). A likely parallel to the expression is to found at Plutarch *Isis and Osiris* 376 A, where the issue is pride of precedence for the names of gods between Egyptians and Greeks, about which Plutarch remarks: ἥκιστα μὲν οὖν δεῖ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων. Baumgarten 1981: 65 n.8 is not particularly helpful on this question.

internal to their tradition, and thus he may not have contradicted himself as blatantly as it may appear at first or as I have just argued for Josephus. But as this is veering into speculation, let us return to what does survive of Philo's works.

In another fragment, found at *PE* 1.10.8, Eusebius gives the following report of Philo (=F 2, Jacoby p. 807: 26– 808: 2):

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πλάνην Ἑλλησιν αἰτιᾶται λέγων· «οὐ γὰρ ματαίως αὐτὰ πολλαχῶς διεσπειλάμεθα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς αὐθις παρεκδοχὰς¹¹⁸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ὀνομάτων, ἅπερ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀγνοήσαντες ἄλλως ἐξεδέξαντο, πλανηθέντες τῇ ἀμφιβολίᾳ τῆς μεταφράσεως».

After this he accuses the Greeks of error when he says: “For we have not defined these matters in many ways without grounds, but because of the further varieties of interpretation of the names in these matters, which the Greeks in their ignorance interpreted incorrectly, having been led astray by the ambiguity of translation.”

The exact details of what the Greeks have failed to understand due to their inability to read Phoenician does not survive in the extracts in Eusebius, even if Philo did describe them.¹¹⁹ The main thrust of Philo's accusation against the Greeks is that that they are wrong about Phoenician cosmogony as a direct result of their ignorance of the Phoenician language. Eusebius' characterization of Philo's remarks as an accusation of error (πλάνην) appears eminently justified by Philo's own apparent use of the term πλανηθέντες to describe the nature of their problem, which is a problem of language, as Philo indicates with the phrase “the ambiguity of translation” (τῇ ἀμφιβολίᾳ τῆς μεταφράσεως).

¹¹⁸ παρεκδοχή is a rare word which appears to mean something like “varieties of interpretation” (LSJ; see also Baumgarten 1981: 141–2; cf. Attridge and Oden 1981: 81, who interpret the term as “erroneous transmission”).

¹¹⁹ Baumgarten 1981: 152.

Philo's perception of Greek ignorance within the Greek historiographical tradition is a theme which has parallels in the *CA*, and constitutes one of Josephus' primary allegations against Greek historiographers, as I discussed in Chapter 1, though there are some key differences between how Josephus and Philo view this alleged Greek ignorance. For Philo, the Greeks have altered Phoenician sources out of ignorance of the language, while for Josephus, the Greeks are wholly ignorant of both their own early history (1.15) and of Jewish history altogether (1.68). Furthermore, Josephus claims at 1.73 that Manetho convicts Herodotus of falsifying many points of Egyptian history due to ignorance (πολλὰ τὸν Ἡρόδοτον ἐλέγχει τῶν Αἰγυπτιακῶν ὑπ' ἀγνοίας ἐψευσμένον). Like Philo, Josephus is quite conscious of the importance of bilingualism and its necessity for accessing ancient indigenous documents and records in order to compose a true history, as I have discussed in some detail. Not only does Josephus assert his ability to translate the Hebrew scriptures into Greek to compose the *AJ*, but he also claims that his unique ability to communicate with Jewish deserters in the Roman camp made him singularly capable of composing an accurate history of the war at 1.49 (τὰ παρὰ τῶν αὐτομόλων ἀπαγγελλόμενα μόνος αὐτὸς συνίειν). Josephus also strikingly remarks on his own inability to access Egyptian priestly documents directly, and his reliance on Manetho's translation, as much an exercise in expediency as an affirmation of the validity of such Greek translations to which the *AJ* is decidedly akin.¹²⁰ Literate bilingualism is thus a necessary

¹²⁰ The passage is found at *CA* 1.73: Ἀρξομαι δὲ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις γραμμάτων. αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε παρατίθεσθαι τάκεινων, Μάνεθως δ' ἦν τὸ γένος Αἰγύπτιος ἀνὴρ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς μετεσχηκῶς παιδείας, ὡς δῆλός ἐστιν ... ("I will begin first from the Egyptians' scriptures. I am not able to provide them from the actual scriptures, but Manetho was an Egyptian man by race, who had a share in Greek παιδεία, as is evident ...").

component of historiographical veracity when it comes to the early histories of their respective peoples for both Josephus and Philo, and is used by both authors to set themselves above and apart from the monolingual Greeks.¹²¹ Unlike Josephus (*mutatis mutandis*), Philo does not attribute alleged Greek falsehood to actual malice toward Phoenicians or to any deliberate attempt to misrepresent Phoenician records or the Phoenician past, at least in the extant fragments. Instead, for Philo, while the Greeks are unambiguously wrong about Phoenician records, they are guilty of a benign falsehood.

Other parallels between Josephus' and Philo's critiques of the Greek tradition are to be found in their remarks on the origins of the Greek tradition. Eusebius reports of Philo at *PE* 1.10.40–1 (=F2 Jacoby p. 813: 11–22):

εἶθ' ἐξῆς αὐθις ἐπιλέγει· «οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες εὐφυΐα πάντας ὑπερβαλλόμενοι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα πλεῖστα ἐξειδιώσαντο, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς προκοσμήμασι ποικίλως ἐξετραγώδιησαν, ταῖς τε τῶν μύθων ἡδοναῖς θέλγειν ἐπινοοῦντες παντοίως ἐποίκιλλον. ἔνθεν Ἡσίοδος οἱ τε κυκλικοὶ περιηχημένοι Θεογονίας καὶ Γιγαντομαχίας καὶ Τιτανομαχίας ἔπλασαν ἰδίας καὶ ἐκτομάς, οἷς συμπεριφερόμενοι ἐξενίκησαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. (41) σύντροφοι δὲ τοῖς ἐκείνων πλάσμασιν αἱ ἀκοαὶ ἡμῶν γενόμεναι καὶ προληφθεῖσαι πολλοῖς αἰῶσιν ὥς παρακαταθήκην φυλάσσουσιν ἥνπερ ἐδέξαντο μυθοποιίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, ἥτις συνεργηθεῖσα χρόνῳ δυσεξίτητον αὐτῆς τὴν κατοχὴν ἀπείργασται, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν δοκεῖν λῆρον, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀφηγήσεως νόθον ἀλήθειαν»

Then he adds in turn: “The Greeks, who surpass everyone in cleverness, were the first to appropriate most of these things, and later exaggerated them with various kinds of ornamentation, and intending to enchant with the pleasures of myths, they worked all sorts of artistic changes. Hence Hesiod and the well known cyclic poets fabricated their individual Theogonies and Gigantomachies and Titanomachies, as well as their castrations, whirling around with which they defeated the truth. (41) Our traditions, having become companions of their fabrications and having been received many ages prior, guard the myth-making which they received as

¹²¹ On monolingualism as the norm for ethnic Greeks in antiquity, see Feeney 2016 25–8.

if it were a sacred trust, and just as I said at the beginning, this (sc. myth-making), being worked upon jointly over time, has made its hold difficult to get away from, with the result that the truth appears to be fluff and the counterfeit part of the story truth.”

In this rather difficult passage, Philo accuses the Greeks of exaggerating and embellishing Phoenician myths, with the result that truth and falsehood appear to be their opposites.

These remarks of course bear similarities to Josephus’ comments on Greek literary skill (as antithetical to historiographical truth), and the dubious relationship of the Greek historiographical tradition to truth generally. Like Josephus, Philo presents the problems he considers endemic to the entire Greek tradition as founded on its flawed beginnings in the epic tradition; he thus targets both Hesiod and the cyclic poets and accuses them of composing their poems with an eye on pleasure rather than truth. Where Josephus saw Greek failure in the original orality and disunity of the Homeric corpus, Philo grounds his view of Greek failure in the pleasure factor and the itinerancy of the epic rhapsodes. Elsewhere, Philo names Pherecydes as another Greek who adapted Phoenician myth.¹²² Like Josephus, Philo also claims that Greek traditions are derivative from his respective indigenous tradition. He goes a step further, however, in Fragment 4, where he claims that not just Greeks (in particular, Pherecydes), but the Egyptian figures Epeeis and Areios Heracleopolites and the Persian sages Zoroaster and Ostanos have all derived their material from the Phoenician Taautos. We lack sufficient surviving material to determine whether Philo made analogous arguments to Josephus’ regarding the priority of the Jewish tradition as proof of its superiority, as well as the emulation of Jewish ideas by Greeks

¹²² *PE* 1.10.50 = F 4 Jacoby p. 815: 22–25.

as proof the superiority of the Jewish tradition. It is at least plausible that Philo had something like this in mind for Phoenician history.

These parallels between Philo's and Josephus' critiques of Greek traditions raise the question of whether one was aware of the other. Josephus appears not to have had any knowledge of Philo, as is particularly evident in his remark at 1.127 following his discussion of Dion, the sole Phoenician historian whom he cites in the *CA*: τῆς μὲν οὖν παρὰ Φοινίκων μαρτυρίας τί δεῖ προσθεῖναι πλέον; ("What need is there to add a further witness from the Phoenicians?"). Philo, moreover, may have harbored anti-Jewish prejudice, which he explicated in a work titled περὶ Ἰουδαίων; that is at any rate what Origen reports (*Cels.* 1.15 = F9). It is possible that Josephus would have found in Philo a target for refutation, had he known his work. Though precise dating of Philo's life and *floruit* is uncertain, Baumgarten presents evidence for a reasonable conclusion that Philo was born in the second half of the first century AD and was active at least until the time of Hadrian.¹²³ These dates make it more implausible that Josephus was aware of Philo prior to the composition of the *CA*. As to whether Philo could have known Josephus, and specifically the *CA*, there simply isn't evidence, though Josephus' works would have been capable of supplying ample material for a work on the Jews.¹²⁴

¹²³ Baumgarten's arguments are based largely on the testimony of the *Suda* (*FGrHist* 790 T1), with other evidence taken into account. See Baumgarten 1981: 32–5.

¹²⁴ Origen reports only that Philo doubted the veracity of the pseudo-Hecataeus' περὶ Ἰουδαίων on the grounds that it presents too favorable a picture of the Jews. It is possible that the context of Philo's apparent anti-Jewish polemic is found in the motif of attributing the origins of the teachings of Pythagoras to the Jews (which Origen mentions in the same sentence but referring to Hermippus). Because Philo certainly claimed a Phoenician origin for Greek philosophy, he may have been motivated to quarrel with such a widely circulating competing account of non-Greek origins for Greek institutions. See *C. Cels.* 1.15 = F9.

The distinct possibility that Philo and Josephus composed their critiques of the Greek tradition independently of one another is highly suggestive. The cultural hegemony of the Greek tradition among the educated elite of the Roman empire was, apparently, perceptible to more than one elite male of bicultural identity, that is, a Greek *πεπαιδευμένος* who also participated in a marginalized indigenous literary tradition in his native language. It comes as no surprise that scholars of Philo have detected many Greek literary and philosophical features in the extant fragments and testimonia. Most notably, Philo proclaims a Euhemerist doctrine.¹²⁵ Baumgarten remarks that the titles attributed to Philo (namely, *Concerning the Acquisition and Selection of Books* and *Concerning Cities and the Illustrious Men each of them Produced*) are suggestive of wide reading and a penchant for encyclopedism.¹²⁶ Though no fragments survive, it is not unreasonable to presume on the basis of their titles that these works contained a considerable display of Greek *παιδεία*. Certainly Philo's readiness to jump into the ring with Hesiod, to show his knowledge of the epic cycle and its performance context in archaic times, and to lay claim to not only Greek philosophy but Persian and Egyptian wisdom for the Phoenicians as well conspicuously displays his learnedness in a manner not unlike Josephus in the *CA*. Philo's intellectual circle appears to have contained a number of intellectuals working in the Greek tradition.¹²⁷ Like Josephus, Philo appears to have occupied an intersectional identity as a member of the elite Greek *πεπαιδευμένοι*, and also an ethnic Phoeni-

¹²⁵ Attridge and Oden 1981: 7–8, Baumgarten 1981: 1 and *passim*.

¹²⁶ Baumgarten 1981: 35. These titles are found in the *Suda* (T1).

¹²⁷ Hermippus of Beirut, Paul of Tyre, and Herodian of Alexandria are named in connection with Philo in their individual entries in the *Suda* (T2). Baumgarten 1981: 35.

cian. He is educated in both the Greek and the Phoenician traditions, and because of this positionality, he has a vested interest in the marginalization of the Phoenician tradition, and he is capable of articulating this marginalization in the idiom of the Greek *πεπαιδευμένοι*.

At the close of Section I of this chapter, I remarked that the Greek culture of the *πεπαιδευμένοι* constitutes a form of power that, though distinct from the machinations of Roman military and political dominance, is nevertheless real. Whatever the nature of the opposition to the *AJ* that Josephus really faced in the aftermath of its publication in Rome, his complaints about Greek historiographical ignorance and marginalization of the Jewish past are not grounded in the imaginary. Philo testifies to precisely the same problem, *mutatis mutandis*. The Hellenocentrism of elite intellectual culture makes the task of the bicultural historian difficult. We should be clear that Josephus presents the problems with the reception of the *AJ* as stemming unambiguously from this Hellenocentrism, coupled with anti-Jewish malice. The war, and Josephus' role in it, is never mentioned overtly in any connection to Josephus' reception problems, even if it is not unreasonable to conjecture that attitudes in at least some quarters at Rome toward Jews in the city were still negatively influenced by the war, and that this could have contributed to any anti-Jewish prejudice at large among Josephus' audience.¹²⁸ What is all the more striking about the similarities between Philo and Josephus is not only their observations about their respective traditions' marginalization, but their decision to speak out against it, to

¹²⁸ See Barclay 2007: XXXVI–XLIV, Goodman 1999: 55–7. Gruen argues against the view that Josephus is responding to anti-Jewish prejudice in the city. See Gruen 2005: 48. See also Schäfer 1997: 180–95, Gruen 2002: 41–53 on attitudes toward Jews at Rome generally.

raise their voices in opposition, and to attempt to communicate this marginalization to the broader community of the Greek *παιδευμένοι*. I have spoken much in this chapter of how Josephus' identity and experience has made him the author that he is; I will add a final dimension to my claim, which is applicable to Philo as well. For these authors who have intersectional bicultural identities, which makes them able both to see the marginalization of their respective indigenous traditions on the one hand, and articulate that marginalization in terms of the dominant tradition on the other, the very marginalization which they oppose has given them the unique opportunity to assert in writing the validity of their respective traditions. In the case of Josephus and the *CA*, the long-term impact is quite astonishing as the *CA* effectively inaugurated a new genre that, as others have argued, became a fixture of the Greek rhetorical arm of Christianity, a movement that would profoundly re-shape the Greek and Roman world.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ On the influence of the *CA* on Christian readers, see e.g. Hardwick 1996, Barclay 2007: LIII–LV with bibliography.

Conclusion:

Josephus the Historian

I will address at the close of this study the issue of Josephus' historiographical self-conception, or how he views himself as a historian, and where he locates himself among the historiographical traditions of the known world and throughout history. Such questions, of course, I have addressed in Chapter 1 as regards Josephus' explicit claims of identity: there can be no question that he claims to be a Jewish historian, and that he presents Jewish historians as different from Greek historians because they use methodologies that are grounded in cultural institutions that in turn are rooted in philosophical/theological differences between the two cultures. I have also argued throughout this dissertation that Josephus performs an identity as one of the Greek *πεπαιδευμένοι*. As part of this performance, he engages in the very practices of criticism and polemic which he castigates in the Greek historians. This participation in conventions which he criticizes in Greek historians in the *CA* accords with the fact that, as I argued in the introduction in the proem of the *BJ*, Josephus also composes his historiographical works as works that are firmly situated within the Greek historiographical tradition. In this way, I am justified in saying that Josephus has shown his readership through signals both in the *CA* and in his histories themselves that he is also a Greek historian. My analysis has also touched on a third category of historiographical identity apart from the Greek-Jewish polarity de-

scribed overtly by Josephus: the Hellenophone bicultural “translators” of indigenous historiographical traditions. As I have discussed, Josephus describes Berossus and Manetho, and to an extent, those involved with the translation of the Septuagint as participants in Greek παιδεία, and in terms that bear a notable resemblance to Josephus’ own descriptions of his composition of the *AJ*.¹ Like Berossus and Manetho, Josephus does not simply translate his native history into Greek, but interprets it, making significant changes in the process.² We may thus say that in the *CA*, Josephus describes three categories of historian: the Greek, the Jewish (with whom other Near Eastern historians are aligned), and a third, the bicultural, non-ethnic Greek πεπαιδευμένος. As my analysis has shown, Josephus identifies himself with all three of these through overt and implicit means, and through rhetorical strategies operating at different levels of the treatise. Philo of Byblos, moreover, bears a close resemblance to Josephus as a historian who is a non-ethnic Greek πεπαιδευμένος.

This tripartite historiographical identity expressed in the *CA* may have implications for how we view the remainder of Josephus’ corpus. This is a matter that I have touched on throughout this study, and it is how I introduced my topic in the introduction, where I explored the Greekness of the proem of the *BJ*, and the anti-Greek polemic found there as well. I have also examined the close of the *AJ*, where Josephus remarks on his bicultural education and its function as a unique historiographical credential. There are

¹ Cf. Ch. 3, pp. 191–4, 199–201.

² Though as Josephus is working with a narrative historical tradition, unlike his Egyptian and Babylonian predecessors, he is arguably not changing his source material to the same degree. On this process for Berossus and Manetho, see Dillery 2015: esp. 55–122.

other places in Josephus' vast corpus beyond these where Josephus comments on himself as a historian, and on other historians, named and unnamed.³ What I am suggesting is not that my analysis of Josephus' performed identity in the *CA* should be read backward, so to speak, into Josephus' earlier work; rather, I suggest that the complexity of the historiographical traditions, the identities which Josephus attaches to them, and the fluidity of his relationship to all such identities should suggest to us that common threads connect many of Josephus' ideas about historiography, and yet his practice reveals that he composes as an author not bound to rigid precepts, whether Greek, Jewish, or his own. As he remarks at *BJ* 1.11, he himself transgresses the norms of the genre. Both of Josephus' historical works show that he does not abide by the historiographical strictures he outlines in the *CA*, whether Greek or Jewish. Or, we might say that he expands the conventions of the Jewish and Greek traditions to create something new. I have devoted much attention in this study to locating Josephus within Greek culture, and justifiably so, for as I have shown, he performs this role with a high degree of intentionality. And yet we also witness in the *CA* something unique, something without precise parallel, and here the frustrated searches for parallels for the genre of the *CA* and the lack of precise antecedents should lead us to the conclusion that Josephus has created something new and unique in the *CA*. Attention to such newness, and the ways in which he not only signals his position within Greek and Jewish traditions, but also signals how he is untethered from them, may provide fruitful new lines of inquiry into the analysis of form and content (and any apparent disconnect between the two) in the whole of Josephus' corpus.

³ e.g. *BJ* 1.7–8, *AJ* 1.93–5, *Vita* 336–367.

It is also in my presentation of Josephus' ad hoc argumentation, in which all other claims are subsidiary to his primary commitment to defend the Jews and their past, including Josephus' accounts of their past in the *AJ* and *BJ*, that this dissertation intersects with my previous work on Josephus and his representation of Nicolaus of Damascus in the *AJ*.⁴ There I argued that Josephus creates neither a positive nor a negative depiction of Nicolaus, but that he uses Nicolaus to corroborate some of his claims where this is possible, and refutes him where Josephus chooses to disagree with Nicolaus' apparently positive portrayal of Herod the Great. In Josephus' presentation, the consistent thread in Nicolaus' works was the application of his considerable rhetorical skill in the service of Herod's interests. For Josephus, this was only problematic on specific occasions, and so he either explicitly refutes, or else negatively characterizes Nicolaus more subtly, on these points.

What is more, my linguistic analysis of the *CA* and my finding that Josephus has Atticized his Greek in this work to a higher degree than in the rest of his corpus could help us think about the variations in Josephus' dialect and style across his corpus. For instance, in the *Vita*, even in a recent publication, Josephus has been accused of writing poor Greek.⁵ Instead of imposing a judgement worthy of the lexicographers of the Second Sophistic, we might describe Josephus' Greek in this work in terms of register, and ask what Josephus could be attempting to communicate through and by it, and how any par-

⁴ See Teets 2013.

⁵ According to Steve Mason, "Greek was [Josephus'] second or third language and, worse, he seems to have rattled off this personal history in great haste. His disturbing carelessness makes the question of his purpose that much more intriguing." Mason 2001: XIII.

ticulars in aims or audience for this work might impact Josephus' linguistic choices as well as the effect of those choices. In this vein, a comparison of the *Vita* with extant fragments of Greek ὑπομνήματα and the posture of unembellished plain prose found within this genre could prove fruitful.⁶ Asking similar questions of the rest of the *AJ*, and even the *BJ* could yield valuable results, as might comparing Josephus more broadly with his Hellenophone contemporaries and near-contemporaries (whether ethnic Greeks or not) who produced multiple works in various dialects and registers such as Lucian and Arrian.⁷

It is also my hope that I have demonstrated the complexity and fluidity of Josephus' identity in the *CA*. This should prompt us to understand two things about Josephus' presentation of Greek and Jewish culture as a polarized opposition in much (but not all) of the treatise: (1) Josephus does not describe an obvious or simple historical fact, and (2) this polarized opposition does not even reflect Josephus' "true" perspective or belief about the relations between these cultures. In previous centuries, this polarity, hardly unique to the *CA* among ancient sources, was taken to be not merely historical fact but enduring truth, and was wedded to anti-Semitism.⁸ Because we, at our particular moment in history, are witnessing the resurgence of violent anti-Semitism, we must also take up the renewed imperative to combat the falsehoods of this ideology wherever they arise.

⁶ Mason gestures toward this genre in his discussion of the genre of the *Vita*, but not in his negative assessment of the language. See Mason 2001: XLII. On the genre and its conventions generally, see Marincola 1997: 180–2, 195–8.

⁷ An observation I owe to the unpublished work of my colleague Evan Waters.

⁸ Rajak 2001: 535–57.

Scholarship that resists the flattening of historical Jews into one-dimensional stereotypes to be subjected to derogation has some part, however small, to play.

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