# The Imaginaries and Claims of 20th Century Forced Migrants: A Comparative Study of Georgian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani Exiles

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# Abstract

This dissertation investigates the construction and role of national memory in exile through the intersection of memory studies, nationalism, and forced migration. It systematically compares the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani exiled communities who found refuge in Europe around the 1920s until the onset of World War II. Occasionally, I extended the analysis to include materials from subsequent decades and the 21st century in addition to those from this interwar period. Using historical archives and interviews, two sets of research questions are examined on the agency, claims, nature, and role of the subaltern exilic national memory. In considering these communities of exile, my research examines how national memory is created, stored, safeguarded, and utilized both in exile and beyond. This is a story of postcolonial intellectuals and nationalist elites who acted as a carrier group in the 1920s, advocating internationally against the suffering of Soviet Georgians, Ukrainians, and Azerbaijanis. Exiles produced an alternative account, comprised of four counternarratives, to that of the Soviet Union. These identified narratives (*a memory of occupation and independence*, *"the civilized ," the victorious nation, and the politics of differentiation*) constitute a stored memory that became an available past for their respective countries. In the case of the Georgians, the safeguarded émigré memory was negotiated, recovered, used for centennial celebrations in 2018 and finally reintegrated into the national body.

I dedicate this dissertation to my family, in and outside of my homeland

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## Introduction

When hearing stories of displacement, exile, and refuge, perhaps the first images that come to mind are those of traumatized and human rights-deprived individuals with no home, property, or shelter at the mercy of different countries, donors, and international organizations. The power imbalance in such dire settings calls into question the possibility that exiles could retain agency and a voice in their own future. This dissertation explores a peculiar case of exiled communities that not only actively engaged in the process of defining their own futures, but also challenged the principles and virtues of Western countries. This is a story of Georgian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani postcolonial intellectuals—all of whom experienced exile to 1920s France from their home democratic republics owing to occupation by the Red Army. In considering these communities of exile, my research examines how national memory is created, stored, safeguarded, and utilized both in exile and beyond.

Migration has been a basic feature of human societies for as long as they have existed. Today, we talk about different kinds of migration. People migrate most frequently for economic reasons, in search of a better life. But not all migration is voluntary. Migration also occurs for political reasons when people are left with no other choice than to become a “refugee” or an “asylee.” In recent decades, migration studies have expanded the classic binary of political and economic categories to include a considerably wider spectrum of migration (Black, 2001; FitzGerald & Arar, 2018). We now know that some scholars prefer to employ the following alternative categories:

immigrants, emigrants, refugees, economic-based migrants, expatriates, émigrés,[1] forced migrants, internally displaced persons, survival migrants,[2] political exiles,[3] diaspora,[4] and remittance man/woman. Some of these categories imply that migrants retain at least some measure of agency, breaking down the often attributed dichotomy between political and economic migrants.

For my research, I selected all of the categories that imply a forceful driver into the migration process (such as violence, persecution, wars, and disasters, all of which could impel migration). Such forced migrants can be émigrés, political exiles, and refugees.[5] More precisely, I focus on the experience of those who have come to be known as the "exile." Exile has been defined as a condition of orphanhood, uprootedness, and terminal loss (Said, 2000). The condition of feeling homeless in modernity challenges our understanding of how different communities create a sense of belonging in a continuously globalizing world. I thus focus not on any exile, but specifically on the condition of exile in modernity. With this work, I attempt to bring back the concept of

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[1] Although this French term was applied to the Huguenots and the French and American Revolutions, it has recently been attributed mainly to the migrants who fled the Bolshevik revolution. In all cases, the concept seems to refer to political expulsion.

[2] Betts (2013).

[3] Hallvard Dahlie (1986) differentiates between an émigré and an exile. Historically, the exile was seen as an outcast and a dangerous thinker who had been banished as a form of punishment. As for the émigré, Dahlie suggests the following: "In today's world...'émigré' is more accurately applied to political exiles driven out of their native counties by totalitarian repression, and prepared to return once the political conditions make it morally and intellectually proper to do so" (p. 5.) If the exile is at odds with the society he has rejected or joined, an émigré might carry a feeling of superior indifference and stop being spiritually in exile.

[4] "The difference between a community of émigrés and a community of diaspora lies in the self-perception of the group. It is not only a matter of historical, material reality: as far as their legal status was concerned, the Jews remained, to the very end of Graeco-Macedonian rule in Egypt, a mere component of the class of Hellenes...the notion of diaspora involves a dimension of mental representation" (Cohen & Frerichs, 1993, p. 126).

[5] Throughout this dissertation, I sometimes employ the concept of diaspora to indicate exiled communities.

exile in sociology with which literary scholars have engaged. I argue that it is a useful analytical concept that uniquely embodies the complexities of migration. Answering the two sets of research questions reveals the complexities of forced migration in a sociological context through connecting hopes, frustrations, and exilic national memory.

Forced migration and the condition of exile differ from other types of migration. In this case, the exiles represent themselves as something different than just immigrants. The "forceful" element puts migrants in a peculiar situation where they must instrumentalize their nationalism as well as maintain distance from the host community. This peculiar situation is even felt by groups of migrants displaced into a relatively similar racial or cultural setting and who manage to "pass" as locals to various degrees. However, the situation of a forced migrant does not imply that of a passive recipient without any agency in the process of resettlement and readjustment. I am thus particularly interested in the ways that exiles advocate for themselves, create transnational communities, and instrumentalize national memories. For instance, exiles use their national history or collective memory to make various claims and address various audiences.

In line with such reasoning this dissertation answers two sets of research questions that explore the agency and the peculiar situation of the exiles:

- **Set 1:** What are the hopes, frustrations and claims of forced migrants? How do they exercise their agency? Who is their targeted audience and what role does nationalism play in this process? And, finally, what explains the variations between groups?
- **Set 2:** What is the nature and role of a subaltern exilic national memory?

What role does national or historical memory play in this complex process?

The remainder of this chapter discusses the empirical cases used in this study, the unexpected direction that my findings took in focusing on the concept of the civilized, and the outline of the dissertation chapters.

### Exiled and Suppressed Memory

For my dissertation, I compared the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani exiled communities who found refuge in Europe around the 1920s. By examining these communities, I recouped a lost story of battle against the Soviet Union. In addition to bringing to light the experiences of some disadvantaged communities, this study illustrates how national identity can be constructed both internationally and in a multidirectional fashion. An exploration of the multidirectional nature of the émigré memory reveals the transnational aspects of national identity. Through scrutiny of the nature and role of an exilic national memory, this research contributes to theories of transnational (De Cesari, 2014), fragmented (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2002), and multidirectional memory (Rothberg, 2011).

At the same time, a comparison of these exiled communities moves beyond "methodological nationalism"[6] and contributes to the transnational enterprise of forced migration in a manner that focuses on cultural contexts. I trace the flow of fragmented memory within, outside, and back into a single national unit through complex,

[6] Methodological nationalism is a perspective that sees nation-states as social containers or as major units of analysis. In the literature review, I discuss the need to move away from this approach.

multidirectional, and transcultural ways of travel. Given that I am well versed mainly in Georgian history and case study, I took the Georgian exiles as the primary group of reference and compared them with other exiled groups as much as the collected and secondary data permitted.

The story of these particular exiles begins with the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian Civil War, which presented opportunities for once-occupied and peripheral countries in the Caucasus region (such as Georgia) to regain their independence in 1918. However, the independence of these post-colonial, democratic states did not last long. Around 1921, all of the newly created independent states (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Ukraine) aside from the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) were quickly forced into a new autocratic system: the Soviet Union. Georgians from the Menshevik government of the first Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) eventually fled the country. Consolidating in Paris with a stated mission of rescuing Georgian sovereignty, they acted as an official legation of exiles until the recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. Forced migrants from Ukraine and Azerbaijan fled their countries, too, alongside the Georgian exiles.

This dissertation systematically analyzes these groups during the interwar period that lasted from the start of their exile in the 1920s until the onset of World War II.[7] The history of the exile experiences and suffering of these groups is not well-known owing to the predominance of Soviet power, which largely silenced the voices of diasporic populations. Nevertheless, historical documents preserve an abundance of information on

[7] Occasionally, I extended the analysis to include materials from subsequent decades and the 21st century in addition to those from this interwar period. This became necessary to study the influence of the émigré memory on contemporary Georgian national memory.

the different strategies that these communities adopted to fight for their own human rights or their respective countries. Observation of the different trajectories of exiled diasporas in France from the 1920s onward thus provides a sufficient timeline for comparative study of national exilic and suppressed memory.

The struggles that followed the occupation of Georgia and Azerbaijan by the Red Army can be categorized as what memory scholars call "suppressed memory." Here, the choice of the concept of suppressed memory (as opposed to repressed memory or inertial amnesia) is purposeful. By suppressed, I refer to the actions of a third party such as the Soviets, who intentionally silenced émigré accounts by erasing and falsifying history through Soviet scholarship and official accounts. Once suppressed in Soviet scholarship, these historic cases took much longer to reach Western scholarship.

Given their existence as a suppressed memory, the historic episodes mentioned here cannot be classified as the sort of rare, transformative events that classical historical sociologists describe and encourage us to study (Lachmann, 2013; Sewell, 2005). It is not surprising that the brief existence of the independent Caucasian countries, the history of the 1921 occupations, and resistance from Georgian or other exiles are largely absent in works on the Russian Civil War/Revolution (see Foran et al., 2008; Hirsch, 2005; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1993), studies on Mensheviks in exile (see Liebich, 1997a; Liebich, 1982b) or in works on the League of Nations (see Holborn, 1939; Pedersen, 2015). In these works, countries that declared independence around the time of the Bolshevik Revolution are mostly grouped together and referred to as nations involved in the Russian

Civil War. To be fair, this was not a case of "eventful sociology";[8] for this reason, scholars often saw the short-lived democracies as "turbulences" instead.

Only recently have some historians started to point out the significance of the DRG as a successful example of an early socialist-democratic state (e.g., Jones, 2018; Lee, 2017).[9] That recognition partly explains why this case study should be of interest to social scientists. But I believe that this study carries a greater potential contribution once we move away from an idiographic and linear style of history to analyze events through the lens of memory studies. The flexible nature of the field of memory studies welcomes research cases such as the proposed one and is relatively more open-minded about the scientific importance of dismissed memories, silenced stories, suppressed pasts, and the role of counternarratives in a memory war or contest.

### Appealing to the Concept of the Civilized World

Can the subaltern speak?[10] Only a few years ago, my question about the agency of less powerful nations to a discussion panel organized by the Harriman Institute in Paris was instantly shut down as out of place. Today, such questions are welcome. Back then,

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[8] According to Sewell (2005), an example of eventful sociology is the storming of the Bastille. Eventful sociology distinguishes inconsequential everyday actions from rare moments when social structures are transformed. It also explains why transformative events occur at particular times and places and not elsewhere; and finally, it shows how events made possible later events (Lachmann, 2013, p. 10).

[9] The newly specialized sub-field of Caucasus Studies and purely historical books focus extensively on the occupation of 1921 and the DRG (for examples, see Blauvelt 2012,2014; Brisku & Blauvelt 2021, Grant, 2009; Jones 1988,2007; Kobakhidze 2020, Khvadagiani 2016, Lee, 2017; Rayfield et al., 2018; Resiner 2009, and others).

[10] This question is a reference to the following work: Morris, R. C., and Gayatri, C. S. (2010). *Can the subaltern speak?: Reflections on the history of an idea*. Columbia University Press.

leading area studies experts did not believe in the agency of subaltern nations. What can Ukraine, Georgia, or others do without great powers such as Russia and the United States? As Yekelchyk (2023) notes, “The subaltern is allowed no subject-position and is continuously rewritten as the object of imperialism (in Western narrative) or nationalism and patriarchy (in the narrative of an imperial-educated nationalist elite)” (p. 190). The assumption of total subjugation to superpower states may be logically valid but, as we have witnessed with the war in Ukraine, it is not always correct.

On January 25, 2022, I watched the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, Oksana Markarova, speak to *PBS* about ongoing tensions between Russia and Ukraine. As she spoke, I was reminded how much her words on the obligation of the “civilized world” to unite against Russia and to collectively defend democratic values resonated with those I had been reading from the 1920s and 1930s. She portrayed the possibility of war as a problem not only for Ukrainians, but also for everyone who had chosen to live in freedom and with democratic values:

> It’s a very much united front that the civilized world is putting together [to help] us, because this is not a fight about Ukraine – it’s a fight about values and principles. So, anyone who treasures freedom and democracy and believes that those values and principles are worth fighting for are standing together with Ukraine these days. (Markarova, 2022)

It was soon after data collection, that I became convinced about where my dissertation research was heading—a rather unexpected finding. While I had been aiming to expand the Bergerian concept of homelessness, I was suddenly overwhelmed by the idea of civilization. I had embarked on this journey with the intention of exploring the

longitude and condition of exile. I wanted to understand how and why communities make a sense of exile endure over time, how exiles cope with the feeling of homelessness, and what explains variation between groups of exiles. However, the materials I was reading were pointing in another direction.

As I read and analyzed thousands of archival documents, I realized that a historic mission was emerging from these pages. This 100-year-old mission had remained active over time, finally gaining traction and attention with the current war in Ukraine. What was this historic mission? Was it similar for Georgians, Ukrainians, and Azerbaijanis? And, finally, has this historic mission remained intact for all of these nations? I call the mission a century-old one because I have traced it in documentation that dates back to the 1920s. However, it could be argued that the mission started earlier, perhaps with the awakening of nationalism under Russian tsardom.

This mission was a desperate effort to reveal the uncivilized character of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union—to seclude it from the rest of the civilized world and to exert pressure on Western countries to contain it. In this mission, Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky cannot save Russia. All ties must be broken. In this mission, Russia is the soldier, the general, and the politician who kills, rapes, and mutilates innocent civilian lives. If successful, the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani nations would join the civilized world and free themselves from Russia's yoke.

Markarova's speech was neither the first nor the only one to convince me of the liveliness and continuity of the concept of civilization used by these nations. I have heard or read about "being civilized" over and over in contemporary Georgian civic society discourse, whether online or on television, for many years. The use of this concept was so

overwhelming that if I were to collect excerpts and proofs, hundreds of pages would not suffice. The Georgian nation's end goal has been to measure how close or far the Georgian society or nation has moved in relation to civilization. This proximity or distance to civilization is invoked numerous times in discussions of local societal issues and national or international politics. With Makarova's statement, I understood that my findings from the interwar period also resonated in contemporary Ukrainian discourse.

President Volodymyr Zelensky's speeches alone reflect a similar use of the concept. I searched for the word "civilized" on the official website of the President of Ukraine and located it in 61 of his speeches. For instance, his speeches emphasize how Russian aggression exists outside civilized laws. He argues (2023, March 26) that "liberating Ukraine from Russian evil this year is a joint task of the civilized world. Because civilized means, in particular, determined to defend civilization." The bravery of Zelenksy and the Ukrainian people brought the world's attention to this 100-year-old mission, but Zelensky achieved more. As I watched and listened to his speeches delivered since the outbreak of the war, I was astounded by their rhetorical quality and the perfect balance he maintained when asking for help with dignity. This was perhaps the first time that a world leader from a post-Soviet country, to whom the world was finally listening, said publicly and aloud something that many other people had been desperate to say:

> Protect this peaceful atmosphere in which you are. And today, when the war is on our territory, you have the opportunity to help us so that the war does not destroy all the beautiful, warm, sunny things that you have now, that you enjoy. And this is your absolute right. And we are fighting for this right today. So please don't get

> tired of the war in Ukraine. Because this is a war for the peace you have today. (Zelensky 2022, August 29)

This message was addressed to the civilized world, the West, the French who drink their cafés au lait in peace, and the Germans who enjoy low gas prices. Elsewhere, Zelensky (2023, March 21) mentioned that the Ukrainians are fighting for the "preservation and functioning of civilized rules and civilized life in the world" and that the "civilized countries should unite to overcome all the risks facing humanity" (2022, August 29). By linking the fate of the prosperous and peaceful world with Ukraine's fight, he positioned the country not as a beggar asking for help from rich countries but as the one who defends these rich countries at the expense of its own blood. Thus, any financial or political support becomes not a gesture of kindness from these countries, but one of self-interest:

> In response to all the crimes and injustices caused by Russian aggression against the state of Ukraine and against the civilized system of the world, all the necessary steps must be taken by us and you – steps for the sake of one result: the result that will unite the civilized world. It will testify to the reality of the rule of international law. (Zelensky 2023, March 3)

The Ukrainian position vis-à-vis the East and West has been addressed by liberal Ukrainians of the 19th century, post-war émigré thinkers, post-communist national intellectuals, and the modern Ukrainian national imagination (Yekelchyk, 2023). For

Ukraine, the West has more recently meant Europe and the Atlantic; historically, the West was more typically represented by Germans and Poles (Rudnytsky, 1987). Poles were the ones "bringing civilization" to Ukraine (Yekelchyk, 2023, p. 196). As regards the East, here we find a rejection of a particular depiction of the East represented by destructive nomads alongside an acknowledgment of a civilized Oriental Byzantium as part of Ukrainian culture (Yekelchyk, 2023). The Georgians also saw Byzantium as an empire of civilization rather than an oppressing power (Brisku 2016). In my dissertation, the concept of "the civilized" certainly embodies the pro-Western aspirations of these countries, but it does more than simply show a preference for a geopolitical alliance: use of the concept has its roots in the Enlightenment era and such usage continues into modernity.

The dualism of the Russian empire, as both a civilizing and an oppressive power,[11] is discussed by Adrian Brisku (2016) in his work on the Georgian political and intellectual discourse on empires. Brisku argues that the concept of empire carried two meanings, one of conquest and another of civilization. It is true that the Russian empire identified itself as the bearer of civilization and discussed its obligation to bring civilization to the barbaric Caucasus. As the Russian historian D. Romanovskii wrote:

> Given the sacrifices that Russia was to bring to the Caucasus, there was no doubt that these sacrifices would find their deserved recognition, most of all because the

[11] See Brisku (2016, p.33): "The first one is that of empire as a large political centre/space that wields its power and authority (imperium) over smaller nations through actual or threatened military conquest. The second one is that of empire as a locus of civilisation (high/religious culture, values and development) that resonates with, dislocates, protects or advances national culture."

> triumph of Russia in the war with the Caucasus peoples was the triumph of civilization over the most tenacious barbarism…As every person knows the obligation to labor not only for himself, but to use his life to bring greater good to society, so exactly does every great people have the obligation not only to advance itself, but to offer as much as it can for the development of other, more backward peoples. Can we deny the favorable influence of the West on our development? Are we not obliged to pay this debt of civilization by extending our influence to the East? ([1860] 2004, 29) (as cited in Grant 2009, p. 47)

Even in the late 19th century, the Russian empire was still perceived by the Georgians as "benevolent" and as representative of modern civilization. Brisku (2016) argues that the perception of Russia as an oppressive power started in the 1980s. Still, it was mainly in post-Soviet Georgia, after the Russian military involvement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that Russia came to be perceived only as a "conqueror." In that sense, Russia joined the ranks of other empires, such as the Ottoman and the Persian, which were seen simply as conquering. In my research, I show that there was an understanding of Russia as an uncivilized empire by the 1920s/1930s among all three émigré groups.

The agency of the exiles is revealed in the ways in which they instrumentalized the concept of the civilized to challenge Western nations. I present findings and discuss this theme in each of my ethnic samples. In an excellent work by Krishan Kumar (2014) on the trajectory of the concept of civilization, we learn how many thinkers who initially described the concept (e.g., Guizot, Buckle, Durkheim and Mausse, and Toynbee) acknowledged the plurality of civilizations and included the European one among others.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, a new understanding developed of the civilized as moral humanity, as an antonym to barbarism, and as a world on its way to progress (Kumar, 2014). It was this definition of civilization that the exiles subscribed to. This was also the time in intellectual history when the concepts of "culture" and "civilization" were not yet distinguished (as with Norbert Elias's theory[12]) and were even equated by the anthropologist E. B. Tylor (Kumar, 2014). Their equation is revealed in émigré writings from Georgian and Ukrainian exiles, who also use the concepts interchangeably. Hill (2013) and other authors argue that concepts such as civilization, which traveled from imperial centers to other parts of the world, were "universalized" and used accordingly by local intellectuals.

These intellectuals, along with the later exiles from Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, internalized the idea of civilization. My research reveals that while inscribing themselves as part of the "civilized world" and defending their eligibility for international protection, the exiles systematically pressured the so-called great powers to align with their civilized virtues. In the case of Georgian exiles, they turned their gaze to Western Europe and appealed to it as the "enlightened world." Different official reports, decrees, and correspondences reveal a pattern in this narrative, in which addresses to the "civilized world," "the cultural world," "humanity," or the "whole world" all employ multiple tactics and channels to put pressure on the "civilized world" to take up their cause. In their requests for transitional justice, they essentially portray Georgia as a victim of uncivilized barbarism.

[12] Krieken, R. van (Ed.). (2005). Key Sociologists: Norbert Elias. New York: Routledge.

Similar calls were found in the Ukrainian sample. While asking the "civilized world" for help during the Holodomor (a period of famine in Ukraine) and Dniester River Massacre (when Ukrainian refugees fleeing from occupied Ukraine were shot at the Romanian border by the Bolsheviks), Ukrainian exiles were frustrated that the "conscience of the cultured humanity – as it is – is both blind and deaf". [13] But, despite such frustration, both Ukrainian and Georgian exiled communities self-identified as part of the "Civilized West" and anticipated help and support from it. In this sense, Ukrainians and Georgians differed from the Azerbaijani exiles who identified Turkey as part of the "civilized world" and saw it as a major source for support.

### Chapter Outlines

This dissertation is comprised of one background chapter, three chapters of independent analysis of émigré communities, and a conclusion. Chapter One provides a general overview of the interwar period in which the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani exiles settled in France. In this chapter, I discuss statistics, different legal definitions of refugee[14] status, the official statuses of the exiled political groups, and cooperation between émigré groups. This overview relies heavily on archival materials from the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) and the Hoover Institute, and on the related scholarship on these communities. The chapter intends to sketch an image of the environment and conditions in which these exiled communities were operating.

[13] Trident, *17* (325), 1932, April 24, p. 1.
[14] Throughout this dissertation, I sometimes employ the refugee concept to discuss the exiles because of its frequent use in interwar documents.

In Chapter Two, I discuss my first émigré community sample: the Georgians. Building on descriptions of the Georgian émigré memory, its comparison to the Soviet Georgian identity, and its trajectory of travel, this study illustrates the potential of subaltern national exilic memory. My data on prominent Georgian émigrés are juxtaposed with a recent historical study of the internal diaspora of prominent Georgians in the Soviet Union. This is a story of particular post-colonial intellectuals and nationalist elites who, by 1921, were acting as a carrier group to advocate for relief of the suffering of an occupied population at an international level. Capitalizing on the DRG's three years of independence, the exiles produced an alternative account comprising four distinct narratives to counter that of the Soviets. First, the exiles promoted the idea of Georgia as an independent country occupied by the Red Army. Second, they inscribed themselves as part of the "civilized world" (which excluded Russians) and systematically pressured the great powers to align with the noble values they claimed to hold. Third, despite a failed 1924 rebellion in Georgia and unfavorable historical circumstances, the exiles maintained a politics of hope and presented themselves as victorious. Fourth, they enacted a type of politics of differentiation in the 1930s that mostly replaced the politics of hope. These identified narratives constitute a stored émigré memory that safeguarded memory as it was negotiated, recovered, used for centennial celebrations in 2018—and finally reintegrated into the national body.

My case study of Georgian exiles provides unique insights into how national memory is created, stored, protected, and utilized both in exile and beyond. It reveals what kind of memory is produced, how an extraterritorial national identity differs from that fostered in one's country of origin, and how émigrés press the international

community to address the suffering of their fellow nationals. It illustrates the potential and role of subaltern national exilic memory through a comparison of the Georgian émigré memory with the Soviet Georgian identity, as well as by tracing the transformation of the émigré national memory from a stored to a functional, available past for the homeland.[15]

Chapter Three explores my second émigré community sample: the Ukrainians. For the sake of comparison, this chapter is organized following the model of the Georgian émigré community findings. After analyzing the Georgian émigré community sample, I identified four distinct yet interconnected narratives: a *memory of occupation and independence*, "*the civilized*," *the victorious nation*, and *the politics of differentiation*. I adopted these narratives as a model and investigated their presence in the other ethnic group samples of Ukrainians and Azerbaijanis. I found these four narratives represented in both a similar and a different fashion in the Ukrainian sample. In addition to the four narratives, I identified important themes specific to the Ukrainian émigré sample (e.g., frustration, nationalism, religious narratives, and remembrance). These themes were added to the chapter as either diverging or distinct from those of the Georgian sample.

Chapter Four applies the same model to my third and final sample: the Azerbaijani community. In addition to discussing the four above-mentioned narratives, the Azerbaijani sample brings novelty by focusing on a Pan-Caucasian thread and on Pan-Turanism. Participation in an Islamic brotherhood influenced how Azerbaijani exiles voiced their claims and frustrations. They too articulated the narratives of occupation,

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[15] This chapter is a modified version of the following published article: Kekelia, E. (2022). National memory in exile: The case of the Georgian émigré community, 1921–2018. Nations and Nationalism, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12870

civilization, victory, and differentiation in their own way. The Azerbaijani community was mostly split between the two émigré centers of Istanbul and Paris, both of which are represented in the materials analyzed.

The conclusion to this thesis reviews the similarities and differences between all three samples. It presents research findings that indicate the part that émigré narratives play in national exilic and non-exilic memory. The comparative summary elaborates on the theoretical significance of the findings and also outlines the limitations of the study. To illustrate the potential and role of subaltern exilic memory, I briefly reconnect the émigré memory of each community with the present-day memory politics of each country. For the Georgian case study, this work is undertaken through an analysis of the Château de Leuville-sur-Orge as a site of memory. For the Azerbaijani and Ukrainian case studies, I rely on the existing works of memory studies scholars. Finally, I illustrate that both in the nature of their respective émigré memories and agencies and in the ways in which the émigré narratives traveled back to their homelands, all three samples share strong similarities rather than differences.

In a way, this research is also an attempt to bring the voices, pain, and struggles of the émigré communities to the reader. Although I was initially concerned that I was overwhelming my dissertation with direct quotations from the exiles, my instincts were validated by Karida Brown's brilliant work *Gone home: Race and roots through Appalachia* (2018). Brown normalized the presentation of her findings on African-American micromigration in an unusual way for sociologists. Her oral history interviews are presented as strings of quotations throughout the book:

> The point of the long, multivocal soliloquies that follow is to bring you into the world in which these people's selves emerged, so we may know the social types that constituted the black community (…) There is no better way to peer into the interiority of what it meant to be black and Appalachian during the pre-Civil Rights era than through the subjective reflections of those who experienced it. (Brown, 2018, p. 57)

In much the same way, I have used the words of the exiles to bring their experiences of exile, frustration, and homelessness to the reader. In some ways, one can read these quotations as antiquated, owing to their vocabulary and content; in other ways, one can almost believe that the struggles they depict are so contemporary that it is as if we were reading today's news.

## Literature Review

### The Condition of Homelessness and Exile

The condition of homelessness in modernity (Berger 1974) challenges our understanding of how different communities create a sense of belonging in a constantly globalized world. With Berger, the concept of homelessness is metaphorically used to describe how humans lost their traditional life-worlds in modern times. In contrast, the case of the exiles implies that the concept of homelessness is used in a literal sense too. Thus, there is a double burden on a modern exile who shares not only a metaphorical sense of homelessness with every modern human being but also homelessness as a literal condition. Here, I consider it important to distinguish the concept of exiled homelessness in modernity rather than in antiquity. No doubt, exile has existed since antiquity. Famous examples include Ovid, Cicero, and Odysseus. However, modernity, with its more advanced media and international organizations, brings another dimension to the experience of homelessness (both literal and metaphorical.) Therefore, in my study I engage with the modern understandings of homelessness.

Heidegger (Heidegger 1947, Coulson 1997) has posed a crucial question: can metaphysical[16] homelessness really be the destiny of the modern world? Or could it be

[16] Heidegger's understanding of homelessness in modernity is metaphysical rather than literal. In his "Letter on Humanism", he talks about the causes of homelessness in relation to Marx's alienation and Nietzsche's nihilism: "Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world. Hence it is necessary to think that destiny in terms of the history of being. What Marx recognized in an essential and significant sense, though derived from Hegel, as the estrangement of the human being has in roots in the homelessness of modem human beings. This homelessness is

that in modernity the feeling of homelessness will be overcome? Interestingly, Thomas Mann noticed a change in the experience of exile that is directly linked to the literal and metaphorical homelessness. He has noted that "exile has become something quite different from what it once was; it is no longer a condition of waiting programmed for an ultimate return. But rather it hints of the dissolution of nations and the unification of the world" (Quoted in Dahlie 1986, p. 202.) This change is attributed to the historical development, modernity and new social, technical and economic changes in a more interconnected or globalized world. Could this unification of the world lead exiles to give up the idea of their own home? And if some diasporic communities realize sooner than others that there is no going back home, what explains the variation between them?

Dialectically coupled with the concept of homelessness, comes the Simmelian concept of the *Stranger*. These two concepts are dialectically connected because being displaced or away from home easily makes one a *Stranger*:

> The unity of nearness and remoteness involved in every human relation is organized, in the phenomenon of the stranger, in a way which may be most briefly formulated by saying that in the relationship to him, distance means that he, who is close by, is far, and strangeness means that he, who also is far, is actually near (Simmel 1908.)

Simmel's dialectical approach presupposes that the tension between the social group and the stranger, which does not share common origins, can never be surmounted. In fact,

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specifically evoked from the destiny of being in the form of metaphysics, and through metaphysics is simultaneously entrenched and covered up as such (1947, p.219.)"

building on his theory, sociologists such as Robert Park offered the concept of the marginal man, in which the conditions of the stranger are even more aggravated, since they represent migrants who suffer from self-consciousness and inability to assimilate (Levine et al. 1976.) In the same spirit, Zygmunt Bauman argued that such ambivalent people, or strangers, threatened the newly constructed boundaries and "will-to-order" of modernity (Marotta 2017.) In other words, the modern systems in Europe were so concerned with classification and order that the ambivalent nature of the stranger was seen as a menace. An example of such a marginalized ambivalent stranger would be a Jewish person.

Perhaps the clearest example on how the condition of exile and homelessness is linked to nation-states is voiced by Hannah Arendt (1951) in *The Origins of Totalitarianism.* When Arendt questioned the Rights of Man, she advanced the idea of a *right to have rights* and to belong to some kind of political and organized community. This was exactly the right that millions of stateless refugees and especially the Jewish populations, that Arendt witnessed in her time, were deprived of. Arendt's observation on the dependency on nation-states and citizenship (or the rights of belonging) predicted that "the more the world globalized, the more people would be thrown into an existence where all they had left was their "humanity" to bargain with" (Cox et al. 2020, p.2.) Being stateless is a condition that only appeared in modernity after sovereign states invented citizenships and specific legal statuses. With no place at all in the social hierarchy, Arendt argues that a stateless person is in an even worse position than a criminal or a slave. Thus, following her reasoning, the metaphorical and literal feeling of homelessness becomes even more unaccommodating for the exiles.

The condition of homelessness is painted as a bleak picture by the literary scholar Edward Said. To him, being rooted "is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul" (Simone Weil quoted in Said 2000, p.183) The author paints the condition of exile as terminal loss, orphanhood; and as something that produces rancor, regret, mourning and homelessness in a heartless world:

> Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience. It is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted. And while it is true that literature and history contain heroic, romantic, glorious, even triumphant episodes in an exile's life, these are no more than efforts meant to overcome the crippling sorrow of estrangement. The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind forever. (...) And naturally "we" concentrate on that enlightening aspect of "their" presence among us, not on their misery or their demands. But looked at from the bleak political perspective of modern mass dislocations, individual exiles force us to recognize the tragic fate of homelessness in a necessarily heartless world" (Said 2000, p.173; p.183.)

Thus, for Said too, the exiles are the ones who always feel their own differences and estrangement from the society in which they live (Said, p.182.) Moving from a general concept of the society to the concept of nation-states, Said (p.176) recognized that "the interplay between nationalism and exile is like Hegel's dialectic of servant and master, opposites informing and constituting each other." And if the loss of the bond with home is an inherent part of the exile's existence, no man is free from the tragic fate of terminal loss unless the "Strong or "perfect" man achieves independence and detachment by

working through attachments, not by rejecting them" (Said, p.185.) These feelings of tragic loss and inherent helplessness resurface in my study when I discuss the frustrations they feel and the way they engage with tragic memories. For example Georgian émigrés indicate that exile narratives do not necessarily have to be binary, since they can be both victorious and tragic at the same time.

## The Hopes, Claims and Frustrations of Forced Migrants

Part of my research questions deal with the hopes, claims and frustrations of the forced migrants. Namely, how do exiles engage in claim making and who are their targeted audiences?

My archival work resulted in findings about the agency and strategies of political exiles. For instance, findings from all three samples illuminated both the hopes that exiles carried towards the "civilized world" and how audience tuning was used for different audiences. Interestingly, the same narrative was voiced by the Kurds towards the U.S. in the very recent conflict around Turkey and Syria in 2019. This shows the potential of instrumentalizing the concept of the civilized as an analytical tool in exile studies.

At the beginning of my dissertation, this set of questions was inspired by the following theme. In her movie *Capernaum* (based on research), a young Lebanese director, Nadine Labaki, masterfully showed the high, and sometimes utopian, hopes that Syrian refugees or Lebanese children have towards the "civilized west." For instance, we

hear two children, a Syrian refugee girl (Maysoun) and a poor Lebanese boy (11-year-old Zain), dreaming of collecting enough money to hire a smuggler and leave for the West:

> In Sweden. There's a neighborhood full of Syrians there. No one asks what are you doing here. No one messes with you. I'll have my own room, no one comes in without knocking. I choose who can come in and who can't. Kids there, they die only from natural causes. (Capernaum 2018.)

For the character of Zain, it does not really matter in which country he will end up as long as he can escape from his miserable life of constant suffering and struggle for survival. Information is so little that he asks his smuggler which country is prettier[17]: Lack of information or misinformation from smugglers on what kind of life to expect in the West is not the only kind of expectation that migrants carry. In fact, network analysis has shown that some potential migrants base their expectations on the information they get from migrant networks (Ali and Hartmann 2015.) Nevertheless, they all dream of escape, shelter and a better life.

This example from Lebanon is certainly different from the exiled groups that I studied in my research. However, they help us to see one similarity that pervades across most exiled or forced migrant communities. This similarity is the hopes, expectations and claims that people from developing countries carry. These are less known to scholars who work on the intersection of memory and exile. Some insightful studies from Machteld Venken (2012) and Irial Glynn & J.Olaf Kleist (2012) mostly focuses on the

[17] "ASPRO: Where do you want to go? ZAIN: To Turkey. I mean Sweden. ASPRO: Sweden, Turkey, whichever you like. ZAIN: Which one's prettier? ASPRO: You choose. I'll even send you to the moon. All you have to do is convince her about the boy. Deal, kiddo? (Capernaum 2018.)

aspects of assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. Relatively more is known from literary scholars (like Said 2000, Dahlie 1986, Lawrie 2015, Bozovic 2017, Rudakoff 2017, Simpson 1995) about the suffering and frustrations that exile intellectuals (such as poets, artists and writers) carry after displacement. In the literature of exile, one can notice a pattern that manifests itself in various ways: as images of suffering (Purseigle 2007); as despair (Hirsch 1996); as trauma (Wise 2004); as sadness (Said 2000.) This pattern of sadness, isolation and nostalgia is mostly common in the literary or artistic aspects of exile experiences. As Jean-Pierre Makouta-Mboukou (1993) has noted, the space of exile is inherently tragic. We constantly see the desperate need to find refuge and shelter from extended experiences of suffering. For instance, from his own experience J.J. Rousseau expressed a shared feeling : "Tourmenté, battu d'orage de toute espèce, fatigué le voyages et de persécution depuis plusieurs années, je sentais vivement le besoin du repos, dont mes barbares ennemis se faisaient un jeu de me priver" (Makouta-Mboukou 1993, p.221.)

Interestingly, Hoffman (2013) argues that if, historically, the condition of exile was mostly defined as a tragic one, now it is redefined as a heroic and even glamorous one. With this dual understanding of the experience of exile in mind, either glamourous or tragic, I identified the non-binary type of narratives that Georgian exiles produced. The Georgian émigré community produced a national memory of both victimhood and victory in exile. It illustrated that exiled communities do not always rely on binary, either tragic or glamourous, narratives (as shown in the literature) but that they can be intertwined.

The dynamics of the exile process can be fully understood as a social experience by examining hopes and frustrations together. After risking their lives to reach asylum, how do exiles deal with their frustrations? How much are these frustrations advanced in their claims? Who is the audience to whom the exiles address their grievances? What models of discourses do they use? And depending on these premises, how much and what kind of national memories are preserved? With this research I examined the voices of the exiles and understood how and why these voices were directed to different audiences.

## Memory Studies & the Sociology of Forced Migration

### Memory Studies

Social theory is challenged to keep up with the transnational dynamics that surrounds modern immigration. Acknowledging the importance of social theory in migratory studies, I argue that forced migration should not be studied solely as demographic process but as a cultural one. Studying the experiences of exile imply understanding various cultures, meanings, past memories and narratives. Thus, I am looking at the experience of exile through the lenses of memory studies by combining it with the literature of forced migration. I believe that the field of memory studies offer a well-suited conceptual apparatus and methodology to undertake such research. Moreover, old and new transcultural concepts are needed to capture the positionality of different worlds/cultures, exile, hybridity, audiences and the ongoing processes that shapes the migrant's memories.

This study engages with a recent turn in memory studies away from the nation-state as a clearly bound and self-evident carrier of memory. The vibrant field of memory studies,[18] which originated in the early 1980s, has shaped our understanding of how national identities are created and maintained through the propagation of shared memories on national pasts. This line of thinking draws from many sources, including Renan (1882), Anderson (2016) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). However, since its peak in the 1990s, numerous scholars have sought to elaborate our understanding of a 'memory–nation nexus', arguing that the nation-state is not a container of collective memory. Literary theorist Erll (2011) identified a new wave of memory studies that seeks to overcome the biases of 'container' thinking, while Rothberg (2009) introduced the concept of multidirectional memory to analyse how memory of the Holocaust flowed back and forth across national borders and identities. De Cesari and Rigney (2014) developed notions of 'transnational memories', which encompassed national boundaries and the capacity of culture to transcend them.

Work on fragmented commemoration further deepens our understanding of national memory in exile. In her study of the commemoration of the assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Vinitzky-Seroussi (2002) showed how groups with different views of the event created separate commemorative communities and vernaculars. While this study applied to different views within a single nation, sometimes fragmentation is physical, existing both within a divided society and beyond, when a specific set of memories is taken into exile. A unique phenomenon occurs when the exilic memory of the nation, nurtured afar, is reintroduced into a changed domestic body—

[18] See Olick and Robbins (1998).

almost like stored stem cells. Thus, the Georgian case can illuminate the complex flow of fragmented memory within, outside of and back into a single national unit in complex, multidirectional, transcultural and travelling ways.

I identify these exiles-turned-émigrés as postcolonial intellectuals: a self-designated carrier group of memory. Here, I rely on Erll's (2011) dimension of carriers of memory and Alexander's (2012, p. 16) concept of carrier groups from the social theory of trauma, both specifically connected to migration and exile. According to Erll (2011), carriers of memory practice mnemonic rituals and draw on repertoires of 'explicit and implicit knowledge' (p. 12). Alexander (2012) defines similar groups as elites who 'have particular discursive talents for articulating their trauma claims—for "meaning making"—in the public sphere' (p. 16).

As a carrier group, Georgian émigrés had many reasons to express their past histories and experiences of trauma at an international level. Their sophisticated and organised memory entrepreneurship targeted three different audiences: their own émigré community in France, the international community and the population that remained in Georgia. Although their public and private narrative tactics differed for each audience, the overarching theme remained.

In both sub-fields that my research is engaged with, literature calls for innovative ways and transcultural concepts to define and explain modern processes. In 2011 memory studies called for a third wave of theory that will study the memory *of* cultures instead of memory *in* cultures (Erll 2011, Feindt & al. 2014, Rothberg 2011.) For the third phase, the challenge is in capturing the dynamic nature of travelling memory: As explained by Erll (2011, p.16), "The transcultural lens promises a better understanding of

our own globalizing age, in which memory travels high speed across, and increasingly beyond boundaries." Michael Rothberg's concept of multidirectional memory (2011) is another tool to capture transcultural dynamics, collective and historical memory. Rothberg claims that collective memory is not a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources, but a multidirectional process where the exemplary model of Jewish persecution (for example, the Holocaust) can be borrowed and applied to other disadvantaged groups' struggles for recognition:

> I argue that collective memories of seemingly distinct histories - such as those of slavery, the Holocaust, and colonialism - are not so easily separable from one another. I have discovered not only that memory of the Holocaust has served as a vehicle through which other histories of suffering have been articulated, but also something even more surprising(...) I demonstrate how the public articulation of collective memory by marginalized and oppositional social groups provides resources for other groups to articulate their own claims for recognition and justice. (Rothberg 2011, p.524)

In my research on Georgian exiles, I was able to see the multidirectional dynamics in migratory settings when exiles articulated their claims in comparison to other cases. These were clear-cut examples of what Michael Rothberg calls "multidirectional memory." For instance, the victimhood of the Polish or Irish people was borrowed and used as a vehicle for the Georgian cause. While Rothberg's examples start with the Holocaust template in the aftermath of WWII, my case study showed that the claims on the basis of "victimhood" were already advanced in the 1920s. International and national historical experiences inspired the hope of liberation for the exiles. The fact that a

political exile could end soon was based on the perception that many occupations around the world had previously ended successfully. For instance, Ireland, Belgium, Poland, and other cases were cited as examples of successful liberation. This finding was consistent with Rothberg's theory according to which the human mind is structurally and inherently multidirectional. Thus, multidirectional dynamics can be found across different sections of space and time.

## Agency and Memory

The approach of memory studies towards agency is almost intuitive. The field itself is deeply embedded into how social memory is malleable and constantly reconstructed. Therefore, it certainly does not reject the existence of agency, but rather differentiates the degrees of power in agency. Namely how much instrumentalism is possible, why and how. In addition, the field also tries to overcome the stiff distinction between agency and structure. An example of such effort would be Jeffrey Olick's (2016) concept of the "mnemonic practices" where collective memory is both practices and products.

Forced migrant's agency is a central piece of my research, thus I discuss the relationship of memory studies with the question of agency in detail. For one, almost all memory scholars across the board understand the malleable nature of collective memory, which is derived from the idea that memory is constantly transformed from the present. After Maurice Halbwachs (1994) explained the process of remembering with the help of different social frameworks (language, family, friends), we learned that the reconstruction of the past is always triggered or stimulated by existing environments.

Other memory scholars have also developed this line of thought in various ways. For instance, for Pierre Nora memory „is blind to all but the group it binds" (1989, p.9.) With Nora, selection is one of the characteristics of memory: "There are as many memories as there are groups, that memory is by nature multiple and yet specific, collective plural, and yet individual (Halbwachs, 1994.) In addition, Elizabeth Jelin (2003) introduced the concept of labors of memory, which indicated an active involvement from the agents in the transformation and elaboration of the past. For Jelin, if memories are subjective processes expressed in various forms, or objects of disputes that need to be historicized, then the working-through process, the debates and reflexivity on the past is not only a therapeutic activity but something that involves the agency of the actors. Astrid Erll (2011, p.8) made the same remark on subjectivity, who claimed that memory is not objective but "highly subjective and selective representations, dependent on the situation in which they are recalled." As a result, we are involved in the selective remembering processes and forgetting, where amnesia works as the other side of the coin.

It is not enough to say that memory studies inspect a reconstruction process involving the human agency. We also need to differentiate the variations in human agency. On the one hand, presentism takes an extremely instrumental approach with the manipulation of the past, while others might take relatively moderate or even essentialist approaches in assessing the transformation process. According to Olick & Robbins (1998), the past can be more or less malleable or persistent to change. Six ideal types of mnemonic malleability and persistence (instrumental, cultural, inertial) are schematically offered by Olick & Robbins (1998, p.129.) First, there can be instrumental changes or persistence that are consciously advanced to preserve some memories/monuments, or

revise them by inventing new traditions or engaging into other kinds of memory entrepreneurship. This first dimension is strongly related to the Marxian tradition that Hobsbawm later developed in the form of "invented traditions."

When analyzing the process of agency and claim-making by postcolonial exiles, I move away from the classic understanding of the constructivist approach. According to Olick (2007, p.20) the constructivist approach does not respond to the questions on the origins of the present interests. He notes that "an instrumentalist approach is unable to give a good account of why it is that the past works so well as an instrument of present interests." Olick distinguishes between what we do with the past, what the past does for us, and finally, what the past does to us: "Sometimes we use the past, and sometimes, for better (functional) or worse (traumatic) it uses us, but there is always a combination of all these going on in every case, historical or psychiatric" (2007, p. 31.) The past has done something *for* the émigré communities, as well as done something *to* the émigré communities. For instance, how Georgian émigrés used the past of Soviet occupation to advance claims on legitimacy is an example of what we do with the past that implies a pure instrumentalist or functional approach. In addition, Barry Schwartz and Michael Schudson are those scholars who try to find a middle ground between essentialists and presentists. Schudson (1989) argues that there are three factors that restrict the deliberate and instrumentalist reconstruction of the past. Among those factors, the fact of how the structure of "available pasts" from history dictates the structures of "individual choices" speaks to my research. In that sense, my research showed that the Georgian émigré memory became that available past in itself that, despite being suppressed for decades, was eventually imposed as a traumatic past.

As mentioned above, selected memory studies theories are instrumental to understanding forced migrant's claim making and agency. In addition, the literature of migration also recognizes a distinction between the realist and social constructivist approaches. According to Jeremy Hein (1993), if we employ the realist approach, we can distinguish refugees from immigrants according to their relationships with the state. Along these lines, world system theory offers a social constructivist critique by rejecting the boundaries between political and economic migrants. David Scott FitzGerald and Rawab Arar favor this approach. The authors argue that when some categorizations describe refugee movements as involuntary, they deprive these migrants of their own agency (FitzGerald and Arar 2018, p.86.) Therefore, labeling maintains crucial importance. In fact, as Roger Zetter (1991) has shown, in real-life circumstances, labeling and categorizations even determine the fate of the migrants. Often such labeling happens in traumatic conditions and results in transformed identities and symbolic meanings.

Zetter and Castles believe that it is not only compulsion, or drivers, that provoke forced migration but also the agency[19] of the migrants too. After conceptualizing five drivers of forced migration, Roger Zetter (2018, p.35) argues that these drives are rarely mono-causal but often come in combination: 1. Existential threats from socio-economic

[19] The question of agency has been analyzed by other scholars of memory studies and forced migration, such as J. Olaf Kleist (2017), Alice Bloch and Giorgia Dona (2018), Mainwaring (2016) and Blakewell (2010.)

and state fragility; 2) violence and armed conflicts; 3) environmental degradations; 4) development induced displacement; 5) and natural disasters.[20]

## Exile and Transnational Memory

A distinction between transnational and cosmopolitan memory emerges among modern scholars of memory studies. The concept of transnational memory was prioritized by scholars like Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney (2014) who saw the potential of grasping the national frameworks of memory making in a global age. Here, we find a subtle difference in moving away from the "national containers." The authors do not entirely disregard the importance of the "national" in memory-making processes. Instead, they understand the enterprise of "transnationalism" as an endeavor that recognizes the dialectical role of the national borders:

> This means that, while it takes on board the principle that memory 'travels' and that it does so increasingly in our age of globalized communication, it recognizes the dialectical role played by national borders (which are not just imagined, but also legally defined) in memory practices and in memory studies. In light of these considerations, among others, we concluded that the term 'transnational,' although not without its own shortcomings (see Vertovec 2009, 17), seemed best suited to approach the multi-layered, multi-sited, and multi-directional dynamic

[20] "It seeks to capture the episodic nature of this 'displacement continuum', the diversity and complexity of patterns, processes and channels, and the 'shifting statuses' of mixed and irregular migration. It moves beyond unique cause-effect relationships and linear processes of movement. At the same time, the analytical approach highlights the interplay between two structural components of forced migration: the complexity and variety of drivers that lead to forced migration are echoed in the complexity and diversity of mobility trajectories that forcibly displaced people undertake, and vice versa. (Zetter 2018, p.38)

> that we are hoping to capture. 'Transnationalism' recognizes the significance of national frameworks alongside the potential of cultural production both to reinforce and to transcend them. (De Cesari & Rigney 2014, p.4.)

As for the case of even more global memory, Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider (2002) offer the notion of the cosmopolitanization of memory. The latter differs from transnationalism because transnationalism still carries the "nationalism project" at its core. If transnationalism occurs between nations, cosmopolitanism claims to occur on a more global level (such as the European Union). This theoretical distinction is important to my research since it offers different ways to approach international organizations that deal with refugees, such as the League of Nations, I.R.O. and U.N.H.R.C. Following Levy's argument, the United Nations is an international project that keeps nation-states alive. The relation is always circular between different nations; in this circularity, Levy identifies the Rothbergian multidirectional memory too. If according to transnationalism, shared humanity is imagined by the connection of different nations, for Levy other kinds of shared humanity emerges, as more transcultural ones, with new cases of global memory and cosmopolitanism. Along these lines, existing migratory studies sits in the theoretical frameworks of the transnational and multidirectional rather than cosmopolitan. As Rotheberg (2014, p.143) noted: "Memory in migratory settings is simultaneously multidirectional and thickened".

The sociology of forced migration

In the same spirit of *Memory Studies*, the Sociology of Forced Migration sub-field calls for a transnational enterprise where new characteristics of globalization can be analyzed.

Stephen Castles' (2003) take on transnationalism as a choice for migratory studies aligns with the call to move away from container societies:

> This implies departing from the national focus of traditional social theory and taking global flows and networks as the key frameworks for social relations (Castles, 1996, 1997, 1998; Held et al., 1999). Migrants are then to be seen as moving, not between 'container societies', but rather within 'transnational social space' (Faist, 2000), in which 'global cities' with dualistic economies form the key nodes (Sassen, 1991). In such spaces, transnational communities are emerging as a new focus for social and cultural identity for both economic migrants (Bäsch et al., 1994; Portes, 1999; Vertovec, 1999) and forced migrants (Cohen, 1997; Van Hear, 1998.) (Castles 2003, p.27)

Castles also argues that sociology should be involved with forced migration because it is "a central aspect of social transformation in the contemporary world". He also argues against putting too much emphasis on the individual and cultural aspects of forced migration and calls the sociology of forced migration to analyze more structural dimensions in the time of globalization (2003, p.22):

> We need a sociological argument, that points to the significance of forced migration in contemporary society and in current processes of change. A first clue is provided by Zygmunt Bauman, who argues that 'mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor'. The new global economic and political elites are able to cross borders at will, while the poor are meant to

> stay at home: 'the riches are global, the misery is local' (Bauman,1998: 9, 74.) (...) The task for a contemporary sociology of forced migration is to analyse the new characteristics of forced migration in the epoch of globalization. Today, forced migration is both a result and a cause of social transformation in the South. Situations of conflict, generalized violence and mass flight emerged from the 1960s, in the context of struggles over decolonization, state formation and incorporation into the bipolar world order of the Cold War (Zolberg et al., 1989)." (Castles, 2003, p.16-17)

Another sociologist of forced migration, David FitzGerald (2012), takes this turn from "methodological nationalism" into the discussions of methodology on how to compare different fieldwork sites. According to him, the Millian logic of comparison and Geertz's thick description are not anymore applicable in the age of globalization because the idea of discrete cultural unites is also gone. Thus, FitzGerald's approach is aligned with my vision on moving away from methodological nationalism without totally dismissing the relevance of the national category:

> Yet even the transnationalism literature, which rightly warns of the dangers of 'methodological nationalism' seen in the preoccupation with immigrants' assimilation into the nation-state (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), has often fallen into the trap of unconsciously defining its subjects in simple national terms. Comparisons of domestic and international migrants from the same community, avoiding the assumption that the experience of migrants in one city (e.g. Sydney) represents the national whole (Australia), and attending to how migrants dissimilate (become different from those whom they leave behind), are ways of

> avoiding the methodological nationalist trap. These strategies allow for an empirical assessment of when and how the national category is relevant (FitzGerald 2012, p.1726)

Both scholars, Castles and FitzGerald (2018), argue that sociologists should develop concepts not directed by political objectives and major organizations such as UNHCR. Framing migratory movements has been influenced by humanitarian organizations, colonial administrations, and military processes (Banerjee & Samaddar 2018, Malkii 1995, Zetter 1991.)[21] Thus, there is a strong call for an interdisciplinary, historical and comparative approach that can academically enrich this N.G.O. dominated area.

With my dissertation, I also respond to that call. By merging the theoretical achievements of transnational memory and forced migration, I contribute to comparative historical sociology. The intersection of memory and exile can help us understand transcultural processes and possibly identify similar patterns between diasporas and time periods. As Said (2000, p.xxxv) noted:

> What has been left behind may either be mourned, or it can be used to provide a different set of lenses. Since almost by definition exile and memory go together, it is what one remembers of the past and how one remembers it that determine how one sees the future.

[21] For instance, in the 19th century humanitarianism was for the poor and destitute in the colonies, while now it is for the displaced (Banerjee & Samaddar 2018, p.57.) As for the refugees from WWII, they were mostly taken as a military problem according to Liisa H. Malkki (1995.)

## Research Design and Methodology

Extensive archival research has led me to design this research with a targeted and manageable scope. I reconstructed the historical background using secondary and primary materials in this qualitative study before moving to a systematic textual analysis of émigré newspapers, historical documents, and interviews. Considering the Biernacki-Evans methodological debate, I avoided pure methodological formalism and took a relatively more hermeneutic approach with textual analysis.

In 2020, I was awarded the Albert Gallatin Graduate Research Fellowship to conduct international research. Initially, I planned to travel internationally for fieldwork in Geneva, Paris, and Tbilisi. Unfortunately, the frequent closure of the international and U.S. archives and other pandemic-related issues disrupted my access to materials. My in-person fieldwork got limited to a 2018 data collection from Paris and Tbilisi with earlier support of the Sociology department summer research funding. Since neither international nor domestic travel were possible due to the pandemic, I developed an alternative plan with the sociology department and GSAS. This plan allowed me to collect archival data remotely and with the help of on-site researchers. Collecting data remotely was a challenge because of the nature of the archival documents. I spent a considerable amount of time identifying the right archival fonds and folders online. Many requested documents, some of which were hundreds of pages long, were not helpful for my research. This is a nuisance that one could quickly fix when in the archives.

Despite Covid-19 related challenges, I collected more than sufficient historical documents and émigré newspapers from twelve archives and in six different languages. I collected six in-depth interviews with resettled family descendants and embassy officials as a supplement. The type of data that I analyzed includes archival historical documents, émigré newspapers/journals, interviews with émigré descendants, and secondary historical data on each ethnic group. Historical documents that I collected vary by type and length. Some are one page long and some are up to thirty and more. When dealing with collected data, I did not treat newspapers as objective sources from which I can gather historical facts. Newspapers indeed report their view on historical events, political movements or ideas, but the importance of these documents lies precisely in the heart of the narrative constructions they represent.

In *OFPRA.*, I read the entirety of the Georgian section (59 documents) and part of the Paul Chastand fond (52 documents). With the help of my on-site researcher, from the *Archives Nationales de France* I accessed 31 folders (2941 pages) related to the Georgian and Caucasian émigré communities. Notably, the Archives Nationales inherited documents from I.R.O. (International Refugee Organization) after its dissolution [22]. To guide me in this massive depository and select relevant records, I read a four-volume book series: *Les étrangers en France, Guide des sources d'archives publiques et privées: XIXe-XXe siècles (1999 et 2005, 4 volumes.)*

At the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine I worked on " the Archives de la République indépendante de Géorgie, du Parti social-démocrate de

[22] The archive contains: 1) *Haut Commissariat de Londres (1er janvier 1939 - 31 décembre 1946)* and *Comité intergouvernemental pour les Réfugiés (1939 - juillet 1947.)*

Géorgie et du gouvernement géorgien en exil" and analysed 84 documents from boxes 38, 39, 40, 41, et 42. Later with the help of my on-site researcher I got access to additional documents from boxes 56, 57, 58, 61, 75, 76, and 80 (2371 pages).

From Columbia University Libraries' archival collections, I collected thirty-two journal issues from *Trident* (104 pages). *Trident* was a weekly publication, so I sampled two issues per year and requested copies of the first pages of each issue. I gathered two monographs from the Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO of Ukraine), which contained extensive collections of historical documents.

I started collecting the first volume of the journal of *Yeni Kafkasya* from *Hathi trust* and collected the rest of the volumes (volumes three, four, and five) from the *Library of Congress*. During the pandemic, the Library of Congress librarians could not physically locate the journal version that was published in modern Turkish. They only found the version that was issued in Ottoman Turkish. This problem was solved for me with the help of a brilliant graduate student, Gunay Kayarlar, who helped me translate the content of the articles and locate the themes I was looking for. As a result, I collected thirty issues of *Yeni Kafkasya.* I collected eleven issues of *Yeni Kafkasya* from *Hathi trust* and nineteen issues from the Library of Congress (eleven issues from the third volume, six issues from the fourth, and two from the fifth volume). Like in the Ukrainian journal, I also sampled each issue's first few pages or first article. In addition to the journal, I sampled and analyzed 75 historical documents from the archive of the head of the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation in Paris, A. M. Topchibashi. Thanks to G. Mamoulia, I

was able to access Azerbaijani émigré historical documents from the most extensive four-volume collection of the archive: *A. M. Topchibashi: the Paris archive (1919–1940).*

From the Hoover Institute, I accessed materials from the inventory of the Dimitri Shalikashvili Writings 1920-1960, the Register of the American Relief Administration Russian operational records, the Archives of the Soviet communist party and Soviet state microfilm collection: Russian State Archives of Social and Political History, and the Georgian K.G.B. records. And finally, I collected various archival journals and historical materials from: *Gallica BNF* (29,14,9,14 and 99 issues of various journals), The Geneva U.N. League of Nations Archive , National Association for Armenian Studies and Research (monographs).

As for the Georgian journals, I collected 10 journal titles from The National Parliamentary Library of Georgia and the Sharadze Emigration Museum: '*T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo', 'Sak'art'velos Moambe'. 'Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo' (La Géorgie Indépendente), 'Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo', Mamulišvili, Brdžola, Saxalxo Sak'me, T'et'ri Giorgi, Sak'art'velo'*, and *Axali Iveria*. The first three journals I analyzed systematically. I collected fully or at least all of their first articles in addition to articles of interest. The rest of the journals were instructive in getting a sense of the émigré printing press and their major themes.

Because the Georgian sample is my primary group, I will describe a detailed picture of the sampling process. At first, I studied the journals and constructed a table of an extremely broad sample that captivated all available materials that have been released and are available in the archives. I classified them according to the: name of the journal; edition and issue dates and numbers of the journal; location of the journal; editors in chief

of the journal; political or other kinds of affiliations of the journal; the language in which the journal was released; and whenever possible the scope of the diffusion of the journal. Because the Georgian government in exile was diverse and had multiple political parties (the Social Democrats, the National Democrats, the Social Federalists, and the military officers), I tried to select only the titles that represented a unified front for the entire émigré community.

To identify the kinds of "usable pasts" that the Georgian émigré community employed to produce national feelings, I introduced a historical measure - the 1924 Georgian rebellion in Soviet Georgia. In anticipation that this measure could allow me to compare narrative change from one period to the other, I decided to have two different samples. The first sample was supposed to assemble journal articles before the 1924 rebellion. Since there were few pre-rebellion journals to choose from, I was limited to two titles, I included my two pre-rebellion titles: *, 'Sak'art'velos Moambe'* and '*T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo'* (28 issues and 636 pages altogether). In this sample, one is an impartial journal and one is from the social democrats[23]. Since the second sample was supposed to give me findings that can be comparable with the pre-rebellion sample, to match the proportions of my first sample, I decided to include the most consolidated journal (comprised of several political parties) with a general unified front and a consistent publication schedule (159 issues and 733 pages): *'Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo' (La Géorgie Indépendente).*

[23] Since the government in exile was in charge they issued a journal which was mostly affiliated with their party.

When I discuss articles from Georgian, Ukrainian, or Azerbaijani journals, I often use "the authors" to designate the subject. Unless I am discussing a specific archival fond such as Topchibashi's, Assathiany's or others whose writings I can identify, I use the construct of the authors. This choice is purposeful. The authors do not sign many journal articles. However, we can guess that the editors in chief of each respective journal wrote a large part of them. For instance, N. Jordainia, K. Chkheidze, R. Ivanitski-Ingilo, J. Gobechia, G. Uratadze, and S. Pirtskhalava were the editors of '*T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo', 'Sak'art'velos Moambe', and'Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo'.* *Yeni Kafkasya* was issued by the President of the committee of Azerbaijani independence, M. E. Rasulzade. And finally, the Ukrainian journal *Trident* was edited by Symon Petliura, the former President of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Following the concept of postmemory, I decided to conduct interviews with exile descendants. Thanks to Marianne Hirsh's work on Holocaust survivors in exile, we have learned that postmemory is mediated not through recollections but through the imagination of the object [24]. Parents successfully transmit images of their homelands, which results in memory that is not only an act of recall but also of mourning, anger, despair and rage. The children always remain marginal or exiled; home is somewhere else that is not any more accessible: "The condition of exile from the space of identity, this diasporic experience, is characteristic of postmemory (…) a foreign country we can never hope to visit" (Hirsh 1996, pp.662-663.)

[24] This results in different forms of postmemory, an absent memory, a "mémoire trouée" and "diaspora des cendres".

To strengthen the analysis of the Georgian émigré community, I conducted semi-structured interviews with Georgian and Azerbaijani émigré descendants. Initially, I planned to interview at least ten representatives from each community, but locating Azerbaijani and Ukrainian descendants proved challenging with the pandemic-related obstacles. Finally, I managed to interview the deputy and Georgian Ambassador at the Georgian embassy in France, the 97-year-old son of the first president of the D.R.G. government, two other Georgians and one Azerbaijani émigré descendant. These interviews provided insight into the exiles' communicative memory and brought a temporal aspect to my dissertation.

My data consists of ethnographic notes, thousands of pages of archival documents, interviews and official state documents regarding the status of the château. Through these historical documents, the meaning-making process and its development over time can be seen as objects of the émigré memory across three languages (Georgian, French and English).

My language skills gave me flexibility to work in three languages fluently (French, English, Georgian) and in one language intermediately (Russian.) The help of my Russian language tutor, UVA Prof. Emeritus Lilia Travisano, is immeasurable, as she helped with Russian language documents, Ukrainian, and some Turkish as well. Prof. Travisano and I met 68 times to work on archival materials in Russian and Ukrainian languages, and I received language assistance in reading, accessing the context, and translating the materials.

I followed Carpenter’s (2002) steps of analyzing textual material for all three samples. According to Carpenter (2002), content analysis is a perfect tool both for

historical phenomena and comparative studies because it enables the categorization of massive data systematically and objectively while seeing changes over time. First, I created several coding categories after reading a small sample of the newspaper articles. Then, I designed a coding protocol in which some of my categories grouped together or collapsed. While I progressed in my data analysis, I adjusted my coding categories to the following themes: journal's declared mission, memory of occupation and independence, frustrations and claims, narrative of "the civilized", politics of hope and victory, politics of differentiation, tone of the article & emotional expressions, audience, nationalism, rebellion and resistance, return from exile. I proceeded with *memoing*, which helped generate the hypothesis by combining or interacting with relevant categories.

# Chapter One

## Comparability Between Selected Groups

There are some basic points of comparison between the groups of exiles selected for study in this thesis. Initially, my research also included the Armenian community. However, once Covid-19-related difficulties altered my fieldwork, I decided to remove the Armenian émigré community from my samples. After reading several works on Russian political exiles (Liebich, 1997; Raeff, 1990), I also concluded that Russian exiles could not be sampled alongside the Caucasian and Ukrainian communities; all of the selected groups were from independent countries that had been part of the Russian empire at some point in history, and were fleeing Soviet occupation in the 1920s. Similarity in the dates of Soviet occupation singled out this subset of countries from other Baltic States that were occupied much later in the 1940s. In addition to having similar historical trajectories, the selected groups collaborated and fought against the Soviet Union several times. Thus, there was a sufficient historical basis for comparison among these groups but not among the Russian exiles.

At the same time, the characteristics of the selected groups also varied in exile. For instance, different legal statuses were attributed to each. Compared with other exiled groups, the Georgians were the only group who retained legitimacy through a functioning legation. The Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Ukrainians all received the Nansen passport

issued by the League of Nations,[25] whereas Georgian émigrés received a special "*titre d'identité*." All three groups I analyzed, have in common a degree of inner conflict among their émigré communities; however, these conflicts did not affect their common goal. They also differed in the constitution and numbers of their exiled communities. Official historical documents openly state the impossibility of offering exact statistics about the number of interwar refugees fleeing the Soviet Union or the Russian Civil War. Nevertheless, I gathered information from documents that sometimes give a varying—but generally approximate—picture of the size of each émigré community. For instance, the first wave of Georgians involved only around 1,200 exiles[26,27,28]. This number is significantly small compared with the number of Russian exiles in France, which some counted at around 400,000 by the mid-1930s (Gousseff, 2008). There were also only small numbers of Georgian émigrés elsewhere: 3000–5000 in Harbin,[29] 60 in Czechoslovakia,[30] 400 in Istanbul,[31] and 260 in Italy.[32] As for Ukrainians, there were an estimated 38,000 exiles in France before 1940. An additional 5000 refugees were

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[25] Nansen passports were issued from 1922 to 1938 by the League of Nations. The passport was a legal instrument used to extend identification papers to stateless people, making the request for asylum possible for hundreds of thousands of international refugees. The creation of this document was precipitated by the revoking of citizenship by the Soviet Union. The passport was extended to Russian citizens and covered many Armenians and Ukrainians as well.

[26] Letter from Assathiany. 'A l'intention de monsieur Rain, pro memoria'. Paris. February 14, 1951. La contemporaine (ex BDIC), Archives de la République indépendante de Géorgie, du Parti social-démocrate de Géorgie et du gouvernement géorgien en exil. From this point forward, citations will refer to a shortened version of this archive as (La contemporaine, ex BDIC).

[27] Letter from Assathiany to the vice president and secretary under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France. 30 December 1941. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.

[28] With a longer diasporic tradition, Armenians accounted for some 63,000 refugees in France.

[29] *Report from the Georgian embassy in Harbin* (1921, February). La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[30] *Letter from Chkhenkeli* (1921, September). La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[31] *Rapport sur la question des refugies georgiens*. Kh. Shavishvili (1921, November). La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[32] *Letter to Mr. Chkhenkeli from G. Abkhasi* (1946, July). OFPRA: Office of the Georgian Refugees.

registered under the Nansen status at the Russian Section, comprising 43,000 exiles in total. Choulguine (1951) listed five categories of Ukrainian refugees:

1) Nansen refugees (reportedly numbering in the thousands);
2) locals who had been former Polish subjects (around 30,000);
3) those displaced by war (WWII, for which estimates are difficult);
4) those from Germany and Austria (estimated to number in the thousands); and
5) those from Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain.[33]

Thus, there was a very large number of Ukrainian exiles compared with the other émigré groups. It is also said that the Ukrainian organizations count the number of Ukrainian refugees in France at about 50,000, but the French administration calculates fewer.[34] On the other hand, grievances about how the French administration calculated the Georgian refugees was voiced in 1951 by Sossipatre Assathiany, who claimed that the number should be three or four times bigger.[35]

After the end of the interwar period, another picture emerges. In the final count made by the OIR in collaboration with the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies in 1949, émigré population numbers were adjusted to include those who had naturalized as well as minors:[3637]

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[33] Doc. 11-36. (1951, November 14). *Note concernant le nombre des refugies Ukrainiens en France*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[34] Doc. 3-2-1. (1950, December 18). *Dossier 2. Notes sur l'état de l'émigration Ukrainienne en France par M. Choulguine, 1949*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[35] *Letter from S. Assathiany* (1951, December). La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[36] Doc 11-37. (1949, December). *Statistique des refugies en France*. OIR. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.

1) 16,500 Ukrainians (5000 Nansen and 11,500 non-statutory refugees).[38]
2) 600 Georgians (down from 852 counted in 1941).
3) 35,000 Russian refugees.[39]

The number of émigré groups is significant because it breaks the expectation that such small émigré groups could have any say in defining their fate under the French administration. Despite their small size and subaltern nature, these communities illustrated impressive efforts and agency, as well as influence on their respective countries.

**Destination France**

The exile communities selected for study all fled to France. Aside from one Azerbaijani journal located in Istanbul, almost all of the other archival materials analyzed here originated from that geographical area. So, why did the exiled communities choose France? Perhaps France was perceived to be the most welcoming country for refugees. A French document from 1953 claims that France offered the "most liberal laws and regulations in the world and is the land of welcome for all those who flee misery, hatred or terror." Another document boasted of France as "the country of immigration par

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[37] There were 39,000 Armenian and 49,000 Polish refugees. They note that there were 300,000 non-refugee Polish settled in France before the war. Armenians were counted as arriving in two waves: in 1919 from Russia, and from 1922 to 1926 from Turkey.
[38] In 1940, Ukrainians from Galicia and Volhynia were counted as Polish and made up 18% (5253) of Polish refugees.
[39] The OIR claims the number listed by the Office of Russian refugees in 1945 (90,000) has no real foundation.

excellence";[40] it also claimed that France was loyal to humane traditions and best understood the refugee problem.[41] Indeed, a list of institutions offering social services to Russian émigrés in France during the interwar period illustrates the many types of government assistance available to Russian exiles. Some services had been regulated by law since the early 1900s (e.g., judiciary aid; assistance for the disabled, elderly, and terminally ill; assistance with tuberculosis; large family aid; help for nursing and laboring mothers, etc.).[42] Other laws were introduced in the 1930s and 1940s (e.g., for unemployment, war damages, rent compensation, a widow allowance, aid to the blind), all of which could be accessed by refugees.

Another document lists twenty-three international and French associations with a mandate to help foreign refugees. In 1945, France created a national office for immigration that addressed around 1,700,000 immigrant workers, among whom 400,000 were refugees. The International Organization for Refugees (IOR), which existed from 1947 to 1952, was created to manage refugees. While the IOR was in operation, 20,542 refugees immigrated to France. And, finally, after the closure of the IOR, a new structure, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) was created, which took on the administrative and juristic protection of 400,000 political refugees.[43]

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[40] Doc. 12-4. (1953, June 24). *Note pour Monsieur le Consul General Chastand*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[41] Doc. 12-4. (1953, June 24). *Note pour Monsieur le Consul General Chastand*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[42] Doc 5-17. *Législation applicable aux refugies russe dans les mêmes conditions qu'aux nationaux*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[43] Doc. 12-4. (1953, June 24). *Note pour Monsieur le Consul General Chastand*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.

In 1949, IOR Director J. Donald Kingsley outlined the guidelines for identifying who fell under the mandate of the organization. The administrative document details the importance of ascertaining refugees' status;[44] this was necessary to avoid the difficulty of appealing an unfavorable decision until legal status was defined. Other guidelines stressed the importance of background checks before attributing applicants to their sociological group, whether national or ethnic:

> The simple fact of belonging to a determined group cannot be enough to recognize one as under the organization's mandate. Although sociological belonging to a group should not be neglected, whether national, ethnic, or other, it is often necessary to know a person's background and occupations during the war to judge the reasons against their repatriation.[45]

Despite the existence of these associations, each émigré community had to advocate for themselves and relentlessly appeal for help and assistance. For instance, Chapter Two traces the efforts of Sossipatre Assathiany to advocate for the Georgian exiles[46]. We do know that the Georgian émigré community chose France because of their

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[44] Doc. 7-8. *Organization International Pour les Refugies* (Ordre Provisoire No. 42.1). Administration Centrale. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[45] Doc. 7-8. *Organization International Pour les Refugies* (Ordre Provisoire No. 42.1). Administration Centrale. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[46] In the Assathiany archive a letter is claiming that Georgians constitute an active element in France's economic and social life, but that they had been deprived of the rights and guarantees essential to their civil existence for several months. He urged the Government and the French Parliament to end the current situation by granting refugees the status and legal and administrative protection that the French Government undertook to provide in the Agreement of February 28, 1950.

relations with Aristide Briand (former Prime Minister of France), who had facilitated their escape across the Black Sea in French ships (Rayfield, 2012).

Exiles were differentiated by their status—for instance by whether or not they carried a Nansen passport. During the interwar period, Fridtjof Nansen championed the idea of a Nansen passport. This legal document allowed stateless refugees to exist and therefore secure financial and political aid. The mechanism was established after several humanitarian organizations felt overwhelmed by massive Russian emigration. Along with the President of the International Red Cross Committee, the organizations asked the League of Nations to put its machinery into service (Holborn, 1939). Nansen was responsible for defining the refugees' legal status, repatriating them back to Russia or other countries, and employing them in their countries of residence. Because the League provided only its machinery and not financial relief, Nansen had to coordinate with representatives of welcoming counties and humanitarian organizations (Holborn, 1939).

Following several international conventions, Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Turkish, Sarrois, and Spaniard refugees were classified under Nansen status and taken under the protection of the League of Nations' office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. Ethnic Georgians, Ukrainians, and Azerbaijani who wished to pass as Russian were also welcome to get this document. However, Georgians not only officially retained a separate identity in the paperwork but even denied taking care of those Georgians who had served in Anton Denikin's Russian Army.[47] In Chapter Two, I discuss the enduring efforts of Georgian exiles to differentiate themselves from Russian exiles. After the Menshevik government of the first DRG consolidated in Paris, it began to act as an

[47] *Rapport sur la question des refugies georgiens*. Kh. Shavishvili (1921, November). La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

official Georgian legation. Following recognition of the Soviet Union in 1924, the French government abolished the official Georgian legation in 1933. With the demise of the Georgian legation, a number of Georgian refugees began to operate under French authorities.

As regards the Ukrainian refugees, a 1949 document[48] recounts rare cases of Ukrainians addressing the IOR solely to change a record of Russian or Polish nationality to Ukrainian. The same document explains the rarity of such appeals.[49] Apparently, the investigative procedures that Ukrainians had to undergo to change their nationality at the IOR were difficult—especially for "less cultured" Ukrainians. Anxiety about France becoming communist had played a role in their decision to mask their Ukrainian identity. Such masking was helpful during a period of forceful repatriation in 1945: they believed that if France were to become communist, repatriation could be avoided if they claimed to have Polish identity.

Once in exile, the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) or the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) continued its legal existence from 1920 to 1921. The UPR had received de jure recognition in 1918, but the countries that initially recognized it gradually withdraw their recognition after the Soviet government was established in Kyiv (war lasted from 1917 until 1921). From 1921 to 1923, the UPR operated with a semi-legal character. From 1923 onward, the UPR became a public organization. The Ukrainian delegation at the Peace Conference and the Ukrainian diplomatic mission had a consular

[48] Doc. 3-2-1. (1950, December 18). *Dossier 2. Notes sur l'état de l'émigration Ukrainienne en France par M. Choulguine, 1949*. OFPRA/ Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[49] Doc. 3-2-1. (1950, December 18). *Dossier 2. Notes sur l'état de l'émigration Ukrainienne en France par M. Choulguine, 1949*. OFPRA/ Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.

service that issued diplomatic and regular passports until 1926.[50] These passports were recognized by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French administration. But, in 1926, the minister of Foreign Affairs suggested ending the practice and opening an office to serve Ukrainian refugees, which delivered documents de facto admitted by the French administration. As Ukrainian diplomatic representation ceased from 1924 to 1925, the new political representation of the UNR was established in its place. The mission of the government in exile was, at first, to enable a return to the country. Later, as the difficulty of that task grew clear, it switched to helping the Ukrainian people with their fight for independence (Panova, 2013). Still, the government of the democratic Republic of Ukraine presented their notes to the French government and the League of Nations until 1939 and various presidents took charge of the government in exile: V. Prokopovitch, A. Choulguine, M. A. Livitzky. Eventually, in 1945, the socialist Soviet Republic of Ukraine was admitted to the League of Nations and recognized by all member states. In 1948, the French Ministry of Interior Affairs specified that all Ukrainian refugees would be recognized as "refugees of Ukrainian origin" or the former statutory refugees as "Ukrainian refugees" [51].

Unlike the Georgians, the Azerbaijani received only *de facto* recognition of their independence from the Allied Supreme Council in January 1920. By April 1920, the country was already under the rule of the Red Army. According to Mamoulia and Aboutalibov (2019), more than 500 political refugees fled and stayed in Georgia for ten months. Once the Red Army had also occupied Georgia, Azerbaijani exiles were forced to leave Georgia for Turkey. Soon after, both émigré communities, the diplomatic

[50] Doc. 8-5. *Notes sur L'Ukraine*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[51] Doc. 8-5. *Notes sur L'Ukraine*, p.4. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.

delegation in Paris, and the committee for Azerbaijani independence began anti-Bolshevik operations.

But who was a refugee? It is worth referring to the definition of a refugee found in the OFPRA archives, as the United Nations' definition of refugee status emerged only after World War II. Before and after that definition appeared, the word refugee was still retrospectively ascribed to all exiles who had found a home in France. Refugee status was given to anyone who:

1) was considered a refugee during the period from 1914 to 1946, according to older conventions and protocols;
2) was recognized as a refugee by the IOR; or
3) as a result of events that occurred in Europe before January 1951, had a well-founded fear of prosecution owing to their race, religion, nationality, or political views. Those who had to leave were outside their country and thus could not claim protection from their own national government.[52]

Whereas most of the documents in the Chastand fond[53] related to the definition of a refugee mention the victims of the Nazi and fascist regimes along with Francoist Spain, one document acknowledges refugees from the Soviet Union and introduces a new category for them: *neo-refugees*. Paul Chastand claimed that neo-refugees were the most pressing clients of the IOR in 1951:

[52] Doc 7-7. *Le comité social adopte la définition du terme refugie*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.
[53] Such as Doc 4-8. (1951, March 10). *Note de M. Chastand sur la protection des refugies en France et la création d'un office*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.

> To the victims of the Nazi and fascist regimes, there is an addition of the victims of the aftermath of war from the totalitarian regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (USSR, Yugoslavia) and republics that are satellites of Moscow: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania.[54]

The destination country is hugely important because its audience has the potential to understand and receive émigré claims. In our case, the destination country, France, was perceived as part of the civilized world by all three émigré groups. The claims that these communities voiced would have been irrelevant to audiences who do not acknowledge human rights, even if this acknowledgment is sometimes evident only on paper.

**Cooperation Between Émigré Communities**

Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Ukrainian émigrés cooperated to achieve their common goal. This collaboration began in the early 1920s and intensified with the *Prométhée* movement; each chapter in my dissertation illustrates the degree of cooperation between these three groups. Despite their small population size, Georgians had an official legation that gave them a more potent political presence; as such, they often led official meetings with politicians and the League of Nations. A historical document illustrates the lack of positions of these former short-lived republics. Even the sympathetic Aristide Briand,

[54] Doc 4-5. *Dossier 4. Notes de M. Chastand sur les catégories de refugies en France*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, reminds the Armenian representative that demands should not be exaggerated because they all were 'embryonic countries.[55]

Alongside the Azerbaijani and the Ukrainians, the North Caucasians also participated in the anti-Bolshevik fight. When all individual or collective attempts failed to regain independence, Poland—and specifically the incredibly influential Józef Piłsudski—began to politically and financially support (and even initiate) the *Prométhée* movement.[56]

The *Prométhée* movement published a journal from 1928 to 1938 by the national defense body of the people of the Caucasus and Ukraine. According to Mamoulia and Abutalibov (2014), Poland was the country that most generously supported the Caucasian cause. This cause was also partially supported by Japan, who acted as an ally against the Soviet Union:

> Even though Soviet Union and Japan signed a treaty in 1925, Japan still kept close diplomatic ties with the government in exile in Paris. The Soviet Union declared that the Georgian community in the Far East was a cover for Japanese intelligence (*marshrutnya agentura*). In 1932, Japan tried to employ emigre communities for anti-Soviet subversion. By supporting the independence of the Georgian, Ukrainian and Azerbaijani states, Japan hoped to destabilize Soviet Union. Japan also tried to get involved in the movement called "Prometheanism,"

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[55] *Procès-verbal de l'entrevue avec Monsieur Briand des Représentants des Républiques du Caucase au Ministere des Affaire Etrangères* (1921, August). Page 8. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[56] A detailed study of this movement is found in Mamoulia's (2009) book, *Les combats indépendantistes des Caucasiens entre URSS et puissances occidentales: Le cas de la Géorgie, 1921–1945*. Editions L'Harmattan.

> which was operated by the Poles and included the Caucasus. Cooperation lasted until the defeat of Japan in 1945. (Kuromiya & Mamoulia, 2009, pp. 1415–1440)

We can thus see a degree of collaboration among these émigré groups to defeat the Soviet Union, but there was one group that was less involved in this endeavor: the Russian émigrés. The Georgian and Azerbaijani case study chapters illustrate the level of bitterness that these non-Russian groups carried toward the Russian exiles. Although Russian émigrés also desired the end of Bolshevik rule, they did not collaborate much with the other groups. In my reading of the archives, the only documents I saw these communities signing alongside Russian émigrés were when the French administration was transferring the work of the IOR to OFPRA. There was anxiety over how French law and administration would receive this international organization's heritage and, in fear of an unknown future, of losing protection and national sections, all of the émigrés united in requesting the smooth transfer of operations.[57] Appeals, and later some thank-you letters, were signed by the Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Belarusians, Polish, Romanians, Yugoslavians, Hungarians, and Spaniards.

The Russian émigré community was purposefully excluded from my sample for reasons of comparison. However, I still wanted to understand whether the picture that non-Russian émigrés painted of white Russians was exaggerated owing to nationalist fervor. Over the course of my research, I found some basis for animosity from non-

[57] See Doc. 10-1, Doc. 10-2, Doc. 10-11, Doc. 10-13, Doc. 10-20, Doc. 10-40, Doc.10-43. *Projet de loi office documentation 1950-1953*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954.

Russian émigré communities toward Russian émigrés; the bitterness that non-Russian émigrés felt about the inability of Russians to accept their independence was not fictional.

For instance, former Russian Ambassador to France Vasily Maklakov shared his views about history, geopolitics, and the one-time subjects of the Russian Empire in a 1939 document (His interpretation of history prefigures Russian President Vladimir Putin's historical revisionist speech about Ukraine.)[58] First, Maklakov questions the historic right of nations to declare sovereignty by calling Finland a province of Sweden, which was given to Russia in 1919. As for Estonia and Latvia, he sarcastically states that their independence "seems to be a historic right, too" and that the independence of these "two minuscule provinces can only be fiction."[59] The next target of his attention is Poland, whose conduct toward Russia is "seen in the eyes of the Russians as more than ingratitude."[60] Claiming that nobody questions the right of Polish independence, Maklakov blames Catherine II for permitting the sacrifice of "a Slav state...to Germanism." Poland is also accused of having attempted to create an independent Ukrainian state. He then ascribes the independence of Ukraine to Germany, and calls it an act of German lust. With regard to Georgia and Azerbaijan, he notes that these countries cannot exist without finding a protector.[61]

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[58] Anon. (n.d.). *Russian President Putin statement on Ukraine* [Video]. C-SPAN.org. https://www.c-span.org/video/?518097-2/russian-president-putin-recognizes-independence-donetsk-luhansk-ukraines-donbas-region.
[59] Doc. 5-9. (1939, December 6). *Introduction*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954, p. 8.
[60] Doc. 5-9. (1939, December 6). *Introduction*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954, p. 12
[61] Doc. 5-9. (1939, December 6). *Introduction*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954, p. 13

Next, Maklakov finds it problematic for universal opinion to denounce Russian imperialism and claims that the national aspirations of Russia are perfectly legitimate:

> [Universal opinion] does not recognize the difference between the monopolization of a foreign land with violence and the duty to keep the territories that are a part of the country that have been torn from it. It denounces "Russian imperialism" as if all the empires should cease to exist and do not have any beneficial roles to play, as if France was not herself proud to rightly so be a grand colonial Empire.[62]

Claiming that Russia is a necessary element to preserve both European and universal peace, Maklakov posits that it is not the "imaginary perils, supposedly the imperialism of Russia and its threat to civilization"[63] that should be denounced, but rather oppressive Stalinism that should disappear for the sake of peace.

The ingratitude that Maklakov describes in relation to Poland can be understood as a rejection or unappreciation of what Grant (2009) describes as the gift of empire. Grant (2009) argues that the empire narrates the taking of lives, lands, and resources as forms of giving that should be appreciated:

> How Russians gave of their own in a civilizing cause to legitimate imperial, colonial, and later communist interventions. This is what I came to consider the

[62] Doc. 5-9. (1939, December 6). *Introduction*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954, p. 30
[63] Doc. 5-9. (1939, December 6). *Introduction*. OFPRA/Fonds privé. Paul Chastand 1924–1954, p. 34

> gift of empire, found in tales of sacrifice such as these, gifts of civilization that draw express attention to the political contexts in which they were created. (p. xv)

Another document[64] sheds additional light on Russo-Georgian émigré relations. Authored by Lieutenant Dimitri Shalikashvili in 1954 and now kept in the Hoover Institute, the document discusses the mistakes made by both sides with regard to their émigré relations. Born into a princely Georgian family, Shalikashvili fought against Armenia, invading Bolsheviks, and white Russians in 1918. After the fall of the DRG, he first emigrated to Turkey as part of the Georgian military mission. Later, he was recruited by Poland in a Georgian émigré colony in Warsaw as an ally against the Bolsheviks. After a second defeat in protecting Poland against the Nazi–Soviet invasion, he finally surrendered to the Germans. On his release by the Germans, he joined German forces, hoping to restore Georgian independence. Frustrated to be assigned to Western Europe, he surrendered to the British. Eventually, he moved to the United States where he wrote his memoirs in the 1970s.

Shalikashvili's description of the Georgian and Russian émigrés confirms the findings of my chapter two. It again illustrates the bitterness that Georgians carried toward Russians and the reasons for this. First, Shalikashvili reprimands Georgians by saying that it is not right to blame only the Russians for the Bolsheviks rise to power. Arguing that Russians were not passively obedient to the Bolsheviks, he claims that statistical data on the prison camps would prove that the number of Russian political

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[64] Shalikashvili, D. (1954, March 1). *Typescript of an article, Osvobozhdenie. Dimitri Shalikashvili writings* [Box 1, Georgian-Russian relations], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

prisoners is no less than that of other ethnicities. He reproaches Georgians for maintaining a sometimes-unacceptable tone toward Russians, as Georgians occupy such a strong position that they do not need to insult Russians. For him, insults are the tool of those with nothing better.

Second, Shalikashvili argues that mistakes were made in certain elements of political emigration from Russia when describing the Russian people as inheriting the Russian empire—as if Russians had the rights to ascribe to their one-time subjects whatever rights they wanted. He further claims that Russian émigrés were wrong to say that there is no national question in the Soviet Union, or to think that only insignificant groups of Shovinists and Marxists want political independence, or to label groups who rebel for independence in the Soviet Union as troublemakers. He observes that the overwhelming majority of Georgians, both émigrés and in the homeland, stand for independence. Another mistake he lists on the part of the Russians is how some Russian émigré circles think that the Georgian question should be resolved in only one way: by Russia swallowing the Georgian nation. To that solution, he responds, "We also think that the Georgian question should be resolved very easily, but diametrically differently from the opinion of Russian circles: with the political independence of Georgia. Georgia has all the right to be independent."[65] He goes on to deconstruct the idea of a "unified and indivisible" Russia as an artificial creation wherein nations were compelled into unification, noting that white émigrés were trying to compare this fiction of a "Russian

[65] Shalikashvili, D. (1954, March 1). *Typescript of an article, Osvobozhdenie. Dimitri Shalikashvili writings* [Box 1, Georgian-Russian relations], Hoover Institution Library & Archives.

nation" with the American one. He argues that they should not look for peace in a Russia united, but in each national pillar.

Third, Shalikashvili discusses the question of imperialism. White Russians are described as those who remain delusional about the prospect of their empire:

> We are witnessing how great world empires come to a liquidation period. Russian emigres approve of this and even say that the process is relatively slow in their printing press. They do not understand what the Russian empire was once and is now; the USSR also obeys those laws of evolution. They imagine this affects only colonial empires and because Russia does not have colonies, it follows different laws. (Shalikashvili, 1954)

It is worth noting here an important distinction between continental/land and colonial/sea empires. Shalikashvili alludes to how its status as a land empire does not justify Russia and its imperial existence. He acknowledges the difficulty in identifying where empires, which force so many people together, begin and end. To strengthen his argument, he recounts how despite the absence of an ocean or sea to separate the two, Georgia is far more different from Russia—both culturally and ethnically—than Austria is from England.

Like Shalikashvili, some members of Georgian, Azerbaijani, Ukrainian, and other émigré communities joined the German forces during World War II, forming their own respective legions. They believed that by fighting the Soviet Union, they would help the

liberation of their respective countries. In 1950, Assathiany discussed the collaboration with the Germans of one Georgian émigré, Mikheil Kedia,[66] and defended him despite having different political views. Assathiany claims that Kedia did nothing against the French people and was concerned only with the liberation of Georgia:

> My activity aims exclusively for the liberation of Georgia, which has been groaning under the yoke of the invaders for almost 23 years...look, he told me, at General de Gaulle...and he listed the other French personalities who worked abroad to liberate France. Also, my conscience of a patriot would not rest if I did not take advantage of the current situation to liberate my country.[67]

Mamoulia and Abutalibov (2014) discuss the collaboration of Azerbaijani émigrés with the Third Reich through an interesting interview with a member of the Azerbaijani legion, Abdurrahman Fatalibeyli-Dudanginski. When recalling his collaboration with the Germans, he stated that if national interests were sufficient reason for the West to ally with the Soviets, then their (Azerbaijani) national interests were sufficient reason to ally with Germany. He claimed that despite having no hatred toward the West and even having some sympathy for it, Azerbaijanis could not fight for Bolshevism for the sake of the West—just as the West could not renounce their alliance with the Bolsheviks for the sake of Azerbaijan (Mamoulia & Abutalibov, 2014, p. 539). This is an interesting point as the interviewee justifies his actions by equating the crimes of the Nazi regime to those of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union. While collaboration

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[66] An entry at the National Parliamentary Library of Georgia lists Kedia next to Noe Jordania and other Georgians who helped many thousands of Georgian and European Jews escape death by providing fake identity papers. For this action, Kedia received awards from Rabbi Weiss and Mosseri, the head of the Jewish cultural association (*Mikheil Kedia- Georgians Abroad*, n.d.)

[67] *Letter from S. Assathiany to Maitre Budin* (1950, May). OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.

with the Nazis was gradually understood by most international society as an ultimate crime, partnership with the Soviets is still not thoroughly studied, discussed, or condemned. When historian Timothy Snyder (2022) analyzed Nazi and Soviet crimes (fourteen million murders combined) in what he called the *Bloodlands*,[68] he was criticized for comparing these two regimes. Snyder believed that this criticism was convenient both for Russian memory politics and the German government. He argued how by inscribing the Holocaust into memory and out of history many facts relating to the atrocities of the Holocaust were ignored.

The reasons for the cold memory of the Soviet crimes are partially given in Charles Maier's *Hot memory/cold memory: On the political half-life of fascist and communist memory* (2001), which discusses why so many Europeans, Americans, and others felt that the Holocaust was worse than the Stalinist crimes of famine, ethnic cleansing, judicial murders, and forced labor camps. Arguing that the memory of Nazi crimes did not fade even as the memory of communist crimes grew cold, his answer lies in the different ways in which these powers attacked their victims—whether stochastically or in a targeted fashion. Maier further emphasizes how in the case of the Nazis, there was one organic group of victims who organized their victimhood; in the case of Stalin, however, everyone was subjected to terror. In the end, the Nazi case wrought an ardent soul-searching process in Europeans and Americans that invoked the shame of bystanders. In contrast, the former communists did not feel shame and did not embark on a painful soul-searching process; they did not feel guilt. In addition to Maier's reasons, I add two factual realities to the explanation of cold memory: first, many post-

[68] From central Poland to Western Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states.

Soviet countries have not had the chance to explore archives and discuss collaboration properly; second, unlike the Holocaust,[69] Soviet atrocities happened on the peripheries of the civilized world where the tradition of ardent civic soul-searching was less institutionalized.

Fast forward to the present day, wherein the world is slowly waking up to the crimes of Russia in Ukraine and elsewhere. In February 2022, the first Russian human rights organization (Memorial International, which embarked on the research if Soviet crimes in the 1980s) was shut down by the Russian government under on the guise of a "foreign agents" law.

In this introductory chapter, I have shown why and how these three émigré groups were comparable. Their size and official statuses in particular highlight the extent of their achievements and failures. The reconstruction of the interwar historical background helps us to imagine the environment in which these émigré groups articulated their rights. A brief section on the country of destination for émigrés has provided the framework by which we might understand the importance of the host country. I have also shown émigré cooperation and the reasons behind the inability to cooperate with the Russian émigrés. This background helps us to understand the chapters that follow and the agency of each émigré group.

[69] Although many groups with a sense of victimization compare their tragedies with the Holocaust (Armenians and Ukrainians), I discuss Holocaust in Michael Rothberg's terms (2011) as a multidirectional process where the exemplary model of Jewish persecution is borrowed and applied to other disadvantaged groups' struggles for recognition.

# Chapter Two: The Georgian Émigré Community

## Introduction

In 2017, Russia struggled with the problem of how to commemorate the centennial of the October Revolution (Kolonitsky & Matskevich, 2019; Malinova, 2018). The difficulty lies in identifying whether this was a day of tragedy or glory. In contrast, Georgia, the Baltic States, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia each jumped at the opportunity to celebrate the centennial of their first declaration of independence. Unlike Russia, these post-Soviet countries had no trouble framing their memories with celebrations of national pride that recalled both their national victimhood under Soviet rule and the historical roots of their current democracies.

This chapter focuses on Georgia, in particular, to examine characteristics of nationalism in exile and the role played by émigré national memories in a nation's self-perception. It follows the unique story of postcolonial intellectuals from the First Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG), exiled to France in 1921 after the occupation of Georgia by the Red Army. My research will examine how national memory is created, stored, protected and utilised in exile and beyond; what kind of memory is produced; how an extraterritorial national identity differs from that at home; and how émigrés press the international community to address the suffering of their fellow nationals.

The centennial of Georgian independence was celebrated in 2018 at the central site of the exile community: a château in Leuville-sur-Orge, France.[70] Officials asserted Georgia's enduring position as a nation in the European family dating back at least a century, stating that 'contrary to what is sometimes believed, Georgia was not born independent after the collapse of the USSR, but … [as] a democratic and progressive European republic one hundred years ago.'[71] Thus, Georgia celebrated and claimed its national memory as a century-old democracy, incorporating both independence and Soviet occupation/victimhood.

This newly claimed memory differed greatly from Georgian self-perceptions during the Soviet period. Here, I juxtapose my work as a complement to Erik Scott's (2016) historical study on the Georgian diaspora in the Soviet Union. Scott argues for the successful image of an internal Georgian diaspora, while I examine the more traumatic memory held by Georgians forcefully exiled to Paris and elsewhere. In comparing Scott's depiction of prominent Georgians in the Soviet Union with prominent Georgians in exile, I discuss these different perceptions of national identity between internal and external diasporas. This comparison between two prominent groups takes advantage of Roger Brubaker's theory. When Roger Brubaker (2009) criticised the 'Groupist' approach to nationalism as static, he advanced a more dynamic and processual understanding of the concept. In addition to studying claims in his Nationalism Reframed, Brubaker (1996, p. 25) underlines the importance of elite groups to national struggles.

[70] The château was bought by the Georgian political exiles.

[71] Ambassador Eka Siradze-Delaunay, Gala concert at the UNESCO venue. 4 June 2018.

This study illustrates the potential and the role of subaltern national exilic memory by comparing the Georgian émigré memory with Soviet Georgian identity and tracing the émigré national memory's transformation from stored to a functional available past for the homeland.

**Historical Background: Advocates of the Nation**

The Russo-Georgian political relationship has a complex history of conflict dating back almost three centuries until the firm establishment of Russian rule in Georgia.[72] By the 1860s, the Georgian nobility was domesticated,[73] integrated into the Russian aristocracy and military services, and on its way to Georgian nationalism. Over time, three generations of Georgian intellectual movements each developed a distinct perspective on nationalist ideas (Reisner, 2009, p. 37).

The third generation of the Georgian nationalist movement originated with what is now discussed as national memory in exile. In 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian Civil War provided opportunities for once annexed and peripheral countries in the Caucasus region, including Georgia, to declare independence in 1918. It was this third generation that created the First Democratic Republic of Georgia. The DRG was unquestionably a postcolonial state, heavily determined and influenced by the Russian

[72] See Jones (1987).
[73] Suny (1979b) explains how the once-rebellious Georgians were transformed into a service gentry loyal to the new monarch.

imperial legacy[74]. However, its government was democratically elected, multipartisan, ethnically diverse and inclusive of women's rights (Khvadagiani 2016). Georgia became the stronghold of the Menshevik Party's socialist government, gaining respect internationally (Jones, 2005; Lee, 2017).

The enjoyment of a proper postcolonial democratic state did not last long. Aside from the Baltic States, all of the other newly created independent states, including Georgia, were quickly forced into an autocratic system under the Soviet Union, which formed before they had a chance to sustain independence. When the Georgian army lost the Soviet–Georgian War in February 1921, the DRG government fled the country. Aristide Briand (former prime minister of France) facilitated their escape across the Black Sea in French ships (Rayfield, 2012), and it was in Paris that the Menshevik government of the first DRG eventually consolidated under the mandate of saving the nation's sovereign status, acting officially as a Georgian legation until 1933.

In 1924, some exiled politicians in Paris plotted and organised a rebellion against the Soviet Union, which was discovered and pre-emptively crushed. Despite this failure, fighting between Soviets and insurgents continued for another month, followed by mass killings and repressions in Georgia. After the defeat, the exiles remained politically

[74] First, most of the Georgian intellectuals were educated in St. Petersburg, Moscow, or other imperial universities. Among the first Constituent Assembly of Georgia members that studied in different universities abroad, sixty-two deputies studied in Russia, twenty-six in Western Europe, and one in Ottoman Empire. Second, a significant number of Georgian officials that started to serve the newly formed independent nation were successfully part of the Russian imperial administration, military units, or the Russian socialist front as well. Finally, liberal ideas, industrialization, and nationalism were imported into Georgia through the Russian empire, which remained the main window to the West. However, after the October Revolution, relations between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were exacerbated.

active, employing multiple diplomatic tactics and acquiring new Caucasian and other allies (see works on the Prométhée movement; Mamoulia & Abutalibov, 2014).

In 1921, the exiled Georgian émigré community had bought and established residence in a château at Leuville-sur-Orge, where they actively engaged in establishing a tragic narrative of the Soviet occupation to counter Soviet claims of liberation. In the wake of WWII, however, with Stalin aligned with the West and war atrocities ongoing, the émigré ability to contest Soviet domination was diminished. (The Promethean movement and the Caucasus Group were the last organised political activities; see Kuromiya & Mamoulia, 2009; Mamoulia, 2009.) By 1945, Europe was no longer able to question Soviet legitimacy as ruler of Caucasian countries. The émigré community nonetheless stored their suppressed memory and narratives (in the Assmannian 2011 sense [A. Assmann, 2011; J. Assmann, 2011]), ready to become an available past whenever the opportunity arrived.

In the late 1980s, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new wave of nationalism rose in Georgia, resulting in the restoration of Georgian independence in 1991. At first, the descendants of the exiles felt overlooked by this home-bred nationalism. However, as Georgia's new nationalisms emerged and its borders opened, the émigré memory became an available past for the modern Georgian state that now rejected the Soviet narrative of ‘successful Georgians’. Eventually, modern Georgia chose to adopt the suppressed tragic memory that had been safeguarded and recorded by the exiles.

I use the term ‘occupation’ here both as a discursive product of the émigré Georgians and in reference to the events of February 1921. Today, scholars in Caucasus Studies refer to the 1921 Red Army invasion as either ‘occupation’ or ‘annexation’. This usage is

unsurprisingly recent, given that the DRG's brief existence, the 1921 invasion and resistance from Georgian exiles are largely absent from works on the Russian Civil War/Revolution, Mensheviks in exile and the League of Nations. The short-lived democracies of the countries that declared independence during the Bolshevik Revolution have been mainly perceived as 'turbulences' in the Russian Civil War. Only recently have historians started to consider the DRG a successful early socialist–democratic state.

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The research I discuss in the following pages is based on a systematic textual analysis of émigré newspapers. In order to strengthen this analysis, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the deputy and Georgian ambassador at the Georgian embassy in France, the 97-year-old son of the first president of the DRG government and two other émigré descendants. Finally, I completed ethnographies on the site of memory in Leuville-sur-Orge and observed the June 2018 centennial commemoration. My data consist of ethnographic notes, thousands of pages of archival documents, interviews and official state documents regarding the status of the château. Through these historical documents, the meaning-making process and its development over time can be seen as objects of the émigré memory across three languages (Georgian, French and English).

I classify the Georgian émigré community of the 1920-30s as an elite group who lost political power but maintained cultural and social capital. Unlike Georgian émigré groups, the Russian emigration was much more numerous and diverse.[75] I constructed a

[75] According to Hassell (1991) the entire spectrum the Russian emigration included practically all classes and professions. In addition, Catherine Gousseff (2008) points out that two third of the émigré population had a complete general education. The remaining portion comprised the

descriptive statistical table on the Georgian émigré editors in chiefs to briefly describe them. For this, I considered Hroch's (1985) indicators for social class and Bourdieusian (1986) forms of capital: education, social origins, occupational status before 1921; political, cultural, or economic capital. A picture emerges of highly educated eighteen editors in chiefs. 77% of them went to universities outside their homelands. 72% of editors in chiefs used to hold high-level official governmental positions during the short-lived first DRG. Finally, the editors came from relatively diverse socio-economic backgrounds: seven noblemen, five peasants, two clergy families, three unknown, and one merchant. It is not a surprise that most editors only had cultural or social capital at their disposal. In the 19th century Georgia, even those with royal descendants were deprived of economic power. For instance, only eight deputies from the DRG owned some businesses (Khvadagiani 2016).

**Findings: Four National Narratives**

Georgian émigrés disseminated four distinct, yet interconnected, narratives: a Memory of Occupation and Independence, the 'Civilised', the Victorious Nation and the Politics of Differentiation. My research findings discuss these narratives and their roles in Georgian national exilic and non-exilic memory.

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military, peasantry, or people from more rural areas with less language knowledge than their elite counterparts.

## A Memory of Occupation and Independence

Across the entire archive of data that I examined whether diplomatic or journalistic, one salient theme emerges: Georgia's brutal and illegitimate occupation by the Red Army in 1921. Almost every historical document mentions this loss of Georgian independence, a narrative that remains consistent for all three audiences: émigré Georgians, Soviet Georgians and the international community. Most importantly, it is this tragic narrative that fuelled the exiles' sense of moral victory, supported their appeal to the civilised world, justified the national struggle—and later became an available past. Schudson (1989) describes the available past as the depository of history that can be used later for an instrumentalist reconstruction of the past. Yet how the structure of 'available pasts' (Schudson, 1989) from history dictates and limits this reconstruction speaks to my case study. Here, despite being suppressed for decades, the memory of occupation and independence re-emerges as an available past, eventually established as a traumatic past following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new wave of nationalism in Georgia.

Georgian independence lasted only 3 years, from 1918 until Soviet occupation in 1921, its brevity limiting the capacity of exiled émigrés to fight for it. Perhaps the very first task they faced was to prove that their country was in fact occupied. Why did Georgia's independence matter? How could they prove that its invasion was indeed worthy of Western attention and not another turbulent event in the Russian Civil War? During the very first year of exile, the president of the exiled government, Noe Jordania, delivered a speech interpreting the events in Georgia as Soviet occupation. According to a 1921 article in an émigré newspaper, Jordania asked, ' "What happened in Georgia? A

revolution? A rebellion-coup? If there was a war, who fought it?" With documents in hand [the president] explained the issue and proved that war was initiated by Soviet Russia precisely in order to occupy Georgia.'[76] The Georgian exiles asserted this constantly; in appealing to the so-called civilised world, they had to prove that the Soviet narrative of Georgia willingly joining the USSR to free itself from Georgian Menshevik rule was false. Corney (2004) explains how the Bolsheviks forged a foundation narrative of the October Revolution.

> Much of the archival material shares a similar narrative template for the history of the successful first republic of Georgia and its tragic and unjust fate:

> > 25 February is the day of suffering, captivity, and chains/bonds […] a day of mourning and groaning. The nation that was free, flourishing, and passionate about new ideals and hope was imprisoned this day. Russian despotism tied it and made it into its colony.[77]

The memory of the first DRG was systematically erased from the Soviet population through repression and murder, safeguarded only in exile.

Just 2 months after the political exile, the first émigré newspaper, Free Georgia, appeared. Its stated mission was simple and clear: to extend voice and 'real news' to the Soviet Georgian population, and regain independence by driving away the 'abusive

[76] 15 May 1921, #1. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris. All translations are mine.

[77] February 1933, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #86.

Russian Red Army'.[78] Another journal appeared in 1923, Sakartvelos Moambe, similarly com-mitted to strengthening Georgian independence and sovereignty.[79] It also aimed to reach the Georgian population, which did not have access to free speech and media, and consolidate the émigré community.

Following the rebellion, the newly established La Géorgie Indépendente expressed similar goals. Its first edition in 1926 states a responsibility to become the free voice of a nation deprived of free media: 'Towards the independence with the entire front, these three words exhaust the mission, goal, means, and solutions of La Géorgie Indépendente.'[80] Five years after its first edition, the journal reaffirms its mission, saying 'the newspaper is an organ of fight [for independence].'[81] But while the journal addressed both émigré and Soviet audiences, it approached them differently. The émigré community was asked to give moral and material support, while the Soviet population received expressions of unconditional care and empathy.[82]

After 1931, when even clandestine channels were blocked from disseminating émigré newspapers, the editors were forced to admit that few copies reached Georgia. Their attention thus turned mainly to the émigré population: 'La Géorgie Indépendente was first

[78] 15 May 1921, #1. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[79] 1 October 1923, Sak'art'velos Moambe #1.

[80] January 1926, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #1.

[81] January 1931, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #61.

[82] October 1923, Sak'art'velos Moambe #1. Location: Berlin. September 1929. Newspaper: Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #48.

of all conversing with the local readers and trying to satisfy their spiritual needs.'[83] 'Spiritual nourishment' defined the tone of the articles.

Before what later became known as the Iron Curtain was firmly drawn, the émigré community managed to remain informed about the ongoing situation in Georgia and spoke out strongly against it in the press. The narrative of an occupied and victimised nation emerged through frequent use of words and phrases such as 'aggressive', 'enslavement', 'occupational government', 'bloody dictatorship', 'murderous' and many more. The newspaper published glorifying tales of the heroic ends of insurgents who were repressed and shot to death in various prisons or camps.[84]

Apocalyptic accounts of the situation in Georgia focused on hardship and the erasure of independence. People were starving, the country was bankrupt, agriculture had failed and industry vanished, and diseases such as cholera and typhus were spreading.[85] Before the rebellion, journals wrote extensively about how Soviet-subjugated nations were doubly taxed during the Russian famine. An August 1921 article speculated that the Bolsheviks were deliberately hiding the famine in Georgia, intending to starve the Georgian people, who despised them, to death. The authors claimed that starving

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[83] January 1931, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #61.

[84] For instance, one article addresses the murdering of several Georgian generals by describing in detail how they were tortured and killed one after another. Their last words were brought to exemplify how heroically they were able to embrace death for the country: 'In Russia, they became unaccustomed to dying for an ideal selflessly. Go and tell them how Georgians are dying for their homeland.' - Colonel Chrdileli. Aged Tsulukidze: 'You cannot scare us with death, our death is the guarantor of the Georgian liberation, it will fortify the nation's strength, will multiply fighters from one to hundred!' Newspaper: October 1923, "Sak'art'velos Moambe" #1. Location: Berlin.

[85] 10 August 1921, #5. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

Georgians were forced to feed and provide[86] for Russian citizens and the occupying Red Army:

> Bolsheviks are directly mocking the misery of the Georgian nation and its greatest tragedy: in a starving and ravaged Georgia, they formed committees whose function is to widely collect 'donations' for Russian people […] There is an order to collect any kind of natural taxes for Russia […] We cannot imagine how it can be that the Russian people are dying from hunger and dependent on someone else's aid and provisions, while meantime in the name of the same (Russian) people they maintain huge armies just for the sake of oppressing and torturing small, freedom-loving nations? No, this is impossible![87]

Eventually, the call to recognise Georgia's famine alongside Russia's was accepted by the Second International and other relief organisations. A new historical study from SovLab (Khvadagiani, 2016) reveals that by 1922, the exiles were successful in fundraising and sending aid to the starving population, although the issue of distribution remained fraught, because the Soviets refused to accept aid that they did not control.

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[86] 'Les envahisseurs ont enlevé les provisions de céréales qui existaient dans le pays et les ont importées en Russie, comme butin de guerre' (La famine en Géorgie. Georgian legation. 5 October 1921. Paris).

[87] 31 August 1921, #7. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

### ‘The Civilised’

The exiles were the third generation of Georgian intellectuals; those previous generations had initially emerged from the enlightenment ideas. The first generation consisted of the noblemen who were born after annexation and were part of the 1832 conspiracy. The second generation, the Tergdaleulebi, was comprised of liberal intellectuals who studied in Russian imperial universities, integrated into Russian society, and espoused modern and national ideas in the Russian Empire. Finally, the third generation, in the 1880s, constituted mostly Socialist/Menshevik parties (the future exiles). Over time, these generations ‘Europeanised’ Georgia, facilitating its claim to a place in European culture.[88] Unsurprisingly, the exiles appealed to Western Europe as the ‘enlightened world’. Multiple official documents reveal a pattern to this narrative. They address the ‘civilised world’, ‘civilised humanity’, ‘great powers’ or the ‘whole world’ differently from newspapers and journals addressed to Soviet and exiled Georgians. They employ numerous means to pressure the civilised world to take up their cause, portraying Georgia as a victim of uncivilised barbarism.

While inscribing themselves as part of the civilised world and arguing their eligibility for international protection, the Georgian political exiles systematically challenged ‘the great powers’ to align with their expressed noble concepts. This challenge was frequently conveyed by identifying the ‘civilised’ and those obligated to support them: ‘It is not mercy that we are asking for. It is our right, and it is your duty. Justice and truth,

[88] See Manning (2012).

civilization and humanity oblige you to defend the weak member of civilization invaded by a big and strong neighbor.'[89] One document asserts that the Caucasian unified front does not doubt the well-known 'benevolent sentiments' that France carries towards oppressed nations.[90] Another declaration by the four Caucasian communities expresses their conviction that moral and political aid is guaranteed for the cause of independence.[91] Letters of gratitude are sent in the name of civilisation and help requested to stop bloodshed for the 'peace of humanity'.[92] Similar language is employed when expressing gratitude for diplomatic relations, referring to 'the noble French people' who have a 'glorious tradition of secularly defending the liberty of all people'.[93]

For Georgian political exiles (or at least for Social Democrats), the newly emerged civilised world encompassed 'true' socialists and labour parties. They thus focused on humanitarian ideas without excluding imperialist Europe (France, Belgium or others), who they saw as allies. Often, mentions of 'the worker class of Europe' and 'all of civilised humanity' are juxtaposed.[94,95] Above all, their struggle in the international arena was meant to expose Bolshevik evil and the non-socialist, imperialist nature of the Soviet

[89] 'A Tous Les Peuples Civilisés' 10 December 1921. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[90] Letter to Raymond Poincaré, Président du conseil ministre des Affaire étrangères. Paris. 23 February 1922. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[91] Declaration of the Representatives of Caucasian Countries, signed by A. Aharonian; A.M. Toptchibacheff; A.M. Tchermoeff; A.J. Tchenkeli. 10 June 1921, copy of the first secretary of the Georgian Legation. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[92] Letter to the editorial office of HAVAS agency from Djaparidze, Georgian legation. 20 September 1924. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[93] Exposé, 28 June 1933. Paris. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[94] Résolution adoptée par le groupe en France du parti Social-Démocrate de Géorgie. 8 September 1924. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[95] A Tous les Partis Socialistes et Syndicats Ouvriers. Le Bureau a L'étranger du parti ouvrier Social-Démocrate de Géorgie. Paris. 26 September 1924. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

regime.[96] For instance, in one of the documents, we read how Bolshevism is a disguise for imperialism: 'The working classes of the civilized world to begin to realize that Bolshevism has gone bankrupt on the social terrain and is turning into an imperialist venture' .[97] The barbarism and uncivilized nature of the Bolsheviks are constantly emphasized[98]. In the struggle against the Bolshevik power, the exiles actively participated in almost all congresses/conferences organized by the Second International and gained the support of different socialist parties worldwide.

The exiles list the reasons why Georgia has the "right" to claim international protection. Claims are based on: 1) the illegitimacy of Soviet rule in a militarily occupied country [99], 2) The successes of the DRG, 2) The atrocities of the Occupation[100]; 3) Russian imperialism that enchained the Caucasus; 4) the differences between Russian and

[96] It is noteworthy that the enemy was articulated as the 'Soviet Union', 'Bolsheviks' or 'imperialist Russia' while Stalin's figure was not accentuated but rather included in this group. Emigrés referred to him as 'Moscow's commissar—Jughashvili' or 'Sick country—Russia of Soso Jughashvili'(T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo #5, 1921. Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #44, 1929).

[97] *Memoire*. p. 10. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[98] One example is the letter of the President of the Georgian government to the Belgian Socialist Party: 'The Moscow government has finally taken off its mask in front of the civilised world and began a war of conquest against rebellious Georgia, which revolted for its independence and freedom...the savage hordes of the Middle Ages turn pale (fade) when compared to the barbarism of the Bolsheviks from Moscow. I ask you to raise your voice in defense of the Georgian people who fight against the Moscow invader and reclaim this conflict's resolution through arbitration. (*Parti Socialiste Belge Bruxelles*. Letter from N. Jordania La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[99] *Memorandum*. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[100] *Depeche to the president of the League of Nations Leon bourgeois* signed by Lomtatidze. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

Caucasian political choices that speak to the choice of democracy and the rights of men[101]; 5) the rights of self-determination:

> The victims of this bloody Soviet politics, the Georgian people and its best sons, are appealing to the conscience of the universal proletariat, to the conscience of all the socialist parties, to the civilized world: support Georgia in its struggle for its right to his national self-determination and say loudly and openly to Moscow: leave Georgia! [102]

The success of these appeals to Europe's so-called civilised nature is unclear. [103] Following its recognition of the Soviet Union in 1924, the French government abolished the official Georgian legation in 1933. A section of Georgian refugees then started to

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[101] "No small state of Europe has made greater efforts than Georgians. Only Belgium, with its bravery, could serve as an example ... the Georgian people who, during the three years of their political existence, had, despite innumerable difficulties, demonstrated to the civilized world their political capacity, has the right to claim the international guarantees and protection ... The peoples of the Caucasus have taken advantage of the freedom they have won to establish a democratic regime guaranteeing the rights of man and of the citizen. This fact, recognized by the whole world, once again demonstrates the divergence between Russians and Caucasians, both from the point of view of mentality and temperament" (*Memoire*, pp. 2, 3. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[102] A Tous les Partis Socialistes et Syndicats Ouvriers. Le Bureau a L'étranger du parti ouvrier Social-Démocrate de Géorgie. Paris. 26 September 1924. P.4. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[103] Interestingly, Charles d'Espinay de Briort, author of the document "Appel au monde civilisé", used the same language. Charles d'Espinay de Briort had his interests and grievances towards the Bolsheviks. We read Charles d'Espinay expressing all of the reasons mentioned above to intervene and solve the Georgian case. In his lengthy speech, where he tried to persuade his audience to the cause, he also beseeches in the name of civilization and humanity: "Remain the faithful guardians of your own traditions...humanity will be eternally grateful to you." Along with different pragmatic and economic reasons that he provided in support of the intervention, his appeal to being the guardians of humanity and peace exceeds all else:

> It is unacceptable that in the twentieth century, while a League of Nations exists for the abolition of wars and the well-being of the world, a country is being destroyed, its inhabitants massacred by an association of criminals...will the civilized world, proud of its name, let the Bolsheviks once again do their cowardly work: the destruction of the Russian people...It is, therefore in the general interest that belongs to the civilized nations, guardians of peace of the world, to fight this formidable scourge for the greater glory of humanity! (*Appel au Monde Civilisé.* La contemporaine (ex BDIC.)

operate under French authorities. Archives from that section reveal another appeal to the civilised world, with a new objective: to differentiate Georgians from Russians. In the following documents, Georgian section head Mr. Assathiany is frustrated by the treatment of Georgian refugees compared to Russians and Armenians. He accuses the French of compromising their 'civilised' understanding of rights by prioritising refugee groups with higher numbers.[104,105]

While such frustrations were expressed in non-public documents, published newspapers maintained a different story, one for both émigrés and Soviet Georgians: The civilised world is on our side. In a letter to exiled Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Akaki Chkhenkeli, émigré Raphiel Ivanitski-Ingilo expresses deep disappointment in the futility of diplomacy: 'But does that all satisfy us? I am asking you? We hear a lot of good words but in reality, help is nowhere to be found! This damned diplomacy has eaten us away ….'[106] Letter from Akaki Chkhenkeli to A. M. Topchibashi illustrates additional frustrations:

> Unfortunately, I am not an optimist and do not expect victory, but perhaps the movement will grow and spread to the North Caucasus, and it will be possible to achieve intervention, at least diplomatic. In our telegrams from Constantinople,

[104] Letter from Assathiany to the Délégué General I.R.O. Paris. 25 January 1950. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.
[105] Letter from Assathiany to Léon Blum. Paris. 20 January 1950. This excerpt is addressed to Leon Blum (former Prime-Minister of France): "You declared that you would never abandon the Georgian question. (…) But here in France, a country of human freedom, nothing should prevent Georgian refugees from being put in similar condition to other refugees (Russian, Armenians, etc..) In 1945, all old offices were reinstated except ours, under the pretext that the restoration of the Georgian office would not please Stalin, while he would accept the existence of Russian and Armenians Offices. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.
[106] Letter to Akaki Chkhenkeli from Raphiel Ivanitski-Ingilo. Rome. 23 June 1934. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

your country was mentioned twice. But there were no specific instructions; the last telegram also spoke about Dagestan and added that he and Azerbaijan were participating from the very beginning. We give these telegrams to the press, and they are passed over here, especially the Journal de Genève. What a pity that you are not here, Tapa (1) again did not keep his word. The atmosphere here was very unfavorable; they simply did not believe the first telegram, but now they are getting a little interested. But it is still far from any concrete step.

We submitted one note and expressed only the hope that the League of Nations would take such measures as it thought fit to restore peace and justice. They were afraid of rejection even worse. You will still have to apply, but it is difficult to expect anything from this. The main thing is that the "big ones" do not want to do anything, and the "small" ones do not dare. This is not a gathering of sincere and determined people. For now, we are trying to interest our socialist friends, to make them feel the gravity of the situation, and then act through them on others. But while they - friends - hesitate, and besides, they haven't seen everyone yet, the last week, with its "big days" did not allow them to tear them away from the meetings. In the speeches of the prime ministers, one could hear a note of respect and goodwill towards the Moscow executioners. I didn't even try to see those jesters, it was hopeless. Here, in general, the local situation. Of course, one should

> not lose heart, but I would still prefer, if I had the means, to purchase weapons and ammunition and smuggle them to the place![107]

In a letter dated August 16, 1930, Akaki Chkhenkeli shares with Topchibashi other pessimistic news: "The situation is complicated on the Caucasian front, it is almost impossible to resolve it: there is no single plan among the official ones, there is nothing to say about unofficial ones."[108]

In contrast, newspaper articles always portrayed the civilised world as a great source of help, deeply involved in Georgian affairs. Newspaper authors assert that 'help can only be expected from civilised Europe […] as usual, Georgian people have turned their gaze towards civilised Europe and anticipate its aid.'[109] This certainty that the civilised world would help a victim nation[110] was reinforced in the 1914 German invasion of Belgium when, according to the author, history redressed justice for the crimes that were committed[111].

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[107] Doc 19, September 7, 1924, pp.82-83. A. M. Topchibashi: the Paris archive (1919–1940), edited by Ismail Agakishiev, translated by Georgi Mamulia and Ramiz Abutalybov. 4 vols., Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura and Heidar Aliev Foundation, 2016–2018.

[108] Doc. 202, August 16, 1930, p.691. A. M. Topchibashi: the Paris archive (1919–1940), edited by Ismail Agakishiev, translated by Georgi Mamulia and Ramiz Abutalybov. 4 vols., Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura and Heidar Aliev Foundation, 2016–2018.

[109] 20 August 1921, #6. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[110] The idea that Georgia was not alone in this struggle and had civilised allies was mentioned on numerous occasions: 'The whole enlightened humanity highly sympathises with them […] Georgian nation today has much more reliable friends than it even had during its independence.' 15 January 1922, #15. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[111] 'The whole cultural humanity's conscience was outraged by the crime, which was done by the German imperialistic diplomacy and army towards Belgium. Without hesitation, the strongest military country crushed a small nation and trampled international contracts. History paid him back with a just sentence for those who committed this crime and vileness. After seven hard years, in another corner of Europe, a similar kind of crime is ongoing, which is even more savage

Competition for the attention of the 'civilised world' and frustrations among the Georgian exiles mounted simultaneously. Regarding how the world responded to the ongoing famine in Russia, Georgian authors expressed joy in seeing the development of human empathy and the 'coming back' of the lost solidarity from European and American societies. This shift is labeled as a significant psychological turn, but at the same time, they expressed fear that the occupied territories, where the Red Army brought famine, would be ignored [112] : 'Sure, help the miserable, starving and enslaved Russian people, but do not let the Moscow imperialists oppress and extinguish the Georgian people in their name!'[113]

After the rebellion, a new idea emerges, along the same theme. The enlightened world certainly remains a major source of support, having helped Poland and other victim nations in the past,[114] but now the exiles turn to a Georgian audience, constantly reminding them that the nation remains victorious due to its resistance to occupation and inter-national visibility. The failed rebellion of 1924 is interpreted thus: Stakes are high because 'the whole enlightened world is talking' about the rebellion. All major official representatives around the world are concerned about the fate of Georgians, which is 'the business of international conscience'.[115] The rebellion is praised as having consolidated

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and cynical in nature.' 15 May 1921, #1. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[112] 10 August 1921, #5. Newspaper: "T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo" (Free Georgia) Location: Istanbul – Paris. Pages 3-4

[113] 31 August 1921, #7. Newspaper: "T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo" (Free Georgia) Location: Istanbul – Paris. Page 9

[114] June 1930, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #54.

[115] August 1928, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #32.

the Georgian identity in the eyes of the international community.[116] Authors describe how the Georgian issue is being advanced in Europe by official and benevolent bodies. They offer anecdotes about ordinary French women in the street shouting ‘Down with Krasin! Long live Georgia!’ at the Soviet ambassador,[117] portraying Georgia as a nation that receives unique attention and support from an enlightened humanity.[118]

According to the authors of these articles, the Russian émigré community was not part of that particular civilised world; all Russians, whatever their differences, feared that revolutions would lead to civil war and the fragmentation of Russian borders and thus would rather endure a century of Bolshevism then let non-Russian nations escape Moscow's chains.[119] One article claimed that Russian émigrés, alarmed by increasing empathy for non-Russians, had begun to publicly contest the aspirations of Caucasian–Ukrainian nations to independence.[120] Furthermore, in 1953, Georgians sent a note to an anti-Bolshevik reunion in Paris, where 16 (primarily Russian) organisations all objected to the idea of ‘sharing’ Russia. They claimed that only after winning against the Bolsheviks should different groups be concerned with their rights. The note affirmed Georgians' commitment to fight against Bolshevism for genuine liberty of ‘nos peuples’,[121] while asserting their independence by emphasising the multiplicity of nations. Unable to ally with Russian émigrés, exiled Georgians criticised them as immune

[116] August 1931, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #68.

[117] February 1926, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #2.

[118] January 1930, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #49.

[119] March 1930, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #51

[120] January 1929, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #37.

[121] Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides. Fonds privé: Paul Chastand. Dossier « Russes » # 5-60. 7 November 1953.

to European enlightened ideas, too immature to understand statehood and devoted to 'sick nationalism'.[122] 'What is the point of [Russian émigrés] living in Europe?', one author inquires. 'What are they learning? Are this lesson and the European examples not enough for [them] to finally understand the importance of a national front?'[123]

The Russian Empire, which had tended to identify as European, had always claimed a sacred civilising mission, as in its quest to Russify the Asian people.[124] Grant (2009) describes how this mission was supposedly a 'gift of the empire' to the Caucasus. According to Sunderland (2014), Russians saw themselves as the modern bearers of civilisation, industry, science, law and Christianity, whereas Asians were considered backward, dirty and godless. Despite its claims to multi-confessionalism and tolerance, the Russian Empire exercised cultural imperialism over faith and migration for political purposes (Layton, 2006; Remnev, 2012; Werth, 2014), which Georgian exiles condemned as intrinsically uncivilised.

The notion of the civilised and enlightened world carried different meanings for Georgian and Russian exiled communities. For the Russians, cultural heritage was enough to classify them as European and civilised; they pre-served and created the Russian culture banned in the Soviet Union (until later). Literature and Nobel Prize awards were central to the Russian émigré identity of high culture (Raeff, 1990).

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[122] In his book From the Other Shore, Liebich (1997, p. 15) mentions that one of the Russian émigré Mensheviks maintained warm relations with a Georgian Menshevik, whereas he was more hostile to Ukrainian nationalism.

[123] June 1931, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #66.

[124] Russification was an official and unofficial imperial policy to culturally assimilate non-Russian communities through, for example, the primacy of the Russian language.

Georgian exiles capitalised less on their centuries-old cultural heritage, instead defining a civilised nation according to its political and imperial beliefs. Perhaps for practical reasons, this logic was not applied to their host country, France.

### The Victorious Nation

While measuring the tone of journalistic articles, an unexpected entanglement emerged between narratives of victory and success, with tragic discourse. In articles before and after the rebellion, the dominant tone was hopeful, combative and deterministic. It claimed, without any shred of doubt, an 'unshakable hope' that the end of Soviet rule was near and Georgian liberation imminent. Even after the failed rebellion of 1924, this politics of hope did not vanish. In fact, tragic narratives of suffering, misery and injustice were used to enhance those of hope and resistance. Victimhood was presented as success because it revealed the martyrdom of the Georgian nation: '… once again, in front of the whole world, the question of the Georgian nation was raised; public opinion was moved; their conscience started to talk against the barbaric act that happened nine years ago … the cross of Svetic'xoveli[125] was erected, and the heroic Georgian nation was crucified on it.'[126]

Before the rebellion, the politics of hope saw exiles refuse to label themselves as losers. 'The nation has lost the war physically, but won it morally,' claimed one author.[127]

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[125] A historical Georgian church in Mtskheta.

[126] July 1929, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #43.

[127] January 1926, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #1.

In these terms, Soviets are losers who can only dominate by military force, whereas the Georgian nation successfully consolidates the international community around its cause. Another account observes that '… Moscow and its agents from Tbilisi got their hopes dashed … [as] the international status of Georgia remains unshaken.'[128] Authors further claim that the unfortunate events were beneficial in garnering European support.[129] A moral victory over the Soviets is asserted by discrediting Soviet rule per se: Multiple articles criticise the imperialist Bolsheviks, their failure as a state and how they falsified elections. Thus, the 1924 rebellion is represented as a tragic event that, while unsuccessful in literal terms, provided an indirect victory by reaffirming Georgian viability.[130] An interview with a Georgian émigré descendant repeats this narrative. The descendant recalled that despite having huge financial difficulties, they neither appeared to be nor were victims. They were the 'opposite of the victims'.[131]

Perhaps the most obvious example of this politics of hope is provided by the exiled foreign affairs minister himself, Akaki Chkhenkeli, who emphasises the absolute unacceptability of despair:

> Wobbling on the sides or behind is unforgivable. Desperation and impatience are unacceptable. We should look at other nations, which in a short period of time achieved freedom. Take, for example, Ireland, which is fighting for an

[128] 5 May 1922, # 21. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[129] 20 August 1921, #6. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[130] August 1930, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #56.

[131] Virtual interview with a Georgian descendent from Paris. 7 June 2021.

> entire century and how?! But why look for other examples when the Georgian nation with its whole past is an incarnation of perseverance and vigour?[132]

Both international and national historical experiences thus inspired hopes for liberation. The notion that political exile might soon end was based on a perception that many political exiles around the world had ended successfully. Ireland, Belgium, Poland and others were cited as examples of successful liberation.

Naturally, more emphasis was placed on national historical memory, which functioned as an available past. Georgians were portrayed as a freedom-loving people with a centuries-old history who had vigorously fought against Russian tsars and whose spirit was not easily breakable.[133] This spirit and the belief that every foreign rule is temporary are reinforced by tales of historical struggles and thousands of years of culture that refused to accept foreign domination.[134] The authors claim that unlike other cultures, the Georgian nation is a survivor; therefore, there is no doubt that the occupation will be overcome:

> If the dreadful waves of history assigned place to many neighbors and companion peoples into Oriental Museums, Georgianness is still active today with even more rigor. We are not taking away the hope that this terrible occupation will be overcome. We should nail down this hope in the mind of the emigration, and we also want to transfer this unshaken faith in the extremely tormented and saddened

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[132] 15 September 1921, #8. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[133] 15 May 1921, #1. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

[134] 10 August 1921, #5. T'avisup'ali Sak'art'velo (Free Georgia). Location: Istanbul—Paris.

Georgian people, there, in the faraway homeland.[135]

Even after the rebellion, the politics of hope remained intact. Of the three most important historical dates of the Georgian nation, Independence Day (26 May 1918) was the most celebrated and mentioned. In the wake of the rebellion, this victorious tone prevailed in newspapers; 25 February 1921 (the occupation of Georgia) and August 1924 (the rebellion) were certainly discussed, but in tragic terms; whereas 26 May, a success story and a victorious narrative, appeared in newspapers three times more than references to 1921 and twice as often as 1924. A 1933 article states '25 February is the day of suffering, captivity and chains. This is a day of national mourning' along with the wish that '26 May will replace the bloody February.'[136] Logically, a narrative of resistance was inscribed in the symbolic date.[137]

Attempts to discredit the Soviet Union are still present in post-rebellion narratives. Soviet diplomacy is dismissed with statements that 'nobody believes Moscow's rubbish talks'[138] or the 'Polish press laughed out loud at their [USSR] clumsy clownery.'[139] But as political circumstances grew more complicated, the authors admitted to being mistaken in their expectations for regime collapse.[140] Attempting to avoid disheartening the Georgian people, they project their mistake onto the Russian people, who were proving

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[135] *Oct 1923, Newspaper: "Sak'art'velos Moambe" #1. Location: Berlin* P.3

[136] February 1933, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #86.

[137] May 1931, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #65.

[138] September 1928, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #33.

[139] July 1929, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #43.

[140] January 1929, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #37.

more ‘hardy and enduring’ than expected.[141] The authors claim to have erred only in terms of timing, and direct their readers' gaze towards Georgian and other non-Russian peoples, ‘constantly fighting for the last eight years’.

The temporal aspect is worth noting here. From a historical perspective, an 8-year occupation is relatively insignificant in a nation's history. One author notes ‘Georgians are not from a nation that was born yesterday, so that they become scared of one or two years of exceeding in reaching its goal. The historic experience, which it has, makes it clear that in the life of a nation, such pauses do not have a big importance.’[142] This tone recurs in the 10th and subsequent anniversaries of the invasion. Initial hopes and narratives about swiftly regaining independence migrate to the idea that time is immaterial so long as liberation happens: ‘… time does not matter; it will be today or tomorrow that depends on many factors; the most important thing is that the victory over the enemy is without doubt; its end is inevitable. What is ten years in a nation's life? It is a second, a little spray.’[143] Decades later, the same idea was expressed to me by Redjeb Jordania (2018). When asked whether his father got discouraged or frustrated, Redjeb responded that while he must have been frustrated, he was never discouraged:

> There is a big difference in the perception of time. For people, a year is very long and for some, a year is not very long at all. For people who came in the

[141] January 1929, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #37.

[142] January 1929, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #37.

[143] February 1931, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #62.

> exile, every year there was always a new possibility. Of course, it did not happen but it was always a possibility, and they never ceased the struggle.[144]

The newspapers exhibit their commitment to the politics of hope when covering tragic or politically unfavourable events. Whether discussing the assassination of émigré political leader Noe Ramishvili[145] or the unexpected suicide of passionate and successful diplomat Karlo Chkheidze, Georgians are portrayed as emerging victorious. After Chkheidze's suicide, the shocked community maintained a combative spirit, claiming that regardless of Soviet interpretations, such deaths only intensified the will of others to live and fight for the nation: 'let them make up fake stories, as if Karlo lost his hope in the liberation of the country.'[146]

By the end of the 1920s and early 1930s, the exiles discuss the diminished League of Nations, new treaties made with the Soviet Union and even the restoration of British embassies in Soviet Russia. While unable to deny the political impact of such events, they still conclude their articles with the hope that Europe will soon lose faith in the idea of 'taming' Russia.[147]

One event is openly acknowledged as a cruel blow: the closing of the Georgian legation in Paris in 1933. The legation was the ultimate symbol of the exile narrative of victory and success in diplomatically outmanoeuvring the Soviets. With its closure, the authors finally acknowledge defeat, writing, 'The legation is no more […] the enemy

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[144] Interview with Redjeb Jordania. June 11, 2018. Paris.

[145] December 1930, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #60.

[146] June 1926, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #6.

[147] October 1929, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #46.

defeated us, we should have courage to admit it to the world, the way it is typical for our Georgian heroic nation.'[148] Nonetheless, they observe that recognition of independence has not disappeared and conclude, somewhat hopefully, that the Georgian situation will likewise continue to claim the international community's attention.

### Two Politics of Differentiation

Here, I adapt Scott's term, politics of differentiation to build a picture that encompasses two aspects of such politics. Georgian émigrés fought for the national cause by employing the politics of differentiation alongside those of hope. The politics of hope were embedded in a victorious narrative, while the politics of differentiation only intensified with geopolitical changes. After the Georgian legation closed in 1933, a Georgian section continued under the French government until 1941. Around this time, content analysis illuminates a clear shift from hope towards differentiation.

The politics of differentiation in exile emerge in the early 1930s, when correspondence addressing the absolute need to distinguish Georgian refugees from Russians dominates the Georgian émigré diplomatic archive. Numerous documents reveal how Assathiany aimed to ensure that Georgian national identity remained distinct throughout the European administration. The fruit of these diplomatic efforts appears in a document wherein French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre Laval recalls reminding the

[148] July 1933, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #91.

French Minister of Interior Affairs about the correct classification for Georgian refugees: 'it is appropriate to describe these foreigners, in the various administrative documents issued to them, only as "Georgian refugees" and of Georgian origin to the exclusion of any other denomination likely to make them attached to Russian refugees.'[149]

Many Georgian émigrés had sympathetic Belgian socialist friends and colleagues, and several documents acknowledge the Belgian government's initial recognition of Georgia and Georgians. Belgian socialist Emile Vandervelde made a pledge on behalf of his friend Noe Jordania, stating, 'Until today, Georgian refugees who, for national reasons, are essentially holding on to not being confused with the Russians, enjoy a special situation in France as described in the Memorandum we are transmitting to you.'[150] The Belgian government eventually noted the demand and promised to observe the distinction.[151,152]

To keep their national identity distinct, Georgian émigrés asked for the same rights and conditions enjoyed by their Russian or Armenian counterparts, sensitive to a downgrading of the Georgian émigré status. When Georgians had their own legation, they did not need a Nansen passport (issued by the League of Nations to Russians,

[149] Letter from Pierre Laval to Edouard Herriot, Minister of State Office. Paris. 21 March 1935. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[150] Letter from E. Vandervelde to Van Zeeland (cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères Bruxelles). 15 May 1935. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[151] Response from Van Zeeland to E. Vandervelde. 7 July 1935. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

[152] Letter from Mr. Hymans (Ministre des affaire étrangères) to Mr. Le Baron de Gaiffier D'Hestroy (Ambassadeur de Belgique à Paris). La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

Armenians and others). But after the recognition of the Soviet Union, the rights of Georgians risked conflation with those of Russians. As described, the closing of the legation was a significant symbol of defeat for Georgian émigrés. While their sense of victory was based on its existence, its loss did not stop them fighting for special status under the French government. In a 1937 note, Georgians observed how it was extraordinary that Georgian émigrés did not enjoy protection from Geneva and that after the disappearance of their legation, they might be placed in a less favourable situation compared to other refugees—whereas previously, it was the opposite.[153]

These attempts succeeded, at least for a while. Diplomatic efforts by Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Akaki Chkhenkeli secured authorisation for Georgian émigrés to sign documents and passports under the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but they did not really enjoy a special status, as became apparent. They continuously expressed frustration, asking the French government to issue circulars that would facilitate their recognition in different offices:

> Thus, we feel absolutely abandoned […] the officials having no instructions regarding this category of refugees do not know what to answer, or, in most cases we are considered as Russian refugees, or according to them we are not mobilisable as foreigners (for war), or we are asked for Nansen documentation and papers, etc ….[154]

[153] Exposé sur l'office des réfugiés géorgiens à Paris'. March 1937. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[154] Letter from Assathiany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. Paris. 12 October. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.

Even on the verge of WWII, Georgian émigrés were articulating grievances associated with the politics of differentiation and asserting their distinction from Russians. In October 1939, when Assathiany addressed the French government (A. Leger) a second time[155], he channeled the frustrations on how the war changed everything and on how people informally say that the question of refugees has no value anymore. In addition, he asks to send a circular again so that young Georgians can be mobilized for war in the name of their distinct national and alien identity.

Whether in terms of international arrangements concerning documents and privileges, retirement houses for elderly Georgian and Ukrainian refugees, or official offices, they compared their conditions to those of Russian, Armenian, and even Spanish or Jewish refugees.[156,157,158,159,160] In a letter dated 30 December 1941, Assathiany tellingly lists the ongoing distinction between Georgians and Russians in refugee administration as a success.[161] Another note, dated from 1946 and addressed to H. L. Oates, an administrative officer for an intergovernmental committee on refugees, depicts how Georgians insist on distinctive treatment:

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[155] Letter from Assathiany to Mr. Leger. 12 October 1939. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.
[156] Letter from Assathiany to the Délégué General I.R.O. Paris. 25 January 1950. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.
[157] Letter from Assathiany to Léon Blum. Paris. 20 January 1950. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.
[158] Letter from Assathiany to Mr. Emerson (Haut-commissaire de la S.D.N. pour les refugies). 21 December. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.
[159] Letter from Assathiany. 'A l'intention de monsieur Rain, pro memoria'. Paris. 14 February 1951. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).
[160] Letter from Assathiany to Mr. Nourissier (Secrétaire Général du secours Catholique). Paris. 22 June 1951. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.
[161] Letter from Assathiany to the vice president and secretary under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France. 30 December 1941. OFPRA: Office of the Georgian refugees.

> Many Georgians are, if not full-fledged separatist nationalists, so at least very anxious to be dealt with by international machinery, specially provided for them, and not by a machinery provided to deal with Russian refugees generally, i.e. with any persons originating from the Russian Empire or from present Soviet territory. We had to cope with the difficulty in respect of small Georgian groups coming under the Nansen regime in France, and it appears that the same difficulty arises now in the Zones. (Archives Nationales, Côte # AJ_43_79)

Nationalism in exile works differently from nationalism in the homeland, as emerges from the self-perceptions of the internal and external Georgian diasporic groups. One way of approaching the question of the Georgian diaspora is to examine the experiences of the internal exiles. By complementing Scott's story of Georgians in the Soviet Union with that of Georgians in exile, my research delineates their different perceptions of national memory and identity.

According to Scott (2016), the Soviet Union is not a federation of nationalities but an empire of mobile diasporas with a culture of domestic internationalism. Using the Georgian diaspora as an example of a particular diasporic strategy, he illustrates the opportunities and limitations faced by particular ethnic communities. Here, the concept of domestic internationalism stands for a continuous dialogue that existed between the empire and its diverse ethnic population—rarely on equal terms, although imperial subjects still acted as imperial agents.[162]

[162] Despite their prominence, Scott's Georgians were still living under totalitarianism.

Unlike Armenians or Jews, internal diasporic Georgians did not have a long diasporic tradition. Rooted in opportunity rather than trauma, they appeared to pursue a policy of differentiation, or familiar strangeness, through which they competed with other diasporas by standing at the forefront of Soviet life and occupying multiple niches in Soviet culture. Their deep cultural repertoire set them apart and functioned as cultural capital to secure their success. As Scott (2016, p. 2) notes, 'the Soviet authorities used, promoted, and sometimes resented Georgian success, while Georgians capitalised on it, negotiating between imperial prominence and local self-assertion.' Even when individuals did not overtly identify as Georgians, their 'Georgianness was still an artifact: a visible, audible, and edible repertoire of familiar strangers' (Scott, 2016).

Scott's work argues convincingly for the successful image of the Georgian internal diaspora, with examples such as Meliton Kantaria (the WWII hero representing a multiethnic nation), Joseph Stalin and the uniqueness of the Georgian revolutionary (Bolshevik) network, the Georgian film Repentance that questions the legitimacy of Soviet power, the dominance of Georgian cuisine, the informal Georgian economy and trade, and the influence of the Georgian intelligentsia. Scott (2016) acknowledges that his book focuses solely on Georgians who gained 'widespread prominence in Moscow' (p. 4). He thus does not include the traumatic memory of Georgians who were forcefully exiled or victimised by the Bolsheviks in Soviet Georgia, but whether internally or externally diasporic, prominent Georgians seem to capitalise on their identity and deep cultural repertoire (see Table 1).

T A B L E 1 The politics of differentiation

| *Georgian Diaspora in USSR (Scott)* | *Georgian Émigrés (Kekelia)* |
|---|---|
| • Pursued a strategy of 'familiar strangeness' to differentiate from all other ethnic groups.<br>• Perceived as special and exotic. | • Since the 1930s, differentiated only from Russians.<br>• Inscribed into the European, socialist, and civilised/enlightened world. |
| • Created a successful niche in the USSR that was not rooted in tragedy. | • Maintained a victorious narrative rooted in tragedy. |
| • Capitalised on their deep cultural (visible, audible, and edible) repertoire. | • Claimed liberal and moral ideas as markers of differentiation. |

When juxtaposing Scott's depiction of Georgians in the Soviet Union with my own research on Georgians in exile, differing claims about national identity appear: If Georgians in the Soviet Union achieved a narrative of success, the émigré community invited the title of a victorious nation while characterising the situation in Georgia as tragic and miserable. While the internal Georgian diaspora employed a policy of differentiation towards all other ethnic groups, another kind of differentiation was apparent in France one that targeted Russians exclusively. Emigré Georgians advocated for a modern understanding of statehood and citizenship, and claimed to be part of the civilised European family, from which they excluded Russians as barbaric imperialists. As one Georgian émigré descendant, Elisso Tarassachvili, noted, she understood that her grandfather's 'home' (in a way, his identity) was his political engagement when he said he would never go back to a Bolshevik Georgia: "it did not matter that it was Georgia or

another country, he had unshakable principles".[163] These differences contribute to the understanding of nationalism generally and, in particular, nationalism in exile.

**Negotiating the Émigré Memory**

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgian independence was restored in accordance with the Declaration of Independence of 26 May 1918. With this act, the National Liberation Movement symbolically recovered the DRG memory. Since then, not all elected Georgian governments have fully acknowledged the émigré community. A sense of being forgotten by the homeland or belittled by history was again voiced by émigrés. Still, every ambassador from the post-Soviet Shevardnadze government onward has expressed an interest in the site of the émigré community at Leuville.

Negotiations between Georgian officials and the descendants of the émigré community to purchase the château started roughly around 2004. In 2005, a national celebration marked the relocation of anti-Bolshevik hero Kakutsa Cholokashvili's tomb from the Leuville cemetery to a Georgian Pantheon. After the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the narrative of the 1921 occupation intensified with state-sponsored memory projects. The original purchase of the château had been made with Georgian state funds, but upon the French state's recognition of the Soviet Union, the property was made legally private to safeguard it from Soviet claims. The political exiles had intended to transfer ownership to the state of Georgia once it regained independence, a process that proved unexpectedly complicated. After intense disputes that involved legal assistance on

[163] Virtual interview with Elisso Tarassachvili. April 30, 2021.

both sides, the parties rebuilt trust, agreeing on a memorandum in 2011 and, finally, on a contract in 2016.

This memorandum was the first document where the Georgian government succeeded in negotiating devolution. Reaching an understanding only became possible when the Georgian side agreed on the conditions that were presented by the émigré community. The conditions reveal the price of accepting the stored memory as national heritage, which is the proper recognition of the First Democratic Republic of Georgia and its work. Half of the document reaffirms or traces the history and success of the first republic, while the other half asserts the obligations taken from the Georgian side. In the document, we discern three essential ideas: 1) The restoration of the historical timeline by reconnecting the political emigration with the modern Georgian republic,[164] 2) The justification of the political exile versus a counter-narrative that portrays the exiles as the ones that cowardly fled the country, 3) Finally, the obligations to study and commemorate the First Democratic Republic in both spaces (Georgia and Leuville.) These conditions specifically asked for commemorating the Château de Leuville-sur-Orge as a site of memory, organizing museums, libraries, commemorative events, and the cemetery. In the final documents, we see the obligation to study and reveal the historical importance of the DRG[165].

Sentiments of being ignored and forgotten by the homeland were expressed by

[164] Memorandum between Georgia and the "Foyer Leuville." 2011.
[165] Ordonnance N 836 Gouvernement de Géorgie 18 mai 2016. Relative aux mesures nécessaires au transfert à la Géorgie du domaine de Leuville-sur-Orge, acquis en France par le gouvernement de la Première République démocratique de Géorgie; Ordonnance n° 1456 Gouvernement de Géorgie 21 juillet 2016 Relative aux mesures de financement du projet à réaliser après le transfert à la Géorgie du domaine de Leuville-sur-Orge, acquis en France par le gouvernement de la Première République démocratique de Géorgie.

Redjeb Jordania when I asked a question about the restoration of Georgian independence:

> I happened to be in Georgia but was not really involved. It was a very emotional moment. Nobody announced or mentioned the names of the people who did it first, as if there was nothing to these days. It took years, the first time someone ever mentioned my father's name was Misha (Saakashvili.)[166]

The Georgian officials (the ambassador and the deputy in chief) identified two types of fears that pushed the émigrés into incorporating these conditions. The ambassador (Eka Siradze-Delaunay) said that their biggest fear was that their ancestors did not have their place in the perception of the Georgian people: "Either they do not have a place, or they have a bad place (referring to Georgian history and Soviet falsifications.)"[167]Another fear reported by Mr. Javakhishvili (2018) was the distrust in the government, which implied that one day this historic site could have fallen into the hands of some oligarch, sold out, turned into a restaurant, or private villa. The fear that one day this site could have another meaning meant a betrayal to the memory of their ancestors. Therefore, they insisted on inscribing in the contract that the site should always remain a public domain, like an academy, museum or library.

> "They say that the matter is not about trust, but look, this is how many times Georgia faced the risk of occupation. What if tomorrow Fascists came in the

[166] Interview with Redjeb Jordania. June 11, 2018. Paris.

[167] Interview with Eka Siradze-Delaunay. June 2018. Paris.

government, or Russians made another occupation, why risk? Essentially, they think that we are never safe and insured."[168]

The centennial celebration of June 16, 2018 marked the first time the Georgian government had officially hosted a commemorative event there. Official speeches emphasized the site's symbolic importance, the necessity of honouring the past, and valuable contributions from the DRG and its exiles, whose descendants had finally achieved victory. On their own terms and conditions, they exchanged property rights to the castle for a commitment to the DRG and its political exiles. In return, they gave Georgian government officials the right to own and use the suppressed and stored émigré memory of European values, Soviet occupation, independence, and success (see Figure 1).

F I G U R E 1 Timeline




[168] Interview with Gotcha Javakhishvili. June 2018. Paris.

## Conclusion

When the exiles fled the country, they took with them the national treasury, official documents and national memory of the DRG. Even as the homeland suppressed its memory of subjugation for decades, its national treasury was safeguarded in a French bank and returned untouched during the Soviet period. The carrier groups' newspapers and journals can be understood as reflecting the meaning-making process of occupation and exile, through which they made the suffering of the Georgian nation visible to the international community.

By contextualising Georgian exiles as elite carrier groups of a particular national memory (Brubaker, Erll and Alexander), this study shows that they used four constructs: occupation, civilisation, victory and differentiation to create this memory. These four narratives are intertwined rather than limited to binary categories of tragic or glorious. Their predominantly victorious tone was rooted in a tragic past and national martyrdom, and I found the exilic identity and memory best understood through the lens of trauma. They were the ones who discussed the traumatised physical body of Soviet Georgians. As one Georgian émigré descendant noted in an interview,[169] Georgians now had 'two different pasts' with different types of suffering. While émigrés lived through materially and morally tough times, frustrated and deprived of their country, their lives were not under threat like the Soviet Georgians, who lived with fear in their bones.

[169] Virtual interview with Elisso Tarassachvili. April 30, 2021.

Eventually, the exilic national memory that carried components of victimhood and tragedy overtook the existing national identity of Soviet Georgians. There are three major differences between the national identity held by Scott's (2016) internal Georgian diaspora and by émigré Georgians. The former pursued the strategy of familiar strangeness from all other ethnic groups, presenting themselves as special and exotic. But émigré Georgians inscribed themselves into the European family as part of the socialist, civilised and enlightened world; their differentiation from Russians began only in the 1930s. The internal Georgian diaspora occupied a successful niche in the Soviet Union that was not based in tragedy. Meanwhile, émigré Georgians voiced a narrative of victory rooted in tragedy and occupation. Liberal, political and moral ideals became their markers of differentiation and self-representation. In contrast, a politics of differentiation was advanced among Soviet Georgians, capitalising on a deep cultural repertoire.

This research is not limited to showing the differences between nationalism at home and in exile through the fragmentation of national memory. While Vinitzky-Seroussi's fragmented memory may build dissensus rather than solidarity, here fragmentation has enabled a stored émigré memory to become an available past that travelled back home and shaped the choices of the Georgian state from the 1990s onward. Emerging slowly at first, a once suppressed available past was activated in 2004. By 2018, even a relatively pro-Russian Georgian government could not stop the political integration of the émigré memory of victimhood. Thus, like stem cells heal the physical body, the insertion of exilic stored memory helped the regeneration of the national body, enhanced social solidarity and consensus on the historical past.

For many decades, the exilic national identity seemed lost, either suppressed or dormant, its reach and influence limited to the fewer than 1500 people who kept it alive. The return of this stored (A. Assmann, 2011), differently fragmented available past (Vinitzky-Seroussi; Schudson), and its insertion into the post-Soviet Georgian national identity reveals its particular role and unexpected power as exilic national memory and identity. An exilic memory, both subaltern and limited, is nonetheless able to become a functional national memory for the homeland if and when circumstances align.

A passage from an article calling for resistance can be symbolically applied to the role of the exiles. It describes a rebellious spirit that tried to rise during the 1924 insurrection, enduring a physical defeat only to gain a moral victory:

> The nation raised itself up, tried to stand up. It is true that it fell, but its body and soul has not col-lapsed. On the contrary, it raised itself up and got revived. In front of us stands a living creature […] and this is exactly why the spirit of rebellion became invincible in the Georgian nation, in the Georgian. It cannot rest or be pacified, cool down, or disappear until it finds its body. Without the body, its power is suffocating.[170]

This invincible rebellious spirit, as stored and represented in the émigré community, sought to reclaim its body. While this body (in Georgia) was physically tortured and

[170] August 1931, Damoukidebeli Sak'art'velo #68.

mentally deprived of its memory, the émigré community instrumentalised and kept the national memory of rebellion alive, waiting.

By the 1990s, Georgian society was ready to receive the tragic narrative that had been safeguarded in émigré memory. The traumatic past was now an available past, and the cadaver of the DRG revealed itself to the once ‘successful and happy’ Georgians. After the Soviet archives were opened and the academic community discovered the history of the DRG, they reinterpreted the Soviet past through a tragic lens that superseded the Soviet narrative of success. As the narrative of successful Georgians dissipated, the émigré memory of tragedy was fully embraced. Once interest in the Château of Leuville was reignited, émigré descendants negotiated proper recognition of the DRG.

This is how the Georgian state became the official owner of a tragic and victorious available past. The tragic sources for the narrative of victory (the 1921 occupation and 1924 rebellion) remained alive, eventually becoming available for use. Along with the tragic available past, the Georgian state incorporated the success story of the 1918 independence. With a national memory of independence, it could now claim a century of democracy and ‘Europeanness’. At the same time, the memory of occupation and failed rebellion provided a victimhood identity for the Georgian nation.

# Chapter Three: The Ukrainian Émigré Community

## Mission and Audience of the Journal

Ukrainian emigres were scattered around Europe and the world. Many went to the Czech Republic (Prague), Romania, Poland, Germany, and other places. Those who came to France were probably the largest group of exiles (as compared to Georgians and Azerbaijanis). A 1951 document[171] containing Polish statistical information estimates the existence of 38,000 Ukrainian exiles in France before 1940. An additional 5000 refugees were registered under the status of Nansen at the Russian section. More arrived after 1940 and WWII but, for the sake of this research, I count only the number of Ukrainian exiles up until 1940: approximately 43,000 exiles.

The journal *Trident*[172] was a weekly Ukrainian émigré journal published in Paris. It was established by Simon Petliura, former President of the Ukrainian People's Republic and Commander of the Ukrainian People's Army[173]. In the very first publication, dated October 15, 1925, the editors stated that they had deliberately launched the journal under the sign of the trident, a symbol of Ukrainian statehood. The mission of

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[171] "Les Ukrainiens avec notes manuscrites (Brouillon). 1951, Avril 10. Dossier 3. OFPRA/Fonds privé : Paul Chastand.

[172] A trident appears in a coat of arms used by Ukrainian dynasties to symbolize their power. For more information, consult: http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CT%5CR%5CTrident.ht.

[173] Petliura actively cooperated with other émigré groups against the Soviet Union. In 1926 he was assassinated in Paris by someone who claimed losing relatives in the pogroms. Petliura's involvement in the pogroms is debated until today. Some scholars call these accusations defamation and false statements (Joukovsky, 1990). Even though Petliura issued orders to expel from the army as traitors those who carry out pogroms, other scholars claim that he did not do enough to stop U.P.R. soldiers in committing crimes against Jews (Gilley, 2019).

the journal was to reveal the essence of Ukrainian state ideology and clarify ways of nation-building. A hopeful tone and faith in the inevitability of independence were presented. Calls and appeals were made to Ukrainians both at home and abroad, as unification (not separation) was seen as vital (*Trident, 1*, 1925, October 15). Despite acknowledging the existence of certain "flanks" of Ukrainians diverging around notions of Ukrainian statehood, the authors remained confident that "the overwhelming part of our citizenship is morally healthy and nationally determined and does not lend itself to decay and unwaveringly stands on the positions of Ukrainian statehood in its concept—the Ukrainian People's Republic" (*Trident, 1*, 1925, October 15, p. 2).

As in the case of the Georgian émigrés, here too, Ukrainians appealed to two main audiences: an occupied population in the homeland and exiled Ukrainians. These audiences remained unchanged even in 1938, when the journal addressed "...all fellow countrymen there, in Ukraine, and here, in the scattering of existence sincere greetings sent by the editorial staff of *Trident*" (*Trident, 1-2*(601-2), 1938, January 2). But as the data will later show, there was an unspoken third audience (as in the case of Georgians), too: the international community. The editors gave practical advice to the occupied population in Ukraine. Acknowledging that self-isolation and lack of participation in the local life of nationally-aware people would be a mistake, they encouraged their fellow Ukrainians to collaborate in order to pursue their national work and achieve independence:

> Even a tuft of wool from a black sheep is better than nothing. It is with this principle that the Polish used in Tsarist Russia, Czechs in Austria, and Croatians

> in Austria-Hungary. Let the enemy think that this is “cooperation” with organic “inclusion” in “creative work” over implementations of seemingly common tasks. Such illusion will be dispelled in the first opportunities for the strongest side. Historical experiences shows that the strongest was always the one which flirted with the existing government, which was bought with concessions and which with these concessions came into force consolidated and prepared for further moves attacks for achieving new positions. (*Trident, 30*, 1926, May 9, pp. 1-2)

**Narrative I: A Memory of Occupation and Independence**

While tracing this narrative, I created a word bank from the writings of émigrés. Similar to Georgians and Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians used language that indicated the heavy yoke of occupation: *blood, tears, devastation and hunger, grief and death, destroy, villainous, Moscow imperialism, bloody events, death strip, systematic hunt, barbaric sadism, hardened corpses, enslaving regime, bloody hunt, brutal, hated invaders, calamities, yoke,* and *unmerciful enemy*.

A narrative of occupation and independence appears in this Ukrainian sample. As with the Georgians, we see the remembrance of an independent Ukraine and a struggle against occupation. In an article from 1929, the authors commemorated the tenth anniversary of the struggle against their enemies, the battle to free the now destitute Ukraine. They stated that the most valuable result of these events was the legend of the battle to achieve Ukrainian statehood:

> Ten years ago, a fierce struggle with enemies was waged on the lands of Ukraine, there was a heated battle for life and death. Our people fought on all sides, defending themselves and their wealth, freedom and rights, their desire to live (…) Our retreats and advances, defeats and victories, the mighty and brave ranks of our heroic army, which fought without ammunition, without clothes and shoes, without stopping, enduring all the hardships and troubles - these ranks are unlikely to find analogies in the history of other peoples. All this will eventually find its assessment in the works of future researchers and historians. But the most valuable and dear thing that 1919 left us is the legend of the armed struggle for the statehood of our country. (*Trident*, *1-2*(157-58) 1929, January 1, pp. 2-3)

Over time, the authors claimed that the older the most important historical events in the life of the Ukrainian nation were, the more significance they acquired from witnesses and new generations. For instance, both considered January 22, 1918 as the beginning of the revival of the nation (*Trident*, *4*(262) 1931, January 25). It is thus not surprising that the authors considered celebrating Ukraine's Independence Day critical even as they simultaneously mourned the people who had spilled blood during the war. They claimed that in both the occupied fatherland and in foreign lands, they had an obligation to listen to the voices of every Ukrainian soul who preached the following: "If I forget you, Jerusalem, may my right hand be withered" (*Trident*, 15, 1926, January 22, p. 1). The idea of remembering fallen soldiers and their graves is strong in these articles. The soldier who fought on the battlefield is remembered as well as all emigrants who did not accept Soviet rule and were scattered instead across foreign lands. In this case, the

authors are concerned about the uncertain fate of graves scattered worldwide (listing nine towns) and in greater Ukraine. The authors seem to understand the importance of tangible sites of memory to their nation-building process: “Preserving the memory of those, who died for the native land in a foreign country, is our duty—not only to the families of his comrades, but also to ourselves, to the future generations, toward Ukraine” (*Trident, 25*(83) 1927, June 12).

The oppression of the Ukrainian people is perceived in both physical and cultural terms. Culturally, the authors claim that the enemy is destroying some of the Ukrainian traditions that are considered the very foundation of society. Among such centuries-old traditions is the celebration of Christmas:

> The fierce enemy who covered the “wide steppe” with blood, tears, devastation, and hunger, who turned the “cheerful land” into the land of grief and death, who separated us with his weapons, victorious today, with our homeland, with our loved ones, relatives, are trying to destroy the very foundation of society—the homeland. [The enemy] tries to uproot the centuries-old traditions that are deeply rooted in their native soil, which give the whole life of the people such a peculiarity that appears especially expressively in customs and daily rituals precisely during the holidays, stretches out a villainous hand to the treasures that were left to us in inheritance from our ancestors. (*Trident*, *1*(407) 1934, January 7)

After all, in the early stages of Sovietization, many Christian churches and centuries-old cultural heritage sites were physically destroyed. In turn, the priests and their families were oppressed. Groups such as The Union of the Godless fought hard against the existence of any faith in the Soviet Union.

In terms of physical suppression, numerous examples of killing, torture, or enslavement are given. The most important representation of the enslavement of the Ukrainian people is described in an article published in 1931, where the authors oppose the fact that Ukrainians were deprived of their vote and representation in society:

> On the international arena […] representatives of the Soviets usually take away their vote not only in the name of Moscow but also in the name of the enslaved from the outskirts of the country. The red occupants do not have the greedy right to intercede the interests of Ukraine and other lands, which they have enslaved with weapons and are holding under their power only by the force of arms. (*Trident*, *4*(262), 1931, January 25)

In addition to acknowledging the loss of Ukrainian agency, horror stories surrounding the Dniester River and Ukrainian political emigration to Romania are also related. The authors claimed that during the winter of 1931 and 1932, the river (which separates Romania from the Soviet Union) became a death strip. There, the Bolsheviks systematically organized a hunt for unarmed old people, women, and even children trying to escape the Soviet Union by crossing the border:

> The Bolsheviks went so far that they did not even consider it necessary to remove from the ice on the Dniester those who fell victim to their barbaric sadism. There, the pleading cries of the dying almost every night mingled with the howls of hungry dogs, which tore and dragged the hardened corpses across the Dniester. (*Trident*, *14*(325), 1932, April 24)

Because the Moscow Chekists were closely monitoring the border, not everyone was successful in their attempt to cross it. The authors insisted that many of these new refugees gambled with their lives in an attempt to flee this Soviet hell. Those who managed to escape faced a Romanian threat of deportation over the existing crisis, a lack of jobs, and no financial support. The author feared for the fate of those unfortunate enough to return, since nobody knew what they would be subjected to under the Soviets. The article thus appealed to the Ukrainian committee for aid, which was needed in Romania to save new refugees from being sent back to the Bolsheviks (*Trident*, *2-3*(360-61), 1933, January 6).

Moscow is represented as a "horrible monster, which is drinking from our people the last drops of blood."[174] However, this "monster" is not a new phenomenon in Ukrainian culture. Like Azerbaijani émigrés, the Ukrainians equate the Soviet Union with Russian imperialism. The authors argue that the national movement in Ukraine would lead to hostilities regardless of the type of power that Russia wielded. To them, Russian power was all the same since the Russians did not accept the idea of an independent Ukraine and were ready to fight against it in various ways:

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[174] *Trident*, *2-3*(360-61), 1933, January 6, p. 4.

> For us, there is no difference between Tsarist Russia and modern communist Russia since they both represent only different forms of Moscow despotism and imperialism. The idea of Ukrainian statehood cannot be squeezed into the narrow framework of a federation, confederation, and even more so autonomy either with Russia or with anyone else. All these forms of "fraternal" coexistence have been very well known and felt throughout our history, having become convinced of their destructive and demoralizing influence on our people. (*Trident 1*, 1925, October 15, p. 3)

**Narrative II: "The Civilized"**

Above all, it is important to identify who or what is considered the "civilized world" from the perspective of Ukrainian émigrés. Similar to Georgians, Ukrainians use language and wording about "taking the mask off" of the Bolsheviks to reveal their true "barbaric" nature. Their mission is to achieve this in front of the world stage and convince the world that rather than acting as a sort of cultural messiah or civilized group, the Bolsheviks were, in fact, "barbarian-executioners" (Berkovsky et al., p. 53).[175] It is

[175]. № 8: Звернення українських емігрантських організацій в Чехословаччині до українців за кордоном про організацію одноденної голодовки та збір коштів для Українського Червоного Хреста Не пізніше 29 жовтня 1933 р. [Address of Ukrainian Emigrant Organizations in Czechoslovakia to Ukrainians Abroad Regarding the Organization of a One-Day Hunger Strike and Fundraising for the Ukrainian Red Cross No Later Than October 29, 1933]. ЦДАВО України, фонд 3963, опис 2, справа 26, аркуш 100 [Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO Ukraine), fond 3963, inventory

easy to notice that for the Ukrainians, the Soviet Union does not exist in the civilized world. This exclusion is far reaching, with the authors opposing any cooperation with the Soviet Union or its inclusion in international meetings, negotiations, or networks. In a 1931 article, the authors argue European leaders must understand that any form of collaboration with the Soviets is impossible. For example, any experiment to make concessions to the Soviets is met with sharp opposition from Ukrainian émigrés: "We even more sharply oppose any projects to bring USSR into normal international life, to give them a place and a voice in the organizations, that unites the cultural world" (*Trident*, *4*(262), 1931, January 25, p. 3). The émigrés worry that Bolshevik propaganda is building momentum abroad, having been recognized by different countries. Seeing this as a threat to the whole world, they instead urge civilized countries to run to defend against it in order "to [save] themselves" (*Trident 3*(61), 1927, January 16, p. 1).

Whether the Soviets should have been given a seat at the table is up for debate. While some businessmen and politicians saw advantages to negotiating with them, others did not. In this decisive moment, Ukrainian émigrés felt the burden of becoming the ambassadors of their own country. Their task was simple and similar to that of Georgian and Azerbaijani émigrés: revealing the occupying identity of the Soviets while hindering Soviet legitimacy in the international arena. Despite what they call critical financial (and sometimes even legally unfavorable) conditions, the authors assume the burden of becoming ambassadors for Ukrainian émigrés. Over time, they admit how much harder it gets to carry this "heavy cross along the thorny road of emigrants" as people increasingly

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2, file 26, sheet 100.] In Berkovsky, V., Hryhorchuk, N., & Petruk, O. (2008). The 1932–1933 Famine in Ukraine through the Eyes of Ukrainian Diaspora: Documents from the Fonds of TsDAVO of Ukraine.

leave their ranks. But despite this hardship, they still call for patience, strength, energy, and hope for a brighter future:

> Just like the political emigration of any people who are fighting for national liberation, so our emigration is the ambassador of the Ukrainian people in a foreign land. She wants to show the world grievances that are inflicted (are done) on the Ukrainian people, to declare her will to the world, finally to achieve, where necessary, the rights for her people and help them to throw off someone else's yoke. (*Trident, 35*(441), 1934, September 30, p. 1)

As we will discover when discussing the feelings of frustration in the following section, the massacre at the Dniester River and Holodomor are especially painful as the silence of the civilized world seems unforgivable. The authors depicted a Ukrainian wave of emigration that had been protesting for more than ten years, “appealing to the human feelings of the civilized world” about the mass shootings the Bolsheviks practiced continuously on the territory of the Soviet Union—and especially in the Ukraine:

> Meanwhile, Ukrainian emigration had time to be convinced that the conscience of the cultured humanity—as it is—is both blind and deaf. At best, she responds with platonic sympathy on paper, but in practice, the authors of the massacres are invited to various international conferences, they are given loans, they zealously buy products of slave forced labor and even those products of basic necessities, which are taken by force and taken away from the starving population. (*Trident, 17*(325), 1932, April 24, p. 1)

The authors denied the possibility that news about the mass execution on the

Dniester was unknown to the world. They claimed that it was not only the Romanian press, but also the world press that was writing about it—for which they were grateful. They asserted that by conducting a bloody hunt along the borders, the Bolsheviks had revealed their "barbarism in an extremely brutal way in front of the whole world." Gratitude is shown for the support and the hospitality given to the political émigrés toward the Romanian state, the only state that the Ukrainians believed supported them in this case.

The following year, an article discussing the horrors of the famine in Ukraine claimed that it had been well-known across the globe how the Bolsheviks were leading a massive extermination of the Ukrainian people. This, they claimed, was connected to the rise of cannibalism. Confirming that the rebellious Ukrainian population was dying from hunger and extremely impoverished, they noted that despite evil attempts to lull the human conscience, it was not possible to silence this conscience because some countries had arranged for help the starving populations:

> Ukrainian people do not have the chance to turn to the world for getting help themselves and are dying in silence. For the Ukrainian people, this appeal to the world was written by the central Ukrainian emigration Rada, in which it asks all nations and all people of goodwill to come to help. (…) If Ukraine found itself in such a tragedy it is looking with hope at the cultured and human Europe, which cannot ignore the groans of the dying children and which we believe, will respond and come to aid of the Ukrainian suffering-nation, in the difficult moment of its life. (*Trident*, *30-31*(388-9), 1933, August 27, p. 2)

Representing a country that before World War I had fed the rest of Europe with

wheat, the authors expected help to be given to Ukrainians who were dying from hunger. In this public article, we noticed that hope was addressed to the "civilized world"; support was also expected from Europe, their supposed ally against the Soviet Union.

## A Relatively More Critical View from Historical Documents

Reports on Holodomor differ in non-public historical documents, which are written by émigré Ukrainians. In 2008, the Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO of Ukraine) published a monograph containing a collection of archival documents from the funds of the Central State Archives of Ukraine. The monograph, titled *We Ring the Great Bell...: The Holodomor of 1932-1933 Through the Eyes of the Ukrainian Diaspora*, was of particular interest to me since its collection consisted of letters written by exiled Ukrainians across Europe.

To understand the severity of the famine and thus the frustrations that émigré Ukrainians carried, we must consider the descriptions of life in Ukrainian villages during the famine. The famine was a man-made one caused by the Bolshevik rule, rather than a drought or an environmental cataclysm. As some émigré documents[176] ironically characterized it, the Soviet government was "spinning from the success of socialism." One archival document (#7) from 1932 recounts how witnesses noticed the lack of wheat, butter, and oil in markets. People dressed in old, ragged clothing thought ceaselessly about how to fill their stomachs, and thus went mad: "the population went wild [with]

[176] This document was written by F. Burdeinov, who was the chairman of Taras Chevchenko scientific society from Prague. It is an excerpt from his diaries on the reflections of famine in the Soviet Union.

dulled human feelings. People swell and die from hunger directly in the streets of Armavir, where the witness served at the slaughterhouse as a translator between British engineers and Russians."[177] The use of the term "going wild" was not a random selection: "going wild" and the dulling of human feelings had led to cannibalism among the starving population. In a book published through a joint Ukrainian and Polish effort, a collection of unknown archival materials from the Polish and Ukrainian secret services on Holodomor is presented (Bednarek, J., Bohunov, S., et al., 2009). Among these 225 historical materials, six historical documents describe horrific instances of cannibalism. The editors note the first acts of cannibalism recorded in early 1932. They found it hard to estimate the exact numbers of such behavior during the famine, since not all acts were publicly reported. However, some reports suggested at least ten cases per day, or seventy-two cases in total for Kiev Oblast in March 1933. One of the letters that the editors presented illustrated the story of a villager from Ukraine who wrote to his parents in Poland: "There is such poverty here that it could not get any worse. Every day, 8 or 9 people die of starvation. People kill and eat one another. Do not think that I am writing foolish things. I am writing the truth" (Bednarek, J., Bohunov, S., et al., 2009, p. 39).

The notions I gathered from the émigré archival documents align with what the editors of the above-mentioned book argue. The editors claim that most Western

[177] №7, З щоденника Ф. Бурдейного про роздуми щодо голоду в Радянському Союзі, ЦДАВО України, фонд 4431, опис 1, справа 2, аркуш Ззв,_4, Оригінал [From the diary of F. Burdeinov reflecting on the reflections on the famine in the Soviet Union, Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO Ukraine), fond 4431, inventory 1, file 2, sheet 4, Original]. p. 27. In State Committee on Archives of Ukraine, Center, State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administrations of Ukraine. (2008). *We Ring the Great Bell...: Holodomor 1932-1933 through the Eyes of the Ukrainian Diaspora: Documents from the State Archives of Ukraine*. N. M. Makovska (Ed.) [et al.]. Kyiv: Publishing House "Horobets". From this point forward, citations will refer to a shortened version of this archival collection as ("We Ring the Great Bell...", 2008).

countries were trying to maintain good relations with the Soviets for economic purposes and against the growing threat of Hitler's Germany; they thus turned a blind eye to Holodomor, viewing it merely as an internal problem for the USSR (Bednarek, J., Bohunov, S., et al., 2009). In my observation, the émigré Ukrainians perfectly understood these geopolitical ramifications and the reluctance of Western countries. They thus emphasized the immorality of collaborating or supporting business interests with the Soviets at the expanse of safeguarding human life:

> In contemporary world international politics, a favorable situation to the Bolshevik government in Moscow has been establish, to hide a big crime, which is going on in Ukraine.Our duty to our nation is the urgent need to make the world public opinion pay attention to this next crime of contemporary power of USSR and outline the ways of moral and material help to starving brothers of ours.[178]

The excepts below illustrate the claims and directed toward the civilized West and the rest of humanity. One of the documents (#5) is a review of the Soviet press from 1932 and an appeal from the chairman of the Women's National Ukrainian Rada to all Red Cross organizations and women's societies for immediate assistance to the hungry population in Ukraine. The author, Sofia Rusova, was an emigrant teacher in Prague who had arrived in 1923. She explicitly expressed her frustration with the civilized world for collaborating with the Bolsheviks who had brought famine and disaster to Ukraine:

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[178] № 13, Запрошення на збори Тимчасового комітету допомоги голодуючим в Україні 14 липня 1933, ЦДАВО України, фонд 3801, опис 1, справа 755, аркуш 133, Машинопис [Invitation to the meeting of the Temporary Committee for Aid to the Starving in Ukraine on July 14, 1933, Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO Ukraine), fond 3801, inventory 1, file 755, sheet. 133, Typewritten]. p. 37. In "We Ring the Great Bell...", (2008).

The cultural world cannot not pay attention to the fact that in front of their eyes in Europe, there is a cruel and armed war going on against unarmed helpless people. Europe cannot watch peacefully that a rich country which fed Europe with its own wheat now is in ruins. Villages empty because people are running from it to the world in a search for bread. Whole generations of Ukrainian children are dying physically and become morally wild. Need of immediate organized fraternal aid ordered by the people of the civilized world so that brotherly bread really reaches the mouths of hungry peasants and workers. […]

How could the organized countries of Europe and America recognize such chaotic country, which destroy everything and kill without a war millions of people. how could these European countries sign with the Bolsheviks some sort of trade agreements when all these goods/merchandise which the Bolsheviks bring to Europe either was taken forcefully from the mouths of hungry children and women or were produced by forced labor of enslaved people. […] We are only appealing to all red cross organizations in women's societies to give help to the confused exhausted people of once upon a time rich Ukraine. Give a piece of bread to the starving children![179]

[179] №5 Огляд радянської преси та звернення голови Жіночої Національної Української Ради С. Русової до всіх організацій Червоного Хреста, жіночих товариств про надання негайної допомоги голо¬ дуючим в Україні [Overview of the Soviet press and appeal from the Chairwoman of the Women's National Ukrainian Council S. Rusova to all Red Cross organizations, women's societies regarding the immediate assistance to the starving in Ukraine]. 1932, Prague. ЦДАВО України, ф. 3801, опис 1, спр. 755, арк. 268-269 [TsDAVO of Ukraine, fond 3801, inventory 1, file no. 755, pp. 268-269]. In "We Ring the Great Bell...", (2008).

The same letter reveals the powerlessness of Ukrainian émigrés to help their relatives by sending provisions. Apparently, even one kilogram of rice sent from abroad was taxed by the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian émigrés felt so removed from the occupied people that "neither from there to us nor from us to Ukraine cannot fly even a feather." [180] Furthermore, the simple act of sending correspondence to relatives would put these relatives at risk of persecution. The author's only agency was to truthfully inform "the cultured world of the horrors that are going on behind the walls [of the USSR]."[181]

Another document (#8) from 1933 tells stories of horror about how tens of thousands of Ukrainians peasants were dying from hunger; thousands of others were being sent to Siberia or Solovetsky (Solovki) even as hundreds were being shot in the basements of the Cheka. The document claims that all grain sent from Ukrainians abroad was forcefully stolen in order for Soviets to pay their agents around the world—the kind of agents that Ukrainian émigrés saw in Germany. According to the author, Moscow was looking for any viable excuse to eliminate Ukrainian peasants. When peasants resisted giving up their grain, they were killed. Uprisings from Kuban Cossacks were crushed by the Muscovite army, resulted in the deportation of 18,000 Cossacks even as thousands of them were shot. Given the situation, the authors concluded that "the whole world is talking about the hard situation in the Soviet paradise, and many people have witnessed the poverty of Ukrainian peasants. Only the Moscow communists and their servants abroad do not want to see this" (TsDAVO of Ukraine, f. 3567, op. 1, file no.9, sheet 3).

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[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.

Some frustrations or claims against nations of the so-called civilized world are revealed in a document (#15) from August 1933. The author recounts multiple strategies used by the USSR to assuage news of famine in Ukraine, Kuban, Don, the Caspian area, and the Caucasus. In their attempt to deny these facts, they collaborated with the French ambassador in Moscow who was later exposed for telling lies about the situation in Ukraine. Denial was not only part of an ongoing information war, but also a strategy to hinder any émigré effort to help the starving population in Ukraine. Despite evidence from a correspondent's account from Moscow to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which described the horrible hunger in the journal *Le Temps* in 1933, the French ambassador to Moscow still perpetuated the Soviet propaganda. The correspondent wrote about how confiscated wheat from peasants was distributed to more privileged individuals such as the KGB and army members. He also described how typhus had spread alongside the famine, and the situation was so awful that not even one honorable communist would deny it.

Meanwhile, the French ambassador gave an interview to the Moscow emigrant journal *Last News* in Paris where he denied the existence of the famine. Instead, he talked about how lovely the strawberries brought by peasants to Moscow were as well as the various delicatessens found in the city markets. Despite his collaboration with Soviet propaganda, he also admitted that the French embassy was receiving flour from abroad—another source of undeniable evidence for the famine and the wheat crisis in Ukraine[182]. While denouncing the French ambassador, the author was grateful for London

[182] The ambassador might have fallen victim to Soviet propaganda, but the Ukrainians saw this as collaboration with the Soviets and a cover-up.

newspapers and an American author who had called for help for the starving population and wrote about the ten million people (in some villages as much as eighty percent of the population) who had died in half a year in Ukraine, the Kazak lands, the Caucasus, and the lower Volga regions:

> The task of the action to help the starved in Ukraine is to touch the conscience of people of old and new world [USA] and motivate them to raise the voice in order to organize broad moral and material help to our sisters, brothers and little innocent children which are in terrible agony dying from hunger in Greater Ukraine. Do not close the eyes to the fact that this action is happening in unspeakable hard conditions, which are created by the policy of a number of Europe and American countries, they are going after any kind of their own profits and interests, which have the tendency to not pay attention to what is going on in Ukraine and even speak from the voice of the Kremlin rulers. […] Only one thing is left to say: interests do not smell! But it is now time to approach this tragedy without "interests" and simply out of a sense of humanity. (Berkovsky et al., 2008, p. 46)

While another historical document once again confirmed the collaboration between France and Communist propaganda, others praised the British media. For instance, a document detailing the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the International Socialist conference in Paris emphasized that the bourgeois press of countries looking to form an alliance with the Soviets (such as France) had avoided

including news of the famine in their journals (Berkovsky et al., 2008, p. 47). This is why the Ukrainian delegation of the Social Democratic Labor Party was trying to forge close relationships with socialist journals from different countries, constantly informing them about ongoing events in Ukraine (Berkovsky et al., 2008, p. 48).

On the other hand, three archival documents (#9, #20 and #21) from 1933 discussed how knowledgeable and vocal both the English press and some British officials were about the famine in Ukraine. For example, document #21 presented a collection of excerpts from different British press articles discussing the famine. The *Daily Telegraph*, *English Churchman*, *Christian Herald*, and *Yorkshire Observer* were among the journals that discussed the following issues. First, there was the issue of how the population of a village had shrunk from 3,500 to 1,500 people, or from a village of 700 to four families. Second, there was the issue of how people ate absolutely everything to the extent that there were no more cats, dogs, sheep, or cattle; cases of cannibalism were also present and only the strongest men were managing to survive. Third, there was the issue of how bread prices differed for Communist Party members and impoverished peasants. While the former could buy one kilogram of rye bread for fifty kopecks, a peasant had to pay five rubles (roughly nine percent of their salary, if they had any). Fourth, there was the issue of how the population had not seen bread for many months and were instead eating weeds and tree bark. Finally, one article spoke against nations washing their hands of the matter like Pontius Pilate. They labeled those who were deaf to such news as unfit representatives of the British nation “which has been famous for the virtue of its actions

everywhere."[183] Some authors suggested that if anyone wanted to know what real persecution meant, they should then move to Ukraine and see the "Red terror" at work:

> Those who study all sorts of horrors will lose a good opportunity if they do not pay attention to Ukraine at this time—a state in which a person is actually shot for taking a few grains of grain that he planted in his own field. They are shot not by a few fanatics, but legally and officially by the authorities.[184]

Another document (#20) listed more journals calling for support for the Ukrainian cause. *The Times*, *The Morning Post*, *The Western Mail*, *The Catholic Times,* and *The Manchester Guardian* were listed for showcasing what the Soviet government was trying to hide from the rest of the world. Letters of support were written by clergyman who called upon the whole world to support Ukrainians. For instance, one article appealed to the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Innitzer, and the Ukrainian bishops who protested "in front of the entire civilized world against the starvation and persecution" of the Ukrainian population. *The Guardian* reported a cry for help by the Ukrainian Catholic bishop to the whole world to stop the famine of the once-rich country:

> It is rare that the church hierarchy responds with such harsh words and such clear

[183] №21 Повідомлення з бюлетеня «Ukrainian bureau» про публікації в англійській пресі про голод в Україні [Notice from the bulletin "Ukrainian bureau" about publications in the English press about the famine in Ukraine]. Англійська преса про голод на Україні [The English press about the famine in Ukraine]. 9 вересня 1933 р. pp. 55-56 [September 9, 1933. pp. 55-56]. Ukrburo London TsDAVO of Ukraine, f. 4465, on. 1, file no. 106 [Ukrburo London TsDAVO of Ukraine, fond 4465, inventory 1, file no. 106]. In "We Ring the Great Bell...", (2008).
[184] Ibid. p.56.

> language as the Bishops of the Galician Province did in their joint letter on the plight of workers and peasants in Soviet Ukraine who are dying of starvation. Ukraine is in a throe of death, they say, and appeal to their Catholic brothers to raise a powerful protest against the persecution of the small, the poor, the weak and the innocent.[185]

Frustrations are also obvious regarding the Dniester River tragedy, where the authors of a specific 1932 document (#3)[186] claimed that more than a thousand women, children, and men were shot to death while attempting to flee Ukraine. Interestingly, the authors blamed not only the Bolsheviks for this atrocity but also all bystander countries and civic societies of Europe, which "have not received yet neither transparency nor courage to evaluate it as the circle of conscious universal criminal fanatics."[187] More grievances were shared concerning the ongoing flirtation taking place in secret and overt contacts between the European bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviks. Bribes and credits from Germany, England or America to Bolsheviks, and support to the Soviet propaganda to recognize the Soviet Union were listed as examples of collaborative efforts. Flirting with

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[185] №20 Повідомлення з бюлетеня «Ukrainian bureau» про публікації в англійській пресі про голод в Україні [Notice from the bulletin "Ukrainian bureau" about publications in the English press about the famine in Ukraine]. 2 вересня 1933 р. [September 2, 1933]. ЦДАВО України, ф. 4465, оп. 1, спр. 106, арк. 57 [TsDAVO of Ukraine, fond 4465, inventory 1, file no. 106, sheet 57]. In "We Ring the Great Bell...", (2008, p.53).

[186] №3 Повідомлення з «Вісника Народньої Української Ради» про резолюцію Народної Української Ради щодо розстрілу більшовиками на р. Дністрі втікачів з УСРР [Bulletin of the People's Ukrainian Council report on the resolution of the People's Ukrainian Council regarding the execution of refugees from the USSR by the Bolsheviks on the Dniester River]. 15 червня 1932 р.16 [June 15, 1932, p. 16]. ЦДАВО України, ф. 4004, оп. 1, спр. 3О, арк. 6-7 [TsDAVO Ukraine), fond 4004, Inventory 1, File 30, Sheets 6-7]. In "We Ring the Great Bell...", (2008, pp.16-17).

[187] Ibid.

Maxim Litvinov in Geneva was perceived as a "handshake stained by human blood."[188] Eventually, a call was made to those who felt empathy and were moved by the crimes of the Dniester River, the murdering of hundreds of thousands, and the twelve years of brutality against the unarmed and dismissed Ukrainian people. The authors said such people:

> Cannot support mass murderers, cannot purchase wheat that was robbed from famished working people, cannot give credits to criminals for the continuation of their atrocities, cannot promote the recognition of their power, cannot silently watch how in the middle of Europe the whole Ukrainian working nation is being exterminated.[189]

Many years later, in 1958, the goal of remembering Holodomor or making the rest of the world recognize it were still very much active. A concentration camp (Gulag) survivor émigré, Yuri Lavrinenko, gave a speech in Bound Brook, New Jersey, on the 25th anniversary of Holodomor and, once again, remembered that despite protests and resistance from the Ukrainian people, "the world did not want to listen to the signals." Emphasizing the role and responsibility of people like him in fighting for the truth, he listed one of the goals to make the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations (OHCHR) create a special investigation committee about Holodomor that could obtain evidence or a response from the USSR, which was still denying the famine itself. The eventual recognition of Holodomor was still an ongoing fight in 1958. In this fight,

[188] Ibid.
[189] Ibid, p.18

Ukrainian émigrés saw their collective memory as an indispensable weapon for the nation's liberation: "Our memory cannot be put to sleep, if the nation wants to live further. Disappearance of memory and understanding of this people's sacrifices is the death of nation" (Berkovsky et al., pp. 54-55).

## Frustrations

I identified feelings of frustration that began to appear in articles beginning in 1929; the Ukrainian exiles then voiced many more frustrations in the 1930s than in the 1920s. In general, their accusations were directed not only towards Western countries, allies, and the civilized world, but also towards the Ukrainian exiles themselves.

In 1929, the authors recalled the heated war in Ukraine that had taken place ten years ago. While mentioning how Ukrainian people fought on all sides to defend themselves, their freedom, and their rights, they revealed a deep sorrow. Despite having no support and being strangers to everyone, the authors claimed they did not give in to despair and fought on all fronts. Still,

> [I]t seems that everything was against us. Against us were not only our enemies, but also nature, the elements, which by hunger and cold, and then typhoid, knocked out loyal and loyal fighters from our ranks. Everything that surrounded us was against us. We were not known anywhere, we were strangers to everyone, we did not have any long-awaited help or support from anywhere. (*Trident*, *1-2*(157-58), 1929, January 1, p. 2)

Despite the world not being familiar with the country during its wars for independence,

ten years later, the Ukrainians could claim recognition, trust, support, and most importantly the right to represent themselves and have a voice in international affairs:

> If today, the Ukrainian question (whether the modern rulers of the world want it to or not) is increasingly demanding a solution, then this imposes on us special obligations: to make sure that it is not only our word spoken in this decision, but also [the legitimacy of] our power. Controlled by the united will of the Ukrainian nation, [it] is playing its own role. (*Trident, 40-41*(690-91), 1939, December 31, p. 2)

In their attempt to describe Europe's relationship with the Soviets, the émigrés use symbolic language to convey their routinely disturbed feelings about fluctuations in relations. In the following except, the expression "high and low tides" refers to the ebb and flow of European-Soviet relations:

> Every time that wave of the Soviet tide rises high**,** we protest against any agreement with those who have no right to claim to speak in Europe on behalf of Ukraine and other occupied lands, held by the force of the arms of the Red Army. Our representatives at the last session of the Union of the Association of Supporters of the League of Nations in Budapest have vividly and expressively raised their voice of warning against the threat from the East and protest against any assistance to the Soviets. Also, our government in Geneva made a note of protest. And it is very valuable that a similar note from the Georgian government

> coincides with our speech. (*Trident*, *23* (281), 1931, June 14, p. 2)

Describing the moment as a Soviet tide, the authors identify various culprits for it. First, there was the press, which inflated the waves of Soviet tide in their pursuit of momentary sensation. Second, there were the leaders of European politics. Third, there were the business people in the fields of finance and trade, fuelled by fever dreams of luxurious castles and interest in industry and trade in the "expanses of the East shrouded in Red darkness."[190] The authors claimed that such moments of international competition between states is used by "Red traders who trade in human blood."[191] The authors conveyed the frustration that with such "rosy perspectives" on benefiting from an economic agreement with the Soviets, these counties were considering cooperation with bandits:

> In Geneva, representatives of the strongest powers talk on an equal footing, sitting at the same table, with the empowered state of bandits and global arsonists.[192] Moscow tenors sang unusually sweetly and tenderly over the English Channel, finding themselves listeners and recognition. And recently in France, a revision of the economic understanding of the Soviets has resumed and the question of signing a mutual non-aggression pact is being raised. (*Trident*, *23*(281), 1931, June 14, p. 1-2)

The authors remained convinced that no beneficial agreement could result from

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[190] *Trident*, *23* (281), 1931, June 14, p. 2.

[191] Ibid.

[192] Similar grievances were voiced by the Afghan population, which protested any negotiations with the Taliban.

such negotiations. They feared that this flirtation with the Soviet Union would actually work against the occupied populations living under the Soviets: “These endless and fruitless perturbations in Europe, nevertheless, externally reinforce the order that is decaying from within, and thereby help the occupiers to keep the enslaved peoples in their clutches.” (*Trident*, *23*(281), 1931, June 14, p. 2). A 1936 article reiterated the same notion by claiming that the foreign loan, which the Soviet government was trying to obtain from different countries, would be applied to two ends: “support for its enslaving regime at the center, at home within the border of the Soviet kingdom, and payment for external destabilization work in other countries in order to cause uprisals, revolutions, and the destruction of the system” (*Trident*, *3*(507), 1936, January 12, p. 1).

Responding to the meeting of the European Commission for the League of Nations in Geneva in 1931 where Italian representative Dino Grandi called for the Soviets to participate in European affairs, the authors concluded that no collaborative efforts should be made since it would only offer an opportunity for the Soviets to spread propaganda and would disappoint Europe once again: “Have not European countries had enough of bitter experiences from previous meetings?” They insisted that:

> [n]o kind of collaboration between them is possible. The leaders of European politics must understand this. But realizing this they often are inconsistent and blinded by international competition or for the sake of the benefits of the internal state of affairs or whim of particular political groups making concessions to the Soviets, which makes it easier for these global instigators a possibility to transfer their corrupting work to European soil. (*Trident*, *4*(262), 1931, January 25, p. 3)

Various articles point to the immoral collaboration of politicians and businessmen with the Soviet Union. Many authors were frustrated by such collaborations and labeled them as "completely incomprehensible."[193] Considering the extent of collaboration with Nazi puppet regimes in occupied nations, which was only revealed after the end of World War II, it is not surprising that similar collaborations with the Soviets were not generally disregarded. For the Ukrainians, such collaboration became especially problematic following Holodomor and its devastating consequences. The authors claimed that Bolshevik propaganda and some dark global forces were trying to hide the reality of the famine. With a degree of success, they had managed to lull the human conscience: "even some more or less outstanding foreigners who have relations with the press or politics are proclaiming terrible lies that in the Soviet Union, as in Soviet Ukraine, there is no hunger anywhere. This is, for us Ukrainians, completely incomprehensible" (*Trident*, *30-31*(388-9), 1933, August 27, p. 1).

Aside from Holodomor, the bloody events at the Dniester River were also cited to express grievances about the silence of the Western world. In the winter of 1932, the Ukrainian population was trying to leave Soviet Ukraine by crossing the Dniester River that separated it from Romania. The authors stated that the Bolsheviks had organized a systematic hunt for unarmed women, children, and elderly people. These systemic and barbaric shootings were known to the Romanians, who raised their voices against it. The Ukrainian authors expressed immense gratitude towards the Romanian press and their civil opinion. However, they also expressed frustration toward the rest of the "cultured humanity," who remained silent about these issues:

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[193] *Trident*, *30-31*(388-9), 1933, August 27, p. 1.

> After all, these murders were committed in front of their eyes. After all, now she will not be able to say that she did not see them, she does not know anything about them. Meanwhile, now the same thing that happened before that time is being repeated. Not only are there no real steps that would indicate that the cultural world is turning away, separating itself from the Bolshevik barbarians, but even protests and general indignation are not felt. (*Trident*, *17*(325), 1932, April 24, p. 3)

If Romania was thanked for its help, accusations were fired at Czechoslovakia in 1926. The Czechoslovakian government had helped the Ukrainian émigrés open colleges and universities both in Prague and in Poděbrady.[194] However, the authors claimed that if, on the one hand, they were helping to welcome new Ukrainian refugees from the Soviet Union and fund universities, they were mistreating the Ukrainians who had been living in the Prikapat region for years on the other. The authors were worried that the closure of schools in the Carpathian region was driving out the Ukrainian intelligentsia and population by encouraging Ukrainians to dream about a "Soviet paradise." They believed that such policy was pushing Ukrainians into Soviet Ukraine, where hunger was prevalent and thousands of homeless children wandered the streets. They offered a solution, suggesting giving national and cultural autonomy to the region,[195] transferring the two universities there, and creating a solid bridge between Prague and Kyiv to create the "strongest antitoxin against communist infection which is spreading broadly every

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[194] The Ukrainian Husbandry Academy was a technical higher education institution in Czechoslovakia founded in 1922 with financial support from the Czechoslovakian government.

[195] The nationalization of the region by Czechoslovakia and the debate on autonomy were ongoing issues during the interwar period.

day" (*Trident 52*, 1926, November 7, p. 1).

As for the complaints directed to Ukrainian exiles themselves, four examples will help to illustrate the émigré reality. First, a 1927 article illustrates the frustration toward the lack of political activities about emigration. The authors argued that there was more cultural work than political among the émigrés. Despite appreciating their cultural work, they claimed that "one way or another the fact remains a fact that our citizens in the fight with the occupants are not using everything and, in the way, it should be used" (*Trident 3*(61), 1927, January 16, p. 1). One of the complaints concerned the Memorandum of the Bureau of International Union Against the Third International. There was a deficiency was it appeared none of these countries (whether independent or occupied by the Bolsheviks) had a representative in the Union. Only Russian emigrants had joined the cause. Another complaint was made towards different groups of émigré Ukrainians who, despite their various ideologies, were spreading a defeatist attitude that promoted surrender:

I want to talk about the mood of reconciliation with the Soviets, about a kind of "defeatism" that is characteristic of some circles of our emigration. In the emigrant press not so long ago, a rather big concern was caused by the question of repatriates who recognize the necessity and possibility to return to Ukraine, by signing the promise to Soviets [that they would not fight against it, seen as a trap]. This group occupies the so-called center. To the left stands a more sincere and honest group of Smenovekhovites - outright renegades who completely break all the threads that unite them with emigration. To the right of the returnees are those about whom we talk, the evolutionists. […] Representatives of such currents, however, show an amazing similarity and commonality

of their thoughts and moods. They are characterized by two points…An extremely critical attitude towards all emigrant work, which comes to a general denial of the importance of emigration, its usefulness, and its very existence. For everything on this side of the Soviet border, evolutionists have only black paint, and for the actions of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, rose. In everything that concerns emigration, they are hopeless pessimists, and as for the Bolsheviks, their optimism knows no bounds. (*Trident 3*(61) 1927, January 16, p. 3)

Second, a 1930 article discussed the influence of the Efremov case on fellow exiled Ukrainians. The Efremov case was known as being a direct repression of forty-five Ukrainian intellectuals who were put on trial. Frustrated about Ukrainian civil circles in Galicia, the authors shared the hope that these events in greater Ukraine (which included the occupied Eastern parts of the country) would open the eyes of Galician circles that were blinded by Muscovite policies: "They saw the blatant contradiction between the boastful statements of Soviet officials aimed abroad and the terrible Soviet reality as it is" (*Trident, 1-2*(201-10), 1930, January 1, pp. 3-4). Frustration toward the Galicians was fashioned into a hope that the civic atmosphere would be emptied of the Muscovites.

Third, ten years later, the challenge remained the same. In a 1939 article, the authors concluded by toasting "inner peace" and the mutual truce during the World War. The mutual truce appeared more realistic to the authors since they mentioned how successful the call for unification had been. The frustration is evident, as coordinating the liberation struggle with the unity of Ukrainians is perceived as a condition for success:

> Apparently, our nation has not yet reached the stage of development when all its sons, putting the social above the personal, unite all their efforts in one striving, in

> one rank. We do not want to give examples of this today, on holidays. There are many of them, they are bitter and painful, harmful to the cause and before everyone's eyes. Also, we will not update the call for unification today. If we excluded this issue, then for other reasons. Since today we cannot achieve national unity, the absence of which is so harmful to our cause in the eyes of foreigners (we cannot since we have not yet matured) then it is completely in our power, in the strengths of each group, each trend that externally manifests itself, refrain from renouncing their line—good or bad—from mutual struggle, endless bickering, abuse and rejection of any dissent. During the Great World War, when the fate of Ukraine is being weighed on the scales, we will move, at least, to a mutual truce. (*Trident*, *40-41*(690-91), 1939, December 15, pp. 2-3)

Fourth, in a 1940 article titled "Come To Your Senses, And Be People," the authors implored Ukrainian emigrants to read and re-read their news releases in order to become moved and remain involved in the overall struggle for independence. The authors tried to attract the attention of fellow Ukrainians "lulled by everyday life" by depicting the coming of a decisive battle and the danger of not forging their destiny soon enough, which would keep them in slavery for decades:

> Read, gentlemen, Ukrainian emigrants (we know, you do not really like reading your press, you prefer local media or even that of Moscow), read, as an exception, at least that article in the same issue of our magazine "The Earth Moans" ...You will find a terrible testimony: there are more elderly people per eight million inhabitants of Galicia and Volhynia than in greater Ukraine with its thirty-two million population. Our people are tortured and exiled; Ukraine is being destroyed

> […] Come to your senses and be people…Listen to the voice of the earth…Save us, save Ukraine. We are perishing…[these are t]errible words from which it is impossible not to shudder. (*Trident 1-2*(692-93), 1940, February 15, p. 2)

The authors claimed that they knew that few Ukrainians, who were scattered around the world, fully understood the significance of the present historical moment and, therefore, dared to burden the national work despite various difficulties. However, they also admitted that there are too many "home-grown politicians" who did not understand the severity of the national problem and only "criticize" by yawning:

> Needless to say, criticism is also a necessary thing, but there is criticism and criticism. There is sincere, necessary criticism, and there is also criticism that is unhealthy, slanderous, superficial. Healthy criticism revives the case, corrects the action of those who conduct it, gives them energy; painful, frivolous criticism only confuses life, brings dirt into the purest business. (…) Only that nation achieves its national ideal, which is able not only to criticize but also to respect those who are at the head of the cause. It is not easy to respect your government when it is ruling in its capital, as the most liberal government can always call to order who follows. In a foreign land, the authority of the government is based on moral foundations. Under such circumstances, citizenship should show the highest moral qualities, be highly patriotic. (*Trident, 1-2*(692-93), 1940, February 15, p. 3)

In this excerpt, we notice the frustration towards "unhealthy criticism" and about

not being properly recognized as the legitimate government by fellow Ukrainians. Since the Ukrainian government did not enjoy legal rights and the legitimization of the ruling power, it called for moral qualities and asserted that in a foreign land, government is based on moral foundations.

Solidarity with an oppressed nation is an important narrative that people who were exiled more or less employed. In the Azerbaijani sample, we saw how they discussed the events around the Republic of Rif. In an interesting 1936 article, Ukrainian authors discussed the case of Ethiopia and emphasized the concern of the world and its reaction to the occupation of Ethiopia. Understandably, fears for the future of Ukraine were visible. If the world accepted the occupation of Ethiopia, what would it do with the Ukraine? They explain:

> How will we turn victory into the true and permanent domination of the occupied territory and what will we do with the League of Nations, whose authority has been greatly compromised and whose very foundations have been greatly shaken? How will we reconcile this precedent with the established norms of international law because, until now, the fact of an armed seizure by force has not yet decided state authority over the land? What will be the legal status of Ethiopia? How will peace be established, since the point lies not only with the conquest of Ethiopia, but with other interested countries (primarily England and France)? How will new

relations develop in Africa and how will all this affect Europe?[196]

In this case, the Ukrainians were concerned about the weakening of the League of Nations and the growing number of occupied territories. They thus decided to work intensively to "confront the whole world with the final fact—the existence of an independent Ukrainian state."[197]

**Narrative III: The Victorious Nation**

Articles dating from the years 1925 to 1934 and 1938 to 1940 all contain strong politics of hope and an unshakable faith in an eventual victory. First of all, in 1927, the body of Ukrainian émigrés attests to its own success and achievement by listing the cultural acquisitions they had received and the close relations they had established with Western populations in order to familiarize Europe with the Ukrainian cause (*Trident*, *3*(61), 1927, January 16).

Second, many articles conveyed an optimistic and adversary outlook that was intended to bring hope of an eventual victory to the audience. This involved the use of words and phrases, such as "a victorious end" an references to the bright future of Ukraine, the inevitability of the implementation of the idea of a free and independent

[196] *Trident, 19* (523), 1936, May 10, p. 1.

[197] Ibid.

Ukraine, the temporary nature of their stay in foreign lands, the faith and hope that this year would be happier, that "today we no longer just believe in our victory, we definitely know that...the restoration of the independent statehood of our homeland will come true", and the belief that the time for a new liberation struggle is coming closer and closer, that Ukraine will be resurrected, that Ukraine as an independent state will become a reality both in the life of our people and in front of the whole world. These examples provide just a glimpse into the victorious language adopted by journals. Even in the face of World War II and unfavorable conditions, the authors maintained a hopeful demeanor and claimed that the redrawing of the map of Europe could be an opportunity for Ukraine and its place to emerge more fully (*Trident, 40-41*(690-91), 1939, December 31).

Third, despite the constant sadness that was evident in the remembering of various events, the authors avoided falling prey to despair and strongly spoke against it. In this sense, they were similar to Georgian émigrés who also avoided despair at all costs. Desperation is mentioned as an infection that comes with Easter and tries to "tear apart the Ukrainian heart and soul."[198] Sadness is acknowledged as a feeling that appears especially painfully during the holidays among exiles who long for their native land. Holidays contrast with the "gray everyday conditions" their émigré life and brings both pain and hope:

We feel more bitterly the pain from the wound that is bleeding on the tortured

[198] № 10 З Інформаційного листка Комітету допомоги збігцям з Західноукраїнських земель в Німеччині про події в Україні [From the Information Leaflet of the Committee for Aid to Refugees from Western Ukrainian Lands in Germany about Events in Ukraine]. Квітень 1933 р. [April 1933]. ЦДАВО України, ф. 3567, оп. 11, спр. 9, арк. 6-6 зв. [TsDAVO Ukraine, fond 3567, Inventory 11, File 9, Sheets 6-6 rev.] In "We Ring the Great Bell...", (2008, p. 31).

> pastures of our people, we penetrate deeper into its grief, its unbearable sufferings. On this evening, wherever we are, memories of our youth involuntarily creep into our thoughts, a sad mood covers our souls... (*Trident, 1*(407), 1934, January 7, p. 2)

This is why, Ukrainian émigrés emphasized the importance of keeping their spirits up and to not "fall into hopeless sadness, not to fill our hearts with hopelessness, but on the contrary":

> And even though a year later we were forced to leave our native land and go to a foreign land, even though we were overcome physically, our enemies did not succeed in suppressing the impulses of our spirit, although we have already been in emigration for nine years in difficult disastrous conditions, even though we live in a scattering far from our native land, our spirit, fighting, stormy, full of memories of our (albeit bitter, terrible, painful, yet wonderful) past—that that our spirit did not die. On the contrary and in the face of memories that have already turned ten years old, it becomes stronger and stronger. And today, entering the new year 1929, we see that our victory has incomparably more chances than ten years ago. (*Trident, 1-2*(157-58), 1929, January 1, p. 3)

Feeling more united and organized than ten years prior, the authors claimed that the enemy feared their strong spirit, and what appeared like a loss through exile would transform into an eventual victory that they did not just believe in but definitively knew would happen.

Fourth, the authors identified the current exile and captured the "motherland" as temporary and delayed. They remained confident that the threads of events that had been interrupted by time would resume soon. The idea of the Ukrainians independence was seen as something that would inevitably unfold, be imposed on everyone, and thus could not be prevented. For instance, in an article from 1926, the authors stated that Ukraine could already be today what it would inevitably be tomorrow. The only reasoned for this delay was the violence of the historical enemy and the unfavorable, international scene to their plight. However, they made sure to emphasize that the competitiveness of the Ukrainian people in the world would only be delayed and not killed:

> However, this competitiveness is only delayed - just not killed. Its living source has spread through the arteries of the national organism and carries out its living and life-giving function, gaining in this process new forces in search of new ways for the nation to achieve its state goal. Time will pass, the preparatory work will pass, and the goal will be achieved. (*Trident*, 1, 1925, October 15, p. 2)

Fifth, the trajectory of Ukrainian independence was compared to a child, who goes through painful stages to develop in life. Nevertheless, experienced trauma is seen as something that forged the Ukrainian nation and made it ultimately stronger. This discourse is similar to the one found in other articles, where authors spoke about the role of spilled blood in the creation of the Ukrainian nation:

> Maybe the first year of life was painful, maybe childhood turns into a constant threat to its existence from neighboring countries, but it lives, develops, and will live for the happiness of its people. Our young state was baptized by fire and

> sword, with our and foreign blood, and this baptism tempered its soul. All the evils that fell on its shoulders right after Ukraine was born in the twentieth century only deepen its consciousness, crystalized its spirit, and strengthen its will. We believe strongly, that our state will rise to its feet and will continue to maintain its normal records in the registrar book of mankind. (*Trident, 4*(262), 1931, January 25, p. 2)

And finally, taking into consideration the ongoing struggles between Ukrainian émigrés, the authors still called for passive émigrés to take action and join the fight for independence. The condition of achieving this unshakable goal, after all, rested on the activism of Ukrainian émigrés, who stayed away from the battle:

> Many things have been done on this road, but the goal is still far away. We are moving toward the goal unshakably, but we will reach it only when each of us stays with the consciousness of his duty to the homeland, will do everything that depends on him, above all will put the common cause, when we will unite all our efforts in the fight for liberation, when will and thought are one. On this day, may everyone ask itself: have I done everything that I had to do in the name of Ukraine's independence? (*Trident, 1-2*(209-210), 1930, January 1, p. 2)

It is important to note that even though hope stood by itself and derived from the idea of achieving the Ukrainian independence, the authors still identified who was the

source of support for them and to whom they directed their hope. Just like the Georgians and unlike the Azerbaijani journal, the Ukrainian émigrés viewed Europe as a source of hope and support. They mentioned how many possible plans and opportunities had arisen in European political negotiations and life and they saw the role of Ukraine in helping Europe diminish the Bolshevik threat:

> There is a possibility to put an end to this constant threat to order and peaceful life in Europe. It is also clear that in all of these noticeable keen interest in Ukraine, its current role, and its significance in the future. (*Trident, 18*(124), 1928, May 13)

In 1940, amid World War II, the authors associated themselves and their freedom with Europe by strengthening the belief that "the truth will prevail, we believe that Europe—and with it, Ukraine—will become free. There is nothing worse than falling under the yoke of an unmerciful enemy; we Ukrainians know this well" (*Trident, 13-14*(704-705), 1940, May 15, p. 3).

**Narrative IV: Politics of Differentiation**

As for the narrative of differentiation, very few excerpts that spoke of this theme (which was found in two articles). In this sense, the Ukrainian sample differs from the Azerbaijani or Georgian ones. In the Georgian sample, the politics of differentiation started to emerge in the early 1930s when the Georgians addressed the absolute need to distinguish Georgian refugees from actual Russians. However, these documents were

identified in the Georgian émigré diplomatic archive and not the émigré journals. In the rest of the historical documents collected on the Ukrainian emigration (apart from the journals), I was still not able to pinpoint this narrative[199]. As with the Azerbaijani sample, I was able to identify this narrative both in émigré journals and diplomatic archives.

In a 1940 article, the authors expressed their identity by joining Europe in World War II. Despite this alliance, they still shared grievances about being unable to have a proper Ukrainian legion, bearing a Ukrainian name and flag:

> There should be no neutral, as we wrote last time. Now events have proven our opinion. With a closed heart, we are following the world's largest battle, which takes place in Holland, Belgium, and France. Millions of people have been thrown into a terrible battle, a decisive battle. Which will win: the right of people to live freely or the rule of one people, one race over all? […] We know that at this moment a lot of Ukrainians are in the French army, they are also shedding blood for the greatest values, without which human life loses all its meaning: for the freedom of peoples, for the freedom of people. But we, Ukrainians, have not yet occupied our millions, we do not have our troops. There is no yellow-blue flag among others. At this hour, when only weapons can decide the fate of nations, we feel this especially painful. (*Trident*, *13-14*(704-705), 1940, May 15, p. 2)

Furthermore, in a 1926 article, they differentiated themselves from

[199] Unlike in my sample, Satzewich (2002) identified how the nationalizing elites of the North American Ukrainian diaspora created the Ukrainian identity as different from the Russians and other ethnic groups.

Czechoslovakians and Hungarians. The authors remained confident that forty million Ukrainian people could not be wiped from the face of Europe through any experiment trying to assimilate them into different national identities. According to them, Ukrainians could not be turned into Czechoslovakians or Hungarians just as the Polish could not be made into "Muscovites" (*Trident 52*, 1926, November 7, p. 1).

The absence of this narrative from the Ukrainian sample is unexpected because the Ukrainian People's Republic showed some efforts to differentiate themselves from Russians and label Russians as the "others." For instance, the education minister of UPR, Ivan Ohiienko, published and widely distributed a survey in 1918 Ukraine that asked questions related to the self-determination of the country (Yekelchyk 2023). In this book, titled *Ukrainian Culture*, Ohiienko answers these questions by affirming not only the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian culture but also its superiority compared to Russian culture before the nineteenth century:

> Not only does Ohiienko challenge the Russian imperial cultural narratives by claiming higher status for Ukrainian culture, he also presents Ukraine as a part of Europe in an implicit opposition to Russia. (Yekelchyk 2023, p.155)

Presenting Ukraine as part of Europe while denying Russia's place in the civilized world is a similar politics of differentiation that Georgian émigrés pursued. Nevertheless, I was unable to find this narrative in my Ukrainian sample. Perhaps the reason for this was the controversial reception of the book due to the irritation of older generation Ukrainians who did not share the politics of an open break with Russia.

**Religious Narratives**

Interestingly, the Ukrainian journals conveyed a relatively distinct religious narrative from other émigré groups. Although other groups did mention the name of God occasionally, the Ukrainians were focusing instead on drawing analogies between Christian bible stories and the country of Ukraine. For instance, exile and martyrdom were often perceived as a cross to bear by both Ukraine and Christ. In an article published in 1928, the authors explicitly drew analogies between Herod and the Red Army, the exile of the Mother and Son (Christ) in Egypt, and the Ukrainian exile:

> The baby in the den, the shepherds and the wise men, bloody Herod and mothers crying over the bodies of the beaten children, and finally the flight to Egypt—the Purest Mother and the Child in exile: "Herod sends out his servants, seeks to kill Christ" ... Such distant and such close images. Those torments and feats of the Blessed Virgin and the tragedy of the Most Holy Mother, which today have become our tragedy, our torment, our feat. Does not Red Herod reign supreme in the enslaved Ukraine today? Isn't our whole long-suffering region flooded with pure blood, not only of the beaten babies but also of tens and hundreds of thousands of those tortured and shot by the red executioners? Isn't that path to exile in Egypt—is this not our path, the thorny path of emigration? Isn't the star that shone over the cave in Bethlehem our star, showing us the way to the land of truth, light, and good? And she will lead us through the torments of exile, through the liberation struggle, through victory to a free and independent Ukraine. (*Trident*, *1-2*(107-108), 1928, January 1, p. 3)

Other articles draw similarities between the crucifixion of Christ and the suffering the Ukraine had endured. A 1930 article, for instances, describes a modern version of Judas, torture, and hatred:

> Ukraine is also experiencing days of the Passion of the Christ. Isn't Kharkiv today, as it once was in Jerusalem, not spat upon, not covered with the bitter shame, not shown defiantly to the public all that we have the holiest, the purest? Aren't these the Passion of the Christ days of the best people of Ukraine, in which the nation is accustomed to seeing its mind, its heart, all the best it has, to which it treats with the deepest respect and the greatest trust? Isn't this the Passion of the Ukraine itself? Didn't a cheesy crowd of farm laborers and slaves, full of hatred and anger, greedy for blood, trained, incited and by modern communist scribes, bitter enemies of all truth, all freedom, exclaim in blinding, as then: "Crucify him! Crucify him! Among the twelve was Judas, who betrayed the truth to death. Isn't our new Judas found here today too? Didn't one of the apostles closest to him, who was as hard as a stone, deny Christ at the last minute three times in the face of death? And don't we see new Peters today? And at this hour, when these lines are being written, there may already be heard, as before, the verdict of the unrighteous court: "Guilty and sentenced to death." Can't you hear, from Kharkiv right up to here, the animal cry of the blinded and furious street: his blood is upon us and our children. Yes, upon you and your children. (*Trident, 16-17*(224-25), 1930, April 20, pp. 2-3)

Interestingly, the path that Christ took is not only perceived as similar to the one followed by Ukraine as a country, but also to the identity of the Word (God). Christ is somehow conveyed as an ally to the Ukrainian language and country. A transition from serving the Word as a nation to embodying the Word itself can be found in this excerpt:

> Centuries have passed and the Word triumphed in the world, smashed all opposite forces, and destroyed the Roman empire. In our history, the Word also played an important role. It saved us in the darkest times of our nation's life and protected us from final destruction for the Ukrainian nation, for the Word died our ancestors and in the future Word will protect us. And even though today it has not been yet recognized by everyone, it lives, expands, and wins. It destroys forces, which chain downs our land, destroys this "third" Roman empire, former Empire of the Russian Tsars, descendants of which continue to rule the Ukrainian world. (*Trident*, *2-3*(360-61), 1933, January 6, p. 1)

The ritualistic remembrance of the Passion of Christ in the Christian calendar is closely aligned to the ritualistic remembrance of Ukrainian sufferings:

> And every year, remembering devoutly in the dramatic church services the great tragedy of God and Man, the whole Christian world with a broken heart again experiences it, is concerned with bitter pity, heavy sorrow, suffers to on the verge of inhuman grief and endless despair to deal with / light up from the bright news

> of the resurrection, in which the commandment of new life.
>
> And with special strength, sharpness we feel the eternal drama of humanity this year. Today, even closer, even more, expressive before the sad eyes rise suffering and endlessly sweet figure of our homeland, enslaved, tortured, crucified. (*Trident*, *16-7*(224-25), 1930, April 20, p. 2)

Despite these analogies with suffering, both religious events are eventually seen as classic exemplars for hope, victory, and the resurrection of independence. In terms of emotions, for instance, the authors claim that Christmas brings both sadness and hope to Ukrainian souls:

> Christmas carols sounded triumphantly and joyfully throughout Ukraine in the days of the glory and greatness of our state in the living memory of our great dukes and glorious hetmans. They filled the hearts of our ancestors with sadness during the difficult times of the Tatar hard times and the Great Ruins. And today—over a new great ruin—they sound everywhere in our enslaved homeland and foreign land, cutting the heart with bitter sadness and at the same time filling it with hope.
>
> Hope and belief that the time is not far away when, at Christmas, addressing the master of joy with greetings, our youth with the ancient, pre-ancient words of carols greeting the free people—the real Lord Master of the Ukrainian land: Good evening to you, Master! Rejoice, earth, rejoice, the Son of God is born! (*Trident*, *1-2*(107-108), 1928, January 1, p. 3)

Another 1934 article describes how instead of bringing happiness, as it does in other, more fortunate countries, Christmas reactivates sadness and pain for Ukrainian exiles:

> Christmas everywhere in the Christian world is the biggest holiday, illuminated by some kind of inner light, a holiday fanned by the warmth of feelings, primarily for children, a holiday for families. And this holiday, even among the happiest of us nations that live a normal life, gives the cheerful mood of festivity a certain intimacy, covers it with a light haze of sadness.
>
> These feelings appear even more clearly in Ukrainian emigrants, deprived of their homeland, scattered in a foreign land. The longing for a distant native land resonates louder on the holiday, we feel more bitterly the pain from the wound that is bleeding on the tortured pastures of our people, we penetrate deeper into its grief, its unbearable sufferings. On this evening, wherever we are, memories of our youth involuntarily creep into our thoughts, a sad mood covers our souls, our whole being in the midst of the cold and fog of a foreign land is warmed by the warm atmosphere of Ukrainian Christmas, shrouded in touching customs of the hoary antiquity. It is on Christmas that, scattered around the world, deprived of their homeland, more acutely than we ever feel in a foreign land this great family to which we belong—the Ukrainian nation, its unity, and indissolubility. (*Trident*, *1*(407), 1934, January 7, pp. 2-3)

As for the analogies to Easter, here too, we see hope and the resurrection of Ukraine as an inevitable outcome as the power of malice and evil is questioned:

> That all the malice, all the rage of hell were powerless to do something against the eternal truth. Spat upon, tortured, crucified, killed, and then resurrected. Does evil have more strength today, while it still rages? Is it not in the fierce and irreconcilable struggle between truth and falsehood that began from the ages, the truth will not triumph over falsehood? In this firm belief in our just cause, in the imminent victory of truth, we address this Easter with long-term greetings to all our fellow countrymen in Ukraine and not living in Ukraine. And first of all, we send these greetings, full of honor and devotion to those who there today courageously bear the cross of the liberation of their native land, who accept the Passion of the Christ for it, who steadfastly and boldly walk the thorny road to the Calvary of Ukraine. We put all our love, all our firm faith in the Old Testament words with which we address them: "Christ is risen." (*Trident, 16-17*(224-25), 1930, April 20, pp. 3-4)

In 1939, ten years into exile, Christmas still symbolized hope for Ukrainians:

> Christmas again ... again in a foreign land ... for the umpteenth time, or finally for the last? Every year, whenever we sit down for a holy supper (for a Christmas dinner), when we remember in a quiet word our loved ones, dead and alive, here and there, thoughts are involuntarily transferred to our distant homeland. And at

> the same time, congratulating each other on the holiday, we express our mutual best wishes that we can express in a foreign land - to celebrate the next Christmas at home. Each time, the hope of returning to the free native land awakens in the heart. It responds with special force, piercing our entire being, precisely this year. And oddly enough, but actually this fact that on these holidays in the heavenly song of angels and shepherds, which sounded from Bethlehem, still rings to the whole Christian world, dominates it defeating, the hellish roar of cannons and the roar of airplanes, in reality, this fact strengthens our hope. (*Trident, 40-41*(690-91), 1939, December 31, p.2)

According to the authors, Christmas and Easter holidays most painfully reminded Ukrainians of their home:

> And today, everywhere—both in villages and in cities in snow-covered native Ukraine, and among the stones and sands of the desert warmed by the sun on the border of Algeria—wherever there is a living Ukrainian soul, eyes are sadly looking out for the evening star. And it will remind each of us, whether we are sitting among our people at the holy supper or among strangers alone, meeting a holiday without *kutya* and booze, it will remind each of a distant home, envelop it with cravings, because it cannot be forgotten. It is impossible to convey in words the fifth of the ancients and the sweet customs of our Christmas. And by themselves, with frost on the back as happens every time these eternal melodies begin to play on the strings of the soul, carols will sound in the ears (whether in

> reality, or just in the imagination)—carols. (*Trident*, *1-2*(107-108), 1928, January 1, p. 3)

Being home around Christmas is once again referenced in a 1933 article. The authors claimed that despite having strong and negative feelings about celebrating Christmas at home, they cannot express them since the situation in Ukraine is like "hell." The excerpt conveys the understanding that exiled Ukrainians have lost their native huts. In other words, the home that they once knew and want to go back to no longer exists. The situation is aggravated with the famine in Ukraine:

> It is sad for us to celebrate abroad. Our thoughts will fly to our motherland, we will warm ourselves with memories of it, we want to be home in our village, in our native hut. But now in Ukraine, there are no more of our old villages, only *Kolkhozes*. Your native hut is not yours anymore. There, today, no one has Christmas supper because famine reigns everywhere there (which we never had in the past). And starving people are dying. Those who are in the *Kolkhozes* will get some sort of dirty broth. The rest will be happy to get even just one potato or a mixture of sugar beets or corn. And altogether, them there and us here on foreign land will remember how we used to celebrate Christmas eve in the past. Many of us will have thoughts of this evening flying to Ukraine, and many of us would want to visit home. But what hell, what terrible living conditions must have been created by the strangers who today own our land if our people would give up everything and run from that Ukraine to which our hearts are so eager to go.

(*Trident*, *2-3*(360-61), 1933, January 6, p. 3)

**Nationalism**

When working on the Ukrainian sample, I realized how many texts were dedicated to specifically discussing Ukrainian nationalism. This study acknowledges and explores nationalism in exile. But because of its salience, I found it necessary to add the theme of nationalism in the context of the Ukrainian sample. Before I present my final findings associated with Ukrainian nationalism, a brief historical note must be discussed first.

As Serhii Plokhy (2017) identified, in 1868 Ukrainophiles had already created a society for the Enlightenment to spread Ruthenian nationalism among all classes. In 1873, an important society named after Taras Shevchenko was founded to promote Ukrainian language and culture. Like other nations, the Ukrainians had a national myth concerning their origins that they referred to, namely, *The history of the Rus*. Plokhy's research unveils the processes at play behind this myth, which alludes to some sort of invention of traditions. As Plokhy (2012) suggests, the mysterious manuscript was created as a response from Ukrainian elites who were trying to better assimilate into the Russian empire. The manuscript was "the product of an era of forgeries in which entrepreneurial intellectuals were busy producing birth certificates for their nations—the older, the better" (p. 5). But unlike the Scots and Czechs, the Ukrainians do not know the names of the authors of these forgeries.

This was an attempt by Cossack officers and elites to secure better conditions in

the Russian empire. Nevertheless, the modern Ukrainian nation used the myth of *The history of the Rus* in their legitimization process in 1917. With their new independence, the Ukrainian government adopted a special mission to produce school textbooks abroad. For instance, production of pedagogical books was already on its way in 1918 in Vienna, where the choices of books revealed rapprochement with European culture. The book series included the publication of a Ukrainian library as well as a "world library" that contained translated works from Western European authors. Of the twenty train wagons of books, only or seven train wagons arrived in the Ukraine to reach their intended audience (Narizhnyi 1999). By 1921, the vibrant Ukrainian publishing houses in Vienna were in decline as they could no longer expect to sell books in occupied Ukraine. Their publishing activities were thus transferred first to Berlin, then to Prague, and adapted to the needs of the new environment.

In my data, three general trends regarding nationalism were visible. First, there was a trend of explaining the birth of Ukrainian nationalism through "blood" and "cultural nationalism." Second, there was concern about future generations in exile and Ukrainian schools. Third, there was discussion of a suppressed national memory.

The authors claimed that spilled blood and related trauma only fed Ukrainian nationalism and brought it to fruition. They stated that the path of liberation of every nation is filled with blood, both our own and foreign. It is this native blood that is identified as an important agent to finalize the processes of national awareness and emotions:

Blood spilled for this high purpose is not drying out, its warmth will stay warm in

> the soul of the nation and will play the role of restless disturbing enzymes which is reminding about the unfinished and calls for the continuation of the started work. It is with these feelings that I always celebrate our day of independence. (*Trident*, *15*, 1926, January 22, p. 2)

The authors seemed to understand the process of nationalism, the awakening of national consciousness, and described the transition of Ukraine from an ethnocultural framework of a nation into a fatherland-type of an independent nation. Here, we see how the authors understood the transition of the country, and were moving from a "mother Ukraine" to a fatherland: "This idea from the narrow framework of the prerevolutionary era, outlined by ethnography and culturalism, has grown into a powerful problem of world significance" (*Trident, 1-2*(601-2), 1938, January 2, p. 3). If in the past, the national movement was christened as some version of "terrorism" by Ukraine's enemies, for them "Petliuralism,"[200] or the national movement is not an anarchist but a constructive path to national freedom (*Trident, 21-22*(571-72), 1937, May 30). This concept of an independent Ukraine is claimed to be so strong that it unifies all exiled and non-exiled Ukrainians as a single community.

Interestingly, the authors explicitly discussed a suppressed national memory safeguarded only by a few Ukrainians. They recounted how, despite the loss of the Ukrainian independence, their political discourse was never interrupted, and certain prominent Ukrainians carried these national ideas of the restoration of a free Ukrainian

[200] Simon Petliura was a historical figure and leader of the Ukrainian national movement.

state, a fatherland:

> It was a gigantic job for them, sometimes black and ungrateful, sometimes even without proper understanding on the part of the Ukrainian people themselves, at a time when suppressed by enemies and deprived of national memory, he was sleeping deeply, from which he needed so long and with such sacrifices to wake up. But their work was for the good and welfare of the Fatherland, for the happiness of the Ukrainian people, and when the right time came with the development of national self-consciousness, this work bore the fruits that the sowers of the ideas of state independence of Ukraine expected from it and which in the darkest times of their history the Ukrainian people subconsciously yearned for it. (*Trident, 3-4*(457-58), 1935, January 22, p. 1)

As we can see, Ukrainian nationalism was revived by the few who safeguarded this suppressed memory and with their efforts sowed the foundation of a newly awaken fatherland and found self-consciousness at the right time. Understanding its historical task, the "multimillion-dollar giant" woke up and declared its independence on January 22, 1918.

Once emigrated, the authors wrote quite frequently about the danger of losing a sense of nationalism among the younger generations. They argued that children who did not study in Ukrainian would certainly denationalize. Living among foreigners challenged the agenda of preserving national holidays and traditions more intensely.

Preserving old customs and having a reason to unify in a single Ukrainian family was seen as a solution against scattering and to liberate the country from foreign domination (*Trident, 2-3*(360-61), 1933, January 6).

Unlike Azerbaijani or Georgian émigrés, Ukrainians were quite organized when opening schools and colleges as emigrants. In an article dated to 1932, four schools were listed in France: in Paris, Chalet, Knutange, and Auden-le-Trichet. While communicating news of a new Ukrainian school in Knutange, they mentioned the abnormal conditions that Ukrainian children found themselves in. On the one hand, they did not deny to good things that came from foreign schools, but they also fear that the most important things were not offered: "They cannot give them the most necessary thing for Ukrainian children, future citizens so that they can be true sons of their fatherland. Give knowledge on native country, its language, past and present" (*Trident,* 25(83), 1927, June 12, p. 2). Claiming that there should not be a single child in a Ukrainian emigrant family, who does not know its language, history, or literature, they considered existing schools as insufficient to teach a proper sense of nationalism:

> Where can they get the knowledge about their native land, the knowledge that is very necessary for every cultured person, regarding his national "I"? From school? But only a small part of our children was lucky to receive education in their native language in those two gymnasiums that exist in exile—in the village of Ukrainskaya near Kalisz and Rzhevice near Prague. Due to the small number of emigrant schoolchildren who attend the few Ukrainian schools in Volhynia or Galicia, the rest of our children are educated in foreign schools, in a foreign

> language, in a foreign environment. If, on the one hand, this has some advantages, giving children a command of a foreign language and acquaintance with European culture, then, on the other hand, there are many disadvantages in this: foreign influence, which threatens the denationalization of emigrant youth, torn from their native soil with an unstable psyche and still undeveloped worldview. (*Trident, 17*(325), 1932, April 24, p. 2)

This level of concern about the future nationalization of their youth is quite different from other émigré samples where this concern is not as heavily articulated. The authors not only discuss the institutional nationalization of Ukrainian children, but they also give explicit advice to families about how to organize children's free time during the summer to fill the missing gaps of their knowledge about Ukraine: "Systematic reading, self-education, organizing summer courses, colonies can come in handy here […] It's not just the parents themselves who are worried about this. Both Ukrainian teachers and all our citizens should help them" (*Trident, 17*(325), 1932, April 24, p. 2).

Apart from children, the Ukrainian émigrés also considered the fate of graduate students. This issue was treated as an "urgent" case and presented to the public as something toward which the Ukrainian émigrés should carry a moral duty to the nation. For instance, in an article dated to 1928, the authors discuss the dissertation works of Ukrainian students who graduated from the Poděbrady University. These works, which are mostly written in the field of engineering, are considered highly valuable and more than merely student works since they managed to internationalize the Ukrainian context. The authors worried that these valuable works would sit in archives instead of being

considered cultural acquisitions or being used to develop the future of a nation. In conclusion, Ukrainians were institutionally preparing future generations for repatriation, for which they need to keep nationalism alive.

### Remembrance

An additional theme that I considered alongside the existing themes is memory and remembrance. Similar to the theme of nationalism, here too, I encountered direct calls and appeals for memory, commemoration, and remembrance. Interestingly, in my sample, this theme became prominent in the 1930s. Excerpts are identified from articles published in 1929, 1934, and 1935.

It seems that Ukrainians were eager to commemorate the national heroes of important events. Their activism led to the establishment of a Museum of the Liberation Struggle of Ukraine (1925) and a library for Simon Petliura (1926).[201] This institutionalization of Ukrainian memory is quite impressive despite unfavorable circumstances. Donations, which became a custom, from the émigré community helped to establish them. When discussing the museum, the authors emphasized its national importance and celebrated its tenth anniversary in Prague. Claiming that the museum, as a national institution, was important for the entire Ukrainian people, they hoped that it could become a cultural weapon in the context of the Ukrainian independence:

The Museum of the Liberation Struggle of Ukraine, having a purely cultural

[201] See Joukovsky, A. (1990). The Symon Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 14*(1/2), 218–235

> character, is at the same time a powerful weapon in the hands of the Ukrainian people in the ongoing struggle for their independence. As a matter of the Ukrainian emigration, it also has nationwide significance. And that is why we are so confident that the Ukrainians, by joint efforts, will soon complete the work they have begun. (*Trident, 28-9*(482-83), 1935, June 14, p. 2)

Celebrating the day of the Ukrainian independence was important to the émigrés. The authors believed it was critical to keep the memory of Simon Petliura alive, the leader of the nation in both life and death. Considering him an embodiment of the ideas of Ukrainian statehood and independence, they were concerned about forgetting and losing this particular memory. Since his contemporaries also followed him in death, they feared that all painful experiences would necessarily disappear over time. This is why they felt it was their duty and obligation to keep the memory of Petliura, "the leader, statesman, warrior, political activist, writer and a human being", alive for future generations (*Trident, 22*(178), 1929, May 25).

The importance to transmit national memories to future generations is reiterated in an article from 1934, when discussing the importance of Christmas for the Ukrainian nation. In this sense, the exiles strive to transmit their memories in a way that Marianne Hirsch describes as "postmemory" when the "generation after" carry the cultural trauma of their ancestors:

> We who grew up at home, marked by our native element and brought along with our childhood memories those treasures of the great grandfather's traditions, must

> first of all take care to pass them on to our children as unshakable. They are deprived of those memories and do not know the warmth of our home. They grow up in a foreign land, study in a foreign school and in a foreign language. They live in a foreign environment. We must take care to tighten the knots that unite them with Ukraine, its past, and its present. We must take care to save them for our native land. This is the most wonderful gift that expatriate parents can give their children on this family holiday. (*Trident*, 1(407), 1934, January 7, p. 2)

It seems especially important to transmit the traditions of how Christmas was celebrated at home because the authors consider that this deprivation is like destroying "the treasures that were left to us in inheritance from our ancestors" (*Trident*, *1*(407), 1934, January 7, p. 2). Uprooting their traditions, customs, and daily rituals is perceived as a vicious attack on the very foundation of their society and homeland. Therefore, fighting back with postmemory and transmitting the deprived customs is one of the ways in which the Ukrainian émigrés fought to preserve their national identity.

## Chapter four: The Azerbaijani Émigré Community

Like any other émigré population, Azerbaijanis, too, emigrated in different waves. Some scholars (Vazeh Asgarov 2012) identify four waves: 1) before the 1920s, with the diplomatic delegation under A. M. Topchibashi and the hundred students sent by the RDA for education in Europe; 2) after April 27th, 1920, the Red Army invasion in Azerbaijan; 3) before WWII, as a result of fleeing repression or being deported; and 4) during WWII, when soldiers did not want to go back to Soviet Azerbaijan. According to Asgarov (2012), Soviet repression killed 50,000 Azerbaijani people and exiled 100,000 to Siberia or Kazakhstan. Another comprehensive study of the Azerbaijani community was conducted by G. Mamoulia and R. Abutalibov (2014); in their book titled "Land of fire. The struggle for freedom and independence. The political history of Azerbaijani emigration 1920-1945", they discuss the different ways Azerbaijani political emigrants tried to fight the Soviet occupation in Azerbaijan. Over time, these emigrants remained close to their allies and stayed active in the Prométhée movement, which was organized to resist the Soviet occupation of several countries.

For this research, I focus on the first wave of emigration. According to Asgarov (2012, 309), these were elite groups, diplomats, students, and soldiers. Therefore, I sampled historical documents from two sources:

1) the journal *Yeni Kafkasya*, issued by the president of the committee of Azerbaijani independence, M. E. Rasulzade.

The journal *Yeni Kafkasya (New Caucasus)* was an émigré publication authored by exiled Azerbaijani and issued in Istanbul from 1923 to 1927. Mamoulia & Abutalibov (2014,

270) note that the creators of the Prométhée movement from Poland financed the journal, which was issued as the official journal of the Azerbaijani nation. Some Azerbaijani scholars consider this journal the first[202] Azerbaijani émigré journal and one of far-reaching importance to the resistance movement. Its Azerbaijani authors heavily influenced the Turkish anti-communist community by sharing their lived experiences and expertise of Russia and communism (Gasimov 2012). The main editor of this journal, M. E. Rasulzade, was formerly the president of the independent Azerbaijani National Council (overthrown on April 28th, 1920) and was a member of the political émigré groups that I study here. Rasulzade brought together emigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus and offered a space to discuss the evils of Bolshevism. He anonymously authored most of the first editorial articles of each issue and focused on politics, nationalism, and the critique of communism (Can 2007). The proportion of political discussion dwarfed other themes, such as literature. For this journal, one hundred thirty-nine authors were given pseudonyms, to hide their identities and to keep them secure (Can 2007). I selected this journal due to its importance and its fit in my research, even though it was not published in France but in Istanbul.

The exiles anticipated help and support from their brother country Turkey. However, support was sometimes withdrawn when Turkey tried to collaborate with the newly created Soviet Union.[203] As a result of such collaboration, the Azerbaijani journal of *Yeni Kafkasya* was first suspended in 1925 and later ordered to cease publishing in 1927. After the closure of *Yeni Kafkasya* a new journal, *Âzeri Türk*, was opened by the

[202] There was another "first" Azerbaijani émigré journal, titled *Azerbaijan*, that was briefly published in 1921.
[203] A Soviet–Turkish treaty of Neutrality and Friendship was signed in 1925.

same founding members. *Âzeri Türk* was also closed in 1929; that same year, once again, Rasulzade opened a new émigré journal, *Odlu Yurt* (*Land of Fire*), which operated until 1931. Another journal, *Bildiris* (*Message*), started to be issued in 1930. All these short-lived journals—the latter two closed down in 1931—shared similar editors and anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian rhetoric. Gasimov (2019, 191) mentions the similarity between the *Land of Fire* and *Message* journals: "Message was eager to cover a broader geography. Its rhetoric concerning Turkey and its place and pivotal role in the imagined anti-communist alliance were similar to those of Land of Fire." Finally, in 1942, a new journal, *Turk amacı* (Turkish Target), was founded. Its editor, Ahmet Caferoğlu, had lost his academic position at the University of Istanbul in 1934 for anti-Russian speech, although in 1938 he was reinstalled at the same university. During the crackdown on Azeri exiles, many journal contributors were forced to leave for Europe. Observing these episodes of journal shutdowns and assaults on academic positions, we see that on the one hand, Turkey tried to satisfy the Soviet Union's demands to purge anti-communist exiles, but on the other hand, it somewhat permitted these exiles to exist unofficially and to exert influence on the Turkish intellectual community.

2) the archive of the head of the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegation in Paris, A. M. Topchibashi.

A. M. Topchibashi was a prominent Azerbaijani politician and led the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris from 1919. His archives were published in commemoration of the centenary of the proclamation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Thanks to G. Mamoulia, I was able to access Azerbaijani émigré historical documents from the most extensive four-volume collection of the archive: *A. M. Topchibashi: the Paris archive*

*(1919–1940).*[204] I sampled and analyzed 75 historical documents from this archive to supplement textual analysis of *Yeni Kafkasya*.

In addition to historical records, I also interviewed a descendant of the Azerbaijani community whose grandfather, although an oil baron and not a politician, nevertheless ran in the circle of the political delegation. Beyond the journal and the Topchibashi archive, I searched for historical documents mentioning the Azerbaijani community. I could not find information in the samples from the *OFPRA* archives, because neither the Azerbaijani nor the Ukrainian community had a separate office there. In *OFPRA,* I read the entirety of the Georgian section (59 documents) and part of the Paul Chastand[205] fond (52 documents). In the *La Contemporaine* archive, I found a few historical records including those that mentioned the Azerbaijan and Dagestan insurrections in 1924 against the Soviet Union.[206]

Throughout the chapter, I have been using the word Turkic to refer to the set of Turkic people, culture, and identity. This differs from the word usage of the Azerbaijani

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[204] Agakishiev, I. (Ed.). (2016–2018). *A. M. Topchibashi: The Paris archive (1919–1940)* (G. Mamoulia & R. Abutalybov, Trans.) (4 vols.). Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura and Heidar Aliev Foundation. ISBN: 978-5-280-03820-2.

[205] Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides. Fonds privé: Paul Chastand 1924-1954.

[206] "In Azerbaijan, the insurrection dominates in the districts of Azakh, Nouch, Koub and Zakathal." *L'insurrection en Azerbaidjan et dans le Caucase du Nord*. Paris 10 September, 1924. La contemporaine (ex BDIC).

exiles as they use "Turkish" to refer to both the people who live in Turkey and the Turkic identity more broadly.[207]

## The Mission of the Journal

Just like any elite from newly formed nations that went through their own national-awakening process, the Azeri clearly understand the role and importance of a national newspaper. Distinguishing between nationality and nations and referencing Emile Durkheim, the authors of *Yeni Kafkasya* assert that only once a society has a newspaper in its spoken language does it start to become a nation, transforming into a fully established nation once a tradition of publishing has been achieved.[208] In his study of anti-communist writings of emigrant Muslim intellectuals, Zaur Gasimov describes how a number of newspapers in Tbilisi, Baku, Kazan, and Ufa fostered Turkic culture and nationalism in the late 19th century. Affinities with similar concerns, group identity, and ethnic identity were forged during tsardom. Among other prominent Turkish intellectuals, the Azerbaijani journalist Ali Bey Huseyinzade (1864–1941) is listed as the founder of Turkic nationalism (Gasimov 2019).

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[207] See Gasimov (2019, p.200) for the distinction between "Turkish" and "Turkic": "The is notion is primarily of a linguistic nature and defines the communities of Azerbaijanis in the Russian Caucasus and in the northern provinces of Iran, the Crimean, and Kazan Tatars as well as the Turkophone population of Central Asia. Most Turkic societies are of the Muslim faith, representing both the Sunni and the Shiite (particularly) confessions. The differentiation between "Turkish" and "Turkic" is widespread in international Turkology, corresponding to the Russian terms *tiurkskii* (Turkic) and *turetskii* (Turkish) as well as to the German notions of *turksprachig* (Turkic) and *turkisch* (Turkish)."

[208] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 9). 1926, 1 March. *Azeri Matbu'atının Şanlı Hatırası* "The Glorious Memory of Azeri Publishing", pp.1-2.

In the first year of its issuance, the journal's mission is defined as a Turkic freedom-loving movement or national independence movements that are not limited to the geographical bounds of the Caucasus but the new Caucasus, which follows events in both the East and the West.[209] A similar spirit around defying geographical limitations is articulated four years later. The authors claim they are not confined to their priority of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus; instead, they include significant issues from Eastern countries, and in the journal pages they fight for "Turkishness against Russianness, Azerbaijan against Moscow, Caucasia against Russia, nationality against communism, liberty against servitude, democratism against dictatorship and independence against the invasion!"[210] Along these lines, we understand that the audience of the journal is not limited to an elite group of diplomat Azerbaijani but rather is open to all "honorable Azerbaijanis who wish to struggle for their country and their liberty."[211]

Six principles are laid out to define the journal of *Yeni Kafkasya.*[212] First, it is a nationalist, radical, and democratic journal. Second, it is Turkist/pro-Turk and aims for "the cultural recognition, civic connection, spiritual unity and independence of Turks." Third, it advances the ideas of Azerbaijan's independence. Upon exploring the third principle in detail, we see that the authors elsewhere promote the idea of a Caucasian federation, and they applaud connecting all Russian-opposed forces, from Turkestan to

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[209] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 1). 1923, 26 September. *Ateş Çalan Promete* "Prometheus Stealing Fire", p.3.

[210] *Yeni Kafkasya, 4* (No. 1).1926, 1 October. *Dördüncü Yıl* "The Fourth Year", p.2.

[211]*Yeni Kafkasya, 5* (No. 1). 1927, 1 October *Beşinci Yılın Başlangıcında* "At the Beginning of the Fifth Year", p.2.

[212] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No.1), 1925, 3 October. *Üçüncü Yıl Başında "*At the Beginning of the Third Year", p.1.

Ukraine. However, they still claim that "Caucasia forms the heart of this front"; therefore, a strong Caucasia is seen as indispensable to rebuking any current or future Russian invasions.[213] Fourth, the journal "supports the liberation of the Caucasian nations from the Russian yoke and supports the unification of Caucasia as a confederation to resist a future Russian invasion successfully." Fifth, the radical modernization of the East is welcomed with "all sincerity". Being "Azerbaijanist, Turkist, and Caucasist", or supporting the national independence movements, are seen as elements of their larger ideas. Exploring this principle, another article mentions how the journal espouses modern democratic views and rejects relics of the feudal age:

> Our continuing opposition to communism is not just because this path [i.e., communism] is a mark of the Russian invasion. Communism earns our enmity and ire because it is an enemy of democracy and a harmful premise. Having said that, while struggling against the despotism of communism, *Yeni Kafkasya* does not try to revive the backward institutions that make up the relics of the feudal age. *Yeni Kafkasya* emphasizes national values in cultural and civilizational matters. However, it is also of the opinion that these values are only beneficial if they are coupled with ideas of modern democracy. With Turkey at its head, the East is experiencing the great revolution of moving towards contemporary

[213] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *5* (No. 1). 1927, 1 October. *Beşinci Yılın Başlangıcında* "At the Beginning of the Fifth Year", p.2.

> democracy. *Yeni Kafkasya* analyzes these events from this viewpoint and will applaud the most radical steps towards modernity, just like it has before![214]

Sixth and finally, the journal sees Bolshevism and tsarism as harmful and hostile to the Turkic world and Caucasia; thus, it struggles against Russian imperialism.

*Yeni Kafkasya* is also described as the first and only newspaper that rallied against "the red invasion and oppression in the Islamic and Turkish world".[215] Claiming to defend Azerbaijani independence, it also identifies itself as the first newspaper that "published abroad for Azerbaijan as well as Turkish lands under Russian yoke and the Caucasian countries".[216] They acknowledge being joined later by many friends on the same path.

Shirin Melikoff Sayar's grandfather was one of the readers of the émigré Azerbaijani journals. When asked about the purpose of this émigré journal, my respondent stressed its role in sustaining hope, culture, and links to the homeland:

> What can be an emigrant journal for emigrants? It's the link with the homeland. It's the link with the culture. Something that was that they were losing. So, it's for any immigration. It's the willingness to be together, gathering, or just something together, keeping the links with the homeland, and lost land. But also keeping hope, Hope, because they had no news from there, but they had if you look at

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[214] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *5* (No. 1). 1927, 1 October. *Beşinci Yılın Başlangıcında* "At the Beginning of the Fifth Year", p.3.

[215] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *4* (No. 1). 1926, 1 October. *Dördüncü Yıl "*The Fourth Year", p.1.

[216] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *5* (No. 1). 1927, 1 October. *Beşinci Yılın Başlangıcında* "At the Beginning of the Fifth Year", p.1.

> Topchibashi et cetera. It's for all of the community and others to tell the rest of the world who they were. And what was there and what was the cost to their existence. And I would say it was a proof of existence.[217]

**Narrative I: Memory of Occupation and Independence**

In the Azerbaijani journal sample, Similar to Georgians and Ukrainians, we see the usage of language associated with the occupation by the Soviet Union, indicating suffering, slavery, and more. Words and phrases like '*martyrdom', 'bloodshed', 'chains', 'demonic violence', 'savagery', 'rotting in the dark', 'dictatorship', 'ruthless oppressors', 'merciless', 'torture', 'dark and bloody cellars', 'annexed', 'red imperialism', 'deception', 'abused', 'lawless colony', 'despotism and servitude', 'brigandage', 'bloody imperium', 'Soviet Demons', 'terror machine',* and '*murders'* are used throughout the texts. This observation aligns with Adem Can's study (2007), which noted that in every article, the reader was faced the brutalities of communist Russia.

Like the Georgian émigrés, Azerbaijani exiles had to convince the world that an independent country had existed and was now occupied. The task was probably even more challenging for the Azerbaijani, since the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was only granted a *de facto* recognition by the Allied Supreme Council in 1920. In that sense, Azerbaijan and Ukraine shared the same status in France, and only the Georgian

[217] The respondent kindly gave me the interview in English. Her primary language is French. I retained her verbatim words and only minimally revised her quotes.

Democratic Republic had managed to survive long enough to be granted *de jure* recognition in 1921. Therefore, the Azerbaijani made sure to use the language of occupation and former independence. For example, they claimed that Russian Bolsheviks in Baku had made up two fake holidays to celebrate two 'red lies':

> One of these lies is that Azerbaijan workers and villagers invited Russia, and the second is the 25th anniversary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.4 years ago, supposedly, Baku workers rebelled and repelled the 'Müsavat invasion',and declared the 'real independence' of Azerbaijan. Supposedly, the Azerbaijan Communist Party, which achieved this 'independence', had been established on the same day 25 years ago.[218] [219]

The exiles argued against a distorted representation of history wherein "Russia's communist party's Baku province committee" supposedly fought for Azerbaijan's independence, enlisted Azerbaijani members, and was even named Azerbaijan's communist party until four years prior. In addition, they accused the Bolsheviks of abandoning, "barring from visits," or forgetting the people who won the independence of Azerbaijan and the achievements of September 15th, 1918 (considered as the Liberation Day of Baku).[220]

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[218] All translations from the Ottoman Turkish journal *Yeni Kafkasya* were performed by Gunay Kayarlar, a brilliant graduate student from the University of Michigan.
[219] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *1* (№19), 1924, July 1. "Fake Holidays," p.1.
[220] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 21), 1926, September 17. *15 Eylül* "15th of September", p.1.

Along with losing independence, the exiles complained about the loss of Azerbaijani political representatives in Ankara and elsewhere. With the loss of trade representatives, Azeris claimed that they lost both political and economic independence.

> Not just the right to send political and economic representatives, but even the right to give passports to their own citizens has been taken away from these 'sovereign' states who joined the Soviet Union. To the outside, there is no Azerbaijani, Georgian or Uzbek, there are only subjects of the Soviets and red Russians.[221]

Economic independence was an important point, as the petroleum of Baku had significant geopolitical power. If for Ukrainians wheat was the subject of economic exploitation without any benefit for the local population, in the case of Azerbaijan, it was oil:

> [They say that] every nation can decide on its own destiny, but they cannot decide on their national economy. This is because economics is not a national matter, this authority lies within Moscow. For this reason, in the Republic of Azerbaijan, which has a sultanate of oil, the villagers are left in darkness; they cannot even find petrol to burn in lamps.[222]

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[221] *Yeni Kafkasya 4* (No. 5/6), 1926, December 16. *Tarihi İki Hadise* "Two Historical Events", p. 3.

[222] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 12), 1924, March 15. *Ahmed Cevad Mahbus*! "Ahmed Cevad is Imprisoned!", pp.3-4.

Like Georgians, Ukrainians, and the Azeri exiles describe the occupation by vividly depicting horrific repression in local communities. The authors claim that Bolsheviks unleashed "demonic violence" on any innocent people associated with the idea of the Azerbaijani Republic who stayed loyal to national customs or religious faith and rejected Bolshevism. Although they claim that no social groups (teachers, clergy/scholars, military commanders, and workers/villagers) were spared, the authors emphasize that "intellectuals and honorable people" were especially targeted.[223] According to their report, hundreds of young Azeris were accused of being connected to the Musavat party, sent to rot in dark and damp cellars, and often left paralyzed.[224] Describing the *Cheka*[225] mentality as something that sane people cannot understand, they argue that the *Cheka* constantly invents new ways of torture and savage actions against their perceived enemies, where even women are not shown mercy:[226]

> When a 25-year-old nationalist, in his time of youth, enters prison for 5-6 months, he leaves with white hair like that of a 40-or-50-year-old man, his teeth fall off, he becomes lame, ill, and weak. Today in Baku some political prisoners have lost their sanity.[227]

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[223] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 15), 1924, April 27. *Azerbaycanın Büyük Matemi* "Azerbaijan's Great Mourning", p.2.

[224] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 12), 1924, March 15. *Aynı Usul ve Aynı Vahşet*! "The Same Method and the Same Cruelty!" pp.1-2.

[225] Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya (*Cheka*), or the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption, was a Soviet security organization created by Lenin that later transformed into the KGB.

[226] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 12), 1924, March 15. *Aynı Usul ve Aynı Vahşet*! "The Same Method and the Same Cruelty!" pp.1-2.

[227] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 21), 1924, August 1. M. M. B. *Bolşeviklerde Ceza ve Habs Usulü* "Punishment and Imprisonment Methods of Bolsheviks", p.5.

In addition to sending regular people to prisons or "uncorrectable and defective"[228] ones to deadly exile in Siberia, the authors argue that the *Cheka* forced collaboration on any woman, girl, or man they deemed weak. After being taken to a deserted area and subjected to death threats, the person became a 'volunteer' spy. Volunteer spies were obligated to report on families or localities at least twice a week. The authors claim that countless such spies ruined hundreds of innocent lives to save their own.[229] Finally, the exiles share the suspicion that there are differences in the way ethnic groups are repressed in the Soviet Union, claiming that Azeris receive more cruel treatment than Russians do:

> It is seen that the Cheka, who is sovereign over Azerbaijan, is not just ignoring provisions of law and logic that are held in high esteem by the civilized world. They don't even obey the Soviet logic and precedent that is applied inside Russia. They do not punish Russian scholars and poets in this way, but they see it worthy on Turkish poets.[230]

Another aspect of repression and occupation that the exiles consider an assault on Turkic culture was the Latinization of their alphabet. The authors voice concerns about how the education system privileged the teaching of Russian, or "the language of October

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[228] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 21), 1924, August 1. *'S. S. S. R'daki Sözler ve İşler* "Words and Actions in the 'S. S. S. R.'", p.2.
[229] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 21), 1924, August 1. M. M. B. *Bolşeviklerde Ceza ve Habs Usulü* "Punishment and Imprisonment Methods of Bolsheviks", pp.3-4.

[230] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 12), 1924, March 15. *Ahmed Cevad Mahbus*! "Ahmed Cevad is Imprisoned!", pp.3-4.

revolution", over Turkic languages: "If three Turkish schools are opened, there are ten Russian schools opened in return. The holy Russian culture is killing the weak Turkish culture."[231] Furthermore, they claim that the Latinization of the alphabet facilitates the appointment of Russians and Jews into administration, rather than Azeris: the Bolsheviks justified such placement disparities as nationalizing the administration, rather than "nationalist-izing".[232] Another perceived danger was the process of Latinization being used as a weapon to disunify the Turkic communities under the Soviet Union. For instance, a Latin alphabet was introduced in Azerbaijan, while the Russian language was instituted in Dagestan; a completely new spelling system was created in Kazan, and Crimea received a new spelling system involving Arabic letters. This linguistic diversity was perceived as attempting to compartmentalize Turkish publishing and literature, whereby divisions were implemented to weaken their solidarity and unity.[233]

A closer look at various articles reveals the use of language that indicates interchangeable understandings of the tsarist and Soviet eras. Like Ukrainian émigrés, Azeris also viewed the newly created Soviet Union as similar to the Russian empire; to them, both systems were, in essence, the same, and change was only superficial:

> The coat of arms of today's Bolshevik Russia consists of a hammer and a sickle, instead of an eagle. It is possible that many people who see this superficial change imagine Russian imperialism has also ended, and the body of Caucasia is not

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[231] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 21), 1924, August 1. *'S. S. S. R'daki Sözler ve İşler* "Words and Actions in the 'S. S. S. R.'", pp.2-3.
[232] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 21), 1924, August 1. *'S. S. S. R'daki Sözler ve İşler* "Words and Actions in the 'S. S. S. R.'", pp.2-3.
[233] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 2), 1925, October 15. Mirza Bala. *Bolşevizm ve Türkçülük* "Bolshevism and Turkism", p.4.

> being pierced anymore(….) What brings liberty to Caucasia cannot be a change in the outfit of Russian soldiers. As long as Russian soldiers are present beyond the Caucasian mountain range, even if they are called reds, they cannot play any role except the duty of a black eagle! [234]

One article from 1923 mentions how—"just like in previous Tsarist times", when governors were appointed from Petrograd—Moscow now dictated politics.[235] Another article points out how even though Azerbaijan is now supposedly an autonomous country, in reality it is "no different from a province of the old Tsarist era" and is still being abused by "Moscow imperialists" and used like "a lawless colony!"[236] Claiming that the Soviet Union is now continuing the "bloody policies of Tsarist Russia", the exiles fear that the Russian population will overtake Azerbaijan, with the calculated, Tsar Nicolas-like, Russian migration policies, designed to destroy Azeri Turkishness, religion, language, and civilization.[237] Going even further in their comparison, the authors argue that even the Tsarist institution was not as centralized as the Communist Party is, which makes all so-called "autonomous republics" yield to the Moscow center.[238] Considering

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[234] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *1* (No. 1), 1923, September 26. *Ateş Çalan Promete* "Prometheus Stealing Fire", p.2.

[235] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *1* (No. 4), 1923, November 15. Gürcü [Georgian]. *Mavera-yı Kafkasın İkinci Def'a İlhakı "*The Annexation of Transcaucasia for the Second Time", pp.3-4.

[236] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 12), 1926, April 27. *Azerbaycanın Matem Günü* "Azerbaijan's Day of Mourning", p.2.

[237] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *1* (No. 19), 1924, July 1. M. M. B. *Azerbaycana Rus Muhaciratı "*Russian Migration to Azerbaijan", p.3.

[238] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *4* (No. 5/6), 1926, December 16. *Tarihi İki Hadise* "Two Historical Events", p.2-3.

themselves as "a captive colony under the thumb of Moscow,"[239] the exiles argue that if, at first, the Soviet government had maintained the independence of the Caucasian republics in appearance, it had become prepared to annex them officially:[240]

> The principle that nations have the authority to decide on their destiny was convenient for the Bolsheviks when they were busy with internal struggles. As soon as they overpowered the counterrevolutionary forces, they started to 'gather' the former tsarist empire with great seriousness.[241]

Such comparisons between tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union were also present in the Topchibashi documents. In a letter addressed to the council of French ministers, Topchibashi claims that Moscow is applying the same old tyrannical methods to the Caucasian people (Doc. 8, June 17, 1924, Volume III).

Talk of imperialism was not limited to the Russian Empire; interestingly, the Azeri authors openly talk about colonial Europe and imperialist England. This theme emerged in comparisons of the Soviet Union to other empires, with the former judged as the worst imperialist power. Nevertheless, the fact that these authors compare the dreadful Soviet Union to Western powers acknowledges that these other imperial powers were also at fault with respect to their colonies. Indirectly, this discussion expressed solidarity with oppressed nations by positioning themselves as having the same fate. The same cannot be said about the Georgian authors, who are more careful in using such

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[239] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 2), 1925, October 15. Mirza Bala. *Bolşevizm ve Türkçülük* "Bolshevism and Turkism", p.3.

[240] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 4), 1923, November 15. Gürcü [Georgian]. *Mavera-yı Kafkasın İkinci Def'a İlhakı "*The Annexation of Transcaucasia for the Second Time", p.3.

[241] Ibid.

language about the West, at least in the materials that I have sampled and analyzed: I did not encounter such open comparisons. However, there is one caveat to Azeri discussion of imperialism: the authors never talk about Turkey, or the former Ottoman Empire, in the same negative way as they do about the Western and Russian empires. On the contrary, Turkey is presented as a victim of English imperialism: "Turkey was trampled under the boots of black imperialism. Azerbaijan is being trampled by the armies of red imperialism."[242]

Comparing the Soviet Union with other Western empires, the authors note that even though, theoretically, the Bolshevik system was supposed to be built on the maxims of freedom and liberation, in practice it is so despotic and rooted in servitude that the so-called "'autonomous' nations in the Soviet Union were exploited worse than those in European colonies".[243] Furthermore, another article asserts that even Soviet lawyers (such as a certain Makerovski) described the "autonomous" republics in essence as national *guberniyas* (provinces).[244] Juxtaposing the British Empire's eventual development with that of the Soviet Union, the authors assert that while England was able to accept democratic principles and the process of national awakening, "red imperialists" did the opposite:

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[242] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 12), 1926, April 27. *Azerbaycanın Matem Günü* "Azerbaijan's Day of Mourning", p.2.

[243] *Yeni Kafkasya, 4* (No. 18), 1927, July 18. *Rusya Çıkmazda* "Russia In a Bind", p.2.

[244] *Yeni Kafkasya, 4* (No. 5/6), 1926, December 16. *Tarihi İki Hadise* "Two Historical Events", p.4.

> It is clearly seen that imperialist England has had to deal with the unfolding of natural economic laws, with provisions of democratic principles, with the results of national solidarity and struggles. They necessarily had to obey and honor the great principle that nations should have the right to personally administer themselves. On the other hand, red imperialism, which has been rallying under the banner of bringing freedom and independence to nations, has taken a path completely opposite of this. They are working to establish the world's cruelest, most dishonest, centralist, and bloody imperium. And this is the second event. The conclusion to be made with the comparison of these who events' analysis is clear: Bolsheviks, who imprinted the case of liberating nations from world imperialists on their flags, are worse centralists and worse imperialists. Red imperialists![245]

Another example of Azeri authors not being shy in supporting communities fighting against Western powers (such as France and Spain) is the Republic of Rif in Morocco, precursor to the Algerian war. They identify with "Rifistan," who struggled against a strong enemy. Showing empathy for the bitter experiences of defeat and sorrow, the authors maintain hope that this defeat will one day turn into victory, with the Rif gaining its independence.[246]

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[245] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *4* (No. 5/6), 1926, December 16. *Tarihi İki Hadise* "Two Historical Events", p.4.

[246] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 15), 1926, June 15. *Abdü'l-Kerimin Teslimi* "The Surrender of Abdulkerim"

**Narrative II: "The Civilized"**

The first thing to identify is who Azerbaijani exiles consider 'civilized' and if they see themselves as part of this world. We quickly learn from various articles that Turkey and the Turkic people are generally considered part of the civilized world: "Continuing their glorious struggle under this flag, Azeris trust the favors of the civilized world and the affection of the Turkish world."[247] At the same time, another element is present in the civilized identity of Turkic people, namely democracy. Azeris describe the flag of the Turkic people and the flag of national democracy together. The link is evident in an excerpt in which Turkey is portrayed as the leading nation in the struggle for these two things:

> The defense of Turkey is the defense of Turkishness. To guarantee the independence of the Turkish Republic is to guarantee the independence movements of the East. To take a stand against the enemies of the new Turkey is to defend the inspiring steps of the civilization and democracy movements that belong to all Turks and Muslims against reactionism.[248]

This excerpt aligns with Gasimov's (2019) study, which notes that the exiled intellectuals and their Turkish contemporaries shared the principles of moderate Islam and eagerly

[247] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 12), 1926, April 27. *Azerbaycanın Matem Günü* "Azerbaijan's Day of Mourning", p.2.
[248] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 4), 1925, November 17. *Mukaddes Bir Vazife "*A Holy Task", p.1.

combined laicism with Turkish nationalism. The author (2019, 199) argues that when expressing their anti-Russian resentment, the exiles perceived the Turkish wall not "as a Muslim bulwark against Christianity but as a defender of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic affinity and distinctiveness."

In addition to democracy, nationalism is also considered part of being civilized. The authors claim that no community without a history and civilization could claim to be a nation; thus, when faced with the danger of losing Azerbaijani national identity, their calls for help are for the "sake of civilization, for the sake of humanity, for the sake of Turkishness and Muslimness".[249]

Interestingly, the authors not only argue that Azerbaijan is part of the civilized world, but on the topics of women's emancipation, liberty, and education, they insinuate that independent Azerbaijan was even more civilized than Europe: "This situation was something that was not fully applied in the entire East, and not even in Europe. The National Covenant of Azerbaijan proves how it was full of lofty, humanitarian, and civilizational aims with this decision."[250] Once they situate Azerbaijan as part of the civilized world, the authors declare that it has the right to demand help and support from the rest of this civilized world. The right to call on other "fortunate brothers" and "freedom-lovers of the world"[251] is the primary shared identity-marker among people

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[249] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *1* (No. 19), 1924, July 1. M. M. B. *Azerbaycana Rus Muhacirati "*Russian Migration to Azerbaijan", p.3-4.

[250] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 21), 1926, September 17. *Azerbaycan Misak-ı* Millisi " Azerbaijan's national covenant", p.2.

[251] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *5* (No. 2), 1927, October 15. *Yeter Bu Kadar Cinayet!* "Enough of These Murders!", p.3.

who value liberty and independence, and they ask their "fortunate brothers" to at least be vocal in their support: "If nothing else, they should exclaim to the bloody executioners: Enough of these murders!"[252]

To this end, they also consider it necessary to spread information about the cruelty and savagery of the Soviet Union to the world:

> It is necessary that the world of civilization should be informed about the existence of this savagery and this cruelty. The whole world should know that a bloody regime claiming to bring liberty to the world and claiming to have the agenda of earning independence for nations is destroying liberty and independence. They crush those who want liberty and independence with the most despicable systems.[253]

## Claims and Frustrations

The narrative of the civilized intersects with the claims and frustrations that Azerbaijani exiles conveyed in the journal. It becomes apparent that frustrations are directed toward the country for which they held the highest hope or expectations, something that appears to be true for each émigré community. When Georgians identified themselves as Europeans, they looked to the West; for the Azerbaijanis, Turkey is not just

[252] Ibid.

[253] Ibid.

one of their prominent supporters but the only one from which they expect firm support, and also the one with which they get frustrated:

> Undoubtedly, Turks wailing under Russian servitude under strong coercion directed all their hopes and courtesy towards their brother Turkey. Their only source of hope and inspiration was the Turkish national movement, the Turkish rebirth/awakening, and the wave of Turkism born there. Because a Turk is only at liberty in Turkey, he is only free in Anatolia.[254]

One of the reasons why Azerbaijani exiles considered Turkey their main ally is because they shared the same culture. Accordingly, if the center of this particular culture was Turkey, Turkey had a "duty" to help its brother nations. The authors assert Turkey's obligations when discussing the danger of breaking the alphabet uniformity of the Turkish world (into Latin and Arabic) and identifying the sole winner of this splinter as Moscow: "In issues relating to Turkish culture, Turkey has the duty of standing at the head of the Turkish world and not behind Russia. Does this possibility [of splitting the Turkish world] not make Turkey think?"[255]

As we can see from this excerpt, Azerbaijani authors are quite frustrated by the lack of support from their brother nation on a number of issues. In the excerpt above, the subject is the Latinization of the Turkic languages: they are frustrated that Turkey allows the Soviets' ongoing Latinization, which is seen as splitting the Turkish world.

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[254] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 2), 1925, October 15. Mirza Bala. *Bolşevizm ve Türkçülük* "Bolshevism and Turkism", p.4.
[255] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 11), 1926, April 14. *Elifba Mes'elesi* "The Alphabet Debate", p.3.

Elsewhere, they articulate their accusation: "The silence of Turkish delegates has helped these maneuvers [of Soviets] quite a bit. (...) The propaganda that Turkey will also change its alphabet to Latin has been made in countless ways."[256] Turkey's silence had its reasons; as we know from history, Turkey itself converted its alphabet to Latin in 1928. As seen elsewhere, Azerbaijani authors are concerned that in the Soviet Union, this linguistic decision was forced on Turkic communities, including Kazan:

> The idea that the congress majority, who accept the superiority of Latin letters and recommend their application, is a translator of the true demands and needs of Turkish lands, has been doubted not just by anti-Bolsheviks like us but even by one of the leaders of Kazan communists, Alimcan Ibrahimov, who is known as the publisher of 'Karamayaklar'. In the newspaper 'Red Tatarstan' published on the 20th of March, in an article written about the Baku Congress, Ibrahimov warns his readers away from assuming that all Turkic peoples took the decision. There are incidents that demonstrate that a free scientific conviction did not take this decision, but by the encouragement of 'Russian science' and the influence of the Communist Party.[257]

Aside from the language debate, the issue of Azerbaijani independence and the lack of support from Turkey against the Red Army are voiced in the journal. The authors are visibly frustrated by the lack of support, yet they try to justify Turkey's indifference with various explanations:

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[256] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 11), 1926, April 14. *Elifba Mes'elesi* "The Alphabet Debate" p.2.
[257] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 11), 1926, April 14. *Elifba Mes'elesi* "The Alphabet Debate", p.1.

> Azerbaijan was the first republic that was formed in the Islamic world, and it was the second Turkish government to enter the life of independence. The recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan, of this [lesser/small] Turkey, by European states had been a great consolation and had been welcomed by cheers in Turkey, which was undergoing great injustices at the time. Three months after this event, the independence and sovereignty of Azerbaijan was trampled under by the dirty boots of Russia's Red Army. This trickster Russia had declared the principle of 'all world nations living as they want with their own will and chart their own destiny'. Alas! The Turkish world was under peculiar circumstances at that time and could not understand the actual nature of what was happening at the time. It could not truly recognize that the April event was an awe-striking invasion and murder.[258]

Additional fear, or anticipation of a lack of support, is expressed in another article in which the Azerbaijanis discuss the rapprochement of Turkey with the Soviet Union. The negotiations that were taking place between these two powers invoked fear and heartbreak in the Azerbaijanis. They claim that neglecting autonomous Caucasian republics is a major sin against the Turkic historical mission; furthermore, they contend that the complicity of communist governments cannot be sufficient reason to accept the annexation of Caucasian republics.[259]

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[258] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 8), 1924, January 15. M. Garib. *12 Kanun-u Sani "*12 January", p.3-.
[259] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 2), 1923, October 15. *Gayet Mühim bir Su'al* "A Very Important Question", p.2-3.

> (...) If these news [we received] are correct, this means Ankara has accepted the point of view of Moscow. (…) Since we cannot know what these offers and these questions consist of, naturally, we are not able to declare our comments. Our hearts hope that these offers be on the side of clarifying more the legal status of the Caucasian republics and -just like it has been done until now- to secure their independence, even if only procedurally. (...) Even after many disagreements and opposition, if [Turkish] statesmen are obliged to accept Russia's insistence, we hope that the Turkish public opinion will certainly not find such an acceptance suitable.[260]

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If in the journal of *Yeni Kafkasya* the authors primarily directed their claims to Turkey, in the Topchibashi archives we see a set of diplomatic letters and documents addressed to the League of Nations, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Italy, and Turkey.

First, a note of protest was sent to the Italian ambassador to France in March 1924, objecting to the recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan as part of the Soviet Union (Doc. 2, March 1, 1924, Volume III)[261]. The note claimed that a forcibly occupied nation cannot be recognized as part of Soviet Russia nor its mineral riches (oil) allocated to Soviet Russia. A second note, from all the representatives of the Caucasian nations,

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[260] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 2), 1923, October 15. *Gayet Mühim bir Su'al* "A Very Important Question", p.2-3.

[261] All cited documents are sourced from A. M. Topchibashi: the Paris archive (1919–1940), edited by Ismail Agakishiev, translated by Georgi Mamulia and Ramiz Abutalybov. 4 vols., Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya Literatura and Heidar Aliev Foundation, 2016–2018.

was sent to Italy to remind them about the rights of small nations to enjoy the benefits of peace and humanity, which the international community had achieved and agreed on:

> At a time when great and small nations are looking for a path to peace based on a just solution to international conflicts, our people would also like to take advantage of this great upsurge of humanity and enjoy the peace they have been deprived of for so long. (Doc. 41, December 24, 1924, P. 152, Volume III)

Letters were also sent to the British Empire (Doc. 108, October 30, 1922, Volume II; Doc. 43, August 25, 1921, Volume II), in which Topchibashi praises the British as the "supporter of the freedom of small peoples" and asks for their moral support in the Azerbaijani cause.

Neither was France spared in receiving similar letters of request, which expressed grievances concerning the recognition of the Soviet Union and also hope that virtuous France would keep defending oppressed people. For instance, one document describes the French government as the one with the "best feelings toward the people of the East" (Doc. 8, June 17, 1924, p. 52, Volume III). Another letter stated that any acknowledgment of Azerbaijani oil as Soviet oil would be legally void and encouraged France to maintain their moral support for the Caucasians. The tactic of complimenting France as the defender of oppressed people and justice is similar to the Georgians' diplomatic approach. It is noteworthy that Georgians, Azeris, Armenians, and North Caucasians sign this particular letter:

> The peoples of the Caucasus have always enjoyed the favorable attention and moral support of the allied powers, who have marked their good disposition towards them by international acts. For this reason, we allow ourselves to hope that France, the centuries-old defender of oppressed peoples, who has not ceased condemning in the voices of her eminent statesmen, the policy of violence pursued by Soviet Russia against our countries, will not allow the government of Moscow to carry out its annexationist encroachments. Confident in the spirit of justice of France, we have the honor, Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to ask you on behalf of our peoples not to extend the act of recognition to the Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus and Georgia, which the government of the republic will grant to the government of the USSR. (Doc. 10, August 4, 1924. pp. 58-59, Volume III)

An additional note of protest from Topchibashi was sent to the American ambassador to France, Hugh Wallace Campbell. In this document, the character of the American people as freedom-loving and democratic is stressed. They express hope that the "apostle" of the self-determination of peoples, President Wilson, would understand the Azerbaijanis' claims to be treated equally to Armenians or other nations that the American government has recognized, stating:

> The Azerbaijani delegation wants to believe that the great Transatlantic Republic and its outstanding leader, President Wilson, the apostle of the salutary idea of self-determination of peoples, recognize the right of the small Azerbaijani people to self-determination, which they have already exercised and in the name of

> which they are ready to carry every possible sacrifice. (Doc. 98. August 16, 1920, p. 472, Volume I)

This letter was the result of a published note sent by the Unites States Department of Foreign Affairs to the Italian embassy that expressed warm sympathies for the Russian people. This note saw the future of Russia as "indivisible, represented within former tsarist Russia, with the exception of Poland, Finland and part of the territory that can be given to the projected Armenian state with the consent of the same Russia." (Doc. 98, August 16, 1920, p. 471, Volume I). Wishing Armenians independence and every possible benefit, Topchibashi claimed that unlike their neighboring Armenians, who had never waged any wars against Russians, Muslims had fought against Russian troops both in the khanates of Azerbaijan as well as in free Dagestan. Thus, if Americans recognized the right of Armenian independence under the pretext that they were was annexed by force, Topchibashi requested a similar approach for the protection of another small nation: "We only want to note that the small population of Azerbaijani people also needs the help and patronage of the great free nations and that they deserve more attention and a fairer attitude" (Doc. 98, August 16, 1920, p. 471, Volume I).

Another letter, dated October 14th, 1924, appeals to the "great people of the Unites States", "defenders of the rights of small people", to offer them moral support and justice by securing the principles of individual freedom and private property for the Caucasian nations. These appeals were made to the Americans and British equally, in a

desperate effort to keep the legal rights over Caucasian oil[262] from going to the Soviets. Frustrated by Great Britain's recognition of the Soviet Union, they turned to the Americans:

> It seems that some industrialists and financial circles, especially after the recognition of the Soviets by Great Britain, are inclined to allow the Bolsheviks to grant themselves oil concessions, seeking to ignore the declarations of the peoples concerned, the legitimate owners of these lands. (Doc. 37, October 14, 1924, p.142, Volume III)

American support is labeled as 'precious aid' that would serve the efforts to preserve freedom and economic development. If Russia is represented as the strangler of freedom, the United States is addressed as the country that is guided by the ideas of peace and civilization.

The notion of civilization is evoked in multiple documents addressed to the League of Nations. One document (Doc. 24, September 12-17, 1924, Volume III) characterizes the word of the high assembly as representing the 54 nations of the civilized world, and it expresses hope that the representatives of the civilized world will lend their moral support and engage in peaceful intervention to stop the bloodshed. The document

[262] Multiple documents reveal vain attempts to receive a 5% fund from Western oil companies in favor of the former owners of Baku oil to the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris (Doc. 45, March 3, 1933, Volume IV; Doc. 33, March 30, 1932, Volume IV). The society of Donors in London denied the request. Other documents show an attempt to interest Britain in the strategic role of Baku oil (Doc 106, March-April, 1940, Volume IV). Others call out the immorality of taking Azerbaijani oil away from the Azerbaijani people (Doc. 84, May 14, 1922, Volume II; Doc. 92, June 30, 1920, Volume I).

asks for help over and over, as the Caucasian nations are described as being deprived of outside help, property, independence, religious feelings, and elementary conditions of human life. The claim is made that this lack of support led the Caucasians to engage in an uprising in 1924:

> As oppressed peoples fighting for their freedom and independence, the peoples of the Caucasus are crying out for moral support and signs of sympathy from the civilized world, for which the word FREEDOM is an attribute inseparable from the people. The peoples of the Caucasus are anxiously awaiting this moral support and favorable attention, especially from the high assembly, this international Areopagus, which is the guardian of peace and justice on earth and is in the process of developing high principles of security and arbitration. (Doc 24, September 12-17, 1924, p.100, Volume III)

Elsewhere, convinced that the League of Nations is on the side of the oppressed and weak, Topchibashi "demanded" moral support and the condemnation of the occupation of Azerbaijan from the high assembly. After listing various reasons for support—including the drowning in blood of 57 uprisings in Azerbaijan, the Russification of Azerbaijan, the settlement of 50 thousand Russians in the Mugan steppe, and the usurpation of Azerbaijani oil—Topchibashi calls for help:

> In this struggle, our people need moral support from the League of Nations, one of whose noble goals is to protect the rights of oppressed peoples. The Azerbaijani people ardently desire to hear the voice of justice raised by the high

> assembly against the acts of the aggressors, against the presence of the Red Army, the Moscow Cheka, and Russian commissars on the territory of Azerbaijan. (Doc. 68, September 15, 1925, p. 242, Volume III)

In the 1930s, stronger language calling out morally dubious actions was directed to the League of Nations. Together with other Caucasian, Ukrainian and Turkestan exiles, Azeris objected to the Soviet Union's admission to the League of Nations in 1934. Protesting that the USSR's inclusion blatantly contradicted the League's principles, they called out the organization's double standards. Reminding the League of its commitment to world peace and justice among nations, they claimed that it "should not simultaneously become the guardian of the independence of some people and the guarantor of the enslavement of others" (Doc. 60, September 25, 1936, p. 231, Volume IV). The document lists the facts of starvation and oppression in the USSR to dispel the delusion, as if populations from the USSR and the countries of Central and Western Europe were in similar situations. The document advises the League of Nations to, instead of following appeasement politics, help the Soviet republics leave the Soviet Union under the fourth article of its constitution, allowing them to leave by their free will. Only then can the League of Nation commend its actions:

> By maintaining the integrity of the USSR, stabilizing its current state, providing it with financial and other assistance, foreign powers are appeasing the fetters that weigh on our countries occupied by Moscow. Can the League of Nations allow such a state of affairs, based on the principles of its charter? (…) This method could partially correct the morally delicate position in which the League of Nations has found itself since the USSR was allowed to sit in Geneva. Only under

> this condition will the League of Nations be able to establish a just, that is, a true peace, for any unjust peace contains within itself the seeds of a future war. (Doc. 60, September 25, 1936, pp.236-237, Volume IV)

Reminding the "fraternal people of Turkey" of the good neighborly relations between them, their mutual interests, and that the country recognized the independence of the Caucasian countries and Ukraine, Topchibashi asks for moral support (Doc. 125, July 13, 1927, Volume III). Turkey is considered to be part of the civilized world, and thus one of the powers to which these nations turn for help:

> In this struggle for independence, full of vicissitudes of fate, the peoples of the Caucasus and Ukraine have the right to expect moral support from the civilized world for the reasons of their just cause and high principles of self-determination of peoples, which the masters of Moscow had the audacity to use to hide their imperialist tendencies. (Doc. 125, July 13, 1927, p.441, Volume III)

The term 'fraternal Turkish people' is mentioned three times in a document addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. First, the document states that the martyr nations "turn their eyes to their close neighbor, the fraternal Turkish people". Second, they place their hopes in their "close neighbor, the fraternal Turkish people", who "cannot remain indifferent" to the tragedy of the Caucasian people. Third and finally, religious, cultural, and racial ties with the "noble Turkish people" are emphasized, to legitimize the right to demand help:

> Religious and racial ties, the commonality of culture and traditions by which our peoples are related to the Turkish people, mainly the unity of our interests in the difficult question of constant common danger emanating from the north, give us the right to turn to the government of the fraternal Turkish people at this difficult moment, asking them to provide moral and other assistance that it deems it useful to give our peoples fighting the invaders.

In addition to this pressure on the civilized world, its duty, and how they should not fail to protect democratic virtues, in this archive we also read about the frustration and despair that Topchibashi experienced. Topchibashi himself frankly describes his lack of funds, hope, and support. Lack of funds became an obstacle to going to Geneva for the League of Nations or to Istanbul to meet fellow Azerbaijani exiles. Topchibashi was also deprived of any help: his son initially helped with typing and copying, but once he started to work in a factory, he left his father alone with the full burden of diplomatic work. The following extract is a rare insight into the perseverant Topchibashi's feelings of frustration, as he describes the disappointment of the hopeless, invisible, and ungrateful work he had been doing for years in exile:

> Finally, I am compelled to say (and you are the first to whom I express this) that my present financial situation cries out for itself: not only for any trip, but I have no means to live ... I hinted about this in my letters in general terms, but now I have to speak about it in a frank form, so as, by the way, not to hear from you the blame that I am not going to Constantinople, as if I "don't attach any importance meeting you"... Quite the contrary: I considered and still consider it essential and

> important not only a meeting but the most detailed exchange of views with you and our other leaders. This is required, first of all, by the seven years of the past life, full of torments, disappointments, hesitation, unbearably difficult crucial moments, and excessive and often unbearable work. Work is almost lonely, uncontrolled, invisible, forced, and often without hope for success, without support, without funds, without a light... I want everyone to know this. I want them to point out the mistakes of such work. I want a lively mutual exchange of suffering, a joint development of a plan for further actions, and a reasonable and fair distribution of duties and responsibilities. I want to, but I can't because I literally don't have the means to come to Constantinople, which I wrote to you in a letter dated April 27, 25. This painful situation is aggravated by the question of how "desirable" I am now in Turkey. After all, they wrote about intrigues against me in Angora. What good, they refer to an agreement with Moscow and will not allow me to come. Anything can happen!?.. (Doc 67, August 31, 1925, pp. 235-237, Volume III)

In the same document, we read Topchibashi's frustration in juggling to maintain good relations with Georgians ("how often I myself am dissatisfied with such a "policy" assuring myself that it is not "they" [Georgian Social Democrats] alone who make up Georgia, that there are other Georgians!") and Armenian émigrés. He also shares his

struggles in diffusing rumors and managing internal conflicts[263] in the Azerbaijani émigré community (Doc. 67, August 31, 1925, p. 234–237, Volume III). Notably, the same document mentions how close they became with the Ukrainian exiles.

**Narrative III: The Victorious Nation**

The politics of hope is revealed in the Azerbaijani sample in numerous aspects. The myth of Prometheus is used as a symbolic example of the Caucasus' constant struggle—but with a somewhat optimistic turn of events, with the tragic myth concluding in a happy ending. The myth of Prometheus is a famous analogy that the authors like to employ to symbolize the suffering of the Azerbaijani people. The mythological hero was perceived as chained on the Caucasian mountains, indefinitely struggling against the eagle. The exiles claim that the revolts for the freedom of Azerbaijan, Georgia, or Dagestan and their bloodshed "are nothing but another emanation of this struggle of Prometheus and the eagle."[264] In this symbolism, the authors especially identify themselves with the fire that Prometheus brought to the world, claiming it is that fire after which Azerbaijan is named.[265] They view that the Caucasians are still being tormented and punished by the Russian Empire for their rebellions for liberty and civilization: "Is not the seal of the Russian Empire, who has been shredding the chest of the Caucasus and

[263] Multiple documents from the Topchibashi archive reveal internal conflicts between the Azerbaijani émigré centers in Paris and Istanbul. Some successful and some unsuccessful negotiations were made to keep the émigré community's focus on the main goal of independence (Doc. 74, January 31, 1938, Volume IV; Doc. 82, May 14, 1938, Volume IV; Doc. 48, July 1, 1933, Volume IV).

[264] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (Vol. 1), 1923, September 26. Ateş Çalan Promete "Prometheus Stealing Fire", p.2.

[265] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (Vol. 1), 1923, September 26. *Ateş Çalan Promete* "Prometheus Stealing Fire", p.1.

piercing its lungs[266] for a century, an eagle? And so, Prometheus is being dismembered again and being healed again."[267] However, instead of remaining stuck in perpetual suffering, the authors assert that eventually, Prometheus will free himself from the chains:

> If we extend the similarity in imagery to the meanings of these two tales, we should have faith that one day, Prometheus will also break his chains and be freed from his struggle against the black eagle that has been shredding him.[268]

When eventual victory and the regaining of Azerbaijani independence are often presented as an inevitable outcome that will undoubtedly happen, the ongoing occupation is understood to be only temporary. Reassurances—such as "a temporary interruption, and not the abortion, of its independence",[269] or belief that Azerbaijan "will achieve"[270] its independence, "will sooner or later be successful!"[271] "in the holy struggle"—are frequently scattered throughout the journal.

Similar to the Georgian exiles, here, too, is a strong and "unshakable conviction"[272] that the nation will overcome its occupation and be victorious:

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[266] Greek mythology talks about the liver rather than lungs. It is unclear if the author misunderstood the legend by referring to 'lungs'. In Turkish, the word "ciğer" can mean both lung and liver.
[267] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (Vol. 1), 1923, September 26. *Ateş Çalan Promete* "Prometheus Stealing Fire", p.1.
[268] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (Vol. 1), 1923, September 26. *Ateş Çalan Promete* "Prometheus Stealing Fire", p.2.

[269] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 21), 1926, September 17. *15 Eylül* "15 September", p.1.
[270] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 14), 1926, May 28. *28 Mayıs Nedir?* "What is May 28th?", p.3.
[271] Ibid.
[272] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 15), 1924, April 27. Doktor Abdullah Cevdet. *Har-ı Azerbaycan İçün "*For the Fire of Azerbaijan", p.3-4.

> The entire nation is faithful that it will be rescued from this villainy it has been caught in. With the strength of this faith, after an unfavorable and unequally occurring struggle, passing beyond the era of hope, the nation is convinced that it will reach a great day of liberation. For the Azeri Turk who believes that these bitter manifestations that history has doled out for him are temporary, the 12th of January and other such dates are a stop for hope, a pause for thinking.[273]

Several arguments reinforce this unshakable faith in eventual success. To start, there is hope that the Azerbaijani youth, despite the cruelty and repression inflicted by the Soviet authorities, continue to fight: "In Azerbaijani youth, unrelenting bravery, unquenchable ardor, and a great fury and revenge urge are being fueled. It is with this urge that they don't mind the *Cheka's* oppression and continue their struggle."[274] Elsewhere, the Azerbaijani youth are described as the brightest and enlightened, who sacrifice themselves to the strong desire to live under a national government.[275] To them, it is an "accomplished fact"[276] that this stratum of national freedom fighters is growing.

Moreover, hope also seems to come from the Azeris' expectations of both moral and monetary support from the world.[277] The authors share that the persecution of the

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[273] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 8), 1924, January 15. M. Garib. *12 Kanun-u Sani "*12 January", p.4.
[274] *Yeni Kafkasya, 4* (No. 24), 1927, September 15. *15 Eylül Münasebetiyle* "On the Occasion of September 15", p.2.
[275] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 12), 1926 April 27. *Azerbaycanın Matem Günü* "Azerbaijan's Day of Mourning", p.2.

[276] Ibid.
[277] "According to reports captured, published, and exposed by Bolsheviks, it is reported that some important groups in America and England held a positive outlook towards the Caucasian question. The separation of Caucasia from Russia would be warmly welcomed by these groups. On this topic, it is even strongly expected that Caucasians would be materially aided." (*Yeni Kafkasya, 4* (No. 11-12), 1927, March 18. *Rus-İngiliz Dü'ellosu* "Russian-English Duel", p.2.

Caucasian countries is despised worldwide. They also assume that whoever fought to defend their own country would never morally support the annexation of the Caucasian nations:

> The whole world, the widest popular masses of the East and the West, responded to this molestation of the Caucasian nations by the Bolsheviks with hatred and protests. But we know one thing for certain: The freedom-loving public opinion of nations who defended their national independence and liberty with their own sons' blood, will never [approve of/allow] the re-annexation of Transcaucasia by Russia. They will certainly never withhold their moral support for the Transcaucasian nations who shed their blood to regain their liberty and independence![278]

In addition, victimhood and positionality in the role of the captive are viewed as an axiomatic win. In this regard, Azerbaijani authors convey a somewhat similar attitude to the Georgians, who also represented themselves as victorious, at least morally. While these émigré groups were thoroughly aware of their defeat and vulnerable position, they comforted themselves with being the moral victors. For instance, we read: "Yet, they [Soviets] should be assured, they are being fooled. The liberties they physically stole are earned mentally".[279] Similarly, "In reality, every passing year does not move us away from our goal but takes us further towards it. The independence that was declared on 28th

[278] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 4), 1923, November 15. Gürcü [Georgian]. *Mavera-yı Kafkasın İkinci Def'a İlhakı "*The Annexation of Transcaucasia for the Second Time", p.3,5.
[279] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 15), 1924, April 27. *Azerbaycanın Büyük Matemi* "Azerbaijan's Great Mourning", p.2.

of May has been physically severed with the Bolshevik invasion, but spiritually it has won further, [spiritually] it has invaded the souls of the younger generation."[280]

Furthermore, philosophical arguments on the captor and captive echoing Hegel's Master–Slave dialectic are made to illustrate the eventual demise of the captor. According to the authors, rights cannot be fully confiscated; therefore, a confiscated right is a source of weakness for the occupier. In addition, they argue that servitude corrupts the captor rather than the victim, and the oppressor will be destroyed by their own oppressiveness. Examples from Poland and the Roman Empire are provided to illustrate their point:

> Today, in my eyes, Azerbaijan is an entity whose laws have been usurped and has seen cruelty and hostility. However, a right can be suspended/occupied, but it is impossible to wholly confiscate it. (…) A right is a source of strength for the owner of that right, but a source of weakness for its occupier. Poland has been the captive of three great states in three occupation zones and the target of their countless hostilities. Has Poland been a source of strength for Russia, Germany or Austria-Hungary? (…) Poland broke the gravestones placed on it with its head, and rose up like an injured hero buried alive, bursting from the grave it has been buried in. (…)
>
> One of the most important causes that gnawed on the great Roman Empire's soul and eventually rotted and ruined it are the captives that Roman commanders

[280] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *1* (No. 17), 1924, May 28. *Azerbaycanın Büyük Günü* "The Great Day of Azerbaijan", p.4.

> dragged and brought from all over the world. Servitude corrupts the capturer rather than the captive. The captive tribe is subjected to hypocrisy and deception. The capturing tribe is thrust into lethargy, prodigality, debauchery, and losing their faculty of personal enterprise. They are bound to go through many centuries of deprivation and frustration to regain this important faculty that they have lost.[281]

This excerpt is perhaps the best illustration of the victorious narrative, wherein defeat and capture are represented and understood as a philosophical and moral victory. Even though physical defeat mostly meant the community's annihilation or slavery throughout human history, today, academia and some pockets of human societies have turned toward the victimhood narratives. In the same area, another line of thought is advanced in favor of the eventual success of Azerbaijani independence, one heavily based on the interpretation of nationalism. Predictions are made that all the *Cheka's* oppression only strengthens the fever of nationalism in the Azerbaijani population. In other words, once again, oppression and the status of captivity only underpins the eventual victory of the captive:

> As long as the national movement has such a deep economic and social grounding, the atrocities the *Cheka* commits are for naught. With their oppression, they can be doing nothing but give the greatest and the most dominant ideal of the time, nationalism, the spiritual fire it needs to strengthen it even further. As the

[281] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 15), 1924, April 27. Doktor Abdullah Cevdet. *Har-ı Azerbaycan İçün* "For the Fire of Azerbaijan", pp.2-3.

> oppression of nationalism increase, their mental resistance will also increase; they will destroy their oppressors with their oppressiveness.[282]

In addition, an important argument in the theory of nationalism that the Bolsheviks disregarded is put forth. Specifically, the idea that national culture eventually perpetuates a national state is verbally articulated and believed by the Azeri authors:

> To soothe themselves, they say, "The creation of a great Turkish state from Edirne to Kashgar Is an unsuccessful dream." But national culture perpetuates national existence, and national presence demands the creation of a national state. Against this, 'Comrade' gives them the hope that "Just like how the Soviet government can have capitalism without capitalists, New Economic Policy can foster national cultures without allowing nationalism to grow!"[283]

As history has shown, circumstances played out in a way that this theory was proved and confirmed by various scholars many decades later (Yuri Slezkine 1996; Vera Tolz 2009; Rogers Brubaker 1996; Ronald Suny 1993). Cultural nationalism gave sufficient grounds to different entities to claim a nation-state and to go through the national awakening process. Despite the imperial elites' intentions, in most countries an irreversible national self-determination process was initiated by minority cultures in the Russian empire and only partially pursued and reinforced by the Soviet Union.

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[282] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 6), 1923, December 15. *Bolşevik Mezalimi* "Bolshevik Atrocities", p.2.

[283] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 6), 1925, December 15. *Türkoloji Kongresi "*Turkology Congress", p.4.

Undoubtedly, none of them could foresee the results of this process. As Slezkine (1996, 229) puts it, Soviet leaders found themselves confronting what they had helped to implement: "the county's leaders found it harder and harder to explain what their 'socialist content' stood for." Another scholar, Rogers Brubaker (1996, 23), described that due to the institutionalization of multiple nations and nationalities, nationhood/nationality and statehood/citizenship came to be different categories, and through this process, the Soviet Union prepared the way for its demise.

Finally, in 1927, there was naive anticipation of the collapse of the Soviet Union—an exciting hope for the future that would only come true many decades later:

> The political rumblings coming from under the ground in Russia herald us that a new earthquake will take place. We think this collapse will be awesome. As a result, Russia will withdraw to its natural borders, and the captive nations of today will be free and independent.[284]

In the Topchibashi archive, documents from 1939 and 1940 stress the similarities between Hitler and Stalin, the importance of defeating Bolshevism alongside Nazism to secure world peace, and the importance of not being delusional about the USSR's nature. One document states that Stalin regrettably managed to capture some of the leftists in European countries with his lies:

> The Russian riddle has been solved, even assuming it may be a riddle for anyone. It is hoped that civilized peoples, especially their leftist and democratic circles,

[284] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *5* (No. 1), 1927, October 1. *Beşinci Yılın Başlangıcında* "At the Beginning of the Fifth Year", p.2.

> will stop calling on the USSR and its leaders to preserve peace once and for all. How ironic today would be the recent call sent by the USSR to participate in the "united democratic front" on the side of France, Great Britain, and the United States of America! (Doc. 95, November-December 1939, p.338, Volume IV)

Arguments against the USSR are made using the example of the invasion of Poland and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Topchibashi argues that Stalin's declaration of the Soviet Union's neutrality is a stark contradiction to the occupation of Poland by the Red Army. England and France are described as unreliable guarantors of Poland's sovereignty, and Russians as those who paved the way for the Germans to easily occupy Poland:

> Poland was an ally of these two democratic powers, and they guaranteed the integrity of its borders. Is it really possible to qualify as neutrality the fact that, thanks to Soviet intervention, Germany was able to deal with Poland in three weeks and transfer its divisions from the Eastern to the Western front? (Doc. 95, November-December 1939, p.347, Volume IV)

Claiming that without the German-Russian pact, Hitler would have never been able to start a war against Poland, Topchibashi argues that the crimes of one dictator should not justify the crimes of another: "Are we confronted with a new axiom of international law that the crime of one dictator justifies the resulting crime of another dictator?" (Doc. 95, November–December 1939, p. 347, Volume IV). Similarities between Hitler and Stalin are emphasized multiple times: they are described as equivalent, as hating democratic countries, as similar in their governing methods, as pursuing a common goal, and as threatening the world with misfortune. This is why he argues that the victory over Germany will not be enough to ensure international peace and justice: unless the Soviet

Union is also vanquished, he claims that Central Europe and the Middle East will continue to suffer without justice. Calling for the "restoration of international morality", Topchibashi warns against repeating "the fatal mistake made during and after the First World War":

> It is known that the victorious allies not only did not provide effective assistance to the nations freed from Russian oppression, but, on the contrary, provided their assistance to the white generals fighting to restore the collapsed empire. This attitude of the allies contributed to the death of these perfectly healthy and well-built young national republics, cementing the foundation of the monster called the USSR. (Doc. 95, November-December 1939. P.352, Volume IV)

In addition to recalling the mistakes of the post-World War I period, which contributed to strengthening the Soviet Union, Topchibashi blames Western democracies for their ignorance of the nature of Russian imperialism. Unlike Western countries, Eastern European and Asian countries are listed as informed about Russian imperialism:

> Indeed, if we can assume that for the Western democracies, which often gave an example of ignorance of the psychology of Russian imperialism, this truth is not yet sufficiently obvious, it, on the contrary, is more than well known to all the peoples of Western Asia and Eastern Europe and, above all, Poland. Indeed, does not the tragic history of the Polish people over the past two centuries clearly prove that the freedom of these noble people, as well as the freedom of numerous other peoples enslaved by Moscow, directly depend on the link between German and Russian imperialism? The tragic events of our day have once again proved the disastrous consequences of this union. As long as the cruel power of Russia

> continues to exist, no peace can be solid and lasting. (Doc. 99, the 25th of January, 1940. P.365, Volume IV)

Like the Georgian émigré community, the Azerbaijani émigré community also stopped their activities after World War II. As Shirin noted, there was still hope in the interwar period, but that hope vanished after WWII, to the point that she does not recall family talks about going back to her homeland:

> I think between the two wars, some organizations were trying to do something with the hope of somehow being able to go back to any country. But I think after the Second World War, it stopped because when I was born in 1950, so, in the 50s and 60s, there was nothing about this idea of going back. That is why I told you before that Baku was a kind of dream. Baku was a town in a fairy tale because it didn't exist, and this life didn't exist anymore. (Melikoff Sayar 2021)

**Narrative IV: Politics of Differentiation**

When looking at the mechanism of the politics of differentiation among Azerbaijani authors, we can see one prominent idea: Azerbaijan is part of the Islamic brotherhood. With the example of the unknown soldier from *Dumlupınar* (located in western Turkey), a symbol of the Turkish war of independence, they differentiate themselves from the British or French, and they consider that all Islamic nations of the world also venerate the same unknown soldier they venerate. This comparison with the British and French implies that the Turkic identity encompasses more than ethnicity; it

states that not just Turks but all Islamic nations and tribes in the world celebrate his victory and kneel to him:

> An unknown soldier lying in the Etoile Square is, undoubtedly, selfless. But he is selfless only for France. He is a hero, but he is a hero only for France. The unknown English soldier has only served England and has defended Britain's imperialism and might. With their self-sacrifice, the world gained the Versailles, Sevres, and Trianon treaties, dividing the world into two enemy camps: winners and losers. But the unknown Mehmetçik lying in Dumlupınar has torn apart the deed of servitude that was written with the victory of the aforementioned unknowns and thus saved not only his homeland but spiritually, he has saved the entire captive world.[285]

Another perceived merit of the unknown soldier commemorated in *Dumlupinar* is that this particular soldier fought from the positionality of servitude, thereby inspiring the whole captive world. Here, we will not engage in the historical debate about whether Turkey can genuinely claim the identity of a victim, as the history of the Turkish wars is quite complex. However, the aftermath of World War I and the Treaty of Sèvres left the Ottoman Empire defeated and under the control of the Allied forces. Most importantly, for this research, the Azerbaijani authors attempted to depict them as captives[286]. As

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[285] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 23), 1924, August 31. *Mechul 'Askerin Mezarı Başında* "By The Side of the Unknown Soldier's Grave", p.1-2.

[286] On the concept of the "Captive" Turks see Elif Kanca's work on *The "Single Nation, Two States" Idea: Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations in the Post-Soviet Period*. *The South Caucasus and Turkey: History lessons of the 20th century*. (2012). Heinrich Böll Stiftung South Caucasus.

Gasimov (2019) notes, another Turkish intellectual, Arın Engin, identifies various people from Azerbaijan and Central Asia as "captive Turkish nations" for which Turkey remained the last hope for liberation. Notably, Azerbaijani authors felt more at ease at criticizing Britain out of their allegiance to Turkey, which was under British rule. Thus, they frequently use anti-imperialist language—but only on the subject of the Western power, and never the Turkish powers (Ottoman Empire).

In a number of instances, we see excerpts where Turks and Azeris are "brother nations" that share common goals, pain, and culture. The authors relate that the blood they shed together remolded their racial and cultural unity:[287] "In their struggle against tsarism, Azerbaijan Turks have worked with Crimea, Kazan and Turkestan Turks. In the struggle to defend the national civilization from Russian assault, the 'Muslims of Russia' worked together and shared their wins and losses."[288]

Azerbaijani authors view themselves as part of the civilization that stems from Turkey, which is seen as the "civilizational capital of today": "Here is the exalted office of the caliphate that the entirety of the Islamic world turns its eyes to, and here is a long-established center of wisdom known in the Turkish world".[289] Interestingly, Azeris differentiate themselves from other Muslim communities in terms of cultural development and degree of civilization. Once again, the vehicle for such hierarchy-building appears to be the alphabet or written language:

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[287] *Yeni Kafkasya, 4* (No. 24), 1927, September 15. *15 Eylül Münasebetiyle* "On the Occasion of September 15", p.1.
[288] *Yeni Kafkasya, 3* (No. 14), 1926, May 28. *28 Mayıs Nedir?* "What is May 28th?", p.2.

[289] *Yeni Kafkasya, 1* (No. 2), 1923, October 15. *İstanbulun İkinci Fethi* "The Second Conquest of Istanbul", p.1.

> Caucasian mountain peoples who didn't originally have writing, like Chechens, Kabardins, and Ossetians, as well as Turanid tribes of shamanist sects like Yakuts who entered the field of culture and civilization only recently, can easily accept and use Latin letters. For these, the debate is simply about receiving the specified letters. But the form of the debate is different for Turkish lands who went through an Islamic period, who have their own culture and civilization like Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and Kazan.[290]

One way that the alphabet debate contributed to the politics of differentiation is through the divides it created between supporters and opponents of the Latinization of the Azerbaijani alphabet. Russians, Armenians, and Jewish communists were seen as those who wanted to divide Turks; at the same time, the "Turkish Latinists" were thought to have been forced to cave to the nationalism question.[291] The question of nationalism remains central to the identity of the Azerbaijani community: their fear of the extinction of their community starts with understanding "denationalization" politics, which they claim does not affect the "well-established Veliko Rus nationality" but only newly-established national groups. Despite this fear, as mentioned above, they assert that nationality is not a temporary episode like the revolutionary Marxists would like to believe, but rather a permanent institution. The title of the article in which these statements are found is self-explanatory: "the nationality that does not get destroyed."[292]

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[290] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 11), 1926, April 14. *Elifba Mes'elesi* "The Alphabet Debate", p.2.
[291] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 6), 1925, December 15. *Türkoloji Kongresi* "Turkology Congress," p.2.
[292] *Yeni Kafkasya*, *3* (No. 18), 1926, August 1, *Kahr Olmayan Milliyet* "The Nationality That Does Not Get Destroyed", p.3.

One can think about this type of Islamic brotherhood and identity through the notion of pan-Turanism.[293] Born in the 19th century, this cultural and political movement mirrored nationalist ideologies like pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism and offered a unified front against East Asian and European influences. Nations and ethnic groups with a common culture, language, and religion—such as Turks, Azerbaijanis, Tatars, Mongols, and others—started to share interests in close cooperation. As Gasimov (2019) notes, the rise of Russian nationalism in the tsarist era prompted the "emergence of a distinct ethnic identity among the Turkic population on the southwestern and southern borderlands of the Russian Empire." This distinct identity involved Turkic notions that, according to Gasimov (2019), corresponded to the European-Christian concepts of *bulwark* and *antemurale*. Pan-Turanism was present in the early journals, which I analyzed, and in the later émigré journals from the 1940s. For instance, the editor of the journal *Turkish Target*, Ahmet Caferoğlu, imagined Turkic and Turkish communities as one entity that lived in different places:

> [One] of the essential and great duties of the *Turkish target* is to make the compatriots living in the different places aware of each other." For "compatriots," he used the term *ırktaş*, which indicates belonging to the same race. By promoting this kind of categorization, a transfer of the racial discourse from Italy and Germany to Turkey is more than evident. In his thematic article on the medieval Central Asian poet Alisher Navoi (1441–1501), Caferoğlu described him as a protagonist of Turkish cultural unity. By doing so, the linguist shaped an imagined intellectual continuity between the Turkic poetry in the Central Asian

[293] The etymology of Turan comes from Iran, and it refers to a prehistoric society in Central Asia.

> region, far away from the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire and contemporary Turkey (Gasimov 2019, 192).

Despite the frequent usage of the word Turkishness by Azerbaijani exiles, we should remember that the Azerbaijani national identity differs significantly from Turkish national identity. Azeris perceived themselves as part of the Turkic people but still maintain a distinct national identity. Azeris had, and continue to have, their own national flag, political parties, and language which is separate from the Turkish national identity. For instance their national flag, represented Turkic heritage, Islamic civilization, and modern state democracy. Further, their language, first adopted by Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, was a vernacular language separate from both Turkish and Ottoman (Gasimov, 2023). And finally, no exile discourse has been identified that would suggest Azerbaijanis' strive for unification with Turkey. (Gasimov, 2023)

**Differences with Russians**

As in the case of the Georgians, Topchibashi's archive illustrates the difficult relationships that non-Russian émigrés had with Russian exiles. In a document describing the minutes of a meeting of the representatives of the Caucasian Republics, A.M Chermoev and Topchibashi talk about a potential collaboration and state that not much should be expected from Russians who oppose the existence of the independent former Russian colonies:

> Milyukov[294] says that although this is not an entirely pleasant recognition for Russian leaders, the Russian spheres are beginning to assimilate and become accustomed to the principle of separation. In general, he says approximately the following: "If you picture your future based on an agreement, without a hostile attitude towards Russia, then he, Milyukov, promises his sympathy and asks to acquaint him with the text of the declaration to be able to figure out because, in his opinion, one cannot now live with the psychology of even last year."
>
> M. Topchibashi: He proposes to discuss the issue of negotiations with Russian leaders, arranging meetings for this in the form of a conference to listen to them and explain our case to them. He does not expect much benevolence from them because they cannot part with the idea of a federal Russia. (Doc 9, June 13, 1921, pp.66-67, Volume II)

Ten years later, another document signed by Topchibashi discusses the negative press and attitude of the Russian émigré press and the Bolshevik press toward Caucasian anti-Bolshevik communities. To counter such negative press, Topchibashi suggests establishing a pan-Caucasian press that would publish in the Russian language and protect the national interests of Caucasian nations (Doc. 11, May 24, 1931, Volume IV).

On multiple occasions, differences with the Russian people are emphasized. The Caucasus is described as a homogeneous entity that dramatically differs from Russia: "For centuries, aboriginal peoples lived in the Caucasus: Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Circassians, Georgians, who have nothing in common with the Slavic race either in

[294] Milyukov is later described as 'malicious' by Topchibashi. Milyukov Pavel Nikolaevich was a historian and a politician. He remained an influential figure in the Russia emigration.

language, or in customs, or in traditions" (Doc. 78, January 5, 1922, p. 348, Volume II). They also mention that the revolutionary movement went in different directions in the Caucasus versus in Russia: while civil war raged in Russia, the Caucasus peoples used their freedom to establish democratic regimes that guaranteed human rights. Azerbaijani people are described as those who continue to fight: "Belonging to another race, another religion and another language, the Azerbaijanis have nothing in common with the Slavs, neither in customs, nor in morals, nor in their moral and intellectual ideas against the Russian Bolsheviks" (Doc. 98, August 16, 1920, p. 471, Volume I). The forcible and unfair inclusion of Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union is rejected as incompatible with the Azerbaijani people, who are said to be "racially, linguistically, religiously, traditionally, mentally, culturally and morally absolutely different from the countries of the Slavic race" (Doc. 8, June 17, 1924, p. 51, Volume III).

In a document dated from 1940, Topchibashi describes the non-Russian people of the Turkic race in the Soviet Union as being of paramount importance. His statistical count lists 3,500,000 Azerbaijani, 3,000,000 people from the North Caucasus, 8,000,000 people from Idel-Ural (Volga-Ural), 20,000,000 from Turkestan, and 750,000 from Crimea. Despite living geographically separately, these people are connected through religion, race, and culture. In the task of connecting the Turkic people with each other, Azerbaijan is claimed to have been an important cultural and intellectual center.

**Pan-Caucasian Unity**

One prevalent theme in the Topchibashi archive is the idea of the Caucasian confederation and the pan-Caucasian identity. Historical documents from the 1920s and 1930s reveal strong advocacy for a collective Caucasian effort. Several records push the idea of a Caucasian Confederation (Doc. 5, May 21, 1921, Volume II; Doc. 3, May 8, 1921, Volume II; Doc. 110, January 1921, Volume I). At a celebratory event hosted by the editors of the journal *Independent Caucasus*, Topchibashi described the Caucasus as the pearl of the Russian tsardom, which fell into dirty hands in which it does not belong:

> This was and is the whole task for Caucasians. Its resolution is possible. Suppose we all observe the principles of the Caucasian orientation and the formation of the Confederation. Based on the first principle, we must strive to create the second and achieve the unity of the peoples of the Caucasus, without which there is no salvation for any of them. (Doc. 200, p.683, Volume III)

An interesting exchange of letters between Topchibashi and the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Akaki Chkhenkeli reveals how much the Azerbaijani emigres tried to show a unified Caucasian front by celebrating events together. In a letter dated April 17th, 1932, Topchibashi asks Chkhenkeli to organize a pan-Caucasian celebration of the declaration of independence of the Caucasian countries. He argues for the need to show unity in a foreign land and under challenging circumstances, and he also notes that if Chkhenkeli agreed, others would follow out of their respect for him. From this correspondence, we learn that Topchibashi was the only ardent advocate of this idea:

> You remember, I have raised this question more than once and proposed to arrange such a united celebration of the Declaration of Independence. Unfortunately, I did not meet with a response... Despite this, and deeply believing in the enormous moral significance of the united celebration, I decided to repeat the proposal to organize a joint holiday this year. (Doc 34, April 27, 1932, p. 123, Volume IV)

Chkhenkeli responded to this request with a letter full of frustrating news, despair, and a needed reality check. In a letter dated May 5th, 1932, he recounts the lack of funds, the illness of his secretary, and the scattering of Caucasian representatives as obstacles to keeping up his diplomatic work:

> I wholeheartedly welcome your proposal to organize a joint Caucasian Independence Day, but now there are even fewer conditions for its implementation than before. Take the fact that you, foreman of the Caucasians, are forced to stay on the sidelines; that is the extent to which our joint work here has collapsed! How can I take the initiative when I have completely withdrawn or had to withdraw from the Caucasian diplomatic front? In my work, of course, I never forget about the Caucasian cause, but to represent it together with my neighbors, I am deprived of such an opportunity. You have probably heard that the National Council of the Highlanders also denounced its delegation, which

> means that things are moving toward the liquidation of everything that was. Gvazava went to Geneva, and one Azerbaijani and one Highlander were supposed to come there; they did not come - that's how unity was achieved. In a word, it is clear that you have moved a little away from reality in your patriotic thoughts about the Caucasus! And it's good, and I appreciate it highly, that you remain malgré tout yourself, God willing, you stay like this until the day of the celebration of independence in the Caucasus! (Doc. 36, May 5, 1932, pp.127-128, Volume IV)

In response to this frank letter, Topchibashi pushed back even more. Opening his letter with the news that Chkhenkeli's letter did not convince or satisfy him, he claimed that all these circumstances were known to him. He noted that despite this knowledge, he wrote with the ardent desire to take steps that would keep them away from "further collapse, as you say, from the liquidation of everything that was" (Doc. 40, May 8, 1932, p. 142, Volume IV). Reminding Chkhenkeli that he considered himself and his colleagues only as Caucasians and not as officials with formal positions, he refused to give up:

> Therefore, forgive my bewilderment at your words that you "completely (?) Withdrew, or rather, were forced to withdraw from the Caucasian diplomatic front." Is this so, or rather, can you, do you have the right to do this? - Not. Is it possible to say this only because this front has been usurped and, I will say frankly, not without our own fault?! I do not want to reopen fresh wounds, but your argument is weak. As for me, I am aloof only regarding the initiatives and not regarding the actions to arrange a united celebration. (Doc. 40, May 8, 1932, p.142, Volume IV)

Remaining convinced that a common celebratory day should be arranged, Topchibashi explained to Chkhenkeli that in view of the circumstances, he had regrettably limited himself to only one logical conclusion. The two colleagues meet and discuss the matter. Ten days later, Topchibashi sent another letter, once again pushing for the idea of organizing a unified pan-Caucasian day. This time, he stressed the importance of dispelling an inaccurate image of Caucasians, after the murderer of the French president, Paul Doumer, was wrongly labeled as Caucasian in the French press (the murderer, Paul Gorguloff, was a Russian émigré born in Labinskaya, Russia):

> Indeed, in the entire French press, next to the vile name of the murderer-bandit, there is, even if in the bracket, the dear word Caucase- and the French reader believed that the village of Labinskaya, is the Caucasus and that he, the murderer, is indeed Caucasian by origin. It is necessary to dispel this wrong idea, which is created every day by newspapers and against which the real Caucasus, represented by representatives of its peoples, is silent. I believe it would be necessary and appropriate to arrange a reunion of Caucasians, at which together to express pan-Caucasian regret and sympathy, indignation and protest, and, finally, a short explanation of why Caucasians cannot be called "Russes", as the French authorities do. I am convinced that such a resolution will make a proper impression and serve the cause of Caucasian unification. We just need to hurry, because the moment is good. Think about it. (Doc. 41, May 18, 1932. p. 145, Volume IV)

This policy of linking the Azerbaijani community's fate to that of other Caucasian nations was a pragmatic one. In August 1924, when the Georgian uprisal against the

Soviet Union began to be discussed at the League of Nations, Topchibashi and Chermoev (the chairman of the delegation of North Caucasus) sent letters to League of Nations officials requesting the inclusion of Azerbaijani and North Caucasian rebels in the report (Doc. 29, September 22, 1924, Volume III; Doc. 30, September 22, 1924, Volume III). Claiming that the Azerbaijani and North Caucasians[295] were fighting against the Bolshevik yoke, similar to the Georgians, they asked for similar treatment. The document notes that these three groups were united in their actions, in their sacrifices, and in their experiences of repression, and therefore it would only be just to consider them all together: "Your Excellency knows very well that the fate of the peoples of the Caucasus in interconnected" (Doc. 30, September 22, 1924, p. 115, Volume III).

Before these letters were sent to the League of Nations, Topchibashi worked tirelessly in the Azerbaijani émigré community to clarify the Azerbaijani rebels' role and spread accurate information about them. In a letter dated September 10th, 1924, he informs his fellow émigré colleague in Istanbul, M. Rafiyev, about the need to unite with the rest of the rebels and the importance of combating bad press, which depicts only Georgians as fighting the Bolsheviks:

> Based on the available information, the Georgians are vigorously propagating the events in the local Russian and French newspapers, which have so far refrained from publishing. At the same time, news agencies (Havas and others) are already receiving information from various sources, but they have many contradictions.

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[295] In this work, I have not sampled the émigré community from the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus. To learn more about the unified Caucasian activities and one of their leaders, Haidar Bek Bammate, see Mamoulia's work: Mamoulia, G. (2007). *L'histoire du groupe Caucase (1934-1939)*. *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 48(1), 45-85.

> On the other hand, newspapers and telegraph agencies bought by the Bolsheviks are working, refuting many of the messages of the Georgians. In today's "Latest News," there is a note about the spread of the uprising to Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus. It is clear what a bad impression the lack of information about the participation of Azerbaijan produces, indicating that Georgia alone is fighting against the Bolshevik government. I beg you to report immediately everything you learn and what can be disclosed. (Doc. 21, the 10th of September, 1924, pp. 89-90, Volume III)

The correspondence between Chkhenkeli and Topchibashi reveals the nuanced political situation in which these émigré diplomats tried to gain the support of European leaders. Another particularly interesting letter responds to Topchibashi's pan-Caucasian efforts with an illustration of the perceived dangers of linking the Azerbaijani problem to the Georgian one. The Georgian diplomat, Chkhenkeli, honestly describes his pessimism concerning the prospects of the report that the Caucasians brought to the delegations at the League of Nations; he fears that "like many of our papers, it will not be distributed to the delegations" (Doc. 31, September 25, 1924, p. 117, Volume III). He complains that delegates only sympathize with them privately and lack the courage to support them publicly: "The trouble is that the gentlemen of the delegates do not have the civic courage to speak publicly and boldly about the Moscow atrocities in our country, while in private everyone warmly sympathizes with us" (Doc. 31, September 25, 1924, p. 117, Volume III). Most importantly, Chkhenkeli responds to Topchibashi's request to engage in joint political steps by warning that fully associating Georgia with Baku's and Grozny's problems might cost Georgians the little support they have:

> You write about our joint steps - that they are not always taken. There is no dispute that we should act this way, but there are cases when separate steps are also necessary. Unfortunately, on your part, and especially on the part of the highlanders, very little has been done to find active adherents of your aspirations, and we run the risk of losing even the little that can still be achieved if we decide to completely identify our and your tasks. Since the problems of Baku and Grozny are considered so difficult that no one dares to defend them together with ours publicly. Your stay here would be very useful for trying to take joint steps, depending on certain specific cases. (Doc. 31, the 25th of September, 1924. p.117, Volume III).

***

When asked who the Azerbaijani exiles imagined as their primary supportive ally, Shirin, the Azerbaijani descendant, responded "of course Turkey." In addition to identifying Turkey as an ally, Shirin's response also brings together all ethnic groups by including all Caucasian exiles and even Russians:

> For the Azerbaijani, it was Turkey. Of course, the hope was Turkey, but as the immigrants in Paris were from all of Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia…the point of the genocide because we have to say it was a genocide. It was a difficult one to overcome and to seek help from any country. So, this was difficult. I know the Russians were at one point were very angry at England. Because, you know, they did not let the family of the Tsar flee when the Tsar wanted to go to England; they said it's impossible, etc. So, there was a sort of resentment against England who was not considered an ally in this (….)

> I don't know what other people told you on that matter, but I can only imagine Turkey. Because many migrants came through Turkey, you know, there were immigration from Russia, from the North, and then many of them to East to China, then to Istanbul, etc. So many of them came from Turkey and the Balkans. But at that time, between the two wars, the number was were very, very unstable. So they had no way in this. And as far as Turkey was a young new country and European because they all considered themselves as European(…), So to scale down, I understand Turkey was seen as an ally, and between these immigrant groups, Azerbaijani and Armenia had difficult relationships.

This apparent predisposition seen in Topchibashi's speeches and written documents is perceivable even in the Azerbaijani descendant. With the interviewee, we see a similar strive to unite the Caucasian community and perceive them as one entity instead of segregated ethnic groups. In response to a question about if and how the Azerbaijani immigrant community differed from other communities, Shirin insists on the "Caucasian house":

> Well, I would not say Azerbaijan. I would say Caucasus, the Caucasian community. If you look at the immigrants from Russia, the rest of them, in part, were Russians, and they were, of course, Ukrainian. While they were both Caucasian, they were apart. They were different. But they were different as Caucasians, not as Georgian. But each group has had its community, its church, et cetera. But there was a kind of, as I said before, *La Maison Caucasienne* was somewhat real at the time.

Shirin recalled that for her grandfather, the home was always in the Caucasus, “just the whole” Caucasus, and not only Baku; he had also had offices in Yerevan and Tbilisi. As an émigré in Paris, he tried to recreate such a familiar atmosphere by bringing together Caucasians: “There was the place called *la Maison Caucasienne* where all the Caucasians used to come and go. You know there was music…C’est très nostalgique.”

My respondent’s grandfather was an Azerbaijani oil baron; her grandmother was Russian; and her mother was raised in France and later married her father, a Turkish student in Paris. Despite her mixed heritage, Shirin told me that when she finally managed to travel to Baku, this is where she felt at home:

> Look, there is a bay in Baku, which is a little bit like the Bay of Naples. And when I saw this bay and the Caspian Sea, I had a strange feeling about it. Wow, I'm home. And from that moment, I felt I was closer to Baku than to the other places, just to Istanbul or St. Petersburg. So I was working on my Ph.D., and I changed my subject. I took a subject related to Azerbaijan and started going to the region every year. And that's how it started. And I was really. I must say I was really secure, then I was…I felt, I felt like I was at home. I can't explain that. It's very strange…I said, well, my grandfather is here, and it's a very strange feeling. I'm very Russian too, but I'm very Turkish too. I wouldn't say, but Baku is something special. Azerbaijan is special. I really felt at home.

Her wealthy grandfather had owned twelve mansions and palaces, including a palace in St. Petersburg that is now an official building. Once they became immigrants, they lost all their property and money: “The past of this rich family was like a fairy tale for us.” Shirin asked her friends to show her her grandfather's house, and she was captivated by the beauty of it. Today her grandfather’s home is one of the palaces in Baku; a second house he owned functioned as a library at the time of her visit. Once again, she mentioned how strange it was that she felt so well in Baku.

When I asked Shirin about the Azerbaijani immigrant community's most significant achievements or failures, her answer included an interesting comparison with other émigré groups. Shirin listed Azerbaijanis’ ability to preserve their culture and not be fully assimilated as their biggest achievement. She compared this approach with Russians, Poles, and Armenians,[296] who sought to assimilate quickly or tried to be French as soon as possible. She mentioned that even though the Azerbaijani community was tiny, its descendants are interested in the culture and history of the country: “They kept their culture alive. And the result is someone like me willing to go to Baku after 60 years; for instance, this is very important. But the failure is that they were not proactive enough, maybe. I think some other groups were much more active than Azerbaijan. I think because when you look at the Georgians, I remember when we were young, Georgians met every week, and they had the camps, etc.” (Melikoff Sayar 2021).

[296] She also mentioned that Armenians assimilated with another group of Armenians that fled the genocide.

Pain, Nostalgia, and Homelessness

Looking at the post-memories of the Azerbaijani émigré descendant, we see the pain, nostalgia, and feeling of homelessness that the exiles carried. Shirin talked about the particular type of pain that exiles carry:

> You know, the immigrants are there is a kind of special spirit because when you know you cannot go back to your homeland, it becomes something very…it's a pain, it's a real pain. I feel that with my grandmother. I saw that because my grandfather used to tell my mother many things about their life. We have his memoirs. He wrote many things about his childhood, how they used to go to the sea in summer. It was life. The pain of not returning to the country was very strong." (Melikoff Sayar 2021)

She recalled that his grandfather was 'back home' in every sentence: "You feel that in every sentence." Her mother told Shirin that when her grandfather was sick, he sang songs from his childhood in Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Armenian. Shirin found the words to amply express the feelings that exiles carry, but she still said that this is something "you cannot feel if you didn't live that, I think."

> You know, I remember the son of the Topchibashi, when people from Azerbaijan started coming during the Soviet period. My mom was at the university; there were some tough times, and some academics professor from Azerbaijan were coming. So there was a dinner at my mother's place, and I think Topchibashi was there. I remember the first time he met someone from Baku; he was very much moved. It was very, very moving because it was something. Then you hear and

feel the grief, the pain of being an exiled immigrant. It is not easy to leave. I think it is not easy to leave, you know? And when you leave a country, you leave everything, and you don't have any chance to come back. (Melikoff Sayar 2021).

# Conclusion

I shall conclude this thesis by responding to my research questions through a detailing of the frustrations, hopes, audiences, and agency of each of the émigré groups under discussion. I explain the nature of émigré memory through a description of the kinds of narratives put forward by all three groups, discussing the four most prominent narratives found in the journals and historical documents of each sample. The final section reveals something of émigré agency through the ways in which the exiles created, instrumentalized, and safeguarded their national memories. All three sections compare the groups of exiles and explain the differences among them.

## The Nature of Émigré Memory

### Journals

This study identifies political exiles as a carrier group engaged in the production of exilic memory. As elite carrier groups of specific national memories (Brubaker, Erll, and Alexander), political exiles exploited four constructs—occupation, civilization, victory, and differentiation—to create exilic memory. The research analyzed different types of materials, which included public and private documents from historical archives, émigré journals and letters, sites of memory, ethnographic observations, and interviews. To examine exilic memory, I considered the émigré journals as objects of constructed émigré memory. Although each émigré community varies somewhat in terms of their narratives, there are strong similarities among them.

In their respective journals, the Georgians, the Ukrainians, and Azerbaijanis all focused primarily on narratives of victory. The frequency of allusions to the *victorious nation* theme in each sample outnumbered allusion to any other theme. Interestingly, the Georgian and Azerbaijani samples showed the exact same number of allusions to the theme. Considering that this finding came from an analysis of the journals, it is unsurprising that all of the émigré groups attempted to maintain a victorious and hopeful tone in their public writing. Although the total number of allusions to a narrative of victory still outnumbers allusions to any other narrative, it is also true that the victory narrative was replaced over time by a narrative of differentiation in the Georgian émigré group.

Another similarity across the groups was the presence of *the memory of occupation and independence* narrative. In journals from all three émigré communities, accounts of a forceful occupation, resistance, uprisings, terror, and repression are second only to narratives of victory. The Georgian and Azerbaijani samples again referenced this narrative equally often. The tragic events of occupation and resistance are taken as primary sources for the victimhood of the nations, providing a crucial foundation for all legitimate claims. Tragic memories are created, expressed, and instrumentalized for various causes. Victimhood even serves as a foundation for the claims of victory and the identity of the exiles themselves. In the Georgian émigré community, which I analyzed over a longer timeframe, there is no change over time for this narrative.

It is notable that the number of allusions to the narrative of *the civilized* is precisely the same for each ethnic group. However, this particular narrative occupies a different place or rank in each sample. For the Georgian and Ukrainian exiles, the total

number of allusions to the narrative of the civilized falls into third place. For the Azerbaijani exiles, however, this narrative appears in fourth place as they talk more frequently about *the politics of differentiation*, which comes in third place in their sample. The same narrative is absent from the Georgian journal sample and falls into fourth place among other narratives in the Ukrainian journal sample.

This is a significant finding because, as we know, the politics of differentiation appeared frequently in historical documents linked to the Georgian émigré group even as it was absent from their journals. It is also interesting that the Azerbaijani émigré community communicated this narrative frequently in both their historical documents and their journals. As regards the Ukrainians, their journals and historical documents tended to overlook the politics of differentiation. This could be because groups who were ethnically and culturally more distinct from Russians felt the need to identify themselves as other-than-Russian. Azerbaijan was both ethnically and religiously distinct from Russia in that sense, whereas Georgia and Ukraine shared Orthodox Christianity with Russia. Another explanation could be that Ukraine's complex history led to Ukrainians wanting to differentiate themselves from numerous other identities (e.g., Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian).

Table 2 below represents the distribution of the frequency of each narrative (as a percentage of total references to the narratives mentioned above) in journal samples across the three groups of exiles. As mentioned in my Research Design and Methodology section, I collected this information from 30 Azerbaijani journal issues, 32 Ukrainian journal issues, and 187 Georgian journal issues. I was surprised to see the degree of similarity in the frequency of the three narratives across the groups as it resulted from

random sampling. This was particularly the case between Georgians and Azerbaijanis, who alluded to all of the narratives aside from the politics of differentiation at roughly the same rate. Suffice it to say, there are strong similarities across all three samples in terms of what they articulated in their respective journals. Still, this is an important finding when considering the significant cultural differences between the three ethnic groups.

**Table 2** Frequency of narrative themes in journals, by émigré group.

| **Themes** | **Frequency of theme (%)** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Georgian exiles | Ukrainian exiles | Azerbaijani exiles |
| *The victorious nation* | 45.83 | 42.85 | 38.59 |
| *The memory of occupation and independence* | 39.58 | 31.42 | 33.33 |
| *The civilized* | 14.58 | 20 | 12.28 |
| *The politics of differentiation* | 0 | 5.71 | 15.78 |

In addition to these four main narratives, I identified other themes that sometimes distinguished one ethnic sample from the others. While working on the Ukrainian and Azerbaijani samples, for instance, I uncovered themes such as *nationalism*, *religion*, and *frustration.* The presence of frustration in the Ukrainian journal sample was significant. This narrative was also present in the Azerbaijani sample, but less pronounced than for the Ukrainians. Both of these samples shared a somewhat similar number of allusions to

nationalism (with the Ukrainians leading slightly).[297] As for *religion*, I introduced this theme only after observing its prominence in the Ukrainian sample.

### Historical Documents

In addition to the journals, I analyzed historical documents for all three samples. The Georgian sample of historical documents was much larger than that of the Ukrainian and Azerbaijani samples. The Georgian and Azerbaijani samples also inherently carried a high degree of agency as both samples were based on archival collections for émigré diplomats and representatives, who argued rigorously through diplomacy. For instance, there are numerous appeals to international partners and their respective émigré communities.

One notable difference between the journals and the historical documents is that the victorious nation narrative all but disappears for all three samples, dropping in number to a minimal count. In the Georgian sample, allusions to the civilized and the politics of differentiation are the most prominent. In the Azerbaijani sample, the most prominent theme was pressure on the civilized followed by *pan-Caucasian unity* and the politics of differentiation. While the Georgians were part of and led united Caucasian efforts against the Bolsheviks, the Azerbaijani archive is the only one that seems to embody this identity.

[297] For example, the Ukrainians cared deeply about the future nationalization of their youth. For the other émigré samples, this concern was not articulated as strongly.

In the Ukrainian sample, however, narratives of the civilized and of frustration were the most prominent, while the politics of differentiation was totally absent. The Ukrainians advanced these narratives in relation to two major events: Holodomor and the Dniester River tragedy. They expressed frustration about the collaboration of the civilized world with the USSR and its silence on the two tragedies. By describing these tragedies, all three émigré groups were automatically advancing the narrative of the memory of occupation and independence.

Taken together, the journals and historical documents reveal the picture detailed below. It is safe to say that all these groups shared more similarities than differences in both the type of émigré memory they produced and how they advocated for themselves:

- **N1:** The narrative of the memory of occupation and independence was continuously present (across journals and historical documents) for all three samples. This is a foundational narrative. The samples share a language that indicates the heavy yoke of occupation as they describe occupation, famine, and terror by vividly depicting horrific stories from local communities. This made the suffering of their nations visible to the international community.

  The nature of exilic identity and memory is thus best understood through the lens of trauma. It was the exiles who discussed trauma to the physical bodies of Soviet populations, not the Soviet populations. Furthermore, the three groups had an interchangeable understanding of the Tsarist and Soviet eras as they equated the Soviet Union with Russian imperialism. Both systems were essentially the same

to them, and the historical change was only superficial in nature. For the exiles, the lens of trauma could be applied continuously to the whole history of their nations

- **N2:** The narrative of the civilized comes in third place (for Georgians and Ukrainians) and fourth place (for Azerbaijani) in the émigré journals, but maintains a similarly strong presence in the historical documents of all three samples. The audience variable explains the stronger presence of these narratives in historical documents rather than in journals. While frustrations were expressed in private documents, published newspapers maintained a different story. This public story was for both the émigrés and the Soviet populations: the civilized world is on our side.

  Meanwhile, the relatively private (non-public) documents reveal the intensity of the pressure placed by the exiles on the civilized world. They conveyed their frustration and directed it toward the countries they identified as sources of hope. Ukrainian and Azerbaijani exiles expressed frustration over Western collaboration with the Soviets. In this narrative, we read a desperate effort among all three samples to reveal the uncivilized character of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union—to isolate it from the rest of the civilized world and to exert pressure on Western countries to contain it.

Despite their shared frustrations, the Ukrainian and Georgian exiled communities self-identified as part of the "civilized West," anticipating help and support from it. Their perception contrasted with that of the Azerbaijani exiles, who also included Turkey as part of the "civilized world" and saw it as a major source of support.[298]

- **N3:** Here, too, we see a similarity across the samples: the narrative of the victorious nation is the strongest in the journals from all three émigré communities, but becomes almost non-existent in their historical documents. Despair was publicly unacceptable, as maintaining a fighting spirit and hope for liberation was vital. Both the Georgian and the Azerbaijani exiles offered a thought-provoking reinterpretation of their situation: despite exile, they identified themselves as the holders of a moral high ground and the Soviets as losers. The Azerbaijani exiles even provided a philosophical explanation for this interpretation by explaining how a captor can never win, whereas the victim's eventual victory is axiomatically guaranteed.

- **N4:** The Georgian and the Azerbaijani exiles strongly articulated a politics of differentiation that focused on distinguishing themselves from the Russians. For the former, the politics of differentiation began to emerge in the early 1930s as the

[298] If Georgians and Ukrainians were relatively careful not to discuss Western imperialism (they discussed Italy's occupation of Ethiopia), the Azerbaijani exiles talked freely about the European colonies and British, French, and Spanish imperialism. However, they restrained themselves from discussing Turkey's wrongdoings.

Georgians addressed the absolute need to distinguish Georgian refugees from actual Russians. However, these politics were identified in the Georgian émigré diplomatic archive—not the journals.

For the Azerbaijani exiles, the politics of differentiation emerged in both the émigré journals and the diplomatic archives; this narrative was the third most prominent in the journals and occupied a strong, second place presence (after the civilized) in the historical documents. Its overall strength indicates its importance to this group. This stands in contrast to the Ukrainians, for whom the narrative was weak in the journals and non-existent in historical documents. When Ukrainians discussed a politics of differentiation, they did so mostly in reference to Czechoslovakians and Hungarians—not Russians.

In this section, I shall respond to each of the research questions from Set 1. In relation to the question 'What are the hopes, frustrations and claims of forced migrants?', I argue that the exiles never ceased to hope for repatriation and the liberation of their country. The primacy of the narrative of the victorious nation is evident in the journals in the various expression of hope. Despite challenging circumstances, despair was unacceptable. The exiles' hope was strengthened by the help they expected from those allies that they identified as belonging to the civilized world. Émigré journals conveyed the story of how the exiles believed the civilized world to be on their side. In the relatively private (non-public) documents, the exiles expressed frustration toward their allies and placed pressure on them. They were frustrated by the lack of support, and by the lack of any

acknowledgment of victimhood (or acknowledgment of the suffering of their home country's population). Seeing themselves as victims, they became frustrated at the civilized world's cooperation with the USSR and its ignoring of the problems faced by their countries within the Soviet Union.

The thesis has also engaged with the question of how the exiles exercised their agency. I have shown that the exiles showed remarkable agency. They advocated for themselves, demanded what they claimed was the civilized world's obligations, influenced international politicians, and created an émigré memory that would become an 'available past' for newly independent nation-states. The target audience of the emigres' efforts was the wider émigré community, the international community, and the Soviet population. When the smuggling of émigré journals into the Soviet Union became impossible, the Soviet population was lost as an audience. This is especially true for journals published in native languages. The final question I have sought to answer related to the variations between groups and the reasons for such variation. In fact, there was little variation between groups. It was mostly shaped by the exiles' particular national and cultural histories. Despite significant cultural differences, exiles from all three ethnic groups shared more similarities in their hopes, frustrations, and agency than differences.

In the second set of questions, I sought to investigate the nature and role of a subaltern exilic national memory and the part that national or historical memory plays in this complex process. With the activation of four main narratives, the émigrés created an exilic national memory based on: a *memory of occupation and*

*independence*, "*the civilized*," *the victorious nation,* and *the politics of differentiation.* National and historical memory played an extensive role in the creation of exilic memory. All claims were built on national and historical memories that exiles used and instrumentalized. The most crucial historical memory was the existence of their independent nations. They also instrumentalized other important historic events, such as the rebellion, Holodomor, and historical resilience. Eventually, exilic national memory came to have an unexpected potential and power in its contribution to the memory of the newly independent states.

**The Return Journey of Exilic Memory to the Homeland**

This research reveals that the exiles achieved the one thing the Soviets tried so hard for years to erase: they sustained the idea of national independence. They did so through the politics of hope. By safeguarding the memory of an independent nation and refusing to give up the idea of their eventual liberation, the exiles prepared an "available past" for their future nations. They persisted in believing in the liberation of their countries and in the demise of the USSR. Once these historical events came to pass, each country was then primed to recoup its suppressed memory and history. By the 1990s, the post-Soviet societies were ready to receive the tragic narratives that had been safeguarded in émigré memory.

**Georgia**

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of Soviet archives, the academic community discovered the history of the DRG. It was this suppressed history that enabled the Georgians to reinterpret their Soviet past through a lens of tragedy. That lens then superseded the Soviet narrative of success. As the narrative of successful Georgians dissipated, post-Soviet Georgian society fully embraced the émigré memory of tragedy. This exilic national memory, which carried components of victimhood and tragedy, soon overtook the existing national identity of Soviet Georgians.

In Chapter Two, I identified three significant differences in conceptualizations of national identity across the internal Georgian diaspora (Scott, 2016) and émigré Georgians. But this research is not limited to showing the differences between nationalism at home and in exile through the fragmentation of national memory. While Vinitzky-Seroussi's fragmented memory may build dissensus rather than solidarity, here fragmentation enabled a stored émigré memory to become an available past. It was this past that then traveled back home to shape the choices of the Georgian state from the 1990s onward.

As the Georgian émigré group was my primary reference group, I analyzed the longevity, influence, and role of the Georgian exilic national memory in the present day through a study of the 2018 centenary celebrations and the Château de Leuville as a site of memory. I concluded that once interest in the Château of Leuville was reignited, descendants of the émigrés negotiated the proper recognition of the DRG. This suppressed past of the DRG was reintegrated into the country's national body through the devolution of the Château—a highly symbolic gesture that exchanged the property rights

of the castle with the obligation to commemorate the exiles and acknowledge their role in Georgian historiography. While the memory of occupation and failed rebellion served as an available past for an identity of victimhood, the Georgian state eventually claimed a national memory of independence, a century of democracy, and "Europeanness."

### Ukraine

Like the Georgians, the Ukrainians also defined their nation as part of European democracy. As noted in the excerpts of Zelensky's speeches provided in the Introduction, Ukrainians today use the concept of "the civilized" in a manner very similar to its use in the émigré samples. In 2019, Ukraine moved away from Russian authoritarianism by transitioning from a stage of de-communization to de-colonization (Yekelchyk, 2023). Most importantly, Yekelchyk (2023, p. 35) outlined the role of the Ukrainian diaspora in endorsing "an unsophisticated version of the national paradigm" and a sophisticated conceptual interpretation of Ukraine's history. In other words, the Ukrainian diaspora "helped to establish the dominance of the national paradigm" that played an important role in deconstructing the imperial paradigm of Ukraine's history (Yekelchyk, 2023, p. 38). By 1990, once émigré Ukrainian historians had reconnected with the homeland, they also began helping the academic community learn about theoretical approaches.

Moreover, Ukrainians in North America created a US Congressional Commission on the Ukraine Famine of October 1984 (Kulchytsky, n.d.). A 2002 study on the North American Ukrainian diaspora captured the feelings of frustration that Ukrainians carried toward their host societies:

> Those troubled relations stem, in part, from the impression that in the course of pursuing Nazi war criminals, their governments and others have unfairly portrayed Ukrainians as anti-Semites and war criminals. There is also a feeling that countries like Canada and the United States have not done enough to acknowledge and condemn the atrocities that were committed against Ukrainians in the 1930s in the Soviet Union. For many Ukrainians in the diaspora, the famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932–3 is regarded as the Ukrainian genocide, and the feelings of victimization stem from the perception that the famine takes second place to the Jewish Holocaust. (Satzewich, 2002, p. 217)

Most importantly, Satzewich (2002) argued that cultivating a sense of victimization was essential in enabling the Ukrainian diaspora to create its own identity and group boundaries.[299] While the émigré community advocated for the recognition of Holodomor as a genocide, the notion of Holodomor remained highly controversial in the newly independent Ukraine as it was "instrumentalized by pro-Russian and pro-Western politicians alike" (Yekelchyk, 2023, p. 50). Eventually, the commemoration of Holodomor began both nationally and annually. Different types of events are dedicated to the remembrance of victims, while a public holiday facilitates public participation.

[299] Satzewich also found that intense conflicts between the Ukrainian communists and nationalists within the diaspora communities helped to forge their common Ukrainian identity.

### Azerbaijan

After regaining independence, Azerbaijan recognized and honored Ali Mardan Bay Topchibashi in various ways. For instance, he began to appear in abundance in research works, a street in Baku was named after him, and his grave in Saint-Clois (near Paris) received regular ceremonious visits from Azerbaijani officials (Hasanli, 2018). In 1998, a memorial plaque was positioned on the house where he lived in Paris and in 2008, a tombstone was placed on his grave (Hasanli, 2018). According to Hasanli (2018), his old gravestone was brought back to Baku for display in a museum where the Azerbaijani placed the following inscription:

> Ali Mardan bey proudly watches his house at Rue Ernest Tissaud 28, where he lived in desperate poverty. Here rests the great fighter, who protected our national existence for fifty years of Azerbaijan's history. His dream was to see Azerbaijan independent. Ali Mardan bey has achieved this day at last: his Azerbaijan is now free and independent. (p. 255)

Today, prominent figures from the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (including Mahammad Rasulzade) are honored and symbolically celebrated in modern Azerbaijan. They are arguably more celebrated than the Georgian N. Jordania and the Ukrainian S.

Petliura.[300] Scholars discuss the post-Soviet interpretation of the first democratic republic in Azerbaijan and the events surrounding its establishment and demise. Some argue that Azerbaijan has presented itself as a victim nation and a survivor of genocide (Abbasov 2012). This was most prominently voiced in 1998, when President Geidar Aliev officially recognized the "March combat"[301] as a genocide.

The narrative of struggle with the Soviet Union and Russian imperialism has remained active. But according to Abbasov (2012), the interpretation of 1918 events has "always been influenced by certain political agendas (either Soviet national politics or post-Soviet 'nationalizing nationalism'). Depending on the context of these political agendas, the Azerbaijani nation has been either friends or enemies with their Neighbours" (p. 22). In some cases, this actualization involved a struggle to maintain national independence against the wishes of Russia and Iran. More recently, the Armenian and Azerbaijani conflict gave the March events a new meaning wherein Turkey and Azerbaijan fought against their common enemy (Abbasov, 2012).

According to Sevil Huseynova (2012), the official state ideology that emerged in the 1990s was called "Azerbaijanism." This ideology combined ethnic and civic nationalism. Interestingly, Huseynova (2012) found anti-colonial rhetoric about the undemocratic "Soviet Empire" and Russians depicted as "others" in Azerbaijani textbooks. There, Russians are once again portrayed as different, with a foreign language and spiritual values that have continuously deprived Azerbaijan of its independence. But

[300] Petliura's controversial past made his commemoration problematic.
[301] The "March combat" refers to a bloody struggle between the united forces of the Bolsheviks and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks) against the Azerbaijanis (Musavat Party). The Bolsheviks and Armenians temporarily seized Baku in 1918, resulting in the slaughter of numerous Muslim civilians.

unlike in our sample here, Russians are also blamed for supporting Armenia against Azerbaijan. In the post-Soviet Azerbaijani imagination, Azerbaijan remains the ally of democratic countries represented by the West.

Still, tension with the West sometimes emerges, given its Christianity and recognition of the Armenian Genocide (Huseynova, 2012). Despite this and in the grand scheme of things, Azerbaijan remains an ally of NATO countries, Turkey, and potential candidate for EU membership Georgia. In other words, Azerbaijan perceives Turkey and Georgia as friendly neighbors, while Russia, Iran, and Armenia are enemy neighbors. The fraternal relationships with Turkey discussed in my sample remain actualized in contemporary Azerbaijan. This alliance was forged through a shared language and religion—ties that are much stronger than those with Georgia.[302]

While more research is needed to fully understand the influence of the Ukrainian and Azerbaijani exilic memories on their respective countries, one can see in existing scholarly works that exilic national memory has played an important part here, too. As in the Georgian case, both Ukrainian and Azerbaijani émigré memory helped to fuel local nationalism alongside identification with victimhood[303] and European democracy. Russia

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[302] Despite sharing a language and a religion, Azerbaijan seems to be placed somewhere below Turkey in the Turkish imaginative hierarchy: "Turkish national identity, which originates from Anatolia, is a perfect civilization for today to the extent that it serves as a model for the whole 'Turkish World.' Turkey locates its national identity, which provides a criterion, at the center, and presents relations with Azerbaijanis beginning with Safavids and extending until the Soviet period, as a history of captivity and damnification. Language is treated similarly as the issue of history. Azerbaijani is reduced to a dialect of the Turkish language; moreover, it is degraded as a source of humor. These reductions serve to promote Turkish national identity's hierarchical superiority in comparison with Azerbaijani identity" (Kanca, 2012, p. 206).

[303] According to Catic, M. (2015, p.1685), in 2011 Georgia was the first country to recognise as genocide the mass deportations and massacres of the Circassians of the Northwest Caucasus.

has remained an enemy "other" for all three counties, and all three countries have self-identified as part of the civilized world.

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In terms of the above findings, this research could benefit from the addition of recent studies for the Ukrainian and Azerbaijani cases to parallel the Georgian case study on the Chateau de Leuville. Owing to pandemic-related issues, this study can offer only a limited exploration of the ethnography of Ukrainian and Azerbaijani émigré centers in France. It is also limited in the number of supplemental interviews collected from émigré descendants. Despite the generous efforts of my Ukrainian contacts and scholars, I was unable to interview any Ukrainian émigré descendants. And, finally, the unexpected findings on the concept of civilization would benefit from closer study and development of the history and use of "the civilized."

Despite these limitations, it is clear that the exiles were far from powerless. In a way, their power came from the truth they advocated for and the fact that this truth had a place in France. Even though they were at the mercy of the civilized world, they were bold enough to challenge it and demand what they claimed was its obligation. Despite their small size and subaltern voices, they were able to influence politicians internationally. They accumulated an émigré memory that would eventually help to heal the new nation-states of Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. The transfer of exilic stored memory nourished the regeneration and revitalization of the national body, enhancing social solidarity and building consensus around the nation's history.

This research indicates that most of the descriptions and claims expressed by recent exiles after an occupation (or similar event) of their homelands tend to be factually correct. Even when communications were severed with the Soviet Union, the exiles understood the political landscapes of their countries and the dangers that the new power brought. One might say that we ought to listen to such exile communities when they advance claims regarding conditions in their countries. Their interest in the country, the strength of their nationalism, and their care for their homeland position them as true advocates. As early as the 1920s and 1930s, all three émigré groups were already spreading accurate information about the brutal nature, terror, and similarity to Russian imperialism of the Soviet regime.

One émigré mission that emerged from this study remained the same for a hundred years. Starting in the 1920s and continuing to the present day (excluding the Soviet period), we see efforts to label Russia as an uncivilized empire and attempts made at freedom from Russian influence. Once the trajectory of their national independence was interrupted, the émigré communities safeguarded the idea of independence in exile. In a sense, history was not linear for these groups—but the interruption in their mission was only temporary. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, nations resumed their history from the point at which it had been interrupted; in so doing, they devalued the many intervening decades of Sovietization. One might wonder about the value of a national discourse that does not change for a hundred years. In the case of Georgia, we see how a newly independent nation was prompted by an exilic national memory to prioritize conceptions of historical victimhood and tragedy over the existing national identity of Soviet Georgians, thus creating continuity for a hundred-year-old mission.

For many decades, the exilic national identity seemed lost. It was either suppressed or dormant, its reach and influence limited to small émigré communities who kept it alive. The return of this stored, fragmented, and available past, alongside its insertion into the post-Soviet national identity, reveals the unexpected power of its role in the creation of national memory and identity. Despite being subaltern and limited, exilic memory is nonetheless able to become a functional national memory for the homeland—if and when circumstances align.

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