GOTT MIT UNS:

GERMANY'S PROTESTANT THEOLOGICALS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Charles Edward Bailey

Fort Edward, New York

B. A., Bob Jones University, 1962

M. A., Roosevelt University, 1969

A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate

Faculty of the University of Virginia

@ COPYRIGHT BY

in Candidacy for the Degree of

CHARLES EDWARD BAILEY

Doctor of Philosophy

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

AUGUST, 1978

Corcoran Department of History

University of Virginia

August, 1978

Approved

25 July 1978

Ernest H. Knoke

H.C. Erik Midelfort

Daniel Zuck

GOTT MIT UNS:

GERMANY'S PROTESTANT THEOLOGIANS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

(Dissertation Abstract)

Charles Edward Bailey

Fort Edward, New York

B. A., Bob Jones University, 1962

M. A., Roosevelt University, 1969

A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate

Faculty of the University of Virginia

in Candidacy for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Corcoran Department of History

University of Virginia

August, 1978

Approved

25 July 1978

Ernest Krache

H.C. Erik Midelfort

Daniel Zerk

GOTT MIT UNS:

GERMANY'S PROTESTANT THEOLOGIANs IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

(Dissertation Abstract)

On the eve of the First World War, Germany's 220 Protestant theologians enjoyed unchallenged supremacy in religious studies. Students from all over the world came to sit at the feet of the Berlin giants: Adolf von Harnack, Ernst Troeltsch, and Reinhold Seeberg. And when the guns of August marred the Christian hope of "peace on earth," sensitive men everywhere looked to these high priests of the academic profession to illumine the darkness that had descended upon Europe. Surely these scholars who interpreted divine truth, who had led the world in higher criticism, comparative religion, and church history, would rise au-dessus de la mêlée, even though others were committing, in the opinion of Julien Benda, intellectual "treason." Unlike 1939, when no one expected anything hallowed to come forth from the halls of Nazi academe, neutrals and belligerents alike in 1914 hoped for a fresh oracle--a word of censure against reported Teutonic barbarism and disregard for international law. But, seemingly, the theologians too had sold their soul to the god of blood and iron. Unlike the ancient Hebrew prophets, who had upbraided their kings for their iniquities, these modern religious spokesmen cloaked their rulers with a mantle of righteousness.

The theologians unanimously pronounced Germany to be innocent of having plotted the war. Declaring England to be the villain of the piece, they seized the self-proclaimed savior of Belgium and verbally crucified her for four years. With only one notable exception, Martin Rade of Marburg, they dismissed the Kantian ideal of "perpetual peace" as a fairy tale and limited Jesus' admonition, "Turn the other cheek," to individuals, leaving states free to fight a "just war." With unflagging vigor, they took up pen and sword in defense of the Fatherland. Some perished at the front, while at home, others celebrated the glories of German Kultur, extolled their tradition of militarism and political conservatism, and proudly proclaimed the gospel according to Treitschke. And they did all this spontaneously; there was no Gleichschaltung in World War I. The theologians were passionate patriots who flung aside their tempered judgment and indulged in an orgy of abuse against "barbaric" Russia, revanche-blinded France, and "perfidious Albion."

On all moral and cultural issues, they spoke with one voice. Only on territorial war aims and the question of political reform did they disagree--and here, they split predictably. The conservatives, with their rigid "positive" theology, championed grandiose continental and colonial conquests and the maintenance of the political status quo at home, while the liberals, reflecting their more flexible Ritschlian viewpoint, advocated moderate territorial goals and a progressive domestic policy, particularly the introduction of equal

suffrage in Prussia. Germanophiles called attention to the moderate minority, but Germanophobes stressed that it agreed with the chauvinistic majority on the larger questions of war guilt, atrocities, and pacifism.

But the German Protestant theologians were not the only ones who abandoned the realm of academic detachment. Like the Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, war fever reached epidemic proportions and played no favorites with nations or classes. The sage as well as the simpleminded was infected with jingoistic myopia. So, if the theologians had a tragic flaw, it was simply that of being human, all too human. And if their cry of "Gott mit uns," which animated the final years of the Second Reich, seems a bit presumptuous to our sophisticated ears, it was certainly far more noble than the strains of the Götterdämmerung, which accompanied the collapse of the Third Reich.

Charles E. Bailey, R. D. 1, Fort Edward, New York, 12828

Dissertation for the University of Virginia, Corcoran
Department of History, August, 1978

PREFACE

The subject of this study is the attitudes and activities of the German Protestant theologians during the First World War. It treats their attitudes toward the more abstract questions of war guilt, international morality, and cultural distinctions as well as the more concrete issues of social ills, territorial aims, and political reform. It concerns only Protestant or evangelische theologians. Catholics are mentioned only as they occasionally serve as a basis of comparison or when the Protestants became directly involved with them. The theologians are studied as historical personages, and it is their reaction to a historical occurrence, not the impact of the war on German theology, that is under investigation. As one might expect, there was a close correlation between their theological positions and their attitudes about the war: liberal theologians showed an affinity with moderate war aims, and conservative theologians with radical ones.

Only academic theologians are discussed, that is to say, men holding positions of theology faculties. Pastors, church officials, chaplains, editors of religious periodicals, and others in some way connected with the theological world

are mentioned only in passing. Three exceptions are Julius Wellhausen, Ernst Troeltsch, and Erich Foerster. In the early 1800s, Wellhausen transferred from a theology to a philosophy faculty, and in 1915, Troeltsch went from a chair of Systematic Theology at Heidelberg to the Berlin Faculty of Philosophy. Yet, since both men started in theology and made lasting contributions to the discipline, they deserve to be classified as theologians. Foerster was Honorary Professor of Church History at the University of Frankfurt am Main but served on its philosophy faculty since it had no theology division.¹

Though the subject of this study is not entirely new, previous treatments all leave something to be desired. During the first two years of the war, a few Germans made compilations and comparisons of the theologians' reactions, but for the most part these studies dealt only with the problems of war guilt and a "just war." Moreover, they appeared before observers could weigh responses to events such as the Russian revolution, America's entry into the war, the Reichstag Peace Resolution of 1917, and the fall

¹Troeltsch is discussed in Chapter I, Foerster in Chapter VI. Wellhausen gained fame with his Die Komposition des Hexateuchs (1876-1877), which popularized the "J, E, P, D" theory of the Pentateuch that denied the Mosaic authorship. He taught on Prussian theology faculties from 1870 to 1882, when he was pressured by her conservative religious and civil authorities to transfer to a faculty of philosophy as professor of Semitic languages. During the war, he taught at Göttingen until his death in January, 1918. See Adolf Jülicher, "Julius Wellhausen," Christl. Welt, XXXII (1918), 73.

of Bethmann-Hollweg.²

During the Weimar Republic, a few theologians described the attitudes of the pastors and state churches toward the social and ecclesiastical problems raised by the war but said little about the theologians themselves.³ The collapse of Nazism tended to shift much scholarly attention to the role of the Confessing Church during the Second World War, but, happily, interest in the religious life of the First has not been lost. In 1950, Hans Gatzke presented a seminal study of "Germany's Drive to the West." Focusing on

²Shortly after the war began, Wilhelm Laible, editor of the conservative Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung, published the reactions of sixteen conservative theologians to the outbreak of the war in his paper and then in his Deutsche Theologen über den Krieg (Leipzig, 1915). Otto Herpel, a German pastor, surveyed the pronouncements of three dozen theologians in "Deutsche Theologie-Professoren zum Kriege," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 783-787, 802-805, 824-829, 848-850, 882-886. Friedrich Thimme, librarian of the Prussian Herrenhaus, tried to promote unity among the vying social, political, and religious groups by editing Vom inneren Frieden des deutschen Volkes (Leipzig, 1916); in its chapter on ecclesiastical problems are essays by one Catholic and four Protestant theologians.

³Martin Schian, a Giessen theologian, was commissioned by the German Protestant Church Committee to publish Die Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche in der Heimat (Berlin, 1925). His treatment of pacifism, the prewar decline of church membership, and the structure of the state churches is especially valuable. Otto Baumgarten, a Kiel theologian, gave a series of lectures in 1923-24, which appeared as "Der sittliche Zustand des deutschen Volkes unter dem Einfluss des Krieges," in Carl Melchoir et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, I (Stuttgart, 1927), 5-69. In the same volume, Erich Foerster discussed the response of the state churches to wartime ecclesiastical problems in "Die Stellung der evangelischen Kirche," 93-150. The work was part of a series of books, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, covering several of the former belligerents.

V9

the pressure groups and prominent personalities in the war-aims controversy, he did not overlook the feud between the liberal theologian, Adolf von Harnack, and his conservative opponent, Reinhold Seeberg. Unfortunately, Gatzke neglected the rest of the theological community, made a few factual errors, and did not have the use of archival material subsequently made available. Nevertheless, his thesis of the running rivalry between those holding moderate and radical war aims remains sound. A clear picture of German Protestants' response to political and ecclesiastical questions can be found in Gottfried Mehnert's Evangelische Kirche und Politik 1917-1919 (1959), but like the Weimar studies it largely skirts the moral, intellectual, and cultural problems of the war.⁴

Still dwarfing into near obscurity most subsequent works on the First World War is Fritz Fischer's monumental Griff nach der Weltmacht (1961). Though barely mentioning the theologians, Fischer pointedly contends that the liberal Harnack was only a pseudo-moderate on war aims and for all practical purposes had the same voracious appetite for territory as his conservative colleagues. Fischer's attempt to blur the distinction between moderates and radicals is forced, and the same flaw mars the work of his disciple, the theologian Karl Hammer. Hammer follows his master in seeing Pan-German chauvinism as omnipresent and in throwing all the

⁴Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West (Baltimore, 1950); Gottfried Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche und Politik 1917-1919 (Düsseldorf, 1959).

theologians into one kettle. Half of his Deutsche Kriegstheologie 1870-1918 (1971) is a welcome collection of the prewar and wartime writings of the theologians, but the commentary in the other half is merely an echo of Fischer's thesis. Moreover, Hammer completely neglects the heated debate over political reform and only whets our taste for more on the territorial question.⁵

In the interval between Fischer's and Hammer's works, three books appeared which treat the entire German academic community. In 1965, Frank Manuel completed an ambitious comparison of French and German professors of the past two centuries. While Fischer and Hammer have minimized the differences between German intellectuals during the war, Manuel has made a false distinction between them and their French counterparts. He holds that until the time of the Second World War the French were given to a vita activa and the Germans to a vita contemplativa. My research, however, shows that German professors had an active interest in political questions by the time of the First World War and that the Protestant theologians of 1914-1918 deserve the label "political professors." Fritz Ringer's The Decline of the German Mandarins (1969) casts a wide net over the German intellectual community from 1890 to 1933 but does not give adequate coverage to World War I. Moreover, Ringer mentions only three theologians: Harnack, Troeltsch, and

⁵Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, 3rd ed., 1967 [1st ed., 1961]), 207-208; Karl Hammer, Deutsche Kriegstheologie 1870-1918 (Munich, 1974 [1st ed., 1971]), 68-69.

Seeberg, all at Berlin University, and although they were Germany's most prominent theologians at the turn of the century, they by no means represent the diversity of war-time opinion. In his Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral (1969), Klaus Schwabe rightly puts asunder what Fischer has tried to join together. Focusing only on the war years, he parades the whole academic community before us and exposes its in-fighting and bitter divisions; nevertheless, his work is narrow in scope and coverage of sources. Schwabe treats twenty-two theologians, but they tend to become lost in the crowd of historians, jurists, scientists, and other intellectuals. Furthermore, he sees the theologians only as professors and not as academic "men of the cloth," wrestling with distinctly moral and religious questions. Though occasionally noting the theologians Adolf Deissmann and Martin Schian, he makes no use of Deissmann's weekly news letter, Evangelischer Wochenbrief, or Schian's monthly periodical, Deutsch-Evangelisch. An almost unforgivable omission is his complete neglect of the theologian Rudolf Otto, who served as a National Liberal deputy in the Prussian Lower House throughout the war.⁶

⁶Frank Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical History (Stanford, 1965), 116-117; Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge, 1969); Klaus Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral. Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die politischen Grundfragen des Ersten Weltkrieges (Göttingen, 1969); Joachim Remak, review of Schwabe's book, Amer. Hist. Review, LXXV (1970), 872-873. Schwabe had preceded his book with articles on the same subject: "Zur politischen Haltung der deutschen Professoren im ersten Weltkrieg," Hist. Ztschr., CXCI (1961), 601-634, and "Ursprung und Verbreitung des alldeutschen Annexionismus in der deutschen Professorenschaft im ersten Weltkrieg," Vtjh. f. Ztgtscht., XIV (1966), 105-138.

The organizational principle of this study is a compromise between simple chronology and topical analysis. Each chapter discusses a specific issue, and the chapter sequence reflects the chronological order in which the theologians gave their most concentrated attention to the issues. Chapter I, for example, deals with the war guilt question because in the early part of the war it dwarfed such other issues as franchise reform, which crested later.

It may be helpful to state here, in brief, the conclusions derived from this inquiry. The reactions of the Protestant theologians show that they were not pacifists but patriots---indeed, at the outset, passionate patriots--and not passive but "political professors," precisely in consequence of which they became polarized while at the same time pursuing their particular wartime interests.

It remains for me to give thanks. My gratefulness extends to a wide circle of friends and critics who have shared in this labor of love. First of all, I wish to thank the University of Virginia for a research fellowship to study in Germany, and I am especially indebted to the late Dr. Axel von Harnack of Tübingen for his valuable insights into his father's wartime activities. Staff members of the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin, and the Nachlass division of Marburg University Library were also most kind in assisting me. Mrs. Shirley Weiner of the English Department of Adirondack Community College helped me eliminate many awkward grammatical constructions, and my typist, Mrs. Marjorie

Shea, accomplished a herculean task in preparing the final draft.

My Doktorvater, Professor Enno E. Kraehe, carefully watched over this project from the beginning, and his experienced eye helped me to separate the wheat from the chaff. For his firm hand I am more grateful now than earlier. His colleagues at the University of Virginia, Professors Erik Midelfort and David Little, saved me from some embarrassing errors and helped me clarify certain points. In spite of the efforts of my co-laborers to purge this study of its impurities, I am certain that a measure of dross remains, for which I must assume full responsibility. Finally, to my wife, Deborah, who graciously managed to ignore my ignoring her, and to our children, who have wondered long enough about the pater absconditus, I promise that my future duty to scholarship shall not perpetuate my neglect of those whose cheerful support made the completion of this work possible.

ABBREVIATIONS IN FOOTNOTES

I. ARCHIVES and LIBRARIES

BAK	Bundesarchiv, Koblenz
SBB	Staatsbibliothek, (East) Berlin
UBF	Universitätsbibliothek, Freiburg im Breisgau
UBM	Universitätsbibliothek, Marburg am Lahn
ZSTA	Deutsches Zentralarchiv, I, Potsdam (containing
Potsdam	Akten der Reichskanzlei pertaining to the
	Nationaler Ausschuss für einen Deutschen Frieden)

II. PERIODICALS, JOURNALS, and NEWSPAPERS

<u>Alldt. Bl.</u>	<u>Alldeutsche Blätter</u>
<u>Allgem. Evangel.-</u>	<u>Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische</u>
<u>Luther. Kirchztg.</u>	<u>Kirchenzeitung</u>
<u>Amer. Hist. Review</u>	<u>American Historical Review</u>
<u>Berl. Tagbl.</u>	<u>Berliner Tageblatt</u>
<u>Christl. Welt</u>	<u>Die Christliche Welt</u>
<u>Construct. Qtrly.</u>	<u>Constructive Quarterly</u>
<u>Current History</u>	<u>The New York Times Current History</u>
	<u>of the European War (vol. nos.</u>
	<u>used refer to single issue editions,</u>
	<u>not the bound set of twenty volumes)</u>
<u>Dt.-Evangel.</u>	<u>Deutsch-Evangelisch</u>
<u>Dt. Pol.</u>	<u>Deutsche Politik</u>
<u>Dt. Tagztg.</u>	<u>Deutsche Tageszeitung</u>
<u>Evangel. Freiht.</u>	<u>Evangelische Freiheit</u>
<u>Evangel. Wochbr.</u>	<u>Evangelischer Wochenbrief</u>
<u>Frkft. Ztg.</u>	<u>Frankfurter Zeitung</u>
<u>Hist. Ztschr.</u>	<u>Historische Zeitschrift</u>
<u>Inter. Concil.</u>	<u>International Conciliation</u>
<u>Inter. Monatsschr.</u>	<u>Internationale Monatsschrift für</u>
	<u>Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik</u>
<u>Jour. of Contemp. Hist.</u>	<u>Journal of Contemporary History</u>
<u>Köln. Ztg.</u>	<u>Kölnische Zeitung</u>
<u>Neue Kirchl. Ztschr.</u>	<u>Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift</u>
<u>Neue Rund.</u>	<u>Die neue Rundschau</u>
<u>Norddt. Allgem. Ztg.</u>	<u>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</u>
<u>Preuss. Jahrbh.</u>	<u>Preussische Jahrbücher</u>
<u>Prot. Wkly. Letter</u>	<u>Protestant Weekly Letter</u>
<u>Süddt. Monatshf.</u>	<u>Süddeutsche Monatshefte</u>
<u>Tägl. Rund.</u>	<u>Tägliche Rundschau</u>
<u>Theol. Rund.</u>	<u>Theologische Rundschau</u>
<u>Vtjh. f. Ztgscht.</u>	<u>Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte</u>
<u>Ztschr. f. evangel.</u>	<u>Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik</u>
<u>Ethik</u>	

III. EDITORIALS

Kirchl. Ch.	Kirchliche Chronik
Kl. Mittlgn.	Kleine Mitteilungen
Pol. Korr.	Politische Korrespondenz

"Gott mit uns." German device inscribed on the soldiers' belts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	ii
ABBREVIATIONS IN FOOTNOTES	x
ILLUSTRATION	xi
Chapter	
I. THE THEOLOGICAL ELITE	1
II. GERMANY NOT GUILTY	46
III. THE LAND OF THE PHARISEES	94
IV. THE FAIRY TALE OF PERPETUAL PEACE	126
V. WITH PEN AND SWORD	184
VI. PRECARIOUS ECCLESIASTICAL TRUCE	253
VII. PAN-GERMANISM AND THE POLARIZATION OF THE PROFESSORS	289
VIII. BELGIUM, THE BALTIC PROVINCES, AND BETHMANN-HOLLWEG	345
IX. REFORM, REACTION, OR REVOLUTION?	397
CONCLUSION	458
APPENDICES	479
BIBLIOGRAPHY	488

THE THEOLOGICAL ELITE

Chapter I

By 1914 the German Empire built by Bismarck had made impressive achievements in almost every field of human endeavor. In several, however, Germany was virtually supreme. Her music was unexcelled. She was the birthplace of Marxism, and her Socialist party was the largest and most successful in the world. Hardly less imposing was the renown of her scholarship, and among her scholars none excelled in world prestige her Protestant theologians. They had wrestled with the challenge to religion posed by the modern world and in many ways had emerged victorious. Wherever pulpits were manned by the learned, the names of Adolf von Harnack, Reinhold Seeberg, Ernst Troeltsch, and Albert Schweitzer were known and revered. The world over, in mission churches in Africa, in China and Japan, in rural Lutheran parishes on the American great plains could be found friends and students of these men. In 1910, a World Missions Conference in Edinburgh had brought together for the first time continental missionary societies with their counterparts from Britain and America, achieving a high point in ecclesiastical good will. Then the guns of August began to fire. Obviously the march of the German army was the first concern, but

thoughtful men looked toward Germany for more. And just as socialists looked to their brethren in the Reichstag for guidance, so, too, did Christians the world over look to the German theologians. Surely these men, the founders of higher criticism, the creators of comparative religion, giants accustomed to dealing with all cosmic and earthly issues, would light a beacon. They could not, of course, stop the war, but surely they could tell us how to view it.

When the war began, Germany had about 4,000 professors and instructors in her twenty-two universities, including approximately 220 Protestant theologians. Of the latter, beyond a doubt the most revered was Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930). A master of many religious disciplines, he was unexcelled in his own field of early church history. A theological liberal, he led the left (least dogmatic) wing of the Ritschlian school, named after a Göttingen theologian, Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889). Although Ritschl had not completely ruled out the supernatural and dogma in religion, he had sought to liberate theology from what he regarded as its bondage to metaphysics and to place greater emphasis on Christian ethics. Influenced by the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), who had held that although things could not be known in themselves, they could be known in their attributes and activities, Ritschl had taught that as these attributes affect one's conduct, one makes what he called a "value judgment." Thus, although one has no way of knowing what God is like in Himself or abstractly,

when one sees Him revealed in Christ as love, one can assign to Christ the value of God. Ritschlians had an optimistic outlook, believing in the power of love to transform society and usher in "the kingdom of God"--an age of peace and universal brotherhood. In 1900, an American Protestant periodical renamed itself The Christian Century in the confidence that the twentieth century would realize this ideal, and Ritschlians preached what their opponents castigated as merely a "social Gospel."¹

In embracing liberalism, Harnack departed from his conservative roots. Born in the Baltic province of Russian-controlled Livonia, he was the son of Theodosius Harnack, a pietistic theologian who taught at the Livonian University of Dorpat. When Adolf was only two years old, his father accepted a call to Erlangen University, where he taught from 1853 to 1866, providing his son with memories of a Bavarian childhood. After the family returned to Livonia, Adolf

¹The best treatment of nineteenth and twentieth-century liberal German Protestantism is Johannes Rathje, Die Welt des freien Protestantismus (Stuttgart, 1952). Ritschl's most representative disciple was Wilhelm Herrmann, who reflected his master's ambiguous attitude toward speculative doctrines. The more dogmatic right wing of the Ritschlian school was led by Julius Kaftan and Theodor Häring; see John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (New York, 1963), 75-89, and Kenneth Scott Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, II (New York, 1959), 26-32. The Christian Century was formerly a Disciples of Christ publication entitled The Christian Oracle; "Turning the Century," Time, CI (1972), 98. For general information on topics and persons discussed in this study, consult Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3rd ed., 6 vols. (Tübingen, 1957-1962) and The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, 12 vols. (New York, 1908-1912).

attended Dorpat University and then completed his studies at Leipzig, two noted bastions of orthodoxy. Harnack taught on the theology faculties of Leipzig, Giessen, and Marburg; and in 1887, the Berlin Faculty of Theology, the largest and most prestigious in Germany, extended him a unanimous call, but the Prussian Oberkirchenrat, or Supreme Church Council, immediately raised doctrinal objections. This body of thirteen men, appointed by the king for life, was the highest organ of the Prussian state church. Usually conservative in theology, the Council often raised its voice against the appointment of liberal professors. In this instance their anxiety had been aroused by Harnack's Dogmengeschichte (1885-1889), which questioned the traditional interpretation of the virgin birth, resurrection, and ascension. The Supreme Church Council successfully thwarted his appointment for almost a year, a period which included the final months of Emperor William I and the "hundred days" of Frederick III. But when William II came to the throne, Friedrich Althoff, the assistant to the Prussian minister of culture and education, and Chancellor Bismarck prevailed upon him to override the Council's objection and summon Harnack to Berlin. While licking their wounds, the orthodox raised another howl when, in 1892, Harnack defended a young cleric who had performed a baptism without using the Apostles' Creed. The minister of culture refrained from censuring Harnack, but this time, as a concession to the defenders of the faith, the Kaiser appointed the conservative Adolf von Schlatter (1852-1938)

to a chair of systematic theology at Berlin, and for the first time in the history of Prussian universities, the term "punishment professorship" was used. Though Harnack remained a bête noire in the eyes of conservatives, he soon became an intimate of the Kaiser, who bestowed upon him the title of privy councilor and later, in March, 1914, ennobled him, making him the last scholar to be so honored in royal Prussia. In spite of these laurels, the Prussian church never permitted him to sit on its councils, synods, or boards, or to examine his own pupils as they entered the service of the church.²

Berlin afforded Harnack numerous outlets for his seemingly inexhaustible talents and energy. In 1890, the Prussian Academy of Sciences invited him, as a historian, to join its illustrious ranks--an honor granted to only two other theologians since the days of Schleiermacher. The same year, the Protestant-Social Congress, an ecclesiastical parallel to the Association for Social Politics, was formed. Preaching social action based on Christian concern, this group had Harnack's active support from the start, and he

²An admiring but scholarly biography of Harnack was done by his daughter, Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, Adolf von Harnack (Berlin, 1951; 1st ed., 1936). On the origins of the Prussian Supreme Church Council, see William O. Shanahan, German Protestants Face the Social Question 1815-1871 (Notre Dame, 1954). Writing his memoirs in Holland, the Emperor remembered the struggle to bring Harnack to Berlin; Kaiser Wilhelm II, Ereignisse und Gestalten aus den Jahren 1878-1918 (Berlin, 1922).

Harnack, Harnack, 161-165, 191, 236-250, 327-332.

served as its president from 1903 to 1911. From 1906 to 1921, he was General Director of the Prussian Royal Library. In 1911, when the Kaiser asked for ideas on how to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the University of Berlin, Harnack's suggestion led to the creation of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Promotion of Science (the present Max Planck Institute), and he was its president until his death.³

Harnack had many gifted relatives. In 1912, his daughter Agnes became the first woman to receive a doctorate from a German university, and on the eve of the war she was active in the women's rights movement in Germany. Shortly after her father's death, she wrote what is still the only complete biographical study of him. As already noted, Harnack's father was a conservative theologian, and the publication of his son's liberal Dogmengeschichte so distressed him that he sorrowfully but sternly rebuked him. Harnack was so stung by this rebuff that he could scarcely bring himself to mention it in later years. His three brothers were also accomplished intellectuals, but two of them and his only sister had died before the war began--one brother by his own hand. Compensating for these losses was the gain of a promising brother-in-law. Harnack married in 1879, and five years later his wife's sister married the historian Hans Delbrück, who soon distinguished himself as Treitschke's successor at the University of Berlin and editor of the Preussische Jahrbücher.

³Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 161-165, 191, 238-250, 327-332.

Harnack and Delbrück were not only relatives, colleagues, and neighbors in the Berlin suburb of Grunewald; they were kindred spirits. For over forty years, they and their wives met nearly every Sunday for lively discussion. During the war, the two historians were the leaders of the liberal intellectuals who advocated internal political reform and opposed inordinate territorial demands.⁴

Harnack attained international fame through a series of extemporaneous lectures on "The Nature of Christianity" given at Berlin University in the winter of 1899-1900. The addresses were so enthusiastically received that he decided to publish them. The result, Das Wesen des Christentums, went through three editions in 1900 alone and was subsequently translated into fourteen languages. Today it still stands as the classic statement of nineteenth-century theological liberalism. Harnack asserted that the Gospel originally preached by Jesus had focused not upon himself as the Son of God but upon God the Father and the coming of God's kingdom. The early church, however, under the influence of Hellenistic philosophy, had erroneously attributed to Jesus divine claims about his own person, and therefore the New Testament contained a "double Gospel."⁵

⁴Agnes von Harnack, "The Civil Work of German Women in War Times," Current History, V (1916), 97-102; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 21, 60, 105-106, 134-161; Wilhelm Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch. Two Historical Theologians (New York, 1968), 3.

⁵Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 181-188; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 114-117, 166; Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums (Leipzig, 1920; 1st ed., 1900), 33, 91-92.

Though Harnack was known at home and abroad as the champion of liberalism, he was weighed in the balances and found wanting by some of his disciples. In 1909, the General Synod of the Prussian state church had called for the establishment of a Disciplinary Board with authority to determine whether a clergyman's views were consonant with the confessional statements of the church. To the dismay of most of his liberal colleagues, Harnack defended the proposal as a progressive measure, since it would transform heresy from a crime into a mere ecclesiastical offense and permit the offender, even if dismissed from his pulpit, to retain his title, pension, and other clerical benefits. In 1910, William II, as summus episcopus of the Prussian state church, called the board into being.⁶

The following year, it tried its first case, when it summoned Karl Jatho, a Cologne pastor, to answer charges of teaching pantheism. Rudolf Sohm, a Leipzig jurist, Max Lenz, a Hamburg historian, and Paul Natorp, a Marburg philosopher, drew up a protest which quickly gained 430 signatures. Harnack, however, refused to sign, arguing that a "completely unprotected" state church was worthless.⁷ Of a different

⁶Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 303-307; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 152-154. The thirteen-man board included four members of the Prussian Supreme Church Council, two theologians and two jurists; three men from the general synod, four from the provincial synod involved, including its general superintendent; and two theologians named by the king.

⁷Harnack in Christl. Welt, 1911, cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 185. The entire Jatho affair is discussed in Rathje, 179-194, and Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 307-312.

mind was Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922), the best representative of pure Ritschlianism and uncrowned king of the Marburg theology faculty. He held that even though Jatho had embraced "religiously empty and insolent nonsense," the board's action had to be stopped.⁸ Nevertheless, the majority of the board found him guilty of doctrinal deviation and dismissed him from the ministry. At last, Harnack issued a mild protest. Conceding that Jatho's theology was incompatible with official doctrine, he argued that his piety and Christian concern entitled him to his office. Yet, when another declaration against the board was drawn up late in 1911, Harnack again refused to sign, and Jatho, who considered himself a disciple of Harnack, openly complained that his master had left him in the lurch. The Socialist organ, Vorwärts, accused Harnack of moral bankruptcy, and in his memoirs, Prince Bernhard von Bülow revived the charge, attributing this instance of seeming inconsistency to Harnack's fear of displeasing the conservative empress and her circle. During the cause célèbre, Harnack defended himself by drawing upon his vast knowledge of church history. Only because the Prussian state church was a confessional church had it held together, he insisted. Though rejoicing that the confession had become more elastic, he believed that it could not be discarded altogether. He interpreted as a sign of significant progress

⁸Wilhelm Herrmann to Martin Rade, no date [spring, 1911], Herrmann Nachlass, UBM.

the prominence of a right-wing Ritschlian, Julius Kaftan (1848-1926), on the Supreme Church Council, and he concluded that "the wheel of history cannot be driven faster."⁹ Jatho died in 1913, but the issue was not buried with him. It surfaced frequently throughout the war and ruptured the ecclesiastical Burgfriede or truce between the church factions.

Harnack's opinion was sought not only in internal but also in international religious affairs. Students from all over the world came to sit at his feet in Berlin, and learned societies in numerous countries competed for his presence at their meetings. From 1900 to 1914, hardly a year passed that he did not address a foreign conference. In 1903, he attended the International Congress for Historical Studies at Rome and arranged for the next session to be held in Berlin. The following year, he went to America to visit the World Exposition at St. Louis and to speak at Harvard and Yale. In London in 1911, he addressed the Associated Council of Churches of the British and German

⁹Harnack to Gustav Krüger, July 1, 1911, cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 193; Bernhard Fürst von Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, III (Berlin, 1931), 93-94, 115-116. Bülow died in 1929, and Harnack in 1930. In his memoirs, Bülow frequently criticized the theologian, portraying him as second only to Theodor Schiemann in his expertise at flattering the Kaiser. According to Harnack's daughter, Bülow's dislike of Harnack resulted from the latter's refusal to help him regain power after his fall in 1909. His memoirs caused such a stir that several Berlin theologians took class time to make critical comments and corrections; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 271; Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. by Eric Mosbacher et al. (New York, 1970), 124.

Empires for Fostering Friendly Relations between the Two Peoples. As an ambassador of good will, he told his English listeners that "your Shakespeare has become our Shakespeare" and assured them that Germans looked forward to the day when "the alleged natural law of necessary wars" would be overcome.¹⁰

Thus, when the European holocaust began and Christian lifted up sword against Christian, clergymen and intellectuals the world over looked to this academic man of the cloth for some word of moral guidance. Most listened for a note of censure against what they saw as a monstrous manifestation of Prussian militarism and barbarism. When instead, his foreign disciples heard Harnack condone and even celebrate the German war effort, they felt betrayed--concluding that he, too, had sold his soul to the god of blood and iron.

Though Harnack defended the innocence of his Fatherland, he disagreed with the majority of his theological colleagues over war aims and the political restructuring of Germany. His most vigorous opponent, theologically and politically, was Reinhold Seeberg (1859-1935), whose career was remarkably similar. Like Harnack, he was born in Livonia in the 1850s, studied at the University of Dorpat, and eventually received a call to Berlin; in 1898, he succeeded Adolf von Schlatter in the "punishment chair" of systematic theology. Like his rival, Seeberg wrote a massive Dogmengeschichte (1895-1898)

¹⁰Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 293-303; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 219-220; Dietrich Schäfer, Mein Leben (Berlin, 1926), 163.

and in answer to the former's Das Wesen des Christentums gave a series of lectures in 1901-1902, published as Die Grundwahrheiten der christlichen Religion (1902). Harnack was president of the Protestant-Social Congress, Seeberg of the Free Ecclesiastical-Social Conference, a rival, more conservative organization though both had been founded by Adolf Stöcker, the well known court chaplain, who saw in such organizations religion's answer to Social Democracy. There were other similarities as well. Even as Harnack had followed his father's profession, Erich Seeberg (1888-1945), Reinhold's son, had become an Instructor in Church History at Greifswald in 1913. During the war, Harnack's first son-in-law fell in an opening campaign on the western front, and Seeberg's son Erich served as a chaplain in the east. On the home front in 1915, Harnack lost his last sibling when a brother died, and Seeberg mourned the passing of his only brother, Alfred (1863-1915), a liberal Professor of New Testament at Kiel.¹¹

The conservative theology which Seeberg championed

¹¹Reinhold Seeberg, "Selbstbiographie," in Hans von Arnim and Georg von Below (eds.), Deutscher Aufstieg (Berlin, 1925), 415-422; Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II (manuscript, 1930), 260, 270, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 137, 161-165; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 53-57, 77-83, 212-214. A thorough treatment of German Protestantism's response to the social question during the quarter century before the war can be found in Manfred Schick, Kulturprotestantismus und soziale Frage (Tübingen, 1970).

stemmed from the "Erlangen school," so named after the Bavarian university in which a resurgent Lutheranism mixed with Pietism had found a stronghold in the early nineteenth century before moving to Dorpat, Leipzig, and Rostock. Later theologians spoke of it variously as "old Protestantism," a theology of revelation, confessional religion, or--most commonly--positive theology. As Harnack led the left-wing Ritschlians, so did Seeberg lead the left wing of the positive school, known as the "modern-positive," which sought to reconcile orthodox Lutheranism with the discoveries of higher criticism and modern science. Other leaders of the Erlangen school were Theodor von Zahn, Karl Dunkmann, Ludwig Ihmels, and Nathanael Bonwetsch. Zahn (1836-1933) was Professor of New Testament at Erlangen and co-editor of the monthly Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift, which along with the weekly Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung were the mouthpieces of positive theology. Dunkmann (1868-1932) described the conflict between it and liberalism as a battle between supernaturalism and rationalism. Ihmels (1858-1933) upheld one of the chief tenets of orthodoxy by defending the bodily resurrection of Jesus in his Die Auferstehung Jesu Christi (1909). Bonwetsch (1848-1925) maintained that unless there was a clear line between what he saw as "two religions" the Gospel was being abandoned, and during the war he struggled

against the appointment of liberal professors to his theology faculty at Göttingen.¹²

Seeberg fought a similar battle when Harnack tried to bring to Berlin the man who completed the trinity of Germany's most celebrated theologians, Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923). Troeltsch was the son of a Bavarian physician, but since neither medicine, law, nor philosophy attracted him, he decided to study theology as a springboard for exploring both metaphysical and historical problems. Beginning at conservative Erlangen, he completed his studies at more liberal Göttingen, where he finally abandoned Ritschl's systematic-dogmatic approach to religion for the historical approach of Paul de Lagarde (1827-1891). From 1890 to 1892 Troeltsch was an instructor on the Göttingen theology faculty, where together with a coterie of like-minded young instructors he laid the foundations for the study of the history of religions. After two years as an associate professor at Bonn, he received in 1894 a full professorship in Systematic Theology at Heidelberg, while under thirty.¹³

¹²Dunkmann, "Die protestantischen Parteien nach dem Kriege," in Thimme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 168; Bonwetsch to Reinhold Seeberg, Jan. 26 and Nov. 17, 1916, and Nov. 4, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. Positive theology is discussed in: Richard Grützmacher, "Der ethische Typus der Erlanger Theologie," Neue Kirchl. Ztschr., XXVIII (1917), 435-456; Erich Schäfer, "Theocentric Theology: In Peace and War," Construct. Qrtly., III (1915), 39-53; Schick, Kulturprotestantismus und soziale Frage, 33-49; Bethje, Bonhoeffer, trans. by Eric Mosbacher et al., 47.

¹³We are indebted to Troeltsch for a brief autobio-

The shoe of systematics did not exactly fit, however, and two years later Troeltsch became the enfant terrible of the theological world. At a gathering of liberal theologians in Eisenach, he listened impatiently as the right-wing Ritschlian, Julius Kaftan, delivered what he regarded as a stuffy lecture. When the time came for discussion, he sprang to the rostrum and exclaimed, "Gentlemen, everything is tottering." No sooner had he explained the intellectual crisis that he perceived than another Ritschlian took the floor and dismissed his reasoning as "paltry theology." At this, Troeltsch rose and left the room, slamming the door behind him.¹⁴

In this bombastic manner, Troeltsch announced the conclusions of his former Göttingen group, which included Wilhelm Bousset (1865-1920), Johannes Weiss (1863-1914), and Hermann Gunkel (1862-1932). They believed that Ritschl had merely exchanged old dogma for new and had erred in regarding Christianity as a factor that had entered history from without. Everything had evolved, they held, and both man and religion were products and prisoners of history.

graphical sketch with a misleading title, "Meine Bücher," (1922), Gesammelte Schriften, IV, ed. by Hans Baron (Aalen, 1966; 1st ed., 1925), 1-18. A large interpretative study by one of his first students is Walther Köhler, Ernst Troeltsch (Tübingen, 1941); see also Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 43-94.

¹⁴Köhler, Troeltsch, 1.

The "older" (designating not so much age as manner of thinking) Ritschlians' belief in the supernatural or at least superhistorical character of Christianity had to be discarded, and the dogmatic method of theology give way to the historical method. The emphasis of these "younger" theologians on the relativity of all religions led them to secede from the already divided "older" Ritschlians and to place the study of religions on historical foundations alone. In his Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (1902), Troeltsch denied the absoluteness of Christianity, arguing that all high religions had entered into a union with historical cultures. Although the early church had naively advanced claims for absoluteness, both its doctrinal and social-ethical teachings involved a compromise with the temporal world. He delineated the process of social adaption in his best-known work, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (1911). A monumental piece of scholarship, it was for Troeltsch a "full parallel" to Harnack's Dogmengeschichte.¹⁵

While at Heidelberg, Troeltsch married, had a son, represented the university in the upper house of the Baden legislature, and became fast friends with his famous Heidelberg colleague, Max Weber. In 1905, the two scholars visited

¹⁵Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 55-68, 76-79; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 89-94, 110-111; Troeltsch, "Meine Bücher," (1922), Gesammelte Schriften, IV, ed. by Hans Baron, 11-12.

the United States together, and four years later they moved with their families into the same house on the Neckar river. The war brought an unpleasant end to their relationship. Weber was a reserve officer in charge of Heidelberg hospitals for wounded French prisoners. Troeltsch was the civilian administrator of one hospital, and when he heard that visitors were committing treasonable acts, he required them to be accompanied by military personnel. Weber accused him of a cowardly surrender to meaningless gossip, but Troeltsch refused to budge, and their friendship was ruptured. Only in 1919, one year before Weber's death, did their wives effect a partial reconciliation.¹⁶

This was not the only wartime casualty that Troeltsch experienced. Soon after the war began, his mother had a stroke, and after her death a short time later, his father suffered a complete breakdown and lived only two more years. His sister lost her only son after only two weeks of military service, and his brother-in-law became so distraught that he died a year later. Hermann Süsskind, one of Troeltsch's most promising students and an instructor on the Tübingen theology faculty, perished at the front in 1914.¹⁷

¹⁶Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 69-74, 88.

¹⁷Ibid., 88; obituary of Troeltsch's father, Christl. Welt, XXXI, (1917), 755; information on Süsskind in Troeltsch, "Über massstäbe zur Beurteilung historischer Dinge." Hist. Ztschr., CXVI (1916), 14, footnote 1, and in Dr. Volker Schäfer (Tübingen Univ. archivist) to Charles E. Bailey, Jan. 14, 1970.

Offsetting Troeltsch's personal losses was a professional gain--his summons to Berlin. Never fully interested in theology, he felt confined within its narrow purview. As he put it, he had "outgrown" the theology faculty.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Harnack wanted to bring him to Berlin as a theologian. The full professors of theology were divided five to five on the matter, Seeberg heading the opposition. The Prussian Supreme Church Council was likewise opposed. A way around the impasse was found when the Minister of Culture, August von Trott zu Solz, proposed that Troeltsch join the philosophy faculty--a frequent means of disposing of undesirable theologians. Seeberg still objected, fearing that even if Troeltsch sat on the other faculty he might eventually be authorized to teach theology. He privately grumbled that Harnack was striving for a "personal success" and "glowing with a grandiose fanaticism" as he tried to force Troeltsch on Berlin through "power and cunning."¹⁹ But the compromise solution was finally accepted, and at Easter, 1915, Troeltsch came to the Prussian capital as Professor of the Philosophy of History and Religion. Seeberg's wife and biographer wryly summed up the affair, remarking that Berlin received "a believing philosopher instead of an unbelieving theologian."²⁰

¹⁸Troeltsch, "Meine Bücher," (1922), Gesammelte Schriften, IV, 12.

¹⁹Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II (1930) 221, and Reinhold Seeberg to Nathanael Bonwetsch, June 22, 1914, cited in Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild, II, 222, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

²⁰Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 221, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

Upon arrival in Berlin, Troeltsch quickly won the hearts of several of his fellow historians. He deepened his life-long friendship with Harnack, who admired his "powerful, primitive nature and hearty laughter," and every other Sunday morning he went with Friedrich Meinecke and Otto Hintze for an invigorating walk that led through Grunewald to a coffee-house.²¹ Though theology did not lose all appeal, he regarded his formal exit from it as a "liberation and a stimulus,"²² putting him on the pathway toward "an ever more exacting study of the real life of Kultur in general."²³ Indeed, of Troeltsch's thirty wartime articles about the war, only one gave any more than passing mention to distinctly Christian topics, such as the Sermon on the Mount, repentance for sin, or concern over the disrupted missionary activity in the German colonies.²⁴ When his life was cut short in the early years of the Weimar Republic, Harnack eulogized him not as a great theologian but as, next to Hegel, "the

²¹Harnack's remarks, cited in Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 340; Friedrich Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin 1901-1919 (Stuttgart, 1949), 155-159.

²²Troeltsch to Wilhelm Herrmann, March 10, 1918, Herrmann Nachlass, UBM.

²³Troeltsch to Paul Natorp, July 4, 1918, Natorp Nachlass, UBM.

²⁴Troeltsch, "Der Völkerkrieg und das Christentum," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 294-303.

first great philosopher of history" Germany had produced.²⁵

Another theologian who went from Heidelberg to Berlin was Adolf Deissmann (1866-1937). Born in Nassau, he studied at Tübingen, Berlin, and Marburg and in 1897 became Professor of New Testament Exegesis at Heidelberg. He was dean of the theology faculty when it conferred upon the preacher-politician Friedrich Naumann an honorary doctorate, and he led the local chapter of Naumann's short-lived National Social Association. His opponents berated his political affiliation when trying to block his call to Berlin, but the senior of the Berlin theology faculty, Bernhard Weiss (1877-1918), whom Deissmann was to replace, supported him, and in 1908 he joined the illustrious band at the apex of German education.²⁶

Deissmann's prewar fame rested on two works: Licht von Osten (1908) and Paulus (1911). In the first, he demonstrated that New Testament Greek was koine or common Greek, spoken throughout the Graeco-Roman world at the time of Christ.²⁷

²⁵Harnack, "Funeral Address for Ernst Troeltsch," Feb. 3, 1923, in Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 122.

²⁶Gottfried Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche und Politik 1917-1919, 25-26; William U. Shanahan, "Friedrich Naumann: A Mirror of Willhelman Germany," The Review of Politics, XIII (1951), 267-301.

²⁷Deissman, Light from the Ancient East. The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World, trans. by Lionel R. M. Strachan (London, 1910). Deissmann's conclusion was based on the discovery in Egypt in the 1890s of numerous Greek papyri documents.

Paulus was based on journeys he had made in 1906 and 1909 to Asia Minor and Greece, and he was so impressed with the land of Paul's birth and missionary journeys that he named his summer home outside Berlin "Anatolia." Theologically, Deissmann eludes classification, but his favorable treatment of Paul, exonerating the apostle of having "corrupted the simple Gospel of the Nazarene with harsh and difficult dogmas," places him outside the standard liberal camp.²⁸ He first presented his portrait of the apostle in a series of lectures at Uppsala University in 1909, and his book appeared two years later in both German and English. One of his most awkward wartime experiences was finding his English translator, who was also the godfather of one of his children, in a German internment camp for British civilians.²⁹

Deissman visited England five times before the war and held honorary degrees from Manchester, Aberdeen, and St. Andrews. His reception at St. Andrews in 1911 was marred by the furor over the "Panther's Leap at Agadir." While addressing an ecclesiastical conference in Queen's Hall, London, the following year, he tried to improve Germany's image. He argued that Germany's universal conscription

²⁸Deissmann, St. Paul. A Study in Social and Religious History, trans. by Lionel R. M. Strachan (London, 1911), vi-ix, 4-6.

²⁹Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, July 24, 1915.

made her less, not more, prone to unleash a war, since a country whose own youth would bear the brunt of the battle would practice greater restraint than a nation depending chiefly on mercenaries, colonial troops, and the manpower of her allies. When war eventually came, he charged that England's decision to enter was partially predicated on the frivolous assumption of her own minimal losses.³⁰

It was America, however, not England that occupied Deissmann during the war. At the suggestion of Matthias Erzberger, the Zentrum leader and coordinator of German propaganda, he began sending weekly news letters, in December, 1914, to his friends and students across the Atlantic. The theme supposedly discussed in each Evangelischer Wochenbrief was "war and religion," but the real aim of influencing the most powerful neutral was scarcely concealed. In the post-war period, Deissmann was the leading German figure in the young ecumenical movement, which tried to bind up the spiritual wounds of a broken world. He helped formulate some of the declarations of the Oud Wassenaar Conference (1919), the Stockholm Conference on Life and Work (1929), and the Lausanne

³⁰Deissmann, "Die deutsche Erweckung," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 119-120, and Prot. Wkly. Letter, Dec. 18, 1915. His degrees are listed in William Archer (ed.), Gems (?) of German Thought (London, 1917), 256.

Conference on Faith and Order (1927).³¹

Even as Deissmann rejuvenated Paul, another Berlin theologian, Karl Holl, revitalized the study of Luther. Holl (1866-1926) was a Swabian brought up under the influence of pietistic Lutheranism. After studying in his native city of Tübingen, he went to Berlin, where Harnack took him under his wing and secured his appointment in 1906 to the second chair of church history. In 1915 he joined Harnack in the Prussian Academy of Sciences. He learned Russian in order to probe the depths of the Orthodox faith, and he was well versed in both eastern and western Christianity. During the war, he published several essays on the Saxon reformer, and the first of his volumes of collected essays was entitled Luther.³² At the time of his death, he was president of the Luther Society, and at his funeral, Harnack declared that neither "positive," "liberal," nor "a disciple of Ritschl" rightly described him but rather a theologian who had "grounded himself in the teachings of Luther."³³ Though Holl owed his scholarly advancement to

³¹Matthias Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1920), 18-20; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Dec. 6, 1914; Nils Karlström, "Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work, 1910-1925," and Nils Ehrenström, "Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work, 1925-1948," in Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill (eds.), A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948 (Philadelphia, 1967), 531, 537.

³²Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 6, footnote 3.

³³Harnack, "Rede bei Gedächtnisfeier der Universität Berlin für Karl Holl," in Karl Holl, Briefwechsel mit Adolf von Harnack, ed. by Heinrich Karpp (Tübingen, 1966), 91-92.

Harnack, his wartime sympathies were with Seeberg and the radical annexationists. In fact, he became so angry when Harnack's friend, Meinecke, attacked the extremist Fatherland Party that he refused to tolerate Meinecke's company and resigned from a small club of scholars to which they both belonged.³⁴

As Holl became synonymous with German interest in Luther, Julius Richter (1862-1940), a Berlin Associate Professor in Missions, symbolized the German enthusiasm for the world-missions movement. Reflecting the nineteenth-century impulse to carry both the Gospel and trade to benighted lands, a united Germany answered the call to "take up the white man's burden." At the outbreak of the war, she had over 1,600 missionaries in the field, representing twenty-five different mission societies whose efforts were coordinated by the German Protestant Mission Auxiliary. Richter was its secretary and Germany's delegate to the World Mission Conference at Edinburgh in 1910. For the first time, British, American, and continental mission organizations linked arms in brotherly cooperation, and the modern ecumenical movement was born. Richter was made vice-president of a Continuation Committee to carry on the work, and hovering above the "Europe of the armed camps" was an aura of ecclesiastical good will. When the European bloodletting finally began and spilled over into Germany's colonies, Richter blamed the English in

³⁴Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, 164.

particular for turning the missionfields into battlefields and complained that captured German missionaries fared better in the hands of the heathen Japanese than in those of the Christian English.³⁵

Along with the Berliners Harnack, Seeberg, Troeltsch, Deissmann, Holl and Richter, several other theologians shared the spotlight by virtue of their influence as publicists or their special doctrinal or political positions. Among the former were Martin Rade, editor of Die Christliche Welt, Martin Schian, editor of Deutsch-Evangelisch, and Otto Baumgarten, editor of Evangelische Freiheit. All three were pastors before becoming professors and publicists, and the latter two taught Practical Theology. Martin Rade (1857-1940) was the son of a Saxon pastor who experienced the turning point in his intellectual life when he fell under the spell of Harnack, his instructor in theology at Leipzig. A dozen students assembled in Harnack's room in the evening, dipping eagerly into both their master's mind and his open cigar box. Upon receiving his theological licentiate from Leipzig in 1881, he assumed his first pastorate, and a decade

³⁵Martin Schian, "Die evangelische Mission," in Dietrich Schäfer (ed.), Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1917, II (Leipzig, 1917), 361-363; A. W. Schreiber, "Der Weltkrieg als Belastungsprobe der deutschen evangelischen Missionen," Christl. Welt, XXIX, (1915), 188; Richter, Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche evangelische Mission, (Gütersloh, 1915), 6; see also K. S. Latourette, "Ecumenical Bearings of the Missionary Movement and the International Missionary Council," in Ruth Rouse and Stephen C. Neill (eds.), History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948, 355-362.

later, after Giessen University had favored him with an honorary doctorate of theology, he accepted a call to the Paulskirche in Frankfurt am Main. In 1899 he began his teaching career at Marburg, where five years later he was promoted to Associate Professor of Systematic Theology. Rade married the sister of Friedrich Naumann, and like Harnack and Delbrück, this pair of brothers-in-law also championed moderate territorial aims and political reform during the war.³⁶

In order to show that Christianity and scholarship could go hand in hand, in 1886 Rade and three other former students of Harnack at Leipzig founded Die Christliche Welt. Though this weekly did not officially represent any particular view but served, as its masthead declared, "the cultured in Protestant circles," it gradually became the unofficial organ of Ritschlianism. On several occasions prior to the war, the Swiss theologian Karl Barth, whose brother later married Rade's daughter, served as an assistant editor, and by 1914 the periodical had 4,360 subscribers. As a means of encouraging his supporters to exchange theological views, Rade began in 1893 to hold annual meetings in Eisenach, where Troeltsch made his startling debut four years later. With local groups all over Germany, his circle

³⁶Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 9, 15, 33, 60-63, 99, 380.

numbered about 1,500 on the eve of the war.³⁷

Like many of the theologians, Rade was known abroad. In 1908, English churchmen invited him and one hundred other German Protestant leaders to London for a conference to promote peace and understanding between the two nations. He was especially active in the World Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress. After having addressed the fourth congress in Boston in 1907, he arranged for the next session three years later to be held in Berlin, where he, Harnack, and Troeltsch shared the rostrum with other noted liberals.³⁸

Already at odds with German conservatives, Rade became suspect even to his liberal friends because of his flirtation with pacifism. Reflecting the unpopularity of this ideology in Germany was the membership of the German Peace Society--a meager 10,000, including only 114 clergymen, out of population of sixty-eight million.³⁹ In 1913, the

³⁷Ibid., 39-41, 90, 118-123, 171-172, 228, 242. The three other co-founders of Die Christliche Welt were Friedrich Loofs, Paul Drews, and Wilhelm Bornemann, all of whom were subsequently distressed to observe the continual leftward drift of the periodical. Because he was Swiss, Karl Barth does not fall within the scope of this study. After attending German universities, he returned to Switzerland and pastored a church in Safenwil from 1911 to 1921. He attracted attention in 1919 with his commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Römerbrief, which helped to found the neo-orthodox movement.

³⁸Ibid., 156-168, 229.

³⁹An exhaustive study of the German Peace Society is Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World Without War. The Peace Movement and German Society 1892-1914 (Princeton, 1975); a concluding chapter notes the inferiority of the German organization in membership and influence to its French counterpart.

struggling pacifist group tried to broaden its base by drafting an appeal which urged the realization of "a community of law which would replace the unlawfulness of war with the maxim of law and require from nations the ethic that is self-understood among men."⁴⁰ 3,400 copies were sent out for signatures, but only 395 were returned-- one quarter coming from Alsace-Lorraine. Only twelve theologians, including Rade, endorsed the appeal, but there was not a Berliner among them, and the only eminent scholar was the Leipzig New Testament critic, Caspar René Gregory (1846-1917).⁴¹

When the war broke out, Rade found himself a lone voice in the wilderness. To be sure, he defended Germany's innocence and the terrible necessity of recourse to arms, but he bewailed the worldwide failure of Christians to shoulder their responsibility of trying to prevent war. Though a member of the National Liberal Party, whose war-time chauvinism outdid even that of the hawkish Conservatives, he longed for the appearance of the dove of peace. Clearly out of step with the patriotic drum beat, he chided even his friends Harnack and Troeltsch for hesitating to hold forth

⁴⁰Otto Umfried, "Mobilmachung der Kirchen gegen den Krieg," Die Friedens-Warte, XV (1913), 210.

⁴¹Ibid., 211. For list of the twelve theologians, see Appendix A. Gregory was born in Philadelphia and attended Princeton Theological Seminary, where he assisted the Reformed theologian Charles Hodge in preparing his Systematic Theology (1872-73). After then studying under Harnack at Leipzig, he remained there as successor of the famous New Testament textual critic Konstantin von Tischendorf (1815-1874).

the olive branch. A barometer of his falling popularity was his periodical, which by March, 1915 had lost 600 of its 4,360 subscribers.⁴²

Until shortly before the war, Rade had enjoyed a good relationship with Martin Schian (1869-1944), who until 1910 was leader of the Prussian Mittelpartei and editor of its newspaper, Preussische Kirchenzeitung. The Mittelpartei was a church faction which lobbied in the Prussian General Synod for "mediation theology," a nineteenth-century compromise between the Erlangen school and the pre-Ritschlian liberalism of the "Tübingen theology." Its stronghold was the University of Halle, and its adherents were fond of citing Schleiermacher, who had taught there before going to Berlin. Schian was born in Silesia and after studying theology at Halle and other universities returned to the Prussian province in 1896 as a pastor. Ten years later, he became an Instructor in Practical Theology at Breslau University in Silesia, and in 1908 he went to Giessen as full professor in that discipline. By then, his relationship with Rade had become strained because of the leftward drift of Rade's theological circle. As a consequence of several disputes, Schian and ten other members of the Mittelpartei seceded from Rade's group in 1911.⁴³

⁴²Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 17, 242; Rade to Harnack, Aug. 15, 1916 and Apr. 13, 1918, Rade Nachlass, UBM.

⁴³Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 35-36, 50, 85, 127-128, 180, 198-199, Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany 1648-1840 (New York, 1964), 491-493.

A year before the exodus, Schian had founded a new journal, Deutsch-Evangelisch. To allay suspicion that it was an organ of the Mittelpartei, the cover of this monthly proclaimed that it served "all of German Protestantism." Nevertheless, its co-editor was Wilhelm Kahl, a Berlin Professor of Law and the faction's new leader. Schian's determination to keep the journal free from any party alignment finally led to Kahl's name being dropped from the masthead in January, 1917. Yet, in a broad sense, Schian and Deutsch-Evangelisch stayed in the middle of the theological spectrum and of the debate over wartime issues. Though he signed a petition of Seeberg's calling for extensive annexations, he remained a flexible conservative on both territorial and political questions. In the early 1920s, the German Protestant Church Committee honored his intimate understanding of church politics by commissioning him to do a study of the German state churches during the war. Within his carefully compiled work, he took a jab at Rade, crediting his wartime praise of peace with demoralizing German civilians.⁴⁴

Another theologian who, like Rade and Schian, went from pastor to publicist to professor was Otto Baumgarten (1858-1934). Born in Bavaria and reared in Baden, he inherited from his mother the strange mixture of Huguenot blood and religious skepticism. From his father, the noted historian

⁴⁴Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 576; Schian and Wilhelm Kahl, "Zum neuen Jahrgang," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 1; Schian, Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 24.

Hermann Baumgarten, and from his uncle, Baden's minister-president, Julius Jolly, he acquired an interest in politics and an affinity for the National Liberals. After making the normal student pilgrimage through several universities, he found himself under the spell of Schleiermacher. While serving for nearly a decade as a pastor, he married his half-English cousin, whose frail health did not endure the rigors of giving birth to their first child. In 1890, he began his teaching career at Berlin, and four years later he went to Kiel as full professor of Practical Theology and university preacher.⁴⁵

Attracted to the liberal and tolerant outlook of Rade's theological circle, he joined it and the editorial staff of Die Christliche Welt as well. In 1901, he founded his own journal, Evangelische Freiheit, which described itself as a "Monthly for Present-Day Church Practice" and during the war had about 1,400 readers. His lengthy editorials sought to apply Christian principles to the needs of the modern world, and he had further opportunity to make theology relevant when in 1912 he succeeded Harnack as president of the Protestant-Social Congress. But translating heavenly doctrine into earthly reality was not easy, and Baumgarten constantly wrestled with the task of relating the Gospel to a humanistically educated society.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Baumgarten, Meine Lebensgeschichte (Tübingen, 1929), 1-19, 61-69, 98-105.

⁴⁶Ibid., 19, 38, 85-87, 146, 267, 280-281.

Another problem was that of defining the proper relationship between politics and morality. His father had been so committed to political liberalism that he had at first opposed Bismarck, but he was so bedazzled by the triumph of "blood and iron" in 1866 that he publicly castigated the liabilities of his former creed. During the First World War, Otto published a much-noted book that drew similar conclusions. In his Politik und Moral, he insisted that a statesman's first duty was to further the interests of his state, that statecraft must remain impervious to the direct demands of Christian morality, and that personal Christian scruples were therefore often more of a hindrance than a help to political leaders. To the surprise of many of his colleagues, he denounced the popular slogan "Gott strafe England [may God punish England]," which was part of the hate campaign against "perfidious Albion." His reaction stemmed not from respect for his deceased half-English wife but from his conviction that politics and war had to be conducted without recourse to a religious rationale.⁴⁷

It was through taking another difficult stand that Baumgarten first came to national prominence--the defense of Karl Jatho. This Cologne pastor was defrocked in 1911, but not before Baumgarten had given an impassioned two and

⁴⁷Baumgarten, Politik und Moral (Tübingen, 1916), i, 3-6, 114-115, 173; Hermann Baumgarten "Der deutsche Liberalismus. Eine Selbstkritik," Preuss. Jahrbh., XVIII (1866), 589-590, 608-610.

one-half hour plea before the Disciplinary Board. Like Harnack, he acknowledged the incompatibility of Jatho's theology with the church's confession but argued that the church must make room for men of such undeniable piety and spiritual power. Baumgarten's co-editor, Gottfried Traub, a liberal Dortmund pastor, also sprang to Jatho's side, using the occasion to denounce not only the board but the nature of the Prussian state church as well. The horrified Westphalian consistory assembled as an ecclesiastical court and summoned Traub before it. The case finally reached the Prussian Supreme Church Council, which with its two Berlin theologians, Julius Kaftan and Gustav Kawerau, concurring, defrocked Traub in 1912. Unlike Jatho, he was not charged with heresy but with being an intolerable trouble-maker. During the war, Baumgarten and Rade publicly protested that the council's persistent refusal to reinstate Traub was inconsistent with the spirit of the Burgfriede.⁴⁸

In the war aims controversy, Baumgarten sided with Harnack, Rade, and other moderates who opposed inordinate annexations. Though a member of the National Liberal Party, he chastised its leaders for having too large an appetite for territory and too little regard for the difficulties of assimilating foreign subjects. On the related subject of domestic reform, he used both his periodical and his pulpit

⁴⁸ Baumgarten, Lebensgeschichte, 171-178; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 307-316; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 186-187, 201, 209; Gottfried Traub, Staatschristentum oder Volkskirche (Jena, 1911), 34-64.

at Kiel in the final year of the war to preach acceptance of an imminent new political order. Like many of his closest wartime associates, he became a "Vernunftrepublikaner" at the beginning of the Weimar era, and the leaders of the new republic rewarded both his liberal stripe and expertise on religious affairs by appointing him as a consultant to the German peace delegation at Versailles.⁴⁹

Together with the towering Berliners and the professor-publicists, three other theologians merit attention because of their unusual doctrinal or political position: Albert Schweitzer, Rudolf Otto, and Friedrich Lezius. Schweitzer (1875-1965) was the son of an Alsatian pastor. After completing his studies at the theologically liberal Strassburg University, he became an instructor on its theology faculty in 1902, while also serving as curate of a local church. The following year, while studying music in Paris, he was made organist of the J. S. Bach Society.⁵⁰ What catapulted him to theological fame--by offending conservatives and liberals alike--was his Vom Reimarus zu Wrede (1906), translated as The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1910). Though by no means a conservative, Schweitzer charged that the portrait which nineteenth-century liberals had drawn of Jesus as a moral teacher and social reformer smacked too much of a desire to

⁴⁹Baumgarten, Lebensgeschichte, 10-15, 123-127, 256-356, 377-378, and Predigten aus der Revolutionszeit (Tübingen, 1919); Karl Hammer, Deutsche Kriegstheologie 1870-1918, 370.

⁵⁰Schweitzer, Aus meinem Leben und Denken (Leipzig, 1931), 1-25.

make him over in their own Victorian image. A "gentle Jesus" who spoke consoling words about the "kingdom of God" and the brotherhood of man was a myth, "a figure designed by rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern theology in historical garb."⁵¹ No, Jesus was an imperious figure who expected God's imminent, cataclysmic intervention in history; God would "bring in the kingdom" not through evolutionary development but by a sudden act. According to Schweitzer's "eschatological" interpretation, when Jesus saw that the kingdom had not come, he tried to force its realization by bringing about his own crucifixion. Thus, Jesus was wrong twice in his expectations, and, moreover, his moral teachings, as summarized in the Sermon on the Mount, were not applicable to the Christian Church, for he had taught only an "interim ethic," a special code necessary merely during the interval before the imminent kingdom. Schweitzer's aberrant views initially met with a cool reception in Germany, but later theologians, notably Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976), revived his "eschatological" theme. Schweitzer received his first popular acclaim in England, where William Sanday at Oxford and F. C. Burkitt at Cambridge disseminated his ideas.⁵²

⁵¹Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. by W. Montgomery (New York, 1950; 1st ed., 1910), 398.

⁵²Ibid., 354, 380-397; Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, trans. by Kendrick Grobel (New York, 1951), 4-20.

One reason for Schweitzer's initial failure to gather disciples was his decision to take up a new vocation, medicine. In 1904, while reading a publication of the Paris Missionary Society which told of the need for workers in Africa, he resolved to become a jungle doctor. Completing his medical studies in 1912, he offered his services to the society, but its leaders distrusted his unorthodox views and hesitated. Only after he had assured them that he would restrict himself to medicine and not teach theology to either the natives or other missionaries did they accept his offer. In the spring of 1913, he and his wife left for French Equatorial Africa. Anticipating the outbreak of a European war, he carried gold instead of German marks. On August 5, 1915, immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, French authorities in Lambaréné informed him that he was a prisoner of war. Though interned for a few months, he was released in November, 1914, whereupon he resumed his medical duties and with great zest began working on the manuscript for his magnum opus, The Philosophy of Civilization (1923). In September, 1917, he was shipped to France, where he was again interned until July, 1918, when he was among those exchanged for French prisoners in Germany. His return home was darkened by the loss of his mother, who had been trampled to death in 1916 by cavalry horses on an Alsatian road.⁵³

⁵³Schweitzer, Aus meinem Leben und Denken, 1, 70-93, 119-157.

While Schweitzer combined theology, music, and medicine, Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) mingled politics with a professorship in systematic theology. After attending Göttingen University in his native Hanover, he taught at Breslau (1914-1917) and Marburg (1917-1937) while serving as a National Liberal deputy in the Prussian Lower House (1913-1918). Although he came from a conservative "old Lutheran" background, his primary theological interest was comparative religion, which in 1910-1911 took him on a trip around the world to examine various faiths at first hand. Two years later in Paris, he asked the World Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress, "Is A World Religion Possible?" If defined as a general set of convictions and feelings, he answered, "yes," and affirmed that such a faith was already being formed. In his wartime treatise on the psychology of religion, Das Heilige (1917), he contended that at the base of all religious experience was "the feeling of the numinous," man's subjective sense of awe, mystery, or dread when contemplating that objective aspect of deity that transcends rational comprehension. An immediate success, the work was translated into many languages. Though Otto's intent was not to elevate non-rational above rational perception but to show them as the complementary warp and woof of man's understanding of God, his book found a ready audience in the "lost generation" of those disillusioned with rational categories alone. At the time of his death, it was in its twentieth-fifth edition and had had wider

distribution than any other German theological work since Harnack's Das Wesen des Christentums. So popular was the book in the United States that Otto was one of the first German scholars invited to speak there after the war. Americans were also impressed with Otto's wartime record. He had sided with Harnack's group in calling for a restraint on territorial gains and the abolition of the Prussian three-class voting system. As a deputy in the Prussian Lower House, for which that franchise was in effect, he had urged the introduction of equal suffrage—but in vain.⁵⁴

The antithesis of Otto, theologically and politically, was Friedrich Lezius, Associate Professor of Church History at Königsberg. Like Seeberg, whose conservative views he shared, he was born in 1859 in Livonia. His father was a Prussian who had become a Russian subject in order to pastor in the Baltic provinces, and Friedrich became a Prussian citizen only at the turn of the century. He joined the Conservative Party and the Pan-German League and in 1913 shocked pacifists by publicly justifying wars of aggression as compatible with Christian ethics. No sooner had the war begun than this archchauvinist revelled in the expectation of German conquests eastward and westward, and he privately

⁵⁴John W. Harvey, "Translator's Preface," in Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (London, 1950; 1st ed., 1923), ix-xix; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 229-230, 482-483; Ernst Rolffs, review of Das Heilige in Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXIX (1917), 439-445; Otto, address in Prussian Lower House, May 2, 1918, Protokolle des preussischen Abgeordnetenhauses, Vol. 140, pp. 9418-9422.

denounced the Kaiser and Chancellor as cowards. By 1917 he was dreaming of a dictatorship under Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who he believed would consign the Prussian franchise reform to perdition. Though he was obscure in the world of scholarship, his political fulminations against the Prussian Poles were heard even in America.⁵⁵

Lezius was nearly imprisoned during the war on a charge of slandering the Kaiser. Though cleared of the allegation, he did try to undermine confidence in both William II and his chancellors, proving that even though a professor was an official of state he did not shrink from criticizing its policies or leaders. Foreign observers, however, doubted that German professors dared to disagree and often regarded them as sychophants--fawning courtiers of the Kaiser, who consistently clicked their heels and obeyed his commands. The professors seemingly prostituted their intellects in the service of the state, and what was more, they included Protestant theologians who no longer protested.⁵⁶

⁵⁵"Zivilprozess gegen Friedrich Lezius, 1917-1918," a typed legal manuscript; Lezius to Reinhold Seeberg, July 30, 1914, Nov. 29 and Dec. 2, 1917, and to Friedrich Kropatscheck, no date [May 7, 1915], all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; William Skaggs, German Conspiracies in America (Toronto, [1915]), 128.

⁵⁶"Zivilprozess gegen Friedrich Lezius, 1917-1918," a typed legal manuscript, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; foreign critics of the supposed servility of German professors include: Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem (London, [1913], 122-123; D. Thomas Curtin, The Land of Deepening Shadow. Germany at War (New York, 1917), 48-56 (a chapter entitled "Puppet Professors"); Thomas F. A. Smith, The Soul of Germany. A Twelve Years Study of the People from Within 1902-1914 (New York, 1915), 17-59, 153-207.

Such was not the case. Like other professors, the theologians rushed to Germany's intellectual defense mainly because they believed her cause was just. Still, appearances were against them, and nothing contributed more to these appearances than German's academic structure. Like the churches, the universities were institutions of state. There was almost nothing that corresponded to the American private or denominational college. Although several of the universities had been founded in the Middle Ages and Reformation, they had laid aside their denominational character. Since the universities were state institutions, their professors were civil servants and as such subject to prosecution for public or private behavior adjudged unworthy of their office. Upon being appointed to a faculty, a teacher was required to take an oath forbidding him to write, do, or say anything subversive to the interests of his sovereign or state.⁵⁷

Professors were appointed by the head of state or one of his ministers. In Prussia, for example, the king appointed a full professor or Ordinarius, and the Minister of Culture appointed an associate professor or Extraordinarius. In both cases, the faculty with a vacancy submitted three names for consideration, but the state was not obligated to choose any of them. Full professors not only owed their appointment

⁵⁷Friedrich Paulsen, The German Universities. Their Character and Development, trans. by Edward Perry (New York, 1895), 89-105; Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 35-38, 55. For Prussia, the pertinent legal stipulations were in the General Code of 1794 and the disciplinary laws of 1852 and 1898.

to their sovereign; they were also dependent upon him for the acquisition of titles. Some scholars became privy councilors or Geheimräte, and others, such as Harnack, were ennobled.⁵⁸

In spite of the degree of state control, the universities exercised a great deal of self-government. The rector, the head of a university, was chosen annually by the whole body of full professors. Seeberg filled this office at Berlin during the transition years of 1918-1919. The full professors also chose the Academic Senate, of which the rector was chairman. Each faculty elected its own dean from among its members and extended the venia legendi, the right to lecture, to the instructors or Privatdozenten. Instructors were not paid by the state but supported themselves by lecturing for fees to students who requested instruction. While a Privatdozent sometimes made only a meager living, an associate or full professor earned a good salary and enjoyed a high standing in society.⁵⁹

All of Germany's twenty-two universities had distinguished reputations, but a call to Berlin was still the most cherished dream of an academician. Most of the universities had the standard four faculties: theology, law, medicine, and philosophy. The philosophy faculty was normally the

⁵⁸Paulsen, German Universities, trans. by Edward Perry, 98-99; Ringer, Decline of German Mandarins, 37-38.

⁵⁹Paulsen, German Universities, trans. by Edward Perry, 94-96; Ringer, Decline of German Mandarins, 38; Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 286-288, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

largest, since it included not only philosophy in the usual sense but also history, economics, philology, mathematics, and the natural sciences--in other words, the liberal arts. The theology faculty was normally the smallest. Including instructors, Germany had about 220 Protestant theologians, averaging ten per institution. About four-fifths of the men were fairly evenly divided among the four primary disciplines of church history, systematic theology, Old Testament studies, and New Testament studies; one-tenth of them lectured on practical theology, and the rest taught either dogmatics, apologetics, homiletics, or missions.⁶⁰

Thirteen universities had only Protestant theology faculties: Berlin, Erlangen, Giessen, Göttingen, Greifswald, Halle, Heidelberg, Jena, Kiel, Königsberg, Leipzig, Marburg, and Rostock. Three had only Catholic theology faculties: Freiburg im Breisgau, Munich, and Würzburg. Five had both: Bonn, Breslau, Münster, Strassburg, and Tübingen. As already noted, the University of Frankfurt am Main, founded as a Prussian institution in August, 1914, had no theology faculty.⁶¹

⁶⁰A few universities had a fifth and even a sixth faculty for Naturwissenschaft, including mathematics and the natural sciences, and Staatswissenschaft, including national economics and statistics.

⁶¹See Minerva. Jahrbuch der Gelehrten Welt, XXIII (Strassburg, 1914). Münster had only a Catholic theology faculty until 1914, when a Protestant one was added; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Nov. 27, 1915. Part of the reason for the absence of a theology faculty at Frankfurt was the conflict over whether the city or the Prussian state would bear the cost; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 505-506.

The theologians were not only servants of the state; they were servants of a state church as well. Their job was to train men for the ministry, and inevitably they became involved in ecclesiastical affairs. Like the educational system, the ecclesiastical system was supervised by the individual states or Länder. No national church existed, only state churches or Landeskirchen. Yet even within the separate states the nineteenth-century march toward consolidation was incomplete. For example, Prussia had not only the Landeskirche encompassing the nine older provinces but six others belonging to each of the provinces annexed in 1866. Bavaria, Oldenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and Alsace-Lorraine were other states with more than one state church, though for different reasons. As a result, Germany had thirty-seven state churches in her twenty-six states. Except for her great number of state churches, Prussia was in general fairly representative. If a state had a hereditary ruler, he was the summus episcopus of her church. Thus, the Kaiser, as king of Prussia, was head of the Prussian state church. Beneath him were two parallel, pyramidal systems. The ecclesiastical organs were the local congregations, the district and then provincial synods, and finally the general synod. The state structure paralleling this consisted of dioceses headed by superintendents and grouped into provinces, each supervised by a consistory and a general superintendent. At the top of the pyramid, just below the king, was the

Prussian Supreme Church Council, regulating both the ecclesiastical and state organs, but only in the nine older provinces. The other state churches in Prussia were autonomous but still under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Culture. Periodic discontent on the part of both liberals and conservatives threatened to disestablish the churches, but the French example of 1905 was not followed until 1919.⁶²

The Prussian state church was not exclusively Lutheran. It was a union of Lutheran and Reformed groups dating back to 1817, when the King of Prussia somewhat ironically celebrated the tercentenary of Luther's Reformation by allowing communicants to confess either Lutheran or Reformed interpretations of the Lord's Supper. Some Lutherans resisted the merger, and Breslau in Silesia became the center of

⁶²In Prussia, there were separate Landeskirchen for Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, Frankfurt am Main, and two for Hanover, a Lutheran and a Reformed. Alsace-Lorraine likewise had a Lutheran and a Reformed church. Bavaria had a church for Bavaria proper and one for the Palatinate. Oldenburg had three, one for the Grand Duchy and one for each of its principalities, Lübeck and Birkenfeld. Saxe-Coburg-Gotha had one each for Coburg and Gotha. In addition to these Protestant Landeskirchen, there were also the Protestant "free churches," including the Brethren, Baptists, Methodists, Adventists, New Apostolic Church, and "old Lutherans." The Roman Catholic Church in Germany embraced thirty-six per cent of her population and was organized into five archbishoprics: Cologne, Gnesen-Posen, Munich-Freising, Bamberg, and Freiburg im Breisgau. Like the Protestant Landeskirchen, it, together with the Jewish church, was recognized by the states and had the right to levy an ecclesiastical tax upon its members. See K. S. Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, II, 91-95; Schian, Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 38-39, 67; Robert M. Berry, Germany of the Germans (New York, 1912), 94-103.

these "old Lutherans," who eventually formed their own general synod and were recognized as a separate church. On occasion, however, the Prussian Supreme Church Council required men of an "old Lutheran" background to sign a formal declaration of support for the United Protestant Church of Prussia before approving their appointment to the Breslau theology faculty. Later in the century, other German states followed the Prussian example of merger, with about the same degree of success.⁶³

Then, in August, 1914, a miracle happened. Germany's thirty-seven state churches, her twenty-two universities, and her 220 Protestant theologians representing half a dozen theological opinions, became one. War fervor melted academic, doctrinal, and ecclesiastical diversity into a glowing patriotic unity. As one theologian put it, the tower of Babel was reversed: out of a confusion of tongues came a national language.⁶⁴ From Kiel to Munich to Tübingen to Berlin, the theologians joined in the harmonious refrain: Germany is not guilty!

⁶³Holborn, A History of Modern Germany 1648-1840, 488-490; Friedrich Kropatscheck to Reinhold Seeberg, May 7, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. 1817 also witnessed the merger of the Prussian universities of Wittenberg and Halle.

⁶⁴Baumgarten, "Der sittliche Zustand des deutschen Volkes unter dem Einfluss des Krieges," in Melchior et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, I, 44.

GERMANY NOT GUILTY

Chapter II

Considering the absence of a national church and the complexity of institutional religion in Germany, one would not have been surprised if the outbreak of the war had generated a corresponding diversity of views. On some issues this was true, but the most striking feature of German theological opinion was its essential unanimity on the large issues--and the largest was that of assessing responsibility for the war. Of course, all the belligerents had to ponder their guilt or innocence, but for Germany the examination was especially acute--for the simple reason that she had struck the first blows; from the start, her armies were on foreign soil. Thus, in comparison to Britain, with her small expeditionary force, or France, with her back to the wall, or Russia, with her slow-moving armies, Germany had more to explain--or explain away.

Some military historians have held that after the Marne, General Helmuth von Moltke lost his nerve. This certainly was not true of Germany's Protestant theologians. From beginning to end and beyond, they unanimously proclaimed Germany "not guilty." To be sure, the question of war guilt was complex and involved a variety of sub-themes. Along with the question of who started the war, there were

the issues of who prolonged it and who first violated Belgium's neutrality. After the war, some theologians acknowledged partial German guilt in regard to the latter two. But on the matter of who willed the war, they held fast to their original verdict.

On August 4, 1914, both the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg unequivocally affirmed that Germany was going to war with a "clear conscience."¹ Without hesitation, the theologians echoed their leaders' theme of a defensive war. As Otto Eissfeldt, a Berlin instructor in Old Testament, put it: the "prophets" walked hand in hand with the "politicians."² Harnack, for example, assured the Norwegian explorer and statesman, Fridtjof Nansen, that the Kaiser was a "prince of peace" and that Germans had a "good conscience" with respect to the outbreak of the war.³ Harnack's colleagues, conservatives and liberals alike, agreed. While insisting on Germany's innocence, otherwise estranged scholars became bed-fellows. Reinhold Seeberg, Adolf Deissmann, and Julius Kaftan had opposed Harnack's efforts to bring Troeltsch to Berlin, but they all saw eye to eye on

¹William II, "Die Thronrede," Aug. 4, 1914, and Bethmann-Hollweg, "Die grosse Rede des Reichskanzler," Aug. 4, 1914, in Kriegs-Rundschau, I, (Berlin, 1915), 62, 71.

²Eissfeldt, "Politiker und Propheten," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXIV (1916), 520.

³Harnack to Nansen, Sept. 22, 1914, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

the guilt question. Seeberg and Deissmann confessed the oft-repeated formula that the war had been "forced" upon the German people, and Kaftan asserted that Germany was guilty only of naiveté--having pursued peace so earnestly that her enemies had suspected weakness and had therefore drawn the sword.⁴

Martin Schian, the Giessen champion of "mediation theology," insisted that no amount of enemy propaganda would alter his conviction that Germany's hands were clean, and his colleague, Hermann Gunkel, a leader of the liberal historical school, was certain that God, a righteous judge, would bless Germany's weapons engaged in "just defense."⁵ Conservative theologians who responded to an inquiry of the Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung voiced variations on the same theme. Viktor Schultze, Karl Dunkmann, and Philip Bachmann, to name but a few, all stressed Germany's good conscience, and Bachmann added that since Germany's cause was just, world history would lose all meaning if God did not vindicate her through victory. In Heidelberg, the liberal Troeltsch likewise emphasized the idea of a defensive war and compared Germany's relative lack of allies to the predicament faced by Frederick the

⁴Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 135; Deissmann, "Eines deutschen Kriegers Wert," Der Tag, Oct. 4, 1914; Kaftan, "Wider England," Inter. Monatsschr. IX (1915), 135.

⁵Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 599; Gunkel, "Jesus Weint," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 662.

Great in 1756. His colleague Friedrich Niebergall, Associate Professor of Practical Theology and assistant editor of Otto Baumgarten's periodical, claimed that Germany has not willed the war but was fulfilling the duty of self-protection.⁶ In Kiel, Baumgarten prophesied that the "naked robber-politics" of a numerically superior Russia would come to nought, since "moral impotence" could never triumph over "moral power." Erich Schäder, also at Kiel, assured the readers of a Christian journal in America that neither German diplomacy nor the will of the German people was to blame for the outbreak of hostilities.⁷

The only discordant note in this otherwise harmonious refrain came from Marburg. Martin Rade, Associate Professor of Systematic Theology, immediately told the readers of his Die Christliche Welt: "We cannot speak of a purely defensive war; we also were involved in the guilt [mitschuldig] of a hitherto existing condition that signified only a non-war, but not peace."⁸ Throughout the war, Rade marched to a different drummer and was often out of step with the popular

⁶Schultze, "In diesem Zeichen wirst du siegen," Dunkmann, "Idealismus oder Christentum," and Bachmann, "Christentum und Krieg," all in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen über den Krieg, 12, 92, 204-205, 214. Troeltsch, Nach Erklärung der Mobilmachung (Heidelberg, 1914), 5; Niebergall, "Krieg und Hass," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 964.

⁷Baumgarten, "Gottes Gerechtigkeit," Evangel. Freiht., XIV (1914), 330; Schäder, "Theocentric Theology: In Peace and in War," Construct. Qtrly., III (1915), 52.

⁸Rade, "Nach der Mobilmachung," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 767.

and patriotic cadence. He did not indict his fatherland on any substantial issue, but he showed himself more sensitive than his fellow scholars to the moral tragedy of war. In this instance, he did not impute to Germany an evil will but merely a sin of omission, shared by the other belligerents as well. They had all failed, he charged, to take sufficient steps to prevent the war.

Rade's mild concession nevertheless invited criticism. His Marburg colleague Karl Bornhäuser insisted that Germany was in no way mitschuldig. Rade reiterated his verdict just after the armistice of November, 1918, and Schian charged him with error and indiscretion. Not only was Rade's judgment incorrect, Schian held, but the concession had sapped Germany's moral confidence at the outset of the war. Refusing to let the matter rest, in 1925 Schian again publicly lamented that Rade had undermined the German cause by planting "seeds of doubt" in the minds of his countrymen.⁹

None of the men, however, believed that Germany had willed the war, and in support of their contentions, they entered into the "battle of the rainbow books," so named because each belligerent published his immediate pre-war diplomatic correspondence in a binding of distinctive color.

⁹Bornhäuser, "Der Krieg und der Busse," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 101; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXXII (1918), 435; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 503, and Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 24.

The first to appear was the German White Book, which Bethmann laid before the Reichstag on August 4, 1914. Two days later came the British Blue Book, and the following day the Russian Orange Book. Before the end of the year, the Belgian Grey Book, the Serbian Blue Book, and the French Yellow Book were similarly pleading the innocence of their respective nations. Austria-Hungary published her Red Book in February, 1915, and when Italy entered the conflict three months later, she proffered her Green Book. Inexpensive copies of the books were distributed among the neutrals, but, as one observer wryly commented, those who studied them usually emerged with the same "mental colorblindness" with which they began.¹⁰

The theologians ardently defended the veracity of their White Book and denounced the suspected incompleteness or

¹⁰Roland Hugins, Germany Misjudged (Chicago, 1916), 106. Several collections of the eight "rainbow books" appeared during the war, including two complete chronological compilations by Germanophiles: Max Beer (ed.), Das Regenbogen-Buch. Die europäischen Kriegsverhandlungen; die massgebenden Dokumente, chronologisch und sinngemäss zusammengestellt, übersetzt und erläutert (Bern, 1915), and Edmund Robert Otto von Mach (ed.), Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (New York, 1916). The American Association for International Conciliation published the diplomatic correspondence in numbers 83-84, 86-90 and 93 of its International Conciliation (Oct., 1914-Aug., 1915). The German White Book, compiled on August 2, 1914 (before Germany was officially at war with either France or Russia) was aimed solely at justifying war against Russia. Copies of the book sold for 10¢ in America. Several of the belligerents published a second or even a third "rainbow book" during or just after the war.

falsity of their opponents' documents. Harnack and his Berlin colleague Julius Richter supplied friends in America with an English translation of the White Book.¹¹ They also sent them copies of The Truth About Germany: Facts About the War. Published late in August, 1914, this German apologetic was edited by eleven men, including Matthias Erzberger, Friedrich Naumann, and the Pan-German publicist Count Ernst zu Reventlow. It was endorsed by an honorary committee of thirty-four, including Harnack, the Leipzig historian Karl Lamprecht, and the director of the Hamburg-America steamship line, Albert Ballin. Among its more provocative claims was that the White Book proved "the white purity of the German conscience," represented by the Kaiser, chancellor, and people. Americans returning home from Germany were furnished with free copies, and more were printed in New York. Like most of the subsequent German propaganda efforts, it immediately drew fire from abroad.¹²

Troeltsch, Rade, and the church historian Friedrich Loofs (1858-1928) all called attention to the "rainbow books,"

¹¹Harnack et al. to American Christians, Aug. 19, 1914, and Richter to American mission directors, n. d. [fall, 1914], in Die Eiche, VI (1918), 163-164.

¹²The Truth About Germany: Facts About the War (New York, 1914), 44. Foreign rebuttals included: Frederick W. Whitridge, One American's Opinion of the European War: An Answer to Germany's Appeals (New York, 1914), 57-58; Douglas Sladen, The Real "Truth About Germany": Facts About the War, with an Appendix, "Great Britain and the War" by A. Maurice Low (New York, 1914); Sir Theodore Cook, The Mark of the Beast (London, 1917), 38-47.

and Deissmann told his American friends in 1915 that after closely studying the documents he was more than ever convinced that Germany's cause was just. He and Loofs pointed indignantly to one document in the original British Blue Book that had been tampered with in later editions. They charged that the British Foreign Office had first altered a message from the French foreign minister to the French ambassador in London and then had clumsily tried to conceal the all too obvious falsification. Allegedly, the British foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, had attempted to saddle Germany with provocative military action against France before Serbia had even rejected Austria's ultimatum.¹³ The French Yellow Book and the Russian Orange Book were also skewered. Shortly after Germany had signed the

¹³Troeltsch, "Die deutsche Idee von der Freiheit," Neue Rund., XXVII (1916), 50; Rade, "Die Neutralen und wir," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 150; Loofs, "William Sandy über den Krieg," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 258-259, 308-310; Deissmann, Prot., Wkly. Letter, June 19 and July 3, 1915, and "Jahreswende des Weltkriegs," Der Tag, Aug. 1, 1915, reprinted in Deissmann, Inneres Aufgebot, (Berlin, 1915), 111. Deissmann and Loofs cited Appendix 3 of Document 105 in the British Blue Book, which was a message from the French foreign minister to his ambassador in London, dated July 31, 1914 (the message also appears in the French Yellow Book as Document 106). Aside from other chronological discrepancies, what angered the Germans was that the French minister had accused Germany of taking preparatory military actions against France on Saturday, July 25, which, according to the Blue Book, was "the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in." In later editions of the Blue Book, the British admitted the error and explained that instead of the Austrian note of July 23, it was the Serbian reply of July 25 that was meant. But Germans saw the initial wording as a malicious attempt to accuse them of planning for war before Serbia had even had a chance to consider Austria's demands. For further details, see Karl Federn, The Origins of the War: Facts and Documents (New York, 1915), 121-122, 173-207.

Versailles Treaty, Harnack publicly charged that both of⁵⁴ these books had suppressed certain documents and had falsified others. Subsequent investigation proved him right.¹⁴

Not only individually but collectively the theologians proclaimed that Germany's honor was without spot and blemish. At the end of August, 1914, twenty-nine leaders of German Protestantism issued an "Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad," which asserted Germany's innocence in the outbreak of the war. Eight theologians endorsed it, including the Berliners Harnack, Deissmann, and Richter. Without referring to the diplomatic documents, the appeal insisted that the origins of the war lay in the "net of war conspiracies" secretly spun against Germany.¹⁵ Of the many foreign replies, only one was favorable. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America was so impressed that its General Secretary, Charles S. Macfarland, suggested to Harnack that an American delegation visit Germany as a

¹⁴Harnack, "Offener Brief an Herrn Clemenceau," Tägl. Rund. Nov. 6, 1919, reprinted in Erforschtes und Erlebtes (Giessen, 1923), 305. Postwar indictments of the French and Russian books include: Georges Demartial, L'Evangile du Quai D'Orsay (Paris, 1926); Alfred Wegerer (ed.), Das Französische Geldbuch von 1914 (Berlin, 1926); Baron Gisbert von Romberg (ed.), Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, trans. by H. W. (New York, 1923); Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, I (New York, 1928), 6, 11-12; G. P. Gooch, Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (London, 1927), 102-103.

¹⁵Karl Axenfeld et al., "An die evangelischen Christen im Auslande," n.d. [Aug., 1914], in Die Eiche, III (1915), 52-53.

gesture of good will. Macfarland's tour of Germany at the end of 1915 was the high point of German-American ecclesiastical relations during the war. In France, on the other hand, the Protestant Committee for French Propaganda Abroad issued a counterappeal charging that the "Christian Kaisers," William II and Francis Joseph, had "willed, prepared, and unleashed" the war. The far-reaching aims of the Pan-Germans, they added, substantiated their suspicion that Germany had a "Napoleonic spirit" and aspired to rule the world.¹⁶

The most formidable rebuttal came from England. In September, 1914, forty-two English churchmen, led by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, complained that the Germans had overlooked the two primary factors prompting England's entry into the war: (1) Germany's rejection of Lord Grey's proposal of a four-power conference, with no offer of a substitute plan, and (2) the invasion of Belgium.

¹⁶Charles S. Macfarland to Harnack, Nov. 19, 1914, and George Wenner to Ernst von Dobschütz, Nov. 9, 1914, both in Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Jan. 15, 1916; "Antwort auf den deutschen Aufruf an die evangelischen Christen des Auslandes," Revue Chrétienne, May-Aug., 1915, reprinted in Die Eiche, IV (1916), 259-261. The Protestant Committee for French Propaganda Abroad was formed in June, 1915. Its president was André Weiss, and its vice-president Ernest Denis, professors of law and history, respectively, at Paris. Its administrative secretaries included Paul Doumergue, editor of Foi et Vie, and John Viénot, editor of Revue Chrétienne and professor on the Free Theology Faculty at Paris. See Die Eiche, IV (1916), 258-318, and Georg Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918 (Stanford, 1938), 11-12.

The forty-two represented all of the churches in England and entire spectrum of theological opinion and included such scholars as William Sanday of Oxford and F. C. Burkitt of Cambridge. Though Rade had not signed the appeal, he rushed to his country's defense by reiterating the position taken by the German Foreign Office; namely, that Grey's suggested conference amounted to a court of arbitration and therefore could have been called only at Austria's and Russia's request. He further argued that the Kaiser's personal messages to Tsar Nicholas had served in lieu of and were more significant than a substitute proposal. No, the war was not Germany's fault; it was the result of the "unnatural alliance policy" of the Triple Entente.¹⁷ The twenty-nine Germans retorted in similar fashion. Claiming that the Russian foreign minister had counted on not merely France's but England's aid, they charged England with deliberate duplicity: proclaiming that she was not militarily bound but actively supporting her two continental partners, who could not reach their ultimate goals without a European war. The English were not willing to let their opponents have the last word, and twenty-five Oxford dons,

¹⁷Randall Cantuar et al., "Antwort auf den Aufruf der deutschen Theologen," Sept. 23, 1914, Die Eiche, III (1915), 56-62; other English signers were professors J. H. Moulton and T. R. Glover and pastor G. Campbell Morgan; for the overall response of the English ecclesiastical community to the war, see Albert Marrin, The Last Crusade. The Church of England in the First World War (Durham, N. C., 1974); Rade, "An die 42 britischen Kirchenmänner," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1002.

including Sanday and the New Testament source critic, B. H. Streeter, took up their intellectual cudgels. Accusing Germany of a reckless and belligerent foreign policy, they cited as prime examples her war threats of 1875, her forcing of Delcassé's dismissal in 1905, and her ambitious naval program.¹⁸

The Germans refused to budge. Though in the course of the four-year struggle the theologians' ardor diminished a little, their judgment remained the same. They continued to preach even into the postwar period the themes of necessity, defense, and good conscience. In August 1915, Deissmann assured his American readers that his countrymen cherished the "sacred conviction" that Germany had not wanted war. On the eve of the third year of hostilities, Harnack told a large Berlin audience that the German government had avoided war as long as possible during the final days of July, 1914, and that the guilt of Russia and England was "obvious." The following year, 1917, he advised Bethmann that since Germany was waging only a defensive war she should declare her willingness for a negotiated peace. In May, 1918, Troeltsch reminded his countrymen that inasmuch

¹⁸Karl Axenfeld et al., "Noch einmal ein Wort an die evangelischen Christen im Auslande," Nov. 20, 1914, Die Eiche, III (1915), 69-71; To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America. A Reply from Oxford to the German Address to Evangelical Christians (London, 1914). The German charge that Russia counted on English intervention rested on Document 17 of the Russian Orange Book, a telegram from foreign minister Sazonov to his ambassador in London on July 25, 1914, and on a message from the Belgian chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg to the Belgian foreign minister on July 30, intercepted by the Germans and published in the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung on Sept. 12.

as they had entered the war only to defend their national existence, they should be willing to end it short of totally annihilating the enemy.¹⁹

Even after the war was lost, the theologians continued to uphold their country's virtue. Just after the armistice, Schian inveighed against shallow moralizers who wanted to interpret Germany's defeat as a judgment of God against her sinfulness. Germany had her shortcomings, he admitted, but he insisted that England, France, and Italy were no better. His verdict remained the same as in 1914: Germany had not willed the war; others had forced it upon her; it was a war of national defense, a "just war."²⁰ Deissmann was more conciliatory. He conceded that some of the roots of the war lay in Germany's own foreign policy, which had become "increasingly incompetent" after Bismarck's fall. He added, however, that Europe in general bore a "collective guilt of mistrust and ill will"--a theme taken up by Brockdorff-Rantzau when confronted with the war-guilt clause at Versailles and shortly echoed by Baumgarten.²¹ In June,

¹⁹Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Aug. 14, 1915; Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit (Giessen, 1916), 338, and "Das Gebot der Stunde, Eine Denkschrift im Juni 1917 dem Reichskanzler eingerichtet," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 302; Troeltsch, "Anklagen auf Defaitismus," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 661.

²⁰Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 502-503.

²¹Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Dec. 20, 1918; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., June, 1919, cited in Meine Lebensgeschichte, 390.

1919, just before the German delegates were forced to sign the treaty, Troeltsch complained that the Allies had made German guilt into a dogma as strong as the Inquisition's insistence on the reality of the devil, and what good did it do the heretic to question dogma? But just before his untimely death in 1923, he modified his position and found Germany guilty of divorcing herself from the natural law tradition of western Europe. In the early 1800s, he lamented, Germany had taken a wrong turn philosophically, when she allowed romanticism and nationalism to supplant rationalism and internationalism. Departing from his wartime defense of Germany's right to her own political, military, and cultural traditions, he bemoaned the legacy of Hegelianism: the maximizing of German individuality and the minimizing of the cosmopolitan spirit.²²

Harnack's conscience was less troubled. At the end of 1919, when Clemenceau delivered a harangue about German war guilt before the French Senate, Harnack was so infuriated that he issued a public reply. Reaffirming his position of 1914, he noted that Germany alone had opened her archives. Alluding to the secret Russian documents

²²/Troeltsch/, "Das Schulddogma," June 19, 1919, Spektator-Briefe, Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik, 1918-1922, ed. by Hans Baron (Tübingen, 1924), 320; Troeltsch, "Naturrecht und Humanität in der Weltpolitik," address of Oct., 1922, Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa, ed. by Hans Baron (Tübingen, 1924), 4-16. Leonard Krieger acknowledged his debt to Troeltsch's discussion of "natural law" for his own ideas in his The German Idea of Freedom (Chicago, 1957), 4.

that the Bolsheviki had published in 1917, he saddled the tsarist regime with the blame for the war and argued that neither the German Kaiser, nor the government, nor the people had provoked it. In 1921, attempting to curry favor with a still vengeful France, he softened his tone and came close to echoing Rade's brave admission at the outbreak of hostilities. Still insisting that Germany had not willed the war, he granted that no country in 1914 had been without "clumsiness, stupidity, and indiscretion," and that the question of joint German responsibility would therefore have to be settled by future archival research.²³

Thus, from the war's outset to its conclusion and afterwards, no German Protestant theologian imputed to his nation a willful intent to precipitate the war. Rade at the very start and Harnack, Baumgarten, and Deissmann in the aftermath affirmed only a collective guilt on the part of all the belligerents for having failed to prevent the catastrophe, and Troeltsch stigmatized his nation with only a certain cultural culpability. With respect to political

²³"Clemenceaus Erklärung im Senat," Berl. Tagebl., Oct. 17, 1919, Hans Wehberg, Wider den Aufruf der 93: Das Ergebnis einer Rundfrage an die 93 Intellektuellen über die Kriegsschuld (Charlottenburg, 1920), 31; Harnack, "Offener Brief an Herrn Clemenceau," Nov. 6, 1919, Tägl. Rund. and "Deutschland und der Friede Europas," Dec. 1921, Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 318.

responsibility, they all agreed with David Lloyd George's later dictum--Europe had stumbled into war.²⁴

Who prolonged the war was another question. In Schian's estimation, when the Allies "scornfully" rejected the German Peace Note of December 12, 1916, the answer was clear: only a fool would believe that England was the "lamb" and Germany the "wolf."²⁵ At the conclusion of the war, a few of his colleagues disagreed. Just before the armistice, Harnack privately murmured that the German Supreme Command, together with the Pan-Germans and rabid annexationists, were chiefly to blame for extending the conflict one and one-half years beyond the Reichstag Peace Resolution of July, 1917. In retrospect, Baumgarten similarly concluded that the initial, morally-inspired goal of national defense against "unmotivated attack" had gradually grown into goals of conquest, which split the nation into "two camps."²⁶ Troeltsch concurred and even named names. In a series of anonymous letters published during the early years of the Weimar Republic, he charged that Germany, though having begun the struggle with

²⁴Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I (Boston, 1933), 49-55. For a study of how theologians in the Weimar era treated the war-guilt question, see Reinhard Gaede, Kirche--Christen--Krieg und Frieden (Hamburg, 1975).

²⁵Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 88.

²⁶Harnack to Bertha Thiersch, Oct. 31, 1918, cited in Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 373-374; Baumgarten, "Der sittliche Zustand des deutschen Volkes unter dem Einfluss des Krieges," in Melchior et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, I, 45.

the aim of protecting herself, had acquired the aim of enlarging herself--fostered primarily by the evil genius, General Erich Ludendorff. When testifying before the Reichstag Investigating Committee in 1926, the Berlin historian Hans Delbrück summed up the attitude of his friends and fellow "Vernunftrepublikaner," Troeltsch, Baumgarten, and Harnack. He exonerated Germany of having an "evil will" eager to precipitate the war, but he sadly admitted that Germany was perhaps the nation chiefly guilty for prolonging it.²⁷

A third aspect of the guilt question was the violation of Belgium's neutrality. Prussia was one of the five powers which had guaranteed that neutrality in 1839, and therefore Germany's penetration of Belgium's borders on August 3, 1914 became the technical basis for England's declaration of war the following evening. In the lengthy controversy that ensued, the Germans justified the invasion by claiming that it was militarily imperative, that England had snubbed their offer of August 1 to respect Belgium's neutrality, and that Belgium had in fact already forfeited her neutrality by entering into military agreements with England in 1906 and 1912.

²⁷/Troeltsch/, "Das Ende des Militarismus," Nov. 16, 1918, and "Das Schuld dogma," June 19, 1919, in Spektator-Briefe, ed. by Hans Baron, 1-8, 319 (first pub. in F. Avenarius' journal Kunstwart); Delbrück, testimony of Feb. 4, 1926, in Germany, Nationalversammlung, Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses, 4. Reihe, "Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918, IV [henceforth cited as 'Ursachen']", (Berlin, 1928), 158. Delbrück was one of the four editors of the German White Book presented at Versailles in May, 1919.

When asking the Reichstag to appropriate the war credits on the afternoon of August 4, 1914, Bethmann appealed only to military necessity and actually apologized for trespassing on neutral territory.

We are now acting in self-defense [he declared], and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg and perhaps have already been obliged to cross the Belgian border. This is a breach of international law. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait, but we could not. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the governments of Luxembourg and Belgium. The wrong--I speak frankly-- the wrong that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal is reached.²⁸

Although Baumgarten praised the chancellor for his scruples, the general public was critical. The Germans were embarrassed, and the Allies were incensed. The Vossische Zeitung, the newspaper of the liberal intelligentsia, declared that it was idle to discuss whether, in the event of war, a breach of international law was permissible or not, since the necessities of war overrode such law. On the other hand, eleven English churchmen told Harnack that the excuse of "necessity" called to mind Milton's phrase: "necessity, the tyrant's plea." Even Rade thought that "necessity knows no law" was a "doubtful

²⁸Bethmann-Hollweg, "Die grosse Rede des Reichskanzler," Aug. 4, 1914, Kriegs-Rundschau, I, 70. The Allies made almost no mention of Germany's violation of Luxembourg's neutrality, guaranteed by the Treaty of London, May, 1867. For one thing, England regarded the treaty as a collective guarantee by which no one power was obligated to defend Luxembourg unless all did, and secondly, Luxembourg had offered almost no resistance; see Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, II (New York, 1925), 3-7.

maxim" and regretted that Bethmann had used it.²⁹ Harnack was of a different opinion. Writing the churchmen a stinging reply, he blamed Germany's confrontation with a two-front war for necessitating her march into Belgium and then insisted that the chancellor had been too kind. Germany, he held, had been forced into a position in which there were "no formal duties at all" but only the "moral duty" of protecting herself, and consequently, he refused to acknowledge a formal wrong. He further justified the invasion by pointing to an Old Testament incident of law-breaking that Jesus had cited with approval. When desperately hungry, David had eaten holy bread from the Table of the Lord, which only the High Priest had the right to do. Yet, David was completely in the right, Harnack concluded, because "the letter of the law" no longer existed at that moment. "There is a necessity that breaks iron, how much more a treaty," he added.³⁰ The British and the French were appalled. J. M. Robertson, a member of Parliament, denounced Harnack's alleged parallel of David's and Germany's need. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim rebuked Harnack for trying to "improve upon" the chancellor's "official cynicism," and

²⁹Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XIV (1914), 318; and Politik und Moral (Tübingen, 1916), 8; "Neutralitätsbruch," Vossische Zeitung, Aug. 6, 1914; "Brief von elf englischen Theologen," Aug. 27, 1914, in Harnack, Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 291; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 814.

³⁰Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 296.

Alfred Loisy, the excommunicated leader of Catholic modernism, reprimanded him for implying that a good end justified any means. Reflecting upon the wartime addiction of most intellectuals to nationalistic passion, the French philosopher Julien Benda cited Harnack's remark as one of the most odious examples of what he regarded as "the treason of the intellectuals."³¹ When Italy abandoned the Triple Alliance and sided with the Entente in May, 1915, Richter drew a distinction between the German and Italian departures from treaty obligations. "Nibelungentreue," he explained, meant that when a nation's very existence was threatened, as Germany's was in 1914, she was justified in breaking a treaty, but Antonio Salandra's "sacro egoismo" was a selfish and unjustified breach of faith, since Italy's life was not in danger.³²

Bethmann's appeal to necessity was not his only faux pax on August 4. That evening he allegedly made another indiscreet remark. A few hours before England was officially at war, the English ambassador in Berlin informed him of Grey's demand that German troops withdraw from Belgium. According to the ambassador, Bethmann was furious

³¹Robertson, Britain versus Germany. An Open Letter to Professor Eduard Meyer (London, 1917), 51; Durkheim, "Germany Above All." German Mentality and War, trans. by J. S. (Paris, 1915), 36; Loisy, Guerre et religion (Paris, 1915), 113-120; Benda, La trahison des clercs (Paris, 1946; 1st ed., 1927), 135-136.

³²Richter, "'Sacro Egoismo' und 'Nibelungentreue,'" Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 543.

and complained that England was about to declare war on a kindred nation "just for a word, 'neutrality,' a word which in wartime had been so often disregarded, just for a scrap of paper." Immediately seizing upon this incriminating statement, the Allied propaganda mill exploited it to the full. Popular accounts of the German militaristic spirit, such as E. J. Dillon's A Scrap of Paper (1914), castigated the chancellor's attitude as typical of the German disregard for law and humanity. But during and after the war, Bethmann insisted that he had been misquoted. His explanations differ slightly, but it was his wartime version that drew the greatest fire. In January, 1915, he publicly stated that he had told the ambassador that "among the reasons which had impelled England to war the Belgian neutrality treaty had for her only the value of a scrap of paper." England had drawn the sword, he argued, "only because she believed her own interests demanded it; just for Belgian neutrality she would never have entered the war." Thus, it was England, not Germany, who had had a low regard for the treaty.³³

³³Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Aug. 8, 1914, Document 160 in British Blue Book, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, Miscellaneous, no. 3649 (London, 1915), 111; Dillon, A Scrap of Paper (London, 1914), *passim*; Bethmann's press interview in Der Tag, Jan. 27, 1915, and in "A Scrap of Paper," Current History, I (1915), 1120-1125, and in "A Published Interview Explaining the 'Scrap of Paper' Speech," in Charles F. Horne (ed.), Source Records of the Great War, I (Indianapolis, 1930), 407-409. For Bethmann's postwar explanation, see his Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg, I (Berlin, 1919), 180; he thought he had spoken quite fluent English and was dismayed to think that the British ambassador had misunderstood him; Otto Hammann, Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit (Berlin, 1926), 76.

Friedrich Loofs defended the chancellor's explanation, but Germanophobes held that he had only compounded his sin. Sir Gilbert Parker, the director of British propaganda for America, called Bethmann's explanation "a gross perversion," and among the numerous English penny propaganda pamphlets was one which accused him of "double-dealing."³⁴

Bethmann's assertion that the neutrality question was irrelevant to England's entrance into the war apparently found confirmation in the British Blue Book itself. If the English regarded their ambassador's conversation with Bethmann on August 4 as damaging to the German cause, the Germans considered a conversation of their ambassador in London with the English Foreign Minister on August 1 as completely destructive of the English war rationale. As reported in Document 123 of the Blue Book, the German ambassador, Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, asked Grey whether England would remain neutral if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality. Grey replied that he could not give him such a promise on that condition alone. When Lichnowsky pressed him to formulate conditions on which Britain would remain neutral, suggesting even the integrity of France and her colonies, Grey answered that he was "obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms,"

³⁴Loofs, "William Sanday über den Krieg," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 253; Parker, The World in the Crucible (New York, 1915), 251; Fernand Passelecq, The "Sincere Chancellor" (London, 1917), 19.

explaining that "we must keep our hands free." There it was-- at least, it seemed so--a naked admission that Belgium's neutrality was not the decisive question. What was worse, Grey did not tell the Cabinet of Lichnowsky's offer until the following day, and he made no mention of it when he addressed the House of Commons on August 3.³⁵

England's critics eagerly seized on these apparently culpable acts. Rade told British clergymen that Grey's talk with Lichnowsky showed that the invasion of Belgium had nothing to do with England's declaration of war. Deissmann went even further, labelling the conversation of August 1 as the most important part of all the "rainbow books." Dangling it proudly before the eyes of the Americans, he claimed that this one interview refuted all charges made against Germany in regard to Belgium. In England, too, Grey's critics regarded the conversation as the Achilles heel of Britain's case. George Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Russell singled it out as particularly damning to England's moral posture,³⁶ and F. C. Conybeare, an Oxford theologian,

³⁵Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1, 1914, Document 123 in British Blue Book, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Collected Diplomatic Documents, 93.

³⁶Rade, "An die 42 britischen Kirchenmänner," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1003; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, July 3, 1915; Shaw, "Common Sense about the War," Current History, I (1914), 20-21; Bertrand Russell to the London Nation, Aug. 15, 1914, cited in Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, The Middle Years 1914-1944 (New York, 1969; 1st ed., 1951), 42-44.

privately denounced Grey as a "sinister liar" who had "tricked" England into war by "deliberately concealing" Lichnowsky's offer from Parliament. Against Conybeare's wishes, his letter was published by American Germanophiles, and Deissmann and Schian were overjoyed. Conybeare held an Honorary Doctorate of Theology from Giessen, and the Giessen theologian Schian reprinted the entire letter in his periodical. But the Germans' glee was short-lived, because Conybeare immediately published a recantation. Apologizing for his "intemperate language and hasty judgment," he maintained that a re-examination of the Blue Book had convinced him that Grey had sincerely tried to avert war after all. The two Germans insisted that, on the contrary, his earlier criticisms were still valid, and Schian concluded that he simply no longer had the courage to "swim against the stream."³⁷

The Grey-Lichnowsky conversation remained one of the favorite weapons of the Germans and their sympathizers. Bethmann called attention to it in his Reichstag address of November 9, 1916 and again in his memoirs. American

³⁷F. C. Conybeare to Kuno Meyer, March 5, 1915, orig. pub. in the American Germanophile periodical, The Vital Issue, and reprinted in England on the Witness Stand. The Anglo-German Case Tried by a Jury of Englishmen (New York, 1915), 99-106; "Brief eines englischen Theologen," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 321-328; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, July 3, 1915; Conybeare to Sir Walter Raleigh, June 30, 1915, in "Dr. Conybeare's Views: A Recantation," London Times, July 2, 1915, and "Dr. Conybeare's Recantation," Current History, II (1915), 928; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 371; Deissmann, "Jahreswende des Weltkriegs," Der Tag, Aug. 1, 1915, reprinted in Deissmann, Inneres Aufgebot, 119-120.

Germanophiles, such as John Burgess of Columbia, Roland Hugins of Cornell, and the novelist Frank Harris, likewise asserted that in Document 123 the English stood condemned out of their own mouths. Another accuser was Bernhard Dernburg. German Colonial Secretary from 1906 to 1910, he went to America with Ambassador Bernstorff, when the latter returned there in August, 1914. As director of a German press bureau in New York, he disseminated propaganda to combat the already unfavorable American press. His Searchlights on the War focused harsh light on Grey's remarks of August 1. Grey and the Anglophiles countered the barrage of criticism by insisting that Lichnowsky's queries had only a personal probe, not an official offer of the German government. Recent historians hardly bother to mention the episode, and those who do usually emphasize Grey's dismay over the previous evasiveness of the German Foreign Office on the question of Belgian neutrality and therefore defend his discounting of Lichnowsky's offer. For the Germans of 1914, however, Grey's reaction revealed him as nothing less than the villain of the piece.³⁸

³⁸"Bethmann-Hollweg's Address before the Main Committee of the German Reichstag," Nov. 9, 1916, in "Official Documents Looking Toward Peace," I, Inter. Concil., No. 110 (1917), 8; Burgess, The European War of 1914 (Chicago, 1915), 38-44; Hugins, Germany Misjudged, 46; Harris, England or Germany? (New York, 1915), 33. On Aug. 27, 1914, Grey explained in the House of Commons that Lichnowsky's proposal was "without authority"; "How the War Came," The Labour Leader, n.d., reprinted in England on the Witness Stand, 24-25, and in the Allied propaganda work Richard Grelling/The Crime, trans. by Alexander Gray (New York, 1917, 193-224. Strangely enough, Lichnowsky did not refer to his offer of Aug. 1, 1914 in

Another argument the Germans advanced for their invasion was that Belgium had already forfeited her neutrality because of the flight of French airplanes over her territory on August 2, 1914, and because of prewar military collusion with England and France. On August 3, 1914, the German ambassador in Paris received a telegram from his chancellery containing the declaration of war on France. The text read:

A French aviator, who must have flown over Belgian territory, was shot down yesterday in an attempt to wreck the railroad at Wesel. Several other French planes were unquestionably placed over the Eifel district yesterday. These also must have flown over Belgian territory. Yesterday, French airmen dropped bombs on the railroads near Karlsruhe and Nürnberg.³⁹

The message somehow became jumbled during its transmission and decoding, but the form in which the ambassador handed it to the French retained the point that French aviators had violated Belgian air space. The original draft of the telegram is in Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow's handwriting,

a private memorandum he wrote in Aug., 1916, but only in his postwar memoirs; "Lichnowsky's Memorandum," Current History, VIII (1918), i-xxxi; Lichnowsky, Heading for the Abyss trans. by Sefton Delmer (New York, 1928), 415. Recent works that hardly bother with the offer are: Samuel F. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy. Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 353-354, and Harry F. Young, Prince Lichnowsky and the Great War (Athens, Ga., 1977), 117-118.

³⁹"The Imperial Chancellor to the Ambassador at Paris," Aug. 3, 1914, Doc. 734 in Karl Kautsky (ed.), Outbreak of the World War. German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky and edited by Max Montgelas and Walter Schücking, trans. by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law [hereafter cited as Kautsky Documents] (New York, 1924; Germ. orig., 1919), 530.

with alterations by Under Secretary Alfred Zimmermann. It seems doubtful that Bethmann himself had seen it, because the following day, August 4, when explaining the penetration of Belgium to the Reichstag, he made no mention of the alleged French flights over Belgium. He charged that French airmen had bombed Germany, but he justified the breach of Belgium's neutrality solely by appealing to military necessity. On August 7, the Wolff Telegraphic Agency published the original telegram,⁴⁰ and Harnack, presumably taking note of it, again outdid the Chancellor. He angrily told British clergymen that it was not Germany who first violated Belgium's neutrality. "As we feared," he explained, "and as we now, informed by the actual facts, see still more clearly, Belgium was for a long time in alliance with France and--with you. France's airmen were flying over Belgium before we marched in; negotiations with France had already taken place."⁴¹ Emile Waxweiler, Director of the Solvay Institute of Sociology at Brussels, quickly rebuked Harnack in his Belgium: Neutral and Loyal (1915), but similar accusations continued to pour forth. The Truth

⁴⁰"Mutilated text of the declaration of war on France," Aug. 3, 1914, and "Text of the declaration of war presented at Paris," Aug. 3, 1914, and "Announcement of the declaration of war on France through the Wolff Bureau," n.d. [Aug. 7, 1914], Documents 734 a, b, and c in Kautsky Documents, 531-532; Baron Wilhelm Eduard von Schoen, Memoirs of an Ambassador, trans. by Constance Vesey (New York, 1923), 200-201.

⁴¹Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 23; "Prof. Harnack in Rebuttal," Current History, I (1914), 204-205.

About Germany, endorsed by Harnack and other dignitaries, asserted that "large numbers" of French planes had crossed Belgium enroute to Germany with no warning from the Belgian government. Deissmann similarly charged that the previous French violation of Belgian neutrality necessitated Germany's. In the spring of 1916, however, the German government modified its position. Bavarian authorities admitted that they had no evidence of bombs having been dropped in their area by hostile airmen in August, 1914. The flight over Belgium was another matter, however, and neither the government nor Harnack was yet ready to retreat on it. Consequently, the following year, a French publicist took them to task for persisting in The Lie of the 3rd August, 1914 (1917). In 1919, Harnack finally did recant. In an open letter, he deplored the German violation of Belgium's neutrality, regretting that the "excuse" for it had rested on "false reports."⁴²

The suspicion of Belgium's prior military collusion gained greater credibility through the discovery of official documents in the Brussels archives and the alleged discovery

⁴²Waxweiler, Belgium: Neutral and Loyal (New York, 1915), 172; The Truth About Germany, 11; Deissmann, "Die deutsche Erweckung," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 120; Dr. Schwalbe, article in Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, May 18, 1916, cited in Pierre Renouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (28th June-4th August 1914), trans. by Theodore C. Hume (New Haven, 1928), 275, and in Paris Chamber of Commerce, Facts About the War. A Bulletin of Information, June, 1916; /René Puaux/, The Lie of the 3rd of August, 1914 (London, 1917), 139-140; Harnack, "Offener Brief an Herrn Clemenceau," Tägl. Rund., Nov. 6, 1919.

of circumstantial evidence in France. On September 7, 1914, the Germans captured the French fortress of Maubeuge, just south of Belgium, and reportedly found an arsenal of English munitions. With righteous indignation, Harnack again embraced his government's claims and rushed to judgment. In an open letter to English clergy, he charged that the arsenal had been stationed there before the war and that it was therefore an indication of prewar agreements between Britain and France, to which Belgium was party. British authorities countered that if British munitions had indeed been found, they had been shipped there only after the war had begun. This time, Harnack back-pedalled before the war was over. In 1916, he published a collection of his wartime essays which included the famous letter, and, noting that he was no longer certain of the allegation, he dropped it. The Allies apparently did not learn of his retraction, for in 1917 British and French propagandists were still upbraiding him for his endorsement of, as one member of Parliament put it, the "official falsehood" about Maubeuge.⁴³

The French fortress had supposedly furnished only an

⁴³"Maubeuge," Kriegs-Rundschau, I, 318; Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 24, and explanatory remarks in Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 278; Lord Chancellor in London Times, Nov. 14, 1914, cited in Oliver Perry Chitwood, The Immediate Causes of the Great War (New York, 1918), 158-159; J. M. Robertson, The German Idea of the Peace Terms (London, 1917), 18. For prewar German suspicions about Maubeuge, see Alexander Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium (New York, 1915), 93.

indication of Belgium's prior collusion, nothing like the more formidable documents later discovered in the Brussels archives. Yet even before these more incriminating disclosures, nearly one hundred German scholars voiced a loud accusation. Indeed, the most ill-conceived attempt to curry favor with foreign intellectuals was the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three to the World of Learning." Its endeavor to meet and parry six allegations against Germany completely miscarried. In fact, its infamy became so pronounced that during and after the war, some of its signers tried to explain its meanings and even acknowledged the falsity of some of its assertions. Foreign critics thought that German scholars had taken leave of not only their honor but their intellect, since their statements seemed both servile and in blatant contradiction to presumably well-established information.

The "Appeal of the Ninety-Three" first appeared in German newspapers on October 4, 1914. Its origins are still shrouded in uncertainty. A postwar investigation was unable to determine its authorship, but its sponsors included Harnack, Emil Fischer, Franz von Liszt, and Gustav von Schmoller. Erzberger, the coordinator of German propaganda, also had a hand in gathering signatures, and the support of seven Catholic theologians and only five Protestants may suggest that his influence was preponderant.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Hans Wehberg, "Clemenceau und der Aufruf der 93!" Berl. Tagebl., Oct. 28, 1918, and Wider den Aufruf der 93!, 7-8. For Erzberger's influence, see Joseph Mausbach to

The appeal contained six paragraphs, each beginning with "it is not true that" With no elaboration or attempt to muster evidence, the ninety-three claimed that Germany was not guilty of starting the war, that her violation of Belgium's neutrality rested on the certain knowledge that France and Britain, with Belgium's consent, planned to do the same, that German soldiers had not, except in urgent self-defense, harmed Belgian civilians or their property, that the army had not brutally destroyed the city of Louvain, and that the battle against so-called German militarism was actually a campaign against German Kultur⁴⁵

These naked assertions, flying in the face of what the Allies promulgated as gospel truth, might have passed unnoticed had it not been for the illustrious names appended to them. Who in the intellectual world would fail to give

Harnack, Oct. 5, 1914, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Georg Nicolai, The Biology of War, trans. by Constance A. Grande and Julian Grande (New York, 1919), xvii. Fritz Fischer mistakenly equates the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three" with the "Declaration of the 3000," both appearing in Oct., 1914, and wrongly claims that Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, who drafted the latter, was the author of the former as well; Griff nach der Weltmacht (3rd ed., 1964), 186. Klaus Schwabe initially made the same mistake, based on a misreading of Dietrich Schäfer, Mein Leben, 166, but he later corrected it; "Ursprung und Verbreitung des alldeutschen Annexionismus in der deutschen Professorenschaft im ersten Weltkrieg," Vtjh. f. Ztgscht. XIV (1966), 109, and Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral, 195, footnote 19.

⁴⁵"An die Kulturwelt," Berl. Tagebl., Der Tag, Frkft. Ztg. October 4, 1914.

dismissed the charges against Germany. Having already a hearing to Harnack, Wilhelm Wundt, Ernst Haeckel, Wilhelm Röntgen, Emil von Behring, Max Planck, Gerhard Hauptmann, Max Reinhardt, and dozens more of the same caliber? Indeed, scholars did listen--and were dismayed. The appeal was almost universally greeted with an incredulity mixed with rage. Criticism came even from within Germany herself. Georg Nicolai, a Berlin physiologist, tried to launch a counter-manifesto, but his efforts were stillborn. Together with Albert Einstein and the Berlin astronomer Wilhelm Foerster, he drew up an appeal stressing the need to be "good Europeans" first and nationalists second, but it met with such icy reception that he dropped the project.⁴⁶

If the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three" caused only a few rumbles within Germany, it brought down an avalanche of criticism from the Allied and neutral world. The five Protestant theologians who signed the appeal were Harnack, Seeberg, Deissman, Adolf von Schlatter and Wilhelm Herrmann. Maurice Goguel, professor on the Free Faculty of Protestant Theology in Paris, told Herrmann that he was surprised to find his honored name among those who had peremptorily

⁴⁶ Nicolai, Biology of War, ix-xx. Nicolai wrote this work while imprisoned in Germany because of his protest against the war; in 1918 he escaped to Denmark. Wilhelm Foerster had unwittingly given his signature to the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three"; see Wehberg, Wider den Aufruf der 93!, 8. Significantly, Hans Delbrück was not one of the 93, a fact over which he later rejoiced; Lina Delbrück, Hans Delbrücks Leben, XI (private manuscript) 64-65, Delbrück Nachlass, BAK. On Nicolai, see also G.P. Gooch, Germany (New York, 1925), 136-137; Wehberg, "Helden des Pazifismus," Die Friedens-Warte, XXI (1919), 62-63.

dismissed the charges against Germany. Having already written a treatise on Herrmann's theology, Goguel now rebuked the Marburg neo-Kantian for failing to follow the "categorical imperative." He demanded to know what proof the Germans had that Belgium had consented to a French and English violation of her neutrality. Herrmann's reply was as void of documentation as the appeal. He merely asserted that when the war was over "irrefutable documents" would convince Goguel that he had been deceived. He was apparently alluding to the "Brussels Documents," which had just been made public but were not known when the appeal was first published. Their contents will be discussed shortly.⁴⁷

Other Frenchmen joined the assault. Romain Rolland, long an admirer of German culture, accused the ninety-three of a "criminal" blindness to the truth. Reflecting the popular suspicion that the scholars had buckled under government pressure, he contrasted Russian and German intellectuals. Citing Prince Alexander Kropotkin, Leo Tolstoi, Feodor Dostoievski and Maxim Gorki, he thanked God that the great thinkers of Russia had not justified the crimes of tsarism, but he accused German intellectuals of being "slavishly obedient" to their rulers' commands. Louis Dimier, an art historian, published an entire book on the appeal, attacking it point by point. Was it possible, he asked, that a declaration which carried Harnack's name had

⁴⁷Goguel to Herrmann, Oct. 24, 1914, and Herrmann to Goguel, Nov. 14, 1914, in Die Eiche, III (1915), 36-37.

not been "suggested from on high?" Alfred Loisy, the Catholic theologian who had written a rebuttal to Harnack's Das Wesen des Christentums, even branded Harnack as the probable author of the appeal. The Protestant Committee for French Propaganda Abroad accused the ninety-three of an ostrich-like refusal to see their nation's transgressions. One hundred French academicians and artists, including Maurice Barrès, Claude Debussy, Anatole France, André Gide, Auguste Rodin, and Edmond Rostand alluded to the destruction of Louvain and Rheims by referring to the Teutons as "destroyers of cathedrals."⁴⁸

In England, too, one hundred scholars, including J. B. Bury, F. G. Kenyon, A. F. Pollard, W. M. Flinders Petrie, Gilbert Murray, William Ramsay, A. H. Sayce, and the theologians Sanday and Conybeare, issued a joint reply. They judged the assertions of the ninety-three to be so "utterly baseless" that they could scarcely believe that these were the "considered opinion" of intellectuals. They held the German

⁴⁸ Rolland, "Pro Aris," and *De deux maux, le moindre,* "Au-dessus de la mêlée" (Paris, 1916, 13-14, 42-44; Dimier, *L'Appel des intellectuels allemands* (Paris, 1915), 10; Loisy, *Guerre et Religion*, 16; "The Germans, Destroyers of Cathedrals," *Current History*, II (1915), 1004-1005; "Antwort auf den deutschen Aufruf an die evangelischen Christen des Auslandes," *Die Eiche*, IV (1916), 263. On Aug. 26, 1914, fire destroyed most of the university library and parts of the collegiate church of St. Peter's in Louvain, but German soldiers saved the great Town Hall (Cloth Hall). On Sept. 19, the Germans bombarded the cathedral at Rheims. See L. H. Crondys, *The Germans in Belgium* (New York, 1916), 36-60; Fernand Mayence, *Die Legende der Franktireurs von Löwen* (Louvain, 1928).

government largely responsible, claiming that it did not give its citizens full and accurate information. As a case in point, they noted the brevity of the German White Book, with its paltry appendix of twenty-seven documents in support of its thesis. The English publicist Sir Theodore Cook described the ninety-three as "professors of evil" and added that two of them, Harnack and Karl Lamprecht, had already disgraced themselves by endorsing The Truth About Germany. Sir Gilbert Parker denounced the appeal as a glorification of German militarism, and singling out Harnack, lamented that "even theology is pressed into the service, to sketch a new creed which it shall be Germany's high mission to impose upon the world."⁴⁹

In Russia, over two hundred artists, authors, and actors, including Maxim Gorki and Michael Rostovtzev, Professor of History at St. Petersburg, responded by decrying the "black crimes" of Germany, especially the destruction of priceless art and the ravaging of helpless civilians. Criticism also came from citizens of the occupied countries. Emile Prüm, leader of Luxembourg's Catholic Party, contended that the German disclaimer of war guilt flew in the face of all the evidence of the "rainbow books." Jean Massart, Vice-Director of the Royal Academy

⁴⁹"Reply to the German Professors by British Scholars," Current History, I (1914), 188-191; Cook, The Mark of the Beast, 243-245; Parker, World in the Crucible, 78.

of Belgium, announced that when he saw such "flagrant lies" attested to by such celebrated savants, he first thought the document was a hoax. Voicing a typical complaint was Baron Eugen von Beyens, former Belgian minister to Berlin, who concluded that the ninety-three had been used as the "cat's-paw" of Wilhelmian policy.⁵⁰

The neutrals were no more sympathetic than the belligerents. American newspapers carried the appeal on October 10, 1914, and the pacifist editor Randolph Bourne claimed that most American professors were filled with "virtuous horror and stupefaction." Within a month, John Jay Chapman had published a violently anti-German work that pilloried the ninety-three. Like many Germanophobes, he was certain that the German government had inspired the appeal but added that the intellectuals gladly gave the endorsement which their Kaiser demanded. Another critic was Samuel H. Church, President of the Carnegie Institute at Pittsburgh. In an open letter, he noted that, having met Harnack and some of the other signers, he could hardly believe that men of their caliber could support such an "unwarranted" declaration.⁵¹ The historian

⁵⁰"An Appeal by Russian Authors, Artists, and Actors," Sept. 28 (Oct. 11), 1914, Russkia Vedomosti, reprinted in Current History, I (1915), 817-819; Prüm, Der Witwestand der Wahrheit (Paris, 1919; 1st ed., 1915), 10-14; Massart, Belgians Under the German Eagle, trans. by Bernard Miall (New York, 1916), 211-212; Beyens, Germany before the War, trans. by Paul V. Cohn (London, 1916), 202.

⁵¹Bourne, "The War and the Intellectuals," The Seven Arts, II (1917), reprinted in Untimely Papers, ed. by James Oppenheimer (New York, 1919), 24; Chapman, Deutschland über Alles or Germany Speaks (New York, 1914), 42-44; Church, The American Verdict on the War (Baltimore, 1915), 4-5, 15.

William Roscoe Thayer was more caustic. Though posing as "heralds of truth," he wrote, the men had spoken the words that had been put into their mouths, furnishing the final proof of their complete subservience to the Kaiser. As he pictured it, "the government cracked the whip, the ninety-three fell into line, saluted, and repeated the formula." Furthermore, he asked, if Harnack could declare that Germany had not trespassed in neutral Belgium, how could scholars ever again trust his statements about higher criticism? The American professors and publicists were joined by the preachers. Many ministers tried to call down the wrath of the Almighty on the reprobate Teutons, but Newell Dwight Hillis, pastor of the Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, outdid them all. The Kaiser and chancellor, he once exclaimed, had commanded their servants to lie, and "they lied like slaves." Singling out Harnack and the philosopher Rudolf Eucken, he railed against their "moral cowardice and intellectual subserviency."⁵²

The smaller neutrals also took up the chant. J. P. Bang, Professor of Theology at Copenhagen, charged that German intellectuals had prostituted their intellects in

⁵²Thayer, Germany versus Civilization (Boston, 1916), 158-159, and "The Collapse of the Superman Myth," Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 10, 1917, reprinted in Thayer, Volleys from a Non-Combatant (Garden City, 1919), 36; Hillis, German Atrocities (New York, 1918), 91-93. For a heavy-handed criticism of the wartime behavior of American clergymen, see Ray Abrams, Preachers Present Arms (New York, 1933).

the service of the Fatherland. Danish author Johannes Jørgensen attacked the appeal point by point and condemned it as a False Witness (1916). Léon Maccas, Professor of Law at Athens, denounced the appeal as "shameful" and argued that in Germany "the pedant is the ally of the trooper." Also from Greece came the only favorable reply. A group of intellectuals who supported King Constantine (who was married to the Kaiser's sister) sent a sympathetic declaration to several German newspapers and periodicals, including Rade's Die Christliche Welt. Though expressing their approval of the ninety-three and their hope for a German victory, they also asked that Germans be more understanding of the general anti-German sentiment of their compatriots.⁵³

In short, the appeal was a disaster, and its infamy prompted its signers to reconsider it. No sooner had it been published in Germany than the Catholic theologian Joseph Mausbach tried in vain to have it altered before it reached the foreign press. He had given his signature by telegraph without knowing its actual wording and was aghast to see that it denied German mistreatment of Belgian

⁵³Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, trans. by Jessie Bröchner (New York, 1917), 162; Jørgensen, False Witness, authorized trans. of Klokke Roland (London, 1916); Maccas, German Barbarism. A Neutral's Indictment (London, 1916), 227; "Aus Griechenland," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1149.

civilians. He immediately told Harnack that "authentic reports" filtering in through the Rhineland made such a claim untenable. Unable to stop its publication abroad, he did try to protect the reputation of Rome by publicly noting that the Catholic theologians who had signed the appeal had done so as representatives of German scholarship and not of the Roman Catholic Church. In 1915, Deissmann, too, admitted that individual German soldiers had no doubt committed acts of unnecessary cruelty.⁵⁴ The following year, Max Planck, speaking for himself, Harnack, and a few others, issued a qualified apology for the appeal. In a Dutch newspaper, he explained that it had reflected the "patriotic excitement" of the early war weeks and was nothing more than an attempt to redeem the good name of the maligned German army by identifying the scholars with its cause. Like Mausbach and Deissmann, Planck was willing to concede that some Belgian civilians had been wantonly molested, but on the crucial question of war guilt, he was less conciliatory, holding that only a subsequent, objective examination would reveal the truth. Yet, even this was a retreat from the initial proposition: "It is not true that Germany is responsible for this war."⁵⁵

⁵⁴Mausbach to Harnack, Oct. 5, 1914, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Mausbach, "Die literarische Kriegserklärung der französischen Katholiken," in Georg Pfeilschifter (ed.), Deutsche Kultur, Katholizismus und Weltkrieg, 5; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Sept. 18, 1915.

⁵⁵Max Planck to H.A. Lorentz, March, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB, and in Algemeen Handelsblad, April 11, 1916, and German Scholars Explain Their Manifesto, "Current History," IV (1916), 876. Planck's letter mistakenly cites August, instead of October, 1914, as the date of the appeal.

The end of the war brought more retractions. Five days after the armistice, with censorship restrictions finally lifted, Deissmann confessed that the invasion of Belgium had increasingly tormented his soul and that he was relieved to acknowledge the "appalling iniquity." Even at the end of 1919, Clemenceau had not forgotten or forgiven the provocative appeal and pointed a fresh finger of accusation at it in a speech before the Senate. Harnack responded with an open letter that treated four of the six points. Asserting that he had not drafted the declaration nor seen its exact wording until it was published, he admitted that he could no longer defend the invasion of Belgium or the claim that no German soldier had maltreated Belgian civilians. He asserted, however, that such claims were understandable in the heat of 1914, especially since enemy propaganda had predisposed Germans to reject all information from the foreign press. Moreover, on other issues he remained firm. Point six of the appeal had affirmed that the war against so-called German militarism was actually a war on German Kultur, and he argued that the enemy's attempt to "drive a wedge between the army and the German people" justified in 1914 and again in 1919 an insistence that German scholars felt no shame in feeling one with the German army. Most important of all, he held that Versailles had by no means settled the question of war guilt. In his opinion, the evidence at hand indicated that the Russian government bore the blame for the outbreak of the war. On the crucial

issues, therefore, Harnack refused to budge. Seeberg, however, feared that the victorious Allies would publicize and exploit only Harnack's concessions and regarded his colleague's action as foolish if not cowardly.⁵⁶

Clemenceau's speech prompted the publication of other retractions which had been collected since April, 1919, by the German pacifist Hans Wehberg. Scholars in neutral countries had told him that it would take at least five years to restore the intellectual ties destroyed by the war. Believing that a repudiation of the appeal would help shorten that period, he sent letters to the ninety-three, asking if they would retract their signatures. Several of the men, he announced, had not known the actual contents of the appeal and would not have signed it had they been fully informed. Several names had been obtained by telegraph. There was no evidence, however, that the government had initiated the declaration or supervised the collecting of signatures. By 1919, eighteen of the ninety-three had died, and seventeen others did not respond to Wehberg's inquiry. Of the fifty-eight who did, only sixteen still adhered to the entire manifesto, including the Tübingen theologian Adolf von Schlatter. Forty-two men, including Harnack,

⁵⁶Deissmann, Evangel. Wochenbr., Nov. 16 and Dec. 20, 1918; "Clemenceaus Erklärung im Senat," Berl. Tagebl., Oct. 17, 1919, reprinted in Wehberg, Wider den Aufruf der 93, 31; Harnack, "Offener Brief an Herrn Clemenceau," Tägl. Rund., Nov. 6, 1919, Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 303-305; Seeberg to Nathanael Bonwetsch, Nov. 9, 1919, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

Deissmann, and Wilhelm Herrmann, disagreed in whole or in part with the six points. Where Seeberg stood Wehberg did not say. Thus, whether genuinely disavowing the appeal or simply desirous of improving international relations, nearly half of the illustrious group publicly admitted to having acted prematurely.⁵⁷

The same type of infamy which the Allies attached to the appeal, the Germans heaped upon the "Brussels Documents." In 1906 and 1912, after the two Moroccan crises, British and Belgian officers had discussed the contingency of a German invasion of France through Belgium. Records of these conversations were found when the German army captured Brussels at the end of August, 1914. On October 13, the government announced the discovery, and the following month the press published the documents in their entirety. Henceforward they became a virtual first line of defense for all retrospective efforts to justify the German march into Belgium.⁵⁸

In 1906, an English military attaché had given assurances to Belgium that, in the event of a German invasion, England would land 100,000 troops in northern France and then move them into Belgium. Six years later, General Sir Henry Wilson,

⁵⁷Wehberg to "Sehr geehrter Herr," April 14, 1919, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Wehberg, "Clemenceau und der Aufruf der 93!" Berl. Tagebl., Oct. 28, 1919, and Wider den Aufruf der 93!, 7-12. In his posthumously published memoirs, Clemenceau took another jab at the 93; Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire (Paris, 1930), 233-238.

⁵⁸Norddt. Allgem. Ztg., Oct. 13 and Nov. 25, 1914.

English Director of Military Operations, directed another attaché in Brussels to inform a Belgian general that if Germany invaded, England would land 160,000 troops--whether Belgium asked for them or not. The Belgian Minister of War resented this dangerous presumption, and the English ambassador had to assure the Foreign Minister that the attaché's remarks had no official sanction. Indeed, on August 1, 1914, Belgium declared that she would defend herself and asked no one for aid. Two days later, King Albert appealed to King George only for "diplomatic intervention."⁵⁹

Modern scholarship generally dismisses the conversations as incidental,⁶⁰ but for the German theologians of the time, they were revelations almost from on high. Since they seemed to confirm suspicions about Belgium's prior perfidy, they brought a measure of satisfaction mingled with scorn. The conversations became household knowledge so quickly that by early 1915 Julius Kaftan declared that describing their details would be like "carrying owls to Athens." On October 14, 1914, one day after the German public learned of the documents, Sir Edward Grey admitted that some "academic discussions" might have taken place, but the following year he added that neither the Foreign Office nor the War Office

⁵⁹Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy, 86-89, 215, 353-371; Sidney B. Fay, Origins of the World War, II, 537-542.

⁶⁰The leading authority is Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Politics of Grand Strategy, 87, 215.

had any record of them. Deissmann told his friends in America, who constantly raised the Belgian question, that he could hardly regard as "academic" discussions which the Belgian Foreign Office had labelled "Conventions anglo-belges" and "confidentielles."⁶¹ Addressing the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, Bethmann cited the talks as evidence that when Germany had entered Belgium, the latter had already forfeited her neutrality--a theme reiterated by the theologians Carl Mirbt, Friedrich Loofs, and Arthur Titius. In response to British churchmen who had attacked their "Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad," twenty-nine German church leaders stamped the documents as proof of the "lowest perfidy and hypocrisy." Replying to charges of French Catholics, German Catholic scholars pointed an accusing finger at the military talks, and in America, Bernhard Dernburg and Alexander Fuehr, a German authority on international law published the complete conversations in defense of Germany's invasion.⁶²

⁶¹Kaftan, Vorm Jahr noch--und Heute? (Berlin, 1915), 22; Grey, "Circular Telegram to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives Abroad," Oct. 14, 1914, in Mach (ed.) Official Diplomatic Documents, 582-583; Grey's remarks of Jan. 27, 1915, cited in James Wilford Garner, International Law and the World War, II (London, 1920), 208; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Sept. 18, 1915.

⁶²"Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag," Dec. 2, 1914, Inter. Concil., Nr. 86 (1915), 10; Mirbt, Die Kampf um unsere Kolonien /address in Braunschweig, Oct. 30, 1914/(Braunschweig, 1914), 4; Loofs, "William Sanday über den Krieg," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 261; Titius, Unser Krieg (Tübingen, 1915), 13; "Noch einmal ein Wort an die evangelischen Christen im Auslande," November 20, 1914, Die Eiche,

The Allies retorted that when the Germans marched into Belgium, they had no knowledge of the talks and that their ex post facto justification was invalid. Moreover, they asserted that the talks were by no means an infringement of Belgium's neutrality but thoroughly in keeping with her role and that of Britain, one of her guarantors. In particular, they underscored Belgium's resolve in 1912 to resist unilateral British intervention. Yet, none of these arguments prompted any of the theologians to alter his opinion during the war. In 1919, however, Bethmann himself admitted that although the documents compromised Belgium's position, they in no way justified Germany's violation of her neutrality. In similar fashion, the German White Book presented at Versailles in May, 1919 made no mention of the Anglo-Belgian discussions and apologized for the wartime attempt to retreat from Bethmann's admission of wrong on August 4, 1914.⁶³

III (1915), 74; A.J. Rosenberg (ed.), Der Deutsche Krieg und der Katholizismus. Deutsche Abwehr französischer Angriffe (Berlin, 1915), 42-47; Godehard Josef Ebers, "Belgiens Neutralität und ihr Untergang," in Pfeilschifter (ed.), Deutsche Kultur, Katholizismus und Weltkrieg, 98-108; Dernburg (ed.), The Case of Belgium in the Light of Official Reports Found in the Secret Archives of the Belgian Government after the Occupation in Brussels (New York, 1915/); Dernburg (ed.), "The Case of Belgium," Current History, I (1915), 1101-1109; Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, facsimiles at end of book.

⁶³ Allied apologists included André Weiss, The Violation by Germany of Belgium and Luxembourg, trans. by Walter Thomas (Paris, 1915), 25-30; Gilbert Parker, World in the Crucible, 270-272; Baron Eugen von Beyens, Germany before the War, 316-322. Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, I, 168-169; Germany, Foreign Office, Das Deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Kriege (Berlin, 1927), 71. Other justifications

Thus, unlike Pilate, the Protestant theologians knew exactly what truth was. With the exception of Rade, they found their nation blameless at the outbreak of the war, and they justified her march into Belgium by pointing to the Grey-Lichnowsky conversation of August 1, 1914, the alleged English arsenal at Maubeuge, the alleged flight of French planes over Belgium, and the Anglo-Belgian conversations of 1906 and 1912. Neither at the outset, during, nor after the war did any of them accept German culpability for having willed to precipitate it. The Versailles Treaty stood in flat contradiction to their unanimous verdict on that score. Rade's immediate concession and subsequent admissions of Harnack, Baumgarten, Deissmann, and Troeltsch acknowledged only Germany's share in the collective responsibility for international mistrust that helped trigger the war. Troeltsch did, however, find Germany uniquely guilty of having exchanged the western European tradition of natural law for the Hegelian exaltation of the state. He

for the invasion, though hardly ever used by the theologians, included the arguments: (1) that since only Prussia, not the German Empire, signed the treaty of 1839, it was not binding upon the latter; (2) that the Anglo-German and Anglo-French treaties of 1870 superseded the former treaty, and the Anglo-German treaty was made with the North German Confederation and lapsed in 1872; (3) that a treaty is binding only so long as the status of the nation concerned remains essentially the same (*rebus sic stantibus*), and Belgium had gradually become a military and colonial power. See John W. Burgess, The European War of 1914, 167-171; Mach, "Defense of the Dual Alliance--A Reply," Current History, I (1915), 443-444; Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, *passim*; Dernburg, Search-lights on the War, 8-9; J.H. Labberton, Belgium and Germany. A Dutch View, trans. by W.E. Leonard (Chicago, 1916), 29-41.

also joined Harnack and Baumgarten in accusing Germany of having prolonged the war, and Harnack and Deissman even publicly apologized for the invasion of Belgium.

German scholars did act in a non-scholarly manner. If Sigmund Freud, as he tells us, gave all his libido to Austria-Hungary at the outbreak of the war,⁶⁴ intellectuals in the Reich likewise gave all their passions to the Fatherland--and theologians were not immune to the plague of patriotic fever. They, too, temporarily abandoned their lofty perch of scientific detachment. Only the protracted months of struggle allowed tempers to cool enough to mingle rational reflection with nationalistic fervor. Whatever they endorsed--the "Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad," the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three to the World of Learning," The Truth About Germany--they did so as free men and not as puppets of the state. As civil servants, they were certainly expected to be loyal, but their enthusiastic defense of their country's honor was not feigned. Though they often made passionate and premature pronouncements, they were sometimes courageous enough to retract them. So, if they were guilty of anything, it was not of falsehood or subservience but of letting the heart run away with the head. And they were not unique. Scholars everywhere succumbed to a worldwide epidemic of

⁶⁴Ernst Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, ed. by Lionel Trilling and Steven Marcus (Garden City, 1963; 1st ed., 1953), 327.

chauvinistic myopia. Carol S. Gruber has shown how in America "Minerva" joyously enlisted in the service of "Mars." Albert Marrin has described the blind crusading zeal of the British churchmen and theologians. And Julien Benda has accused not only his fellow Frenchmen but thinkers all over the globe of intellectual "treason."⁶⁵ Original sin was not transferred only to the German soul. War hysteria infected all the children of Adam.

⁶⁵ Gruber, Mars and Minerva. World War I and the Uses of Higher Learning in America (Baton Rouge, 1975); Marrin, The Last Crusade. The Church of England in the First World War (Durham, N. C., 1974); Benda, La trahison des clercs (Paris, 1927).

LAND OF THE PHARISEES

Chapter III

If Germany was not to blame for starting the war or violating Belgium's neutrality, then who was? On this score, too, the theologians' verdict was unanimous and simple. Aware that the war was ultimately a contest for world leadership and hence mainly with England, they were obsessed with enumerating her transgressions, both superficial and serious. Among the latter, they held, was her refusal to acknowledge her misdeeds. Instead, she compounded her iniquity by playing the hypocrite and hiding behind a mask of morality. Consequently, the theologians added to Napoleon's "perfidious Albion"¹ and "a nation of shopkeepers" a term of their own: Pharisee. They were ready, if not to forgive, at least to understand the animosity of France and Russia. The French, they asserted, were blinded by feelings of revanche and irreligion, and the Russians were little more than barbarians indulging in wild dreams of Balkan conquests. But England, so closely related in culture, religion, and even blood had needlessly and

¹In 1803, Napoleon had revived the phrase "perfidious Albion," first used by the French cleric, Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, in a sermon of 1652.

grievously betrayed her cousin across the Channel. If the English regarded Germany's contempt for a "scrap of paper" as an international crime, the Germans viewed England's breaking of a family relationship as the unpardonable sin.

Though Germans had long regarded France as the Erbfeind or hereditary enemy, at the outbreak of the war they relegated her to third place among the guilty Entente powers. For the most part, the theologians dismissed her as a puppet--with England and Russia pulling the strings.² Even Russia was being manipulated by, as Friedrich Lezius put it, "John Bull, the Hauptfeind" or main enemy.³ What made England's participation appear so heinous was that she had only an entente, not an alliance with Russia and France. As Kaftan explained it, she was not militarily bound and therefore might have used her influence to restrain her two friends and prevent a large-scale war, but her base, mercantile spirit had prompted her to exploit a continental crisis, and thus the lion's share of the responsibility fell upon her.⁴ To the German mind, the English declaration of war was nothing less than a "stab in the back," and though the theologians were annoyed at

²Seeberg, "Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des gegenwärtigen Krieges," Jan., 1915, Geschichte, Krieg und Seele (Leipzig, 1916), 33-34; Loofs, "Erinnerungen und--Fragen," Inter. Monatsschr., IX, (1914), 70; Rade, "Franzosen und Deutsche," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 950; Deissmann, "Die deutsche Erweckung," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 118.

³Lezius to Seeberg, Aug. 29, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁴Kaftan, Vom Jahr noch--und Heute?, 24.

France and angered at Russia, they were outraged at England.

Like the German chancellor, the theologians had fervently hoped that England would stay neutral, and when, instead, she plunged headlong into the imbroglio, they were stunned. Upon hearing the news, Johannes Haussleiter (1851-1934), a Greifswald Professor of New Testament, declared that he would never forget the pain and indignation he felt, and as he railed against "hypocritical, envious" England, he underscored the two vices most often attributed to her: commercial jealousy and Pharisaism.⁵

The Germans had no doubt about it--the English had drawn the sword because of greed, willfully denying Germany her rightful "place in the sun." No, it was not the obligation to play guardian angel to neutral nations that was the springboard of England's actions. Her self-styled image of protector of the small simply did not square with her naked aggressiveness of the previous century, especially her high-handedness against Denmark, Egypt, and the Boer Republics in South Africa. During the Napoleonic wars, England had not only refused to recognize Danish neutrality but had bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet. In 1882, she had fired upon Alexandria, bullied her way into Egypt, and suppressed an "Egypt for the Egyptians" movement. When English clerics rebuked Harnack for justifying the

⁵Haussleiter, "Der Krieg in neutestamentlicher Beleuchtung," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 138.

invasion of Belgium, he pointed to the blemished record of English foreign policy and asked, "What about Egypt?"⁶ With similar incisiveness, Deissmann urged his American friends to measure England's obvious economic motives in trampling under foot the Transvaal and Orange Free State against her alleged motives in assisting Belgium. As already mentioned, Germans charged that England had further tarnished her reputation in 1912 by telling Belgium that, if necessary, she would land troops there--whether requested or not. England's wartime measures merely perpetuated her prewar wickedness. When Allied forces landed at Salonika in October, 1915, Deissmann and Schian bellowed that England had violated a neutral nation. Indeed, claimed Deissmann, the British imperialistic spirit was the "ultimate reason" for the world conflict and was so prevalent, he noted half in earnest, half in jest, that a British newspaper had even robbed his last name of its second "n."⁷ All the evidence, the theologians concluded, showed that England was a merciless bird of prey that would stop at nothing to satisfy her desires, and she simply made matters worse by cloaking her rapaciousness in a mantle of moral necessity. No, it was

⁶Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 295-296.

⁷Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, and Dec. 18, 1915, May 10, 1916, and Feb. 23, 1918; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel, VI (1915), 520-523. For England's defense of her action in Greece, see J.W. Headlam, Belgium and Greece (London, 1917).

not England's "honor" that was at stake, as Lord Grey had told Parliament on August 3, 1914;⁸ it was her commerce. But like the unrepentent Pharisees, for whom Jesus had reserved his most scathing denunciations, the English stood smugly robed in self-righteousness.

Count Ernst zu Reventlow, a leader of the Conservative Party, portrayed England as "the vampire of the continent," sucking the economic life-blood out of nations too weak to resist her, and the theologians were almost as graphic. Kaftan pictured Grey marking down England's entrance into the war on the credit side of a ledger.⁹ Seeberg noted that some of his colleagues had quietly envied the "practical Christianity" of England, as they called neo-Calvinism, and had questioned the benefits of what some critics termed the "purely scholarly interests of the Prussian religion." But the war, he claimed, had shown that England's religion was not capable of thwarting her national selfishness. In Britain, "the cold, calculating spirit of the shopkeeper rules all; it does not shy away from a sea of blood and tears, because it seeks to crush the strongest competition of its commercial monopoly." Seeberg also helped draft a

⁸Lord Grey's speech in the House of Commons, Aug. 3, 1914, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Great Britain and the European Crisis. Correspondence and Statements in Parliament (London, 1914), 95.

⁹Reventlow, The Vampire of the Continent, trans. by George Chatterton-Hill (New York, 1916), passim; Kaftan, "Wider England," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 138-140.

a petition to the government which again branded England as "a nation of shopkeepers."¹⁰ Rade and Loofs proudly pointed to a speech of John Burns, one of the two English cabinet members who resigned in protest to the war, who claimed that England's part in it stemmed from the "brutal battle of competition."¹¹ With a slight alteration of St. Paul, Harnack reminded British clerics in September, 1914, that envy was "the root of all evil" and charged that Britain's industrial, commercial, and naval envy had driven her into the war. On this occasion, he blamed only the government, but when addressing a patriotic assembly a few weeks later, he asserted that the English people themselves were so captive to a "base, commercial jealousy" that even the best diplomacy could not have prevented the war.¹² Hans Preuss, an Erlangen theologian, likened England to the Jewish Sanhedrin, which out of envy had delivered Jesus (Germany) to a frivolous Herod (France) and a cowardly Pilate (Russia).

¹⁰Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 137; his petition is discussed in Chapter VII.

¹¹Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 846; Loofs, "Erinnerungen und--Fragen," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 70. The other member who resigned was Lord John Morley, President of the Privy Council.

¹²Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, Aus der Friedens-und Kriegsarbeit, 298, and "Was wir schon gewonnen haben und was wir noch gewinnen müssen, Rede am 29. Sept., 1914," in Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit, I, ed. by Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt (Berlin, 1914), 150, 163.

Probably the best summation of the German criticisms was given by Paul Feine, a Halle Privatdozent in New Testament. On Sunday, he conceded, the Englishman goes to church, but during the week, "he goes after business."¹³

The hollowness of England's pretext for entering the war reduced her in many German eyes to nothing more than a flagrant hypocrite. Arthur Titius, a Göttingen Professor of Systematic Theology, called hypocrisy the "national vice" of England. Other theologians, however, were not quite so abrasive. Deissmann, for example, distinguished between deceitful politicians and the gullible majority of English Christians.¹⁴ Baumgarten, Rade, Loofs, and Troeltsch insisted that the English were more self-deceived than self-deceiving--in Baumgarten's words, "a blinded, self-deceived, puffed-up, secluded, insular people." Rade held that "British cant" was something other than hypocrisy, since the people really believed in their "moral mantle."¹⁵ Both Loofs and Deissmann came to the rescue of William Sanday, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford, who had sent them and other Germans copies of his treatise on the war,

¹³Preuss, "Germany's Passion," Allgem. Evangel.-Luther. Kirchztg. Sept. 17, 1915, cited in J.P. Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, trans. by Jessie Bröchner (New York, 1917), 176-191. Feine, "Nation, Kultur, Religion," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 336, and "Die englische Religiosität," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1915), 663-664.

¹⁴Titius, Unser Krieg, 35; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, June 19, Sept. 25, and Oct. 30, 1915.

¹⁵Baumgarten, "Trösten im Kriegsnot," and "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XIV (1914), 345, 390-392; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt., XXXI (1917), 38.

which promised that if Germany would repent, like the prodigal son, England would not act haughty, like the elder son in Jesus' parable (Luke 15). Though many Germans were outraged at the analogy, Loofs exonerated Sanday from all Pharisaism, insisting that "seeing the splinter in his brother's eye and not the beam in England's eye" was simply symptomatic of the limitations of human judgment.¹⁶

Troeltsch, too, kept the argument on a higher plane, deploring references to "petty shopkeeping" as shallow echoes of the English obsession with German "violence and militarism."¹⁷ Moreover, he devoted an entire essay to a peculiarity he detected in the English--unconscious hypocrisy, a blend of "a Christian-liberal-moralizing standard" and "a thoroughly unscrupulous sense of lordship and power." The British instinct for self-protection had rendered her leaders insensitive to the contradictions of their own policies. On the one hand, England was like an "old maid," always insisting on doing what was right, and her statesmen, reflecting the humanitarian outlook of the "puritan-influenced middle class," talked of humanity, world peace, the

¹⁶Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Feb. 23, 1918; Loofs, "William Sanday über den Krieg," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 246, 256; Sanday, The Meaning of the War for Germany and Great Britain (Oxford, 1915), 120-121.

¹⁷Troeltsch, "Der Kulturkrieg, Rede an 1. Juli, 1915," in Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit, III, 238.

rights of small states, Christian righteousness, and the hope of a democratic world. But at the same time, she was seizing every opportunity to enhance her world position. Troeltsch ascribed part of the moralizing to the British conception of themselves as God's chosen people, through whom God mediated His blessings upon the rest of mankind. Thus, England could view her quest for world dominance as in the best interests of others and any threat to it, such as Germany's growing economic competition, as a challenge to the divine will. With the coming of the war, England continued to judge by a double standard. While interpreting her blockade of Germany, which Troeltsch denounced as a "refined war of hunger," as the logical outcome of her "God-intended world position," she condemned Germany's submarines and zeppelins as a "godless sacrilege." Troeltsch nevertheless did not equate this "dual-directedness" with a deliberate duplicity. It was simply that the right hand did not know what the left was doing. English cant was "honest hypocrisy."¹⁸

Unwitting or not, England's hypocrisy and her crass commercialism kindled Germany's wrath, and what brought it to a white heat was the feeling of being betrayed by a relative. Flippantly ignoring the Catholic third of Germany's population, Seeberg stated that England's hostility had

¹⁸Troeltsch, "Über einige Eigentümlichkeiten der angelsächsischen Zivilisation," Neue Rund. XXVIII (1917), 230-250.

hurt so deeply because she was "bound to us through blood and a common faith." In an essay with the bitter title, "Against England," Kaftan similarly explained that it was precisely England's cultural closeness to Germany that made her such a despicable enemy.¹⁹ Shortly after the Agadir crisis of 1911, Harnack had written an open letter reprimanding England for interfering in a matter strictly between Germany and France. England's meddling was especially grievous, he noted, because she and Germany were sisters, and among sisters only a peace based on friendship would last. Indicative of his anger over England's entrance into the war was his inclusion of the letter in a collection of his essays published in 1916. The two sisters, Harnack further asserted, were guardians of a common cultural heritage. Addressing a group of Americans stranded in Berlin at the outbreak of the war, he exclaimed: "This Kultur of ours . . . was entrusted especially to three peoples, indeed almost to them alone--us, the Americans, and the English. That is all I will say. I cover my head! Only two of the three are left"²⁰

The theologians were by no means unique but merely

¹⁹Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 174; Kaftan, "Wider England," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 137.

²⁰Harnack to Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, Jan. 17, 1912, "Blätter des kirchlichen Komitees zur Pflege freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zwischen Grossbritannien und Deutschland," reprinted in Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 281-282; Harnack, "Rede zur 'Deutsch-amerikanischen Sympathie-kundgebung,'" Aug. 11, 1914, Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 12.

reflected the nationwide antipathy against England. The German poet Ernst Lissauer penned a vitriolic "Hymn of Hate" that proclaimed:

Hate by water and hate by land,
Hate of heart and hate of hand,
We love as one and hate as one;
We have one foe and one alone--England!²¹

Rather than saying "Guten Tag," some Germans greeted one another with "Gott strafe England [May God punish England]." ²² Others melted the English medals they had been awarded into coin. Die Eiche, a religious quarterly, changed its subtitle, "An Organ for the Promotion of Friendly Relations between Great Britain and Germany," to "An Organ for Social and International Ethics." Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, a secular journal, likewise took a new turn. Prior to the war, it had been a medium of cultural exchange among many European nations, including France, Italy, England, and Germany. The first "war issue" of October 1, 1914, however, had a distinctly nationalistic face. The editor announced that the journal's new purpose was to aid German intellectuals in the battle

²¹Ernst Lissauer, "Hassgesang gegen England," in Hermann Kellermann (ed.), Der Krieg der Geister (Dresden, 1915), 461-462, trans., mine.

²²"Gott strafe England" was sometimes inscribed on scarf pins, cuff-links, brooches, pocket-knives, wedding rings, and schoolchildrens' badges and buttons; it was rubber-stamped on letters, and there were special stickers with the motto to be affixed to letters; Carl Ackerman, Germany, The Next Republic? (New York, 1917), 124; Frederic W. Wile, The Assault (Indianapolis, 1915), 48.

for "right and truth." Three of the ten articles in the issue were by theologians: Harnack, Troeltsch, and Loofs, who singled out England for special abuse. In subsequent issues, Deissmann, Kaftan, Seeberg, Feine, and other theologians pursued the attack against "perfidious Albion."²³

Some theologians publicly gave thanks that they had not been duped into participating in the cultural exchange program between Germany and England at the turn of the century. As one scholar put it, the whole affair had been a "swindle."²⁴ Troeltsch lamented that the international character of intellectual culture had been damaged for at least a generation, and Deissmann thought it would be almost impossible to restore fellowship between England and Germany.²⁵ Max Reinhardt, director of the Deutsches Theater, even worried about the propriety of producing Shakespearean drama on the German stage and sought advice from Harnack on this abstruse ethical

²³Die Eiche, edited by Berlin pastor Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, was founded in 1913 as the German organ of the Council for Fostering Better Relations between Germany and England, established in 1910. Like Current History in America, it gave a running account of the intellectual battle by publishing manifestoes, letters, and their replies. Max Cornicelius, "Deutschlands Kampf für Recht und Gesittung," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 1; the theologians' articles in this periodical have been cited in previous footnotes.

²⁴Rade, quoting an unidentified colleague in "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914); Deissmann, however, said that he was glad to have participated, in "Die deutsche Erweckung," Inter. Monatsschr. IX (1914), 118.

²⁵Troeltsch, "Der Krieg und die Internationalität der geistigen Kultur," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 52. Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Dec. 20, 1914.

matter. Although Harnack could hardly give an address, write an article, or publish a book without berating England, he did not indulge his bitterness on this question. True to his prewar pledge before an English assembly that "Your Shakespeare has become our Shakespeare," he told Reinhardt that without question the bard should continue to be produced.²⁶ Probably the most striking example of the rampant Anglophobia was the decision of Leipzig New Testament scholar, Caspar René Gregory, to volunteer for active duty-- at the age of sixty-eight. England's desire to make Germany "a second Ireland or India," he explained, necessitated his personal opposition. He perished on the western front in 1917.²⁷

Although the theologians did not alter their basic judgment about England's perfidy, many did try to mitigate the hate campaign against her. Baumgarten felt himself estranged

²⁶Max Reinhardt to Harnack, Sept. 21, 1914, and Harnack's handwritten reply on same sheet, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Harnack's reply also in Kellermann (ed.), Der Krieg der Geister, 474.

²⁷Caspar René Gregory, "Warum ich ins deutsche Heer eingetreten bin und warum ich darin bleibe," Allgem. Evangel. Luther Kirchztg., Nov. 18, 1916, reprinted in "Ein siebenzig-jähriger Professor der Theologie an der deutschen Front," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 33-34. The news of his death came during a meeting of the Protestant-Social Congress, of whose managing board he was a member; Rade, "Kriegstagung des Evangelisch-Sozialen Kongresses," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 329-330; see also Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 159, Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., April 16 and May 14, 1917, and Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkriege," Neue Freie Presse, March 31, 1918, reprinted in Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 309.

from the majority of his compatriots, whom he believed to enjoy the "Gott-strafe-England" slogan. With tears in his eyes, he broke fellowship with one of his closest friends over the motto. He reminded his readers that although the Bible said "'Vengeance is mine, I will repay,' saith the Lord," it also admonished Christians to be "slow to speak, slow to wrath." He even devoted an entire book, Politik und Moral (1916) to showing the impropriety of applying religious moral judgments to international politics. The goals of a state and hence its motivation for war, he argued, cannot be measured by the yardstick of Christian ethics.²⁸ Seeberg likewise disapproved of the anti-English slogan, asserting that Christians should not emulate the authors of the imprecatory Psalms, who had called down Jehovah's wrath on Israel's enemies. Deissmann, Rade, Troeltsch, Schian, and Friedrich Niebergall similarly denounced hate as unnecessary and improper.²⁹ Ironically, even the

²⁸Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XV (1915), 182, and Meine Lebensgeschichte, III, 237; in his Politik und Moral, I-II, 161-162, Baumgarten noted that the common complaints against England, namely, the use of dum-dum bullets, an illegal blockade, and the violation of Greek neutrality, were simply improper, inasmuch as when a nation is fighting for her existence, she cannot be bound by international law.

²⁹Seeberg, Was sollen wir denn tun? (Leipzig, 1915), 20; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, April 16 and Aug. 21, 1915, and May 24, 1916; Rade, "Britten und Deutsche," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 981; Troeltsch, Das Wesen des Deutschen (Heidelberg, 1915), 6; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 515, and VI (1915), 185; Niebergall, "Krieg und Hass," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914).

jingoist Alldeutsche Blätter, organ of the Pan-German League, cautioned against the overuse of "Gott strafe England"---lest the concentration on England result in an unwarranted leniency toward France at the peace table.³⁰

While trying to stem the tide of hate, the theologians nevertheless kept count of England's iniquities. In addition to her general sins of commercial envy and hypocrisy, they charged her with several specific transgressions. One was that of having launched a Kulturkrieg along with the shooting war. In this propaganda battle, England characterized Germany as an autocratic nation of militarists and barbarous Huns who dreamed of world domination. Germany, to be sure, found herself at a distinct disadvantage in this fight because of the blockade, which gave Britain control of the overseas mail and a monopoly of the Atlantic cables, Germany's having been cut. A later chapter treats the Kulturkrieg at length, but it should be noted here that until the United States entered the conflict, Germany regarded England as the chief poisoner of the wells of truth. Catching the mood of his countrymen was one theologian who exclaimed: "What a mountain of lies has been thrown up against Germany. And most thought out, most malicious, most clever, and most hateful in this respect is the work of that ever honest, ever moral, ever Christian England!"³¹

³⁰"Gott strafe England," Alldt. Bl., XXIV (1914), 7.

³¹Ludwig Lemme, "Gottes Gerechtigkeit in den Schicksalen der Völker," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 169.

More harmful than England's intellectual blockade was her economic blockade. Claimed by military historian B. H. Liddell-Hart to have been the weapon that ultimately won the war, it worked silently and surely to weaken Germany, which protested its illegality. The Peace of Paris of 1856 had guaranteed the rights of neutral ships, except for those carrying contraband, and had given legal status only to a blockade that effectively prevented the entrance and exit of ships from enemy ports--the prevailing idea being that an effective blockade had to be conducted close to shore. In 1909, delegates from America and the great powers of Europe had signed the Declaration of London, which stipulated that a blockade must grant free access to neutral ports. It also classified goods into three categories: absolute contraband, conditional contraband, and free articles. For selfish or technical reasons, however, many of the home governments refused to ratify the agreement, but when the war began, America urged the belligerents to abide by it anyway. Germany agreed, but England subscribed only to a modified version that reclassified many goods as absolute contraband. Then, on November 3, 1914, she designated the North Sea as a military zone. Germany retaliated on February 4, 1915, by declaring the English Channel and the waters around the British isles likewise to be military zones. The British responded with an Order in Council of March 11, 1915, which established a complete

blockade of the German coast. The United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Holland protested that the action was contrary to the earlier agreements. They pointed out that England never officially designated her action a "blockade"; it was not maintained close to shore; it was not altogether effective; it was discriminatory (the United States, for instance, was hurt more than Sweden); and it blocked access to neutral ports. On March 30, 1915, the United States finally conceded that a close blockade was no longer practicable in view of the submarine, but when she again raised the point about blocking neutral ports, England resorted to the doctrine of continuous voyage, which held that goods ostensibly bound for a neutral country might actually be destined for Germany and could therefore be seized.³²

The Germans accepted none of these arguments and accused England of conducting a "paper blockade." Schian called it

³²B.H. Liddell-Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (Boston, 1931), 278; for English justification of the blockade as compatible with the Union's blockade of the South in the American Civil War, see A. Maurice Low, The Law of Blockade (Washington, D.C., [1916]) and Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, How the British Blockade Works (London, 1916); for an American protest to the blockade and England's modifications of the London Declaration, see Edwin J. Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War (New Haven, 1915); the German and English decrees are discussed in "Germany's War Zone and Neutral Flags," Current History, II (1915), 1-21; postwar treatments include Count Johann von Bernstorff, My Three Years in America (New York, 1920), 127-138; James W. Garner, International Law and the World War, II (London, 1920), 317-338; Maurice Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power (New York, 1924), 5-246; Rear Admiral M.W.W.P. Consett, The Triumph of Unarmed Forces (1914-1918) (London, 1923).

"despotic," and Harnack denounced it as an inhumane attack on non-combatants. Titius lampooned "English morality" as a system which violated international law by maintaining an undeclared blockade with the intent of starving innocent civilians and compelling Germany to accept a humiliating peace.³³ As already noted, Troeltsch declared that England had no compunctions about waging a "refined war of hunger" while condemning Germany's U-boats, and he denounced President Wilson's reaction to the measures as unequal. While only mildly protesting the blockade, Wilson deplored the submarines' taking of life on the high seas. Yet, Troeltsch insisted, the manner of the blockade was completely illegal, and Germany had no other means of "salvation" than the U-boat.³⁴

At the end of the war, Deissmann published an open letter to Archbishop Nathan Söderblom, Primate of the Swedish Luthern Church and a discreet Germanophile, com-

³³Cartoon in Lustige Blätter, reprinted in Current History, II (1915), 936; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 523; Harnack, "Wilsons Botschaft und die deutsche Freiheit," address of May, 1917, in Die deutsche Freiheit, ed. by Bund der deutschen Gelehrter und Künstler (Gotha, 1917), 8; Titius, Unser Krieg, 32; A thorough but biased treatment of England's numerous alleged violations of international law is Ernst Müller (Meinigen), Der Weltkrieg und das Völkerrecht. Eine Anklage gegen die Kriegführung des Dreiverbandes (Berlin, 1915).

³⁴Troeltsch, "Über einige Eigentümlichkeiten der angelsächsischen Zivilisation," Neue Rund., XXVIII (1917), 243, and "Der Ansturm der westlichen Demokratie," address of May, 1917, in Die deutsche Freiheit, 80.

plaining that the armistice had not lifted the blockade and asking his friend to inform the Archbishop of Canterbury of Germany's plight. Söderblom complied with the request, and the English Archbishop replied that Deissmann's complaint ignored the origins of the war and manner of German warfare. Deissmann conceded that German foreign policy had taken an unfortunate turn after Bismarck's dismissal but insisted that neither in mistakes of policy nor in committing atrocities was Germany a match for the Allies, Russia in particular for her behaviour in East Prussia. England herself was guilty of horrors, he said--the mistreatment of German missionaries, the destruction of their mission establishments, and the starvation caused by the blockade--citing the case of his Berlin predecessor, Bernhard Weiss, who died of malnutrition in January, 1918. England's evil weapon, he declared, "has a certain elegance of appearance and avoids bombs, blood, and firebrands. It works before the world like a gentleman-criminal, quiet and inconspicuous, and adorns its visiting card with the doctorate of international law."³⁵

The blockade continued, and in March, 1919, Deissmann published a declaration of fifty German physicians, including Sigmund Freud, who appealed for help from the medical faculties of the neutrals. That same month, 150 Englishmen petitioned their government to lift the blockade, but it

³⁵Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Jan. 21, Nov. 16 and Dec. 20, 1918.

refused. In accordance with the armistice provisions, however, the Allies finally began to supply Germany with food-stuffs at the end of the month. But the damage had already been done. Berlin pastor Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, who ten years earlier had been a staunch advocate of an Anglo-German rapprochement, complained that "the slaughter of the innocents in Bethlehem was but child's play" when compared with the starvation among the German children wrought by "one of the cruelest crimes in history."³⁶

An illegal blockade, the Germans protested, was bad enough, but the British also violated international law by using illegal bullets, dum-dums. Their soft noses with split ends shattered upon impact and inflicted large wounds. At the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, Belgium, Serbia, and other countries had agreed to outlaw these bullets, and England

³⁶Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr. March 19, 1919; "Englische Denkschrift für die Aufhebung der Blockade," Die Friedens-Warte, XXI (1919), 74-75; Siegmund-Schultze, The Effect of the Hunger Blockade on Germany's Children (/1919/; reprint of article in Die Eiche, May, 1919/), 3, 5. In Jan., 1919, the German government stated that between the fall of 1916 and the end of 1918, more than one half million deaths had resulted from malnutrition attributable to the blockade; on May 7, 1919, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau stated at Versailles that hundreds of thousands more had perished since the armistice; see J.W. Garner, International Law and the World War, II, 336. Berlin theologian Bernhard Weiss (d. 1918) was the father of Heidelberg theologian Johannes Weiss (d. 1914), whose Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes (1892) foreshadowed Schweitzer's "eschatological" theology; Schweitzer, Aus meinem Leben und Denken, 39. Among the British protestors were William Archer, G. D. H. Cole, G.P. Gooch, John Masefield, Arthur Ponsonby, G. B. Shaw, R. H. Tawney, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and H. G. Wells.

added her endorsement later.³⁷ In August, 1914, German soldiers found packages of dum-dums in the French fortress of Longwy. Citing this evidence and alleging that captured French and British soldiers carried the forbidden bullets, Bethmann on September 2, 1914 charged that Germany's enemies must be using them in battle. Five days later, William II appealed to President Wilson to support the charge and demand cessation.³⁸ On September, 10, Harnack took up the lance, pleading to British churchmen that in using dum-dums their soldiers were turning a "decent war" into "the most bloody butchery." The following month, the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three," endorsed by Harnack and four other Protestant theologians, similarly lamented that on the western front dum-dums were "shredding to pieces the breasts of our soldiers." Harnack also endorsed The Truth About Germany, an apologetic which carried the chancellor's and Kaiser's protests and photographs of the illegal bullets allegedly taken from

³⁷James Brown Scott (ed.), The Texts of the Peace Conferences at the Hague, 1899 and 1907 (Boston, 1908), 83, 87; dum-dums were developed by the British in the Indian town of Dum-dum for use against wild native charges which ordinary bullets seemed inadequate to stop; see Edward C. Crossman, "'Dum-dum' Bullets," in The Scientific American War Book, ed. by Albert A. Hopkins (New York, 1916), 53-57.

³⁸"Bethmann-Hollweg an die Vertreter der grossen amerikanischen Pressbureaus," Sept. 2, 1914, and "Kaiser Wilhelm an Präsidenten Wilson," Sept. 7, 1914, in Kriegs-Rundschau, I, 195-197, 295-297.

captured soldiers.³⁹ Schian complained that England's use of the bullets was all the more disgraceful since at the outset of the war she had "struck a moral posture," which made her subsequent action "a world-historical example of the most shameful hypocrisy." In an open letter to British clerics, Rade stated that he had been given British bullets captured in northern France which were so made that they could be converted into dum-dums by merely breaking off the tips, and what especially angered him was that they bore as their year of manufacture "1914."⁴⁰ During the first year of the war, Baumgarten, Loofs, Titius, and Carl Mirbt joined the jury that found the Allies guilty of using dum-dums. Austria-Hungary even published an official Red Book claiming that the prohibited bullets had been found on Russian and Serbian soldiers.⁴¹

The German charges boomeranged. In 1914, the French and Belgian governments protested that the Germans were using the bullets, and the following year both governments

³⁹"Harnack in Reply," letter of Sept. 10, 1914, Current History, I (1914); The Truth About Germany, 2nd ed. (Sept. 20, 1914), 124-128 and Appendix; "An die Kulturwelt," Berl. Tagebl., Oct. 4, 1914.

⁴⁰Schian, "Chronik" Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 602; Rade, "An die 42 britischen Kirchenmänner," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1003.

⁴¹Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XIV (1914), 356; Loofs, "William Sanday über den Krieg," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 261; Titius, Unser Krieg, 32; Mirbt, Der Kampf um unsere Kolonien, 8; Austria-Hungary, Foreign Office, Collection of Evidence concerning the Violations of International Law by the Countries at War with Austria-Hungary (n.p., 1915), 63-69.

issued official reports with photographs of dum-dums supposedly captured from the Germans.⁴² The English charged that Germans used the bullets in Africa, and even neutrals pointed the finger at the initial plaintiff. In the fall of 1914, the Francophile New York Herald claimed that Prussian soldiers were using the bullets; Lausanne professor R.-A. Reiss published pictures of Serbians purportedly wounded by Austrian dum-dums; and Athens professor Léon Maccas labelled the bullets another example of "German barbarism."⁴³

By 1916 the storm of accusations had begun to subside. In fact, Harnack publicly withdrew his earlier charge, explaining that he was no longer so sure. His recantation on the question of dum-dums and on the previously mentioned

⁴²"President Poincaré of the French Republic to President Wilson," Sept. 11, 1914, Current History, I (1914), 375; The Case of Belgium in the Present War. An Account of the Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium and of the Laws of War on Belgian Territory (New York, 1914), 27; République Française, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents relatifs à la guerre, 1914-1915-1916. Rapports et procès-verbaux d'enquête de la commission instituée en vue de constater les actes commis par l'ennemi en violation du droit des gens, III-IV (Paris, 1916); République Française, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Les violations des lois de la guerre par L'Allemagne, I (Paris, 1915), 151-166; Henri Davignon (ed.), Belgium and Germany. Texts and Documents (London, [1915]).

⁴³Facsimile of article in New York Herald, Oct. 5, 1914, in Mark Sullivan, Our Times. The United States 1900-1945, V (New York, 1933), 79; "The Conquest of Cameroon and Togoland," The London Times History and Encyclopedia of the War, Pt. 99, VIII (1916), 279; Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia. Personal Investigations of a Neutral, trans. by J. S. (Paris, 1915), 4-10; Maccas, German Barbarism, 42-49.

Maubeuge arsenal show that after two years of war he finally allowed reason and reflection to temper his initially passionate patriotism. Postwar investigation indicates that no belligerent had authorized the use of dum-dums or had made any general use of them. Apparently, however, individual soldiers on both sides had occasionally used them. The French admitted that there may have been a quantity of dum-dums at Longwy but only for the use of nearby rifle clubs. It seems, therefore, that there had been much ado about nothing and that scholars had indulged in premature judgments.⁴⁴

More grievous to the theologians than England's bullets or her blockade was her brutality in the foreign mission fields. It was tragic that Orthodox Russia and Catholic France warred against Protestant Germany, and worse still that Protestant England lifted the cudgel against her. But worst of all was that the English, the very people who had done so much to promote Christian missions, carried the conflict to the mission fields, invading Germany's colonies, disrupting the work of her missionaries, sending heathen black troops against white Christians, and even stirring up the heathen yellow race against Germany--all of which discredited the Gospel which the missionaries had brought.

England, France, and Russia all led heathen troops into

⁴⁴Harnack, explanatory remarks in Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 278; Garner, International Law and the World War, I, 262, 269.

battle, but again England was the worst because she was a member of the Protestant family, manifesting, as Baumgarten put it, "no trace of solidarity" with German Protestants and besmirching Protestant culture through her "Machiavellian power politics." Rade lamented that the mission field had been turned into a battlefield, pitting "black against white." The final straw was that England had not shrunk from inciting the heathen Japanese against German Christians. Even Troeltsch, who usually avoided exaggerations, maintained that England had "everywhere destroyed the missions of the enemy" and that her colonial armies had brought "all the heathen colored of the world" to fight in Christian Europe.⁴⁵

England's action seemed especially unforgivable in light of the international missions conference at Edinburgh in 1910. At this high point in ecclesiastical relations, Julius Richter, then serving as a Prussian pastor, was made vice-president of a Continuation Committee to carry on the

⁴⁵Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 318; Rade, "An die 42 britischen Kirchenmänner," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1004, and Dieser Krieg und Christentum (Stuttgart, 1915), 7; Troeltsch, "Der Völkerkrieg und das Christentum," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 295. Similar complaints about England's inciting of the Japanese came from: Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 174; Mirbt, Der Kampf um unsere Kolonien, 9; Johannes Haussleiter, "Der Krieg in neutestamentlicher Beleuchtung," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 123; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Feb. 19, 1915.

work of coordinating mission outreach. When the war began, he exchanged letters of mutual concern with the committee's secretary, Joseph H. Oldham, a Scot who tried to protect German missions from the encroachments of his own government. In the summer of 1917, however, just after America had entered the conflict, he refused to recognize any longer as the committee's president the American John R. Mott, who had openly sided with the Allied and Associated Powers.⁴⁶ Reflecting the dismay and nostalgia of many of his colleagues, Baumgarten asked:

When will a World Missions Conference of all Protestantism such as in Edinburgh ever again be possible? Will not the "century of mission," that was preponderantly a victory march of Protestantism over the world, become a century of mutual isolation of Christians from one another? England, allied with the eldest daughter of the Church, the Great Power of a religionless culture, and with the Asiatic Great Power of the Graeco-Oriental culture, is filled with one idea: to destroy the other Protestant Great Power,--and already knocking on the gates of Europe is the yellow race, the Great Power of Confucius and Buddha⁴⁷

When the war broke out, Germany had over 1,600 missionaries abroad. About one-third labored in German colonies, one-third in English colonies, and the remainder in Green-

⁴⁶J. H. Oldham to Richter, Aug. 15, 1914, and Gottlob Haussleiter to J. H. Oldham, Oct. 8, 1914, in Die Eiche, III (1915), 78-79, 82-83; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 614; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Aug. 12, 1917, Feb. 9 and 23, 1918; K. S. Latourette, "Ecumenical Bearings of the Missionary Movement and the International Missionary Council," in Rouse and Neill (eds.) Ecumenical Movement, 364-365.

⁴⁷Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 319.

land, China, Japan, the Dutch East Indies, and the Americas. They were sponsored by twenty-five different mission societies whose efforts had been coordinated since 1913 by the German Protestant Missions Auxiliary. In August, 1914, its president, A. W. Schreïber, and secretary, Richter, and twenty-seven other prominent German Protestants sent out an "Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad." Fourteen of the sponsors were closely associated with the missions movement, including Richter and Gottlob Haussleiter, Professor of Missions at Halle. Six other theologians endorsed the appeal: Harnack, Deissmann, Herrmann, Loofs, Carl Mirbt, and Georg Wobbermin. Recalling the spirit of cooperation at Edinburgh, the "Appeal of the Twenty-Nine" asked that the mission fields be spared from battle lest the Christian message be compromised in the eyes of the natives. British clergymen replied that they, too, were concerned about the repercussions on the mission fields but believed that the Allies' honorable struggle must be prosecuted to the full. In Paris, the Catholic theologian Pierre Batiffol echoed their sentiments, and the excommunicated Alfred Loisy dismissed the appeal as nothing more than a selfish attempt to save the German colonies from invasion.⁴⁸

⁴⁸Karl Axenfeld et al., "Aufruf an die evangelischen Christen im Auslande," Aug., 1914, Die Eiche, III (1915), 49-53, and "Germans to Christians," New York Times, Sept. 5, 1914; Randall Cantuar et al., "Antwort auf den Aufruf der deutschen Theologen," Sept. 23, 1914, Die Eiche, III (1915), 60; Batiffol, "The Catholic Church and War," Construct. Qtrly., III (1915), 210; Loisy, Guerre et religion, 17. For

Most of the non-German and non-British areas were spared from combat, and some German missionaries in British colonies were allowed to continue their work, though others were interned. In 1917, two-thirds of Germany's missionaries were still free to pursue their labors. Those in Germany's African and Asian colonies were the least fortunate. By October, 1914, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand had seized Germany's Asiatic and Pacific holdings, but Mirbt rejoiced that only one of the four African colonies, Togo, had fallen. His joy was shortlived, for within the next year, the British and the French had overrun the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa, and most of German East Africa. He and Richter complained before the Missions Auxiliary that this action violated the Congo Act of 1885, which had recognized mutual "spheres of influence" and had guaranteed the protection of Christian missions in Africa, and they cited England as the chief offender. When British churchmen answered the "Appeal of the Twenty-Nine" by condemning Germany's violation of the Belgian Treaty of 1839, the twenty-nine likewise pointed to England's disregard of the Congo Act. The issue was raised

a general description of the German missions program, see Schian, "Die evangelische Mission," in Dietrich Schäfer (ed.), Der Krieg 1914-1917, (Leipzig, 1917), 361-363; Mirbt, Die Evangelische Mission. Eine Einführung in ihrer Geschichte und Eigenart (Leipzig, 1917); K. S. Latourette, "The Spread of Christianity: British and German Missions in Africa," in Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), Britain and Germany in Africa. Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, 1967), 393-416.

again at Versailles, where the Allies heaped insult upon injury by requiring Germany to surrender all the properties of her missionary organizations to foreign trustees of the same denomination as that of the mission involved. Brockdorff-Rantzau protested this forced transfer as contrary to the Congo Act and the supranational character of Christian missions, but to no avail.⁴⁹

The theologians also berated England for the indignities she had reportedly perpetrated against German missionaries in Africa. Mirbt declared that joint Anglo-German mission efforts would never again be possible until the English had repented of their "outrageous" treatment, and, recalling Luther's rebuke of Zwingli, scolded them with the remark, "your spirit is different from ours." Richter was especially angry to learn that white missionaries had been interned under the supervision of black soldiers.⁵⁰ On several occasions, Deissmann used his Protestant Weekly Letter to bewail the alleged British brutalities in the Cameroons. Women missionaries transported to Liverpool,

⁴⁹Mirbt, Der Kampf um unsere Kolonien, 15-16, and "Das Auslandsdeutschum und die christlichen Missionen im gegenwärtigen Weltkrieg," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 385-386, and Mission und Reformation, (Gütersloh, 1917), 25-26; Richter, Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche evangelische Mission, (Gütersloh, 1915), 3-7; Karl Axenfeld et al., "Noch einmal ein Wort an die evangelischen Christen im Auslande," Nov. 20, 1914, in Die Eiche, III (1915), 71; "Deutsche Note vom 17. Mai 1919 über Missionsfragen," in Germany, Foreign Office, Materialien, betreffend die Friedensverhandlungen (Berlin, 1919), 35; Latourette, "Ecumenical Bearings and the Missionary Movement," in Rouse and Neill (eds.) Ecumenical Movement, 365.

⁵⁰Mirbt, Mission und Reformation, 25; Richter, Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche evangelische Mission, 7.

123

he reported, had been greeted with mud and stones, and one woman shuttled off to the Gold Coast had died from lack of proper medical care. Deissman was highly respected in England; he had been on several lecture tours there and held honorary doctorates from three English universities. Consequently, his and similar horror stories raised a furor in England and came to the attention not only of Parliament but Deissmann's close friend and fellow Greek scholar, Professor James Hope Moulton of Manchester. Moulton checked with Liverpool police, who denied that any such indignities had occurred there, but Deissmann refused to budge, stating that he had an eyewitness who would swear under oath to the incident. In a modest attempt to copy Foxe's Book of Martyrs, the German Protestant Press Association published a full account of the "martyrdom" of German missionaries in the Cameroons, and Deissmann tried to win sympathy abroad by sending copies to the Archbishop of Canterbury and his friends in America.⁵¹

By contrast, the theologians were almost silent about the French and Japanese actions. In fact, Deissmann, Richter, and A. W. Schreiber praised the conduct of the Japanese who captured Tsing-tau in 1914. "Not a hair of the German

⁵¹Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Feb. 19, June 5, and July 15, 1915; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence relative to the Alleged Ill-Treatment of German Subjects Captured in the Cameroons (London, 1915), Parliament, Papers by command, Cd. 7974; W. Stark (ed.), Das Martyrium der evangelischen Missionären in Kamerun 1914 (Berlin, 1915).

missionary within his own border has been touched," announced Deissmann--proof that the heathen had been more "Christian" than actual Christians.⁵² Though the French had interned Albert Schweitzer and had aided the English in overrunning Germany's African colonies, the Germans hardly condemned them at all. As in other matters, they were too busy finding fault with England, and their cavalier disregard for the one out of three German Catholics was matched by their dismissing France as a mere Catholic or "religionless" collaborator, from whom less was expected than her Protestant partner.

Considering the intellectual caliber of the theologians, one is shocked to see them uncritically parroting the slogans of popular journalism, the biases of the man on the street, and the revelations of the government press. But maligning England became the national pastime in Germany, and the erudite as well as the simple enjoyed throwing verbal mud-balls across the Channel. Why did the theologians join in? For one thing, they seemed to have naively believed that England could and should have remained neutral and that her unwarranted meddling in continental affairs merited contempt. Furthermore, they wanted to dispel any notion that they were "slackers," and they regarded it as their moral duty to keep civilian morale high by spicing

⁵²Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Feb. 19, 1915; Richter, Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche evangelische Mission, 6; Schreiber, "Der Weltkrieg als Belastungsprobe der deutschen evangelischen Missionen," II, Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 216.

up their pronouncements with reminders of how ugly the enemy really was. Finally, being involved in the propaganda campaign gave them a rare opportunity to throw off their normal academic restraint and indulge in hyperbole. It was no doubt fun for men who were usually preoccupied with hedging to hurl dogmatic clichés for a change.

Though, in the aftermath of the conflict, bitterness lingered on both sides of the Channel, some theologians tried to rebuild the burned bridges. At the outset of the war, both Troeltsch and Deissmann had stated that it would be nearly impossible to restore intellectual fellowship among the belligerents, but in 1923 Troeltsch was preparing to deliver lectures at Oxford, London, and Edinburgh when he died prematurely, and Deissmann became the German luminary in the postwar ecumenical movement that produced the Life and Work Conference in Stockholm (1925) and the Faith and Order Conference in Lausanne (1927). Harnack found it more difficult to forgive and forget. Though he had been internationally-minded enough to recommend the continued performance of Shakespeare on the German stage, his personal feelings were another matter. His daughter claimed that the English declaration of war struck him to the very quick and that although human and academic relationships were restored after the war, "the wound of 1914 never completely healed in Harnack's heart."⁵³

⁵³See footnote 25 for Troeltsch and Deissmann; Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, 87; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 346.

THE FAIRY TALE OF PERPETUAL PEACE

Chapter IV

During the early weeks of battle, the theologians made primarily visceral protestations of Germany's innocence and England's guilt for the outbreak of the war. Gradually, however, when the war was not over by Christmas, they calmed down and developed more intellectual and peculiarly theological explanations for the absence of peace on earth and the justice of Germany's cause.

The theologians justified war in a tone not of apology but of affirmation. War was simply a fact of life, part of the normal course of world events. It was not a total tragedy that needed special explanation or an aberration that required embarrassed elucidation. No, war was merely "the revelation of sin,"¹ testimony to the conviction that man lived in paradise lost. Bertha von Suttner's appeal, Lay Down Your Arms (1892), had made no impression on the German theological community, and Karl Holl cheerfully asserted that most foreign theologians likewise recognized the legitimacy of war.² Thus, the Germans' arguments, while

¹Hermann Gunkel, "Jesus Weint," Dt.-Evangel., V (Dec., 1914), 662.

²Holl, "Luthers Anschauung über Evangelium, Krieg und Aufgabe der Kirche im Lichte des Weltkrieges" [hereafter cited as "Luthers Anschauung"], Gesammelte Aufsätze zur

not plagiarized, were only a statement of what they believed was taken for granted by most intellectuals the world over.

In September, 1914, the church historian Friedrich Loofs captured the mood of his countrymen when he proclaimed:

War is and remains the ultima ratio regum, the ultimate argument, when all negotiations fail, the final means of suppressing envy, slander, and violence. Yet the application of this fearful means is morally justified only when it helps the victory of right over wrong, of civilization against Unkultur.

We are with pure conscience convinced that we have drawn the sword for the defense of our Fatherland and our Kultur against French lustfulness for revenge, Russian barbarism, and English competitive envy.³

To justify a defensive war, the theologians looked to the Scriptures and to Luther. Yet, as they openly admitted, the Bible was anything but a manual for a Christian soldier. Both the Old and New Testaments presented problems. The question with the Old was whether it was a valid norm for Christian action. Was its picture of the Hebrews as God's chosen people going out to battle against the heathen still

Kirchengeschichte [hereafter cited as Gesammelte Aufsätze], III (Tübingen, 1928), 157. Suttner had great difficulty finding a publisher for her work, but once the German original, Die Waffen Nieder (1889) appeared, it was translated into eight languages and sold more than a million copies. Its publication coincided with the World Peace Congress in Paris and the establishment of the Interparliamentary Union. Suttner helped influence Alfred Nobel to found the Nobel Peace Prize, and in 1905 she was its first woman recipient; Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs of Bertha von Suttner, I (Boston, 1910), 294-302.

³Loofs, "Erinnerungen und--Fragen," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 69.

an appropriate standard? Had not the wrathful God worshipped by the Israelites been replaced by the loving heavenly Father portrayed by Jesus? Moreover, could Germany claim the unique, favored position which the Jews had claimed in relation to God?

These doubts led the theologians by and large to bypass the Old Testament as a guide for Christian conduct. As already mentioned, they specifically rejected its exaltation of righteous hate. Moreover, Seeberg denounced the "Gott strafe England" slogan precisely on the grounds that Christians were no longer in the position of those who had penned the imprecatory Psalms, and Friedrich Niebergall similarly inveighed against those who wished to emulate Zephaniah, the prophet who had rejoiced at the destruction of Israel's foes. Johannes Haussleiter pointed out that since this war pitted Christian against Christian, it posed a different question from the Old Testament chronicle of Jew against pagan.⁴

Still, Haussleiter's specialty was New Testament. What did the professors of Old Testament think? Most of their articles continued as before to be purely scholarly in nature, but some comment on the war could scarcely be avoided. Rudolf Kittel, who had recently edited a new text of the Hebrew Old Testament, stated that since Jehovah was a God of righteousness

⁴Seeberg, Was sollen wir denn tun?, 20; Niebergall, "Krieg und Hass," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 964; Haussleiter, "Der Krieg in neutestamentlicher Beleuchtung," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 123.

and since Germany's cause was just, He accompanied her armies. Otto Eissfeldt was still more hopeful, seeing not only God's blessings but greater national solidarity in Germany than in ancient Israel. In the pre-exilic era, he noted, the prophets had opposed their political leaders, rebuking the kings of Judah and Israel for their sins and predicting a coming judgment in the form of foreign conquest. Jeremiah had even advocated surrender to the Chaldeans. How unlike the present war, he rejoiced, when intellectuals, both religious and secular, supported the government--politicians and prophets, as it were, marching hand in hand, a sure sign of coming victory!⁵ More soberly, Hermann Gunkel pictured Jesus in heaven as mourning the pitiable spectacle below, and he hoped to see the day when, the war ended, the rights of all nations would be recognized. Although the Old Testament was full of war, he explained, its final message was one of perpetual peace. The bellicose disposition of the Hebrews belonged only to their early history and had been gradually superseded by a more friendly outlook, so that the ultimate thought of Old Testament religion was peace on earth. Though not sharing all the scruples of Martin Rade, Gunkel came closer than any of his colleagues to reflecting Rade's lack of war enthusiasm.⁶

⁵Kittel, "Vom Kriege im Israel," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 171; Eissfeldt, "Politiker und Propheten," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXIV (1916), 514-521.

⁶Gunkel, "Jesus Weint," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 662, and "Kriegsfrömmigkeit im Alten Testament," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1915), 758-760.

While the Old Testament said a great deal about war, the New Testament said almost nothing about it. Since neither Jesus, Peter, nor Paul had experienced a national war in his lifetime, they had had no direct occasion to speak to the subject. The point was strikingly, if inadvertently, illustrated by Eissfeldt, whose booklet Krieg und Bibel devoted seventy-two pages to the Old Testament and only twelve to the New. He and his colleagues admitted that none of Jesus' statements clearly indicated how a Christian was to relate to the secular state or how he was to behave in the event of a war. Yet, in spite of these "gaps" in Jesus' teachings, a New Testament scholar noted that Jesus' one explicit mention of war indicated that "wars and rumors of war" would continue until the end (Matthew 24:6).⁷

Furthermore, other New Testament passages seemed to imply the right of war or at least its inevitability. For instance, Jesus told a parable about a king's going to war, but he did not digress to rebuke him for it (Luke 14). Another example was Jesus' healing the servant of a Roman centurion without taking offense at the latter's vocation (Luke 7). In Jesus' refusal to render judgment on questions of political and private strife (Luke 12:14; 20:19-26), the theologians found further indirect support for the legitimacy of war. Taken in light of Jesus' statement, "My kingdom is

⁷Eissfeldt, Krieg und Bibel (Tübingen, 1915), 76; Gustav Wohlenberg, "Das neue Testament und der Krieg," Neue Kirchl. Ztschr., XXV (1914), 940.

not of this world," these instances seemed to show his indifference to secular affairs. Altogether, they apparently amounted to his tacit acceptance of war as an understood part of the normal order of things. If not approving of war, Jesus at least acquiesced in it. Moreover, the Apostle Paul told Christians at Rome to be subject to secular rulers (Romans 13), while recognizing that they often called upon their subjects to take up the sword. Yet, he did not qualify his injunction. Thus, the consensus of theological opinion was that the New Testament recognized, at least implicitly, the right of war.⁸

Astonishingly enough, what the theologians saw as the clinching argument was Jesus' command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Julius Richter and Holl underscored its importance,⁹ and Deissmann and Seeberg insisted on its primacy over other injunctions. Replying to questions of American Quakers, Deissmann explained that Jesus' admonition, "Resist not evil," must give way to his other command. "Self-sacrificing love for our neighbor," he affirmed, was the "Alpha and Omega of the Master's mind and teaching." There-

⁸Among the numerous articles that could be cited here are: Walter Caspari, "Vaterland und Vaterlandsliebe," Neue Kirchl. Ztschr., XXXI (1915), 933; Philip Bachmann, "Christentum und Krieg," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 207; Otto Ritschl, "Die christliche Religion und Krieg," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1915), 598.

⁹Richter, "Luthers Stellung zum Kriege," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 173; Holl, "Was Verstand Luther unter Religion?" Gesammelte Aufsätze, I (Tübingen, 1921), 84, and "Luthers Anschauung," Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 149.

fore, he could not believe that Jesus wished him to be an idle onlooker while robbers threatened his family or a foreign nation his homeland. In such instances, Jesus' "law of love" impelled him to defend his neighbor, "even at the point of the sword, if necessary."¹⁰ Seeberg devoted an entire essay to this question and concluded that war was probably the most vivid fulfillment of Jesus' saying: "Greater love hath no man than this, than that he lay down his life for his friends." The problem of why love for one's neighbor should take precedence over love for one's enemies, which Jesus also enjoined, he dismissed by affirming that whenever two duties became mutually exclusive, it was "self-evident" that a person must do what is "closest at hand." Moreover, Christians showed love for the enemy by caring for captured and wounded opponents, and even defeating an enemy nation was a work of love inasmuch as it humbled an overly proud people and showed them their true worth.¹¹

Most of the favorite proof-texts of the pacifists, such as "Turn the other cheek," "Resist not evil," and "Love your enemies," were in Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, and the theologians not only explained them away individually but dismissed the entire sermon as inapplicable to secular realities. Jesus' sermon, they explained, described life in the "kingdom of God,"

¹⁰Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, July 31, Sept. 4 and Dec. 31, 1915.

¹¹Seeberg, "Der Krieg und die allgemeine Menschenliebe," Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 81-86.

and, as Ludwig Ihmels asserted, "the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world are . . . two different dimensions which have nothing to do with one another. . . ."¹²

As discussed earlier, the Ritschlian school interpreted the "kingdom of God" as a state of charitable relationships realizable here upon earth. As the European leader of this school, Harnack adhered faithfully to this view and even during the war gave frequent public expression of his optimism. In an academic worship service for the University of Berlin, he proclaimed that the kingdom was present in every confident man who had a God, in every bond of love that furthered the brotherhood of man, and in every work that was practiced by God-fearing men. Despite all the evidence to the contrary in 1917, he admonished the congregation to see "the fountains of God in the midst of the desert and remain convinced that His kingdom is founded among us and is enlarging itself." Except for Rade, other German theologians, Ritschlians and non-Ritschlians, gave no indication of sharing Harnack's sanguine outlook. The war temporarily shoved this aspect of Ritschlianism into the closet.¹³

Schian was typical of the many who denied that the kingdom of which Jesus spoke could be realized in this world by

¹²Ihmels, Der Krieg und die Jünger Jesu (Leipzig, 1916), 4, and Der Krieg im Lichte der christlichen Ethik (Leipzig, 1915), 7.

¹³Harnack, "Vom Reiche Gottes, Predigt im akad. Gottesdienst in d. Kaiser-Friedrich Gedächtniskirche in Berlin d. 4. März 1917," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 383-391.

human efforts. Those who attempted to "bring in the kingdom," he argued, overlooked the futuristic character of Jesus' preaching. A dominion of God upon earth which would dissolve the hostilities among nations had to be preceded by Jesus' return. Thus, the kingdom lay still in the future, and it was not to be realized here but upon a "new earth." In similar vein, Baumgarten asserted that the kingdom would not come by a slow, historical process but would come "down from above with one blow."¹⁴ Friedrich Spitta, one of Albert Schweitzer's professors at Strassburg, stressed that Jesus did not have in mind a self-developing kingdom of peace and righteousness but a powerful intrusion of God at the end of the age. Old Testament scholars noted that the idea of God's establishing His kingdom among men was not a novel aspect of Jesus' teaching; the Hebrew prophets had talked much about it and believed that Jehovah would create peace in the world with "one great blow." Thus, it was by no means a Christian mandate to help realize the kingdom by avoiding wars at all costs.¹⁵

¹⁴Schian, Das deutsche Christentum im Kriege (Leipzig, 1915), 39, and "Kleine Beiträge und neue Bücher," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 83; Baumgarten, "Der Krieg und der Bergpredigt, Rede am 10. Mai 1915," in Deutsche Reden, III, 142.

¹⁵Spitta, Der Krieg und das neue Testament, cited by Hans Windisch, "Jesus und der Krieg," Theol. Rund., XVIII (1915), 335; Gunkel, "Kriegsfrömmigkeit im Alten Testament," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1915), 756, and "Die Politik der Propheten," Inter. Monatsschr., XI (1917), 463; Eissfeldt, Krieg und Bibel, 73.

Baumgarten devoted an entire public address to explaining why the Sermon on the Mount was largely inapplicable to the present age. Jesus, he claimed, was "not in a single instance" thinking about the "necessities of national and international relationships." Rather, he placed his directives "on a completely different plane." Jesus thought about "souls, their love relationships one to another and to the supernatural God and the supernatural kingdom of ultimate glory."¹⁶ Ludwig Ihmels insisted that citing the Sermon to deny one's right to protect himself and his goods contradicted the Sixth Commandment, which gave one the right to protect the former, and the Eighth, which safeguarded the latter; Jesus' injunctions had nothing to do with these matters. Deissmann asserted that Christians could no more apply parts of the Sermon than any of Jesus' other teachings in a legalistic manner. Their purpose was not, like a "manual of casuistry," to prescribe rules for specific cases but to "discipline our hearts and minds toward that 'perfection' which our heavenly Father possesses."¹⁷ Harnack limited their meaning not to degree of fulfillment but to the circle within which they could be fulfilled. In 1900,

¹⁶Baumgarten, "Der Krieg und der Bergpredigt, Rede am 10. Mai 1915," in Deutsche Reden, III, 137; see also his Alldeutschum und Christentum (Berlin, 1918), 11.

¹⁷Ihmels, Der Krieg und die Jünger Jesu, 27; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Dec. 31, 1915.

he had insisted that Jesus' Sermon had in view only the community of disciples, not a family of nations. "Resist not evil" was directed only to the individual Christian; to try to make it mean that states should use no weapons except gentleness was a "clumsy and dangerous" interpretation. During the war, he further explained that the fourth-century Church had finally realized that Jesus' moral injunctions could not be transferred from individuals to nations and had therefore wisely abandoned its earlier pacifism.¹⁸

Troeltsch, too, elaborated on his prewar writings. In 1911, he had shown that the social teachings of the Christian churches had been characterized by constant compromise with the world. In the midst of the war, he again pointed out the Church's peculiar dilemma. Only religious and philosophical enthusiasts, he held, cherished the illusion that "a pure Christianity of human love" would eventually establish a Christian culture among nations. No, he insisted, "in the most real sense, Christianity is a kingdom not of this world." Jesus had expected an imminent, miraculous kingdom introduced by divine power. When the miracle did not take place, Christianity had to sink roots within the secular order and arrive at a modus vivendi with the temporal world. But the problem was that the Christian's guidebook, the New Testament, had been written with the coming age in mind. The mundane affairs

¹⁸Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums, 71, and "Die Religion im Weltkrieg," /orig. in Neue Freie Presse, March 31, 1918/, Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 312.

of nation and state, of war and peace, had scarcely been mentioned. How then was a Christian to relate to the present world? He must practice a tortuous dual relationship: living simultaneously in an earthly order and in a supra-earthly order, and unfortunately the Gospels and Epistles gave little insight into one's role in the former.¹⁹

Therefore, a defensive war was no problem for German theologians. They were not embarrassed about the seemingly pacifistic injunctions of the New Testament. One simply needed to know how to interpret them. On the basis of Jesus' command to love one's neighbor, the non-political nature of the "kingdom of God" and the Sermon on the Mount, and the implications of other statements by Jesus and Paul, they proclaimed that the scriptural right to take up arms was undeniable.

Buttressing the teachings of the Scriptures were those of Luther. In fact, the Saxon reformer was a source of strength from the very outset of the war. On August 1, 1914, the crowd standing in front of the Berlin palace spontaneously struck up his famous hymn, "Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott," and German soldiers sang it a short time later as they marched victoriously into Antwerp. Not only did the hymn become

¹⁹Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte in unserem grossen Kriege, (Berlin, 1914), 15, and "Privatmoral und Staatsmoral," Neue Rund., XXVIII (1916), 168, and "Glaube und Ethos der hebräischen Propheten," Gesammelte Schriften, IV, 63 [orig. in Logos, VI, 1916].

a Protestant Marseillaise,"²⁰ but Catholic soldiers also sang it--to the delight of Protestant scholars, who rejoiced that it had thus become interconfessional.²¹ Since Germany was threatened by so many foes, Ernst Sellin drew courage from the words, "and though this world with devils filled. . . ." Deissmann, Schian, Mirbt, and Troeltsch all alluded to the hymn, and Seeberg inspired his Berlin students with its promises.²²

More important than Luther's hymn was his doctrine of the "just war." Reiterating the ideas of Augustine and Aquinas, Luther had justified a defensive war conducted under the auspices of a secular ruler. His most explicit teaching on the subject was his tract, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," penned in the aftermath of the Peasants' War of 1525. Adding short, explanatory notes, Rade published most of the tract as a serial in his periodical in the early weeks of the war.²³ In fact, the writings of

²⁰Karl Kupisch, "Protestantismus im Epochenjahr 1917," in Hans J. Schoeps (ed.), Zeitgeist im Wandel, II (Stuttgart, 1968), 315.

²¹Rade, "Mitteilungen," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1134; Hans von Schubert, Die Weihe des Krieges, 17.

²²Sellin, "Der Krieg," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1915), 393; Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion, Rede am 12. November 1914," Deutsche Reden, I, 296; Schian, "Der Krieg ist da," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 514; Mirbt, Mission und Reformation, 3; Troeltsch, Unser Volksheer (Heidelberg, 1914), 21; Seeberg, "Heldentum," Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 75.

²³Martin Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can be Saved," Luther's Works, ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann, XLVI (Philadelphia, 1967), 89-137; Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 788ff., 806ff., 820ff.

the theologians bulge with references to their Saxon hero, especially in connection with the celebration of the four-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation in 1917. The professor of Wittenberg had clearly become the praeceptor Germaniae. Surprisingly, however, when the theologians wrote about the reformer, they usually ignored his military views and concentrated on his religious teachings or exemplary life. Even when they raised the subject of belligerency, they normally paraphrased his doctrine of the just war without actually invoking his name. For example, Seeberg's collection of wartime essays published in 1916 contained only one fleeting reference to Luther's tract of 1526, and Hans von Schubert's biography of the reformer mentioned only in passing that he had "joyfully affirmed" the right of a defensive war. In a lengthy article of 1917 about the reformer, Troeltsch paid only brief attention to his view on war, and Harnack wrote two articles about him the same year that said not one word about the subject. Even in an essay on "Luther and the State," the eminent church historian Albert Hauck took only a couple of sentences to note that Luther regarded war as a moral duty of a prince, who was obligated to defend his subjects.²⁴

²⁴Seeberg, "Der Krieg und die allgemeine Menschenliebe," Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 79; Schubert, Luther und seine lieben Deutschen (Stuttgart, 1917), 124; Troeltsch, "Luther und der Protestantismus," Neue Rund., XXVIII (1917), 1304, 1318; Harnack, "Die Reformation," Inter. Monatsschr., XI (1917), 1281-1384, and Martin Luther und die Grundlegung der Reformation (Berlin, 1917); Hauck, "Luther und der Staat," Süddt. Monatshf., XV (1917), 14-15; Hauck (1845-1918),

The exceptions to this general observation were Julius Richter and Karl Holl. Richter explicitly delineated three levels of war in Luther's thought: war born of brutal egoism, which was sinful; war due to defensive necessity, which was just; and the just war further ennobled by the conviction that defending one's countryman was showing love for one's neighbor.²⁵ Holl, Professor of Church History at Berlin and a prominent Luther scholar, took several occasions to discuss the reformer's justification of war. Arguing against the claims of Swiss pacifists, he appealed to Luther's "doctrine of the two kingdoms." Luther, he explained, held that the ordinance of the kingdom of God, love, and the ordinance of the state, law, were two separate standards. Love came from the Gospel and pertained to Christians. Law was derived from natural reason and was applicable to believers and non-believers alike. Therefore, the Gospel had nothing to do with economic and political affairs, and secular authorities

professor at Leipzig from 1889 until his death, was sole editor of the third edition of the famous Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, which, when translated and combined with an American work, became The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (12 vols., 1908-1912). The most significant wartime work on Luther was Otto Scheel's two-volume biography covering the reformer's life up to his appointment at Wittenberg in 1512; Martin Luther. Vom Katholizismus zur Reformation (Tübingen, 1915 and 1917).

²⁵Richter, "Luthers Stellung zum Kriege," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 169-173; Richter had written the article early in 1914, before the outbreak of the war.

²⁶Holl, "Die Aufgabebestimmung der Reformation," Reformation und Gegenwart, I, 375.

had the God-given responsibility of protecting their subjects, which often obligated them to wage war.²⁶

On October 31, 1917, Holl participated in the Reformation festivities by addressing a crowd assembled at the University of Berlin. He reminded his audience that Luther regarded the state as necessary because it guaranteed the protection of the pious and insured good order in a fallen world. If the state therefore benefited Christians, then, as Holl quoted Luther, the Christian must help it "be it as authority or judge, as soldier or hangman."²⁷ In another public address of January, 1918, Holl claimed that Luther's teachings had exercised a restraining influence upon German foreign policy. Luther's justification of only a defensive war, he argued, had given Germany pangs of conscience lest territorial expansion be purchased at peril to the soul. Shortly after the war, he published a revised version of the speech, wherein he contended that Luther had actually contributed to his nation's defeat. How? Germans had been so saturated with Luther's views that when they came to believe that Germany was no longer waging a war of defense but of conquest they lost their moral confidence and will to fight.²⁸

²⁶Holl, "Luthers Anschauung," Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 150-151.

²⁷Holl, "Was Verstand Luther unter Religion?" Gesammelte Aufsätze, I, 84.

²⁸Holl, "Die Kulturbedeutung der Reformation," Gesammelte Aufsätze, I, 375.

Holl left much unclear. He did not say whether this conviction that Germany had become greedy stemmed from domestic sources or from foreign propaganda or both, whether he shared the belief, or when the doubts began. As early as June, 1915, however, Seeberg lamented that many Germans had refused to sign his petition for large territorial gains because of a doctrinaire anxiety over a war of conquest. The following year, even Harnack's group of moderate annexationists tried to assure the public, particularly the Social Democrats, that coveting strategically necessary border rectifications did not amount to endorsing wholesale conquest.²⁹

Troeltsch was of a different mind. Rather than crediting Luther with a negative influence on war morale, he complained that the radical annexationists' appeal to Luther as a nationalist was precisely what made their aims popular with the masses.³⁰ The theologians simply did not agree on whether the great Saxon reformer had restrained or strengthened the craving for expansion.

What they did agree on was that Lutheranism was preferable

²⁹Seeberg, "Unsere Kriegsziele, Rede am 20. Juni 1915," manuscript privately printed by Independent Committee for a German Peace, copy in "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," a collection of war pamphlets, UBM; declaration of the National Committee for a German Peace, Nov. 12, 1916, in Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1, 1916 (Munich, 1920), 537.

³⁰Troeltsch to Rade, [early 1918], cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 256-257.

to Calvinism, or more precisely, neo-Calvinism. In rebuttal to foreign estimates of Lutheranism as scholarly and impractical and Calvinism as energetic and realistic, Seeberg credited much of Germany's wartime courage to her native religion and, though acknowledging its imperfections, admonished its critics "not to throw out the baby with the bathwater."³¹ Moreover, emphasizing distinctions recently revived by Fritz Fischer, he insisted that part of the difference between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon world was due to the respective influences of the two religions. The neo-Calvinist preference for a republic or democracy was foreign to Luther's thought, he held, and the kind of democracy practiced in the west was nothing more than a "systematic egoism." For Luther as well as for Hegel, the state was the rational order, standing above individuals, whereas for Calvin's followers, reason was the possession of individuals, who had to purify the historically developed state of "unreason." Thus, for the former, "natural law" was an anti-revolutionary force, while for the latter, it was the springboard of revolution.³² Holl, too, contrasted the two

³¹Seeberg, "Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des gegenwärtigen Krieges," Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 34; Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 174; Seeberg, Was sollen wir den tun?, 19.

³²Seeberg, "Protestantismus und Sozialismus," Süddt. Monatshf. XV (1917), 96-103, a summary of which is contained in Seeberg to Friedrich Lezius, Sept. 7, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Fischer, "Der deutsche Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert," Hist. Ztschr., CLXXI (1951), 472-518.

religions and noted that Calvin's followers, unlike their master, had increasingly predicated his qualified endorsement of the right of revolution on the "rights of man" and "natural rights." Thus, it was a short step from Cromwell to England's conception of herself as the protector of freedom and human rights in general. Whereas Luther--and even Bismarck--had condemned preventive or punitive war, neo-Calvinists regarded war precisely as a means of moral chastisement, and therefore England, as God's avenger, could draw the sword even against a state that had not transgressed against her but against a third party. Moreover, she treated a conquered foe as a criminal and demanded repentance and rehabilitation.³³

France and America were also inflected with the disease. Harnack complained that Calvinism was driving the Huguenots to "blind fanaticism,"³⁴ and Seeberg became especially intrigued with the influence of Calvinism on the United States. Shortly before America entered the war, he described President Wilson's policy as lamentable but understandable. Wilson's interest in China and Japan, he held, had necessarily driven him into England's arms, and as an earnest Calvinist he "naturally placed politics under the will of God and the promotion of His honor." When the war was over and the peacemakers were at Versailles, Seeberg's academic interest

³³Holl, "Die Kulturbedeutung der Reformation," Gesammelte Aufsätze, I, 375-381.

³⁴Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkrieg," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 311.

in the question changed to horror. He complained that the Entente powers desired to constitute the League of Nations so as to render Germany "the general slave" and thereby bring about the "victory of Calvinistic hypocrisy over Lutheran honesty."³⁵ In similar vein, Troeltsch blamed the "guilt legend" on "the manner of Anglo-Saxon thinking, which cannot do anything without grounding it morally." "The boundless self-righteousness of Calvinism," he complained, had prejudiced the entire world against Germany.³⁶ Thus, when the guns of August finally fell silent, the theologians found Wittenberg prostrate at the feet of Geneva.

Although the theologians cited Luther and the Scriptures to legitimize a defensive war, they did not systematically treat the specific categories in the "just-war tradition." For instance, instead of explicitly discussing the traditional division between the jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) and the jus in bello (proper conduct within war), they simply invoked Luther for the former and, as noted earlier, enumerated England's alleged violations of the latter, and they completely ignored the question of "proportionality," whether the good that was to result from the war outweighed the evil and violence being done.³⁷ Clearly, for the most

³⁵Seeberg to Nathanael Bonwetsch, Feb. 15, 1917 and Feb. 16, 1919, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

³⁶[Troeltsch], "Das Schulddogma," June 19, 1919, Spekulator-Briefe, ed. by Hans Baron, 318.

³⁷Arguments for and against the "just-war tradition," reflecting the travail of the Vietnam war, the prospect of a nuclear holocaust, and the deliberations of Vatican II, are contained in Paul Ramsey, The Just War. Force and Political Responsibility (New York, 1968).

part, the theological community deemed detailed argumentation superfluous, and their passionate rather than analytical approach is nowhere better shown than in their frequent use of the label "holy war." Many pamphlets bore this title, and theologians, like other intellectuals, enlivened their pronouncement with the catchy phrase. They did not mean that Germany was fighting a war of religion but simply that conducting a just, defensive war was a sacred task, the magnitude and righteousness of which made it holy. Baumgarten, Deissmann, Harnack, Ihmels, Schubert, and Sellin all used the term in this sense, and they denounced a more literal use of it.³⁸ Holl called attention to Luther's insistence that war was strictly an affair of state and his consequent anger when the Habsburg campaign against the Turks was popularized as a religious crusade. In Harnack's one wartime essay devoted exclusively to the role of religion in war, he rejoiced that no belligerent had unfurled the "crusade banners" or defended a particular confession. As already mentioned, Niebergall underscored the difference between the holy wars of the Old Testament era and those of

³⁸Baumgarten, "Gottes Gerechtigkeit," Evangel. Freibt., XIV (1914), 331, and "Der Krieg und der Bergpredigt, Rede am 10. Mai 1915," in Deutsche Reden, III, 146-147; Deissmann, "Eines deutschen Kriegers Wert," Der Tag, Oct. 4, 1914; Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs, Rede am 1. August 1916," Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 334; Ihmels, "Eine Stunde der Entscheidung," sermon of Nov. 18, 1914, Darum auch wir. 7 Predigten während der Kriegszeit (Leipzig, 1914), 95-96; Schubert, Die Weihe des Krieges, 25; Sellin, "Der Krieg," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1915), 393.

the present. Troeltsch was especially insistent about not dragging the Christian God into the conflict. Orthodox Russia, Catholic France, and Protestant England, he noted, arrayed themselves against Protestant Germany, but each nation believed that she prayed to the same God. Therefore, it was not the high and supra-national Christian faith that Germans needed most in that hour but a specific "German faith," a faith in the German nation, which God had called into existence and provided with a divine mission.³⁹

It was Russia, not Germany, charged the theologians, who was conducting a traditional "holy war." They painted the Russian Orthodox Church not only as "caesaropapist" but backward, benighted, and intolerant. On August 3, 1914, Tsar Nicholas II proclaimed that his people were fighting for "brother Slavs" and "co-religionists" and asked God's blessings on "holy Russia." The German "Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad" stretched his words into a declaration of war on "Teutonism and Protestantism."⁴⁰ Seeberg fancifully

³⁹Holl, *Luthers Anschauung*, "Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 15; Martin Luther, "On War Against the Turks," *Luther's Works*, ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann, XLVI, 165-168; Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkriege," *Erforschtes und Erlebtes*, 306, wherein he commented that Islam's "holy war" was "meaningless"; Niebergall, "Krieg und Hass," *Christl. Welt*, XXVIII (1914), 964; Troeltsch, *Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte*, 22, 27-29.

⁴⁰Russia to her enemy, "Current History, I (1914), 358; Karl Axenfeld et al., "Aufruf an die evangelischen Christen im Auslande" [Aug., 1914], *Die Eiche*, III (1915), 51.

charged that Orthodoxy had a definite anti-Muslim bias and was bent on replacing the crescent on top of the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople with the cross. Harnack charged that the Russian Church had added no new insights to sixth-century Byzantine Christianity and was therefore static and non-progressive. Troeltsch portrayed the Russians as possessed by "dark feelings of the godlessness of the non-Orthodox world," and Old Testament scholar Alfred Bertholet generalized that for Russia "every war . . . is a holy war."⁴¹

Rade believed that if there was a genuine religious war, it was between Russia and Austria, and Heinrich Schrörs, a Catholic theologian at Bonn, feared that he was right. In Schrörs's opinion, Orthodoxy's aversion to Roman Catholicism had never been extinguished; rather, it was the "fire that welds together the ecclesiastical communities of the east." The Russian people and the Orthodox of the Balkans, he claimed, understood the present struggle as a war of religion, and because of the association of Orthodoxy with Pan-Slavism, a Russian victory would have tragic consequences for the world position of Catholicism.⁴²

⁴¹Seeberg, "Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des gegenwärtigen Krieges." Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 32; Harnack, "Die morgenländische Kultur," Deutsche Warschauer Zeitung, April 20, 1916; Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte, 13; Bertholet, Religion und Krieg (Tübingen, 1915), 12.

⁴²Rade, Dieser Krieg und das Christentum, 11; Schrörs, "Gedanken eines katholischen Theologen zur gegenwärtigen Lage," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 114-115.

The only belligerent officially to designate her action a religious war was the Ottoman Empire. In his office as caliph, the Sultan proclaimed a "holy war" for all Islam. Since the Turks fought with the Central Powers, however, the German theologians could hardly be expected to find fault. An exception was Ludwig Ihmels, Professor of Dogmatics and preacher at the University Church of Leipzig. Early in November, 1914, he dared to tell his congregation that the imminent call for another "holy war" from the traditional enemy of Christianity, even though Germany's ally, placed a terrible burden upon his soul.⁴³ His colleagues remained silent. In fact, when the English countered Germany's charges of linking arms with the heathen black and yellow races by denouncing Germany's partnership with the "infidel Turk," Wilhelm Herrmann defended Germany's alliance by stressing the similarity between the two Central Powers. Both Turks and Germans, he explained, believed in one supreme God and in unquestioning obedience. Although the Germans needed to introduce the Turks to Christ, who was the unrecognized source of their strength, the affinity of their religious and philosophical outlooks justified their cooperation. Baumgarten denounced Herrmann's

⁴³Ihmels, "Wir haben einen Gott, der da hilft," sermon on Nov. 8, 1914, Darum auch wir, 71. Sultan Mohammed V, brother of the deposed Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) proclaimed the "holy war" on Nov. 13, 1914; since 1908, however, the real rulers of the Ottoman Empire had been Talaat, Enver, and Djemal. Henry Morgenthau, American ambassador to the Sublime Porte from 1913-1916, claimed that German ambassador Baron Hans von Wangenheim admitted to him that it was Germany's plan to rouse the Muslim world against the English and Russians; see his Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden City, 1915) 157-170.

picture of Turkish religiosity as "utterly contrived" but offered no criticism of the Sultan's proclamation.⁴⁴

While thus acquiescing in Islam's "holy war," the theologians insisted that Germany was not waging one. In 1915, French Catholics published a book which argued that the war had been incited by Prussian Protestantism's hatred of French Catholicism and was thus a war of religion. German Catholic theologians joined their Protestant colleagues in sharp rebuttal. Rade was incensed over enemy reports that Germany sent Protestant regiments against Belgium and France and Catholic ones against Russia. No one in the army, he insisted, kept track of the confessional differences among the troops except the chaplains.⁴⁵ The Allies also complained that Germans too often referred to the "German God." Though pleading guilty to the charge, the theologians explained that this was merely a manner of speaking in time of extremity. The German people had again found their God to be real and vital. He was "their God" not in the sense that He belonged to no one else but in that He had manifested His faithfulness in spite of their unfaithfulness. As Schian took one-third of a book to explain,

⁴⁴Herrmann, "Die Türken, die Engländer, und die deutschen Christen," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 224 and 232; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XV (1915), 143-144.

⁴⁵The controversy between the French and German Catholics is discussed in Chapter VI; Rade, Dieser Krieg und das Christentum, 10.

Germans had not reduced God to the level of a tribal deity or nationalized Him; they simply wished to express their renewed closeness to the God who had listened to their cries. Deissmann, Seeberg, and Holl likewise disclaimed any pharisaical self-righteousness in the use of the term, and when Deissmann heard from a Dutchman who recoiled from the "German God," he assured him that Germans also prayed to the God of the Netherlands.⁴⁶

Thus, the usual line of argument was that since Germany was fighting to protect herself, and the Scriptures and Luther permitted a defensive war, Germany's cause was holy and just. Even at the outset, however, some theologians took a slightly different tack. Troeltsch, for example, held that the world was always in a state of tension as nations vied for a "place in the sun." Therefore, war was simply the transformation of peaceful economic and diplomatic competition into martial conflict; it was merely part of the "natural and inexorable phenomena" of the world of nations, of the "struggle for existence" among the great powers. Harnack agreed. What was usually called "war," he argued, was only a transition from latent to open warfare. Echoing Clausewitz, he minimized war as only "the continuation of policy."⁴⁷

⁴⁶Schian, Das deutsche Christentum im Kriege (Leipzig, 1915), 50-74; Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion, Rede am 12. November 1914," in Duetsch Reden, I, 297-298; Seeberg, Was sollen wir denn tun?, 63; Holl, "Luthers Anschauung, Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 148.

⁴⁷Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte, 18, and "Der Völkerring und das Christentum," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 296, 301; Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkriege," Erforschetes und Erlebtes, 307, and "Der Abschied von der weissen

As soon as the European struggle began, Troeltsch admitted that although the formula of a defensive war was popular with the common man, it was not sufficient. The German state being defended, he conceded, had been created by several wars, not all of which had been defensive. To the famous historicist, it came naturally to find the true justification for Germany's action not in what she had been and was but in what she had to become. Germany, in other words, was defending her right to a future. Other theologians concurred. In 1913, the fire-eating Friedrich Lezius had horrified pacifists by publicly defending necessary wars of aggression and conquest as compatible with the spirit of Christianity. In the midst of the war, even the moderate Baumgarten affirmed that the Protestant ethic in itself could not take offense at a policy of conquest. He noted, by way of example, that he had no moral objections to Russia's push toward Constantinople or Rumania's desire for the Rumanian-speaking parts of Hungary. Likewise, if Germany's arable land, including that of her colonies, was unable to sustain her growing population, he could not morally object to the seizure of the Russian-held province of Courland. "Absolute pacifism," he exclaimed, was "by no means Protestant dogma."⁴⁸

Weste, "Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 305 [orig. in Der Tag, April 21, 1917].

⁴⁸Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte, 18; Lezius, "Krieg und Christentum," address in Königsberg, Nov. 13, 1913, cited in "Angriffskrieg und Christentum," Die Friedens-Warte, XVI, (1914), 30; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVII (1917), 189-190.

Germany, therefore, had the right to defend the future of her state and her world mission. Troeltsch insisted that though the state was not man's highest possession, it was his best and the foundation of all others. Ultimately, then, Germans fought for the idea of the state, not for the idea of nationality or race or even for economic prosperity, no, not even for the German Geist or Kultur. As Troeltsch explained, there was "no naked Geist or Kultur in and for itself; all that exists in and through the state." The German state was the work of providence, the "bequest of God," and being "grounded in the world-will," it had a world mission and would achieve great benefits for not only Germany but for all mankind.⁴⁹

While preaching this Hegelian gospel of the divine purpose of the state, the theologians often discussed the relation of the state and Kultur, a subject reserved for the next chapter, and occasionally alluded to the concept of the "German mission"--but only vaguely. For example, all that Troeltsch said in this regard was that the true faith was a faith in Germany's world mission and in the "world reason" that had called Germany to be one of the great peoples of the world. Ihmels remarked that since God had entrusted great things to Germany she had a "high mission" to other nations, and consequently the moral duty of war lay in defending her God-given tasks. Richter told a public assembly not to despair

⁴⁹Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte, 22-23.

in the midst of war, for it was precisely when Israel had been most threatened by her enemies that God had clarified her world mission. Hans Preuss likened wartime Germany to the "suffering servant" of Isaiah, a messianic figure whose mission was to suffer for the benefit of mankind. Paul Feine noted that each of the four great belligerents of 1914 believed in a special mission: France to be the "leader of civilization, the Mecca of education, elegance, and grace"; Russia to unite the Slavs, create a mighty organism out of them, and to represent the Orthodox faith; England, conceiving of herself as the "master race," to rule the world; and Germany to become a "blessing to mankind." What kind of blessing Feine did not say, but the echoing rhetoric of the Wars of Liberation is unmistakable.⁵⁰

Deissmann wrote an entire essay extolling Germany's mission without giving the slightest idea of what this involved. He interpreted Jesus' words, "Ye are the salt of the earth," to refer to saline manure, dung salts to fertilize the ground. Like "Ye are the light of the world," they were words of consecration to a task. While every nation had a divine purpose, Deissmann asserted, God had given Germany

⁵⁰Ibid., 19; Ihmels, Der Krieg im Lichte der christlichen Ethik, 10, and Der Krieg und die Jünger Jesu, vi; Richter, Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche evangelische Mission, 17; Preuss, "Germany's Passion," Allgem. Evangel.-Luther. Kirchztg., Sept. 17, 1915, cited in Jacob P. Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, trans. by Jessie Bröchner, 181-182; Feine, "Nation, Kultur, Religion," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 361-362.

⁵¹Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben, Ende des 29. September 1914," in Deutsche Zeits. I, 155.

gifts that were "indispensable" for the rest of mankind. Picturing German blood fertilizing the ground of Europe, Africa, and Asia, he stated that those who perished in battle had become the salt of the earth--presumably implying that a German victory would insure that German traits would continue to benefit other peoples!⁵¹

Harnack, who came closer than any of his colleagues to spelling out Germany's mission, still left much to the imagination. Addressing a Berlin audience in September, 1914, he declared that his country's particular task was to "esteem and appropriate the best that other peoples have brought forth" and then to introduce them "the profound, satisfying Kultur with the German trade-mark." Thus, although the theologians never elaborated on German's sacred mission, they made no attempt to conceal their ethnocentric bias.⁵²

The primary means of justifying a not strictly defensive war was to underscore the difference between morality proper to persons and morality proper to states. In 1916, Troeltsch emphasized that since Germany had thus far held her own and since her enemies could also claim to be on the defensive, an appeal to the righteousness of a defensive war, though still satisfactory to the man on the street, was

⁵¹Deissmann, "Ihr seid das Salz der Erde," Deutscher Schwertsegen (Stuttgart, 1915), 57-63 [orig. in Die Hilfe, Jan. 7, 1915].

⁵²Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben, Rede am 29. September 1914," in Deutsche Reden, I, 155.

inadequate. Leaving Jesus and Luther as he had left theology at Heidelberg, he proposed a new champion in the philosopher and moralist Immanuel Kant. Kantian ethics, he held, exerted greater influence on the German intelligentsia than the moral teachings of Jesus himself, and therefore educated Germans should rejoice in discovering that even in accordance with Kant they could boldly proclaim that they sought the enhancement of their state. According to Troeltsch, Kant had taught that until individual states had formed an international league bound together by law, they had to strengthen themselves and to develop by means of war and peace all that was requisite for their existence. Kant had not failed to see, Troeltsch insisted, the utopian character of his ideal of perpetual peace and had recognized that a state, unlike an individual living within it, must forcibly seek redress for its grievances. Persons could look to civil authorities to rectify wrongs, but nations had no impartial court to which they could appeal and therefore had to resort to arms. Love, forbearance, and renunciation of violence could be required from individuals but not from states. Thus, while striving for harmony and a moral intercourse among themselves, each state must remain distrustful and "keep its powder dry." Altering St. Paul's famous statement, Troeltsch concluded that "now, however, abide these three: private morality, a state morality, and a morality for the community of nations. But for the present the state morality is the greatest among them."⁵³

⁵³Troeltsch, "Privatmoral und Staatsmoral," 149-159. Troeltsch's close friend, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, the

In similar fashion, Richter contrasted "state egoism" and "private morality." For a state, he held, self-preservation was an absolute requirement, and therefore even the breaking of treaties was sometimes necessary. Harnack, too, separated the various spheres of ethics. In 1916, the leader of the Free Conservatives asserted that Germany's leaders should bid farewell to the "clean shirt," that is, to a consideration of history's judgment upon their actions. Showing that Germans had not wiped Shakespeare from their minds, he demanded that statesmen act resolutely, insisting that no one "sicklied o'er with the pale case of thought" belonged in high political office. Harnack wrote a vigorous protest against this disclaimer of the state's moral responsibility, claiming that Germans trusted their government precisely because it had a "clean shirt." He acknowledged, however, that there was a private ethic, a social ethic, and a political ethic, the last having the state for both its subject and object. Though not outlining the fine distinctions between the three, he noted that transferences could not easily

leader of Catholic modernism in England, commended the distinctions in Troeltsch's essay; see his The German Soul (London, 1916), 87-117. For Kant's essay "Zum ewigen Frieden," (1795), see Kants Werke, Akademie Ausgabe, VIII (Berlin, 1968), 354-357. The controversy over Kant's essay is "argument without end." F. H. Hinsley claims that Kant's "federal union" means neither a world government nor a voluntary federation of states but the voluntary adherence of each state to a perfected international law, which all see as in their mutual self-interest. He also stresses Kant's concluding paragraph which declared that "perpetual peace" was "no empty idea," therefore not utopian but the coming result of the activity of "the great artist, nature." See Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge, England, 1963), 62-80.

be made from one to the other. Thus, while implying that a state could not be judged by the standards applicable to persons, he maintained that it could not shrug off all moral accountability.⁵⁴

Holl, too, distinguished between the different types of morality. He accused the pacifist Leo Tolstoi of confounding the state with the individual and erroneously affirming that the requirements of the Gospel, especially Christian love, could be fulfilled among nations. On the contrary, argued Holl, a "moralization" of the intercourse between countries could mean only the recognition of the uniqueness of various peoples.⁵⁵

Seemingly, therefore, the only kind of law or morality governing the life of nations was the law of the jungle. Though the theologians never used the term "social Darwinism," they left no doubt that they accepted its tenets. Arthur Titius unashamedly affirmed that in the life of nations just as in the life of nature there was a constant "struggle for existence," with all contending for "a place in the sun." Troeltsch maintained that since biology had shown that the impulse to grow was the essence of all life and that organisms developed through struggle, conflicts and wars were inevitable in the maturation process of the state; indeed, they revealed

⁵⁴Richter, "Staatsegoismus und Privatmoral," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 325-327; Harnack, "Der Abschied von der weissen Weste," Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 300-303 [orig. in Der Tag, April 21, 1916/.

⁵⁵Holl, "Luthers Anschauung," Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 164.

its true fitness. "The law of the rise of healthy and strong and the decline of aged and internally weak state forms" was valid, he proclaimed, and therefore war had honor and moral significance. Such affirmations led one German-American to accuse the land of his forebears of being "the self-appointed health officer of the world testing out who, under the laws of biology, was among the nations fit to survive."⁵⁶

Troeltsch and Hans von Soden, a Berlin Privatdozent in Church History, also called attention to Jesus' parable of the three servants entrusted with varying amounts of money (Luke 19:11-27). Soden claimed that since war was an international test of strength, the parable applied also to nations. God was holding an examination among peoples prior to "dividing the world anew," he stated, and Germany was to show what she had done with her talents. If she had wisely improved upon her gifts, she would be rewarded with greater tasks and privileges, but if, like the timid and unfaithful servant, she had done nothing, she would be punished.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Titius, Unser Krieg, 9; Troeltsch, "Privatmoral and Staatsmoral," Neue Rund., XXVIII (1916), 159, and "Der Völkerkrieg und das Christentum," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 297; Hermann Hagedorn, Where Do You Stand? An Appeal to Americans of German Origin (New York, 1918), 76-77. Stressing that "social Darwinism" was by no means confined to Germany is H. W. Koch, "Social Darwinism as a Factor in the 'New Imperialism,'" in H. W. Koch (ed.), The Origins of the First World War (New York, 1972), 328-350.

⁵⁷Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte, 19; Hans von Soden, Bismarcks Glaube (Stuttgart, 1915), 29. Hans was the son of Hermann von Soden (1852-1914), a Berlin Professor of New Testament, remembered for his edition of the Greek New Testament of 1913.

Harnack credited war with revealing a nation's true worth and destroying "false appearances and all hollowness," and Holl rebuked Social Democrats and pacifists for failing to see that national worth changed. Nations, he contended, come and go; they were not "once for all given quantities," and it was not right that a decadent nation enjoy large areas while "a youthful and strong one atrophies within narrow boundaries." But since no law court could render an impartial verdict, only war could measure the respective strengths.⁵⁸

Outdoing all of his colleagues on this subject, Seeberg again and again hammered away on the proposition that war was the only legitimate test of the strengths of nations. At the very outset of the conflict, he proclaimed that the moral right of war lay in its being "the great test of world history," wherein God cleared the stage of the weak in order that He might reward the strong. He later insisted that war had world-historical significance precisely because it was an international test of strength, and in keeping with Ranke stressed that this meant spiritual and intellectual strength, not merely brute force. On yet another occasion, he emphasized that war was just because it kept the balance of power up to date. The international equilibrium was not a fixed condition; it had to be corrected

⁵⁸Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkrieg," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 313; Holl, "Luthers Anschauung," Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 162-163.

from time to time. Since some nations had grown in power while others had diminished, a restoration of the old balance of power after the war was unthinkable. At a patriotic rally in Berlin, he inspired his compatriots with the idea that war aided the progress of Kultur by elevating the possessors of a higher Kultur and humbling the representatives of a lower Kultur--a thought scarcely palatable to losers. At another time, he insisted that if a swollen, covetous power had overrated itself and maliciously attacked its neighbor, it was the latter's moral duty to put the has-been in its place. ⁵⁹

To summarize, the theologians justified not only a purely defensive war, by citing the Scriptures and Luther, but also a state's right to guarantee its future when faced with "the survival of the fittest," by invoking Kant, Hegel, and Darwin or Spencer. The Old Testament was usually bypassed, because Israel's religious wars were hardly a relevant standard for the modern age. Jesus seemed implicitly to have recognized the right or at least the inevitability of war, and the Apostle Paul had enjoined Christians to be subject

⁵⁹Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 171; "Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des gegenwärtigen Krieges," and "Deutsche Zukunft" [revised version of "Unsere Kriegsziele," address of June 20, 1915 in Berlin, priv. print. by Independent Comm. for German Peace], both in Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 30, 49; "Krieg und Kulturfortschritt, Rede am 15. Januar 1915," in Deutsche Reden, II (Berlin, 1915), 120; "Der Krieg und die allgemeine Menschenliebe," Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 83.

to Rome without disqualifying military service. The injunctions of the Sermon on the Mount and the teachings about the "kingdom of God" were dismissed as inapplicable to the secular world. Consequently, a defensive war was a just war, a holy war. On a different plane, they held that states could not be judged by the moral codes incumbent upon individuals. Since there was no neutral international court of appeal, states must have recourse to arms to protect their rights--and one was the right of a young, healthy nation to expand while directing older and decadent nations to retire. War was the only impartial judge, a legitimate test of national strengths. The fit would be vindicated, the unfit humbled. Without the slightest embarrassment, the academic men of the cloth accepted the challenge of showing what Germany had done with her God-given talents--presumably with the full expectation of hearing "Well done, good and faithful servant."

Consequently, pacifism was a dead letter among the theologians. They saw nothing incongruous about a Christian's becoming a soldier, receiving a chaplain's blessing before killing another Christian, and wearing "Gott mit uns" on his belt buckle. Pacifism did not even come close to being a Christian "categorical imperative." In fact, Titius declared that "perpetual peace" was merely a dream. Thus, when contrary to expectations, the troops were not home by Christmas and the Crown Prince's "lively, merry war" had degenerated into an enervating stalemate, the theologians turned to

reconciling the Christmas message with the ugliness of trench warfare. How could the bellowing of the howitzers, asked Deissmann, be harmonized with the angelic pronouncement, "Peace on earth"? The answer was simple, he said: the Savior was not only the babe in the manger and the gentle lamb of God; he was also the lion of Judah and the conqueror of death. Germany at war could finally appreciate the heroic side of Jesus' nature that had too long been pushed into the background.⁶⁰ Troeltsch offered another explanation. During the Christmas season of 1914, he declared that there were two Gospels: one, national, the other Christian. Both were divine, since God was the author of the state no less than the message of peace to the soul, but in human history the Christmas message had always been "a foreign sound out of a foreign world." Even Rade held that the angelic proclamation referred only to inner peace, and Harnack offered exegetical support for this interpretation. The famous passage, he contended, did not proclaim "Glory to God in the highest; peace on earth; good will to men." Rather, it read: "Glory to God in the heights and upon earth; peace to men of good will." In other words, peace was not promised to the earth as a whole but only to good men, that is, not an international but an internal peace.⁶¹

⁶⁰Titius, Unser Krieg, 2; Deissmann, "Heilands Weihnacht," Deutscher Schwertsegen, 47-52 [orig. in Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung, Christmas, 1914].

⁶¹Troeltsch, "Friede auf Erden," Die Hilfe, XX (1914), 833-834; Rade, "Friede auf Erden," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914),

Both prior to and during the war, only a few Germans swore allegiance to the flag of pacifism. The German Peace Society, founded in 1892, attracted only 10,000 of Germany's 68,000,000 people, a dismal percentage when compared with France's 300,000 involved in the peace movement. Moreover, the Society included only two theologians, Martin Rade and Heinrich Weinel, and 114 clergymen--and most of the latter had joined only in response to a special appeal of 1907 sent out by Rade and Vice-President Otto Umfrid.⁶² In an attempt to clarify its stand, the Society drew up in 1913, the centennial of the "Battle of Nations" at Leipzig, a manifesto advocating the realization of "a community of law which replaces the unlawfulness of war with the maxim of law and requires from nations the ethic which is self-understood between individuals." Weinel was among its seven sponsors. 3,400 copies were sent out, but only 395 favorable replies were received--112 of them from Alsace-Lorraine! Umfrid nevertheless expressed delight with the response and was especially glad that a dozen theologians representing six universities had endorsed the appeal, including Rade, Weinel, Friedrich Niebergall, and Caspar René Gregory. Interestingly, there was a heavy concen-

1123; Harnack, "Über den Spruch 'Ehre sei Gott in der Höhe' und das Wort 'Eudokia,'" lecture at the Berlin Academy, Dec. 9, 1915, cited in Ferdinand Kattenbusch, "Weihnachten und der Friede," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 532-535; Kattenbusch agreed with Harnack's exegesis.

⁶²Bertha von Sittner, Memoirs, I, 440-448; Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World Without War, 62-63, 344-345; Otto Umfrid, "Mobilmachung der Kirchen gegen den Krieg," Die Friedens-Warte, XV (1913), 208-209.

tration of systematic theologians (five of the twelve), and there were no church historians and no one from Berlin.

Martin Schian interpreted the paltry response as indicative of German Protestants' conviction, shared by himself, that the goals of pacifism were simply unattainable.⁶³

Just after the war began, a smaller but more radical pacifist group was organized, the League for the New Fatherland. Its 135 members included men from several intellectual disciplines but none from theology. Law, philosophy, literature, and science were represented respectively by Walther Schücking, Friedrich W. Foerster, Ernst Sieper, and Albert Einstein. Though not members of the League, Hans Delbrück, the jurist Franz von Liszt, and the economists Ferdinand Tönnies and Lujo Brentano expressed sympathy with its aims. The German government considered both the League and the milder German Peace Society subversive and suppressed their activities during the war.⁶⁴

⁶³Umfrid, "Mobilmachung der Kirchen gegen Krieg," Die Friedens-Warte, XV (1913), 209-211; Schian, Die Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche in der Heimat, 22. For the complete list of the twelve theologians, see Appendix A.

⁶⁴Pierre Grappin, Le Bund Neues Vaterland (1914-1916). Ses rapports avec Romain Rolland (n.p., 1952), 1-49; Gustav Fuchs, Der deutsche Pazifismus im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1928), 20-33; Wolfgang Benz, "Der 'Fall Mühlton.' Bürgerliche Opposition im Obrigkeitsstaat während des ersten Weltkriegs," Vtjh. f. Ztgscht., XVIII (1970), 544-547; Alfred Fried, "Zum Verhalten der deutschen Pazifisten während des Weltkriegs," an open letter to B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, Feb. 28, 1919, Friedens-Warte, XXI, (1919), 36-38; James Shand, "Doves Among the Eagles: German Pacifists and Their Government During World War I," Jour. of Contemp. Hist., X (1975), 95-107.

Internationally as well, Germany's relationship to the peace movement was flawed. In 1910, various Christian social groups had founded the International Federation of Social Christians, but its conference scheduled for September, 1914, in Basel had to be cancelled because of the war. It is doubtful that much would have been accomplished anyway, because the Germans had taken offense at the anti-German innuendo in the Swiss suggestion for the theme, "Christianity and Militarism," and the topic had been changed to "Christianity and World Peace."⁶⁵ A similar conference, however, was held at the invitation of the Church Peace Union.

Founded early in 1914 by Andrew Carnegie, this body invited representatives of American and European Protestant churches to meet in Constance, Germany, August 3-5, 1914. About 150 delegates from thirteen countries were expected, but as the European crisis worsened, only half had arrived by August 2, and they decided to begin the meeting a day early. That evening, the German government announced that the last safe passage through Germany would be the next morning, and therefore about all that was done was the offering of prayer for peace. Departing on August 3, most of the delegates were accompanied as far as Cologne by one of the German leaders, Berlin pastor Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze. Those who were

⁶⁵Baumgarten, "Deutscher Militarismus?" Evangel. Freiht., XIV (1914), 387; Gottfried Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche und Politik 1917-1919, 32.

able to reach London continued the conference there, and Siegmund-Schultze was elected in absentia as one of the secretaries of a committee to work for peace.⁶⁶

The war not only broke up scheduled peace meetings; it brought renewed conflicts between Christian brethren. Germany's thorn in the flesh throughout the war was the Swiss Religious Socialists, a pacifist group headed by Leonard Ragaz, a Zürich Professor of Systematic Theology. Ragaz accused the Germans of refusing to take the Sermon on the Mount seriously, and he lamented that the war signified a "falling away from the cross of Christ to the 42 cm howitzer." Wilhelm Herrmann, on the other hand, cheerfully upheld the "Christianity of the 42 cm cannon," declaring that the iron in the weapon was fulfilling a God-appointed purpose.⁶⁷ In his magazine, Neue Wege, Ragaz continued his fulminations, thereby prompting Holl to complain that Ragaz, Tolstoi, and French theologian Alfred Loisy had all committed the same error: believing that Jesus' kingdom could be established on earth. Schian too rebuked Ragaz for a baseless idealism rooted in a misunderstanding of the kingdom of God. Baumgarten declared that the Religious Socialists ignored Luther's

⁶⁶Nils Karlström, "Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work 1910-1925," in Rouse and Neill (eds.), Ecumenical Movement, 511-515; Siegmund-Schultze to American Christians, Aug. 19, 1914, and Harnack to American Christians, [Aug., 1914], in Die Eiche, VI (1918), 162-163; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 814; Peter Ainslie, Christ or Napoleon--Which? (New York, 1915), 7.

⁶⁷Ragaz to Gottfried Traub [end of 1914], in Die Eiche, III (1915), 24-25; Herrmann, "Die Türken, die Engländer, und die deutschen Christen," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 234.

"doctrine of the two kingdoms" and insisted that the Gospel must remain distinct from "everything national, cultural and tribal."⁶⁸ When Ragaz railed against Deissmann's Evangelischer Wochenbrief, labelling it as nothing more than "masked propaganda," Deissmann replied that no one in belligerent countries had stooped to such abuse as the supposedly neutral Ragaz. Deissmann then appealed to another Swiss theologian, Paul Wernle, and to Rade, known for his sympathy with the peace movement. Wernle, Professor of Church History at Basel, had received the Wochenbrief since the fall of 1917, and he expressed regret that his countrymen often viewed it with mistrust. Alluding to the title of an anti-German work published in Switzerland, he insisted that the Swiss should not require a German to admit to the "crime" Germany had allegedly committed in 1914 before granting him a hearing. Rade called Ragaz' "personal polemic" the most disgusting he had seen in years. It is not surprising that Ragaz was not among ninety-four Swiss Reformed theologians and clerics who sent German Lutherans a brotherly greeting during the Reformation celebrations in 1917.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Holl, "Luthers Anschauung," Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 158; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 92-96; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 290.

⁶⁹Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Oct. 21 and Nov. 22, 1917, March 15 and 29, April 26, and Aug. 10, 1918; Wernle, "Deissmanns Evangelischer Wochenbrief und die Schweiz," Kirchenblatt für die reformierte Schweiz, July 13, 1918, cited in Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Aug. 10, 1918; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 797, and XXXII (1918), 290; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 573. The Germans regarded Wernle as their warmest theological supporter in Switzerland;

From Italy, too, came expressions of both good and ill will. La Luce, the weekly of a pacifist Protestant group, the Waldensians, took an anti-German position before and after Italy entered the war. Waldensian church authorities nevertheless announced that the periodical did not always reflect the official opinion of the church. Schian joyfully called attention to this admission, and Deissmann happily reported that twelve Waldensian clerics had expressed sympathy for Germany and had claimed that their colleagues' antipathy rested on misinformation.⁷⁰

In the United States, many Germans were convinced, pacifism was hypocritical because Americans were given to "moralizing and mammon." Rade rejected this generalization, but he had doubts about President Wilson. The President's choice of William Jennings Bryan for Secretary of State indicated his pacifist inclinations, Rade conceded, but his non-recognition of President Victoriano Huerta, likewise on pacifist and Christian principles, had plunged Mexico into bloodshed. Moreover, the shallowness of Wilson's pacifism

Wernle to Harnack, July 13, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XV (1915), 145; Deissmann, "Jahreswende des Weltkriegs," Inneres Aufgebot, 119.

⁷⁰Schian, "Die christlichen Kirchen im Weltkrieg," in Dietrich Schäfer (ed.), Der Krieg 1914-1916, I (Leipzig, 1916), 326; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Jan. 16, 1915. The Waldensians were founded in the late twelfth century by the Lyons merchant Peter Waldo. The only medieval sect to survive into the modern world, it embraced Protestant principles during the Reformation.

⁷²Schöberg to Nathanael Bonwetsch, April 24, 1916, Deissmann Nachlass, SBB; Schian, "Chronik," Evangel. Freiheit., VIII (1917), 128.

was evident in his permitting the sale of munitions to Germany's enemies. Rade's heroes were Charles F. Aked, Walter Rauschenbusch, and Secretary Bryan. Aked, a San Francisco pastor, and the German-American Rauschenbusch, Professor of Church History at Rochester Theological Seminary and champion of the social Gospel, issued a joint declaration in 1915 against the American munitions trade. When Bryan resigned the same year rather than support Wilson in the Lusitania crisis, Rade and other German editors gave him front-page coverage, extolling his devotion to ideals. The following year, Rade expressed fear that Wilson, while professing pacifist principles, was about to plunge America into the war.⁷¹

Seeberg labelled Wilson's lecturing "pedantic insolence," and in March, 1917, after he had broken diplomatic relations, Schian accused him of a two-faced pacifism that had "great words but small deeds, high ideals but poor practice."⁷² After Wilson had asked Congress in April for a declaration of war, Harnack indignantly branded his address "the most shameless, arrogant, and hypocritical" pronouncement directed from one nation to another since the time of Napoleon. Comparing Wilson's earlier and more recent statements, he angrily

⁷¹Rade, "Von den Amerikanern," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 370-371; "Zwei amerikanische Theologen wider den Munitions-handel," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 644-646; "Eine Rede Bryans," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 494; "Rücktritt des Staatssekretärs Bryan," Der Tag, June 9, 1915.

⁷²Seeberg to Nathanael Bonwetsch, April 24, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 128.

paraded the discrepancies. Schian continued to denounce the President's "inflated" rhetoric, and in October, 1918, he claimed that Wilson's pre-armistice demands destroyed any illusion that he might yet prove to be a "world arbiter of idealistic convictions."⁷³

Wilson was not the only disappointing American. Charles S. Macfarland, Executive Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, seemed to be an even greater traitor. He was so impressed with the German "Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad" that at the end of 1915 he made an official visit to Germany as a gesture of good will and Christian solidarity. Since Deissmann was one of the twenty-nine who issued the appeal and since his Weekly Letter aimed especially at improving German-American relations, he was overjoyed. Rade was so excited about the momentous occasion that he reprinted the entire Weekly Letter describing it in his own periodical under the title "Good Will in America." In June, 1918, however, Macfarland told a group of Frenchmen in Paris that he was finally "free from the fetters of neutrality." Embittered almost beyond words, Deissmann declared that the American churchman had simply traded his previous

⁷³Harnack, "Wilsons Botschaft und die deutsche Freiheit," address of May, 1917, in Die deutsche Freiheit, ed. by Bund der deutscher Gelehrter und Künstler, 3, 10-11; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 238, and IX (1918), 459. For contradictions in Wilson's statements before and after America entered the war, see John Kenneth Turner, Shall It Be Again? (New York, 1922), 419-443.

⁷⁴Schian, "Die Kirche und der Weltkrieg," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 97-102; Deissmann, 1915. Briefe, Jan. 7, 1915.

chains for worse ones, and Rade let the matter drop with the remark, "You, too, Brutus?"⁷⁴

Though disillusioned with the American church leader, Germans remained pleased with Nathan Söderblom, Archbishop of Uppsala, who proved to be their best ecclesiastical friend. At the outbreak of the war, he was a visiting professor at Leipzig, and he immediately returned to Sweden, where he was consecrated as head of her Lutheran Church and promptly issued a pastoral letter which did not raise the guilt question but simply expressed sorrow at the coming of the war and especially its effects on foreign missions. Schian printed lengthy excerpts in his periodical, and Deissmann devoted an entire Weekly Letter to praising the Archbishop's fairness and his "delicate conscience."⁷⁵ Shortly thereafter, Söderblom tried to promote a united appeal for peace, but the church leaders of Germany, France, and England refused to sign without conditions. Only a group of neutrals, including Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Switzerland, and the United States issued a call to end the war. When the Archbishop tried again three years later, it was only the same countries, minus America, that supported a

⁷⁴Preparations for Macfarland's visit are noted in George Wenner to Ernst von Dobschütz, Nov. 9, 1914, and Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze to Harnack, Nov. 26, 1914, both in Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Jan. 15, 1916; Rade, "Guter Wille in America," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 67-70; Semaine Religieuse de Genève, July 20, 1918, cited in Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Sept. 21, 1918; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXXIII (1918), 349.

⁷⁵Schian, "Die Kirche und der Weltkrieg," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 97-102; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Jan. 7, 1915.

a manifesto urging a cessation of hostilities. Troeltsch, who supported the Reichstag Peace Resolution of July, 1917, bemoaned the abstention of Germany's ecclesiastical leaders, fearing that such behavior strengthened foreign suspicion that they wanted "war to the knife." In yet another ill-fated venture, Söderblom planned an ecumenical conference in Uppsala for December, 1917. In the wake of the socialists' failure to convene a genuinely international peace conference at Stockholm in July, Söderblom thought it was now time for the churches to sponsor a "Christian Stockholm." The official Committee of the German Protestant Churches declined his invitation but individual German churchmen, including Deissmann, supported the idea of a conference, and the Foreign Office, eager to keep the good will of the Swedish Primate, was willing to provide passports and travel expenses. But the official leaders of the Church of England likewise turned thumbs down on the proposal, and even had they been favorably disposed their government was averse to making any overtures toward Germany and refused its clergy passports. Moreover, postal communications were so slow that France and America did not receive the invitation until after the date set for the conference. So, Söderblom reluctantly decided to limit the gathering to representatives of only the neutral nations, and like their socialist predecessors, they accomplished nothing.⁷⁶

⁷⁶"Ein Meinungs-austausch der Kirchenfürsten über Krieg und Frieden," Die Eiche, III (1915), 6-13; Karlström, "Movements for international Friendship, 1910-1925," in Rouse and Neill

Though Deissmann was warm toward Söderblom's ecumenical peace efforts, it was Rade who was Germany's most vocal champion of sheathing the sword. Because he flirted with pacifism and recognized the legitimacy of neutrality, his colleagues often viewed him with mistrust. But he did not deny the right to take up arms. "There are just wars," he assured his 4,000 readers in August, 1914, and his answer to "peace at any price?" was "phooey!" In fact, he even maintained Christian nations should have led to a punitive expedition against the Turks during the Armenian massacres of 1896.⁷⁷ Yet he urged Christians to work and pray for peace and to stop chastising the neutrals by reversing Jesus' statement to read, "He that is not for us is against us."⁷⁸ In 1916, hearing that the Interparliamentary Union, a body of delegates from the popular assemblies of European countries, desired a proclamation from Germany pledging her support to restore international law when the war was over, he tried to persuade Harnack to influence the chancellor to

(eds.), Ecumenical Movement, 522-528; Troeltsch to Wilhelm Herrmann, Sept. 23, 1917, Herrmann Nachlass, UBM; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Oct. 21 and Dec. 2, 1917, Jan. 1, March 29, June 8, July 12, Dec. 20, 1918, and Nov. 1921.

⁷⁷Rade, "Glossen zum Balkankriege," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 766, and "Friede um jeden Preis?" Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 744.

⁷⁸Rade, "Die Neutralen und wir," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 155; "Dürfen wir um Frieden beten?" XXIX (1915), 313-314; "Friedenssehnsucht--Friedenswille," XXX (1916), 689-691; "Die Friedenstaube," XXX (1916), 993-995.

cooperate. Insisting that "without a drop of pacifist oil" no one would be able to end the war, he chided his friend for being less pacifistic than he. In contrast to Baumgarten, he believed in the union of politics and morality.⁷⁹

Even a glance at the war issues of Die Christliche Welt shows that Rade dared to depart from accepted norms. An early hint of his aberrant position was that he allowed pacifist Walther Schücking, his Marburg colleague on the Law Faculty, to proclaim in September, 1914 that "in the midst of this sea of blood, we raise our white flag high and let it flutter in the wind." In February, 1915, Rade differentiated between three kinds of neutrals: citizens of a "political neutral" like Italy that might enter the war at any moment, people in a neutral state who inwardly sided with one of the belligerents, and individuals who were neutral in principle. Portraying the last as miserable and frustrated in wartime, he begged his countrymen to sympathize with them without expecting special sympathy in return.⁸⁰

In June, 1916, Rade came to the defense of the controversial Catholic pacifist, Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster. Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy at the Technical College of Munich, Foerster had contributed an article to the January,

⁷⁹Rade to Harnack, Aug. 15, 1916, Rade Nachlass, UBM.

⁸⁰Schücking, "Der Weltkrieg und der Pazifismus," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 875; Rade, "Die Neutralen und wir," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 152-155.

1916, issue of a German pacifist paper published in Zürich. He deprecated Bismarck's "Prussian solution" to the German question for having destroyed the German Confederation, the legitimate heir to the Holy Roman Empire, and he extolled Constantin Frantz's federal solution for recognizing the supranational and Christian mission of the German people. When his article became known in Germany a few months later, the Munich Faculty of Philosophy, normally sympathetic to federalist ideas, publicly censured him. Although many students supported him, his colleagues hounded him into self-exile in Switzerland. Rade denounced the Philosophy Faculty's "papal bull" as an abuse of academic freedom, but Schian condemned both Frantz for having made federalism his "Alpha and Omega" and Foerster for declaring it the only policy compatible with the Christian spirit.⁸¹

At the end of 1916, in the aftermath of the Foerster affair, Rade complained that pacifism was dead in Germany, indeed, that it had died before the war, and that German

⁸¹F. W. Foerster, "Bismarcks Werk im Lichte der gross-deutschen Kritik," Die Friedens-Warte, XVIII (1916), 1-9; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," and "Zum Fall Foerster," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 494, 608-610; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel. VII (1916), 381-382; Foerster, Europe and the German Question (New York, 1940), x, xvi, 11-15, 231; Ebba Dahlin, French and German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims 1914-1918 (New York, 1971; 1st ed., 1933), 89-90; G.P. Gooch, Germany (New York, 1925), 135-136. Foerster's father was Wilhelm Foerster, Director of the Berlin Observatory, who had bequeathed to his son a loathing of Bismarck and who had supported G. F. Nicolai's attempt to launch a counter-manifesto alongside of the "Appeal of the Ninety-three to the Civilized World."

clerics who attacked it were beating a dead horse. Schian retorted that Rade's and Schücking's statements in Die Christliche Welt hardly bore this thesis out, and although insisting that he and other anti-pacifists were also "friends of peace," he assailed pacifism for seducing people from "the world of facts into a world of dreams."⁸² In the summer of 1917, Rade published a letter from an Austrian reader who exhorted Protestant pastors and churches the world over, as representatives of international Christendom, to emulate the representatives of international socialism gathered at Stockholm, by actively engaging in formal efforts to end the war. Rade wished the appeal God-speed but pointed out a blurred distinction. The institutional Protestant church, he maintained, always had the obligation to instill in men's hearts a spiritual longing for peace, but it had neither the power nor the duty to participate in formal attempts to stop a war already in progress. With less charity, Baumgarten denounced the appeal for secularizing the Gospel and confusing the temporal and spiritual realms, the two swords of Luke 22:38, and Schian dismissed it as full of "impractical idealism and naiveté."⁸³

⁸²Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 909; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 126-127.

⁸³Anonymous author in Galicia, "Kirchen und Pfarrer hinein in die Arbeit für den Frieden," Christl. Welt, XXXI (July 26, 1917), 560-562; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 331; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 290-292.

In the spring of 1917, Rade bravely launched a special series of political editorials discussing the Pan-Germans, the Social Democrats, the Jesuits, the pacifists, the neutrals, and Germany's situation in November, 1917. In the latter three essays, he insisted that though he was a member of the German Peace Society he was not a pacifist "in principle or in a programmatic sense." Why? Because he held that shrinking away from all suffering was a symptom of decadence and that war sometimes wrought positive changes. For example, the present struggle had won over the Social Democrats to the Reich and had toppled tsarism. But "pacifist," he argued, was no more a term of reproach than "Pan-German."⁸⁴

Rade praised Pope Benedict XV's peace proposal of August 1, 1917, and expressed shame that Protestant clergy had not likewise raised their voices in behalf of peace. Lamenting that Germany's war theologians had numbed themselves with the Lutheran idea of the separate spheres of politics and morality, he exclaimed: "Jesus is greater than Luther." Baumgarten, on the other hand, always drawing a sharp dichotomy between morality and power, rejected the Pope's premise that in the midst of war "the moral force of right" should replace "the material force of arms."⁸⁵

⁸⁴Rade, "Die Pazifisten," "Die Neutralen," "Zur äusseren und inneren Lage--Mitte November," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 483-485, 512, 843.

⁸⁵"Message from His Holiness Benedictus XV, Pope," August 1, 1917, in "Official Documents Looking Toward Peace, III," Inter. Concil., Nr. 119 (Oct., 1917), 5-7; Rade, "Die Antwort der Mittelmächte auf die Friedensnote des Papstes" and "Zur äusseren und inneren Lage--Mitte November," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 714-714, 844; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 294.

The gap between Rade and his fellow theologians widened on the eve of the Reformation observance in October, 1917, when he published a declaration of five Berlin pastors who wanted to see war "vanish from the world." Rade saluted their courage and chided other editors for refusing to carry the announcement.⁸⁶ Indignation was rampant. With his usual disdain for utopian solutions, Schian retorted that one could no more banish war than sin from the world. Baumgarten protested that the manifesto contradicted Luther's idea of the "inner freedom of the Christian man from the external world." Even Heinrich Weinel, who had sponsored the German Peace Society's declaration of 1913, held that such a manifesto, though perhaps proper at the outset of a conflict, was inappropriate once a war was in full swing. The voices of opposition left the five undaunted, and Rade gave further support by allotting them three full pages for a rebuttal. Considering that the paper shortage of 1918 had reduced Die Christliche Welt from a weekly to a bi-weekly, his generosity was more than a polite gesture.⁸⁷

⁸⁶Karl Aner et al., "Erklärung," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 756; Rade, "KI. Mittlgn.," and "Zur äusseren und inneren Lage," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 755, 843; Deissmann made the Berlin declaration known abroad in his Evangel. Wochbr., Oct. 7, 1917.

⁸⁷Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 554; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 457-458; Weinel, in Fränkischer Kurier, Nr. 628 (1917), cited in Friedrich Rittelmeyer, "Ein Nachwort zu unserer Friedens-erklärung," Christl. Welt, XXXII (1918), 136; Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche und Politik, 53.

In December, 1917, Rade duplicated his offense by printing a peace declaration of seventeen Hanoverian clerics. Schian praised them for avoiding the Berliners' mixing of religion and politics but found fault with their vague reference to "war theologians." Inferring that this meant all who opposed pacifist efforts, he refused to support the declaration.⁸⁸

Rade not only allowed pacifists and their sympathizers to contribute to his periodical; he contributed to one of Europe's foremost pacifist papers, Die Friedens-Warte. Founded in 1899 by the German Alfred Fried, it had the unpleasant duty in the summer of 1914 of reporting not only the death of its heroes, Bertha von Suttner and Jean Jaurès, but the outbreak of the European war. Its contributors included Friedrich W. Foerster, William Jennings Bryan, and Rade, who was the only German theologian who dared to associate himself with the paper during the war.⁸⁹

Although Rade was an anomaly among the theologians, he

⁸⁸Pastor Bartels et al., "Erklärung," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 877; Schian, "Christ und Krieg," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 87-87; Deissmann carried the declaration in his Evangel. Wochbr., Dec. 24, 1917.

⁸⁹The following are all from Die Friedens-Warte: "Bertha von Suttner Gedenk-Nummer," XVI (July, 1914), 275-298; "Unsere Toten," XVI (1914), 310-311; "Pastor Rade über die Fragen des Tages," XVI (1914), 317-318; Rade, "Archiv für Kriegsphantasie, Kriegslist und Kriegslüge," XVII (1915), 250-258. Die Friedens-Warte was a continuation of Bertha von Suttner's defunct periodical, Die Waffen nieder; Suttner, Memoirs, I, 389.

did not urge Germany unilaterally to lay down her arms. He did not view peace as an inescapable Christian mandate; he merely believed that Christians the world over, Germans included, had not done all that they could to promote it. When Germany asked for an armistice in October, 1918, he bemoaned the "intellectual capitulation" to Wilsonian ideals and regretted that German Protestant churches had not led a similar intellectual campaign.⁹⁰ Insisting that the Gospel of Christ meant not only the forgiveness of sins but a belief in the kingdom of God which would triumph over even the conditions of the present age, he sadly concluded that most German religious leaders had abandoned this Ritschlian expectation.⁹¹

As an advocate of qualified pacifism, Rade stood alone. Harnack called himself a "pacifist," but he meant only that every pious man must not cease to shudder before the horrors of war or renounce his faith in the coming kingdom of God or cease to work for that end. Hermann Gunkel pictured Jesus weeping over the tragedy of war, but neither he nor Harnack admonished Christians to take the lead in trying to prevent it.⁹² Although Baumgarten made a startling about-face in

⁹⁰Rade's remarks, cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 259.

⁹¹Rade, "Offener Brief an einen neutralen Freund," Christl. Welt, XXXII (1918), 398.

⁹²Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkrieg," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 311; Gunkel, "Jesus Weint," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 662.

November, 1918, he was motivated mainly by expediency, not ethics. On the day of the naval mutiny, he conducted a worship service for students and faculty at Kiel University. Admitting that he had previously regarded the concept of a league of nations, in which countries helped rather than hurt one another, as a phantastic dream, he declared that the war had finally driven him to embrace the hope of a lasting peace. While the Allies were deliberating Germany's future at Paris, he became more desperate, urging his countrymen to support the proposed league as their only salvation. But this was prudence after the fact, resembling the accommodation of the Vernunftrepublikaner in the Weimar era, and Die Friedens-Warte was quick to criticize the shallowness of Baumgarten's conversion.⁹³

The deeper commitment had been made long before, when Baumgarten and his colleagues had become disciples of Luther, Kant, Hegel, and Darwin or Spencer. Appealing to these sages and to the Scriptures, the theologians pronounced pacifism anathema. The declarations of the five Berliners and the seventeen Hanoverians were sponsored only by pastors and church officials, not a single academic man of the cloth, and Rade was abused for his courageous support of their

⁹³Baumgarten, "Vision einer besseren Zukunft," sermon on Nov. 3, 1918, Predigten aus der Revolutionszeit (Tübingen, 1919, 46-47; Baumgarten's remarks of March 18, 1919, cited in Alfred Fried, "'Deutscher' Pazifismus," Friedens-Warte, XXI (1919), 61, footnote 1.

ideals. His detractors concurred with Willy Staerk, a Jena Professor of Old Testament, who remarked that the idea of perpetual peace belonged only in "the land of fairy tales."⁹⁴ Indeed, the real world in Germany, complained Rade, Schücking, the Hanoverians, and, ironically, even the nationalistic Troeltsch on one occasion, was all too saturated with "the theology of war."⁹⁵

⁹⁴Willy Staerk, "Der Mythos vom ewigen Frieden," Inter. Monatsschr., X. (1916), 1288.

⁹⁵Troeltsch to Rade [early 1918], cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 256; Schücking, "Europa am Scheideweg," in Schücking, Der Dauerfriede (Leipzig, 1917), 42.

WITH PEN AND SWORD

Chapter V

At the outbreak of hostilities, intellectuals and promising young scholars all over Europe experienced a burst of spiritual excitement. The English poet Rupert Brooke, for example, sang the praises of a war that enabled its participants to leap as swimmers into a "cleanness" from a "world grown old and cold and weary." The resulting exhilaration swept thousands of intellectuals to the front, where Europe was nearly stripped of a whole generation of her finest minds. Romain Rolland lamented that the world was witnessing "the murder of the elite." "Never in any period," he complained, "have we seen humanity throwing into the bloody arena all its intellectuals and moral reserves, its priests, its thinkers, its artists, the whole future of the spirit--wasting its genius as food for cannon."¹ Not all intellectuals took up the sword, but those who remained at home also fought--with the pen. The German theologians were no exception, and however much obsessed with defending the German war effort, they were still human enough and

¹Rupert Brooke, "Peace" (1914), The Collected Poems of Rupert Brooke, with an Introduction by George E. Woodberry (New York, 1921; 1st ed. 1915), 101; Romain Rolland, "The Murder of the Elite," Above the Battle, trans. by C. K. Ogden (Chicago, 1916), 168.

learned enough to sense the overpowering human and divine tragedy in the conflict and to ponder the riddle of larger issues. The generation of scholars that had led the world in comparative religion, ancient history, and theology could not fail to view the war in broad, human terms apart from its immediate participants. This they endeavored to do--even if in the end they reverted to their time-bound German ideas.

Looking beyond the trenches, the barbed wire, the exploding shells, the scholars asked what higher significance the war held for the history of Germany and the world. Lezius saw a re-enactment of the Second Punic War. Picturing "Roman" Germany standing precariously alone against "Carthaginian" England and her allies, he nevertheless confidently redrew the map of Europe in anticipation of a German victory. Troeltsch likened the struggle to Frederick the Great's Third Silesian War, when Prussia had had only meager support while warding off a host of enemies. A frequent analogy was that of the fearsome ride of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, who visited the earth with famine, destruction, and death. Ignoring the gruesome punishments, Deissmann exhorted his countrymen to look at the first horse, the white one, whose rider went forth to conquer. This, he asserted, symbolized Germany's coming victory.²

²Lezius to Seeberg, Sept. 17, 1914, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Troeltsch, Nach Erklärung der Mobilmäschung (Heidelberg, 1914), 5; Deissmann, "Sechs Monate Krieg," Deutscher Schwertsegen, 77; Rade, "Gottes Wille im Kriege," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 769; Schubert, Die Weihe des Krieges, 5; Johannes Haussleiter, "Der Krieg in neutestamentlicher Beleuchtung," in Laible (ed.) Deutsche Theologen, 128. The New Testament passage referred to is Revelation 6:1-8.

In contrast to Deissmann's sanguine speculation was the sanguinary spectacle on the battlefield. The unexpected horrors of the machine gun, poison gas, and no man's land, made the war a re-education to reality. One of the early casualties was nineteenth-century optimism, which had predicated the perfectibility of man on the belief that he was a rational animal. As the idealism, dreams, and presuppositions of the Victorian age lay prostrate before the grotesque demonstration of man's inhumanity to man, the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 seemed like empty gestures.

The sudden jolt back to a reconsideration of man's bestial side came naturally to the theologians. When Schian heard that Belgian women were engaging in ferocious guerrilla warfare, he ridiculed Rousseau's belief in the goodness of human nature. For many people, he concluded, civilization was "nothing but veneer." Always priding himself upon his realism, he scolded those who had clung to the hope of lasting peace and had had their "soap bubbles" rudely burst.³ Troeltsch thought that Germans of all people ought not to have been surprised at the outbreak of the war. Their history, he said, from the Schmalkaldic Wars to the Franco-Prussian War, showed that apparently they were to be allotted no more than fifty years of peace at a time; the war of 1914 was thus

³Schian, "Der Krieg ist da," and "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 513, 602.

just about on schedule. But the previous five decades, he believed, had brought serious delusions. Despite their technological and cultural achievements, progress was constantly threatened by a "dark, volcanic underground of human foolishness and passions and animalistic wildness." Troeltsch's judgment reminds one of Sigmund Freud, who early in 1915 spoke of disillusioned Europeans who could scarcely believe that their fellow civilized beings were capable of such brutality. Both the Heidelberg theologian and the Viennese psychoanalyst berated their generation for having embraced an illusion.⁴

Though interesting, these metaphors taken from antiquity, Scripture, and the contemporary psyche, were side issues for the theologians. Their concern was the war's function of revealing the bankruptcy of international Christendom and rejuvenating the religious life of Germany. The conservatives in particular viewed the war as a purgatorial fire that promised spiritual regeneration for a wayward people. The war was God's chastisement and cleansing, for Germany needed both. While not charging sins of diplomatic or military perfidy, they charged their country with ingratitude toward God's blessings, indulgence in worldly pleasures, and excessive

⁴Troeltsch, Nach Erklärung der Mobilmachung, 4-5; Freud, "The Disillusionment of the War," James Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, XIV (London, 1960), 281; Freud's essay first appeared in his periodical Imago in the spring of 1915.

religious and political bickering. Though God had not sent the war expressly to punish transgressing Christians, His "rod of correction," as Karl Dunkmann put it, was being felt.⁵

Ludwig Lemme affirmed that every war contained a divine judgment against immorality, and he listed among Germany's prewar vices the increase of prostitution, libertinism, atheism, nihilism, and a general disregard for religion, as manifested by the mounting numbers who officially left the state churches. Karl Bornhäuser noted that Germany needed repentance not for having precipitated the war but for her ingratitude to God for His gift of the Reich. Johannes Haussleiter accused his countrymen of frivolity, sensuality, and apostasy and saw the war as "the scourge of God" to summon men to repentance and faith.⁶ Paul Althaus eloquently summed up his colleagues' feelings when he wrote:

We feel ourselves blown about by the living breath of God. We hear the voice of the Eternal in our midst. He intends to bring our Fatherland a new spring, to accomplish a new birth in us, a return . . . to new piety and new morality. In this hope we intend to strengthen our hearts with the joyful confidence of faith: "We know that all things work together for good to them who love God," yes, all things, even the war.⁷

Germany's purification was for a purpose. Hans Preuss

⁵Dunkmann, "Idealismus oder Christentum?" in Laible (ed.) Deutsche Theologen, 92-93.

⁶Lemme, "Gottes Gerechtigkeit in den Schicksalen der Völker," and Bornhäuser, "Der Krieg und die Busse," and Haussleiter, "Der Krieg im neutestamentlicher Beleuchtung," all in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 101-102, 123, 130, 162-163.

⁷Althaus, "Der Krieg und unser Gottesglaube," in Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 247.

compared her sufferings to the Passion of Christ. As man's redemption had been accomplished through the crucifixion of Jesus, so salvation would come to the world through a purified and prepared Germany. Deissmann stressed that the war was helping to equip Germany for her world mission, and Rade told his readers that in view of that task God wanted to discipline and strengthen them. Richter reminded his compatriots that Israel had received her call to world service precisely when threatened by hostile powers; was Germany's distress any less God's means of preparing her to accomplish His will?⁸

Just after the war began, the Kaiser declared a national day of repentance, and many German pulpits echoed his call. On August 7, 1914, Ludwig Ihmels exhorted his congregation at Leipzig University Church to take the appeal to heart, despite Germany's innocence, and Deissmann rejoiced afterwards that the manifestations of sorrow had not been merely outward show. Troeltsch, however, thought the idea was being overdone, and late in 1914 told a patriotic assembly that Germans needed neither to dilate on their virtues nor to repent of their errors; courageous action was more relevant than jeremiads like those of the Old Testament prophets.

⁸Preuss, "Germany's Passion," Allgem. Evangel.-Luther. Kirchenztg., Sept. 17, 1915, cited in J. P. Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, 176-190; Deissmann "Ihr seid das Salz der Erde," and "Sechs Monate Kriege," Deutscher Schwertsegen, 62, 71; Rade, "Gottes Wille im Kriege," and "Wir Deutsche fürchten Gott und sonst nichts in der Welt," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 770, and XXX (1916), 725; Richter, Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche evangelische Mission, 17.

Baumgarten rebuked him, insisting that the dross which had preoccupied Germans could not be purged merely by heroic deeds. When a German pastor repeated this rebuke, Rade came to Troeltsch's aid, declaring that the great historian had not inveighed against earnest repentance but only against the outmoded style of those who encouraged it.⁹

In October, 1914, Carl Mirbt joyfully proclaimed that a moral and religious rebirth was occurring in his homeland, indications of which were increased church attendance and a diminishing rate of resignations from the state churches. Several other theologians likewise rejoiced that the prodigal son had at last returned to his father's house. The national crisis had revealed Monism, Idealism, and other surrogate religions as broken reeds and had re-emphasized Christianity's storehouse of succor and strength. Deissmann told an assembly that the war proved the lingering vitality of true religion, at least on the national level; it was a Phoenix rising from the ashes.¹⁰ With equal fervor, Rade proclaimed citizen and

⁹Ihmels, "Wir heben unsere Augen auf," sermon on Aug. 7, 1914, Darum auch wir, 21; Deissmann, "Ihr seid das Salz der Erde," Deutscher Schwertsegen, 62; Troeltsch, Das Wesen des Deutschen (Heidelberg, 1915), 30; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XV (1915), 143; Troeltsch, "Der Völkerkrieg und das Christentum" Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 296; Otto Herpel, "Deutsche Theologie-Professoren zum Kriege," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 804; Rade's comment in footnote 1 on p. 804.

¹⁰Mirbt, Kampf um unsere Kolonien, 21; Gerhard Hilbert, "Die Schicksalsstunde der Volkskirche," and Philip Bachmann, "Christentum und Krieg," and Karl Dunkmann, "Idealismus oder Christentum?" all Laible (ed.), Deutsche Theologen, 90-91, 141, 195; Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion, Rede am 12. November 1914," Deutsche Reden, I, 299.

Christian one. "The whole nation," he claimed, "sought and found its church." Rade exaggerated, but American ambassador James W. Gerard was just as wrong when he reported no signs of any great religious revival or increased church attendance. During the early months of the war, churches were abnormally full, and open-air services likewise attracted crowds. Even the editor of Der Atheist admitted that a "religious wave" had swept over Germany.¹¹

At the end of 1915, Schian nevertheless prophesied that the "floodtide" would gradually ebb. He was right. The declining rate of resignations from the churches was only temporary. To be sure, the prewar mass exodus peaked in 1913, dropped slightly in 1914, and took a steep plunge in 1915, but it regained momentum in 1916, as the following table of resignations from the Protestant Landeskirchen shows.¹²

<u>State church</u>	<u>1910-1912</u>	<u>1913</u>	<u>1914</u>	<u>1915</u>
Prussia	52,032	19,479	17,589	1,322
All Others	<u>11,258</u>	<u>3,517</u>	<u>3,336</u>	<u>356</u>
total	63,290	22,996	20,925	1,678
<u>State church</u>	<u>1916</u>	<u>1917</u>	<u>1918</u>	<u>1919</u>
Prussia	2,790	3,030	4,811	150,381
All others	<u>479</u>	<u>408</u>	<u>685</u>	<u>25,104</u>
total	3,269	3,438	5,496	175,485

¹¹Rade, Die Kirche nach dem Kriege (Tübingen, 1915), 23; James W. Gerard, Face to Face with Kaiserism (New York, 1918), 134; Schian, Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 2-3.

¹²Schian, "Die religiöse Bewegung im Weltkrieg," in Dietrich Schäfer (ed.), Der Krieg 1914-1916, 325; chart in Schian, Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 9-13.

Whatever the case on the national level, all the theologians agreed that on the international level, religion was obviously suffering. As Deissmann complained, the solidarity of the Christian faith as a missionary religion had been destroyed. How was one to explain Luther's "doctrine of the two kingdoms" to an African tribesman who knew only the message of God's love but could see with his own eyes what the Christians really practiced? Even Troeltsch, who usually ignored such matters, commented that the war was "an absolute catastrophe" for "the white man's religion."¹³

Though solidarity was gone, the theologians disagreed on exactly what its absence meant. Shortly after the Germans had been halted at the Marne, Rade coined the term "the bankruptcy of Christendom," meaning that the visible Church had failed to bind Christian nations together enough to prevent the war. Swiss pacifist Leonhard Ragaz went one step further, insisting that it was the invisible Church and the Christian faith itself that were bankrupt. Even Rade's more moderate judgment was too much for Schian, who replied that the situation merely reflected the immaturity of Christianity and the imperfections present in any institution. As long as Christendom still had its Gospel, he added, one could not speak of bankruptcy.¹⁴ Continuing their controversy into

¹³Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion, Rede am 12. November 1914," Deutsche Reden, I, 285-286; Troeltsch, "Der Völkerring und das Christentum," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 295.

¹⁴Rade, "Der Bankrott der Christenheit," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 849-850; "Antwort von Prof. Ragaz an Herrn Pfarrer Gottfried Traub," [end of Sept., 1914] Die Eiche, III (1915), 24-25; Schian, "Bedeutet der gegenwärtige Krieg den Bankrott der Christenheit?" Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 670.

1915, Rade refused to alter his opinion but conceded the possibility of a fresh start after the war. Schian likewise would not budge, affirming that "religious internationalists" were as helpless as their socialist counterparts in trying to preclude rivalry among nations. Harnack sided with Schian, pointing out that the world had always been in a state of war, before and after Christ. In similar vein, Deissmann sadly concluded that organized religion was incapable of preventing not only wars but many other things contrary to it.¹⁵

While the conservatives placed great value on the purgatorial nature of the war, and Rade underscored the war's revelation of the bankruptcy of Christendom, the theologians in general placed the greatest emphasis on the war's role as a Kulturkrieg or war of cultures. Although H. G. Wells falsely prophesied that the struggle would be "the war that will end war," he correctly characterized it as "a war of ideas."¹⁶ As the Germans saw it, there were actually two such wars: a real one which Germany waged against the Unkultur and barbarism of the east, and a false one maliciously fabricated by England which portrayed German

¹⁵Schian, Das deutsche Christentum im Kriege, 37-40, and "Bankrott der Christenheit?" Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 81-84; Rade, Dieser Krieg und das Christentum, 6, and Die Kirche nach dem Kriege, 52-53; Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkriege," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 307; Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion," 298-299.

¹⁶H. G. Wells, The War That Will End War (New York, 1914), and In the Fourth Year (New York, 1918), v.

autocracy as trying to crush western liberties. Throughout the four years, the belligerents hurled invectives back and forth. Like the Homeric heroes, they accompanied the war of weapons with a war of words.

Inter arma musae silentes was not true of the Great War. Propaganda salvoes mingled with the sharpnel and mortar fire. The scholars did not heed Romain Rolland's call to remain au-dessus de la mêlée or to listen to Bertrand Russell's plea that men of science not prostitute their intellects in the service of war.¹⁷ On the contrary, they enthusiastically flung themselves into a sometimes visceral, sometimes reflective defense of their maligned homelands. The Belgian playwright Maurice Maeterlinck explained that he tried to lift himself "above the fray," but the higher he rose the more he saw "of the justice of the one cause and the infamy of the other." In fact, even though Rolland counselled the "finer spirits" of Europe to rise above the hate, the exaltation of race, and the glorification of war, he indulged in denouncing the German "pedants of barbarism," particularly the theologians and pastors, whose whitewash of Germany's evil made them "a race of Pharisees."¹⁸

¹⁷Rolland, "Above the Battle," Above the Battle, trans. by C. K. Ogden, 37-55 (orig. pub. in Journal de Genève, Sept. 15, 1915); Russell, "An Appeal to the Intellectuals of Europe," Justice in War Time (Chicago, 1917), 1-18.

¹⁸Maeterlinck, Les débris de la guerre (Paris, 1916), 2-3; Rolland, "Pro Aris," "Above the Battle," and "The Lesser of Two Evils: Pangermanism, Panslavism," Above the Battle, trans. by C. K. Ogden, 29, 54-54, 71.

As Troeltsch observed, not only did the popular press supply shallow caricatures but the professors offered sophisticated arguments, and when the war was over, the French philosophical writer Julien Benda castigated their involvement as "the treason of the intellectuals." Berating the scholars of nearly all nations for succumbing to nationalistic passions, he cited as especially despicable Harnack's initial justification of the invasion of Belgium.¹⁹ Indeed, Germany's Protestant theologians played a conspicuous role in seeking to bolster German morale and in defining and defending her Kultur. They wrote pamphlets and books, contributed articles to journals and newspapers, and delivered patriotic speeches such as the famous "German Addresses in Hard Times" given in Berlin in 1914-1915. Otto Scheel, a Tübingen Associate Professor of Church History and a native of Schleswig, aided the German War Press Bureau in interpreting and influencing the neutral Danish press.²⁰ Deissmann was prompted by Matthias Erzberger, coordinator of German

¹⁹Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, trans. by Richard Aldington (New York, 1969; 1st ed., 1928), 54-55; Troeltsch, "Der Geist der deutschen Kultur," in Otto Hintze et al., (eds.), Deutschland und der Weltkrieg (Leipzig, 1915), 51-53.

²⁰For various series of addresses, see Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit, I-III (Berlin, 1914-1915), and Die deutsche Freiheit, ed. by Bund deutscher Gelehrter und Künstler (Gotha, 1917), and Axel Ripke (ed.), Zehn deutsche Reden (Leipzig, 1915); information on Scheel in letter of Dr. Volker Schäfer, Tübingen Univ. archivist, to Charles E. Bailey, Jan. 14, 1970.

propaganda, to begin sending his four-to-eight page Protestant Weekly Letter to Americans and other neutrals. For a while, Charles S. Macfarland, Executive Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, helped distribute the letters, whose recipients numbered about 500 by the fall of 1915. Despite the British confiscation of some postal matter on neutral ships, Deissmann believed that he had maintained a good relationship with Americans up to the end of 1916. America's entry into the war forced him to send a larger number of the letters to friends in still neutral countries, but all in all he thought his efforts had been well received. He terminated the project in 1921 with a final stab at the "so-called Peace of Versailles, which perpetuates hate and revenge."²¹

Meanwhile, Deissmann and his colleagues levelled similar charges of barbarism against Russia. In fact, the German Social Democrats voted the necessary war credits precisely on the assumption that the war was directed against tsarist tyranny, and Germany's task therefore to defend a common western Kultur. On the afternoon of August 4, 1914, the German Secretary of the Interior asked Harnack to draft an appeal

²¹Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg, 18-20; Deissmann, "Vom geistigen Kampfesfeld /four letters with explanatory introductory/, " Inneres Aufgebot, 64-95, and Prot. Wkly. Letter, March 27 and Oct. 30, 1915, and Nov., 1921; until America entered the war, the English translation was done by Rev. J. Quiring, an American studying at Berlin. On the failure of the German propaganda effort, see: Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen (Stuttgart, 1932), 208-247; Edgar Stern-Rubarth, Die Propaganda als politische Instrument (Berlin, 1921); Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1919), 292-303, 360-370, 553-576; George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918 (Stanford, 1938), 156-221.

which the Kaiser could issue to the public. Considering only the belligerency of Russia and France--England was not officially at war until midnight--he composed a declaration stressing Germany's need of protection against "Asiatic half-Kultur and alien essence." Though the Kaiser omitted this particular phrase, he used parts of Harnack's draft for the imperial proclamation of August 6, 1914.²² One week later, Harnack addressed a group of Americans stranded in Berlin and claimed that western Kultur had been primarily entrusted to the Germans, the English, and the Americans and rested on three concepts: the supreme worth of the human soul, the duty of sacrificing everything for high ideals, and respect for law and order. "Mongolian-Muscovite Kultur," on the other hand, was a Kultur of hordes ruled by despots, a Kultur that had failed to profit from the enlightenment of the previous two centuries. The unruly masses of Asia threatened to pour across Germany like desert sands, and England had committed a breach of faith in abandoning her western sister, Germany, to side with non-European Russia. He concluded his address with the ancient prayer, "Father, preserve us from the Hun."²³

²²Axel von Harnack, "Der Aufruf Kaiser Wilhelm II. beim Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges," Neue Rund., LXIV (1953), 612-620; Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, Adolf's daughter and biographer, states that while her father was writing the draft, the Secretary of the Interior informed him of England's joining Germany's enemies, Adolf von Harnack, 345-346; but Axel, Agnes' brother, thinks she is misinformed on this point; Axel von Harnack to Charles E. Bailey, April 30, 1974.

²³Harnack, "Rede zur 'Deutsch-amerikanischen Sympathiekundgebung,'" Aug. 11, 1914, Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 287-290.

In an intellectual duel with English churchmen in September, 1914, Harnack made similar charges. The British novelist G. K. Chesterton and the French author Emile Hovaleque replied that Harnack fulminated against broken promises when none had been made, whereas Germany had clearly broken her repeated pledges to Belgium. Paul Vinogradoff, former Professor of History at the University of Moscow who in 1914 taught at Oxford, likewise questioned Harnack's memory. Had the Germans forgotten, he asked, that they had not been so "squeamish" about choosing their friends a century earlier when Russia had helped them throw off the Napoleonic yoke? Moreover, he countered, a nation with Pushkin, Tolstoi, and Dostoievski in literature, Tschaikovski and Moussorgski in music, Mendeleeff and Pavlov in science, and Kluchevski and Solovieff in history need not be ashamed to compete for the international trophies of culture.²⁴

Eager to impress the United States with the difference between the real and false Kulturkrieg, Harnack told an American press correspondent in January, 1915, that no reputable German scholar regarded the war as Germany's attempt to force her particular Kultur on other western nations. On the other hand, Germany was defending the entire western

²⁴Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 295; Chesterton, "Why England Came to Be in It," Current History, I (1914), 123; Hovaleque, The Deeper Causes of the War (New York, 1916), 144; Vinogradoff, Russia: The Psychology of a Nation (London, [1914]), 3, 9.

European Kultur, not only for herself but also for England and France, against a Muscovite attack. While on a speaking tour of the eastern front in 1916, he gave an address in Warsaw on "The Oriental and Occidental Kultur." Emphasizing the gap between east and west, he claimed that if Russian Kultur triumphed, it meant "certain death" for Europe.²⁵

Seeberg and Deissmann, Harnack's Berlin colleagues, fully concurred. Seeberg berated the "hollowness" and "degeneracy" of Russian Kultur and lamented that his birthplace, the Baltic provinces, lay in the hands of "barbarians." Everywhere Russian influence went, he added, it destroyed Kultur.²⁶ Just before German and Russian negotiators assembled at Brest-Litovsk in December, 1917, he set forth his case for attaching Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania to the Reich. These areas, he argued, enjoyed a western, not Slavic, Kultur, and therefore should be under western rule. He desired German control also over Poland and the Ukraine but conceded that their Kultur was too unlike Germany's to justify incorporating them. Coming close to Harnack's description, he defined western Kultur as consisting of the concept of a free and reflective personality,

²⁵"Von Harnack Defends Attitude of Germany," Chicago Daily News, Jan. 20, 1915; Harnack, "Die morgenländische und die abendländische Kultur," Deutsche Warschauer Zeitung, April 20 and 21, 1916.

²⁶Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 173.

²⁶Deissmann, Presb. Miss. Letter, June 12, 1915.

a society to which the state has given structure and order, and the application of human energy to the mastery of nature. Slavic Kultur, on the other hand, was characterized by unfree personalities controlled by natural impulses, an anarchistic society necessitating despotism, and an aversion to the steady work required to develop natural resources. Within western Kultur, he granted, German traits did differ somewhat from the Latin, but he insisted that their similarities, when compared with eastern Kultur, far outweighed their differences.²⁷

Deissmann used a personal example to explain to Americans the "abyss between Asia and Europe." Having visited a prisoner of war camp, he noted that French prisoners displayed cultural characteristics common to Germans and Frenchmen. On the other hand, most of the Russians were "Asiatic Mohammendans of the Mongolian type" who had the "dull and cruel features of a beastly ferocity in their almost inhuman faces"²⁸--an estimate not far removed from the Hitlerian label "Untermenschen."

While stressing that German Kultur was part of a larger western Kultur threatened by that of the east, the professors also affirmed Germany's individuality within that western family of nations. At the root of the false Kulturkrieg, they held, was England's attempt to force Germany into her partic-

²⁷Seeberg, "Östliche und westliche Kultur," Deutschlands Erneuerung, I (1917), 780-783.

²⁸Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, June 12, 1915.

ular mold. Adding to their distress was the fact that England had the upper hand in this ideological struggle. For one thing, Germany lacked the natural advantages that on the battlefield her central position gave her. England controlled the Reuter and Havas telegraphic news agencies, while Germany had only the Wolff Bureau, which covered merely central and eastern Europe. Moreover, as already mentioned, Britain was mistress of the seas and able to seize the mail, and she had promptly severed Germany's communication with the largest neutral by cutting her Atlantic cable. According to Deissmann, this was one of the most shameful deeds of the war--a Protestant country not letting the land of the Reformation be heard in America!²⁹ Harnack delighted Berliners with the claim that the enemy's false allegations entitled Germany to an extra billion marks in war indemnities.

Alexander Gray, a former Edinburgh professor involved in Allied propaganda, was amused that Harnack "worked himself into paroxysms" over alleged English mendacity, and a British parliamentarian derided him for demanding an extra indemnity for lies at the very time he was promoting the "official falsehood" about the British munitions at Maubeuge.³⁰

²⁹Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Jan. 7, 1915, Oct. 11, 1916, Jan. 8, 1917; Lord Robert Cecil, Why Mail Censorship Is Vital to Britain (London, 1916).

³⁰Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben und was wir noch gewinnen müssen, Rede am 29. September 1914," Deutsche Reden, I, 150; Gray, The Upright Sheaf (London, 1915), 73; J. M. Robertson, The German Idea of the Peace Terms, 18.

Another English advantage, as Troeltsch saw it, was her earlier preparations. Troeltsch gave most of his wartime literary talents to the Kulturkrieg, and he bitterly accused England of having entered the war with intellectual ammunition already at hand, whereas Germany had been caught off guard and had to formulate her counter-barrage gradually. But England's very preparation revealed her guilt, he charged, because while Germany had thought about nothing other than waging a purely defensive military campaign in the west, England had had to disguise her aggressiveness with "an artificial war, a moral Kulturkrieg." For Germany, the ideological battle was a necessary afterthought; for England, it had been malicious forethought.³¹

Allied propaganda usually taxed Germany with three vices: autocracy, militarism, and barbarism. As the title of one book put it, Germany's problem was a combination of Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur (1915), or, as Anatole France told his countrymen on Bastille Day, 1915, the war must continue until "justice shall have conquered iniquity, civilization barbarism, and until the nations are delivered from the monstrous menace of an oppressive militarism."³²

³¹Troeltsch, "Der Kulturkrieg, Rede am 1. Juli 1915," Deutsche Reden, III, 222.

³²Theodore Andrea Cook, Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur (New York, 1915); France, "Address to the Fighters of France," in Dwight E. Watkins and Robert E. Williams (eds.), The Forum of Democracy (Boston, 1917), 39-40.

The German scholars replied that their nation had the right to maintain its own distinct institutions, which sprang from a unique Kultur. At the outset of the conflict, Thomas Mann penned a celebrated essay which rebuffed the charge that Germany was less "civilized" than England and France. Reviving a famous Kantian distinction, he explained that Kultur was "resolution, style, form, bearing, taste," whereas Zivilisation was "reason, enlightenment, softness, politeness, skepticism, dissolution,--intellect /Geist/." Geist was "civil and bourgeois, anti-demonical and anti-heroic" and was the "sworn enemy of the instincts and passions."³³

Seeberg made a similar distinction, defining Kultur as something internal, a spiritual condition, while Zivilisation was an external quality, a certain outward structuring of one's life. He held that Russia's barbarism and England's mercantilism and industrialism, which gave her only technological improvements and a superficial life style, prevented both countries from having real Kultur. All they had was dreams of imperialism. Germany, he argued, had no imperialistic aims; she wanted merely the liberty to develop her particular essence, to offer its benefits to others, and then to let them freely decide whether they preferred English or German Kultur.³⁴

³³Mann, "Gedanken im Kriege," Neue Rund., XXV (1914), 1471, 1484; Kant's point was in his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784).

³⁴Seeberg, "Krieg und Kulturfortschritt, Rede am 15. Januar 1915," in Deutsche Reden, II, 144-145.

Harnack frequently urged his compatriots to cultivate their special virtues. Like the eighteenth-century Lutheran theologian, J. G. Herder, he disdained cosmopolitanism as shallow and vapid and contended that Kultur must express a national character, a Volksgeist. If Germany wanted to be a good fruit, he explained, she must first be a good apple or some other specific variety.³⁵ On several occasions, he stressed the importance of Germany's Kulturkrieg, insisting that though she fought to maintain the morality, humanity, and international law of the entire world, she also fought to preserve the individuality of her Kultur, which the enemy wanted to crush.³⁶

The genius of that Kultur, Harnack held, was evident in the kind of state it had produced. Indulging his ethnocentrism, he informed Bethmann in 1916 that only in Germany had the state developed into the type of social community that did not suppress the distinctiveness, inner freedom, creative power, and responsibility of the individual. He even pandered to the chauvinism of a crowd by making the ridiculous claim that only Germans were willing to die for

³⁵Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben," 155.

³⁶Harnack, "Kulturkrieg im Weltkrieg," handwritten notes in Harnack Nachlass, SBB. As Harnack indicated on the notes, he gave the address in several cities, but it never appeared in print; see Axel von Harnack to Charles E. Bailey, Jan. 30, 1972, and Friedrich Smend, Adolf von Harnack. Verzeichnis seiner Schriften (Leipzig, 1927); Prince Bernhard von Bülow cited the address in his Denkwürdigkeiten, III, 277, and the English propagandist Michael A. Morrison took note of it in his Sidelights on Germany (New York, 1918), 55.

the state, thereby demonstrating that Germany alone had any real Kultur.³⁷ Though continuing to inspire the public, by 1917 he began to caution Bethmann against overplaying Germany's right to uniqueness. By inaugurating internal political reform, he advised, Germany would not only satisfy the legitimate cries of the lower classes but would also take the wind out of the sails of much foreign propaganda. To be sure, Germany should not change her fundamental political conservatism, but she could no longer afford the luxury of representing herself as "the misunderstood oddity" of Europe.³⁸

Holl, too, drew distinctions between German and English ideas about the state, but Deissmann tried to turn the tables on the English by identifying German with American ideals. Germany's social legislation, her universal conscription, and the active participation of both her upper classes and masses in her political life, he claimed, had made her "the strongest democracy" the world had ever seen.³⁹

Troeltsch outdid all his colleagues in glorifying

³⁷Harnack, "Friedensaufgaben und Friedensarbeit, Denkschrift im Sommer 1916 dem Reichskanzler auf Ersuchen eingerichtet," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 280, and "Kulturkrieg im Weltkrieg," handwritten notes in Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

³⁸Harnack, "Das Gebot der Stunde, Eine Denkschrift im Juni 1917 dem Reichskanzler eingerichtet," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 298-302.

³⁹Holl, "Die Bedeutung der grossen Kriege für das religiöse und kirchliche Leben innerhalb des deutschen Protestantismus," Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 303; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Aug. 28, Sept. 11, Dec. 4, 1915, and "Bismarck und sein kämpfendes Volk," Der Tag, April 1, 1915.

Germany's national peculiarities. Rarely mentioning theological, scriptural, or distinctly Christian topics, he immersed himself instead in the political, philosophical, and historical issues. Although when the war was over he regretted that his country had so rigidly maintained her specifically German essence and recommended a new cosmopolitan outlook, during the war he consistently celebrated the presence and profits of that specialness. "We are different from others," he proudly proclaimed.⁴⁰

In broad terms, he explained, the difference between Germany and the other western nations lay in the antithesis between "conservative" and "liberal." There was no absolute line between the two; every nation was an admixture of both, but Germany leaned toward conservatism. This was an anti-individualistic, organic principle, a belief in the intuitive and irrational processes, a denial of the unquestioned validity of "natural law" and the ability of pure reason to deduce political principles for all nations, and a turning away from the democratic-humanitarian-pacifistic outlook. The German manner of thinking recognized the ineradicable basic peculiarities of all nations, which were not to be explained rationally.⁴¹

⁴⁰Troeltsch, "Naturrecht und Humanität in der Weltpolitik," lecture of 1922, in Troeltsch, Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa, ed. by Hans Baron, 4; Troeltsch, "Die deutsche Idee von der Freiheit," Neue Rund., XXVII (1916), 54; see also an analysis of Troeltsch's wartime political thought in G.M. Schwarz, "Deutschland und Westeuropa bei Ernst Troeltsch," Hist. Ztschr., CXCI (1960), 510-540.

⁴¹Troeltsch, "Konservativ-Liberal," I and II, Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 647-651, 659-666.

In particular, the difference lay in the German conception of freedom, as related to the state. Troeltsch frequently insisted that there was no abstract, pure idea of freedom in itself. All conceptions of freedom had been historically conditioned, and Germany must remain true to her social and political heritage just as France, England, and America must remain true to theirs. Granted, the German idea of freedom was distinct, but so was that of each of the other western powers. The French conception differed as much from the English as the latter did from the American. Refusing to be forced upon a Procrustean bed of another nation's heritage, Germany demanded the right to develop in accordance with her own historical roots.⁴²

In France, Troeltsch argued, the idea of freedom was a bourgeois creation. It meant freedom from royalty and the church, and it rested upon a rationalism that posited the equality of all men. France's separation of church and state in 1905 made her more truly liberal than her English partner, which still had a state church. To the English, freedom meant the inviolability of the individual and freedom of faith and opinion from state control. The American conception of freedom rested largely on the doctrine of government non-interference in business and the right to worship as one pleased. While all these conceptions differed in detail, they did have

⁴²Troeltsch, "Die deutsche Idee von der Freiheit," 61-65, 74.

a common denominator. Reiterating a famous distinction made by Treitschke in 1861, he noted that freedom in one way or another meant freedom from the state. The German idea, on the other hand, was expressed in Frederick the Great's self-appellation of being "the first servant of the state." Freedom was the "free, dutiful, conscious devotion to the . . . whole."⁴³ The German state was not the sum total of the individuals who inhabited it. No, it was, as Hegel had taught, the product of history and the gift of God. Like Harnack, Troeltsch insisted that there was no abstract Kultur in and of itself. It existed "only in the state and through the state."⁴⁴

Germans had been aware of their distinctive manner of thinking for some time, Troeltsch stated, but only the war had set it in bold relief. In other words, the war had not arisen out of the ideas, but a sharpening of the ideas had arisen out of the war. Borrowing from the Swedish Germanophile Rudolf Kjellén, he proclaimed that the "Ideas of 1914" stood in stark contrast to the "Ideas of 1789." Whereas the French Revolution had found its ideals in the "isolated individual and his everywhere uniform reason," the German

⁴³Ibid., Troeltsch, "Konservativ-Liberal," II, Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 663; Heinrich von Treitschke, "Die Freiheit," Historische und Politische Aufsätze, III (4th ed., Leipzig, 1871), 16.

⁴⁴Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte, 22.

ideology stressed the "life of the folk-whole and the personal pledging for and the alignment in this."⁴⁵

Nevertheless, Troeltsch noted in a strongly apologetic tone, Germany was in the process of liberalization along western lines. Through her social legislation, her national army, and her public schools, she was progressing toward democratization. Outside observers, however, must not expect too much too soon. Whereas France and England had been unified nation-states for some time, Germany had suffered the setbacks of the Thirty Years War. She was the youngest of the large European powers. Give her time, Troeltsch asked. She did not want the "gift" of freedom imported from abroad, ~~least~~ of all imposed on the basis of a military defeat. Moreover, the other western powers needed to recognize that even when Germany did achieve democratization, her form would be different from theirs. All that she wanted was the right to be faithful to her historically-conditioned selfhood, as she in turn recognized other nations' distinctions.⁴⁶

Such protestations hardly satisfied the Germanophobes. Among the most caustic was Abbé E. Wetterlé, a Reichstag deputy from Alsace who had fled to France in July, 1914, to avoid indictment for treason. He continued to bemoan the "fiction" of German parliamentarianism and the frightfulness

⁴⁵Troeltsch, "Die Ideen von 1914," Neue Rund., XXVIII (1917), 607, 618. Kjellén was Professor of Constitutional Law at Uppsala and member of the Swedish Riksdag; see his Die Ideen von 1914, trans. by Carl Koch (Leipzig, 1915.)

⁴⁶Troeltsch, "Der Ansturm der westlichen Demokratie," in Die deutsche Freiheit, 109-111, and "Der Geist der deutschen Kultur," in Otto Hintze et al. (eds.), Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, 88-89.

of her militarism, as revealed in the Zabern Affair of 1913. Another critic was the American war correspondent Carl Ackerman, who concluded from his stay in Germany that the United States must force her to introduce popular rule.⁴⁷

While explaining the German idea of freedom and of the state, the theologians also responded to the charges of militarism and barbarism. Thomas Mann proudly admitted that a "very deep and irrational" element within the German soul was its "'militarism,' its soldier-like morality,--an element of the demonical and heroic." Foreign observers were horrified. The French Protestant pastor Paul Sabatier lamented that German Kultur was "naught save the worship of the sword and the golden calf," and H. G. Wells described German militarism as "that trampling, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe that has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years."⁴⁸ On the other hand, the Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw and the Anglo-American author Norman Angell protested that England as well as Germany was infected with "Prussian militarism." Another notable intellectual who refused to jump on the bandwagon of abuse was the Polish historian Lewis B. Namier of Oxford. Insisting

⁴⁷Wetterlé, Behind the Scenes in the Reichstag. Sixteen Years of Parliamentary Life in Germany, trans. by George F. Lees (New York, 1918), and Alsace and Lorraine on the Eve of Deliverance (Paris, 1917), 12; Carl Ackerman, Germany, the Next Republic? (New York, 1917), *passim*.

⁴⁸Mann, "Gedanken im Kriege," Neue Rund., XXV (1914), 1484; Sabatier, The Ideals of France (London, 1915, orig. in The London Times Jan. 22, 1915); Wells, "The Fourth of August, Europe at War," Current History, I (1914), 87.

that militarism was a matter of national ethics, he declared that Britain had no right to interfere in the private affairs of the German nation.⁴⁹ The theologians reacted by deploring the Allies' attempt to exorcise the demon of militarism from the body of German Kultur, by defending the virtues of "democratic militarism," and, since England avoided conscription until 1916, by disparaging her soldiers as hirelings, similar to the mercenaries of the early modern era.

The Germans vigorously protested the Allies' artificial cleavage between their supposedly abhorrent militarism and their otherwise admirable cultural traits. In August, 1914, Harnack and thirty other German dignitaries endorsed The Truth About Germany, which tried to convince Americans that their appreciation of Kant and Goethe should make them realize that the German soul was not satisfied merely with "military drill and servile obedience." No, Germans were soldiers because they had to be, the booklet argued; otherwise, German civilization would have been swept off the earth. Two months later, the ill-starred "Appeal of the Ninety-Three to the Civilized World" ended on the same note, proclaiming that: "It is not true, as our enemies hypocritically affirm, that the struggle against our so-called militarism is not a struggle against our Kultur." "The German army and the German

⁴⁹Shaw, "Common Sense About the War," Current History, I (1914), 13-23; Angell, Prussianism and Its Destruction, (London, 1914), 74-100; Namier, Germany and Eastern Europe (London, 1915), xiv-xvi, 113-128.

people are one," the ninety-three insisted, for without German militarism German Kultur would have perished long ago.⁵⁰ Later that same month, October, 1914, a manifesto exclusively on the subject of militarism was circulated among Germany's 4,000 professors. Some of the savants were at the front and unable to sign, but over 3,000 academicians at home endorsed it--even Martin Rade. Protesting against the English allegation that the scientific spirit was opposed to "Prussian militarism," they affirmed that "the same spirit that rules the German army pervades the whole German nation, for both are one and we are part of it." In November, 1914, twenty-nine clerics and theologians took up the chant by informing British churchmen that what God had joined together in Germany, the Allies ought not to try to put asunder.⁵¹

Not only collectively but individually the theologians defined and defended their military institutions. Baumgarten contended that there was nothing irreconcilable between the spirit of free inquiry and the spirit of militarism; no, they went hand in hand. Harnack tried to assure Americans

⁵⁰The Truth About Germany, 1-2; "An die Kulturwelt," Berl. Tagebl., Oct. 4, 1914.

⁵¹Erklärung der Hochschullehrer des deutschen Reiches, Germ. and Engl. text (Berlin, 1914); Karl Axenfeld et al., "Antwort auf die 42 englischen Kirchenmänner," Nov. 20, 1914, Die Eiche, III (Jan., 1915), 74. The declaration of the 3,000 professors was drafted by the Berlin philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and its signatures collected by Seeberg's friend Dietrich Schäfer, Berlin Prof. of History; see Chpt. II, footnote 44.

that militarism was the best means of instilling in young people a sense of duty, a love of order, and a social spirit.⁵² Julius Kaftan reminded a patriotic assembly that militarism was nothing more than "the nation in arms" and that if Germany's foes wanted to "save" her from the supposed disease, they would have to exterminate the nation itself. With similar gusto, Carl Mirbt publicly belittled the spirit of England's "mercenaries" and praised conscription as the "strongest guarantee" of peace.⁵³

Deissmann elaborated on this idea when trying to correct the distorted image of German militarism in America. Paradoxically, he claimed, Germany's universal military conscription predisposed her not to belligerency but to peacefulness. A nation whose army consisted of the finest of her own flesh and blood would be much less prone to precipitate a war frivolously than a country which planned to fight with the "scum" of mercenaries, colonial troops, and illiterates. England's lack of conscription was precisely what made her the most bellicose power in the world, he argued, whereas Germany's "democratic militarism" gave her leaders a grave sense of responsibility and restraint. He also cautioned against translating "universal conscription" allgemeine

⁵²Baumgarten, "Deutscher Militarismus?" Evangel. Freiheit., XIV (1914), 389; "Von Harnack Defends Attitude of Germany," Chicago Daily News, Jan. 20, 1915.

⁵³Kaftan, Vom Jahr noch--und Heute?, 9; Mirbt, Kampf um unsere Kolonien, 2-4, 9.

Wehrpflicht as "compulsory service." When one looked at the letter of the law, he admitted, compulsory service Zwangsdienst was in force, but observing the spirit of the law, one saw that those who had to serve did so with a free will, and furthermore, from among those exempt from service had come twenty army corps of volunteers. In December, 1914, Deissmann's wife presented Herbert Adams Gibbons, an American war correspondent in Berlin, two toy soldiers as a Christmas gift for his children, and Deissmann assured Americans that German militarism was no more dangerous than those playthings which inside Gibbons' luggage had pierced the Allied defenses and entered Paris. At the same time, he sent his students in the field the gift of a letter, which sought to encourage them by extolling the manifesto of the 3,000 professors as a "joyous, open confession" of the bond between militarism and science, a bond which assured Germany's future.⁵⁴

Troeltsch devoted an entire address to praising Germany's "people's army." The aristocratic-feudal army of Frederick the Great, he explained, had become a national and "democratic" body through the addition of the popular element introduced with the Scharnhorst reforms. The so-called anti-thesis of Weimar and Potsdam did not exist, because the army was "flesh of our flesh and spirit of our spirit." He admitted

⁵⁴Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, June 12, July 31, Aug. 28, Sept. 11, Dec. 18, 1915, and "Ver Sacrum" and "Das Kriegsesemester: Ein Sendbrief an die Studenten im Feld," Deutscher Schwertsegen, 18-20, 35.

that to some degree the military organization colored Germany's entire civil life, but like Harnack he argued that that relationship brought the whole nation the blessings of obedience, discipline, health, strength, resolution, and energy. Moreover, even though the German spirit was not a "barracks' spirit," a militaristic spirit was better than a "merchant spirit," which waged war with hired soldiers and a paid press.⁵⁵

In November, 1918, however, with Germany in defeat, Troeltsch sang a different tune. He anonymously contended that in spite of the national character of the army, it had actually been identical with the officer corps. Not only had Germany endured a military dictatorship during the war, but she had for some time lain in the grips of "militarism," which was a political and not a military institution, reflecting the biases of the ruling class, which monopolized political power by means of the Prussian three-class voting system. In 1917-1918, Troeltsch had agitated in vain for the reform of the Prussian franchise, and he blamed Germany's defeat and revolution on the obstinacy and shortsightedness of the ruling class. Unfortunately, he concluded, the revolution had been the only means through which the "bourgeois-democratic spirit" could realize itself.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Troeltsch, Unser Volksheer, 10-18.

⁵⁶Troeltsch, "Das Ende des Militarismus," Nov. 16, 1918, Spektator-Briefe, ed. by Hans Baron, 1-14.

Allied propaganda usually intertwined tirades against German "militarism" with harangues against her "barbarism." Henry van Dyke, the American minister to Holland, berated the "spectacled barbarism" of the "predatory Potsdam gang" and pictured the German drive westward as "the werewolf at large." When Germans denounced Russia as barbaric, G. K. Chesterton lashed out against "the barbarism of Berlin." Distinguishing between "positive" barbarians, that is, the culturally advanced who nevertheless wanted to destroy ideas common to western civilization, and "negative" ones, or backward peoples lacking the refinement and technological skills of the modern age, he argued that the "veneered vandals" of Germany were greater sinners than a primitive people.⁵⁷

The Germans fired back with charges of Allied provincialism. Troeltsch held it only natural for the English, who regarded soldiers as hirelings and war as merely a "line of business," to decry the furor teutonicus and misconstrue Germany military discipline as "Prussian barbarism." When Deissmann heard that the French ambassador in London had berated German intellectuals for proclaiming a "religion of barbarism," he predicted that what the enemy called "barbarism"

⁵⁷Van Dyke, Fighting for Peace (New York, 1917), 85; Chesterton, The Barbarism of Berlin (London, 1914), and "How England Came To Be In It," Current History, I (1914), 108-125, and The Autobiography of G. K. Chesterton (New York, 1936), 258-259.

history would one day call "primitive strength," and he rejoiced that the war had indeed revealed the "religion of strength."⁵⁸

Several incidents had helped to foster the image of Germans as barbarians. In 1900, when the Kaiser had called upon his soldiers to face the "Yellow Peril" in the Far East, he had encouraged them to be awe-inspiring as "Huns." During the Anglo-German debt-collecting sortie into Venezuela in 1902, Rudyard Kipling had publicly scorned his country's cooperation with "the shameless Hun." Therefore, when the European war broke out, Germanophobes had a ready-made label. The English press baron, Alfred Harmsworth, better known as Lord Northcliffe, applauded the Belgian army that had arrested "the rush of the Huns," and Cloudesley Brereton, an English authority on comparative pedagogy, foresaw the outcome of the war as either "a great spiritual Renaissance or the return of the Huns." Portugese scholar Henrique Lopes de Mendonça added a more optimistic note. In May, 1917, he assured an audience in Lisbon that history repeated itself, and even as the defeat of Attila the Hun at the battle of Châlons near the Marne had spelled the end of Hunnish conquest in western Europe, so the German reversal at the Marne meant that the same fate was in store for "the modern Hun." The most clever twist was given by Jean Massart,

⁵⁸Troeltsch, Unser Volksheer, 14; Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion, 305.

a Vice-Director of the Royal Academy of Belgium, who said that the German motto ought to be "Gott mit Huns."⁵⁹ It was small wonder that one German theologian complained that the good-natured German Michael had been transformed into a bloodthirsty monster, German Kultur into barbarism, and the "Peace Kaiser" William II into Attila the Hun.⁶⁰

As a revelation of German ruthlessness, the Allies cited not only the Kaiser's own description of his soldiers but the official German War Book of 1902. Entitled Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, the manual summarized the methods of warfare as "cunning and violence" and justified "every means of war without which the object of war cannot be obtained." Critics in England, France, and America recoiled at this official endorsement of Schrecklichkeit or "frightfulness" and charged that it had found its most heinous manifestation in the German march through Belgium.⁶¹

⁵⁹Kipley, "The Rowers" (1902), cited in Oron J. Hale, The Great Illusion (New York, 1971), 238; Northcliffe, At the War (New York, 1916), 219; Brereton, Who is Responsible? Armageddon and After! (New York, 1914), viii; Lopes de Mendonça, Moral Aspects of the European War (London, 1917), 6; Massart, Belgians Under the German Eagle, 335.

⁶⁰Hans von Schubert, Die Weihe des Krieges, 24. The German Michael was an innocent-looking, dreamy-eyed peasant who was the symbol of Germany, as "Uncle Sam" and "John Bull" stood for America and England; he should not be confused with the archangel Michael, symbol of Germany's fighting spirit.

⁶¹The War Book of the German General Staff, trans. with a Critical Introduction by J. H. Morgan (New York, 1915); Gilbert Parker, The World in the Crucible, 327-328; Prussian Militarism at Work. A Letter by the Right Rev. Dr. Cleary (London, 1917), 1-5; Charles Andler, "Frightfulness" in Theory and Practice As Compared With Franco-British War Usages, trans. by Bernard Miall (London, 1916); Morton Prince, The American Versus the German View of War (London, 1915), 40-44.

The alleged rape of Belgium was painted in picture and word. Louis Raemaekers, a relatively unknown Dutch artist, was catapulted to world fame by his sketches of the atrocity stories. He highlighted the Germans' spiked helmets and the inscription "Gott mit uns" on their belt buckles, and he supplied such incriminating titles as "Kultur has passed here" and "Kreuzland, Kreuzland über alles." Arthur Conan Doyle lamented that the German terror had been equalled only by the Spanish fury at Antwerp three and one half centuries earlier. The Canadian novelist Sir Gilbert Parker, who disseminated British propaganda in America, charged that Germany had "sinned against the light" in her barbarous methods of warfare, and the British publicist Sir Theodore Andrea Cook equated German cruelty with that of the anti-Christ, bemoaning that every Prussian forehead bore "the mark of the beast."⁶² Maurice Maeterlinck likened his nation's heroism to that of the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae and praised Belgium for having saved western civilization by throwing herself in the path of the "barbarians." G. K. Chesterton claimed that Belgium had been turned into "a desert where dwell demoniacs" and that the suffering of the Belgians could not be pictured in terms of a Christian hell but only in those of "the infernal arabesques" of Chinese

⁶²Raemaekers' Cartoon History of the War, ed. by J. Murray Allison, 2 vols. (New York, 1918-1919); Doyle, The German War (London, 1914), 85; Parker, World in the Crucible, 343; Cook, The Mark of the Beast (London, 1917), xxii.

and Tartar history. Like Maeterlinck, he assigned a sacrificial quality to Belgium's agony. Comparing her afflictions with those of the "suffering servant" in Isaiah, he gave thanks that "by her stripes we are healed."⁶³

Specific charges against the Germans included mass executions, rape, and cutting off women's breasts and children's hands. The Swedish explorer and Germanophile Sven Hedin, however, travelled with the German armies on the western front and swore that he saw not a single instance of German cruelty, and some American war correspondents corroborated his testimony when they reported that after extensive investigation they could not find a single mutilated Belgian child.⁶⁴ Other friends of Germany retorted that the rumors stemmed from the Belgian practice of cutting off the hands of rebellious natives in the Congo.⁶⁵

The German government admitted only to the summary execution of Belgian civilians, as legitimate reprisal for their unlawful belligerence. In reply to an official report of

⁶³Maeterlinck, "Pro Patria," I, speech at Milan, Dec. 2, 1914, Les débris de la guerre, 31-32; Chesterton, "The Martyrdom of Belgium," in Charles Sarolea, How Belgium Saved Europe (Philadelphia, 1915), 226-227.

⁶⁴Hedin, With the German Armies in the West, authorized trans. by H. G. de Waltersdorff (London, 1915), v; Albert R. Williams, In the Claws of the German Eagle (New York, 1917), 199-203; Horace Green, The Log of a Non-Combatant (Boston, 1915), 156.

⁶⁵John K. Turner, Shall It Be Again?, 206; Herman Ridder, Hyphenations (New York, 1915), 228-229.

the Belgian government, Germany issued a White Book on May 10, 1915, which argued that the resistance of the franc-tireur civilians had not met the qualifications for a legitimate people's war prescribed by the Hague Convention of 1907. The franc-tireurs had therefore forfeited their claim to be treated as prisoners of war--they were "assassins." Even women and children, charged the White Book, had emasculated, disemboweled, and gouged out the eyes of wounded German soldiers; consequently, swift punishment had been meted out.⁶⁶ Two days after the publication of the German defense, the "Bryce Report" appeared simultaneously in America and England. Viscount James Bryce, former English ambassador to America, had presided over a committee appointed to investigate the alleged German outrages. Seven men, including the historians Sir Frederick Pollock and H. A. L. Fisher, reviewed testimonies from Belgian refugees and examined diaries from dead and captured German soldiers. Painting black in black, they concluded that "murder, lust,

⁶⁶The Case of Belgium in the Present War. An Account of the Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium and of the Laws of War on Belgian Territory (New York, 1914); Official Commission of the Belgian Government, Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium (London, 1915); Germany, Foreign Office, The Belgian People's War. A Violation of International Law (New York, 1915); A. A. A. Struycken, "The German White Book on the War in Belgium," in The War of Democracy. The Allies' Statement (Garden City, 1917), 201-241; Fernand Passelecq, "Le troisième livre gris belge. Réponse au dernier livre blanc allemand," Revue des deux mondes, XXXII (1916), 902-919.

and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war between civilized nations during the last three centuries." Up to that time, hardly anyone of consequence in America had taken the horror stories seriously, but Bryce's illustrious name bestowed formal sanction on the image of the German fiend and convinced some of the doubting Thomases. As postwar studies have shown, however, the report was grossly exaggerated and was itself, as historian H. C. Peterson concluded, "one of the worst atrocities of the war."⁶⁷

The German theologians rushed to the rescue of their beloved army. The immediate object of the "Appeal to the Civilized World" was to refute Allied allegations. Harnack, Seeberg, Deissmann, Herrmann, and Adolf von Schlatter were among those who insisted that only in cases of "bitter self-defense" had "the life or property of a single Belgian civilian" been molested but that "assassins" had received their just punishment. Rade and Schian also sprang to their army's defense. Schian insisted that though some German soldiers might have acted inhumanely, in reaction to the Belgian women who fought like "hyenas," the army as a whole was above such

⁶⁷Great Britain, Foreign Office, Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages Appointed by His Britannic Majesty's Government and Presided over by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce (New York, 1915), 61; H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War. The Campaign against American Neutrality 1914-1917 (Norman, Okla., 1939), 58; see also James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919 (New Haven, 1941), 200-209, who concurs with Peterson; and Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1900-1917 (New York, 1954), 147-148.

behavior. Rade initially tried to soften the accusations against both Belgians and Germans. After one month of hostilities, he told his readers that German civilians would no doubt have endeavored to defend their homeland as valiantly and violently as the Belgians had purportedly done, and he noted that the Hague Convention of 1907 recognized under certain circumstances both an organized and unorganized people's resistance. Accused of exonerating the Belgians, he replied that he had never justified atrocities but merely acknowledged the right of popular resistance. As neutral newspapers continued to report German atrocities, he became more protective. At first, he gave credence to some of the alleged Belgian brutalities, and later he denied the allegations of mass German injustices. With millions of men in the field, he conceded, a few of them might have committed isolated crimes, but he insisted that he knew his compatriots too well to think them capable of the "fables" of large-scale outrages.⁶⁸ As the war progressed, Harnack and Deissmann retreated from the blanket exoneration in the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three" and admitted that individual German soldiers might have committed unprovoked brutalities. But Deissmann told his readers that German transgressions would not begin

⁶⁸"An die Kulturwelt," Berl. Tagebl., Oct. 4, 1914; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 601-602; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 815, 845, and XXIX (1915), 350, and "Deutsches Greuel," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1009, and "Die Neutralen und wir," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 151-152.

to compare with Russia's shameful deeds in East Prussia and Poland; nor should they forget England's atrocities: the havoc wrought on the mission fields and the starvation effected by the blockade.⁶⁹

World opinion was again directed toward Belgium when the Germans executed at Brussels an English nurse, Edith Cavell. Working in a Red Cross hospital there when the war broke out, she continued her services after the Germans captured the Belgian capital in August, 1914. While ministering to both German and Allied wounded, she secretly harbored English soldiers and helped them find guides who escorted them to neutral Holland, whence they returned to England. German authorities discovered her part in this "underground railroad" and arrested her in August, 1915. At her trial on October 7, she admitted her complicity and was convicted of "conducting soldiers to the enemy." In accordance with German military law, she was sentenced on October 11 to be executed the following day. The American minister at Brussels appealed for a commutation of the sentence or at least a stay of execution, but the military governor of Brussels, General Traugott von Sauberzweig, refused, and she was shot on October 12.⁷⁰

⁶⁹For Harnack, see Max Planck to H. A. Lorentz, March, 1916 in Amersterdam Algemeen Handelsblad, April 11, 1916, and "German Scholars Explain Their Manifesto," Current History, IV (1916), 876; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Sept. 18, 1915 and Dec. 20, 1918.

⁷⁰For details of the case, see the most recent biography, Rowland Ryder, Edith Cavell (New York, 1975).

World opinion was outraged. Viscount James Bryce and others labelled the deed a crime, but it was worse--it was a blunder. Miss Cavell, a paragon of virtue, unlike her later counterpart, Mata Hari, became a heroine overnight. Hardly any Germanophobe missed the opportunity to invoke her revered name. A Florence Nightingale and Joan of Arc rolled into one, she provided Allied propagandists with a martyr and a saint. England held memorial services; Americans struck a medal in her honor; Allied soldiers charged German lines breathing her name. "Her blood," proclaimed an English publicist, "like that of Abel, crieth from the ground."⁷¹ Indeed, the clamor it evoked drowned out the quiet voice of Henry M. Gwatkin, Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Cambridge, who admitted that since the Germans were "within their rights," the Cavell case was "not so very bad." When the war ended, the return of her body to England was front-page news, and a statue was erected in Charing Cross to perpetuate her memory.⁷² The roar of publicity that Miss Cavell

⁷¹Statement of Viscount Bryce," in Arnold J. Toynbee, The Belgian Deportations (London [1917]), 13; Sir Theodore Cook, Mark of the Beast, 317.

⁷²Gwatkin, Britain's Case Against Germany. A Letter to a Neutral (London, 1917), 5; "Nation's Homage to Miss Cavell," American Daily Mail, May 15, 1919. A brief sampling of the enormous Cavell literature includes: Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence with United States Ambassador respecting the Execution of Miss Cavell at Brussels (London, 1915), Miscell., no. 17 (1915), Papers by command, Cd. 8013; James M. Beck, "The Case of Edith Cavell," Current History, III (1915), 482-484; La vie et la mort de Miss Edith Cavell, with a Preface by Paul Painlevé (Paris, 1915); Maeterlinck, "Edith Cavell," address in Paris, Dec. 18, 1915, Les débris de la guerre, 197-205; "Thrown to the Swine" and "The Martyred Nurse," sketches in Raemaekers' Cartoon History of the War, II, ed. by J. Murray Allison, 8-11; Brand Whitlock, Belgium, II (New York, 1919), 81-159.

received makes the silence of the German theologians especially noticeable. In this instance, they were apparently too embarrassed to defend their government.

Belgium's "martyrdom" continued with the deportation of 66,000 of her workers to Germany. In October, 1916, the Governor-General of Belgium, General Moritz von Bissing, acquiesced in the demands of German industrialists, led by Hugo Stinnes, for an increased labor supply, and the compulsory deportations were carried out during the next four months. The Belgian poet Emile Cammaerts lamented that whereas Attila had listened to Pope Leo's entreaties and spared Rome, the Germans turned a deaf ear to the pleas of the Primate of Belgium, Cardinal Mercier.⁷³

Another infamous deportation was that of two Belgian historians, Henri Pirenne and Paul Frédéricq. In 1916, when they refused to accept the transformation of the University of Ghent into a purely Flemish institution, they were sent to Germany and interned with other civilians in regular detention camps. Partially owing to the intervention of Harnack and Friedrich Meinecke, they were subsequently transferred to the university town of Jena, where they were given

⁷³Jules Destrée, The Deportation of Belgian Workers (London, 1917); Memorandum of the Belgian Government on the Deportations and Forced Labor of the Belgian Civil Population ordered by the German Government (London, 1917); Fernand Passelecq, Les déportations belges à la lumière des documents allemands (Paris, 1917); Gaston Raphael, Hugo Stinnes: Der Mensch, Sein Werk, Sein Wirken (Berlin, 1925), 96-99; Emile Cammaerts, Through the Iron Bars (London, 1917), 46; Cardinal Mercier, Pastorals, Letters, and Allocutions 1914-1917 (New York, 1917), 145-196.

substantial privileges. When Governor-General Bissing finally opened the "Flamingant" university in October, 1916, its new faculty included the Dutch scholar J. H. Labberton, who had applauded Seeberg's defense of social Darwinism and had justified the invasion of Belgium as morally consistent with a state's duty of self-protection. Always eager to capitalize on the testimony of a neutral, Deissmann proudly pointed to Labberton's commendations.⁷⁴

Nor did German "barbarism" stop at the water's edge. The sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, made the horrors of the Bryce Report, published one week later, all the more believable. The English naval authority, Archibald Hurd, accused the Germans of "murder at sea," and Harvard Professor of Philosophy Josiah Royce declared that the deed showed that Germany bore the mark of Cain.⁷⁵ Yet, the theologians offered not a word of censure against their government. In fact, three days after the event, Baumgarten assured a Berlin assembly that, since Germany was forced to wage war with "cruelty, ruthlessness, and the employment of every conceivable device," anyone who could not overcome his sorrow for

⁷⁴Kristoffer Nyrop, The Imprisonment of the Ghent Professors (London, 1917); Oscar E. Millard and Auguste Vierset, Burgomaster Max (London, 1936), 262; Whitlock, Belgium, II, 243-244; Friedrich Meinecke to Harnack, May 29, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; J. H. Labberton, Belgium and Germany, trans. by W. E. Leonard (Chicago, 1916), 14; Deissmann, "Jahreswende des Weltkriegs," Inneres Aufgebot, 119; James W. Garner, International Law and the World War, II, 226, footnote 3.

⁷⁵Hurd, Murder at Sea (London, [1916]); Royce, The Duties of Americans in the Present War, address of Jan. 30, 1916, (priv. printed, 1916), 6.

the incident and approve it "from the bottom of his heart" was not a true German. With simultaneous horror and glee, Germanophobes dangled Baumgarten's statement before the world as singularly indicative of Germany's disregard for human life.⁷⁶ Schian, Rade, and Deissmann likewise defended Germany's action. They blamed the ship's authorities and its passengers for disregarding the warning in American newspapers and accused the British of a cowardly attempt to use innocent civilians as cover for the transport of munitions. Rade also surmised that the munitions had done less damage in causing the ship to sink so rapidly than had they arrived at their destination. Deissmann took most of a Weekly Letter to justify the incident to Americans. Labelling every British ship that left America with war material a "floating hell" and every attempt to protect that material with civilian passengers as "diabolical," he dismissed the protest that the ship had been sunk without warning as hypocritical, affirming that the newspaper notice was warning enough. "In order to save dear souls," he explained, "we sank deadly goods," which was consistent with the Pauline teaching: "If any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel (I Timothy 5:8)." It was useless, he argued, to try to

⁷⁶Baumgarten, "Der Krieg und der Bergpredigt, Rede am 10. Mai 1915," Deutsche Reden, III, 132; William Archer, (ed.), Gems (?) of German Thought, 186 and back cover, and The Pirate's Progress (New York, 1918), 36-37; Henry van Dyke, Fighting for Peace, 194; J. Selden Willmore, The Great Crime and Its Moral (New York, [1917], 204; Munroe Smith (ed.), Out of Their Own Mouths (New York, 1917, 68; Wallace Notestein and Elmer E. Stoll (eds.), Conquest and Kultur. Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words (Washington, D.C., 1918), 32, 37.

distinguish between "civilized" and "uncivilized" methods of warfare, and to isolate single incidents from the casual nexus in which they occurred was a "devilish trick of unparalleled hypocrisy." Acts of war were like "unbroken links of a chain, awful! yes, but inevitable." If Americans reflected upon General Sherman's "march to the sea," he added, they would find the proper standard by which to judge acts like the Lusitania affair.⁷⁷

The theologians never veered from their approval of submarine warfare. They contended that it was just as moral as England's blockade and more merciful, because sudden death was preferable to slow starvation. In the early weeks of the struggle, Harnack and Mirbt publicly sang the praises of U-9, which sank three British ships within an hour. Seeberg was a U-boat enthusiast and was exasperated when Bethmann yielded to American pressure after the Sussex affair of March, 1916. "Out with the U-boats" was his slogan. In the spring of that year, his Berlin colleague Dietrich Schäfer collected 90,000 signatures in support of relentless submarine warfare against England--to the dismay of Rade, who bewailed such "U-boat fanatics." At the end of the year, the U-boats were better prepared and public opinion more favorable to their use than in 1914, and therefore, when Seeberg believed that his government had failed to capitalize on these factors and on the

⁷⁷Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 281-283; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 408; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, July 31 and Oct 2, 1915.

contrary had issued its famous Peace Note, he was outraged. Only at the end of January, 1917, when the government announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, did he recover his hopes.⁷⁸ Harnack suggested to Bethmann that he soften the announcement by simultaneously offering to restore Belgium, but he did not question the morality or necessity of the measure. On the contrary, in May he was publicly doing his bit by berating President Wilson for harshly condemning the U-boat but only mildly protesting the British blockade, which threatened women and children. Germany, he declared, had to repay "like with like." A few days later, Troeltsch similarly insisted that the submarine was Germany's only means of salvation against England's stranglehold. By June, however, the promised six-month knockout blow was faltering before the convoy system, but Harnack's greater anxiety over Germany's domestic unrest prompted him to urge Bethmann to place more emphasis on the reform of the Prussian franchise than the U-boat campaign. On July 6, Matthias Erzberger informed the Reichstag Main Committee of the campaign's failure, and the same day, Rade lamented that Germany's expectations of the U-boat had been too high and that it made her the odium generis humani. The

⁷⁸Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben," 152; Mirbt, Kampf um unsere Kolonien, 20; Seeberg to Nathanael Bonwetsch, June 8, 1916 and Feb. 15, 1917, and to Friedrich Lezius, Dec. 26, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 183; Rade to Harnack, Aug. 26, 1916, Rade Nachlass, UBM.

fanatical Friedrich Lezius, on the other hand, was still advocating an all-out submarine attack as late as November 1, 1918. Conservative and liberal theologians alike, however, had no complaints about the ethics of submarine warfare. Rade and Harnack questioned only its efficiency, expediency, and effect of world opinion.⁷⁹

Further evidence of Germany's barbarism, the Allies maintained, was her treatment of prisoners of war and civilians interned in Germany. The British became especially alarmed about reports of maltreatment, and in March, 1915, the American ambassador in Germany, James Gerard, secured permission to inspect the German camps on the understanding that the American ambassador in England would examine the condition of German prisoners there. Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, the Berlin pastor who had worked hard for Anglo-German friendship prior to the war, tried to implement Gerard's idea by establishing a German civilian commission to inspect the camps. He believed that if churchmen attested to the falsity of foreign rumors, Germany's reputation abroad would be enhanced. He asked Harnack to support his plan, but

⁷⁹Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin 1901-1919, 222; Harnack, "Wilsons Botschaft und die deutsche Freiheit," address of May, 1917, and Troeltsch, "Der Ansturm der westlichen Demokratie," address of May, 1917, both in Die deutsche Freiheit, 8, 79-80; Harnack, "Das Gebot der Stunde, Eine Denkschrift im Juni 1917 dem Reichskanzler eingerichtet," Erforschetes und Erlebtes, 299-301; Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg, 251-257; Rade to Harnack, July 6, 1917, Rade Nachlass, UBM; Lezius to Seeberg, Aug. 29, 1916 and Nov. 1, 1918, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. For Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz' passionate defense of submarine warfare, see his Erinnerungen (Leipzig, 1919), 340-386.

the latter refused. Not yet having mellowed into his more conciliatory position of 1917, he held that such a commission was superfluous and smacked of imitating foreigners. He insisted that the organ of justice and order in Germany was the state and that its officials did not need to be checked by "amateurs." Germany, he argued, had tried too long to ape English and American concepts and had already made too many concessions to their political outlook; it was high time that they came to appreciate the efficiency of German Kultur.⁸⁰

Siegmund-Schultze's inspection plan fell by the wayside, but at the end of 1914 a Service Committee for the Spiritual Care of Prisoners was created. Its Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish divisions distributed religious literature and held worship services in the camps. Two Göttingen theologians, Carl Stange and Nathanael Bonwetsch, ministered in the camp outside their city. Born in Russia, Bonwetsch was able to conduct services for the Russian Orthodox prisoners, and Stange went beyond providing spiritual care by insisting on better nutrition, improved hygienic conditions, a lending library, and study classes for the men. In his camp office, Stange spent two hours each day consulting with prisoners who asked to see him. His labor of love did not go unnoticed;

⁸⁰ Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in Germany (London, 1915), Miscell., no. 19 (1915), Papers by command, Cd. 8108; Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 117-146; Siegmund-Schultze to Harnack, April 27 and Oct. 23, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Harnack to Siegmund-Schultze, May 1, 1915, copy in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK.

Ambassador Gerard, his inspectors, and a representative of the international YMCA all praised his work and rated Göttingen as the best camp in Germany. Stange's own townsmen, however, thought he was overzealous and demonstrated their disfavor by painting his house red, white, and blue--the colors of France and England.⁸¹

Deissmann pointed out to Americans that Germany had confined British male civilians of military age living within her borders only in response to Britain's interning of German civilians living there. One of his most awkward wartime experiences was visiting the English translator of his works, Lionel R. M. Strachan, in the internment camp at Ruhleben, outside of Berlin. Offsetting this, however, was his pride in noting that Germany did not neglect to minister to her captive Muslims, many of whom were at the so-called "crescent" camp at Wunsdorf near Berlin, where a mosque was erected in 1915 and officially consecrated by a muezzin. There was a fringe benefit in this concern; scholars to the core, the theologians missed no opportunity to do religious

⁸¹"Hilfsarbeit für die Gefangenenlager," Die Eiche, IV (1916), 148-164; Stange, "Das Gefangenenlager in Göttingen," Die Eiche, IV (1916), 221-232; Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Feb. 17, 1915; Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 124-128; Ellis L. Dressel and Karl Ohnesorg to James W. Gerard, Feb. 3, 1916, Encl. 3 in No. 61, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Further Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned in Germany (London, 1916), Miscell., No. 16 (1916), Papers by command, Cd. 8325. By Oct., 1915, Germany had one and one quarter million prisoners of war and 74,000 interned civilians, a number far exceeding her plans and provisions.

research. Harnack, as Director of the Prussian Royal Library, and Richter, as a Professor of Missions, were excited about the capture of Muslims, Sikhs, Dervishes, and other Asian and African peoples in the British and French armies. To their delight, a collection of films and phonograph recordings were made of the songs, dances, and recitations of these exotic groups.⁸²

When the war ended, the Allies ignored the altruism and remembered only the atrocities allegedly committed in the camps and elsewhere. They demanded the right to try 900 "war criminals," including Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, for advocating unrestricted submarine warfare, Baron Oskar von der Lancken, chief of the Political Department in Brussels mistakenly held responsible for Nurse Cavell's death, and twenty commandants of German prison camps for excessive brutality. Germans of all classes and parties resolutely opposed the demand, and in July, 1919, two dozen Berlin professors, including Seeberg, Holl, and three other theologians, denounced the measure as hypocritical. The German government finally agreed to try a test list of twelve at their own Supreme Court in Leipzig in 1921. Only six were convicted, and the heaviest punishment was a prison term of four years--laxity which prompted American professors like Sheldon Glueck

⁸²Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, July 25 and Oct. 30, 1915; Richter to Harnack, Sept. 9, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 347.

during World War II to cry out against a possible repetition of Leipzig and to prepare the way for Nürnberg.⁸³

A genuine instance of barbarism for which Germany was blamed indirectly was the atrocities of the "infidel Turk" against his Christian Armenian subjects. On April 24, 1915, as British ships were bombarding the coast of Gallipoli prior to the ill-fated landings, Turkish authorities arrested 250 Armenian leaders in Constantinople on charges of conspiracy to commit treason. Then in order to forestall a general uprising, all Armenians were deported to the hinterlands of Asia Minor, and in the process, about one million were massacred or died of abuse and malnutrition.⁸⁴

Christian groups quickly raised a chorus of protest. One hundred Swiss professors and pastors, including Leonhard Ragaz, appealed to the world to help stop the "systematic extermination" of their fellow believers. The Protestant Committee for French Propaganda Abroad went further by denouncing the "Christian" Kaiser for tacitly endorsing the butchery. Baron Hans von Wagenheim, the German ambassador to the Sublime Porte, lodged a formal protest against his

⁸³"Der Kampf gegen die Auslieferung," Kriegs-Rundschau, V, 2274-2281; Glueck, War Criminals. Their Prosecution and Punishment (New York, 1944), 19-34; James M. Read, Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919, 214.

⁸⁴Arnold J. Toynbee, Armenian Atrocities. The Murder of a Nation (London, 1915); A. P. Hacıbıyan, Armenia and the War (New York, 1917).

ally's action, but Germanophobes dismissed it as a perfunctory, face-saving gesture.⁸⁵

William W. Rockwell, Professor of Church History at Union Theological Seminary and member of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, urged his friends Harnack and Deissmann not to discount the horror stories as English propaganda, and Dr. Johannes Lepsius, President of the German-Armenian Society, returned from Turkey in the fall of 1915, blushing to admit that the reported atrocities were true. Lepsius was also President of the German Orient Mission, which he founded for Armenian children orphaned by the Turkish massacres of 1895-1896, and under his leadership, Harnack, Deissmann, and fifty other theologians, pastors, and mission officials petitioned Bethmann in October, 1915, to help the ravaged race.⁸⁶ Baumgarten rejoiced over the petition as well as over the chancellor's promise to do all that he could, and Deissmann, a member of the board of directors of the Orient Mission, gave prominent attention to the Armenian problem in his Weekly Letter. Though exonerating Wangenheim and the German Foreign Office

⁸⁵"Aufruf an das Schweizervolk," Sept.-Oct., 1915, copy in Traub Nachlass, BAK; "Antwort auf den deutschen Aufruf an die evangelischen Christen des Auslandes," Revue Chrétienne, May-Aug., 1915, reprinted in Die Eiche, IV (1916), 259; Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden City, 1918), 364-384.

⁸⁶Rockwell to Harnack, Oct. 5, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Nov. 13, 1915; Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1968), 227-229; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 368-369; article in Foi et vie, April 16, 1916, reprinted in Die Eiche, IV (1916), 343-346.

and charging that some of the Armenians, incited by Russians, were guilty of high treason, he trumpeted abroad that Germany genuinely sympathized with the persecuted people. Schian similarly lamented that many innocent were suffering with the few guilty. In the summer of 1916, Richter, Halle Professor of Missions Gottlob Haussleiter, mission directors Karl Axenfeld and A. W. Schreiber, and other churchmen asked for financial support for the Armenians, and Rade, who held that Christian nations should have punished the Turks for their earlier massacres, warmly endorsed their effort.⁸⁷

The Allied world, however, was not impressed, and it was certainly a measure of the wartime hysteria that Germany was made the scapegoat for the iniquities of others. In December, 1916, a second official "Bryce Report" hinted that the slaughters were possible only with the connivance of Berlin, and a few months later, an English propagandist insisted that the Turkish atrocities were a clear case of "Deutschland über Allah" and that not all the perfumes of Arabia could wash her hands clean.⁸⁸ There is no proof,

⁸⁷Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XV (1915), 458, and Politik und Moral, 159; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, July 17, Sept. 18, Oct. 9, Nov. 13, and Dec. 18, 1915; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 525; Karl Axenfeld et al., "Eine asserordentliche einmalige Bitte um Hilfe für unbeschreibliches Elend," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 514; Rade, "Glossen zum Balkankriege," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 766, and "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 513.

⁸⁸/Arnold J. Toynbee/, Great Britain, Foreign Office, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916. Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount Bryce (London, 1916), Miscell., no. 31 (1916); E. F. Benson, Deutschland über Allah (London, 1917), 28-30; see also Read, Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919, 216-222; Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg, 74-82.

however, that Germany suggested or even approved the massacres. At the most, she may have acquiesced in them and thus in the eyes of the purist be guilty of a sin of omission. But it is surely too much to expect of a nation at war to intervene in the internal affairs of a much needed ally, especially when the intended recipients of such humanitarianism are tainted with the suspicion of aiding the enemy. The Armenian tragedy simply afforded the Allies an excuse to stick yet another pin in the already disfigured doll of Germandom.

Who were the real fathers of Germany's barbaric, militaristic, and autocratic spirit? Here again, the Allies did not hesitate to judge. Summing up their indictments, Troeltsch lamented that Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi formed the "unholy trinity." The almost monotonous chorus of foreign criticism was that the bellicose, antichristian, and Napoleonic mentality of the evil trio had overpowered the otherwise noble race of Kant, Goethe, and Beethoven. The English historian J. A. Cramb wailed that "Corsica, in a word, has conquered Galilee," and the Irish professor and politician Thomas Kettle harangued the three and their disciple Harnack for promulgating "the gospel of the devil."⁸⁹ The German theologians responded by denying Bernhardi's influence in Germany, describing Nietzsche's spell as literary and not political, and declaring Treitschke an upholder of state morality.

⁸⁹Troeltsch, "Der Geist der deutschen Kultur," 53-58; Cramb, Germany and England (London, 1914), 119; Kettle, The Ways of War (New York, 1917), 196-234.

Just after the second Moroccan crisis of 1911, General Friedrich von Bernhardi revised and published a work he had written in 1896, Deutschland und der nächste Krieg. Prophesying that the next naval war would be with England and urging Germany to make financial and political preparations for it, he provoked interest with such bold chapter titles as "The Right to Make War" and "The Duty to Make War." With world attention already focused on Germany and publishing houses eager to find a work that apparently mirrored the German mind, the English translation of 1912 was an immediate success. Early the next year, Arthur Conan Doyle warned Britons not to take the general lightly.⁹⁰

Ironically, the theologians had barely heard of Bernhardi. Though a best seller in England, Bernhardi's German version, though in its sixth edition by 1913, sold only 6,000 copies altogether. In a lengthy interview, Harnack told the American politician Albert J. Beveridge that he had never read the general's book and did not know anyone who had. Having only heard of its contents, he insisted that it did not represent German opinion at large but only that of a small group with whom he disagreed. Rade announced that he could

⁹⁰Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, trans. by A. H. Powles (New York, 1914); Doyle, Great Britain and the Next War (Boston, 1914; orig. in Fortnightly Review, Feb., 1913); the figure 6,000 was cited by Harnack, Troeltsch, Kaftan, Axenfeld, Foerster, and Beveridge in articles cited below.

not even find a copy in Marburg and had to order one. Troeltsch expressed dismay that the work had been received as the semi-official incarnation of German thought, and a group of twenty-nine clerics and theologians told British churchmen that most of them had learned of the book only through the British agitation against it.⁹¹ Deissmann declared that the notoriety which English, French, and Russian newspapers had given Bernhardi was ridiculous in light of the complete absence of his influence in Germany. When one of Kaftan's colleagues asked several Berlin instructors what they knew about Bernhardi, many were totally ignorant of him, and others did not even understand the question. A few had seen his name in English papers; three had heard of him from German sources, but only three others had read his book. One of Deissmann's colleagues took a similar poll at Berlin, and only two interviewed were familiar with the general. One was Deissmann himself, who had been in London in 1912 and had witnessed the press campaign against Bernhardi's book.⁹²

Other influential men within Germany and abroad accepted

⁹¹Beveridge, What is Back of the War (Indianapolis, 1915), 168-169; "Von Harnack Defends Attitude of Germany," Chicago Daily News, Jan. 20, 1915; Rade, "An die 42 britischen Kirchenmänner," and "Nietzsche, Treitschke, Bernhardi," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1001, 1080; Troeltsch, "Der Kulturkrieg," 238-239, and Das Wesen des Deutschen, 10; Karl Axenfeld et al., "Antwort auf die 42 englischen Kirchenmänner," Nov. 20, 1914, Die Eiche, III (1915), 73.

⁹²Kaftan, Vom Jahr noch--und Heute?, 14; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Jan. 22, 1915.

the theologians' confessions of ignorance. Frederic W. Wile, an American press correspondent in Berlin who had helped Bernhardi find an English translator, doubted that one in 10,000 Germans had heard of Bernhardi before the outbreak of the war. Ambassador Gerard went so far as to claim that he had found no one of the German ruling class who had read the book. Scottish professor Alexander Gray admitted that the general had not acquired fame in his own country, and British parliamentarian J. M. Robertson suggested that German scholars' high degree of specialization prevented them from reading outside their field and thus explained their ignorance of him. Even the pacifist F. W. Foerster and the Social Democrat Eduard Bernstein insisted that the Anglo-Americans had given Bernhardi far more publicity than he had ever received in his own homeland, and the editor of the liberal Berliner Tageblatt, Theodor Wolff, maintained that though the general's book was revered in officers' quarters and a few conservative families, it had enjoyed no popular success in Germany.⁹³ Moreover, as Germanophiles

⁹³Wile, The Assault (Indianapolis, 1916), 32-33; Gerard, Face to Face with Kaiserism (New York, 1918), 182; Gray, The True Pastime, 6-7; Robertson, The German Idea of the Peace Terms, 15; Foerster, "Statt und Sittengesetz," Friedens-Warte, XVIII (1915), 28; Bernstein, "American Opinions on the World War As Seen by a German," Inter. Concil., no. 99 (1916), 15; Wolff, The Eve of 1914, trans. by E. W. Dicks (London, 1935), 323-324. In spite of all the evidence to the contrary, Fritz Fischer persists in overestimating the influence of Bernhardi's book; see his World Power or Decline. The Controversy over Germany's Aims in the First World War, trans. by Lancelot L. Farrar, Robert Kimber, and Rita Kimber (New York, 1974; 1st Germ. ed., 1965), 4; Fischer's disciple, Imanuel Geiss, mimics his master in referring to Bernhardi's "widely read" book; see his July 1914. The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents (New York, 1917; 1st Germ. ed., 1964), 39.

quickly pointed out, if one wanted to speak of a Bernhardian genre of literature, why not include the anonymous Battle of Dorking (1871) or Colonel Arthur Boucher's La France victorieuse dans la guerre de demain (1911) or General Homer Lea's The Day of the Saxon (1912)? The American Lea made no excuse for the "brutality of all national development" and insisted that "the scorn of war, like the denial of death" was a foolish self-deception. He prophesied an imminent British-German conflict and therefore urged Britain not to rely solely on her sea power but to find an ally with a large land army. The American professor Edmund von Mach therefore dubbed him "the British 'Bernhardi.'"⁹⁴

The case with Nietzsche was different. The German scholars readily admitted his influence, especially on German youth. Kaftan had known him personally and conceded that a "Nietzsche-mania" had swept over Germany at the turn of the century, and Baumgarten thought that Nietzsche was more popular in Germany than his countrymen wanted to recognize. Although Troeltsch lamented that German students all too mechanically repeated his catchy phrases, Deissmann applauded his scorning of a "sugary, sentimental religion" and was glad to hear that Munich booksellers had discovered that the books most often purchased by soldiers leaving for the front were the New Testament, Goethe's Faust and Nietzsche's

⁹⁴Lea, The Day of the Saxon (New York, 1942; 1st ed., 1912), 6-10; Mach, What Germany Wants (Boston, 1914), 7-11, 154-157; see also G. B. Shaw, "Common Sense About the War," Current History, I (1914), 13-14.

Also Sprach Zarathustra. The noted author, Gerhard Hauptmann, approved the soldiers' choices as evidence of high intellectual taste, but foreign observers feared that the prominence of Nietzsche meant that Germans glorified the "blond beast" and believe that "Odin was greater than Jehovah."⁹⁵

The theologians insisted that Nietzsche's sway was that of an artist or a poet, not that of a systematic thinker. According to Kaftan, one could not speak of a Nietzschean school, and Troeltsch added that Nietzsche had had little to do with philosophy per se and nothing to do with politics. How could Nietzsche have influenced official policy, asked Loofs, when his following was primarily the politically powerless youth? Even the English historian J. W. Allen admitted that the mature Nietzsche had deplored all nationalism and was therefore a "bad German" and, as he himself had put it, a "good European," but Allen still held that a misunderstood Nietzsche had led Germany astray.⁹⁶

⁹⁵Kaftan, Vom Jahr noch--und Heute?, 12; Baumgarten, Politik und Moral, 121; Troeltsch, "Konservativ-Liberal," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 651; Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion," 301, and "Welche Bücher trägt der deutsche Soldat in Tornister?" Berl. Tagebl., Nov. 26, 1914; Hauptmann, "Are We Barbarians?" Current History, I (1914), 179. Nietzsche had said, "Ye have heard men say 'Blessed are the peacemakers,' but I say unto you, 'Blessed are the warmakers, for they shall be called, if not the children of Jahve, the children of Odin, who is greater than Jahve'" (from "War and Warriors" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra).

⁹⁶Kaftan, Vom Jahr noch--und Heute?, 13; Troeltsch, "Der Geist der deutschen Kultur," 86; Loofs, William Sanday über den Krieg, "Dt.-Evangel.", VI (1915), 294-295; Allen, Germany and Europe, 5.

The last of the three whipping-boys was Treitschke. The American James M. Beck, a former assistant attorney-general, castigated his Vorlesungen über Politik, which exalted the state and denigrated political weakness as the "sin against the Holy Ghost," as the "Gospel of Junkerdom." When British clergymen similarly labelled his teachings pernicious, a group of German clerics and theologians pointed out that he had expressly condemned frivolous wars, and Rade enshrined him as "an educator unto German unity and the German manner of thinking out of particularism and a false cosmopolitan individualism." Harnack praised him as a "politician of high morality" and protested against his more vehement words being taken out of context--the struggle for German unification. In 1916, Baumgarten devoted an entire book to sanctioning Treitschke's maxim that the duty of a state is to enhance its own power. In neutral Holland, the Groningen faculty of theology pilloried Treitschke for having deified the state and Baumgarten for having deified Treitschke. The Dutch theologians also rebuked Rade, whose periodical they had previously regarded as one of the best representatives of international Christian ethics, for stooping to endorse Baumgarten's work.⁹⁷

⁹⁷Beck, The Evidence in the Case (New York, 1914), 6; Randall Cantuar et al., "Antwort auf den Aufruf der deutschen Theologen," Sept. 23, 1914, and Karl Axenfeld et al., "Antwort auf die 42 englischen Kirchenmänner," Nov. 20, 1914, in Die Eiche, III (1915), 52-62, 67-75; Rade, "Nietzsche, Treitschke und Bernhardt," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1079; "Von Harnack Defends Attitude of Germany," Chicago Daily News, Jan. 20, 1915; Baumgarten, Politik und Moral, 114-179; J. van Dyk et al. to Rade, Feb. 18, 1918, Christl. Welt, XXXII (1918), 177-183; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 255-256.

According to Copenhagen theologian Jacob Bang, among the "minor prophets" who had perverted German thought were Emmanuel Geibel and Ernst Moritz Arndt. Both attained fame during the early and mid-nineteenth century, and their fiery prophesies were rekindled during the war. Harnack, Troeltsch, Baumgarten, Deissman, and Schubert cited the first two lines of Arndt's "Vaterlandlied" and agreed with him that "the God who had iron grow intended no slaves." Rade published several chapters of Arndt's Katechismus für den deutschen Kriegs- und Wehrmann and carried advertisements for it in his periodical. Johannes Haussleiter devoted an entire article to this hero of the Wars of Liberation. He praised Arndt's prophetic insight on Germany's eventual and rightful possession of Belgium and reaffirmed his belief that peace should not be concluded on the basis of sentimentality but on the reality of the need of self-protection against future aggression.⁹⁸

Geibel was a mixed blessing. Harnack whetted the appetite of a crowd by beginning one of his patriotic addresses with the poet's promise: "When east and west combine to draw the sword against you, know that God does not forsake you."

⁹⁸Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, trans. by Jessie Bröchner, 30-41; Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben," 157; Troeltsch, Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte, 29; Baumgarten, "Die Weihnachtspredigt im Kriege," Evangel. Freiheit., XIV (1914), 464; Deissmann, "Bismarck und sein kämpfendes Volk," Der Tag, April 1, 1915; Schubert, Die Weihe des Krieges, 25; Christl. Welt, XXVIII, Oct. 22 to Dec. 17, 1914; Haussleiter, "Ernst Moritz Arndts deutsche Ziele," Inter. Monatsschr., X (1916), 1376-1377.

Baumgarten, on the other hand, winced at the abuse the Pan-Germans made of his prophecy: "Once again the world will be healed by Germandom." Although Baumgarten and even Rade believed that a purified German people would be able to minister healing strength to other nations, Baumgarten regretted that the Pan-Germans had twisted this sentiment into a rabid chauvinism that gave both Geibel and Germany a black eye abroad.⁹⁹

Surprisingly, the Kulturkrieg had little to say about Bismarck. On the centennary of the former chancellor's birthday in 1915, Deissmann and other Germans saluted Germany's creator, but foreign intellectuals said almost nothing about him. Presumably, this was because they regarded him as a man of action, and they were concerned with thought.¹⁰⁰

The foreign thinker whom the Germans took as their hero was Thomas Carlyle. Turning the tables on the English, they asked them why they did not listen to what he had said about Germans instead of misconstruing Treitschke and overrating Bernhardi. Carlyle, they proudly noted, had appreciated the character of the German people and protested the insular philistinism of his own people. Baumgarten, Troeltsch,

⁹⁹Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben," 149; Baumgarten, Politik und Moral, 24, and Das Echo der alldeutschen Bewegung im Amerika, 2, and Lebendige Religion (Leipzig, 1915), 3, 12, and Alldeutschtum und Christentum (Berlin, 1918), 5; Rade, "Wir Deutsche fürchten Gott und sonst nichts in der Welt," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 725.

¹⁰⁰Deissmann, "Bismarck und sein kämpfendes Volk," Der Tag, April 1, 1915. The theologians' comparisons of Bismarck and Bethmann are treated in Chapter VIII.

Herrmann, Titius, Schubert, and Georg Wobbermin singled out the Scottish writer for applause, and Harnack concluded a letter to English clergy by insisting that Germans were no different in 1914 from Carlyle's portrayal of them.¹⁰¹

Thus for the entire four years, a Kulturkrieg raged simultaneously with the military conflict, fattening the purses of publishing houses. Looking at the prodigious amount of literature poured forth on all sides, one can hardly imagine the presses idle for a moment. Seemingly, everyone who had even a minor literary reputation or hoped to gain one eagerly dipped his pen in ink. Seven months of combat produced enough manifestoes and invectives to fill a 500-page work, Der Krieg der Geister.¹⁰² Siegmund-Schultze's quarterly, Die Eiche, and The New York Times Current History of the European War gave Germans and Americans a running account of the intellectual battle, and penny propaganda pamphlets in Britain kept Englishmen informed of the latest blot on Germany's honor.

¹⁰¹Baumgarten, Politik und Moral, 118-119; Troeltsch, "Über einige Eigentümlichkeiten der angelsächsischen Zivilisation," Neue Rund., XXVIII (1917), 241; Herrmann, "Die Türken, die Engländer, und die deutschen Christen," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 221; Titius, Unser Krieg, 38; Schubert, Die Weihe des Krieges, 24; Wobbermin, "Deutschland, Nordamerika und England als christlich-evangelische Kulturstaaten," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 671; Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, 299. Initially influenced by rational arguments against God, Carlyle gradually developed a qualified belief in a deity through reading Kant, concluding that Germany alone had retained a faith in the invisible during the assaults of the Enlightenment. In several works, notably On Heroes and Hero-Worship, he lauded German qualities and individuals.

¹⁰²Hermann Kellermann (ed.), Der Krieg der Geister (Dresden, 1915). A nearly exhaustive list of British propaganda is given in Hermann Wanderscheck (ed.) Weltkriegsbücherei. Bibliographie zur englischen Propaganda im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1935).

Early in 1915, leading German scholars attempted to explain their Kultur to the world in a collection of essays entitled Deutschland und der Weltkrieg. The English-speaking world was provided with a translation the following year by the Germanophile William Wallace Whitelock. While this may have attracted the attention of the cultured, the man on the street grabbed up the more sensational compilations of German pronouncements. Indeed, one of the simplest devices for smudging the German image was to publish a collection of incriminating statements by German leaders. One of the first to appear was Deutschland Über Alles or Germany Speaks (1914), edited by the American author John Jay Chapman. Among several declarations he included the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three" and the entire address of the "habitual courtier" Harnack to Americans stranded in Berlin in August, 1914. In 1917, the Frenchman Salomon Grumbach, the Dane Jacob P. Bang, the Englishman William Archer, and the American Munroe Smith got into the act. Grumbach was an Alsatian Social-Democrat who fled to Switzerland and published Das annexionistische Deutschland, 450 pages filled with the annexationist clamor of prominent Germans. English historian J. Ellis Barker translated an abbreviated version into English, commenting that the German "annexation mania" flowed from the "exaltation of Might and contempt for Right" that had become "national peculiarities" in Germany.¹⁰³ Bang was Professor of Theology

¹⁰³Hintze et al. (eds.), Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, trans by William W. Whitelock as Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War (New York, 1916); Chapman, Deutschland Über

at the University of Copenhagen, whose Hurrah and Hallelujah gave two of its fifteen chapters to theologians Wilhelm Herrmann and Hans Preuss. Another chapter berated the "German Addresses in Hard Times" of Harnack and Deissmann. Archer, a drama critic who plunged headlong into the propaganda war, gave a topical presentation entitled Gems (?) of German Thought. Among 500 utterances were eighteen from Nietzsche, excerpts from the "German Addresses" of Harnack, Deissmann, Seeberg, Baumgarten, and Troeltsch, and other remarks by Harnack and Preuss. Heading the list of "gems" on the back cover as especially typical of the warped German mind was Baumgarten's celebration of the sinking of the Lusitania. Smith was a Columbia Professor of Law whose Out of Their Own Mouths judged that the Germans stood self-condemned. With evident relish, he served up the pronouncements of rulers, statesmen, poets, scholars, soldiers, and industrialists. In January, 1918, the American Committee on Public Information (Creel Committee) came out with its version, Conquest and Kultur: Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words, which was based largely on Grumbach, Bang, and Archer. Later that year, the English war correspondent for the Daily Chronicle, Michael Morrison, cited supposedly culpable remarks of Harnack, Seeberg, Deissmann, Troeltsch, and other professors in his Sidelights on Germany.¹⁰⁴

Alles or Germany Speaks, 67; Grumbach (ed.), Das Annexionistische Deutschland (Lausanne, 1917), trans. by J. Ellis Barker as Germany's Annexationist Aims (London, 1917), 6.

¹⁰⁴Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, trans. by Jessie Bröchner, 145-191; Archer (ed.), Gems (?) of German Thought, see Index;

As if the Germans had not sufficiently tarred themselves, Allied critics threw on more. And perhaps the lowest point in wartime yellow journalism--at least in the estimation of Harnack's daughter twenty years later--was the chauvinistic insults of Oxford Assyriologist A. H. Sayce. His article "Hermann's a German" claimed that Germany's contribution to international scholarship had been almost nil. In science, Sayce contended, none of the great names were German; in literature, Schiller had been only a "milk-and-water Long-fellow"; in philosophy, it was difficult to tell what Hegelian thought would have been had the German language been more "cultivated." Deissmann and Troeltsch were appalled at the unbridled and vitriolic attack, and Harnack drafted an immediate reply. Even the English Germanophobe Thomas F. A. Smith, who had taught in Germany for twelve years prior to the war, thought that his fellow countryman had gone too far.¹⁰⁵

Smith (ed.), Out of Their Own Mouths, with an Introduction by William Roscoe Thayer (New York, 1917); Wallace Notestein and Elmer E. Stoll (eds.), Conquest and Kultur. Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words, 8; Morrison, Sidelights on Germany, 16, 45-46, 55, 170-172.

¹⁰⁵Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 357; Sayce, "Hermann's a German," The [London] Times, Dec. 22, 1914; Deissmann, "Jahreswende des Weltkriegs," Inneres Aufgebot, 118; Troeltsch, "Der Geist der deutschen Kultur," 52; Harnack, "Die geistige und kulturelle Leistung der Deutschen, Antwort auf Sayce," manuscript in Harnack Nachlass, SBB, but apparently unpublished, since not listed in Friedrich Smend, Adolf von Harnack. Verzeichnis seiner Schriften; Smith, The Soul of Germany (New York, 1915), 43.

Although Sayce was inordinately vituperative and ridiculous, he merely reflected the general tendency to indulge in colorful and unrestrained philippics. By foreigners and her own disenchanted, Germany was painted as an autocratic, barbaric, and militaristic nation, which had embraced the devil's gospel promulgated by Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi. In rebuttal, the theologians defended the virtues of military conscription, argued that the German army was far less barbaric than the Belgian civilian "assassins" and the Russian soldiers in East Prussia, and asserted that the U-boat was more merciful than the British blockade. They defended Treitschke as a preacher of state morality, dismissed Nietzsche as a poet who had hypnotized only the young, and denied that they knew Bernhardi. In response to foreign caricatures, they replied with national stereotypes of their own: England was a "nation of shopkeepers" and hypocrites not at all interested in the "rights of small nations"; France was a land of revanche, irreligion, and superficial refinement; Russia was a country of backward, benighted souls; and America was a land of "moralizing and mammon." Though recognizing national peculiarities, the theologians affirmed that a common western Kultur was endangered by an Asiatic culture. Therefore, they held that a genuine Kulturkrieg had to be waged against the east but that England's Kulturkrieg was fabricated, because it refused to recognize that within the western European family Germany had her distinctiveness just as the other members did.

Germany was not the black sheep of the family, they insisted; she simply wanted to remain free to develop in accordance with her particular heritage and organic nature--not to be forced into a foreign mold. Even though Harnack cautioned against overplaying Germany's role as "the misunderstood oddity" and championed internal reform, he upheld "die deutsche Freiheit." In like manner, Troeltsch opposed what some Germanophobes demanded--imposing the "gift" of freedom on the basis of a military defeat. But the antithesis between Germany and the west was not settled in this manner. Two days before the armistice, the German people seized the initiative and instituted a republic. Apparently, the conflict of cultures had at last been resolved.

PRECARIOUS ECCLESIASTICAL TRUCE

Chapter VI

As academicians, the theologians naturally thought in abstract and philosophical terms. But while wrestling with the moral, cultural, and intellectual questions posed by the war, they also considered the concrete, practical problems. In the secular sphere, the most disputed issues were the reform of the Prussian three-class voting system and the proper extent of territorial acquisitions. In the religious realm, the theologians were concerned about the troubled church-state relationship and the tensions between Protestants and Catholics and among Protestants themselves. The Kaiser's address of August 4, 1914 supposedly signalled the establishment of a political Burgfriede. Although ecclesiastical groups excelled the politicians in shelving their differences, even among the clerics and theologians the truce was periodically marred by sniping or localized battle.

While trying to maintain ecclesiastical amity, the theologians addressed themselves to problems that had either arisen out of the war or had been aggravated by it. They

pointed with alarm to the increase of prostitution, venereal disease, and alcoholism and urged the German people to practice moral restraint.¹ Two Göttingen theologians, Carl Mirbt and Ernst Kühl, worked in social service agencies to alleviate wartime distresses.² In January, 1915, the Protestant-Social Congress, led by Otto Baumgarten, and the Free Ecclesiastical-Social Conference, led by Reinhold Seeberg, issued a united appeal, exhorting German pastors to admonish their parishioners to conserve bread and flour. Created at the end of the nineteenth century, these two groups were theologically estranged and had shared in no common endeavor until the threat of starvation posed by the blockade prompted them to cease ignoring one another. Rade was so excited about their joint declaration that he carried it as front-page news, and Baumgarten hailed this first united action as a milestone for the two organizations.³

¹Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 350, and Die Kirche nach dem Kriege, 42, and Rade to Harnack, April 21, 1915, Rade Nachlass, UBM; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 569; Friedrich Mahling, "Die Kirche und ihre Friedensaufgaben im Volksleben," in Timme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 244; Hermann Jordan, Die Demokratie und Deutschlands Zukunft (Berlin, 1918), 7.

²Nathanael Bonwetsch to Reinhold Seeberg, Feb. 17, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

³"An die evangelischen Geistlichen Deutschlands," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 41-42; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XV (1915), 73. The origins of these two groups are discussed in Chapter I.

In February, 1916, Seeberg and his Berlin colleague, Friedrich Mahling, gathered these and nineteen other Protestant service groups into the Conference of German Protestant Work Organizations, a coordinating agency for the various social services.⁴

While attending to social needs, the professors did not ignore spiritual matters--and even intellectuals needed encouragement. In the university church at Leipzig, Ludwig Ihmels and Franz Rendtorff preached messages of hope and inspiration to students and faculty. Baumgarten did the same at Kiel. In Berlin, something of a miracle happened. For the first time in decades, academic worship services were held on a regular basis. Beginning in November, 1916, Harnack, Seeberg, Deissmann, Holl, Kaftan, and Mahling addressed their colleagues and pupils from the pulpit of the Kaiser Frederick Memorial Church, revitalizing the concept of the preacher-professor, exemplified by Schleiermacher a century earlier.⁵

⁴Rade, "Deutsche evangelische Arbeitsgemeinschaft," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 230-231; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 190-192, 286-287, 572, and Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 46-47; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., May 1, and Sept. 20, 1916, and April 26, 1918.

⁵Ihmels, Darum auch wir. 7 Predigten während der Kriegszeit; Rendtorff, Aus dem dritten Kriegswinter. 5 Predigten in der Universitätskirche zu St. Pauli in Leipzig (Leipzig, 1917); Baumgarten, Predigten aus der Revolutionszeit; Violet, "Der akademische Gottesdienst in Berlin und der Professorendienst an der Kirche," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 51-55; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., March 9, 1917, Jan. 7 and June 30, 1918.

While ministering to civilians, the theologians did not forget the troops in the field. In fact, several went as soldiers to the front, where some perished, including Troeltsch's protégé, the young Hermann Süskind, and the seventy-year old Caspar René Gregory. Others served as chaplains, including Otto Scheel, Paul Althaus, Gerhard Kittel, Heinrich Weinel, and Erich Seeberg, Reinhold's son. Karl Heim, a member of the newly established Protestant theology faculty at Münster, ministered as a chaplain to Germans interned in Denmark.⁶ The theologians who remained at home also tried to bring spiritual inspiration to the men in the trenches. In December, 1914, all two dozen members of the Berlin theology faculty sent Christmas greetings to their students in the field. Deissmann had a collection of his war essays, Deutscher Schwertsegen, distributed at the front, and several of Paul von Wurster's pamphlets, including Kriegsgebetbüchlein für Soldaten im Feld, were distributed in more than one and one quarter million copies.⁷

⁶Troeltsch, "Über Massstäbe zur Beurteilung historischer Dinge," Hist. Ztschr., CXVI (1916), 14; Scheel to Harnack, Nov. 9, 1917, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Althaus, "Die deutsch-evangelische Kirche im Königreich Polen," Süddt. Monatshf., XV (1917), 79; Kittel, "C. F. Georg Heinrici," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 547; Weinel to Harnack, Jan. 22, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 260, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Heim, "Notiz," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 805.

⁷Weihnachtsgruss den im Felde stehenden theologischen Kommilitonen der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Berlin gewidmet von den Berliner Universitätslehrern der Theologie (manuscript, 1914); Deissmann, Deutscher Schwertsegen, 5; Otto Herpel, "Deutsche Theologie-Professoren zum Kriege," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 883.

The chaplains also needed moral support. Erich Seeberg informed his father that his fellow chaplains often felt inadequately prepared for their tasks, and Reinhold therefore prompted the Central Committee of the Inner Mission to institute training centers near the war zones where the field clergy could receive additional instruction. Reinhold himself lectured at Brussels, Riga, Vilna, and Warsaw, and about 200 chaplains attended the Warsaw center, where they also sat under Schian, Richter, Titius, Deissmann, Holl, Mahling, and other academic men of the cloth.⁸

The theologians' concern did not stop with their own civilians and soldiers; they also showed love for, as the Old Testament put it, "the stranger within your gates." In the early months of the war, an Information and Aid Bureau for Germans Abroad and Foreigners in Germany was established. Its board of directors included Deissmann, Baumgarten, Richter, Loofs, and Gottlob Haussleiter, and it helped foreigners stranded in Germany to receive mail, food, and clothing and

⁸Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 260, 281, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Reinhold Seeberg, "Selbstbiographie," in Hans von Arnim and Georg von Below (eds.), Deutscher Aufstieg, 418-420; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Dec. 9 and 15, 1916, March 9, 1917; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 183. The Central Committee was started by Johann Wichern in 1848. At a Kirchentag, the first joint meeting of the state churches, he suggested as a Christian alternative to the Communist Manifesto the establishment of a committee to deal with the problems of a growing urban proletariat, the need of prison reform, and the care of vagabonds; see Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, II, 85-86; Shanahan, German Protestants Face the Social Question 1815-1871, 202-208.

to return to their homelands. Ambassador Gerard's complaint that "nothing was done" for Americans in Germany must be weighed against Romain Rolland's praise for the bureau's "successful" labors.⁹

Most of these secondary matters were directly precipitated by the war. The primary ecclesiastical problem, however, the religious bickering, had existed for some time and simply assumed new importance because of the military exigencies. The theologians hoped that the war would bring peace to the divided ranks of Protestantism and progress toward better Protestant-Catholic relations, but on both counts they were disappointed. In the early weeks of the struggle, Deissmann naively exclaimed that the awesome presence of God had silenced the roar of religious strife, but a year later, Seeberg compared the friction among Protestants to trench warfare--no one won but no one was willing to yield. In retrospect, Schian observed that the war had effected only a partial religious truce.¹⁰

In some ways, the Protestants and Catholics made more progress toward a rapprochement than did the Protestants among

⁹"Hilfsarbeit für Zivilisten, die durch den Krieg in Not geraten sind," Die Eiche, IV (1916), 108-120; Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 111; Rolland, "Our Neighbor, the Enemy," Journal de Genève, March 15, 1915, reprinted in Rolland, Above the Battle, trans by C. K. Ogden, 146-149.

¹⁰Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion," Deutsche Reden, I, 293; Seeberg, Was sollen wir denn tun?, 53; Schian, Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 31.

themselves. Though Prussia and Germany were usually regarded as bastions of Protestantism, both were more than one-third Catholic. Likewise, just over one-third, or eight, of the German universities had a Catholic theology faculty. In both the Reichstag and Prussian House of Deputies, the Catholic Center Party held about one-fourth of the seats. The growth of Catholic influence in Germany alarmed some Protestants, and when Bismarck called off the Kulturkampf, a group of them, including Rade, decided to take the "Roman question" into their own hands. In 1886, they formed the Protestant League for the Protection of German-Protestant Interests. As a "watcher of Zion," it endeavored to aid Protestants in Catholic-dominated areas like Bavaria, to uphold Protestants' rights in mixed marriages, and to promote a Protestant-oriented patriotism. One of its accomplishments was to revive a popular interest in Luther.¹¹ But not everyone who joined the League had a defensive attitude. Harnack, for example, who belatedly became a lukewarm member, scolded his fellow Protestants for failing to emulate the virtues of their Roman brethren, particularly their emphasis on the unity and catholicity of the church. In January, 1907, just after a Center victory in a Reichstag election had triggered new Protestant anxiety, he nevertheless urged civil and religious

¹¹Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 27, 49-50; Erich Foerster, "Die Stellung der evangelischen Kirche," in Melchior et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte I, 108-109.

officials celebrating the Kaiser's birthday to promote better communication and cooperation between the two faiths. Troeltsch applauded his candor and conviction, but several of his Protestant friends regarded him as a traitor, and continued Protestant alarm brought the membership of the League in 1914 to 540,000.¹²

The response of German Catholics to the war, however, helped dispel some of that fear. Catholics proved as patriotic as any other group of Germans. They went willingly to the front, where they joined Protestants in singing Luther's "Ein feste Burg"; the leading Catholic newspaper the Kölnische Volkszeitung, took a definitely pro-German stand; and Hermann von Bezzel, leader of the Bavarian Lutherans, even praised the Jesuits for their services to the Reich.¹³

What especially impressed Protestants was the Catholic reaction to a book published in April, 1915 by the French Catholic Committee for Propaganda Abroad. Entitled La guerre allemande et le Catholicisme, it contained seven essays by

¹²Harnack, "Was wir von der römischen Kirche lernen und nicht lernen sollen," address of 1891, and "Protestantismus und Katholizismus in Deutschland," address of 1907, and Troeltsch to Harnack, May 19, 1907, all cited in Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 317-322.

¹³Gottfried Traub, "Wie ich deutschnational wurde," in Arnim and Below (eds.), Deutscher Aufstieg, 428; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1134, and XXXI (1917), 835, 876; Joseph Mausbach, "Die Wahrung und Förderung des konfessionellen Friedens," in Thimme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 159.

French clergymen, theologians and other scholars, the gist of which was that the war was a war of religion instigated by Protestant Germany's hatred of Catholics. German Catholics made two replies, both inspired by Matthias Erzberger. In May, 1915, he organized a committee of 125 Catholic scholars, politicians, and businessmen, including August Thyssen, the industrialist, Count Georg von Hertling, the Bavarian Minister-President, Peter Spahn, the leader of the Center Party, and Prince Hermann von Hatzfeldt, member of the Prussian House of Lords. The group promptly issued a rebuttal, arguing that the war was one of defense against French and English aggression. Rade praised the forthrightness of the work, which was distributed gratis in six foreign languages and won an especially warm reception in America.¹⁴

In July, 1915, Erzberger organized a permanent Committee to Defend German and Catholic Interests in the World War. Under the presidency of Joseph Mausbach, a Catholic theologian at Münster, this group of forty scholars sponsored the publication of Deutsche Kultur, Katholizismus und Weltkrieg. Appearing in December, 1915, and distributed by

¹⁴Alfred Baudrillart (ed.) La guerre allemande et le Catholicisme (Paris, 1915); A. J. Rosenberg (ed.), Der deutsche Krieg und der Katholizismus. Deutsche Abwehr französischer Angriffe (Berlin, 1915), and the authorized American ed., The German War and Catholicism. German Defense Against French Attacks (St. Paul, 1916); Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 510. See also Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg, 11-13; George Bruntz, Allied Propaganda, 11.

the thousands in English, Portugese, French, Spanish, Italian, and Dutch, it was edited by Georg Pfeilschifter, a Freiburg theologian, and contained essays by twenty prelates and professors, including five theologians. Mausbach noted that Germany's twenty-four million Catholics were grieved that their French brethren had thrown "the apple of religious discord" among the nations, and Bonn theologian Heinrich Schrörs emphatically denied that the war was a war of religion. Alois Knöpler at Munich contrasted the spirituality and restraint of the German war-pastorals with the calumnies of their French counterparts. Since one French critic had extolled the breadth and successes of French Catholic foreign missions and disparaged the smaller efforts of German Catholics, Joseph Schmidlin of Münster explained that the latter were not indifferent to propagating the Gospel but that Germany's late unification had scarcely given them time to develop overseas projects. Georg Pfeilschifter refuted the charge that Germany had sent Protestant regiments against Catholic France and Belgium, while deploying Catholic troops against Orthodox Russia.¹⁵

¹⁵Erzberger, *Erlebnisse*, 13-14; Pfeilschifter (ed.), *Deutsche Kultur, Katholizismus und Weltkrieg* (Freiburg, 1916), 2, 73, 244-245, 269-290, 477-490; Pfeilschifter also included a patriotic declaration of twenty-six German bishops and telegrams between the two German cardinals and the Kaiser.

¹⁶Pfeilschifter to Harnack, Dec. 15, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, 589; Harnack review in *Presb. Jahrb.*, CLXXXI (1916), 533; Delemann, *Evangel. Rundsch.*, April 25, 1916; Harnack, *Kirchl. Ch.*, *Evangel. Rundsch.*, XVI (1916), 188-189, 230-241, 301-305.

Mausbach subsequently concluded that the book proved Catholics to be just as enthusiastic about German Kultur as any other Germans, and his Protestant colleagues heartily agreed. Troeltsch and Rade rejoiced that it had gone far beyond its original purpose of merely defending Germany and had become, as Troeltsch christened it, "the Catholic War-Book," or, in Rade's estimation, a "standard work" on the moral unanimity of German Catholics and Protestants.¹⁶ Pfeilschifter asked Harnack for a favorable review of the work as a means of strengthening Catholic-Protestant solidarity, and Harnack complied. Deissmann urged his American friends to consult the English translation, and Baumgarten was so impressed with the book that he devoted three successive editorials to it. Baumgarten found fault only with one author who had named him, Harnack, Troeltsch, and Karl Dunkmann as the Protestant champions of a Protestant-Catholic theological rapprochement. Though encouraging greater social and political cooperation between the two faiths, he insisted that the gap could never be bridged between the rigid Roman theology and the more elastic and liberal form of Protestantism which he represented.¹⁷

¹⁶Mausbach, "Währung und Förderung des konfessionellen Friedens," 167; Troeltsch, "Das katholische Kriegsbuch," Dt. Pol., I (1916), 785-789; Rade, review in Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 18-19, and "Protestantismus und Katholizismus im neuen Deutschland," in Thimme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 132-133.

¹⁷Pfeilschifter to Harnack, Dec. 15, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Harnack review in Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXIII (1916), 533; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., April 25, 1916; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVI (1916), 188-189, 230-241, 301-305.

Apart from the accolades to Pfeilschifter's book, prominent Protestants extended the hand of friendship to Catholics in other ways. Wilhelm Herrmann, a middle-of-the-road Ritschlian, proclaimed that Protestants could learn a great deal from the Roman Church and could feel themselves one with Catholics in the basis of their faith.¹⁸ In 1916, Friedrich Thimme, librarian of the Prussian Upper House, tried to shore up the failing political and religious truce by publishing a collection of articles entitled Vom inneren Frieden des deutschen Volkes. Five chapters, each with essays by several men, sought to promote unity among the different world views, classes and occupations, political parties, nationalities, and religious confessions and factions. Rade, Dunkmann, and the Catholic Mausbach contributed to the chapter on religion. Rade and Mausbach discussed Protestant-Catholic relations and urged that, although doctrinal compromise was inconsistent with the nature of both faiths, the wartime mutual good will and cooperation be carried into the postwar period. Mausbach sought to dispel Protestants' latent fear of ultramontaniam by alleging that the Center was not a confessional, Catholic party but merely the counterpart of the Conservative Party, which, though predominantly Protestant, did not call itself a Protestant party. Both parties, he explained, rejected the Socialists'

¹⁸Herrmann, "Zöllners Reformvorschlag," Christl. Welt XXX (1916), 743.

dictum: "Religion is a private affair," regarding it instead as an important part of public life. Rade tried, with some exaggeration, to convince Catholics that Protestants no longer suspected them of being "ultramontane" or "Reichsfeinde." More realistically, he expressed hope that tensions could be reduced on such procedural problems as mixed marriages, religious instruction in the public schools, and burial rights in sectarian cemeteries. The "positive" theologian Dunkmann voiced admiration for Catholicism's stand against the individualistic trends of the nineteenth century, and his previous efforts for Catholic-Protestant conciliation won the applause of both Rade and Mausbach.¹⁹

In short, during the first two years of the war, leading Protestant and Catholic theologians, though recognizing the permanence of doctrinal differences, sought to bury the bitterness of the Kulturkampf. The religious truce outlived the political one, which lasted less than a year, but in 1917, the four-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation, smoldering religious resentments burst again into flame.²⁰

¹⁹Mausbach, "Wahrung and Förderung des konfessionellen Friedens," and Rade, "Protestantismus und Katholizismus im neuen Deutschland," and Dunkmann, "Die protestantischen Parteien nach dem Kriege," all in Thimme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 131-137, 144-161, 179. Dunkmann's earlier article cited by Mausbach and Rade was "Welche Aufgaben erwachsen der Theologie infolge des Krieges?", Neue Kirchl. Ztschr., XXVI (1915), 81-100. Thimme asked both Harnack and Seeberg to submit an article for his book, but none appeared from either man; Thimme to Harnack, Oct. 10, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Thimme to Seeberg, Oct. 15, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

²⁰Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 568.

One problem was the Jesuits. By the mid-1880s, most of the Kulturkampf legislation had been rescinded, but it was not until 1904 that the Bundesrat permitted individual Jesuits to re-enter the Reich, and when the war broke out, the Jesuit Order itself was still banned. In November, 1914, Bethmann had his vice-chancellor announce that his domestic policy would shortly assume a "new direction," and the implied promise of internal reforms prompted the Center to ask for the revocation of all exceptional laws, including the Jesuit ban. While the government dragged its feet for two years, Jesuits assisted in the chaplaincy, and even the staunchly conservative leader of Bavaria's Lutherans praised their actions. Mausbach therefore predicted that their patriotism spelled the imminent death of the anti-Jesuit law, and in January, 1917, Baumgarten recommended that the government re-admit the Order as a reciprocal act of good will.²¹ The following month, Bethmann breathed new life into his policy of a "new direction" by going before the Reichstag and personally promising reforms. The Russian revolution of March made him all the more desirous of courting Catholic favor against the Socialists, whose already diminishing zeal for the war was further weakened now that

²¹Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 137-138; Graf /Kuno von/ Westarp, Konservative Politik im letzten Jahrzehnt des Kaiserreiches, II (Berlin, 1935), 219-221; Mausbach, "Wahrung und Förderung des konfessionellen Friedens," 159; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 32.

its supposed object, the overthrow of tsarist autocracy, had been attained. At the end of March, he promised the immediate lifting of the ban, and on April 19, 1917, the Bundesrat sanctioned the re-establishment of the Jesuit Order in Germany.²²

Baumgarten applauded this boon to the Center, and Rade praised the removal of the "bone of contention" as the fitting conclusion to a long process of state action, assuring worried Protestants that their watchdog, the Protestant League, would keep a vigilant eye upon the Order. Schian, however, was dismayed. Since the Protestant League was the only group that formally protested, he concluded that the majority of Protestants had simply acquiesced in the measure, which he interpreted as the beginning of national surrender to the will of the Center. In his opinion, the Jesuits were the same determined opponents of the modern state and Protestantism as before, and ominously, the first act of Bethmann's "new direction" had been to purchase peace with them too dearly.²³

Only three months after this Catholic victory, Rome again stole the spotlight from Wittenberg when, in July, the

²²Bethmann's speeches of Feb. 37 and March 29, cited in Konrad Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann-Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, 1973), 327-330.

²³Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 380; Rade, "Die Jesuiten," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 528-529; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 239-240, 280-282, 372-378.

Center proposed and put through the Reichstag the famous resolution that called for a "peace of understanding" and rejected "forced territorial acquisitions."²⁴ Two weeks later, Protestantism was once more upstaged by Pope Benedict XV's peace proposal calling for a return to the status quo ante. Benedict was already unpopular in Germany. In 1916, when the nuncio to Munich, a German, had died, Benedict had replaced him with an Italian. The same year, he appointed seven Italians and three Frenchmen as cardinals, giving the Allies fifty red caps in the sacred college to the Central Powers' seven. The German Peace Note of December 12, 1916, he had not answered. In January, 1917, he had given papal Archchancellor Rudolf von Gerlach, the only German remaining at the Vatican, an indefinite vacation at home.²⁵

Some of the Protestant theologians therefore regarded his peace proposal as simply another slap in Germany's face. As noted earlier, Baumgarten argued that once an appeal to arms had been made, a war should be fought to the finish with might as the determining factor, not moral considerations, as the Pope urged. Schian agreed and rejoiced that no similar

²⁴The particulars of this resolution and its relation to the fall of Bethmann are discussed in Chapter IX.

²⁵Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 95, and VIII (1917), 143-144, 476, and "Der Krieg und der Vatican," in Schäfer (ed.), Der Krieg 1914-1917, 366; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 37-38; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 32, and XVIII (1918), 59.

proposal had come from the ranks of German Protestantism. Rade, however, was ashamed that his religious kinsmen had not lifted their voices in behalf of peace, complaining that Luther's "doctrine of the two kingdoms" had seduced them from their task of effecting a moralization of politics.²⁶ At the end of 1917, Seeberg reflected his disgust with the papacy by murmuring that one of the reasons for the general longing for peace was the "sinister advancement of ultramontanism." Indeed, the Vatican's efforts to maintain a strict neutrality and to work for peace were well repaid. In 1915, Troeltsch predicted that, while the war was a catastrophe for international Protestantism, Rome's prudent neutrality would reap its rewards. One tangible result was that during and immediately after the war England, Holland, Portugal, and France either resumed or began diplomatic relations with the Vatican.²⁷

Ironically, two other events which distressed the Protestants in their own Reformation year occurred on October 31-- the very day Luther had posted his ninety-five theses. Out

²⁶Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVII (1917), 32, 294; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 480; Rade, "Die Antwort der Mittelmächte auf die Friedensnote des Papstes," and "Zur äusseren und inneren Lage--Mitte November," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 716, 844; "Official Documents Looking Toward Peace," III, Inter. Concil., Nr. 119, Oct., 1917.

²⁷Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Nov. 17, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Troeltsch to Rade, April 30, 1915, cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 240; Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, IV, 23-30.

of respect for Catholic sensitivities, the customary celebrations at Wittenberg were cancelled, and the Kaiser and other state authorities refrained from public declarations. While these sacrifices had been anticipated by the knowledgeable, it came as a surprise to most that Germany acquired a Catholic chancellor!²⁸ The man displaced was Georg Michaelis, a staunch Protestant, the brother of a pastor, member of the League for Resolute Christianity, and President of the German Student Christian League. The majority parties in the Reichstag had never been very happy with him, for though they had helped oust Bethmann, his predecessor, they had not been consulted in his appointment. Moreover, they resented his qualified approval of their Peace Resolution--his famous "as I understand it." At the end of October, they consequently took advantage of his indiscreet attack on the Independent Socialists to demand his dismissal. Since the Kaiser was worried about the next war credits, he acceded to their wishes, and on October 31, Michaelis resigned. In an unprecedented move, the Reichstag not only brought down a chancellor singlehandedly but took a hand in naming his successor, the elderly Bavarian Minister-President, Count Georg von Hertling.²⁹

²⁸Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 315, 377-378; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 329, 567-573; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Oct. 18, 1916, Nov. 30, 1918.

²⁹Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, III, 268, notes that members of the League for Resolute Christianity had the letters "E.C." (Entschiedenenes Christentum) inscribed on their buttons and

Schian construed the naming of a Catholic as chancellor and minister-president of Prussia so soon after the pro-Jesuit legislation as confirmation of the oft-quoted claim that "the Center had become trump." Nathanael Bonwetsch similarly overrated the events as "the victory of parliamentarism and the rule of the black-red bloc." With his typical distain for anything short of demagogic thunderings, Lezius berated Hertling's inaugural address as "Jesuit gibberish."³⁰ Baumgarten, on the other hand, remained calmly faithful to the thesis of his Politik und Moral (1916) by endorsing the change. Though glad that Michaelis was a "resolute Christian," he acknowledged that such a person was often unsuited for political office, and he welcomed the more worldly-wise Hertling. But the count fell short of expectations, and when Prince Max of Baden became chancellor in October, 1918, Baumgarten complained that Germany had suffered under the "Jesuit-like cleverness" of the Hertling government, which had adopted a compromise course between the Reichstag majority's "peace of understanding" and the Supreme Command's inordinate territorial aims. Though declaring himself free from any anti-Catholic bias, he also admitted that he

stationery; Georg Michaelis, Für Staat und Volk (Berlin, 1922), 27, 193, 328-329, 367-370; Daniel Horn, The German Naval Mutinies of World War I (New Brunswick, 1969), 171-183; Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 238.

³⁰Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 574; Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Nov. 4, 1917, and Lezius to Seeberg, Dec. 2, 1917, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

was relieved to have a Protestant again at the helm of state. Schian, on the other hand, feared trouble from the two strongest parties in Prince Max's new government, the Catholics and the Socialists, whom he still distrusted as Reichsfeinde.³¹

What Schian disliked most about Catholicism, its political power, soon proved a boon to Protestantism. In January, 1919, one of the main issues in the election for the National Constituent Assembly was the role of religion in the new republic. The Majority Socialists, who favored reducing that role by separating church and state, won the largest number of seats, and it was primarily the Center, with the second largest representation, that prevented a complete separation. In 1916, Georg Pfeilschifter had urged Harnack to help their two faiths stand together after the war to protect the status of organized religion,³² and thus, the followers of Leo X and Luther, who had fought one another for more than four hundred years, linked arms to foil the disciples of Karl Marx.

The proper relationship of church and state was the most explosive issue on the other side of the religious truce, that

³¹Baumgarten, "Reichskanzler und Gemeinschaftschrist," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 823-827, and "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 379-380, and XVIII (1918), 33, 314-319; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 461.

³²Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche und Politik 1917-1919, 238-239; Foerster, "Die Stellung der evangelischen Kirche," in Melchoir et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 136-138; Pfeilschifter to Harnack, March 8, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

is, among Protestants themselves. The problem was: how could a Landeskirche, a territorial church, that was also a Staatskirche, a state church, and a Bekenntniskirche, a confessional church, fulfill its broad role as a Volkskirche, a people's church? In other words, how could people of diverse doctrinal persuasions confess the same creed and accept the state's enforcement of uniform belief within the territorial church? During the Reformation, the German Protestant churches had emerged as Landeskirchen that were at the same time Staatskirchen; that is each territorial unit (Land) had an established church controlled by the state authorities. In keeping with the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, several territorial princes loosened their control over their churches, and as a result of the Prussian revolution of 1848, the Prussian constitution of 1850 proclaimed a formal separation of civil and ecclesiastical administration. By this step, Prussia technically ceased to be a confessional state, but her church remained a confessional church in personal union with her ruler. Ecclesiastical officials rejected the idea of the church's being governed by the secular state but approved of her being led by the Landesherr, or sovereign, in his role as summus episcopus, or chief bishop. All faiths were placed on a parity, the state giving official recognition to the Catholic and Jewish as well as the Protestant churches and allowing them to tax their parishioners. In July, 1850, the Prussian Supreme Church Council was established as the highest body of the Protestant state church. Although formally

independent of the Prussian cabinet, its thirteen members were appointed by the king, who continued to exercise considerable influence over religious affairs. But the dual system of civil and ecclesiastical administration, described in Chapter I, left the Prussian church and those patterned after it a good deal of freedom. In fact, some theologians held that their autonomy made it incorrect to refer to them as "state" churches.³³

The universities were likewise state institutions, and the appointment of theology professors regularly sparked controversy between conservatives and liberals. In 1913, one academician charged that, of seven appointments to the Marburg theology faculty since 1892, the Prussian Ministry of Culture had not even consulted the faculty in two of the cases, had disregarded its wishes in three others, and had usually bypassed liberals, even if their scholarship exceeded that of other candidates.³⁴ During the war, conservatives wailed that August von Trott zu Solz, Minister of Culture from 1909 to 1917, was favoring liberals. When the liberal Rudolf Otto was named to the Breslau faculty in 1914, the

³³Shanahan, German Protestants Face the Social Question 1815-1871, 230-231; Schian, Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 41; Foerster, "Stellung der evangelischen Kirche," in Melchoir et al. (eds.) Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 95-97.

³⁴"Strassburg und Freiburg," by an "impartial professor," Die Hilfe, XIX (1913), 102-104.

conservative Friedrich Kropatscheck complained that faculty relations were strained to the breaking point. Seeberg similarly bemoaned the minister's acquiescence in Harnack's determination to bring Troeltsch to Berlin in 1915. The following year, Nathanael Bonwetsch accused the minister of always choosing a liberal if one were among the candidates, and he criticized Carl Mirbt, his fellow Göttingen conservative and church historian, for not maintaining a clear line between the "two religions" when the faculty made nominations to fill a vacancy.³⁵ When the conservative religious press in Prussia lamented the appointment of three liberal professors as typical of the times, Rade retorted that these had merely replaced others of similar leanings, and he chastised the grumblers with Jesus's words: "O ye of little faith." In the summer of 1917, Baumgarten was excited about the rumor that Chancellor Michaelis was going to replace Trott zu Solz with Harnack and was therefore disappointed when Friedrich Schmitt-Ott was named instead.³⁶

While Prussians squabbled, Hessians showed themselves remarkably conciliatory. In 1916, Wilhelm Bousset, a co-

³⁵Kropatscheck to Seeberg, May 19, 1915, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Jan. 26 and Nov. 17, 1916 and Nov. 4, 1917, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

³⁶Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 374, and XXXI (1917), 297, and "Die Kirche nach dem Kriege," Christl. Welt XXX (1916), 683; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 261, 283-385; Heinrich Weinelt to Harnack, Sept. 17, 1917, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, III, 276.

founder with Troeltsch of the liberal "history-of-religions" school, joined the predominantly liberal theology faculty at Giessen, Hesse-Darmstadt's only university. Conservative clerics became more anxious about the future of their theology students, but the Hessian state synod, also predominantly liberal, deferred to its conservative minority by permitting Giessen ministerial students to take their state theological examination before a theology faculty other than their own. Schian, a "mediating" theologian on the Giessen faculty, saluted the synod's action as a significant manifestation of the spirit of the Burgfriede and the first wartime step toward bringing the thirty-seven state churches closer together.³⁷

Other problems aggravated by the church's link to the state were its confessional nature and its disciplining of deviant clergy. In 1911, it will be remembered, the Prussian Disciplinary Board dismissed from the ministry Karl Jatho, a Cologne pastor, on charges of teaching pantheism. Gottfried Traub, a liberal Dortmund pastor, defended him, denounced the power of the board, declared compulsory allegiance to a strict confession inconsistent with the nature of Protestantism, and demanded that the Prussian Landeskirche abandon its

³⁷Schian, Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 28-31, and "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 571-572. Bousset was co-editor of the scholarly monthly, Theologische Rundschau, begun in 1897 and discontinued in 1917 because of various wartime problems. His Kyrios Christos (1913) provoked the wrath of conservatives by emphasizing the Hellenistic influences on Pauline theology. At his death in 1920, he was one of the pioneers of form criticism.

confessional status in order to become a true Volkskirche, embracing men of varied beliefs.³⁸ The Prussian Supreme Church Council defrocked him, but when the war came, his friends hoped that it would reverse its decision as an act of reconciliation in keeping with the religious truce. In September, 1914, the majority of his former parish petitioned the council for his re-instatement, but it refused. That same month, the Reichsbote, a conservative daily which had led the attack on Traub, demonstrated its sympathy by publishing one of his patriotic war letters. Traub's own weekly, Christliche Freiheit, and his occasional bulletins, Eiserne Blätter, likewise glowed with his love for the Fatherland. Rade and Baumgarten insisted that if civil and military officials were bending rules in order to re-instate dismissed personnel, church authorities could do the same, but their pleas came to nought. Only the revolution of November, 1918 prompted the council to rehabilitate Traub--and then, ironically, he became a member of its new advisory board.³⁹

The Jatho affair had even wider repercussions. Erich Foerster, a Frankfurt pastor and Honorary Professor of Church

³⁸Traub, Staatschristentum oder Volkskirche (Jena, 1911). The origin of the Disciplinary Board and the details of the Jatho and Traub affairs are discussed in Chapter I.

³⁹Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 1150-1151, and Dieser Krieg und Christentum, 32; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit, XV (1915), 313, and XVII (1917), 283-285; Schian, "Die christlichen Kirchen im Weltkrieg," in Schäfer (ed.), Der Krieg 1914-1916, 328, and Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche, 31; Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche, 111, 126.

History at Frankfurt University, was already concerned about the growing numbers of Marxist workers whose disenchantment with organized religion led them out of the churches, and the dismissal of Jatho triggered an immediate reaction. At a meeting of Rade's circle in 1911, he and Rade proposed a much-publicized solution to both crises. Somewhat like Traub, they suggested that the Prussian Landeskirche relinquish its confessional nature and become a purely economic and administrative entity. Without actually separating church and state, they wanted a further weakening of the church as a Staatskirche in order to accomodate liberals and conservatives. The majority of Rade's circle, including Baumgarten, supported the idea, but Harnack feared that it would mean the eventual dissolution of the territorial church and rejected it. Schian and ten other members of the Mittelpartei, a Prussian church faction, were so strongly opposed that they severed relations with Rade's circle.⁴⁰

Jatho died in 1913, but the issue was not buried with him. It assumed the form of a running debate between Rade and Theodor Kaftan, a general superintendent of the Schleswig Landeskirche and brother of Julius Kaftan, the Berlin theologian on the Supreme Council who had voted to defrock Traub. They began arguing in the summer of 1914 and continued their

⁴⁰Foerster, "Entstaatlichung der Kirche und Entkirchlichung des Staates," cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 194-200.

feud until the end of 1918. Both men acknowledged the impropriety of bickering under the exigencies of war, but neither was willing to let the other have the last word. With all the fervor of a crusading fundamentalist, Kaftan charged that Jatho's teachings showed that "two religions" existed in the church, not merely two types of the same religion, and this amounted to a compromise with truth. Rade retorted that Jesus was the central point of two different kinds of religion and begged Kaftan to retract his formula lest it aggravate the already existing ecclesiastical tensions. Kaftan refused. Rade was so irate that, like Luther in his debate with Zwingli, he denied Kaftan the hand of fellowship. Watching from the sidelines, Schian reflected his "mediating" theology by contending that liberal theology in general was merely one of two types of the same religion but that Jatho's brand was so far to the left that the church must avoid it and all other forms of pantheism.⁴¹

When the war suddenly swept the masses into the churches, Rade and Foerster began to reappraise the value of a state church. In 1915, they let a German pastor, Emil Fuchs, speak for them on the front page of Rade's periodical. Though arguing that a state church had no right to call itself a people's church unless it tolerated men like Jatho, Fuchs made no plea for a weakening of state control. In the

⁴¹Rade, "Zwei Religionen?" Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 729-731, 750-753, 828-830; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., V (1914), 555-557.

fall of that year, Rade gave a provocative address before a group of Württemberg church officials, similarly urging the territorial churches to continue their ties with the states but to become true people's churches by laying aside their confessional statements. He overconfidently interpreted the religious resurgence to mean that for the near future most Germans would not desire the separation of church and state. "What God has joined together," he exclaimed, "let not man put asunder." But the state, he cautioned, should exercise control only in matters of form, not in content or conscience. Infant baptism should still be observed as a means of perpetuating the church, but there should be no compulsory adult or confessional baptism. In short, the church must abandon its creedal basis and become "a nurturing institution for all, the just and the unjust, the believers and the unbelievers."⁴²

Foerster endorsed Rade's new proposal and retracted his former one as too severe. Schian did not see much difference between the two, but Baumgarten, who had supported the plan of 1911, contended that the new one was riddled with weaknesses. For one thing, he held that Rade had overestimated the masses' recent infatuation with religion and that even if his observations were valid, he had no right to assume

⁴²Fuchs, "Jatho und wir," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 374-383; Rade, Die Kirche nach dem Kriege, address of Sept. 16, 1915, 23-28, 34-35.

that the people's attitude would not change. Baumgarten also pointed out that Rade's rosy picture of future church-state relations was predicated on a state left essentially unaltered by the war, and this naively assumed a German victory. Events proved Baumgarten right on all counts. In fact, Rade's biographer admitted that the outcome of the war reduced Rade's address to "shadow boxing."⁴³ But Rade and Foerster were not the only foolish prophets. Seeberg and Heinrich Weinel expected not only the preservation of the Landeskirchen but even the creation of a national church, a Reichskirche. Rade and Schian had second thoughts on that score, arguing that since the churches had emerged as territorial churches, they should remain so.⁴⁴

As previously mentioned, in the summer of 1916, Friedrich Thimme tried to bolster the Burgfriede by publishing a collection of articles by German leaders in various fields. Baumgarten, Dunkmann, and Mahling attempted in their essays to bridge the gaps between their respective Protestant positions. The conservative Dunkmann stressed that both the right and left must readjust their views in order to achieve

⁴³Foerster, review of Rade's book in Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 196; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 41-45; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVI (1916), 67-69; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 242.

⁴⁴Seeberg, Was sollen wir den tun?, 51; Weinel, "Die deutsche Reichskirche," Kunstwart, Sept., 1915, cited in Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche, 214; Rade, Kirche nach dem Kriege, 35; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 43.

harmony and that the church must focus on ethical renewal, not doctrinal squabbling. The liberal Baumgarten sounded a note often echoed throughout the book: emulate the spirit of the trenches, for no man there inquired into the details of another's beliefs. The "mediating" theologian Mahling urged each church to be a Volkskirche, representing all the people, by regarding itself as a Bekennergemeinschaft, a community of confessors, not a Bekenntnissgemeinschaft, a confessional community. He chided church leaders for assuming that their members had actually subscribed to a definite confession of faith when in fact, he argued, they had merely confessed Christ as "the invisible centerpoint" of all that the term "church" implied. The church's duty, therefore, was to look after not the doctrinal purity but the piety, morality, and social problems of its people.⁴⁵

The calm that Thimme hoped to bring into religious circles was precluded in August, 1916, when the conservative general superintendent of Westphalia, Wilhelm Zöllner, dropped a bombshell into their midst. At a meeting of Prussian Lutherans, he reflected the dissatisfaction of "positive" minorities in liberal congregations by proposing that the Prussian church renounce its confessional character and

⁴⁵Dunkmann, "Die protestantischen Parteien nach den Kriege," and Baumgarten, "Burgfrieden unter den kirchlichen Parteien," and Mahling, "Die Kirche und ihre Friedensaufgaben im Volksleben," all in Thimme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 175-178, 216-217, 218-226.

establish instead individual confessional groups within it. Foerster was strongly opposed. He argued that the same kinds of conflicts that plagued the entire state church would crop up within the proposed bodies of conservative believers. He also held that many Christians would have difficulty choosing one group over another. Intellectually, they might prefer a liberal form of worship, but emotionally they would incline toward the familiar, conservative forms. He therefore suggested that doctrinally dissatisfied members of any congregation be allowed to attend a church other than the one prescribed by their place of residence.⁴⁶

Foerster's problems, were merely imaginary, argued Theodor von Häring, Ritschl's successor at Göttingen and his most conservative disciple. During the war, Häring taught at Tübingen in his native Württemberg, and he endorsed Zöllner's plan because he believed it was already working well in his own state. Deissmann went further, supporting the scheme on the claim that it amounted to only a formal legalization of what was actually going on also in Prussia. Baumgarten had just broached the idea of small confessional bodies himself, and while giving his blessing to the general superintendent's recommendation, scolded Foerster for disowning his own child. With his usual stress on realism,

⁴⁶Foerster, "Der Zwiespalt in der Kirche und ein Versuch zu seiner Lösung," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 768-771; Zöllner's address and many of its replies bore the same title.

Schian contended that the proposal did not strike at the root of the church's most serious problem, the aloofness of the masses, which he attributed not to their supposed dislike of specific doctrines but to their indifference toward religion in general.⁴⁷ With greater vigor, Wilhelm Herrmann criticized Zöllner for neglecting Paul's emphasis on pleasing God and not man, for ignoring Luther's warning against turning "the Word" into "law," and for rashly embracing Kaftan's "rabid" formula of "two religions." When Kaftan renewed his attack, Rade was so angry with his and Zöllner's resurrection of the divisive slogan that he labelled their tactics "sin."⁴⁸

The momentous events of 1917 caused Foerster to regret his backpedalling. The religious excitement began to subside, and increasing numbers resigned from the churches. The Socialist paper, Vorwärts, and the leaders of the working class continued their attacks on organized religion. The Russian revolution of March brought about a separation of her church and state. In July, the Kaiser promised the

⁴⁷Häring, "Der Zwiespalt in der Kirche und ein Versuch zu seiner Lösung," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 842-843; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Sept 20, 1916; Baumgarten, "Burgfrieden unter den kirchlichen Parteien," in Thimme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 215-216, and "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVI (1916), 394; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 477-480, 573-576, and "Volk, Kirche, Religion," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 455-463.

⁴⁸Herrmann, "Zöllners Reformvorschlag," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 743-744; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 1006.

abolition of the Prussian three-class voting system, and clerics feared that the resulting increase in the workers' political power would shortly mean an alteration of the church's status. It therefore seemed prudent to anticipate the inevitable and have the church itself take the initiative in reform. Foerster therefore made a second about-face. In the spring of 1918, he re-issued his proposal of 1911 for a self-governing and self-supporting church. Baumgarten rallied to his side; Schian was still opposed; but before much could be done, the war was over and Germany was busy dismantling her monarchies.⁴⁹

On November 14, 1918, Rade conceded that the state churches had collapsed with the Reich but recommended the creation of "councils" (the equivalent of Russian "soviets") to help organize people's churches. His appeal was supported by Foerster, Baumgarten, Rudolf Otto, Erich Seeberg, Friedrich Niebergall, and Friedrich Naumann. Before the year was out, he also urged that, though the separation of church and state was certain, the concept of institutionalized religion not be surrendered, for "religion without church is spirit without body." He further proposed that churchmen be allowed to assist secular officials in making the

⁴⁹Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVIII (1918), 191, 376-377; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 338-341; Foerster, "Stellung der evangelischen Kirche," in Melchoir et al. (eds.) Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 124.

necessary transition.⁵⁰ One of the most severe critics of the former ecclesiastical system was Deissmann. Just after the revolution, he predicted that the state churches were about to be presented a bill for their past sins, including their all too intimate relationship with the "Obrigkeitsstaat." Overdue reforms, he noted, included a broader franchise, extending also to women, for synodial elections and the appointment of "bishops" who would shepherd their flocks instead of tending to bureaucratic details. While admitting that the church needed "to oil itself with more than a drop of democratic oil," he also urged Germany's new Social Democratic leaders not to perpetuate the old errors of political liberalism by assuming an indifferent or hostile attitude toward religion.⁵¹

As previously noted, thanks to the Center's weight in the National Constituent Assembly of 1919, the Socialists' attempt to effect a complete separation of church and state failed. Harnack and Mausbach served on the constitutional committee that helped formulate the ecclesiastical provisions of the Weimar Constitution.⁵² Article 137 declared that

⁵⁰Rade, "Anzeigen an unsere protestantischen Volksgenossen," and "Grundlinien, Richtlinien, Ziellinien für die Volkskirchen-Räte," Christl. Welt, XXXII (1918), 466, 492, 500; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVIII (1918), 377-378; Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 260-261; Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche, 116-118.

⁵¹Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Nov. 30, 1918.

⁵²Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 385-390; Friedrich Purlitz (ed.), Die deutsche Reichsverfassung vom 11. August 1919 (Leipzig, 1919), 190-195.

"There is no state church," but this was almost superfluous, because there had been no Staatskirche in the strict sense, at least in Prussia, since 1850. More importantly, there was no longer a Prussian sovereign or any other sovereign to act as summus episcopus. Also, there was to be no civil administration paralleling and checking on the ecclesiastical hierarchy. But the churches retained many of their former privileges. They could still tax their members for support, and some states still acted as their collecting agencies. The states continued to assist the churches financially and to maintain the theology faculties, as they did the other faculties. Moreover, formal recognition was still accorded to ecclesiastical high days. No national church emerged, as Seeberg and Weinelt had hoped, but compared with the political changes on the national and state level, the churches came through the fire with hardly the smell of smoke upon them.⁵³

In retrospect, neither the Catholic-Protestant Burgfriede nor the truce among the Protestants themselves was a complete success. The Protestants' bright hope for rapprochement with the Catholics, heightened by the latter's patriotic responses, especially to the French propaganda attack, were clouded by fears of ultramontaniam and the Catholic triumphs of 1917. The Protestant truce was broken by the repercussions

⁵³Foerster, "Stellung der evangelischen Kirche," in Melchior et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 136-138; Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, IV, 248-249.

of the Jatho and Traub affairs and the repeated attempts to resolve the church-state dilemma. One of Karl Holl's favorite essays, written in 1917, demonstrated that Germany's previous wars had not dispelled religious differences but had accentuated them. World War I helped substantiate his thesis that, even in an hour of extremity, factionalism usually proved stronger than the desire for unity.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Holl, "Die Bedeutung der grossen Kriege für das religiöse und kirchliche Leben innerhalb des deutschen Protestantismus," Gesammelte Schriften, III, 382-383.

PAN-GERMANISM AND THE POLARIZATION OF THE PROFESSORS

Chapter VII

The theologians locked horns not only on ecclesiastical issues but even more stubbornly on political and strategic questions. They were above all patriotic Germans, absorbed in and ready to give advice on national problems. If that stock figure of western mythology, the unpolitical German, ever existed, he was not a Protestant theologian. This was especially true of the Berlin giants, Harnack, Seeberg, and Troeltsch. If their wartime writings had appeared anonymously, one would hardly have guessed the profession of the authors. Between 1914 and 1918, Troeltsch wrote more than thirty articles dealing with the war, but only one gave any more than passing mention to distinctly Christian topics. Harnack's and Seeberg's collected wartime essays reveal the same preoccupation with secular rather than spiritual themes. Moreover, these men were not passive observers, reflecting upon the controversies in the safety and serenity of an academic tower; they were involved. They sent telegrams, memoranda, and petitions to the chancellor, and they formed pressure groups to influence popular opinion as well as government policy. All in all, they were precisely the type of "political professor" that one American

historian says did not appear in Germany until the Second World War.¹

The theologians and other intellectuals jubilantly celebrated the Burgfriede supposedly inaugurated by the Kaiser's proclamation of August 4, 1914. Petty rivalries, party spirit, and particular interests were seemingly dwarfed by the enormity of the nation's new tasks. Doubtless the vision of a spirited four-month campaign, instead of the four-year war of attrition, contributed to the enthusiastic declarations of willingness of shelve political differences. Deissmann compared the phenomenal unity to the miracle of Pentecost, and Baumgarten likened it to the Tower of Babel in reverse--out of the peacetime confusion of tongues came a national language.² Yet the political truce had a short life. At the outset of the war, the government tried to prevent dissension by imposing censorship which prohibited a general discussion of war aims. In face of numerous protests, however, and in the hope that unleashing pent-up

¹Frank Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical History, 116-117, 134. For a list of Troeltsch's wartime articles, see his Gesammelte Schriften, IV, ed. by Hans Baron, 868-870; for Harnack's war essays, see his Reden und Aufsätze, III-IV (Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit and Erforschtes und Erlebtes); Seeberg published his early war utterances in his Geschichte, Krieg und Seele (1916).

²"William II's Speech from the Throne, August 4, 1914," in Ralph H. Lutz (ed.), Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918, I (Stanford, 1932), 8-9; Deissmann, "Vorwort," Deutscher Schwertsegen, 6; Baumgarten, "Der sittliche Zustand des deutschen Volkes unter dem Einfluss des Krieges," in Melchoir et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 44.

emotions would strengthen public morale for prolonged war, General Ludendorff ordered the muzzle to be loosened in November, 1916.³ The plan backfired, for it merely made more obvious the already present cleavage in public opinion.

The controversy over territorial aims was closely intertwined with two other hotly debated issues: the reform of the Prussian three-class voting system and the suitability of Bethmann-Hollweg as chancellor. The franchise question is dealt with in a later chapter, but it is imperative to recognize here that many annexationists opposed suffrage reform not only because they happened to be conservative in any case but also because they feared that the masses would be moderate and use their ballots to repudiate aggrandizement. Bethmann had begun his chancellorship with an abortive effort to change the antiquated Prussian system, and therefore, when the war broke out, he was already anathema to those who wanted to enlarge Germany's territory while maintaining her existing suffrage. As he observed in retrospect, agitation for extensive war aims went hand in hand with opposition to his policy of a "new direction" in political reform.⁴

³Konrad Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, 217. Even after November, 1916, Major Walter Nicolai of the War Press Office kept a close watch on statements about the Kaiser and submarine warfare; Lutz (ed.), Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918, I, 195.

⁴Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg, II, 31. Bethmann died early in Jan., 1921, just before finishing the second volume of his memoirs, which was completed by his son, Felix.

The chancellor's view of himself has in recent years been challenged by the Hamburg historian, Fritz Fischer, who sees Bethmann as an annexationist, distinguishable from the rest only by his greater finesse and circumspection. If this were so, however, it would be hard to account for the ferocity of the attacks on him by the annexationists and opponents of electoral reform. What follows therefore tends rather to confirm the moderate position of the American historian, Konrad Jarausch, who maintains that Bethmann tried conscientiously to emulate Bismarck's restrained Realpolitik.⁵ The chancellor's tragic flaw was that he lacked the charisma and instinct for personal power necessary to implement his convictions-- but it is to his credit that his defect lay here rather than in endorsing the extreme demands of Germany's military leaders, industrialists, and Pan-Germans.

The German public was roughly divided between those who supported Bethmann, domestic reform, and only moderate territorial gains, and those who opposed all three. Baumgarten stated that the nation was split into "two camps"; Meinecke spoke of "two systems"; and Troeltsch referred to "two poles."⁶

⁵Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, 1964; 1st ed., 1961); Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, *passim*, but especially 8, 187, 214-215, 400-401; Jarausch relies heavily on the diary of Bethmann's confidant, Kurt Riezler. In essential agreement with Jarausch are Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West (Baltimore, 1950) and Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, 1972; Germ. orig., 1964).

⁶Baumgarten, "Der sittliche Zustand," in Melchoir et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 45; Meinecke, "Zwei Systeme," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 708; Troeltsch, "Anklagen auf Defaitismus," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 668.

But like most issues, the territorial question was not cut and dried; it was a matter of degree and direction. Everyone recognized that some form of increased territorial control was desirable and necessary, but whether to move eastward or westward and whether to control tightly or loosely engendered controversy. The majority of professors, led by Seeberg, clamored for firm control in both directions, but since their primary interest was Belgium they can best be described as the "westerners" or "radicals." The minority, led by Harnack and Troeltsch, opposed this Drang nach Westen, urging instead that the government exchange Belgium for Germany's colonies, using her as a Faustpfand, or pawn, at the peace table. They held that the war was primarily against Russia and that Germany must content herself with some form of increased but still limited power over Poland, the Baltic provinces, and other Russian areas. Hence, they were the "easterners" or "moderates."⁷

The moderates labelled their opponents' aims as unrealistic, injurious, and immoral. A gargantuan territorial appetite, they objected, was an affront to both international morality and Germany's own ethical standards. Moreover, in view of Britain's determination to maintain an independent Belgium, they considered the restoration of the conquered

⁷The best contemporary account of the war aims controversy is Dietrich Schäfer's "Kriegszielbewegung," in Schäfer (ed.) Der Krieg, 1914-1917, 1-11. On the Faustpfand debate, see Hans Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXXIII (1918), 413-414.

country inevitable, though with an eye on the infamous "Brussels Documents" they desired some guarantee of her future neutrality. They also argued that the cultural and political disadvantages of acquiring new land often outweighed the economic and military gains. Germany had enough problems, they claimed, with assimilating the foreign populations of Schleswig, Posen, and Alsace-Lorraine, and new conquests would simply further injure the ideal of the "nation-state." The radicals, however, usually avoided the term "annexation [Annexion]," which implied enfranchisement, and spoke instead of making "attachments [Angliederungen]" to the Reich--autonomous areas whose inhabitants would have no voice in purely German affairs.

As early as January, 1915, Troeltsch correctly observed that it was the question of "imperialism" that divided his compatriots, and Baumgarten similarly concluded that Germany's initial goal of national defense had soon changed into dreams of conquest which split the nation apart.⁸ The polarization first became obvious in the summer of 1915, when Bethmann was presented with the so-called "Petition of the Intellectuals," supervised by Seeberg, and a counter-petition, sponsored by Hans Delbrück and his brother-in-law, Harnack. The fathers of the Seeberg petition were the Pan-Germans and the leaders of heavy industry. The Pan-German League was

⁸Troeltsch, "Imperialismus," Neue Rund., XXVI (1915), 1; Baumgarten, "Der sittliche Zustand," in Melchior et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 45.

founded in 1891 by the colonial enterpriser Karl Peters. Though its wartime membership reached only 34,000, its eighty-four affiliated organizations brought its total following to over 100,000, and its official weekly, All-deutsche Blätter, and other dailies edited by League members, gave it considerable press leverage.⁹ In 1914, its president was Heinrich Class, and before the war was a month old, he gave an address before its executive committee that became the springboard for the war aims discussion. Bemoaning the possibility of Prussian electoral reform and denouncing all its suspected supporters, including Bethmann, the Socialists, the intellectuals, and the Jews, he then demanded territorial acquisitions in the east and west, especially Belgium and northern France. At the end of December, 1914, nearly 2,000 influential figures received copies of the "Class Memorandum," which the government tried unsuccessfully to suppress.¹⁰

In January, 1915, Class, Alfred Hugenberg, chief director at Krupp and spokesman for heavy industry, and Ernst Hirsch, syndic of the Essen Chamber of Commerce, drafted a memorandum similar to Class's, and on March 10, five prominent trade

⁹Mildred S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, 1890-1914 (New York, 1924); Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 24-25. Papers under Pan-German influence included Tägliche Rundschau, Post, Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, and Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung.

¹⁰Class, Wider den Strom (Leipzig, 1932), 319-322; Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 26-28.

associations adopted it and sent it to the chancellor. The five lobbies--the League of Industrialists, the Central League of German Industrialists, the Agrarian League, the German Farmers League, and the League of Middle Class Citizens of the German Empire--also petitioned the Reichstag for an open discussion of war aims. On May 5, the Pan-German League sent Bethmann a petition calling for extensive conquests in the east and west, and two weeks later, a sixth economic lobby joined the other five in giving him a slightly revised form of their petition of March 10. This famous "Petition of the Six Trade Associations" of May 20 tried to protect its sponsors from the stigma of materialistic self-interest by insisting that its demands rested on military as well as economic considerations.¹¹

The suspicion was already current, however, that radical territorial aims stemmed from the industrialists' desires for profit. To meet this objection, Class, at the instigation of Emil Kirdorf and Carl Duisberg, two "captains of industry," and with the blessing of the ardent annexationist Count Kuno von Westarp, leader of the Conservative Party, decided to broaden the base of the annexationist movement and dignify it

¹¹Class, Wider den Strom, 359-362; Westarp, Konservative Politik, II, 162; "Eingabe des Alldeutschen Verbandes an den Herrn Reichskanzler über das politische Kriegsziel," May 5, 1915, copy in Harnack Nachlass, SBB; "Petition der sechs Wirtschaftsverbände an den Reichskanzler," May 20, 1915, in Grumbach (ed.), Das annexionistische Deutschland, 123-132; "Zur Frage der Erörterung der Kriegsziele," Alldt. Bl., XXV (1915), 91-92.

by adding the endorsement of intellectuals and professionals.¹²

In the spring of 1915, Class asked Dietrich Schäfer, a devoted member of the League and prominent Berlin historian, to head the endeavor, but Schäfer disagreed with Class over specific war aims and refused to lead the project though he agreed to help. Class therefore turned to Schäfer's colleague, Reinhold Seeberg, who enthusiastically took the job in good faith--not seeing himself, as later charged, as a tool of big business in a camouflage operation but as a patriot who wanted to goad his fellow professors into action. He believed that his compatriots desired and deserved territorial rewards for their sacrifices, and he was convinced that Bethmann and some of the diplomats already had a defeatist mentality that would sell Germany short. As a result of the failure at the Marne, the government had made its first tentative peace feelers toward Russia and England in November, 1914, and Seeberg feared that a separate peace with either foe would be a premature or "rotten" peace. As a native of Livonia and a member of the ten-man Baltic Consultant Council, he was excited about the prospect of returning the Baltic provinces to German rule. He grumbled that the chancellor was

¹²Class, Wider den Strom, 395; Westarp, Konservative Politik, II, 166. In his memoirs (Mein Leben, 169-170), Dietrich Schäfer denies that the project originated with the industrialists, but Amanda Seeberg names Kirdorf and Duisberg in her Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 261, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. See also Klaus Schwabe's study of the origins in "Ursprung und Verbreitung des alldeutschen Annexionismus in der deutschen Professorenschaft im ersten Weltkrieg (Zur Entstehung der Intellektuelleneingaben vom Sommer 1915)," Vtjh. f. Ztgscht., XIV (1966), 105-138.

courting the anti-annexationist Socialists by censoring in the press only radical demands.¹³ In October, 1914, Hans Delbrück publicly proclaimed that Germany's goal must be merely to maintain the existing balance of power on land and to attain a similar balance on sea. When the Pan-German press upbraided him, he defended his position as consonant with Bethmann's. In fact, the Pan-German Lezius dubbed him the chancellor's "press lackey." Seeberg therefore wanted to persuade what he saw as a weak and indecisive chancellor that the majority of intellectuals desired a victorious peace that brought notable gains. As he put it, he wanted "to strengthen the government's backbone."¹⁴

On March 26, 1915, he held his first meeting--a private one--in Berlin. After a lengthy discussion on war aims, the industrialists, led by Alfred Hugenberg, and the agriculturalists, led by Baron Konrad von Wangenheim, voiced agreement that Germany should make vigorous demands at the peace table. Exactly one month later, he held another confidential session attended by several leading Pan-Germans: General Konstantin von Gebsattel, the League's vice-president; Friedrich von Schwerin, district president of Frankfurt an der

¹³Seeberg to Bonwetsch, May 5, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Seeberg, "Selbstbiographie," in Arnim and Below (eds.), Deutscher Aufstieg, 420; Class, Wider den Strom, 395. Jarausch erroneously credits Schäfer with supervising the petition, Enigmatic Chancellor, 205.

¹⁴Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLVIII (1914), 191-192; Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 58; Lezius to Friedrich Kropatscheck, no date/May 7, 1915/, and Seeberg to Bonwetsch, May 5, 1915, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

Oder; Paul Fuhrmann and Ernst Hirsch, National Liberal deputies in the Prussian Lower House; Andreas Gildemeister, a Bremen merchant; and Lezius. Gildemeister submitted the draft of a petition, which was accepted with minor alterations, and plans were made to submit it to a large assembly in Berlin in June, in the meantime lining up as much academic support as possible. The group hoped especially to enlist the aid of, as Lezius called him, "the old odd ball," Adolf Wagner, a Berlin economist. To oversee the work, a thirteen-man committee was appointed, including seven professors; Seeberg as chairman; the Berlin historians Schäfer, Otto Hintze, and Friedrich Meinecke; the Berlin law professor, Otto von Gierke; the Heidelberg historian, Hermann Oncken; and the Bonn economist, Hermann Schumacher, a devotee of heavy industry. Five other members were Pan-Germans, including Schwerin, Gildemeister, and Kirdorf.¹⁵

Between April and June, Seeberg worked energetically to prompt his fellow professors to hoist their colors. His distrust of Bethmann was not diminished when the chancellor made his first public statement on war aims on May 28, 1915. Reacting to Italy's entrance into the war and trying to appear favorable to the annexationist fervor of recent petitions without offending the moderates by naming specific demands, he announced that Germany would fight until she had won "all

¹⁵Seeberg to Lezius, March 26, 1915, and Lezius to Kropatscheck, no date May 7, 1915, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Class, Wider den Strom, 395; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 169.

possible real guarantees and securities" against future attacks. Though the Reichstag and the press applauded the vague remark as a pledge to annexations, Seeberg remained a doubting Thomas and continued his labor. He was pessimistic, however, fearing that the intellectuals were really not excited about territorial gains or too timid to say so. He was particularly worried that the many varied connections of his own Berlin colleagues would make them hesitant to stand up and be counted. Lezius likewise sensed a great deal of indifference and blamed it on Bismarck's statement that Germany was "satiated." Indeed, during the Bismarck centennial of April, 1915, the moderates underscored the former chancellor's realism and restraint, but Seeberg thought that the intellectuals suffered not from the principle of "satiation" but from the English concept of "fair play"--as if that were something to be ashamed of.¹⁶

Trying to contact as many academicians as possible, Seeberg used several of his theological friends as liaison. For example, Lezius, his former fellow student at Dorpat, collected signatures for him at Königsberg, and Bonwetsch, his former teacher at Dorpat, did the same at Göttingen, where another conservative, Carl Mirbt, lavished praise on the petition. At Greifswald, church historian Friedrich Wiegand thought

¹⁶Bethmann's speech to the Reichstag, May 28, 1915, cited in Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 16; Seeberg to Lezius, March 26, 1915 and to Bonwetsch, May 5, 1915, and Lezius to Seeberg, Sept. 17, 1914 and Nov. 20, 1917, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

the document reflected more of the idealism and exaggerated aims of the "professors' parliament" of 1848 than the realism of Bismarck, but he endorsed it anyway.¹⁷

While signatures were pouring in, Seeberg had to navigate around the chancellor's opposition to the proposed assembly in Berlin. At first, Bethmann refused permission for a large rally, and even when he finally gave in, he still hoped to prevent the meeting by requiring the Berlin Chief of Police, Traugott von Jagow, to approve. But Jagow favored the project and posed no problem, whereupon Bethmann added another stipulation--the prohibition of any discussion following the speeches.¹⁸ Though regarding this as a serious handicap, Seeberg and the six other professors on the committee sent out invitations for a rally on June 20, 1915, the stated purpose of which was "to offer the government support at the future peace negotiations by clearly demonstrating the will of the people."¹⁹

On the appointed day, about 400 men from all over Germany gathered in the Berlin Artists' House. Seeberg gave the opening address, entitled "Our War Aims." Noting that

¹⁷Seeberg to Lezius, June 6, 1915, Bonwetsch to Seeberg, May 6, 1915, Mirbt to Seeberg, June 13, 1915, and Wiegand to Seeberg, June 19, 1915, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

¹⁸Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 262-263, and Seeberg to Lezius, June 6, 1915, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

¹⁹Invitation of June 9, 1915, cited in Schäfer, Mein Leben, 170.

many Germans seemed reluctant to sign a petition favoring an extension of Germany's boundaries because of a doctrinaire anxiety over a "war of conquest," he contended that such an enlargement was necessary because of the impossibility of restoring the old balance of power. Moreover, he argued, the moral right of war as an international test of strength meant that the victor deserved the spoils. Though speaking mainly in generalities, he concluded by naming specific goals: freeing the Baltic area from "the Russian yoke" and maintaining control over Belgium. Schäfer then delineated other general aims; Hermann Schumacher proposed several specific goals in the west; and Friedrich von Schwerin completed the picture by sketching in their ambitions in the east.²⁰

The petition was then submitted to the assembly, but the majority, including Schäfer himself, found the final paragraph too offensive and voted to delete it before approving the document. Possibly drafted by Lezius, the section stated that the popular dissatisfaction resulting from an inadequate peace settlement might provoke a revolution that would topple the monarchy. Businessmen and intellectuals had already

²⁰Seeberg, "Unsere Kriegsziele," address of June 20, 1915, privately printed by the Independent Committee for a German Peace, copy in collection of documents "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," UBM, and published as "Deutsche Zukunft" in Seeberg, Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 41-55; excerpts from Schumacher's speech in Grumbach, (ed.) Das annexionistische Deutschland, 171-173; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 170.

registered objections with Seeberg and Gildemeister, and therefore the assembly's decision could hardly have come as a surprise. Copies of the petition were again mailed out for additional signatures, and on July 8, 1915, it was sent to the chancellor bearing the impressive total of 1,347 names.²¹

The document began with the old cliché that "the pen of the diplomats would spoil what the sword had victoriously accomplished"--a gibe at Bethmann, who in February had publicly promised the unity of "pen and sword." The petition claimed that the people were unanimous in their desire for protection from another "surprise attack" and the ability to guarantee future generations a secure and larger homeland.²² The specific demands were draconian. France was to give Germany part of the north channel coast and its large enterprises, but the subjugated inhabitants were to have no voice

²¹Schäfer, Mein Leben, 170; a copy of the petition in the Seeberg Nachlass contains the finally deleted paragraph; a copy in the Delbrück Nachlass is the amended version. For objections to the paragraph, see Felix von Luschan to Seeberg, June 23, 1915, and A. Lohmann to Andreas Gildemeister, June 15, 1915, explaining the opposition of the Barmen Chamber of Commerce, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. Schwabe suggests the Pan-German Lezius as the possible author of the paragraph; "Ursprung und Verbreitung," Vtjh. f. Ztgtscht, XIV (1956), 125-126; and, if so, he may have been merely reflecting the idea used in the League's petition to Bethmann of May 5, 1915.

²²Copy of petition in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; [Bethmann], "Das Kriegsziel," Norddt. Allgem. Ztg., Feb. 21, 1915, cited in Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 199.

it was accordingly labelled the "Petition of the Intellectuals."

²³Copy of petition in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

in German affairs. Belgium was to be closely controlled militarily, politically, and economically, and the Flemish were to be brought back to their original Germanic culture. Since Germany's population growth must keep pace with Russia's, Russia must relinquish land for future German farmers, especially in the Baltic provinces. England, the primary villain, must grant freedom of the seas and give Germany an African colonial kingdom and partial control of the Suez Canal. Indemnities were to include not only the costs of the war but reparations, pensions, and funds to rebuild and expand the German military. Anticipating the charge that Germany's goal ought to be the spreading of her culture, not her might, it was argued that concern for the "German spirit" did not belong among war aims and that there could be no Kulturpolitik without Machtpolitik. Having thus presented "attainable goals," the petition capitalized on the recent Bismarck centennial by concluding with the Iron Chancellor's summons to heroic expectations: "If true in any realm, then it is so in that of policy, that faith actually moves mountains, and courage and victory are not cause and effect but are identical."²³

Judged by the number of its adherents, 1,347, the petition was a spectacular success. Over half of its supporters were intellectuals--352 university professors, 252 artists, writers, and publishers, and 158 clergymen and teachers-- and it was accordingly labelled the "Petition of the Intellectuals."

²³Copy of petition in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

Other professions represented included 182 men of commerce and industry, 148 justices and lawyers, 145 higher state officials, fifty-two agrarians, forty parliamentarians, and eighteen retired generals and admirals. Since the object of the declaration was to enable the industrialists and Pan-German League to stay in the background, it is surprising that, though neither Hugenberg nor Class signed it, Emil Kirdorf and Carl Duisberg did, along with League Vice-President Gebattel. Among the intellectuals, one of the most illustrious groups was the historians, including Erich Brandenburg, Erich Marcks, Eduard Meyer, Theodor Schiemann, and Dietrich Schäfer.²⁴

What naturally caught Seeberg's eye was the response of the Protestant theologians. Forty-one or nearly one-fifth of Germany's 220 signed his petition. Among them were Deissmann and Schian, who in light of other evidence were the least extreme; Richter, Mahling, Johannes Haussleiter; and twelve church historians, including Holl, Bonwetsch, Mirbt, Lezius, Wiegand, Albert Hauck, and Hermann Jordan. Ten of the eighteen Protestant theology faculties were represented, Breslau leading the way with seven of her thirteen theologians. Greifswald, Halle, and Leipzig each had five, which was about one-third of their theology faculties. Seeberg's fears about Berlin came true when only six of her two

²⁴Copy of petition with signature list, UBF; numerical breakdown given by Seeberg in Tägl. Rund., Oct. 11, 1915, and his article reprinted by Independent Committee as an undated flyer, copy in collection "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," UBM.

dozen theologians signed, and he was also disappointed to discover that nearly all of his forty-one were theological conservatives.²⁵ He had hoped that his petition had enough patriotic magnetism to attract all the religious factions, but he realized that success was unlikely. "It is not uncommon," he had remarked earlier in 1915, "that political antitheses and differences of world opinion receive their particularly sharp distinctions precisely out of the antitheses of the ecclesiastical and religious standpoint. It is precisely the religious element that often makes the separating cleavage between the one and the other unbridgeable."²⁶ Indeed, the theological world split predictably. Its responses to the war aims question were consistent with doctrinal attitudes. The conservatives, who held a more rigid and dogmatic theology, showed the same lack of compromise in regard to territorial goals, while the liberals rallied around a moderate petition sponsored by Harnack later in July.

The aloofness of the liberals was not Seeberg's only setback. No sooner had his petition been given to the chancellor than his triumph was marred by government opposition, bickering and defection among his disciples, and the launching of the counter-petition. When Bethmann learned of the

²⁵Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Sept. 7, 1915, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Sept. 9, 1915, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. For list of the forty-one theologians, see Appendix B.

²⁶Seeberg, Was sollen wir denn tun?, 13.

large numbers of signatures the petition had received, he was, as Seeberg correctly heard, "furious," fearing that if its popularity were known abroad, it would blacken Germany's already tarnished image. Consequently, he retracted his offer to receive the document personally. On July 23, 1915, two weeks after it had been delivered to his office, he declared that such a detailed treatment of war aims was premature and harmful and refused to comment on its demands. Rumor had it that he planned to suppress the petition, and Seeberg was relieved when it appeared that this was false; but his joy was short-lived, for when the chancellor learned that the document had been published abroad in early August, he ordered all copies confiscated and forbade its publication in Germany and the further collection of signatures. Authorities seized 30,000 copies in Bremen alone.²⁷

As Bethmann had dreaded, the petition became grist for the Allied propaganda mill. Salomon Grumbach, an Alsatian socialist who had fled to Switzerland, printed the entire document in his Das annexionistische Deutschland, and in America, The Literary Digest and Current History gave it immediate attention. J. W. Headlam, a British historian working in the Foreign Office, and Edwyn Bevan, a member of Britain's Department of Information, noted the similarities between it and its predecessor, the Petition of the Six Trade

²⁷Seeberg to Lezius, July 16 and 27, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 170-173, 180-181; Karl Wortmann, Geschichte der Deutschen Vaterlands-Partei 1917-1918 (Halle, 1926), 14.

Associations, branding both as "Pan-German."²⁸ Coming less than one year after the ill-starred "Appeal of the Ninety-Three," Seeberg's petition helped confirm foreign suspicion that German intellectuals worshipped Mars.

Another setback for Seeberg was the defection of two historians on the sponsoring committee, Friedrich Meinecke and Hermann Oncken. Hermann Schumacher had persuaded them to endorse what they understood was only the invitation to the June rally, not the petition, which they had not yet seen. Neither was able to attend the rally, and when it was subsequently reported that they had endorsed the petition, they publicly denied that they had ever wittingly given their names to it.²⁹ Hans Delbrück therefore argued that, since two of the sponsoring professors had dissociated themselves from the petition, which other scholars had no doubt signed because of their supposed endorsement, the large academic response was hardly valid. At any rate, he contended, the petition's claim to have the whole nation behind it was exaggerated. Seeberg's answer was that no one

²⁸Grumbach (ed.), Das annexionistische Deutschland, 132-140; "Peace Memorial of the German Professors," The Literary Digest, XXV (1915), 839-840; "Germany's Peace Terms. Manifesto of the German Professors," Current History, II (1915), 163-166; Headlam, The Issue (Boston, 1917), 56-57, 152-159; Bevan, The Pan-German Programme. The Petition of the Six Associations and the Manifesto of the Intellectuals (New York, 1918/), 7-10, and German War Aims (New York, 1918), 5-8.

²⁹Oncken to Delbrück, June 28, 1915, and Meinecke to Delbrück, June 24, 1915, both in Delbrück Nachlass, SBB; Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin 1901-1919, 203; Gatzke erroneously states that Otto Hintze withdrew his signature; Germany's Drive to the West, 122.

had ever said the two men had signed the document--a denial that Delbrück rejected on the grounds that the endorsement had been so widely reported.³⁰

Not only did Meinecke and Oncken dissociate themselves from the petition, but Seeberg himself nearly disowned the project. He had willingly shouldered the burden as a conscientious patriot but not as a puppet of the Pan-Germans and big business. Although sympathetic with Pan-German aims, he was not a member of the League, and his relations with heavy industry were strained. In February, 1915, he publicly noted that since the war had brought government control of prices, production, and the distribution of goods, the post-war era would inevitably bring some form of state socialism.³¹ By May, the industrialist press was castingsstone at the

³⁰Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXII (1915), 190, 360; Seeberg in Tägl. Rund., cited in Delbrück's editorials and in an undated flyer of the Independent Committee, copy in collection "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," UEM. A copy of the petition in the Delbrück Nachlass, BAK, presumably circulated in Delbrück's circle, states in an explanatory heading that Meinecke and Oncken signed it. The American Current History reported that the two had signed it, and the Englishman J. W. Headlam perpetuated that journal's fallacy in his The Issue, 152. Though the two men thought the petition's demands too harsh, they regarded the counter-petition too soft on Belgium and did not sign it either. Oncken hoped for the "military-political castration" of Belgium; Oncken to Delbrück, June 28, 1915, Delbrück Nachlass, SBB. Meinecke wanted to make Belgium a German protectorate or "Luxembourgize" her, that is, demilitarize her, draw her into the Zollverein, and limit her foreign representation to consulates; Meinecke to Delbrück, June 24, 1915, Delbrück Nachlass, SBB; Meinecke, "Sozialdemokratie und Machtpolitik," in Friedrich Thimme and Carl Legien (eds.), Die Arbeiterschaft im neuen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1915), 29.

³¹Seeberg, Was sollen wir denn tun?, 69-70.

would-be prophet. Shortly after the petition had been given to Bethmann in early July, 1915, reports began to circulate that Alfred Hugenberg had engineered the project and used the professors as lackeys. Seeberg felt personally insulted to see his labor of love stigmatized as a "contract job." The academicians were glad, he privately admitted, to walk "hand in hand with industry and agriculture" but resented being discredited as dupes. He complained to Lezius that Class had used Schumacher to pull the wool over their eyes.³² Therefore, when Seeberg's committee, having completed its assignment, dissolved itself at the end of July, 1915, but was then reconstituted as a new group to agitate for the petition's aims, Seeberg agreed to help but refused a position of leadership. As he later explained in veiled terms, he decided to step down lest the cause be crippled by "personal differences" that had arisen in his group.³³

A final blow to the radicals was the competition of a counter-petition, hurriedly fashioned by the moderates, who regarded Seeberg's followers as frondeurs. On July 2, 1915, Delbrück, Gerhard Anschütz, a member of the Berlin law faculty, and Prince Hermann Hatzfeldt, a Catholic member of the Prussian House of Lords, sent out invitations

³²Seeberg to Lezius, May 27, July 10 and 16, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

³³Seeberg, "Selbstbiographie," in Arnim and Below (eds.), Deutscher Aufstieg, 420; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 171.

to a meeting on July 7 to discuss western war aims. A second group led by Theodor Wolff, editor of the liberal Berliner Tageblatt, and Albert Ballin, director of the Hamburg-America shipping firm, who heard about Delbrück's meeting, was also active. Hatzfeldt opened the session by declaring that the fate of Belgium was the primary issue. Some of the fifty men present held that Germany should relinquish all control over the country, while others desired at least a mandatory customs union with her. When Wilhelm Kahl, a Berlin law professor, spoke against all outright annexations, eastward and westward, Ballin walked out. Hatzfeldt appointed a committee to draft a petition, including himself, Delbrück, Wolff, August Stein, director of Berlin bureau of the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung, and former Colonial Secretary Bernhard Dernburg.³⁴

On July 9, 1915, one day after Bethmann had received Seeberg's petition, the committee met at Delbrück's house in the Berlin suburb of Grunewald and discussed a draft submitted by Wolff. Kahl suggested that the professors could best be won by adding an ambiguous demand for a "peace

³⁴Circular letter of July 2, 1915, signed by Delbrück, Anschütz, and Hatzfeldt, Delbrück Nachlass, BAK; Wolff, Der Marsch durch zwei Jahrzehnte (Amsterdam, 1936), 268-269. Both Schwabe (Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral, 71) and Gatzke (Germany's Drive to the West, 132) confuse Prince Hermann Hatzfeldt, Duke of Trachenberg, with Count Paul Hatzfeldt, ambassador to England from 1885 until his death in 1901. Ballin had already hinted at his desire for German control over the port of Zeebrugge, in his "Das nasse Dreieck," Frkft. Ztg., Jan. 5, 1915; but Lezius still classed him with other Jews and moderates who wanted a "rotten peace"; Lezius to Kropatscheck, May 7, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. See also Lamar Cecil, Albert Ballin. Business and Politics in Imperial Germany 1888-1918 (Princeton, 1967), 264-266.

corresponding to the sacrifices made." Already a popular concept, it resembled the spirit of the paragraph finally deleted from the "Petition of the Intellectuals," but without threatening a possible revolution. To help settle the matter, the committee called upon the expertise of Harnack, Delbrück's brother-in-law and neighbor. By way of compromise, he proposed a modified version of Kahl's idea. With everyone satisfied, and with the valuable addition of an intimate of the Kaiser and chancellor, the group sent out copies of the declaration, endorsed by Harnack, Delbrück, Kahl, Hatzfeldt, and Dernburg, to potential signatories. The committee did not aim at large numbers, as Seeberg had, but only a representative sampling; and certain professions, parliamentarians, for example, were not contacted at all.³⁵

There was no mistaking the actual target of either the radicals' or moderates' efforts--it was the chancellor. While the former wanted to goad him into a commitment for large war aims, the latter hoped to keep him from succumbing to the waves of chauvinism. While Harnack's associates were collecting signatures, he assured Bethmann that the purpose of their action was to express confidence in his

³⁵Wolff, Marsch durch zwei Jahrzehnte, 270, and Vollendete Tatsachen 1914-1917 (Berlin, 1918), 242-243; circular letter of July 9, 1915, Delbrück Nachlass, BAK; Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXII (1915), 360. Fischer erroneously names Georg Bernhard, editor of the Vossische Zeitung, as author of the petition; Griff nach der Weltmacht, 207.

leadership. The radicals' territorial aims and dreams of a peace that automatically secured Germany from attack, he insisted, were utopian and pernicious. A satisfactory peace, he argued, would maintain the nation-state without "foreign burdens" but enlarge its borders where military security so dictated or where actual Germanization was possible; preclude England's domination of the Belgian coast; retrieve, multiply, and militarily strengthen Germany's colonies; and guarantee financial compensation for the conquered areas which she would give up.³⁶ But Bethmann did not eagerly reach for the intended life preserver being tossed him by the moderates. He thought it still too early for a declaration of war aims and even told Albert Ballin not to sign the petition.³⁷

The document itself was not lengthy and detailed like the Seeberg petition. One-seventh as long, it had only four paragraphs which demanded neither territories, indemnities, nor reparations. It stressed that since Germany had drawn the sword for self-preservation, her greatest victory prize would be the proud assurance that she had withstood a world of enemies. The crucial section stated that the areas Germany would evacuate must never be allowed to become enemy bulwarks, but that "the incorporation or attachment of

³⁶Undated, handwritten letter on back of typed invitation issued by Delbrück, Anschütz, and Hatzfeldt on July 2, 1915, Delbrück Nachlass, BAK (see footnote 34 above); the handwriting is unmistakably Harnack's, the intended recipient undoubtedly Bethmann.

³⁷Wolff, Marsch durch zwei Jahrzehnte, 270.

politically independent peoples or peoples accustomed to independence" was contrary to the ideal of the German nation-state, which had only slowly and incompletely assimilated foreign peoples. Surprisingly, no allusion was made to Bismarck. Within a couple of weeks, the petition attracted ninety signatures, and on July 28, 1915, the chancellor accepted it personally. He also allowed it to be published, and by October it had gained fifty-one more supporters.³⁸

At first glance, it seems that Seeberg's 1,347 names compared to Harnack's 141 was an overwhelming endorsement of radical war aims. But the numerical disparity obscures significant similarities. Half of the supporters of both petitions were intellectuals. Seeberg had 762, of whom 352 were university professors, and Harnack had seventy-one professors. Although Seeberg carried the day with the historians-- Delbrück was the only prominent one among the moderates-- both documents boasted distinguished signatures. The counter-petition was signed by eminent scholars, such as Gustav von

³⁸Copy of petition, dated July 27, 1915, with ninety names, Delbrück Nachlass, BAK; Delbrück published only the list of 141 signatures in "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXII (1915), 168-172, but many other periodicals and papers printed the text, including Alldt. Bl., XXV (1915), 280. Schwabe notes that Bethmann received it personally; Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral, 225, footnote 218. The petition was not publicized abroad nearly as much as Seeberg's; although English propagandist Edwyn Bevan (German War Aims, 17-18), praised its moderation, American law professor Munroe Smith branded it a government cover-up job to offset the bad impression made by Seeberg's document and criticized Grumbach (Das annexionistische Deutschland, 409-411) for listing it as one of the few German "anti-annexationist" declarations; Smith, Statecraft and Militarism (New York, 1918), 232-234.

Schmoller, Max Planck, and Max Weber, who was Otto Baumgarten's cousin, and also by men of wealth, such as Franz von Mendelssohn, head of the famous Berlin banking house, Karl Friedrich von Siemens, director of a huge electrical firm, and Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, the richest (next to the Kaiser) man in Germany. Seeberg had forty-one theologians, or 1/32 of his total; Harnack had nine, or 1/16 of his number: himself and Troeltsch from Berlin, Baumgarten from Kiel, Rade and Wilhelm Herrmann from Marburg, Arthur Titius and Julius Wellhausen from Göttingen, Georg Henrici from Leipzig, and Friedrich Loofs from Halle. Unlike Seeberg's supporters, only a small number (Harnack and his former student, Loofs) taught church history, whereas nearly half (Rade, Herrmann, Titius, and Troeltsch before coming to Berlin) taught systematic theology. More importantly, all nine were theological liberals, and while Bonwetsch was disappointed that men of such stripe had shied away from the Seeberg petition, he rejoiced that none of his fellow conservatives had flocked around Harnack's endeavor.³⁹

³⁹Signature list of Seeberg petition in UBF; signature list of Harnack petition in Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXII (1915), 168-172; Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Sept. 9, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. Gatzke erroneously lists former ambassador Count Paul Wolff-Metternich among the signers; Germany's Drive to the West, 133. Titius succeeded Harnack in 1910 as chief editor of the Theologische Literaturzeitung, a critical review of theological scholarship; Henrici was a forerunner of the "history of religions" school, though he still held a high regard for the Scriptures; Loofs was one of the four co-founders of Rade's Die Christliche Welt. For additional information about the nine theologians and names of other signers, see Appendix C.

The Alldeutsche Blätter gleefully pointed out that fourteen of the signers were members of or affiliated with the pacifist League of the New Fatherland, including Albert Einstein, Walther Schücking, Lujo Brentano, and Ferdinand Tönnies. The Pan-Germans also gloated over what was to them the damaging signatures of the liberal editors Wolff, Stein, and Delbrück, lamenting that Delbrück had ironically succeeded none other than Treitschke as editor of the Preussische Jahrbücher. Such a pack of Flaumacher or "do-nothings," the Pan-Germans howled, dishonored any document from the start.⁴⁰

Although knowing who supported the declaration, the radicals were in a quandary about who had inspired it and exactly what it meant. Lezius erroneously guessed that it had originated with a patriotic organization formed in February, 1915, by Wilhelm Kahl, the Independent Association of the Fatherland. Dedicated to upholding the Burgfriede, it contained men of various persuasions, but with Harnack and Delbrück among its founders and with Bethmann's public endorsement its basically moderate nature was evident, and it was therefore a likely suspect.⁴¹ As to the meaning and

⁴⁰"Alldeutsche Umschau," "Die Flaumacher an der Arbeit," "Kriegsprofessorium," Alldt. Bl., XXV (1915), 280-281, 307-308, and XXVI (1916), 368. The League of the New Fatherland is discussed in Chapter IV. For information in its membership, see Pierre Grappin, Le Bund "Neues Vaterland" (1914-1916). Ses rapports avec Romain Rolland, 49; and undated circular letter entitled "Betriff die Eingabe des Herrn Delbrück und Genossen," Traub Nachlass, BAK.

⁴¹Lezius to Kropatscheck, Aug. 19, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. For the founding of the Association, see Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLX (1915), 178-184.

intent of the document, not until August, 1917, did Delbrück publicly explain that its primary aim had been to discourage the annexation of Belgium. The eastern question, he noted, and especially the future of the Baltic area, had been left entirely open. Seeberg and Lezius initially heard that the petition opposed all annexation, but Bonwetsch was more correctly informed that it was a "compromise formula" and assured Seeberg that although some of its adherents rejected all territorial gains, Harnack and others were not willing to go that far. In fact, at the end of July, 1915, Delbrück proposed to Seeberg that their two groups issue a joint statement on eastern aims, but Seeberg refused.⁴² Instead, it was the Baltic Consultant Council that on July 28 presented such a declaration to Bethmann, who accepted it personally. Founded in May, 1915, this group of ten native Balts who had settled in Germany included Seeberg and the Berlin historian Theodor Schiemann, and they demanded that the coming peace bring Estonia, Livonia, and Courland within the Reich. In March, 1917, a similar petition was given to the chancellor by Meinecke, Karl Friedrich von Siemens, and Eugen Schiffer, a National Liberal member of the Reichstag. Demanding the

⁴²Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXIX (1917), 306-307; Seeberg to Lezius, July 16, 1915, and Lezius to Kropatscheck, Aug. 19, 1915, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Sept. 9, 1915, and Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Sept. 7, 1915, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

"reunion" of the Baltic provinces within the empire, it attracted the impressive total of 20,000 signatures.⁴³

Without question, many of the moderates desired an extension of Germany's power eastward, but their attitude on Belgium is still disputed. The center of controversy is a famous letter that Harnack wrote a fellow Balt on July 31, 1915, three days after Bethmann had received the counter-petition. Several of his fellow Balts were perturbed to conclude from his support of the declaration that he opposed even the renewal of German control over his former homeland. He assured his friend that this was not true and blamed the distorted interpretation of the Pan-Germans. Moreover, he added, if one read the document correctly, he would see that "nothing is excluded except the naked annexation of the Belgian state. Neither the annexation of parts of Belgium, nor a disposition under which Belgium would become partially or entirely dependent on us, is excluded."⁴⁴

Fritz Fischer makes this letter "Exhibit A" in his case for the essential similarity of the moderates and the radicals. Determined to minimize the distance between not only Bethmann and the Supreme Command but between Harnack and Seeberg

⁴³Copies of the two petitions are in the Johannes Haller Nachlass, BAK. The Baltic Consultant Council was a product of the Association of Balts, founded in 1908; the Council should not be confused with the German-Balt Society, founded in May, 1917.

⁴⁴Harnack to Silvio Broedrich-Kurmahlen, July 31, 1915, in Broedrich, Das neue Ostland, privately printed memorandum (Charlottenburg, 1915), 44.

as well, he overlooks the fact that when Seeberg learned of the letter, he called attention only to Harnack's remarks on the east, seemingly attaching no weight to the supposed concessions on Belgium. What Harnack was doing, as Klaus Schwabe correctly deduces, was giving the petition the broadest possible interpretation in order to secure the widest possible support for the chancellor, whose formula of "real guarantees and securities" implied some form of assurance that Belgium would not secretly ally with Germany's enemies.⁴⁵ Thus, although the wording of the petition was elastic enough to permit the possibilities Harnack mentioned, his personal views were a different matter. As he confided to another friend a month later: "I am more than ever convinced that in the east we must join to ourselves Balts, Lithuanians, Livonians, and Estonians. In the west, for the time being, I still hold the negative viewpoint: never again must Belgium be a confederate of England and France."⁴⁶

Harnack manifested no personal desire to annex parts of Belgium or make her dependent on Germany; he merely hoped to preclude a future set of "Brussels Documents." In the aftermath of the war, he publicly explained that his signature on

⁴⁵Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 207-208; Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Sept. 7, 1915; Schwabe, "Ursprung und Verbreitung," Vtjh. f. Ztgscht., XIV (1966), 134, footnote 125. Fischer is echoed by his disciple Karl Hammer, Deutsche Kriegstheologie 1871-1918, 68-69.

⁴⁶Harnack to Gottfried Traub, Aug. 29, 1915, Traub Nachlass, BAK.

the counter-petition was a vote against "any annexation of the west."⁴⁷ Furthermore, by the middle of 1917, he had retreated from even his occasional aggressiveness of the earlier war years. Just before Bethmann fell from office, Harnack begged him to issue a new peace proposal to the Allies, more conciliatory than the offer of the previous December, and to be prepared to make sacrifices--even Belgium.⁴⁸

The appearance of the two petitions in the summer of 1915 clearly meant that the political Burgfriede was dead. Addressing a patriotic rally in July, Troeltsch conceded that the unity of August 1914 was gone but urged his countrymen to remain "brothers."⁴⁹ But the moderates regarded the radicals as frondeurs, and the radicals saw the moderates as "Flaumacher"; a very unbrotherly contest between them had just begun.

Undaunted by the government's opposition to its petition, Seeberg's committee reconstituted itself on July 29, 1915, and Dietrich Schäfer accepted Seeberg's nomination for president. Ten men were present at the founding, including the National Liberal deputy Paul Fuhrmann, Berlin historian

⁴⁷Harnack, Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 280, footnote 1.

⁴⁸Harnack, "Das Gebot der Stunde," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 302.

⁴⁹Troeltsch, "Der Kulturkrieg," Deutsche Reden, III, 241.

Eduard Meyer, and several members of the previous committee: Seeberg, Schäfer, Kirdorf, Gildemeister, and Schwerin. With his usual lack of modesty, Heinrich Class later claimed that the "Schäfer Committee" was his brainchild.⁵⁰

The new group met next on September 4, 1915. In order not to have to register with the police and have its activities investigated, it decided not to take an official name or constitute itself a formal organization. Its immediate goals were to find contact men in various cities and to secure more signatures for the Seeberg petition. Since the censor had suppressed the petition, the group resolved at the end of October to restate its aims in another form, and Schäfer therefore wrote a thinly disguised substitute, a pamphlet innocuously entitled "The Situation at Hand."

Circulated privately at the beginning of 1916, it met the same fate as its predecessor. Early in March, police confiscated over 2,000 copies in Berlin.⁵¹

That same month, however, the committee scored one of its greatest successes: the marshalling of support for Admiral Tirpitz' policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. Schäfer succeeded in rounding up 40,000 signatures for a petition to the Reichstag and 28,000 for a similar one to the Kaiser calling for "the most stringent U-boat war imaginable,"

⁵⁰Seeberg to Lezius, July 27, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 171-172; Class, Wider den Strom, 398.

⁵¹Schäfer, Mein Leben, 172-174, 181-182; Schäfer to Traub, Oct. 9, 1915, Traub Nachlass, BAK.

and agitation for this goal remained one of Schäfer's primary concerns. By the summer of 1916, the committee had forty members, including Ernst Hirsch, Carl Duisberg, the East Prussian bureaucrat Wolfgang Kapp, and the leaders of the Agrarian League, Gustav Rösicke and Baron Konrad von Wangenheim; it had 300 other contacts and had established local branches in two dozen cities. Seeberg's friend, Friedrich Kropatscheck, a Breslau theologian, helped organize the branch in his city. On June 25, the group held its first large meeting in Berlin, and the 350 men present unanimously approved Schäfer's address advocating extensive war aims.⁵²

Meanwhile, the friends of the chancellor and the counter-petition themselves began to organize, and in July, 1916, they formed the National Committee for a German Peace. Its father was Matthias Erzberger, who in April had urged Bethmann to seize the initiative in the war aims discussion by establishing a nominally independent but governmentally controlled propaganda bureau. In June, Ulrich Rauscher, an editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung, similarly recommended a huge patriotic organization to help the government combat Pan-German pressure tactics, and to attract the masses, he proposed General Hindenburg for honorary president. Beth-

⁵²Schäfer, Mein Leben, 172, 181-183, 188; Tirpitz, Erinnerungen, 362-367; Ritter, Sword and the Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden, 169-171; Kropatscheck to Seeberg, Jan. 5, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1 (1916), 126-127.

mann turned to Harnack, who agreed that something must be done to thwart the dangerous and "politically blind" Pan-Germans, who wanted to conquer the world "solely with the fist." Therefore, with the chancellor's blessing, the project was provisionally entrusted to Prince Karl von Wedel, former governor of Alsace-Lorraine.⁵³

On July 5, 1916, Wedel and fifteen others, including Harnack, Kahl, and the banker Paul von Schwabach, met in Berlin and formally organized the committee. Twenty other sympathizers sent apologies for their absence, including Catholic theologian Joseph Mausbach and the industrialists August Thyssen and the Röchling brothers, Hermann and Louis. Wedel accepted the nomination for president, and Fritz Röchling, a cousin of the industrialists, agreed to serve as managing director. No mention was made of Hindenburg. Harnack offered suggestions for the committee's initial press release and for the rallies to be held on August 1 to drum up mass support, insisting that the group stress that England as well as Germany had pawns to trade, notably the colonies, and that Germany was therefore in no position to dictate the peace. Also discussed was the immediate need

⁵³Erzberger to Bethmann, April 13, 1916, and Rauscher to Wahnschaffe, June 2 and 21, 1916, both in ZSTA Potsdam, Akten der Reichskanzlei, Nationaler Ausschuss, call nos. 2-11, 57-63, 76-81; Harnack to Delbrück, July 7, 1916, Delbrück Nachlass, SBB. See also Westarp, Konservative Politik, II, 185-186; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 188-189; Klaus Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (Princeton, 1959), 111.

of more money to finance the committee's large propaganda bureau, headed by Ulrich Rauscher and Peter Breuer, also of the Frankfurter Zeitung.⁵⁴

On July 6, German newspapers carried the committee's first public announcement, a brief, innocuous statement about the formation of the committee, whose task was "while avoiding all one-sidedness, to awaken a unified understand of the German people for an honorable peace, one that guarantees the secure future of the Reich." With the exception of President Wedel, no names were mentioned. This careful approach was what Harnack described to Delbrück as the committee's "indirect attack."⁵⁵ On July 12, Peter Klöckner and Baron Hans von Bodenhausen-Degener, a director at Krupp, joined their fellow tycoons, Thyssen and the Röchling brothers. The magician behind this anomaly of industrial support for a moderate program backed by the chancellor was the seemingly omnipotent and omnipresent Erzberger. Thyssen wanted a wire-puller in Berlin to swing government contracts his way and, as a Catholic who considered the industry-oriented National Liberal Party too Protestant, turned to the Center, persuading Erzberger in the summer of 1915 to join his board of directors. The following summer, at Bethmann's request,

⁵⁴Protocol of meeting of July 5, 1916, ZSTA Potsdam, Akten der Reichskanzlei, Nationaler Ausschuss, call nos. 102-108.

⁵⁵Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1 (1916), 345-346; Harnack to Delbrück, July 7, 1916, Delbrück Nachlass, SBB.

Erzberger asked Thyssen for a return favor: to join the National Committee and to win over Klöckner and Bodenhausen-Degener. All three joined--but two with strong reservations. Incorporating Antwerp and part of the North Sea coast was a must for Thyssen, and the committee's flirtation with the Frankfurter Zeitung filled Bodenhausen with grave concern. These misgivings soon helped spell the demise of the ill-fated group.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Schäfer's committee was not content to sit by and let the moderates steal the show. On July 13, 1916, it came out of the woodwork and proclaimed its existence as the "Independent Committee for the German Peace." The battle was now in the open, and it was short. The National Committee responded by issuing a formal manifesto. Discarding the discretion of its previous announcement, it boldly declared that its purpose was to steer a middle course between a "rotten peace" and "annexationist madness." This meant avoiding the "lack of fight in the peacemakers-at-any-price" and the "insatiability of the current pronouncements of the Pan-German League," in other words, supporting the war aims which Bethmann had announced the previous March and which Hindenburg had endorsed, namely, "the extension of

⁵⁶Bodenhausen-Degener to Kurt Riezler (two letters), and Thyssen to Bodenhausen, and Bodenhausen to Thyssen, all four dated July 12, 1916, ZSTA Potsdam, Akten der Reichskanzlei, Nationaler Ausschuss, call nos. 114-119; Epstein, Erzberger, 109-111.

of our borders eastward and real guarantees in the west." The manifesto bore twenty-one names, including Thyssen, the Röchling brothers, Schwabach, Mausbach, and at the top of the list, Wedel and Harnack, who unofficially served as vice-president.⁵⁷

As Count Kuno von Westarp correctly observed, the National Committee was "for all practical purposes directed exclusively against the Pan-Germans."⁵⁸ In fact, its manifesto had the audacity to berate not merely the often disparaged Pan-German movement in general but the League itself. Such a pointed attack prompted the League's vice-president, General Gebattel, to suspect the guiding hand of Harnack, whose private denunciation of the Pan-Germans the previous summer in connection with the counter-petition had earned him a blistering rebuke from the League's managing director.⁵⁹ In a bitter exchange of letters, Harnack denied that he had drafted the manifesto but refused to apologize for its bluntness. Gebattel asked him to identify the "pronouncements" which the manifesto deplored, claiming that the League's sole official wartime statement was its petition of May 5, 1915 to the chancellor. Admitting

⁵⁷Schäfer, Mein Leben, 189; Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1 (1916), 345-346; "Deutscher National-Ausschuss und Alldeutscher Verband," Alldt. Bl., XXVI (1916), 289; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 361.

⁵⁸Westarp, Konservative Politik, II, 186.

⁵⁹Harnack to Silvio Broederich-Kurmahlen, July 31, 1915, cited in Leopold von Vietinghoff-Scheel to Harnack, Aug. 21, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

that he was not familiar with this document, Harnack replied that the manifesto referred to the numerous statements which the League had been making in its periodical for years. Gebattel was astonished to learn that Harnack, whom he christened the committee's "intellectual leader," had endorsed an attack upon the League without knowledge of its only wartime statement to the government. Upon receiving a copy from Gebattel, Harnack exclaimed that "insatiable" aptly described the Pan-German desire to rule Belgium as, in his words, "a German Ireland." Hoping to discredit Harnack and the committee, the Alldeutsche Blätter, without Harnack's consent, published the exchange of letters.⁶⁰

The Pan-Germans also tried in other ways to undermine the committee. For one thing, they claimed that Prince Wedel had bungled the "Zabern Affair" when he was governor of Alsace-Lorraine. They also pointed out that during his administration his wife had sent flowers to an outspoken critic of the government, Reichstag deputy Abbé E. Wetterlé, who was then serving a short prison term for libel and who on the eve of the war fled to France to escape indictment for treason. They also imputed guilt by association, linking the committee with the counter-petition of 1915, even though only five of the manifesto's twenty-one signatures appeared on the earlier document. They further bemoaned

⁶⁰Gebattel to Harnack, July 16 and 22, 1916, and Harnack to Gebattel, July 18 and 25, 1916, all in Alldt. Bl., XXVI (1916), 289-291, 305-306.

the reaction of the foreign press. Since British, French, and Italian newspapers stamped the new group as the government's semi-official peace society, they complained that it fostered the image of a war-weary Germany.⁶¹

Even the committee's sponsor, the chancellor, seemed a doubtful friend. While completing plans for the committee's rallies of August 1, 1916, Fritz Röchling begged Bethmann to rescind the prohibition on the discussion of war aims and allow the speakers full freedom of expression. But Bethmann was reluctant, fearing that such liberty would be abused to champion too moderate a policy and that he would be branded a defeatist because of his known or suspected association with the committee. He therefore instructed his new watchdog not to bite and to bark only softly.⁶²

In an effort to construct a broad base for the chancellor, the committee asked men of various persuasions to speak at the rallies and to stress "the positive, the unifying, and the already achieved."⁶³ It even contacted those whom it

⁶¹"Die Reklame des 'Deutschen Nationalausschusses,'" Dt. Tagztg., July 20, 1916; "Deutscher National-Ausschuss und Alldeutscher Verband," and "Nochmals: Deutscher Nationalausschuss und Alldeutscher Verband," Alldt. Bl., XXVI (1916), 290-291, 306-307. Wetterle is discussed in Chapter V.

⁶²Fritz Röchling to Bethmann, July 14, 1916, and Bethmann to National Committee, July 18, 1916, and Arnold Wahnschaffe to National Committee, July 25, 1916, ZSTA Potsdam, Akten der Reichskanzlei, Nationaler Ausschuss, call nos. 125-127, 158-159, 170.

⁶³Prince Karl von Wedel to Gottfried Traub, July 4, 1916, Traub Nachlass, BAK.

knew or suspected had signed the Seeberg petition, including Gottfried Traub, who declined, and Adolf Deissmann and Erich Marcks, who accepted. Initially, the committee planned to hold meetings in fifty cities, but arrangements could be made in only thirty-nine, with forty-two men scheduled to give addresses. Four of them had signed the Seeberg petition, ten the counter-petition, and twenty-eight neither. The latter included the Progressive deputies Friedrich von Payer and Friedrich Naumann, the historians Hermann Oncken and his Walter Goetz, and the liberal theologian Wilhelm Bousset. Half of the speakers were professors, including the theologians Harnack, Rade, Baumgarten, Bousset, and Deissmann. At the last minute, four of the rallies had to be cancelled, including Deissmann's, which the military authority in Stettin suddenly prohibited.⁶⁴

On August 1, 1916, Harnack addressed a full house of over one thousand at the Berlin Philharmonic Hall. The large turnout resulted partially from the entrance fees having been set low in order to attract the biggest crowds possible and partially from Schäfer's having urged his followers to attend the rallies in the hope of interjecting

⁶⁴Undated letter from National Committee to Traub, and Ulrich Rauscher to Traub, July 18, 1916, and list of speakers and cities for rallies of Aug. 1, all in Traub Nachlass, BAK; reports of rallies of Aug. 1, ZSTA Potsdam, Akten der Reichskanzlei, Nationaler Ausschuss, call nos. 208-231; "Nochmals: Deutscher Nationalausschuss und Alldeutscher Verband," Alldt. Bl., XXVI (1916), 307; notice in Berliner Volkszeitung, Aug. 2, 1916, evening edition.

their viewpoint. Although Harnack had practiced his speech on Delbrück, who praised it as "masterly,"⁶⁵ it produced both comical and costly results. Without first stating his own views, Harnack announced that one school of thought on war aims held that the coming peace must "automatically secure for all time the security and freedom of the land and seas." To his chagrin, a considerable part of the audience, presumably Schäfer's disciples, enthusiastically applauded. Having to raise his hand to quiet them, he then broached his own position of moderate territorial goals. Above all, he insisted, Germany must regain her colonies, and that meant making sacrifices in Europe. To be sure, Germany must remember her cultural mission eastward, must redraw the boundaries of Russia, and must prevent Belgium from ever again becoming England's "satrapy," but she must not impair her nation-state or create a "new Ireland."⁶⁶

Harnack also took occasion to denounce war profiteering. As soon as the war had begun, he exclaimed, foreign competition had disappeared and "an uncaring national private enterprise, influenced only by the profit motive, took its place in many circles." He accused not individuals but "the whole system which . . . even in war permitted a complete business

⁶⁵"Die Reklame des 'Deutschen Nationalausschusses,'" Dt. Tagztg., July 20, 1916; Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1 (1916), 380; Lina Delbrück, Hans Delbrücks Leben, XII, 52, typed ms. in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK.

⁶⁶Harnack "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 343-345; list of press reviews of the rallies of Aug. 1, Traub Nachlass, BAK.

egoism and relentless gain." In order to prevent a recurrence of such exploitation, he recommended that postwar Germany establish large numbers of "mixed enterprises," involving the states and municipalities, especially in the mining and lumber industries. Although the enterprising spirit and private responsibility ought not to be excluded, they needed to find their limits in "the needs and welfare of the whole."⁶⁷

Ostensibly taking offense at these barbs, four industrialists resigned from the National Committee: Thyssen, Klöckner, Bodenhausen-Degener, and Hermann Röchling.⁶⁸ When the Kölnische Zeitung, the voice of the industrial Rhineland, rebuked Harnack for making no mention of German industry's enormous contributions to the war, Rade offered him space for rebuttal, but Harnack had no taste for a new fight. Licking his wounds, he confided to Rade that, although he had had no part in the committee's formation, its "pretentious name,"

⁶⁷Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," 341-342. Schian applauded Harnack's denunciation of profiteering, admitting that the prevailing greed made him almost ready to embrace Rade's thesis that the war revealed "the bankruptcy of Christendom"; "Kleine Beiträge und neue Bücher," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 181-182.

⁶⁸Westarp, Konservative Politik, II, 186, lists Thyssen, Klöckner, Bodenhausen, and Röchling, but does not say which Röchling brother; Lezius to Seeberg, no date [Aug. 12, 1916, not Aug. 12, 1918, as someone has penciled at top of letter] says Bodenhausen, Thyssen, and Röchling, but does not say which Röchling; "Harnack und die Industrie," Köln Ztg., Aug. 12, 1916, merely says four industrialists; Schwabe (Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral, 117-118) and Gatzke (Germany's Drive to the West, 135-136) imply that all five men left; but a report of the Hobohm Committee, Nov. 20, 1916, Delbrück Nachlass, BAK, lists Louis Röchling as still a member of the National Committee.

its actual leadership, or its "many inept acts," because of his affiliation with it, he was being "bombarded" by the Pan-Germans and private industry.⁶⁹ Rade therefore courageously jumped into the ring, scolding private industry for being so touchy and praising Harnack's condemnation of social evil as fitting for a former president of the Protestant-Social Congress.⁷⁰

Though Harnack had been indiscreet on August 1, his friends did not saddle him with the loss of the industrialists. The real reason for their exit, many moderates were convinced, was a conflict between heavy industry and the War Ministry over the fixed price for munitions. Since the government backed the committee, weakening the latter was a means of slapping the former. Delbrück thought the problem lay deeper, and he was right; "the fundamental differences" on the war aims questions, he held, "were not to be papered over by pretty words."⁷¹ The National Committee had futilely tried to bridge the gap, but the misgivings with which the industrialists had joined the committee made it unstable from the start. Fritz Röchling still held out hope for some sort of harmony, but Ulrich Rauscher was sick of

⁶⁹"Harnack und die Industrie," Köln. Ztg., Aug. 12, 1916; Rade to Harnack, Aug. 15, 1916, and Harnack to Rade, Aug. 18, 1916, both in Rade Nachlass, UBM. The longer name of the committee was the German National Committee for the Preparation of an Honorable Peace.

⁷⁰Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 687.

⁷¹Delbrück to Harnack, Aug. 13, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

the pretense and wanted to cross swords with the radicals at once.⁷²

Other reactions to the committee took on a predictable tone. Baumgarten's Evangelische Freiheit warmly welcomed it as a means of striking a sensible balance between the defeatists and the fire-eaters. The Frankfurter Zeitung rushed to its defense by denying the rumor that it was the "semi-official incarnation of war-weariness." The All-deutsche Blätter and powerful dailies edited by Pan-Germans ridiculed the disparity of views expressed on August 1 and questioned whether the "National Committee for a Rotten Peace," as they called it, was a unified organization at all.⁷³ Lezius was irate that Harnack's warning against a "new Ireland" implied that Belgium must be restored. Even the recent spectacle of the Easter Rebellion had not spoiled his appetite for the little country. Consistent with his middle-of-the-road theology, Schian neither censured nor praised the committee but simply noted that the co-editor of his Deutsch-Evangelisch, Wilhelm Kahl, had spoken at one of the rallies.⁷⁴

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVI (1916), 274; Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1 (1916), 344-345; "Nochmals: Deutscher Nationalausschuss und Alldeutscher Verband," and "Ein Rückblick auf die Erlebnisse des 'Nationalausschusses,'" Alldt. Bl., XXVI (1916), 307, 330-331; list of press reviews of the rallies of Aug. 1, in Traub Nachlass, BAK. Even Ambassador Gerard agreed that the dissimilarity of the speeches made the committee look ridiculous; My Four Years in Germany, 300-301.

⁷⁴Lezius to Kropatscheck, Aug. 10, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK: Schian, "Chronik,: Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 427.

Immediately after its inauspicious launching, the National Committee began to flounder. Not only was there mutiny among the industrialists, but the captain abandoned ship. Embarrassed by the fiascoes of August 1, Wedel left Berlin on vacation, whereupon Harnack reluctantly took the helm.⁷⁵ Exploiting their opponents' discomfort, Schäfer's Independent Committee published a declaration at the end of August which faintly praised Bethmann's demand for "real guarantees in the west" but insisted that Belgium must eventually become either a German or an English bulwark. It was endorsed by 250 committee members and sympathizers, including several intellectuals who had signed the "Petition of the Intellectuals": Eduard Meyer, Theodor Schiemann, Otto von Gierke, Seeberg, Bonwetsch, and an Erlangen theologian, Hermann Jordan.⁷⁶ The National Committee then disregarded Rauscher's advice and made repeated overtures to its obviously stronger rival for a joint conference. Though Schäfer was adamantly opposed, his associates thought it unwise to reject the request, and at the beginning of October, 1916, representatives of the two groups came face to face. Nothing was achieved, however, and the National

⁷⁵Lezius to Seeberg, no date [Aug. 12, 1916], Seeberg Nachlass BAK; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 361.

⁷⁶"An das deutsche Volk," Aug. 23, 1916, a proclamation of the Independent Committee, copy in collection "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," UBM, Schäfer, Mein Leben, 190. Other prominent signers were Gustav Stresemann, Count Ernst zu Reventlow, Carl Röchling, and Carl Duisberg.

Committee went from bad to worse. Early in November, one of its founding fathers, Kahl, who was President of the Independent Association of the Fatherland, told Harnack that because some of the Association's prominent members despised the chancellor and therefore the committee he would have to diminish his active support of it.⁷⁷

On November 12, 1916, in a desperate effort to take the wind out of the sails of the jingoists, the National Committee issued an amazingly annexationist declaration. Germany, it stated, should win indemnities corresponding to her sacrifices, a strong colonial empire, freedom of the seas for herself and neutrals--and should not shrink from a policy of conquest.⁷⁸ With this final flourish of patriotic fervor, the committee, while not formally disbanding, simply ceased to function. When it came to espousing chauvinistic war aims, it could not compete with the rival Independent Committee, which continued its agitation until the end of the war.

In its manifesto, the National Committee likened itself to a ship steering a middle course. With influential

⁷⁷Schäfer, Mein Leben, 189-190; Kahl to Harnack, Nov. 9, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

⁷⁸Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1 (1916), 537. Though a failure, the National Committee deserves more than the few sentences it has received from Gerhard Ritter, Sword and Scepter, III, 181, Konrad Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, 217, and Fritz Fischer, World Power and Decline, 78. Furthermore, Fischer erroneously equates it with the Independent Association of the Fatherland. Only Hans Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 134-136, and Klaus Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral, 117-119, begin to do the committee justice, and Gatzke did not have the use of the Potsdam archival material, nor Schwabe the Rade-Harnack correspondence at Marburg.

designers, official sponsors, illustrious officers, and an impressive crew, it had seemed destined for glory--but within five months, it had suffered shipwreck. An initial broadside against an enemy ship followed by orders to spike its cannon, a colorless if not cowardly captain, a half-hearted second-in-command, the mutiny of powerful crew members and the subsequent timidity of others, the failure to gain the protective company of a larger vessel--all contributed to its tragedy. Even the belated hoisting of an attractive new flag did not save it. It succumbed to inner and outer pressures and sank from view.

Carrying on its crusade against the Pan-Germans was the Hobohm Committee, so named from its director, Martin Hobohm, a student of Delbrück's. Like the National Committee, it had governmental sponsorship but only minimal success. In August, 1915, the government asked Hobohm, who worked in its Central Office for Foreign Affairs, a clearing house for the numerous official, semi-official, and unofficial propaganda agencies, to collect material damaging to the Pan-Germans. Three months later, Delbrück personally urged Bethmann to initiate a press campaign against them, and the chancellor casually agreed that something of that sort should soon be done, but while he hesitated, the secret leaked out. In July, 1916, the Alldeutsche Blätter pointedly asked: "Herr Hobohm, is your book finally ready?" With the element of surprise thus lost and with the National Committee having just fired its broadside against the League, Hobohm grew impatient and

begged Bethmann to let him publicize his findings. Again the chancellor hesitated, fearing that some of the evidence assembled against the Pan-Germans might discredit even his less ambitious aims. Thus, for a second time, he shrank from unleashing the full force of an enterprise meant to undergird him.⁷⁹

Hobohm was nevertheless determined that his beloved project should not die an orphan just because its parent had abandoned it; so, he adopted the fledgling endeavor as his own. The young scholar had courage and energy, but, since Bethmann was no longer willing to put government funds into the venture, he lacked the necessary money. Consequently, he turned to Delbrück for help in forming a financial committee. Only three men could be found who were willing to shoulder this sort of load: Baumgarten and the Leipzig historian Walter Goetz, both of whom had spoken in support of Bethmann at the National Committee rallies, and Delbrück himself. Since Hobohm was especially eager to attract men from the traditionally patriotic parties, he considered Baumgarten's membership in the National Liberal Party a definite asset.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Report by Hobohm labelled "Materialien zur Prüfung des Organisationsproblems," Dec. 4, 1916, and Delbrück, "Bericht über meine Unterredung mit dem Reichskanzler am 16. Nov., 1915," and Hobohm to Bethmann, Aug. 1, 1916, all in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK; "Deutscher National-Ausschuss und Alldeutscher Verband," Alldt. Bl., XXVI (1916), 292.

⁸⁰Hobohm report of Dec. 4, 1916, and Baumgarten to Delbrück, Nov. 14, 1916, both in Delbrück Nachlass; summaries of Baumgarten's and Goetz's speeches of Aug. 1, 1916, ZSTA Potsdam, Akten der Reichskanzlei, Nationaler Ausschuss, call nos. 210-211, 226.

Hobohm and his committee quietly informed friends of their work, and by mid-November, 1916, they counted a loose following of about sixty. Only ten, however, were willing to join the four leaders that month to discuss the urgent need of funds. As one might expect, half of this inner circle of fourteen had signed the counter-petition, including Delbrück, Baumgarten, Troeltsch, August Stein, and the journalist Paul Rohrbach. But few within this circle or among other wealthy sympathizers, including Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, Walter Rathenau, the banker Max Warburg, and Louis Röchling, who was still a member of the National Committee, were willing to meet the expenses. The outlook was so dismal that the leaders toyed with the idea of turning over their assembled material to the National Committee and letting it find the resources for publication, but, as just noted, the National Committee expired in November. By the end of the year, the treasury was so depleted that Hobohm had to dismiss his research staff for lack of funds, and Delbrück had to resort to circular letters and his editorials in the Preussische Jahrbücher to plead for financial assistance. On several occasions, the two men had to dig deeply into their own pockets just to keep the work barely solvent. Another temporary setback was Hobohm's summons to front-line duty in 1917, but a wound the following year allowed him to return to Berlin and resume his labors.⁸¹

⁸¹Report of meeting of Nov. 20, 1916, dated Nov. 30, 1916, and Wilhelm Solf to Delbrück, Nov. 24, 1916, and Hobohm report

In spite of all these difficulties, the committee did manage to make its voice heard. Beginning in December, 1916, Martin Wenck, Hobohm's chief literary assistant, supplied interested newspapers with weekly articles entitled "Deutsche Korrespondenz," which among other things warned against the annexation of Belgium. Wenck also edited a series of pamphlets called Der Tag des Deutschen, the first of which was written by Baumgarten, who zealously threw himself into the fight. When consenting to serve on the financial committee, he promised stout-hearted loyalty, and though his subsequent mail contained more abuse than acclaim, his energy did not flag.⁸² His pamphlet bewailed the echoes of the Pan-German proclamations in the United States. Citing several American sources which highlighted the Pan-German threat, including Roland Usher's famous Pan-Germanism (1913), he contended that the inflated rhetoric and gargantuan demands of the noisy group had helped turn initially friendly Americans into Germanophobes. In another pamphlet series, Vaterlandsdienst, edited by Hobohm, Baumgarten contrasted Christianity with Pan-Germanism. Although he freely conceded that one could be a good Pan-German and a good Christian at the same time,

of Dec. 4, 1916, and undated circular letter signed by Delbrück, Goetz, and Baumgarten, all in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK; Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXVIII (1917), 339, Schwabe, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral, 247, footnote 200.

⁸²"Deutsche Korrespondenz," Feb. 1, 1917, and Baumgarten to Delbrück, Nov. 14, 1916, both in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 188.

he charged that Jesus' message was directly opposed to the Pan-German mentality.⁸³

Among Hobohm's well-wishers was Baumgarten's friend, Rade. In a series of special editorials in the spring of 1917, he praised Baumgarten's exposé of the damage the Pan-Germans were doing abroad and hurled his own invectives at them as well. Though admitting that not all their ideas were "satanic," he deplored their rash demands, reflected in one article which contained the word "must" twenty times and "if it is possible" only twice. Contrasting their simplistic solutions with Bethmann's more sensible and temperate approach, he rejoiced that the Kaiser supported the chancellor and shuddered at the thought of his being replaced by a Pan-German.⁸⁴ The reactions of the radicals ran true to form. Lezius remained a militant member of the League's greater executive committee; Seeberg helped edit a Pan-German journal founded in April, 1917, Deutschlands Erneuerung; Schian straddled the fence by saluting the Pan-Germans' patriotism but wincing at some of their pronouncements; and

⁸³Baumgarten, Das Echo der alldeutschen Bewegung in Amerika (Jena, 1917), passim; denunciations similar to Usher's included: Edwyn Bevan, The Pan-German Programme (New York, 1918), Charles Andler, Pan-Germanism, trans. by S.J. (Paris, 1915), André Chéradame, The Pan-German Plot Unmasked (New York, 1917), and Emile Prüm, Pan-Germanism versus Christendom, Being an Open Letter by M. Emile Prüm, ed. by René Johannet (London, 1916). Baumgarten, Alldeutschtum und Christentum, 4; George Bruntz mistakes the object of this and other pamphlets in the Vaterlandsdienst series as combatting Allied propaganda instead of chauvinism at home; Allied Propaganda, 198-199.

⁸⁴Rade, "Die Alldeutschen," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 426-429.

Deissmann even rebuked a Pan-German student for ignoring the apostle Paul's concern for foreigners as well as his own people.⁸⁵

The loss of the war prompted the moderates to turn an angry gaze on the Pan-Germans. Just prior to the armistice, Harnack privately complained that it was largely due to their influence on the Supreme Command that the war had been prolonged after the Reichstag Peace Resolution of July, 1917. Baumgarten carried on his crusade by publicly lamenting early in 1919 that his countrymen, including Bethmann, had not offered sufficient resistance to the Pan-Germans' "crypto-government," and he subsequently supported Hobohm's efforts to convince the Reichstag Inquiry Commission that they shared in the guilt for Germany's defeat.⁸⁶

The war ended with German intellectuals still divided. Conservative theologians still cherished the radical war aims of the Pan-Germans, while liberals blamed the latter for Germany's failure to reach even moderate goals. In May, 1919, for example, Seeberg began a memorial service for fallen Berlin students with the ominous prophecy: "Invicti victi victuri (to the undefeated, the defeated who will be the

⁸⁵"Zivilprozess gegen Friedrich Lezius, 1917-1918," legal ms. in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; other editors of Deutschlands Erneuerung were Class, Wolfgang Kapp, H. S. Chamberlain, and Georg von Below; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VII (1916), 524; Deissman, Evangel. Wochbr., Aug. 10, 1918.

⁸⁶Harnack to Bertha Thiersch, Oct. 31, 1918, cited in Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 373; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch." Evangel. Freiht., XIX (1919), cited in Meine Lebensgeschichte, 369; Baumgarten, "Der sittliche Zustand," in Melchior et al. (eds.),

future conquerors)." Harnack, on the other hand, told German youth a short time later that "the age of Bismarck is irretrievably gone" and that Germany must temper her nationalistic spirit with a new respect for mankind.⁸⁷

Thus, even in the Weimar era, the theologians continued to stand at the very forefront of the intellectual battle. As we have seen, Harnack and Seeberg sponsored opposing petitions, supported rival committees, and kept the fires of political agitation burning until the end of the war and afterwards. And Baumgarten bravely joined two other scholars who dared to challenge the mighty Pan-German League. Though relying on the support of their fellow academicians, these men were in the vanguards of the contending forces.

We should also remember that there was a sane and not at all silent minority. Although the cries of the National Committee and Hobohm Committee were drowned out by the roar of the chauvinistic crowd, their voice of dissent shows that there was "the other Germany" within the Second Reich. In fact, the cleavage in public opinion, first apparent in the two petitions given to the chancellor in 1915, widened during the following three years, and for the moderates it

Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 66-67. For a short post-war eulogy of the Hobohm Committee, see Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914, 328-330.

⁸⁷Seeberg, Selbstbiographie, 420; Harnack, "Politische Maximen für das neue Deutschland," (1922), Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 321-322.

was a losing fight all the way. They had insufficient funds, the appearance of only a half-hearted patriotism, and the inadequate backing of their benefactor, Bethmann. Though suppressing the Petition of the Intellectuals, he deemed the counter-petition premature; though approving the launching of the National Committee, he denied it full steam on August 1, 1916; and though secretly preparing a campaign against the Pan-Germans, he forbade Hobohm to come forth boldly with his findings. The moderates' attempts to bridge the gap were in vain. In 1915, Delbrück proposed to Seeberg that their two groups issue a joint declaration on the eastern question, but Seeberg refused. The following year, the National Committee tried to put forth a common front, but the facade of unity collapsed within a month, and a wiser Delbrück concluded that "fundamental differences" were "not to be papered over by pretty words." Instead, ugly labels like "frondeur" and "Flaumacher," as vicious as any rhetoric hurled at the foreign enemy, continued to underline the seriousness of the struggle, and Bethmann was caught in the crossfire. Though a cautious, conscientious, and conservative servant of state, and above all a political realist who understood the limits of Germany's power, he failed to contest vigorously the jingoistic clamor of the military and other radical pressure groups. He stuck to his "policy of the diagonal," carefully compromising with the right and left. Looking back on the tragedy of Wilhelmian Germany, Baumgarten lamented that

in sabotaging the full force of the Hobohm endeavor the chancellor had undermined a project that might have prevented his own fall and that of his nation as well.⁸⁸

BELGIUM, THE BALTIC PROVINCES, AND BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

Chapter VIII

In the previous chapter we treated the moderate and radical annexationists in broad terms, emphasizing the general differences between the two movements. It is now time to examine the wide range of opinion within each group, in particular on the concrete questions of Belgium, the Baltic provinces, and Bethmann-Hollweg. As we will see, those who signed the Seeberg petition ranged all the way from the cautious Martin Schian to the fanatical Friedrich Lexius, and Harnack's circle included the consistently temperate Martin Rade as well as the eventually land-hungry Ernst Troeltsch.

Without a doubt, the most colorful theologian was Lexius. From his outpost in Königsberg, this professor of church history feverishly reported to his friend Seeberg his heights of joy and depths of despair.¹ A militant Pan-

¹Lexius' correspondence with Seeberg is in the Seeberg Nachlass in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz. Most of Seeberg's letters begin with "Sehr geehrter Kollege" instead of the actual name of the recipient, and unfortunately two letters have been miscatalogued by the archive. On the basis of the contents and their classification by Amanda Seeberg

⁸⁸Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, II, 35; Baumgarten, Meine Lebensgeschichte, 300.

Lexius' letters to Seeberg, and one designated "Seeberg to Bonwetach" of April 24, 1916 is actually

BELGIUM, THE BALTIC PROVINCES, AND BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

Chapter VIII

In the previous chapter we treated the moderate and radical annexationists in broad terms, emphasizing the general differences between the two movements. It is now time to examine the wide range of opinion within each group, in particular on the concrete questions of Belgium, the Baltic provinces, and Bethmann-Hollweg. As we will see, those who signed the Seeberg petition ranged all the way from the cautious Martin Schian to the fanatical Friedrich Lezius, and Harnack's circle included the consistently temperate Martin Rade as well as the eventually land-hungry Ernst Troeltsch.

Without a doubt, the most colorful theologian was Lezius. From his outpost in Königsberg, this professor of church history feverishly reported to his friend Seeberg his heights of joy and depths of despair.¹ A militant Pan-

¹Lezius' correspondence with Seeberg is in the Seeberg Nachlass in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz. Most of Seeberg's letters begin with "Sehr geehrter Kollege" instead of the actual name of the recipient, and unfortunately two letters have been miscatalogued by the archive. On the basis of their contents and their classification by Amanda Seeberg (Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 266, 275, in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK), the letter designated "Seeberg to Bonwetsch" of Oct. 7, 1915 is actually from Seeberg to Lezius, and one designated "Seeberg to Bonwetsch" of April 24, 1916 is actually

German, anti-Semite, constantly carping against the Kaiser and Bethmann, dreaming of a dictatorship under Admiral Tirpitz and of vast conquests eastward and westward, but tormented with nightmares of a Prussian franchise reform, he nearly landed in prison in 1917 on a charge of lèse-majesté.

Lezius was always grumbling that the Kaiser was weak and vacillating. At the end of July, 1914, just before the outbreak of hostilities, he feared that Germany would help Russia and Austria conclude a "rotten peace" instead of engaging in a full-fledged struggle, and the specter of an inadequate or premature settlement haunted him throughout the war.² Just after the Sussex crisis of March, 1916, when Germany seemed willing to restrict her submarine warfare, he moaned that William and Bethmann were "two extremely pro-foreign, brotherly cowards" who were letting Germany "foolishly bleed to death."³ Later that year, when government officials searched the Munich printing office of the rabid annexationist J. F. Lehmann, they found a copy of a circular bearing Lezius' home address and labelling the Kaiser a "degenerate Hohenzollern." Although the document bore no signature, Prussian authorities charged Lezius with slander and brought him to trial in December, 1917. While

from Seeberg to Kropatscheck. For the sake of the future researcher, I have used the archive's classification and placed my correction in brackets.

²Lezius to Seeberg, July 30, 1914, and Dec. 2, 1917; Lezius to Kropatscheck, no date [May 7, 1915], all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

³Lezius to Seeberg, April 29, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

privately grumbling against "Prussian justice" and publicly denying authorship of the statement in question, he was found guilty of lèse-majesté and sentenced to a two-month imprisonment. Sympathizing with his former Dorpat student, Bonwetsch characterized the verdict as tragically typical of the prevailing tendency to condemn true patriots and condone peace-mongers such as Erzberger and the Socialist leader, Philipp Scheidemann. Lezius appealed his case, and the Imperial Court reversed the decision of the Prussian tribunal, but even this harrowing experience did not dissuade him from private vituperations.⁴ As before, however, when writing his fellow Balt, Seeberg, he discreetly used Estonian words to castigate the Kaiser. On November 1, 1918, for instance, he used his second language to exclaim: "The boss must go; instead of a boy, we need a dictator. Cowards are not fit to be kings."⁵

At the outset of the war, Lezius basked in the expectation of a German conquest of England, although, more far-sighted than most of his countrymen, he thought it would take three years. Anticipating an overwhelming victory, he drafted an elaborate plan for dividing the British spoils, allocating

⁴Zivilprozess gegen Friedrich Lezius, 1917-1918 (manuscript of the trial), and Lezius to Kropatscheck, Nov. 12, 1916, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Dec. 12, 1917, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁵Lezius to Seeberg, Nov. 1, 1918, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

some English ports to Prussia and others to the Reich. The following spring, doubts arose, and he lamented to his friend Friedrich Kropatscheck that William, Bethmann, Albert Ballin and other Jews, Hans Delbrück and the Social Democrats were about to conclude a "rotten peace." Kropatscheck thought that he was too pessimistic, and indeed the following year he succumbed to despair. Disappointed ~~that~~ Germany had not already forced Russia out of the war, allowing her to concentrate on "the main enemy, John Bull," he sighed: "The Germans are in their narrow borders like old people without courage or a future. I prefer to go hence and die, because I no longer hope for the German people as a whole. It is God's will that they go under." Lezius nevertheless endured Germany's collapse, and in November, 1919, Seeberg described him as "strangely enough, full of hope."⁶

Seeberg stood just to the left of Lezius. As already noted, he insisted that it was impossible to restore the old balance of power, because the moral right of war as an international test of strength necessitated a re-ordering of the world according to proven abilities. At the outset of the conflict, he proclaimed with graphic starkness:

We must pluck the fruit which the enemy holds
before our eyes. It would be immoral not to cut

⁶Lezius to Seeberg, Sept. 14, 1914; Lezius to Kropatscheck May 7, 1915; Kropatscheck to Seeberg, Nov. 5, 1915; Lezius to Seeberg, Aug. 29, 1916; Lezius to Kropatscheck, Nov. 12, 1916; Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Nov. 9, 1919, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

the sinews of the enemy's horses and to spike his cannons. The war would be meaningless and an outrage to one's own people if everything remained as it was beforehand.

It is a divine law--"weighed in the balances and found wanting." Out of this proceeds the right of the victor. It is God's will that the victor so dictate the peace that its political power is formed in accordance with its real strength.⁷

Early in 1919, he forgot this justification of a victor's Diktat when accusing the Allies of trying to constitute the League of Nations so that Germany would become the world's "common slave."⁸

After five months of hostilities, Seeberg grumbled that nothing would be worse than a "rotten peace" that allowed the miseries of war to be renewed, and later in 1915, he murmured that for Germany to conclude peace then meant that one half million men had died in vain. He lauded Germany's military accomplishments and lamented the lack of diplomatic triumphs. Just after the Sussex crisis, he despaired of Germany's political leadership, and in the summer of 1916, he, Schäfer, and five other Berlin professors issued a patriotic declaration praising the successes of the army and deploring faintheartedness and a yearning for peace.⁹

⁷Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 175-176.

⁸Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Feb. 16, 1919, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁹Seeberg, "Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des gegenwärtigen Krieges," (essay written in Jan., 1915), Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 36; Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Aug. 29, 1915, and Seeberg to Bonwetsch [Kropatscheck], April 24, 1916, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; "An unser Volk!" declaration of July

When Bethmann issued his famous Peace Note of December 12, 1916, Seeberg and most of his disciples were aghast. Released six days after the fall of Bucharest and thus from a position of strength, it was defiant in tone and vague in meaning and, asserting that Germany had not started the war, offered nothing more than the Central Powers' willingness to negotiate. Bonwetsch was nevertheless afraid that it indicated a "failure of nerve," and Seeberg was all the more upset that Germany acceded to President Wilson's subsequent proposal that the belligerents exchange peace conditions. Observing that his countrymen were then much more favorable to the all-out use of the U-boat than before, he held that his government's action was most ill-timed. He predicted that his leaders, instead of engaging in a va-banque struggle, would settle for a premature peace returning the status quo ante--which for Germany meant "a fifty-year setback, a maimed national body, poverty, and bitterness."¹⁰ Deissmann was of a different mind, even though he had signed the Seeberg petition. Citing a letter from his British friend, Professor James Moulton, who had insisted that the war must go on until the Kaiser cried "Enough!", he praised the peace note as a

19, 1916, signed by Seeberg, Schäfer, Otto von Gierke, Wilhelm Kahl, Eduard Meyer, Adolf Wagner, and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, copy in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK, and in Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII, Pt. 1 (1916), 369-370.

¹⁰Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Dec. 26, 1916, and Seeberg to Lezius, Dec. 26, 1916, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

morally superior substitute for such an exclamation. Rade, too, was overjoyed. He acclaimed Bethmann for making the offer, compared it to Noah's sending forth the "dove of peace" from the ark, and declared it consistent with the biblical injunction: "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men (Romans 12:18)." Lamenting that politics and morality usually went their separate ways, he made another plea for them to join hands.¹¹

On December 30, 1916, the Allies denounced Germany's offer as "empty and insincere" and blamed Germany for starting the war. Deissmann expressed deep disappointment, and Schian noted that since the Entente had "scornfully refused" the proposal, Germany's honest doubters ought no longer wonder who wanted to prolong the conflict. Even Rade berated the Allies for having "basely rejected" the offer. Harnack, on the other hand, later told Bethmann that though the German note had been a great stride forward, its tone had been too "discordant" and not sufficiently "peaceful or universal."¹²

The distrust that plagued Lezius, Seeberg, and Bonwetsch was harbored by others who signed the "Petition of the Intellectuals." Johannes Haussleiter publicly warned against the

¹¹Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Dec. 15, 1916; Rade, "Die Friedenstaube," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 993-995.

¹²Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Feb. 21 and April 9, 1917; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 88; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 38; Harnack, "Das Gebot der Stunde," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 301-302. For the German note, the replies, and counter-replies, see "Official Documents Looking Toward Peace," Inter. Concil., Nos. 110-111 (Jan.-Feb., 1917).

German tendency to "sentimentality" and urged that the coming peace be based on realistic considerations, not an attitude of forgiving and forgetting. Julius Kaftan told Harnack that he did not share the latter's optimism about Germany's leadership, and Friedrich Wiegand's hopes were clouded by "black memories of former days when diplomacy spoiled what the sword had accomplished."¹³ Schian, however, was not so pessimistic. He did not transform his periodical into a platform for the ultra annexationists' demands, and as late as September, 1916, he publicly stated that there was no reason to believe that Bethmann would conclude a weak peace. He refused to join the radicals' cry for the open discussion of war aims, and even in 1917, after censorship had been lifted, he denounced the press debate over territorial goals as premature. Decrying doctrinairism of every sort, he berated those who tight-fistedly demanded Belgium as well as those who rejected all annexations. Acquisitions that were "necessary and useful," he argued, were permissible, and he especially hoped for new settlement areas in the east for Germany's growing population. He cautioned, however, that Germany's need to expand be weighed against her need to maintain national homogeneity.¹⁴

¹³Haussleiter, "Ernst Moritz Arndts deutsche Ziele," Inter. Monatsschr., X (1916), 1376-1377; Kaftan to Harnack, Dec. 10, 1916, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Wiegand to Seeberg, Jan. 3, 1918, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

¹⁴Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 380; VII (1916), 428; VIII (1917), 186-187; IX (1918), 180.

Apart from Schian and Deissmann, who were atypical, the radicals contended that might makes right, feared that their government would conclude a "rotten" or premature peace that brought only the status quo ante, and branded the defenders of such a settlement as defeatists. The moderates were also a fairly cohesive group. They stressed the defensive nature of the war, and, appealing to both expediency and ethics, Machtpolitik and morality, national self-interest and international propriety, they urged Germany to practice self-restraint and settle for limited gains. Harnack classified the "will to power" as a "sin." Troeltsch argued that respect for Christian principles and German moral idealism must prevent Germany from embracing a "pagan Machiavellianism." Baumgarten contended that although Russia might still be able to rule with "whips and straitjackets," for western Europe that day was over, because the principle of humane treatment of all persons precluded the forced subjugation and expropriation of conquered peoples. He and Rade also insisted that inordinate territorial demands merely perpetuated Germany's already distorted image abroad, making her the odium generis humani.¹⁵ But

¹⁵Harnack to Frau Dr. Zeller, July, 1917, cited in Bayerische Kurier, July 12, 1917, and later noted in Schäfer, Mein Leben, 217, and Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, 277; Troeltsch, "Imperialismus," Neue Rund., XXVI (1915), 1-14; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XV (1915), 264-265, and XVII (1917), 193-195, 318; Rade to Harnack, July 6, 1917, Rade Nachlass, UBM.

these ethical considerations aside, there were still sound, though selfish, reasons for being temperate. For one thing, Germany must not complicate her future by subjugating peoples who would be ever ready to revolt--Harnack's warning against a "new Ireland." The moderates were also convinced that, even though the Socialists had voted the war credits and the masses had gone willingly to the front, the international solidarity of the working class would never allow German workers to tolerate the ruthless subjugation of fellow laborers. Worker unrest increased throughout the war, and when 400,000 workers in Berlin alone quit work in January, 1918, demanding a peace policy that recognized national self-determination, Baumgarten reiterated his plea that Germany's leaders not minimize lower-class opposition to a policy of conquest. Another factor was the desire that the Protestant hegemony in Germany not be jeopardized by the incorporation of Catholic Belgium or Poland. Furthermore, as Troeltsch repeatedly pointed out, one of Germany's paramount aims must be to maintain her world trade--and the restoration of the world economy was possible only through treaties, not annexations and occupations. Finally, as the counter-petition of 1915 had emphasized, the nation-state must be kept pure. Baumgarten and Harnack rejoiced that Germany, unlike her polyglot ally, Austria-Hungary, was blessed with cultural unity. Though admitting that some foreign blood was already present--Danish, Polish, and Alsatian--they argued that it had never been assimilated and that the future incorporation

of outsiders was therefore to be avoided. They chastised the radicals for having such a large appetite when Germany had such a poor digestive system.¹⁶

With these considerations in mind, the moderates privately advised more and more concessions as the war progressed, while trying to appear as patriotic as possible in public. Harnack, for example, told a Berlin assembly in September, 1914, that he would not delineate particular war aims but that Germany must never again be so vulnerable to attack. In May, 1915, however, he told Rudolf von Valentini, the head of the Imperial Civil Cabinet, that Germany's tasks, in order of importance, were the defending of her position in the east, the weakening of France, and the breaking of England's monopoly of the sea. An "honorable peace," he held, could therefore include the evacuation of northern France and the restoration of Belgium.¹⁷ The following January, he reiterated these priorities at a small dinner party he gave for the Kaiser, Admiral Tirpitz, and the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral Georg von Müller. When a dispute arose over whether England or Russia would be the more dangerous enemy of the future, Harnack sided with the Kaiser in choosing the latter. Clearly, it was the Drang nach Osten,

¹⁶Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 318, and XVIII (1918), 154; Troeltsch, "Freiheit und Vaterland," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 75; Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," 345.

¹⁷Harnack, "Was wir schon gewonnen haben," Deutsche Reden, I, 163; Harnack to Valentini, May 23, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

toward his former homeland, not the Drang nach Westen, that interested him. In the summer of 1916, when Bethmann asked him for advice, he sent a lengthy memorandum insisting that though "the ideals of the conquistadors" had no place in German foreign policy, Germany did have the right "to secure her threatened possessions, when such is required." As he explained after the war, he was not thinking of Belgium or Poland but of securities for East Prussia.¹⁸ In his speech for the National Committee on August 1, 1916, he acknowledged that a war of such magnitude could not simply end with a return to the exact prewar situation. On the other hand, the most important thing was that Germany regain her colonies, and that meant, though not allowing Belgium to remain an English "satrapy," being prepared to make sacrifices in Europe. By June of the following year, the failure of the U-boat campaign had convinced him that Germany must conclude a negotiated peace, and he sent Bethmann an unsolicited, anxiety-laden memorandum, urging him to issue a new proposal that made plain Germany's readiness not only to surrender Belgium and Poland but even to readjust the borders of Alsace-Lorraine.¹⁹

¹⁸Walter Görlitz (ed.), Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral Georg von Müller 1914-1918 (Göttingen, 1959), 146; Harnack, "Friedensaufgaben und Friedensarbeit," and explanation of the memorandum, Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 280.

¹⁹Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," 344-345, and "Das Gebot der Stunde," 302.

Like Harnack, Rade publicly used popular slogans--carefully seasoned with caution--and privately advocated concessions. After three months of conflict, he proclaimed that Germany must not conclude a speedy or "rotten" peace with England but must come to a definite reckoning with her. Yet, like Schian, he openly deplored the war aims controversy, declined to use his periodical to champion his individual goals, and spoke only in generalities. On July 8, 1915, the day Bethmann received the Seeberg petition, he insisted on his front page that since Germany would not be able to dictate the peace, demands for a settlement guaranteeing that no one would ever again dare to attack Germany were as "naive and crass as any utopia ever fashioned in the name of pacifism." On the other hand, he denounced the Socialist motto of "no annexations" as too doctrinaire and unrealistic. Since war brought changes of territorial control, it was militarily and morally right that the peace allow the alteration of frontiers and the acquisition of new possessions. Even the inclusion of small nationality groups was permissible, if they were too young or too old to manage their own affairs.²⁰ Reserving his specific opinions for his friends, in 1916 he confided in Harnack that though he hoped for gains in the east, Belgium would have to remain "love's labor's lost. Turning a blind eye on all the alleged justifi-

²⁰Rade, "Britten und Deutsche," Christl. Welt, XXVIII (1914), 983, and "Jenseit des Kriegsziels," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 533-534, and "Die Sozialdemokratie," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 502.

cations for keeping Belgium, he wanted Germany to uphold Bethmann's promise of August 4, 1914 to rectify the "wrong" of trespassing there.²¹

Though Rade belonged to the moderate camp, which included Delbrück and eventually Friedrich Meinecke, he vigorously opposed their stated aim of restoring the balance of power. He held that the goal was both too high, since God alone was able to keep the world in perfect balance, and too low, because Germany's mission was more noble. Claiming that the attempt to maintain the old equilibrium had been a primary reason for the war, he concluded that the concept had done enough damage already; so, "hand it over to the devil," he advised. Instead of a competitive balance of power system, he wanted to see a cooperative "league of nations," in which trust and common endeavor would replace envy and strife. Finding a scriptural rationale in I Corinthians 12, where Paul likened the church universal to the body of Christ and individual members of it to specific organs, he held that nations must become "members of one body," maintaining an "organic relationship" with one another. Until that day arrived, however, Germany's ticklish task was to couple the full development of her military strength with a political moderation that would win foreign confidence.²²

²¹Rade to Harnack, April 28, 1916, Rade Nachlass, UBM.

²²Rade, "Gleichgewicht?", "Verschiedenes," and "Die Antwort auf die Friedensnote des Papstes," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 43-45, 393-394, 715; Rade, Dieser Krieg und das Christentum, 30.

The most persistent and explicit opponent of forced annexation was Baumgarten. His editorials were liberally sprinkled with the arguments from national self-interest and international sentiment mentioned above. Although conceding that the Protestant ethic in itself was not always opposed to a policy of conquest--for instance, if a growing nation could no longer feed itself by means of its present areas, it was morally justified in adopting an expansionist policy--he insisted that Realpolitik must be tempered with ethics, the idea of humanity, and respect for national ("völkisch") individuality. Moreover, if, from ethical considerations, Germany could not treat conquered peoples as helots but must eventually enfranchise them, there would then arise the practical problem of pacifying additional non-Germans who had the leverage of the ballot. Consequently, Germany must practice a "morally disciplined Machtpolitik," not a "morality of masters [Herrenmoral]." On the other hand, he added, if the inhabitants of a small territory, such as the German "Baltic barons" in Courland, requested German protection, some form of suzerainty was permissible. He therefore held that the German Social Democrats had gone too far in approving the resolution of the Congress of Russian Soldiers and Workers of April, 1917, which called for the "free national development of all peoples." Such socialist idealism, he argued, confused old party slogans with practical politics and imperilled the multinational character of Germany's

Habsburg ally and even challenged Germany's present inclusion of Frenchmen and Poles.²³

Though wanting to maintain the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Baumgarten rejected Friedrich Naumann's call for stronger ties with it. A former clergyman and then a Reichstag deputy, Naumann envisioned an economic union of the central European powers that would bind them together politically and militarily as well. His book, Mitteleuropa, appeared in October, 1915 and sold a 100,000 copies in a few months. Baumgarten, however, recoiled at the thought of a Catholic majority in the projected super-state, and he urged Germany to hold fast to her kleindeutsch character, Prussian leadership, and Protestant hegemony. Though not wishing to injure the Catholic-Protestant Burgfriede or to ignore the needs of Germany's ally, he argued that foreign policy must take confessional considerations into account. On precisely this basis, he also opposed the annexation of Catholic Belgians and more Catholic Poles.²⁴

At the end of 1916, Julius Kaftan echoed Baumgarten in a public address which specifically attacked Naumann's arguments. Naumann stressed that Bismarck had made the Dual Alliance with the Habsburg Empire the cornerstone of his

²³Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XV (1915), 264-265, and XVII (1917), 163-164, 193-195, 318, and XVIII (1918), 154.

²⁴Naumann, Mitteleuropa (Berlin, 1915), 1-3, 67-68; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVI (1916), 30-33, and Politik und Moral, 165.

foreign policy, and the appearance of his book during the centenary of the Iron Chancellor's birthday enhanced his case. On the religious question, he admitted that it meant a "definite sacrifice" to form an "intimate and indissoluble union with a power that is Catholic both in theory and practice," but he contended that, economically, Germany had no other choice, because she could no longer maintain her existence alone.²⁵ Kaftan replied that, politically, Mittel-europa was not Bismarck's legacy, since he had excluded Austria from the North German Confederation and the Reich; economically, it was not necessary; and religiously--this was the main point--it would produce the intolerable situation of a Protestant minority, as was the case in Bavaria. Consequently, he concluded: "When the ship for Mitteleuropa lifts anchor, we do not sail with it. We cling to our roots and sing now as always, 'Deutschland, Deutschland über alles, über alles in der Welt.'"²⁶

Rade and Troeltsch did not share the apprehensions of Baumgarten and Kaftan. Rade admitted that though many people had serious religious misgivings, he hoped for and expected a closer association with Austria.²⁷ Typical of his more

²⁵For Naumann, see footnote 24 above.

²⁶Kaftan, Wollen wir wirklich aus Deutschen Mitteleuropäer werden?, address in Bremen, Oct. 6, 1916 (Berlin, 1916), 4-11, 20-23. Baumgarten praised Kaftan in "Notizen," Evangel. Freiheit., XVII (1917), 302.

²⁷Rade, "Protestantismus und Katholizismus im neuen Deutschland," in Thimme (ed.), Vom inneren Frieden, 136, 141; Rade, "Zum Fall Foerster," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 612.

historical and philosophical orientation, Troeltsch ignored the confessional problem altogether as he repeatedly rejoiced that the war was effecting "the rebirth of central Europe." In January, 1915, he characterized those who dreamed of vast conquests and world domination as blind to the demands of both Realpolitik and German moral idealism. To be sure, Germany needed open doors for trade and a colonial area sufficient to provide raw materials, but her meager coastline militated against a large overseas empire. Even a substantial expansion on the continent was impossible, he held, since Germany's victory would not be decisive enough for her to redraw the map of Europe at will. Apart from this practical level, classical idealism overlaid with Christian ideas had produced a political morality that necessitated the recognition of all substantial nationality groups. He contended that Bismarck's greatness lay not in his being a man of "blood and iron" but in his giving careful attention to the ethical considerations of his own people and others. Thus, the most that Germany should strive for was making central Europe finally secure; she must not confirm foreign suspicions that she had embarked on a new "Napoleonism."²⁸

In place of vast colonial or continental conquests, Troeltsch advocated greater unity among the four Central Powers. In June, 1915, he noted that an essay, Der Kaiser-gedanke, recently published by the poet and geographer Alfons Paquet, contained realistic as well as romantic notions

²⁸Troeltsch, "Imperialismus," Neue Rund., XXVI (1915), 1-14.

about the recreation of the old Germanic empire. Later that year, before having read Naumann's book, he told an assembly in Vienna that England's policy of encirclement and Russia's interest in the Balkans meant that the powers dominating the Rhine, Danube, and Black Sea could maintain themselves only through the creation of cohesive central bloc.²⁹ In 1916, he argued that Bismarck's opponents, the Grossdeutschen, were wrong to have clamored for Austria's inclusion, because they were thinking only of continental protection, and Prussia was then strong enough alone. Now, however, Germany must consider the whole world, and the threats of Russification and Anglicization required that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria band together under German leadership--but not under German rule. Though the proposed union would provide the military, political, and geographic foundations for its members' future, he admitted that its one weak point was that it would not replace the world trade system. By January, 1918, his concern for Germany's economic future had become so acute that he told a Berlin assembly that she must be willing to sacrifice almost anything in order to regain a strong position in world-trade.³⁰ But after the rape of Russia

²⁹Paquet, Der Kaisergedanke (Frankfurt/Main, 1915); Troeltsch, "Die Arbeit an der Idee unseres Krieges," Fkftr. Ztg., July 11, 1915.

³⁰Troeltsch, "Die deutsche Idee von der Freiheit," "Privatmoral und Staatsmoral," "Die Ideen von 1914," Neue Rund., XXVII (1916), 50, 154, 619-622; Troeltsch, "Freiheit und Vaterland," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 75.

at Brest-Litovsk, he became especially excited about the renewed prospects of Mitteleuropa. The four-year struggle, he claimed, was reversing the decentralizing effects of the Thirty Years' War and restoring the unity of the Middle Ages; central Europe was being reborn. The new belt of buffer states from Finland to the Caucasus, he rejoiced, provided military security for central Europe against Russia. "Destiny and necessity," he exclaimed, had regenerated the medieval drive to colonize the east and educate the "sub-germanic" peoples.³¹

Apart from Troeltsch's deviation in 1918, the moderates consistently rejected an aggressive, expansionist policy. They likewise opposed a doctrinaire exclusion of all gains, justifying border rectifications and minor acquisitions to provide security. They insisted, however, that neither a favorable battlefield situation nor the demands of naked Machtpolitik alone should be allowed to dictate the peace terms. These factors must be tempered by respect for Christian principles, moral idealism, world opinion, and the conscience of the working class, and by the desire to avoid a "new Ireland" and to maintain national homogeneity, Protestant hegemony, and a strong position in world trade. In most instances, they noted, the demands of ethics and expediency

³¹Troeltsch, "Das Wesen des Weltkrieges," in Max Schwarte (ed.), Der Weltkrieg in seiner Einwirkung auf das deutsche Volk (Leipzig, 1918), 19-25; Troeltsch, "Verschiebungen der inneren Front," Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, April 6, 1918.

³²Bothmann's speeches are cited in Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the East, 90-113, 145.

happily coincided, enabling them to characterize themselves as moral realists, their opponents as immoral dreamers.

The division between them was especially apparent in their views on Belgium, the Baltic provinces, and Bethmann-Hollweg. Belgium was always the apple of discord between Germany and the Allies, and it was the question of her fate that precipitated the first open break in the German academic community. Although Bethmann had promised on August 4, 1914 to rectify the wrong of marching through Belgium, the Seeberg petition demanded that she be kept "politically, militarily, and economically tightly in our hand," whereupon the Harnack petition countered by denouncing the incorporation of independent peoples.

On April 5, 1916, in a famous speech before the Reichstag, Bethmann announced that in Belgium there could be no return to the status quo ante, but on November 9, 1916, he told the Reichstag Main Committee that he had never regarded the actual annexation of Belgium as one of Germany's war aims. What he wanted to do was to strip Belgium, not of her sovereignty, but of the opportunity of being a secret ally of England.³²

On several occasions, Harnack advocated the essential restoration of Belgium's independence, and in January, 1917, he, Delbrück, and Meinecke sent Bethmann a telegram recommending--in vain--that the government soften its impending

³²Bethmann's speeches are cited in Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 98-113, 145.

announcement of the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare by simultaneously declaring its willingness to restore Belgium. Only on October 5, 1918, when Prince Max publicly pledged to reestablish Belgium's independence, could the moderates rejoice.³³ To Harnack, Belgium raised the specter of a "new Ireland"; to Rade, she represented "love's labor's lost"; to Baumgarten, she meant the increase of "ultramontane voices." All three theologians, though hoping somehow to render her innocuous, regarded her as a bargaining chip to be traded at the peace table for Germany's colonies or other concessions. This idea was championed by Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf but was vigorously opposed by the Governor-General of Belgium, General Moritz von Bissing, and in the spring of 1918, even Troeltsch was reluctant to surrender the area.³⁴

Seeberg and his followers, however, consistently clamored for Germany's continued domination of the country. Addressing the assembly that approved his petition on June 20,

³³Harnack's references to Belgium are cited in footnotes 17-19 above; Meinecke notes the telegram in his Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, 222; Max' pledge is noted in Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVIII (1918), 315.

³⁴Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," 345; Rade to Harnack, April 28, 1916, Rade Nachlass, UBM; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 318, and XVIII (1918), 154; General Moritz von Bissing's Testament. A Study in German Ideals (London, [1917]), 9, 29; Troeltsch, "Das Wesen des Weltkrieges," in Schwarte (ed.) Der Weltkrieg, 24; Solf, various speeches cited in Grumbach (ed.), Das annexionistische Deutschland, 9-10.

1915, he suggested that models for various degrees of German control might be found in England's different relationships with Ireland, Egypt, Portugal, and the Boer States. The following year, he explained that he did not want to annex Belgium outright but to preclude a future conspiracy between her and Germany's enemies and to give the Flemish a separate, national existence. In the spring of 1917, just after Governor-General Bissing had divided Belgium into Flanders and Wallonia, Seeberg tried to assure the leaders of German workers' unions that no injury was being done when the "unnatural bond" between the Flemish and the Walloons was forever severed; the idea of a "Belgian nation" was merely a "fairy tale."³⁵ Lezius considered Harnack's protests against a new Ireland the most objectionable part of his speech for the National Committee on August 1, 1916, and the same day, Johannes Haussleiter publicly praised Ernst Moritz Arndt's call for the German mastery of Belgium.³⁶ Thus, the radicals wanted to keep a tight grasp on a divided country, while the moderates were willing to let her slip through their fingers in return for compensation overseas.

³⁵Seeberg, "Unsere Kriegsziele," manuscript in "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," collection in UBM; Seeberg, "Deutsche Zukunft," Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 53; Seeberg, "Was Erwarten Wir von Friedensschluss?" address to workers' unions in 1917, manuscript in "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," collection in UBM.

³⁶Lezius to Kropatscheck, Aug. 10, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Haussleiter, "Ernst Moritz Arndts deutsche Ziele," Inter. Monatsschr., X (1916), 1393.

The two groups also disagreed on the Baltic question, although both were excited about the German successes in the east. The victory of Tannenberg raised the prospects of freeing the Balts--German and Slavic-- from the "Russian yoke" and of reasserting German influence over land once held by the Teutonic Knights. As noted previously, several theologians had been born in the Baltic provinces: Harnack, Lezius, Reinhold Seeberg and his son Erich in Livonia; and Alfred Seeberg, Reinhold's brother, in Estonia. Bonwetsch came from deep within Russia itself, where his father had been a Lutheran pastor to the Volga Germans. In 1913, Harnack and other professors gave a series of lectures in the Livonian city of Riga in order to bolster the cultural nationalism of its Germans.³⁷

As the war progressed, Harnack became more moderate on the eastern as well as the western question, allowing realistic and ethical considerations to temper the dictates of his heart. In May, 1915, when the German armies were making their first significant advances eastward, penetrating Courland and approaching Livonia, he became so elated that he offered his services as a military or civilian administrator in the area. Admitting that he was not very familiar with Courland but priding himself on a knowledge of his birthplace, Livonia, he told Bethmann that since he understood the Baltic people, he felt himself competent to handle them

³⁷Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 819.

correctly. Although prudently noting that it was unlikely that Germany would be able to keep the area, he added: "I would consider it the crowning of my life if I could make myself useful on Baltic soil."³⁸ On August 19, 1915, just after the fall of Warsaw, Bethmann made his first open reference to eastern war aims by announcing that Poland, Lithuania, and Courland had been liberated from the Russian yoke, and a week later, Harnack privately admitted that he was more than ever convinced that "we must join to ourselves" not only the Baltic peoples but the Lithuanians as well.³⁹ Though he was not precise, Harnack apparently envisioned a cluster of protectorates in the east, and his hopes were heightened in January, 1916, when the Kaiser personally promised him that at least Courland would be retained.⁴⁰

Harnack's colleagues at Berlin were well aware of his fondness for his former homeland. On the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday in 1916, his protégé Karl Holl characterized him as someone "transplanted" into Germany from his "true home," the Baltic provinces. As a birthday gift, Holl wished him that the peace would bring the realization

³⁸Harnack to Bethmann, May 2, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB. Only the handwritten copy of the letter exists, and whether he sent a formal draft and what kind of reply he received, if any, is unknown, but his daughter regarded the letter as especially significant; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 362.

³⁹Bethmann's Reichstag address of Aug. 19, 1915, cited in Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 244; Harnack to Gottfried Traub, Aug. 29, 1916, Traub Nachlass, BAK.

⁴⁰Görlitz (ed.), Regierte der Kaiser?, 146.

of his "deepest desires," namely, that Germans and Balts draw closer together. Later that year, after reading Harnack's new volume of Reden und Aufsätze, he told him that he always looked for "where the heart beats" and had found it in his essays on the Baltic area.⁴¹ Dietrich Schäfer similarly observed that Harnack had a "Baltic heart" but regretted that it did not beat in rhythm with his on foreign policy. Lezius was less kind, remarking that Harnack would never express himself in the "pro-Baltic fashion" in which Seeberg had publicly advocated the incorporation of the incorporation of the Baltic lands.⁴² Some of Harnack's Baltic compatriots were disappointed to assume that his signature on the counter-petition of 1915 meant that he excluded even eastern gains, and others were offended that he held himself aloof from the Baltic Consultant Council. His daughter claimed that the animosity of his fellow Balts hurt him far more deeply than the insults of the Pan-Germans.⁴³

Seeberg's aspirations were similar but less flexible than Harnack's. As a true son of a German "Baltic baron," he complained at the very outset of the war that former German soil lay in Russian hands. The following spring, he personally helped formulate the section of the "Petition of the

⁴¹Holl to Harnack, May 6, 1916, and no date [autumn, 1916], in Holl, Briefwechsel mit Adolf von Harnack, ed. by Heinrich Karpp (Tübingen, 1966), 68-69.

⁴²Schäfer, Mein Leben, 223; Lezius to Seeberg, Dec. 2, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; referring to Seeberg, "Östliche und westliche Kultur," Deutschlands Erneuerung, I (1917), 767-783.

⁴³Paul Rohrbach to Harnack, Aug. 17, 1915, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 362-363.

Intellectuals" that demanded the incorporation of the three Baltic provinces as future settlement areas for German farmers, and in July, he gave Bethmann a petition from his Baltic Consultant Council which was devoted exclusively to urging the inclusion of the provinces into the Reich.⁴⁴ At first, he feared that the government would be satisfied with only Courland, and he was also distraught to hear that some of the German landed proprietors objected to being annexed, but in September, 1917, he rejoiced that the Kaiser's speech celebrating the fall of Riga implied that Germany had no intention of trading off her new foothold in Livonia.⁴⁵

Seeberg and Harnack were keenly interested in the future of the Livonian University of Dorpat, where both had studied and where Harnack's father had taught theology. Under Tsar Alexander II, the university had been largely under German and Baltic influence, but Alexander III had transformed it into a predominantly Russian institution. In 1916, the two theologians published similar essays bemoaning the university's fate,⁴⁶ but soon after the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk had

⁴⁴Seeberg, "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges," Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 173; Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Aug. 3, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; copy of "Petition of the Intellectuals" in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK; copy of Baltic Council's petition in Johannes Haller Nachlass, BAK.

⁴⁵Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Aug. 3, 1915, and to Lezius, March 5, 1915 and Sept. 7, 1917, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Seeberg to Haller, Sept. 9, 1917, Haller Nachlass, BAK; Kaiser's speech in Kriegs-Rundschau, IV, 1673-1674.

⁴⁶Harnack, "Die deutsche Universität Dorpat, ihre Leistungen und ihr Untergang," Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit, 369; Seeberg, "Die deutsche Wissenschaft und die Universität Dorpat," Geschichte, Krieg und Seele, 200.

returned it to German hands, their differences surfaced. Harnack immediately recommended that the same solicitude that Germany had demonstrated in restoring the University of Warsaw for the Poles and in reconstituting the University of Ghent for the Flemish be shown for Dorpat. In September, 1918, the university was reopened as a German institution--with the stipulation that all lectures be given in German. Since the former student body had had about equal numbers of Germans, Letts, and Estonians, Harnack protested the requirement and refused the Eighth Army's invitation to speak there. The more chauvinistic Seeberg, however, justified the regulation by arguing that the more zealous students would henceforth come from Germany herself, and he happily accepted the army's request to inspect the new university and lecture there.⁴⁷

Both theologians recognized that only eight per cent of the Balts were German, but even though each denied a Russian character to them, only Seeberg concluded that Germanizing them would be easy. In the spring of 1915, he argued that since the Baltic nationalities were only small "splinter" groups there was no danger of irredentism; moreover, the

⁴⁷Harnack, "Die deutschen Ostseeprovinzen: der nächste Schritt," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXXII (1918), 1931; Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXXIII (1918), 415; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 820; Karl Hammer, "Adolf von Harnack und der Erste Weltkrieg," Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik, XVI (1972), 94; Seeberg, "Baltenland und Kultur," in Die neue Ordnung unserer östlichen Nachbargebiete (Berlin, 1918), 41, copy in "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," collection in UBM; Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 282, and Seeberg to Bonwetsch, March 30, 1918, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

predominantly Lutheran Estonians and Livonians belonged with-
in the orbit of Protestant Germany. Two years later, he
publicly stressed the importance of German control over the
sea coast from Riga to Reval--especially in light of the
rumor that Britain planned to make Estonia and Livonia a
"second Egypt" and the islands in the adjoining Gulfs of Riga,
Finland, and Bothnia a "new Gibraltar."⁴⁸ In June, 1918,
after returning from his official tour of Dorpat, Riga, and
Reval, he assured the Independent Committee, which greeted
his findings with enthusiastic applause, that incorporating
the Balts would not mean absorbing foreigners, because an
exposure to a cross-section of the people had convinced him
that they were "indeed flesh of our flesh and blood of our
blood." With some justification, he likened them to a minor
who had been violated by her guardian and had fled to her
relatives for protection, but with less validity, he claimed
that giving Estonia and Livonia independence would only result
in "dwarf states" which would immediately become dens of
Bolshevist intrigue. Adorning annexationist cravings with al-
truistic garb, he closed with the prayer: "May God grant that
Germany be a comfort to this long plagued land and that German
essence bring real happiness to these oldest German colonies."⁴⁹

⁴⁸Seeberg, "Unsere Kriegsziele," address of June 20, 1915,
and "Was Erwarten Wir von Friedensschluss," address of spring,
1917, both priv. printed by the Independent Committee, copies
in "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," collection in UBM.

⁴⁹Seeberg, "Baltenland und Kultur," address before Ind.
Comm., June, 1918, in Die neue Ordnung unserer Ostlichen Nach-
bargebiete (Berlin, 1918), 30-43, copy in "Kriegs- und Friedens-
ziele," collection in UBM.

Harnack rose above this sort of jingoism. Although he had formerly desired some form of satellite status for the Baltic lands, just after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk he openly espoused the principle of the self-determination of nations. Estonia and Livonia remained nominally part of Russia until the supplemental treaties of August, 1918, but Harnack immediately rejoiced that all three provinces had been freed from Russian control, "given back to themselves," and were preparing to "take up again the threads of their independent history." Reviving Bethmann's emphasis on Kulturpolitik, he publicly declared that the main thing was not to establish political control over the provinces but to preserve German Kultur within them. Calling himself "a patriot with a heavy heart," he rejected the rash solution of gobbling up the territories, welcomed Courland's decision to become an independent duchy under German protection, asserted that there were many ways Kultur could be perpetuated in the other two provinces without attaching them to the Reich, and insisted that the other Baltic peoples should have equal rights with the Baltic Germans.⁵⁰ Most importantly, he announced his expectation of seeing the three provinces and also

⁵⁰Harnack, "Die deutschen Ostseeprovinzen: der nächste Schritt," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXXII (1918), 129-132. William II accepted the request of the Diet of Mitau, Courland's provisional government in March, 1918, to assume the ducal crown of Courland, thus establishing a personal union between the little Baltic province and the Reich.

Finland enter the European state system as independent political bodies.⁵¹

For Seeberg, Kulturpolitik still had to bow to Macht-politik, and national self-determination was still anathema. His followers heartily concurred. His brother Alfred, Professor of New Testament at Kiel, continually revelled--even on his deathbed in August, 1915--in the prospect of restoring German control over the Baltic provinces and had had little patience with those who were lukewarm on the matter.⁵²

Schian visited the occupied area from Warsaw to Riga in late February-early March, 1918, and was impressed by the ample room for colonization in the sparsely settled land and by the strength of Lutheranism in the Baltic provinces. He was also struck by the large numbers and "oriental" characteristics of the Polish and Lithuanian Jews, especially in Warsaw, Vilna, and Bialystok. In spite of the German in their Yiddish, he argued, they were not west-Europeans. Consequently, although he had nothing against outright annexation per se, he shuddered at the thought of its enfranchising eastern Jews and contaminating Prussia with non-Germans. Granting full independence to the liberated areas would likewise be fraught

⁵¹Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkrieg," Erforschtes und Erlebtes, 312 [orig. in the Vienna Neue Freie Presse, March 31, 1918/].

⁵²Reinhold Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Aug. 3 and 29, 1915, and to Lezius, July 27, 1917, and Bonwetsch to Reinhold Seeberg, Sept. 5, 1915, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

with problems; so, he advocated a row of buffer states with varying degrees of autonomy but all somehow under Germany's thumb.⁵³

The most uncompromising on the eastern question, as on everything else, was Lezius. From his vantage point in East Prussia, he gathered scraps of information that indicated Germany's dilly-dallying in her Drang nach Osten. Although the Reichstag had greeted Bethmann's announcement in August, 1915 of the conquest of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland with thunderous applause, Lezius fretted over the chancellor's silence about the future of his birthplace, Livonia. Even Bethmann's strong pledge to the Reichstag on April 5, 1916 that the liberated Poles, Lithuanians, and Livonians would not be returned to Russia made no impression on him. That summer, when Germany renewed her efforts to negotiate a separate peace with Russia, Lezius feared that Courland might be relinquished, and in the summer of 1917, he deemed it typical of his leaders' "slipshod" work that they had toyed with the idea of allowing the Lithuanians to decide by plebiscite whether to join Germany or not.⁵⁴

The only formal revelation of his unbridled desires is an essay he wrote in the summer of 1915. He sent it for

⁵³Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 174-184; the entire editorial is on the eastern question.

⁵⁴Lezius to Kropatscheck, Aug. 19, 1915, and to Seeberg, Aug. 29, 1916, and Aug. 14, 1917, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 244, 286-290, 615; see also the Marxist study: Werner Basler, Deutschlands Annexionspolitik in Polen und im Baltikum 1914-1918, (Berlin, 1962), 271-273.

evaluation to Seeberg, who told him to soften it, mentioned that the Independent Committee was wealthy and might be able to print it, and asked him to contact the committee's president, Schäfer, on his own, lest Schäfer think he was trying to "tryannize" him.⁵⁵ As things turned out, the jingoist Munich publisher, J. F. Lehmann, printed the essay as a confidential document, and by May, 1916, about 3,000 copies had been distributed, including a few which Lezius sent Seeberg to circulate among his friends.⁵⁶

If Lezius did temper his demands, one wonders what he originally coveted, for the finished product, Deutschland und der Osten, spelled out a merciless Diktat for Russia. Assuming that Germany was going to settle for a weak peace in the west, he insisted upon a strong one in the east. His maximal aim was to limit the Great Russians to the Muscovite and Asiatic areas by extending German control as far east as Lake Ladoga and the Dnieper River, a line roughly between Novgorod and Kiev. If German forces should not advance that far, then as a minimal goal--which Brest-Litovsk and the supplemental treaties achieved--Germany must secure a line running from Narva and Lake Peipus south to the Pripet marshes. The more ambitious plan envisioned an independent Ukraine which, in order to preclude Polish-Catholic intrigues which

⁵⁵Seeberg to Bonwetsch [Lezius], Oct. 7, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁵⁶Lezius to Seeberg, Nov. 20, and 21, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

would drive the new state into Russia's arms, was to have a Uniate leader. The more modest program anticipated leaving the eastern Ukraine under Romanov control but giving the western half to Austria-Hungary. In either case, the Baltic provinces and control of the Baltic Sea would fall to Germany; Russian Poland would be divided between the Habsburg and Hohenzollern empires, and Finland would become an independent state as a buffer to Russia. In keeping with his picture of the war as a battle between Hannibal and Rome, Lezius advised that future German rule follow the Roman practice of combining dictatorial control with substantial autonomy. Germany would dominate millions of Poles, Balts, Lithuanians, and White Russians; with the exception of the Baltic Germans, none was to be enfranchised or receive other civic rights but neither were they to be forced to adopt the German language. Like the Athenian metics, they were to be denied citizenship but required to pay taxes and serve in the army. Furthermore, the "backward eastern Jews" were to be prevented from immigrating to Germany proper, especially to Berlin.⁵⁷

Erich Seeberg, whom Lezius favored with a copy of his essay, deemed the minimal program sufficient, approved of treating eastern peoples as "subjects," and agreed that an independent Poland was unthinkable, since it would be a

⁵⁷Lezius, Deutschland und der Osten /Munich: J. F. Lehmann, 1915, 1-14, copy in UBM.

"new Serbia" on Germany's flank.⁵⁸ In fact, on one point, theologians in both camps agreed with Lezius: the Poles hated the Germans.⁵⁹ Before the war broke out, Lezius had publicly decried the rights accorded the three million Poles within the empire, and his diatribes had been heard even in England and America.⁶⁰ During the war, he pontificated that an independent Poland was "sheer nonsense" and a "deadly danger," claimed that even a personal union of Poland with Austria would be too problematic, and insisted that the area must "remain forever a subjugated province."⁶¹

In November, 1916, in the hopes of creating a strong buffer to Russia and raising a large Polish army to fight her, the Supreme Command prompted William II and Francis Joseph to create a quasi-independent Poland. The old Congress Poland was transformed into a hereditary, constitutional monarchy that was to remain in military, economic,

⁵⁸Erich Seeberg to Lezius, Jan. 17, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁵⁹Ibid.; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 194, and XVIII (1918), 154; Seeberg to Lezius, Dec. 26, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Paul Althaus /Jr./, "Die deutsch-lutherische Kirche im Königreich Polen," Süddt. Monatshf., XV (1917), 83; Althaus, a Privatdozent in Göttingen in 1914, served as a pastor in occupied Poland from 1915 to 1918; his father taught dogmatics at Leipzig.

⁶⁰Emil Reich, Germany's Madness (New York, 1914; orig. pub. as Germany's Swelled Head, 1907), 55-56; Reich was a Hungarian who settled in England; William Skaggs, German Conspiracies in America (Toronto, [1915]), 128.

⁶¹Lezius to Seeberg, Sept. 17, 1914, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Lezius, Deutschland und der Osten, 3, 14.

and political alliance with her two creators. Although Poland had simply traded one master for another, Deissman hailed "the resurrection of a free and independent state." Minimizing the strings that Germany had attached, he tried to impress neutral America with the claim that whereas the Allies merely mouthed irredentist slogans and pretended to fight for small, oppressed peoples, Germany had actually ended the "martyrdom" of a nation, thereby fulfilling a "world-historical mission." He also rejoiced that a large and old area of the Roman Catholic Church as well as a small body of Protestants had finally been snatched from the clutches of Russian Orthodoxy. While he focused foreign attention on the alleged blessings of the event, other theologians saw a darker side of the picture. Bonwetsch foresaw grave consequences for the German inhabitants of the new Polish state, and Lezius prophesied that it would not adequately protect Germany from Russia and that when a "second world war" came about, it would fight Germany to regain West Prussia.⁶²

Indeed, the Polish puppet did not prove responsive to her German manipulator. In November, 1916, when the Supreme Command asked for volunteers for a Polish national army, instead of the million men that Lezius dreamed of, only 370

⁶²R. H. Lutz (ed.), Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918, I, 757-760; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 294-309, 346-349; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Nov. 8, 1916; Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Dec. 26, 1916, and Lezius to Kropatascheck, Nov. 12, 1916, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

came forward-- all but twenty of them Jews. Further conflicts over the proposed army brought not only moans of disappointment from Schian, but the replacement, in September, 1917, of the provisional Council of State with a Regency Council, over which the military governors retained a veto. After a year of such troubles, Bonwetsch concluded that Germany had opened a Pandora's box, and while the negotiators conferred at Brest-Litovsk, Seeberg's Independent Committee recommended that since the Polish people had done next to nothing to effect their "liberation," they should be brought under German control.⁶³

The wine of success that flowed from Brest-Litovsk intoxicated nearly all of the German people, moderates and radicals alike. Though discreetly silent about the territorial gains, Deissmann boasted that the treaty had ended "the rule of barbed wire" and had finally permitted him to send his weekly letters to Protestants in the Baltic provinces.⁶⁴ With no pretense of restraint, the Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung, the voice of conservative Protestantism, exclaimed:

"Peace without annexations and indemnities!" So men resolved . . . , but God willed otherwise. Ger-

⁶³Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 307, 597-598; Lezius to Seeberg, Aug. 29, 1916, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Nov. 4, 1917, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 183; "Nach dem 27. Dezember 1917," flyer of the Independent Committee, Jan. 6, 1917, copy in "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," collection in UBM.

⁶⁴Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., June 8, and July 12, 1918.

many's armies pressed on . . . , and Russia, who wanted to give no indemnities, was forced at the last minute to yield enormous booty: 800 locomotives, 8,000 railway cars with every kind of treasure and supply; God knew that we needed it. And we also needed guns and munitions for the last blow against the enemy in the west. God knew that too. So He freely gave us, because God is good, 2,600 guns, 5,000 machine guns, two million artillery shells, rifles, aircraft, trucks, and innumerable other things Thus it was decided by God--a true peace of God, contrary to everything men had planned and wanted. Whatever may happen to the liberated border states, Russia will never get them back, and they will find in Germany the protection and support they seek.⁶⁵

The initial advances of the "Ludendorff offensive" in the spring of 1918 further stimulated the public's thirst, causing dismay among the few moderates who remained calm. Baumgarten openly complained that nothing more was heard of a "peace of understanding" and that its former proponents were apologizing for their faintheartedness. He decided that many had considered the spoils of war sour grapes only because they seemed to hang too high, but now that they were within reach they appeared sweet. In April, Rade privately lamented to Harnack that Germany's successful thrust westward had prompted many champions of the Reichstag Peace Resolution to cast restraint to the winds. He hoped that in spite of their victories his countrymen would keep themselves "pure and moderate," and he was disappointed to see even Troeltsch grabbing at the new prizes in sight.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Allgem. Evangel.-Luther. Kirchztg., Nr. 11, 1918, cited in Mehnert, Evangelische Kirche und Politik, 1917-1919, 64-65.

⁶⁶Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVIII (1918), 152-153; Rade to Harnack, April 13, 1918, Rade Nachlass, UBM.

For the first three and a half years of the war, Troeltsch advocated an essentially complete return to the status quo ante. At the end of 1917, he even helped organize a counterweight to the jingoist German Fatherland Party, the People's League for Freedom and Fatherland, and at its inaugural rally on January 8, 1918, he passionately impressed upon his listeners the need for moderate aims. Demands for forced annexations and war indemnities, he argued, merely lessened the Allies' inclination to negotiate. He also urged an "intellectual demobilization," asking his compatriots not to embrace pacifism or sentimentality but to abandon an absolute mistrust of their foes and a worship of the "power theory."⁶⁷ In the spring of 1918, however, the Saul who had harassed the radicals became the Paul who preached the gospel of expansion--especially to the east. A hint of his potential for change had surfaced in 1916, when he had announced that Germany's degree of moderation at the peace table would partly depend on the attitudes of the other belligerents and that only "Don Quixotes" would make specific prior commitments.⁶⁸ Now, he argued on several occasions that new conditions, including the Russian collapse in the east, the German advance in the west, and--primarily-- the

⁶⁷Troeltsch, "Freiheit und Vaterland," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 76-77.

⁶⁸Troeltsch, "Privatmoral und Staatsmoral," Neue Rund., XXVII (1916), 162.

Allies' refusal of the German offers to negotiate early in 1918, necessitated a reconsideration of Germany's aims. He contended that the French and English leaders, especially the "brazen and obstinate" Lloyd George, were unnecessarily prolonging the war, thereby further draining Germany of material resources. Consequently, she was justified in new demands for securities in the east and indemnities; in fact, she should even re-examine the Belgian question. What primarily fascinated him was the vision of a line of buffer states from Finland to the Black Sea under German "suzerainty."⁶⁹

Like Bethmann, Troeltsch was now attacked by both left and right, and he tried to clarify his new position. "Intellectual demobilization," he explained, did not mean defeatism but merely giving up the desire to annihilate one's enemies. On the other hand, he insisted, since his recommendations to the People's League had basically reflected the attempts of Germany's leaders at the beginning of 1918 to end the war by diplomacy, and those efforts had been in vain, Germany must indeed re-think her goals. "Naturally," he added, "there are no dogmas in these things; the rule of holding fast to principles lies in another plane."⁷⁰

Though Troeltsch was not specific, the attempts to which

⁶⁹Troeltsch, "Das Wesen des Weltkrieges," 22-24; Troeltsch, "Verschiebungen der inneren Front," Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, April 6, 1918.

⁷⁰Troeltsch, "Anklagen auf Defaitismus," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 668.

he alluded were presumably Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlmann's invitation to all the Allies to gather at Brest-Litovsk in order to conclude a general peace and Chancellor Hertling's Reichstag speeches of January and February, 1918, in which he renewed Germany's offer to negotiate. But coming to Brest-Litovsk would have been exceedingly awkward for the world's two largest colonial powers, since it meant endorsing, as the Central Powers had pretended to do, the principle of the self-determination of nations. As Kühlmann freely confessed in his memoirs, he merely used self-determination as a lever to pry loose from Russia the areas Germany coveted and to detach Russia herself from an embarrassed England and France. And Hertling's offers were simply part of a plan by Colonel Hans von Haeften, supported by Ludendorff, to precede a military offensive with psychological gestures. By offering to negotiate, but by making no clear concessions on Belgium, Germany hoped to secure the sympathy of the neutrals and of the peace parties within the enemy countries. By returning the initiative to her opponents, she could saddle them with the onus of prolonging the war. While current scholarship is generally agreed that the German overtures were deceitful, Troeltsch seemingly took them at face value.⁷¹

⁷¹Kühlmann, Erinnerungen (Heidelberg, 1948), 522-535; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten Peace (New York, 1971; 1st ed., 1938), 116-140; Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 251-259; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 647-649, 829-836. David Lloyd George denounced Kühlmann's invitation as hypocritical; see his "The War Aims of the Allies," speech of Jan. 5, 1918, in Lloyd George, The Great Crusade. Extracts from Speeches Delivered During the War, ed. by F. L.

He was not what his contemporaries dubbed a "tree-frog annexationist," one who jumped up when the war news was good and down when it was bad, nor was he a crypto-radical whose true desires finally came to light. He was simply enough of a historical relativist to maintain that Germany was entitled to extra compensation for having to continue the war, as he believed, against her will.

Such a stance was nothing new for Troeltsch. Years earlier, he had abandoned Ritschl's dogmatic theology for Paul de Lagarde's historical method. But three of his liberal friends who had remained, in some sense of the word, true believers, did not imitate his new rejection of dogmas and principles. Rade was disgusted with him; Harnack gave no hint of second thoughts on restoring independence to Belgium or granting it to the Baltic provinces and Finland; and Baumgarten proclaimed in May, 1918, that even if the Allies had refused a compromise peace, he still objected to forced annexations and indemnities, and in October, he applauded Prince Max's willingness to revise the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and apply national self-determination to Russia's border lands.⁷² Of the four apostles of moderation, only one

Stevenson (New York, 1918), 251-266. But the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Ottokar Czernin, who desperately wanted a general peace, defended the offer as sincere; see his In the World War (London, 1919), 219-236.

⁷²Rade to Harnack, April 13, 1918, Rade Nachlass, UBM; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVIII (1918), 153, 315; Harnack, "Die Religion im Weltkrieg," 312.

betrayed the cause. And he was more of a Thomas than a Judas--doubting the Allies' good will more than coveting their silver.

Divided over war aims, the moderates and radicals naturally held opposing views on Bethmann. On one thing, though, they agreed: he was too hesitant. The chancellor's pensive and pedantic nature had already earned him the nicknames of "philosopher" and the "sage of Hohenfinow,"⁷³ and his wartime performance added an even less flattering tag--"Hamlet." Bethmann's deliberate policy of tacking between the extremes desired by the Social Democrats, on the one hand, and the Pan-Germans, National Liberals, and heavy industry, on the other, made him appear an irresolute and inferior successor to the decisive Iron Chancellor, whose centenary was celebrated on April 1, 1915.

Bethmann's friends as well as his foes bewailed his refusal to align himself with a particular camp. Momentarily despairing of his own circle, Seeberg once remarked: "We on the right are too much like Bethmann; we . . . avoid every thought of the future and hope in God!" While rejoicing over Bethmann's fall, Bonwetsch commented: "He shows so well how

⁷³Frederic W. Wile, Men Around the Kaiser (Indianapolis, 1914), 19-26; Wile was Berlin correspondent for the London Daily Mail. Gerhard Ritter tried to rescue Bethmann from the "silly nickname" of "the philosopher of Hohenfinow," arguing that he had not indulged in abstract thinking but had courageously and realistically grappled with Germany's problems; The Sword and the Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden, 485.

disastrous a small man is during a great hour in a crucial place; he was a Hamlet when the first duty was to act." Baumgarten publicly lamented that he had fallen because he had sinned against "the iron rule of politics: the maintenance and ruthless realization of power," and he regretted that the "limitations of his talent for statesmanship proceeded from his Hamlet-like nature." Rudolf Otto, another liberal who supported the chancellor, bemoaned his "usual lack of firmness."⁷⁴ Even Rade, who publicly praised Bethmann's strengths, privately credited him with one weakness. In the summer of 1917, for instance, he told his readers that Bethmann's grasp of political complexities elevated him far above the Pan-Germans, who wished to cut knots rather than try to untie them. But just one week before the chancellor resigned, Rade grumbled that his "inclination to let things drift" had produced such a "depressing" situation that he would almost be glad to be rid of him--even if his successor was a military man or a radical annexationist. The impression that Bethmann made on most people was probably best summed up by Ambassador James W. Gerard, who observed that he simply "lacked punch."⁷⁵

One result of Bethmann's futile efforts to maintain

⁷⁴Seeberg to Lezius, May 27, 1915, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, July 22, 1917, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 254; Otto to Harnack, May 9, 1917, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; See also Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 471.

⁷⁵Rade, "Von den Alldeutschen," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 429; Rade to Harnack, July 6, 1917, Rade Nachlass, UBM; Gerard, Face to Face with Kaiserism, 34.

national unity was that radicals and moderates alike drew hope from his ambiguous speeches. On May 28, 1915, in his first public pronouncement on war aims, he declared that Germany must secure a peace that brought "real guarantees and securities" against future attacks. Although the Reichstag and the press applauded the address as a pledge for expansion, Baumgarten professed no alarm. He assured his readers that since the chancellor was "an objectively-thinking philosopher" as well as a "disciple of Bismarck," he would be able to blend Germany's need for a strong peace with the obviously contradictory need of a peace satisfying all the belligerents. When Bethmann gave a similar address on December 9, 1915, Seeberg momentarily rejoiced that he was becoming more insistent on "real guarantees."⁷⁶ But Bethmann went too far for the radicals on November 9, 1916, when he daringly told the Reichstag Main Committee that he had never designated the actual annexation of Belgium as one of Germany's aims. The National Liberals, Conservatives, Free Conservatives, and Center voiced their disapproval, prompting Baumgarten to mourn the chancellor's loss of parliamentary support and to join the Hobohm Committee against the Pan-Germans.⁷⁷ Bethmann's Peace Note the following month further

⁷⁶Bethmann's addresses cited in Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West, 16, 70-74; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XV (1915), 265; Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Dec. 12, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁷⁷Bethmann's speech cited in Kriegs-Rundschau, III; 1368; Baumgarten to Delbrück, Nov. 14, 1916, Delbrück Nachlass, BAK.

alienated the annexationist parties, and though Baumgarten regretted that the right wing of his National Liberty party, under Ernst Bassermann, had opposed the offer, he happily noted that the left wing, led by Eugen Schiffer, had supported it. Seeberg and Bonwetsch were disgusted with Bethmann and dreaded to think what would happen if he led the peace negotiations.⁷⁸

Bethmann's problem, argued the radicals, was that he watered down a hard Machtpolitik with a soft Moralpolitik. Indeed, the war had no sooner begun than he confessed to a "wrong" in violating Belgium's neutrality but excused it with the maxim: "Necessity knows no law." Baumgarten conjectured that Bismarck would never have resorted to such theoretical justification but would have merely argued that an imminent French attack necessitated an invasion through Belgium. Having already berated Bethmann's opponents for regarding his confession as "the forgivable sin," Baumgarten surmised after his fall that his "completely new anti-Machiavellian method of politics" might have heralded a new epoch in the relation of politics and morality.⁷⁹ Rade similarly applauded the chancellor's admission, but Harnack thought that Bethmann's "scrupulous conscientiousness" had this time gone too far.

⁷⁸Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 30-31; Seeberg to Lezius, Dec. 26, 1916, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Dec. 12, 1916, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁷⁹Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XIV (1914), 318, and XVII (1917), 256-258, and Politik und Moral, 8.

In Harnack's view, there was no need to acknowledge a formal wrong, because Germany's desperate situation had absolved her of formalities, leaving her only the moral duty of defending herself. But this instance aside, he vigorously supported Bethmann's moral concern--to the point of publicly defending, in the spring of 1916, the chancellor's efforts to keep Germany wearing a "clean shirt."⁸⁰ In like fashion, Troeltsch openly commended Bethmann as one who held fast to German moral idealism and who, "walking down the road of morality," found himself on "the pathway to greatness."

Praise came even from the less extreme supporters of the Seeberg petition. Deissmann lauded Bethmann as a "religious man," and Schian approved when his Giessen theology faculty, which had conferred upon Bismarck an honorary doctorate of theology in 1888, bestowed the same honor upon Bethmann for his insistence that Germany waged war with a clean conscience.⁸¹ Other radicals were not so kind. When the chancellor attempted to present a tough public image by denouncing a policy of "sentimentality," Seeberg and Haussleiter cited his remark as a means of inciting their countrymen to hold him to his

⁸⁰Rade to Harnack, April 28, 1916, Rade Nachlass, UBM; Harnack, "Meine Antwort auf den vorstehenden Brief," Sept. 10, 1914, Inter. Monatsschr., IX (1914), 22; Harnack, "Der Abschied von der weissen Weste," Der Tag, April 21, 1916; Troeltsch, "Imperialismus," Neue Rund., XXVI (1915), 14.

⁸¹Deissmann, "Der Krieg und die Religion," 299; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 576.

⁸³Deissmann, "Bismarck und sein kampfendes Volk," Der Tag, April 1, 1915; Baumgarten, "Bismarck, Ch...," Evangel. Archiv.

word. Of course, the most vitriolic was Lezius. Characterizing the chancellor as "an epigone of Bismarck with a cowardly conscience," he claimed that his show of fervent nationalism was only a mask for his private machinations. With another allusion to the ancient world, he murmured: "Bethmann plays the part of a Cato, but he is a malicious, scheming wire-puller."⁸²

The radicals also feared that Machtpolitik was being adulterated with Kulturpolitik and an overly cautious Realpolitik. Even though Deissman proclaimed on Bismarck's birthday in 1915 that the Iron Chancellor's descendants showed that Macht and Kultur went hand in hand, a few weeks later he signed the Seeberg petition which criticized the fifth chancellor for emphasizing the latter at the expense of the former. That radicals winced to hear Baumgarten proclaim that Bismarck's Realpolitik, though not romantic, was realistic enough to prompt him always to consider the consequences of his actions and had therefore made him the master of moderation. Frequently referring to the Austrian town where in 1866 Bismarck had persuaded King William I to spare the Habsburgs territorial losses in order to dispose them to future friendliness, Baumgarten's motto on the annexation question was "Remember Nikolsburg."⁸³

⁸²Seeberg, Was sollen wir denn tun?, 41; Haussleiter, "Ernst Moritz Arndts deutsche Ziele," Inter. Monatsschr., X (1916), 1377. Lezius to Seeberg, Nov. 20, 1917, and to Kropatscheck, May 7, 1915, both in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁸³Deissmann, "Bismarck und sein kämpfendes Volk," Der Tag, April 1, 1915; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt.,

The radicals countered by noting the virtues of Macht-politik. For one thing, it did not moralistically try to "play God" in international affairs. Holl insisted that Bismarck was the avowed enemy of preventive war or war as punishment for a wrong done to one's own or another country, and he scolded the English for assuming the role of a judge of wayward nations. Schian held that even though power-politics did not have to be immoral, moral maxims and abstract principles simply did not belong in the sphere of politics; therefore, Germany should pursue her self-interest openly--unlike her enemies, who hypocritically embellished their ruthless aims with moral maxims. Furthermore, Schian noted, the appeal of Machtpolitik to nationalism was not unchristian. When Paul taught that all believers were one in Christ (Galatians 3:28), he explained, he did not mean to erase national distinctions but merely to point to a higher spiritual unity. Therefore, cosmopolitan concern was not a Christian imperative; on the contrary, Germans should follow Bismarck in regarding national sentiment as "a holy duty, a glorious right."⁸⁴ Other theologians added that a statesman who practiced power-politics need not be personally

XV (1915), 182, and XVII (1917), 30, and Politik und Moral, 100-113, and "Der Krieg und die Bergpredigt," 142.

⁸⁴Holl, "Die Kulturbedeutung der Reformation," Gesammelte Aufsätze, I, 374, 381-382, and "Luthers Anschauung," Gesammelte Aufsätze, III, 156; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 185, and VII (1916), 525-528.

irreligious and insisted on the genuineness of Bismarck's conversion. Seeberg held that he had been a "convinced Protestant" who had had times of doubt but had kept his faith until the end. Hans von Soden recommended that Bismarck's favorite prayer, "Thy will be done," become Germany's in the midst of the war. Baumgarten carefully noted that though Bismarck had had a vital faith in a personal God, he did not allow it to thwart his duty of furthering the interests of the state.⁸⁵ Current scholarship agrees that Bismarck had a conversion experience but that it had little influence on his social attitudes or political decisions.⁸⁶

The radicals, however suspected that Bethmann's political decisions were heavily affected by his fondness for Moralpolitik, Kulturpolitik, and an overly restrained Realpolitik, and that consequently, his war aims were below par. They emphasized the impossibility of restoring the old balance of power and the urgency of adding new territory for a growing population, of promoting a strong buffer zone against tsarism and, later, Bolshevism, and of preventing Belgium from ever again becoming England's puppet. Looking both eastward and westward, they rejected the extremes of

⁸⁵Seeberg, Das Christentum Bismarcks (Berlin, 1915), 5, 14; Soden, Bismarcks Glaube (Stuttgart, 1915), 14; Baumgarten, "Bismarck als religiöser Charakter," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLX, 4, and "Bismarcks Bedeutung für unser inneres Leben," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 263-265, and Bismarcks Glaube (Tübingen, 1915), 48-55, 132-143.

⁸⁶Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, 1815-1871 (Princeton, 1963), 53-62; Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (New York, 1964; 1st ed., 1950), 15.

complete independence as well as outright annexation with accompanying enfranchisement. Instead, they envisioned protectorates--vassal states either in personal union with the Kaiser or under some form of German suzerainty. Their motto was that Germany must forfeit none of her deserved spoils of war. The moderates were more flexible, urging German leaders not to aim at what they could not realistically achieve. Combining principles and pragmatism, they stressed the need of respecting Christian values, German moral idealism, the conscience of the Germany working class, and world opinion, as well as the need of preventing a "new Ireland" and preserving national homogeneity, Protestant hegemony, and a strong position in world trade. Baumgarten praised Bethmann for confessing to a "wrong" on August 4, 1914; Harnack wanted him to keep a "clean shirt" and avoid the "sin" of "will to power"; and Rade, hoping that despite the successes of early 1918 his compatriots would remain "pure and moderate," winced to see Troeltsch dismiss as "Don Quixotes" those who stuck to principles. To be sure, there were similarities between the two groups. In 1915, as Harnack looked toward his eastern homeland, his "Baltic heart" beat as rapidly as Seeberg's, but by 1918, as a "patriot with a heavy heart," he opted for national self-determination for the Baltic peoples--a doctrine still heretical to his colleague. Likewise on the western question, though Harnack's circle hoped somehow to prevent Belgium from becoming a secret foe, they advocated trading her for

Germany's colonies, whereas Seeberg's coterie demanded keeping her on a tight leash. Baumgarten's postwar estimate remains valid: the war aims controversy did "split the nation into two camps."⁸⁷

Chapter IX

The division over war aims was duplicated in the split over the related question of internal reform. Underlining the connection between the two issues, Friedrich Meinecke asserted that by the beginning of 1917, Germany was divided between "two completely different political systems": the one agitating for unrestricted submarine warfare, and the other for the reform of the Prussian franchise.¹ While some clamored for a vast program of extensive annexations, others emphasized the wisdom of moderate territorial goals and the primacy of a progressive domestic policy. The theologians split predictably. All of them were conservatives and monarchists at heart. As men of *Bildung und Besitz* (education and wealth), they wanted the reins of government safely in the hands of a propertied elite. But while Seeberg and his followers staunchly opposed all reform or, as they claimed, merely its realization during the war, Harnack and his disciples

¹Meinecke, "Zwei Systeme," *Die Zeit*, III (1918), 708.
⁸⁷Baumgarten, "Der sittliche Zustand," in Melchior et al. (eds.), Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, I, 45.

REFORM, REACTION, OR REVOLUTION?

Chapter IX

The division over war aims was duplicated in the split over the related question of internal reform. Underlining the connection between the two issues, Friedrich Meinecke asserted that by the beginning of 1917, Germany was divided between "two completely different political systems": the one agitating for unrestricted submarine warfare, and the other for the reform of the Prussian franchise.¹ While some clamored for a va banque military program and extensive annexations, others emphasized the wisdom of moderate territorial goals and the primacy of a progressive domestic policy. The theologians split predictably. All of them were conservatives and monarchists at heart. As men of Bildung und Besitz (education and wealth), they wanted the reins of government safely in the hands of a propertied elite. But while Seeberg and his followers staunchly opposed all reform or, as they claimed, merely its realization during the war, Harnack and his disciples

¹Meinecke, "Zwei Systeme," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 708. The best recent monograph on the wartime struggle over the franchise reform is: Reinhard Patemann, Der Kampf um die preussische Wahlreform im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf, 1964), which is vol. XXVI of Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien.

begged the government from 1917 on to introduce equal suffrage immediately into Prussia. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, he argued that it was better to sponsor a partial "revolution from above" than to be swept away from below. Seeberg held that granting one concession would simply whet the masses' appetite for more. As usual, Bethmann's "policy of the diagonal" brought him into the cross-fire of the two camps.

In the eyes of the lower classes, the most obnoxious part of what Theodor Mommsen called Germany's "pseudo-constitutionalism" was the Prussian three-class voting system. Prussia had sixty per cent of the Reich's population and was larger than the other twenty-five federal states put together. Her constitution of December, 1848, had been revised the following year to establish a suffrage for her Lower House that was universal but indirect, open, and unequal. In each electoral precinct, the people were divided into three classes on the basis of the amount of direct taxes they paid. Because of the graduated tax scale, a small number of the very wealthy paid one-third of the taxes and were entitled to elect one-third of the electors. Those paying the second third of the taxes, a slightly larger number, chose the same number of electors, and the large mass of people who together paid the final third of the taxes, chose the last third. The electors then met in a body and voted for the members of the Prussian House of Deputies (Abgeordnetenhaus). As the system worked out, about fifteen per cent of the population, composed mainly

of east-Elbian bourgeois and Junker landowners and Rhineland industrialists, paid two-thirds of the taxes and therefore controlled the Lower House.²

Though not the most crucial aspect of Germany's conservatism, the lopsided franchise was a palpable inequality and a constant affront to the dignity of the laboring man. To abolish the plutocracy of rye and iron had been a rallying cry of the left long before August, 1914, and the levelling influence of the war made it seem insufferable that men who faced equal dangers at the front should have unequal political strength at home. Equal suffrage would not have automatically undermined royal authority, especially if the king retained control of the army and could appoint and dismiss ministers at will, but the crown showed a remarkable hesitancy to grant this sop to the masses. Although the Prussian House of Lords approved the change on October 24, 1918, the revolution occurred before the Lower House could add its endorsement.³

A more serious threat to Hohenzollern supremacy was the possibility of parliamentary rule on the national level. Giving the Reichstag authority over military and foreign affairs and introducing ministerial responsibility would have

²Patemann, Wahlreform, 11; Eugene Anderson and Pauline Anderson, Political and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, 1967), 314-319.

³Arthur Rosenberg, Die Entstehung der Deutschen Republik 1871-1918 (Berlin, 1928), 148-150.

transformed Germany into a constitutional monarchy like England. Reform in Prussia had been demanded at the very outset of the war by the Social Democrats, but the idea of a wholesale renovation of the Reich was not seriously considered until the Russian revolution scared Gustav Stresemann and his National Liberals into calling for the creation of a Reichstag Constitutional Committee to consider reform at the national as well as the state level. The committee got nowhere until Ludendorff panicked after the collapse of Bulgaria and expedited the transfer of power from the Kaiser and Supreme Command to the Reichstag. Determined that the ugly duckling of Europe must be transformed into a swan to please the Allies, he personally sponsored the German metamorphosis.⁴ But it was too late. While the newly endowed national parliament enjoyed a week of Alice-in-Wonderland fantasy, the Prussian people still wore the chains of the three-class suffrage. Reaction had too long been the rule. Reform was overdue. The bill for such tardiness was revolution.

In July, 1909, when Bethmann had become chancellor and minister-president of Prussia, he immediately attempted to substitute plural suffrage for the three-class franchise and also to introduce either the secret ballot or direct voting. Plural suffrage would have given every man one vote and some mentadditional votes in consideration of age, education, family position, and wealth. As a gradualist and a reforming conser-

⁴Ibid., 208-209, 221-234.

vative, Bethmann was convinced that this concession to the left was imperative. But the Conservatives feared that a newly empowered proletariat would jeopardize private property, while the Center had nightmares about Marxist masses removing religious instruction from the public schools; so, in the spring of 1910, this blue-black bloc in the Prussian Lower House strangled his bill.⁵

In 1913, a new Prussian Lower House was elected, which stood in glaring contrast to the Reichstag elected the previous year. The universal, secret, direct, and equal suffrage for the Reichstag filled 110 of its 397 seats with Social Democrats, while the Conservatives and Free Conservatives captured only fifty-seven seats, and the Center, ninety-one. The universal but open, indirect, and unequal suffrage in Prussia sent only ten Social Democrats to her 443-seat Lower House, whereas the Conservatives, who had dominated the House since the end of the "liberal era" in 1878, boasted 202 deputies, and the Center 103.⁶

On August 1, 1914, when the Kaiser, not bothering with the required consent of the Bundesrat, declared war on Russia, Bethmann was a bit apprehensive about the Social Democrats.

⁵Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, I, 96-98, II, 184; Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, 51-53, 75-79.

⁶Rosenberg, Entstehung, 263, n. 10; Koppel Pinson, Modern Germany (New York, 1966), 601-602. Other Reichstag parties were: National Liberals, 45; Progressives, 42; Poles, 18; Alsace-Lorrainers, 9; Guelphs (Hanoverians), 5; Danes, 1; Anti-Semites, 3; other groups, 16. The Prussian Lower House also included 73 National Liberals, 40 Progressives, 15 Poles, Danes and Lithuanians.

Their party was one million strong; they were powerful in the Second International; and their weight in the Reichstag might be used against the necessary war credits. In fact, despite the government's portrayal of the war as a crusade against tsarist autocracy, there were a few dissenters in their party caucus, but on August 4, the strength of their unit rule resulted in a solid bloc of votes for the war funds.⁷ Harnack, Rade, and Baumgarten attributed their patriotic stance to Bethmann's conciliatory policy toward them, and Deissmann proudly noted that Socialists proved themselves good Germans by going to the front like men of every other political persuasion.⁸ But as the war progressed, they continued to trumpet their demands for equal suffrage, which reactionaries feared would not only upset their monopoly of Prussia but also would become the workers' weapon against annexations. Bethmann's continued commitment to a cautious but progressive domestic policy made him anathema to these champions of territorial conquest and the political status quo.

At the end of August, 1914, Socialist leader Eduard David told Vice-Chancellor Clemens von Delbrück that the only suitable reward for the sacrifices being made by the masses was a

⁷Holborn, Modern Germany, 1840-1945, 423; Pinson, Modern Germany, 327.

⁸Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," 338; Rade, "Zu den Ereignissen im Reich," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 554; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 29; Deissmann, Prot. Wkly. Letter, Feb. 26, 1915.

democratic reform of the Prussian franchise. The reversal at the Marne early in September made concessions all the more necessary. Bethmann therefore had Delbrück announce on October 21 that the government would repay the spontaneous national unity by inaugurating a "new direction" in domestic affairs. When the Reichstag reassembled for its second wartime session on December 2, Bethmann himself promised that when the struggle was over the government would seek to eradicate class divisions. His second request for war credits, however, was met with a negative vote from Socialist Karl Liebknecht, who dared to break party discipline. That same month, Bethmann asked the arch-conservative Prussian minister of the interior, Friedrich von Loebell, to draft a franchise reform proposal. While preparing only minimal suffrage alterations, Loebell did try to pacify the left by instructing local authorities to expedite the confirming in office of Socialists who had been elected to town and school boards.⁹

But Socialist dissent continued to grow. Seeing nothing sacrosanct in the frontiers of August, 1914, the workers did not oppose an extension of German territory and power per se, but they objected to being used as cannon fodder in order to

⁹"Speech of the Imperial German Chancellor to the Reichstag Dec. 2, 1914," Inter. Concil., Nr. 86 (Jan., 1915), 13; Westarp, Konservative Politik, II, 219-220; Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, 310-327; John Williamson, Karl Helfferich, 1872-1894, Economist, Financier, Politician (Princeton, 1971), 200-201.

prolong a war for the sake of territorial gains that would primarily benefit the middle and upper classes. More and more convinced that it was a rich man's war and a poor man's fight, Karl Kautsky, the orthodox Marxist leader, Eduard Bernstein, the revisionist leader, and Hugo Haase, the president of Reichstag Socialist delegation, issued a declaration in the summer of 1915, warning against a war of conquest and questioning whether the party should continue to vote the war credits.¹⁰

With his usual furor against naiveté, Schian charged the three Socialists with childishly assuming that if Germany would simply forswear all annexations, her enemies would respond like sporting gentlemen and break off the match. Troeltsch, on the other hand, made overtures to the Socialists in hopes of maintaining the Burgfriede. In August, 1915, Friedrich Thimme, librarian of the Prussian House of Lords, and Carl Legien, General Secretary of the Socialists' General Commission of German Trade Unions, published a collection of essays by both bourgeoisie and proletariat spokesmen, in an effort to heal the breach between the two classes. As a bourgeois representative of the church, Troeltsch admonished Christians to stop eyeing Socialists as potential converts and start practicing peaceful coexistence. Another advocate of rapprochement was Philipp Scheidemann, a leader of the Reichstag

¹⁰Rosenberg, Entstehung, 100; Pinson, Modern Germany, 331.

Socialists, who thanked the government of its promise of a "new direction" and for facilitating the admission of Socialists into municipal offices. But he also insisted that nothing less than the postwar reform of the Prussian franchise and the introduction of some form of democracy at the national level would adequately recompense the masses for their war efforts.¹¹

In response to these proposals, Baumgarten and Rade approved Troeltsch's motion for a modus vivendi between Marxism and Christianity, but Schian and Seeberg recoiled at Scheidemann's demands. Schian contended that the Socialists were placing an inordinate emphasis on reform and that any attempt to implement the government's promises would simply engender party strife which a nation at war could not afford. Upon coming to Berlin in 1898, Seeberg had affiliated himself with the Conservative Party, and, fully in keeping with its sentiments, he revised in 1915 one of his earlier war booklets precisely in order to confront the "new direction." Though conceding that postwar Germany must grant greater popular participation in government and some alteration of the Prussian franchise, he explicitly attacked equal suffrage.¹²

¹¹Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 376-380; Troeltsch, "Die Kirchen- und Religionspolitik im Verhältnis zur Sozialdemokratie," in Thimme and Legien (eds.), Die Arbeiterschaft im neuen Deutschland, 179-180; Scheidemann, "Zur Neuorientierung der inneren Politik," in Thimme and Legien (eds.), Arbeiterschaft, 58-67.

¹²Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XV (1915), 465-467; Rade, "Verschiedenes," Christl. Welt, XXIX (1915), 728-729; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 187-188, 376-378, 571-573; Seeberg, "Selbstbiographie," 418, and Was sollen wir denn tun? 2nd ed., i, 66-79.

Moreover, when minority Socialists from all over Europe gathered at Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in September, 1915, and called for "no annexations, no indemnities," he cited a letter from a German Socialist at the front who condemned such doctrinaire exclusion of all gains. Although Schian rejoiced that it was only minority Socialists who embraced such "unreasonable" theories, the dissident German minority continued to grow, and in December, 1915, twenty Socialists voted against the fourth war credits.¹³

Meanwhile, Loebell had proposed a franchise reform which Bethmann found too repugnant to consider. But believing that something had to be done to satisfy the left, including the Progressives, the chancellor persuaded the Kaiser to make vague promises of reform in his speech from the throne on January 13, 1916. At this point, not even the liberal theologians were committed to immediate revisions. Baumgarten, for instance, assured his 1,400 readers that changes should be postponed until after the war, lest debate over them split the nation. And why speak of the necessity of rewards, he asked, since each man had merely done his duty? Furthermore, he cautioned, politicizing the masses could be dangerous, especially if they were given influence over foreign policy, and he reminded his countrymen that they had traditionally been a

¹³Seeberg, Was sollen wir den tun?, 2nd ed., 2; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VI (1915), 570-571; Ebba Dahlin, French and German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims 1914-1918, 51-52.

people of "poets and thinkers," not political activists, and that they should not be too hasty to change their fundamental nature.¹⁴

As usual, Bethmann's overture proved too little for the left and too much for the right. In March, 1916, Haase and seventeen other Socialist deputies seceded from the party, and on May Day, the extremist Liebknecht led a demonstration against the government for which he was imprisoned until the end of the war. The right continued its fronde against Bethmann, this time led by a relatively unknown East Prussian agricultural bureaucrat, Wolfgang Kapp, who at the end of May, distributed 300 copies of his Die Nationalen Kreise und der Reichskanzler (The National Circles and the Chancellor). Arguing against both equal suffrage and parliamentary rule, he insisted that a decisive military victory was necessary to take the people's minds off reform and save the nation from sinking into a "democratic swamp." Bethmann, who was himself favored with a copy, gave Kapp a tongue-lashing before the Reichstag, denouncing his kind as "pirates of public opinion." Rade went further, charging that such men were "grossly sinning" and urging his readers to support the beleaguered chancellor.¹⁵

¹⁴Patemann, Wahlreform, 21-33; Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 179-185; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVI (1916), 32-34; and Politik und Moral, 175-176.

¹⁵Kapp, Die Nationalen Kreise und der Reichskanzler (Königsberg, 1916), cited in Gatzke, Drive to the West, 127-130, and Karl Wortmann, Geschichte der Deutschen Vaterlands-Partei 1917-1918 (Halle, 1926), 25-26; Bethmann's speech of June 15, 1916, cited in Kriegs-Rundschau, III, 1274-1280; Rade, "Vertrauen," Christl. Welt, XXX (1916), 776-777.

In this dark hour, Bethmann turned to Harnack for advice, which was gladly given. Citing Jesus' words, "He who hath an ear to hear, let him hear," Harnack exhorted Bethmann to listen to the unmistakable cry of the people for reform. As a church historian, he based his plea for government action on the inevitability of change. Unless the crown did something, he warned, the masses, who were earning their rights in the trenches, would rebel. Although neither Germany nor Prussia needed to depart from her monarchical foundation, leaving the old order untouched would be like reviving the Karlsbad Decrees. A full recognition of the people's proven maturity required something more than the tokenism of admitting Socialists into municipal offices, but since equal suffrage would antagonize the right, some form of plural suffrage, as Bethmann himself had previously recommended, was the answer. The chancellor agreed, adding that the government must not lose the initiative.¹⁶

While privately prodding the chancellor to take action, Harnack tried to build up public confidence in him. On August 1, 1916, at the inaugural rally of the National Committee for a German Peace, he extolled Bethmann for bridging the gap between the Socialist and bourgeois parties and for his promise of a "new direction." Carefully avoiding the particulars of the franchise question, he merely expressed his hope that the

¹⁶Harnack, "Friedensaufgaben und Friedensarbeit," 279-297; Bethmann to Harnack, July 14, 1917, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

new suffrage would fulfill the highest hopes of the German people. Ironically, an essay appeared the same day by the reactionary Haussleiter, who branded the Reichstag suffrage a French creation and warned Germans against mimicking foreign ideas. Bonwetsch was similarly distressed and complained that the promises of reform had merely revived the troubles of the 1840s--popular unrest unchallenged by energetic government measures.¹⁷ At the end of the year, Baumgarten reassessed the dangers from the right, joined the Hobohm Committee against the Pan-Germans, hailed Bethmann as the "herald of the new Germany," and scolded the "national circles" who were leading the fronde against him. Although expecting "reasonable and healthy conservatism" in high places to block the unnecessary introduction of equal suffrage into Prussia, he cheered Bethmann's "'new direction' in internal politics, the shift to the left in Prussia, the disowning of a policy of reaction, and the bringing in of the workers and little people into the joint responsibility of government."¹⁸

In his effort to keep the whole nation happy and unified, Bethmann believed that his shift to the left required compensation for the right. So, in January, 1917, he courted the

¹⁷Harnack, "An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahrs," 338-341; Haussleiter, "Ernst Moritz Arndts deutsche Ziele," 1385; Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Nov. 17, 1916, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

¹⁸Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVII (1917), 28-32, 90-92.

Conservatives by allowing the introduction of a bill in the Prussian House of Deputies which called for the creation of additional entailed estates. At the outset of the war, twelve per cent of Prussian land was already tied up in these large, indivisible properties, and the liberals, envisioning a resurrection of feudalism, raised a howl of protest. Trying to regain their lost affections, Bethmann addressed the Reichstag at the end of February and for the first time personally used the term "new direction." He was so determined to woo the left that he even used a quotation from the Socialist poet Karl Bröger: "Germany's poorest son was also her most loyal."¹⁹

Such tactics were perhaps understandable in the Reichstag, but on March 14, he carried his campaign into the Landtag itself. In answer to slurs that had just been made in the House of Lords on parliamentary rule in general and the Reichstag in particular, he shouted with unprecedented candor: "Woe to the statesman who does not recognize the signs of the time," who thinks that after such momentous events he can restore the past and can "pour new wine into old wineskins without bursting them."²⁰ Bethmann's thundering jeremiad seemed less theatrical that evening when news came of the Petrograd

¹⁹Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 135-139, 169-172, 180; Patemann, Wahlreform, 44-50; Holborn, Modern Germany, 1840-1945, 469-470.

²⁰Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 171-174; Williamson, Helffferich, 201-202; Westarp, Konservative Politik, II, 218.

revolution. When the tsar abdicated the next day, Bethmann the prophet became the high priest of reform, trying to persuade his reluctant king to make the reforms necessary to atone for the government's past and save the country from coming judgment.

Bethmann was on the verge of abandoning the halfway measure of a postponed plural suffrage and advocating both the speedy introduction of equal suffrage in Prussia and some measure of national parliamentarism, but he hesitated because of the known opposition of the Kaiser, Supreme Command, the majority of both houses of the Landtag, and half of the Prussian ministers. Furthermore, he was unsure of where the majority of the Reichstag stood until, on March 29, he found that no less than the National Liberal leader, Gustav Stresemann, was frightened enough by the Romanov debacle to call for the creation of a constitutional committee to consider reform at the state and national levels and especially the abolition of the Prussian three-class system. Bethmann was stunned. Although he wanted reform, he wanted it to be instituted by the crown, not precipitated by the masses or even railroaded through by an overzealous Reichstag, and certain of a bitter fight with the Landtag, he believed that the friction would be intolerable for a nation at war. Caught off guard, and trying to buy time to bring renewed pressure on William, he denied that such reform was needed immediately and offered lesser measures instead: the immediate repeal of the anti-Polish and anti-Jesuit laws

and the dividing of the mammoth Reichstag electoral districts, which had not been altered since 1867 (1871 for the south). Not satisfied with these palliatives, the Reichstag voted by an overwhelming majority to establish a Constitutional Committee.²¹

The battle was now joined in earnest. Caught in a no man's land between a reformist Reichstag majority and a reactionary Landtag majority, Bethmann finally decided to hoist his colors. At the beginning of April, he pleaded with the Kaiser to declare himself in favor of the immediate introduction of equal suffrage. Several exigencies led him to this resolve. Since the Burgfriede had completely collapsed, there was less to lose by closer identification with progressive forces. The spectacle of a fallen dynasty in the east meant that Germany must make haste if she wanted to avoid the same fate. Moreover, the demise of tsarism meant that the German lower classes would have to be rewarded for continuing the fight when their avowed aim had already been attained. In the same vein, some form of compensation was required to offset the decision of the War Food Board to tighten the bread ration on April 15. It was also imperative to challenge President Wilson's distinction of April 2 between the German people and their "autocratic government." Furthermore, as minister-president of Prussia, Bethmann

²¹Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, 329-330; Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 181-182; Ritter, Sword and Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden, 450.

resented the Reichstag's high-handed attempt to interfere in her internal affairs and to snatch the reins of reform from his hands, and the Reichstag's Easter recess gave the crown a chance to regain the initiative. Finally, since he had only a majority of one in the Prussian Ministry of State in favor of equal suffrage, Bethmann hoped that William's support would sway the weaker opponents. But the king, like Pharaoh, hardened his heart, and the traditional imperial Easter Message of April 7 did not promise equal suffrage but only the abolition of the three-class system, the introduction of the direct and secret ballot, and a broader representation for the Prussian House of Lords--all to be granted only at the end of the war.²²

Nevertheless, the government had acted in the nick of time. One day before the Easter Message, America had declared war, and one day afterwards, Haase's group constituted itself as the Independent Socialist Party. Though less enamored of the government than its parent party, the Independents were not yet preaching revolution, and Haase was impressed enough with William's promises to aid Majority Socialists in quelling food riots that broke out in the middle of April. In Berlin alone, more than 200,000 munition workers walked off the job, and in Leipzig, strikers for the first time coupled economic protests with demands for an immediate peace without annexations and the introduction of universal, direct, secret, and

²²Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 183-186; Pate-mann, Wahlreform, 58-63.

equal suffrage in elections to all public bodies of the Reich, federal states, and municipalities.²³ Bonwetsch blamed Bethmann's concessions for the strikes and hoped William would dismiss him. The chancellor's "softness" and promises of reform, he grumbled, had merely "stiffened the workers' necks," and the government had reaped with it had sown.²⁴

The Easter Message resurrected the animosities that Bethmann had temporarily managed to bury. Ludendorff whined that it was a "kowtowing to the Russian revolution," but Rade was pleasantly surprised,²⁵ and Baumgarten hailed the proclamation as a "redeeming word" that sounded as joyous as Easter bells. As president of the Protestant-Social Congress, Baumgarten addressed its first wartime session on April 12, taking the imperial message as his text. Reminding the congress that it had been founded largely in response to the Kaiser's proclamation of February, 1890, indicating his desire to preside over a "social monarchy," Baumgarten praised the recent message as a follow-up on that promise. The congress sent William a congratulatory telegram, and Baumgarten subsequently told the readers of his journal that a "new age"

²³Rosenberg, Entstehung, 194; Williamson, Helfferrich, 207. In 1896, Saxony had replaced her equal suffrage, introduced in 1868, with the three-class system.

²⁴Bonwetsch to Seeberg, April 19, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

²⁵Ludendorff, cited in Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 191; Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, 356; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 298.

was about to dawn--an age that must free the Prussian church from the military discipline and uniformity that had been imposed upon it by the conservative Ministry of Culture and House of Deputies. Though no friend of total democracy, he welcomed the imminent liberalization of Prussia as a means of cutting the final ties between church and state and allowing the liberal Protestantism he represented to flourish unmolested alongside the more traditional forms. Moreover, he contended, Prussian reform would help cool the affections of Alsace-Lorraine for France. Claiming that the Reichsland was primarily attracted to France's republicanism and anti-militarism, he argued that remodelling Prussia would make Alsatians more favorable to being annexed into her. Though rejecting completely equal suffrage and numerically equal voting districts for Prussia, he warned that delayed reform was certain to bring revolution.²⁶

Deissmann, too, rejoiced over the Easter Message. Consistent with his former support of Naumann's National Social Association, he praised the announcement as "the slowly ripened fruit of August 4, 1914, that great day of the inner solidarity of all classes of our people," and like Baumgarten, he welcomed it as the harbinger of a new age. Even Schian gave the proclamation a qualified endorsement. Having supported Bethmann's plural suffrage proposal of 1910, he

²⁶Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 156-161.

reaffirmed his belief that the indirect, open, tax-based suffrage must go, but he still feared that equal suffrage would separate church and state, and unlike Baumgarten, recoiled at the thought. Besides, he pontificated, Germany need not be intimidated by all the talk of the "democratic wave" moving throughout the world. On the contrary, if a nation was to prosper, the "people"--he regarded "demos" as a horrid word--must never rule. Moreover, the winning of the war was Germany's paramount problem, and all divisive domestic questions should be shelved.²⁷

On May 2, 1917, the Reichstag Constitutional Committee held its first meeting, elected a willing Scheidemann as chairman, and, ignoring the franchise question, called for ministerial responsibility and especially a responsible minister of war who would countersign officers' commissions. When the Kaiser learned of this attempted infringement of his military prerogative, he was insulted and turned even colder toward the idea of a "new direction." The chancellor had been trying to coax him into taking a ~~small~~ step toward parliamentarism by allowing Reichstag deputies to become Reich secretaries and Prussian state ministers, and now convinced that the tactless committee was hurting his efforts, Bethmann finally persuaded it to muzzle itself for a while.²⁸

²⁷Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., April 16, 1917; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 237-239.

²⁸Scheidemann, The Making of New Germany, II, trans. by J. E. Michell (New York, 1929), 18-19; Williamson, Helfferrich, 209-212; Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 192-193.

The seemingly do-nothing king and chancellor were especially exasperating to Rudolf Otto, a liberal Marburg theologian and left-wing National Liberal Deputy in the Prussian Lower House. Though most of his party were avid annexationists, he had refused to sign Seeberg's petition, and his fellow National Liberals, Baumgarten and Rade, had signed the counter-petition. Coupling territorial moderation with political liberalism, he turned to Harnack in the middle of May in hopes that his Berlin friend could persuade Bethmann to "demonstrate firmness for a change" and implement the Easter Message, thereby "damming up the fronde from the right and the left." At the same time, he aired his anxiety publicly. In a recently founded liberal journal, Deutsche Politik, he called upon the government to resume the initiative and introduce, though not necessarily equal suffrage, the immediate reform of the franchise. The disadvantages of delay, he warned, included the increased danger of the "red flood," the prospect of returning soldiers being met with no appropriate reward, the loss of wartime unity propitious for such a change, and missing an opportunity to enhance Germany's image abroad and thereby facilitate the conclusion of peace.²⁹

²⁹Otto to Seeberg, June 18, 1915, Seeberg Nachlass, SBB; Otto to Harnack, May 15, 1917, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Otto, "Reform des Wahlrechts jetzt!" Dt. Pol., II (1917), 670-671. Klaus Schwabe's complete neglect of the theologian-politician Otto is a serious defect in his treatment of the German academic community, Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral.

Otto's hopes were in vain. When Bethmann went before the Reichstag on May 15, it was scheduled to adjourn until early July. Again playing for time, he said nothing about reform, but he did answer interpellations of the Majority Socialists and Conservatives on war aims by steering clear of both extremes, thereby rallying the middle parties-- National Liberals, Centrists, and Progressives--behind him.³⁰ This was Bethmann's last speech to the full Reichstag-- another triumph for his consensus politics but in the long run a tragedy for both himself and Germany.

Like Otto, Harnack and Troeltsch were worried about the government's inaction, but that did not stop them from defending their country against foreign caricatures. In the middle of May, 1917, they participated in a series of patriotic addresses entitled "Die deutsche Freiheit." In a tone of righteous indignation, Harnack denounced President Wilson's professed desire to "free" the German people and "make the world safe for democracy" as arrogant and hypocritical. Affirming that Germany's freedom was derived from continuity with her past, he claimed that her people enjoyed an "inseparable unity" with her "social empire." Troeltsch echoed these sentiments, pointing out that Germany had long been in the process of democratization, especially in the area of social legislation, and that because of the war she was on the verge of extending popular freedom further. Rade

³⁰Ritter, Sword and Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden, 434-436.

heartily endorsed his friends' remarks and added that the western world must realize that "German freedom" was just as good as its democracy and that moreover, it needed German ideas and ideals.³¹

Going beyond this public display of patriotism, Harnack, in June, sent Bethmann an unsolicited memorandum frantically urging the immediate introduction of equal suffrage in Prussia. The time for "tacking" was over, he insisted. Decisive reform was the only means of maintaining popular support for the government and the war. Forgetting his recent boasts about German "Freiheit," he warned that Germany could no longer ignore foreign charges of political backwardness nor afford the luxury of representing herself as "the misunderstood oddity" of Europe. Government initiative in reform was also the key to a negotiated peace; it would strengthen the peace parties in the enemy countries and force the war parties to revise their ideological campaign. Departing from Ranke's "primacy of foreign policy," Harnack championed the primacy of domestic policy.³²

Harnack was not exaggerating the intensity of the foreign propaganda campaign. By the middle of 1917, a mountain of material had already flayed the "medieval" and "despotic"

³¹Harnack, "Wilsons Botschaft und die deutsche Freiheit," and Troeltsch, "Der Ansturm der westlichen Demokratie," in Die deutsche Freiheit, 2-3, 9, 109-112; Rade, "Kl. Mittlgn.," Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 694-695.

³²Harnack, "Das Gebot der Stunde," 298-317.

Prussian-German political system. Even before the war, Germanophobes had stigmatized the Prussian franchise, and as soon as hostilities began, England and France portrayed the struggle as one between parliamentary rule and autocracy. With the removal of the tsar's embarrassing regime and the entrance of America into the war, Germany's foes were able for the first time to make their ideological claims credible. Oxford historian Ernest Barker pictured Prussia's three-class system as allowing her to "smile pityingly at the academic Reichstag." Belgian professor Charles Sarolea pointed out that in some electoral districts one man alone comprised the first class of voters and chose one-third of the district's electors. French propaganda was enhanced by the talents of Alsatians who fled to France at the outbreak of the war. Among them was Reichstag deputy Abbé E. Wetterlé, who contrasted the "fiction" of German parliamentarism with the reality of her militarism, manifested in the Zabern affair of 1913. The American war correspondent Daniel Thomas Curtin dismissed the Reichstag as nothing more than a "debating society and a safety valve," and in the Creel Committee's "War Information Series," Columbia historian Charles Downer Hazen castigated the plutocratic Prussian franchise as "monstrous."³³

³³Barker, The Submerged Nationalities of the German Empire (London, 1915), 37; Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem (London, 1913); Wetterlé, Behind the Scenes in the German Reichstag, 112, 324; Curtin, The Land of Deepening Shadow: Germany at War (New York, 1917); Hazen, The Government of Germany (Wash., D. C., 1917), 11. The Germanophile Rudolf

As foreign criticism mounted and the government continued to drag its feet, Harnack became bolder. On July 3, 1917, he and nine kindred spirits, including Troeltsch, Delbrück, Meinecke, and Thimme, called for not only the immediate honoring of the Easter Message but equal suffrage. Delbrück proudly informed his readers of the step; the Socialist Vorwärts made it headline news; and the American journal, Current History, expressed surprise. Rade privately congratulated Harnack but doubted that Bethmann would do anything.³⁴ Not to be outdone by the progressives, on July 7, Seeberg and nine Berlin colleagues urged postponement of all reform until after the war, as provided for in the Easter Message. As might be expected, all but one had signed his "Petition of the Intellectuals" in 1915.³⁵

While professors squabbled over domestic affairs,

Kjellén, a Swedish professor and politician, pointed out the inconsistency of Britain's and France's crusade against "German autocracy" when they themselves were allied with tsarist Russia; Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges, trans. by Friedrich Stieve (Leipzig, 1916), 138-139.

³⁴"Für gleiches Recht in Preussen," Vorwärts, July 3, 1917; Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXIX (1917), 156, 305-306; "The German Crisis," Current History, VI (1917), 192; Rade to Harnack, July 6, 1917, Rade Nachlass, UBM. The other five were publicist Paul Rohrbach, former ambassador Count Anton von Monts, professors Walter Nernst and Emil Fischer, and the chief magistrate of Schöneberg, Alexander Dominicus. Monts and Rohrbach, along with Harnack, Delbrück, and Troeltsch, had signed the counter-petition of 1915.

³⁵Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVIII (1917), 679. Seeberg's group included Otto von Gierke, Theodor Schiemann, Eduard Meyer, and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.

politicians turned to foreign policy. On July 6, Centrist chieftain Erzberger threw a bombshell before the recently reconvened Reichstag by asking it to formulate a peace proposal renewing Germany's efforts of the previous December. His speech contained such a frontal assault on the government that Bethmann asked him what he really intended. Erzberger replied that he merely wanted to rally a majority around the chancellor, who was known to favor a moderate peace, but this plausible answer concealed his desire to play kingmaker. For some time he had been intimate with ex-chancellor Bülow, who still cherished dreams of returning to office, and Erzberger seems to have thought he had found the propitious moment to replace Bethmann with his friend.³⁶

The following day, Bethmann played into Erzberger's hand by going before the Reichstag Main Committee and opposing a new peace resolution. Such an overture was inopportune, he argued; it would merely convince Germany's enemies that she was war-weary and spur them to greater aggressiveness. Moreover, with his hands still tied by a stubborn king and Prussian Ministry of State, he further disappointed the left by declining to make any promises on the franchise question.

³⁶Erzberger, Erlebnisse, 251-299; Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 224-230; Ritter, Sword and Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden, 465-473; Klaus Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (Princeton, 1959), 182-200. Ritter finds Erzberger guilty of intrigue with Bülow, and Epstein holds that even though Erzberger did not make his speech of July 6 with the intent of overthrowing Bethmann he did decide the next day to topple him in order to please the National Liberals and win their support for his peace resolution.

But more than ever persuaded of the need for change and also hoping that reform would appease the left and deter them from passing a peace resolution, he prevailed upon William to hold a crown council on July 9. There, Bethmann's renewed plea for equal suffrage was supported by four Reich secretaries and six Prussian ministers, while only one secretary and five ministers opposed it. As usual, Loebell led the opposition. Since the vote was so close, William decided to consult the Crown Prince. Frederick William was already in the pocket of the Supreme Command, but on the 11th he chose not to oppose; rather, he agreed that equal suffrage must be granted and that Bethmann be kept in office. That evening, William signed an executive order directing the Prussian Ministry of State to introduce a bill in the House of Deputies for equal suffrage in elections for that body. Moreover, the measure was to be expedited in order that the next elections could be held under the new system.³⁷

The executive order was made public on July 12, and it seemed as though Bethmann had finally emerged victorious. But events of that very day brought him down. For one thing, Harnack unintentionally discredited him by having informed his niece that Bethmann had recently told him that he sympathized with men like Scheidemann and that he was struggling to free himself from the influence of the "national circles."

³⁷Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen, II, 220-230; Ritter, Sword and Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden, 476-478; Patemann, Wahlreform, 89-96.

Harnack's niece indiscreetly let the letter out of her possession, and the hostile Bayerische Kurier gleefully quoted it on the 12th. That same day, the Crown Prince showed his true colors by taking the unprecedented step of calling a secret conference of party leaders to discuss replacing Bethmann. Erzberger led the attack, arguing that the chancellor's "soiled shirt," including his official responsibility for submarine warfare and the break with America, rendered him unacceptable to the Allies as a peace negotiator. Stresemann for the National Liberals, Erich Mertin for the Free Conservatives, and Count Kuno von Westarp for the Conservatives voiced other objections. Eduard David stated that the Majority Socialists would back him only if he endorsed a peace resolution. Only Friedrich von Payer, the Progressive leader, unequivocally stood behind the chancellor. The Crown Prince informed his father of Bethmann's loss of confidence, and the Center and National Liberal Party sent William letters demanding his dismissal. The final blow was a telephone call from Kreuznach, informing the Kaiser that Ludendorff and Hindenburg could no longer work with Bethmann and were tendering their resignations.³⁸ The choice was clear. William must sacrifice either his popular military heroes or his unpopular chancellor. Bethmann graciously fell on his sword, submitting his resignation the next day. It

³⁸Bayerische Kurier, July 12, 1917, cited in Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 254, and Schäfer, Mein Leben, 217, and Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, III, 277; Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, 346, 375-397; Ritter, Sword and Scepter, III, trans. by Heinz Norden, 12-13, 479-483; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, III, 265.

was Friday the 13th, a most unlucky day for Germany. Ironically, the very statesman who had tried in vain to achieve a precarious balance between the left, middle, and right was toppled by a momentary union of the three forces.

Though the liberal theologians welcomed the new promise of reform, they mourned the loss of its champion. On his front page, Rade extolled the fallen chancellor and berated those who had undermined him. He also rejoiced that equal suffrage would at last bring the people their "full share" in government but warned against majority rule or mimicking western parliamentarism. Baumgarten took an entire editorial to praise his martyred hero's commitment to social justice. Harnack sent the ex-chancellor a letter of sympathy, and Bethmann thanked him for his previous support and absolved him of any responsibility for the Bayerische Kurier affair.³⁹

The reactionaries were glad to see Bethmann fall but disgusted that he had remained long enough to bring William around to equal suffrage. The Kaiser had long been opposed to it, and Lezius, a member of the Imperial Association Against Social Democracy, which fought reform, correctly conjectured that William had signed the executive order "gnashing his teeth." Bonwetsch lamented that, like Samson, Bethmann had done more damage with his last deed than with all

³⁹Rade, "Zu den Ereignissen im Reich," Christl. Welt, XXXI, (1917), 554; although Rade at this time endorsed equal suffrage, he ignored the reform question in his series of seven special articles, "Politische Extravaganzen," running from May to December, 1917; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVII (1917), 253-259; Bethmann to Harnack, July 20, 1917, Harnack Nachlass, SBB.

of his previous actions. Seeberg feared the religious repercussions in Prussia, and Schian similarly insisted that equal suffrage, though suitable for the Reichstag, since the national government had no ecclesiastical or educational tasks, would mean trouble for the Prussian state church and religious instruction in the schools. Moreover, Schian added, the war had helped Germany appreciate anew the "blessings of authority."⁴⁰

The new chancellor, Georg Michaelis, was a dutiful servant of the Supreme Command, and during his "hundred days" took no further action on the franchise directive, especially since he feared that equal suffrage would raise the Socialists from ten to over one hundred seats in the Prussian Lower House. Another victory for reaction was the civil war within the Reichstag Constitutional Committee. It resumed its deliberations in early July, and the Socialists proposed a resolution calling for equal suffrage in all the federal states. Other members thought that was going too far, and a compromise formula was finally accepted that called for the "full equality of civil rights" in all states. The Socialist proposal nevertheless enflamed the Pan-Germans, and their new journal with Seeberg and Kapp on the editorial staff, Deutschlands Erneuerung, railed against Scheidemann's

⁴⁰Lezius to Seeberg, Nov. 29, 1917, and Bonwetsch to Seeberg, July 22, 1917, and Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Nov. 11, 1917, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 377-378. Samson's final deed was pulling down a pagan temple upon himself and his tormentors (Judges 16:30).

brazenness. But even though the committee was full of sound and fury, it signified nothing. Its inter-party feuds resulted in constant deadlock, and by October, 1917, it had ceased to function.⁴¹

The greatest victory for the reactionaries in the fall of 1917 was the founding of the German Fatherland Party. This boisterous pressure group was the brainchild of Kapp, who became its vice-president, while the presidency was assumed by no less than Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, still angry at having been dropped as secretary of state for the navy in March, 1916. In a manifesto signed by twenty prominent East Prussians, and dated September 2, the anniversary of the triumph at Sedan in 1870, the new organization charged that large segments of the German people did not support the Reichstag majority that had passed the Peace resolution of July 19th. Invoking Bismarck's hallowed name, the group inveighed against all weak-kneed peace efforts and demanded that the complex question of reform be postponed until after the war. Claiming that their aim was to found a patriotic community above all parties, the men boasted that "German freedom" towered sky-high above the freedom of "fake democracies."⁴²

⁴¹Michaelis, Für Staat und Volk (Berlin, 1922), 365-366; Patemann, Wahlreform, 87; "Gedanken über die Politik des Reichskanzler v. Bethmann-Hollweg" and "Bild der Lage," Deutschlands Erneuerung, I (1917), 389-398.

⁴²Manifesto of the Fatherland Party, Sept. 2, 1917, in Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVIII (1917), 782,-785; Wortmann, Vaterlands-Partei, 25-32. Although two of the twenty sponsors were Königsberg professors, neither was a theologian.

The manifesto boomeranged. It drew such strong protests from liberal organs like the Berliner Tageblatt, Frankfurter Zeitung, and Vorwärts that its sponsors decided to soften it. At the organization's first official meeting, on September 24, a clarification was drafted, stating that the group was not identical with the Pan-Germans, nor opposed to the Catholic Church or Social Democracy, and took no formal stand on the franchise question. Strictly speaking, the Fatherland Party did confine itself to the war aims question, but it let its subsidiary, the League of the Kaiser's Faithful (Bund der Kaisertreuen) agitate against reform.⁴³

Contrary to its claims, the Fatherland Party was the same coterie of Pan-Germans, though in new garb, who had maligned Bethmann's foreign and domestic program, supported Seeberg's petition of 1915, and joined Schäfer's Independent Committee for a German Peace. The Pan-German League was excited about the new group but disappointed that Seeberg was not on its board of directors. Heinrich Class, the President of the Pan-German League, had discreetly declined to associate himself with Seeberg's or Schäfer's endeavors, but this time he came out of the curtains and accepted a seat on

⁴³Wortmann, Vaterlands-Partei, 33-39; Testimony of Erich Volkmann, Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918, XII (1), 145-146; Tirpitz, Erinnerungen, 288-290. Tirpitz claimed that his organization had neither reactionary political aims nor excessive annexationist goals, since its only demands pertained to Belgium, and therefore did not deserve the bad image given it by the sponsors of the peace resolution.

the Fatherland Party's steering committee. Schäfer placed his 2,000-member Independent Committee at Tirpitz' disposal, and the committee subsequently confined itself merely to formulating annexationist demands, letting its stronger ally take charge of propagating them. By the middle of 1918, Schäfer had become the second vice-president of the Fatherland Party, and it had achieved its aim of becoming a mass organization. With 2,500 local branches and one and one quarter million members, it exceeded by a quarter million the membership of the Socialist Party in 1914. Although it boasted representation from all political parties, its leadership was securely in the hands of Conservatives and National Liberals.⁴⁴

No sooner had the Fatherland Party been born than one of its most ardent members, Tübingen historian Johannes Haller, launched his own attack against the Reichstag majority. He enlisted the aid of several colleagues, including Leipzig historian Erich Brandenburg and, as a last-minute replacement for Seeberg, Karl Holl, who correctly prophesied little support from the Berlin theologians. All in all, however, Haller's project was a spectacular success. Within a month, he collected the signatures of 1,077 professors for a declaration sent to Michaelis on October 15, 1917. Stressing their independence from party politics and special interests,

⁴⁴Wortmann, Vaterlands-Partei, 67-73; circular letter of the Independent Committee, Sept. 10, 1917, in "Kriegs und Friedensziele," a collection in UEM; Lezius to Seeberg, Dec. 2, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Schäfer, Mein Leben, 220-221.

the academicians asserted that since the Reichstag majority had been elected six years earlier under different circumstances, it could not automatically claim to represent the will of the nation now, but that, on the other hand, the chancellor and Supreme Command could be trusted to secure a suitable peace. No mention was made of the manifesto of the Fatherland Party, but the two declarations were so similar that the Pan-German editor of the bi-weekly Kriegs-Rundschau proudly printed them together. ⁴⁵

If we compare the famous apologetic for German militarism of October, 1914, Seeberg's "Petition of the Intellectuals" of July, 1915, and the Haller Declaration, we find several surprises. For one thing, the unanimity of the early war weeks was never duplicated. In 1914, Dietrich Schäfer rounded up 3,000 academicians; Seeberg attracted only 352 (out of a total of 1,347 supporters), and Haller captured only 1,077.⁴⁶ Although three-fourths of the academic world had endorsed the fairly innocuous defense of militarism, the

⁴⁵ Brandenburg to Haller, Sept. 28, 1917, and Holl to Haller, Sept. 9, 1917, and Seeberg to Haller, Sept. 9, 1917, and Haller to the chancellor, Oct. 15, 1917, and copy of the declaration with 1,077 names, all in Haller Nachlass, BAK; "Die deutschen Hochschullehrer," Kriegs-Rundschau, IV, 1708-1711. Klaus Schwabe (Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral, 265, footnote 247) counted 843 returned signature forms in the Haller Nachlass; Kriegs-Rundschau reported 906 signatures; the declaration bears 1,077; Haller told the chancellor 1,100; Delbrück heard it was 1,300 ("Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXX, 1917, 306.)

⁴⁶The Declaration on German militarism is discussed in Chapter V; the Seeberg petition in Chapter VII; See also Appendix E.

majority of professors remained silent on subsequent issues. A few may have been indifferent or undecided about the questions, while others were afraid to give offense. Only a minority chose to affix their signatures to controversial declarations, and of this group, only a small fraction dared to take a seemingly unpatriotic stand.

Another astonishing discovery is that Haller, a historian, did better with the 220 Protestant theologians than did their own pied piper, Seeberg. Four-fifths of them flocked to Schäfer; only one-fifth followed Seeberg, but Haller attracted one-third. In fact, Haller nearly doubled not only the number of Seeberg's theologians (seventy-six compared with forty-one) but also the number of Protestant theology faculties (seventeen compared with ten).⁴⁷ Schäfer had corralled all eighteen faculties, and Haller missed only Königsberg, where Lezius, awaiting trial for lèse-majesté, was too frightened to sign anything polemical. Also startling is that Haller won only half (twenty-six) of Seeberg's theologians.⁴⁸ Of course, a few had died in the interim, but others had seemingly changed their outlook or had lost the courage of their convictions. Even more amazing, we find that among Haller's fifty new theologians were two, Karl Thieme and Wilhelm Nowack, who had signed the German Peace Society's manifesto of 1913, and two others, Friedrich Loofs and Arthur

⁴⁷See Appendix D.

⁴⁸See Appendix F.

Titius, who had signed Harnack's counter-petition of 1915. All four were theological liberals, but it is interesting that Loofs, though he had helped found Die Christliche Welt, had subsequently criticized Rade for letting it drift too far to the left, and that the other three were all natives of the nine older Prussian provinces. Thus, even though two camps continued to squabble over domestic and foreign policy, their composition varied from crisis to crisis, and a lingering respect for religious conservatism or roots in conservative Prussian soil may help account for some of the anomalies. Some factors, however, remained fairly constant. Berlin theologians tended to be non-committal; both Seeberg and Haller enticed only one-quarter of them. Furthermore, both in 1915 and 1917, the rightist declarations attracted scholars from all three Protestant denominations: Lutheran, Reformed, and United Protestant. And on both occasions, the theological discipline most favorable to extensive annexations and reactionary politics was church history, represented by Bonwetsch, Hauck, Holl, Jordan, Mirbt, and Wiegand.

The Haller Declaration quickly drew fire from the progressives, who howled that it, the Fatherland Party's manifesto, and Pan-German demands were all cut from the same cloth. Delbrück aimed his Preussische Jahrbücher against Tirpitz' group, labelling it and everything else opposed to the Peace Resolution as "Pan-German." Meinecke followed suit, branding the Fatherland Party as a vehicle for Pan-German territorial phantasies and as a tool for sabotaging the Prussian franchise

reform. Holl was so angered by these allegations that he confronted Meinecke face to face, broke off their friendship, and even resigned from a small club of scholars to which they both belonged.⁴⁹ The note of alarm sounded by Delbrück and Meinecke was echoed by Baumgarten and Rade. They denounced the Haller Declaration and Fatherland Party's manifesto as divisive to national unity and feared that the decision of a clergy group to join the new organization would reflect upon the church at large.⁵⁰

As they had done in 1915, the moderates tried to launch a nationwide counter-declaration. Troeltsch held that this would not only combat Haller but would arm foreign Germanophiles with proof that German intellectuals did not want "war to the knife." The liberal theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, who had sided with Troeltsch in 1915, gathered a few signatures at Marburg, but neither his efforts nor those of Troeltsch's other contacts proved satisfactory, and the Berlin progressives decided to settle for their own university.⁵¹ Troeltsch, Harnack, Meinecke, Delbrück, and six colleagues drafted a

⁴⁹Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXX (1917), 154-155, 307; Meinecke, "Vaterlandspartei und deutsche Politik," Die Hilfe, XXIII (1917), 700-702, and Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, 164. The Wednesday Society (Mittwoch Gesellschaft), from which Holl resigned consisted of sixteen men who met sixteen times a year to hear a paper presented by one of the members. It should not be confused with Delbrück's Mittwoch-abend Gesellschaft, an association of business, political, and cultural leaders; see Lamar Cecil, Albert Ballin, 250-251.

⁵⁰Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVII (1917), 354-355; Rade, "Zur äusseren und inneren Lage--Mitte November, Christl. Welt, XXXI (1917), 844.

⁵¹Troeltsch to Herrmann, Sept. 9, 1917, Herrmann Nachlass,

statement asserting that the German Peace Note of December, 1916 and Germany's answer to the Papal Peace Note of August, 1917 were sufficient bases upon which to conclude peace.

Both of these official statements had been vague, but the latter had at least referred to the Reichstag Peace Resolution, and neither had echoed the Pan-German demand for the retention of Belgium. Delbrück's student, Martin Hebohm, who had just returned from the field wounded, collected the signatures of forty-nine associate and full professors, and the resolution was sent to Michaelis on October 10, five days before Haller's protest arrived. Among the forty-nine were astronomer Wilhelm Foerster, who had opposed the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three to the World of Learning" of 1914, Albert Einstein, who had signed the counter-petition of 1915, the historian Otto Hintze, who had defected from Seeberg's camp, and Georg Stuhlfauth, a liberal theologian.⁵²

On October 22, the Berlin action was duplicated in Heidelberg, where thirty-two professors, about one-fourth of the faculty, publicly denounced the Fatherland Party as dangerous to national unity. Among the protesters were historian Hermann Oncken, who had dissociated himself from the Seeberg

UBM; Karl Budde to Harnack, Sept. 28, 1917, Harnack Nachlass, SBB; Seeberg to Haller, Sept. 9, 1917, Haller Nachlass, BAK.

⁵²Copy of Berliners' declaration, letter of request for signatures, list of forty-nine names, and letter to Chancellor of Oct. 10, 1917, all in Delbrück Nachlass, BAK. For the German Peace Note and German reply to the Papal Peace Proposal, see R. H. Lutz (ed.) Fall of the German Empire, I, 398-399, 421-423.

petition; law professor Gerhard Anschütz, one of the initiators of the counter-petition, and sociologist Max Weber, who had signed it; and the liberal theologians, Friedrich Niebergall, co-editor of Baumgarten's periodical and a supporter of the peace manifesto of 1913, and Martin Dibelius, a former student of Harnack and a pioneer of the "history-of-forms" school of New Testament criticism. At Giessen, a similar statement reproaching Tirpitz' group was endorsed by nineteen professors, including three liberal theologians: Wilhelm Bousset and Samuel Eck, who were among its sponsors, and Gustav Krüger, Harnack's pupil and successor at Giessen.⁵³

Comparing the efforts of Haller and Troeltsch, it would appear that the moderates failed miserably. But Delbrück consoled himself by pointing out that Haller won only one-quarter of the academic world, and that one-quarter of Berlin's professors had spoken out against him. Going even further, Delbrück made the dubious claim that, since it took a rare courage to challenge a noisy crowd, the brave Berliners actually spoke for the silent majority who supported the new Reichstag majority and its peace resolution.⁵⁴

As mentioned previously, the majority parties--Centrists, Progressives, and Majority Socialists--had never been happy with Michaelis, and, taking advantage of his indiscreet

⁵³Declaration of Heidelberg professors, Heidelberger Neueste Nachrichten, Oct. 22, 1917. The Giessen protest does not seem to have been published, but a copy with names, dated Nov. 12, 1917, is in the Delbrück Nachlass, BAK.

⁵⁴Delbrück, "Pol. Korr.," Preuss. Jahrbh., CLXX (1917), 306.

attack on the Independent Socialists, asked the Kaiser to dismiss him. On October 30, one day before he fell, Harnack became so exasperated with his failure to follow up on the franchise directive that he begged Rudolf von Valentini, the head of the Imperial Civil Cabinet, to help bring in a new chancellor who was resolved to bring about equal suffrage immediately. He insisted that even though his historical studies made him a "thorough-going conservative" the completion of the "Stein-Hardenberg reforms" could not be delayed a moment longer. By resuming the initiative, the government could avoid parliamentarism; by delaying, it would bring that or something worse upon Germany.⁵⁵ Like most of his progressive middle-class colleagues, he underwent no change of heart. He merely deemed it prudent to channel and control inevitable change rather than resist and perish. In the jargon of the Weimar era, he was a "Vernunftrepublikaner."

For a while, it looked as though Harnack's wish would come true. The Kaiser was worried about the next war credits and acceded to the request of the majority parties, and on October 31, Michaelis stepped down. In an unprecedented move, the Reichstag not only toppled a chancellor single-handedly but took a hand in naming his successor, the elderly

⁵⁵Harnack to Valentini, Oct. 30, 1917, cited in Zahn-Harnack, Harnack, 355-356.

Bavarian Minister-President, Count Georg von Hertling. Moreover, it required him, as the new minister-president of Prussia, to promise the earliest possible presentation of a franchise bill before the Landtag.⁵⁶

To the dismay of the reactionaries, parliamentary rule had come one step closer. Lezius had wanted Tirpitz as chancellor, believing that he would bury the franchise proposal for good. Drawing upon the Scriptures, he lamented that the government had been "abandoned by all good spirits and possessed by demons of cowardice and blindness" and that the Kaiser "resisted the strong and upheld the weak."⁵⁷ Seeberg and Bonwetsch foresaw a pusillanimous foreign policy and severe damage to the Prussian crown. Exaggerating the recent coup, Bonwetsch bemoaned "the victory of parliamentarism and the rule of the black-red bloc." By the end of 1917, his distrust of the Reichstag majority led him to equate its high-handedness with "treason." Comparing Germany with her enemies, he concluded that the biblical lament, "The whole world lieth in wickedness" (I John 5:19), was more applicable to his own country. The only consolation, said Seeberg, was that Catholics and Socialists were still divided on the franchise question, the point at which

⁵⁶Michaelis, Für Staat und Volk, 328-329, 367-370; Daniel Horn, The German Naval Mutinies of World War I (New Brunswick, N.J., 1969), 171-183; Rosenberg, Entstehung, 185-186.

⁵⁷Lezius to Seeberg, Nov. 29 and Dec. 2, 1917, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

"ultramontanism collided with democratic interests." Since unequal suffrage protected the interests of the Catholic as well as the Protestant religion, he counted on Centrist support in the Landtag to devise some form of watered-down suffrage bill.⁵⁸ Schian, however, was worried that the Center faction in the Reichstag no longer had an ideological commitment. Examining the new majority, he concluded that the Socialists were simply up to their old tricks, that the Progressives were again flirting with parliamentary rule, and that the Center's support of the peace resolution and the dismissal of Michaelis rested on nothing more than its shameful desire to strengthen itself by strengthening the Reichstag.⁵⁹

While waiting upon Hertling to fulfill his promise, the progressives decided to combat the Fatherland Party and promote reform by forming their own mass organization. The impetus came from Dr. Adolf Grabowsky, editor of the Free Conservative weekly, Das neue Deutschland. Abandoning his former annexationism, he joined with Troeltsch and Meinecke in an effort to enlist the might of the trade unions. The Independent (Free) Trade unions, allied with the Socialist Party, numbered about two and one-half million members; the

⁵⁸Bonwetsch to Seeberg, Nov. 4 and Dec. 20, 1917, and Seeberg to Bonwetsch, Nov. 17, 1917, all in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. Bonwetsch quoted the Johannine passage in Greek: ὁ κόσμος κεῖται ἐν τοῦτοῦ.

⁵⁹Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., VIII (1917), 573-576.

Christian Trade Unions, allied with the Center, about one-third of a million; and the Hirsch-Duncker Unions, allied with the Progressives, about 100,000. On November 14, 1917, Meinecke addressed a planning session in Berlin attended by Gustav Bauer, leader of the Socialists' General Commission of German Trade Unions, and Johann Giesberts, leader of the Christian Unions. The aim of the new crusade, Meinecke explained, was to perpetuate Bethmann's foreign and domestic policies and to help blend the already similar desires of the government, Reichstag majority, and masses.⁶⁰

True to his pledge, Hertling introduced in the Prussian House of Deputies on December 5 a bill for equal suffrage. Though no friend of parliamentarism, he genuinely supported franchise reform in Prussia as a timely and relatively innocuous concession, and, backed by the new minister of the interior who had replaced Loebell, Wilhelm Drews, he warned against offering the half measure of plural suffrage. His home state of Bavaria had equal suffrage, and he was willing to see Prussia follow her lead and become a moderately liberal bourgeois monarchy. But the House had other ideas. On December 11, rather than swiftly passing his bill, the deputies referred it to a committee. At the end of the month,

⁶⁰Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, 235; Meinecke, "Um Freiheit und Vaterland," speech of Nov. 14, 1917, and "Volksbund und Vaterlandspartei," Strassburger Post, Feb. 10, 1918, both in Meinecke, Werke, II, ed. by Hans Herzfeld, Carl Hinrichs and Walter Hofer (Darmstadt, 1966), 213-266. For trade union figures, see Pinson, Modern Germany, 247.

⁶¹Troeltsch, "Freiheit und Vaterland," III (1918), 73-74.

hoping to point the committee in the right direction, Troeltsch's organization came before the public with its inaugural manifesto. The new People's League for Freedom and Fatherland called for the immediate introduction of a new political order.⁶¹

At the League's first public meeting on January 7, 1918, Troeltsch made an impassioned plea for equal suffrage. As a good Hegelian, he rested his case not on natural law but on the present stage of historical evolution. German political development, he argued, had not kept pace with changing social conditions. Modern society with its general schooling, general military system, and informed public opinion, he argued, required the equal participation of each individual in electing the popular or lower house of government. If such equality was not realized immediately by legislative means, it would come later by violent methods. With an eye on his nervous bourgeois listeners, he noted that since the Prussian Ministry of State and House of Lords would act as a check on the Prussian House of Deputies, equal suffrage would not mean the "rule of the masses" but would provide a needed "safety valve." Moreover, if the Reichstag and Prussian Lower House had the same suffrage system, they would cease to work at cross purposes.⁶²

⁶¹Patemann, Wahlreform, 127-134; Rosenberg, Entstehung, 187-188; "Aufruf des Volksbundes für Freiheit und Vaterland," Die Hilfe, XXIII (1917), 751; Wortmann, Vaterlands-Partei, 94-98.

⁶²Troeltsch, "Freiheit und Vaterland," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 73-74.

The League boasted that it was "the voice of the working people," and on paper its strength looked good. With all three of the large trade union alliances behind it, it claimed to speak for four million people--three times the membership of the Fatherland Party. For the first time, Christian and Socialist unions joined hands, and together with the Progressive Hirsch-Duncker unions, they foreshadowed the Weimar coalition. The Fatherland Party had belatedly tried to conciliate the Socialists and the Catholics, but these two former "Reichsfeinde" professed allegiance to the "Fatherland" by affiliating with Troeltsch's not Tirpitz' group.⁶³

As valuable as its broad base of union workers was the League's superstructure of luminaries. Its board of directors, steering committee, and active supporters included liberal professors, social reformers, and leaders of all three types of trade unions. Among the already familiar names were Friedrich Thimme and Carl Legien, who two years earlier had urged cooperation between the proletariat and bourgeoisie; leaders of the Protestant-Social Congress, such as its president and past president, Baumgarten and Harnack, as well as Friedrich Naumann, and Professor Ernst Francke, the League's president; professors who had signed the counter-petition of 1915, including Delbrück, Gerhard Anschütz, and Max Weber, Baumgarten's cousin; Meinecke and Oncken, who had disowned

⁶³"Aufruf des Volkbundes für Freiheit und Vaterland," and "Chronik," Das neue Deutschland, VI (1918), 195, 219.

the Seeberg petition; and "socialists of the lectern," such as Lujo Brentano and Walter Goetz. This meant that all three members of the Hobohm Committee--Baumgarten, Goetz, and Delbrück--were involved in another effort to counter the Pan-Germans.⁶⁴

Troeltsch also won his Ritschlian friend, Wilhelm Herrmann, for the new cause, but Rade remained aloof. When Troeltsch asked Rade's endorsement, he stressed that the League's aim was precisely what Rade had always advocated, a "moralization of politics," and he warned that unless reform was enacted, the growing strength of the Independent Socialists meant the danger of more strikes and riots and possibly even a popular upheaval. A "revolution from below," he predicted, was very likely unless Tirpitz' and Ludendorff's "revolution from above" was thwarted. Troeltsch believed that Ludendorff was exploiting his seeming indispensability and playing the role of a "Wallenstein" and that he might even force the Kaiser to abdicate; helping him was the "experienced intriguer" Tirpitz, who was seeking revenge on Bethmann by trying to make Bülow chancellor and then having Germany fight to the last man. The Fatherland Party, Troeltsch insisted, was not a mass but a class organization, operating through the political influence of the Conservatives and the money of heavy industry; in order to thwart its schemes,

⁶⁴List of board and committee members in Das neue Deutschland, VI (1918), 196; Karl Hammer, "Adolf von Harnack und der Erste Weltkrieg," Ztschr. f. evangel. Ethik, XVIII (1972), 95.

reward the masses, and prevent insurrection, equal suffrage and even some measure of parliamentarism were imperative. But Rade was unmoved. Though he usually sided with his fellow liberals, he did not transform his periodical into a trumpet for reform. Instead, he denounced the League for being as divisive as its rival.⁶⁵ Baumgarten, on the other hand, told his readers that the League was accomplishing what Legien and Thimme had worked for since 1915: to close the gap, which Tirpitz' group had widened, between the workers and the rest of society.⁶⁶

In spite of the League's illustrious leadership, numerical strength, patriotic rallies, and propaganda material, it was not, as Meinecke himself admitted, an effective counterweight to the Fatherland Party. Why did it fail? For one thing, it did not attract the Protestant masses. The Catholic unions joined it but not the Protestant ones, which claimed that it was too soft on territorial demands. Troeltsch attributed this attitude to the prevailing "war theology," intensified by the focus of the Reformation celebrations on Luther's nationalism. Baumgarten similarly lamented that Protestant groups were the "hard core of the frondeurs." Another drawback was the initially successful spring offensive of 1918, which, as Baumgarten observed,

⁶⁵Herrmann to Seeberg, Dec. 26, 1918, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; Troeltsch to Rade, early 1918, cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protestantismus, 256-257; Rade in Christl. Welt, early 1918, cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protest., 256.

⁶⁶Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVIII (1918), 58, 153, 316.

refurbished the Fatherland Party's demand for a "Hindenburg peace" and dulled the luster of the League's moderate goals. Finally, there were organizational difficulties, typified in Troeltsch's complaint that forming the League had burdened him with all sorts of complex political problems.⁶⁷ By the summer of 1918, the moderates' third and final attempt at organized opposition had foundered. Neither the National Committee for a German Peace, nor the Hohenzollern Committee, nor the People's League for Freedom and Fatherland could conjure up the ultra-patriotic allure enjoyed by the Independent Committee, the Pan-German League, and the Fatherland Party.

While the League was strutting and fretting its hour upon the stage, equal suffrage was dying a slow death in the Prussian House of Deputies. The thirty-five man committee which debated Hertling's bill did not refer it again to the full house until April 11, 1918. In the interim, Baumgarten pointed with anxiety to the handwriting on the wall. In his monthly editorials, he prophesied that substantial political reform was inevitable--even the eventual enfranchisement of women! He therefore urged the clergy to prepare the people for the responsibilities of self-government. He urged the Kaiser and chancellor not to veer from their

⁶⁷Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, 235; Troeltsch to Rade, early 1918, cited in Rathje, Welt des freien Protest., 256-257; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVIII (1918), 152-153, 318. In the fall of 1917, a Protestant workers' association came out in favor of a strong peace; Gatzke, Drive to the West, 202-203.

commitment to democratizing the Prussian franchise and politicizing the masses. He urged the reactionary wing of his own National Liberal Party to foreswear obstructionism in the Landtag, and he urged the Center to place the need for reform above its confessional interests in preserving religious instruction in the public schools. Finally, he urged the arch-reactionary Agrarian League, the "incarnation of Junker and militaristic self-interest," to abandon its "unchristian class pride" and accept change, because resistance would merely bring more liberalization than Prussia needed or liberal Protestants like himself wanted.⁶⁸

His pleas went unheeded. On April 11, when the bill came up for its second reading, a narrow margin of right-wing National Liberals on the committee had replaced the proposed equal suffrage with plural suffrage. On May 2, just before a vote was taken, Rudolf Otto addressed the House on behalf of thirty-seven of his fellow National Liberals and admonished the rest of his party and other deputies to restore the original provision, reminding his opponents that the Kaiser had explicitly requested equal suffrage and warning that a denial of the royal will might precipitate a loss of confidence in the crown. Moreover, the people's wartime solidarity and achievements showed that they had matured, and to deny them their reward was like trying to force a grown man into a

⁶⁸Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch." Evangel. Freiht., XVIII (1918), 13, 57-59, 94-96, 119-120.

child's jacket. Also, domestic peace and social reconciliation were prerequisites to winning the war, and Germany must associate herself with the "democratic impulse" moving throughout the world, because trying to resist the "laws of the social-psychic life" was futile. But like Baumgarten's exhortations, Otto's seeds of truth fell on stony ground. Equal suffrage was defeated by 235 to 183, with the seventy National Liberals splitting down the middle.⁶⁹

On May 14, the amended bill came up for its third vote, and plural suffrage passed again. Moreover, the Center finally won acceptance of its demand for a required two-thirds majority on any future amendment to the Prussian constitution affecting church-state relations or a redistricting of electoral precincts, which had not been altered since 1860 and heavily favored landed interests. Baumgarten scolded the Center for being selfishly preoccupied with "safeguards" for the church and condemned his own party, the former champions of the Kulturkampf, for collaborating with the "ultramontanes."⁷⁰ His pulpit echoed his periodical. At the university church at Kiel, he began exhorting his congregation to accept change as part of the Christian and

⁶⁹Patemann, Wahlreform, 143-146, 155-156, 175; Otto, address in Prussian Lower House of May 2, 1918, Protokolle des preussischen Abgeordnetenhauses, Vol. 140, pp. 9418-9422; Otto's speech reflected the psychological emphasis of his famous treatise on religious psychology, Das Heilige (1917), discussed in Chapter I.

⁷⁰Patemann, Wahlreform, 182-185; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freibt., XVIII (1918), 184.

especially the Protestant tradition. At the beginning of Pentecost season, he proclaimed that Jesus had come as a liberator to free men from dead forms and put them under the control of the life-giving Spirit. Jesus' dictum: "The Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath," had revised one of the holiest of Jewish beliefs. The Apostle Paul had also tried to emancipate Christians from Jewish legalism, and the day of Pentecost, the birthday of the church, had introduced something radically new into the Christian community--the Holy Spirit. Luther himself, in his essay "The German Mass," had taught that forms that had outlived their usefulness ought to be discarded to make room for new ones. Thus, the "revolutionary impulse" moving across the world could bring positive changes, and Protestants, who historically were not tied to the letter but only the spirit of the law, should not oppose it.⁷¹ While Baumgarten was portraying Jesus, Paul, and Luther as revolutionaries, Troeltsch was reiterating the proposition that reform was dictated by considerations of Realpolitik, not of natural law. In the liberal journal, Deutsche Politik, he asseverated that the inauguration of democratization and parliamentarization was necessitated by the "compulsion of events."⁷²

⁷¹Baumgarten, "Geist und Ordnung," sermon on June 2, 1918, in Predigten aus der Revolutionszeit (Tübingen, 1919), 8-19.

⁷²Troeltsch, "Anklagen auf Defaitismus," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 661-669.

But unwilling to bend, Protestant reactionaries stood like oaks. They boycotted Troeltsch's League, began staying away from Baumgarten's services, and, when the franchise bill came up for its fourth reading on June 11, again upheld plural suffrage and the Center's demand for "cultural safeguards." Disgusted but undaunted, Baumgarten repeated his sermon for the benefit of his readers, sounding forth Jesus' warning about pouring new wine into old wineskins. Even Schian, who coveted protection for the Protestant state church, rebuked the Protestants for jumping into bed with the Romanists, whose lust for power was insatiable.⁷³

On July 5, after a seven-month debate, the house took a fifth and final vote, which confirmed the fourth. A plural suffrage with a maximum of three votes was adopted. Every man was to have one vote, and some men, in consideration of vocational level and family position or age, an extra one or two. The residency requirement to vote was raised from one to two years, and a three-fourths (raised from the Center's previous demand of two-thirds) majority was required to amend the constitution or to alter voting precincts. All in all, it meant that the old guard was still entrenched.⁷⁴

The decision was a considerable defeat for Hertling. He denounced the altered bill and, as Schian had expected,

⁷³Baumgarten, Lebensgeschichte, 124; Patemann, Wahlreform, 189-191; Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVIII (1918), 220-223; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 304.

⁷⁴Patemann, Wahlreform, 201-202.

threatened to dissolve the Landtag unless it passed equal suffrage before the winter. It was not Hertling's parliamentary speeches, however, that did the trick, but the Allies' blood and iron. The amended bill was sent on to the House of Lords, where it lay buried in committee until the deteriorating military situation--the loss of the second battle of the Marne on July 18, the "black day" of August 8, and the collapse of Bulgaria at the end of September--prompted Ludendorff to wave his baton over the Lords and transform them into friends of reform.⁷⁵

But before this startling volte-face transpired, a Protestant reactionary made a final protest against democratization. In the fall of 1918, Hermann Jordan, Associate Professor of Church History at Erlangen and member of the Independent Committee, contended that Paul's admonition, "Ye are all one in Christ" (Galatians 3:28) did not teach social and political equality. Though admitting that Paul had stressed that the slave and the freeman were one in Christ, he correctly pointed out that Paul had not challenged the Roman practice of slavery. He then drew the disputable conclusion that Christians had no biblical mandate to erase class distinctions. Harnack, Troeltsch, and Otto held that because men of all classes offered themselves in common on the battlefield, they merited equal political rights upon returning home, but Jordan argued that this confused moral

⁷⁵Ibid., 202-206, 220-221; Rosenberg, Entstehung, 226-229; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 335.

achievement with service to the state. To be sure, a general was no better morally than a foot soldier, since each merely did his duty, but a leader contributed more than a man in the trenches and deserved greater political rights. Viewing democratization as the father of mediocrity and an artificial levelling, Jordan urged that the Prussian motto adopted by King Frederick I in 1701, "to each, his due," not be replaced by "to each, the same."⁷⁶

Until September 28, it looked as though Jordan would have his way. But on that day, Ludendorff panicked. Bulgaria had collapsed; the military situation in Austria-Hungary was rapidly deteriorating; and convinced that Germany must sue for peace and that only a domestic metamorphosis could secure suitable terms from the Allies, Ludendorff not only told the Prussian Lords to approve equal suffrage but advised the Reichstag to prepare legislation transforming Germany into a parliamentary monarchy. Since parliamentary rule was too bitter a pill for Hertling to swallow, he resigned and was replaced by the heir to the Baden throne, the liberal Prince Max.⁷⁷

On October 6, Baumgarten voiced mixed feelings about the impending changes. He admitted that his historical and polit-

⁷⁶Jordan, Die Demokratie und Deutschlands Zukunft (Berlin, 1918), 2, 32-37, 78-79; Harnack, "Friedensaufgaben und Friedensarbeit," 292; Troeltsch, "Freiheit und Vaterland," Dt. Pol., III (1918), 74; Otto, "Reform des Wahlrechts jetzt!" Dt. Pol., II (1917), 670.

⁷⁷Rosenberg, Entstehung, 226-229.

ical convictions had always run counter to politicizing the masses, and he questioned whether the virtues of popular responsibility would outweigh the problems of a less structured society, but he nevertheless affirmed that the hour had come to democratize Prussia and the other reactionary federal states, and he even applauded Prince Max's inclusion of Majority Socialists in his cabinet. Even if there was a strong "ultramontane" element and a Jewish streak in the Reichstag majority, he argued, Protestants ought not to sabotage it but cooperate with it. "Let's make the best of the unavoidable," he advised. Even Deissmann, who had signed the annexationist petition of 1915, welcomed the new chancellor. While he had taught at Heidelberg University he had had opportunity to observe Max's progressive spirit, and he had already praised him in his Weekly Letter. On October 12, he told his readers that the recent turn of events squared with his long held conviction that Germany needed greater popular participation in government. While certainly aware of the propaganda value of such statements, he was genuinely consistent with his prewar support of political reform.⁷⁸

Die-hards like Lezius, however, refused to yield. While Max was requesting armistice conditions from President Wilson, he whined that the Kaiser should have established a dictatorship under Ludendorff and Hindenburg instead of capitulating

⁷⁸Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVIII (1918), 316-318, 348; Deissmann, Evangel. Wochbr., Dec. 24, 1917, Oct. 12, 1918.

to the Reichstag but concluded that "God has blinded him, and therefore the empire falls."⁷⁹

In the event that Max decided to reject Wilson's terms and make a last stand, the Prussian Minister of Culture, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, wanted the three large patriotic organizations to secure a united popular front. On October 10, he assembled fifteen leaders, including Tirpitz and Kapp from the Fatherland Party, Seeberg and Schäfer from the Independent Committee, Troeltsch, Legien, and Francke from the People's League, and Harnack as moderator. He asked them to draft a joint manifesto based on the motto: "Hurrah, homeland, for you we die." The representatives of two reactionary groups favored the idea, but the leaders of the League demanded that the manifesto also declare support for the new government of Prince Max. Tirpitz claimed that his organization was uninterested in domestic politics and concerned only with an honorable peace, but Francke replied that the most pressing need was to stand behind the Reichstag majority--which Tirpitz' group had refused to do. Francke also argued that Germany should not give the impression abroad that while asking for peace she was preparing for continued

⁷⁹Lezius to Seeberg, Oct. 3, 1918, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK. In another of his frequent comparisons of Rome with Germany, Lezius used the Greek word τὸ κατέχον to mean "empire." Used by the Apostle Paul in II Thessalonians 2:17 to mean "that which restrains" evil, it was interpreted by the early Church Fathers to mean the Roman empire, which restrained anarchy and guaranteed civil order in a fallen world; see William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich (eds.), A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (Chicago, 1963), 423.

war. When Legien demanded that the right-wing groups declare themselves in favor of the further reform of the Prussian franchise, they refused, and Francke sized up the impasse by echoing Delbrück's observation when the industrialists left the National Committee in 1916: "Papering over the differences is impossible."⁸⁰

After further bickering, Harnack tried to mediate by stating that the League merely wanted a declaration of support for the principle of parliamentary reform, not an advance endorsement of every change the Reichstag might propose. Admitting that for many people even this meant a real sacrifice of conviction, he insisted that the military crisis required it. The men finally decided that no common endeavor was possible at that time but agreed to try again if Germany rejected the armistice terms. Summing up the fruitless discussions, Troeltsch concluded that serious differences of principle still existed, but Harnack made a final appeal to everyone to stand behind the new government.⁸¹

On October 16, Baumgarten addressed the second wartime session of his Protestant-Social Congress and reiterated the League's plea for accepting the fundamental change that Germany was undergoing. Germans must rethink their principles,

⁸⁰Verhandlungen zwischen Vertreter des Unabhängigen Ausschusses für einen Deutschen Frieden, der Deutschen Vaterlandspartei und des Volksbundes für Freiheit und Vaterland, Oct. 10, 1918, pp. 1-7, typed manuscript in Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁸¹Ibid., 8-11.

he counselled; namely, they must abandon Bismarck's "militaristic, authoritarian power state" and learn to be comfortable in a democratic society. Schian did not agree. He distrusted the new political triumvirate--Socialists, Progressives, and Center-- and he was dismayed to hear that the Prussian Upper House was speeding up its deliberations on equal suffrage. He thought it a horrible revelation of the Center's new power that Socialist deputies in the Lower House had already agreed to keep "safeguards" for religion if equal suffrage were introduced. Unlike Harnack, he did not regard equal suffrage as the culmination of the "Stein-Hardenberg reforms" or wish it God-speed.⁸²

With both equal suffrage and parliamentary rule imminent, but with armistice negotiations still snarled, Seeberg decided to renew Schmidt-Ott's attempt to bolster military and public morale in case a final stand had to be made. But mindful of the enmity between the pressure groups, he turned to his fellow professors. As rector of Berlin University, he secured the unanimous support of the faculty, including Harnack and Troeltsch, for a compromise patriotic manifesto. On October 21, fulfilling the moderates' wishes, the professors declared that inasmuch as the war effort required internal unity, they supported the new political order. Satisfying the reaction-

⁸²Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVIII (1918), 349-352; Schian, "Chronik," Dt.-Evangel., IX (1918), 461-464.

⁸⁴Patzmann, Evangel., 229-230.

⁸⁵Rosenberg, Evangel., 212-213.

⁸⁶Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiheit., XVIII

aries, they also urged the nation not to consent to a humiliating peace.⁸³ Thus, in the last days of the empire, the moral unanimity that had marked the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three" of 1914 was temporarily revived.

Three days later, the Prussian House of Lords passed equal suffrage, but a second vote was required twenty-one days later, and then the Lower House would have to approve, also by two roll calls twenty-one days apart.⁸⁴ As Baumgarten had feared, the clock ran out before this reform could be accomplished. On the national level, however, Germany succeeded in her self-imposed house-cleaning. On October 28, exactly one month after Ludendorff had given his blessing, the Bismarckian Reich was converted into a parliamentary monarchy. Ministerial responsibility was introduced, and the Reichstag gained authority over war and peace and the appointment of army officer, the latter through the ministers of war in the several states.⁸⁵

Baumgarten endorsed the transformation and tried to sell his diminished congregation on it. From his pulpit at Kiel on November 3, the day of the naval mutiny, he exhorted perturbed Protestants to remember that their Reformation had been nothing less than the overthrow of old forms to make room for new.⁸⁶ In Berlin, Seeberg watched the passing of

⁸³Reinhold to Amanda Seeberg, Oct. 17, 1918, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK; "Eine Kundgebung der Berliner Universität," Berl. Tagbl., Oct. 21, 1918.

⁸⁴Patemann, Wahlreform, 223-226.

⁸⁵Rosenberg, Entstehung, 232-234.

⁸⁶Baumgarten, "Kirchl. Ch.," Evangel. Freiht., XVIII

the ancien regime with nostalgia and sorrow. Observing the masses' enthusiasm for the new order, he told his wife: "The joy of living grows less and less; what shall I do in a world that no longer understands my speech and ideals, in which I can maintain myself only by keeping silent and submitting?" In the wake of the Kiel mutiny, he lamented like the prophet Jeremiah over his nation's vanished greatness: "Proud Germany is gone; a regime of workers will take over, hating and humiliating all the higher classes."⁸⁷ While Seeberg sank into sadness, Lezius ranted and raved. On November 1, fearing that the Kaiser might introduce a republic, he grumbled that Germany needed a dictator, not a "boy." Even Ludendorff, he complained, had shown weakness in calling for an armistice instead of for William's abdication, and such failure of nerve was as tragic as "the fall of man." Clutching at straws to the bitter end, Lezius was still hoping on November 8, one day before Scheidemann proclaimed the republic, that William would muster the courage to establish a dictatorship instead of groveling like his cousin Nicholas II.⁸⁸ Thus, as the curtain came down on Wilhelminian Germany, the progressives were preaching accommodation, and the reactionaries were full of resentment and resistance. Unity among the

(1918), 348, and "Vision einer besseren Zukunft," sermon of Nov. 3, 1918, in Predigten aus der Revolutionszeit, 40-43.

⁸⁷ Reinhold to Amanda Seeberg, early Nov., 1918, and Nov. 6, 1918, cited in Amanda Seeberg, Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg, II, 287-288, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

⁸⁸ Lezius to Seeberg, Nov. 1 and 8, 1918, Seeberg Nachlass, BAK.

theologians--and the intellectuals in general--had reigned only in the very early and the very late stages of the war. At the outset, it had been spontaneous; now it was forced.

CONCLUSION

Of Germany's 220 Protestant theologians, we have examined a representative sampling of about three dozen, following twelve closely and catching random glimpses of the others. What immediately catches our eye is their unanimity on the ethical issues and their division on domestic reform and territorial war aims. Their unity is fairly easy to explain. They were bound together by the threads of an ever prevalent Lutheranism, a revived Hegelianism, and a new Social Darwinism. Following the Saxon reformer, they preached submission to the state and the union of throne and altar. Echoing Hegel, they proclaimed the state to be an incarnation of the divine Geist. Like Spencer, they unabashedly endorsed the survival of the fittest. Undoubtedly, Troeltsch was correct when he insisted that in the early 1800s Germany had tragically divorced herself from a common western European tradition of natural law. She had abandoned a cosmopolitan and rational viewpoint for a national individualism and the organic theory of the state. Her intellectual isolation made her all the more insensitive to foreign protests against her reckless foreign policy. Although her cultural peculiarities did not directly precipitate the war, her view of herself as, in Harnack's estimate, "the misunderstood oddity of Europe" certainly lessened the chances of international harmony.

The absence of any fundamental dissent can also be attributed to a chronological factor. The theologians of the First World War had been mere children during the battles of Königgrätz and Sedan. By the time most of them came to the age of political awareness, the bloody birth of the Second Reich was only a faint memory and its kleindeutsch character an established fact. Growing up within a Prussian-dominated empire, they took pride in its rapid accomplishments and repaid its benefits with a spontaneous obedience.

In glaring contrast stands the life of Heinrich Ewald (1803-1875). A native Hanoverian and the greatest Semitic and Old Testament scholar of the nineteenth century, Ewald was one of "Göttingen seven" who in 1837 protested the new king's suspension of their recently granted constitution. He was dismissed from his post but returned in 1848, after the constitution had been restored. Twenty years later, just after Prussia had swallowed Hanover, he again showed his mettle by refusing to take the required oath of allegiance to the new Prussian monarch. This time, he was stripped of both his post and the right to lecture. Still undaunted, he left his lectern for the political arena and carried his battle into the Reichstag, where he served from 1869 until his death as a member of the opposition Guelf party. This Hanoverian patriot was probably the best nineteenth-century equivalent of a fiery Hebrew prophet. The following generation, however, displayed little of his pluck, but some of it lived on in his fellow Hanoverian, Julius

Wellhausen (1844-1918), who in 1892 inherited Ewald's chair on the Göttingen philosophy faculty and was one of the nine theologians who dared to sign Harnack's counter-petition of 1915.

Finally, the scholars' enthusiastic wartime loyalty was simply the normal response of state employees. Professors were civil servants, whose appointments, salaries, and promotions lay in the hands of their governments. Given their vocational status and the ingrained Lutheran respect for civil authority, it is astonishing that they offered any political protest at all. Even the Barmen Declaration of the Confessing Church of May, 1934 criticized only the religious, not the political, aberrations of the Hitlerian regime. Moreover, it was a Swiss, not German, theologian who drafted it: Karl Barth, at that time Professor of Systematic Theology at Bonn.

The theologians' solidarity can thus be attributed to their vocational status, their time of birth, and the prevailing German Weltanschauung. Less easy to explain is the division that appeared on several occasions: the German Peace Society's manifesto of 1913, Seeberg's "Petition of the Intellectuals" of 1915, Harnack's counter-petition of 1915, the Haller Declaration and Tirpitz' Fatherland Party of 1917, and the protests against Haller's and Tirpitz' actions by the Berlin, Heidelberg, and Giessen faculties.

Factors that seem to have molded one's political outlook were birthplace and early background, particular theo-

logical discipline, and general theological position. Most important was one's general commitment to either liberal or conservative theology. The liberals, those who belonged to the Ritschlian school, the "history-of-religions" school, the "history-of-forms" school, or were associated with Rade's "Friends of Die Christliche Welt" or the World Congress for Liberal Christianity and Religious Progress, were usually moderate in their territorial aims and supported franchise reform. The conservatives, those of the Erlangen or "positive" school, who upheld divine revelation and miracles, tended to demand extensive annexations and the preservation of political status quo. Eleven of the twelve theologians who signed the peace declaration of 1913, all nine who signed the counter-petition of 1915, and all eight who signed the three faculty protests of 1917 were liberals.¹ In fact, two who signed the counter-petition, Wellhausen and Troeltsch, were so offensive to the orthodox that Prussian authorities had shuffled them from the theology to the philosophy faculty, which served as a quarantine ward for theologians with communicable heresies. It is also significant that both Seeberg and Haller had poor responses from Marburg and Giessen, seen by the conservatives as the Sodom and Gomorrah of the theological world. The Marburg faculty included Martin Rade and Wilhelm Herrmann, noted Ritschlians and leading wartime moderates, and Giessen was one of the three universities which drew up a protest against

¹See Appendices A, C, and G.

the Fatherland Party, a document whose six sponsors included two liberal theologians.

Conversely, as Seeberg himself observed, almost all the theologians who endorsed his petition in 1915 were conservatives, and as he also noted, it is often one's religious predilections that determine his political stripe. Seeberg and his circle, holding fast to the old Christian faith, remaining inflexible and dogmatic in theology, exhibited a similar all-or-nothing attitude on the war issues. A doctrinaire rigidity characterized their inordinate territorial demands and their refusal to grant the masses political power. They recoiled at the prospect of a church severed from state protection and religious instruction in the schools being replaced by the gospel according to Marx. On the other hand, Harnack and his disciples, reflecting their more progressive theology, championed political moderation. Even as they had embraced higher criticism and the findings of modern science, they took into account political trends outside of Germany, the so-called "democratic wave" sweeping across the world. Instead of revering the Bible as a definitive revelation, they held that man has an ever-developing understanding of God. Carrying their evolutionary premise into the political field, they recommended granting workers' demands for parliamentary rule and equal suffrage as proper rewards for a matured people. Likewise, their willingness to limit Germany's expansion stemmed from a sensitivity to world opinion and the growing aversion of the

German masses to a war being prolonged for the sake of conquest. In short, in both theology and war aims, the conservatives thundered forth their own convictions, while the liberals listened to the misgivings of others.

For the conservatives, religion was a sacred heritage to be preserved. Compromise with modern novelties was ruled out. The liberals saw compromise as an integral part of the growth of Christianity. Harnack claimed that the early Church had blended Jewish messianic expectations with Hellenistic philosophy, and Troeltsch maintained that the Church had continued to adapt its social teachings to the changing mores of each succeeding age. So it was natural for them to regard Britain's sine qua non for peace, the restoration of Belgium, as a negotiable item, whereas the conservatives clung to the conquered country as they did to the Apostles' Creed.

Klaus Schwabe took only a sentence to mention that in four cases (Harnack, Rade, Seeberg, Holl) the theologians' political views were consistent with their religious position, but we now know from several manifestoes and petitions that the rift ran throughout the whole theological community and that, furthermore, different religious disciplines tended to attract men of different political persuasions. Of the 220 theologians, four-fifths were divided fairly evenly among the fields of church history, systematic theology, Old Testament exegesis, and New Testament exegesis; one-tenth taught practical theology; and the rest lectured on apologetics,

dogmatics, homiletics, or missions. Although most of the disciplines showed no strong bent toward either political direction, church historians, like secular historians, displayed a marked preference for ultra-patriotic causes, while systematic theologians tended to gravitate toward left-wing endeavors. Church historians were only twenty percent of the theological community, but they accounted for a greater percentage of the theologians who supported Seeberg in 1915 (twelve of his forty-one) and Haller in 1917 (eighteen of his seventy-six), being the largest theological group each time. While these two ratios are not grossly disproportional, it is startling that two-fifths of the theologians (ten of the twenty-six) who endorsed both the Seeberg and Haller documents--²the real "hard-liners"--were church historians, while this discipline was totally absent among the twelve theologians who signed the Peace Society's manifesto of 1913.

Conversely, the minority of the theological community that rose above the waves of chauvinism included a high percentage of systematic theologians: five of the twelve theologians who signed the peace manifesto, four of the nine who signed Harnack's counter-petition, and the outspoken champion of suffrage reform, Rudolf Otto.³

Of course, the two important exceptions to these general-

²See Appendix F.

³See Appendices A and C.

izations are Harnack, the church historian, and Seeberg, the systematician. In their cases, the sheep did not harken unto the voice of their own shepherd. But, for the most part, those who taught the past had seemingly come to revere it and were enamored of the conception of history fostered by Hegel and Treitschke. It is also possible that, since history sometimes tends toward a mere gathering of details, it may have attracted the less innovative and flexible minds, while systematic theology, which offers greater room for philosophical speculation and creative genius, may have appealed to the more imaginative and bolder scholar. At any rate, systematic theology still bore the impress of Albrecht Ritschl, who during his twenty-five years (1864-1889) at Göttingen spawned a new generation of theological liberals.

Another possible explanation of the theologians' political outlook was their early background. At first glance, it would appear that the moderates were rooted in south German constitutionalism or Saxon or Hanoverian particularism. Of the twelve who endorsed the peace manifesto, all but three were born outside the nine older Prussian provinces, and two of those three later defected to Haller's camp.⁴ Similarly, six of the nine who endorsed the counter-petition were born outside of old Prussia: one Balt, Harnack; one Saxon, Rade; two Hanoverians, Wellhausen and Friedrich Loofs; and two Bavarians, Baumgarten and Troeltsch, both of whom later

⁴See Appendix A.

breathed the even more liberal air of Baden. Baumgarten's uncle, Julius Jolly, was Baden's prime minister from 1868 to 1876, and Troeltsch taught for twenty years (1894-1914) at Heidelberg and was its representative in the Upper House of the Baden legislature. Of the three Giessen theologians who opposed the Fatherland Party, two were born in the free cities of Bremen and Lübeck, and the third in Russia.⁵ Before concluding, however, that non-Prussian origins begat political moderation, one must note that non-Prussians also preponderated among the twenty-six "hard-liners" who supported Seeberg and Haller; only seven of them were born in old Prussia, whereas two came from Hanover, two others from Saxony, and Karl Holl, Johannes Haussleiter, and Albert Hauck all from south of the Main.⁶ The only conclusion that can be drawn is that early background and place of origin alone had little influence. In combination with other factors, however, the picture is different: the political left was overwhelmingly populated by non-Prussians, systematic theologians, and religious liberals. To be sure, these qualities did not always produce a moderate, but they did combine powerfully to create the only theologian directly involved in the political arena throughout the war, Rudolf Otto. A native Hanoverian, professor of systematic theology, and a left-wing Ritschlian, he expressly refused to sign Seeberg's petition

⁵See Appendix G.

⁶See Appendix F.

and courageously led the fight in the Prussian Lower House for equal suffrage.

But was all of this political activity proper for an academician? In 1927, the French philosopher Julien Benda accused the wartime intellectuals of nearly every nation of having committed "treason," of having profaned a sacred trust by succumbing to passion. He argued that thinkers should be a race apart, remaining ideologically neutral and refusing to take up academic cudgels in behalf of a national cause. Such banishment of the sage into the proverbial ivory tower, denying him the right to make value judgments on daily affairs, seems a cruel and unusual punishment indeed. We cannot indict the theologians simply because they did not remain apolitical, or as Romain Rolland put it, "au-dessus de la mêlée." Nor were they guilty of crucifying their consciences by supporting a cause in which they did not believe; they were not cowards, liars, or hypocrites. Neither were they mere opportunists, personally indifferent to the "real world" and trying to ingratiate themselves with their rulers and the masses. What they were guilty of is betraying their responsibility to subject the complex problems of war to the same rigorous scrutiny they applied to their academic disciplines. They temporarily abandoned the curious, probing, critical attitude always brought to bear on scholastic matters. They stepped out of character and were inconsistent. Harnack, for instance, would never have made the kind of rash judgments about church history that he initially made about the out-

break of the war. But, gradually, he and a few others did regain their academic composure.

Because of their privileged position, the theologians sometimes look like fallen angels, at least given their lofty station above the horizon visible to the ordinary mortal. Jesus himself said, "Unto whom much is given, from him much shall be required," and even as the Scriptures mention no provision for the redemption of Lucifer, history is often less forgiving with those who have tarnished halos than those who have none at all. Yet, a dispassionate evaluation of the theologians' wartime foibles must consider as well their elements of greatness and the behavior of their counterparts elsewhere.

As Troeltsch and Freud both proclaimed, the war did not produce but merely revealed the beast within the human breast. Nineteenth-century scientific progress had fostered an unwarranted belief in the fundamental improvement of human nature, and Freud welcomed the war as a bayonet to pop the balloon of Victorian optimism and confirm his own diagnosis of man's incurable maladies.

Excesses were committed with both pen and sword, and the theologians were not without blemish. Undoubtedly, they exhibited a naiveté, a narrow nationalistic spirit, a Prussian-Protestant prejudice, and a penchant for oversimplification and intemperate language. They ingenuously reduced the war to a struggle between the children of darkness and the children of light. Where, we ask, were the doubting Thomases

who demanded solid proof of the Entente's culpability? Did no one stop to ponder the complexity of prewar diplomacy and entertain even a slight suspicion of German guilt? Did no one feel uneasy that the thesis of the German White Book was buttressed by only twenty-seven documents, which included only two notes between Berlin and Vienna during the critical days of July? At least there was Rade, who at the very outset admitted that Germany's shirt was not altogether clean. And in subsequent months, a few others began asking questions, proving that ingrained scholarly habits are not easily discarded. Harnack retracted his accusations about French planes having violated neutral Belgian air space and about the British having stored dum-dums at the French border town of Maubeuge. Others soon joined in repenting of the more brazen claims in the "Appeal of the Ninety-Three to the World of Learning." Had it not been for the military censors, other recantations might have surfaced. Just after the revolution of November, 1918, had abolished censorship restrictions, Deissmann confessed that the violation of Belgium's neutrality had lain like an incubus upon his soul and that he was relieved to be able to do public penance.

As noted in the Preface, this study rests upon the foundations of other historians, but caught up with the larger questions (moral cultural, political) of the war, they neglect the human and spiritual element. They usually point to the theologians' tirades against the "barbaric" Slavs and criticize their racial chauvinism, but they overlook their cosmo-

politanism and compassion. For one thing, Lezius' fulminations against the Poles and Jews were not echoed by his colleagues. Furthermore, Carl Stange's ministry at the prisoner-of-war camp in Göttingen was an exemplary fulfillment of Jesus' admonition to "love your enemies." His Christian concern for the foe earned him the praise of neutral inspectors and the disgust of his fellow townsmen, who showed their displeasure with his excessive concern by painting his house red, white, and blue--the colors of France and Britain. Baumgarten and Rade helped supervise the Bureau to Aid Foreigners stranded in Germany, following the Old Testament commandment to show kindness to "the stranger within thy gates." Harnack intervened in behalf of the Belgian historians, Paul Frédéricq and Henri Pirenne, and helped secure their transfer from a civilian prison camp to the university town of Jena, where they were given special privileges. When the University of Dorpat was reestablished as a German institution, Harnack pleaded--in vain--that lectures be given in the native Baltic languages as well as in German. At the outbreak of the war, when the famous Max Reinhardt was worried about the propriety of continuing Shakespearean drama on the German stage, he turned for advice to Harnack, who assured him that the illustrious bard belonged not merely to "perfidious Albion" but to the world. In the midst of the war, when the Turks resumed their previous persecution of the Christian Armenians, Harnack, Deissmann, Rade, Baumgarten, and other savants asked Bethmann to put pressure upon the Sublime Porte to halt the

within the Wilhelmian Reich.

slaughters. Such a request to intervene in the internal affairs of a valued ally on behalf of alleged traitors certainly lifts the theologians above the level of a Dr. Goebbels.

Although the theologians were Germans to the core, they were not all Pan-Germans. One might wish they had all emulated Rade in joining the Peace Society, but at least they did not all follow Lezius into the Pan-German League. To be sure, they extolled the German mission, believing with Emmanuel Geibel that "one day the world will be healed by German Kultur," but Baumgarten winced at the Pan-German perversion of this prophecy. Moreover, he showed genuine courage in joining the Hohohm Committee against the League, and his only reward was a flood of abusive mail. In 1915, after Seeberg had bestowed academic prestige on the unholy alliance of Pan-Germans and Rhineland industrialists, Harnack and his comrades quickly opposed their inordinate demands, urging Bethmann to lash himself to the mast of moderation and not be seduced by the howling sirens. The following year, by endorsing the National Committee's attack on the League's insatiable appetites, he found himself in a bitter feud with the League's vice-president. Even when the sweet wine of success that flowed from Brest-Litovsk had intoxicated most of the nation, Harnack, Rade, and Baumgarten stayed sober. Harnack even dared to declare himself publicly in favor of national self-determination for the Baltic provinces and Finland. Here is surely evidence of "the other Germany" within the Wilhelmian Reich.

If all the theologians were monarchists at heart, some were perceptive enough to see the handwriting on the wall and advocate franchise reform in Prussia and some degree of parliamentary rule on the national level, and when the old regime crumbled, they became "Vernunftrepublikaner." Abandoning the Rankean "Primat der Aussenpolitik," the liberal theologians focused on the mounting domestic crisis. They did not appeal to "natural rights" but rather argued that the German people, having endured a baptism of fire, deserved political responsibility befitting their proven maturity. In 1916, when Bethmann sought advice from Harnack, he urged that the masses be rewarded with at least some form of plural suffrage, and the following summer, he took the initiative and begged Bethmann to introduce equal suffrage. When his counsel went unheeded, he, along with Troeltsch and other kindred spirits, took his case to the public, providing Vorwärts with headline news: an appeal to the government to go beyond the promise of the Imperial Easter Message (merely to amend the Prussian franchise at the end of the war) and introduce equal suffrage immediately. Baumgarten ruined his popularity as university preacher at Kiel by sermonizing on the need to adapt to revolutionary changes, and Otto jeopardized his political career in the Prussian legislature by voting against the majority opposed to equal suffrage. These mandarins must certainly be credited with a measure of "civil courage."

Although even the enlightened progressives were still

tied to the Lutheran legacy of the "Obrigkeitsstaat" and to Frederick II's self-proclaimed duty of being "the first servant of the state," their ideals seem no shallower than that of "making the world safe for democracy." Much of the war-time propaganda was simply the Allied kettle calling the Teutonic pot black. Furthermore, if all the theologians were politically conservative, at least Rade, Otto, and Baumgarten stood to the left fringe of the National Liberal Party. We should hardly hope to find one among the Social Democrats. And to keep the theologians in perspective, we should remember that the Second International collapsed and that 110 Socialists in the Reichstag forgot the class war and voted the war credits. If the supranational workers' movement was torn asunder by the battering waves of nationalism, what was to be expected of civil servants who had long upheld the doctrine of throne and altar?

Among the theologians' more glaring deficiencies, overlooked by most historians, was their religious shortsightedness. Ignoring Germany's one out of three Catholics, they equated her Christianity with Protestantism and scolded England for betraying her "Protestant" sister. But it is also true that many attempted to uphold the ecclesiastical Burgfriede by making friendly overtures toward their Roman brothers. Desiring to bury the bitterness of the Kulturkampf, they spared no superlatives in praising a German Catholic apologetic that rebuffed French accusations, and in their own Reformation year of 1917, they tolerated the readmission of

the Jesuits, the cancellation of the Wittenberg festival, and the appointment of a Catholic chancellor. If we find their fixation on England annoying, we must likewise note that many of them denounced the hate campaign and the "Gott strafe England" slogan as unchristian, and some even exonerated England of deliberate hypocrisy, charging her only with being blind to her own inconsistencies.

With no hesitation, the theologians dismissed perpetual peace as a "fairy tale" and accepted the inevitability of war, but they were not insensitive to its horrors. Deissmann's weekly letters to American and neutral friends, though filled with propaganda, were saturated with a genuine sense of pathos. They reveal the soul of a scholar rubbed raw by the indiscriminate slaughter of a generation of gifted intellects, including his own theological colleagues in Germany and Britain. Though tough-minded enough to defend the necessity of a "just war," he was tender-minded enough to loathe its cost in human resources. Like Jeremiah weeping over the destruction of Solomon's temple, he lamented that the temple of European scholarship was being laid waste. And Rade went a step further. As a lone voice in the wilderness, he pleaded for the moralization of politics. Though not harkening to Tolstoi's plea to beat all swords into ploughshares, he upbraided Christians the world over for not taking seriously Christ's admonitions to be peacemakers, and the outbreak of the war signified to him nothing less than the bankruptcy of Christendom.

Moreover, unlike most of his colleagues, Rade avoided

intemperate language. The majority indulged in hyperboles, shallow caricatures, and acerbic invectives that were hardly fitting for men of so rich and precise a vocabulary. Their excesses partially resulted from the war's providing a rare opportunity to escape normal academic restraint and a license to hurl verbal mudballs. Unprofessional? Yes, but along with the fun was a sense of duty to bolster public morale. As self-appointed defenders of the faith (the German national faith), the theologians played to the crowd in order to keep popular enthusiasm high. Furthermore, the progressives, who did not march quite in goose step with the reactionaries, were especially eager to appear totally patriotic; so, they peppered their speeches with an extra dose of bombast to make up for their seemingly deficient territorial demands. Both groups feared that the slightest hint of uncertainty about the righteousness of the German cause might undermine the civilian effort required for "total war." In fact, Schian accused Rade of this very transgression: namely, that by admitting collective guilt in August, 1914, he had sowed debilitating seeds of doubt in the hearts of his countrymen.

When the theologians spoke, the people listened, both at home and abroad, and even the German government. Only Troeltsch and Otto had actually entered politics, but perhaps of greater importance was Harnack's position as confidant of the Kaiser, Bethmann, and other state secretaries. William had personally overridden the Prussian Supreme Church Council

to bring Harnack to Berlin and had showered him with honors culminating in a title of nobility, and according to Harnack's daughter, the Kaiser frequently sought and followed his advice on secular matters. Through his brother-in-law, Hans Delbrück, Harnack was related to Secretary of the Interior Clemens von Delbrück, who asked him to draft the Kaiser's address to the nation at the outbreak of the war. In January, 1916, Harnack gave a small dinner party attended by the Kaiser and Tirpitz, and when the two men argued over whether England or Russia was the more dangerous enemy, Harnack sided with William against the naval secretary in naming Russia. In Harnack's view, Germany's primary goal lay in the east: freeing his homeland, the Baltic provinces, from the Russian yoke. Tirpitz' Anglophobia meant retaining Belgium and gaining control of the high seas through relentless submarine warfare. Such discussions may have had some bearing on the Kaiser's decision two months later to dismiss Tirpitz. Also, the advice which Harnack gave on the franchise question must have strengthened the chancellor's resolve to secure from William the royal directive for equal suffrage of July 11, 1917. We can only guess at other instances of Harnack's moderating influence, but we can safely assume that had Seeberg been the court theologian, the ship of state would have pursued a more reckless course than it did.

While Harnack helped sway the scepter, his colleagues moved the nation. Three professor-publicists addressed the men of culture and wealth. Rade's Die Christliche Welt they were convinced, conscientious persons, and we must not deny,

preached its gospel of qualified pacifism to an audience of 4,000. Baumgarten's Evangelische Freiheit warned 1,400 readers of the perils of Pan-Germanism and reactionary politics. With his Deutsch-Evangelisch, Schian reached 1,000 compatriots with his middle-of-the-road solution to the wartime dilemmas. Though these figures are not significant in themselves, they represented the intellectual elite, ecclesiastical and lay patricians who molded the opinions of the plebians. And the theologians also went straight to the masses. At numerous patriotic rallies, they enflamed popular passions, and even though the local clergy were more fiery, the professors lent a special sanction to the war myths, since the lower classes had almost a religious reverence for "Herr Doktor."

The theologians were also heard abroad, but their pronouncements simply confirmed foreign suspicion that German academe had prostrated itself before the god of blood and iron. As the Allies saw it, the high priests of the intellectual world had failed to exorcise the demons of militarism, barbarism, and autocracy from the German soul.

In the main, it is true that the theologians' war contribution consisted of endorsing governmental policies and popular prejudices instead of offering needed correctives. Unlike the Old Testament seers, who rebuked their kings and countrymen, the modern German prophets walked hand in hand with their politicians and people. But when they joined the crowds in singing "Deutschland über alles," it was not because they were mere showmen or sychophants but because they were convinced, conscientious patriots. And we must not deny,

as most historians have, a proper salute to Martin Rade, whose brave cry, "Jesus is greater than Luther," elevates him above his colleagues as a Protestant who had not forgotten how to protest.

If we still find the theologians' general performance disappointing, we must not think them unique. Like the Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, war fever reached epidemic proportions. All over the globe, sages as well as the simple-minded were afflicted with nationalistic myopia. So, if the theologians had a tragic flaw, it was that of being human, all too human. And even though they may have lost their perspective, they did not altogether lose their sight. Here and there, they did manifest redeeming qualities. If their cry of "Gott mit uns," which animated the final years of the Second Reich, sounds a bit presumptuous to our sophisticated ears, it was certainly far more noble than the strains of the Götterdämmerung, which accompanied the collapse of the Third Reich.

*Wilhelm Hoesack
(1850-1922)

Berlin

Old Test. Strasbourg

Martin Rade
(1857-1940)

Saxony

Syst. Theol. Marburg

*Karl Thieme
(1862-1932)

Saxon
Prussia

Syst. Theol. Leipzig

*Heinrich Meinel
(1874-1936)

Hesse-
Cassel

New Test. Jena

Hans H. Wendt
(1853-1920)

Marburg

Syst. Theol. Jena

*(the only theological conservative among the dozen)

**signed the Haller Declaration of 1917)

***one of the seven sponsors of the manifesto)

APPENDIX A

The twelve theologians who signed the German Peace Society's manifesto of April, 1913 (total of 395 signatures)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Discipline</u>	<u>University</u>
Wilhelm Baldensperger (1856-1936)	Alsace	New. Test.	Giessen
Karl Bornhausen (1882-1940)	Frankfurt am Main	Syst. Theol.	Marburg
Otto Frommel (1871-1950)	Heidelberg	Pract.Theol.	Heidelberg
Paul Glaue (1872-19??)	Berlin	Pract.Theol.	Jena
*Caspar René Gregory (1846-1917)	USA	New Test.	Leipzig
Paul Lobstein (1850-1922)	France	Syst. Theol.	Strassburg
Friedrich Niebergall (1866-1932)	Rhenish Prussia	Pract.Theol.	Heidelberg
**Wilhelm Nowack (1850-1928)	Berlin	Old Test.	Strassburg
Martin Rade (1857-1940)	Saxony	Syst. Theol.	Marburg
**Karl Thieme (1862-1932)	Saxon Prussia	Syst. Theol.	Leipzig
***Heinrich Weinell (1874-1936)	Hesse- Cassel	New Test.	Jena
Hans H. Wendt (1853-1928)	Hamburg	Syst. Theol.	Jena

*(the only theological conservative among the dozen)

** (signed the Haller Declaration of 1917)

*** (one of the seven sponsors of the manifesto)

APPENDIX B

The forty-one theologians who signed Seeberg's "Petition
of the Intellectuals" of July 8, 1915
(total of 1,347 signatures)

<u>Berlin</u>	Adolf Deissmann, Hugo Gressmann, Karl Holl, Friedrich Mahling, Julius Richter, Reinhold Seeberg
<u>Breslau</u>	Franklin Arnold, Walter Bauer, Wilhelm Caspari, Gustav Hoennicke, Friedrich Kropatscheck, Karl Steuernagel, Johannes von Walter
<u>Erlangen</u>	Hermann Jordan, E. F. Karl Müller
<u>Giessen</u>	August von Gall, Martin Schian
<u>Göttingen</u>	Nathanael Bonwetsch, Ernst Kühl, Carl Mirbt
<u>Greifswald</u>	Johannes Haussleiter, Johannes Kunze, Otto Procksch, Viktor Schultze, Friedrich Wiegand
<u>Halle</u>	Hans Achelis, Paul Feine, Ferdinand Katten- busch, August Lang, Wilhelm Lütgert
<u>Kiel</u>	Erich Schäfer, Alfred Seeberg (Reinhold's brother), Ernst Sellin
<u>Königsberg</u>	Friedrich Lezius, Martin Schulze, Alfred Uckeley
<u>Leipzig</u>	Otto Frenzel, Caspar René Gregory, Hermann Guthe, Albert Hauck, Georg Schnedermann

No Protestant theologian signed from Bonn, Heidelberg, Jena,
Marburg, Münster, Rostock, Strassburg, or Tübingen.

(Signed the Haller Declaration of 1917)

Others who signed were: Berlin philosopher Edmund Husserl,
Freiburg law professor Bernhard Windscheid, Berlin law pro-
fessor Franz von Liszt, Berlin pastor Walther Ritschl, Berlin
publicist Paul Schönbach, former ambassador to Italy,
Count Anton von Tettau, former ambassador to Spain, Baron
Ferdinand von Stumm, Berlin general superintendent of the
Prussian state church, Friedrich Lohse, former governor of
Kiao-Chow then working for the Hamburg-America line, Admiral
Graf von Treppe.

APPENDIX C

The nine theologians who signed the counter-petition of
July 28, 1915 against Seeberg's "Petition of the Intellectuals"
(total of 141 signatures)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Discipline</u>	<u>University</u>
Otto Baumgarten (1858-1934)	Bavaria	Pract. Theol.	Kiel
Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930)	Livonia	Church History	Berlin
Georg Heinrici (1844-1915)	East Prussia	New Test.	Leipzig
Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922)	Brandenburg	Syst. Theol.	Marburg
*Friedrich Loofs (1858-1928)	Hanover	Church History	Halle
Martin Rade (1857-1940)	Saxony	Syst. Theol.	Marburg
*Arthur Titius (1864-1936)	East Prussia	Syst. Theol.	Göttingen
Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923)	Bavaria	Syst. Theol. (1894-1914); Phil. of Hist. Berlin and Religion (1915-1923)	Heidelberg
Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918)	Hanover	Semitic lang. and Old Test.	Göttingen

*(signed the Haller Declaration of 1917)

Others who signed were: Göttingen philosopher Edmund Husserl, Freiburg law professor Hermann Kantorowicz, Berlin law professor Franz von Liszt, Berlin pastor Walther Nithack-Stahn, Berlin publicist Paul Rohrbach, former ambassador to Italy, Count Anton von Monts, former ambassador to Spain, Baron Ferdinand von Stumm, Berlin general superintendent of the Prussian state church, Friedrich Lahusen, former governor of Kiao-Chow then working for the Hamburg-America line, Admiral Oscar von Truppel.

APPENDIX D

The seventy-six theologians who signed the Haller Declaration of October 15, 1917 (total of 1,077 signatures)

<u>Berlin</u>	Karl Holl, Julius Kaftan, Friedrich Mahling, Julius Richter, Reinhold Seeberg, Hermann Strack, Bernhard Weiss
<u>Bonn</u>	Hans Achelis, Gustav Ecke, Edward Grafe, Rudolf Knopf, Eduard König, Johannes Meinhold, Emil Pfenningsdorf, Otto Ritschl
<u>Breslau</u>	Carl Franklin Arnold, Johannes Steinbeck, Carl Steuernagel
<u>Erlangen</u>	Philipp Bachmann, Hermann Jordan, E. F. Karl Müller, Theodor von Zahn
<u>Göttingen</u>	Nathanael Bonwetsch, Karl Knoke, Johannes Meyer, Carl Mirbt, Carl Stange, Arthur Titius
<u>Greifswald</u>	Friedrich Bosse, Johannes Haussleiter, Johannes Kunze, Otto Procksch, Victor Schultze, Friedrich Wiegand
<u>Giessen</u>	Martin Schian
<u>Halle</u>	Ernst von Dobschütz, Paul Feine, Gottlob Haussleiter, Hermann Hering, Gustav Hölscher, Ferdinand Kattenbusch, August Lang, Friedrich Loofs, Wilhelm Lütgert, Heinrich Voigt
<u>Heidelberg</u>	Georg Beer, Ludwig Lemme, Hans von Schubert
<u>Jena</u>	Hans Lietzmann, Wilhelm Thümmel
<u>Kiel</u>	Gerhard Ficker, Julius Kögel, Erich Schaefer, Ernst Sellin
<u>Leipzig</u>	Heinrich Boehmer, Otto Frenzel, Hermann Guthe, Albert Hauck, Ludwig Ihmels, Alfred Jeremias, Rudolf Kittel, Franz Rendtorff, Karl Thieme
<u>Marburg</u>	Rudolf Günther, Eduard Simons
<u>Münster</u>	Wilhelm Rothstein, Julius Smend
<u>Rostock</u>	Hermann Mandel
<u>Strassburg</u>	Wilhelm Nowack
<u>Tübingen</u>	Theodor von Häring, Karl F. F. von Müller,

Tübingen

Otto Scheel, Adolf von Schlatter, Friedrich Traub, Paul Volz, Paul von Wurster

Halle had ten; Leipzig, nine; Bonn, eight; Berlin and Tübingen, seven each; Göttingen and Greifswald, six each; Kiel and Erlangen, four each; Breslau and Heidelberg, three each; Jena, Marburg, and Munster, two each; Giessen, Rostock, and Strassburg, one each.

Of the seventy-six theologians, one third (twenty-six) had signed the Seeberg petition; two (Titius and Loofs) had signed the Harnack counter-petition; and two-thirds (forty-eight) had signed neither.

Number of univer.
professors (out
of 6,000)

Number of Prot.
theol. professors
represented
(out of 16)

Number of Prot.
theologians (out
of 226)

Proportion of
signing theologians
to total number of
theologians

Proportion of
signing theologians
to total of signing
professors

APPENDIX E

COMPARISON OF THE THREE NUMERICALLY SUCCESSFUL MANIFESTOES

Name	Apologetic for German Militarism Oct. 23, 1914; signatures col- lected by Schäfer	Seeberg's "Petition of Declaration the Intel- lectuals" July 8, 1915	Haller Declaration Oct. 15, 1917
Hans Achelis (1862-1937)			
Carl Franklin Arnold (1853-1927)			
Mathias Bonwetsch (1848-1925)			
Total Signatures	3,000	1,347	1,077
Number of univer. professors (out of 4,000)	3,000	1,077	352
Number of Prot. theol. faculties represented (out of 18)	18	10	17
Number of Prot. theologians (out of 220)	178	41	76
Proportion of signing theologians to total number of theologians	4/5	1/5	1/3
Proportion of signing theologians to total of signing professors	1/17	1/9	1/14
Karl Müller (1863-1935)			
Otto Frotscher (1874-1947)			
Julius Richter (1862-1940)			
Erich Schneider (1861-1936)			
Martin Schian (1869-1944)			
Victor Schulze (1851-1937)			
Reinhold Seeberg (1859-1935)			
Ernst Sellin (1867-1945)			
Karl Steumrath (1869-1938)			
Friedrich W. W. W. W. (1860-1934)			

APPENDIX F

The twenty-six theologians who signed both the Seeberg Petition of 1915 and the Haller Declaration of 1917

<u>Name</u>	<u>Birthplace-</u>	<u>Discipline</u>	<u>University</u>
Hans Achelis (1865-1937)	Bremen	Church Hist.	Halle
Carl Franklin Arnold (1853-1927)	USA	Church Hist.	Breslau
Nathanael Bonwetsch (1848-1925)	Volga region, Russia	Church Hist.	Göttingen
Paul Feine (1859-1933)	Saxe-Weimar- Eisenach	New Test.	Halle
Otto Frenzel (1865-1934)	Saxony	Pract. Theol.	Leipzig
Hermann Guthe (1849-1936)	Brunswick	Old Test.	Leipzig
Albert Hauck (1845-1918)	Bavaria	Church Hist.	Leipzig
Johannes Haussleiter (1851-1928)	Bavaria	New Test.	Greifswald
Karl Holl (1866-1926)	Württemberg	Church Hist.	Berlin
Hermann Jordan (1878-1922)	Brandenburg	Church Hist.	Erlangen
Ferdinand Kattenbusch (1851-1935)	Westphalia	Dogmatics	Halle
Johannes Kunze (1865-1927)	Saxony	Syst. Theol.	Greifswald
August Lang (1867-1945)	Westphalia	Church Hist.	Halle
Wilhelm Lütgert (1867-1938)	Brandenburg	Syst. Theol.	Halle
Friedrich Mahling (1865-1933)	Frankfurt/Main	Pract. Theol.	Berlin
Carl Mirbt (1860-1929)	Silesia	Church Hist.	Göttingen
E.F. Karl Müller (1863-1935)	Anhalt	Reform. Theol.	Erlangen
Otto Procksch (1874-1947)	Saxe-Altenburg	Old Test.	Greifswald
Julius Richter (1862-1940)	Brandenburg	Missions	Berlin
Erich Schaefer (1861-1936)	Hanover	Syst. Theol.	Kiel
Martin Schian (1869-1944)	Silesia	Pract. Theol.	Giessen
Victor Schultze (1851-1937)	Waldeck	Church Hist.	Greifswald
Reinhold Seeberg (1859-1935)	Livonia	Syst. Theol.	Berlin
Ernst Sellin (1867-1945)	Mecklenburg- Schwerin	Old Test.	Kiel
Karl Steuernagel (1869-1958)	Hanover	Old. Test.	Breslau
Friedrich Wiegand (1860-1934)	Hesse-Cassel	Church Hist.	Greifswald

Breakdown of disciplines: Breakdown of origins:

Church History--10
 System. Theol.---4
 Old Testament----4
 Pract. Theol.----3
 New Testament----2
 Dogmatics-----1
 Missions-----1
 Reformed Theol.--1
26

Older nine Prussian provinces--7
 Newer six Prussian provinces---4
 Smaller northern states-----4
 South Germany-----3
 Russia-----2
 Saxony-----2
 Thuringian states-----2
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin-----1
 USA-----1
26

Georg Stahlfauth

Prussian provinces

Christian Archaeology
 and Church Art

*Ernst Troeltsch

Prussian provinces

Systematic Theology
 (1894-1914); Phil.
 of Hist. and Relig.
 (1915-23)

*(among the ten sponsors of the declaration)

2. The Heidelberg protest of thirty-two professors, October 22, 1917

Martin Dibelius

Saxony

New Test.

Friedrich Niebergall

Prussian provinces

Pract. Theol.

3. The Glasgow protest of nineteen professors, November 12, 1917

*Wilhelm Bouquet

Libeck

New Test.

*Samuel Eck

St. Petersburg

System. Theol.

Gustav Erdger

Prussian provinces

Church History

*(among the six sponsors of the declaration)

APPENDIX G

The eight theologians who signed protests against the Haller Declaration or the Fatherland Party in 1917

1. The Berlin protest of forty-nine professors, October 10, 1917

<u>Name</u>	<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Discipline</u>
*Adolf von Harnack	Livonia	Church History
Georg Stuhlfauth	Rhenish Bavaria	Christian Archaeology and Church Art
*Ernst Troeltsch	Bavaria	Systematic Theology (1894-1914); Phil. of Hist. and Relig. (1915-23)

*(among the ten sponsors of the declaration)

2. The Heidelberg protest of thirty-two professors, October 22, 1917

Martin Dibelius	Saxony	New Test.
Friedrich Niebergall	Rhenish Prussia	Pract. Theol.

3. The Giessen protest of nineteen professors, November 12, 1917

*Wilhelm Bousset	Lübeck	New Test.
*Samuel Eck	St. Petersburg	System. Theol.
Gustav Krüger	Bremen	Church History

*(among the six sponsors of the declaration)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Smend, Friedrich (ed.). Adolf von Harnack. Ver-
zeichnis seiner Schriften. Leipzig: J. C.
Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1927.

Wanderscheck, Hermann (ed.). Bibliographie zur
englischen Propaganda im Weltkrieg. Stuttgart:
Weltkriegsbücherei, 1935.

II. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz

Nachlass Hans Delbrück

Nachlass Johannes Haller

Nachlass Reinhold Seeberg

Nachlass Gottfried Traub

Delbrück, Lina. Hans Delbrücks Leben. 18 vols.

Typed manuscript, no date, in Delbrück Nachlass.

Seeberg, Amanda. Lebensbild von Reinhold Seeberg.

2 vols. Typed manuscript, 1930, in Seeberg
Nachlass.

Deutsches Zentralarchiv I, Potsdam

Akten der Reichskanzlei; material pertaining to
the Deutscher National-Ausschuss; Kriegsakten 15
(1), call numbers 1-233.

Staatsbibliothek, Berlin

Nachlass Hans Delbrück

Nachlass Adolf von Harnack

Universitätsbibliothek Marburg

Nachlass Wilhelm Herrmann

Nachlass Paul Natorp

Nachlass Martin Rade

Collection of pamphlets and flyers of the Unabhängiger
Ausschuss für einen deutschen Frieden, entitled
"Kriegs- und Friedensziele."

III. PUBLISHED COLLECTIONS OF DIPLOMATIC AND PARLIAMENTARY RECORDS

GENERAL

Beer, Max (ed.). "Das Regenbogen-Buch"; Deutsches Weissbuch, österreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch, englisches Blaubuch, französisches Geldbuch, russisches Orangebuch, serbisches Blaubuch und belgisches Graubuch. Die europäischen Kriegsverhandlungen; Die massgebenden Dokumente, chronologisch und sinngemäss zusammengestellt, übersetzt und erläutert von Dr. Max Beer. Bern: F. Wyss, 1915.

Mach, Edmund Robert Otto von (ed.). Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, with photographic reproductions of the official editions of the documents (Blue, White, Yellow, etc., Books) published by the governments of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and Serbia. New York: Macmillan, 1916.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Austro-Hungarian Red Book. Official English Edition with an Introduction. New York: John C. Rankin Company Press, [1915].

_____. Collection of Evidence concerning the Violations of International Law by the Countries at War with Austria-Hungary. Concluded on January 31, 1915. N. p., 1915.

BELGIUM

Belgium. Belgian Delegation to the United States. The Case of Belgium in the Present War. An Account of the Violations of the Neutrality of Belgium and of the Laws of War on Belgian Territory. New York: Macmillan, 1914.

Belgium. Official Commission of the Belgian Government. Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office on behalf of the Belgian Legation, [1915].

Belgium. Memorandum of the Belgian Government on the Deportation and forced Labor of the Belgian Civil Population by the German Government. London: The Furnival Press, 1917.

Davignon, Henri (ed.). Belgium and Germany. Texts and Documents. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, [1915].

Passelecq, Fernand (ed.). Les déportations belges à la lumière des documents allemands. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1917.

FRANCE

France. Ministère des affaires étrangères. Les violations des lois de la guerre par L'Allemagne. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1915.

France. Commission instituée en vue de constater les actes commis par l'ennemi en violation du droit des gens. Documents relatifs à la guerre, 1914-1915-1916. Rapports et procès-verbaux d'enquête, III-IV. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1916.

GERMANY

Germany. Auswärtiges Amt. Aktenstücke zum Kriegausbruch. Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1915.

_____. Belgische Aktenstücke 1905-1914. Berichte der belgischen Vertreter in Berlin, London und Paris an den Minister des Ausseren in Brüssel. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, [1915].

_____. The Belgian People's War. A Violation of International Law. Translations from the Official German White Book. New York: John C. Rankin Company Press, [1915].

_____. Das Deutsche Weissbuch: Wie Russland Deutschland hinterging und den Europäischen Krieg entfesselte. Denkschrift und Aktenstücke mit den Original-Telegrammen und Noten. Berlin: Liebheit und Thiesen, 1914.

_____. Das deutsche Weissbuch über die Schuld am Krieg mit der Denkschrift der deutschen Vierenkommission zum Schuldbericht der Alliierten und Assoziierten Mächte vom 29. März 1919. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927.

- _____. Materialien, betreffend die Friedensverhandlungen. 12 vols. Charlottenburg: Reichsdruckerei, 1919-1921.
- Germany. Nationalversammlung. Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses 4. Reihe. "Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918." 12 vols. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1925-1929.
- Germany. Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen. Das französische Geldbuch von 1914; Berichtiger und durch die nachträglich bekannt gewordenen Dokumente ergänzter Wortlaut der ersten amtlichen Veröffentlichung der Französischer Regierung über den Kriegausbruch. Mit einem Vorwort von Alfred von Wegerer. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1926.
- Prussia. Landtag. Stenographische Berichte der Verhandlungen des preussischen Hauses der Abgeordneten nebst Drucksachen. 22nd legislative session, 1914-1918.
- Dernburg, Bernhard (ed.). The Case of Belgium in the Light of Official Reports found in the Secret Archives of the Belgian Government after the Occupation of Brussels. [The "Brussels Documents"] New York: The International Monthly, [1915].
- Geiss, Imanuel (ed.). July 1914. The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967 (1st Germ. ed., 1963-1964).
- Kautsky, Karl (ed.). Outbreak of the World War. German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky and edited by Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking. Translated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924.
- Romberg, Baron Gisbert von (ed.). Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book. Actual Exchange of Telegrams Between Paris and St. Petersburg at the Outbreak of the War. Translated by H. W. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1923.
- Siebert, Baron Benno von (ed.). Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Entente politik der Vorkriegsjahre. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1921.

GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain. Foreign Office. Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915. (Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1915). Parliament. Papers by command. Cd. 7860.

IV. Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the Execution of Miss Cavell at Brussels. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915. (Miscellaneous, no. 17, 1915). Parliament. Papers by command. Cd. 8013.

Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in Germany. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915. (Miscellaneous, no. 19, 1915). Parliament. Papers by command. Cd. 8108.

Correspondence relative to the Alleged Ill-Treatment of German Subjects Captured in the Cameroons. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915. Parliament. Papers by command. Cd. 7974.

Further Correspondence with the United States Ambassador respecting the Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in Germany. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. (Miscellaneous, no. 16, 1916). Parliament. Papers by command. Cd. 8235.

Great Britain and the European Crisis. Correspondence, and Statements in Parliament, together with an Introductory Narrative of Events. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914.

[Toynbee, Arnold, J.] The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916. Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount Bryce. With a Preface by Viscount Bryce. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916. (Miscellaneous, no. 31, 1916).

Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages appointed to His Britannic Majesty's Government and presided over by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce ["Bryce Report"]. With an appendix: Evidences and Documents. New York: The Macmillan Company for His Majesty's Stationery Office, [1915].

RUSSIA

Russia. Ministère des affaires étrangères. Recueil de documents diplomatiques. Négociations avant précédé la guerre. 10/23 Juillet-24 Juillet/6 Août 1914. Petrograde: Imprimerie de l'état, 1914.

IV. CONTEMPORARY JOURNALS, NEWSPAPERS, AND NEWSLETTERS

Alldeutsche Blätter; official weekly organ of the Pan-German League, ed. by Franz Sontag.

Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung; official organ of the Evangelical Lutheran Conference, ed. by Wilhelm Laible.

Berliner Tageblatt; the leading liberal daily newspaper, edited by Theodor Wolff, published by the Rudolf Mosse firm.

Die Christliche Welt; liberal religious weekly, edited by Marburg Professor of Systematic Theology, Martin Rade.

Current History (The New York Times Current History of the European War); monthly journal begun in December, 1914, carrying many articles by intellectuals from the various belligerent and neutral nations.

Deutsch-Evangelisch; a monthly unofficially representing the Mittelpartei, a church faction taking a middle of the road position; ed. by Giessen Professor of Practical Theology, Martin Schian.

Deutsche Politik; a weekly begun in January, 1916, by the former editors of Das Grössere Deutschland, Ernst Jäckh, Paul Rohrbach, and Philipp Stein, who wanted to place Kulturpolitik above Machtpolitik; Troeltsch and Meinecke were among its contributors.

Die Eiche; a quarterly edited by Berlin pastor, Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze; founded in 1913 with the subtitle "An organ for the Fostering of Better Relations between Great Britain and Germany," the subtitle was changed after the outbreak of the war to "An Organ for International Social Ethics."

Evangelische Freiheit; a liberal religious monthly edited by Kiel Professor of Practical Theology, Otto Baumgarten.

Evangelischer Wochenbrief (pub. simultaneously in English as Protestant Weekly Letter); weekly newsletter, begun in December, 1914 and continued until 1921, sent out by Berlin Professor of New Testament Adolf Deissmann, in the hope of currying favor with the neutral powers, especially America.

Frankfurter Zeitung; next to the Berliner Tageblatt, the most influential liberal daily newspaper; no editor-in-chief, but August Stein headed its Berlin bureau; published by Sonnemann firm.

Die Friedens-Warte; a pacifist monthly, edited by Alfred Fried, begun in 1899 as a continuation of Bertha von Suttner's defunct journal, Die Waffen nieder.

Die Hilfe; an intellectual and political weekly edited by Progressive Reichstag deputy, Friedrich Naumann, who championed a liberal social policy and, prior to the war, an imperialistic foreign policy.

International Conciliation; monthly pamphlets published by the American Association for International Conciliation, a branch of Conciliation Internationale, founded in 1905.

Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik; a scholarly monthly edited by Max Cornicelius; prior to the war, a medium of European cultural exchange; when the war began, it assumed a thoroughly nationalistic tone.

Kriegs-Rundschau; a bi-weekly summary of the daily Tägliche Rundschau, edited by the Pan-German Heinrich Rippler.

Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift; a conservative Lutheran monthly, representing "positive" theology, edited by Erlangen Professor of New Testament, Theodor von Zahn.

Die neue Rundschau; Germany's leading liberal intellectual monthly, edited by Oskar Bie; Troeltsch was a frequent contributor.

Preussische Jahrbücher; political and intellectual monthly, edited since 1896 by Berlin Professor of History, Hans Delbrück, who succeeded Treitschke; during the war, advocated limited territorial aims and political reform.

Theologische Rundschau; scholarly theological monthly, edited by Göttingen Professor of New Testament, Wilhelm Bousset; suspended in 1917 because of the exigencies of the war.

Vossische Zeitung; one of the oldest of the German newspapers, appealing especially to the liberal intelligentsia of Berlin; purchased in 1914 by Ullstein concern and then co-edited by Georg Bernhard.

V. CONTEMPORARY BOOKS AND ARTICLES

(In order to avoid an unduly large Bibliography, only the most significant articles in newspapers, journals, and collections of essays are included in Sections V and VI. The footnotes contain sufficient information to locate the other articles.)

Ackerman, Carl W. Germany, The Next Republic? New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1917.

Ainslie, Peter. Christ or Napoleon--Which? New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1915.

Allen, J. W. Germany and Europe. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914.

Andler, Charles. "Frightfulness" in Theory and Practice as Compared with Franco-British War Usages. Translated with a Preface by Bernard Miall. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916.

_____. Pan-Germanism. Its Plans for German Expansion in the World. Translated by J. S. Paris: Armand Colin, 1915.

Aner, Karl et al. "Erklärung /peace declaration of five Berlin pastors/." Die Christliche Welt, XXXI (1917), 756.

Angell, Norman. The Great Illusion. A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.

_____. Prussianism and Its Destruction. London: William Heinemann, 1914.

Archer, William. Gems (?) of German Thought. An Anthology of German War Scriptures. Garden City: Doubleday and Page, 1917.

- _____. The Pirate's Progress. A Short History of the U-Boat. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1918.
- Bang, Jacob Peter. Hurrah and Hallelujah. The Teaching of Germany's Poets, Prophets, Professors and Preachers. Translated by Jessie Bröchner with an Introduction by Ralph Connor. New York: George H. Doran, 1917.
- Barker, Ernest. The Submerged Nationalities of the German Empire. London: Darling and Son, 1915.
- Barker, Ernest et al. Why We Are at War. Great Britain's Case by the Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914.
- Baudrillart, Alfred (ed.). La guerre allemande et le Catholicisme. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915.
- Beck, James M. The Evidence in the Case as to the Moral Responsibility for the War. Revised edition, with additional material. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1915.
- _____. The War and Humanity. A Further Discussion of the Ethics of the World War and the Attitude and Duty of the United States. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916.
- Bédier, Joseph. Comment l'Allemagne essaye de justifier ses crimes. Paris: Armand Colin, 1915.
- Benson, E. F. Deutschland über Allah. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- Bernhardi, Friedrich von. Germany and the Next War. Translated by Allen H. Powles. New York: Longmans and Green, 1914.
- Bevan, Edwyn. German War Aims. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1918.
- _____. (ed.). The Pan-German Programme. The Petition of the Six Associations and the Manifesto of the Intellectuals. New York: George H. Doran, [1918].
- Beveridge, Albert J. What Is Back Of The War. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1915.
- Beyens, Baron Eugen von. Germany before the War. Translated by Paul V. Cohn. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1916.

- Bourne, Raldolph S. Untimely Papers. With a Foreward by the editor, James Oppenheim. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919.
- Bouton, S. Miles. And the Kaiser Abdicates. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920.
- Brereton, Cloudesley. Who Is Responsible? Armageddon and After! New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.
- Brinville, J.-C. Hohenzollern et Democratie. Paris: Attinger Frères, 1917.
- Broederich-Kurmahlen, Silvio. Das neue Ostland. Charlottenburg: Ostlandverlag, 1916 [1st edition, 1915].
- Brooke, Rupert. The Collected Poems of Rupert Brooke. With an Introduction by George Edward Woodberry and a Biographical Note by Margaret Lavington. New York: John Lane, 1921 [1st edition, 1915].
- Bund deutscher Gelehrter und Künstler (ed.). Die deutsche Freiheit [speeches by Harnack, Meinecke, Sering, Troeltsch, and Hintze in May, 1917]. Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1917.
- Burgess, John William. The European War of 1914. Its Causes, Purposes, and Probable Results. Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1915.
- Cammaerts, Emile. Through the Iron Bars. (Two years of German occupation in Belgium). Illustrated with cartoons by Louis Raemaekers. London: John Lane, 1917.
- Cecil, Lord Robert. Why Mail Censorship Is Vital To Britain. London: Jas. Truscott and Son, 1916.
- Chair, Sir Dudley de. How The British Blockade Works. London: Sir Joseph Causton and Sons, 1916.
- Chapman, John Jay (ed.). Deutschland über Alles or Germany Speaks. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.
- Chéradame, André. The Pan-German Plot Unmasked. Berlin's Formidable Peace-Trap of "The Drawn War." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.
- Chesterton, G. K. The Barbarism of Berlin. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914.

- Chitwood, Oliver Perry. The Immediate Causes of the Great War. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1918.
- Church, Samuel Harden. The American Verdict on the War: A Reply to the Appeal to the Civilized World of 93 German Professors. Baltimore: The Norman, Remington Company, 1915.
- Clapp, Edwin J. Economic Aspects of the War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915.
- Cleary, Henry W. Prussian Militarism at Work. A Letter by The Right Rev. Dr. Cleary. London: Barclay and Fry, 1917.
- Cook, Theodore Andrea. Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.
- _____. The Mark of the Beast. London: John Murray, 1917.
- Cramb, John Adams. Germany and England. London: Murray, 1914.
- Curtin, D. Thomas. The Land of Deepening Shadow. Germany-At-War. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1917.
- Demartial, Georges. L'Évangile du Quai D'Orsay. Paris: Andre Delpeuch, 1926.
- Dernburg, Bernhard. Search-Lights on the War. New York: The Fatherland Corporation, 1915.
- Destrée, Jules. The Deportations of the Belgian Workmen. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917.
- Dillon, Emile Joseph. A Scrap of Paper. The Inner History of German Diplomacy and Her Scheme of World-Wide Conquest. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914.
- Dimier, Louis. L'Appel des intellectuels allemands. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1915.
- Doyle, Arthur Conan. The German War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1914.
- _____. Great Britain and the Next War. Boston: Small and Maynard, 1914.
- Durkheim, Emile. "Germany above all" German mentality and war. Translated by J. S. Paris: Armand Colin, 1915.

- Durkheim, Émile, and Denis, Ernest. Who Wanted War? The origin of the war according to diplomatic documents. Translated by A. M. Wilson-Garinei. Paris: Armand Colin, 1915.
- England on the Witness Stand. The Anglo-German Case Tried by a Jury of Englishmen. New York: The Fatherland Corporation, 1915.
- Federn, Karl. The Origin of the War. Facts and Documents. New York: G. W. Dillingham, 1915.
- Fernau, Hermann. Because I Am A German. Edited with an Introduction by T. W. Rolleston. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1916.
- Foerster, Friedrich Wilhelm. "Bismarcks Werk im Lichte des grossdeutschen Kritik." Die Friedens-Warte, XVIII (1916), 1-9.
- For the Right. Essays and Addresses by Members of the "Fight for Right" Movement. With a Preface by Sir Francis Younghusband. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918.
- Fosdick, Harry Emerson. The Challenge of the Present Crisis. New York: Association Press, 1917.
- Fuehr, Alexander. The Neutrality of Belgium. A Study of the Belgian Case under Its Aspects in Political History and International Law. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1915.
- General [Moritz] von Bissing's Testament. A Study in German Ideals. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917.
- Gerard, James W. Face to Face with Kaiserism. New York: George H. Doran, 1918.
- German General Staff. The War Book of the German General Staff. [Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, 1902]. Translated with a Critical Introduction by J. H. Morgan. New York: McBride, Nast and Company, 1915.
- Gray, Alexander. The True Pastime. Some Observations on the German Attitude towards War. London: Methuen, 1915.
- _____. The Upright Sheaf. Germany's Intentions after the War. London: Methuen, 1915.
- Green, Horace. The Log of a Noncombatant. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915.

[Grelling, Richard]. The Crime. Translated by Alexander Gray. New York: George H. Doran, 1917.

_____. J'Accuse! Translated by Alexander Gray. New York: George H. Doran, 1915.

Grondys, L. H. The Germans in Belgium. New York: D. Appleton, 1916.

Grumbach, Salomon (ed.). Das annexionistische Deutschland. Eine Sammlung von Dokumenten, die seit dem 4. August 1914, in Deutschland öffentlich oder geheim verbreitet wurden. Lausanne: Payot, 1917.

_____. [English translation]. Germany's Annexationist Aims. Translated and abbreviated, with an Introduction, by J. Ellis Barker. London: John Murray, 1917.

Gwatkin, H. M. Britain's Case Against Germany. A Letter to a Neutral. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917.

Hacobian, A. P. Armenia and the War. An Armenian's Point of View with an Appeal to Britain and the Coming Peace Conference. With a Preface by Viscount Bryce. New York: George H. Doran, [1917].

Hagedorn, Hermann. Where Do You Stand? An Appeal to Americans of German Origin. New York: Macmillan, 1918.

Harris, Frank. England or Germany--? New York: The Wilmarth Press, 1915.

Hazen, Charles Downer. The Government of Germany. Washington, D. C.: The Committee on Public Information, 1917.

Headlam, J. W. Belgium and Greece. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.

Hedin, Sven. With the German Armies in the West. Translated by H. G. de Walterstorff. London: John Lane, 1915.

Hillis, Newell Dwight. The Blot on the Kaiser's 'Scutcheon. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1918.

_____. German Atrocities. Their Nature and Philosophy. Studies in Belgium and France during July and August of 1917. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1918.

- _____. Studies of the Great War. What Each Nation Has at Stake. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1915.
- Hintze, Otto et al. (eds.). Deutschland und der Weltkrieg. Leipzig: B. F. Teubner Verlag, 1916 [1st edition, 1915].
- _____. [English translation]. Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War by Various German Writers. Translated by William Wallace Whitelock. New York: Mitchell Kennerly, 1916.
- Hoffmann, Conrad. In the Prison Camps of Germany. A Narrative of "Y" Service among Prisoners of War. New York: Association Press, 1920.
- Hovaleque, Emile. The Deeper Causes of the War. Translated by the Author with an Introduction by Sir Walter Raleigh. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1916.
- Hügel, Friedrich von. The German Soul in Its Attitude Towards Ethics and Christianity, the State and War. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1916.
- Hugins, Roland. Germany Misjudged. An Appeal to International Good Will in the Interest of a Lasting Peace. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916.
- Hurd, Archibald. Murder at Sea. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916.
- Jørgensen, Johannes. La Cloche Roland. [Translation of Klokke Roland]. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916.
- _____. False Witness. The Authorized Translation of "Klokke Roland." London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916.
- Kellermann, Hermann (ed.). Der Krieg der Geister. Dresden: Rammingsche Buckdruckerei, 1915.
- Kettle, Thomas M. The Ways of War. With a Memoir by wife, Mary S. Kettle. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.
- Kjellén, Rudolf. Die Grossmächte der Gegenwart. Translated by Carl Koch. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1915.
- _____. Die Ideen von 1914. Eine weltgeschichtliche Perspektive. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1915.

- _____. Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges. Translated by Friedrich Stieve. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1916.
- Labberton, J. H. Belgium and Germany. A Dutch View. Translated by W. E. Leonard. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916.
- Lea, Homer. The Day of the Saxon. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942 [1st edition, 1912].
- Lichnowsky, Prince Karl. The Guilt of Germany for the War of German Aggression. Prince Karl Lichnowsky's Memorandum, Being the Story of His Ambassadorship at London from 1912 to August, 1914, Together with Foreign Minister Von Jagow's Reply. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918.
- _____. Le mémoire Lichnowsky et les documents Muehlton. Avec une preface de Joseph Reinach. Paris: Berger-Levrault, [1918].
- _____. My Mission to London, 1912-1914. With a Preface by Professor Gilbert Murray. New York: George H. Doran, [1918].
- Lloyd George, David. The Great Crusade. Extracts from Speeches Delivered During the War. Arranged by F. L. Stevenson. New York: George H. Doran, 1918.
- Loisy, Alfred. Guerre et religion. Paris: Emile Nourry, 1915.
- Low, A. Maurice. The Law of Blockade. Washington, D. C.: Columbian Printing Company, [1916].
- Maccas, Léon. German Barbarism. A Neutral's Indictment. With a Preface by Paul Girard. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916.
- Mach, Edmund von. What Germany Wants. Boston: Little and Brown, 1914.
- Maeterlinck, Maurice. Les débris de la guerre. Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, 1916.
- _____. [English translation]. The Wrack of the Storm. Translated by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos. New York: Dodd and Mead, 1916.
- Mann, Thomas. "Gedanken im Kriege." Die neue Rundschau, XXV (1914), 1471-1484.

- Massart, Jean. Belgians Under the German Eagle.
Translated by Bernard Miall. New York: E. P.
Dutton, 1916.
- Meinecke, Friedrich. Politische Schriften und Reden
(Werke, II). Edited by Georg Kotowski.
Darmstadt: Siegfried Toeche-Mittler, 1966.
- _____. "Zwei Systeme." Deutsche Politik, III
(1918), 707-710.
- Mendonça, Henrique Lopes de. Moral Aspects of the
European War. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917.
- Mercier, Cardinal Joseph. Pastorals, Letters,
Allocutions 1914-1917. With a Biographical
Sketch and Foreword by Rev. Joseph F. Stillemans.
New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1917.
- Mokveld, L. The German Fury in Belgium. Experiences
of a Netherland Journalist during Four Months
with the German Army in Belgium. Translated by
C. Thieme. New York: George H. Doran, [1917].
- Morgan, J. H. German Atrocities. An Official
Investigation. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1916.
- Morrison, Michael A. Sidelights on Germany. Studies
of German Life and Character During the Great War,
Based on the Enemy Press. New York: George H.
Doran, 1918.
- Müller (Meinigen), Ernst. Der Weltkrieg und das
Völkerecht. Eine Anklage gegen die Kriegführung
des Dreiverbandes. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1915.
- Murray, Gilbert. Faith, War, and Policy. Addresses
and Essays on the European War. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1917.
- Namier, Lewis. Germany and Eastern Europe. With an
Introduction by H. A. L. Fisher. London: Duck-
worth, 1915.
- Naumann, Friedrich. Mitteleuropa. Berlin: Georg
Reimer, 1915.
- Nicolai, Georg Friedrich. The Biology of War. Trans-
lated by Constance A. Grande and Julian Grande.
New York: Century, 1919.
- Northcliffe, Lord [Harmsworth, Alfred]. At the War.
New York: George H. Doran, 1916.

- Notestein, Wallace, and Stoll, Elmer E. (eds). Conquest and Kultur. Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words. Washington, D. C.: The Committee on Public Information, 1918.
- Nyrop, Kristoffer. The Imprisonment of the Ghent Professors; A Question of Might and Right. My Reply to the German Legation in Stockholm. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- Oxford Professors. To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America. A Reply from Oxford to the German Address to Evangelical Christians. London: Oxford University Press, 1914.
- Oxford War Studies. Essays of prominent British scholars. 4 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1914-1915.
- Paquet, Alfons. Der Kaisergedanke. Frankfurt am Main: Rütten und Loening, 1915.
- Parker, Gilbert. The World In The Crucible. An Account of the Origins and Conduct of the Great War. New York: Dodd and Mead, 1915.
- Passelecq, Fernand. The "Sincere Chancellor." London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917.
- Prince, Morton. The American Versus the German View of the War. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915.
- Prüm, Emile. Pan-Germanism Versus Christendom, Being an Open Letter by M. Emile Prüm. Edited by René Johannet. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916.
- _____. Der Witwestand der Wahrheit. Bemerkungen eines Neutralen zu der Abwehrschrift der deutschen Katholiken gegen das französische Buch "La guerre allemande et le Catholicisme." Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1919 [1st edition, 1915].
- [Puaux, René]. The Lie of the 3rd of August, 1914. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- Purlitz, Friedrich (ed.) Die deutsche Reichsverfassung vom 11. August 1919. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, [1919].
- Raemaekers, Louis. Raemaekers' Cartoon History of the War. 2 vols. Compiled by J. Murray Allison. New York: Century, 1918-1919.
- Reich, Emil. Germany's Madness. New York: Dodd and Mead, 1914 (originally publ. in 1907 as Germany's Swelled Head).

- Reiss, R.-A. How Austria-Hungary waged war in Serbia. Personal Investigations of a Neutral. Translated by J. S. Paris: Armand Colin, 1915.
- Reventlow, Count Ernst zu. The Vampire of the Continent. Translated with a Preface by George Chatterton-Hill. New York: The Jackson Press, 1916.
- Ridder, Herman. Hyphenations. A Collection of Articles on the World War of 1914 which have appeared from time to time in the "New Yorker Staats-Zeitung" under "The War Situation from Day to Day." New York, Max Schmetterling, 1915.
- Ripke, Axel (ed.). Zehn Deutsche Reden. Leipzig: Kurt Wolff Verlag, 1915.
- Robertson, J. M. Britain Versus Germany. An Open Letter to Professor Eduard Meyer. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917.
- . The German Idea of Peace Terms. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- Rolland, Romain. Au-dessus de la mêlée. Paris: Paul Ollendorff, 1916.
- . [English translation]. Above the Battle. Translated by C. K. Ogden. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916.
- Rosenberg, A. J. (ed.). Der deutsche Krieg und der Katholizismus. Deutsche Abwehr französischer Angriffe. Berlin: Verlag der Germania, 1915.
- Royce, Josiah. The Duties of Americans in the Present War. Address delivered at Tremont Temple, Sunday, January 30, 1916. [Boston: priv. printed, 1916/.
- Russell, Bertrand. Justice in War Time. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1917 [1st edition, 1916/.
- Sabatier, Paul. The Ideals of France. London: Unwin Brothers, 1915.
- Sanday, William. The Meaning of the War for Germany and Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1915.
- Sarolea, Charles. The Anglo-German Problem. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1913.

- _____. How Belgium Saved Europe. With a Preface by Count Goblet D'Alviella. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1915.
- Schäfer, Dietrich (ed.). Der Krieg 1914-1916, 1914-1917. 2 vols. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1916 and 1917.
- Schücking, Walter. Der Dauerfriede. Kriegsaufsätze eines Pazifisten. Leipzig: Verlag Naturwissenschaften, 1917.
- _____. "Der Weltkrieg und der Pazifismus." Die Christliche Welt, XXVIII (1914), 875-888.
- Schwarte, Max (ed.). Der Weltkrieg in seiner Einwirkung auf das deutsche Volk. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1918.
- Skaggs, William H. German Conspiracies in America. From an American Point of View by an American. With an Introduction by Theodore Andrea Cook. Toronto: Thomas Langton, [1915].
- Sladen, Douglas. The Real "Truth About Germany." Facts About the War. An Analysis and a Refutation from the English Point of View of the Pamphlet "The Truth About Germany," Issued under the Authority of a Committee of Representative German Citizens. With an Appendix, "Great Britain and the War," by A. Maurice Low. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.
- Smith, Munroe. Militarism and Statecraft. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918.
- _____. (ed.). Out of Their Own Mouths. Utterances of German Rulers, Statesmen, Savants, Publicists, Journalists, Poets, Business Men, Party Leaders, and Soldiers. New York: D. Appleton, 1917.
- Smith, Thomas F. A. The Soul of Germany. A Twelve Year Study of the People from Within 1902-1914. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1915.
- Stark, W. (ed.). Das Martyrium der evangelischen Missionären in Kamerun 1914. Berlin: Evangelischer Pressverband, 1915.
- Stuart, Campbell Sir. Secrets of Crewe House. The Story of a Famous Campaign. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920.

- Thayer, William Roscoe. Germany versus Civilization. Notes on the Atrocious War. Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1916.
- _____. Volleys From A Non-Combatant. Garden City: Doubleday and Page, 1919.
- Thimme, Friedrich (ed.). Vom inneren Frieden des deutschen Volkes. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1916.
- Thimme, Friedrich, and Legien, Carl (eds.). Die Arbeiterschaft im neuen Deutschland. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1915.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. Armenian Atrocities. The Murder of a Nation. With a Speech delivered by Lord Bryce in the House of Lords. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915.
- _____. The Belgian Deportations. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916/.
- The Truth About Germany. Facts About the War. New York: The Trow Press, 1914/.
- Turner, John Kenneth. Shall It Be Again? New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1922.
- Umfrid, Otto. "Mobilmachung der Kirchen gegen den Krieg." Die Friedens-Warte, XV (1913), 208-211.
- Unabhängiger Ausschuss für einen Deutschen Frieden (ed.). Die neue Ordnung unserer östlichen Nachbargebiete. Berlin: Unabhängiger Ausschuss, 1918.
- Usher, Roland G. Pan-Germanism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913 [revised and enlarged 2nd ed., 1914/.
- Van Dyke, Henry. Fighting for Peace. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.
- Verhaeren, Emile. Belgium's Agony. Translated by M. H. Sadler. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915.
- La vie et al mort de Miss Edith Cavell. With a Preface by Paul Painlevé. Paris: Fontemoing et Compagnie, 1915.
- Vinogradoff, Paul. Russia: The Psychology of a Nation. London: Oxford University Press, 1914/.
- Watkins, Dwight E. and Williams, Robert E. (eds.). The Forum of Democracy. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1917.

- Waxweiler, Emile. Belgium, Neutral and Loyal. The War of 1914. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.
- Wehberg, Hans. Wider den Aufruf der 93! Das Ergebnis einer Rundfrage an die 93 Intellektuellen über die Kriegsschuld. Charlottenburg: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1920.
- Weiss, André. The Violation by Germany of the Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg. Translated by Walter Thomas. Paris: Armand Colin, 1915.
- Wetterlé, Abbé E. Alsace-Lorraine on the Eve of Deliverance. Paris: Jean Cussac, 1917.
- _____. Behind the Scenes in the Reichstag. Sixteen Years of Parliamentary Life in Germany. Translated by George Frederic Lees with a Prefatory Letter by René Doumic. New York: George H. Doran, 1918.
- Whitridge, Frederick W. One American's Opinion of the European War. An Answer to Germany's Appeals. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1914.
- Wile, Frederic W. The Assault. Germany Before the Outbreak and England in War-Time. A Personal Narrative. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1916.
- _____. Men Around the Kaiser. The Makers of Modern Germany. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1914.
- Williams, Albert Rhys. In the Claws of the German Eagle. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1917.
- Willmore, J. Selden. The Great Crime and Its Moral. New York: George H. Doran, 1917.
- Wolff, Theodor. Vollendete Tatsachen 1914-1917. /His articles in the Berliner Tageblatt/. Berlin: Kronen, 1918.
- Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt (ed.). Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit. 3 vols. Berlin: Carl Heymanns, 1914-1915.

VI. WORKS OF THE THEOLOGICIANS

Baumgarten, Otto. Alldeutschtum und Christentum.
Berlin: Der Holzmarkt, 1918.

_____. Bismarcks Glaube. Tübingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1915.

_____. Christentum und Weltkrieg. Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1918.

_____. Das Echo der alldeutschen Bewegung in
Amerika. Jena: Eugen Diedrichs, 1917.

_____. "Der Krieg und die Bergpredigt, Rede am
10. Mai 1915," In Deutsche Reden in schwerer
Zeit, III, 127-148. Edited by Zentralstelle für
Volkswohlfahrt. Berlin: Carl Heymanns, 1915.

_____. Politik und Moral. Tübingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1916.

_____. Predigten aus der Revolutionszeit.
Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1919.

_____. "Der sittliche Zustand des deutschen Volkes
unter dem Einfluss des Krieges." In Wirtschafts-
und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, Deutsche
Serie, I, 5-95. Edited by Carl Melchior et al.;
general editor of series, James T. Shotwell.
Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1927.

Berliner Universitätslehrer der Theologie. Weihnachtsgruss
den im Felde stehenden theologischen Kommilitonen
der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Berlin.
Manuscript, 1914.

Bultmann, Rudolf. The Theology of the New Testament,
I. Translated by Kendrick Grobel. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951 [1st Germ. ed.,
1948].

Bertholet, Alfred. Religion und Krieg. Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1915.

Deissmann, Adolf. Deutscher Schwertsegen. Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915.

_____. "Ein Durchbruch der Wahrheit." Deutsche
Politik, I (1916), 449-453.

_____. Inneres Aufgebot. Deutsche Worte im Welt-
krieg. Berlin: August Scherl, 1915.

- _____. "Der Krieg und die Religion, Rede am 12. November 1914." In Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit, I, 283-323. Edited by Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt. Berlin: Carl Heymanns, 1914.
- _____. Light from the Ancient East. The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World. Translated by Lionel R. M. Strachan. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1910 [1st Germ. ed., 1908].
- _____. St. Paul. A Study in Social and Religious History. Translated by Lionel R. M. Strachan. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1911 [pub. simultaneously in English and German].
- Eissfeldt, Otto. Krieg und Bibel. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915.
- _____. "Politiker und Propheten," Preussische Jahrbucher, CLXIV (1916), 514-521.
- Feine, Paul. "Die englische Religiosität." Internationale Monatsschrift, IX (1915), 663-664.
- _____. "Nation, Kultur, Religion." Internationale Monatsschrift, IX (1914), 362-371.
- Foerster, Erich. "Die Stellung der evangelischen Kirche." In Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, Deutsche Serie, I, 89-148. Edited by Carl Melchior et al.; general editor of series, James T. Shotwell. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1927.
- _____. "Die Zwiespalt in der Kirche und eine Versuch zu seiner Lösung." Die Christliche Welt, XXX (1916), 768-771.
- Gregory, Caspar René. "Warum uch ins deutsche Herr eingetreten bin und warum ich darin bleibe." Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung, November 18, 1916.
- Gunkel, Hermann. "Jesus Weint." Deutsch-Evangelisch, V (1914), 661-663.
- _____. "Kriegsfrömmigkeit im Alten Testament." Internationale Monatsschrift, IX (1915), 723-758.
- Harnack, Adolf von. Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1916.

- _____. Die Dienstentlassung des Pfarrers Lic.
G. Traub. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche
Buchhandlung, 1912.
- _____. Erforschtes und Erlebtes. Giessen:
Alfred Töpelmann, 1923.
- _____. Martin Luther und die Grundlegung der
Reformation. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung,
1917.
- _____. "Die morgenländische und die abendländische
Kultur." Deutsche Warschauer Zeitung, April 20
and 21, 1916.
- _____. "Die Reformation." Internationale
Monatsschrift, XI (1917), 1281-1364.
- _____. Das Wesen des Christentums. Leipzig:
J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1920 [1st ed.,
1900].
- _____. "Wilsons Botschaft und die deutsche
Freiheit." In Die deutsche Freiheit, 1-13.
Edited by Bund der deutscher Gelehrter und
Künstler. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes,
1917.
- Hauck, Albert. "Luther und der Staat." Süddeutsche
Monatshefte, XV (1917), 11-16.
- Haussleiter, Johannes. "Ernst Moritz Arndts deutsche
Ziele." Internationale Monatsschrift, X (1916),
1370-1394.
- Herrmann, Wilhelm. "Die Türken, die Engländer und die
deutschen Christen." Die Christliche Welt, XXIX
(1915), 218-228 and 231-235.
- Holl, Karl. Briefwechsel mit Adolf von Harnack.
Edited by Heinrich Karpp. Tübingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1966.
- _____. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte.
3 vols. (Luther, Der Osten, Der Westen). Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1921-28.
- Ihmels, Ludwig. Darum auch wir. 7 Predigten während
der Kriegszeit in der Universitätskirche zu
Leipzig gehalten. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche
Buchhandlung, 1914.
- _____. Der Krieg im Lichte der christlichen Ethik.
Leipzig: A. Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung,
1915.

- _____. Der Krieg und die Jünger Jesu. Leipzig:
A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1916.
- Jordan, Hermann. Die Demokratie und Deutschlands
Zukunft. Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1918.
- Kaftan, Julius. Vorm Jahr noch--und Heute? Berlin:
Verlag Kameradschaft, 1915.
- _____. "Wider England." Internationale Monatsschrift,
IX (1914), 133-140.
- _____. Wollen wir wirklich aus Deutschen Mittel-
europäer werden? Berlin: Martin Warneck, 1916.
- Laible, Wilhelm (ed.). Deutsche Theologen über den
Krieg. Leipzig: Dörffling und Francke, 1915.
- Lezius, Friedrich. Deutschland und der Osten. /Munich:
J. F. Lehmann, 1915/.
- Loofs, Friedrich. "William Sanday über den Krieg,"
I and II. Deutsch-Evangelisch, VI (1915), 246-
266, 289-314.
- Luther, Martin. Luther's Works. American Edition.
Edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann.
55 vols. St. Louis and Philadelphia: Concordia
Publishing House and Fortress Press, 1952-1969.
- Mirbt, Carl. Der Kampf um unsere Kolonien.
Braunschweig: F. Vieweg und Sohn, 1914.
- _____. Mission und Reformation. Gütersloh: C.
Bertelsmann, 1917.
- Niebergall, Friedrich. "Krieg und Hass." Die
Christliche Welt, XXVIII (1914), 963-964.
- Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy. An Inquiry into
the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine
and Its Relation to the Rational. Translated with
a Preface by John W. Harvey. London: Oxford
University Press, 1950 [1st Germ. ed., 1917].
- _____. "Reform des Wahlrechts jetzt!" Deutsche
Politik, II (1917), 669-672.
- Rade, Martin. "Der Bankrott der Christenheit." Die
Christliche Welt, XXVIII (1914), 849-850.
- _____. Dieser Krieg und das Christentum. Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915.

- _____. "Friede um jeden Preis? Die Christliche Welt, XXXI (1917), 743-745.
- _____. "Glossen zum Balkenkriege." Die Christliche Welt, XXVIII (1914), 765-766.
- _____. Die Kirche nach dem Kriege. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915.
- Rendtorff, Franz. Aus dem dritten Kriegswinter. 5 Predigten in der Universitätskirche zu St. Pauli in Leipzig. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1917.
- Richter, Julius. Der deutsche Krieg und die deutsche evangelische Mission. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1915.
- _____. "Luthers Stellung zum Kriege," Die Christliche Welt, XXIX (1915), 169-173, 192-195.
- _____. "'Sacro Egoismo' und 'Nibelungentreue.'" Die Christliche Welt, XXIX (1915), 541-545.
- _____. "Staatsegoismus und Privatmoral." Die Christliche Welt, XXX (1916), 322-329.
- Ritschl, Otto. "Die christliche Religion und der Krieg," Internationale Monatsschrift, IX (1915), 577-602.
- Schian, Martin. Die Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche in der Heimat. Berlin: F. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1925.
- _____. Das deutsche Christentum im Kriege. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1915.
- _____. "Die evangelische Mission." In Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1917, II, 361-363. Edited by Dietrich Schäfer. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1917.
- Schubert, Hans von. Luther und seine lieben Deutschen. Eine Volksschrift zur Reformationsfeier. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1917.
- _____. Die Weihe des Krieges. Berlin: Verlag Kameradschaft, 1915.
- Schweitzer, Albert. The Quest of the Historical Jesus. Translated by W. Montgomery. New York: Macmillan, 1959 [1st Engl. ed., 1910; 1st Germ. ed., 1906].

Seeberg, Reinhold. Das Christentum Bismarcks.
Berlin: Edwin Runge, 1915.

_____. Geschichte, Krieg und Seele. Reden und Aufsätze aus den Tagen des Weltkrieges.
Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1916.

_____. "Krieg und Kulturfortschritt, Rede am 15. Januar 1915." In Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit, II, 105-144. Edited by Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt. Berlin: Carl Heymanns, 1915.

_____. "Östliche und westliche Kultur." Deutschlands Erneuerung, I (1917), 767-783.

_____. "Das sittliche Recht des Krieges." Internationale Monatsschrift, IX (1914), 169-180.

_____. Unsere Kriegsziele (Nach einer Rede im Künstlerhause zu Berlin am 20. Juni 1915).
Privately printed by "Independent Committee for a German Peace," [1915].

_____. Was erwarten wir von Friedensschluss? Rede, auf der Versammlung nationaler und christlicher Arbeiterverbände im Zirkus Busch zu Berlin gehalten.
Privately printed by "Independent Committee for a German Peace," [1917].

_____. Was sollen wir denn tun? 2nd edition.
Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1915. [1st ed., 1915].

Soden, Hans von. Bismarcks Glaube. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915.

Staerk, Willy. "Der Mythos vom ewigen Frieden." Internationale Monatsschrift, X (1916), 1285-1318.

Titius, Arthur. Unser Krieg. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915.

Traub, Gottfried. Staatschristentum oder Volkskirche. Eine protestantisches Bekenntnis. Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1911.

Troeltsch, Ernst. "Der Ansturm der westlichen Demokratie." In Die Deutsche Freiheit, 80-113.
Edited by Bund deutscher Gelehrter und Künstler.
Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1917.

_____. Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa. Gesammelte Kulturphilosophische Aufsätze und Reden. Edited by Hans Baron. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924.

- _____. Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte in unserem grossen Kriege. Berlin: Verlag Kameradschaft, 1914.
- _____. "Der Geist der deutschen Kultur." In Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, 52-90. Edited by Otto Hintze et al. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1915.
- _____. Gesammelte Schriften. 4 vols. Edited by Hans Baron. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1965-1966 [1st ed., 1912-1925].
- _____. "Der Kulturkrieg, Rede am 1. Juli 1915." In Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit, III, 209-249. Edited by Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt. Berlin: Carl Heymanns, 1915.
- _____. Nach Erklärung der Mobilmachung. Rede gehalten bei der von Stadt und Universität einberufenen vaterländischen Versammlung am 2. August 1914. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1914.
- _____. "Privatmoral und Staatsmoral." Die neue Rundschau, XXVIII (1916), 141-169.
- _____. The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches. 2 vols. Translated by Olive Wyon. New York: Macmillan, 1931 [1st German ed., 1911].
- _____. Spektator-Briefe. Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik 1918-1922. Compiled and edited by Hans Baron. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924.
- _____. Unser Volksheer. Rede gehalten am 3. November 1914 in der vaterländischen Versammlung im Nibelungensaal zu Mannheim. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1914.
- _____. "Verschiebungen der inneren Front." Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, April 6, 1918.
- _____. "Der Völkerkrieg und das Christentum." Die Christliche Welt, XXIX (1915), 294-303.
- _____. Das Wesen des Deutschen. Rede gehalten am 6. Dezember 1914 in der vaterländischen Versammlung in der Karlsruher Stadthalle. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1915.
- _____. "Das Wesen des Weltkrieges." In Der Weltkrieg in seiner Einwirkung auf das deutsche Volk, 7-25. Edited by Max Schwarte. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1918.

VII. MEMOIRS, AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, DIARIES

Baumgarten, Otto. Meine Lebensgeschichte. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1929.

Bernstorff, Count Johann. My Three Years in America. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920.

Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von. Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg. 2 vols. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1919, 1921.

Bülow, Bernhard Fürst von. Denkwürdigkeiten. 4 vols. Berlin: Ullstein, 1930-1931.

Chesterton, G. K. The Autobiography of G. K. Chesterton. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936.

Class, Heinrich. Wider den Strom. Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1932.

Clemenceau, Georges. Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire. Paris: Plon, 1930.

Czernin, Count Ottokar. In the World War. London: Cassell, 1919.

Erzberger, Matthias. Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1920.

Gerard, James W. My Four Years in Germany. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1917.

Görlitz, Walter (ed.). Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral Georg von Müller 1914-1918. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1959.

Grey of Fallodon, Viscount. Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916. 2 vols. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925.

Hammann, Otto. Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1922.

Kühlmann, Richard von. Erinnerungen. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1948.

Lichnowsky, Prince Max. Heading for the Abyss. Translated with a Preface by Sefton Delmer. New York: Payson and Clarke, 1928.

- Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs of David Lloyd George. 6 vols. Boston: Little and Brown, 1933-1936.
- Ludendorff, Erich. Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919.
- Meinecke, Friedrich. Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin 1901-1919. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1949.
- Michaelis, Georg. Für Staat und Volk. Eine Lebensgeschichte. Berlin: Furche, 1922.
- Morgenthau, Henry. Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. Garden City: Doubleday and Page, 1918.
- Russell, Bertrand. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell. The Middle Years: 1914-1944. New York: Bantam Books, 1969 /1st ed., 1951/.
- Schäfer, Dietrich. Mein Leben. Berlin: K. F. Koehler, 1926.
- Scheidemann, Philipp. The Making of New Germany: The Memoirs of Philipp Scheidemann. 2 vols. Translated by J. E. Michell. New York: D. Appelton, 1929.
- Schweitzer, Albert. Aus meinem Leben und Denken. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1931.
- Schoen, Baron Wilhelm Eduard von. The Memoirs of an Ambassador. A Contribution to the Political History of Modern Times. Translated by Constance Vesey. New York: Brentano's, 1923.
- Seeborg, Reinhold. "Selbstbiographie." In Deutscher Aufstieg, 415-422. Edited by Georg von Below and Hans von Arnim. Berlin: Schneider, 1925.
- Suttner, Bertha von. Memoirs of Bertha von Suttner. The Records of an Eventful Life. Authorized translation. 2 vols. Boston: Ginn, 1910.
- Tirpitz, Alfred von. Erinnerungen. Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1919.
- Westarp, Graf Kuno von. Konservative Politik im letzten Jahrzehnt des Kaiserreiches. 2 vols. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1935.
- Whitlock, Brand. Belgium; A Personal Narrative. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1919.

Wilhelm II. Ereignisse und Gestalten aus den Jahren 1878-1918. Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1922.

Wolff, Theodor. Der Marsch durch zwei Jahrzehnte. Amsterdam: Allert de Lange, 1936.

VIII. SPECIAL STUDIES

(These include books and articles which treat limited topics or topics only partially concerned with the substance of this study.)

Abrams, Ray H. Preachers Present Arms. New York: Round Table Press, 1933.

Basler, Werner. Deutschlands Annexionspolitik in Polen und im Baltikum 1914-1918. Berlin: Rütten und Loening, 1962.

Benz, Wolfgang. "Der 'Fall Mühlen.' Bürgerliche Opposition im Obrigkeitsstaat während des ersten Weltkriegs." Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XVIII (1970), 343-365.

Bruntz, George G. Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1938.

Cecil, Lamar. Albert Ballin. Business and Politics in Imperial Germany 1888-1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Chickering, Roger. Imperial Germany and a World Without War. The Peace Movement and German Society 1892-1914. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Dahlin, Ebba. French and German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims 1914-1918. New York: AMS Press, 1971 /1st ed., 1933/.

Fischer, Fritz. "Der deutsche Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert." Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXI (1951), 473-518.

Foerster, Friedrich William. Europe and the German Question. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940.

Fuchs, Gustav. Der deutsche Pazifismus im Weltkrieg. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1928.

- Gaede, Reinhard. Kirche--Christen--Krieg und Frieden. Die Diskussion im deutschen Protestantismus während der Weimarer Zeit. Hamburg: Herbert Reich Evangelischer Verlag, 1975.
- Gierke, Otto von. Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800. With a Lecture on The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity by Ernst Troeltsch. Translated with an Introduction by Ernest Barker. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957 [1st. English ed., 1934].
- Gifford, Prosser, and Louis, Wm. Roger (eds.). Britain and Germany in Africa. Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Glueck, Nelson. War Criminals. Their Prosecution and Punishment. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944.
- Grappin, Pierre. Le Bund Neues Vaterland (1914-1916). Ses rapports avec Romain Rolland. Nr. 7 of Bibliothèque de la société des études germaniques. N. p.: IAC, 1952.
- Hale, Oron J. Publicity and Diplomacy with Special Reference to England and Germany 1890-1914. New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1940.
- Hammer, Karl. "Adolf von Harnack und der erste Weltkrieg." Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, XVIII (1972), 85-101.
- Harnack, Axel von. "Der Aufruf Kaiser Wilhelm II. beim Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges." Die neue Rundschau, LXIV (1953), 612-620.
- Hinsley, F. H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace. Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
- Horn, Daniel. The Naval Mutinies of World War I. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969.
- Kupisch, Karl. "Protestantismus im Epochenjahr 1917." In Zeitgeist im Wandel, II, 307-320. Edited by Hans Joachim Schoeps. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1968.
- Lasswell, Harold D. Propaganda Technique in World War I. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971 [1st ed., 1927].
- Manuel, Frank E. Shapes of Philosophical History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.

Mayence, Fernand. Die Legende der Franktireurs von Löwen. Antwort auf das Gutachten des H. Professors Meurer, von der Universität Würzburg. Louvain: F. Ceuterick, 1928.

Millard, Oscar, and Vierset, Auguste. Burgomaster Max. With a Preface by Count Carton de Wiart. London: Hutchinson, 1936.

Mock, James R., and Larson, Cedric. Words That Won The War. The Story of "The Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

Parmelee, Maurice. Blockade and Sea Power. The Blockade, 1914-1919, and its Significance for a World State. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1924.

Peterson, H. C. Propaganda for War. The Campaign against American Neutrality, 1914-1917. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939.

Ponsonby, Arthur. Falsehood in War-Time. Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated Throughout the Nations During the Great War. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1928.

Ramsey, Paul. The Just War. Force and Political Responsibility. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968.

Raphael, Gaston. Hugo Stinnes Der Mensch, Sein Werk, Sein Wirken. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing Verlag, 1925.

Read, James Morgan. Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

Ryder, Rowland. Edith Cavell. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975.

Schick, Manfred. Kulturprotestantismus und soziale Frage. Versuche zur Begründung der Sozialethik, vornehmlich in der Zeit von der Gründung des Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses bis zum Ausbruch des 1. Weltkrieges (1890-1914). Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1970.

Schwabe, Klaus. "Ursprung und Verbreitung des alldeutschen Annexionismus in der deutschen Professorenschaft im ersten Weltkrieg (Zur Entstehung der Intellektuelleneingaben vom Sommer 1915)." Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XIV (1966), 105-138.

- _____. "Zur politischen Haltung der deutschen Professoren im ersten Weltkrieg." Historische Zeitschrift, CXCI (1961), 601-634.
- Schwarz, G. M. "Deutschland und Westeuropa bei Ernst Troeltsch." Historische Zeitschrift, CXCI (1960), 510-540.
- Scott, James Brown (ed.). The Texts of the Peace Conference at the Hague, 1899 and 1907. Boston: Ginn, 1908.
- Stern-Rubarth, Edgar. Die Propaganda als politische Instrument. Berlin: Trowitsch und Sohn, 1921.
- Trumpener, Ulrich. Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Wertheimer, Mildred S. The Pan-German League 1890-1914. Vol. CXII, Nr. 2 of Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University. New York: Columbia University, 1924.
- Wheeler-Bennett, John W. Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten Peace March 1918. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971 [1st ed., 1938/].
- Wortmann, Karl. Geschichte der Deutschen Vaterlands-Partei 1917-1918. Halle: Otto Hendel, 1926.

IX. GENERAL WORKS

(Here are listed those works which have provided essential reference material and background.)

- Anderson, Eugene N., and Anderson, Pauline R. Political and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- Barnes, Harry Elmer. The Genesis of the World War. An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926.
- Benda, Julien. La trahison des clercs. Paris: Editions Bernhard Grasset, 1946 [1st ed., 1927/].
- _____. [English translation/]. The Treason of the Intellectuals. Translated by Richard Aldington. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969 [1st ed., 1928/].

- Berry, Robert M. Germany of the Germans. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.
- Epstein, Klaus. Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Eyck, Erich. Bismarck and the German Empire. New York: W. W. Norton, 1964 [1st ed., 1950].
- Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. The Origins of the World War. 2 vols. New York: The Free Press, 1966 [1st ed., 1928].
- Fischer, Fritz. Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918. 3rd Edition. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1964 [1st ed., 1961].
- _____. World Power or Decline. The Controversy Over "Germany's Aims in the First World War." Translated by Lancelot L. Farrar, Robert Kimber, and Rita Kimber. New York: W. W. Norton, 1974 [1st German ed., 1965].
- Garner, James Wilford. International Law and the World War. 2 vols. London: Longmans and Green, 1920.
- Gatzke, Hans W. Germany's Drive to the West. A Study of Germany's Western War Aims During the First World War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966 [1st ed., 1950].
- Glick, G. Wayne. The Reality of Christianity. A Study of Adolf von Harnack as Historian and Theologian. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
- Gooch, George Peabody. Germany. With an Introduction by H. A. L. Fisher. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.
- _____. Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy. London: Longmans and Green, 1927.
- Gruber, Carol S. Mars and Minerva. World War I and the Uses of Higher Learning in America. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975.
- Hale, Oron J. The Great Illusion 1900-1914. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- Hammer, Karl. Deutsche Kriegstheologie 1870-1918. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1974 [1st ed., 1971].

- Holborn, Hajo. A History of Modern Germany 1648-1840. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964.
- _____. A History of Modern Germany 1840-1945. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.
- Horne, Charles F. (ed.). Source Records of the Great War. 7 vols. Indianapolis: The American Legion, 1930.
- Jarausch, Konrad H. The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.
- Koch, H. W. (ed.). The Origins of the First World War. Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims. New York: Taplinger, 1972.
- Köhler, Walther. Ernst Troeltsch. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1941.
- Krieger, Leonard. The German Idea of Freedom. History of a Political Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott. Christianity in a Revolutionary Age. 5 vols. New York: Harper and Row, 1958-1962.
- Liddell-Hart, B. H. The Real War 1914-1918. Boston: Little and Brown, 1931 /1st ed., 1930/.
- Link, Arthur S. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917. New York: Harper and Row, 1954.
- Lutz, Ralph Haswell (ed.). The Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918. 2 vols. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932.
- Macquarrie, John. Twentieth-Century Religious Thought. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
- Marrin, Albert. The Last Crusade. The Church of England in the First World War. Durham: Duke University Press, 1974.
- Mehnert, Gottfried. Evangelische Kirche und Politik 1917-1919. Die politischen Stromungen im deutschen Protestantismus von der Julikrise 1917 bis zum Herbst 1919. (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Band 16). Düsseldorf: Droste, 1959.

- Patemann, Reinhard. Der Kampf um die preussische Wahlreform im Ersten Weltkrieg. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1964.
- Pauck, Wilhelm. Harnack and Troeltsch. Two Historical Theologians. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Paulsen, Friedrich. The German Universities. Their Character and Development. Translated by Edward D. Perry. New York: Macmillan, 1895.
- Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck and the Development of Germany. The Period of Unification 1815-1871. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Pinson, Koppel. Modern Germany. Its History and Civilization. With a final chapter by Klaus Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1966 [1st ed., 1954].
- Rathje, Johannes. Die Welt des freien Protestantismus. Ein Beitrag zur deutsch-evangelischen Geistesgeschichte: Dargestellt an Leben und Werk von Martin Rade. Stuttgart: Ehrenfried Klotz Verlag, 1952.
- Renouvin, Pierre. The Immediate Origins of the War (28th June-4th August 1914). Translated by Theodore Carswell Hume with a Preface by Charles Seymour. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928 [1st ed., 1927].
- Ringer, Fritz. The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890-1933. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Ritter, Gerhard. The Sword and the Scepter. Vols. III-IV. Translated by Heinz Norden. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1972-73 [1st German editions, 1964, 1968].
- Rouse, Ruth, and Neill, Stephen Charles (eds.). A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967.
- Schwabe, Klaus. Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral. Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die politischen Grundfragen des Ersten Weltkrieges. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969.
- Shanahan, William O. German Protestants Face the Social Question 1815-1871. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954.

- Williamson, John G. Karl Helfferich 1872-1924.
Economist, Financier, Politician. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Williamson, Samuel R., Jr. The Politics of Grand
Strategy. Britain and France Prepare for War,
1904-1914. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1969.
- Wolff, Theodor. The Eve of 1914. Translated by
E. W. Dickes. London: Victor Gollancz, 1935
[1st ed., 1934].
- Young, Harry F. Prince Lichnowsky and the Great War.
Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press,
1977.
- Zahn-Harnack, Agnes von. Adolf von Harnack. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1951 [1st ed., 1936].