

Dangerous Power
An International History of German Unification, 1969-1993

Harold Mock
Augusta, Georgia

Bachelor of Arts, Georgia College, 2006
Bachelor of Science, Georgia College, 2006
Master of Arts, University of Virginia, 2008

A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Corcoran Department of History

University of Virginia
August 2017

DANGEROUS POWER

An International History of German Unification

1969-1993

Abstract

After 1945, achieving a peaceful unification of Germany remained a prospect as elusive as ending the Cold War itself. While overcoming national division remained but a distant and illusory hope, for Bonn, surmounting the Yalta-Potsdam system of Four Power control over Germany remained the more important ambition; with the 1945 machinery in place and with Soviet domination over half of Germany, no unification formula would be worth pursuing.

This study shows how, from 1969 onward, Bonn pursued a grand strategy that simultaneously accepted the limitations on West German sovereignty—through NATO, European integration, and the international nuclear weapons régime—and, by shaping those multilateral networks according to Bonn's own designs, used them to further West German interests within Europe. Across the political spectrum in the Federal Republic of Germany, politicians and policymakers reached a consensus that they must shape postwar arrangements and international organizations in a manner conducive to maximizing German peace, prosperity, and power.

This study tells the story of the Germans' bid to remake Europe in their own image, of their quest to reclaim their country's great-power status—albeit peaceably—and, most importantly, to be emancipated from their status as a defeated nation. The grand strategy that stands at the center of this story was never an ultimate plan for unification; it was an endeavor to overcome the machinery of 1945 laid down at Yalta and Potsdam.

It argues that, in their forty-year effort to contain German resurgence, Bonn's neighbors created precisely what they hoped to avoid: German hegemony over Europe. For a generation, nationally divided and deprived of their sovereignty, the West Germans exercised the only influence in international affairs that they could—by pressing for greater multilateral cooperation, for economic integration, and for military equilibrium in Europe. Across the last two decades of the Cold War, from 1969 to 1990, they fashioned the institutions that would outlive the east-west conflict altogether and would guide the European order into the next century. NATO, the international nuclear weapons régime, the European Union, European Monetary Cooperation, the G7, the CSCE—each originally a means of containing German power and wealth—had all been transformed into engines linking Germany to the world it once had sought to destroy.

Der Vergangene ist nicht tot;
es ist nicht einmal vergangen.
Wir trennen es vor uns ab und stellen und fremd.

—Christa Wolf, *Kindheitsmuster*

Contents

Figures	ix
Tables	x
Preface	xii
A Note on Conventions	xiv
Abbreviations and Acronyms	xvii
Bibliographic Abbreviations	xxiii
Introduction	Germany Among the Great Powers 1
Chapter One	A New Peace for Europe, 1969-1974 46
	“God Helps Only Those Who Help Themselves” 46
	An Exile Returned 52
	The Road to Oslo 56
	Brandt’s Vision 58
	Between Germany and Russia 63
	Inner-German Relations 68
	The Structural Security Problems of the Federal Republic, 1947-67 72
	The Opposition 81
	“Let’s Dare More Democracy” 87
	Creating a Union 88
	Redefining Political Legitimacy 94
	The Politics of Pessimism 96
	Globalizing Europe 104
	Thinking EC, Thinking NATO 110
	Brandt’s Unraveling 118
Chapter Two	Europessimism, Eurosclerosis, and the Cold War, 1974-1979 145
	Helmut Schmidt: A Life in Leadership 145
	Europe’s Leader 149
	Europe Rekindled 151
	The Architecture of Prosperity: Domestic 156
	The Architecture of Prosperity: International 161
	Adapting to the New Security Situation 171
	Dangerous Power: A Second World Power of the West 184
	The Limits of Alliance 188
	The Enduring Alliance 196
Chapter Three	Between Ideology and Pragmatism, 1979-1983 218
	NATO’s “Double-Track” Decision and the Collapse of the Elite Consensus 218
	The Strategic Role of Public Opinion 224
	Superpower Perfidy 229
	Decoupling: Holding Germany Hostage to U.S. Interests 232

	Deploying the Euromissiles	242
	A Parliamentary Coup	243
	Kohl Takes Office	250
	Conservative Change through Strength	254
	Dangerous Power: Finlandization	259
	Dangerous Power: A Nationalist Renaissance	263
	"The Europeanization of Europe"	266
	Nightmare and Memory	266
	"Dangers of the World Situation"	272
Chapter Four	Europeanizing the Divided Continent, 1983-1987	292
	Genius of the Present	292
	The Chancellor and His Circle	300
	Europe: A Slogan in Search of a Policy	307
	European Political Cooperation	311
	Revitalizing the Bonn-Paris Axis	314
	Achieving a Single Europe	319
	A Transatlantic Rift	324
	Inner-German Rapprochement	332
	A Red Star Rising in the East	338
	Germany Abandoned	341
	Getting to Zero	349
	Superpower Summitry	359
	A State of Penance	368
Chapter Five	Overcoming Europe's Military Imbalance, 1987-1989	393
	Diplomacy in the Shadows	393
	A Disarming Proposal	397
	The Right: A Crisis of the Leaders	401
	The Left: A Crisis of the Followers	409
	The Pacesetter	419
	The Second Zero	422
	The Strategic Situation	431
	Conventionalizing NATO's Defense	436
	A New Chapter in German-Soviet Relations	441
	Franco-German Mutual Containment	447
	Building a Common European Home	451
Epilogue	Dangerous Power and German Unification, 1989-1993	481
	Facing East: The Divided Nation	481
	Rending the Curtain	482
	A Revolution Within	491
	Vom Wende zum Ende	500
	Unification	506
Appendices		514

Figures

1.1	West German Federal Election Results, 28 September 1969	60
1.2	West German Federal Election Results, 19 November 1972	88
1.3	Heads of Government of the Major European NATO Countries, 1974-79	98
2.1	Defense Expenditures of the Major European NATO Countries, 1975	153
2.2	Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP in the Major European NATO Countries, 1975	154
2.3	West German Federal Election Results, 3 October 1976	159
2.4	Political Party Preferences of Labor Union Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1978	159
2.5	Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles in the U.S., Soviet Union, UK, France, and China, 1945-83	198
3.1	Soviet Naval Potential, 1968 and 1975	221
3.2	Strategic Nuclear Potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Pact	222
3.3	West German Attitudes toward INF Deployments, January 1983	230
3.4	West German Attitudes toward Unification on a Neutral Basis, 1978-81	241
3.5	West German Attitudes toward German Unification and World Peace, July 1982	241
3.6	West German Attitudes toward Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, October 1982	248
3.7	West German Attitudes toward Continuing Détente Policy, 1980	249
3.8	West German Federal Election Results, 5 October 1980	253
3.9	West German Federal Election Results, 6 March 1983	254
3.10	West German Attitudes toward European Integration and German Unification, January 1979	262
4.1	West German Attitudes toward Foreign-Policy Orientation, 1983	332
5.1	West German Federal Election Results, 25 January 1987	416
5.2	Land-Based NATO Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Warheads, 1979 and 1988	431

Tables

1.1	Monetary Growth and Inflation, 1974-89	107
1.2	Consumer Price Inflation in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s	108
1.3	Unemployment in the G7 Countries, 1967-82	109
2.1	Stagflation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-76	161
3.1	NATO Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1982	234
3.2	NATO and Warsaw Pact Nonnuclear Forces in Place in Europe, 1982	235
3.3	NATO Ground Forces and their Availability for the Central Region of Europe, 1983	236
3.4	NATO Resources Allocated to the Central Region of Europe, 1983	237
4.1	West Germany's Main Trading Partners, 1985: Exports	348
4.2	West Germany's Main Trading Partners, 1985: Imports	348
4.3	Proposals for an INF "Zero Solution": A Summary	372
5.1	U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1988	455
5.2	U.S. Theater Nuclear Forces, 1988	456
5.3	U.S. Nuclear Warheads in Europe, 1965-92	457
5.4	Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1988	458
5.5	Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces, 1988	459
5.6	British Nuclear Forces, 1988	461
5.7	French Nuclear Forces, 1988	462

Preface

This project has enjoyed generous support from many institutions, public and private, at home and abroad. Most notably, gracious funding from the Bradley Foundation provided for several extended stays in Europe and Britain and allowed me to delve deeply into the rich archival collections available. Likewise, grants and fellowships from the Berliner Kolleg Kalter Krieg, the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst, the Scowcroft Institute for International Affairs, the Bankard Fund for Political Economy, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation, the John Anson Kittredge Fund, and Texas A&M University all facilitated research in archives and libraries critical to this project. At the University of Virginia, the Corcoran Department of History, the Dean of the College and Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, the Vice President for Research, the Institute for Humanities and Global Cultures, the Buckner W. Clay Endowment for the Humanities, the Albert Gallatin Research Fellowship in International Affairs, and the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation all offered generous support. Funding from the Seven Society and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation allowed me to connect my teaching and research agendas and to find innovating and engaging ways of bringing this project into the undergraduate curriculum. Additional support from the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the German Historical Institute (Washington), the Cambridge German Studies Research Hub, the Auswärtiges Amt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, the Stresemann-Gesellschaft e.V., the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Rheinland-Pfalz Staatskanzlei, Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, and Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg enabled me to share my research with others, across the United States and Europe.

Dr. Johnson famously suggested that “a man will turn over half a library to make one book.” Alas, dozens of librarians and archivists on both sides of the Atlantic can attest to that truth. In Germany, I am grateful to the staff of the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amts and to Holger Berwinkel, who advised on sources, and Sonja Nicolaus, who provided assistance in the reading room. The staff of the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie were likewise gracious hosts, and I offer particular thanks to Sven Haarman, who arranged access to the Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt papers. Likewise, the staffs of the Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik and of the Deutsches Bundesarchiv kindly made Bonn and Koblenz a warm and hospitable place to spend a snowy winter.

In England, visits to the Bank of England Archive, to the Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives at King’s College, and to the British Library of Political & Economic Science at the London School of Economics were facilitated by gracious hosts. Andrew Riley at the Churchill Archives Center at the University of Cambridge helped to make my brief stay at Magdelene College a productive one.

In the United States, Bill McNitt and Helmi J. Raaska offered unparalleled assistance during my stay at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, as did Bert Nason and Kelly Barton at the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Presidential Libraries respectively. The George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas is a lovely place to research and write, and Rachael Medders helped to make my time there productive and fruitful. The staff and volunteers of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the U.S. Army War College exceeded the call of duty and assisted me in locating strategic and operational planning documents for the defense of western Europe, for which I am thankful. Likewise, Rebecca Hirsch at Yale University Library advised on access to the

Kissinger papers. Most importantly, my home institution boasts the finest librarians I ever have met. Anne P. Benham, Barbie Selby, George Crafts, and Keith Weimer have aided me in tracing down obscure texts and have never denied a request—though, at times, perhaps they should have.

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Schmidt granted permission to access his closed papers, as did the Hon. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. I acknowledge with deep gratitude their consideration.

This study has been enriched by the thoughtful criticism of many colleagues and fellow researchers, particularly Andreas Rödder, Peter Hoeres, Frédéric Bozo, Leopoldo Nuti, Gerhard L. Weinberg, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald Granieri, Andreas Lutsch, Mathias Haeussler, Stephan Kieninger, Björn Grötzner, Timothy A. Sayle, John Treadway, and Thomas J. Badey. In the earliest stages of this project, Carole Fink offered guidance on access to the German political party archives.

I am proud to have completed my doctoral studies at an institution where the standards for scholarship remain impeccably high, to have worn the honors of honor and to have graduated from the University of Virginia. U.Va. is among the very finest institutions in the world to study international history, given our traditions, our resources, our collections, and most importantly our community of eminent scholars. Students at the University are privileged to study with a distinguished faculty and the world's leading minds in international security, diplomacy, and finance. I am privileged to have enjoyed the riches of this University and to have read in European history and diplomacy at this fine and venerable institution.

Every Ph.D. candidate believes his own advisor is a great man; mine genuinely is. From my first days at Virginia and across multiple research projects, Stephen A. Schuker has remained a supreme mentor and advocate. His standards for scholarship remain impeccably high, as does his commitment to helping his students to meet those standards. I hope that the careful reader will identify his influence over this project, particularly its reliance on multi-archival research in meeting the evidentiary burden. I am grateful that in my first extended visit to an archive, Steve Schuker and Lisa Glaser worked adjacent to me. He is a genuine master of his craft a true *Doktorvater*.

William I. Hitchcock patiently abided my many questions and read my manuscript with care. He helped me to take a long view and to think strategically. He is an equally gifted scholar and teacher, and his example has shaped my own approaches to my work. Melvyn P. Leffler is an exemplar of historical scholarship, a tough critic and a generous advocate. With so many demands on his time, he never ceases to support his students. This project began in a file folder labeled "Conversation with Mr. Leffler," and I hope he finds that this dissertation does that legacy credit. Allen C. Lynch, though he joined this project in its later stages, remained a generous reader. A contemporary to many of the actors in this story, he urged me to recapture the human dimensions and to grapple with the inertial suspicions of players on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

My time at the University of Virginia has been enriched by many conversations and studies with Manuela Achilles, the late Lenard R. Berlanstein, Alon Confino, the late Elisabeth Glaser, H. C. Erik Midelfort, Joseph C. Miller, Karen V. H. Parshall, and Philip D. Zelikow.

Likewise, my depth of affection for my alma mater, Georgia College, can scarcely be recorded here. More than anyone else, Martha L. Keber shaped my thinking as a professional historian. She helped me to understand the rich tapestry of human endeavor and folly that is European history; she challenged me methodologically and impressed upon me the importance of serious engagement with archival material. She helped me to answer my own research questions with care and precision. As an educator, I aspire daily to her example. In her own writing, on Bréton émigrés and French colonial settlers, or in her lectures, she inspires a supreme sense of historical empathy. A generation of students have, with Dr. Keber as their professor, lazed in the splendor of Versailles, stormed the fields with Wellington's cavalry, grown fearful in the heart of darkness, sheltered from the Blitz, and marched with Gandhi to the sea; I count myself privileged to be among their number.

Similarly, Lee Ann Caldwell, from my first days as a student, mentored me and gave selflessly of her time, energy, and expertise—even while her own scholarship and administrative duties proved demanding. Every student should be so fortunate to have such an advocate, and every historian should have such a committed and careful scholar critique his work.

Robert J. Wilson, III first introduced me to the wit and wisdom of Jefferson. More importantly, he helped me to see that all history is local and imparted a supreme appreciation for the delicate interconnection of politics and culture. His energy and enthusiasm for his craft and his willingness to set aside his own plans to read the work of his students distinguishes him among the very best in our profession.

I am especially grateful to Henry T. Edmondson, III, Veronica Womack, Mike Digby, Larry Elowitz, Doris C. Moody, and John E. Sallstrom for their enduring support.

A Note on Conventions

This study offers an international history of German unification. Those terms, however, are not without complication. Strictly speaking, neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the German Democratic Republic enjoyed full sovereignty as independent states.^{*} Thus, neither state ever completely asserted its own prerogatives within European or international affairs, instead remaining legally subject to the victors of the Second World War. Still, paradoxically, the Bonn régime largely drove international affairs in western Europe across the second half of the Cold War. The legal mechanisms of German division notwithstanding, this study treats the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign actor in diplomatic affairs, relying on the contemporaneous logic of Bonn's own officials during the 1970s and 1980s: by accepting the limitations on West German sovereignty, Bonn could shape Europe's multilateral networks to overcome the weaknesses imposed on it.

Additionally, the terms "unification" and "reunification" caused difficulties in 1989 and 1990, though their complications have faded since the Cold War's end. In the absence of a peace treaty, by the victors' logic, the Third Reich had endured, subject to Four-Power control. "Reunification" implied a renewed German state within its borders of December 1937, including the vast territories east of the Oder-Neiße line ceded to Poland and the Soviet Union in 1945. By contrast, "unification" implied a united Germany within the territories of the two states of the Bonn republic and the GDR. In English, the two terms were used interchangeably until 1989; after Helmut Kohl laid out his ten-point program for "reunification" to the Bundestag, however, "unification" became the preferred English term. Similarly, in German, *Wiedervereinigung* ("reunification") was replaced by the less precise phrase *deutsche Einheit* ("German unity"). The French literature has followed somewhat the same formula, though with less aversion to the term *réunification* than one finds in German or English.[†]

^{*} During the negotiations preceding the 1954 Paris Agreements, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer secured the revocation of the Occupation Statute and the dissolution of the Allied High Commission in exchange for Bonn's defense contribution to the western alliance and a commitment of the U.S., UK, and France to the nominal sovereignty for the Federal Republic. The same convention, however, reaffirmed "the rights and responsibilities" of the three powers "relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement" and to "the stationing of armed forces in the Federal Republic." See Detlef Junker, "Politik, Sicherheit, Wirtschaft, Kultur und Gesellschaft: Dimensionen transatlantischer Beziehungen," in *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945-1990: Ein Handbuch*, vol. 1, 1945-1968, ed. Detlef Junker (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 28-30; and "Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, 26 May 1952, as Amended by Schedule I of the Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Régime in Germany, Signed at Paris, 23 October 1954," in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, ed. U.S. Department of State (Washington: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985), 425ff.

Similarly, though the Soviet Union attributed "full sovereignty" to the German Democratic Republic in March 1954, as the western Allied High Commission quickly noted, Moscow retained "effective control" over East German affairs and politics. In the absence of free elections, no sovereignty existed. See the Statement by the Soviet Union (25 March 1954) and the Declaration of the Allied High Commission (8 April 1954) in *Documents on Germany*, 418-19.

The Federal Republic of Germany gained its full sovereignty when the Final Treaty with Respect to Germany, signed in 1990, was fully ratified in March 1991.

[†] SPD foreign-policy spokesman Karsten Voigt, for instance, when asked to assess the prospect for reunification, corrected his interviewer: "I don't like to speak about *re*-unification, because we are not talking about going back to an old state of affairs." See his interview with Michael Lucas, in "Germany After the Wall," *World Policy Journal* 7, no. 1 (Winter 1989-90), 206. For clarifications on terminology, see Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton, and Stephen Twigge, *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, ser. 3, vol. 7, *German Unification, 1989-1990* (New York: Routledge, 2010), ix; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 182; and James A. Baker, III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 162-63.

Historians likewise have avoided the term “reunification.” Strictly speaking, the two German states never reunified; instead, the Federal Republic absorbed its eastern neighbor. Furthermore, “unification” encompasses the social, economic, and cultural reconfigurations in German life after 1989.

Even the names of the two German states had been politicized by the Cold War. The respective governments referred to themselves as the Federal Republic of Germany (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*) and the German Democratic Republic (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik*), and each claimed an exclusive mandate (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*) over the entire German people and nation. Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain avoided the shortened “West Germany” and “East Germany” preferred by English and French speakers. Instead, they relied on the long-form titles that implicitly substantiated the mythologies of their respective states. As has become common in the historical literature, however, and given the English preference for the simpler terms, the shorthand “West Germany” and “East Germany” appear in this study synonymously with the long-form names.[‡] Additionally, capitals and place names are used metonymously with governments or corporate bodies, *e.g.*, “Bonn” referring to the West German Federal Government (*Bundesregierung*), “Quai d’Orsay” referring to the French Foreign Ministry, “Downing Street” referring to the Government of the United Kingdom, and so on.

All data involving federal elections in the Federal Republic of Germany are drawn from the official record of the Federal Returning Officer (*der Bundeswahlleiter*). Data on elections to the Länder parliaments are drawn from the appropriate Land returning officers.

Nuclear weapons figure prominently in this study. Despite the vast technical jargon surrounding nuclear strategy, such terms of art are minimized in the text, with specific data and explanations provided in figures, tables, notes, and appendices.

Weapons and their delivery vehicles are typically divided into two classes: strategic and tactical. *Strategic* weapons are the forces configured according to preconceived strategic objectives against the adversary. Such weapons include the nuclear warheads delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles, by submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and by long-range heavy bombers; fractional-orbital bombardment systems (banned under SALT II); and anti-ballistic missile systems. By contrast, *tactical* weapons are those intended for use in the theater of battle, including air-dropped free-fall bombs and glide bombs, air-to-surface missiles and air-to-surface stand-off missiles, air-breathing cruise missiles, shorter-range surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles, artillery, depth charges, torpedoes and rocket torpedoes, atomic demolition munitions, and ocean mines. Tactical nuclear forces have also been referred to as theater forces, non-strategic forces, and sometimes as pre-strategic forces, each term offering its own nuance among diplomats, defense strategists, and arms-control negotiators.[§]

‡ M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

§ *Military Applications of Nuclear Technology*, pt. 2, Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, 93rd Congress (22 May, 29 June 1973), p. 3; Milton Leitenberg, “Background materials in tactical nuclear weapons (primarily in the European context),” in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives*, ed. SIPRI (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), 3-4; and Amy F. Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” CRS Report RL32572 (23 February 2015).

Strategic weapons typically carried payloads of higher yield and garnered greater destructive power, while tactical weapons were smaller and designed for battlefield adaptability. Particularly in the American mind, strategic weapons were understood as those designed to strike the adversary's homeland; they represented the essence of deterrence. Tactical weapons were the means of opposing the Warsaw Pact without fielding vast conventional armies; they represented the surrogate for American manpower in Europe. Such generalizations were formed early in the Cold War, when the U.S. and Soviet Union stood alone as the world's nuclear powers and when the West Germans remained utterly dependent upon the United States for their protection. By the late 1970s and the 1980s, however, categorizations that adhered to the U.S. strategic-tactical dichotomy caused strain in the transatlantic relationship. "Indeed, I personally resent a terminology that calls weapons that kill Americans 'strategic' and weapons that kill only Poles or Germans 'tactical,'" remarked Helmut Schmidt in 1985.**

More precisely, however, weapons are classified according to the missions they serve. This study proceeds in that understanding and takes care to explain the relevant information of pertinent weapons systems and strategic planning.

Counter military potential (CMP) is calculated as follows:

$$\text{CMP} = \frac{\text{Yield}^{2/3}}{(\text{CEP})^2}.$$

Circular error probable (CEP) identifies the radius of a circle around a target within which there is a fifty-percent probability that a weapon aimed at that target will fall.^{††}

In nuclear weapons, equivalent megatonnage (EMT) is calculated as follows:

$\text{EMT} = Y^{2/3}$, where Y = nominal yield in megatons. One megaton produces the energy equivalent of one million tons of TNT and is equal to 4.18×10^{15} joules.

In figures and tables, the following general conventions are used:

- Part of unit is detached [referring to warheads].
- + Unit reinforced.
- ε Estimated.
- n.k. Not known.
- .. Information is not available.
- () Data are uncertain or estimate based upon available data.
- Nil or not applicable.

Metric units apply in all illustrations unless otherwise noted. Standard metric abbreviations are used throughout. Ranges for weapons delivery systems and ranges and radii of action for naval vessels and aircraft are given in kilometers, not in nautical miles.

** Helmut Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West: The Anachronism of National Strategies in an Interdependent World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 35-36.

†† This study relies on the conventions set forth by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. See IISS, *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London: IISS, 1988), 219.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A2/AD	anti-access/area-denial [weapon]
AA	Foreign Office (FRG) Auswärtiges Amt
ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile
APO	extra-parliamentary opposition Außerparlamentarische Opposition
ASBM	air-to-surface ballistic missile
ASROC	anti-submarine rocket
ASW	anti-submarine warfare
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BdV	Bund der Vertriebenen
Benelux	Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
BFA	Federal Expert Committee (FRG) Bundesfachausschuß
BfV	Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (FRG) Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
BMVg	Federal Ministry of Defense (FRG) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung
BND	Federal Intelligence Service (FRG) Bundesnachrichtendienst
BPA	Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (FRG) Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bundespresseamt
C³	command, control, and communication
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CBMs	confidence-building measures
CCCP	Central Committee of the Communist Party
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (FRG) Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CEA	Atomic Energy Commission Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (France)
CEP	circular error probability
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [Treaty]
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CINCEUR	Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command (serves concurrently as SACEUR)
CMP	counter-military potential
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CO	Cabinet Office (UK)
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Совет Экономической Взаимопомощи
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ČSSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Československá socialistická republika

CSU	Christian Social Union (FRG) Christlich-Soziale Union
CVP	Christian People's Party of the Saarland Christliche Volkspartei des Saarlandes
DDR	German Democratic Republic Deutsche Demokratische Republik
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
DKP	German Communist Party Deutsche Kommunistische Partei
DM	Deutsche Mark (FRG)
DMI	Directorate of Military Intelligence (UK)
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS	Democratic Party of the Saar (Saarland) Demokratische Partei Saar
EC	European Communities European Community*
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMS	European Monetary System
END	European Nuclear Disarmament
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EMT	equivalent megatonnage
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERM	European Exchange Rate Mechanism
ERW	enhanced radiation weapon
EU	European Union
EUA	European Unit of Account
EUCOM	United States European Command
EUR	Bureau of European Affairs (U.S. Department of State)
EUR/RPM	Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs (U.S.)
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FDP	Free Democratic Party (FRG) Freie Demokratische Partei
FDP/DVP	Free Democratic Party-Democratic People's Party (Baden-Württemberg) Freie Demokratische Partei/Demokratische Volkspartei
FFA	French Forces in Germany <i>Forces Françaises en Allemagne</i>
FOFA	Follow-On Forces Attack

* "European Communities" refers to the three principal international organizations of early European integration: the European Coal and Steel Community (est. 1951), the European Economic Community (est. 1957), and the European Atomic Energy Community (est. 1957). Together, the three constituted the European Communities, though, in English, by the 1960s, the term *European Community* entered colloquial usage. After the 1967 Brussels Treaty entered into force, the three institutions were governed under a single council and single commission. In this study, focused on the period after 1969, uses "EC" to refer to the "European Community."

FOST	Strategic Oceanic Force (France) Force océanique stratégique
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany Bundesrepublik Deutschland
FRGNATO	Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
G7	Group of Seven
GDP	gross domestic product
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
GMS	Strategic Missile Task Force (France) Groupement de Missiles Stratégiques
GRU	Main Intelligence Directorate (Soviet Union) Главное разведывательное управление
GSPE	European Parliament Socialist Group Groupe socialiste du Parlement européen
HM	Her Majesty's
HVA	Main Reconnaissance Administration (GDR) Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IFR	in-flight refueling
IISG	International Institute for Social History (The Netherlands) Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
IOC	initial operational capability
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRRI	Royal Institute for International Relations (Belgium) Institut royal des relations internationales
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.)
KAL	Korean Air Lines
KGB	Committee for State Security (Soviet Union) Комитет государственной безопасности
KoKo	Bureau of Commercial Coordination (GDR) Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung
KPD	Communist Party of Germany Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
KPS	Communist Party of the Saar Kommunistische Partei Saar
KSČ	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Komunistická strana Československa
kt	kilotons
LRTNF	long-range theater nuclear forces
M	Mark (GDR)
MAD	mutually assured destruction

MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [†]
MC	Military Committee (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
MdB	member of the Bundestag Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages
MIRV	multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
Mk	mark or model number [for munitions/warheads]
mod.	modified/modification [for munitions/warheads]
MP	member of Parliament
MPT	Multilateral Preparatory Talks [for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]
MSBS	sea-to-ground strategic ballistic [missile] mer-sol-balistique-stratégique
Mt	megatons
MRV	multiple [but not independently targetable] re-entry vehicle
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group (NATO)
NSC	National Security Council (U.S.)
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PD	Presidential Directive
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism (GDR and FRG) Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus
PPS	Policy Planning Staff (U.S. Department of State)
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSYOP	psychological operation
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza
RADAG	radar area guidance
RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
REP	Republicans (FRG) Die Republikaner
RyAN	Operation: "Nuclear-Missile Attack" (Soviet Union) Ракетно-ядерное нападение
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (U.S.)
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative

[†] "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions" (MBFR) became the standard Western title for the Vienna conference. The official terminology for the negotiations was the "Conference on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe," the phrase used more commonly in Eastern bloc documents and writing. Delegations from the communist bloc objected to "MBFR," taking issue with characterizing the goal of their bloc-to-bloc talks as seeking "balance" between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

SED	Socialist Unity Party (GDR) Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin Sozialistische Einheitspartei Westberlins
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
SNF	short-range nuclear forces [‡]
SNLE	ballistic missile submarine (France) <i>Redoutable</i> -class submarine sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins
SP	self-propelled [for weapons delivery vehicles]
SPD	Social Democratic Party (FRG) Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SPG	Special Planning Group (U.S. National Security Council)
SPS	Social Democratic Party of the Saarland Sozialdemokratische Partei des Saarlands
SRAM	short-range attack missile
SSBN	ballistic missile submarine
SSBS	surface-to-surface strategic ballistic [missile] sol-sol balistique stratégique
Stasi	Ministry for State Security (GDR) Ministerium für Staatssicherheit
SUBROC	submarine rocket
TASM	tactical air-to-surface missile
TASS	Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union Телеграфное агентство Советского Союза
TEL	transporter-erector launcher
TERCOM	terrain contour matching
TNF	theater nuclear forces
UDF	Union for French Democracy (France) Union pour la Démocratie Française
UDR	Union of Democrats for the Republic (France) Union des Démocrates pour la République
UE	unit equipment
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKNATO	Joint Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America
USIA	United States Information Agency
USNATO	United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Союз Советских Социалистических Республик
WEU	Western European Union

[‡] Some American documents, namely the files of the National Security Council staff during the George Bush administration, abbreviate “strategic nuclear forces” as SNF, defying the conventional usage. To avoid confusion, such references have been corrected or clarified in the notes.

WP	Warsaw Pact
WSI	Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut
ZK der KPdSU	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
	Das Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion
	Центральный комитет Коммунистической партии Советского Союза

Bibliographic Abbreviations

To aid the reader in locating and accessing archival and manuscript sources cited here, full documentary citations are given at first reference, including record groups, divisions, subdivisions, boxes, and folders. Subsequent references to archival materials in the same box or folder use catalogue number abbreviations. To aid the reader in identifying potential bias in official documents, where available, appropriate security classifications have been retained.

Bibliographic Abbreviations

AAP	<i>Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland</i>
ACDP	Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik
ACSP	Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik
AdL	Archiv des Liberalismus
AdsD	Archiv der sozialen Demokratie
AGG	Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis
BA	Deutsches Bundesarchiv
BA-DDR	Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Deutsche Demokratische Republik
BA-MA	Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Militärarchiv
BA-SAPMO	Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR
BEC	<i>Bulletin of the European Communities</i>
BGBI	<i>Bundesgesetzblatt</i> (FRG)
BoE	Bank of England Archive
BPA	Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung
BPI	<i>Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung</i>
BStU	Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
CA	The Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project
DBPO	<i>Documents on British Policy Overseas</i>
DDRS	Declassified Documents Reference System
DNSA	Digital National Security Archive
DzDP	<i>Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik</i>
EBB	electronic briefing book
ECBA	European Central Bank Archives
FAZ	<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>
FOI	Freedom of Information Law (UK)
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act (U.S.)
FRUS	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i>
GB-PL	George Bush Presidential Library
GPO	Government Printing Office (U.S.)
GRF-PL	Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
HA-DB	Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
JC-PL	Jimmy Carter Presidential Library

LHCMA	Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London
LoC	Library of Congress (U.S.)
LSE	British Library of Political & Economic Science, London School of Economics
MemCon	memorandum of conversation
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (U.S.)
NA-UK	National Archives of the United Kingdom
NSA	[files of the] National Security Advisor (U.S.)
NSA-GW	National Security Archive, The George Washington University
PAAA	Politisches Archiv und der Historische Dienst, Auswärtiges Amt (FRG)
PHP	Parallel History Project
PPP	<i>Public Papers of the Presidents</i>
PREM	records of the Prime Minister's Office
RR-PL	Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
SGM	Seely G. Mudd Manuscripts Library, Princeton University
TelCon	memorandum of telephone conversation
TzDP	<i>Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik</i>
UL	University of Liverpool, University Library
WH	[files of the] White House (U.S.)
WHORM	White House Office of Records Management (U.S.)
WOD	Western Organisations Department (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office)

Germany Among the Great Powers An Introduction

The German Armed Forces on land, at sea, and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally, and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious powers. . . . Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now and hereafter be imposed on her.

—Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the
Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers
5 June 1945¹

The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their declarations that only peace will emanate from German soil. . . . The French Republic, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America hereby terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole . . . and all related Four Power institutions are dissolved.

—Treaty on the Final Settlement
with Respect to Germany
12 September 1990²

I.

This study has its origins in a question posed by Helga Haftendorn, the eminent historian of European security policy, in the conclusion to her interpretive history of modern German foreign relations, *German Foreign Policy: From Self-Restraint to Self-Assertion*: “How were the two German states able to overcome their ‘triple-bind’: the legacies of German history, their dependence on the Four Powers, and the constraints of the East-West conflict?” she asks. “How was Germany able to bring about its reunification and become a respected partner in the international community of nations?”³ Haftendorn contends that the answer lay in both German states’ penchant for transforming liabilities into

opportunities. In west and east, from 1945 through the end of the Cold War, both Bonn and East Berlin gradually recovered their capacity for political action by accepting “the system of structural dependencies that had evolved on the European continent” and by shaping the multilateral networks that grew up around those systems.⁴ In short, neither state could change the rules of the game, but each could play the game better than its allies—and often better than the two superpower hegemons.

Haftendorn’s interpretation, the latest in a small but distinguished literature on German foreign policy, prompts a number of important questions.⁵ How did a nation, conquered and broken, divided and dispirited, recover political and economic preeminence in Europe? More specifically, accepting Haftendorn’s assertion, what common vision united German policymakers in their efforts to shape Europe’s international order? Were those efforts merely adaptive to circumstance, or did they represent a common strategy for reasserting German leadership on the continent? Most importantly, how were those efforts perceived by Germany’s neighbors in west and east?

This study sets out to reconcile the paradox of Germany’s division with the power it ultimately wielded in European affairs, in the transatlantic community, and in world financial markets. Institutions once designed to contain German power—NATO, the Western European Union, the international nuclear weapons régime, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—ultimately came to be dominated by Bonn. Arrangements intended to harness German wealth—the EC, European monetary cooperation, the G7—ultimately facilitated the Federal Republic of Germany’s benign hegemony over western Europe.

This study offers a dual claim. First, it argues that, from 1969 onward, Bonn pursued a grand strategy that simultaneously accepted the limitations on West German sovereignty—through NATO, European integration, the nuclear weapons régime, and others—and, by shaping those multilateral networks according to Bonn’s own designs, used them to further its own national interests in Europe.⁶ With the rise of the Social Democrats’ new eastern policy in the late 1960s, West German politicians of the left and right, united in the two axioms of postwar German foreign policy—“never alone” and “never again”—pursued such a strategy to overcome the “system of stopgap measures” laid down at Yalta and Potsdam.⁷ Across the political spectrum in the Federal Republic of Germany, politicians and policymakers reached a consensus that, though limited in their sovereignty, they must shape postwar arrangements and international organizations in a manner conducive to maximizing German peace, prosperity, and power. That powerful state at the heart of Europe, wedged between the two superpowers and commanding the vast lot of the continent’s natural resources and wealth, represented an inherent danger to the existing international order.⁸ The key to Bonn’s grand strategy was to pursue equilibrium between east and west by leading simultaneous efforts toward détente and balanced forces and to devise policies that would grant the Federal Republic freedom of action without provoking anxieties among its neighbors.

But their neighbors *did* experience anxiety; a resurgent Germany, which economically eclipsed friends and enemies alike, unnerved officials on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This study secondly argues that perceptions of Germany as dangerous to European peace and stability represented a proxy about the structure and durability of international order itself.⁹ Much has been written about the constructed peace that evolved in Europe

between 1945 and the 1960s.¹⁰ A stable international system in Europe emerged not simply by balancing American power against Soviet power, but by taming the complex German problem. By singularly forbidding German access to nuclear weapons, the western allies assuaged the greatest Soviet security problem; by protecting the Federal Republic of Germany through NATO and American-controlled nuclear weapons, the alliance simultaneously solved the greatest western security problem. Western Europeans enjoyed a relatively stable peace through the NATO system, which in the words of the alliance's first secretary-general, proved capable of "keep[ing] the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."¹¹ The story of keeping the Germans down does not end there, but much of the historical scholarship does. As this study demonstrates, from the late 1960s through the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s, the French, the British, and the Americans all actively sought to contain German hegemony, both economically and politically, in Europe, taking a step further than earlier concerns about a resurgence of German militarism or nationalism. All the while, their apprehensions about German power actually represented concerns about the stability and durability of the international system itself. Had they built a system that would endure? Were transatlantic and European institutions, namely NATO and the EC, stable enough to contain German power, to sustain European prosperity, and to maintain western security?

By 1993, as the Maastricht Treaty on European Union entered into force, Europeans could clearly answer "yes." The grand strategy to overcome Yalta and Potsdam had positioned the Germans to end the Cold War within existing western institutions and as stable and trusted partners to their neighbors. Berlin maintained a firm reliance on multilateral networks and had renounced any vestige of unilateralism (*national*

Alleingänge). Continuing the prudent practices of “calculability” (*Berechenbarkeit*) that had guided the divided nation through the Cold War, the Germans aimed for safe predictability in all of their foreign dealings. And, though no longer strictly necessary, burdened by “fifty years of an unhappy history,” the Germans maintained their habit of respected self-restraint.¹² The constellation of international institutions and arrangements endured, and Germany fixed itself within them.

II.

Answering those questions, this study tells the story of the Germans’ bid to remake Europe in their own image, of their quest to reclaim their country’s great-power status—albeit peaceably—and, most importantly, to be emancipated from their status as a defeated nation. The grand strategy that stands at the center of our story was never an ultimate plan for unification; it was an endeavor to overcome the machinery of 1945 laid down at Yalta and Potsdam.

When the Big Three—U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin—met at Yalta in February 1945, the Nazi collapse was clearly in sight. Hitler’s Germans still resisted mightily, as the Anglo-Americans cut through the Ardennes in the west and the Red Army seized Pomerania and neared Greater Berlin in the east. Preparing for the Nazis’ imminent surrender, negotiators readied for Germany’s partition into occupation zones, still holding out the ultimate possibility of “the complete dismemberment of Germany”—according to Stalin, a measure “requisite for future peace and security.”¹³ They agreed to extract reparations from the

Germans through forced labor and by expropriating industrial equipment, ships, rolling stock, and investments.¹⁴

Six months later, Hitler's Reich lay in ruins. Amid the devastation of postwar Berlin, the allies converged on a nearby Hohenzollern palace to finalize details for terminating the war and for taking control of conquered territories. "Chaos and suffering" had been made "inevitable," they agreed; their top priority was "to convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves."¹⁵ Since Roosevelt's death in April, Harry S. Truman had risen to the presidency, and midway through the conference, Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee replaced Churchill as chief British negotiator when the Tory party lost the general election. Stalin abided the newcomers with a "quiet and practiced, if not somewhat puzzled," countenance, still pressing for maximum punishment of the Germans and for enduring security guarantees against the German menace.¹⁶

Together, the two Allied Powers conferences of 1945 represented a series of fateful improvisations that, contrary to what anyone expected, hardened into seemingly immovable features of international politics: Yalta froze in place the power realities and interests as they existed in the winter of 1945, and Potsdam codified them with legal status.¹⁷ The essential formula provided for German dismemberment and occupation to last until a peace treaty could be concluded between the conquering powers and a future German government. Only with such a treaty would Germany regain its full sovereignty, but, in order for such a peace settlement to be concluded, "a government adequate for the purpose" must first be established.¹⁸ And, in order for the Germans to produce such a government, the conquering Allies must first agree on how such a government would be

legitimately chosen.¹⁹ The final structure, enshrined in the Potsdam Agreement, confirmed that the allies harbored competing agendas for the future of Germany.²⁰ It also bound them together indefinitely—or at least until they could agree on the proper disposal of the conquered nation. It made the national question, eventual reunification, and German sovereignty contingent upon mutual agreement by the victorious powers; until then, the precarious status quo would remain in place.²¹

This was the system that Bonn's strategizing was meant to overcome. West Germany's first postwar chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, obsessed relentlessly over the Yalta and Potsdam machinery. "Bismarck spoke of his nightmare of coalitions against Germany," Adenauer explained. "I have my nightmare too: its name is Potsdam."²² Surviving on "borrowed strength" from the conquering powers proved frustrating, as did Germany's permanent status as a shuttlecock between the superpowers. But the realities both of Cold War politics and of Bonn's dependence on the west made the scheme all but permanent. The only way to undo the arrangement would be through a peace treaty. In Bonn, consistently from Adenauer until Kohl, every West German chancellor assigned reunification (in some form) a lower priority than overturning Potsdam. With the 1945 machinery still in place and with Soviet domination over half of Germany, no unification formula would be worth pursuing.

Meanwhile, the German Democratic Republic, from its founding until its collapse, viewed the Potsdam arrangement as validating its very *raison d'être*. GDR chiefs consistently praised the Potsdam Agreement as the basis for peace in Europe; they cited it, alongside the UN Charter, as the fullest embodiment of "the will of the peace-loving peoples of Europe."²³ "The Soviet Union unswervingly adheres to the peace-loving and democratic

principles of Potsdam,” Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin advised the American president. “To this we are committed by our sacred duty.” In their dealings with Bonn too, neither Soviet nor East German diplomats ever missed an opportunity to lecture officials on their privileges “as states of the anti-Hitlerite coalition.” “In view of the absence of a peace treaty,” the Potsdam arrangements, “which carry the force of the basic international obligations . . . of the former Reich which signed the act of unconditional surrender of Germany” comprised the “legal basis” of Soviet-West German relations. Until the surrender was accompanied by a peace treaty, “nothing can diminish, weaken, or change the international relations” of Germany.²⁴

Overcoming Yalta and Potsdam did not necessarily mean achieving German unification. As this study shows, for most of the Cold War, German reunification remained but a distant and illusory prospect, and for Bonn, surmounting the Yalta-Potsdam system remained the more important ambition. In 1959, speaking with Adenauer, American journalist Walter Lippmann asked the chancellor if German reunification was possible. “If now by a miracle Germany would be reunited,” Adenauer responded, “tensions in the world would remain as they are.”²⁵ Talk of reunification took on an increasingly perfunctory character as the decades passed.²⁶ Though the western allies often described unity as the essential precondition for overcoming the division of Europe and the Yalta-Potsdam framework, West German leaders understood such statements for what they were—diplomatic niceties but hollow pledges.²⁷ Willy Brandt believed that “‘reunification’ became the indispensable lie (*Lebenslüge*) that characterized the second German republic.”²⁸ Future Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, a month before the Berlin Wall opened, advised Hessians to “shut up about reunification.”²⁹ West German officials regularly eschewed reunification

talk for fear of raising unrealistic hopes among their people or provoking anxiety among their allies. Historian Jost Düllfer summarized this perspective: “We pursue reunification in the long run, but unfortunately it cannot, even must not be on the agenda for everyday politics, because that would lead to foul compromise.”³⁰ German unification remained a prospect as elusive as ending the Cold War itself.³¹

Overcoming the Yalta-Potsdam system then meant recovering Germany’s great-power status quietly, passively—and, perhaps, slyly. Emancipation from Four-Power control required policies of prudence and balance. Bonn officials needed to demonstrate that West Germans remained contrite for the Nazi war of aggression. They needed to nurture a political culture that was forward-looking and sanguine without being irreverent or amnesic. They needed to avoid constant reminders of their country as a menace to European peace but also needed to demonstrate a keen awareness of their violent past and their peculiar national development. West Germans needed to show that the Federal Republic was inextricably woven into the fabric of a secure and peaceful Europe. They needed to participate in shaping Europe’s security régime and accept U.S. protection through extended deterrence, all the while resisting NATO’s Flexible Response posture, which had the potential to provoke protracted conventional war on German soil or to invite decoupling between U.S. and West German interests.³² They needed to establish economic preponderance within Europe so to be indispensable to the western economy and to maintain bargaining power behind the Iron Curtain. They needed to shape their own destiny without giving the appearance of any changes to the status quo. In fact, they needed to demonstrate such an incontrovertible commitment to the status quo that their allies would never abandon them for an independent resolution to the German question. Simultaneously, they needed to

behave as equal partners and push, when appropriate, for an arrangement that would transcend World War II and the Yalta-Potsdam arrangement. Though seemingly impossible, they needed to conclude a peace treaty with Germany's erstwhile enemies.³³

Only in September 1990 was such a treaty signed—for Germans, the legal end of the Second World War. The victors of 1945—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France—recreated the state they had destroyed at the end of the conflict, and the tangled thicket of Yalta-Potsdam arrangements was cleared away. One month later, on October 3rd, the two German states' own negotiations for unification entered into force, and the Länder of the former GDR—Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, and the city-state of united Berlin—became coequal states in the Federal Republic of Germany.

From the present, those two separate processes—overcoming Yalta-Potsdam and achieving German unification—appear congruent and coterminous. The popular symbols and familiar mythology of 1989-90 have allowed the latter to overshadow the former. The momentous events of unification seemed to reaffirm western tropes of freedom and to offer a positive trajectory of German history: after centuries of defying the perceived norms of western parliamentary liberalism with “revolution from above” (*Revolution von oben*), a popular *Revolution von unten* had pushed for freedom and for an end to German division. But the fateful events of 1989 and 1990—neither the peaceful celebrations at the Berlin Wall on November 9th nor the Day of German Unity on October 3rd—would have been possible without Bonn's decades-long efforts to integrate Germany into the multilateral networks of Europe and the transatlantic community. Willing partners took ten months to

negotiate German unity; reluctant partners took more than four decades to agree to overturn the Yalta-Potsdam régime.

III.

To undermine the Yalta-Potsdam régime required removal of the sources of Europe's instability. The constructed peace two decades in the making—an arrangement which forbade a nuclear Germany, thus satisfying Soviet interests, and which protected Germany with American nuclear weapons, thus satisfying NATO interests—could not last forever. The 1945 régime constituted a clear “historical anomaly,” indeed a “predicament,” but it also would require the collective and concerted action of all Europeans—east and west—to overcome. “We must understand that [any changes] cannot on any account be brought about by unilateral German action,” warned Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt in 1969. To overcome the status quo, “we must understand that it will only be possible for Europe to be restored if this is desired by both superpowers, *and* by all our eastern and western neighbors, *and* by our nation itself (both parts of it).” The Soviets and the Americans, the eastern Europeans and western Europeans, the Ossis and Wessis, all needed to believe that an integrated Europe and effective multilateral institutions could replace Four-Power control. “We must learn to put ourselves in the shoes of others,” Schmidt wrote.³⁴ Power realities and security impulses of each player must be weighed and respected, and any new arrangement needed to provide more stability and security than the current one—in Schmidt's estimation, increasingly “peculiar” and unsustainable.

Why was the Yalta-Potsdam arrangement precarious—Schmidt calling it “unnatural and containing the seeds of danger”? In short, because it represented a hasty improvisation

that had accidentally been made permanent—Europe’s entire security apparatus hinged on mutual dissatisfaction and institutionalized insecurity. In the intervening decades, the pronounced disequilibrium between East and West Germany was clearly leaving the Soviets frustrated and perhaps perceiving greater threats than before: “it is a distinct source of tension, of anxiety,” Schmidt wrote, “lest someone try to change it by force, and . . . lest it lead to war.”³⁵ That is what Bonn’s grand strategy needed to address; beginning with a new eastern policy, it needed to assuage Soviet angst and demonstrate that a West German state, woven into the fabric of both western and eastern Europe, was better than any alternative. “The status quo in Europe,” Schmidt argued—“the fact that Europe and Germany continue to remain divided”—is “a consequence of the peace-preserving strategy of equilibrium between the two superpowers.” But what had staved off tensions in the 1950s and 1960s may exacerbate tensions in the 1970s and 1980s.

The turning point came in 1969, when the Social Democrats formed a government for the first time in forty years. When Brandt took office that October, he and his cabinet confronted a vastly reconfigured strategic landscape for their country: In 1967, NATO had codified its new Flexible Response doctrine, beginning a slow divergence between Bonn and its allies over nuclear defense; the following summer, negotiators concluded the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reaffirming West Germany’s non-nuclear status and institutionalizing U.S. extended deterrence over the Federal Republic; a month later, twenty-six Warsaw Pact divisions subdued an uprising in neighboring Czechoslovakia, demonstrating yet again Moscow’s willingness to abuse its socialist comrades in order to preserve the Yalta status quo.³⁶ The Social Democrats had won office largely owing to their promise to redefine the east-west conflict and to mitigate the symptoms of the Cold War in Europe; the

transformations in European politics seemed to offer unprecedented opportunity for West Germans to redefine their role in world affairs and to reopen the German problem.

As chapter one shows, the new government brought a fresh worldview to Bonn politics, informed by its unique assumptions on German historical development and by its suppositions about trends in world affairs.³⁷ Most centrally, the anachronistic notion of Germany as an eternally defeated country needed to be overcome.³⁸ “A German peace treaty lies at the heart of everything,” asserted the new government; “the German problem is the one major residual problem of the Second World War.”³⁹ Chancellor Willy Brandt took a step further, believing that Bonn should lead Europe toward adopting a post-national approach to international politics wherein the countries of Europe would cede much of their sovereignty to the EC.⁴⁰ Brandt and his new government believed they faced a world in which “bipolar hegemony had been replaced by polycentrism,” no longer “oriented round the twin poles of Washington and Moscow.”⁴¹ In this polycentric world, the West Germans must pursue a strategy for a return to balance-of-power politics and to reclaim their status as one of the great powers of Europe.

The cabinet’s erudite defense minister, Helmut Schmidt, authored the new government’s “grand strategy” for this new polycentric era—a “strategy of equilibrium.”⁴² While Brandt remained the political power behind the new policies, Schmidt represented the singular intellectual force behind the long-term grand strategy that ultimately ended the Cold War on terms favorable to West Germany. *Equilibrium*, premised on a return to balance-of-power politics in Europe, called for “security by military balance and security by détente.”⁴³ Western and eastern perceptions of Germany as dangerous or unpredictable could be assuaged by (1) military balance at the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic

levels and by (2) fixing the Federal Republic within robust international institutions—NATO, the EC, the European Monetary System, and the Helsinki network. Schmidt took a systemic view toward inter-European relations, believing that each player needed to perceive more reward from remaining a part of the system than by seeking to overturn it.⁴⁴ He understood that absolute security for any country would result in absolute insecurity for all the others and that a general European settlement required each state, east and west, to enjoy “fair compromises.”⁴⁵ “Only thus can we harmonize different national goals into one common strategy.”⁴⁶ And, though “the means available to the Federal Republic [were] severely limited,” Schmidt conceded, only Bonn could devise such a “grand strategy (*Gesamtstrategie*) for the west”; only Germany, the original source of Europe’s instability, could correct the weaknesses of the European system. Schmidt understood as much and believed his country must pursue a collaborative western grand strategy that would integrate Europe, overcome Yalta-Potsdam, and defuse Cold War tensions.

When he became chancellor in his own right in the spring of 1974, as chapter two demonstrates, Schmidt continued the equilibrium strategy. “The world seemed largely satisfied with the division of Germany,” he observed; “paradoxically, it was far less content with the division of Europe.”⁴⁷ By linking the two, largely through German economic preponderance, he worked to make German wealth and leadership essential to Europe’s future. In the late 1970s, Schmidt led the creation of the European Monetary System and leveraged West German wealth to lead western recovery from economic and monetary crises. “The west,” he believed, “[had] the institutions it needs, if it would only use them effectively.”⁴⁸ Such a resurgence in German power did not go unnoticed in Moscow, and to assuage Soviet anxieties, Bonn needed to reduce Soviet perceptions of Germany as an

economic or military threat—achieved by continuing Brandt’s Ostpolitik and by leading the west’s efforts toward arms-control.⁴⁹ Such efforts, he found, became considerably more complicated as the western allies reenvisioned their defense strategies for Europe and worked to retool NATO’s nuclear arsenal—a struggle that came to symbolize the German question in the final decade of the Cold War.

Nearly ten years had passed since NATO had adopted its new Flexible Response strategic concept. Rather than immediate and overwhelming nuclear retaliation against Warsaw Pact aggression, as had been the policy of Massive Retaliation in the early Cold War, Flexible Response promised “a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression.” Put simply, the alliance hoped to resolve any conflict at the lowest possible level of violence while still maintaining the ability to escalate as required by Soviet aggression. The alliance needed a strategic doctrine that simultaneously could reassure allies, deter aggressors, and prove operationally feasible. While Massive Retaliation certainly buoyed European confidence, its deterrent quality had waned, and it altogether lacked battlefield usefulness. Flexible Response corrected the imbalance: it deterred Soviet aggression and laid out a feasible order of battle from initial defensive operations through general nuclear war.⁵⁰ The complication, however, proved to be the doctrine’s ability to reassure the nonnuclear allies—namely the West Germans, whose trust in extended deterrence was being taken for granted.

To the West Germans, the consequences of NATO’s new posture mattered little in the years after the transition from Massive Retaliation, particularly as the east-west détente and major arms-control negotiations promised to mitigate the symptoms of the Cold War

conflict altogether. By the mid-1970s, however, the strategic calculus had changed; détente had taken on a theatrical quality, barely masking the renewed east-west tensions, and arms-control talks had devolved into litigious exercises of disinformation. Meanwhile, the Warsaw Pact had achieved strategic parity with the west, surpassing NATO's quantitative nuclear superiority. A succession of hardships between Bonn and its allies caused the West Germans to question the endurance of the U.S. commitment to their country. Did Bonn and Berlin really enjoy protection on equal terms with Washington and New York if the Americans could terminate Soviet aggression at lower costs?

On that question depended the answer to the German question and the future of the Yalta-Potsdam régime. Nuclear weapons had stabilized an otherwise volatile international system in the early Cold War because the American nuclear guarantee to West Berlin and the Federal Republic simultaneously assuaged both western and eastern security concerns. Though American assurances to western Europe theoretically remained absolute, the transition to Flexible Response clearly was reshaping the strategic balance. The U.S., under both Carter's and Reagan's leadership, vacillated between policies of confrontation and coexistence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and a decade of inchoate foreign policy from Washington had caused the West Germans to become more assertive in their own foreign politicking and more strong-willed in determining the alliance's future nuclear posture—one that would guarantee German security without antagonizing eastern suspicions.

The interallied dispute over nuclear forces and strategic posture became inextricably entangled with the German question, both in political circles and in popular discourse, until 1989. As chapter three shows, West Germans faced a nadir in transatlantic relations between 1979 and 1983 during the so-called euromissiles dispute. While many have treated

the conflict over the nuclear deployments as the cause of transatlantic rift during the 1980s, as this study shows, it represented but a symptom of Bonn's frustrations in achieving its designs for a more integrated Europe and for multilateral institutions ultimately capable of replacing Four-Power control.

Ever so reluctantly, Helmut Kohl, who inherited Schmidt's design when he took office in 1982, continued the elder statesman's strategy. Unlike either of his predecessors, Kohl did not necessarily come to office with a coherent foreign-policy program; instead, he adapted his thinking to suit his emotional and ideological commitment to a united Germany within an integrated Europe.⁵¹ As demonstrated in chapter four, though his Christian Democratic Party had long opposed Ostpolitik—at least officially—Kohl believed that he could work actively and directly with both Washington and Moscow to arrive at a better solution than the Yalta-Potsdam order.⁵² Furthermore, he believed he could negotiate directly with the East German régime to secure "humanitarian improvements that would ease the dour lives of its subjects and make the Wall more permeable"—what one commentator identified as a policy of "relaxation through reassurance."⁵³ In a radical departure from the consuetudes of Bonn politics, Kohl spoke unabashedly and often of German unification, sometimes obscuring West German dissatisfaction with the Yalta-Potsdam apparatus. It was, in the end, Kohl's adherence to this decades-old strategy of equilibrium, along with his deft tactical maneuvering in the autumn of 1989 and winter of 1990, that overcame the machinery of Four-Power control, concluded a final peace treaty, and provided for German unification on terms negotiated between two German states themselves.

Chapter five analyzes the last paroxysm of Bonn's nuclear debate, including the perception in West German policy circles that the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty of 1987 had actually

decreased their country's security and left them exposed between east and west.

Simultaneously poor relations with Washington and with Moscow redoubled Bonn's interest in pressing toward European integration and toward a special security community with the French. Among their allies, the West Germans' popular reticence to upgrade theater-based nuclear missiles in their country was being perceived as disloyalty to the transatlantic alliance and as a neonationalist assertion of Germany's rights in international affairs. Rather, it remained, as it had for more than a decade, an effort from Bonn to convince their allies—namely the United States—to pursue comprehensive arms-control with the Soviet Union and to include all classes of weapons, including the sub-strategic forces not provided for in the 1987 treaty.

Meanwhile, beyond the Iron Curtain, revolutionary events had been unfolding. Since his rise to power in the spring of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev had been hailed as a popular hero; after just a few years of his leadership, the people had witnessed the demise of the Stalin orthodoxy that continued to dominate the Kremlin. In the GDR, while no popular Gorbachev-style leader emerged, the people gathered in protest across the spring and summer of 1989, pressing for their own “openness” and “restructuring.” The events of 1989 raised many questions in the west and touched off tremendous debate in Bonn. Some, such as veteran foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, believed “it would be a mistake of historic dimensions” not to seize on this moment. “Let us take Mr. Gorbachev seriously,” he urged; “Let us take him at his word!”⁵⁴ Others, including West Germany's former defense minister and NATO's new secretary-general, Manfred Wörner, wondered “whether it is only an attempt to gain time and create more room for maneuver” on the part of the Kremlin.⁵⁵ At the very least, however, western leaders could agree that an opportunity lay before them

for a lasting détente between East and West Germany—an essential dimension of the equilibrium strategy, which had consistently proved a challenge. Furthermore, popular desire for reform may help touch off new and lasting arms-control balancing between east and west. The epilogue tells this story, as well as the story that eclipsed those early concerns when the Berlin Wall opened on November 9th—the negotiations to end the Yalta-Potsdam system altogether, for the Federal Republic of Germany to absorb the eastern Länder, and for the GDR to dissolve.

As the Cold War ended, West Germany's grand strategy of equilibrium had positioned Bonn to assert its own interests, to integrate the eastern Länder on its own terms, and to exploit the influence West Germany had gathered within Europe's multilateral networks to assert its benign hegemony over the continent. On September 12, 1990, the Four Powers ceded the rights and responsibilities their armies had won in 1945 back to the German people. Across the coming four years, the occupation forces would depart German soil. In the absence of mutual threat, the nuclear debate, which had raged on for more than a decade, subsided. Just as importantly, efforts toward European integration continued apace. In the end, Germany's weakness had become its strength; the series of structural dependencies built across the decades to contain German power had become the ties linking German wealth, stability, and security to the Europe it had integrated.

IV.

Who were the men and women who devised and executed this grand strategy? Naturally, the political leaders of the West German state figure prominently. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Chancellors Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl led

successive governments fundamentally committed to working within the Yalta-Potsdam framework with an ultimate aim of altogether overcoming the system. They united in a consensus that the German problem remained unfinished business. Though they came from different parties and shared few ideological precepts in common, the three men generally approached the German problem with the same mindset: the west needed to view overcoming the Yalta-Potsdam régime as a fundamental component of European integration, and the east ultimately needed to see resolution to the German question as preferable to the status quo. Bonn need no longer remain the passive object of the unfinished peace, they believed; West Germans could seize control of their own destiny and take the lead toward concluding a final peace treaty.⁵⁶

Europe's security architecture had been laid down to punish the Germans for their past, to assuage fears of them in the present, and to prevent their resurgence in the future. Understanding that burden, each of those men worked to overcome perceptions of the German danger in Europe. Brandt saw the need to overcome perceptions of his country as dangerous through a wholesale "conquest of the past." "We are no longer dangerous because of our war-lust and our pigheadedness," he explained. "What is dangerous, though, is the position our nation has gotten into and in which it is being kept by short-sighted political power interests. Getting out of this position by peaceful means," he warned, "will constitute the stern moral test of our people."⁵⁷ Brandt's successor, Schmidt, worried not about the national past, but about the present. We are experiencing an "unintentional and dangerous climb to the second world power of the West in the consciousness of other governments"—both east and west—Schmidt warned.⁵⁸ International suspicions toward Bonn could awaken renewed resentment toward the German question, historical and

contemporary, and ultimately serve to isolate the Federal Republic within the multilateral networks critical to West German foreign policy. The Germans, Schmidt believed, thus needed to assuage the anxieties of their neighbors, striking a balance between self-restraint and assertiveness.⁵⁹ Kohl, the chancellor of German unification, focused on the future. “Our country is divided, but the German nation endures,” he explained. “Through our own strength (*Kraft*), we Germans cannot change this state of affairs, but we must make [our country] more tolerable and less dangerous.” Only by reshaping “the peaceful order in Europe,” Kohl believed, “will the German people regain their unity in free self-determination.”⁶⁰

Beyond the broad contours of this grand strategy—that the German question could be answered by reshaping European institutions—its execution, and thus its operational scope, fell to the men and women of Germany’s civil service, its central bankers, and the political parties. Across the 1950s and 1960s, postwar European politics had facilitated the emergence of a transnational network of internationally-minded public servants and technocrats. These were the professional civil servants, whose tenures often survived the political vicissitudes of the age and whose purpose remained largely apolitical. Along with central bankers and central planners, they often worked within ad hoc transnational networks of their counterparts in other European governments. These informal channels deepened to become indispensable mechanisms of each country’s foreign policy and proved critical to European integration.⁶¹

At the other end of the spectrum, serving a purely political function, were the permanent staffs of West Germany’s political parties—the planners, pollsters, and public relations men—who, within West Germany’s culture suspicious of powerful central

leadership, exercised tremendous power in the Länder and in federal politics.⁶² The political parties of West Germany play a particularly important role in this study. By the mid-1980s, they had come to exert unprecedented influence over their country's foreign policy, often convening working groups with the like-minded parties in western Europe and conducting direct negotiations with the single-party régimes in the Eastern Bloc.⁶³ By the middle of that decade, a thoroughgoing crisis was afoot in West German politics in which each of the major political parties—the Social Democrats, the Christian Democratic Union, Bavaria's Christian Social Union, the Liberals, and the Greens—sometimes independently, sometimes in coalition with the others, pursued their own foreign-policy platforms separate from the Foreign Office and outside usual diplomatic channels. In 1990, eight months before unification, those trans-party connections provided the basis for the two German states' political integration.

V.

This study is foremost a study in grand strategy. As Hal Brands has noted, “grand strategy” is “one of the most slippery and widely abused terms in the foreign-policy lexicon.”⁶⁴ A steady proliferation of texts have poured forth from English presses in recent years, all claiming to offer authoritative grand-strategic interpretations of some historical moment. In hindsight, a persuasive prosaist can recast any series of improvisations, sharing no underlying theoretical calculus, as grand strategy—*post hoc ergo propter hoc*.⁶⁵ “Strategic coherence,” in the estimation of U.S. President Bill Clinton, is “largely imposed after the fact by scholars, memoirists, and ‘the chattering classes.’”⁶⁶ Certainly commentators have labored apace, each hoping to make his own unique mark on thinking

in grand strategy.⁶⁷ Brands identifies such approaches as “quixotic” and even “pernicious,” yielding only “confused or superficial” interpretations.⁶⁸ Too frequently, writers “muddle or obscure what they mean to illuminate.”⁶⁹ This study rejects such trends in the literature.

Most authors in the Anglo-American tradition rely on the well established taxonomy laid down by Edward Mead Earle and subsequently refined by Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart and Sir Michael Howard, among others. *Strategy*, writes Earle, “is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.” *Grand strategy*, Earle argues, “is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.”⁷⁰ In the postwar years, Liddell Hart pressed for the systematic application of grand strategic thought to peacetime diplomacy, and Howard simplified the war-peace nexus to argue that grand strategy involved the correlation of wealth, allies, and public opinion to achieve a state’s objectives, whether in peace or war.⁷¹ Most of the English-language literature has since relied on some carefully rephrased iteration of those three classical definitions.

The German tradition, however, makes little use of the grand strategy concept. Proceeding in the logic of Clausewitz, German writers typically rely on a broad concept of *Strategie*, normative approaches that calibrate political will and national resources, leveraged both in war and in peace.⁷² They eschew notions of a *Gesamtstrategie*, an English phrase and English concept that has not gained currency in the German literature—largely owing to the many shades of meaning and nuance already embodied in the German usage of *Strategie*. Historically, the German tradition has adhered more closely to the original

military connotations of the word, referring to “that which is the purview of generals.”

Clausewitz’s acolyte, for instance, Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, who served both as a professor in the Prussian Staff College and as an attaché to Field Marshal Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, identified strategy simply as the “operational (*operativ*) elements in war.”⁷³

The division between wartime and peacetime strategic thought was compounded by Field Marshall Helmut Graf von Moltke the Elder, chief of the Prussian General Staff, who jealously guarded the purview of the command staff against incursions by diplomats, statesmen, and even the Kaiser himself; in wartime, the generals remained “completely independent” of politics, Moltke asserted.⁷⁴ Such ideas, broadly construed, guided Prussian-German strategic thinking from the nineteenth-century wars of unification through the Nazi downfall in 1945.⁷⁵ The postwar experience of *Strategie* in Germany largely proved one of “situational culture,” in the phrasing of political scientist Werner Weidenfeld—an aim “to keep the present safe and stable.”⁷⁶ The notion of a fully-integrated grand strategy, *à la* Meade or Liddell Hart in the Anglo-American tradition, integrating the full range of the state’s economic resources, diplomatic leverage, and military assets, has proven a foreign concept to German strategic culture.

Defying the lot of twentieth-century German strategic thought, then, was Helmut Schmidt, the architect of Bonn’s “grand strategy for the west.” Schmidt had been an avid reader of Clausewitz; of France’s Raymond Aron and André Beaufre; of Britain’s Alastair Buchan; of America’s Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, Albert Wohlstetter, and Thomas Schelling; of the Soviet Union’s Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky.⁷⁷ Informed by a rich literature and unlike his German contemporaries, Schmidt specifically employed the phrase *Gesamtstrategie* and called for a reinterpretation of German strategic thought that moved

beyond “the classical military concepts of the past.” *Strategy*, he insisted, must be “something on a higher plane than ‘the doctrine of the employment of armed conflict to fulfill the aims of war.’”⁷⁸ “As I see it,” he wrote, “strategy does not come into a purely military category, but also into a foreign or world-political category: it is, therefore, not a matter for generals (though it can assign tasks to generals) but for governments.” Brandt echoed such a sentiment, arguing that “he who conducts his foreign policy as a function of military strategy will remain a prisoner of the vicious cycle of atomic armaments”; political imperatives must dictate military planning and not the other way round.⁷⁹

Grand strategy, Schmidt asserted, “involves a state marshaling all of its resources to achieve a given end.”⁸⁰ A grand strategy, he believed, must be pursued in concert with others; such had been the success of Metternich and the failure of Bethmann-Hollweg. Strategic thinking should include economics, social science, and psychology; it is “a complex of political decisions, partly simultaneous and partly successive, which are aimed in sum at fulfilling the objective set by policy in accordance with a specific plan”; it is “the advanced calculation of states’ actions and the factors affecting those actions.”⁸¹ Purely “national strategies are anachronistic in our present-day world,” Schmidt told an audience in 1985.⁸² Just as a strategy must be coherent conceptually, it must be “cohesive” among its executors as well. In his own country, for instance, Bonn must so integrate its interests and wealth into the wellbeing of its neighbors that no one ever again would question Germany’s commitment to peace.

Grand strategies are not so much prescribed as they are discovered. The structures of international politics largely determine a state’s ability to pursue its interests. Just as a statesman cannot move the oceans or level mountains to improve his country’s geostrategic

position, he cannot alone overcome decades or even centuries of power realities in the international system.⁸³ Schmidt and those who united in the pursuit of his strategic vision—Brandt, Kohl, Scheel, Genscher, Wörner, Georg Leber, Hans Apel, Rupert Scholz, Gerhard Stoltenberg, Herbert Wehner, Egon Franke, Rainer Barzel, Heinrich Windelen, Dorothee Wilms—understood as much, some perhaps more reluctantly than others.⁸⁴ “Recognition of realities instead of desperate clinging to illusion, rational recognition of the possibilities instead of displays of emotional voluntarism, and—in general—preparedness to face the real facts—all these things are necessary if our will to peace is to prevail,” Schmidt asserted.⁸⁵

Among the vast English-language literature purporting to reinterpret some “grand strategy” during the Cold War, Schmidt’s language and logic sets this study apart. As defense minister, as economics and finance minister, as chancellor, and as the grand old man of West German politics, Schmidt specifically outlined a *Gesamtstrategie* for his country, built a consensus around its tenets, and pursued it relentlessly across decades. He used the phrases “strategy” and “grand strategy” in his own writing and speaking and worked to marshal public and political support for his ideas. Among contemporaries—though they may have found him occasionally severe or difficult, and though (as cabinet minister) he clearly served at the pleasure of Chancellor Willy Brandt—Schmidt was regarded as the genius behind continental integration and the author of a new vision for Europe. “No single man has done more to create this new intellectual climate in German politics than Helmut Schmidt,” opined Britain’s Denis Healey (later the Lord Healey) in 1971.⁸⁶

As Marc Trachtenberg has observed, the greatest liability of studying grand strategy “is that it places a premium on a certain kind of intellectualizing”—theorizing about the nature of international politics, which many public officials necessarily avoid on a day-to-day basis.⁸⁷ Explicitly articulated scholarly theories seldom guide foreign policymaking. As the French diplomat chided U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright when the latter proposed a new American initiative for the Middle East: “That’s all very well in practice, Madame, but how will it work in theory?”⁸⁸ Many more grand strategies have been dreamed up in think tanks and universities than in the corridors of power, and while poring over dog-eared translations of Clausewitz may satisfy the Protestant sensibilities of many inventive and enterprising students of “strategy,” the task set the historian is to understand the past in its own terms, not to impose one’s own *ex post facto* agenda upon historical actors. We can only measure explicitly articulated strategies against their ensuing successes and failures.

Schmidt explicitly rooted his strategy in particular intellectual assumptions about the nature of international politics. He understood in both scholarly and practical terms the so-called “security dilemma” of international relations theory, the nature of “balance-of-power” politics, and the diverse traditions of western strategic thought. “By a combination of persistence and realism,” outlined by Schmidt and carried out by him along with Brandt, Kohl, and others, West Germany could realize this grand strategy—to overcome the Yalta-Potsdam machinery through European integration and by shaping international politics through the multilateral forums available to Bonn officials.

VI.

What then of the German Democratic Republic? Critics will insist that this study has not done justice to the East German state, which is treated here more as an object of international affairs than as a subject. While this study does rely on archival and manuscript materials from the former GDR, it considers East German politics and culture only insofar as (1) they impelled historical change in the Federal Republic, or (2) they determined the scope of the final peace settlement in 1990. The GDR's economic crisis, for instance, is detailed here, as are Egon Krenz's abortive reform plans in 1989; East Berlin's complicated foreign relations—determined largely at Moscow's behest—are not. This is, after all, a study of Bonn's grand strategy to dismantle Yalta and Potsdam. The East German régime would never willingly sacrifice the 1945 settlement—its very *raison d'être* and its only claim to legitimacy in international affairs.⁸⁹

"How did you go bankrupt?" asks Bill in Ernest Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises*. "Two ways," Mike told him. "Gradually and then suddenly."⁹⁰ Mary Elise Sarotte has drawn the same conclusion regarding the political bankruptcy of the German Democratic Republic. How did the Berlin Wall open? Gradually and then suddenly.⁹¹ Dismantling the Yalta-Potsdam framework took decades of measured diplomacy; dismantling the East German régime took only a few weeks. This is not to dismiss the bravery of the hundreds of thousands of East Germans who voted with their feet across the autumn and winter of 1989-90. After all, in the end, it was the workers and farmers of the GDR whose hands pulled apart the Berlin Wall on the evening of November 9th; it was the Ossis who faced off against the pervasive state security apparatus outside of Leipzig's Nikolaikirche, who filled East Berlin's Alexanderplatz with their cheers of "We are one people," who breached the gates to free Berlin at the Bornholmer Straße crossing, and who opened the wall forever.

That story of freedom's hour has been rendered expertly by Andreas Rödder, Mary Elise Sarotte, and Wolfgang Jäger, among others.⁹² The brilliant diplomacy that ended the Cold War peacefully and with virtually no bloodshed has been documented by Werner Weidenfeld as well as in Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice's unparalleled study.⁹³ This study focuses on the gradual rather than the sudden.

Ronald J. Granieri has cautioned historians of modern Germany against losing sight of the "individual histories" of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.⁹⁴ The people of each state necessarily developed their own societies, cultures, mentalities, national mythologies, and imagined futures.⁹⁵ To treat the two states uniformly or to presume an equal share of responsibility for ending the Cold War constitutes historical folly. Much of the literature on the end of the Cold War has nonetheless privileged outlooks that reinforce tropes of liberalism; thus, authors place the two German states side by side for comparison. Such interpretations, however, confuse the causes of the Cold War's end with the causes of its long duration. These authors—perhaps innocently—establish a false equivalence between the two German states that distorts historical reality. As Granieri observes, "some events did have distinct trajectories, and to force them into a comparative format can either blur distinctions or create false dichotomies." In 1990, Germany's peaceful unification on western terms resulted clearly from Bonn's and Washington's skillful tactical maneuvering within a strategic framework designed decades earlier. By 1989, the GDR's population was shrinking and represented only a quarter of West Germany's total population. While East Berlin commanded a dysfunctional economy and decrepit infrastructure, Bonn presided over one of the world's largest and most prosperous economies and managed a gross national product more than five times that of East

Germany. While Bonn maintained virtually no foreign debt, the East Germans shouldered more than \$20 billion in external liabilities.⁹⁶ In the end, both legally and practically, the Federal Republic simply absorbed the rump East German state. To place the two states side by side obscures that historical reality.

VII.

This study draws its title from Rudolf Augstein, one of West Germany's finest, if not most controversial, journalists. On the eve of the Berlin Wall's opening, he reminded his readers in *Der Spiegel* of Victor Hugo's words: "Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come." "We can modify it," Augstein suggested: "'Nothing is more *dangerous* than an idea whose time has come.' And we can modify it further: 'Nothing is more *dangerous* and more *powerful* than an idea whose time has come.'"⁹⁷ The idea: Germany could be free to determine its own national future, absolved from the Yalta-Potsdam régime and free from Four-Power interference. The danger: after decades of division, Germany was poised to reshape the European status quo and the transatlantic order; institutions once designed to contain German power had been overtaken and dominated by Bonn and facilitated the Federal Republic of Germany's benign hegemony over Europe.

But the perception of danger neither began nor ended there. Just as the European state system had grown up around the fragmentary Reich, the stability of postwar Europe relied on Germany's division and its institutionalized insecurity between east and west.⁹⁸ Thus, endemic to the German problem was a sense that Germany was somehow extra-European. As Klaus Hildebrand has shown, historically, the *disorganization* of Germany

correlated to the *orderliness* of the European state system (*Staatensystem*)—in perception and often in reality.⁹⁹ That is, Europe’s peace and prosperity depended upon Germany’s weakness and fragmentation. Much of Bonn’s Cold War diplomacy revolved around those two competing, and seemingly incompatible, impulses: retaining Europe’s orderly framework while still (eventually) uniting the two Germanys and consolidating German power and interests.

Though Germany was a country *perpetually in danger*, its European neighbors still perceived it as *perpetually dangerous*. Even at the end of the Cold War, notions of a united Germany as harmful to European interests persisted. “There was—and still is—a tendency to regard the ‘German problem’ as something too delicate for well-brought-up politicians to discuss,” opined Margaret Thatcher. “This always seemed to me a mistake. . . . Germany is by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Europe.”¹⁰⁰

But, in that spirit and in their forty-year effort to contain German resurgence, Bonn’s neighbors created precisely what they hoped to avoid: German hegemony over Europe. For a generation, nationally divided and deprived of their sovereignty, the West Germans exercised the only influence in international affairs that they could—by pressing for greater multilateral cooperation, for economic integration, and for military equilibrium in Europe. Across the last two decades of the Cold War, from 1969 to 1990, they fashioned the institutions that would outlive the east-west conflict altogether and would guide the European order into the next century. NATO, the European Union, European Monetary Cooperation, the G7, the CSCE—each originally a means of containing German power and wealth—had all been transformed into engines linking Germany to the world it once had sought to destroy.

Germany Among the Great Powers: An Introduction

1. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers, 5 June 1945, in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1985), 33.

2. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990, in *American Foreign Policy Current Documents Documents, 1990* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1991), 354.

3. Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung, 1945-2000* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001); later translated and revised as *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). Haftendorn figures as the dean of German foreign-policy historians; her study has become the standard text on German foreign policy in the postwar period.

4. Haftendorn identifies such an approach—"regaining sovereignty by deliberately giving up some sovereign rights"—during the early years of the Federal Republic, as the "Adenauer method." See her *Coming of Age*, pp. 2, 403ff, and ch. 1. Scott Erb offers a complementary interpretation, reviewing the history of German foreign policy in light of the politics of the early 2000s. See his *German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

5. Historical scholarship has mirrored the political realities in the historiography of postwar German foreign policy. Scholarly treatments have vacillated between self-restraint and self-assertion, and historians focusing specifically on Bonn's and East Berlin's foreign relations remain few in number. For general treatments on West German foreign relations, see Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Jäger, and Werner Link, *Republik im Wandel: Die Ära Brandt, 1969-1974* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1986); Manfred Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 1999); Christian Hacke, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen?* (Berlin: Ulstein, 1997); Klaus Hildebrand, *Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition, 1963-69* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1984); Peter Graf Kielmansegg, *Nach der Katastrophe: Eine Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland* (Berlin: Siedler, 2000); Ulrich Lappenküper, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949 bis 1990* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008); A. J. Nicholls, *The Bonn Republic: West German Democracy, 1945-90* (London: Longman, 1997); Peter G. J. Pulzer, *German Politics, 1945-1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Gregor Schöllgen, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Beck, 1999); Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen*, vol. 2, *Deutsche Geschichte vom "Dritten Reich" bis zur Wiedervereinigung* (Munich: Beck, 2000); and Edgar Wolfrum, *Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006). For a specific treatment of East German-West German relations, or so-called *Deutschlandpolitik*, see Heinrich Potthoff, *Im Schatten der Mauer: Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1999). For a central text on the GDR's foreign policy, see Joachim Sholtyssek, *Die Außenpolitik der DDR* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003).

6. Haftendorn, *Coming of Age*, 6. Haftendorn's own assessment is that Bonn effectively hoodwinked its allies into following West German leadership. The Federal Republic "learned to present [its] own aims and goals in a manner which Germany's partners could accept as theirs," she argues.

This argument militates against the logic of realist theory. Kenneth N. Waltz has argued that "no state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained." The West German government, however, from Adenauer to Kohl, specifically sought to constrain itself within the structures of transatlantic and European stability. They recognized that their country stood to gain more by investing in the institutions of their own containment. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), 91.

7. On “never alone” and “never again,” see Hanns Maull, “Außenpolitische Kultur,” in *Deutschland Trendbuch: Fakten und Orientierungen*, ed. Karl-Rudolf Karte and Werner Weidenfeld (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2001), 645-72; and Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands außenpolitische Verantwortung in einer interdependenten Welt* (Stuttgart: Robert-Bosch-Stiftung, 2000), 28. On “stopgap measures,” see Klaus Hildebrand, “‘System der Aushilfen’? Chancen und Grenzen deutscher Außenpolitik im Zeitalter Bismarcks,” in *Flucht in den Krieg? Die Außenpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland*, ed. Gregor Schöllgen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 108-31.

8. Hans-Peter Schwarz has written on Germany’s centrality in Europe—literally and figuratively—noting the stabilizing role it plays. See his “Die Zentralmacht Europas auf Kontinuitätskurs: Deutschland stabilisiert den Kontinent,” *Internationale Politik* 54, no. 11 (1999): 1-10.

9. For an early American assessment, see Thomas L. Hughes to Dean Rusk, “Western Europe Looks at Germany: Research Memorandum,” 6 August 1965; Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, available in Declassified Documents Reference System, doc. No. CK3100383557.

10. Marc Trachtenberg has written the definitive account on European security in the postwar period. See his *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Among the other central contributions on the institutions of postwar stability, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (Lexington: Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1984); and Timothy Andrews Sayle, *NATO’s Crisis Years: The End of the Atlantic Mystique and the Making of Pax Atlantica, 1955-1968*, Ph.D. diss, Temple University, 2014.

Additionally, for more specialized treatments, see Stephen Artner, *A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and NATO, 1957-1961* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985); Mark Cioc, *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany during the Adenauer Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jeffrey Glen Glauque, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and the French from the Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Ludolf Herbst, ed., *Westdeutschland, 1945-1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986); William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Timothy Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981); David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Olav Riste, ed., *Western Security: The Formative Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Hermann-Josef Raupieper, *Der besetzte Verbündete: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1949-1955* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991); Georges-Henri Soutou, *L’alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996* (Paris: Fayard, 1996); and Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri, and Frédéric Bozo, eds., *La France et l’OTAN*, rev. ed. (Brussels: A. Versaille, 2012).

11. The Lord Ismay, private meeting of Tory backbenchers, 1949; quoted in Peter Hennessy, *Whitehall* (London: Pimlico, 2001), 412.

12. See Haftendorn, *Coming of Age*, 6 and 399. On German *Berechenbarkeit*, for instance, see Clay Clemens, *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik* (Durham:

Duke University Press, 1989), 242; and Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 3-4.

13. Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, 11 February 1945, *FRUS: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1955), 978.

14. Across the next two years, the Red Army occupiers carted off German heavy industry from their zone, much of which simply rusted on Soviet rail cars, all in an effort “to ensure that Germany is permanently weakened.” Record of meetings between Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and M. Joseph Stalin, 16-20 December 1941; NA-UK, PREM 3/394/3; Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 115; Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 155-56 and 243-46. On reparations generally, see Bruce Kuklick, *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

15. Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin [Potsdam] Conference, 1 August 1945, *FRUS: The Conference at Berlin, 1945*, vol. 2 (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1960), pp. 1478-98. From the British side, see *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, ser. 1, vol. 1, *The Conference at Potsdam, July-August 1945*.

16. St. James’s Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 12 November 1950, quoted in Costigliola, *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances*, 363.

17. As Carole K. Fink has observed, forty-five years of controversy followed Yalta; behind “its civilized and amicable façade,” she notes, lay but “a series of momentous improvisations.” Obscured by the language of democracy and human rights enshrined in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the Yalta conference laid bare the shrewd and calculated interests of a new great-power directorate. Three victors divided the spoils of war among themselves, punishing Germany and carving up the world in pursuit of their competing ideologies and ambitions. Frank Costigliola takes a less generous view of the negotiators, citing British diplomat Alexander Cadogan’s assessment that “the Great Men don’t know what they’re taking about.” Writes Costigliola: “Shaping outcomes were not only exhaustion, illness, and aging, but also confusion, misunderstanding, and trauma.” Carole F. Fink, *Cold War: An International History* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2014), 43; Costigliola, *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances*, 237. From Cadogan, see David Dilks, ed., *Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M., 1938-1945* (London: Cassell, 1971), 704.

In general terms, the Potsdam Conference involved three competing conceptions for world order. Soviet negotiators hoped for a spheres-of-influence peace, which would validate Moscow’s grip over eastern Europe and Stalin’s aim to establish a buffer zone of socialist states between the USSR and Germany. British negotiators hoped to restore a balance of power and to remain a weighty part of that balance; they hoped to retain their country’s geopolitical reach and, more immediately, to secure a massive loan from the Americans. The Americans brought the most complicated agenda to Potsdam. The historical consensus largely holds that Roosevelt, before his death on 12 April 1945, was willing to concede a measure of Soviet influence over eastern Europe. Truman however, infused with the confidence of America’s successful atomic-weapons test in New Mexico the day before the conference convened and fearful of the Soviets’ long-term ambitions, aimed for more concessions from Stalin—often with less tact than his predecessor. “I gave them an earful,” he wrote to his wife. “I reared up on my hind legs and told ‘em where to get off and they got off.” Quotation from Harry Truman in Robert H. Ferrell, *Dear Bess: The Letters of Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959* (New York: Norton, 1983), 519-21; Costigliola, *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances*, 363.

For cursory overviews of the two conferences, see S. M. Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Viking, 2010); and Michael Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of*

Europe (New York: Basic, 2015). On the “Yalta system” as a foundation for postwar U.S. foreign policy, see Thomas J. McCormick, *America’s Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 38-42. On the Allied Control Council, see Gunter Mai, *Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland, 1945-1948: Alliierte Einheit, deutsche Teilung?* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995).

On Stalin’s thinking, see esp. Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 63-69; Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Soviet Union and the World, 1944-1953,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 1, *Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 91-100; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-1956* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); R. C. Raack, *Stalin’s Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); and Eduard Mark, “Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947,” CWHIP Working Paper no. 31 (February 2001). In particular, Vojtech Mastny takes a gentler view of Stalin in his *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 21; as does Geoffrey Roberts in his *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 245-53.

On Britain, see Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983); Keith Sainsbury, “British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War,” *English Historical Review* 94, no. 373 (October 1979): 786-804; and Josef Foschepoth, “Britische Deutschlandpolitik zwischen Jalta und Potsdam,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 30, no. 4 (1982): 675-714. On the loan, see *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, ser. 1, vol. 2, 1945.

On Truman’s thinking, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), ch. 1; *idem.*, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), ch. 1 and 2; and John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), ch. 7.

18. In that regard, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic remained, in effect, “interim states.” Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin [Potsdam] Conference, 1 August 1945. On the subsequent legal status of the two states, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 51.

19. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard later summarized this arrangement: “It is only by, and in, such a [peace] treaty that the final boundaries of Germany can and must be determined since, according to valid legal authority, German continues to exist within her boundaries of 31 December 1937 as long as a freely elected all-German Government does not recognize different boundaries. Reunification of Germany means peace in Europe.” Address by Erhard, 10 November 1965, in *The Atlantic Alliance: Allied Comment*, committee print, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd session (1966), pp. 73-76.

20. On a more specific level, more than any question, the reparations issue and import-export matters divided negotiators at Potsdam. After some diplomatic wrangling, U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes, with Truman’s concurrence, pushed through a policy of control by zonal - commanders. On foreign trade, “if the Control Council failed to agree,” the respective military régime of the occupation zone could devise its own solution. Thus, before the Potsdam Conference had even concluded, negotiators established a precedent for circumventing their mutual control machinery. See Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1968), 569-75. For a contemporary account, see B. U. Ratchford

and William D. Ross, *Berlin Reparations Assignment: Round One of the German Peace Settlement* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947).

The reparations issue—along with the recovery of the Ruhr’s coal, steel, and metallurgy—continued to divide the western allies from the Soviets in the eighteen months that followed. In the documentary record, see, for instance, “United States Delegation Working Paper,” n.d.; despatch from Collado to Thorp and Reinstein, 23 July 1945; memorandum for Clayton on “German Economic Matters,” 23 July 1945; and Clayton and Collado to Thorp; all in *FRUS: The Conference in Berlin, 1945*, vol. 2, pp. 812-14 and 829-30.

As central Europeans starved, the Americans came to see that essential to recovery, and key to preventing western Europe and Britain from starving as well, required restoration of the Ruhr’s coal industry. Truman, in the last week of July 1945, ordered General Dwight D. Eisenhower “to take all steps necessary” to prepare for export ten million tons of coal within the next five months, to be followed by another fifteen tons of coal by April of 1946. For Truman’s order, see Truman to Eisenhower, 26 July 1945, in *FRUS: The Conference in Berlin, 1945*, vol. 2, pp. 1028-30.

Despite earlier rumination on an internationalized Ruhr district—including, for instance, Jean Monnet’s plan for “detachment of the German industrial regions” and justifiable concerns from Paris that German heavy-industry should be ceded either to the French or be internationalized—the Americans ultimately feared German irredentist claims that might edge that country eastward in its loyalties. (Beyond French designs for the Ruhr and Rhineland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg all produced their own annexation plans for German territory.) Washington’s preoccupation with the Ruhr recovery led to the fusing of the American and British zones of occupation in 1947 in hopes of hastening recovery and settling the Ruhr question. When the French zone was added in June 1948, the so-called “Trizone” was established, which on 23 May 1949, became the Federal Republic of Germany. See Leffler, “The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War,” German Historical Institute (Washington), occasional paper no. 16 (1996), 22 and 28; and John Gimbel, “On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on U.S. Postwar German Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (June 1972): 242-69.

21. Both the United States and the Soviet Union clearly each sought the full integration of a united Germany into its own sphere of influence, but each also lacked a comprehensive plan to accomplish such an end. “The Soviets did not occupy Germany with specific long-range goals in mind,” argues Norman M. Naimark. As Naimark shows, in the summer of 1945, before the Potsdam conference, Stalin instructed German Communists (KPD) to prepare for future German unity and that he hoped to avoid a division. Likewise, for the Americans, “a unified German state was only imaginable if it was controlled by the west and integrated into the western system,” argues Melvyn P. Leffler. From Naimark, see *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995). From Leffler, see “The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War,” 4-5.

Walter Brown, assistant to Byrnes, struck a somber note in his diary during the Potsdam meeting, suggesting that “there is too much difference in the ideologies of the U.S. and Russia to work out a long-term program of cooperation.” Walter Brown diary entry, 24 July 1945, quoted in Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 118; Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 16.

Carolyn Woods Eisenberg has argued that the decision to divide Germany was ultimately an American one, Washington determining the time and manner of Germany’s longstanding division between east and west. She contends that Moscow hoped to avoid the division of Germany and, apart from receiving his due reparations, Stalin would have relented in his confrontation with the west over the conquered nation. See her *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

22. In his "Potsdam complex," Adenauer feared that the Four Powers might conclude their own solution to the German problem without involving Bonn. Konrad Adenauer quoted in Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Aufstieg, 1876-1952* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), 833. On the "Potsdam complex," see Jost Düllfer, "'No More Potsdam!': Konrad Adenauer's Nightmare and the Basis of his International Orientation," *German Politics and Society*, issue 82, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 19-42, esp. 26; and William Patch, Conference Report, "Western Integration, German Unification and the Cold War: The Adenauer Era in Perspective," 4 April 2006, BMW Center for German and European Studies (Georgetown University) and the German Historical Institute.

23. See, e.g., Address by Walter Ulbricht, 9 December 1970 in *Documents on Germany*, p. 1129; and Letter from Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin to Richard M. Nixon, 1 August 1970, in *ibid.*, p. 1107.

24. Memorandum from the Soviet Union to the Federal Republic of Germany on West German Draft Declarations on the Renunciation of the Use of Force, 21 November 1967, in *ibid.*, 966. East Bloc documents related to Germany nearly always began with a reiteration of the terms of the Potsdam Agreement and with an assertion of Soviet rights and responsibilities under the terms of the Four-Power arrangement.

In the tensest moments of the Cold War—during the Berlin Crisis, for example—East Berlin and the Kremlin were quick to accuse the western powers of abdicating their responsibilities under the Potsdam Agreement and to accuse Bonn of revanchist aims of overturning Potsdam. "The Potsdam Agreement has been grossly violated by the Western powers," wrote the Soviets in November 1958. "It is like the trunk of a tree, once mighty and fruitful, but now cut down and with its heart taken out. The lofty goals for which the Potsdam Agreement was concluded have long since been renounced by the Western powers, and what they are doing in Germany is diametrically opposed to what the Potsdam Agreement had envisaged." Note by the Soviet Union to the United States Regarding the Status of Berlin and the Potsdam Agreements, 27 November 1958, in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* 40, no. 1021 (19 January 1959), p. 81. Similar notes were delivered to the governments of the UK, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. See also U.S. Department of State, *The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis* (Washington: GPO, January 1959).

Notably, when seemingly convenient for other purposes, Moscow renounced the Potsdam Agreements, though usually with an aim of stoking a response from the Americans. In 1958, for instance, Khrushchev warned that "We have every reason to set ourselves free from the obligations under the Potsdam Agreement, obligations which have outlived themselves and which the western powers are clinging to, and to pursue with regard to Berlin a policy that would spring from the interests of the Warsaw Treaty." Address by Khrushchev, 10 November 1958, in *Soviet News*, no. 3948, 11 November 1958 (Soviet Embassy in London), 113-16.

25. Konrad Adenauer, 17 March 1959, in *Teegespräche, 1950-1954*, vol. 3, ed. Hans-Peter Mensing (Berlin: Siedler, 1984), 32.

Washington's ambassador to Bonn, George McGhee, echoed this position: "All of us who are concerned with German reunification," he said, "have a responsibility to ourselves, and a right to ask others, to maintain a strict intellectual honesty about this very vital problem." George C. McGhee, address at the Evangelische Akademie Tutzing, 16 July 1964; in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* 51, no. 1310 (3 August 1964), 138-44.

British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd agreed. "A divided Europe has meant a divided Germany. To unite Germany while Europe is divided, even if practicable, is fraught with danger for all," he concluded. "Therefore everyone—Dr. Adenauer, the Russians, the Americans, the French and ourselves—feel in our hearts that a divided Germany is safer for the time being. We all publicly support a united Germany, each on his own terms." Memorandum from Minister Selwyn Lloyd to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 22 June 1953; PREM 11/673, NA-UK.

In 1958, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained that “he was apparently more interested in reunification than Adenauer.” See Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (New York: Berghahn, 2003), esp. 114.

26. By appearing to keep the German national question opened, the three western powers hoped to anchor the Federal Republic more firmly to the transatlantic community.

27. Among dozens of official statements over the years, in 1966, the North Atlantic Council declared that “So long as Germany continues to be divided there cannot be a genuine and stable settlement in Europe.” Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Paris, 16 December 1966, in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin* 56, no. 1437 (9 January 1967), 49.

28. Willy Brandt, quoted in Noel D. Cary, “Reassessing Germany’s Ostpolitik: From Détente to Refreeze,” pt. 1, *Central European History* 33, no. 2 (2000), p. 237.

29. Joschka Fischer, “Die Wiedervereinigung die Schnauze verbieten,” *Stichwort Grün: Monatsmagazin der Grünen Hessen* (October 1989).

30. Düllfer, “No More Potsdam!” 32.

31. In a series of diplomatic exchanges in the weeks preceding the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Soviets acknowledged as much: “To make the conclusion of a German peace treaty dependent on the solution of the problem of Germany’s reunification means to refuse to settle either of the questions.” See “Text of the Soviet Reply to the United States Note on Berlin and German Treaty,” *New York Times*, 5 August 1961.

32. This problem is thoroughly developed in chapter five of this study.

33. Imanuel Geiss has defined the German question: “How can the Germans be organized in such a way that they are no longer dangerous, but are still reasonably satisfied?” See his *Die deutsche Frage, 1806-1990* (Mannheim: Taschenbuchverlag, 1992).

34. Helmut Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts: Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969), 22 and 24; and “A Policy of Reliable Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 4 (Spring 1981), 748-49.

35. Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts*, 20.

36. Christian Hacke has shown that, in the late 1960s, security became a politicized concept and that, by the 1970s, the energy and economic crises added new dimensions to West German security discourse. See his “60 Jahre Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Bilanz nach 60 Jahren*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), esp. 494. On Czechoslovakia, see Aleksei Filitov, “The USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” in *The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968*, ed. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2010), 319-39.

37. Alexander L. George identifies such mentalities as “operational codes”: the “sets of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics.” See his “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Decision-Making,” *International Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 190-222. John Lewis Gaddis later interprets such assumptions as “geopolitical codes,” often formed before or immediately after a new government takes office. See his *Strategies of Containment*, viii-ix.

38. On later implications of this view, see Ronald D. Asmus, “The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany,” RAND Corporation, R-3846-AF (September 1989), p. 57.

39. Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts*, 24; later published in English as *The Balance of Power: Germany's Peace Policy and the Superpowers* (London: William Kimber, 1971), see p. 34.

40. The unstable position of the United States compounded such perspectives. American adventurism in Indochina had irrevocably damaged the U.S. reputation in Bonn. Brandt, along with Schmidt, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, and other leading members of the West German foreign-policy élite, believed U.S. hegemony in western Europe was proving unsustainable. The impending collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, spiraling American debt, and perennially unbalanced budgets had demonstrated the weakness of American leadership in economic affairs; incoherent and “clumsy” U.S. foreign policy had shown its deficiencies in international affairs. Helmut Schmidt, “Book Discussion on *Men and Power: A Political Retrospective*,” C-SPAN, 10 April 1990.

As this study shows, in Schmidt's years as defense minister (1969-72) and finance minister (1972-74), as well as the early years of his chancellorship (ca. 1974-77), he hoped for the United States to recover its position as leader of the western world—a position, he believed, that the Americans had sacrificed to incoherent foreign policies and irresponsible economic policies. “The Japanese and Germans were expected to pull the vast economy of the United States out of its inflationary and unemployment mess,” he wrote. In the late 1970s, however, he came to believe that Bonn should take the lead in inaugurating a new western economic orthodoxy, as far as possible isolating the Europeans from U.S. monetary woes. The United States had led “a progressive decay in common western grand strategy since 1977,” he believed. On this transition, see chapter two.

Envisioning a new balance-of-power arrangement in Europe, Schmidt pursued close synchronization with France and with the United States—along with West Germany, the two countries he saw as the real great powers of Europe. As the moorings of American hegemony weakened, a Bonn-Paris axis could assert a new European role in the transatlantic community and leave the stopgap arrangement of 1945 behind. “Starting in the early sixties, partly in response to Johnson's leadership, I understood the necessity of European leadership to be asserted by the French,” Schmidt explained. “I have stuck to the necessity of French leadership in Europe since then.” Such a Europe, less dependent upon American military largesse and less dogmatic, wealthy and prosperous, still firmly anchored within NATO but keen to negotiate for mutual arms-control with the USSR, would be less threatening to Moscow and a more attractive trading partner for the east.

41. Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts*, 41.

42. In German, Schmidt consistently referred to a goal of *Gleichgewicht*. In English, he used “balance” and “equilibrium” interchangeably.

43. Schmidt, *The Balance of Power*, 16.

44. For theoretical insights on “countries as part[s] of a larger whole,” see Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 137; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 9; and Marc Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 29-35.

45. Schmidt borrowed the concept of “absolute security” from Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 144-45.

46. Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West: The Anachronism of National Strategies in an Interdependent World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 137-38. With reduced military tensions, even the ideological divisions between east and west could function as balancers in the international system. For the theoretical implications, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5ff.

-
47. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1987), 41.
48. Quotation from William P. Bundy, assessing Schmidt's grand strategy, in Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West*, xviii. Schmidt wrote the original text in English and delivered the chapters as a series of lectures at Yale University. A German edition was subsequently released as *Eine Strategie für den Westen* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1986).
49. "We must direct our Soviet policy to winning Moscow's acceptance of our desire to maintain our national identity and to ease the destiny of those Germans who have been forcibly confined in a communist state," he wrote. See *ibid.*, 42 and 382-83.
50. See Final Decision on MC 14/3: A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept of the Defence of the NATO Area, 16 January 1968, MC 14/3 (Final), in *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*, ed. Gregory W. Pedlow (Brussels: Historical Office, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 1997), 345-46; and Andreas Wenger, "The Politics of Military Planning: Evolution of NATO's Strategy," in *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West*, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), 182.
51. In matters of the EMS, Andrew Moravcsik also sees continuities between Schmidt and Kohl. See his *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 327-28.
52. On the CDU/CSU's complex attitudes toward Ostpolitik, see Clemens, *Reluctant Realists*.
53. Josef Joffe, "Détente über alles: How Genscher Made Germany's Voice Heard," *Times Literary Supplement* (13 October 1995), 6.
54. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, address before the World Economic Forum, Davos, 1 February 1987, in *Statements and Speeches* 10, no. 3 (6 February 1987), German Information Center, New York. In the weeks and months that followed, Genscher repeated his calls to honor Gorbachev's intentions. See *idem.*, "Take Gorbachev Seriously," 28 December 1987, in *Statements and Speeches* 11, no. 1 (2 January 1988), pp. 4-7.
55. Manfred Wörner, "Bedrohung und Sicherheit heute," 14 July 1987; BA, B 136/27065.
56. Cable from AmEmbassy Bonn to SecState, "Kiesinger Agenda," 8 August 1967; LBJ-PL, DDRS doc. no. CK3100475202.
57. Willy Brandt, *Friedenspolitik in Europa* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1968), 38.
58. Helmut Schmidt, "Erwägungen für 1977," 5 January 1977; AdsD, Depositum Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt, 1/HSA009302.
59. Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung*, 432-45.
60. Beschluß des Deutschen Bundestages zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation und zur Deutschlandpolitik, 9 February 1984, in *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ser. 3, vol. 2, 19. Januar 1984 – 31. Dezember 1984 (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Deutscher Bundes-Verlag, 1985), 45. See also Jochen Staadt, "Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen vom 1949 bis 1989," in *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Bilanz nach 60 Jahren*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), 173.
61. By the 1980s, many became institutionalized. Political directors from each foreign ministry met monthly, for instance, and desk officers managing similar portfolios corresponded regularly on working-level issues using an early form of an email network. This study relies in part on records of

those many communications. Stanley R. Sloan, "A Uniting Europe and U.S. Interests," CRS Report 83-72F, 31 March 1983, p. 4.

62. Much to the chagrin of many Bonn officials, chancellors derived their mandate to lead only from their parties—parties which occasionally circumscribed their politicians' ambitious agendas. On the structural limitations placed upon the chancellor in West German politics, see Clay Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager: Helmut Kohl, the CDU and Governance in Germany," *West European Politics* 17, no. 4 (October 1994), 39.

63. After Willy Brandt resigned as chancellor in the spring of 1974, he continued on as Social Democratic Party chairman. Unlike any of his predecessors (none of whom resigned amid scandal), however, Brandt retained unique control over various aspects of West Germany's political agenda and over the trajectory of the Social Democratic policy. In particular, the ex-chancellor leveraged the cachet he acquired in his years as chancellor to serve his party's interests abroad. By the time the SPD was forced out of government in 1982, Brandt had positioned his political party to continue its earlier foreign-policy agenda, often at odds with the chancellor and Federal Cabinet in power. The other political parties soon followed suit.

64. Hal Brands, *The Promises and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 1.

65. Consider but one relevant example in U.S. President Ronald Reagan. John Lewis Gaddis, for instance, lauds Reagan as "one of the sharpest grand strategists ever" and "as skillful a politician as the nation had seen for many years." Gaddis contends that Reagan ended the Cold War. Though the documentary record clearly demonstrates otherwise, the literature praising Reagan's strategic vision is overwhelming. Reagan, for instance, wrote to White House Communications Director John Koehler that, "I know I'm being criticized for not having made a great speech outlining what would be the Reagan foreign policy," the president admitted, but "I just don't think it's wise to always stand up and put quotation marks in front of the world what your foreign policy is." From Gaddis, see *Strategies of Containment*, 353; and *idem.*, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 217; Reagan to Koehler, 9 July 1981; in *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Free Press, 2003), 375.

Among the treatments imposing a strategic vision on Reagan, see John P. Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007); Paul Kengor, *The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism* (New York: Harper Collins, 2006); Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005); Ramesh Ratnesar, *Tear Down this Wall: A City, a President, and the Speech that Ended the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009); Richard Reeves, *President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005); Peter Schweitzer, *Reagan's War: The Epic Story of his Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

66. Clinton, for instance, believed that it was "a huge myth that we always knew what we were doing during the cold war." In his early presidency, he immersed himself in popular biographies of Roosevelt and Truman. According to Talbott, the president became convinced "that neither had grand strategies for how to exert American leadership against the global threats posed by Hitler and Stalin." Rather, in Clinton's own words, both men had "powerful instincts about what had to be done, and they just made it up as they went along." See Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York: Random House, 2002), 133.

Nonetheless, though Clinton himself specifically renounced the notion of grand strategy in favor of "instinct" and improvisation, that has not slowed new interpretations imposing a so-called "grand strategy" on Bill Clinton's presidency. See James D. Boys, *Clinton's Grand Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

67. Public officials have proven no exception. Many officials style themselves grand strategists as the years wear on, particularly as they nourish ambitions of higher political office. Who wants to be remembered as an effective improviser rather than as the surefooted visionary—to be seen as but a cog in the machine, commanding only his small fiefdom, rather than one who integrated the economic, diplomatic, political, and military considerations to achieve some great end? Despite overwhelming documentary evidence to the contrary, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, for instance, has billed himself as “the architect of Germany’s reunification” and has responded bitterly to anyone who questions his pride of place in the historical legacy. See *e.g.*, his exchanges with Philip Zelikow, dated 24 January 1995, 6 March 1995, and 17 April 1995, in Hoover Institution Archive, Philip D. Zelikow-Condoleezza Rice Papers, box 1, folder 3. His memoir, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), according to one reviewer in the *Times Literary Supplement*, constitutes “a monument to himself.”

68. Brands, *The Promises and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy*, 46.

69. Karl Walling, “Grand Strategy and World Order,” *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 3 (Summer 2015), 139. According to Stephen Krasner, a grand strategy should offer heuristic power to officials without reducing the complexities of world politics to too simple an organizing schema; it should function as an “intellectual ballast” or a “conceptual center of gravity” for statesmen. As Dean Acheson observed, the strategist must “look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crisis of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them.” Stephen D. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy,” *Policy Review*, no. 163 (October 2010); Brands, *The Promises and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy*, 8; John Lewis Gaddis, “What is Grand Strategy?” Karl von der Hayden Distinguished Lecture, Duke University, 26 February 2009; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1987), 214.

70. Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), viii.

71. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1954), 335-36. In his 1972 contribution to the UK’s official history of the Second World War, Howard argued that grand strategy essentially involved only the “non-military inputs into warfare.” He later softened this position, calling for grand strategy to understand peacetime as well. Sir Michael Howard, *Grand Strategy*, vol. 4, *August 1942-September 1943* (London: HMSO, 1972), 1; “Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century,” *Defence Studies* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2001), 2-3.

72. From Clausewitz, see the Werner Hohlweg edition, *Vom Kriege* (Bonn: Tümmelers Verlag, 1980).

73. Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, *Generalship in the World War: Comparative Studies* (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, 1934), vol. 1, 34; translation of *Heerführung im Weltkrieg: vergleichende Studien*.

74. Quoted in, *inter alia*, Großen Generalstabs, Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte I., ed., *Moltkes Militärische Werke*, ser. 2, *Die Thätigkeit [sic] als Chef des Generalstabes der Armee in Frieden*, vol. 2, *Moltkes Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze aus dem Jahren 1857 bis 1871* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1900), 19.

75. Cf. Gerhard Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des “Militarismus” in Deutschland*, 4 vols. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1958ff); Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1961), esp. ch. 1; and Adolf Gasser, *Preussischer Militärgeist und Kriegsentfesselung 1914* (Basel: Verlag Helbing und Lichtenhahn, 1985).

76. Among Weidenfeld's most relevant contributions, see his *Außenpolitik für die deutschen Einheit: die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998); *Die Deutschen: Profil einer Nation* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991); and *Der deutsche Weg* (Berlin: Siedler, 1990). See also Judy Dempsey, "Is Germany Discovering Strategy," Carnegie Europe (11 February 2015); available online, www.carnegieeurope.edu/strategieurope.

77. Beginning in 1960 and before his service in the federal government, Schmidt corresponded with Buchan, Liddell Hart, Kissinger, Osgood, and Schelling about his strategic ideas, "exchanging views personally" and "learning from them," he notes. Sir Michael Howard later placed Schmidt among their ranks as a "seminal strategic thinker." See Howard, "Alastair Francis Buchan (1918-1976), writer on strategic and international affairs," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

78. Quoting Clausewitz.

79. Willy Brandt, quoted in Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts*, 17. Simultaneously, Schmidt warned against "strategic dilettantism." See his *Verteidigung oder Vergeltung: ein deutscher Beitrag zum strategischen Problem der NATO* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961).

80. Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West*, 146.

81. *Idem.*, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts*, 16-17. See also Schmidt's Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 28 October 1977; published in *Survival* 20, no. 1 (January/February 1978): 2-10.

82. *Idem.*, *A Grand Strategy for the West*, 3.

83. This logic represents the crux of the realist tradition in international politics.

84. "Even after he was out of office," recalled Brandt, "Helmut Schmidt did especially well in this area." Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen, 1989), 458.

85. Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts*, 20.

86. Denis Healey, quoted in the foreword to the English edition of Schmidt, *The Balance of Power*, 10.

87. Marc Trachtenberg, "Making Grand Strategy: The Early Cold War Experience in Retrospect," *SAIS Review* 19, no. 1 (1999): 33-40.

88. Quoted in Donald Morrison, "On Different Planets: News Media in the United States and Europe," in *Growing Apart: America and Europe in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 94.

89. Many excellent studies of the GDR exist. See, for instance, Richard Bessel and Ralph Hessen, eds., *Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1996); Gareth Dale, *Popular Protest in East Germany, 1945-1989* (London: Rutledge, 2005); *idem.*, *The East German Revolution of 1989* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Catherine Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); *idem.*, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow, eds., *Weg in den Untergang: Der innere Zerfall der DDR* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1999); Hans Joas and Martin Kohli, eds., *Der Zusammenbruch der DDR* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993); John O. Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,

1999); Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, *Endspiel: Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR* (Munich: Beck, 2009); Ulrich Mähler, *Kleine Geschichte der DDR* (Munich: Beck, 1998); Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism in East Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Erhard Neuwert, *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1997); Bernd Schäfer, *Staat und katholische Kirche in der DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999); Joachim Scholtyssek, *Die Aussenpolitik der DDR* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003); Klaus Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat: Geschichte und Strukturen der DDR* (Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, 1998); Hermann Weber, *Die DDR 1945-1990* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993); and Jonathan R. Matlin, *The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

90. Ernest Hemingway, *The Sun Also Rises* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926).

91. Mary Elise Sarotte, "Why the Berlin Wall Really Fell," *Politico*, 9 November 2014.

92. Andreas Rödder, *Deutschland einig Vaterland: die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung* (Munich: Beck, 2009); M. E. Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); *idem.*, *The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall* (New York: Basic, 2014); and Wolfgang Jäger, *Die Überwindung der Teilung: der innerdeutsche Prozess der Vereinigung 1989/90* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998).

93. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*; and Weidenfeld, *Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit*. See also Stephen Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

94. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, x-xi.

95. As Norman A. Graebner has observed, the intellectual milieu in which foreign policies are devised often determine the policies themselves. See his *Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). See also John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

96. Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book 1989* (Washington: GPO, 1989), 107-10.

97. Rudolf Augstein, "Eher mit 'bang' als mit 'whimper,'" *Der Spiegel* 24/1989 (12 June 1989), 144. *N.b.*: The original quotation, attributed to Victor Hugo, is from a poorly done English translation of his *Histoire d'un crime* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1877). He wrote, "*On résiste à l'invasion des armées; on ne résiste pas à l'invasion des idées*," – "One resists the invasion of armies; one does not resist the invasion of ideas."

98. Until the nineteenth century, the many princely states and crown lands of central Europe functioned as a collective buffer between the great powers and as intermediaries in European affairs. Paul W. Schroeder traces this development in his "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System," *The International History Review* 6, no. 1 (February 1984): 1-27.

99. Klaus Hildebrand, *German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer: The Limits of Statecraft*, trans. Louise Willmot (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 237.

100. Though Thatcher relied on opaque notions, including "collective guilt," national "morality," and "national character, she gave voice to widespread popular notions of the "German problem." Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 791 and 797. For important insight into Thatcher's "surprisingly simple-minded" thinking on Germany, particularly at

the time of unification, see George R. Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion at the Court of Margaret Thatcher: An Insider's View* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 125, ch. 8 and 9.

Chapter One

A New Peace for Europe 1969-1974

Keep your son away from politics! The boy is gifted. But,
what a pity, politics will ruin him.

—Schoolmaster Dr. Kramer
to Willy Brandt's mother, c. 1930¹

“God Helps Only Those Who Help Themselves”

“I quickly saw that there was neither a moral nor a national duty to remain in Germany,” explained young Herbert Ernst Frahm. With his tall frame pressed inside the hold of a small cutter ship, the nineteen-year-old escaped Hitler's Germany, across the strait, to Denmark. The North Sea's frigid easterly wind bore down on the vessel as the shores of the Reich vanished behind him. “Faith in the power to resist had been dealt a death-blow,” he remembered. “God helps only those who help themselves.”²

Within a matter of weeks during the winter of 1933, every mechanism of political and public life had come into the clutches of the Nazis. As Frahm's hometown of Lübeck battled an uproar of protests, strikes, and turmoil, Hitler's brown-shirted troops lined the cobbled sidewalks of the old city.³ Frahm's socialist comrades faced beatings, prison, and worse. At the seashore, the young shipbroker's apprentice would leave Germany behind.

In his pocket, he carried a hundred Reichsmarks, given to him by his grandfather. Frahm pressed the rest of his possessions into a small attaché case. The same attaché case had almost betrayed his hiding place when a Nazi customs officer boarded the ship for

inspection. Having escaped notice, shortly after midnight, he set off for the Danish port of Rødbyhavn.

Though the fishermen aboard called the crossing a calm one, young Frahm found it brutal. Wedged in his cramped hiding place, he felt the freezing fierceness of the turbulent passage. Racked with anxiety, he battled the worry of leaving behind his single mother, a modest department store clerk who worked six days a week to support herself. He also left his ailing grandfather, who soon thereafter ended his own life. Frahm's small family—and all Germans—faced an uncertain future.

At dawn, the ship entered the Danish harbor. After three days, Frahm prepared for another ship passage—this time not as a stowaway, but with a third-class ticket. With a few kroner from the Norwegian Labor Party's "legal fund," he began a new life in Scandinavia. He shielded his identity from the Nazis' sophisticated espionage network by assuming a series of pseudonyms. Perambulating the continent, the enigmatic student-journalist witnessed carnage in Germany, Spain, Norway, and Sweden. "It is the Nazis—in Germany as in other countries—who are *guilty*," he wrote. "All were implicated in the unleashing of terror and war."⁴

Once settled in Oslo, he adopted his most famous alias—Willy Brandt.

Nearly forty years later, Brandt returned to Oslo. No longer a fugitive, this time he arrived in a luxury jetliner to a red-carpet welcoming ceremony. In the intervening decades, Brandt had gone on to become the first Social-Democratic chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1971, his particular take on European politics had earned him the Nobel Peace Prize, which he traveled to Norway to receive. "Just like an exile rediscovering

the peaceful and human features of his fatherland,” Brandt explained, “[the award] demonstrated to me and to the whole world that Germany has come to terms with itself.”

The country Brandt led in no way resembled the Germany he fled in his youth. Two decades of Cold War had carved the land in two, and seventeen million of his countrymen lay captive behind an Iron Curtain. The ideological scourge of Nazism had been replaced by an armed standoff between liberal capitalism and Soviet-style communism. Germany hosted more nuclear arms per square mile than any other quarter of the world, and each weapon remained under foreign control. His people stood at the front lines of a global cold war. Brandt, along with his Nobel benefactors, believed his plan—a *neue Ostpolitik*—would defuse those tensions.

“The brotherhood of peoples is an institution which grimly reminds us: Cain and Abel were also brothers. However confident our hopes, we should never forget that.”⁵ Standing before the Nobel Committee, Brandt urged caution. “A good German cannot be a nationalist; a good German knows that he cannot refuse a European calling. Through Europe, Germany returns to itself and to the constructive forces of its history.”⁶ The chancellor’s words riveted his audience—in Oslo and around the world. Brandt, who often hurried through his speeches, delivered his Nobel lecture, “Peace Policy in Our Time,” with an abiding, deliberate pace. Crafted by the activist-novelist Günter Grass, his carefully scripted lecture seemed inviting, with a genial, off-the-cuff style. It contained all the hallmarks of typical Brandt oratory: impassioned rhetoric but deniable policy imperatives.

Brandt spoke of peace, of Europe, of unity; so too did every West German politician. The devil always lay in the details. Since 1949, the Christian Democrats had relied on the delicate, dangerous diplomacy of nonrecognition of the East German state. Assuming office

in late 1969, Brandt and his Social Democrats completely recast their country's foreign policy through the chancellor's Ostpolitik, seeking official cooperation with the estranged German Democratic Republic.

Through the decades of Cold War, the divided nation had remained in the foreground as an *object* of international concern. Christian-Democratic leadership had guided West Germany through the harrowing days of the postwar crises and the early Cold War; it had established Germany's right to exist in a post-Nazi world and affirmed its trustworthiness as a western ally.

By the 1970s, however, Germany emerged as the principal *subject* of international relations and the guardian of a new status quo. Bonn seized the initiative in advancing its own foreign-policy aims, ultimately finding its place as the continent's benign hegemon. In Brandt's mind, his policies represented ideas appropriate to the new era of international politics his country faced. West Germany's first Social-Democratic chancellor, Brandt stood alone as the only policymaker of any party who believed that "the Cold War had passed its peak."⁷ By the early 1970s, the divided German nation was no longer a new phenomenon; he believed it had become a fixture of international politics. Unlike his detractors, Brandt thought his country no longer faced an existential threat. Instead, the Federal Republic needed policies calibrated to its peculiar economic and security situation within Europe. Opening to the east would orient his country's foreign policy toward coexistence rather than confrontation.

Through his Ostpolitik, the new chancellor believed he had found a panacea for Europe's ailments. Most importantly, he hoped to leverage Germany's political and economic influence to rejuvenate Europe's stalled integration and to modulate the east-west struggle.

A stronger EC, with its own peaceful international agenda, could simultaneously assert greater independence from the transatlantic partnership and endow European institutions with credibility. The chancellor and his followers thought that the EC, under German leadership, could supplant American-dominated NATO as the chief interlocutor in east-west relations. Surely, the argument ran, the Europeans could more effectively pursue their own peace and security more effectively than the ornery superpowers.

In the years that followed, Brandt would leverage his country's influence to retool Europe's postwar institutions. His Ostpolitik, which won him acclaim on both sides of the Iron Curtain, provided him clout to advance an even bolder European agenda. An ardent European, Brandt supported a bold vision for Europe in which national governments would cede much of their traditional authority to international institutions. Given his own country's peculiar international status—neither fully subject nor fully sovereign—he sponsored a scheme that discredited traditional notions of state sovereignty, including the Westphalian nation-state itself, in hopes of using multinational institutions to solve the domestic political, economic, and social problems Europeans faced across the 1970s.

At the center of such schemes remained the seemingly immovable features of the Cold War: a divided nation, partitioned by the great powers and hosting hundreds of thousands of foreign troops on its soil. Despite the familiar mythology of Ostpolitik—that engagement between east and west would lead to ultimate reconciliation and reunification—Brandt's program was never a blueprint for unity; instead, it represented a plan for returning his country to the peaceful conduct of international relations and for achieving greater independence between the superpowers.⁸ Brandt understood that overcoming Germany's division remained a prospect as elusive as ending the Cold War itself. "Reunification," he

later confessed, “became the indispensable lie (*Lebenslüge*) that characterized the second German republic.”⁹ Instead, achieving independence from the Yalta-Potsdam system of Four Power control remained the far more important ambition.

Since 1945, German security and prosperity were largely determined by outsiders through a web of multilateral institutions laid down in the early Cold War: NATO and a series of allied agreements restricted the size and scope of German rearmament, the EC harnessed Bonn’s economic power, and international security agreements forbade German access to nuclear arms. That status quo had ensured West Germany’s recovery and defense in the 1950s and 1960s and had anchored Bonn firmly in the west. The coming economic and political dislocations of the late 1960s and 1970s, however, brought into focus the divergence of interests between West Germany and its allies. The German nation was divided, and its reunification had been indefinitely postponed; Bonn remained officially under Four Power control, despite the schism in the wartime alliance; most importantly, any military confrontation between east and west would guarantee the nuclear destruction of Germany, and Bonn retained no control over its own security and defense. The mechanisms that had protected and renewed West Germany in the wake of war, by 1969, now seemed to compromise Bonn’s security and prosperity.

Brandt and the senior members of his government—namely Helmut Schmidt, Walter Scheel, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Alexander Möller, Karl Schiller, Georg Leber, and Erhard Eppler—recognized that the Germans’ greatest leverage in international affairs remained, paradoxically, the very strictures placed on their sovereignty. By simultaneously accepting the limitations on their freedom of action—through NATO, European integration, and the international nuclear weapons régime—and by shaping those multilateral networks

according to Bonn's own designs, the West Germans could both overcome the Yalta-Potsdam system of Four Power domination and ultimately be emancipated from their status as a defeated nation. Brandt and especially Schmidt helped to initiate a new foreign-policy consensus in Bonn that, though limited in their sovereignty, West Germans could shape their own destiny without giving the appearance of any changes to the status quo, ultimately maximizing German peace, prosperity, and power. As expressed by Egon Bahr, Bonn's aim was "overcoming the status quo in the long term precisely by not changing it in the short term."¹⁰

An Exile Returned

With his new eastern policy, shrewdly cloaked in a mantle of peace, Brandt promised the most thoroughgoing overhaul of international politics since Hitler's bid for world power three decades earlier. He focused his agenda on multilateralism, intra-European consensus-building, and strengthening international institutions, namely the European Community. Pledging West German diplomatic influence and economic capital to alleviate the troubles facing Europe would demonstrate the Germans' incontrovertible commitment to continental peace, stability, and prosperity.

Brandt saw the challenges facing Germany and Europe. By the 1970s, European integration projects were collapsing. Slow economic growth and high unemployment across the continent yielded economic sclerosis. Europeans, including West Germans, proved unable to sustain high wages and expensive welfare benefits as they faced the end of three decades' commercial expansion. Western economies struggled with chronic balance-of-

trade deficits, as low production costs lured manufacturers to the developing world. Across the continent, governments seemed powerless to slow the crises gripping their countries.

Meanwhile the conduct of international relations itself was being redefined. In a world of globalized trade and communication, technological revolution, and nuclear weapons numbering in the tens of thousands, to Brandt, the notion of sovereign states conducting diplomacy through their ambassadors seemed antiquated. Even the nation-state itself figured as little more than a sentimental anachronism. “The classical nation-state belongs to yesterday,” he told the European Parliament. “Only in a Europe that has found its personality can we secure our national identities.”¹¹ The pressing problems of the day—sluggish economic growth, skyrocketing unemployment, high inflation, superpower brinksmanship—could all best be addressed through the European Community, Brandt believed, not in the “isolation of the nation-state.”¹²

Though European institutions had been initiated in 1950 for “the preservation of world peace,” their one purpose always had been to harness Germany’s preponderant economic and manufacturing strength for the benefit of its neighbors, namely France.¹³ Under the guise of ensuring European peace, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had been designed by two Frenchmen—Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman—to legitimize French control over Germany’s coal and iron-rich Ruhr and Saarland. Two decades later, Brandt hoped to recalibrate those European institutions for a new era.

Speaking in Strasbourg, the chancellor proposed “a European government in charge of the economic and monetary community, the social community, and perhaps also the educational community, definitely the community of foreign affairs, and—certainly with a cogent logic, one day—a security community administered under European sovereignty.”¹⁴

Such a system, he believed, though complicating the postwar security régime, could supplant American meddling in German affairs under the façade of interallied cooperation. More importantly, it could transcend the Cold War itself along with the bipolar world.

The EC and NATO seemed to represent two diverging paths for Europe. Occasional disputes between the two institutions raised a pivotal question of international relations: What would be the role of the United States in Europe? Brandt believed that American involvement in European affairs represented a relic of 1945—a temporary stopgap until Europeans developed their own mechanisms of continental stability. On the contrary, his Christian-Democratic predecessors—and official U.S. policy for Europe in the 1970s—held that the American presence in Europe signified a deeper civilizational connection between the allies and a transoceanic bond based upon capitalism and liberalism.¹⁵ As such, Brandt worked to overturn that Atlanticist platform of his predecessors in the chancellery, aiming instead to fashion Europe a third great-power bloc through the EC.¹⁶

Simultaneously, the transatlantic link was growing tenuous. In 1967, NATO had codified its new Flexible Response doctrine, beginning a slow divergence between Bonn and its allies over nuclear defense; the following summer, the Non-Proliferation Treaty reaffirmed West Germany's non-nuclear status and institutionalized U.S. extended nuclear deterrence over the Federal Republic. Both decisions papered over interallied differences of opinion in order to reach multilateral agreement. Rather than immediate and overwhelming nuclear retaliation against Warsaw Pact aggression, as had been the policy of Massive Retaliation in the early Cold War, Flexible Response promised "a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression"; put simply, the new doctrine hoped to resolve any conflict at the lowest

possible level of violence while still maintaining the ability to escalate as required by Soviet aggression. If the Americans could terminate Soviet aggression at lower costs, did Bonn and Berlin really enjoy protection on equal terms with Washington and New York? Could a conventional war wipe out Germany before the Americans and Soviets picked up the red telephone?

The West Germans faced a precarious situation. They needed to shape their own destiny without giving the appearance of any changes to the status quo. In fact, they needed to demonstrate such an incontrovertible commitment to the status quo that their allies would never abandon them for an independent resolution to the German question.

Simultaneously, they needed to behave as equal partners and push, when appropriate, for an arrangement that would transcend World War II and the Yalta-Potsdam arrangement.

Under Brandt and his successor Helmut Schmidt, the Bonn government played a central political and intellectual role in scouting a path for West Germany in international politics and in inaugurating a new western economic orthodoxy based upon macroeconomic integration and fusion of markets. Capitalism was reborn under the West German aegis, transcending partisan ideologies. The German central bank led the way in establishing European monetary stability in the wake of an international recession. The deutsche mark became the basis for the European economy, ultimately replacing the dollar as Europe's reserve currency. At the same time, while American leadership within the alliance floundered, the West Germans pursued a security agenda premised on achieving equilibrium between east and west. As defense minister and later as chancellor, Schmidt led simultaneous efforts toward détente and balanced forces and pursued policies that would

grant the Federal Republic freedom of action without provoking anxieties among its neighbors.

In the decade that followed, even the architect of Ostpolitik himself could not have seen the far-reaching consequences of his policies and vision. The 1970s represented a pivotal moment in postwar history. Mutual nonrecognition between the two German states evolved into economic and diplomatic rapprochement. As Europeans confronted international political and economic dislocations, the Federal Republic of Germany emerged as the unequivocal leader in fashioning solutions to international problems.

The Road to Oslo

The journey to West Germany's chancellery and to an international peace prize had proven a long one. As the war was ending, then a journalist, Brandt summed up Germany's fate: "The dream of the master race [will] never be dreamed again."¹⁷ By 1947, he returned to his native land, legally adopting his alias. Berlin had represented "the center of the contagion," and there Brandt hoped to reconcile Germany's past with its future.

A committed socialist, he sat on the Social Democratic Party's executive committee through the harrowing days of the Berlin Blockade and, by 1949, had been elected to the Berlin state parliament (*Abgeordnetenhaus*). In a nation battling an identity crisis, Brandt's malleability seemed to represent the SPD's future. He chafed at his party's reticence to engage the weighty political questions of the day. To Brandt, the Social Democrats still seemed mired in the politics of the pre-Nazi years. Their venerable predecessors had steadfastly resisted Hitler as his thugs dismantled Germany's pluralist democracy. In postwar Germany, however, their steadfastness had become obstinance. Brandt's ideological

adaptability won him the attention and confidence of the SPD's most important leaders, Berlin mayor Ernst Reuter and party chairman Kurt Schumacher. Schumacher and his acolytes clung to the anachronous positions of their predecessors, namely the party's passé Marxist bent.¹⁸ Many Social Democrats contented themselves with opposition politics; Brandt wanted to put the SPD back in power for the first time since 1930. His audacity and agility endeared him to the party leadership. As the SPD seemed to be losing touch with its younger constituents, Brandt represented the party's entrée into the burgeoning student movements and millions of young Germans anxious to immerse themselves in the political life of their country. In the face of idealistic obsolescence, Brandt's measured pragmatism rejuvenated the party.

When the East German military carved apart Berlin in 1961, Brandt—then governing mayor of the city's western sector—decried the “Wall of Shame” (*Schandmauer*) in the international press. A month later, he stood for his party in the federal election—the first time the SPD put forward a candidate who was not their party's chairman. Opposing Adenauer, the contrast between the two candidates proved stark. At eighty-five years old, with waistcoat and homburg, Adenauer seemingly represented a figure from the past. Brandt, only half of his opponent's age, casual and dashing, spoke of Germany's future and demonstrated dynamism previously anathema to the Social Democrats.

Though he lost his bid for the chancellorship in 1961 and again in 1965, Brandt continued to build momentum for his reformist approach to east-west relations. Instead, in 1966, he entered his post as vice chancellor and foreign minister in Kurt-Georg Kiesinger's government—the years of the “Grand Coalition” of the CDU/CSU and the SPD.

Brandt's greatest achievement as foreign minister was the political capital he accumulated among his country's young people—the generation of 1968. Armed with the “critical theory” of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, youth culture in the 1960s attacked elitist, detached elders. Relativists condemned ideologues in universities, in the press, and in politics. Young Germans bristled at the Grand Coalition, which dominated the Bundestag until 1969. With ninety-five percent of the seats controlled by the coalition and expanded emergency authority threatening civil liberties, agitators pointed to the apparent expansion of state power and the need for an extra-parliamentary opposition (*Außerparlamentarische Opposition*) to check the coalition's strength.

As foreign minister, Brandt positioned himself for further political success, simultaneously matching the political legitimacy of his coalition with his youthful popularity among the 68ers. Brandt's own Social Democrats faced attacks from that extra-parliamentary opposition (APO), particularly for abetting the conservative stranglehold on political power. Brandt himself, however, managed to leverage his anti-Nazi credentials and his political acumen to win over many of the APO; while many within his own party willingly cast off the 68ers' criticisms as radical, Brandt engaged them rhetorically and appropriated their progressivism into his own political persona. When West German suffrage was expanded to eighteen-year-olds in July 1970, support for Brandt's forward-looking agenda exploded.¹⁹

He knew all of that popular support could be leveraged for political gain—at home and abroad.

Brandt's Vision

“Legitimate national interests required a spring-cleaning of Federal German policy toward Moscow and its allies,” Brandt explained. “We knew where we belonged, and we realized that loyalty to and friendship with the West must be complemented by adjustment to and cooperation with the East.”²⁰


Just a week before the 1969 federal election, Brandt traveled to New York for the annual UN General Assembly. While the soon-to-be chancellor carried on his diplomatic duties, his top aide, Egon Bahr, remained in the background, devising a foreign-policy strategy for a new government. Bahr completed the resulting internal paper, “Reflections on the Foreign Policy of a Future Federal Government,” on 21 September 1969. Furthering Brandt’s envisioned Ostpolitik, Bahr argued that a future SPD-led government should reconfigure the Federal Republic’s relationship with its allies, abandoning those “last relics of the postwar period.”²¹

Nearly eighty-seven percent of West Germans turned out on election day. The Social Democrats had gained twenty seats, giving them one of their largest electoral victories in nearly forty years. “Now Hitler has truly lost the war!” Brandt exclaimed. He laughed: “Our partners in the world may have to contend with a not always easygoing (*bequem*) government.”²²

A coalition with the Free Democrats, led by Walter Scheel, though necessary, did not prove a natural fit for Brandt. The two parties did not even attempt a domestic-policy agreement, focusing instead on a common foreign-policy vision. Brandt asked Bahr to edit his recent foreign-policy paper to use in the coalition negotiations with the FDP.²³ Brandt had been elected chancellor by a margin of only two votes. Fearing his political career lived

on borrowed time, he refused to let his questionable mandate devolve into political floundering.

Fig. 1.1. West German Federal Election Results, 28 September 1969



Outlining his agenda before the Bundestag, Brandt cited the need for an inner-German “*modus vivendi*.” European peace and security demanded rapprochement. His Christian-Democratic predecessors had insisted that no reconciliation was possible, as the GDR enjoyed neither sovereignty nor international recognition. Adenauer, Hallstein, and their contemporaries had seen recognition of East Germany as tantamount to a renunciation of eventual unification with the east; to honor the GDR with diplomatic recognition would endorse the SED’s legitimacy within East Germany and international affairs. Brandt saw quite the opposite. He continued the earlier policy but not its logic. “Our relations with each other can only be of a special nature,” he explained, as “the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR are not foreign countries to each other.”²⁴ He refused to greet his East German countrymen as foreigners and believed that diplomatic recognition of the GDR would deny the inherent dignity of the single German nation.

Before the Bundestag, Brandt laid out an explication of the inner-German problem. First, Germans, both West and East, enjoyed full rights to “self-determination.” Second, the open

wounds left by the Second World War—Germany divided and Berlin partitioned—could be solved only through a general European peace. Third, policymakers in both German states must work toward preservation of “the unity of the nation,” offering sincere efforts toward reconciliation. Fourth, “German interests” were synonymous with European peace. For those reasons, Brandt’s government offered the GDR Ministerrat (Council of Ministers) “contractually agreed cooperation.” Finally, as a step toward peace, both German states should conclude treaties mutually renouncing the use of and the threat of military force.²⁵ Meanwhile, what the chancellor laid out before the Bundestag did not even closely resemble the plots he hatched with Bahr behind closed doors.

Always a political pragmatist, Brandt schemed with fellow-traveler Egon Bahr to devise a series of maximum rapprochement aims. The two men had become acquainted during Brandt’s tenure as governing mayor of West Berlin, when Bahr, a journalist with RIAS, began service as a press advisor. When Brandt moved to the Foreign Office during the years of the Grand Coalition, Bahr took over as chief of the policy-planning staff (*Planungstab*). By 1969, with Brandt’s accession to the chancellorship, Bahr had become his closest advisor and confidant. The two men intentionally chose the modest title of “state secretary” for Bahr, as M. E. Sarotte has shown, allowing the chancellor to disavow Bahr’s actions should Ostpolitik go badly awry.²⁶

Through Bahr’s formulation, Ostpolitik focused equally on creating a stable peace with the east and establishing independence from the west. Bahr hoped to leverage the Soviet desire for an all-European security conference (eventually the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) “as an instrument for the realization of our interests”—greater independence from the west. The result, a modernized Rapallo, would afford the two

German states latitude for inner-German rapprochement, outside of the two Cold War alliances.

In Brandt's formulation, Europeans needed a collective identity of their own, outside the bipolar worldview thrust upon them by superpower outsiders. Central to that aim, the European Community represented the proving ground; if the Europeans could strengthen their community through political, diplomatic, and economic cooperation, NATO and the Warsaw Pact could fade away.

In fact, an earlier Bahr paper pledged to leverage discussion of the German question to reshape the European security régime, replacing NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Bahr envisioned a new transcontinental security pact, headquartered in Berlin, freed from Four-Power administration.²⁷ In Bahr's configuration, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would not actively participate in the new European security structure. Instead, Central Europe, including both German states, would stand as independent, nuclear weapons-free territories. No foreign troops would be stationed in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, the Federal Republic, or the Benelux countries. The two German states then independently could pursue unification on their own neutralist terms. Hellbent on redrawing the map of Europe, Bahr earned the soubriquet "the armchair Metternich."²⁸

Despite Bahr's fantastic scenarios, Brandt understood that improved relations could not be created overnight. The former was a dreamer, the latter a politician. The chancellor frequently cited Bahr's motto, calling for "a policy of small steps" (*eine Politik der kleinen Schritte*).²⁹ Brandt understood that ideas such as Bahr's West German neutralization scheme should *guide* policymaking, not represent an end unto itself.³⁰

Between Germany and Russia

By the time Brandt came into office, the Cold War dynamic had transformed, subtly but powerfully, from confrontation to cooperation. As Germany's first postwar Social-Democratic chancellor, Brandt needed to negotiate a new path for both his party and his country. By 1969, Kremlin defense planners no longer focused their energies on Europe, but on the southern periphery. Soviet economic interests necessitated a relaxed grip on eastern Europe; trade opportunities would open, whether the West Germans were involved or not. More importantly, the relaxation in global tensions, spearheaded by the U.S., might result in East Germany achieving international recognition over Bonn's objections—a nightmare scenario for West Germany.

While reconciliation between the two German states remained paramount on the chancellor's agenda, Brandt turned toward Moscow to begin. "It was no use trying to conduct relations separately with the states lying between Germany and Russia," he explained; "the Foreign Ministry had tried it before my time."³¹ Across the spring and summer of 1970, and without any specific orders from the Cabinet, Bahr had spent four months negotiating the terms of an agreement with the Kremlin. The final document agreed on a mutual renunciation of force, guaranteed existing borders in Europe, and affirmed support for a general European peace conference. More importantly—and controversially—for the first time since 1945 the Federal Republic of Germany relaxed its claim to unification, recognizing the de facto existence of two states on German soil. Brandt's foreign policy validated Moscow's control over the GDR.³²

The international press affirmed Brandt's approach; normalizing relations with East Germany and opening the east to trade would require Soviet imprimatur.³³ *Le Monde* called

the West German negotiations with the Soviets “a turning point in the history of modern Europe,” while *Der Spiegel* praised the chancellor’s “farsighted boldness.” *Time* magazine even hailed the signing as “nothing less than a peace treaty between West Germany and Russia.”³⁴

After being rattled by a bomb threat against his Lufthansa 707 in Cologne, on August 12th, Brandt departed for Moscow for his first meeting with Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko and Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin. Despite the months of preliminary negotiations, the chancellor arrived to the Kremlin with some trepidation. When his predecessor Adenauer had traveled to Moscow fifteen years before, he had leveraged diplomatic recognition for ten thousand German prisoners of war—hardly an enjoyable diplomatic errand.³⁵ By 1970, however, the visit proved unexpectedly pleasant.

“I found Gromyko more agreeable than the picture I had formed of a caustic ‘Mr. Nyet,’” Brandt remembered. “He seemed friendly, relaxed, and reserved in a pleasant, almost British way.”³⁶ The usually stoical Brezhnev seemed convivial, “clowning for photographers.”³⁷ After the signing, the general secretary invited Brandt for an impromptu private discussion. Abandoning their schedules, the two men, with only their translators present, chatted for nearly four hours. The chancellor flattered his Kremlin hosts, describing the Soviets as “inextricably interwoven into Europe.” “If only we in Western Europe recognize this partnership,” Brandt explained, those on both sides of the Iron Curtain might find a stable, peaceful détente.³⁸ “This is the end of an epoch,” said Brandt, summing up his trip. “But, it seems to me, also a very good beginning.”

Brezhnev pressed Brandt to extend his visit, but the chancellor politely declined. The next day, August 13th, marked the ninth anniversary of the Berlin Wall’s construction.

Brandt's political opponents, the Christian Democrats, would seize on that bit of political theater: the opposition chancellor enjoying Cuban cigars and Russian vodka with Brezhnev while the people of the GDR battled privation inside Ulbricht's police state. After all, twenty Soviet divisions still propped up the SED's brutal régime, and, at least in some measure, Brandt had just legitimized their presence in the GDR.³⁹ The chancellor returned to Bonn, signed treaty in hand.

"We have opened a gate to the east," exclaimed FDP Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, who also had been in Moscow.⁴⁰ With improved relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union, an expansive new trade market had been opened. Commentators praised "the vast horizon of economic and diplomatic movement" and the new "policy of industrial penetration of the east."⁴¹ As German manufactured goods grew less competitive in world markets and terms of trade tipped toward emerging economies, thanks in part to the SPD's high-wage policies, the east offered appealing new commercial prospects. By the 1970s, the east bloc battled chronic shortages of consumer goods, and West German manufacturers hoped to fill the void.

Brandt agreed, though he shied away from economic topics when he could. (With no university education, he possessed only a thin grasp of basic macroeconomics. He left those matters to Schiller and Schmidt.) Instead, he preferred the political benefits he saw. The Moscow Treaty, he said, constituted "a starting point for a new kind of West Germany no longer utterly dependent upon the U.S."⁴² As mayor of West Berlin when the East Germans built the wall, Brandt had seen the limits of American diplomacy; the Americans had stood by while the communists carved his city and his country in two. The United States, he knew, would never sacrifice its own security to achieve German unification—despite any rhetorical

assurances from Washington. "We are losing nothing with this treaty that was not gambled away long ago," Brandt explained in a television address to his countrymen.

With his own Soviet policy and his own east-west contacts, Brandt hoped to limit U.S. meddling in his country's affairs. A redoubled effort toward European integration would provide West Germany a stronger, more independent international position, and the Moscow Treaty represented the first step toward overcoming Adenauer's policy of subservience to the allies.⁴³

Furthermore, the chancellor battled domestic political concerns. Although his party had retaken control of the government in the most recent election, his coalition maintained only a twelve-seat margin over the opposition. The SPD's alliance with the Free Democrats remained tenuous. Brandt needed to build a political platform that would garner unrivaled support, and his Ostpolitik appeared capable of meeting the challenge. Seventy-four percent of West Germans approved of his maneuvering. For the first time in the postwar era, Germans saw their government boldly seize the initiative in international politics. Their chancellor, opening the gateway between east and west, was redefining the nature of the Cold War contest and using German power to champion European peace. As one allied diplomat in Bonn remarked, "German history resumes this week."⁴⁴

Three months after signing the Moscow Treaty, Brandt traveled to Warsaw, where he concluded a similar agreement with the People's Republic of Poland. In the Warsaw Treaty, both the Poles and the West Germans pledged nonviolence toward the other and accepted the Oder-Neiße line as Poland's western border.⁴⁵

The treaty, while it received much scrutiny at home and acclaim abroad, was overshadowed by a stunt of public diplomacy that quickly came to symbolize both Brandt's

chancellorship and his Ostpolitik. Immediately before the treaty signing ceremony, the German delegation traveled to the memorial honoring the tens of thousands of Jewish victims who perished in the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising.⁴⁶ Whether overcome by spontaneous emotion or engaging in brilliant political theater, the chancellor silently fell to his knees in front of the memorial. Before him stood a frieze depicting starving children battling the SS flamethrowers and broken bodies piled into handcarts. At eleven meters tall, the monument itself is sculpted of granite blocks, reminiscent both of the ghetto's deadly perimeter and of Jerusalem's Wailing Wall. With his face as stone cold as the wet granite under his knees, for about thirty seconds of silence the chancellor honored the victims of Nazi brutality. Even Bahr, his closest confidant, looked shocked as he stood by. So unexpected and uncomfortable was the situation, remembered one reporter, "one was almost grateful for the wind, so icy that it filled one's eyes with tears."⁴⁷ A breathless delegation looked on and pondered the meaning.

The next morning, every major newspaper in Germany featured Brandt's genuflection on its front page. Questions poured forth: Was the act premeditated? An admission of guilt? A request for forgiveness? And in whose name? Brandt never answered those questions satisfactorily. "Under the weight of recent history, I did what people do when words fail them," he explained simply. "In this way, I memorialized millions of murdered people."⁴⁸

While forty-eight percent of West Germans identified the genuflection "excessive" (*übertrieben*), the chancellor succeeded in bolstering his popularity and charisma among his country's young people—the base of his political support.⁴⁹ His genuflection and silent prayer invoked both morality and reconciliation through Ostpolitik. His people stood resolutely behind him as the ingenious chancellor revolutionized east-west relations.

The chancellor's trip to Moscow had won him Brezhnev's affection for Ostpolitik; his silent prayer Warsaw had earned him the Polish people's. Only East Germany's Walter Ulbricht remained.

Inner-German Relations

Despite the seeming goodwill of the FRG's new eastern policy and Brandt's successful engagement with the Kremlin, the chancellor's overtures to the GDR initially met with peevish rhetoric from Walter Ulbricht, general secretary of the SED Central Committee. "A revanchist policy!" Ulbricht scoffed. Bonn's goal, he said, was to subsume the GDR into NATO. Brandt's policy only represented the newest iteration of "the wrecked CDU/CSU policy" of an older generation.⁵⁰ Ulbricht's penchant for hyperbole seldom failed him as he labored to build the East German state, but he never allowed the truth to interfere with his narrative of victimization—a besieged socialist in an imperialist world. "If we are asked the next goal of our efforts, Ulbricht declared, "then we say frankly: We want to prevent West Germany from taking the road of revanchism, atomic arms policy, and war policy."⁵¹

"Europe certainly will not profit from their know-it-all attitude," Brandt retorted. "Patriotism calls for realizing the facts and trying over and over again to seek new possibilities," he instructed. "It demands the courage to recognize reality. This does not mean, however, that this reality is so desirable that one gives up hope of changing it over the course of time."⁵² For Brandt, pursuing his Ostpolitik placed his country within the spirit of the times. He saw his policies as a new means of modulating the ideological struggle between east and west, not as a resignation from it.⁵³

In truth, Ulbricht's obstinance over inner-German relations contributed to his ouster as general secretary in May 1971 and his political marginalization for the remainder of his life. After the chairman's hostility toward détente, Brezhnev proved only too eager to replace the uncompromising Ulbricht with the SED's security boss, Erich Honecker. With the Sino-Soviet split and the new security challenges on the southern periphery, Brezhnev and his defense planners hoped to achieve stability in Europe; improved inner-German relations would prove essential to that aim. Additionally, the East German economy, propped up by government subsidies for consumer goods, could benefit from an influx of West German capital—a possibility with improved relations.

When Brandt visited Erfurt in March 1970, he created a worldwide sensation. Throngs of East Germans, despite official actions to disburse the crowds, gathered outside of Brandt's hotel. "I looked down on the excited and hopeful crowd," Brandt remembered. "For a moment, they had felt free to express their emotions." From the window of his hotel room, the chancellor waved. "I was moved, but I had to think of the fate of these people [after my departure]." He later confessed, "I feared that hopes would be raised which could not be fulfilled."

While Brandt enjoyed the public spotlight, always a few steps behind, working in the shadows, stood Egon Bahr. As state secretary, throughout 1971 and 1972, Bahr carried on negotiations with his East German counterpart, Michael Kohl. The two had worked together to arrive at a Transit Accord in December 1971 and a Traffic Treaty in February 1972. By the spring of that year, they turned to Bahr's long-hoped-for "framework treaty" (*Rahmenvertrag*), establishing the basis of a permanent relationship between the two German states.

M. E. Sarotte, who has written the definitive account of the Basic Treaty negotiations, explains the central issues that Bahr and Kohl confronted.

- (1) Did a German nation still exist?
- (2) What did the lack of a peace treaty for World War II imply for the German situation? and
- (3) How did one define 'German' citizenship?⁵⁴

The fundamental divide between the two negotiators remained stark: While, in theory, the West German government claimed to represent the legitimate interests of the German nation, the East Germans denied that such a nation even existed. "History already has decided the national question," Kohl chided.⁵⁵

In the matter of the nonexistent peace treaty, Kohl similarly demurred. The Iron Curtain and the Cold War formed his country's *raison d'être*. The SED, with orders from Moscow, adopted a convoluted logic: the recent Moscow and Warsaw Treaties represented ad hoc peace treaties with Bonn and, by Kremlin logic, Hitler's defeated Reich. While the borders of 1945 remained permanent, the Soviets still viewed putative German revanchism—now with NATO backing—as an existential threat. Even with improved inner-German relations, the GDR still required twenty Soviet divisions to hold at bay the supposed inheritors of Hitler's fascism in West Germany.

Bahr and Kohl failed to settle the question of "German" citizenship. Under the Federal Republic's Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), any GDR citizen could claim West German citizenship if he came to the West. Kohl, with instructions from SED apparatchiks, eschewed the topic. By November 1972, the citizenship discussion threatened to torpedo six months of negotiations. With the failure of the treaty a distinct possibility, and with a federal election just a few days away, Bahr convinced his government to append a qualification to the treaty

text, stating Bonn's position that the citizenship question remained unresolved and outside the purview of the agreement. The concomitant note from East Berlin registered the SED's goal of continued citizenship discussions between the two governments.

To a large degree, Bonn's participation in a new treaty régime with the GDR represented a disingenuous act. The agreements bore all the hallmarks of good diplomacy—innocuous proclamations of "good-neighborly relations," "preservation of peace," and the like.

Nonetheless, in the treaty, Bahr had compromised the core of his country's stated constitutional principles and, at least conceptually, had acquiesced to the legitimacy of the East German régime. For the first time, Bonn relented in its claim of sole representation (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*) of the German people, conceding "that neither of the two states can represent the other in the international sphere or act on its behalf" and honoring "the sovereign jurisdiction of each of the two states is confined to its own territory."⁵⁶

Fortunately, Bahr realized that he could afford to be disingenuous. "As long as the four powers have rights [in Germany], the German question is not legally closed," he wrote; Bahr could offer concessions to the GDR without ultimately making any changes to his country's legal situation.⁵⁷ Owing to the Yalta-Potsdam régime, Bahr could yield to Kohl's demands and, if ever necessary, ultimately repudiate the agreements in the name of Four-Power supremacy.

On 21 December 1972, Bahr and Kohl met in Berlin to sign the Basic Treaty normalizing relations between East and West Germany. With the mutual promises of more permeable borders and the exchange of *representatives* (*i.e.*, not *ambassadors*), the treaty codified Brandt's belief of "two German states in one German nation." Though the Bonn government nominally supported eventual unification of the two German states, the reality remained

otherwise: improved relations with the GDR had trumped the aim of unification.⁵⁸ Despite considerable opposition from the Union parties, the treaty was ratified in May of 1973. Four months later both German states became members of the United Nations.⁵⁹

“German policies had considerable influence at the all-European level and beyond,” the chancellor explained. Brandt had leveraged the Federal Republic’s critical position as a NATO member to pivot eastward. He seized on the détente in east-west relations to assert his country’s independence from American meddling and from NATO influence (which he often conflated). “I saw more clearly than some that détente between the Great Powers—fragile as it was—would be bound to fail without us,” he explained.⁶⁰

The Structural Security Problems of the Federal Republic, 1949-67

Brandt’s dreams for a new European peace were set against the backdrop of rapid transformations in the security sphere—changes which Brandt ultimately failed to account for but that would rack the tenure of his successor Helmut Schmidt and would redefine his party for a generation.

Just as the legacy of the Second World War determined many political and cultural norms in the new Federal Republic, it likewise handed down the peculiar and immovable features of the country’s strategic landscape. As the Second World War drew to a close in 1945 and the victorious allies carved the Reich into zones of occupation, no one had anticipated the permanence of Germany’s division. The borders of each sector did not follow naturally defensible frontiers, for the victors had been more concerned with defending against the Germans themselves than against their fellow occupiers. Thus, when the wartime alliance finally collapsed and the Cold War began, the three western

occupation zones (after 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany) faced an exposed geographic position against the east, making the country difficult to defend.⁶¹ The German theater suffered from a lack of depth; more than thirty percent of the country's population and twenty-five percent of its industrial capacity were situated within a hundred kilometers of the eastern states. The inner-German border spanned hundreds of miles of lowlands and plains, vulnerable to the Warsaw Pact's superior armored divisions and massive conventional strength.⁶² With a calculated surprise attack against NATO, both eastern and western war planners estimated, the Federal Republic could be completely defeated within three days.⁶³ Thus, in any conflict, Bonn believed that NATO must respond swiftly and resolutely, avoiding prolonged combat operations on German soil; anything more than a small skirmish, according to Defense Minister George Leber, "would end by destroying what was to be defended."⁶⁴

Nuclear weapons must correct the imbalance; they offered, in the words of the American secretary of state, "more security at less cost."⁶⁵ "Left to fend for itself," warned Leber, "the Federal Republic of Germany would [neither] be capable of defending itself successfully against military attack, nor of developing a credible deterrent against possible aggression."⁶⁶ The answer to such a strategic asymmetry, the Atlantic allies agreed, would be that the West Germans must be joined permanently to the strength of their NATO partners, secure behind a shield of U.S. nuclear weapons. This had been the essence of NATO's doctrine of "massive retaliation": against the overwhelming conventional strength of the Warsaw Pact, the Americans and their allies could only threaten disproportionate nuclear attack—indeed a *massive retaliation* of America's nuclear arsenal against the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ "NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe unless NATO

immediately employed [nuclear] weapons both strategically and tactically,” warned NATO’s military Standing Group.⁶⁸

Such an arrangement, though altogether perilous, had guaranteed stability in western Europe across the 1950s and the early 1960s. It coupled the West Germans to the Americans, resulting in risk sharing; Washington could never abandon Bonn without fearing for its own security. Simultaneously, it deterred Soviet aggression, such that Moscow must expect American reprisal for any aggressive action against Bonn. “An attack on Germany must have fundamentally the same consequences for the Soviet Union as an attack on the U.S., Great Britain, France, or any other region of the alliance,” explained Hans-Georg Wieck, West Germany’s representative to NATO.⁶⁹ In this arrangement, both the Federal Republic and the U.S. remained zones of equal security, coupled together indefinitely—at least in the minds of the Germans.⁷⁰ Massive retaliation demonstrated to the European allies, and to the West Germans and Berliners in particular, that America’s commitment to their freedom and security remained incontrovertible. “Only through its membership in NATO can [we] resolve [our] security problems,” Leber explained. “Hence, the defense policy of the Federal Republic of Germany always has been and will continue to be Alliance policy.”⁷¹

That precarious exposure between east and west had produced in the Federal Republic a domestic political consensus that allied defense cooperation remained sacrosanct and, with few exceptions, above partisan squabbles. Similarly, common perceptions of the Soviet threat transcended the political spectrum and united West Germans in the belief that the USSR was an expansionist power intent upon uniting all Germans under communist authoritarianism. West Germans, whose permanent insecurity had been institutionalized in

the years following Yalta, must then cleave themselves to the multilateral institutions that had grown up around their national division—namely NATO and the European Community—and to the Americans, once their occupiers, now their defenders. Bonn wanted to deter Soviet aggression and Soviet attempts to blackmail the Federal Republic or otherwise to separate the West Germans from western Europe. To achieve those two goals, the West Germans required nuclear deterrence and continued equally shared risk with the Americans.

By the early 1960s, however, massive retaliation appeared an increasingly hollow pledge. In addition to major investments to expand their nuclear arsenal, the Soviets had developed more effective missile technology. Reorganization within the military had privileged the newly created Strategic Rocket Forces, which commanded prestige within the armed forces and became the pride of the Soviet Defense Ministry. Most importantly, the Warsaw Pact began posturing its forces for *nuclear* rather than *conventional* conflicts.⁷² Thus, at least to the American mind, massive retaliation no longer invited *equal* risk for the Federal Republic and the United States, but an unnecessary and disproportionate threat against the American homeland should even a limited conventional war threaten Europe. For, if conflict could be contained to the European continent—say, to West Berlin—why use the American people as collateral to deter further Soviet aggression? Such a doctrine seemed irrationally escalatory. As early as the spring of 1961, the U.S. National Security Council internally conceded that massive retaliation was defunct, asserting that “first priority be given . . . to preparing for the more likely contingencies” in Europe.⁷³ With the Warsaw Pact able to make war on the U.S. and easily equipped for offensive war in Eurasia,

the bluff of massive retaliation had lost its credibility. So too had Bonn's unreserved reliance on American strength.⁷⁴

At the most fundamental level, and despite their close alliance, the West Germans and Americans would never see eye to eye in matters of defense planning—neither for their nuclear nor conventional strategies. Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt, the chief architect of Bonn's security strategy, called for "security by military balance and security by détente," arguing that balance at the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic levels would demonstrate to the eastern bloc that NATO maintained no offensive intentions beyond the Iron Curtain but still equipped to defend their territory against invasion.⁷⁵ Brandt agreed: "As part of the western alliance, we wanted to help bring equilibrium between west and east," he later reflected. "We saw our contribution as defensive."⁷⁶

The Germans remained a non-nuclear power but more affected by nuclear weapons than any country in the world. Likewise, Bonn and Washington maintained fundamentally different requirements from nuclear weapons; the Germans needed nuclear forces to protect them from any invasion whatsoever, and the Americans needed to keep war off their own shores. At the operational level, the two countries planned at cross-purposes and maintained mutually contradictory views on nuclear deterrence. The Germans privileged the concept of *general* deterrence, supposing that the very existence of NATO and its members' nuclear arsenals would prove sufficient to dissuade a Soviet attack. Should deterrence fail, and should conventional forces not be able to meet the threat, theater nuclear weapons should function as a tripwire, triggering NATO's strategic nuclear retaliation.⁷⁷ By contrast, the Americans preferred a model of *immediate* deterrence, which held that only active planning for battlefield operations would genuinely deter the Soviets;

nuclear weapons must always be perceived as trained on specific targets and commanders perceived as ready to launch.⁷⁸ This American perspective naturally became the favored view within the alliance, though not without stoking concern among the Germans. “The Federal Republic should not be made the aircraft carrier” of Europe, warned Herbert Wehner.⁷⁹

The massive retaliation doctrine had papered over those differences, but to the West Germans, the alternative seemed worse than a having no strategic doctrine at all. “I could not see that the logic of deterrence and the spiraling balance of power was as logical as all that,” wrote Brandt.⁸⁰ U.S. officials tried to fill the void, for instance, flirting with various conventional force improvements. Such promises met with tremendous approval in Bonn, where conventional forces were seen as the most visible deterrent against the Warsaw Pact and as the most adaptable means of defense. They were, according to Georg Leber, necessary “for implementing the Forward Defense concept without, however, precluding the possibility of deliberate escalation to nuclear conflict.”⁸¹ Leading minds within the Bundeswehr fundamentally rejected the American notion of theater nuclear forces as NATO’s battlefield panacea. Nuclear weapons may be able to destroy enemy forces, but they could not subsequently secure or occupy terrain; they may slow but could not altogether stop an enemy offensive. Thus, if necessary, the Germans preferred to launch nuclear forces as quickly as possible, thus signaling NATO’s intent to escalate and before most of West German territory was taken by the enemy.⁸² “I had no time for geopolitical simplification,” Brandt later reflected.⁸³

A major point of contention within NATO across the early 1960s had been the anticipated line of resistance against invading Warsaw Pact forces. Despite German

accession to the alliance in 1955, SHAPE continued to plan for defense along the Rhine, thus conceding most of West German territory to the aggressor. Such scenarios became increasingly unpalatable in Bonn; as the principal lodgement against the east and with its large contributions to alliance strength, the Federal Republic should at least enjoy equal security with its NATO partners.⁸⁴ Instead, should nuclear deterrence fail, German defense planners called for a highly mobile strategy based on forward defense and superior firepower against the adversary. Rather than fall back to the Rhine, the Germans believed that NATO should launch offensive operations to seize East German territory up to the Elbe, instead using the Rhine as a contingency. The Bundeswehr dubbed such an operational plan *Vorneverteidigung* (“at-the-front defense”), and planned for twelve to eighteen German armored divisions along the inner-German border.⁸⁵ Properly outfitted conventional forces should, in the estimation of Bundestag armed services committee deputy chairman Erwin Horn, pose an offensive risk to Soviet buffer states—the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—without threatening the USSR itself.⁸⁶

Across the 1960s, the Federal Republic pursued one of the most ambitious peacetime rearmament programs of the twentieth century. Aside from force improvements and major investments in materiel, the Bundeswehr restructured its forces for more effective operations along the inner-German border and centralized its intra-service function, streamlining the service staffs, production, procurement, and management.⁸⁷ Rather than maintain the Army’s existing twelve uniformly equipped divisions, two specially equipped light infantry (*Jäger*) units were deployed in the Hessian hills and Bavarian forests, operational environments less conducive to heavy armor. To each of the Army’s three corps was added an armored regiment with a full complement of battle tanks, armored infantry,

armored reconnaissance, and armored engineer elements. A new West German-designed Leopard tank replaced the American-made World War II-era M47 and M48 Pattons, and the Marder infantry-fighting vehicle redoubled the strength of the mechanized infantry (*Panzergranadiere*). By 1969, an additional ten thousand troops were brought into the Army.

Air and naval forces enjoyed their own renaissance. The Luftwaffe, which had previously been organized by region, was consolidated into two commands, headquartered at Münster in the north and Karlsruhe in the south. A new Air Force Tactical Command (*Kommando der Luftflotte*) assumed responsibility for operational planning, particularly in light of increased Warsaw Pact capacity for low-altitude and surface-to-surface missile strikes. Additions to the Luftwaffe supplemented the alliance's air forces by thirty percent. The Navy (*Marine*) received an infusion of investments to upgrade C³ systems and to modernize its fleet. Redoubled in strength, German surface vessels took greater responsibility for the Danish straits, and with the newly designed Klasse-205 submarines, the Bundesmarine demonstrated its worth in the Baltic Sea as well. By the early 1970s, some senior U.S. commanders cited the German forces "as equal to the best in NATO."⁸⁸

Allied forces did not fare so well. The American defense secretary had admonished NATO for not allocating its resources well enough, and despite pledges from the Pentagon that the U.S. would upgrade its own conventional forces in Europe, such assurances proved disingenuous. The allies supported forward defense in principle, but necessities elsewhere left the Germans to shoulder much of the burden. In the summer of 1966, owing to budget shortfalls, Whitehall announced unilateral reductions in the British Army of the Rhine. Likewise, the Belgians declared that, of their six active army brigades, two would be cut. The

Vietnam conflict had left the Americans with only four active divisions to reinforce Europe and much materiel diverted to Southeast Asia. By 1968, the dire manpower shortage forced the Pentagon to redeploy 34,000 troops from Europe, as well as to withdraw two brigades of 24th Infantry Division and three tactical air squadrons.⁸⁹ As the Americans grew increasingly preoccupied with conflicts in the Third World, Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt believed that strong and self-sufficient West German conventional forces would become ever more necessary in the years to come. "As far as land forces were concerned," Schmidt remarked, "the Bundeswehr had become the backbone of the joint defense of Central Europe."⁹⁰

By 1967, the massive retaliation doctrine, though increasingly defunct, had lulled Bonn's allies into conventional weakness, West Germans feared; it had imparted an overreliance on nuclear weapons complemented with a sense of invulnerability to Soviet aggression. But to the Germans, whose homeland straddled the border between east and west, defending their country and their ideals seemed far more complicated. Hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers lived on their soil and milled about their towns; tanks rumbled through the countryside and military convoys crowded down the Autobahn; every bridge they passed over had been retrofitted for self-destruction rigging in times of crisis; in their schools, West German children learned to distinguish between air-raid sirens and chemical-biological-radiological alerts. For the Germans, war was never a distant concept; every adult had seen it firsthand, and in the shadow of the Iron Curtain, young people feared that too would become their destiny.⁹¹

The Opposition

For all of their claims to political shrewdness, the Union parties in the Bundestag severely damaged their credibility in the early Ostpolitik years. They criticized the chancellor, questioned his intentions, and even protested his Nobel peace honor—all at a time when seventy-four percent of West Germans approved of his revolutionary approach to east-west relations.⁹² A mere twenty-five years after the Germans had plunged the world into an abyss, the German chancellor was honored with an international peace prize. Only ten years after the wall carved Berlin in two, Brandt had negotiated an inner-German rapprochement. The German people, scarred by war, guilt, and division, saw their leader hailed as the world's greatest advocate for peace—all over the opposition of the Christian Democrats.⁹³

Every time Brandt returned from his travels in the east, he did not enjoy the same goodwill he had seen in Erfurt, Moscow, Warsaw, Oslo, or any of his other destinations. Back in Bonn, his political foes had accused him of treachery and even treason—for auctioning off the FRG's sovereignty to the highest superpower bidder. After being named a Nobel laureate, as the chancellor reconvened the Bundestag, his CDU/CSU opponents refused to join in honoring his peace prize, remaining seated in their opposition to his Ostpolitik and to his leadership. In the coming weeks, Union parliamentarians criticized the award: “problematic,” “unwise,” “stupid,” and even “absurd.” “Perhaps the laurel wreath of peace has slipped down over the chancellor's eyes,” mused Bavaria's conservative justice minister.⁹⁴

Of course, in actuality, every postwar government in Bonn had pursued its own version of Ostpolitik.⁹⁵ Adenauer's 1955 trip to Moscow had established diplomatic relations with the USSR, and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder had pursued ambitious trade deals

beyond the Iron Curtain. Across 1963 and 1964, only two years after the construction of the Berlin Wall, Schröder's "policy of movement" (*Politik der Bewegung*) had yielded trade agreements between Bonn and communist régimes in Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.⁹⁶ By the time of Adenauer's retirement from the chancellery in 1963, prominent West Germans were calling for engagement with the east—among them essayist Golo Mann, journalist Rudolf Augstein, psychiatrist Karl Jaspers, and physicists Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (elder brother of the CDU's Richard von Weizsäcker).⁹⁷ Left-of-center publications, namely *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel*, along with the maturation of a new political generation, were gradually swaying public opinion away from the Adenauer-Hallstein doctrine and toward a greater sense of maneuverability between east and west.⁹⁸ During the Grand Coalition government of Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Brandt and Schröder both had secured top cabinet posts and helped to continue greater engagement with the east.⁹⁹

Earlier dalliances with eastern negotiations, however, did not dissuade the CDU/CSU, now in opposition, from attacking the *neue Ostpolitik* mightily. Brandt's detractors on the right saw the chancellor as an idealistic fool, blind to the political realities of the postwar era. Since 1949, the Christian Democrats had never ultimately deviated from the strategy of Adenauer: the Federal Republic's security and prosperity depended upon the transatlantic alliance and European integration. Any hope of unification depended upon leveraging western strength to liberate their eastern countrymen. Earlier trade negotiations between the CDU governments and eastern régimes would not compromise Bonn's long-term ambitions; these early ventures were, in the words of Gordon A. Craig, "tentative and abortive."¹⁰⁰ "The SPD-FDP coalition has been warned," noted the CDU opposition: "The government should be in recognition that this short course [of the new eastern policy] will

result one day in NATO's protection crumbling and Soviet domination over all of Europe."¹⁰¹

Brandt had betrayed Adenauer's legacy; he had unraveled twenty years' steadfastness in opposing communism and the brutal East German régime; in the name of "false détente" (*falscher Entspannung*), he had sacrificed the people of the GDR to permanent division from the West.¹⁰²

To the chancellor and his Social Democrats, only their opponents suffered from any myopia. The outmoded tenets of Adenauer's "change-through-strength" policy had won allied trust in the immediate postwar years but then achieved nothing in the two decades that followed. Brandt accused his political adversaries of shortsighted thinking and pretensions of grandeur. "My country is no longer a great-power (*"große" Macht*), nor can it be," he told his Oslo audience, "however much Government and Opposition may otherwise be in dispute over this question."

Instead, Brandt argued for a refashioning of West Germany's foreign policy for a new era. "No national interest can today be isolated from collective responsibility for peace," he remarked. Twenty years of West German foreign policy refused to acknowledge the status quo; Brandt and his comrades believed they saw the world more clearly—unobstructed by the fog of past wars. "Our Europe," he explained, "born of the experience of suffering and failure, is the imperative mission of reason." He employed a politically powerful, albeit demagogic, message: The antiquated Union—ex-Nazis and war criminals—remained consumed with postwar division, while his own Social Democrats looked toward Germany's future and peace with its neighbors.

Brandt was building an indomitable political force behind his foreign policies. Ostpolitik represented more than a series of treaties; it marked a turning point for the German nation

and the peoples of Europe. “We must discard that unimaginative principle that nations with different social and economic systems cannot live side by side without being in grave conflict,” Brandt explained. Rapprochement with the east meant that Germany was returning to the realm of international politics, now in a benign, predictable, peaceful way. For the first time in modern history, German foreign policy had become synonymous with European peace policy.

So insurmountable were the foreign-policy differences between left and right that in April 1972, the opposition Christian Democrats, touting their “sober and realistic alternatives,” took the unprecedented step of arranging a constructive vote of no confidence to force Brandt out of office—the first such attempt in postwar history.¹⁰³ The opposition, throwing their support behind CDU Chairman Rainer Barzel, hoped to make the vote a referendum on the chancellor’s new eastern policy. Ostpolitik, they warned, would bring “a communist or socialist Europe through a backdoor.”¹⁰⁴

Tension in Bonn was matched by tension in East Berlin. Brandt’s political demise would prove cataclysmic for east-west relations, and Honecker desperately sought to preserve the West German chancellor. Thanks to Egon Bahr’s behind-the-curtain parley with the GDR’s Kohl, Honecker himself spoke out on Brandt’s behalf. “Of course I would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany,” he told the Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst, “but what is happening in Bonn is no longer only a matter that affects the Federal Republic.” The CDU/CSU’s attempt “to overthrow the government,” represents not only a threat in West Germany, “but a crucial question of European politics, peace, and security.”¹⁰⁵ The chairman longed for the legitimacy that only Brandt could provide; east-

west détente would count for nothing without the West German chancellor's signature on a treaty normalizing relations with the GDR.

With only two days left before the vote, the GDR's Politbüro, in a two-and-a-half hour meeting, agreed to relax its negotiating positions. Bahr and Kohl, now desperately collaborating against the CDU bid for supremacy in Bonn, agreed to push the traffic treaty through in less than two days; both men understood that Brandt needed a foreign-policy victory to maintain his position. Honecker went so far as to meet with Bahr personally to seek his predictions on the vote's outcome. In the chairman's desperation for Brandt's victory, the Stasi funneled bribes to Bundestag members, purchasing both their loyalty and their silence. Soviet intelligence operatives likewise approached Bahr, offering him bribe money to persuade obstinate Bundestag members.

"This conversation never happened," Honecker told Bahr. Bahr certainly agreed; he had compromised federal foreign-policy aims for his own political ends and had allowed GDR operatives to establish leverage over his own government at the very highest levels. Improved inner-German relations were taking an enormous toll on Brandt's credibility. Just how deeply he and Bahr had ingratiated themselves with the GDR remained to be seen.¹⁰⁶

By a margin of only two votes, Brandt's Ostpolitik had survived its referendum—the chancellor's no-confidence motion—if only through extralegal bribery, scandal, and foreign meddling.¹⁰⁷ Still, an emboldened chancellor redoubled his efforts at rapprochement. The optics of the situation badly damaged the Union parties. His opponents seemed to be playing dirty politics while he was on a mission of international peace. The old party of foreign-policy realism seemed not to understand the world as it existed—only the world of twenty years earlier. Brandt preempted his detractors: "Realpolitik," he explained, "proved

to be an infernal chimera.” Postwar, divided Germany was on a quest for redemption, hoping to find “a tolerable balance between ourselves and with the world.”¹⁰⁸

Brandt and his followers believed the new eastern policy agenda transcended both partisan loyalties and ideological limitations. Ostpolitik dealt with diplomatic realities. The two superpowers were losing their interest in Europe, yet Europeans remained confined by the limitations placed on them by three outsiders at Yalta. Western Europe, Brandt believed, could “develop into a union which will be able to assume part of the responsibility for world affairs, independently of the United States. However unmistakably great the strength of the superpowers may be, it is an indisputable fact that other magnetic fields are emerging at the same time.”¹⁰⁹

CDU/CSU foreign policy held that any deviation from the status quo proved impossible; Brandt’s Ostpolitik redefined the limits of possibility altogether. By opening to the east, Brandt could open new possibilities not only for his country, but for Europe as a whole. Peace, freedom, and human rights “can no longer be achieved with the help of the nation-state tradition but only in alliance with others,” he explained. “In the future, significant political solutions will no longer be achieved outside alliance, security systems, or communities.”¹¹⁰ The days of nation-state competition were numbered, he believed.

Despite the barrage of criticism he faced, Brandt managed to survive the many attacks of his early chancellorship. He emerged from his no-confidence vote more popular than before—perhaps owing to some illegal machinations in the background. Few in German politics ever enjoyed the resiliency of Willy Brandt. He skillfully married his foreign-policy ambitions to the popular Zeitgeist in unprecedented ways. His foreign-policy agenda took on a life of its own.

“Let’s Dare More Democracy”


At home, by 1972, Brandt and his party enjoyed more support than ever. The coalition with the Free Democrats seemed strong, particularly as the FDP reaffirmed its commitment to “social capitalism” through the 1971 Freiburg Theses. “Let’s dare more democracy!” the chancellor challenged the Bundestag.¹¹¹

Brandt surrounded himself with eager Social Democrats. His cabinet meetings saw vigorous debate from committed, intelligent ministers—many veteran public servants and men and women who continued distinguished careers in politics: Walter Scheel, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Helmut Schmidt, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Horst Ehmke, and Erhard Eppler, among others.

After two decades in opposition, the Social Democrats, now in power, had unveiled a full catalogue of social reform programs, which Brandt hoped would provide a model for the rest of Europe. Brandt’s years in office saw a proliferation of legislative acts to expand social welfare programs—pensions for veterans and the elderly, unemployment benefits, social insurance, housing allowances, increased tax-deductions for families, and so on—largely at the expense of government deficits.¹¹² By the spring of 1974, Schmidt reported to the Bundestag that the real purchasing power of pensioners had increased by nineteen percent within just the past three years.¹¹³ In many cases, the federal government subsumed responsibilities previously held by Länder governments—often more conservative than their leaders in Bonn. “People were seized by a completely new feeling about life,” reported journalist Marion Gräfin Dönhoff. “A mania for large-scale social reforms spread like wildfire.”¹¹⁴

In the November 1972 federal election, dubbed the *Willy-Wahl* (“Willy election”), the Social Democrats saw their best electoral showing since 1930. An unprecedented 91.1 percent of eligible voters turned out to vote. West German young people adored their energetic Nobel-laureate chancellor, certainly preferring him to the CDU’s cranky Rainer Barzel. In the first election since the voting age had been lowered, eighteen-year-olds eagerly queued to cast their ballots for the Social Democrats.

Fig. 1.2. West German Federal Election Results, 19 November 1972



Creating a Union

The pursuit of a new eastern policy and an ambitious domestic agenda overshadowed perhaps the most enduring achievement of Brandt’s tenure: genuine rapprochement with Paris and the institutionalization of Franco-German leadership within the EC. “Reconciliation between the two peoples,” he later noted, “had become a fact of postwar life, perhaps the most important and gratifying fact of all.”¹¹⁵

In his years of Social-Democratic leadership and as foreign minister, Brandt had seen nominal improvements in relations with France.¹¹⁶ The Franco-German enmity certainly had faded into the past, and leaders from the two governments understood the mutual interests

that trumped their historic animus. Still, the rapprochement remained largely superficial. Even the 1963 Élysée Treaty, which declared an end to “a centuries-old rivalry” and the “consolidation of Franco-German friendship,” failed to quash suspicions on both sides of the Rhine. Soon after the treaty entered into force, an American diplomat questioned Charles de Gaulle on how France might manage German power within Europe. Simply, he replied: “*Par la guerre.*”¹¹⁷ The general emblemized the old thinking; France and Germany could cooperate only until the next conflict. More than any single act, the passing of a political generation, scarred by the memories of two devastating continental wars, helped to overcome such suspicions.¹¹⁸

Soon after taking over the Foreign Office in 1966, Brandt made his first trip as minister to Paris. “I saw it as the way into the traffic system of Europe,” he recalled.¹¹⁹ He was politely received by his counterpart in the French Foreign Ministry, Maurice Couve de Murville, and enjoyed all of the privileges of French hospitality. Still, Couve, “that brilliant technician of state,” made little impression on Brandt; he remained de Gaulle’s man and, though he later revealed his differences with the general’s policies, Couve defended the president’s erratic behavior with distinguishing fealty.¹²⁰

Instead, the more important relationship Brandt cultivated across the late 1960s was with Prime Minister Georges Pompidou. The two had first been introduced in 1963 when, as governing mayor of Berlin, Brandt traveled to Paris for an opening of a Watteau exhibition at the Louvre. His later service as foreign minister brought him regularly into contact with then-Prime Minister Pompidou, in an age when Bonn-Paris relations still remained generally cool. Brandt came to hold the Frenchman in high regard. As prime minister and later as president, Pompidou was not particularly dynamic or energetic (as was Brandt), but he

remained a stable and reliable fixture of French life across an age of terrible upheaval. Brandt later described his counterpart with great respect, a “moderate” and “level-headed” partner, “that cautiously calculating son of the Auvergne.”¹²¹ Their association ultimately proved an effective one, if only because the two men complemented one another so well. Brandt, particularly in light of his overtures to the east and his ambitious plans to upend the European status quo, often was perceived in official circles as impulsive and a bit unseasoned, perhaps too much a populist; Pompidou, however, who often agreed with Brandt’s approaches to international politics, did so with characteristic sobriety and lent the German chancellor credibility among his skeptics.

In 1969, both men rose to their new offices; Pompidou took the presidency in June and Brandt became chancellor in October. Their first European summit together met at The Hague in December of that year. Little substantive work was completed at the conference, and many contemporaries remember the meeting as little more than a procedural affair. Both Pompidou and Brandt, however, recall their time at The Hague with fondness as a turning point in Franco-German relations, for it was there, in their first months in office, that they established their positive personal rapport as heads of government and realized that they shared such closely aligned visions for European integration. “We agreed that we should not stop at a tariff union,” Brandt recalled, and that the EC should become a genuine political and economic association.¹²² With combined and coordinated Franco-German effort, the two believed they certainly could unify Europe. In preparation for The Hague summit, Brandt and Pompidou began a custom that they would continue across the remainder of their terms in office, laying out their ideas to one another in private and synchronizing a joint agenda before the conference itself.¹²³ Then, Brandt recalled, “on the

first day of the conference, the two of us got together to cross the ‘t’s and dot the ‘i’s.”¹²⁴ In this practice, the two managed both to harmonize their views and to press a joint Franco-German agenda among their peers.

Brandt did not resent Pompidou’s continuation of Gaullist policies after the general’s retirement from political life; in fact, he came to welcome such an outlook.¹²⁵ Tempered of its Germanophobia, Gaullist policy in France could complement Brandt’s aspiration for a Europe freed from superpower meddling and more assertive in world affairs.¹²⁶ Brandt had admired de Gaulle’s refusal to accept the status quo and his unwillingness “to adapt too fast and too permanently to the postwar landscape.” After all, de Gaulle too had resented the Yalta-Potsdam régime, from which he had been shut out in 1945, and he also hoped for reduced U.S. influence over the continent. “If we want Europe, then it must *be* Europe,” de Gaulle had told Brandt, “and not America plus individual European states.”¹²⁷ De Gaulle had come “closer to a *whole* Europe” than anyone else; Brandt both admired such an achievement and hoped to make it his own.¹²⁸

Thus, as they prepared for the 1969 Hague summit, Brandt and Pompidou focused their debate on questions of European enlargement, namely British entry into the EC.¹²⁹ Brandt had personally supported UK membership, not least because he preferred to orient the British away from the Americans and toward the Europeans. Still, as he later recalled, “the British were not especially adroit”; if they were ultimately to enjoy EC membership, they likely would only do so in spite of themselves—or at least in spite of well-meaning fools such as Foreign Secretary George Brown, who led Britain’s negotiations.¹³⁰ Though he did not share his predecessor’s reactionary contempt for “the Anglo-Saxons,” Pompidou harbored reservations toward British accession; he feared a too-powerful European Commission,

which could diminish the authority of the large EC states (*i.e.*, France and Germany), and he hoped to preserve the privileges guaranteed France's farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy.¹³¹ Through dexterous diplomacy and in concert with Brandt, the French president saw his fears assuaged, and negotiations for British, Irish, and Danish entry were finalized by January 1972. Brandt considered this a favorable outcome for Germany and for Europe. "Anyone who fears that the economic weight of the Federal Republic of Germany could work against equilibrium within the Community should support its extension for that very reason," he told Pompidou.¹³² That is, Germany should voluntarily pledge its wealth and influence toward European stability.

In October 1972, Brandt flew to Paris for the first summit of the enlarged EC.¹³³ (Though their membership would not take effect until January 1st of the following year, the three new member states had been invited to participate.) Pompidou convened the conference at Paris's Hotel Majestic. Before Brandt's arrival in Paris, the two men had been in frequent contact, discussing their visions for the evolving EC. The French president had laid out an ambitious conference program, and with his own pen wrote out in longhand a draft communiqué to reflect his hopes for Europe. He ended his draft with a call for "a European union" by 1980.¹³⁴ In the preceding three years, he and Brandt had discussed the merits of a European "federation" or "confederation," but, the two agreed, since the 1950s, both terms had become burdened with too many connotations to be effective. Brandt quickly embraced the phrase "European union," and with Pompidou, became its champion.

For two decades, European élites had generally rallied around two competing visions for continental integration. The first, put forward by Monnet, imagined a future European federal state or "United States of Europe"; in such a scheme, the fragmented nation-states

of the continent would give way to centralized European power. De Gaulle offered a different vision, calling for “a Europe of states,” integrated between the superpowers but with its member states retaining their individual sovereignty and accorded prestige relative to their power.¹³⁵ Brandt and Pompidou’s phrasing of “a European union” helped to paper over the differences, instituting, according to Jens Kreutzfeldt, “a fragile consensus,” neither singularly federal nor confederal, Monnetist nor Gaullist.¹³⁶ British Prime Minister Edward Heath later praised this seemingly modest achievement as essential for future integration. “What we were concerned with was making a success of the European Community,” he wrote, “and the word ‘Union’ allowed us to do just that.”¹³⁷

Pompidou and Brandt never enumerated the details of their “European union.” The French president continued to support his predecessor’s notion of a “Europe of states,” while Brandt maintained his hope of a post-national and fully integrated EC. Brandt remained a pragmatist. He heeded Bahr’s advice to adhere to “a policy of small steps.” One day, perhaps, common European institutions may subsume many functions of the nation-state, but at the very least, the constraints of German and French domestic politics would require gradual economic convergence and intergovernmental cooperation. Together, Paris and Bonn could pursue such assimilation across the 1970s, and the details could be sorted out later.

In the coming years, the phrase and concept of “European union” gained political cachet. Brandt and Pompidou had provided language for a concept that had long eluded their contemporaries. They reconciled two competing concepts for integration, federal and confederal, by altogether obscuring their differences with the innocuous language of “union.” *“None of us knew what European union meant,”* later confessed the Irish foreign

minister.¹³⁸ By refocusing their energies on their immediate similarities rather than eventual differences, Brandt and Pompidou redoubled their efforts to lead the EC. They simultaneously forged a Franco-German entente, which would become the engine of European integration in the decades to come and which would only deepen under their successors.

Redefining Political Legitimacy

Willy Brandt's desire to relegate "the classical nation-state" "to yesterday" remained the chancellor's topmost priority. Across the Atlantic, however, his American counterparts fretted about the scheme. "The problem of the western countries right now is that the nature of authority of all of them is in the process of redefinition," brooded U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.¹³⁹ As the western allies confronted the political and economic crises of the early 1970s, Kissinger worried, would the locus of the transatlantic relationship—NATO—remain intact? Brandt had demonstrated an ability to internationalize domestic politics, and many of his European counterparts would soon follow suit. Diplomacy was becoming a more difficult enterprise because domestic conflicts were reshaping the nature of international relations itself.

"European society is rudderless and has no sense of direction," remarked Zbigniew Brzezinski, Kissinger's successor. Following a conversation with the CDU's Kurt Birrenbach, Brzezinski reported to the U.S. president that "the welfare society has produced a culture which has no sense of history and no sense of purpose. . . . A society based on foreign workers and defended by foreign soldiers is indeed a society in a state of decay."¹⁴⁰ As the U.S. became mired in the Vietnam Conflict and confronted a host of would-be enemies in

the Middle East, Washington hoped that the Europeans would maintain their own stability, perhaps with less direct U.S. involvement—not redefine the transatlantic relationship altogether.

With Ostpolitik a decoy for shaping a third great-power bloc via the EC, Brandt had thrown the American role in Europe into jeopardy. Since 1945, the American relationship with Western Europe “required the U.S. to play an active role in European politics, not only to shield Western Europe from Soviet pressure, but also as a stabilizing factor in relations among the Western European governments themselves.”¹⁴¹ By the mid 1970s, however, many in London, Paris, and Bonn believed their once war-ravaged continent had matured beyond the need for American meddling, even under the guise of NATO cooperation. Assessing “the scene of world politics,” Bonn’s defense ministry believed that “the bipolar structure of world politics is losing stability and exclusiveness” and that “a multipolar structure is becoming more pronounced.” Certainly, western Europe “will develop into [a] new international center of power.” Furthermore, by the 1970s, the two superpowers had largely been satiated, with “dampened ideological zeal” and “more pragmatic.”¹⁴² Even the doctrinaire Soviet Union could be considered “a status-quo power,” no longer seeking “any territorial gain in Europe.”¹⁴³

Ultimately, Brandt hoped to supplant superpower influence through NATO and the Warsaw Pact, superseding both organizations with *European* security. Moreover, he believed, NATO’s very survival demanded greater intra-European cooperation. “There is a growing need for the European allies jointly to formulate and present their particular interests,” particularly as “the modalities of the U.S. commitment to Europe are subject to change.” No alliance lasts forever, and, “in all countries the question will arise . . . whether

[NATO] should be abandoned in favor of new solutions.” Thus, Brandt believed, “coordination, particularly among the nations of western Europe, had become a necessity.”¹⁴⁴ Through the EC, the chancellor helped to devise international institutions that privileged West German political and economic interests. “We can, and we will, create Europe!” he promised. “The unification of Europe is not merely a question of the quality of our existence. It is a question of survival between the giants.”¹⁴⁵

In many ways, Brandt was able to pursue such a radical new vision for Germany and for Europe because social and political life on the continent reached such disarray in the early 1970s. In those years, Europeans confronted a defeatist sense of pessimism that their integration projects were collapsing. Policymakers, intellectuals, and the public at large began to question the longevity of European institutions.¹⁴⁶ The outlook for Europe appeared bleak, but a renewed mission for the EC could breathe new life into an old institution. Though the once lauded visions of Monnet and Schuman had stalled, Brandt hoped to retool them for a new era. Across Europe, political legitimacy was being redefined, expanding the nexus of politics and power beyond the sovereign institutions of the nation-state.

The Politics of Pessimism

Europessimism represented more than just a loss of faith in Monnet and Schuman’s vision; it represented a collective melancholy about life on the continent as a whole. The 1970s saw a fundamental unraveling of the postwar order. The conservative parties, which had dominated European domestic politics since the war, were replaced by their left-of-center opponents in every EC country.¹⁴⁷ The European economy all but collapsed, yielding

unemployment and domestic unrest. The superpowers pledged themselves to détente, all the while facing off against one another in every corner of the globe. “You all have felt how difficult it has become—our struggle to succeed,” Brandt told his countrymen. “It has become clear that there is no island of stability for us.”¹⁴⁸ The solution, he believed, could be found through deepened integration, and the Germans, he thought, should take the lead.

Fig. 1.3. Heads of Government of the Major European NATO Countries, 1974-1979

	United Kingdom	France	West Germany	United States	
1974	Edward Heath <i>Conservative</i>	Georges Pompidou <i>UDR</i>	Willy Brandt <i>SPD</i>	Richard Nixon <i>Republican</i>	
1975	Harold Wilson <i>Labour</i>	Valéry Giscard d'Estaing <i>Independent Republican until 1978; then UDF</i>	Helmut Schmidt <i>SPD</i>	Gerald R. Ford <i>Republican</i>	
1976					
1977	James Callaghan <i>Labour</i>				Jimmy Carter <i>Democrat</i>
1978					
1979					
	Margaret Thatcher <i>Conservative</i>				

For much of the period between 1974 and 1979, left-of-center governments dominated the politics of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States. Left-of-center governments are shaded blue, and right-of-center governments are shaded red. Giscard's own "republic of the center" is shaded orange, the traditional color of the UDF.

Ironically, the very success of thirty years of postwar prosperity proved the undoing of affluence in the 1970s. Since 1945, the U.S. had provided a baseline of security and economic stability for the transatlantic community. Europeans achieved material abundance and prosperity under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and kept dollars as the reserve currency in their central banks. Since 1944, the Bretton Woods monetary system tied Europe's postwar

economies to America's superpower wealth. In West Germany, the *Wirtschaftswunder* ("economic miracle") had sustained decades of prosperity, yielding a society of abundance and consumer comfort. Like the ubiquitous Volkswagen Beetles that zipped down the country's Autobahnen, West German prosperity proved comfortable, humble, and always dependable. Across the Rhine, France's economy likewise expanded during *les Trente Glorieuses*—"the glorious thirty" years of postwar prosperity. With high consumer spending, high productivity, and high wages, the standard of living completely recovered from the destruction of two devastating global wars fought on French soil.¹⁴⁹ The Italians enjoyed their *miracolo economico*, the Spanish their *milagro español*, the Swedes their "record years," and so on. Though the British never quite achieved the boom of the French or Germans, the cottage homes to which warriors returned were blessed with modest but solid prosperity, well-fenced and guarded against misfortune. "Let us be frank about it," remarked Prime Minister Harold Macmillan; "Most of our people have never had it so good."¹⁵⁰

By the early 1970s, however, American dollars did not provide the stability they once offered. The U.S. had come to rely on chronic balance-of-payments deficits as the government depleted its gold reserves. Rising commodity prices in the industrialized countries favored the developing economies of the global south, and Europeans produced less and imported more. Rising wages and production costs chipped away at private-sector profits, and expanding welfare benefits siphoned off public-sector revenues. Underwriting the entire system was abundant, low-cost energy.

In May 1971, the Bonn government backed out of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Though Bretton Woods had guaranteed economic stability in the western world since its

inception in 1944, three decades later, the overvalued dollar jeopardized the West German economy. U.S. President Richard Nixon had instituted a ten-percent import surcharge, a ninety-day price and wage freeze, and halted convertibility between the dollar and gold, effectively destroying the Bretton Woods régime.¹⁵¹ Finance Minister Karl Schiller signaled Bonn's resolve, both protecting the Deutsche Mark against inflation and initiating an assault on the dollar from European arbitrageurs.¹⁵²

Economic crisis in the transatlantic community was exacerbated by the Egyptian and Syrian invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights in October 1973. The twenty-two-day Yom Kippur War invited superpower confrontation. In retaliation for American tactical and material support for Israel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices by seventy percent, holding hostage the lifeblood of western infrastructure, industry, and consumer livelihood. OPEC's scheme effectively brought the western world to a screeching halt. In the U.S., rationing yielded bumper-to-bumper queues leading to service stations; Americans abandoned the heft of their V-8 Ford Galaxies in favor of the more energy-efficient Pinto; and Christmas gleamed a little less brilliantly with twinkle lights banned by many localities.¹⁵³

With oil reserves dwindling, West Germans and western Europeans generally divorced themselves from the United States' interventionist and pro-Israel tendencies. Although the U.S. imported only thirty percent of its oil from abroad, most of the EC states imported more than ninety percent, and Japan imported nearly its entire supply.¹⁵⁴ The London government called for Israel's return to its 1967 borders, denied Americans use of Cypriot airfields, and embargoed arms to combatants. Paris decried the potential superpower confrontation. "We see Mr. Brezhnev, the apostle of détente, and Dr. Kissinger, now a Nobel

Peace Prize winner, shaking hands while sending thousands of tons of arms by air,” wryly noted Foreign Minister Michel Jobert.¹⁵⁵ The Germans temporarily allowed overflight, though Bonn soon distanced itself from U.S. policy.¹⁵⁶ “Don’t kill the goose that lays golden eggs,” warned one German daily.¹⁵⁷ The December 1973 Copenhagen summit of the EC, initiated by the French president because of the oil crisis, ended with a common declaration on “European identity” and a call for “a United Europe.” Behind Georges Pompidou and Brandt’s pro-European agenda, the EC nine were drawing closer together, largely in reaction to “the developing energy crisis” and America’s interventionist foreign policies. “Convinced that the present tensions in international relations, and their repercussions within the Community, make it even more essential to advance the deadlines for achieving European union,” they declared, “the Nine reaffirm their intention of transforming the whole complex of their relations into a European Union before the end of the present decade.”¹⁵⁸ Brandt himself believed that, if the oil shock failed to bring the Europeans together, nothing would. He told his speechwriter: “If there is no progress on this, then the whole European Union is no good.”¹⁵⁹

On the domestic front in Europe, a curious new brand of Marxism emerged in so-called “eurocommunism.” Gaining traction across the continent, eurocommunists proposed a “third way” between competitive capitalism and authoritarian communism.¹⁶⁰ Supporters established a Danish Communist League in Århus in early 1974, joining their comrades in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. Much of the eurocommunists’ effort was devoted toward advancing the new social movements of the 1960s. Notably absent, the French Communist Party rejected eurocommunism in the early 1970s in favor of the Soviet-dictated party line.¹⁶¹ “We don’t want to see what NATO has prevented come about by the

internal route,” worried the American president. Toeing the official line, West Germany’s Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher agreed. “We can’t let NATO be undermined—it is the alpha and omega of our . . . security.”¹⁶²

Outside the realm of high politics and diplomacy, terrorists wrought fear among nervous populations. In September 1972, Palestinian terrorists took hostage eleven Israeli Olympic team members in Munich, reviving the horrific memories of Jewish victimhood in that city. The litany of furious reactions poured forth: “mad, cruel, senseless, outrageous, abhorrent, abominable, and awful.” Anxieties had already been heightened when one Israeli athlete insisted on wearing a yellow Star of David on his jersey, reminiscent of his imprisonment at Bergen-Belsen in 1944. After an abortive rescue attempt, all eleven hostages died. Thirty-six years had passed since the last Olympics hosted on German soil, but, as one German weekly observed, the distance between Dachau and Munich remained the same.¹⁶³

The rest of Europe endured similar traumas. Returning from mass, just before Christmas in 1973, Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero-Blanco was assassinated when an explosion blasted his car from the road, propelling it into the adjacent Jesuit monastery. Dubbed “Operation Ogre” by its Basque separatist plotters, the murder had deprived Francisco Franco of his chosen successor.¹⁶⁴ In the spring, a neo-fascist bombing at Brescia’s Piazza della Loggia killed eight and wounded ninety. Three months later, members of the radical right-wing *Ordine Nero* targeted the Italicus Express train traveling between Rome and Munich, killing a dozen and wounding four times that many. This neo-fascist *strategia della tensione* aimed to create panic and thus popular demand for strong government. The terrorists cited the train bombing as a harbinger for further attacks: “We wanted to show the nation that we can place a bomb anywhere we want, whenever and however we

please,” the Ordine Nero declared. “Let us see in autumn; we will drown democracy under a mountain of dead.”¹⁶⁵ In another train attack, the “Chopin-Express” between the Soviet Union and Vienna was hijacked by Arab terrorists, who later escaped to Libya. In the same year, members of the Japanese Red Army organization (JRA) hijacked Japan Air Lines flight 404 en route from Amsterdam to Tokyo. In cahoots with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the JRA held the passengers and crew hostage for nearly four days, landing in Dubai and Damascus, finally releasing them and exploding the aircraft in Libya. In the coming months, the JRA assaulted a Shell refinery in Singapore and hijacked the *Laju*, with the PFLP simultaneously storming the Japanese mission in Kuwait. The JRA soon after seized the French Embassy in The Hague. Anti-Arab terrorists of the Groupe Charles-Martel killed four and injured a score more when they bombed the Algerian consulate at Marseilles in December.

With the proliferation of global terrorist networks throughout 1973 and 1974, no Europeans suffered more than the people of the UK. During the period of “The Troubles,” the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) waged its paramilitary battles on the Emerald Isle. The IRA orchestrated repeated bloody attacks in Britain as well—even bombing Whitehall and Old Bailey.¹⁶⁶ An IRA-hijacked helicopter from Donegal bombed the Royal Ulster Constabulary barracks in the Northern Irish town of Strabane in January.¹⁶⁷ In June, the Palace of Westminster was ripped apart when a bomb planted in the building exploded and ruptured a gas main, spreading both fire and terror. Later that year, as patrons settled in two Guildford pubs frequented by British Armed Forces personnel, explosions tore through the houses, killing five and injuring thirteen times that number.¹⁶⁸ For the rest of the year, IRA bombings provoked panic. Multiple bombings every few weeks claimed dozens of lives,

injured hundreds, and added London, Woolwich, Northampton, Birmingham, and Coventry to the list of terrorized cities.

Every reach of society faced an uncertain future. Terrorist attacks murdered the innocent week after week. Factories were closing, and workers faced off against their governments. Strident OPEC suppliers held their prices firm in the face of oil-thirsty customers. Inflation chipped away at middle-class savings and wiped out the poor as the long-standing gold-dollar standard was overtaken by fiat currency. The politically disenfranchised searched for answers and clamored for social and political influence; they even experimented with eurocommunism. Deadly hostilities boiled over in the eastern Mediterranean, and the superpowers once again confronted one another.

To Brandt's mind, none of those crises stopped at the border; by their history, by the challenges they faced, and by their ability to meet the problems of the age, the nations of Europe were inextricably woven together. Only through an international forum could European solve their problems, and the Germans must take the lead.

Globalizing Europe

"The results for Europe are hopeless: debt, debt, and debt again," noted France's *Le Nouvel Observateur*.¹⁶⁹ The blessings Europeans enjoyed in abundance since World War II seemed to have vanished without a trace. All that remained was debt: economic debt, political debt, energy debt.

The problems that Europeans faced—the collapsing economy, closing factories, political perfidy, the energy crisis, terrorism—were international in scope but domestic in origin; national governments proved powerless to solve them. To many European leaders—namely,

French Presidents Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing—Brandt's inclination to relegate the traditional nation-state "to history" seemed an understandable, though complicated, reaction.¹⁷⁰

Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, teaching international relations at Stanford University at the time, described such a situation as nothing short of "The Diplomatic Revolution of our Time"—the title of their course:

the expansion in the numbers and types of actors within the international system, the geographical scope of that system, powerful domestic political forces pressing to ignore the advice of professional diplomats and instead elevate the role of public opinion and promote economic interests, . . . and the deliberate rejections by many national leaders of traditional norms of diplomacy and self-imposed restraints on force and statecraft.¹⁷¹

As the once subject peoples of the global south hoisted their own flags and declared their sovereignty, the variety and number of actors in the international system multiplied. In 1970, 126 states were recognized by the United Nations; by 1980, twenty-eight new states had been added.

Furthermore, in the absence of nation-state diplomacy solving Europe's crises, a proliferation of new multinational institutions redefined world politics.¹⁷² Since the 1950s, NATO and the EC had bound together the western European states with mutual pledges of security cooperation and economic integration. To that twenty-years-old foundation had been added the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961. The European Communities, which had begun as three distinct entities—the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and

the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)—took on greater supranational influence when the three merged behind a single executive body with the Brussels Treaty in July 1967.¹⁷³ Previously domestic issues were being “internationalized” but with little result.¹⁷⁴

One observer quickly identified Brandt’s strategy to internationalize domestic politics. “Transnational relations and other multicultural processes seriously threaten democratic control of foreign policy,” wrote West German political scientist Karl Kaiser. He feared that both “the intermeshing of decision-making across national frontiers” and “the growing multinationalization of formerly domestic issues” was creating a crisis of governance in the western world.¹⁷⁵ The western democracies altogether were failing to integrate their democratic ideals with their foreign-policy interests. “Almost all the people to whom I spoke stated that they could not imagine a better future for their country than that offered by the building of Europe,” reported Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans.¹⁷⁶ In short, domestic governments, bewildered and in turmoil, were abdicating their responsibilities to Europe, and European institutions were failing time and again to do any better.

Most importantly, diplomacy devolved into an exercise in public-policy pandering. Democratic societies demanded answers they could understand, but the technocratic dimensions of political economy, international trade, and the energy market surpassed the average voter’s understanding and politicians’ one-liners. Solutions for political crises were subsumed by political shorthand—“Europe,” “cooperation,” “globalization”—and few leaders risked their reputations outlining the intricacies of problems they barely understood themselves.¹⁷⁷ “Foreign ministries,” Kaiser worried, “are losing their traditional monopoly over the regulation of the external affairs of their countries.” Instead, “transnational

organizations [and] multinational corporations, which often conduct their own foreign policy, are encroach[ing] on the foreign ministries' role as sole regulators of external relations.”¹⁷⁸ A democratic surplus was producing a democratic deficit.

At the root of every trouble facing Europeans in the 1970s was the economic crisis. Stagnant economic growth and spiraling inflation, earning the portmanteau “stagflation” from Britain’s chancellor of the exchequer, destroyed confidence in the economy. Contemporaries quickly attributed stagflation to the most immediate culprit—the energy crises of 1973 and 1974. The roots of the problem, however, lay in the 1960s, with expansion of welfare states and the far reach of the U.S. balance-of-payments difficulties.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, with the liberalization of world capital markets and enduring national sovereignty over monetary policy, attempts at domestic remedies for stagflation proved short-lived.¹⁸⁰

Table 1.1. Monetary Growth and Inflation, 1974-1989

	<i>M1</i>		<i>Inflation</i>	
	<i>compound annual growth rates</i>		<i>compound annual growth rates</i>	
	<i>1974-1978</i>	<i>1979-1989</i>	<i>1974-1978</i>	<i>1979-1989</i>
EMS average	14.5	8.4	10	6.4
Belgium	9.2	4.2	8.3	4.9
Denmark	14.8	14.1	9.9	6.9
France	14.2	8.2	10	7.3
Germany	10.9	6.3	4.1	2.9
Ireland	21.7	7.7	14.9	9.2
Italy	19.7	11.3	15.7	11.1
Netherlands	11.2	6.8	7.4	2.8
UK	16.7	13.7	16.1	7.4
Japan	11.3	4.9	8.3	2.5
U.S.	7	7.4	7.3	5.5

Source: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, 1989, 1990; in John B. Goodman, *Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 195.

While consumer price inflation only reached 4.9 percent for West Germans, their European neighbors saw numbers unprecedented even since the era of the World Wars.¹⁸¹ France registered an average 8.8 percent inflation between 1970 and 1979, the United States 7.1 percent, and the United Kingdom 12.6 percent. Others in Europe fared no better—Belgium at 7.1 percent, Greece at 12.4, Italy at 12.3, the Netherlands at 7.0, Portugal at 18.3, and Spain at 14.4.¹⁸² Economic growth remained low and unemployment high, while per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the western countries leveled off. Of the OECD member states, GDP saw average growth between 1970 and 1980 of 2.6 percent, compared with 4.4 percent in the previous decade.¹⁸³ Contractions in the international economy produced a decade of malaise in the Western world, resulting in decreased interest in defense spending and increased interest in multinational economic and political cooperation.¹⁸⁴

Table 1.2. Consumer Price Inflation (%) in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s

	<i>Belgium</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Portugal</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
<i>1960s</i>	2.9	3.8	2.5	2	3.9	4.2	4.3	6.1	3.8	2.4
<i>1970s</i>	7.1	8.8	4.9	12.4	12.3	7	18.3	14.4	12.6	7.1
<i>1980s</i>	4.9	7.4	2.9	19.5	11.2	2.9	17.7	10.3	7.5	5.6

Source: OECD; in Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 7.

Table 1.3. Unemployment in the G7 Countries (%), 1967-1982

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
U.S.	3.7	3.5	3.4	4.8	5.8	5.5	4.8	5.5	8.3	7.6	6.9	6	5.8	7.0	7.5	9.5
Japan	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.4
FRG	1.3	2.6	2.3	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.6	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.2	3.0	4.4	6.1
France	1.9	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.8	4.1	4.4	4.7	5.2	5.9	6.3	7.3	8.0
UK	3.3	3.2	3.0	3.1	4.0	4.4	3.3	3.2	4.7	6.0	6.4	6.1	5.6	6.9	10.6	12.8
Italy	5.3	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.3	6.3	6.2	5.3	5.8	6.6	7.0	7.1	7.5	7.4	8.3	8.9
Canada	3.8	4.4	4.4	5.6	6.1	6.2	5.5	5.3	6.9	7.1	8.0	8.3	7.4	7.5	7.5	10.9

Unemployment rates are calculated as a percentage of the total labor force. Source: OECD, *Economic Outlook 34, Annual Projections for OECD Countries* (December 1983), p. 163.

The solutions to Europe's economic woes would only be found in concert with one another. Ironically, the decade of europessimism and eurosclerosis produced a remarkably robust EC by the early 1980s. Andrew Moravcsik has rightly argued that the deepening of European institutions as a reaction to europessimism and eurosclerosis represented each country's individual economic interests rather than a common supranational effort.¹⁸⁵ The "strong-currency countries," represented by Germany, and the "weak-currency countries," represented by France, found common solutions in the monetary agreements.¹⁸⁶ As Moravcsik and other scholars have demonstrated, the de facto Franco-German leadership of the community in the middle and late 1970s produced a deeper set of European institutions in the EMS and the European Council, as the "Community of Nine sought to 'rediscover itself.'"¹⁸⁷

In the face of political and economic crisis, many policy-makers and intellectuals across the continent found Brandt's optimistic European agenda persuasive. The weakened institutions of the nation-state found renewed purpose in crafting an international problem-solving body in the EC. In the coming years, across the late 1970s, deepening international organizations exerted their own discreet pressures on political processes and social

discourse.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, the internationalization of formerly domestic political and economic questions seduced political capital away from defense and security-related matters—NATO’s traditional province—and devoted it toward social and economic projects—the EC’s expanding purview.

Thinking EC, Thinking NATO

“Only lip-service is being paid to NATO,” warned West Germany’s alliance representative, Franz Krapf. In his 1976 farewell address to the North Atlantic Council, Krapf explained that, despite rhetorical support from all major West German political parties, he constantly found himself having “to preach, to explain, to defend, and to convince” his countrymen of the alliance’s enduring utility. “The lack of knowledge about NATO is often appalling, even in the highest places,” he worried.¹⁸⁹

Krapf’s British counterpart, Sir John Killick, echoed that concern. “[T]he alliance is taken too much for granted,” Killick warned. “Apart from the provision of a background insurance for explorations in détente, NATO’s role is too little thought about.” The problem, Killick warned, was a loss of “thinking NATO” in allied capitals. “We should encourage the habit of ‘thinking NATO,’ with all its practical consequences,” he told Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, “including more enthusiastic participation in political consultation in NATO, greater readiness to consult on defence issues, and the posting of the best members of our Armed Services to staff positions in NATO.”¹⁹⁰

Both Krapf and Killick had begun their diplomatic careers when Europeans relied on NATO for their survival.¹⁹¹ By the 1970s, however, both ambassadors, along with their colleagues in Brussels, found that domestic support for the alliance was waning. Attitudes

such as Brandt's were having an effect. "[W]e no longer look first to NATO for the deployment of our external policies in important respects," admonished Killick, "mainly because of our adherence to the European Community."¹⁹² *Thinking EC* had replaced *thinking NATO* in Europe.

Spurred on by rhetoric such as Brandt's call for a "europeanization of Europe," a perfect storm in international politics positioned NATO and the EC as competitors to one another. The transatlantic divide in the wake of the Vietnam Conflict divided Europeans from their American partners, and the superpower reversal from confrontation to coexistence devalued the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The strategic challenges of continental security seemed to be yesterday's problem; rebuilding political stability and economic prosperity were today's. European leaders' efforts to solve domestic problems through the EC had made European institutions the locus of international stability.

"Although the EC is vital," Killick warned, "it is not in the foreseeable future a substitute for NATO." For both the British and the French, "the pendulum may have swung too far towards our Community preoccupations at present."¹⁹³ For his part, Brandt hoped that the London and Paris governments, both beleaguered by political and economic turmoil, would find stability in renewed European institutions, joining his vision for continental integration.

In Britain, since EC accession in 1973, many in Whitehall had staked their reputations on EC membership and, sometimes begrudgingly, expended vast political capital to achieve British admission into the Community. In its foreign policy, the Labour government resolved to instill an "*esprit communautaire*," seeking to demonstrate at home and abroad the fullness of Britain's hard-won membership in the EC.¹⁹⁴

The collapse of Bretton Woods touched off a continental-wide economic crisis, soon compounded by the Yom Kippur War and the energy crisis. The British battled economic stagnation, inflation of the pound, and decreased purchasing power. Heavily weighted down with Commonwealth trade obligations abroad and suffering poor labor relations at home, the British economic situation continued to deteriorate under Prime Minister Edward Heath. By 1974, never had government seemed so far removed from the popular will. As labor unions organized strikes, the government responded by restricting commercial electricity consumption to only three consecutive days—thus effectively cutting the work week in half.¹⁹⁵ By the end of the year, the Tories' battles with labor proved the cabinet's undoing. The February 1974 general election's defining question became "Who governs Britain?"¹⁹⁶

In the days that followed the voting, the answer remained unclear; no party had won a majority. After days of party negotiations, the queen asked Harold Wilson to form a minority Labour government.¹⁹⁷ That hung parliament—the first since 1929—lasted only eight months, when Britons had to return to the polls. Amid economic stagnation, the energy shock, and labor strikes, Wilson's government lurched from crisis to crisis. As he was forced to modulate his party's traditional labor-sympathetic platform, the prime minister instead committed the government to broad liberalization in social politics, relaxing laws on abortion and homosexuality, equalizing access to primary education, and abolishing capital punishment.

Questions of Anglo-EC relations dominated the British foreign-policy agenda during the tumultuous years of 1974 and 1975. Privately, the conservative Heath had confessed pessimism for Europe's future. "The most disappointing thing in Europe is the lack of leadership," he told Gerald Ford. "Pompidou lost his grip a long time ago," he said, and

“Brandt was getting more and more moody.”¹⁹⁸ Importing commodities from the Commonwealth, many working-class Englishmen agreed with their prime minister; they resented the EC’s high agricultural subsidies and extra-Community import taxes. By 1974, the new Labour government harnessed that discontent. The 1973 terms of British EC membership, negotiated by their political opponents, constituted “a draconian curtailment of the power of the British Parliament to settle questions affecting vital British interests” — namely food prices.¹⁹⁹

Seizing their moment, Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan renegotiated Britain’s position among the Nine. On 5 June 1975, in a constitutionally unprecedented popular referendum, 67.2 percent resolved to preserve British membership in the EC.²⁰⁰ The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, on the eve of the referendum, noted the centrality of Britain’s future in the EC were the integrative institutions to survive. “Were the UK to quit membership, “[t]he EEC would cease to be what is surprisingly represents outside Europe: namely, an exemplar of hope, an economic power, and an independent partnership in a world of superpowers.”²⁰¹

Across the Channel, Franco-NATO cooperation fared no better, although for different reasons. Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 expulsion of allied troops and withdrawal from the alliance’s integrated military command, even a decade later, still hindered France’s relationship with NATO. The popular Gaullist sentiments that lingered into Georges Pompidou’s presidency spurred anti-NATO policies emanating from Paris. As early as February 1970, preparing for his first meeting with the American president, Pompidou hoped to be “spared the litany of NATO integration.”²⁰²

Pompidou had risen to power at the side of de Gaulle; many came to see Pompidou's presidency as an extension of his mentor's policies. As president, however, Pompidou, who lacked his predecessor's mettle and charisma, struggled to navigate between "the politics of grandeur," atlanticism, and pan-Europeanism. Motivated more by domestic political ambitions than by France's strategic interests, Pompidou followed the foreign policies of his inimitable predecessor. De Gaulle's populism and charisma had wedded France to a particular international policy that only could be undone by Pompidou to his political peril.²⁰³

While seemingly adrift in foreign policy, Pompidou's presidency had focused on domestic productivity and prosperity. France's dirigiste economy expanded markedly, with high consumer spending, high productivity, and high wages. Along with the president's demise also ended *les Trente Glorieuses*.

Pulling away from the alliance, rather than following the British zeal for an "esprit communautaire," Pompidou's government turned inward, ultimately embracing a neo-Gaullist independence—much to the annoyance of France's neighbors and allies.²⁰⁴ Under Pompidou's leadership, France's Fifth Republic strayed dangerously close to the errors of the Third; namely, trying to appease too many political factions within the same government. Defense Minister Michel Debré, the unapologetic Gaullist, coveted the presidency for himself and preached the politics of grandeur. Economics and Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, an ardent Europeanist, hoped to leverage his ministerial popularity for redoubled public support for his beloved integration projects. Justice Minister René Pleven, a shrewd defense strategist, focused on the ever precarious military balance of power on the continent and called upon his government to honor its NATO commitments

more fully. As contemporaries were quick to note, “being partially faithful to three diverging notions had earned Pompidou the reputation of being completely unfaithful to all of them. Instead of winning friends on all sides, Pompidou’s France had succeeded in alienating everybody—Atlanticists, Europeans, and Gaullists alike.”²⁰⁵

In April 1973, the president’s selection of foreign minister tipped the balance in favor of Gaullism. Just as Pompidou himself had been plucked from relative political obscurity to serve in de Gaulle’s cabinet, the president paid the favor forward, choosing the unknown but fiery *fonctionnaire* Michel Jobert.²⁰⁶ “Jobert’s move from the Elysée Palace to the Quai d’Orsay gave a new impetus to French foreign policy that had been lacking for years,” noted *Foreign Affairs*. Contemporaries quickly noticed Jobert’s meteoric rise, but no one questioned his skill. Dubbed by Pompidou *mon Kissinger à moi*, Jobert shrewdly navigated the perilous shoals of French politics and the tempest of superpower relations. He had been “transformed from staff assistant to the foreign minister and from self-effacing aide to the oratorical terror of allied diplomacy.”²⁰⁷

The vacillations in French international policy appeared to Washington, Bonn, and London as foreign-policy schizophrenia.²⁰⁸ Kissinger posited that Europeans had “come to believe that their identity should be measured by [their] distance from the United States.”²⁰⁹ Jobert largely confirmed Kissinger’s hypothesis, echoing Brandt, suggesting that “the Atlantic relationship actually impeded the European one.” In 1973, ironically Kissinger’s “Year of Europe,” Europe was both “humiliated” and “treated like a non-person,” according to Jobert.²¹⁰ To complement Brandt’s “europeanization of Europe,” Jobert called for Europe to “assert its identity everywhere, for all purposes and for its own benefit.”²¹¹

The deepening of the EC did not offer an end unto itself, but a means by which France could achieve a greater measure of independence and once again style itself a great power. As such, even the most careful diplomacy on the part of the Americans and Soviets met with hostility in Paris. Even a milestone of détente—the June 1973 U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war—found little favor with Jobert. “How can Europe be absent from this negotiation when she is so profoundly affected?” Jobert asked the French Senate.²¹² After a lukewarm meeting between Pompidou and Brezhnev at Rambouillet, Jobert similarly locked horns with Kissinger in Brussels at the North Atlantic Council ministerial session.²¹³ Such a superpower agreement, absent French consultation, compromised American nuclear defense assurances to their European allies.²¹⁴ “Experience has shown us that this superpower tête-à-tête can just as easily lead to confrontation as to détente,” Jobert told the National Assembly. “These observations may be brutal, but we must be realistic and lucid. They reinforce our convictions that, if we want to stay free, have any influence in the world, participate in the determination of our destiny, then we must tirelessly pursue both European construction and our defense effort,” he exclaimed.²¹⁵

Despite Jobert’s apprehensions about superpower influence in Europe, his real concern lay across the Rhine. Though he maintained an amicable relationship with Brandt, he privately feared that the chancellor’s Ostpolitik might be creating a nationalist German Frankenstein “that would prove impossible to contain.” After a meeting between Nixon and Pompidou, Kissinger reflected on the French president’s suspicions: “German nationalism might break forth again and, if through calamity it had learned patience, it might prove even more dangerous.”²¹⁶

Paris appreciated the energy that Brandt brought to the European project, but his insistence on linking integration with Ostpolitik fundamentally divided the two governments. To Paris, Ostpolitik smacked of nationalism. Although de Gaulle had twice vetoed UK entry into the European Community, Pompidou welcomed the British, hoping their membership might contain possible German nationalist impulses as the divided nation shows signs of reconciliation. “Everybody wanted Britain in the Common Market to help restrain Germany,” Kissinger later explained. Reminiscent of Richelieu’s designs, “Pompidou even went so far as to ruminate on a London-Paris axis as a counterweight to uncontrolled German nationalism.”²¹⁷

With Pompidou’s untimely death on 2 April 1974 the era of de Gaulle came to an end. The late president was succeeded by Finance Minister Giscard, who won office in his own right at the end of May. “Giscard brought a greater realism and receptivity to French policy as it relates to the U.S. and NATO,” noted the U.S. National Security Council soon after.²¹⁸ The French president similarly hoped to synchronize his foreign-policy with his neighbors across the Rhine. “Throughout the Gaullist years, the argument was that there could only be an Atlantic Europe *or* a European one—the two could not coexist,” reported *Foreign Affairs*. Giscard rejected such an outlook. In his five years as finance minister, he had argued for more nuance in French foreign policy, hoping to prove wrong the old French ideal that euro-atlanticism stood as the enemy of euro-Gaullism.²¹⁹

The new French president sought absolution from the European partners most affronted by de Gaulle’s coup against NATO. He hoped to appeal to the euroskeptical British and to reorient the Germans westward.²²⁰

Though the British and French maintained diverging outlooks on European institutions, both governments recognized the advantage of greater European independence from the United States and harnessing Brandt's seemingly unpredictable international agenda by anchoring the Federal Republic of Germany to the west.

Brandt's Unraveling

On the surface the chancellor seemed a dynamic and enterprising politician; he proved quite scrappy in Bundestag politics and dispensed with detractors handily. Through his political prowess, he resisted the encroaching continental pessimism and sclerosis, retaining prosperity and stability at home. Physically and emotionally, however, a life in politics was taking its toll. After his party's November 1972 electoral victory, Brandt soon was hospitalized for throat surgery. After some surgical complications, a tumor was removed from his throat. During his short convalescence, Brandt was denied his three favorite activities. "I was not allowed to talk, to see visitors, or to smoke," he remembered. "I felt all these deprivations."²²¹

Brandt believed that his coalition partner Walter Scheel took advantage of his illness to overstep his position. "I was forced to realize that my remarkably harmonious cooperation was with Walter Scheel was coming to an end," he acknowledged.²²² Worse still, Brandt feared he was losing his grip over his cabinet, forced to balance the competing political ambitions of his ministers. "Team spirit is more easily found among mediocrities," Brandt noted. In the absence of a clear domestic agenda in 1969, the ministers largely had become masters of their own houses with little integration between their efforts. A missive from his

hospital bed warning against “eccentric or self-destructive tendencies” went largely unheeded. The chancellor feared the cabinet was “overdrawing our account.”²²³

In particular, though Brandt maintained the utmost respect for his fellow Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt, he found Schmidt a difficult subordinate to manage. Much like the biting winds of Schmidt’s native Hamburg, the future chancellor often projected a cold, unforgiving demeanor. As minister for defense, Schmidt clashed with his fellow ministers, namely finance minister Karl Schiller. One commentator assessed Brandt’s second cabinet, saying that the ministers would rather have worked “against one another than for him.” “There is much truth in that,” Brandt later acknowledged.²²⁴ Even on the momentous occasion of the two German states entering the United Nations, the chancellor was forced to compose his own remarks, as his advisors fought too bitterly to write an acceptable draft.²²⁵

By the fall of 1973, the situation had not improved; self-interested politicking had materialized a fifth column within the party. Herbert Wehner, chairman of the SPD group in the Bundestag, launched a series of attacks on the weakened chancellor. “What the government is missing,” Wehner told *Der Spiegel*, “is a head.”²²⁶ As chairman, Wehner stood as the second most powerful Social Democrat in the country; his criticism of Brandt garnered intense attention.²²⁷ He described the chancellor as so “arrogant” (*hochmütig*), that he had become “Adenauer-like”—only without the elder chancellor’s “skill.”²²⁸ Many expected Brandt to retaliate, but he just shrugged off the criticism. Even his dearest confidant, Günter Grass, publicly bemoaned the chancellor’s “paralyzing complacency.”²²⁹ Despite an overwhelming electoral mandate, the SPD seemed to be unraveling. Too many of the party’s achievements hinged on a single personality.

All the while the playboy chancellor nursed his melancholy with Burgundy and female companionship. Brandt's vices were well known; he was fond of overindulging in spirits, chomped his cherished cigarillos, and his many love affairs were the worst kept secret in Bonn. "Alcohol transports him into a conqueror's mood," wrote one of his lovers, "blocking out complexes which he had to fight every now and then."²³⁰ As autumn faded into winter and 1973 drew to a close, the chancellor's staff began to worry about his depression. Perhaps he suffered from a "fatigue of office" (*Amtsmüdigkeit*), pondered one commentator. After an off-the-record meeting with Brandt in Washington, one journalist contemplated the chancellor's possible retirement. "He would be free to write, travel and make a few speeches," she wrote after their talk. "He would be freed from the harassment of the press, disenchantment with people and, most important, the miserable isolation that was slowly engulfing him."²³¹

Meanwhile, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), West Germany's euphemistically named domestic intelligence agency, worked in the shadows to root out a possible espionage threat in the chancellery. Across 1973, the BfV had been gathering evidence regarding the loyalties of Brandt's closest personal aide, Günter Guillaume. As early as January of 1970, junior intelligence analysts had noted his name in connection with three possible informant cases. By the spring of 1973, the upper echelons of BfV leadership began gathering evidence against him.

Returning from Cairo, on 24 April 1974, the chancellor was greeted on the tarmac by Minister of the Interior Genscher and head of the chancellery Horst Grabert. "Even from a great distance, I could see they had something of significance to tell me," Brandt remembered.²³² Guillaume had been arrested on suspicion of espionage that morning. As

the officers took him into custody, Guillaume declared his loyalties; “I am a citizen and an officer of the GDR; you respect that!” he told his captors.²³³

For days, Brandt brooded in private, while his ministers attacked one another. “I did not know or even guess that his unmasking meant the end of my chancellorship,” Brandt later confessed.²³⁴ The spy scandal divulged more than just sensitive state secrets; the chancellor hardly could be held to account for Stasi espionage on his watch. Instead, it revealed the intricate web of Brandt’s own darkest affairs.

As the chancellor’s aide, Guillaume controlled access to Brandt, kept his diary, received his telephone calls, dispatched his correspondence, and booked all of his travel. To understand the scope of Guillaume’s exploits, authorities would need to conduct a thorough investigation of the chancellery’s inner workings, including the many papers that passed before Guillaume’s eyes: visitor logs, the chancellor’s datebook, telephone messages, and volumes more. Even a cursory glance would raise questions: Why had the chancellor’s appointments with young female journalists been scheduled for so much longer than those with men? Why the repeated meetings with the same young lady staffers? Why such bitter exchanges between the Chancellor Brandt and Parliamentary Chairman Wehner? What were the terms of the negotiations with the GDR?

Two days after the scandal broke, stormy weather hung over Bonn. The chancellor was bedridden with severe stomach troubles and, meanwhile, had two molars extracted. Brandt’s conspicuous absence fueled rumors across the country: a parade of women, elicit romantic liaisons, secret visits to the east, blackmail, contemplated suicide. A detailed report, seen by Genscher, was delivered to the chancellor. “I must admit that I was rather shaken by what I read,” he remembered.²³⁵ The chancellor’s political capital was slipping

away. A week later, Brandt resigned as chancellor. Though he retained his role as party chairman, life in politics had taken its toll on him. “In truth,” Brandt later reflected, “I was broken (*kaputt*), for reasons that had nothing to do with the trials that faced me then.”²³⁶

Brandt’s unceremonious departure from office signaled that political crisis finally had reached Bonn, which previously had seemed immune to Europe’s predicaments. Until the spring of 1974, the West Germans had escaped relatively unscathed by the collapsing economies, spiraling debt, political scandal, domestic unrest, and terror. The chancellor’s disgrace placed Germany squarely within the European political crisis—the age of europessimism. “The free countries of Europe,” warned the CDU, “are at risk of no longer being the masters of their own destiny.”²³⁷

In the end, Ostpolitik never represented a principled program, as Brandt made it out to be. Many times over, he cited unification and improved inner-German relations as the goal of his eastern policy. In private, however, he confessed his true belief: “‘Reunification’ became the indispensable lie (*Lebenslüge*) that characterized the second German republic.”²³⁸ Brandt had used his Ostpolitik as a Trojan horse for a broader strategy that involved replacing superpower influence in Europe by establishing the EC as a third great-power bloc. By the time of his resignation, though he had proven unsuccessful in his aims, his scheming positioned the European integration project on the trajectory that it followed for the next decade—the decade of europessimism and eurosclerosis.

The Guillaume affair robbed the Social Democrats of their largest achievement: Ostpolitik. For five years, while Germans and Europeans celebrated Brandt’s new approach to east-west relations, East Germany’s odious régime had infiltrated even the most sacred of

Bonn's institutions—the chancellery itself. The goodwill Brandt had demonstrated toward the east had been met with betrayal. The morality and idealism he claimed as vital to inner-German relations were dashed by amoral realism.

Nine days after Brandt's resignation, Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt succeeded him as chancellor. Realism would prove the lodestar for West German diplomacy in the years to come.

Chapter One: A New Peace for Europe, 1969-1974

1. Oberstudienrat Dr. Kramer, English and French professor at Johanneum, Lübeck, c. 1930, quoted in Willy Brandt and Leo Lania, *Mein Weg nach Berlin* (Munich: Kindler Verlag, 1960), 36.
2. Willy Brandt, *My Life in Politics* (New York: Viking, 1992), 83-86. The German edition provides a more evocative account. See *idem.*, *Erinnerungen*, 94-95.
3. Within a day of Hitler's appointment as chancellor, noted labor leader Social Democrat Julius Leber was attacked by Nazi stormtroopers. Brandt and a few associates hoped to organize strikes in Lübeck, including a labor walkout, prompting the largest protests in the city since 1918. See *ibid.*, 84.
4. Brandt's memoirs, while engaging, are less revealing about his pre-political life (if he ever indeed had such a time). For a more vivid treatment, see his *Draussen: Schriften während der Emigration*, ed. Günter Struve (Munich: Kindler, 1966). Quotation on pp. 127-28.
5. Willy Brandt, acceptance speech on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, 10 December 1971.
6. *Idem.*, "Friedenspolitik in unserer Zeit," Nobel Lecture, 11 December 1971; in Hans Kloft, ed., *Friedenspolitik und Friedensforschung: Die Friedensnobelpreisträger aus Deutschland* (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2011), 137-52.
7. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 170.
8. In his memoir, Brandt asserted that his Ostpolitik inspired Gorbachev's own "openness." *Ibid.*, 403-13.
9. Brandt made this comment on at least three separate occasions: addressing the Munich Kammerspiele Theater on 18 November 1984, on 11 September 1988 in his "Berlin lessons" address, and on September 14th to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn. See Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen*, vol. 2, p. 471. The text of the first address had been drafted by Bahr. See Andreas Vogtmeier, *Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage: Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung* (Bonn: Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachfolger, 1996), 287-92; and Golo Mann, "Gedanken zum Grundvertrag," *Neue Rundschau* 84, no. 1 (1973), 3.
10. See Egon Bahr, "Wandel durch Annäherung," address delivered at der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, 15 July 1963; later reprinted in *Deutschland Archiv* 8 (August 1973): 862-65.
11. Willy Brandt, address given to the European Parliament, Strasbourg (13 November 1973), in *Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament*, Annex 168 (November 1973), pp. 20-25.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Déclaration liminaire de Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950, in *Ce jour-là, l'Europe est née: 9 May 1950* (Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe: Centre de recherche européennes, 1980), 22.
14. Willy Brandt, address given to the European Parliament (13 November 1973). Many documents refer to the goal of Europe "speaking with one voice" in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Politischer Ausschuss Arbeitsdokument (und Fragebogen) im Hinblick auf die Ausarbeitung des Berichts über die Europäische Union (13 January 1975); ACDP, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 07-001, Karton 1911.
15. Helmut Kohl, speaking with Gerald Ford, explained that "NATO is more than a military alliance; it is an alliance of ideas and must have unity on these philosophic concepts." MemCon (4 May 1976), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, Memoranda of Conversations, box 19.

Similarly, President Gerald Ford, preparing for an address to the North Atlantic Council recorded, "I would like to recall the commitment we have all made to the goals of NATO, not only in our political-military relations but in securing a better way of life under our democratic systems. . . . It is up to us, and particularly to all of you, as those in closest contact with NATO, to convey to our citizens that the Alliance is the expression of our belief in the principles of peace, human dignity, freedom and prosperity on which our countries are founded." Memorandum from Charles W. Robinson to Gerald R. Ford (15 September 1976), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Agency File, 1974-1977, box 16; folder, NATO (18).

16. A German internal assessment noted that American leadership in NATO faced an uncertain future owing to (1) U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, (2) the bipolar world being replaced by "multilateral trends," (3) European allies contributing more to world leadership through NATO, and (4) transformed relations with the east through détente. See Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an das Auswärtiges Amt (26 February 1974), no. 60, in *AAP 1974*, vol. 1, pp. 229-32.

The Christian Democrats continued to maintain their traditional position toward the EC, arguing that "the political and economic cooperation and unity of the states of free Europe represents the first of the major tasks of German policy." See "CDU und Europa" and "Europapolitik" (22 January 1976); ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1913.

17. Brandt, *Draussen*, 165.

18. The moderate position of the SPD was enshrined in the 1959 Godesberg Program, adopted at the November party convention. For the first time in its history, the party abandoned its official Marxist position in favor of a progressive social agenda meant to appeal to broader sectors of the electorate.

19. *Bundesgesetzblatt* (hereafter *BGBI.*) I S. 1161.

20. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 170. Brandt's communications with the Kremlin often displayed tremendous familiarity. See, e.g., Bundeskanzler Brandt an den Generalsekretär des ZK der KPdSU, Breschnew, no. 1 (4 January 1974) in *AAP 1974*, vol. 1, pp. 3-5. Cf. Bundeskanzler Brandt an Präsident Nixon (28 January 1974), no. 25, in *ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

21. Egon Bahr, quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993), 68. Bahr thoroughly developed his ideas in his "Im Untergang wären wir vereint: Gemeinsame Sicherheitsinteressen und die deutsche Frage," in *Bahr, Was wird aus den Deutschen? Fragen und Antworten* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1982), 214-36. One observer later noted that "Bahr has had a more profound and sustained influence on the basic structure of European security than is generally understood." See John E. Reinertson, "The Egon Bahr Line," in *Defense Planning for the 1990s and the Changing International Environment*, ed. William A. Buckingham, Jr. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1984), 139.

22. Willy Brandt, *Begegnungen und Einsichten: Die Jahre 1960-1975* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976), 296.

23. Fortunately for Brandt, both Walter Scheel and Hans-Dietrich Genscher had traveled to Moscow in July 1969 and returned with an interest in negotiating a West German-Soviet agreement. See Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 69.

24. Willy Brandt, address before the Bundestag, *Deutscher Bundestag, 6. Wahlperiode, 5. Sitzung* (28 October 1969), 20; and Address by Chancellor Brandt Before the Bundestag, *Deutscher Bundestag, 6. Wahlperiode, 22. Sitzung* (14 January 1970), pp. 839-47.

25. Address by Chancellor Brandt Before the Bundestag (14 January 1970).

26. M. E. Sarotte, "Egon Bahr," in *The Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, vol. 1, ed. Ruud van Dijk (New York: Routledge, 2008), 57-58; Stephan Fuchs, *"Dreiecksverhältnisse sind immer kompliziert": Kissinger, Bahr, und die Ostpolitik* (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1999). Sarotte identifies Bahr as "Brandt's personal emissary to East Germany and the Soviet Union" and credits him with "de facto control over the key elements of policymaking."

27. In his final weeks before leaving office, a distraught Kiesinger wrote to Brandt, inquiring "about alleged new foreign-policy deliberations of the SPD" within Brandt's Foreign Office. The chancellor had learned from an anonymous source about Brandt and Bahr's scheming. Stellvertretender Regierungssprecher Ahlers an Bundesminister Brandt (4 September 1969), in AAP 1969, vol. 2, pp. 961-62.

Bahr's ideas, later leaked, were published and caused a public stir. See "Wie Egon Bahr Deutschland neutralisieren will," *Quick* 40 (27 September 1973). The Christian Democrats correctly accused Bahr of spreading his poisonous brand of Ostpolitik to other western European states, hoping that all of Europe might "slowly drift eastward." See "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und das europäische Einigungswerk," n.d.; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

28. For a thorough assessment, see Hans-Georg Lehmann, *Öffnung nach Osten: Die Ostreisen Helmut Schmidts und die Entstehung der Ost- und Entspannungspolitik* (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1984). See also Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 74.

29. Bahr first called for his "policy of many steps and many stations" in his 1963 Tutzing address. See his "Wandel durch Annäherung" (15 July 1963).

30. "Wie Egon Bahr Deutschland neutralisieren will" (27 September 1973).

31. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 176-177.

32. See Peter Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik: Vom Mauerbau zum Moskauer Vertrag* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986).

33. Victor Fay, "La principale difficulté pour le chancelier fédéral se trouve du côté polonais et est-allemand," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, no. 193 (April 1970), 6.

34. "Europe: The End of World War II," *Time* 96, no. 7 (17 August 1970), p. 19

35. CDU partisans cited Adenauer's visit as the Christian Democrats' own introduction to a new eastern policy. See "Ostpolitik," 2 February 1976; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1913.

36. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 175.

37. "A New Era in Europe," *Time* 96, no. 8 (24 August 1970), 20.

38. *Ibid.*

39. The CDU argued that, while their party maintained consanguinity with the *people* of the GDR, Brandt and his Social Democrats now colluded with the *régime* itself. See "Deutschlandpolitik," 2 February 1976; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1913.

40. "Europe: The End of World War II," 19.

41. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber quoted in "A New Era in Europe," 20.

42. Quoted in *ibid.*

43. Brandt's political mentor Kurt Schumacher had criticized Adenauer as "the chancellor of the allies." Kurt Schumacher, *Deutscher Bundestag, 1. Wahlperiode, 18. Sitzung* (24-25 November 1949), p. 525. See Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, ch. 1. For an authoritative treatment of Adenauer, see

the classic Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Aufstieg*, and the more recent Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer und die deutsche Geschichte* (Bonn: Bouvier, 2001).

44. Quoted in "A New Era in Europe, *Time* (24 August 1970).

45. Despite the Warsaw Treaty, the question of the Oder-Neiße line remained theoretically open at the time of German unification in 1990. See chapter six of this study. Negotiations began with frustration from the Polish delegation, as the Moscow Treaty had negotiated terms of Poland's western border without even consulting Warsaw.

46. Jürgen Stroop, the SS commander responsible for subduing the uprising, reported that, "of the total 56,065 Jews apprehended," approximately 7,000 were killed within the ghetto, with another 6,929 transported to the Treblinka extermination camp. Additionally, he reported that five to six thousand died in fires, when the SS burned the ghetto block by block. See Jürgen Stroop, *The Stroop Report: The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw is No More!* ed. and trans. Sybil Milton (New York: Pantheon, 1979), entry for 24 May 1943. Historians have subsequently corroborated Stroop's figures; see Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 524-25; Israel Gutman, *Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), ch. 11.

47. Hermann Schreiber, "Ein Stück Heimkehr," *Der Spiegel* 51/1970 (14 December 1970), 29-30.

48. See Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 214-15.

49. "Kniefall angemessen oder übertrieben?" *Der Spiegel* 51/1970 (14 December 1970), 27. See P. Koch, *Willy Brandt: Eine politische Biographie* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1988), 357.

50. News Conference Remarks by Chairman Ulbricht on Negotiation of a Treaty Establishing Equal Relations Between East and West Germany (19 January 1970), U.S. Department of State unofficial translation in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 1066-67. Quotation on p. 1065.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Address by Chancellor Brandt Before the Bundestag (14 January 1970). Of Ulbricht, Brandt later remembered that "for all of his oddity, however, I was rather impressed by his doggedness." Brandt, *My Life in Politics*, 216; *idem.*, *Erinnerungen*, 231-32.

53. Address by Chancellor Brandt Before the Bundestag (14 January 1970). In his memoir from the period, published twelve years later, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described the relationship between Ostpolitik and Détente in the same terms. See his *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 245. On the relationship between Ostpolitik and Détente, see Cary, "Reassessing Germany's Ostpolitik: From Détente to Refreeze," pt. 1, p. 250. From Kissinger, see also *Years of Upheaval*, 237 and 242; and *idem.*, *White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 116-22.

54. M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Another fine English-language account is Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany*, vol. 2, *Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1988* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 214-19.

55. Stenografische Niederschrift, Egon Bahr-Michael Kohl (15 June 1972), p. 69; quoted in Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil*, 141. Sarotte notes that the GDR régime believed that Bahr and his negotiators remained more concerned with political appearances than with diplomatic reality.

56. Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (21 December 1972), in *Documents on Germany*, pp. 1215-30.

57. "As long as the four powers have rights [in Germany], the German question is not legally closed," Bahr wrote. Egon Bahr, "Vermerk Betrifft: Persönliche Gespräche mit StS Kohl am 10., 11. und 12. Oktober 1972" (12 October 1972), in 379, Egon Bahr Depositum, AdsD, quoted in Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil*, 145.

With the opening of the archival material of the former GDR, historians have subsequently shown that, in the matter of the Basic Treaty's terms, Bahr had little alternative available to him were the negotiations to be successful. The SED desperately sought UN membership (otherwise impossible without an inner-German rapprochement) but could never concede their country's very *raison d'être*. See *ibid.*, 145-46.

58. At the signing ceremony, Bahr handed the note to Kohl: "Dear Mr. Kohl: In connection with today's signing of the Treaty concerning the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has the honor to state that this Treaty does not conflict with the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination. Very respectfully yours, Bahr."

59. For more than a decade, the SED had sought admission to the United Nations, hoping to assert the GDR's permanence and legitimacy as a state. The West Germans, along with the three western allies, also hoped for UN membership though with the explicit guarantee that equal membership with the GDR did make permanent the status quo. Bonn had long demonstrated its commitment to the principles of the UN Charter. By 1956, the Federal Republic had become a member of all of the UN's special organizations and sub-agencies. With the Basic Treaty (*Grundlagenvertrag*) in place, specifying the nature of the relationship between the two German states and establishing a *modus vivendi* on the national question, both states acceded to the others' demands and applied for UN membership, which they achieved in September 1973. The West Germans ultimately softened their position, though they still achieved their ends; so long as the four powers retained their authority over Germany, the national question remained open. See Wolf J. Bell, "50 Jahre UNO und die deutsche Mitgliedschaft," 1995; Ulrich Scheuner and Beate Lindemann, eds., *Die Vereinten Nationen und die Mitarbeit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1973); Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil*, 139, 145-46; Bark and Gress, *A History of West Germany*, vol. 2, pp. 215-21; and *UN Monthly Chronicle* 10, no. 7 (July 1973), 66.

60. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 178-79.

61. The zones largely had been determined by the western allies' successes during the Ardennes offensive in the winter of 1944-45. In the spring of 1945, the U.S. First and Ninth Armies and the British 21st Army Group held positions within a hundred kilometers from Berlin, and in the south, the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies held positions flanking the Elbe through western Czechoslovakia and Austria—positions that would have been more easily defended. Interallied agreements for occupation zones called for the western allies to withdraw from their forward positions. The resulting arrangements left the west defending a long concave front against superior conventional forces. During the Cold War, more easily defended boundaries would have been the Lech-Weser line or from the Elbe south to Leipzig. See David Eisenhower, *Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1986); Richard L. Kugler, "NATO's Future Conventional Defense Strategy in Central Europe: Theater Employment Doctrine for the Post-Cold War Era," R-4084-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1992); and Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons of Defense Planning* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982), 217-18.

62. Furthermore, the battlefield situation in the spring of 1945 left the formidable U.S. Army in southern Germany, an area far less vulnerable to Soviet attack, and the weaker British Army of the Rhine to manage the Fulda Gap and Hanover, the likely routes for a Warsaw Pact offensive against

the west. IISS, *The Military Balance, 1974-1975* (London: IISS, 1975), 95-97; Frederick Zilian, Jr., "The Shifting Military Balance in Central Europe," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook*, vol. 2, 1968-1990, ed. Detlef Junker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 157; and Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1993), 218-19.

63. For one such estimate, see the "Giersberg Protocol," a joint memorandum of the Defense Ministry and Foreign Office, anticipated a Warsaw Pact advance of eighty kilometers per day, quickly overpowering NATO's forward-based defenses.

64. Stanley M. Karanowski, *The German Army and NATO Strategy* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1982), 5 and 67-68. See Hans-Jurgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggerhaus, *Die "Himmeroder Denkschrift" vom October 1950* (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1977), 36-42; and *Weißbuch 1975/1976 zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: BPA, 1976). Strategists of the era, including Sir Michael Howard and Sir Lawrence Freedman, echoed such concerns, citing the separation of *deterrence* from *reassurance*; to deter Warsaw Pact aggression against the west, NATO may destroy what it was meant to defend. Katarina Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," in *The West European Option: From Yesterday till Tomorrow* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 12; Sir Michael Howard, "The Future of Deterrence," *RUSI Journal* (1986); and Lawrence Freedman, "Indignation, Influence, and Strategic Studies," *International Affairs* 60, no. 2 (1984).

65. John Foster Dulles, address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York (12 January 1954), in *The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed., Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 128-32.

66. Georg Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1976), 218.

67. The Soviets needed to fear that any aggression against the Federal Republic, whether conventional or nuclear, would result in American nuclear retaliation. As Thomas M. Nichols has argued, massive retaliation "was simplicity itself": "an asymmetric solution to [an] asymmetric dilemma." See his *No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 18-19. The doctrine had first been articulated in a U.S. National Security Council paper in 1953 and subsequently made public by John Foster Dulles.

68. Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on the Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years [MC 48], 18 November 1954, in Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., *NATO Strategy Documents* (Brussels: Historical Office, SHAPE, 1997), 231-50.

69. Hans-Georg Wieck, "Sicherheitspolitische Rahmenbedingungen der Bündnisstrategie," *Europäisches Wehrkunde*, no. 6 (1983).

70. This need for coupling had represented the logic behind Adenauer's initial acceptance to deploy medium-range ballistic missiles in the Federal Republic. When SACEUR Lauris Norstad proposed the deployments, Adenauer viewed them as a U.S. and NATO commitment to German security. Jeffrey Boutwell, *The German Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 36-37; and Mark Cioc, *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany during the Adenauer Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 155.

71. Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy."

72. The Soviet experience in World War II left an indelible lesson in the minds of Soviet strategic planners. Every man in the Kremlin had endured the USSR's humiliating military collapse before the

Nazi juggernaut, whether as a civilian or on the front. They universally saw the initial hours of conflict as the most decisive of a war and resolved never again to be caught unprepared, either for invasion from without or for offensive operations against the west. Taking a lesson from the Wehrmacht's *Blitzkrieg* against them, Soviet theorists integrated nuclear forces into tactical, operational, and strategic planning, believing in combined arms synchronized for swift offensives. The Soviets, argue William E. Odom and John Erickson, did not differentiate between the conventional and nuclear phases of a future potential conflict and did not see their nuclear forces as a never-to-be-used deterrent. Instead, they integrated sub-strategic nuclear weapons into battlefield plans. Western strategists, writes Odom, proved more reticent to integrate nuclear forces at the tactical and operational levels. They often mistook the Soviets' lack of writing about deterrence as either stagnation in Soviet strategic thinking or as an indicator of internal dispute over the role that nuclear weapons should play. See Odom's "The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Weapons: A Historical Review," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 469 (September 1983), 124 and 130-34; and Erickson, *Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice* (College Station, Tex.: Center for Strategic Technology, 1981); and *Soviet Troop Control* (Oxford: Brassey's Publishers, 1982). Stanley R. Sloan and Amy F. Woolf later echoed Odom's assessment. See Sloan, "NATO Nuclear Forces: Modernization and Arms Control," CRS Report 83-213F (24 October 1983), p. 8; and Woolf, "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons," CRS Report (3 January 2014), p. 9. Thomas M. Nichols has provided the most revealing assessments of Soviet thinking on nuclear war. See his *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 188.

73. Policy Directive, NATO and the Atlantic Nations, 20 April 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-63*, vol. 13, *Western Europe and Canada* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1994), 285-91.

74. Soviet authors had described massive retaliation as obsolete as early as 1960. Nichols, *No Use*, 20.

75. Such self-restraint in the west likewise would induce the Soviets to pursue arms-control negotiations. Schmidt, *Strategie des Gleichgewichts*; later published in English as *The Balance of Power: Germany's Peace Policy and the Superpowers* (London: William Kimber, 1971), 16.

76. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 188.

77. See, e.g., MemCon, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, George C. McGee, *et al.* (31 July 1963), Bonn; PHP, p. 2; Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 37-40 and 72. General deterrence had been the logic underlying NATO's MC 14/2.

78. Sir Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); *idem.*, "I Exist, Therefore I Deter," *International Security* 13, no. 1 (1988): 177-95; Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 25-48; and Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 20-21. In 1978, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Congress that the American government "plans its theater nuclear forces on the basis of war-fighting missions" (as opposed to mere deterrence). U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress*, FY 1978, p. 82.

79. Herbert Wehner, "Deutsche Politik auf dem Prüfstand," in *Die Neue Gesellschaft* 26, no. 2 (1978), 93; John Van Oudenaren, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, doc. R-3198-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1984), 67-68.

80. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 356.

81. The CDU's Manfred Wörner also had been a proponent of such an approach. See Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy"; and Gert Krell, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, "The No-First Use Question in Germany," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First Use Question*, ed. John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983).

82. NATO's MC 14/2 had advised "You can count on using nuclear weapons from the outset" of a Warsaw Pact attack on Europe. In November 1976, CINCENT General Kurt Schnell argued that early use of ADM and nuclear surface-to-air missiles may be able to halt Warsaw Pact forces. The Americans had seen nuclear weapons the alliance's primary means "to compensate for numerical inferiority," but German theorists believed that nuclear forces benefited the adversary with the *larger* conventional ground force. A powerful conventional response to a Soviet offensive would slow the recourse to nuclear weapons and create, as one analyst suggested, essential "firebreaks" in battle, thus allowing decision-makers to react with sobriety rather than panic. Bonn defense planners believed that SHAPE would quickly differentiate between a limited attack against local targets and a general offensive against NATO. In German thinking, nuclear weapons would hasten battlefield attrition on both sides, ultimately benefiting the larger force. NATO, Directive by the Standing Group to the Regional Planning Groups on Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning, 28 March 1950 [enclosure to MC 14]; in *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*, ed. Pedlow, p. 90. On "firebreaks," see Robert S. McNamara, Draft Memorandum for the President (6 January 1967), "Subject: Theater Nuclear Forces," p. 6; Jane E. Stromseth, *The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 64; Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 145; and Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 191-93.

83. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 356.

84. The NATO allies were tasked with defending the periphery of the Eurasian landmass, while the area of Warsaw Pact lands and resources surpassed those of NATO Europe by a ratio of 8.4 to 1. The Rhine contingency seemed necessary to SHAPE strategists, as French, British, Belgian, and Dutch allied forces were based so far from the front, some feared they may not reach the inner-German border in the event of a surprise offensive. British planners were particularly keen to use the Rivers Weser and Fulda as natural barriers against the Warsaw Pact. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Standing Group (re: MC 70 and AR(59) Germany-D/1, Item VIII, 17 Jul. '59), 2 November 1959, NATO Archives, SGWM-639-59.

85. Planners preferred the *Vorneverteidigung* ("at-the-front defense") phrasing, seeking to avoid the conceptual imprecision of "forward defense" (*Vorwärtsverteidigung*). The two phrases maintain different connotations, which ultimately became politicized during the late 1970s and early 1980s. *Vorne-* suggested that troops were stationery, planted at the front, while *vorwärts-* suggested forward momentum. During the late 1970s, SPD moderates feared that imprecision between the two phrases had allowed NATO to escape high-level debate and analysis on the concept. Hans Apel, "Braucht die NATO eine andere Strategie?" *Europäische Wehrkunde*, no. 4 (1983); Walther Stütze, "Abschreckung und Verteidigung," *Europa Archiv*, no. 5 (1983); *idem.*, *Politik und Kräfteverhältnis: die Bundesrepublik im Wechselspiel der wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Kräfte von Ost und West* (Herford: Mittler, 1983); Eckhard Lübke, "Vorwärtsverteidigung—keine Alternativ zur Vorneverteidigung," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, no. 4 (1983); and Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, 90-91.

During the Second World War, a typical Wehrmacht division was tasked with defending ten to twenty kilometers of battlefield frontage, but the Bundeswehr, with its highly effective artillery, tasked each division with twenty to thirty kilometers of frontage. Philip A. Karber and John H. Milam, "The Federal Republic of Germany," in *NATO-Warsaw Pact Mobilization*, ed. Jeffrey Simon

(Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988), 245-68; David C. Isby and Charles Tustin Kamps, *Armies of NATO's Central Front* (London: Janes, 1987); and Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 213-17.

86. Krell, Risse-Kappen, Schmidt, "The No First-Use Question"

87. *Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: BPA, 1971), 37-40.

88. *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: BPA, 1970), 52-56; Karanowski, *The German Army and NATO Strategy*, 67; Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 213; and Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, 1.

89. The U.S. had of necessity pursued force improvements across the 1960s, upgrading all of its infantry divisions to armored or mechanized divisions. Likewise, McNamara had called for a ninety-day NATO logistical supply, while most of the allies prepared only for thirty days. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 204-208; and Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget, 22 January 1968 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 1968).

90. Helmut Schmidt, *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective* (New York: Random House, 1989), 149; and John Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, 65; and *Weißbuch 1970*.

91. Arthur A. McGee, "Civil Defense in Germany," October 1965 (U.S. Department of the Army, Office of Civil Defense).

92. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 466.

93. "Die Unions-Fraktion blieb sitzen," *Der Spiegel* 44/1971 (25 October 1971), pp. 27-28. For an internal CDU review of Brandt's policies, see Herbert Czaja, "Überprüfung der Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik," 13 January 1975; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1912.

94. Otto Köhler, "Friedenskanzler erschlägt Kritiker," *Der Spiegel* 44/1971 (25 October 1971), p. 41.

95. On the 1960s, especially illuminating is Peter Hoeres, "Außenpolitik, Öffentlichkeit, öffentliche Meinung: Deutsche Streitfälle in den „langen 1960er Jahren," *Historische Zeitschrift* 291 (2010): 689-720.

96. See Oliver Bange, "Kiesingers Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik von 1966 bis 1969," in *Kurt Georg Kiesinger: 1904-1988: von Ebingen ins Kanzleramt* (Frieburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005).

97. See A. James McAdams, *Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 64-71; Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Die Ära Adenauer, 1957-1963* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), 299-300; Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, 118; and Karl Kaiser, *German Foreign Policy in Transition: Bonn Between East and West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 90-95.

98. Additionally, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Der Monat*, and *Frankfurter Hefte* featured prominent discussions on a relaxation in Bonn's eastern policies. Future U.S. National Security Advisors Henry A. Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski offered important contributions to the debate as well. Key contributions to the debate were compiled by Theo Sommer in his *Denken an*

Deutschland: Zum Problem der Wiedervereinigung: Ansichten und Einsichten (Hamburg: Nannen, 1966).

99. Historians largely have neglected each party's internal dynamics in instituting the new eastern policies. Most scholars draw rather an arbitrary distinction, assuming that the left aspired to ultimate recognition of the eastern European communist states while the right hoped to retain the nonrecognition policies until an ultimate German reunification. Reality, however, proves more complex. While the Social Democrats and Liberals debated their foreign policies in the pages of West Germany's news magazines, the internal party politics of the Union parties, as well as Adenauer's tendency toward centralized decision-making, imbued within the political right a tradition of collective partisan responsibility. Though the CDU/CSU deliberated over a range of eastern policy options, their debates remained largely confined to private offices and party cloakrooms. See, *e.g.*, Sommer, *Denken an Deutschland*, 7.

100. Gordon A. Craig, "Did Ostpolitik Work: The Path to German Reunification," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (January-February 1994), 163. For a succinct treatment on the Union parties' policy on European integration at the time, see H.-A. Lückner, Papier der CDU/CSU-Fraktion, "Die Europa-Politik der CDU/CSU," 12 March 1975; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

101. Arbeitspapier der Unterkommission "Ostpolitik" der Außenpolitischen Kommission: "Fünf Jahre Ostpolitik der SPD/FDP-Koalition — eine Bilanz," zweiter Entwurf, n.d.; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

102. Czaja, "Überprüfung der Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik"; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1912. For a further threat assessment, see "Verteidigung als Teil deutscher Sicherheitspolitik," [c. 1974]; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1912.

103. "Deutschlandpolitik," 2 February 1976; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1913.

104. "Zur Europapolitik der CDU," 16 June 1975; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1912.

105. Erich Honecker, "Zu den Vorgängen in der BRD," 25 April 1972, in Erich Honecker, *Reden und Aufsätze*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1975), 504.

106. Sarotte provides an authoritative overview of these transactions. See her *Dealing with the Devil*, 132-33.

107. Even some of his own coalition broke ranks, with the SPD's Herbert Hupka joining the opposition. Hupka served as an outspoken advocate for the ethnic Germans who either fled the east or were expelled from their homes following the Second World War. Hupka remained a member of the Bundestag between 1969 and 1987 and was distinguished by his far-reaching advocacy for expellees, famously noting that "everyone has the right to a homeland." He served as long-time president of the Landsmannschaft Schlesien and as vice president of the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV). See "Herbert Hupka - Getrieben von der eigenen Biografie," *Die Welt* (31 August 2006).

108. Brandt, "Friedenspolitik in unserer Zeit," 11 December 1971.

109. *Ibid.*

110. Address by Chancellor Brandt Before the Bundestag (14 January 1970).

111. Willy Brandt, address before the Bundestag, *Deutscher Bundestag, 6. Wahlperiode, 5. Sitzung* (28 October 1969), p. 20.

112. Economics and Finance Minister Karl Schiller resigned from Brandt's cabinet in opposition to government profligacy.

113. Helmut Schmidt, statement before the Bundestag, *Deutscher Bundestag, 7. Wahlperiode, 100. Sitzung* (17 May 1974), pp. 6593-6605.

114. Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, *Von Gestern nach Übermorgen: Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Hamburg: Albrecht Kanus Verlag, 1981), 222-23. Born to an East Prussian noble family, Dönhoff became, in the words of *The Guardian's* Kate Connolly, "the grande dame" of West German journalism, helping to found *Die Zeit*, where she served for more than five decades. Dönhoff had opposed the Nazis and taken an active role in the July 20th plot to assassinate Hitler in 1944.

115. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 250. For a useful overview, see Stephan Fröhlich, "Die Europäisierung der Bundesrepublik," in *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Bilanz nach 60 Jahren*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), esp. 517-18.

116. Much of the historical literature generally treats Franco-German rapprochement as the logical outcome of postwar recovery, whitewashing the competing agendas in European policy and conflicting impulses in transatlantic relations. As this study argues, however, relations between the two countries and their leaders remained, if not contentious, at most lukewarm.

117. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 604.

118. One early English-language treatment of de Gaulle's foreign policy argues that the suppression of German power in Europe remained the critical element of preserving French dominance within the EC. Pompidou later reversed such thinking. See Edward L. Morse, *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). Adopting a more favorable view is Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). Kolodziej credits de Gaulle and Pompidou with promoting general European stability through rejecting bipolar notions of world order in favor of multipolar balance-of-power ideas.

119. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 249. Additionally, see Brandt's discussion of "the primacy of proximity" in Franco-German relations in his *Friedenspolitik in Europa* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1968).

120. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 259.

121. *Ibid.*, 170, 458, and 489.

122. Brandt claims that he and Pompidou, in a private bilateral talk, agreed that "the national banks should become a kind of European Central Bank." The documentary record, however, does not yet substantiate such a claim. The two likely agreed to such a concept in principle, yet ultimately it was Helmut Schmidt who realized the vision of economic and monetary cooperation.

123. Their two staffs similarly corresponded and collaborated. From the summit, Parliamentary State Secretary Katharina Focke dispatched a positive summary from the conference. Parlamentarische Staatssekretärin Focke, Bundeskanzleramt, z.Z. Den Haag, an Bundesminister Ehmke, 2 December 1969, in *AAP 1969*, pp. 1357-59.

124. Brandt, *My Life in Politics*, 421.

125. Gaullism in foreign policy sees superpower domination of Europe as antithetical to French interests and thus rejects a bipolar view of world order. Instead, an independent and integrated Europe between the superpowers should function as a counterbalance in international affairs. De Gaulle nurtured his own peculiar historical assumptions about France, positions that would come to suffuse his political attitudes and which remained present in French politics from the 1950s through the twentieth century. He viewed history as "the rivalry between nations struggling to realize their

own ambitions” and believed that, in the unforgiving world of power politics, France must resist any limitations on its freedom of action, whether by transient circumstance or permanent alliance. Gaullism inherently, though not explicitly rejected the Yalta settlement, which codified a great-power directorate within European affairs, ostensibly to the detriment of France. Gaullism, argues Serge Bernstein, which remains present in French political discourse in the twenty-first century, constitutes “neither a doctrine nor a political ideology.” Conceptually, it lies outside the usual partisan spectrum, though its namesake de Gaulle tended toward conservatism. See Bernstein, “Gaullism,” in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2nd ed., ed. Joel Krieger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

126. De Gaulle “was on the point of inaugurating his own détente policy, one which would benefit rather than detract from German Ostpolitik,” Brandt remembered. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 246-47.

127. When Brandt had been received by de Gaulle in June 1959, the president greeted him “rather like a military supreme commander” might interrogate a junior officer. “It had been the most natural thing in the world for me to address him as ‘*mon général*,’” Brandt remembered. In his later writings, Brandt recalled de Gaulle in effusive terms, calling him “der große Karl” and “the great symbol of the French Resistance,” sanitizing and ultimately embellishing the general’s record. “The influence he exerted from London and Algiers has been compared to a beacon of light that never went out during the long night of Hitler’s war,” Brandt wrote. “I was greatly impressed by this Frenchmen who, although a conservative, fitted into no categories, and I have felt sorry that I was unable to attempt more with him in European politics.” Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 240-246.

128. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 260. In an earlier period, such perspectives had been labeled “German Gaullism,” a general sympathy in West Germany for the French president’s aim to have Europe become less dependent on the U.S. The German Gaullists deviated from de Gaulle’s vision for a “Europe of states,” however, instead generally supporting a federal Europe. In the early and middle 1960s, the principal German Gaullists were the CSU’s Franz Josef Strauß and Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, though Strauß later changed allegiances. The “German Atlanticists,” on the other hand, hoped for (or, at the very least, relied upon) an enduring American defense commitment to Europe. Unlike the Gaullists, they did not shun British overtures for EC. The chief Atlanticists were Gerhard Schröder and Ludwig Erhard. Despite most of his party’s support for the Atlanticist platform, Brandt generally expressed Gaullist sympathies. See Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen*, vol. 2, pp. 213-15.

129. Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, eds., *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

130. Brandt recalls a personal plea from the “eccentric” and “mercurial” Brown: “Willy, you must get us in, so we can take the lead.” Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 453. George-Brown remembered Brandt as “well-disposed to us” and “my favorite European politician.” See Baron George-Brown, *In My Way: The Political Memoirs of Lord George-Brown* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1971), 222 and 252.

131. Serge Bernstein and Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Pompidou Years, 1969-1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 26.

132. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 453. Brandt addressed French concerns directly with Pompidou. Bundeskanzler Brandt an Staatspräsident Pompidou, 27 November 1969, in *AAP 1969*, pp. 1346-47.

Historical treatments of the British entry debate have often obscured more than they have clarified. Some have contended that Brandt coaxed Pompidou into agreement for British entry. Others have said the British did so. Such treatments confuse Pompidou’s reservations about British membership with de Gaulle’s. Pompidou was compelled to protect French interests (as he perceived

them), namely to guarantee that France would not lose its place of privilege within the EC and that CAP subsidies would be preserved. In fact, EC enlargement served Pompidou well politically, largely overshadowing other foreign-policy failures in the Mediterranean and with the Americans and Soviets. Fine treatments of the issue are Berstein and Rioux, *The Pompidou Years, 1969-1974*, 26; and Eric Roussel, *Georges Pompidou* (Paris: J. C. Lattès, 1984), 369-75 and 405-406.

133. On the Paris summit, see Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reiner, 2004), 161-63; and Jürgen Mittag and Wolfgang Wessels, "Die Gipfelkonferenzen von Den Haag (1969) und Paris (1972): Meilensteine für Entwicklungstrends der Europäischen Union," in *Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: die europäische Einigung, 1969-1984*, ed. Franz Knipping (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2004), 3-27.

134. Jens Kreutzfeldt, "'Zukunftsmusik': Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and the Origins of the European Union, 1970-1979," in *Zeiten im Wandel: Deutschland und Europa des 20. Jh.: Kontinuität, Entwicklungen und Brüche* (Brussels: P. I. E. Peter Lang, 2008), 197-98; see the preparatory files, including reports from West Germany, in NA-UK, PREM 15/895; and from Pompidou's own representative, Jean-René Bernard, see "L'élargissement de la Communauté, vu de Paris," in *Georges Pompidou et l'Europe: Colloque, 25 et 26 novembre 1993*, ed. Institut Georges Pompidou (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 1995).

135. Often attributed to de Gaulle is the phrase *Europe des patries*, translated in German as a "Europe of fatherlands." De Gaulle, however, never used such a phrase and specifically disclaimed it in a press conference of 15 May 1962.

136. Kreutzfeldt, "Zukunftsmusik," 198.

137. "In contrast," he reflected, "the words federalism and confederation have always caused no end of confusion. In Britain there is still little understanding of either term." Sir Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life: My Autobiography* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), 391.

138. Garret FitzGerald, *All in a Life: Garret FitzGerald, an Autobiography* (Dublin: Gill, 1991), 132. Emphasis in original.

139. Transcript of telephone conversation, Henry A. Kissinger and Jerrold Schechter (22 March 1974), NARA; quoted in Jeremi Suri, "Détente and Human Rights: American and West European Perspectives on International Change," *Cold War History* 8, no. 4 (November 2008): 527-45. Quotation on p. 530.

140. Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, "NSC Weekly Report #31" (7 October 1977), top secret—contains codeword; JC-PL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, subject file 5.

141. Memorandum, "Atlantic Relations," n.d.; NSA, Presidential Agency File, 1974-1977, box 15; folder, NATO (1).

142. Brandt took a decidedly anti-dogmatic view and avoided ideological language as often as possible. During his service as foreign minister, this approach to east-west relations divided him from the Americans, namely his counterpart Dean Rusk, who, as Oliver Bange has argued, pressed Brandt to welcome ideological "competition" rather than minimize it. See Bange's "Ostpolitik—the Hidden Agenda," open paper delivered at the London School of Economics, 26 February 2003; available online at www.ostpolitik.net.

143. The 1970 West German security white paper (the first published during Brandt's chancellorship) relied on vague language of "western partnership" tempering earlier references to NATO. *Weißbuch 1970*, 3-4.

144. *Ibid.*, 33.

145. Brandt, address to the European Parliament (13 November 1973).

146. Jürgen Schwarz, addressing the CDU's Sicherheitspolitischer Kongreß in January 1975, noted that "both the integration of western Europe and western defense cooperation appear in a state of stagnation, if not erosion." Jürgen Schwarz, "Westeuropäische Sicherheitspolitik: Konturen einer westeuropäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft," 9 January 1975; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

147. France remains the notable exception, as the French political spectrum proves quite broader than those of its neighbors. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who rose to the presidency in May 1974, proved as genuine a centrist as France has ever seen.

148. Willy Brandt, Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers, "Stabilitätspolitische Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung," 9 May 1971 in *BPI*, no. 70 (11 May 1971), p. 710.

149. Jean Fourastié, *Les trente glorieuses, ou, la Révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975* (Paris: Fayard, 1979). Fourastié, an economist, identified the three postwar decades as the "invisible revolution" transforming France from the poverty of war to the prosperity of a continental power. Fourastié appropriated his expression, of course, from *les Trois Glorieuses*—the three glorious days of July 1830 in which Charles X abdicated, bringing Louis Philippe to the throne as a constitutional monarch.

See D. L. Hanley, A. P. Kerr, and N. H. Waites, *Contemporary France: Politics and Society since 1945* (Boston: Routledge, 1979); and Henri Mendras and Laurence Dubois Fresney, *Français, comme vous avez changé* (Paris: Tallandier, 2004).

150. Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959* (London: Macmillan, 1971), 350.

151. Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: "The Challenges of Peace," 15 August 1971, *PPP 1973, Book II* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1974). See also *idem.*, Address to the Congress on Stabilization of the Economy, 9 September 1971, in *PPP: 1971: Book II*.

152. For a historical overview, see Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), pp. 339-60.

153. On the energy crisis and globalization, see Daniel J. Sargent, "The United States and Globalization in the 1970s," in *Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

154. MemCon (8 February 1973), GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 1. Discussing the impending energy crisis, Nixon, explained that "[o]ur national security said we should keep our oil in the ground and import what we need. But the unsettled nature of much of the oil-producing area made this a problem." Jahangir Amuzegar, "The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play," *Foreign Affairs* 51, no. 4 (July 1973): 676-89. Among other contemporary discussions, see Walter J. Levy, "Oil Power," *Foreign Affairs* 49, no. 4 (July 1971): 652-68; and James E. Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here," *Foreign Affairs* 51, no. 3 (April 1973): 462-90.

See Staatssekretär Frank an Botschafter von Staden, Washington (31 January 1974), no. 30, in *AAP 1974*, vol. 1, pp. 123-27.

155. Quoted in Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 710.

156. *Ibid.*, 709-16.

157. Horst Uhlmann, "Mit der Ölkrise leben: Europas Energieversorgung im Würgegriff der Lieferanten," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (6 February 1971). For insight into Bonn's attitudes toward the

Middle East crisis, including longer-term energy-policy implications, see Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Entscheidungsfragen der deutschen Europapolitik* (23 February 1975); ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

158. The Copenhagen Summit Conference, *BEC*, no. 12 (1973), pp. 6-12 and 118-22.

159. Klaus Harpprecht, *Im Kanzleramt: Tagebuch der Jahre mit Willy Brandt, Januar 1973-Mai 1974* (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 2000), 427.

160. On eurocommunism, see Silvio Pons, "The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 3, *Endings*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Rick Simon, "Eurocommunism," in *Twentieth-Century Marxism: A Global Introduction*, ed. Daryl Glaser and David M. Walker (New York: Routledge, 2007).

161. On communism in France, see M. Adereth, *The French Communist Party: A Critical History (1920-84) from Comintern to "the Colours of France"* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

162. MemCon (26 September 1974); secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 6.

163. "Die schlimmste Nacht der Bundesrepublik," *Der Spiegel* 38/1972 (11 September 1972), 19-21.

164. Quotation in Julen Agirre, *Operation Ogro: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero-Blanco*, trans. Barbara Probst Solomon (New York: Quadrangle, 1975).

165. "Strage sul treno Italicus," Biblioteca Salaborsa; available online, <http://www.bibliotecasalaborsa.it/cronologia/bologna/1974/567>. More broadly, see Alessandro Orsini, *Anatomia delle Brigate rosse: Le radici ideologiche del terrorismo rivoluzionario* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009); and Vittoriano S. Pisano, *The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).

166. "One Dead, 238 Hurt after London Terror Bombs," *The Times* [London] (9 March 1973); "Parliament Explosion may Herald IRA Offensive," *The Times* [London] (18 June 1974); "A Moment which Many of Us had Been Expecting and Dreading," *ibid.*, and "Parliament Attached," *ibid.*

167. "IRA Gang Vanish after Helicopter Bombing Raid," *The Times* [London] (25 January 1974).

168. "Police Give Description of Girls Seen Before Public House Explosions," *The Times* [London] (8 October 1974).

169. "L'Europe allemande," *Le Nouvel Observateur* (9 December 1974).

170. French leaders were pleased to have the West Germans pushing for deepened European institutions, though the scope of Brandt's ambitions remained largely unclear.

171. Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 47. For the earlier assessment, see Craig and George's first edition, published in 1983. In particular, Craig wrote widely on the theme of "diplomatic revolution." See his "The Revolution in War and Diplomacy, 1914-39," in *War, Politics, and Diplomacy: Selected Essays*, Gordon A. Craig (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). See also Paul Gordon Lauren, "The Diplomatic Revolution of Our Time," in *International Politics and Germany History: The Past Informs the Present*, ed. David Wetzel and Theodore S. Hamerow (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), pp. 37-58.

172. On the nature of world politics as "international society," see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 13.

173. The Brussels Treaty, officially the “Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities,” was signed by representatives of Belgium, France, the FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands on 8 April 1965. It entered into force on 1 July 1967.

174. This trend continued into the 1980s. Even in the early days of Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship, the Foreign Office noted the conflation between domestic policy and European policy. Arbeitsbesuch des Bundeskanzlers in Luxemburg am. 5.11.1982: Weitere Entwicklung der europäischen Einigung, 21 October 1982; BA, B 136/34377.

175. Karl Kaiser, “Das internationale System der Gegenwart als Faktor der Beeinträchtigung demokratischer Außenpolitik,” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, special edition 2/1970, *Probleme der Demokratie heute* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971): 340-358. Additionally, see *idem.*, “Transnationale Politik: Zu einer Theorie der multinationalen Politik,” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, special issue no. 1, (1969): 80-110.

176. Leo Tindemans, covering letter (29 December 1975), Report on European Union, in *BEC*, no. 1 supplement (1976), 5.

177. See, e.g., Vermerk für die Kabinettsitzung am 6. November 1974, TOP 7: Europafragen: Treffen der Regierungschefs der Neun, 5 November 1974; BA, B 136/34377.

178. Kaiser, “Das internationale System der Gegenwart als Faktor der Beeinträchtigung demokratischer Außenpolitik,” 345-346ff. The Trilateral Commission echoed such a concern. See Niall Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global,” in *The Shock of the Global*, 14.

179. Charles S. Maier, “Malaise: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s,” in *Shock of the Global*, 29ff; Fred L. Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977); and Robert J. Samuelson, *The Great Inflation and its Aftermath: The Past and Future of American Affluence* (New York: Random House, 2008).

180. Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis?” 18-19.

181. See, for instance, MemCon (24 August 1974), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 5.

182. Consumer price inflation percentages are based upon data sets from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). See Ferguson, “Crisis, What Crisis?” in *Shock of the Global*, 7.

183. Per capita GDP percentages are based upon data sets from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. See *ibid.*, 9.

184. On “malaise,” see Maier, “Malaise: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s,” 25-48. In his famous “malaise” speech of 15 July 1979, Carter never actually uttered the word. See Jimmy Carter, “Address to the Nation on Energy and National Goals,” *PPP: 1979, Book II*, pp. 1235-41.

185. Scholars have not neglected the domestic undercurrents of international politics in the period. See Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 239. For variant interpretations, see John Goodman, *Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Making Commitments: France and Italy in the European Monetary System, 1979-1985* (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, University of California, 1993); and Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey A. Frieden, eds., *The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

186. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 239.

187. "Une Communauté des Neuf qui cherche à «se retrouver»." Paul Meunier, "Giscard-Schmidt: La relance européenne," *La Croix* (3 September 1974).

188. Despite the once standard interpretive doctrine of *Primat der Außenpolitik*, "the pressures of [international] competition" do not explain fully the international political developments of the 1970s in western Europe. Quotation from Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Relations*: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 329. *Primat der Außenpolitik*, from German, literally, "the primacy of foreign policy," was first popularized in the writings of Leopold von Ranke. See Leopold von Ranke, "A Dialogue on Politics," reprinted in Theodore H. von Laue, *Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 152-80. Fareed Zakaria initiated an important evaluation of the *Primat der Außenpolitik*. See his "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992): 177-98.

The concept possesses a dual meaning. First, *Primat der Außenpolitik* refers to a state's internal structures being determined by forces of the international system. See, e.g., Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 183ff. The second meaning emphasizes the traditional realist interpretation of international politics, holding that "states conduct their foreign policy for 'strategic' reasons, as a consequence of international pulls and pushes, and not to further domestic ends." See Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," 179-80.

189. Franz Krapf, address to the North Atlantic Council, quoted in despatch from John Killick to Anthony Crosland (10 September 1976), "Medium and Long-Term Problems for NATO"; NA-UK, FCO files 82/670.

190. Killick, "Medium and Long-Term Problems for NATO" (10 September 1976); NA-UK, FCO 82/670. For the most thorough responses to Killick's report, see the letter from R. A. Sykes to John Killick (30 September 1976), "Medium- and Long-Term Problems for NATO"; and the letter from Peter Ramsbotham to R. A. Sykes (13 October 1976), "Medium and Long-Term Problems for NATO," in NA-UK, FCO 82/670.

191. Krapf had served as a member of the German delegation to the Schuman Plan negotiations in 1950 and held diplomatic posts in Paris, Washington, and on the staff of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department. Beginning in 1966, he served as ambassador to Japan. After Krapf's death in October 2003, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called the late ambassador's legacy into question, citing his Nazi past, by refusing to honor him at the Foreign Office. Krapf indeed had been a member of the Nazi party, though later documents note that he also had worked in the resistance. See Guido Heinen, "Der Botschafter Franz Krapf rückt in neues Licht," *Die Welt* (13 April 2005).

Killick's reputation for plain speaking distinguished him as a member of St. James's diplomatic corps. A seasoned crisis manager, Killick had served as an intelligence officer during the Second World War, prior to being taken prisoner by the Germans. On staff in the Foreign Office, Killick had served around the globe—in Japan, across Europe, in Addis Ababa, Canada, and the U.S.—honing his skills as a pragmatic diplomat. He had worked in contingency planning for Berlin and as counselor and head of chancery in Washington before serving as HM ambassador to the Soviet Union beginning in September 1971. Killick navigated carefully through the nadir in Anglo-Soviet relations, with five Britons expelled from the USSR in 1971. As deputy undersecretary in 1973, he kept a ten-day vigil in the Foreign Office calming the international tempest with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In his final posting, Killick served as the UK representative to NATO, a role he assumed in October 1975 and held for four years. Ever discerning, Killick remained suspicious of Soviet intentions during the détente era, declaring that Soviet pretensions of peaceful coexistence and cooperation in fact masked nefarious intentions. "'Peaceful co-existence,' as used by the Russians is a fraud and should

be treated as such," he warned. Killick believed that to shirk NATO obligations for the seductive mirage of EC cooperation was to compromise western security and sacrifice the credibility of the North Atlantic alliance. See letter from Sir John Killick, Moscow, to Mr. C. C. C. Tickell (4 August 1972), in *DBPO*, ser. 3, vol. 1, *Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-1972*, ed. G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (London: HMSO, 1997), 497. Additionally, see Alastair J. Noble, "Sir John Edward Killick (1919-2004), diplomatist," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

192. Killick, "Medium and Long-Term Problems for NATO."

193. *Ibid.*

194. *Ibid.*

195. The Three-Day week lasted for the first three months of 1974. Despite ongoing negotiations between the government and the National Union of Mineworkers, domestic coal reserves diminished—with the price of coal skyrocketing owing to the global oil crisis.

196. On the British economy, see B. W. E. Alford, *British Economic Performance, 1945-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

197. U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Walter Annenberg, predicted a Heath victory in the October 1974 general election. MemCon (6 September 1974), confidential; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 5.

198. MemCon (10 September 1974), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 5.

199. James Callaghan, "Statement by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at the Council," *BEC*, no. 3 (March 1974), 14-19. The recently ousted Heath, who first negotiated UK entry into the EC, defended his work. "For the first time in their history, the ancient nation-states of Europe are coming together to learn the lessons of history and to avoid a repetition of its mistakes." See Edward Heath, "Britain has never been able to opt out of Europe, and that has never been truer," *The Guardian* [Manchester] (9 May 1975).

200. On the UK's position within the EC, see Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); *idem.*, ed., *Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); and Simon Bulmer, Stephen George, and Andrew Scott, *The United Kingdom and EC Membership Evaluated* (London: Pinter, 1992).

201. Hans Herbert Götz, "Wenn England austräte," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (16 March 1974), p. 1.

202. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 421.

203. Marc Trachtenberg, echoing Georges-Henri Soutou, describes Pompidou's policies "a Gaullism shorn of the General's eccentricities." See Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After*, 186; Georges-Henri Soutou, "Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les États-Unis et l'Europe," *Journal of European Integration History* 6, no. 2 (2000): 111-46. On French foreign policy under Pompidou; see esp. Institut Georges Pompidou, *Georges Pompidou et l'Europe: Colloque*; and Éric Bussière, François Dubasque, Robert Frank, and Nicolas Vaicbourdt, *Georges Pompidou et les États-Unis: Une «relation spéciale» 1969-1974* (Brussels: P. I. E. Peter Lang, 2013).

204. Despite the tense language emanating from Paris, Nixon strove to maintain close relations with France and aimed to seduce Pompidou into a cooperative relationship with Washington. "The main thing is, to the extent you can talk to Pompidou, to say you were selected because France is an

important post," Nixon advised his newly appointed ambassador to France. "[S]ay that the President has a special affection for France. . . . France has the best civil service in the world. World peace is served best if France plays a large role in the world, as in pre-World War II days. . . . Tell the President I said to the Cabinet that the French President has a great brain. Tell him I want closer cooperation with him. . . . I want a close relationship with the President—as the heir of de Gaulle." MemCon (9 March 1973), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 1. On Franco-American relations, see Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After*, ch. 7.

205. James O. Goldsborough, "France, the European Crisis, and the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 3 (April 1974): 538-55.

206. *Ibid.*

207. See *ibid.*, 545; and Kissinger, *White House Years*, 423. Despite the close relationship Nixon aimed to build with Pompidou, Kissinger did not have a great deal of fondness for Jobert. See, for instance, Kissinger's complaint to Giscard and Sauvagnargues about Jobert's "inflammatory comments." MemCon (15 December 1974), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 8.

208. At the center of the controversy remained Pompidou's permissive relationship with his foreign minister Jobert. As Trachtenberg has conclusively demonstrated, Franco-American relations under Pompidou remained fundamentally strong. The French and American presidents genuinely respected one another, and Kissinger maintained productive relationships with his counterparts on the Quai d'Orsay, especially with Hervé Alphand, general-secretary of the French Foreign Ministry and former ambassador to the United States. Jobert, however, often demonstrated reactionary anti-Americanism, remained suspicious of U.S. overtures, and, as Kissinger observed, actively pursued "the old Gaullist dream of building Europe on an anti-American basis." See Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After*, 213.

209. Kissinger, quoted in Goldsborough, "France, the European Crisis, and the Alliance," 545.

210. In a meeting between Nixon and Brandt, the president noted that "other European governments are not as enthusiastic or are opposed to the idea of the Year of Europe. We raised it, but the idea that we are forcing it on Europe as an American idea is not our intent." MemCon (29 September 1973), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 2. See also MemCon (17 January 1974), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 3. For an internal reflection of Jobert's attitudes toward European institutions and toward NATO, see "Gespräch des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem französischen Außenminister Jobert (1 March 1974), no. 65, in *AAP 1974*, vol. 1, pp. 251-73.

Jobert's characterization of Europe being "treated like a non-person" was echoed in internal CDU discussion as "the impotence of the 'Unperson Europa.'" See "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und das europäische Einigungswerk," n.d.; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

211. Ministère des affaires étrangères de la République française, Direction d'Europe, circular telegram 446 (24 July 1973), MAE, EC files 1971-6, 3810; quoted in Aurélie Élisabeth Gfeller, *Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973-1974* (New York: Berghahn, 2012), 39-40 and ch. 2. Rather than accusing Jobert of a reactionary approach to transatlantic relations, Gfeller credits him with a calculated scheme for asserting an independent European identity between the superpowers. She also notes his insistence on references to a single "European identity" in response to the "Year of Europe."

212. Goldsborough, "France, the European Crisis, and the Alliance," 538. For the text of the Joint U.S.-USSR Communiqué, see *Department of State Bulletin* 69, no. 1778 (23 July 1973), 130-34.

213. See Jonathan C. Randal, "Brezhnev Fails to Allay Paris Summit Fears," *The Washington Post* (27 June 1973), p. A26; Flora Lewis, "Pompidou, After Brezhnev Talk, Says Pacts Do Not Limit Force,"

New York Times (28 June 1973), p. 13; and Scott Sullivan, "Brezhnev Fails to Sway Pompidou on Two Major Issues," *Washington Post* (28 June 1973), p. A26.

214. For an account of the meeting, see the Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 14-15 June 1973.

Following a private meeting with a high-ranking U.S. State Department official, Ambassador to the U.S. Berndt von Staden reported to the Foreign Office his concern that NATO's strategic position needed to be reaffirmed among the allies such that "the concept of the indivisibility of alliance defense not be undermined" and "no difference in the situation for nuclear and non-nuclear alliance partners be created, as that only would create further difficulties." See Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an den AA (19 January 1974), no. 16, in *AAP 1974*, vol. 1, pp. 72-74.

215. Jobert, quoted in Goldsborough, "France the European Crisis, and the Alliance," 549.

216. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 422-423.

217. *Ibid.*

218. "Status of the Alliance," [n.d., 1974]; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Agency File, box 15; folder, NATO (4).

219. Goldsborough, "France, the European Crisis, and the Alliance," 503. Frédéric Bozo, *Deux stratégies pour l'Europe: De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l'Alliance atlantique, 1958-1969* (Paris: Plon, 1996). In English, see *idem.*, *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, trans. Susan Emanuel (Lanham, Md. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). Bozo questions whether de Gaulle operated from "the politics of grandeur" or from "a grand design," determining ultimately that the president's affront to the existing state of transatlantic relations involved de Gaulle's careful strategy for achieving autonomy for Europe and abandoning the precarious system of Cold War blocs in favor of a more durable, peaceful system of international relations.

Bozo explains that "[t]he balance of terror, heralded in 1957 with the launching of *Sputnik*, overturned the initial calculation of Western strategists who had believed they could base European security on the sole guarantee of the United States. Now, faced with the prospect of Soviet intercontinental nuclear capacity, U.S. involvement could no longer be considered unconditional, which was confirmed in de Gaulle's eyes by the concept of *flexible response*. Hence the necessity of a European strategic organization that would rely heavily on French nuclear power and would guarantee an ensured and permanent transatlantic tie" (p. xii).

Bozo argues against understanding de Gaulle's strategy as "a sort of archaic survival of the European balance of power," instead contending that the General's plan constituted a "postnational approach to relations among states" (p. xiii).

220. For a contemporary account of NATO-EC relations, see Grethe Vaernø, "The Atlantic Alliance and European Integration," *NATO Review* 26, no. 2 (April 1978): 23-29.

In a meeting with Ford, Giscard outlined some of his foreign-policy ideas as they related to the alliance; namely, to strengthen international institutions and to deepen ties among the nine EC members. See MemCon (29 May 1975), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 12. See also "Status of the Alliance," [n.d.; 1974]; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Agency File, box 15; folder, NATO (4); and MemCon (16 December 1974), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 12.

221. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 303.

222. *Ibid.*, 307.

223. *Ibid.*, 304-5.

224. *Ibid.*, 310.

225. See Arnulf Baring's discussion of "the weakness of the chancellor and his advisors" in his *Machtwechsel: die Ära Brandt-Scheel* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), 594-600.

226. "Was der Regierung fehlt, ist ein Kopf," *Der Spiegel* 41/1973 (8 October 1973), 25.

227. Various commentators have struggled to translate adequately the parliamentary language of German democracy. Wehner served as *Vorsitzender der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion. Fraktion*, in English, might be rendered as "parliamentary group"; "caucus" and "faction" carry different connotations.

228. Herbert Wehner, quoted in "Manchmal bin ich verzweifelt," *Der Spiegel* 40/1973 (1 October 1973), 22.

229. Peter Merseburger, "Sie werden dich jagen," *Die Zeit* 4/2013. See also Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Jäger, and Werner Link, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Republik im Wandel, 1969-1974: Die Ära Brandt* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), 115.

230. Claire Mortensen, . . . *da war auch ein Mädchen* (Munich: Humboldt-Verlag). Mortensen is the pseudonym for Brandt's alleged lover, Suzanne Sievers. Quotation in the work of socialite-journalist Viola Herms Drath, *Willy Brandt: Prisoner of his Past* (Radnor, Penn.: Chilton, 1975), 116.

231. Drath, *Willy Brandt*, 66.

232. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 315.

233. For Guillaume's own account, see his *Die Aussage: Wie es wirklich war* (Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Republik, 1988), 383ff.

234. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 316.

235. *Ibid.*, 320.

236. Willy Brandt, quoted in Gregor Schöllgen, "Der Kanzler und sein Spion," *Die Zeit* 40/2003 (25 September 2003).

237. "Zur Europapolitik der CDU" (16 June 1975); ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1912.

238. Willy Brandt, quoted in Noel D. Cary, "Reassessing Germany's Ostpolitik: From Détente to Refreeze," pt. 1, *Central European History* 33, no. 2 (2000), p. 237.

Chapter Two

Europessimism, Eurosclerosis, and the Cold War 1974-1979

We must be sure that what we construct will someday be a
good house for all Germans.

—Karl Arnold
on the future of a West German state, 1948¹

Helmut Schmidt: A Life in Leadership

During the second week of May 1974, the chancellery's porters packed away Brandt's belongings, and new chancellor Helmut Schmidt settled into his office in the Palais Schaumburg. Gone were the tumblers and decanter from the credenza; in their place lay carefully arranged stacks of books interspersed with briefing memoranda. Hundreds more volumes lined two large bookcases behind the chancellor's desk.²

Schmidt's successor had communicated a political message with his office; Brandt's cabinet had been appointed to charm guests, who could sit in comfort and sip whiskey with the chancellor. Brandt's tenure in office had been built on personal charisma and much closed-door politicking.

New chancellor Helmut Schmidt communicated his own political message: intellect and diligence would define his leadership. The comfortable armchairs were replaced with functional steel-framed and leather furniture. The usual desktop accoutrements had been stripped away in favor of a simple lamp, a pencil cup, and an ashtray. Guests compared his political style to that of a headmaster or an economics professor—an obligatory handshake, perfunctory pleasantries, and a brief but brilliant lecture on macroeconomic principles,

replete with citations to the scholarly literature.³ Others pointed to Schmidt's style as that of an industrial manager. The spartan office featured a large meeting table reminiscent of West Germany's corporate boardrooms.

Though he permitted himself few luxuries, a large portrait of August Bebel dominated one wall of Schmidt's office—a gift from party insider Alfred Nau. Bebel, a leading socialist during the Kaiserreich, had opposed Bismarck's labor policies and helped to organize the modern Social Democratic Party. Schmidt often used the painting and knowledge of Bebel as a shibboleth for visitors to his office.⁴

Brandt and Schmidt came from the same political party but shared little else in common. While the former achieved political fame on the basis of his charm, the latter had risen through the ranks, in his own words, as “a maker” and “a doer.”⁵ Brandt, though too insipid to be called ideological, surrounded himself with left-leaning ideologues. Schmidt, on the other hand, prided himself as a shrewd centrist, committed to social democracy because of its purported applicability to the daily life of the average German. Trained as an economist, he believed in the SPD economics platform he had helped to build. Brandt was an emotional Social Democrat; Schmidt was an intellectual Social Democrat.

The two men maintained quite different reputations abroad. Brandt had been seen as a visionary—one who looked beyond the nation-state and the bipolar world. Schmidt, however, was viewed as a traditionalist—a sober defender of the status quo, one who placed limits on multilateral experimentation in the name of protecting both his country's sovereignty and wealth. Brandt resisted U.S. influence and had wanted to abandon the system of sovereign nation-states altogether; Schmidt hoped for a robust transatlantic partnership to ensure European security and prosperity.

Nonetheless, Schmidt agreed with his predecessor that Europe's union must be strengthened. His foremost concern was that his country's newfound military and economic power be acceptable to his neighbors; building a European union would demonstrate West Germans' incontrovertible fidelity to European stability and prosperity. He confronted the challenges of the age by shoring up domestic institutions and by synchronizing West Germany's economic and security policies with Europe's institutions.

Across the 1970s, Germany, once the greatest threat to world peace, became the stabilizer to a world in crisis. NATO and the EC—organizations once designed to contain German power—transformed into powerful engines linking West Germany to the world. German political and economic leadership in Europe, once a source of great anxiety, became the essential touchstone to managing a continent in crisis.

Helmut Heinrich Waldemar Schmidt had been born on 23 December 1918 in working-class Bembek, near Hamburg.⁶ On the day of his birth, the demons of the twentieth century already had been unleashed. Civil war gripped Germany's once magnificent imperial cities, as millions of Germans battled for the future of their defeated Reich. Lenin's Bolsheviks consolidated their power in Russia, and communists gained footholds across the world. The German revolution, which previously had been bloodless, turned violent within only hours of Schmidt's birth, as the last remnants of the German army fired on the revolutionary socialists who had been guarding the Kaiser's abandoned Berlin palace. The emperor—by then citizen Wilhelm Hohenzollern—settled into more modest quarters in the Netherlands, and seventy-five railroad carriages rumbled across the German countryside, carting his belongings en route to his court in exile.⁷ A stab-in-the-back legend gained momentum, and

Lance Corporal Adolf Hitler, recovering in a Brandenburg hospital from a mustard-gas attack, soon struggled his way back to Munich. Dozens of paramilitary units roamed the lawless countryside. The German nation had gambled its future on world domination and sunk now into military, political, and societal defeat.

Schmidt's father, a schoolmaster, was revered in Bembek for his strictness and sense of discipline. Gustav Schmidt meted out fierce rebukes for both intellectual and moral laziness. Young Helmut's mother, on the other hand, nurtured her two sons—Helmut and Wolfgang—organizing regular trips to museums, libraries, concerts. She arranged weekly family madrigal singing and fostered in her children a love for the arts and letters. Helmut, called "Schmiddel" as a child, attended the progressive Lichtwark-Schule, an institution which prided itself for its coeducation of boys and girls and for egalitarianism among rich and poor pupils.⁸ The future chancellor earned high marks in all of his disciplines, took up painting, captained the rowing team, relished the piano, and later learned the pipe organ as well.

As a young man, Schmidt dreamed of becoming an architect or urban planner, perhaps marrying his blossoming passion for art with his desire to impose order upon chaos. But, when the war came in 1939, he entered his military service in an anti-aircraft unit. During the war, he corresponded with his childhood sweetheart, Hannelore Glaser, called Loki, whom he married in June 1942. In fact, his first trip to the future capital of Bonn was to present his fiancée to his commanding officer and to receive permission to marry her.

When the war ended, and after Schmidt's release from a British prisoner-of-war camp, he returned to Loki and to Hamburg. Like all Germans of his generation, Schmidt's young adulthood had vanished, and his future appeared bleak. At twenty-six years old, he

possessed no education, no training, and no country. With no architecture courses available in postwar Hamburg, he turned instead to economics. Schmidt spent his days studying and writing comparative economic analyses of the Japanese and German currencies and spent his evenings in Social Democratic Party meetings.

As he rose through the ranks of the Social Democratic Party, serving in the Hamburg Senate and the Bundestag, he authored a number of important works on German defense strategy, NATO, and the nature of parliamentary democracy.⁹ In 1967, he began service as chairman of the SPD's parliamentary group in the Bundestag before being named Brandt's minister for defense in October 1969.

Europe's Leader

Schmidt: "Lightening intelligence, vast technical expertise, pragmatism and tirelessness," described an old Hamburg friend. Of course, also "a non-sufferer of fools," the new chancellor exhibited "permanent irritability" and tended toward "know-it-allism and arrogance." Despite his perceived "iciness," one profiler noted he was "his own best public-relations man"; his coolness toward the press drew both fascination and curiosity from the public. Altogether, Schmidt compared favorably both with his contemporaries and with his predecessors. "He's convinced most of the time that he's the only real leader in the Western world. He's also probably right," noted one commentator. "The problem is he's German."¹⁰

In international politics, Schmidt boasted strong Atlanticist credentials. He traveled frequently to the United States and enjoyed popularity in America. Though he spoke clumsy French, he conversed fluently in perfectly accented English and professed himself an anglophile. As both defense and finance minister, he had shown himself more fixated on the

transatlantic relationship than on the European one. Despite the prevalent tension of “thinking EC” versus “thinking NATO” in Europe at the time, Schmidt and his government successfully managed both.

Perhaps defying popular expectations, the chancellor’s strategic vision for Germany and for Europe involved a productive transatlantic relationship with the United States. Economic recovery in the western world, he believed, relied on Europeans enjoying a true “partnership of equals” with the Americans.¹¹ Still, the chancellor came to embrace European integration both as a means of ensuring his country’s economic prosperity and in hopes of guaranteeing a trusted position for Germany within international institutions.¹²

With Europe gripped by economic crisis, Schmidt believed that his country needed to cultivate its political and economic relationship with the United States to weather the storm. West Germany, he believed, did not wield adequate economic influence to emerge as a leader within the European Monetary System. Ideally, he hoped—unrealistically, following the 1971 Smithsonian agreement—for a resumption by the U.S. of its former Bretton Woods-style role.¹³ International political cooperation and economic integration represented the only path toward western economic recovery, he believed. Capitalism, by its very nature, relied on *international* relationships; a variety of single-country approaches to recovery would fail. That had been the folly of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Schmidt believed.

Europe’s economic crisis, which by 1974 gripped the entire western world, naturally dominated Schmidt’s first weeks in office. With his academic background and his distinguished service as finance minister, the new chancellor devoted many hours each day to economic questions and proved reluctant to hand the finance ministry over to fellow

Hamburg native, the able Hans Apel. Contemporaries quickly noted the irony; as chancellor, Schmidt continued much of the same work he had performed as finance minister, “fum[ing] around Europe, lecturing the British, lecturing the French, with occasional trips to America to lecture the Americans.” One French official, who had been among the first French occupiers of Germany, remembered 1945 and said: “Never would I ever have imagined that only thirty years later I would be sitting through economics lessons given by a German to Americans and Frenchmen.”¹⁴

While his predecessor had shied away from economic discussions, Schmidt viewed nearly every problem through economic lenses. In particular, he saw his country’s security posture as intensely bound up with the mechanisms of its economic stability. Schmidt’s notion of security involved establishing predictable and trusted mechanisms of international monetary cooperation, buttressed by common outlooks on economic policy.¹⁵

Recovering economic dynamism at home and achieving stability abroad represented his foremost goals. To that end, the “reluctant European” came to embrace European institutions. The EC provided an infrastructure for extending Bonn’s economic influence and fiscal discipline across the continent. The “creation of a European union has become more urgent than ever,” Schmidt told the Bundestag in his inaugural address.¹⁶ Germany, the benign hegemon, would take the lead. Unlike his predecessor, who had seen European institutions as a replacement for the nation-state, Schmidt came to see the EC as its savior.¹⁷

Europe Rekindled

Meanwhile, a number of European intellectuals and technocrats had begun taking action on Brandt’s earlier calls for deepened European institutions. Europessimism and

eurosclerosis lingered, but if there were solutions to be found, they must be *European* solutions. "The fragile nature of Europe in some ways also reflects the powerlessness of our states," reported Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans. "We are vulnerable and powerless." Three decades' of economic dynamism clearly had reached their end. "This is a new experience for our peoples in recent history."¹⁸


At the EC summit in Paris in December 1974, Schmidt, along with the convened heads of government, charged Tindemans with studying how the community might rekindle its "guiding light."¹⁹ Tindemans soberly assessed Europe. "The European citizen does not view the reasons for the construction of Europe in exactly the same way as in 1950," he explained as he introduced his report. "The European idea is partly a victim of its own successes: the reconciliation between formerly hostile countries, the economic prosperity owing to the enlarged market, the détente which has taken the place of the cold war, thanks particularly to our cohesion, all this seems to have been achieved and consequently not to require any more effort. Europe today is part of the general run of things; it seems to have lost its air of adventure." In short, Tindemans sought to answer: "What do the Europeans want? What do they expect from a united Europe?"²⁰

Tindemans unabashedly called for a federal "European Union," endowed with authority even to override sovereign national decisions.²¹ "Our peoples expect the European Union to be . . . the voice of Europe," he told the European Commission, able "to determine a common, coherent and all-inclusive political view" and even "binding political commitments."²² While Brandt had openly embraced such a prospect, Schmidt proved far more circumspect.

Europe's postwar political institutions could not fail as they had after the Great War. "If we fail," Tindemans warned, "our democracies will be at risk and our children will inherit a decadent society."²³ With a European Parliament, European Council, Council of Ministers, European Commission, Court of Justice, European Foundation, and a full slate of coordinating committees, Tindemans hoped to build institutions that would both guarantee international stability and assert independence from superpower domination.


Tindemans recognized the potential conflict between his European vision and preexisting NATO. "Defense does indeed raise difficult problems," he told an interviewer, "but let us adopt a prudent approach and take account . . . our desire for détente and cooperation within Europe."²⁴ He warned "against the subjection and narrow dependence which would prevent [Europe] from making its voice heard."²⁵

Fig. 2.1. Defense Expenditures of the Major European NATO Countries, 1975



Figures are calculated in constant 2011 U.S. dollars. Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

**Fig. 2.2. Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP
in the Major European NATO Countries, 1975**



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg's prime minister and future European Commission president, similarly qualified the position of the EC vis-à-vis NATO. "I do not see any incompatibility between our broader alliance and a unifying Europe," Thorn told the American president. "Some people seem to see dangers and fear that a choice has to be made between these two objectives. Part of the problem is that the French are not in the NATO organization and they are an important part of the EC integration. Some say that the Americans don't like this because they fear that the EC competes with NATO. I think that the question of U.S. views is sometimes used by Europeans as an alibi when they don't want to reach a European decision."²⁶

The mid 1970s saw a nadir in transatlantic relations, particularly related to their alliance and defense cooperation. For Europeans, the strategy of containment, once the guarantor of continental security, lost its luster in the jungles of Indochina. Neither militarily,

politically, nor rhetorically did any European government support the Vietnam Conflict, deeming it an exercise in American nationalism.²⁷ “What had been an alliance of interest and friendship is now just an alliance of interest,” bristled U.S. President Richard Nixon. “The damage was in the area of personal relations,” noted one White House staffer. “The president said that he did not love the PRC [People’s Republic of China] and the USSR and that his relationships with them were based solely on national interests. That is the way it would have to be now with the European countries—no more toasts, no more state visits, except perhaps with Pompidou, but certainly not with Brandt.”²⁸

In the wake of America’s Vietnam quagmire, western European publics were developing a general distaste for military power. Remaining inextricably tied to the U.S. superpower no longer offered the benefits it had in the days of the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Crisis. By the 1970s, the transatlantic alliance had devolved into disputes over burden-sharing and complacency in America’s third-world adventurism. The Europeans would need to develop their own mechanisms of international cooperation. Relationships between states need not be sanctified by military alliance alone; those alliances should substantiate broader collective engagement of political, economic, and social issues, reaching beyond force and statecraft. That had been Brandt’s vision, but Schmidt resisted such a federal Europe.

“The need for Europe to speak with one voice in its relations with the United States is one of the main underlying reasons for the construction of Europe,” Tindemans wrote. Citing Europe’s “vulnerability” and “relative impotence,” Tindemans denounced “[t]he traditional distinctions maintained by diplomatic chancelleries . . . , [which] make increasingly less sense in the modern world.”²⁹ Although purporting to address “the destinies of our two regions,” he made little mention of NATO, ultimately hoping to replace

many of its functions with a European Union. The thanks Europeans owed to NATO, Tindemans believed, was in making European integration possible; by the 1970s, the alliance had outlived its purpose. “By virtue of the Atlantic Alliance we in Europe enjoy a measure of security and stability which has enabled us to undertake the construction of Europe.”³⁰

Europe’s high-profile internationalists were publicly questioning NATO’s *raison d’être*, while they pledged loyalty to the fledgling EC. Like Brandt, they linked European institutions to progressive notions of abandoning the traditional nation-state and to international collaboration in solving their domestic problems. Schmidt’s vision for Europe proved more reserved. Europe, he believed, should insulate its nation-states from economic catastrophe and should marshal its collective economic power within an increasingly competitive global economy.

The Architecture of Prosperity: Domestic

As a young man, Schmidt aspired to become an architect. Though he never built any great structures, his design for the modern German economy outlasted the crises of the 1970s, the Cold War, and the bipolar world itself. His great edifice, later dubbed “Model Germany,” proved the envy of the industrial world and soon after the basis for the European Monetary System itself.

Schmidt inherited an economy in crisis. By 1974, every western economy had collapsed. Even West Germany’s resilient gross national product lost six percent between 1973 and 1975, shrinking to its lowest levels in the postwar period.³¹

The foundation for Schmidt's architecture proved unsure. Though the Germans long had suffered from an excess of political ideology, economically, German culture always had proven decidedly anti-dogmatic. Unlike the English narrative, in which capitalist ideas determined political outcomes, the German story proved the opposite. In Bismarckian Germany, the powerful East Elbian nobles rejected Manchester liberalism in the pursuit of preserving the social status quo. The interwar republic, torn between the great industrialists, the landowners, and the civil servants, lurched through its economic crises with little ideological continuity. The development of the bourgeoisie as a political class remained stunted.³² Hitler legitimized monopoly and state intervention, but National Socialism allowed little room for any economic ideology per se.³³ As Gerald D. Feldman has noted, the German "preference for codified authoritarianism over regulated conflict" produced economic systems resistant to change, even wealth-building, in the name of guarding the status quo.³⁴

The postwar republic, beyond rebuilding its political institutions and social structures in a divided nation, likewise constructed new economic conventions. After 1945, against the historical backdrop of National Socialism, the Federal Republic produced a modern social-welfare state that merged classical Anglo-Saxon liberalism with traditional continental statism.³⁵ As Guido Goldman has pointed out, Germany's twentieth-century political instability placed a premium on achieving consensus. Thus, West Germany's domestic political spectrum proved narrower than in other European states.³⁶

Economic growth in West Germany largely had been taken for granted, both at home and abroad. If Prussia had been an army with a state, Bonn, through its "Economic Miracle," had become an economy with a state.³⁷ Enamored with a culture of comfort and

consumption, Germans, perhaps for the first time in their history, were cautioned against “a life that is too good.” After years of deprivation, “our faces are approaching the full moon shape; one chin has turned to at least two,” warned one West German periodical.³⁸ Father of the Economic Miracle Ludwig Erhard, whose face certainly did resemble the waxing moon, promised his countrymen “prosperity for all.”³⁹ Sustainable economic growth, stable prices, and steady employment produced a robust economy in the once devastated country.⁴⁰

By 1974, the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary régime, the oil crisis, and the global recession of the early 1970s all produced an acute systemic shock in the Federal Republic.⁴¹ The Social Democratic program aimed to recapture economic prosperity in the short term and to fashion a new foundation for German wealth in the long term. By coincidence, simultaneously, West Germany’s most highly credentialed economist became the country’s chancellor.

Modell Deutschland became the slogan for the Social Democratic economics platform in 1975 and during the federal election campaign of 1976. Perhaps a misnomer, the SPD’s model did not figure as a singular program but as a dynamic recalibration of the public-private sector relationship to support low inflation and an export orientation for the country. The 1976 Codetermination Act (*Mitbestimmungsgesetz*) provided for near parity in representation between labor and shareholders on boards of directors. Of Schmidt’s fifteen cabinet ministers, three previously had served as union chiefs. Unlike the French and British, who suffered terrible labor relations in the period, Germans enjoyed largely harmonious relations between employees and management in their firms.⁴²

Fig. 2.3. West German Federal Election Results, 3 October 1976





Fig. 2.4. Political Party Preference of Labor Union Members in the Federal Republic of Germany
Autumn 1978



Source: Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 295.

According to Schmidt's design, an able economic team retooled the West German economy and rejuvenated faith in its institutions. In real terms, West Germany's GNP expanded by 12.7 percent in the second half of the 1970s, equating to 2.5 percent per year. The labor force expanded to include an additional 700,000, with unemployment falling from 4.6 percent to 3.8.⁴³

As one scholar noted at the time, the SPD faced its "historical dilemma" once in power, "caught between its reformist goals and its duty as the fire brigade of capitalism."⁴⁴ Despite disagreements between liberal Economics Minister Hans Friedrichs and social-democratic Finance Minister Hans Apel, the chancellor erred on the side of prudence and fiscal conservatism; the fires of 1974 must be extinguished. While inflation spiraled out of control in the rest of the industrial world, the Federal Republic managed inflation rates at just above one-third of most of its European neighbors.⁴⁵ Thus, the role of the state would be to facilitate capital formation, to pursue low inflation policies, and to maintain West Germany's export orientation.⁴⁶

With the success of the West German economic model, along with the fiscal restraint exercised by Bonn, by 1977, the Deutsche Mark and German leadership provided the basis for the European economy.

Table 2.1. Stagflation in West Germany, 1973-1976

	1973	1974	1975	1976
<i>GNP (real) percent change of previous year</i>	4.9	0.4	-1.9	5.1
<i>Private investments (real) percent change over previous year</i>	0.3	-13.2	-4.5	2.3
<i>State investments (real) percent change over previous year</i>	-0.5	7.7	-3	-3.9
<i>Prices percent change</i>	6.9	7	6	4.5
<i>Unemployment total (percent of working population)</i>	1.3	2.6	4.7	4.6
<i>Percent change of industrial employment</i>	1.2	-3.6	-6.2	-2.5
<i>Employed population (in millions)</i>	22.9	22.6	22	21.9
<i>Productivity increase (percent)</i>	7.1	4.6	4.4	8.8
<i>Capacity utilization percent (WSI)</i>	86.7	81.7	77.7	81.7
<i>Bankruptcies</i>	5,515	7,772	9,195	9,362

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, *WSI-Mitteilungen* SVR report (1977/78); in Jeremy Leaman, *The Political Economy of West Germany, 1945-85* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1988), 202.

The Architecture of Prosperity: International

“I do not accept that Europe’s capacity for creating new wealth, providing new employment, and stimulating growth in the right direction is at an end,” European Commission President Roy Jenkins told an audience in Florence. Eurosclerosis need not condemn the European dream but should rejuvenate it. “We require a new driving force comparable with the major rejuvenations of the past two hundred years; the industrial

revolution itself, the onset of the railway age, the impact of Keynes, the need for post-war reconstruction,” he explained.⁴⁷

No revolution lay in Europe’s future. Jenkins’ calls for such a reconstruction of Europe’s institutions ultimately produced little more than some newspaper headlines and scurrying among a few dozen Brussels technocrats. Still, his calls sounded persuasive. He echoed Brandt’s sentiments; problems engendered by the nation-state—be they inflation, unemployment, or deficits—could not be solved by sovereign nation-states alone. Instead, new supranational European institutions should rebuild what sovereign states had destroyed: international liquidity, stable monetary relations, and prosperity on the continent.

Schmidt found that such schemes lacked intellectual mettle. He favored not an overhaul of international order and the monetary régime but calculated and creative adaptation to the political and economic malaise of the era.

High-profile Europeans—Jenkins, Pompidou, Luxembourg’s Pierre Werner, the Netherlands’ Willem Duisenberg, and many others—advanced their various schemes for an overhaul of European institutions. In nearly every case, plans for economic and monetary convergence called for stripping down the European edifice to its foundations and rebuilding from scratch. Despite the hundreds of proposals from intellectuals, pundits, and politicians across the continent, Schmidt knew that no such rollback to the Rome Treaty of 1957 would succeed; European institutions must be built within the context of the intervening decades of turmoil and triumph.

From the first weeks of Schmidt’s chancellorship—the spring of 1974—until the European Monetary System came into force—March of 1979—the German chancellor

maintained his firm resolve that prudent renovation of European institutions would guarantee international stability while preserving state sovereignty in a mutually beneficial EC system that still nourished the transatlantic relationship.

Schmidt's neighbors, namely the French under Pompidou, aimed for a European system that would enjoy a portion of German prosperity and Deutsche Mark stability while still avoiding German economic hegemony. As the coming years would show, no arrangement would be possible. The Federal Republic's position as an international monetary stabilizer, generous lender, and exemplar of economic self-restraint—buttressed by sound domestic economic institutions and the discipline of the Bundesbank—produced de facto German economic leadership of Europe.

A variety of proposals for European economic and monetary cooperation had been floated over the years. During the decades of prosperity, however, while member-states enjoyed balance-of-payment surpluses, few, including Schmidt, imagined a European monetary system built on any foundation other than a dollar reserve.

By 1969, the Bretton Woods régime exhibited the symptoms of its terminal decline. "How did we get into this mess?" asked Schmidt. "The first thing that comes to my mind is inflation."⁴⁸ At Brandt's urging during the summit at The Hague that year, a joint EC committee began laying out plans for monetary cooperation. Chaired by Luxembourg's Prime Minister Pierre Werner, the committee aimed to reconcile the German demand for economic policy coordination and the French demand for monetary cooperation. Bonn always had resisted monetary integration, viewing it as premature without coordinated economic policies that would guarantee the stability of the mark and would prevent inflation. Paris, particularly bowing to the will of the Gaullist Pompidou, refused to sacrifice

economic sovereignty, hoping instead for an intergovernmental consensus on monetary cooperation. Werner's report called for phased institutional reform over the coming decade, resulting in fixed exchange rates. Though the council agreed in principle to a gradual transition toward fixed exchange rates in March 1971, it took little action in the years that followed. The U.S. dollar clearly would no longer underwrite European prosperity and stability, but the Franco-German monetary-economic divide seemed insurmountable.

A modest breakthrough took place two years later, in the spring of 1973, when EC economics ministers agreed to a "European Monetary Cooperation Fund" (EMCF). The EMCF relied on the logic of the Werner plan but issued no accompanying requirements. It would coordinate exchange rates among the members but not necessarily with an aim to achieve monetary union; in 1973 managing inflation in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse proved the far more pressing concern.

Handling foreign-exchange rates dominated the economic policy discussions in those years.⁴⁹ The December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement aimed to update the Bretton Woods arrangement, maintaining fixed exchange rates between European currencies and the dollar—now a fiat currency. Exchange rate fluctuations were guaranteed at ± 2.25 percent, establishing the so-called "currency tunnel." In the months that followed, governors of Europe's central banks pegged their currencies to one another, establishing the so-called "currency snake." The snake slithered out of the tunnel in 1973, when, after successive devaluation of the dollar, U.S. currency was allowed to float. In Europe, between 1973 and 1976, snake members periodically left the arrangement as proved domestically convenient. In the end, the snake formula left the Deutsche Mark as the anchor with only Danish krone and Dutch guilder pegged to it.⁵⁰

At the heart of the economic and monetary questions facing Europe lay the age-old Franco-German divide. With the two largest economies in Europe, Paris and Bonn drove EC economic policy and maintained de facto control over monetary policy.

Since the 1950s, the French had resisted any EC attempts to control internal economic policy, even vetoing the modest proposals of the Werner report. The Gaullist governments maintained that Europe must take a monetary route to economic integration, following the lead of the Banque de France. The Germans meanwhile harbored deep suspicions of France's inflationary policies and bristled at their European partners' flippant relationships toward spiraling debts. The traditional German view maintained that no monetary convergence could occur without structural integration of economic policies that eschewed inflation and renounced deficit spending. Economics Minister Karl Schiller had built his reputation on resisting French interventions and establishing the Mark as the de facto currency anchor after 1973. Stymied at the impasse, European economic integration stalled for more than a decade. While Belgium and Luxembourg privileged the French view, the Netherlands and Italy followed the German lead.

Despite their opposing outlooks, Giscard and Schmidt forged a close personal friendship. Both men had been finance ministers who had come to office unexpectedly in May 1974—Giscard through his mentor's death and Schmidt through his predecessor's resignation. Giscard, elegant and urbane, settled into the Elysée Palace quite naturally. Schmidt, however, with Elbe bargeman's cap and pipe, gruff and candid, did not seem so natural in his new office.⁵¹ Both men specifically cited a Franco-German rapprochement in their official platforms. "There have been more discussions between the German chancellor and the French president in the past four months than in the whole postwar history of Franco-

German relations,” Schmidt boasted to a friend soon after taking office.⁵² “La Bonne entente,” which Giscard called his relationship with the German chancellor, was reciprocated by Schmidt, who called his relationship with the French president a “profound personal friendship which I believe will last all our lives.”⁵³ “Schmidt and Giscard were firmly in control of Europe,” wrote European Commission president Roy Jenkins, “but for the moment had no direction in which they wished to take it.”⁵⁴

The turning point came in August 1976, when Giscard appointed economics professor Raymond Barre both prime minister and economics and finance minister—posts he held concurrently.⁵⁵ Though a respected economist, having authored the standard university text on political economy, Barre proved largely obscure in political circles. Giscard defended his appointee as “the best economist in France.”⁵⁶ In his inaugural address before the National Assembly, Barre identified the singular goal of his government: “to fight inflation and to maintain the stability of the French economy.”⁵⁷ The prime minister’s modest austerity agenda risked tremendous political retribution from the left, as he cut public budgets and restricted wage increases.⁵⁸

Barre’s anti-inflation policies at last reconciled the Franco-German monetary-economic divide. He, Giscard, and Schmidt all favored fixed exchange rates and limiting public debt. France’s two leaders had reversed their country’s monetary policy position: integration within Europe must be achieved on the basis of prior economic convergence. The failures of the last decade could be relegated the era of their predecessors, while the new Franco-German engine could drive European economic convergence in the years to come.

By the time of the February 1977 Franco-German summit in Paris, the beginnings of an economic consensus had emerged between the two countries.⁵⁹ To expedite cooperation, Schmidt and Giscard agreed to exchange representatives from their central banks and their foreign and economics ministries four times annually. The bilateral nature of economic reform—a Franco-German microconvergence—proved unnerving to many, namely the euro-federalists on one end of the spectrum and the euroskeptics on the other.⁶⁰ “Actions in monetary affairs are currently deliberated and implemented at the *bilateral* and *international* level rather than at the *Community* level,” noted long-time Commission president François-Xavier Ortoli.⁶¹

In the months that followed, a redoubled effort toward a community-wide union came together. “We must face the fundamental question. Do we intend to create a European union or do we not?” European Commission President Roy Jenkins asked an audience in Florence. “There would be little point in asking the peoples and governments of Europe to contemplate union, were it not for the fact that real and efficient sovereignty over monetary issues already eludes them to a high and increasing degree.”⁶²

Schmidt agreed. With the continued decline of the dollar, he abandoned his previous goal of rebuilding a Bretton Woods-type order; the United States had abdicated its leadership of the international monetary régime.⁶³ “Bretton Woods is broken because the ‘anchor power’ of the Bretton Woods system, the United States of America, has not fulfilled its duties,” Schmidt told the Bundesbank Council. “The anchor power of the new system is the French and Germans together; let us hope that it will not be said that it is only the Germans.” With the continued decline of the dollar and a series of rifts in the U.S.-German relationship, the chancellor sharpened his resolve to build a European-led monetary régime.

The key challenge would be to limit German exposure to U.S. monetary policy. “The dollar cannot carry on like this,” he said. American politicians must “give up their policy of ‘benign neglect.’”⁶⁴ By maintaining his firm position over the years and by guarding West German prosperity, the trailing EC economies gradually fell into line behind the German chancellor’s position.⁶⁵

Schmidt’s architecture, which would become the European Monetary System in the years to come, envisioned pooling European reserves to protect the EEC against the falling dollar. In February 1978, Schmidt told his cabinet that the West Germans would begin construction on a new European monetary order. The announcement would come at the April European summit. “With this it is important to make clear that we, without openly announcing it, are ready to aid our partners in the stabilization of their currencies,” the chancellor said.⁶⁶

Two weeks later, when Callaghan visited Bonn, he and Schmidt enjoyed a private dinner in the chancellor’s bungalow. The two sat up until 1:00 in the morning discussing Schmidt’s idea for the creation of “another European snake, but of a different kind.”⁶⁷ Schmidt envisioned a common reserve to buttress currencies stabilized against one another. Finance ministries, rather than central banks, would administer the reserve.⁶⁸

At the Copenhagen summit the following month, Schmidt and Giscard laid out their agenda to resurrect a stronger “snake.” The European currencies would be stabilized against one another, and each country would make contributions to a pooled reserve. Central banks would settle their accounts via a common European Unit of Account (EUA). The scheme was “not to replace the present snake,” Schmidt remarked, “but to swallow it.” Giscard followed, presenting the proposal as an ultimatum; the French and Germans would “create a

European Bretton Woods with a European exchange rate against the dollar.” A final alternative, Schmidt noted, may result in “the European Community breaking up as a result of the stresses brought on by the present situation.”⁶⁹ Privately, Giscard accepted that “the final result of the evolution being discussed would be a Deutsche Mark zone, just as there formerly had been a sterling area.” Likewise, Schmidt acknowledged “that the Deutsche Mark was bound to become increasingly a reserve currency.”⁷⁰

Schmidt and Giscard clearly would determine the future of European monetary convergence. Callaghan felt personally slighted and politically isolated. His “neutrally critical stance” did not match the speed of the Franco-German scheme.⁷¹ With internal Labour Party conflicts over Britain’s European policy, Callaghan risked political repercussions with either path. A general election loomed in his future, and turmoil at home dominated the agenda. When Callaghan had taken his seat for Cardiff South in 1945, the City of London still dominated global banking, and sterling provided the world’s largest monetary bloc. Now, three decades later, monetary policy was being dictated by the continental powers. In April, Schmidt visited Chequers with a small delegation for a seminar on monetary issues. In a particularly bitter exchange, Schmidt rather smugly told the chancellor of the exchequer that the best “solution was that those with deficits should get rid of them!”⁷² Schmidt, well schooled in English understatement, knew precisely the insult he had made, particularly on the heels of Britain’s £2.3 billion rescue package from the IMF—the largest in its history.⁷³

In the end, the British played very little role in the EMS creation. Schmidt and Giscard’s pace left the recalcitrant Callaghan behind.⁷⁴ Even a private visit in June by Callaghan to Schmidt’s hometown of Hamburg did little to reconcile the two. “Things have gone very badly with Callaghan,” the chancellor later confessed to Jenkins.⁷⁵ Months later, a Cabinet

committee secretly resolved to keep Britain out of any European monetary system that may emerge.⁷⁶

Days later, the European Council convened in Bremen.⁷⁷ Danish Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen praised progress of the Franco-German proposal—“a very exciting prospect,” he said. “It [would be] equally exciting if you drove over a cliff,” Callaghan retorted, “except that you hurt yourself at the bottom.”⁷⁸ Clearly the British had been muscled out of the arrangement.

Schmidt’s handiwork—the system agreed to in Bremen—became the European Monetary System in the months that followed. “It is not sufficient to draw up emergency plans for 1978. Whatever plans we draw up must deal with our immediate problems but they must also go beyond 1978 and try to tackle the problems of the eighties as well.”⁷⁹ A resurrected currency snake would guarantee exchange-rate stability; a European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) would underwrite the semi-pegged system, holding a common basket of currencies to manage variations in monetary values; and members would coordinate their exchange-rate policies with third countries, namely the U.S. and Japan, by institutionalizing central bank cooperation. Though no one said so, the Deutsche Mark would function as the de facto currency anchor.⁸⁰ By March of the following year, the new EMS took effect.

At home and abroad, how had the West Germans come to establish a new financial orthodoxy for the western world? Only a decade before, the divided nation remained the principal *object* of international concern; international institutions and the two superpowers wrangled with the “German question”—how to keep Germany peaceful and limited in its

power. By 1979, however, the Federal Republic had emerged as the principal *subject* of international relations; Bonn was determining the scope of European integration and the limits of the transatlantic relationship.⁸¹ Capitalism was being reborn under the German aegis, transcending partisan ideologies. The Deutsche Mark had become the basis for the European economy, replacing the dollar as Europe's reserve currency.

The Federal Republic's combined domestic prosperity and international economic leadership unnerved many contemporaries. As strikes raged on across Europe, German workers joined management at boardroom tables and kept their factories running. As inflation destroyed the middle classes in Britain and the U.S., prices in Germany remained steady. As governments struggled to tame their deficits, German account sheets remained balanced. As the American president promised "I'm reading and studying," trying to understand stagflation, Helmut Schmidt designed a new world economy with German stability at the center.⁸²

The remaining challenge for Schmidt and his government would be to stem international resentment of German leadership and to make German power—economic, political, military, and diplomatic—palatable to its neighbors, both east and west.

Adapting to the New Security Situation

The moorings of the existing nuclear régime were loosening, and the West Germans needed to adapt to the transformed security sphere, simultaneously anticipating their future foreign-policy ambitions and asserting their maximum interests at present. By the middle 1960s, NATO's Military Committee was contemplating changes to the alliance's strategic concept, and allied conventional improvements were taking shape as new

operational plans for ground warfare on the continent. In 1967, allied defense ministers unanimously adopted Pierre Harmel's report on "the future tasks of the alliance," recommending that NATO pursue simultaneous tracks of deterrence and dialogue with the eastern bloc. Also in 1967, NATO was seeking to redefine the role of the non-nuclear powers within the alliance's nuclear planning, simultaneously allowing them a role in nuclear decision-making and institutionalizing their non-nuclear status. The Soviet Union, roughly between 1968 and 1970, achieved strategic parity with the west in ICBMs. And across 1968, an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was being negotiated, promising to freeze the number of nuclear weapons states, forever excluding the Federal Republic from the ranks of the nuclear powers and making the West Germans indefinitely dependent upon American extended nuclear deterrence. Likewise, beginning in November 1969, U.S. and Soviet diplomats began negotiations in Helsinki on limiting strategic arms held by the superpowers.⁸³

The death of the massive retaliation concept proved neither quick nor definitive; instead, the doctrine withered away across the 1960s as ever increasing numbers of western defense intellectuals lost their confidence in the idea. In that vacuum, West German strategists were becoming concerned by their Pentagon colleagues' instincts. In but one poignant example, the Americans, in joint war games with the Germans, had suggested deploying atomic-demolition munitions as deep as two hundred kilometers within West German territory, including in urban and industrial areas. This had been the Americans' answer to slow a Warsaw Pact advance on the Rhine—gradually to destroy German towns, harbors, railroads, and industrial infrastructure. The network of Bundeswehr and Pentagon planners remained small—in Bonn, especially Helmut Bertram, Friedrich Foertsch, and Adolf

Heusinger—and though the studies had been arranged purely as theoretical exercises, otherwise close collaborators began to lose their trust in one another, particularly when the Americans seemed willing to kill millions of Germans and destroy the entire Federal Republic as an act of warning against the Soviets. Should the day of battle come, the West Germans hoped that NATO's overwhelming nuclear strength would *deter* the Soviet aggressor, not gradually destroy their homeland.⁸⁴

Such exercises provided but one of many indications that NATO required more flexibility in its defense posture. The alliance's existing strategic concept had been codified in MC 14/2, adopted in the spring of 1957. Plans emphasized swift nuclear escalation against the Warsaw Pact and anticipated that "maximum destruction would occur within the first few days as both sides [seek] to exploit their nuclear stockpiles to gain nuclear superiority." Western conventional forces, limited in size and scope, remained in place largely as a tripwire against eastern aggression and with the understanding that any conventional phase to a future war would be eclipsed by strategic attack against the Soviet Union. "The first few days, which would be characterized by the greatest intensity of nuclear exchange, would be critical," warned NATO's Military Committee.⁸⁵ The "political guidance" from the North Atlantic Council advised, in short, "counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset."⁸⁶

By the middle 1960s, MC 14/2 had outlived its usefulness, and NATO, by retaining its nuclear-only strategy, was courting more risk than was the Warsaw Pact. As one contemporary worried, "what about an incident at sea or a probing attack on Norway or Turkey? Or for that matter, what about a large conventional attack in Central Europe with ambiguous origins? Or an attack advertised by Moscow as a product of 'limited' and

negotiable political goals?”⁸⁷ Would NATO launch a nuclear war over smaller-scale encroachments? Furthermore, would all of the western allies remain united in their resolve if losses could be kept relatively low? The standing doctrine permitted the Soviets to calculate risks of aggression quite easily and to prepare in advance for those dangers; a Warsaw Pact offensive would produce either no NATO military response or overwhelming nuclear retaliation. To ensure the former, the Soviets need only advance their claims incrementally or ambiguously, to undermine western resolve with coordinated disinformation and propaganda campaigns, or as NATO contemporaries worried, by “salami slice tactics.” To strengthen deterrence, NATO needed to reintroduce risk into the Soviet strategic calculus, to make the consequences of any potential attack incalculable. “Nothing would be more dangerous than an aggressor who is not aware of such a risk,” warned Leber.⁸⁸ Under strategic concept MC 14/2, the alliance’s deterrence and defense goals were no longer compatible; the threat of quick nuclear escalation in fact *weakened* deterrence and *limited* defense capabilities.

To answer the many challenges embodied in MC 14/2, in December 1967, the alliance adopted a new strategic concept. Instead of immediate escalation and the “use of nuclear weapons from the outset,” NATO’s new MC 14/3 promised “flexible response” to any Warsaw Pact attack. No longer could the Soviets easily calculate western reaction; NATO would “defeat [Warsaw Pact] aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight,” and a limited offensive could conceivably be terminated without resort to nuclear weapons. Flexible response took three stages. First, “should deterrence fail,” the alliance would pursue *Direct Defense* against the adversary, “physically preventing the enemy from taking what he wants,” most likely by NATO’s forces-in-being, already deployed at sea and along

the West German frontier. Second, should direct defense fail, the alliance would pursue *Deliberate Escalation*, “raising but where possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat” in hopes of containing a conflict locally and dissuading the Kremlin against further attack. Such an escalation may involve opening another conventional front, either on land or at sea; use of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons, including mines and theater nuclear forces; demonstrative use of nuclear weapons, signaling western resolve to escalate; attacks on Soviet interdiction targets, including airfields and supply lines; and selective counterforce nuclear strikes. Such a protracted phase was meant to forestall resort to NATO’s *General Nuclear Response*, including “massive nuclear strikes against the total nuclear threat, other military targets, and urban-industrial targets” in the Soviet bloc: “It is both the ultimate deterrent and, if used, the ultimate military response.”⁸⁹

“Credible deterrence must rest on the visible capability of the Alliance to respond effectively with conventional or nuclear means,” explained Leber, “*irrespective* of the level of aggression chosen by the attacker.”⁹⁰ Thus, flexible response, as envisioned in MC 14/3, provided retaliatory options other than immediate escalation, instead placing the onus of escalation on the Soviets—every success of Warsaw Pact conventional forces on the battlefield increased the likelihood NATO would resort to nuclear weapons. Or, as one specialist on Soviet military affairs has noted, flexible response presented Soviet leaders “with a storyline they could understand and believe, in which the first bullet fired in Europe would inexorably be tied to the last U.S. or British missile launched from the last silo or submarine.”⁹¹

The leading specialist on flexible response (and future U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO), Ivo H. Daalder, has correctly argued of MC 14/3 that “ambiguity was its essence”; it

was, in the estimation of another scholar, “laced with internal compromises and unresolved ambiguities.” Since the beginning of the Cold War, western deterrence strategy had promised massive retaliation and the immediate resort to nuclear forces. Such a guarantee seemed resolute and definitive; any aggression against the west must face the “deterrent of massive retaliatory power.”⁹² Under the flexible response doctrine, however, deterrence would be pursued by precisely the opposite—by offering no guaranteed reaction and by keeping the nature of NATO’s response intentionally equivocal. Such a shift met all of the requisite theories of Soviet aggression; unable to calculate the risks of an offensive, the Kremlin would seek to avoid conflict. But as a means of shoring up NATO’s internal cohesion, the new doctrine fell short. Would the Americans permanently and unquestioningly invite their own destruction if Soviet aggression could be contained to Europe? Would the West Germans remain loyal to the alliance as NATO commanders escalated the intensity of destruction on German soil? Did the doctrine represent, as one commentator argued, simply “a redistribution of military risk”?⁹³ Assessments over such risks underlay the next two decades of interallied disagreements over nuclear doctrine. After all, “deterrence has nothing to do with a preparation for war,” argued Hans Apel, and “it has nothing to do with a policy of threatening to take coercive measures.” Deterrence “is above all a political principle.”⁹⁴

The adoption of flexible response had represented the triumph of the American defense technocrats, both over opponents in the Pentagon and among their European counterparts. NATO’s new strategic concept proved theoretically rich and capitalized on increased Congressional defense appropriations and the diverse array of new military hardware being designed by Martin Marietta, Lockheed, and General Dynamics.⁹⁵ Smaller missiles could

carry greater payloads and deliver them with more accuracy. Leading minds in the Bundeswehr, however, feared such improvements, concerned that more precise strikes on Warsaw Pact targets would decouple the American homeland from the European theater.⁹⁶ Increased tactical forces in the European theater, from the American perspective, further limited the potential for general nuclear war or, at the very least, could contain a conflict to Europe.⁹⁷ The designers of flexible response remained purposely ambiguous about the role that nuclear forces would play in defending NATO, and MC 14/3 papered over competing attitudes within the alliance about the duration of each phase of escalation, about conventional versus nuclear response, and about the relative strength of theater versus strategic forces in defending Europe.⁹⁸ The compromise of MC 14/3 represented “a definite lack of agreement on the strategic direction of the Atlantic Alliance,” Daalder concluded.⁹⁹ But “after years of effort,” noted the U.S. Defense Secretary, “this is the most ambitious strategy we have been able to convince our allies to accept.”¹⁰⁰

From Bonn, Horst Ehmke, Brandt’s chief of the chancery staff, argued that “flexible response was an unavoidable compromise.” As codified in MC 14/3, Ehmke concluded, flexible response represented the least common denominator that could be agreed to by the allies; the doctrine was less of an improvement on western strategy than simply a replacement, “as we realized that massive retaliation was no longer sufficient.”¹⁰¹ Leber agreed, asserting that “there will be no alternative to flexible response in the foreseeable future.”¹⁰² RAND Corporation guidance to the U.S. Air Force likewise concluded that the “deliberatively vague phrases” of NATO’s new doctrine “reflect a belief in [Bonn] that deterrence is best served by leaving as much as possible unsaid.”¹⁰³ But as transatlantic relations grew more tenuous in the coming years, German grievances against NATO’s

strategic doctrine and against the United States' nuclear hegemony became more pronounced.¹⁰⁴

Whereas MC 14/2 had advised "counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset" of battle, MC 14/3, as one Pentagon staffer remembered, warned "*not* [to] count on nuclear weapons from the outset."¹⁰⁵ Naturally, the Germans began to fear such a doctrine reflected the Americans' lack of commitment to the European allies and a willingness in Washington to sacrifice West Germany to the Soviet invaders. Escalation, as they had seen in joint war-games with the Americans, would result in the alliance destroying all of Germany, even if only to forestall general nuclear war. They feared that flexible response had weakened the Americans' resolve and, more importantly, that the Soviets had sensed weakness in the west and an opportunity to cleave West Germany from the herd.¹⁰⁶ Though both Bonn and Washington eventually "submerged" their differences over MC 14/3, "both sides continue[d] to have their own national interpretations of what 'agreed' NATO strategy really is," explained one American defense specialist. The U.S., he explained, sought "to bend flexible response in the direction of extended conventional warfare," while West Germany "stressed that nuclear use could come any time after the outbreak of fighting."¹⁰⁷

The ambiguities of flexible response left the Americans and the Europeans to interpret NATO's strategic concept according to their own biases. While the Americans emphasized the *flexible* nature of NATO's new strategic concept, the Europeans preferred the *response* element. As Jeffrey Boutwell has argued, the Americans privileged maneuverability and conventional options in defending against the Soviets, and the Europeans, and the West Germans in particular, stressed the need for prompt and resolute response to Soviet threats or aggression.¹⁰⁸ To the Americans, the defense of Europe represented a tactical concern

meant to forestall global nuclear war; to the Europeans, whether they died in a continental nuclear war or a global one, seemed inconsequential. "Indeed, I personally resent a terminology that calls weapons that kill Americans 'strategic' and weapons that kill only Poles or Germans 'tactical,'" remarked Helmut Schmidt.¹⁰⁹ By Pentagon logic, the death of the entire German nation would represent a mere tactical loss. Willy Brandt agreed. "People were inclined to sing the praises of the bomb," he remarked. "Had it not made an unusually long period of peace possible in our part of the world? Yet one must also ask whether the means of destruction piling up in ever-increasing quantities might not one day take on independent life of their own."¹¹⁰

NATO's new flexible response concept, though controversial among the West Germans, had largely been enabled by force improvements in the Bundeswehr and by the *Forward Defense* conventional forces strategy already being implemented. The 1960s had seen the resurrection of Germany as one of the world's most formidable fighting forces, and though a non-nuclear state, West Germany maintained the most powerful military forces on the continent.¹¹¹

The Bundeswehr's force improvements and increased manpower likewise facilitated new operational plans for conventional deterrence in Europe, dubbed within NATO the "layer-cake" concept. Militarily, Bonn feared a Warsaw Pact offensive directed only at West German forces, and politically, the Germans feared isolation from their allies in times of crisis. The layered forces concept ensured that any Soviet offensive against the west would immediately target more than one NATO ally and guaranteed Bonn equal security with its allies. Operational plans divided the Federal Republic's battlefield frontage into eight corps

sectors, most ranging in length from forty to seventy-five kilometers. In the north, the Bundeswehr took responsibility for the Hamburg-Lübeck region and the Jutland approaches, adding a de facto ninth sector. To prevent Warsaw Pact advance on the northern plain, the Dutch I and German I Corps were deployed. Defending the Braunschweig approach and autobahn routes leading to Hanover and Paderborn stood the BAOR, and to the south of the British, the Belgian I Corps guarded the River Weser and Göttingen gap. The Hessian corridor was protected by the German III Corps, and the Fulda gap, Meiningen gap, Coburg approaches, the Cheb gap, and the Hof corridor—western Europe's most vulnerable territories—were guarded by the U.S. Army V and VII Corps. The Bundeswehr II Corps guarded nearly the entire Bavarian border, spanning a frontage of 175 kilometers.

The ambiguities embodied in NATO's new strategic concept were likewise reflected in the lack of a common U.S.-European threat assessment toward the Warsaw Pact. From 1967 and across the 1970s, each estimate produced by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense touted the unflappable resolve of the alliance and the supremacy of NATO forces; simultaneously, analyses prepared at NATO Headquarters or among command staffs in the European countries always proved more circumspect.¹¹² In particular, the Germans always feared that NATO's conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact were withering away.

To manage such differences, in December of 1966, NATO established a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which would allow the non-nuclear allies, namely the Federal Republic, to be involved in developing the alliance's nuclear doctrine.¹¹³ "It is timely to take a look at the NATO organization," suggested General Friedrich Foertsch, general inspector of the

Bundeswehr. General Maxwell Taylor, his American counterpart, agreed: “the time was ripe to come forward with a really fundamental look at the problems of the NATO organization,” he believed.¹¹⁴ In that forum, the Germans were subsequently able to negotiate for new “political guidelines” for the tactical nuclear forces stationed in their country, such that, though not a nuclear power, the Bonn government must confirm the “selective release of nuclear weapons employed from or on German soil.”¹¹⁵ For the Americans, such a step was necessary to integrate “German power in the multilateral structure of the West” and to prevent their deviation from the NATO status quo.¹¹⁶ Despite good intentions, creation of the NPG also institutionalized West German dissent from the NATO status quo within the alliance. More importantly, the NPG served to delineate flexible response and translate the new doctrine into operational plans, including drafting and adopting new “Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO” (PPGs) in 1969.¹¹⁷

A decade later, RAND Corporation guidance to the U.S. Air Force advised that the Germans had used their new position within the alliance and their conventional force strength to exercise de facto control over their neighbors’ military policies: “The Nuclear Planning Group, the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, the NATO Military Committee, and the various *ad hoc* bodies commissioned by the alliance have all become mechanisms by which the FRG exerts influence over NATO and the policies of individual NATO members.”¹¹⁸

At the heart of the coming debates over western security lay the connected questions of extended deterrence and so-called “coupling” of the Europeans to the Americans. *Extended*

deterrence involved providing the same protections of the U.S. homeland to the NATO allies; *coupling* involved keeping the risks facing the North American allies and the European allies relatively the same, as far as possible, such that the Soviets could not single out individual NATO members as targets for harassment or aggression.¹¹⁹ Though every NATO ally recognized the interdependence between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the question remained: were to go from here? Balance at the strategic levels had seemingly rendered the two superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals obsolete as a means of deterring conflicts at lower levels. Thus, parity increased instability in the European theater, yielding the so-called stability-instability paradox: increased stability at one level of potential conflict would lead inevitably to increased instability at other levels. "Stability at every level is impossible by definition," argued Raymond Aron. Henry Kissinger agreed, writing that "the degree that mutual deterrence of all-out war is achieved, the perils of limited aggression *must* multiply."¹²⁰ Nonetheless, the problem remained unresolved for the duration of the Cold War. Some, such as McNamara, James Schlesinger, Fred Iklé, and Albert J. Wohlstetter, hoped to destabilize the central nuclear balance, in an effort to make strategic forces more usable.¹²¹ Others sought to address the European imbalance specifically, most often by conventional force improvements in the European theater. Most notably, Helmut Schmidt argued for such an approach for decades.

The stability-instability problem yielded a second challenge: the so-called "abandonment-entrapment paradox." Diverging interest among the western allies, which had been highlighted by the east-west strategic parity and by NATO's flexible response doctrine, provoked European fears of *abandonment* by the Americans; should the risks confronting the United States grow too great, NATO could disintegrate and the European

allies be abandoned to an aggressor. Simultaneously, loyalty to the alliance may force the Europeans to accede to U.S. leadership, even if too provocative vis-à-vis the Soviets, thus with the European allies facing *entrapment* by the superpower hegemony. As Daalder, Glenn H. Snyder, Robert Jervis, and other theorists of the security dilemma have concluded, U.S. efforts to guard against European entrapment would in turn stoke allied fears of abandonment, and U.S. policies to counteract abandonment would heighten European concerns of entrapment.

European defense intellectuals, and the West Germans in particular, recognized that any future conflict would destroy the continent. Faced with two bad options, in theory, they often erred toward “entrapment,” which at the very least, should hold the alliance together in the face of the Soviet juggernaut. They privileged theories of deterrence that threatened immediate nuclear escalation against an aggressor, hoping to redeem the portions of the old massive retaliation doctrine that had comforted the European partners in the early Cold War.¹²² “Now as before,” explained Manfred Wörner, “strategic thinking in the Federal Republic, and in western Europe more generally, is handcuffed to a conception of deterrence that dates back to the era of U.S. nuclear monopoly.”¹²³ But theories of war and the fog of battle could not easily be reconciled, and the operational scope of MC 14/3 remained unclear. The precise role nuclear forces would play in the defense of Europe was never clarified, and the NATO Military Committee’s formula to use nuclear weapons “as early as necessary and as late as possible” served only to confuse anxious European partners.¹²⁴ But ultimately, as Sir Lawrence Freedman argued to the IISS, flexible response was “satisfactory only as a peace-time doctrine, offering a form of words that [could] accommodate the great variety of strategic perspectives found within the alliance.”¹²⁵ And

as the politics of the 1970s and 1980s would bear out, NATO's doctrine was premised on an uneasy compromise that, as Daalder argues, "encompassed rather than resolved differences over strategy."¹²⁶

Dangerous Power: A Second World Power of the West

Schmidt saw the unique challenges of German foreign and economic policy and his country's status as a "dangerous" (*gefährlich*) power.¹²⁷ While vacationing in Marbella over the new year holiday, the chancellor penned a confidential memorandum—"Goals for 1977"—in which he gave voice to a growing sense of unease about the Federal Republic's rise in relative international power, especially considering "our unwanted and dangerous climb to second world power of the west in the minds of other governments."

"Owing to the relative economic backwardness remaining in Italy, England, and also other countries (including France), and because of relatively strong social peace in our country," he wrote, "in the eyes of the world we have ascended economically to the de facto second world power of the west." Going on to cite his country's low unemployment, low inflation rates, positive balance of payments, strong currency, high per capita GDP, and "unprecedented wealth and reserve assets," he explained that "many look to foreign competitors and peers with admiration, but toward Germany they look with envy."¹²⁸

Why would German economic stability and military security unnerve European neighbors? In a time of europessimism and eurosclerosis, West German leadership had initiated continent-wide recovery and wedded German wealth to European stability. Schmidt believed the apprehensions involved implicit questions of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*—

coming to terms with Germany's past—as well as apprehensions about the durability of NATO.¹²⁹

Ostpolitik had recharged suspicions of German nationalism, and strain in the transatlantic alliance inaugurated a fear of NATO's weakening. "That Berlin and Nazi Germany act as handicaps of German politics is increasingly apparent," he advised. The Federal Republic's newfound status may initiate "a revival of memories not only of Auschwitz and Hitler but also of Wilhlem II and Bismarck . . . perhaps as much in the west as in the east," he worried. The Germans had never boasted strong democratic traditions. Thirty years after the defeat of the Third Reich, the Bonn régime had lasted longer than any representative government on German soil. Unlike earlier misgivings about German democracy—a fear of the *radical right* in which pluralism was stamped out and the people elected a dictator—these postwar concerns involved a fear of the *radical left* and a lack of collective vision for the Federal Republic's politico-military alignment.

With West Germany's strong military, its financial and political contributions to NATO, and its deep currency reserves, Schmidt feared that others may perceive that the alliance had devolved into an exclusively U.S.-German partnership. "The North Atlantic Alliance appears increasingly as an American-German alliance at the core," he explained. Whereas the allies once had determined policy on Germany, now Germany seemed to determine policy for the alliance.

Schmidt believed that weaving his country into the fabric of the EC and NATO could prevent West Germany from pursuing an independent foreign policy or from seeking unification with the GDR outside of NATO. "For us, it is therefore necessary to operate to the maximum extent possible not nationally or independently but rather in the context of the

European Community and within the Alliance,” he explained. “This attempt to cover (*abdecken*) our actions multilaterally will only partially succeed because we will (necessarily and against our own will) become a leadership factor in both systems.”¹³⁰ Multilateralism and deepened European institutions could remedy suspicions of West Germany’s apparent rise.

Schmidt’s assertions in the Marbella paper revealed his apprehensions about Germany’s international clout. His logic seemed fatalist à la A. J. P. Taylor: “nothing could prevent the Germans from overshadowing Europe, even if they did not plan to do so.”¹³¹

As the documentary record later confirmed, Schmidt proved justified in his alarm. Both U.S. and European leaders secretly considered those same “dangerous power” concerns of the German chancellor. “The division of Germany at the end of World War II put the major issue of Europe in this century on ice: the emergence of German power and the relative decline of Britain and France,” National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski reported to President Jimmy Carter. “Furthermore, the Federal Republic broke with the traditional ambivalence about Germany’s place in the East or the West by choosing the West. In the intervening three decades, many political leaders in the West have come to *assume* that indeed the Federal Republic is *irreversibly part of the West as well as a rooted democracy*.” Brzezinski worried that Germany’s western orientation may be taken too much for granted. “German power, military and economic, is once more a source of concern in Europe,” he explained. “The NATO alliance has increasingly become a U.S.-German military affair that inspires thinly veiled concern among the NATO allies, especially France and Britain. The European Community has its economic center of gravity in Germany. The FRG stabilizes the EC and plays a key role in the international monetary system. German economic wealth

causes no less concern in both Eastern and Western Europe than German military power. Thus, the possibility of German political pre-eminence in Europe is again a shadow haunting Europe.”¹³²

A visiting Congressional delegation reaffirmed Brzezinski’s interpretation. “The Federal Republic is almost surprisingly willing to spend its resources to ameliorate the economic problems of its European Community partners,” wrote Senator Jacob Javits.¹³³

“Notwithstanding the dedication of the German leadership to pan-Europeanism, there is a profound perception of western Europe and Germany’s community of interest with the United States and a constant instinct to be in agreement with the U.S. on all important economic and security issues. Even its barest form, the indispensability of the United States—its troops and its nuclear umbrella—to the Federal Republic’s security remains very high in the German consciousness.”¹³⁴

Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexander M. Haig—the future U.S. Secretary of State—had offered similar observations to Ford in March 1975. “The Germans appear to have made a conscious decision to try and lead in Europe,” Haig explained. “If we don’t keep our hand in Europe, I can see them breaking off as a third force.”¹³⁵

Three months later, Thorn registered his own fears. “It is fundamental to have more European integration and that will make the alliance stronger. I am also deeply disturbed about the evolution of Germany,” he worried. “I think that they are moving away from the firm connection we had established tying them to Europe.” Kissinger agreed. “[T]here are disturbing trends,” he replied. Fearing the “combined German qualities of romanticism and discipline,” Kissinger warned that “Brandt told us that we have three to five years left to

anchor German in a larger democratic Europe. . . . There could be an appeal at some later date to West Germans on a nationalist basis.”¹³⁶

All of those anxieties demonstrated the need for a common approach to anchoring German power within western institutions. NATO and the EC once had filled that role, but now the Federal Republic of Germany had come to dominate both as “second world power of the west.” Each organization needed a redoubled purpose and clearly defined parameters on Bonn’s role. “Germany still needs its anchor in the west just as we said thirty years ago,” explained Thorn. “To avoid these dangers with respect with Germany, it is very important that the European Community continue to grow and that we not just rely on the broader alliance.”¹³⁷

Implicitly and instinctively, Schmidt understood all of those apprehensions about his country, as he explained them in his Marbella memorandum. Misgivings about German power, he believed, required a foreign policy committed to both European and Atlantic institutions. Unlike Brandt and contrary to European popular opinion at the time, Schmidt saw a close relationship with the U.S. as the *sine qua non* of West German diplomacy. Alas, with Ford’s ouster in the electoral upset of 1976, the days of a Washington-Bonn consensus were numbered.

The Limits of Alliance

“The world image of most Americans—and of most American politicians—does not go far beyond the borders of their own country,” Schmidt reflected. “This is the reason for the American naïveté in assessing and dealing with other nations.” The chancellor certainly found that an accurate observation of Jimmy Carter. The peanut farmer turned president

maintained good intentions but, in Schmidt's view, lacked both the intellect and the vision to preserve the transatlantic alliance. "Connected with isolationism is a considerable lack of knowledge of the world; what the American people know about the geography, history, and politics of other peoples and nations outside the 'Western Hemisphere'—more precisely, outside the *North* American continent—is comparatively little."¹³⁸ As Schmidt observed, the new president seemed determined to restructure economic, foreign, and defense policy, but, even when pressed, could not articulate anything more than moralistic platitudes.

Carter lacked the earnestness of Ford, and his new national security advisor Brzezinski lacked the finesse of Kissinger.¹³⁹ Schmidt feared that Carter's idealism left him vulnerable to manipulation by his supremely ideological advisors. Conflicting messages from Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance demonstrated the wandering foreign policies of the new administration. One historian has interpreted the Brzezinski-Vance divergence as symptomatic of a larger crisis in the Carter presidency. In the face of disagreements between his two top foreign-policy advisors, Carter unsuccessfully tried to synthesize the two irreconcilable perspectives: "He believed in patient diplomacy *and* in the dramatic gesture; he saw beyond the Cold War *and* he was a firm Cold Warrior."¹⁴⁰

The strain between Washington and Bonn threatened to undermine years of productivity the two countries had enjoyed. Ford had always proven gracious when Schmidt dispensed his economic advice to the Americans.¹⁴¹ One historian notes that, "probably overestimating himself," the chancellor even believed "that his advice to Ford had helped the U.S. economy to perform so well."¹⁴² Jimmy Carter, however, did not prove so cordial when Schmidt came calling. After Schmidt's less-than-graceful support for Ford's reelection bid, Carter distanced himself from the West Germans. The credulous new president—to

Schmidt's mind an undereducated pretender—did not seek the advice of his seasoned “second world power of the west” colleague, particularly as he placed his foreign-policy emphasis on the Third World.¹⁴³ After a series of affronts by Carter, Schmidt summarized the state of U.S.-West German relations: “I am very pro-American. . . . Well, I’ve done what I can.”¹⁴⁴

Vexed by his lack of invitation to Washington, Schmidt grew frustrated. “I sent my foreign minister to see Carter. Genscher was rather impressed by him. I sent Brandt, the leader of my party, to see Carter; he was impressed by him too. But I can’t go myself unless I am asked,” he explained, “and in present circumstances, even if asked, I do not think I could easily respond very quickly.”¹⁴⁵

In economic affairs, Schmidt found Carter a deplorable partner. Frustrated by Carter’s preference for Keynesianism and his insistence on depreciating the dollar, Schmidt feared that Carter was courting another economic catastrophe in hopes of winning short-lived domestic support.¹⁴⁶ Schmidt and Carter each blamed the other in some measure for the economic slump of the 1970s. From Schmidt’s perspective, the persistent American balance-of-payments shortfalls that had destroyed Bretton Woods continued to propel inflation in the years that followed. Meanwhile, Carter, noting trade surpluses in the FRG, believed that Schmidt’s government had not proven tenacious enough in quickening economic growth. Carter hoped the West Germans would pursue a Keynesian deficit-spending agenda, which Schmidt refused to countenance.¹⁴⁷

Most importantly, the new president’s incoherent policy toward nuclear weapons threatened the upset the fragile constructed peace that had taken decades to build. To the West Germans, who hosted more nuclear arms per square mile than any other quarter of

the world, Carter's promises of "the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth" seemed either disingenuous or dangerous.¹⁴⁸

"We are a proudly idealistic nation," the newly inaugurated president told his countrymen. "We will maintain strength so sufficient that it need not be proved in combat—a quiet strength based not merely on the size of an arsenal but on the nobility of ideas."¹⁴⁹ Weeks later, Vice President Walter Mondale traveled to Paris, where he reaffirmed the president's aim to bring nuclear weapons deployments "to zero."¹⁵⁰ Regardless of Carter's idealistic motivations, Europeans, and West Germans in particular, lived under daily threat by the massive Soviet forces bearing down on the continent. "It is certain that Europe would have been communized and . . . under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States," Winston Churchill had said.¹⁵¹ Schmidt agreed. Only weeks into office, the Carter administration had promised away the full strength America's security guarantees.¹⁵² Genscher even wryly mused with Louis de Guiringaud, his French counterpart, that perhaps the tenderfoot Carter needed a bit more time to learn the intricacies of nuclear strategy before they judged him too harshly in the capitals of Europe.¹⁵³

As the Americans revealed their strategy vacuum, their allies—especially the West Germans—were left to hypothesize about long-term U.S. intentions and the future global balance. In the spring of 1976, the Soviets had begun deploying their Pioneer intermediate-range ballistic missiles, known within NATO as the SS-20. One of the only classes of weapons not covered by ongoing arms-control negotiations, the SS-20s' operational range stood at 3,500 kilometers—weapons clearly aimed at Europeans and not at Americans. At the

moment when the Europeans needed U.S. strength the most, the American president seemed ambivalent to western European security.

The U.S. solution to the growing strategic imbalance came a year later with his proposal to deploy enhanced radiation weapons (ERW)—the so-called neutron bomb—in Western Europe. The destructive power of the ERW riled European publics. The new bomb, which relied on radiation more than explosive yield, was designed to diffuse radiation through solid buildings and armor, completing its damage through radiation rather than by blast, fallout, or infrastructural damage. For the U.S., the ERW offered an ideal defensive situation; the new weapons, if launched, could contain any east-west conflict to the European theater. Washington had met Moscow's posturing with a defense worse than the threat itself.¹⁵⁴

Addressing London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 1977, Schmidt called for a reassessment of European security and of east-west relations. In the chancellor's judgment, the neutron bomb failed both as a deterrent and a defensive weapon. The Soviet SS-20s should be matched with more than area-denial weapons; NATO needed modernized theater-based nuclear forces in Europe to reflect the American nuclear guarantee to non-nuclear West Germany.¹⁵⁵ Thus, the chancellor believed, the neutron bomb was obscuring the real strategic dilemma facing Europe.

"In no way would the neutron bomb give the West a significant advantage—that became more and more apparent to me," the chancellor remembered.¹⁵⁶ Carter and his administration crusaded for deployment of the neutron bombs in Europe, relying on his well-worn moralistic vocabulary to make his case: "So, I don't believe that the neutron bomb is more wicked or immoral than the present nuclear weapons we have and the Soviets have as well."¹⁵⁷ Schmidt severely disagreed. It was becoming apparent "that the German

chancellor was emphasizing matters that were clearly at odds with what was favored by the new American president,” Schmidt remembered.¹⁵⁸

Der Spiegel quickly identified the ERW deployments as an American bid for supremacy in Europe. Carter wanted “close mutual relations” between the U.S. and Europe, and he would achieve them with the threat of irradiation. Western leaders, preparing for the 1977 London summit, had “received disturbing signals from Washington: Carter wants to restore the authority of the U.S. president within the alliance.”¹⁵⁹

Even Schmidt’s personal meetings with Brzezinski failed. “My effort had only slight results,” Schmidt later remembered. “Brzezinski felt that none of these matters was for Bonn to worry about, that they concerned only the United States.”¹⁶⁰ Meeting with the U.S. national security advisor in September 1977, Schmidt relayed the West German frustration with the American coercion over the neutron bombs. After noting that deployment in Scandinavia was “out of the question,” in France politically impossible, and that Britain lacked military value, Schmidt reminded Brzezinski that “if the new weapons were alone deployed on the territory of the Federal Republic, they could expect widespread German opposition.” The U.S. decision was coming to the Germans as a Diktat; the Americans saw “the weapons to be militarily useful and good, but [Carter] would not be regarded international as an ogre (*Menschenfresser*)” over the issue.¹⁶¹

The Americans pressed hard for Schmidt’s support on the ERW deployments. Though conscious of the growing anti-nuclear sentiment in his country, the chancellor resisted the Americans privately but won begrudging SPD support for the bomb publicly. Strengthened transatlantic relations necessitated mutual good faith. Furthermore, under no circumstances should the “second world power of the west” even hint at independent foreign or defense

policies. Schmidt feared that public resistance of the U.S. would risk his entire foreign-policy agenda of balancing a politically and economically powerful Federal Republic within a robust NATO and EC. Was the world ready for an independent West Germany with foreign policies at odds with the U.S. and NATO? Schmidt believed not. Despite domestic opposition, he acquiesced and publicly committed his government to the neutron bomb deployments.¹⁶²

Within just a few months, by the spring of 1978, Carter began publicly wavering over the planned deployments. “This was a huge mistake,” remarked one U.S. State Department official. “We essentially asked the Europeans to support our decision on the bomb before we had come to a decision ourselves.” Richard Burt—soon to be Reagan’s director of politico-military affairs at the State Department, but in the late 1970s writing for *The New York Times*—assessed the situation. “The controversy generated by the neutron bomb has left a deep scar in alliance relations, raising doubts in European capitals over Mr. Carter’s decisiveness and willingness to take the lead on difficult defense matters,” he explained.¹⁶³ The Washington-Bonn impasse unfolded in the public eye with a farcical quality. Fearing the isolation of deploying an unpopular weapon, Carter declared that the U.S. would not begin producing enhanced radiation weapons “unless it was an agreement by our NATO allies.”¹⁶⁴ Schmidt, along with many of his European counterparts, refused to consent to neutron bomb deployments until the U.S. actually began production of the weapon. Dilatory conversations between Schmidt and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Bonn on March 31st and between Genscher and Vance in Washington in April 4th did not resolve the tensions.¹⁶⁵ Three days later, despite his commitment to “the forward defense of

Europe,” Carter announced his decision to “defer production” indefinitely of the neutron bomb.¹⁶⁶

“The president may well underestimate just how much he has strained relations with West Germany,” reported *The New York Times*. The lead editorial on “The Mishandled Bomb” noted that, with Carter’s abandonment of the neutron bomb, “our NATO allies would be left dangling at the end of a very long limb. They will already have paid a domestic political cost by agreeing to deploy a weapon which their opponents have characterized as horrible. Now they would be forced to pay a second price, being made to look foolish.”¹⁶⁷

The Dutch, Belgian, and Danish governments all welcomed Carter’s decision.¹⁶⁸ In Paris, the government seemed unfazed, as no ERWs would have been deployed within French borders. Dr. Joseph Luns, NATO secretary-general, after meeting with the NATO ambassadors, politely expressed “understanding for the United States decision.”¹⁶⁹

The real damage had been done in Bonn. When Carter visited West Germany in July 1978, he was peppered with critical questions. “Ultimately, in a democracy we leaders are responsible to our people,” he lectured. “And our policies can’t depart too greatly from those that our people espouse.” The president’s equivocations did little to placate restive reporters. “I have no concern at all about the stability of our relationship,” he remarked, “at the government level and on a personal basis as well.”¹⁷⁰ By that point, Schmidt detested his American counterpart.

The chancellor’s political opponents eagerly painted Schmidt as the American president’s unwitting political pawn. “In my knowledge of American history since the Second World War,” remarked CSU leader Franz Josef Strauß, “this is the first case where an American president has openly and recognizably cringed before a Russian tsar.”¹⁷¹ Schmidt

was bearing the brunt of European hostilities toward the United States.¹⁷² The damage done by Carter proved irreversible.

The Enduring Alliance?


Meanwhile, an impregnable Iron Curtain rent Europe in two. To the east lay an increasingly militant Soviet Union, infused with the zeal of its interventionist Brezhnev doctrine. “When external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country,” Brezhnev had instructed, “this is no longer merely a problem for that country’s people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries.”¹⁷³ The Kremlin’s willingness to use military power for political ends redefined the Cold War conflict in its last decade; behind Soviet diplomacy lay overwhelming military power.¹⁷⁴

Since the Second World War, Soviet conventional forces had vastly outnumbered NATO manpower in Europe, and by the early 1970s, the Soviets had achieved absolute parity with the west in its strategic nuclear arsenal. Moscow was accumulating conventional, strategic, and tactical power of unprecedented scope. With an increasingly muscular foreign policy and an eye toward testing the containment strategy in the Third World, by the end of the 1970s, the Soviet threat had become more offensive and demonstrated a willingness to use military power to achieve diplomatic leverage.¹⁷⁵

“While Moscow capitalized on “conflicting relaxation concepts in east and west,” warned the opposition Christian Democrats, “the ability of the Soviet Union to use force has increased.”¹⁷⁶ By the end of the decade, the détente of the 1970s proved largely illusory. In

West Germany, the opposition believed that the SPD governments of Brandt and Schmidt had won undue political popularity at home through their Ostpolitik. Meanwhile, the Soviets capitalized on the relaxation in east-west tensions to achieve military buildup. A CDU/CSU government, the opposition contended, would not prove so credulous but would meet the international situation "without illusions."

Fig. 2.5. Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles in the U.S., Soviet Union, UK, France, and China, 1945-1983



Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data, available at www.nrdc.org/nuclear.

In West Germany and across Europe, the domestic government began to buckle under domestic pressures. At odds with the United States, the major political parties of western Europe redoubled their commitment to European integration, which promised peace, prosperity, and security outside an American-dominated framework. The transatlantic alliance soon would confront the worst political crisis of its history, as Europeans hoped to form their own international institutions which gradually could replace NATO.

“Europe needs a new and viable form of asserting itself in world politics,” explained the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. “Europe’s need for protection is at its most striking in the

areas of external security, its supplies of energy, and keeping its trade open with others.”¹⁷⁷

Many hoped that the EC would fill that role.

In the world’s first international direct election by universal suffrage, on 7 June 1979, citizens of the nine EC countries traveled to their polling places to elect the 410 members of the European Parliament. “The rules of political civilization were invented in Europe,” noted one commentator, and now the Europeans would again set an example for the world.¹⁷⁸

By 1979, europessimism and eurosclerosis finally revealed themselves to be a mirage. European institutions, now with their own elected European Parliament, proved as resilient and robust as they ever had been. NATO struggled through the bleakest days since its inception. The EC deepened its institutions and consolidated its influence across the continent.¹⁷⁹ From Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” to the end of the decade, transatlantic relations strained even further, now with even Bonn distancing itself from Washington’s policies and leadership.

Across the continent, the decade of the left came to an end. In the years that followed, those left-of-center fire brigades of capitalism were replaced by their conservative opponents. In the UK, Tory Margaret Thatcher took up residence on Downing Street after her party’s victory at the polls in May 1979. In the U.S., conservative Republican Ronald Reagan entered the White House amid much fanfare, defeating the beleaguered Jimmy Carter in November 1980. In France, the Socialist François Mitterrand took office, having ousted incumbent Giscard in May 1981. Within two years of winning his office, Mitterrand departed from his socialist manifesto, routing the communists, and taking on a more centrist mantle.¹⁸⁰ In West Germany, opposition leader and CDU chairman Helmut Kohl ousted Schmidt in a legislative coup.

In a decade, the Federal Republic of Germany had become the principal guarantor of stability in Europe. NATO, in part founded to contain German power, now linked Bonn's political and military strength to the rest of the continent. The EC, originally a mechanism for harnessing German economic power, by 1979 functioned as the Federal Republic's primary avenue for advancing a new financial and economic orthodoxy for Europe.

German power, once the greatest threat to world peace, by the end of the 1970s, represented Europe's best hope for peace, stability, and prosperity.

Chapter Two: Europessimism, Eurosclerosis, and the Cold War, 1974-1979

1. "Berlin to Bonn," *Time* 52, no. 11 (13 September 1948), p. 30.
2. Frank Bösch, et al., *Die Bundeskanzler und ihre Ämter* (Heidelberg: Wächter Verlag, 2006).
3. Kurt Becker, "Feldwebel oder Oberlehrer? Helmut Schmidt: der Kanzler mit dem Zeigefinger," *Die Zeit* (19 December 1975).
4. Schmidt noted with delight that Henry Kissinger knew of Bebel and with surprise that Gerald Ford did as well. "I did not find a comparable familiarity with the history of my country in either of his successors"—Carter and Reagan—Schmidt remembered. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 211.
5. Becker, "Feldwebel oder Oberlehrer?"
6. Schmidt has maintained an active post-political career, authoring a number of revealing publications. Among them, see his *Menschen und Mächte; Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn* (Berlin: Siedler, 1987); *Kindheit und Jugend unter Hitler* (Berlin: Siedler, 1992); and *Weggefährten: Erinnerungen und Reflexionen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1996). Additionally, he has been the subject of excellent biographies, including Jonathan Carr, *Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Martin Rupps, *Helmut Schmidt: eine politische Biographie* (Stuttgart: Hohenheim, 2002); Hartmut Soell, *Helmut Schmidt* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2003); and Hans-Joachim Noack, *Helmut Schmidt: die Biographie* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2008).
7. Giles MacDonough, *The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), 425.
8. See Anne-Kathrin Beer, *Eine Schule, die hungrig machte: Helmut und Loki Schmidt und die Lichtwarkschule* (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2007).
9. See Helmut Schmidt, *Verteidigung oder Vergeltung: ein deutscher Beitrag zum strategischen Problem der NATO* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961); "Verfassungsschutz als gemeinsame Aufgabe des Bundes und der Länder," in *Verfassungsschutz: Beiträge aus Wissenschaft und Praxis*, Bundesministerium des Innern (Cologne: Heumann, 1966); *Strategie des Gleichgewichts: deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969); "Militärische Befehlsgewalt und parlamentarische Kontrolle," in *Festschrift für Adolf Arndt zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. Horst Ehmke, Carlo Schmid, and Hans Scharoun (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1969).
10. Quoted in John Vinocur, "Helmut Schmidt: Asserting Germany's New Leadership," *New York Times Magazine* (21 September 1980), 35.
11. "Partnership of equals" was the phrase that Jean Monnet used to describe his vision for a transatlantic security and economic architecture. Allocution de M. Jean Monnet a l'occasion de la remise du Prix de la Liberté, New York, 23 January 1963; available online, Archive of European Integration, University of Pittsburgh, at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14286>. On the relationship of this vision to Schmidt's policies, see Matthias Schulz, "Vom Atlantiker zum Europäer? Helmut Schmidt, deutsche Interessen und die europäische Einigung," in *Die Bundesrepublik und die europäische Einigung, 1949-2000: Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen*, eds. Mareike König and Matthias Schulz (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2006).
12. On Schmidt's transition, see Schulz, "Vom Atlantiker zum Europäer?" Schulz has identified Schmidt "a reluctant European," showing how the chancellor overcame his skepticism toward the EC to become one of the architects of the European Monetary System and of the modern European Union. Schulz correctly argues that Schmidt saw European institutions as a *complement* to the Atlantic alliance, not as a replacement for NATO or for the transatlantic relationship. See his, "The Reluctant European: Helmut Schmidt, the European Community, and Transatlantic Relations," in *The*

Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, eds. Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. pp. 282-283.

13. Schulz, "The Reluctant European," 281 and 293.

14. Goldsborough, "The Franco-German Entente," 500.

15. Officially, the CDU security policy platform made the same argument: foreign policy, trade, and economic development functioned as "instruments of security policy." Though a Social Democrat, Schmidt's security policy precepts eventually resulted in his being outflanked within his own party by the left. See, e.g., "Sicherheitspolitische Leitlinien der CDU: Verteidigung als Teil Deutscher Sicherheitspolitik," n.d.; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1913.

16. Helmut Schmidt, address to the Bundestag, in *Deutscher Bundestag, 7. Wahlperiode, 100. Sitzung* (17 May 1974), p. 6597. See Schultz's discussion in "The Reluctant European," 281-282.

17. Schmidt's position recovered some of the relationships Brandt had damaged among CDU parliamentarians, who believed that "the EC is the basis for our economic and social performance" (*wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Leistungsfähigkeit*). "Zur Europapolitik der CDU" (16 June 1975); ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1912. For a treatment on "German hegemony," see Andrei S. Markovits, Simon Reich, and Frank Westermann, "Germany: Hegemonic Power and Economic Gain?" *Review of International Political Economy* 3, no. 4 (1996): 698-727.

18. Tindemans, covering letter (29 December 1975), "Report on European Union."

19. Leo Tindemans, "Report on European Union," in *ibid.*, pp. 11-25. Tindemans published the report on 29 December 1975. As prime minister, Tindemans had shown himself to be staunchly pro-European. His earlier work had focused on developing transnational party federations, which he hoped would offer international solutions to domestic problems. Simon Hix, "The Transnational Party Federations," in *Political Parties of the European Union*, ed. John Gaffney (London: Routledge, 1996), 316.

20. Tindemans, "Report on European Union," 11. Following the release of Tindemans' study, the CDU asked itself the same question: "The question is not whether the western European integration should be continued or not, but which strategy is most appropriate for the short term and the medium term." After 1969, in opposition, the Union parties, which had build European institutions over the decades, needed to redefine their policies. The Social-Democratic government was redefining European institutions, and the CDU hoped to rearticulate its European policy accordingly. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Entscheidungsfragen der deutschen Europapolitik* (23 February 1975); ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

21. In a letter to Schmidt, Tindemans noted his interest in discussing "the institutional problems facing European union." Letter from Tindemans to Schmidt (22 November 1975); BA, B 136/30664.

22. Tindemans, "Report on European Union," quotations on pp. 12, 13, and 19.

23. *Ibid.*, 12.

24. Interview with Leo Tindemans (27 September 1975); Archief Sicco Leendert Mansholt, #463 Documentatie over het 'Rapport Tindemans' inzake de Europese Unie (1974-1976), Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.

25. Tindemans, "Report on European Union," 12.

26. MemCon (29 May 1975), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 12.

27. On European attitudes toward America's Vietnam War, see Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse, eds., *La guerre du Vietnam et l'Europe, 1963-1973* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003). See also Joachim Arenth, *Johnson, Vietnam, und der Westen: transatlantische Belastungen, 1963-1969* (Munich: Olzog, 1994); and Eugénie Blang, *Allies at Odds: America, Europe, and Vietnam, 1961-1968* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).

28. MemCon (15 February 1973), top secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 1.

29. Tindemans, "Report on European Union," 13. In a meeting with Gerald Ford, Tindemans modulated his tone. "For us, Europe is not against the Atlantic Alliance. We need an Atlantic world—it is life for us. But if we can have Europe, we want it, because otherwise borders are closed and the small countries are hurt." MemCon (28 May 1975), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 12. See also Politischer Ausschuss Arbeitsdokument (und Fragebogen) im Hinblick auf die Ausarbeitung des Berichts über die Europäische Union (13 January 1975); ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

30. Tindemans, "Report on European Union," 17. In the end, Tindemans overreached. His report was kept in abeyance by virtue of the European Council meeting of November 1976, as it failed to galvanize support both from those who envisioned a federal Europe and from those who saw Europe as an affront to state sovereignty. While his compatriots welcomed the shaping of a new, great-power European identity, a *federal* European union took a step too far. Nonetheless, he tapped into a popular sentiment that rejected superpower domination and promoted a neo-Gaullist European approach to international politics. "Statement by President Ortolí on the Commission's Activities During its Term in Office," 15 December 1976, *BEC*, no. 12 (1976), 82-83.

31. Jeremy Leaman, *The Political Economy of West Germany, 1945-85* (London: Macmillan, 1988), 202-203.

32. This argument is well developed in the social history literature. For a brief application to economic history, see David Abraham, "Economic Democracy as a Labor Alternative to the Growth Strategy in Weimar Germany," in *The Political Economy of West Germany: Modell Deutschland*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits (New York: Praeger, 1982), 117.

33. For an abbreviated overview of German economic ideologies and their relevance to the economy of the 1970s, see "Jeremiah M. Riemer, 'Alteration in the Design of Model Germany: Critical Innovations in the Policy Machinery for Economic Steering,'" in *The Political Economy of West Germany*, 56-57. Christopher S. Allen has illustrated this point, arguing that, beyond a baseline of rejecting statist intervention, the West Germans resisted ideological economic policies. See his, "The Underdevelopment of Keynesianism in the Federal Republic of Germany," in *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations*, ed. Peter A. Hall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

34. Gerald D. Feldman, review of *Society and Democracy*, Ralf Dahrendorf, *The Journal of Social History* 2, no. 3 (Spring 1969), 274.

35. Peter J. Katzenstein has illustrated this point. See his "West Germany as Number Two: Reflections on the German Model," in *The Political Economy of West Germany*, 199.

On the characteristics of the postwar German economy, leading to the so-called "Economic Miracle," see Willi Semmler, "Economic Aspects of Model Germany," in *ibid.*, 24-28; Charles P. Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of the Labor Supply* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Mark E. Spicka, *Selling the Economic Miracle: Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957* (New York: Berghahn, 2007).

The causes of the "Economic Miracle" have been debated widely, though the literature has ebbed since the early 1970s. The finest work has produced a consensus, accepted by many, that the

collapse of organized labor under Nazism and the peculiarities of the postwar recovery—a broad range in income distribution, restricted consumption, and high returns on investment—allowed for significant capital accumulation in the postwar period. For such interpretations, see Henry C. Wallich, *Mainsprings of German Revival* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); Ernest Mandel, *Late Capitalism* (London: New Left, 1975); Ferenc Janossy, *Das Ende der Wirtschaftswunder: Erscheinungen und Wesen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1969); Elmar Altvater, Jürgen Hoffman, and Willi Semmler, *Vom Wirtschaftswunder zur Wirtschaftskrise: Ökonomie und Politik in der Bundesrepublik* (Berlin: Olle und Wolter, 1979). Mancur Olson has argued that the Second World War stripped away Germany's existing cartels and special-interest groups with the potential to erode the country's economic vigor. See his *Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), building on his theories in *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

Scholars have neglected, however, that, unlike the rest of Europe, defeat left the Federal Republic with no expensive colonial crises to manage. In fact, the Germans maintained effectively no defense burden, while their European neighbors were cobbling together funds to wage the Cold War.

The neoliberal interpretation holds that the West German economy enjoyed such marked success in the postwar years owing to the political resolve to transform Germany into a socially progressive capitalist system. For the associated literature, see Alfred Müller-Armack, *Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft* (Hamburg: Verlag für Wirtschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1948); Alexander Rüstow, *Zwischen Kapitalismus und Kommunismus* (Godesberg: Kipper, 1949); Wilhelm Röpke, *Die Krise des Kollektivismus* (Munich: Kurt Desch, 1947); among others.

Keynesians have argued that state intervention drove economic growth and that stimulating aggregate demand through state expansion produced the miracle. Those scholars do not account for the later start of Keynesian policies in West Germany—in the mid 1960s. Beginning in the mid 1960s, the West Germans embraced the Keynesian policies they would renounce less than a decade later. For such interpretations, see Andrew Schonfield, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in the West: Comparative Experience in Europe and North America* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964); K. W. Roskamp, *Capital Formation in West Germany* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965); Frederick G. Reuss, *Fiscal Policy for Growth without Inflation: The German Experiment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); Winfried Vogt, *Macroökonomische Bestimmungsgründe des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1950 bis 1960* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1964); and Rüdiger Hopp, *Schwankungen des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums in Westdeutschland, 1954-67* (Meisenheim: A. Hain, 1969). On the later flirtations with Keynesianism in the Federal Republic, see Allen, "The Underdevelopment of Keynesianism in the Federal Republic of Germany."

36. Guido G. Goldman, "The German Economic Challenge" in *The Political Economy of West Germany*, 12-14. After 1979, however, that observation no longer proved correct. Whereas extremism of both the left and the right once lacked political credibility, after 1979 West Germany's mainstream political parties strayed from the political center, most notably in the wake of NATO's so-called "Double-Track" decision of 1979. See chapter three of this study.

37. The joke about Prussia, attributed to the French revolutionary Mirabeau, likely originated with the eighteenth-century military historian Georg Heinrich von Behrenhorst, who suggested that "the Prussian monarchy was not a country that had an army, but an army that had a country which it used as a billeting area." Walter Görnitz, *Der deutsche Generalstab: Geschichte und Gestalt, 1657-1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1950).

38. *Ratgeber*, no. 9 (1950), 257; reprinted in Christoph Kleßmann and Georg Wagner, eds. *Das gesplante Land: Leben in Deutschland 1945-1990: Texte und Dokumente zur Sozialgeschichte* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1993), 186.

39. Ludwig Erhard, *Wohlstand für Alle* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1957), 9-12.

40. One scholar identifies those factors as the “magic triangle” of the postwar German economy. See Leaman, *The Political Economy of West Germany*.

41. While those three events catalyzed the German recession of 1974, one also must note that they hastened the slow deterioration of West Germany’s Economic Miracle conditions. Expansion of welfare state benefits, a demographic shift, increased production costs, and greater labor rights had slowed long-term growth. Many sources document those trends. For the briefest structural overview, see Semmler, “Economic Aspects of Model Germany”; and Altwater, Hoffman, and Semmler, *Vom Wirtschaftswunder zur Wirtschaftskrise*.

42. The West German system enshrined the symbiosis between labor and capital into law, including a variety of mechanisms to arbitrate disputes, both on the shop floor and in the boardroom. See, e.g., Goldman, “The German Economic Challenge,” 15ff. On *Mitbestimmung*, see Horst-Udo Niedenhoff, *Mitbestimmung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Cologne: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1983); and Thomas Hertfelder and Andreas Rödder, eds., *Modell Deutschland: Erfolgsgeschichte oder Illusion?* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2007).

43. For figures see the *Statistisches Jahrbuch* for those years, as well as the Bundesbank monthly reports. For an overview, see Leaman, *The Political Economy of West Germany*, 231.

44. Leaman, *The Political Economy of West Germany*, 215.

45. The traumas of the Weimar economy produced a collective fear in West Germany of hazardous inflationary policies and even toleration for austerity measures unacceptable to their European neighbors. Andrei S. Markovits, “Model Germany—A Cursory Overview of a Complex Construct,” in *The Political Economy of West Germany*, 4-5.

46. Adenauer had told the Bundestag in 1949 that “the primary function of the state is to encourage capital formation.” (Quoted in Semmler, “Economic Aspects of Model Germany,” 28.) By the mid 1970s, the Bonn government owned and controlled railroads; Veba, the largest oil producer; Volkswagen, the largest automotive manufacturer; and many other companies. Through the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, the federal government, along with the *Länder* governments, could invest in domestic industry. Both at home and abroad, Bonn extended credit for purchase of West German goods and, during the energy crisis of 1973, granted petroleum to domestic manufacturers whose production was threatened. See Goldman, “The German Economic Challenge,” 14-15. On the oil crisis, see Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, 365.

The banking infrastructure mirrored such an arrangement, with no division between deposit and investment institutions. As such, the three largest banks of West Germany—Commerz, Deutsche, and Dresdner—controlled significant shares in private firms, serving both as shareholders and, when necessary, as lenders of last resort. See Goldman, “The German Economic Challenge,” 19-20; Riemer, “Alterations in the Design of Model Germany,” 63; Wilhelm Hankel, *Der Ausweg aus der Krise* (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1975), 117-118; and Hans-Eckart Scharrer, “Die Rolle der Banken,” in *Handbuch der deutschen Aussenpolitik*, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Munich: Piper, 1975), 221.

47. Roy Jenkins, “Europe’s Present Challenge and Future Opportunity,” Jean Monnet Lecture, Florence (27 October 1977), p. 9. Jenkins served as president of the European Commission from August 1977 to January 1981. On his tenure as president, see his *European Diary, 1977-1981*

(London: William Collins, 1989), and parts three and four of his memoir, *A Life at the Centre* (London: Macmillan, 1991).

48. Memorandum, "The Case for More Intra-European Monetary Cooperation" (7 April 1978), Copenhagen; NA-UK, PREM 16/1615.

49. Academic discourse proved far more wide-ranging. See, e.g., Giovanni Magnifico, *L'Europe par la monnaie* (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1974).

50. Both contemporaries and scholars alike have criticized the perennial failure of European monetary arrangements and Community economic policy. Stymied either by national self-interest, economic insolvency, or systemic crisis, decades of woolgathering produced no results until 1979—twenty-seven years after the signing of the Rome Treaty establishing the EEC. Recently, however, some have relaxed the critique, noting that (1) the relative success of the European economies between 1949 and 1971 did not warrant a structural overhaul and (2) the 1979 EMS capitalized on many of the ostensible failures of the previous decade by incorporating them into a new European "economic and monetary consensus." The crises of the 1970s demonstrated the need for establishing a single European policy vis-à-vis the dollar, the need for symmetry in governmental interventions, and clarity in the exchange-rate mechanism. Notably, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol has argued that the EMS represented "the outcome of what was 'in the air' already." See his *A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 4, 9ff.

51. James O. Goldsborough, "The Franco-German Entente," *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 3 (April 1976): 496-510. Alastair Buchan, a friend of Schmidt's, noted of the newly elected chancellor that "[h]e has never looked well since I have known him, but I thought he looked better than I had seen him in recent years." See Alastair Buchan, "[notes following] a conversation with Helmut Schmidt, [n.d., November 1974], confidential; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 5; folder, Germany (2).

52. See Buchan, "[Notes following] A Conversation with Helmut Schmidt, GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 5; folder, Germany (2). President Gerald Ford read Buchan's account of his private and personal conversation with the chancellor. A U.S. source at the British Embassy in Bonn obtained copies of Buchan's notes, which then were obtained by the U.S. National Security Council staff. A. Denis Clift, the NSC's area director for Europe, submitted them to Kissinger, who shared them with President Ford, advising "his impressionistic observations merit attention—particularly on the eve of your talks with Schmidt." See the memorandum from A. Denis Clift to Henry A. Kissinger (25 November 1974), confidential; and the memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to Gerald R. Ford, [n.d., November 1974], confidential; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 5; folder, Germany (2).

Kissinger reported to President Ford that "[t]he assertiveness and self-confidence of the new FRG leadership manifests itself in German involvement in a wide range of international issues, including European Community (EC) and NATO affairs . . . [T]he Schmidt-Giscard relationship and Germany's economic, military and political strength have resulted in a crucial role for the FRG both within the Nine and in Atlantic relations." See the memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to Gerald R. Ford, "Your Meeting with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher" (22 September 1974), confidential; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 5; folder, Germany (1).

53. Schmidt, after-dinner speech in Paris, February 1980; quoted in Carr, *Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany*, 91. On the "Bonne entente," see Michael Wirth, *Die Deutsch-Französischen*

Beziehungen während der Kanzlerschaft von Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982): "Bonne Entente" oder öffentlichkeitswirksame Zweckbeziehung? (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2007).

54. Jenkins, *European Diary*, 22.

55. In his first two years as president, Giscard—himself previously France's finance minister—appointed a number of noted economic experts to key posts, including Jean-Pierre Fourcade, Jacques de Larosière, and Bernard Clappier. See Samy Cohen, *Les conseillers du président: De Charles de Gaulle à Valéry Giscard d'Estaing* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980).

56. In his memoir, Giscard disputes making such a pronouncement, calling Barre "one of the best economists in France." See Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money*, 105; and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, *Le pouvoir et la vie*, vol. 2, *L'affrontement* (Paris: Cie 12, 1988), 463.

57. Barre, statement before the National Assembly, 5 October 1976, in *Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats parlementaires: Assemblée nationale*, no. 82, p. 6322.

58. On the Barre Plan, see Goodman, *Monetary Sovereignty*, 118-126.

59. Such bilateral meetings followed the terms of the 1963 Franco-German Friendship Treaty concluded between Adenauer and de Gaulle.

60. Mourlon-Druol uses the term "mini convergence," referring to the Bonn-Paris consultations. See "Deutsch-französische Konsultationen," no. 160 (17 June 1977) in *AAP 1977*, vol. 1, pp. 829-836.

61. Ortoli, quoted in Protokoll der Hundertneunten Sitzung des Ausschusses der Präsidenten der Zentralbanken der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Basel (8 March 1977), p. 6; ECBA, Frankfurt, Committee of Governors, Agendas and Minutes.

The British worried that the "German or Franco/German draft . . . does not reflect discussion on a Community-wide basis." See memorandum from A. M. W. Battishill to K. Stowe, "Bremen: Briefing on European Currency Reform" and annexes (5 July 1978); NA-UK, PREM 16/1634.

62. Roy Jenkins, "Europe's Present Challenge and Future Opportunity," Jean Monnet Lecture, Florence (27 October 1977), p. 16.

63. Schmidt specifically cited the need for EEC currencies "to function as a heavier counterweight against the dollar." See "Schulman/Clappier Draft of 28.6.78 for a European Monetary System: Commentary" [secret]; NA-UK, PREM 16/1634.

Others shared his view. Ortoli and EC Commission vice president for external relations Sir Christopher John Soames relayed to Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger: "If the dollar is not strong, we [the EC] will suffer. If you do not have a good economy, we will suffer. America in its internal policy must take a deeper view of the influence it exerts on our world." MemCon (30 May 1975), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 12.

64. Schmidt's comments before the Bundesbank Council (30 November 1978); Nachlaß Prof. Dr. Otmar Emminger N2/267, HA-DB, Frankfurt am Main.

Schmidt shared his frustrations with the European Council. "Without a dramatic turnaround in U.S. policies regarding energy and inflation the likely result will be a further decline in the exchange rate of the dollar and a further erosion of confidence in what used to be *the* store of value for people all over the world," he said. "And countries whose currencies will follow the dollar will experience a higher rate of inflation than those whose currencies appreciate against the dollar. (Memorandum, "The Case for More Intra-European Monetary Cooperation" (7 April 1978), Copenhagen; NA-UK, PREM 16/1615.)

65. Exemplifying Schmidt's stubbornness on economic and monetary questions was his response to the so-called Duisenberg initiative in the summer of 1976. See Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money*, 125. On Schmidt's disillusionment with the U.S., see note of a meeting held in the Cabinet Room (20 April 1978); UK Freedom of Information (hereafter FOI) release 248745.

66. See Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money*, 152-154. Bundesbank President Otmar Emminger pondered the chancellor's political motivations for pursuing a new EMS. "A lively desire was expressed by a succession of members as to whether you could not more closely inform the council of the central bank, when the opportunity arises, about the political motives for the construction of the European monetary system," he requested, "just as the desire exists on our side to be able to explain to you more closely our general monetary policy considerations in this question." Letter from Emminger to Schmidt (16 November 1978); HA-DB, Nachlaß Prof. Dr. Otmar Emminger N2/267.

67. Note for the record: Prime Minister's Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt at the Bundeskanzlei, Bonn (12 March 1978); UK FOI release 248745.

68. Owing to a series of domestic political reasons, Callaghan's political position related to European monetary integration remained untenable.

69. Note for the record (Ken R. Stowe, principal private secretary to the prime minister), "Proposals for a European Currency Reserve" (7 April 1978); NA-UK, PREM 16/1615. For British internal reaction, see notes from the prime minister's breakfast with Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard (Ken Couzens), 7 April 1978; NA-UK, PREM 16/1615.

70. MemCon, Schmidt, Giscard, and Callaghan (8 April 1978), Copenhagen; UK FOI release 248745.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Note for the Record, Prime Minister's Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt at Chequers (23 April 1978); NA-UK, PREM 16/1655.

73. Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, *Goodbye, Great Britain: The 1976 IMF Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

74. Callaghan's position was that "it would be inappropriate for the European Council to get down to discussing the details of a new scheme." Draft Telegram, "European Monetary Cooperation," (Annex F), 20 June 1978; NA-UK, PREM 16/1634. In a private conversation between the prime minister and Jenkins, Callaghan noted "that he felt a little put out that, after agreeing in Copenhagen that the three Heads of Government [Schmidt, Giscard, and Callaghan] should work together on these issues, Helmut Schmidt had discussed them with President Giscard alone, and had not given him an account of the exchanges." MemCon, Callaghan and Jenkins (3 July 1978); NA-UK, PREM 16/1634.

75. Jenkins, *European Diary*, 287.

76. Minutes, Cabinet, Ministerial Group on European Monetary Co-operation, 10 October 1978 [GEN 136 (78) 5th meeting]; NA-UK, CAB 130/1047.

77. For a short account, see Procès-Verbal de la session du Conseil Européen tenue à Brême les 6 et 7 juillet 1978, Brussels, 24 July 1978; Margaret Thatcher Foundation, available online at <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111545>.

78. Callaghan's notes from after-dinner meeting at the European Council (6 July 1978), Bremen; NA-UK, PREM 16/1634.

79. Memorandum, "The Case for More Intra-European Monetary Cooperation" (7 April 1978), Copenhagen; NA-UK, PREM 16/1615.

80. Extract from the Presidency's Statement after the European Council in Bremen and Annex to the Summary of Conclusions from the Presidency of the European Council, 6 and 7 July 1978 (hereafter "Bremen Annex"); NA-UK, PREM 16/1637.

81. See, e.g., Schmidt-Carter TelCon (7 July 1978); JC-PL, Plains Files, box 1.

82. Schmidt-Carter TelCon (7 July 1978); JC-PL, Plains Files, box 1.

83. Historians and commentators disagree about the precise date when the Soviets reached parity. John Erickson, writing for the Royal United Services Institute, placed the date in 1968; David M. Glantz suggested sometime in the early 1970s. For contemporaries and historians alike, the precise date is largely immaterial, as even the prospect of parity provoked the same anxiety in Washington and among its allies.

84. Beatrice Heuser, "Alliance of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence," in *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in East and West*, ed. Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), 202; and Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," p. 21. Theater-based forces, the Germans believed, should function as a tripwire.

85. Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area [MC 14/2 (Rev.) (Final Decision)], 23 May 1957; in *NATO Strategy Documents*, ed. Pedlow, pp. 277-314.

86. *Ibid.*; and Henry H. Gaffney, "Euromissiles as the Ultimate Evolution of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014), 183.

87. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 188.

88. Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy."

89. Overall Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area [MC 14/3 (Final)], 8 December 1968; in *NATO Strategy Documents*, ed. Pedlow, pp. 345-70.

90. Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy."

91. Nichols, *No Use*, 26.

92. John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York (12 January 1954); in *Department of State Bulletin* 30, no. 761 (25 January 1954): 107-10.

93. Kori N. Schake, "NATO Strategy and the German-American Relationship," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook*, vol. 2, 1968-1990, ed. Detlef Junker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 134; and Stromseth, *The Origins of Flexible Response*.

94. Apel, "Braucht die NATO eine andere Strategie?"; and Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, 14.

95. The U.S. government contracted with Martin Marietta in 1974 for new warheads and guidance systems for what would become the hotly debated Pershing II after 1979. Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung: Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 1970-1987* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1988), 21-22.

96. Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, p. v.

97. For instance, between 1961 and 1969, the United States more than doubled the payload (including fuel) capacity of its tactical air forces, allowing craft to penetrate deeper into enemy territory, to be based further to the rear, to fly further at lower altitudes, and to evade anti-aircraft defenses more effectively. See Alain Enthoven (U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense), *U.S. Tactical Air Power Program*, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Forces, U.S. Senate, 90 Congress, 2nd Session (6 June 1968), 144; and *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1968-69* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1970), 90-95.

98. Heuser, "Alliance of Democracies," 208; Ivo H. Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 70; Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma," *Orbis* 14, no. 2 (1975); and Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 185-86.

99. Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 2.

100. Robert S. McNamara, "Draft Memorandum for the President: NATO Strategy and Force Structure" (16 January 1968); NARA, Papers of Robert S. McNamara, record group 200, box 77. See also Boutwell, *The German Nuclear Dilemma*, 54.

101. Ehmke, speech delivered before the German Foreign Policy Association. Reprinted under the title "Perspectives on European-American Relations," *Europa Archiv*, no. 15-16 (1989), p. 508. Jorg Baldauf similarly identified MC 14/3 as "a compromise document." See his "How Big is the Threat to Europe: Transatlantic Debates Over the Balance of Forces," doc. P-7372 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1987).

102. Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy."

103. Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, 14.

104. Another important factor, though not a decisive one, was the problem identified by Catherine McArdle Kelleher as "strategic grasp time." Before the 1970s, within the western alliance, the United States retained a virtual monopoly on technical knowledge related to nuclear weapons. Certainly among the Germans, expertise on nuclear weapons and strategy remained limited. After 1967, however, the gap between the Americans and their European allies had decreased considerably. See Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). For the implications in planning, see Boutwell, *The German Nuclear Dilemma*, ch. 1.

105. MC 14/2; and Gaffney, "Euromissiles as the Ultimate Evolution of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe," 184. Emphasis in original.

106. Wenger, "The Politics of Military Planning," 181.

107. Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 20-21.

108. See his *The German Nuclear Dilemma*.

109. Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West*, 35-36. Henry H. Gaffney, an American Defense Department official, later reflected on the language and logic of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. "I learned early on from my West German colleagues that any use of 'tactical' nuclear weapons on West German soil would be catastrophic (and therefore 'strategic') for them," he recalled; "Their country and its people would be wiped out." Gaffney later worked to have the Pentagon's official language changed, instead referring to "theater nuclear weapons," and to scrub references to "tactical" forces in Europe in the defense secretary's annual posture statement. See Gaffney, "Euromissiles as the Ultimate Evolution of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe," 182.

110. Brandt, *My Life in Politics*, 398. Lawrence Freedman, analyzing the theoretical implications, suggested that “whether a strategic doctrine is acceptable to the people for whom it has been developed is as important in an alliance of democratic societies as the doctrine’s ability to impress the enemy.” Freedman, quoted in Kurt Biedenkopf, “Domestic Consensus, Security, and the Western Alliance,” in *Defense and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security*, ed. Christoph Bertram (London: IISS, 1983), 6.

111. As this study shows, the resurrection of the Bundeswehr likewise compelled the Soviets to pursue arms-control across the next decade—though with mixed results.

112. Baldauf, “How Big is the Threat to Europe.” Notably, a U.S. congressional report authored in 1977 disagreed with Pentagon assessments, estimating the Warsaw Pact to hold “a decisive conventional military superiority over NATO.” As chapter three of this study reveals, those differing attitudes reverse, and by the early 1980s, the Americans were decidedly more alarmed than the Europeans over Warsaw Pact force improvements. See U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *NATO and the New Soviet Threat: Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey Bartlett*, 95th Congress, 1st session (24 January 1977); and Schake, “NATO Strategy and the German-American Relationship,” 136.

113. Creation of the NPG had been recommended by a Special Committee of Defense Ministers, chaired by Robert McNamara. The NPG later absorbed the responsibilities of NATO’s Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee.

114. MemCon, Hassel, McGee, *et al.*, “Secretary McNamara’s Meeting with Defense Minister von Hassel on Strategic Subjects” (31 July 1963), p. 10; PHP, available online.

115. Final Decision on MC 14/3: A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area” (16 January 1968), in *NATO Strategy Documents*, ed. Pedlow, pp. 345-46; and Wenger, “The Politics of Military Planning,” 183.

116. Robert S. McNamara, Draft Memorandum for the President, “NATO Strategy and Force Structure” (21 September 1966), quoted in Wenger, “The Politics of Military Planning,” 180.

117. As Andreas Lutsch has demonstrated, already in the early 1960s, Bonn officials feared that NATO was divided between the nuclear “center” and the non-nuclear “periphery,” countries such as the Federal Republic treated as “protectorates” within the alliance and within defense planning. Andreas Lutsch, “Merely ‘Docile Self-Deception’? German Experiences with Nuclear Consultation in NATO,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 4 (2016), 540.

118. Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, 18; and Richard E. Shearer, “Consulting in NATO on Nuclear Policy,” *NATO Review* (October 1979).

119. Various theoretical explanations of “extended deterrence” have come and gone over the years, each author often defining the concept to privilege his own theory. On the terminology itself, see Richard Smoke, “Extended Deterrence: Some Observations,” *Naval War College Review* 36, no. 5 (1983); Walter B. Slocombe, “The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” in *Adapting NATO’s Deterrent Posture*, ed. Richard G. Lugar and Robert E. Hunter (Washington: CSIS, 1985); Philip C. Bobbitt, *Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1988), ch. 2; Edward N. Luttwak, “The Problems of Extending Deterrence,” in *The Future of Strategic Deterrence*, pt. 1, Adelphi Paper no. 10 (London: IISS, 1981); and Sir Lawrence Freedman, “The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” in *The Changing Strategic Landscape*, pt. 2, Adelphi Paper no. 236 (London: IISS, 1989); and Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 2.

120. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Anchor, 1962), 41; Emphasis in original. Raymond Aron, *The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy*, trans. Ernst Pawel (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 214. See also Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 5.

121. McNamara has offered contradictory statements over the years, in 1983 suggesting that “in long, private conversations with successive presidents—Kennedy and Johnson—I recommended, without qualification, that they never initiate, under any circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted my recommendation. See his “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 1 (Fall 1983), 79.

122. Stanley R. Sloan, “NATO Nuclear Forces: Modernization and Arms Control,” CRS Report 83-213F (24 October 1983), p. 3; and Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 7. One historian attributes differing European attitudes on MC 14/3 to its tremendous complexity when compared with earlier NATO doctrines; it was, he observes, “confusing to laymen, and even seasoned professionals often found it hard to absorb at first exposure.” Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose*, 202.

123. Wörner, quoted in Van Oudenairen, *West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy*, 14; and Apel, “Braucht die NATO eine andere Strategie?”

124. “Let us remember that the aim of the strategy was all about deterrence,” later reflected one Pentagon official, “not war-fighting.” Gaffney, “Euromissiles as the Ultimate Evolution of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe,” 184; and Gunilla Herolf, “What Became of the West European Option,” in *The West European Option*, p. 36.

125. Freedman, “The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” 20.

126. Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 21.

127. Helmut Schmidt, in his memorandum “Erwägungen für 1977,” dated 5 January 1977, noted the relative rise in West German economic and military power vis-à-vis its European partners. He noted “our unwanted and dangerous climb to the second world power of the West in the minds of other governments.” AdsD, Depositum Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt, 1/HSA009302.

128. *Ibid.*

129. *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, from German, literally, “coming to terms with the past,” often cited among scholars of modern Europe, involves the complex and often controversial process of reconciling contemporary Germany’s politics, society, and culture with its brutal heritage—particularly the genocide and atrocities of the Third Reich. In Germany, those struggles emerge in acknowledging, narrativizing, and memorializing the Holocaust and the recent Nazi past, including its long reach into institutions, schools, churches, businesses, government, and the everyday lives of Germans.

Useful and instructive texts on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* include, foremost, Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Norbert Frei, *1945 und wir: das Dritte Reich im Bewußtsein der Deutschen* (Munich: Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005); *idem.*, *Vergangenheitspolitik: die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich: Beck, 1996); in English, *idem.*, *Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration*, trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Peter Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland: die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur von 1945 bis heute* (Munich, C. H. Beck, 2001); Jürgen Danyel, ed., *Die geteilte Vergangenheit: zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995); and Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988; reprint, 1997).

130. Schmidt, "Erwägungen für 1977."

131. A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Atheneum, 1962), 24.

132. Zbigniew Brzezinski, quoting Colonel William Odom, in memorandum from Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, "NSC Weekly Report #20" (8 July 1977), top secret; JC-PL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, subject file 4. Emphasis in original.

The summary on Germany concluded, noting "[t]his is a step back toward the traditional German predicament of being in the middle. At the same time, the interaction of external and domestic political factors could damage the fragile roots of West German democracy. Economic deprivation, fear of Communism, and growing disillusionment with the Western democracies, including the U.S., could in the long run feed anti-democratic and authoritarian sentiments in schizophrenic Germany. The Soviet Union, to be sure, will attempt to exploit the emerging opportunity to loosen Bonn's ties with the U.S."

133. Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to Gerald R. Ford (17 December 1976), administratively confidential; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 1; folder, Europe - General (2).

134. Memorandum from Jacob K. Javits to Gerald R. Ford, [n.d., December 1976]; GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 1; folder, Europe - General (2).

135. MemCon (27 March 1975), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 10.

136. MemCon (29 May 1975), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 12.

137. *Ibid.*

138. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte* 157-158. Schmidt's memoir devotes several chapters to "The United States: The Difficulty of Being a World Power," "Jimmy Carter: Idealistic and Fickle," and "Carter's Foreign Policy Collapses." He includes an itemized list of grievances against Carter and his politics.

On Schmidt's mistrust of Carter, see Klaus Wiegrefe, *Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und der Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2005). Wiegrefe tends to neglect the European dimensions of his topic, focusing explicitly on bilateral relations between the Bonn and Washington. See also Herbert Dittgen, *Deutsch-amerikanische Sicherheitsbeziehungen in der Ära Helmut Schmidt: Vorgeschichte und Folgen des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses* (Munich: W. Fink, 1991); and Barbara D. Heep, *Helmut Schmidt und America: eine schwierige Partnerschaft* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990).

139. For examples, see, for instance, the discussion on U.S. economic policies and U.S.-German relations in "Interview with the President, Question-and-Answer Session with West German Reporters" (11 July 1978), *PPP: 1978, Book II*, 1258-1263; and "Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Heinz Lohfeldt of *Der Spiegel* Magazine" (14 July 1978), in *ibid.*, 1272-1277.

Of course, Schmidt's relationships with Ford and Kissinger were not without complication. In an off-the-record interview with Winston Churchill, MP for Stretford, the chancellor criticized Kissinger, describing "his one-man foreign policy as a 'recipe for disaster.'" Despatch from Nicholas Henderson, Bonn, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (29 November 1974), "Chancellor Schmidt's Visit to the UK." NA-UK, FCO, Records of the General Economic Departments, Foreign Office: Economic Relations Department and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Financial Policy and Aid Department and Financial Policy Department, Registered Files; Visit of Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany, to UK, 30 November-1 December 1974, series 59, folder 1182.

140. Nancy Mitchell, "The Cold War and Jimmy Carter," in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 3, *Endings*, 68.

Additionally, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Advisor, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 148-149; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 346-347; Cyrus R. Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); and Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 40-45.

141. MemCon (5 December 1974), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 7; MemCon (6 December 1974), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 7; and MemCon (14 February 1975), confidential; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 9.

142. Schulz, "The Reluctant European," 295.

143. See Verschlechterung des deutsch-amerikanischen Verhältnisses aufgrund angeblicher Kritik von Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt an der amerikanischen Wirtschafts- und Außenpolitik (Briefwechsel Arthur J. Goldberg/WB); AdsD, WB, A11.1, Mappe 89.

144. Schmidt, quoted in Jenkins, *European Diary*, entry for 18 March 1977, 68-69.

145. Schmidt, quoted in *ibid.*

146. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 229. Meeting in Brussels with Ford in May 1975, Schmidt cited Keynes, explaining to the American president that "Keynes' methods worked in the 1930s; they don't today, and there is no new Keynes." MemCon (29 May 1975), secret; GRF-PL, NSA, MemCons, box 12.

147. "Weltwirtschaftsgipfel in London, Aufzeichnung der Gespräche der Staats- und Regierungschefs beim Downing-Street-Gipfel, London, 6. bis. 8. Mai 1977" [docs. 111 and 112], 7 May 1977, AAP 1977, vol. 1, pp. 562-583.

148. Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Address (20 January 1977), PPP: 1977, *Book I*, pp. 1-4.

149. *Ibid.*

150. The SPD pledged to make the "disarmament campaign issue" the centerpiece of their 1980 federal election campaign platform. Kurzprotokoll der Sitzung des BFA Außenpolitik der CDU am 18. Dezember 1978 in Bonn (17 January 1979); ACDP 07-001, Karton 1916.

151. Winston Churchill, "The Twentieth Century—its Promises and its Realisation," address given at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (31 March 1949); CA, Churchill Papers, Speeches, CHUR 5/24A-E.

152. On U.S. nuclear guarantees to Europe, see Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*; and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Catherine McArdle Kelleher, eds., *Sicherheit, zu welchem Preis? die Zukunft der westlichen Allianz* (Munich: Olzog, 1983). For a historical treatment, see Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, ch. 19, 20, and 21.

153. Schulz cites the speech by Mondale as an important turning point in the U.S.-FRG relationship of the 1970s. Schulz, "The Reluctant European," 299. See Thiele, AA, and [illegible] for Schmidt, concerning conversation between foreign ministers Genscher and Louis de Guiringaud at the Franco-German summit (3 February 1977); and Olivier Wormser, summary of conversation, 3 February 1977, 1/HSA006689.

154. For Carter's retrospective on enhanced radiation weapons, see Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982), 133, 225-229, and 500. On the U.S. NATO

delegation's support for the ERW, see "Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO), an das AA" (13 September 1977) [doc. 243], in *AAP 1977*, vol. 2, pp. 1191-1196.

155. Helmut Schmidt, Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London (28 October 1977); published in *Survival* 20, no. 1 (January/February 1978): 2-10.

156. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 90.

157. Quotation from Jimmy Carter, Yazoo City, Mississippi Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Public Meeting (21 July 1977), in *PPP: 1977, Book II*, pp. 1316-1334. On Carter's repeated calls for deployment of the neutron bomb, see his replies to United Press International correspondent Helen Thomas, The President's News Conference" (12 July 1977), in *ibid.*, pp. 1231-1239; The President's News Conference (30 December 1977), in *ibid.*, pp. 2205-2212; Winston-Salem, North Carolina Information Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, (17 March 1978), in *ibid.*, pp. 535-538; and The President's News Conference (25 April 1978), in *ibid.*, pp. 775-783. On the reversal of his position, see Spokane, Washington, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Town Meeting (5 May 1978), *PPP: 1978, Book I*, pp. 860-880.

158. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 231.

159. "Beunruhigende Signale," *Der Spiegel* 20/1977 (9 May 1977): 125-128.

160. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 230.

161. "Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit dem Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Präsidenten Brzezinski" (27 September 1977) [doc. 257], in *AAP 1977*, vol. 2, pp. 1250-1257.

Contrast the Schmidt-Brzezinski private conversation with Carter's public pronouncements. In July 1977, the president explained that "I'm eager to work with the Soviet Union, with China, with France, with England, on a continuing basis, so that there will never be a need for the use of those weapons." See Carter, The President's News Conference (12 July 1977), in *PPP: 1977, Book II*, pp. 1231-1239. In December, while in Poland, the president explained that "We would not deploy the neutron bomb or neutron shells unless it was an agreement by our NATO allies. That's where the decision will be made." See *idem.*, The President's News Conference (30 December 1977), in *ibid.*, pp. 2205-2212. In April 1978, the president explained that "Ourselves, our NATO allies will meet here in Washington the last of May with a recommitment, which is already well in progress, for a long-range strengthening of NATO in all its aspects." See *idem.*, The President's News Conference (25 April 1978), in *PPP: 1978: Book I*, pp. 775-783)

162. Carter and Brzezinski both recognized allied frustrations over the neutron bomb. See the memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, "NSC Weekly Report #22" (22 July 1977), top secret; JC-PL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, subject file 4. See also the memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, "NSC Weekly Report #36" (11 November 1977), top secret; JC-PL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, subject file 5. Many similar discussions follow in Brzezinski's weekly reports to the president.

163. Richard Burt, "Carter's Delay on Neutron Bomb Issue Irks Allies," *New York Times* (1 April 1978), p. 5.

164. Jimmy Carter, The President's News Conference (30 December 1977), in *PPP: 1977, Book II*.

165. Richard Burt, "Aides Report Carter Bans Neutron Bomb; Some Seek Reversal," *New York Times* (4 April 1978), p. 69.

-
166. Jimmy Carter, "Enhanced Radiation Weapons, Statement by the President" (7 April 1978), *PPP: 1978, Book 1*, p. 702.
167. "The Mishandled Bomb," *New York Times* (6 April 1978), p. A20.
168. Notably, however, Dutch Defense Minister Dr. Roelof Kruisinga resigned his post in opposition to the deployment of the neutron bomb, having faced considerable opposition against Foreign Minister Christoph van der Klaauw. See Robert Schuil, "Minister Resigns over Bomb," *The Times* [London] (6 March 1978).
169. "Michael Hornsby, "White House Decision Welcomed," *The Times* [London] (8 April 1978).
170. Jimmy Carter, Interview with the President, Question-and-Answer Session with West German Reporters (11 July 1978), *PPP: 1978, Book II*, pp. 1258-1263.
171. Hornsby, "White House Decision Welcomed" (8 April 1978).
172. In particular, the Union parties capitalized on the apparent inconsistency in Social-Democratic security and defense policies. The CDU steadily argued that "security in the nuclear age is reachable only by credible deterrence" and that "the availability of weapons systems" was useless without "the apparent determination actually to use them for defense." See "Dritte Fassung des Entwurfes der Arbeitsgruppe 'Atlantische Allianz und Sicherheitspolitik' (zur abschließenden Diskussion und Verabschiedung)," n.d.; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.
173. Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom: Rechi i stat'i* (By Lenin's Course: Speeches and Articles), vol. 2 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1970), 329; quoted in Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 67.
174. The CDU especially worried about this development in the Soviet Union. Große Anfrage der CDU/CSU-Fraktion zu den "Aufgaben, Problemen und Perspektiven des Atlantischen Bündnisses" (25 May 1982), pp. 7-8; BA, B 136/14778.
175. For Bonn's protests against the Soviet invasion, see, e.g., Sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan (5 January 1980); in BA, B136/27052, Ost-West-Beziehungen. Internal documents demonstrate that the West Germans reacted quickly to the invasion, coordinating leadership among their allies.
176. Große Anfrage der CDU/CSU-Fraktion zu den "Aufgaben, Problemen und Perspektiven des Atlantischen Bündnisses" (25 May 1982), pp. 11-15ff; BA, B 136/14778.
177. Günther Gillissen, "Unbedingt zur Wahl gehen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 130 (7 June 1979), p. 1.
178. *Ibid.* On Bonn's preparations, see the Kurzprotokolle der Sitzungen des BFA [Bundesfachausschuß] Außenpolitik der CDU vom 16. Oktober 1978, 22./23. November 1978; ACDP 07-001, Karton 1916.
179. The U.S. National Security Council staff noted the deepening, writing that "[i]ntra-European economic and political coordination has intensified, and high-level EC-9 and ad hoc meetings are becoming more frequent." The U.S. administrations struggled in the coming years to develop their policy toward evolving European institutions, often adapting inconsistent policies. Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to Henry Kissinger (10 January 1975); GRF-PL, NSA, Presidential Agency File, box 15; folder, NATO (3).

180. Mitterrand was the Fifth Republic's first socialist president. Along with the Communists (PCF) and the Radical Left (PRG), he sponsored the socialist "110 Propositions for France," involving expensive Keynesian programs to stimulate economic growth. Surprising contemporaries and his coalition partners, Mitterrand orchestrated a turnaround of his own policies two years later, calling for a "*tournant de la rigueur*" in an effort to protect the franc against inflation, to maintain France's competitive edge within the EMS, and to synchronize France with the established views of his neoliberal companions in Bonn, London, and Washington.

Chapter Three

Between Ideology and Pragmatism 1979-1983

99 Kriegsminister
Streichholz und Benzinkanister
Hielten sich für schlaue Leute
Witterten schon fette Beute
Riefen „Krieg“ und wollten Macht
Mann, wer hätte das gedacht
Dass es einmal soweit kommt
Weg'n 99 Luftballons?

—Nena, “99 Luftballons”
Offizielle Deutsche Charts for 32 weeks, 1983¹

NATO's “Double-Track” Decision and the Collapse of the Elite Consensus

Late in the autumn of 1983, a flight of U.S. Air Force Starlifters touched down on European runways, their cargo bays loaded with a battery of fearsome new missiles.² For nearly four years, Europeans had wrangled over their arrival. Through the newly installed razor wire that guarded the NATO outposts, protesters hurled insults from their picket lines, demanding the Americans retreat.³ The capitalist crises of the 1970s, along with growing European contempt for American adventurism in the Third World, had provoked waves of dissent in the Atlantic alliance. Between 1979 and 1983, those waves swirled into a roaring tempest of European hostility with the onset of the missiles crisis. In the tens of thousands, Europeans took to the streets, rioting and agitating for peace, independent of wily American self-interest. At the center of that debate lay the question of Germany's politico-military alignment. Could NATO, besieged from without and convulsing within, endure? Would the

Federal Republic of Germany, gripped by domestic tumult, remain a steadfast alliance partner, or would the Germans seek a neutral “third way” between the two superpowers?

Addressing the West German Bundestag in September 1982, CDU member Volker Rühle explained that the North Atlantic alliance was “a community of values” (*Wertegemeinschaft*), rather than a mere “accidental geographical community of interests.”⁴ Nonetheless, in the early 1980s, those interests between the major NATO partners—the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States—seemed to diverge. NATO’s first secretary general, Lord Ismay, famously explained the alliance’s purpose: to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” Between 1979 and 1983, however, those three aims collapsed. The Soviets used the leverage gained through *détente* to secure the strategic advantage on the continent; the Americans presumably “decoupled” their interests from Europe; and the West Germans rose up in defense of their own security, exclusive of the alliance.


The 1970s had witnessed the habits of “thinking EC” over “thinking NATO,” resulting in national governments focusing on European integration and shirking their NATO obligations.⁵ By the 1980s, however, *domestic* debates regarding proper relationships with the two organizations had given way to *international* debates over the alliance’s future. President of the European Parliament (EP) Pieter Dankert explained that the partners were “drifting apart together,” enduring a “long-term decline in reciprocal understanding between Europe and America.”⁶ At the root of that divergence lay the 1979 decision to deploy 572 medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe—the so-called “euromissiles.”

Although popular discussions of those theater nuclear forces did not begin until 1979, the problem the missiles were meant to solve had gestated for more than a decade. The greatest liability of NATO lay in the geographic realities the alliance confronted. While the Warsaw Pact enjoyed contiguous borders and proximity to the European theater, NATO did not. The North Atlantic allies spanned an ocean, with the U.S. superpower three thousand miles from Europe.⁷ Any U.S.-Soviet armed conflict, limited or otherwise, would involve the nuclear destruction of Europe. When the Warsaw Pact achieved nuclear parity, NATO no longer could guarantee overwhelming retaliation against a Soviet incursion into Europe. Western strategy required recasting. NATO defense specialists knew that the Americans, fearing a nuclear reprisal against the United States, would hesitate to resort to nuclear weapons if the Soviets attacked Europe. Would the Americans stop at counterforce targets in Europe, avoiding Soviet territory proper? With no counterweight nuclear force on the continent, what would deter the Soviets from attacking Western Europe?⁸ Would the United States risk the destruction of American territory to liberate Bonn, Brussels, and Paris? Thus, the Warsaw Pact's theater nuclear weapons were severing the Western alliance. Ironically, the only means to ensure the *coupling* of the U.S. and its NATO allies was to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. Beyond massing conventional forces on the continent, theater-based weapons represented the only possibility.⁹

As the Kremlin maintained the rhetoric of détente, the Soviet leadership used the relaxation in East-West tensions to expand their arsenal. By 1979, the results of those efforts manifested stark disparity, quantitatively and qualitatively, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. At sea, the Red Fleet had more than doubled its size. "[W]e now have to reckon with a greatly increased maritime threat in the Atlantic and a demonstrated Soviet

capability to intervene militarily in support of political objectives in far flung areas outside the North Atlantic region,” explained British ambassador to NATO Sir John Killick.¹⁰ The buildup of the Soviet Navy under Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov threatened the West militarily, allowing the Soviets sea control, sea denial, and deterrent capabilities once afforded only to the navies of the U.S. and its NATO allies.¹¹ Likewise, the Soviets deployed the new Backfire bomber, which outperformed its predecessor aircraft, and already amassed quantitatively superior conventional strength in Europe.¹²

Fig. 3.1. Soviet Naval Potential, 1968 and 1975




Source: *Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1976), 32.

The Kremlin dragged on with MBFR conventional arms control discussions and SALT II strategic arms negotiations. Simultaneously, the Soviets also expanded their deployment of the only major weapons not included in ongoing talks: theater nuclear forces. Since 1976, the Soviets had been developing and deploying the mobile SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile in Eastern Europe. With a range of 5,000 kilometers, and with its multiple

independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each of the 243 SS-20s could launch three nuclear warheads on Western Europe.¹³ NATO ministers bristled at the threat, and the rhetoric of cooperation that characterized détente wore thin.

Fig. 3.2. Strategic Nuclear Potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Pact



Of the eighteen medium-range ballistic missiles, each was under French control. NATO weapons systems include those of the Americans, British, and French. Source: *Weißbuch 1975/1976*, pp. 28-31.

The Soviets invested between eleven and thirteen percent of their gross national product on their armaments industry. Western defense strategists “concluded that the numerical strength and offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces, coupled with the Soviet Union’s efforts to expand its global interest and influence, constituted a major and growing challenge to the security of the Alliance.”¹⁴ Meeting on 12 December 1979, NATO foreign and defense ministers announced the so-called “Double-Track Decision.” Recognizing that “arms control as part of détente” and “security by military means . . . must be pursued in parallel,” the NATO ministers resolved to pursue simultaneous “tracks” of East-West relations: diplomacy and armament. Since the heads of government of the four leading states of NATO had convened in Guadeloupe early in 1979, NATO ministers had

been developing their plans for negotiation with the Warsaw Pact over theater nuclear forces, reinforced by the deployment of two hundred to four hundred medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe.¹⁵

Many centrists, such as Hans-Dietrich Genscher, welcomed the NATO dual-track plan. He embraced the peaceable Western *Nachrüstungsbeschluß* [“decision for catch-up armament”] versus the bellicose Eastern *Vorrüstung* [“preemptive armament”].¹⁶ Others, such as Dankert, saw NATO as the aggressor in a dangerous contest of brinksmanship. As Western Europeans railed against nuclear arms, “the arrival of the new missiles will confirm their worst suspicions,” Dankert explained: “the second track of the NATO . . . decision—that of arms control—was always a convenient cover for deployment.”¹⁷

Formerly the Dutch parliament’s foreign affairs and defense spokesman, EP President Dankert echoed earlier calls from the 1975 Tindemans Report on European political integration for “the development of a specifically European approach to security.”¹⁸ He criticized both NATO and the U.S. because the weapons would be deployed solely in the European theater. Dankert called for “future security policies” to be based upon “*European* requirements.” He enjoined Europeans, through the EC, to “mak[e] their views heard” and urged “the development of public consensus on future defense policy” outside of NATO, under the auspices of European institutions.¹⁹

For much of its history until the 1980s, NATO had enjoyed the support of an elite consensus in the UK, FRG, and the U.S.; during those decades, no mainstream opposition to NATO defense and security policies had challenged the alliance’s strategic premises from within.²⁰ The controversy over NATO’s double-track decision, which dominated Western European politics between 1979 and 1983, destroyed that decades-old consensus. In those

four years, anti-nuclear and anti-American sentiment in Europe became synonymous as Western Europeans sought to “set [the] Atlantic house in order.”²¹ “We must avoid imposing decisions in the name of Alliance solidarity,” explained Dankert. “We should accept that the very diversity of the Alliance—which is its strength—runs counter to attempts to impose such cohesion.”²²

The defense ministers’ announcement to deploy 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in an effort to “modernize” NATO nuclear theater forces affronted Soviet leaders.²³ But no Eastern frustrations over the nuclearization of the continent could rival those to be found in the public squares, periodicals, and universities of Western Europe.

The Strategic Role of Public Opinion

With the collapse of the elite consensus, fundamental questions of Western security, long answered by the North Atlantic Treaty, were reopened.²⁴ “What would happen today if the first atomic bomb was dropped in 1945 on the land for which it was constructed—in Germany?” asked *Der Spiegel*. Journalist Wilhelm Bittorf, in his June 1981 cover story, pondered West Germany’s cozy relationship with nuclear weapons.²⁵ How had the Germans found such a condition of tolerance toward nuclear arms, even a desire for nuclear defense, he asked, without lapsing into a sort of collective nervous breakdown [*kollektiven Nervenzusammenbruch*].²⁶ Discussing nuclear strategists in Washington, Brussels, and Bonn, he explained that “they have developed a technical jargon which is so mangled that it subsumes charred and irradiated civilians, resulting from a nuclear attack on a military target, into the term ‘collateral damage’ [*Kollateralschaden*]. Unimaginable disasters are

becoming mathematical quiz questions,” he wrote: “‘How many warheads will it take to destroy the urban centers of my opponent if he first obliterates all of my missile silos?’ The unthinkable is becoming conceivable,” he concluded.

For Bittorf and his contemporaries, West Germans had lapsed into a sort of moral bankruptcy—a lazy, unthinking acquiescence to the Federal Republic’s status as a pawn in a superpower war. Between 1979 and 1983, more than two dozen *Der Spiegel* covers featured stories about the FRG’s frontline position between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the six thousand nuclear weapons stationed on West German soil. As détente eroded and *Wandel durch Annäherung* produced neither peace nor independence, the battle over the euromissiles dominated popular consciousness and public discourse.²⁷ Opponents, such as Bittorf, rallied discontent for the removal of the missiles; advocates such as CDU foreign-policy spokesman Alois Mertes, trumpeted the resiliency of democratic institutions over authoritarianism.²⁸ Naturally, both positions invoked the continued American military presence in Germany, either as hostage-taker or as defender.

Across the Atlantic, Ronald Reagan was inheriting his predecessor’s unpopularity among Western Europeans. But Reagan understood that successful politics are bolstered by careful showmanship. He renewed the White House emphasis on “public diplomacy” after taking office in January 1981, aiming to discredit similar efforts in the Kremlin’s “peace offensive.”²⁹ Aside from Reagan’s keen appreciation of the spotlight, the administration’s commitment to public diplomacy manifested official U.S. concerns about the chasm between American and European public opinion on defense matters.³⁰ “The huge number of Soviet tanks that rumble through the countryside, the Soviet missiles that peer over the border, they aren’t there for defense,” Reagan remarked upon arriving in West Berlin.

“They’re here to threaten the West and divide the Alliance. . . . We don’t seek to make Europe captive,” explained the president. “We seek to keep Europe free.”³¹

Reagan’s administration sought to devise an irreproachable position within the euromissiles debate, deflecting the causes of discontent eastward rather than westward. The president seized every opportunity to remind audiences that he had proposed to the Soviets the elimination of all land-based, intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the continent.³² Furthermore, the initial request for theater nuclear weapons had come from the Europeans themselves, most notably in Helmut Schmidt’s famous address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1977.³³ Thus, the president argued, the Soviets bore responsibility for the missiles being necessary, and the Europeans bore responsibility for their being present. The United States, by deploying the euromissiles, he argued, had demonstrated the depth of the American commitment to Western Europe and to NATO.

In his first visit to Germany as president, Reagan expressed little sympathy for opposition to the euromissiles. “To those who’ve taken a different viewpoint and who can’t see this danger, I don’t suggest that they’re ignorant, it’s just that they know so many things that aren’t true,” he explained. Echoing Genscher’s characterization of the Western “decision to arm after” versus the Soviet “preemptive armament,” Reagan puzzled, “I cannot understand why among some, there is a greater fear of weapons NATO is to deploy than of weapons the Soviet Union already has deployed.”³⁴

With popular discontent tearing at alliance unity, Reagan ordered a “Special Planning Group” (SPG) within the National Security Council (NSC) to ensure that “a wide-ranging program of effective initiatives is developed and implemented to support national security

policy, objectives and decisions.” Reagan especially wished to parry the Soviet “peace offensive” in Europe, aiming “to counter totalitarian ideologies and aggressive political action moves undertaken by the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates.”³⁵

With protests tearing through European capitals, the White House and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) began “massive data-gathering campaigns” to gauge public perceptions of America among Europeans.³⁶ As Steven Smith and Douglas Wertman show, peace activism did not represent a uniform campaign but instead a catch-all movement for disaffected citizens.³⁷ Even the new Green Party in the FRG, the most outspoken of the anti-INF political groups, represented a convergence of environmentalists, leftists, and feminists dissatisfied with the ruling parties.³⁸

Nonetheless, the best efforts of the White House could not rival those of the Kremlin. Moscow’s “peace offensive” masterfully manipulated West German politics.³⁹ “[M]ake 1980 a year of mass action against the imperialistic arms race and for military détente,” appealed Leonid Zamiatin, head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) International Information Department. “Act now: Eliminate the danger of the new U.S. missiles!”⁴⁰ Within a day of NATO’s announcement of the dual-track decision, the CPSU convened a secret meeting of international communist parties in the Hungarian village of Tihany. The delegates were instructed to cooperate with social democratic parties, as Gerhard Wettig has shown, “for the sake of undermining and destroying NATO.”⁴¹ Even the FRG’s German Peace Union [*Deutsche Friedensunion*] received its financing and orders from the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED). On at least one occasion, its leaders were summoned to Moscow to do the CPSU’s bidding.⁴² The influential “Krefeld Appeal,” with its five million

signatures protesting the deployments, had been initiated by the GDR's Ministry for State Security (Stasi) and orchestrated by the SED-manipulated German Peace Union.⁴³

Soviet leaders at the highest levels understood that the NATO deployments offered negligible change to the strategic situation in Europe. Still, they exploited fractures among the Western publics by characterizing the new missiles as destabilizing first-strike weapons. Committee for State Security (KGB) chairman Yuri Andropov, for instance, aimed to use the NATO deployments "to raise the struggle against all the [Western] course of militarization to a higher level."⁴⁴ Even the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat enjoined the Soviet media to mobilize publicity offensives that accused NATO of war mongering.⁴⁵ "One has to note that the NATO countries . . . are still searching for specious arguments in order to carry out the dangerous plans to deploy in Western Europe the new U.S. medium-range missile-nuclear weapons," Brezhnev declared.⁴⁶ And while Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders appealed to the world with pledges of "parity and equal security," in top-secret internal conversations they maintained "strategic superiority" as their intent.⁴⁷

The apparent democratization of defense policy of the early 1980s revolutionized Western European politics. Governments reckoned with disenchantment of their citizens and the strain of their alliance. NATO's institutional salience had waned during the relaxation in East-West tensions of the 1970s, but, ironically, in the post-détente era, the alliance seemed to sink even further into the political abyss. Discussing the missiles in 1983, Dankert explained that "they will remain highly visible symbols of the lack of consensus within our societies towards the role of nuclear weapons. . . . I have a feeling that an increasing number of Europeans feel uncomfortable about the society in which they live,"


he explained. “Certainly in Germany, many people would like to have a rethink about the Atlantic relationship—to find a middle way between East and West.”⁴⁸

Superpower Perfidy

“Is the world war coming in 1983?” asked the Social-Democratic weekly *Vorwärts*.⁴⁹ Paradoxically, by 1983—the year of the euromissiles—many West Germans came to believe that NATO actually intended *to provoke* a European war with the Warsaw Pact. Twice in the twentieth century, world war had emanated from Germany, and many believed the INF dispute would instigate another. “[T]he third, the largest, and the last world war, the final Armageddon, has taken on concrete features,” lamented *Der Spiegel*.⁵⁰ In such a war, argued Wolf Perdelwitz, “the USA would have some chance to stay out of this inferno—then from a great distance emerge as the only superpower on the earth.”⁵¹

Popular anger overwhelmed West European capitals. Hundreds of thousands rallied against INF missiles in Brussels, Bonn, and many other cities. When U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited West Berlin in September 1981, upward of forty-thousand rioted in the streets, battling police and one another.⁵² With hundreds of arrests and injuries, Schmidt and Genscher encouraged the U.S. administration to pursue a goal of eliminating INF weapons on the continent.⁵³ Two months later, Reagan proposed eliminating all intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. If the Soviets agreed to withdraw their SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles, NATO would abandon its planned deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles.⁵⁴

Fig. 3.3. West German Attitudes toward INF Deployments, January 1983



“If the Geneva arms negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union fail, new American medium-range missiles will be stationed in the Federal Republic by the end of this year. Would you say that all in all that more rockets mean more danger and this depresses you or rather would you feel reassured because the [nuclear] equilibrium between America and Russia will be restored?” Source: Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann und Edgar Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1983), 246.

Nonetheless, the president’s proposal did little to quell the anti-INF discontent.⁵⁵ As protesters marched across Europe, West German scholars attempted to harness the debate and channel mass unrest into academic discourse. Among intellectuals, the euromissiles dispute produced broader utopian schemes for ending the Cold War, losing its initial focus on the deployments altogether.⁵⁶ “We are being lied to a great deal, every day,” wrote journalist Günter Gaus.⁵⁷ Others also tried to debunk the credentials of security strategists, harnessing popular discontent by “democratizing” defense policy. “It concerns us all and we are all equally ignorant,” wrote Augstein. “No one should tell us . . . that Reagan, Haig, Thatcher, and Weinberger know more than any one of us.”⁵⁸ Demands from the newly

formed Green Party for a “Nuremburg trial” of the nuclear superpowers galvanized popular anger and further democratized the security debate.⁵⁹

Amid talk of “atomic Auschwitz” and “nuclear holocaust,” Germans continued to come to terms with the memory of the Third Reich’s atrocities.⁶⁰ Those invocations of the Nazi past were politicized further in the summer of 1983, when the Bundestag unsuccessfully voted to dismiss CDU General Secretary Heiner Geißler from his post as cabinet minister. The fiercely conservative Geißler already had proven a lightning rod for conflict, having denounced the “peace movement” as a Soviet-sympathetic “*Angst* movement.”⁶¹ From the floor of the Bundestag, Geißler declared that the pacifists of the 1930s, much like the pacifists of the 1980s, had catalyzed Nazi violence and genocide by their weakness in the face of threat. Amid the controversy, leading Green Party member Joschka Fischer hurled back at Geißler: “The German right—including you, Mr. Geißler—will never be able to talk itself out of its responsibility for the genocide at Auschwitz. This legacy, which your party always purposefully neglects, has been saved and continued in the West German postwar republic.”⁶²

The Geißler-Fischer conflict, along with the public outcries over INF, revealed both the narrowing limits of civility in German political discourse and the long reach of historical memory in addressing the fundamental questions of Germany’s postwar alignment and identity. While the peace activists represented many perspectives and advanced diverse ambitions, they shared a common foe: nuclear weapons themselves. Therefore, as the protests raged on, their collective anxieties and anger were turned on the North Atlantic alliance and their American partners.

Decoupling: Holding Germany Hostage to U.S. Interests

Were the superpowers to wage a *limited* nuclear war, “[t]he continent would become a hecatomb, and in it would be buried . . . hundreds of millions of people [and] also the remains of a civilisation. If some Europeans survived, in Swiss shelters or British Government bunkers, they would emerge to a cannibal universe in which every humane instinct had been cauterized.”⁶³ With the “[m]iniaturisation of megadeath bombs [making] fine progress,” Europeans confronted a scenario in which the continent could be “decoupled” from its transatlantic alliance.⁶⁴ “Decoupling” envisaged a limited nuclear exchange in Europe with theater-based weapons, without necessarily escalating to strategic attacks against the two superpowers. “And that is precisely why politicians in the United States find ‘limited’ war more tolerable than the other sort,” published the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation’s campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament (END), “because it leaves a hope that escalation to the total destruction of both superpowers might be a second-stage option to be deferred during the negotiations which could be undertaken while Europe burns.”⁶⁵ With the fear of decoupling, millions of Europeans would be sacrificed to the new SS-20s and Pershings, in the interest of staving off a superpower war.⁶⁶

Many peace activists argued that the Western strategy was relying on a “Europeanization of nuclear war.”⁶⁷ With the U.S.-Soviet negotiations to limit intercontinental missiles, the Americans could escalate nuclear conflict in Europe without immediately risking massive retaliation. Authors such as left-leaning Social Democrat Erhard Eppler argued that NATO war-planning strategy was predicated upon sacrificing West Germany to eastern missiles. The Americans, he asserted, had created “a necrophilic, death-seeking utopia . . . far away from the realities of human life.”⁶⁸ Activists feared that hubris

was demanding an over-reliance on limited nuclear war in Europe rather than conventional forces to defend the continent.⁶⁹ “Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons,” explained Lord Mountbatten. “There are powerful voices around the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept—if you desire peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense.”⁷⁰

Even two decades earlier, NATO strategists understood that Soviet military operational planning called for a “highly escalatory doctrine.”⁷¹ In Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces prepared for conflict according to opposite strategies. Western defense planners hoped to “terminate the conflict quickly, at the lowest level of violence consistent with NATO’s objectives.”⁷² They envisioned an escalatory conflict that began with conventional forces, relying on anti-tank installations and superior Western airpower. Should political and diplomatic efforts fail to terminate the war before Western conventional forces were overrun, NATO would escalate through its battery of theater nuclear forces, including its surface-to-surface missiles, nuclear artillery, nuclear-capable tactical aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, and atomic demolition munitions (ADMs). Each of those measures envisioned theater-based fighting, presumably limited to Europe, without yet resorting to the release of strategic weapons from land-based silos, submarines, and strategic bombers. Finally, as a last resort, NATO would have recourse to the latter, triggering a counterattack against the American homeland.

Warsaw Pact forces trained and postured their troops according to an opposite doctrine. Soviet strategists prepared for massive theater nuclear strikes against Western nuclear and conventional forces in Europe with follow-on armored attacks to seize and subdue NATO territory.⁷³

Table 3.1. NATO Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1982

<i>Type</i>	<i>Number</i>
Atomic demolition munitions	300
Artillery shells (155mm and 203mm)	2,250
Surface-to-surface missiles (Honest John, Lance, Pershing I)	500
Gravity bombs	1,850
Surface-to-air missiles (Nike Hercules)	700
Maritime weapons	400
<i>Total</i>	6,000

Figures for French surface-to-surface missiles and gravity bombs are not included.
Source: Jonathan Alford, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *NATO's Fifteen Nations* 2 (1981), 80.

Table 3.2. NATO and Warsaw Pact Nonnuclear Forces in Place in Europe, 1982

	<i>NATO</i>	<i>Warsaw Pact</i>
<i>Military manpower</i> (in millions)	2.6	4
<i>Ground forces</i>		
Divisions	84	173
Main battle tanks	13,000	...
Antitank guided weapons launchers (crew served and/or mounted)	8,100	24,300
Artillery/mortars (tubes ≥ 100 mm, including rocket launchers)	10,750	31,500
Armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles	30,000	78,800
Helicopters		
Attack	400	700
Transport/support	1,400	300
<i>Combat aircraft</i>		
Fighter-bomber/ground attack	1,950	1,920
Interceptors	740	4,370
Bombers	...	350
Reconnaissance	285	600
<i>Naval forces</i>		
Aircraft carrier	7	...
Kiev-class ships	...	2
Helicopter carriers	...	2
Cruisers	15	21
Destroyers and frigates	274	182
Amphibious ships (ocean-going)	41	16
Mine warfare ships	257	360
Long-range attack submarines	60	149
Sea-based tactical and support aircraft (including helicopters)	712	146
Land-based and tactical support aircraft	180	719
Land-based antisubmarine warfare aircraft and helicopters	450	179

NATO figures exclude French forces. Of the 173 Warsaw Pact divisions in Europe, only about thirty could be mobilized within about four days for an attack on the Central Region of NATO. About 110 divisions could mobilize within four months' notice. (Bruce K. Scott, "A NATO Nonnuclear Deterrence: Is it Affordable?"; RR-PL, Tyrus W. Cobb files, box 91096, European Defense Issues. Source: William W. Kaufmann, "Nonnuclear Deterrence," *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, ed., John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983), 40-46.

Table 3.3. NATO Ground Forces and their Availability for the Central Region of Europe, 1983

Origin	NATO ground forces mobilize, deploy, and defend at:									
	M + 4		M + 9		M + 14		M + 90		M + 120	
	Divisions	Combat power	Divisions	Combat power	Divisions	Combat power	Divisions	Combat power	Divisions	Combat power
Belgium	2	50,000	2.67	67,000	2.67	67,000	2.67	67,000	2.67	67,000
United Kingdom	4	104,000	5	130,000	5	130,000	5	130,000	5	130,000
Canada	0.3	13,000	0.67	25,000	0.67	25,000	0.67	25,000	0.67	25,000
Denmark	0.3	24,000	1.67	40,000	1.67	40,000	1.67	40,000	1.67	40,000
France	3	78,000	7	182,000	7	182,000	7	182,000	7	182,000
Germany, West	12	420,000	14	490,000	14	490,000	14	490,000	14	490,000
Netherlands	2.3	70,000	3	90,000	3	90,000	3	90,000	3	90,000
U.S.										
in U.S.	3.33	160,000	6.33	304,000	9.33	448,000	9.33	448,000
in West Germany	5.67	272,000	5.67	272,000	5.67	272,000	5.67	272,000	5.67	272,000
<i>Total</i>	30.3	1,031,000	43	1,456,000	46	1,600,000	49	1,744,000	49	1,744,000

M = day of mobilization. Source: Kaufmann, "Nonnuclear Deterrence," 62. See also IISS, *The Military Balance, 1981-1982*, (London: IISS, 1981), pp. 4-10, 27-37; and U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual: Maneuver Control*, FM105-5 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1973), apps. E, F, and G.

Table 3.4. NATO Resources Allocated to the Central Region of Europe, 1983

	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Non-U.S. NATO</i>	<i>Total</i>
Poseidon warheads committed to SACEUR	1	...	1
Tactical nuclear capabilities	3.2	...	3.2
Ground forces	43.5	61.2	104.7
Naval forces	30.7	19	49.7
Tactical air forces	55.2	45	100.2
Long-range mobility forces	4.4	...	4.4
Total	138.0	125.2	263.2
Percent of total	52	48	100
National income	3,390	2,831	6,221
Percent of total	55	45	100

Income figures are calculated in billions of U.S. dollars, 1983 value. Source: Kaufmann, "Nonnuclear Deterrence," 80.

With those two opposing strategies and asymmetrical force postures, the United States no longer functioned as a steadfast deterrent partner to Western Europe; U.S. leaders would refuse to sacrifice American cities to forestall nuclear attacks on Europe. "[E]ven if we preempt, surviving Soviet capability is sufficient to produce unacceptable losses in the U.S.," explained U.S. General Leon Johnson to the National Security Council. "[T]here is no way, no matter what we do, to avoid unacceptable damage in the U.S. if nuclear war breaks out."⁷⁴ With qualitative and quantitative advances in Soviet nuclear and missile technology, NATO's strategy of "controlled escalation" from conventional forces to tactical and strategic nuclear weapons had lost its potency. Even Richard Nixon admitted, "We will never use the tactical nuclears," confessing that "the nuclear umbrella in NATO [was] a lot of crap."⁷⁵

In his annual report to Congress on foreign policy, Nixon had examined the strategic implications of parity. "Sole reliance on conventional forces might lead an aggressor to conclude that we might accept the loss of vital territory without taking further action," he wrote. "Sole reliance on nuclear forces, on the other hand, might lead inevitably and

unnecessarily to the very widespread devastation that we should be trying to prevent.”⁷⁶

Thus, as early as 1971, a limited nuclear conflict in Europe proved more strategically sensible for the Americans, allowing both negotiating leverage with the Soviets on arms control and a delayed possibility of immediate strategic nuclear exchange. The Carter administration’s commitment “to achieve a high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions” further had cemented limited nuclear exchange as a possibility in Europe.⁷⁷

Marc Trachtenberg has documented this crisis of Western strategy, noting that nuclear deterrence constituted “something of a sham.”⁷⁸ If U.S. National Command Authority would not strike Soviet territory, fearing nuclear retaliation, then the doctrine of deterrence had collapsed and U.S. leaders truly had decoupled their country from their NATO allies. Thus, in a war that originated in Europe, the United States likely would withdraw from the conflict if the war could be contained to the continent and Isles.

By 1979, many Europeans questioned the endurance of the American commitment to the continent’s security. Respected West German defense strategist Lothar Rühl wrote widely on the strategic situation in Europe. He argued that the Soviets could bide their time while the North Atlantic alliance disintegrated, “and that, after the present brief moment in history has passed,” the fundamental reality of geography [would] reassert itself.”⁷⁹

Some analysts, such as Rühl, believed the Soviet military buildup not only had foreseen such a *strategic* decoupling, but also a *public opinion* decoupling. Ironically, as nuclear war became more likely, Europeans resented NATO, their foremost defender, all the more.

“[T]he very fact that NATO is being programmed to follow this line of action means that Europeans must awaken to understand what a sinister mutation has taken place, beneath


the continuing official charter about ‘deterrence,’” published END.⁸⁰ Among peace advocates, the postwar yoke of U.S. and European defense had transformed itself into a bridle on a continental hostage, bearing the brunt of insecurity. “The most reliable ally of the United States within the alliance has become the country with the liveliest anti-Americanism,” observed *Der Spiegel*. “The country in which neither reunification nor Europe were primary concerns, but rather security, has become a country in which the ‘not-with-us’ attitude and the refusal to view foreign policy from the perspective of defense seem to be triumphant. What a surprise!”⁸¹

Egon Bahr, the SPD’s Janus-faced spokesman, argued for West German “codetermination” (*Mitbestimmung*) with the superpowers.⁸² His SPD comrade, Willy Brandt, similarly called for a “European peace order.”⁸³ Other critics, such as Anton-Andreas Guha, *Frankfurter Rundschau* defense correspondent, argued in effect for West German “self-determination” between the superpowers. The U.S., he asserted, had committed the Germans to a “risk of annihilation of the people” (*Völkervernichtung*).⁸⁴ The two German states, because of the thousands of nuclear weapons stationed on their soil not under their control, shared more in common than they did with their respective alliances. With NATO and the Warsaw Pact holding the two German client states hostage, Guha called for neutralism for the non-nuclear states wedged between the superpowers.⁸⁵

Proponents of neutralism called for European independence from superpower brinksmanship. “We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists,” END exhorted. “*We must learn to be loyal, not to ‘East’ or ‘West,’ but to each other,* and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.”⁸⁶ Echoing other calls within the peace movement to look beyond the Cold War


constructs of international order, neutralists called for a European “third force” between the two alliances.⁸⁷ “We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objective must be to free Europe from confrontation, . . . and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.”⁸⁸ For the Federal Republic, Rühl posited three possibilities: “Should it play an independent role as a ‘third force’ in international politics with a symmetrical neutrality between the two superpowers? Or, on the contrary, should Europe maintain an organized alliance with North America and membership in the Atlantic community? Or, finally, should Western Europe make an arrangement with the Soviet Union on the basis of cooperation in an ‘all-European system of security’?”⁸⁹ Believing that a “limited war” would produce “the end of Europe” and that “a third world war [was] increasingly likely,” neutralism offered a path for Europeans, and West Germans in particular, to reclaim their sovereignty outside the Yalta system of superpower domination.⁹⁰ “Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilization by engendering world war,” published END. “This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.”⁹¹

Fig. 3.4. West German Attitudes toward Unification on a Neutral Basis



“What do you think about the following proposal for German unification? Unification is conditioned upon the following requirements. (A) The GDR withdraws from the Warsaw Pact and the Federal Republic withdraws from NATO. (B) The reunited Germany will guarantee that it will be neutral and alliance-free. (C) Germans can determine its social system in free and secret elections among themselves. Where do you stand? Would you welcome a reunification of Germany under these conditions or not?” Source: Noelle-Neumann and Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8, p. 208.

Fig. 3.5. West German Attitudes toward German Unification and World Peace, July 1982



“Recently someone said: ‘Peace in the world would be better guaranteed if there were only one Germany.’ Would you say that is correct or incorrect?” Source Noelle-Neumann and Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8, p. 216.

Deploying the Euromissiles

The first track of the NATO decision—diplomacy—failed in November 1983. No U.S.-Soviet agreement over INF had emerged, and the consequences of the second track—armament—became apparent. In that month, the Pershing missiles began arriving in West Germany and the cruise missiles began arriving in the UK, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands.⁹² U.S. embassies heightened security, and military bases added concertina wire to their perimeters, anticipating mass demonstrations. Peace activists prepared protests, hunger strikes, and even a blockade of the Bremerhaven harbor.⁹³ Amid all the political and popular debates over the euromissiles, few asked the most salient question: Were the cruise and Pershing II missiles strategically necessary, as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Defense Minister Hans Apel both argued?⁹⁴

Within the “inter-locking system of comprehensive deterrence . . . with the pistol and the grenade on one end and the MX missile at the other,” strategic weapons had assumed primarily deterrent roles since the 1970s.⁹⁵ Despite opponents’ claims that “NATO would be reduced in a nuclear war to stinging itself, like a scorpion, to death,” the post-détente security paradigm necessitated intermediate-range missiles in Europe if NATO were to retain its *defensive*, rather than mere *deterrent*, capabilities.⁹⁶

Despite the rhetoric and propaganda surrounding the INF deployments, in reality the new NATO weapons remained purely defensive. The SS-20s had many times the range of the Pershings. While the NATO missiles boasted many attributes, they could not reach deep into Soviet territory, to land-based silos or major military targets. The cruise and Pershing missiles lacked the offensive capability to match Soviet nuclear forces, many of which were

fortified well beyond the Urals.⁹⁷ NATO's INF deployments could serve but two purposes: (1) to play as bargaining chips in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, and (2) to fire in theater on advancing Warsaw Pact troops.⁹⁸

Most importantly, the far-reaching political consequences of the deployments rippled throughout European politics for the next four years, until Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev concluded the INF Treaty in 1987. Despite the genuine fears of "atomic Auschwitz," the only immediate casualties the missiles produced remained the political career of Helmut Schmidt and his Social Democratic Party. The chancellor and a faction of his followers became estranged from their party, which lost control of the government in October 1982.

A Parliamentary Coup

"The only thing one can really rely on in politics," explained *Der Spiegel*, "is opportunism."⁹⁹ With the missiles dispute and the collapse of NATO's elite consensus, West Germany's SPD-FDP coalition, which had ruled since 1969, faced its own strain. Seizing his opportunity, leader of the CDU/CSU opposition Helmut Kohl hatched a plot to fracture the governing coalition and to oust Schmidt from the chancery. His approach was twofold. First, he aimed to exploit the growing rifts among Social Democrats on matters of defense and security policy. Second, capitalizing on the Schmidt-Brandt dispute, he painted the SPD as dysfunctional and as a party that neither understood nor represented the interests of its constituency. When successful, he could form a Christian-Democratic coalition with the FDP, ensconcing the CDU as senior partner and himself as chancellor.¹⁰⁰

The INF dispute was isolating Schmidt from his party.¹⁰¹ Brandt, despite the earlier political scandals that had forced him to resign as chancellor, continued to serve as chairman on the SPD, aided by his companion Egon Bahr. For more than a decade, Schmidt and Brandt had represented two conflicting foreign-policy outlooks of the party; while Schmidt focused on national and strategic interests, Brandt emphasized his ideals, including his rapprochement with the East and resistance to manipulation from the West. Schmidt was being outmaneuvered within his party by Brandt and outside of his party by Kohl.¹⁰² And his coalition ally, FDP chairman and Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher, proved little more than a liability.¹⁰³

In the third week of April 1982, the Social Democrats convened in Munich for their annual party congress. The assembled delegates immediately splintered into factions. Erhard Eppler and Oskar Lafontaine called for abandonment of the armament track of NATO's 1979 decision. Others, led by Karsten Voigt and Horst Ehmke, pushed to extend INF negotiations for another eighteen months. At the beginning of the congress, 175 resolutions related to the double-track decision lay before the party. If any doubts remained, the 1982 SPD congress confirmed that Chancellor Schmidt stood totally outside the mainstream of his own party.¹⁰⁴ His talk of transatlantic security partnership sounded misguided, as the party defined its primary goal as a "nuclear weapons-free Europe."¹⁰⁵

Amid all the political maneuvering, Hans-Dietrich Genscher figured as the pivot between the two major parties in coalition-building.¹⁰⁶ Although he already had spoken out in favor of the double-track decision, his loyalties proved easy to purchase.¹⁰⁷ Years of navigating between coalitions had enabled Genscher to perfect his supreme political talent: finding the true wind and adjusting his sails accordingly. As Kohl's star rose, Genscher fixed his eyes on

the horizon, giving his loyalty to a coalition with Kohl. He defended his dithering as necessary for the continuity of longstanding foreign-policy aims and for the preservation of the Free Democrats. "The existence of the party is at stake," he warned.¹⁰⁸ With the FDP holding only ten percent of the Bundestag's seats, Genscher understood his position as a cockboat in the wake of a man-of-war. The fragmentation of the SPD and the rise of a neutralist minority within his coalition could relegate the FDP to obscurity.

"The social-liberal coalition is dead," proclaimed *Der Spiegel* in September 1982.¹⁰⁹ Kohl successfully had wrested Genscher and the FDP away from their thirteen-year social-democratic partnership. Genscher, together with Kohl, had triangulated the CDU/CSU-FDP position as above and between the earlier debates that had driven disaffected populations to protest. "The path of German foreign policy began in 1949 with the fundamental decision for integration into the West," Genscher declared before the Bundestag. "There is much talk about equidistance . . . between the USA and the Soviet Union. . . . In fact, there are two superpowers, but we are allied with the United States, not because the USA is stronger, but because the United States is a democracy, as we are."¹¹⁰

As further injury to the SPD, the new Green Party was gaining traction in federal politics. Formed in January 1980 at Karlsruhe, the Greens brought together previously splintered causes, including environmentalists, opponents to nuclear power, and critics of NATO's deployments. The new party "tends to look east, rather than west, in search for political soulmates," wrote *The Economist*.¹¹¹ The formation of the Greens further galvanized the far left, increasing their political clout and isolating moderates such as Schmidt.¹¹²

Robbed of support in the Bundestag after the SPD-FDP split, Schmidt lost a constructive vote of no-confidence in October. Despite the vote, the SPD's electoral loss in 1982 resulted

not from an actual loss of trust in Schmidt's cabinet, but from the governing coalition's inability to speak with one voice in confronting its opponents. And unlike other coalition failures in German history, the social-liberal coalition dissolved not because the two parties diverged, but because of dissent *within* the SPD itself.


Despite his high office, Schmidt lacked political aptitude. His honesty and candor functioned as political liabilities. The son of two teachers, he evaluated arguments on their academic merit, questioning credentials and interrogating evidence. He admonished friends and enemies alike based on their logical form. But Schmidt failed to account for democracy's fickleness; by his rationale, the politician who crafted the most cogent argument should win the electoral mandate. In a stunning paradox, Schmidt was a man of such high principles that he represented his party's Achilles heel.

Most importantly, Schmidt's failure and Kohl's success was in understanding that it is much easier to change what the party stood for than to change people's beliefs. Amid the public vacillating and controversy over German defense and security policy, Kohl proffered straightforward, no-nonsense solutions, sponsoring the double-track decision and the zero-zero formula. A December 1982 profile on Kohl in *The Economist* compared the two chancellors. "Unlike his predecessor, . . . the new chancellor does not spend hours poring over files. Mr. Kohl prefers to be briefed by colleagues and aides. For him . . . the conversation is what counts." Kohl's new counterparts in the EC quickly noted the differences between the two men when he attended his first EEC summit that December. "Had Mr. Schmidt still been chancellor, he would have shone in Copenhagen last weekend by delivering a brilliant lecture on the world economy—and would have irritated several

members of his audience in the process. Mr. Kohl, who is not given to lecturing . . . was content, as he put it, to discuss problems and to learn something.”¹¹³

Schmidt, on the other hand, argued carefully formulated, complex, seemingly contradictory solutions for his country’s foreign-policy challenges. He called for a nuanced defense policy that kept the relevant elements of *Wandel durch Annäherung* without compromising too much of Western strength. In essence, he agreed with the missile deployments but not in the accompanying ultimatum that threatened to derail ongoing East-West dialogues.¹¹⁴


Fig. 3.6. West German Attitudes toward Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, October 1982



Source: Noelle-Neumann und Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie*, 1978-1983, vol. 8, 246.

Still, he did not fully trust détente, calling it “a psychological smoke screen for obscuring the intentions of the Soviet Union and world communism to use all methods beneath the level of actual war for extending its power.”¹¹⁵ Schmidt’s view of détente envisioned dialogue as a means of mitigating the consequences of Cold War conflict but not as a means of treating the actual causes. Schmidt saw the unique challenges of German foreign policy and his country’s status as a “dangerous power.” Kohl, on the other hand, envisioned the zero option as a means of *overcoming* the nuclear threat in Europe. And Kohl was prepared to return to Adenauer’s *Wandel durch Kraft* approach to international politics and to redefine conservatism for his country—dangerous or not.¹¹⁶

Fig. 3.7. West German Attitudes toward Continuing Détente Policy, 1980



“Should the federal government continue the détente policy (*Entspannungspolitik*) toward the east as hitherto, or do you think it makes no sense to continue the détente policy?” Source: Noelle-Neumann und Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8, 637.

Kohl Takes Office

On 13 October 1982, Kohl ascended the rostrum of the Bundestag, delivering his first address as chancellor. He praised the Christian Democrats, thanked the Free Democrats, and attacked the Social Democrats. “The new government became necessary because the old one proved incapable” of confronting the country’s many challenges.¹¹⁷ “On urgent issues of home and foreign affairs, the SPD let their leader down,” he opined. Kohl had capitalized on the “successful anarchy” he created, vowing to chart a new course in Cold War politics.¹¹⁸

The chancellor’s own views on foreign policy puzzled commentators. “Abroad, of course, Kohl naturally is measured according to Schmidt—and not to his advantage,” observed *Der Spiegel*.¹¹⁹ Similarly, *The Economist* sneered at “Germany’s Kohl policy,” calling him an “amiable generalist.”¹²⁰ The London *Times* referred to the new chancellor as “the colorless man from the sticks.”¹²¹ Kohl lacked expertise in international politics and had to demonstrate that CDU/CSU foreign and defense policy constituted more than “the party of the missiles” [*Raketenpartei*].¹²² Thus, in foreign policy, Kohl promised an all-encompassing approach; he supported the double-track decision, pledged close relations with the EC, promised careful Bonn-Paris cooperation, and continued limited dialogue with the GDR and Soviet Union. Most importantly, he sought admission to Reagan, Thatcher, and Mitterrand’s club. Within his first eight weeks in office, he visited Washington, London, and Paris. He trumpeted the zero-zero formula and told Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov that he hoped to achieve such a peace.¹²³

In contrast to his predecessor, Kohl masterfully balanced the politics of showmanship. Jolly and genial, he often was caricatured for his heft [*e.g.*, “raumfüllend”] and his

“unrestrained paunch.” The new chancellor mastered self-effacing wit as he played for audiences, even mocking himself as “the antithesis of the Zeitgeist.”¹²⁴ Still, he understood and practiced Machiavellian politics. He capitalized on popular angst, labeling his SPD opponents a “security risk” for the country.¹²⁵ He warned that the party’s neutralism and wavering invited Soviet aggression.¹²⁶ Kohl’s steadfastness seemed to communicate conviction, while Schmidt’s had come to signal obstinance.

Schmidt, whom *The Economist* labeled “West Germany’s only statesman of rank,” returned to the Bundestag’s back benches representing the Hamburg constituency of Bergedorf.¹²⁷ “No longer at odds in the yea, but united in no” over the missile deployments, the official SPD position grew more extreme.¹²⁸ On 20 July 1983, Lafontaine called for total denuclearization of the country. His manifesto, *Angst vor dem Freunden: Die Atomwaffen-Strategie der Supermächte zerstört die Bündnisse* [Fear of One’s Friends: The Nuclear Weapon Strategy of the Superpowers is Destroying the Alliances], quickly sold forty-thousand copies.¹²⁹ He called for FRG withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command structures on the model of Gaullist France. He argued for “an alternative to the bloc system,” administered by the United Nations and a “collective security system in Europe in which a reunited Germany would be effectively embedded.”¹³⁰ To Lafontaine and his followers, NATO threatened West German security and sovereignty as much as the Warsaw Pact. At the November 1983 SPD congress, convening in Cologne, 96.5 percent of the delegates voted to oppose the missile deployments.¹³¹

Kohl’s ascent to office quelled neither debate over the missiles nor controversy over Germany’s politico-military alignment. The SPD, now without Schmidt’s moderating influence as chancellor, launched attacks on every front. Bahr, who functioned at Brandt’s

mouthpiece, touted opinions shared by Brandt, still allowing the party's chairman political maneuverability. In a November 1982 essay, Bahr called for a redefinition of the U.S.-FRG "security partnership." Three months later, he renewed international fears over the German question by hinting at West German neutrality. He reprised ideas from his 1963 *Wandel durch Annäherung* address, advising "overcoming Adenauer's *West-* and *Deutschlandpolitik* by a thoroughgoing distancing from the USA and an equally thoroughgoing rapprochement with the Soviet Union."¹³²

For two years, Kohl had campaigned against Schmidt, citing the Social Democrats' own divergence from Schmidt's positions. The irony of the Brandt-Bahr putsch within the SPD was not lost on the CDU/CSU. Party defense policy spokesman Manfred Wörner, in a June 1983 debate in the Bundestag, scoffed at Bahr. Why would the Social Democrats criticize the CDU/CSU for seeking policies that originated with an SPD chancellor? Two weeks later, Bahr and former Defense Minister Hans Apel, who also had abandoned the Schmidt position, presented an "alternative strategy" report to the SPD. Behind the usual boilerplate of "European peace order," they called for "replacing the strategy of nuclear deterrence," negotiating away the theater nuclear forces, and a "conventionalization" of West German security strategy.¹³³

Alas, they made no prescription for West Germany as part of NATO's defense strategy, presuming the continued U.S. defense of their country *without* nuclear forces.

The federal election of 6 March 1983 represented a clear mandate for Kohl and his CDU/CSU-FDP coalition to pursue the double-track decision.¹³⁴ "This election . . . is the most important in the history of our democracy," warned the FDP.¹³⁵ The majority won 55.8 percent of the seats in the Bundestag, while the Greens took 5.4 percent and the SPD

retained only 38.8 percent. Ironically, after the election, the left within the SPD agitated more vociferously against the Schmidt position, even ruminating on a possible Social Democrat-Green coalition.¹³⁶ The Greens, represented foremost by new Bundestag members Joschka Fischer and Gert Bastian, criticized the zero-zero option.¹³⁷

They argued that Reagan and Kohl sought to hoodwink unwitting publics in Western Europe. They would, according to the Greens, demand more than the Soviets could yield in the Geneva negotiations. When the Soviets inevitably refused to retreat, Reagan and Kohl would have achieved what they ultimately wanted all along: popular legitimacy for the euromissile deployments.¹³⁸

Fig. 3.8. West German Federal Election Results, 5 October 1980





Fig. 3.9. West German Federal Election Results, 6 March 1983



The West German Federal Election of 6 March 1983 firmly ensconced Kohl's CDU/CSU-FDP coalition as the dominant power in the Bundestag. Of the 520 seats in the Bundestag, a governing coalition needed 261 to form a majority. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition won a collective 290 seats.

In public discourse, commentators struggled to account for democracy's unpredictability. In the thirty-seven debates in the Bundestag between the announcement of NATO's double-track decision in December 1979 and the arrival of the missiles in November 1983, West German politics had been totally transformed. The country's most respected statesman, Helmut Schmidt, was forced out of office and relegated to political obscurity. The Christian Democrats wholly co-opted their opponents' foreign and security policy platforms.¹³⁹ Helmut Kohl entered the chancellery prepared to redefine the nature of West German conservatism and to adapt Adenauer's "change-through-strength" approach to Cold War politics in the 1980s.

Conservative Change through Strength

In his first annual address "on the state of the nation," Kohl boldly confronted Germany's division and the West's complacency toward unification. "Today we are returning once more to the true purpose of this address," he instructed. "It concerns

Germany. It concerns self-determination, human rights, the unity of our divided nation.”

Announcing an end to Brandt and Bahr’s *Wandel durch Annäherung* policy, the new chancellor declared: “We Germans do not accept the division of our Fatherland.”¹⁴⁰

Critics originally feared that Kohl’s foreign policy would constitute “a rolling back to the sixties”—to Hallstein’s nonrecognition doctrine and the Federal Republic’s reliance on NATO.¹⁴¹ Despite worries that Kohl might serve as another “chancellor of the allies,” Kohl proved them wrong. He called for West Germany to honor its commitments as a NATO ally, to cooperate with its EC partners, and, consequently, to seek unification of Germany on terms that respected individual rights, the rule of law, and pluralism. Like Adenauer, he placed his country’s commitment to the North Atlantic alliance at the heart of his foreign policy and as a precondition for all of West Germany’s international commitments.

Kohl focused on Germany’s centrality in Europe, both literally and figuratively. “The division of Germany is at the same time the division of Europe,” he explained. He described his country as “open to all influences over the centuries . . . and embedded in a larger European framework.” Thus, West Germans played a leading role in unequivocally seeking unification with their GDR countrymen—out of duty both to their common nation and to the European peace they had previously destroyed. “We need European unification, just as the peoples of Europe need the elimination of the division of Germany. Our neighbors, our allies, and our partners know that the settlement of the German question is also in their own interest,” explained the chancellor. “One of the foundations of the Federal Republic of Germany is the concept of European union. This goal remains unchanged.”¹⁴² Kohl believed that German unity and European unity existed synonymously and must be pursued in tandem. The obvious question would be how.

Kohl, who claimed to be Adenauer's "spiritual and political grandson," charged his government to effect the "change" promised by the FRG's first chancellor.¹⁴³ The West German conservative *Tendenzwende* ("turnaround") had transformed the country's intellectual and political life during the 1970s and early 1980s. In the wake of leftist surges after 1968, a "countermobilization" of the right began a redefinition of conservative values in the Federal Republic.¹⁴⁴ Conservatives embraced democratic and capitalist liberalism, defining their ideals in the language of a post-1945 rejection of traditional notions of the German right—centralism, oligarchy, militarism, and monopoly. With that reinvention came a difficult exploration of the relationship between German conservatism and the rise of National Socialism five decades prior. To tamper with Konrad Adenauer's articulation of West German conservative values was to return to the immediate postwar debates at Germany's 1945 "zero hour." Kohl openly confronted those debates.¹⁴⁵

Essentially, Kohl reopened the decades-old questions of guilt and remembrance following the atrocities of the Third Reich. He unabashedly employed the language of nationalism, arguing that "the feeling of belonging to one nation must be embedded in a feeling of belonging to Europe as a whole."¹⁴⁶

Kohl understood that his conservative party maintained a dangerous legacy of association with the National Socialists. The Social Democrats, especially Brandt, had begun to confront the politics of remembrance during the 1970s. In the 1980s, the Christian Democrats, led by Kohl, could follow suit. Reminiscent of National Socialist discourse of *das Volk* tracing its origins to time immemorial, Kohl explained that "the German nation existed before the national state, and it survived it."¹⁴⁷ The trauma of the missile deployments reached deeper than picket signs and legislative bedlam indicated; the (perceived)

nuclearization and militarization of Central Europe went to the heart of collective memory of the two world wars and to the ignored agonies of guilt, loss, and national division.

Culpability for the Second World War and the Holocaust provided a means to unite the divided nation. “Whoever acknowledges the heritage of our common German history cannot close his eyes to these [European] commitments. They, too, are elements of historical continuity,” explained the chancellor. “The experiences of our people in the horrors of the Second World War has made of us fervent supporters of a strict policy of the renunciation of force and of security [and] peace. Germans have learned the lessons of history.”¹⁴⁸

The two Germanys may have been united in their nationality and their culpability for war, but in the 1980s, they shared little else in common.¹⁴⁹ Kohl believed that Ostpolitik had been disingenuous and that the FRG had surrendered the moral high ground by engaging with the East while extracting no meaningful concessions.¹⁵⁰ “Our concept of the German nation is incompatible with the concept of Germany which the officials of the GDR continue to subscribe to,” explained the chancellor. “Normality cannot come about as long as there are the wall, barbed wire, firing orders, and harassment at the border that cuts through Germany.” Kohl sought to redefine the relationship between the two German states by injecting candor and pragmatism. Rapprochement proved meaningless if the West surrendered all of its strength—including its military interests and political ideals—to achieve détente. “Policy on Germany must be based on the real balance of power as it exists today,” Kohl told the Bundestag. “But reality covers not only the policies of governments and the strength of weapons but also . . . the historical source of the will [for unity] are keeping the German question open.” Kohl defended his limitations on détente. “Our policy

on Germany must therefore always be understood as a contribution to European unification and hence to European peace.”¹⁵¹

Kohl, like his predecessor, understood that the Federal Republic would benefit most from “thinking EC” *and* “thinking NATO,” allowing neither relationship to subjugate the other. In his first address after taking office, the new chancellor declared that “the alliance is the core of German national interest.”¹⁵² In the summer of 1983, he renewed his pledge: “To overcome the division of Germany, we need the backing of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The alliance and united Europe—we need them more than other people.”¹⁵³

Kohl, along with his opponents and many commentators, believed that Europe again was poised on the precipice of great war. Across the political spectrum, observers appropriated the rhetoric of world war to advance their positions. “Fatalism is spreading as it did before 1914,” remarked Rudolf Augstein.¹⁵⁴ END and other international peace organizations, in their exhortations against missile deployment, invoked the arms races and the reliance of militarism that preceded 1914 and 1939. Democracy could not fail as it had before. “Either democracy will destroy nuclear armaments, or nuclear weapons will destroy democracy,” warned former Dutch defense minister Hans von Mierlo.¹⁵⁵ Conversely, Kohl argued that the pro-neutralists were committing the same dangerous errors of the Nazis, charting their own independent, self-interested course for Germany. “Whoever considers it possible for Germany to steer a neutralistic course on its own . . . is ignoring the experience of history and has fallen victim to nationalist error.”¹⁵⁶

Across the political spectrum, and across the continent, the domestic political and intellectual turmoil signified Germany’s continued status as a “dangerous power.” Would

the Federal Republic, with its increasingly polarized partisan politics, remain a reliable alliance partner as it had since 1949? Would the tumult in West German politics, the collapse of the elite consensus, and the SPD's defection from NATO's defense strategy galvanize a redoubled Soviet effort to "Finlandize" Western Europe?

Dangerous Power: Finlandization

"The SPD's rejection of the *Nachrüstungsbeschluss* constitutes a fundamental change in foreign policy," warned CDU General Secretary Heiner Geißler. "It ultimately will lead the Federal Republic of Germany out of NATO and into a political no man's land."¹⁵⁷ Geißler and his Christian Democrats worried that their country's "western orientation" hung in the balance.¹⁵⁸ They saw themselves as a bulwark against capitulation, as the only political force between European freedom and the onslaught of Soviet domination. Even their SPD countrymen, either blind to the intentions of the Kremlin or too bewildered to effect a solution, rejected NATO's security strategies.

While many commentators in the early 1980s correctly identified the most *extreme* threat facing Europe—nuclear destruction—they neglected the most *probable* threat—severing of the transatlantic alliance and forced neutralization of West Germany. "Worst-case scenarios reign supreme," warned Schmidt. "We spend inordinate time and thought on the worst that can happen, which not only diverts our attention from the possibility of positive action but often turns our minds to extreme and unrealistic approaches."¹⁵⁹ Despite the fears of nuclear destruction—real and imagined—that gripped West Germany during the early 1980s, the more probable threat remained such a "Finlandization" of the FRG.¹⁶⁰

Der Spiegel mused at the irony: without fighting, NATO, by merely deploying weapons in its own territory, would have forced its own dissolution and neutralized Western Europe.¹⁶¹

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of peace activists, the euromissiles deployments offered little substantive change to the threat of Europe's nuclear destruction, which had remained relatively constant since the 1960s. The real peril was in the psychological pressure applied by Moscow to exert greater control over Western Europe—ultimately producing either a de jure or de facto neutral Germany. The Soviets were not hesitating to use military might to achieve political ends within their own orbit. Their forces had precipitously rolled across the border into Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979, and for eighteen months between 1981 and 1983, the communist régime in Poland ruled by martial law in an effort to crush Lech Wałęsa's "Solidarity" movement. The Soviets' newfound conventional and nuclear strength extended Moscow's influence beyond its former limits. The West was losing the arms race, and Kremlin leaders hoped the Americans would lose the battle for hearts and minds as well. Soviet military power in Europe, coupled with the Kremlin's "peace offensive," created a dangerous possibility for the West Germans. *Der Spiegel* projected Moscow's relations with the Federal Republic and the "loosening of ties to America" could cripple the West, culminating in "a possible Finlandization of Europe."¹⁶²

The possibility of a pax Sovietica had not been lost on Schmidt's cabinet. As early as 1975, Defense Minister Georg Leber reported that the Kremlin might exploit "internal political weaknesses in western democracies through the medium of subversive actions conducive to achieving its goals."¹⁶³ The chancellor himself even identified Soviet TNF as "weapons of political intimidation" targeting his nonnuclear country.¹⁶⁴ With those

observations of Moscow's military expansion, he cited the "neutralization" of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and worried about the political implications for the FRG.


After taking office, Kohl and his Christian Democrats continued the resistance. The political fallout over the euromissiles deployments demonstrated the paradoxes of Western democracy. Equality and pluralism in West Germany had proved unsuccessful in creating enlightened understanding of the country's foreign and defense policy. Rather than focus on the strategic implications of NATO and Warsaw Pact global balance of forces, popular discourse in Western Europe devolved into anxieties over the missiles themselves.

Public opinion in the United States proved capricious as well. Many Americans saw the preoccupation with Europe as outdated. "Europe is shrinking into a 'miserable affair,'" bemoaned American economist Ronald C. Nairn.¹⁶⁵ Nairn, whose scholarly work focused on economic development in southeast Asia, described his vision for the future of "the Old World": "A truly neutral Europe, a demilitarized buffer zone, between peaceful nations of the Soviet Union and the United States, could be really attractive for America." Similarly, leading neoconservative ideologue Irving Kristol argued that a "'chronic widespread Finlandization of Europe' would not necessarily be a disaster for the United States."¹⁶⁶ *Der Spiegel* noted Americans' "lukewarm attitude" toward European politics: "Many Americans are tired of Europe, and some consider even a 'Finlandization' of Europe to be acceptable."¹⁶⁷ U.S. trade with Pacific Rim countries was outpacing that with Europe, urging some to contemplate an economic decoupling to match the strategic decoupling.

Only a minority of defense intellectuals in Western Europe yet understood the implications of the 1960s retooling of American strategy toward Europe. If European publics discovered the fragility of U.S. commitment to the transatlantic allies, and with the

European crescendo of anti-American sentiment, similar vacillations among the Americans surely would break the alliance. The CDU's Alois Mertes saw the threat, speaking against "West Germany's internal turn away from America [and] the military and psychological dismantling of the credibility of the American guarantee."¹⁶⁸ One of the few in the Bundestag to understand clearly the hazards of the U.S.-German relationship within NATO, Mertes saw through much of the rhetoric and hyperbole that accompanied the public debates. Likewise, his colleague Manfred Wörner, future defense minister and NATO secretary general, understood the stakes. "Every wavering in the Western camp will encourage the Soviets," he warned. "The more determined and united NATO remains, the more successful will the negotiations with the Soviet Union be."¹⁶⁹

Fig. 3.10. West German Attitudes toward European Integration and German Unification, January 1979



"Which statement reflects what you think? (1) I have concerns about European union, as it is currently planned, among the western European countries. I am afraid that we will lose the chance of German reunification. (2) The reunification of Germany is impossible at the moment, but a European agreement is possible. So we should with all of our strength pursue a united Europe now." Source: Noelle-Neumann and Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8, 604.

Dangerous Power: A Nationalist Renaissance

To their neighbors, the seemingly unpredictable Germans remained dangerous. “Before, we feared German militarism,” remarked French presidential advisor Jacques Huntzinger. “Now we fear German pacifism.”¹⁷⁰ Pierre Lellouche, director of the French Institute of International Relations, remarked that “[t]he German question is back on the table.”¹⁷¹ Periodicals across Europe issued their own warnings. “The national consensus is broken,” wrote Italy’s *La Stampa*. France’s *le nouvel Observateur* similarly warned: “Behind the mass movement against the upgrade there is a new nationalist sentiment.”¹⁷² “A neutral zone in Central Europe would be a huge threat of war,” explained the French-German political scientist Alfred Grosser.¹⁷³ Jean Poperen, leading French Socialist, warned that a “chronic Finlandization is spreading from Germany,” leading him to question whether the FRG really could be counted as a reliable ally.¹⁷⁴

To observers across Europe, West German redefinition of Adenauer’s *Wandel durch Kraft* seemed also to signal a redefinition of Adenauer’s western orientation for the country. Furthermore, Brandt’s Ostpolitik had opened the door to redefining the FRG’s role in Europe and position between east and west. The collapse of the elite consensus, domestic upheaval over the euromissile deployments, and rebirth of the SPD provoked a new sense of German nationalism—a Gaullist gravitation toward independence of action against the U.S.-dominated North Atlantic alliance. Were the Kremlin to have proposed unification of the divided nation along a neutral basis, West German public opinion easily could have swung in that direction.

The French periodical *Le Matin* argued that Western Europe was suffering through the “first perverse consequences of the famous eastern policy.”¹⁷⁵ Brandt, Ostpolitik’s architect,

continued to call for a “europeanization of Europe.”¹⁷⁶ Kohl, on the other hand, condemned Brandt’s new eastern policy as an aberration in German diplomacy and the greatest betrayal of German values in the postwar era.¹⁷⁷

Leftist political circles in West Germany had completely abandoned their country’s most fundamental security precepts. Rather than seeing communism as the adversary and Western integration as their goal, they looked toward the two superpowers as the enemy and unification as their aim.¹⁷⁸ SPD parliamentarian Peter Glotz, for instance, argued that the first step in rescuing his East German countrymen from communism was to liberate his own country from NATO and the U.S. West Europeans “must stop imagining that, just behind the Berlin Wall, ‘The East’ begins—the east in the sense of the realm of the Huns—when Warsaw, Prague and Budapest are European cities, too,” he cautioned. “Only when the West Europeans gain greater independence vis-à-vis their American partner will there be a chance that East Europe can gain greater independence from the Soviet Union.”¹⁷⁹ By that logic, to strive for European integration meant to transcend ideology and, if necessary, scout a third way between the two blocs. Similarly, journalist Peter Bender, a close comrade of Brandt and Bahr, called for “an end of the ideological era” and for “the Europeanization of Europe.”¹⁸⁰ His book quickly became, in the words of one observer, “the bible of the peace movement.”¹⁸¹

On 21 December 1982, Yuri Andropov made an overt bid for domination of Western Europe. His ambassadorship in Hungary during the 1956 revolution and fifteen years as KGB chairman had distinguished him as both ruthless and calculating. Less than eight weeks into his new post, he offered a cunning concession to the Americans. Andropov proposed that the Warsaw Pact would reduce its six hundred SS-20s to only 162, matching the cumulative

number of French and British theater ballistic missiles.¹⁸² In effect, Andropov proposed a bribe to the Europeans to effect a U.S. retreat from the continent. If the Americans obliged, he would match only French and British weapons. By forcing such a decoupling, Andropov would secure West German neutralization outside of NATO's integrated military command *à la* independent France. Some pacifists in West German political circles welcomed such a proposal. Bahr, who long had espoused greater independence from the Americans and "europeanization" of security and defense policy, embraced the idea. Soviet official state news agency TASS praised Bahr as one of the only "realistically thinking politicians on the Rhine."¹⁸³ Andropov eagerly exploited the tensions between the West Germans and their NATO allies. While the French and British maintained sovereign nuclear deterrents, the Germans did not.¹⁸⁴ The Soviet offer highlighted that distinction between the allies.

Paradoxically, the West Germans, lacking nuclear sovereignty, actually drove international defense policy in Western Europe in late 1982 and early 1983. The SPD, having agitated against NATO missile deployments, demonstrated both the instability of the elite consensus and the popular discontent pro-NATO policy-makers faced. The Social Democrats' ouster of Schmidt and subsequent reversal of their security platform heightened the stakes for Soviet initiative and *invited* Andropov's December offer. The Kremlin, by demonstrating a willingness to cooperate with Brandt, Bahr, and their abettors, hoped to galvanize West German support around the SPD and to paint Kohl's government as provincial and indifferent to the cause of peace. By maintaining a cooperative relationship with the SPD, Kremlin leaders hoped to secure a veto over West German security policy and to fracture the Western alliance. In a twist of irony, the SPD became the tail that wagged the dog in 1983.

“The Europeanization of Europe”

The dominance of “thinking EC,” which characterized West European politics during the 1970s, was outpaced by “thinking NATO” in the early 1980s.¹⁸⁵ Those popular preoccupations with NATO, largely negative with riots and mass demonstrations against the alliance, temporarily stalled the European integration efforts that had gained such traction in the 1970s. Instead, talk of “Europeanization,” particularly popular among followers of Brandt and Bahr, represented a sort of Euro-Gaullism. As Kissinger noted a decade before, many in Europe had “come to believe that their identity should be measured by [their] distance from the United States.”¹⁸⁶ Such a europeanization under the auspices of the EC could provide a means of minimizing U.S. influence through NATO. The ensuing power vacuum again could lead to West European Finlandization.¹⁸⁷

Kohl urged West Germans to abandon such a bifurcated mentality. “The community of values and ideas must again emerge alongside the community of weapons,” he instructed. “It is decisive that the idea of a militant democracy remain the content of the Atlantic community and of the movement for European unity.”¹⁸⁸ Still, Brandt, Bahr, and their wing of the Social Democrats disagreed. Germans needed to embrace their own national identity, independent of international organizations, Bahr argued. Such surrogates—NATO and the EC—constituted mere apparitions (*Wesenloses, Abstraktes*).¹⁸⁹

Nightmare and Memory

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please . . . but under circumstances transmitted from the past,” warned Karl Marx. “The tradition of all dead

generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”¹⁹⁰ In Europe, and in the divided Germany, the agony of World War II hung like a shroud over the continent, tormenting the living with memories of carnage and death. By November 1983, when years of negotiations promised only illusory peace—like Munich forty-five years earlier—Europe again teetered precariously on the precipice of great war. For Kremlin leaders in particular, a militarization of Germany and a chancellor who spoke of unification proved especially unnerving. The new NATO missile deployments themselves posed little macro-strategic threat to the Warsaw Pact, but the dangerous “correlation of world forces” against communism, coupled with the welcomed fractures in Western European public opinion, offered a turning point to the Kremlin.¹⁹¹ Veterans of the Great Patriotic War dominated the Politburo; Andropov, Chernenko, Gromyko, and their comrades all had witnessed the humiliating tragedy of Hitler’s offensive in the summer of 1941. Four decades later, they feared an Operation Barbarossa of nuclear proportions.

As summer waned in 1983, the Soviets persisted in their peace offensive. The KGB understood that West Germany represented the definitive battleground for Europe. Since the spring of 1981, along with the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), the KGB had executed a top-secret joint intelligence operation codenamed “Nuclear Missile Attack” (RyAN).¹⁹² Brezhnev and then-KGB chief Andropov charged their intelligence assets to monitor and analyze any signals of preemptive NATO war against the Warsaw Pact. Spies across Western Europe monitored presumed indicators of NATO’s readiness for war, including prices of food and petrol, the numbers of diplomatic vehicles entering and exiting government facilities, and the number of windows that remained illuminated on Whitehall after nightfall.¹⁹³ “Wherever you may go [in West Germany] these days, you are sure to

meet endless columns of dark green trucks moving with head-lights on, tanks and rocket launchers, armed-to-the-teeth infantry and armoured personnel carriers,” observed the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*.¹⁹⁴ “Do not miss!” Andropov instructed his RyAN executors.¹⁹⁵ RyAN proved unparalleled in size and scope. Intelligence apparatuses throughout the eastern bloc, as well as KGB residencies around the world, fed data back to Moscow. The East German Main Reconnaissance Administration (HVA) reportedly collected eighty percent of all intelligence on NATO. Between 1983 and 1989, FRG counterintelligence documented more than 1,500 attempts by GDR spies to recruit West German military officers, seeking information on alert procedures, plans for mobilization, weapons, and manpower.¹⁹⁶

Meanwhile, General Secretary Andropov, battling renal failure, had remained confined to his sickbed in the Kremlin Hospital since February 1983. Even deprived of their most prolific spokesman, party speechwriters and public information officers carried on the peace campaign, painting the eastern bloc as victims of NATO’s militarism and nuclear provocation. The superiority of Moscow’s manipulation and propaganda schemes had eclipsed the work of the USIA in Western Europe, demonstrating the superiority of Soviet propaganda efforts.

That autumn, the Soviets lost the moral high-ground they had held for nearly four years. On the evening of September 1st, Korean Airlines (KAL) flight 007, en route from Anchorage to Seoul, strayed off course and penetrated Soviet airspace near Moneron Island. A commander at nearby Smirnykh airbase scrambled interceptors, assuming a U.S. reconnaissance flight had violated Soviet territory. After failed attempts to establish communication with the KAL flight, Lt. Col. Gennadi Osipovich received orders to fire his

missiles and destroy the target.¹⁹⁷ All 269 passengers aboard died. “What can we think of a régime that so broadly trumpets its vision of peace and global disarmament and yet so callously quickly commits a terrorist act?” Reagan decried.¹⁹⁸ The White House quickly capitalized on the incident to paint the Soviets as barbaric militarists. “The tradition in a civilized world has always been [to help] mariners and pilots who are lost or in distress,” advised the president. “[I]t’s essential that as civilized societies, we ask searching questions about the nature of régimes where such standards do not apply.” In its rhetoric, the administration seized on the incident, aiming to demonstrate a link between the airbase commander’s overzealous attack and a trigger-happy band of murderers in Moscow.

In the Kremlin (and its adjacent hospital), top leaders feared the America would use the KAL 007 incident as a pretext for war. Andropov called the incident a “sophisticated provocation, organized by the U.S. special services . . . using a South Korean airplane.” He denounced the Americans’ “extreme adventurism in policy,” arguing that, with the troubled peace further compromised, U.S. leaders were “now rubbing their hands in satisfaction.”¹⁹⁹

Six months before the KAL tragedy, Ronald Reagan had already stoked their fears when, in a speech before the National Association of Evangelicals, he condemned the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” Weeks afterward, he promised to match his trillion dollars in annual defense spending with a protective “shield” that would render Soviet offensive missiles obsolete. Addressing the nation from the Oval Office, the president unveiled his plans for a U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dismissed by his opponents as futuristic “star wars.”²⁰⁰ Top KGB officials, and Andropov in particular, obsessed over Reagan’s intentions. Though publicly they carried on with condemnation of the Pershings and GLCMs, behind the walls of

the Kremlin they wrangled with the unpredictability of the wily new American president who so boldly touted his contempt for communism and the Soviet superpower.

Amid the political and diplomatic traumas of 1983—Reagan’s “evil empire” rhetoric, the American SDI, the KAL tragedy, euromissiles deployments, and Operation RyAN, along with a terrorist suicide bombing of a U.S. Marine base in Beirut and an American invasion of Grenada in October—superpower mistrust reached dangers not experienced since the harrowing days of 1962. George F. Kennan, who had been present at the creation of the bipolar world, worried as he identified “familiar characteristics, the unfailing characteristics, of a march toward war—that and nothing else.”²⁰¹ RyAN intelligence, streaming in from assets across the globe, and especially in West Germany, heightened Moscow paranoia. “It was the deliberate policy of the [KGB] and the Party to make Soviet communities abroad feel as isolated as possible, and to inflate the threat supposedly presented by foreign security services,” remembered double agent Oleg Gordievsky. “[E]very small accident or setback—a flat tyre, a broken window—was interpreted as an attack or provocation by opposing forces.”²⁰² Andropov and his cadre of party bosses predicted that NATO intended to launch a first strike against the Warsaw Pact—disguised as war games.²⁰³

On 2 November 1983, leaders in Brussels, Whitehall, Washington, and across Europe descended into hardened nuclear bunkers, preparing for a simulated nuclear strike against the Warsaw Pact. The war game, codenamed *Able Archer 83*, simulated a release of nuclear weapons against targets in the eastern bloc. *Able Archer* envisaged an east-west diplomatic crisis that, across ten days, escalated Western defense readiness conditions (DEFCON) to nuclear retaliation against the Warsaw Pact.²⁰⁴

In the same week, the top Soviet political and military leadership likewise descended into their labyrinth of underground command, control, and communication (C³) suites, preparing for nuclear war with NATO. Hundreds of feet beneath Moscow, however, Kremlin officials saw the simulation as a ruse, believing conflict was imminent. Andropov, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, and Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov each traveled with nuclear briefcases in hand, prepared to launch Soviet nuclear weapons against NATO. Gordievsky, stationed at the time in London, later reported that the KGB Center despatched a flash telegram to its West European residencies warning that U.S. forces stationed in Europe were being mobilized and placed on heightened alert.²⁰⁵

Able Archer 83 concluded on the solemnity of Armistice Day, 11 November 1983. No warheads exploded and nuclear bunkers could remain sealed for another day. Although some historians have concluded that *Able Archer 83* brought the world the closest to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. leaders perhaps overestimated Soviet reactions to the simulation itself.²⁰⁶ “Had the United States come close to a nuclear crisis . . . and not even known it?” asked the CIA’s deputy director for intelligence Robert Gates.²⁰⁷ To the Kremlin leadership, memories of surprise attack on the dead weighed like nightmares on the brains of the living. Western leaders largely failed to understand those suspicions as the escalating danger of east-west relations across 1983 heightened tensions. Soviet manipulations of Western peace movements and bids for strategic superiority in Europe had failed, while a revived sense of German nationalism, albeit innocuous, had succeeded. SPD losses and pledges from Kohl “[t]o overcome the division of Germany” through a strengthened NATO and integrated EC threatened the constructed peace that had taken decades to build.

“Dangers of the World Situation”

In Stuttgart, on 19 June 1983, the EC heads of government came together to sign the Solemn Declaration on European Union. They pledged “to continue the work begun on the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome and to create a united Europe.” While the political and economic turmoil of the 1970s largely had catalyzed *economic* integration among the members, common defense and security challenges of the 1980s were galvanizing *political* integration of the EC. The signatories agreed that their commitment had become “more than ever necessary in order to meet the dangers of the world situation.”²⁰⁸

The declaration, “wish[ing] to affirm the *European* identity,” asserted that “by speaking with a single voice in foreign policy, including political aspects of security, Europe can contribute to the preservation of peace” in international affairs.²⁰⁹ Barely masking their frustrations with NATO as the only outlet for collective Western foreign policy, the signatories called for “coordinated foreign policy of the Ten” and pledged “to give the Ten greater weight as an interlocutor in the foreign policy field.”²¹⁰

The era of the euromissiles had proven devastating both for superpower relations and for transatlantic cooperation. “The outlook was hopelessly gloomy,” reported Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin. “Diplomacy became more than ever an exercise in public relations, and the American-Soviet dialogue an exercise in propaganda.”²¹¹ For the NATO allies, deploying the euromissiles had come at the price of the decades-old elite consensus.²¹² In Europe, international debates over the alliance’s future envisaged a transformed relationship between the Western European countries and their American

partner, with many commentators calling for Europe's emergence as its own third great-power bloc.

From 1974 until 1984, the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S. each executed foreign policies that failed to reconcile both European institutions and the North Atlantic alliance. The British governments of Wilson, Callaghan, and Thatcher, though politically dissimilar, each had managed EC deepening carefully, as a protection of their sovereignty and in defense of their commitments to NATO. Meanwhile, the French governments of Giscard and Mitterrand kept the republic in its precarious relationship with the alliance. Dating back to de Gaulle's presidency, French national interests necessitated closeness with the EC, even if the NATO relationship suffered.²¹³ In the U.S., leaders maintained their rhetorical support for European integration; EC efforts—limited and modest—did not threaten a substantive upset to U.S. interests in Western Europe.²¹⁴ But by the late 1970s, when “the Europeanization of Europe” threatened the focal point of the transatlantic relationship and the basis of the peaceful status quo, American hostility toward the EC grew.

Only in the Federal Republic of Germany did the governments of Schmidt and Kohl both manage productive relationships between the burgeoning EC and the embattled NATO. Like his predecessor, Kohl successfully “thought” *both* EC and NATO. Often in spite of public opinion, he committed his political capital toward alliance solidarity.

By the middle of the 1980s, however, the EC experienced transformations not seen since the days of Monnet and Schuman. The gulf widened between the United States and its European allies, not because of divergent points of view over NATO, but because of competing visions for European integration. In Europe, Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Kohl led governments that continued to balance the many pressures of deepening international

institutions—the EC, NATO, and the CSCE process. Those organizations continued to exert their own discreet pressures on domestic political processes and social discourse while the structures and order of international relations continued to transform.

In West Germany, for the first time in the postwar era, citizens had experienced a mass political awakening over matters of foreign affairs. In popular conscience and public discourse, West Germans began to link the technocratic realm of foreign and security policy with longstanding questions of domestic politics and national identity. In the process, tens of thousands took to the streets in protest—albeit sometimes misinformed—demonstrating their willingness to march in defense of their divided country’s interests within the evolving Europe and transatlantic community.

Chapter Three: Between Ideology and Pragmatism, 1979-1983

1. "Ninety-nine ministers of war / matches and petrol cans / They regarded themselves as clever people / Already they caught the scent of their fat prey / They shouted "war" and coveted power / Man, who would have thought / that someday it would come so far as this / because of ninety-nine red balloons?"

2. For a summary, see "INF Verhandlungen" (4 November 1983); and "INF-Stationierung" (4 November 1983); BA, B 136/30133.

3. For a contemporary summary of major peace actions, see "An outpouring of protest—peaceful and determined," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 7 (December 1983-January 1984): 10-12.

4. Volker Rühle, *Deutscher Bundestag, 9. Wahlperiode, 114. Sitzung* (16 September 1982), p. 7038; quoted in Jeffrey Herf, *War By Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 161.

5. See chapter two of this study.

6. Pieter Dankert, "U.S.-European Relations: Defence Policy and Euro-Missiles," lecture delivered at Harvard University, Center for International Affairs (1 November 1983), p. iii.

7. For discussion on this topic, see Leonid Brezhnev, quoted in telegram from UK Embassy, Moscow, to FCO (12 October 1979), "Brezhnev's Berlin Speech"; NA-UK, FCO 28/3694.

8. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963-1975," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 2, *Crisis and Détente*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 488.

9. On the push for conventionalizing NATO's defense posture, see chapter five of this study.

10. Despatch from John Killick to Anthony Crosland (10 September 1976), "Medium and Long-Term Problems for NATO"; NA-UK, FCO 82/670, covering summary, p. 1.

11. On Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshov, see Sergei Chernyavskii, "The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 2 (April 2005): 281-308; Ronald J. Kurth, "Gorshkov's Gambit," in *ibid.*: 251-80; and Robert Waring Herrick, *Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1988). Gorshkov's fame even earned him a profile in *Time* Magazine; see "Russia: Power Play on the Oceans," *Time* (23 February 1968).

12. "Brezhnev Proposals," UN Documents Section, FCO (16 October 1979); NA-UK, FCO, NATO Theatre Nuclear Force modernisation, series 28, folder 3694, p. 1. Access to ports and airfields in the third world further expedited global Soviet power. On the strategic posture, see the letter from Lorenz Knorr to Brandt (22 October 1979), "Fragen und Probleme des NATO-Doppelbeschluss"; AdSD, WB A11.1, Mappe 91.

13. On SS-20 figures, see *Weißbuch 1983: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: BPA, 1983), 72-81.

14. Final Communiqué, NATO Defence Planning Committee, Brussels (11-12 December 1979). Also see "U.S. Approach to INF Arms Control Negotiations," n.d.; RR-PL, Sven F. Kraemer Files, box 90103, Folder, NATO—Special Consultative Group (SCG), 11/20/1981.

Assuming equal financial outlays, the Warsaw Pact's combat strength surpassed that of NATO, in the estimation of West German Defense Minister Georg Leber, owing to the Kremlin's lower investment in manpower and nearly total standardization in defense procurement. See Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy," 222.

-
15. *Weißbuch 1983*, pp. 72-81.
 16. Herf, *War by Other Means*, 116.
 17. Dankert, "U.S.-European Relations," 7.
 18. *Ibid.*, 6. Emphasis added.
 19. *Ibid.*, 9.
 20. On elite consensus, see Sarah Kreps, "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no. 3 (2010): 191-215; and Kenneth Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (1998): 829-44. Steven K. Smith and Douglas A. Wertman attribute the breakdown of this elite consensus in the UK and the FRG to "the changed nature of East-West relations"; see their *U.S.-West European Relations during the Reagan Years: The Perspective of West European Publics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 2.
 21. Dankert, "U.S.-European Relations," v and 3.
 22. *Ibid.*, 8.
 23. Anatoli Gribkov (chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Unified Armed Forces), Analyse des Zustandes der Infrastruktur der NATO und die Notwendigkeit der weiteren Verbesserung der operativen Vorbereitung der Territorien der Länder des Warschauer Vertrages (1 December 1980), Geheime Verschlusssache; BA-MA, DVW 1/71038; also available online from PHP. See also Dmitri F. Ustinov (Soviet defense minister), Beitrag . . . auf der außerordentlichen Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages (20 October 1983), Vertrauliche Verschlusssache; BA-MA, DVW 1/71040; PHP. On NATO, see Ministerial Communiqué, Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, Brussels, (12 December 1979).
 24. Bonn saw recovery of the elite consensus of the "utmost importance." See "Stand und Perspektiven der West-Ost-Beziehungen" (8 November 1983); BA, B 136/30133.
 25. Wilhelm Bittorf, "Die Wiederkehr der Angst," *Der Spiegel* 25/1981 (15 June 1981), 28. During the INF dispute, Bittorf, an editor for *Der Spiegel*, became well known for his inflammatory attacks on NATO and the U.S. Bittorf often relied heavily on insinuation and facts later revealed to be false.
 26. Brandt similarly characterized the new strategic landscape as "a neurotic peace without security. See Brandt, "Ein neurotischer Friede ohne Sicherheit," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (19 January 1982).
 27. On *Wandel durch Annäherung*, see the introduction to this study.
 28. On Mertes, see Herf, *War by Other Means*, 129.
 29. See, e.g., Memorandum from Sven Kraemer to Robert Schweitzer, "Shaping European Attitudes" (12 June 1981); RR-PL, Sven F. Kraemer Files, box 90103, folder, NATO—European Attitudes. SecState to USNATO [and subsequent exchange], "HLG: Perle Press Backgrounder" (19 August 1981); RR-PL, Sven F. Kraemer Files, box 90103, folder, NATO—High Level Group, 9/1-2/1981.
 30. On "the nature of the Reagan administration" and the importance of "public relations," see Smith and Wertman, *U.S.-West European Relations during the Reagan Years*, 2-4. Within his first year in office, the administration half-heartedly sought to deepen U.S.-West European solidarity by altering its nuclear nomenclature. The administration abandoned "long-range theater nuclear forces" in favor of "intermediate-range forces" in reference to the cruise missiles and Pershing IIs. See Smith and Wertman, *U.S.-West European Relations during the Reagan Years*, 54.

-
31. Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Arrival in Berlin (11 June 1982), in *PPP: 1982*, vol. 1, p. 764.
32. *Idem.*, Remarks to the People of Foreign Nations on New Year's Day (1 January 1982), in *ibid.*
33. Schmidt, Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture (28 October 1977).
34. Ronald Reagan, Address Before the Bundestag in Bonn (9 June 1982), in *PPP: 1982*. U.S. officials had been making similar arguments for months in allied capitals. Director of Politico-Military Affairs Richard Burt, visiting Brussels in February 1982, even argued that the NATO deployments would yield long-term arms limitations, "considering the range of the Soviet systems threatening Europe." Brüssel NATO to Bonn AA (12 February 1982); BA, B 136/27064. Robert Jervis has identified such phenomena as "self-deterrence," instances in which a state is deterred by causes other than retaliation by others. See his "Deterrence, Rogue States, and the U.S. Policy," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). See also T. V. Paul, "Self-Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons and the Enduring Credibility Challenge," *International Journal* 17, no. 1 (March 2016): 20-40.
35. "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," National Security Decision Directive [hereafter NSDD] no. 77, 14 January 1983, secret; available online FAS, Intelligence Resource Program.
- The West Germans similarly began efforts to "make the NATO Double-Track decision understandable to the public," though they largely proved unsuccessful. See "Sicherheitspolitische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Bundesregierung" (8 November 1983); BA, B 136/30133.
36. Smith and Wertman, *U.S.-West European Relations during the Reagan Years*. Both Smith and Wertman served in USIA's Office of Research during the 1980s. Reagan advisor Richard Wirthlin spearheaded the effort to collect data on perceptions of the NATO's INF deployments. "West European Attitudes on Economic Issues: Breakdowns on Age, Size of Communes, Social Class and Sex" (April 1983); Hoover Institution Archives, Richard Wirthlin Papers, box 337.
37. The NSC reported to the International Communications Agency that the press exaggerated opposition to the deployments and that "[t]here is little popular support for the arguments that LRTNF increases the risk of war or that a nuclear war could be confined to Europe." Memorandum and accompanying research report from Richard V. Allen to Gilbert A. Robinson, "West European Attitudes on LRTNF" (4 September 1981); RR-PL, Sven F. Kraemer Files, box 90103, Folder, NATO—Shaping European Public Opinion.
38. The Green environmental platform proved compelling to many West Germans in the mid-1980s. In particular, the national Green movement grew organically from local movements. The Greens tailored many of their initiatives to local political interest. For instance, the Bavarian Greens gathered supporters by protesting against pollution in the Main and Danube Rivers, which ultimately translated into action on the national level. See Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 115, Peace Movement, die Grünen. See also Smith and Wertman, *U.S.-West European Relations during the Reagan Years*, 59.
39. Several years later, Manfred Wörner observed that "this political strategy of the Soviet Union has not been without some success." Manfred Wörner, "Bedrohung und Sicherheit heute" (14 July 1987); BA, B 136/27065.
- Shortly before his terminal hospitalization, Andropov told the Politburo of "diplomatic propaganda actions" to combat NATO missile deployments. "We must not lose time setting in motion all the levers that could impact the governments and parliaments of the NATO countries in order to create maximum obstruction on the path of deployment of American missiles in Europe," warned Andropov. "It is essential to smartly and precisely coordinate all of this, so diplomatic propaganda

actions must complement and reinforce each other.” Заседании Политбюро ЦК КПСС, Рабочая запись (4 August 1983), [top secret]; Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov Papers, container 26, reel 17, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division.

40. Leonid Zamiatin, quoted in Baer and Storm, report from Helsinki, *Allgemeiner Deutsche Nachrichtendienst* (18 December 1979), in Gerhard Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign Against NATO Euromissiles, 1979-1983,” *Cold War History* 9 no. 1 (2009), 90.

41. “Sowjetische Friedenskampagne in Europa,” *IPZ-Information*, no. K/9 (December 1982), 77; in Wettig, “The Last Offensive in the Cold War,” 90.

42. Rudolf van Hüllen, “Der Krefelder Appell,” in *Die verführte Friedensbewegung: der Einfluss des Ostens auf die Nachrüstungsdebatte*, ed. Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke (Munich: Olzog, 2001), 216-19.

43. Heinrich August Winkler, *Germany: The Long Road West*, vol. 2, 1933-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 340. Similar “appeals” emanated from all strata of German society. See, e.g., Abschlusserklärung des Kongresses “Mainzer Appell zur Verantwortung für den Frieden: Naturwissenschaftler warnen vor neuer Atomrüstung” (3 July 1983). A dissenting appeal came from the Christian-Democratic students’ group: Beschluss der 35. o. Bundesdelegiertenversammlung des RCDS [Ring Christlich-Demokratischer Studenten], 11-13 March 1983, Bonn. Both in Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 115, Peace Movement—General. Reagan’s NSC suspected and monitored such activities. See, e.g., Memorandum from Richard V. Allen to Richard Pipes, “World Peace Council ‘Program of Action’” (19 August 1981); in RR-PL, Sven F. Kraemer Files, box 90103, folder, NATO—anti-nuclear/Soviet fronts.

William Borm, highly ranked FDP member and twenty-two-year veteran of the Bundestag, authored twelve theses for West Germany’s security policies, which made the rounds in political circles. (Sicherheitspolitik: 12 Thesen von William Borm, n.d.; BA, B 136/14778.) Throughout his career and in his theses, he argued for reconciliation with the GDR, beyond the typical FDP line. In 1991, four years after Borm’s death, GDR intelligence files revealed that he had shared West German secrets with the Stasi since at least 1973. Peter-Ferdinand Koch and John O. Koehler have argued that many of Borm’s public statements and writings were prepared by the Stasi’s Main Intelligence Administration. (Koch, *Die fiendlichen Brüder* (Munich: Scherz, 1994); and Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), 189-90.)

On the Krefeld Appeal, see also Wolfgang Biermann, Vermerk an Peter Glotz, Bonn (3 November 1981), Betr.: Zweites Forum der Krefelder Initiative am 21. Nov. 1981 in Dortmund, Westfalenhalle; AdSD, WB, A11.4, Nr. 108.

44. Yuri Andropov conversation with Erich Honecker (4 May 1983), in Jochen Staadt, “Die Westarbeit der SED und ihre Wirkungen,” *Materialien der Entquete-Kommission Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozess der deutschen Einheit*, vol. 8, *Das geteilte Deutschland im geteilten Europa* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), p. 2267; quoted in Wettig, “The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War,” 88.

45. Russian State Archive of Most Recent History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii), fond 89, god 1979, perechen’ 31, 19-1, pp. 1-2: *O propagandistskikh meropriiatiakh v sviazi c dopol’nitel’nymi veonno-politicheskimi merami po ogranicheniiu gonki vooruzhenii v Evrope* (excerpt of Protocol No. 179 § 34gs of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat), 8 October 1979; quoted in Wettig “The Last Offensive in the Cold War,” 88. For another example, see the pamphlet “Disarmament: Who’s Against?” (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1983); CWIHP.

46. Leonid Brezhnev, quoted in telegram from UK Embassy, Moscow, to FCO, 12 October 1979, "Brezhnev's Berlin Speech"; NA-UK, FCO 28/3694, p. 1. Brezhnev condemned NATO's deployments as "a bid for nuclear supremacy in Europe."

47. Wettig, "The Last Offensive in the Cold War," 87.

48. Dankert, "U.S.-European Relations," 7 and 10.

49. Dieter Lutz, "Kommt der dritte Weltkrieg 1983?" *Vorwärts* 46 (16 November 1978), 16-17.

50. Rudolf Augstein, "Krieg in Sicht?" *Der Spiegel* 5/1980 (28 January 1980), 18; quoted in Herf, *War By Other Means*, 118. The language of "Armageddon" and "apocalypse" pervaded the peace movements in Europe. See, e.g., "The Scales of Disaster: Elegy for an Endangered Species," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 7 (December 1983-January 1984): 26-27.

51. Wolf Perdelwitz, *Wollen die Russen Krieg?* (Hamburg: Stern, 1980).

52. Many periodicals and circulars helped protesters to coordinate their efforts. *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* represented the most widely circulated. In Germany, *Friedensklärchen: Monatsblatt Bonner Friedensinitiativen*, proved influential in coordinating the 1983 "Ostermarsch Rheinland," as did the newsletters of the Junge Europäische Föderalisten, the Marxistische Gruppe, and many others. For examples see BA, B 136/27064; and the Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 115, Peace Movement—General. Religious organizations likewise facilitated peace movement activities, including the *EKD Bulletin* (Evangelical Church in Germany), and the newsletters of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Evangelische Schülerarbeit, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft christlicher Schüler, the Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst für den Frieden (Bonn), the Arbeitskreis kirchlicher Mitarbeiter (Wolfsburg), and many others. Many of the student and youth groups produced independent pamphlets as well.

See Brandt's personal correspondence pertaining to the NATO dual-track decision and youth protests in AdsD, WB, A11.2, Mappe 112.

53. U.S. Department of State cable, Schmidt and Genscher prepare for visit of Haig, 10 September 1981, confidential; U.S. Department of State cable, Haig summary of West Berlin dinner meeting with Schmidt, 16 September 1981, secret; summary of discussion between Rostow and Schmidt, cable, U.S. Department of State (14 October 1981), confidential; summary of meeting between Schmidt and Mitterrand, cable, U.S. Department of State (23 October 1981), confidential; DDRS.

54. Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons (18 November 1981), in *PPP: 1981*.

55. Besuch von US-Präsident Reagan und NATO-Gipfel, Demonstrationsgeschehen, Fakten und Bewertung, 16 June 1982; Besuch von US-Präsident Reagan und NATO-Gipfel (24 May 1982); US-Medienberichterstattung über Reagan-Besuch/NATO-Gipfel vom 9.-11. Juni/Demonstrationen; BA, B 136/14778.

56. See, e.g., E. P. Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War* (London: Merlin Press, 1982).

57. Günter Gaus, quoted in Herf, *War By Other Means*, 138.

58. Rudolf Augstein, "Raketen zu Lande ausgesprochen bedenklich," *Der Spiegel* 21/1981 (25 May 1981), 30-32.

59. Some scholars warned that "subjective feelings, fears, and hopes" had warped realistic thinking about security policy in the Federal Republic. Instead, the most important political questions of the day were being overtaken by "scaremongering" and "trivializing" as too many commentators

sought “cheap applause.” See, e.g., Wolf Graf von Baudissin, “Strategische Stabilität—Voraussetzung der Friedenspolitik,” in *Briefdienst des Arbeitskreis Sicherung des Friedens e.V.* (July 1981); BA, B 136/27064.

60. The intellectual debate over the euromissiles even figured as a prologue to the *Historikerstreit* in West Germany that raged between 1986 and 1989.

61. Geißler proved both outspoken and forward-thinking in most of his interactions. See, e.g., “Geißler: Menschenrechte sind unteilbar,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung* no. 26 (1 February 1978); AdsD, 1/WBA-SI00020.

62. Joschka Fischer, quoted in Herf, *War By Other Means*, 190.

63. European Nuclear Disarmament, spokesman pamphlet 72 (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1981), 13.

64. *Ibid.*, 7. A similar expression on the “miniaturization of atomic combat weapons” is reflected in Wolfgang Biermann, Bonn (1 April 1982), Neufassung des Beitrages “Positionen der SPD zur Friedenspolitik und zum Verhaeltnis von SPD und Friedensbewegung”; AdsD, WB, A11.4, Nr. 109.

65. *Ibid.*, 12. Lawrence S. Wittner has called END “the very heart and soul of the massive European antinuclear campaign.” See his *The Struggle Against the Bomb*, vol. 3 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 234.

66. Such a sentiment was well expressed in Wolfgang Biermann, Vermerk an Peter Glotz, Bonn (23 November 1981), Betr.: Zweites Forum der Krefelder Initiative am 21. Nov. 1981 in Dortmund, Westfalenhalle; AdsD, WB, A11.4, Nr. 108.

67. Wilhem Bittorf, “Euroschima, mon futur,” *Der Spiegel* 35/1981 (9 February 1981), 111. To the protesters’ point, the U.S. continued to deploy a number of outdated and dangerous systems in Europe, including nuclear land mines, both because their scheduled withdrawal dates had been postponed and because they could artificially raise the reported totals on American nuclear weapons for leverage in arms-control negotiations with the Soviets. Thomas J. Hirschfeld, “Reducing Short-Range Nuclear Systems in Europe: An Opportunity for Stability in the Eighties,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 469 (September 1983), 88.

68. Erhard Eppler, *Die tödliche Utopie der Sicherheit* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1983).

69. “A nuclear war could be limited to Europe!” warned the new West German Green Party. “Schlachtfeld Europa?” [1983 election pamphlet]; Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 115, Peace Movement, die Grünen. In evaluating defense and security strategies for Western Europe, Reagan administration documents, contrasting a maritime approach versus a continental approach, reference the risk of establishing a “nuclear tripwire,” still noting that nuclear weapons could “not substitute for conventional shortfalls.” Memo on defense strategies [untitled, n.d.], Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.

See also Wolfgang Biermann, Bonn (1 April 1982), Neufassung des Beitrages “Positionen der SPD zur Friedenspolitik und zum Verhaeltnis von SPD und Friedensbewegung”; AdsD, WB, A11.4, Nr. 109.

70. Lord Mountbatten, quoted in END, spokesman pamphlet 72, 8.

71. James R. Schlesinger, Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: A Report to the United States Congress, 2 May 1975, p. 10; released via FOIA, available online at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/237.pdf.

72. *Ibid.*, 1.

73. *Ibid.*, 13. See also William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 66-71. In 1982, SIPRI offered a grim assessment: "Nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons are highly integrated, and Soviet strategic literature does not emphasize the selective use of nuclear weapons and the limitation of collateral damage as NATO declaratory strategy does. Generally, the logic of Soviet military doctrine seems coherent. NATO doctrine, however, is based on premises which have been heavily criticized for lack of consistency and credibility. *SIPRI Yearbook 1982: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1982), 26.

74. Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington (12 September 1963), *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 8, p. 499.

75. Richard Nixon, quoted in Trachtenberg, "The Structure of Great Power Politics," 491. Trachtenberg provides careful analysis of Nixon-era policies toward the tactical nuclear weapons.

Soviet war-fighting doctrine called for swift offensive attacks into western Europe, thus bringing the conflict "as far toward the West as possible." With the mobile Pershing IIs and GLCMs, some projected that Warsaw Pact troops either would reach the deployment positions before NATO escalatory doctrine called for the tactical weapons to be fired. In most NATO simulations, 8-inch howitzers and 155-mm shells are fired first. *SIPRI Yearbook 1982*, p. 28.

76. Richard Nixon, Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy (25 February 1971), in *PPP: 1971*.

77. Presidential Directive/NSC-59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy" (25 July 1980), top secret; JC-PL, Records of the White House Office of Counsel to the President.

78. Trachtenberg, "The Structure of Great Power Politics," 491.

79. Lothar Rühl, "Soviet Policy and the Domestic Politics of Western Europe," in *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, ed. Richard Pipes (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), 94. For an internal CDU discussion of this dimension of transatlantic security strategy, see "Erklärung" (15 June 1979); ACDP 07-001, Karton 1916.

80. European Nuclear Disarmament, spokesman pamphlet 72, 12.

81. Alfred Grosser, "Diese Krise ist die schwerste," *Der Spiegel*, 43/1981 (19 October 1981), pp. 34-35.

82. Herf, *War By Other Means*, 150.

83. Willy Brandt, "SPD: Partei für Europa, Rede vom 18. November 1983," in *Auf der Zinne der Partei: Parteitagsreden 1960 bis 1983*, ed. Werner Krause and Wolfgang Gröf (Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz, 1984), 344. See *ibid.*, 205.

84. Anton-Andreas Guha, "Thesen zur Kritik der Sicherheitspolitik und des Brüsseler Beschlusses," in Hans Apel, *et al.*, *Sicherheitspolitik contra Frieden*, 19; quoted in Herf, *War By Other Means*, 133.

85. This attitude became tremendously popular for the rest of the 1980s. See, *e.g.*, "The Crossroads of a Campaign," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 6 (October-November 1983), 2. "More and more people have come to realize that the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe have no quarrel with each other and that the division of our continent is artificially imposed by the military apparatus of the superpowers."

86. European Nuclear Disarmament, spokesman pamphlet 72, 2. Emphasis added. See also Peter Glotz, "Prospects for European Security Policy" (26 August 1987); BA, B 136/27065.

-
87. Rühl, "Soviet Policy and the Domestic Politics of Western Europe," 94.
88. END, spokesman pamphlet 72, 2.
89. Rühl, "Soviet Policy and the Domestic Politics of Western Europe," 94. For inter-Warsaw Pact assessments of NATO capabilities, see Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991* (New York: Central European University Press, 2005).
90. END, spokesman pamphlet 72, 9 and 1.
91. *Ibid.*, 3.
92. Jon Nordheimer, "First U.S. Missiles Arrive by Plane at a British Base," *New York Times* (15 November 1983), p. A1; and James M. Markham, "First U.S. Pershing Missiles Delivered in West Germany," *New York Times* (24 November 1983), p. A14. The Italian case provides a fascinating example of transnational peace activism, most notably with protesters traveling from London to Sicily for a hunger strike and protests. In solidarity with Bonn protesters, they cloistered themselves in a Comiso monastery on a hunger strike, until Italian President Sandro Pertini agreed to meet with them—which he did on 25 November 1982. Diary of Ben Thompson (for November 1982), courtesy B. Thompson via Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington.
93. "Limbering Up for 1984," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 6 (October-November 1983), 13-14.
94. Apel privately had confessed to William Rodgers, British shadow defense minister, that he believed the alliance "would stand or fall" over the TNF deployments. See memorandum from Oliver Wright to Sir Frank Cooper (19 September 1979); NA-UK, FCO 28/3694, p. 1.
95. Quotations from E. P. Thompson, "Protest and Survive" (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation), 6.
96. Margaret Thatcher addressed the *deterrent* purposes of NATO's missiles candidly with the Soviet ambassador to the Court of St. James. Letter from Michael Alexander to George G. H. Walden (15 October 1979), "Soviet Ambassador's Call"; NA-UK, FCO 28/3694.
97. Although the Americans announced the range of the Pershing II at 1,600 kilometers, the Soviets incorrectly projected the range at 2,500. See Aleksandr' G. Savel'yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union*, trans. Dmitriy Trenin, ed. Gregory Varhall (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 57-58. From their West German deployment positions in Schwäbisch-Gmünd, Neu Ulm, and Neckarsulm, the Pershings would not have reached Moscow. *SIPRI Yearbook 1982*, p. 27.
98. Brandt privately recognized the utility of the former, noting in a private letter to Weizsäcker that "internally, we must do everything possible to come to negotiations." See letter from Brandt to Weizsäcker (29 November 1979); AdsD, WB, A11.1, Mappe 97.
99. "Das Schiff verläßt den Lotsen," *Der Spiegel* 46/1983 (14 November 1983), 26.
100. See, e.g., Helmut Kohl, "Koalition der Mitte: Für eine Politik der Erneuerung: Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl vor dem Deutschen Bundestag" (13 October 1982); in Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 61, FRG Election 1983—CDU—General.
101. In a letter to the chancellor, Alois Mertes accused Schmidt, his party, and their staffs of "irresponsibly" misrepresenting both parties' positions on nuclear deterrence strategy, "apparently

to indulge domestic political polemics and in disregard of our loyal consensus." Letter from Alois Mertes to Helmut Schmidt (8 December 1981); BA, B 136/14778.

102. Jeffrey Herf offers a compelling portrait of Schmidt as he was "outmaneuvered" within the SPD. See, e.g., Herf, *War By Other Means*, 45 and 143. See also Hans Klein, ed., *Die Bundeskanzler* (Berlin: Edition Q, 1993).

103. See, e.g., Genscher's letter to the FDP leadership, warning that the country was "at a crossroads." Brief von Hans-Dietrich Genscher an die Mitglieder den Führungsgremien und an die Mandatsträger der Freien Demokratischen Partei (20 August 1981); AdL, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit, Gummersbach.

104. Christian Democrat Volker Rühle later identified this episode as a turning point among his Social-Democratic opponents, as they unleashed their "failed INF policy against the alliance." Volker Rühle, "Bündnisunfähig und Entspannungsunfähig: Die SPD-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik ist zum Scheitern verurteilt" (6 August 1986); BA, B 136/27067.

105. For an example of one such plan, see Jonathan Steele, "A Nuclear Free Zone in Central Europe: Reviving the Rapacki Plan," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 1 (December 1982-January 1983), [included as an unpaginated insert].

106. MemCon, Carrington and Genscher (31 October 1979), "TNF Modernisation"; NA-UK, FCO, NATO Theatre Nuclear Force modernisation, series 28, folder 3695.

107. British analysts in the Bonn embassy believed that the Soviets singled out Genscher "for special attack" in hopes of fracturing the coalition. Letter from H. N. H. Synnott to F. J. Goulden (9 November 1979), "FRG Defence Policy: Recent Developments arising from Public Debate"; NA-UK, FCO, NATO Theatre Nuclear Force modernisation, series 28, folder 3696, p. 2.

108. Genscher, quoted in "Wenn nur die FDP nicht wieder reinkommt," *Der Spiegel* 38/1982 (20 September 1982), 18. The official campaign literature from the FDP also cited continuity of the party's foreign-policy goals. See, e.g., "Sicherheit für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (August 1982); and "Ohne die FDP können Sie diese Bundesregierung vergessen"; both in the Hoover Institution Archive, German Subject Collection, box 63, West German Election—1983—FDP.

109. Jürgen Leinemann, "Es wird mit Laserstrahlen operiert," *Der Spiegel* 38/1982 (20 September 1982), 28.

110. Genscher, quoted in Herf, *War By Other Means*, 162. The CDU likewise declared that "a policy of equal distance between Washington and Moscow" would never be considered by their party. Große Anfrage der CDU/CSU-Fraktion zu den "Aufgaben, Problemen und Perspektiven des Atlantischen Bündnisses" (25 May 1982), p. 3; BA, B 136/14778.

111. "Into Kohlpolitik," *The Economist*, no. 7256 (25 September 1982), 13.

112. Among the Green Party's early publications, see the "Friedensmanifest," which consolidated the multifaceted positions of the new party; in the Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 63, West German Election—1983—Greens.

The British likewise endured a splintering on the left, with a centrist Social Democratic Party splitting from the Labour Party in the spring of 1981. The departure of many centrists from Labour allowed the party to adopt more anti-nuclear positions.

113. "Just a Touch of Adenauer," *The Economist*, no. 7267 (11 December 1982), 50.

114. "Auf dieser Regierung liegt kein Segen," *Der Spiegel* 40/1982 (4 October 1982).

115. Helmut Schmidt, *Defense or Retaliation* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 113. On Schmidt's views, see also Herf, *War By Other Means*, ch. 4; and Helmut Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*.

116. Meanwhile, the SPD published in their platform that "there is no alternative to the continuation and deepening of the policy of détente." Resolution Adopted by the SPD Party Conference on Peace and Security, Cologne (19 November 1983); Tyrus W. Cobb, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.

117. Helmut Kohl, "Koalition der Mitte: Für eine Politik der Erneuerung," *BPI* 93 (14 October 1982), 853.

118. Rudolf Augstein, "Gelungene Anarchie," *Der Spiegel* 40/1982 (4 October 1982).

119. "Auf dieser Regierung liegt kein Segen," *ibid.*, 19.

120. "Into Kohlpolitik," 13; and "Just a Touch of Adenauer," 50.

121. Patricia Clough, "On Trial: The Colourless Man from the Sticks," *The Times* [London] (27 September 1982), p. 6.

122. "Auf dieser Regierung liegt kein Segen," 19.

123. "Harte und klare Aussprache in Moskau, Vage Drohungen Andropows mit Gegenmassnahmen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (6 July 1983), 1-2; see Herf, *War By Other Means*, 193.

124. Jürgen Leinemann, "Ein bißchen Adenauer und viel Wachturm," *Der Spiegel* 40/1982 (4 October 1982), 26.

125. Additionally, the Christian Democrats also worked to link the established SPD with the most radical Greens. The CDU, for instance, published statements on "the foreign policy of . . . the red-green track," in "Argumente für eine Politik der aktiven Friedenssicherung" [1983], pp. 12-15; Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 61, FRG Election 1983—CDU—General.

Such assessments continued well into Kohl government. In May 1984, senior advisor Horst Teltschik identified the Social Democrats "anti-American to the core" and committed to "permanently weakening NATO." Memorandum from Teltschik to Kohl (28 May 1984), Beschlüsse des SPD-Parteitages zur "Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik" vom 19. Mai 1984; BA, B 136/27064.

126. "Kohl sieht die SPD auf dem 'gefährlichen Weg der Isolation,'" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (24 January 1983), 4; see Herf, *War By Other Means*, 171.

127. "Into Kohlpolitik," 13.

128. "Das Schiff verläßt den Lotsen," 26.

129. Oskar Lafontaine, *Angst vor dem Freunden: Die Atomwaffen-Strategie der Supermächte zerstört die Bündnisse* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983).

130. *Ibid.*, 105.

131. The American NSC staff monitored the SPD position with worry, particularly the SPD's apparent sympathy for the Soviet negotiating position: "The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have moved a certain way along the right path pursuant to the proposals made by Andropov and pursuant to the Prague Declaration. The USA and NATO must now also move towards their negotiating partners." An SPD working group tasked with identifying "new strategies" likewise advised the party's executive committee that "security is only attainable—in this age of weapons of mass destruction and mutually assured destruction—with the potential enemy and not against him." Resolution

Adopted by the SPD Party Conference on Peace and Security, and report submitted to the SPD executive committee by the working group, Cologne, 19 November 1983; RR-PL, Tyrus W. Cobb, box 91096, European Defense Issues.

132. Egon Bahr, "Neokonservatismus und Sicherheitspolitik: Sicherheitspartnerschaft," *Die Neue Gesellschaft* (November 1982): 1041-54.

133. *Idem.*, "Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 'Neue Strategien,' beim SPD-Parteivorstand vom Juli 1983," in Hans Günter Brauch, ed., *Sicherheitspolitik am Ende? eine Bestandsaufnahme, Perspektiven und neue Ansätze* (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1984), 275-90.

134. The new government continued to assert the necessity of the double-track decision. See Hans-Georg Wieck, "Herausforderungen in Europa: Zwischen Rüstungskontrolle und Abschreckung — Ist die NATO-Doppelstrategie noch realistisch" (October 1983); BA, B 136/30133.

135. "Freiheit braucht Mut: Deutschland braucht die Liberalen" (1983); in Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 63, West German Election—1983—FDP.

136. "What has the last half year brought in Geneva?" asked Eppler. "Literally nothing!" *Die Linke in der SPD* (18 March 1982); BA, B 136/14778.

137. "Die Grünen in den Bundestag," 1983; in Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 115, Peace Movement, die Grünen. Bastian served more than three decades in the Bundeswehr, retiring in 1980 at the rank of major general. His subsequent opposition to NATO's INF deployments earned a great deal of attention, which the budding Green Party exploited in their rhetoric. See his "Notwendige Anmerkungen zum NATO-Doppelbeschluß in der Darstellung der Bundesregierung" (June 1981); in the Hoover Institution Archive, German Subject Collection, box 63, West German Election—1983—Greens. Bastian also helped to found the organization "Generals for Peace and Disarmament." See Memorandum der Gruppe Generale für Frieden und Abrüstung unterbreitet der 2. UN-Sondertagung für Abrüstung (11 May 1982); BA, B 136/14778.

Klaus Jürgen Citron, a member of the FRG delegation in Geneva and later head of policy planning in the Foreign Office, noted that, since the introduction of the zero option, Geneva negotiations improved but the peace movement picked escalated its rhetoric. Memorandum from Citron, Bonn, 30 December 1981, "Überlegungen zur sicherheitspolitischen Öffentlichkeitsarbeit"; BA, B 136/27064.

138. "The Hoax of Geneva," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 7 (December 1983-January 1984), [included as an unpaginated insert]. Herf also discusses in *War By Other Means*, ch. 10. Weizsäcker privately confessed a similar fear to Brandt, noting the difference between "American soil" and "densely-populated Europe." See letter from Weizsäcker to Brandt (15 November 1979); AdsD, WB, A11.1, Mappe 97.

139. NATO, the CDU argued, represented "the answer" to securing their country's independence and freedom. See Hans-Georg Wieck, "Deutschland und das Nordatlantische Bündnis" (September 1983); BA, B 136/30133.

140. Helmut Kohl, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany, Bonn (23 June 1983), in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, p. 1365. Even the CDU's official campaign literature boldly called for "peace in Germany and Europe." See "Argumente für eine Politik der aktiven Friedenssicherung" [1983], pp. 12-15; Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 61, FRG Election 1983—CDU—General.

141. "Auf dieser Regierung liegt kein Segen," 17-18.

142. Kohl, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany, Bonn (23 June 1983); quotations on pp. 1365 and 1373.

143. "Just a Touch of Adenauer," 50.

144. Herf's study represents the best monograph on the Federal Republic's *Tendenzwende* in any language. See his *War By Other Means*, 7ff. William Outhwaite has addressed the *Tendenzwende* from a theoretical perspective. See his *Critical Theory and Contemporary Europe* (New York: Continuum, 2012).

145. Reagan's NSC staff noted Kohl's confrontation of the Nazi past. "Chancellor Kohl speaks for both peers and young Germans in insisting that the sins of Nazi fathers can no longer be visited upon their sons, even if some fault him for occasional bluntness in saying so." Memo on FRG: The Successor Generation Security Agenda, Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues; RR-PL.

146. Kohl, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany, Bonn (23 June 1983); quotation on p. 1373.

147. *Ibid.*, 1365.

148. *Ibid.*, 1372. See also, Helmut Kohl, "Europa und die deutsche Frage," *Lutherische Monatshefte* 20, no. 5 (May 1981): 261-263; ACDP.

149. Of course, the GDR régime rejected the notion of its own war guilt, ceding the infamous distinction of Nazi successor state to the Federal Republic of Germany. See Herf, *Divided Memory*.

150. Officially, the CDU's line on Ostpolitik argued that "with its policy on Germany, the SPD/FDP coalition has raised expectations and hopes which were unjustified (*ungerechtfertigt*) among the German people." See "Deutschlandpolitik" (2 February 1976); ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1913.

151. Kohl, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany, pp. 1368 and 1365.

152. Helmut Kohl, "Koalition der Mitte: Für eine Politik der Erneuerung: Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl vor dem Deutschen Bundestag" (13 October 1982); in Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 61, FRG Election 1983—CDU—General. Also available in *Deutscher Bundestag*, 9. Wahlperiode, 121. Sitzung (13 October 1982), p. 7220.

153. *Idem.*, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany, Bonn (23 June 1983); quotation on p. 1365.

154. Rudolf Augstein, "Krieg in Sicht?" 18.

155. Hans von Mierlo, quoted in Mient Jan Faber, "We have challenges faith in nuclear deterrence. But has that won us the argument for disarmament?" *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 6 (October-November 1983), 14-15.

156. The SPD "was afraid of Europe," noted the CDU. See "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und das europäische Einigungswerk," n.d.; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1911.

157. Heiner Geißler, quoted in "Wo ist der Deutschen Vaterland?" *Der Spiegel* 48/1983 (28 November 1983), 17-21.

158. Kohl most notably expressed that idea in an address to the Bundestag on 21 November 1983. See "Rede vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zum NATO-Doppelbeschluß," *Verhandlungen des*

Deutschen Bundestages. Stenogr. Berichte, vol. 126, *Plenarprotokoll 10/35*, pp. 2321-2332; courtesy of ACDP.

159. Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West*, 151.

160. "Mit Strauß und Brandt zur Einheit," *Der Spiegel* 37/1984 (10 September 1984), 28-29.

161. "Schießplatz der Supermächte," *Der Spiegel* 29/1981 (13 July 1981), 106-121. An internal memorandum within the West German Defense Ministry drew a similar conclusion. See K.-Peter Stratmann, "Aspekte der sicherheitspolitischen und militärstrategischen Entwicklung in den 90er Jahren" (May 1986); BA, B 136/27064.

162. "Wo ist der Deutschen Vaterland?" pp. 18-19.

163. *Weißbuch 1975/1976*, p. 22.

164. Helmut Schmidt, quoted in Herf, *War By Other Means*, 55.

165. "USA—Abwendung von Europa?" *Der Spiegel* 1/1982 (4 January 1982), 57-59.

166. Irving Kristol, quoted in *ibid.* See his "Does NATO Exist?" *Washington Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (Autumn 1979): 45-53.

167. *Ibid.*

168. Alois Mertes, "Hans Joachim Vogel kapituliert von Egon Bahr: Zur Gefahr eines National-Neutralismus," *Deutschland Union Dienst* (11 February 1983), p. 3; Herf, *War By Other Means*, 195.

169. Manfred Wörner, *Deutscher Bundestag, 8. Wahlperiode, 194. Sitzung* (14 December 1979), p. 15471.

170. Jacques Huntzinger, quoted in "Wo ist der Deutschen Vaterland?" 19.

171. Pierre Lellouche, quoted in *ibid.*

172. *Ibid.*

173. Alfred Grosser, quoted in *ibid.*

174. "'Respekt für ein solches Verhalten?' Der französische Soziologe André Gorz über die Deutschland-Kritik der französischen Linken zu Polen," *Der Spiegel* 4/1982 (25 May 1982): 34-41; quotation on p. 35.

175. *Ibid.*

176. Willy Brandt, quoted in *Deutscher Bundestag, 10. Wahlperiode, 36. Sitzung* (22 November 1983), p. 2509.

177. See Kohl, *Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatismus*, 111.

178. See, e.g., Wolfgang Müller, "Delicate Compromise Between State and Grassroots: The Difficult Task of the East German Churches," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 1 (December 1982-January 1983): 12-14. In 1982, the Evangelical churches in both the FRG and GDR cooperated to coincide their "peace week" activities, protesting the NATO INF deployments.

179. Peter Glotz, "Prospects for European Security Policy" (26 August 1987); BA, B 136/27065. Hans-Georg Wieck, West Germany's representative to NATO, soberly assessed such a scheme, calling the Soviet Union the "source of our danger." See Hans-Georg Wieck, "Deutschland und das Nordatlantische Bündnis" (September 1983); BA, B 136/30133.

180. Peter Bender, *Das Ende der Ideologischen Zeitalters: die Europäisierung Europas* (Berlin: Severin und Siedler, 1981). Herf provides a short profile on Bender; see *War By Other Means*, 122ff.

181. William D. Zuckerman, "The Germans: What's the Question," *International Affairs* 61, no. 3 (Summer 1985), 467.

182. On numbers of deployed missiles, see *Weißbuch* 1983, pp. 72-73. As much as a year earlier, the NSC staff had expressed concern about "the long-standing Soviet effort dividing Europe from the U.S." Robert Schweitzer to Sven Kraemer, "SCG: Opening Remarks" (20 July 1981); RR-PL, Sven F. Kraemer Files, box 90103, Folder, NATO SCG, 8/3/1981.

183. Quoted in Herf, *War By Other Means*, 167.

184. Brezhnev had begun the belligerent approach against the British, French, and West Germans as early as 1979. He specifically identified the "American nuclear missile weapons" as the single threat to peaceful relations between the USSR and Western Europe. See letter from Brezhnev to Thatcher (14 October 1979); NA-UK, FCO 28/3694. Subsequent discussion among NATO representatives revealed that Brezhnev had despatched similar letters to Giscard and Schmidt.

185. On "thinking EC" and "thinking NATO," see chapter two of this study.

186. Henry Kissinger quoted in James O. Goldsborough, "France, the European Crisis, and the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 3 (April 1974): 538-555; quotation on p. 543.

187. The SPD's security platform asserted that "There is no evidence of a community of values (*Wertegemeinschaft*) with the USA!" The CDU argued the opposite, noting that "we have common beliefs and therefore there only can be common security with the partners in NATO." See "Voraussetzungen sozialdemokratischer Sicherheitspolitik," n.d.; and Wortlaut der Pressekonferenz zur SPD-Sicherheitspolitik am 6. August 1986 im Konrad-Adenauer-Haus (13 August 1986); BA, B 136/27067.

188. Kohl, *Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatismus*, 105-114.

189. Egon Bahr, *Was wird aus den Deutschen? Fragen und Antworten* (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1982), 11.

190. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 595.

191. Benjamin B. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare" (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997). Fischer authored two separate works on the events of 1983. The aforementioned text provides an unclassified assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations in the early 1980s. Separately, he authored a classified (secret) study: "Threat Perception, Scare Tactic, or False Alarm? The 1983 War Scare in U.S.-Soviet Relations," *Studies in Intelligence*, n.d. [c. 1996, date redacted]; available through CIA FOIA. While the former offers sweeping assessments about the 1983 tensions within the context of the "Second Cold War," the latter offers a focused study of intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union, the reliability of U.S. and British assets, and Washington's antagonism toward the Kremlin through a series of PSYOP exercises in 1983.

192. Internal KGB reports confirm the 1981 initiation of RyAN. Отчет о работе Комитет государственной безопасности СССР за 1981 год, 10 April 1982; and Отчет о работе Комитет государственной безопасности СССР за 1981 год, 15 March 1983; National Security Archive, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov Papers. The full collection of Volkogonov's papers are available in the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division.

193. Sir Charles Powell (foreign-policy advisor to Margaret Thatcher), interview in *1983: The Brink of Apocalypse*, (London: Channel 4, 2008), documentary.

194. A. Grigoryants, "A Khaki White Book," *Izvestia* (12 September 1979), in NA-UK, FCO 28/3694.

195. Oleg Kalugin (KGB general), quoted in *1983: The Brink of Apocalypse*.

196. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum." Did Soviet leaders truly believe war was imminent in 1983? Historians have struggled to separate rhetoric from reality. Although not explicitly taking a position, a June 1984 CIA memorandum noted the "disturbing" behavior of Soviet armed forces. "From the operational deployment of submarines to the termination of harvest support to the delayed troop rotation there is a central theme of not being strategically vulnerable, even if it means taking some risks." Memorandum from William J. Casey, "US/Soviet Tension" (19 June 1984). CIA Director Casey drew most of his information from a May 1984 Special National Intelligence Assessment, "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities," 18 May 1984 (top secret); both documents courtesy National Security Archive, available online at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB428.

197. The upper echelons of Soviet military and intelligence officers had already worried about the Moneron Island and Kamchatka Peninsula's vulnerabilities. U.S. psychological warfare operations (PSYOPs) had successfully revealed the weakness of Soviet surveillance and early-warning systems in the spring of 1983. "[The Soviets] are as naked as a jaybird there, and they know it," the U.S. chief of naval operations testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. See Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum."

198. Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Reporters on the Soviet Attack on a Korean Civilian Airliner (2 September 1983), in *PPP: 1983*.

199. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum." Notably, the END called KAL "victim[s] of the war games" between the superpowers. According to END, unbeknownst the passengers aboard KAL, they traversed "an arc of maniac superpower confrontation, a gigantic chain of military bases, nuclear missile test sites, early warning stations and centres of airborne espionage." See "Korean Air-Liner: Victim of the War Games," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament* 6 (October-November 1983), 2. Even seven years later, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev remained convinced that the KAL incident was laced with conspiracy. "Now I'm sure that the KAL 007 purposefully changed its route and flew over Soviet airspace," he told interviewer Don Oberdorfer. (Interview with Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (10 January 1990), p. 6; Seely G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Don Oberdorfer Papers, series 1, Soviet interviews, 1990

200. The many critics to SDI—foreign and domestic—produced a vast literature opposing the president's initiative. One of the most thorough stocks of those materials are the Lorelei Kelly collection at the Hoover Institution Archives, box 1.

201. George F. Kennan, quoted in Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum."

202. Oleg Gordievsky, *Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 260.

203. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger later told interviewer Don Oberdorfer "that it is sometimes quite difficult to tell the difference between an exercise and the beginning—the raising of indicators that we watch all the time every day, every hour." Interview with Caspar Weinberger, 18 October 1989; Seely G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Don Oberdorfer Papers, series 3, research documents files.

204. Most of the literature on *Able Archer 83* has been driven by Gordievsky's recollections and documents he subsequently published (with Christopher Andrew). Christopher M. Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990); *idem.*, eds., *Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991); and *idem.*, eds., *More "Instructions from the Centre": Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985* (London: F. Cass, 1992).

Gordievsky has emphasized RyAN and its apparent culmination during the first week of November 1983. Other sources indicate, however, that the preoccupation with *Able Archer 83* may simply be a fascination of the English-language scholarship.

In an unpublished 1990 interview with Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, however, he told Don Oberdorfer that he did not recall *Able Archer 83* offhand, but "We believed that the most dangerous military exercises [were] *Autumn Forge* and *Reforger*." In fact, *Autumn Forge 83* was the longer umbrella exercise of which *Able Archer* represented the culmination. Nineteen thousand troops deployed to Europe for *Autumn Forge 83*. (*Reforger 83/Crested Cap 83/Display Determination 83/Autumn Forge 83 After Action Report*, 8 December 1983 (confidential), in *History of Military Airlift Command: 1 January - 31 December 1983: Supporting Documents*, vol. ix (confidential); courtesy National Security Archive.) "I considered that the United States [was] pressing for world supremacy, that the Soviet Union was the barrier in these aspirations first of all," he told Oberdorfer. "There [could] be a war between the Soviet Union and the United States." (Interview with Akhromeyev, pp. 7 and 11.)

All told, the 1983 war exercises involved forty thousand U.S., Canadian, British, Dutch, and West German personnel. [Exercise *Autumn Forge 83*—Final After Action Report (1 February 1984), in *437 Airlift Wing, Charleston AFB, S.C.: History, 1 January-31 March 1984*, vol. 2, *Supporting Documents* (for official use only); courtesy National Security Archive.]

205. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum," 35. Aside from Gordievsky's mention of the telegram from Moscow, its existence has not otherwise been corroborated in published sources. U.S. assessments of Gordievsky's reliability remain classified; however, after 150 debriefings by British intelligence services and checking six thousand pages of notes, UK analysts uncovered no substantive inconsistencies.

206. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 227-28. Vojtech Mastny identifies 1983 as "the climax of the 'second Cold War.'" See his "How Able was 'Able Archer'? Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2009), 109.

Specifically, the U.S. National Security Agency's classified internal history noted that "the period 1982-1984 marked the most dangerous Soviet-American confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis." Thomas R. Johnson, *American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989*, book 6, *Cryptologic Rebirth, 1981-1989* (Washington: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 1999), 264.

While many of the sources relevant to *Able Archer 83* remain classified, scholars have worked aggressively to bring the exercise into their interpretations of the Cold War. Mark Kramer warns against such overreaching, calling the relevant scholarship "an echo chamber of inadequate research and misguided analysis." Mark Kramer, "The Able Archer 83 Non-Crisis: Did Soviet Leaders Really Fear an Imminent Nuclear Attack in 1983," quoted in "The 1983 War Scare: 'The Last Paroxysm' of the Cold War." pt. 1, ed. Nate Jones; available online at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426.

207. Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 273.

208. Solemn Declaration on European Union, European Council, Stuttgart (19 June 1983), in *BEC* 6 (1983), 24.

209. *Ibid.*, 24-25. Emphasis added.

210. *Ibid.*, 28.

211. Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962-1986* (New York: Random House, 1995), 478.

212. "Stand und Perspektiven der West-Ost-Beziehungen" (8 November 1983); BA, B 136/30133.

213. Kohl often referenced Franco-German cooperation as essential for European integration. See, e.g., "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Kohl: Europa und Europäische Integration" (25 November 1982), *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenogr. Berichte*, vol. 123, *Plenarprotokoll 9/130*, pp. 8007f; ACDP.

214. Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 4. As Lundestad has argued, "In the American perspective, the integrated Europe was always to be fitted into a wider Atlantic framework. Through this Atlantic framework, the United States would presumably be able to protect its leading role within the Western world, although this could not be *guaranteed* once a supranational Europe had been established. Perhaps we could call this policy hegemony, or even 'empire' by integration."

Chapter Four

Europeanizing the Divided Continent 1983-1987

Ideas are born as sparks fly upwards. They die from their own weakness; they are whirled away by the wind; they are lost in the smoke; they vanish in the darkness of the night. . . . [But] among the innumerable sparks that flash and fade away, there no and again gleams one that lights up not only the immediate scene, but the whole world.

—The Rt. Hon. Sir Winston S. Churchill
on European integration, 1953

Genius of the Present

Helmut Kohl proved to be one of the great Europeans of rare incandescence—the chancellor of German unification; alongside Jean Monnet, the only “Honorary Citizen of Europe”; praised by two successive U.S. presidents as “the greatest European leader” since the war.¹ Brandt had been all flash with little substance, and Schmidt had been all substance with little flash. Kohl possessed both—a genuinely patriotic everyman who ultimately ended German division, redrew the map of Europe, and unified the continent. Like so many postwar efforts to end the Cold War and unite Germany, glimmers of hope were always snuffed out as “the ruck of old feuds and ghastly revenges” made German division all but permanent. Kohl managed to overcome them all.²

Kohl has been called a “genius of the present” by supporters and detractors alike. On the one hand, he excelled at politics; he navigated the perils of Bundestag politicking as well as any West German parliamentarian and continued Schmidt’s record for efficient chancellory operation. On the other hand, he eschewed long-range thinking; he lacked the

skills of a strategist but proved to be a brilliant tactician.³ Unlike all of his predecessors, Kohl never wrote any “programmatic” texts outlining his vision for Germany’s future, nor did he arrive to the chancellory with a coherent foreign-policy platform. “Kohl does not stand for a particular policy, nor for a concept, a specific program, a worldview (*Weltanschauung*) or philosophical credo, a vision,” explained his biographer Karl Hugo Pruys. Simply put, “he is a pragmatist.”⁴

In the wake of the INF dispute, pragmatism is what Europe needed. Kohl came to office during a nadir in transatlantic relations; Americans and Europeans had irredeemably damaged their reciprocal trust during the period, and matters of foreign policy, traditionally held sacrosanct, entered the partisan political fracas. But by a combination of deft tactical maneuvering and diplomatic goodwill, Kohl led the way toward improved relations with Washington and simultaneously managed to initiate an era of good feelings among his European counterparts. More importantly, after all the hardships of the INF dispute, Kohl’s leadership within the EC allowed for a more emancipated Europe, borne not out of resentment toward the United States but from a desire to meet the Americans as coequal partners in pursuing economic prosperity and military security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.⁵ By his leadership, Kohl managed to redeem a particularly contentious period in transatlantic relations and to continue to assert Germany’s position in Europe, namely by shaping international institutions according to Bonn’s own designs. Despite partisan impulses to the contrary, he continued the equilibrium strategy of his predecessors—to pursue security for Germany by military balance at the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic levels and by east-west détente. To that end, though his Christian Democratic Union had long opposed Ostpolitik (at least officially), beginning in 1983 and continuing through 1990, Kohl

maintained the Social Democrats' diplomacy with the east in an effort to overcome the Yalta-Potsdam régime. "The Europe of today," according to one analyst, "is a product of [Kohl's] vision and action more than any other."⁶

Helmut Josef Michael Kohl had been born in April of 1930, the youngest child of Hans and Cäcilie Kohl. Hans Kohl, a middle-level civil servant, had come from particularly humble origins—one of thirteen in a farming family in Lower Franconia. When a fire destroyed the farm, the suddenly penniless family scattered, and Hans, aged only fourteen, was taken in by a miller and his wife. Like many of his generation, Hans lost his youth to the First World War, having served as a first lieutenant the Bavarian forces. In 1918, at age thirty-one, he began his career as a finance clerk and married three years later.⁷ Kohl's mother, Cäcilie Elisabeth Schnur, had come from a more comfortable background. The daughter of a teacher, she enjoyed a middle-class life, was well educated, and attended boarding school for several years. Like her husband, she was a devout and practicing Roman Catholic, though she spurned ideological Catholicism and impressed upon her children the need for tolerance.⁸ The home in which she and Hans raised their family, at Hohenzollernstraße 89 in the Ludwigshafen suburb or Friesenheim, had passed to Cäcilie from her father and grandfather. Despite the privations during the war years, Cäcilie Kohl governed her household with care and managed to provide meat at least twice per week with fish always on Fridays. Across his public life, Kohl frequently pointed to his parents as archetypes of German character. "The feeling of nationalism in my home was without any missionary zeal or even sectarianism," he remembered. "My parents felt a bond for the country they were born in; they identified themselves with its interests without denying 'the others.' They kept

historical dates in their heads, were proud of Germany's cultural achievements; they loved their homeland, its customs and traditions, its language."⁹ And across his life, Kohl embodied that same genuine patriotism, largely anathema to postwar German culture, always with an aim to reconcile the German question with European interests.

In the estimation of his schoolmasters, young Helmut was bright, optimistic, and mischievous. At the end of the school-day, he went about his household chores, namely caring for the garden and the menagerie of animals he kept, including his twenty Viennese rabbits, peacocks, a tamed fox, and a raven. A carefree childhood ended at age fourteen, during Christmas 1944, when the family learned that Helmut's older brother Walter had been killed at the front. "Daily life became different," he recalled. "It was darker, more painful, more constricting."¹⁰ Across the five remaining months of war, Kohl continued his service in the youth fire brigade. He and his schoolmates traveled to Berchtesgaden, where they began training as *Flakhelfer*—the children who defended the Reich against allied aircraft. As American forces closed in around them in April, Kohl and his friends fled toward home, still in their Hitler-Jugend winter uniforms. Near Augsburg, they were attacked by a group of Polish forced laborers and later spent three weeks in American custody working on a farm. After weeks crossing the devastated German landscape, in June, Kohl finally returned to Ludwigshafen. The seat of chemical giant IG Farben—the manufacturer with the monopoly on the Nazis' Zyklon B—the city had been devastated in a series of fifty-six air-raids.¹¹ Amid the devastation of his hometown, Kohl put to work on a farm in Düllstadt owned by the firm Süddeutscher Zucker AG, where he earned a small wage and received regular meals. When his old school reopened as the Max-Planck-Gymnasium, he gladly resumed the childhood that had been interrupted by the war.

By his own estimation, Kohl had been spared by “the mercy of a late birth” (*Gnade der späten Geburt*). Even in the dark days of postwar destruction and privation, he entered university, the first in his family to do so.¹² Each morning, he boarded the train to Frankfurt am Main, where he studied law, and in 1951, he matriculated to the University of Heidelberg, where he read in history and political science under constitutional theorist Dolf Sternberger. Working part-time at BASF (the chemical conglomerate that replaced IG Farben), he continued his studies and wrote his doctoral thesis on postwar democratic parties in the Palatinate. On his Lambretta scooter, he commuted between his classes, his work as a stone-polisher, and CDU party meetings.¹³

Neither of the working class nor of the bourgeoisie, Kohl and his friends formed the ambitious milieu of the upwardly mobile—enterprising men of the lower-middle classes, thrifty and resourceful survivors of Nazism and war, ultimately tasked with West German recovery.¹⁴ Coming of age in the era of Adenauer, the young partisan seemed a bit radical; Kohl hoped that German Christian Democracy might become a diverse movement with broad popular appeal and, in the assessment of one commentator, reach “beyond its base of aging [Weimar] dignitaries.”¹⁵ Nonetheless, young Kohl idolized his party’s leader, the august Adenauer, hoping one day to succeed him as chancellor and as a beloved father of the nation. By his commitment and his work ethic, Kohl quickly rose through the ranks of party and government leadership. In 1966, he became chairman of the CDU parliamentary group in Mainz, and during his service as minister-president of Rhineland-Palatinate, in 1973, he took over as federal chairman of the CDU.

Despite his meteoric rise, Kohl remained always a Pfälzer at heart. Located just a hundred kilometers from the French border, his hometown of Ludwigshafen had been

shaped by the many diverse peoples who milled about the region—not least the last contingent of French occupiers who had departed just months after his birth. A city whose inhabitants saw their peace and prosperity tied to that of their neighbors, where the hum of industry required everyone to work together and the mainstay of the economy—BASF—linked the shop floor to every quarter of the world, Ludwigshafen seemed a genuinely European city. As a young man, Kohl had witnessed the Economic Miracle firsthand, watching the large commercial barges make their way up and down the river, linking his country's factories and farms to Europe and to the world. Growing up in Germany's industrial heartland, Kohl had developed a keen sense of his German identity as tied inextricably with Europe, and his upbringing had impressed upon him the traditional values of the liberal and tolerant Rhineland, "satisfied with itself and the world."¹⁶ Even his election placards urged voters to cast ballots for "Der Pfälzer." Kohl touted his western roots as anti-Prussian, for Kohl's views of the German nation were informed more by Charlemagne than by Bismarck. "My nearer Heimat is not Germany but the Palatinate," Kohl wrote. "And my fatherland is Germany. Unmistakably, I am German, if you like, even a thoroughly typical German." He remained, in the estimation of one historian, the embodiment of "inoffensive normality."¹⁷

Kohl's arrival to the chancellory in 1982 thus marked a definitive culture shift within federal politics. He had been only two years old when Hitler came to power and therefore was Germany's first postwar chancellor with no living memory of Weimar and its collapse. Whether by his coming of age during the postwar recovery, his Palatine outlook, or his characteristic optimism, unlike his predecessors, Kohl saw Germany as less encumbered by

its violent past. Frequent references to “the Fatherland,” the *Volk*, “patriotism” (*Heimatliebe*), and “sense of duty” (*Pflichtgefühl*) to the nation—language reminiscent of the Nazi era and altogether unconventional for a postwar politician—peppered his speeches, often shocking his colleagues in government. Indeed, critics accused him of inculcating an “internalized obedience” to the state.¹⁸ Kohl unabashedly spoke in power-political terms, and he exercised his authority unapologetically. “We have the curious habit in Germany of defaming power,” he later reflected. “Power in itself is neither good nor bad. The question is how you use power. You cannot perform a political job of any kind without exerting power.”¹⁹ Kohl offered a nationalist vision in which the Germans’ love of their own Fatherland urged them not to resist multilateralism and international collaboration but to embrace Europe and the Atlantic alliance all the more. The Federal Republic of Germany had been “designed in opposition to national isolation,” he argued; he enjoined his countrymen: German patriotism should produce “cosmopolitan openness” (*Weltoffenheit*).²⁰

Contradicting many norms of West German politics, Kohl likewise spoke often and unrepentantly of national unification. For decades, West German leaders had eschewed reunification talk for fear of raising unrealistic hopes among their people or provoking anxiety among their allies. In his first address to the Bundestag as chancellor, however, Kohl addressed the national question directly. Our goal, he explained, is “to work toward a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regain their unity in free self-determination.” Quoting the August 1970 “Letter on German Unity,” the new chancellor pledged his “unequivocal” commitment to unification. “Thoughts are free, and people must be able to go from Germany to Germany without the danger of death (*Todesgefahr*).”²¹ Critics at home and observers abroad immediately feared that the chancellor’s attitude

presaged a return to chauvinist German nationalism. After all, in their decade out of power, the Union parties had shown skepticism toward international institutions, multilateral networks, and the east-west détente. Might an inward focus on German unity produce a backlash against European institutions? Might the CDU, more partial to economic neoliberalism, seek to reverse some of Schmidt's progress in the European economic sphere?²² But Kohl took precisely the opposite tack; "the feeling of belonging to one nation must be embedded in a feeling of belonging to Europe as a whole," he argued.²³ By maintaining continuity in Bonn's policies toward European unity and by accepting the limitations on West German sovereignty—through the EC, NATO, and the international nuclear weapons régime—Kohl helped to shape Europe's multilateral networks according to his own designs and Germany's national interests.

As the peacemaker in the wake of the INF dispute, as the Americans' most trusted ally on the continent, as Europe's most prolific spokesman, and as the pivotal voice in Bonn's foreign policy, Kohl had been thrust into the limelight as the decisive factor in European and transatlantic politics. "This was," according to *Der Spiegel*, "the hour of the German chancellor."²⁴ And like his predecessors, Kohl used that popularity to strengthen European institutions. "I say it again: we all need Europe," he told the European Parliament. "The nation-state ideas of the nineteenth century will never take us across the threshold to the twenty-first century."²⁵ The questions of Germany's eventual unification, he believed, of Europe's deepened union, and of NATO's endurance were all bound together, and they ultimately represented his dream for solving the German problem. "Nowhere is the cruel nature of Europe's division more vivid than at the border in the midst of Germany," he said.²⁶ He embraced the sentiment expressed during his childhood by Paul Claudel, the

French diplomat and poet: “Germany does exist not to divide peoples but to make the different nations surrounding it realize that they cannot live without one another.”²⁷ The key to overcoming Yalta and Potsdam was to strengthen European institutions and to make German peace and prosperity indispensable to that of Germany’s neighbors, west and east. Like Adenauer, the hero of his youth, Kohl believed that the EC should represent more than simply a marketplace or solution to some economic crisis; integration was Europe’s destiny, and unity could forever solve the German problem.²⁸ And like Adenauer, Kohl believed that his divided country one day would unify. But that unification would count for nothing with the mechanisms of Yalta and Potsdam still in place and with Germany torn between the superpowers. His country had been anchored firmly in the west, but the institutions of European and transatlantic cooperation needed to be strengthened even more: that would be essential to Kohl’s diplomatic ambitions in the years to come.

The Chancellor and His Circle

Kohl prided himself on providing, as Adenauer had, “spiritual leadership” (*geistige Führung*) to the German people—in west and east. The Social Democrats, he believed—and Schmidt in particular—had preoccupied the nation with the technocratic details of their policies, but Kohl aimed to turn popular attention toward the enduring “moral and political questions” of German nationhood.²⁹ Whereas Schmidt had been seen as a specialist and manager, Kohl styled himself a generalist and visionary. Schmidt had often convened long meetings around the conference table; Kohl on the other hand summoned staffers to his office only to give them their orders. His cabinet did not meet regularly, and when ministers did convene, they often adjourned in less than an hour.³⁰ The chancellor’s staff found Kohl to

be a demanding boss with a critical eye. "It was exhausting because you had to work day and night for him," remembered one aide. "Sometimes I had to tell him I can't just shake my hand and the solution . . . is ready. It really was the toughest time in my life."³¹

Kohl's political style was more that of a retailer than of a wholesaler. In private, he proved to be a sharp conversationalist, albeit sometimes domineering. At six feet and four inches tall and weighing some 320 pounds, the chancellor often could not help but to overshadow a room. In his public addresses, however, he often seemed inarticulate. While folksy and charming in person, Kohl spoke with a thick provincial accent reminiscent of the Palatinate he loved so dearly. Frequent verbal gaffes earned the chancellor much ridicule. "What fascinates me with Kohl's television appearances," remarked Franz-Josef Strauß, "is that they give the impression that anyone could be chancellor."³² But Kohl remained altogether unapologetic about his foibles and idiosyncrasies. To him, the political and the personal were one in the same. Unlike his predecessor, who sat for long hours at his desk with his collar buttoned and coat on, Kohl arrived to his office, exchanged his coat for a knitted cardigan and slipped off his Oxfords in favor of bedroom shoes. The thrifty Pfälzer proved thoroughly uninterested in the trappings of political life; glamorous parties and wealthy socialites failed to impress him.³³ Whether out of genial wit or sardonic revenge, he decorated his office with framed magazine covers and headlines that had inaccurately projected his defeat at various points in his career.³⁴ "Kohl, it seems, is not a big intellectual, but he enjoys a certain popularity in his country, especially among the petit-bourgeois public," assessed Mikhail Gorbachev.³⁵ And despite his eccentricities, West Germans (and ultimately East Germans) embraced their chancellor, lavishing him with affection and an unprecedented sixteen years in office. Treating his countrymen with "the solidarity and

warmth of his extended family,” explained one commentator, “he cultivated the image of a good, typical German doing his duty.”³⁶

Kohl showed little deference to traditional hierarchies, both in managing the party and in leading the government. Once in the chancellory, he surrounded himself with loyalists, including associates from his days as minister-president in Mainz, and appointed more ministers from outside of the Bundestag than had all of his predecessors combined. Leading the chancellor’s staff, long-time aide Wolfgang Schäuble served as head of the chancellory (*Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes*) and remained one of Kohl’s closest confidants. Unlike his boss, Schäuble enjoyed a particular gift for negotiating, building consensus, and finding seemingly impossible compromises. He had been the political genius behind the party’s coalition agreement with the CSU and the Liberals in 1982 and in the years that followed, often settled political problems before the chancellor ever learned of their existence. Kohl trusted Schäuble instinctively and had tapped him as his natural successor within the party. In Kohl’s so-called “Kitchen Cabinet” (*Küchenkabinett*) of closest advisors were his long-time personal assistant Juliane Weber, public-relations man Eduard Ackermann, and foreign-policy advisor Horst Teltschik. The group, sometimes with the addition of Schäuble or political scientist Wolfgang Bergsdorf, passed many hours together drinking wine in the chancellor’s bungalow or at Isola d’Ischia, Kohl’s favorite Bonn restaurant. And thus Kohl governed: by sitting with trusted colleagues and talking through the problems of the day.

The chancellor’s dearest confidant, always laboring behind the scenes, was Teltschik. Contemporaries often likened him to Kissinger or Bahr, whether for his appreciation for balance-of-power politics or as the power behind the throne. But Teltschik was *sui generis*, a man of immense intellectual and political talent, and the bond he shared with Kohl was

unlike any other. His appointment broke with tradition, as the chancellor's security aide had traditionally been detailed from the Foreign Office. Brandt, upon taking office, had himself previously served as foreign minister, and Schmidt understood diplomacy and foreign affairs as chancellor as well as anyone in the Foreign Office. Kohl, however, had come up through party politics and, aside from an instinct for multilateralism and emotional commitment to European integration, possessed no particular expertise in international affairs. Teltschik filled that void. The two men shared a reputation for brashness, though while Kohl acted more on instinct and political savvy, Teltschik proved more cerebral and strategic—a necessary complement to Kohl's skills as a tactician.³⁷ In 1989-90, Teltschik would ultimately become the genius behind Kohl's efforts to speed along German unification and for the west to absorb the GDR, first economically, then politically, and finally legally. The chancellor particularly valued Teltschik's counsel in light of Genscher's domination at the Foreign Office. For while he appreciated Genscher as a coalition partner, he never fully trusted that Genscher might not betray him for partisan political reasons.

While Kohl (and Teltschik) laid out the broad agenda for Bonn's foreign policy, Hans-Dietrich Genscher ultimately took responsibility for the day-to-day operations of West German diplomacy. Genscher had served in the cabinet since 1969 and at the Foreign Office since 1974. More importantly, as chairman of the Free Democrats, he controlled the coveted middle ground in Bonn's narrow political spectrum and functioned as kingmaker in West German politics. He managed a high-profile cabinet portfolio as vice-chancellor and chief diplomat, appeared frequently in the media, and became one of the most recognized West

Germans around the world. Popularly, his countrymen perceived the FDP as the party of foreign policy and party-chief Genscher as the country's most gifted diplomat.

Such attitudes were shared in European capitals, where the veteran foreign minister enjoyed many productive personal relationships among his counterparts and their staffs and knew the idiosyncrasies of every diplomatic corps from Madrid to Moscow. To foreign diplomats, Genscher embodied West German "calculability" (*Berechenbarkeit*) in foreign affairs. "A new Federal Government has taken office in Bonn," Genscher explained to the European Parliament in October 1982. "As we have said to our friends in the European Community, to our allies in the Atlantic Alliance, to the governments of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Third World, this new government in the Federal Republic of Germany stands for continuity in foreign policy."³⁸ A state whose existence depended upon the will of its former enemies and a nation so associated with danger to its neighbors—in east and west—should maintain predictability in all of its foreign dealings, Genscher believed.³⁹ During Kohl's first days in office, it was junior coalition partner Genscher who endowed the new chancellor with credibility in European affairs.

Genscher had been born in 1927 in Saxony to a humble middle-class family. His father, a legal advisor for an agricultural cooperative, had died when Genscher was nine, leaving the boy to be raised primarily by his mother and in the company of relatives near their hometown of Halle. "Perhaps I inherited my tendency for harmony from him," Genscher later remembered of his father. "I will never forget what he said over and over again: Hitler—that means war." Just months after his father's death, young Hans-Dietrich began secondary school, and on Hitler's birthday that year, 1937, he was inducted into the *Deutsches Jungvolk*. Coming of age during the war, he progressed into the Hitler Youth, the

antiaircraft service (*Luftwaffenhelfer*), and ultimately into the Wehrmacht, serving in Walther Wenck's Twelfth Army. In the last days of the war, he was taken prisoner by the Americans. "Fate had been kind to me," he remembered. When Genscher returned to his hometown in July, the Soviet military occupiers were in control. He soon began his legal training at Martin Luther University. "We could not imagine that Germany would be cut in two," he recalled, but by 1949, when he finished his studies, the national division seemed all but permanent. "Don't deceive yourself, my boy," his grandfather would tell him; "They'll divide Germany up for fifty years."

After fleeing to the west in 1952, Genscher joined the Free Democrats, becoming party chairman seven years later. Across his public life, Genscher enjoyed a reputation for diligence and an unparalleled work-ethic. He began every morning with a swim at six o'clock, cycled to and from his office, and often did not end the workday until at least ten o'clock at night. His coalition partners found him to be brilliant but unpredictable. Helmut Schmidt, whom Genscher had betrayed and forced out of office, described his erstwhile ally as "a tactician without a concept." Kohl, more given to compliments than criticisms, simply described his partner as "perpetually in motion." "A day without a flight is a day lost for Hans-Dietrich," Kohl laughed.⁴⁰ A popular story held that anyone looking for the foreign minister would try any place but his office on Adenauerallee. If two Lufthansa jets cross paths over the Atlantic, the joke went, Genscher would manage to be on both. And while Kohl held court in his office in Bonn, Genscher traveled across Europe and the globe, shaping Germany's position in the world and scouting a path toward European unity—and often overshadowing the chancellor.

Forged in 1982, Kohl and Genscher's partnership had been borne of political necessity, but even in the best of times, their relationship proved stormy. Kohl was far too self-centered for Genscher's taste, and Genscher seemed not nearly deferential enough for Kohl's. Ultimately, however, the two needed one another to continue their coalition, and one of the few areas where they readily found agreement was in European policy. In his first address to the Bundestag as chancellor, Kohl quoted Genscher's maxim: "German-German policy is European peace policy."⁴¹

"While opinions certainly differed between the FDP and the CDU/CSU in some areas of foreign policy," Genscher remembered, "European policy became a connecting link within the coalition" with Kohl.⁴² Now in coalition with the CDU/CSU, Genscher hoped to maintain his lock on West Germany's foreign-policy agenda and to steer Kohl toward definitive statements in support of European integration, even European federalism. He accomplished both goals by forcing the new chancellor's hand. "The new Federal Government will be particularly active on behalf of European unification," Genscher promised the European Parliament. "It regards this as the core of its foreign policy." Interrupted twenty-five times with applause, Genscher then guaranteed Kohl's unwavering support for integration by offering the chancellor public praise for his private statements. "Mr. Kohl, the Federal Chancellor, is a proponent of European unification, and this has colored his entire political thinking and activities," he declared. "He will give his full support to every effort to adopt a substantive European Act in the near future."⁴³

As the political partnership between the two parties deepened, Kohl's ideological and personal commitment to European integration assumed clearer policy dimensions—thanks in large portion to the foreign minister's goading. Genscher, though ultimately self-serving,

helped Kohl's European agenda to become actionable, and he spoke on behalf of integration with a clarity that Kohl often lacked. "We want Europe to be a politically and economically viable entity," Genscher told the European Parliament. "We want a Europe that will work for peace and equality in the world, we want a Europe that, in conjunction with other like-thinking countries, will stand for the ideals of democracy and human rights. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the Europe that we hope to build."⁴⁴

In time, Genscher's name would become synonymous with European political cooperation and Kohl would become the EC's most powerful advocate. But at the European level, Community institutions were mired in the darkest days of their history. Europe remained but an idea.

Europe: A Slogan in Search of a Policy

"The prospects for stronger West European cooperation remain clouded," noted *Foreign Affairs* in 1984. The European Community had proven "incapable of cutting a perspective of common interest through the jungle of financial obligations and agricultural subsidies," and the European Council, along with "all the other institutions of the Community," had degenerated into little more than "a bargaining parlor." Meanwhile, despite their lack of focus, an immense bureaucracy had grown up around Europe's fledgling institutions. An army of technocrats and translators trooped into the Commission headquarters in the Berlaymont each morning—only a fraction of the Commission's eleven thousand employees. They filled their days with procedural meetings that, even in the estimation of the Commission's president, generated no results and "undermined the credibility of the Community."⁴⁵ Their goal, however elusive, was to pursue integration, an imprecise concept

that had, for a generation, remained completely undefined. To Monnet, it had meant a federal union, indeed a “United States of Europe”; to de Gaulle, it referred to “a Europe of states,” each retaining its sovereignty and accorded prestige relative its power; to Brandt, it referred to a wholly post-national entity, a political organization without precedent. In the absence of consensus, in 1972, Brandt and Pompidou had called simply for a “European union,” an innocuous phrase that ultimately gained cachet owing to its imprecision. As the Irish foreign minister remembered, “None of us knew what European union meant”; that precisely had been the appeal for Brandt in the 1970s, and that remained true for their successors in the 1980s.⁴⁶ “European union” provided a shorthand for a consensus yet to be determined, and “to judge by the results of 1983,” remarked one commentator, Europe was indeed “still a slogan in search of a policy.”⁴⁷

Little more than two years later, however, the Europeans had found their policy. “European union” no longer represented a hollow concept; it was an imperative. The European Union would become a supranational political and economic organization without parallel; it would overcome parochial national interests to achieve a wholly integrated power within world affairs. The greatest victory for integration since the Treaties of Paris and Rome had been Schmidt’s organization of the European Monetary System in 1978-79. A less visible, though essential, achievement likewise had been the Franco-German convergence that had begun in 1969 and remained still underway in the middle 1980s. But many of the most important ideas for integrating Europe had foundered: a common foreign and defense policy; a borderless union, joined in a common legal framework; a common market; a social and cultural union. Prominent voices had called for such developments for decades, not least in the landmark Tindemans Report that had been shelved in 1976. Europe had seen a

number of turning points and failed to turn. How, after decades of uneven progress, in 1985 and 1986, did Europe achieve such a swift transformation?

Analysis of the transformation in European affairs reveals, as Andrew Moravcsik has argued, “a bewilderingly wide range” of interpretations. Some have argued that European marginalization between the superpowers, illustrated most presciently at the October 1986 Reykjavík meeting, spurred the EC toward closer cooperation. Others have pointed to the EC’s internal mechanisms becoming stronger, namely the European Court of Justice. Moravcsik himself points to “supranational bargaining theory.” Like many scholars, he credits the decisive actions of genuinely supranational actors, namely Delors, Davignon, and Cockfield, who elevated integration above a mere intergovernmental enterprise. The most persuasive analyses have shown that such supranational efforts comported with domestic political and economic imperatives.⁴⁸

In fact, the Franco-German engine of integration, coupled with Bonn’s increased clout within world affairs, proved the decisive factor. The popular leadership provided by Kohl and Mitterrand offered the public compelling emotional appeals they had not heard for a generation—not since the passing of Churchill and Adenauer, Monnet and Schuman. At once, Europeans saw doughty champions speaking out in favor of integration and offering tangible benefits—not least that, as trust in the United States deteriorated, and an integrated Europe could liberate them from the bullish Americans. They likewise saw in Commission President Jacques Delors a paladin for the European cause—an ambitious and persuasive advocate for a genuine European Union.

But in the immediate term, europessimism wore on. Gaston Thorn, an august veteran of European politics, had succeeded Roy Jenkins as president of the European Commission in 1981. Before his EC presidency, Thorn had served as prime minister of Luxembourg and presided over the UN General Assembly. Guided by his lawyerly disposition, he labored to transcend competing national interests within the EC, though, by his departure from the commission in 1985, his efforts had largely proven unsuccessful. In his speeches, Thorn seemed little more than a frustrated bureaucrat shouting at the wind. “The Community,” he warned, “is in crisis.” Europe “has proved incapable for years now of taking the decisions that should have been taken.” The EC had become mired in the inefficiencies of officialdom and a thicket of special subsidies, shabby bargains, and litigious deals, and by the end of his tenure, Thorn seemed resigned to Europe’s bleak future. “The history of the Community is an eternal quest for ways of circumnavigating political deadlocks,” he assessed.⁴⁹

The Thorn commission never garnered much popular or political support. Too many competing schemes crowded the agenda. While the German and Italian foreign ministers pressed for greater synchronization of international policy, the French urged defense coordination, and the British agitated for an overhaul of agriculture and financial institutions. Active manufacturing and business lobbies pushed for more aggressive infrastructural development.⁵⁰ The UK, which had joined the EC in 1973, frequently vetoed any actions that might chip away at British political or monetary sovereignty, such that the “Community was in a quasi-paralyzed state” by the end of 1983. In the following year, the commission fared no better, with “no breakthroughs, no catastrophes,” in the words of one analyst, “but not enough to make of 1984 something more than a year of frustrations.”⁵¹

By contemporaries and historians alike, Thorn has been criticized for the failures of his presidency. Certainly he lacked the “grand visions and major initiatives” of his charismatic successor, Jacques Delors, but Thorn’s labors did lay much of the foundation for the later Schengen Agreement and Single European Act, particularly in the penultimate European Council meeting of his presidency at Fontainebleau.⁵² More importantly, most have neglected the degree to which his agenda was thwarted by the economic recession of the early 1980s. By 1982, neoliberals governed West Germany, France, the UK, and the U.S. and dominated much of the rest of Europe. Recession emboldened advocates of national economic sovereignty.⁵³ Free trade, low government spending, and deregulation seemed incompatible with Thorn’s federal agenda for European institutions. Thorn himself conceded the difficulty of “finding effective solutions . . . for community interests while taking into account national specificities.”⁵⁴

By the end of 1984, Thorn’s tenure had run its course. “You have left an inventory of problems for your successors,” U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz told the outgoing Thorn in a joint news conference. Energy for integration remained, but parochial national interests prevented progress at the European level, “far from the spirit of Messina in 1955.”⁵⁵

European Political Cooperation

In those years, the greatest challenge facing Thorn and his colleagues involved foreign-policy coordination among the EC member states. Since the 1970 Davignon Report, through “European Political Cooperation,” there had been ad hoc institutional mechanisms in place—quarterly meetings of the EC foreign ministers, monthly meetings of top foreign office civil servants, and increased contacts among desk officers. Those processes, however,

existed completely outside of the auspices of the Paris and Rome Treaties, and the Commission, though its representatives joined EPC meetings, had no formal authority over the EPC process. So, as foreign ministers devised their common approaches toward the CSCE, arms control, martial law in Poland, or the Falklands Conflict, they did so completely outside the auspices of the European Community.⁵⁶ Just as importantly to many in Brussels, if EPC lacked permanence and resolve, it could not represent Europe alongside NATO or compel the United States, in the thinking of EP President Pieter Dankert, toward “more rational” behavior.⁵⁷

In the wake of the INF dispute, such informal mechanisms no longer seemed robust enough. Speaking in Stuttgart in January 1981, Genscher called for the EC to formalize its foreign-policy cooperation—an appeal echoed weeks later by Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo.⁵⁸ The two quickly put to work sketching out plans for increased institutional integration, including new multilateral forums to devise a common European foreign policy.⁵⁹ “We introduced into the EC a concept for a joint foreign policy for all members,” Genscher explained. “We also sought to advance close cooperation in the areas of cultural policy and law, and the development of an economic and currency union.”⁶⁰ Most importantly, the German-Italian initiative (as it came to be called), truly federal in scope, called for “acceptance of statements by the Ten as a *binding* common basis,” such that the foreign policy of Europe would supersede the policies of member states.⁶¹

In October of that year, the EC foreign ministers released their London Report on European Political Cooperation, calling for integration “to become a central element in the foreign policies of all member states” and aiming for national governments to treat European commitments as their intermediary in all foreign-policy decisions. “The Foreign

Ministers believe that in a period of increased world tension and uncertainty the need for a coherent and united approach to international affairs by the members of the European Community is greater than ever," they declared. Nonetheless, "the Ten are still far from playing the role in the world appropriate to their combined influence."⁶² With a "common foreign policy," member states could "act in concert in world affairs," Genscher believed; they could "safeguard Europe's independence, protect its vital interests, and strengthen its security."⁶³

Its architects had intended the London Report as a turning point for European political cooperation, but, like so many of the Thorn commission's actions, it sat idle until 1986—not because of any failing by Thorn but because of the intractability of some member states and a reticence to cede any measure of foreign policy to the EC.⁶⁴ In the interim, despite their common pledge "that the Ten should seek increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them," most of the joint EC foreign-policy actions seemed hollow: innocuous affirmations of human rights, expressions of sympathy for victims of violence in Namibia, and a belated condemnation of Pol Pot.⁶⁵ Genscher grew frustrated, as did Thorn. "The development of integration is slowing dangerously," Thorn told the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations, but by 1984, he seemed resigned to "the difficulties as they are." "I would say that all this is perfectly normal."⁶⁶

Even as a stalled process, European Political Cooperation unnerved some in Washington. "It is possible that the EPC could become established as a coordinating mechanism for European foreign and security policies completely outside the Atlantic framework," warned one analyst. "It would seem imperative, therefore, to find some way to link EPC to the Atlantic framework in such a way that preserves the European integrity of EPC while feeding

the product of EPC into an Atlantic decision-making framework.” But to U.S. officials, whether in Washington or in Brussels, such efforts seemed impossible. Particularly within NATO, whereas the American representatives once had been able to negotiate with their foreign counterparts, by 1983 and 1984, they increasingly found that “national positions [had been] already formally aligned in an EC consensus” before being brought to the alliance. Through the EPC mechanisms, “the political component of European unity is catching up with the economic component.”⁶⁷

Helmut Schmidt, partnered with Giscard and largely over British opposition, had been the genius behind the European Monetary System in 1978-79. Whether Kohl might match his predecessor’s example would largely depend upon how carefully he coordinated with his French counterpart—again, in the face of British intractability.

Revitalizing the Bonn-Paris Axis

Despite frustrations at the European level, Kohl optimistically assessed his future prospects. “I am,” he admitted, “a newcomer and not as jaded as the others.”⁶⁸ His French counterpart, President François Mitterrand, shared that attitude. In fact, Mitterrand, who had succeeded Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in May 1981, was particularly pleased with the new German chancellor. For the first year of his presidency, Mitterrand had urged Schmidt to broaden his thinking on Europe. Schmidt, sometimes identified as a “reluctant European,” had conceived of Europe as an economic community; Mitterrand hoped for a federal Europe.⁶⁹ From 1974 to 1981, Schmidt enjoyed a close and productive relationship with Giscard, particularly as the two forged the EMS. When Mitterrand came to office, Schmidt hoped to continue a close Bonn-Paris economic and monetary partnership. Mitterrand,

however, hoped for grander ideas. Europe, he believed, should provide for common regulation of agriculture, fisheries, industry, food, the environment, and transportation; should hasten economic growth through common standards for data processing, uniform laws and tax provisions, research in electronics and biotechnology, and by establishing diploma equivalencies between European universities; and should build a common European culture by facilitating exchanges and broadcasting a European television channel. Only then, Mitterrand said, could Europeans “achieve our hopes and perpetuate a great civilization—our civilization.”⁷⁰

For the seventeen months they worked together, Mitterrand and Schmidt maintained a pleasant enough relationship, though the chancellor did resist his counterpart’s ambitions for Europe as a social and cultural project.⁷¹ Kohl, however, quickly imbued new energy into the Bonn-Paris axis, positioning the Federal Republic and France as the leaders of integration not seen since the 1950s.⁷² “European policy and German policy are like the two sides of a coin for us,” he declared to the Bundestag. “To serve as a motor for the unification of Europe is part of our national mission and in the national interests of the Federal Republic from the beginning. We co-founded the European Community [with France],” he explained, “and we belong to it irrevocably, because of our democracy, because of our appreciation for the rule of law, and because our security interests and political capacity to act (*Handlungsfähigkeit*) demand it.”⁷³

Genscher agreed. He heartily approved of the chancellor’s close relationship with Mitterrand. “Without Franco-German reconciliation, there is no European unity,” explained Genscher. “Regardless of our respective governments, after centuries as archenemies (*Erzfiendschaft*), we possess a special responsibility for the process of European

unification.”⁷⁴ Genscher similarly worked very closely with his counterparts in the French Foreign Ministry, Louis de Guiringaud and Jean François-Poncet. “One of your predecessors once said that there could be no French foreign policy that was not built on the irreversibility of Franco-German reconciliation,” Genscher told Guiringaud. “That affirmation is no less true of German policy. The reconciliation between France and Germany and the Franco-German cooperation built upon it not only were and remain of historical importance for our two countries; they were and remain also a European necessity.”⁷⁵

In those early years of their coalition, promoting a common European agenda, Genscher and Kohl enjoyed the best days of their partnership. The foreign minister proved eager to spar with intransigent parliamentarians in Bonn, helping the chancellor to preserve his political capital. Some Social Democrats challenged the Kohl-Genscher agenda, criticizing Germany’s responsibility as “paymaster of Europe”; EC integration, the argument ran, would cost the West Germans money and resources they could not recoup in Community benefits. Genscher scoffed at such a “victims’ theory” attitude as the ignorance of those who failed to understand basic political economy. “We are an export-dependent country,” he retorted. “For us, a market with 271 million people is better than one with 60 million people.”⁷⁶

Just as their predecessors’ partnership had been galvanized by British intransigence over the EMS, Kohl and Mitterrand found themselves similarly allied against Margaret Thatcher, who adamantly opposed deepened integration. In fact, British intractability altogether emboldened Kohl. From Harold Wilson’s 1974 campaign promise to renegotiate the terms of British EC membership and the 1975 UK referendum on Europe, British policy on Europe had been contested for more than a decade. In the autumn of 1980, Foreign Secretary Peter Lord Carrington (the soon-to-be secretary-general of NATO), in a speech to the Hamburg

Übersee-Club, called for definitive limits to the EPC process—friendly cooperation between member states, increased contact among EC ambassadors on matters of common interest, and a mechanism for confronting common crises.⁷⁷ EC policies from both Labour and Tory governments proved inconsistent from year to year, and in Parliament, members often contradicted their own parties' stances. Thatcher herself, as leader of the opposition during the 1975 referendum, proved instrumental in preserving UK membership. By 1984, now prime minister, she bitterly resisted it. "I was in despair," Thatcher later confessed. "I told the heads of government that Britain had never been treated fairly from the beginning."⁷⁸ In meetings with the Commission president, Thatcher often barreled over the shy Thorn. In a particularly nasty exchange at Downing Street, "during a tirade against other European leaders' policies," Thorn noticed that the prime minister's pearl necklace had snapped. "One by one, her pearls were falling to the carpet, without her noticing," he later remembered. "We were all too scared to say anything."⁷⁹ Too reticent to interrupt Thatcher's many diatribes against Europe—both in public and in private—Thorn typically served simply as an intermediary between Thatcher and the other heads of government.

Kohl shrugged off Thatcher's stubbornness, attributing her attitude to an overestimation of Britain's influence in the world. "One must remember," Kohl advised, "that in her youth Margaret Thatcher saw the King of England also as the Emperor of India."⁸⁰ Mitterrand, on the other hand, grew furious. In the spring of 1984, he embarked on an ambitious tour to every EC capital in hopes of marginalizing British influence and galvanizing support for internal market reforms and coordinated community decision-making. At each destination, the French president told his audience that British membership had been the greatest mistake in the EC's history.⁸¹

During the spring of 1984, Kohl and Mitterrand arrived at a joint strategy for overcoming the implacable British. Their solution was to revive an old idea of “two-tier Europe”; deepened European political cooperation would continue without the British and Whitehall would forfeit decision-making authority in the Community.⁸² Confident in Mitterrand’s partnership, Kohl declared the European train ready to depart the station, with or without British passengers. “Unless the European Community can move forward once more, it is threatened with the prospect of disintegration,” noted one European daily. “Britain’s dispute with her Community partners is demeaning, dispiriting, and debilitating.”⁸³

In the last week of June 1984, the European Council convened in Fontainebleau.⁸⁴ Brandishing the stick of two-tier Europe and offering the carrot of budgetary concession, Kohl and Mitterrand successfully bridled the obstinate Thatcher after thirty-six hours of negotiations. In an otherwise stagnant era for European integration, the Fontainebleau summit represented a watershed moment—the “revival of Europe,” according to *Le Monde*.⁸⁵ Even Helmut Schmidt, from the backbenches, spoke out in favor of continued Franco-German collaboration vis-à-vis Britain, telling the Bundestag that “the forces of inertia would hold Britain back from . . . European cooperation.”⁸⁶ For the first time in nearly a decade—since the 1976 Tindemans Report—each of the major players agreed to reconcile the previously uncoordinated visions for monetary, fiscal, social, and political integration. The Council tasked ad hoc committees on a “People’s Europe,” chaired by Italy’s Pietro Adonnino, and on Institutional Affairs, chaired by Ireland’s James Dooge, with making recommendations for a lasting European political union.⁸⁷ “This meeting at Fontainebleau,” Kohl reported to the Bundestag, “has marked a momentous breakthrough.”⁸⁸ The basis for codified European political cooperation had been laid.

Achieving a Single Europe

“If the Commission is ineffective, as it tragically was during the Thorn presidency, the Community languishes,” explained Arthur Lord Cockfield, EC commissioner for internal market affairs. But “where you have a forceful and visionary president, as Jacques Delors has been, backed by a strong and effective Commission, the Community makes progress.”⁸⁹ Indeed, with Delors at the helm, the year 1985 marked the definitive turning point for European integration. Delors had replaced the long-suffering Thorn as president of the European in January, and within two weeks of taking office, promising a “*Europe sans frontières*” by 1992. “It was thanks to his efforts,” Kohl remembered, that the “full integration [of Europe] succeeded so quickly. I will never forget Jacques Delors’ attitude.”⁹⁰

Delors had been born in the working-class eleventh arrondissement of Paris to a humble family. His father, a courier for the Banque de France, had surrounded his only child with socialist influences, and his mother, a devoted Catholic, had impressed upon her son the Church’s social teachings of equality and human freedom. Even as a young man, Delors had asserted his belief that he must be “useful” to his neighbors and his country. Very much an idealist, he eschewed personal gain or political advancement in favor of “an unchanging set of values.”⁹¹ In his own words, Delors preferred “to sow” (*semer*), leaving “reaping” (*recolter*) to others.⁹² As a scholarship student at the Lycée Voltaire, young Delors excelled, especially in the arts and in mathematics. He and his family departed Paris for Clermont-Ferrand in Auvergne in 1940, abandoning their home for the *zone libre*. The war years, and his experiences under the Nazi occupation, convinced him of his country’s “decadence” and exposed the glaring inefficiencies and incompetence of France’s prewar leaders. And the

Fourth Republic, in Delors' view, had been beset by its own problems: a "tentacular state," "excessive" individualism, and unbridled capitalism."⁹³

Before his international prominence, Delors began his career as a workaday bureaucrat in the Banque de France during "the glorious thirty" years of postwar economic prosperity. In his later service as finance minister during the early 1980s, the centrist Delors functioned as a moderating force in Mitterrand's government. Delors stood for his country in the European Parliament's first election in 1979, where he served for two years and chaired the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. In France and across Europe, Delors earned a reputation as a shrewd spokesman for Europe's deepened integration. He dispensed with euroskeptics handily, always citing persuasive economic and monetary arguments in his favor.⁹⁴ And while he boasted strong professional qualifications for his post as Commission president, he possessed more "subtle credentials" as well.⁹⁵ A moderate, Delors held a nuanced political outlook that proved difficult to paint with broad partisan brushstrokes. He fell prey neither to the left's fierce socialist rhetoric nor to the right's reactionary anti-Europeanism. The subtlety of his European agenda, particularly his emphasis on market-based solutions for unemployment and economic growth, garnered favor in neighboring Germany and especially with Kohl's CDU/CSU coalition. "[He] always proved to be a loyal friend of the Germans," Kohl recalled, "but was also a close personal friend as well."⁹⁶

Delors began his first week in office with a visit to each of the EC capitals. At each stop, he recounted the uneven history of European integration since the 1950s, which had culminated with the EMS six years earlier. Now the time had come, he asserted, to match monetary union with a single market—an aim that had eluded Schmidt and Giscard.⁹⁷ Most EC governments had already consented to the concept of a common market, and the

popular reception Delors received on his tour sharpened his resolve. “With an iron will this president did his utmost to keep the European ship on course and under steam,” Genscher recalled.⁹⁸ An internal common market—the central promise of the 1957 Rome Treaty—would represent Delors’ topmost priority.

Meanwhile, the Bonn-Paris axis was generating results. With Kohl and Mitterrand’s popular leadership, Delors heading the European Commission, and strained transatlantic relations, popular support for European integration reached its highest levels in a generation.⁹⁹ In late March, the Dooge and Adonnino Committees, which Kohl and Mitterrand had proved instrumental in initiating, generated two landmark reports for the European Council on establishing both the institutional mechanisms of integration and cultivating a deepened sense of common European culture.¹⁰⁰ In particular, the Dooge Committee, focused on the creation of “a genuine political entity,” outlined the institutional steps to create “a homogeneous internal economic area,” indeed a “European Union.”¹⁰¹ The committee recommended the “promotion of the common values of civilization” with an aim to “give a European dimension to all aspects of collective life”—from social policy and a common justice system to environmental protection and “the safeguarding of the European cultural heritage.” Finally, the committee called for codifying the ad hoc EPC mechanism through “the search for an external identity—to develop common foreign, security, and defense policies.”¹⁰² Making little mention of the transatlantic alliance, the committee pledged simply to harmonize stances “on the major problems posed by the preservation of peace in Europe.” The next steps involved summoning a conference to draft a treaty for a “European Union.”

Delors seized on the Dooqe report's recommendations. He already had ordered the Commission draft a white paper on "completing the internal market." Led by Lord Cockfield and François Lamoureux, a team of Cabinet staffers drafted the 222-item document in only three months, focused on practical steps to remove physical, technical, and fiscal barriers to a common market. Delors subsumed the Adonnino and Dooqe recommendations into the *Completing the Internal Market* white paper, championing his proposals as the answer to Europe's institutional and market integration. The white paper outlined Delors agenda for European union by 1992, and "1992" soon became shorthand for a European borderless union and common market.

At the Milan meeting of the European Council two weeks later, the Commission's white paper was presented for public consideration. Representatives of the ten approved the ambitious document and charged an intergovernmental conference to strategize its implementation by 1992.¹⁰³

Across the next six months, negotiators worked to do precisely that and to turn the Dooqe committee's recommendations for institutional reform and for a common foreign policy into a "Single European Act." The first restructuring of European institutions since the Treaty of Rome, the act proposed an unprecedented overhaul of the EC: a single market would match the economic and monetary union; the European Parliament would be endowed with actual legislative authority and take on an advisory role to the European Council; a common foreign and security policy—according to Kohl, a "favorite project" (*Lieblingskind*) of Delors—would represent Europe within the world.¹⁰⁴ In their December meeting in Luxembourg, the European Council approved the Single European Act, only

eleven months after Delors' promise to build a European Union. "It was the highlight of my political life," Kohl remembered.¹⁰⁵

On 14 June 1985, the same day as the landmark white paper release, Kohl's childhood schoolfriend, State Secretary Waldemar Schreckenberger, traveled from Bonn to a small village in neighboring Luxembourg. Aboard the *MS Princesse Marie-Astrid* in the River Moselle, near the intersection of the Belgian, Luxembourgish, and Dutch borders, and with his French and Benelux counterparts, he committed the Federal Republic to a borderless union within Europe.¹⁰⁶ Officially their agreement on "the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders"—later dubbed the Schengen Agreement—provided for the "free movement of persons, goods, and services" among its five signatories and began five years of negotiations for a borderless union.¹⁰⁷ Though the Schengen Area would eventually become the distinguishing characteristic of European integration, that summer, the signing went relatively unreported in the West German press. For some, such as Genscher, talk of a borderless union in western Europe seemed bittersweet, for it highlighted the seeming permanence of Germany's division. A West German could conceivably walk unimpeded across Europe to the Atlantic but not to visit his family and countrymen beyond the Iron Curtain; Genscher himself, negotiating for the future of western Europe, could travel the world but not return to his own hometown of Halle in the GDR. "The ensuing steps seemed to me to have even greater urgency," he recalled. "It was necessary for Germany resolutely to advance west-east relations."¹⁰⁸

In truth, the Schengen Agreement and the Single European Act, despite their revolutionary appeal, proposed little that already had not been envisioned in the

Community's founding documents three decades prior. Delors' achievement was in bringing the many promises floated across the decades into a single comprehensive agreement; after decades of stalled progress, he helped to realize the fullness of the Treaty of Rome.¹⁰⁹

"Now European integration could progress," wrote Genscher. "The European Parliament became more powerful, the European Council was transformed into an organ of the EC, and European Political Cooperation obtained a legal foundation."¹¹⁰ His coalition partners agreed. Leveraging the peace rhetoric popular on the left, the Christian Democrats declared European integration the greatest contribution to world peace of the postwar era. And Kohl, true to his word, pledged to use European integration to redress Germany's national division. According to the CDU, "A final and stable European settlement is not possible without a solution to the German question, which forms the core of present tensions in Europe."¹¹¹

On both sides of the Atlantic, pundits mused on a future "United States of Europe." Delors, however, balked at such suggestions. "The United States is no model for my goal of European Union," he replied. "Our union must be as efficient as the United States, but without falling into its errors. It must be deeply rooted in social justice and the welfare state, and be firmly based on our own European traditions." For Delors and for many in Brussels, the U.S. could never offer a blueprint for a future European Union; it was precisely to assert independence from the Americans that many in Europe shared such enthusiasm for integration.

A Transatlantic Rift

Much of the redoubled effort toward building “a single Europe” in 1985 had been prompted by the unreliability of the American ally and out of resistance to Reagan’s confrontational foreign policy. Meanwhile, Kohl was entering the darkest days of his public life, largely owing to his ambitious but unsuccessful efforts to reconcile the transatlantic divide, only later to be marginalized by Washington’s gradual rapprochement with the Kremlin under Reagan and the new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

Though the INF dispute had ended in 1983, the consensus on security defense policy, once enjoyed by all the major western European political parties, remained broken. “Deterrence is only credible if it frightens the adversary more than it does one’s own population,” advised long-time IISS director Christoph Bertram.¹¹² Alas, for the West Germans, the INF deployments had simultaneously emboldened the Soviets and unnerved their own people. From the European perspective, the Americans seemed to learn the wrong lessons from the INF dispute. In a private meeting between Reagan and NATO’s newly minted Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, the president lectured him on how American firmness and resolve carried the day—despite the political consequences that Carrington had seen firsthand.¹¹³ Meanwhile, Kohl had been working in Bonn to recover the elite consensus, though largely without success.¹¹⁴ His government offered a candid assessment of “American Global Strategy,” noting that the Reagan administration seemed preoccupied by the most *extreme* threats Europe faced but not by the most *likely* threats: expanding Soviet control over critical energy supplies and raw materials and economic interdependencies with the Third World.¹¹⁵ “As so often in the postwar years,” explained one commentator, “the future of western security [is] challenged less by threats from the east than by political erosion in the west.”¹¹⁶

Further complicating the transatlantic relationship, on 23 March 1983, Reagan offered a bold “vision of the future”: a strategic defense initiative, meant to protect the U.S. homeland from incoming ballistic missiles and to render Soviet offensive capabilities—and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction—obsolete. The president made his case in apocalyptic terms. “It’s up to us, in our time,” he warned, “to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore our duty and blindly hope for the best, while the enemies of freedom grow stronger day by day.”¹¹⁷

Dubbed by his critics the “Star Wars” speech, Reagan’s promise “to maintain the peace through our strength” distressed the Europeans nearly as much as the Soviets. Delivered only two weeks after his condemnation of the Soviet Union as “the focus of evil in the modern world,” Reagan had adopted rhetoric sharper and more aggressive than any U.S. president since 1945. “Soviet paranoia is jumpy and dangerous enough as it is without adding to it by verbal prosecution,” warned one British commentator; Reagan “seem[s] to confirm the image of ideology-crazed American fanaticism.”¹¹⁸

While Mitterrand refused to back the program and Thatcher initially equivocated citing the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, Kohl rushed headlong into a hearty endorsement of SDI. Some within the chancellor’s cabinet proved less fulsome. Genscher feared that SDI “was more likely to cause insecurity and destabilization,” and Research and Technology Minister Heinz Riesenhuber, Defense Minister Manfred Wörner, and Economics Minister Martin Bangemann privately offered their own skeptical assessments. Even the most loyal Christian Democrats feared a repeat of the 1979 neutron bomb fiasco, in which a half-baked American scheme united enemies and divided friends. The opposition seized on Kohl’s apparent subservience to Washington, eager to divide the governing coalition. “He follows the wishes

of President Reagan,” wrote Peter Bender. “No wonder Bonn’s political weight has decreased significantly both in east and west.”¹¹⁹ Similarly, the SPD quickly dubbed Wörner, tasked with defending the chancellor’s policies before the Bundestag, the country’s new “minister for misleading the public”—the Pangloss to Kohl’s Candide.¹²⁰ Meanwhile, the chancellor grew frustrated with the “‘politicization’ of relations with the United States,” particularly following “the clear proof of loyalty to the alliance [and to Europe]” his government had offered.¹²¹ But “rarely has the loss of influence for West German foreign policy become more apparent,” warned *Der Spiegel*.¹²²

The harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric from Washington alarmed the European allies, and many European defense specialists took issue with the strategic calculus embodied in SDI. “There would be no advantage in creating a new Maginot line of the twenty-first century,” warned the British foreign secretary. “We must make sure we are not developing what might prove to be a limited defense against weapons of devastating destructive force.”¹²³ SDI laid bare the fundamental divergence between American and European attitudes toward nuclear defense. While U.S. policy regarded nuclear forces as another step on the escalatory scale, “designed to provide a spectrum of deterrence across the range of conceivable military contingencies,” European policies viewed such weapons as fundamentally unusable.¹²⁴ Reagan’s protective shield guarded against ICBMs, but Europeans were threatened by substrategic forces and missiles that reached their targets in under ten minutes. SDI, if operational, promised to make the American homeland more secure and Europe less secure. Furthermore, while the Americans had abandoned their efforts toward an east-west détente, many Europeans had not yet given up hope—not least the West Germans who still enjoyed a productive relationship with the GDR. The U.S. president seemed to divide the

world into good and evil, but the Europeans believed such an outlook lacked depth.

Thatcher's foreign policy advisor Charles Powell noted with disdain Reagan's commendation of Tom Clancey's thriller *Red Storm Rising* to the prime minister, which would provide, the president assured, "an excellent picture of the Soviet Union's intentions and strategy. He had clearly been much impressed by the book," Powell recorded.¹²⁵ "The European approach was fundamentally different," described another commentator. East-west cooperation represented "an inevitable byproduct of the nuclear age, not a favor to be granted but a duty to be pursued."¹²⁶

Rather than soothe tensions, Reagan exacerbated them. "[A] certain 'macho' element had been added in the case of the Reagan régime," suggested longtime Chatham House director David Watt. When faced with that observation in his European tour, Reagan's vice president, George Bush, inflamed the situation. "I'm sorry," he said. "The United States is leader of the free world, and under this administration we are beginning once again to act like it."¹²⁷ A January 1983 poll in Britain revealed that seventy percent "lacked any confidence in the judgement of the American administration."¹²⁸ And in Bonn, three times as many West Germans saw Reagan's policies as too hardline as were impressed by him.¹²⁹ Joschka Fischer condemned what he perceived as reductionist simplicity in U.S. foreign policy. "He divided the world into good and evil," Fischer explained. "He Ronaldizes (*ronaldisiert*) it."¹³⁰ As the Cold War wore into its fourth decade, were the Americans unnecessarily stoking the fires of east-west conflict to preserve their dominance over western Europe?

A spring 1985 visit to Europe by the American president did not improve attitudes. At the G7 summit in Bonn, Reagan met Delors for the first time. Reagan was not impressed

with him, noting in his diary that he had met with “French writer Jacques Delors” [*sic*].¹³¹ Delors, on the other hand, remembered the president as “absolutely hostile.”¹³² His visit the following day to the Kolmeshöhe Cemetery to mark the fortieth anniversary of V-E day proved disastrous when reporters pointed out that many of the graves there honored fallen members of Hitler’s Waffen-SS. In Madrid, Reagan directly criticized the EC, declaring it a protectionist trading club and danger to transatlantic relations.¹³³ “Today, we’ve come to understand that all the nations of the earth are part of one global economy, our economic fates interwoven in a tapestry of a million connecting threads,” he explained. “We understand that we break those ties only at our peril, for if too many of them are severed, our prosperity will begin to unravel.”¹³⁴ But as recession gripped the western economies, Europeans resisted American efforts all the more. Paris and Bonn both blamed high U.S. interest rates for the lethargic recovery and thus pushed for common European economic and trade policies at odds with Washington’s leadership.¹³⁵ The strength of the Deutsche Mark and Bonn’s fiscal restraint helped to restabilize the European economies, though only enough to result in “a year of marking time,” an atmosphere of “*attentisme*.”¹³⁶ That hostility strained relations within NATO as well. “In the long run,” warned long-time French Foreign Ministry Policy Planning Staff director Thierry de Montbrial, “the Atlantic alliance would not survive a collapse of the international economic order.”¹³⁷

Increasingly, European institutions seemed designed to shut out American influence. Resentment toward U.S. foreign policy and simultaneous talk of a “Europeanization of Europe” had galvanized popular and political support for distinctive European approaches to world politics, exclusive of American influence. Some even believed that the process of EC rejuvenation underway could altogether *replace* America’s role in Europe and NATO. “If the

Europeans are able to combine their powers in solidarity,” opined Rudolf Augstein, “they in fact could defend themselves.”¹³⁸ From the Vietnam Conflict and the failures of American economic and financial leadership to Carter’s vacillations during the neutron bomb fiasco and Reagan’s “Star Wars,” for upwards of two decades, Europeans had been losing their faith in American leadership. The transatlantic alliance had been forged in the 1940s to match American power with European free markets and political liberalism. For decades, interallied conflicts had always been superseded by NATO’s need to protect Western Europe from the Soviet juggernaut, and even in tense times, the social and cultural bonds between the U.S. and Europe made the politico-military ties palatable. But by the 1980s, the Americans and Europeans seemed to share fewer common outlooks than they had when they forged their indefinite partnership, and faith in the U.S. commitment to Europe grew thin. “If this process develops primarily in reaction and opposition to U.S. policies,” warned one American analyst, “it will tend to split the Atlantic alliance.”¹³⁹ Soon after Christmas in 1985, seven Libyan-backed operatives stormed the airports in Rome and Vienna, killing sixteen and wounding more than 130. While the Reagan administration sought immediate military retribution, the Europeans resisted; while Washington called for NATO solidarity in the face of terrorism, the Europeans responded that sanctions could only emerge through “a collective decision by the European Community, not unilaterally.”¹⁴⁰


Efforts to rebuff U.S. influence even caused Mitterrand to resurrect the moribund Western European Union in 1984. In principle, the organization had been established by an intergovernmental mutual-defense treaty among the UK, France, and the Benelux countries in 1948. Adding the Italians and West Germans in 1954, the WEU was born, though its organizational functions quickly were overshadowed by the North Atlantic alliance. With

western Europe too often “at the mercy of forces beyond its control” and faced with “unreliable American leadership,” French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in 1986 called on Europeans to forge a new charter of security principles, exclusive of the United States.¹⁴¹ The WEU, according to one Swedish analyst, represented a “convenient tool” for such an end, and even British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe argued that “the point of using the WEU . . . will be to demonstrate more clearly, for our own public as well, that the Atlantic arch truly has two pillars and that one of these is truly European.”¹⁴²

Similarly, the bilateral Franco-German security dialogue was maturing entirely outside of NATO—and thus American—auspices. By 1986, the French and German foreign and defense ministers were meeting at least three times annually, and the two governments had established a permanent Commission on Security and Defense. Desk officers and civil servants similarly convened bilateral working groups to coordinate joint policies on arms control, procurement, and battlefield cooperation. Even the resolute Helmut Schmidt, whose political career had been sacrificed on the altar of the American-led security régime, spoke out in favor of the blossoming Franco-German security partnership, arguing that “this heartland of continental Europe will not be bound to the west by an American president.”¹⁴³ Building on the strengthened Bonn-Paris axis, the former chancellor proposed France unilaterally extend its nuclear deterrent to the Federal Republic and that France and Germany together field thirty divisions for Europe’s conventional defense.¹⁴⁴ The following year, seventy-five-thousand French and German troops conducted the *Kecker Spatz-Moineau hardi* (“Bold Sparrow”) battlefield exercise in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, completely exclusive of NATO or SHAPE.¹⁴⁵

Meanwhile, on 29 May 1986, the states of the European Community hoisted their azure flag, punctuated with its twelve golden stars, in front of the executive commission headquarters. Just as EC bureaucrats cheered the deepening of their institutions, with plans toward a single Europe underway, NATO's Secretary-General Lord Carrington decried the state of allied relations: "the situation in the Atlantic alliance is very serious and as bad as I can remember."¹⁴⁶

Fig. 4.1. West German Attitudes toward Foreign-Policy Orientation, 1983



Source: Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Edgar Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1983), 615.

Inner-German Rapprochement

Meanwhile, the Bonn government had grown quite skilled at, as Kohl and Genscher called it, "funeral diplomacy." Within Kohl's first two months in office, Brezhnev died, and within the coming two years, Andropov and Chernenko also expired. The diplomatic repertoire thus was repeated in quick succession, whereupon the West German chancellor would fly from Bonn to Moscow, honor the dead communist, and extend condolences to the

new head of government—otherwise already busy consolidating his power over the party apparatus. More importantly, while the superpowers remained preoccupied with the peaceful transition of power, the leaders of the two German states would meet face to face, “without much fanfare and without the complications of protocol.” “Such an informal encounter could do no harm,” assessed Genscher. With relations between the superpowers souring in the early 1980s, “relations between the two Germanys were imbued with a new urgency.”¹⁴⁷

The Christian Democrats, and Kohl in particular, had never fully come to terms with the new eastern policy initiated by their Social Democratic predecessors. On the one hand, the chancellor saw the many benefits Ostpolitik offered: improved trade between east and west, a human-rights dialogue with the SED, and a new opportunity to assert German interests in east-west relations.¹⁴⁸ On the other hand, how could one who proudly claimed to be Adenauer’s spiritual and political grandson pursue any alternative to the elder chancellor’s Westpolitik? During the opposition years, the Union parties had fragmented over their members’ reactions to Ostpolitik. A fundamentalist majority, led by Franz Josef Strauß, Herbert Hupka, and others, had focused on dismantling the SPD’s new eastern policy. Meanwhile, a reformist minority encouraged their colleagues to consider adapting Ostpolitik to the CDU/CSU’s own foreign-policy agenda. And while Kohl, who often mediated between the two factions, bristled at Brandt’s apparent willingness to close the so-called German question, as early as 1972, CDU/CSU party documents had abandoned references to “reunification” in favor of “self-determination.”¹⁴⁹

In the 1950s and 1960s, the CDU/CSU’s traditional opposition to a new eastern policy had been premised on the fear that by engaging with the GDR, Bonn would be (1) endowing

the SED with legitimacy and forfeiting its claim of sole representation over the German nation (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*), (2) making permanent the temporary status quo of national division, and (3) isolating itself within the west.¹⁵⁰ The intervening years of the SPD-Liberal coalition had demonstrated, however, that Bonn could find ways of engaging with the GDR and avoid forfeiting its rights to represent the German people and ultimately to conclude a future peace treaty; the 1972 Basic Treaty and accompanying letter on German unity had seen to that. More importantly, the 1970s had represented the heyday of détente; engaging with the eastern régimes would not isolate the West Germans, but maintaining hardline policies of nonrecognition would have. When Kohl took office in 1982, détente was all but dead. But the Federal Republic—by then the world’s second most powerful economy, the engine of the EMS, and the strongest military in western Europe (save the Americans)—could take a more pronounced role in east-west relations and as an interlocutor between the superpowers. Abandoning the influence the West Germans had won as a result of the SPD’s Ostpolitik would have seemed absurd. More importantly, a radical departure in foreign policy would have unsettled neighbors on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Adenauer had pursued “change through strength” in the 1950s. Kohl hoped to resurrect the “change through strength” ideal, but once in office, he and his Union colleagues realized that the metric of international power had changed since Adenauer’s day. The elder chancellor and his generation—Hallstein, Wilhelm Grewe, Heinrich von Brentano, and others—had asserted the nonrecognition doctrine as a sign of West Germany’s strength; in the absence of economic or military power, the most the young Bonn republic could aspire to was uncompromising diplomatic principle. Kohl, however, governed the most powerful

country in Europe; the strength he wielded could achieve more through engagement than by shunning the GDR.

Thus, contrary to the projections of many contemporaries, by the mid 1980s, the two German states enjoyed their own inner-German rapprochement. Particularly in light of his party's long-term reservations toward Ostpolitik, Kohl worked to redefine the limits of West German cooperation with the east. Simultaneously, the GDR reciprocated and Honecker facilitated a softening of the GDR's policies toward the German question.¹⁵¹ Recognizing the success of the east's propaganda campaign during the INF dispute, Honecker hoped to continue to improve his country's image in the Federal Republic. In September 1983, he shocked his countrymen, speaking in emotional terms of "the German people" rather than relying on the usual sterile rhetoric of classless workers and farmers. Contrary to decades of East German policy, he intimated that the two German states maintained a special relationship, exclusive of ideology. His additional reasons for reluctantly embracing his West German neighbors—a desperate need for hard-currency investment—would not become fully clear until 1989-90.

More simply, politics required Kohl and his coalition to continue their predecessors' Ostpolitik. Just as Schmidt had struggled to hold together his government in the early 1980s, Kohl likewise suffered attacks from both the left and right within his own coalition. In particular, he sparred with his longtime rival, the intransigent Franz-Josef Strauß, Bavaria's minister-president and chairman of the CDU's southern sister party, the Christian Social Union. Strauß stood far to the right of Kohl on most political questions, and in foreign policy, he continued bitter resistance to Ostpolitik, calling it a capitulation to Germany's permanent division.¹⁵² Strauß frequently attacked Kohl as too liberal for their parties' conservative

electorate, and the chancellor's "coalition of the middle," in Strauß's view, constituted a sacrifice of their parties' conservative principles.

Kohl was determined, however, to maintain his partnership with Genscher and the Liberals. He remained particularly attuned to the attitudes and moods of the German people, kept informed by his close collaborator, CDU pollster Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. As she reported to the chancellor, after a decade of progress with the GDR, most West Germans had come to believe that unification, while an ultimate goal, should not stand in the way of improved east-west relations. In another study, she showed that fifty-five percent of CDU/CSU members and eighty-four percent of Liberals reported their belief that Bonn should continue the inner-German rapprochement, and while nearly three-quarters of West Germans supported reunification conceptually, less than a quarter expected any political action on the issue. The Union parties would lose their constituency if they opposed Ostpolitik.¹⁵³ With popular support on his side and in firm agreement with CDU general-secretary Heiner Geißler, Kohl broke with Strauß, knowing that the CSU would either modulate its attitudes or be left in political obsolescence. Strauß's 1950s-style anti-communist rhetoric appeared antiquated thirty years later, particularly as Kohl demonstrated that conservatism need not preclude productive relationships beyond the Iron Curtain.

Strauß's sudden isolation following Kohl's victory was not lost on Honecker and his functionaries. In the spring of 1983, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, Honecker's close aide and head of the East German Foreign Trade Ministry's "commercial coordination" (*KoKo*) wing, approached Strauß with an offer. In exchange for softening their relations toward the west, Schalck-Golodkowski asked Strauß to organize credits to the GDR worth 1 billion

DM.¹⁵⁴ The East Germans knew that Strauß, a hardliner and internal critic of Kohl, would leap at the opportunity to outflank the chancellor. And thus, Strauß leveraged his supreme anti-communist credentials to secure concessions from the SED and to offer his own “realistic détente.”¹⁵⁵ Among other compromises, he insisted that Honecker’s régime must dismantle the GDR’s *Selbstschussanlagen*—the lethal self-shooting weapons that automatically fired on easterners trying to flee over the border.¹⁵⁶ Even Brandt, Schmidt, and Kohl, for all of their careful diplomacy, had not been able to gain such an advantage. Strauß had won a great victory for his CSU—though most West Germans simply recognized it as another advance made by Kohl’s coalition. In the coming months, Strauß, Weizsäcker, and Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg all made visits to the GDR.¹⁵⁷

Above all, continuity in foreign policy remained the basis of the Union parties’ coalition agreement with Genscher’s Liberals. “De facto progress [in relations with the east] became more important than de jure retreats [in the legal realm],” explained one Christian Democrat.¹⁵⁸ The CDU/CSU simply had to recast Ostpolitik in terms that would highlight their parties’ long-term aim of national unification; their Ostpolitik would represent more than a mere rapprochement with the east but a demonstration of Bonn’s special role and indispensability to improved east-west relations.¹⁵⁹

Kohl and Honecker’s impromptu two-hour meeting at Chernenko’s funeral in March 1985, though an “unprecedented German-German summit,” dealt with largely procedural issues of mutual interest: visitation rights, family reunification, and asylum seekers.¹⁶⁰ As always, the chairman was keen to chide his West German counterpart for tolerating America’s supposed imperialism, but such protestations made little impression on the chancellor. Kohl had been more struck by the stark contrast between Honecker and the new

Soviet general-secretary—men of two different generations and seemingly worlds apart in policy.

A Red Star Rising in the East

Mikhail Gorbachev's election as general secretary was greeted in western Europe with cautious optimism—and with a bit of confusion. One day after Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko succumbed to emphysema, hepatitis, cirrhosis, and heart failure, on 10 March 1985, Gorbachev took his post. "The time of troubles is over and the gerentocracy is ending," joked *Der Spiegel*. At fifty-four years old, Gorbachev was the youngest member of the Politburo. Unlike all of his predecessors, he endured the Nazi invasion and the Great Patriotic War not as a soldier or partisan but as a child on a village farm. The West German press quickly recognized Gorbachev as "a completely new type of Soviet leader."¹⁶¹ Indeed, he "captured the imagination of West Germans in a fashion not seen since the days of former U.S. president John F. Kennedy."¹⁶² Gorbachev spoke eloquently of "openness" (*glasnost*) and "restructuring" (*perestroika*), seemingly at odds with the long history of Soviet authoritarianism. An earlier trip to Britain had made a fine impression on Margaret Thatcher, Geoffrey Howe, and top Cabinet ministers. "[H]is personality could not have been more different from the wooden ventriloquism of the average Soviet *apparatchik*," Thatcher remembered. "I found myself liking him."¹⁶³ Likewise, Mitterrand, contemplating a potential Franco-Russian entente, likewise found Gorbachev a respectable partner. And after years of Soviet policy "seeming to revolve around the age and disease problems of the leadership," noted *Der Spiegel*, the youthful, charismatic Gorbachev represented a bright and rising star in the east.¹⁶⁴

Across the coming two years—1985 and 1986—many of Kohl’s western counterparts grew to respect and, albeit reluctantly, trust Gorbachev; he spoke compellingly of reform, peace, and overcoming the bipolar order. Even the most recalcitrant cold warriors, Reagan and Thatcher, gradually warmed to him. Gorbachev clearly represented a new sort of Soviet leader—not simply the last man standing after decades of enduring Kremlin intrigue. Youthful and urbane, the new general-secretary had impressed Kohl, though not enough to elicit any change in the chancellor’s attitude. After their first meeting at Chernenko’s funeral, “the climate of the conversation remained extremely frosty,” Kohl reported, and when Gorbachev accused the Germans of too readily acquiescing to American machoism, the two quickly found themselves in a debate. Kohl, who sometimes spoke more quickly than he thought, described the new general secretary with the same harsh rhetoric he had hurled at Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. “He is a modern communist leader who simply understands public relations,” Kohl remarked, dismissing Gorbachev. Kohl added: “Goebbels, one of those responsible for the crimes of the Hitler era, was an expert in public relations, too.”¹⁶⁵

Perhaps unintentionally, Kohl’s offhanded jab about the Soviets’ authoritarianism and public misinformation, for which the chancellor was lambasted in the press, went to the heart of Gorbachev’s apprehensions toward him and the Federal Republic. The chancellor’s reliance on patriotic and pseudo-nationalist rhetoric, his focus on German unification, and his frequent invocation of the Nazi past all disturbed Gorbachev. “More people voted for me than voted for Hitler,” Kohl declared to a group of *Newsweek* editors.¹⁶⁶ In Kohl’s thinking, his electoral victory represented West Germans’ readiness to confront their national past. To Gorbachev, it indicated precisely the opposite; a German chancellor who measured himself

against the worst of humankind and, foregoing the usual diplomatic niceties, spoke openly of German unification, could not be trusted as reliable.

But unlike so many of his countrymen, Kohl did not shy away from discussions of Germany's national past. To overcome Yalta and Potsdam indeed required Germans to address what had made the occupation régime and Europe's division necessary—the Nazis' war of aggression. Kohl's willingness to discuss openly his German identity renewed long-repressed traumas of national memory, as both élites and the public at large eagerly debated their historical consciousness and national identity. Suddenly words and phrases once reserved to intellectual circles were plastered across the pages of German dailies: "coming to terms with the past" (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*), "self-awareness problem" (*Bewußtseinsproblem*), "identity politics" (*Identitätspolitik*), and so on. "Psychologically speaking, we have no national identity with which someone who was a child in 1945—or not even born yet—could identify," opined Rudolf Walter Leonhardt in *Die Zeit*. "All in all, this Federal Republic is not a bad state; perhaps it is really the best that ever existed on German soil. But who wants to feel like a 'Federal Republican'?"¹⁶⁷ Had the West Germans, in an effort to seem unthreatening to their neighbors, sacrificed the traditions of their German identity? So long as they remained divided and in indefinite penance for the crimes of Nazism, Leonhardt argued, the German people could not claim to be fully "German." And thus the wounds of 1945 would remain unhealed. "Have we lost our orientation with regard to our history and our identity? Do we no longer know who or what we are?" asked West German President Richard von Weizsäcker. "My Germanness is not an inescapable fate but rather a task," he explained. "That question—'What is that actually: German?'—becomes a question I must answer to myself and before history."¹⁶⁸

As West Germans answered those questions in the mid 1980s, they did so within the context of their own times—as easterners and westerners alike spoke of European peace, as specialists and the public at large debated NATO’s new nuclear deployments, and as even reluctant Europeans celebrated the progress made behind Delors’ direction. Leading the continent in forming a European consciousness, West Germans were confronted with their own peculiar national development, division, and identity. In a seminal address, Weizsäcker addressed that struggle of his countrymen: “We Germans have had a hard time dealing with [our history]. The history of the German Reich in this century and the terrible crimes committed in the name of Germans have blemished the term ‘German’ and ultimately led to the division of Germany,” he explained.¹⁶⁹ To atone for the sins of Hitler, West Germans understood they must demonstrate incontrovertible fidelity to peace in Europe. Kohl and his Union-Liberal coalition believed they could serve European stability and prosperity through the dual strategy of (1) pursuing military balance between east and west at the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic levels and (2) fixing the Federal Republic within robust international institutions—NATO, the EC, the EMS, and the Helsinki network. Meanwhile, Schmidt’s resignation and the fallout from the INF dispute had driven the opposition further toward the left. Among the Greens and even within the traditionally moderate SPD, partisans called for West German neutralism; the “europeanization of Europe” underway ultimately could yield total independence between the superpowers. But as the Cold War wore on and the superpowers forfeited the advances made during the détente era, what approach toward peace would prove genuine?

Germany Abandoned

Polarization within Bonn's political spectrum was compounded by the quick succession of east-west summits between 1985 and 1989; paradoxically, as the two superpowers came closer together, the West German government and its opposition grew further apart. Even two decades after its birth, NATO's flexible response doctrine remained just as contested in the 1980s as it had been a generation prior. Laced as it was with "unresolved ambiguities" and premised on "an unavoidable compromise," flexible response continued to present West Germans with an abandonment-entrapment paradox.¹⁷⁰ Diverging interests among the western allies provoked European fears of *abandonment* by the Americans; should the risks facing the U.S. become too great, Washington may abandon Europe to the Soviet aggressor. Simultaneously, loyalty to the alliance may force the Europeans to accede to U.S. leadership, even if reckless or unwise, thus facing the Europeans with *entrapment* to superpower hegemony.¹⁷¹ The attitude among the West German right, including that of Kohl and Defense Minister Manfred Wörner, was to fear abandonment by the Americans—that the Reagan administration might bargain away necessary theater forces in order to reach an agreement with the Kremlin. On the left, both among the Greens and in the SPD, Germans grew suspicious of entrapment—that reckless White House policies might pull the Germans into a conflict that had been stoked by the U.S. "The peace movement thought deployment coupled the allies too tightly," explained SPD foreign-policy spokesman Karsten Voigt, and "the right fears arms control will decouple West Germany" altogether.¹⁷²

Years of incoherent and inconsistent American foreign and defense policy, in combination with effective Soviet propaganda campaigns and Soviet-backed European "peace initiatives," had undermined NATO's doctrine of deterrence and flexible response in the minds of many Europeans. Kohl, along with his predecessors dating back to the late

1960s, had hoped for a comprehensive and unified western strategy to overcome Cold War tensions: pursue security by military balance between west and east at the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic levels and simultaneously seek détente with the Soviet Union. But despite remarkable consistency across the governments of Brandt, Schmidt, and Kohl, Washington suffered precisely the opposite, veering radically from one policy to the next, all the while expecting the allies to accede to American leadership.

As early as the 1960s, as they hammered out NATO's MC 14/3, the Europeans and Americans could not arrive at a common threat assessment vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. In 1969, while NATO strategists sketched out new defense plans in Brussels, American SALT negotiators in Helsinki operated at cross purposes, raising questions in Bonn about what precisely were U.S. goals. Compounding those inconsistencies was the leaked information in 1974 about the so-called Schlesinger doctrine, which relied on falsely optimistic assessments of NATO's conventional preparedness in the Central Region and called for an increased reliance on those conventional forces. Three years later, a new American administration promised to eliminate "all nuclear weapons from this earth," with Carter rattling his European counterparts and undermining the credibility of America's extended deterrence over western Europe. With seeming contradiction, Carter spent much of the next two years browbeating Helmut Schmidt into accepting enhanced-radiation weapons in the Federal Republic, only to cancel the deployments after the chancellor's political capital had been spent and his credibility largely destroyed. Finally in the last year of Carter's administration, the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* published leaked reports of the president's new directive for "nuclear weapons employment policy." In the wake of Middle East instability, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, disputes with the Kremlin over human rights, and Soviet

interference throughout the Third World, Carter's PD-59, the press alleged, lowered the United States' threshold for launching nuclear strikes against its adversaries. A president who had come into office believing nuclear weapons were fundamentally unusable and should be destroyed—thus facing the Europeans with abandonment—left office four years later planning for a protracted nuclear war relegated to Europe—thus facing the allies with entrapment. A year later Ronald Reagan entered the White House. Similarly, he told reporters that he could envision a nuclear war limited to Europe, unleashing a political storm across the continent and earning the quick denunciation of nearly every NATO ally. Reagan was, in the estimation of Karsten Voigt, “fueling fear” and sending mixed signals about the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence.¹⁷³ Reagan's subsequent condemnation of the USSR as “the focus of evil in the modern world” and, days later, his promise to render deterrence obsolete with a new Strategic Defense Initiative, compounded European panic, again undercutting allied trust in the wisdom and leadership of American leaders.

Since the late 1960s, the Americans had seemingly moved from a *deterrence mindset* toward a *war-fighting mindset* and posture; whereas nuclear war once had seemed impossible, by the 1980s, the American president was contemplating an “exchange of tactical weapons” without “it bringing [in] either of the major powers.”¹⁷⁴ Owing to leaks to the press, much of those debates—however misinformed—unfolded in the pages of American and west European newspapers; simultaneously, a classified debate carried on among defense intellectuals, at NATO Headquarters, and particularly within NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. But because the alliance's strategic concept had been premised on, as Horst Ehmke argued, “an unavoidable compromise” and was laced with “unresolved ambiguities,”

maintaining an effective deterrent required more than a codified interallied agreement; the western allies in mutual good faith needed to find a consensus.

Reaching such a transatlantic consensus, however, proved terribly difficult. Though Kohl respected and trusted Reagan, most defense intellectuals and career civil servants remained skeptical. Reagan's White House seemed to be operating from haphazard defense planning, presenting Europeans with a succession of contradictions. The president had vehemently defended Europe's nuclear weapons and then promised to abolish them altogether; he pledged peace and then joked to a radio host that "we begin bombing [the USSR] in five minutes"; he insisted upon his unproven Strategic Defense Initiative to protect America from nuclear weapons, and then allowed the program to sink a bilateral agreement with the Soviets to rid the world of nuclear arms; he invoked NATO solidarity in the face of interallied disagreements during the INF dispute and in response to foreign terrorism and then failed to consult the allies regarding his disarmament negotiations with Gorbachev.¹⁷⁵ Meanwhile Reagan knew the skepticism with which he was viewed. "I know I'm being criticized for not having made a great speech outlining what would be the Reagan foreign policy," Reagan confided to a friend. "I just don't think it's wise to always stand up and put quotation marks in front of the world what your foreign policy is."¹⁷⁶ If Reagan indeed possessed a foreign policy, its nuances were lost in Europe; the Americans seemed to be conducting foreign policy without an end in sight and ultimately without consulting their allies.¹⁷⁷ His was "a zig-zag policy," argued *Der Spiegel*.¹⁷⁸

The Soviets readily understood the divisions within the western alliance. "Notwithstanding the appearance of relative solidarity in NATO and among other allies, there is no unity," reported a top-secret Soviet briefing paper. Immediately after taking

office, Gorbachev requested his aide Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev prepare a candid assessment of the American president. “The U.S. is watching its allies with concern,” Yakovlev advised. The Soviet Union, then should “undertake a certain reorientation of our foreign policy” toward Europe with an aim to exploit tensions among the western allies.¹⁷⁹ In his first meeting with the Central Committee’s secretaries, Gorbachev advised continuation of the Soviets’ propaganda campaign in western Europe, including continued support for the European peace movements, hoping to capitalize on the transatlantic rift. “The European direction of our diplomatic, political, and other actions is extremely important for us,” he warned.¹⁸⁰

Kohl’s Germany represented an opportune target. Compared with his European counterparts, by the start of 1986, the chancellor battled low public approval ratings, and Bonn’s political spectrum was becoming more polarized; the European peace movements had upset West Germany’s traditional centers of political power, and new voices, including the Greens, were entering the partisan fracas; most importantly, other western governments hoped to move their goods into increasingly open eastern markets, and thus Bonn’s share of trade beyond the Iron Curtain would be diminished.¹⁸¹ Reagan had impressed upon Gorbachev his desire for a Soviet-American rapprochement, diminishing Bonn’s traditional role as interlocutor. If Kohl hoped to build a productive relationship with the Soviets, his government would need to temper its support for America’s brash policies, especially SDI.¹⁸²

Beyond isolating West Germany, Gorbachev targeted Kohl personally. No sooner than their frosty first meeting at Chernenko’s funeral, Gorbachev began marginalizing Kohl among his counterparts within Europe. “One could feel that [Kohl] was very concerned about the

present situation,” Gorbachev told the Central Committee secretaries. Moreover, “Britain, France, Italy, and other NATO countries are actively pushing ahead of the Federal Republic in their efforts to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union,” he noted. The Kremlin’s topmost European policy, then, should be to divide the western alliance by cleaving West Germany from its allies—to paint Kohl as truculent and unreliable, ultimately an impediment to improved east-west relations. As the gulf widened between the West German left and right, Gorbachev hoped Kohl and his coalition would lose the next federal election. Unlike his Kremlin predecessors, the new general-secretary embraced the European left as allies and equals. He shared a good rapport with Willy Brandt and favored a left-leaning SPD victory in the FRG.¹⁸³ By January 1987, Gorbachev had twice met with Johannes Rau, leader of the SPD opposition and the social-democratic candidate for chancellor. Even more than a year later, Gorbachev had not met the sitting chancellor aside from their “frosty” encounter at Chernenko’s funeral. Only in October 1988, three and a half years after taking office, did Gorbachev meet with Kohl.¹⁸⁴

Gorbachev’s campaign proved successful, and despite Kohl’s proclamation that “1985 must become the year of negotiations!” the German chancellor found himself marginalized—from the Americans and from his European counterparts.¹⁸⁵ Proving his supreme credentials as a cold warrior had cost him much of the goodwill the West Germans had accumulated beyond the Iron Curtain. More importantly, Bonn—once the indispensable interlocutor of superpower relations—lost its pride of place within international affairs. The year 1985, and indeed 1986, became years of negotiations Kohl had imagined, but the West Germans largely watched from the sidelines as U.S.-Soviet relations started to improve.

Table 4.1. West Germany's Main Trading Partners, 1985: Exports

	<i>DM (billions)</i>
France	61
U.S.	56
Netherlands	46
UK	45
Italy	40
Belgium and Luxembourg	37
Switzerland	30
Austria	28
Sweden	15
Denmark	11

Totals in table 4.1 account for 69.5 percent of West German total exports.

Table 4.2. West Germany's Main Trading Partners, 1985: Imports

	<i>DM (billions)</i>
Netherlands	57
France	49
Italy	38
UK	38
U.S.	38
Belgium and Luxembourg	29
Japan	21
Switzerland	18
Austria	16
Soviet Union	15

Totals in table 4.2 account for 66.9 percent of West German total imports. Source: *Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die BRD* (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 1985); in William D. Graf, ed., *The Internationalization of the German Political Economy: Evolution of a Hegemonic Project* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992), 242.

Getting to Zero

At the heart of NATO's dual-track decision had been the alliance's coercive guarantee that, should the superpowers not reach an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, the Americans would deploy 572 new missiles in the European theater by the autumn of 1983. Washington and Moscow both prepared negotiating positions and despatched ambassadors to Geneva, where year after year, talks drug on with little result. Since 1980, the Germans had observed those negotiations with apprehension. Though Bonn was officially excluded from the talks, a Special Consultative Group (SCG) within NATO provided West German officials a forum for consultation with the Americans who would be sitting across the negotiating table from the Soviets. Whereas early SCG meetings had been extremely productive, described by West German delegates as "very extensive," by about 1982, the Americans were subverting the consultative process, hiding from the SCG positions the Reagan administration feared the Europeans might find too provocative.¹⁸⁶

For Bonn, the Geneva talks and participation in NATO's SCG seemed to offer great promise. The West Germans lacked the clout to advance their own arms-control agenda, but an apparent willingness by the Americans to negotiate and a guaranteed mechanism for West German consultation offered them a role they had been previously denied. Still, dating back to the 1960s, Bonn's arms-control agenda had appeared to the allies as exceedingly technocratic; the West Germans were not interested in arms control for its own sake but aimed for a comprehensive approach that would balance forces in Europe at the conventional and sub-strategic levels. That message, however, never fully registered in east or west, and West German foreign policy seemed, as Gorbachev later told Genscher, a tangle of contradictions: the Germans wanted arms control but only the elimination of certain

weapons; they boasted the strongest conventional forces on the continent but feared NATO's strategic doctrine might rely too heavily on conventional forces; they resisted installation of American theater nuclear weapons but worried that the Reagan administration might then negotiate them away. As Bundeswehr planners knew well, a bad arms-control agreement could prove far more dangerous than the status quo; if the superpowers were to negotiate away their intermediate-range nuclear forces (as they ultimately would do in 1987), the Federal Republic could be decoupled from the Americans' extended deterrent and made vulnerable to the Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces. But many Americans, including Reagan himself, had fetishized "arms control for the sake of arms control," West Germans feared, naively supposing "the alternative to arms control is nuclear perdition."¹⁸⁷

The Federal Republic's exposed position vis-à-vis the eastern bloc continued to trouble Bundeswehr planners. NATO's conventional forces faced off against a Warsaw Pact redoubled in strength and qualitatively more formidable than the east bloc forces of a decade earlier. Meanwhile, NATO's ground forces had dwindled from their levels when Forward Defense had been instituted. Of the Bundeswehr's twelve divisions, all but one had been committed to defense at the front. The formidable BAOR, with its three divisions deployed flanking the Braunschweig approach, faced troop reductions owing to Whitehall's commitment to modernize its nuclear deterrent. The French Forces in Germany (FFA) likewise battled budget cuts, with Paris planning increased appropriations to France's *Force de dissuasion*. The Dutch and Belgians maintained their small numbers, though by 1986, Belgium met only thirty-eight percent of its NATO force goals.¹⁸⁸ Western planners remained loathe to construct formidable barrier defenses, refusing to capitulate to the permanence of

Germany's division, and thus forcing NATO ground forces, already too few in number and with minimal reserves, to hold a rigid defensive position against the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, the Soviets had adapted their operational method to capitalize on NATO's weaknesses—namely dwindling reserves and lack of barrier defenses. Warsaw Pact strategists had replaced their earlier “steamroller approach” in ground combat with dynamic and adaptable plans meant to probe western vulnerabilities and create “strong points” to penetrate western defenses with operational maneuver groups—the Soviets’ answer to Forward Defense. “Even if NATO had adequate warning of an impending attack and acted on that warning in a timely manner,” warned one analyst, “it could still easily find itself in a position worse than the French faced in 1940.”¹⁸⁹

To West German defense specialists, the INF dispute and the ensuing arms-control negotiations illustrated NATO's “gray area” problem—a challenge, as Kristina Spohr has argued, “less military than political.”¹⁹⁰ The greatest threat to the Germans, Bonn defense planners believed, was not a sudden Warsaw Pact offensive against the west; it was Moscow's ability to extort concessions from West Germany. With parity at the strategic level and superiority at the conventional level, the Kremlin could take advantage of ostensible western weakness at the sub-strategic level, leveraging Soviet military power to blackmail Bonn politically. Therefore, in every NATO strategic and operational plan for defense of western Europe, Bonn had pressed the need to avoid “singularization”; the West Germans could not be perceived to be any more vulnerable than their allies, neither concentrating the Bundeswehr's conventional forces in a single area nor hosting any weapons system not also deployed elsewhere in Europe.¹⁹¹ The entire mission of the Bundeswehr lay at stake. Werner Altenburg, who assumed command as Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr in

1983, had been the first in his post not to have served in the Wehrmacht; he was, according to *Die Zeit*, “the product of a deterrence army—a manager, not a fighter.”¹⁹²

Moreover, West Germans now suffered from an ostensible “gap in NATO’s spectrum of escalation” (*Lücke im Eskalationsspektrum der NATO*); the alliance had fewer escalatory options available than when Flexible Response had been first adopted, owing both to uneven investments in NATO’s defenses and augmented Soviet capabilities. Improved Soviet air defenses, for instance, required NATO’s F-111 tactical attack aircraft, based in the British Isles, to fly less direct routes to their targets in the western USSR, reducing their range of operation and altogether weakening NATO’s position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact.¹⁹³ Flexible response no longer guaranteed a “flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses,” and the intermediate-range nuclear forces had become, in the estimation of one Pentagon analyst, “an orphan between the strategic and conventional forces.”¹⁹⁴ Weaknesses in flexible response threatened a long-held nightmare for Bonn: a war absent the allies, in which West Germans fought only against their GDR brothers.¹⁹⁵

From the earliest days of the INF debates, talk of avoiding the deployments altogether grew louder and louder. As early as 1978 and 1979, the Belgian and Dutch social-democratic parties contemplated a “zero option” for intermediate-range nuclear forces on the continent. Preparing for their 1979 party conference in Berlin, West German Social Democrats studied a similar concept. The following spring, Alfons Pawelczyk, a prominent SPD security intellectual, refined his party’s Berlin resolution, proposing that NATO should abandon the scheduled INF deployments should the Soviets drastically cut their medium-range missiles in the European theater. The FDP followed suit two months later and at their

June 1980 party conference in Freiburg, calling for a total elimination of the Soviets' SS-20s to avoid deployment of NATO's 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 GLCMs.¹⁹⁶ By 1981, the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache ("Association for German Language") chose *Null-Lösung* ("zero solution") its official word of the year.¹⁹⁷

With Helmut Schmidt still chancellor, in the summer of 1981, the Foreign Office's Arms Control Department called for a "global zero solution" to the INF question, proposing that the Americans and Soviets eliminate all ground-launched INF globally. The idea built on the Liberals' proposal from the previous summer, with Genscher leveraging his position as foreign minister to advance his party's platform. In principle, Schmidt supported this global zero solution, though he recognized that it effectively would destroy NATO's strategic concept of Flexible Response and risked decoupling West Germany from the United States. Realistically, as Schmidt and Genscher both knew, any U.S.-Soviet agreement on INF would likely fall far short of such a goal, and NATO could adjust accordingly.

The CDU/CSU on the other hand, rejected any zero option as unworkable—precisely because of the decoupling risk. Before the Bundestag, Manfred Wörner chided the government for entertaining "the total illusion of the so-called zero option." Strauß similarly rejected the offer as foolish, noting that, without the INF, West Germans would be exposed to the Soviets' superior conventional forces.¹⁹⁸ Officially, the Union parties dismissed the zero option as little more than leftist propaganda. They reached a turning point, however, in November 1981, when the American president announced his support for the zero option. Addressing the National Press Club in Washington, Reagan explained that "the United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles."¹⁹⁹ Within two weeks, the CDU

reversed its position, which Kohl announced to the Bundestag on December 3rd. With the Christian Democrats' reversal, each of the major West German political parties had officially adopted a zero position on INF.

During Kohl's first year as chancellor, for political reasons, the position of the Federal Security Council remained to support a zero option as a matter of principle. Recognizing the unfeasibility of the superpowers agreeing to eliminate their intermediate-range nuclear forces, realistically, the government hoped for a global ceiling on LRINF with a subceiling on European deployments. Bonn was keen to avoid compensating for Soviet deployments in the Asian USSR with NATO forces in Europe—matching the Warsaw Pact missile for missile. Kohl spent months trying to persuade the Americans to adopt such an interim position, but hardliners in the Reagan administration made such a shift in U.S. policy impossible—at least until May 1983.

The closest the superpowers came in their negotiations had been in the summer of 1982, when U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze and Soviet ambassador Yuli Alexandrovich Kvitsinsky, walking together in the woods of Saint-Cergue above Geneva, agreed to a compromise: (1) to limit LRINF and INF aircraft in Europe to seventy-five launchers (thus providing for 225 Soviet MIRV warheads and U.S. cruise missiles), (2) to cap INF aircraft for each party at 150, (3) to cap LRINF in the Asian USSR at ninety, (4) to keep SRINF at their present levels, and (5) to negotiate for a verification régime within three months. Both governments repudiated the offer and chided their ambassadors for offering too many concessions. Nitze faced intense criticism back in Washington. Nitze's "still off there in the goddamn woods with Kvitsinsky, cooking up deals to kill the Pershing II," fumed Secretary of State George Shultz.

The Pentagon dismissed the deal as “an act of intellectual and political cowardice.” And Reagan, rejecting the “walk in the woods” formula, instructed Nitze to tell the Soviets “that I am just one tough son of a bitch.” Kvitsinsky received a similar warning: “No more walks in the woods unless you’re under instructions” to do so.²⁰⁰

Nitze’s overture with Kvitsinsky had represented an act of genuine diplomacy; he hoped to balance U.S. and allied strategic interests with the Soviets’ needs for security and their domestic political concerns. “Imagine in advance that narrow strip where both sides could stand comfortably,” he told one of his deputies, “and try to steer the negotiations in that direction.”²⁰¹ Furthermore, Nitze’s primary focus had been “alliance management.” American intransigence in the INF negotiations would fracture the Atlantic alliance, and West German domestic politics would not permit the government to remain steadfast to its deployment commitment. In Washington, however, the administration deliberately concealed the compromise from the SCG, and from the West Germans in particular. By the autumn, however, lower-level officials in Bonn had received “scraps of information” from their American counterparts, and slowly details of the failed compromise came to light.²⁰² Schmidt, whose government had collapsed over the INF issue, responded bitterly when he belatedly learned the truth. “The opportunity created by the ‘walk in the woods’ has been frittered away,” Schmidt remarked. “It would have made for considerably diminished danger for Europe without the loss of parity,” and “I myself would have accepted it at once if I had know about it. But once again, neither the West German government nor the other European governments affected were informed about this walk in the woods or even consulted.”²⁰³ After all, “the real purposes of the INF negotiation was not to achieve an

agreement before deployment of the American missiles,” explained Strobe Talbott; “it was to make sure that the deployment proceeded on schedule.”²⁰⁴

“Much confusion remained in Washington about what exactly West German wishes were,” assessed Ronald Asmus, writing for RAND.²⁰⁵ As Schmidt argued, Bonn feared that American negotiators would fail to take German and European interests into account, either by misreading the strategic situation on the continent or, so keen to achieve a predetermined outcome, fail to negotiate in good faith. Washington had proved in recent years Stanley Hoffmann’s aphorism—that the world remained a mere projection of American rationality; others, in the U.S. worldview, either “are supposed to reason like Americans or to be in need of education to bring them to this level.”²⁰⁶ Washington “ignored,” according to one analyst, Bonn’s plea “either for a more comprehensive deal” as well as German fears of “singularization.”²⁰⁷ “Perhaps some most basic differences can be traced back to the fact that we are here and they are there,” noted the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Europe has gained far more in tangible benefits, some of utmost importance, than has the United States,” the committee assessed, but “the cost/benefit relationship does not look nearly as favorable from an American perspective.”²⁰⁸

Unable to anticipate the outcome of U.S. nuclear planning and disarmament negotiations, prominent voices within the CDU/CSU called for an independent European defense force with its own nuclear deterrent. Franz-Josef Strauß had long agitated for such an organization, along with closer Franco-German consultation on nuclear targeting, and CDU/CSU parliamentary group military spokesman Jürgen Todenhöfer likewise called for a “Eurostrategic nuclear force” with an executive body formed of the European NATO

members.²⁰⁹ Richard von Weizsäcker, honoring the fortieth anniversary of the West German Basic Law, asserted the need for Bonn to pursue its own interests within Europe and the world.²¹⁰ “Restructuring,” according to future Defense Minister Volker Rühe, “will keep our strategy both acceptable and effective with fewer weapons but with a more convincing structure.”²¹¹

Perspectives on the left proved more disparate with attitudes ranging from those who had pragmatically supported INF deployments in Europe to pacifist, pro-Soviet factions. Within the SPD, Schmidt led a small minority of intellectuals who, though critical of inconsistent U.S. positions on arms control, faulted the Soviets for torpedoing the Geneva INF negotiations. Provided NATO avoided West German “singularization” and remained open to comprehensive arms-control negotiations at the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic levels, his faction remained with the alliance.²¹² They argued against the party’s apparent anti-NATO attitudes, with prominent voices including Karl Kaiser, Gesine Schwan, Kurt Sondheimer, and Hartmut Jäckel registering official protests in the party organ *Vorwärts*.²¹³ A second group of political pragmatists effectively adopted the Schmidt line in principle, but as the party’s electorate began to fracture and the base turned against NATO’s INF deployments and modernization, they abandoned the old position. Most prominently Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the SPD parliamentary group and future party chairman, represented this faction, as did a number of the party’s upwardly mobile leaders. Horst Ehmke led a third group of reluctant supporters of the U.S. position. He and his few followers held that NATO’s dual-track decision, though altogether undesirable, had been strategically necessary. Fearing Reagan was too provocative, they blamed the Americans for too readily giving up in the INF negotiations, arguing that “the Reagan administration has

left the common ground.”²¹⁴ A fourth group, including many of the party leaders, were those opposed to any INF deployments in Europe. Many had supported the dual-track decision in 1979 and 1980 but had never believed the forces ultimately would be deployed. Bahr, the most outspoken member of the group, bitterly attacked the U.S. for rejecting Andropov’s offer to reduce Soviet SS-20 deployments to 162 missiles, matching the cumulative number of French and British theater ballistic missiles—an overt bid to sever the Atlantic alliance.²¹⁵ Kohl and the government quickly attacked Bahr as serving a proxy for Soviet interests within Bonn.²¹⁶ A fifth group, led by Oskar Lafontaine and Erhard Eppler, had rejected the dual-track decision from its inception. Some, such as Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, favored a sea-based deterrent rather than matching the Soviets missile-for-missile in central Europe.²¹⁷ Lafontaine, by circuitous logic, argued that any missile deployments would violate the Basic Law, the UN Charter, and West Germany’s accession agreement to NATO.²¹⁸ Finally, a sixth group favored unilateral western disarmament. In increasing numbers, these pacifists abandoned the SPD for the Greens, and though party chairman Brandt himself could not accurately be labeled a pacifist, he often appropriated their language for fear they might leave the Social Democrats.²¹⁹ In the autumn of 1983, Andropov wrote directly to fifty-seven members of that wing of the party, encouraging them to vote against deploying American missiles in their country.

But without result, the Geneva negotiations wore on. “The two world powers,” according to Helmut Schmidt, “were no longer obliged to pay attention to Bonn,” and the West Germans had been faced with “defending their country’s interests against the wishes of not just one but both superpowers.”²²⁰

Superpower Summitry

In Bonn, public officials had long seen arms-control as a quiet, esoteric exercise in which defense specialists negotiated outside of the public eye; that had been the appeal of the Nitze-Kvitsinsky “walk in the woods” compromise—skilled ambassadors, specialists in their fields and steeped in diplomatic protocol, working in private to find common interests. Reagan and Gorbachev, however, each keen to promote himself as the broker of world peace, preferred the highly public venue of an international summit. Such summits had become, however, in the words of one contemporary, “one of the most unfortunate diplomatic inventions of the modern era,” and U.S.-Soviet summits in particular had devolved into terribly unproductive affairs, warned another commentator, “always accompanied by a near carnival atmosphere and inordinately high expectations that can seldom be fulfilled.”²²¹ The West Germans were more inclined to remember Frederick the Great’s admonition: “heads of state should, whenever possible, avoid meeting one another”; more effective negotiations could be accomplished by their plenipotentiaries without the fanfare of international peace bearing down on their efforts.

A populist wave had already swept across Europe during the INF controversy, and the coming age of superpower summitry redoubled its impact. Just as the dispute over the Pershing II missiles should have remained one among a small group of policymakers and defense intellectuals, so too would Reagan and Gorbachev’s high-profile debates over nuclear posture compound public anxiety about nuclear arms. “The days when the formulation of security policy was the domain of a small group of experts” have passed, warned one specialist. Coupled with “a more attentive public”—though perhaps misguided—“security policy issues will continue to be surrounded by public debate and

controversy.”²²² A new class of “counter-élites” had formed, warned another analyst, “willing to organize themselves outside traditional political channels.”²²³ “Peace” had become more than a political goal; by the mid 1980s, it had become a subculture. Academics sponsored “peace research” (*Friedensforschung*), celebrities held “peace conferences,” gymnasts competed in “peace gymnastics” (*Friedensturnerei*), and artisans gathered at “peace markets.” Schoolteachers sponsored “peace education” in their classrooms, mobilizing their pupils and proclaiming their schoolhouses “nuclear-free zones.”²²⁴ And as many misinformed debates played out in the pages of European newspapers and in public squares across the continent, the Soviet propaganda machine pulled the levers of western politics, helping to polarize Bonn’s historically narrow partisan spectrum.

Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time in November 1985. The American president, with neither topcoat nor hat, greeted his tightly bundled Soviet counterpart on the steps of the Chateau Fleur d’Eau on the banks of Lake Geneva. Geneva seemed an appropriate venue for their meeting; after years of fruitless negotiations by their representatives, the two principals themselves would try to find common ground. Since Gorbachev had come into office seven months earlier, the two had exchanged a number of letters, mostly handwritten, already presaging a qualitative shift in U.S.-Soviet relations. For years, Reagan had hoped for a candid face-to-face meeting with the Soviet general-secretary, but, as he asked his wife, “How am I supposed to get anyplace with the Russians if they keep dying on me?”²²⁵ Their first meeting, scheduled for only fifteen minutes, lasted for more than an hour as the two men became acquainted and affirmed their mutual commitment to peace.

Still, both sides entered the summit with sober ambitions. Among the foreign and defense ministries and the KGB, the Soviets remained circumspect in their assessment: “The best we can expect is a joint statement that both sides will proceed from the assumption that nuclear war is unacceptable and unwinnable.”²²⁶ Since March, Gorbachev had issued five major arms-control proposals, either in his exchange of letters with Reagan or in public addresses. Like his American counterpart, Gorbachev hoped to achieve significant disarmament between the superpowers, both as a genuine desire for a stable peace and to alleviate the expensive burden of constant arms modernization. By their second meeting that afternoon, however, the entirety of agenda had been eclipsed by the Americans’ proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. To disarm in good faith, Reagan insisted, SDI was necessary as insurance. Gorbachev believed precisely the opposite; the Soviet Union could never agree to disarm while the Americans militarized space.

To insiders on both sides, the Geneva discussions seemed rather procedural. “We are coming closer to acknowledging that no one will start a war, to understanding that we cannot keep provoking it either in the name of communism, or in the name of capitalism,” reflected Gorbachev’s top aide, Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev.²²⁷

Ultimately, the Geneva summit produced little more than “improvements in the atmospherics” of superpower relations.²²⁸ The greatest achievement at Geneva was Reagan and Gorbachev’s agreement in principle to frame an interim agreement on the troubled INF question—to find ways of protecting both U.S. and Soviet interests in Europe with lower levels of weapons.²²⁹ In his dinner toast on the final evening in Geneva, Gorbachev quoted from Ecclesiastes. “There is a time for everything,” he said. “For everything there is a season, and a time for every purpose under the heavens: a time to be born, and a time to die, . . . a

time to break down, and a time to build up, . . . a time to throw away the stones, and a time to gather the stones together.” But despite his hopeful tone, the time for an east-west rapprochement had not yet arrived.

In the months that followed the Geneva summit and across the summer of 1986, Genscher played a round of shuttle diplomacy between the Soviets and Americans, hoping to facilitate an east-west agreement—and more importantly to assert Bonn’s role as player between the superpowers. Anticipating Geneva, the Germans (and most of the allies) had barely been consulted at all as Washington prepared for negotiations. And in the months that followed, both the Soviets and the Americans placed so many conditions on a future INF accord that agreement would become impossible. Breaking such an impasse appealed both to Genscher’s talents and to Bonn’s need to overcome West German marginalization. With a “lightening-fast visit” to Washington in the summer, Genscher tried to persuade Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger of the Soviets’ “peaceful intentions.” Gorbachev, Genscher advised, could be counted on as a “serious partner,” a genuinely new breed of Soviet leader. Quickly then visiting Moscow, Genscher met with Gorbachev. “The general-secretary knew me and wanted to meet me,” Genscher noted; whereas, in Washington, “the president was deeply concerned with avoiding me.”²³⁰ After all, Gorbachev understood the precarious internal politics in Bonn. A high-profile diplomatic victory for Genscher may undermine the chancellor, whom he still had not received. Ultimately, however, German efforts had little bearing on the superpowers. “The Europeans and West Germans,” Helmut Schmidt remarked, were expected to play “only the role of friendly, applauding audience—just as they did a year later, when Gorbachev and Reagan met a second time, in Reykjavík, to discuss the fate of the world.”²³¹

At Geneva, Reagan and Gorbachev had agreed to subsequent summits in on another's capitals; the Reykjavík meeting was simply meant as an interim, in Gorbachev's thinking, to "demonstrate political will." After a series of low-level diplomatic upheavals—not least some mutually embarrassing spy exchanges—that threatened to undermine the spirit of their Geneva progress, Gorbachev appealed to his American counterpart for an informal get-together, "maybe just for one day."²³² Still, the Soviets had arrived to Iceland better prepared and with a panoply of bargaining positions to offer; the Americans, anticipating a less formal affair than prevailed in Geneva, did not. Eighteen months in his post, Gorbachev faced unparalleled domestic challenges. In April, a catastrophic disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear facility and the botched government response claimed dozens of lives and exposed to the world the decrepit state of east bloc infrastructure; a surplus of crude sunk the price of oil and destabilized the Soviet economy; and in its seventh year, the war in Afghanistan continued to consume untold blood and treasure with no end in sight. Gorbachev feared that his country and the world stood at the edge of a great precipice. "Our goal is to prevent the next round of the arms race," he told his aides. "And if we do not compromise on some questions, even very important ones, we will lose the main point: we will be pulled into an arms race beyond our power." He struck an ominous tone. "And we will lose this race, for we are presently at the limit of our capabilities."²³³ His people stood at the hinge of a new phase of history; they must reform because "neither we nor America can carry the burden of an arms race any longer."²³⁴ Chernyaev detailed in his diary Gorbachev's shift in thinking. "My impression is that he's decided to end the arms race no matter what. He is taking this 'risk' because, as he understands it, it's no risk at all—because nobody would attack us if we

disarmed completely. And in order to get the country out on solid ground, we have to relieve it of the burden of the arms race, which is a drain on more than just the economy.”²³⁵

Nuclear weapons could no longer save the Soviet Union, Gorbachev believed, but they could destroy it. And while the American president seemed determined to bring the Cold War into outer space, back on earth, the Soviets could barely keep food in the grocery or basic consumer goods in the shops. And talk of nuclear abolition—what had begun as a propaganda ploy against the west—took on real dimensions.²³⁶ “I can pinpoint the exact time when Gorbachev placed his stake on a direct dialogue with the American leadership,” Chernyaev reflected. “It was at the very beginning of 1986.”²³⁷ Gorbachev told the Politburo: by the year 2000, the Soviet Union would have liquidated its nuclear arsenal.

Meeting with Reagan, Gorbachev offered an unprecedented package of concessions, first in person and then reiterated by Chief of the General Staff Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeyev. From a fifty-percent cut in strategic offensive arms to a relaxed position on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev candidly told Reagan “we are ready to seek a compromise solution and are even agreeing to considerable risk for this sake.” The Soviets withdrew their objection that British and French weapons must be counted in western totals, overcoming the chief impediment to years of failed INF talks.²³⁸ Furthermore, Gorbachev offered to freeze the numbers of short-range missiles and to negotiate for their elimination—indeed “a great concession,” he admitted. Gorbachev even withdrew the Soviet objection to SDI research, provided it remain confined to laboratories. His only precondition: any progress on INF negotiations must be linked to mutual readiness to limit strategic arms through START I.²³⁹

The American delegation remained, by comparison less prepared. “We came with nothing to offer and had offered nothing,” remembered one American negotiator; “we merely sat there while the Soviets unwrapped their gifts.”²⁴⁰ Briefed before departing for Iceland, aides warned the president “you will have to smoke him out during your discussions” and to avoid “raising false expectations.”²⁴¹ Reagan arrived then, prepared only to hold firm to U.S. positions on arms control and on SDI and to “convince Gorbachev of the wisdom of our step-by-step approach.”²⁴² Enchanted by Gorbachev’s talk of abolition, Reagan even suggested that the two of them return to Iceland in ten years’ time and disarm the world’s last two nuclear weapons. But the Strategic Defense Initiative remained strictly non-negotiable. When Gorbachev refused to concede his position, Reagan walked out. “We have come very close to accomplishing this historic task,” Shevardnadze pleaded, hoping to salvage negotiations. “And when future generations read the record of our talks, they will not forgive us if we let this opportunity slip by.”²⁴³ But with no deal in place, the Americans abandoned the offer.

Back in Washington, the president received a hero’s welcome; he refused to back down and American firmness had one the day. In Moscow, Gorbachev appeased hardliners in the Politburo with his report on Reykjavík, recounting the president’s “extreme primitivism, caveman outlook, and intellectual impotence.”²⁴⁴ But in the four months that followed, both men ruminated on the failure in Iceland. Reagan, battling the Iran-Contra scandal, faced with an opposition Congress, and soon to be a lame duck, had been captivated by Gorbachev’s proposal for “a nuclear-free world by 2000.”²⁴⁵ And Gorbachev, who had seen an INF agreement in his grasp only to slip through his fingers, longed to recapture that initiative. “For ourselves first and foremost, keep in mind the task of knocking the Pershing

Its out of Europe. It is a gun pressed to our temple,” he told his aides. “We have a strong position here: to remove all intermediate-range missiles from Europe.”²⁴⁶ The only apparent leverage that remained was to withdraw Moscow’s demand that an INF agreement be linked to progress on START. With his closest aides, Gorbachev contemplated the move. “There exists an opportunity to achieve agreement on disarmament,” Yakovlev advised his boss, “but only if we ‘untie’ the Reykjavík package.”²⁴⁷ By the end of February 1987, he had reached his decision. “No matter how difficult it is to do business with the United States, we are doomed to it,” he told the Politburo.²⁴⁸

By the October 1986 Reykjavík summit, many Europeans had come to trust Gorbachev more than Reagan.²⁴⁹ The American president seemed dangerously indecisive. He had discredited the nuclear deterrent, but when given the opportunity to eliminate the nuclear threat itself, he demurred—all to preserve his unproven Star Wars program, which remained unpopular in Europe. Officials across the continent had been shocked by “the Reykjavík scare.”²⁵⁰ Reagan had completely discarded the alliance’s new “General Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons in the Defense of NATO,” which after a year of negotiation, had been agreed to in October. Instead, absent allied consultation, the Americans unilaterally contemplated a new deal with Moscow. Indeed, not even SACEUR General Bernard Rogers had been consulted by the White House regarding the elimination in intermediate-range nuclear forces.²⁵¹ James Callaghan penned an article from retirement denouncing Reagan’s actions. “As for Europe, the recent debate reminds us once again how valuable a stronger European presence in world affairs will be,” he wrote. “Our voices were not heard in Reykjavík, even though we have two nuclear powers in our ranks, our total

population is greater than either the United States or the Soviet Union, and our GNP is bigger than that of either superpower.”²⁵² Furthermore, after years of Anglo-American cooperation as Whitehall modernized its Trident deterrent, American unilateralism proved all the more shocking. Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey railed against U.S. policy. “The Reagan administration’s proposals at Reykjavík and its Strategic Defense Initiative suggest to many Europeans that America is now primarily concerned with establishing a continental sanctuary across the Atlantic, whatever the consequences for the security of Europe,” he wrote. “The nightmares which NATO sought to exorcise in the 1960s are back again, more frightening than ever.”²⁵³

“Bonn’s Christian Democrats fear a deal between the superpowers,” opined *Der Spiegel*.²⁵⁴ Nearly a decade of careful diplomacy from Bonn had resulted in only setbacks: the zero option, which had originated in Germany, threatened now to become reality; Schmidt’s and Kohl’s efforts to assert Bonn as an interlocutor between east and west had been stymied by Reagan and Gorbachev; and the only offer for a comprehensive program of arms reductions, linking the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic levels—since 1969, the goal of the Bonn government—had failed. In private, Kohl and his ministers admitted they had been altogether shut out from Reagan’s thinking and the superpower tête-à-tête. “A certain sobriety has set in on my part of the political spectrum in terms of the interests of the United States,” conceded Karl Lamers, the party’s disarmament spokesman.²⁵⁵ The zero option, though the party’s official stance since December 1981, had been a bluff—a political ruse to win moderate support for Kohl’s “coalition of the middle” and to uphold Genscher’s promise for continuity in foreign policy. The party’s defense specialists—Alfred Dregger, Jürgen Todenhöfer, and Alois Mertes—had been convinced that the Soviets would never

accept such an offer.²⁵⁶ But now, as Teltschik worried, the Reykjavík formula “could make a war in Europe more probable”—unless Reagan and Gorbachev mutually eliminated their strategic forces.²⁵⁷ They had been outmaneuvered by Reagan’s “right-wing pacifism.”²⁵⁸ The opposition seized on the government’s failed policies, arguing that the east-west challenge could not be “armed away”; only by “political efforts” could NATO actually achieve security in Europe.²⁵⁹ And among the Greens, eighty-two percent of members preferred neutrality between east and west and no American troops in West Germany.²⁶⁰ Kohl had entered the political wilderness.

A State of Penance

“In my next life I shall be a Jew or a Spaniard or an Eskimo or just a fully committed anarchist like everybody else But a German I shall never be—you do it once as a penance and that’s it.” So asserted John le Carré’s Alexis in his 1983 spy thriller *The Little Drummer Girl*.²⁶¹ In his early years in office, Helmut Kohl had come fully to appreciate the hazards of his German identity. Like no other time in postwar history, the complexities of German *nationhood* permeated the meaning of German *statehood*, and questions long answered by the Yalta-Potsdam settlement were being reopened—not least by the chancellor himself.

Despite his ultimate achievements, those early years in office almost saw Kohl’s political undoing. By early 1987, the chancellor faced enemies at every turn and a better than even chance that either he or his party would fall. Kohl had come into office promising a “coalition of the middle,” but five years later, partisan infighting and palace intrigue threatened to topple the government. His relationship with Strauß, always strained, had boiled over into

an open feud, splashed across the pages of West Germany's dailies. Strauß humiliated the chancellor publicly, intimating that he would withdraw from the CDU/CSU partnership, as he saw Kohl too much of a political liability.²⁶² Having resigned his post as party chairman, Genscher likewise publicly condescended to the chancellor: "I feel sorry for Kohl," Genscher told ZDF.²⁶³ Perhaps more importantly, internal polling data at CDU headquarters showed that Kohl indeed represented a liability for the party in the coming federal election. "No chancellor before him had to put up with such a lack of political support," warned party elder Rüdiger Altmann; Kohl should step down, he counseled.²⁶⁴ Were Kohl to continue on as the party's standard-bearer, the Christian Democrats may again find themselves as the opposition. Even CDU general-secretary Heiner Geißler, writing to the 251 district chairmen, made no mention of Kohl in a six-page letter touting the government's achievements. And the greatest accomplishment in recent years—recovery from the economic recession and return to prosperity—had been largely credited to Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and not to Kohl himself. A scandal involving insider dealing and financial irregularities—the so-called Flick affair—followed by Kohl's misleading statements to the press, further weakened the chancellor's position. A modest cabinet reshuffle in the summer of 1986 did little restore confidence, and by the late summer, even loyal observers prepared for the coming "regicide."

Most egregiously, a rash of antisemitic statements from Christian Democrats across 1986 reflected poorly on Kohl—the man who had declared Germany ready to confront its violent past and who, despite the Nazi legacy, hoped to redeem German conservatism. Hermann Fellner, a CSU backbencher, demanded that the Jews show "more sensitivity to the Germans" and leave the Holocaust in the past. "The Jews are quick in coming forward

whenever they spotted gold in German coffers,” he remarked. Both Kohl and Strauß stepped in to repair the political damage, but gaffes from both men only compounded the scandal. Within weeks, a local CDU Rhineland Mayor, Wilderich Freiherr von Mirbach Graf von Spee, wanted that “several rich Jews will have to be killed in order to balance the 1986 budget,” and shortly thereafter, the party’s youth organization, the Junge Union, issued a newsletter condemning Israel, decrying the “arrogance of Israel to make our democratic nation responsible for murdering Jews.”²⁶⁵ Kohl, already in a difficult political position, worked to insulate himself from the fallout, but his lack of a resolute response only further emboldened his critics.

Most importantly, Kohl had been completely marginalized in world affairs. On the heels of his gaffe comparing his electoral victory to Hitler’s and Holocaust denial within his own party, Kohl again invoked the Nazi past, equating the Reykjavík meeting with the 1938 Munich conference. Kohl’s great-power neighbors negotiated war and peace for his country without so much inviting the Germans to consult. “It was then that the world powers fell into a trap,” Kohl warned; “they fell for the peace talk of Hitler, who unleashed the Second World War the following year.”²⁶⁶ That was the very definition of Adenauer’s “Potsdam complex,” his “nightmare of coalitions against Germany”—in the absence of a final peace treaty, to have the superpowers negotiating directly and for Bonn to lose control over West Germany’s destiny.²⁶⁷ Kohl faced that prospect more seriously than any chancellor since Adenauer himself.

Kohl spoke openly and often of national unification, of his “Fatherland’s” proud past, of “duty” to the *Volk*. And while critics accused him of authoritarian tendencies, Kohl believed that only by confronting the past could Germans hope to overcome their own national

division and the division of Europe.²⁶⁸ But the political realities of the age seemed to dash his aspirations, and the chancellor's "spiritual leadership" was failing to gather followers. After five years in office, Kohl seemed a different man than the gregarious and energetic candidate he once had been. His duties as chancellor had aged him considerably, and though only fifty-six, he appeared much older. He had gained considerable weight, his hair was noticeably thinning, and deep worry lines marked his face. Like Brandt, he seemed to battle a sense of *Amtsmüdigkeit* ("fatigue of office") and showed few signs of recovery.²⁶⁹

In the coming years, amid the tensions of transatlantic relations and superpower diplomacy, Kohl ultimately would find his redemption. To the Americans, he represented the best hope for continued U.S. security in Europe; to the Soviets, he represented the dangers inherent in the German problem—conservative nationalism, a "change-through-strength" mentality, and talk of national reunification.

Table 4.4. Proposals for an INF “Zero Solution”: A Summary

Belgian and Dutch Zero Discussions c. 1979	In 1978 and 1979, within the Belgian and Dutch social-democratic parties, specialists contemplated a “zero option.” Though the West Germans, British, and Americans either rejected the ideas or did not take them seriously, talk of a “zero option” began to make the rounds in NATO circles.
SPD Berlin Resolution Early 1979	Before NATO adopted the dual-track decision, the West German Social Democrats, preparing for the 1979 party conference in Berlin, contemplated a zero option. The SPD working group responsible for the policy considered looser terms than the party would advance later. The resolution did not expect the Soviets to dismantle <i>all</i> SS-20s (<i>i.e.</i> , including those in the Asian USSR). Unlike future iterations of the zero option, the Berlin resolution considered British and French missiles in western totals—a position the United States later rejected.
Pawelczyk Proposal April 1980	The West German SPD’s Alfons Pawelczyk, head of the Studiengruppe Internationale Sicherheit der Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik and director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Gesprächskreises Sicherheit und Abrüstung, refined the party’s earlier Berlin resolution. Pawelczyk proposed that U.S. deployments of the 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles be abandoned provided the Soviet Union drastically cut its medium-range missiles in the European theater.
FDP Freiburg Resolution June 1980	The West German Free Democrats, at their June 1980 party conference in Freiburg, called for a total elimination of the Soviet SS-20s to avoid deployment of NATO’s 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 GLCMs. Genscher later pointed to the FDP’s 1980 proposal as evidence that he had been the genius behind the future INF Treaty.
Schmidt Proposal	Helmut Schmidt supported the zero option in principle but remained typically less specific about the details. He most closely adhered to the 1979 Berlin resolution, stipulating that the Soviets must withdraw their SS-20s far beyond the Urals to the Asian USSR. Unlike Ronald Reagan, Schmidt did not believe that the goal of a zero option should preclude negotiations that fell short of that goal.
Global Zero Proposal Summer 1981	During the summer of 1981, the West German Foreign Ministry’s Arms-Control Department proposed a “global zero option” proposing that the Americans and Soviets eliminate all ground-launched LRINF missiles globally. The idea built on the FDP’s proposal from the previous summer, with Genscher leveraging his position as foreign minister to advance his party’s platform. Schmidt also supported this global zero option in principle, though recognizing that it effectively destroyed NATO’s strategic concept of Flexible Response and decoupled the Federal Republic from the United States.
Perle-Pentagon Proposal 18 November 1981	U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Richard Perle, one of the Reagan administration’s hardliners, designed a zero option for the Americans to propose at the U.S.-Soviet INF talks in Geneva. According to multiple internal accounts, the proposal was designed to be rejected by the Soviet negotiators. Perle called for the Soviets to eliminate all INF missiles, including those in the Asian USSR, in exchange for NATO canceling the deployment of the Pershing II missiles and GLCMs. He also called for the inclusion of the Soviet SRINF, including the SS-12, SS-22, and SS-23 systems. The distinguishing characteristic of the Perle proposal was that it remained non-negotiable. Perle gave guidance to the U.S. chief negotiator in Geneva to “tough it out for a long, long time,” and he told Congress that there was no American “fallback position” on INF—that the Soviets could accept the terms offered or break off negotiations. NATO’s military command opposed the Perle zero proposal, and any proposal that canceled the Pershing II missile deployments; without NATO LRINF, Flexible Response would become unworkable. Despite competing proposals from the State Department, Reagan sided with Perle and, dropping the inclusion of SRINF, introduced the proposal publicly on 18 November 1981. Perle’s proposal to include both LRINF and SRINF later formed the “double-zero” formula codified in the 1987 INF Treaty.

Burt-State Proposal 1981	Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Richard Burt authored the U.S. State Department's principal position on INF in Europe. Burt called for elimination of LRINF globally, but remained altogether less concerned with the military feasibility of the U.S. position, believing the Pentagon and SHAPE could devise new solutions in support of Flexible Response. Burt's primary concern was "alliance management," fearing that western European politics could result in a fractured NATO. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, formerly Supreme Allied Commander Europe, reluctantly endorsed Burt's proposal, though he remained concerned about the military feasibility of a global zero outcome. Most importantly, Burt saw his proposal as one option among many and was keen to keep negotiations going with the Soviets rather than to adopt hardline positions.
U.S. Geneva Position 11 December 1981	U.S. negotiators in Geneva issued their zero position, calling for global elimination of all ground-launched LRINF, with specific requirements for eliminating the Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles in exchange for NATO not deploying its 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 GLCMs; for mutual limitations on SRINF, with specific calls to keep Soviet SS-23 and SS-12 mod deployments to their early 1982 levels; and for negotiations on nuclear-capable INF aircraft to be handled in a follow-on agreement. U.S. negotiators produced a draft treaty to that effect in February 1982.
Nitze-Kvitsinsky Compromise ("Walk-in-the-Woods Formula") July 1982	U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze and Soviet negotiator Yuli Alexandrovich Kvitsinski, meeting during the summer of 1982, agreed to a U.S.-Soviet compromise (1) to limit LRINF launchers and INF aircraft in Europe to 75 launchers (which could provide for 225 Soviet MIRV warheads and U.S. cruise missiles); (2) restrictions to cap INF aircraft for each party at 150, including the U.S. F-111 and FB-111 and the Soviet Backfire, Badger, and Blinder; (3) a cap of 90 on LRINF in the Asian USSR; (4) an agreement to keep SRINF at their present (<i>i.e.</i> , 1982) levels; and (5) an agreement for verification measures to be handled within three months. After internal deliberations, the Americans rejected the compromise on 13 September 1982, and the Soviets likewise rejected it on September 29th. The position was kept hidden from the West Germans, though Schmidt later indicated he would have gladly supported such a compromise.
CDU Position in Opposition 1980-81	The West German CDU adopted a number of confusing positions on the INF question. Throughout 1980-81, the party rejected any zero option as unworkable. The SPD and leftists had popularized "zero option" (<i>Null-Lösung</i>) in the German vernacular, and Christian Democrats, as a matter of course, came out against any zero proposal as mere propaganda. Manfred Wörner chided the Bundestag in June 1981 for any contemplation of the "total illusion of the so-called zero option." After Reagan's November 1981 announcement of the modified Perle-Pentagon proposal, calling for global zero on LRINF, the CDU reversed its position. Kohl announced his party's new position on 3 December 1981. With the CDU's reversal, each of the West German major political parties had officially adopted a zero position on INF.
CDU Position in Government 1982-83	During the first year of Kohl's government, the position of the Federal Security Council was, in principle, to support a zero solution, but, as a matter of policy, to hope for a global ceiling on LRINF forces with a subceiling for European deployments. Specifically, the West Germans were keen to avoid compensating for Soviet deployments in the Asian USSR with NATO forces in Europe—matching the Warsaw Pact missile for missile. Kohl and his government spent much of 1983 trying to persuade the Americans to adopt these ideas, at least as an interim position in the INF negotiations. Leading voices within the government included Alois Mertes and Volker Rühe, the Christian Democrats' two most senior foreign-policy experts.
U.S. Geneva Interim Proposal May 1983	After the Geneva negotiations had stalled, in May 1983, the Americans proposed a "zero-plus" position. Richard Burt had been the primary author. The proposal, while adhering to the original zero position as an ultimate goal, offered an interim solution: medium-range bombers and missiles would capped at 300 warheads globally for each the Americans and the Soviets. Andropov had earlier conceded that warheads should represent the primary counting unit, not launchers. Kohl and Genscher subsequently offered public support for the zero-plus proposal in the summer of 1983.

Todenhöfer-Dregger Position
July-August 1983

The CDU's disarmament-policy spokesman Jürgen Todenhöfer and parliamentary group chairman Alfred Dregger, without consulting Chancellor Kohl, in July and August 1983, publicly admonished the government for supporting any negotiating position that would give up the Pershing II missiles. They contended that the 108 Pershing IIs to be deployed later that year represented the only weapons capable of matching the Soviet SS-20s. The West German Federal Security Council had supported a position that all of the scheduled deployments—572 intermediate-range missiles—should be treated on an equal basis in negotiations, with the 108 Pershing IIs and the 464 GLCMs reduced equally by percentage in the overall deployments.

Sources: Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung: Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 1970-1987* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1988); "Materialien: Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der Friedenspolitik," *Leitantrag des Parteivorstands für den Parteitag in Berlin* (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, Abteilung Presse und Information, 1979); "Dokumente: Beschlüsse zur Aussen, Deutschland, Friedens und Sicherheitspolitik," *SPD Parteitag Berlin, 1979* (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, 1979); Alfons Pawelczyk, "Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der Friedenspolitik," *Neue Gesellschaft* (January 1980); Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, *Politik für Frieden und Sicherheit: Die Debatte auf dem F.D.P.-Bundesparteitag* (Bonn: FDP, 1981); Reagan, "Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons," 18 November 1981, in *PPP 1981*; Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988); *idem.*, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Vintage, 1985); Thomas Graham, Jr., *Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); Jürgen Todenhöfer, "Verzicht auf Pershing II?" *Deutschland-Union-Dienst*, no. 134 (18 July 1983), 4; Alfred Dregger, interview with *Der Spiegel* 33/1983 (15 August 1983); Thomas Bender, *SPD und europäische Sicherheit: Sicherheitskonzept und Struktur des Sicherheitssystems in den achtziger Jahren* (Munich: Tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991); John Cartwright and Julian Critchley, *Cruise, Pershing, and SS-20: The Search for Consensus: Nuclear Weapons in Europe* (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1985); Pierre Hasner, "Zero Options for Europe?" *European Journal of International Affairs* 1, no. 1 (1988); and Jeffrey Boutwell, *The German Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

Chapter Four: Europeanizing the Divided Continent, 1983-1987

1. George H. W. Bush, "Grußadresse zum 80. Geburtstag Helmut Kohls (12. March 2010)" *Die Politische Meinung*, no. 485 (April 2010), 12-13; American Academy in Berlin, Hans Arnhold Center, "Henry A. Kissinger Prize Honoring Former Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl" (16 May 2011).
2. Sir Winston S. Churchill, preface, in *An Idea Conquers the World*, [Richard] Count Coudenhove-Kalergi (London: Hutchinson, 1953), ix.
3. For example, in the early years of his chancellorship (*i.e.*, 1983-87), Kohl spoke passionately and often of German unification. By early 1987, battling unpopularity at home and largely marginalized in international affairs, he struck a more sober note.
4. Karl Hugo Pruys, *Helmut Kohl: Die Biographie* (Berlin: Edition Q, 1995), 15. Pruys served as Kohl's press spokesman during the 1970s. In Zelikow and Rice's estimation, "Kohl's instincts were almost always for the middle ground on an issue even before the others could discern what the middle ground might be. See their *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 77.
5. See, *e.g.*, Katarina Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," in *The West European Option: From Yesterday till Tomorrow* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 10.
6. Jeffrey Gedmin, "Helmut Kohl, Giant," *Hoover Institution Policy Review* (1 August 1999).
7. Hans Kohl lived to age eighty-eight, long enough to see his son enjoy success in federal politics. The future chancellor remembered his father always with reverence and affection, pointing to his thriftiness and diligence. "Every day, my father rode his bicycle to the office, clutching his pants so they didn't get caught in the chain," Kohl remembered. "Only in the snow and ice would he take the streetcar." Helmut Kohl, quoted in Rudolf Pörtner, ed., *Mein Elternhaus: Ein deutsches Familienalbum* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984), 312.
8. Following mass, Cäcilie often enjoyed sitting home, listening to the Protestant ministers on the radio.
9. Quoted in Pörtner, *Mein Elternhaus*, 315-16.
10. Kohl never spoke publicly of his brother, and even close friends and associates report that he never mentioned him in private. Quoted in Pruys, *Helmut Kohl*, 25.
11. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Division, "IG Farbenindustrie Ludwigshafen, Germany," vol. 1, 2nd ed. (April 1947).
12. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biografie* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012), 43.
13. Kohl had joined the CDU in 1946 as member number 00246. Pruys, *Helmut Kohl*, 48.
14. Johannes Gros, "Warum Kohl bleibt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 March 1978. See Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager," 44.
15. Henrik Bering, *Helmut Kohl* (Washington: Regnery, 1999), 34. Aside from some revealing and candid interviews, Bering's biography of Kohl is quite poorly done. He takes great liberties with his source material and relies heavily on anecdotes and his own commentary.
16. Pruys, *Helmut Kohl*, 33.
17. Christian Wicke, *Helmut Kohl's Quest for Normality: His Representation of the German Nation and Himself* (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 137-39; and Volker Kronenberg, *Patriotismus in Deutschland: Perspektiven für eine weltoffene Nation* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 338;

-
18. Jürgen Leinemann, "National verstand sich von selbst," *Der Spiegel* 46/1986 (10 November 1986), 25.
19. Kohl, quoted in Helmut Schmidt, *Jahrhundertwende: Gespräche mit Lee Kuan Yew, Jimmy Carter, Shimon Peres, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Ralf Dahrendorf, Michail Gorbatschow, Rainer Barzel, Henry Kissinger, Helmut Kohl und Henning Voscherau*, ed. Dorothea Hauser (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1998), 200.
20. Kohl, "Plädoyer für Weltoffenheit," *Europa Union* (August 1972), quoted in Wicke, *Helmut Kohl's Quest for Normality*, 111; and Kohl, *Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatismus*, 62.
21. Kohl, "Regierungserklärung vor dem deutschen Bundestag," 13 October 1982, in *TzDP*, ser. 3, vol. 1, p. 9-11.
22. Jeremy Leaman, *The Political Economy of Germany Under Chancellors Kohl and Schröder: The Decline of the German Model?* (New York: Berghahn, 2009), 12.
23. Kohl, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany, Bonn (23 June 1983); quotation on p. 1373.
24. "Schlechte Karten," *Der Spiegel* 27/1984 (2 July 1984), 99.
25. Helmut Kohl, address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 30 June 1983, in *Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament*, no. 301 (1983), pp. 16-21.
26. *Idem.*, address before the Bundestag, *Deutscher Bundestag, 10. Wahlperiode, 59. Sitzung* (15 March 1984), p. 4161.
27. Paul Claudel, "Quelques réflexions sur l'Allemagne," *Œuvres en prose* (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), p. 1383.
28. Werner Filmer and Heribert Schwan, *Helmut Kohl* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1985), 255-57; and Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 327-28.
29. John Van Oudenaren, "West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy," Project AIR FORCE Report, R-3198-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1985), 24.
30. Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager," 34.
31. Security advisor Horst Teltschik quoted in Bering, *Helmut Kohl*, 42.
32. Strauß quoted in *ibid.*, 40. Kohl often relied on clichés and awkward similes in his extemporaneous speaking, usually obscuring his main point. He also enjoyed train and food metaphors, as one scholar has noted. The chancellor often blamed journalists and the media for exaggerating his gaffes, and he particularly deplored West Germany's left-wing dailies and periodicals—*Der Spiegel* above all. Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager," 38.
33. Even as chancellor, he still frequented the same simple restaurants and ate his favorite rustic Palatine dishes, especially Saumagen with sauerkraut and plum tart with cream. Some of the chancellor's personal habits proved frustrating to his staff, namely his tendency to yawn in public and his "altar-boyish reticence" toward women. Pruys, *Helmut Kohl*, 20.
- British Prime Minister John Major succinctly assessed Kohl's habits, noting "We had tea, I remember, perilously close to lunch." Quoted in Frederick Baker, "How Helmut Kohl Turned Satire on its Head," *The Independent*, 6 September 1998.
34. Gedmin, "Helmut Kohl, Giant."

35. Soviet Record of Conversation Between Mikhail Gorbachev and Egon Krenz, 1 November 1989, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya, Notes of A. S. Chernyaev, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation; and MemCon Between Krenz and Gorbachev, trans. Christian F. Ostermann; both in CWIHP.

36. Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager," 44.

37. An October 1983 profile in the *Financial Times* praised Teltschik as "agile" and the reason things have been "pleasant for Herr Kohl." See James Buchan, "Performing a Dizzying Balancing Act," *Financial Times*, 31 October 1983.

38. Genscher, address before the European Parliament, 14 October 1982, in *Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament*, no. 289 (1982), pp. 241-47.

39. On West German "calculability," see the introduction to this study.

40. "The Triumphs and Harrumphs of Genscherism," *The Economist*, no. 7533 (16 January 1988), p. 41.

41. "Deutschlandpolitik ist europäische Friedenspolitik." Kohl, "Regierungserklärung vor dem deutschen Bundestag" (13 October 1982), 10.

42. Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided*, 133. See, e.g., Memorandum for Kohl, 8 February 1984; BA, B 136/30668.

43. Genscher, address before the European Parliament, 14 October 1982.

44. *Ibid.* While Kohl's vision for a united Europe came together only over time, Genscher understood his views as soon as his Twelfth Army surrendered in 1945—or so he claims in his memoir. "I believed," he later remembered, "that democracy would prevail throughout Germany and Europe." Genscher's memoir, however, must be read with an exceedingly critical eye. He is quick to promote himself as a visionary and all of his countrymen as reluctant converts to his position. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 43-51.

45. The first landmark document produced by the Delors Commission, the report on "A People's Europe," promised to "[free] the Community from an endless round of meetings." The time finally had come "to break this vicious cycle. In the year 1983, one-third of the eleven thousand employees were translators. Pietro Adonnino (chairman), Report from the *ad hoc* Committee on a People's Europe to the European Council, Brussels, 29-30 March 1985, in *BEC* 7/85, p. 9; Letter from Pietro Adonnino to Bettino Craxi, 20 June 1985, in *ibid.*, 17; Stanley R. Sloan, "A Uniting Europe and U.S. Interests," Report 83-72F (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1983), 12.

46. See chapter one of this study.

47. Christoph Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 3 (1984 special issue), 631.

48. Though Delors remained more circumspect, Cockfield concurred with such an analysis. Lord Cockfield, *The European Union: Creating the Single Market* (London: Wiley Chancery Law, 1994), 111. The scholarly literature has reached a similar consensus, though authors debate the degree to which supranational political leadership caused the EC convergence versus merely created conditions conducive to such developments. See Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," *World Politics* 42 (1989); George Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Neill Nugent, "The Leadership Capacity of the European Commission," *Journal of European Public Policy* 2, no. 4 (1995); Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O.

Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Daniel Wincott, "Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 33, no. 4 (1995): 597-609; Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder," in *ibid.*, 611-28; and *idem.*, *The Choice for Europe*, 316-47. On supranational versus intergovernmental bargaining theories, see *ibid.*, 52-53.

49. In a single lecture, Thorn went on to call Europe in "crisis" six times. "European Union or Decline: To Be or Not to Be," seventh Jean Monnet Lecture (24 May 1984), Florence (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1984).

50. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, ch. 5.

51. Stanley Hoffman, "The U.S. and Western Europe: Wait and Worry," *Foreign Affairs* 63, no. 3 (1984), 632.

52. On the Fontainebleau European Council meeting, convening 25 and 26 June 1984, see *BEC*, no. 6/1984. At the Fontainebleau meeting, the heads of government established two ad hoc committees crucial to later European political cooperation.

For a critical assessment of Thorn, see *e.g.*, Neill Nugent, ed., "At the Heart of the Union," in *At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission.*, ed. Neill Nugent (New York: St. Martins, 1997). Moravcsik paints a more favorable portrait of Thorn, also noting that Thorn helped to lay the groundwork for Delors' later successes. See Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 19-56; *idem.*, *The Choice for Europe*; and Jean De Ruyt, *L'Acte unique européen: Commentaire* (Brussels: Institut d'Etudes européennes, 1987).

53. On the economic impacts of new EC members (Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986), see "Programm für Südeuropa," n.d.; "Erweiterung der EG lurch Griechenland, Portugal und Spanien: Entwurf diner Stellungnahme des Bundesfachausschusses Agrarpolitik," n.d.; and Egon A. Kelch, "Auswirkungen einer Erweiterung auf die Substanz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft," 25 October 1977; ACDP 07-001, Karton 1916.

54. Thorn, "L'Europe: comment sortir de la crise?"

55. Joint News Conference, Brussels, 14 December 1984, in *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 85, no. 2095 (February 1985), 17. Hoffmann, "The U.S. and Western Europe: Wait and Worry," 645.

56. Divisions between the EC Council and European Policy Cooperation, by 1983, had become largely arbitrary. EPC ministerial meetings took place on Monday afternoons, and the EC Council convened on Tuesday mornings with the same men and women in attendance. Sloan, "A Uniting Europe and U.S. Interests," 12 and 25-28.

57. Addressing members of the American-Dutch-European Roundtable in The Hague, Dankert argued "for Europeans to develop a common approach to the requirements of western security, an approach that would derive from European assessments and European perspectives." Dankert, address before the American-Dutch-European Roundtable Conference, The Hague (22-23 November 1982).

58. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 6 January 1981, Stuttgart; in *Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz* 1981, no. 2 (Bonn: Pressedienst der Freien Demokratischen Partei, 1981), 41ff; and Emilio Colombo, 28 January 1981, Florence, in *Documents*, no. 1136 (Brussels: Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse, 3 February 1981).

59. The Genscher-Colombo proposal had provided the basis for the 1983 "Solemn Declaration on European Union."

-
60. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 364.
61. Draft European Act, German-Italian Initiative, submitted to the European Council, 26-27 November 1981; in *BEC* 11/1981, pp. 87-91. Emphasis added. On European political cooperation, e.g., see Memorandum, "Europäische Union: Rechtsfragen einer abgestuften Integration," 10 January 1984; BA, B 136/30668.
62. Report on European Political Cooperation issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten (hereafter London Report), 13 October 1981, in *BEC* 1981, supplement 3, pp. 14-17.
63. Draft European Act, German-Italian Initiative, submitted to the European Council, 26-27 November 1981; in *BEC* 11/1981, pp. 87-91. A portion of Genscher's ideas built upon earlier work done internally by the CDU on European political cooperation. "Our Europapolitik der CDU," 16 June 1975; and Erik Blumenfeld, "Wie soll die 'Europäische Union' aussehen? Neufassung und Umgruppierung der Europapolitik der CDU/CSU," 25 March 1975; ACDP, 07-001, Karton 1912.
64. Greece, Denmark, and the UK proved most reluctant in the EPC process.
65. London Report. For an ex post facto assessment of the London Report's limitations, see Emanuele Gazzo, "A more effective 'Political Cooperation,' and then?" *Europe: Bulletin Quotidien*, no. 3229 (Brussels: Agency International d'Information pour la Presse, 16 October 1981), 1.
66. Gaston Thorn, "L'Europe: comment sortir de la crise?" address delivered before the IRRI, Brussels; in *Studia Diplomatica* 37, no. 3 (1984).
67. Sloan, "A Uniting Europe and U.S. Interests, 39-41.
68. "Wir brauchen ein Europa ohne Grenzen," *Der Spiegel* 13 (26 March 1984), 144. The Foreign Office identified "the special role of German-French cooperation" as a "core element" (*Kernelemente*) of its security policy. Grove Anfrage der CDU/CSU-Fraktion zu den "Aufgaben, Problemen und Perspektiven des Atlantischen Bündnisses," 25 May 1982; BA, B 136/14778.
69. On Schmidt's attitudes toward European integration, see chapter two of this study.
70. François Mitterrand, address before the European Assembly, 24 May 1984, in *Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament*, no. 314 (1984), pp. 257-63.
71. On Franco-German cooperation in the 1980s, see the Bericht der Interministeriellen Kommission der Bundesregierung für die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit (Berichtszeitraum Januar bis Dezember 1983), April 1984; BA, B 136/30504.
72. See, e.g., Ausführungen des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Hans-Dietrich Genscher vor der Fraktionsvorsitzenden-Konferenz der FDP am 19. Juni 1987 in Bremen zur Europa-Politik; BA, B 136/30682.
73. Kohl, *Deutscher Bundestag, 10. Wahlperiode, 59. Sitzung* (15 March 1984), p. 4163. See also Eberhard Schulz, *Die deutsche Nation in Europa* (Bonn: Europa Union, 1982); and A. James McAdams, *Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 172.
74. Genscher, quoted in "Spiegel Gespräch: Es darf nicht scheitern," *Der Spiegel* 13/1984 (26 March 1984), 146.
75. Genscher, quoted in "Deutsch-französischer Beitrag zum Aufbau Europas," *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 141 (Bonn: BPA, 1978), pp. 1313-15.
76. Genscher, quoted in "Spiegel Gespräch: Es darf nicht scheitern," 147.

77. Émile Noël, secretary-general of the EC, condemned such an approach: "How can you not see that the community system has degenerated gradually into an intergovernmental negotiation?" Émile Noël, "La Communauté européenne: quel avenir?" Address delivered before the Institutional royal des relations internationales (IRRI), Brussels; in *Studia Diplomatica* 37, no. 6 (1984).

78. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 543. On the same topic, see Thatcher's speech to the Dublin European Council [handwritten], 30 November 1979; Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, Margaret Thatcher Papers, THCR 1/17/58.

79. "When a senior official eventually could not stand it any longer and got on his knees to pick them up," he recalled, "she told him to 'stop fooling around down there.'" John Palmer, "Gaston Thorn," *Guardian* [Manchester], 27 August 2007.

80. "Wir brauchen ein Europa ohne Grenzen," *Der Spiegel*, 144.

81. "Einer wurde des anderen überdrüssig," *Der Spiegel* 13/1984 (26 March 1984), 138.

82. The notion of "l'Europe à deux vitesses," "à géométrie variable," and "Europa in zwei Stufen" has remained popular in Europe since the 1980s. Memorandum, "Europäische Union: Rechtsfragen diner abgestuften Integration," 10 January 1984; BA, B 136/30668.

83. Peter Jenkins, "The day the shrillness has to stop" *The Guardian* [Manchester], 25 June 1984.

84. See "Europäischer Rat am 25./26. Juni 1984 in Fontainebleau: Fortentwicklung der Gemeinschaft/Europäische Union," 18 June 1984; and "Entwurf eines Vertrags über die Gründung einer Europäischen Union," 10 July 1984; BA, B 136/30668. "Deutsch-französischer Entwurf eines Vertrages über die Europäische Union," 28 June 1985; BA, B 136/30669.

85. "La relance de l'Europe," *Le Monde*, 28 June 1984.

86. Schmidt, 28 June 1984; Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," 25.

87. For official West German reactions to the Dooge Committee, see letter from Manfred Wörner, 29 March 1985; BA, B 136/30668.

88. Kohl, *Deutscher Bundestag, 10. Wahlperiode, 77. Sitzung* (28 June 1984), p. 5596.

89. Francis Arthur Cockfield, Lord Cockfield of Dover, *The European Union: Completing the Single Market* (London: Wiley Chancery Law, 1994), 111. Derk-Jan Eppink has identified Delors as the "European mandarin" in his compelling biography, *Europese mandarijnen: een blik achter de schermen van de Europese Commissie* (Tiel: Lannoo, 2007). For Delors' own reflections on the era, see his *L'Europe tragique et magnifique: les grands enjeux européens* (Paris: Saint-Simon, 2006).

90. Kohl, *Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinigung*, 141. At home, Delors' approval ratings often topped the French president in opinion polls.

91. Delors, *Changer: Conversations avec Claude Glayman* (Paris: Stock, 1975), 35-36; and Helen Drake, *Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European Leader* (London: Routledge, 2000), 27.

92. Delors interview with Helen Drake in her *Jacques Delors*, 26.

93. Delors, *L'Unité d'un homme: entretiens avec Dominique Wolton* (Paris: Editions O. Jacob, 1994), 100.

94. Delors' experiences in French finance particularly informed his views on Europe. "Creating Europe is a way of regaining that room for maneuver necessary for 'a certain idea of France,'" he wrote. Quoted in Gedmin, "Helmut Kohl, Giant."

-
95. Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration*, 29.
96. Kohl, *Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinigung: Meine Erinnerungen* (Munich: Kroemer, 2014), 140-41.
97. Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration*, 30.
98. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 399.
99. See the data on European union Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Edgar Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1983), 598-605.
100. Report from the ad hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs to the European Council, Brussels, 29 and 30 March 1985, in *BEC* 18, no. 3 (1985): 102-111; and Report from the ad hoc Committee on a People's Europe to the European Council, Brussels, 29 and 30 March 1985, in *ibid.*, pp. 111-117.
101. EC economic policies in the previous decade had failed to secure a European competitive edge in the international economy, particularly with the emergence of Japan as an industrial and manufacturing power.
102. This third category remained the most underdeveloped in the final report. For government reactions, see "Europäische Union," n.d.; and "Zur Problematik," n.d.; BA, B 136/30669. For opposition response, see the SPD message press summary, no. 649/85, 3 December 1985; BA, B 136/30669.
103. Heinz Stadlmann, "In Europa kommt es zum Schwur," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (1 July 1985).
104. Kohl, *Erinnerungen, 1982-1990*, 439.
105. *Ibid.*, 440. Some, however, remained more reserved in their celebration. "Let us hope that . . . this time we are going in the right direction," remarked European Parliament vice president Siegbert Alber. Siegbert Alber, "on the occasion of the signing of the Single European Act . . ." in *Speeches and Statements Made on the Occasion of the Singing of the Single European Act* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1986), 8-12.
106. Schreckenberger served as State Secretary in the Federal Chancellory (*Staatssekretär im Bundeskanzleramt*), having previously served with Kohl in Rhineland-Palatinate.
107. "Not since Napoléon's quest to unite Europe has anything so ambitious been attempted," later remarked the U.S. assistant secretary of state. "Opening Statement by Senator Sarbanes, Chairman" in Europe 1992; Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States," U.S. Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd session (18 November 1988), p. 1.
108. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 374-75.
109. Under the Jean Rey Commission in 1968, the representatives had agreed to eliminate internal tariffs, and at the Hague Summit in 1969, the EC had adopted a plan on the "coordination of economic policies and monetary cooperation within the Community." But in 1985 and 1986, the elusive prospect of a truly integrated, united Europe was becoming a reality. European Commission, Secretariat of the Commission, "Commission Memorandum to the Council on the Co-ordination of Economic Policies and Monetary Co-operation within the Community," 12 February 1969. The memorandum is often called the "Barre Report."
- Jean Rey of Belgium served as president of the Commission from 2 July 1967 to 30 June 1970.
110. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 374.

-
111. Große Anfrage der CDU/CSU-Fraktion zu den "Aufgaben, Problemen und Perspektiven des Atlantischen Bündnisses," 25 May 1982, pp. 3-5; BA, B 136/14778.
112. Christoph Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 3 (1984), 631.
113. Talking points for the President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Carrington, n.d.; Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.
114. The Kohl government had been largely unsuccessful at recovering the élite consensus. See "Stand und Perspektiven der West-Ost-Beziehungen," 8 November 1983; BA, B 136/30133.
115. "Die Entwicklung der amerikanischen Globalstrategie während der Amtszeit Präsident Reagans," [n.d., likely mid-1984]; BA, B 136/27064.
116. Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," 631. An internal memorandum offered a similar assessment. See K.-Peter Stratmann, "Aspect der sicherheitspolitischen und militärstrategischen Entwicklung in den 90er Jahren," May 1986; BA, B 136/27064.
117. Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," 23 March 1983, in *PPP 1983*.
118. Watt, "As a European Saw It," 531.
119. "Vom Englischen sofort ins Russische," *Der Spiegel* 43/1986 (20 October 1986), 22-23.
120. "Kohls Optimismus-Kampagne in Sachen Rüstungskontrolle ist eine erneute Irreführung der Öffentlichkeit," 1 July 1986; BA, B 136/27067.
121. See Roßbach memorandum for Kohl, *et al.*, "Perspektiven für die Gestaltung der Ost-West-Beziehungen nach der Unterbrechung der INF-Verhandlungen durch die Sowjetunion," 7 December 1983; BA B 136/30133.
122. "Krieg der Sterne," *Der Spiegel* 20/1984 (14 May 1984).
123. Many Europeans feared precisely such an outcome—that like Maginot's relic, Reagan's SDI would consume untold resources and purchase little more than naïve peace of mind. Sir Geoffrey Howe, speech to the Royal United Services Institute, 15 March 1985, published in *Arms Control and Disarmament: Developments in International Negotiations*; quoted in Montbrial, "The European Dimension," 510.
124. Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," 629.
125. Powell to C. R. Budd, "Prime Minister's Talk with President Reagan," 14 October 1986, secret; NA-UK, PREM 19/1759 F159. The White House omitted the president's recommendation from the official record. TelCon, 13 October 1986, confidential; RR-PL, Executive Secretariat, NSC: System File, 8607413.
126. Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," 628.
127. George H. W. Bush, quoted in Watt, "As a European Saw It," 529.
128. *Gallup Political Index* 270 (February 1983), p. 18; Watt, "As a European Saw It," 529.
129. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Edgar Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1983), 613.
130. Joschka Fischer, "Au Renouir, Mao—Hallo, Ronny," *Der Spiegel* 28/1984 (9 July 1984), 67.

131. The editor has added a note to Reagan's diary to that effect. The unabridged edition simply refers to "the Pres. of the European Community." Douglas Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. 1, *January 1981-October 1985* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 453.

132. Delors, *Mémoires* (Paris: Plon, 2004), 322.

133. U.S. Department of State, *Gist*, "The European Community," April 1986, 2. See also Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 10-11.

134. Reagan, "Visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, France, and Portugal" (30 April-10 May 1985), *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 85, no. 2100 (July 1985): 7-30.

Keeping with longstanding U.S. policy, in most of his public addresses, Reagan offered hearty support for European integration. Since the 1950s, integration—altogether limited and modest—showed little prospect of upsetting U.S. interests in western Europe. Dating back to Eisenhower, U.S. administrations believed that increased integration among the western European states may well complement NATO, with the Europeans taking more responsibility for their own defense within an American-designed security framework.

By the early and middle 1980s, however, official American attitudes toward the EC had changed. With the accessions of Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986 to the EC—the first enlargements since 1973—Washington began to fear that EC subsidies to the underdeveloped economies within Europe and preference for intra-Community trade would threaten U.S. exports. American concerns proved justified. Beginning in early 1986, the EC levied fierce penalties on U.S. agricultural exports to the Common Market, and the Reagan administration responded in kind. "While we welcome the addition of Spain and Portugal to the European Community, we have made it clear that we won't allow EC enlargement to be used as an excuse for putting unfair restrictions on our exports," U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Roxanne Ridgway told Congress. "Unfortunately, our message hasn't fully registered in Europe."

Between October 1985 and February 1986—the months in which Spain and Portugal entered the EC—U.S. wheat exports had fallen by sixteen percent. Estimating damages to U.S. farm exports at more than \$1 billion and to U.S. livestock at \$125 million, the Americans pledged to offset export losses by fully reciprocating against the EC. "When Greece was brought into the European Community," argued U.S. Congressman Douglas Bereuter in 1986, "the costs were in part passed on to . . . the United States." U.S. policymakers were outraged by losses on exports of oilseeds and grains to Portugal and losses on corn and sorghum to Spain. Restrictions on the Portuguese grain market especially frustrated American commerce. With Portuguese accession to the European Community, 15.5 percent of Portugal's grain market was delimited to EC suppliers. Portugal also secured import licensing and quota arrangements on soybeans. Those conflicts over grain compounded the preexisting "citrus war" and the European Community's "Third Country Meat Directive," in which EC veterinarians would be required to inspect and certify U.S. meat processing plants prior to export to Europe. Prior to Portuguese accession to the EC, the United States dominated ninety-five percent of Portugal's market share in grains. Similarly, the U.S. projected grains losses to Spain at \$625 million.

The EC simultaneously constituted the United States' largest market and strongest competitor. Agricultural exports to the EC totaled \$5.2 billion, and EC exports to the U.S. totaled \$3.6 billion. Total U.S. exports to the EC, including nonagricultural products, totaled \$43.6 billion in 1985. U.S. imports from the EC surpassed that figure, totaling \$64.5 billion, and leaving the Americans with a \$20.9 billion trade deficit. After Greece entered the EC, aggregate U.S. agricultural exports declined by more than one-third, resulting in \$19.6 billion in losses. Within those aggregates, the principal U.S. agricultural goods included soybeans at \$1.3 billion, tobacco and associated products at \$508 million, corn gluten feed at \$439 million, soybean oilcake at \$355 million, cotton at \$259 million, and

corn at \$234 million. EC sales of wine and other alcoholic beverages comprised the community's principal exports to the United States at \$1.3 billion. Cheese, ham, and nursery products also ranked among the principal exported commodities.

Ridgway confirmed to Congress that "we have repeatedly warned the EC that the U.S. would not pay for EC enlargement" but to no avail.

On Bonn's reactions, see "Programm für Südeuropa," n.d.; "Erweiterung der EG dutch Griechenland, Portugal und Spanien: Entwurf einer Stellungnahme des Bundesfachausschusses Agrarpolitik," n.d.; and Egon A. Klepsch, "Auswirkungen einer Erweiterung auf die Substanz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft," 25 October 1977; ACDP 07-001, Karton 1916. From the United States, see the "Developments in Europe" series of the U.S. House of Representatives, particularly from 1986 (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs," U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd session); "Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary, Speaks on United States Actions Against Foreign Unfair Trade Practices," 31 March 1986, *PPP* (1986), vol. 1; "Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary, Speaks on United States Actions Against Foreign Unfair Trade Practices"; "Proclamation 5453, Amending the Generalized System of Preferences," 31 March 1986; Reagan's and Martens' comments at the visit of Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens. Ronald Reagan (13-15 January 1985), in *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 85, no. 2096 (March 1985): 42-43; "European Community Agricultural Trade Practices; Hearing before the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee," U.S. Congress, 99th Congress, 2nd session (23 April 1986); "Statement of Hon. Richard E. Lyng, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture," in "To Examine the Effects of the European Community Enlargement on U.S. Agricultural Exports; Hearing Before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry," U.S. Senate, 99th Congress, 2nd session (6 May 1986). On European data, see Eurostat, *External and Intra-European Trade: Statistical Yearbook—Data 1958-2007* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009).

135. The Americans, meanwhile, blamed the EC and its Community-financed agricultural subsidies for stalling economic growth. See, e.g., Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," 630.

136. Sylvia Ostry, "The World Economy in 1983: Marking Time," *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 3 (1984), 534.

137. Thierry de Montbrial, "The European Dimension," *Foreign Affairs* 64, no. 3 (1985), 506.

138. Rudolf Augstein, "Das Brandmauer-Denken," *Der Spiegel* 18/1989 (1 May 1989), 20.

139. Stanley R. Sloan, "A Uniting Europe and U.S. Interests," CRS Report 83-72F, 31 March 1983, iii.

140. The United States embargoed Libyan goods, froze Libyan assets, and banned travel. Meanwhile, the Europeans took up the question of sanctions in the EC foreign ministers' meeting on 27 January 1986, where they pledged to avoid arms sales with Libya and issued the halfhearted declaration that "such states cannot expect to have 'normal' relations with the European Community." The Americans dispatched Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead to Europe on a mission to shore up support for punishments against Qadhafi. Visiting nine capitals in ten days, Whitehead ultimately met with little success. "No country wants to be considered a lackey of the United States, and it didn't help to declare ahead of time that my job was to persuade them to follow our lead, he later recalled. Even the British, traditionally closely aligned with the U.S. on security issues, declared that "Mr. Whitehead would be wasting his time to come to Britain." See Whitehead, *A Life in Leadership: From D-Day to Ground Zero* (New York: Basic, 2005), 190; and Neil Winn, *European Crisis Management in the 1980s* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), ch. 4.

141. Katarina Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," in *The West European Option: From Yesterday till Tomorrow* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 32.

142. Gunilla Herolf, "What Became of the European Option," in *ibid.*, 52; and Howe, quoted in Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," 27-28.

143. Schmidt, *A Grand Strategy for the West: The Anachronism of National Strategies in an Interdependent World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 56; and *idem.*, *Deutscher Bundestag, 10. Wahlperiode* (28 June 1984), p. 5062.

144. In Schmidt's program, the West Germans would provide eighteen of those divisions as well as subsidize the French forces. See Hoffmann, "The U.S. and Western Europe," 647; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Future of Yalta," *Foreign Affairs* 63, no. 2 (1984): 279-302. Notably, a U.S. interagency intelligence memorandum identified the Bundeswehr as "the most effective" force in Europe and "the bulwark of NATO's defense." NATO Modernization: The West German Armed Forces, interagency intelligence memorandum, July 1983, secret, Tyrus W. Cobb files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.

According to fellow Social Democrat Peter Glotz, Schmidt later admitted "that as a politician he went from being an anglophile to an americanophile to end up as a francophile." Peter Glotz, "Prospects for European Security Policy," 26 August 1987; BA, B 136/27065. On Franco-German cooperation, see the Bericht der Interministeriellen Kommission der Bundesregierung für die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit (Berichtszeitraum Januar bis Dezember 1983), April 1984; BA, B 136/30504.

145. Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," 25; and Huldt in *The Western European option*, 4. Recognizing prominent voices of neutralism in West Germany, Paris was keen to orient Bonn westward. See "Die Partei Giscard für die Neutronenbombe," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (30 May 1987); George Blum, "Französischer Neutronenbombe soll in der BRD stationiert werden, Zweitschlüssel für Bonn," *Tageszeitung* (7 May 1987); and Michael Lucas, "The United States and Post-INF Europe," *World Policy Journal* 5, no. 2 (1988), 210-11.

146. Hella Pick, "Carrington Gloomy over NATO Rift: NATO Leader Urges New Steps to Ensure Alliance Consultation," *The Guardian*, 28 April 1986.

147. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 489-90.

148. Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Kreile, *Osthandel und Ostpolitik* (Baden-Baden: Noms Verlag, 1978), 115-41; and Clemens, *Reluctant Realists*, 250-51.

149. Clay Clemens has written the definitive work on the Christian Democrats and Ostpolitik. He shows how "the legal dimension of the 'open German question' took on an implicitly more formal character." See his *Reluctant Realists*, 237-38. On Kohl, see *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ser. 1, vol. 12, 105.

150. Clay Clemens outlines those concerns thoroughly in his *Reluctant Realists*.

151. See, e.g., Fortgang des Dialogs westlicher Länder mit der Sowjetunion," 8 November 1983; BA, B 136/30133. The GDR survived only by western credits and extralegal means of bringing hard currency into the economy.

152. "Kohls Bahr," *Der Spiegel* 31/1984 (30 July 1984). Strauß sparred with Kohl both in public and in private. See the exchanges in BA, B 136/30670.

153. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Edgar Piel, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1978-1983*, vol. 8 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1983), 637.

154. Franz-Josef Strauß, *Die Erinnerungen* (Munich: Siedler, 1989), 470-479.

155. Clemens, *Reluctant Realists*, 259.

156. The *Selbstschussanlagen* provoked particular emotion in the west. Self-firing weapons typified the SED's brutality against its own people: though invisible, the omniscient state security service would fire automatically and indiscriminately on anyone who approached the border—whether a traitor or a child lost in the Thuringian forest. Only later would border guards be dispatched to retrieve the casualties.

157. See McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 154-158.

158. Wolfgang Dexheimer, cited in Clemens, *Reluctant Realists*, 238.

159. For a complete summary of Kohl's Ostpolitik agenda, see also "Beziehungen zu osteuropäischen Staaten," 8 November 1983; BA, B 136/30133.

160. A. James McAdams, argued in *Foreign Affairs* that "a deep change in the structure of inter-German relationship itself may now be under way." See his "Inter-German Détente: A New Balance," *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 1 (Fall 1986), 137. For a complete summary of Kohl's Ostpolitik agenda, see also "Beziehungen zu osteuropäischen Staaten," 8 November 1983; BA, B 136/30133.

161. "Niemand wird uns vom Kurs abbringen," *Der Spiegel* 43/1986 (20 October 1986), 154.

162. Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 13.

163. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 461.

164. "Ein roter Star steigt auf im Osten," *Der Spiegel* 12/1985 (18 March 1985).

165. Kohl was quickly criticized in the West German press for his "impolite, self-righteous, and free use of the Nazi era." Jürgen Leinemann, "National verstand sich von selbst," *Der Spiegel* 46/1986 (10 November 1986), 24-25.

Richard Nixon offered a similar assessment, cautioning against deception by appearance. "We must recognize that while Russians and Americans can be friends, our governments are destined by history to be adversaries," he wrote. "The leaders change but the policies remain the same. Khrushchev wore short-sleeved shirts and Brezhnev wore French cuffs, but both set the same foreign policy goals: the extension of Soviet domination and influence in the world." Richard Nixon, "Superpower Summitry," *Foreign Affairs* 64, no. 1 (1985), 10.

166. "Ich bin von mehr Leuten Gewalt als Hitler," *Der Spiegel* 46 (10 November 1986), 24.

167. Rudolf Walter Leonhardt, "Von der Last, Deutscher zu sein," *Die Zeit*, 2 September 1983.

168. Richard von Weizsäcker, "Was ist das eigentlich: deutsch" in *Reden und Interviews*, vol. 2, 1. Juli 1985-30. Juni 1986 (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1986), 395-412.

169. Weizsäcker, "Was ist das eigentlich: deutsch?"

170. Ivo H. Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 6-7.

171. See chapter two of this study.

172. Voigt, quoted in "German's Warning: Don't Impose Modern Arms," *International Herald Tribune* (29 February 1988), 2.

-
173. Voigt, quoted in "Reagan Remark Stirs European Furor," *Washington Post*, 21 October 1981.
174. Reagan, Remarks at a Question-and-Answer Session at a Working Luncheon with Out-of-Town Reporters," 16 October 1981, *PPP* 1981.
175. Preparing to give a radio address on 11 August 1984, Reagan joked that "I'm pleased to tell you today that I've signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes." Soonafter, *Der Spiegel's* cover story on "Reagan's menacing (*bedrohlicher*) humor," featured the president's quotation.
176. Letter from Ronald Reagan to John O. Koehler, 9 July 1981; in *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Free Press, 2003), 375.
177. Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 523. On the interallied dissent, see also John W. Young, "Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979-1989," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. 3, *Endings*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 303-306.
178. Original references to Reagan's supposed "zig-zag policy" came from the *New York Times*. Quoted in "Ohne Kampf gibt das Alte nicht auf: Der Biltz-Gipfel in Reykjavik—Fahrplan für die Abrüstung?" *Der Spiegel* 41/1986 (6 October 1986), 157.
179. Memorandum from A. Yakovlev to Mikhail Gorbachev, 12 March 1985, in State Archive of the Russian Federation, Yakovlev Collection, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive; available online at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc3.pdf>.
180. Conference of Secretaries of the CC CPSU, 15 March 1985.
181. In November 1985, Kohl's public approval ratings had fallen to forty-five percent, with only forty-two percent trusting his ability to make unpopular decisions. "Kohl ist ein Handicap für die CDU," *Der Spiegel* 2/1986 (6 January 1986).
182. See "INF Verhandlungen," 4 November 1983; BA, B 136/30133. Still, in 1985, the defense minister identified "German participation in SDI" as important expense in the Defense Ministry's annual budget. Memorandum from Teltschik to Kohl, 1 February 1985, Ihr anstehendes Gespräch mit BM Dr. Wörner über Vorhaben im Bereich Sicherheitspolitik und Bundeswehr; BA, B 136/27064.
183. See Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 254.
184. Gorbachev realized that Kohl was anxious to cultivate good relations with the USSR. Conference of Secretaries of the CC CPSU, 15 March 1985; Library of Congress, Volkogonov Collection, reel 17, container 25, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc5.pdf>.
185. "INF/START," 23 November 1984; BA, B 136/30060.
186. On the early meetings, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung: Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 1970-1987* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1988), 86-87. On subverting the SCG, see pp. 111-12 and Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 333-35.
187. Alex Alexiev, "Of Arms Control, Summit Meetings, and the Politics of Make-Believe," RAND Paper (January 1985), 1 and 5. Arms control did not represent, Alexiev advised a "universal panacea." See also "Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance: Origins and Implications," CRS Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd session (March 1985).

-
188. Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defensing Post-INF Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 4 (1988), 738-41.
189. Ibid., 737-38. On Soviet operational planning, see William Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs* 67, no. 2 (1988): 114-34.
190. Kristina Spohr, "Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, 1977-1979," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 2 (2011), 45 and 49.
191. See, e.g., Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Dannenbring, 6 August 1976, AAP 1976, vol. 2, doc. 259. On singularization, see Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 34.
192. Christoph Bertram, "Ein Manager, kein Haudegen," *Die Zeit* (22 July 1983).
193. Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung*, 21.
194. Gaffney, "Euromissiles as the Ultimate Evolution of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014), 198.
195. Herbert Schildener, "Glückspiel am Atom-Automaten," *Kasseler Post*, 1 September 1956; Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 19.
196. Genscher later pointed to the FDP's 1980 proposal as evidence that he had been the genius behind the 1987 INF Treaty.
197. "Wörter des Jahres" in *Deutsches Universalwörterbuch*, 8th ed. (Berlin: Dudenverlag, 2015), 2117.
198. Strauß interview with *Der Stern*, 11 August 1983.
199. Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, 18 November 1981, in *PPP: 1981*.
200. Quoted in Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 176-77.
201. Thomas Graham, Jr., *Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 114.
202. Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung*, 111-12.
203. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 333. When Kohl, on the other hand, learned the details of the aborted compromise from Eugene Rostow, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the proposal made little impression on him. Risse-Kappen rightly contends that, because the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition was less dependent on the INF issue, Kohl gave it less attention than had his predecessor. Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung*, 114.
204. Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 170.
205. Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 16.
206. Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 160; Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Has Soviet Nuclear Strategy Changed?" RAND Paper, December 1985, 1-2. Bernard Brodie offered a similar assessment in his *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 147.

-
207. Emil J. Kirchner, "Genscher and What Lies Behind Genscherism," *West European Politics* 13, no. 2 (April 1990), 156.
208. "Crisis in the Atlantic Alliance: Origins and Implications," CRS Report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session (March 1982), 1-3.
209. Van Oudenaren, "West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy," 61.
210. Weizsäcker, "Was ist das eigentlich: deutsch"; Kirchner, "Genscher and What Lies Behind Genscherism," 157.
211. Rühle quoted in Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 18.
212. See, e.g., Schmidt, "Der Doppelbeschluss ist nach wie vor richtig," *Die Zeit*, 3 June 1983.
213. See the letter from Jäckel to Vogel, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 October 1983; Kaiser, "Die SPD und ihre Glaubwürdigkeit," and "Unangenehme Wahrheiten für die SPD," *Vorwärts*, 6 and 13 October 1983; and "Kritik an Vogel im Seeheimer Kreis," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 September 1983. For a thorough summary, see Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke, *Wohin treibt die SPD?* (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1984).
214. Quoted in Tyler Marshall, "Key German Party Shuns Missile Plans," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 November 1983.
215. See chapter three of this study.
216. Bahr, who served as a member of the Bundestag committee on disarmament, remained privy to allied documents on the Soviet position. Bahr, then, would have known that Andropov's offer would have destroyed only the launchers and not the missiles or warheads, despite Bahr's assurance to the public that the Soviets, "for the first time in the history of the arms race," had offered to destroy weapons. Additionally, as editor of the SPD's official publication, *Vorwärts*, Bahr suppressed criticism of his position. See "Bonn: Im Ergebnis begünstigt Bahr die Politik der Sowjetunion," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 October 1983; and Fritz Ullrich Face, "Was Bahr zu unterzeichnen empfiehlt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 October 1983; Van Oudenaren, "West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy," 70.
217. Schmidt similarly had long called for such a sea-based deterrent, namely to bring missiles away from population centers, instead located on submarines and surface vessels. U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown likewise supported such a position. See Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "West Germany and the Nonnuclear NATO Countries," in *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics*, ed. Richard K. Betts (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981); *idem.*, "The Present as Prologue: Europe and Theater Nuclear Modernization," *International Security* 5, no. 4 (1981); Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 190; and Sir Michael Quinlan, "The UK/FRG Defence Relationships, 1968-1981," in *Britain and Germany*, ed. Manfred Görtemaker (New York: Berg, 2006), 192.
218. Lafontaine, "Den Austritt aus der NATO wagen," *Der Spiegel* 35 (1983).
219. See Peter von Örtzen, "Frieden ohne Illusion: Thesen zur sozialdemokratischen Sicherheitspolitik," *Vorwärts*, 10 November 1983.
220. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 127-28; and Lewis Edinger, *West German Politics* (New York, 1986), 329.
221. Gordon A. Craig, "Summitry: A Historic Weekend," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 June 1984; and Alexiev, "Of Arms Control, Summit Meetings, and the Politics of Make-Believe," 4.

222. For instance, a study by Gerhard Schweigler showed that the West German public had reached a consensus that (1) deterrence against the Warsaw Pact did not require nuclear weapons, that (2) western Europe could be protected without any nuclear weapons stationed on the continent, and that (3) nuclear disarmament did not require improvements in conventional forces. See his "Western Security in the Context of Political Change: The Federal Republic of Germany," *Politics and Society in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland* 1, no. 3 (1989), 8-20. Similarly, a June 1989 opinion poll held that eighty percent of West Germans wanted total nuclear disarmament. See *The Independent*, 27 June 1989; and Kirchner, "Genscher and What Lies Behind Genscherism," 185.

223. Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," 11-12.

224. Van Oudenaren, "West German Policymaking and NATO Nuclear Strategy," 101-12.

225. Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 611.

226. Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 585-86. Gorbachev's Personal Agenda for the November Meeting [n.d., 1985], CIA assessment referred to NSC; National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc14.pdf>. On Gorbachev's ambitions for the summit, see: Letter from Gorbachev to Reagan, 10 June 1985; National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc10.pdf>.

The Soviets did not find Reagan a formidable opponent. "At first [Gorbachev] saw the empty, lacking understanding, eyes of the president, who mumbled commonplace things from a piece of paper," recorded Gorbachev's top aide, Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. "Only toward the end of the second meeting was he able to establish a normal conversation." Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, diary entry of 24 November 1985, trans. Anna Melyakova, ed. Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive.

227. Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, diary entry of 24 November 1985, trans. Anna Melyakova, ed. Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive,

228. Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview by Peter F. Krogh, 30 November 1985, Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives; available online at repository.library.georgetown.edu.

229. In their third plenary, the principals only discussed INF for the first ten minutes, followed by an hour on SDI. MemCon, "Reagan-Gorbachev Meetings in Geneva: Third Plenary Meeting," 20 November 1985; National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/>.

230. "Es lohnt sich, jetzt zuzupacken," *Der Spiegel* 31/1986 (28 July 1986), 17-18; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 537.

231. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 128.

232. Quoted in Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations that Ended the Cold War* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016), 123.

233. Gorbachev's Instructions to the Reykjavík Preparation Group, 4 October 1986; in *ibid.*, 161-64.

234. Notes of a CCCPSU Politburo Session, 8 October 1986; in *ibid.*, 165-69.

235. Chernyaev, Diary, 16 January 1986; available online from the National Security Archive and quoted in *ibid.*, 125.

236. Indeed, in his memoir, Dobrynin recorded that "it would not be honest to deny that Gorbachev's proclamation carried elements of propaganda." See his *In Confidence*, 597.

-
237. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. and ed. Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 59.
238. "There will be no war with Britain or France. It is not possible," Gorbachev told Sokolov. Quoted in James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 124.
239. To see the evolution of West German policy on these negotiations, see "START-Verhandlungen," 8 November 1983; BA, B 136/30133.
240. Ken Adelman, *Great Universal Embrace: Arms Summity—A Skeptic's Account* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 70.
241. "Meeting in the Secretariat Room with Members of the Politburo and Assistants," 22 September 1986; and Memorandum from Shultz to the President, "Reykjavik, 2 October 1986, both in Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 156-60.
242. Stephen Sestanovich (NSC), "Gorbachev's Goals and Tactics at Reykjavik, 4 October 1986, secret; National Security Archive; available online at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203>.
243. MemCon, "Reagan-Gorbachev, Fourth Meeting, Reykjavik," 12 October 1986; and "Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks, Final Meeting," 12 October 1986; both in Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 221-35.
244. Session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU (14 October 1986); National Security Archive, available online, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB504/>.
245. Chernyaev, diary entry for 16 January 1986.
246. "Gorbachev's Instructions to the Reykjavik Preparation Group," 4 October 1986, in Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 161-64.
247. Yakovlev memorandum to Gorbachev, "Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR" [Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown], 25 February 1987; National Security Archive; available online.
248. Gorbachev, quoted in Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation*, 123.
249. Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," 30.
250. Bo Hultdt, *The West European Option: From Yesterday till Tomorrow* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 4.
251. "General Rogers: Time to Say 'Time Out,'" *Army* (September 1987); Thomas E. Halverson, *The Last Great Nuclear Debate: NATO and Short-Range Nuclear Weapons in the 1980s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 92; Heuser, "Alliance of Democracies and Nuclear Deterrence," 197.
252. James Callaghan, "Europe, Worried, Watches the White House," *New York Times* (19 December 1986), p. A19.
253. Healey, "A Labour Britain, NATO and the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 4 (1987), 721.
254. "Angst vor der Courage," *Der Spiegel* 18/1987 (27 April 1987).
255. Quoted in Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 11.
256. Mertes, a leading voice within the CDU on foreign policy, died in the summer of 1985.
257. "Arms-Pact Fear Sweeps Europe," *Chicago Tribune* (26 October 1986).

-
258. Engberg, "The Maturing of NATO," 30.
259. Gert Krell, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, "The No-First-Use Question in Germany," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, ed. John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983). U.S. officials did doubt whether the SPD, faced with the responsibility of governing again, would implement the zero solution. Harold Brown, "Domestic Consensus and Nuclear Deterrence," in *Defense and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security*, pt. 2 (London: IISS, 1983), 19.
260. Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans*, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London: Butterworths, 1983), 69.
261. John le Carré, *The Little Drummer Girl* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 19.
262. In particular, Strauß politicked within his own coalition to undercut support for the centrist FDP, in hopes of pushing their parliamentary group below the five percent required by the Grundgesetz to sit in the Bundestag. For a contemporary summary of the "problems with the Bonn coalition government," see Dyson, "The Challenged Consensus," 160-61.
263. "Genscher: Kohl tut mir leid," *Der Spiegel* 23/1985 (3 June 1985), 19.
264. Quoted in Pruys, *Helmut Kohl*, 316.
265. *Frankfurter Rundschau* (8 January 1986); Werner Bergmann, *Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Konflikten: Kollektives Lernen in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik, 1949-1989* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1997), 384 and 441-49.
266. "Ich bin von mehr Leuten Gewalt als Hitler," 21.
267. Adenauer quoted in Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Aufstieg, 1876-1952*, 833. On the "Potsdam complex," see the introduction to this study.
268. Rudolf Augstein, "Lohn der Angst, Koalition der Angst," *Der Spiegel* 26/1984 (25 June 1984), 18; and e.g., "Vom Englischen sofort ins Russische," 21.
269. See chapter one of this study.

Chapter Five

Overcoming Europe's Military Imbalance 1987-1989

For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?

—I Cor. 14:8¹

Diplomacy in the Shadows

The situation is hopeless. Those who had survived the opening salvo now draw the poisonous air into their lungs—a toxic mixture of dust, ash, and radioactive fallout, the so-called “Niederschlag.” No one yet knows how many West Germans lay dead—at least a quarter of the population, but many more will perish in the coming days. Nuremberg, Munich, and Stuttgart have all been destroyed by atomic blasts. Hungarian and Czechoslovak soldiers soon will march into the rubble to secure cities of the dead. Austria's declared neutrality policy had done nothing to spare Vienna. A city built over a millennium was wiped away in an instant under the destructive force of two five-hundred kiloton bombs. What the Warsaw Pact weapons lacked in precision they compensated for in explosive power.

Only days ago, the Bundestag voted to place the Federal Republic in what has been called “V-Fall,” a legal “state of defense,” for the first time in our country's history. The chancellor, now by law commander-in-chief of the Bundeswehr, announced that civil aviation has been suspended indefinitely. He directed all Germans to stay in their towns and cities, reserving the roadways for military and emergency traffic. Thousands of frightened citizens disobeyed the order when the sirens began to wail. Now stalled cars and blinded

drivers clog West Germany's Autobahnen and highways. If they survive, most will never recover their vision, their retinas permanently seared. They had hoped to evacuate the cities, but a sudden air-burst of nuclear weapons burned out engines and caused thousands of pileups. Invisible ionization instantaneously ended radio and television broadcasts; civil defense warnings have become useless.

Our nightmare has been realized. Plumes of smoke funnel out of our great cities. The enemy's bombers and fighter aircraft enter our sovereign airspace undeterred and unimpeded. Our old plans had envisaged wiping out the opponent's airfields, but those no longer remain an option. There are no missiles or nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic, and our long-range artillery is useless against such a formidable foe. In light of the rising tensions between east and west, the Soviets suspended the agreement for Central Europe's nuclear-free corridor and have deployed hundreds of mobile missile launchers in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The Federal Republic stands defenseless.

Only a few hundred tanks are operational in the country. They have been deployed to the north and to Hessen, perhaps as a last pretense of national defense. The enemy's thousands of armored vehicles remain out of sight, but they shake the ground on both sides of the border. Explosions come from behind as our own people demolish the remaining bridges. The Technisches Hilfswerk have deployed in force, evacuating citizens from high-risk areas and guiding them to civil-defense shelters. The vast majority of West Germans, however, remain helpless.

An unsteady force of ninety-thousand young men stands at the ready, armed with rifles and little else. Most are younger than twenty and possess only the military training they received during their seven months of required national service. Ninety-five divisions of the

Warsaw Pact now march against the inner-German border. West Berlin has fallen, along with the five hundred American soldiers who remain of the once mighty Berlin Brigade. The surviving forces of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, the King's Regiment, and the 14th/20th Hussars, which had helped to liberate Germany in 1945, have either surrendered or been wiped out. Thousands of weapons depots and barracks stand empty, cleared by the Americans and British when the government forced them to leave German soil a decade ago. Their airbases, since being transferred to the Luftwaffe, have slowly been overtaken by nature. Airstrips are now little more than cracking pavement surrounded by empty hangars; our purely defensive air corps did not require so many facilities. Any force capable of interdicting such a mighty foe is now gone. We have been punished by our own self-imposed weakness.

The phased disbanding of the Bundeswehr stands nearly complete. In its place, a territorial defense militia will helplessly witness Germany's last days—capable of only surrender.²

Fortunately for the West Germans, no such situation ever unfolded; Warsaw Pact forces remained beyond the Iron Curtain, Bonn remained within the Atlantic alliance, and the Cold War itself ultimately ended with minimal bloodshed. Nonetheless, during the tense days of the mid 1980s, the West German right spared no effort to remind their countrymen that such scenarios grew increasingly plausible. At the very least, they represented the logical outcome of their opponents' security policies. The Social Democrats and the Greens, since the INF dispute, had embarked on ambitious plans to restructure West German defense, to reorder their country's politico-military alignment, and to "overcome" the Cold War

altogether. The Union condemned the left's nefarious "shadow foreign policy" (*Nebenaußenpolitik*), though leading figures—Egon Bahr, Oskar Lafontaine, Andreas von Bülow, and others—operated with impunity, drawing up new defensive strategies, traveling to East Berlin and to Moscow, and consulting with eastern European communist parties on "mutual security" arrangements.³ "There is a struggle going on for the future of Europe, and West Germany is the weak point," remarked John Vinocur." The Federal Republic had become, he warned, the "soft underbelly" of the west."⁴

Moreover, by 1987, West Germans had tired of politics as usual in Bonn. "This country they keep calling solid is really in the process of becoming ungovernable," explained Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a former 1968 student radical and anarchist.⁵ Preferring internal antagonists to foreign foes, they fought the Cold War at home rather than be manipulated abroad. Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD seemed more consumed by outmaneuvering the other than with serving their constituents. The 1987 federal election confirmed that trend, with the mainstream parties of the left and right losing seats to the political fringes.

Kohl spent much of 1987 trying to reassert control over his country's rogue foreign-policy establishment. Marginalized between east and west and suffering political unpopularity at home, the chancellor stood at the lowest point of his political career. On both right and left, political opponents were seeking direct negotiations with the east bloc régimes, outside of the usual diplomatic channels. Even the foreign minister himself leveraged his position to advance the political positions of his party rather than the government's own agenda. A fundamental question divided Bonn politicians: How seriously should they take Gorbachev's overtures? The new Soviet leader promised a new future, for

the people of the USSR and for a “common European home.” The superpowers labored apace to arrive at an INF settlement and to overcome Europe’s military imbalance.

Kohl had never been a gifted a strategist, but he proved an agile tactician. Against that backdrop, the year 1987 would witness the chancellor’s renaissance—ironically, owing largely to his adroit maneuvering in foreign policy. And barely three years later, those very east-west intra-party connections that frustrated Kohl’s policy agenda in 1986-87 proved indispensable to achieving a speedy unification of Germany in the eleven months following the Berlin Wall’s opening. Tens of thousands of workers and farmers did pour across the inner-German border, not as conquerors but to seek refuge from their own dying régime.

A Disarming Proposal

“With Bonn’s consent,” warned journalist Heiner Emde, “Western Europe will be threatened with nuclear disaster.” The Social Democrats, under the leadership of former State Secretary for Defense Andreas von Bülow, had worked in the months and years following the INF dispute to develop a revolutionary new security arrangement for West Germany. Emde introduced West Germans to the proposed reforms by reminding his readers of the logical outcomes of the SPD’s agenda: Soviet domination over central Europe.⁶ Enshrined in the so-called Bülow-Papier, officially “A Strategy for Confidence-Building Security Structures in Europe: Pathways to Security Partnership,” the leftist treatise called for an end to the “Russian hysteria” NATO used to keep West Germans loyal to the alliance.⁷ Instead, Bülow proposed full American withdrawal from the Federal Republic by the year 2000, to cut national service from eighteen months to a maximum of eight months, and to transform the Bundeswehr into a strictly defensive militia force. To Bülow, the loss

would not be all that great: "The strategy of the western alliance," he argued, "which makes nuclear suicide an unavoidable element of deterrence, finds no more adherents in the Bundeswehr" anyhow.⁸

Andreas von Bülow had served in the Federal Ministry of Defense from 1976 to 1980 and later as federal minister for research and technology under Schmidt. His proposals marked yet another betrayal of the former chancellor's legacy of close adherence to NATO, but Bülow would hardly be the last Social Democrat to renounce the old policies. When critics decried such approaches as neutralism, Bülow and his likeminded partisans defended the ideas as "the self assertion of Europe," purely a "nationalization of [West Germany's] defense."⁹

"Security policy nonsense" Defense Minister Wörner retorted. "Anyone who dares not account for the expansive power of the Soviet Union as the real threat to peace [in Europe] undermines the freedom of the west."¹⁰ Other Christian Democrats took a step further, condemning the proposal as treasonous. "The Social Democrats want to impose their foreign-policy ideas in cooperation with the communists," warned the CDU's Willy Wimmer. "The SPD plan is lethal for you," cautioned former Bundeswehr Inspector-General Harald Wust. Still, Bülow and his followers defended both their disarmament plans and conciliatory policies toward the east. "The profound intellectual laziness of the Union represents perhaps our greatest security risk," Bülow contended. The party's inner circle concurred; Bülow had simply documented "the thoughts of the dominant left wing" in the party. "Whoever wants to overcome the division of Europe and of Germany must also think of a Europe without the armies of the superpowers," declared the SPD presidium. "Bans on thinking, which ultimately lead to intellectual sterility, we leave to the CDU."¹¹

Bülow may have been the most high profile schemer, but he certainly enjoyed a proud and diverse company of likeminded self-styled reformers. By 1987, the SPD's earlier flirtations with East Germany's SED had matured into an unchaperoned courtship of questionable virtue. As early as the SPD party conference in the spring of 1982, shortly before Schmidt was muscled into political obsolescence, Egon Bahr convened a working group on "new strategies" for the Federal Republic's security policies. "We [the SPD and the SED] speak openly about every subject," he declared.¹² Within a year, the Social Democrats had dispatched a delegate to East Berlin for an international conference of socialist and communist parties, and later that summer, Egon Bahr joined Honecker and GDR Volkskammer foreign-policy chairman Hermann Axen to explore joint SED-SPD solutions to east-west cooperation.¹³ "He developed a mastery in quasi-conspiratorial contacts," Richard von Weizsäcker later remembered of Bahr. "Shrouded in mystery" and with no diplomatic credentials, Bahr advanced the private foreign policy of his party, according to Weizsäcker, "with highly placed officials of the other nation, people who could be trusted to keep silent."¹⁴

In 1984 and 1985, the Social Democrats' unique brand of paradiplomacy began to take shape.¹⁵ SPD leftists, including Bahr and Oskar Lafontaine, cultivated relationships with their colleagues in East Germany's Socialist Unity Party, in Czechoslovakia's Communist Party (KSČ), in the Polish United Workers' Party, and in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They established inter-party working groups and exchanges on a number of topics, namely their mutual responsibility for overcoming the security dilemma that gripped central Europe. At the end of May 1983, the SPD's moderate parliamentary leader Hans-Jochen Vogel began a series of annual meetings with Honecker, and within a year, the two agreed to convene a

permanent working group on establishing a chemical-weapons free zone in Europe. Two years later, SPD chairman Willy Brandt, accompanied by Bahr and Günter Gaus, traveled to East Berlin for a meeting with Honecker. They similarly agreed to appoint a joint committee to prepare plans for a nuclear-weapons-free corridor flanking the inner-German border.¹⁶ In the coming years, the Social Democrats signed joint declarations with the East Germans, Czechoslovaks, Poles, and Soviets—all in direct contradiction to their own government's foreign policy. The loyal opposition bordered on treason.

Moscow welcomed the SPD's leftward swing, though it came as no surprise. For years, the eastern intelligence agencies had been surreptitiously sponsoring and funding the West German peace movements. As the Social Democrats gradually repudiated their country's postwar foreign policy—built upon NATO integration, the transatlantic relationship, and nuclear deterrence—they galvanized their constituents around a new vision, which unbeknownst to the party leadership, was being designed by Moscow.¹⁷ Peace activism provided the fledgling SPD a ready-made mechanism by which to compete with the Greens on the left and the Union on the right. The peace movements became so critical to the SPD agenda that the party even offered funding for movement activities at various critical junctures.¹⁸ One contemporary, after careful study, traced a number of the Kremlin's new joint security initiatives in the middle and late 1980s to prominent West German Social Democrats.¹⁹

Even as Kohl and Reagan sat together in Washington in October 1986, hammering out the details for the future of European nuclear security, back in Bonn, the SPD and SED were unveiling their own plans to remove all nuclear weapons from central Europe. "The

European continent has become a powder keg that could explode at any time,” the parties cautioned. “An expression of the special responsibility of the two German states,” the SPD-SED proposal warned “that war should never again originate on German soil.” Each party called upon its respective government to begin negotiations as quickly as possible before “mankind is thrust into disaster.”²⁰ Of course, the SED and the East German régime remained virtually synonymous, so in reality, the Social Democrats had colluded with a foreign government to enforce the party’s political agenda domestically. All the while, Kohl and his staff remained in Washington, humiliated abroad by their own countrymen.

Within a year, the SPD had formed a “Basic Values Commission” to work with the SED Central Committee’s Academy for Social Sciences to conclude a joint agreement on “Conflicting Ideologies and Common Security.”²¹ Still unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of his own foreign and security policies, and threatened from both left and right within his own coalition, Kohl simply labelled the Social Democrats a “security risk” for the country—a fifth column continuing to conduct its own illicit “shadow foreign policy.” Ultimately, the *Nebenaußenpolitik* indictment proved effective in discrediting some of the left’s foreign-policy notions, but Kohl himself still struggled to reclaim his position as the final authority in West Germany’s foreign affairs.²² All the while, the Americans and Soviets negotiated a future for intermediate-range nuclear weapons and for Germany’s security over Kohl’s head.²³

The Right: A Crisis of the Leaders

“Who is in charge of West German foreign policy?” asked *The Economist*. “At present, judging by the contradictory signals from Bonn, no one seems to be.”²⁴ Kohl, who only

recently had enjoyed the international limelight as the central figure of European and transatlantic politics, now seemed but an afterthought both to Bonn's relations with Moscow and to his country's own foreign policy. The chancellor had lost much of his credibility and political capital across 1986, as his country's foreign-policy agenda slipped beyond his grasp. Many ambitious competitors—Weizsäcker, Geißler, Genscher, and Strauß within his coalition, and Rau, Bahr, Lafontaine, and Bülow from the opposition—seized on Kohl's marginalization between the superpowers, each hoping to style himself the new champion of Bonn's foreign relations. It may have been "the hour of the German chancellor," but Kohl had never felt so powerless.²⁵

Even as détente collapsed during Kohl's earliest days in office, his country remained an important interlocutor in east-west relations. West Germans had come to cherish the special role their country played between the superpowers, and as the east-west détente withered, they valued their Ostpolitik all the more. Though Kohl and his CDU/CSU had been reticent to continue the Social Democrats' engagement with the east, public support for continuity in foreign policy and for Ostpolitik remained high across the 1980s.²⁶ But as Reagan and Gorbachev forged a more productive relationship, Kohl found himself increasingly marginalized and seemingly superfluous to superpower relations.

Since Gorbachev's accession in 1985, Kohl had gradually lost much of the influence he once had enjoyed in foreign affairs.²⁷ During the chancellor's first years in office, his chief foreign-policy aim involved maintaining solidarity with the United States. Kohl had unseated his predecessor largely because he had been able to consolidate the West German right during the INF dispute. Amid those tense days of the "'second' Cold War," he demonstrated his resolve against the forces of pacifism and neutralism in his country, and he and Reagan

forged a close working relationship.²⁸ Reagan had viewed Kohl as his most important ally on the continent.²⁹ Kohl understood and appreciated his American counterpart; both men were shrewd tacticians, and both had committed themselves to overcoming the Cold War, even if they lacked a strategy to do so.³⁰ Mutual antagonism between the superpowers had assigned the chancellor an easy role to play: cold warrior.

Gorbachev's rise to power recast the Cold War drama. In the new Soviet general secretary, Reagan found a willing partner for engagement; Gorbachev demonstrated genuine commitment to overcoming the east-west conflict. From the autumn of 1985 to the autumn of 1986, meeting in Geneva and in Reykjavík, Reagan and Gorbachev gradually put aside many of their differences and came closer to an INF accord. Kohl had pledged his unequivocal support to Reagan's muscular eastern policy and then gradually was abandoned as U.S.-Soviet relations improved.

Gorbachev harbored tremendous resentment toward Kohl from his earliest days in office. He had not forgiven Kohl for comparing him with Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels and for the graceless insults the chancellor lobbed at the Kremlin before the two had ever enjoyed a proper visit.³¹ Gorbachev quickly came to view the West German chancellor as a philistine and a boor. Gorbachev had worried about Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative more than any other dimension of east-west relations, and Kohl's brash support for SDI had not smoothed their already tense relationship.

Of course, Gorbachev hoped Kohl and his coalition would lose the 1987 federal election. Unlike his predecessors in the Kremlin, the new general secretary embraced the European left as allies and equals. He shared a good rapport with Willy Brandt and favored a left-leaning SPD victory in West Germany.³² Frequent exchanges of high-profile negotiators

between Bonn's opposition and the ruling eastern parties demonstrated Gorbachev's commitment to the West German left. Gorbachev and the CPSU cultivated close and productive relationships with Bonn's leading "shadow foreign-policymakers," including Bülow, Lafontaine, and Bahr, all of whom received warm welcomes in Moscow.³³ A Social-Democratic government would prove more pliable in negotiations and likely would resist further U.S. deployments of forward-based systems and theater forces in Germany and in Europe.

By 1987, Kohl realized how marginalized he had become. Gorbachev viewed him as an impediment to productive relations with western Europe. "One could feel that [Kohl is] very concerned about the present situation in which Britain, France, Italy, and other NATO countries are actively pushing ahead of the FRG in their effort to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union," Gorbachev explained to the Central Committee, noting Kohl's anxiety.³⁴ In Gorbachev's first letter to Kohl, and in many exchanges thereafter, he politely encouraged the chancellor to revisit his position on SDI. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze likewise pressed Genscher on the matter. The message from the Kremlin remained clear: Were Bonn and Moscow to enjoy productive relations, Kohl would need to temper his support for Reagan's brash defense policies, especially SDI.³⁵

Proving his supreme credentials as a cold warrior cost Kohl much of the goodwill the West Germans had cultivated in the east.³⁶ Likewise, as the American president aimed to move beyond rhetoric to improved interbloc relations, Kohl's perilous political position proved a liability. No longer did West Germany function as an honest broker in east-west relations; the German chancellor's concept of détente seemed too narrow for the

engagement Reagan and Gorbachev envisioned. Kohl had no relationship with Moscow, while Ostpolitik continued to figure so prominently in West German domestic politics.

Gorbachev punished Kohl by isolating him. When Gorbachev had taken office in the spring of 1985, he embarked on many visits to western capitals, demonstrating his willingness for engagement and his vision of the Soviet Union as inextricably woven into the tapestry of European politics, economics, and culture. In all of his jet-setting, however, he had bypassed Bonn each time.

Nor did Gorbachev extend an invitation for Kohl to visit Moscow. Two days after taking office, Gorbachev received Bundesrat President Lothar Späth, who spent a week in the Soviet Union. Deutsche Bank chief Wilhelm Christians followed three weeks later and SPD chairman Willy Brandt shortly thereafter. In an especially egregious affront to the chancellor, Johannes Rau, an SPD favorite for the chancellorship, enjoyed a well publicized four-day visit with Gorbachev in September. Another Bundestag delegation followed that winter. In the coming two years—throughout 1986 and 1987—Gorbachev extended invitations to each of Kohl's political opponents, with Rau, Genscher, Weizsäcker, and Strauß all traveling to Moscow for high profile visits. Genscher returned to Bonn particularly impressed with Gorbachev's promise to "open a new page" in German-Soviet relations, and when he and the federal president visited Gorbachev a year later, Weizsäcker was keen to address reunification with his hosts. "Gorbachev did not waste a minute on ideology and propaganda," he remembered. When the subject turned to German reunification, the general secretary answered flatly: "We should leave the solution to history, since it was impossible to predict what things would look like in a hundred years," echoing the Kremlin's decades-old pro-forma response. "I asked him if he knew what things would look like in fifty

years,” Weizsäcker reported, “and he began to smile.”³⁷ While Kohl remained sidelined in Bonn, Gorbachev had just engaged in his first discussion with a German leader about Kohl’s most cherished topic: the German question. Only after three and a half years in office did Gorbachev finally welcome Kohl to the Kremlin—at the end of October 1988.

Domestic politics failed to reinforce the chancellor’s position. Ambitious coalition partners chipped away at the government’s solidarity, leaving Kohl to manage tendentious relationships not only abroad and in the Bundestag, but in the cabinet room as well. “In a coalition, every party must be able to preserve its own standpoint,” the chancellor explained, but “solidarity must remain foremost, not self-promotion at the group’s expense.”³⁸ Alas, Kohl confronted precisely such a dilemma, threatened both within his own party and from coalition partners on the left and right.

Unlike Kohl’s political idol Adenauer, the younger chancellor did not function as a kingmaker in Bonn politics. By the mid 1980s, even the most loyal of Christian Democrats found they could boost their own political profiles by asserting their independence from Kohl.³⁹ Among others, Heiner Geißler particularly flexed his autonomy, as did many enterprising young CDU hopefuls. By the nature of the West German Basic Law, the chancellor did not enjoy strong executive power.⁴⁰ Thus reliant on his parliamentary group, on the extra-parliamentary party, and on the annual party congress, Kohl could not dictate the coalition’s foreign-policy agenda neither to the degree he wished nor in the style of his predecessors, who often had enjoyed stronger leadership at the party level.⁴¹

Neither was the chancellor immune from duplicity among his coalition allies. Beyond doubt, “at various critical junctures,” noted one commentator, Foreign Minister Genscher

remained “the most powerful man in Bonn.”⁴² At home and abroad, Genscher boasted more popularity than Kohl, always surpassing the chancellor in public-opinion polls.⁴³ And while Kohl had been snubbed by Moscow, Genscher enjoyed fast, friendly relations with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and other leaders throughout the east bloc. During the summer of 1986, Genscher played a round of shuttle diplomacy with the Kremlin. Meeting directly with Gorbachev, Genscher listened as the general secretary railed against Kohl’s policies, particularly his stance on NATO’s theater-based nuclear weapons stationed in West Germany. Genscher politely toed the party line. Since 1979, he and his Free Democrats had officially supported INF modernization, beginning with the alliance’s double-track decision. Genscher did, however, impress upon his host how earnestly he and his countrymen desired a stable and lasting nuclear agreement between east and west. When the subject turned to a future “common European home,” the two found they shared many perspectives in common. Without so much as a nod from Kohl, both Genscher and Gorbachev agreed to “open a new page” in Bonn-Moscow relations.⁴⁴

While Genscher traveled the world as Bonn’s chief diplomat, Bavaria’s Minister-President Franz-Josef Strauß remained in Munich, imagining what might have been. Both Kohl and Genscher had colluded to block Strauß, longtime chairman of the Christian Social Union, from any senior cabinet posts, a bitter insult that Strauß continued to resent for the remainder of his life—until his sudden death in October 1988.⁴⁵ In fact, Strauß’s experience and political skill far surpassed Kohl’s, the former having held top cabinet posts under both Adenauer and Kiesinger. Bound together by political necessity, Kohl and Strauß continued their bitter sparring and made little effort to conceal their mutual contempt.⁴⁶ Strauß perceived Kohl as a self-serving opportunist, though his own brand of politics differed

very little from the chancellor's. "At the age of ninety," Strauß observed, Kohl "would be writing memoirs entitled 'Forty Years as Chancellor Candidate.'"⁴⁷

Most importantly, Strauß believed that Kohl privileged the relationship with the Free Democrats over the CDU's long-standing alliance with its more conservative Bavarian sister party. Though he could not control the legislative agenda as Kohl did, Strauß instead mobilized his Christian Socialists to pull coalition policy to the right. With nearly a quarter of seats in the Union parliamentary group, the CSU leveraged their voting power to negotiate for more conservative stances in the Bundestag.⁴⁸ Strauß stood far to the right of Kohl on most political questions, and in foreign policy, despite his own work arranging the "Strauß credits" to the GDR years earlier, he bitterly resisted the chancellor's continuation of Ostpolitik, seeing it as a capitulation to Germany's permanent division.⁴⁹

Torn between the two superpowers and stretched between the extremes of his coalition, Kohl struggled to reclaim his country's foreign policy. Marginalized by Gorbachev and forgotten by Reagan, outmaneuvered by Genscher and castigated by Strauß, the chancellor largely failed to show how *his* leadership proved essential to the many goals he boasted for a united Germany in a united Europe. From early 1986 to late 1988, West Germany's foreign policy veered wildly between the extremes of the governing coalition and danced dangerously along the vicissitudes of superpower politics. Kohl had capitalized on a foreign-policy crisis to come to power, but now his own tactics had been appropriated by his rivals within the governing coalition.

The chancellor's greatest worry, however, lay beyond his reach. Just as Kohl battled fragmentation within his own coalition, his opponents on the left were enduring a wholesale

party realignment. Renewed activism in foreign and security policy brought many ambitious ideologues to the fore, as Kohl's weaknesses in foreign affairs received unrelenting public attention and scrutiny.

The Left: A Crisis of the Followers

A crisis within the West German left, brewing since Schmidt's overthrow four years earlier, finally reached its boiling point by late 1986. An intra-party struggle, centered upon foreign and security policy, destroyed the SPD's traditional security-policy consensus laid down in the Bad Godesberg program of 1959.⁵⁰ "The party, after marching from the left to the center on defense in the late 1950s," noted one commentator, "appears determined to march back again to the left."⁵¹

Prior to the Godesberg consensus, the SPD had been dominated by the survivors of the Hitler era—men who had experienced firsthand the excesses of German militarism and who harbored deep suspicions toward their country's rearmament. A return to military strength, even within western institutions, would condemn Germany to permanent division, they believed—according to Kurt Schumacher, resulting in "senseless sacrifices" and "collaboration on capitulation."⁵² From the fray, young pragmatists such as Helmut Schmidt, Fritz Erler, and Herbert Wehner emerged, showing that Adenauer's *Westbindung* was not irreconcilable with the Social Democrats' social and domestic-policy goals. "If you elect us, we can do much for you with reference to the legal order, school questions, home construction, and the regulation of social matters," joked Wehner, "but on one question—national defense—you must stick with the others." Certainly the SPD could not deliver such a message and could not be left behind on the most important political questions of the day.

The Godesberger program called for a national defense “adapted to the political and geographical position of Germany” and focused on “easing of international tensions, effectively controlled disarmament, and for the reunification of Germany.”⁵³ As Helga Haftendorn later noted, “the status quo had become a powerful force,” and the Godesberger program thus moderated the party’s ideological intransigence, making the SPD compatible with the realities of Cold War Europe.⁵⁴

In the intervening decades, however, a new political generation had come of age. The working-class of the 1950s had become the pensioners of the 1980s. Their political influence had diminished as German industry was shipped overseas and a new middle class filled the SPD’s ranks. “This younger generation,” explained one commentator, “was especially critical of the ‘Godesbergization’ of the SPD.”⁵⁵ As Schmidt was muscled from power, by the early 1980s, a new foreign-policy left took shape. Ambitious young ideologues, led by Oskar Lafontaine, Erhard Eppler, and others, pushed an anti-nuclear platform and for a renunciation of NATO in favor of West German neutrality.⁵⁶ To these leftists, the politics of the nation-state had become antiquated; Europe had evolved beyond the chauvinist nationalism of generations past. Peace was a universal concept and protection of the environment a global imperative; neither could be advanced in “the isolation of the nation-state.”⁵⁷ Convening the so-called Frankfurt Circle (*Frankfurter Kreis*), the group styled itself the inheritor of the SPD’s original platform—before the corruptions of Godesberg. Functioning as a liaison with the peace organizations, the Frankfurt working group strategized plans for a nuclear-free Germany outside of NATO. They further pushed for the SPD to abandon any claims to eventual German unity. “The restoration of German unity must be abandoned as our goal,” they declared.⁵⁸

At the other end of the SPD spectrum, the Seeheim Circle (*Seeheimer Kreis*) retained the traditional atlanticist platform of Schmidt. Including Hans Apel, Dieter Haack, Karl Kaiser, and Georg Leber, the group feared tainting their party's venerable reputation with the radical left and hoped to limit SPD exposure to the peace movements and the Greens. "They remain critical of what they see as a drift toward neutralism in the party," assessed one commentator, "arguing that the stress on peace as the goal has gradually blurred distinctions between communist and Western values."⁵⁹

Between the Frankfurt and Seeheim circles, a center-left coalition emerged. A diverse assembly, the group included the assorted talents of Egon Bahr and Andreas von Bülow, as well as chairman of the SPD's Bundestag Committee on Foreign and Security Policy Horst Ehmke and SPD foreign-policy spokesman Karsten Voigt.⁶⁰ The center-left's topmost priority was to return the Social Democrats to power—by the ideological path least objectionable to voters. Having lost their coalition with the Liberals, the Social Democrats no longer needed to lean right to appease the centrists. Instead, they needed to lean left and stem the flow of their partisans toward the upstart Greens.

Amid the intra-party maneuvering, the most important variable in Social Democratic politics had come from outside of the party altogether. Blossoming at the local level, the Greens, under Joschka Fischer's leadership, had been transformed from a radical splinter force to an increasingly influential party in the Landtage and in the Bundestag. An "anti-party party," the Greens welcomed many socialists who had grown altogether disillusioned with partisanship and the SPD.⁶¹ Rejecting U.S. extended deterrence and American troops in Germany, they called for disbanding the Atlantic alliance and the Bundeswehr itself. Instead, their defense policy called for "social self-defense" in the form of civil disobedience. "The

west's nuclear codes should be inscribed on the heart of a child," declared Petra Kelly, chairwoman of the Greens' Bundestag parliamentary group. "Reagan should have to rip open a child's heart when he is ready to begin a nuclear war."⁶² Kelly always drew large crowds with her radical emotional appeals, and SPD moderates did not offer the same populist appeal as Kelly's or Fischer's calls for "peace" and "denuclearization."⁶³ By 1987, the Green Party was no longer an aberration; it had become a fixture of Bonn politics.⁶⁴

From that constellation, the embattled Social Democrats needed to chart their course in the 1987 federal election and beyond. At the August 1986 Nuremberg party congress, they codified a new security-policy agenda.⁶⁵ "The peoples of the east-west conflict will either survive together or perish together," they declared. Envisioning a continent "free of aggression and alliances," the SPD called for the most ambitious overhaul of Europe's security architecture of the postwar era. "Conflicting ideologies will not solve our common problem of preventing war," and "Europeans of east and west can only survive in a security partnership" (*Sicherheitspartnerschaft*).⁶⁶ Through "European self-determination," the peoples of Europe, east and west, would pursue the ultimate elimination of nuclear and conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. The West Germans would lead by example, instituting Bülow's proposals for a drawdown in Bonn's military capacity resulting in a "structural inability to attack."⁶⁷ Central European nuclear- and chemical-weapons-free zones would replace heavy armaments to support NATO's Flexible Response posture in Germany. "Peace can only be secured *with* and not *against* the political opponent," the Social Democrats held. The problems gripping European society could no longer be treated by a modest, compromising parliamentary opposition; only a wholesale overhaul of the

politico-military nexus could produce any lasting results. And, they held, any reforms in Germany must begin with the bipolar international system itself.⁶⁸

After their decade in power, how had the Social Democrats reached such a position of division and political impotence? Dating back to the SPD's ouster in 1982, a power vacuum had opened at their party's highest levels. The moderates—for decades the SPD's centrist majority, representative of the working classes and believers in the state's ability to provide comprehensive welfare programs—had lost their champion in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The very reasons for Schmidt's dismissal—political polarization and abandonment of the party's centrist precepts—led to the moderates' marginalization. Throughout the Godesberg era, from 1959 to 1982, Schmidt and Brandt had represented the party's two ideological poles. Schmidt, the Hamburg intellectual, represented pragmatism and proved keen to balance West Germany's Atlantic and European commitments; Brandt, a rolling stone, proudly touted his ideals and believed that West Germany ultimately could overcome the Westphalian order and the bipolar world. Schmidt may have been deposed in 1982, but Brandt, whose political career had been built on adaptation and survival, continued on as party chairman, a post he held since 1964.

Out of the chancellory, free from the constraints of coalition politics, Brandt redoubled his commitment to international affairs, focusing especially on the north-south economic divide.⁶⁹ His views on politico-military affairs became far less focused on defense than on development, and his outlook on European security had become decidedly pacifist. Practicing his usual closed-door politicking, public policy came to matter far less than personal relationships under Brandt's leadership; advancement in Social-Democratic politics,

either in the Länder or in Bonn, depended largely upon the chairman's grace and favor.⁷⁰

Among Brandt's young favorites in the Bundestag were Gernot Erler and Hermann Scheer, both of Baden-Württemberg, and Katrin Fuchs of North Rhine-Westphalia. Despite only brief tenures in parliamentary politics—Scheer, the most senior, entered the Bundestag in 1980—each quickly rose to an important posts under Brandt's tutelage. Each of Brandt's protégés professed expertise in security policy and arms-control issues, and each affiliated with the Frankfurt Circle of SPD pacifists. Erler sat on the Bundestag's Defense Committee, Scheer chaired the party's parliamentary committee on arms control, and Fuchs sat on the Bundestag's Defense Committee and served as vice chair of the party's foreign and security policy committee. Brandt likewise hoped to choose his successor and warmly cultivated support for Lafontaine as future party chairman. Lafontaine, minister-president of the Saarland, had often been surrounded by controversy. In 1983, he argued publicly that NATO nuclear deployments in the Federal Republic violated both the Basic Law and the UN Charter, and within the next two years, he directly called for West Germany to leave NATO—views Brandt refused to contradict.⁷¹

The moderate Social Democrats had largely been muscled out of party politics. Condemned to obsolescence by their own political steadfastness, year after year, they poured new wine into old wineskins—waxing on about their technocratic policies—as the far left and the moderate right siphoned off voters. The working class, which represented the traditional base of SPD support, had been decimated as a political force. Johannes Rau, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Hans Apel, and their cohort of SPD veterans courted a constituency that no longer existed as a major force in West German politics. In particular, the trade unions had been dealt a series of blows politically across the 1980s, including a demotion of their

privileges under the Mitbestimmung arrangement.⁷² In the 1950s, nearly half of SPD members were in the working class. By the late 1970s, only a quarter were in the working class.⁷³ “Realism and reform,” noted Hamburg First Mayor Klaus von Dohnányi, “that’s the issue within the party.”⁷⁴


The Social Democrats prepared for the January 1987 federal election largely devoid of a standard-bearer. Johannes Rau, the party’s deputy chairman stood as chancellor-candidate though he inspired little confidence within the ranks. He spoke in grandiose terms—promising that the SPD would achieve an absolute majority in the Bundestag, a first in German history—but in reality, he simply struggled to hold his fractured party together.⁷⁵ Though “a populist with a great campaigning record,” according to one commentator, Rau “lacked the political gravitas to give the party a sense of purpose or direction.”⁷⁶ “For me,” Rau told an interviewer, “the stress placed upon Central Europe with the medium-range missiles is a depressing topic.”⁷⁷ The *Nebenaußenpolitik* indictment from the Union parties had proven politically detrimental. Critics on the right suggested that the election represented a de facto referendum on West German neutrality, and Kohl tirelessly criticized the opposition as a “security threat” for the country—a party with plans to gut the Bundeswehr and willing to take orders from the Kremlin.⁷⁸

Ironically, the Greens saw the SPD as even more dangerous. On the eve of the election, they issued an exhaustive point-by-point refutation of the Social Democrats’ security-policy platform. “We Greens cannot accept the SPD’s view”—“the Half Peace,” they warned. Quite simply, “we are convinced that the SPD has no viable peace policy.”⁷⁹ The best Rau could hope for was to create a catch-all *Volkspartei* of the left and hope to unite as much of the opposition as possible.

Eighty-four percent of West Germans turned up at their polling places on January 25th. By day's end, the results of the election were clear: both right and left were splintering among their uncompromising ideological factions, and a pervasive sense of populism and anti-incumbency gripped the electorate. The Union parties lost twenty-one parliamentary seats, and the Social Democrats lost another nine. The Liberals gained thirteen, and the Greens gained another sixteen. The election saw the SPD's worst showing in twenty-five years. Some even projected the Greens may replace the SPD as West Germany's party of the left; the Social Democrats simply would fade into oblivion.⁸⁰

The Social Democrats' losses were compounded in the months that followed. In the Hesse Landtag election that April, the SPD lost power for the first time in postwar history. The Hessians had traditionally represented the SPD's most reliable constituency, but they had grown exasperated with Hesse's red-green coalition and the ideological battles that came to dominate regional politics. Across Germany, many saw the SPD's loss of Hesse as even more devastating than their performance in the federal election.

Fig. 5.1. West German Federal Election Results, 25 January 1987



Unbeknownst even to the party's own leaders, the traumas of late 1986 and early 1987 had begun the creative destruction that would lead to the Social Democrats' renewal in the years to come. In the meantime, however, the party would remain "in the wilderness."⁸¹

The turning point came when Brandt was muscled out of the party's leadership in the last week of March. Once the youthful champion of Ostpolitik, by 1987, the seventy-three-year-old ex-chancellor was the oldest member of the Bundestag. "His life has been a history of changing fortune," assessed one commentator: "violent swings between political defeat and triumph, public adulation and bitter denunciation, euphoria and despair."⁸² Finally, by the spring of 1987, his political journey had reached its end. His ouster had been triggered by a minor scandal involving his appointment of a new party press spokesperson who many insiders saw as unqualified. Ultimately, however, a long train of preconditions precipitated his departure. The electoral losses in both the federal election and in the Hessian Landtag had exposed the intra-party rift before the country and the world. Brandt's lukewarm support for Rau's candidacy had been conspicuous, as had his favoritism for Lafontaine and other leftists out of step with the party's base of support.⁸³ Most importantly, his twenty-three years as chairman, as well as his stranglehold on the party's leadership posts, had hindered younger leaders from advancing in Social Democratic politics. The party's leadership lacked continuity, and suddenly the Social Democrats "had a lightweight appearance."⁸⁴

The moderate deputy chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel replaced Brandt. Though chosen by the party's national executive with thirty-two of thirty-four possible votes, Vogel did not necessarily seem the natural choice as Brandt's successor. His selection represented a clear

decision at the highest levels of the SPD to avoid the radical left, including Brandt's favorite Lafontaine, and to return the party to power by remaining loyal to its moderate tradition.

In Washington, anxious defense planners and officials were pleased with Vogel's appointment. After "an unpredictable, zigzag course" in SPD politics, Vogel would restore the "tired and dispirited party."⁸⁵ Whereas Social Democratic policy had once been seen as "unrealistic, dangerous, and capable of undermining NATO," Vogel historically had shown himself more inclined to soothe allied anxieties.⁸⁶ He remained moderately critical of NATO's theater nuclear forces in Germany, not for ideological reasons, but because he believed that the 1979 dual-track decision had been flawed in its implementation.⁸⁷ He hoped for renewed détente between east and west and for arms-control negotiations to result in fewer nuclear forces deployed in his own country. Visiting Washington and Ottawa, he told the Americans and Canadians that the SPD remained firmly committed to the transatlantic alliance, and he took great care to renounce any neutralist thinking in Bonn.⁸⁸ Critics even identified Rau as "Schmidt II"—a pragmatic Atlanticist content to work within existing multilateral networks rather than overturn them altogether.⁸⁹

If any single person won the 1987 federal election, it was Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bonn's indefatigable foreign minister. For three decades Genscher had remained active at the highest levels of FDP politics, including his eleven years as party chairman. Even after the upsets of the election, both right and left remained entrenched in their foreign and security-policy positions—the CDU/CSU by its political impotence and the SPD by its ideological intransigence. Genscher and his Liberals, however, received a nine-percent increase in their Bundestag seating. As the superpowers neared an INF accord and made progress in arms-

control negotiations, Genscher was among the very few Bonn officials who remained actively engaged and consulted in both west and east, by the Americans and by the Soviets as well. As the pivot of the West German system, he had endured the upsets of 1987 and now functioned as the pivot of European politics as well.

The Pacesetter

Addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos in February 1987, Hans-Dietrich Genscher delivered one of the most important speeches of his political career. “After forty years of confrontation,” he explained, Europeans faced “a turning-point in east-west relations.” Gorbachev clearly harbored no evil intentions toward the west; he had renounced the “orthodoxy of the Brezhnev era” in deed, if not yet in word, and his efforts needed to be validated by the west. “It would be a mistake of historic dimensions for the west to let this chance slip just because it cannot escape from a way of thinking which invariably expects the worst from the Soviet Union.” The Cold War was ending, Genscher believed, and West Germany’s government—Genscher’s own coalition, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl—remained too consumed by ideology to realize as much. “Let us take Mr. Gorbachev seriously. Let us take him at his word!”⁹⁰

Genscher’s Davos address represented the biggest gamble of his political life. Neither his comments nor his position had been vetted by the chancellor, and his statement did not represent the government’s attitude. He publicly had circumvented Kohl and was promoting his own personal foreign policy.⁹¹

Critics within the coalition justifiably accused Genscher of overstepping his role. His policies quickly earned the epithet “Genscherism”—a quasi-neutral West Germany, scouting

a third way between Washington and Moscow. Thus “Genscherism” became political shorthand for West German détente policies during the otherwise tense period of the mid 1980s. “A Germany that was in and of the west,” explained one commentator, “but not always with the west”—that was Genscher’s approach.⁹² Another described his policies as “a German-inspired second wave of Ostpolitik,” though retaining both its nationalist and neutralist tendencies.⁹³

A man of the middle, Genscher was always lampooned as unreliable and opportunistic. By 1987, however, he stood at the pinnacle of German politics. He enjoyed popularity in both east and west and had cultivated a network of personal relationships with leaders around the globe. Politically astute, he led a small but loyal centrist party that, after the 1987 federal election, controlled more than nine percent of the Bundestag’s seats.⁹⁴ He had served in the cabinet since 1969 and survived three successive chancellors. Genscher’s Free Democrats proved essential for any coalition government, and his political acumen always guaranteed his party important portfolios in coalition agreements—whether with the Social Democrats on the left or the Union on the right.⁹⁵ Years of navigating between the two giants of West German politics prepared him well for his shuttle diplomacy between east and west.

The Americans found Genscher particularly devious. A leading *Washington Post* editorial identified him as “Bonn’s tightrope walker” and the “leading dove within NATO,” while a U.S. ambassador called him “a slippery man.”⁹⁶ The British characterization of “West Germany’s seemingly perpetual foreign minister” held that “east is east, west is west, and Genscher is in the middle.”⁹⁷ Genscher was a master of parsing words, relying on vague diplomatic platitudes: “bloc-transcendence,” “peace order,” “cooperation,” among his favorites. He was

“an exemplar of political correctness before PC was even a gleam in a deconstructionist’s eye,” remembered one interviewer.⁹⁸

Genscher wasted little time with detractors. In all of that maneuvering, he clearly stated his purpose: to preserve détente in Europe at all costs. “Again and again, I tried . . . to make clear that we Germans in particular would draw no benefit from confrontation in Europe,” he explained. “By promoting the process of détente, we could only win.”⁹⁹ Thus, for Genscher, success in his agenda meant bridging the east-west divide through his own brand of *Schaukelpolitik*.¹⁰⁰ He defended détente in ideological terms—the vocabulary of a politician—never as a matter of interest—the language of a diplomat. Kohl in particular found that approach unnerving; Genscher used his power abroad to advance his agenda at home.

The Davos speech typified Genscher’s effrontery toward the chancellor. Kohl, who had largely been marginalized between the superpowers, had been humiliated by his own government minister. Only a week before, Kohl had lost twenty-one seats in the 1987 federal election, while Genscher had gained thirteen. “The alliance still creates the impression that 240 million Americans are defending 320 million Europeans against 280 million Russians,” Genscher warned his audience. “This impression is in neither side’s interest and cannot be allowed to continue.” Through his Davos speech, Genscher hoped to convince his coalition partners to relax their negotiating positions on both strategic arms and theater-based weapons and to soften their support for Reagan’s SDI. The west needed to reciprocate Gorbachev’s “far-sighted boldness.” The Davos trip seemed like a victory tour while Kohl remained in Bonn trying to reassert control over his rogue foreign-policy team.

Genscher's address in Davos ultimately marked an important milestone in the east-west rapprochement of the late 1980s. But in the short term, it revealed to the Soviets Bonn's tractability in the face of tough negotiations over NATO's intermediate-range forces deployed on West German territory. The speech also highlighted the degree to which Kohl had lost control over his cabinet and his country's foreign-policy establishment and that West Germany's indefatigable foreign minister had more staying power than any of his colleagues in Bonn.

The Second Zero

Reagan and Gorbachev both remained ideologically committed to redefining the east-west strategic relationship and to eliminating as many nuclear weapons as possible, in Europe and the world over. But decades of mutual mistrust and inertial defense bureaucracies stood in their way. Moreover, as Reagan gradually came to realize, no single deal would rid Europe of nuclear weapons on the continent; only through a series of discreet agreements for each weapons class could negotiators overcome Europe's strategic imbalance.¹⁰¹ West German strategists had long worried about that American propensity to play "on a few squares of a chess-board or which the remainder was vacant."¹⁰² The longstanding wisdom in Bonn held that negotiations must be linked at the conventional, strategic, and sub-strategic levels in order to be effective; anything short of such an integrated approach would cede an advantage to the adversary. To Genscher, that had been much of the appeal of the double-zero option in which both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would eliminate all of their land-based short-range (*i.e.*, 500-1,000 km) and intermediate-range (*i.e.*, 1,000-5,500 km) missiles and launchers; rather than piecemeal negotiations with

no underlying strategic calculus, the double-zero position accounted for the full range of escalatory options in a potential European conflict.¹⁰³

After the abortive meeting at Reykjavík, fraught as it was with disagreement, a potential INF deal remained indefinitely stalled. But, according to one U.S. negotiator, “Reykjavík came unexpectedly close to an unexpectedly ambitious agreement.”¹⁰⁴ In a glimmer of consensus, both Reagan and Gorbachev had agreed in principle to the double-zero formula. But Reagan insisted that his SDI was necessary to guarantee that both sides disarmed in mutual good faith. The president had even learned the Russian proverb “Trust, but verify” (Доверяй, но проверяй), which he relished repeating to Gorbachev in his clumsy Russian. Gorbachev, on the other hand, insisted that any progress on INF negotiations must be linked to mutual readiness to limit strategic arms through START I.

To many in West Germany, the entire episode seemed a bit farcical. Global double-zero had begun as a political ploy; it appealed to “the peace-loving passions of the Western publics”—though perhaps ill-informed on the nuances of nuclear deterrence—but remained a ruse to silence the peace movements.¹⁰⁵ Now, just a few years later, the two superpowers, who could agree on little else, concurred that any future INF deal must be based on the global double-zero formula. Simultaneously, every major West German political party had supported a deal at least as far reaching as double zero. “Hardly anyone believed that it could be realized on a global scale,” Genscher recalled. But both “the left and the right succumbed to their own misconceptions.”¹⁰⁶ Privately, Genscher, Kohl, and Wörner worried about the implications of including the shorter-range missiles (500-1,000 km) in the negotiations, which could decouple West Germany from the United States and reopen the “gray area” problem, possibly inviting nuclear blackmail by the Soviets.¹⁰⁷ Genscher shuttled

back and forth between his government and the Americans, hoping to persuade Washington to relax the position on the shorter-range weapons. Meanwhile, several Christian Democrats broke ranks with the chancellor, publicly speaking out against the second zero.¹⁰⁸

Europeans struggled to reconcile the rhetoric of Reagan, fierce cold warrior, with Reagan, nuclear abolitionist. In fact, many in the West German press believed that the administration's inclusion of the second zero represented little more than a ruse to win back domestic support in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal and projections that the Republicans would lose more seats in Congress during the 1986 midterm election.

In reality, Reagan had come genuinely to believe that the world must be rid of nuclear arms. After meeting with Gorbachev, he viewed that task as an almost sacred obligation of his life, and with messianic zeal, he preached the religion of nuclear abolition. In fact, Reagan's own staff, including his national security advisor John Poindexter, had been shocked after the Reykjavík meeting when the president committed "to eliminating all nuclear weapons within ten years." Four days after the president's return to Washington, the NSC warned him in writing to "step back from any discussion of eliminating all nuclear weapons" and to "make no further public comment endorsing the idea." Poindexter reiterated: "I strongly feel that you should step back—and do so now."¹⁰⁹ At its December 1986 meeting, the North Atlantic Council refused to endorse Reagan's position. "The alliance strategy of deterrence, based on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, has proved its value in safeguarding peace and enabling us to resist intimidation," noted the final communiqué. "It remains fully valid." Moreover, as Ambassador Niels Hansen was keen to press, "Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation." Instead, the alliance must "look

for progress in other areas of arms control.” Such progress remained “an essential requirement for real and enduring stability and security in Europe.”¹¹⁰

Faced with the sudden reality of virtually no sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, the Bonn security establishment splintered. Many on the political right had been angered by the Americans’ ostensible turn away from European defense (despite the official position of their parties endorsing fewer nuclear weapons on the continent); removing the Pershing II missiles and GLCMs, combined with an American pledge not to offset those withdrawals, exposed West Germans to a position worse than they faced a decade earlier, at the time of Schmidt’s IISS address.¹¹¹ Wörner spoke out powerfully in the Bundestag and in the press against the withdrawals, faced with this “test of political will between the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’” within NATO.¹¹² Meanwhile, nuclear withdrawals enjoyed broad popular and political support. Many on the left had already been frustrated when Reagan torpedoed the Reykjavík summit in order to save his SDI program, and for Bonn to resist a far-reaching disarmament deal would seem even worse.¹¹³ Genscher spoke out forcefully in favor of the second zero. After all, most of the missiles in question had ranges only long enough to strike the GDR—“my home,” Genscher told the Bundestag, “the city where I was born.”¹¹⁴

The chancellor faced an unenviable position: with low popularity ratings (certainly lower than Genscher’s), losing control over his own foreign-policy establishment, and marginalized between east and west, Kohl saw ninety-two percent of West Germans support the immediate conclusion of an INF treaty. But with the SNF question unresolved, that number fell to only fifty-one percent. Moreover, Washington was exerting considerable pressure on the NATO allies to fall in line behind the double-zero formula. Secretary of State George Shultz, who had traveled to Moscow in April 1987, warned the allies: accept the double-zero

solution or support the deployment of many more short- and intermediate-range missiles in NATO Europe.¹¹⁵ The Soviet press quickly seized on the Washington's strong-arm tactics with the Europeans. The Americans had "passed the buck" to Bonn, noted commentator Nikolai Sergeyevich Portugalov, while another official source equated Shultz to "Pilate washing his hands."¹¹⁶

Meanwhile, behind the Iron Curtain, no Soviet chief ever so expertly understood western politics as Gorbachev. At the end of February 1987, Gorbachev had agreed to remove his conditions on a potential INF deal; no longer would the Kremlin insist that progress on sub-strategic weapons be linked to reductions in strategic forces.¹¹⁷ He cleverly offered concessions on INF, pursuing double-zero in Europe and, should the U.S. reciprocate, offering also to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons with ranges up to five hundred kilometers. After all, NATO sub-strategic forces in Europe could only be used against battlefield targets, and the Soviets boasted the largest and strongest conventional forces in the world. Three months later, he announced his intentions to withdraw SS-20s from the Soviet Union's Asian rim, making the offer for *European* double zero an offer for *global* double zero.¹¹⁸

The rapid transformations between east and west over the sub-strategic forces roiled Kohl and his government, and as one commentator, writing for RAND, noted, "isolated abroad and under growing pressure domestically, Kohl retreated from his initial opposition to the double zero."¹¹⁹ The Social Democrats, the Greens, the peace movements, and even many moderates leapt at the Soviets' offer; popularly, his countrymen failed to understand Kohl's reticence to embrace the double-zero formula.

The chancellor clung, however, to his country's small cache of seventy-two Pershing IA missiles. Though the warheads remained under the ownership and operation of the U.S. Army, the decades-old Pershing IAs represented at least a modicum of Bonn's nuclear self-determination between the great powers of Europe. In June, with the assent of Defense Minister Wörner, he rejected outright a Soviet request to eliminate the missiles. Reluctantly, the Reagan administration backed the chancellor, fearing a precedent of the superpowers negotiating for third parties.¹²⁰ Genscher, of course, rejected both Kohl's position and his logic; the Pershing IAs, in Genscher's estimation, represented an outdated and negligible deterrent (if any at all) and should not prevent an arms-control deal between the superpowers.¹²¹ Just as he had in Davos some months earlier, Genscher spoke out again, contradicting the chancellor and providing much fodder for the anti-nuclear left to paint Kohl as a warmonger, whose own subordinates could no longer countenance his uncompromising positions.

Genscher shored up his own position with a trip to Washington. In discussions with Reagan, Shultz, White House Chief of Staff James Baker, and newly minted National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci, Genscher saw his perspective validated. "The crux emerged with increasing clarity: any agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union depended on West Germany's giving up the Pershing IA." Weeks later, he accompanied President Weizsäcker on an official visit to Moscow. In private, Shevardnadze "left no doubt" in Genscher's mind "that there would be no double-zero option unless we relinquished the Pershing IA"—a position Shevardnadze made public in Geneva on August 6th that year.¹²² Meanwhile, back in Bonn, the SPD parliamentary group implored the government "not to

allow a 'double-zero solution' to fail because of an insistence [to retain] the Pershing IA rockets."¹²³

Kohl faced competing imperatives. Since coming to office, his aim always had been to achieve military balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, facilitated by a simultaneous east-west détente; the prospects of a double-zero INF deal represented the greatest stride toward such an end. But "Germany would have to take responsibility for the failure of arms policy," Genscher warned, "and whatever might hinder the policies of rapprochement in the future."¹²⁴ On the other hand, with the Pershing IAs, West German fears of "singularization" had been finally realized; the Federal Republic had become more vulnerable than its allies and was being directly targeted by Moscow. To trade the missiles away would be to acquiesce to Soviet pressure, to open a new "gap in NATO's spectrum of escalation," and to forfeit an important symbol of Bonn's strength.¹²⁵

In reality, and despite appearances to the contrary, Kohl's decision to eliminate the Pershing IA missiles was not a difficult one. Even diehard defense hawks in Washington discounted both the military and symbolic value of the few remaining Pershing IAs—to wit, the Pentagon had scheduled them for replacement within the coming five years. The technology of the weapons was nearly as old as the Cold War itself, developed in the late 1950s by the Glenn L. Martin Company. Within Bonn, few specialists took them seriously; absent a complement of hundreds more short- and intermediate-range missiles armed with thousands of warheads, the small force of seventy-two outdated missiles meant little—either for the defense of the Federal Republic or of western Europe.¹²⁶

But Kohl stood virtually alone in his defense of the Pershing IAs, taking months to deliberate over their future. Commentators puzzled on his delay, particularly given the

stakes of the decision: Moscow would not accept an INF deal without the American warheads included, and Washington would not buckle under Soviet pressure. Prominent voices across West Germany—not least the country’s most popular politician, Genscher, who enjoyed wide recognition as the greatest foreign-affairs mind in Bonn—all proved anxious to eliminate the Pershing IAs. Popular support had come to favor an east-west INF deal over the symbolic Pershing IAs.


Such an opportunity should not be allowed to slip by. “There must be talking if the instruments of destruction are not to take on an independent life of their own,” Brandt warned.¹²⁷ Schmidt agreed. “Now, in 1987, even the communist leaders of Russia are finally discovering their membership in the ‘common European home,’” Schmidt exclaimed. “Even in Bismarck’s day tsarist Russia was a dangerous and powerful neighbor—and the Soviet Union more powerful still. It is by no means an international charitable institution, but we must not think of it as the enemy! We must see it as our neighbor and strive for good neighborly relations with it.”¹²⁸

But in the delay, the chancellor created suspense, and with suspense he regained power. Every newspaper mused on his decision, reporters clamored for interviews, and Bonn parliamentarians parsed his statements, hoping to glean some sense of his intentions; Kohl had suddenly become the most important man in world politics. The Pershing IAs, though a negligible force of outdated missiles, had placed the West German chancellor back at the center of the east-west contest. Across the spring and summer of 1987, conversations with Kohl about the missiles had “ended without a clear outcome,” but on August 26th, the chancellor announced a reversal of his earlier position: Bonn would remove the Pershing IA

missiles.¹²⁹ Once the U.S. and the Soviets had withdrawn their intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Bundeswehr would eliminate its own Pershings and not seek to replace them with more modernized weapons. After months of the world watching, no longer did Kohl remain marginalized in world affairs, sidelined between Gorbachev and Reagan. More importantly, the Federal Republic had reclaimed its role as the indispensable interlocutor between east and west and ultimately emerged as the facilitator of the most significant arms-control deal of the Cold War. Just as an INF deal seemed beyond the world's grasp, Helmut Kohl made it a reality. He "could take credit for maintaining a strong, reliable, and firm stand from the beginning of the discussions," remembered Genscher, "thus making a significant contribution to the success in the Geneva negotiations that now seemed so close."¹³⁰ An INF deal, which had eluded negotiators for a decade, was finally coming to fruition, and Kohl was the man responsible. "Entirely on his own," noted Genscher, the chancellor "acted as a catalyst for overcoming the east-west conflict."¹³¹

Four months later, shortly before Christmas, Mikhail Gorbachev flew to Washington. Foregoing the usual niceties of an official visit—touring, sightseeing, and grand dinners—he arrived to the White House on December 7th. The following day, he and Reagan set their hands to a final treaty to eliminate all intermediate- and short-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear and conventional, of both countries worldwide. The Soviets would eliminate all of their SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 missiles—some 680 in total—their SSC-X-4 cruise missiles, and their complement of warheads. The Americans would destroy their BGM-109G cruise missiles, the Pershing IA and IB ballistic missiles, and the much maligned Pershing IIs, along with all related warheads. Furthermore, both parties

agreed to dismantle all related hardware, including training missiles and launch equipment, and to far-reaching mutually-binding inspection and verification protocols. From Bonn, the West Germans hailed the signing “a triumph for both of the superpowers.” Thanks to Kohl’s intervention (or so the story ran), in the “absurd, dangerous game of poker” over Europe, both sides had folded.¹³² It represented a “symbol of hope,” according to the London *Times*, and a “miraculous treaty.” “For me,” Genscher later reflected, it “was a day of deep satisfaction. Now the objectives of the NATO double-track resolution could be realized,” and “short- and long-range intermediate missiles were destroyed throughout the world.”¹³³



The Strategic Situation

In Bonn, celebrations of the INF treaty did not last long. The agreement created as many problems as it solved. Indeed, as one commentator noted, the treaty had “left in its wake a

shattered consensus on NATO nuclear strategy.”¹³⁴ Western Europe still required defense, and absent conventional mobilization and conscription, nuclear weapons represented NATO’s only option.

The treaty had done nothing to address the conventional asymmetry on the continent; the western alliance faced off against the Warsaw Pact’s overwhelming conventional superiority—forces that, in a sudden attack, would overrun western defenses within hours. NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe had been in place as a means of countering Soviet conventional strength on the battlefield. And absent a mobilization, the likes of which the world had not seen since 1940, the west would never be able to match Soviet forces man for man, tank for tank. French Defense Minister André Giraud, who as a child had seen western weakness destroy his country, likened the new treaty to another “European Munich.”¹³⁵ Ceding the western advantage at the sub-strategic level created a strategic calculus that dramatically favored the Warsaw Pact: superiority at the conventional and sub-strategic levels and parity at the strategic level.¹³⁶

Flexible response, “long obsolete” according to Helmut Schmidt, was effectively dead. Prominent defense intellectuals of every political persuasion recognized as much.¹³⁷ The flexible response doctrine, codified in NATO’s strategic concept MC 14/3, relied on one critical feature: by the west guaranteeing a range of retaliatory options, they had introduced risk into the Soviet strategic calculus, making the consequences of a Warsaw Pact offensive incalculable.¹³⁸ At their disposal, then, NATO war planners could pursue *Direct Defense* against an adversary, “physically preventing the enemy from taking what he wants,” most likely by conventional forces already deployed in Europe. Should direct defense fail, *Deliberate Escalation* would raise “the scope and intensity of combat” in an effort to give

the adversary a moment of pause and to dissuade further attack. That escalation relied heavily on intermediate-range forces, both conventional and nuclear, whether to open another front, as A2/AD weapons, or to attack Soviet interdiction targets. Finally, should all else fail, NATO's *General Nuclear Response* promised "massive nuclear strikes against the total nuclear threat, other military targets, and urban-industrial targets" in the eastern bloc—according to the doctrine's architects, "the ultimate deterrent" and "the ultimate military response."¹³⁹ Absent those intermediate-range forces, then, NATO had lost a broad range of western escalatory options. For instance, SHAPE would task western air power with MC 14/3's deliberate escalation duties, moving NATO "far down the road to a [strategic] diad," in the estimation of Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin.¹⁴⁰ According to the CSU's Friedrich Zimmermann, "even one less nuclear weapon could make an attack easier for the Soviet Union."¹⁴¹ The new east-west treaty had removed thousands. "We now have a situation in which the short-range systems are the last U.S. instruments capable of waging a nuclear war in Europe," noted Egon Bahr. "We are the first battlefield," he warned.¹⁴²

In Bonn, right and left followed those observations to opposite conclusions. The right placed a premium on closing the nuclear firebreak left by the INF treaty; the left hoped to leverage the successful disarmament talks for classes of sub-strategic weapons to achieve the total denuclearization of Europe. Both government and opposition rushed forward with their own assessments of the European security situation. The CDU's most respected defense specialists quickly reached a consensus that the INF Treaty had bargained away the most useful of the nuclear forces in Europe—weapons focused on theater deterrence—and had left in place shorter-range battlefield systems—weak in deterrent value, but geared toward slowing a Warsaw Pact advance on the west. "This is a nuclear posture that, if its

current structure and scope remained unchanged, would include only land-based systems that would only destroy German territory if they were to be used,” warned Rühle—“German territory in the German Democratic Republic and in the Federal Republic of Germany.”¹⁴³ Wörner in particular, in his final days as defense minister, before leaving for Brussels to take over as secretary-general of NATO, called for “restructuring” and for a “comprehensive concept” (*Gesamtkonzept*) for western security and arms control—as opposed to the Americans’ preferred piecemeal approach. The west must restore the workability of flexible response—namely, by offsetting forces eliminated under the INF treaty with new escalatory options. “It is a question of restructuring our nuclear potential in conjunction with the comprehensive concept,” he explained. “It is not a question of compensation for the land-based or cruise missiles currently being withdrawn, and even some form of trying to get around [the provisions of] the INF Treaty.” Rather, “German interest is leaning toward a further reduction of shorter-range systems, above all battlefield weapons, in favor of those weapons which can carry the risk of a potential attacker back to his own territory.”¹⁴⁴ Volker Rühle echoed Wörner’s call. “Restructuring,” he noted, “means that we will keep our strategy both acceptable and effective with fewer weapons but with a more convincing structure.”¹⁴⁵

The opposition issued their own calls for a comprehensive concept—ultimately for complete disarmament in Europe and the protection of only U.S. strategic forces deployed in America.¹⁴⁶ SPD defense specialists saw the INF treaty more positively—as a worthy effort and good first step toward a nuclear-free Europe. After a decade of marginalization from policy circles, they delighted at their return to the nuclear debate and viewed their right-leaning counterparts’ disappointments with a keen sense of Schadenfreude. The party’s

traditional atlanticism, typified by Schmidt, Apel, Kaiser, and others, had been completely overpowered by its neutralist and anti-nuclear voices.

Ironically, the Americans likewise had their own concerns about the deal they had just concluded. The Reagan administration, despite the achievements of the INF accord, had grown concerned about “the momentum of denuclearization” in Europe.¹⁴⁷ Beyond the strategic realignment required by INF withdrawal, the political consequences among U.S. allies could prove detrimental; the Europeans, Washington officials feared, already seemed unmoored in their loyalty between east and west. The West Germans, particularly in light of the neutralist rhetoric of the SPD and Greens, did not need to perceive the United States as too weak to defend their country. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, meeting in Monterey, California in November 1987, committed to preserving and strengthening flexible response, despite the overwhelming cuts in theater forces. New fighter aircraft, increased capabilities for the B-52 and F-111 bombers, and tactical air-to-surface missiles, the defense ministers hoped, might offset losses incurred under the INF Treaty. Most importantly, they committed to modernizing the alliance’s tactical missiles with ranges below five hundred kilometers and to deploy such weapons at sea.¹⁴⁸ But, as Genscher noted, “the modernization of nuclear artillery was just beginning,” and “that effort was not an easy matter for Germans to swallow.”¹⁴⁹

Europeans, in the estimation of one commentator, “understand that the United States—a globally overstretched power in economic decline—will inevitably be forced to reduce its conventional commitment to Europe at some point in the future.”¹⁵⁰ “Everyone agrees that if we accept the zero option we need compensating measures,” opined one NATO official.¹⁵¹ Another commentator warned that “dangers will arise when the West’s arms control policies

are inconsistent with its strategic requirements.”¹⁵² Within days of the treaty signing, the Americans announced plans to augment their short-range nuclear forces in Europe, which had not been covered by treaty obligation, and to shore up conventional forces on the continent. Two days after Gorbachev’s return to Moscow, Reagan, acknowledging Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, touted the benefits of the short-range forces not covered by his agreement. “Tactical battlefield nuclear weapons have evened up that competition,” he noted.¹⁵³ Likewise, Shultz, traveling to Copenhagen, pled with Europeans to increase their commitment to conventional forces. “It’s not a viewpoint,” he argued; “It’s a description of reality.”¹⁵⁴ Similarly, as Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci soon detailed to Congress, his foremost goal was to “revitalize and strengthen our military capabilities” in light of the INF accord.¹⁵⁵ Absent the formidable intermediate-range forces once arrayed against the Warsaw Pact, the western alliance must compensate with new tactical conventional munitions.

“It is no longer possible to ignore the political fact,” opined Rühle, “that deterrence is being criticized in the FRG not only by the left but by the right and by people who have traditionally been in favor of the strategy of nuclear deterrence and because of the structures that will be left in place by the INF Treaty.”¹⁵⁶

Conventionalizing NATO’s Defense

“The western alliance is just as divided and conceptionless (*konzeptionlos*) as the Bonn government coalition,” noted *Der Spiegel*.¹⁵⁷ With flexible response in doubt, NATO faced dangerous uncertainties, not just on the battlefield but also among critics who saw the alliance as a mechanism for American suzerainty over Europe. Earlier iterations of that

argument had surfaced in the 1970s when Joseph Luns, then NATO secretary-general, dispensed with them. Identified in the West German press as “sleepy, submissive, and with the intellectual modesty of an eternal corporal,” Luns led the alliance altogether unremarkably.¹⁵⁸ In his thirteen years at the helm, he brooded about Europe, defending NATO institutions but without much tangible result. Departing Brussels for the last time, Luns eulogized his tenure: “the alliance has seen the rise and fall of détente, the rise and fall of arms control, the rise and fall of transatlantic relations, and the rise and fall of public confidence.” But NATO had been “found wanting in applying its own strategy,” he reported.¹⁵⁹

Peter Lord Carrington, who replaced Luns in June 1984, proved quite the opposite. Educated at Eton and Sandhurst, he served as a tank commander in the Second World War, led a distinguished career as a Tory in the House of Lords, became the UK’s inaugural secretary of state for energy, and sat in the Cabinet as both foreign secretary and defense secretary. An altogether imperious figure, cut from the pages of an Edwardian novel, Carrington seemed an anachronistic oddity among the upwardly mobile technocrats of NATO HQ. A consummate English country gentleman, Carrington found Brussels a desolate place. In a 1984 interview, he described the greatest attributes of his new post: “There are only forty minutes from Brussels to Heathrow and then another forty minutes to go home.”¹⁶⁰ In a time of such turmoil, acquiring a secretary-general of Lord Carrington’s credentials proved difficult. Though he hesitated to accept his new post, the alliance met all of his demands: (1) unanimous appointment, (2) a four-year term with an option for four years’ renewal, (3) a “free hand for revival of the alliance as a military and political alliance,”

(4) unfettered access to any NATO head of government and to defense committees within alliance parliaments, and (5) recognition as NATO's only spokesman.¹⁶¹

Long before the INF Treaty had been in place, but recognizing the popular animosity toward theater nuclear weapons in Europe, Carrington had emphasized NATO's *conventional* rather than *nuclear* defense—"the presence of 326,000 in-place troops and their dependents" in Europe. "There can be no greater demonstration of national commitment to the Alliance than . . . to send their own countrymen to what would be the front line, bearing the brunt of any initial attack on NATO Europe. Flesh and blood count for more than deterrent concepts," he told the North Atlantic Assembly.¹⁶² For others, the mandate for conventional improvements remained clear. "As a defensive alliance, NATO does not have the luxury of choice; it must prepare for all contingencies," warned James Moray Stewart, NATO's assistant secretary-general for defense planning.¹⁶³ SACEUR General Bernard W. Rogers heightened the stakes. "If a war broke out today," he warned, "it would only be a matter of days before I would have to turn to our political authorities and request the initial release of nuclear weapons."¹⁶⁴ If the presence of nuclear weapons terrorized so many in western Europe, surely another form of deterrence could suffice.

With the popular democratization of defense policy discussions in the early 1980s, NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy had already come under popular scrutiny. "Terms such as nuclear threshold, second strike capability, penetration capability, etc. have started to be bandied about" by "broad sectors of the general public," wrote Wilfried Hofmann, NATO's director of information and long-time head of the West German Foreign Office's NATO and defense division.¹⁶⁵ The SPD's Karsten Voigt echoed those sentiments within his own party. "A reduction of NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons lies in the interests of Germans,

Europeans, and the Atlantic alliance,” he remarked. “Whatever security can be achieved with fewer risks and less expensive, we should attempt it.”¹⁶⁶ Across the continent, Europeans of all persuasions questioned the necessity of NATO’s *nuclear* deterrence.¹⁶⁷

Denunciations of nuclear arms emanated from all strata of society.¹⁶⁸ The World Council of Churches, convening in Vancouver in August 1983, had called for an end of “the production, deployment and use” of nuclear weapons. Three months later, American, French, and German bishops met in Lourdes, objecting to nuclear arms as unethical. By the end of November, the Bundestag summoned experts to testify before the Defense Committee on possible reforms to NATO’s nuclear strategy. Three weeks later, the FRG’s Federal Constitutional Court, although rejecting requests for an injunction against INF deployment in the country, held long hearings on the virtues of nuclear deterrence. A week later, addressing the World Peace Conference, the pope renewed his earlier calls for peace. Similarly, the World Muslim Congress, assembled in Karachi, convened a conference on “The Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament: The Muslim Perspective.” I cannot help but ask, if a full-scale war breaks out between any two powers,” inquired Secretary-General Inamullah Khan, “will any of the ‘ordinary’ states survive?”¹⁶⁹ The solutions to nuclear brinksmanship and war mongering seemed obvious: either find another means of deterring aggression against western Europe or engage with the Soviet Union for a more stable peace.

The peace activists of the INF dispute had not surrendered. Earlier calls for denuclearization had now become calls for conventional force improvements in place of nuclear forces. In the wake of the INF Treaty, ironically, many defense experts concurred. Stronger and more numerous forces on the continent could restore faith in NATO’s flexible-response doctrine, “across the entire spectrum, from conventional to strategic.”¹⁷⁰ “There is

now a clear consensus among NATO nations that a major effort should be made to strengthen conventional deterrence and defense in Europe,” reported a 1984 NATO periodical.¹⁷¹ Conventionalizing the alliance’s defense would help “to demonstrate that NATO strategy does not demand a dangerous degree of dependence on nuclear weapons,” suggested Stewart.¹⁷² The alliance’s 1985-1990 force goals emphasized “the readiness, survivability and sustainability of NATO’s forces,” particularly as they matched the Warsaw Pact’s “current nuclear and conventional advantages.” The Defense Planning Committee specifically cited “the growing offensive strength of Warsaw Pact forces” and eastern “superiority in the field of conventional armaments.”¹⁷³ Rather than match the east bloc man for man or tank for tank, the ministers hoped to leverage technologically superior and better equipped conventional forces against the Warsaw Pact’s more numerous forces.¹⁷⁴

Calculating appropriate conventional force levels in Europe required careful balance. Too few forces could invite Soviet aggression or Finlandization; too many may undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. With too many boots on the ground, “the East could conclude that the West was in fact deterred by its own nuclear weapons, and at least secretly no longer relied on them,” remarked Hofmann.¹⁷⁵ The path to such a conventionalization of western deterrence, and the one supported by Carrington, involved member state specialization. An internal Bundeswehr report echoed that sentiment, recommending that NATO consider “a more rational use of resources.”¹⁷⁶ The Dutch defense white book cited national specialization as a necessary means of reducing military costs, as did the military strategies of the UK, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, and Norway. Carrington rationalized the need for specialization, hoping to preempt member states’ gradually withdrawing both their rhetorical and financial support from the alliance. “A de facto

division of labour is emerging,” warned Hofmann. NATO would need to adjust to remain relevant.¹⁷⁷

Manfred Wörner, both as Bonn’s defense minister and as NATO’s secretary-general, agreed with such an approach, provided the Europeans carry out their effort in concert with the United States. “There can be no adequate defense of Europe without close cooperation with the United States and their strong presence in Europe,” he warned. “Without the U.S. being bound to western Europe, freedom in the world would run dry,” and “without the North Atlantic alliance, we have no chance to preserve security and freedom.”¹⁷⁸ Helmut Schmidt also weighed in. “Dependency corrupts and corrupts not only the dependent partners, but also the oversized partner who is making decisions almost singlehandedly,” he warned. “Most of the European governments rely too much on American nuclear weapons and most of them neglect their own conventional defense.”¹⁷⁹ Lord Carrington, who also had grown frustrated with the left’s reactionary anti-Americanism, agreed: “It is also difficult to engage in serious negotiations when Soviet ambassadors in European capitals will have been reporting that all their objectives might be achieved through the polarisation of defence thinking in the West without the need to make any concessions of their own.” To Wörner, Carrington, and many others, the issue was self-evident: “political expediency has replaced military security as the Alliance’s priority.”¹⁸⁰

A New Chapter in German-Soviet Relations

In the same months Kohl was ruminating on the Pershing IA withdrawals, his government was preparing for a more immediate event: the visit of the GDR’s head of state Erich Honecker. To Honecker and the régime, his visit secured the long awaited West

German validation of East German sovereignty—to be received by Kohl as an equal, accorded the privileges and respect of a visiting head of state. The two had not met face to face since Chernenko's funeral. As the chairman and his host strolled the path toward the ceremonial entrance of the Palais Schaumburg, the famous West German Wachbataillon presented full military honors.¹⁸¹ The visit laid bare the paradoxes of the national division: Honecker needed good relations with Kohl to demonstrate the permanence of division in his own bloc; Kohl needed good relations with Honecker to demonstrate their common nationhood and potential for reconciliation.

Honecker, who had been born in the Saarland in 1912, had been imprisoned by the Nazis for his communist political views. In 1945, he embraced the Soviet occupiers, continuing his work as a partisan and agitator, whereupon he quickly abandoned western Germany. His visit in 1987 marked the only time of his life that he returned to the west and to the land of his birth. The contrast between the two men reflected the stark realities of the countries they governed. Kohl, oversized and grand, maintained his genial smile, inspecting the troops and greeting well-wishers. Honecker, a slip of a man and nearly a foot shorter than Kohl, smarmy and unctuous, plodded along in the giant's shadow, offering his Pioneer salute.

In their discussions, Honecker abided Kohl's continual reference to "our unaltered goal of reunification," though he did not reciprocate.¹⁸² Assessing the trip, Honecker and the Politbüro declared that the visit "documented to the whole world the independence and equal status of the two German states and underscored their sovereignty and the nature of their relations." In the chairman's formulation, actions spoke louder than words. His western host may have discussed unification, but by receiving Honecker he had conceded the permanence of division and East Germany's equality with the west. According to Honecker,

the West Germans' pragmatic desire for "peace, détente, and normal relations with the GDR" ultimately "reflect[ed] the enhanced prestige of the GDR, the strength of its peace policies, and its increased international influence."¹⁸³

For his part of the conversation, Honecker turned to the nuclear forces stationed in West Germany—or so he reported to the Politbüro upon returning home. Barely a mention of the missiles appeared in the final communiqué, shrouded by oblique reference to the simple concession "that a long-term, stable, lasting peace in Europe cannot be achieved by military means alone."¹⁸⁴ Days later, however, Honecker reported to the Politbüro that he, on behalf of the workers and farmer of the GDR, "introduced the proposals to create a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe and a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. Kohl's earlier pledge in support of the "global double-zero option" published by the Politbüro, was "a decisive outcome of Comrade Honecker's visit to the FRG."¹⁸⁵ According to the East German press, the chairman arrived in Bonn amid great fanfare and slapped Kohl's hand away from the metaphorical nuclear button, crushing any ambitions of western revanchism.

All told, the trip afforded Honecker the legitimacy he craved abroad and the diplomatic credentials he desired at home. Kohl's quest for the impossible—unification with the east—represented Honecker's ticket to loans, credit, and conciliation from Bonn. The chairman's positive reception in the west entered him more into the mainstream of western European politics. "The GDR is no longer a phenomenon," wrote Klaus Bölling.¹⁸⁶ In the coming years, he received offers to visit most NATO capitals. No substantive breakthroughs emerged between the two Germanys, but diplomatic reception itself demonstrated the inner-German rapprochement which defied Cold War tensions in the 1980s.¹⁸⁷

Nine months later, Genscher represented the Federal Republic in the east, making an official visit to the GDR. For nearly two years, Genscher had been the most vocal member of the Federal Government calling for redoubled engagement with the east. As he saw it, such a high-level visit by the West German foreign would underscore the message of his Davos address in February 1987. Europeans now faced “a turning-point in east-west relations,” and Genscher hoped to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost.¹⁸⁸

Fanfare at Genscher’s arrival was considerably understated. “In 1952,” he told his hosts, “I made a decision in favor of the Federal Republic of Germany and thus for its political and social order.” He spoke of unity—for the west an elusive concept and for the east an impossible one. “Unity,” Genscher explained, “can be achieved only by way of Europe.” Furthermore, “what is needed is needed is a bold plan that secures peace in Europe. Our membership in the community of western democracies, the European Community, and the western alliance, has allowed West Germans to make responsible use of the freedom we regained on May 8, 1945. Thus we have entered the closest possible connection among nations; we are connected by shared values.” Those values that bound Bonn to its western allies and neighbors, he explained, could be present in the east as well. Citing the “vision voiced by Gorbachev,” he implored his hosts: “We want a house with wide-open doors, a house of unfettered communication, a Europe of freedom and self-determination.”¹⁸⁹

The visit, Genscher later remembered, “touched me deeply,” but it also confirmed his suspicions: changes within the communist bloc had to be effected by the easterners themselves. Absent a military confrontation, machinations from the west could not overcome Germany’s division. “It was up to the west to provide stable conditions for these unfolding events,” he reflected; “tension and confrontation would only increase repression.”

Bonn could work to overcome the Yalta-Potsdam régime, but achieving national unification remained an entirely different principle. “Events in the communist countries needed to draw their stimulus and momentum from their own people.”¹⁹⁰

A visit by Kohl to Moscow four months later marked the high point of east-west diplomatic exchanges. It also marked Kohl’s definitive return to world politics as an important player in east-west relations. Since his early affronts to Gorbachev—not least equating the new Soviet leader to Goebbels—the Kremlin had actively sought to isolate Kohl.¹⁹¹ High profile visits to Moscow by each of the chancellor’s political opponents—Strauß, Weizsäcker, Stoltenberg, Rau, and Genscher—as well as by the other western heads of government, sent a clear message. But as Kohl tempered his rhetoric, as U.S.-Soviet relations improved, and with no alternative after Kohl’s 1987 electoral victory, Gorbachev relaxed his efforts to marginalize the West German chancellor.

When Kohl arrived to Moscow on October 24th, he hoped to put that unhappy past behind him. Accompanied by five cabinet ministers and seventy giants of West German industry and finance, the chancellor also brought a \$1.6 billion line of credit meant to prop up the fledgling Soviet economy. “The Federal Republic of Germany wishes, and this goes for all political forces, a deepening and widening of relations with the Soviet Union,” Kohl told his hosts. “If the Soviet side shares this wish, nothing should prevent us from going down the path of more intensive political dialogue and the consolidation of [our] cooperation.”¹⁹² Certainly \$1.6 billion represented a good first step in that direction.

Kohl used his return to world politics to stake a position on Germany’s national question. Better than Honecker himself, Kohl understood the shifting dynamics of Moscow’s relations

with East Berlin. In the age of Gorbachev, Honecker's GDR had become increasingly isolated, both within the communist bloc and in world affairs more generally.¹⁹³ Gorbachev's domestic reform agenda of openness and restructuring could only be carried out with a concomitant détente in east-west relations. "I am convinced that life in a common European home with fewer tensions will only be possible when relations between the two German states, too, are constantly stimulated as a stabilizing element in the context of the overall process of development between west and east," Kohl explained.¹⁹⁴

Meanwhile, Kohl had outflanked the SPD back home. For years, the opposition sought to paint the government as incapable of achieving meaningful improvements in east-west relations; only the Social Democrats, they contended, by leveraging their inter-party collaboration with the SED and by sponsoring neutralism between the superpowers, could improve inner-German relations or achieve peace in Europe. But the SPD operated under false assumptions about the nature of the GDR's relations with the Kremlin; no longer were East German and Soviet leaders playing from the same score, and Honecker no longer enjoyed fast relations with his superpower patron. Meanwhile, Kohl understood the necessity to work directly with Moscow, adopting Brandt's earlier logic: "It was no use trying to conduct relations separately with the states lying between Germany and Russia."¹⁹⁵ Since early 1987, Honecker's régime had redoubled its vicious persecution of dissenters, filling jail cells and labor camps with citizens who had reacted perhaps too quickly to Gorbachev's promises of openness. Just a few months before Kohl's Moscow trip, Egon Bahr addressed a conference in East Berlin on his party's efforts to shake off western defense in favor of a denuclearization agreement with the east. Meanwhile, just a few blocks away, the SED's Volkspolizei were brutalizing their own citizens as well as the western broadcasters who

filmed the violence. West German news outlets featured both segments in their programming that evening—Bahr’s promise to work with the East German government and the régime’s brutality against its own people. Against that backdrop, the Social Democrats’ attitudes and policies toward the east seemed particularly craven.¹⁹⁶

Orienting the Kremlin toward Bonn rather than toward East Berlin could marginalize Honecker within the communist bloc and perhaps induce Gorbachev-style reforms in the GDR as well. Kohl’s visit to Moscow had convinced the chancellor of Gorbachev’s good intentions and the sincerity behind his rhetoric. Indeed, it was “a new chapter was opened in German-Soviet relations.”¹⁹⁷

Franco-German Mutual Containment

In his return to world politics, and despite improved relations with both Washington and Moscow, Kohl prized no relationship more than West Germany’s bond with France. Likewise, his personal friendship with François Mitterrand remained closer and more cherished than his relationship with any other world leader. (The chancellor even kept a portrait of his French counterpart in his office in Bonn.) From Kohl’s earliest days in office, he and Mitterrand enjoyed solid, productive relations. The French president found Kohl more imaginative than Schmidt, willing to countenance ideas for Europe as a social and cultural project and as a federal union. Most significantly, through their close partnership, Kohl and Mitterrand had dispensed with Thatcher’s obstinance over deepened integration.¹⁹⁸

Together, the two men forged the basis for codified European Political Cooperation and common European positions in foreign affairs.¹⁹⁹ They nourished a close Franco-German security dialogue outside of NATO auspices and established a Commission on Security and

Defense between their two countries. They arranged bilateral working groups on defense and security, which included everyone from cabinet ministers to low level desk officers and bureaucrats. In January 1988, they made permanent their bilateral defense council, complemented soon thereafter by a common finance council.²⁰⁰

Bonn's policy toward France revolved around two interconnected strategic aims: (1) keep Paris tethered to the Atlantic alliance and anchored to the west, and (2) ensure that Franco-German leadership within the EC remained unchallenged and properly synchronized between Paris and Bonn. For decades, the French had seemed to their NATO partners as fair-weather allies; the unilateralist Gaullist tendency, though tempered, had continued on after the general's death. Giscard and Mitterrand's occasional oblique references to a "third way" between the two superpowers worried observers across the Rhine, a concern raised even to the level of France's ambassador in Bonn.²⁰¹

In internal discussions, Bonn noted the need "to bind France to the military alliance," worried by continued French dalliances with Moscow.²⁰² In December 1979, Giscard had helped to craft NATO's dual-track decision in Guadalupe, but by the following spring, he distanced himself from it. With a shuttle diplomacy campaign between Paris and Moscow, he hoped to protect France's own détente with the Soviet Union in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion.²⁰³ Since coming to office in May 1981, his successor Mitterrand had sought to maintain France's privileged position with the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev was elected general secretary, Mitterrand was the first western leader to reach out to his new Soviet counterpart, and Gorbachev's first visit to the west was indeed to Paris, where he was received by the French president. Politically, Mitterrand benefited tremendously from his strong relationship with the Kremlin. As his security advisor, Hubert Védrine, had noted,

Franco-Soviet cooperation “might have the advantage of bringing the United States to a less imperial attitude.”²⁰⁴ Similarly, as another commentator observed, “France might choose to head those forces, which lack a leader, by arguing that now if ever is the moment for the countries of western Europe to assert their independence of both blocs before the over-armed and reckless superpowers force them to, or over, the brink of war.”²⁰⁵

Often to the Germans’ frustration, both Giscard and Mitterrand focused heavily on France’s independent nuclear deterrent, and overestimating their international clout, styled themselves peers of the American president and Soviet general secretary, entitled to the rights and privileges of superpowerdom.²⁰⁶ Nuclear weapons held a different symbolism to West Germans, seen as altogether less useful within the flexible response concept. In Bonn, some specialists grew frustrated by their neighbor’s “concentrating its defense outlays on the buildup of the *Force de Frappe* and neglecting its conventional forces.”²⁰⁷ Moreover, the sovereign nuclear deterrent, in the German estimation, nurtured in French officials an overinflated sense of their country’s power and an altogether unhealthy reliance on unilateralism.

But French and German interests complemented one another, and ironically, Mitterrand’s government maintained exactly those same worries about the Federal Republic. Though Paris largely endured the INF dispute without political upset, the French saw the toll the affair had taken on German domestic politics. French defense specialists had grown concerned by the West Germans’ apparent drift toward neutralism and the Social Democrats’ many calls for denuclearization and even demilitarization on the continent. The opposition in Bonn had become the most vocal anti-NATO voices in Europe, and though the

French traditionally chafed against the alliance, French strategists recognized the unspeakable terror of a neutral Germany in the center of Europe, unpredictable perhaps in its loyalties and pushing NATO's line of resistance to France's eastern border.²⁰⁸

Close cooperation with Bonn, Mitterrand's calculations showed, should help to strengthen Kohl's domestic position (and thus continuity in CDU/CSU-FDP foreign policy) and to anchor the Federal Republic to the west.²⁰⁹ West Germany, once "a docile, quiescent glaxis," for French foreign policy, now required careful attention from Paris.²¹⁰ On 21 January 1983, celebrating the twentieth anniversary of Adenauer and de Gaulle's friendship treaty, Mitterrand traveled to Bonn to address the Bundestag. The Élysée judged the speech "the most important in foreign policy since the start of the president's term."²¹¹ Mitterrand addressed the *incertitudes allemandes* that occupied French policy. "Whoever would bet on the decoupling of the European continent and the American continent," he warned, "would put into question the maintenance of equilibrium and thus the maintenance of peace."²¹² *Le Matin* noted the irony: a socialist French president "exhorting a Germany tempted by a pacifist adventure to get a grip on itself."²¹³ Defense Minister André Giraud addressed the issue directly in a visit to Munich. "The day it comes to general disarmament, nuclear weapons should be the last to go, and it is from Europe that they should go last," he warned. "After the INF agreement, it is . . . our duty to warn [Europe's] public opinion against premature and exaggerated optimism and to emphasize that a credible defense effort, far from jeopardizing a lasting improvement of east-west relations, is, on the contrary, one of its preconditions."²¹⁴

On the same occasion, honoring Franco-German relations, Kohl attempted to assuage fears in Paris. "We are not wanderers between worlds," he explained. "Our place is at the

sides of the Atlantic community and our French friends.”²¹⁵ Still, Mitterrand and his government harbored suspicions. The German left seemed to have seized their own Gaullist attitude, which proved frustrating in the land of de Gaulle himself.²¹⁶ In the estimation of Védérine, “anchoring the FRG to the west through Franco-German friendship” and “strengthening the assertion of Europe in security matters” represented the key for French foreign policy.²¹⁷ As Mitterrand himself recorded in 1986, western Europe, “militarily dependent, politically disunited, economically anachronistic,” each day verged closer to “submission to the American imperium or abandonment to neutrality.”²¹⁸ Bonn, in concert with Paris, must toe the line.

Building a Common European Home

Across 1987 and with the INF deal on the horizon, Gorbachev had begun speaking of a “common European home”; surely, he believed, east and west could find a more peaceful and stable coexistence in Europe. “We are resolutely against the division of the continent into military blocs facing each other, against the accumulation of military arsenals in Europe, against everything that is the source of the threat of war,” he told an audience in Prague. Rather, in our “all-European house,” there remains “a certain integral whole.” The states of Europe may “belong to different social systems,” he conceded, but those differences should not preclude them from coexistence and engagement as neighbors who shared visions of a peaceful Europe.²¹⁹ Such “new thinking” seemed wholly incompatible with the rhetoric of his predecessors. It sounded, in fact, more reminiscent of Brandt and Bahr’s early efforts to achieve a new Ostpolitik for West Germany. Now, twenty years later, Moscow seemed to be reciprocating Bonn’s call for peaceful engagement across the blocs.

Once signed, the INF treaty seemed the surest confirmation of the Soviets' change of course, indicating a gradual demilitarization within Europe and a heightened sense of common interests that transcended the parochial needs of states. Taking a cue from Gorbachev, Genscher likewise rejected "power politics," instead committing his country to the "politics of responsibility" for Europe.²²⁰ The rhetoric calling for a "europeanization of Europe" was finding a less pernicious meaning. No longer simply the language of anti-Americanism, calls for an "all-European house," a "common European home," and a "europeanization of Europe" found their answer in European institutions, redoubled in strength behind Delors' leadership, a seeming rapprochement between east and west, codified in the December 1987 INF treaty, and the imminent withdrawal of thousands of sub-strategic theater weapons, the most thoroughgoing arms reduction of the Cold War and the single greatest step toward an east-west military balance since 1945.

Finished. "We're not in a Cold War now," declared Margaret Thatcher.²²¹ Perhaps not in word, but in deed, Mikhail Gorbachev's USSR had renounced Stalin's brutality, Khrushchev's manipulation, and Brezhnev's foreign meddling. With a new leader, the Soviet Union was demonstrating its commitment to overcoming the east-west divide and to integrating the communist bloc into a "common European home."

Continuing. "We continue to face a host of threats," U.S. Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci warned Congress. "Foremost among them is Soviet military power." Like many western defense planners, Carlucci remained unconvinced by Gorbachev and the Kremlin's reformers. "Neither glasnost nor the stirrings of economic reform . . . have resulted in any redirection of resources away from the Soviet military machine."²²²

“Closed.” To Hans Apel, former defense minister, the German question was “no longer open.” Among many Social Democrats, unification talk seemed anachronistic and provincial. Apel, along with many from his party, believed that the only unification question on the political agenda should be the unification and integration of Europe.

“Open.” To Alois Mertes, deputy foreign minister and longtime CDU defense policy specialist, the German question remained painfully unresolved. To ignore Germany’s division would be “factually incorrect and politically irresponsible,” tantamount to abandoning seventeen million countrymen behind the Iron Curtain.²²³

Was the Cold War ending? Stirrings of a new world order were becoming apparent, but no one dared be the first to sound retreat. “Once you say the Cold War is over,” warned one American official, “you can never take it back. You can only say it once.”²²⁴ Schulz, as outgoing secretary of state, feared that no one in the American government properly recognized that truth and “did not understand or accept that the cold war was over.”²²⁵ And Gorbachev himself conceded that “strategically and philosophically, the methods of the Cold War were defeated.”²²⁶

Even Ronald Reagan, the most strident cold warrior on either side of the Iron Curtain, wandering with Gorbachev amid the journalists in the shadow of the Moscow’s Grand Kremlin Palace, conceded that a fundamental reordering of east-west relations was afoot. Asked if he remained convinced that the Soviet Union represented the “focus of evil in the modern world,” indeed, an “evil empire,” the president answered simply and with a smile, “no.” “You are talking about another time, another era,” he said.

Genscher agreed. "There is neither a socialist German nation nor a capitalist German nation," Genscher told *Der Spiegel*. "The word 'reunification' was coined during the period of a Europe of nation-states," he explained. "I speak of German unity . . . year after year, but embedded in the development of Europe."²²⁷

Table 5.1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1988

<i>Weapon system</i>	<i>Warheads</i>					
	<i>Number deployed</i>	<i>Year deployed</i>	<i>Range (km)</i>	<i>Warhead × yield</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Number deployed</i>
<i>ICBMs</i>						
Minuteman II	450	1966	11,300	1 × 1.2 Mt	W56	450
Minuteman III (Mk 12)	220	1970	13,000	3 × 170 kt	W62	600
Minuteman III (Mk 12A)	300	1979	13,000	3 × 335 kt	W78	900
MX	30	1986	11,000	10 × 300 kt	W87	300
<i>Total</i>	1,000					2,310
<i>SLBMs</i>						
Poseidon	256	1971	4,600	10 × 40 kt	W68	2,560
Trident I	384	1979	7,400	8 × 100 kt	W76	3,072
<i>Total</i>	640					5,632
<i>Bombers*</i>						
B-1B	72	1986	9,800	ALCM	W80-1	1,614
B-52G/H	263	1958/61	16,000	SRAM	W69	1,140
FB-111A	61	1969	4,700	Bombs [†]		2,316
<i>Total</i>	396					5,070
<i>Refueling aircraft</i>						
KC-135	615	1957

Adapted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 36. Sources: T. B. Cochran, W. M. Arkin, and R. S. Norris, *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, vol. 1: *U.S. Forces and Capabilities*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1984); Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1989*.

* Loading of bombers varies, depending on the missions they serve. B-1B and B-52 bombers can hold eight to twenty-four weapons, and FB-111s can hold six, excluding ALCMs and B53 and B28 bombs.

[†] Bomber weapons reflected here include six designs, namely the B83, B61-0, -1, -7, B57, B53, B43, and B28), each with a yield from sub-kt to 9 Mt, ALCMs with operator selectable yields ranging from 5 to 150 kt, and SRAMs with yields of 170 kt.

Table 5.2. U.S. Theater Nuclear Forces, 1988

<i>Weapon system</i>	<i>Warheads</i>					
	<i>Number deployed</i>	<i>Year deployed</i>	<i>Range (km)</i>	<i>Warhead × yield</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Number deployed</i>
<i>Land-based systems:</i>						
<i>Aircraft</i>	2,250	...	1,060-2,400	1-3 × bombs	Bombs*	1,800
<i>Missiles</i>						
Pershing II	120	1983	1,790	1 × 0.3-80 kt	W85	125
GLCM	309	1983	2,500	1 × 0.2-150 kt	W84	325
Pershing Ia	72	1962	740	1 × 60-400 kt	W50	100
Lance	100	1972	125	1 × 1-100 kt	W70	1,282
Honest John	24	1954	38	1 × 1-20 kt	W31	132
Nike Hercules	27	1958	160	1 × 1-20 kt	W31	75
<i>Other Systems</i>						
Artillery [†]	3,850	1956	30	1 × 0.1-12 kt		1,540
ADM (special)	150	1964	...	1 × 0.01-1 kt	W54	150
<i>Naval systems:</i>						
<i>Carrier aircraft[‡]</i>	1,100	...	550-1,800	1-2 × bombs	Bombs	1,450
<i>Land-attack SLCMs</i>						
Tomahawk	150	1984	2,500	1 × 5-150 kt	W80-0	150
<i>ASW systems</i>						
ASROC	...	1961	1-10	1 × 5-10 kt	W44	574
SUBROC	...	1965	60	1 × 5-10 kt	W55	285
ASW aircraft [§]	710	...	1,160-3,800	1 × <20 kt	B57	897
<i>Naval SAMs</i>						
Terrier	...	1956	35	1 × 1 kt	W45	290

Adapted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 37. Sources: Cochran, Arkin, and Norris, *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, vol. 1; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1989*.

* Aircraft include U.S. Air Force F-4D/E, F-16A/B/C/D and F-111A/D/E/F. Bombs include four types (B28, B43, B57, and B61) with yields from sub-kt to 1.45 Mt.

† There are two types of nuclear artillery (155-mm and 203mm) with four different warheads: a 0.1-kt W48, 155-mm shell; a 1- to 12-kt W33, 203-mm shell; a 0.8-kt W79-1, enhanced-radiation, 203-mm shell; and a variable-yield (up to 1.1 kt) W79-0 fission warhead. The enhanced-radiation warheads will be converted to standard fission weapons.

‡ Aircraft include Navy A-6E, A-7E, F/A-18A/B and Marine Corps A-4M, A-6E and AV-8B. Bombs include three types with yields from 20 kt to 1 Mt.

§ Aircraft include U.S. Navy P-3A/B/C, S-3A/B and SH-3D/H helicopters, Some U.S. B57 nuclear depths bombs are allocated to British Nimrod, Italian Atlantic and Netherlands P-3 aircraft.

Table 5.3. U.S. Nuclear Warheads in Europe, 1965-1992

	May 1965	Dec. 1981	Dec. 1987	After INF (1992)
<i>Artillery</i>				
8-inch	975	938	738	240
155-mm	0	732	732	732
<i>Tactical SSMs</i>				
Lance	0	692	692	692
Pershing I	200	293	100	0
Pershing II	0	0	108	0
Honest John	1,900	198	0	0
Sergeant	300	0	0	0
<i>Nike Hercules SAMs</i>	990	686	100	0
<i>Bombs</i>				
B57 NDB	1,240	1,729	1,400	1,400
	...	192	192	192
<i>ADMs</i>	340	372	0	0
<i>GLCMs</i>	0	0	256	0
<i>Total</i>	5,945	5,832	4,318	3,256

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 38.

Table 5.4. Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1988

	<i>NATO code-name</i>	<i>Number deployed</i>	<i>Year deployed</i>	<i>Range (km)</i>	<i>Warhead × yield</i>	<i>Number deployed</i>
<i>ICBMs</i>						
SS-11 Mod. 2	Sego	184	1973	13,000	1 × .950-1.1 Mt	184
Mod. 3		210	1973	10,600	3 × 100-350 kt (MRV)	630
SS-13 Mod. 2	Savage	60	1973	9,400	1 × 600-750 kt	60
SS-17 Mod. 2	Spanker	139	1979	10,000	4 × 750 kt (MIRV)	556
SS-18 Mod. 4	Satan	308	1979	11,000	10 × 550 kt (MIRV)	3,080
SS-19 Mod. 3	Stiletto	350	1979	10,000	6 × 550 kt (MIRV)	2,160
SS-24	Scalpel	5	1987	10,000	10 × 100 kt (MIRV)	50
SS-25	Sickle	126	1985	10,500	1 × 550 kt	126
<i>Total</i>		1,382				6,846
<i>SLBMs</i>						
SS-N-6 Mod. 3	Serb	256	1973	3,000	2 × .375-1 Mt (MRV)	512
SS-N-8 Mod. 1/2	Sawfly	286	1973	7,800	1 × 1-1.5 Mt	286
SS-N-17	Snipe	12	1977	3,900	1 × 0.5-1 Mt	12
SS-N-18 Mod. 1/3 Mod. 2	Stingray } }	224	1978 1978	6,500 8,000	7 × 200-500 kt 1 × 0.45-1 Mt	1,568
SS-N-20	Sturgeon	80	1983	8,300	10 × 100 kt	800
SS-N-23	Skiff	64	1986	7,240	4 × 100 kt	256
<i>Total</i>		922				3,434
<i>Bombers</i>						
Tu-95	Bear A	30	1956	8,300	4 bombs	120
Tu-95	Bear B/C	30	1962	8,300	5 bombs or 1 AS-3	150
Tu-95	Bear G	40	1984	8,300	4 bombs + 2 AS-4	240
Tu-95	Bear H	55	1984	8,300	8 As-15 ALCMs + 4 bombs	660
<i>Total</i>		155				1,170
<i>Refueling aircraft</i>	...	140-170
<i>ABMs</i>						
ABM-1B	Galosh Mod.	16	1986	320	1 × unknown	16
ABM-3	Gazelle	80	1985	70	1 × low yield	80
<i>Total</i>		96				96

SS-11 and SS-B-6 MRV warheads are counted individually. Adapted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 39.
 Sources: T. B. Cochran, W. M. Arkin, and J. I. Sands, *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, vol. 4, *Soviet Nuclear Weapons* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1989); Arkin and Sands, "The Soviet Nuclear Stockpile," *Arms Control Today* (June 1984), pp. 1-7; U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*; NATO, *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons*; R. P. Berman and J. C. Baker, *Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982); U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Unclassified Communist Naval Orders of Battle*, DDB-1200-124-85 (December 1985); Congressional Budget Office, *Trident II Missiles: Capability, Costs, and Alternatives*, July 1986; J. M. Collins and B. C. Victory, *U.S./Soviet Military Balance*, CRS report no. 87-745-S, (1 September 1987); N. Polmar, *Guide to the Soviet Navy*, 4th ed. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986); Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1989*.

Table 5.5. Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces, 1988

	<i>NATO code-name</i>	<i>Number deployed*</i>	<i>Year first deployed</i>	<i>Range[†] (km)</i>	<i>Warhead × yield</i>	<i>Number deployed</i>
<i>Land-based systems:</i>						
<i>Aircraft</i>						
Tu-26	Backfire	160	1974	4,000	1-3 × bombs or ASMs	320
Tu-16	Badger A/G	272	1954	3,100	1-2 × bombs or ASMs	272
Tu-22	Blinder A/B	120	1962	2,900-3,300	1-2 bombs × or 1 ASM	120
Tactical aircraft [‡]		2,700	...	700-1,300	1-2 × bombs	2,700
<i>Missiles</i>						
SS-20	Saber	405	1977	5,000	3 × 250 kt	1,215
SS-4	Sandal	65	1959	2,000	1 × 1 Mt	65
SS-12	Scaleboard	135	1969/78	900	1 × 500 kt	405
SS-1c	Scud B	500	1965	280	1 × 1-10 kt	500
SS-23	Spider	102	1985	500	1 × 100 kt	167
...	FROG 7	370	1965	70	1 × 1-25 kt	200
SS-21 [§]	Scarab	130	1978	120	1 × 10-100 kt	1,100
SS-C-1b	Sepal	100	1962	450	1 × 50-200 kt	100
SAMs [¶]	40-300	1 × low kt	...
<i>Other systems</i>						
Artillery ^{**}	...	<7,700	1973-80	10-30	1 × low kt	...
ADMs	...	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.

* Includes operational or deployed missiles on launchers.

[†] Range for aircraft indicates combat radius without refueling.

[‡] Nuclear-capable tactical aircraft models include MiG-21 Fishbed L/N, MiG-27 Flogger D/J, Su-7 Fitter A, Su-17 Fitter C/D, and Su-24 Fencer A/B/C/D/E.

[§] Includes SS-21s in East German and Czechoslovakian units.

[¶] Nuclear-capable land-based surface-to-air missiles probably include SA-1 Guild, SA-2 Guideline, SA-5 Gammon, SA-10 Grumble, and SA-12 Gladiator.

^{**} Nuclear-capable artillery include systems of three calibers: 152-mm (M-1976, 2S3, and 2S5), 203-mm (2S7 and M-1980), and 240-mm (2S4 and M-240). William M. Arkin estimates that some older systems likely also were nuclear capable at the time.

Naval systems:

Ballistic missiles

SS-N-5	Sark	39	1963	1,400	1 × 1 Mt	39
--------	------	----	------	-------	----------	----

Aircraft

Tu-26	Backfire	130	1974	4,000	1-3 × bombs or ASMs	260
Tu-16	Badger A/C/G	205	1955	3,100	1-2 × bombs or ASMs	205
Tu-22	Blinder	35	1962	2,900-3,300	1 × bombs	35
ASW aircraft ^{††}	...	390	1966-82	...	1 × depth bombs	390

Anti-ship cruise missiles^{††}

SS-N-3 b/a, c	Shaddock/Sepal	228	1960	450	1 × 350 kt	120
SS-N-7	Starbright	90	1968	65	1 × 200 kt	44
SS-N-9	Siren	208	1969	280	1 × 200 kt	78
SS-N-12	Sandbox	200	1976	550	1 × 350 kt	76
SS-N-19	Shipwreck	136	1980	550	1 × 500 kt	56
SS-N-22	Sunburn	80	1981	100	1 × 200 kt	24

Land-attack cruise missiles

SS-N-21	Sampson	12	1987	3,000	1 × n.a.	12
SS-NX-24	n.k.	0	ε 1988	<3,000	1 × n.a.	0

ASW missiles and torpedoes

SS-N-15	Starfish	} 400	1973	37	1 × 10 kt	n.k.
SS-N-16	Stallion		1979	120	1 × 10 kt	n.k.
FRAS-1	...	10	1967	30	1 × 5 kt	10
Torpedoes ^{§§}	Type 65	n.k.	1965	16	1 × low kt	n.k.
	ET-80	n.k.	1980	>16	1 × low kt	n.k.

Naval SAMs

SA-N-1	Goa	65	1961	22	1 × 10 kt	65
SA-N-3	Goblet	43	1967	37	1 × 10 kt	43
SA-N-6	Grumble	33	1981	65	1 × 10 kt	33

Adapted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, pp. 40-41. Sources: Cochran, Arkin, and Sands, *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, vol. 4; Arkin and Sands, "The Soviet Nuclear Stockpile"; Polmar, *Guide to the Soviet Navy*; NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons; *U.S. Military Posture for FY 1989*; "More Self-Propelled Gun Designations," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (7 June 1986), p. 1003; J. Handler and W. M. Arkin, *Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: A Complete Inventory*, Neptune Paper no. 2 (Washington: Greenpeace/Institute for Policy Studies, 1988).

^{††} Includes 95 Be-12 Mail, 50 Il-38 May, and 55 Tu-142 Bear F patrol aircraft. Land- and sea-based helicopters include 140 Ka-25 Hormone and 50 Ka-27 Helix models.

^{††} Based on an average of two nuclear-armed cruise missiles per nuclear-capable surface ship, except for four per Kiev and Kirov Classes; and an average of four per nuclear-capable cruise missile submarine, except for twelve on the Oscar Class.

^{§§} The two types of torpedo are the older and newer models, respectively, with the ET-80 ultimately replacing the Type 65.

Table 5.6. British Nuclear Forces, 1988

	<i>Number deployed</i>	<i>Year deployed</i>	<i>Range (km)[*]</i>	<i>Warhead × yield</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Number in stockpile[†]</i>
<i>Aircraft</i>						
Buccaneer S2B	25 [‡]	1962	1,700	1 × 5-200 kt bombs	WE-177 [§]	25
Tornado GR-1	220 [¶]	1982	1,300	1-2 × 5-200 kt bombs	WE-177	220
<i>SLBMs</i>						
Polaris A3-TK	64	1982 ^{**}	4,700	2 × 40 kt	MRV	128
<i>Carrier aircraft</i>						
Sea Harrier FRS. 1	34	1980	450	1 × 5-200 kt bomb	WE-177	34
<i>ASW helicopters</i>						
Sea King HAS 5	56	1976	...	1 × depth bomb	unknown ^{††}	56
Lynx HAS 2/3	78	1976	...	1 × depth bomb	unknown	78

Adapted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 42. Sources: Sources: UK Ministry of Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: HMSO, 1980ff); P. Rogers, *Guide to Nuclear Weapons, 1984-85* (Bradford: University of Bradford, 1984); D. Campbell, "Too few bombs to go round," *New Kingdom*, DDB-1100-UK-85 (secret, partially declassified), Oct. 1985; J. Nott, "Decisions to modernise UK's nuclear contribution to NATO strengthen deterrence," *NATO Review* 29, no. 2 (April 1981); IISS, *The Military Balance 1987-1988* (London: IISS, 1987).

^{*} Range for aircraft indicates combat radius without refueling.

[†] Sources vary, with some analysts placing the total number of nuclear warheads in the British stockpile as low as 185, comprised of 80 WE-177 gravity bombs, 25 nuclear depth bombs, and 80 Chevaline A3-TK warheads.

[‡] Plus eighteen in reserve and nine undergoing conversion during 1988, probably the remainder from the Federal Republic of Germany.

[§] Analysts understand the WE-177 to be a tactical "lay-down" type bomb.

[¶] Some Buccaneer and Jaguar aircraft, withdrawn from bases in the Federal Republic of Germany and replaced by Tornado GR-1, still likely served nuclear roles in the UK.

^{**} The Polaris A3-TK (Chevaline) was first deployed in 1982. By 1988, the Royal Navy had completely replaced the original Polaris A-3 missile, first deployed in 1968.

^{††} Analysts understood the Royal Navy nuclear depth bomb to be a low-yield variation of the Royal Air Force tactical bomb.

Table 5.7. French Nuclear Forces, 1988

	<i>Number deployed</i>	<i>Year deployed</i>	<i>Range (km)*</i>	<i>Warhead × yield</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Number in stockpile</i>
<i>Aircraft</i>						
Mirage IVP/ASMP	18	1986	1,500 [†]	1 × 300 kt	TN 80	20
Jaguar A	45	1974 [‡]	750	1 × 6-8/30 kt bomb	ANT-52 [§]	50
Mirage IIIE	30	1972	600	1 × 6-8/30 kt bomb	ANT-52	35
<i>Refueling aircraft</i>						
C-1325F/FR	11	1965
<i>Land-based missiles</i>						
S3D [¶]	18	1980	3,500	1 × 1 Mt	TN-61	18
Pluton	44	1974	120	1 × 10/25 kt	ANT-51 ^{**}	70
<i>Submarine-based missiles</i>						
M-20	64	1977	3,000	1 × 1 Mt	TN-61	64
M-4A	16	1985	4,000-5,000	6 × 150 kt (MIRV)	TN-70 ^{††}	96
M-4 (modified)	16	1987	6,000	4-6 × 150 kt (MIRV)	TN-71	<96
<i>Carrier aircraft</i>						
Super Etendard	36	1978	650	1 × 6-8/30 kt bomb	ANT-52	40

Adapted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 43. Sources: Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), “Informations non classées sur l’armement nucléaire français” (26 June 1986); CEA, “Regard sur l’avenir du CEA,” *Notes d’Information* (January-February 1986), p. 7; CEA, *Rapport Annuel 1985*, pp. 77-79; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, *A Guide to Foreign Tactical Nuclear Weapon Systems under the Control of Ground Force Commanders*, DST-1040S-541-83 (9 September 1983, 17 August 1984, and 9 August 1985); U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), *Air Forces Intelligence Study: France*, DDI-1300-FR-77 (April 1977); DIA, *Military Capability Study of NATO Countries*, DDB-2680-15-85 (September 1985 and December 1977); R. F. Laird, “French nuclear forces in the 1980s and the 1990s,” *Comprehensive Strategy* 4, no. 4 (1984), pp. 387-412; IISS, *The Military Balance 1987-1988* (London: IISS, 1987).

* Range for aircraft indicates combat radius without refueling.

[†] Range does not include the 80- to 250-km range of the ASMP air-to-surface missile.

[‡] The Mirage IIIE, first deployed in 1964, did not carry nuclear weapons until 1972. The Jaguar A, first deployed in 1973, did not carry nuclear weapons until 1974.

[§] Gravity bombs for these aircraft include the ANT-52 warhead (incorporating the same basic MR 50 charge as that used for the Pluton SSM), reported as being of 25- and 30-kt by CEA and DIA, respectively; and an alternate low-yield gravity bomb of 6-8 kt.

[¶] S3D (“Durcie”) is the designation for the hardened S3 missile. The original S3 missile was deployed in 1980.

^{**} Warheads for the Pluton include the ANT-51 (incorporating the same basic MR 50 charge as the ANT-52) with a yield of 25 kt, and a specially designed alternate warhead of 10 kt.

^{††} The *Inflexible* was the only SSBN to receive the TN-70. All subsequent refits of the M-4 into Redoubtable Class SSBNs incorporated the improved TN-71 warhead. The M-4As of the *Inflexible* were retrofitted to hold the TN-71.

Chapter Five: Overcoming Europe's Military Imbalance, 1987-1989

1. I Corinthians 14:8 (Douay-Rheims).

2. Such scenarios occupied many NATO and Bundeswehr planners in the mid 1980s. An April 1987 *Der Spiegel* cover story warned West Germans about the "three to five minutes of hell" that would presage the end of Europe. "Drei bis fünf Minuten vor der Hölle," *Der Spiegel* 18/1987 (27 April 1987).

Warsaw Pact strategists, less averse to casualties than their western counterparts, planned for the troops to operate under nuclear, chemical, and biological battlefield conditions. As early as the 1960s, Soviet war planners recognized the relative survivability of tanks and armored vehicles properly retrofitted for nuclear exposure. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown warned that "Warsaw Pact "tanks and troops are in general better able to operate in a chemical, biological, and radiological environment than ours."

By the mid 1980s, Soviet war planners aimed to conduct multi-front operations across a frontage of about seven hundred kilometers, securing enemy territory about 1,200 kilometers deep—to the English Channel in the north and the Pyrenees in the south—within three to four weeks. By early 1988, Soviet ground forces comprised more than two hundred mechanized divisions prepared for five theaters of operation. Though qualitatively unable to compete with NATO equipment, the Soviets held 53,000 battle tanks, 48,000 artillery tubes, 4,600 SAMs, and 4,500 helicopters. See William E. Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs* 67, no. 2 (1988); *idem.*, "The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Weapons: A Historical Review," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 469 (September 1983), 118; and U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1983), 21; *United States Military Posture for FY 1977*.

In late 2005, Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski declassified an unprecedented 1,700 volumes of Soviet military files. Those files revealed Warsaw Pact resolve to wage nuclear war in a European theatre. Among the opened items was a map outlining Soviet operation "Seven Days to the Rhine River," in which Soviet-launched warheads would rain down on Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Baden-Baden, Haarlem, Antwerp, Charleroi, and Brussels. See Gerhard Gnauck, "In sieben Tagen am Rhein," *Die Welt* (9 May 2006). Among English-language publications, *The Daily Telegraph* produced a number of articles from the released documents. See Neil Tweedie, "Vienna was top of Soviet nuclear targets list," *The Daily Telegraph* (1 December 2006); and David Rennie, "World War Three Seen through Soviet Eyes," *The Daily Telegraph* (26 November 2005).

3. "'Neben-Außenpolitik' der SPD schadet deutschen Interessen," *Union in Deutschland* 26 (5 September 1985), 9-11; "SPD-Deutschlandpolitik—gegen die Interessen der Deutschen, *CDU Extra* 29 (1986): 1-16. On electoral implications, see McAdams, *German Divided*, 170; Dyson, "The Challenged Consensus"; and Kai Ambos, "The Greens and the West-German Federal Election of 1987: The New 'Third Party'?" *Politics* 8, no. 1 (1988): 24-31.

4. John Vinocur, "Mitterrand Sees Test for the West's Unity," *New York Times*, 24 January 1983.

5. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, quoted in Vinocur, "Mitterrand Sees Test for the West's Unity," 24 January 1983.

6. Heiner Emde, quoted in Andreas von Bülow, *Strategie vertrauensschaffender Sicherheitsstrukturen in Europa: Wege zur Sicherheit-Partnerschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 1985), 90.

7. James M. Markham, "Militants Show Muscle as Bonn Socialists Meet," *New York Times*, 29 August 1986.

8. *Ibid.* Bülow further proposed stripping away any offensive capabilities from the German military so as not to antagonize the Soviet Union. Many units of the former Bundeswehr, he envisioned, should be designed to be staffed only in times of military crisis.

9. Quoted in Peter Bruce, "SPD Defence Row May Mar Gorbachev Meeting, West German Opposition Chief Rau to Meet Soviet Leader Gorbachev," *Financial Times*, 9 September 1985; and Frank Johnson, "Defence Paper Splits Bonn Opposition, West German Social Democrats Propose Withdrawal of U.S. Troops by Year 2000," *The Times* [London], 10 September 1985.

10. Manfred Wörner, quoted in "Pressestimmen und veröffentlichte Meinung zum «Bülow-Papier», in *Das Bülow-Papier: Strategie vertrauensschaffender Sicherheit-Strukturen in Europa Wege zur Sicherheits-Partnerschaft*, Andreas von Bülow (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag, 1985), 75-77.

11. Rudolf Seiters, quoted in *ibid.*

12. "Wir sprechen mit der SED offen über jedes Thema," *General Anzeiger* (Bonn), 8 June 1988.

13. McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 158. The SED extended an invitation to Willy Brandt, but the ex-chancellor understood the dangers of appearing too friendly with the Honecker régime, particularly since the Guillaume affair. The SPD instead sent Wilhelm Bruns, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's director of foreign policy and GDR research. See Ann L. Phillips, "Seeds of Change in the German Democratic Republic: the SED-SPD Dialogue," American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Research Report no. 1 (December 1989), 13. Notably, Honecker's address at the conference appropriated some of the SPD's own language of "common security" (*gemeinsame Sicherheit*). He addressed the need for a coalition of reason and realism (*Koalition der Vernunft und Realismus*) in the face of mutual nuclear threats. See Erich Honecker, "Rede auf der Internationalen Wissenschaftlichen Konferenz des Zentralkomitees der SED 'Karl Marx und unsere Zeit—der Kampf um Frieden und sozialen Fortschritt' im Berlin," 11 April 1983, in *Reden und Aufsätze*, vol. 9 (Berlin: Dietz, 1985), 278-285.

14. Richard von Weizsäcker, *Vier Zeiten: Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1997), 210-11.

15. For a summary of the Social Democrats opposition policies, see Stephen Padgett, "The West German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1982-86," *West European Politics* 10 (July 1987): 33-56; Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," *Survival* 30 (November-December 1988): 515-28; and Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 345ff.

16. The Palme Commission, headed by former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, convened in twelve working sessions between 1981 and 1982 with an aim of reducing tensions in world politics. The commission promised "practical steps which, if implemented, could produce genuine and significant improvements in the international political climate and real progress towards arms control and a lessened risk of war." Most notably, it recommended the "establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapons-free zone and measures to reduce pressures for the early use of nuclear weapons" along with "a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe, beginning in Central Europe." Bahr represented West Germany, Cyrus Vance the United States, Giorgi Arbatov the Soviet Union, Jean-Marie Daillet France, and David Owen the UK. Norway, Poland, Canada, Mexico, Japan, India, Nigeria, Guyana, Tanzania, Indonesia, and the Netherlands were also represented. See Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

17. "SPD für Abkehr von der Nuklearabschreckung," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 22 May 1984. See also Alexander R.; Alexiev, "The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, Means," A RAND Note (prepared for the U.S. Air Force" (February 1985), pp. 42-43.

-
18. "SPD Unterstützt Herbstaktionen der Friedensbewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 September 1984; and Günther Bannas, "Die Finanzen der Friedensbewegung: Die SPD engagiert sich mit Personen und Geld," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 September 1984.
19. Eberhard Schulz, "Das 'neue politische Denken' und die Deutschen," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 9 (1988), 972-73.
20. BA-MA, VA-01/40372. See Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 528-30.
21. See Phillips, "Seeds of Change in the German Democratic Republic." The SPD's "security policy" platform had come to resemble the peace activist literature, arguing for "ethical/moral claims" on behalf of "all peace-loving peoples" who encouraged all sides "to renounce violence." See "Voraussetzungen sozialdemokratischer Sicherheitspolitik," n.d.; BA, B 136/27067.
- Even the East German Politburo noted that Honecker's September 1987 visit to the west would mark an important step in maintaining good relations with the SPD. "SED-Politbürovorlage vom 15. September 1987 über den offiziellen Besuch von Erich Honecker in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 7. bis 11. September (Auszug)," in *Die SED: Geschichte, Organisation, Politik: Ein Handbuch*, ed. Andreas Herbst, Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, and Jürgen Winkler (Berlin: Dietz, 1997)
22. The CDU/CSU continued depicting the Social Democrats as a "security risk" for years after. CDU spokesman Volker Rühe summarized SPD foreign and security policy as "condemned to failure." The "anti-NATO policy" he warned, "has damaged the reputation of our country." See Volker Rühe, "Bündnisunfähig und Entspannungsunfähig: Die SPD-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik ist zum Scheitern verurteilt," 6 August 1986; BA, B 136/27067.
23. Even Kohl's economic leverage in the east diminished as trade between the Federal Republic and the eastern economies also dropped off in 1985 and 1986.
24. "Kohl v. Genscher," *The Economist* no. 7589 (11 February 1989), 52.
25. "Schlechte Karten," *Der Spiegel* 27 (2 July 1984), 99.
26. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcker, eds., *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, 1984-1992*, vol. 9 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1993), 979-94.
27. "Kohl v. Genscher," 52. A year earlier, *The Economist* had offered a similar observation: "Mr. Kohl is less active in foreign policy (with the possible exception of West Germany's relations with France)." See "The Triumphs and Harrumphs of Genscherism," 41.
28. Of the so-called "second Cold War," Michael Cox noted that its "intensity . . . was as great as its duration was short." See his *Beyond the Cold War: Superpowers at the Crossroads?* (Charlottesville, Va.: Miller Center of Public Affairs, 1990), xviii.
29. See, e.g., Reagan's diary entries for 15 November 1982 and 15 April 1983 in *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 113 and 145.
30. On Reagan's improvisation, see James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
31. Weizsäcker later confirmed Gorbachev's resentment toward Kohl over the Goebbels comparison. See Weizsäcker, *Vier Zeiten*, 341.
32. See Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 254.

-
33. See Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 345-46.
34. Even internally, Kohl's government was reasserting its INF position. See "INF Verhandlungen," 4 November 1983; BA, B 136/30133.
35. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 345. Still, in 1985, the defense minister identified "German participation in SDI" as an important expense in the Defense Ministry's annual budget. Memorandum from Teltschik to Kohl, 1 February 1985, Ihr anstehendes Gespräch mit BM Dr. Wörner über Vorhaben im Breech Sicherheitspolitik und Bundeswehr; BA, B 136/27064.
36. Of course, the chancellor had hoped to see "a year of negotiations. See "INF/START," 23 November 1984; BA, B 136/30060.
37. Weizsäcker, *Vier Zeiten*, 346.
38. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 4 December 1987; and *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 20 June 1987. See Clay Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager: Helmut Kohl, the CDU and Governance in Germany," *West European Politics* 17, no. 4 (October 1994), 39.
39. Politicians in the *Länder* found that to be particularly true. Eberhard Diepgen in Berlin, Uwe Barschel in Schleswig-Holstein, and Hans-Otto Wilhelm in Rhineland-Palatinate successfully maneuvered thusly within the CDU. See *ibid.*, 42.
40. On Kohl specifically, see Clay Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager: Helmut Kohl, the CDU and Governance in Germany," *West European Politics* 17, no. 4 (October 1994): 28-51. Clemens, who has written extensively on Kohl's leadership and management, notes that "Kohl's means of winning support for his government often diminished its image, and his own" (p. 28). Clemens attributes the "mixed verdict" on Kohl's leadership, among other factors, to the growing distance from the Weimar era. West Germans, he explains, no longer valued an "apolitical" executive as they once did.
41. Renata Mayntz, "Executive Leadership in Germany: Dispersion of Power or 'Kanzlerdemokratie,'" in *Presidents and Prime Ministers*, ed. Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 148-49; Gerhard Loewenberg, *Parlamentarismus im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1969), 481-90; Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Der starke Regierungschef und das Parteiensystem: Der Kanzler-Effekt in der Bundesrepublik," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 2 (1961); and Werner Kaltefleiter, "Die Kanzler-Demokratie," in Helmut Unkelbach, Rudolf Wildenmann, Werner Kaltefleiter, eds. *Wähler, Parteien, Parlament* (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 19645), 49.
42. Josef Joffe, "Détente über alles: How Genscher Made Germany's Voice Heard," *Times Literary Supplement* (13 October 1995), 6.
43. Gedmin, "Helmut Kohl, Giant."
44. Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 106-107.
45. Strauß was succeeded as CSU chairman by Theo Waigel. Kohl later nominated Waigel as federal finance minister, guaranteeing the CSU a coveted cabinet portfolio.
46. See exchanges in BA, B 136/30670.
47. Quoted in Gedmin, "Helmut Kohl, Giant."
48. Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager," 31. Additionally, when polling data indicated the Union parties may achieve a majority without the SPD or the Liberals, Strauß and the Bavarians to draw a more conservative line in foreign policy. See *idem.*, *Reluctant Realists*, 250-54.
49. "Kohls Bahr," *Der Spiegel* 31/1984 (30 July 1984).

50. Godesberger Programm (1959) in *Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ed. Ossip Kurt Flechtheim (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1973), 215-33.

51. Stephen F. Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense after the 1987 Elections," *SAIS Review* 7, no. 2 (Summer 1987), 52. The party had attempted to clarify its Godesberg positions in 1985 by drafting a new "guiding framework" (*Orientierungsrahmen*). The document served, however, as "little more than an exercise in compromise between party factions," according to one commentator, and lacked even short-term durability. See Siegfried Heimann, "Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands," in *Parteien-handbuch: Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, 1945-1980*, vol. 2, *FDP bis WAV*, ed. Richard Stöss (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984), pp. 2081-85.

52. Kurt Schumacher quoted in *Turmwächter der Demokratie: ein Lebensbild von Kurt Schumacher*, vol. 2, ed. Arno Scholz and Walther G. Oschilewski (Berlin-Grunewald: Arani, 1952-54), 230; Schumacher's press conference proceedings of 15 August and 24 August 1951 in *Sopade*, September 1951, p. 3; and Lewis J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 231-32.

53. Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Beschlossen vom Außerordentlichen Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Bad Godesberg vom 13. bis 15. November 1959; AdsD.

54. Helga Haftendorn, *Security and Détente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 54. Stephen J. Artier has shown that "the Social Democratic security policy alternatives had proved irreconcilable with the international system and unacceptable to West German voters." See his *A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and NATO, 1959-1961* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 224.

55. Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense after the 1987 Elections," 57.

56. In September 1987, Lafontaine delivered an address at the U.S. National Defense University, calling for a nuclear-free corridor and lecturing the Americans that "tactical weapons have no place in Europe because they make no sense militarily." See Mitteilung für die Presse, 23 September 1987, Service der SPD für Presse, Funk, TV.

57. Willy Brandt, address given to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 November 1973, in *Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament*, Annex 168 (November 1973), pp. 20-25.

58. Positionspapier des "Frankfurter Kreises" in der SPD "Für eine neue Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik," 16-17 February 1986.

59. Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense after the 1987 Elections," 59.

60. Again, Bahr emerges as one of the most enigmatic figures in West German politics. Despite his rhetoric, his writings, and the company he kept, he likely never was as radical as he seemed to contemporaries. While his positions on foreign and security policies varied wildly over the years, he always maintained at least enough realism so as not to be painted as a radical. Speaking before a Bundeswehr delegation in January 1988, for instance, he argued that the complete denuclearization of Europe was "not realizable." By 1987 and 1988, however, Bahr likely had tempered his views in an effort to win support among West German moderates for cooperation with Gorbachev. Bahr saw Gorbachev's overtures as genuine and recognized Gorbachev's public support of the western European social-democratic parties. See "Bahr: Kein totaler Atomwaffen-Abbau," *Neue Ruhr Zeitung*, 16 January 1988; Egon Bahr, *Zum europäischen Frieden: Eine Antwort auf Gorbatschow* (Berlin: Wolf

Jobst Siedler Verlag, 1988); and Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," 523-27. On Gorbachev's support for social-democratic arms-control proposals and their larger political positions, see his *Perestroika* (London: Collins, 1987), 190-209.

Similarly, Ehmke, speaking in Beijing later that spring, called for a "minimal [nuclear] deterrent," and Voigt likewise criticized peace activists' misappropriation of "zero solution" rhetoric. See "Verminderung der Atomwaffen bis our Minimalabschreckung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 May 1988; and Karsten D. Voigt, "Von der nuklearen zur konventionellen Abrüstung in Europa: Kriterien konventioneller Stabilität und Möglichkeiten der Rüstungskontrolle," *Europa Archiv* 42, no. 14 (July 1987): 409-18.

61. See Gerhard Bronchial, "Koalition zwischen Sozialdemokraten und Grünen: Perspektiven einer neuen Allianz," *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung*, no. 3 (1986), 9.

62. Quoted in Gedmin, "Helmut Kohl, Giant."

63. "Grüne Friedenspolitik" in Hoover Institution Archives, German Subject Collection, box 115, Peace Movement, die Grünen

64. The Greens' position was reinforced in April 1986 when an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power facility showered radioactive contamination over Belarus, Ukraine, and western Russia. In November, an industrial disaster in an agrochemical storage facility released tons of pollutants into the Rhine. For weeks, the river flowed red as toxic chemicals plashed the banks and fish and wildlife perished. Although the nuclear disaster began in the Ukraine and the Rhine disaster began in Switzerland, both tragedies blighted the West German environment, buttressing the left's claims that self-interested *foreign* policy must be replaced with universal *peace* policy. Traditional diplomacy, focused on sovereignty and power, failed to meet the challenges of nuclear disaster or environmental degradation—air pollution, ozone depletion, or acid rain—that leached through borders and wafted over the Iron Curtain. Two months later, a Green electoral victory flowed from the red waters of the Rhine.

65. With a particular emphasis on the SPD's leftward shift on foreign and defense policy between 1984 and 1987, see Franz H. U. Borkenhagen, "Aspekte der sicherheitspolitischen Discussion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Aus dem Blickpunkt der SPD," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, no. 2 (1987): 138-45. The CDU response identified the Social Democrats as "a foreign and security-policy risk" within West Germany, actively politicking against their country's defense. See "Die SPD ist ein Außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Risiko: Politik gegen das Atlantische Bündnis," *CDU Extra* 28 (1986): 1-8.

66. "Unser Weg zu Abrüstung und Frieden: Beschluß zur Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik der SPD," 25-29 August 1986, in *Politik* 8 (September 1986).

67. Bülow called for a Bundeswehr with "a structural inability to attack." For contemporary assessments, see Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," *Survival* 30, no. 6 (November-December 1988): 515-28.

68. See, e.g., Kommission Sicherheitspolitik des Vorstandes der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, "Entwurf für Leitantrag zur Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik," 13 March 1986; BA, B 136/27064. By 1986, SPD policy "excluded war as an instrument of policy." In their declaration, the Social Democrats distanced the party from NATO, calling for the CSCE, the Stockholm Conference for Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, MBFR, and other multilateral east-west forums to advance peace on the continent.

69. Klaus Larres and Bernd Rother, eds., *Willy Brandt and International Relations: Europe, the USA, and Latin America* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), forthcoming.

70. Shortly before his resignation in June 1987, Brandt faced a chorus of criticism for clinging to power for so many years and preventing a new generation of Social Democrats from advancing. See, e.g., Robert J. McCartney, "Brandt Forced from Top of West German Party," *Washington Post*, 24 March 1987.

71. Others, including the SPD's Peter Glotz, argued for a "phased revision of the German role in NATO." See "Die SPD vervollständigt ihn Nein zur Nachrüstung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 October 1983.

72. Kenneth Dyson, "The Challenged Consensus: The 1987 German Federal Elections," *The Political Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (April 1987), 159. On *Mitbestimmung*, see chapter two of this study.

73. Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense after the 1987 Elections," 56-57.

74. "SPD: Wir müssen neu anfangen," *Der Spiegel* 34/1986 (18 August 1986), 20.

75. Rau on "Bonner Perspektiven," ZDF, 10 August 1986.

76. Stephen Padgett, "The West German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1982-86," *West European Politics* 10, no. 3 (July 1987), 334.

77. "Man Muß unersättlich sein," *Der Spiegel* 43/1986 (20 October 1986), 40.

78. See, e.g., Kommission Sicherheitspolitik des Vorstandes der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, "Entwurf für Leitantrag zur Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik," 13 March 1986; BA, B 136/27064. By 1986, SPD policy "excluded war as an instrument of policy." In their declaration, the Social Democrats distanced the party from NATO, calling for the CSCE, the Stockholm Conference for Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, MBFR, and other multilateral east-west forums to advance peace on the continent.

79. Die Grünen im Bundestag, *SPD-Sicherheitspolitik: Ein halber Frieden: Was uns von der SPD trennt* (Hamburg: Die Grünen, 1986).

Nonetheless, some Social Democrats still contemplated a red-green coalition at the federal level. Such a partnership would spare them from courting the Liberals and would provide a logical trajectory for their party's leftward bent.

In April 1986, Rau had declared unequivocally that he would never accept a coalition with the Greens. (Rau on "Journalisten fragen—Politiker antworten," ZDF, 10 April 1986.) He was contradicted, however, on many occasions by others within the party, including Brandt, Lafontaine, and Willi Görlach

Joschka Fischer, environment minister in Hesse, participated in a red-green coalition in the Landtag, and many hoped for a productive partnership at the federal level as well. In the short-term, however, the Greens rebuffed such advances, insistent upon remaining West Germany's "anti-party party." Torn between the wing of realists (*Realos*), willing to countenance legislative partnerships, and the wing of fundamentalists (*Fundis*), insistent on remaining an "extra-parliamentary protest movement," the Greens remained divided on the issue until the 1990s.

80. Jutta Ditfurth and Rainer Trampert, two founders of the Greens, believed their party could replace the SPD. See Dyson, "The Challenged Consensus," 164.

81. Stephen F. Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense after the 1987 Elections," *SAIS Review* 7, no. 2 (Summer 1987), 61.

The CDU/CSU suffered their own setbacks. Kohl entered the 1987 federal election in the weakest position of his political career. His marginalization in east-west relations, his support for Reagan's unpopular SDI, and his unruly coalition partners all threatened to oust his "coalition of the middle" from power. The chancellor's situation had deteriorated "from bad to worse," according to *Der*

Spiegel, which identified him as “a handicap for the CDU.” After just three years in office, his popularity had declined by at least twelve percentage points. Even supporters conceded that the chancellor’s policies seemed “confusing” and his agenda meandering. See “Kohl ist ein Handicap für die CDU,” *Der Spiegel* 2/1986 (6 January 1986), 22. See also, e.g., “Vom Englischen sofort ins Russische,” 21; and “Kohl ist ein Handicap für die CDU,” 22.

82. Michael Binyon, “Willy Brandt Resignation: Giant of European Politics,” *The Times* [London], 24 March 1987.

83. One report indicated that Brandt offered the chairmanship to Rau when Rau was chosen as chancellor-candidate. See “Aus dem Schneider,” *Der Spiegel* 2/1987 (5 January 1987).

84. Padgett, “The West German Social Democrats in Opposition,” 336. The western press reported that distraught East Germans “lamented” Brandt’s fall from grace. One “East Berlin housewife” suggested that “we ought to build a monument to Willy Brandt,” while another Ossie suggested that “He was too good for them [the Bonn government].” See e.g., Leslie Colitt, “East Laments Der Willy’s Fall,” *Financial Times*, 25 March 1987.

85. James M. Markham, “Brandt Resigns as West German Socialist Party Chief,” *New York Times*, 24 March 1987; and “The German Question Forty Years After Yalta,” Report for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 17 June 1985 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 7.

86. Matthew A. Weiller, “SPD Security Policy,” *Survival* 30, no. 6 (November-December 1988), 515.

87. Rau likewise found his fellow Social Democrats’ fixation on the TNF issue frustrating. See, e.g., the interview with Rau in “Man muß unersättlich sein,” *Der Spiegel* 43/1986 (20 October 1986), 40.

88. On Vogel’s thinking, e.g., see “Mr. Vogel’s Way,” *The Globe and Mail*, 8 February 1984.

89. Jürgen Leinemann, “Wir können damit auch siegen,” *Der Spiegel* 36/1986 (1 September 1986). Unlike Schmidt, Rau always carefully tailored his rhetoric to his audience. Addressing the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, Rau affirmed his steadfastness to NATO although laced with criticism. “For us Social Democrats,” he explained, “we are not giving any thought to withdrawing from the Alliance The policy of peace and détente promoted by Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, of which we are proud, would have been impossible without the support of the alliance and without being members of it.” He added the caveat: “I should like to add that friendship, partnership, and loyalty to the alliance do not mean that we waive the right to have our own opinion. Friendship must rely on openness.” Johannes Ray, address to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, quoted in Ridgway, “Developments in Europe, January 1986, Supplemental Questions Submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East to the Department of State and Responses Thereto,” 70.

90. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, address before the World Economic Forum, Davos, 1 February 1987, in *Statements and Speeches* 10, no. 3 (6 February 1987), German Information Center, New York. In the weeks and months that followed, Genscher repeated his calls to honor Gorbachev’s intentions. See *idem.*, “Take Gorbachev Seriously,” 28 December 1987, in *Statements and Speeches* 11, no. 1 (2 January 1988), pp. 4-7. The Davos address had been drafted by Genscher’s longtime speech-writer Konrad Seitz.

91. Both by force of personality and as the country’s longest-tenured foreign minister, Genscher managed West Germany’s foreign policy as his own personal province. See Clay Clemens, *Reluctant*

Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 249.

92. Josef Joffe, "The Secret of Genscher's Staying Power: Memoirs of a 'Slippery Man,'" *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 1 (January-February 1998), 152.

93. Gustav Schmidt, "The Conduct of East-West Relations during the 1980s," *Contemporary European History* 1, no. 2 (July 1992), 210. Andreas Rödter offers an important historical treatment. See his "Breakthrough in the Caucasus: German Reunification as a Challenge to Contemporary Historiography," *German Historical Institute London Bulletin* 24, no. 2 (November 2002), 13. Rödter notes that Genscherism "precipitated a serious crisis of confidence" within NATO," particularly in the critical years of 1988-90. See, e.g., Wolfram Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949-1989*, 2nd ed. (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1995), 353. Rödter points specifically to the interallied dispute over the short-range nuclear forces in Europe. See Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany*, vol. 2, *Democracy and its Discontents*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung, 1945-2000* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 296-305; Stefan Fröhlich, *Auf den Kanzler kommt es an. Helmut Kohl und die deutsche Außenpolitik: Persönliches Regiment und Regierungshandeln vom Amtsantritt bis zur Wiedervereinigung* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2001), 142-86; and Michael Broer, "Zwischen Konsens und Konflikt: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluß, der INF-Vertrag und die SNF-Kontroverse," in Detlef Junker et al., eds., *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges, 1945-1990*, vol. 2, *1968-1990* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 234-44.

94. Genscher chaired the FDP until 1985. He was succeeded by Martin Bangemann and by Otto Graf Lambsdorff thereafter.

95. Genscher hoped that, if Bonn could offer Gorbachev backing, the Soviet leader might further marginalize hardliners in Moscow and consolidate support within the Politburo for east-west rapprochement. Scholars have not always understood the full scope of Genscher's political power in Bonn politics. Michael J. Sodaro, for instance, describes Genscher and his FDP as perpetually courting obsolescence in West German politics. See his *Moscow, Germany, and the West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 348-49.

96. Robert J. McCartney, "Bonn's Tightrope Walker: Genscher Survives 15 Years of Controversy," *Washington Post*, 3 May 1989, p. A1; Richard Burt, quoted in Joffe, "Secret of Genscher's Staying Power," 149.

97. "East is East and West is West, and Genscher is in the Middle," *The Economist*, no. 7602, 13 May 1989, p. 59.

98. Joffe, "Secret of Genscher's Staying Power," 149. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, in their *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, more directly cite Genscher's "opaque policy phrases" (p. xi).

99. Quoted in Joffe, "The Secret of Genscher's Staying Power," 151.

100. *Schaukelpolitik*, literally "swing policy," had been a phrase used to describe Weimar diplomats (namely Foreign Ministers Walther Rathenau and Gustav Stresemann) who aimed to play east against west. To call Genscher a *Schaukelpolitiker* in the Weimar sense was truly an overstatement. He always believed in a Federal Republic firmly anchored in the western alliance, but he did represent one of Bonn's most conciliatory negotiators with the east bloc.

-
101. MemCon, Cyrus Vance and S. F. Akhromeyev, 4 February 1987, National Security Archive; available online.
102. Comment by Mr. Spencer Wilkinson to the Royal Geographical Society, 25 January 1904, in *The Geographical Journal* 23, no. 4 (1904), 438.
103. See NSDD 214, "U.S. Response to Gorbachev's January Arms Control Proposals," 21 February 1986; available online from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intelligence Resource Program.
104. N.a. [likely Paul Nitze], "Lessons of Reykjavík," 12 October 1986, in Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 237.
105. Memo, Robert McFarlane to Ronald Reagan, 17 December 1984, Box 6, Matlock Chron. December 1984, Jack Matlock Files, RR-PL.
106. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 560.
107. *Ibid.*, 563.
108. Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 9.
109. John Poindexter, "Why We Can't Commit to Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons within 10 Years," 16 October 1986; in Savranskaya and Blanton, *The Last Superpower Summits*, 240-45.
110. Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council (Brussels), 11-12 December 1986. In particular, the British and the French worried that such zealous attitudes toward nuclear disarmament might later target their own sovereign nuclear deterrents or single their countries out for Soviet-orchestrated propaganda campaigns.
111. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 348.
112. Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 31.
113. Geir Lundestad, "The United States and Western Europe Under Ronald Reagan," in *Ronald Reagan and the World*, ed. David E. Kyvig (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 53.
114. Quoted in Robert J. McCartney, "Bonn's Tightrope Walker: Genscher Survives 15 Years of Controversy," *The Washington Post*, 3 May 1989, p. A1.
115. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 349. Europe dominated Shultz's schedule during the spring and summer of 1987, traveling to Ireland, Helsinki, Moscow, Brussels, Venice, and Reykjavík across two months. See Final Communiqué, NATO Nuclear Planning Group (Stavanger, Norway), 14-15 May 1987; Final Communiqué, NATO Defense Planning Committee (Brussels), 26-27 May 1987; and Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Reykjavík), 11-12 June 1987.
116. See FBIS, *Soviet Union*, 19 August 1987, p. AA2; Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 350.
117. See NSDD 214, "U.S. Response to Gorbachev's January Arms Control Proposals," 21 February 1986; available online from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intelligence Resource Program.
118. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 348-50.
119. Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 10.

120. Fear of negotiating for a third party may have represented Washington's official reasoning in this 1987 instance; however, U.S. negotiators had used the Pershing IA missiles as leverage for years—as early as the summer of 1982. On the West German government's position, see Entschließungsantrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP zur Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu Fragen der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle, 3 June 1987, in *Deutsche Bundestag, 11. Wahlperiode*, Drucksache 11/405.

121. "The Triumphs and Harrumphs of Genscherism," *The Economist*, no. 7753 (16 January 1988), 41.

122. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 571.

123. Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion der SPD zur Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu Fragen der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle, 3 June 1987, in *Deutsche Bundestag, 11. Wahlperiode*, Drucksache 11/409. The Greens echoed the sentiment. See Entschließungsantrag der Abgeordneten Frau Beer, Frau Kelly, Frau Schilling und der Fraktion die Grünen zur Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu Fragen der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle, in *ibid.*, Drucksache 11/412.

124. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 573-74.

125. Risse-Kappen, *Null-Lösung*, 21.

126. The missiles were becoming too expensive to service, as spare parts were being discontinued. For an early discussion, see the memorandum from Teltschik to Kohl, 1 February 1985, "Ihr anstehendes Gespräch mit BM Dr. Wörner über Vorhaben im Bereich Sicherheitspolitik und Bundeswehr"; BA, B 136/27064.

127. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 363.

128. Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 150.

129. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 575.

130. *Ibid.*, 576-77. Strauß again attacked the chancellor in the press, writing in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that Kohl had ceded away Bonn's influence within NATO and had compromised the very *raison d'être* of Germany's membership in the alliance. See "CDU und CSU streiten unentwegt München warnt vor einem Weg des Unheils," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (13 August 1987), pp. 1-2; see also Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 10.

131. "In this way, the West German government took its place among the actors and decision-makers," he noted. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 567 and 576. A U.S. State Department briefing paper noted Kohl's maneuver, explaining that the "Soviets have mounted [an] intense propaganda campaign aimed at isolating [the] Germans." "Nuclear and Space Talks (NST)," Department of State Briefing Paper, 11 August 1987, National Security Archive, available online.

132. "Ein Triumph für die beiden Supermächte," *Der Spiegel* 50/1987 (7 December 1987), 122.

133. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 580.

134. Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 4.

135. Raymond Barre, "Foundations for European Security and Cooperation," Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, IISS, London, 26 March 1987; published in *Survival* 29, no. 4 (July/August 1987), 295. On the decoupling fear, see, for instance Jacques Baumel, "La France et l'option zéro," *Revue des deux Mondes* (May 1987), 329; Yves Boyer, "La présence militaire américaine en Europe et la politique de sécurité française," *Politique étrangère* 52, no. 3 (1987), 683; Pierre Lellouche,

"Euromissiles: l'Europe rend les armes," *Le Point* (15 June 1987); Maurice Schumann, "Sur l'Europe entre Reagan et Gorbatchev," *Revue des deux Mondes* (July 1987), 7; Service d'information et de Relations Publiques des Armées, "Désarmement et déséquilibre nucléaire," *Armées d'aujourd'hui*, no. 120 (1987), 23-25; Jean Klein, "Portée et signification du traité de Washington," *Politique étrangère* 53, no. 1 (1988), 60; Yves-Marie Laulan, "La grand choix à faire pour assurer notre sécurité," *Revue Défense Nationale* 44, no. 3 (March 1988), 41; Roland Lahellec, "Option triple, zéro," *Libres Réflexions sur la Défense*, no. 22, in *Armées d'aujourd'hui*, no. 129 (April 1988), pp. ii-iii; Nicolas Tenzer, "La Défense européenne et ses mythes," *Revue Défense Nationale* 44, no. 11 (December 1988), 47; and Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 21.

136. Since the war with Hitler, the Red Army had maintained conventional superiority in Europe. NATO's 4.4 million soldiers, of which half were American, could not match the vast 5.7 million of the Warsaw Pact. NATO's nuclear defense doctrine, codified in MC 14/3 in 1968, represented the maximum deterrent the west could marshal without incurring tremendous expense or sustaining permanent wartime footing. *Weißbuch 1983: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: BPA, 1983), pp. 60-61.

Wörner feared that the agreement had gutted the western deterrent, and he cited a range of respected American statesmen who agreed with him, including Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Woolsey, and Richard Nixon. The agreement "continues a process whereby successive American administrations have for three decades abandoned European leaders who staked their political positions on American proposals for the nuclear defense of Europe," Kissinger opined. SACEUR Bernard W. Rogers likewise urged caution. "If we end up getting rid of all nuclear weapons and we haven't achieved equity between [Warsaw Pact] conventional forces and ours, we'll wake up one day and find ourselves dancing to the tune of the Soviet pipe." See Kissinger, "Missiles: A Zero Option is No Choice," *Los Angeles Times* (5 April 1987), p. E1; and Rogers, quoted in Kenneth L. Adelman, "Why an INF Agreement Makes Sense," *World Affairs* 149, no. 3 (1986-87), 147.

137. Schmidt, quoted in Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 4 (1988), 744; and Michael Lucas, "The United States and Post-INF Europe," *World Policy Journal* 5, no. 2 (1988), 202.

138. See chapter two of this study.

139. "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area," 16 January 1968; in Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*, 345-70.

140. Record and Rivkin, "Defending Post-INF Europe," 744.

141. Friedrich Zimmermann, "Frieden nur durch Stärke," *Bayernkurier* (29 May 1982); and Gert Krell, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, "The No-First-Use Question in Germany," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, ed. John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal (Washington: Brookings Institution 1983), 151.

142. Bahr, "Wir sind das erste Schlachtfeld," *Der Spiegel* 19/1989 (8 May 1989), 22. The Greens had recently published a similar statement on "Schlachtfeld Europa." Hoover Institute Archive, German Subject Collection, box 115, Peace Movement: Die Grünen. Likewise, as Genscher noted, "Nowhere is the East's superiority as great as in short-range missiles. Therefore it is in the West's vital security interest to overcome this superiority." Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 608.

143. Rühle, "Perspektiven zur Friedenssicherung in Europa," *Europa Archiv*, no. 23 (1987), 678.

144. Wörner, in *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 4 (1988); and Ismus, "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization," *Survival* 30, no. 6 (November/December 1988), 499.

-
145. Rühle, "Ich sehe keinen Entscheidungsbedarf," *Die Zeit*, no. 6 (5 February 1988), p. 6; and interview in *Die Welt* (15 March 1988).
146. "European Security 2000—A Comprehensive Concept for European Security from a Social Democratic Point of View," *Service der SPD für Presse, Funk, TV* (6 July 1989).
147. Lucas, "The United States and Post-INF Europe," 196.
148. Final Communiqué, NATO NPG, Monterey, Calif. (3-4 November 1987); David Buchan, "Respinning the Arms Web," *Financial Times* (3 November 1987); and Lucas, "The United States and Post-INF Europe," 196.
149. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 596.
150. Lucas, "The United States and Post-INF Europe," 210.
151. Quoted in Daniel Charles, "NATO Looks for Arms Control Loopholes," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (September 1987), 7.
152. Lynn E. Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 4 (1988), 727.
153. Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with News Editors and Broadcasters," (11 December 1987) *PPP* 1987.
154. Elaine Sciolino, "Summit Aftermath: Shultz Asks NATO to Raise Spending on Non-Atom Arms," *New York Times* (13 December 1987).
155. Carlucci, *Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990s: A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 100-180* (25 January 1988), p. vi.
156. Rühle, quoted in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 January 1988; quoted in Asmus, "The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany," 12.
157. "Die konventionelle Kampfkraft steigern," *Der Spiegel* 50/1987 (7 December 1987), 128.
158. "Brüssel befreit," *Der Spiegel* 26/1984 (25 June 1984), 108. The official line from Bonn proved far more gracious. See "35 Jahre Atlantische Allianz — Sicherheit in Kontinuität," 1984; BA, B 136/30133.
159. Joseph M. A. H. Luns, "Taking a Parting Look at NATO," *NATO Review* 32, no. 2 (April 1984), 1.
160. "Brüssel befreit," 108.
161. *Ibid.*
162. Lord Carrington, "Alliance Challenges and Opportunities," *NATO Review* 35, no. 5 (October 1987), 4.
163. James Moray Stewart, "Conventional Defense Improvements: Where is the Alliance Going?" *NATO Review* 33, no. 2 (April 1985), 4.
164. General Bernard W. Rogers, "Follow-On Forces Attack: Myths and Realities," *NATO Review* 32, no. 6 (December 1984): 1-9. "My major concern," Rogers warned, "is that we're going to wake up someday and find ourselves politically and economically intimidated in Western Europe." Rogers, quoted in *Armed Forces Journal International* (September 1983), in Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.

In a 1983 NATO command post exercise, war gamers anticipated “initial limited use of nuclear weapons against pre-selected fixed targets” by the second day of the crisis. Gregory Pedlow (SHAPE chief historian), Exercise Scenario (NATO unclassified); courtesy National Security Archive.

165. Wilfried Hofmann, “Is NATO’s Defence Policy Facing a Crisis?” *NATO Review* 32 no. 4 (August 1984), 1.

166. Karsten Voigt, quoted in Bruce K. Scott, “A NATO Nonnuclear Deterrence: Is it Affordable?” in Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL. See also “Zusammenstellung der wesentlichen Einzelforderungen für die Koalitionsverhandlungen,” January 1987; BA, B 136/27065.

167. In a 1985 survey, only fifteen percent of West Germans identified NATO as “militarily superior” to the Warsaw Pact, down from thirty-seven percent in 1962. Meinungsbild zu Bedrohung und Kräfteverhältnis, 21 October 1985; BA, B 136/27064.

For a thorough assessment within the context of West German partisan politics, see Heinz Brill, “Die Sicherheitspolitik der SPD unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der „Bülow-Studien,” 1986; BA, B 136/27067.

168. While specific demonstrations about the INF deployments largely dissipated after the autumn of 1983, broader protests against nuclear weapons gained intellectual and political momentum. In a private report for the chancellor, senior advisor Horst Teltschik argued that “the public debate about the 1983 armament (Nachrüstung) has calmed down quickly after the start of the deployments.” Memorandum from Teltschik to Kohl, 29 May 1984, “Sicherheitspolitik und öffentliche Meinung”; BA, B 136/27064.

169. Wilfried Hofmann, “Is NATO’s Defence Policy Facing a Crisis?” *NATO Review* 32 no. 4 (August 1984), 2. For useful contemporary assessments, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Europe,” *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 7 (August 1985): 158-162; and John T. Correll, “Why NATO Needs a Conventional Defense,” *Air Force Magazine* (August 1987): 38-46.

170. Final Communiqué, NATO Defence Planning Committee, 16-17 May 1984.

171. David Greenwood, “Strengthening Conventional Deterrence: Doctrine, New Technology, and Resources,” *NATO Review* 32, no. 4 (August 1984), 8.

172. Stewart, “Conventional Defense Improvements,” 1. In a confidential memorandum, Teltschik offered the same assessment to Kohl: conventional forces could demonstrate a commitment to the West German public that nuclear weapons truly figured as weapons of last resort. Memorandum from Teltschik to Kohl, 1 February 1985, Ihr anstehendes Gespräch mit BM Dr. Wörner über Vorhaben im Bereich Sicherheitspolitik und Bundeswehr; BA, B 136/27064.

173. Final Communiqué, NATO Defence Planning Committee, 16-17 May 1984.

174. Even five years earlier, with the first discussions of NATO’s dual-track decision, Weizsäcker had written to Brandt that he believed in a greater reliance on conventional forces, including non-nuclear cruise missiles. See letter from Weizsäcker to Brandt, 15 November 1979; AdSD, WB, A11.1, Mappe 97.

175. Hofmann, “Is NATO’s Defence Policy Facing a Crisis?” 7. Ronald Reagan likewise explored the conventional-nuclear balance with Lord Carrington fearing “damage[d] confidence on both sides of the Atlantic.” Talking points for the President’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Carrington, n.d.; Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.

176. Commission on Long-Term Planning for the Federal Armed Forces, *Report*, para. 592. See also David Greenwood, "Strengthening Conventional Deterrence: Doctrine, New Technology, and Resources," *NATO Review* 32, no. 4 (August 1984), 11.

177. With any conventionalization path, the alliance risked "structural disarmament," in which unilateral defense planning based on domestic political considerations and budgetary constraints might undermine NATO's collective defense. The U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research explored such a scenario of "unilateral military enfeeblement" and warned the NSC. "Western Europe: Toward Greater Armaments Cooperation," Bureau of Intelligence and Research Analysis, 13 December 1984, Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.

178. Manfred Wörner, "Bedrohung und Sicherheit heute," 14 July 1987; BA, B 136/27065.

179. "Saving the Western Alliance," *The New York Review of Books* (31 May 1984), 25.

180. Lord Carrington, "Alliance Challenges and Opportunities," *NATO Review* 35, no. 5 (October 1987), 3.

In Bonn, for instance, addressing a seminar on east-west relations, longtime SPD parliamentarian Peter Glotz attacked the alliance's credibility. Though "denied by all official NATO representatives, behind closed doors, almost everyone admits that it is true," he said. Peter Glotz, "Prospects for European Security Policy," 26 August 1987; BA, B 136/27065.

Kohl and Luns, on the other hand, shared a private meeting on November 1982 to discuss the "continuity of German alliance politics." See memorandum for Kohl, *et al.*, "Gespräch mit Generalsekretär Luns," 26 October 1982; BA, B 136/30324.

181. Der Staatsratsvorsitzende der DDR, Erich Honecker, 7. September 1987, zum ersten Mal die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, BA, B-145 Bild 00010687. Notably, the West German Foreign Office did not designate Honecker's trip a *state* visit. See McAdams, *Germany Divided*, 173.

182. Karl Wilhelm Fricke, "Interview mit Senator Stolz über den Besuch Honeckers," 11 September 1987, *Deutschland Archiv* 20, no. 10 (1987): 1116-20.

183. "SED-Politbürovorlage vom 15. September 1987 über den offiziellen Besuch von Erich Honecker in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 7. bis 11. September (Auszug)," in *Die SED: Geschichte, Organisation, Politik: Ein Handbuch*, ed. Andreas Herbst, Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, and Jürgen Winkler (Berlin: Dietz, 1997), 792.

184. Gemeinsames Kommuniqué über den offiziellen Besuch des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich Honecker, in der BRD vom 7. bis 11.9.1987, in *Ein Erfolg der Politik der Vernunft und des Realismus* (Berlin: Panorama DDR, Auslandspresseagentur GmbH, 1987), 39-48.

185. "SED-Politbürovorlage vom 15. September 1987," 793.

186. Klaus Bölling, "Honecker ist kein Träumer," *Der Spiegel* 14/1984 (2 April 1984), 21.

187. The GDR produced a retrospective of Honecker's visit. See *Ein Erfolg der Politik der Vernunft und des Realismus: Offizieller Besuch des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Erich Honecker, in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 7. bis 11. September 1987* (Berlin: Panorama DDR, 1987).

188. Genscher, address before the World Economic Forum, Davos, 1 February 1987.

189. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 584.

190. *Ibid.*, 612-13.

191. Moreover, earlier visits to Moscow by Kohl had all ended badly. In 1975, representing the Rhineland-Palatinate, he had been rudely treated at the hands of Brezhnev and his apparatchiks. Kosygin postponed meeting with Kohl twice during the visit, and *Pravda* released an embarrassing polemic on Strauß, which Kohl was forced to address. Several years later, a meeting with Andropov went no better. See Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West*, 247 and 282

192. Letter by Kohl to Gorbachev, 30 January 1986; quoted in Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 106.

193. See, e.g., Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev: An Analysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews* (Baden-Baden: Noms, 1998), 401-13.

194. Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 106-107.

195. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 176-77.

196. Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," *Survival* 30, no. 6 (November-December 1988), 521.

197. Karl-Rudolf Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen, 1982-1989* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), 439-40; Haftendorn, *Coming of Age*, 278. Gorbachev similarly had agreed with Genscher to "open a new page" in German-Soviet relations." See Gorbachev, *Das Gemeinsame Haus Europa und die Zukunft der Deutschen* (Düsseldorf, Econ, 1990), 103-106.

198. See chapter four of this study.

199. Kohl, *Deutscher Bundestag, 10. Wahlperiode, 77. Sitzung* (28 June 1984), p. 5596.

200. Herolf, "What Became of the West European Option?" 43-44.

201. Henri Froment-Meurice, *Vu de Quai. Mémoires, 1945-1983* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 659. Froment-Meurice served as ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1979 until January 1982, when he became ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

202. Scheffer, "Verteidigungspolitische Stichworte für Ihre USA-Reise," 6 February 1987; BA, B 136/27065.

203. Giscard himself had set the Guadeloupe meeting into motion. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, *La Pouvoir et la Lie*, vol. 2, *L'affrontement* (Paris: Compagnie 12, 1988), 363-75. See also Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande: De Yalta à Maastricht* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005), 30-31.

204. Note d'Hubert Védrine, a.s. Obsèques de M. Tchernenko, 12 March 1985, quoted in Bozo, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande*, 40-41. The Germans were keen to counter such an attitude, fearful of antagonizing Washington. "In no case is [Franco-German defense policy collaboration] directed against the USA. Rather, a stronger European role in defense matters corresponds with U.S. needs," noted an internal assessment. See Scheffer, "Verteidigungspolitische Stichworte für Ihre USA-Reise."

205. A. W. DePort, "France's New Realism," *Foreign Affairs* 63, no. 1 (1984), 149.

206. The U.S. NSC staff identified such an approach as the "doctrine of 'fortress France.'" Despite mutual talk in Paris and Bonn of the Franco-German entente, the Americans were reluctant to take the relationship too seriously, citing the ultimate incompatibility of French aims for European

structures to administer theater forces and West German aims to reduce military overhead. See memo on FRG/France, n.d.; Tyrus W. Cobb Files, box 91096, European Defense Issues, RR-PL.

207. Horst Ehmke, "Europäische Verteidigung und deutsch-französische sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit," die SPD im deutschen Bundestag (25 February 1988); Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," 522.

208. The French were not alone in such an assessment. "It used to be the militarism of the Germans that worried the Americans, the British, and of course the other democratic nations of Europe," noted the Danish daily *Politiken*. "Today, it is apparently German non-militarism bringing frowns in Washington and London. *The Times* of London ran similar editorials and op-eds. See also "Die Katze ist aus dem Sack," *Der Spiegel* 18/1989 (1 May 1989), 22.

209. Herolf, "What Became of the West European Option?" 44.

210. Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," 627.

211. "Discours prononcé par le Président de la République, devant le Bundestag à l'occasion du 20ème anniversaire du Traité de Coopération Franco-Allemand," Bonn (20 January 1983), in *Politique étrangère de la France (PEF)*, January-February 1983, pp. 41-47; Bozo, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande*, 34.

212. Mitterrand, quoted in James R. Markham, "Mitterrand, on Bonn Visit, Warns Against Efforts to Divide the West," *New York Times* (21 January 1983), p. A1.

213. John Vinocur, "Mitterrand Sees Test for the West's Unity," *New York Times* (24 January 1983).

214. Giraud, "The Defense of Europe: What is at Stake?" address delivered at the 25th annual *Wehrkunde* Conference (6 February 1988), p. 6; Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," 522.

215. Kohl, quoted in "No Drift Toward Neutralism, Kohl Tells the French," *New York Times* (22 January 1983), p. 4.

216. Bertram, "Europe and American in 1983," 626-27.

217. Védérine, note pour le président de la République, Perspectives des relations Est-Ouest en 1984, après la début de déploiement. Rôle de la France (1 December 1983), Archives Nationales, 5AG4/4066; quoted in Bozo, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande*, 34.

218. Mitterrand assessed such a situation as "l'Europe absent." See his *Réflexions sur la politique étrangères de la France* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 66.

219. Quoted in Milan Svec, "The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later," *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 5 (1988), 990.

220. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 598.

221. Margaret Thatcher, quoted in Don Oberdorfer, "Thatcher: Gorbachev Has Ended Cold War," *Boston Globe*, 18 November 1988, p. 7. For a discussion on when the Cold War ended, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *German Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), ch. 3, esp. pp. 19-21.

222. Frank C. Carlucci, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget, 11 February 1988 (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1988), 3-4.

223. Richard von Weizsäcker agreed, describing the "German question that is both open and uncomfortable." Richard von Weizsäcker, "Was ist das eigentlich: deutsch?" in *Reden und Interviews*,

vol. 2, 1. Juli 1985-30. Juni 1986 (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1986), 395-412.

224. Brent Scowcroft, quoted in Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 20.

225. George Platt Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1993), 1138.

226. Gorbachev, quoted in Zelikow and Rice, *Germany United and Europe Transformed*, 127.

227. "Hier ist Engagement gefordert," *Der Spiegel* 39/1989 (25 September 1989), 24-27.

Epilogue

Dangerous Power and German Unification 1989-1993

Facing East: The Divided Nation

With 142 medals, it won the 1988 Seoul summer Olympics. At \$1.33 trillion, its gross national product dominates as the second largest global economy. With the greatest population of any European country and boasting some of the world's best educational institutions, it stands as a beacon of culture, the arts and letters, science and engineering. It commands the center of Europe. With no trade deficit and no foreign debt, it represents the lodestar of any continental alliance or union. Its neighbors both envy and fear it; they covet its wealth and are unnerved by its power.¹

In the spring of 1989, no such country existed. The two German states remained divided by ideology, by politics, by alliances, and by an impregnable defensive cordon.

Little more than a year later, a sovereign and united Germany stood at the center of Europe. The Federal Republic had absorbed its eastern counterpart. West Germany's constitution guaranteed the rights of the former *Ossies*; the Bundesbank empowered them with credit and capital; the EC welcomed them into the community of European nations; and NATO shielded them with its protective mantle.

The Germans had never boasted a strong revolutionary tradition. Lenin once joked that the Germans would not storm a railway station without first queuing for platform tickets. During the November 1918 demonstrations in Kiel, one protester warned the mob to "remain calm," the words *bleib ruhig* carefully etched onto his placard. In December 1989,

as the citizens of Leipzig seized the Stasi headquarters at Runde Ecke, they presented their state identity cards to the comrade duty officer at the gate before they seized the building.

The events of 1989-90 that brought the two Germanys back together—or, more specifically, that allowed the Federal Republic of Germany to absorb the German Democratic Republic—did not constitute a revolution. But they were indeed revolutionary.

Rending the Curtain

“Border violators are to be arrested or exterminated” (*vernichten*). So mandated the infamous *Schießbefehl*—the “firing order” of the East German régime. “Firearms are to be ruthlessly used in the event of attempts to break through the border,” Erich Honecker told his countrymen in 1974, “and the comrades who have successfully used their firearms are to be commended.”² In Berlin alone, carved apart by its “anti-fascist protective barrier,” thousands died trying to engineer their escapes from the GDR. The troops who shot them were decorated with medals and often paid special stipends for their resolve in defending their government from its own citizens. “Anyone who does not respect our border will feel the bullet,” promised Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann.³

The inner-German frontier, including the Berlin Wall, stretched for nearly a thousand miles across the German landscape. “From the defeat of Hitler’s Germany in the Second World War,” the SED told its citizens, “the Bonn government has concluded that the rapacious politics of German monopoly capitalism and its Hitler-generals should be given one more try.”⁴ According to official SED doctrine, the border fortifications protected the workers and farmers of the GDR from western revanchism and militarism, from “human traffickers and head hunters,” from “Hitler” and “fascist German imperialism.”⁵ The

defenses were designed to prevent NATO from launching World War III, but, as Germans on both sides of the fortified frontier observed, the hundreds of guard towers, barbed wire, beds of nails, anti-vehicle trenches, self-firing flares, anti-personnel mines, attack dogs, and shoot-to-kill orders all pointed conspicuously eastward.⁶

Fifteen years later, in April 1989, the chairman issued shockingly different orders. “Firearms [are] no longer to be used to prevent border breakthroughs,” Honecker told his functionaries. “Better to let someone get away than to use firearms in the current political situation.”⁷

Exactly what “political situation” had dislodged such an essential touchstone of the GDR’s internal policy? As the momentous events of 1989 unfolded, even Honecker and his apparatchiks, with their pervasive policing and all of their resources of internal control, failed to match the vertiginous speed of transformation in Germany and in Europe.⁸

A “silent crisis” was afoot in world communism as a schism divided the East Germans from their Soviet partners.⁹ Honecker prided himself as a political purist of Stalinesque dynamism. The truth, alas, proved less illustrious. What Honecker lacked in intellectual fortitude, he failed to compensate for in charisma. His decidedly dour disposition, his flat oratory, his micro-managerial leadership, and his amateurish approach to governance frustrated even the most loyal of party bosses. He preserved his public power through brutal repression and his internal power by closing his political circle to only the most agreeable of functionaries: security chief Erich Mielke, propaganda master Joachim Hermann, and economics minister Günter Mittag.¹⁰ While his public position remained

secure behind a web of policing and brutality, his internal position grew tenuous as he became both practically and ideologically a relic.¹¹

Gorbachev, on the other hand, possessed all the charisma that Honecker lacked. Gregarious, humble, and energetic, always clad in finely tailored Brooks Brothers suits, the Soviet general secretary inspired new confidence in socialist institutions. He articulated a new vision for the east bloc based upon greater transparency and pluralism in government, economic restructuring, and integration with the rest of Europe. Old hardliners such as the GDR's Honecker and Romania's Nicolae Ceaușescu, who remained loyal to Stalin's domestic repression and Brezhnev's foreign meddling, were being left behind.

"Freedom of choice is a universal principle that should allow [for] no exceptions," Gorbachev had told the UN General Assembly the previous December. "As the world asserts its diversity, attempts to look down on others and to teach them one's own brand of democracy become totally improper," he explained, "to say nothing of the fact that democratic values intended for export often lose their worth very quickly."¹² He spoke in revolutionary language for any Soviet leader: of the world economy as "a single organism," of "radical changes," of "unity in diversity," of "de-ideologizing relations among states."¹³

Most importantly, Gorbachev presaged an end to the Brezhnev doctrine of Soviet intervention to defend the forces of socialism abroad. Gorbachev earnestly believed in the 1975 Helsinki pledge of "respect for national laws and practices and non-interference in internal affairs." "*Pacta sunt servanda*," he told the assembly.¹⁴ For the first time, a Soviet leader recognized the "multi-optional nature of social development in different countries."¹⁵ Even in his private notes, preparing for a meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev observed that

“each country has its unique situation and we would be correct not to approach them across-the-board; we seek to figure out the specifics of each of them,” he reflected.¹⁶

Not far behind, issuing a full-throated defense of Gorbachev’s vision, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced to the Supreme Soviet a “rejection of the use of force within.” In an ironic role reversal, Chairman Gorbachev defended his policies to the world, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze defended them to his own government.¹⁷ Together, both men battled hardliners within the party, particularly those who wished to place limits on the glasnost and perestroika programs. To Shevardnadze, however, *domestic* reforms required a complete recasting of *foreign* policies. “We often talk about the international significance of our perestroika, but do we always realize what it really means for the world?” he asked. “Foreign policy can be effective if the values it upholds are also an organic part of the state’s domestic policy. Interdependence and the unity of what it does internally and externally ultimately determine a state’s position in the community of nations.” Like Gorbachev, Shevardnadze called for each socialist state to develop and thrive according to its own path, without outside force from Moscow. “The notion that we can ignore the world around us and disregard other people’s interests has cost our people and socialism dearly in the past,” he told the Supreme Soviet.¹⁸

When Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Németh visited Moscow in the spring of 1989, he tested the limits of Gorbachev’s openness. “Every socialist country is developing in its idiosyncratic way,” Németh told his host, “and their leaders are above all accountable to their own people.” Gorbachev agreed. “Every generation is responsible for the present, first and foremost,” he said. “The process of renewal is gradually spreading over the entire socialist bloc, and adds to the political culture and historical experiences of all these

countries according to the local conditions. The most important for all of them, however, is turning towards the people and revitalizing the socialist system.”¹⁹ As Gorbachev’s traveled throughout the communist bloc, defending his glasnost and perestroika, his vision became clear: Moscow would not intervene militarily to preserve the status quo.

“We are . . . on the eve of a year from which we all expect so much,” Gorbachev told the world. His meaning would become clear as 1989 unfolded, but Honecker’s days in leadership were numbered. Let us “make 1989 a decisive year.”²⁰

In the spring of 1989, Németh gambled on Gorbachev again. Refusing to reauthorize funding for the maintenance of border defenses, in the spirit of Gorbachev’s openness, the prime minister pulled back the Iron Curtain with neutral Austria. He disproved the myth that socialism was under attack from the west. “Hungary tears down the Iron Curtain!” exclaimed *Der Spiegel*. “It remains to be seen if comrades in the neighboring countries will prove enthusiastic imitators.”²¹

Certainly the GDR would not. “Comrade Honecker did not comprehend the statements by Comrade Gorbachev, or he did not want to understand them,” later reflected Honecker’s successor.²² Winds of change may have been blowing from the east, but the SED remained firmly tethered to its ideals. Honecker bristled at his socialist comrades’ wavering: Poland’s internal affairs minister had begun official talks with the once-banned Solidarity trade union, Soviet forces were withdrawing from Afghanistan, and the traitor Imre Nagy was being rehabilitated and reburied as a hero, publicly honored for challenging “blind obedience to the Russian empire.”²³ The GDR, once the model Soviet satellite, now seemed but a relic.

The July 1989 Warsaw Pact summit, meeting in Bucharest, affirmed Gorbachev's promise of "non-interference in internal affairs." A peaceful future for Europe required mutual respect, "regardless of socio-political system."²⁴ Days later, Gorbachev traveled to Strasbourg to address the Council of Europe. "Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states—whether of friends and allies or anybody else—are impermissible," he told the Council.²⁵

The transformations in the east bloc, infused with so-called "Gorby-mania," emboldened many of the people who lived behind the Iron Curtain—the workers and farmers of the communist world. Had the Hungarians just opened a "backdoor to the west?" asked one West German commentator. Certainly it seemed that they had.

Jörg Käckemeister and Katrin Ahrend indeed believed so. Both twenty-two years old, Käckemeister an electrician and Ahrend a midwife, the young couple arranged an impromptu vacation to Hungary with hopes of crossing into the west—like hundreds of their GDR countrymen. On April 25th, when they arrived to the border with Austria, Hungarian frontier guards denied their passage and arrested them on charges of *Republikflucht*—illegal desertion of the Republic. After two weeks in a Budapest jail, they were extradited to Schwerin to begin eight-year sentences for their crimes.²⁶ Little could anyone predict that their sentence would be cut short by the monumental transformations in the months to come.

Käckemeister and Ahrend would not be the last to test the Hungarian border guards as a thick summer descended upon Central Europe; a refugee crisis clearly was brewing. "The people of the GDR have suddenly fallen into a collective escape hysteria (*kollektive Fluchthysterie*)," warned one commentator.²⁷ Thousands of East Germans arrived along the

border, hastily packed suitcases in hand and children in tow. A 1969 agreement between Hungary and the GDR required the Hungarians to deny passage into a third country and to turn illegal travelers over to their government. The demands of tens of thousands could not easily be ignored, however. By August 9th, the Hungarian government stopped returning the Germans to their home. Budapest's foreign minister, Gyula Horn, keen to avoid diplomatic incident with neighbors on either side of the Iron Curtain, remarked that the situation "should be settled between the two German states."²⁸ Whether Bonn and East Berlin could arrive at a mutual solution remained to be seen.

Certainly the dogmatic Honecker showed no willingness to compromise. "The mental state of the GDR leaders seems desolate, and their reactions seem helpless," remarked one West German. "Regarding the disastrous electoral outcome for their Polish neighbors last week, the GDR media reports proved monosyllabic—no analysis, no commentary, no opinions from the SED leadership."²⁹

Instead, in the last week of August, Kohl and Genscher began secret negotiations directly with Hungary's Németh and Horn, meeting at Schloß Gymnisch near Bonn.³⁰ Despite the growing tensions with their east bloc neighbors, the Hungarians pledged not to return fleeing East Germans back to SED custody. The eight thousand refugees who crowded the Budapest embassy and camped along the border, Horn promised, would remain safe in Hungary. Twenty-one-thousand more followed in the weeks to come.

Though both Németh and Horn declined the offer, in gratitude, Kohl helped to arrange extensive credits to Hungary from the Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank. In the end, the Hungarians accepted the much-needed loans, at least in some measure, increasing Bonn's benevolent leverage over its east bloc neighbors. Furtive protests from Pankow made little

impression in Budapest; “the words merely concealed helplessness,” Genscher later remembered. “Hungary had definitely cross the Rubicon of ‘communist solidarity.’”³¹

Thousands of easterners were on the move in numbers unprecedented since World War II. Those who could not travel to the Austro-Hungarian border presented themselves to West Germany’s diplomatic missions in East Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague. Queues at consular desks, demanding German citizenship under article 23 of the Grundgesetz, turned into throngs of thousands. By requesting protection of Bonn’s diplomats, the Ossies had circumvented the SED’s authority. On August 8th, the East Germans closed Bonn’s permanent mission in East Berlin. In the days that followed, Honecker’s men pressed Kohl and Genscher to do the same in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. “The reasons for the mass exodus lay in East Germany,” recalled Genscher, “and that was the only place where they could be eliminated.”³² Bonn refused.

The traditional instruments of control in the eastern bloc had seemingly collapsed. Gorbachev had renounced violence from Moscow, and thus delegitimized forceful suppression of dissidents among satellite governments as well. Single-party control had faded into the past, as both Hungary and Poland admitted opposition parties into government. By late August, Poland had even formed the first non-communist government in the communist bloc, with Solidarity leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki becoming the first non-PZPR prime minister of the postwar era.³³ Popular protests in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova all threatened the status quo. With virtually no income, and relying on a constant stream of secret loans to stimulate the flagging economy, eastern governments could no longer artificially subsidize consumer goods.

Thousands took to the streets in peaceful demonstration against SED repression. At best, they hoped for the GDR's own glasnost and perestroika—some modest freedoms and an economic restructuring to match Gorbachev's efforts in the Soviet Union. By the end of the summer, each Monday evening, protesters gathered at Leipzig's Nikolaikirche for prayers and marches. Such "Monday demonstrations" found followers across the GDR, including in its capital. Calls for a political alternative to the single-party SED state gained traction. Citizens agitated for an East German Social Democratic Party, and budding movements took shape through the Democratic Awakening (*Demokratischer Aufbruch*), Democracy Now (*Demokratie Jetzt*), and New Forum (*Neues Forum*) among others.

The refugee crisis continued to mount. Thousands of easterners tested the Iron Curtain, looking for any means of escape; GDR leaders steadfastly resisted their own people and peevishly protested to Bonn, to Moscow, and to their allies. Furious with Budapest and in an abortive attempt to assert authority, the East German Politbüro restricted all travel to Hungary. "If this continues," explained West German Border Guard agent Armin Hofschulte, "the term 'border protection' will soon be completely anachronistic."³⁴

Sleeping in packed tents, crowding onto cots, and queueing to share eighteen portable toilets, thousands of desperate refugees filled the Warsaw and Prague embassy compounds, unable to continue their journeys west and faced with desertion charges if they returned home. The West German diplomatic corps transformed their offices into dormitory rooms for children, while adults crowded the military-style tents in the embassy gardens.³⁵

Kohl and Genscher pleaded for the patience of their Polish and Czechoslovak counterparts.³⁶ Meanwhile, they hoped to negotiate a peaceful release of the refugees with the uncompromising East Germans. With few options available to him, GDR Foreign Minister

Oskar Fischer reluctantly agreed to allow his asylum-seeking countrymen to be released from the Warsaw and Prague embassies. The Politbüro conceded on the condition that those who “removed themselves from our society” be *expelled* from the GDR in sealed trains. Their expulsion began on October 1st. Staving off further disaster, the Politbüro closed the border with Czechoslovakia two days later. Both literally and figuratively, the GDR had walled itself in. Not even its socialist allies could be trusted.

“The Federal Republic is preparing for the largest immigrant wave in its history,” warned *Der Spiegel*.³⁷ Special “crisis teams” organized train transports, requisitioned empty apartments, furnished shelters with emergency beds, and erected cities out of tents. Municipalities across the country filled local parks with tents, outfitting each camp with transportable commercial kitchens, sanitation facilities, and caretakers. Civil defense authorities, who for decades had stockpiled rations and cots for their own citizens, offered up their emergency supplies to the men and women they once had guarded against. Even the commandant of the Navy forces stationed in Eckernförde opened his barracks to the newcomers. As the sealed trains rolled in at Bavaria’s Passau station, eager westerners cheered on the platforms and along the trackways, welcoming the Ossies to their country.

Meanwhile, behind the Iron Curtain, emboldened by anger and redoubled in righteousness, Honecker and his régime calculated their next move.

A Revolution Within

“With the centenary of the October Revolution in 2017, will Lenin’s head still be on the stamps?” asked Rudolf Augstein.³⁸ In every corner of the world, communism seemed to be under threat. Honecker, infuriated with his comrades in the Soviet Union, Poland, and

Hungary, felt increasingly isolated ideologically. The “bourgeois types gone wild,” Honecker told the Central Committee, had betrayed socialism; East Germans would not join their “march toward anarchy.” He banned publications and films from Moscow, even embargoing the official party organ, *Pravda*. The socialist utopia that Honecker had labored to build seemed to be slipping away.³⁹

When Gorbachev visited Bonn in June, throngs of West Germans crowded the city’s narrow Marktplatz, hoping for a glimpse of the Soviet leader. Waving small hammer-and-sickle flags, they hailed him “the evangelist of peace.” In Russian, one placard urged him, “Keep it up, Gorbachev, and Bring us Peace!”

Leading Soviet foreign-policy specialist Georgy A. Arbatov accompanied Gorbachev. “We want to take what we call our ‘new political thinking’ right to the people,” Arbatov told the press. “We want them to see what we are proposing and to compare it to what existed for so long, to what the others are proposing.”⁴⁰ Another aide agreed. “Governments cannot so readily use the national-security argument to exclude popular demands for change,” he told the press.

As the East German chieftains battled their own people, halfway around the world, the Chinese Communist Party faced its own struggles. For six weeks across the late spring, students and workers faced off against tanks in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, with thousands of injuries and deaths at the hands of the party. Sit-ins, occupations, and hunger strikes spread to hundreds of cities across the country. By the first week of June, every whiff of (counter-)revolutionary activity had been snuffed out. Mobilizing at least thirty divisions—with troops numbering nearly a quarter of a million—and declaring martial law, the party meted out uncompromising punishments and reestablished its supremacy.

Honecker took heart that at least some of the old guard refused to give up the fight. To him, the Chinese solution certainly seemed palatable. His security chief commended Beijing's actions to his lieutenants, calling them "resolute measures in suppression of counterrevolutionary unrest." The SED, now free of corrupting foreign press, filled the airwaves with news of Tiananmen, citing "a heroic response of the Chinese army and police to the perfidious inhumanity of the student demonstrators."⁴¹ The less-than-subtle message to the people of the GDR was clear: This could be you; we too will restore order at gunpoint if necessary.

For months, demonstrators in East Germany had been taking to the streets, protesting repression by the SED. With the Chinese crisis dominating the headlines, the Honecker government ordered the preparation of thousands of hospital beds and the banking of blood plasma for the soon-to-be punished dissenters. The SED even deputized special operational battle groups (*Betriebskampfgruppen*) to dispense with the protests. East German society teetered on the brink of unrest.

Against that revolutionary backdrop, the dreary monotony of socialist life churned on in the imprisoned society. Like the cranky, wheezing engines of GDR industry, neither smoothly nor productively, the ponderous apparatus of state and party control droned along, dragging its citizens with it. "The future belongs to socialism," Honecker famously promised. Much to his chagrin, however, GDR socialism had come to speak for itself. Even the best propaganda emanating from Pankow could not explain away the shortages of consumer goods, the refugee crisis, the protests, and the disenchantment of millions.⁴²

In the first week of October, the party prepared its fortieth-anniversary celebration for the GDR. Gorbachev, the guest of honor, arrived to East Berlin on October 6th for a full program ceremonies to aggrandize the myths of GDR statehood. A parade down Unter den Linden featured the great military hardware of the GDR's armory. The party trotted out the old veterans of the revolution to inspect the forces. On the platform, a phalanx of grey overcoats flanked Gorbachev. Beneath the brims of their fedoras, the proud faces of the old guard looked out over their achievement—a socialist republic guarded by the people's army. Gorbachev, surrounded by the relics of the past, did not conceal his irritation, periodically checking his watch and refusing to feign interest in the cocksure exercise. Only blocks away, protesters continued to do battle with internal security forces.

"The situation is indeed depressing in this jubilee year," noted the West German press. "The standard of living is stagnating, and career prospects depend more on blind commitment to the party than on professional qualities." The GDR, now isolated from the world and deprived of Soviet favor, could no longer function as a society or as a marketplace. By the end of the summer, for instance, grocers in Berlin featured only a bleak range of produce: cabbages and grapefruits, limes and pickles.⁴³

Tens of thousands of East Germans petitioned for travel visas to exit the GDR. One worker, who had been permitted to visit his uncle in Cologne, sat together with his family after returning home. "After all that we have endured, why have we been so heavily punished? Didn't *all* Germans lose the war?"⁴⁴ Why had disproportionately awful hardships befallen the people of the east? One West German parliamentarian offered a bleak assessment. Quite simply, "radical disillusionment is the prerequisite to a new European utopia," he explained.⁴⁵

Kohl feared as much. While the West German press guessed at possible GDR reforms or even unification, a sober chancellor lowered expectations. With Honecker, Kohl told reporters, he wished to “continue a policy of good sense.”⁴⁶ The chancellor thus confronted a precarious political problem: he needed to advance maximum claims for GDR reform while not openly stoking instability in Honecker’s régime. Kohl assured Honecker and Genscher assured Shevardnadze that Bonn only wished to provide support—including financial—to the GDR.⁴⁷ Kohl and his foreign-policy team needed to continue their Ostpolitik, seeking productive relationships with the east, while continuing to press for humanitarian reforms.

As always, the chancellor struggled to manage his sometimes unruly party members. Beginning September 11th, the Christian Democrats converged on Bremen for their party conference. On the cusp of a new decade, the agenda looked squarely at the future—toward sustaining economic growth, caring for the environment, creating a European union, and maintaining stability in east-west relations. Some in the party seized on that opening, speaking openly of unification and restoring Germany to its 1937 borders.⁴⁸ “Unity of all Germans” would represent the “pressing challenge of the 1990s,” assessed one report.⁴⁹ Kohl, whom Gorbachev largely mistrusted, did not add his voice to that chorus, but he certainly did not chide any of their nationalist rhetoric. Standing for reelection as party leader, the chancellor could ill afford to isolate his fellow CDU delegates.

For his part, Gorbachev hoped for gentle and progressive reforms in the GDR; revanchist language from the west might undermine any spirit of openness afoot within the SED. Shevardnadze, addressing the UN General Assembly later that month, gave a stern warning. “It is to be deplored that, fifty years after the Second World War, some politicians have

begun to forget its lessons,” he advised. “German Nazism marched under the banner of revanchism. Now that the forces of revanchism are again becoming active and are seeking to revise and destroy the post-war realities in Europe, it is our duty to warn those, who wittingly or unwittingly, are encouraging those forces.”⁵⁰

The Social Democrats similarly attacked the opposition chancellor. By welcoming the refugees into the west, the Christian Democrats had alienated the East German régime.⁵¹ Even innocuous nationalist rhetoric could destroy the tenuous cooperation between Bonn and East Berlin. Prudence required restraint.

With too many political forces stacked against him, Kohl chose not to capitalize on the crisis—yet.

The GDR found itself more isolated than at any moment in its history. Moscow had distanced itself, as Gorbachev could not allow his glasnost and perestroika agenda to be tainted by Stalin’s legacy, still alive and well in East Germany. Instead, for the first time in the Cold War, the Kremlin had formed more productive relationships with Washington and Bonn than it had with its own allies and satellites.

Further afield was Honecker’s own tenuous grasp on political power. “I am convinced that at this time the German Democratic Republic is the most unstable member of the Warsaw Pact,” Genscher told American Secretary of State James Baker. “That instability also explains why its leaders are at a total loss right now. They worry about Gorbachev’s reforms because they are losing more and more control over their political, economic, and social processes.” Genscher clearly saw Honecker’s perilous position. “If Honecker refuses further

reforms, he will be faced with even greater problems. If he opens the door to democratization, he will be in an equally difficult position.”⁵²

“I will not say a word in support of Honecker,” Gorbachev told his foreign-policy advisor, preparing a visit to East Berlin.⁵³ Days later, when the two men sat down, Gorbachev chastised the East German leader: “Asshole!” he called him. “[You] could have said to [your] lieutenants: I have undergone four operations, I am seventy-eight years old, the stormy time requires too much strength; let me go, I have done my job.”⁵⁴ By clinging to power for so long, Honecker had compromised the GDR’s entire future, Gorbachev believed. “Life punishes those who arrive too late,” he lectured.⁵⁵ Within hours, the GDR’s Politbüro forced Honecker out.

The same day, October 18th, the Politbüro voted to replace the ousted Honecker with his deputy, Egon Krenz. Twenty-five years his mentor’s junior, Krenz took over both as general secretary of the SED Central Committee and as chairman of the State Council. The youngest member of the Politbüro, with his cheshire cat grin and mop of unruly hair, Krenz resembled nothing of the man he replaced. With a small band of self-styled reformers—Günter Schabowski and Harry Tisch, among others—Krenz aimed to appeal directly to the people, promising “an SED with a human face.”⁵⁶

Krenz hoped that his countrymen would see that he had delivered a coup de grâce to Honecker’s ailing system; he styled himself a patriotic hero, who, like Gorbachev, remained committed to modernizing and reforming the party and the republic. Alas, twenty years of training in the ways of SED politicking left him helpless to do anything more than mimic the ways of his ousted predecessor. The people, now completely disenchanted with their government, viewed him as a delusional pretender. For years, they had seen him at

Honecker's side, rewarded handsomely for toeing the party line. The Politbüro had traded in one wooden apparatchik for another. Within the week, more than a million East Germans poured into the streets in protest.

In those first days, Krenz learned the awful truth of his country. In a presentation by state-planning officer Gerhard Schürer, he was brought into a circle that included only five men: Schürer himself, the now obsolete Honecker, Minister for State Security Erich Mielke, Central Committee Economic Secretary Günter Mittag, and Commercial Coordination chief Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski. Schürer painted a bleak picture: within days, the state would be "bankrupt" and "ungovernable."⁵⁷

Schürer had been well schooled in socialist reporting. Despite "international envy" of the GDR's "significant successes," he began, the government needed to confront some "economic shifts." He then told Krenz "the unvarnished truth." In short, the country's foreign debts had exploded from DM 2 billion when Honecker had taken office to DM 46 billion by 1989.⁵⁸ With a GDP estimated at only DM 250 billion, even to remain solvent, the country needed to raise its exports at least five times over within just a few years.⁵⁹ After about 1985, the report assessed, the state had passed the point of no return. He told Krenz: Any opportunity to solve the structural flaws "no longer exists."

The problem lay in the state's very *raison d'être*; central planning and isolation from the west had produced absolute insolvency. For decades, state economists had manipulated the country's balance sheets to serve political ends. Economic shortfalls and manufacturing inefficiencies had been ignored so that party chieftains could deliver only good news to their people and the world. "Consumption had grown faster than our achievements," Schürer

advised. During his eighteen-year tenure, Honecker had ratcheted up consumer and housing subsidies seven times over.⁶⁰

Just to service interest on the GDR's debt would require the state to cut its spending, including consumer-goods subsidies, by twenty-five to thirty percent effective immediately (*i.e.*, in the 1990 budget). The régime had to cease buying down the prices of its goods in order "to ensure solvency of the GDR against the non-socialist economic region." With massive social unrest, Krenz knew that such action proved politically impossible—particularly for a group styled as the people's reformers. He knew that a sudden influx of loans was needed. "It is necessary to do everything possible to avoid [IMF involvement]," Schürer warned. Decades of illegal dealing would be revealed in any International Monetary Fund investigation, and the state's closest guarded secret would be revealed to its own people and to the world. The best advice Schürer could offer was to seek credits from Bonn or from Moscow.

Just how had the GDR economy reached such a deplorable state, and how did no one—including Honecker's deputy Krenz—know? The only man with all the answers was KoKo chief Schalck-Golodkowski. In the régime, "Commercial Coordination" had become a euphemism for Schalck-Golodkowski's extralegal fundraising for the state coffers as well as for his fellow party bosses. From the earliest days, GDR economic planners always had looked outside of their country for economic stability. Always seeking the next economic windfall, they adopted an attitude that just another small influx of capital would grease the rusty gears of GDR productivity. For decades, they labored under the delusion that prosperity lay just around the next bend.

Schalck-Golodkowski—well insulated behind a layer of international contacts, hidden assets, hard currency, political protection, and his rank of Stasi general—for twenty years traversed the world setting up hundreds of front companies and phantom accounts. Through his sophisticated network, he laundered stocks, gold, gems, and commercial goods. No asset better protected him than his intimate knowledge of the state's supreme secret: the GDR survived only by western credits. Carrying cash in his briefcase, unparalleled in intrigue and thievery, Schalck-Golodkowski leveraged his credentials to secure enough foreign currency to compensate for GDR shortfalls.

Not the least of his duties involved supplying Honecker's personal account at the Deutsche Handelsbank. Perhaps the only man in the GDR with hand-stitched tailored suits, Honecker maintained personal wealth that surpassed nearly any German—in east or west. In times of economic crisis, he dipped into his own personal account to stock East German grocers' shelves with bananas and apples—luxuries the régime could no longer afford. Only the GDR's political bankruptcy could shield its economic bankruptcy. By 1989, that is what the GDR had been reduced to: a international criminal smuggling foreign cash in a briefcase and a dictator personally financing food for his citizens. Still, Honecker assured his compatriots, "The wall will . . . remain as long as the conditions that led to its construction are not changed. It will still exist in fifty or even a hundred years."⁶¹

Vom Wende zum Ende

Already discredited and emasculated by the continuing failures of his young administration, Krenz feared the worst. The SED must effect the quick "turn around" (*die Wende*) he had promised.⁶² But as he quickly found, an utterly bankrupt country had very

few options. Only three weeks in his new office, the chairman seemed desperately beleaguered. With his coterie of closest aides, Krenz contemplated options for alleviating the domestic crises facing the GDR—the régime was bankrupt and its citizens were fleeing by the tens of thousands.

Kohl himself, careful not to disturb the precarious balance in the GDR, on November 8th finally broke his public silence. Were Krenz and the SED to follow the Poles and Hungarians in allowing political parties to compete fairly and openly in elections, Bonn, he promised, would be prepared “to talk about a completely new dimension of economic aid”—precisely what the GDR required. No one in the SED leadership would countenance a multi-party state; certainly Krenz would not. Still, the new chairman and his inner circle desperately needed to find some other gesture to placate the decadent western imperialists, if only to obtain much needed credits. With refugees already pouring out of the GDR, Krenz seized the opportunity to look magnanimous. One possibility floated among the Politbüro and the Council of Ministers involved relaxing travel restrictions. Kohl and Genscher had always proven keen to press freedom of travel in their bilaterals with East German counterparts, and permitting departures from the GDR might simultaneously alleviate the embarrassing refugee crisis at home and earn goodwill abroad. Moreover, less than a quarter of East Germans held passports. Anticipating a rash of sudden passport applications, the régime, by controlling the issuance of visas and travel documents, could stagger departures to the west at its discretion and as served the political necessities at home. More importantly, mandatory money exchanges at the border would rake in hard currency.

The economic and financial situation dominated the attention of top party bosses, and meanwhile, alternatives to the travel law were relegated to lower level functionaries.

Interior Minister Friedrich Dickel, a longtime survivor of East German politics, tasked Gerhard Lauter, recently promoted chief of the Passports and Registration Office, to draw up a proposed new program.⁶³ After but a short meeting in his office at Mauerstraße 32 near Alexanderplatz, Lauter and his team of four sent their draft back up the chain of command. The new program aimed to be quite exacting. As Lauter later explained, it relied upon one simple assumption: that given the option to come and go freely from the GDR, most East German citizens would simply visit the west and then to return home. “They had furnished apartments, and their refrigerators were full. What would they do in the west?” Lauter asked.⁶⁴ Others tended to agree. “They would stroll down the Kurfürstendamm, maybe drink a beer, but then go back,” suggested another contemporary. “They all had to work.”⁶⁵ But quite simply, “things were boiling over,” Lauter remembered; “we were looking for a solution.”⁶⁶ The program allowed for East German citizens with passports to apply both for permanent emigration from the GDR or for shorter-term visits. Thus, as one East Berlin journalist later noted, the régime “allow[ed] the disgruntled to leave, in hopes that they would stay away and stop making trouble for the state.”⁶⁷ The others, then—now with increased freedom to come and go from the GDR—might enjoy their own East German version of *Glasnost*.

The Politbüro and Central Committee approved the action late in the afternoon on Thursday, November 9, 1989, and Krenz himself handed the file containing the new regulation to Politbüro spokesman Günter Schabowski. “Here’s something for the press conference, Günter,” he told him.⁶⁸ After dismissing Schabowski, he quickly returned to the visiting Johannes Rau, who recently had arrived to East Berlin to press Bonn’s position and to discuss the potential for free and fair elections in the GDR.⁶⁹ Krenz hoped to make a good

impression, not least because the West German SPD had adopted such friendly positions toward the GDR and Rau was quickly rising among the ranks as the most important Social Democrat in Bonn.

As every day, the Politbüro authorized its actions to be detailed to the press in a procedural repertoire masquerading as a western-style press conference. Just before 18:00, correspondents for the régime's propaganda organs filed into their seats in the drab, dimly lit, Politbüro press room. And day after day, year after year, the régime's apparatchiks read off their turgid statements, quickly thereafter reproduced on Fernsehen der DDR and Aktuelle Kamera broadcasts, over the airwaves on Rundfunk der DDR, and in the party organ, *Neues Deutschland*. At the rostrum sat the rumpled Schabowski. With square jaw and drawn expression, the sixty-year-old spokesman appeared perpetually disgruntled—an archetype of the inflexible, graceless régime he represented. With sallow complexion, rumpled gray hair, ill-fitting gray suit, and dingy gray shirt, Schabowski held forth for fifty-five minutes, repeating the régime's puffery. In the last minutes of the press conference, he fumbled into the folder Krenz had handed him earlier.

In the coming five minutes, Schabowski would sputter out a series of hapless sentence fragments and unravel forty years of communism in East Germany. "We know about this tendency in the population, this need of the population, to travel or to leave the GDR," he said. "And," he hesitated, "we have ideas about what we have to bring about." With a pause, he looked toward his colleagues in the room—Chair of the Teachers' Union Helga Labs, party propagandist Manfred Banaschak, and Foreign Trade Minister Gerhard Beil. Beil whispered gently to Schabowski, "integration"—but to little avail. "So we want," Schabowski explained,

“through a number of changes, including the travel law, to [create] the chance, the sovereign decision of the citizens to travel wherever they want.” Puzzled again by what he was reading in the file Krenz had handed him, Schabowski looked toward Labs and Banaschak, seeking guidance or at least a nod of affirmation. Reporters, at once stupefied, began shouting their questions—an altogether unprecedented act in East German journalism. “With a passport?” asked one reporter. “The substance of the announcement is decisive,” Banaschak replied. “When does this come into effect?” asked another. “Without delay,” muttered Labs.

Summoning his resolve, Schabowski read from the typescript directly: “Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued within a short time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particular exceptional cases. The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the Volkspolizei district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit.” He paused to scratch his head and was again peppered with questions. “Permanent exist is possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG,” he continued, reading aloud from the folder. “That has to be decided by the Council of Ministers,” Beil interjected, too quietly to be heard by the audience, again shouting their questions. “When does this come into effect?” one reporter asked. Fumbling through his papers, Schabowski replied: “That comes into effect, according to my information, immediately, without delay.” With that, a number of journalists hurried out of the room. His countenance, once quizzical, was now terrified. “It has been brought to my attention that is is now 19:00 p.m.,” Schabowski

interrupted. "That has to be the last question. Thank you for your understanding."⁷⁰

Unwittingly, Schabowski had destroyed the party, the régime, and ultimately the great socialist state itself.

Within five minutes, western news outlets interrupted their broadcasts with the news. "GDR opens borders," exclaimed the Associated Press. The Deutsche Presse-Agentur followed with news of the "sensational announcement" from Pankow, and Bonn's *Tagesschau* opened its broadcast with the story. But all of the border crossings remained as tightly locked as they had been for more than twenty-seven years. One of the worst kept secrets in the GDR remained the overwhelming popularity of western programming. With relative ease, the ossies could tune into the forbidden broadcasts from the capitalist world, replete with commercials and multiple viewpoints. As western news agencies broke news of the announcement and replayed Schabowski's ill-fated appearance, the workers and farmers of the GDR learned what their government had just done. By 20:00, as every day according to schedule, the GDR's own state-owned news outlets broadcast the press conference.

Along the frontier, the border guards had received no orders. But the swell of citizens massing at the border crossings was quickly growing untenable. Anxious guards radioed for answers, but there was no clarity to be found; even their superiors could reach "only deputies or deputies of deputies."⁷¹ The whole root and core and brain of the régime remained cloistered in a Central Committee meeting, just extended to run even later into the evening. After all, the government had a crisis on its hands: Krenz needed to bring his comrades up to speed on the quickly deteriorating financial situation. But meanwhile, just

outside the Palast der Republik, a new crisis for the régime was spinning quickly out of control.

In Prenzlauer Berg, thousands of East Berliners massed at the Bornholmerstraße crossing. Like every East German, the guards there knew that a revolutionary spirit was afoot in their land. But unlike earlier rebellions—the workers’ uprising of 1953, for instance—no military support would be forthcoming; Soviet backing would not be guaranteed. Fearing for their lives, they agree to let a few of their countrymen through the gates to forbidden West Berlin. They stamp each identity card presented as *ungültig* (“invalid”); “Invalid”; border crossers could depart but had been disavowed by their government, never to return. Well trained by forty years of oppression, emigrants began to queue for inspection and departure. Releasing a few rapacious easterners had done nothing to quell the crowds, now redoubled in strength and stamina. At Invalidenstraße, even the phalanx of forty-five members of the Volkspolizei, each brandishing an automatic weapon, failed to dispel the hordes gathering. Thirty minutes before midnight, guards understood how unsustainable their position had become. By command of Lt. Col. Edwin Görnitz, deputy chief of the Stasi’s passport inspection staff, guards were to stop inspecting documents and simply to open the border. “We’re opening the floodgates now,” he told the controllers. “We’re opening everything.”⁷²

Unification

Eleven months later, Germany had unified. “What belongs together is now growing together,” remarked Brandt.

The Germans had overcome the mechanisms of Yalta and Potsdam and after forty years of division, achieved their national unification. Kohl's personal faith in his nation's recovery from its brutal past emboldened him to pursue speedy negotiations with the east. More importantly, his deft tactical maneuvering within the decades-old equilibrium strategy enabled the two German states to pursue unification on their own terms, largely without Four-Power interference.

In just a generation, Germany had recovered its capacity for political action. Nationally divided and deprived of their sovereignty, the West Germans exercised the only influence in international affairs that they could—by pressing for greater multilateral cooperation and for economic integration. But across the last two decades of the Cold War, they shaped the institutions that would outlive the east-west conflict and would guide European order into the next century. Through coordinated and consistent diplomatic effort from Bonn, institutions once designed to contain German power—NATO, the Western European Union, the international nuclear weapons régime, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—ultimately came to be dominated by Bonn (and then Berlin). Arrangements intended to harness German wealth—the EC, European monetary cooperation, the G7—ultimately facilitated the Federal Republic of Germany's benign hegemony over western Europe. The Länder of the former GDR were secured by America's nuclear umbrella and NATO's protective mantle. Delors' promises for "Europe 1992" were realized with the Maastricht Treaty on European Union entering into force on 1 November 1993. In just a generation, Germany had once again become the most powerful country in Europe.

The Germans had built the very institutions that contained their own power, and after decades of wrangling, in the end, Germany was not dangerous at all.

Epilogue: Dangerous Power and German Unification, 1989-1993

1. Richard Cohen, in his May 1989 assessment, inadvertently credited such a united state with thirty additional medals. (Richard Cohen, "Europe's Secret Fear: The Return of One Germany," *The Washington Post*, 7 May 1989, p. B1.) On GNP figures, see Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1989* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1989), 107-110.

2. Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Die Berliner Mauer: Monument des Kalten Krieges* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2008), 101. In the months after the collapse of the GDR, many questioned the veracity of an actual Schießbefehl. In the intervening decades, a number of documents have surfaced confirming the régime's mandate to fire. For specifications on the use of firearms by border troops, see DV 018/0/008, Einsatz der Grenztruppen zur Sicherung der Staatsgrenze, 5 August 1974; BStU. Pp. 108-110 address the use of firearms. For Minister for State Security Erich Mielke's reaffirmation that "the firing order is not cancelled," see Protokoll der Beratung des Ministers für Staatssicherheit mit dem Minister für Nationale Verteidigung und den Minister des Innern und Chef der Deutschen Volkspolizei, 24 July 1973; Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereafter BStU), Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, AGM 494, Bi. 72-84; available online. For affirmation under Honecker's own signature, see Protokoll der 45. Sitzung des Nationalen Verteidigungsrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 3 May 1974; BA, DVW 139503.

3. Die Armeefilmschau 7/1966 (Leipzig: UAP).

4. Beschluss des Ministerrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, *Neues Deutschland* (13 August 1961).

5. Maßnahmen zum Schutz des Friedens und zur Sicherung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in Kraft, *Neues Deutschland* (14 August 1961).

6. For a thorough contemporary description, see William E. Stacy, *U.S. Army Border Operations in Germany, 1945-1983* (Headquarters, U.S. Army in Europe and Seventh Army, 1984), especially pp. 192-193.

7. "Protokoll der 45. Sitzung des NVR der DDR am 3. Mai 1974," in *Opfer der Mauer: Die geheimen Protokolle des Todes*, Werner Filmer and Heribert Schwan (Munich: C. Bertelsmann, 1991), 393.

8. Miklós Németh, Hungary's chairman of the Council of Ministers, likewise told Gorbachev: "The wheels of the machine are turning with such dizzying speed that it could pose a potential danger to society." See Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Miklós Németh (3 March 1989), in *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989*, ed. Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 412-13.

9. U.S. Ambassador to the GDR Richard C. Barkley called the events unfolding in East Germany "a silent crisis." U.S. Embassy in East Berlin telegram no. 6311 to U.S. Department of State, "The GDR's Silent Crisis: A Commentary," 4 August 1989; quoted in Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 64.

10. Egon Krenz confirmed Honecker's inner-circle membership in a conversation with Gorbachev. See the Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Egon Krenz (1 November 1989), in *Masterpieces of History*, 569. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 5, *Bundesrepublik und DDR, 1949-1990* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2008), 218;

Catherine Epstein, *The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

11. Internal memoranda identified Honecker as “dogmatic.” See, e.g., memorandum to Alexander Yakovlev from the Bogomolov Commission (Marina Sylvanskaya), “Changes in Eastern Europe and their Impact on the USSR,” February 1989; in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 57.

12. Gorbachev, address to the United Nations General Assembly (7 December 1988), in *Diplomatic Discourse: International Conflict at the United Nations—Addresses and Analysis*, Ray T. Donahue and Michael H. Prosser (London: Ablex, 1997), 298.

13. Gorbachev, address to the United Nations General Assembly (7 December 1988), in *Diplomatic Discourse: International Conflict at the United Nations—Addresses and Analysis*, Ray T. Donahue and Michael H. Prosser (London: Ablex, 1997), 298. See also Philip Taubman, “Gorbachev Urges ‘Radical’ Changes to Spur Economy,” *New York Times* (26 June 1987), p. A-8.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Gorbachev, address to the UN General Assembly (7 December 1988); and “Preparatory Notes from Georgy Shakhnazarov for Mikhail Gorbachev for CC CPSU Politburo Meeting” (6 October 1988), in *Masterpieces of History*, ed. Savranskaya, Blanton, and Zubok, pp. 306-308.

16. Georgy Shakhnazarov’s preparatory notes for Mikhail Gorbachev for the Meeting of the Politburo, 6 October 1988; in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 15. Gorbachev further articulated his vision in his *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 177ff.

17. See, e.g., the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 27-28 December 1988; in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 24-29.

18. Eduard Shevardnadze, address to the Plenary Session of the Supreme Soviet (23 October 1989). Two days later, Shevardnadze’s approach was dubbed by his press spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, the “Frank Sinatra doctrine.” Gerasimov told a television interviewer: “We now have the ‘Frank Sinatra doctrine.’ He has a song, *I Did it My Way*. So every country decides on its own which road to take. . . . Political structures must be decided by the people who live there.” See Metta Spencer, *The Russian Quest for Peace and Democracy* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2004), 194; and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, *The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze*, 2nd ed. (Washington: Brassey’s, 2001), 158.

19. Record of Conversation between President M. S. Gorbachev and Miklós Németh, Member of the HSWP CC Politburo, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Moscow, 3 March 1989, in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 76-77.

20. Gorbachev, address to the UN General Assembly (7 December 1988).

21. “Fröhlicher Schmaus,” *Der Spiegel* 19/1989 (8 May 1989). As Mark Kramer and other scholars have shown, Gorbachev indeed hoped that neighboring socialist states, beginning with Poland, would adopt their own forms of perestroika. Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part I),” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 178-256. For a complementary sociological study, see Spencer, *The Russian Quest for Peace and Democracy*. Archie Brown has reaffirmed that interpretation, noting in particular

Gorbachev's frustrations with Honecker. See Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (London: Bodley Head, 2009).

22. MemCon between Egon Krenz and Mikhail Gorbachev, Berlin, 1 November 1989, in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 151. Krenz offered his interpretation to Gorbachev. When Gorbachev had been elected in 1985, "[s]uddenly Comrade Honecker saw himself confronted with a young dynamic leader who approached new questions in very unconventional ways. Until that time, he had viewed himself in that role. Slowly he lost his sense of reality."

23. Victor Orban, spokesman for the Federation of Young Democrats, quoted in Henry Kamm, "Hungarian Who Led '56 Revolt is Buried as a Hero," *New York Times*, 17 June 1989. See also the minutes of the meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee, Political Committee, 31 January 1989; in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 73-76.

24. Erklärung der Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Paktes, Bukarest (7-8 July 1989), in *Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Paktes* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1989), 14-26.

25. Address by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg (6 July 1989); in Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, *Official Report*, 41st Ordinary Session (8-12 May and 3-7 July 1989), vol. 1, Sittings 1-9 (Strasbourg, 1990), pp. 197-205.

26. "Keine Hintertür für DDR," *Der Spiegel* 22/1989 (29 May 1989).

27. "'Warum bin ich selbst gegangen?'" Die DDR-Schriftstellerin Monika Maron über den Exodus ihrer Landsleute," *Der Spiegel* 33/1989 (14 August 1989).

28. "Eine Zeit geht zu Ende," *Der Spiegel* 36/1989 (4 September 1989).

29. "Am Leben bleiben," *Der Spiegel* 24/1989 (12 June 1989).

30. Vermerk des Bundesministers Genscher über das Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Németh und Außenminister Horn, Schloß Gymnisch, 25 August 1989 (doc. 28); and Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl und des Bundesministers Genscher mit Ministerpräsident Németh und Außenminister Horn während des Mittagessens, Schloß Hymnisch, 25 August 1989 (doc. 29); in *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90*.

31. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 637-43.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 69-70.

34. "Luftleerer Raum," *Der Spiegel* 26/1989 (26 June 1989).

35. Serge Schmemmann, "East Germans Swell Embassy in Prague," *The New York Times*, 29 September 1989, A3; and John Tagliabue, "Chilly Days for East Germans Outside Embassy in Prague," *ibid.*, 30 September 1989, 4.

36. Genscher enlisted the assistance of Shevardnadze, France's Roland Dumas, and the U.S.'s James Baker in pressing the reticent Czechoslovak foreign minister Jaromír Johanes. See Richard E. Kiessler and Frank Elbe, *Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), 30-31 and 35-44; Antonius John, *Rudolf Seiters: Einsichten in Amt, Person und Ereignisse* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), 82-104. Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall:*

Germany's Road to Unification (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993), 97-98; and Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 75.

37. "Eine Zeit geht zu Ende."

38. Rudolf Augstein, "Eher mit 'bang' als mit 'whimper,'" *Der Spiegel* 24/1989 (12 June 1989).

39. In a stroke of irony, West German newsstands featured the traditional German-language editions of *Moscow News* and the other east bloc publications all now banned in the GDR. See also Serge Schmemmann, "Two Germanys' Political Divide is Being Blurred by Glasnost," *New York Times* (18 December 1988).

40. Georgy A. Arbatov, quoted in Michael Parks, "'Gorbymania' Captures Bonn—It's a Challenge to the West, Aid Says," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 June 1989.

41. Erich Mielke to Heads of All State Security Units (10 June 1989), in *The End of the Cold War*, CWIHP Bulletin 12/13 (2001), p. 209. See also Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, 241-242.

42. Zelikow and Rice noted that "socialism could be defended only to the extent that capitalism could be attacked." See Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 38.

43. "Das droht die DDR zu vernichten," *Der Spiegel* 33/1989 (14 August 1989).

44. "Warum bin ich selbst gegangen?"

45. Peter Glotz, "Prospects for European Security Policy," 26 August 1987; BA, B 136/27065.

46. Quoted in G. Jonathan Greenwald, *Berlin Witness: An American Diplomat's Chronicle of East Germany's Revolution* (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 105.

47. See Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 67 and 72; Peter Przybylski, *Tatort Politbüro: Honecker, Mittag und Schalck-Golodkowski*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1992), 110; and Ralf Georg Reith and Andreas Bönnte, *Das Komplott: wie es wirklich zur deutschen Einheit kam* (Munich: Piper, 1993), 56-58.

48. See especially Julij Kwitzinskij, *Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten* (Berlin: Siedler, 1993), 14; and Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 73.

49. "Siegen oder untergehen," *Der Spiegel* 38/1989 (18 September 1989).

50. Eduard Shevarnadze, address before the UN General Assembly, 26 September 1989, in "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Sixth Meeting," 44th session, 27 September 1989, A/44/PV.6. On Soviet reactions to "propaganda campaigns," see Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 73.

51. See Konrad H. Jarmusch, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 28; and "Das droht die DDR zu vernichten."

52. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 624-25.

53. Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 5 October 1989; *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 17.

54. Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 11 October 1989; in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no. 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 161.

55. Gorbachev and Krenz (1 November 1989), in *Masterpieces of History*, 569.

56. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, 86.

57. Gerhard Schürer, "Analyse der ökonomischen Lage der DDR mit Schlußfolgerungen" (24 October 1989); in *Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates*, Hans-Hermann Hertle (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), 448-60.

58. Hans-Hermann Hertle, "Der Weg in den Bankrott der DDR-Wirtschaft: das Scheitern der 'Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik,'" *Deutschland Archiv* 25, no. 2 (February 1992): 127-31; *idem.*, "Staatsbankrott: der ökonomische Untergang des SED-Staates," *Deutschland Archiv* 25, no. 10 (October 1992): 1019-30; Maria Haendke-Hoppe-Arndt, "Wer wußte was? Der ökonomische Niedergang der DDR," *Deutschland Archiv* 28, no. 5 (May 1995): 588-602; Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 60; and Stephen Kotkin, "The Kiss of Debt: The East Bloc Goes Borrowing," in *The Shock of the Global*, p. 84.

59. For a contemporary assessment, see "Where Marx Still Drives a Trabant," *The Economist*, no. 7602 (13 May 1989), 59.

60. Kotkin, "The Kiss of Debt," 82-83; and Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 68-69 and 80.

61. Honecker, speech at a meeting of the Thomas Müntzer Committee (19 January 1989); quoted in *Neues Deutschland* (20 January 1989). See also Hans-Hermann Hertle, *The Berlin Wall Story: Biography of a Monument* (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2011).

62. Hertle, *Die Berliner Mauer*, 144.

63. Lauter headed the Hauptabteilung Pass- und Meldewesen im Ministerium des Innern der DDR.

64. Gerhard Lauter, interview with Deutsche Welle (21 November 2014).

65. Robin Lautenbach, interview with Deutsche Welle (21 November 2014).

66. Lauter, interview with Deutsche Welle.

67. Lautenbach, interview with Deutsche Welle.

68. Lauter, interview with Deutsche Welle.

69. Robert J. McCartney, "East Germany Opens Berlin Wall and Borders, Allowing Citizens to Travel Freely to the West," *Washington Post* (10 November 1989).

70. Internationale Pressekonferenz von Günter Schabowski (in Begleitung der ZK-Mitglieder H. Labs, G. Beil und M. Banaschak), Ton-Abschrift, 9. November 1989; in Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Chronik des Mauerfalls: die dramatischen Ereignisse um dem 9. November 1989*, 12th ed. (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2009), 141-46.

71. Hertle, *Die Berliner Mauer*, 150.

72. According to the recollection of Major Manfred Sens, deputy commander at the Bornholmerstraße checkpoint. See Hertle, *Chronik des Mauerfalls*, 166.

Appendix

1. NATO Nuclear-Capable Delivery Vehicles
 - United States
 - Other NATO States
2. NATO and Warsaw Pact Nuclear Weapons Not Covered Under SALT and START, 1988
3. British and French Nuclear-Capable Aircraft
4. British and French Ballistic Missile Submarines
5. British and French Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
6. Long-Range Theater Nuclear Missiles
7. Major Eurostrategic Weapons
8. Party Affiliations of the Ministers-President in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1969-1989
9. Results of the Landtäge Elections in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950-1993
 - Baden-Württemberg
 - Bavaria
 - Bremen
 - Hamburg
 - Hesse
 - Lower Saxony
 - North Rhine-Westphalia
 - Rhineland-Palatinate
 - Saarland
 - Schleswig-Holstein
 - West Berlin

Appendix One

NATO Nuclear-Capable Delivery Vehicles

NATO Nuclear-Capable Delivery Vehicles: United States

	Category and type	First year deployed	Range (km)	Throw-weight*	CEP (m)	Launcher total†	Munition/warhead	Yield per warhead‡	Remarks
LAND-BASED									
Strategic									
ICBM	LGM-30F	1966	11,300	1.6	370	450	Mk 11C; W-56	1.2 MT	
	<i>Minuteman II</i>								
	LGM-30G	1970	14,800	2.2	220	211	3 × Mk 12 MIRV; W-62	170 KT	
	<i>Minuteman III</i>	1980	12,900	2.4	200	300	3 × Mk 12A MIRV; W-78	335 KT	
	LCM-118 <i>Peacekeeper (MX)</i>	1986	11,000	7	100	39	10 × Mk 21 MIRV; W-87	300 or 400 KT	50 to be in modified <i>Minuteman</i> silos
Intermediate-/medium-range									
GLCM	BGM-109G	1983	2,500	--	20	123	W-84	10-50 KT(s)	443 missiles. 28 launchers not deployed.
MRBM	<i>Pershing IA</i>	1971	160-720	--	400	1	Mk 50 mod 1; W-50	60 or 200 or 400 KT	Not deployed
	<i>Pershing II</i>	1983	1,800	3	40	165	W-85	5-10 KT(s)	51 launchers not deployed
Tactical									
SRBM	MGM-52C <i>Lance</i>	1972	110	0.5	150-400	65	{ W-70 mods 0, 1, 2 W-70 mod 3	3 values: 1-10 KT 1 KT(–) or 1 KT(+)	
Artillery[§]	M-110A1/A2 203 mm SP	1977/9 1981	21.3 29	-- --	170 200-500	} 1,029	{ M-422 shell; W-33 M-753 rocket-assisted projectile; W-79	0.5 or 10 KT 0.5, 1 or 2.5 KT	Some enhanced radiation warheads stored in U.S.
	M-109 155 mm SP (3 mods)	1963	18/24/30	--	n.k.		{ M-454 shell; W-48 or	0.1 KT	
	M-198 155 mm towed	1979	14	--	n.k.	590	} XM-785 shell; W-82	Under 2 KT	W-82 still under development, potentially enhanced-radiation capable

* All throw-weights are given in thousands of pounds. Throw-weight is calculated as the weight of the post-boost vehicle, including warhead(s), guidance systems, penetration aids, and decoys. Figures shown here are for each weapon system's maximum weight and not necessarily for the range cited.

† All launcher totals are for June 1988.

‡ Maximum yields are shown, though yields can vary significantly. Yields rendered as 1-10KT mean that the yield falls within those limits; yields rendered as 1-10KT(s) means that the yield can be selected within those limits; yields rendered as 1 or 10 KT mean that either yield can be selected.

§ All artillery numbers are for theoretically nuclear-capable pieces, though they likely would have filled conventional roles.

AIR

			Radius of action (km)	Max. speed (mach)	Weapon load (000 kg)	Maximum ordnance load			
Strategic									
Long-range bombers	B-52G	1959	4,600	0.95	29.5	98	Internal: 12 bombs (B-43/-53/-61/-83) or 8 SRAM External: 12 ALCM Internal: 12 bombs (B-43/-53/-61/-83) or 8 Harpoon	30 aircraft in conventional role but could re-role	
	B-52H	1962	6,140	0.95	29.5	96	Internal: 12 bombs (B-43/-53/-61/-83) or 8 SRAM or 8 ALCM External: 12 ALCM	Only 60 aircraft mod for ALCM	
	B-1B	1986	4,580	1.25	61	99	Internal: 8 ALCM plus 8 SRAM; or 24 SRAM; or 24 B-61 bombs External: 14 ALCM or 14 SRAM or 14 bombs (B- 43/-61/-83)	Includes 25 aircraft in store	
Medium- range bombers	FB-111A	1969	1,890	2.2	13.15	61	2 bombs (B-43/-61/-83) plus 4 SRAM	Includes 5 aircraft in store	
Tactical									
Land-based strike	F-111D/E/F	1967	1,750	2.2/2.5	13.1	160	3 bombs (B-43/-57/-61)		
	F-4E	1969	840	2.4	5.9	632	3 bombs (B-28RE/-43/-57/-61)		
	F-16	1979	550/930	2+	5.4	1,224	1 bomb (B-43/-61)		
Carrier-based strike	A-4E/F/M	1970	1,230	0.9	4.5	57	1 bomb (B-28/-43/-57/-61)	U.S. Marine Corps	
	A-6E	1963	1,250	0.9	8.1	276	3 bombs (B-28/-43/-57/-61)	Includes 54 U.S. Marine Corps	
	A-7	1966	880	0.9	6	480	4 bombs (B-28/-43/-57/-61)		
	F/A-18	1982	850	2.2	7.7	398	2 bombs (B-57/-61)		
	S-3	1974	575	0.6	n.k.	140	1 B-57 depth charge	2 hours endurance at radius of action. Total endurance 5 hours.	
ASW	P-3	1961	1,140	0.66	19	385	2 B-57 depth charges	8 hours endurance at radius of action. Total endurance 18 hours.	
			Range (km)				Missile total	Munition/warhead	Yield per warhead
ALCM	AGM-86B	1982	2,400	0.66	60	€ 1,650	W-80	170-200 KT	
ASM	AGM-69A (SRAM)	1972	56 (low altitude) 220 (high)	3.5	€ 0.03	€ 1,170	W-69	170 KT	Planned total of 1,175 warheads

SEA-BASED

Strategic									
SLBM	UGM-73A <i>Poseidon</i> C-3	1971	4,600	3.3	450	256	10 × Mk 3 MIRV; W-68	40 KT	Installed in 16 SSBN
	UGM-93A <i>Trident</i> C-4	1980	7,400	3.0+	450	384	8 × Mk 4 MIRV; W-76	100 KT	Installed in 20 SSBN
Tactical									
SLCM	BGM-109A <i>Tomahawk</i>	1983	2,500	--	280	--	TLAM-N; W-80	200 KT	758 warheads planned. Launchers installed in 46 submarines, 25 surface combatants
ASW	UUM-44A <i>SUBROC</i>	1965	50	--	--	--	W-55	1-5 KT	Some 285 warheads produced. Installed in 26 submarines
	RUR-5A <i>ASROC</i>	1961	11	--	--	--	W-44	1 KT	Some 500 warheads remain. Installed in 166 surface combatants. Normally fitted with conventional homing torpedo.

BOMBS

Type	Yield per warhead	No. in stockpile mid-1987	Remarks	Type	Yield per warhead	No. in stockpile mid-1987	Remarks
B-28	70,350 KT, 1.1, 1.45 MT	ε 1,000	Replaced by B-61, B-83 by 1990	B-57	5-20 KT	1,195	Depth-charge capability
B-43	1 MT and others	975	Hard target penetration	B-61	3 yields between 100-500 KT	n.k.	In-flight yield selection and fusing, hard target penetration, choice of 31- or 81-second delay.
B-53	9 MT	25		B-83	1-2 MT	1,000	1,500 more planned, to replace B-28, -43, -53

NATO Nuclear-Capable Delivery Vehicles: Other NATO Countries

	Category and type	First year deployed	Range (km)	Throw-weight	CEP (m)	Launcher total	Munition/warhead	Yield per warhead	Remarks
LAND-BASED									
Intermediate-range									
IRBM	SSBS S-3D	1980	3,500	n.k.	n.k.	18	TN-61	1 MT	France
Tactical									
SRBM	MGM-31A/B <i>Pershing</i> IA	1971	160-720	0.8	400	72	Mk 50 mod 1; W-50	60 or 200 or 400 KT	U.S. warheads on FRG missiles. To be withdrawn on conclusion of INF elimination.
	<i>Pluton</i>	1974	120	n.k.	150-300	32	AN-51	15 or 25 KT	France
	MGM-52C <i>Lance</i>	1976	110	0.5	150-400	59	W-70	3 values: 1-100 KT	Belgium (5), FRG (26), Italy (6), Netherlands (8), UK (14).
Artillery	M-110 203mm SP	1962	21.3	--	170	397	M-422 shell; W-33	0.5 or 10 KT	Belgium (11), FRG (226), Greece (16), Italy (36), Netherlands (76), Turkey (16), UK (16).
	M-109 155mm SP	1964	18/24/30	--	--	1,883	M-454 shell; W-48	0.1 KT	Belgium (165), Canada (76), Denmark (76), FRG (586), Greece (222), Italy (108), Netherlands (260), Norway (130), Portugal (6), Spain (102), Turkey (42), UK (110).
SAM	MIM-14B <i>Nike Hercules</i>	1962	140	1.12	--	375	W-31	1-2 or 20+ KT	Belgium (36), FRG (106), Italy (96), Spain (9), Turkey (128). Only some 75 W-31 warheads remain in service.
SEA-BASED									
Strategic									
SLBM	<i>Polaris</i> A-3 TK	1967	4,600	1.5	900	64	3 × MRV; W-58 (<i>Chevaline</i>)	200 KT	UK. Installed in 4 SSBN.
	M-20	1977	3,000	n.k.	n.k.	64	TN-60	1 MT	France. Installed in 4 SSBN, including 1 in refit.
	M-4	1985	4,400+	n.k.	n.k.	32	6 × MIRV; TN-70/-71	150 KT	France. Installed in 2 SSBN.

AIR

			Radius of action (km)	Max. speed (mach)	Weapon load (000 kg)	Launcher total	Maximum ordnance load		
Tactical									
Land-based strike	F-104G/S	1958	830	2.2	1.8	260	1 B-28/-57/-61 bombs		Greece (76), Italy (25), Turkey (159)
	F-4E/F	1967/73	840	2.4	5.9	208	1 B-61 bomb		FRG (75), Greece (33), Turkey (100)
	F-16	1982	930	2+	5.4	265	1 B-61 bomb		Belgium (49), Denmark (52), Netherlands (99), Norway (65)
	CF-18	1986	740	2.2	7.7	48	2 bombs		Canada
	Mirage IIIE	1964	960	1.8	19	15	1 or 2 AN-52 bombs		France
	Mirage IVP	1986	930	2.2	9.3	18	1 ASMP		France
	Mirage 2000N	1988	690		6.3	13	1 ASMP		France
	Jaguar A	1974	850	1.4	4.75	153	1 or 2 AN-52 bombs		France (45), UK (108)
Tornado IDS	1981	1,390	0.95	6.8	596	n.k.		FRG (308), Italy (98), UK (210). Only UK aircraft certified for nuclear ops.	
Carrier-based strike	Super Etendard	1980	650	1.0	2.1	64	1 or 2 AN-52 bombs		France. 52 to be converted for ASMP
ASW	Sea Harrier	1980	460/750	0.98	2.3	42	1 (maybe 2) WE-177 bombs		UK
	P-3B/C	1961	1,140	0.66	9.1	24	2 B-57 depth charge		Netherlands (13), Norway (5), Spain (6). 8 hours endurance at radius of action. Total endurance 18 hours.
	Nimrod	1969	1,000	0.85	6.1	36			UK. 8 hours endurance at radius of action. Total endurance 12 hours.
	Atlantic	1965	1,300	0.57	3.8	32			FRG (14), Italy (18). 8 hours endurance at radius of action. Total endurance 18 hours.
	Buccaneer	1963	1,410	0.85	7.3	52			UK
ASM Bombs			Range (km)				Munition/warhead	Yield per warhead	
	ASMP	1986	100-300	2	n.a.	n.a.		45 KT	France
	AN-22	--	--	--	--	--		15, 300 KT	France
	WE-177	--	--	--	--	--		10, 200, 400 KT	UK. Depth-charge capability

Source: Adapted from *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London: IISS, 1988), pp. 210-19. Many of the weapons listed here were dual-capable, but a high proportion were assigned to conventional roles. Aircraft often carried fewer munitions than their maximum payloads. This table shows each system's highest capabilities. A missile carrying its maximum payload may have its range reduced by up to twenty-five percent. Radii of action for aircraft are noted in normal configuration, at optimum altitude, with a standard warload, without in-flight refueling. When two figures are shown, the first refers gives a low-low-low mission profile, and the second gives a high-low-high mission profile.

Appendix Two

NATO and Warsaw Pact Nuclear Weapons Not Covered Under SALT and START, 1988

A. Land-Based Launchers							
Category and type of system	Countries deploying	NATO Guidelines Area [*]		Atlantic to Urals		Global	
		NATO	WP	NATO	WP	NATO	WP
IRBM							
SSBS-S3	France	--	--	18	--	18	--
SS-20 [†]	USSR	--	--	--	342	--	509
GLCM							
BGM-109G [†]	U.S.	29	--	95	--	123	--
SS-C-1b <i>Sepal</i>	USSR	--	--	--	40	--	40
SSC-X-4 [†]	USSR	--	--	--	6	--	6
MRBM							
<i>Pershing</i> IA [†]	U.S.	--	--	--	--	1	--
<i>Pershing</i> II [†]	U.S.	114	--	114	--	165	--
SS-4 [†]	USSR	--	--	--	72	--	72
SRBM							
<i>Pershing</i> IA	FRG	72	--	72	--	72	--
<i>Pluton</i>	France	--	--	32	--	32	--
<i>Lance</i>	U.S.	36	--	36	--	65	--
<i>Lance</i>	Other NATO	53	--	59	--	59	--
SS-12 mod [†]	USSR	--	58	--	83	--	135
SS-23 [†]	USSR	--	16	--	78	--	102
<i>Scud</i> B	USSR	--	150	--	506	--	630
<i>Scud</i> A/B	Other WP	--	83	--	158	--	158
<i>FROG</i> /SS-21	USSR	--	104	--	534	--	790
<i>FROG</i> /SS-21	Other WP	--	140	--	234	--	234
Artillery[‡]							
	U.S.	644	--	644	--	4,042	--
	Other NATO	1,546	--	2,378	--	2,378	--
	USSR	--	1,840	--	5,100	--	9,700
	Other WP	--	288	--	498	--	498
Aircraft[§]							
	U.S.	156	--	368	--	2,134	--
	Other NATO	668	--	1,014	--	1,014	--
	USSR	--	225	--	2,004	--	3,180
	Other WP	--	300	--	345	--	345

^{*} The NATO Guidelines Area includes the territories of the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

[†] Eliminated under terms of the 1987 INF Treaty.

[‡] Artillery figures include all nuclear-capable weapons.

[§] Aircraft figures exclude long-range strategic and land-based naval bombers. For figures on naval bombers, see tables B, C, and D in this appendix.

B. Maritime Launchers

Category and type of system	Countries deploying	European/Atlantic Waters		Global	
		NATO	WP	NATO	WP
<i>SLBM</i> ^{**}	France	96	--	96	--
	UK	64	--	64	--
	USSR	--	18	--	36

C. Nuclear-Armed Ships

Category and type of system	Countries deploying	European/Atlantic Waters		Global	
		NATO	WP	NATO	WP
<i>SLCM</i>					
Land Attack (submerged)	U.S.	30	--	46	--
	USSR	--	5	--	8
Land Attack (surface)	U.S.	11	--	25	--
Anti-Ship (submerged)	USSR	--	14	--	21
Anti-Ship (surface) ^{††}	USSR	--	39	--	67
<i>ASW (Air Flight)</i>					
<i>SUBROC</i>	U.S	12	--	26	--
<i>SS-N-15</i>	USSR	--	23	--	34
<i>ASROC</i>	U.S.	83	--	166	--
<i>SS-N-14/SUW-N-1</i>	USSR	--	43	--	66
<i>Torpedoes</i> ^{††}					
Torpedoes	USSR	--	337	--	549

D. Maritime Aircraft^{§§}

Category and type of system	Countries deploying	European/Atlantic Waters		Global	
		NATO	WP	NATO	WP
Carrier-Based Strike	U.S.	352	--	1,294	--
	France	64	--	64	--
	UK	42	--	42	--
Land-Based Bombers	USSR	--	286	--	400
Land-Based ASW	U.S.	18	--	385	--
	Other NATO	138	--	138	--
	USSR	--	137	--	219

^{**} Additionally, four hundred sea-launched ballistic missiles are assigned to SACEUR.

^{††} Anti-ship (surface) figures exclude patrol combatants outfitted with anti-ship missiles unlikely to be or unsuited as dual conventional-nuclear capable.

^{††} Torpedo figures exclude vessels unlikely to be or unsuited as dual conventional-nuclear capable.

^{§§} Maritime aircraft figures include only fixed-wing aircraft.

Appendix Three

British and French Nuclear-Capable Aircraft

Nuclear-Capable Aircraft							
Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Combat radius (km)	IFR	Inventory		Program status
					UE	Total	
United Kingdom	Tornado GR.1 (IDS)	1982	1,400	Yes	24	100	220 programmed (including 68 dual-controlled trainers)
	Buccaneer S.2	1962	1,400	Yes	36	80	Being replaced by Tornado; including 20 in maritime strike role
	Jaguar S GR.1	1973	1,200	Yes	48	100	Excluding Jaguar B T.2 trainers (30 delivered)
	Harrier GR.5 (AV-8B)	(1986)	900	Yes	0	0	Total program: 60
	Sea Harrier FRS.1	1979	600	Yes	15	26	14 on order
France	Mirage IV A	1964	1,600	Yes	24	33	Plus 14 for training, reconnaissance, and reserves
	Mirage 2000N	(1988)	1,400	Yes	0	0	First 15 will be operational by 1988; total program may reach 200
	Jaguar A	1973	1,200	Yes	45	118	Excluding 22 Jaguar E trainers
	Mirage IIIE	1961	1,000	No	30	105	Excluding 14 Mirage IIIBE trainers; being replaced by Mirage 2000N
	Super Etendard	1979	700	Yes	36	64	Total program: 80

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1983: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1983), 38.

Appendix Four

British and French Ballistic Missile Submarines

Ballistic Missile Submarines						
Country	Designation	Pennant number	Laid down	Launched	Operational	Main armament (SLBM)
United Kingdom	<i>Resolution</i>	S 22	1964	1966	1967	16 × Polaris A-3
	<i>Repulse</i>	S 23	1965	1967	1968	16 × Polaris A-3
	<i>Renown</i>	S 26	1964	1967	1968	16 × Polaris A-3
	<i>Revenge</i>	S 27	1965	1968	1969	16 × Polaris A-3
France	<i>le Redoutable</i>	S 611	1964	1967	1971	16 × MSBS M-20
	<i>le Terrible</i>	S 612	1967	1969	1973	16 × MSBS M-20
	<i>le Foudroyant</i>	S 610	1969	1971	1974	16 × MSBS M-20
	<i>l'Indomptable</i>	S 613	1971	1974	1976	16 × MSBS M-20
	<i>le Tonnant</i>	S 614	1974	1977	1980	16 × MSBS M-20
	<i>l'Inflexible</i>	..	1980	1982	(1985)	16 × MSBS M-20

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1983: *World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1983), 36.

Appendix Five

British and French Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles						
Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Range (km)	Warhead(s)	Inventory	Program status
United Kingdom	Polaris A-3	1967	4,600	3 × 200-kt MRV	64	On 4 SSBNs, being replaced by Chevaline system
	Trident II (D-5)	(1990s)	10,000	10 × 335-kt MIRV	0	Replacing the Polaris/Chevaline system from the 1990s, with 64 launchers on 4 submarines
France	SSBS S-3	1980	3,000	1 × 1-Mt	18	
	MSBS M-20	1977	3,000	1 × 1-Mt	80	On 5 SSBNs
	MSBS M-4	(1985)	4,000	6 × 150-kt MRV	0	On the 6th SSBN; total program, including retrofits: 96 (by 1992)

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1983: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1983), 36.

Appendix Six

Long-Range Theater Nuclear Missiles

Long-Range Theater Nuclear Missiles								
Country	Missile designation	Year first deployed	Range (km)	CEP (m)	Warhead(s)	Inventory		Program status
						U.S. figures	Soviet figures	
Soviet Union	SS-4 Sandal	1959	1,800	2,400	1 × Mt	232	..	Phasing out
	SS-5 Skean	1961	3,500	1,200	1 × Mt	16	..	Phasing out
	SS-20	1976-77	5,000	400	3 × 150-kt MIRV	333	..	Deployment rate approximately 50 per year
	SS-N-5 Serb	1963	1,200	n.a.	1 × Mt	30	18	3 each on Golf II submarines, 6 of which have been deployed in the Baltic since 1976
United States	Pershing II	1983	1,800	40	1 × ? (low-kt)		0	108 launchers to be deployed by 1985
	GLCM	1983	2,500	50	1 × ?		0	464 missiles to be deployed by 1988
United Kingdom	Polaris A-3	1967	4,600	800	3 × 200-kt MRV	64		On 4 SSBNs, being replaced by the Chevaline system
	Trident II (D-5)	(1990s)	10,000	250	8 × 355-kt MIRV		0	Replacing the Polaris/Chevaline system from the 1990s, with 64 launchers on 4 submarines
France	SSBS S-3	1980	3,000	n.a.	1 × 1-Mt		18	
	MSBS M-20	1977	3,000	n.a.	1 × 1-Mt		80	On 5 SSBNs
	MSBS M-4	(1985)	4,000	n.a.	6 × 150-kt MRV		0	On the 6th SSBN; total program including retrofits; 96 (by 1992)

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1983: *World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1983), 6.

Appendix Seven

Major Eurostrategic Weapons

Major Eurostrategic Weapons












	Country	Weapon designation	Year first deployed	Maximum range (km)	No. of reentry vehicles	Yield	CEP (m)	No. deployed in 1979
Missiles	<i>USSR</i>	SS-4	1959	2,000	1	1 Mt	2,400	390
		SS-5	1961	3,700	1	1 Mt	1,250	80
		SS-12	1969	~800	1	1 Mt	..	72
		SS-20	1977	~4,000	3	150 kt	400	~120
		SS-N-5	1964	~1,200	1	1-2 Mt	..	18
	<i>U.S.</i>	Pershing IA	1962	~750	1	60-400 kt	450	108
		Pershing IA	1962	~750	1	60-400 kt	450	72
		Pershing II	(1983)	~1,600	1	10-20 kt	45	0
		GLCM	(1983)	2,500	1	200 kt	90	0
	<i>UK</i>	Polaris A-3	1967	4,600	1	3 × 200 kt	800	64
	<i>France</i>	S-2	1971	3,000	1	150 kt	..	18
		M-20	1977	5,000	1	1 Mt	..	64

	Country	Weapon designation	Year first deployed	Range (km)	Weapon load (t)	Nuclear weapons per aircraft	Speed (Mach)	No. deployed in 1979
Aircraft	<i>USSR</i>	Tu-16 Badger	1955	6,500	9.1	2	0.8	318
		Tu-22M Backfire	1974	9,000	8.0	4	2.5	50
	<i>U.S.</i>	FB-111A	1969	10,000	17.0	6	2.5	66
		F-111E/F	1967	4,900	12.7	2	2.2/2.5	156
	<i>UK</i>	Vulcan B2	1960	6,500	9.6	2	0.95	48
	<i>France</i>	Mirage IV A	1964	3,000	7.3	1	2.2	33

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1980: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1980), 179.

Appendix Eight

Party Affiliations of the Ministers-President in the Federal Republic of Germany 1969-1989

	Baden- Württemberg	Bavaria	Bremen	Hamburg	Hesse	Lower Saxony	North Rhine- Westphalia	Rhineland- Palatinate	Saarland	Schleswig- Holstein	Berlin (West)
											
1969	Filbinger	Goppel	Koschnick	Weichmann	Zinn	Diederichs	Kühn	Kohl	Röder	Lehmke	Schütz
1970					Osswald						
1971						Kubel					
1972				Klose						Stoltenberg	
1973											
1974											
1975											
1976											
1977					Börner	Albrecht		Vogel			
1978											Stobbe
1979	Späth	Strauß					Rau				
1980									Zeyer		
1981											Vogel
1982				Dohnányi							Weizsäcker
1983										Barschel	
1984											
1985											Diepgen
1986			Wedemeier						Lafontaine		
1987										Schwarz	
1988					Wallmann					Engholm	
1989		Streibl		Voscherau				Wagner			Momper


As city-states, Bremen and Hamburg do not have ministers-president, but a Mayor and President of the Senate (*Bürgermeister und Präsident des Senats*) and First Mayor (*Erster Bürgermeister*) respectively. Party affiliations are noted here with the traditional colors of the CDU (orange), CSU (blue), and SPD (red).

Appendix Nine


Results of the Landtäge Elections in the Federal Republic of Germany 1950-1993

The following line graphs show the results of Landtäge elections in the ten Bundesländer of Federal Republic of Germany and of West Berlin between 1950 and 1993.* Results are only shown for the CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP (FDP/DVP in Baden-Württemberg and DPS/FDP in Saarland), and Greens.

Baden-Württemberg




Bavaria




* Between 1949 and 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany contained ten federal states (*i.e.*, *Bundesländer*). Hamburg and Bremen, however, often are identified as city-states (*Stadtstaaten*), distinguishing them historically from the "area states" (*Flächenländer*).


Bremen




Hamburg




Hesse




Lower Saxony




North Rhine-Westphalia




Rhineland-Palatinate



Saarland[†]




Schleswig-Holstein



[†] Data for the Saarland begin in 1955. The CDU, SPD, and DPS/FDP only became mainstream political parties in the Saarland following the rejection of the Saar Statute of 23 October 1955. The 1947, 1952, and 1955 elections were led by local parties, namely the Christian People's Party of the Saarland (CVP), the Social Democratic Party of the Saarland (SPS), and the Communist Party (KPS).

West Berlin[‡]



[‡] West Berlin remained under Quadripartite control until 1990 though it politically functioned as part of the West German state.