Are Workers Effective Lawmakers?

Jacob M. Lollis*[†]

April 24, 2022

Abstract

Are working-class legislators effective lawmakers? Intuitively, one may expect that lawmakers from manual labor, clerical, and service-based jobs (the working-class) are less effective than legislators who have previously worked in business, politics, or law (white-collar) occupations. The legislative effectiveness of the working-class, however, has not yet been empirically evaluated. This article addresses two primary questions. First, is there a class-based effectiveness gap between working-class and white-collar legislators? Second, do various institutional and contextual arrangements moderate the effectiveness of working-class legislators? I motivate my analysis by developing theoretical arguments for why workers may be more or less effective than white-collar legislators. Next, I extend this theoretical argument to consider whether institutions within and across state legislatures moderate the legislative effectiveness of the working class. I find no evidence of a class-based effectiveness gap-working-class and white-collar legislators are equally effective throughout the lawmaking process. Additionally, although workers serving as party leaders are more effective than white-collar legislators serving as party leaders, I find little evidence that institutions collectively moderate workers' effectiveness. I conclude that workers and white-collar legislators are equally effective throughout the lawmaking process despite institutional variation.

Keywords: Legislative institutions, state politics, legislative effectiveness, representation, social class

Word Count: 6,200

A Thesis Presented to the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts

^{*}Ph.D Student, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, jml7hf[at]virginia[dot]edu

[†]The author extends sincere gratitude to Justin Kirkland and Craig Volden for their mentorship. The author thanks Nick Carnes for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Todd Makse and The Center for Effective Lawmaking for making their data available to me.

Introduction

Are working-class legislators effective lawmakers? For a large portion of American political development, political leaders have advanced arguments that workers were less skilled than individuals working in professional jobs, and were, therefore, less suitable for political office.¹ Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, argued:

"... [workers] *interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves*. They [workers] are sensible that their *habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments*, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for the most part useless..." (Federalist No. 35, 1788, emphasis added).

Hamilton's argument suggests that we should expect legislators from working-class backgrounds to be less effective than legislators from white-collar backgrounds. To date, however, the legislative effectiveness of the working class has not been empirically evaluated. I turn to state legislatures to evaluate the support for this claim. I motivate my analysis by developing theoretical arguments for why workers may be more or less effective than white-collar legislators. Next, I extend this theoretical argument to consider whether workers' effectiveness may be moderated by institutional and contextual variation across state legislatures.

To empirically test these expectations, I pair pre-legislature occupational data for over 14,000 state legislators (Makse 2019) with Bucchianeri, Volden, and Wiseman's (2020) state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES). This data set includes observations from 49 states over thirty years (1988-2017).² A simple comparison of means shows that, on average, white-collar legislators are only 0.034 times more effective than working-class legislators. However, in a multivariate model with controls, this effect disappears. To ensure that this null effect is precisely estimated, I include several robustness checks. The robustness checks again suggest that there is not a class-based effectiveness gap, meaning that any difference between working-class and white-collar legislators'

¹I refer to workers and working-class legislators interchangeably throughout this article.

²SLES for four states appear in the data set post-2003: Massachusetts (2009), Nebraska (2007), Oregon (2007), and Rhode Island (2007). SLES do not exist for Kansas due to insufficient data.

effectiveness is not directly attributable to differences in legislators' professional backgrounds.

After presenting evidence demonstrating that working-class and white-collar legislators are equally effective lawmakers, I analyze whether institutional and contextual variation across state legislatures moderate workers' effectiveness. I find that when workers become party leaders, they are considerably more effective than white-collar party leaders and rank-and-file legislators. Apart from party leadership, I find little evidence that institutions moderate the effectiveness of workers. Therefore, most broadly, I conclude that working-class and white-collar legislators are equally effective despite institutional and contextual variation.

Questions of legislative effectiveness, especially for underrepresented groups, are necessary to consider for several reasons. First, empirically evaluating the legislative effectiveness of underrepresented groups empowers scholars to address discriminatory arguments that these groups are in some way less capable than majority groups. My analysis provides evidence against this argument; I find no evidence that white-collar legislators are more effective than workers. Second, examining the legislative effectiveness of underrepresented groups allows scholars to better understand the consequences of numerical and descriptive underrepresentation. I show that workers are effective lawmakers with the legislative skills to pass substantive policy. As other scholars have shown, however, the policies workers support often don't become law. This is not because workers are ineffective lawmakers, but rather because the working class is numerically underrepresented across legislatures (Carnes 2013). Therefore, this analysis supports the argument that white-collar government is not caused by the inability of working-class representatives to effectively legislate (Carnes 2013). The structural barriers that are responsible for the underrepresentation of the working-class weed out working-class candidates long before they have the opportunity to become effective lawmakers (Carnes 2018).

The Legislative Effectiveness of Underrepresented Groups

The working class is numerically underrepresented in legislative bodies across the United States, including the U.S. Congress and state legislatures (Carnes 2012; Carnes 2013; Carnes 2016), as well as in other developing and advanced democracies (Carnes & Lupu 2015). On av-

erage, only 2% of U.S. legislators and 6% of state legislators are from working-class occupational backgrounds (Carnes 2012; Makse 2019). There is a growing literature that analyzes the causes and consequences of the numerical underrepresentation of the working class. Carnes (2013), in his seminal book on working-class legislators, finds that workers support more liberal economic legis-lation than white-collar legislators. As a result, class-imbalanced legislatures in the United States produce policy that is more economically conservative. (Carnes 2013). The largest takeaway from prior work on working-class legislators, however, is that social class background has a meaning-ful and lasting impact on how legislators think, legislate, and vote (Carnes 2012; Carnes 2013). Given that social class is a salient identity for lawmakers, I consider the legislative effectiveness of workers.

There is an extensive literature that seeks to conceptualize, measure, and analyze legislative effectiveness in the U.S. Congress and the states (Matthews 1959; Weissert 1991; Volden et al. 2013; Volden & Wiseman 2014; Hitt et al. 2017; Volden & Wiseman 2018; Bucchianeri et al. 2020; Stacy 2020). Volden and Wiseman define legislative effectiveness as "the proven ability to advance a member's agenda items through the legislative process and into law" (2014, p. 18). Scholars have primarily analyzed the legislative effectiveness of two underrepresented groups—women and Black legislators—in the U.S. Congress (Volden et al. 2013; Volden & Wiseman 2014). Importantly, scholarship shows that legislative effectiveness varies between minority groups. Minority legislators are not uniformly less effective than non-minority legislators, rather their effectiveness is uniquely shaped by their descriptive identity. Therefore, while considering the legislative effectiveness will likely be unique.

Volden and Wiseman (2014) find that women legislators when in the minority party, are more effective than male legislators. When in the majority party, however, women are equally effective as male legislators (Volden et al. 2013). Women legislators are particularly effective at the consensus-building portions of the lawmaking process like committee and floor action (Volden & Wiseman 2014; Volden et al. 2013). Volden et al. attribute women's increased effectiveness at

consensus-building stages of the legislative process to behavioral differences between genders women are more collaborative than their male colleagues (Volden et al. 2013).

Black legislators, however, are less effective than white legislators when Democrats are in the majority party (Volden & Wiseman 2014). Black lawmakers are equally as effective as White legislators when in the minority party. Volden & Wiseman (2014) theorize that this is a result of American American legislators having a more specialized legislative agenda.

Given prior findings on the effectiveness of underrepresented groups, I expect that the legislative effectiveness of workers will differ in important ways from women and Black legislators. Additionally, I expect that the intersection of descriptive identities—like race, gender, and class will shape the effectiveness of workers. For example, Barnes et al. (2021) examine the policy priorities of female working-class legislators—or pink-collar legislators—in state legislatures, and find that the pink-collar legislators are more supportive of education and social service spending.

To date, however, only one study has considered the effectiveness of working-class legislators. Carnes (2013) examines measures of legislative entrepreneurship for economic policy in the U.S. Congress and finds that workers sponsor and cosponsor more economic legislation than whitecollar legislators; however, they are not more effective at passing economic policy than white-collar legislators.

I provide a more robust analysis of working-class legislative effectiveness in two ways. First, I consider legislative effectiveness across all policies areas rather than just economic policy. Second, rather than examining workers in the U.S. Congress, I analyze state legislatures. State legislatures are a useful laboratory for my analysis in several ways. Workers have greater numerical representation across state legislatures (Carnes 2016), which will provide greater variance in levels of representation to examine. Additionally, state legislatures are optimal for analyzing variation in professionalism (Mooney 1994; Squire & Hamm 2005; Bowen & Green 2014), term limits (Thompson 1993; Carey 1998; Kousser 2005; Olson & Rogowski 2005), super-majoritarian institutions, polarization (Kirkland 2014; Shor 2015; Banda & Kirkland 2018; Masket 2019) and diversity (Squire 1992; Bratton 2002; Bratton 2005; Reingold 2019).

Class-Based Legislative Effectiveness

There are several reasons why we may expect workers to be less effective lawmakers than white-collar legislators. First, as Alexander Hamilton argued, workers may be less effective than white-collar legislators because they lack the skills to legislate. Working-class legislators, prior to their time in the legislature, spent their professional lives engaging in manual labor, clerical, and service-based jobs. The skill set required in these jobs is certainly different from that of a legislator. Though this argument may have intuitive appeal, scholars have found no empirical evidence supporting this claim (Carnes 2013, Carnes 2016, Carnes & Lupu 2016). Scholars have found that workers, when running for political office, are equally as qualified as affluent candidates (Carnes 2018). And, once they are elected to legislatures, they introduce and cosponsor more economic legislation than white-collar legislators (Carnes 2013). Therefore, I expect that if a class-based effectiveness gap does exist, it will not be a result of a skill differential between workers and white-collar legislators.

Second, workers may be less effective than white-collar legislators because they are numerically underrepresented in political institutions. The policy preferences of white-collar lawmakers who occupy 94% of the seats across state legislatures—are certainly more advantaged throughout the lawmaking process than the policy preferences of working-class legislators. Given that workers only occupy 6% of seats across state legislatures, it is reasonable to expect that the numerical underrepresentation of the working class may limit their ability to develop coalitions around their working-class identity, and thus impede their ability to become effective lawmakers.

Despite theoretical expectations that support a class-based effectiveness gap, there are also reasons to expect workers and white-collar legislators to be equally effective. First, Carnes (2018) argues that working-class candidates face many obstacles, most notably the cash ceiling, when running for elected office. Workers typically do not have the financial resources required to sustain a two-year-long campaign. Some workers, however, overcome this cash ceiling and win elections. To overcome the many structural barriers baked into the American political system, workers often have to be more qualified than white-collar candidates (Carnes 2018). Therefore, when workers

do win elections to legislatures, they are likely to be equally or more skilled legislators than whitecollar representatives. Indeed, scholars have shown that positive selection boosts the legislative effectiveness of other underrepresented groups, like women (Anzia & Berry 2011).

Second, recent work on minority representation in state legislatures has found that, proportional to their seat share in the legislature, workers are equally represented in legislative leadership positions as white-collar legislators (Hansen & Clark 2020). If workers are proportionally represented in legislative leadership positions, like committee chairs and party leaders, we may expect that they earned these positions by demonstrating that they are effective lawmakers. Similarly, acquiring a legislative leadership position could facilitate increased effectiveness (Volden & Wiseman 2014). Therefore, if workers are gaining access to positions of power, they may indeed be equally effective at lawmaking. I return to this empirical question in the next section.

The current literature provides mixed expectations for whether a class-based effectiveness gap exists in state legislatures. However, these mixed expectations could be a result of failing to consider how the institutional and contextual variance across state legislatures moderates the effectiveness of working-class legislators.

Critical mass theory argues that a threshold of legislators from an underrepresented group must be numerically represented in a legislature to pass substantive policies that would benefit that group (Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers 2007; Bratton 2005). Scholars of critical mass theory have argued that the threshold for descriptive representation to produce substantive representation could be as low as 15% and as high as 40%. Currently, workers occupy only 6% of seats across state legislatures. Why might an underrepresentation of workers produce less effective lawmakers? One reason is that the underrepresentation of a minority group may inhibit opportunities for legislative collaboration (Fowler 2006; Kirkland 2011; Kirkland 2012; Kirkland 2014; Kirkland & Gross 2014; Holman & Mahoney 2018). Indeed, scholars have shown that increased collaboration is associated with higher legislative effectiveness scores (Battaglini 2020). Therefore, when numerical representation increases, I expect workers' legislative effectiveness will also increase. *H1 (Numeric Representation)*: Working-class legislators will be more effective in state legislatures where workers have greater numerical representation.

Second, extant literature suggests that white-collar and working-class legislators have equal access to leadership positions within state legislatures (Hansen & Clark 2020). Volden and Wiseman (2014) find that lawmakers who serve on power committees, as committee chairs, or as party leaders, are more effective than rank-and-file legislators. Given this, I expect that workers, when proportionally represented in legislative leadership positions, will be equally as effective as white-collar legislators.

H2 (Legislative Leadership Positions): Working-class legislators, when proportionally represented in legislative leadership positions, will be equally as effective as white-collar legislators.

Finally, I expect that institutional features that vary across state legislatures, like term limits and professionalism, will moderate the effectiveness of working-class legislators. First, the number of terms that a legislator is allowed to serve may influence effectiveness (Bucchianeri et al. 2020; Kousser 2005; Carey et al. 2009). Term limits create more turnover in both rank-and-file legis-lators and representatives in positions of power. This turnover could act as a "reset button" that allows working-class legislators to win elections to legislatures and to acquire positions of power within legislatures. If term limits allow working-class representatives to gain access to positions of institutional power, like committee chairs and party leaders, we should expect to see their effectiveness increase. The prior scholarship on term limits, however, is mixed. Scholars have found that term-limited state legislatures are comprised of more minority legislators (Casellas 2011; Darcy et al. 1994). Other studies, however, have found that term limits do not affect whether underrepresented groups serve in state legislatures (Carey et al. 2006). Recently, Hansen and Clark (2020) find that term-limited state legislatures do not see more minority groups acquiring party leader-

ship positions. Therefore, given these mixed findings, I do not expect term limits to moderate the effectiveness of working-class legislators.

Second, professionalism is associated with legislative effectiveness in state legislatures (Bucchianeri et al. 2020). Bucchianeri et al. (2020) find that increased staff and salary promote the power of individual rank-and-file legislators rather than party leaders and committee chairs. Increased session length, in contrast, results in strong majority party and committee chair powers. Additionally, Carnes and Hansen (2016) find that professional legislatures, those legislatures that pay legislators more, attract wealthy politicians rather than workers. They conclude that professionalism "crowds out" working-class legislators (Carnes & Hansen 2016). Given this, I expect increased session length will decrease the effectiveness of working-class legislators, while greater staff and salary will increase the effectiveness of workers.

H3 (State Legislative Institutions): Term limits will not moderate the effectiveness of workers. Increased session length will decrease workers' legislative effectiveness, while increased salary and staff will increase workers' legislative effectiveness.

Data & Measurement

To test my hypotheses, I pair pre-legislature occupational data for over 14,000 unique state legislators (Makse 2019) with Bucchianeri, Volden, and Wiseman's (2020) state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES). The data set includes 51,951 legislator-term specific observations for 49 states from 1987-2017. ³

SLES are constructed similarly to legislative effective scores (LES) used to measure effectiveness in the U.S. Congress (Volden et al. 2013; Volden & Wiseman 2014). SLES, like LES, capture the weighted average of a legislator's actions throughout five stages of the lawmaking process: bill introduction, action in committee (AIC), action beyond committee (ABC), passing one cham-

³SLES for four states appear in the data set post-2003: Massachusetts (2009), Nebraska (2007), Oregon (2007), and Rhode Island (2007). SLES do not exist for Kansas due to insufficient data.

ber (PASS), and becoming law (LAW). Therefore, these scores evaluate effectiveness throughout the entirety of the legislative process, rather than simply analyzing roll-call votes. Additionally, SLES are weighted to reflect the substance and significance of the legislation. This means that commemorative/symbolic legislation counts less than substantive and significant legislation when computing a legislator's SLES.⁴

To operationalize social class, I use pre-legislature occupational data (Makse 2019). Legislators are coded as workers if their most recent pre-legislature occupation "required little material security or formal education" (Carnes 2012, p. 21). I use occupational background to operationalize social class because it is arguably the best predictor of individuals' income and social status (Matthews 1954; Hout 2008, cited in Carnes 2012) and it has become convention in the study of social class (Makse 2019; Carnes 2013). These include manual labor, service-industry, public safety, and retail workers (Makse 2019; Carnes 2012; Carnes 2013). A full list of working-class and white-collar occupations can be found in the appendix.

One potential imitation of this data is that I only have occupational data for the most recent pre-legislature occupation for each legislator. Therefore, this data cannot distinguish legislators who worked in a working-class occupation prior to working in a white-collar occupation. For example, a legislator who worked as a retail worker for five years before transitioning into a job in real estate will be coded as white-collar. Given that I am perhaps measuring a smaller pool of working-class legislators than what may exist, I expect the relationship between social class and legislative effectiveness in this analysis to be a conservative estimate.

I condition on several covariates that likely influence legislators' effectiveness. I include demographic covariates, like race, gender, and party identification.⁵ Additionally, I include chamberspecific covariates, like seniority, vote share, majority party status, governor's party, leadership

⁴See the appendix and Bucchinaeri et al. (2020) for a more detailed explanation of how SLES scores are calculated.

⁵Barnes et al. (2021) have argued that pink-collar workers—female workers— are theoretically and empirically distinct from blue-collar workers. I investigate whether gender moderates workers' effectiveness and find that the interaction term is statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that a workers' gender does not influence their legislative effectiveness (see appendix).

positions, and polarization. Finally, I include state and term fixed effects to control for variation specific to each state legislature and term.

Results

Are Workers Effective Lawmakers?

I first consider whether a class-based effectiveness gap exists within legislatures across the American states. I estimate an OLS regression model using clustered standard errors. The dependent variable is state legislative effectiveness scores, and the independent variable is a dichotomous "Worker" variable (coded 1 for working-class). As Table 1 shows, all else equal, workers are on average 0.026 times less effective than white-collar legislators. However, the magnitude of the relationship is small and statistically insignificant. Further, each stage of the legislative process— bill introduction, action in committee (AIC), action beyond committee (ABC), passing chamber (PASS), and becoming law (LAW)—are all positive and statistically insignificant. Further, these results hold regardless of whether workers are in the majority or minority party. Therefore, this provides suggestive evidence that there is not a class-based effectiveness gap—working-class and white-collar legislators are equally effective throughout the lawmaking process.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES
Worker	0.000275	0.0000487	0.000257	0.000525	0.000575	-0.0263
	(0.63)	(0.11)	(0.54)	(1.02)	(1.04)	(-0.99)
Female	-0.0000693	0.000508	0.000617*	0.000710*	0.000810**	0.00840
	(-0.27)	(1.83)	(2.25)	(2.54)	(2.65)	(0.52)
Black	-0.00257*	-0.00313*	-0.00279*	-0.00258*	-0.00215	0.0685
	(-2.15)	(-2.52)	(-2.21)	(-2.03)	(-1.42)	(0.98)
			0.000.000	0.000.400	0.0004.40	
Hispanic	-0.000428	-0.000985	-0.000507	-0.000429	-0.000149	(2.67)
	(=0.39)	(-0.85)	(-0.45)	(-0.55)	(-0.11)	(2.07)
Race (Other)	-0.00143	-0.00136	-0.00118	-0.00529**	-0.00587**	-0.0646
	(-0.58)	(-0.63)	(-0.52)	(-2.69)	(-2.92)	(-0.52)
White	-0.00143	-0.00178	-0.00145	-0.00137	-0.000949	0.162**
	(-1.42)	(-1.66)	(-1.33)	(-1.26)	(-0.75)	(2.81)
Democrat	0.000228	-0.000816***	-0.000869***	-0.000989***	-0.00100***	-0.0277*
Beniotiat	(1.05)	(-3.53)	(-3.66)	(-4.05)	(-3.83)	(-1.98)
Seniority	0.0000299	0.0000130	0.000000153	-0.0000106	0.0000238	0.0168***
	(0.67)	(0.28)	(0.00)	(-0.24)	(0.49)	(5.72)
Committee Chair	0.00568***	0.00754***	0.00852***	0.00893***	0.00892***	0.518***
	(24.41)	(28.16)	(29.82)	(29.92)	(27.03)	(30.63)
Majority Party	0.00240***	0.00432***	0.00472***	0.00500***	0.00439***	0.358***
	(9.50)	(15.07)	(16.09)	(18.71)	(15.12)	(20.41)
Governor Same Party	0.000580***	0.000737***	0.000631**	0.000750***	0.00123***	0 0333**
Governor Same Farty	(3.39)	(4.00)	(3.19)	(3.76)	(5.76)	(2.97)
	()	((,		(,
Majority Leadership	0.00295***	0.00409***	0.00508***	0.00561***	0.00578***	0.178***
	(4.46)	(5.59)	(6.38)	(6.95)	(6.92)	(4.75)
Minority Leadership	0.00252**	0.00211*	0.00173	0.000638	0.000451	0.108**
	(3.22)	(2.18)	(1.73)	(0.98)	(0.64)	(2.94)
Polarization	-0.000130	-0.00122***	-0.00203***	-0.00226***	-0.00259***	-0.168***
	(-0.53)	(-4.38)	(-7.04)	(-10.03)	(-10.80)	(-10.62)
Leader Sneaker President	0.000252	0.00123	0.00197	0.00321*	0.00433*	-0.0217
Leader, Speaker, President	(0.23)	(0.97)	(1.41)	(2.12)	(2.50)	(-0.32)
	(0.20)	(00,1)	()	()	()	(
Professionalism	-0.00771***	-0.00711***	-0.00703***	-0.00708***	-0.00685***	-0.0687
	(-10.41)	(-9.24)	(-9.15)	(-8.87)	(-7.74)	(-1.22)
Vote Share	-0.00203***	-0.00204***	-0.00193***	-0.00155**	-0.00160**	0.0298
	(-4.89)	(-4.06)	(-3.64)	(-3.00)	(-2.83)	(1.02)
Senate	0.0142***	0.0135***	0.0131***	0.0132***	0.0131***	-0.164***
	(46.57)	(43.09)	(40.74)	(40.32)	(37.60)	(-10.14)
T	0.00204**	0.00000	0.00100	0.000250	0.00077	0.100*
Intercept	-0.00386**	-0.00203	-0.00198	-0.00259	-0.00276	-0.180*
State Fixed Effects	(-2.93)	(-1.46)	(-1.40)	(-1.80)	(-1.69)	(-2.08)
Term Fixed Effects	* ./	* ./	· ·	* ./	· ·	, ,
N	48220	48220	48220	48220	48220	48220
Adjusted-R ²	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.25	0.18

Table 1: Workers Legislative Effectiveness Throughout The Legislative Process

t statistics in parentheses

A statistically insignificant effect, however, is not necessarily a negligible effect (Rainey 2014). A regression coefficient may be statistically insignificant for reasons other than the absence of a relationship between a set of variables. For example, a small sample size can result in large error estimates that might make a large effect statistically insignificant (Rainey 2014). To ensure that my insignificant results are indeed negligible, meaning that working-class and white-collar legislators are equally effective lawmakers, I follow the advice of Rainey (2014) and (1) define a contextually specific negligible legislative effectiveness score (-m and m) and (2) use a 90% confidence interval to examine whether the estimated confidence interval falls within the zone of negligibility (-m and m).

I define the zone of negligibility as a SLES between -0.075 and 0.075. I justify this decision in two ways. First, the SLES variable ranges from -2.9 to 9.9. An effectiveness score that falls within the range of -0.075 and 0.075 is only 20% of a standard deviation. Second, I descriptively analyze effectiveness scores that differ by 0.075 and find no substantive difference among such legislators. Said differently, an effectiveness gap of 0.075 does not meaningfully explain any variation in a legislators' effectiveness. Therefore, given that the zone of negligibility is defined in a way that is contextually specific to my data, I plot estimates and their confidence intervals and analyze whether they fall within this zone (-0.075 and 0.075). If the confidence intervals fall within the zone of negligibility, we can be confident that the insignificant results are truly null (Rainey 2014).

Figure 1 shows the point estimate and confidence intervals for estimates using clustered standard errors, bootstrapped standard errors, and median regression. Given that state legislative data is particularly likely to have clustered groups and heavy-tailed distributions, I replicate my results using clustered and bootstrapped standard errors and median regression. I use clustered standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors to ensure that the grouped nature of the data does not produce unmodeled correlations that result in a downward bias in standard errors estimates (Harden 2011). Additionally, I replicate the OLS results using median regression to ensure that the heavytailed error term does not produce inefficient estimates (Harden & Desmarais 2011). All four estimates and confidence intervals are similar in magnitude and fall within the zone of negligibility. This means that, across four different models, the 90% confidence intervals only include estimates within the zone of negligilibity. Therefore, consistent with the findings in Table 2, I conclude that there is no meaningful effectiveness gap between working-class and white-collar legislators in my sample.



Figure 1: Negligible Class-Based Effectiveness Gap

Institutions

Given historical perspectives on the capabilities of the working-class, the null results uncovered in the previous analysis may be surprising. To both ensure that the effect of working-class backgrounds on legislative effectiveness is truly null and to explain this result, I examine variance in workers' effectiveness across institutional and contextual arrangements. This ensures that the precisely estimated null result is not masking institutional-level variation in workers' effectiveness. It could be the case that the effectiveness of working-class legislators is negative in some institutional environments, while positive in others.

First, I examine whether the numerical representation of workers within a chamber influences their legislative effectiveness. I expect that as the numerical representation of workers increases, so will their effectiveness. I estimate a similar regression model as Table 1; however, I include an interaction term between the percentage of workers in a state legislature and the worker dummy

variable.⁶ Interactions terms are used for conditional hypotheses, like my own, to illustrate how the relationship between an independent and dependent variable differs in the presence of a moderating variable (Brambor et al. 2005). Therefore, I analyze how the legislative effectiveness (dependent variable) of workers (independent variable) is moderated by the percentage of workers' in a legislature (moderating variable). Given the complexity of interpreting interaction effects from regression models, I visualize this relationship using a marginal effect plot in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Average Marginal Effect of Worker Given The Percentage of Worker in Chamber for



Worker

As the percentage of workers in a legislature increases from 1% to 21%, the average effectiveness of working-class legislators increases by approximately 0.1 times. Though the relationship is positive, the magnitude of the relationship is small and not statistically distinguishable from zero. Therefore, while the relationship is in the expected direction, this finding offers only suggestive support for H1.

Second, I consider the influence that legislative leadership positions—like serving on a power committee, as a committee chair, or as a party leader—may have on the legislative effectiveness of workers.⁷ I have three expectations for how legislative leadership positions should moderate

⁶The full regression model including the interaction term can be found in the appendix.

⁷Power committees are committees related to rules, appropriations, budget, and finance (Bucchianeri et al. 2020).

legislative effectiveness for workers. First, I expect, consistent with extant research, that workers will have equal access to leadership positions as white-collar legislators (Hansen & Clark 2020). Second, I expect that workers in legislative leadership positions will be more effective than rankand-file workers. Third, I expect that when workers are in legislative leadership positions, they will be equally as effective as white-collar legislators in legislative leadership positions. Volden and Wiseman (2014, p. 37) have found that the average effectiveness score of committee chairs is significantly higher than rank-and-file members. Therefore, if workers are systematically disadvantaged from serving in legislative leadership, I expect that they will be less effective. Table 2 shows the percentage of workers, proportional to their representation in the chamber, that serve on power committees, as committee chairs, and as party leaders relative to white-collar legislators. There is striking equality of representation in these positions of institutional power. For example, 9% of white-collar state legislatures serve as party leaders, whereas 7% of working-class state legislators serve as party leaders. A chi-squared test of difference shows that the representation of working-class and white-collar legislators in legislative leadership positions is not statistically different (p-value=0.000). Thus, on average, workers are not disproportionally underrepresented in state legislative leadership positions.

	White-Collar	Worker
Power Committee	47.2%	38.1%
Committee Chair	28.2%	24.7%
Party Leader	9%	7%
N	48,357	3,572

Table 2: Percentage of Workers in Legislative Leadership Positions

Are workers who serve as committee chairs more effective than rank-and-file workers? Table 3 reports an OLS regression model that is subsetted to include only workers with SLES as the

dependent variable. The three independent variables of interest are power committee, committee chair, and party leader.

Table 3: Workers' Effectiveness in Legislative Leadership Positions

	SLES
Power Committee	0.0867*
	(2.02)
Committee Chair	0.519***
	(8.09)
Leader	0.395***
	(3.38)
Female	-0.125*
	(-2.09)
Democrat	-0.106*
	(-2.23)
Black	-0.0547
	(-0.20)
Hispanic	-0.172
	(-0.64)
Race (Other)	-0.0954
	(-0.48)
White	-0.170
	(-0.91)
Seniority	0.0244*
	(2.10)
Majority Party	0.512***
	(11.97)
Govenor Same Party	-0.0528
	(-1.31)
Professionalism	-0.101
	(-0.46)
Vote Share	0.0160
	(0.17)
Senate	-0.175**
	(-2.84)
Term Limits	0.0811
	(1.34)
Intercept	0.0897
	(0.36)
State Fixed Effects	1
Term Fixed Effects	2407
IN	3407

Serving on a power committee, all else equal, increases workers effectiveness by .087 (p-value=0.04). Serving as a committee chair, all else equal, increases workers effectiveness by 0.52 times (p-value=0.000). Serving as a party leader, all else equal, increases workers legislative effectiveness by 0.40 (p-value=0.000). Therefore, workers are more effective than rank-and-file workers when they serve in legislative leadership positions. Power committees increase this effectiveness the least, whereas serving as a committee chair or party leader increase effectiveness more. Workers serving as committee chairs are considerably more effective than rank-and-file workers. Therefore, these findings lend partial support to H2.

Are workers more effective than white-collar legislators when they serve in legislative leadership positions? Figures 3 plots the average marginal effect of serving on a power committee, as a committee chair, and as a party leader (coded as 1).⁸ The average marginal effect plots below estimates the legislative effectiveness for workers, relative to white-collar legislators, conditional on whether they are in a legislative leadership position. Said differently, the average marginal effect plots below display the relationship between two regression estimates: (1) workers' effectiveness when they are not in a legislative leadership position and (2) workers' effectiveness when they are in a legislative leadership position. As shown below, serving on a power committee or as a committee chair results in workers being marginally more effective than white-collar legislators, though this relationship is not statistically significant. The most drastic effect, however, is when workers serve as party leaders. Workers serving as party leaders are approximately 0.3 times (p-value=0.017) more effective than white-collar legislators serving in party leadership positions.

⁸The regression table for models with interaction terms can be found in the appendix.



Figure 3: Average Marginal Effect of Legislative Leadership Positions for Worker

Overall, these analyses lend support for H2. Examining institutions within state legislatures, like leadership positions, shows that workers are not only equally effective as white-collar legislators, but they are also equally represented in legislative leadership positions. Workers who are committee chairs and party leaders are more effective than rank-and-file workers. And workers, when serving as party leaders, are significantly more effective than white-collar legislators serving in party leadership positions.

Finally, I consider whether institutional variation across state legislatures moderates the effectiveness of the working-class lawmakers. To analyze this, I examine the average marginal effect of term limits and legislative professionalism on workers' effectiveness. I expect that term limits will not increase the legislative effectiveness of workers. As for professionalism, I expect that increased session length will reduce the legislative effectiveness of workers, while greater salary and staff will increase their effectiveness.

Figure 4 displays the average marginal effect of legislative effectiveness for workers conditional on whether the legislature is term-limited (coded as 1). As shown below, term limits do not appear to moderate the legislative effectiveness of workers. Working-class legislators and white-collar legislators are equally effective in the presence or absence of term limits.





Next, I consider whether legislative professionalism moderates the legislative effectiveness of workers. Figure 5 visualizes the average marginal effect of legislative effectiveness for workers conditional on the professionalization of the legislature. To operationalize legislative professionalism, I use the squire index. Figure 5 shows that, as a legislature becomes more professional, the legislative effectiveness of workers increases by approximately 0.06 times. This positive relationship is quite small and is statistically insignificant. It is possible, however, that the composite squire index measure of legislative professionalism is masking variation within each of the three individual measures of professionalism.



Figure 5: Average Marginal Effect of Professionalism for Worker

To examine this, I break apart the squire index into its three individual measures: session length, salary, and number of staff. I estimate the average marginal effect for each of these measures. Figure 6 presents these estimates. As shown below, increased session length results in a decreased legislative effectiveness of approximately 0.1 times. Conversely, in legislatures that provide more staff and salary workers are approximately 0.1 times more effective, though neither of these results is statistically significant. Therefore, while the individual measures of professionalism appear to influence workers' effectiveness differently, all three measures fall short of statistical significance. I consider whether additional sources of institutional and contextual variation across state legislatures like chamber, seniority, and filibuster thresholds moderate workers' effectiveness. Consistent with my prior findings, these institutions do not moderate workers' effectiveness (see appendix).



Figure 6: Average Marginal Effect of Salary, Staff, and Session Length for Worker

Discussion

This article addressed two questions. Does a class-based effectiveness gap exist in state legislatures? And does institutional and contextual variation across state legislatures moderate workers' effectiveness? I find no evidence supporting a class-based effectiveness gap in state legislatures. Indeed, I provide evidence of a negligible effect between working-class and white-collar legislative effectiveness. White-collar and working-class legislators appear to be equally effective throughout each stage of the lawmaking process, regardless of whether they are in the majority or minority party. Further, I find that workers are more effective than white-collar legislators when they are party leaders. Otherwise, I find little evidence that institutions are considerably moderating the effectiveness of working-class legislators. I conclude that working-class legislators are no different than their white-collar colleagues across a wide array of institutional settings.

First, workers in legislatures with the highest share of working-class legislators do not appear to be significantly more effective than workers in the most class-imbalanced legislatures. Why might increased numerical representation not result in a more drastic, or statistically significant, increase in legislative effectiveness? One possible explanation is that even in legislatures with the greatest numerical representation of workers (21%), the critical mass threshold required to increase effectiveness has not yet been reached. Critical mass theory argues that the threshold for representation to produce substantive benefits for the descriptive group could be anywhere from 15% to 40% (Bratton 2005). We know that, on average, workers only occupy 6% of seats across state legislatures. Thus, to observe a more drastic increase in legislative effectiveness, workers may still need more numeric representation across state legislatures. Another explanation is that increased numerical representation may lead to increased effectiveness for workers in specific policy areas, rather than across all policy areas. Unfortunately, SLES are not yet available by policy area. We might expect, however, that increased numerical representation of workers could lead to increased effectiveness in policy areas that are directly related to social class, like economic and labor policy. Indeed, Carnes (2012) finds that workers in the U.S. Congress introduce and cosponsor more economic legislation than their white-collar colleagues.

I also examine whether legislative institutions within state legislatures, like legislative leadership positions, moderated the legislative effectiveness of workers. I find, consistent with Hansen and Clark (2020), that workers are not systematically underrepresented in state legislative leadership positions. When workers do occupy legislative leadership positions, they are more effective lawmakers. Workers who become party leaders are significantly more effective than white-collar party leaders and rank-and-file legislators. Why might working-class party leaders be more effective than white-collar party leaders and rank-and-file legislators? It could be the case that workers, when they become party leaders, are more involved in bill sponsorship, cosponsorship, committee, and floor action. If workers are underrepresented in the legislature, a working-class party leader may need to have a hands-on approach to guide their preferred legislation throughout the lawmaking process. Overall, the evidence supports H2.

Finally, I consider whether institutions that vary across state legislatures moderate the effectiveness of the working class. I find that term limits do not influence workers' effectiveness. Likewise, I find that legislative professionalism does not significantly moderate the effectiveness of workers. I break the composite measure of professionalism into its three components: session length, salary, and staff. Although I find evidence of cross-cutting relationships—increased session length decreases workers' effectiveness while increases salary and staff increase workers' effectiveness these estimates are not statistically significant. Thus, I find no support for H3.

Taken together, two primary conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, workers are equally effective lawmakers as white-collar legislators. Despite Alexander Hamilton's claim that legislating should be left to the merchant class of society, this analysis has shown that workers are just as effective as white-collar lawmakers. Second, workers and white-collar legislators appear to be equally effective despite institutional variation. While I do find that party leadership positions increase workers' effectiveness relative to white-collar party leaders, most institutions examined in this analysis do not highlight a class-based effectiveness gap. Indeed, the absence of a class-based effectiveness gap across various institutional and contextual arrangements should increase our confidence that workers and white-collar legislators are equally effective lawmakers.

Conclusions

This article makes several contributions to the representation, social class, and legislative effectiveness literature. To my knowledge, this article is the first empirical work to consider the legislative effectiveness of workers in state legislatures. Considering workers' effectiveness in state legislatures broadens the scope of the legislative effectiveness literature and provides more institutional and contextual variation. Most broadly, my findings are consistent with other scholarly works that consider the legislative effectiveness of minority groups. Minority groups in legislatures are not systematically less effective than majority groups (Volden & Wiseman 2014).

These findings suggest several implications for representation and institutional design. This

analysis demonstrates that, in line with Carnes (2013, 2018), workers are not numerically underrepresented in legislatures because they are ineffective legislators. Rather, the bottleneck that inhibits class-balanced legislatures is a pipeline problem that materializes during elections (Carnes 2018). This analysis has provided evidence that workers are effective lawmakers, and that their effectiveness would likely increase in the presence of more working-class legislators.

This analysis focused broadly on the legislative effectiveness of workers and, as a result, many questions remain. I note two remaining questions for future scholarship to consider. First, political scientists should consider whether workers' effectiveness varies by policy area. Are workers more effective when sponsoring, cosponsoring, and passing economic and labor policy? Extant research suggests that this may be the case (Carnes 2013).

Second, scholars should consider whether and how working-class legislators are different from working-class candidates and citizens. Carnes (2018) argues that workers have to navigate an incredibly difficult, and structurally biased, campaign process to win elections to legislatures. It is plausible that those workers who successfully win campaigns are systematically different from workers who do not win (or run for) elected office. Given that this article only seeks to examine the legislative effectiveness of working-class legislators, this question is beyond the scope of this analysis; however, if this is true, my analysis may only speak to one type of worker—those that win elections. I do not, however, expect that this is the case. Carnes (2018) finds that, unlike female candidates, there is not an ambition gap between working-class candidates and working-class are structural (recruitment and resources) and not a result of individual qualities of working-class candidates (qualifications and ambition) (Carnes 2018). Thus, we may expect that working-class candidates are quite similar to working-class legislators. Regardless, future scholarship should address this empirical question.

References

- Anzia, Sarah F and Christopher R Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):478–493.
- Banda, Kevin K and Justin H Kirkland. 2018. "Legislative Party Polarization and Trust in State Legislatures." *American Politics Research* 46(4):596–628.
- Barnes, Tiffany D, Victoria D Beall and Mirya R Holman. 2021. "Pink-Collar Representation and Budgetary Outcomes in US States." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46(1):119–154.
- Battaglini, Marco, Valerio Leone Sciabolazza and Eleonora Patacchini. 2020. "Effectiveness of Connected Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 64(4):739–756.
- Beckwith, Karen and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers. 2007. "Sheer Numbers: Critical Representation Thresholds And Women's Political Representation." *Perspectives on Politics* 5(3):553–565.
- Bowen, Daniel C and Zachary Greene. 2014. "Should We Measure Professionalism With An Index? A Note on Theory and Practice in State Legislative Professionalism Research." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 14(3):277–296.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses." *Political Analysis* 14(1):63–82.
- Bratton, Kathleen A. 2002. "The Effect of Legislative Diversity on Agenda Setting: Evidence from Six State Legislatures." *American Politics Research* 30(2):115–142.
- Bratton, Kathleen A. 2005. "Critical Mass Theory Revisited: The Behavior and Success of Token Women in State Legislatures." *Politics & Gender* 1(1):97–125.
- Bucchianeri, Peter, Craig Volden and Alan E Wiseman. 2020. "Legislative Effectiveness in the American States." *Center for Effective Lawmaking* pp. 1–51.
- Carey, John M. 1998. Term Limits and Legislative Representation. Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, John M, Richard G Niemi and Lynda W Powell. 2009. *Term Limits in State Legislatures*. University of Michigan Press.
- Carey, John M, Richard G Niemi, Lynda W Powell and Gary F Moncrief. 2006. "The Effects of

Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(1):105–134.

- Carnes, Nicholas. 2012. "Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 37(1):5–34.
- Carnes, Nicholas. 2013. White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making. University of Chicago Press.
- Carnes, Nicholas. 2016. "Why Are There So Few Working-Class People In Political Office? Evidence from State Legislatures." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4(1):84–109.

Carnes, Nicholas. 2018. The Cash Ceiling. Princeton University Press.

- Carnes, Nicholas and Eric R Hansen. 2016. "Does Paying Politicians More Promote Economic Diversity in Legislatures?" *American Political Science Review* 110(4):699–716.
- Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. 2015. "Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):1–18.
- Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. 2016. "Do Voters Dislike Working-Class Candidates? Voter Biases and the Descriptive Underrepresentation of the Working Class." *American Political Science Review* 110(4):832–844.
- Casellas, Jason. 2011. "Latinas in Legislatures: The Conditions and Strategies of Political Incorporation." *Aztlán: A Journal of Chicano Studies* 36(1):171–189.
- Darcy, Robert. 1994. Women, Elections, and Representation. Vol. 1 U of Nebraska Press.
- Fowler, James H. 2006. "Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks." *Political Analysis* 14(4):456–487.
- Hamilton, Alexander et al. 1788. "The Federalist Papers: No. 35." January 5:1788.
- Hansen, Eric R and Christopher J Clark. 2020. "Diversity In Party Leadership in State Legislatures." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 20(1):81–107.
- Harden, Jeffrey J. 2011. "A Bootstrap Method for Conducting Statistical Inference With Clustered Data." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 11(2):223–246.

Harden, Jeffrey J and Bruce A Desmarais. 2011. "Linear Models With Outliers: Choosing Be-

tween Conditional-Mean and Conditional-Median Methods." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 11(4):371–389.

- Hitt, Matthew P, Craig Volden and Alan E Wiseman. 2017. "Spatial Models of Legislative Effectiveness." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3):575–590.
- Holman, Mirya R and Anna Mahoney. 2018. "Stop, Collaborate, and Listen: Women's Collaboration in US State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 43(2):179–206.
- Hout, Michael. 2008. "How Class Works: Objective and Subjective Aspects of Class Since the 1970s." *Social class: How does it work* pp. 25–64.
- Kirkland, Justin H. 2011. "The Relational Determinants of Legislative Outcomes: Strong and Weak Ties Between Legislators." *The Journal of Politics* 73(3):887–898.
- Kirkland, Justin H. 2012. "Multimember Districts' Effect on Collaboration between US State Legislators." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 37(3):329–353.
- Kirkland, Justin H. 2014*a*. "Chamber Size Effects on the Collaborative Structure of Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(2):169–198.
- Kirkland, Justin H. 2014*b*. "Ideological Heterogeneity and Legislative Polarization in the United States." *Political Research Quarterly* 67(3):533–546.
- Kirkland, Justin H and Justin H Gross. 2014. "Measurement and Theory in Legislative Networks: The Evolving Topology of Congressional Collaboration." *Social Networks* 36:97–109.
- Kousser, Thad. 2005. *Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Makse, Todd. 2019. "Professional Backgrounds in State Legislatures, 1993-2012." *State Politics* & *Policy Quarterly* 19(3):312–333.
- Masket, Seth. 2019. "What Is, and Isn't, Causing Polarization in Modern State Legislatures." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 52(3):430–435.
- Matthews, Donald R. 1954. "United States Senators and the Class Structure." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 18(1):5–22.
- Matthews, Donald R. 1959. "The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness." *American Political Science Review* 53(4):1064–1089.

- Mooney, Christopher Z. 1994. "Measuring US State Legislative Professionalism: An Evaluation of Five Indices." *State & Local Government Review* pp. 70–78.
- Olson, Michael P and Jon C Rogowski. 2020. "Legislative Term Limits and Polarization." *The Journal of Politics* 82(2):572–586.
- Rainey, Carlisle. 2014. "Arguing For A Negligible Effect." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4):1083–1091.
- Reingold, Beth. 2019. "Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Representation in State Legislatures." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 52(3):426–429.
- Shor, Boris, James A Thurber and Antoine Yoshinaka. 2015. "Polarization in American State Legislatures." *American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization* pp. 203–21.
- Squire, Peverill. 1992. "Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* pp. 69–79.
- Squire, Peverill and Keith E Hamm. 2005. *101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures, and the Future of Legislative Studies*. Ohio State University Press.
- Stacy, Darrian. 2020. Wealth and Policymaking in the U.S. House of Representatives. APSA.
- Thompson, Joel A and Gary F Moncrief. 1993. "The Implications of Term Limits for Women and Minorities: Some Evidence from the States." *Social science quarterly*.
- Volden, Craig and Alan E Wiseman. 2014. *Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress: The Lawmakers*. Cambridge university press.
- Volden, Craig and Alan E Wiseman. 2018. "Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Senate." *The Journal of Politics* 80(2):731–735.
- Volden, Craig, Alan E Wiseman and Dana E Wittmer. 2013. "When Are Women More Effective Lawmakers Than Men?" *American Journal of Political Science* 57(2):326–341.
- Weissert, Carol S. 1991. "Issue Salience and State Legislative Effectiveness." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* pp. 509–520.

Appendix

Contents

1	Occi	upational Categories	31
2	Com	nputing State Legislative Effectiveness Scores	32
3	Desc	criptive Statistics	33
4	Dem	nographics of Working-Class State Legislators	34
	4.1	Table 1: Workers Effectiveness with Gender, Race, and Partisanship Interaction	
		Terms	36
5	Inte	raction Models	37
	5.1	Table 2: Workers Effectiveness with Percentage of Workers in Chamber Interaction	
		Term	37
	5.2	Table 3: Workers Effectiveness with Legislative Leadership Position Interaction	
		Terms	39
	5.3	Table 4: Workers Effectiveness with State Legislative Institution	
		Interaction Term	41
6	Add	itional State Institutions	42
	6.1	Table 5: Workers Effectiveness with Additional State Legislative Institutions In-	
		teraction Terms	44

1 Occupational Categories

orking-Class Occupations	
	Contractors & Construction
	Office & Clerical Workers
	Public Safety Professions
	Retail & Service Professions
	Semi-Skilled Laborer
	Skilled Trade
	Unskilled Laborers
hite-Collar Occupations	Artist
	Attorney & Judge
	Business Executive
	Business owner
	Clergy
	Consultant
	Conservation Professions
	Design Professions
	Doctor
	Education Administrator
	Education Staff
	Educator
	Engineer
	Finance & Banking
	Financial Specialists
	Government
	Homemaker
	Humanities Professions
	Insurance
	IT Professions
	Journalism and Media
	Management Specialists
	Medical Professions
	Military Professions
	Non-profit
	Operations Managers
	Physical Scientist
	Politics & Advocacy
	Real Estate
	Social Scientist
	Social Worker
	Social Worker Sports & Entertainment
	Medical Professions Military Professions Non-profit Operations Managers Physical Scientist Politics & Advocacy Real Estate Social Scientist

2 Computing State Legislative Effectiveness Scores

State Legislative Effectiveness Scores (SLES) are weighted averages calculated for individual legislators (i) in each legislative term (t) within each legislative chamber. SLES consider the number of bill's a legislator (i) introduced (BILL), received action in committee (AIC), received action beyond committee (ABC), passed their chamber (PASS), and became law (LAW) (Bucchianeri et al. 2020, p.6). Each bill is weighted by its overall significance. Commemorative bills are weighted α =1, substantive bills are weighted β =5, and substantive/significant bills are weighted γ =10.

Finally, this equation is normalized (n/5) across N legislators to ensure SLES takes a mean value of 1 for each chamber (Bucchianeri et al. 2020, p. 6).

The equation below explains how SLES scores are calculated. For a more detailed description of how legislative effectiveness scores are calculated see Volden & Wiseman (2014), and for more information on state legislative effectiveness scores see Bucchinaeri et al. (2020).

$$SLES_{it} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\alpha BILL_{it}^{C} + \beta BILL_{it}^{S} + \gamma BILL_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} BILL_{it}^{C} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} BILL_{it}^{S} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} BILL_{it}^{SS}} \\ + \frac{\alpha AIC_{it}^{C} + \beta AIC_{it}^{S} + \gamma AIC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} AIC_{it}^{C} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} AIC_{it}^{S} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} AIC_{it}^{SS}} \\ + \frac{\alpha ABC_{it}^{C} + \beta ABC_{it}^{S} + \gamma ABC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} ABC_{it}^{C} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} ABC_{it}^{S} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} ABC_{it}^{SS}} \\ + \frac{\alpha PASS_{it}^{C} + \beta PASS_{it}^{S} + \gamma PASS_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} PASS_{it}^{C} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} PASS_{it}^{S} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} PASS_{it}^{SS}} \\ + \frac{\alpha LAW_{it}^{C} + \beta LAW_{it}^{S} + \gamma LAW_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} LAW_{it}^{C} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} LAW_{it}^{S} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} LAW_{it}^{SS}} \end{bmatrix}$$

Note: Equation copied from Bucchinaeri et al. 2020 (p.6)

Descriptive Statistics

	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev
Dependent Variables				
SLES (SLES z)	-2.94	9.92	.009	.981
Bill Introduction (BILL)	0	.287	.014	.015
Action in Committee (AIC)	0	.323	.014	.016
Action Beyond Committee (ABC)	0	.367	.014	.017
Pass One Chamber (PASS)	0	.014	.014	.018
Become Law (LAW)	0	.014	.014	.019
Independent Variables				
Worker				
Female	0	1	.232	.422
Black	0	1	.023	.149
Hispanic	0	1	.184	.184
Race (other)	0	1	.031	.031
White	0	1	.929	.257
Democrat	0	1	.487	.499
Seniority	1	25	3.894	3.245
Committee Chair	0	1	.279	.449
Majority Party	0	1	.620	.485
Governor Same Party	0	1	.539	.498
Majority Leadership	0	1	.055	.229
Minority Leadership	0	1	.032	.176
Polarization	0	4.999	.674	.602
Leader, Speaker, President	0	1	.028	.165
Professionalism	.027	.629	.216	.124
Vote Share	.015	1	.713	.225
Senate	0	1	1.283	.450
N				48,220

Table 1: Descriptions of Key Variables

4 Demographics of Working-Class State Legislators

My data set includes 51,941 legislator-term specific observations. Of those legislator-term specific observations, 3,572 are from working-class backgrounds. From this, on average, 6.8% of state legislators are workers. Figure 1 plots the percentage of workers across state legislatures from 1988-2018. The numerical representation of workers peaked in 1990 at around 20% (though the early data is sparse); however, the percentage of workers serving in state legislatures remains consistent around 6%.



Figure 1: Workers in State Legislatures (1988-2018)

The figures below present the partisan, race, and gender breakdown of workers across state legislatures. Workers are approximately evenly split between the two parties (Republicans = 47%, Democrats = 52%). Workers are overwhelmingly white (94%) and male (88%). I condition on gender, race, and partisanship to ensure that demographic factors aren't confounding the estimates of workers' effectiveness. I also consider whether demographic factors moderate workers' effectiveness. To do this I interact gender, race, and partisanship with the worker variable. All three of the interactions are statistically insignificant, indicating that demographic factors do not moderate workers' effectiveness.





4.1 Table 1: Workers Effectiveness with Gender, Race, and Partisanship Interaction Terms

	Gender Interaction	Race Interaction	Partisanship Interaction
Worker	-0.0153	-0.00851	-0.0759
	(-0.60)	(-0.08)	(-0.21)
Female	-0.0173		
	(-0.89)		
Worker#Female	-0.0471		
worker#reinate	(-0.55)		
Black	0.0896		
	(1.12)		
Hispanic	0.176*		
	(1.96)		
Race (other)	-0.0715		
	(-0.57)		
White	0.145*		
	(2.06)		
Democrat	-0.0806***	-0.0804***	
	(-4.90)	(-4.86)	
Saniarity	0.0177***	0.0176***	0.0181***
Semony	(4.89)	(4.93)	(5.06)
Governor Same Party	0.0463***	0.0459**	0.0632***
	(3.32)	(3.29)	(4.55)
Minority Leadership	0.0675	0.0682	0.0827*
	(1.79)	(1.81)	(2.20)
Leader, Speaker, President	0.398**	0.399**	0.370**
	(2.82)	(2.82)	(2.68)
Vote Share	0.171***	0.175***	0.172***
	(5.47)	(5.57)	(5.48)
Senate	-0.0795***	-0.0802***	-0.100***
	(-4.09)	(-4.14)	(-5.18)
XX71 '-		0.0460	
white		(1.05)	
		(1.05)	
Worker#White		-0.0137	
		(-0.11)	
Republican			-0.504***
			(-7.38)
Democrat			-0.522***
			(-7.62)
Worker#Republican			0.154
			(0.43)
Worker#Demograf			0.0280
			(-0.08)
Intercept	-0.431***	-0.332***	0.138
State Fixed Effects	(-4.57)	(-4.41)	(1.44)
Term Fixed Effects	1	1	1
N	19073	19073	19073
Adjusted-R ²	0.13	0.13	0.13

t statistics in parentheses

5 Interaction Models

5.1 Table 2: Workers Effectiveness with Percentage of Workers in Chamber

Interaction Term

Worker -0.0715 (-1.02)Percentage of Worker 0.00445^* (2.00)Worker#Percentage of Worker 0.00469 (0.66)Black -0.100 (-1.33)Hispanic 0.0661 (0.89)Race (Other) -0.421^{**} (-3.09)White 0.0390 (0.64)Female -0.0452^{**} (-2.61)Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49)Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36)Minority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63)Minority Leadership 0.334^{***} (-8.68)Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93)Power Committee 0.143^{***} (4.71)Intercept 0.223^{**} (2.79)State Fixed Effects \checkmark \checkmark N \checkmark \checkmark N \checkmark \checkmark N \checkmark \checkmark N \checkmark \checkmark N \checkmark \checkmark N \checkmark N \checkmark \checkmark N \checkmark N \diamond N \diamond N \diamond N \diamond N \bullet N \bullet N \bullet N \bullet N \bullet		Percentage of Worker Interaction
$ \begin{array}{ccc} & (-1.02) \\ \\ \text{Percentage of Worker} & 0.00445^* \\ (2.00) \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \text{Worker#Percentage of Worker} & 0.00469 \\ (0.66) \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ $	Worker	-0.0715
Percentage of Worker 0.00445* (2.00) 0.0669 Black -0.100 (-1.33) (-1.33) Hispanic 0.0661 (0.89) (0.69) Race (Other) -0.421** (-3.09) (0.64) White 0.0390 (0.64) (0.64) Female -0.0452** (-2.61) (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) (1.49) Governor Same Party 0.209*** (18.36) (-3.63) Minority Leadership 0.353*** (-0.0452) (-1.49) Covernor Same Party 0.209*** (18.36) (-1.49) Minority Leadership 0.353*** (-0.0452) (-1.49) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) (-1.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (-1.79) (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ <i>N</i> 47970		(-1.02)
(2.00) Worker#Percentage of Worker 0.00469 (0.66) Black -0.100 (-1.33) Hispanic 0.0061 (0.89) Race (Other) -0.421** (-3.09) White 0.0390 (0.64) Female -0.0452** (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) Governor Same Party 0.209** (18.36) Majority Leadership 0.353*** (-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) Power Committee 0.156*** (-1.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects × N 49790	Percentage of Worker	0.00445*
Worker#Percentage of Worker0.00469 (0.66)Black-0.100 (-1.33)Hispanic0.0661 (0.89)Race (Other)-0.421** (-3.09)Race (Other)-0.421** (-3.09)White0.0390 (0.64)Female-0.0452** (-2.61)Democrat-0.0219 (-1.49)Governor Same Party0.209*** (18.36)Majority Leadership0.353*** (9.63)Minority Leadership-0.334*** (-8.68)Leader, Speaker, President0.0636 (0.93)Power Committee0.143*** (4.71)Intercept-0.223** (-2.79)State Fixed Effects✓ YN49790		(2.00)
Image: High spanic 0.060 Hispanic 0.0661 (0.89) 0.0421** (3.09) 0.0421** (3.09) 0.0421** (3.09) 0.0432** (2.61) 0.0452** (2.61) 0.00190 Democrat -0.0219 (1.49) 0.209** Governor Same Party 0.209** (18.36) 0.353*** Majority Leadership 0.353*** (9.63) 0.0334*** (4.868) 0.033 Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) 0.056*** (1.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) 1 Intercept -0.223** (2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790	Worker#Percentage of Worker	0.00469
Black -0.100 (-1.33) Hispanic 0.0661 (0.89) Race (Other) -0.421** (-3.09) White 0.0390 (0.64) Female -0.0452** (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) 0.209*** Governor Same Party 0.209*** (18.36) 0.353*** Majority Leadership 0.353*** (-8.68) 0.93) Power Committee 0.166*** (17.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 447970		(0.66)
(-1.33) Hispanic 0.0661 (0.89) Race (Other) -0.421^{**} (-3.09) White 0.0390 (0.64) Female -0.0452^{**} (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36) Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63) Minority Leadership 0.334^{***} (-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) Power Committee 0.156^{***} (1.79) Vote Share 0.143^{***} (-2.79) State Fixed Effects \checkmark \checkmark $Term Fixed EffectsN49790450^{***}(-2.21)^{**}$	Black	-0.100
Hispanic 0.0661 (0.89) Race (Other) -0.421^* (-3.09) White 0.0390 (0.64) Female -0.0452^{**} (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) Governor Same Party 0.209^{**} (18.36) Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63) Minority Leadership 0.334^{***} (-8.68) (-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) Power Committee 0.143^{***} (-1.79) Vote Share 0.143^{***} (-2.79) State Fixed Effects \checkmark Term Fixed Effects \checkmark N 49790		(-1.33)
(0.89) Race (Other) -0.421^{**} (-3.09) White 0.0390 (0.64) Female -0.0452^{**} (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36) Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (*8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) Power Committee 0.156^{***} (1.79) Vote Share 0.143^{***} (-2.79) State Fixed Effects \checkmark Term Fixed Effects \checkmark \checkmark N 49790 $+5622$	Hispanic	0.0661
Race (Other) -0.421^{**} (-3.09) White 0.0390 (0.64) Female -0.0452^{**} (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36) Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63) Minority Leadership 0.0636 (0.93) 0.0636 (0.93) 0.0636 Power Committee 0.165^{***} (1.179) Vote Share 0.143^{***} (-2.79) State Fixed Effects \checkmark Term Fixed Effects \checkmark N 49790		(0.89)
$ \begin{array}{c} (-3.09) \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\$	Race (Other)	-0.421**
White 0.0390 Female 0.0452^{**} Female -0.0452^{**} (-2.61) -0.0219 Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) 0.209^{***} Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36) 0.353^{***} Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63) (-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) (-143^{***}) Power Committee 0.143^{***} (1.79) Vote Share 0.143^{***} (-2.79) State Fixed Effects \checkmark Term Fixed Effects \checkmark \checkmark N 49790 \checkmark		(-3.09)
(0.64) Female 0.0452^{**} (-2.61) Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49) Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36) Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63) Minority Leadership 0.334^{***} (-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) Power Committee 0.156^{***} (11.79) Vote Share 0.143^{***} (4.71) Intercept -0.223^{**} (-2.79) State Fixed Effects \checkmark Term Fixed Effects \checkmark N	White	0.0390
Female 0.0452^{**} (-2.61)Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49)Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36)Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63)Minority Leadership 0.334^{***} (-8.68)Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93)Power Committee 0.156^{***} (11.79)Vote Share 0.143^{***} (-2.79)State Fixed Effects \checkmark $Ierm Fixed EffectsN49790$		(0.64)
(-2.61) Democrat (-2.61) (-1.49) Governor Same Party (-1.49) $(-1.4$	Female	-0.0452**
Democrat -0.0219 (-1.49)Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36)Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63)Minority Leadership -0.334^{***} (*8.68)Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93)Power Committee 0.156^{***} (11.79)Vote Share 0.143^{***} (4.71)Intercept -0.223^{**} (2.79)State Fixed Effects \checkmark \checkmark N 49790		(-2.61)
(-1.49) Governor Same Party $\begin{array}{c} 0.209^{***}\\ (18.36)\\ \\ Majority Leadership \\ 0.353^{***}\\ (9.63)\\ \\ Minority Leadership \\ -0.334^{***}\\ (-8.68)\\ \\ Leader, Speaker, President \\ 0.0636\\ (0.93)\\ \\ Power Committee \\ 0.156^{***}\\ (11.79)\\ \\ Vote Share \\ 0.143^{***}\\ (4.71)\\ \\ Intercept \\ -0.223^{**}\\ (-2.79)\\ \\ State Fixed Effects \\ V \\ Term Fixed Effects \\ V \\ 49790\\ $	Democrat	-0.0219
Governor Same Party 0.209^{***} (18.36)Majority Leadership 0.353^{***} (9.63)Minority Leadership -0.334^{***} (*8.68)Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93)Power Committee 0.156^{***} (11.79)Vote Share 0.143^{***} (4.71)Intercept -0.223^{**} (2.79)State Fixed Effects \checkmark \checkmark N 49790		(-1.49)
(18.36) Majority Leadership $\begin{array}{c} 0.353^{***}\\ (9.63) \end{array}$ Minority Leadership $\begin{array}{c} -0.334^{***}\\ (-8.68) \end{array}$ Leader, Speaker, President $\begin{array}{c} 0.0636\\ (0.93) \end{array}$ Power Committee $\begin{array}{c} 0.156^{***}\\ (11.79) \end{array}$ Vote Share $\begin{array}{c} 0.143^{***}\\ (4.71) \end{array}$ Intercept $\begin{array}{c} -0.223^{**}\\ (-2.79) \end{array}$ State Fixed Effects \checkmark $\begin{array}{c} V\\ Term Fixed Effects\\ \hline V \\ 49790 \end{array}$	Governor Same Party	0.209***
Majority Leadership 0.353*** Minority Leadership -0.334*** (-8.68) (-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) (0.93) Power Committee 0.156*** (11.79) (143*** (4.71) (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects N 49790 Atimeted B ² 0.62		(18.36)
(9.63) Minority Leadership $\begin{array}{c} -0.334^{***} \\ (-8.68) \\ \\ \text{Leader, Speaker, President} \\ (0.93) \\ \\ \text{Power Committee} \\ (0.93) \\ \\ \text{Power Committee} \\ (11.79) \\ \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (11.79) \\ \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (11.79) \\ \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (11.79) \\ \\ (11.79) \\ \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \checkmark \\ \\ \hline \text{Term Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ N \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ N \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ \hline \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ \hline \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ \hline \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \ \\ \text{State Fixed Effects} \\ \hline \\ \hline \\ \text{Vote Share} \\ \hline \\ (-2.79) \\ \\ \hline \\ \ \\ \ \\ \ \\ \ \\ \ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \$	Majority Leadership	0.353***
Minority Leadership -0.334*** (-8.68) (-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) (0.93) Power Committee 0.156*** (11.79) (11.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects X Y Term Fixed Effects X N 49790 Atimeted P2 0.62		(9.63)
(-8.68) Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) Power Committee 0.156*** (11.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 Atjusted P ² 0.62	Minority Leadership	-0.334***
Leader, Speaker, President 0.0636 (0.93) (0.93) Power Committee 0.156*** (11.79) (11.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 Attimet B ² 0.62		(-8.68)
(0.93) Power Committee 0.156*** (11.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects / Term Fixed Effects / N 49790 Atimated P ² 0.62	Leader, Speaker, President	0.0636
Power Committee 0.156*** (11.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 Attimet B ² 0.62		(0.93)
(11.79) Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 Atjunct B ² 0.62	Power Committee	0.156***
Vote Share 0.143*** (4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 Atimeted P2 0.62		(11.79)
(4.71) Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 A timeted P ² 0.022	Vote Share	0.143***
Intercept -0.223** (-2.79) State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790		(4.71)
(-2.79) State Fixed Effects Term Fixed Effects N 49790 Atjunct B ² 0.02	Intercept	-0.223**
State Fixed Effects ✓ Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 A direct d P ² 0.02		(-2.79)
Term Fixed Effects ✓ N 49790 A directed P ² 0.02	State Fixed Effects	1
A directed D ²	Term Fixed Effects	49790
Adjusica-K ⁻ 0.03	Adjusted-R ²	0.03

t statistics in parentheses

5.2 Table 3: Workers Effectiveness with Legislative Leadership Position In-

teraction Terms

	1	2	3
	Power Committee Interaction	Committee Chair Interaction	Party Leader Interaction
Worker	-0.0230	-0.0181	-0.0363
	(-0.83)	(-0.78)	(-1.45)
Power Committee	0.103***	0.0877***	0.104***
	(7.90)	(7.19)	(8.25)
W I #D C '#	0.0211		
worker#Power Committee	(0.42)		
	(0.45)		
Committee Chair		0.519***	
		(30.67)	
Worker#Committee Chair		0.0269	
		(0.43)	
Leader			0.0545
Leuder			(1.87)
Worker#Leader			0.307*
			(2.42)
Female	-0.0115	-0.00852	-0.0113
	(-0.71)	(-0.54)	(-0.69)
Black	0.0392	0.0468	0.0391
	(0.57)	(0.70)	(0.57)
	0.127	0.1.418	0.104
Hispanic	(1.86)	(2.11)	0.124
	(1.00)	(2.11)	(1.05)
Race (other)	-0.151	-0.0450	-0.152
	(-1.48)	(-0.39)	(-1.49)
White	0.122*	0.145**	0.120*
	(2.18)	(2.68)	(2.15)
Democrat	-0.0815***	-0.0564***	-0.0817***
	(-5.83)	(-4.14)	(-5.85)
Seniority	0.0342***	0.0180***	0.0344***
	(11.38)	(6.22)	(11.44)
Majority Party	0.657***	0.493***	0.664***
	(53.21)	(40.58)	(53.34)
Governor Same Party	0.0321**	0.0411***	0.0314**
	(2.84)	(3.75)	(2.79)
	0.00008	0.477***	
Majority Leadership	0.0929*	0.157***	
	(2.46)	(4.15)	
Minority Leadership	0.0168	0.0841*	
	(0.45)	(2.25)	
Leader, Speaker, President	0.0220	-0.00116	
	(0.32)	(-0.02)	
Voto Shara	0.0341	0.0102	0.0330
tote biline	(1.15)	(0.67)	(1.15)
	()	()	(1110)
Senate	-0.0511**	-0.170***	-0.0510**
	(-3.27)	(-10.78)	(-3.27)
Intercept	-0.402***	-0.296***	-0.404***
	(-5.35)	(-4.07)	(-5.37)
State Fixed Effects	1	1	1
Term Fixed Effects	1	1	1
N .	49790	49790	49790
Adjusted-R ²	0.13	0.17	0.13

t statistics in parentheses

5.3 Table 4: Workers Effectiveness with State Legislative Institution Interaction Term

	1	2	3	4	5
	Term Limit Interaction	Professionalization Interaction	Session Length Interaction	Salary Interaction	Staff Interaction
Worker	-0.0117	-0.0340	0.0319	-0.0304	-0.0335
	(-0.39)	(-0.64)	(0.59)	(-0.71)	(-0.89)
Tarm Limite	0.100***				
Term Linnes	(6.07)				
	(0.07)				
Worker#Term Limits	-0.00252				
	(-0.05)				
Protessionalism		-0.134			
		(-2.37)			
Worker#Professionalism		0.105			
		(0.48)			
Session Length			-0.000194		
			(-1.32)		
Worker#Session Length			-0.000470		
			(-0.82)		
Salary				-0.000000856**	
				(-3.04)	
Worker#Salary				0.000000610	
				(0.59)	
Staff					-0.00415*
					(-2.35)
Worker#Staff					0.00430
					(0.70)
Female	-0.00709	-0.00794	-0.00745	-0.00811	-0.00693
	(-0.45)	(-0.51)	(-0.46)	(-0.52)	(-0.44)
Black	0.0351	0.0340	0.0410	0.0321	0.0336
	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.60)	(0.48)	(0.51)
	(0.55)	(0.21)	(0.00)	(0.40)	(0.51)
Hispanic	0.120	0.138*	0.142*	0.133*	0.143*
	(1.80)	(2.08)	(2.09)	(2.02)	(2.16)
Page (other)	0.0575	0.0641	0.0465	0.0688	0.0577
Race (onici)	(0.49)	(0.57)	-0.0400	-0.0000	(0.51)
	(-0.49)	(-0.57)	(-0.42)	(-0.02)	(-0.51)
White	0.129*	0.134*	0.141*	0.133*	0.134*
	(2.40)	(2.49)	(2.57)	(2.48)	(2.47)
Democrat	0.0520***	0.0546***	0.0500***	0.0528***	0.0540***
Democrat	-0.0339	-0.0340	-0.0309	-0.0338	-0.0340
	(-3.97)	(-4.01)	(-3.08)	(-3.94)	(-3.90)
Seniority	0.0217***	0.0178***	0.0178***	0.0178***	0.0177***
	(7.29)	(6.12)	(5.99)	(6.13)	(6.00)
Committee Chair	0.515***	0.525***	0.512***	0.526***	0.526***
	(31.40)	(31.88)	(31.05)	(31.99)	(31.84)
Majority Party	0.495***	0.490***	0.497***	0.491***	0.491***
	(40.84)	(40.27)	(39.85)	(40.38)	(40.25)
Governor Same Party	0.0417***	0.0409***	0.0308**	0.0405***	0.0405***
	(3.81)	(3.73)	(2.74)	(3.70)	(3.67)
Majority Leadership	0.157***	0.160***	0.148***	0.162***	0.160***
	(4.19)	(4.26)	(3.89)	(4.32)	(4.22)
Minority Leadership	0.0826*	0.0879*	0.0897*	0.0902*	0.0772*
	(2.20)	(2.35)	(2.31)	(2.42)	(2.11)
Leader, Speaker, President	-0.0138	-0.00256	-0.0194	-0.00533	-0.00453
	(-0.20)	(-0.04)	(-0.29)	(-0.08)	(-0.07)
Power Committee	0.0903***	0.0898***	0.0956***	0.0908***	0.0893***
	(7.40)	(7.37)	(7.69)	(7.46)	(7.30)
Vote Share	0.0259	0.0235	0.0162	0.0233	0.0288
	(0.91)	(0.82)	(0.58)	(0.81)	(0.99)
	(/*)	()	(((>>)
Senate	-0.170***	-0.172***	-0.165***	-0.172***	-0.173***
	(-10.72)	(-10.85)	(-10.29)	(-10.87)	(-10.87)
Intercent	.0 336***	.0.278***	.0 208+++	-0.280***	-0 266444
mercept	-0.550	-0.278	-0.306	(2.97)	-0.200
	(-0.0)	(-3.77)	(-+.10)	(-3.87)	(-3.90)
State Eine J Diff.	,	V	~	~	~
State Fixed Effects			,	,	
State Fixed Effects Term Fixed Effects	40700	40700	1	40700	100000
State Fixed Effects Term Fixed Effects N	49790	49790	46576	49790	49238

6 Additional State Institutions



Figure 3: Average Marginal Effect of Chamber, Seniority, and Filibuster for Workers in State Legislatures

6.1 Table 5: Workers Effectiveness with Additional State Legislative Institutions Interaction Terms

	Senate Interaction	Seniority Interaction	Filibuster Interaction
Worker	-0.0362	-0.0295	-0.00795
	(-1.23)	(-0.74)	(-0.27)
Senate	-0.0427*		
	(-2.48)		
Workor#Consta	0.0485		
worker#senate	(0.68)		
Black	-0.0897	0.0390	0.0460
	(-1.20)	(0.56)	(0.09)
Hispanic	0.0681	0.127	0.139*
	(0.92)	(1.86)	(2.08)
Race(other)	-0.405**	-0.151	-0.0467
	(-3.03)	(-1.48)	(-0.41)
White	0.0502	0.122*	0.144**
	(0.83)	(2.18)	(2.66)
Female	-0.0459**	-0.0116	-0.00830
	(-2.64)	(-0.72)	(-0.53)
Democrat	-0.0230	-0.0816***	-0.0566***
	(-1.57)	(-5.84)	(-4.15)
Governor Same Party	(18.32)	0.0320**	0.0412***
	(18.52)	(2.84)	(3.76)
Majority Leadership	0.363***	0.0927*	0.157***
	(9.88)	(2.47)	(4.19)
Minority Leadership	-0.324***	0.0171	0.0846^{*}
	(-8.38)	(0.45)	(2.27)
Leader, Speaker, President	0.0641	0.0223	-0.00131
	(0.94)	(0.33)	(-0.02)
Power Committee	0.158***	0.104***	0.0877***
	(12.04)	(8.28)	(7.20)
Vote Share	0.137***	0.0340	0.0203
	(4.51)	(1.15)	(0.71)
Seniority		(10.93)	(6.19)
		(1000)	(0.15)
Worker#Seniority		0.00400	
		(0.35)	
In Majority		0.657***	0.493***
		(53.21)	(40.64)
Senate		-0.0511**	-0.172***
		(-3.27)	(-10.94)
Filibuster			-0.00835
			(-0.41)
Worker#Filibuster			-0.0145
			(-0.25)
Committee Chair			0.521***
commute clidii			(31.66)
x	0.101*	0.400000	0.00
Intercept	-0.181*	-0.402***	-0.294***
State Fixed Effects	(-2.20)	(-3.34)	(-+.04)
Term Fixed Effects	1	1	1
N	49790	49790	49790
Adjusted-R ²	0.03	0.13	0.17

t statistics in parentheses $\label{eq:product} ^* \ p < 0.05, \ ^{**} \ p < 0.01, \ ^{***} \ p < 0.001$