A Poetics of Emotion: Sidney, Spenser, and the Poetry of Thoughtful Movement

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

Abstract

"A Poetics of Emotion: Sidney, Spenser, and the Poetry of Thoughtful Movement" argues that poets in late sixteenth-century England demonstrated the efficacy of their poems in the ethical and intellectual lives of their readers by conceptualizing those poems in terms of the thinking and moving of their readers. Chapter 1 explores a novel interpretation of Philip Sidney's *Defence of Poetry* that links that treatise's emphasis on the moving powers of poetry with the equine references throughout, both of these emphases suggesting interesting engagements with and revisions of Horatian poetics. But this melding of ideas into new concepts means also that poets need new words. Chapter 2 shows how Spenser's coinage of *emmove* gives further evidence for a changing sense of what we now call *emotion*, a word initially unavailable to sixteenth-century English writers. The project then moves to show how these new ideas might inform interpretations of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, particularly the character of Britomart and the House of Busirane in Book III. I thus give a detailed reading of III.xi-xii, showing how the poem, by borrowing the cultural resonance of the Temple of Solomon and the aesthetic theories of Bernard of Clairvaux, provides a ductus for readers to move through. The spatial, rhetorical arrangement of Spenser's fictional house encourages readers to ponder some complex intellectual problems. In Chapter 3, I show how two intellectual problems, the problem of the different dimensionalities of representation, and the problem of distinguishing the real world from the fictional one while simultaneously allowing the fictional to impinge upon the real, may be profitably

contemplated through one's reading of the episode. Thus, I both theorize and show a good example of thought and movement at a key point in the development of English poetics.

Table of Contents

For Jessie

And when she sang, the sea,
Whatever self it had, became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker.

Wallace Stevens, "The Idea of Order at Key West"

Acknowledgements

> It hardly needs to be said that my family is the chief martyr in this cause. But what can a Professor's family expect!!! (T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakspere's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke* ix)

This project has at times seemed never-ending. Slowed down by three moves, three very different academic jobs, and a growing family, I have worked in fits and starts rather than continuously. In several distinct ways, this slowness has, I hope, helped the project to mature more gradually and, one hopes, more fully than it otherwise would. The slowness has also meant that I have picked up a larger number of mentors, companions, and more-or-less sympathetic readers along the way.

Much of the groundwork was laid during my time in Oxford, where I read Sidney with Katherine Duncan-Jones, Spenser with Richard McCabe, and Shakespeare with Tony Nuttall. More than anyone, Professor Nuttall, who did not live to see me finish this project, helped inform my approach to Renaissance literature as writing that is deeply and complexly philosophical.

In Charlottesville, James Nohrnberg and Elizabeth Fowler served as the primary intellectual encouragers in the early stages of this project. I first came to Charlottesville to study with Professor Nohrnberg, and upon arrival was glad to discover the warmth, engagement, and challenge of working also with Professor Fowler, who taught me with her own example that generosity is the most important scholarly virtue. I owe an immense debt of gratitude to both of them. Clare Kinney came on board a little later, and

quickly showed herself as one of the most acute readers and voluminous commentators on my work. As a committee, each of them has remained interested, critical, understanding, and supportive throughout.

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Finally, Shane Sharpe hired me to work at the University of Alabama, allowing me to work in an atmosphere of the highest intellectual standards and excellent library resources, thus making the completion of the dissertation possible.

At home, wherever that has been over the last decade, my wife, Jessie, has been patient to a degree that those outside this profession cannot imagine. She has supported me financially, gastronomically, psychologically, and, most amazing of all, lovingly. My son, Jackson, has helped me put all of this in perspective and kept me in good spirits while his daddy tried to become a real academic. (My daughter, Johanna, arrived just as the defense was being scheduled.) With the help of so many family and friends, I guess I've done it. Thank you all.

A Note on Texts

References to classical works, including their English translations, are to the Loeb Classical Library editions unless otherwise specified. The works of Aristotle are cited according to the standard page, column, line (1738a15, e.g.) of the Bekker ed. (Berlin, 1831) as reproduced in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes. References to, and quotations from the Bible are to the first English printing of the Geneva Bible (London, 1576) unless otherwise specified. References to Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* are to the book, canto, and stanza (e.g., III.ii.31) of A. C. Hamilton's 2nd edition (London: Pearson Education, 2001). References to Spenser's shorter poems are to Richard McCabe's edition (London: Penguin, 1999). References to Shakespeare's works are to the *Riverside Shakespeare*, 2nd ed., unless otherwise specified. I have reproduced quotations as exactly as possible. The only exceptions are the silent change of the Elizabethan long *s* to the modern *s*; and the silent change of Greek characters to their Roman equivalent. For example, in her edition of Sidney's *Defence of Poetry*, Duncan-Jones prints the Greek words *gnosis* and *praxis* in their Greek characters; I print them as I just did.

Abbreviations

FQ	Spenser, Edmund. *The Faerie Queene*. Ed. A. C. Hamilton. London: Pearson Education, 2001. Print.
MP	Sidney, Philip. *Miscellaneous Prose*. Ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones and Jan van Dorsten. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973. Print.
MW	Sidney, Philip. *Major Works*. Ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.
SEnc	Hamilton, A. C., ed. *The Spenser Encyclopedia*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1990. Print.
Smith	Smith, G. Gregory, ed. *Elizabethan Critical Essays*. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1904. Print.

Introduction

Renaissance Poetry as Pragmatist Thought Experiment

> AESCHYLUS What's the poet's duty, and why is the poet respected?
>
> EURIPIDES Because he can write, and because he can think, but mostly because he's injected some virtue into the body politic. (Aristophanes, *The Frogs*, trans. William Arrowsmith, 551)

> [T]hey call him in scorn a philosopher or poet . . . not making difference betwixt terms. (Puttenham, *The Art of English Poesy* 109)

> An action is the perfection and publication of thought. (Emerson, *Nature* 42)

1. Philosophers and Poets

Philosophers and poets think and write differently. The former argue; the latter represent. And although we cannot always draw a distinct boundary between them, nevertheless there is a difference between the poetic and philosophic modes of writing. One curious fact about these disciplines is that one can write in the philosophic mode about poetry (e.g., Aristotle's *Poetics* or John Dewey's *Art as Experience*), and one can also write in the poetic mode about philosophical problems (e.g., Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*). But throughout Western history and culture, there has been a battle for

prominence between these two modes of writing, what Richard Lanham calls "the quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric." Lanham writes, "[W]e must do more than use philosophy to debunk rhetoric, as the scientific world view has done. . . . Upon seeing Western literature aright depends our ability to hold together the two different ways of knowing which *together* make us human" (*Motives* 35; Lanham's emphasis). Lanham thus neatly encapsulates the interdisciplinary goal of this project: to show philosophy and poetry working together in Renaissance English writing.[1] Ronald Levao explains, "Renaissance thought is not so much a background for poetry nor poetry so much an illustration of doctrine as both are expressions of a common effort to come to terms with a dynamic, and often disorienting, world" (xxi).

The Renaissance works examined in this project help readers think. Peter Porter writes, "Poetry is based on thinking . . . as much as philosophy is, but its method is radically different in its priorities" (94). Levao writes, "[P]oetry and poetics function as important speculative instruments in a humanistic culture" and as "embodiments of the speculative challenges of the period" (99). Imaginative writing of the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries in England experienced a kind of revolution in thinking. The period stands somewhat doubtfully between the Catholic scholasticism and Aristotelian natural philosophy of the Middle Ages on the one hand and the Scientific Revolution and

[1] Lanham considers this distinction in a number of ways. The most ubiquitous formulation of it in his book is *homo rhetoricus* and *homo seriosus*. The view that both Lanham and I are working against is the traditional view that "*Homo rhetoricus* cannot, to sum up, be *serious*" (*Motives* 5). This traditional view is given the lie by, for example, the "artist's philosopher," Nicholas of Cusa, whose works unite the two modes in his "spirit of serious play (*serio ludere*)" (Levao 84, 88). The Plutarchan tradition, which I will return to in Chapter 1, suggests something similar, though it ultimately privileges philosophy over poetry. The Plutarchan "progression from poetry to philosophy becomes a staple of Renaissance educational theory and a mainstay of interpretative practices in the Erasmian schoolroom" (Grogan 14).

Cartesian skepticism on the other. But the Elizabethan era is not just one of between-ness; it is also one of grand new horizons.

The developmental and experimental aspect of the period can be seen by comparing the Elizabethan poetry of Edmund Spenser to the epics of John Milton. The difference is immense. Spenser is only partially a Renaissance man: he is the first to mention tobacco in an English poem and is at times militantly anti-Catholic, but he is also heavily and self-consciously reliant on medieval archaisms and monastic theology. Milton, on the other hand, engages with Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and the Civil War. But if Milton is the greatest fruit of the English Renaissance, he is also its old man. Spenser and Philip Sidney are its precocious adolescents, its exceptional freshmen, discovering a new world. Gordon Teskey has described "poetic thinking" in Spenser as a wandering opening-out, a process whose ends are constantly being discovered. He contrasts this method with the closed-circuit argumentation of Milton, for whom ends are already implicit in beginnings. According to Teskey, the opening lines of a Milton poem already entail the ending lines, while in Spenser's poetry beginnings are just that. The proems of the books of *The Faerie Queene* set a subject matter for thinking; they do not set a necessary trajectory. The books are themselves a primary thinking-through. In contrast, Milton's poems begin *after* he has *already* thought through the issues (Teskey, "Allegory").

The notion of a poet thinking has not been isolated to Spenser and Milton studies. A. D. Nuttall, in the book finished just before his death in early 2007, posits *Shakespeare the Thinker*. Nuttall's claim for a thinking Shakespeare represents the culmination of a

lifetime of work that sought to ask intellectual questions of poems and that saw poets as intellectuals of the highest order. My own project is closely aligned with Nuttall's. Like Nuttall, I share training in the Anglo-American traditions of philosophy, whereas Teskey draws chiefly from the post-Kantian continental traditions of Hegel and Heidegger. Though my work shares with and borrows from Teskey and Nuttall the notion of poetic thinking, the intellectual problems I see in the poems I treat, and the philosophers through whom I treat them, make up, I believe, an original and coherent reconceptualization of poems as thought experiments.[2]

Because the term "thought experiment" may be used in a number of different senses in a number of different disciplines, let me briefly describe the concept I have in mind. In most philosophical thought experiments, there are essentially two parts: first, an example, which is usually a fictional story; and then an explanation of the story's philosophical meaning. A good example of this kind of thought experiment occurs in Roderick Chisholm's attempt to make sense of Bishop Butler's statements that

> [W]hen we say of a physical thing at one time that it is identical with or the same as a physical thing existing at some other time, we are likely to be using the expression "same" or "identical" in a "loose and popular sense." But when we say of a person existing at one time that he is

[2] The notion of a poem as a thought experiment is certainly not new in itself. Elizabeth Fowler has a fine chapter on "The Pardoner's Thought Experiment," in which she argues that "the conflict among social persons generates ethical deliberation about his body and his preaching that then leads us into political deliberation about the ideals and institutional arrangements of society" (73). Literary character, she writes, is like "an X on the map that allows one to calculate the direction and distance between one's body and the treasure of meaning. The task of interpreting the figure requires each reader to align herself or himself, cognitively and affectively, with the world that is conjured by words" (32). Lauren Silberman writes, "Each book [of *The Faerie Queene*] has something of the character of a thought experiment" (*Transforming* 3).

> identical with or the same as a person existing at some other time, we are likely to be using "same" or "identical" in a "strict and philosophical sense." (Chisholm 173-74)

Chisholm wonders why identity of persons and identity of physical things is so different. To tackle this problem, he invokes the old chestnut known as "the Ship of Theseus." In its earliest recorded form, Plutarch writes

> The ship on which Theseus sailed with the youths and returned in safety, the thirty-oared galley, was preserved by the Athenians down to the time of Demetrius Phalereus. They took away the old timbers from time to time, and put new and sound ones in their places, so that the vessel became a standing illustration for the philosophers in the mooted question of growth, some declaring that it remained the same, others that it was not the same vessel. ("Theseus" 49)

Is the completely replaced ship still the ship of Theseus? If yes, then what does the ship suggest about our normal ideas about identity? If not, then at what precise point did it cease to be? In Chisholm's version of this story, a ship owned by Theseus gradually has each of its wooden pieces replaced by aluminum pieces. But, in a twist first suggested by Hobbes, all of the wooden pieces are preserved and eventually reconstituted. Imagine now that the aluminum ship and the wooden ship meet at sea and crash, and Theseus, like any good pilot, must protect his ship. "Where does his duty lie -- with the aluminum ship or with the reassembled wooden ship?" (90). This is an interesting, even captivating story. It does indeed make readers think. Chisholm, though, does not leave this thinking

to readers. "What are we to say of such puzzles?" he asks (91). The rest of the essay offers answers. In other words, he interprets the story for readers, and ends up making positive metaphysical claims for which he offers arguments. Whereas Chisholm uses a thought-provoking story to prepare for his own conclusions, the writers I study in this project create such stories to prompt readers to think for themselves. In the analytic tradition of philosophy in which Chisholm works, one goal is fine-tuned and detailed linguistic analysis of discrete problems, a goal we might contrast with what Keats calls the "negative capability" of poets, "when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason" (831).

But some exuberant philosophical thought experiments do dwell in negative capability, when explanation is overwhelmed by anecdote and there is no voice telling readers what the example means, instead leaving it up to readers to think through the example for themselves. One such case is Daniel Dennett's classic story about a peculiar version of the mind-body problem known as the brain in a vat. In the 1978 article "Where am I?" Dennett gives a Kafkaesque fictional first-person account of going deep underground to work on a nuclear device while his brain stays above ground suspended in a vat. This is done to protect his brain from the radioactive environment in which his body will be working. With the proper wires and transmitters, his body does not miss his brain. He *feels* as if his brain were still in his head. This science fiction tale raises some tricky questions regarding the mind-body problem, the problems of consciousness, and the ethical choice to order or undertake such a mission in the first place. But though such thinking is adumbrated in Dennett's essay (usually by humorous asides), explicit stances

on the implications of his story remain largely absent. Dennett tells us he is a strict physicalist, but one gets the sense that this story upsets Dennett's materialist position more than it confirms it. Furthermore, by telling this story, he provokes his readers to think, though he cannot predict *how* each reader might think about the episode. His thought experiment becomes a catalyst for the thinking of readers. Moreover, the essay is highly entertaining. In fact, it was first presented in person as an act, at the end of which Dennett pretended to be an alternate personality created by an alternate brain to which his body has been hooked. Dennett thus ends his essay in an entertaining and thought-provoking fiction, not in a proposition.

Stephen Dobranski has written about Renaissance authors and readers in a way that reminds me of Dennett's open-ended strategy. Dobranski writes, "[W]hile the notion of an autonomous author was emerging, an equally empowering concept of active readers was also taking shape" (*Readers* 5-6). Dobranski contrasts the rise of active reading in early modern England with the classical, essentially Aristotelian, notions of moving readers, which was essentially a passive encounter. Dobranski compares this earlier sense of moving readers to "the classical myths of Amphion, who charmed stones with his harp, or Orpheus, who enchanted trees and streams with his singing" (*Readers* 23). But already in the medieval period, the concept of supremely active poets moving supremely passive readers was changing. Alastair Minnis writes that "medieval thinkers were more interested in the psychology of audience-response, images being common property of author and audience, having a life beyond the psyches of their creators" (239). As Dobranski makes clear, in late-sixteenth-century England, too, readers were viewed

neither as inanimate sponges that simply soak up the words on the page, nor as non-volitional stones that could be moved through authorial magic. Rather, Sidney, Spenser, and their contemporaries started to think of readers as something like horses, creatures who can be moved with proper training, but who sometimes have stubborn wills of their own.[3]

Dobranski examines a particular way that writers in the seventeenth century engage the wills of their readers: through various kinds of *omissa*. By sometimes purposefully leaving blank spaces in texts, authors slyly authorized readers to fill them in. The numerous gaps and unfinished state of Sidney's 1593 composite *Arcadia* thus make it a perfect text to consider in the context of an active, thinking readership.[4] But I will not be considering, as Dobranski does, the urging of readers that a blank implies. Rather, I will explore how Sidney's text might be considered as a thought experiment or series of thought experiments, like Dennett's, that is, stories with philosophical ramifications but without the second component of explanation. Further, I seek to supplement the exciting work of the last decade on historical examples of early modern readings, as evidenced by marginalia and commonplace books.[5] A good example of this work is Fred Schurink's analysis of William Blount's early marginalia in a copy of Sidney's *Arcadia*. "By detaching [parts of the work] from their original framework in Sidney's romance he

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[3] I will elaborate this idea in Chapter 1.

[4] I borrow Kenneth Borris's helpful verbal distinction between the *Old Arcadia* (the MS 5-book version, *c*. 1580), the *New Arcadia* (the 2 1/2 book, greatly revised version, published in 1590), and the composite *Arcadia* (the *New Arcadia* plus the last 2 1/2 books of the *Old Arcadia*, published in 1593) (*Allegory* 279). I will sometimes identify these three versions as MS, 1590, and 1593.

[5] For a good up-to-date overview of this work, as well as an argument to move beyond it, see Jennifer Richards and Fred Schurink, "Introduction: The Textuality and Materiality of Reading in Early Modern England" (*Huntington Library Quarterly* 73 [2010]: 345-61).

turned them into general truths that could be applied to his own life" (17). I seek to embody in my project a present-tense version of this useful reading, providing a new (rather than describing an old) example of pragmatist reading. Not confined to early modern interpretations, the composite *Arcadia* also provides its current readers with what is colloquially called "food for thought," or what I will call later, after Mary Carruthers, "machine[s] for thinking" (*Craft* 276). Sidney provides food; it is up to readers to eat. Sidney builds a machine; it is up to readers to operate it.

In Book I of the composite *Arcadia*, after telling the history of her seemingly doomed romantic pursuit of Amphialus, Helen says to Musidorus, "[N]ow weigh my case" (127). Specifically, she is telling Musidorus to decide based on the story whether she is to be pitied or not. But the weighing of cases, I would argue, is central to Sidney's entire project.[6] Like the medieval topos of the *demande d'amour*, the *Arcadia* consistently asks its readers to weigh cases and think through complex issues and problems.[7] This is essentially what Ake Bergvall takes Sidney's phrase in the *Defence* "enabling of judgement" to mean. Bergvall writes that Sidney seeks "to stimulate his readers to judge for themselves" (474). Whereas Bergvall sees a resounding lack of emphasis on judging

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[6] On this point, see Thelma Greenfield, *The Eye of Judgment: Reading the* New Arcadia (Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 1982).

[7] D. S. Brewer writes that the *demandes d'amour* or *questiones d'amour* "have as their subject the question which lover, or which kind of love, a person should prefer" (Brewer 325). Examples of such debates can be found in Chretien de Troyes; Boccaccio's *Filicolo*, Book 4; and Chaucer's *Parlement of Fowles*. Like thought experiments, medieval *demandes d'amour* often end "with the winner undecided" (Brewer 326). But in *The Parlement of Fowles*, there is no real debate. "No one can be puzzled whom to choose," Brewer writes. "The lower-class birds do not even discuss the problem" (326). Nevertheless, there are ample signs that the direct address to an audience, asking them to weigh a case, is a medieval topos. Take, for example, the belling-of-the-cat episode early in William Langland's *Piers Plowman*. After the dream is related, the poet writes, "What this meteles [i.e., dream] bemeneth, ye men that be merye, / Devine ye, for I ne dar, bi dere God in Hevene," explicitly asking readers to decide how to interpret it. On Chaucer's use of the *demande d'amour* in *Parlement*, see also Jack B. Oruch.

in Sidneian criticism, he also points out that the early reader Fulke Greville readily emphasized Sidney's *Arcadia* as a text for thought. Greville saw in the *Arcadia* "morall Images, and Examples, (as directing threds) to guide every man through the confused *Labyrinth* of his own desires, and life" (Greville 134).[8] Though retaining some of the more common didactic notions of exemplary fiction, Greville is right to note that Sidney's images and examples are "directing threds" for a reader's "own desires and life," including the future desires and lives that Sidney cannot direct any more than he can know. Bergvall thus argues that Sidney's *Arcadia* "points to a poetics that is far more complex than the simple portrayal of perfect people" (475). Instead, Greville claims, "[T]he like and finer moralities offer themselves throughout that various and dainty work of his for sounder judgements to exercise their spirits in" (10). Wishfully pointing toward the absent completion of Sidney's revised romance, Greville imagines "what a large field an active, able spirit should have had to walk in" (10). This thinking, metaphorized by walking and exercise, is one of the final causes of Sidney's romance. But the poem does not finish the thinking for a reader. Rather, it provides thought experiments without conclusions. It provides multi-voiced debates for readers to judge and weigh. Moreover, a reader cannot just choose one of the voices (say, Kalander's) and make that her own stance. The poem insists by its many voices that a reader think for herself.[9] Building on

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[8] On the trope of life as labyrinth, see Nohrnberg 137-39.

[9] I have used the feminine pronoun here because the stated audience of the *Arcadia* from its inception was a woman: Sidney's sister, Mary Herbert (née Sidney), the Countess of Pembroke, who later helped shape the *Arcadia* into its composite form. Furthermore, romance itself might be seen as the feminine counterpart to epic, as we see for example in the fact that Spenser addresses *The Faerie Queene* "To all the gratious and beautifull Ladies in the Court." That Spenser dedicated so many of his works to females shows a growing sense perhaps of peculiarly female ways of reading in the late sixteenth century. Juliet Fleming further

the ideas of Teskey about Spenser's and Milton's thinking, I will now briefly describe some of the specific thinking the composite *Arcadia* makes possible.

2. Thinking with Sidney's Composite *Arcadia*

One of the distinguishing features of Sidney's romance is the quantity of what we might call dualities.[10] These dualities, both in the details of the narrative and in its edited form, are not merely coincidental. They represent one very important intellectual strand in the composite *Arcadia*. Readers are confronted with a multiplicity of such dualities. For example, the number of paired characters in Sidney's romance is startling. The composite *Arcadia* begins on the shores of Laconia, where the two shepherds Claius and Strephon are in love with Urania. Often the narrative simply treats the two lovers as an indistinguishable pair. "They" make speeches as one (68); a ring is "bestowed upon them" (69); "they took their journey together through Laconia" (69). Urania even writes a love letter "written jointly both to him and Claius" (72). At first it might seem that Sidney is being lazy, not taking the time to properly differentiate between them and give readers a fuller sense of each of their distinctive personalities. Even if one makes the point that such novelistic realism is not an appropriate criterion for late-sixteenth-century English writing, Sidney seems to be going out of his way *not* to differentiate. But he is not being

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explores the phenomenon of texts written by males and dedicated to females. But she argues rather negatively that "Elizabeth's poets intended their writings first to explore, and then to reject, female power and its most alarming consequences" (179). Sidney removed the frequent addresses to the "fair ladies" in the revised *Arcadia*, signalling a transition from romance to epic. See also Helen Hackett, *Women and Romance Fiction in the English Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000).

[10] Gavin Alexander writes, "The world [Sidney] makes sense of operates according to a binary logic. His works are consequently built on pairings and oppositions, with plot, character, and language partitioned into binaries" (2). This aspect of Sidney influenced later writers: "The rhetoric of dialogue, as in Sidney, gravitates towards schemes and tropes that pattern binaries--synoeciosis, isocolon, antimetabole" (Alexander 33).

lazy or primitive -- he is prompting readers to think. Occasionally, there are rather feeble attempts by other characters to differentiate between Claius and Strephon: "'For them two,' said Kalander, 'especially Claius, they are beyond the rest by so much as learning commonly doth add to nature; for, having neglected their wealth in respect of their knowledge, they have not so much impaired the meaner as they bettered the better'" (83). When Kalander says "especially Claius," he is attempting to differentiate, but then he utterly fails to show any distinction between them in the succeeding clauses. The narrative thus raises the problem of the differentiation between two persons that the text often treats as one. This is similar to Chaucer's Palamon and Arcite in *The Knight's Tale*; Shakespeare's Antipholus of Ephesus, Antipholus of Syracuse, Dromio of Ephesus, and Dromio of Syracuse in the *Comedy of Errors*; and to a lesser degree Valentine and Proteus in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*. Like Claius and Strephon, these characters are often treated as one rather than two. I think such dualities encourage readers to question and debate the philosophical problems of unity and separation.[11]

The composite *Arcadia*'s thought experiment about duality and individuation gets even more complex in the case of Parthenia. She has no partner supplementing and competing with her own individuality. Instead, she doubles herself. In the competition between Argalus and Demagoras to win the love of Parthenia, Argalus is the obvious winner of her affection, though Parthenia's mother fiercely champions the case of Demagoras. After her mother's death, Demagoras despairs of ever marrying her, and in

[11] One might even consider the Falstaff of the historical plays vis-à-vis the Falstaff of *Merry Wives*. Though Shakespeare does not explicitly call attention to the problem of whether to treat them as single or double, the situation leads to deep ontological questions about the status of fictions across multiple works, questions I will treat more fully in Chapter 3.

one of the most vicious episodes of the *Arcadia* "rubbed all over her face a most horrible poison, the effect whereof was such that never leper looked more ugly than she did" (90). Though Argalus nobly persists in his love for her, Parthenia will not allow him to marry her in her current state of disfiguration and instead goes into hiding. After an intervening civil war, through which the Helots win full citizenship, a woman appears at Kalander's estate, claiming to be "near kinswoman to the fair Helen, queen of Corinth" (103). Immediately, Kalander notices the striking resemblance between this visitor and the missing Parthenia, whom Argalus is preparing to seek after:

> [W]hen they met this lady, Kalander straight thought he saw his niece Parthenia, and was about in such familiar sort to have spoken unto her, but she, in grave and honourable manner giving him to understand that he was mistaken, he half ashamed, excused himself with the exceeding likeness was between them, though indeed it seemed that this lady was of the more pure and dainty complexion. (104)

In fact, this really is Parthenia, whose beauty has been restored by one of Helen's physicians. "[T]he exceeding likeness [that] was between them" thus has a kind of perpendicular relation to the case of Claius and Strephon. Whereas Claius and Strephon are two characters that are sometimes undifferentiated, Kalander is tricked by Parthenia to believe in two characters, who are really one and the same. Whereas Claius and Strephon often make two seem as one, Parthenia here makes one seem like two.[12]

Though Sidney never states a theory about how readers are to deal with such

[12] For more examples of, and more theorizing about, self-impersonation, see Wendy Doniger.

problematic duality, the problematic duality itself prompts attempts to account for and explain it. In medieval and Renaissance philosophy the intellectual consequences of this tension between the singular and the multiple might be related to the problem of individuation, a special problem for Platonic realists: If everything is a faint copy of a Form, how can we account for the apparent differences among the instantiations of such Forms? Another perhaps more obvious historical context in which to read the dualities of Sidney's poem is dualism. Though dualism in its classic form is associated with Descartes in the seventeenth century, Sidney writes in the sixteenth that "on earth we are but pilgrims made, / And should in soul up to our country move" (*MW* 155), a statement of Christian Neoplatonic dualism privileging the real heaven over the illusory world, and privileging the Neoplatonic soul over the dross of the body. If Sidney expounds a theory about dualism, this is it. But the story of Parthenia's disfiguration and disguise complicates the case, suggesting a growing discomfort with the stability and reason of such strident dualism, a discomfort that leads readers to think.

The complicated existence of the composite *Arcadia* itself suggests one clear application of this thinking. Specifically, the related problems of dualism and individuation resonate with the multiple versions, both discreet and combined, of Sidney's *Arcadia*: the earliest MS five-book version, now commonly called the *Old Arcadia*; the revised Books I-III published by Greville in 1590, now commonly called the *New Arcadia*; and the 1593 composite *Arcadia*, an attempt by Sidney's sister, Mary Herbert, to combine the two versions. Because the first two versions are so radically different, and because the composite *Arcadia* actually combines the *New* version of

Books I-III with the *Old* version of Books III-V, this composite version raises many difficult questions about identity and differentiation.

The various bridges and continuations by later authors represent attempts not only to make the *Arcadia* one, but also by implication to answer the deeper questions that the *Arcadia*s raise: questions about dualism and individuation. For example, William Alexander's bridge between the two *Arcadia*s, first published in 1621 in Dublin, picks up where the *New Arcadia* leaves off, in the middle of a battle between Anaxius and Pyrocles, the latter disguised as the female Zelmane. When Pyrocles and Anaxius are temporarily separated in Sidney's text, Anaxius finds other objects for his wrath, including a man whom "he did cleave . . . through the helmet to the shoulders, making so, by being two headed, headless" (*Arcadia* 599). This is a startlingly violent and pessimistic image, informed by the impossibility of surgery to repair an utterly split skull. On the metanarrative level, the violence suggests the dubiety of uniting Sidney's texts. Once Anaxius returns to his fight with Zelmane, one might argue that their battle is on some level the battle between the two *Arcadia*s. In his bridge, Alexander tries to be the peacemaker, noting what Anaxius and Pyrocles have in common like a modern-day mediator. Alexander takes care to note, for example, that together "Their thought, eye, hand and foot seemed chained to one motion, as all being tuned by violence to make up a harmony in horror" (600). The sentence begins by offering the possibility that the reconciliation will work and the two fighters will become, like Claius and Strephon, "chained to one motion"; but the last phrase of the sentence undermines this possibility by noting its horrific violence.

Maurice Evans, focusing on the attempted reconciliation between the two *Arcadia*s, admits the "patchwork" nature of the composite *Arcadia*, but nevertheless calls it "a great English classic," "which pleased so many for so long [that it] can be no mere period piece" (10). Katherine Duncan-Jones, on the other hand, focusing on the violence of the juxtaposition, writes, "it is as if the head and shoulders of a man were grafted on to the hind quarters of a horse" ("Introduction" ix).[13] But whereas Duncan-Jones views this as a reason to reject the composite *Arcadia* in favor of the more unified *Old Arcadia*, I view the problematic duality of the composite *Arcadia* as an important part of what Duncan-Jones admits are the "more ambitious, intricate and increasingly intellectual qualities" of the *New Arcadia*. That is, the composite *Arcadia*'s disjunctions both prompt intellectual inquiry and are one object of that inquiry.

In Alexander's supplemental chapter (Chapter 30 in Evans's edition), he writes, "Both [Anaxius and Pyrocles] thus being already allied by blood yet did strive for a more strict affinity, wounds, in regard of their frequency, being no more respected than blows were before. Though they met in divers colours, now both were clad in one livery as most suitable to their present estate being servants to one master and rivals in preferment" (601). At the end of the battle, Pyrocles wins. If the battle is on one level suggestive of the two *Arcadia*s, then Pyrocles's victory perhaps suggests that one of the *Arcadia*s is something like the true *Arcadia*, the accepted *Arcadia*, the one *Arcadia*, and that there might be a way to individuate a duality. But, at the same time, Alexander tells us that the

[13] Duncan-Jones's metaphor is apt, since, as I suggested above, readers in the period quite often are thought of as horses.

two are "allied by blood." Primarily, he means that they are similar because they are both covered in blood. But on the level of metafictional allegory, he implies that the old and new *Arcadia*s are blood relatives (though not the same). The phrase also calls attention to the blood relation of Sidney and the compiler of the composite *Arcadia*, his sister Mary. If the two parts of the 1593 *Arcadia* go together, then one argument appeals to the close blood relation between the two authors. So *can* we differentiate (within) Sidney's text? Alexander's continuation of the thought experiment leaves that thinking to his readers.

On a thematic level, one of the chief dualities of the *Arcadia* is that between contemplation and action, *gnosis* and *praxis*, knowledge and deeds. This is the main theme of the conversations between Musidorus and Pyrocles in Book I, where Musidorus upbraids Pyrocles for his lovesickness.

> For [Musidorus] having at the beginning of Pyrocles' speech, which defended his *solitariness*, framed in his mind a reply against it in the praise of honourable *action*, in showing that such a kind of *contemplation* is but a glorious title to *idleness*; that in *action* a man did not only better him*self* but benefit *others*; that the gods would not have delivered a *soul* into the *body* which hath arms and legs, only *instruments of doing*, but that it were intended the *mind* should employ them; and that the *mind* should best *know* his own good or evil by *practice*, which *knowledge* was the only way to increase the one and correct the other. . . . (113, my emphases)

This passage brilliantly and compactly illustrates the way that many different intellectual debates are intertwined. The debates between idleness and action, knowledge and

practice, mind and body are of a piece. This is the way that good philosophers work, recognizing that each and every intellectual stance implies others, creating a vast and complicated (philosophers might say beautiful) web of arguments. Privileging knowledge over action, for example, seems almost automatically to entail a privileging of mind over body. Kalander's opinion on these subjects seems clear: "Too much thinking doth consume the spirits, and oft it falls out that while one thinks too much of his doing, he leaves to do the effect of his thinking" (115). Kalander would seem to be privileging action over thinking. But in fact he is not. He is privileging action over *too much* thinking. That is, Kalander intuits the close relation between knowledge and practice that Sidney lays out in the *Defence*. For Kalander, the keys to this debate are not the thinking and doing themselves but rather the *spirits* and *effect* that link them, if they are used aright, into a harmonious whole. Neither thinking nor doing is privileged. What is privileged is a thinking that leads to doing, a doing that proceeds from thinking. Neither thought nor action can be absent from Kalander's briefly expounded ethical idea.

It is clear that Sidney's poem leads a reader to think about action and contemplation.The debate between Pyrocles and Musidorus is continued when Musidorus, after long journeying, finds Pyrocles disguised as a woman and complaining in a secretive arbor. But the debate continues to be further complicated by the poem, requiring a reader to think more deeply. Pyrocles, in defense of his strange behavior in the service of the virtue of love, exclaims, "[I]f we love virtue, in whom shall we love it but in a virtuous creature - without your meaning be, I should love this word 'Virtue' where I see it written in a book!" (136). The debate between action and contemplation

has here transformed into a meditation on words and things. How can we love "virtue" without loving virtuous creatures? Pyrocles asks. In exasperation, Pyrocles ends by saying, "But these disputations are fitter for quiet schools than my troubled brains, which are bent rather in deeds to perform than in words to defend the noble desire that possesseth me" (136). I've got things to *do*, he says, we can *talk* later.

In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates tells Glaucon that there is "an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy" (607b). Socrates quotes from poems that cast aspersions on thinkers. And though Socrates leaves open the possibility of a successful defense of poetry in the future, until that happens, only praises of the gods and eulogies of good people will be allowed in the ideal city. This banishment has always puzzled readers who realize how much of a poet Plato is, and how much poetry he knows. Plato (or Socrates) obviously did not live in the ideal, de-poeticized city. And so the ancient quarrel continues. In this dissertation, I want to suggest, sometimes overtly, sometimes merely by example, that there need not be a quarrel.[14] What poetic fictions and some philosophical thought experiments share is an imaginative open-endedness that provides readers with "machines for thinking."[15] My project describes several such poetic machines in the Renaissance.

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[14] Iris Murdoch, *The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), fully explores the contradictions in Plato's position; and Julius A. Elias, *Plato's Defence of Poetry* (London: Macmillan, 1984), tries to soften the banishment of the poets, by claiming that Plato leaves obvious room for them. A good collection of essays on Plato's position is Julius Moravcsik and Philip Temko, eds., *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts* (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982). See also Morriss Henry Partee, *Plato's Poetics: The Authority of Beauty* (Salt Lake City: U of Utah P, 1981).

[15] The phrase is Carruthers's; it is explained more fully in Chapter 2. Stephen Fallon writes, “Historians of ideas have too often shortchanged both poets and philosophers. Despite impatience with disciplinary boundaries in their theoretical statements, [A. O.] Lovejoy and his followers respected those boundaries in

I will mostly expect the individual readings of the following chapters to present this view (rather than providing a fully fleshed-out theory of "poetic thinking" in this introduction). But it is at least important, I think, to emphasize here one new insight offered in this project: the connection between thinking and moving. According to Teskey, "Reading philosophy is unlike other kinds of reading because it is discontinuous: we have to keep stopping to think, and this thinking is the grasping of a structure we conceive to stand out of time" ("Thinking Moments" 114). This is precisely why philosophic thinking is different from poetic thinking, and might be one reason why Sidney contrasts the stasis of reading philosophy with the movement of poetry. Sidney's argument in the *Defence of Poetry*, which I examine more closely in Chapter 1, is this: If to think philosophically, readers must pause, then to think poetically, they must move.

3. Moving from Thought to Action

It has usually been thought that to move readers means to manipulate their emotions. The project to understand the early modern passions in England has so far been a very fruitful one. The work begun by Gail Kern Paster and Michael Schoenfeldt has been followed by the work of Douglas Trevor and by the essays collected in *Reading the Early Modern Passions* (Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, eds.). Their projects, seen as a whole, have been focused on the important task of historicizing our understanding of how

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practice. The philosophers had original ideas, which they expressed in plain language; the poets took those ideas and clothed them in metaphor and verse. But there is a kind of poetry in the structure and imagery of the *Discourse on Method* or *Leviathan*, and there is philosophical originality and sophistication in *Paradise Lost*" (244). In Lovejoy's criticism, Fallon writes, there is an "explicit subordination of literature to the history of philosophy" (12). Even "Descartes's strategy is located between the conventions of philosophical epic and familiar 'nonfictional' philosophical discourse. Philosophy's counterfactual and poetry's fictional meet in the middle and authorize speculation" (15). "Descartes illustrates the permeability of the border between philosophy and poetry (broadly conceived) in the seventeenth century" (15).

early modern subjects felt, and how they conceptualized those feelings. My project seeks to continue this good work by attempting an even sharper understanding of the role of emotion in early modern ethical aesthetics.

It is a commonplace and often unexamined observation that poetry moves its readers. And yet much of formalist, post-Kantian literary criticism explicitly disowns such moving as inessential or even absolutely counter to aesthetic experience. In the third critique, Kant places the beautiful and the sublime between the extreme poles of the agreeable and the good. The agreeable is purely subjective and particular: this ice cream cone tastes agreeable (to me). The ethical is purely objective and universal: that action is good for all time and all people. Judgements about beauty, however, are described as "subjective universal" judgements. They represent subjective judgements about particular objects that nevertheless entail universal consent. Surprisingly, then, Kant presents the aesthetic as a bridge between the pleasurable and the good. But this is a schematic rather than an ethical theory, since Kant does not show the movement from aesthetic pleasure to ethical good.

Today, aesthetics is haunted by the specter of Kantian "disinterested pleasure." For more than two centuries, Kant's idea has been the elephant in the room for all aestheticians, whether they agree or disagree. Derrida writes: "a disinterested pleasure: the formula is too well known, too received, as is the refusal it has never ceased to provoke" (*Truth* 46). Derrida speaks of Kant's distinction between *pulchritudo vaga*, or free beauty, and *pulchritudo adhaerens*, or adherent beauty. Adherent beauty is for Kant less pure since it is dependent on a goal or final end outside or beyond itself, whereas free

beauty has no end or goal. Derrida makes a nice distinction when he calls these two kinds of beauty "mercenary art and liberal art, the latter being the only one which is fine art inasmuch as it plays and is not exchanged against any salary" (*Truth* 102). Most aesthetic philosophy in the last two centuries, including that of the pragmatist John Dewey, may be seen as responding to this Kantian distinction. In *Art as Experience*, Dewey implicitly argues against Kant's "disinterested pleasure" by claiming that art should be a part of experience, and therefore of the ethical lives of its perceivers. Kant's idea has haunted aesthetic discourse for so long now that theories that posit some mercenary interest in art automatically draw attention to themselves. One of the most powerful voices for mercenary interest in art is Martha Nussbaum, who argues that art, and especially the emotions it raises, does and should play an important role in personal and societal moral debates and ethical choices. Aristotle, whom the classical scholar Nussbaum knows well, clearly saw how the public had an interest in art: by purging the emotions of fear and pity, tragedy could be useful to the state. Similarly, as I will show, in late sixteenth-century England, disinterested pleasure in art is rare. There is, for political, religious, and practical reasons, little room for "art for art's sake." But as I have discovered, and as I will show, early modern thinking about the extrinsic utility of art is vexed by the complexities of vocabulary and intellectual inheritance. Sidney, Spenser, and others in the Elizabethan milieu evince intense thinking about art that is at the same time tentative, unsure, and sometimes confusing. This project hopes to reopen the idea of the social utility of art in early modern England as an exciting problem that deserves more careful attention.

Classical writers continuously tried to pinpoint the utility, if any, of literature. Plato laid down the gauntlet for future critics in the *Republic*. In Book 10, which rightly or wrongly has usually been taken as the most important statement from Socrates on the issue, Socrates (in)famously banishes imitative poets from his republic, claiming that it "is likely to distort the thought of anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of what it is really like, as a drug to counteract it" (595b). "[H]ymns to the gods and eulogies of good people are the only poetry we can admit into our city. If you admit the pleasure-giving Muse, whether in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law or the thing that everyone has always believed to be best, namely, reason" (607a). But though Socrates cannot find a reason to admit imitative poetry, chiefly the epic poetry of Homer, into his republic, he seems nevertheless to desire its admission. Thus, at the end of his discussion about poetry, he calls for a defense of poetry, asking someone else to provide what he cannot: a justification of imitative poetry as not only pleasurable, but also beneficial.

Aristotle's *Poetics* is a direct reply to this call. Whereas Plato had banished poetry for the reason that, among other reasons, it was emotional rather than rational, Aristotle rehabilitates this very emotional appeal as itself beneficial. He writes that tragedy is beneficial in its arousal of pity and fear leading toward catharsis. Thus Aristotle is the first in a long line of thinkers to make a case for the social utility of reading (or attending plays or listening to rhapsodes). It is no surprise then that editions of Aristotle exploded in the sixteenth century, for it is also the writers of this century that, more rigorously than

those in any previous century, theorized the utility of literature in new and exciting ways.[16] As J. E. Spingarn argued long ago:

> The first problem of Renaissance criticism was the justification of imaginative literature. The existence and continuity of the aesthetic consciousness, and perhaps, in a less degree, of the critical faculty, throughout the Middle Ages, can hardly be denied; yet distrust of literature was keenest among the very class of men in whom the critical faculty might be presupposed, and it was as the handmaid of philosophy, and most of all as a vassal of theology, that poetry was chiefly valued. In other words, the criteria by which imaginative literature was judged during the Middle Ages were not literary criteria. Poetry was disregarded or contemned, or was valued if at all for virtues that least belong to it. The Renaissance was thus confronted with the necessity of justifying its appreciation of the vast body of literature which the Revival of Learning had recovered for the modern world; and the function of Renaissance criticism was to reestablish the aesthetic foundations of literature, to reaffirm the eternal lesson of Hellenic culture, and to restore once and for all the element of beauty to its rightful place in human life and in the world of art. (3-4)

[16] For exhaustive lists of sixteenth-century editions of Aristotle in Europe, see Charles B. Schmitt, and Paul Oskar Kristeller.

That poetry moves readers is a notion as old as Plato and Aristotle, both of whom accepted such movement, but each of whom took a different stance toward such movement. Plato famously worried about the political instability such audience captivation might precipitate. And so he chose to banish poets from his ideal republic. In sixteenth-century England, the Puritanical theater-haters sided with Plato, seeking to banish stage plays from the realm.[17] Aristotle on the other hand saw at least some positive benefits in the movements of art. In the instance of tragedy (the only dramatic genre Aristotle treats in his surviving corpus), he wrote that by arousing fear and pity, tragedy leads to beneficial catharsis. The English writers upon whom I focus in this project side with Aristotle in the debate. In fact, social pressure forced them to side with Aristotle, and encouraged them to think of their poetry as benefitting the public through moving them in certain ways.

If looked at anachronistically, these Elizabethan writers were striving to prove one of Wittgenstein's more gnomic utterances: "Ethics and aesthetics are one." (*Tractatus* 6.421). If placed in historical context, they are building upon the medieval idea that "mental pictures help in moving the will to initiate courses of action," an idea that "underlie[s] many medieval manifestations of ethical poetics" (Minnis 241). As I will show, both "ethics" and "aesthetics" are terms themselves contested in Elizabethan

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[17] On the sentiments and arguments against poetry and drama in the period (a huge area of scholarship), see Robert Matz, *Defending Literature in Early Modern England: Renaissance Literary Theory in Social Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000); Peter C. Herman, *Squitter-Wits and Muse-Haters: Sidney, Spenser, Milton, and Renaissance Antipoetic Sentiment* (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1996); and Jonas Barish, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1981). Levao provides a quick overview of the classical and patristic lines of anti-poetic argument that passes through Plato, Tertullian, Abelard, and Aquinas (103-04).

England. But partly by wrestling with the meaning and importance of these terms, what we might call the extrinsic and intrinsic value of poems, the writers inevitably show how the two concepts work together. Poets and audiences begin in the early modern period to recognize that assessments of intrinsic value help assessments of extrinsic value and vice versa.

Most people would assent to the proposition that poetry has the ability to move its readers. But most people also mean this in a purely metaphorical way: our hearts and minds are "moved." But what if in the early modern period, this movement was understood more physically and literally? When Elizabethans speak of poetry's ability to move readers, they typically mean something both more and less defined than most people nowadays. They mean something more because for them this movement is concrete, physical. They mean something less because the notion, as seen in the first appearances of the word "emotion" in the early seventeenth century, is still a contested one.

To get at the problem of movement, both its possibility and its value, I focus my argument on an exploration of emotion. And I do so through two lenses. One is Carruthers's concept of rhetorical structures as machines for thinking (*Craft* 276). Like the medieval literature, art, and architecture that Carruthers studies, Renaissance poems are designs that help readers to think about complex problems. The other lens is the concept of emotion itself. The concept of emotion is not quite an early modern one, but it is, I believe, nascent (as my first chapter argues). If cars move us by taking us from point A to point B, poems move us through what Milton's Samson calls "rousing motions" (line

1382). The two lenses of moving and thinking are a bit like the red and blue lenses of 3D glasses. Used separately, each might change the color of our immediate environment; together they more radically alter the way we view the world.

4. Pragmatist Poetics

I am concerned to formulate a theory of poetry that does justice to what I believe Sidney, Spenser, and some of their contemporaries must have shared in the way of intellectual commonplace. But that it was commonplace sometimes means that it goes unspoken or only hinted at. Latter-day pragmatists help us to comment and expand upon the commonplace that poetry's importance is the action it makes possible. And there are remarkable similarities between some Renaissance and some modern defenses of poetry. The project is thus organized as a series of pragmatist explorations of English Renaissance texts.

The first chapter treats the pragmatist notion of meaning as conversation, specifically the way in which a new term, *emotion*, arises because of a need in conversation to describe something different from what is allowed by the available lexicon of passion, affection, and feeling. Taking a hint from the pragmatists, I suppose philosophical concepts to be historically contingent. Furthermore, I believe poets are vital players in the game of language creation. My methodology is thus to investigate, by close reading and linguistic history, how early modern writers create language and endow lexicons with philosophical valence.

The second chapter begins by showing how Spenser's poem portrays a specific emotion, pity. It then provides an example of how a specific text, the House of Busirane

episode of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, might be used as a machine for thinking, that is, how it provides a path for thoughtful readers to move through. As I argue in this chapter, correct *interpretation* I believe is less important to Spenser's text than the *use* readers might make of it. I show how the poet facilitates and encourages this use by modelling the space of the House of Busirane upon the memorial architectural space *par excellence*, the Temple of Solomon, and by engaging the medieval aesthetic theories of Bernard of Clairvaux.

The third and longest chapter examines how Spenser employs the epic convention of ecphrasis to present readers with objects of concern. This latter concept derives from Robert Roberts's definition of emotion as concern-based construals, and thus helps to link the concern that readers of the House of Busirane episode have for the artistic objects in it with a moving ductus, a concept borrowed from Carruthers to be elaborated upon. Specifically, I show how the ecphrases in the episode help readers explore one problem for my posited early modern pragmatist aesthetics: if imitative poetry is not like reality, then how can it move us toward reality? Moreover, how do we even distinguish between fiction and reality? Using Britomart's experience of the House of Busirane as my main example, I return to and assess some of the twentieth century debates about character criticism, laying out a position that humans and characters are similar, though not for the reasons that much character criticism assumes. Sidney claims that the role of good poetry, for example the *Cyropaedia* of Xenophon, is "to bestow a Cyrus upon the world to make many Cyruses" (*Defence* 79). Though the "many Cyruses" could refer to other fictional characters derived from the model of Xenophon's character, the thrust of

Sidney's treatise strongly suggests otherwise. The "many Cyruses" are clearly meant to stand for the many readers of the poem that might pattern their real lives after it. But it seems right to say that a fictional Cyrus can only make many real-world Cyruses if the first Cyrus is strongly parallel to the many Cyruses. They must, as Wittgenstein writes, "have *something* -- a form -- in common" (*Tractatus* 2.022). For this reason and others, thinking about fictional ontology is important to our understanding of early modern theories of how fictions perform the work prescribed for them.

There are places where my project's affinities with American pragmatism end. The chief example, perhaps, is my extended treatment of the so-called paradox of fiction: why do we react emotionally to things that we know do not exist (i.e. fictional objects). This entire concern might be seen as antithetical to pragmatism's avowed anti-skepticism and anti-metaphysicalism. Instead of doubting the nature of fictional characters, pragmatists would have us accept them as they are in our experience. Richard Rorty, for example, claims in "Is There a Problem about Fictional Discourse" that there is no reason to worry about what fictional characters "are." As I try to show, however, in the case of Spenser such a metaphysical concern ends up having serious practical consequences. Though I spend some time worrying about the ontological status and epistemology of fictional characters, I try to show how these questions impinge and signal towards everyday life, thus, I hope, gesturing toward the kind of intellectual inquiry whose ends might satisfy Dewey's pragmatist prescriptions for education. What is important is not the question of fiction itself, but the consequences in life of contemplation of such a question. What is important about Sidney's *Defence of Poetry* and Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* is

how these works are designed to become engaged in readers' everyday lives, and to point readers away from the text and into the world.

The movement I describe might be helpfully formulated in the terms that Paul Valéry sometimes used to describe the writing of poetry. Valéry wrote, "In fact, the completion of a work is only ever an abandonment, a halt that can always be regarded as fortuitous in an evolution that might have been continued" (Jarrety 119; trans. Jarrety). He also wrote, "A poem is never finished -- it is always an accident that ends it, that is to say, that gives it to the public" (*Oeuvres* 2.553, my translation). Valéry is talking about the craft of writing poetry, but with the abandonment of writing equated with the publication for an audience. And what Valéry has said about writers, Spenser seems to imply about readers. In the Renaissance, at least in the tradition of Sidney and Spenser, good readers never finish poems; rather they put them aside at some point for ethical action in the real world. This action is seen in the life of Sidney himself, who famously moved from a literary life to a military one, a life of *gnosis* to one of *praxis*. Literature, for Sidney and Spenser, is part of a transitional stage from solipsism to ethical action, the transition Narcissus was tragically unable to make. This notion of literature might seem alien to our modern readership, which has learned to read Proust and Joyce as hermetic forgers of conscience who ultimately withdrew from all action into the secret universes of their own heads. But it is an argument we must keep in mind when reading Renaissance texts, especially those of Sidney and Spenser.

This dissertation presents a pragmatist theory of Renaissance English poetry not only by examining some important statements of poetics in the period, but also by

analyzing poetic expression itself. I look for recurring patterns in trope, language, and plot to find clues to how poets are conceiving of their craft in the midst of writing it. The only treatise that is treated at length is Sidney's *Defence of Poetry*. But as James Calderwood put it in the introduction to *Shakespearean Metadrama*, "In a sense each poem contains its own poetics" (7). The poems thus help me to reconceptualize a theory of poetry in general, one that highlights the ways that the complexity of poems help readers to interact with, and even decide about, deep and perennial intellectual problems. This in turn reshapes the ways we think about so-called didactic literature in the early modern period. That is, it helps us to better understand what Sidney meant when he said poetry should move readers from *gnosis* to *praxis*. Nevertheless, all of these insights find their foundations in a study that links poetry to traditionally philosophical questions, specifically those of emotion, epistemology, and the role of art in the ethical life.

There is, of course, not just one tradition of philosophy, and I am more indebted to some than to others: specifically, the tradition whose arc extends from the beginning of analytical philosophy to latter-day post-philosophical pragmatism. Some of its chief figures are Wittgenstein, Dewey, Stanley Cavell, Noel Carroll, and Rorty. Though disparate in nationality and expansive in their interests, these thinkers have a tradition in common. Frege and especially Wittgenstein are responsible for the linguistic turn in philosophy, a turn that has taken at least two directions: the post-structuralist and the analytic. Within the analytic, Cavell has remained more than others a Wittgensteinian in his attention to nuance and forms of life. Rorty has used Wittgenstein to push analytic philosophy beyond its prior understanding of itself. These last two writers also provide a

paradigm for the interdisciplinarity of my project. Cavell's breakthrough 1968 collection of essays, *Must We Mean What We Say?*, was considered radical at the time for its interdisciplinary nature. In the book Cavell mingles explorations of Wittgenstein's later philosophy with essays on the aesthetics of modern music and a famous essay on *King Lear*. Many philosophers of the next generation have followed Cavell's lead, including Nussbaum, whose work on ethics, philosophy, emotion, music, and classical and modern literature, has had an enormous impact on scholars across disciplinary lines, and Rorty, who turned to literature in his later work.

Wittgenstein's writings have helped to shape and refine my own in pervasive ways. But in the preface to his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein warned against his own influence when he wrote, "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking" (x). This amounts to a bold refutation (as does his refusal to view his writing as property) of a deeply entrenched tradition of philosophy. It amounts, as Marjorie Perloff has argued, to a poetic vision of philosophy. Poets, I argue, don't make arguments; they give us complex workbooks for intellectual thinking. Like Wittgenstein, they have us do the thinking for ourselves.

My project uncovers some key issues that allow us to complicate the Renaissance conception of the connection of literature to the ethical life. Since moving is the primary capacity in which literature makes us better people (according to Sidney), we must understand what Sidney meant by moving, which, I argue, we begin to understand once we start investigating the emergence of the meaning of "emotion" for early modern readers and writers.

My dissertation project interacts with a currently vigorous philosophical discussion about the role of art in the ethical life. Scholars trained in philosophy and working as philosophers have carried on the current debate. One result of this has been inattention to the literary aspects of literary works. Too often philosophers treat complex literary texts as straightforward "arguments" or characters as straightforward "persons." As a scholar trained in literary studies I want to correct some of this bias and show how poems help us to live, not through telling us what to do, but by revealing the complexities and contradictions of the ethical life. My project, then, stands Nussbaum on her head, privileging as I do the literary over the straightforwardly philosophical.

In Nussbaum's specific interpretations, she stands open to a criticism that Peter Herman has recently levied against the Milton industry--that, by and large, such scholarship has suffered from a one-dimensional view of the poetry (*Destabilizing*). For example, W. A. Hart criticizes Nussbaum for privileging philosophy ("pointing the moral") over meticulous close reading. Her reading of the novel is too "unproblematic" (214), Hart says, that is, too unaware of the complexities of literary rhetoric. Her resulting interpretation thus "comes across as a perversity" (214). "She has, one suspects, a preconceived view of the moral life as inherently fragile in the face of circumstances, as typically caught up in contradictions, that predisposes her to interpret Maggie Verver's story in precisely those terms" (214-15). Herman sees a similar tendency in Milton studies to attempt to explain Milton's one and final position on any issue. Is he republican or monarchist? orthodox or heretical? feminist or misogynist? As Herman argues, the very nature of poetic discourse makes straightforward answers to these questions

problematic (*Destabilizing*). For poetic discourse has as its prerequisite a set of unanswered questions. As I would argue, poetry is where philosophers turn when they don't yet have a complete answer to present. This is when philosophers create thought experiments. Nussbaum asks of Henry James's *The Golden Bowl*, "Do the insights of the prefaces and of Part II stand or fall? I want to say that they stand, that there is an ideal here. It is not altogether undermined; it is still precious. It is only shown to be, like everything human, imperfect" (*Love's* 137). But much of her previous analysis hints at more major problems for her sense of the moral vision of the novel, problems that Nussbaum seems quick to override. Nevertheless, at least the passage shows Nussbaum acknowledging a more unstable picture, when she admits that any human moral vision is finally imperfect. The poets I study are keenly aware of this. This imperfection and uncertainty makes the poems I study that much more brilliant.

For Nussbaum and others, emotion has been resurrected as a fundamental part of the ethical life. This resonates strongly with Renaissance theories and ideas about how art "moves" or "urges" its readers from *gnosis* to *praxis* (in Sidney's words). So part of what I do in my dissertation project is investigate the role of emotion as a bridge between art and ethics, self and others. The poets I explore, primarily Sidney and Spenser, worry in one way or another about the ethical impact of their poems, even if only because of societal pressures to do so. Their poems evince a remarkable array of complex attitudes toward, and methods of dealing with, the connection between art and ethics.

Gavin Alexander argues convincingly that Sidney's works evince a "pragmatic version of literary imitation" (30). I have no wish to suggest that Sidney or Spenser is a

pragmatist, which would be merely anachronistic. But, like Alexander, I do seek to show how the literary works of these writers suggest ideas about the role of book learning and literary interpretation that are compatible with a pragmatist outlook. Levao writes that Sidney's *Defence* argues for poetry's ethical efficacy as "a conduit of the ideal into the actual" (135). When Sidney revises the *Arcadia*, he moves it away from contemplation and toward action. Provincial pastoral exchanges become international epic escapades, and erotic dalliance becomes military prowess. In the *Old Arcadia*, Pyrocles and Musidorus are characterized by debate; in the revised *Arcadia* they are increasingly characterized by deed. Sidney's revisions thus show a poet working through his own relations to thought and action, and revising toward the latter. Taking its model from Sidney, my project both tries to explain how this movement is theorized, and shows concrete examples of its practical application.

Chapter 1

Poetry, Movement, and Emotion in Elizabethan England

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus* 5.6)

Yet, if by chance, in uttering things abstruse,
Thou need new terms; thou may'st without excuse,
Feign words, unheard of to the well-trussed race
Of the Cethegi.[18] (Ben Jonson, trans., "Horace, Of the Art of Poetry" 69-72)

We may look to writers . . . and expect them to forge a language linking orthodox codes to personal experience, where none exists. (John Kerrigan, "Introduction," *Sonnets and a Lover's Complaint* (47))

Must I understand an order before I can act on it? -- Certainly, otherwise you wouldn't know what you had to do! -- But isn't there in turn a jump from *knowing* to doing? (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* 118)

"Eppur si muove" 'And yet it moves.' Galileo to the Inquisitors[19]

[18] The Cethegi were a patrician branch (cognomen) of the powerful Cornelii family (nomen).

Sidney was, both as a poet and as a statesman-in-training, invested in the idea that poetry is better than history and philosophy because it has the ability to move readers from contemplation to action. He writes in *A Defence of Poetry*, "[M]oving is of a higher degree than teaching," "[b]ut to be moved to do that which we know" is the hard task that only poetry can accomplish (91). Even in Sidney's earliest writings, he is thinking about the proper relation between thinking and action. In *The Lady of May*, an outdoor entertainment written for Elizabeth's visitation to Leicester's estate in 1578 or 1579, the competition between the shepherd Espilus and the forester Therion for the love of the Lady of May is at least in part a competition between contemplative pastoral and active forestry. But Espilus is also boring, while Therion is exciting. It is curious that Queen Elizabeth judges "that Espilus did the better deserve her" (*MP* 30). Though the choice has puzzled critics, who worry that "the Queen turned the occasion into a fiasco by choosing the contemplative Espilus," Duncan-Jones is quick to point out that "[i]t is unlikely that Sidney intended *The Lady of May* to embody firm conclusions which the Queen missed or rejected. But one certainly has a general sense that major themes are being touched on" (*MP* 14, 15).[20] Indeed, the theme of contemplation versus action is one of the constants in Sidney's many different kinds of writing. And though the Queen's choice of Espilus

[19] Angus Fletcher, *Time*, writes that these "were Galileo's no doubt apocryphal words to the Inquisitors, yet they catch the spirit of the age, which everywhere in literature is reflected clearly enough" (11). Fletcher explores the dependence of ideas of literary movement upon scientific ideas about movement. This is especially relevant within the Renaissance, since science itself was so rapidly advancing.

[20] Stephen Orgel, "Sidney's Experiment In Pastoral: *The Lady of May*" (Kinney, *Essential Articles* 61-71), writes that there is "no question about where the choice between Espilus and Therion must lie. . . . And since the case is so clear, we will find it amusing enough that Elizabeth should have picked wrongly, but astonishing that no one since then should have noticed the error" (69).

might imply a choice of leisure over work, the parody of barren scholarship that Rombus the pedant displays in that entertainment satirizes such self-indulgent thinking at the expense of real action in the real world. "The theme of action and contemplation, so lightly handled here, was one which concerned Sidney for the rest of his life" (*MP* 17). As late as the *Defence of the Earl of Leicester* (c. 1584-85), Sidney denies the validity of an anonymous attack on his uncle by claiming that it does not have the power to "move" even "the lightest wits to give thereto credit" (*MP* 130). Throughout Sidney's work, one recurring theme is that if a work of literature does not move, it is, *ipso facto*, a failure. The most thorough theoretical treatment of the theme is found in Sidney's *Defence of Poetry*, a treatise that determines to some extent how his successor, Spenser, thinks about his own writing.

1. Horacemanship in the *Defence of Poetry*

Sidney begins his *Defence of Poetry* with a story about horsemanship, featuring John Pietro Pugliano's praise of horses delivered before his pupils, Sidney and Edward Wotton. The story serves as introduction by analogy: just as Pugliano the horseman is driven by "self-love" to praise horses and horsemanship, Sidney the poet is driven by self-love to praise poetry. The analogy with Pugliano serves to ironize Sidney's discourse as a parody of Pugliano's discourse, an irony Sidney often remarks within the disingenuous closet oration.

But according to Edward Berry, "To see the opening merely from a rhetorical perspective . . . is to miss the real source of its expressive power" (24). "Horsemanship," Berry writes, "was a potent symbol of aristocratic manhood for both Sidney and his

audience" (24). For Berry, the horse imagery in the opening thus foreshadows the military imagery in the rest of the *Defence*, whereby "the poet . . . becomes the epic hero" (30). The *Defence* is read as "transforming the marginal figure of the poet into the leader of a military aristocracy" (26). While I agree with Berry that "Sidney's commitment [is] not to poetry but to heroic action" (33), the *Defence* itself displays considerable anxiety about the movement from contemplation to action. Berry admits that "Sidney's argument on this issue is extremely vulnerable" (30), but Berry's article treats the aristocratic ideal as if it were invulnerable, either in the mind of Sidney or in Elizabethan culture. The purpose of this chapter, then, is not to debate the kinds of action to which poetry might move readers, but to look more deeply at how Sidney and some of his contemporaries think in exciting new ways about the possibility of this kind of movement.

The relation of poetry to action is often conceptualized as the link between delight and profit. Andrew Zurcher writes that "one of the most important problems in early modern hermeneutical theory [is] the relation of the aesthetic (*voluptas*) to the utile (*utilitas*)" (18), a link that Robert Matz describes as a double bind. Matz sees Sidney's *Defence* as an attempt to defend the aristocratic pleasures, which Stephen Gosson thought were frivolous, as profitable. Sidney "attempts to defend the courtly pleasure of poetry by claiming that such pleasure promotes warrior service" (21). But Matz also sees Sidney's *Defence* as famously "erratic" in its argument (68). Matz sees this inconsistency (or possibly even incoherence) as a result of the fact that Sidney wants (but can't have) it both ways: To counter Gosson, Sidney wants to make poetry profitable, both morally and politically; but Sidney is too much in love with "the golden world" of poets and courtiers

to simply give up the pleasure inherent in courtly activities. Sidney writes his *Defence* partly as a meditation on the Horatian link between pleasure and utility. I argue that Sidney seeks to resolve the double bind of profit and pleasure with movement, which thus replaces the conjunction of the double bind (*and*) with something like a directional arrow: pleasure *movement* profit. To be efficacious, pleasure must move readers, and also needs a profitable goal towards which to move. Movement thus bridges what Gavin Alexander calls "the pragmatic gap between a work and its moral efficacy" (45). This, I think, is Sidney's major contribution to Humanist poetics, which had always insisted, after Horace, that poetry should combine pleasure and profit, but did not think clearly enough about how such a combination might actually work.

Horace is quoted ubiquitously in late sixteenth-century England. In Spenser's Latin poem to Gabriel Harvey, *Ad Ornatissimum virum*, he writes, "Omne tulit punctum, *qui miscuit vtile dulci*" 'He carries every vote, who mixes utility with pleasure,' a direct quote from Horace's *Ars Poetica*, line 343.[21] It is sometimes claimed that the line is a merely platitudinous commonplace in late Elizabethan England. For example, Rudolf Gottfried's edition of Spenser's prose notes that Harvey himself quotes the line in his *Rhetor* (1577, sig. O4v) in a list of commonly memorized phrases: "Quid si Horatianum illud vobis in memoriam revocem, *Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit vtile dulci*?"[22] In one of his letters to Spenser, Harvey chides him: "What? Is Horace's *Ars Poetica* so quite out of our Englishe Poets head that he muste haue his Remembrancer to pull hym by the

[21] This Latin poem is reproduced in Spenser's *Prose Works* 8-12. An English translation is provided in the same book (256-258).
[22] This line from Horace is quoted verbatim in, for example, John Harington's *A Brief Apology for Poetry*, the preface to his 1591 translation of Ariosto (Smith ii. 208).

sleeue, and put him in mind" (Smith i.117)? Alongside Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and others, Horace was one of the classical theorists about poetry often appealed to in Elizabethan poetics. Gregory Smith writes, "The debt to Horace is certainly greater than would appear at the first estimate, for much that stands to the credit of Aristotle and others is really his, or at least Horatian. The *Ars Poetica* had usurped the place of mentor, not only to many who would write poetry, but to all who would write about it" (lxxv). To his *Discourse of English Poetrie* (1586), William Webbe simply appends a list of 54 "Cannons or generall cautions of Poetry, prescribed by Horace" (Smith i. 290).[23] But the circle with which Spenser, Harvey, Sidney, Dyer and others were associated was especially concerned with the applicability of the phrase "miscuit utili dulci."[24] In Spenser's early poem to Harvey, the traditional debate between utility and delight is given a new context. The context for the Horatian quote is a passage in which Spenser is gently chiding the serious and brittle Harvey for his lack of good humor, in contrast to Aristippus "who softened mild words to a tyrant proud of his purple," and Father Ennius, who "pour[ed] out poems which flowed with delirious wine" (*Prose Works* 257). Though

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[23] The canons and cautions are not a direct translation from Horace. Gregory Smith writes, "These are a translation of the concluding section of the 6th Book of the enlarged edition of Fabricius's *De Re Poetica Libri Septem* (printed in 1560)" (i. 416).

[24] Spenser refers to the circle as an Areopagus in one of his published letters to Harvey. Alexander C. Judson discusses the probable relationships between these men, writing that "there can be no doubt that Spenser . . . was on a friendly footing with Sidney, Dyer, and [Daniel] Rogers" (59). S. K. Heninger is much more skeptical: "I conclude that the Areopagus was a product of Spenser's and Harvey's high-spirited joking, most likely a pipedream of the over confident Harvey, and those who have viewed it in the image of Ronsard's Pleiade have seen an elephant on the face of the moon. There was no poetical academy dubbed the Areopagus with fixed rules and regular meetings. [¶] In sum, although the opportunity for acquaintance existed, it can be only a surmise that Sidney and Spenser actually met" (10). But whether or not they met, it is undeniable that we can nevertheless detect common concerns among them. The biographical truth of the Areopagus is less important than its intellectual truth. Whereas it may never be proved that they met together, it can be shown that Spenser was making an intellectually sound, if not socially probable, grouping when he posited the group.

wisdom is a virtue, Spenser tells Harvey that only those who mix such wisdom with pleasure can win "every vote of approval" (257). Spenser thus warns Harvey not to "spurn voluptuous pleasures too much," and seems to encourage the bachelor Harvey to find a woman to marry. Intellectually, Spenser is warning Harvey against a particular kind of writing, the kind of mean satire for which Harvey is known.[25] Instead, Spenser writes, you must "mingle use with delight" (257).

Sidney argues that movement can help them mingle. Partly as a response to diatribes against their craft, but also as an inheritance of classical and medieval ideas, many Elizabethan writers conceived of poetry in general as an ethical instrument.[26] In late medieval English literature, the ethical use of literature informs Chaucer's Host's criteria for the story-telling competition. The winner will be he or she that "telleth in this caas / Tales of best sentence [usable wisdom] and moost solaas [comfort or pleasure]" (I.797-98). Spenser, of course, based both his language and, at times, his plots on the works of Chaucer. Sidney, too, replying to Gosson's *School of Abuse* in his *Defence of Poetry*, borrows the Horatian prescription that poetry must "teach and delight," but also adds an idea at least as old as Cicero, and at least implicit in Aristotle: the poem must also *move* the reader. The Aristotelian "Middle Commentary" of Averroes, for example,

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[25] Much of this vitriolic satire would later burst out in the series of veiled and not-so-veiled exchanges with Thomas Nashe, the so-called Harvey-Nashe Quarrel (c. 1592-93), proof that Spenser's advice to his mentor to cool down (c. 1579) was not heeded in the long term.

[26] George Puttenham, for example, defines poesy as "whatsoever witty and delicate conceit of man meet or worthy to be put in written verse, *for any necessary use of the present, or good instruction of the posterity*" (114, italics mine). In general, the renewed focus on the utility of poetry was inspired by the revival of Aristotle's *Poetics*, which claimed that the social utility of tragedy is the *catharsis* of pity and fear. The Socrates of Plato's *Republic* and the Aristotle of the *Poetics* each has an essentially pragmatist theory of poetry, the former banishing poetry because it has, if any use, only bad use, the latter valuing tragedy for its good use. If pragmatism defines meaning and value as utility, then Plato thinks poetry has negative value, while Aristotle sees its positive value.

"makes clear how, in place of the intellectual assent demanded by scientific demonstration, poetic representation elicits psychological assent; its imaginative syllogisms seek to move rather than prove" (Minnis 255). "[M]oving is of a higher degree than teaching," Sidney writes, echoing Spenser's advice to Harvey. "For as Aristotle saith, it is not *gnosis* but *praxis* must be the fruit. . . . But to be moved to do that which we know, or to be moved with desire to know: *hoc opus, hic labor est*" (*Defence* 91). In the last quote there are two different kinds of movement described, with two different ends: movement to "do that which we know" or movement "to know." Sidney introduces this important distinction into Horatian discourse through the Aristotelian distinction between *gnosis* and *praxis*, a distinction not present in Horace's own text.[27] Webbe's translation of Horace sometimes seems to echo Sidney, for example, when he writes, "Sweetnesse retayneth a Reader; affection moueth him" (Smith i. 292). But affection only moves toward what Sidney calls the "desire to know," not the desire to act. Webbe writes,

> The ende of Poetry is to wryte pleasant thinges, and profitable. Pleasant it is which delighteth by beeing not too long or vneasy to be kept in memory, and which is somewhat likelie and not altogether forged. Profitable it is which styrreth vppe the mindes to learning and wisedome. (Smith i. 295-96)

For Webbe (and Horace), the movement that poetry can effect is toward contemplation; for Sidney, poetry can also move one to action. Here Sidney supplements Horatian

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[27] When Sidney writes, "For, as Aristotle saith, it is not *gnosis* but *praxis* must be the fruit" (91), he is referring to Aristotle's statement at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that "the end aimed at is not knowledge but action" (937; 1095a4).

poetics with a Ciceronian idea, for it is Cicero, not Horace, who emphasizes "noble action" as the end of literature. He writes, "All literature, all philosophy, all history, abounds with incentives to noble action" (*Pro Archia Poeta* vi. 14).[28] Cicero, the lifelong civil servant, not surprisingly writes that "shame belongs rather to the bookish recluse, who knows not how to apply his reading to the good of his fellows" (vi. 12). Movement is how Sidney theorizes the ability of poetry to bridge the gap between *gnosis* and *praxis*, knowledge and action. It is his important supplement to the classical theories.

Sidney writes, "The ending end of all earthly learning being virtuous action, those skills that most serve to bring forth that have a most just title to be princes over all the rest" (83). Philosophy does not deserve the title, since according to Sidney, it privileges contemplation over action, and abstraction over useful detail. This leads the historian to say, "The philosopher . . . teacheth a disputative virtue, but I do an active" (84). Not so fast, says Sidney. Historians may show actions from the past, he says, but they have no means to effect action in the present or future. Moreover, the past actions in history may not be exemplary, the real world being more morally chaotic than the golden world of the poets. "I conclude, therefore," he writes, "that [the poet] excelleth history, not only in furnishing the mind with knowledge, but in *setting it forward* to that which deserveth to

[28] Here, Sidney is not really Ciceronian either, since Cicero does not make the distinction, so crucial to Sidney's argument, between philosophy, history, and poetry. This speech in court defends the Roman citizenship of Archias, a poet from Antioch, who had been living and writing among the Romans, especially Lucullus, for many years. In the speech, Cicero digresses to consider the merits of poetry and the study of poetry more generally. Cicero says that studying literature, especially the poetry of Archias, helps him to compose speeches. Literature, for Cicero, has this pragmatic purpose. He proclaims, "I am a votary of literature, and make the confession unashamed" (vi. 12).

be called and accounted *good*: which *setting forward*, and *moving to well-doing*, indeed setteth the laurel crown upon the poets as victorious" (90, my emphases).[29]

Sidney not only revises, or perhaps combines the better parts of, Cicero and Horace, he also overgoes Plutarch. Plutarch's "Reading and Hearing of Poemes and Poets" is an important late classical source for Elizabethan apologists for poetry. Amyot had translated the *Lives* (1559) and *Morals* (1572), the former put into English by Thomas North in 1579, the probable year that Sidney's *Defence* was written. Both Harington's *Brief Apology* and the section of Francis Meres's *Palladis Tamia* devoted to Poetry begin with "the learned Plutarch," Meres quoting verbatim from "Reading and Hearing" (Smith ii. 194, 309). What Harvey calls "Plutarches holesome Morrals" are among the sources for Sidney's *Defence*. Sidney directly mentions Plutarch four times, and is indebted to Plutarch for some of the *Defence*'s ideas. For example, when Sidney echoes the commonplace that poetry is a speaking picture, he is ultimately echoing Plutarch, who explicated this theory in "Reading and Hearing" (22). For Plutarch, poetry is the spoon full of sugar for the teaching of philosophy, which is privileged above poetry as the ultimate pedagogical goal. So unlike Cicero, Plutarch does distinguish between poetry and philosophy, but gives a different hierarchy than Sidney, who claims that "of all sciences . . . is our poet the monarch" (91). As we saw above, Sidney bases this

[29] Though the *Defence* theorizes movement to exemplary action, such leading is not always, even in Sidney, employed to purely moral ends. The anadiplosis in *Astrophil and Stella* 1 mimics a ductus, or path for movement, but one whose end is merely seduction: "That she (dear she) might take some pleasure of my pain; / Pleasure might cause her read, reading might make her know; / Knowledge might pity win, and pity grace obtain." Though my study focuses on more exemplary uses of ductus, it should be kept in mind that the "infected will" of the poet can also abuse such ductus and produce a split between theoretically good versions and practically devious examples.

hierarchy on poetry's ability to move readers to practice. Plutarch, though he, too, works from the Horatian principle of "pleasure and profit together," mostly views poetry as an educational tool the end of which is philosophical knowledge, or understanding. That Plutarch privileges philosophy too often leads to a simple didacticism based on poetic justice: "For the shew and representation of wicked deeds, if there be propounded withall the shame and losse which befalleth unto them that have committed the same, doth no hurt at all, but rather much good unto the hearers" ("Reading" 25). And he infamously suggests the following as a perfectly respectable practice in textual criticism: "When as therefore we meet with such repugnant places among them, which being laid neere togither do implie evident contrarieties, we ought to encline to the safer side and favor the better part," by which he means the morally better ("Reading" 25).

For the Platonist Plutarch, poetry is pleasurable lies, and, indebted to the very Stoics he railed against, he cautions against such false pleasure. "[O]n the one hand," Jane Grogan writes, "he warns against its potentially pernicious influence on young minds, but on the other he recommended that the young be introduced to poetry as a propadeutic to learning philosophy" (14). To properly balance the two impulses, readers, and especially the young, must constantly be on guard against allowing emotion to infect their sense of true and false:

> [W]hen as the straunge fables and Theatricall fictions therein, by reason of the exceeding pleasure and singular delight that they yeeld in reading them, do spred and swell unmeasurably, readie to enter forcibly into our conceit so farre as to imprint therein some corrupt opinions: then let us

> beware, put foorth our hands before us, keepe them backe and staie their course. ("Reading" 19)

Plutarch sees poetic pathos, what he calls the "vertue to moove affections and passions in the readers" and "that part of their Poesie which stirreth up the affection," as an important part of reading poetry ("Reading" 33). But emotion for Plutarch is a rather passive reaction to one's reading, rather than a direct spur to action in the world. "When a yoong man then is thus prepared, and his understanding so framed, that when things are well done and said, his heart is mooved and affected therewith as by some heavenly instinct: and contrariwise not well pleased with lewd deeds or words, but highly offended thereat, certes, such instruction of his judgement will be a meanes that he shal both heare and read any Poemes without hurt and danger" ("Reading" 34).

Plutarch's emphasis is on the use of poetry "not for delight, pleasure and pastime, but for the insight of learning, and for the treasure of knowledge" ("Reading" 40). But any account of how moral education moves toward moral action is missing. Instead we are left with the vague notion that young men "will learne after a sort to draw alwaies some holesome and profitable doctrine or other" from their reading ("Reading" 43). They will understand certain things, not act in certain ways. In fact, whereas Sidney privileges poetry above philosophy for its ability to move readers from thought to action, poetry is, in Plutarch, a mere handmaiden to philosophy, consideration of truth and doctrine being the ultimate goal. Hence Plutarch's essay is thoroughly contemplative, barely even acknowledging the problem that Sidney's *Defence* points toward: how to explain poetry's ability to move us to action.

Though Plutarch's essay on the study of poetry does not take movement as a problematic event, in his *Lives* he does supply for Sidney a poignant example of how poetry can move. Plutarch tells how the tyrant Alexander of Pherae wept at the sufferings of Hecuba and Andromache in Euripides' *Troades*, and was so ashamed that he left the theatre, so that his subjects would not see him perturbed ("Pelopidas" 415; xxix.5). Sidney uses the story as an example of how tragedy "maketh kings fear to be tyrants, and tyrants manifest their tyrranical humours; that, with stirring the affects of admiration and commiseration, teacheth the uncertainty of this world, and upon how weak foundations gilden roofs are builded" (96). In other words, following Aristotle, Sidney claims that the "affects" induced by tragedy serve a positive role, but whereas Aristotle claims pity and fear have a political purpose (*catharsis*), Sidney sees the positive role as one of education. "But how much it can move," Sidney continues, "Plutarch yieldeth a notable testimony of the abominable tyrant Alexander Pheraeus, from whose eyes a tragedy, well made and represented, drew abundance of tears, who without all pity had murdered infinite numbers, and some of his own blood: so as he, that was not ashamed to make matters for tragedies, yet could not resist the sweet violence of a tragedy" (96).

Valuable ethical education (e.g., that "to make many Cyruses," [79], or "to take that goodness in hand," [81]) can be accomplished by means of poetry, says Sidney, through moving a reader to action. And Sidney seems to view poetic persuasion to move as a path to be followed. The poet is monarch of all sciences because he "giveth so sweet a prospect into the way, as will entice any man to enter it. Nay, he doth, as if your journey should lie through a fair vineyard, at the first give you a cluster of grapes, that

full of that taste, you may long to pass further" (92). This is precisely the kind of rhetorical path posited by Carruthers. She introduces the ancient rhetorical concept of ductus, that is, the way we are led through a composition, be it poetic or architectural:

> As a technical term, *ductus* was defined first in the rhetoric textbook of Chirius Consultus Fortunatianus, probably a contemporary of Augustine, whose work reflects the pedagogy of rhetoric that Augustine also knew and taught. The *ductus* is what we sometimes now call the "flow" of a composition. *Ductus* is an aspect of rhetorical "disposition," but it is the movement within and through a work's various parts. Indeed, *ductus* insists upon movement, the con*duct* of a thinking mind on its *way* through a composition. (*Craft* 77)

Sidney and Carruthers refer specifically to leading a reader through a text. But ultimately, as the following chapters show, this movement is not so much through text as out of text. Eventually, as the works I study suggest, and Sidney's emphasis on *praxis* attests, one must long not simply for the next grapevine, but to leave the vineyard altogether. As Sidney's oration claims, this moving that poetry can perform by means of its "heart-ravishing knowledge" (76) is more powerful than the logic of philosophy or the examples of history alone. And it is in this movement toward ethical action that poetry's real value lies.[30]

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[30] Andrew D. Weiner, "Moving and Teaching: Sidney's *Defence of Poesie* as a Protestant Poetic" (Kinney, *Essential Articles* 91-112), eloquently shows, according to Christian Calvinistic revisions of faculty psychology, "The process by which sensory data became the basis for action" (102). "The will, looking to what the reason and the intellect have propounded, then acts. This chain, of course, was broken in three places by the fall: the senses, which now feed inaccurate information to the sensorium; the reason, which

Sidney writes in a 1578 letter to Hubert Languet, "For why should our thoughts be aroused to various kinds of knowledge, unless we have some opportunity of exercising them so that some public benefit may result" (*Major Works* 282). That moving the reader from *gnosis* to *praxis* is a fundamental process in Sidney's conception of poetry is so obvious that it has been noted almost without fail in studies of Sidney's poetics. Michael Mack writes that in contrast to some earlier theories, "which direct attention to the psychological processes of the poet, Sidney's poetics show far greater interest in the psychology of the reader. He is interested primarily in the *effect* of poetry rather than its *cause*. . . . Sidney believes that the mystery of creativity is seen most clearly in what the poem originates in the lives of readers" (110). Mack notes that Sidney's use of the Virgilian tag *hoc opus, hic labor est* asserts that "moving the reader is no less a feat than returning from the underworld" (127). It seems, though, that many readers of the *Defence* treat such a difficult task as a simple one. I would like to suggest, by way of recent philosophy of emotion and the early modern etymology of the concept, the complexity of Sidney's thinking about poetry's ability to move.

Sidney's thinking about movement is set up by the story about horsemanship in the opening paragraph, the first in a string of equestrian references in the rest of the

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was darkened; and the will, which was 'infected.'. . . Because the poet can appeal directly to the imagination, he avoids the corruption of the senses; because he controls what the imagination receives, he avoids the possibility of its disorder; finally, because the imagination can work directly upon the will, he can overcome the obstacle to virtuous action presented by our 'infected will'" (102-03). In the Sidneian poetics I present in this chapter, the infected will is symbolized by the horse, which needs to be trained very rigorously if its will is to be controlled by its master. But such control is not the ultimate end of Sidneian poetics. Sidney and Spenser instead attempt to cure the infected wills, so that readers might use their own intelligence and reason for their own ends.

Defence.[31] For example, when Sidney discusses "architektonike," he borrows Aristotle's equine explanation of the concept: "as the saddler's next end is to make a good saddle, but his further end to serve a nobler faculty, which is horsemanship, so the horseman's to soldiery, and the soldier not only to have the skill, but to perform the practice of a soldier" (83).[32] Sidney mentions elsewhere that "Philip of Macedon reckoned a horserace won at Olympus among his three fearful felicities" (97). Besides these mentions, though, the theme of the horse resonates throughout the *Defence* in sometimes-sly ways that have not yet been noticed. For example, there is wordplay on both the Latin and Greek words for horse. The wordplay arises naturally enough from the etymology of Philip's name, which means horse lover in Greek. A similarly equestrian name is contained in a line Sidney quotes from Horace's epistles, "melius Chrysippo et Crantore" (98). Chrysippus means "golden horse" in Greek. This leads, I believe, to a pun on the name of the poet Horace, mentioned three times in the *Defence* and pronounced very closely to "horse." The entire treatise might profitably be viewed as one on "Horacemanship." Horacemanship might mean the ability to balance pleasure and pedagogy in poetry, or the ability to use entertainment educationally, or to compose poetry with an eye to its practical effects on the reader. Horace knows that "Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons" 'Wisdom is both the foundation and the fountain of right writing' (*Ars Poetica*, line 310, my translation); but he also knows that stale wisdom is just that.

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[31] Berry writes that "Sidney attempts to fuse the antithetical symbols of the contemplative and active lives, the poet and horseman" (26), but, again, for Berry the "horseman" is the aristocratic military leader. I treat the horseman as a figure of the poet, whereas Berry seems to do the opposite.

[32] Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a. For Aristotle, architectonic means ruling science, or the science that aspires to the goal to which all other goals are ultimately directed.

Instead the poet must use wisdom and beauty to move the reader: "Non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunto / et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto" 'It is not enough for a poem to be beautiful; it must also be sweet and lead the soul of the listener wherever it wishes' (*Ars Poetica*, lines 99-100, my translation). Just a few lines later, Horace speaks of "animi motus" 'motions of the soul' (111). If horses and Horace are linked in Sidney's text, then perhaps all the horseplay in the *Defence* warrants reading a pun in another line from Horace that Sidney quotes: "Est Ulubris, animus si nos non deficit aequus" '[Contentment] is in Ulubrae, if we are not deprived of a well-balanced mind' (95). Might Sidney playfully suggest that we see in *animus aequus* the paronomastic suggestion that true contentment is found by those with an *animus equus*, a "horse-mind"? Through a similar pun, Sidney obliquely suggests the importance of the homophonic idea of *writers* as *riders*. Poets will be successful, he suggests, so long as they remember they are like the riders of horses.

The equestrian opening of the *Defence*, which sets up an analogy between the crafts of horsemanship and poetry, and clear, non-punning references to horses throughout are enough to make us ask what it is that horses might have to do with the craft of composing poetry and the craft of reading it. The seemingly facetious beginning of Sidney's "ink-wasting toy" metaphorically suggests that readers are horses, and poets are the riders supposed to move them in certain ways. If this is true, then Sidney's response to Pugliano's teaching ("[I]f I had not been a piece of a logician before I came to him, I think he would have persuaded me to have wished myself a horse" [73]) is more than a joke. Pugliano is fond of "telling what a peerless beast the horse was, the only

serviceable courtier without flattery, the beast of most beauty, faithfulness, courage, and such more" (73). In his emotional response, Sidney creates sympathy with his own readership by responding so strongly to Pugliano's praise of horses (i.e., readers). Sidney thus obliquely claims he would rather be reading than writing (though the professed disingenuousness of this desire will be given different degrees of emphasis by different readers of his treatise). Very importantly, though, Sidney's desire to be a reader is not a masochistic desire to be controlled. He is eager to point out that he himself is a "piece of a logician" who can stand his ground against his teacher, and that Pugliano's rhetoric does not completely work (73). In this qualification, Sidney registers the anxiety of a writer who writes for an increasingly sophisticated readership. And he invites an allegorization of that anxiety as the problem of a horseman trying to ride a highly intelligent, or just plain stubborn, horse.

There is a robust tradition of comparing the arts of horsemanship and the arts of ethical writing. One of the most extended treatments of the poet as horseman occurs in George Puttenham's *The Art of English Poesy* (1589). Distinguishing between three different kinds of caesura (comma, colon, and period), he makes the following analogy:

> This cannot be better represented than by example of these common travelers by the highways, where they seem to allow themselves three manner of stays or easements: one a-horseback calling perchance for a cup of beer or wine, and having drunken it up, rides away and never lights; about noon he cometh to his inn and there baits himself and his horse an hour or more; at night when he can conveniently travel no further, he

> taketh up his lodging and rests himself till the morrow, from whence he followeth the course of a further voyage, if his business be such. *Even so, our poet*, when he hath made one verse, hath as it were finished one day's journey, and the while easeth himself with one bait at the least, which is a comma or caesura in the midway, if the verse be even and not odd, otherwise in some other place, and not just in the middle. (164, emphasis mine)

Though Puttenham's metaphor turns language itself into a horse, there is another trajectory in the Renaissance that sees language as the reins that (try to) control readers as horses.[33] The problematic relation of emotion and passion is acute in the metaphor of horsemanship that began this chapter. When Spenser shows Redcrosse Knight controlling an "angry steede" in the opening lines of his very long poem (*FQ* I.i.1), he is borrowing the ancient topos of the bridled steed as controlled passion. But when Sidney writes, "Horsemen my skill in horsemanship advance" (*MW* 169), he is thinking about the craft of moving readers. This metaphorical treatment of the art of reading and of writing for readers has a wide range of significance for Renaissance poets. Moving readers was a cultural prescription; though there are many ways to ride a horse, ride they must. The idea is so pervasive that Renaissance criticism often echoes it, as when Schoenfeldt writes, "Together, the two passions [shamefastness and honor] balance temerity against reticence, audacity against modesty. The one is a spur, the other a bridle, but both move

[33] The equestrian metaphor might be read in any number of ways. But its ubiquitous presence in the sixteenth century makes possible what I think is Sidney's most interesting use of the metaphor.

to virtuous action" (65). Like Sidney, Schoenfeldt has used equestrian metaphors (spur and bridle) for the effects that literature might have on readers.[34] When combined with the tradition of figuring poets as magicians (see Spenser's Archimago, for example, and Genevieve Guenther's work on the magical instrumentality of poetry), the following passage from Ariosto links poetic skill to control of horses. In canto 4 of *Orlando Furioso*, Atlante, the necromancer, presents Ruggiero, the hero, with the famous hippogriff. Ariosto comments, "This is the secret work of the magician, / Who has not yet renounced his cherished scheme / Of rescuing Ruggiero. . . . It's he who moves the horse to this position" (4.45). And Ariosto's poem repeats the "chivalrous respect for horses" common to medieval warfare:

> Each tries to pierce the visor at first thrust,
> But no intention either has to kill
> The other's horse, an action which all must
> Condemn, since it is not the horses' will
> That battle should be waged; a special trust

[34] Other examples of poetry that might be read within the context of this tradition of considering writing as riding are numerous. And of course many examples suggest that poetic respect is a two-way street. The "angry steed" of Redcrosse Knight in the first stanza of *The Faerie Queene* might suggest not only the unruly passions of the novice holy knight, but also that a reader must be trained to the poet's reins. Sidney's *Astrophil and Stella* 49 also suggests a reciprocity of wills: "I on my horse, and love on me, doth try / Our horsemanships, while by strange work I prove / A horseman to my horse, a horse to love" (1-3). Even in more unexpected places, we might assume that equine discourse signals meta-poetic concern. A good example might be Shakespeare's *A Lover's Complaint*, in which "often men would say [of the young lover]/ 'That horse his mettle from his rider takes; / Proud of subjection, noble by the sway, / What rounds, what bounds, what course, what stop he makes!' And controversy hence a question takes, / Whether the horse by him became his deed, / Or he his manage by th'well-doing steed" (106-12). For an idea of the pervasiveness of horses and thinking in terms of horses in the Renaissance, see Karen Raber and Treva Tuker, eds. See also Bruce Boehrer, Chapter 2, "The Legacy of Baiardo," where Boehrer traces the valence of horses in romance as sites for the contestation of character and personhood.

(Though not a formal pact, yet it is still

Respected by all knights) makes them refrain:

To aim to kill a horse was shameful then. (30.50)

As an allegory of poetics, this fits Sidney's preoccupations with the poet's role. Poets might argue amongst themselves for priority in the ways that the final sections of Sidney's *Defence*, with its canonizing impulse, suggests. But they must respect readers and their wills in a different and special way. Horsemanship thus provides an analogy, both in Sidney and in other early modern writers, for what I take to be one of the most important concepts of the *Defence*: the ability of writers (riders) to use language (reins) to move their readers (horses) from thought to action.

Elisabeth LeGuin's essay on Renaissance horsemanship might serve as an illumination of exactly how this relationship between writers, language, and readers should work. Noticing the influence of "Xenophon's humane and commonsensical approach" to horsemanship, which was on display in his *The Art of Horsemanship*, LeGuin claims that early modern treatises on horsemanship "suggest the possibility of a dialogic relationship between trainer and trained" (177, 178). Sidney mentions Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* early in his *Defence*, so we might take this as yet one more slightly disguised allusion to the art of horsemanship. Through the equine writings of Xenophon and his Renaissance followers, we can see how Sidney was theorizing a more "humane and commonsensical" approach to one's readers, one that suggests not the domineering moralizing of pedantically serious poetry, but rather that readers are to be given their own wills, treated as equals with whom a writer might engage in dialogue.

Peter Edwards echoes the revival of Xenophontean ideas about the proper treatment of horses:

> In 1587 Leonard Mascall reported that horses and mules lacked intelligence (literally 'no braines'), the argument being that, 'if they had understanding no man should be able to rule them', on account of their great strength. Most writers, however, did not hold this opinion. Gervase Markham, a practical horseman and one of the most prolific writers on equine matters, believed that horses felt emotion and possessed understanding. (22)[35]

Surprisingly then, the ubiquitous references, both explicit and more subtle, to horses in the *Defence* usefully highlight the intelligent, emotive, and active roles of readers, helping not only poets to rethink their role vis-à-vis readers, but also readers to rethink their relation to poets.

2. "Passion" and "Emotion"

The task of moving readers is both echoed and complicated by a discourse of emotion that emerges in the late sixteenth century. This development might usefully be compared to philosophical treatments of emotion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. For many recent analytical philosophers emotions have been rehabilitated as cognitive, rather than merely physiological, states. Like Sidney and his peers, they see emotion as having a close relation to thought. Furthermore, again like Sidney, several

[35] Edwards explicitly makes the anthropologic metaphorical link when he claims that "one might assume [from reading Renaissance horsemanship manuals] that horses shared a number of psychological traits with humans: nobility of mind, loyalty, faithfulness, pride, courage, and desire to please and even intelligence" (24).

theorists have returned to earlier, basically Aristotelian ways of incorporating emotions into the ethical life. Related to this development in contemporary philosophy is the ongoing interest in the passions in early modern studies. Scholars such as Paster have been working on the project that Nussbaum describes as "understand[ing] the logic behind another culture's emotions" (*Upheavals* 170). For example, Richard Strier argues that the entire Renaissance revival of rhetoric depends on justifications for manipulating the emotions.

But too much of both the philosophical work on emotion and the scholarship on the early modern passions has been confined to what, in another context, David Chalmers has called the "easy problems." In an article on the so-called mind-body problem, Chalmers argues against both physicalist reductionism (mind is physical) and mysterianism (mind is inexplicable). Instead he shifts the conversation to what he calls "the hard problem": why is it that we *experience* neural firings (if that is what they are) in the way we do, viz. as *conscious experience*? "It is the link that perplexes," he writes. "Remarkably, subjective experience seems to emerge from a physical process. But we have no idea how or why this is" (335). I suggest there is a similar explanatory gap between *gnosis* and *praxis*, a gap that Sidney and his contemporaries think movement fills. But no one so far has made leaps toward explaining exactly how an internal, intellectual, subjective process gets translated, so to speak, into action. We might say, reductively, through neurons and muscles. But that only answers the easy question about movement. I would like to suggest that much of the fascination on the part of poets with emotion has to do with the hard question. One problem that late sixteenth-century English

writers face is how to justify the ethical usefulness of poetry without denying the passionate pleasures associated with it. And one robust attempt to deal with the problem is represented by the theorizing of the perplexing link between *gnosis* and *praxis*.

Early modern English writers, I argue, make far-ranging contributions to our understanding of the hard question of emotion. Passions in the Renaissance, as Paster has shown, are intimately connected to bodily processes and theories about them. But bodily passions do not ultimately account for the way that something "moves" someone to action. And although not used in the relevant sense until the seventeenth century, the word *emotion* (not *passion*) more properly denotes the phenomenon that I see poets trying to describe in the period.[36]

For Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, *emotion* is basically a modern word for what early modern writers called *passions* or *affections*. Though they note the "lexical variants," including the fact that *emotion* becomes a word in the relevant sense only in the seventeenth century (2), they nevertheless use *emotion* as a synonym for *passion*: "Are there early modern passions? Do the emotions in the period and place we now designate, however unsatisfactorily, as 'early modern Europe' have a character and distinctive profile--an 'emotional universe'-- such as anthropologists describe for the societies under their professional gaze?" (1). The answer to both questions is yes, but they are questions about two very different concepts.

Even in Europe *emotion* is a new vernacular term in the sixteenth century (e.g., in Montaigne). Such easy equivalency of early modern *passion* with modern *emotion* elides

[36] In the next section of this chapter, I look more closely at the early history of the word and its uses.

a distinctly nascent early modern category (*emotion*) in the Renaissance. I argue that early modern writers find themselves in much the same quandary about emotion that Heidegger describes about Being: "With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about *entities*, but another to grasp entities in their *Being*. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'" (63). Likewise, while Elizabethans can employ Galenic vocabulary to talk about passions, they only gradually create a lexicon and grammar of the emotions.

Wittgenstein writes, "An unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It as it were bars the way out" (*Investigations* 92-93). Wittgenstein also writes that language "is founded on convention" (*Investigations* 96). It is important to keep this in mind when reading recent work on early modern passions and emotions. To treat *emotion* and *passion* as synonymous in early modern England is to ignore the fundamental lesson of New Historicism: "Always historicize." Hilary Putnam writes in a different context (a thought experiment comparing a supposedly normalized and Westernized ethical culture with an imaginary "super-Benthamite" [i.e., ultra-utilitarian] culture, where individual suffering is permitted, even encouraged for the public good): "The vocabulary available to the super-Benthamites for the description of people-to-people situations will be quite different from the vocabulary available to us" (352). Whether the comparison is between ontologists and phenomenologists, normal Westerners and super-Benthamites, or current Renaissance scholars and their primary texts, we must keep in mind the uses and contingencies of the lexicons we use.

Although Wendy Olmsted in practice sometimes uses *emotion* and *passion* rather indiscriminately, she makes a theoretical effort to discriminate between them:

> I use the word 'emotion' to distinguish the phenomena I analyse from the more common Renaissance term 'passion.' The *OED* (2) defines passion as 'any strong, controlling, or overpowering emotion, as desire, hate, fear, etc., an intense feeling or impulse.' But 'emotion' (not used until 1660) emphasizes the stirring or exciting of a mental state (*OED* 4a). It comes from the Latin *emoveo*, 'I move out,' and *emota*, 'stirred,' related to the verb *moveo* ('I move, stir') that is used figuratively to mean 'move, influence, affect, excite, or inspire.' Rhetoricians writing in Latin use this verb to refer to moving the audience's emotions. I use 'emotion' to refer to what is moved in Aristotle's sense that emotions pertinent to rhetoric are 'those . . . through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure' (*On Rhetoric* 2.2, 1378a). (Olmsted 7-8)

Like Olmsted, I seek to differentiate my theory of early modern emotion from both Freudian and humoral theories. Like Olmsted, I want to be clear to distinguish between how early modern writers used the word *passion* and how they began to use the word *emotion*.

One way to distinguish their use of *emotion* is to consider the meaning of its plural. When most early modern scholars write about emotions, they refer to the taxonomy of different passions such as anger, fear, shame, and desire; those are

"emotions."[37] In my project, though, emotions would be instances of being moved to action. Emotions in the taxonomic sense (fear, anger, lust, etc.) may be important parts of emotion in the spur-to-action sense. But I will not, for example, use *emotion* very often as the object of a transitive sentence, and certainly not as the redundant object of the verb *to move*. In my project, I do not see writers using rhetoric, as Olmsted does, to move emotions. I see writers formulating the verb *move as* emotion. Emotion becomes a concept, the general meaning of which is "movement to action," a movement that may or may not in specific instances involve what we now call emotions and what early modern writers called passions or affections. Where my project breaks new ground is in the emphasis on how, in the early modern period, this concept of emotion is implied. Though they do not have the word, it is clear that they want it.

In his introduction to Sidney's *Arcadia*, Maurice Evans writes, "The conflict between right reason and unregulated passion is fundamental in Sidney's work" (28). True, and yet also true that something like right passion is fundamental. It is right passion that poets begin to describe as emotion. Though Pyrocles claims in the *Arcadia* that he "mean[s] not to move passions" (90), Sidney is concerned, as he writes in the *Defence* to "stir . . . the affects" (230) and "move . . . to practice" (226). It is this concern that underlies his *Letter to Queen Elizabeth*, counselling her against marriage, when he writes, "Now resteth to consider what be the *motions* of this sudden change" (*MP* 51, emphasis mine). *Motion* here is used not as a synonym for the movements of the change itself, but

[37] Cora Fox, for example, speaks (I think wrongly) of the "early modern humoral (i.e., emotional) body" (7).

the prompting that made such change possible, the link between thought and action. It is the same meaning of movement that Spenser invokes when he writes that all living things "moued are / To multiply the likenesse of their kynd" ("An Hymne in Honour of Love," lines 99-100). As Thomas Wright puts it, "Passions, are not only, not wholy to be extinguished (as the Stoiks seemed to affirme) but somtimes to be moued, and stirred vp for the seruice of virtue, as learnedly *Plutarch* teacheth" (31).

When Sidney speaks of a poem moving a reader to *praxis*, the moving is more complex than that of an "unregulated passion." Sidneian movement provides the missing link in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* between understanding (*nous*) or reason (*logos*) on the one hand and feeling or passion (*pathos*) on the other. By the sixteenth century, all of the Aristotelian canon (including many now-spurious works) was available in editions in Latin and, later and to a lesser extent, Greek.[38] The French scholar Isaac Casaubon completed his magnum opus Greek edition of Aristotle's *Opera Omnia* in 1590. Beyond the readily available canon of Aristotle, a vast outpouring of vernacular English translations and commentaries, ranging from faithfully prosaic to unashamedly imaginative, were available. As Ronald Horton writes, "The three centuries separating Aquinas and Spenser yielded hundreds of commentaries on the *Ethics* alone" (58). The Fathers of the English Church printed in the Parker Society Publications refer time and again to Aristotle, both to execrate the fact of his authority exceeding that of Christ, and to quote him as an authority on, *inter alia*, "the piety of the stork."[39] It is beyond doubt

[38] See Schmitt, and Kristeller.
[39] See Henry Gough's index to the Publications.

that any well-educated person, and many less-educated persons, would have known Aristotle in any number of guises. In his 7 April 1580 letter to Spenser, Harvey remarks that at Cambridge Aristotle is "muche named, but little read" (Spenser, *Prose Works* 460). To put this in perspective, we might today say the same of the Bible, Shakespeare, Plato, or indeed Aristotle. To say they are little read is usually reactionary and an index of their actual pervasiveness in culture, even if much of the general public's knowledge of the texts is purely secondhand.

In *The Nicomachean Ethics*, a *very* popular text in the Renaissance, Aristotle writes that his goal is to move readers (or the audience of his lectures) from study to practice. For example, in a moment of anti-Platonism, he writes, "It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby" (1097a10). Elsewhere, he writes, "[T]he present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use" (1103b26). But the "master of those who know" (in Dante's phrase) recognizes that incitement to action is problematic. [40]

Though Aristotle desires the impetus to action, Sidney claims that this is precisely where the philosopher fails to be as effective as the poet. Because the philosophers, in Sidney's wonderfully witty caricature of the type, "do soberly ask whether it be possible to find any path so ready to lead a man to virtue as that which teacheth what virtue is,"

[40] Dante, *Inferno* IV.131 refers to Aristotle as "'l maestro di color che sanno."

readers of philosophy get lost in a labyrinth of "definitions, divisions, and distinctions" (*Defence* 83). "For the philosopher, setting down with thorny arguments the bare rule, is so hard of utterance and so misty to be conceived, that one that hath no other guide but him shall wade in him till he be old before he shall find sufficient cause to be honest" (85). What readers need is a sufficient cause to be moved to act, and the philosophers do not provide one. This was also one of Petrarch's particular criticisms of Aristotle. In *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia*, Petrarch wrote, "He teaches what virtue is, I do not deny that; but his lesson lacks the words that sting and set afire and urge toward love of virtue and hatred of vice" (qtd. in Charles Trinkaus 14).

Arguments might, as Aristotle concedes, be sufficient to "encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the young, and to make a character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by excellence, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness " (1179b10). Here Aristotle uses the verb *protrepo*, meaning "to turn toward." It is the same verb used by Herodotus (whom Sidney mentions in the *Defence* 75) when speaking of fiction's rousing ability. In Book I of Herodotus's *Histories*, Croesus, the ruler of Lydia, asks Solon, the wise Athenian lawmaker, to tell him who has been the happiest person. The vain Croesus expects that the answer will be himself, but Solon surprises him by naming Tellus, an Athenian who had died gloriously in battle, as the happiest. This story piques the interest of the slightly miffed Croesus. This piquing, or "protrep-ing," has been variously interpreted and translated. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott (*s.v. protrepo*) translate the Herodotean passage, "Solon's story *led* Croesus *on*" (1537). Their entry also shows that

the verb, with its meaning "urge on" or "urge forwards" is found in both Homer (*Iliad* and *Odyssey*) and Aristotle (*NE* and *Rhetoric*), among others. Aristotle writes in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that people speak of vice and virtue "as though they meant to encourage [protrepo] the latter and deter the former" (1113b26). Thus W. W. How and J. Wells translate the Herodotean passage, "'had moved' [Solon] (to inquire further)" (68; 1.31). This translation highlights in its parenthetical addition that *protrepo* expects an action, in Croesus' case "to inquire further." *Protrepo*, like the early modern English *move*, is not passive. J. H. Sleeman's translation is more ambiguous: "Now when Solon had roused Croesus' curiosity by describing the many points of happiness in Tellus' case, Croesus (note the change of subject) asked him which of the persons he had seen came next after Tellus, thinking he could not help getting at least second place" (170). Though the rousing of mere curiosity seems at first rather passive, the curiosity then leads Croesus to ask. The asking is the justification for the use of *protrepo*, being the action the verb implies. This is why the translations of A. D. Godley and Aubrey de Selincourt miss the mark. Godley translates, "Now when Solon had admonished Croesus by recounting the many ways in which Tellus was blest, the king further asked him whom he placed second after Tellus, thinking that assuredly the second prize at least would be his" (35; 1.31). Admonishment is not the proper concept here because it implies standing still while being talked at, rather than being encouraged to move. The mistaken passivity in Godley's translation is taken to its most impotent extreme in Selincourt's translation: "All these details about the happiness of Tellus, Solon doubtless intended as a moral lesson for the king" (13; 1.31). The reduction of the truly emotive capacities of literature to tired

moral lessons represents exactly the kind of didacticism that Sidney is arguing against. Instead, Sidney writes, poets should look for ways both to suggest, and to effect, literary motivation to action.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which Sidney is said to have translated, offers some strategies for effecting such turning. [41] And the *Rhetoric* comes closest to discussing the kind of moving that Sidney and others seem to be thinking about. It is moving that is more sophisticated and more educable than passion. Reason is part of the process, as is the will, two faculties mostly ignored in passional discourse, which is tied irredeemably to the intemperate body. Aristotle's *De Anima*, the originary text of the science of psychology, discusses "the faculty of originating local movement" (432a16) and the paradoxes and puzzles surrounding it. What exactly prompts one to act, Aristotle asks? It was clear to medieval scholastics that artistic images could effect such local movement. Nicole Oresme (1323-82), for example, writes that "strong imagination (*fors imaginatio*) can cause many natural effects. For example, it can make a person angry or afraid; one imagining fat perhaps vomits, and a man imagining a woman may have an erection" (Minnis 248). But though a cause and effect relation is established, the workings of that relation are not. Angus Fletcher writes that self-motion, "or power to initiate their own movements in society (as Aristotelians would put it), becomes an open mystery to be examined in literature during the early modern period" (*Time* 7).

It is a mystery that is fundamental not only to understanding Sidney's argument in the *Defence*, but also, as we will see in the following chapters, to interpreting Spenser's

[41] On Sidney's lost translation, see Duncan-Jones, *Courtier* 84.

ethically-based aesthetics as explored in the House of Busirane episode of *The Faerie Queene*, Book III. Toward the end of Book III, Britomart approaches its major challenge: to overthrow the evil magician Busirane, rescue the tortured Amoret from his enchantment, and return Amoret to her true lover Scudamour. When Britomart discovers Scudamour in a forlorn state, his complaints "empassioned sore" the "warlike Damzell" (III.xi.18). Here, the poem invokes a passion close to pity or rue. But there is a countervailing, insistently nascent discourse of emotion throughout the episode. In III.xi.4, we are told that Britomart "was *emmoved* in her noble mind, / T'employ her puissaunce to his reskew" (my emphasis). Metrically, Spenser could have reused *empassion'd* in this passage. But instead he uses his coinage *emmoved*, very close to *emotion*, to specify a spur to action. Trying to help Scudamour out of his pain, Britomart "him amoved light" (i.e. prompted Scudamour to arise). Most telling, perhaps, is Britomart's response to the earthquake at the beginning of canto 12: "Yet the bold Britonesse was nought ydred, / Though much emmov'd, but steadfast still persevered," where a lack of passion (fear) in no way restricts being emmoved.[42] And it is this emotion, or emmovement, that is important for Spenser's ethical and aesthetic thinking.

3. "Emmove"

Cora Fox has claimed that sixteenth-century England "saw surprising renegotiations of ideas surrounding the experience of emotion" (2). But this must be qualified by the fact that *emotion* could not have been renegotiated, because the word did

[42] James Nohrnberg suggests, in a private communication, that the lines might mean that Britomart is "astonished, but not unnerved." But this paraphrase only once again highlights the verbal troublesomeness of the lines. "Astonished" cannot be a synonym or paraphrase of "emmov'd" because they mean nearly opposite things: made like stone or thunderstruck, and made to move.

not exist until the very end of the century. In the late sixteenth century, writers in England became worried about the deleterious effects of lexical introductions, which were often classified as inkhorn terms, overly scholarly and ponderous on the tongue. In *The Art of English Poesy*, Puttenham writes that such terms as "method, methodical, placation, function, assubtiling, refining, compendious, prolix, figurative, [and] inveigle" are merely "usurped Latin and French words" (231). According to the editors Frank Whigham and Wayne A. Rebhorn, "Puttenham uses a word [i.e., usurped] that had a distinctly political meaning in the period and that underscored the illegitimacy of the seizure involved" (231n.36). Nevertheless, Puttenham believes that such words "doth so well serve the turn, as [they] could not now be spared," because of their "well expressing the matter, and more than our English word[s]" (231-32). Though Puttenham is anxious that "many other like words borrowed out of the Latin and French were not so well to be allowed by us" (232), he knows that English writers turn to other languages to express matters that English is ill-equipped to handle. Puttenham then translates Horace's *Ars Poetica*, lines 70-72: "Many a word yfall'n shall eft arise / And such as now be held in highest prise / Will fall as fast, when use and custom will, / Only umpires of speech, for force and skill" (232). Jonson's translation of the same passage makes even more clear the point that Puttenham is trying to make: "Yet, if by chance, in uttering things abstruse, / Thou need new terms; thou may'st without excuse, / Feign words" (355). E. K. defends Spenser's language in *The Shepheardes Calender* by claiming "he hath laboured to restore, as to theyr rightfull heritage such good and naturall English words, as haue ben long time out of vse and almost cleare disherited" (27). But Frederick Padelford rightly claims that

Spenser "early recognized that while the full resources of the native language should be explored and employed, it should likewise be enriched with judicious importations from abroad" (279).[43] What Spenser's coinage "emmoved" shows is that he and his peers needed a "new term" to describe a concept that was thus far uttered only abstrusely. And so they went abroad to find it.

The *OED* only lists one occurrence of the word *emotion* in the sixteenth century: in 1579, Nicholas Fenton used the word to mean "a political or social agitation," when he wrote, "There were . . . great stirres and emocions in Lombardye." In the early seventeenth century, Richard Knolles uses the word to describe the migrations of the Turks, what he calls the "divers emotions of that people" ("Emotion"). But despite these early uses, the word in anything like its modern meaning appears not to have become common until late in the seventeenth century. The great and zany etymologist Walter Skeat traces *emotion* in the sense of "feeling, passion" to Jeremy Taylor's 1660 *Rule of Conscience*. In fact, the word first appears in an English dictionary in Randle Cotgrave's *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongves* (1611), in which he defines the French word *esmotion* with the English cognate "an emotion": "Esmotion: f. An emotion, commotion, sudden, or turbulent stirring; an agitation of the spirit, violent motion of the thoughts, vehement inclination of the mind" (Llv). Here, Cotgrave seems to be choosing, or even creating, a cognate when he uses *emotion*, rather than using a familiar, English word.

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[43] In Padelford's list of 103 Spenserian coinages "derived wholly or in part from the classical or Romanic languages for which first citations are from Spenser," he omits "emmove," probably because of his reliance on the *New English Dictionary* or his reliance on Charles Osgood's concordance.

In 1656 (still before 1660) the English word *emotion* receives its own entry in Thomas Blount's *Glossographia*: "Emotion (*emotio*) a stir-ing or moving forth" (O7v). Though Blount categorizes the word as an English word, the context of its inclusion in the volume is instructive. The full title of Blount's work is

> *Glossographia: Or a Dictionary Interpreting all such Hard Words, Whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, Teutonick, Belgick, British or Saxon; as are now used in our refined English Tongue. Also the Terms of Divinity, Law, Physick, Mathematicks, Heraldry, Anatomy, War, Musick, Architecture; and of several other Arts and Sciences Explicated. With Etymologies, Definitions, and Historical Observations on the same. Very useful for all such as desire to understand what they read.*

Blount seeks to define "hard words," words that are outlandish or part of specialized jargon. And Blount explicitly acknowledges in "To the Reader" that these are mainly words that have stumped him, even though he is very well educated:

> After I had bestowed the waste hours of some years in reading our best English Histories and Authors; I found, though I had gained a reasonable knowledge in the Latine and French Tongues, as I thought, and had a smattering both of Greek and other Languages, yet I was often gravelled in English Books; that is, I encountred such words, as I either not at all, or not throughly understood, more then what the preceding sence did insinuate. (A2r)

Blount's inclusion of *emotion*, then, does show that in 1656 the word was an uncommon, difficult one. But it is also important to note the audience and purpose of Blount's work: it is written for readers "to understand what they read." So the words that Blount includes are words that a mid-seventeenth-century reader of "our refined English Tongue" might plausibly come across. Though some educated English writers are using it, *emotion* is still a "hard word" in 1656. To put the point in stark terms, though Milton is quite possibly the most learned writer of the seventeenth century in England, and his output both in prose and poetry is vast, he never once deigns to use the word *emotion*. Not once.[44]

On 24 January 1665, John Evelyn writes in his diary that he has been selected for a special committee of the Royal Society for "the Improvement of our English tongue" (*Diary* 3: 396). Just a few months later, in a letter to Sir Peter Wyche (20 June 1665), Evelyn offers, in twelve points, his advice on linguistic reform. In step 10, he tackles the problem of the proper occasion for introduction of foreign words into English:

> And since there is likewise a manifest rotation and circling of Words, which goe in & out like the mode & fashion; Bookes would be consulted for the reduction of some of the old layd-aside words and expressions had formerly *in delicijs;* for our Language is in some places sterile and barren, by reason of this depopulation, as I may call it; and therefore such places should be new cultivated, and enrich'd either with the former (if significant) or some other: For example, we have hardly any words that do

[44] Nor does Shakespeare, though this is less surprising given Shakespeare's earlier dates.

> so fully expresse the French *clinquant, naïveté, ennuy, bizarre, concert, faconiere, chicaneries, consummé, emotion, defer, effort, chocq, entours, débouche*; or the Italian *vaghezza, garbato, svelto,* &c. Let us therefore (as the Romans did the Greeke), make as many of these do homage as are like to prove good citizens. (*Memoirs* 630)

Evelyn's concept of linguistic cycling and recycling is quite sophisticated, showing his merits for inclusion on the committee. Puttenham and Jonson, in their translations of Horace, note the continuing need for newly introduced words. Evelyn adds that some words need to be *re*-introduced, because they once were used "*in delicijs*" but have since become "layd-aside." Thus the "manifest rotation and circling of Words" continues. And *emotion* is among the handful of words Evelyn wants either introduced or re-introduced (the statement above is not clear). Once again, as late as the second half of the seventeenth century, the situation of *emotion* in the English lexicon is unsettled. It might "do homage" to the English, as Evelyn suggests, but it has yet to "prove [a] good citizen."

The English word *emotion* first begins to appear, not surprisingly, in translations of French works. It is a well-known fact that the English language is a hodge-podge of Anglo-Saxon, Latin, French, and Celtic languages. Thus E. K. complains that "they haue made our English tongue, a gallimaufray or hodgepodge of all other speches" (Spenser, *Shorter Poems* 27). He claims that instead of resorting to old and disused English words, "they patched vp the holes with peces and rags of other languages" (27). According to the basic account, Anglo-Saxon (Old English) underwent major change at the Norman invasion in 1066, which introduced all manner of French words onto the English isle. The

language of kings and courtiers was French until 1362, when "English was made the standard language in courts of law" (Adams 66). The switch to English in official uses was a patriotic move in the Hundred Years War, probably akin to some Americans refusing to eat French fries in the first decade of the 21st century (instead, they ate "freedom fries").[45] French writers had used the word *émotion* at least since Montaigne. *Le Petit Robert* gives 1534 (without attribution) as the first instance of the word (spelled *esmotion*), and gives its etymology as deriving from the older verb *emouvoir* (850). Alain Rey's cultural dictionary in French cites an earlier instance from 1512, meaning "*trouble moral*" 'moral disturbance' (420). So the word appears to arise in the early sixteenth century in France. Montaigne's *Essais*, first published toward the end of the century in 1580, contains 29 uses of the word *emotion*. Not only does Montaigne use the term in its older meaning of political disturbance or migration, but he also uses it occasionally in the modern sense of psychological upheaval. For example, he speaks of "*une émotion de plaisir extraordinaire*" (Leake 392). But in this sense, Montaigne appears to be fashioning new meaning. So it should come as no surprise that the earliest instance in the relevant sense I have found in England is in John Florio's 1603 translation of Montaigne's *Essayes*. But even there Florio only reluctantly translates *émotion* as *emotion*. In his preface "To the curteous Reader" he cites *emotion* in a list of "uncouth terms" that the reader may not like: "entraine, conscientious, endeare, tarnish, comporte, efface,

[45] The name change was a protest against France's disapproval of the United States invasion of Iraq. It is quite possible that the English borrowing of *emotion* from the French also held a sophisticated, upper-class, well-educated, cosmopolitan connotation. Historian Robert Bartlett notes that "Pig is English in origin, pork is French. Sheep is English, mutton is French. Cow is English, beef is French. When it's in a cold and muddy field covered in dung, it's named in English. When it's been cooked and carved and put on a table with a glass of wine, it's referred to in French" (qtd. in Lane).

facilitate, ammusing, debauching, regret, effort, emotion, and such like" (I. 11).[46] In one case Florio translates the French word *émotion*, which looks simple enough to modern ears, into the awkward *concitation*. Modern translators would certainly opt for the cognate *emotion*. The fact that Florio hesitates shows that the word was in its infant journeyings from French to English. What Florio's translation shows, when it does use *emotion*, then, is the birth of an English word to describe a concept that had recently become important.

But if Florio is the midwife for *emotion*, then Spenser conceived it fifteen years earlier or so, as Skeat notes in his definition:

> **EMOTION,** agitation of mind. (L.) In Bp. Taylor, Rule of Conscience, b. iv. c. I (R.) Suggested by obs. verb *emmove* (Spenser, F. Q. iv. 8. 3).--Lat. *emouere*, pp. *emotus*, to move away.--Latin. *e*, away; and *mouere*, to move. (189)

Not only does the entry cite Taylor's use of the word in 1660, it also conjectures that Spenser's *emmoue* in the 1590 *Faerie Queene* marks the evolution of the word. Andrew Zurcher amply demonstrates through a brilliant close reading of *FQ* I.ii.4-6 that "Spenser was a poet who took his diction, and the ability of his readers to assimilate and understand that diction in all its nuance, seriously" (4). According to Zurcher, Spenser is "a linguistically hyper-sensitive poet," who "experiments with signification, and draws his readers into that experimentation" (9). Spenser's use of *emmoued* in *The Faerie*

[46] For some of these words, instances from Florio's Montaigne are either listed as first instances or predate the listed first instance in the *OED* 2.

Queene shows that he was hunting for language that would go beyond the common *passion* to entail two things not associated with the more common term: thought and action. Passions were of the body; they were suffered. The move toward *emotion* evinces a need by the speakers of the language to recognize the mind and its role in the move toward action. In his use of *emmove*, we see Spenser performing one of the most important cultural roles of the poet: the creation of language.[47]

4. Harvey's Earthquake

The etymological import of Spenserian emotion is seen most clearly in the last canto of Book III of Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. As the Knight of Chastity, Britomart, awaits an entrance into the inner room of the evil Busirane's house, a small earthquake heralds the appearance of Cupid:[48]

> With that, an hideous storme of winde arose,
> With dreadfull thunder and lightning atwixt,
> And an earthquake, as if it streight would lose
> The worlds foundations from his centre fixt;
> A direfull stench of smoke and sulphure mixt
> Ensewd, whose noyaunce fild the fearefull sted,
> From the fourth howre of night vntill the sixt. (III.xii.2)

[47] This role is particularly acute in Elizabethan England, since orthography and vocabulary are so fluid, the language having not yet been made solid in the way it would be for Milton and Dryden.

[48] I borrow from Hamilton's note on the stanza: "Heralding the appearance of the god of love, as the appearance of God in 1 Kings 19.11-12 is heralded by strong wind, earthquake, and fire, and Exod. 19.16-18 by thunder, lightning, thick cloud, and 'the sound of the trumpet exceding loude'."

Though the passage is glossed in A. C. Hamilton's edition by referring the reader to the earthquake of April 6, 1580 and Harvey's letter on the same, no one has yet considered the implications of the next two lines of Spenser's poem:

> Yet the bold *Britonesse* was nought ydred,
> Though much emmou'd, but stedfast still perseuered. (III.xii.2)

The word that is both important and ambivalent in these lines is *emmou'd*, a word that conveys both the physical shaking of Britomart's body and the psychological turbulence of her mind. *Stedfast* links the final couplet to the rest of the stanza where *sted* is used; and *ydred* refers back to *dreadfull*. That Spenser thinks about emotion through an earthquake is not as odd a claim as it might first seem.[49] Galenism lent itself quite well to such analogies between the earth and the human body. After all, Galen's theories about inner human experience are largely metaphors from the observable world: boiling, drying, evaporating, sublimating. And a letter that was familiar to Spenser specifically ties the "mooving" of an earthquake to the passional body.

Harvey wrote *A Pleasant and pitthy familiar discourse, of the Earthquake on April last* to his friend Spenser on the occasion of the British earthquake of April 6, 1580. The earthquake had been widely interpreted as a sign from God that the times were corrupt and heading for oblivion. Against this theological approach Harvey gleefully offers a satiric and witty scientific account. It is a conversation between several learned gentlemen (of which Harvey is the most learned) and two improper and easily-confused

[49] In the revised *Arcadia*, Dorus (a.k.a. Musidorus) replies to Pamela "with a quaking all over my body" (225). Dorus's physical "quaking" is of course intimately tied to his emotional state.

women, the Mistresses Inquisitiva and Incredula. Though much of what Harvey says about earthquakes must be read within the satirical context, he provides a thorough compendium of opinions on the subject, opinions that should impinge upon any reading of the earthquake in the House of Busirane.

Harvey's letter is a response to a question that Spenser had asked in a previous letter. Spenser writes,

> I thinke the *Earthquake* was also there wyth you (which I would gladly learne) as it was here with vs: ouerthrowing diuers old buildings, and peeces of Churches. Sure verye straunge to be hearde of in these Countries, and yet I heare some saye (I knowe not howe truely) that they haue knowne the like before in their dayes. *Sed quid vobis videtur magnis Philosophis*? (Spenser, *Prose Works* 15-16)

"But what does it seem like to you, great philosopher?" Spenser playfully asks in Latin. In Harvey's reply, one of the gentlemen present reprises this inquiry, "Nowe I pray you, Master *H*. what say you philosophers to this suddayne Earthquake?" (Spenser, *Prose Works* 450). The 1679 Folio of Spenser's works says of Harvey's reply that it "gives an account of the Causes of *Earthquakes* according to *Aristotle*, and then proceeds by way of Satyr" (Spenser, *Prose Works* 449). But later Folios appropriately omitted the description, since it is erroneously reversed. In fact, as Gerard Passannante correctly points out, Harvey's first speech, to the women, is the "satirical jab at Cambridge academics, in which Harvey travesties an ineffective scholastic analysis for the benefit of two recently married gentlewomen"; the second, addressed to the men, is the "more

serious kind of analysis: a 'short, but sharpe and learned' discourse organized by the logical principles of Pierre de la Ramée, or Peter Ramus" (Passannante 793-94). In the second, more philosophically serious version Harvey proceeds in the scholastic, Ramist vein to explain the four causes of the earthquake: the material, or internal, cause (wind or vapors); the formal, or natural cause (motion); the efficient, or external cause (immediate: God; instrumental: heat); and the final, or supernatural cause (either a warning from God or wind returning to its natural place). Passannante's essay sticks to this second version, brilliantly showing how a quote from Ovid belies a criticism of Arthur Golding's own theologized reading of the event.[50] Yet what is the explanatory role and rhetorical power of the first speech?

There, in a mockery of university scholasticism that could only come from a practitioner of it,[51] Harvey links the earth with the human body. "*The Earth* you knowe," he begins, "is a mighty great huge body" (451). The line's triple string of modifiers ("mighty great huge") is absurdly pompous, but also makes a very important metaphorical starting point for Harvey's mock-treatise, linking the earth to the human body. The earth, he continues, "consisteth of many diuers, and contrarie members, and vaines, and arteries, and concauities, wherein to auoide the absurditie of *Vacuum*, most necessarily be very great store of substantiall matter, and sundry Accidental humours, and

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[50] Maddalena Pennacchia also focuses on the second version, in which she says Harvey "simply repeat[s] the almost hackneyed Aristotelian theory which was shared by all Latin 'naturalist' writers" (315).

[51] Harvey (1552/53-1631) was generally unpopular at Cambridge, where he was university praelector of rhetoric, due to his "arrogant, unsociable demeanor," a view of Harvey that informs the play about him, *Pedantius* (Scott-Warren). But Harvey's letter shows a side of a derided scholar who is able to mock himself deftly and generously. He is now known chiefly for his friendship with Spenser, his (lost) verbal battle with Nashe, and his great collection of intricately annotated books.

fumes, and spirites, either good, or bad, or mixte" (451). The passage elaborates the bodily metaphor by drawing on the overlap of the lexicons of anatomy and geology: members, veins, arteries, concavities, humors, fumes, and spirits.

The mock-treatise becomes even more corporeal as he continues, in ways that either elude the women or might make them blush. For at the heart, or perhaps we should say in the bowels, of Harvey's mock-treatise is an unmistakable strand of scatological humor. Harvey first agrees with one of the men's suggestion that the earthquake is caused by "some forcible and violent Eruption of wynde, or the like" (450). This sets up a series of indecorous references to body parts and bodily functions, for example when Harvey claims that "the windie Exhalations, and Vapours, [are] pent up as it were in the bowels [of the earth]" (450). He also compares the earth, when it experiences quaking to "a drunken man, or wooman (when their Alebench Rhetorick commes vpon them, and specially the moouing Patheticall figure *Pottyposis*,) and therefore in this forcible sort, you lately sawe, payneth itself to vomit vp againe, that so disordereth, and disquieteth the whole body within" (452).[52] Vomiting is merely one of the bodily functions, along with "neesing [i.e., sneezing], or sobbing, or coffing" that supplies a metaphorical understanding of earthquakes. The women eventually protest, "No more Ands, or Ifs, for Gods sake, quoth the Madame, and this be your great Doctorly learning" (453). Passannante calls this a protest against Harvey's "literate vulgarity" (794).

[52] Though it orthographically resembles a Latinate rhetorical term, Harvey's *pottyposis* is a nonce word, having no actual rhetorical meaning. Moreover, though to our eyes the word carries an inevitable scatological resonance with *potty*, *potty* only means "little toilet" since the 1940s ("potty, *n*."). Harvey is instead creating the word from the related Latin words "*potio*" 'drinking' and "*poto*" 'to drink.' Thus *pottyposis* means, roughly, "what drunkeness makes come out of one's mouth" (i.e., vomit), a more physical rhetorical phenomenon than the merely metaphorical modern usage of *logorrhea*.

But this vulgarity is not merely satirical; it is also an important part of late sixteenth-century England's preoccupation with the definition of emotion and its differentiation from passion. Harvey only begins his mock-treatise after one of the other gentlemen present has requested that the ladies silence their "zealous and deuoute Passion [i.e. their fear] a while" (450). Harvey goes on to specifically make a connection between human emotion and the motion of the earth. After speaking of the earth as having disease, humours, feverous and flatuous spirites, he calls the earthquake "a violent chill shiuering shaking Ague,"

> Which Ague, or rather euery fitte thereof, we schollers call grossely, and homely, *Terrae motus*, a moouing, or sturring of the Earth, you Gentlewomen, that be learned, somewhat more finely, and daintily, *Terrae metus*, a feare, and agony of the Earth: we being onely mooued, and not terrified, you being onely in a manner terrified, and scarcely mooued therewith . . . the one being manly, and deuoyde of dreade, the other woomanish, and most wofully quiuering, and shiuering for very feare. (451)

The men are moved or impressed, but not terrified; the women are terrified, but not moved. But what does "moved" mean? It cannot mean the person is physically jostled by the shaking earth, for certainly that would affect the women as much as the men. And it does not mean "passionately fearful," for surely the men would not admit that. Instead, Harvey's usage of "moouing," I want to suggest, betrays a glimmer of the concept of emotion that emerges in late-sixteenth-century England. The men are moved because

they are propelled toward activity, namely the activity of explaining the earthquake. Continuing the strategic confusion of the earth's body with the human body, Harvey writes that the earth is masculine, since "it only mooueth with the very impulsiue force of the malady, and not trembleth, or quaketh for dastardly feare" (451). Transferred to the masculine scholars, it is this "impulsiue force," or emotion, that moves them to scholarly activity. They experience emotion, whereas the women only experience passion. As we saw above, *Pottyposis* is described as a "moouing Patheticall figure" (452), which, if the distinction between emotion and passion is to hold, verges on the oxymoronic. But Harvey's dual accounts of the earthquake strongly suggest that Harvey, like Sidney and Spenser, is striving to accommodate a new concept of emotion in the English language. And his treatise is at least useful in showing the difficulties involved.

Movement is, I believe, a quintessential Renaissance concern. From the new scientific theories of Galileo and Copernicus to the moving sculpture of Bernini, the Renaissance is a period that obsesses over movement, scientifically, aesthetically, and ethically. In late-sixteenth century, movement is being reconceptualized in its relation to what we now call human emotion. In Sidney's treatise, Spenser's poem, Harvey's letter, and Florio's translations we see early modern English thinkers working to distinguish between the passive passions and the active emotions. The problem was crucial for poets who took seriously Sidney's prescription to move their readers.

Chapter 2

Movement, Memory, and Ethical Aesthetics in the House of Busirane

Having seen in the previous chapter the early modern conception of emotion arise alongside new ideas about the efficacy of poetry, it is now time to consider in more depth how one poem, Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, both theorizes movement and enacts it, in the character of Britomart and, ultimately, in the poem's readers. The experience described in the House of Busirane episode (III.xi-xii) shows a poet thinking deeply about, and a poem embodying, movements from contemplation to action.

1. Britomart's Emotions

Spenser sets up his thinking about moving readers with a corresponding presentation of movement in Book III's heroine. The end of Britomart's previous adventure sets up the emotional program of the House of Busirane episode. When she sees a young man being chased by the giant Ollyphant, "She was emmoued in her noble minde, / T'employ her puissaunce to his reskew" (III.xi.4). Spenser's coinage "emmoued," as we saw in the previous chapter, is carefully chosen to distinguish Britomart's active response from its ethically lazier counterparts. This "emmoue"-ment to action on behalf of an unidentified "young man" rehearses *in parvo* the pity that will spur Britomart to intercede on Scudamour's behalf.

Britomart first comes upon Scudamour, in Ariostan romance style, as she is in the midst of chasing Ollyphant:

> [S]he at last came to a fountaine sheare,

By which there lay a knight all wallowed
Upon the grassy ground, and by him neare
His haberieon, his helmet, and his speare;
A little off his shield was rudely throwne. (III.xi.7)

The posture of this knight is all wrong, his position running counter to what readers expect from knights: someone on horseback, fully armed and armored, with a dignified and chivalrous mien. These knightly expectations form a coherent cultural form that Elizabeth Fowler helpfully theorizes as a "social person," by which she means "a paradigmatic representation of personhood that has evolved historically among the institutions of social life" (2). "Social persons," she writes, "are sets of expectations built in the reader's mind by experience, and they are notions of what it is to be a person" (3). Spenser can thus be seen to be playing with, rather than merely appropriating, the social person of the knight. For the stately, towering mien of a proper knight he substitutes a wallowing, impotent, emasculated young man, thus violating the norms of one social person, while simultaneously fulfilling the expectations of another, the social person of the dejected lover. That Spenser actually calls Scudamour a "knight" thus serves to highlight the incongruity between the expected and the actual. A dog wallowing upon the grassy ground would not, after all, be unusual. But a knight acting so unknightly is meant to be a shocking juxtaposition. Spenser thus deftly draws upon the cultural meaning of a

particular social person to heighten readers' appreciation of the beastly impropriety of such behavior.[53]

The state of the knight's accoutrements is just as telling, especially in this context. In Book I, when Redcrosse Knight takes off his armor, there is an unmistakable allegory regarding the armor of God of the New Testament, whereby the disarming of Redcrosse suggests the vulnerability of his holiness. Scudamour's disarming, though, externalizes the psychological results of the unarming, unmanning arrow of Cupid, who is, indeed, pictured on Scudamour's shield, "On which the winged boy in colours cleare, / Depeincted was, full easy to be knowne" (III.xi.7). In the book of the art of love, Scudamour is one more worshipper of Cupid, though his shield has been tellingly abandoned. Spenser strongly makes this point by upsetting the conventions of the social person upon which the character of Scudamour is supposedly based.

Spenser thus quickly gives *readers* of the poem the most important visual and cultural clues for understanding Scudamour's appropriation and misappropriation of a particular social person. But Spenser brilliantly delays *Britomart's* awareness of Scudamour's dejected spirits. He does this, I believe, to highlight the problem of the (mis)attribution of phenomenology to her. Readers might be tricked by literary *trompe l'oeil* into thinking that Britomart slowly becomes aware of Scudamour's situation. After describing Scudamour in stanza 7, the next stanza turns to a description of Britomart's

[53] I say *readers* because at this point, the poem has merely described Scudamour to readers. It has not *yet* given any indication of Britomart's phenomenological response.

immediate experience of the situation. Though readers know from stanza 7 that they are dealing with a *wallowing* knight-in-love, Scudamour looks to Britomart

> As if he had beene slombring in the shade,
> That the braue Mayd would not for courtesy,
> Out of his quiet slomber him abrade,
> Nor seeme too suddeinly him to inuade. (III.xi.8)

Britomart sees a potent knight who is lightly sleeping, instead of the impotent wallower the poem describes to readers. By contrasting Britomart's slow realization with what the poem has already told readers, Spenser is partly suggesting, as he so often does in Book III, that Britomart is a legend-in-the-making rather than a fully formed, perfectly heroic character. It takes a vocalization of grief by Scudamour to arouse in Britomart a better understanding of the situation:

> Still as she stood, she heard with grieuous throb
> Him grone, as if his hart were peeces made,
> And with most painefull pangs to sigh and sob,
> That pitty did the Virgins hart of patience rob. (III.xi.8)

This is the first time that Britomart appears to realize the prostrate man is in trouble, and it is the first time *pity* is used to describe Britomart's stance toward Scudamour. Epistemological clarity, Spenser seems to suggest, precedes ethical emotion, which is why it is so hard to use emotion ethically in a fallen world of "seeming." This is one reason why Britomart's pity for Scudamour is central to the poem's conception of the role of literature and emotion in the ethical life of readers. Colin Burrow shows how pity, in

the Western epic tradition, is supposed to be antithetical to the role of an epic hero and more proper to romance. "For Tasso," he writes, "the way to return to the narrative shape and motive structures of classical epic was to fight off pity" (*Epic Romance* 101).[54] But Susanne Wofford is quick to point out the shifting valuations of pity in Spenser's Book III: "[I]t is specifically pity for Malecasta that leads [Britomart] into trouble in canto i. [But P]ity seems a more acceptable emotion by canto xi" (*Choice* 252). This is because they are actually two different forms of pity, one passive, and the other active. In any case, it is no surprise that Spenser's most romantic book, modeled closely on Ariosto, is also the one most closely concerned with pity.[55]

That pity is central to the episode is shown in other ways as well. For instance, one of the source texts for the name of Busirane is Virgil's *Georgics*, where the poet exclaims, "quis aut Eurysthea durum / aut inlaudati nescit Busiridis aras?" 'who knows not pitiless Eurysthea or the altars of detested Busiris?' (3.4-5). Here the religious aspects of Busirane are seen to be derived from the cult of Busiris, just as the pitilessness of Eurysthea is highlighted, suggesting a link between the characters of the two poems. This strong feeling of pity Britomart's "hart of patience rob[s]" (III.xi.8), meaning that the impulse to act has overcome her forbearance and self-possession. This is an embodiment of the ability of strong emotion to move one to ethical action. True emotion in Spenser's

[54] For Burrow, though, Spenser's conception of genre is more complicated. Rather than writing epic or romance, Spenser writes "epic romance -- a mode which creates, then abruptly cuts off pitiful digressions" (101).

[55] In her study of the composition history of *The Faerie Queene*, Josephine Waters Bennett claims that Book III is the most Ariostan of Spenser's poem.

poem makes inaction unbearable. Something must be done, the poem suggests that Britomart decides.

The portrayal of Britomart's emotion is made possible by the portrayals of her prior experience. When Spenser attributes pity to Britomart, he can do so because he has thoroughly prepared readers for this possibility by gradually compiling throughout Book III a long line of contributing causes. As Spinoza writes, "An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused" (Solomon 42). Britomart's pity for Scudamour has been rehearsed in her salvation of Redcrosse Knight earlier in Book III: "When *Britomart* him saw, she ran apace / Vnto his reskew, and with earnest cry, / Badd those same sixe forbeare that single enimy" (III.i.22). Between *saw* and *ran* there is an unspoken emotion that links them, the movement that Sidney's *Defence* describes. In that early part of Book III, though, Spenser does not yet explore the link closely, instead waiting until the end of the book to explicate more fully the mechanisms and procedures of the movement.

In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle claims that the first thing to consider when defining passion [*pathe*] is the temperament of the person who might feel such a passion (in Aristotle's examination, anger, 1378a30-1380a5). "Hence," he writes, "people who are afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily aroused" (*BW* 1379a15). Though Aristotle does not discuss pity as fully, he certainly would admit that similar contributing factors might make a person more prone to pity than usual. And the temperament of Britomart is ideally suited for experiencing pity toward an anguished lover, because Britomart has been tempered by

her own experience of lovesickness. Scudamour's physical pining for Amoret painfully recalls the physical disturbance of Britomart's first lovesickness. A key component of compassion, as Lawrence Blum has shown, is the imaginative reconstruction of the situation of the object of the emotion.[56] Blum claims that the imaginative capability of an individual will largely determine the range of persons and situations for which she can feel emotion. This reasoning is similar to that which Nussbaum uses to rehabilitate literature as a means of ethical education.[57] The imaginative reconstruction needed for pity is not much of a leap for Britomart, because it is but a small step from her own lovesickness to the grief of another forlorn lover.

It is no accident that Scudamour's passionate utterances come in the form of stylized, formal speeches, for the literary and social construction of *emotion* seems to be at the heart of Spenser's thinking in the episode. Scudamour's two complaints that rouse Britomart's pity are conspicuously formulaic. The first (III.xi.9-11) has three stanzas linked by anadiplosis.[58] The link between stanzas 9 and 10 is "If goodnesse find no grace, nor righteousnes no meed? / If good find grace, and righteousnes reward." Between stanzas 10 and 11 the link is "My lady and my loue so cruelly to pen? / My lady and my

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[56] The emotion that Britomart has, which the poem identifies as *pity*, fits the emotion Blum describes. Blum claims that *pity* has condescending overtones that *compassion* does not, even though Nietzsche's *mitlied* does not distinguish. While the modern usage is, I think, differentiated as Blum claims, Spenser's usage of *pity* is essentially synonymous with Blum's *compassion*. See also Spinoza's distinction between pity and sympathy (*misericordia*) (Solomon 38).

[57] In particular, see *Love's Knowledge* and *Poetic Justice*. My reading implies that pity, or compassion, is a beneficent emotion, an implication Nietzsche, for example, denies. In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche writes, "Overwork, curiosity and sympathy -- our modern vices" (section 73). In section 928, he writes that compassion "must first be habitually sifted by reason; otherwise it is just as dangerous as any other affect." But in this particular episode of Spenser's poem, Britomart's pitiful action leads to the rescue of Amoret and is called magnanimous and heroic (III.xi.19).

[58] Anadiplosis: repetition of the last line of one stanza as the opening line of the next one.

love is cruelly pennd." In both links, though, there are crucial differences between the two instances of a line. Between stanzas 9 and 10, a negative conditional becomes a positive one, though both either end or begin complaints about the providence that Richard McCabe examined closely in *The Pillars of Eternity: Time and Providence in* The Faerie Queene. Between stanzas 10 and 11, the end of a question becomes an emphatic declarative, as if to emphasize Scudamour's gradual realization or acceptance of his lover's plight. The links give the three-stanza speech a formal quality that highlights the artificial, literary nature of Scudamour's utterance. But the small differences simultaneously invest the speech with literary insecurity. Borrowing the metaphor of Linda Gregerson's *The Reformation of the Subject*, we might call these unsteady links the noses that one cannot grasp in sacred art that strives to distinguish itself from idolatrous art.[59] They call attention to the constructedness of the art in a way that reminds readers that literary character is essentially artificial, especially when the character is allegorical. In this way, the poem begins to imply that literary production and reception must be abandoned at some point for ethical action, an idea that this and the next chapter make more clear.

Scudamour's second set piece (III.xi.16-17) secludes itself from the rest of the poem by repeating the first line as the last one in a boxing-in technique of extended analepsis: "What boots it plaine, that cannot be redrest . . . What boots it then to plaine,

[59] E. H. Gombrich writes, "The Eastern Church, which came to admit sacred images, made a distinction between sculpture in the round, which was too real for admission, and painted icons. The test was whether you could take the image by the nose" (113). Gregerson uses this test as one of the foundational metaphors of her study of the ways in which Protestant English epic poets tried to distinguish their poems from the idolatrous (1).

that cannot be redrest?" Here the pentameter first line of the first stanza morphs into the required alexandrine of the last line of the next stanza by the addition of "then to," thus highlighting the uncanny way that Spenser's art determines the speech of Scudamour. Readers might be tempted at this point to ask, "What boots it to create mimesis, where art is king?" Thus, the poem begins to suggest the artificiality at the core of literary character, a suggestion treated more fully in the next chapter.

If any doubt lingers in Britomart's mind, Scudamour's outburst after the first complaint assuages it.

> There an huge heape of singulfes did oppresse
> His strugling soule, and swelling throbs empeach
> His foltring toung with pangs of drerinesse,
> Choking the remnant of his plaintife speach,
> As if his dayes were come to their last reach. (III.xi.12) [60]

This is an instance of passion inspiring emotion. Scudamour's passionate fit impeaches his faltering tongue, but this impotent expression causes pity to rob Britomart's heart of patience. This passionate encounter inspires Britomart to action. At the moment that she is smitten with "great ruth and terrour" (III.xi.12), "Tho stouping downe she him amoved light" [Then stooping down, she gently aroused him] (III.xi.13). Britomart's intervention

[60] Presumably derived from the Latin *singultus* (sob, gasp), *singulfes* in line 1 is emended in the 1609 edition to the easier, but unauthoritative, *singultes*. The 1609 edition thus violates one of the major axioms of textual criticism: *difficilior lectio potior*, "let be the more difficult reading." The editions of Spenser's lifetime print an *f* instead of a *t*, better substantiating the onomatopoetic effect according to Hamilton's note (following an earlier suggestion by Osgood).

signals a movement to action, changing the inherent passivity of passion into the activity of emotion, just the kind of transformation Sidneian poetry hopes to effect.

The next action that arises from Britomart's pity (after the small but telling action of helping him up) is an attempt at comforting Scudamour through speech (III.xi.14). But that speech soon turns into a promise to act in a more concrete fashion. "Perhaps this hand may helpe to ease your woe, / And wreake your sorrow on your cruell foe, / At least it faire endeuour will apply" (III.xi.15). Britomart formulates her promised action in terms of displacing a passion, sorrow, from Scudamour to Busirane ("your cruell foe"), suggesting a kind of economy whereby passion is neither created nor destroyed, only moved around. The opening stanzas of canto xi set up an emotional program by juxtaposing "Fowle Gealosy" and "Sweete Loue" in a way that suggests that behind the battle between two forms of magic, which James Nohrnberg has seen in the episode, lies another battle between two kinds of feeling (*Analogy* 9). Britomart is trying to overcome the foul jealousy of Busirane with the sweet love she has come to know in her relation to (the representation of) Artegall.[61] The contest enlists not only positive against negative feelings, but also by implication those feelings that prompt action (*emotions*) against those feelings that are suffered to no end (*passions*). Aristotle, in his discussion of angry persons, posits just such an exchange economy: "It [i.e., the anger] stops when they pay back the offense," he writes; "for the exaction of the penalty produces pleasure in place of pain, and so puts a stop to the anger. But if this does not happen, they hold their grudge"

[61] At least she has come to know that the love might be made sweet through union. This is still an advance from her first impulse to categorize her feelings for him as a "crime" (III.ii.37).

(*NE* 1126a21-25). Aristotle's idea is that before retaliation, the angry person feels pain while the supposed culprit of the misdeed feels pleasure. The solution for the bitter individual is to somehow steal the culprit's pleasure by displacing his own pain onto the culprit. In taking on Scudamour's burden, Britomart exchanges some of her pleasure for his pain.

But if Spenser's poem sets up such a passional economy, then what becomes of the pity that spurs Britomart to action in the first place? The emotional state of Britomart at the end of her heroic mission is stated plainly in stanza 46 of the 1590 ending:

> *Britomart* halfe enuying their blesse,
> Was much empassiond in her gentle sprite,
> And to her selfe oft wisht like happinesse,
> In vaine she wisht, that fate n'ould let her yet possesse. (III.xii.46*)

Britomart's passion here, notice, is only half envy. The rest of her complex passion is a vain wishing for the absence of a lover, exactly the passion, in the 1590 ending, that she has relieved in Scudamour. The next stanza seems to allude to this passional economy: "Thus doe those louers with sweet counteruayle, / Each other of loues bitter fruit despoile" (III.xii.47*).

In the 1596 ending, it is just this passional economy, still in a state of dis-equilibrium, that perpetuates the poem. Scudamour's grief has been appropriately transferred to Busirane, who "deep engrieued was" (III.xii.43). But the rest of the characters (Britomart, Amoret, Scudamour, and, surprisingly, Glauce) are left unwhole. Britomart, on finding that Scudamour and Glauce have disappeared, is "stonisht sore,"

and Amoret is "fild with new affright" (III.xii.44). The disappearance of Scudamour and Glauce is explained with reference to their unwholesome passions. "His expectation to despaire did turne" and she "did mourne" (III.xii.45).

In the House of Busirane episode, when stifling passions become a motive for action, these passions become emotions. Thus Spenser begins to search for language and form for the role of feeling in the ethical life. Britomart's heightened feelings, here and elsewhere, are related to some key aesthetic and ethical themes of Book III. First, Britomart's emotional life is used to comment on and explore the possibility of mimesis in literary art, a theme raised in the Bower of Bliss episode at the end of Book II, developed in the proem to Book III, and treated more fully in the next chapter. Second, Britomart's emotions underlie one of the Spenser's intellectual borrowings from Sidney: that art must "move" readers. Inside the House of Busirane, as we shall see, the exploration of aesthetic movement takes an interesting turn.

2. Moving and Ductus

The work of Carruthers on the affective and memorial significance of sacred architecture in medieval monasticism suggests one powerful way of understanding how poetry moves its readers. She describes sacred architecture as one important paradigm for the arts of memory, and also for the memorial instrumentality of actual buildings. Carruthers describes the tradition of using pictures, statues, and buildings -- in both plan and built forms -- as tools of the craft of thought in reading and composing. Carruthers writes, "A locational memory system is any scheme that establishes a set of ordered, clearly articulated, and readily recoverable background locations into which memory

'images' are consciously placed" ("Poet" 881-82). She has called the virtual and material art that embodies these rhetorical programs "machine[s] for thinking" (*Craft* 276).[62]

In the writings of Cicero, rhetorical patterns are explicitly directed toward proof of one side of a question or the other. Even in the case of what Lanham calls "antilogy, the ability to argue on either side of a question" (*Motives* 3), the goal of the rhetor is persuasion to an intellectual position; that position is the final cause of the rhetoric.[63] In medieval monasticism the final cause of such rhetoric is often conversion, conviction, or concentration. In the humanist age, though, poets began to see poems as machines that not only move readers in certain ways and to certain points, but that also crucially leave undetermined the final causes of such movement. Renaissance poets instead expect poems to be used as instruments for the exercise of thought and ethical development, even with all the attendant possibilities of misuse.[64] Carruthers's ideas about the use of

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[62] Elsewhere in *The Craft of Thought*, Carruthers uses the terms "*machina memorialis*" (7), "*machina mentis*" (92), and "meditation machines" (230). The concept of rhetorical devices meant to be used dynamically in the thinking of their audience pervades her book. The notion of poem as machine is prominent in the writings of Valéry: "Un poème est une sorte de machine à produire l'état poétique au moyen des mots" (1.1337). But notice that Valéry has a different kind of machine in mind, a machine "to produce the poetic state by means of words." Carruthers's elaboration of the idea is what I mean to point toward when I use the phrase "machine for thinking." The phrase, however, is ubiquitous in discourse about poetry and architecture. "The Alhambra was designed by and for intellectuals with mystical inclinations. It was a machine for thinking in" (Robert Irwin, *The Alhambra* 99). Mark Jarman writes, "The poem as a machine for thinking, especially the formal poem as a machine for thinking, was a mode the English formalists Donald Davie and Thom Gunn were especially skilled at" (324). Compare Dewey: "[T]he fine arts as well as the industrial technologies are affairs of practice" (*Experience and Nature* 288). Like Carruthers, Dewey seems to imply that literature might be a practical machine. But note that Dewey (and I would guess Carruthers) is quick to avoid "a division of art into useful and fine, adjectives which, when they are prefixed to 'art,' corrupt and destroy its intrinsic significance [as experience]" (*Experience and Nature* 293). Using a closely related phrase, Elizabeth Fowler claims that in the Thames and Medway marriage episode (*FQ* IV.xi-xii), Spenser provides "an engine of deliberation" (205).

[63] This rhetorical exercise is sometimes called *disputatio in utramque partem*. Thus such rhetorical exercises resemble the philosophers' thought experiment when, unlike the example from Dennett I examined in the Introduction, the conclusion is stated rather than conclusions being left to readers.

[64] The danger of misuse when there is no prescribed reading is akin to the argument of Augustine's life that without the burning lusts of Carthage, there would be no contrary development into sainthood, and to

rhetorical texts as machines for thinking provide a wonderful opportunity to rethink earlier studies of the use of early modern texts, such as Stanley Fish's *Self-Consuming Artifacts*. I think it may be time to consider how her version of the history and uses of rhetoric might change our understanding of Renaissance poetry and ethics.

Ethics in the classical world was heavily virtue-based, whether the virtues of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* or the *ataraxia* of the Stoics. In the middle ages, virtue is by and large still the end of ethics, but the virtues are Christianized. To take just one example from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that bravery (Gk. *andreia*) is a virtue proper to the battlefield: "Properly, then, he will be called brave who is fearless in face of a noble death, and of all emergencies that involve death; *and the emergencies of war are in the highest degree of this kind*" (1115a32; emphasis mine). Thomas Aquinas, though, stretches Aristotle's military condition of bravery to include Christian martyrdom, an obvious revision of the definition of the virtue: "Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God; wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been *valiant in battle*" (1710, 2.2.123.5). Aquinas not only Christianizes the highest good, replacing Aristotle's happiness with love of God; Aquinas also uses the Bible as evidence (the italicized phrase is quoted from Hebrews 11.34). Moreover, we can see in Aquinas's notion of Christian warfare the subtle allegorization of Aristotle's military condition. Though

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Milton's argument against censorship in *Areopagitica*. Augustine, Spenser, and Milton would seem to agree that the dangers of sin, misuse, or misinterpretation are part of education.

Aquinas might very well have in mind the actual Christian warfare of the Crusades, the notion was easily stretched to include any act of Christian "sacrifice." This kind of displacement is one of the fundamental ways that virtue was revised in the medieval period.

In the Renaissance, I would argue, virtue-based ethics is beginning to be once again rethought, and one of the important sites of this philosophical work is literary fiction. Spenser structures *The Faerie Queene* as legends about virtues, but the critiques of those virtues within the books themselves (for example, the strong rewriting of chastity as married love in Books III and IV) suggest that Spenser and his contemporaries are powerfully revising their understanding of the efficacy of virtue-based ethics. Pyrocles in Sidney's *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia* exclaims, "[I]f we love virtue, in whom shall we love it but in a virtuous creature - without your meaning be, I should love this word 'Virtue' where I see it written in a book!" (136). His complaint about the uselessness of an abstract virtue is similar to the complaint Spenser's legends imply. Instead of creating structures that simply describe virtues, late Elizabethan poets are rather more interested in finding a "*taxis*" that induces *praxis*.[65] They do not want poems merely to instill virtue; they want poems to move readers to virtuous action. Book III of Spenser's *Faerie Queene* is especially prone to revise a personal sense of virtue into a social one. As William Oram writes, "The initial books of *The Faerie Queene* [i.e., books I and II] focus on the self, asking 'how can I act in the world so that I may become whole or holy,

[65] *Taxis* means "order or arrangement of words" ("Taxis"). On the idea of praxis-inducing rhetoric, see Kathy Eden, *passim*.

master my passions?'" (57). In Book III, though, "Spenser concerns himself less with human corruption than with the inability to use one's drives to good purpose in the world" (Oram 58-59). Such a shift toward a *praxis*-inducing poetics inevitably forced Renaissance poets to reconceive the rhetorical disposition of their poems, and to reconfigure the poems' relation to ethics. Fortunatianus (4th c. AD), Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), Sidney (1554-86), and Spenser (1552-99) might have very different products in mind when they imagine the results of the practice of "ethike" -- but they are all part of a tradition of presenting texts, images, and artifacts as instruments in the process of "moving" souls to virtuous action.

3. A Templar Ductus

Fox has already established the "interpretive importance of Britomart's *progress through the house*, implying that the significance of the episode is to be gained for both Britomart and the reader through *a careful interpretation of the spaces she passes through*" (68, my emphases). In the rest of this chapter, I show how Spenser, at times a radical Protestant writer, employed medieval and Romanist traditions in *The Faerie Queene*, and I argue that the disposition of architectural space in the House of Busirane is shaped by two surprising influences: the practice of architectural memory in medieval monasticism and the aesthetic theories of the twelfth-century theologian Bernard. I will then make the case that the architectural ductus of the House of Busirane specifically

creates a machine for thinking about one of the most difficult problems that poets face: how to justify their own creations as effective and affective public tools.[66]

Spenser's poem thinks about literature's moving capacity in part, I shall argue, by appropriating a medieval tradition of architectural ductus. Frances Yates, in *The Art of Memory*, deftly expounded how Renaissance thinkers borrowed the memorial techniques of the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which encouraged the practice of architectural mnemonic devices. Her foundational work presents the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as the central text of the practice that Carruthers calls locational memory, the mnemonic use of space ("Poet" passim; *Craft* 10-16). But whereas the Ciceronian model upon which Yates focuses uses remembered buildings simply to place the facts one wishes to retrieve from memory, many medieval memory experts, as Carruthers has shown, use locational memory to invent and compose their *own* elaborate meditations (*Craft* 16-21). Like other medieval practices, the orthopraxis of thinking in buildings continued into the early modern period, even as its aims changed. In Spenser's case, such medieval memorial practices, I want to argue, underlie some of his most impressive imaginary edifices. A central example in Spenser's work is his taking up the traditional memorial space *par excellence*, the Temple of Solomon, in his construction of the House of Busirane episode.[67]

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[66] The House of Busirane is only one example of a ductus in Spenser's poem, though I do think the high level of attention it has received both recently and in the past can be attributed to its status as one of the more highly suggestive and open-ended examples. For an excellent example of another episode treated as what I would call a ductus in Spenser, see Kenneth Gross's recent interpretation of the Garden of Adonis episode as a "garden of thought" or as "an image of the motion of thought" ("Green" 355, 356).

[67] The Temple of Solomon is not the only analogue for the episode, though it is an important one that has, to my knowledge, yet to be suggested. Edwin Greenlaw suggested the narrative analogue of the Chateau

"The most interesting and fruitful of all the inventional tropes developed from the Bible from the point of view of literary invention," Carruthers writes, "is the temple-city on a hill which Ezekiel sees in a vision . . . a version of the actual temple of Solomon described in I Kings chapter 6" ("Poet" 897-98). According to Hebraic tradition, the pre-exilic Temple of Solomon was destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar's Babylonians in 586 BCE, the Second Temple by Titus's Romans in 70 CE. The Temple is from that time no more than a memory; but I would like to say the Temple is now no *less* than a memory. As Alfred Edersheim writes in his examination of Second Temple Judaism at the time of Christ, "In every age, the memory of Jerusalem has stirred the deepest feelings. Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans turn to it with reverent affection" (23). This is the resonance the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints attempts to capture when it borrows the inscriptions and designs of Solomon's Temple for its temples. Peter and Linda Murray note that many Christian churches have also been based on the Old Testament Temple (517). These "ancient memories" of the Temple Complex, as Edersheim calls them, have throughout human history remained a remarkably constant repository of cultural memory. But these memories are powerful as both presence and loss. Jon D. Levenson writes, "A central paradox of Jewish spirituality lies in the fact that

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Merveil of the Grail cycle, picking up as I do a religious, liturgical resonance in the House of Busirane. Greenlaw writes that Spenser "was able to give new life to an old story without doing violence to [its] original meaning" (124). Spenser is also giving new life to an old space, the Temple of Solomon. The episode thus has as one of its strands of thinking, a consideration of what happens to old spaces when they are used for new purposes, and specifically how memory insists on drawing attention to its "original meaning." This happens in the real world, for example when an old church is turned into a museum or a concert hall. These represent a special category of museums and concert halls, and artists like to exhibit in them and musicians like to play in them, because they can steal some of the aesthetic, and maybe even ideological, meaning, giving to their own performance or art a richer set of contexts than it might ordinarily have.

so much of it centers upon an institution that was destroyed almost two millenia ago, the Jerusalem Temple" (32). Indeed, the loss of the Temple is problematic in practical ways: some commandments in the *Mishnah*, the compilation of Jewish oral law, apply only when the Temple is standing. In those cases, it is as if the loss of the Temple directly means the loss of a tradition, an absence that perhaps weakens the force of law. But, on the other hand, absence only strengthens the motives of memory. Memory is strong where the presence of the object is denied, much as the sense of touch is strong in a person whose sense of sight has been deprived. In the middle ages, cultivated memories of the tabernacle and temple famously became meditation machines for, among others, Augustine, Richard of St.-Victor, Abbott Suger, and Bernard (Carruthers, *Craft* passim). Spenser, I believe, also draws upon these memories to form a recognizable ductus for the readers of his poem who are aware of the meditational resonance of the Temple "which that wise King of *Iurie* framed, / With endlesse cost, to be th'Almighties see" (*FQ* IV.x.30).[68]

As we saw above, the heroic lady Britomart has offered to help Scudamour rescue his lover, Amoret, from the clutches of the evil magician Busirane. The physical obstacle

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[68] Fletcher writes that "the Bower of Bliss and the House of Busirane are demonic parodies of temples of pleasure and love" (*Prophetic* 35). Though Fletcher is concerned with more general notions of temples as artfully conceived sacred spaces and never mentions Solomon or the Hebrew Bible temple, his work might be seen as a first step toward the more specific analogue I find for the House of Busirane. He writes, "Spenser depends heavily on two cardinal images for his prophetic structure: the temple and the labyrinth . . . The image of the temple is probably the dominant recurring archetype in *The Faerie Queene*. Major visions in each of the six books are presented as temples: the House of Holiness, the Castle of Alma, the Garden of Adonis, the Temple of Venus, the Temple of Isis, the sacred round-dance on the top of Mount Acidale. Even the Mutabilitie cantos display this 'symbolism of the center,' as the trial convenes at the pastoral *templum* of Diana, Arlo Hill" (*Prophetic* 11, 12). Though Spenser never calls the House of Busirane a temple, critics have often seen it as one. For example, William V. Nestrick casually writes about the "Temple of Busyrane" (359).

to Britomart and Scudamour's entrance to Busirane's House is a fiery barrier before the gate:

> But in the Porch, that did them sore amate,
> A flaming fire, ymixt with smouldry smoke,
> And stinking Sulphure, that with griesly hate
> And dreadfull horror did all entraunce choke,
> Enforced them their forward footing to reuoke. (III.xi.21)

Editors of the poem, including Thomas P. Roche and Hamilton, rightly note the literary sources of the fire in medieval and Renaissance romance and epic. But too many commentators have read the fire as symbolic of the burning desires of Scudamour. That he cannot pass through the fire, these critics contend, implies that his desire is out of control or misplaced. On the other hand, they argue, Britomart's desires are in order because they recognize the procreative and chaste aspects of love, as opposed to the Ovidian, Petrarchan, and unduly lustful aspects that the House of Busirane seems to symbolize. But I would argue that these readings ignore both the reader-directedness of the episode and one of the episodes most important sources: the woodcuts of the Temple of Solomon in the Geneva Bible, a visual source Spenser would have known well. Incorporating this Biblical source into an understanding of the House of Busirane makes possible a highly suggestive investigation of its program of moving readers, as I will show.

In "The Temple Uncovered" (*Geneva Bible* 151^{v}), there appears to be a fire before the entryway (G). In "The Temple Covered" (152^{r}), the flames in the first picture are

revealed as originating from the altar of burnt offering (D), not from the floor as they appear to do in the first illustration. This three-dimensional fact is obscured in the two-dimensional representation of the first woodcut, which inadvertently suggests a fiery barrier. The distortion was repeated in other visualizations of the Temple. One later example is the title page to an early-eighteenth-century *Mishnah* in which Moses points to the Temple in the center of the page (Wigoder 540). Again "a flaming fire, ymixt with smouldry smoke" appears to present a distinct and symbolic barrier between the commoners in the foreground and the Temple in the background.

"The Temple Uncovered" also makes clear the tripartite division of the Temple: the porch (G-H), "the holy place" (Q), and "the holiest of all" (R, i.e., *sanctum sanctorum* or “the holy of holies”). The House of Busirane has a corresponding tripartite structure: the room of tapestry, the room of gold relief, and the inner room where Amoret is held hostage. The tripartite division of the Old Testament Temple, each room more sacred than the last, ending in the *sanctum sanctorum*, provides a negative pattern for Busirane's house, where each room is more profane than the last, so that the third room of Busirane's house represents what I would call the *profanum profanorum*, or worst of the impious places.

The verses from 1 Kings 6 that the Geneva Bible woodcuts accompany describe the walls of the Temple, specifically the enormous amount of gilt work they support. Verse 20 says, "[H]e couered it [i.e., the holy of holies] with pure golde." Verse 21 elaborates: "So Salomon couered the house within with pure golde: and he shut the place of the oracle with chaines of golde, and couered it with golde." Verse 22 concurs: "And

he ouerlaied the house with golde." Verses 29-32 continue the precious metallic overload by describing the figurative work on the walls and doors, also covered with gold. This shows up in Spenser's poem first as the gold thread lurking in the tapestries of the first room, and then in the gilded altar of Cupid. In the second room Britomart finds "with pure gold it all was ouerlayd" (III.xi.51), in language directly echoing that of the Geneva Bible (verse 22 above).[69]

Finally, there is the resemblance between the two imagined spaces: the placement of a censing altar in the Geneva woodcut (151^{v} X) provides a source for the altar of Cupid in the House of Busirane's first room.

> And at the vpper ende of that faire rowme,
> There was an Altar built of pretious stone,
> Of passing valew, and of great renowme,
> On which there stood an Image all alone,
> Of massy gold, which with his owne light shone. (III.xi.47)

What this visual analysis of the Geneva Bible woodcuts provides, then, is a set of strong resemblances between Spenser's House of Busirane and an image of the Temple that would have been familiar to him and his readers.

Such parallels with the Temple in liturgical spaces such as cathedrals, synagogues, and monasteries throughout Byzantine and Gothic architecture are commonplace and need little explanation. And Carruthers has shown how biblical architecture was the *ne plus ultra* of monastic memory practices (*Book* passim). But if

[69] The next canto (III.xii) begins with a corroborating allusion to 1 Kings. See note 45 above.

one wishes (as I do) to make the argument that Spenser uses such a structure for a decidedly non-Judaic, non-Christian space in the Renaissance, one needs to look for evidence of more unexpected borrowings.

In fact, the idea of reconstructing Solomon's Temple for secular use would not have been extraordinary. For example, Tudor estates were constructed along the idea of an outer and inner court leading ultimately to the privy chamber, where the monarch or lord of the manor admitted important or intimate visitors, lending the feel of a trinal procession to many of the great English houses built and used in this period.[70] Such borrowings suggest that the original ideological import of space is in some cases less important than the undetermined and various uses that can be made of it.

Even more to the point, at the very time *The Faerie Queene* was being composed, a distinctly Solomonic country house was being designed and erected in Nottinghamshire. Mark Girouard has traced this example of what he thinks may be a direct attempt to rebuild the Temple of Solomon as a country estate. His 1992 book, *Town and Country*, reproduces pictures and plans of Wollaton Hall, created 1580-88 by Francis Willoughby (patron) and Robert Smythson (architect). Girouard examined, researched, and tried to interpret Wollaton Hall over a period of close to 40 years, beginning in the early sixties. The house intrigued Girouard for the same reason it has baffled most architectural historians and critics -- its mysterious and awkward central

[70] Susan Frye specifically compares the House of Busirane with Hampton Court: Busirane's three rooms open sequentially, like Elizabeth I's presence chambers at Hampton Court, described in 1598 as 'adorned with tapestry of gold, silver, and velvet, in some of which were woven history pieces'" (124). The golden-threaded tapestry is an older epic motif as seen in a poem that, alas, Spenser could not have known, *Beowulf* (trans. Heaney), lines 993-95: "Gold thread shone / in the wall-hangings, woven scenes / that attracted and held the eye's attention."

prospect room, around which the rest of the house is built. Rising like a central watchtower, Girouard says, "the general effect is of a combination of church and castle" (*Town* 188), a combination which might also describe Busirane's odd house. Even Girouard's evocation of the patron, Willoughby, sounds a little bit like Busirane: "There, up in the clouds in his great desolate prospect room, he could think he was the superman or even God himself" (*Smythson* 108).

In his 1983 book, *Robert Smythson and the Elizabethan Country House*, Girouard locates possible parallels for the tower in other English houses such as Mount Edgcumbe. But in 1992 Girouard revealed a new and convincing explanation of the strange architectural feature. In *Town and Country*, Girouard explains that Willoughby was an eccentric, wealthy intellectual with a large collection of books, who also considered himself something of a theologian, writing theological treatises. Girouard shows that it is very likely that Willoughby would have used, if not owned, one of the many editions of Anton Koberger's Latin Bible, which included the *Postilla Super Totam Bibliam* of Nicolaus de Lyra. In Lyra's commentaries, illustrations of the Temple and Temple Complex accompany the last chapters of Ezekiel. Girouard helpfully juxtaposes Koberger's engraving, based on Lyra's, with Smythson's plan for Wollaton (*Town* 190) to show the likely borrowing. Moreover, Girouard reproduces two later, but relevant, illustrations: a section of Solomon's Temple as reconstructed by Bernard Lamy in 1720, and a section of Wollaton Hall published in 1889. The resemblances are obvious. Girouard thus proves that the Temple was a major influence on one of the notable country houses of the English Renaissance.

Wollaton Hall had architectural influence itself. Willoughby and Smythson had borrowed the sacred Temple architecture and applied it to a secular country estate. Jacques Perret seems to have done the opposite, by appropriating the design of Wollaton Hall for a projected Huguenot temple in 1601, just a few years after the completion of Wollaton (Girouard, *Smythson* 86). Girouard was the first to notice the central tower and the symmetrical layout of Wollaton in Perret's drawing (apparently never built). Girouard's architectural source study points to a remarkable narrative of influence: Hebraic sacred architecture is translated through the intermediary of Christian interpretation and reconstruction into a secular country estate, and then back into Christian sacred space. Girouard notes that the grandiosity of temple design made it an appealing model for the aristocracy. He writes:

> It was therefore appropriate that a king's palace should follow the model of the house of God; for this reason, according to a contemporary witness, Herrera used the Temple as a prototype for the Escorial, and John Webb almost certainly used Villalpando's reconstruction of the Holy of Holies as the basis of his design for Charles II's bedchamber at Greenwich Palace. To extend imitation to the house of a great landowner and local magnate was only to move one step further down the chain. (*Town* 195-6)

So Spenser's use of temple design has a precedent in the architecture of the era.

But what might this mean for our interpretation of the episode involving Scudamour, Britomart, Busirane, and Amoret? To begin, I think it suggests that one key to understanding the episode is the liturgy associated with the Old Testament Temple.

Kenneth Gross compares the victimization of Amoret to "a parodic mass" (*Spenserian* 162). But the direct link to the Hebrew Temple suggests rather a parodic Yom Kippur, perhaps suggesting the same kind of revisionary protest that is seen in Hebrews 9.[71] Such a context is corroborated by the time of the poem, in which Amoret has been in Busirane's possession for "these seuen monethes day," Yom Kippur itself occurring on "the tenth day of the seuenth moneth" (*FQ* III.xi.10; Lev. 16.29). The Geneva Bible's chapter headings for Leviticus 16, where the sacrificial ritual Yom Kippur is described, I would argue, parallel the events of the end of *FQ* III.xii. The Bible outlines "The Purging of the Sanctuarie" and "The clensing of the Temple" as the center of the chapter. The conspicuous ritual of Yom Kippur includes making the well-known distinction between a sacrificial goat and the so-called scapegoat. The scapegoat symbolically bears the weight of Israel's sins into the wilderness, thence reconciling God and man, in a move that is the type of Christ's sacrifice in the New Testament. Sacrificial burden-bearing is also the heroic task of Britomart as she prepares to martyr herself for Scudamour's sake: "I will with proofe of last extremity, / Deliuer her fro thence, or with her *for you dy*" (III.xi.18, my emphasis). So the link with sacrifice and substitution is provided and underpinned by Hebraic liturgy. But what we might call an allegory of the two goats is complicated in the House of Busirane, because it is a mere profane parody of the House of the Lord. In this parody, Britomart's "sacred" task is to obstruct the sacrifice of Amoret, a stand-in for the goat of the sin offering. Just as the Israelites must respect and hold in awe the sacred

[71] The argument of Hebrews 9 is "I. How that the ceremonies and sacrifyces of the lawe are abolished, II. by the eternitie and perfections of Christes sacrifice."

ritual of Leviticus 16, Britomart must obstruct and destroy its profane double. The difficulty, though, is knowing the difference, which seems to be the point of Britomart's constant amazement in the House of Busirane. But in the end, imitating the career of Jesus, Britomart enters the Temple and exposes those who would profane such a spatial pattern. The priest goes into the *sanctum sanctorum* once a year to sacrifice, propitiate the Hebrew God, and reconcile the people to God. In Spenser's variation, Britomart penetrates the *profanum profanorum* to obstruct sacrifice, bind the false God, and atone Scudamour and Amoret (Scudamoret). This sacred ductus, moving from Scudamour's anguish to Britomart's offer of propitiation and then to a purging reconciliation, provides one compelling way to interpret the episode.

But I think the borrowed Temple architecture also suggests that such interpretation is not as important as use. The patterns of the Temple provide a ductus for the memorial work of its readers, a gymnasium for the exercise of the mind, and a workbook for ethical thought. Perhaps the most telling indicator of this is the description of the artwork in the House of Busirane as “the goodly ordinaunce of this rich Place” (III.xi.53). Hamilton glosses *ordinaunce* as “warlike equipment,” a gloss faithful to interpretations of the episode as an obstacle course for Britomart. But this meaning of *ordinaunce* is not, I suggest, the most useful one. While *OED*’s *ordnance, n.* gives Hamilton this definition, the far larger entry for *ordinance, n.* is perhaps more relevant to Spenser's poem. In the latter entry, ordinance is defined as "Arrangement of literary material, or collocation of parts, as in architecture, in accordance with some plan or rule of composition or artistic production; also, a characteristic series of architectural parts"

(2b), "A practice or usage authoritatively enjoined or prescribed; *esp.* a religious or ceremonial observance, as the sacraments" (8), or an "ordered, arranged, or regulated condition" (2), such as the "goodly order" of Fansy's "paynted plumes" (III.xii.9) amidst the masquers "enranged orderly" (III.xii.5). This orderliness has long been remarked, most singularly by Alastair Fowler in his numerological studies. [72] But his discoveries of numerical patterns were published almost a half century ago, when Spenser studies was still focused on psychological questions such as, "Is Busyrane Amoret's emotional state, or its objective cause?" (Alastair Fowler, *Triumphal* 50) and "why is Amoret tortured by Busyrane?" (Alpers, *Poetry* 14). Such questions unfortunately elide the possibility that the ordinance of the House of Busirane is itself a dispositional order, a taxis or ductus, based largely on the Temple of Solomon, that underlies the poet's composition and supports the thinking of readers.

4. Bernardine Aesthetics

Because the Temple was one of the chief places of monastic memory, it might be helpful to consider Spenser's poem with reference to medieval thinking about art. Specifically, I want to explore the poem's suggestions about aesthetics and ethics through a reading of this scene in the light of what I have found to be a possible material source for Spenser's thinking on the use of art: the vexed Protestant inheritance of the writings of Bernard and the aesthetic traditions of Cistercianism.

[72] See Alastair Fowler, *Spenser and the Numbers of Time* 148-55. "[T]he key to [James Broaddus's] reading [of the episode] is progression, not within Britomart as she moves through the House but the progression of the rooms themselves" (Broaddus 91).

Early modern English studies have long fluctuated between Catholic and Protestant emphases. In the 1960s, the whiggish reformation narrative of A. G. Dickens was tempered somewhat by the literary work on Catholic modes of poetry by Louis Martz. But after Barbara Lewalski's seminal *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric* (1979), the increasingly historicist scholarship of the 80s and 90s focused almost exclusively on early modern permutations of Protestantism. A complex issue like iconoclasm, for example, was ceded to those critics who, like John King, chose to treat it in Protestant contexts, leaving aside the strong tradition within Catholic writings (patristic, monastic, recusant) of defending the soul against undue attention to idolatrous objects. Currently, though scholars like John Wall have argued that Establishment Church of England theology and *praxis* are central to early modern historiography and literary studies, the late 1990s and now the first decade of our present century have seen overall emphases yet once more shift toward the Catholic. Scholars such as Eamon Duffy, Frances Dolan, and Arthur Marotti have continued to investigate the unavoidable Romanist margins of the early modern period.[73]

The binary opposition of Catholic and Protestant, like that of medieval and renaissance, is itself often misleading. Many practicing Catholics identified as Anglicans out of legal propriety, while many honestly Protestant politicians, writers, and preachers clung to older Catholic traditions in their laws, poems, and exegeses. We are now perhaps more than ever prepared to understand the ways in which early modern English men and

[73] Katherine Duncan-Jones, "Sir Philip Sidney's Debt to Edmund Campion," demonstrates Sidney's Catholic sympathies, a very strong revision of entrenched ideas that he was an exceptionally committed Protestant.

women were "neither integral Tridentines nor fully Protestant or Calvinist" (Palliser 36). Instead it appears most men and women merely suffered the ruptures of the Reformation. Michael Questier writes, "A decision to become a Catholic or Protestant in England [was] always partly a matter of politics and partly a matter of religion, and . . . try as they might, people could not consciously adhere to the Roman or the English Church without having an eye constantly to both sorts of motive" (2).

While politics and religion are two very important motives in these matters, I think another warrants emphasis, one we might call the motive of established intellectual tradition. In the late sixteenth century, a writer's religious or political identity does not always determine his or her literary and cultural sources. Duffy has enhanced our understanding of the way that traditionally Catholic religious practices asserted influence long after the official break with Rome; yet to be fully examined is the lingering and perhaps inextinguishable influence of the Latin and Greek fathers on the ethical and aesthetic thinking of late sixteenth-century England.

The inertia of religious canons can be very strong. Writers and sermonizers of the sixteenth century could not suddenly abandon their Romanist heritage since it was what and whom they and their forbears had read. Augustine, Jerome, Anselm, and Bernard: these and others formed an important core of a tradition that would never be fully eradicated from English memory. Thus Nicholas Ridley, in a "disputation" at Oxford in 1555, claims his argument against the real presence is in agreement not only with Paul, but also with Cyprian, Augustine, Athanasius, Hilary, Cyril, Basil, Ambrose, and Jerome (201-202), and he and his interlocutor dispute the authority of Bernard on the real

presence (217-18).[74] And William Perkins in a treatise published posthumously in 1606 openly hopes that he "shall sufficiently perswade an indifferent iudge, that these things haue not beene lately hatched at home, which wee deliuer in our Congregations and Schooles, but that we haue also deriued and fetched them from the Fathers themselues" (n.p.).

There has been a minority in Renaissance studies paying attention to such lingering memories. Gross, for example, writes that he is not comfortable "with the work of recent critics who have tried to make English Renaissance literature into a predominately Protestant or Calvinist phenomenon" (*Spenserian* 20). In Spenser studies, Darryl Gless, Anne Lake Prescott, and Carol Kaske have kept reminding early modern scholars not to forget this important heritage. For these critics and others, a deep indebtedness to Catholic thought lies just behind the officially sanctioned Protestantism of the age.[75]

The Western doctor most often considered alongside Spenser is, of course, Augustine.[76] I by no means want to suggest that Bernard was as influential as the doctor from Hippo; rather, it strikes me that each of them would have been interesting to Spenser for some of the same reasons. Most importantly, Bernard and Augustine are both Western doctors of the church who exhibit styles heavily indebted to classical rhetoric.

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[74] Actually, this "disputation" on April 17 was a kind of trial, the ultimate result of which was the martyrdom of Ridley along with Hugh Latimer in Oxford just a few months later on October 16.
[75] Robert Stillman, *Philip Sidney and the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitanism*, has revised the Protestant, Calvinist picture of (Sidney's) intellectual heritage by showing his strong reliance on the ideas of Melanchthon, whose Protestant ideas are not Calvinist.
[76] See, for example, James Schiavone, "Spenser's Augustine."

Indeed, Bernard is remembered as the "Doctor Mellifluous."[77] This stylistic affinity suggests one powerful reason why sixteenth-century writers such as Spenser would have found Bernard and Augustine appealing, for Spenser and his contemporaries were performing similar balancing acts: trying to find justification for their use of rhetoric.

One important fact leads me to the writings of Bernard: he was one of the early sponsors of the Knights Templar, also called the Knights of the Temple of Solomon. As Piers Paul Read writes in his history of the order, Bernard had heard about the new order from his "friend and patron, Count Hugh of Champagne . . . who had joined the order in Jerusalem" (101). Read writes that the order "might well have been stillborn had it not received the Church's endorsement at the Council of Troyes, subsequently confirmed by Pope Honorius II. That endorsement was due largely to the support of Bernard" (Read 105). Spenser makes reference to the order in *Prothalamion* as the narrator passes the Inner Temple: "There whylome wont the Templar Knights to byde, / Till they decayd through pride" (134-36). Redcrosse Knight's insignia, as has always been known, links him to St. George. But a red cross on a white background was also the dress of the Knights Templar. It seems possible that, along with the legend of St. George, the Redcrosse Knight's symbolic outfit is a nod to the Knights Templar. Moreover, Artegall's judicial debut is modelled on Solomon's, further making plausible the connection of Busirane's house with the Temple of Solomon.[78] All these hints suggest that the Knights

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[77] Cf. *Doctor Mellifluus: Encyclical of Pope Pius XII on St. Bernard of Clairvaux, The Last of the Fathers May 24, 1953*.

[78] Artegall's first judgement occurs at V.i.26-28. As Hamilton notes, "Artegall's 'doome' (27.1) replicates Solomon's judgement at 1 Kings 3.16-27 by which he proved that his wisdom was given him by God."

Templar provide one of the vital foundations of Spenser's machine for thinking in *The Faerie Queene*.

This military religious order, now much fabled, was created to protect pilgrims to the Holy Land after the capture of Jerusalem in the First Crusade. They called themselves "Templar" after the old Temple compound in Jerusalem where they made their headquarters. Up to this time, the site had been under Muslim control. The only religious buildings on the hill were al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock (covering the rock from which Muhammad began his journey heavenward). After the Christians took over the site, they ignored the Muslim significance of the buildings, calling them instead the Temple of Solomon and the Temple of the Lord respectively, a powerful example of inventive memory. Bernard, who was the chief preacher of the Second Crusade, was very glad to help prop up the newly distinguished military order. He not only wrote *De Laude Novae Militiae [In Praise of the New Knighthood]*; he also helped write the seventy-two rules of the order.[79]

As Benedicta Ward, William Paulsell, and others have shown, Bernard perhaps more than any other patristic writer has been viewed as a proto-Protestant. John Wyclif cites Bernard often in his tract against papal power. Chaucer's humble Parson invokes Bernard frequently. And all the major spokespersons for the sixteenth-century English church were also steeped in Bernard: Cranmer, Whitgift, Grindal, Hooker, Becon, and

[79] For the sensational downfall of the order amid accusations of heresy and debauchery, see Read 266-301. "From the time of their trial," though, "opinion was divided on whether or not they had really committed the crimes ascribed to them" (302). Thus, like the House of Busirane, not only the Temple of Solomon, but also its champions, are a site of contestation. Another good recent history of the order is that by Malcolm Barber.

Jewell. Lancelot Andrewes, Spenser's fellow student at Pembroke, also liked to quote Bernard.[80] Even Harvey cites Bernard in superlative company: "Mans will no safe rule, as Aristotle sayth; good Homer sometime sleepeth; S. Augustine was not ashamed of his retractations; S. Bernard saw not all thinges" (Smith ii.247). Even to cite Bernard alongside Aristotle, Homer, and Augustine suggests his stature. And to claim that he "saw not all thinges" sounds very much like a weak protest against what must have been a common judgement: Bernard saw all things. As Gregory Schweers notes, even the recusant poet Robert Southwell called on Bernard in his writings as a ploy to garner support from the Protestant regime. When being sent to the Tower, Southwell requested two books: the Bible and the works of Bernard (Schweers 159). John Panke, in a treatise published in 1618, regards both Bernard and Gregory the Great as proto-Protestant voices.

Cistercianism, always associated with its early abbot Bernard, thrived in England up to the dissolution. In Lancashire, possible ancestral home of Spenser, there were two monasteries, Whalley and Sawley -- both Cistercian.[81] The order was so robust that it had a college in Oxford: the pre-dissolution incarnation of St. John's College was Bernard's College, a place for Cistercian monks to study (Hopkins 9; Catto and Evans *passim*).

There were around a dozen continental editions of Bernard's works in the sixteenth century, including a 1547 Paris edition now held by Spenser's Pembroke College (though, as my email conversations with the current librarian have indicated,

[80] See "Bernard (St), abbot of Clairvaux" in Gough's index to the Parker Society publications.
[81] Richard Rambuss writes, "Spenser's father may have been John Spenser, a weaver from Lancashire" (15).

probably not acquired until 1599). A biographical note in Bateman's augmented version of Bartholomew's encyclopedic *De Proprietatibus Rerum* gives an overview of the Bernardine canon for late sixteenth-century English readers:

> *Bernard,* was borne in *Burgondy,* in the Castle of *Fountaynes,* of noble lygnage, he became a Muncke in the Monestarie of *Clareuallencis,* gaue himselfe to studie, and wrote diuers Bookes, as *De Consideratione*, *ad Eugenium Papam*, *De Cantica canticorum*, *De amore Dei*, *Librum meditacionum*, and manye other Homelies, Epistles and Sermons. He was about *Anno. 1112.* and lyued to the yeares of *63*. After the *Legenda,* de- / ceased *Anno. 1156.* (Bateman ¶iir/v)

That some of these writings provide an intertext for sixteenth-century English literature is an idea that has been put forward in the past. Prescott's work, including that with Susie Sutch, on the relationship between Bateman's *The trauayled pylgrime* (1569) and its continental predecessors has shown that Bernard's allegorical treatment of the Prodigal Son in *Parabola I, De pugna spirituali* is the source of the characters and plot of these later stories. In Bernard's *First Parable*, they write, "man's pilgrimage on earth is merged with and symbolically represented by the story of the prodigal son," the kind of narrative later picked up "in some ways [by] Books I and II of Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*" (284). Also, Noam Flinker's work on Canticles in the seventeenth century, though it does not mention the abbot of Clairvaux, inevitably implicates Bernard's allegorical exegesis of the work. And George Scheper and Stanley Stewart, writing on the same subject, do name Bernard.

Though Bernard was the most powerful Catholic abbot of the twelfth century, counting as personal friends two popes, he was also reform-minded. In the theoretical and practical debates between the black monks of Cluny and the white monks of Cîteaux, Bernard wrote an impassioned defense of his view denouncing what he saw as Cluniac indulgence in art and Epicureanism: "I shall say nothing," he writes, "about the soaring heights and extravagant lengths and unnecessary widths of the churches, nothing about their expensive decorations and novel images, which catch the attention of those who go in to pray, and dry up their devotion" ("Apologia" 63-64). Bernard theorized that attention given to narrative or pictorial representations could obstruct one's contemplation of the unrepresentable and ineffable God:

> What excuse can there be for these ridiculous monstrosities in the cloisters where the monks do their reading, extraordinary things at once beautiful and ugly? Here we find filthy monkeys and fierce lions, fearful centaurs, harpies, and striped tigers, soldiers at war, hunters blowing their horns. Here is one head with many bodies, there is one body with many heads. Over there is a beast with a serpent for its tail, a fish with an animal's head, and a creature that is horse in front and goat behind, and a second beast with horns and the rear of a horse. All round there is such an amazing variety of shapes that one could easily prefer to take one's reading from the walls instead of from a book. One could spend the whole day gazing fascinated at these things, one by one, instead of meditating on the law of God. ("Apologia" 66)

In polemically stark contrast, Bernard offered the ascetic principles of the Cistercian way of life and instituted the theories of meditation and contemplation that led Cistercians to adopt the austere, non-narrative, non-pictorial architectural decoration for which they are known. It is Bernard's careful thought about the utility of art that I believe becomes important to sixteenth-century aesthetic theories.[82]

The Cistercian commitment to an ascetic aesthetic was in practice always full of tensions. Bertrand Russell comments, wryly as usual, that "Fountains Abbey, in Yorkshire [which is one of the most majestic medieval ruins in all of Britain] is Cistercian--a remarkable work," he writes, "for men who thought all beauty of the Devil" (411). And Kilian Hufgard opens his investigation of the aesthetic of Bernard by calling attention to a similar paradox: "Ascetic or aesthete?" he asks. "Is it possible to reconcile these apparently paradoxical roles within a single personality?" (Hufgard 1). A similar question might be asked of the Protestant Spenser. But if the last half-century of Spenserian scholarship has taught us anything, it is that contradiction is an inherent feature of Spenser's work. The nature of *The Faerie Queene*'s thinking about art and ethics is no different.

Bernard's rationale for an ascetic aesthetic is in part that experienced Cistercian monks do not need images because they are experts at meditation, i.e. at creating mental images. And almost all of his sermons, letters, and treatises are addressed to clerics and monks, which we should bear in mind when trying to ascertain his ethical and aesthetic

[82] According to Minnis, "Warnings against the unbridled imagination are ubiquitous in the Middle Ages" (243). But, as I hope I have shown, the Templar ductus of Spenser's poem as well as the apparent ubiquity and influence of Bernard in sixteenth-century England establish Bernard as an especially important source for Spenser's thinking about the subject.

views. Indeed, it seems that Bernard saves space for the fact that novices and lay folk *need* images to set their minds to work on holy conversation. Carruthers, reading the story of the monk Isaac and the hermit Sarapion in John Cassian's *Conference* (from which she quotes), concludes that

> Those who pray most purely will not only "reject all representations of the divine and all that is of human shape" but will banish from their minds even the memory of words or actions, whatever mental form they may take. *But these [other] young monks are beginners, not yet among the* purissimi. (*Craft* 71, my emphasis)

The eventual banishment of such images is then, for Cassian, a further step in ethical growth. Bernard is acutely aware of these developmental stages as he opens his sermons on the *Song of Songs*:

> The instructions that I address to you, my brothers, will differ from those I should deliver to people in the world, at least the manner will be different. The preacher who desires to follow St Paul's method of teaching will give them milk to drink rather than solid food, and will serve a more nourishing diet to those who are spiritually enlightened. (*Song* 1)

In this passage, Bernard describes the Pauline development from limited and accommodated perspective to the strong wisdom that only comes through practice.[83]

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[83] The quotations from Bernard also impinge our understanding of Sidney's description, in the *Defence*, of the poet "freely ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit," thus creating "Heroes, Demigods, Cyclops, Chimeras, Furies, and such like" (78). It might appear that Sidney espouses a more Gothic aesthetic, but Bernard makes it clear that for trained monks, ornamentation is fine. So I think Sidney's emphasis on

Spenser contemplates a related question for a largely lay audience: how is the transition made from the images of art to one's own action? For the truly chaste, almost all earthly images are profane distractions from and distortions of God's kingdom, which for Bernard is contemplative, but for Spenser and his contemporaries is active. Nevertheless, Renaissance poets posit that these profane images can lead beyond themselves, making their role in the active life a positive one. Advanced readers, like the Renaissance readers that Dobranski and others have described, can leave these images behind because they have been moved (by these very images) to action. Spenser thus adopts an important medieval idea: that the images of art themselves function as signposts to their own abandonment. Minnis comments on the failure of memory and speech at the end of Dante's *Commedia*:

> The poem then ends, there being nothing more which can be said, imaged, or held in memory. When the *apex mentis* is reached the soul must leave behind the operations of those human faculties, no matter how elevated or inspired they may be. And herein lies the ultimate paradox of the psychologies of imagination and memory. Despite their perpetual battle with the forces of forgetfulness and oblivion, when they are working to the best of their ability *they must collude in the realisation of their own redundancy*. (274, my emphasis)

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fantastical imagination suggests, as I did in the last chapter, that Sidney is not writing for a novice audience; he is writing for sophisticated readers.

Luckily for poets though, no abandonment lasts forever. One can return to abandoned poems periodically for the emotional empowerment they once again induce.[84] The House of Busirane episode is a perfect example of this experiment -- an experiment that allows the novice a set of images as a kind of elementary ethical workbook, while also expecting him or her to come to the realization that such images must be left behind. Thus Britomart's actions and views in the House of Busirane are different in kind from Guyon's destruction of the Bower of Bliss at the end of Book II. If Guyon's act "lead[s] one to fundamental questions of Spenserian poetics" (Alpers, "Bower" 105), then the House of Busirane episode goes some way toward answering those questions.

After rescuing Amoret, Britomart walks back through the space of the House, but

> Returning back, those goodly rowmes, which erst
>
> She saw so rich and royally arayd,
>
> Now vanisht vtterly, and cleane subuerst
>
> She found, and all their glory quite decayd,
>
> That sight of such a chaunge her much dismayd. (III.xii.42)

Like the Bower of Bliss episode, this episode of disenchantment adopts an iconoclastic architectural stance, showing the House in a decayed and inglorious state. But the latter episode also employs this iconoclasm in a different and more complex way, since both Britomart's dismay and her relative lack of agency in the vanishing of the House contrast

[84] Spenser's poem itself suggests the eternal recurrence of the aesthetic, since in both earlier books and later ones it presents more artistic and architectural showpieces, such as the Bower of Bliss, the Temple of Venus, and the Temple of Isis. In the 1590 version of the poem, though, the House of Busirane is the last such structure. In the 1590 version, both the Bower of Bliss and the House of Busirane are destroyed or disappear, whereas the Temples of Venus and Isis, in Books IV and V, receive decidedly different treatments.

strongly with Guyon's "rigour pittilesse" and his active and violent destruction of the Bower. Britomart's reaction to the vanishing House is more muted and subtle. The poem suggests, with the indecisive position of "erst," that she has gained new epistemological ground: "Before Britomart saw the House as rich and royal, (now she sees it aright)." What the poem suggests with the final vanishing of the House of Busirane and all of its art is that the art of Spenser's poem might be expendable, but only after it has been gainfully used in the guided thinking of the reader. But this does not exclude a certain aesthetic wonderment. Britomart is "dismayd" by the vanished House, but the poem has been at pains to make it apparent that this dismay is now registered on a different level than Britomart's earlier curatorial impulse. Britomart seems to miss the art, but, unlike its treatment of Guyon, the poem situates Britomart's greatest task (to marry Artegall and procreate a line of English rulers) beyond the House of Busirane, beyond Book III, and ultimately, altogether beyond the bounds of the poem.

Much like readers of the poem, Britomart leaves the House and enters the world. Spenser is an unexpected precursor of Wittgenstein in this regard, the vanishing of the House of Busirane foreshadowing the paradox of the penultimate statement of the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*: "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: he who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them -- as steps -- to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it)" (74).[85] Spenser's poem works in much the same way

[85] Here Wittgenstein reprises the medieval figuration of ascent-through-contemplation as a ladder. Cf. Carruthers *Book of Memory*, p. 27.

that Wittgenstein's prose does: by anticipating, even encouraging its being put aside, though only after readers have used it in their deliberate movement toward personal thinking and real life. And like Wittgenstein, Spenser sets up the work that must be left behind as containing the steps of a ductus. Like proto-gothic imagery, both the House of Busirane and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* should be understood as elementary, though beautiful, workbooks to be left behind once the novice has become more adept. The poem's paradoxical ductus through art to the end of art shows a poet thinking deeply about a key concern of his age: the desire for an ethical aesthetics that moves beyond the world of the poem, and from *gnosis* to *praxis*.

The stance toward art that the House of Busirane episode implies is more balanced, even paradoxical, than any straightforwardly iconoclastic reading can allow. This is the point made by Guenther's claim that "The art of Spenser's magicians [including Busirane] is less mimetic than it is instrumental" ("Spenser's Magic" 195). Spenser's "instrumental aesthetics" supposes that the episode and its magnificent and magical artworks play an important role in the meditational practice of its readers, and thus entails a rethinking of the roles of idolatry and iconoclasm in the poem and in the world Spenser knew. Gregerson has argued that epic poets like Spenser and Milton had to work in specific ways to differentiate their poems from the idolatrous, so as to justify their existence. I am arguing instead that Spenser's poem might be making an argument for the efficacy of an idol properly used, even if in the end it must be disenchanted. As Minnis writes, "The fact that all images must ultimately be left behind in the soul's journey to God . . . does not, however, render them worthless" (257).

Spenser's Bernardine aesthetic is, like most everything else in his poetry, riddled with contradiction and paradox. The House of Busirane episode suggests that Spenser is situating it as a developmental stage, in the Bernardine sense. Bernard, as we saw above, made a distinction between audiences, making a point that the Cistercian ascetic aesthetic is designed for monks, while people of the world may need more aesthetic accommodation. Britomart's movement from aesthetic wonder to worldly quest showcases the developmental transition from such accommodating use of art to a wiser askesis that is enacted *through* and only *after* aesthesis. The poem thus evinces a poet closely attentive to the dynamic interplay of literature and ethics. Teskey has argued, "Spenser is not primarily a narrative poet but a poet whose main concern is to think" ("Mutabilitie" 108). If Teskey is right, then Spenser's thinking about aesthetics and ethics, I suggest, is acute in the House of Busirane episode at the end of Book III, where the technique of ductus produces a Bernardine meditation on the way that art nurtures the ethical thinking of its readers.

Whereas Teskey sees Spenser as a poet who thinks, whose *métier* is "poetic thinking" ("Stranger" 358), I have tried to show how Spenser's poem is ultimately designed to support the thinking of its readers. That is why, as Lauren Silberman has shown, reading *The Faerie Queene* is not a "pointless, boring activity," but a "worthy activity" (*Transforming* 1).[86] But Teskey is right that the subject of this thinking, at least in the House of Busirane, is "an encounter between persons, or, as we call them,

[86] Silberman actually takes a position somewhere between Teskey and me when she claims that the thinking of *The Faerie Queene* "is the *shared* enterprise of writer and reader who join in the quest" (5). My own position, as the horse analogy of Chapter 1 makes clear, is less stridently focused exclusively on readers than my emphasis on readerly ductus in this chapter sometimes suggests.

personifications" ("Stranger" 348). "[T]hinking in *The Faerie Queene*," he writes, "is not a thinking about objects, a conscious reflection directed towards unconscious things. Thinking in *The Faerie Queene* is an intersubjective encounter between persons, where one mind engages with and responds to another, and neither mind achieves a 'grasp' of the situation in its totality" ("Stranger" 348). "Thinking is to be understood as an encounter with the strange as a stranger" ("Stranger" 344). Perhaps nothing is stranger in Spenser's poetry than the scene that Britomart encounters, along with her readers, in the House of Busirane. And therefore, if Teskey is right that strangeness is the catalyst of Spenserian poetic thinking, then Spenser's machine for thinking is well oiled in that episode. Thus, as a place for readers to practice use, rather than a poem to be interpreted, the House of Busirane episode will no doubt continue to allow readers to think, remember, and move in ways that are simultaneously unique and common. In the following chapter, I will explore in some detail how one "intersubjective encounter between persons," one shared but individual reading of the ductus might proceed.

Chapter 3

Moving from Art to Life in the House of Busirane

> Or why doe not faire pictures like powre shew,
> In which oftimes, we Nature see of Art
> Exceld, in perfect limming euery part? (Spenser, "An Hymne in Honour of Beautie," lines 82-84)

> What child is there, that, coming to a play, and seeing *Thebes* written in great letters upon an old door, doth believe that it is Thebes? (Sidney, *Defence* 103)

> It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have *something*--a form--in common with it. (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus* 2.022)

In the previous chapter, I argued that the House of Busirane episode of *The Faerie Queene* provides a space for readers to participate in a ductus, which Carruthers has recently described as "the experience of artistic form as an ongoing, dynamic process rather than . . . the examination of a static or completed object" ("Concept" 190). And I further argued that, like Wittgenstein's ladder, this ductus seems to point beyond the poem to the real world, thus providing an example of the movement from *gnosis* to *praxis*

that Sidney writes about in his *Defence of Poetry*. What I have not done yet is *show* a concrete version of how the House of Busirane episode might *actually* be used in accordance with the ductus it sets up. It *might* actually be used in any number of ways; that is part of its pragmatic appeal. But to make such possibilities apparent, it will be helpful to elaborate one such example. In the chapter that follows I do just that, arguing that the episode provides, among other things, a ductus for thinking about one of the most difficult and fascinating problems for both Elizabethan writers and contemporary philosophers: the relation between fictional and real persons.

In the House of Busirane, readers pass through a series of ecphrases of tapestry, statuary, gold work, and masque. These ecphrases, or verbal descriptions of visual works of art, are primary features of a ductus that leads readers through a thought experiment about personhood. In the House of Busirane, the tapestries present basically two-dimensional representations of inhuman gods and only slightly human mortals. With the statue of Cupid and the gold reliefs, the poem moves to three-dimensionality and its accompanying sense of greater reality. With the masque, the poem gives us mobile characters, though we are still aware of their strange status *as* characters, symbols, and personages. The art objects in the episode are placed and described in ways that problematize the relation of self to other by raising difficult questions about the relation of fictional entity to actual entity. What the episode helps readers to consider, as it journeys through scepticism about fictions, is the degree to which the epistemology of everyday interaction is similar to getting to know fictions. Readers like Nadya O. Chishty-Mujahid approach Britomart, like Maurice Morgann's Falstaff, as a real human

with real human psychology, a mode that has produced countless productive readings. Others, like Paul Hecht, take up the poem's invitation to see Britomart as allegorical, and to treat the House of Busirane episode as one in which "the durability of inner character is being probed" (8).[87] Horace writes that "ficta voluptatis causa sint proxima veris" 'pleasing fictions should be close to the real,'[88] and some of Spenser's most pleasing fictions are pleasing exactly because they question the dichotomy of real and fictive.[89] One way to use the ductus the episode provides, then, is as an intellectual exercise about the philosophical problems of fiction as they relate to interpersonal ethics. These problems were adumbrated at the beginning of the last chapter, where the form(ality) of Scudamour's complaints served as a reminder of the constructed veneer of fictional personhood. The ductus of the House of Busirane episode continues to develop this hint of a tension between art and life much more fully.

1. Moving Through the House of Busirane

As Carruthers has thoroughly shown, architectural spaces (both built and unbuilt) such as the House of Busirane offer paths for rhetorical movement and thought. Visualizations of the Temple of Solomon and other similar liturgical spaces make this

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[87] Hecht's paper compares meditations on character in Jane Austen's *Persuasion* to similar meditations in Spenser's work. "Everything leading up to this point [in *Persuasion*], however, in the way the novel presents people as multi-layered objects of interest, presents the terrible costs of remaining fixed against the flux of change, and the terror of finding cold fixity where one hoped for living, changing humanity—this is a Spenserian sort of meditation on character" (10). Note Hecht's "multi-layered objects of interest" are similar to what I will call in the next section "objects of concern."

[88] *Ars poetica* 338.

[89] This is one of the abiding concerns of *The Faerie Queene* as a whole. The narratives of Florimell and false Florimell explicitly call attention to the sometimes problematic attempt to distinguish between the real and the fake, for example.

clear. Consider more closely Koberger's 1481 engraving of the Temple,[90] to which he has added an engraved line that suggests the route of someone walking through the building. Koberger's engraving makes clear that the Temple is not meant to be a static wonder; it is meant to create the possibility of human movement. A more elaborate example of the depiction of the movements that a liturgical space makes possible is a drawing of the abbey of Centula-St.-Riquier, including the routes of a dual procession.[91] In such a procession, the walkers make choices about where to turn, where to go forward, where to pause, but the choices are limited and directed by the disposition of the building, the artifacts within it, and the liturgical instructions. Such liturgical movements parallel the dual nature of the ductus that Spenser's poem provides: it is equal part determined and free. The author determines the objects in the house; readers cannot change the space or the objects themselves. But readers are free to choose a path through this space. Like the objects and pathways in a large cathedral, the elements of the House of Busirane might be approached through any number of routes.

From the beginning of the episode, Britomart's actions are described in ways that emphasize such routes. At the castle gate, the flaming fire forces Britomart and Scudamour "their *forward footing* to reuoke" (III.xi.21; my emphasis). In other words, the fire impedes their ductus. A few lines later, Britomart asks Scudamour to reveal "what *course* of you is safest dempt" (III.xi.23; my emphasis). Through Britomart's question, Spenser suggests that readers, too, will need to find a safe path through their

[90] Reproduced in Girouard, *Town and Country* 190.
[91] Reproduced in Carruthers, *Craft of Thought* 267.

reading experience. This is partly because both Britomart and Scudamour are linked to readers in the way they are presented, the impatience of Scudamour contrasted to the patience of Britomart. "With huge impatience he inly swelt" (III.xi.27), whereas "she there wayted vntill euentyde" (III.xi.55). When taken with Britomart's many instances of reading in the episode (e.g., "she oft and oft it ouer-red" [III.xi.50]), the respective patience and impatience of the characters might be interpreted as two different kinds of readers: those who impatiently grab for meaning, and those who patiently wait for the useful path. This is akin to the distinction that Bernard makes between the novice and trained monk. Novices can be distracted by elaborate artwork because they impatiently and intemperately interpret them. The sparse Cistercian style was meant to counter these impulses. Only a truly patient and experienced reader can enter a Gothic cathedral, Bernard seems to suggest, and make it out with his soul intact.[92] Spenser's poem makes a similar point by implying paradoxically, but significantly, that impatient readers get nowhere while patient readers move very quickly indeed. Britomart, the patient reader, "passed, as a thonder bolt" through the fiery gate and into the House (III.xi.25), while Scudamour, the impatient reader, "backe retire[d], all scorcht and pitifully brent" (III.xi.26). Because Scudamour stays outside the House, Britomart becomes a model for readers within the House, as many Spenserians have noted before.[93] Yet strangely, since she is supposedly a surrogate for readers, Britomart becomes oddly transparent because

[92] See Bernard's "Apologia to Abbot William," quoted and discussed in the previous chapter.
[93] Wofford, "Gendering," claims that "Britomart serves as a reader who is urged by Busyrane in his inscriptions to be bold but not too bold in her interpretations" (10); "Britomart stands in the same place as the reader" (12). Silberman, *Transforming*, claims that "In the House of Busirane, Britomart plays the role of militantly active reader" (58).

the narrative does not refer to her, after stanza 27, for over 21 stanzas, leaving readers to find their own ways. Britomart's absence from the narration of large portions of the House of Busirane episode is an important fact of the poem that has not been emphasized in either older or more current interpretations of the episode. As I will show, this absence means a lot for what the poem suggests about its own utility.

Many important interpretations of the House of Busirane episode over the last half-century, such as those by Harry Berger, Jr., Wofford, Sheila Cavanagh, Silberman and others, have focused on the ramifications of Spenser's psychological and anti-Petrarchan sexual ideology.[94] Several have questioned the applicability of psychology to literary character, including Wofford, who argues that Britomart resists the figuration of the poet surrogate, Busirane. These suggestions provide good foundations for the investigation I pursue in this chapter. But there is also a robust tradition in Spenser studies of thinking about the house in other ways. Judith Anderson's idea of a house of rhetoric and Guenther's argument for an "instrumental aesthetics," for example, both seek to redress an imbalance that has privileged the psychology of Britomart and Amoret over

[94] Roche's interpretation concentrates on "Amoret's mind," "Amoret's mental attitude," and "Renaissance love psychology" ("Challenge" 341). Though his reading of the episode remains substantially the same, Roche softens its emphasis somewhat when it is reprinted in *The Kindly Flame*. There he calls the episode "extremely problematical" and, in a footnote, seems to warn against "reading the allegory as psychological realism" (73). The House of Busirane has also received much commentary, much of it psychological character criticism, from Berger through the years: "The masculine mind wounded first by desire and then by jealousy and envy: this is the center of the emotional and psychological experience visualized by Spenser as Busirane's house and depicted in the concluding two cantos of Book III of *The Faerie Queene*" ("Busirane" 99). Spenser's "'world picture' exists primarily as a function of the changing psychic development of the major characters" (*Revisionary Play* 23). The exposition of the anti-Petrarchan theme in the House of Busirane episode goes back at least as far as C. S. Lewis's *Allegory of Love*, where he reads Books III and IV as "the final defeat of courtly love by the romantic conception of marriage" (298). This strand of criticism continues in the brilliant work of Silberman, who, again, reads the House of Busirane episode as an expression of "Spenser's critique of Petrarchan poetics" ("Singing" 263).

readers' use of the astonishingly clever ecphrastic treatment of the artwork in the house.[95] Significantly for my own interpretation of poetic ductus, Cavanagh claims that the tapestries "remain more available for interpretation by readers than for comprehension by Britomart" (156). This, Jane Grogan claims, is Spenser's major revision of Sidneian poetics. She writes, "Spenser distances himself from the relatively passive model of readership inherent in Sidney's Platonic poetics to demand instead a more active and responsible reader to collaborate in the process of making meaning" (16). Though I disagree with Grogan's dismissal of Sidney's *Defence* as essentially passive, her sense of Spenser's goals is correct. But these two kinds of reading, the character-based and the reader-based, the aesthetic and the ethical, might be enlisted in an argument that is important for both. Thus, in this chapter, I will present one example of how a reader might collaborate in the process of making a poetic episode and its characters more useful.

Among the books of Spenser's encyclopedic poem, Book III is conspicuously concerned with art. The proem calls attention to the art of the "life-resembling pencil" (III.proem.2).[96] Anderson has written that the shared syllable in the names of Britomart

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[95] Anderson argues that "the first two rooms in the House of Busirane consist of rhetorical 'places' or topoi familiar both to Spenser's heroine Britomart and to his contemporary readers" ("Busirane's Place" 112). Guenther argues for a renewed appreciation of the relation of Spenserian poesis to magic, which she says is "less mimetic than instrumental" ("Spenser's Magic" 195). "[H]is own aesthetics," she writes, "are explicitly instrumental," and "their claim to instrumentality occupies the same discursive field as magical claims to occult efficacy" ("Spenser's Magic" 196). See also Guenther's dissertation, "Magical Imaginations, or Instrumental Aesthetics from Sidney to Shakespeare." Roche writes, "The description of these tapestries is one of Spenser's greatest poetic achievements; his mastery of the stanza never once falters" ("Challenge" 343).

[96] Each proem, we might say, has a disciplinary concern. Book I: epic song; Book II: historiography; Book III: aesthetics; Book IV: the art of love; Book V: astronomy/astrology; Book VI: courtesy and virtue. Though concern with art is present in every book of Spenser's poem, only Book III's proem explicitly

and Artegall is a "coincidence implying both concord in the eventual union and androgynous potential within each individually" ("Artegall" 62). But the shared syllable of *Britom-art-egall* also cabbalistically suggests the aesthetic interests of Book III. Artistic objects are strewn throughout the book: the architecture, tapestries, and music of Castle Joyeous, for example, and the sculpted landscape of the Gardins of Adonis. But it is in the last two cantos (III.xi-xii) that Spenser's thought experiment about art culminates. In these two cantos, readers are presented a *copia artium* of architecture, inscription, tapestry, statuary, gold work, and theater. In the previous chapter, I suggested some possible ramifications of the architecture of the building. Now it is time to consider the objects in the building.

The impressive collection of art in the House of Busirane is reminiscent of those that decorated the estates of European aristocrats, such as that of the palace of Urbino as Castiglione describes it. Duke Federico, he writes, "furnished it not only with what is customary, such as silver vases, wall hangings of the richest cloth of gold, silk, and other like things, but for ornament he added countless ancient statues of marble and bronze, rare paintings, and musical instruments of every sort" (13-14). In England, the palace of Nonsuch in Surrey (begun 1538, demolished c. 1687) was "richly adorned and set forth and garnished with a variety of pictures and other antick forms of excellent art and workmanship," according to the survey of 1650. John Evelyn, visiting the house in 1666, notes the "plaster statues and bass relievos." Moreover, Evelyn describes "mezzo-relievos

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theorizes that concern. And just as the historiographical proem of Book II sets up the genealogical culmination of that Book; the aesthetic proem of Book III prepares readers for the house of art at the end of the book.

as big as the life, [in which] the storie is of the Heathen Gods."[97] The House of Busirane thus represents a *pinacotheca*, the Latin term for an art gallery brought into English in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and used by Thomas Cooper, Henry Wotton, and Evelyn, among others.[98] Britomart's worries about the art mark her as what today would be recognized as a budding museum curator: "Straunge thing it seem'd, that none was to possesse / So rich purveyance, ne them keepe with carefulnesse" (III.xi.53). The House of Busirane cantos also abound in stanzaic rhymes that hint at this important theme: *art*, *smart*, *hart*, *dart*, *pervart*, *desart*, *part*, *dispart*.[99] And there are artful puns as well: the opening stanza of the episode says of Fowle Gealosy, "Of all the passions in the mind thou vilest art" (III.xi.1), the copula *art* punningly foreshadowing the "vile Enchaunter," Busirane, "figuring straunge characters of his art" (III.xii.31).

Sidney explicitly avers that *ut pictura poesis* in *A Defence of Poetry*: "Poesy therefore is an art of imitation, . . . to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture" (79-80). And Spenser draws a connection between the visual artist and the poet when he refers to Apelles, "the Chian Peincter," in both the 17th dedicatory sonnet and in *The Faerie Queene* IV.v.12. Even more than Apelles, writes Spenser, "me needs to draw the semblant trew, / Of beauties Queene" (Dedicatory Sonnet 17). In the proem to Book III, Spenser, while claiming that poets surpass painters in the depiction of beauty, draws attention to the proximity of their arts. And Spenser does not limit the parallel between poets and visual artists to painters. In the proem to Book III, Spenser compares his poetry

[97] The quotes from the survey of 1650 and from Evelyn are taken from Summerson 34.
[98] See Cooper, s.v. "Pinacotheca," and "Pinacotheca" in *OED*, 3rd. ed. W. B. C. Watkins writes, "Spenser's House of Busyrane, like his earlier Castle Joyous, is an art gallery" (223).
[99] See for example III.xi.1, 30, 36, and 44; III.xii.16, 21, 28, 31, and 38.

not only to the painting of Zeuxis but also to the sculpture of Praxiteles. Moreover, the weaver of tapestries often figures as a double for the poet. In Dedicatory Sonnet 10, Spenser says his "rude rymes" have been "roughly wrought in an vnlearned Loome." Such a connection between the plastic and literary arts, along with the artistic edifices and objects of Book III, is perhaps what led the fictional Southey of Walter Savage Landor's *Imaginary Conversations* to describe Spenser's poem itself as "a spacious but somewhat low chamber, hung with rich tapestry, on which the figures are mostly disproportioned, but some of the faces are lively and beautiful; the furniture is part creaking and worm-eaten, part fragrant with cedar and sandalwood and aromatic gums and balsams; every table and mantelpiece and cabinet is covered with gorgeous vases, and birds, and dragons, and houses in the air" (Landor 204). It is inviting to follow Landor and read the tapestries in the House of Busirane as allegories of poetic text, as the tapestries' allusions to the literary text of Ovid also suggest.

So if Book III is partly the book of the art of love, it is also the book of the love of art. The elaborate artworks inside the House of Busirane and the correspondingly elaborate description by Spenser have received much commentary in the history of Spenser scholarship. Critics have taken up various stances toward the tapestries, gold work, and altar of the house. Most make essentially negative claims about the artwork, emphasizing the paralyzing effect they seem to have on Britomart.[100] Page Dubois writes, “In his description of the works of art in *The Faerie Queene*, he demonstrates rhetorical brilliance while at the same time he condemns the brilliance and the works of art it

[100] See Oram 59-60.

describes" (74-75). Depicting as it does sinister forms of eros, the art inside the house is often coupled with the house itself, so that the vanishing of the idolatrous castle is taken as proof of the worthlessness of the art inside it, a view that I think needs to be reconsidered. I would like to do so by explaining how its readers might put the poem to positive use.

Specifically, I show in the following sections that the House of Busirane episode of *The Faerie Queene* presents readers with a ductus through a series of encounters with persons. The ecphrastic descriptions of Busirane's house progress from the least life-like, mostly two-dimensional figures in the tapestries of the first room, to the mostly static three-dimensional figures of the gold work and the statue of Cupid, and then to the animated three-dimensional figures in the Masque of Cupid. But the masquers are themselves wraith-like allegories, not human persons. Finally, in the inner chamber of Busirane's unholy temple, Britomart meets her lively counterpart, Amoret, and the vile magician Busirane himself. But though life-*like*, these three characters are themselves, as James Joyce would write, "signs on a white field," specters of literary imagination rather than "real-life" humans (Joyce 40). If the progression from non-living to living is to continue, then the poem must allow readers to make a final leap from representation to reality, from character to person, from fiction to world. Spenser's poem thus presents a complex and rhetorically structured thought experiment about literary character and personhood, which has implications for the ability of fictional literature to move its real-life readers. Alastair Fowler has detected a "programme of climactic involvement" in the house's tapestries, but I think the entire house and all of its art objects provide a more

expanded such program (*Realism* 90). Silberman notices, as do I, that "Busirane's artworks become increasingly three-dimensional and lifelike" (*Transforming* 65). In the first room, the poem represents tapestry alongside a particularly lifelike statue of Cupid. But already in this first room, the dimensions of reality and the degrees of personhood are unstable, called into question.

Tapestries are commonly considered to be two-dimensional works of art, valued for their surface image in much the same way as paintings or murals. But Rebecca Olson points out the bias in such two-dimensional conceptualizations of these material art forms:

> The discovery several years ago at the Cloisters Museum in New York that a lined sixteenth-century unicorn tapestry in their collection was actually double-sided, the original colors intact on its reverse side, thrilled many: we might see the brittle lining that obscured the back of the tapestry from Metropolitan Museum of Art curators for over sixty years as analogous to a larger blind spot, one that prevents us from thinking of tapestries as two-sided, three-dimensional works of art. (2-3)

In an article about digitally photographing the reverse side of the Cloisters tapestry, Richard Preston focuses on the mathematical computations necessary to properly visualize the 200 CDs of numerical data that the digital cameras captured. The two mathematicians enlisted for this duty, David and Gregory Chudnovsky, ran into problems when they realized that during the photography, the tapestry was actually moving, which made it nearly impossible to piece together the images properly. "'We found out that a

tapestry is a three-dimensional structure,' Gregory went on. 'It's made from interlocked loops of wool.' 'The loops move and change,' David said. 'The tapestry is like water,' Gregory said. 'Water has no permanent shape'" (Preston). The mathematicians' descriptions brilliantly bring to light the instability and liveliness of the tapestries that Spenser presents to his readers. Olson writes, "As Marina Belozerskaya has pointed out, the life-size images on quality tapestries would have seemed very animated in the late sixteenth-century: hung away from the wall, they would have swung slightly, their bright threads glimmering in candlelight" (2).[101] Ultimately, there is no completely satisfying answer as to whether we should consider tapestries two- or three-dimensional, since they seem to partake in both dimensional schemes when viewed in different ways. But the puzzle itself encourages readers to think, and jumpstarts the intellectual path through the ductus of the episode.[102]

Spenser thus continues a literary tradition of ecphrasis that is useful in the way it moves characters and readers to understand important facts about the world in which they must practice their ethical postures. As Alessandro Barchiesi writes, "[T]he topic of ecphrasis [is relevant] to a number of concerns of recent criticism," particularly "three

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[101] Olson refers to Belozerskaya, *Luxury Arts of the Renaissance* (Los Angeles: Paul Getty Museum, 2005), 95. On the distinction between two- and three-dimensional works of art, compare the "pictura inani," the murals of Virgil's Temple of Dido. Seemingly more two-dimensional than the tapestries in the House of Busirane, actually the murals create some of the same problems as Spenser's tapestries. Murals, of course, are three-dimensional insofar as no wall surface is perfectly flat. Because the notions of multi-dimensionality and flatness are routinely applied to characters, Spenser's ductus through various kinds of art is also ripe as a thought experiment about both literary character and personhood in general.

[102] Spenser's use of the multi-dimensional art form of tapestry in the poem's ductus thus is an example of how "he seeks to interrogate the privileged forms of visuality of his own culture, and the visual terms in which they figured learning and knowledge. Even as he subscribes to and exploits the affective resources of those visual terms, Spenser simultaneously renders the tacit visual operations of Renaissance epistemology and pedagogy as poetic images to be scrutinised in turn" (Grogan 9).

major issues: the limits of narrative, the dimension of reflexivity, and the various approaches to realism and representation" (272). Spenser's episode provides a ductus for readers by brilliantly investigating the effect that visual art has upon characters, which is an important element of the Western epic tradition.

In placing such artistic objects of concern in front of Britomart, Spenser is following a long epic tradition. As Burrow writes, Spenser's "love of impacted allusions, tales within tales, ecphrastic descriptions of pictures and places, does not set him in a dream-world apart from other classically inspired Elizabethan writers: it shows that he is the inspiring central presence in late sixteenth-century English classicism" ("Spenser" 220). Specifically, through the figure of ecphrasis Spenser introduces the classical topos of the epic hero contemplating artistic objects with concerned attention.

Concern is one of the fundamental values, both ethical and aesthetic, of Western epic. Voltaire, for example, in his essay on epic poetry, worries that the *Iliad* gives readers no reason to have "tender concern" for Achilles (29).[103] Rather, Voltaire claims, readers' more natural concern for the besieged Priam, Hecuba, Hector, and Andromache undermines the supposedly Greco-centric narrative (29). Far from being a passing interest, Voltaire's suggestions about concern are part of a tradition in the epic genre itself. I believe we can better understand the use of this tradition in Spenser's poem by borrowing the term "object of concern" from Robert Roberts, a philosopher of emotion who has defined emotions as "concern-based construals" (64). According to Roberts, if we have a *concern* for a person's well-being, then we would *construe* a gun pointed at

[103] Voltaire's *Essay on Epick Poetry* was composed in England, in English.

him or her in a fearful or perhaps angry way. In such an example there are at least two objects of concern: the gun, and the person in danger. Roberts is not always clear on what the object of concern of a particular emotion is. But rather than pinpoint one object, we might think of an environment of concern (the gun, bullets, the person in danger, bystanders, the weather). We might think of these objects, I suggest, as having a prepositional relation to the resulting emotion: I am scared *of* the gun; I am worried *for* the targeted person; I am horrified *at* the situation. The objects of concern are the grammatical objects of the prepositions following verbal phrases about feeling. In my own argument, these feelings are confined to the emotional in a sense stricter than Roberts's, because of the particular early modern valence of the locution, including the more general "is moved by," as seen in Chapter 1. So when I say the poem presents objects of concern, I mean the objects are there in order to propose moving, though the resulting motions are undetermined and unpredictable, both in Britomart and in her readers. The ductus that the episode embodies is fundamentally one about objects of concern -- primarily fictional, artistic objects. From the mirage of Artegall in Merlin's mirror to the apparently human physicality of Amoret's body, Book III presents readers with a series of object encounters designed to precipitate ethical thinking. The ductus that allows for this thinking consists in the gradually changing ontological status of the objects of concern.[104]

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[104] What I have in mind here is echoed by Bobbyann Roesen (Anne Barton) in an essay on Shakespeare's *Love's Labour's Lost*: "There are, of course, huge *differences in the reality of* the people who walk and speak together within the limits of the royal park. From the *artificial* and virtually indistinguishable figures of Dumain and Longaville, never really more than fashionable voices, the *scale of reality* rises gradually towards Berowne, in whom the *marriage of a certain remote and fantastic quality with the delightful*

Not all ecphrases involve the observations of characters. For example, the most famous ecphrasis is Homer's description of the shield of Achilles, but Homer does not describe Achilles looking at the shield. Epic ecphrases that include the epic character as a viewer include the scene early in the *Aeneid* where Aeneas views “artificumque manus inter se operumque laborem” ‘the art of their hands and the works of their toil’ (1.455) in the Temple of Juno in Dido's Carthage. The Temple murals mainly describe war and heroism, thus creating a foil for Aeneas's love-interest in Dido. These “pictura inani” ‘inanimate pictures’ (1.464) make Aeneas “stupet obtutuque haeret defixus in uno” ‘remain stuck, staring in amazement with one fixed gaze’ (1.495), pulling for a moment out of his fixation on Dido, for whom he waits in the grove. Though Virgil is not explicit in calling attention to such development in Aeneas, he allows us to read Aeneas's later decision to leave Dido as a result of this ecphrastic reminder of his heroic calling. Virgil tells us that Aeneas "feasts his soul on the unsubstantial portraiture, sighing oft, and his face wet with a flood of tears" (1.464-65), making explicit the emotion caused by the objects. Alastair Fowler goes so far as to claim that Aeneas's "highly charged response is more salient in Virgil than the spatial disposition of the murals themselves" (*Realism* 77).

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realism which first recognized the flaws in the Academe reflects the comedy as a whole, and reaches its apogee in the *utter substantiality* and prosaic charm of Constable Dull, who could never in any sense be accused of retreating into *unreality*, or affecting an elegant pose. Again and again, *characters from different levels along this scale* are grouped into scenes in a manner that helps to maintain the delicate balance of the play world; thus in the first scene, with the incredible idea of the Academe and the sophisticated dialogue of Berowne and Longaville, Costard and the bewildered Dull are employed in much the same way that the mocking voice of the cuckoo is in the glowing spring landscape of the closing song, *to keep the play in touch with a more familiar and real world, as well as to indicate the ultimate victory of reality over artifice and illusion*" (414, my emphases). Teskey writes, "Meaning in *The Faerie Queene* is like meaning in life: it is always entangled with the real" ("Thinking Moments," 111).

Though St. George in Book I of *The Faerie Queene* might have been Spenser's wry attempt at Virgilian "Georgic," Britomart is the most Virgilian of Spenser's heroes and heroines.[105] There is ample evidence that the poetry of Virgil closely informs the Britomart matter of Book III. A large portion of the beginning of Britomart's dynastic quest is based upon *Ciris*, an epyllion now considered spurious but thought by Spenser and his contemporaries to be by a young Virgil.[106] In *Ciris*, the young maid Scylla falls in love with Cretan Minos, her father's enemy. Her love for Minos causes Scylla to become sick (lines 163-90). Many critics have noted Spenser's borrowing, but some important parallels between Scylla and Britomart have yet to be noted.[107] To begin, there is a kind of license given in the *Ciris* itself for poets to create new versions of Scylla's story: "namque alias alii vulgo finxere puellas, / quae Colophoniaco Scyllae dicantur Homero" 'For various writers have commonly substituted various maidens for the Scylla named by Colophon's Homer' (lines 64-65).[108] Thus Britomart is one in a long line of possible substitutions for the pseudo-Virgilian girl. Moreover, Scylla as allegorical personage is specifically mentioned in *Ciris*, when the poet mentions that some commentators on Homer say that Scylla is a vice, who "but portrays the sin of lust and love's incontinence" (line 69), just as, in opposite fashion, Spenser's "Legend of Chastity" seems to encourage

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[105] For the suggestion that Book I of *The Faerie Queene* is Spenser's georgic, see Neuse 614-15.
[106] See Burrow, "Spenser and Classical Traditions," 219-20. I quote from the poem found as part of the *Appendix Vergiliana* in volume 2 of the Loeb edition of Virgil's works.
[107] For some extended treatments of the parallels, see Nohrnberg, *Analogy* 446-47; and Burrow, "Spenser" 220-21. William Nelson quickly summarizes the most noticeable narratological parallels, and notes an important difference: "The pathetic interchange between the heroine of Chastity, Britomart, and her nurse Glauce is taken almost verbatim from that between Ciris, or Scylla, daughter of the King of Megara, and her nurse Carme in a poem attributed to Vergil. . . . [But Ciris] is as bad a girl as Spenser's Britomart is a good one, a symbol of lust as Britomart is of chastity" (142-43).
[108] "Colophon was one of the towns that vaunted itself the birthplace of Homer" (Lyne 130).

readers to see in Britomart, not a lively human, but a portrait of a virtue. Most interesting is the way that Spenser deploys one of the most important aspects of some tales about Scylla -- her metamorphosis. Virgil repeats the story of when

> the luckless maiden . . . beheld awful shapes coming into being about her: how often, alas! did she marvel and grow pale at her strange limbs! how often, alas! did she turn in terror from her own baying! but still, long afterwards, she exacted a penalty, for when his consort's beloved was riding upon the deep, she in her turn suffused the savage sea with a torrent of blood. (*Ciris* 71-76)

The story is, of course, about the transformation of the girl Scylla into the monster Scylla. But in Spenser's poem the transformation is puberty, Britomart's transformation from young girl into (biologically) mature woman. Even Britomart's "bleeding bowels" (III ii 39) appropriate the "torrent of blood" associated with Scylla's metamorphosis. Thus the legends of Scylla and Britomart are undeniably intertwined. But the evidence goes even beyond this. Curiously, the daughter of Virgil's Carme (Scylla's nurse) is Britomartis. But because Britomartis has been deified, Carme now thinks of Scylla as her substitute daughter. Carme calls Scylla "mea alumna," and Scylla calls herself "alumnae," the word for foster daughter. This pseudo-Virgilian source helps explain, I think, why Britomart in Spenser's poem does not have a mother, and also sheds light on the figure of Glauce in Spenser's poem, helping to emphasize the closeness of this nurse with this child. Though Spenser calls her Britomart's nurse, both the source and Spenser's narrative itself suggests the relation is more like foster-mother.

In the "Letter to Raleigh," Spenser explicitly names Aeneas as a source for his concept of heroism, when he writes that Virgil's "like intention [i.e., to fashion a "good gouernour and a vertuous man"] was to do in the person of Aeneas" (715). Specifically, there are obvious signs that Spenser has Aeneas in mind while composing the Britomart material. For example, though the magic mirror of canto ii was created by Merlin, and is thus related to the Arthurian matter of Britain, a Virgilian subtext lingers: in Froissart's *L'Espinette amoureuse* (1369), a magic mirror is "attributed to Virgil, who passed in the Middle Ages for a magician" (Pomel, "Du miroir-mire" 292, my translation). Spenser explicitly introduces the *Aeneid* into Britomart's legend in canto ix, when Paridell proclaims his Trojan ancestry. Along the way, Paridell gives a wonderful summary of Virgil's epic in just three stanzas (41-43), to which Britomart replies by invoking *translatio imperii* to show Paridell that Britain is the modern state of Aeneas' people. And, in the case of Britomart, there is a direct link between her person and that of Aeneas. For example, one of the most memorable aspects of Britomart is the way that her very long hair stands on end when she is frightened (III.xii.36). This trait is borrowed from Aeneas, whose hair twice stands on end: "obstipui, steteruntque comae et vox faucibus haesit" 'I was appalled, my hair stood up, and the voice choked in my throat' (2.774, 3.48). The first time, Aeneas is recounting his reaction to seeing the "infelix simulacrum atque ipsius umbra Creusae" 'the sad phantom and ghost of Creusa herself' (2.772). (Remember that Britomart's entire legend and journey is precipitated by the *simulacrum atque umbra* of Artegall.) The second time is when Aeneas discovers the gruesome, bloody trees of Polydorus's grave. These two instances are especially

memorable because the exact line ("obstipui, steteruntque comae . . .") is repeated, and Spenser manages to borrow all aspects of the line. Notice that *obstipesco* can be translated, as Dryden in his famous version does translate, "struck dumb." In Spenser's poem, being struck dumb relates to the speechlessness of the narrator himself, who in the Masque of Cupid could "note [i.e., not] readen well" the names of the many masquers (III.xii.26). The poet is essentially struck dumb; *Narrator obstipuit*. The last part of Virgil's line is thus incorporated: "vox faucibus haesit" 'the voice choked in my throat.'

Ecphrastic preparation of characters is ubiquitous in Virgil: one need only look at the series of ecphrases in Books 7 and 8, describing the palace of Latinus (7.170-91), the armor of Turnus (7.783-92), and the shield of Aeneas (8.626-728). The ecphrasis of Aeneas' shield comes just as Aeneas prepares to conquer Latium, the main subject of the last four books of the poem. It serves as a reminder of the future nation for which he is fighting and his destined heroic role within that country's founding. The shield, then, serves as a pre-war pep talk for the general at the top of the chain of command who gives pep talks to his soldiers, but has no human to encourage *him*. Thus, the artworks described in Virgil's epic play a central role in helping Aeneas to be an epic hero, and in providing a framework for Spenser's treatment of similar character development.

But in a significant departure from his Virgilian model, Spenser has Britomart in her ecphrastic scene suspiciously absent from the ecphrasis. In the Temple of Juno, Aeneas is very present. When he sees the depiction of Hector being dragged around Troy's walls, "tum vero ingentem gemitum dat pectore ab imo" 'then indeed from the bottom of his heart he heaves a deep groan' (1. 485). At every point in Virgil's narration

the poem makes readers aware that "Dardanio Aeneae miranda videntur" '[the] wondrous sights are seen by Dardan Aeneas' (1. 494). For every scene depicted in the Temple, the poem portrays the corresponding reaction of Aeneas: "stupet obtutuque haeret defixus in uno" 'in amazement he hangs rapt in one fixed gaze' (1. 495); "obstipuit" 'amazed was he' (1. 513). But though Aeneas is very present as a viewer of the art, he and Achates are invisible to Dido and the other Trojans in the Temple: "dissimulant et nube cava speculantur amicti" 'they keep hidden, and, clothed in the enfolding cloud, look to see what is their comrades' fortune' (1.516). Spenser does not highlight this aspect of Virgil's ecphrastic scene until the Masque of Cupid, during which Britomart "al this while was plast, / In secret shade, and saw both first and last" (III xii 27). But the absence of Britomart within the tapestry descriptions in canto xi seems also to be a sly rewriting of Aeneas' invisibility for Spenser's metapoetic purposes. Barchiesi writes,

> [E]pic ecphrases have a potential for becoming 'main stories', (for example the Shield of Herakles starts as heroic narrative but the narrative is then swallowed by a shield description) and . . . a particular tradition of modern epic (the so called epyllia, poems like Moschus' *Europa* and Catullus 64) had already exemplified the alternative: narratives that could be sidetracked and even engulfed by digressive descriptions. (274)

In Spenser's poem, too, the secondary narrative that the tapestries represent overwhelms the primary narrative of Spenser's poem.

When considering the plethora of critics writing about Britomart's experience of the art in the House of Busirane, it is startling to realize that, during the long ecphrasis of

the tapestries in the first room of Busirane's house, Britomart is not mentioned for over 21 stanzas. In stanza 27, "the Championesse now decked has / The vtmost rowme;" in stanza 49, "That wondrous sight [i.e., Cupid's altar] faire Britomart amazd;" in between there is not even a hint of the heroine, which I think should qualify Silberman's claim that Britomart "plays the role of militantly active reader" (*Transforming* 58). Even at the one point where the extended ecphrasis makes reference to witnessing the tapestry, it is only through an impersonal construction: "Wondrous delight it was, there to behould" (III.xi.34). At the end of the room's description, when the poem says Britomart is amazed (III.xi.49, above), this amazement is precipitated by the altar of Cupid, so that no reaction by Britomart to the tapestries is ever directly described. This lack, I would argue, is a signal to readers that the tapestries, along with the rest of the art in the House, serve an important role not just in the Britomart narrative, but also in readers' further thoughtful use of the episode.[109]

The tapestries in the House of Busirane begin with a series of acts: Ram, Bull, shower of gold, snowy Swan--the acts of Jove.[110] The tapestries as described never show Jove, the substance behind all the masks. Readers are not allowed to know Jove, only to

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[109] This special emphasis on readers' use, signalled by the absence of Britomart, goes further than Grogan, who sees equal emphasis on Britomart and readers. She writes, "Where his heroes are invited to scrutinise significant works of art in the narrative, Spenser's readers hang by their shoulders, made privy to the same visual experiences as closely as possible" (110). The image of looking over a character's shoulder at first seems brilliantly vivid and apt, but I think Britomart's absence makes the visual experience of readers even closer than Grogan is willing to entertain. Grogan, I think, misreads the import of Spenser's long description. She writes, "Besides a hefty nineteen stanzas of descriptions of the tapestries, it becomes apparent that Britomart is fully engaged with these images" (122). As I show, such a long description by the narrator heightens both Britomart's distance from them, and readers' distance from Britomart. The reader does not "hang fretfully behind her shoulder," as Grogan claims, but for nineteen stanzas *replaces* her (Grogan 123).

[110] By acts, I here mean something close to a routine, like a comedian's "act." But I also mean something like actions, the things that one does.

inspect his shifting surfaces. Even when Semelee requests to see Jove "in his souerayne maiestee, / Armd with his thunderbolts and lightning fire" (III.xi.33), she requests just another mask. The thunderbolts and lightning are merely props in Jove's most popular act. *So where is Jove?* The poem almost conjures the real presence of the god when Alcmena enjoys his love "in likenes more entire" (III.xi.33). The phrase introduces the possibility that Jove will be more like himself in this woven vignette. But it is only a fleeting possibility that context betrays. The Ovidian source portrays Jove in likeness, not of himself, but of Alcmena's husband (*Metamorphoses* 6.112). Seen in this light, Spenser's "more entire" means more entirely *human*, or more entirely fulfilling Alcmena's desire. But *not* more like Jove himself; Spenser uses the phrase "God himselfe" to refer to Apollo (III.xi.37) and Neptune (III.xi.41), but not to Jove. Jove's masks, "the hard beginne" (III.iii.21) of Spenser's ductus, start an intellectual trajectory by sowing the seeds of suspicion in the minds of readers as to the ability to discern a substantive being behind any of the many masks this God wears.[111]

Stanzas 36-37 contain a strange second-person address to "thou, faire *Phoebus*." The apostrophe to the woven Phoebus is conventional, but placed within a long ecphrasis that proceeds in the third person, this address is wonderfully energetic. Suddenly, Phoebus is not a set of threads in a tapestry but a person being addressed. The poem heightens the effect by repeating Phoebus' second person pronoun 14 times in as many

[111] Berger, in his magisterial study *Fictions of the Pose*, situates the self-portraits of Rembrandt within Renaissance conventions of dress and class, and within an intellectual query about the difference between selves and acts. For Berger, portraits are always pictures not of persons, but of acts, specifically acts of posing for a portrait. Berger's theory of the pose is similar to recognition of Jove's "acts." Later in this chapter, I will return to the thinking about interpersonal epistemology that the episode invites.

lines and in three different cases ("thou" 4 times, "thy" 5 times, and "thee" 5 times). Spenser brilliantly follows this pronominal assault with a pronoun that is easily passed over: "ye." After the address to Phoebus ends with the transformation of Hyacinct and Coronis into flowers, the poet comments: "For griefe whereof, ye mote haue liuely seene / The God himselfe rending his golden heare" (III.xi.37). If one catches the passing two-letter pronoun for what it is, the effect is jolting. Here, I submit, we find the real audience for the description of the tapestries: not Britomart as is usually assumed, but readers of the poem, an interpretation that should cause critics to reassess the thinking the ecphrasis makes possible.

Taking cues from Virgil and other epic poets and romancers, Renaissance poets make the proper viewing of artistic narrative a necessary skill for the ethical development of their *readers*. While Britomart is absent for a large portion of the ecphrases in the House of Busirane, the poem's readers engage in a complex thought experiment about representation, character, and personhood. And once the tapestries set up this ductus, it continues for the duration of the episode.

Immediately, in the same room, Spenser provides the next step in the ductus, when he describes an altar with a statue of Cupid.

> And at the vpper end of that faire rowme,
>
> There was an Altar built of pretious stone,
>
> Of passing valew, and of great renowme,
>
> On which there stood an Image all alone,
>
> Of massy gold which with his owne light shone. (III.xi.47)

Again, the ecphrasis contains a verbal hint contextualizing this art within the ductus of the episode. The construction *passing valew* has a primary sense of "exceeding value," but *passing* is a remarkably multivalent word that harks back to the Latin *passus* ("step"), a sense foregrounded in the English *passage* and the verb *to pass*. The altar, then, is not just valuable in an aesthetic or economic way; it is valuable as a step in the ductus, or passage, that the episode encourages -- it has *passing value*. And yet again I suggest this value comes from the presentation of this medium, statuary, in a way that pushes the limits of mimesis. For example, it shines "with his owne light," an oddity at least for those of us accustomed to museums where the proper lighting of artworks is always problematic. Spenser's description, in one sense, suggests a kind of curator's dream of the always already properly lit piece. Within this thought experiment about art and reality, the self-shining also suggests a strange degree of self-sufficiency or even self-generation that destabilizes our sense of an artist behind the artifice, and thus raises questions about the possible personal reality, or personhood, of the "statue."

If stanza 47's emphasis on passing and shining is not enough, then stanza 48 emphasizes the point even further:

> Blyndfold he was, and in his cruell fist
> A mortall bow and arrowes keene did hold,
> With which he shot at randon, when him list,
> Some headed with sad lead, some with pure gold. (III.xi.48)

Not only does the preponderance of personal pronouns (*he*, *his*, *him*) when the impersonal *it* might be more relevant suggest a high degree of autonomy, but also the

active verb *shot*. This action in the ecphrasis *might* be paraphrased, "This is a statue of Cupid, and *in some stories about Cupid* he shoots at random." But Spenser carefully leaves out the narrative qualification so that *he shot at random* encourages an attribution of agency, not just to the person represented, but to the representation, the statue, itself. This "statue" of Cupid can *do things*![112] The ecphrasis here once again suggests how uncomfortably narrow the line between art and reality is.

The poem continues the thought experiment with the golden artwork of the second room:

> For not with arras made in painefull loome,
> But with pure gold it all was ouerlayd,
> Wrought with wilde Antickes, which their follies playd,
> In the rich metall, as they liuing were. (III.xi.51)

Spenser, long praised as a consummately visual poet, actually makes visualization of the room very difficult. It is somewhat unclear what "ouerlayd" with gold, or "Wrought . . . In the rich metall" mean for a reader's visualization. This is because there is no clue to the gold's dimensionality. There is nothing in Spenser's (lack of) description to rule out, for example, a gold coating on the walls in which scores have been made like line drawings, creating in essence a two-dimensional artwork. But while such gilding with gold leaf was practiced in sixteenth-century England, Hamilton notes in his edition of the poem, "These

[112] This reading could be compared with the Ovidian subtext of the story of Pygmalion. The effect of Spenser's vivid ecphrasis is replicated when a human statue, of the kind that are ubiquitous in European street life, suddenly moves before a child has realized that it is not a statue at all.

figures seem to be embossed or in bas-relief" (397).[113] Though Hamilton is making a merely plausible suggestion, his suggestion fits with the progressive ductus through varying states of dimensionality set up by the tapestries. Readers' imaginary visualizations of verbally represented bas-reliefs are hard for a poet to control, because such art can fall almost anywhere between the poles of two and three dimensions, depending on how high the relief is raised from its background. Spenser thus uses the gold relief to make apparent the slippery nature of literary representations, as is further emphasized when Spenser writes that the Antickes are wrought "as they living were." This phrase is torn between meaning "as *if* they living were" and meaning "as they *were when they* were living." In the first paraphrase, the sense is that the portrayal is so good that one might be tricked into thinking that they were alive (even though they really cannot have been). The second paraphrase, on the other hand, suggests that the mimesis is so good that it captures the essence of who these antickes were when they really were alive. The difference between the two is whether a living being precedes the act of (re)presentation.

Are there any real persons in the House of Busirane? That is one way of summarizing the problems that the episode's ductus invites readers to ponder. In the midst of Spenser's description of the statue of Cupid, he wildly and surprisingly adds, almost as an aside, that "all the people in that ample hous / Did to that image bowe their humble knee" (III.xi.49). "What people?" a reader may very well ask. This is the first and

[113] Evelyn, as we saw above, had seen "bass relievos" and "mezzo relievos" at Nonsuch in the seventeenth century.

only mention of any possible persons other than Britomart in the room. So are they there worshipping while Britomart watches them? Does Spenser mean to say that though not presently, *sometimes* all the people worship there? I think the poem actually invites not the questions I just asked, but rather deeper questions about personhood in general. Remember the altar is in the first room, which contains many represented persons in the tapestries. And the inscription on the altar of Cupid, which reads "Vnto the Victor of the Gods this bee," suggests that, since the gods have been defeated, it is they who are worshipping. In other words, "all the people" may refer to the gods woven in the tapestries, which further upsets any stable notion of personhood. No matter how intricate the gold reliefs are, no matter how powerful the illusion of life, "Yet liuing creature none she saw appeare" (III.xi.55).

Soon, though, a new and different kind of creature emerges from beyond the door that leads into the third room. If the tapestries suggest that personhood is an unstable concept, then the masque of Cupid further demonstrates such instability. The masque in the second room of the House of Busirane marks a crucial transition in the episode's ductus for its readers. The theatrical presentation of highly iconic "persons" smoothes the way between the gold relief of the second room and the flesh-and-blood (in the fictional world of the poem) magician and his captive in the third room.

The masquers in the Masque of Cupid are strangely unreal characters. We are told that Ease, the presenter, was "a graue personage" (III.xii.3), and the poem later describes the masquers as "persons" (III.xii.25). The very terminology of *persons* and *personages* hints at the sort of transitional stage the poem presents in this scene. The central

meanings of the terms as used by Spenser in this scene seem to be meanings derived from symbolic and theatrical registers. *OED* begins its entry for *personage* with the following definition, a sense now obsolete but common in Spenser's day: "A representation or figure of a person; an image or effigy; a statue or portrait" ("Personage"). The definition highlights the second-level nature of such a re-presentation of a *person*. Interestingly, but not very helpfully, the definition uses *person* to define *personage*. The meaning of *person* here is certainly "human being." But even the word *person* carries with it hints of artificiality and iconicity, being derived from the Latin, *persona*, "a mask used by a player, a character or personage acted (*dramatis persona*), one who plays or performs any part, a character, relation, or capacity in which one acts, a being having legal rights, a juridical person; in late use, a human being in general; also in Christian use (Tertullian *c* 200) a 'person' of the Trinity" ("Person, *n*.").[114] It is fascinating that the Latin word gets transferred from the sense of "an act" to the sense of "a human being." Remarkably, a word describing artificiality becomes a word describing reality, a symptom of the kind of thinking about fiction and reality that Spenser's poem invites.

The iconic nature of the masquers' representations is emphasized by the repetitious structure of their descriptions, including allegorical name, clothes, movement,

[114] Elizabeth Fowler explores what she calls "social persons," essentially culturally and socially constructed roles, such as knight, merchant, martyr, and wife, by which we normally interpret character, and through which poets build character. Terry G. Sherwood draws attention to the problematic multivalence of *person* in Renaissance England. And one chapter of his book is devoted to the vocabulary of *person* in *The Faerie Queene*, including the germane observation that the entire poem is meant to "fashion a gentleman or noble *person*," according to Spenser's "Letter to Raleigh." Sherwood's book is a humanist attempt to salvage the self from the fragmented notion of self common to new historicists and post-structuralists. Unfortunately it is marred by errors, for example a statement that the *Two Cantos of Mutabilitie* were part of the 1596 *Faerie Queene*, when in fact they were not published until 1609.

and accompanying objects, usually held in the hands and always heavily symbolic.[115] Thus Fansy wears "paynted plumes," his movement is "vaine and light," and he carries a "windy fan" (III.xii.8). Desire's "garment was disguysed very vayne," and he holds sparks between his hands (III.xii.9). Doubt had a "discolour'd cote," and "nycely trode" with "feeble steps" with the help of a cane of "broken reed" (III.xii.10).

Spenser brilliantly chooses the masque form to move readers further along in a meditation on artistic representation.[116] The masque is an art form of thresholds and transformations and transitions, and Spenser uses the expectation of such transgressive play to help readers think about the curiously-blurred boundary between real and not-so-real persons. Thus C. S. Lewis writes, "The things we read about in [*The Faerie Queene*] are not like life, but the experience of reading it is like living" (*Allegory* 358). Used in the Elizabethan court as a way of "presenting" aristocratic behavior *in bono* and *in malo*, the masque gave to real persons a highly artificial role. Favorite disguises included allegorical figures such as Time, Government, and Chastity. It is perhaps this allegorical

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[115] Compare the formalism of Scudamour's complaints above.

[116] For a fuller treatment of Spenser's indebtedness to and use of the masque tradition, see Charles E. Walton, who is "inclined to agree with Philo M. Buck that the *Maske of Cupid* is synonymous with the one referred to by E. K. as *The Court of Cupid* in his dedicatory letter to *The Shepheardes Calender*. I think it plausible that Spenser may have, at one time, written such a masque--*The Court of Cupid*, perhaps--or, at least, had witnessed the performance of a similar work and had seen fit, later, to incorporate an account of it into *The Faerie Queene*" (37). For E. K.'s reference to Spenser's "Court of Cupid," see *The Shorter Poems* (ed. McCabe) 30. McCabe does not agree with Buck and Walton; he simply describes the Court of Cupid as "not extant" (519). Whether Spenser actually composed an earlier masque called "The Court of Cupid" or not, he certainly would have seen, or at the very least, heard or read accounts of such performances while he was in the employment of Leicester in London c. 1579. Judson writes, "However the connection was formed, there can be no doubt that Spenser for a time served Leicester and was on a friendly footing with Sidney, Dyer, and Rogers, frequented Leicester House, and had the entrée of the court" (59). Astington records no court masques during the winter of 1579-80, though Spenser still might have seen any number of similar entertainments and disguisings in the festive atmosphere of the court, studied at length by Jean Wilson in *Entertainments for Elizabeth I*. For fuller descriptions of the plays played at Whitehall during the Twelfth Night and Epiphany season leading up to Ash Wednesday in 1579-80, see Steele 77-81.

essence of the masque that makes the form so appealing to Spenser, since many of Spenser's characters are closely akin to masquers: Despair, Care, Mutability, even Calidore, are all allegorical representations of moods and morals that, because of this quality, lack the verisimilitude that readers of novels have been trained to expect. But it is exactly the threshold between icon and human that Spenser's poem encourages us to think about in the masque scene. For the transition between the disguised symbolic figure and the recognizable human being was a signature mark of the masque for Elizabethans.

Queen Elizabeth patronized many masques and similar entertainments early in her reign.[117] The English masque tradition began with the Tudors in the reign of Henry VIII; the first mention of such an entertainment is in 1512.[118] These were closely aligned with other older entertainments known as "disguisings" and even older "mummeries." These maskings were most prominent during the period of misrule preceding Lent.[119] During these performances, lords and ladies would dress up as peasants, monsters, allegorical figures, even mock kings and queens. The form was cleverly devised to reveal the artifice of its disguise at the end when the masquers were unmasked and the social hierarchy restored.

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[117] Masques seem to have been gradually replaced during her reign by a preference for plays. According to John Astington, in the first two years of her reign Elizabeth witnessed at least 13 masques and at least 4 plays, whereas in the last twenty years of her reign only one masque is listed along with about a half dozen plays a year (221-67).

[118] The following entry in Hall's Chronicle recalls 6 January 1512/13: "On the daie of the Epiphanie at night, the kyng with xi. other wer disguised, after the maner of Italie, called *a maske, a thyng not seen afore in England*, thei were appareled in garmentes long and brode, wrought all with gold, with visers and cappes of gold, and after the banket doen, these Maskers came in, with sixe gentlemen disguised in silke bearyng staffe torches, and desired the ladies to daunce, some were content, and some that knewe the fashion of it refused, because it was not a thyng commonly seen. And after thei daunced and commoned together, as the fashion of the Maskes is, thei toke their leave and departed, and so did the Quene, and all the ladies" (quoted in Welsford 130; emphasis mine).

[119] See Welsford, Chapters 1-3.

That the House of Busirane is modeled on sacred space and secular space at the same time makes it a perfect setting for a masque. The secular courtly space with its progression of intimacy, beginning with the public entrance hall and ending (if one is highly privileged) in the private rooms of the monarch, underlies much of the tradition of courtly masques.[120] But the sacred aspects of the House of Busirane also make it an ideal masking space. Suzanne Westfall has shown how private chapels were often where plays were performed for noble patrons on their estates, either by travelling companies or by live-in chapel employees. "The peculiar mixture of religious and secular art that the Chapel performed," she writes, "is perhaps symptomatic of its unique position within early Renaissance society" (31). Indeed, the same mixture gives the Solomonic House of Busirane a certain hierarchical importance in *The Faerie Queene*.

The etymology of *masque* is also important to the proper understanding of Spenser's episode. As the noun for a facial disguise, the word recalls the ceremonial and religious uses for which such disguises were first employed.[121] Busirane's house presents

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[120] Astington describes the typical Tudor palace as "a series of connecting courtyards, from a large, open, more public yard (the base court) to smaller, more private areas" (36). He also notes "the habitual plan of a suite of rooms leading to the sovereign's bedchamber, the most intimate and private space he or she enjoyed within the palace. Like the architectural plan of connecting courtyards, the group of rooms progressed from larger, more public spaces to smaller, private, and increasingly secure and inaccessible chambers" (38). Speaking of the Great Chamber at Whitehall (where Prospero's masque in *The Tempest* was performed in 1611), Astington writes, "It was a rectangular room on the second storey of the palace, sixty feet long by thirty feet wide. One entered it by way of a stair from the courtyard below, and if allowed to do so passed out of it to the next chamber by way of the only other door, at the western end of the southern wall" (38). Typically, the great chamber was followed by the presence chamber, the privy chamber, and the bedchamber (38-39). Masques could be performed in the Hall or the Great Chamber. The great chamber was often on the second storey directly above the Hall. But at Hampton Court, "The two rooms are in fact immediately contiguous, since the Great Chamber--unusually--is placed at ground level immediately behind the high end of the Hall" (64). The Hall is "106 feet long overall by 40 feet in width"; the Great Chamber measures 55 feet by 27 feet. On the resemblance of Hampton Court to the House of Busirane, see note 70 in Chapter 2 above.

[121] See Welsford, Chapter 1, "The Origin of the Masque."

a similarly primitive religious ceremony in honor of a pagan deity. *OED* notes a figurative use of the word as "a pretence, a front, an outward show intended to deceive," a definition certainly applicable to Busirane's masque ("Mask, *n*.[3]"). In fact, the masque is by its very nature linked to the masks of the gods in the Ovidian tapestries.

The stanza devoted to the description of Hope (III.xii.13) is a good place to see the ways that the Masque of Cupid continues to prod readers to think. In the first 8 lines, the figure of Hope is presented almost exclusively as a positive figure among the generally dreadful group of masquers:

> With him went *Hope* in rancke, a handsome Mayd,
> Of chearefull looke and louely to behold;
> In silken samite she was light arayd,
> And her fayre lockes were wouen vp in gold;
> She alway smyld, and in her hand did hold
> An holy water Sprinckle, dipt in deowe,
> With which she sprinckled fauours manifold,
> On whom she list, and did great liking sheowe,
> Great liking vnto many, but true loue to feowe. (III.xii.13)

Like all of the other masquers, Hope appears "in rancke," keeping her proper place in the hierarchical ceremony. But this orderliness also calls attention once again to the ordered ductus of the poem. Hope is not just in the ranks of the masque; she is a step in the sequence of a reader's ductus. She is beautiful, cheerful, virginal, and always smiling. She is the kind of person one might fall in love with or desire to be like. But her hair is

"wouen vp in gold," which is beautiful, but also ominously recalls the sinister, snaky gold of the tapestries. Moreover, her woven hair suggests an aesthetic, even ontological kinship with the tapestries. Thus the detail of her woven hair is working at one level to further a reader's sense of the less-than-secure borders between these various kinds of art.

One might thus compare Spenser's shining figure of Hope to the girl in gold of Rembrandt's famous *Nightwatch*, a spectacular group portrait of the military company of Frans Banning Cocq and Willem van Ruytenburch. According to Egbert Haverkamp-Begemann, "Rembrandt awarded [the girl in gold] a central place in the composition" (95). Spenser's Hope is even more clearly central, since she is the second partner in the third couple out of six, the sixth out of twelve paired masquers. Rembrandt's and Spenser's figures share a certain luminosity that separates them from their surroundings. Both figures wear fine cloth, carry emblematic objects, and have their hair "wouen vp in gold," Rembrandt's girl with a golden hat and a flourish of gold chain encircling her head. Haverkamp-Begemann argues that Rembrandt's shining girl is an "emblem carrier," bearing the allegorical symbols of Banning Cocq's company. But her face closely resembles that of Rembrandt's wife Saskia van Uylenburgh, which not only helps explain her mature features, but also further upsets the distinction between real person and fictional personage. Haverkamp-Begemann indeed suggests that Rembrandt is aware of the girl's potential as a thought experiment about personhood. Along with her companion in the painting (a barely visible second girl), she suggests a thought experiment about the reality of the subjects of the group-portrait:

> The two emblem carriers in the *Nightwatch* are only partially visible, and their speedy steps are going in the wrong direction. As a matter of fact, they would seriously hamper the movement of Banning Cocq's company. As in the case of the shooting musketeer in the center, Rembrandt introduced this dichotomy to indicate that the girls belong to a different reality. (100)

Similarly, Spenser presents his masquers in a "different reality" than his Cupid or his Amoret. Like Rembrandt's painting, Spenser's poem is complicated, the latter forming a ductus that suggests there is no strict dichotomy separating two different realities. The sequence of kinds of representation readers encounter in the House of Busirane leads them to perceive multiple differences according to medium, dimensionality, movement, and divinity: reality is distributed in degrees.

This is further emphasized when the narrator of the episode surprises the reader by introducing his own reading voice at the conclusion of the masque. "There were full many moe like maladies, / Whose names and natures I note readen well" (III.xii.26). Here the introduction of "I" into the poem produces a kind of vertigo. In Castle Joyeous, Spenser similarly invokes the inexpressibility topos when he writes

> But for to tell the sumptuous aray
> Of that great chamber, should be labour lost:
> For liuing wit, I weene, cannot display
> The roiall riches and exceeding cost,
> Of euery pillour and of euery post. (III.i.32)

In the next stanza, Spenser says that the "royaltee / and rich purueyance [of the inner room] might vneath be red" (III.i.33). But the effect of the two instances of the inexpressibility is different. This is partly because in Castle Joyeous the inexpressibility topos becomes an instance of occultatio, the rhetorical move whereby the poet describes something even while saying he cannot or will not. After telling us that he cannot easily read the sumptuous decor, he goes on to give us a remarkable account of it. In stanzas 34-40, Spenser vibrantly describes the tapestry, beds, and music of the Castle. But it is less complex than the description of the House of Busirane, which precedes the inexpressibility topos at III.xii.26. The reversal of order makes the effect more jolting, because readers already have a sense of the poet's very real descriptive powers.[122] Moreover, whereas the inexpressibility topos in Castle Joyeous leads to occultatio, the inexpressibility topos in the House of Busirane leads nowhere, since no description follows the impasse. Spenser also invokes the topos before the marriage of the Thames and Medway in Book IV: "O what an endlesse work I have in hand, / To count the seas abundant progeny . . . All those were there, and many other more, / Whose names and nations were too long to tell" (IV.xii.1, 3). In this case, Spenser directly echoes the House of Busirane example, repeating the phrases "many mo(r)e" and "Whose names and nat(ures/ions)." But as in the case of Castle Joyeous, this does not stop the poet from proceeding in his description. Thus the examples of the topos in Castle Joyeous and at the

[122] The reversal is also another example of chiastic symmetry in Book III: occultatio - ecphrasis -- ecphrasis - occultatio.

marriage of the rivers are rather tame versions; the topos in the House of Busirane is wildly jarring. A full-speed-ahead tour-de-force of description comes to an abrupt halt.[123]

The narrative intrusion at III.xii.26 reminds readers of the actual poet in the real world constructing the poem. The logical next step in this ductus through the dimensions of reality would be *to encounter actual humans reading the epic*. This is I believe where Spenser's ductus leads. The narrator intrudes at the point where the multiplicity of the masque seems to be getting out of control. In the previous stanza, the stately procession of the lewd masquers mimetically degenerates into the disorder that Cupid's marchers naturally precipitate. In stanza 25, thirteen masquers are named at a breakneck pace: Strife, Anger, Care, Vnthriftyhead, Losse of Time, Sorrow, Chaunge, Disloyalty, Riotise, Dread, Infirmity, Pouerty, and "lastly Death." The unlucky number thirteen and the finality of Death indeed both hint at the death of the narrative of the masque as the multiplex art form devolves into near incomprehensibility. But if those thirteen figures are hard to interpret, the narrator in the next stanza gives up completely, admitting to the reader that he can give us only some of the "names and natures" parading in the House of Busirane.

What does this sudden admission of impotence mean for the ductus of the reader? The narrator, calling attention to his failure to read, becomes a surrogate for the reader of the poem. "Look," the narrator seems to be saying, "I am just trying to hold on, too." A

[123] More often, the first-person poet intrudes on the narrative to assert control, as in the nautical and agricultural metaphors for the progress of the poem (I.xii.1.1 and VI.ix.1.2, for example). In the Proems, there are also occasional admissions of poetic impotence, but they are less special instances, since readers expect the Proems to provide the narrator's commentary upon the narrative. Thus, the intrusion in the House of Busirane is an especially noticeable one, both because it actually stops the description and because it is within the narrative.

kind of camaraderie is produced. But readers must also recognize that the objects of reading are different for narrator and reader. The narrator implies, in a brilliant move of enargia, that he is in the room with Britomart watching the spectacle as it passes. In other words, he pretends that he is trying to produce a mimesis of something actual. Paradoxically, this reminds readers of the second-hand nature of their encounter with the pageant and of the constructed nature of its account. The narrator's admission is an aporia that leaves the attentive reader asking important philosophical questions about the linguistic, physical, printed narrative before her: What are representations? Can they be objects of concern? Why do they serve as objects of concern? What is their relation to the real world? The aporia seems designed to cause the reader to pause and ponder the "names and natures" of the dramatis personae of the masque. In the House of Busirane, though, these masquers seem not really to be masking at all. They seem to be displaying their true essence in an act of revelation that is built into the masque form's unmasking. What is revealed, though, is hollowness. And this hollowness backfires to open up an interrogation of the figures in the House of Busirane, including the character of Britomart herself.[124]

The emphasis the poem places on the order of the masquers raises the question of proper order. Within the processional order of Cupid, the masquers proceed as we might

[124] Compare Teskey's description of Spenser's thinking: "Spenser in *The Faerie Queene* does his thinking as he goes along, arriving often, as it seems, by accident, as a result of some particular instance he has seized on, at a deeper formulation than that with which he began, but also a stranger formulation. You cannot run Spenser's thinking backwards. Milton can see farther than Spenser into any question set before him and defined for him. Spenser takes us into regions of thought the existence of which Milton would never have suspected--nor would we have suspected them, either. And to Spenser himself they come as a surprise" ("Thinking Moments" 118). The aporia I am discussing is one such "surprise," or "particular instance," leading in this case to a stranger formulation of the epistemology of personhood.

expect, according to medieval and Petrarchan theories of the progression of love. But it is the point of such order that it is the *wrong* order. It is a tyrannical order that must be superseded by the order of marital chastity. Part of the ethical development that Britomart (and readers) may undergo in the House of Busirane is to learn to distinguish between orders of ontology and, thus, relevance to the ethical life. The ontologically inferior beings of poetry, art, and music are helpful in the ethical life, but only as intermediate figures in the quest for active virtue.

The various arts have from the beginning of the episode suggested instability and inscrutability. All the allegorical representations in the House of Busirane, especially the masquers, raise questions both ontological (What are they?) and epistemological (How and why do we come to believe what we believe about them?) that may be then directed to the major, apparently more realistic figures like Britomart. The poem's insistence on thinking about the relation of personage to person, for example, is like a message that beckons readers to move towards the world outside the poem. Spenser follows Sidneian poesis by calling attention to the artificiality of the literary world and its population. Though such metapoetic thinking is often encouraged in similar ways in a variety of art forms, in Spenser it has a specific ethical purpose: to emphasize the transitional step from concern with personages to concern for persons that poetic fiction constitutes. The figures in Spenser's masque are ontologically transitional, empty of substance but at the same time suggesting a role in Spenser's carefully planned ductus towards full humanity. The masque then is the place where we most undeniably see the graded continuity of artistic and human objects, aesthetic and ethical concerns.

After seeing the masque once, Britomart vows to ignore it and use the next entrance of the masquers as an opportunity to access the final room of the house. Britomart thus provides an imitation of the work the poem expects its readers to make: when she ignores the second masque, she leaves interpretive, intellectual worries behind and goes "backstage" to rescue Amoret.[125] We can compare this abandonment of an aesthetic project of concern with Britomart's original stance toward the tapestries. After the very long absence from the poem described above, which allows for the guidance of readers to begin, Spenser very briefly gives a postscript suggesting at least some very general reaction by the character of Britomart:

> The warlike Mayd beholding earnestly
> The goodly ordinaunce of this rich Place,
> Did greatly wonder, ne could satisfy
> Her greedy eyes with gazing a long space,
> But more she mervaild that no footings trace,
> Nor wight appear'd, but wastefull emptinesse,
> And solemne silence ouer all that place:
> Straunge thing it seem'd, that none was to possesse
> So rich purueyaunce, ne them keepe with carefulnesse. (III.xi.53)

Britomart notices the possibility of the tapestries falling into ruin and is saddened by that prospect. But even here Spenser suggests once again that Britomart is not the intended audience of the art. He does this through representing Britomart as marvelling at the lack

[125] It is Wofford, *Choice* 253, who describes Britomart's action as going backstage.

of other persons in the House. This slyly calls oblique attention to how Britomart's marvelling is wrong, for there are plenty of others "in" the room: those who are reading the poem.

Amoret's appearance in the middle of the Masque's pageant of passions signals a further development of concern for real persons. The fleshy reality of her wounds and skin shocks and haunts both Britomart and her readers, providing a strong contrast to the phantasmagoric allegories of the masque. At first glance, she partakes of the merely symbolic ontology of the masquers with "Deathes owne ymage figurd in her face" (III.xii.19). But unlike Hope, Amoret is "without adorne of gold or siluer bright, / Wherewith the Craftesman wonts it beautify" (III.xii.20). Amoret, then, presents Britomart with an object of concern that is, relative to the objects she has seen so far, painfully real. Like Britomart, Amoret has a wide wound from a deadly dart that mixes red blood and white skin. In an echo of Britomart's original love-sickness, Amoret's "vitall powres gan to fade" (III.xii.21). The vibrancy of Amoret's portrayal, however, does more than present an object of concern for Britomart. It also plays an important role in the ductus of readers. Barchiesi writes that in ecphrasis, "The textual medium explores the limits of visual communication as an indirect way of testing its own material limitations" (278). Amoret's vividness, I would argue, encourages the reader to interrogate Britomart's own status as fictional character.[126]

[126] Silberman writes that "the real poetic point of the mask lies in how the language comes to life the moment Amoret enters. The appearance of a flesh-and-blood woman among the walking allegories gives a genuine shock" (*Transforming* 64). Like me, James Broaddus suggests that the characters in the House of Busirane be "approached as fictional personages," though I look at them in the framework of the

Though Fox, following many Spenserians, claims that the poem "creates a deeper characterization of Britomart than of any other figure," both Britomart and Amoret are ultimately "shades," products of a mage, the poet Spenser (76). This leads Wofford to treat the tension between figure and character as a gendered problem (i.e. as a struggle of female characters to break free from the figuration given them by male poets). Coupled with her assertion that "Britomart stands in the same place as the reader" ("Gendering" 12),[127] Wofford's argument rightly decenters not only notions of literary character but also notions of personhood itself. And I suggest this is exactly what we should expect from such extended ecphrases.

In an article about ecphrasis, D. P. Fowler notes the tension between narration and description: "Narrative is about people, description deals with things" (26). Fowler also writes that "Historically description has tended to make people nervous" (26). In Spenser's poem, one of the reasons the House of Busirane might make readers nervous, I think, is that the long descriptions of artifacts dominate, so that when the poet returns to

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philosophical problems of mimetic art and ethical aesthetics, whereas he treats them as they are "created within the framework of Renaissance psychology" (90).

[127] A common assertion. Roche writes that "Britomart's response to the mask and to Busyrane is that of the intelligent moral reader, who can detect the difference between true and false love" ("Challenge" 343). Wofford calls attention to "the insistent puns on 'read,' which make Britomart a figure of the unknowing reader" (*Choice* 308). Silberman writes that "Britomart's encounter with Busirane presents a reasonably clear-cut model of the relationship of reader to poet" (*Transforming* 61). Terence Cave describes the peculiarly pervasive figuration of reading in the Renaissance. But, for Silberman as for me, the figuration is more unstable than the phrase "clear-cut model" suggests: "The introduction of Amoret's subjective resistance to the magic visions conjured up by Busirane complicates this model. Amoret's dual role as a character in Spenser's *Faerie Queene* and as an unwilling participant in Busirane's Mask of Cupid provides a fictive model of the link between a conscious subject and an object of representation. . . . Spenser's initial model of subjective participation in the object of reading has become an unstable exchange between subject and object as Amoret wavers from one position to the other. Throughout the House of Busirane, we see the interaction of reader and text as a vigorous and highly charged exchange" (*Transforming* 61). The work of Silberman, Mary Ellen Lamb, and other recent critics has qualified readers' senses of Britomart as a specifically female reader, but the trope of Britomart as reader-in-general is still pervasive in criticism of the episode.

his characters, readers are so accustomed to objectification that they tend to consider characters as things rather than persons. In *Art and Illusion*, E. H. Gombrich calls the effect of this kind of sequence "switch[ing] our mental set" (xxix). A well-known example of such mental switching is the duck-rabbit picture (Gombrich 5). Wittgenstein writes of the picture, "It can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's. And I must distinguish between the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect and the 'dawning' of an aspect" (*Philosophical* 165-66). This "'dawning' of an aspect" is what Gombrich calls "switch[ing] our mental set." Another example is the picture that, looked at one way is a beautiful princess, while looked at in another way is an old witch. "Ambiguities of this kind turn out to be useful testing ground for observing the mechanism we are after, since the need to switch our mental set tends to make us aware of its power" (Gombrich xxix).[128] The "mechanism we are after" is the mechanism by which signs create illusions. In his poem, Spenser reveals the constructedness and incompleteness of character by using the inexpressibility topos to make readers aware of the artifice. Gombrich expresses this point by writing, "[W]e can always construct a sequence of signs that trips up our mental set" (xxix).[129]

By inducing such mental switching, Spenser invites readers to ponder both the ontological status of the poem's characters and the figuration of real persons, his

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[128] Two more of Gombrich's examples: 1) watching a puppet theater and suddenly seeing the puppeteer's hand (xxviii); 2) seeing the word *pain* in the vicinity of the word *trouble*, and seeing the word *pain* followed by *et couvert* (the switch is between two different languages) (xxix).

[129] Consider also the switching involved in the performance of Elizabethan theater. Orgel notes that actors possessed actual cast-off clothes from the aristocracy. So when a playgoer saw "royalty" on stage, "he might have thought of the drama as a mere fiction, but its trappings were paradoxically the real thing" (Orgel 6).

readers.[130] "Precisely because ekphrasis represents a pause at the level of narration and cannot be read functionally, the reader is possessed by a strong need to interpret" (D. P. Fowler 27). And this need to interpret is partly based upon an inherent problem with ecphrasis that D. P. Fowler calls focalization, the problem of discerning who is observing what. Is Spenser observing a tapestry? Is Britomart observing a tapestry? Are readers observing Britomart observing tapestry? Are readers observing Spenser depicting Britomart observing tapestry? Such *mise en abyme* is characteristic of both Spenser's poem and the ecphrastic tradition from which it derives.

The Spenserian allegorist Nathaniel Hawthorne, who named his first daughter Una in honor of Spenser's character of the same name, writes in "The Custom-House" about how "the floor of our familiar room has become a neutral territory, somewhere between the real world and fairy-land, where the Actual and the Imaginary may meet, and each imbue itself with the nature of the other" (36). The move to see in them figurations of ourselves should provide pause, because Spenser's literary characters are what E. M. Forster calls, rather dully, "word-masses" (71). Gombrich relates an "anecdote about Matisse. When a lady visiting his studio said, 'But surely, the arm of this woman is much too long,' the artist replied politely, 'Madame, you are mistaken. This is not a woman, this is a picture'" (115). This is the kind of mental switching that constitutes the intellectual ductus of Spenser's poem. In the House of Busirane we witness the poet simultaneously at his most daring, confronting his creations on their own terms. It is an example of what

[130] Silberman beautifully describes the ambiguity and mystery of the House of Busirane's treatment of character and personhood: "The episode represents a living person reduced to the status of a fictive object while from a slightly different perspective, the content of the fictive masque apparently comes to life and resists its author's intentions" (*Transforming* 61).

Teskey calls, in the context of Book VI, an "alarming exposure of the foundations of his art" ("Mutabilitie" 117).

Since the House of Busirane is on one level an allegory of art, and, by implication, of the poem itself, Spenser's "alarming exposure" results in the fate of the house. After Britomart successfully rescues Amoret and binds Busirane, not only is the house exposed, it falls:

> Returning back, those goodly rowmes, which erst
> She saw so rich and royally arayd,
> Now vanisht vtterly, and cleane subuerst
> She found, and all their glory quite decayd,
> That sight of such a chaunge her much dismayd. (III.xii.42)

The dissolution of the House of Busirane represents a strong challenge to the cultural critiques of rhetoric prevalent in Spenser's culture. These critiques show up, for example, in Sidney's *Defence*, in numerous parodies of John Lyly's Euphuism, in attacks on the stage and page, and in iconoclastic religious mores. The vanishing of the House of Busirane highlights the inherent cost in such stances: the loss of a particularly luxurious cultural treasure. Nuttall has argued that Spenser, as a poet, "depresses art," a phrase borrowed from William Blake's jealous comments on Joshua Reynolds's financially successful artworks (Nuttall, "Spenser"). "No one has paid Spenser to depress art," Nuttall writes, "but he has been comprehensively persuaded, at the level of ideology and belief, that art must be depressed in a certain manner. If art is to be allowed any place at all, it must first be drained of any pretended power to contain truth or value within itself"

("Spenser" 211-12). In the House of Busirane, Spenser slyly moves beyond such strident views. The house vanishes, which satisfies the Protestant impulse to iconoclasm. But Britomart's earlier emotional attachment to the art tempers this Protestant reading significantly. Just as individual heroes and heroines are represented as undergoing development in their respective books, Spenser's poem also develops book by book. As Hamilton notes in his edition of the poem, the romance vanishing palace motif is "used here to contrast Guyon's deliberate razing of the 'goodly workmanship' of the Bower of Bliss" (405). In other words, the anti-aesthetic stance implied by the active and brutal destruction of the Bower of Bliss at the end of Book II is tempered by the end of Book III. And the softening of the treatment is directly related to the poem's meditation on the instability of personhood and the complexities of aesthetic dimension.

2. Fictional Persons

Readers of the House of Busirane episode become intimately engaged with the ontology of personhood, a fact that might cause us to recall Maureen Quilligan's insistence on "how unmodern Elizabethan senses of personhood are" (*Incest* 261, n.1). As Quilligan suggests, "Britomart's character, far from realistic, is a remarkable amalgam of traditional literary figures and historical negotiations" (*Incest* 134). Before examining in more detail such thinking about persons and characters that the ductus through various dimensionalities of art in the House of Busirane makes possible, I want to briefly review some of the philosophical and critical literature on the subject of fictional persons. Sidney claims that good poetry encourages readers to make a transition from contemplation of fiction to action in the world. And he is not the only early modern English writer to use

the idea of the movement from *gnosis* to *praxis* as one of the chief means of justifying his poetic craft. This movement, as I argued in Chapter 1, helps give rise to a new concept among English speakers, the concept of emotion, adumbrated in Spenser's coinage "emmoved." It is emotional experience with and about fictional characters and situations that helps move readers from contemplating fiction to living life. This is a commonsense or everyday view of fictions: they move readers. Further, some even make this moving quality of literature its *raison d'être*. Nussbaum, for example, sees the emotional interaction with fiction as a key to moral development.[131] That fiction moves readers is essentially, then, both a very old view and a current one.

But if literary characters move us emotionally, there is the problem of why. I was mostly concerned in the Sidney chapter with a normative argument: poetry *should* move readers. Now I am tackling a modal problem: How *can* this movement happen? How can Cyrus, Sidney's example of an exemplary fictional character, teach real people how to act? Why would readers follow the example of an unreal character? Readers know that Britomart is not a real person, so why might readers care for her in a way that makes emotion possible? At the root of these questions, I believe, is the question of what we can possibly know about literary characters. Most are inclined to accept that all we can know about them is what the author, narrator, other characters, or their situational actions tell us about them. In the case of some novelistic characters, such as Dorothea Brooks or "Marcel Proust," this common sense works well, because readers are given a *lot* of

[131] This could serve as a description of much of Nussbaum's work in *Love's Knowledge* and *Upheavals of Thought*. In another, smaller book, *Poetic Justice*, Nussbaum more succinctly shows both that literary works (specifically Dickens's *Hard Times*) foster "rational emotions" in readers, and that these emotions are important elements of public action and decision making, i.e., applied ethics.

information about these characters. Thus, readers tend to become emotionally invested in these representations. But in the case of a character like Britomart, a character in a sixteenth century epic romance with less robust presentations of character, this common sense is problematic. This is because it would seem, if Roberts's definition of emotion is correct, that the less we know about a character, the less he or she might concern us. And if that is true, readers' abilities to have "concern-based construals" about literary characters is diminished. To see Spenser's thought experiment about concern for fictions more clearly and incisively, it might be helpful to examine fictional personhood through another, lengthy debate about *dramatic* personhood, particularly in the case of Shakespeare's plays.[132]

In *Hamlet*, the eponymous hero becomes distraught when a player weeps while telling the mythological story of the King and Queen of Troy, Priam and Hecuba (2.2). When the player describes the grief of Hecuba for the death of her husband, Polonius notes that the player has tears in his eyes. This prompts Hamlet to soliloquize about the difference between the player's make-believe grief for Priam and Hecuba and Hamlet's real grief for his father.

> Is it not monstrous that this player here,
>
> But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,

[132] Of course, a play and an epic poem are not strictly comparable. In some ways, drama complicates the issue, since real people end up enacting the fiction on stage, and because the text may be regarded as instructions to act in a strict sense. Precisely because of this, drama provides an excellent starting point for thinking about fictional ontology and epistemology. It is an even more explicit case of a textual desire to move readers. On the other hand, currently there is a revival of treating Shakespeare's plays as texts meant to be read, a view that puts them in closer contact with fictional poems like *The Faerie Queene*. I do not think that an extended analysis of the generic differences is warranted here, though such an analysis is, on its own merits, very important.

> Could force his soul so to his own conceit
> That from her working all the visage wann'd,
> Tears in his eyes, distraction in his aspect,
> A broken voice, an' his whole function suiting
> With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing,
> For Hecuba!
> What's Hecuba to him, or he to [Hecuba],
> That he should weep for her? (2.2.551-60)

Hamlet decries the hypocrite for acting as if he cared for Hecuba, but Hamlet's question is also about emotional reaction to fiction. As Fox succinctly puts it, Hamlet's question is "an important moment of reflexivity on playwriting and the power of self-consciously imitated fictions to move audiences" (105). Fox largely sees this as a problem for the dramatic representation of emotion, whereas I take it as a problem for the Sidneian notion that good poetry should move its readers. Why would a reader or playgoer become emotional over the fate of someone who is merely performing? If emotions are concern-based construals, why are readers or audiences concerned about fictions?

In early-twentieth-century literary criticism, such a question went unasked, as A. C. Bradley's influential *Shakespearean Tragedy* gave lasting expression to a brand of character criticism that had been gestating throughout the Romantic and Victorian periods. L. C. Knights, though, rejected Bradleian character criticism when he famously asked, "How many children had Lady Macbeth?," a question that has become the litmus test for whether one is a realist or a skeptic as regards fictional persons. Knights is right

that the question is probably unanswerable, for the reason that Shakespeare says nothing about it. As it turns out, though, Bradley was of the same opinion. Though there are many interesting facets of this ongoing argument, what is important for us here is the foundation of the argument in a question about what we can know about literary characters.

Though Bradley's most well known work, *Shakespearean Tragedy*, is essentially a piece of character criticism, it is much smarter than Knights admits. In the case of Macbeth (since that is where Knights points), Bradley is certainly prone to passages that are exuberant (by today's standards) in their analysis of character, as is the following:

> These two characters [Macbeth and Lady Macbeth] are fired by one and the same passion of ambition; and to a considerable extent they are alike. The disposition of each is high, proud, and commanding. They are born to rule, if not to reign. They are peremptory or contemptuous to their inferiors. They are not children of light, like Brutus and Hamlet; they are of the world. (350)

The last phrase, "of the world," is especially resonant, suggesting not only Machiavellian calculation, but also robust reality. They are part of this world; they are real. So, yes, Bradley treats these characters as if they have personalities and souls, as if they are in some sense real. But after one has learned so much about Bradley from critical osmosis, what is startling about Bradley upon closer inspection of his book is his constant insistence on text as proof. He is not wildly speculating, as Knights's criticism of him

(and casual references to Knights's criticism) might suggest. For example, Bradley writes in a footnote (where some of his best work resides):

> The assertion that Lady Macbeth sought a crown for herself, or sought anything for herself, apart from her husband, is absolutely unjustified by anything in the play. It is based on a sentence of Holinshed's which Shakespeare did *not* use. (350)

Though the previously quoted passage seems to evince a critic's own imaginative construction of Lady Macbeth, this passage clearly claims that textual authority is a sine qua non for analysis of character. That Bradley has it both ways is a curious fact that will impinge upon my later claim about interpersonal epistemology. Far from being a critic in the vein of Maurice Morgann, who inflated Falstaff so far beyond the evidence of the plays, Bradley is cautious, even skeptical about overblown character criticism, the very kind of interpretation for which he is sometimes pilloried.

Having read accounts of Bradley's work, it is surprising to read the following footnote in Bradley's work:

> The tendency to sentimentalize Lady Macbeth is partly due to Mrs. Siddons's fancy that she was a small, fair, blue-eyed woman, 'perhaps even fragile.' Dr. Bucknill, who was unacquainted with this fancy, independently determined that she was 'beautiful and delicate,' 'unoppressed by weight of flesh,' 'probably small,' but 'a tawny or brown blonde,' with grey eyes: and Brandes affirms that she was lean, slight, and

> hard.[133] They know much more than Shakespeare, who tells us absolutely nothing on these subjects. That Lady Macbeth, after taking part in a murder, was so exhausted as to faint, will hardly demonstrate her fragility. That she must have been blue-eyed, fair, or red-haired, because she was a Celt, is a bold inference, and it is an idle dream that Shakespeare had any idea of making her or her husband characteristically Celtic. The only evidence ever offered to prove that she was small is the sentence, 'All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand'; and Goliath might have called his hand 'little' in contrast with all the perfumes of Arabia. One might as well propose to prove that Othello was a small man by quoting,
>
> I have seen the day,
> That, with this little arm and this good sword,
> I have made my way through more impediments
> Than twenty times your stop.
>
> The reader is at liberty to imagine Lady Macbeth's person in the way that pleases him best, or to leave it, as Shakespeare very likely did, unimagined.

As this footnote shows, Bradley stands against the very kind of frippery of which he is accused. Bradley is worried about the problem of what our imaginations can and cannot attribute to fictions. Siddons says *perhaps* Lady Macbeth is fragile, and very quickly such

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[133] Sarah Siddons, the most renowned 18th-century English actress. Sir John Charles Bucknill, Victorian mental health specialist and pioneer, who wrote *Psychology of Shakespeare* (London, 1859). Georg Brandes, influential Danish literary critic, author of *William Shakespeare: A Study* (1897-98).

a surmise forms company with the preterite expression "she was," a grammatical form that attributes historical existence to the dramatic character. Bradley claims at last that readers can take "liberty" in the epistemology of dramatic characters, but suggests firmly that such "bold" inferences are absolutely unjustified. Again such tension between readerly supposes and concrete evidence is the heart of the problem, a problem to which Bradley is finely attuned.

Two more examples from Bradley will suffice to show the degree to which Knights and other anti-Bradleians have tended to overstate Bradley's position. Bradley does occasionally raise speculative questions about characters. In one of his notes appended to the end of *Shakespearean Tragedy*, for example, he asks the question, "Did Lady Macbeth really faint?" The question pertains to Lady Macbeth's public reaction after the murder of Duncan becomes known. She exclaims, "Help me hence, ho!," and Macduff orders minions to "Look to the lady." Nicholas Rowe introduced a stage direction, "Lady Macbeth is carried out," which complicates Bradley's question. But it does seem pretty clear that Lady Macbeth asks for help and that she needs assistance. Now the question "Does Lady Macbeth really faint?" seems a lot like the question "How many children had Lady Macbeth?" until we realize that the former has an anchor in the text: the speech of Lady Macbeth and Macduff suggests strongly that something is wrong with Lady Macbeth. Bradley's question is a practical dramaturgical one: "Shakespeare of course, knew whether he meant the faint to be real: but I am not aware if an actor of the part could show the audience whether it was real or pretended. If he could, he would doubtless receive instructions from the author" (486). Bradley ends by claiming that there

is no way to know the answer, explicitly denying the decidability of the question, rather than speculating about it. Either she fainted, or she didn't, but we can't know; actors and actresses can only interpret.

So what about the even more clearly speculative question, "How many children had Lady Macbeth?" It never appears in Bradley's text. In fact, far from speculating on the question, Bradley dismisses it as undecidable and irrelevant. "Whether Macbeth had children or (as seems usually to be supposed) had none, is quite immaterial" (488). He writes,

> Lady Macbeth's child (I. vii. 54) may be alive or may be dead. It may even be, or have been, her child by a former husband; though if Shakespeare had followed history in making Macbeth marry a widow (as some writers gravely assume) he would probably have told us so. It may be that Macbeth had many children or that he had none. *We cannot say, and it does not concern the play.* (489, my emphasis)

Remarkably for the supposed narrative history of Shakespearean criticism, Knights and Bradley agree on at least one thing: Warranted assertions about the character of Lady Macbeth depend upon the words (and justifiable inferences from those words) that Shakespeare writes for her and about her.

But though Bradley may not have been as naive as some claim, other critics really do cling to the supposed extra-literary knowledge of literary character. Berel Lang, for example, in a very witty essay, suggests that there are many things we know about

characters beyond what an author explicitly writes. Lang begins his essay, "Hamlet's Grandmother and other Literary Facts" with a brief dialogue:

> Q. Did Hamlet have a grandmother?
>
> A. Yes, of course. Two of them, in fact.
>
> Q. What's the evidence? Shakespeare doesn't mention them.
>
> A. Imagine the alternative. (167)

This might serve as a critique of Knightsian skepticism about literary characters. Surely, Lang suggests, no one is willing to deny that Hamlet was born to a man and woman who themselves were born from a man and woman.[134] Lang confronts the eerie implications of such a position. Suddenly, there seem to be what he calls a "Pandora's Box" of an almost infinite number of things we know about Hamlet that Shakespeare never bothers to mention. For example, we know he had four great-grandmothers, eight great-great-grandmothers, and so on all the way back to (another fictional character) Eve. This is because Lang argues that there can be "non-literary causes of literary effects" (169).[135] Lang concludes, "Hamlet does not exist in the same sense that Shakespeare did, but they have more in common--much more--than would be implied in the simple claim that the one of them lived and the other did not" (174). This is similar to Wittgenstein's claim that "an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have *something*--a form--in common with it" (*Tractatus* 2.022). But whereas Lang takes Wittgenstein's

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[134] Lang's assumption, however, may not be justified, as we shall see. Many people, including some philosophers of fiction, would deny that Hamlet is born from a man and a woman; instead, he has only one "parent," William Shakespeare.

[135] For example, biological procreation is a fact about the extra-literary world that Lang can import into the literary world as a cause. My study is interested in the possibility of the converse: literary causes of non-literary effects, or exporting the literary into real-world use.

suggestion to imply that we endorse a more robust sense of the reality of fictional characters, I take it to imply a more troubled existence for "real" persons. As both Lang, the literary critic, and Wittgenstein, the philosopher, claim, there is some close relation between Hamlet and Shakespeare, but I think the specific relation is lack of knowledge about them.

E. M. Forster extends Lang's position even further when he argues that readers can actually know *more* about Homo Fictus than Homo Sapiens. There is, Forster writes, a

> fundamental difference between people in daily life and people in books. In daily life we never understand each other, neither complete clairvoyance nor complete confessional exists. We know each other approximately, by external signs, and these serve well enough as a basis for society and even for intimacy. But people in a novel can be understood completely by the reader, if the novelist wishes; their inner as well as their outer life can be exposed. And this is why they often seem more definite than characters in history, or even our own friends; we have been told all about them that can be told; even if they are imperfect or unreal they do not contain any secrets, whereas our friends do and must, mutual secrecy being one of the conditions of life upon this globe. (74-75)

But Forster's analysis is problematic, and not only for its apparent realism about fictional persons. It is worrisome because he suggests that complete knowledge of a very limited thing (a fictional character) is so much better than partial knowledge of a very complex

thing (a real person). This is like claiming that one should value 2+2=4 more highly than $e=mc^2$. The former can be understood completely, while for most of us the latter can never be. But the former is also lacking in complexity. Whether it is lacking in beauty or not is an open question that depends on one's sense of whether simplicity or complexity is more beautiful. But in the case of persons, complexity is almost always valued over simplicity. No one wants to be one-dimensional or simple-minded. So Forster's option for the former is peculiar. Forster takes the uncommon stance that interpersonal mystery is unwanted:

> For human intercourse, as soon as we look at it for its own sake and not as a social adjunct, is seen to be haunted by a spectre. We cannot understand each other, except in a rough-and-ready way; we cannot reveal ourselves, even when we want to; what we call intimacy is only a makeshift; perfect knowledge is an illusion. But in the novel we can know people perfectly, and, apart from the general pleasure of reading, we can find here a compensation for their dimness in life. . . . [Fictional characters] are people whose secret lives are visible or might be visible: we are people whose secret lives are invisible. (97-99)[136]

But Forster is equivocating. If fictional characters are entirely exposed in the way he claims, then they cannot have secret lives, because they do not have secrets at all, in

[136] This is similar to Harold Bloom's ornery insistence that fictional characters are better friends than real persons. "Shakespeare matters most," he writes, "because no one else gives us so many selves, larger and more detailed than any closest friends or lovers seem to be" (*Shakespeare* 727). This privileging of Shakespearean characters over real humans is the crux of his playfully ironic argument that Shakespeare "invented the human as we know it" (*Shakespeare* 714).

contrast with real people. Our notions of real persons are always fragmentary, just like our notions of literary characters. And the way that readers construct personhood for them is remarkably similar. As Proust constantly reminds readers, our relations with real persons are built upon imaginary constructions founded often on a remarkable lack of evidence.

It is significant that the subject of the player's speech in Hamlet 2.2 is Hecuba, who is also the subject of a famous story of being moved by dramatic fiction. Plutarch writes of Alexander Pheraeus:

> Once when he was seeing a tragedian act the "Trojan Women" of Euripides, he left the theatre abruptly, and sent a message to the actor bidding him be of good courage and not put forth any less effort because of his departure, for it was not out of contempt for his acting that he had gone away, but because he was ashamed to have the citizens see him, who had never taken pity on any man that he murdered, weeping over the sorrows of Hecuba and Andromache. ("Pelopidas" 415; xxix.5)

It is impossible to know at what point Alexander fled the theatre. Presumably he is overcome by the grief-stricken and expressive women, mourning the loss of their husbands and children. But that business takes up virtually the entire play, which reads as one long and repetitive "io io!" It is indeed a play that is highly pathetic, especially in the women mourning their lost children. As I showed in Chapter 1, Sidney used this story as an example of tragedy's ability to move its audience. But Plutarch's story and the Euripidean play behind it served Shakespeare in a different way. Alexander's reaction

provides a model for the reaction that Hamlet hopes to induce in the tyrant Claudius through the "Mouse-Trap" play. Claudius's reaction does look a lot like Alexander's, a sudden flight from the theatre in a fit of emotion.[137] The character of Hecuba reminds the well-read Hamlet of Euripides' play, which in turn reminds him of the story of its efficacy in Plutarch, an efficacy he then successfully replicates with the "Mouse-Trap" production. But there are other clues in Euripides' play itself that may have caused Shakespeare to recollect it in the composition of *Hamlet*. Though the action of Euripides' play takes place after the occasion of Priam's death, Hecuba does refer back to that pitiful event: "Their father Priam -- not from other lips / I heard and wept his doom, but these mine eyes / Beheld him butchered on the altar-stone" (lines 481-83). Furthermore, there is a chilling presentiment of *Hamlet* in Euripides' play, when Andromache is forced to consider how she will respond to Achilles' son, who has chosen her for his spoil. Andromache is thus in a position similar to Gertrude's before she marries Claudius, who, like Achilles son, is party to her first husband's death. Andromache complains

> And yet one night, say they, unknits the knot
> Of woman's hate of any husband's couch!
> I scorn the wife who flings her sometime lord
> Away, and on a new couch loves another! (lines 665-68)

Thematically, then, there are links between *Hamlet* and *The Daughters of Troy*. They share not only the theme of the widow's predicament, but more important for my

[137] I think *emotion* is the right word here, since Claudius acts upon the feeling, thus showing the physical movement that I have argued is what sets emotion apart from passion in early modern poetics.

argument, the theme of emotional reaction to fiction.[138]

Philosophers usually treat questions such as Hamlet's metaphysically by attempting to define exactly what kind of object a literary character is. "What *is* Hecuba?" they ask. There is a commonsense answer, developed by Russell ("On Denoting"), Peter van Inwagen ("Creatures of Fiction"), and others that Hecuba *is* "a character in a play."[139] But this commonsense view is called into question within the metadrama of *Hamlet*. Like Spenser in the House of Busirane, here Shakespeare highlights the inscrutability and incompletion of his own literary creations in order to engage the minds of his audience in some very complex thinking.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophers have expressed worries about the view that Hecuba is a literary character. Arthur Danto writes that among philosophers there has been a "nagging concern that a difference is to be marked between sentences which miss the mark and sentences which have no mark to miss" (*Disenfranchisement* 142). If we say, "England has never had a queen, only kings," we have missed the mark because we have spoken inaccurately. But if we say, "The unicorn leapt over the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow," we cannot miss the mark, because the sentence has no objective truth as its target. "Britomart is lovesick" would be taken by Danto as an example of the latter. According to him, the statement is neither true nor

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[138] Barbara Goff writes that the *Hamlet* reference to Euripides' play, and the question "What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?" "suggests that part of its [i.e., Euripides' play's] fascination lies in the complex sympathy between those on stage and those who spectate" (9).

[139] Whereas the claims of Russell and van Inwagen look remarkably similar, surprisingly each comes from a completely different direction. Russell is an anti-realist about literary characters: They are nothing (but characters in books); van Inwagen is a realist: They *are* characters in books. For Russell, characters are nothing more than characters in books; for van Inwagen they are nothing less than characters in books.

false; it has no truth value *at all*. As Sidney famously wrote, the poet "nothing affirms" (*Defence* 102), a claim Sidney makes to refute the charge that poets are liars. But whether or not poets affirm the lives of their characters to be real is unrelated to whether or not these characters actually have lives.

Moreover, whether they exist or not would seem to have implications for whether or not they can move us, which is the *sine qua non* of good poetry for Sidney. If characters are not real persons then how can Sidney account for why a reader would be moved by an abstract, non-existent thing? Carroll helpfully formulates this potential problem as three related statements that cannot all be true at the same time:

> 1) We are genuinely moved by fictions.
>
> 2) We know that that which is portrayed in fictions is not actual.
>
> 3) We are only genuinely moved by what we believe is actual. (*Horror* 87).

Carroll claims that any theory of fiction's ability to move its audience will have to alter or reject at least one of these three propositions.

A number of solutions have been offered to this paradox. One way to deal with the challenge is to pinpoint the ontological status of fictional characters, that is, to answer the question, "What *are* fictions?," and thus revise or complicate Carroll's 2nd proposition. In 1904 Alexius Meinong made an early and still influential attempt to account for fictional characters by claiming that they had "being." In other words, they are actual, and Meinong is a realist vis-à-vis fictional objects. Thus Carroll's 2nd proposition is falsified. In other words, "There are objects of which it is true that there are

no such objects" (Meinong 83). Meinong writes, "Not only is the much heralded gold mountain made of gold, but the round square is as surely round as it is square" (82). In essence, the reason the gold mountain, Britomart, and other such "pure objects" are real is because without them being assumed to exist, one cannot speak of them. It must already be "given" as an object for one to make judgements about it. Meinongians, as most realists about fiction are categorized, think that fictions are real things.[140]

Russell was the first to quarrel with Meinong's position in print. He came to the conclusion that "All these [Meinongian references to fictions] are denoting phrases which do not denote anything" ("Denoting" 885). Instead, Russell writes, "the present King of France" is a denoting phrase that has a meaning but no denotation. We can understand what "the present King of France" means, even though we have no acquaintance with an actual present King of France.[141] Russell made important contributions to the philosophical conversation about fictions, by drawing attention to the way we use language. Russell's primary contribution to the study of fictional objects such as round squares and Moby Dick, as I see it, is to treat them as constructs of language, propositions, denoting phrases, whereas Meinong essentially takes an ontological

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[140] The basic "Meinongian" impulse to realism about fiction is what concerns me here. Meinong's own theory, as stated in *Theory of Objects*, is much more logically elaborate, separating kinds of reality (*sein* and *sosein*) from objects that are outside a concern for reality (*aussersein*). These logical complications are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

[141] The debate between these two philosophers can be treated adequately only by referring to some important issues in logic and semantics that are, alas, beyond the scope of this project. For a fuller treatment, see Janet Farrell Smith, "The Russell-Meinong Debate." If I wanted to argue about the logic of fictions, I would have to take into account the possibility of logical systems (e.g., free logic) that make room for Meinongian objects, even with their inherent contradictions and inconsistencies. Russell is taking a hard, classical line when he insists upon the violation of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle in his critique of Meinong. Free logic, developed later in the twentieth century, abandons some of these classical laws of logic.

approach. Russell formulated a theory of reference to fictions, one that contextualized them as statements not about fictional objects (which do not exist), but about fictional works (which do exist). Russell distinguishes between what he calls primary and secondary occurrences of a denoting phrase, a strategy that will later be picked up by those who wish to translate talk about fiction into contextualized utterances: "*In Spenser's poem*, Britomart is a beautiful woman." The portion of the sentence after the comma would be untrue if unqualified. But when predicated properly, it is perfectly true. "Britomart is a beautiful woman" is a primary utterance that is false. But "In Spenser's poem, Britomart is a beautiful woman" is a secondary utterance that is true.[142]

Some attempts to deal with Carroll's paradox of fiction have focused on this supposed discursive objectivity of fictional characters. According to these philosophers, we must keep in mind the purport, or intention, of such written creations. Gregory Currie, for example, employs speech-act theory to claim that an author's statements about a fictional character are special sorts of illocutionary acts, namely, ones supposed to *make believe*. Currie thus revises Carroll's 2nd proposition: we do not believe the fictions are actual, but we do *make-believe* that they are. Kendall Walton, in *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, also defends a position in which all fictions are part of a game of make-believe.

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[142] David Lewis, "Truth in Fiction," makes the further claim that even if there was a beautiful woman named Britomart in the real world, "We must distinguish between the homonyms, just as we would distinguish the name of London (England) from the homonymous name of London (Ontario)" (39). Lewis's claim worries me, though, because of its implications for historical persons treated fictionally (e.g., Tolstoy's Napoleon). In those cases, the relation is surely more than merely homonymic. Lewis's homonymic claim needs to be tested against Shakespeare's history plays, for example (Shakespeare's Richard II =? Richard II). There are some kinds of real-world counterparts for Britomart, Elizabeth I being one of them. Characters like Lady Macbeth would be especially important for such inquiry, since she is based on history, but history as told by Holinshed, in which her "historical" character is itself composite and legendary.

In his conception, fictional characters are props, so to speak, in an elaborate game.[143] To understand fictional entities, Walton claims, we must never lose sight of their origin in narrative, story telling, and make-believe. And, he further claims, we should not mistake our reactions to them as *real* emotions; instead, we should revise Carroll's 1st proposition and treat them as *make-believe* emotions.

If we follow Currie and Walton, we can revise the first two propositions, and keep the last one unhindered:

1') We *pretend* to be moved by fictions.

2') We *pretend* that that which is portrayed in fictions is actual.

3) We are only *genuinely* moved by what we believe is actual.

Like Currie and Walton, other philosophers, through what Carroll calls the illusion theory, claim that proposition 2 should be denied or revised. They essentially make a Coleridgian argument about temporarily suspending disbelief. They claim we do not know, *when we are engrossed in fiction*, that what we are reading is fiction. We truly believe *for the time being* that what we read is real. Carroll, however, wants to alter proposition 3, as do I. We know fictions are fictions (prop. 2), *and* we feel real emotions about them (prop. 1). This is because we can have genuine emotions about things other than those things deemed actually to exist (revision of prop. 3). In Carroll's revision of proposition 3, what we have emotions about when we read fiction are *thoughts*. For Carroll, to think that Britomart is in danger is not the same as to *believe* that she is *really*

[143] Though never explicitly invoked, Wittgenstein's theory of language games provides the foundation for Walton's position. In Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, the phrase "language-games [*Sprachspiele*]" is coined on page 4.

in danger in the real world. Nevertheless, Carroll thinks we can have emotions about such thoughts. For example, we can think about someone eating a slimy substance and be genuinely disgusted, *even if the person does not exist or we do not know that the slimy substance exists*. The *thought* of the hypothetical scenario can still make us feel *genuinely* disgusted.

Most treatments of the problem of fictional objects have continued to proceed along these ontological, psychological, or linguistic fronts. For example, van Inwagen makes the ontological claim that fictional characters are abstract existent objects. They exist, they are real, but only as abstract entities, thus revising proposition 2. But then van Inwagen will have to give an account of why we would have emotions toward abstract entities, i.e. provide a revision of proposition 1. Why would we care enough about abstract entities to have emotions about them? Van Inwagen explicitly situates his ontological argument vis-à-vis Meinongian and anti-Meinongian theories. If Meinongians say that Britomart is a real object, albeit an abstract one; and anti-Meinongians say that there is no such thing as Britomart, since that name is a "denoting phrase that does not denote anything"; van Inwagen takes the at-first-glance bold approach of saying that "there are things I shall call 'creatures of fiction,' and . . . every single one of them exists." Britomart, according to van Inwagen, does exist. But she is not a beautiful woman, or an Amazonian warrior. She is a character in a poem, a creation of Spenser, and the heroine of Book III. In other words, van Inwagen treats creatures of fiction as one part of a larger class of items he calls "*theoretical entities of literary criticism*, a category that also includes plots, subplots, novels (as opposed to tangible *copies* of novels), poems, meters,

rhyme schemes, borrowings, influences, digressions, episodes, recurrent patterns of imagery, and literary forms" (302-03). Further, van Inwagen makes a distinction between talk about a character in the discourses of literary criticism, and writing about a character within the literary work itself. When the Spenserian scholar writes, "Britomart has long hair," it is a true statement, because this literary entity named Britomart was actually given long hair in Spenser's poem. But when Spenser writes that Britomart has "golden locks . . . in tramels gay vpbounden" that "raught vnto her heels" (III.ix.20-21), it is not a true statement. Why? Van Inwagen takes exactly the same stance as Sidney: the poet "nothing affirms" (though the literary critic does). As van Inwagen puts it, "[T]ypical narrative or descriptive sentences taken from works of fiction are not about creatures of fiction. They are not about anything. They are not used by their authors as the vehicles of assertions" (307). Van Inwagen thus develops Russell's project of properly contextualizing utterances about literary characters, by making any utterance about Britomart that has truth value contingent upon its contextualization as a reading of Spenser's poem. Moreover, van Inwagen dismisses the Meinongian contention that fictional objects are *incomplete* abstract entities. For Meinong, Britomart does not have earlobes (since Spenser never mentions them). Van Inwagen, however, refines this position (and the position of Berel Lang) so that Britomart neither has earlobes nor lacks earlobes. The object is not incomplete; it's just not as robust an object as we might like. Because Spenser is silent on the topic, critics can make no true or false statement about them at all. Where Spenser is silent, we must be silent, says van Inwagen. Or as

Wittgenstein states at the end of his *Tractatus*, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (7).

Rorty disagrees with van Inwagen and shifts the conversation away from ontology in two important ways. First, he claims that there is no reason to complicate language:

> Why should the perfectly reasonable epistemological point that
>
> > The best way to find out about Sherlock Holmes is to read Conan Doyle's stories
>
> ever have been expressed as the semantical claim that
>
> > Statements about Sherlock Holmes are really about Conan Doyle's stories?
>
> Well, perhaps for the same bad reasons as
>
> > The best way to find out about the stars is to use your senses
>
> was expressed as
>
> > Statements about stars are really statements about sense-data.
>
> ("Problem" 128).

Rorty sees no problem with speaking *simpliciter* of Sherlock Holmes (or Britomart). On his account, it is perfectly fine, indeed felicitous, to have conversations about literary characters without worrying about ontology and epistemology. Unfortunately, though, fictional characters might be one area where pragmatism has thus far failed to speak intelligently. For Rorty's second point at least indirectly concerns epistemology. Rorty writes, "Why would anyone bother to be a Meinongian . . . rather than simply saying that we can have warranted assertions . . . which only a die-hard Platonist would insist are

'about objects'" ("Problem" 128)? We do not need to know what fictions "are," Rorty claims; we only need to be able to make warranted assertions about them in order to have conversations about them. In other words, we can continue to talk about "Britomart's development," "Britomart's beauty" and "Britomart's father" so long as we have a textual warrant for doing so.

But what the ductus of the House of Busirane episode suggests is that whether we are Platonists or pragmatists, realists or anti-realists, the extent of either our knowledge of, or our warrants for asserting things about a character is deeply problematic. In other words, epistemology must be a primary concern when discussing fictional objects vis-à-vis emotional attachments to them. For Platonic realists, this is a problem of the correspondence between conceptions and the world; for pragmatists it is the problem of how to achieve warrant for our assertions. If Rorty is right that "'ability to refer to X' in fictional discourse seems just 'ability to keep up a coherent conversation about X'" ("Problem" 118), then he has diminished any sense of warrant, since I can speak *coherently* about Britomart (perhaps creating *my version* of her) without warrantability in the context of *Spenser's version* of her.[144] And yet I still think Rorty is somehow right. Why? Because this is exactly how *real-world* conversation about *real* persons takes place. If we substitute, say, "Gordon Teskey" (the real-life Renaissance scholar) for "Britomart" (the fictional character in Spenser's poem) in our examples, the epistemological problems resemble one another. That is because Teskey, like any human

[144] To be fair, Rorty would probably want to put more pressure on coherence, and perhaps index that coherence to what a text explicitly says about a character. But such indices themselves seem to violate in spirit the Rortian project of discarding correspondence theory.

being, can be talked about in conversation only because and only if the speaker about him has a coherent version of him, even though knowledge is necessarily incomplete. It is the coherent version that makes warranted assertability possible in our conversations about persons in general, both humans and fictional characters.

What Spenser's poem helps us think through, I think, is a way to consider why this is the case. The poem seems to suggest with Meinong that existence is just one of many qualities we use to think about persons. Instead of giving it a special status, what Meinong calls "the prejudice in favor of the actual," it should be considered on a par with whether someone has red hair and whether someone is in love or in danger. Once this is admitted, then the difference between real persons and fictional characters seems much smaller. We know that Britomart does not exist. We also know that Teskey is not a professor of physics. These are just things we know about certain persons. Britomart is a non-existing female. Teskey is a non-physics professor. Still, Britomart is a female, and Teskey is a professor. They both fall into the category of persons we can know some things about, while also not being able to know other things about them.[145] And insofar as they fall into this category, we can have genuine emotions and conversations about them.

This is at least partly because the move beyond the world of the poem that the poem itself encourages suggests that the line between fictional and real may be very fine, but it also very important for producing an open path that leads from aesthetic objects of

[145] Strictly, this needs to be qualified, since the reasons for not knowing are different. With Teskey, I *may not* know currently whether he has toenails, because I have never been close enough to him to tell. With Britomart, I *cannot* ever know, if Spenser has not spoken on the subject. In practice, I believe such a distinction does not hinder the intuitive connections that readers make between fictional persons and real persons.

concern to concern with real persons. It suggests that the *fullness* (or lack thereof) of one's version of any person (real or fictive) in no way impedes intelligent conversation about that person. I can have a conversation with a non-specialist about Britomart, even though that non-specialist's version of Britomart is less full than mine. Though it is true that I will probably end up teaching him or her something about Britomart, thus making his or her version fuller, it is also true that someone who has read Teskey's work more carefully than me (or someone who knows him personally) can teach me something about him, and thus help me make my version of him more full. But there is no need for me to stop talking about Teskey until I have some ideal, fullest version possible of him. Thus "getting to know" Teskey is very similar to "getting to know" Britomart. We can have concern, and thus concern-based construals, about Britomart or Teskey because when we talk of something we tend to have concern for it. [146] Otherwise, why talk of it? We can thus revise Carroll's propositions in the following way:

> 1) We are genuinely moved by fictions.
>
> 2") We know people portrayed in fictions are not actual, *but* in certain key respects our epistemological situation vis-à-vis them closely resembles our epistemological situation vis-à-vis actual people.
>
> 3') We are genuinely moved by what we believe is actual, *and* by objects whose epistemological situation resembles that of actual objects.

The ductus of Spenser's poem encourages readers to think about the epistemology of art, and does so in a way that suggests that attempts to distinguish between the varying

[146] The concern-based construal, of course, can be positive or negative (hate or love, for example).

dimensionalities of art and attempts to distinguish between fiction and reality are equally quixotic. But this indiscernibility does not end in scepticism. Instead, it helps to make readers' movement from fiction to reality a viable possibility by making the movement itself not so much a huge leap between very different realms, as a shared and similar experience. The resemblance of the two realms is what makes Sidneian and Spenserian aesthetic emotion possible.

3. Back to Britomart

In Spenser studies, critics including Quilligan, Silberman, and Berger have specifically examined Britomart's status as literary character. Gregerson reveals postmodern anxieties about character criticism when she writes that Britomart "is a (fictive) woman," the parentheses highlighting the desire to both speak and not speak of characters as (real) persons (12). Similarly opposed desires are provoked by the presentation of persons in the artwork of Busirane's house. As Spenser's poem leads Britomart and her readers through a dimensional hierarchy of artistic personhood, it calls into question the very notion of personhood. Spenser's philosophical puzzlement about fictional personhood is one of the chief driving forces behind the thinking that the House of Busirane encourages, ultimately with consequences for readers' thinking about their ethical relationships with real persons. Spenser's meditation, and his readers', begins with art, but ends in life.

Renaissance scholarship in the last twenty years has been preoccupied with questions of subjectivity, which has meant in practice a preoccupation with inwardness. Two of the most important books in the field, for example, are Katharine Maus's

Inwardness and Theater and Schoenfeldt's *Bodies and Selves*, both of which focus in different ways on the epistemology of interiority. The latter book, whose subtitle is "Physiology and Inwardness," goes some way toward physicalizing literary interiority by calling attention to physiology. But it privileges inwardness as the thing we want to understand, which is only one kind of worry about literary representation. Amoret's bleeding heart in the House of Busirane gives the lie to the desire for physiological inwardness in our accounts of fictional characters. Busirane's surgical inspection of Amoret's insides is presented as a ghastly violation. Amoret "Of her dew honour was despoyled quight, / And a wide wound therein (O ruefull sight) / Entrenched deep with knyfe accursed keene . . . (The worke of cruell hand)" (III.xii.20). That Busirane, the enemy of chastity, tortures Amoret in this way suggests that knowledge of the interiors of others might in itself be a violation. Instead, the corresponding problem of the epistemology of the *exteriority* of literary representations presents itself. It is this question that I will allow to bother me somewhat. I will not ask the questions, "What are Britomart's beliefs?," "To what degree does Britomart demonstrate self-awareness?" or "Does Britomart have an immortal soul?" I will instead ask, "Does Britomart have two arms?," "Does Britomart have a mother?," "What role does Britomart's physical body play in her picturing of Chastity?" and "How does the picturing of Britomart's physicality by readers inform the ethical significance of the poem?"

In *A Defence of Poetry*, Sidney famously states that Nature's "world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden" (78). He thus makes explicit a comparison between fictional worlds and the real one: "Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers

poets have done" (78). Poetic flowers are "more sweet-swelling," poetic trees are more "fruitful," and poetic rivers are more "pleasant" (78). Sidney then turns his attention away from poetic landscape, and towards poetic characters. Again, Sidney claims that poetic characters are more marvelous, better, more efficacious than their real-world counterparts. A good poet, Sidney says, is able to "deliver forth" poetic characters "in such excellency as he had imagined them" (79). Further, Sidney asks readers to "learn aright why and how that maker made" a character like Cyrus, or Aeneas, or Orlando (79). Sidney explains that the excellence of literary character is its reflection of the "*idea*, or fore-conceit" of the poet (79). For example, if Spenser's *idea* of chastity is the fore-conceit of Britomart, chastity is the excellence that he delivers. And if she accurately represents such excellence, then she is a successful poetic creation. Of course, even this way of reading imagined excellence opens up further issues. (Exactly how does Britomart *represent* chastity?) But, if we read Sidney's account differently, it raises even more interesting questions. In what ways does the poetic Cyrus imitate a real person, and vice versa?

To get at this problem, I want to end this project with a closer consideration of readers' epistemological situation vis-à-vis fictional characters. Positivistic claims about such characters are, of course, common. Mark Rose claims, "Spenser has given us a consistent picture of Britomart's growth" (103). He also claims that after III.iv "[t]here is relatively little further development of Britomart herself" (103). Rose claims, "[W]e have witnessed the growth of Britomart from a young girl, as ignorant of herself as of the world around her, into a great lady of considerable wisdom and knowledge" (103). But

Rose, I think, confuses the issue by failing to differentiate how a reader's knowledge of Britomart develops from how Britomart's knowledge of her self develops. But whether the development of Britomart for readers should be taken as analogous to Britomart's growing knowledge of herself can be left aside for the moment. What is clear is that, as Stevie Davies claims, "Britomart is distinctly felt by most [or at least many] readers to exist as a person rather than a walking concept" (58, my bracketed qualification).

Readers are given a lot of physical information about Britomart. Most memorably perhaps, she has "golden locks . . . in tramels gay vpbounden" that "raught vnto her heels" (III.ix.20-21). In Book IV, this exceedingly long hair not only falls to her feet, but also encircles her entire body (IV.i.13). We are further specifically told that she has "greedy eyes" (III.xi.53), an "angels face" (IV.vi.19), "dainty parts" (which Hamilton glosses as breasts, but which seems to hint at more private areas, V.vii.29), "an alablaster brest" (III.ii.42), and "bone" (V.vii.33). Glauce further calls her "tall, / And large of limbe" (III.iii.53). These are physical attributions that cannot really be questioned, unless one questions the reliability of Spenser's narration. And there are other physical features that, though no explicit reference is made to them, we can deduce. For example, she has all that is required for speech (mouth, tongue, lungs), since we hear her speak many times. Similarly, she must have ears since she listens; and she must have blood, because she bleeds. Spenser also tells us a lot about Britomart's attire. Under her armor, she always wears a "snow-white smock" (III.i.63). The armor itself is "all fretted round with gold" (III.iii.58), and is accompanied by a "brave bauldrick" (III.iii.59), "an Hebene [ebony] speare" (IV.vi.6), and a shield (III.iii.60). On her head, she wears a helmet with a

ventail (IV.vi.19) and a crest (III.iv.7). She also wears a "heauy haberieon," or mail shirt, presumably over her white smock.

But there is also a lot we do not know about her. Glauce, Britomart's nurse has "armes twaine" (III.ii.34); does Britomart? Spenser only mentions one of Britomart's arms (III.i.4). Most readers are prepared to assume she has two arms because she fights and carries a shield and spear. Rose writes, "We become acquainted gradually with the qualities of the characters by their actions, as well as by, what the poet progressively tells us about them" (82). But I would suggest that this assumption and others like it are called into question in Spenser's poem. Spenser sets up his poem, and especially the end of Book III, to make readers think deeply about the epistemology of fictional characters: what can we know about them, and how do we know it?

The ways by which readers come to know Britomart are explicitly complicated at the very beginning of her introduction into the poem. Britomart is one of a number of exemplars of cross-dressing, Amazonian warriors in Renaissance romance. When she first appears in the poem, she is covered in armor and jousts exceedingly well. So the other characters in the poem (and readers of it) mistake her for a man. Though the Proem to the book has prepared readers to expect a female heroine, it does not prepare readers to know when this heroine will appear. She actually shows up very early, in the 4th stanza of the Book. But no first-time reader would know as much from the following description. Guyon and Arthur ride along after defacing the Bower of Bliss in the previous Book, and

> At last as through an open plaine they yode,

They spide a knight, that towards pricked fayre,
And him beside an aged Squire there rode,
That seemd to couch vnder his shield three-square,
As if that age badd him that burden spare,
And yield it those, that stouter could it wield:
He them espying, gan him selfe prepare,
And on his arme addresse his goodly shielde
That bore a lion passant in a golden field. (III.i.4)

The social person of the knight is introduced, and at this point in the poem only male versions of it have been encountered. The masculine pronouns in this passage are also repeated for emphasis, the pronominal evidence for masculinity (him, his, he) imitating the preponderance of visual evidence available to Guyon and Arthur. But Spenser is not just following romantic tradition; he is setting up in the very beginning of the book an uncertainty about literary character and personhood that the entire Book, but especially its ending in the House of Busirane, will develop. Even when readers seem to be presented with a straight portrait of the female Britomart, Spenser's language seems to call attention to its inability to discern characters in the narrative. Like Rabelais's *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, Lanham suggests, Spenser's poem "renders us self-conscious about narrative form. . . . What is a character? An event? What do you mean by story?"

(*Motives* 165).[147] And like Rabelais, Spenser "find[s] characterization a useful tool but not an overpowering obligation" (Lanham, *Motives* 173). Shakespeare, too, due to the necessities of stagecraft, similarly, and explicitly, asked readers to think about characters and events. The prologue to *Henry V* famously begs pardon for

> The flat unraised spirits that hath dared
> On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth
> So great an object. Can this cockpit hold
> The vasty fields of France? Or may we cram
> Within this wooden O the very casques
> That did affright the air at Agincourt?
> O, pardon! (Pro. 9-15)

That such incomplete seeming creates a sense of reality is one of the effects of good narrative poetry.

The effect can be rationally explained by saying that readers are trained early on to fill in the missing parts, to imagine the color of Britomart's eyes when we are only told they are "greedy," and to imagine the details of her rather generally described "angels face." It is just such imagining that Shakespeare explicitly encourages when he asks his audience to "Piece out our imperfections with your thoughts" (*H5* Pro. 23). What is shocking, though, is the generality of such description (the "imperfections") when compared to the realism that readers sometimes think they see in fictional characters.

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[147] Lanham is writing about Rabelais's work, but he explicitly notes the applicability of what he writes about Rabelais to Spenser's poem: "The two poems, in fact, resemble one another in striking ways" (*Motives* 172).

This leads Lanham to protest, "Upon the literal Britomart has been built an edifice of meaning she can scarcely bear" ("Literal" 429). But perhaps Lanham is whistling past the graveyard here. The filling-in that readers perform is not just a part of the experience of reading fiction; it is also a part of their everyday lives. Every day, we meet persons whose total being (both physical and psychological) is hidden from us. Our practical beliefs about them are at once conjectural and unquestioned, just as in the case of literary characters. So when Silberman claims that in Britomart's pursuit of Artegall, she might be "chasing after an illusion, the creation of her own imagination," Silberman, I think, pinpoints a "theoretical model of understanding" that links the world of the poem to the world outside it (*Transforming* 7). For example, under normal circumstances, when we meet someone wearing a dress and high heels and makeup, we assume this person to have a female body, and statistically speaking such an assumption is valid. The problem of course is that such appearances can be misleading. And yet, in most contexts, most people ignore this small statistical possibility rather than considering it. Aside from the practical matter of procreation, the possibility does not seem to matter much. Pragmatically, such assumptions simply help individuals and communities to avoid deep and crippling scepticism and to get on in the world. Readers are similarly willfully ignorant about literary characters. We assume things about characters that are never made explicit in the text.

Even more troubling, perhaps, is Nietzsche's insistence on the paucity of knowledge we may have about *ourselves*: "What indeed *does* man know about himself? . . . Does not nature keep secret from him most things, even about his body, *e.g.*, the

convolutions of the intestines, the quick flow of the blood-currents, the intricate vibration of the fibres, so as to banish and lock him up in proud, delusive knowledge?" (*Works* 2:175-76). Nietzsche's epistemological question might help readers to think more clearly about the intellectual (not to mention psychological) stakes involved in the explicit and gruesome presentation of Amoret's heart at the end of Busirane's masque. Coming at the end of Spenser's ductus concerning art, life, and representation, his description of Amoret represents a *tour de force* of interpretive possibilities. Because Amoret is embedded within the Masque of Cupid, her person recapitulates the Masque's program of iconicity and pseudo-reality. Like the masquers, Amoret is presented as an icon, since she "[h]ad Deathes owne ymage figurd in her face, / Full of sad signes." Instead of representing a step beyond the hierarchies of representation into the real world, Amoret's symbolic description reminds readers that she, too, is necessarily reduced and incomplete. Any knowledge of her or any other person is incomplete in the sense that other persons view her through their own interpretive perspective on her. But, perhaps paradoxically, this incompleteness of Amoret evinces the "common form" that Wittgenstein implies real and fictive worlds must share. Just when readers seem to be presented with a real person, they are swiftly reminded of the symbolic and reductive nature of our knowledge of real persons. She is "like a dreary Spright," which recalls the liminality of the masquers' existence, stuck halfway between earthly physicality and other-worldly numinosity. Moreover, as Emily Jackson has shown, Amoret's heart, according to Galenic and Petrarchan culture, represents the fount of her emotions. Amoret thus fits into the ductus of the House of Busirane as a reminder of the movement that both makes the ductus

possible and is one concern of that ductus. Many other readings of her description can be based upon Spenser's peculiarly multivalent diction here. For example, the diction hints very strongly at her being a metaphor of writing. She is "figurd . . . Full of sad signes," the "wide wound" of the knife being the "work of cruell hand," where *work* hints at the works of a writer and *hand* hints at penmanship. Once these hints are established, the final line of stanza 20 ("That dyde in sanguine red her skin all snowy cleene") conjures the image of red letters in a manuscript rubrification or printed on a white page. This motif continues in stanza 21 in the "drawne" heart and "deadly dart," *drawing* being multivalent between "brought forth" and "represented with a pen or pencil," the writing instrument that the "dart" metaphorically suggests. This is the kind of reading that Spenser's poem time and again makes possible. His poem is deeply metapoetic, as many have noted before.

But there is one context for the imagery of Amoret's description that to my knowledge has not yet been elaborated: the late Renaissance theater of vivisection. Jonathan Sawday has given a revealing reading of such theater scenes through visual images of such anatomy and dissection. The examples of Vesalius, Harvey, and others are too well-known to review here, but Sawday's readings of these images is revealing when paired with a reading of Amoret as subject of dissection. There is plenty in her description that literally denotes a kind of dissection. She has a wide wound caused by a knife, and "At that wide orifice her trembling hart / Was drawne forth and in siluer basin layd." Though the sliver basin indeed fits the liturgical imagery encouraged by the Solomonic structure of the House, such a basin could also be read as the receptacle in

which a professor of anatomy might lay an organ for inspection.[148] Such a receptacle can be seen holding a brain on the title page of Helkiah Crooke's *Mikrokosmographia, A Description of the Body of Man* (London, 1631). Because, as Sawday shows, the late sixteenth century witnesses a shift among anatomists from a Galenic model of the body to a Vesalian one, Amoret's dissected heart cuts right to the heart of Spenser's concern with personhood and inwardness in this episode. Though Jackson is right on one level to compare Amoret's bleeding heart to the Cupidean tradition of the iconized heart, on another level the heart needs to be scrutinized in a more scientific way.

In woodcut portrayals of anatomies, the self-dissecter is one important motif.[149] In these depictions, the anatomized subject remains alive to peel back his or her own skin and reveal his or her insides. Though perhaps not strictly impossible on a small scale, such self-dissection nevertheless upsets several commonsensical ideas regarding the differences between living and dead, real and imagined, possible and impossible. In other words the self-dissecter suggests some of the same issues that the House of Busirane raises. Though Amoret is not a self-dissecter her heartless life presents similar paradoxes and difficulties. It is one thing for the self-dissecter to peel back the skin on his bowels, it is another for the anatomized figure to subsist while the heart is removed from the body. For one thing, removal is very different than mere pointing. For another, the heart is not just another organ. According to the seventeenth-century chirurgeon Thomas Vicary, "[The] Hart . . . is the principal of al other members, and the beginning of life" (H4v).

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[148] Jackson calls Busirane "a medical practitioner" (116).
[149] Several examples are reproduced in Sawday.

The other organs "receyve their liuing of him," the "Lord or King" of the body. If this is anatomical truth, then it might be possible for any one organ to be removed and life still be sustained. The heart is the only organ, if Vicary's logic is followed, that cannot be removed with the subject staying alive. Moreover, Vicary makes another brilliantly suggestive differentiation. Unlike the other organs, which have blood "but in their Veines," the heart "hath blood in his substaunce" (I1r). Thus Spenser's depiction of Amoret's dissected heart is not just another nod to the heart's symbolic valence within courtly love, but also an anatomically informed choice. Busirane's House is modelled on the sacred space of the Temple of Solomon, but it is also modelled on an anatomy theater, a confluence of models that is strange until one realizes that in January 1540 Vesalius performed a series of dissections in the seemingly incongruous confines of the Church of San Francisco in Bologna (Sawday 114). Thus the awful edifice of the House of Busirane is paradoxically a fitting location for the exacting scientific treatment of Amoret's body.

Back in Chapter 1, I first delved into the House of Busirane by comparing Harvey's treatment of an earthquake to the earthquake that Britomart experiences before the Masque of Cupid. But Spenser not only modelled the beginning of the masque on Harvey's account -- Spenser was still thinking of Harvey in his description of the masque's central figure, Amoret. As we saw in Chapter 1, one upshot of Harvey's analysis of the earthquake is the related analysis of human emotion. It is fitting then that Amoret's heart is paraded in the midst of Busirane's masque, because it is after all, as Robert Burton says, "[t]he seat and organe of all passions and affections" (B6r). Thus Spenser's emotional ductus achieves its most startling and clear depiction in Amoret's bleeding

heart. But whereas Jackson reads Amoret's heart as Busirane's "literaliz[ation of] Galenic theory to serve his own purposes" (109), I read it as yet another instance of Spenser thinking in post-Galenic ways about the new concept of emotion.

But the presentation of the heart of Amoret is not a scientific exploration; it is a violation. This is not just because it is violent; it is also because it represents an inappropriate (and quixotic) epistemological invasion. Ultimately, Book III of *The Faerie Queene* concerns itself not so much with a robust notion of self-knowledge and knowledge of others as with an epistemological chastity properly acknowledging "the limitations of human understanding" (Silberman, *Transforming* 13). And just as in real life, knowledge of other minds is harder to achieve than knowledge of other bodies. In a discussion of the possibility of private experience, knowledge, and expression, Wittgenstein writes, "Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot" (*Philosophical* 297)? Wittgenstein uses this example to consider, among other things, the kind of inferences we can make about private experience based upon external expressions. Wittgenstein wants to say we can never assume there is water inside the pictured pot with pictured steam coming out of it. Similarly, we can never know the content of another person's private experience, no matter how fully they try to externalize it through language.

But whereas in the real world facts about another person's inner experiences are more hidden, in some fiction, readers have closer access to inner lives than they do in real life. I would argue, though, that this makes knowledge of the inner lives of fictional

characters even more circumspect, since it lulls readers (including so many readers of Spenser) into a false sense of security regarding their knowledge of characters. It is like "seeing" boiling water in a pictured pot. Spenser's thought experiment provides a way to think more clearly and complexly about the poem's myriad representations. It calls attention to the missing parts of any representation, which percipients might surreptitiously fill in in their own minds. Most people who see the pictured pot with pictured steam will, in a second stage of perceiving, "fill in" the water inside the pot. The problem is that this is not a very strong inference. There could be tea in the pot, for example. Or there might be pasta in there. There *might be* anything in there. Why? Because there is *nothing* in there. It is a picture. There is not even a pot or steam to begin with, only representations of them. And there is not even a representation of the interior of the pot, so it seems silly (to Wittgenstein) to talk about what is in the pot. Similarly for Wittgenstein, it seems like a big jump to try and discern the details of the inner experiences of our fellow humans. In the case of literary character, we are always given some representation, but like the pictured pot, such representations are incomplete in ways that trigger the minds of readers to fill in the details. And as I argued above, this is the important similarity between real-world perception and the perception of fictions that allows for emotion to happen. Whereas ecphrasis turns visual art into words, sometimes readers do the opposite: take verbal descriptions and imagine their visual manifestations. But if we try to draw or paint or put into stained glass Britomart, or simply to imagine her in our minds, we have very little to work with. We have an incomplete picture. And different readers might fill in the picture in different ways, just as different observers

come to have very different pictures of real-life people. Finally, the House of Busirane episode allows its readers to think both about the status of fictional characters, and ultimately about interpersonal relations in the real world. We can never know enough about Britomart; she is incomplete. And this helps us to understand, to think about, the epistemological uncertainty of real world relations. This then is one upshot of the brilliant and demanding ductus that Spenser creates for his readers in the House of Busirane, encouraging readers to think about the similarity of fiction and life, and giving readers a path to follow from aesthesis to action.

In the preceding chapter, I argued that Spenser's ethical aesthetics is indebted to the writings of Bernard. In the House of Busirane, Spenser indeed portrays what Bernard calls "ridiculous monstrosities . . . extraordinary things at once beautiful and ugly" ("Apologia" 66). One sympathizes with Bernard's assessment of elaborate art: "One could spend the whole day gazing fascinated at these things" ("Apologia" 66). But Spenser is not writing for novice monks. He is writing for increasingly sophisticated early modern English readers, and by providing them with a literary ductus he provides them with a Bernardine "more nourishing diet" (*Song* 1).

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