The United States, Swiss and Swedish Neutrality during the Early Cold War, or: How the United States Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Neutrality

This thesis explores the evolution of the United States’ conception of neutrality during the early Cold War (1945–1962) through the cases of Sweden and Switzerland—two of Europe’s most enduring neutral states. Despite early hostility and ideological rigidity, exemplified by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ denunciation of neutrality as “immoral,” the U.S. gradually shifted from stringency to strategic acceptance and even respect for neutral powers. Drawing from extensive archival research, this study identifies three key phases in this paradigm shift: an initial period of ideological rigidity (1945–1949), a transitional phase of practical engagement (1950–1956), and a final period of strategic pragmatism (1956–1962). The analysis reveals that neutrality, while anomalous in a binary Cold War order, became a useful tool in U.S. foreign policy, particularly through the diplomatic services provided by Sweden and Switzerland. By examining these “pericentric” actors, the thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of Cold War diplomacy and demonstrates how pluralism and ideological flexibility persisted within the Western bloc. Ultimately, it challenges the notion that Cold War geopolitics were uniformly rigid, highlighting the space for neutrality even amid ideological polarization.