Chinese Foreign Assistance and African Political Elites

This paper examines how Chinese foreign assistance impacts the political development of African states. The emergence of China as a major trade and aid partner in Africa has drawn popular criticism that Chinese aid practices are detrimental to African democratization and governance reform. I examine these claims by first constructing a model of African elite interactions, in which Chinese foreign assistance serves as an unearned revenue stream that incumbents may use to retain power and avoid reform. I test this model in descriptive case studies of Angola and Zambia, as well as the comparative case of Algeria. I find little significant evidence that Chinese aid plays an important role in reinforcing the power of incumbent elites. There is little evidence that aid is used as a source of institutionalized patronage, and the effects of aid in other areas are insignificant relative to other variables, particularly the presence of nationalized hydrocarbons revenues. I conclude that governance concerns over Chinese aid are overstated, and that future study of Sino-African political interactions should concentrate on the effects of FDI, trade, immigration, and oil as well as aid.