(Somewhat) Willing & Able: The Use of Caveats in Coalition Warfare
Ray, Derek, Foreign Affairs - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Virginia
Potter, Philip, AS-Dept of Politics, University of Virginia
During the course of coalition warfare, many states choose to limit the actions and types of missions their troop contributions can perform through the use of caveats. This self-limiting behavior is bemoaned for how it complicates military planning and reduces the military efficiency of the coalition as a whole; yet countries continue to impose self-limiting caveats on their troops. This dissertation demonstrates that the origin of caveats in coalition warfare lies in the differences between national-level preferences regarding the conduct of war. In particular this dissertation finds the differences in the issues of casualty sensitivity and regard for civilian protections lead determine the level of caveats imposed by an individual state on its troops.
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
Coalition, Alliance, Warfare
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