Socializing Militants:How States End Asymmetric Conflict with Non-state Opponents
Rozman, Jeremiah, Foreign Affairs - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Virginia
Copeland, Dale, AS-Dept of Politics, University of Virginia
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen states engaged in long-term conflicts with asymmetrically weaker non-state opponents. States aim to end these conflicts as quickly as possible by combining force and diplomacy to socialize these militants—meaning give them the characteristics of states—in order to make a credible bargain achievable. The militant’s characteristics determine the state’s optimal strategy. The state’s actual strategy is distorted by its internal and external constraints. Through 41 interviews, primary and secondary source data, I analyze the United States’ Russia’s and Israel’s asymmetric conflicts with militants and demonstrate that socialization logic most comprehensively explains their strategies throughout those conflicts.
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
conflict resolution, terrorism, counterinsurgency, war