Conceptual Distress: the constitutive problem for accounts of mental disorder

Author:
Oakley, Elyse, Philosophy - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Virginia
Advisor:
Barnes, Elizabeth, AS-Philosophy (PHIL, University of Virginia
Abstract:

Starting from the assumption that mental disorders are real entities, I give a sympathetic critical examination of the nature of mental disorders. I conclude that it is unlikely that, given some of the consequences of this assumption taken together with a required component of mental disorders, we can ever give a single, unified, fully explanatory account of the nature of mental disorders.

Degree:
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
Keywords:
philosophy of psychiatry, social metaphysics, mental disorders, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, reification
Language:
English
Rights:
All rights reserved (no additional license for public reuse)
Issued Date:
2023/08/02