Online Archive of University of Virginia Scholarship
Conceptual Distress: the constitutive problem for accounts of mental disorder148 views
Author
Oakley, Elyse, Philosophy - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Virginia
Advisors
Barnes, Elizabeth, AS-Philosophy (PHIL, University of Virginia
Abstract
Starting from the assumption that mental disorders are real entities, I give a sympathetic critical examination of the nature of mental disorders. I conclude that it is unlikely that, given some of the consequences of this assumption taken together with a required component of mental disorders, we can ever give a single, unified, fully explanatory account of the nature of mental disorders.
Degree
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
Keywords
philosophy of psychiatry; social metaphysics; mental disorders; philosophy of science; philosophy of mind; reification
Language
English
Rights
All rights reserved (no additional license for public reuse)
Oakley, Elyse. Conceptual Distress: the constitutive problem for accounts of mental disorder. University of Virginia, Philosophy - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, PHD (Doctor of Philosophy), 2023-08-02, https://doi.org/10.18130/xxft-ry65.
