Online Archive of University of Virginia Scholarship
Chevron Deference and Corporate Concentration in the American Financial System, 1968-1987648 views
Author
Erlandson, Erik, History - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Virginia
Advisors
Balogh, Brian, Department of History, University of Virginia
Abstract
Extant narratives on deregulation underscore the importance of the legislative and executive branches. This paper argues that judicial and administrative mechanisms were equally important to the weakening of regulatory programs. It looks at transformations to financial regulation during the 1980s, and suggests that judicial deference to agency discretion was an instrumental policy tool conservatives used to chip away at the regulatory state.
Erlandson, Erik. Chevron Deference and Corporate Concentration in the American Financial System, 1968-1987. University of Virginia, History - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, MA (Master of Arts), 2014-04-30, https://doi.org/10.18130/V3W372.
