Abstract
In the technical report and sociotechnical research paper that follow, I examine two distinct yet related aspects of marine vehicle development. In my technical report, I present an alternative form of marine propulsion to the classic engine-propeller design. In my sociotechnical research paper, I examine how organizational and financial factors affected the design process of the Titan submersible and led to its eventual, catastrophic failure. The technical report and sociotechnical research are similar both topically and thematically, as both involve marine research and both address the specific design processes necessary to build safety-critical or otherwise-hazardous systems. The technical report deals with a propulsion system which has the potential to release hazardous gases during operation, while the sociotechnical research paper illuminates the specific organizational circumstances which allowed the unsafe Titan submersible to carry passengers before the design could be fully tested.
In the technical report, my capstone team and I outline the inspiration and design process behind our successful magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) propulsion system. MHD propulsion has been evaluated for decades as a potential, quieter alternative to traditional engine-propeller systems, but few real world prototypes exist. The system uses perpendicular electric and magnetic fields to impart a force on the sodium and chloride ions in saltwater, pushing the water through the drive to create thrust. Importantly, this process produces small amounts of dangerous Chlorine gas. Dealing with this gas and other safety challenges, such as high electrical currents and strong magnets, throughout the design process has been important to ensuring the eventual success of the MHD system.
The sociotechnical research paper examines the Titan submersible’s catastrophic failure through the lens of Actor Network Theory (ANT). It proposes that the disaster resulted from a web of economic, social, and psychological factors and the invisible relationships between them. Specifically, the company’s financial strategy, personnel selection, and the existing regulatory environment combined to allow the operationalization of an untested, unreliable submarine design, directly contributing to the eventual implosion of the vessel. By drawing on ANT, I am able to examine how these human and non-human factors interacted to destabilize the traditional safety mechanisms around marine passenger vessels and increase the risk of eventual, catastrophic failure.
The STS project taught me to consider the possibility of unintended, secondary consequences when making design decisions during my technical project. By examining the Titan submersible disaster through the lens of ANT, I learned about the specific ways in which tight schedules and overconfident company culture can lead to disaster, especially when designing new and unproven technologies. I applied these lessons in my capstone project by emphasizing humility in team design processes and by prioritizing testing safety over rapid development when setting team development timelines. Given the hazards posed by Chlorine gas and high electrical currents during operation of the capstone team’s MHD design, the application of Titan’s lessons played a significant role throughout the capstone process. Finally, ANT will provide a powerful tool throughout my career as an engineer, either in evaluating technical systems as an entry-level analyst or in making organizational decisions as a manager and team leader.
Notes
School of Engineering and Applied Science
Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering
Technical Advisors: Daniel Quinn, Christopher Goyne
STS Advisor: Benjamin Laugelli
Technical Team Members: Eric Avellone, Kellylyn Brinkac, Cameron Dearman, Jack Finning, Will Hixson, William McGee, Samantha Ritchie, Amitav Suchdev, Albert Tang
