Relations, Truth, and Existence: A Defense of Presentism

An entity (i.e. an individual or event) is wholly non-present (i.e. Wl10ll_V past or wholly future) it‘, roughly, that entity exists at some past or future times, but does not exist at the present time. If presentism is true, then there are no wholly non-present entities. I defend presentism from a variety of objections clustering around cross - temporal relations (how can entities existing at the present time stand in purported relations to wholly nonpresent entities‘.'), the supervcnicnce of truth on being (on what does the truth of propositions about Wl10ll_V non-present entities supervene?), and the existence of singular propositions (how can singular propositions with wholly non-present constituents existi'). In the presentist"s favor, I conclude that the objection from cross-temporal relations can be resolved, that the supcrveniencc of truth on being poses no insunnountable difficulty, and that, one way or another, the (purported) existence of singular propositions can be aeeonnnodated.

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