How Perceptual Experience Bears on the Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects

"Ordinary ontology" is the thesis that there exist ordinary objects like rocks, but no extraordinary objects like trogs (mereological sums of tree trunks and dogs) or incars (objects essentially co-located with cars inside of garages). Metaphysicians almost uniformly reject ordinary ontology. Most do so based on the charge that ordinary ontology is objectionably parochial, placing the unique concerns of human beings over the objective ontological truth. I contend that this charge – and thereby the almost uniform rejection of ordinary ontology among metaphysicians – rests on an empirically outdated picture of perceptual experience. In this dissertation, I argue that replacing this picture with a contemporary account of perception in better empirical standing vindicates ordinary ontology. Here’s how I proceed. In Chapter 1, I argue that perception (properly construed) justifies claims about the persistence of objects. In Chapter 2, I defend ordinary ontology by arguing that perception provides us with evidence for both the existence of ordinary objects and for the nonexistence of extraordinary objects – as such, I conclude that material object ontology is an empirical discipline. Finally, in Chapters 3 and 4, I leverage my claim that material object ontology is an empirical discipline to diagnose where several challenges to ordinary ontology go awry.