Solar-Powered Fixed-Wing Aircraft Design; A Failure of Society: Liability Without Human Morality

Autonomous technologies become more and more prevalent with each passing day, and with them, innovations in the realm of unmanned control systems are continually being explored. I specifically idealize autonomous technology as part of a “grand vision” for the future, as human ease and efficiency are two of the most prominent avenues of technological growth. The idea that most tasks could someday be completed without any human intervention is both highly tantalizing and slightly horrifying. As a result, my Technical Thesis and STS Research Paper both echo this sentiment: one seeks to advance autonomous technologies to new heights by implementing such systems in a solar-powered aircraft, and the other warns of the problems these technologies have already introduced and explores potential remedies.
The contrarian nature of their coupling is intentional. While I may have starry-eyed visions of a future shaped by autonomous technology, it is important not to understate the significant challenges associated with large-scale integration that must be addressed before achieving that sci-fi future.
The Solar-Powered Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft, or SPARC, was born from an incredibly ambiguous mission statement: create a solar-powered flying vehicle. The actual objectives and constraints for the resulting aircraft were drafted based on realistic expectations and achievable goals. The final mission statement became: create a solar-powered autonomous drone capable of sustaining extremely long-duration flights for satellite-scale reconnaissance and fuel self-sufficiency. Using knowledge gained from the Aerospace major, a group of 13 students and I researched, experimented, and drafted a finalized design for a solar-powered plane that, in all verifiable simulations, was able to achieve a successful launch, steady flight, and landing. Every aspect of the plane was meticulously chosen and implemented for the end goal of steady level flight in realistic scenarios. With all components tested and working, integration into the finalized aircraft and completed design was the final step. Initial hopes were for some kind of physical small-scale demonstration of the solar-powered flight, but neither budget nor time allowed this, leaving the end product of the Technical Thesis as the fully completed design of the SPARC.
My STS Research Paper, on the other hand, identified a problem with autonomous technology and sought to analyze it and offer solutions. Considering the prevalence of self-driving cars as a growing and relevant industry of large-scale, civilian-accessible autonomous technology, my paper uses the case of Elaine Herzberg, the first self-driving car fatality in the United States, to analyze why the law does not function effectively when liability is involved without a human operator–in this case, just an algorithm designed and tested by Uber. I argue that unclear liability in the circumstances is what caused the failure of the system, as Uber was found to bear no fault for the incident. The most important supporting evidence was the fact that liability for Uber was not even considered, despite the company’s inadequate safety culture, general lax regulatory oversight, and weak training practices that allowed the accident to occur in the first place. Even more troubling was that the algorithm's failure to identify a human simply because they were not near a crosswalk was an incredible oversight with dire consequences. With unclear legal frameworks, it becomes nearly impossible to hold a corporation criminally liable. Considering that corporate criminal charges had only ever occurred once in Arizona before this case, there is a clear need for future legal codes and precedents that can ensure fair outcomes.
Overall, both the Technical Thesis and the STS Research Paper resulted in much gained, but still numerous disappointments. The inability to create any physical product for the SPARC honestly made the project feel incomplete. Going in, we had no idea of the scope and scale of the requirements, factors, and considerations that go into creating an aircraft from the ground up. With little inspiration and few prior examples in the industry to rely on, I still feel we ended up with a very strong final product. The STS Research Paper disappointed me in a different way, as I ultimately discovered that a corporation was once again able to evade accountability, with criminal liability falling on someone who truly should not have borne the full weight of culpability. Whether this is a broader consequence of corporate influence or a lack of legal precedent is uncertain, but I believe both played a role. I made the case for the ambiguous liability structure present in the incident.
Despite the challenges, I see room for continued development in both projects. The SPARC design remains open to further detailing, optimization, and perhaps even future manufacturing. Similarly, the STS topic is still underexplored and warrants deeper academic and legal investigation. Future engineers should look beyond surface-level issues, whether in pursuit of optimal flight mechanics or a just resolution to tragedy, and confront the complex layers within each problem.

School of Engineering and Applied Science

Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering

Technical Advisor: Aldo Garguilo

STS Advisor: Kent Wayland

Technical Team Members: Miles Beam, Victoria Camacho, Michael Chou, Larry Egalla, Graham Guerette, Declan Long, Nathan Ong, Christopher Recupero, James Richard, Defne Savas, Adam Snyder