Energy Harvesting via Ballonet Altitude Control; The Challenger Disaster, Reanalyzed Through the Lens of Actor-Network Theory

Both my technical and STS projects can be related through the concepts of Actor-Network Theory (ANT). This framework uses the lens of networks to understand complex organizations and the interaction of actors within them. Key to ANT is the idea that non-human actors are equally important to the success or failure of a network. My capstone group used this facet of ANT to understand, then work to improve, the lowest performing non-human actors in current airship designs. In a similar vein, my STS project uses the concept of non-human actors to reanalyze the root causes of the Challenger Shuttle disaster. It is this emphasis on the agency of non-human actors that unites my technical and STS projects, and allowed me to work through the unique challenges both of them presented.

My capstone group took current design principles in airships to see how their design, which most consider to be obsolete and inefficient, could be improved. This involved conceptualizing a blimp as the interactions between different actors, such as propellers for propulsion and ballonets for altitude control. We realized that ballonets were a poorly aligned actor in this network and underperform when compared to others. So, by redesigning the ballonet subsystem, we could best improve the efficiency of the entire blimp technology network. To do this we designed and tested various energy recapture devices that could be retroactively fitted to existing blimps. Vertically facing propellers or electric generators fitted on the ballonet exhaust were each considered as ways to to target and address the performance of this specific non-human actor.

In my STS research paper I use actor-network theory to explore the Challenger Shuttle disaster in a similar way. I argued that the agency of non-human actors has been overlooked in much existing discourse about the disaster and highlighted the key roles technical and political actors played in it. By framing NASA as a large technology network, I showed the importance of these kinds of actors to the Shuttle program. From this perspective, one must consider not only the interactions of human actors, such as engineers or NASA managers, but their interplay with technical and political actors as well. It was faulty o-rings that ultimately caused the accident, affected by a political climate that grew more opposed to NASA over time. By understanding these as key actors in the NASA technology network, I demonstrated their oversized roles and influence on the Challenger tragedy.

Working through both of these projects gave me two unique experiences in the way STS, and more specifically ANT, can be used by engineers. Analyzing the Challenger Shuttle disaster through the lens of actor-network theory allowed me to map out the relationships between actors within and outside of NASA, an organization that employs tens of thousands of people. For my STS Prospectus I attempted first to organize my technical project around technological momentum. However, while using ANT to research for my STS project, I realized how it could apply to my capstone work. Learning about its applications to human and non-human actors gave me a better understanding of how we could use it to similarly map out high or lower performing subsystems of an airship technology network. Using actor-network theory in similar ways across two unique projects showed its applicability across a range of fields, which I hope to use moving into my engineering career.

School of Engineering and Applied Science

Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering

Technical Advisor: Frank Lagor

STS Advisor: Benjamin Laugelli

Technical Team Members: Clarisse Forro, Vivienne Hughes, Troy S. Meink, Ashlin Schultz, Robert Stambaugh, Will Stevens, Richard Yau, Yining Xu