Online Archive of University of Virginia Scholarship
An Experimental Study of Settlement Delay in Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information469 views
Author
Sullivan, Sean Patrick, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Advisors
Holt, Charles, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Pepper, John, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
O’Connell, Jeffrey, School of Law, University of Virginia
Larson, Nathan, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Abstract
In the United States legal system, tort disputes often exhibit protracted delay between injury and settlement. That is, parties to a dispute tend to agree on settlement conditions only after engaging in lengthy legal sparring and negotiation. Resources committed to settlement negotiation are large and economically inefficient. Even small reduction sinaverage settlement delay stand to affect large reductionsinsocially inefficient spending.
Note: Abstract extracted from PDF text
Degree
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
Language
English
Rights
All rights reserved (no additional license for public reuse)
Sullivan, Sean Patrick. An Experimental Study of Settlement Delay in Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information. University of Virginia, Department of Economics, PHD (Doctor of Philosophy), 2011-12-01, https://doi.org/10.18130/V3625R.
