An Experimental Study of Settlement Delay in Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information
Author:
Sullivan, Sean Patrick, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Sullivan, Sean Patrick, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Advisors:
Holt, Charles, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Pepper, John, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
O’Connell, Jeffrey, School of Law, University of Virginia
Larson, Nathan, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Holt, Charles, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Pepper, John, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
O’Connell, Jeffrey, School of Law, University of Virginia
Larson, Nathan, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Abstract:
In the United States legal system, tort disputes often exhibit protracted delay between injury and settlement. That is, parties to a dispute tend to agree on settlement conditions only after engaging in lengthy legal sparring and negotiation. Resources committed to settlement negotiation are large and economically inefficient. Even small reduction sinaverage settlement delay stand to affect large reductionsinsocially inefficient spending.
Note: Abstract extracted from PDF text
Degree:
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
Language:
English
English
Rights:
All rights reserved (no additional license for public reuse)
All rights reserved (no additional license for public reuse)
Issued Date:
2011/12/01
2011/12/01
