Mechanism Design for the Allocation of Networked Resources

The future of wireless networking relies on the efficient use of resources which must be shared by heterogeneous users. In this context, networking protocols must be aligned with each user’s individual objective. The complexity of designing protocols that are compatible with individual users' incentives is further exacerbated by the presence of negative externalities.

Mechanism design is a field of game theory in which rules (mechanisms) are designed in order to induce a desired equilibrium outcome resulting from the interaction of rational agents with private information. Mechanism design provides the basic groundwork to align actions of individual users with more general objectives. In this dissertation we explore the application of the theory of mechanism design, to different problems related to the allocation of network resources (wired and wireless). We present three “tailor-made” auction designs that solve three different problems, in which a network manager wants to efficiently allocate network resources to a set of rational users with private information regarding their utility.