Going Above and Beyond: Dependence and Military Coalition Participation

Why do states contribute to the military endeavors of another, that are seemingly distant from their central security interests? I argue that states do so due to their economic and/or security related dependence on the state leading such an effort. The argument is presented as an alternative, and more comprehensive, theory of military coalition participation that is overlooked by conventional theories in the alliance and war diffusion literatures. Logit analyses of three competing arguments (dependence, balance of threat, and opportunity/willingness) support the dependence argument most consistently, and the proposed mechanisms are illustrated through two case studies. Additionally, I argue that the politics of inattention in asymmetric dyads lead to outcomes that may not follow the expectations of states. While states participate in coalitions with the hopes of being rewarded in some manner, additional analyses regarding the amount of rewards states receive for their participation demonstrate that such rewards are temporary.